The Invisible War in North Kurdistan

Kristiina Koivunen

The right to healthy living is an essential and non-transferrable basic human right which is guaranteed by our constitution. The utilisation of our health care services by every citizen when he/she needs them, the elimination of regional inequalities, and recognising and raising the health level of our people are some of our basic aims.

Through the establishment and management of health information as required, health care services can be directed and monitored in line with our aims.
(Dr. H. Ibrahim Öksöy, Minister of Health, 1995)

The reason for diseases is poverty, but not only poverty; it is simply the policy of the Turkish state to destroy a nation. Not only to go and shoot and kill them - there are also other methods.(a Kurdish woman)

Kristiina Koivunen

k_kristiina@hotmail.com

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List of Abbreviations

AKIN	American Kurdish Information Network
ANAP	Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)
ARGK	National Liberation Army of Kurdistan (*Artesa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan*)
CATOM	Multipurpose Community Centre (*Çok Amaçli Toplum Merkezleri*)
CHP	Republic People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). Founded by Atatürk
DEP	The Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*) 7.5.1993 - 16.6.1994
DSP	The Democratic Left Party (*Demokratik Sol Parti*)
DYP	True Path Party (*Dogru Yol Partisi*)
ERNK	National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (*Eniya Rizgariya Netewa Kurdistan*)
GAP	Grand Anatolia Project (*Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi*)
HADEP	People's Democratic Party (*Halkin Demokrasi Partisi*)
HEP	People's Labour Party (*Halkin Emek Partisi*) 7.6.1990 - 14.7.1993
HRFT	Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (*TIHV, Türkiye İnsan Haklari Vakfi*)
IHD	Human Rights Association (*Insan Haklari Dernegi*)
IMK. e.V.	International Association for the Human Rights of the Kurds
KHRP	Kurdish Human Rights Project
LIC	Low-intensity conflict
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)
MIT	National Security Organisation (*Milli Istihbarat Teskilati*)
MSF	Médecin Sans Frontières
MSP	Refah Islamic Welfare Party
PHR	Physicians for Human Rights
PKK	Kurdistan Labour Party (*Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan*)
SHP	Social Democrat People's Party (*Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Partisi*)
SES	Trade Union of Health Care (*Saglik Sendikasi*)
TDHS	Turkish Demographic and Health Survey 1993
TTB	Turkish Medical Association (*Türk Tabipler Birligi*)
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees

WHO   World Health Organisation

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1. Introduction:
The scarcity of information about the health of the Kurds

Civil war in North Kurdistan

In March 1997, when I visited the Seyrentepe refugee camp[1] near Amed in the Turkish part of Kurdistan, they were holding a funeral for a 30-year-old woman. The previous day she had suffered breathing difficulties and was taken to a hospital. She did not have any money, so she was turned away. She died a few hours later. This single occurrence gave me an impulse to get more information about the health of the displaced Kurds; thus I decided that the health of the Kurdish population in Turkey and the health care provided for it would be the subject of my Ph.D. dissertation.

There has been an armed conflict in North Kurdistan (Southeast Turkey) since 1984 between the Turkish army and the Kurdistan Labour Party - the PKK (*Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan*). During 1992, the Turkish army underwent a shift in its counterinsurgency strategy in the combat against the PKK and started to use methods of *low-intensity warfare*. To cut the guerrillas' local support in the countryside, the army started to forcibly depopulate villages. (Kürkçü 1997, 8).

In North Kurdistan the most intensive destruction of the countryside was carried out from 1992 to 1996. Conventional warfare changed into an attack on the civilian population. In North Kurdistan about three thousand villages have been razed by the military and there are at least two million internally displaced Kurds living in the shantytowns of Kurdish and Turkish cities. (Amnesty International 1996b, 3). By 2000, about 35,000 people had been killed in battle, but no one has counted the number of civilians who have died of deteriorating living conditions and the increase in diseases. The internal displacement of people is considered to be a domestic issue, so they do not usually get assistance from abroad. In Turkey, the International Red Cross assisted Kurds from northern Iraq during the Gulf crisis in 1991, and the

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[1] The "450" buildings are a four-story housing complex originally built on the outskirts of Amed to house rural victims of a 1975 earthquake in Lice. It was later used by some of the Iraqi Kurd refugees. In 1994 about 3,000 evicted villagers from southeast Turkey moved there. (KHRP 1996, 11; Randal 1999, 266).

UNHCR[2] is still assisting refugees who have come to Turkey from other countries, like Iran and Iraq, but neither of them is providing help to the domestic Kurds. Displaced Kurds do not get international humanitarian aid, and NGOs like Médecins Sans Frontières are not permitted to operate in Turkey. The European mass media keep silent about the destiny of the internally displaced Kurds.

Morbidity in North Kurdistan and among deported Kurds in western Turkey has increased. The incidence of disease within a population is connected to various factors in the living conditions. I describe the health situation during the 1990s and search for connections between the warfare, displacement of civilians, development of health conditions, and lack of humanitarian aid for the displaced Kurds.

The other important aspect is the reasons for the lack of information: It turned out to be very difficult to find information about the health conditions in North Kurdistan. Some organisations like Amnesty International and the Human Rights Association (*Insan Haklari Dernegi, IHD*) monitor the human rights situation, including detentions and disappearances. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT) is studying the effects of torture. But almost no data exists about the effects on physical health that have resulted from the war and the internal displacement of two to three million people. The independent Trade Union of Health Care (SES) has issued some reports, but almost all of them are published only in Turkish. Some international humanitarian organisations have tried to get information about the conditions of the deported Kurds. For example, the German section of the IPPNW (International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War) has sent some delegations to Southeast Turkey to observe the health conditions of the population.

Ethnocide and low-intensity warfare

I search for explanations for the deterioration of the health situation as well as the lack of information and the lack of humanitarian aid to the displaced Kurds, using the theories of *low-intensity warfare* and *cultural genocide (ethnocide)*. There is very little theoretical analysis of either of these theories. Low-intensity warfare is a military doctrine developed in the US during the 1960s by the John F. Kennedy government as an answer to the traumatic experiences of Vietnam. The goal is to limit the war to a certain geographic area and use methods which do not look like warfare so that they do not cause

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[2] United Nations High Commission for Refugees

public reaction at home (the US). (Barnet 1987, 207-208). International observers and human rights organisations usually see the deportation of the Kurds as a method of low-intensity warfare, "taking the sea away from the fish". This comparison is used quite often to describe the strategy of the Turkish army in North Kurdistan, but there is no deep analysis about the use of low intensity warfare methods.

Researchers disagree as to whether ethnocide is a form of genocide which should be included in research about cases of genocide. Research about ethnocide is clearly outside the mainstream research about genocide, and there is very little theoretical analysis of it. Fein suggests a social-scientific definition for the term "genocide" which is broader than the one used by the UN Convention on Genocide. According to her, genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim. (Fein 1992, 3). According to Kuper, ethnocidal acts include deprivation of the opportunity to use a language, practice a religion, create art in customary ways, maintain basic social institutions, preserve memories and traditions and work in co-operation towards social goals. (Kuper 1981, 31).

I present both the visible and the invisible methods by which the state of Turkey oppresses the Kurds. Usually only some of the visible methods - for example, restrictions of the Kurdish language and violations of human rights - are presented and criticised in European mass media. In addition to these, in the background there are also hidden, long-term practices by which Kurds are oppressed as an ethnic group – the ethnocidal methods. How is the lack of information about the health situation connected to the ethnocide of the Kurds? I will also analyse the connections between the methods of low-intensity warfare and ethnocide in Kurdistan. For example, deportation is usually seen as a method of low-intensity warfare, but what ethnocidal effects does it have? What different aspects does the withholding of information have when it is used in low-intensity warfare and in ethnocide?

I describe in considerable detail the background of the crisis, as its present stage is just one step in a long history of oppression and forced assimilation. As a background I start by presenting the history of the Kurds in Turkey, which I describe in rather broad terms because the topic is not well developed. Because the aim of this research is to describe the situation of the Kurds within the theoretical framework of ethnocide, this is also the view taken in the chapter on history.

The target group is the Kurds who live or have lived in the State of Emergency Region in Southeast Turkey. Kurdish provinces have been under the constant application of emergency rule since 1987. The declaration of a state of emergency is valid for a maximum period of six months. The area under emergency rule has not been the same throughout this period (1987-1999) and the number of provinces subject to the law has varied according to the military situation. I study the health situation in the Kurdish provinces Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elazig, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli and Van. These are the provinces – except for Elazig - which (Amnesty International 1996a) described in 1996 as being under emergency rule.[3]

This research describes the deportation of Kurds in the 1990s, but I can not define the exact period under study, as the material which I use is not very exact. The deportation intensified in 1992, so this is the logical starting point for the description. Most of the deported villagers had left their homes by 1996, but I tell about some cases which happened after that. I give information about events which happened after autumn 1998 only in connection with events that happened before that time. Öcalan's departure from Syria (October 1998), the PKK's announcement that it would end its armed struggle (September 1999) and the efforts of the deportees to return to their villages (organised for example by Göç Der in spring 2000) are outside the scope of this research. The changes in the PKK's strategy, resettlement plans for the deportees and Turkey's negotiations with the EU would overextend the scope of this research, which is already wide enough.

The ethics of studying civilians subjected to armed conflicts

There are several armed conflicts going on around the world, but there is very little information about what life is like for civilians caught in the conflict. War and peace studies traditionally pay more attention to the military and political side of conflicts; there exists very little sociological research about life under war conditions. So I want to consider the ethics and practice of doing sociological research about an armed conflict, and examine how the acquisition and analysis of information is different from normal situations.

One particularly important aspect is the position of the researcher: in a conflict there are at least two participants, so there are two perspectives on the topic. Is it possible for a researcher to remain an outsider and find an "objective" truth? Also, it is difficult to deal with a situation that places so

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[3] Elazig is included in my research because it is an integral part of North Kurdistan, located between Tunceli and Diyarbakir, and also because its location between the Keban and Karakaya dam reservoirs is interesting.

many limitations on doing research: a researcher is not free to move around, to collect information and make interviews, trustworthy statistics are not available, and both sides of the conflict have their own version of the situation and the details.

In his research on massacres of Indian peasants by the Guatemalan army, Ricardo Falla argues that it is obvious that people will choose sides in a conflict situation. In his book 'Massacres in the Jungle' he has taken the perspective of the victims. Falla's answer to the demand of objectivity is: "If the army disagrees, let them carry out their own investigations, with their own sources. Hopefully, the army will show the other side of the massacres, but in an accurate way." (Falla, interviewed in Manz 1995, 265). In this research my perspective is closer to the Kurdish deported peasants than to the Turkish army and government. I have used information from both Kurdish and Turkish sources and reached some conclusions on the basis of the comparisons, but I hope that my readers will also draw their own conclusions from the material I present. In a situation where the researcher is not permitted to freely collect needed information, the research circumstances become part of the research and a research question itself. I agree with Falla and hope that "the other side", the Turkish authorities, will show their view of the health situation among the deported Kurdish civilians, but in an accurate way. And especially I hope that they will allow an autonomous international organisation, for example the Red Cross, to conduct a proper survey of the situation. International human rights organisations have been demanding this for a long time. For example, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki recommended in October 1994 and in June 1996 that there should be an independent commission to investigate the depopulation of the villages in Southeast Turkey. (HRW/H 1994, 5 and 1996, 4).

There should not be any topics which are impossible to study. When the traditional anthropological fieldwork methods widen, more issues can be investigated. Subjects about which it is not possible get information by fieldwork are approached by other methods. If nothing else is possible, at least the problems and obstacles that arise when one is doing research can be documented.

This study: The effects of ethnocide and low-intensity warfare on the health situation

This research consists of four parts: first, in Chapter 2 I describe the theoretical basis of the study, the theories concerning ethnocide and low-

intensity warfare. The United Nations Convention against Genocide is the basis which I use for defining ethnocide, in addition to some ideas of Lemkin, which were discussed during the preparatory work of the Convention but not incorporated into the final version.

Secondly, in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 there is a thoroughgoing description of the historical and the present-day situation of the Kurds in Turkey as a background of the study. These chapters focus on how the policies of ethnocide and low-intensity warfare have been used against the Kurds. I present an overview of Kurdish history in Chapter 5; Chapter 6 deals with the ethnocidal policies the Turkish state has been implementing against the Kurds. In this chapter I also present research and statistics about the Kurds in Turkey - or rather the total lack of them. In Chapter 7 I explain the militarisation of the Kurdish provinces and show how the methods of low-intensity warfare have been used in North Kurdistan. In Chapter 5 there is also information about the conventional warfare which has been going on between the Turkish army and the PKK since 1984.

The third part of the book deals with the actual topic: the health situation, health care and morbidity in North Kurdistan during the 1990s. Chapters 8 and 9 give detailed information about various diseases, health conditions and the problems of both preventive and curative health care. Chapter 10 deals with infant and child mortality.

Finally, in the last two chapters I search for connections between all the issues which have been dealt with earlier: how the ethnocidal policies and low-intensity warfare tactics practised by the Turkish state are affecting the health situation in North Kurdistan. I search for answers and explanations for questions on two levels: first, have the deterioration of health conditions and the increase of especially communicable diseases been caused by low-intensity warfare against the Kurds? And second, is the lack of information about the poor health conditions one method of low-intensity warfare or is it the result of some other cause, for example the ethnocidal traditions of the Turkish state? I look for connections and differences between the methods of ethnocide and low-intensity warfare. One important issue is the significance of research - for example about health conditions - in the midst of an ethnocidal process. This question is important for any research about ethnocide, but it has been neglected: research about ethnocide deals mainly with the suppression of the cultural and linguistic existence of the target groups. There are many definitions of ethnocide, and I review several of them looking for references to research.

This research deals with lives of the civilian population under the conditions of an armed conflict. Such research is quite rare, and in anthropological literature there is no advice about how to do such research. Traditionally, war

and peace studies deal with the political infrastructure, not with everyday life at the grassroots level. So I explain in Chapter 4 in great detail how I collected information for this research. In Chapter 3 I consider seriously the ethics of research about war and doing fieldwork under violent conditions. After discussing my experience of the research process I return to this problem and discuss the responsibilities of a researcher in the final chapter, number 12 (Summary and discussion).

2. Theoretical approach

2.1. Ethnic identity

Ethnicity is an aspect of a collectivity's self-recognition and an aspect of its recognition in the eyes of outsiders. It is an avenue by which individuals are linked to society, i.e. to social norms and social values. (Fishman 1977, 16). It has a twofold structure: instrumental and affective. Ethnic groups can act as interest groups within society, and there can be economic and political advantages (or disadvantages) connected to group membership. The second crucial factor is the emotional, symbolic, and meaningful side of ethnicity: it provides a sense of belonging in contemporary interpersonal, global, and alienating societies. (Wahlbeck 1997, 32). Ethnicity is collective consciousness which does not automatically follow the primary sources of ethnic consciousness, such as a common language and history, but there is a need for an experience of a mutual historical destiny, of mutual origin and future, and a feeling of "us" and "them" (Hettne 1990, 22).

Joshua A. Fishman sees ethnicity as an aspect of a collectivity's self-recognition as well as an aspect of its recognition in the eyes of outsiders. He divides ethnicity into the dimensions of *paternity*, *patrimony,* and *phenomenology*. Paternity deals with the recognition of putative biological origins; it is inherited, while patrimony is the qualities which are learned. There is obviously a cultural component in ethnicity. It is not just a state of being but also a behavioural or implementational system. The patrimony dimension of ethnicity is related to questions of how ethnic collectivities behave and what their members do in order to express their membership. Paternity and patrimony are constantly interacting in ethnicity: they may reinforce each other or fuse together, or they may be recognised as distinct. They are poles along a continuum, which shift and interpenetrate. The paternity dimension is less negotiable; patrimony is more changeable. The border between paternity and patrimony is uncertain, since the same feature is sometimes viewed as inherited and at other times as learned. Language is linked at every stage to ethnicity, but sometimes it is viewed as biological inheritance, associated with ethnic paternity, and sometimes as patrimonial, something that can be learned and changed. (Fishman 1977, 20 and 1988, 7, 24-28).

Ethnicity is concerned not only with paternity and patrimony but also with the meaning which persons attach to their descent-related being and behaving. Fishman calls this phenomenology. It explains how the members of ethnic

groups, and the groups themselves, view ethnicity. Actors' views of their ethnicity are a part of their ethnic identity. Phenomenology is not a tidy natural-science construct, but rather a subjective cultural construct that fills and directs the hearts and minds and daily rounds of human beings and aggregate systems. (Fishman 1988, 6, 30-31).

A tribal culture comprises the sociological and cultural forms of community which exist in agricultural societies whose economy is based on feudal land ownership. Tribal communities use local dialects and oral communication, whereas modern societies use literary language and literacy. Compared to national units, tribal communities live autonomously without a sense of belonging to any unit larger than their own village or clan. Until the French Revolution, the whole of Europe consisted of smaller or larger communities of this type. Even when local groups were ruled by some kind of government, they lived in autonomy and the members of a local community did not have a feeling of citizenship with regard to the country. Sometimes anthropologists use the phrase 'indigenous' to refer collectively to people whose traditions and way of living differ from those who are in power (Bowen 2000, 12). Indigenous knowledge means ordinary people's knowledge. It is often contrasted with science. Awareness of the depth and relevance of indigenous knowledge is relatively new in scientific contexts. Indigenous knowledge is as much skill as knowledge, and its learning across generations is characterized by oral transmission and learning of thought experience. There is no coherent overall theoretical model for it, but it is notoriously difficult to access: rituals and symbolic discourse are practiced only by leaders of the group. (Sillitoe 2000, 3-4).

Hobsbawn uses the term *proto-nationalism* to describe an ethnic group's development towards nationalism. Proto-nations live on large areas and even in dispersion, and they feel that they belong together because of their mutual ethnicity, but they lack a common polity. Where proto-nationalism exists, it is possible to mobilize the existing national symbols for creating a modern state. (Hobsbawn 1990, 64, 73, 77).

Ethnicity changes during the modernisation process. In tribal societies ethnicity tends to have a greater overlap with culture as a whole; it may be less conscious but more pervasive. In more modern life, ethnicity may retreat into a corner of social experience under the impact of international influences, and it may often be more conscious. Pre-modern ethnicity is, so far as the ordinary actor is concerned, minimally self-conscious. At best, it recognises ethnic categories. The phenomenology of pre-modern ethnicity is primarily a self-evident, inward- oriented theodicy. Ethnicity, as a highly conscious, instrumental, outward-oriented ideology, has been abundantly in evidence in the Western world since the sixteenth century and in other parts of the world since the nineteenth century. It is characteristic of much of the "rebirth of

ethnicity" during the past decades. In modern conditions ethnicity becomes more salient because it becomes more useful. (Fishman 1977, 35-36 and 1988, 6, 31). Skutnabb-Kangas sees ethnicity as a relationship between the definer and the defined, not mainly as a characteristic of an ethnic group (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, 176). Therefore it needs negotiation, as all relationships do, and therefore assessing the relative power relationships between the negotiating groups is seen as part of ethnicity research. The concept of ethnicity has changed in the course of the modernisation process: developments in transportation, telecommunication, and international migration have brought formerly isolated ethno-cultural groups into contact with other group members and with other groups. As a result of macro-level political development, the populations studied by anthropologists and other social scientists can no longer be conceptualised in terms of their old ethnic group labels. According to Kallen, anthropologists must shift their attention from the holistic cultures of ethnic groups to the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations and to ethnic boundary maintenance. (Kallen 1996, 113-116).

The criteria for an *ethnic group* are, according to Allardt:
> 1. self-categorisation (self-identification);
> 2. common descent (factual or mythical);
> 3. specific cultural traits, e.g. the capacity to speak a specific language;
> 4. a social organisation for interaction both within the group and with people outside the group. (Allardt and Starck 1981, 43)

There are no criteria for inclusion in an ethnic group that all the members of the group have to fulfil. But it is necessary that some members fulfil all the criteria, and every member must fulfil at least one criterion. Socio-linguists tend to be content with the three first criteria in Allardt's definition, while social anthropologists tend to emphasise the social organisation of the group, Allardt's fourth criterion. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, 174-175).

People, nation and nationalism

When talking about ethnicity and ethnic reactions, one must define the most important terms, such as "people", "nation", and "nationalism".
The term "people" is not expressly defined in any instrument of international law. Much of the debate at the ILO (International Labour Organisation) Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (Convention No. 169, 27 June 1989) focussed on the terminology. According to Alfredsson, there are clear signs that the term "people" is meant to stand for the population of a separate political unit with its own territory.

Since "peoples" are entitled to self-determination, states have made strenuous attempts to avoid the use of the term "indigenous peoples" and preferred expressions like "indigenous rights" or "indigenous persons". International law is made and enforced by states with the aim of preserving their own interests. Alfredsson believes that in the name of the 1993 International Year for the World's Indigenous People and in other resolutions the term is intentionally used in the singular. (Alfredsson 1996, 59-60, 64, 69). Anyway, it is problematic that in the English language the term "people" has two meanings: it can be understood as the plural of "person" or as a synonym of the American English word "folk"; in the latter usage its plural is "peoples". The English term leaves space for interpretations which do not exist in some other languages. According to Daes, indigenous peoples are unquestionably "peoples" in every social, cultural, and ethnological meaning of this term. It is neither logical nor scientific to treat them as the same "peoples" as their neighbours, who obviously have different languages, histories, and cultures, and who often have been their oppressors. In the ILO Convention No. 169 the term "peoples" is used, but Article 1, Paragraph 3 states that "the use of the term 'peoples' in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law". (Daes 1996, 50-51).

According to Alfredsson, it is amazing that intergovernmental organisations have not worked out precise definitions of terms like "people" or "minority". Proposed definitions of the term "minority" have much in common with definitions of an ethnic group. These include objective characteristics such as national or ethnic origin; subjective elements relating to identification of the person with the group; numerical considerations inherent in the very term; and the existence of the group over a period of time within the country concerned. On the basis of these proposals, we know most of the time when a group constitutes a minority, and the remaining areas could be easily resolved through national and intergovernmental practice (Alfredsson 1996, 71).

According to Anthony D. Smith, *a nation* is a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy, and common legal rights and duties for all members (Smith, A. 1991, 14). In this definition, Smith mixes together reasons for the emergence of a nation (a shared historic territory, a common economy, and a common legal system) with the results (sharing a myth, historical memories, and a mass public culture). One aspect of nationhood is that individuals see themselves affiliated with and committed to other members. Fraternity is grounded in a view of the nation as a community of

common descent and fate. Nationhood promotes fraternity both between fellow members and across generations. (Tamir 1995, 424-425, 432).

According to Benedict Anderson, a nation is an imagined political community. It is imagined because even in the smallest nations the members will never know most of their fellow members. According to this interpretation, a community is defined as imagined not because of its size or because of the likelihood of face-to-face contact among its members. It is imagined because its existence is contingent on its members' sustaining a certain image of it that is based on their perceptions and feelings. (Anderson 1991, 6; Tamir 1995, 420-423).

Hettne describes a nation as a group with the same culture and history which has decided that they need a national state to protect their mutual interests (Hettne 1990, 57). Fishman uses the term "nation" to refer to any independent political-territorial unit which is largely under the control of a particular nationality (Fishman 1988, 108). He contrasts the term with such terms as "state", "polity", and "country".

Nationalism is seen as one consequence of the disruption of traditional life and the annihilation of tribal, ethnic, and linguistic barriers caused by industrialisation and the modern cash economy. Nationalism provides a redefinition of personal and group identity when the previous identification has been rendered inoperative as a result of social change. (Fishman 1988, 114, 139, 286). Modernity is expressed by the form and idea of the nation-state, and "national identity" emerges as a by-product of its formation (Ahmed 1995, 16). The will to create a national state is sometimes called *ethno-nationalism*. The idea of one's own state can live among the group; this happened, for example, among the Poles in the 1700s after Poland had disappeared from the map. Hettne claims that a group which has the will to create its own national state is already a nation. According to him, ethnicity includes in addition to objective components (race, language, religion) a subjective ethnic consciousness which is based on mutual historical experiences. This can lead to a *nation-building process* and the group can become politicised, which means that the process acquires new dimensions. This increases ethnic consciousness in the group. (Hettne 1990, 12, 57-58).

The heart of the national experience is the presence of shared feelings and perceptions, and a shared desire to collectively protect and foster the national identity. The source of nationalism's power is the view of the nation as a continuous community that influences one's perception of oneself, as well as one's past and future (Tamir 1995, 430).

Fishman describes nationalism as conscious or organised ethno-cultural solidarity which is directed outside of its initial sphere towards political, economic, and religious goals. So it is first necessary for the group to become

convinced that they possess in common certain unique ethno-cultural characteristics which are of importance for them. (Fishman 1988, 108-109). Here vernacular literature, education, and mass media play a significant role, and they all are connected to language:

> Such reading among the previously illiterate not only forged a new bond with language, an awareness of language as part of a rebirth of self and of assertive self-consciousness, but it also put proto-elites into touch with masses whom they would otherwise hardly have reached and never have influenced. (Fishman 1988, 273)

Statelessness is a state of mind. It is akin to homelessness. A nationalist feels that a people can become completely human, completely themselves, only when they have a place of their own. (Ignatieff 1994, 183). The journalist Karine Mannerfelt writes in her article about Kosovo Albanians that those who are denied their identity must always search for it and prove it. If a Kosovo Albanian is asked who he is, he answers, "I am Albanian", while in Western Europe most people would answer by telling their name and profession. She refers to the journalist Aferdita Kelmendi, who asserts that their need to be recognised as Albanians makes them forget themselves as individuals. (Mannerfelt 1999).

Ethnic revival

The fundamental cause of the politicising of ethnic identity is not that ethnic groups are different; rather, the problem arises when they are no longer allowed to be different. This is what happened to the position of minorities when the Ottoman Empire became the Republic of Turkey. They became the Middle Eastern equivalent of minorities in the modern European and North American sense: no longer were they a permanent and distinct part of a multi-verse, they became special groups whose adjustment to overall society was "incomplete" and whose participation was therefore seen as problematic in a number of ways. This change was the result of the change from the Ottoman Empire being the land of Muslims inhabited by numerous *millets*, to Turkey becoming the habitat of one Turkish nation as imagined by Turkish rulers. A consequence of Turkey's change from a quite stable multi-ethnic society to a modern state, where nationalism was political power, was the Armenian genocide of 1915, the first genocide which used modern techniques on a massive scale. (Jafar 1974, 153; Libaridian 1987, 203-204; Phillipson et al. 1994, 7; Uppsala universitet 1999, 34-35). As long as states were weakly centralised, minorities were tolerated (Chaliand 1980, 10). Helen Fein argues that the victims of twentieth-century premeditated genocide - the Jews, the Gypsies, the

Armenians - were murdered in order to fulfil the state's design for a new order. War was used to transform the nation to correspond to the ruling elite's formula by eliminating groups conceived of as alien, enemies by definition. (Fein 1979, 29-30).

