




# Kurdish Issue In Iran

Journal of Ghasemlou Center for research and political development

Issue 1 | December 2008



Edited by: Majid Hakki & Sharif Behruz



# Kurdish Issue In Iran

Journal of Ghasemlou Center for research and political development

An international journal to promote the study of Kurdish issue in Iran

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KI<sup>3</sup> is published is a Journal of Ghasemlou Center for research and political development and published by Koçer Publishing Association.

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ISSN: 1798-002X (print)

ISSN: 1798-0011 (online)

Journal customer service: for ordering information, claims and any enquiry please contact editors via following emails: [sharif.behruz@gmail.com](mailto:sharif.behruz@gmail.com) | [majid.hakki@gmail.com](mailto:majid.hakki@gmail.com)

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Premium institutional: 35 € (Europe), US\$ 40 (The Americans), € 40 (rest of the World), Personal 20 € (Europe), US\$ 25 (The Americans), € 25 (rest of the World).

Price include delivery of printed journal to the recipient's address. Delivery terms are Delivered Duty Unpaid (DDU); the recipient is responsible for paying any import duty or taxes.

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# Introduction

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There is very limited information on the Kurds in Iran available to the world outside. The Kurdish areas in Iran are banned from International press, researchers and human rights activists and organizations; furthermore, in Iran the activities of NGOs are highly monitored and controlled. The Iranian regime considers all NGOs, international organizations, missions and their staff in Iran to be foreign agents; thus the regime believes that they are spies and they act against the Islamic Republic's national security.

Following the 1979 revolution, one of the foremost pressing ethnic challenges to the new regime came from the Kurdish uprising in the Iranian Kurdistan, who had long struggled for their national rights. After the revolution of 1979 was hijacked by the clerics, and the revolutionary guards took the country's matters into their own hands, Ayatollah Khomeini, the regime's spiritual leader, realizing the Kurdish resistance in submitting to the new regime, declared "holy war" against the Kurdish people in Iran on August 19<sup>th</sup> 1979. Since then the regime of Iran has intensified its oppressive policy against the Kurdish people in Iran. As the result of Khomeini's decree and the bloody years that followed over fifty thousand people, mostly civilians were killed in the Kurdish areas and many more were displaced. The already underdeveloped economic infrastructure of Kurdistan was further deteriorated and the fabrics of the society were badly torn apart as a result of this imposed and unjust war.

Continued fighting in the first two decades following the revolution and the heavy internal crackdown on opposition groups coupled with Iran's isolation from the international community resulted in the limited exposure of the Kurdish issue in Iran to research and media coverage. There **KI** aims to shed some lights on the issue and open academic, professional and objective doors on Kurdish issue in Iran.

*The content of KI is summarized as follow:*

In "A Strategy for Federal Democracy in Iran" Mr. Mustafa Hejri, the leader of the main Kurdish opposition group in Iran stresses on the need to accommodate the needs of the Kurds and other national minorities with a federal structure in Iran states that "whereas Iran's national diversity has been regarded as a "problem" by successive regimes in Iran and has been subject to violence and forced assimilation, in fact it holds the key to democracy in the country. Thus, it is in the outside world's interest to support Iran's national diversity." He suggests that, the outside world should give the Iranian democratic and secular opposition its full support. A democratic and federal Iran will not only be at peace with itself, but also with the outside world.

Dr. Hussein Tahiri outlines future trends that could assist the development of Kurdish nationalism in Iran. According to him "it is ironic after decades of struggle the Kurds have not yet been able to establish their own identity which is separate from Iranian identity." In this chapter impediments to the development of Kurdish nationalism in Iran are discussed. It will be argued that how historical affinity between the Kurds and Persians, reinforcement of this affinity by the Iranian rulers and the Kurds, and lack of ability by the Kurds to create their own separate identify became obstacles in the way of Kurdish nationalism in Iran.

Majid Hakki in his article discusses the political system of Iran and the Kurdish question in Iran. According to Hakki Iran is the home to approximately 70 million people, who are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse. The central authority is dominated by Persians, who constitutes less than 50% of Iran's population. The people of Iran speak diverse Persian, Azeri, Kurdish, Arabic, Balouchi and Turkmen languages. The official religion of Iran is Islam and Twelver Ja'fari School. He suggests that a multinational Federation based on the territorial and ethno-territorial principles in Iran can play the role of the balancer between the political and national forces, civic and ethnic national identities to keep Iran united, and mitigate national and ethnic conflicts within Iran.

In the "Kurdish language in the Iranian legal framework" Majid Hakki discusses the state of Kurdish language in the Iranian legal framework; furthermore, the press law of Islamic Republic of Iran is reviewed by author, after which the Kurdish language in the legal framework of Iran will be examined. In order to know the states of Kurds in Iran, the constitution of Iran will be reviewed. After that the press law and freedom of expression in Iran will be discussed. The Kurdish language in the legal framework of Iran will be discussed in the last chapter of the article.

In his article Dr. Ali Kilic analyses the point of departure for the democratization of reports of forces in the Middle East without the foundation of a democratic republic independent free unified there will be implementing the plan of the Greater Middle East.

Editors

22.12.2008

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# A STRATEGY FOR FEDERAL DEMOCRACY IN IRAN

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Mustafa Hijri

Ever since the Islamic fundamentalists imposed their rule on Iran following the revolution of 1979, the clerical regime's policies have puzzled Western politicians, journalists and academics. In addition to this sense of puzzlement, some people in the West assume that there are genuine divisions among the factions within the clerical establishment.

Such an assumption derives in part from the observation that there are multiple views and voices within the regime. On some occasions these voices convey messages of total defiance against international norms of conduct. On other occasions they make cryptic statements about possible changes in the regime's terrorist behavior. However, inferring the existence of genuine divisions among these factions on the basis of such messages leads to a misapprehension of contemporary Iran. This misapprehension is fueled by the fact that officials of the Islamic Republic simultaneously express contradictory positions, leading the outside world to believe that the regime is amenable to change.

However, for those of us in the Iranian Opposition, neither the rhetoric nor the conduct of the Islamic Republic is puzzling or enigmatic. Rather, what we are puzzled by is the outside world's belief in a genuine diversity within the regime.

The contradictory statements by the regime's leaders, its Janus face manifested in a "hardliner" such as Ahmadinejad and "moderate" representatives are nothing but expressions and features of the same violent political setup that has terrorized the peoples of Iran for more than 28 years.

Another aspect of the outside world's misapprehension of Iran is the perception and representation of Iran as a monolithic society in terms of national, religious and cultural identity.

As a result, misrepresentations – or rather concealment – of the country's true national, cultural and religious diversity in conjunction with erroneous beliefs about the Iranian theocracy have underpinned the outside world's understanding of and approach towards our country.

Moreover, despite the clerical regime's continuous sponsoring of global terrorism and in spite of its quest for weapons of mass destruction, some people outside of Iran still believe in the existence of "moderate" factions within the regime. They seem to believe that those factions will put Iran on the path of democratization and reorient the country's foreign policy.

Some European governments have pursued a policy of "constructive dialogue" coupled with trade to achieve that end, whereas the United States has utilized sanctions to bring about change in the clerical regime's behavior. Neither the European nor the U.S. approach toward Iran has yielded positive results, however.

Given that diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to halt uranium enrichment are doomed to failure, three options remain: to take military action against the clerical regime, to bring about regime-change by supporting Iran's democratic Opposition or to accept Iran as a state with nuclear weapons.

Although the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) in December 2007 concluded "with high confidence" that Iran halted its program for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in 2003, it did not alter the United States' threat-perception of Iran. In his recent trip to the Middle East, President Bush stated in a speech: "Iran's actions threaten the security of nations everywhere."

It should come as no surprise that the NIE report did not alter U.S. threat-perception of Iran, since the clerical regime constitutes a five-part threat. Beside the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the regime is the foremost sponsor of terrorism and assassination worldwide. Moreover, it does everything in its power to hinder peace between Israelis and Palestinians and supports various terrorist groups in the region. Iran also poses a direct security threat to the countries in the Gulf.

Furthermore, experts on nuclear proliferation and some former U.S. officials have disputed the conclusions of the NIE on several points. The most crucial argument in this regard is that the report's distinction between "civilian" and "military" programs in the case of Iran is untenable. The fact that Iran continues the enrichment of uranium implies that it could be used for civilian as well as military purposes. In addition, a number of legitimate questions have been left unanswered by the clerical regime: Why does Iran need nuclear power when the country is well endowed with petroleum and gas resources? Why does Iran develop missiles that are designed to be armed with nuclear warheads if the regime's intent is not the acquisition of nuclear weapons?

We, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), believe that only regime-change in Iran will realize the Iranian people's quest for liberty and dignity as well as the outside world's vision of Iran as a force for the good within the International Community.

It is high time for the West to adopt a long-term strategy to bring about regime-change in Iran by supporting the democratic and secular forces inside as well as outside of the country.

For those who have any doubts about such a policy, we invoke (in addition to the five-part threat that Iran poses to international peace and security) the clerical regime's practice of systematic violations of human rights and its brutal oppression of the country's various ethnic, religious and national communities.

We also believe that a nuclear-armed clerical regime in Iran, with its terrorist mindset, is dangerous for the entire Middle East due to the risk of nuclear proliferation in an already volatile and war-prone part of the world.

Some of the neighboring countries sudden and simultaneous interest in nuclear power in the second half of 2007 is a warning sign of the frightening scenario that would unfold. A nuclear-armed Iran will feel emboldened to use its terrorist groups in Lebanon, Iraq and elsewhere to blackmail the United States, other Western powers and countries in the Middle East.

Bearing in mind that the experience in Iraq has resulted in skepticism towards regime-change through foreign military intervention, the task of regime-change in Iran should be left to the Iranian Opposition. This would relieve the United States and its allies of the type of burden they have shouldered in Iraq and, more importantly, no one would be able to doubt the moral and political legitimacy of regime-change from within Iran.

However, such a strategy will not succeed without having as one of its central pillars genuine support for the ethnic and national diversity in Iran. Support for this diversity is also of strategic importance for democracy in Iran.

As long as Iran derives a substantial portion of its income from the sale of petroleum, there will be no incentives for the country's rulers to adhere to calls for popular sovereignty or democracy. This is often the case with regimes that become financially independent of their population. It is in this

regard that Iran's national and ethnic diversity will be of strategic importance for democracy in the country and thereby a key component for stability in the Middle East. Provided that there is real support for the creation of a multinational federation in Iran, the ethnic and national diversity in the country will constitute a novel form of "checks and balances". Put differently, since democratic mechanisms are absent in Iran, this novel form of checks and balances will most certainly be conducive to a working democracy.

Transforming Iran into a multinational federation would result in a fundamental change in prevailing ideas about our country. An Iranian multinational federation would put an end to the myth of mono-nationality – a myth that is being maintained by massive military and psychological violence – and correspond with the country's true multinational makeup. This kind of federalism is premised on the recognition of identity as a source of dignity for the individual members of Iran's ethnic and national communities. The solution to the national question in Iran does not lie in improved socio-economic conditions for the individual members of oppressed nations. Rather, a just and long-term solution is political recognition of the national identities of Iran's nations and constitutional safeguards for their national and territorial rights. Contrary to the fear of some people that federalism would result in the breakup of Iran, such a model would create unity out of diversity.

In short, whereas Iran's national diversity has been regarded as a "problem" by successive regimes in Iran and has been subject to violence and forced assimilation, in fact it holds the key to democracy in the country. Thus, it is in the outside world's interest to support Iran's national diversity.

For this strategy to succeed, however, the outside world should give the Iranian democratic and secular Opposition full support. A democratic and federal Iran will not only be at peace with itself, but also with the outside world.

***Mustafa Hijri** is the General-Secretary of Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI). Founded in 1945, KDPI has struggled for the rights of the Kurdish nation in Iranian Kurdistan. Mr. Hijri's predecessors, Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi, were assassinated in Europe by the agents of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1989 and 1992, respectively.*

# KURDISH NATIONALISM IN IRAN: A REASSESSMENT

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By Dr. Hussein Tahiri

For nearly one hundred years the Kurds in Iran have been struggling to establish an independent Kurdish state. For example, after World War I, Ismai'il Agha Shikak, Simko, attempted to form a Kurdish state. After World War II, the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, KDPI, formed a short lived Kurdish state. Since 1979, Iranian Kurdish political parties have been waging war against the central government to gain autonomy. Despite repeated attempts to establish a Kurdish state, there seems to be little prospect for Kurdish autonomy, let alone an independent Kurdish state.

It is ironic that after decades of struggle the Kurds have not yet been able to establish their own identity which is separate from Iranian identity. In this chapter impediments to the development of Kurdish nationalism in Iran will be discussed. It will be argued that how historical affinity between the Kurds and Persians, reinforcement of this affinity by the Iranian rulers and the Kurds, and lack of ability by the Kurds to create their own separate identity became obstacles in the way of Kurdish nationalism in Iran. It will outline future trends that could assist the development of Kurdish nationalism in Iran.

## Historical affinity

It is believed that between 1200 and 900 BC the Aryans passed through Central Asia and settled in Iran.<sup>1</sup> These Aryans have been generally referred to as Iranic peoples or Iranians. The ninth-century BC cuneiform clay tablets of the Assyrians record the Medes and the Persians as the two main groups of Iranians. At the time, the Medes were more widespread and powerful than the Persians. By the seventh century BC, the Medes dominated the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> The Medes who are believed to be ancestors of the Kurds formed a Median Empire in 727 BC.<sup>3</sup>

The last Median king was overthrown by his half Persian grandson, Cyrus the Great, who founded the Persian dynasty of the Achaemenians.<sup>4</sup> After the demise of the Median Empire the Iranian culture and polity was dominated by the Persians and they came to dominate Iranian history as well. Although Iran was not always ruled by the Persians and

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<sup>1</sup> Shrikant G. Talageri, *The Aryan Invasion Theory: A Reappraisal*, New Delhi, Aditya Prakashau, 1993, pp.25,139. Mehrdad R. Izady, *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook*, Washington, Taylor and Francise International Publishers, 1992, pp.32, 34.

<sup>2</sup> Shrikant G. Talageri, *The Aryan Invasion Theory: A Reappraisal*, New Delhi, Aditya Prakashau, 1993, pp.317-18.

<sup>3</sup> Shrikant G. Talageri, *The Aryan Invasion Theory: A Reappraisal*, New Delhi, Aditya Prakashau, 1993, pp.317-18.

<sup>4</sup> Mehrdad R. Izady, *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook*, Washington, Taylor and Francise International Publishers, 1992, p.32.

not all parts of Iran were controlled by the Persians, historians have related post-Mede Iranian history to the Persians. In turn, historians have used the terms Iranians and Persians interchangeably. Wilhem Gernot states that from 330 BC to 224 AD no Persian political entity had existed in neighbouring of Armenia. Nevertheless, every classical author referred to Iranic people including those living in Anatolia as Persians.<sup>5</sup>

Historical records seem to underline the fact that the Kurds and Persians migrated to what is known as the current Iran and Kurdistan<sup>6</sup> at the same period and shared the same Aryan ancestry. However, despite some affinity between them, history also shows that they were very distinct from each other. There is a belief among many Persians and the Kurds that pre-Islamic religion of the Persians and the Kurds was Zoroastrianism. Still many Kurdish nationalists who have been disenchanted with Islam try to revive Zoroastrianism as the ancient Kurdish religion. Although Zoroaster is believed to have been born in Kurdistan and proclaimed his mission there his religion could not get any rooting in Kurdistan. He preached his religion for ten years and during this period only one person converted to his religion. He then had to migrate to Eastern Persia (currently called Khorasan). There he was able to convert three members of the ruler's court and to expand his religion.<sup>7</sup>

Persian Zoroastrians continue to reside in different parts of Iran, especially in Yazd. Some Zoroastrians escaped persecution and sought refuge in India and are known as Parsis. However, there are no known Kurdish Zoroastrians either in Kurdistan or any other part of the world.<sup>8</sup> If the Kurds were Zoroastrians there would be some Kurdish adherents of this religion. There are significant numbers of Kurds who follow Ezidism and other religions which are believed to be the pre-Islamic Kurdish religions. Therefore, the claim that the Persians and Kurds shared the same religion in pre-Islamic Iran has not been substantiated.

The Kurds and Persians also have distinct languages. The Kurdish language belongs to the north-western branch of Indo-European language groups<sup>9</sup> while the Persian language belongs to the south-western branch<sup>10</sup>. Although there are some words shared by both the Persians and Kurds, the speakers of these languages cannot understand each other.

Furthermore, those who are familiar with Kurdish and Persian cultures can see a clear distinction between these two cultures. Nevertheless, successive Iranian rulers have been trying to exploit this perceived historical affinity between the Kurds and Persians to show that the Kurds are an inseparable and an integral part of Iran. In this way, they hope, they can prevent the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. On 1 May 1936, the USA the-charge in Tehran wrote to the Secretary of State:

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<sup>5</sup> Wilhem Gernot, *The Kurrians*, UK, Aris and Philip Ltd, 1989 (translated by Diana Stein) in *The International Journal of Kurdish Studies* (book review), Brooklyn, The Kurdish library, Volume 7, No. 1 &2, 1994, pp.112-13.

<sup>6</sup> Modern Iran only includes a small part of Kurdistan. Nearly two-third of Kurdistan is located in Turkey, Iraq and Syria.

<sup>7</sup> Percy Sykes, *A History of Persia*, London, McMillan and Co. Limited, 1930, Vol. 1, pp.2-3.

<sup>8</sup> This writer who was born and brought up in Kurdistan has not seen or heard of any Zoroastrian Kurd. I have asked many other Kurds and no one has seen or heard of a Zoroastrian Kurd.

<sup>9</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish\\_language](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_language)

<sup>10</sup> [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian\\_language](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_language)

Iran...has done and is doing everything possible to prevent this [Kurdish nationalism] from happening in Iranian territory...Iranian Government seeks to disestablish contact between the Kurds of Iran and those of Iraq and Turkey, to make them forget that they are Kurds and to realize that they are primarily Iranians—in a word, to wear down and finally to obliterate the differences between the Kurds and the Iranians...<sup>11</sup>

From the 1920s to the 1979 the Pahlavi Shahs' policies were directed towards encouraging the Kurds to assimilate into mainstream society.<sup>12</sup> In fact, Iranian rulers have promoted Persian nationalism at the expense of other nationalities.

There have been two planks in the Iranian approach to nationalism. Iran's pre-Islamic history and Shi'ism. The Iranian rulers and secular intellectuals in an attempt to centralize the state power, weaken the influence of the religion and undermine the power of the clergy resorted to pre-Islamic history of Iran.<sup>13</sup> The Iranian elites emphasized the Aryan roots of Persian identity. Reza Shah promoted the union of all Iranian people based on pan-Iranian identity.<sup>14</sup> The Shah claimed that the Kurds were Aryans and that the Aryans were the purest Iranians.<sup>15</sup>

As the ancient history of the Kurds has been intermingled with the Persians and there were no attempts by Kurdish historians or intellectuals to detach Kurdish from Iranian history, the Kurds came to identify themselves as Iranians. In fact, Kurdish historians such Rashid Yassami has tried to prove that the Kurds are of Iranian origin and have a strong historical affinity with the Persians. Sunni Kurds, even when in opposition to the Shi'ites, were quite happy to identify themselves with pre-Islamic Iranian history, in the process ignoring Kurdish nationalism.

The second plank in Iranian nationalism has been Shi'ism. Since the Safavids Iranian nationalism has been intertwined with Shi'ite Islam. Shi'ism has become a unique Iranian identity which separates the Iranians from their Arab and Turkish neighbours and often foes. As Nikki Keddie outlined, it is often difficult "to say if a trend or identification is Iranian national or Shi'i".<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The Charge in Iran(Merriam) to the Secretary of State (USA), Tehran, May 1, 1936, cited in Lokman I. Meho, *The Kurdish Question in U.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary Sourcebook*, Praeger, London, 2004, pp.409-410.

<sup>12</sup> Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, *Ethnic Conflict in World Politics*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994, p. 39.

<sup>13</sup> Nikki Keddie, *Iran: Understanding the Enigma: a Historical View*, *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 3, September 1998, p.3.

<sup>14</sup> Denise Natali, *The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran*, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 2005, p. 122.

<sup>15</sup> Denise Natali, *The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran*, Syracuse, New York, Syracuse University Press, 2005, p. 134.

