Özge Genç
Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a political party deeply rooted in Turkish nationalism, recently made a groundbreaking call to invite Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), to address Türkiye’s parliament. This move marks a significant shift in the country’s approach to the 40-year conflict. On October 22, 2024, Bahçeli urged parliament to allow Öcalan to “unilaterally declare that terrorism is over and his organization dissolved.”1 He also referenced the principle of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) regarding the “right to hope,”2 advocating for the release of individuals who, like Öcalan, have served a maximum of 25 years.

While the initiative is unlikely to yield immediate results, it holds the potential for meaningful medium- and long-term progress if the Turkish government articulates a clear vision, outlines actionable steps, and manages the process inclusively with public engagement. Achieving success will also depend on building a resilient coalition to address challenges posed by domestic and regional spoilers. A successful peace process could resolve internal tensions, strengthen Türkiye’s regional role, drive economic growth, and enhance diplomacy.

This proposal to grant parole to Öcalan, though unexpected, comes at a time when Türkiye’s internal and regional landscapes have evolved considerably since the last peace process collapsed in 2015.3 In a notable shift from his party’s traditional hardline nationalist stance, Bahçeli’s proposal garnered support from President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan—although this time, the roles are different. In the previous process, Erdoğan assumed the heavy political burden of negotiation, stating he would swallow “hemlock poison” if it meant peace.4 Now, Bahçeli has put his full political weight and his close association with the state and its bureaucracy behind the move, aiming to make the proposal more palatable to the broader population.

The 2013-2015 Solution Process faced significant opposition and skepticism, especially from the opposition, largely due to Türkiye’s polarized society and the fact that Erdoğan led the initiative. In contrast, the latest initiative has received broader support from across the political spectrum, as it is perceived as a state-driven effort this time. Most notably, Özgür Özel, the new leader of the main secular opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), has endorsed the call, emphasizing the importance of parliamentary involvement.5 This broader political backing creates a more conducive environment for the government to pursue the process in earnest.

Bahçeli’s call, backed by Erdoğan, appears less impulsive and more reflective of a broader state strategy aimed at preemptively positioning Türkiye amid shifting geopolitical dynamics. This unfolds against a backdrop of escalating Israeli actions in Palestine and Lebanon since October 7, 2023, raising regional tensions and the risk of broader confrontation potentially involving Iran. The change of leadership in Washington also introduces volatility that could impact the United States’ (U.S.) alliance with PKK-affiliated groups in Syria.

In this context, the new approach seeks to reassure nationalist factions within the state and society that the process is firmly controlled by the Turkish state, thereby mitigating any potential backlash. At the same time, it reflects Erdoğan’s delicate balancing act between addressing nationalist sentiments and attempting to explore renewed dialogue with the Kurdish community, with which he has largely lost connection. However, the depth of alignment between Erdoğan and Bahçeli on the issue remains unclear, adding another layer of complexity to the evolving process.

Complicating matters further, Bahçeli’s call has coincided with intensified actions by Turkish authorities against mayors from the CHP and the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) party over alleged links to the PKK. On October 30, 2024, Ahmet Özer, the CHP mayor of Istanbul’s Esenyurt district, was detained.6 Days later, three pro-Kurdish mayors in Mardin, Batman, and Halfeti were removed over terrorism-related charges and replaced with state-appointed trustees.7 Critics argued that these actions undermine democracy and suppress opposition, while the government defends them as necessary steps in its fight against the PKK.

The key question is whether actions like judicial measures against elected mayors and the nationalist framing of peace efforts will derail the processes of genuine conflict resolution or democratization. Does this mix of pressure and controlled dialogue risk eroding trust and worsening tensions, or can it pave the way for a sustainable resolution to Türkiye’s Kurdish question?[1]

=KTML_Link_External_Begin=https://www.kurdipedia.org/docviewer.aspx?id=625655&document=0001.PDF=KTML_Link_External_Between=Click to read The Kurdish Issue Revisited: Türkiye’s Complex Road to Peace=KTML_Link_External_End=