According to Smith, cultural, social, and political values play the most important role in the formation of ethnicity. In explaining ethnic revival, attention must be paid to the conjunction of culture and politics; economic development acts only as a catalyst in particular situations. Threats to linguistic and cultural identities can have a very strong potential to mobilise groups. Economic deprivation is only grist to the nationalist mill, but in itself it does not generate ethnic sentiment or nationalist movement; deeper existential problems are involved. In most cases in the process of ethnic revival, cultural manifestations appear earlier than political ones; political organisations are preceded by pre-existing cultural organisations or journals and newspapers. Political and cultural rights belong together, as political rights are prerequisites for making the decisions that are necessary to uphold and develop culture. The hatred that an ethnic group can develop against another group probably has less to do with competition per se and more with the risk of having to give up something of oneself, one's identity. It is a question of survival in a cultural more than a material sense. If members believe that the very existence of the ethnic collectivity is threatened, the salience of ethnicity becomes heightened. (Alfredsson 1996, 73; Kallen 1996, 116; Phillipson et al. 1994, 7; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, 434; Skutnabb-Kangas and Toukomaa 1976, 2; Smith, A. 1981, 5, 13-14, 23, 44). During recent years, ethnic revival and the politicisation of ethnicity have been going on amongst many groups throughout the world. In the "global village", groups which previously were isolated have more contacts with the outside world through telecommunication, mass media, immigration, and travel. Ethnic tensions in other countries have an immediate impact on them. (Kallen 1996, 114).

According to Içduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci, ethnic revival is an outcome of complex interactions which include a variety of interacting factors: social, economic, cultural, and political. A poor socio-economic environment may not directly contribute to ethnic revival, but rather to greater insecurity and political instability in which ethnic markers often gain increasing importance. In their definition of *an environment of insecurity,* Içduygu et al. make a distinction between *material insecurity*: income, possessions, education, health, state services, and life itself, and *nonmaterial insecurity*: language, culture (identity), and belonging (the opposite of alienation). (Içduygu et al. 1999, 991-992). Kendal argues that the forms of discrimination which result when a people is prevented from expressing its identity culturally are often more

difficult to bear than material poverty and economic exploitation (Kendal 1980b, 83).

According to Smith, wars, political actions, and military organisations play decisive roles in the development of ethnic communities. If agrarian mores have tended to disperse and fragment any sense of ethnic community, wars have tended to crystallise and unify it. (Smith, A. 1976, 74-75). Poulton argues that war has often played a crucial part in the determination of identity before the advent of modern nationalism (Poulton 1997, 8). Drakulic tells how her identity changed during the Croatian war:

> Some of my foreign friends can not understand that we have less in common than before. I live in a country which has experienced six months of bloody war. It is difficult for them to understand that it has become my destiny to be a Croat. How could I explain to them that in this war it is my nationality, and only that, which determines my identity? ...This is what the war does to us: it reduces us to one dimension: nation. The unfortunate thing about my nationality is that previously my identity was created by my education, my profession, my ideas, my character - and of course my nationality. Now I am deprived of all of that. I am nothing, as I am not any longer an individual. I am one of 4.5 million Croats. (Drakulic 1995, 60-61, translation KK)

The UN Working Group, which has taken more than a decade to prepare the Draft Declaration covering the rights of indigenous peoples, was called the UN Working Group on Indigenous *Populations*, not *Peoples*, even though the Draft Declaration itself is called the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000b).

In international law, when the right to self-determination was formulated after World War II it was meant to imply *external self-determination*, i.e. independence, and to apply to traditional colonies. Because the right to self-determination was supposed to have been exhausted as most of the former colonies became independent, it was imperative to start redefining "self-determination" in the 1970s so as to include *internal self-determination*, i.e. autonomy of some kind. Self-determination was restricted to nations or peoples, not other groups. Entities defined as *minorities, populations, or ethnic groups* do not have the right to self-determination. When indigenous peoples want to claim the right to exist as distinct entities, it is important that they are defined as "peoples", not "minorities". (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000b and 2000c, 487).

According to Skutnabb-Kangas, it is a dilemma that names used by indigenous peoples and by outsiders, even positive ones, do not always reflect

what would be most advantageous for them in international law, and the terminology may even go against the interests of the group (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000b). Also, it is important to see that the needs of international law and diplomacy might be different from the needs of research. Definitions created for international law might be insufficient for academic life, as we will see later with the term "genocide".

In international assemblies the right of peoples to self-determination is frequently invoked, and in principle it is guaranteed in international law. But in practice, human beings as groups have fewer rights than individuals, unless they form a state. Because they do not have states of their own, the minorities in sovereign states - particularly in the Third World - do not have cultural rights. (Chaliand 1980, 8).

2.2. Genocide and ethnocide

When a people is too numerous to be killed physically the occupiers use *cultural genocide* and *linguicide*. What cannot be accomplished through physical genocide in one generation can be accomplished over several generations through cultural and linguistic genocide. (Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 366-367; Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1991, 140-141).

The term "genocide" was first used by the Polish jurist Raphaël Lemkin in 1944, and it appears in the indictment of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg in 1945. Lemkin was the principal drafter of the 1948 UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. (Charny 1988, 1; du Prees 1994, 7). The General Assembly of the United Nations, in response to the horrors of World War II, declared in its Resolution of 11 December 1946 that genocide "is a crime under international law, contrary to the support and designs of the United Nations, and condemned by the civilised world". Genocide received further analysis by the United Nations Economic and Social Council, which appointed a special committee that approved the 9 December 1948 Convention against Genocide. According to Article 2 of the Convention,

genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group, such as:
> 1) Killing members of the group,
> 2) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,
> 3) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,
> 4) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,
> 5) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

(Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48, 595-599; Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49, 958-959)[4]

The UN Convention on Genocide constitutes the key statement in international law about the crime of genocide, but there are several problems when using the definition in sociological research. The Convention is a decision agreed on by the member states of the UN, and the definitions are not scientific definitions. They were developed for the purposes of international law, not for research. The definition represents the interests of various countries and their cultures and historical experiences. Peter du Prees argues that since the Convention was drawn up by the member states, they were conscious of their own particular offences and tried to defend themselves against possible prosecution. Fein writes that the doubt about the usefulness of the UN definition stems in part from the absence of case law: no state has brought anyone to trial for genocide. (Fein 1992, 3; Kuper 1990, 20-21; du Prees 1994, 8). Kurt Jonassohn argues that the UN definition is unsatisfactory because none of the major victim groups of the genocides that have occurred since its adoption falls within its restrictive specifications (Jonassohn 1992, 17-18).

The words "*intent*" and "*as such*" in particular make it problematic to define genocide: there may be a victim and there may be a victimiser, but there is no genocide in the absence of an intent to destroy a group (du Prees 1994, 9).[5]

Fein suggests for the term "genocide" a social-scientific definition which is broader than the UN one. According to her, genocide is sustained purposeful

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[4] According to Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson (1994, 72-73), the forced transfer of children to another community or group (number 5 in the Convention) can be either physical or psychological or both.

[5] Another problem is that there are gaps in the victim groups covered by the Convention (Fein 1993, 10). Jonassohn criticises (1992, 18) the UN Convention, saying that when it defines the victim groups as "national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups", it excludes many potential groups, such as economic, political, and social groups. The UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugee includes in the definition of a refugee people who are persecuted for their membership in a particular social group or for their political opinions. These two conflicting definitions, arising from the same organisation, seem to produce the paradox that some people fleeing from genocide are recognised as refugees while those unable to flee from the same genocide are not acknowledged as its victims. This paradox describes well the problems which occur when a definition of terms is undertaken by international political organisations. In any case, I do not deal with this perspective, as the target group of this study - the Kurds, an ethnic group - fulfils the criteria of the UN definition.

action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of a threat offered to the victim. Her opinion is that since the term "genocide" is a term in international law, sociological definitions can not replace it. (Fein 1992, 3).

According to Lemkin, genocide means not only the immediate destruction of a nation, it also means the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of an ethnic group, with the aim of annihilating the group itself. Genocide is directed against the national group, and the actions are directed towards individuals as members of the group. (Lemkin 1944, 79). It is a synchronised attack on different aspects of the life of the target group:

> 1. in the political field, by destroying institutions of self-government
> 2. in the social field, by disrupting social cohesion and by killing or removing important groups like intellectuals or religious leaders
> 3. in the cultural field, by prohibiting or destroying cultural institutions and activities, and by substituting vocational education for the liberal arts in order to prevent humanistic thinking, which is dangerous because it promotes nationalistic thinking
> 4. in the economic field, by shifting wealth to the occupying country and by prohibiting the exercise of trade and occupations by people who do not promote the dominant ideology
> 5. in the biological field, by a policy of depopulation
> 6. in the field of physical existence, by introducing a starvation rationing system and by mass killings
> 7. in the religious field, by interfering with the activities of the church, which in many countries provides national leadership in addition to religious leadership
> 8. in the field of morality, by creating an atmosphere of moral debasement, for example through pornography and alcohol (Lemkin 1944, xi-xii).

Numbers 4 and 6 are closely connected to each other. According to Lemkin, the starvation caused by the destruction of economic life is not a consequence of war but a genocidal tactic. A daily literal struggle for bread may discourage thinking both in general and in national terms. The Nazis purposefully wanted to create conditions of malnutrition for the peoples of the occupied countries, especially for those peoples who were the first planned targets of genocide: the Jews, the Poles, and the Slovenes. (Hilberg 1961, 101-105; Lemkin 1944, 85).

There is a lot of disagreement among academics about how genocides should be categorised, and whether it is even possible to compare them. According to Fein, there has not been any systematic research or theorising about genocide and other types of collective violence, in sociology, psychology, anthropology, or the political sciences. Because of the special character of mass killings, the definition of the terms has been difficult. Academics face ethical and often emotionally loaded questions when they try to define the differences between genocide and "ordinary" warfare (Uppsala universitet 1999, 27, 32).

Genocide has two aspects: the destruction of the national pattern of the target group and the replacement of it by the national pattern of the oppressing group (Lemkin 1944, 79). It is an extension of a long tradition of legal discrimination, as Hilberg describes the development of attitudes in the anti-Semitic administration of NaziGermany: "You have no right to live among us as Jews. You have no right to live among us. You have no right to live." (Bauman 1989, 1-2; Hilberg 1961, 3-4). Genocide is an advanced form of state terrorism, a co-ordinated use of force by elites within a society to maintain or extend their power over the targeted group within the same state which is perceived as threat. Those states with long histories of internal repression tend to be the same ones that have exhibited patterns of genocide in modern times. Horowitz mentions two examples of such states: the Soviet Union, formerly czarist Russia, and the Turkish Republic, formerly the Ottoman Empire (Horowitz 1997, 35-36). Bauman sees the absence of democracy as the most important factor that made it possible for genocide to occur. Often this happens during or following deep-reaching revolutions which have paralysed old power structures but not yet created new ones. In such situations the political and military forces are not counterbalanced. (Bauman 1989, 111).[6]

Massacres do not occur by coincidence: usually they are the last steps in a long process of oppression and happen when the oppressor has suffered important military defeats. For example, the Armenian genocide started after the Turkish defeat in Bulgaria in 1912, and the killing of Jews intensified after the Nazi defeat at Stalingrad in 1943; most of the Jews were killed after Germany had actually lost the war. (Hilberg 1961, 4; Horowitz 1987, 65).

Genocide has two important structural dimensions: it represents a systematic effort over time to liquidate a national population, usually a minority, and it

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[6] McDowall sees many similarities between the situation of Turkey at the beginning of the 20th century and today: the widespread networks of informers and spies; the physical abuse of detainees; extra-judicial killings; internal exile for both individuals and groups; and the formation of clandestine groups dedicated to changing the system (McDowall 1997, 87).

functions as a fundamental political policy to assure conformity and participation by the citizenry. Like Lemkin, Bauman also says that genocide is rarely aimed at the total annihilation of the group; rather, the purpose of the violence is to destroy the targeted group as a viable community capable of self-perpetuation and defence of its self-identity. The goal of the genocide is usually reached when the level of violence has been great enough to undermine the will of the sufferers and to make them accept the given orders, and when the targeted group has been deprived of the resources necessary to continue the struggle. The objective of genocide is that the marked group, once deprived of its leadership and centres of authority, will lose its cohesiveness and the ability to sustain its identity. The inner structure of the group will collapse, and its members can be assimilated one by one to the new structure or forcibly reassembled into a new category. (Bauman 1989, 119; Hitchcock and Twedt 1995, 491-492; Horowitz 1997, 20-21).

It is important to distinguish between genocide and assassination. Horowitz defines genocide as the structural and systematic destruction of innocent people by a bureaucratic state apparatus, whereas assassination's primary focus is the symbolic, selective liquidation of powerful enemies. The distinction between genocide and assassination is roughly analogous to that between force as the prerogative of state power and violence as the instrument of those excluded from state power (Horowitz 1997, 20-21).

Genocide must be clearly distinguished from other forms of destruction of human beings, such as natural disasters, random killings, warfare, and symbolic or cultural assaults. The collective nature of genocide, in which the victim is "punished" for being part of some particular group, tribe, race, or religion, sets it apart from other social evils. (Horowitz 1987, 68; 1997, 27-28).

A war, especially a civil war, can expand into genocide. Researchers disagree as to whether the death of 600,000 to 1,000,000 Ibos (Biafrans) in the Nigerian civil war at the end of 1960s was genocide. The massive death of the civilian population was not mainly caused by battles but by diseases. During the war the Nigerian government did not permit humanitarian organisations to bring relief food and medicines to the civilian population; a modest relief effort began only after the fall of Biafra in 1970. According to Horowitz , what the relief workers found represents the outer limits of warfare and the initial stages of genocide: of an estimated 5.8 million Ibos, 970,000 were suffering from edema, marasmus (wasting of the body, the most common form of malnutrition), or kwashiorkor (malnutrition causing swelling of the body). Nearly one-third of Biafra's children showed signs of severe malnutrition. But du Prees argues that even if the famine was deliberately imposed by the blockade, the Biafran war was not within the scope of the UN definition of genocide, as there was not the intent to systemically eliminate an

ethnic group after the Nigerian army had attained its goal. (Horowitz 1997, 36-37; du Prees 1994, 11, 22, 26, 27).

There are many troublesome cases of genocide and state-sponsored mayhem which fall short of collective murder, but not by much. Students of the Armenian genocide of the 1910s frequently claim that the Turks' mass deportation of Armenians from their cultural and geographical roots constituted a protracted form of genocide, since the dislodged Armenians could not re-create their society or culture in a generationally meaningful way. The difficulty with the argument that deportation is a form of genocide is that however nasty, brutish, and difficult such a life may become, there is no actual physical dismemberment. (Horowitz 1997, 37-38). The issue of *intention* helps us to define the border between genocide and ordinary man-made catastrophes. Jonassohn says that many of the epidemics of communicable diseases that reached genocidal proportions were caused by unwitting human actions; they could not have been intended because knowledge of the causes of the epidemics was not yet available (Jonassohn 1992, 20-21).

Ethnocide

Lemkin did not use the term *cultural genocide*, but he recognised that Hitler had different population policies and aims in the occupied areas; some areas were to be "Germanised" and assimilated, and cultural discrimination was one method to achieve this purpose. Lemkin did not call this process genocide, but later the policy of forced assimilation was called cultural genocide. (Fein 1993, 8-11).

Vakakn Dadrian distinguishes between five types of genocide:

> 1. *cultural genocide*, in which the aim is assimilation
> 2. *latent genocide*, which is the result of unintended consequences, such as civilian
> deaths during bombing raids, or the accidental spread of disease during an invasion
> 3. *retributive genocide*, designed to punish a segment of a minority
> 4. *utilitarian genocide*, using mass killing to obtain economic resources
> 5. *optimal genocide*, the slaughter of members of a group to achieve its total
> obliteration, as in the Armenian and Jewish holocausts. (Dadrian 1975, ref. Jonassohn and Chalk 1987, 9)

Cultural genocide is also called *ethnocide*. It is the deliberate elimination of a group's collective memory, identity, or culture without its physical elimination. It includes attacks on political and social institutions, culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of the group. (van Bruinessen 1994a, 166-167; Fein 1992, 4-5; Jonassohn 1992, 21; Jonassohn and Chalk 1987, 8).

One famous example of ethnocide is the destiny of American Indians, the Native Americans. Chalk and Jonassohn see it as the principal United States policy towards the Native Americans. Henry Fox, George Washington's Secretary of War and the official responsible for Indian affairs, articulated a program to "domesticate" them. Ethnocide, the destruction of their culture, was the core of this program, but once their culture was destroyed, Fox hoped to save their lives by convincing them to replace their traditional mixed economy with small-scale commercial farming. The cornerstones of the destruction of Native American cultures were their removal from their traditional lands, the reservation system, the Dawes Act, and the education of Native American children in boarding schools. (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 195-196, 203).

During the preparatory work for formulating the UN Convention on Genocide the possibility of including cultural genocide was discussed. Cultural genocide may also take the form of linguistic genocide. (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1996, 202; Selbmann 1998). In the final draft of the Convention, cultural genocide was included and defined as follows in Article III, 1-2:

1) Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or in the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group.

2) Destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group. (Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49, 958).

The inclusion of cultural genocide became an issue of controversy. The Soviet bloc pressed for inclusion of cultural genocide in the Convention and the Western European countries opposed it. According to Kuper, this conflict of views was not sharply ideological, but the representatives of the colonial powers were sensitive to criticism of their policies in non-self-governing territories. In the end this article was voted down by 16 states and not included in the final Convention. But as a consequence of this discussion, the Convention makes reference to the forcible transfer of children from one

group to another, and the word "ethnic" has been added to the list of groups covered by the Convention. (Kuper 1981, 31; Skutnabb-Kangas 1996, 128; Skutnabb-Kangas and Buçak 1994, 359-360). The discussion of whether cultural genocide should be included in the Convention shows clearly the problems of using an international agreement as a theory in research: discussion about the Convention took place in political, not academic circles.

Researchers disagree as to whether ethnocide is a form of genocide which should be included in research about genocide. Research about ethnocide is clearly outside the mainstream research about genocide, and there is very little theoretical analysis of it. Robert K. Hitchcock and Tara M. Twedt say that many researchers, human rights workers, and journalists use the term "genocide" with a wider definition than that of the UN Convention (Hitchcock and Twedt 1995, 490). Some researchers see genocide as defined in the Convention, and some others extend the concept to include such actions as the intentional prevention of ethnic groups from practising their traditional customs, forced resettlement, denial of access to food relief, health assistance, and development funds, and destruction of the habitats utilised by indigenous populations.

Leo Kuper argues that though cultural genocide is not mentioned as a crime in the Convention, it is commonly treated as such. He defines cultural genocide as acts with intent to extinguish, utterly or in substantial part, a culture. Among ethnocidal acts are the deprivation of opportunities to use a language, practice a religion, create art in customary ways, maintain basic social institutions, preserve memories and traditions, and work in co-operation towards social goals. (Kuper 1981, 31). Even when ethnocide is commonly treated as one form of genocide, there are no international conventions to punish the use of ethnocide (Selbmann 1998).

The Society for Threatened Peoples regards the following acts as crimes of ethnocide:

> 1. Forced resettlement of an ethnic group
> 2. Repression of a culture and of the oral and written use of a mother tongue
> 3. Deliberate manipulation of demographics and development policy
> 4. Destruction of traditional economic systems, especially those of tribal peoples
> 5. Forced conversion by missionaries

6. Systematic destruction of buildings that are part of a cultural heritage and of religious and cultural sites, in non-warfare situations as well as during warfare (Selbmann 1998)

This definition defines the destruction of buildings that are part of a cultural heritage as a form of ethnocide, but it says nothing about the destruction of research. In Selbmann's article there is a picture of the destroyed Bosnian National Library in Sarajevo, bombed by the Serbs. It is an example which shows clearly the destruction of a national culture, and even research. To define *prevention of research* as a form of ethnocide is problematic. The definitions of ethnocide usually mention forms of culture which distribute further the information that already exists. Research is the creation of new information about the ethnos. Scientific books and libraries are concrete items which can be destroyed. At the same time, they are symbols of some ideas. When books are burned or confiscated, the target is not the paper and ink but the ideas that they represent. If the *destruction* of a building that is part of a cultural heritage, for example a national library, is described as a form of ethnocide, then *preventing* the creation of a national library is also an ethnocidal policy. Genocidal and ethnocidal acts are often believed to happen fast, maybe in the course of several years, but not over many decades and many generations. If the bombardment of the Bosnian National Library is considered an ethnocidal act, so too should the *lack of* national libraries among many minorities be considered as such. The issue is very complicated, as it is mainly caused not by difficulties in renting a building for the library, but by the lack of literature and research about the ethnos. When the Bosnian National Library was bombed, the books were destroyed but the ideas which they represented remain. But many minority groups lack even the idea of a national library and all it represents. This has been caused not by a single act but by repressive policies over a long period of time.

Academic research is a phenomenon of modern times. Social science is one way of understanding the change from traditional to modern, where, for example, "tribalism" has been replaced by nationalist ideas. Lack of research about the minority group can be one method used by the majority to prevent the minority group from developing a "modern" way of thinking, because it is not possible to understand properly the present situation without knowing its background. Usually the word *intent* makes it problematic to define genocide. But when research about an ethnos is prevented, it is clear whether this has been done with intent or not: research and surveys are never done without planning. By preventing research about a minority, the majority can keep it traditional while it develops its own society in a modern way. In the Kurdish context this means that if there had been a proper understanding among the

Kurds about their tribal system, it might have been easier for them to overcome the lack of unity that the system has caused for them.

Cultural genocide takes place under conditions of state imposition of educational programmes, modernisation efforts, and nation building. Hitchcock and Twedt claim that although ethnocidal policies have been practised widely, they have not necessarily led to cultural disintegration. Among many indigenous peoples there has been a cultural resurgence or a kind of process of *ethnogenesis*. (Hitchcock and Twedt (1995, 493).

Linguistic human rights and linguicide

Language is far from neutral: it is a system of beliefs, values, and interpretations emphasising a certain culture. The adoption of a certain language leads to the dominance of that culture's practices and submission to its different cultural values. Language is an identity-maker and a core value which symbolises a person's belonging to a particular community. Language and identity are related to self-determination - language is a means of exerting power and control, it is a method of colonising the consciousness of peoples in order to maintain oppressive structures. (Skutnabb-Kangas and Toukomaa 1976, 7, 37-38; Tsuda 1986, 49). Fishman calls language the recorder of paternity, the expresser of patrimony, and the carrier of phenomenology; it is the prime symbol of ethnicity (Fishman 1977, 25). Skutnabb-Kangas argues that dominated groups are decreasingly ruled by arms or by physical violence alone, and increasingly by ideological measures and economic suasion. Language becomes the main means of domination when the target group stays dominated with its own partial consent. Instead of, or in addition to, colonising the land and the natural resources of the dominated, as under colonialism, the modern version of domination is increasingly colonising the minds and consciousness of the dominated. When it is the consciousness industry (education, mass media, religions) that socially creates consent, this consent must be mediated, manufactured, or negotiated through language. Therefore, it is important for the rulers that the dominated understand the language of the rulers. Otherwise, they cannot be ruled with their own consent. (Skutnabb-Kangas 1996, 124-126; Smolicz 1994, 237).

The principle underlying the concept of *universal human rights* is that individuals and groups are entitled to rights which no state can be justified in restricting and violating. Linguistic freedom is the precondition for the realisation of many fundamental rights; it is difficult to enjoy them if one is not allowed to use and develop one's own mother tongue. People who are deprived of *linguistic human rights* may be prevented from enjoying other human rights, including fair political representation, a fair trial, access to education, access to information and freedom of speech, and maintenance of

their cultural heritage. A threat to an ethnic group's language prevents it from achieving educational, economic, and political equality with other groups. (Phillipson et al. 1994, 2; Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1996, 201; Skutnabb-Kangas 1996, 131). Cultural, social, and political rights are in many ways complementary, but the minority-rights instruments deal mainly with cultural issues (medico international and KHRP 1997, 2).

Linguistic human rights imply at an individual level that everyone can identify positively with his or her mother tongue, has the right to learn the mother tongue, including at least basic education through the medium of the mother tongue, and has the right to use it in official contexts. At a collective level, linguistic human rights signify for minority groups the right to exist. For them, it means the right to enjoy and develop their language and to maintain schools and other educational institutions in their own languages. It also involves guarantees of representation in the political affairs of the state, and the granting of autonomy to administer matters internal to the groups, at least in the fields of culture, education, religion, information, and social affairs, with the financial means to fulfil these functions. (Phillipson et al. 1994, 2). According to Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak, linguistic human rights also include on an individual level that people can become bilingual in the mother tongue(s) and an official language according to their own choice, and that any change of mother tongue is voluntary, not imposed. (Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 361).

Linguistic human rights have both an individual and a collective dimension. The individual level involves continuity from one generation to the next over time. It is a linguistic human right to acquire the cultural heritage of preceding generations. The collective level involves co-operation between individuals, binding them together as a group. Linguistic majorities, speakers of a majority language, usually enjoy all those linguistic human rights which can be seen as fundamental. (Phillipson et al. 1994, 1-2, 11-12). Minorities can achieve the status which majorities take for granted only when they are able to use their own languages and run their own schools (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1994, 78).

If linguistic rights are not guaranteed, deprivation of the mother tongue may follow, which has profound consequences both at an individual and at a group level. Juan Cobarrubias, a Basque researcher living in the US, presents a "taxonomy of official attitudes toward minority languages", where a state can choose one of the following:

1. attempting to kill a language
2. letting a language die

3. unsupportive coexistence
4. partial support of specific language functions
5. adoption as an official language
(Cobarrubias 1983, 71)

Killing a language expresses what happens at the group level. On the individual level, killing a language means either killing the individuals who speak it or making them change their mother tongue. If people are not allowed to identify with their mother tongue and ethnic group, to learn and develop it in school and use it publicly, the consequence in the long run is that the language is killed. This is called *linguicide*. The first three policies seem to lead, with few exceptions, to languages dying or being killed. Especially under conditions when all children participate in formal education, only the last two policies seem to make a language potentially safe. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, 297, 311; Skutnabb-Kangas and Buçak 1994, 362).

According to Skutnabb-Kangas, *linguicism* is one of the ideologies, structures, and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate, regulate, and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, 369). It is defined on the basis of language, while in racism the group is defined on the basis of race, in sexism on the basis of gender, and in ethnicism on the basis of ethnicity. Linguicism is not only an information problem. It is important to define racism, ethnicism, and linguicism on both an ideological and a structural level. In addition to the ideological dimension they all involve structures and practices which result in unequal access to power and resources. Ethnicism and linguicism socially construct the resources of powerless groups so that they become invisible or are seen as disabilities. Linguicist ideology involves the dominant group presenting an idealised image of itself, stigmatising the minority language, and rationalising the relationship between the two, always to the advantage of the dominant group and language. It can operate overtly or covertly, at both the individual and the societal level, and also at the supranational level. Linguicism is a new concept and many of the phenomena it refers to are still relatively unanalysed. (Phillipson 1988, 339, 341; Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1994, 105).