<sup>16</sup> Nikki Keddie, *Iran: Understanding the Enigma: a Historical View*, *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Vol. 2, No. 3, September 1998, p.5.

The Islamic regime of Iran has been using pan-Islamic ideology to effectively foster Persian nationalism. When the Kurds put their national demands to the Islamic Republic of Iran which came into power in 1979, they were frequently told that all Iranians were Muslims and ethnic identification was not to be emphasized as all Muslims were brothers. In the final draft of the Islamic constitution which was approved by the Assembly of Experts, *Majlis-e-Khobragan*, in 1979, there was no mention of equality of ethnic groups in Iran though the term 'using vernacular languages beside Persian' was retained. For Ayatollah Khomeini the term minority could only be applied to non-Muslim religious groups. Khomeini stated:

Sometimes the word minority is used to refer to people such as the Kurds, Lurs, Turks, Persians, Balouchis, and such. These people should not be called minorities, because this term assumes that there is a difference between these brothers [sic]. In Islam, such a difference has no place at all. There is no difference between Muslims who speak different languages, for instance, the Arabs or the Persians. It is very probable that such problems have been created by those who do not wish the Muslim countries to be united... They create the issues of nationalism, of pan-Arabism, pan-Turkism, and such isms, which are contrary to Islamic doctrines. Their plan is to destroy Islam and the Islamic philosophy.<sup>17</sup>

However, in reality the Islamic Republic of Iran has often taken Iranian nationalism above all other interests. When the Kurds were negotiating with the Islamic regime the government refused to recognize Kermanshah and Ilam provinces as part of Kurdistan claiming that they were Shi'ites and religious identity should override ethnicity.<sup>18</sup> Yet, when it comes to Persian nationalism and Iranian territorial integrity Persian nationalism takes primacy over Islam. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran became threatened by the influence of the Azerbaijan Republic on its own Azeri population which forms an estimated one-third of the Iranian population. When war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno and Karabakh in 1992, Iran supported Christian Armenia against the Shi'ite Muslim Azerbaijan.<sup>19</sup> As Barry Rubin states, "In a sense, it could also be said that Khomeini's revolution encompassed nationalism even while rejecting it explicitly... he did offer an implicit Iranian nationalism."<sup>20</sup>

Implicit beneath Persian nationalism has been a subtle assimilation policy by the successive Iranian governments. The Special Representative of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported that there were claims of implicit government assimilation of ethnic minorities under the Islamic Republic of Iran, a policy that was first started by Reza Shah.<sup>21</sup> There is no guarantee that a regime change would reverse this trend and there is likelihood that any Persian opposition group which succeeds the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue a similar policy.

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<sup>17</sup> Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, pp. 29-30.

<sup>18</sup> David McDowall, *The Kurds: a nation denied*, London, Minority Rights Group, 1992, page 76.

<sup>19</sup> Brenda Shaffer, *International Herald Tribune*, Friday, 2 June 2006.

<sup>20</sup> Barry Rubin, *Regime Change in Iran: A Reassessment*, *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 3-4.

<sup>21</sup> Maurice Danby Copithorne, *The Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights (UN), Report on the situation of human rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran*, 16 January 2002, p.15.

## The position of the Iranian opposition towards Kurdish nationalism

At this stage when there is no hope for the Kurds to realize their national aspirations, their fate is intertwined with the Iranian opposition. The Iranian Kurdish political parties are not in a position to defeat the Islamic Republic of Iran. They seek autonomy or federalism within Iran. If they want to improve their chance of success they need to make an alliance with other opposition parties in Iran. However, the opposition is very weak. Iranian opposition groups, with few exceptions, are often powerless and disunited. They have more differences than commonalities.

Furthermore, there is an atmosphere of distrust between Kurdish political parties and other Iranian opposition groups. Generally, there has been a sense of autonomy-phobia among the Persian population. It is feared that the idea of autonomy for the Kurds would incite other ethnic groups in Iran like the Azeris, Arabs, Balochis and so on. The demand for autonomy would lead to the partition of Iran. The royalists oppose any territorial or ethnic rights for the peoples of Iran. They follow the same policy as the Shah did. The other nationalist groups such as the National Front are not much different. The National Front of Iran, in a letter to the KDPI accused its leadership of separatism.<sup>22</sup>

Even among the groups who are regarded by the KDPI as “progressive”, there is a sense of distrust towards the Kurdish demands. The National Republicans of Iran stated that it would not accept the idea that Iran was a multinational country. They argued that such an idea was incompatible with the structure of Iranian society and would cause the possible partition of Iran.<sup>23</sup> The Kurdish parties cannot form an alliance with such groups because they do not believe in autonomy, let alone federalism.

The Mojahedin Khalq, the people's Combatants, has in principal agreed to Kurdish autonomy. The KDPI, initially, made an alliance with the Mojahedin Khalq. In 1981, Bani-Sadr, the ousted President of Iran, the Mojahedin Khalq and some other groups and individuals formed the National Resistance Council (NRC), in France. The NRC seemed to be an alternative to the Islamic Republic of Iran and recognized the principle of Kurdish autonomy. However, the NRC did not survive for long. Bani-Sadr left the NRC when Mas'ud Rajavi, the leader of the Mojahedin Khalq, met with the Iraqi foreign Minister. The leftist political parties became disenchanted with the Mojahedin program of calling for a 'Democratic Islamic Republic'.<sup>24</sup>

In 1981, the KDPI joined the NRC. By 1984, tension between the KDPI and the Mojahedin grew. The KDPI accused the Mojahedin of self-promotion at the expense of the NRC and its monopolization. The Mojahedin, in turn, accused

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<sup>22</sup> Reaction to the Events of Kurdistan in Persian Publications, Compiled and published by the KDPI, No.7, June 1993, p.31.

<sup>23</sup> Kurdistan, Organ of the Central Committee of Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, No.189, September 1992, p.4.

<sup>24</sup> Val Moghadam, 'the Left and Revolution in Iran: A Critical Analysis', in Hooshang Amirahmadi and Manoucher Parvin (eds.) Post-Revolutionary Iran, Boulder and London, Westview Press, 1988, p.39. (pp.23-39).

the KDPI of negotiating with the Islamic Republic of Iran, though its aim was to topple the regime. In 1984, the KDPI alliance with the NRC collapsed and the NRC turned to a Mojahedin Khalq's organization.<sup>25</sup>

The damage that this tension caused was far greater for the opposition groups. When Mas'ud Rajavi was ousted from France, instead of going to Kurdistan and forming a viable front with the Kurdish parties, he went to Iraq. The presence of the Mojahedin in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war was a great disadvantage for them. The Iranian government's propaganda to discredit the Mojahedin was effective and they lost the support of the Iranian masses. Furthermore, it effectively became a tool in the hands of the Iraqi government. Whereas once, the Mujahedin were considered the most powerful opposition group in Iran, now it has lost much of its popular support among the Iranian peoples, particularly the Persians, for their alliance with Saddam Hussein against Iran, during the Iran-Iraq war.

The Kurds have developed a special dislike for the Mujahedin as they believe that the Mujahedin supported the Iraqi army in their bloody suppression of the Kurds. On 16 August 2007, it was reported that the Iraqi public prosecution was planning to take legal action against the Mujahedin for their role in suppression of the Kurds and the Shi'ites in 1991. The public prosecution revealed that they had access to several documents that proved their role in the suppression of the Kurds and the Shi'ites.<sup>26</sup>

Whilst a combined KDPI, the Komala and the Mojahedin could pose a powerful voice against the Islamic regime but they could not come together as a united front. At the moment any unity among them seems to be very difficult, if not impossible.

Nevertheless, the ethnic minorities in Iran seem to be willing to come together to form a united front to defend their rights and to negotiate with Iranian opposition groups who are ready to accept the concept of federalism for other nationalities in Iran. On 19 February 2005, the leaders of organizations representing non-Persian nationalities and ethnic groups came together in London to form the Congress of Iranian Nationalities for a Federal Iran (CINFI), *Kongrey-e Melathay-e Iran-e Federal*.<sup>27</sup>

The organizations participated at the congress were the Balochistan United Front-Iran, Baloch Peoples Party, Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Democratic Solidarity Party of Ahwaz, Federal Democratic Movement of Azerbaijan, Komala Party –Iran, Organization for Defense of the Rights of Turkmen People.

The congress issued a manifesto that reflected significant common ground among the participant nationalities. The manifesto of the congress read:

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<sup>25</sup> Fereshteh Koochi-Kamali, *op.cit.*, p.187.

<sup>26</sup> Peyamner, 16 August 2007 (Kurdish), [www.peyamner.com/details.aspz?1&id=26792](http://www.peyamner.com/details.aspz?1&id=26792)

<sup>27</sup> Manifesto of the Congress of the Iranian nationalities, <http://www.pdki.org/articles1-86-3.htm?PHPSESSID=7cf1e342f8fb23479526d399a48146fe>

Iran is owned and belongs to all its peoples and nationalities, a right that they have been denied and taken away from them. We understand and feel the national injustice that Iranian nationalities have been subjected to, and therefore, we dearly honor the sacrifices made and the hardships endured by the sons and daughters of Iran for freedom and justice. We believe that the legitimacy of any government is derived from its peoples – this should be the case in multinational/multiethnic Iran as well.

Whereas without the participation of all its nationalities to have the opportunity to rule the country and the regions that they live in, realization of freedom, development and peace is impossible; We believe the establishment of a federalist system of government on the basis of ethnic-nationalities and geography is the only political mechanism that is enduring, and allows all Iranian nationalities to realize their aspirations and the exercise of self rule in a framework of a free, united and a democratic Iran.<sup>28</sup>

These organizations who claimed to represent major Iranian nationalities set up the following principles as the basis of their future activities:

That Islamic Republic of Iran is a totalitarian, anti-democratic and violator of the rights of the Iranian peoples. Hence its removal is the mercenary condition for the establishment of a federal democratic government in Iran.

Notwithstanding our firm believe in the inalienable rights for the exercise of the rights of self determination in accordance with the United Nations declaration of human rights and all pertinent international accords; we desire a federal system of government, on the basis of national ethnicity and geography, in a united and an integral Iran.

Separation of religion and state;

Removal of any gender discrimination and full equality of men and women in every sphere of life, social, political, economics etc;

Guarantee of freedom of thoughts, free speech and assembly, and freedom to organize social and political organizations, ensure and provide for the equal rights of all citizens in legal enjoyment of these freedoms;

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<sup>28</sup> Quotation from the Manifesto of the Congress of the Iranian nationalities, <http://www.pdki.org/articles1-86-3.htm?PHPSESSID=7cf1e342f8fb23479526d399a48146fe>

Guarantee social and political equity and justice, and enhancement of quality of life of all citizens;

Establish peaceful relations with all countries on the basis of mutual respect and respect for international norms and accords, and resolution of conflicts employing peaceful means and internal law;

Combat terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in the region and internationally, cooperate with international endeavors toward achievement of this objective and, in defense of peaceful resolution of regional and international conflicts;

We ask all political organizations and personalities who believe in these principles to join us in CINFI and assist us in fulfillment of our objectives set henceforth.<sup>29</sup>

On its face value this is an important understanding between representatives of Iran's various nationalities. However, it is not clear how representative these organizations are. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran and Komala and possibly to an extent the Balochi organizations could have some representations among their own people but in regards to other organizations it would be very difficult to gauge their support among the Azeris, Arabs and Turkmans. In Iran Azeris have to a great extent been assimilated, no voice of dissent can be heard from the Turkman population and it is not known if the Democratic Solidarity Party of Ahwaz has mass support. Therefore, these political organizations would need to prove that they have public support among their respective minorities before they could be taken seriously by the Persian opposition groups.

### **Lack of ability to create a separate Kurdish identity**

The Kurds of Iran had a few opportunities to develop a distinct Kurdish national identity. However, neither the Kurdish society was ready to exploit these opportunities nor it was in the interests of external powers to support the Kurds. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the first opportunity came after World War I. World War I which caused anarchy in Iran. There was a power vacuum in Iranian Kurdistan, especially in the areas close to Iran-Ottoman borders. This paved the way for Isma'il Agha Shikak, Simko, who was the sole power in the area to establish his authority in the north of Iranian Kurdistan.

Simko, under the influence of regional and international events, developed a nationalist idea. In 1920, Simko began to openly promote the idea of an independent Kurdish state.<sup>30</sup> Simko clashed with the government forces on numerous

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<sup>29</sup> Quotation from the Manifesto of the Congress of the Iranian nationalities, <http://www.pdki.org/articles1-86-3.htm?PHPSESSID=7cf1e342f8fb23479526d399a48146fe>

<sup>30</sup> Hassan Arfa, *The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study*, London, Oxford University Press, 1966, p.58.

occasions, at times capturing areas to the town of Mahabad. However, he could not establish a Kurdish state and was unable to cultivate a Kurdish national identity. Simko could not get support from any external power and was unable to unite the Kurds. He was considered a tribal rather a national leader. In a tribal and divided Kurdish society Kurdish national identity could not be developed. Therefore, Simko's national aspirations died with him when in 1930, he was invited by the Iranian government to negotiate in Ushnu, where he was ambushed by the Iranian forces and assassinated.<sup>31</sup>

Another opportunity came about for the Kurds of Iran during World War II. This time there was a power vacuum in the town of Mahabad and its immediate surroundings. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran that was formed in 1945<sup>32</sup>, used this power vacuum to form a Kurdish Republic on 22 January 1946.<sup>33</sup> However, this Republic only lasted for eleven months. It was crushed by the Iranian forces on 17 December 1946.<sup>34</sup>

The Kurdistan Republic of 1946 has been a significant symbol in Kurdish national history but it too failed to establish a distinct Kurdish identity that would pave the way for pan-Kurdish nationalism. Then there existed a tiny class of Kurdish professionals in Iranian Kurdistan. It was this small group which led Kurdish nationalism but the Kurds as a whole lacked nationalist sentiments. The structure of Kurdish society was still tribal which did not allow the development of Kurdish nationalism.<sup>35</sup> Also, the international political and economic developments did not favour a Kurdish state. Therefore, the Kurdistan Republic of 1946 could not be expanded beyond the town of Mahabad and its immediate surroundings.

Another opportunity to promote Kurdish national awareness came when in 1979 after the Iranians toppled the Shah regime through a mass revolution.<sup>36</sup> The KDPI and Komala actively participated in the struggle against the Shah. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 gave the Kurdish political parties an opportunity to resume their activities and demand Kurdish autonomy.

Initially, the government promised to support and respect the rights of minorities<sup>37</sup> and the first draft constitution partially recognized the rights of ethnic minorities. Article five of the draft constitution promised equal rights for the Persians, Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Turkomans. Article 21 permitted the use of local vernaculars in local

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<sup>31</sup> Abdurrahman Qasemlo, *Kurdistan and Kurds*, Sweden, APEC, 1996, p.90 (Persian translation by Taha Atiqi).

<sup>32</sup> Jalil Gadani, *Pencah Sal Xebat: Kurteyek li Mijoyi Hizbi Dimokrati Kurdistanî Iran [Fifty Years Struggle: A Short History of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, Iraqi Kurdistan, The Ministry of Education's Publication, [1987], p.21 (Kurdish).*

<sup>33</sup> John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, *No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds*, London, Viking, 1992, p.106.

<sup>34</sup> Edgar O'balance, *The Kurdish Struggle 1920-94*, London, MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996, p.32.

<sup>35</sup> For detailed information on internal factors, especially tribalism, preventing the development of Kurdish nationalism and hence a Kurdish state refer to, Hussein Tahiri, *The structure of Kurdish society and the struggle for a Kurdish state*, California, Mazda Publishers, 2007.

<sup>36</sup> Dilip Hiro, *Iran under the Ayatollahs*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, pp.88-94.

<sup>37</sup> Fereshteh Koochi-Kamal, 'The development of nationalism in Iranian Kurdistan', in Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (eds.) *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, London and New York, Routledge, 1992, p.183.

schools and media.<sup>38</sup> However, soon it became evident that the government had no intention of honouring its promises which resulted in clashes between the Kurdish and government forces.

By then, the Kurdish society had undergone significant changes. Tribalism had been weakened and education among the Kurds was more widespread. Therefore, Kurdish political organizations had a greater chance to promote Kurdish nationalism and develop a distinct Kurdish identity. However, instead of promoting pan-Kurdish nationalism, Kurdish organizations advocated for local nationalism. They defended Kurdish national rights but within the framework of Iran. They developed two sets of identities: Kurdish and Iranian.

The Komala, though based in Kurdistan, was more Iranian than Kurdish. The Komala has been struggling to form a democratic revolutionary government in Iran. Although the Komala supports the right of self-determination for the Kurds in Iran it places emphasis on the voluntarily union of the Kurds with other peoples of Iran.<sup>39</sup>

The KDPI while representing a Kurdish nationalist agenda considers the Kurds as an integral part of Iran. Dr. Abdurahman Ghassemlou, the former Secretary General of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran who was assassinated by the Islamic regime of Iran, used to say that no one had the right to consider themselves more Iranian than the Kurds. Both the KDPI and Komala promoted dual identities, preventing the emergence of pan-Kurdish nationalism.

From the collapse of the Kurdistan Republic in 1946 up until the Thirteenth Congress the KDPI demands had not changed much. The Kurdish leadership has claimed to be socialist, social democratic and at times revolutionary. Nevertheless, their approach to the Kurdish question has been very conservative. In fact, the KDPI was more progressive in its outlook in 1946 when it formed the Kurdistan Republic of 1946. Although its intention of being a part of Iran or an independent state is ambiguous it nevertheless formed a Kurdish state while the current KDPI has only recently upgraded its demands to a federal Kurdish state within Iran.

Furthermore, Kurdish political parties have been unable to mobilize the Kurds in Kermanshah and Ilam to support Kurdish nationalism. The Kurds in these provinces feel a greater sentiment towards Shi'ism than to Kurdish nationalism. During the Simko revolt and the Kurdistan Republic of 1946, these Kurds did not join the Kurdish national struggle and as we have entered the 21<sup>st</sup> century, they still have not been a part of it. The affinity between the Shi'ite Kurds and the Shi'ite government of Iran has been so that the Islamic regime has had no difficulty in recruiting them to fight the KDPI and Komala.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p.185.

<sup>39</sup> Komala, A Brief Review of the Struggle of Kurdish Masses from the Kurdistan Republic of Kurdistan to the Present., Khabarnama [Newsletter], Number 154, 1981.

<sup>40</sup> Martin Van Bruinessen, 'The Kurds between Iran and Iraq', *op.cit.*, p.23.

## Future Trends

If Kurdish political parties want to develop a separate Kurdish identity which is distinct from Iranian identity they would need to change their policies to make themselves relevant to the current local, regional and international developments.

The world, especially the Middle East, is changing rapidly, both politically and socially. These changes have affected the situation in Kurdistan as well; the current situation in Iraq is a clear example. It seems that changes would not be limited to Afghanistan and Iraq; Iran and Syria could go through similar changes. Any such changes will directly affect the Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan, particularly Iranian Kurdistan.

Iran is increasingly challenging the US influence in the Middle East and is aspiring to become a regional superpower. In order to achieve this, the Islamic Republic of Iran is trying to develop nuclear technology. Although Iran has been insisting that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, the West believes that Iran is planning to develop nuclear weapons.

Nuclear Iran would have a greater impact on world events as Iran is situated at the centre of one of the most volatile parts of the world. Iran can greatly impact the economic, social, political and strategic direction of the Middle East. The Western countries, especially the United States, would have to prevent the development of such a weapon as it would create nuclear competition in the region, threaten Israel and Western interests in the near and distant future. A nuclear Iran could be the greatest strategic threat to the United States' interests in the region as well as a great threat to world peace.

The Kurdish leadership could take a very proactive role to use this opportunity to publicize the atrocities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, its undemocratic nature and human rights abuses, and should capitalize on the fact that by developing nuclear weapons Iran would become the greatest danger to world's peace.

The Kurdish leadership would need to develop an independent policy and mobilize its forces to promote these policies through a vigorous worldwide campaign through democratic channels. They should try to convince the international community that regime change is the only solution to end Iran's nuclear ambitions. The Kurdish organizations should prove that they are a viable force in future Iran, should the policy of regime change is pursued. A force that the United States, United Nations, the Europe and international community should take it seriously and extend their recognition. Only then the Kurdish political organizations would be able to effectively represent the interests of Kurdish people in Iran in their negotiation with future Iranian authorities and the international community.

