Albert Charara

A #Kirkuk# -centric approach to Iraqi elections and the country’s most immediate challenges

The third Iraqi elections since the end of the US occupation are scheduled for May 12th. These arrive in a context of slow but progressive recovery of Iraq and its institutions. The #Islamic State# (IS) military defeat in December 2017 and the relatively non-violent and effective response of the federal authorities to the Kurdish independence referendum held in September 2017 are remarkable achievements for the Iraqi state and its prime minister, Haider al-Abadi. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers describe the timing and impact of the May 12th vote in diverging ways. The more optimistic portray the upcoming elections as a turning point that will reinforce current positive trends and close one of the darkest chapters of Iraq’s recent history. Those with a more pessimistic approach fear that elections could have a destabilising effect, becoming an obstacle in the path towards recovery that, by altering the current balance of power in Baghdad, could revive internal sectarian dynamics and unpredictably reshape the influence of regional powers.

Iraq has been at a similar crossroads before. The 2010 elections were perceived as an opportunity to set the basis for sustainable peace after four years of sectarian war and the defeat of al-Qaeda in Iraq. However, PM Nouri al-Maliki’s second-term policies, which alienated the Sunni community, the sectarian rhetoric emerging from the Syrian war and the escalating regional tensions allowed the rise of IS in the north of the country, sending Iraq into another cycle of death and violence.

Once again, Iraq is facing one of those periods of sociopolitical reconfiguration that have strongly shaped its recent history. How the current political, security, economic and societal challenges are addressed by the newly elected PM and his government will determine the fate of the Iraqi people in the next decade.

Political fragmentation and electoral cross-sectarianism

The truth is that nobody can accurately predict the results and impact of these elections, set to be the most open since 2003. Abadi runs as favourite, but he will have to cope with the titanic task of putting together a coalition government in a scenario characterised by unprecedented political fragmentation. Shias, Sunnis and Kurds are all internally divided and on different electoral lists: five major Shia lists, two major Sunni lists, two major Kurdish lists, and several independent and/or new parties and lists. This shift towards political fragmentation has been enhanced by the fact that various actors who participated in the war against IS, including the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), are now contenders in the political arena. Also, the Kurdish division after the holding of the independence referendum deserves a special mention. As a united bloc in Baghdad, the Kurds have played a key role in the formation of federal coalition governments. However, the two main Kurdish parties –the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)– are now running separately. This division was exposed by the decision of the then president of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and historic leader of the KDP, Masoud Barzani, to go ahead with the independence referendum and materialised after the subsequent loss of Kirkuk, now under federal control. Even if they act as a united bloc after elections, Kurdish politicians in Baghdad will be weaker than in the past legislature.

With no clear victory expected for any of the alliances, the formation of a coalition government is likely to take months, crippling the provision of public services and slowing down reconstruction and reconciliation efforts.[1]