The media and the educational systems are the most important direct agents in killing languages (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000a). History provides examples of the purposeful killing of minority languages: one of them is the destiny of the languages of Native Americans. In the 19th century the American army conducted military operations against the indigenous tribes west of the Mississippi River; this was known as "the opening of the West". Many of the

survivors of the eastern tribes were relocated to distant areas from their homelands along "the Trail of Tears". For over a century the federal government pursued the goal of cultural as well as physical extermination of Native Americans. Planned cultural disintegration was carried out through laws establishing tribal governments, police forces, and court systems that emulated white institutions. (Hernández-Chávez 1994, 144). Some of the relocated tribes such as the Choctaw, the Seneca, and the Cherokee had established their own school systems, some teaching their own languages as well as English. These schools were eliminated by the Curtis Act of 1898. The most effective method of killing the languages of Native Americans was the establishment of boarding schools, which began in 1879. In the 1920s there were 72 boarding schools far away from the reservations whose purpose was the complete assimilation of Native American children. (Hernández-Chávez 1994, 144-145). In justifying their removal from reservation day-schools to these schools, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs noted the difficulty they had experienced in "freeing the children from the language and habits of their untutored and often savage parents" (US Government Printing Office, 1886: xxiii, ref. Hernández-Chávez 1994, 144-145). Children from different tribes were transported to the boarding schools, often after being forcibly taken from their parents. They were forbidden to use their native languages under threat of physical punishment. To complete the process of Anglicisation, students were placed with white families for three years after the completion of school. (Hernández-Chávez 1994, 145).

During the 1930s a few innovative bilingual education programmes were started, but they existed only for a short time. The years after World War II brought a renewed emphasis on the assimilation of Native American peoples which culminated in the "termination" policies of the 1950s by which many dozens of tribes were stripped of official recognition: federal services were terminated and Native Americans were encouraged to sever their tribal ties and migrate to urban areas. The civil rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s brought the revival of bilingual education programmes, but at present the native languages of most tribes are rapidly disappearing and bilingual education serves only little more than a transitional purpose. (Hernández-Chávez 1994, 145).

Skutnabb-Kangas analyses linguicide from the perspective of how it fits the UN Convention on Genocide. Formal education which teaches children the dominant language *at the cost of* their own language is genocidal. Learning new languages should happen *in addition to* their own languages. Since in most cases there are no alternatives in formal education, the children's loss of their first language and transfer to the majority language group happens by

force. Skutnabb-Kangas refers to research done by Edward Williams, who tested students in Kenya and Malawi. In Kenya they were taught through the medium of English and they studied a local language as a subject. In Malawi children were taught through local languages and studied English as a subject. He found out that even though the Kenyan children were doing their schooling in English, their test results in English were not better than those of Malawian children, but often worse. Concerning the local language, the result was that all Malawian children could read a text with understanding, but many Kenyan children could not even be tested in the local language because they could not read it. Williams concludes that "for the majority of children in both countries the test results, and classroom observations, suggest there is a clear risk that the policy of using English as a vehicular language may contribute to *stunting, rather than promoting, academic and cognitive growth"* (Williams 1998, 63-64, ref. Skutnabb-Kangas 2000a, italics Skutnabb-Kangas). According to Skutnabb-Kangas, this fits the criteria of the UN genocide definition. Minority children's non-identification with their mother tongue leads to an interruption of the transgenerational transmission of the language. According to Skutnabb-Kangas, this means that children from one group have been forcibly transferred to another group, which is part of the UN's definition of genocide. Genocide happens equally effectively when a child is psychologically prohibited from speaking her own language, is psychologically transferred to another group, and is made to want to identify with a dominant group instead of her own. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000a and 2000c, xxxiii, 115).

Hassanpour claims that while linguists have recorded cases of repression of individual languages, linguicide has not yet been conceptualised and theorised as an aspect of the life of a language (Hassanpour, 2000).

2.3. Low-intensity warfare

Explanations of the term "low-intensity warfare" are preliminary and are still being discussed, because there is practically no literature with regard to low-intensity warfare (Castro Apreza 1998). Most of the literature that exists is published by US military sources and is not critical but rather gives information on how to implement and develop its methods.

Low-intensity warfare methods were developed when President John F. Kennedy ordered a vigorous, multilevel response to the revolutionary threats in Third World countries like Cuba, Algeria, and Indochina. The tactics which are today known as low-intensity conflict (LIC) were first called *counterinsurgency.* (Maechling 1987, 21-22). In 1966, US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara saw "limited war" as a promising way to deter Communism without the "necessity of arousing the public ire" (Barnet 1987,

207). During the Reagan era the doctrine of counterinsurgency was extended into a wide variety of other politico-military and covert operations. The Vietnam War inspired a deep-seated public resistance to protracted US military involvement abroad. Low-intensity conflict presented the prospect of waging a war that was not defined as such. No draft would be necessary, few soldiers would be deployed, and even fewer would be sent home in body bags. (Klare and Kornbluh 1987, 3, 9).

Low-intensity warfare is also known as "violent peace" and "fighting without appearing to fight". According to Hippler, this strategy is a result of the US desire to keep or regain control in Third World countries, and to weaken or destroy progressive governments and liberation movements in Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Often the US involvement in low-intensity conflicts is not visible. The people of the US may not be aware of US involvement. For example, counterinsurgency requires relatively stable general economic conditions. Where they do not exist, the US Economic Support Funds programmes create artificial stability. At the end of 1980s, 80% of such funding went to Middle Eastern countries. (Hippler 1987, 33-34, 38). In Latin America, allotments of US arms and equipment designated for anti-narcotics efforts are often used for counterinsurgency (Morín 1994, 43).

Low-intensity warfare is known as the "post-Vietnam counterinsurgency doctrine", but its history actually goes back far before John F. Kennedy's term of office. In the Philippines, when the United States replaced Spain as the colonial power in 1898, there was a vigorous independence movement led by Emilio Aguinaldo. In attempting to subdue the rebellion, the US army drew on experiences gained during the Indian wars during the post-Civil War era. It fought a brutal counterinsurgency campaign that in many respects anticipated the tactics later employed in Indochina. To erode the rebels' base of support, vast areas were stripped of food supplies and thousands of civilians were forcibly resettled in fortified villages. During three years, an estimated 220,000 Filipinos died of combat or starvation. Today, a century later, US counterinsurgency experts are still studying the Philippine insurrection for lessons that can be applied on the LIC battlefields of nowadays. In a section on "populace and resources control", the Army-Air Force Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project (JLICP) concluded that brute force and calculated starvation can prove to be the cornerstones of an effective LIC strategy if one has the "political will" to employ them. (Bello 1987, 159; Hippler 1987, 33).
The JLICP Final Report notes:

The lesson learned from this experience (Philippines 1898) is that military power can be effective against a guerrilla force which has the support of the population.

Victory, however, required the political will to employ total control over the population and the government. This early American experience dramatically demonstrated a classic example of security /populace and resource control. The insurgents were first separated from the population by strict security measures including resettlement, curfews, and an early forerunner of "free-fire" zones. *The relocation of the populace, combined with food denial operations, resulted in defeat of the insurgency.* (Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report, 1986, 2-3, ref. Bello 1987, 158, italics KK)

Actually these principles of pacification had already been used even before the Philippines experiment, for example in Australia, where the annihilation of the original population was accomplished with methods even more brutal than those used by the US. When Governor George Arthur declared martial law in November 1826 in Van Diemen's Land (Tasmania), the aim was to remove all Aborigines from the main island of Tasmania, after quarrels about the use of land between the settlers, with their one million sheep, and the Aborigines. The Aborigines were transported to the Australian mainland, where they and many other tribes vanished.[7] Tony Barta of Melbourne University claims that Australia is a nation founded on genocide, like many other nations in the colonised world. It has been a genocidal society during the whole 200 years of its existence. Although the whole bureaucratic apparatus might have officially been directed toward protecting innocent people, nevertheless a whole race has been subject to the remorseless pressures of destruction which are inherent in the very nature of the society. According to Barta, very few Australians are aware of the ruthlessness of the deportation. References to subsequent history - "smoothing the pillow of a dying race", removing children from their parents, forced assimilation of mixed-race children - are assumed to be either excusable or inevitable. (Barta 1987, 238-246; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, 54-55).

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[7] For example, in the Port Phillips area near Melbourne, the number of Aborigines went from more than ten thousand at the beginning of the 1800s to less than two thousand in eighteen years. In the new colony of South Australia (near Adelaide), the number fell from 650 to 180 in fifteen years. Relatively few of these deaths, perhaps a fifth of them, were the result of direct violence. Most of these people died of previously unknown diseases, malnutrition, and alcohol. (Barta 1987, 241-246).

The Pentagon's image of the "spectrum of conflict" is a theoretical division of armed conflicts into "low", "medium" and "high" levels, depending on the degree of force and violence used. Guerrilla wars and other limited conflicts fought with irregular units are labelled "low-intensity conflicts", regional wars fought with modern weapons are considered "mid-intensity conflicts", and a global non-nuclear conflagration (like World Wars I and II) or a nuclear engagement fall into the "high-intensity" category. (Klare and Kornbluh 1987, 6-7). As the challenges posed by Third World revolutions, which usually employ guerrilla warfare methods, are political as much as military in nature, the US response is equally comprehensive. The basic goal of LIC strategy is to separate anti-government guerrilla forces from the population. (Hippler 1987, 34; Klare and Kornbluh 1987, 5-6). The definition of LIC encompasses more than a category of violence. According to the US Army Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report, it is:

> an environment in which conflict occurs and, second, a series of civil-military activities and operations which are conducted in that environment. (US Army Joint Low-Intensity Conflict Project Final Report, 1986, 4. ref. Klare and Kornbluh 1987, 7)

Another official description of low-intensity conflict is the following:

> Low-intensity conflict is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social, economic, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism and insurgency.
> Low-intensity conflict is generally confined to a geographic area and is often characterised by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and the level of violence.
> (US Army and Training Command, 1986, 2, ref. Klare 1987, 53)

This definition is said to be too wide. Counterinsurgency entails a political-economic effort to secure the loyalty of the rural population, thus depriving the guerrillas of a popular base ("drying up the sea in which the guerrillas swim"). This would require a genuine government commitment to improving the conditions of the peasantry. The US role in such a setting would be theoretically limited to the provision of development aid and military advisory support - with the former taking precedence over the latter. "Classical" counterinsurgency of this type was attempted during the early years of the US involvement in Vietnam. Later during the Vietnam War the US officials came to rely on "pacification", a military effort intended to force the peasantry into submission through the threat of, or employment of, violence rather than to

win them over through the promise of reform. When development programmes are used as part of low-intensity conflict, the purpose is to create the *hope* of a better future among the peasants and thus to extend the government's control over the countryside. (Hippler 1987, 35; Klare 1987, 56-57).

When fighting against a guerrilla movement, the goal of army operations in LIC strategy is not to destroy the insurgent forces but to force their withdrawal by destroying the insurgent infrastructure. When fighting against a radical regime like the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the contras' job is not to take over control of the land but to destroy its economy, its infrastructure, and its constructive political climate. (Hippler 1987, 35-36). To participate and support low-intensity conflicts in Third World countries, the US is sacrificing any commitment to development, and the same also applies to other governments that implement this military principle. Barnet writes that during the years when the US was financing and advising the counterinsurgency war against the guerrillas in El Salvador, unemployment rose from 21% to 33%, illiteracy from 43% to 51%, and households without drinking water from 56% to 81%. The strategy for conducting low-intensity war strikes at the very heart of the development process, and that is its purpose. The greatest obstacle to development in poor countries is disorganisation, suspicion, and conflicting loyalties; enlisting local businessmen, unions, and newspapers in destabilisation campaigns which have been planned in the US has the effort of further polarising the targeted societies and paralysing development efforts. (Barnet 1987, 215-214).

The Biafran war was not within the scope of the UN definition of genocide, even though the famine was deliberately imposed by the blockade, but was the Nigerian government using an LIC method when it did not permit humanitarian aid to be delivered to the Biafran civilian population? The war has not been analysed from this perspective, as it occurred in the 1960s, when LIC methods of warfare were not publicly known. Gayle Smith has analysed the Ethiopian famine of the 1980s and the delivery of international humanitarian aid to the starving people under the conditions of civil war between the Ethiopian army and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). When the annual rains failed for a fifth year in the summer of 1984, food became a key weapon of war on all sides. The majority of the famine victims in Eritrea and Tigray resided in guerrilla-administered areas. The objective of the two liberation fronts was to contain the population within their zones of control, while government strategy was to draw hungry peasants into the urban centres. Smith claims that for the US the famine provided an opportunity to intervene in Ethiopia's internal affairs. During 1985-1986, Ethiopia received more than one billion dollars in famine-related assistance, of which the US was the

largest contributor. More than 80% of this assistance was allocated to the government, despite the fact that it had access to less than half of the famine victims. An estimated one million people starved to death in the guerrilla-held areas of Tigray and Eritrea because of lack of assistance, and millions more were forced to leave their lands and migrate. In Tigray the deported peasants were not encouraged to return to their villages, but they were kept in enormous feeding centres and eventually resettled in the southern part of the country – and the majority of peasants who entered the government towns were lost to the liberation movement. According to Smith, it was partly because of assistance from the West that the Ethiopian government was able to force hundreds of thousands of peasants out of the guerrilla-held areas. (Smith, G. 1987, 31-37).

According to a group of researchers[8] who studied the effects of low-intensity warfare against the Zapatista movement in Chiapas province in southern Mexico, the most important components of low-intensity warfare in Chiapas include:

1. Strengthening the technical and material as well as the symbolic aspects of the army.
2. Attempting to legitimise the government.
3. "Taking water away from the fish", i.e. preventing more people from joining the Zapatista movement, undermining the morale of those already participating, and isolating Zapatista sympathisers.
4. 4. Minimising international solidarity within the Zapatista movement. (Castro Apreza 1998)

Number 4 on the list is especially interesting for Europeans because it concerns their role in the low-intensity conflicts which are now going on in Third World countries. According to Richard J. Barnet - who worked in the US during the Kennedy administration as an official of the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency - political leaders in the US believe that they lost the Vietnam War because the media and the peace movement paralysed people's will to win the war, for example by showing pictures of napalmed children. (Barnet 1987, 208, 220). He says that political observers have wondered how the United States can keep its position as a great power in international politics and still remain a democracy. The tension between projecting power abroad and maintaining liberty at home is particularly acute when US military power is committed to purposes that the American people either do not understand or do not support. Low-intensity

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[8] Angelica Inda, Andrés Aubry, Gustavo Castro, and Ines Castro.

warfare is a strategy for fighting wars without popular support. According to Barnet, some military authorities believe that this strategy cannot work without censorship. An outraged Marine major proposed in an article in *Military Review* that television should be excluded from any combat zone, not because pictures lie but because the bits and pieces of truth they transmit with such emotional impact undermine the official truth. (Barnet 1987, 219-220).

An example of the policy of under-reporting is how the situation of Chiapas has been covered in the mass media in the US. In 1993 the NAFTA free-trade agreement negotiations between Mexico and the US were at an important stage. The armed conflict in Chiapas started in May 1993. At the end of May 1993 the Mexican army launched a massive operation in the area searching for guerrillas. All the Mexican dailies and various European media carried the news, but reporting in the US was virtually non-existent. The Mexican journalist Dolia Estévez believes that if the guerrilla activities in southern Mexico had been printed in the major US newspapers, the NAFTA agreement might have been defeated. (Estévez 1994, 47).

During the Ethiopian famine catastrophe in 1984, about 50% or more of the famine victims resided in guerrilla-held territory, but only about 10% of the international aid was provided to them. The Western media and the relief agencies dealt with the complexities of the disaster with public silence. They did not mention the wars which had caused the famine. In the US, media attention focussed almost exclusively on the Ethiopian government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. Gayle Smith says that the US government was well aware of the situation but it did not give permission for massive aid to the guerrilla-held area until November 1984. Then, US assistance, channelled through the World Food Programme and private US charities, started to flow to Ethiopia. (Smith, G. 1987, 35).

3. Ethics of research about war

3.1. Ethics of research about war

Writers in a variety of fields who deal with people living under conditions of crisis have reflected on the ethics of studying death, war, and genocide. Horowitz points out that professionalism in war and peace studies creates problems of its own. One must avoid a clinical response to the massive death and destruction of innocent people. Professionalism necessitates a certain surgical approach - the way physicians approach an AIDS or cholera epidemic - but it should not become a method for isolating the expert from the public. Academic life often removes the researchers from the feelings of pain and suffering that accompany mass death, and this is dangerous for researchers of this theme. (Horowitz 1997, 7-8.) Green has noticed the same thing: a major problem for social scientists working in Guatemala is that in order to survive they have become inured to the violence, training themselves at first not to react, then later not to feel (see) it. They block out the context in which people live, and in which they live themselves. Self-censorship becomes natural. (Green 1995, 108-109.)

Choosing a side

Anthropologists and sociologists have traditionally approached the study of conflict, war, and human aggression from a distance; Olli-Pekka Ruohomäki's research about local fishermen and trawlers in Phangnan Bay in Thailand is a typical example. He writes:

> My strong opinion was that the fishing policy of the government was short-sighted and even discriminatory. But I felt that as a foreign researcher I do not have the moral right to judge the way the government is acting... When the pro-environment activists invited a television group from Bangkok to make a documentary about small-scale fishing and they wanted to interview me, I had to refuse, despite their disappointment. I did not want to be stamped as a pro-environment activist. (Ruohomäki 1997, 187, translation KK)

In his research report Ruohomäki has tried to present the different perspectives. He writes that during his writing process he tried to present a situation where the small-

scale fishermen discuss the state's fishing policy with pro-environment activists and capitalists. He explains that anthropological fieldwork and reports must find a balance between different perspectives and interests; it is a sign of good research if the researcher has been able to act like a "social juggler" during the fieldwork. (Ruohomäki 1997, 188.)

On the other hand, the anthropologist and Jesuit priest Ricardo Falla argues that it is not possible to study conflicts without choosing a side. He spent six years with escaped Maya Indians deep in the Ixcan rain forest in Guatemala. His research deals with human rights.

> Mixing anthropology with human rights is mixing anthropology with a certain sense of justice. We have to judge, especially in a context of terrible oppression such as we have in Guatemala, with the bloodbath that has taken place. We can't just remain passive and study the massacres as the product of a military culture... We have to choose sides. You either choose to understand the army and its judgement of events, or you choose the judgement of the people. Or you can opt for your own opinion, because you're also looking for the truth in all this. (Falla, interviewed in Manz 1995, 266)

For Falla, it is obvious that in a conflict people choose sides and everything gets filtered through the same lens. In his book "Massacres in the Jungle" Falla takes the perspective of the Indian villagers. "If the army disagrees, let them carry out their own investigations, with their own sources... Hopefully, the army will show the other side of the massacres, but in an accurate way" (Falla, interviewed in Manz 1995, 265).[9] This is quite the same as Eskola's argument that objectivity and reliability are not the same thing. Reliability must be the aim of the researcher even when objectivity is not possible, or when aiming at objectivity would lead to compromises that would decrease the value of the research. (Eskola 1975, 33-35.) I do not believe that in a situation of political or other oppression an objective, scientific truth can be found somewhere in between the views of the oppressed and their oppressors. There exists only one truth and it is always described from someone's point of view. It is fair for the researcher to say openly from whose perspective she is

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[9] In Guatemala it would be very difficult to do research. It is almost impossible to collect material about the civil war for research purposes, and the government archives are not open to researchers. The parliamentarian Héctor Klee Orellana and Bishop Juán Gerardi were murdered after they had demanded access to archives about the civil war (Galeano 1999). Ricardo Falla has been living in exile in the US after publishing his book about the displaced Indians.

looking at the situation. I think that in this sense the social sciences have developed a lot during recent decades.[10]

The researcher's social responsibility

Bourgois argues that anthropologists have a historical responsibility to address larger moral issues because their discipline's traditional research subjects - people in remote Third World settings - are being violently incorporated into the world economy in a manner that often involves starvation, political repression, and even genocide. Traditionally such an approach is condemned as ethically problematic. Bourgois argues that the framing of ethical issues in cultural anthropology needs to be understood in the context of the history of the development of the discipline in the larger society, in the politically polarised world. (Bourgois 1990, 43-44.)

The linguist Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, who advocates the diversity of languages, feels that researchers have a responsibility, based on their knowledge, to distribute information about the problems they survey:

> I would not like to be more dramatic than necessary - but I would still like to remind ourselves: when our great-grandchild asks: "Why didn't you stop this craziness? You could have done it!" the one answer we cannot give is: I DID NOT KNOW. Secondly, if some of you may feel provoked, even furious, please don't shoot the messenger. Reflect rather on the message. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000a)

> In the field of education, it is not enough to discuss methods of dominant (or even dominated) language learning. More is needed. This means that every researcher has to clarify for herself the relationship of intellectual knowledge to morality, duties, and

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[10] My research can be compared, for example, with the other doctoral thesis on Kurds presented in the Department of Social Policy of Helsinki University, M.R. Jafar's "Under-underdevelopment", where he describes the economic position of the Kurdish provinces as that of a colony in Turkey. Jafar, who is a Kurd, mainly uses Turkish state statistics to prove this and writes in a neutral style without expressing any of his own opinions or comments. In the numerous footnotes, which are up to three pages long, he explains what he himself thinks of assimilation and other Turkish practices towards the Kurds. (Jafar 1974.) In 25 years, the academic atmosphere has changed to the extent that a researcher can express her own views in the text itself, not only in the footnotes.

struggle, and to come to terms with what for Wittgenstein is transcendental. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, xxv)

We have to take the big step needed to move issues about linguistic human rights towards the centre of not only the discipline of linguistics but also education, law, and several others, before it is too late. With love, devotion, intuition, understanding, and wisdom. This includes, even with the risk of academic (and economic) marginalisation, asking some of the uncomfortable why-questions, shouting them out in fact, and demanding answers. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, xxvii)

Falla (interviewed in Manz 1995, 266) demands that a science seeking to serve persecuted people must look for the topics that are most relevant to their suffering. In a commentary on anthropology's claim to authority on the subject of Native Americans, Paul Doughty has questioned why monographs have not addressed systematically "the most vital issues that unequivocally affected all Native Americans relentlessly since the European conquest" - death, discrimination, displacement, dispossession, racism, rampant disease, hunger, impoverishment, and physical and psychological abuse (Doughty, 1988, ref. Green 1995, 107). Charny argues that there are many environmentalists and peace researchers who are interested in underdevelopment, but at the same time they are virtually silent and strangely unimpassioned in their response to deliberate genocide (Charny 1988, 7).

Concerning her research on everyday violence in northeast Brazil, Scheper-Hughes declares that "a critical practice of social science implies not so much a practical as an epistemological struggle" (Scheper-Hughes 1992). Green feels that the struggles between the powerful and the powerless are at stake, so anthropologists have to decide on their perspective (Green 1995, 107). These kinds of attitudes are common among researchers, but anthropological and sociological information can also be used against the target group if its enemy gets to know their secrets and gains a better understanding of their way of thinking (Nash 1976, 149).

Philippe Bourgois wrote in 1990 that with notable exceptions most North American anthropologists do not include the political and human rights dimensions of the people they are studying in their discussions of "anthropological ethics". Instead, the dominant trend has been to avoid these issues. As an example, he points out that in the early 1980s dissertations were written about the hermeneutics of shame among the Maya. Bourgois asks how we can understand the meaning of this important cultural construct if we ignore the fact that tens of thousands of Maya were being massacred by the military during this period. (Bourgois 1990, 43, 46.) Thus choosing the topic and

the theoretical framework of the research means, first of all, choosing a point of view.[11]

Sheper-Hughes mentions that being very traumatised after seeing hundreds of children die in a Brazilian shantytown in the 1960s immediately after the military coup was one reason why she returned there in the 1980s to do anthropological research. She finds her anthropological research active and committed: her research exists both as a field of knowledge and as a field of action. Anthropological writing can be a site of resistance. (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 15-16, 24-25.) Michael Taussig calls this kind of approach "writing against terror".

Frank N. Pieke feels that anthropological research can be of interest not only to the researcher and other anthropologists but also to the people being studied. The anthropologist's writings can be a way for the local people to de-contextualise the events making up their lives and invest them with a future relevance for their own society. (Pieke 1995, 76.) I think this is very much true in the Kurdish context. As I pursued my research I received from the Kurds lots of support and demands to get it published as soon as possible. I have also noticed that although Kurdish organisations in exile have effective communication systems among the diaspora communities, for example TV programmes distributed by satellite, they mainly pay attention to the conventional warfare of the conflict. The strategy of low-intensity warfare with all of its different methods does not seem to be familiar to them. So I believe that my research can benefit the target group by helping them understand better the strategy their enemy is using against them.

Bourgois suggests that one way of reformulating anthropological ethics would be to require that studies among the "poor and powerless" contribute to their

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[11] For example, this research would have been different if the research topic had been the health situation in the fast-growing slums of Turkish cities, or if the theoretical framework had included theories concerning economic development or health care in Islamic culture instead of military theories. Comparing this research to Tuula Sakaranaho's doctoral thesis about Turkish women, "The Complex Other", it is difficult to believe that it deals with the same country as my research, and that she carried out her interviews in Turkey at a time when the war against the Kurds had intensified, 1991-1993. Sakaranaho presents Turkey as a country "between Islam and secularism", not as a country waging a civil war. She presents the Islamist movement from other perspectives than the perspective that it is one of the very few groups in Turkey which dares to criticise the army. She studies the position of women from the ideological triangle of Kemalism, feminism, and Islam. She does not pay any attention to ethnicity, not even when she is explaining Kemalism as one form of Turkish nationalism. The word "ethnicity" is not in the index of the book. (Sakaranaho 1998.)

empowerment. On the other hand, research on such topics does not always have something concrete to offer to the target group in their struggle for survival or for political rights - researchers are outsiders, despite their commitment. (Bourgois 1990, 52-53.)

3.2. Fieldwork on violence

My first contact with the Kurds was the Newroz celebration of 1990 in Helsinki, in which I participated because of my work. The party, with Oriental music, delicious food, and beautiful women in shining dresses, gave me the impression that I had walked into the stories of the Thousand and One Nights. In December 1996, I finished my graduate thesis about Kurdish women from Turkey and Iraq residing in Finland. In my research I interviewed fifteen Kurds, of whom nine live in Finland and six in other European countries. I had contact with some Kurdish families; I feel that our relationships were friendly but somehow distant. My attitude towards Kurdish issues was professional. All this changed in March 1997 when I travelled to the Turkish part of Kurdistan as a member of the Finnish human rights delegation. Martin van Bruinessen explains how impressive his first journey to Kurdistan was for him. So it was for me. The natural beauty of Kurdistan is something one can not understand by looking at pictures. And the conditions of war and the military presence everywhere - I do not know how one could prepare herself for it. Van Bruinessen explains how he became deeply emotionally involved in the Kurdish issue during the battles in South Kurdistan in February 1975 (van Bruinessen 1992, 1, 5). This also happened to me in March 1997 in Kurdistan and in August 1997 in Istanbul. I felt lost. There were so many things I simply could not understand. According to Falla (interviewed in Manz 1995, 273-274), research in conflict zones brings the researcher even closer to the community, and the suffering and fear one is witnessing is likely to lead to a special closeness and commitment. The journalist Annika Sandlund, who has reported on the situation in the Balkans, explains that it is the pain and the fear that bind the observers together with the victims of the war (Sandlund 1999).