The Kurdish political organizations should develop a comprehensive plan for their internal, national and international affairs. They need to consider the following issues:

- Re-structure their organizations to reflect the situation on the ground;
- Reach out to the Kurds in Kermanshah and Ilam provinces and promote Kurdish national awareness among them. Otherwise, these two provinces could never become a part of future Kurdistan;
- Train new skilled members and cadres, especially young people, and incorporate them into their leadership structure;
- Establish a Kurdish coordinating committee formed of Kurdish political parties and organizations to promote harmony between various Kurdish organizations, facilitate close cooperation between them and provide a united approach to the Kurdish question;
- Develop a Kurdistan-wide policy, defining its position towards Kurdish question in Iran and other parts of Kurdistan;
- Focus on political activities throughout the world, particularly Western countries, to internationalize the Kurdish question.

The Kurdish leadership should always be on the look to generate new opportunities, to advance the Kurdish cause and take necessary but appropriate risks.

They also need to establish good relations with their neighbours, particularly Azeris who have been living side by side for centuries. These two nations have been living together in harmony for generations, although occasionally at each other's throat. In many areas of Kurdistan the Kurds and Azeris have been living side by side or mixed. Kurdish history shows that when they escalate their demands against the central government they are firstly confronted by the Azeris. Simko came head to head with the Azeri population of Ormiya when he fought the central government. The same experience was repeated in the town of Naghadeh when the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran waged war against the Islamic regime of Iran.

A peaceful co-existence with Azeris would serve two purposes. First, the Kurds and Azeris will have to live together in the future. In some areas they share territory and in others, they border each other. For a stable and peaceful Kurdistan there should be a memorandum of understanding between these two nations. The Azeris in Kurdistan would have to feel safe and enjoy their cultural, social, political and economic rights. For a meaningful coexistence their rights should not only be respected but protected.

Second, tension and conflict with the Azeri population would have implications beyond Kurdistan's border. There is already a significant tension between the Kurds and Turks in Turkey and between the Kurds and Turkmans in Kirkuk. The Kurds should try to avoid such a tension in eastern parts of Kurdistan. In any conflict with the Azeris Turkey, Azerbaijan and other Turkic states would support the Azeri population against the Kurds. The Kurds in Iran cannot afford to create more enemies and add another tension between the Kurdish and Turkic populations. Therefore, the Kurds should proactively engage the Azeris and build mutual trust. The same goes with other peoples bordering Kurdistan.

## Conclusion

The Iranian rulers have exploited the historical affinity between the Kurds and Persians to retain Kurdish royalty. The Kurds in turn have enjoyed being affiliated with the dominant Persian nation. This mutually beneficial relationship between these two people has hindered the development of a separate Kurdish identity and hampered the development of Kurdish nationalism.

The Kurds themselves slowed down the process of Kurdish nationalism by considering themselves as an integral part of Iran. About 400 years ago Ahmed-e Xani criticized the Kurds for lack of unity and said that only if the Kurds were united they would liberate themselves from the yoke of the Ottomans, Persians and Arabs.<sup>41</sup> The concept of nationalism did not exist then as we understand today. However, Xani's Kurdish national sentiments were much stronger than of today's Kurds in Iran. The majority of the Kurds in Iran consider themselves as an integral part of Iran. Iranian identity is very strong among the Kurds of Kermanshah and Ilam, and to a large extent, among the Kurds in the Kurdistan province of Iran. Many Kurds who reside in the West still take their children to Persian schools rather than Kurdish schools. They attend Persian social and cultural functions and avoid Kurdish ones. Persian music and films are constantly played and watched. Although they consider themselves Kurds they are very much immersed in Persian culture. This has prevented the emergence of a separate Kurdish identity to pave the way for pan-Kurdish nationalism.

Reflecting Kurdish sentiments on the ground, Kurdish political parties have been promoting local Kurdish nationalism with greater Iranian identity. Both the Komala and KDPI have failed to develop a separate Kurdish identity which is distinct from an Iranian one. The socialists and communists throughout the world, except in few cases, have given up on the idea of class struggle while the Komala still considers itself as representative of Kurdish proletariat. The Komala needs to clarify its position towards the Kurdish national question if it wants to promote a separate Kurdish identity. It needs to specify whether it will represent Kurdish national aspirations or whether it will remain a primarily Iranian political party with Iranian identity. The KDPI too has no Kurdistan-wide policy and has no intention of developing a Kurdish identity which is separate from an Iranian one.

In the absence of substantial changes and re-assessment of Kurdish nationalism there would be no prospect for the emergence of a distinct Kurdish identity. Therefore, any hope for the growth of pan-Kurdish nationalism in the near future seems to be remote.

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<sup>41</sup> van Bruinessen, 'Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems', in Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (Eds.), *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, P.49.

# THE POLITICAL SYSTEM AND KURDISH QUESTION IN IRAN

Majid Hakki

Iran is the home to approximately 70 million people, who are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse. The central authority is dominated by Persian, who constitutes less than 50% of Iran's population. The people of Iran speak diverse Persian, Azeri, Kurdish, Arabic, Balouchi and Turkmen languages. The official religion of Iran is Islam and Twelver Ja'fari School.

Following the establishment of the Islamic Republic by Ayatollah Khomeini in February 1979, treatment of ethnic and religious minorities grew worse. On August 19<sup>th</sup> 1979 Ayatollah Khomeini declared Jihad (Holy war) against Kurdish people in Iran. Declaration of war against Kurdish people dashed the hope and expectation of Kurdish people in Iran who were hoping for a cultural and political autonomy under the newly created Islamic state.

This article discusses the political system of Iran and the Kurdish question in Iran. The rest of article is organized as follow: In chapter two we discuss the political system of Iran and overview the constitution of Islamic republic. Chapter three discuss the ethnography of Iran, and in chapter four the Kurdish question in Iran is studied; lastly, in the last chapter a multinational federation based on territorial and ethno-territorial principles in Iran is discussed and suggested to preserve the unity of Iranian nationalities and mitigate national and ethnic conflicts within Iran.

## The political system of Iran

Iran is not an electoral democracy. The most powerful figure within the Iranian government is the Supreme Leader, a position currently held by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In February 1979 a tumultuous revolution ousted Iran's monarchy, which was marked by widespread corruption and ethnic assimilation using "big Iranian-Persian civilization", whose aim was the Persianization of the Iranian national minorities. The revolution mobilized the entire Iranian population and brought together diverse political interests from clerics to communists as well as democrats and human rights activities, in their efforts to rid Iran of the Pahlavi dynasty's rule. Ultimately, it was the more organized clerical establishment in a strategic alliance with Iran's merchant class, which emerged victorious. Under the charismatic religious leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, democratic and republican interests were subsumed by more conservative theocratic rule. The constitution drafted by Ayatollah Khomeini's disciples provided for a president and parliament elected through universal adult suffrage, but an unelected clerical body, the Council of Guardians was empowered to approve electoral candidates and certify that the decision of elected officials were in accord with Sharia (Islamic law).

Iran's complex and unusual political system combines elements of Islamic theocracy with limited democratic qualities. A network of unelected institutions controlled by the highly powerful conservative Supreme leader oversees the vetted and elected presidency and the parliament.

Despite the polarized political apparatus, the last three decades of Iranian politics has been characterised by continued wrangling between these semi-elected and unelected institutions, and most notably, this rift reached its peak in 1997



Khomeini stated: "I agree with the Guardianship Council, 100% as an institution and I believe it should be strong and permanent. I must say that I selected the *foqaha* or jurisconsults, members of the Guardianship Council with due knowledge and recognition, and I say, it is necessary that their status be respected and maintained. The Guardianship Council which guards the holy Islamic decrees and the constitution is sanctioned by me. Their duty is highly important and sacred. They should carry out their duties with firmness. Weakening and insulting the members (*foqaha*, jurisconsults) of the Guardianship Council is dangerous for Islam and the country<sup>46</sup>. And he continues: "I remind the Guardianship Council to be firm in its work and act decisively and carefully and have trust in God. I recommend and demand that the honourable Guardianship Council, in present and future generations, to perform their Islamic and national duties with utmost care and authority; not to be influenced by any power; to firmly reject laws that contradict the Religion and the Constitution without any undue consideration and be attentive to the exigencies of the country necessitating the enforcement of decrees by secondary rules and by the action of the Guardian Jurisconsult<sup>47</sup> (= Waliyy-e-Faqih)."

The Supreme Leader, currently led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, appoints the head of the judiciary, six out of 12 of the member of the powerful Guardian Council, the commanders of all the armed forces, Friday prayer sermons and the head of all state broadcastings. He also confirms the president's election.

#### HEAD OF JUDICIARY

The Iran's judicial system has never been independent and free of political influence. It was either influence by the monarch or the Islamist. Following the revolution of 1979 the new Islamic Supreme Court revoked all previous laws that were deemed un-Islamic. New laws based on Sharia - law derived from Islamic texts and teaching - were introduced soon after.

The judiciary ensures that the Islamic laws are enforced and defines legal policy. The head of the Judiciary is appointed by the Supreme Leader, who in turn appoints the head of the Supreme Court and the chief public prosecutors. Public courts deal with civil and criminal cases. "Revolutionary" courts try certain categories of offenses, including crimes against national security, narcotics smuggling, and acts that undermine the Islamic Republic. Decisions rendered in revolutionary courts are final and cannot be appealed.

The Special Clerical Court handles crimes allegedly committed by clerics, although it has also taken on cases involving ordinary people. The rulings of the Special Clerical Court, which functions independently of the regular judicial framework and is accountable only to the Supreme Leader, are also final and cannot be appealed.

Article 156 of the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary. According to Articles 157 and 158, the highest judicial office is the High Council of Justice, which consists of five members who serve five-year, renewable terms.

<sup>46</sup> [http://www.irna.com/ertehal/english/saying/P2CH4.html#THE\\_GUARDIANSHIP](http://www.irna.com/ertehal/english/saying/P2CH4.html#THE_GUARDIANSHIP)

<sup>47</sup> Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists (Persian: ولايت فقيه, Velayat-e Faqih) is a concept in Shi'a Islam which holds that Islam gives faqih (Islamic jurist) or fuqaha (jurists) custodianship or guardianship over those in need of it. The idea is part of Ja'fari jurisprudence (fiqh of Twelvers) but Twelver Ulema disagree over how encompassing custodianship should be. One interpretation - limited Guardianship of the Islamic Jurists - holds that guardianship should be limited to religious endowments (اوقاف) (Owaqaf) judicial matters, to "Owghaf" (religious welfare). Another - "absolute (مطلقه) guardianship of the Islamic Jurists" - maintains that Guardianship should include all issues for which Prophet of Islam and Shi'a Imam have responsibility, including governance of the country. The idea of guardianship as rule was advanced by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in a series of lectures in 1970 and now forms the basis of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The constitution of Iran calls for a faqih, or Vali-ye faqih (guardian jurist), to serve as the Supreme Leader of the government. In the context of Iran, guardianship of the jurists is often referred to as "rule by the jurisprudent," or "rule of the Islamic jurist".

The High Council of Justice consists of the chief justice of the Supreme Court and the attorney general (also seen as State Prosecutor General), both of whom must be Shia *mujtahids* (members of the clergy whose demonstrated erudition in religious law has earned them the privilege of interpreting laws), and three other clergy chosen by religious jurists. The responsibilities of the High Council of Justice include establishing appropriate departments within the Ministry of Justice to deal with civil and criminal offenses, preparing draft bills related to the judiciary, and supervising the appointment of judges. Article 160 also stipulates that the minister of justice is to be chosen by the prime minister from among candidates who have been recommended by the High Council of Justice. The minister of justice is responsible for all courts throughout the country.

Article 161 provides for the Supreme Court, whose composition is based upon laws drafted by the High Council of Justice. The Supreme Court is an appellate court that reviews decisions of the lower courts to ensure their conformity with the laws of the country and to ensure uniformity in judicial policy. Article 162 stipulates that the chief justice of the Supreme Court must be a *mujtahid* with expertise in judicial matters. The *faqih*, in consultation with the justices of the Supreme Court, appoints the chief justice for a term of five years.

In 1980 Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti was appointed by Khomeini as the first chief justice. Beheshti established judicial committees that were charged with drafting new civil and criminal codes derived from Shia Islamic laws. One of the most significant new codes was the Law of *Qisas*, which was submitted to and passed by the Majlis in 1982, one year after Beheshti's death in a bomb explosion. The Law of *Qisas* provided that in cases of victims of violent crime, families could demand retribution, up to and including death. Other laws established penalties for various moral offenses, such as consumption of alcohol, failure to observe *hejab* (veil), adultery, prostitution, and illicit sexual relations. Punishments prescribed in these laws included public floggings, amputations, and execution by stoning for adulterers.

The entire judicial system of the country has been de-secularized. The attorney general, like the chief justice, must be a *mujtahid* and is appointed to office for a five-year term by the *faqih* (Article 162). The judges of all the courts must be knowledgeable in Shia jurisprudence; they must meet other qualifications determined by rules established by the High Council of Justice. Since there were insufficient numbers of qualified senior clergy to fill the judicial positions in the country, some former civil court judges who demonstrated their expertise in Islamic law and were willing to undergo religious training were permitted to retain their posts. In practice, however, the Islamisation of the judiciary forced half of the former civil court judges out of their positions. To emphasize the independence of judges from the government, Article 170 stipulates that they are "duty bound to refrain from executing governmental decisions that are contrary to Islamic laws."

#### ARMED FORCES

The armed forces comprise the Revolutionary Guard and the regular forces. The two bodies are under a joint general command. All leading army and Revolutionary Guard commanders are appointed by the Supreme Leader and are answerable only to him. The Revolutionary Guard was formed after the revolution to protect the new leaders and institutions and to fight those opposing the revolution. The Revolutionary Guard has a powerful presence in other institutions, and controls volunteer militias with branches in every town.

### Expediency Council

Created by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1988, the Expediency Council has the authority to mediate disputes between Parliament and the Council of Guardians. Presently, according to the constitution, the Expediency Council serves as

an advisory body to the Supreme Leader, making it one of the most powerful governing bodies in the country, at least in name. The council also examines presidential and parliamentary candidates to determine their fitness to run for a seat.

In October 2005, the Supreme Leader gave the Expediency Council Supervisory powers over all branches of government – delegating some of his own authority as is permitted in the constitution.

## Constitutional Background

The former monarchy and the Constitution of 1906 were abolished by the revolution of February 1979. The 1979 Constitution dates 24 Oct 1979 and is in force since 3 Dec 1979. Significant amendments were adopted on 28 July 1989.

The 270-member Majlis (Islamic Consultative Assembly) can initiate laws, but is subject to a number of restrictions and needs the support of at least fifteen members. The Majlis can hinder the President's policy, veto cabinet appointments, and even impeach ministers. Its speaker is powerful due to his seat on all of the main councils of state.

The Preamble is very long, containing a history of the revolution, a description of the new state, and quotes of Koranic verses. The Preamble states that Economy is a Means, Not an End. It also asserts that the home centered role of Women in Islam is actually liberation, assigning women special rights. Iran places no belief in Government Control.

Iran has an official religion, some recognized religious minorities, and acknowledges rights of non-Muslims. Iran grants a right to work, extensive welfare rights, and a right to fruits of business. The Constitution requires that the taking of foreign aid be approved by the Parliament. Concessions for foreign businesses are forbidden. The Constitution acknowledges committee legislation and features a religious leader as well as a Head of Judiciary. Public officials are subject to an asset control.

## Guardian Council

This is the most influential body in Iran and is controlled by conservatives. Twelve jurists make up the Council of Guardians, six of whom are appointed by the Supreme Leader. The head of the judiciary recommends the remaining six, which are officially approved by Parliament.

The Council of Guardians is vested with the authority to interpret the constitution and determines if the laws passed by Parliament are in line with Sharia (Islamic law). Hence the council can exercise veto power over Parliament. If a law passed by Parliament is deemed incompatible with the constitution or sharia, it is referred back to Parliament for revision.

The council has to approve all the bills passed by the parliament and has the power to veto them if it considers them inconsistent with the constitution and Islamic law. The council can also bar candidates from standing in elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts. In 2005 presidency elections, the council blocked all female candidates from standing.

## President

According to constitution of Iran, the presidency after the office of supreme leader is the highest office in the country. His is responsible for implementing the Constitution and acts as the head of the executive, except in matters directly concerned with (the office of) the supreme Leader. According to the law, all presidential candidates must be

approved by the Council of Guardians prior to running, after which he is elected by universal suffrage to a 4-year term by an absolute majority of votes.

In practice, however, presidential powers are circumscribed by the clerics and conservatives in Iran's power structure, and by the authority of the Supreme Leader. It is the Supreme Leader not the presidents, who controls the armed forces and makes decision on security, defence and major foreign policy issues.

All presidential candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council, which banned hundreds of candidates from standing in the 2005 presidential elections. Conservative Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005 after he defeated former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in a second round run-off. Rafsanjani complained of an "illegal" campaign to discredit him.

## Cabinet

Members of cabinet of Council of Ministers are chosen by the president. They must be approved by parliament. Parliament can also impeach ministers.

The Supreme Leader is closely involved in defence, security and foreign policy, so his office also holds influence in decision-making processes in these ministries. Reformist ministers under former president Khatami were heavily monitored by conservatives. The cabinet is chaired by the president or first vice-president, who is responsible for cabinet affairs.

## Parliament (The Majlis)

The unicameral Iranian parliament, the Islamic Consultative Assembly or "*Majles-e Shura-ye Eslami*", consists of 290 members elected to a 4-year term. The members are elected by direct and secret ballot. It drafts legislation, ratifies international treaties, and approves the country's budget. All legislation from the assembly must be reviewed by the Council of Guardians. Candidates for a seat in the *Majles* require approval of the Council of Guardians

## Assembly of Experts

The Assembly of Experts, which meets for one week every year, consists of 86 "virtuous and learned" clerics elected by the public to eight-year terms. Only Shia clerics can join the assembly and candidates for election are vetted by the Guardian council. The assembly is dominated by conservatives such as its chairman Hashemi Rafsanjani, who is also the chairman of Guardian Council. Like presidential and parliamentary elections, the Council of Guardians determines eligibility to run for a seat in this assembly.

Members of the Assembly of Experts in turn elect the Supreme Leader. The assembly has never been known to challenge any of the Supreme Leader's decisions, although according to the Iranian constitution it has the authority to remove the supreme leader from power at any time.

## National Security and intelligence

Iran is the only country whose executive does not control the armed forces. In fact, though the president has nominal rule over the Supreme National Security Council and the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, in practice the Supreme Leader dictates all matters of foreign and domestic security.

## Supreme National Security Council

Article 176 of Iran's Constitution sets up the Supreme National Security Council, and charges it with "preserving the Islamic Revolution, territorial integrity, and national sovereignty." Its members include: the president; speaker of Parliament; the head of the judiciary; the chief of the combined general staff of the armed forces; the ministers of foreign affairs, the interior, and intelligence; and the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the regular military, among others.

As head of the Supreme National Security Council, the president helps coordinate the Supreme Leader's foreign policy directives.

## The ethnography of Iran

Only roughly one-half of Iran's 70 million people are ethnic Persian, the rest being Azerbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, Baluchis and Lors (Figure 2). The multinational and multi ethnic Iran is dominated by Persians. Iran's national minorities share a widespread sense of discrimination and deprivation toward the central Tehran government.

The official state religion is Shiite Islam, which is the major ethnic Persian's religion. The official language is Persian, in which all government business and public affairs are conducted.

To varying degrees, these minorities face discrimination, particularly in employment, education and housing, and their regions tend to underdeveloped. Even though the constitution grants some of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, especially the right to use mother tongue in education (Article 15), in reality, the central government emphasises the Persian and Shiite nature of the state.



Figure 2: Iran's National and Ethnic Groups<sup>48</sup>

### Persian dominance

Persian, with only a slim majority, possess a distinct sense of superiority over the Iranians and regards themselves as true heirs of Iran's history and tradition and the guardians and perpetrators of its legacies<sup>49</sup>. Despite their minority within compared to the rest of Iranian population they dominate the central government of Iran (Table 1). Under both the monarchy and the Islamic republic, Persians were and remain the beneficiaries of government economic and social policies. Geographically, the provinces principally settled by Persians continue to be the most developed provinces in Iran; Furthermore, the state run radio and television broadcasts are predominantly in Persian and only limited amount of programs are run in minority languages.

<sup>48</sup> The Empire's New Middle East Map: creating ethnic cleansing to control the oil using sectarian divisions to split Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia to control the oil rich provinces, <http://www.oilempire.us/new-map.html>, 05.05.2008

<sup>49</sup> Hussein D. Hassan, Iran, Ethnic and religious Minorities, , CRS, May 25, 2007

National and Ethnic Groups	estimated % of population	Religions	% of population
Persian	50-35%	Muslim	98 (Shiite 80 – 75 %) Sunni (20 – 25 %)
Azeri	25-30%	Other (Zarathoshtian, Jewish, Christian, and Baha'i)	2 %
Kurds	14-16%	<b>Languages</b>	<b>% of speaking</b>
Arabs	5-7%	Persian and Persian dialects	55 %
Turkmen	2-5%	Turkic and Turkic dialects	25 %
Balouch	5-7%	Kurdish	14 %
Gilaki and Mazandarani	6	Balouchi	2
Others	2	Arabic	4

**Table 1:** The diversion of ethnic, language and religious groups in Iran<sup>50</sup>.

Under the constitution of Islamic republic, certain religious minorities such as Zoroastrians, Christians and Jews and Sunni Muslims are recognised. Followers of the Baha'i faith, who form a sizable group among religious minorities in Iran, are not recognised by the Constitution.

In the early days of the establishment of Islamic republic, Ayatollah Khomeini declared Holy war against Kurdish people, under which the regime of Iran relied on Shiite volunteers from the Persian and Azeri communities to suppress Kurdish, Baluchi and Turken national struggle.

### The raise of Persian nationalism

Michael Hetches defines State-building nationalism as “the nationalism that is embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state. It is the result of conscious efforts of central rulers to make a multicultural population culturally homogenous”<sup>51</sup> He also believes that since the rationale for state-building nationalism is often geopolitical to secure borders from real or potential rivals this kind of nationalism tend to be culturally inclusive.

<sup>50</sup> Because of lack of official and detached source, the ethnography of Iran is estimated using different sources: 1. U.S Department of State, Background Notes, October, 2006, CIA, Word Fact book, Updated on May 15, 2007, 2. Wikipedia, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics\\_of\\_Iran](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Iran), 5.5.2008, 3. Index Mundi: Iran Demographics Profile 2007 [http://www.indexmundi.com/Iran/demographics\\_profile.html](http://www.indexmundi.com/Iran/demographics_profile.html), 5.5.2008, 3. Ahwaz Studies, [http://www.ahwazstudies.org/main/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=3097&Itemid=29&lang=PR](http://www.ahwazstudies.org/main/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=3097&Itemid=29&lang=PR) 5.5.2008

<sup>51</sup> Micheal Hetcher, *Containing Nationalism*, Oxford and New York, Oxford University press, 2000, p. 16

Persia throughout eighteenth century was not integrated and the Persian nationalism was dominated to an extent that it practically failed to incorporate other ethnics in culturally distinctive territories within a state. Although in the first few decades of the twentieth century attempts were made to expand the effective authority of the state to all adjacent territories, the kind of nationalism discourse that the cultural state promoted at the policy level, and to some extent, at rhetorical levels was exclusive, for Persian identity mainly Fars-ethno centrism and the concept of Persia naturally gave a sense of exclusiveness in relation to other ethnic identities in Iran, including Kurds, Baluches, Arabs, Gilanis and Mazandarani. The Persian rulers unlike the European rulers, who tried state-building nationalism to extend the state authority, were violently apprehensive of other ethnicities. Unlike European state-nationalism Persian rulers did not leave the necessary space for other ethnics to practice their cultural and linguistic rights without aggressive government restrictions.

The government policies failed to create a harmony reflected in the reactions of ethnicities, notably Kurds. With further eroding of the central state authority over large swaths of periphery during and after the First World War, peripheral nationalism surfaced in a violent form as was the case in Baluchistan, Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

Peripheral nationalism, according to Micheal Hetcher, “occurs when a culturally distinctive territory resists incorporation into an expanding state, or attempts to secede and set up its own government”<sup>52</sup>. Very often this type of nationalism is spurred by efforts of state-building nationalism. It must be noted in the case of Persia, no serious attempt was made by the central government to homogenise a culturally heterogeneous Persia through an inclusive programme. As a consequence of the government failure, Persia had shaped an identity crisis that posed a potential prospect for the division of the country. It is at this point that the resentment against the central state became increasingly assertive in the second decade of the twentieth century. In the course of the two decades, the peripheral nationalist tendencies constantly emerged and surfaced in a way that posed a challenge to the integrity of Persia dominated by Persians.

## The Kurdish Question in Iran

### A geographical overview

Although it is difficult to determine the exact number of Kurds in Iran, there are approximately 10 million Kurds in Iran. Kurds are the third most important nation in the country after the Persian and Azeris. Official statistics are not published detailing Iran’s ethnic structure. It is estimated that the Kurds are accounted for about 14 – 16 % of the total population.

The Eastern Kurdistan or as official knows Kurdish area of Iran includes West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshahan, Ilam, and parts of Lorestan provinces. Iranian or Eastern Kurdistan is not to be confused with the Kurdistan province in Iran which only encompasses one-eighth of the Kurdish inhabited areas of Iran or Iranian Kurdistan.

There are also significant number of Kurds scattered in the provinces of Fars, Kerman, and Baluchistan va Sistan, and there is a large group of approximately 1.7 million living in a small area of northern Khorasan. These are all descendants of Kurds whom the government forcibly removed from western Iran during the seventeenth century.

Kurdistan in Iran covers an area of about 125,000 square kilometres. It reaches from Mount Ararat in the north to the other side of the Zagrose Mountains. To the west it is bound by the Iraqi – Iranian and Turkish - Iranian borders, to

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p23

east by Lake of Uromiah. The cities of eastern Kurdistan are situated at altitudes of over 1,000 meters in this mountains region.

The climate is continental and the annual rainfall rarely exceeds 400 mm, although in the fertile valley below it reaches 2,000 to 3,000 mm. The variation in temperature between the summer high and the winter low is about 70 or 80 °F. In Saqqez the temperature sometimes drops to 30 °F during the winter. In Kermanshah it reaches as high as 45 °C in the summer.

The shortage of water is not as acute as in most parts of Iran, there are many rivers, such as Kizil Uzen (Sefidrud), the little Zab ( a branch of the Togriss), the Jaghatou and the Tatahou. Lake Uromiah with a surface area of 6,000 square kilometres and Lake Zrewar are the largest bodies of water in east Kurdistan.

The mountains are well wooded: from Lake Uromiah to Luristan there are more than four million hectares of forest, mostly oak, from which fourteen different products are obtained. The forests are not very dense because the mountain people having no other source of fuel use a great deal of wood and are thus exhausting and irreplaceable resources. The Islamic Republic of Iran has also destroyed many forests during the 20 years of war against Kurdish people.

The unexploited sub-oil of Kurdistan in Iran is rich in minerals. Oil is extracted in the Kermanshah region, where the government and other overseas companies have installations, but the production does not meet local demands since the Iranians use the oil source for the budget of their military forces in Kurdistan.

The Iranian administration has divided Kurdistan in Iran into four provinces, but only the central area Sina (Sanandaj) is officially referred to as Kurdistan. The north is called Western Azerbaijan, the south is known as Kermanshah and Ilam.

Given the estimations of the governments who administer the areas inhabited by Kurds, it is by no means easy to find estimated figures for the Kurdish population. The Iranian Government has always claimed the Kurds as ``pure`` Iranians and has carefully avoided any distinction between `` Iranian `` and `` Persians ``; no statistics on the national composition of the population have ever been made available. But it is clear, the overwhelming majority of the population of Kurdistan in Eastern Kurdistan in Kurds. It is estimated that the population of Iranian Kurdistan is 16% of Iran's total population. The population of Iran was 70 million in 2006. The rate of population increases in Kurdistan about 3.5% per year. It is estimated that by year 2015 the population of Iranian Kurdistan will reach about 17 million inhabitants (136 person per1 square kilometres).

The population of Iranian Kurdistan is 98% Muslim. The remaining 2% is made up of Armenian and Assyrian Christians and some Jews. Most of the Muslims are Sunnis (75%), the Shiites are mainly concentrated in Kermanshah and Loristan.

The sheikhs, the Sunni religious dignitaries still exercise considerable influence in some area of Iranian Kurdistan. The two main sects (tariqate) are Qadiri and Naqshbandhi. The sheikhs followers are known as murids, dervishes and sufies; each murid must see his sheikh once a year, bringing him a present and receiving his benediction. A young Kurdish priest (mullah) will receive his diploma from a renowned religious dignitary and will then be sent to a village, where his income will depend entirely on presents from his parishioners. The Islamic Republic of Iran pays salary to the Shiites mullahs. The Islamic government also pays some salaries to those Sunni mullahs who are in good relation with the governmental administration and serve the politics of the government.

## A historical overview

In 12th century CE, Sultan Sanjar, created a province called Kurdistan centered at Bahar located to the northeast of Hamadan. This province included Hamadan, Dinawar, Kermanshah, Sanandaj and Sharazur. It was ruled by Sulayman, the nephew of Sanjar. In 1217, Kurds of Zagros defeated the troops of Ala ad-Din Muhammad II, the Khwarazmid King, who were sent from Hamadan<sup>53</sup>.

During Safavid rule, the government tried to extend its control over Kurdish inhabited areas in western Iran. At that time, there were a number of semi-independent Kurdish emirates such as the Mukriyan (Mahabad), Ardalan (Sinne), and Shikak tribes around Lake Urmie and northwest Iran. Kurds resisted this policy and tried to keep some form of self-rule. This led to a series of bloody confrontations between the Safavids and the Kurds. The Kurds were finally defeated, and as a result the Safavids decided to punish rebellious Kurds by forced relocation and deportation of Kurds in 15-16th century. This policy began under the reign of the Safavid King Tahmasp I (r. 1514-1576).

Between 1534 and 1535, Tahmasp I began the systematic destruction of the old Kurdish cities and the countryside. Large numbers of Kurds from these areas found themselves deported to the Alborz Mountains and Khorasan (Khurasan), as well as the heights in the central Iranian Plateau. At this time the last remnant of the ancient royal Hadhabâni (Adiabene) tribe of central Kurdistan was removed from the heartland of Kurdistan and deported to Khorasan, where they are still found today. See [12] and [13] under the title "Khorasani Kurdish Dances"<sup>54</sup>.

There is a well documented historical account of a long battle in 1609-1610 between Kurds and the Safavid Empire. The battle took place around a fortress called Dimdim located in Beradost region around Lake Urmia in northwestern Iran. In 1609, the ruined structure was rebuilt by "Emîr Xan Lepzêrîn" (Golden Hand Khan), ruler of Beradost, who sought to maintain the independence of his expanding principality in the face of both Ottoman and Safavid penetration into the region. Rebuilding Dimdim was considered a move toward independence that could threaten Safavid power in the northwest. Many Kurds, including the rulers of Mukriyan (Mahabad), rallied around Amir Khan. After a long and bloody siege led by the Safavid grand vizier Hatem Beg, which lasted from November 1609 to the summer of 1610, Dimdim was captured. All the defenders were massacred. Shah Abbas ordered a general massacre in Beradost and Mukriyan and resettled the Turkish Afshar tribe in the region while deporting many Kurdish tribes to [Khorasan]<sup>55</sup>.

The Khorasani Kurds are a community of nearly 1.7 million people deported from western Kurdistan to North Khorasan, (northeastern Iran) by Persia during the 16th to 18th centuries<sup>56</sup>.

Kurds took advantage of the Afghan invasion of Safavid realm in the early 18th century, and conquered Hamadan and penetrated to the area near Isfahan. Nader Shah sought to suppress a Kurdish rebellion in 1747, but he was assassinated before completing the expedition. After Nadir's death, Kurdish tribes exploited the power vacuum and captured parts of Fars.

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<sup>53</sup> Hussein Madani, Kurds and the Strategy of States, (کوردستان و ستراتیژی دهوله‌تان), Spartryck, Sockholm September 2001

<sup>54</sup> Kurdistanica, The Kurds, Deportations & forced resettlements, <http://www.kurdistanica.com/english/history/deportation.html>

<sup>55</sup> Skandar Beig Torkman, Tarikh `Alam `Araye `Abbasi, Second edition, Amirkabir publishing, Tehran, 2003

<sup>56</sup> D. McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2004, p. 67

In 1880, Shaykh Ubaydullah, a Kurdish leader, engaged in a series of revolts against the Iranian government. These revolts were successfully suppressed by the Qajar Kings, and this was one of the Iran's few victories during the Qajar period (See Amanat, Abbas. *Pivot of the Universe: Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy, 1831-1896*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1997, p.408). In early 20th century, Ismail Agha Simko took advantage of the chaotic situation in the aftermath of World War I, and rebelled against the Iranian government. He was finally defeated by Reza Shah Pahlavi.

## Kurdish movement in modern Iran

### Simko Revolts against Reza Shah

Weakness of the Persian government during World War I encouraged some Kurdish chiefs to take advantage of the chaotic situation. By summer of 1918, Simko established his authority in the region west of Lake Urmia. In 1919, Simko organized an army of 20,000 Kurds and managed to establish a small state in northwestern Iran centered in the city of Uromieh. After the conquest of Uromieh city, Simko appointed Teymur Agha Shikak as the governor of the city. Jaafar Sultan of Hewraman region also took control of the region between Marivan and north of Halabja and remained independent until 1925. In 1922, Reza Khan (who later became the first Pahlavi monarch), took action against Kurdish leaders. Simko was forced to abandon his region in fall 1922, and spent eight years in hiding. When the Iranian government persuaded him to submit, he was ambushed and killed around Shno (Oshnaviyeh) in 1930. After this, Reza Shah pursued a crude but effective policy against the Kurds. Hundreds of Kurdish chiefs were deported and forced into exile. Their lands were also confiscated by the government<sup>57</sup>.

During Second World War, when Allied troops entered Iran in September 1941, the Persian Army was quickly dissolved and their ammunition was seized by the Kurds. Sons of Kurdish chiefs seized the opportunity and escaped from their exile in Tehran. A Kurdish chief from Baneh, named Hama Rashid took control of Sardasht, Baneh and Mariwan in western Iran. He was finally driven out of the region by the Persian Army in the fall of 1944<sup>58</sup>.

### The Republic of Kurdistan

On August 20th, 1941, the Soviet, British and American Allied Armies entered Iran. Reza Shah's dictatorship, which came to power in 1925 in Iran through a coup backed by the British, was replaced by a weak government, based in Tehran and with no control over the south and north of Iran which were under the American, British and Soviet occupation. At this time, various democratic rights were granted to the growing number of political parties.

The Mahabad and some other regions in the central Kurdistan were occupied neither by America nor British nor by Soviet. Mahabad was an area with a long tradition of Kurdish nationalism. During World War II, the inhabitants of Mahabad were 13,000. It was the center of intellectual activities during the war.

The Iranian government's control over the town was weak. The people took advantage of the situation by founding the volunteer city guard to save people from strollers and other anarchist forces. The guard was founded under leadership of Qazi Mohammad, who became later as the first president in Kurdish history. The army wanted to fulfill this need by arming Kurdish tribes against the Kurdish youth and intellectuals. But the army's plan and people was their own governness.

<sup>57</sup> W. G. Elphinston, *The Kurdish Question*, International Affairs, Vol.22, No.1, pp.91-103, 1946

<sup>58</sup> W. G. Elphinston, *The Kurdish Question*, Journal of International Affairs, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, p.97-98

During the war, there was a lack of political stability and government who could fulfill the area's political vacuum. In September of 1942, the Kurds of Mahabad launched the first Kurdish Political movement, the Komalay J. K (Jani Jurdi, the Society of Kurdish Resurrection).

The strict nationalist Komalay J. K, led by urban middle class intellectuals, soon attracted mass support in the towns and countryside. The Komalay J. K. was an underground organization which promoted an established Kurdish National government.

Komalay J. K. was a closed circle organization. Only Kurds were allowed to become member of the organization and before their membership, the person should experience a hard test time and should be a trusted person by all means.

Komalay J. K. published the first Kurdish magazine in the Iranian Kurdistan in 1945, which was called ''Nishtiman'' (The Homeland). It also established two evening Kurdish schools, where people were educated in Kurdish language.

Qazi Mohammad, who was a well known lawyer of the Mahabad, became the Komalay J.K member in 1945. He brought with himself the democratization of the organization and importance of democratic rights of the non Kurdish people who lived in Kurdistan. Soon after he became the leader of the Komalay J. K. and managed to change the J. K's political view by establishing the Democratic Party of Kurdistan.

By establishing the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, the democratic movement in Kurdistan, led by Peshawa, soon outgrew Komalay J. K. structure. There was a manifested need for cadres with a broader political outlook, for an organization capable of leading tens of thousands of members<sup>59</sup>.

In 1945, the Kurds occupied the army base in Mahabad. This was the last place where the central government had its forces to defence its occupation of Mahabad city. Soon the new forces called Peshmarga (a person who is ready to die for his nation) enlarged in a short time and it became the major ruling organization of the area.

The situation of Kurdistan and the growth of KDP, who led the Peshmarga forces, encouraged the KDP to go on the offensive.

On January 22, 1946, during a mass meeting attended by delegates from all areas around Saqqez, the first Kurdish Republic was proclaimed and Qazi Mohammad, the leader of the KDP was elected President.

During Republic's proclamation, Qazi Mohammad who led the Kurdistan Republic made a speech, where he outlined the framework of the Republic. The speech contained a short history of Kurdish peoples struggle and it's will for self determination. The manifesto of Kurdish republic included the following:

- I. Autonomy for the Iranian Kurds within the Iranian state.
- II. The use of Kurdish as the medium of education and administration.
- III. The election of a provincial council for Kurdistan to supervise state and social matters.
- IV. All state officials to be of local origin.
- V. Unity and fraternity with the Azerbaijani people.
- VI. The establishment of a single law for both peasants and notables.

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<sup>59</sup> Abdulrahman Ghasemlou, 40 Sal xebat le pênaw Azadi, 40 years struggling for freedom, KDPI, 1985

On March 26, 1946, due to pressure from the United States and United Kingdom, the Soviets promised the Iranian government that they would pull out of north-western Iran. In June, Iran reasserted its control over Iranian Azerbaijan. This move isolated the Republic of Kurdistan, eventually leading to its destruction. By this point, Qazi Mohammed's support was declining, especially among the Kurdish tribes who had supported him initially. On December 5, the war council told Qazi Muhammad that they would fight and resist the Iranian army if they tried to enter the region. On December 15, Iranian forces entered and secured Mahabad. Once there, they closed down the Kurdish printing press, banned the teaching of Kurdish language, and burned all Kurdish books that they could find. Finally, on March 31, 1947, Qazi Muhammad along with some other high officials of the Republic was hanged in Mahabad on counts of treason<sup>60</sup>.

### Today's situation

Another wave of nationalism engulfed eastern Kurdistan after the fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty in the winter of 1979, and as a result Ayatollah Khomeini, the new religious leader of Iran, declared a jihad (holy war) against separatism in Iranian Kurdistan. The crisis deepened after Kurds were denied seats in the assembly of experts gathering in 1979, which were responsible for writing the new constitution. Ayatollah Khomeini prevented Dr. Ghassemloo, the elected representative of the region to participate in the assembly of experts' first meeting. Kurds were therefore deprived of their political rights under the new Iranian constitution in the early days of the new regime in Iran and their alienation further increased due to their adherence to the Sunni branch of Islam. In the spring of 1980, government forces under the command of then the President Abolhassan Banisadr conquered most of the Kurdish cities through a huge military campaign, sending in mechanized military divisions to Kurdish cities including Mahabad, Sinne, Pawe, and Marivan.

Kurdish political organizations were enthusiastic supporters of the revolution against the monarch, which was hijacked by the clergy led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. From the early days of the revolution, relations between the central government and Kurdish organisations have been fraught with difficulties. The Kurds, with their different language and traditions and their cross-border alliances, were seen as vulnerable to exploitation by foreign powers who wished to destabilize the young Republic. Sunni Kurds, unlike the overwhelming majority of their countrymen, abstained from voting to endorse the creation of an Islamic republic in April 1979. That referendum institutionalized Shia primacy and made no provision for regional autonomy. As early as 1979 armed conflict broke out between armed Kurdish factions and the Iranian government's security forces. The Kurdish forces included primarily the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) and the leftist Komala (Revolutionary Organization of Kurdish Toilers). In a speech, Ayatollah Khomeini called the concept of ethnic minority contrary to Islamic doctrines. He also accused those who do not wish Muslim countries to be united in creating the issue of nationalism among minorities, and his views were shared by many in the clerical leadership.