In anthropological fieldwork the researcher's personal and professional roles merge. If the informants are also the researcher's friends, her personal and professional lives are interwoven into the research. The autobiographical side of fieldwork enterprises should not be ignored but analysed in relation to the questions which are asked and those which are avoided. The researcher's personality and life experience are part of the process, as they enable her to reach particular kinds of insights. A researcher should perceive this and see what kind of consequences it has on her interpretations. If the personal is political, the personal is also theoretical, argues Okely. To feel is one thing; to

understand what these feelings entail, how they may govern one's actions and reflections and theoretical preferences is quite another. Norman believes that it is more problematic to analyse how a particular anthropologist experiences her research emotionally than to consider the influences of her cultural background, academic tradition, age, and other more typical traits of the social person. (Dyck 2000, 36; Norman 2000, 140, 123-124; Pink 2000, 96; Okely 1992, 9.)

Existential shock

While collecting material for this research I became deeply involved in the themes of war and death. My first childhood memory is from the summer of 1963: I was four years old and it was my sister's funeral. She died of pneumonia at the age of two months. Throughout my childhood, I can remember the regular family visits to the graveyard. Kurds seem to take the issue of death in a much more relaxed manner. Once a Kurdish friend about my age told me that five of his sisters and brothers had died when they were children, and he surprised me by not knowing exactly how many of them had been born before him and how many after. Scheper-Hughes, who has studied infant mortality in a northern Brazilian shantytown, writes about the different attitudes toward children's deaths:

> In the world in which most of us live, the dialectic between fertility and mortality has lost its edge and is buried in the back of our consciousness. For most Europeans and North Americans each birth signifies new life, not the threat of premature death. But it was not so long ago in our "Western" world that reproduction was as unpredictable and death as "random" and chaotic as they are in Northern Brazil today. (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 273)

Robben and Nordstrom call the situation when ethnographers studying violence experience bewilderment on first seeing it *an existential shock*. It is disorientation about the boundaries between life and death, which appear erratic rather than discrete. Sometimes these tensions are misinterpreted as culture shock. But the fieldwork crisis may also deepen the ethnographers' understanding of the people with whom they associate and the violence they study (Robben and Nordstrom 1995, 13-14.) The Croatian author Slavenka Drakulic says that the presence of death becomes part of everyday life during a war; people think about it constantly and start to imagine their own death (Drakulic 1995, 11, 41).

Nancy Scheper-Hughes writes that she learned to "distance" herself from death in order to continue her work. Only after returning home from the fieldwork did she recover her sensibilities and moral outrage at "the horror, the horror" she had experienced. The horror was the routinisation of human suffering and the "normal" violence of daily life. (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 15.) Mark Danner was in Sarajevo during the siege as a member of the ABC News crew. A professional attitude, which leaves no space for normal emotions, can be seen in his description of his reporting work after the Markela massacre on 5 February 1994, where 68 Sarajevans died:

> I took out my notebook, drew a deep breath, and began to count. It was easier now, all had been properly arranged, what limbs and parts remained had been matched up by people well practised in such things. Twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three ... Yes, this was a big story, perhaps the biggest of the war. Thirty-one, thirty-two ...Yes, a *huge* story ... (Danner 1998a, 35)

Language of conflict studies

I have been very confused when I have not been able to share with Finnish people the experiences I have undergone. Actually, one of the most shocking things has been to realise that people in my country do not know anything about the war going on in Turkey. This seems to be a normal condition for many researchers returning to their home country from a war zone:

> I have found that moving through dangerous field sites took its toll as well. Perhaps the hardest thing is how impossible it is to convey the everyday *normality* of violence to anyone living in our safe middle-class US enclaves. It is extremely difficult to convince anyone that such a "state of emergency"...is not the exception but the rule. So one usually shies away from speaking of the horror, since most people respond with looks of shocked disbelief and exaggerated compassion but rarely with the realisation that the "state of emergency" connects to their own lives. (Swedenburg 1995, 34)

Many times when I tell about my research, people who are not familiar with the situation in Kurdistan do not believe me. They say that I exaggerate, that I should be more objective. This seems to be a common reaction to mass media and research bringing new information about a war or genocide. Lemkin tells how people during and after World War II refused to believe the information coming from Germany because it was too gruesome (Lemkin 1944, 94). Bauman

also writes about how people refused to believe all the atrocities Nazis had done to Jews:

> Just how untoward our complacency may prove in the end becomes apparent once we recall that still in 1941 the Holocaust was not expected; that, given the extant knowledge of the "facts of the case", it was not expectable; and that, when it finally came to pass one year later, it met with universal incredulity. People refused to believe the facts they stared at. Not that they were obtuse or ill-willed. It was just that nothing they had known before had prepared them to believe. For all they had known and believed, the mass murder for which they did not even have a name yet was, purely and simply, unimaginable.In 1988, it is unimaginable again. In 1988, however, we know what we did not know in 1941; that also the *unimaginable ought to be imagined.* (Bauman 1989, 85)

On the other hand, I have also been unable to share my feelings with my Kurdish friends - things connected to the war which are very strange for me are for them part of normal everyday life. Scheper-Hughes gives a very good example of this kind of situation. She spent her first years in Brazil as a community health worker specialising on maternal and child health in a *favela* where three hundred children died during one year out of a total population of five thousand people. Once she had to carry a dead child from the hospital to his home:

> I had to trek all the way through town and climb the Alto with this tiny, yet strangely heavy, dead weight in my arms. It was almost more than I could bear, and I wept bitter and angry tears all along the way. To my great wonder and perplexity, however, the young woman took the news and the bundle from my arms placidly, almost casually and
>   indifferently. Noting my red eyes and tear-stained face, the woman turned to comment to a neighbour woman standing by, "Hein, hein! Poor thing! Funny, isn't she?" What was funny or amusing seemed to be my inappropriate display of grief and my concern over a matter of so little consequence. No one, least of all the mother, had expected the little tyke to live in any case. (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 270-271)[12]

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[12] I myself had an experience that was quite similar, though not so cruel. In September 1998 I watched the sit-in demonstration of the "Saturday Mothers", mothers of disappeared persons, in Istiklal Street in Istanbul. The police arrested thirty women and carried them roughly to a bus in order to prevent the demonstration. I felt quite shocked to see hundreds of policemen, especially when I

It is important to understand that the experiences of a European researcher are also different on an emotional level from those of the people living in war zones. The Iraqi journalist Dia Liilua, who lives in Finland as a refugee, writes that in a country where there has been hate and war throughout its history, suffering and sorrow remain a burden of the people (Tuomarla 1999, 42). For the Kurds as well, warfare and early death are a part of their shared national memory. It helped me to understand them when I read about the Finnish battles in 1939-1945 and remembered how people used to talk about the war during my childhood in the 1960s. When talking with the mother of a dead guerrilla, the right perspective is to remember the mothers of soldiers during World War II rather than to compare her situation to one's own, though this would be the natural perspective when the researcher is also a mother.

Zygmunt Bauman explains about studying the Holocaust that it was not only sinister and horrifying, but also an event that was not at all easy to comprehend in habitual, "ordinary" terms. The Holocaust had to be written down in its own code, which then had to be broken to make understanding possible. He compares research about it to a window rather than a picture on a wall. Looking through that window one can catch a rare glimpse of many things otherwise invisible; it is important to recognise all the factors connected with the process. (Bauman 1989, VIII.) Fein argues that when Europe became aware of the Holocaust, in the beginning there was no word adequate to label the murder of the Jews and make it emotionally understandable (Fein 1979, 3).

The comments of a friend of Amir Hassanpour (whose name he does not mention) on his Ph.D. dissertation express the same difficulty of explaining in ordinary language (in this case academic language) a situation which is not ordinary:

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heard that the arrested women had been attacked with pepper gas. Immediately after this I went to the Mesopotamia Institute, a Kurdish cultural association located in the same street. There the cafeteria was full of people drinking tea and talking to each other, yet they were fully aware of what had happened some minutes earlier. When I asked what would happen to the arrested women and why the people were so calm, they answered, "The women have been taken to the Bayrampasa police station and will be held for at least three days. The IHD is sending an attorney there so they will be taken care of. This is everyday life here: people do not react because they have seen this kind of situation so many times."

> ...it isn't dissertation style which made what you wrote hard to read. There is anger in what you write. Anger against what happened to the Kurds. Although I suspect this anger gives you the energy to do what you are doing, I wish you could find a way to keep it from deadening and flattening your discussions and analyses. (a friend of Amir Hassanpour, 10.4.1985, cit. in Hassanpour 2000)

In writing about linguicide Skutnabb-Kangas uses hard terms like "language murder" and "a killer language" (Anne Pakir's term). Such terms may sound highly emotionally loaded - because the issue is emotionally loaded. It is not possible to write about ugly things with beautiful words. But when emotionally loaded words are used, they need to be defined. Using metaphors to name realities can hide or highlight them. "Language death" is a metaphor at the same level as "language murder" but it is agentless: it makes the disappearance of languages sound natural, like dying of old age. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000b and 2000c, xxxi-xxxii.)

Sensitive writing about the people's suffering is extremely important, as there is a danger of dehumanising the victims and practising sensationalism and creating a form of social pornography (Feldman 1995, 245). Drakulic calls war reporting the "pornography of death" if it merely shows all the cruel details without causing any change in the situation (Drakulic 1995, 179).
Sluka has suggested that the practice of socio-cultural anthropology, with its emphasis on a cross-cultural and comparative perspective, a holistic approach, a reliance on participant observation, concentration on local-level analysis, and the "emic" point of view, is well-suited to understanding the subjective, experimental, meaningful dimension of a social conflict (Sluka 1992). According to Robben and Nordstrom, daily life under war conditions anywhere and at any time is confusing and full of anguish. It means never-ending anxiety about the next meal, the next move, and the next assault. This immediacy of action characterises not only war but also any form of violence. And there are few social prescriptions for how to cope and survive in violent situations. The research done on wars is usually research concerning the political conditions, not the human suffering. (Robben and Nordstrom 1995, 1, 3.)

Ability to help

have felt totally helpless just observing the situation of the Kurds. I have often had the feeling that I must do something, it is not enough just to describe the problems. This feeling has of course badly disturbed me in my research work. Many researchers on war and violence have had the same feeling of inadequacy when seeing the enormous suffering of their research group. The

Guatemalan anthropologist Myrna Mack, who was murdered in Guatemala City on 12 September 1990 while she was doing research about displaced Indians, had explained this feeling in a letter to a friend:

> By the time we left (a village in Chajul), the people in the community appeared to be growing attached to us, seeking us out and inviting us to visit them in their houses. They have such an enormous need for someone to listen to them. I can't stop feeling frustrated at my inability to offer more concrete help. (Myrna Mack 16.12.1989, ref. Oglesby 1995, 259)

Sometimes when I asked Kurdish women in the shantytowns about their health problems they hoped that I could arrange some concrete help for them. It was difficult to explain that I do not represent any organisation and am just writing a book about their situation.

Falla, who has documented testimonies about individual and collective experiences of the Guatemalan people during the years of terror, feels that anthropology can be employed as an agent of social change. Researchers can act as intermediaries; they can lend their voices on behalf of those who have witnessed and lived through the macabre events. (Falla 1994, 2-3.)

In the spring of 1998 I looked through the available research material on Kurdish issues and noticed that there is almost no research material on this topic. That gave me a new perspective on my work, and I started to see that it would be valuable to "just describe" the situation; it is not my personal duty to arrange medicines and hospitals for the Kurds. Karen Norman has also faced the dilemma that the people she studied, Kosovoan Albanian refugees in Sweden, needed a great deal of help. She observed that she is prepared to help them, but "help" can never be set apart from her fieldwork. The greatest help she can give them is to find ways to understand the issues that concern them. (Norman 2000, 135.)

Maria B. Olujic, who returned from the US to her native Croatia in December 1991 during the war to work in the Ministry of Science, explained her feelings:

> I must examine my role as an anthropologist who is ostensibly trained to have an objective stand - to record what is happening, to observe. However, our method in ethnography is participant observation - but in a high-conflict situation, how does one participate in human suffering and violence? (Olujic 1995, 203)

Falla has faced the same absurdity:

> So-called participant observation has a way of drawing the
> ethnographer into spaces of human life where she or he might really
> prefer not to go at all and, once there, doesn't know how to go about
> getting out except through writing, which draws others there as well,
> making them party to the act of witnessing. (Falla 1992, XII, ref. Manz
> 1995, 262-263)

Moral responsibility

In Bolivia in 1967, while Che Guevara was fighting there in the tropical
forests of Santa Cruz, June Nash did fieldwork about labour unions in the
mining town Oruro. Nash argues that it was not possible to choose the role of
an impartial observer and still work in a tiny mining community where the
miners had entered the modern industrial sphere and were demanding power
in it. It was a conflict situation where no neutral bystanders were allowed. She
feels that she became an instrument in the research by just being there,
threatening the existing role structure and hovering in the conflict of identity.
(Nash 1976, 150, 163.)

I have always felt that doing this research is the "right thing" to do. In the
beginning the reasons I chose just this topic were more emotional than
intellectual. After seeing how little information there is about the life of
civilians in this war, I wanted to finish and publish this research as fast as
possible. This target has been so important that I simply had to forget my
shock and emotions concerning the horrible situations and concentrate on
doing my work as well as I could. It also helped me to overcome my shock.
When I was writing about the war I was doing something against the cruelty,
and this made me feel better than sitting alone at home and crying. My
empathy with the Kurds has changed into a passion to understand the reasons
for their situation, and I have tried to gain from my emotions the energy to do
this research. A spirit of hope has also given Tove Skutnabb-Kangas the
strength to write a book about linguistic genocide:

> This has been a difficult but necessary book to write. So much
> (unnecessary) pain and sorrow is included in the experience of many
> of the people and groups I describe... But there has been a lot of joy
> and encouragement too - people are marvels of energy, insight, action,
> love. Much *is* happening. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, xv)

Another important issue is the question of moral responsibility: when one sees the enormous suffering of the Kurds one begins to compare one's own situation with theirs. Eva Juhnke is a German internationalist who joined the PKK. After fighting for four years as a guerrilla she was captured by the Turkish army in northern Iraq in October 1997, and is now serving a 15-year prison sentence in Sivas. She has spoken about the responsibility of the German people for the suffering of the Kurds. She has explained that the reason she joined the armed struggle against the Turkish army was that German companies sell arms to Turkey, and thus it is the responsibility of German people to help the Kurds. (Lippmann-Kasten 1998.) During my first journey to Kurdistan, with an NGO delegation, we spoke at length about moral issues and how the life of the Kurds is so difficult, yet we have been so lucky as to be born in a rich and democratic country. Jouni Pirilä, a member of the delegation, replied to this that "one should not feel guilty that one was born in a rich country, but instead appreciate the fact that one is privileged and act on it in the right way". I have tried to remember these words when I felt depressed or tired. At a meeting of the Kurdish Women's Studies Network (*Tora Navneteweyî ya Lêkolînên Jinên Kurd*) in London in July 1999, there was a long discussion about the ethics of doing research about Kurdish women and participating in the Network. The participants agreed that "there can not be equality when the position of people is not similar; the people who are more visible and have more resources also have more responsibility". In this context, being visible means that doing research about Kurds inside this region (Turkey, Iran, and Iraq) is much more restricted and dangerous than doing it outside the region.

Researcher's emotions in the research process

I have read a great deal of material about political prisoners and torture in Turkey. However, reading about torture is very different from meeting people who have been tortured. Many of their accounts are so terrible that I have felt I am inside a tale of horror that can not be true. In the spring of 1998 I read the Swedish edition of Mehdi Zana's book "Eleven Years in Turkish Prison". In his book Zana, who was the mayor of Amed from 1977-80, recounts in detail how he was tortured in Prison Number 5 in Diyarbakir, which has the reputation of being one of the worst prisons in the world (Laber 1988, 14). Once I was talking about the book with some Kurds. I told them that it had taken me three days to go through this tiny book; I could not read it faster, as the contents were so horrible. They merely laughed and told me that Europeans can not read about these things, and that the Swedish version of the book is very soft compared to the Turkish original, which no European could read. Only later did I hear that one of them had himself been in the same

prison in Amed and had received the same treatment. In the summer of 1998 I met Mehdi Zana and I told him it had been very difficult for me to read the book. He answered that others have said the same thing: they stopped reading the book, as they could not go further.

> *But it is so that I have not written everything that actually happened there. I and my comrades have decided that we won't write about everything. It's so difficult for people to believe that all these things have really happened and we've been there.When I was talking in England about that animal, the dog, no one could really understand it. It caused really strong emotions among people. But everything I told is true. (Zana 1998)*

Van Bruinessen writes that a researcher who studies massacres is torn between sympathy and respect for the victims' reports and the need for further corroborating information (Van Bruinessen 1994a, 175-175). Emotional commitment is a basic necessity in all fieldwork, explains Gothóni, but distance is necessary in all critical research. This means a person's intellectual ability to withdraw temporarily from his or her emotions and stop feeling togetherness. It means observing the situation from a distance, from an inter-subjective perspective. Making field notes is one good method of achieving this aim. In the field, writing is one way to deal with one's own feelings, to analyse and learn from them, and it makes the researcher feel at home in an unfamiliar situation. (Gothóni 1997, 142-143.)

For Caroline Knowles the difficult life of a group (homeless schizophrenics in her case) is just one research topic among others. "Their pain is my data," she says (Knowles 2000, 61). Chalk and Jonassohn advise researchers to study genocide like any other research topic and not to let the work be disturbed by their emotions:

> We must emphasise that we use the term genocide only as it is defined below. This does not imply an absence of feelings, attitudes, and opinions - these can be expressed separately. But since we take it for granted that we are all against genocide, we might as well get on with the scholarly work. (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 3-4)

Riitta Granfelt wrote her Ph.D. thesis about Finnish homeless women. In collecting empirical material in interviews with 21 women, she faced a great deal of pain and suffering, which in turn affected her. She feels that she was able to get deeper into the women's stories after first gaining some distance from them. Granfelt explains that it is important and valuable for the

researcher to have empathy with the research target, but that an empathetic approach is possible only if the researcher is not dominated by a froth of emotions. It is not necessary to experience a storm of emotions to feel empathy. A working method that is an understanding one includes concentrated, analytical thinking which can not be linked only to emotions. Empathy is dialogue between emotions and thinking and a simultaneous dialogue between oneself and other people. (Granfelt 1998, 28-30.)

It has been difficult to do this research, as this is one of the first surveys of the situation of the civilians in the war in North Kurdistan. There are no previous surveys whose methods I could have used, no specialists whom I could have asked for advice, no archives or academic networks which I could have used. At the same time it has been inspiring to create something new. I feel that I am privileged to have been able to observe these historic events. The winter of 1998-99 - when Abdullah Öcalan first appeared in Rome and then was captured in Nairobi - is for the Kurds a defeat comparable to the execution of Sheikh Said in September 1925 and the execution of Sayid Riza in the winter of 1937-38. But the Kurdish national movement reacted differently in 1999 than it did in the 1920s and 1930s. These years might be the turning point in the Kurdish question. My awareness of the uniqueness of the situation has been one factor that has helped me to stop thinking about my own emotions and concentrate on the work.[13]

Security of informants

When Philippe Bourgois began to do anthropological fieldwork in a Salvadoran refugee camp in Honduras in the early 1980s, the church and United Nations organisations operating the camp welcomed him. They felt that a researcher would be in an ideal position to document human-rights abuses. But he was surprised to realise that the refugees desperately wanted

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[13] I learned this through a bitter mistake. In September 1997, during the Musa Anter Peace Train festival, I was a panellist in a Med-TV program where we panellists were offered the opportunity to ask Öcalan questions via a telephone connection. I wanted to ask him what he thinks about Hasankeyf and the government's plan to destroy it by building the Ilisu dam, but I decided not to say anything, as I had arrived late to the program (my flight to Brussels had been delayed). Kurds with whom I spoke about this always told me that there would be other opportunities. Even when Öcalan was in Rome I did not make any effort to arrange an interview with him - I was just planning a journey to Turkey and I was afraid that such a meeting would irritate the Turkish authorities. So these possibilities were missed, and no new ones will come.

foreigners to reside in the camp with them. They hoped that a foreigner would deter local military officials from engaging in random abuses. Bourgois was told that instead of putting the refugees in danger, the physical presence of the researcher granted them a measure of security. (Bourgois 1990, 48.) In Turkey the situation is quite the opposite: any Turkish citizen who co-operates with foreign journalists, human-right activists, or researchers risks being arrested and tortured. Nonetheless, there are still plenty of people willing to guide foreigners and give them information about the situation. The reason for this is that political parties, NGOs, and human-rights organisations so urgently need support from abroad that their activists are prepared to take personal risks for the benefit of their organisations.

Scheper-Hughes postponed her fieldwork in Brazilian shantytowns for a long time. She felt that she could not go while Brazil was under a military dictatorship which relied on torture and the threat of torture, imprisonment, and exile. It would not have been safe either for the target group of her research or for herself. (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 14-15.)

It is a great risk for the Kurds to speak with foreigners when a member of the MIT is standing nearby with a camera or video camera, and we foreigners are of course aware of this and do not want to cause any harm to them. Sidi Nezifa met Finnish delegates in the pro-Kurdish HADEP party's office in Wan in March 1998. When he was asked what it would cost him, he answered:

> *It is one hundred per cent sure that this evening I will sit under arrest in the police station. During this year I've already been arrested twice just because I visited the HADEP office. (Sidi Nezifa, interviewed in Lodenius 1998a, 6)*

The safety of my own informants in Turkey has been a constant worry, more so than my own safety, as the Turkish state does not have a policy of assassinating foreign observers. One terrible example is the fate of the journalist Hafiz Akdemir, who was the guide of the first Finnish human rights delegation in Amed in 1992. He was murdered soon after the delegation left the country. This has been extremely traumatic for Finnish human rights activists and the issue has not been discussed openly. During recent years, international human rights delegations have brought along interpreters who have citizenship in some EU member country. These are usually former Turkish citizens, as there are few Europeans who can speak Turkish and Kurdish fluently, and their safety is also a constant worry during the journeys.[14] In my eyes, no foreign observer is guilty of the death of Hafiz

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[14] During a journey to Turkey the interpreter of an English delegation, Nafiz

Akdemir - he was voluntarily working for an opposition newspaper and meeting foreigners in a country where he knew the conditions. In any case, my fieldwork is different to Scheper-Hughes' in the sense that my journeys to Turkey have been very short, only about one to two weeks. It would not be possible for me to do traditional anthropological fieldwork spending months among the Kurds in a village in the State of Emergency Region or in a shantytown in some city. A fair European woman would sooner or later catch the attention of the intelligence service, and the informants would be arrested. This scenario became very clear during a car accident in a Turkish shantytown: the car in which I was travelling hit a small child, and in a few seconds a crowd of angry people gathered around us. What could happen in such a situation is that the police might come there and find the driver guilty of an accident and, much worse, of guiding a foreign spy. Luckily, the child was taken to a hospital before police intervened in the scene.

Granfelt debates the ethics of her research into homelessness among Finnish women: what right does the researcher have to enter the lives of the target group? She answers her own question by explaining that the stories of homeless women enrich feminist research and are socio-politically relevant. (Granfelt 1998, 39-40.) The situation of deported Kurds is different to that of homeless Finnish women - there is a war going on in Turkey, but Finland is a civil society. Discussion of the causes of homelessness and poverty in Finland is part of normal academic and political discourse. But in Turkey the army is waging low-intensity warfare against the Kurds, and one important method is censorship to minimise international attention and reduce support for the victims of the war. The position of individual informants must be seen against this background. Information about the Kurdish situation has created some positive results for the Kurds. But a researcher, a journalist, a human rights observer, or anyone travelling to Turkey or any other war zone must be aware of these conditions and be fully committed to the work so that she will fully distribute the information she has got; otherwise the sacrifices and dangers faced by the informants are wasted.

It is important that the people who use their time and take risks to gather information for the research also receive information about the results. I have heard this kind of complaint many times:

Bostanci, was subject to an assassination attempt, which he survived; Nilufer Koç, the interpreter of a German delegation, was arrested and tortured (Berger et al. 1998, 101; Koç 1995).

Lots of delegations come to Turkey, they ask lots of questions, and then go, but they never send us any information about what they are doing. They are exploiting us, they get money for the journeys. Many women are taking risks when they speak to foreigners. Foreigners take lot of pictures of us, what are they doing with them? Are they using them to get money? They have a peculiar face when they look at us, as though they feel pity for us. (a woman, Istanbul)

I must say that my first reaction to such complaints has been irritation. Many human rights activists spend lots of time (and money) to draw attention to Turkey's problems in their home countries; they do not benefit financially from this work. Europeans visiting Turkey often face this kind of complaint. A delegation sent by the Kurdish Human Rights Project was blamed by a displaced villager who said that "human-rights delegations all come to ask questions, but they do nothing for us" (KHRP 1996, ii). But the Kurdish Human Rights Project is the organisation which has brought hundreds of cases against the state of Turkey before the European Court of Human Rights; it is one of most efficient NGOs dealing with the Kurdish issue. Yet the despair of the villager can also be understood. McDowall comments on this difficulty:

> There is a broad truth to this displaced villager's scepticism. The ability of human rights groups is severely constricted not only by their own limited resources and influence but, more importantly, it is limited by the seriousness with which European and other Western governments are willing to take the human rights issue, and whether they are prepared to give it the importance it deserves. (McDowall, KHRP 1996, ii-iii).

When dealing with the informants in Turkey one should not go beyond their reality, not create unrealistic expectations, and absolutely keep the promises one has made. I feel helpless when I remember my interview with deported women in Amed. They had many diseases, they wanted a health centre and cheap medicines, and it was beyond my ability to explain to them how a research project about the war can benefit Kurds. Since there are many solidarity activities going on in Europe, such a communication gap is really a pity. Research and solidarity work are two different things, but often solidarity organisations can use for practical purposes the information which researchers collect. Depending on the type of research and how the researcher keeps in touch with her informants, projects with a political or humanitarian purpose should be arranged so that there is a local organisation (or counterpart) with which the project is done in co-operation and which is also a channel for communication. It is important that everyone who travels to

Kurdistan or any other war zone thinks honestly about his or her motives for making the journey: a search for adventures is not an acceptable reason to travel there.