The new leadership had little patience for Kurdish demands and opted for crushing unrest through military means. On August 17th 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini declared holy war against the Kurds. Numerous villages and towns were destroyed to force Kurds into submission. Ayatollah Khomeini, sentenced thousands of men to execution after summary trials without regard for the rights of the accused. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps fought to re-establish government control in the Kurdish regions. As a result tens of thousands of Kurdish people were killed<sup>61</sup>.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid

<sup>61</sup> Ayatollah Khomeini's Speech, Radio Tehran, December 17, 1979. Quoted in David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds

In 1988, following the end of Iraq-Iran war, the Iranian government conceded to several negotiations with the Kurdish side, mainly the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran led by Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou. Several meetings were arranged in Vienna, on December 28, December 30 and January 20. Another meeting was set up for July 13, again in Vienna.

The Iranian delegation at the July 13, 1988 meeting consisted of three men: Mohamed Jafar Sahraroudi, Hadi Mustafawi and Amir Mansur Bozorgian. The Kurdish delegation also comprised of three people: Abdullah Ghaderi Azar, Fadhil Rassul and Dr. Ghassemlou. All three of them were killed that day by the armed diplomats of the Iranian government. The three Iranian perpetrators were allowed to return freely to Iran. Ghassemlou's successor Dr. Sadeqh Sharafkandi was also assassinated on September 17, 1992 in Germany while dining in a restaurant in Berlin with his colleagues and some opposition figures. A German court, following 5 years of investigation into the killing, charged the high level Iranian involvement in the killing including the supreme leader, then the president, the foreign ministry and the intelligence ministry.

During Khatami (1997 - 2005) presidential period, the Kurds enjoyed a limited publication and cultural freedom. In his first term, Khatami appointed Abdullah Ramezanzadeh to be the first Kurdish governor of the Iranian province of Kurdistan. He also appointed several Sunni and Shia Kurds as his own or cabinet member's advisors. In his second term, Khatami had two Kurdish cabinet members; both of them were Shia. The increased presence of Kurdish representatives in the sixth parliament led to expectations that some of the voters' demands would be met. After the first round, in which 18 Kurds were elected, one candidate said that he expected there would be more Kurdish instruction at the university in Sanandaj, and he called on the Khatami government to have more Kurdish officials. Subsequently, a 40-member parliamentary faction representing the predominantly Kurdish provinces of Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, Ilam and Kermanshah was formed. However, there were many other civilian Kurdish activists who did not join the reform movement.

Mr. Khatami presidency period was not golden time for Kurds. In February 1999, Kurdish people took to the streets in several cities such as Mahabad, Sanandaj and Urmieh and staged mass protests against the government and in condemnation of the arrest of Abdullah Ocalan by Turkish Government. This was viewed as trans-nationalization of the Kurdish movement [34]. These protests were violently suppressed by the government forces. According to Human rights groups, at least 53 people were killed by the security forces of Iran.

### **The Kurdish situation after Khatami**

During last two years Iran performed more documented executions than any other country in the world with the exception of China. Tens of Kurdish political prisoners and civilians are also executed in secret and not included in the documented, reported figure. Since July 2005, over 1500 people of Kurdish civilians have been killed, executed, sentenced to jail or charged to pay compensation by the security forces of Islamic Republic. During the uprising of the Kurdish people in July 2005 over 1700 Kurdish people were arrested, and the fate of numerous of these detainees remains unknown. In Iranian Kurdistan, all activities by political parties are prohibited, and it has outlawed all political parties in Kurdistan. According to paragraphs 197 to 202 of the punishment law, members of Kurdish parties are classified as evil<sup>62</sup>.

During current year at least 25 journals, Kurdish website, newspaper and magazine are closed, detained or charged for their content. Among journalists Adnan Hassanpour and Hiwa Boutimar are sentenced to death. At least 135 women are arrested, 6 killed, and 5 sentenced to be stoned. Also at least two 15 years old boys were executed by the regime of Iran. As a result of social, economical and political pressure at least 50 women have committed suicide.

<sup>62</sup> Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Human rights violation in Iranian Kurdistan, September 12, 2007

During current year more than 300 hundred people are detained and charged with supporting of Kurdish political groups. The detainees are under threat of the 198 to 211 regarding retaliation and punishment regulation. At least 200 Kurdish political detainees are condemned between 6 months to 20 years jail. The average imprisonment of political detainees is 1 – 5 years. The sentenced are charged with supporting Kurdish political parties, menacing the unity and security of the country, and participating in demonstrations against Islamic republic. According to Human Rights Organisation of Kurdistan at least 300 Kurdish political imprisons are moved to other Iranian jails.

Hundreds of Kurdish people are since January 2007, battered by security forces of Islamic republic.

At least 100 people are killed during clashes in Kurdistan between security forces and Kurdish groups. The regime of Iran is in co-operation with the Turkish army, has aggregated military forces to the Iran – Turkey border to fight what the regime calls “terrorism” and “smugglers”. Several Kurdish villages near the Iraqi border have been destroyed and the people of the villages have been forced to move to other place without any compensation. The Iranian artillery resumed heavy shelling of the border areas of Iraqi Kurdistan region since July 2007. As result hundreds of people forced to live their home and several people were killed.

The activities of NGOs are highly controlled. The Iranian regime considers all NGOs and contacts from international organizations and other countries missions in Iran to be spies and believes that they are acting against Iranian national security. In Iranian Kurdistan, all activities by political parties are prohibited. The Islamic regime has outlawed all political parties in Kurdistan.

In Iran, the study of the Kurdish language in schools is still prohibited. The economy of the Kurdish area has collapsed and the unemployment rate in Kurdistan is estimated to be 47%. The Islamic republic of Iran systematically distributes drugs to the Kurdish youth in order to prevent them from being active and productive members of society. Shootings by the regime’s gunmen have become a daily event in Kurdistan. The ongoing human rights violation in Iranian Kurdistan is not as a result of sporadic or persistent violation of some officers, but it is the result of systematic and programmed policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Kurdish people and the people of Iran.

Since the negotiations between Iran and the EU on the situation of Human rights has not brought any positive results and the Islamic Republic of Iran has used the negotiations as ‘time wasting’ to avoid international pressure, the observation of the situation of Human rights in Iran are in practice impossible, and the regime of Iran does not allow any international observers to enter to the Iranian.

## Need to solve

The Kurdish question in Iran is a question of denial of Kurdish identity by the state and the Kurds resistance to this denial. This relationship of denial and resistance has existed ever since the formation of modern sate in Iran and continues to date.

Identity is not just what defines a person, or a larger collectivity. But rather it is what defines the rights, liberties and obligations of a person or collectively within a society, and to that extent, the nature of Kurdish question depends very much on who is defining these rights and who is defining this identity<sup>63</sup>. The question of identity is the question of national rights and national identity.

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<sup>63</sup> Abbas Vali, University of Swansea, Wales, WKI Conflict Resolution Forum July 28, 1998

The Kurdish question is to be considered as a juridico-political framework within the Iranian state, which is the Iranian constitution. In the Iranian Constitution of 1905, a significant incongruity between the conditions of citizenship and conditions of political sovereignty is seen. Sovereignty is derived from the collective will of the Iranian people, while citizenship is effectively defined by the constituent elements of Persian ethnicity. This evident between the conditions of sovereignty and the condition of citizenship in Iran theoretically means that the Kurds could enter the political process as citizens of the state only if they were prepared to deny certain aspects or defining elements of their identity, and this denial meant that the political process could never be democratic even if free general elections were held periodically<sup>64</sup>.

According to the Article 12 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelve Ja'fari Schools, and the principle will remain eternally immutable. The constitution does not recognize national or ethnical minorities however religious minorities: Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities (Article 13). All laws and regulation shall adopt with Article 13 of constitution of Islamic republic. Therefore in Kurdistan, Kurdish people whom majority are Sunni Muslims are not covered by regulations adapted by Majlis. Security forces in practice are the highest and only law in Kurdistan.

As mentioned above the incongruity between these two conditions and also the condition of Article 12 and 13 of Islamic republic was the hallmark of the Iranian constitution under the monarchy and clerics. And it is also politically significant. This is because when there was any attempt to express Kurdish identity or demand its recognition, the recognition of and respect for Kurdish rights and liberties in Iran, the government is able to link immediately with the question of political sovereignty to treat it and present it as a clear danger to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. Once a question is linked to the question of sovereignty it could easily be excluded from the realm of everyday *domestic* politics moving beyond the current political scene, becoming an issue above the ordinary day to day conduct of the business of government.

The Iranian government is always able to treat Kurdish question as question of national security and sovereignty and effectively and immediately force it out of the political process into a military process to present it as a military issue linked directly with the survival of the Iranian nation and the Iranian state.

In the Islamic republic of Iran, the Kurdish question is more complicated as the judicial-political framework of the conduct of politics, of legitimacy and authority are concerned. In the constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, there are two conflicting and competing conceptions of sovereignty.

One is the concept of popular sovereignty, which is derived from the indivisible will of the Iranian people, and this is inscribed in the Article I of the constitution of the Islamic Republic. And the other one is the divine concept of institutions of a Imamat is bestowed on the existing *faqih* as the deputy and representative of the Absent Shi'i Imam, and the rightful ruler of the Umma the Islamic community a perception which forms the foundation of Khomeini's doctrine of the "Velayate i Faghih" enshrined in the Iranian constitution in 1979. This divine conception of political sovereignty, which is inscribed in Article 5 of the constitution, is by definition indivisible, indisputable, unquestionable and absolute. It defines the predominance of the living "faqih" as the supreme source of authority and legitimacy whose absolute will defines the boundaries of political power and the juridical-political framework of the conduct of the state.<sup>65</sup>

The Kurdish question has occupied a very curious place in the on-going struggle between the contending forces in the Islamic Republic since its inception. For it is the only question in Iran where these two conceptions of sovereignty

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

easily converge and supplement each other in the political process. When this special policy of the government was carried out in Kurdistan, the outcome was absolutely different; it had nothing to do with the sovereignty of God. The special policy had simply served to impose the Iranian national identity, defined in terms of Persian ethnicity, language and culture, on Kurdistan.

The present crisis in Iran is rooted in the popular quest for the democratisation of the state and society and the conservative reaction and opposition to it. The scale of crisis is unprecedented, it is countrywide and the conservative opposition to reform has already taken the form of an undemocratic resistance to democratic change.

Despite the relatively high level of support of Kurdish people for Khatami, which was overwhelming, Khatami did not initiate any solution for Kurdish question in Iran. It is to be reminded that the Kurds refused to participate in the referendum of 1979 to ratify the Islamic Identity of the post-revolution states. Nor they vote for the constitution of the Islamic Republic. This was also the case in the previous presidential elections, the Kurds stayed away.

The conception of civil society cannot be meaningful if the society is not prepared to respect national, ethnic and cultural difference, and honour the political and civil rights of other.

Dr Ghasemlou's political priority for most of his life was to advance the cause of his oppressed people. The assassination of Dr Ghasemlou as a prominent Kurdish leader is not so much a confirmation of the 'success' of the Iranian state in its violent campaign against Kurdish nationalism, but rather a tragic testimony of the failure of 'nation' building' in Iran. Nation-building in Iran is doomed to failure as long as it is based on the idea of imposing Persian ethnicity on other ethnic and national groups. It is, against that background, most unlikely to bring about a democratic order in Iran based on the rule of law, without accommodating the Kurdish nation's political and territorial rights. Such a vision, for which Dr Ghasemlou gave his life, needs above all international support.

Iran is a multinational and multi-ethnic country. Multinational countries confront a number of political and social problems that may not arise in more homogeneous countries<sup>66</sup>. Political problems arise in multinational states because of implications of the existence of distinct "national" groups that may be said to exist in such states. National group distinctions may include **such** characteristics as geographic origin, language, religion, culture, ethnicity, or race. Often persons share several of these characteristics which gives them a sense of being related to and belonging to a greater group of similar persons. That is to say, many or most persons in a multinational state have at least one national identity that is distinct from that generated by the civic and cultural life of the particular country in which they live. A multinational Federation based on the territorial and ethno-territorial principles in Iran can play the role of the balancer between the political and national forces, civic and ethnic national identities to keep the Iran unity and mitigate national and ethnic conflicts within Iran.

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<sup>66</sup> Roger D. Congleton, *A Political Efficiency Case for Federalism in Multinational States: Controlling Ethnic Rent-Seeking*, George Mason University, Fairfax, 1998

# KURDISH LANGUAGE IN THE IRANIAN LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Majid Hakki

## ABSTRACT

This article discusses the state of Kurdish language in the Iranian legal framework. In order to know the states of Kurds in Iran, the constitution of Iran is reviewed.

In this article, the press law of Islamic Republic of Iran will be reviewed, after which the Kurdish language in the legal framework of Iran will be examined. In order to know the states of Kurds in Iran, the constitution of Iran will be reviewed. After that the press law and freedom of expression in Iran will be discussed. The Kurdish language in the legal framework of Iran will be discussed in the last chapter of the article.

## INTRODUCTION

Freedom of expression and freedom of press are not adequately honored in the Iranian Law. In Iran publications and the press have freedom of expression except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or to the rights of public [1]. Iran is one of world's most dangerous and insecure places for press workers and journalists. During the last 28 years tens of journalists and publishers have been detained, executed or murdered and extra judiciary killed in so called serial murder operations.

Since President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his team of mainly former commanders of Revolutionary Guards and the officials of the intelligence services gained power in August 2005, authorities have cracked down on journalists. During 2006, 38 journalists were arrested and dozen media-outlets were censored.


Many journalists were also held in custody without basic rights. For example, the Kurdish journalist Shirko Jahani was summoned on 27<sup>th</sup> of November 2006 by the town prosecutor who immediately detained him for giving interviews about human rights in Kurdistan to a "foreign" media. Jahani began a hunger strike in protest and refused to pay 5 million tumen (€5,500). Jahani is deprived from all social and employment rights [2, 3].

This paper describes the legal state of the Kurdish language in the Iranian legal framework. The set of current paper is organized as follows: The next section will present the state of Kurds in the Iranian constitution. After that the press law of Iran and freedom of expression will be discussed. The Kurdish language in the legal framework of Iran will be viewed in the last chapter.

## KURDISH STATE IN the CONSTITUTION OF IRAN

The constitution of Islamic republic of Iran, a source of the attitude of the Islamic regime, is plain in sanctioning and requiring of discrimination and injustice toward Iranian citizens and the various *ethnic groups of the country*. *A country's constitution can be viewed as the basic measure of the value that a government places on human life. In Europe and in various democratic nations, the actions of these governments are regulated by law.*

After the 1979 revolution, Iran became a constitutional theocratic republic. The state has a dual power structure with a supreme leader (the “Vali-e fagih” or “Leader”), and an elected president and legislature (the Majlis). The Rahbar with ultimate political authority is the most powerful figure, who has primary control over many state institutions. He has the right to appoint key officials (such as head of judiciary, broadcast media, armed forces, in practice the atriun and minister of foreign affairs ministers, and various revolutionary bodies), and influences major political decisions. The Majlis’ power is restrained by Guardian Council, which reviews all Majlis proposals. The Guardian Council functions as an upper house of parliament with significant veto power. The council also vets all candidates for president and the legislature [figure 1].



**Figure 1:** Iran's complex political system [4]

The Majlis and Judiciary (judges and prosecutors) are controlled with hardliners, who thereby have significant influence in social affairs through the ability to prosecute; the judiciary uses this power to squash dissent and reform especially in media.

According to articles 57, 58 and 107 of the constitution of Iran, the highest institution in Iran is the supreme leader of the Islamic republic who, according to the Article 12, is a male the Shi'ite cleric. The president, ministers and Parliament speaker must also belong to official religion [Article 115].

The ethnic and national minorities of Iran don't have any constitutional rights in ruling the country. According Article 12 of the constitution of Islamic Republic, the official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelve Ja'fari School, and the principle will remain eternally immutable. The constitution does not recognize national or ethnical minorities but religious minorities: Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian Iranian are the only recognized religious minorities (Article 13).

The Persian language (Farsi) is the official language of Iran. Other languages in Iran called 'tribal languages' are only allowed to be used locally. According to the Article 15 of the constitution of Iran the official language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence and texts, as well as text-books, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as in order to teach their literature in schools is allowed in addition to Persian [5].

This article with its all limits has never implemented in Iran. Studying the “regional and tribal languages” is still forbidden in Islamic Republic of Iran.

Iran is a multinational and multicultural country which over ten million Kurds, which amount to 14 percent of the population. The Kurdish language, according to Islamic Republic Broadcast, is classified as a foreign language [6].

The majority of Kurdish people in Iran are Sunni Muslims, who according to the constitution are second class citizens [Article 12, 13, 14]. The Iranian women who comprise half of the country’s population have no rights to participate in the political process of their country [Articles 21, 109, 115].

## **PRESS LAW OF IRAN AND THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION**

Iran imposes harsh censorship on its press. Its laws regulate media content based on religion, morals, liable, national security, and anti-revolutionary activity. The Supreme National Security Council oversees the media. Each week the Council sends Iran’s newspapers a list of banned subjects that if covered will lead to suspensions. A dedicated press court handles charges against journalists and media sources. Even ultra-conservative and hard-line newspapers have been sanctioned. Journalists have been arrested and media sources banned for offending sacred values, spreading “lies”, spreading propaganda against the Islamic republic revolution, undermining national security, insulting the Guide – Ayatollah Khomeini – and writing about questionable financial dealing of officials which was treated as libel. The existing newspapers in Iran practice self-censorship in order to survive. In Iran according to the law selling and possessing a satellite television is officially forbidden, however the ownership of dishes is common. The Islamic republic jams foreign-based TV stations, particularly those broadcasting in Kurdish [7].

The constitution of Iran states that publications and news media shall enjoy freedom of expression provided what they publish does not violate Islamic principles or the civil code. Iran’s Press law ratified on March 19, 1986, explains that the missions of the press is to enlighten public opinion, advance the objectives of the Islamic Republic, to counteract internal division among citizens, to propagate Islamic culture and principles and reject manifestations of imperialistic culture, as well as foreign politics and economics. Publications must not conflict with any of these enumerated goals.

Article 168 of the constitution sets special conditions for the way in which press offences are to be dealt with stating that “political and press offenses will be tried openly and in the presence of a jury in courts of justice....”

Article 2 of the Iranian press law establishes the purpose of the press:

To enlighten public opinion and increase the level of their knowledge of one or several topics mentioned in Article 1.

To advance the objectives set forth in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran;

To strive to eliminate false and divisive social boundaries and to avoid setting different social groups and classes against each other by classifying them on the basis of ethnicity, language, mores, and local customs;

To fight against the manifestation of colonial culture (profligacy, love of luxury, rejection of religiosity, propagation of prostitution);

To maintain and strengthen the policy of "neither east nor west."

In addition, the press law is open to broad interpretation and arbitrary application in its sweeping prohibition of "discourse harmful to the principles of Islam" (mabani va ahkam-e Islami) or to "the public interest" (houghugh omumi). In this regard, the terms of the Press Law give little meaningful guidance to journalists and editors, while providing officials with plenty of opportunities to censor, restrict, and find offense.

Article 34 of the Press Law requires that press offenses should be prosecuted in a general court before a specially constituted press jury. Under articles 12 and 36 of the Press Law, prosecutions are initiated by a council within the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, which is empowered to refer cases to the press court. Press court is form of a general court which also tries ordinary criminal and civil cases, although in such cases without the presence of a jury. The press courts are empowered to impose criminal penalties on individuals as well as to order closures of newspapers and periodicals. Although the constitution provides the separation of powers and speaks in inspirational terms about judicial independence, such independence is lacking in practice.

Self-censorship is the best way to survive for many media-outlets. The regime's boundaries, social taboos, women's rights and regional ethnic demands are out-of-bounds topics. Self-censorship partly explains small amount of journalists sent to prison. Those jailed are often conditionally released but cannot work freely because they could be imprisoned again at any moment for writing something that displeases the regime. The Government of Iran proposed a law in 2006 that would force media workers to register with the ministry of culture and Islamic guidance.

Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), that ratified by Iran in 1975, reads in part:

- (1) everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
- (2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

The ICCPR requires that restrictions on expression "will only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; b) For the protection of national security or of public order (*ordre public*), or of public health or morals" (article 19)

The practice of the Iranian government clearly exceeds these narrowly drawn limits on restrictions of freedom of expression in which, for instance, national security grounds are permissible only in serious instances of political or military threat to the entire nation [8].

Article 14(1) of the ICCPR further provides that "in the determination...of his rights and obligations in a suit of law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law." According to Human Rights Watch Report [3] in cases where rights such as freedom of expression are at stake, administrative actions such as newspaper closures should be subject to immediate appeal to an independent judicial authority, in keeping with the obligation of states under article 2 of the ICCPR to encourage judicial remedies to civil and political rights violations. In Iran, the Supervisory Press Board, dominated by members of the executive branch of government, is neither independent nor impartial and its rulings are not subject to judicial review. Moreover, in practice it exceeds the rights assigned to it in domestic law. Because there is no right to appeal an administrative decision, and because of the law's catch-all restrictions on freedom of expression, the government falls short of its obligation under article 2, 3, (a) of the ICCPR to provide an effective remedy to those whose right for

freedom of expression is violated, "notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity." [9]

Iran imposes cruel censorship on its new media. The regime of Tehran has adopted one of the world's most extensive Internet censorship policies. Iran holds along with China the most sophisticated state-mandated filtering system in the world. The extensive filtering regime has been adopted at a time of extraordinary growth in Internet usage among Iranian people and a burst of growth in writing online in the Farsi, Kurdish, Turkish and Arabic languages.

While selling and possessing satellite television dishes are officially forbidden, ownership of dishes is common. The regime of Iran jams foreign based TV stations particularly those broadcasting in Kurdish and Farsi. During February – March 2007 authorities confiscated thousands of satellite dishes in the Kurdish area.

Since April 2000, 110 daily newspapers and journals have been closed down.

### **KURDISH LANGUAGE PUBLICATIONS IN IRAN**

The first Kurdish school was established in 1912 by Abdulrazagh Baderkhan [4] in Khoy City North West Iran. *Kurd-newspaper* was the first publication in Iranian Kurdistan by Isma'il Agha Shikak, Simko in 1921 in Uromiye. The great period of Kurdish literature in Eastern Kurdistan is that of the Republic of Kurdistan which only lasted for eleven months at the end of the Second World War. Despite its brevity, it triggered a remarkable development in Kurdish literature and publications. Numerous newspapers, journals, books and poets emerged, such as the poets Hejar and Hemin. The repression which followed the fall of the Republic forced the intellectuals to go into exile, mostly in Iraq [10].

Following collapse of Kurdistan Republic, Reza Shah e Pahlavi began a century of atrocious acts by introducing several brutal campaigns against the Kurds causing unnumbered displacements and severe economical losses for the Kurdish people. Reza Shah banned Kurdish publications and schools that were established during the Kurdistan Republic in 1946 - 47. Kurdish publications in Iran never lasted very long as a result of the discriminatory regulations enforced on the editors and writers. The false notions employed by the Shah that being Kurd is a sub-identity of the Persian race, and that Kurds are in fact Persians, is still maintained to this day by chauvinist Persians and political groups, and the current Iranian government. These notions were forced upon Kurdish publishers that refused them, and whose publications were consequently shut down [12].

In February 1979, a revolution of the people expelled the monarchial regime but the Islamic government which replaced it is also unwilling to accord national rights to its Kurdish minority. The Islamic Republic of Iran began its reign by declaring a Jihad on the Kurds in 1979 attacking Kurdish cities and villages in Eastern Kurdistan. In addition to the people's disfavored identity as Kurds, they are further alienated because the majority of Kurds in Eastern Kurdistan are Sunni Muslims. Throughout the Islamic Republic's existence, they have incorporated strategies to further destroy any Kurdish movements.

After 1979 for first three years during stabilization of the Islamic Republic, the Kurdish publishing experienced a new period of growth. Mainly in Kurdish area of Iran numerous Kurdish newspapers and magazines were published. However the war against Kurdish people did not give the opportunity for independent Kurdish publication. Activity after withdrawing Peshmarga forces from Kurdish Cities and Villages, the Islamic Republic of Iran under hard conditions allowed publications of several magazines such as Sirwe and Awene. The editing board of both magazines was under direct control of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, who monitored the content of Kurdish publications.

In 1997 with beginning of presidency of Mohammad Khatami, the Kurdish publications in Iran publication appeared. Within few years dozens of Kurdish journals and newspapers revealed. In October 2003 the First Kurdish Newspaper published in Islamic Republic of Iran was banned by Revolutionary court. Since then many Kurdish newspapers, magazines and publishing houses are banned by Islamic republic.

### **The situation of Kurdish language publication in Iran**

Since July 2005, the Iranian government has forcibly closed down or banned more than 43 Kurdish publications. With the current conservative domination of the government, this tactic has continued, focusing primarily on pro-reformist media outlets. The Authorities detained several Kurdish journalists and human rights activists following the August 2, 2006 demonstrations in Sanandaj, the capital of Iran's Kurdistan province. The following day, the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance closed Ashti, a Kurdish-language daily, and Aso, a bilingual (Kurdish and Persian) weekly.

During Khatami presidency the University of Kordestan (Sanandaj) and University of Tehran, offered Kurdish two credits of Kurdish language studies. Since the beginning of Ahmadinejad's presidency the study of Kurdish language in Universities is forbidden and many Kurdish language teaching centers are closed down by security forces.

The Islamic Republic of Iran allows limited Kurdish broadcasting in TV and Radio stations several hours during a week. The programs are mainly related to religion and the official guidance of the Government policy.

According to Reporters without Borders annual report, many journalists were also held in custody, without even basic rights. Shirko Jahani, who works for Euphrates News agency in Mahabad, was summoned on 27 November by the town prosecutor who immediately detained him for giving interviews about human rights in Kurdistan to foreign media. He began a hunger-strike in protest and refused to pay bail of 5 million tumen (€5,500). Jahani is deprived from all social and employment rights.

### **CONCLUSION**

Iran is the country that remains the Middle East's biggest prison for journalists. The Treatments, interrogation, summonses, arrests and arbitrary detention of Kurdish journalists are sharply increasing. Journalists can often only stay out of prison by paying a very high bail.

Since coming to power in August 2005, ultra-conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his team of mainly former leaders of the Revolutionary Guards and the intelligence services have cracked down hard on journalists. In 2006, 9 Kurdish journalists were arrested and a dozen media-outlets censored.

Self-censorship is still the best way to survive for many media-outlets. The regime's leaders, social taboos, women's rights and regional ethnic demands are out-of-bounds topics. Self-censorship partly explains the fewer journalists sent to prison. Those jailed are often conditionally released but cannot work freely because they could be imprisoned again at any moment for writing something that displeases the regime. Such legal pressures forced some to go abroad.

### **ACKNOWLEDGEMENT**

I thank Ms. Talviki Telanto and Dr. Rebwar Fattah the Director of KurdishMedia for their helpful support, suggestions and comments.

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# THE STATES OF ARMED COLONIALISTES OUT OF KURDISTAN NOT IN INGERENCE OF TURKEY AND THE IRAN OF SYRIA IN KURDISTAN

Dr Ali KILIC

The armed forces of Turkey and Iran began to bombard the southern mountains of Kurdistan since last week. The massive Turkish military attack Iran, involving over 250,000 military, represents a barbaric aggression against the achievements of our revolution of Kurdistan and violates the principles of International Law. The actions of two states justify colonialist they failed to take conscience of the fact that violations of human rights on a large scale are an affront to humanity, which concerns everyone. Crimes against humanity have become forums which are deemed as criminal tribunal in The Hague. The Nuremberg trials have been precedent in this regard. The sovereignty of States does more against these crimes. With the creation of the United Nations, States have formally accepted that the organization is a guarantor of peace and security. The operations led peacekeeping by the UN, its humanitarian interventions or remove threats that violations of human rights can create, are an application of the obligation undertaken by States to cooperate in the quest for peace.

What to do? Is it legitimate silence of the United Nations since the destruction of our Republic of Mahabad in 1946 when our leaders are hanged and our people are massacred in the presence of Soviet and British by the collaboration of Turkish armed Iranian? In other words, the Kurdistan will happen again the subject of genocide for implementing the plan of the Greater Middle East put forward by President Bush WG? If yes, what is the difference between the Treaty of Sykes-Picot and Plan of Greater Middle East Project? If not, how can we act with what scientific analysis of the strategic balance of power in order to implement the declaration by the United Nations to safeguard the achievements of our revolution in order to achieve our project on the political unification of our countries on the one hand and secondly to end colonial domination of the occupants States, Turkey, Iran and Syria, insofar as the USA and England, as member states of the Security Council UN may take the Council to implement the declaration by the United Nations on the granting of independence to colonial peoples without being dominated by another foreign force whose people is one Kurdistan?

I think it is here that lies the point of departure for the democratization of reports of forces in the Middle East without the foundation of a democratic republic independent free unified there will be implementing the plan of the Greater Middle East.

## The Position of Problem

Defender of Human Rights, Rene Cassin was the architect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Despite this declared universality of these rights, the Cold War who moved adjourn the emergence of any

interference by the international community, divided into two blocs, on the conduct of States towards their peoples. The resistance comes mainly from the Soviet bloc. During decolonization, France invokes the principle of non-interference so as not having to answer for his policy in Algeria.

However, the discourse of human rights becomes a growing, and the UN has a limited right of scrutiny, with NGOs, in some countries. So on November 6, 1974, the United Nations adopt a resolution that asks Chile to implement the principles of the Declaration of 1948. This type of action will become increasingly common. In the same dynamic, the right to inspect evolves from a simple ability, certainly faces strong resistance, the international community, a duty to denounce the atrocities committed. But regarding the sharing of Kurdistan between the colonialist states, Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq and military intervention by Turkey and Iran in the Kurdistan South; it is not had a Legal action by the United Nations while we are not only facing an institutional problem of international legal order, but also the presence of these States colonialists who committed genocide and who occupy Kurdistan; abolish the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In this sense, a colonial rule in Kurdistan is a violation of international law including the UN Charter. The question that arises is what the UN will keep his silence to address the violation of its charter by the colonialist states of Turkey, from Iran and Syria? If yes, what is the application of the UN Charter? If not, what are the prospects of international legal initiatives of the UN and the EU?

First "interference means under international law without interference under a State or an intergovernmental organization in matters that fall within the exclusive competence of a third State. "According to Bernard Kouchner, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France" outrage at a massacre is not futile. Passivity is a crime. I believe in a positive globalisation. France has invented interference <sup>67</sup> but at the same time it has kept its diplomatic relations with the States colonialists who occupy Kurdistan delivering chemical weapons in Saddam's Iraq and Iran by Khomeini. Thus the right of interference is here that implementation of commitments taken with the signing of the United Nations Charter. But sometimes States opposed to the United Nations denying the facts. The true scope is interference by civil society, which is of increasing importance in the international order. The question that arises is what is the status of illegal occupants statements and what was the response of the UN Security faces an insecurity that claimed many lives of the people of Kurdistan. Then, awareness of international opinion can be seen that the claims of the nation of Kurdistan the right to self-determination are legitimate. As a result, this legitimacy can make states accountable for their misdeeds against the claim of the nation of Kurdistan in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, it is an essential step for the codification of international law commitments of the United Nations for the People of Kurdistan in order to seize el Security Council under the 1960 declaration of the right to grant the independence in Kurdistan because of its colonial status. However, their motivation to promote the principle of humanitarian assistance is not only able to conduct their activities under better conditions: it is also based on their willingness to spread the core values and their belief in human rights.

Faced with the threat Turko-Persian in a statement released in Baghdad, the Foreign Ministry said qu'la sent a letter to Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to protest against bombing of the Turkish army in the provinces of Dohuk and 'Erbil, which have caused substantial damage, fires and have been panic among the civilian population. According

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<sup>67</sup> ) Bernard Kouchner, *Le Nouvel Observateur* du 19 Février 2004

Jabbar Yawar, spokesman of the armed forces Kurds said that the province is covered by the Turkish Air Force "The Turkish artillery bombardment took place at dawn today, targeting villages in Dohuk province, which lasted for 45 minutes and was the villages of Zakho and Amadiyah regions of Dohuk, are covered. "This means that the People of Kurdistan is the subject of a military aggression that destroys all the rights of the Kurdish nation of 40 million in the Middle East. To legitimize its policy uses the Turkish state against the guerrillas; JITEM founded by General Yasar Buyukkanit Head of State Major Turkish beneficiary of the old tactic in the strategy of NATO, as commander of forced military allies. Moreover, the armed forces of Turkey carry out terrorist provocations throw responsibility on the Kurdish resistance. That is why forgetting the responsibilities of international law by keeping silent in the face of terrorism States against Turkish and Iranian Kurdistan Secretary General of NATO Mr. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said "I deplore the terrorist attacks that took place in Turkey in recent weeks and again last night in the east. I, on behalf of all NATO Allies, my sincere condolences to the Turkish people and especially the families of those who died. We strongly condemn terrorism, whatever its motivations and demonstrations. The fight against terrorism remains a priority issue for NATO. <sup>68</sup> "We the Kurds we also we condemn the same terrorism of the Turkish General Staff in Ankara and Kurdistan and all forms of terrorism including terrorism of the Turkish state and bombed Iranian cities and Kurdish villages and who have declared war on the people of Kurdistan. The question that arises is who organized this provocation terrorist force Ankara and what was behind these criminal acts? Is this are Turkish armed forces, using guerrilla warfare against the Turkish JITEM whose commander of the Turkish General Staff Yasar Buyukkanit top laid the bomb in Ankara? If so, it seems to me that Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer Secretary General of NATO has forgotten the Turkish state terrorism; without knowing who laid the bomb in Ankara, and if not what are evidence of the Secretary-General 's NATO justifying that the Turkish General Staff led by General Yasar Buyukkanit did not *mél * in this case, when he defended his officers who have already put bombs in a bookstore in Semdinli? Is it that Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer condemned the actions of Turkish armed forces in this case? If yes, Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer as we must declare that General Buyukkanit is a war criminal and who has committed crimes against humanity in Kurdistan and now the Turkish armed forces Iranian violate all the norms of international law. military exercises of NATO constitute support for terrorism by the Turkish state. If not, meet the Secretary General of NATO with Yasar Buyukkanit, is a support for the war criminal in Kurdistan:

The truth is Turkey, a NATO member, has concluded a contract with a value of 1.78 billion dollars on the purchase of 30 F-16 fighters to the U.S. aircraft manufacturer Lockheed Martin in through an ambitious program to modernize its armed forces. Under the contract, the aircraft will be manufactured, assembled, tested and delivered by the Turkish company Tusas in Ankara, said Turkish Minister of Defence, Vecdi Gonul. "Through this project, engineers, technicians and workers in Turkey will have new employment opportunities and this will offset a portion of the purchase price of 30 aircraft, "Gonul said during the press conference following the signing of contracts. The Ambassador of USA to Turkey, Ross Wilson, said see in this contract is an example of close cooperation between the two countries. Turkey has the second army of NATO after that of USA. Lockheed Martin is meanwhile the main supplier to the Pentagon.

At the end of 2006, the American aerospace and defence Lockheed Martin received a U.S. government contract for 635 million dollars for the modernization of the fleet of F-16 fighters to Turkey. At the end of this contract, dated December 22, Lockheed Martin will provide the Turkish Air Force 216 modernization kits for its multi-purpose

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<sup>68</sup> *D claration de Jaap de Hoop Scheffer; Site de l'OTAN*

fighter aircraft F-16C and F-16D, as well as various services such as tests flights, Training and technical support, "said the group. These are planes that Turkey used in the bombing of Kurdistan. The execution of this contract, which is based on an agreement US-Turkish government signed in April 2005, should last until February 2016. The Turkish Minister of Defence Vecdi Gönül said in late October 2006 that his country would commit to buy Lockheed Martin a hundred new generation fighter F-35, for an estimated 11 to 12 billion dollars.

In terms of military management, we know that the North Atlantic Council, is the main decision-making body of NATO, which decides on NATO's role in the fight against terrorism. Specific aspects of NATO activities are developed through bodies and specialized committees within which the General Yasar Buyukkanit is specialized. But within NATO Turkish armed forces for years using state terrorism against the people of Kurdistan and currently the Turkish Air Force bombed the basement of Kurdistan with 52 military bases of NATO have been deployed to help protect the attack on the Turkish Army. "The member countries of NATO and partner countries also collaborate in order to improve preparedness civile face the consequences of possible terrorist attacks using chemical, biological or radiological, and able to manage these consequences. In a first step, they drew up an inventory of civilian and military capabilities national may be made available to assist affected countries. "While it is the Turkish armed forces have used chemical and bacteriological weapons against Kurdish fighters, our forests have burned and destroyed our villages by 4000 have forced the deportation of 6000 000 Kurdish and it seems to me that Mr Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has not condemned these acts of terrorism of the Turkish state, then NATO leaders plan a new strategy follows:

"The Response Force is composed of ships, aircraft and ground troops capable of reacting to all kinds of crisis situations throughout the world on very short notice. It operates on the principle of "rotations", member countries of NATO units involving land, air and naval or special forces for a period of six months. The training is therefore essential and it is thanks to being tested through exercises such as the NRF is constantly ready to meet any mission that the NATO decision-makers could choose to require. "In the current circumstances that have organized against these manoeuvres? And what relationship established between these manoeuvres and the intervention of Turkish armed Iranian Kurdistan South? Because occupation of South Kurdistan has been organized by the Turkish General Staff for four months and 23 is the third time, the violation of borders, despite opposition from Ms. Rice and the opposition of Mr Bush is what NATO will agree with the intervention of Turkish armed forces in South Kurdistan who struggle with the forces allied against the saddamistes?

The truth is that "The Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has visited on June 12 in Ankara, met the head of the Turkish General Staff Yasar Buyukkanit" has asked Turkey to "exercise a maximum restraint "in its fight against Kurdish separatists of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), following an interview with Turkish Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gül. While stressing that "NATO expresses its solidarity and \ [that \] it is involved in the war against terrorism," Mr. De Hoop Scheffer rejected the idea of a NATO action against the separatists Kurds in Iraqi territory. This call for restraint and a diplomatic solution will probably result grinner teeth into the ranks of the Turkish General Staff, at a time when relations with Washington and with the Atlantic organization are rather fresh. Even if the State Department has strongly reiterated on Tuesday that "the PKK is a terrorist organization", the Turkish army accuses his American ally its inaction against the PKK in Iraq. According to Ankara, at least 3500 rebels would be stationed in the mountains of the province autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan, with the blessing of local Kurdish authorities. For their part, wanted Kurdish rebels launch a signal, Tuesday, declaring, to everyone's surprise, a "ceasefire unilaterally." "We renew our call to stop attacks against the Turkish army. We want peace and we are ready to negotiate, said Abdul Rahman Chaderchi, a leader of PKK Iraqi side. But if we are attacked we fight and we

will have the capacity to respond to any Turkish aggression. " On many occasions, the PKK has called for ceasefire, but generally not taken seriously. "<sup>69</sup>(3)

What was the motivation of the Turkish armed forces? It is an imperialist army which was supported by NATO and which has monopolies and military industrial firms to highlight this situation it is essential to mention two meetings held in Ankara and Istanbul. The first is the international conference organized by the Turkish General Staff question globalization and the new dimensions of security was opened by Yasar Buyukkanit "Before delivering my speech I would like to clarify that 55 countries 800 people attended the symposium organized by the Centre for Strategic Studies Research Turkish Armed Forces (SAREM) participants have come here can discuss new dimensions of security "The Head of State Major added that" we can achieve the objectives just with scientific approaches. As pointed out by the great leader Ataturk "in life science is to guide the most fair" He added that he worked at NATO headquarters in Brussels and then he presided over "the Directorate General Intelligence and the NATO and the Southern Europe () I would like to express clearly, the ethnic structure is made sociological; not be underestimated, but if we take the floor on a structure ethics on the structure éthinque transforms into a structure racist if it wants to achieve its objective by force of arms; ethnic nationalism turns into a terrorist organization. It is thus facing Turkey the level of development of ethnic nationalist PKK is a fascist organisation "<sup>70</sup>

If the logic of General Buyukkanit is right, then the legal construction of the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty on the prohibition of racial discrimination, is wrong. On the contrary, if the legal construction of the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty on the prohibition of racial discrimination; is right, then all the declarations of General Mehmet Yasar Buyukkanit are wrong, we must judge the war criminals before International Criminal Court because of his racist, but, due to practices of the extermination of Kurds.