4. Methods of collecting information

4.1. Methods and research material

Jacqueline P. Wiseman compares a qualitative researcher to a detective in a classic murder mystery: she starts with no suspects, so the outcome is quite open. In contrast to survey research, for example, the elements to be investigated are thought to be known already – much like a murder in which the method of operation is familiar to the police. In qualitative research the methods of gathering data and the methods of handling it are bound together and they develop together. (Wiseman 1974, 317-318). This comparison describes what it is to study a health situation under war conditions. For me, looking at the traditional sources of information, like statistics, was in vain. I also felt helpless while comparing traditional research methods and advice on how to do fieldwork.

Shelley Taylor describes the principles of ethnographic research, and sometimes the scope can be widened to principles of qualitative research in general: for example, ethnographic research is holistic, i.e. the parts are described in relation to the whole situation. Data collection is based on a theoretical framework and it is comparative, so that the researcher generalizes from that situation to others. The goal of ethnographic analysis is not just to identify topics but to capture relationships between them. (Taylor 2001).

Critical ethnography is a methodology which is "strategically situated to shed light on larger social, political, symbolic and economic issues". It puts the accent on the political, social and economic surroundings of the studied group. Participant observation is one method frequently used in ethnography. Its characteristics are: a) it has a dual purpose (the observer both watches and participates); b) a researcher is aware of the ongoing observations; c) the situation is viewed with a wide-angle lens that looks beyond the focus; d) it has a dual (insider-outsider) perspective; and e) a record is kept on what is seen and experienced. My own participant observation included the first three of these characteristics and I also tried to develop an insider's perspective (despite the fact that the Kurds very clearly positioned me as an outsider). (van Maanen 1988, 127; Taylor 2001).

I wrote field notes most of the time, but now I feel that I should have done it more carefully. In Turkey I wrote down in detail everything I saw, but unfortunately not always in Europe, because of being tired or feeling that there was no time. Sometimes when going through my notes and pictures I

have recognised and understood things differently than before, and sometimes even remembered new things. Tuija Lindqvist says that she remembered new things, which she had not written down, even one or two years after the observation session. Some researchers (Lindqvist 1997, 46; Mäkelä 1990, 46) have noted that remembering new observations after a long period is a phenomenon about which there is no advice in the literature on methodology. I think it is a question of understanding the situation better later on. Sometimes after reading something I have remembered a similar thing which I did not fully understand in the observation situation. I give one example of this: once a Kurdish woman told me that her widowed sister had to marry her brother-in-law, as this is the Kurdish custom. She was shy when telling me about it, as she knew that this is not the custom in Europe. In Yilmaz Güney's film "Yol" there is one scene where a Kurdish man informs his sister-in-law that her husband is dead by telling her that he will be her new husband. When I saw this scene I remembered the discussion and understood the context fully only then.

I use different types of material and data collection techniques to get information about the topic: interviews of Kurdish people, participant observation, travel reports and other reports by human rights observers, and statistics about the situation in the Kurdish provinces. Information from these sources is compared. The information which is available is not very exact but it gives a clear idea about what is going on in North Kurdistan; it is possible to draw quite a systematic picture of the conditions there.

Interviews and observation

In 1997 I was twice in Turkey with a human rights group. In September 1998 I spent one week in Istanbul, and in January and February 1999 I travelled alone for twelve days to Ankara, Istanbul, and Amed. In February 2000 I travelled to Istanbul to participate in the conference "Women and Peace", but it was cancelled because the authorities did not give permission for the conference. In February 2001 I spent two weeks in Ankara, Amed, and Istanbul, but by this time I already had enough material for this study.

I also collected information by interviewing Kurdish women and men in Europe. I taped interviews with twenty-five Kurds, nine men and sixteen women. Some of them were people who had fresh information about the situation, as they had just migrated from Kurdistan or had been there recently, for example on their holidays. Some others know a lot about the issue, as they are activists in Kurdish associations. Some of the people are presented with their names, as all of them are active in Kurdish politics or culture, but

fifteen persons remain anonymous. Kurdish cultural or political activists whom I have interviewed are Hale Anter, Akin Birdal[15], M. Emin Bozarslan, Hanefi Celepli, Nedim Dagdeviren, Eren Keskin, Nazanin M. Rashid, Hikmet Tabak, RahsanYorozlu, and Mehdi Zana. The fifteen others are men and women living in Europe as refugees; five of them are aged 20-30, five 30-40 and the rest below 50. Five persons are teachers and four are housewives, one interviewee has a pizzeria, four are students and one is a nurse. Especially the nurse gave me lots of detailed information. In this research there is information given by two Kurdish nurses: one has been interviewed anonymously, and the other is "Hanife", a nurse and former member of Saglik Ses Diyarbakir. She writes articles in the Internet and e-mail updates about the health situation in North Kurdistan. Most of the Kurds interviewed come from the Turkish part of Kurdistan, one of them is from Syria, one from Iran, and two from Iraq. All were asked mainly for general information about their people. Interviews were done in Belgium, Holland, Sweden, and Turkey. The length of the taped interviews varies from ten minutes to two and one-half hours. I took notes on ten hours of interviews. The themes and questions of the interviews varied according to the issues the interviewed people had good knowledge about. Usually I asked my interviewees to describe their identity as Kurds, to talk about illnesses and how people deal with them and how displaced people manage everyday life. In addition to the taped interviews I did some interviews on which I have taken notes. I also collected information through participant observation and took field notes. So the number of people with whom I spoke and whose attitudes I noted during spontaneous discussions is much higher than the number of interviews.

I did not prepare detailed interview questions in advance; the interviews were more like taped discussions around the themes of Kurdish culture and ways of living and the health situation in Kurdistan. These discussions gave me background information and helped me to understand information from other sources, especially from travel reports and reports published by the SES and the Turkish Medical Association. I also collected information by observing Kurdish people in different types of situations: I visited families and political organisations and spent hours and hours drinking tea, listening to music, and watching Med-TV. I observed more than ten demonstrations, including massive ones in Hamburg in June 1996 and in Bonn in April 1999.

I visited Amed in March 1997, January 1999, and February 2001. These three journeys were very different kinds of experiences; the town looked very much the same, but during the second and third journeys I paid attention to some things, which I had not recognised during the first visit. The town had

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[15] Akin Birdal is Turkish.

not changed, but it was I who had learnt many things during these two years, and I could understand better what I saw.

Contacts with the Kurds

I was in touch with people of two nationalities, the Kurds and the Turks, in collecting material for this research. Making contact with Kurds was a time-consuming process. In Finland, most Kurds from Turkey are political refugees, unlike immigrants in Germany and Sweden; they support the Kurdistan Labour Party, the PKK. So it was natural that I started to build my contacts via Kurds who are active in the Kurdistan National Liberation Front, the ERNK.[16] In Western Europe, all organisations related to the PKK are regarded as terrorist organisations, and they are under close surveillance by security police in various countries, including Finland.

A logical consequence of this is that activists in the group are very suspicious of outsiders. Though the subject of my research was not the activities of the PKK and the ERNK in Europe, I dealt with people who supported them, in order to get other information. Fay G. Cohen, who studied the Native American movement in the US in the 1960s, explains that new people, including researchers, entering small groups are often thought to be spies (Cohen 1976, 88). Jeffrey A. Sluka, who has studied the Irish National Liberation Army, says that being defined as a spy is dangerous. In the case of the Kurds, even if it were not dangerous it would be a hindrance to getting information. If one does not want to be defined as a spy she should not act like one. Sluka avoided asking questions about sensitive political topics. (Sluka 1995, 283). I acted in the same way; for example, issues that I never asked about included the smuggling routes used by refugees coming to Europe and the financing of the PKK.[17] While travelling twice in Turkey with a

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[16] Later I also got to know Kurdish intellectuals who do not support the PKK. My discussions with them widened my perspective about the issue; for example, I started to realise the depth of the disagreements between the Kurds. These Kurds were not able to give me up-to-date information about the present situation in Kurdistan in the same way the PKK supporters have done.

[17] I worked for years as a social worker before doing this research, and I have also studied journalism. I had no steady income to support my research, so I wrote newspaper articles about the Kurds, as I also had information about issues other than my research topic. This worked in my favour, as it made many Kurds trust me. It might otherwise have been difficult to assure people who were suspicious, or even paranoid, about the security police and the Turkish authorities that I was collecting years of information about them in order to write a book. However, they trusted my

human rights group I made contacts which I found useful during the four journeys when I travelled there alone. For the sake of the security of my informants I can not publish the details of these meetings.

Contacts with the Turks

Human rights delegations to Turkey consist of peace activists, and although many of the characters making the journeys are quite amateurish, the MIT (National Security Organisation) takes the threat posed by them very seriously. On 20 March 1997 the Finnish delegation was in Elih (*Batman*), living in a hotel next to a police station, but the Dutch delegation was denied entrance to the town. When we left the next day, they were permitted to travel to Elih. During March 1997 no international delegations were permitted to visit Lice, Dêrsim, or Culemêrg (*Hakkari*). Why were the Dutch not permitted to travel to Elih when other foreigners could do so? The only logical reason I can understand for this is that the city did not have enough policemen suitable for monitoring foreigners. Michael Ignatieff travelled in Kurdistan in 1993 to shoot a TV broadcast for the BBC. He recalls that in the Turkish part of Kurdistan he was followed for days, and an army cameraman filmed every person he spoke with. (Ignatieff 1994, 211).

Most of the Turkish people I met during this research were policemen. From 14-23 March 1997 I travelled with a Finnish NGO group in North Kurdistan, visiting Amed, Cizire, Elih, and Tux (*Tatvan*). We were closely followed almost all the time by security police, so hardly anyone dared to speak with us. In Xana Hewêl (*Baykan*) the whole group was arrested. The next summer I participated in the Musa Anter Peace Festival in Istanbul in August 1997. For personal reasons I had to hurry back home, but other participants of the peace festival faced great problems. They tried to travel by bus to Amed, but were stopped by the military in Gire Sor (*Siverek*) near Amed. At the same time 2,000 people were arrested in Amed, and the next day 24 foreigners were arrested in Istanbul (Hancock 1998).

In March 1997 I spent several days in Elih with the Finnish Human Rights Delegation. The security police were watching over our shoulders day and

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sincerity after reading newspaper articles in which I presented them from another perspective than seeing them as terrorists. Because many Kurds have been desperate about the lack of information in the European mass media about their situation, I have been a useful person for them and this has helped me to create contacts and persuade people to use their time to search out information for me. I am usually presented as a journalist, not as a researcher, among Kurds.

night, they told us they would help us find the places we wanted to go. The policemen explained politely:

> *Turkey is a free country. There are no laws that say that we must arrest people for what they say. People can say what they want. Thousands of people are speaking every day on TV and radio. We can not arrest all of them! We are just interested in knowing if there is anything against the state in what people tell you. (a Turkish policeman, Elih)*

This kind of experience has not encouraged me to get in touch with the Turkish authorities. I wanted to visit the Malaria Institute to ask for their explanation of why cases of malaria have increased so much during the 1990s, but I dared not do so during my stay in Ankara in January 1999. I was afraid that if I presented my topic of interest to the authorities they might confiscate my materials, perhaps in the airport while leaving the country.

Travel reports

I have used material published by Kurdish organisations in Europe and the Turkey State Reports from 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999 published by the US State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

In addition to my own travel notes from Turkey I used the following travel reports: Joel Backström's travel report to the Human Rights Institute in Åbo Akademi (March 1997, the same journey in which I participated); articles by Peter Lodenius in the newspaper "Ny Tid" on the Finnish-Danish delegation's journey to Wan, Culemêrg (*Hakkari*), and Amed (March 1998); the report "Spurensuche" (*"Search for Tracks"*) by the German Newroz delegations in 1995; the report "Krieg und Gesundheit in Türkei-Kurdistan" (*War and Health in Turkish Kurdistan*) by a German group of IPPNW (Physicians Against Nuclear War) on a journey to Adana, Amed, and Wan (1996); and the Kurdish Red Crescent's travel report "Flucht ins Elend der Städte" (*Escape to the Misery of the Cities*) on a journey to Adana and Mersin in April 1997.

On all of these journeys the participants tried to get information by meeting local authorities, such as governors, and visiting political parties and human rights organisations such as the Human Rights Association (IHD) and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT). The Turkish authorities do not welcome human rights reporters to the country. They prevent the delegations from meeting Kurdish people and getting information from them, both by arresting politically active people during the delegations' visits and by putting the delegations under strict police control.[18] Even when it is possible to visit

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[18] For me an extreme example of this was Elih (*Batman*), where we were not

Turkey and meet local human rights activists there, it is almost impossible to visit the evacuated villages. According to medico international and the Kurdish Human Rights Project, those who attempt to do so run the risk of arrest or, in some cases, being shot (medico international and KHRP 1996, 9).

In the travel reports I looked for information about the health situation. None of these reports concentrates on health issues, but they describe the overall situation. The most attention is usually paid to political violence and human rights violations such as detentions, disappearances, and torture - but there is also detailed information about the living conditions of the inhabitants.

In addition to these reports, I used two older travel reports which describe health care in Turkey before the civil war. In 1983, four people from a health-care centre in the Swedish town of Botkyrka spent two weeks in Midyad, which is about 200 km east of Amed. They wanted to collect information about how women handle pregnancies and deliveries. They seem to have faced the same problem as later delegations: they were escorted all the time by police, so they did not dare have much contact with local people for fear of causing them problems. The other source is the book "Evil Eye or Bacteria?"by Lisbeth Sachs. She studied Turkish women's health-care practices in Tensta, Sweden and in Kulu, Turkey (Konya district). Her visits to Kulu in 1977 and 1978 provided a wealth of information about the Turkish health-care system. This can be of use because health care in the Kurdish provinces follows the same principles as in other parts of Turkey. Sachs does not report any difficulties with police or other authorities.

Literature, statistics, and the Internet

On the issue of cultural genocide, the theoretical side of my research benefited most from books and articles written or edited by Tove Skutnabb-Kangas. Perhaps the most important of them is the one I read first, "Linguistic Human Rights. Overcoming Linguistic Discrimination", edited by Skuttnab-Kangas, Robert Phillipson, and Mart Rannut, which contains a lot of information about the Kurds. The ideas of Joshua A. Fishman have been very important in defining the components of ethnicity. On the other important theory - low-intensity warfare - it has been difficult to find information, but one very

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permitted to leave the hotel for even a few minutes to buy a bottle of water without a police escort "taking care of our security". Security police also place representatives of diplomatic missions under visible surveillance in an effort to intimidate those they meet (US State Department 1999).

important book exists: "Low-Intensity Warfare. Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and Antiterrorism in the Eighties", edited by Michael T. Klare and Peter Kornbluh.

For the history of the Kurds the most important single source was David McDowall's "A Modern History of the Kurds". Ismail Besikçi's writings also made a great impression on me but I do not have many of his books or articles. The most important single source about the health situation in Kurdistan was the report "War and Health in Kurdistan" from a seminar arranged by the Kurdish Red Crescent in Hamburg on 28-29 June 1997, especially the chapter written by the Diyarbakir Section of the SES labour union. This has been very useful to me, as have the annual "Turkey Human Rights Reports" prepared by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT). These reports have been carefully documented and include many details. "Der Krieg in Türkei-Kurdistan" (*The War in Turkish Kurdistan*) by Andreas Berger, Rudi Friedrich, and Kathrin Schneider gives detailed information about the Turkish army and the war in the Southeast.

Statistical material is mainly from the Statistical Yearbooks of Turkey, the Internet pages of the Turkish Ministry of Health (http://www.health.gov.tr), and the paper "Gesundheitsbericht der Region Diyarbakir 1996" (*Health Report on the Diyarbakir District 1996*) presented by the Labour Union of Health Care Workers SES (*Saglik Sendikasi*), Diyarbakir Section in the seminar "War and Health in Kurdistan" held by the Kurdish Red Crescent (*Heyva Sor a Kurdistané*) in Hamburg on 28-29 June 1997.

The Internet has been a helpful source of information on Kurdish issues. I have been using both Turkish government sources - mainly the Web pages of the Ministry of Health - and Kurdish sources. *Harawazi*, a Finnish e-mail list on Kurdish issues, provides information collected, for example, from Amnesty International, the American Kurdish Information Network (AKIN), and the Özgurluk press agency. I have been using this e-mail list since it was founded in the summer of 1997.

The Internet has been especially useful because Finland is a marginal country in the context of research on Kurdistan: the Kurdish community in Finland is very small, little literature is available, and few researchers are interested in the topic. By means of the Internet I have managed to partially escape these geographical limitations. Because the political situation in Kurdistan and Turkey is changing rapidly, the Internet is an effective and fast method for the distribution of information. Most of the articles I have used are from the Internet.

4.2. Criticism of sources

It is not easy to find empirical information describing the situation in Kurdistan, so one must accept the fact that the information is not very exact. This is the normal situation when studying the health of people during wartime. Doris Ulrike Schwalm studied the health situation in Lebanon, starting her research in 1992, one year after the civil war ended. She notes that the problem at the beginning was to find sociological or ethnological literature for the research. There was no literature available about the sociological aspects of illness, nor even basic statistics about the health conditions in the country. (Schwalm 1994, 317).

I use information that is mainly provided by NGOs. Human rights organisations such as the IHD have scanty financial resources, and in Turkey their actions are permanently hampered by detentions of their members. Many IHD offices are closed; for example, the IHD office in Amed was closed in May 1997, about two months after I had visited it (Berger et al. 1998, 45). In their work there is a possibility for two types of mistake to be made. First, human rights organisations might overestimate the damage for political purposes, but on the other hand, the information might be insufficient, as it is difficult to obtain exact information. In some areas the authorities have restricted the activities of Kurdish organisations so that very little information is available from there. For example, in Sirnex HADEP could not open an office until the summer of 2000. In various reports there is almost no information from the Sirnak-Silopi area despite the fact that it is one of the areas most severely affected by the civil war.

I will give one example here which shows the difficulties. The Finnish Human Rights Delegation, which visited Kurdistan in March 1998 and travelled by bus from Wan to Culemêrg (*Hakkari*), estimated that about half of the houses and villages near the road had been destroyed (Lodenius 1998a). Huseyin Unit, the chairman of the ANAP party in Culemêrg, told them that more than half of the villages in the district were empty, as the inhabitants had fled because of the war (Lodenius 1998a, 7). This fact can not be seen in the population statistics collected by the Turkish State Institute of Statistics, which takes the data for its yearbook from official sources (Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1980, VII).

Table 1: Population of Hakkari and Van provinces

		1980	1985	1990	1995
Hakkari					
	city	44,118	55,563	71,099	71,522
	village	111,345	127,082	101,380	100,957
	total	155,463	182,645	172,479	172,479
Van					
	city	56,852	89,269	258,967	258,967
	village	11,794	57,947	378,466	378,466
	total	68,646	47,216	637,433	637,433

Sources:
Year 1980: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1983, 36, Year 1985: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1987, 37
Year 1990: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1991, 52, Year 1995: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1996, 67

Looking at the statistics on Hakkari province gives one the impression that the authorities abolished the population census in the 1990s. The observers' guesswork is also quite rough, because of the difficult observation conditions: they were not permitted to stop during the 400- km journey for a closer look except in two places chosen by the authorities (Raportti 15.-23.3.1998).

I have used lots of articles from newspapers and the Internet as sources of information. This is because the situation in Turkey is changing rapidly and there is a lack of research information. Unfortunately, this can sometimes decrease the reliability of the information. Another problem is that there are quite a lot of secondary sources, especially on issues related to Turkish law. I have done my best to find the original sources, but in some cases it has been impossible. As I am not a jurist, I have trusted the sources (for example, the KHRP) even though I have not been able to confirm whether referring to some law describes the context in the best possible way. Even when exact details might not be necessary, I have cited paragraphs of the law so that readers who are interested in the topic can search for more information.

My journeys to Turkey have been very short, four to fourteen days, but the programme has usually been very hectic and I have met lots of people every time. This is also the way foreign delegations usually collect their information in Turkey. This is due to the conditions in Turkey; especially in the winter of 1998-99 it would have been difficult to stay there for a long time researching health and human rights issues, at least if one is dependent on local interpreters. Leitzinger criticises delegation journeys to Turkey, saying that they do not visit different types of organisations (Leitzinger 1999, 75-76). I have tried to decide whether my Kurdish informants have misled me. I have been able to meet almost all the people with whom I requested appointments. When time has been short, my informants have preferred to arrange meetings at their own favourite places, for example the offices of Kurdish organisations instead of Islamic organisations.

One gap in this research is the lack of information provided by the Turkish authorities. For the reasons I explained earlier, I did not contact them when I was in Turkey. In any case, since the Turkish authorities forbid foreign organisations to survey the health conditions in the Southeast, most probably they would not have provided a foreign researcher with any accurate and valid information that was not available from other sources. There might be some gaps, even quite serious ones, in the chapters where I describe Turkish history and research on Turkish issues. I have described these topics from the perspective of how they affect the situation of the Kurds. My purpose has not been to make a comprehensive analysis of these topics.

The main focus of the travel reports which I have gone through is not the health conditions, so the information they provide is quite random. Such material is not sufficient for making a precise and large-scale analysis of the health-care situation, but it shows clearly in which direction the situation has developed. For this purpose there is actually no need for such a detailed description, covering so many diseases, as I have done. But I decided to introduce the situation with many examples, as there is a lack of publications about the health situation in southeast Turkey.

The most serious problem with the journey reports, regarding health issues, is that the information is quite random. The target of the journeys has not been to survey health conditions, and even when the delegates have searched out information about it, it seems obvious that their informants have not been able to provide them with accurate information. There is very little information about areas outside Amed.

One further research problem is that I do not speak Kurdish or Turkish. I have had to rely on written material in English and German, and I have made many interviews with an interpreter. I think that in fieldwork the use of an

interpreter is not a problem, at least in this kind of research where fieldwork is not the most important method of collecting information. Van Bruinessen argues that a researcher can produce a good report while working just with interpreters (Van Bruinessen 1994a, 176). A more serious problem is that I have not been able to read official and theoretical literature about Turkey, since such literature, for example the TOBB report (*Turkiye Odaler ve BorsalerBirligi*, The Eastern Question), has not been translated. I would have liked to read more texts by Ismail Besikçi, but only a few of his books and some of his articles have been translated into English or German.

5. The history of the Kurds in Turkey

5.1. Basic information about Kurdistan

Kurdistan, the land of the Kurds, comprises an area as large as France, 500,000 square kilometres. The Kurds constitute the majority of the population in their homeland, which is divided between Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. (Sheikhmous 1991, 2; Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 349).

Kurdistan is a mountainous country which includes the Pontiac and Taurus Mountains, the northern and central Zagros Mountains, and some of the southern Zagros Mountains. In the Turkish part of Kurdistan the highest mountain is Ararat (5,165 m).. Kurdistan has a continental climate, and the land is covered for half the year in snow. The plains of Mardin and Urfa and the Tigris valley have a more temperate climate. The Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers begin in northern Kurdistan. (Kendal 1980b, 47; O'Shea 1994, 173). Some of the world's richest oil fields are in Kurdistan (Laber 1994, 48). In Turkey the Kurdish provinces cover 230,000 square kilometres (30 % of the total territory of Turkey) (Kendal 1980b, 47).

The Kurds believe that they are descendants of the Medes. The Median civilisation, created four thousand years ago under King Deioces, spanned Tehran and Hamadan in the Zagros mountain range. The Median king Cyaxares' occupation of Nineveh in 612 BC, put an end to the supremacy of the Assyrian Empire; the Kurdish calendar starts with the date Nineveh was captured. (Pireh Babi 1999, 58; O'Shea 1994, 169; Roshani 1993).

According to David McDowall, it is doubtful whether the Kurds form an ethnically coherent whole in the sense of having a common ancestry (McDowall 1997, 8). The majority of Kurds are probably descended from waves of Indo-European tribes moving westwards across Iran, probably in the middle of the second millennium BC. Van Bruinessen concludes that the Kurds have disparate ethnic origins; the Medes are known to have comprised both nomadic and settled elements (Van Bruinessen 1992, 115). Hardly any people consists solely of pastoral nomads, as nomads usually have frequent trading or raiding contacts with sedentary cultivators.

Kurdish is an Indo-European language, which together with Afghan and Persian constitutes the Iranian language group (Kendal 1980a, 11). There are three major Kurdish dialects: Kurmanji (spoken mainly in northern Kurdistan), Sorani (southern Kurdistan), and Kirmanshani-Leki (southwestern Kurdistan). Linguists disagree as to whether Zaza (Dêrsim area) and Gurani (southeastern Kurdistan) are dialects of Kurdish or separate languages (Pireh Babi 1999, 53).

BULGARIA

GREECE

Black Sea

Istanbul

GEORGIA

ARMENIA

Ankara

STATE OF EMERGENCY REGION

IRAN

Bitlis

Wan

Melet Xarpet

Amed   Sêrt

Riha

Culemêrg

Sirnex

Merdin

Mediterranean Sea

SYRIA

IRAQ

The Turkish part of Kurdistan

Table 2: Kurdish names in Turkish[19]

Cizire = Cizre	Nisebin = Nusaybin
Culemêrg = Hakkari	Riha = Urfa
Dêrsim = Tunceli	Sêrt = Siirt
Elih = Batman	Sirnex = Sirnak
Gire Sor = Siverek	Tux = Tatvan
Meletê = Malatya	Xana Hewêl = Baykan
Mêrdin = Mardin	Xarpêt = Elazig

[19] The target group of the research is the Kurds in the Turkish part of *Kurdistan*. I use this name to describe the area where Kurds live, although it is not an independent country. Kurdistan is said to have two halves, North Kurdistan (southeastern Turkey) and South Kurdistan (northern Iraq and northwestern Iran). I prefer to use the name North Kurdistan, but according to the context I also refer to it as southeastern Turkey, the Southeast, or the State of Emergency Region, especially when Turkish sources are used, or when some situation is described in the context of other parts of Turkey.

Many places have both original Kurdish names and new Turkish names brought into use by the Republic of Turkey.[19] For well-known places (Amed, in Turkish: *Diyarbakir*; Dêrsim, in Turkish: *Tunceli*) I use only the Kurdish name. There I use the original name (Amed) as the name of the town, and the Turkish name when it is part of the name of a place (Diyarbakir province) or an organisation (Diyarbakir section of the SES). For smaller, less famous places I use both the Kurdish and the Turkish names if the Turkish is very different to the original (Culemêrg, *Hakkari*), and only the Kurdish if it closely resembles a better-known Turkish name (Sêrt, *Siirt*). As the southeastern provinces have the same names as their biggest towns, the Kurdish name refers to the town, and the Turkish name to the province (town Culemêrg, province Hakkari). The towns already existed during Ottoman times, when Kurds lived autonomously using their own language and place-names. The provinces' present form is a creation of the modern Turkish state and has never existed with Kurdish names. Literature in English and in German about North Kurdistan uses mainly Turkish names (with the exception of Dêrsim, and sometimes Amed), so in a few cases it is not clear whether the information in question refers to a town or a province. If a source has been interpreted in the wrong way, I take responsibility for the mistake.