Regarding the second event is the 2007 Bilderberg conference whose delegation will include this year once again to all politicians, businessmen, central bankers, European Commissioners and bosses of the big Western press greatest. They will be joined at the table by leading representatives of European royalty, led by Queen Beatrix, the daughter of the founder of the Bilderberg and former Nazi, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands and the President of the Bilderberg, the Belgian Etienne Davignon, vice President of Suez-Tractebel. According to the list of the Executive Committee that the author of this article has had access, the following names have been confirmed as official participants of the Bilderberg for the conference"<sup>71</sup>

On the first point if one studies the history of fascism and can establish links between Nazism and Kemalism, the status of the Ottoman Turkish army to a fascist and colonialist founded on the basis of Turkish alliance Germanic . The Pan-Germanism and panturquisme Pan-Islamism and work together on the same basis. Anti-Semitism and racial discrimination and extermination of masses of genocide practices are common. In other words, the current condition, the Turkish army is an army completely imperialist. Mustafa Kemal, as the founder of the "Fatherland and Freedom"; Committee of Union and Progress of the organization and special party Ay Yildiz (Moon Astre) all these organizations are organizations types Nazis; and Mustafa Kémal has never cut its political and military relations with Enver Pasha, Talat pascha and Djemal Pasha who exterminated the Armenian, Greek Assyro-chadéens and Kurds. All these soldiers have been trained by the German imperialist military doctrine. Despite this, Mustafa Kemal was beaten by the Italians he lost with Enver Pasha 450,000 soldiers and he lost the war in Palestine against the British and 75,000 soldiers were

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<sup>69</sup> Le Monde ; 3-06-2007,

<sup>70</sup> Mehmet Yasar Buyukkanit Discours en date du 31-05-2007 ; Site internet [www.tsk.tr](http://www.tsk.tr)

<sup>71</sup> *Les délégués au Bilderberg 2007 - Istanbul, Turquie, du 31 mai au 3 juin*

captured by the English in Palestine 65,000 in Yemen and 60,000 in all war Amman these POWs were sent by the British in India to forced labour.

The truth is that throughout its history, the Turkish armed forces have massacred people Armenian, Kurdish and Greek have committed crimes against humanity have made genocide and war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are not considered: This is the case of Mustafa Kemal who has participated directly in the crimes and he forced the deportation of 400,000 Kurdish 17-01-1917 and the massacred 25 times the people of Northern Kurdistan and gave Nurettin Pacha orders to massacre the people of Qoçgiri in 1921 and the people of Dersim in 1936-37. In this sense, the Turkish armed forces represent a threat to the people of Kurdistan as a whole. We must judge the war criminals before the International Criminal Court Secondly, the question of Science awarded by Mustafa Kemal Yasar Buyukkanit is a concept of the imperialist war based ideas ideologues German military. The Book of General Carl Litzmann "Themes and game tactics of war, contribution to education of our tactical officers ... "Translated from German by Captain Mustafa Kemal in 1909 in Ottoman language and prefaced February 3, 1909 according to the publications of the Turkish General Staff (then Mr. Kemal spoke no German when meeting Sultan Vahdettin with the emperor Kaiser) The Book of General Carl Litzmann had been published by the University of Military Berlin.C 'is a study of the formation of German imperialist army which Hitler salu General Carl Litzmann (hero the first World War ( the lion brzeziny) in early 1930 Hitler and his staff adjuvant Major Willihelm Bruckner and Hitler paid tribute to Litzmann.

This point is quite important, because the Turkish General Staff has considered Litzmann's book as a work of Mustafa Kemal. The question that arises establish what the relationship between political thought and German military and that of Mustafa Kemal; Enver and Djamal and other unionists military practices.

Another study, are notes of Mustafa Kemal on military manoeuvres in the Headquarters Dijoumalı under the leadership of General of the Cavaleries Suphi Pacha.Le 12-09-1909 Mustafa Kemal took part in the manoeuvres eta published notes that took. These manuscripts have been reprinted [1] in 1954: According to Mustafa Kemal "this is not a book, but it is a commencement of military life that I wanted to dedicate to my comrades (footnotes ten days)" [2] Headquarters Dijoumalı is written under the influence of the German military doctrine. In a sense it is the practice from the theoretical doctrine.

Second as important, but "The application of tactics," which was published in 1911 by the military imprémerie Salonique.La Directorate of Strategic Studies and history at the Military Staff in 1995 after in the edition of the Banque d'affaires of Turkey in 1959 entitled "The Works of Ataturk on the Military Art" According to the Turkish General Staff the text was written by Mustafa Kemal, while these are notes taken Conferences Baron Von Der Goltz Pacha and a summary of the book by Baron Von der Goltz, "PATROLS INDEPENDENT. TACTICAL NECESSITEE NEW WEAPONS BY A LONG-RANGE AND THE POWDER NOT SMOKE. TRAD. WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE AUTHOR BY E. JAEGLE written by VON DER GOLTZ (BARON G.): "Published by HINRICHSEN published in 1890; translated and published in french in 1893. Mustafa Kemal in his letter <sup>72</sup> sent to Bulgaria on 05-11-1913 (10) "During a meeting with the Commander of the General Staff of Bulgaria General Fiçef; told me that I applied the plan of the Balkan war according to the report that sent me on the side of Luleburgaz, because I had

<sup>72</sup> VON DER GOLTZ PATROUILLES INDEPENDANTES. TACTIQUE NOUVELLE NECESSITEE PAR LES ARMES A LONGUE PORTEE ET LA POUDRE SANS FUMEE. TRAD. AVEC L'AUTORISATION DE L'AUTEUR PAR E. JAEGLE

Edité par HINRICHSEN paru en 1890 ; traduit et publié en français en 1893.

learned all the plans of the General Staff of the Ottoman Empire, we keep / They are German officers who have given this information and we have benefited particularly Goltz Pacha. I have received regular information on the situation of Ottoman forces every day and our military attaché in Berlin, is informed by the German daily "

Basically the plan on military tactics Mustafa Kemal is a disciple of General Goltz, is under the absolute influence of General Goltz: In his manuscripts "dialogues between the officer and Commander" comes from the book of General Goltz: It is A summary of the book of General Goltz. At the moment I understood "I fell in love with your book"<sup>73</sup> ( he has read several reprises. Following the initial ideas in the Introduction of the book on "the scientific and military expertise," this point is that feed the soul of the officer "that it must impose the soldiers' war 'is the most truth authentic which keeps track of Art military. " Plu late; Mustafa Kemal under the influence of the German General believes that "the guide is the fairest science. Here the concept of science is used in the same sense that the science of war. Mustafa Kemal said that "what he was best known disciple of General Goltz within our army. And the first time during the monarchy manoeuvres of the Ottoman army at Adrianople; imagine them "<sup>74</sup> This is not coincidence that General von der Goltz"<sup>75</sup> In conclusion, the German military thinking is not with science.

Thirdly it is worth mentioning our friend Ambassador Bernard Dorin "But what we are witnessing now in Turkey? in a strange palinodie. The government, and especially the army, wishing disembarkation Alexandrette of 60 000 American soldiers who are waiting offshore for several weeks permission to set foot on Turkish soil to open the "northern front" against Iraq . But the Turkish Parliament, because of the defection of some deputies of the ruling Islamist training, was unable to approve the landing of GI's who determines granting Turkey a very substantial damages, while the equipment itself continues to be unloaded and transported to the Iraqi border by 2 000 U.S. military presence on the spot. (..) But what is crucial however, is the declared will of the Turkish State Major to enter Kurdistan in Iraq at least twice as many Turkish soldiers as American soldiers, ie approximately 120 000 men. To justify this veritable invasion, the Turkish general Ozkök said: "The war will be short if a second front is opened in northern Iraq." In reality, the Turkish motivations are far beyond tactical support for invading American forces. They are essentially twofold.

On the one hand, it is to neutralize the armed forces Kurds in the liberated part of Kurdistan from Iraq and thus destroy the regime of autonomy enjoyed by Kurds in the area. Indeed, the Turkish authorities want to repeat that they can not tolerate a regime of freedom for the Kurds of Iraq. This could encourage the greater part of the Kurdish people, which lies precisely in Turkey, to resume his struggle for basic rights violated. The issue is too vital for Ankara, which has taken years to reduce the PKK rebellion, so one can expect on this point at the slightest concession Turkey. A unique opportunity offered to the Turks in Iraq to destroy Kurdish any desire not only to establish a sovereign state (which is not the intention Kurds), but even to form an autonomous region within a federal Iraq or Confederal. You can be sure that this opportunity is, the Turks will not fail to seize it. "<sup>76</sup>(14)

Thirdly, during an extended meeting between the parties KDP and PUK, in Salahaddin, Thursday, President Massoud Barzani and President Jalal Talabani discussed various political issues Kurds and the political process in Iraq. In a press

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<sup>73</sup> Mustafa Kemal ; *Oeuvres Completes*; Tome I ; ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

<sup>74</sup> Mustafa Kemal ; *Oeuvres Completes*; Tome I ; ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

<sup>75</sup> Evin Cicek; *Etudes sur l'armée turque* ;

<sup>76</sup> Bernard Dorin, *Les Kurdes; Destin Héroïque; Destin Tragique*; Edition , Linges de repères; 2005; Paris

conference, President Barzani described their meeting as a historic achievement. He said they had focused on a common strategy in the long term. They agreed on the need to carry out reforms in their parties in the interest of serving the people of the region of Kurdistan. The President Barzani denied that Turkish troops had crossed into Kurdistan. Any movement across the border would be regarded as an incursion into Iraq. He said they were willing to cooperate with Turkey to seek a peaceful solution to the issue of the PKK. The President said that Turkey can not expect that the authorities Kurds take military action against the PKK.

The question is to know first what is the goal of the international conference organized by the Turkish General Staff on globalization and the new dimension of security while it is an occupying force and imperialist threat and security of the People Kurdistan? Secondly "globalization exerts Does an influence on military power and jobs of armed force and, if so, where and to what extent? The consequences of globalization on military power are the subject of intense debate theoretical and empirical policies. The liberal analysts underline the extent and influence of globalization, which imposes constraints increasingly rigid political leaders and military, limiting their ability to create military power and use military force. Conversely, analysts dispute the inspiration realistic empleur and influence of globalization, and when they give a role, it appears to them as a source of vulnerabilities. Thirdly establish what the relationship between the Bilderberg Conference and NATO's role in the safety of the Greater Middle East? Fourthly who are the real actors of international terrorism? Which organizations are low? For what reasons States colonialist and imperialist organizations have considered the Movement for National Liberation as terrorist organizations while the armed struggle for national independence for each oppressed nation is legitimate and consistent with international law and the Charter of the United Nations? That is why as a first step we will insist on the relationship between the jobs of the armed forces and internal mechanisms clandestine military organizations within the Turkish army against the guerrillas, JITEM, the Directorate of Special war "special organization which highlights the functionality and criminal practice of the Turkish army as a second step we develop the relationship between the Bilderberg Conference and NATO's role in the safety of the Greater Middle East and a third time, we insist on the legitimacy of the right to self-determination of the nation of Kurdistan and the possibilities of implementing the declaration by the United Nations 1960.

In this respect, I think that the foundations of international law and international order, which urged all States, are the UN Charter and resolutions arising there from, and the judgments of the International Court of Justice. These laws prohibit the threat or use of force, unless explicit authorization of the Security Council after it found the failure of peaceful means, or until he decides to intervene in cases of self - defence against "armed attack", precisely defined legal concept.

This obviously does not cover all situations. Thus, there is at least a tension, even a radical contradiction between the rules of world order imposed by the UN Charter and the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, another pillar of order World. The Charter outlaws rape by force of state sovereignty, while the Universal Declaration guarantees the rights of individuals against states oppressors.

For Daniele Ganser: My research focused on the period of the Cold War in Europe. But we know that there was also where False flag State responsibility was proved. Example: the attacks in 1953 in Iran, initially awarded to Iranian communists. But it turned out that the CIA and MI6 had used the agents provocateurs to orchestrate the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh government, as part of the war for control of oil. Another example: the bombings in 1954 in Egypt, which were first assigned to Muslims. It has been proved by the result that in what was called the Lavon affair

<sup>77</sup>, the Mossad agents who were the perpetrators. Here, it was for Israel to ensure that British troops will not leave Egypt, but remain as to ensure the protection of Israel. Thus, we have historical examples showing that the strategy of tension and false flag were used by the USA, Britain and Israel. We still need further research in these areas, because in their history, other countries have also used the same strategy. "

In Turkey the guerrillas against Turkish JITEM, the direction of the Force have committed war crimes against our people, in spite of that in a study entitled the Official General Report on Turkey (January 2002 <sup>(78)</sup>) prepared for the Council of the Union Europe by the Ministry of External Affairs Dutch, said that:

*[...] The Turkish government considers the nationalist aspirations of the Kurds as a threat to the indivisibility of the Turkish state and unified as a cause of division among Turkish citizens based on ethnicity. [...] Support the Kurdish cause [...] constitutes a criminal offence under the Criminal Code [...] or [...] of Terrorism Act, according to the type of support provided. The penal provisions apply to all Turks, whether Turkish or Kurdish origin. The Turkish authorities do not linger as the fact that a person either Turkish or Kurdish as the sympathy she shows for the separatist cause. The Turkish authorities give separatism a broad definition that is not always unequivocal. "*

This approach is closer is that of Mr Senator Chuck Hagel of USA (Nebraska) Republican and member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Special Committee on intelligence. According to Mr Senator Chuck Hagel threat that weighs on NATO today does not come from great powers but weak countries. The world can not afford the luxury of choosing the challenges he wants to meet. Terrorism, poverty, endemic diseases, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, States habits and patterns and prolonged conflicts are complex and interrelated causes. The future success of NATO will be determined by its ability to deepen and expand cooperation in the fields of intelligence, law enforcement, economy, diplomacy and humanitarian action, including the Grand Middle East. One wonders what is the opinion of U.S. Senator on the forced deportation of 6000 000 Kurds and the destruction of 4000 villages in North Kurdistan. Are the Turkish armed forces or the legitimate claims of the People of Kurdistan that threaten NATO? Mr Chuck Hagel made the reference to Mr. Kissinger diplomacy that we have long criticized in another search: Sustainability and the object of the Atlantic Alliance, however, have been seized by Henry Kissinger, who notes in his book Diplomacy adds Senator Hagel.<sup>79</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> [La France autorise l'action des services US sur son territoire](#) » par Thierry Meyssan, *Réseau Voltaire*, 8 mars 2004.

<sup>78</sup> *l'Official General Report on Turkey (January 2002*

<sup>79</sup> Chuck Hagel Sénateur des États-Unis (Nebraska) et membre républicain de la commission sénatoriale des affaires étrangères et du comité sénatorial spécial sur le renseignement. Les Objectifs de politique étrangère des États-Unis, Juin ; 2004

"The architects of the Atlantic Alliance would have been incredulous if they were told that victory in the Cold War would cast doubts on the future of their creation. It was obvious to them that the price of this victory would be a lasting Atlantic partnership. In the name of this objective that has been delivered and has won some battles decisive policies of the Cold War. In this process, America was linked to Europe by permanent consultative institutions and a system of integrated military command structure of a magnitude and duration unique in the history of coalitions. "Mr Chuck Hagel wrote that" The struggle in which we are engaged today is a global struggle that engages in conditions different from those of clashes or military alliances of previous eras. It is no longer the traditional clash between two armies which are fighting to acquire or defend territories. The increase must be done inside the country in the field of human rights, good governance and economic reform, beyond military force, before we can hope for security and stability sustainable. "But this approach Mr Chuck Hagel, is contradictory reports by the legitimate claims of the People of Kurdistan North struggle for basic human rights; opposite which Turkey supported by NATO. The Turkish army has been financed by NATO against the legitimate struggle of the People of Kurdistan. I think it is impossible to build on this basis the political future of the Middle and Near East. According to U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel Mr "President Bush proposed a plan for the Greater Middle East that is potentially historic in scope and reflects the strategic importance of this region for foreign policy USA. The support of American freedom in the Greater Middle East must be accompanied by operational programs partnership with the peoples and governments of the region to promote political democratization and economic openness. NATO is of vital importance for the success of this company. (..) Turkey is also a pivotal cultural and geographical with the Arab and Islamic world. By bringing it to Turkey, NATO will increase its chances to promote further political and economic reforms and increase the possibilities for settling disputes involving that country. If we reposition Turkey, we would go against our interests that are linked to peace and stability throughout the region. "(<sup>80</sup>) It is the foundation of the speech of General Yasar Buyukkanit.

For Anthony Cordesman Principal Investigator and Chair of strategy Arleigh A. Burke, Centre for Strategic and International Studies "If compelling reasons forcing members of the Alliance to cooperate in establishing security in the Greater Middle East, it requires a realistic assessment of the various national policies, a real understanding political problems and socio-economic characteristics of the region, and a commitment to eliminate the root causes underlying instability, violence and terrorism. "

Because the large oil market of Kurdistan is a key determinant of geopolitics in the Middle East with its natural sources, this feature draws the attention of major powers with the aim of the new division of its main wealth of our country. This has been interpreted by the researcher Anthony Cordesman of the following

"The Greater Middle East presents a vital strategic interest to national security for Europe as for the USA. Industrialized nations of the world are becoming increasingly dependent on a global economy driven by energy exports from the Middle East "According to Cordesman," The total population of the Middle East and North Africa

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<sup>80</sup> Anthony Cordesman *Chercheur principal et titulaire de la chaire de stratégie Arleigh A. Burke, Centre d'études stratégiques et internationales in Les Objectifs de politique étrangère des États-Unis, Juin ; 2004*

rose from 78.6 million in 1950 to 307.1 million in 2000. According to conservative projections, it will reach 376.2 million in 2010, 522.3 million in 2030 and 656.3 million in 2050. This growth deplete natural water resources, impose a permanent dependence vis-à-vis imports of food and cover the number of active young people (group of 15 to 30 years) from 20.5 million in 1950 to 145.2 million in 2050. With more than 40% of the population of the region today aged 14 years or less, there will be enormous constraints on social, educational, political and economic. "(81)

We are facing a problematic history of colonialist and imperialist forces and explanations of the Bilderberg Conference held in Istanbul from May 31 to June 3 highlight another vision of Greater Middle East Project: Besides the quagmire in Iraq The energy problems continue to dominate the discussions of Bilderberg. The oil and natural gas are finite non-renewable resources. Once used, they can be replenished. As the world turns and that the resources of oil and natural gas are shrinking we exceeded half the possibilities of production and discovery of oil. Indeed, while demand explodes dramatically, particularly with the Chinese and Indian economies booming who want all the accessories and privileges of the way of life of Americans, we discover less oil than we produce. Starting from now, the only thing that is certain is that supply will continue to decline and prices continue to rise. Under these conditions, a global conflict is a physical certainty. The end of oil means the end of the global financial system, something that has already been recognized by the Wall Street Journal and the Financial Times, two full-time members of the circle of Bilderberg insider. The report by Goldman Sachs on oil [another full-time member of the elite Bilderberg], published on March 30, 2005, has increased the range of oil prices for the year 2005-2006 of \$ 55 - \$ 80 a barrel to \$ 55 - \$ 105. At the 2006 meeting, the Bilderbergers have confirmed that their top estimate of the price range for oil, for 2007-2008, continues to oscillate between \$ 105 - \$ 150/le barrel. As Nicholas Burns Ambassador of USA to the Organization of the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) he thinks that at the next NATO summit in Istanbul and beyond, the USA consider the adoption of ambitious five objectives: the increase in troops and resources to strengthen the NATO presence in Afghanistan; attribution to NATO a clearly defined role in Iraq; expansion of the commitment of the NATO's Greater Middle East; improving relations between NATO and the European Union. Among the five objectives of the USA first is to help the Afghan people; about this Madam Ambassador Victoria Nuland had explained that "The American agenda for the Riga Summit is an open secret. First and foremost, the USA hope to build with allies and partners of NATO alliance, which ensures security in the defence of their values, not just at home, but wherever this security or these values can be threatened and whenever NATO is the appropriate instrument to cope with new challenges. "(82) and the second is to "examine "how to prepare the ground for assigning a greater role for NATO in Iraq" Third, NATO should increase its commitment to Arab States and of Israel to help them decide on the route by which they s'orienteront towards a more peaceful future in the Greater Middle East. The fourth objective is the improvement of relations between NATO and the European Union (EU), these two major institutions responsible for the future of Europe. The fifth objective is to strengthen NATO's relationship with Russia. "(83)

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<sup>81</sup> Anthony Cordesman ,ibid

<sup>82</sup> Exposé de Madame l'Ambassadrice Victoria Nuland devant le Cercle Manfred Woerner, le 23 octobre 2006 à Bruxelles, en Belgique

<sup>83</sup> Nicholas Burns *Ambassadeur des États-Unis auprès de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN in Les Objectifs de politique étrangère des États-Unis, Juin ; 2004*

In these circumstances what is the status of Kurdistan and the future of the People of Kurdistan and the other peoples of the Middle East?