I have taken Kurdish names from a map distributed by the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) and from Baran Rizgar's book "Learn Kurdish" and English-Kurdish dictionary. I also use Kurdish names when the sources use Turkish names. Despite my efforts, I am afraid that some of the places I mention with Turkish names may originally have had Kurdish names. In some cases I use the English equivalents, as they are more familiar to English speakers than are the Kurdish or Turkish names (mount Ararat - *Agri* in Turkish; the Tigris River - *Dicle* in Turkish, *Pinar* in Kurdish).

Midyad = Midyat Wan = Van

Turkish and Kurdish belong to different linguistic families. Kurdish belongs, together with Persian and Afghan, among the Indo-European languages and Turkish is part of the Altaic language group, which also includes, for example, Azerbaijani (the nearest language to Turkish), Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tatar, Mongol, and Yakut. Despite all the efforts to kill the Kurdish language, it has remained the mother tongue of most Kurds in Turkey. During the 1970s, more than three quarters of the Kurds did not speak Turkish. According to the 31.7.1966 issue of "Cumhuriyet" (quoted in Kendal 1980b, 84), 91 % of the population of Mardin did not speak a word of Turkish; the figure in Siirt was 87 %, in Hakkari 81 %, in Diyarbakir 67 %, and in Bitlis 66 %. The usual reaction to this fact among Turkish journalists and politicians was one of indignation: how could it be that, in an area which was an integral part of the Turkish Republic, there were millions of citizens who could not speak Turkish? (Kendal 1980b, 84-85) The Kurdish language is characterised by a large number of regional dialects, which is typical for non-national languages (Hirschler 1999, 8).

McDowall estimated in 1997 that there are 24 to 27 million Kurds living in the Middle East and that about half of them, at least 13 million, live in Turkey, where they form about twenty per cent of the total population (McDowall 1997, 3; Tahiri). Gunter (1990, 6), referring to Kurdish sources, gives about the same figures, and Laber (1994, 48) and Sheikhmous (1991, 2) conclude that there are 20 to 25 million Kurds in the world.

According to official sources, in 1970 there were 8.5 million Kurdish speakers in Turkey (23.8 % of the total population of 35.7 million). Kendal says that this figure is probably not very accurate. According to several estimates, the real number of Kurds in Turkey was at that time between 8 and 12 million. The Turkish authorities prefer to minimise the numbers, and Kurdish nationalist groups tend to exaggerate them. The percentage of Kurds in the population of Turkey has been constantly increasing. From 1945 to 1965 the average rate of population growth in the Turkish part of Kurdistan was 2.88 % compared to 2.65 % in Turkey as a whole. (Kendal 1980b, 48). Here it is important to note that the population growth in the Turkish parts of Turkey was lower than 2.65 %; that is, the high figures of the Kurdish provinces also affected the national average. McDowall estimates that the reproductive rate of Kurds is almost double that of Turks (McDowall 1997, 3).

5.2. Some reflections on the history of the Kurds in Turkey

It is said to be the misfortune of the Kurds that Kurdistan used to lie along the border between two recent empires - the Ottoman Empire and Persia (the Safavid Empire) - and is now divided between four aggressive and expansionist countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. The strategic location of Kurdistan has always been important. For example, the silk route from India to Europe passed through Kurdistan via the route Tabriz-Wan-Bitlîs-Amed-Riha (*Urfa*), and pilgrims to Mecca have travelled via Kurdistan. It acted as a buffer zone in the frequent wars between the Ottoman Empire and Persia (Jafar 1974, 226-227).

After almost two thousand years of Persian rule, the Kurds became part of the Ottoman Empire early in the sixteenth century (Gunter 1990, 11). Kurdish tribes lived there autonomously in a world that did not yet know nation-states; the model for nation-states was adopted after the French Revolution (1789), during the 19th and 20th centuries (Chaliand 1980, 8; Sheikhmous 1999, 1; Tahiri). Up to the 19th century fifteen main emirates were created, which constituted the overall political structure of Kurdistan. The destruction of the emirates as a result of the Ottoman policy of centralisation broke down the "power base" into much smaller segments, and had profound effects on Kurdish society and political structures. The sultans tended to appoint tribal chiefs as governors in the Kurdish provinces in an attempt to control the Kurds through their own local leaders (Jafar 1974, 243; McDowall 1992, 27, 29).

The Turkish state was created after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Kurds fought alongside Turks in the so-called War of Independence, and the leaders of the struggle spoke of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood. In January 1923, Mustafa Kemal was still suggesting that there might be local autonomy for Kurdish-inhabited areas (van Bruinessen 1994b, 150).[20] US President Woodrow Wilson's principle of self-determination for the peoples that had formerly lived in the Ottoman Empire - the so-called "National Pact" – was invoked during the peace negotiations after the victory of the Allies in World War I. In the Treaty of Sèvres, which was signed on 20 August 1920, the Kurds were promised a homeland. But the Allies, under the leadership of Great Britain and France, knew that the implementation of this treaty would require military enforcement in a difficult country and climate and, being exhausted after World War I, they were not prepared to make this

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[20] During the trial of Abdullah Öcalan in the summer of 1999, when he spoke of the brotherhood between Turks and Kurds as the basis of a democratic Turkey, he was referring to the situation at the beginning of the 1920s when the Republic of Turkey was founded.

commitment. So in the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923, which declared the formation of the Republic of Turkey and defined its borders, the word "Kurd" was not even mentioned. Under this treaty the Kurds were not regarded as a minority group. (Chaliand 1980, 12; Ignatieff 1994, 179; Jafar 1974, 249; McDowall 1992, 33; Tahiri).

The references to minorities were limited to non-Muslims, although Article 39 appeared to give all linguistic minorities, both Muslims and non-Muslims, the right to use their own language in commerce, religion, the press and publications, and at public meetings (Avebury 1995, Helsinki Watch 1990, 2; Jafar 1974).

Section III, Article 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne reads as follows:

> There will be no official restriction of any Turkish citizen's right to use any language he wishes, whether in private, in commercial dealings, in matters of religion, in print or at a public gathering.

> Regardless of the existence of an official language, appropriate facilities will be provided for any non-Turkish speaking citizen of Turkey to use his own language before courts. (Treaty of Lausanne, Section III, Article 39, ref. Kendal 1980b, 60).

Turkish officials argue that the Turkish government's policy on minorities is strictly based on the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne. According to them, all citizens of Turkey enjoy equal rights. They claim that because only religious minorities, but no ethnic or national minorities, exist in Turkey there is no need to recognise any additional rights other than those enjoyed by religious minorities (Kirisçi and Winrow 1997, 45).

The "National Pact" principle was not applied in Kurdistan or in other parts of the former Ottoman Empire, and so Kurds could not vote on the fate of their land as called for in the original plan. Jafar asserts that what happened was a de facto military occupation (Jafar 1974, 249). Besikçi contends that the Turkish state interpreted the Lausanne Treaty as a signal to start eradicating the Kurds from the face of the earth. It perceived the signing of the Treaty as an international guarantee and approval of a continuation of its policies. With the signing of the Lausanne Treaty Kurdistan became an inter-state colony (Besikçi: The Lausanne).

From 1918 to 1925, the Kurds lost a great opportunity for statehood and found themselves to be a minority in the new state of Turkey. In the course of the fall and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire most of its subject peoples were able to set up their own states, but not the Kurds (Kendal 1980a,

44; McDowall 1997, XI, 187). Chaliand notes that at the time of World War I the Kurds were clearly behind in development compared to other nationalist movements within the Ottoman Empire (Chaliand 1980, 15). During Ottoman times the Kurdish princes, whose horizons often extended no further than their own frontiers, had been unable to unite their people under a single central authority. Kurdish intellectuals were active at the beginning of the 20th century but there was a conflict between the traditionalists and the modernists, and they were divided into half a dozen different parties and committees. The task of building a national state was beyond their capacity, because they lacked the necessary historical and political experience (Kendal 1980a, 23, 39; O'Shea 1994, 175).

Pan-Turanic dreams

1998 was the 75th anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, a date that was widely celebrated in Turkey. But in fact the creation of the republic was not a victory but the defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The sense of a lost heritage has affected the republic in many ways. (van Bruinessen 1984, 7; Horowitz 1987, 77). According to Gerger, the transition from the empire to the republic was not a smooth transfer of power but a severe rupture, although the psychological, cultural, political, social, and in some areas even legal bonds between the two made the latter appear to be a natural extension of the former (Gerger 1997, 2-3). The new ruling elite did not fully repudiate the Ottoman heritage. Thus shame would leave its scars on the social and psychological make-up of the republic:

> *The Turkish psyche is almost enslaved by the spectre of the long, painful and humiliating dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish nationalism was born in the lost territories... Coupled with the traumatic disintegration of the Empire, these developments engraved the following on the Turkish psyche and nationalism: fear, a reflexive aggressiveness against the outside world, an almost impulsive urge to violence to survival, a bellicosity stemming from a strange interaction of inferiority and superiority complexes and a xenophobic exclusiveness, a reclusive rigidity that reinforces reactionary traits. (Gerger 1997, 2)*

Pan-Turanic dreams can be seen in the idea of the brotherhood of Turkey and *Turania* (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kirghizistan etc).. They were largely inspired by Pan-Germanic dreams. One hindrance to the creation of Pan-Turania was the fact that the territory between the Turanic areas was inhabited by non-Turkish nations and peoples such as the Kurds and the

Christian Armenians. On the eve of World War I, the Unionist leaders found a solution to this problem: they aimed to use the war to destroy these national entities, by physical liquidation if possible, and if not, then by massive deportation aimed at thinning them out as much as possible. The Armenians, as Christians, were considered to be unassimilable and would be exterminated. The Kurds were to be dispersed, deported, or liquidated. (Kendal 1980a, 21-22, 37; Kendal 1980b, 60). The Young Turks campaigned much more brutally against the non-Muslim minorities than the Abdulhamid regime had done. The deportation and massacre of the Armenians from 1915 to 1917 resulted in the death of more than half of the Armenian population, which was originally between two and three million. It started with the detention and execution of about one thousand religious, political, and educational leaders in April 1915; next, 200,000 Armenian draftees of the Ottoman army were liquidated. After that the remainder of the population was given orders for deportation. About half of them died within six months, and a large proportion of the survivors died later of starvation. Those who survived lost their right as a community to live in the lands of their ancestors. (IMK Weekly Information Service 23.2.2001; Libaridian 1987, 204-206; Poulton 1997, 81; Uppsala universitet 1999, 23).

İsmet İnönü claimed during the Lausanne negotiations that the Kurds were of Turanic origin (McDowall 1997, 190). Even in recent times Turkish officials have proclaimed that the Kurds are of Turanic origin, but that because of certain historical reasons they have forgotten their native language and adopted a language which is a combination of the Persian and the Arabic languages (van Bruinessen 1984, 6).
The main ideologue of Pan-Turanism was Zia Gökalp, who is called the "spiritual father of modern Turkey". In "Principles of Turkism", published in 1920, he provided Atatürk with the key arguments to justify a strong, secular, centralised power that is intolerant of minorities and determined to "turkify" them. According to Gökalp, a nation is not a racial, ethnic, geographic, political, or volitional group, but one composed of individuals who share a common language, religion, and morality – that is to say, who have received the same education. It is ironic that he was a Kurdish sociologist who hid his ethnic origins, and that he was interested in Durkheim's theories. (Kendal 1980a, 44; Poulton 1997, 76; Randal 1999, 267; Sakaranaho 1998, 95).

From the 1930s onwards there were mythical proclamations about Turkish history in the form of the Turkish Historical Thesis (*Türk Tarih Tezi*). There were claims that the Turks were descendants of the "Grey Wolves" from the Ergenekon Valley in Central Asia and belonged to the Aryan race. This was a frequent claim in the 1930s. The "universal Turkish history" elaborated by the

Institute of Turkish History claimed that the famous Sumerian, Egyptian, Babylonian, Lydian, Ionian, and Hittite civilisations had all been created by the Turks. Great stress was laid on the Turkish origin of Attila, Genghis Khan, and Hulagu. Even during the 1980s this "universal Turkish history" was still taught in all Turkish schools and, apart from a few intellectuals, nobody has questioned its factual basis. The Sun Language Theory (*Günes Dil Teorisi*) is a logical complement to the Turkish Historical Thesis; it argues that the Turkish language is the source of all the existing languages in the world, and that it was the first spoken language in the development of mankind. (Besikçi 1987, 87 and 1997b; Ciment 1996, 107-108; Hirschler 1999, 5; Kendal 1980b, 68; Poulton 1997, 102). Gerger calls this process of theorising on the basis of false assumptions "the Kemalist falsification of history" (Gerger 1997, 17).

"One state, one nation, one language, one culture"

Ottoman Turkey had been a multi-ethnic state, but the leader of the Young Turks, Mustafa Kemal, who later started to call himself *Atatürk* (Father of the Turks) wanted to create a modern, secular Turkey on a nationalist, homogenous basis (Tahiri). The Kemalist regime claimed to "reject class and privilege", yet the fate of the Anatolian peasants remained exactly as it had been under Ottoman rule: heavy state taxes, no agrarian reform, and no schools. The elements of Atatürk's reforms, such as the importation of the Gregorian calendar, a new system of timekeeping, European dress, the Swiss Civil Code, etc. must be measured against this background. Mustafa Kemal personally had more power than any Ottoman sultan since the early 19th century. On the political level, the Kemalist regime can be described as fascist: from 1930 onwards Atatürk was known as the "Eternal Leader" (*Ebedi Sef),* which is not so different from "Führer" or "Duce". His successor, Ismet Pasha, called himself the "National Leader" (*Milli Sef*). The People's Republican Party was the only party in a one-party state. The party was quite inseparable from the state itself: in the 1930s the president of the party was also the president of the republic, and the general secretary of the party was the minister of the interior. In the towns, governors (*Vali*) presided over the party's local sections. (Kendal 1980b, 71). Randal writes that Kemalism is not a modern concept but a reflection of foreign ideologies, borrowed from the French and Russian revolutions and from Mussolini's corporate state, which greatly influenced Atatürk (Randal 1999, 252).

The Turkification of minorities has its roots in the Ottoman Empire. Medieval Ottoman rulers tried to force the assimilation of minorities, especially the Kurds, though these efforts were usually in vain (Jafar 1974, 162). In the summer of 1922 the Minister of the Interior spoke of "bringing the Kurds to a higher level of "civilisation" through the building of schools, roads, and

gendarmerie posts as well as through military service. The theme of turning Kurds into good Turks was to be elaborated later. (McDowall 1997, 191). The official ideology of the Republic of Turkey since the mid-1920s has been to deny the existence of the Kurdish people in the country. The purpose of this policy was to turn the Kurds into Turks politically, culturally, and socially through assimilation. To attain this aim, the authorities have attempted to eliminate everything that might suggest Kurdish origin. (Gunter 1990, 43).

Ismet İnönü, who was to become Atatürk's successor in 1938, declared in 1930:

> *Only the Turkish nation is entitled to claim ethnic and national rights in this country. No other element has any such right. (İsmet İnönü, Milliyet 31.8.1930, ref. Gunter 1990, 7)*

Minister of Justice Mahmut Esat Bozhurst said the same thing in 1930 during the Ararat uprising:

> *I believe that the Turk must be the only lord, the only master of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have only one right in this country: the right to be servants and slaves. (Mahmut Esat Bozhurst, Milliyet 16.9.1930, ref. McDowall 1992, 38)*

And Foreign Minister Tawfiq Rushdi expressed frankly the views circulating in the cabinet at that time:

> *In their (the Kurds') case, their cultural level is so low, their mentality so backward, that they cannot be simply in the general Turkish body politic...they will die out, economically unfitted for the struggle for life in competition with the more advanced and cultured Turks... as many as can will emigrate into Persia and Iraq, while the rest will simply undergo the elimination of the unfit. (Tawfiq Rushdi, quoted in McDowall 1997, 200).*

In 1923 the Turkish Constitution banned the use of the Kurdish language in public places (Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 368). On the day of the abolition of the Caliphate, 3 March 1924, Kurdish schools, associations, publications, and religious fraternities were banned. In 1938 the Kurds came to be called "mountain Turks" and the Kurdish names of over 20,000 settlements were replaced with Turkish names. (Hirschler 1999, 6; Ignatieff 1994, 179-180; McDowall 1992, 36 and 1997, 200; Olson 1989). The word "Kurdistan" - which has been the name of the country of the Kurds since the 12th century - was the first to be

banned, as it implied the unity of the scattered Kurdish people. Instead the area was renamed Eastern Anatolia. (Kendal 1980, 85; Sheikhmous 1991, 2).[21]

Names are intensely individual and mark both the identity of the unique person and of the person as a member of a group (Jernudd 1994, 121). Because the Kurds in Turkey were regarded as a non-existent cultural community, having a Kurdish name was considered to be contrary to social reality (Sakallioglu 1996, 8). Since 1982, the authorities have not registered Kurdish names and parents have been forced to give their children Turkish names. In particular, names ending with "o", a typical Kurdish name form, are forbidden. (Gunter 1990, 44; medico international and KHRP 1997, 23). This practice is also followed in Europe at Turkish embassies - they refuse to issue Turkish passports to children with Kurdish names. Turkish embassies have lists with "names that may be given to Turkish citizens" (Skuttnab-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 368; Yildiz 1996). Many Kurds have been forced to take a name which is not only Turkish but also means "Turk", like the surname *Öztürk* (which means "pure Turk").

At the same time that it denies the Kurds in Turkey the right to have Kurdish names, the Turkish state has protested against Bulgaria, which between 1985 and 1988 pursued a policy of forcing the Turks in Bulgaria to change their names to Bulgarian ones (Besikçi: From 'everybody…').

The denial of a name has effects both on the individual and at the group level. For the individual, it means a denial of identity, and it erodes his/her ability to manifest him/herself as a member of a group. At the group level it means intervention in the group identity. Mandatory alteration of a name is a means of denying a group's existence *qua* group. (Jernudd 1994, 130-131; Skutnabb-Kangas 1996, 126).

In April 1961 General Cemal Gursel, the leader of the military junta, wrote the foreword to the second edition of M. Sherif Firat's book *Dogu Illeri ve Varto Tarihi* (Eastern Cities and the History of Varto), which claimed that the Kurds were Turkish in origin (Kinnane 1964, 32-33; McDowall 1997, 404). Law No.

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[21] Some old Kurdish place names can also be found in the Bible, for example Haran (located in Urfa province): So Abraham departed, as the Lord had spoken to him; and Lot went with him: and Abraham was seventy and five years old when he departed out of Haran. And Abraham took Sarai his wife and Lot, his brother's son, and all their substance that they had gathered, and the dependents they had acquired in Haran; and they went forth to go into the land of Canaan; and into the land of Canaan they came. (Genesis 12:4-5)

2820, which was passed in April 1983, stated that "it is forbidden to claim that minorities exist in Turkey" (quoted from Skutnabb-Kangas and Buçak 1994, 356).

This view was commonly accepted, and almost no one questioned it. The fourth congress of the Labour Party of Turkey, held on 29-31 October 1970, recognised that

> The Kurdish people exist in the east of Turkey ... from the start various governments of Turkey have pursued a policy of oppression, of terror and assimilation ... the reasons for the backwardness of the region inhabited by the Kurdish people, in comparison to other regions, is the social and economic policy carried out by these governments, which took into consideration the fact that this region is inhabited by the Kurdish people, and the working of the law of unequal development of capitalism. (quoted in Vanly 1971, ref. Jafar 1974, 256-257)

The Turkish government declared the party illegal on 20 July 1971, and the party's leadership was brought before the Military Court of Ankara on 19 August 1971 on charges of pursuing separatist policies (Besikçi 1987, 62-63; Jafar 1974, 257). In April 1979 a cabinet minister, Serafettin Elci, stated publicly: "There are Kurds in Turkey. I too am a Kurd." This caused a sensation in the cabinet which was only resolved by a 17-hour-long crisis meeting. Later Elci was condemned to two years and four months of hard labour for claiming to be a Kurd. (McDowall 1997, 413). In 1989 a member of the Turkish parliament, Ibrahim Aksoy, was expelled from the SHP party for two years after a meeting of the Turkish-European Joint Parliamentary Commission in Strasbourg at which he had said that Kurds exist and should be treated as human beings (Helsinki Watch 1991, 32).

Although the suppression of the Kurdish language has been Turkish policy since the time of Atatürk, it was intensified in the 1980s with a number of new laws (Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 353). An individual's mother tongue is defined as the language he/she has learned first and identifies with most strongly (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1994, 71). According to Law 2932/3, which was not annulled until 12 April 1991, "the mother language of Turkish citizens is Turkish" (quoted from Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 356).
Ismail Besikçi writes that until the 1980s Turkish officialdom denied the national and democratic rights of the Kurds on the pretext that "everybody is a Turk. The origin of the Kurds is also Turkish. There is no Kurdish nation. There is no Kurdish language. Since there is no such nation and language, then there cannot be national and democratic rights for a non-existing

entity".[22] Besikçi writes that because of these assimilation policies Kurdistan has no status and the Kurds lack even the status of a colonised nation or people. (Besikçi: From 'everybody...; Besikçi 1997a).

> *The oppression of the Kurdish people is really...enormous, not in force but in the lack of respect (for) the people. There have been cases like apartheid in South Africa,where blacks were not even (regarded as) human beings. But they did not deny thatblacks have their own language and identity. The existence of Kurds has been denied totally. (Celepli 1998)*

Besikçi compares the situations in Turkey and in South Africa before 1994:

> In South Africa, the white administration told the native population: "You are not like us. You should have your own settlements, your own neighbourhoods, your own schools and restaurants. Don't mix with us." The imposition of "You have to live with us, but like a Turk. You have no other choice" is more barbaric and destructive than racism practised in South Africa. Turkish racism, like apartheid, denies choice but, unlike apartheid, destroys the national, cultural, and historic identity of its subjects. (Besikçi: From 'everybody...')

If parents do not pass on a language to their children, if it does not become the children's first learned language, and if the children do not identify with the language, that language dies. Parents can choose to do this voluntarily or they can be forced to accept the fact that their children do not learn their mother language or do not identify with it. According to Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak, Turkey represents this century's most blatant example of linguicide in

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[22] Dr. Ismail Besikci was in prison from 1994 to 1999, but he continued to take part in public and scientific discussions. "The most important books and articles in Turkey are being written in prison," said Yurdusev Özsökmenler, editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Ülkede Gündem" (which has since then been closed down), in Istanbul in February 1999. There seems to be no difficulty in sending out articles from Turkish special prisons; for example, the imprisoned MP Leyla Zana is writing a column for the newspaper "Özgür Politika", which is published in Germany. During the Musa Anter Peace Train festival in Europe in September 1997, Mehmet Can Yüse remarked that he had sent out articles to newspapers from Çanakkale Prison – a remark that was used by a Turkish state prosecutor to start proceedings to close down the newspaper "Ülkede Gündem". This situation resembles that of Fascist Italy during World War II; for example, Antonio Gramsci wrote his major works in prison (Horowitz 1987, 68).

its attempt to kill the Kurdish language. No other country in the world has formally codified in its constitution and related laws a prohibition against internally and externally identifying with a mother tongue. There are at least thirteen laws that forbid the use of the Kurdish language and the expression of Kurdish culture.[23] Turkey is trying to replace the mother tongue of the Kurds and make Turkish their mother tongue. (Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 362-363, 365-366; Vermot-Mangold 1998, 11).

In 1967, Musa Anter produced a Turkish-Kurdish dictionary (McDowall 1997, 408).[24] The first primer in Kurdish (Kurmanji dialect) was published in Turkey in 1968 by M. Emin Bozarslan. At the same time, he published a Turkish version of the Kurdish national epic *Mem û Zîn*.[25] Both books were banned after two days on the shelves and Bozarslan was arrested. After being reprieved after four months of imprisonment, he took the issue of the primer to court and demanded that the reprieve granted to him should also include the primer. The trial lasted for years; the final decision of the Supreme Court was that only Bozarslan was reprieved, and that the Kurdish primers had to be confiscated, as they were the tools of a crime against the state. Bozarslan made the changes in *Mem û Zîn* demanded by the authorities and in 1973 it was removed from the list of forbidden books. After the military coup in 1980, the Turkish authorities burned all the copies of *Mem û Zîn* they could find.[26]

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[23] Articles 8, 311, 312, and 159 of the Law to Combat Terrorism, which restrict freedom of opinion, are still in force. Articles 168, 169, and 312 of the Turkish Penal Code are used to prosecute writers, journalists, and political activists who criticise the government's policies in the Southeast (Vermot-Mangold 1998, 11).

[24] Musa Anter was shot dead in Amed on 20 September 1992 in a so-called "mystery killing".

[25] The story of Mem and Zîn is assumed to be about six hundred years old. The story still exists in the oral tradition, and is known in Kurdistan as "Meme Alan". In 1695, Ehmedê Xanî travelled around Kurdistan collecting oral poems and writing down, on this basis, the love story of Princess Zîn and the pauper Mem. As a background to their love story, Ehmedê Xanî describes how life would be in an independent Kurdistan. The story does not have a happy end, as Mem and Zîn die when they are forced to separate. Some Kurds interpret the story symbolically to mean that Zîn stands for the land of Kurdistan and Mem represents the Kurdish people; the two have still not been united. Many Kurds believe that an ancient grave in the Cizre graveyard is the grave of Mem and Zîn. In the 1600s Kurmanji was written in Arabic letters, but Bozarslan has transcribed ancient Kurmanji using the Latin alphabet.

[26] Since the coup, Bozarslan has lived in Sweden, where he published a new version of *Mem û Zîn* in Kurdish in March 1995 and in Turkish in 1996. The Turkish version was also published in Istanbul in May 1996; there, it was banned

In the 1990s the Quran was translated into Kurdish (Kurmanji dialect) and published in Turkey, where it too was banned (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, 516-521).

The appearance of Kurdish-language TV channels in the 1990s has been important for the development of the Kurdish language, because languages used in the media, especially in radio and television, have a great impact on their audiences, especially on children and minorities (medico international and KHRP 1997, 25). The programs are produced in Europe and distributed via satellite; they are watched by large numbers of Kurds in the Middle East - including Turkey - and in Europe. The programs mainly deal with the situation in the Turkish part of Kurdistan. Med TV started broadcasting on 15 May 1995 and was closed on 22 March 1999, when the British ITC (Independent Television Commission) cancelled the license of Med Broadcasting Ltd., which had the satellite connections in England, on the grounds that Med TV programs were inciting its audience to commit violent acts. The new channels C-TV and Medya TV started broadcasting in the spring and summer of 1999. The studios are in Brussels and in Stockholm. Kurdish televisions Mezopotamya and Medya broadcast together eighteen hours of programming per day in three Kurdish dialects (Kurmanji, Zaza, and Sorani) and Turkish. Turkish-language programming has decreased in favour of Kurdish programs since the channel began broadcasting. People working for Medya TV say that their viewers want them to broadcast in their own language instead of Turkish.