The truth is that the people of Kurdistan is a fully fledged nation, the fourth largest in the region, estimated today, without doubt, nearly 40 million slightly more than half, nearly 18 million live Turkey where the Turkish army has destroyed 4000 villages and the forced deportation 600000 Kurds. All have strong sense of national identity, language, culture, history Who their own, and a homeland, I had to say one country, which was their over millennia, where they represented a large majority of the population. After coming to power of Mustafa Kemal, Kurdistan was divided between several states nations unit, which continues against the Kurds in various forms and degrees true, a national policy of oppression and underdevelopment, trying to total elimination or forced assimilation as a distinct people. It is because they have been placed against their will and without having been consulted, under the jurisdiction of such totalitarian nation-states, that Kurds are fighting for self-determination for a form of state under the Federalism which enshrined their national identity and ensure their economic and social progress.

Indeed, Kurdistan, is treated as a colony, occupied militarily and economically exploited without even a colonial status to be recognized by the United Nations. Indeed, one can say that this is a settlement practised, outside any international control by totalitarian systems in fact, worse than classic colonialism as it was formerly exercised by the Western powers »(...) "This is a consequence of three quarters of a century of rebellion, repression and massacres da, is still relatively unknown, if not ignored by international opinion: A strange conspiracy of silence has continued to conceal this genocide. The various appeals to the United Nations, States, the universal conscience launched by the oppressed people, doomed to extermination, have so far received no feedback. (29). Officially it is neither the Kurds nor Kurdish Question in Turkey. An identical genocide has taken place since 1992, in Kurdistan in Turkey, containing the Kurdish civilian population, by the will of the Turkish National Security Council and under the auspices of the Anti Terrorist Act in April 1991. Turkey is indisputably governed by laws. Should I add that Germany was Hitler legislature? The Preamble, para 3 of the Universal Declarations of Human Rights declares the following: Considering that it is essential that human rights are protected by a regime of law for that man is not compelled to Supreme resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression. ". The Act is to be based on the broad principles of justice and fairness any rebellion against tyranny is legitimate. It is in the sense that the people of Kurdistan North leads the struggle against the National Libration Army colonialist and fascist Turkey to release the Kurdistan Jung colonial Turkish as General De Gaulle who led the armed struggle against occupation Hitler and fascism against Nazism for the liberation of France. But the Nazis were accused General Charles De Gaulle and french resistance fighters as "terrorists", while the terrorists were Nazis. Today the name of what the representatives of NATO practice injustice against Kurds who were persecuted by the fascist regime who fled Turkish oppression? This practice does not represent the participation of legal liability for NATO countries to direct the injustice of which the Kurdish people has been?

Kurds, a people without condition, are not about right for international law, as ethno-cultural community in its own right, as well as any people in the same conditions. They can not themselves apply to UN bodies, the General Assembly, at the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council (CEOSOC) so that their justice is done. Officially, the United Nations unaware of the existence of Kurds, regarded as citizens of Turkey, Iran, Syria or Russia may be submitted as such the domestic laws of sovereign states to which they belong. These states are masters of their

legislation and their police, the member states of the UN, represented by their respective governments, can be democratic, more or less democratic, dictatorial, guilty of serious violations of human rights, or even genocide, it is unimportant. As long as such violations will not be officially recognized, the authors continue to enjoy full membership in Club, with all the consideration due to them from the Ministries of Europe. Only states may seek to raise an issue on the order of the day with UN bodies, which is a political decision in itself. The members of the body, by another in which your intervene commercial considerations, diplomatic, strategic and others will accept or not this issue be put on the agenda.

Since the adoption of the Declaration to the UN. On the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples clearly demonstrates that whenever people have withstood the pressures of neocolonialism, they have triumphed and been released. Article 1 of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence of countries and peoples Colonisés, December 4, 1960, mentions "The subjection of peoples to a submission, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary the Charter of the United Nations and is an obstacle to advancing peace in the world and its mutual "The article continues that statement as well:" All peoples have the right to self-determination; under this right they freely choose their status ~ ~ ts policies and conduct their economic social and cultural ~ Article 4 adds "Any armed action or repressive measure and some so whatsoever, directed against the non-independent peoples must stop To enable them to exercise freely and peacefully their right to complete independence and integrity of their national territory must be respected. "

But why the United Nations should they assist in the release of only peoples and territories under Western domination or European? Why colonialism would it only because a number of European powers industrially advanced? That is why we usually call colonialism official, the other being, such that one can find in states in the Third World, that of colonialism shameful. . The right to self-determination, defined by the United Nations and a doctrine depth, is universal. For the right of peoples and nations to self-determination has become a universally recognized principle of international law. It means not only the right of every people to elect the form of state direction he sees as best suited to its development, but also the obligation of other states and peoples to assist the people in question assistance in carrying out its right to self-determination.

The question arises what is the responsibility of the State Council UN Security vis-à-vis the situation in Kurdistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Declaration on the progress and development and the two Additional Protocols the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 adopted in 1977 represent an undeniable progress of humanitarian law?

Protocol I, on the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, recognized as such "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and foreign occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. "So what is France's policy on the Kurdish Question?

Protocol II relates to non-international armed conflicts and apply to conflicts on the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or armed groups organized under the leadership of a responsible command, exercise on part of its territory. "

Secondly, the first chapter of the United Nations Charter that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to develop among nations friendly relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights of peoples and their right to have themselves. In other words "the right to self-determination for all peoples and the universal respect and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. This promotes the United Nations in view of creating conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for between nations peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principle of equal rights of their peoples and to have themselves . "We must insist on the right to self determination of the Kurdish nation.

Thirdly, the fundamental document which contains the universally accepted definition of development is the Declaration on the progress and development in the social sphere, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1969. Elle proclaims: "The development and progress dabs the social field are based on respect for the dignity and worth of the human person and must ensure the promotion of human rights and social justice, which requires:

a) The immediate and final elimination of all forms of inequality, exploitation of peoples and individuals, colonialism, racism including Nazism and apartheid and all other political and ideology contrary to the purposes and United Nations principles; In this connection the speech of General Buyukkanit and the President of the Turkish State Nectar Ahmet Sezer are completely racist and fascist.

b) The recognition and effective implementation of Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, social and cultural rights without any discrimination. If the fundamental obstacles encountered in the path of development in the contemporary world, are inequality, exploitation, war, colonialism and racism, then how the abolition of these barriers is possible for the Kurdistan which is a country 34 million people whose language and culture are banned? How is it possible then it is fragmented, colonized by four states colonialists, occupied militarily, economically exploited without even a colonial status to be recognised by the UN? That's how it is possible without creating the conditions for defending the right to self-determination of the Kurdish nation including the founding of his own state? Indeed the United Nations seeks to address anything that may cause a conflict. Conflict prevention and promotion of peace take it for a variety of forms. All this work of the United Nations has become all the more necessary since the second world war, weapons are still sophisticated and have become even more dangerous. If the Turkish state wants to seize the United Nations to intervene, there will be an appeal to the Council of the UN Security under the declaration by the United Nations 1960. This is not only the question of interference in Kurdistan South, but at the same time to withdraw all its armed forces on Turkish territory of Northern Kurdistan and the Iranian armed forces must leave and Syrian Kurdistan. We know that the Security Council of the United Nations is still the main United Nations body whose role is conflict resolution and peacekeeping. It consists of fifteen members, including five permanent members, China, the USA, Russia, France and the United Kingdom, and ten members elected by the General Assembly for two years. When the Security Council is seized of a problem that may pose a threat to peace and international security, it must first try to resolve it through peaceful means. Thus, he came to council to act as a mediator or in the event of armed conflict, proposing a ceasefire. The Council may also strengthen its decisions by establishing a regime of sanctions. According to the report "We the peoples" The sanctions are a means for the Council to enforce its decisions and constitute a step between a simple condemnation and the use of armed intervention. It may be arms embargo, trade restrictions and financial, business interruption of air and maritime relations or a diplomatic isolation. However, the Council may also opt for actions involving more men and equipment, as the operations of peacekeeping. Secondly, Mr Zebari has proposed negotiations if Turkey seeks

interest on the cities of Mousoul and Kerkouk, but must respect the right to self-determination of the People of Kurdistan North, in case Turkey, Iran; The Syria will lose.

Regarding the European Union;. The maintenance of peace and strengthening international security are priority goals for EU action. However, the most important effort to not focus solely on the military dimension, since security and peace requires that "does not close its eyes to the injustices that exist in the world." Moreover, the EU-power "wants to change the course in the world so as to benefit not only for the rich countries but also for the poorest countries" and "wants to set globalisation according to the principles of ethics, ie anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development "[3] 0. On the other hand, one can only note that the EU has today a variety of policy instruments, diplomatic, economic, cultural and military, allowing it to have a role as a "new type of power" in regulating the international system and to counterbalance the hegemonic power of the USA [4].

It is therefore an approach Kurdish; overall international security that may correspond to the policy of President of Kurdistan. Mr. Barzani with our demand next /, In accordance with the Charter of the United application we ask for the resolution 2142

(XXI). Elimination of ail forms of racial Discrimination to the conditions of the nation of Kurdistan colonized by the colonialist states; Turkey, Iran and Syria.

*The General Assembly,*

**Recalling** its resolutions 1905 (XVIII) of 20 November 1953 and 2017 (XX) of 1 November 1965 on measures to implement the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Ail Forms of Racial Discrimination,

**Recalling** also its resolution 2106 A (XX) of 21 December 1965, in which it adopted and opened for signature the International Convention on the Elimination of the Forms of Racial Discrimination,

**Noting** the information in the report of the Secretary General,<sup>53</sup> furnished in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1076 (XXXIX) of 28 July 1965 and General

Assembly resolution 2017 (XX) on the action taken by Member States, the United Nations, the specialized agencies and regional inter-governmental organizations and directed towards the implementation of the Declaration,

**Noting** also that a seminar on the elimination of ail forms of racial discrimination is to be held, under the programme of advisory services in the field of human rights, in 1968,

**Noting** further that the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities is undertaking a special study of racial discrimination in the political, economic, social and cultural fields, and has already appointed a Special Rapporteur for that purpose,

**Reaffirming** that racial discrimination and apartheid are denials of human rights and

fundamental freedoms and of justice and are offences against human dignity,

**Recognising** that racial discrimination and apartheid, wherever they are practised, constitute a serious impediment to economic and social development and are obstacles to international cooperation and peace,

**Deeply concerned** that racial discrimination and apartheid, despite the decisive condemnation of them by the United Nations, continue to exist in some countries and territories,

**Convinced** of the urgent necessity to further measures to attain the goal of the complete elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and apartheid,

1. **Condemns**, wherever they exist, all policies and practices of apartheid, racial discrimination and segregation, including the practices of discrimination inherent in colonialism;

2. **Reiterates** that such policies and practices on the part of any Member State are incompatible with the obligations assumed by it under the Charter of the United Nations;

3. **Calls** again upon all States in which racial discrimination or apartheid is practised to comply speedily and faithfully with the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and with the abovementioned resolutions and all other pertinent resolutions of the General Assembly, and to take all necessary steps, including legislative measures, for this purpose;

4. **Calls upon** all eligible States without delay to sign and ratify or to accede to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;

5. **Call upon** Member States which have not already done so to initiate appropriate programmes of action to eliminate racial discrimination and apartheid, including in particular the promotion of equal opportunities for educational and vocational training, and guarantees for the enjoyment, without distinction on grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin, of basic human rights such as the rights to vote, to equality in the administration and justice, to equal economic opportunities and an equal access to social services;

6. **Appeals** to Member States that, in combating discriminatory practices education and culture should be directed, and mass media and literary creation should be encouraged, towards removing the prejudices and erroneous beliefs, such as the belief in the superiority of one race over another, which incite such practices;

7. **Requests** the Member States which have not yet replied to the Secretary-General's inquiry as to the measures they have taken to implement the Declaration to do so without delay;

8. **Proclaims** 21 March as International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination;

9. **Requests** the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its twenty-second

session a report on the implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution»<sup>54</sup>

2144 (XXI). Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories

*The General Assembly,*

*Noting Economic and Social Council resolutions*<sup>55</sup>

**Confirming** that the United Nations has a fundamental interest in combating policies of apartheid and that, as a matter of urgency, ways and means must be devised for their elimination

**Bearing** in mind the obligation of all Member States under Article 56 of the Charter of the United Nations to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55, which include the promotion of universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

**Convinced** that gross violations of the rights and fundamental freedoms set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights continue to occur in certain countries, especially in colonies and dependent territories, involving discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language and religion, and the suppression of freedom of expression and opinion, the right to life, liberty and security of person and the right to protection by independent and impartial judicial organs, and that these violations are designed to stifle the legitimate struggle of the people for independence and human dignity”

(1) Bernard Kouchner, *Le Nouvel Observateur* du 19 Février 2004

(2), *Déclaration* de Jaap de Hoop Scheffer; Site de l'OTAN

(3)-Le Monde ; 3-06-2007,

(4), Mehmet Yasar Buyukkanit Discours en date du 31-05-2007 ; Site internet [www.tsk.tr](http://www.tsk.tr)

6-Le Quartier Général de Djoumalı ,Bulletin de □ Association des Bibliothèque de Turquie ; 1954 ; Volume ; I N°2 ; Ankara et in ; □uvres Completes; Tome I ; p.32;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

7- Mustafa Kemal ; *Oeuvres Completes*; Tome I ; p.57 ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

8- Mustafa Kemal ; *Oeuvres Completes*; Tome I ; p.151 ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

9- Mustafa Kemal ; *oeuvres Completes*; Tome I ; p.161-163 ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

10- VON DER GOLTZ **PATROUILLES INDEPENDANTES. TACTIQUE NOUVELLE NECESSITEE PAR LES ARMES A LONGUE PORTEE ET LA POUDRE SANS FUMEE. TRAD. AVEC L'AUTORISATION DE L'AUTEUR PAR E. JAEGLE**

Edité par HINRICHSEN paru en 1890 ; traduit et publié en français en 1893.

11- Mustafa Kemal ; *Oeuvres Completes*; Tome I ; ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

12- Mustafa Kemal ; *Oeuvres Completes*; Tome I ; ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

13-Evin Cicek; *Etudes sur l'armée turque* ;

14-Bernard Dorin, *Les Kurdes; Destin Héroique; Destin Tragique*; Editions Linges de repères; 2005; Paris

[15] *Stay behind* (qui veut dire : rester derrière en cas d□ invasion soviétique) est le nom donné aux structures clandestines entraînées pour mener une guerre de partisans.

[16] *Gladio désigne l'ensemble des armées secrètes européennes qui étaient sous la direction de la CIA.*

[17] *Président du Conseil des ministres, membre de la démocratie chrétienne.*

[18] « [Rapport Andreotti sur l'□ Opération Gladio](#) » document du 26 février 1991, Bibliothèque du Réseau Voltaire.

[19] « [1980 : carnage à Bologne, 85 morts](#) », *Réseau Voltaire*, 12 mars 2004.

[20] « [La France autorise l'□ action des services US sur son territoire](#) » par Thierry Meyssan, *Réseau Voltaire*, 8 mars 2004.

[21] *Affaire Lavon*, du nom du ministre de la Défense israélien qui a dû démissionner quand le Mossad a été démasqué comme ayant trempé dans ces actes criminels

23- *l'Official General Report on Turkey (January 2002*

24 Chuck Hagel Sénateur des États-Unis (Nebraska) et membre républicain de la commission sénatoriale des affaires étrangères et du comité sénatorial spécial sur le renseignement. Les Objectifs de politique étrangère des États-Unis, Juin ; 2004

25- Anthony Cordesman *Chercheur principal et titulaire de la chaire de stratégie Arleigh A. Burke, Centre d'études stratégiques et internationales in Les Objectifs de politique étrangère des États-Unis, Juin ; 2004*

26 ; Anthony Cordesman ,ibid

(27) Exposé de Madame l'Ambassadeur Victoria Nuland devant le Cercle Manfred Woerner, le 23 octobre 2006 à Bruxelles, en Belgique

28 Nicholas Burns *Ambassadeur des États-Unis auprès de l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord (OTAN in in Les Objectifs de politique étrangère des États-Unis, Juin ; 2004*

29)Dr Ali KILIC,*Revue Révolution* N°467-1989 ; Paris

30 *Déclaration de Laeken* sur l'avenir de l'UE.

31 Dominique David, *Sécurité: l'après New York*, Presses de sciences Po, Paris, 2002, p.98.

<sup>32</sup>*Prévention des conflits armés*, rapport du Secrétaire général de l'ONU, New York, 2001.

<sup>33</sup>*La responsabilité de protéger*, rapport de la Commission internationale de l'intervention et de la souveraineté des États, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et du Commerce Mondial, Ottawa, Canada, 2002, p.21.

34 François Janne d'Othée, '*L'Union européenne et la prévention des conflits* » in *L'Europe et la sécurité internationale*, ed. Complexe-GRIP, Bruxelles, 1997, p.63 et s.

35 Nous souhaiterions que cette politique de l'UE ne soit pas exclusivement déterminée par des raisons utilitaristes résultantes de la devise selon laquelle « les EUA combattent, l'ONU alimente, l'EU reconstruit ». Même s'il est vrai que la contribution de l'UE à la reconstruction et à la réhabilitation post-confliktuelle, en Europe centrale et orientale, dans l'ex-Jougoslavie, en Palestine et actuellement en Afghanistan, atteint les 55% et celle des EUA n'atteint même les 10% !

36 Félix Nkundabagenzi, Caroline Paille et Valérie Peclow, *L'Union européenne et la prévention des conflits : concepts et instruments d'un nouvel acteur*, GRIP, Bruxelles, 2002.

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3-**Le Quartier Général de Djoumalî**, *Bulletin de l'Association des Bibliothèques de Turquie ; 1954 ; Volume ; I N°2 ; Ankara et in ; Œuvres Complètes*; Tome I ; p.32;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

<sup>4+</sup> **Mustafa K-emal** ; *Œuvres Complètes*; Tome I ; p.57 ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

5- **Mustafa K-emal** ; *Œuvres Complètes*; Tome I ; p.151 ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

6- **Mustafa K-emal** ; *Œuvres Complètes*; Tome I ; p.161-163 ;Kaynak Yayinlari 1998; Istanbul

<sup>[30]</sup> *Déclaration de Laeken* sur l'avenir de l'UE.

<sup>[41]</sup> Dominique David, **Sécurité: l'après New York**, Presses de sciences Po, Paris, 2002, p.98.

<sup>[51]</sup> **Prévention des conflits armés**, rapport du Secrétaire général de l'ONU, New York, 2001.

<sup>[61]</sup> **La responsabilité de protéger**, rapport de la Commission internationale de l'intervention et de la souveraineté des États, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et du Commerce Mondial, Ottawa, Canada, 2002, p.21.

<sup>[71]</sup> François Janne d'Othée, '*L'Union européenne et la prévention des conflits* » in **L'Europe et la sécurité internationale**, ed. Complexe-GRIP, Bruxelles, 1997, p.63 et s.

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<sup>[91]</sup> Félix Nkundabagenzi, Caroline Paille et Valérie Peclow, **L'Union européenne et la prévention des conflits : concepts et instruments d'un nouvel acteur**, GRIP, Bruxelles, 2002.