The Turkish government's spokesmen abroad have consistently defended its assimilation policy. For example, Dr. Sekban said in 1933: "Sincerely, why be afraid of becoming assimilated? The position of the weak, assimilated by the powerful, has always proved better. It is enough if force is not used." (Dr. Ch. Sekban, La Question Kurde, Paris 1933, quoted in Ghassemlou 1965, 58) During the 1980s, when the existence of Kurds was accepted, but only at the individual level, Jeri Laber mentioned a discussion with an anonymous Turkish parliamentarian who observed, "You can say someone is of Kurdish origin, but you can not refer to a Kurdish minority." (Laber 1988, 14)

According to Gerger's analysis, the Kemalist experiment in creating an ethnically homogeneous state seems to have been trapped in a vicious circle of *fear-violence-decay* almost from the beginning. The basic *insecurity* that characterises the Kemalist system and the behaviour of the ruling elite has its roots in Turkish history, for the republic was built on the imperial heritage. This phenomenon is now being augmented in all its dimensions by the war against the Kurds. The Kurds have always been regarded as a threat to the unity of the Turkish state. Gerger adds that the *violence* also has historical

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after one month and the State Security Court gave its publisher, Ihsan Turkmen, a thirteen-month prison sentence. (Bozarslan 1996; Rodikova 1997).

and cultural roots and its own inner dynamics that allow it to reproduce itself at the societal level. Basically it emanates from fear and must be related to it. The refusal to accept the Kurds as a national entity is a form of latent structural violence and results in the unabashed militarism of Turkish society. The Kurdish question has became a taboo which has perverted Turkish intellectual life and morality more than anything else, according to Gerger, who calls this process *moral genocide*. (Gerger 1997, 1-2, 9; Gunter 1990, 123). This is related to what Smith calls teaching citizens nationalism: individuals are being persuaded to bear the responsibility for upholding their fatherland, their national interest, and their nation's strength (Smith 1981, 19).

The role of conflict has been integral to the state and to nation formation in Turkey since the creation of the republic in 1923. Faced with the twin tasks of establishing its democratic legitimacy and maintaining control, the state has historically opted for authority and control. The TOBB report[27] concludes that the ethnic model of a nation has politicised the cultural zone, where one of the most important markers is ethnicity. Turkishness is being manipulated as a political phenomenon rather than being seen as an ethnic phenomenon. (Sakallioglu 1996, 4-6, 14).

Whereas the state claims that Kurds are really Turks, many Turks have repudiated this fiction in a racist manner. In 1927, the magazine "*Otuken*" stated that "Kurds do not have the faces of human beings" and suggested that they should migrate to Africa to join the half-human half-animals who lived there (quoted in McDowall 1997, 407). "Where is your tail?" schoolchildren were taunted if they said they were Kurds. In the 1960s this racism was overt and undiminished; people who lived east of Meletê (*Malatya*) were regarded in all but official circles as foreigners. Treated as foreigners in their own country, Kurds also started to feel that their land was becoming alien to them. It was only in the Turkish Left that Kurds felt they were treated more or less as equals. (Kendal 1980b, 83, 85; McDowall 1997, 407).

Kurdish uprisings

During their many uprisings the Kurds (in Turkey but also in the Iranian and Iraqi parts of Kurdistan) have been quite unable to create any effective opposition. They have been too dispersed geographically and too fragmented by religious and tribal affiliations, socio-economic activity, and language. Only a few Kurds have evolved any coherent idea of Kurdish identity, not to mention the political consequences of such ideas. (van Bruinessen 1992, 7; McDowall 1997, 184; O'Shea 1994, 175; Öcalan 1999, 78). Kurds have been internally prevented from building their own state by the tribal consciousness that was

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[27] *Turkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi*, The Eastern Question

predominant up to the early 1950s, by the lack of a central authority, and by the feudal quarrels which have divided people. Kurdistan has been cut off from the outside world, and because of their accumulated cultural backwardness the Kurds lack a modern intelligentsia capable of understanding contemporary events and acting in accordance with them. There have been no strong national or feudal leaders who could have mobilised the majority of people to attain recognition of their shared national rights. Those leaders and nationalist movements that did arise have failed to agree on shared programs and platforms. Kendal was of the opinion in 1980 that even with these structures, if Kurdistan had been a British or French colony it would have won its independence a long time ago, and with far fewer sacrifices (Kendal 1980b, 101; Sheikhmous 1999).

The first Kurdish national organisation, *Azadi* (the name is Kurdish and means freedom), was founded at the end of 1922, and the Kurdish National League or *Khoybun* was founded in August 1927. The leading figures of Azadi were Yusuf Zia, the former deputy of Bitlîs, Colonel Halit Bey, and some high-ranking Kurdish officers in the Turkish army. Apart from the sympathy of a few Kurdish tribal and religious leaders towards the idea of Azadi, traditional leaders did not play any role in this stage of national agitation. Kurdish peasants and tribesmen did not participate in Azadi to help the idea of nationalism to gain ground in rural Kurdish society. In 1924, when Azadi began to mobilise the Kurds for an uprising, Yusuf Zia, Colonel Halit Bey, and other leaders were arrested and executed by the government. (Kendal 1980b, 62; Pireh Babi 1999, 95, 175).

The Sheikh Said revolt of 1925

The first Kurdish uprising against the Turkish regime started in February 1925, led by Sheikh Said of Piran. He and his supporters called for Kurdish nationalism, but also for Islamic religion, protesting against the secularism of the new state. Most of his followers were Zaza-speaking Kurds. (McDowall 1992, 36-37; Poulton 1997, 98). According to Robert Olson, Sheikh Said was able to mobilise 15,000 Zaza Sunni tribesmen and capture a large area between Amed, Xarpêt (*Elazig*), Mûs, and Bitlîs, The Turkish government deployed 52,000 soldiers against them and crushed the rebellion by mid-April (Olson 1989, 107-111).

After the rebellion was crushed Sheikh Said and fifty-two of his followers were given the death penalty in a military court. They were hung in Amed on 4 September 1925. Thousands of peasants were massacred and hundreds of villages were burned to the ground "to make sure that the lesson stays learned". Ghassemlou gives the figures of 15,200 massacred Kurds and 206

destroyed villages. (Ghassemlou 1973, 61, ref. Pireh Babi 1999, 77).[28] The army acted ruthlessly as it moved across the countryside; for example, in Lijja and Amed 30,000 sheep were seized and auctioned, eliminating the food resources of the tribal population. Sheikhs and aghas who were not directly implicated in the revolt were deported to western Anatolia. (Jafar 1974, 250; Kendal 1980b, 62; McDowall 1997, 196).

The collapse of the Sheikh Said revolt demonstrated the difficulty of uniting the different geographic, linguistic, socio-economic, and religious elements among the Kurds. Only the Zaza Sunni tribes rose as a mass. Of the Kurmanji-speaking majority only the Jibran and Hasanan tribes revolted, and possibly only sections of them. (McDowall 1997, 197). Olson writes that the leaders did not even try to recruit tribal and peasant cultivators (Olson 1989), and that because of the religious character of the revolt urban Kurds led by the Kurdish nationalist organisation *Azadi* did not participate in the uprising (Pireh Babi 1999, 77).

For Turkey, the consequences of the rebellion were more important than the rebellion itself. It represented a nationalism in competition with Turkish nationalism and hence threatened the Turkish state. It gave Kemalists an opportunity to silence the criticism voiced by the press and by opposition groups. The laws and institutions created for the suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion were accepted by those who opposed the Kemalists. Later these laws and institutions, despite being originally created to suppress an "external" enemy, were used by the group in power to quash internal opposition. Olson believes that scholars and students of Turkey have underestimated the importance of Kurds and Kurdish nationalism in the development of the modern Turkish state. (Olson 1989). According to Van Bruinessen, the Sheikh Said rebellion constitutes a watershed in the history of the Turkish republic, because it accelerated the trend toward authoritarian government and ushered in policies that were deliberately aimed at destroying Kurdish ethnicity (van Bruinessen 1994b, 151).

Ararat 1930

The next famous rebellion occurred in Ararat in 1929-30; it was led by Ihsan Nuri Pasha, a former officer in the Ottoman army. The insurgency got some support from the Khoybun movement in Syria and Lebanon, which arranged for the rebels to use Iranian territory. But in the summer of 1930 the Turkish government made an agreement with the Shah which helped the Turkish

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[28] Dr. Abdulrahman Ghassemlou, the secretary of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-Iran), was murdered during a meeting with a delegation of the Iranian government in Vienna on 13 July 1989 (Krulich-Ghassemlou, 1990).

troops to encircle and defeat Ihsan Nuri's forces. After the defeat of the rebels, the blind violence of the Turkish army that had been unleashed upon Kurdistan five years earlier redoubled in intensity. Kurdish villages were still being razed several months after the revolt had been crushed. (Kendal 1980b, 65; Tahiri). Law No. 1850, which was published in the official Turkish gazette, announced that there would be no prosecutions for crimes or misdeeds committed during the repression (of Kurdistan). According to this law,

> Murders and other actions committed individually or collectively from the 20th of June 1930 to the 10th of December 1930 by the representatives of the state or the province, by the military or civil authorities, by the local authorities, by guards or militiamen, or by any civilian having helped the above or acted on their behalf, during the pursuit and extermination of the revolts which broke out in Ercis, Zilan, Agridag (Ararat) and the surrounding areas, including Pulumur in Erzincan province and the area of the First Inspectorate, will not be considered as crimes. (Article 1, quoted in Kendal 1980b, 65) [29]

Tahiri has pointed out that this law was specifically meant to condone the persecution of the Kurdish civilian population, because by the end of summer 1930 the rebellion had been defeated and its forces had either been killed or had taken refuge in neighbouring countries. This situation was similar to that which existed in countries under Nazi occupation during World War II, when the German government's general decrees granted police forces in various countries the right to impose penalties without judicial procedures. If criminal acts committed by members of the police forces were taken to court, it was to the special criminal courts established only for the members of the SS and the police. Turkey committed these atrocities without being put under international pressure or receiving protests from any foreign country. (Lemkin 1944, 20-21; Tahiri).

In van Bruinessen's estimation this uprising, which was supported by a Kurdish political party in exile, was the most nationalist of all the Kurdish rebellions (van Bruinessen 1994b, 151).

Dêrsim 1936-1938

Towards the end of 1935 mass deportations stopped, in response to the Dêrsim revolt. Dêrsim (*Tunceli*) was a veritable eyrie set high in the mountains which had always retained its autonomy. Its inhabitants, most of

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[29] The area of the First Inspectorate covered all of the Kurdish vilayets: Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elaziq, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, and Van. The Mount Ararat revolt did not expand to cover this entire area (Kendal 1980b, 65).

whom are Zaza-speaking Alevites[30], had refused to join in the Russo-Turkish wars, World War I, and the Turkish War of Independence. Dêrsim was the last fortress of Kurdistan, which had been constantly at war since 1925. In 1936 the military governor, General Alp Doǧan, demanded in a communiqué that the people of Dêrsim hand 200,000 rifles over to the authorities. The army's carefully prepared attack on this last pocket of Kurdish resistance was an integral part of the government's policy of pursuing the piecemeal pacification of Kurdistan. (van Bruinessen 1996a; Ercan 1999, 58; Kendal 1980b, 67, Randal 1999, 260).

A state of siege was declared in Dêrsim in 1936. In the spring of 1937, Prime Minister Ismet Inönü personally inspected the army. This war was like none of the other wars that had been fought previously on Kurdish territory: there was no front and there were no battles between large military units. Guerrilla warfare became the order of the day throughout the region. By the end of summer 1937, despite the massive use of poison gas as well as artillery and air bombardment, the army had not achieved any tangible military results. The leader of the rebel tribes, the Alevite cleric Sayid Reza, was executed during the winter of 1937-38. In mid-1938 the government concentrated three army corps and most of its air force in Dêrsim. Surrounded and cut off from all outside aid, the people of Dêrsim resisted from 1936 until their ammunition ran out in late October 1938. (Kendal 1980b, 67; McDowall 1997, 208).

Because the Turkish army had paid heavily for its victory, the repression that followed it was even more violent than before. An estimated 40,000 Kurds perished during the Dêrsim revolt, though McDowall concludes that this number might be exaggerated. According to van Bruinessen, at least ten per cent of the population was massacred. Many people escaped to the mountains, but even forests were encircled by troops and burned in order to exterminate

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[30] Alevism is a mixture of Shiite Islam and Zoroastrianism. It is considered by Muslims to contradict the letter and the spirit of the Quran and is therefore regarded as a branch of the non-Islamic religion of the Cult of Angels (Izady 1992, 150). The beliefs and religious practices of the various Alevite communities differ significantly. Alevites have retained many more elements of pre-Islamic Turkish and Iranian religions than have the Sunni Muslims (van Bruinessen 1996c, 7). In Turkey there are also several million Alevite Turks. Taken together, Turkish and Kurdish Alevites constitute a population of about ten to twelve million people. They are considered the most marginal and oppressed social group in Turkey. They have also been the first group to support left-wing organisations. Many Alevite Kurds have joined movements aiming at the improvement of democratic rights in the whole country, rather than being involved with the Kurdish nationalist movement (Pireh Babi 1999, 57; US State Department 1997).

those who had sought refuge there. There were also collective suicides. Many Kurdish women and girls threw themselves into the Munzur (a tributary of the Euphrates), which is said to have been red for days with blood. Van Bruinessen concludes that the Dêrsim massacre was not a genocide, as it occurred during counterinsurgency and its purpose was not to kill the Kurds *as such*, for those Kurds who disassociated themselves from the nationalists suffered little or no discrimination. But the massacres were part of the state's ethnocidal policy, which aimed at destroying the social and economic foundations of Kurdish separatism and annihilating the Kurds as a separate ethnic group (van Bruinessen 1994b, 148, 162-163 and 1996a; Ercan 1999, 56-57; Kendal 1980b, 67-68; McDowall 1997, 209). After the suppression of the uprising, the Turkish army kidnapped many Kurdish children who were under the age of seven and placed them in Turkish families in western Turkey (Kandolin 1997).

Dêrsim marked the end of "tribal" revolts against the Kemalist state. Once the Dêrsim area had been completely subdued, a special Mountain Brigade was formed to remain permanently stationed in Dêrsim, which was renamed Tunceli. Three thousand notables and others were deported. Not until the end of 1946 was it decided to lift the special emergency regime for Dêrsim and allow the deported families to return home. (McDowall 1997, 209). Because more than a decade had passed, not all of the deportees returned to Dêrsim; many had been assimilated into the public life of Turkey (van Bruinessen 1996a).

Researchers of Kurdish history disagree as to whether the Sheikh Said revolt and the Dêrsim revolt were nationalist or religious. For example, Loghman Pireh Babi argues that neither of them was nationalist in nature, and that at most they can be called ethno-religious movements. Nationalism as a doctrine is a secular ideology which manifests itself as a modern political movement. (Pireh Babi 1999, 78-79).

Most of the former inhabitants of Dêrsim now live in diaspora, either in western Turkey or abroad, and not much is left of Dêrsim's distinctive culture (van Bruinessen 1994b, 154). Life in Dêrsim has been quiet and isolated for decades. Jeri Laber visited Dêrsim in 1988. At that time there were 19,000 inhabitants and a permanently stationed brigade of two thousand soldiers and three hundred commandos (Laber 1988, 17). The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey reports that during 1995 not even cabinet ministers were permitted to visit the town, and special-team members guarded the Tunceli Provincial Governor (HRFT 1997, 10). Because of many problems, a large number of DEP supporters wanted to boycott local elections in Turkey in March of 1994, but voting is mandatory in Turkey. Those who do not vote must pay a small fine. According to a UK/Irish human-rights delegation that monitored the elections in Dêrsim, 79 % of the ballots cast there were defaced or blank. (Laizer 1996, 141). There have been frequent reports of clashes between Turkish soldiers

and Kurdish guerrillas in the Dêrsim district, which is located near the western border of Kurdistan, about 400 km from the borders with Iraq and Iran, where the PKK guerrillas are said to have bases. For example, on 10 April 1999 the Reuters news agency reported that six PKK guerrillas and two Turkish soldiers had been killed in clashes in Tunceli and Batman provinces.

US co-operation with the Turkish military

At the Lausanne Conference in 1923 the division of Kurdistan was sanctioned and legitimated by an international treaty. Great Britain and France actively participated in the division process. Southern Kurdistan was put under the British mandate as part of Iraq, and a segment of south-western Kurdistan was given to Syria under the French mandate. Besikçi accuses the West of being responsible for implementing the division and destruction of Kurdistan by supporting the Turks in the first half of the twentieth century (Besikçi: The Lausanne ..).

In exchange for American aid under the Marshall Plan, Turkey sent thousands of Turkish soldiers (including many Kurds) to fight in Korea between 1949 and 1952. Turkey joined NATO on 18 February 1952. During the Cold War, Turkey was important to NATO because it had borders with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria and could monitor the movements of the Soviet navy from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean at the Bosporus. The fact that Turkey did not share the democratic and human-rights values of the other NATO members was quietly subordinated to the strategic imperatives of the Cold War. On 26 February 1954 Turkey authorised the USA to set up military bases and intelligence posts throughout the country. In 1955 the Turkish government, headed by Adnan Menderes, signed the anti-Communist and anti-Kurdish Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) with Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan, which Britain also joined on 4 April 1955. Iraq withdrew from this pact after the July 1958 Revolution. (Kendal 1980b, 73; medico international and KHRP 1996, 37; PHR 1996, 28).

US military facilities in Turkey include communications and intelligence facilities. The Inçirlik airbase near Adana is the main command and communication centre linked to the global US strategic network. Ömer Karasapan calls it the most important US military facility between Italy and South Korea. When Ayatollah Khomeini gained power in Iran in 1979, American military bases there had to be closed, and the ones in Turkey became more important. In the 1980s Turkey ranked fourth in the number of US nuclear weapons deployed overseas; these were located in Inçirlik and four other US military sites, including Erhac near Meletê (*Malatya*). Other US military bases in the Kurdish provinces are located in Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Mus, and Batman. (Karasapan 1989, 4-5).

The US has strong economic ties with Turkey, in addition to close military co-operation. Turkey is the third-largest recipient of US development aid after Israel and Egypt (Rugman 1996, 19). Although western countries have criticised Turkey's human-rights abuses, trade with it has continued without any problems, especially the arms trade (Laizer 1996, 78-79). From 1987 to 1991 Turkey bought 77 % of its weapons from the US; between 1991 and 1993, when the counterinsurgency war escalated, this percentage increased to 80 %. Research associate Jennifer Washburn says that many of Turkey's weapons are heavily subsidised by American taxpayers through various grants and "surplus" weapons programs. In the Cascade program, "surplus" weapons from US bases in Europe were given as grants to Turkey. (Covert Action Quarterly, No. 54, Fall 1995, 21; Washburn 1997, 79). Turkey has consistently ranked among the top five recipients of US military aid in the world (Karasapan 1989, 5).

With 850,000 men, Turkey has the world's fifth-largest peacetime army (Karasapan 1987, 27). In 1994 Turkey was the biggest single importer of American military hardware and thus the world's largest arms purchaser. Its arsenal includes M-60 tanks, F-16 fighter-bombers, Cobra helicopter gunships, and Blackhawk "slick" helicopters. According to journalist Jonathan Randal, all of these weapons are eventually used in the war against the Kurds. (Randal 1999, 268; Rugman and Hutchings 1996, 19). Human Rights Watch stated in November 1995 that Turkey was using US-supplied fighter-bombers to attack civilian villages. According to many sources, NATO and US weapons played a central role in abuses allegedly committed by Turkish security forces against the Kurds. (Reuters 23.11.1999; Internet: http://burn.ucsd.edu/archives/kurd-l/1995/0157.html). This has happened despite the fact that the CFE treaty does not allow NATO equipment to be used against Kurds. In order to circumvent this treaty, Turkey has also bought arms from other exporters such as Rumania, Russia, and Pakistan, which do not impose such restrictions (Günlük-Senesen 1995, 80).

Turkey's relations with NATO have been dominated by its bilateral relationship with the US. In 1974 the US put Turkey under an arms embargo in response to Turkey's use of NATO arms in Cyprus against Greek Cypriots. This embargo was in force until 1978. Another problem for the Turkish government was that in the 1970s and 1980s it did not want to be bound to close co-operation with Israel, the other important US military partner in the Middle East. To reduce its dependence on US arms, Turkey began to modernise its own armament industry and seek other partners for military co-operation, for example Germany. (Günlük-Senesen 1995, 78; Johnstone 1989, 17-18).

After the military coup in September 1980 the junta initiated programs for modernising the Turkish armament industry. Such plans were also included in

the program of the Özal government in 1983. In 1993 there were 110 Turkish armament companies, which manufactured finished goods and provided services for defence activities, and 119 companies supplying these with intermediate materials. The needs of the air force have been placed at the top of Turkey's defence priority list. (Günlük Senesen 1995, 78-79).

The journalist Diana Johnstone has written that Germany's motives for supporting the Turkish army are more political and economic than directly military. German military aid serves as a government subsidy to the country's own military industry, especially to Krauss Maffei. Between 1986 and 1989 Germany gave the Turkish army weapons and aid worth 260 million DM. Both German and American support to the Turkish armament industry is a channel that permits these respective governments to give military aid to Turkey without having to face domestic political debates. For German companies, co-operation with the military industry in Turkey is also a channel that enables them to reach markets that would be otherwise be impossible because of political reasons, for example Libya. (Johnstone 1989, 17-18; Karasapan 1987, 27).

Jeri Laber stated in 1994 that the war in southeastern Turkey has been one of the most heavily militarised in the world. At that time, the Turkish army reported that it was using 400,000 soldiers, policemen, intelligence officers, and village guards to combat the PKK, which it claimed had 5,000 guerrillas. According to military experts, counterinsurgency warfare requires five to ten soldiers for every guerrilla. In Turkey, if one believes the official figures, the ratio is eighty to one. (Laber 1994, 49). The Turkish army's "Operation Murat", conducted in Hakkari province in April 1998[31], is said to have been the largest military operation in fourteen years, and even the largest ever conducted in the 75-year existence of the Republic of Turkey (Özgürlük 1999). In this operation, 40,000 soldiers led by 24 generals were fighting against 450 guerrillas: the ratio was 88 soldiers to one guerrilla. On 2 February 1999 the Reuters news agency reported that some 7,000 ground troops, with the assistance of four F-16 planes bombing the mountainous terrain, were pursuing about 50 guerrillas in Tunceli province; here the ratio was 140 soldiers to one guerrilla. Ten guerrillas and four soldiers died in the fighting.

Throughout the existence of the Republic of Turkey there have been Kurdish insurrections both large and small against the Turkish regime. Control of North Kurdistan has been the primary function of the Turkish army. Only one of the eighteen military engagements of the Turkish army between 1924 and 1938 occurred outside Kurdistan. After 1945, apart from the Korean War

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[31] Some Kurds say that this operation was named after to Murat Karayilan, the PKK commander responsible for the Botan area at that time.

from 1949 to 1952 and the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, the only Turkish army operations continued to be those against the Kurds. (McDowall 1997, 198; Olson 1989). Since the main enemy of the Turkish army has been the Kurds, it is logical to assume that it has been using its NATO membership for the purposes of this war.[32]

The almost permanent state of counterinsurgency must have had an effect on the development of the state in that military issues were given a high priority. Ignatieff calls the MIT (Turkish National Security Organisation) agents operating in the Southeast "ferrets" who are doing Atatürk's work to maintain the unitary state of modern Turkey (Ignatieff 1994, 211). In 1986 it was claimed (Cumhuriyet 12.2.1986, quoted in McDowall 1997, 428) that "the whole southeast was a sort of concentration camp where every citizen was treated as a suspect, and oppression, torture and insult (was) the rule". The anti-terrorism law introduced by President Turgut Özal on 12 April 1991 defines terrorism "as any kind of action ... with the aim of changing the characteristics of the Republic" - a definition that covers any democratic attempt to moderate the stringent character of the state, such as a demonstration, a rally, or a publication (McDowall 1997, 429).

History of deportation

The "Young Turks" were making plans to assimilate the Kurds even before the Turkish Republic existed. Enver and Talat Pasha, the two Unionist leaders who were the main initiators of the massacre of the Armenians, worked out a program of Kurdish deportation. Kurds were to be deported for resettlement in western Anatolia, in locations where they were not to exceed five per cent of the population. Notables and chiefs were to be resettled in towns and cities and all communication with their tribes or followers would be forbidden. It was a plan that decreed "genocide for the irredeemable Armenians and forced assimilation for the quarrelsome but Muslim Kurds". This fulfils the criteria of cultural genocide. Lemkin defines genocide as an attack on various aspects of the life of the target group. One method is depopulation, and another is to destroy the social cohesion of the group by killing or isolating local leaders and intellectuals, because it is this group which organises resistance against the occupiers. (Kendal 1980a, 44-45; Lemkin 1944, xi-xii; McDowall 1997, 105-106).

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[32] After the capture of Abdullah Öcalan the PKK claimed that the CIA had assisted the Turks. There have also been claims that military co-operation between the US and Turkey has included the US giving the Turkish army satellite intelligence information concerning Kurdistan.

During the winter of 1916-1917, many villagers from the provinces of Bitlis and Erzurum were marched westward away from the border, for fear that Kurds would drift into co-operation with the Russians (McDowall 1992, 31, 37-38). After the Sheikh Said revolt, government officials started to think that the only way to bring Kurdistan to heel would be to denude it of its population. Kendal writes that during the winters between 1925 and 1928 nearly a million people were deported. Tens of thousands died on the way, because of the lack of food and supplies as well as the huge distances they were forced to travel during the harsh winters.(Kendal 1980b, 63).

After the collapse of the Sheikh Said revolt of 1925, hundreds of villages were burned to the ground and thousands of peasants - between 40,000 and 250,000 people - died in the course of the "pacification". All of these figures are estimates, since no objective statistics are available. During the 1930s there were large-scale deportations of Kurdish people to the western and central parts of the country, which were Turkish areas. The aim was to relocate Kurds to areas where they would constitute no more than five per cent of the population.(Jafar 1974, 252; medico international and KHRP 1996, 3). According to a law passed in May 1932, "those speaking a mother tongue other than Turkish were forbidden to rebuild villages and districts" (Ghassemlou 1965, 57-58).

On the other hand, many immigrant Turks from former parts of the Ottoman Empire, mainly from Bulgaria and the Balkans, have been resettled in the Kurdish provinces in order to increase the percentage of ethnic Turks in the population. They have usually received the most fertile land in these areas. (Bexikçi 1987, 45-46; van Bruinessen 1984, 8; Jafar 1974, 120; Kendal 1980b, 47).

On 5 May 1932 the law ordering the deportation and dispersion of the Kurds was passed. There would be four separate categories of inhabited zones in Turkey:

> No. 1 zones will include all those areas in which it is deemed desirable to increase the density of the culturally Turkish population. (This obviously referred to Kurdistan).
>
> The No. 2 zones will include those areas in which it is deemed desirable to establish populations which must be assimilated into Turkish culture. (ethnically Turkish areas)
>
> The No. 3 zones will be territories in which culturally Turkish immigrants will be allowed to establish themselves, freely but with the assistance of the authorities. (The most fertile and habitable areas of Kurdistan were thus offered to Turkish immigrants).

No. 4 zones will include all those territories which it has been decided should be evacuated and those which may be closed off for public health, material, cultural, political, strategic, or security reasons. (This category included the more inaccessible areas of Kurdistan). (Kendal 1980b, 66)

Dêrsim, for example, was designated as part of Zone No. 4, and thus was condemned to be completely evacuated (Kendal 1980b, 67).

Law No. 2510 passed in June 1934, the Law on Resettlement, divided Turkey into three zones:

1. areas to be reserved for the habitation in compact form of persons possessing Turkish culture,
2. regions to which populations of non-Turkish culture were to be moved for assimilation into Turkish language and culture,
3. regions to be completely evacuated. (McDowall 1997, 207)

This law abrogated all previous recognition of tribes and their aghas (feudal landlords or tribal chieftains) and sheikhs (religious leaders). The leaders of tribes and their families were to be transferred for assimilation into Turkish culture. Any kind of association or grouping in which the majority did not speak Turkish was forbidden (McDowall 1997, 207; Yildiz 1996). In 1951, according to Law 5826, Zone 3 included the provinces of Agri, Sason, Tunceli, Zilan (Van), Kars, Diyarbakir, Bingöl, Bitlis, and Mus (IMK e.V. 1993, 52).

The Turkish Communist Party has estimated that during the thirteen years between 1925 and 1938 more than one and a half million Kurds were deported and massacred (Kendal 1980b, 68). McDowall estimates that perhaps over one million Kurds, including aghas and sheikhs, were forcibly displaced between 1925 and 1938. He believes that during the 1930s only the impracticability of assimilating up to three million Kurdish people by transferring them to Turkish areas prevented the deportation law from being implemented in any but a localised and piecemeal fashion. (McDowall 1997, 207). Kendal writes that only the lack of the necessary material means prevented the government from deporting the whole Kurdish population (Kendal 1980b, 67).

The policy of deportation aimed to send to the Kurdish population the clear message that any uprising would lead to the deportation of the entire population to the uninhabited Turkish regions. Moreover, it helped the government to depopulate the strategic territories alongside its borders with Iran, Iraq, and Syria in order to prevent the Kurds from receiving assistance

from other Kurdish communities. (Pireh Babi 1999, 105; medico international and KHRP 1996, 10).

In 1942 the Kurdish magazine "*Khoybun*", which was published in Beirut, circulated information about a report of the Inspector General of the First Inspectorate, which included the vilayets of Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mus, Mardin, Siirt, Urfa, and Van, that expressed concern about the demographic balance of this region. In 1927 these eight Kurdish vilayets had a combined population of 870,000, of which 62 % were Kurds. Despite the deportation of Kurds and the immigration of Turks to the area, the proportion of Kurds in the population had increased to 70 % by 1935, when the total population was almost one million. This was due to the high birth rate among Kurds. (McDowall 1997, 209-210).

According to publications of medico international and the Kurdish Human Rights Project (KHRP), ever since 1925 the mass evacuation of Kurdish villages has been openly viewed by the Turkish authorities as necessarily corrective or punitive. The idea that those who defy the state ideology should be "taught a good lesson" continues to characterise security operations in the Southeast. (medico international and KHRP (1996, 4).

The military coup of 1980

In the 1970s the Turkish Left, which consisted of many small pro-Soviet or pro-China parties and militant groups, was very split and lacked knowledge of how to co-operate (Ahmad 1981, 10; Cengiz 1996). Pireh Babi points out that the radical uprisings of Turkish and Kurdish students and labourers can be connected to wider international events such as the radical student movement of 1968 in France. The Kurdish nationalist groups emerged mainly from Kurdish associations established in the 1960s and from the Turkish Left. (Pireh Babi 1999, 120).

During the late 1970s, weak government leadership brought Turkish society close to anarchy (Laber 1988, 14). In late December of 1979, a massacre occurred in Kahramanmaras, a Sunni town. It was an attack by rightists on leftists. According to the official report, 109 persons were killed and 176 seriously wounded, and 500 shops and homes were destroyed. The main perpetrators were the Grey Wolves (the armed youth wing of the fascist MHP party), and the victims were mainly Alevite Kurdish slum-dwellers. Prime Minister Ecevit responded to the massacre by placing thirteen Kurdish provinces under martial law, but this did not halt the disorder elsewhere. In the first week of September 1980, a major Islamic rally in Konya openly attacked Atatürk's legacy of secularism and Westernisation. During the eight and a half months following the Kahramanmaras massacre an estimated 3,856 people died in clashes. On 12 September 1980, General Kenan Evren

suspended civil government and imposed military rule (Ahmad 1981, 24; McDowall 1997, 413). The army abrogated the constitution, closed down the parliament and all political parties, banned strikes and closed all labour associations. Within weeks the political violence was over. By the end of the year the military had detained some 175,000 people, the majority of whom were leftists. (Karasapan 1989,.8).

The junta returned responsibility to a civilian government in April 1983, but with a new constitution that stripped away most of the liberties which had escaped the revision of 1971. The 1961 constitution had been about pluralism and civil liberties, but the 1982 one was about control. It included a "catch-all" provision, Article 14, which restricted the freedoms of individuals and organisations and prohibited political struggle based upon class, sect, language, or race." (Ahmad 1981, 6; McDowall 1997, 413-414). The principle of "the unity and indivisibility of the state with its land and people" is repeated twenty-four times in various articles of the 1982 constitution. In the 1961 constitution this phrase had been repeated only one or two times; in the revised form of this constitution dated 1971, it had been repeated in 16 articles. (Besikçi: The Lausanne..).

The Kurdistan Labour Party (PKK)

The Kurdistan Labour Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK*) was founded in 1978 by Abdullah Öcalan, a student at the Faculty of Political Science at Ankara University. Its leaders fled Turkey after the military coup in 1980. Öcalan went to Damascus, Syria. (Laber 1988, 16). On 15 August 1984 the PKK declared war on Turkey with attacks on gendarmerie stations in Semdinli and Eruh (Berger et al. 1998, 38). The war was waged by the military wing of the PKK, the ARGK (*Artêsa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistan, National Liberation Army of Kurdistan*).

The PKK considers itself a vanguard organisation that has brought Kurdish identity back to the Kurds and shown them how to overcome the "slave-like" mentality resulting from years of assimilation and oppression by the Turkish state. During the 1980s the PKK, with its strict discipline, gained little support among the urbanised Kurdish middle class, but it was successful among Kurdish peasants and urban lower classes. (Pireh Babi 1999, 143-144).

One consequence of the military coup was the collapse of virtually the entire Left in Turkey in the 1980s, a vacuum which the PKK has filled to become the most important opposition movement (Bieber 1998; van Bruinessen 1996a). In April 1990 the mayor of Nisebin (*Nusaybin*), Muslum Yildirim, caused a sensation - and lost his job on 20 April – when he told a Reuters correspondent that about 95 % of his townspeople were happy to support the PKK (Helsinki Watch 1990, 10-11; McDowall 1997, 427).

From the perspective of many Kurds, the guerrillas are Kurdish soldiers fighting against an occupying military presence for their ancient homeland, Kurdistan (Laizer 1996, 91). In the course of its development the PKK has grown from a small militant group - it resembled many other revolutionary groups in Turkey during the 1970s - to one practising guerrilla warfare and increasingly during the 1990s, a national liberation movement that is gradually learning diplomacy and searching for a political solution.

> *We have enough guerrillas, we do not need more of them. We have seen that we cannot win this war militarily. Mustafa Barzani had one hundred thousand peshmergas but he did not win against Saddam Hussein. Political activities are more important. (a Kurdish man interviewed in Europe)*

Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, has explained the development of the organisation as follows:

> However, my statements also express the need to transform the structure of the PKK, its narrow and strict ideological approach - a remnant of the fiery 1970s - and its political structure in the light of the developments in the world and in Turkey in the 1990s. I have emphasised the need for reviewing, revising, and updating its principles and programme in the aftermath of a huge experience. Throughout these years, I have increasingly tried to broaden the PKK's world-view.

> ... My defence also emphasises the need for change in our organisation and in our people to incorporate the aforementioned transformations. Instead of the now classic kill-get killed cycle, my defence advocates that it is much better to live and let live as our modern times require. ...As we approach the year 2000, should the PKK manage to resolve its contradictory position of both having to transcend itself and once again direct the problem towards a solution, it will have played its historical role. It can bring this about by transforming itself from a revolutionary organisation into a democratic organisation. (Öcalan 1999, 9, 13, 31)

The PKK has quite a negative reputation in Europe, as it is a closed and strictly hierarchic organisation from which even its supporters do not get much information. Kurds who support the PKK accept this structure and say that it is necessary in order to prevent Turks from infiltrating the PKK. They cite as an example the failure of TIKKO (*Türkiye Isçi Köylü Komünist Ordusu*, Workers' and Peasants' Liberation Army), which is said to have been

due to MIT officers infiltrating the organisation and destroying it from the inside.

The policy of the Turkish government towards the PKK has been to avoid discussion about it because "there is no Kurdish nation, there is no Kurdish language, so there cannot be rights for a non-existing entity". Turkish officials describe the PKK as a small group of militants that has no popular support in the Southeast and therefore does not deserve to be taken seriously. According to the government there is no civil war in the Southeast; there are merely some problems with terrorists. The government refuses to use the term "war" even when it issues dispatches about operations with units of 30,000 to 50,000 soldiers using tanks, Super Cobra and Sikorsky helicopters, and other military aircraft. (Besikçi 1996a, 43). The PKK has declared a unilateral cease-fire three times (21 March 1993, 14 December 1995, and 1 September 1998), and in the autumn of 1999 it announced that it would end the armed struggle and use only political and diplomatic means to reach its goals. But the Turkish government has viewed the cease-fires merely as a sign of military weakness and has refused to start any dialogue with the PKK (Laizer 1996, 74). In 1994 Laber expressed the opinion that the PKK might never have been able to grow and flourish if Turkey had responded to Kurdish demands for elementary cultural and political rights and done more to improve economic conditions in the Southeast (Laber 1994, 50). Dogû Ergil, a political scientist at the University of Ankara, concurs, pointing out that one reason why the PKK gained in influence is that the government shut down all democratic Kurdish organisations and repressed all means of expressing Kurdish identity (Ergil 1999). Besikçi writes that when democratic channels are blocked, weapons become the only form of expression (Besikçi 1996a, 44).

The PKK is different from previous Kurdish national movements in the sense that it has many contacts with Kurds living abroad, primarily with migrant Kurds residing in Europe. This support is essential to the PKK, both financially and politically. Migrant Kurds have helped to finance the armed struggle and establish Kurdish satellite TV channels; they have also created contacts with other liberation movements, human-rights organisations, political parties, the mass media etc. Using modern satellite, Internet, and telefax techniques, Kurdish organisations in Europe maintain regular contact with Kurds in Turkey and - thanks to Turkish corruption - even in Turkish special prisons. Their campaigns increase nationalist feelings among the Kurds. The ERNK and other organisations organised several demonstrations and festivals in Germany and Holland in the late 1990s with 100,000 to 150,000 participants. Kurdish publishing houses in Europe publish books and magazines, organisations create homepages in the Internet, music groups make new CDs and cassettes, and the standardisation of the Kurdish language continues, as do mother-tongue education for Kurdish children in Europe and

the production of Kurdish educational materials. The Kurdish issue is also receiving increasing interest from non-Kurdish academics and research institutions. All of this has had an impact on the development of Kurdish nationalism. The Kurdish community in the Diaspora is playing a crucial role in Kurdish nation-building. The situation in Kurdistan strongly shapes the national identity of immigrant Kurds, and their activities are beyond the control of the government of Turkey. Many Kurdish political and cultural organisations have been founded in Europe, such as the Kurdistan Parliament in Exile and the Kurdistan National Congress (founded in May 1999).

Besikçi explains the meaning of the PKK for the Kurds as follows: the guerrilla movement may not achieve the desired results in a short time, but it is bringing about a psychological change in the people. The Kurds have started to compare their situation with that of the Turks, the Arabs, and the Persians, and they have started to demand equality and democracy. When Turkish TV has shown how badly Turks are treated in Bulgaria, Kurds have recognised the similarities to their own situation. The guerrillas, the Kurdish army, have given the Kurds self-confidence. One indication of the change in people's attitude is that they now claim the bodies of dead guerrillas and arrange burial ceremonies for them. Before, at the beginning of the organised guerrilla movement, they were afraid to ask for the bodies of people killed by the army. The security forces did not want the Kurds to claim the bodies of their dead children, for they wanted to create the impression that these were "a handful of traitors" who had no connection to the people and whose dead bodies were not even wanted by their relatives. (Besikçi: The Achievements ...; Vanly 1997, 58-59). During the spring and summer of 1999 the main news stories in the mass media concerned the situation in Kosovo. While watching how much international aid the Kosovar refugees received, the Kurds were comparing the situation of the deported Kurds to that of the Kosovar refugees. Içduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci conclude that the PKK has been the first group to politicise and unite the Kurds on a primarily ethnic and nationalist basis rather than a tribal or religious one (Içduygu et al. 1999, 994).

Proposals for negotiations

During the 1990s, people were no longer sent to prison for saying that they are Kurds, as was done in the 1980s. Government officials and the Turkish mass media have been reluctantly acknowledging that the Kurds actually exist. They have been forced to do so, in part because of the growing war with the PKK but mainly because of the mass exodus of Iraqi Kurds into Turkey after the Gulf War. Iraqi Kurds were not shy about speaking their language or wearing their traditional dress - for most of them, this was the

only language they knew and these were the only clothes they had. (Kürkçü 1996, 3; Laber 1988, 14 and 1994, 48; Sheikhmous 1991, 22).

At the beginning of the 1990s there were signs in the political atmosphere of Turkey that the country might be able to initiate an open discussion of the Kurdish question and search for a non-military solution. For the first time in the history of the republic there was public debate about the Kurdish insurgency. The popular view was that the only language the Kurds understood was the one delivered by the security forces, and that even tougher action was required. But there was growing recognition among politicians that the military had no answer to the progressive loss of "hearts and minds" in the Southeast. (Laber 1994, 47; McDowall 1997, 427).

At the beginning of 1991 Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the ANAP party, expressed the opinion that Kurdish should become Turkey's second official language. In February 1991 President Turgut Özal introduced Law 2932, which permits the use of the Kurdish language in contexts other than radio and television broadcasts, publications, and education. This legalised what was already happening in the streets of Istanbul and Kurdish towns, where Kurdish was freely spoken and Kurdish cassettes were openly available. In 1991, Özal announced his acceptance of the idea of an autonomous Kurdish zone in northern Iraq. He suggested searching for a political solution in southeastern Turkey as well. In an interview with the journalist Ismet Imset in November 1991 the PKK leader Öcalan, when asked whether he would accept a federal solution, replied that "unquestionably this is what we see". Shortly thereafter, Özal shocked Ankara by saying he would be willing to talk about a federal system. By 1992 Özal was arguing for an amnesty for the guerrillas and recognition of the PKK as a participant in Turkey's political system. Özal represented the radical school of thought, while Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel led the conservatives. (McDowall 1997, 428- 431; Randal 1999, 278). But even Demirel had promised, when he became Prime Minister in 1991, that there would be "transparent government" and an end to torture by the police - promises he emphasised by demanding "glass walls" for police stations. His successor Tansu Çiller later expressed interest in studying the "Basque model", which she discussed with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzáles. (Kirisçi and Winrow 1997, 20; Laber 1994, 47; Randal 1999, 283).

Shortly before his death in April 1993, Özal wrote to Demirel:

> The Turkish republic is facing its gravest threat yet. A social earthquake could cut one part of Turkey from the rest, and we could all be buried beneath it. (President Turgut Özal, The Independent 13.11.1993, quoted in McDowall 1997, 1)

On 17 March 1993, Öcalan announced a unilateral cease-fire which would last from Newroz (21 March) until April 15th. In Turkey this was taken as a sign that the PKK was suffering military defeat and seeking to gain whatever it could politically. President Özal, while touring in Kazakhstan, announced that upon his return to Ankara he would make an important statement on the issue. On 16 April Öcalan renewed the cease-fire for an indefinite period. The next day President Özal died under suspicious circumstances, allegedly of a heart attack, one day after he had returned home. The cease-fire finally ended on 24 May when the PKK guerrillas killed 33 unarmed off-duty Turkish soldiers outside the town of Bingöl. (Rugman and Hutchings 1996, 52).

Thus during Turgut Özal's term as president there was a brief period of promise when it seemed possible that Turkey would recognise the Kurds as a community. Öcalan says of this period:

The lifting by the state of the language ban in the early 1990s, the limited freedoms granted in the areas of language and culture, the acceptance of the problem by senior statesmen and their efforts to solve it, and finally my own cease-fire in March 1993 clearly marked a period when both sides were emphasising a free union. (Öcalan 1999, 32)

Süleyman Demirel, who allowed the army to interpret the PKK's cease-fire as a sign of weakness, succeeded Özal as president. During the next six weeks, army troops killed about one hundred guerrillas and civilians and arrested hundreds of others. Demirel and the army made it clear that neither negotiations nor any other concessions were forthcoming. In 1994, with Tansu Çiller as prime minister, all the promises vanished under intensified military repression in Kurdistan and the banishment of the legally elected representatives of the Kurdish DEP from the parliament. (Ciment 1996, 3-4; Laizer 1996, 105; McDowall 1997, 437, 441). About 3,200 Kurds disappeared or died in so-called "mystery killings" in 1993 and 1994 (Randal 1999, 258). The Lawyers' Association of Diyarbakir (1998) calls these deaths extra-judicial executions.

Meanwhile, the majority of Turks have begun to view the Kurdish minority itself as a profound menace. Some Turks use the term "the Dêrsim solution", redolent of the genocidal tactics used in the 1930s, as a shorthand designation of the method necessary to teach the Kurds a good lesson. Such feelings are probably subconsciously encouraged by the process of ethnic elimination that has taken place on either side of Turkey in the former Yugoslavia and the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan. (McDowall 1997, 440). On the other hand,

the Kurdish national movement has also received inspiration from abroad, e.g. from the Palestinian *intifada* uprising (Sheikhmous 1991, 21).

In recent years representatives of successive Turkish governments have made declarations concerning the Kurdish population, but they have invariably failed to fulfil their promises. Vermot-Mangold writes that this seems to be due to the lack of civil control over the army and the security forces in the Southeast, which in practice constitute the only authority in the region (Vermot-Mangold 1998, 10).

According to Ismail Besikçi, as long as the Kurdish question is treated as a taboo in Turkey, it cannot be solved; what is needed is, first, an investigation of its essential characteristics and historical development and, after that, a broadly based public discussion (Besikçi 1997a, 44). Minority rights are a difficult issue in countries where the political freedom of the majority is also very limited. In Chaliand's view it is difficult to see how the rights of minorities could be recognised when the mass of the people are themselves treated like children and addressed only in the hocus-pocus language of nationalist rhetoric (Chaliand 1980, 10).

Despite the official claims of "one state, one nation, one language", Turkey is a multi-ethnic country where ethnic Turks constitute only about half of the population: In addition to the Kurds there are many other minorities, for example Armenians, Assyrians, Arabs, Greeks, Lazers, Tatars, Circassians, and peoples from the Balkans. After 1991, when publishing in other languages than Turkish was permitted, the Lazers and the Circassians started to organise themselves and publish literature in their languages, being inspired by the Kurdish example and by developments in the former Soviet Union (van Bruinessen 1996c, 7). The Turkish government views recognition of the Kurdish question as the first step in the eventual disintegration of Turkey - a "domino theory" prompted by insecurity. If the government recognised the Kurds' right to use their own language and other rights, the other minorities would also start to demand recognition of their rights. Bieber does not believe that this would happen, as most of the other minorities do not have a strong ethnic identity, but Küpeli believes that decentralisation of the state would lead to tremendous chaos and the break-up of the Turkish state. (Bieber 1998; Küpeli 1997, 20).

6. Kurdish ethnocide in Turkey

6.1. Denial of Kurdish identity

The question of Kurdish identity is important in this research: many Kurds have a very strong sense of national identity despite the fact that they have never had a state of their own[33] and that Kurdish groups have many problems co-operating with each other. In this chapter I also describe the various forms of cultural genocide Turkey has been committing against the Kurds.

Kurdish linguicide in Turkey

In Chapter 2.2 (Ethnocide) I explained how an ethnic group can be destroyed by killing its ties with its own language, and in Chapter 5 (The history of the Kurds in Turkey) I described how the Turks have tried to do this to the Kurds.

Language is a source of identity and a core value which symbolises a person's membership in a particular community. Language is the most important thing that binds people together as a nation; it is more important than land or history. This makes it a deeply emotional issue among nationalists and a favourite target for those seeking to destroy the community. (Ignatieff 1994, 10; Kendal 1980b, 83; Smolicz 1994, 237). The oppression of the Kurds in Turkey has led them to react with strong resistance.

> *When a Kurd defines his identity he can seem very incoherent, especially those Kurds who don't even know what identity is. For example, he might say that he's a Kurd under the Turkish flag; it also shows a lack of identity that one doesn't have a flag. One doesn't have Kurdish newspapers, Kurdish schools, TV, libraries, books, institutions, research, or similar things in Kurdish or for Kurds. One feels really weak when one is conscious of the Kurdish identity. But on the other hand, when I see that the little that I have – the language which I learned from my mother - is threatened, I get really furious. (Celepli 1998)*

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[33] The state of Mahabad existed for a short time in the Iranian part of Kurdistan in 1945-46 (Clason 1986, 15-16).

Since 1924 it has been forbidden in Turkey to use Kurdish in public places, but domestic and international pressures have created some changes in the state's behaviour towards the Kurds, especially in terms of language. In April 1991, Law 2932 permitted the use of Kurdish in private speech, songs, and recorded music. However, Kurdish may still not be used for political or educational purposes, and materials dealing with Kurdish history, culture, and ethnic identity continue to be subject to confiscation and prosecution under the "invisible unity of the state" provision of the Law to Combat Terrorism. (McDowall 1992, 52-52; medico international and KHRP 1997, 26-27; US State Department 1999). Since the early 1990s the Turkish government has attempted to persuade world opinion that the oppression of the Kurdish language has ended. But a study of the Turkish constitution tells a different story. The constitution states that "the state of Turkey is in its state territory and state citizens an invisible whole. Its language is Turkish." (Constitution, Article 3) It also declares that "No language prohibited by law may be used for the disclosure or publication of ideas and opinions. Written or printed materials, records, tapes, videotapes, as well as other means of expression that are in violation of this prohibition will be confiscated..." (Constitution, Article 26/3) According to Skutnabb-Kangas this is clearly aimed at the Kurdish language. (Skutnabb-Kangas 1996, 132-133).

In August 1996 the Kurdish Culture and Research Foundation (KÜRT-KAV) attempted to organise a Kurdish language course and requested permission from the Board of Education in ¤stanbul province to conduct a private course in Kurdish. The following March KÜRT-KAV received a negative response to its application. The organisation protested against this decision, took the issue to Ankara District Court, and started a language course without permission, which led to police interrogation and closing of the course. According to Law No. 2923 the Council of Ministers shall make decisions concerning education in a foreign language, after it has received the opinion of the National Security Council. According the same law, state-sponsored and private language courses may be given in Turkey only in English, French, German, Russian, Italian, Spanish, Arabic, Japanese, and Chinese (Information sheet of IMK e.V).[34].

At the end of the 1990s some Kurdish-language magazines were published in İstanbul (for example *Welat, Rewsen, Roja Teze, Zend, Pîne*) under great economic and other difficulties. Although it is legal to publish Kurdish magazines, it is dangerous for readers to buy and have them in their

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[34] French might soon be removed from this list. A ban on the French language was among the boycott demands against France after the French parliament passed a law in January 2001 in which it officially acknowledged the Armenian genocide.

possession. Purchasing Kurdish-language publications can be interpreted as evidence of PKK sympathies (US State Department 1999). The principles of the Turkish government are described in the advice President Jimmy Carter gave to the Shah of Iran (told by an Iranian refugee woman interviewed in Turtiainen 1998, 135): "Let your citizens publish books. It's good because then you can say that there's democracy in Iran. And the police know who writes them and who reads them." Hassanpour points out that although Kurdish is used in books, it is still illegal to write in this language, as most of the publications in Kurdish or about it are banned and confiscated, and their authors or publishers are punished by the state (Hassanpour 2000).

The situation of the Kurdish language in North Kurdistan can be analysed using the taxonomy devised by Cobarrubias. He divides state attitudes toward minority languages into five categories:

> 1. attempting to kill a language
> 2. letting a language die
> 3. unsupportive coexistence
> 4. partial support of specific language functions
> 5. adoption as an official language
> (Cobarrubias 1983, 71)

From 1924 to 1991 the situation was clearly number 1. Turkey was trying to kill Kurdish. Law 2932, which was passed in 1991 and permitted the use of Kurdish in private speech, songs, and recorded music, changed the language's situation to level 2: the Turkish authorities are no longer deliberately killing Kurdish, but instead are letting it die. Kurdish may not be used for political or educational purposes, so the situation is still far from unsupportive coexistence (number 3).

What is lost when a language is lost is the socio-cultural integration of generations, the cohesiveness and naturalness and quiet creativity, the secure sense of identity, the sense of the collective worth of a community and of a people. A loss of these characteristics exacts a price via high levels of alienation, injury to both physical and mental health over two or more generations, and a vastly increased incidence of social dislocation, which manifests itself in civil and criminal offences. (Fishman 1994, 60). Kurdish is among the hundred most common languages in the world (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1999). It has not disappeared, but neither has it been able to develop in a normal way, because of the oppression. Because Kurdistan is divided between four countries, the speakers of different dialects have not been able to co-operate with each other and develop the language

together. Kurdish is written in three different alphabets (Latin, Arabic, and Cyrillic). Representatives of the Enstîtuya Kurdî in Istanbul estimated in January 1999 that about 30 % of the Kurds in Turkey have forgotten their mother language. Even among the rest there are very few who can read and write Kurdish.

The oppression of the language has effects both at the individual and the collective level. I have heard about traumatic childhood memories concerning how Kurdish children needed someone to translate for them when talking with their mothers during holidays from boarding school. Personal and family problems (for example, divorce among the Kurds who live in Europe and family violence among the Kurds who live in Kurdistan) are said to be common, and one explanation for this could be - in addition to economic and other problems - the break-up since the 1920s of oral traditions going back many generations. Orature (oral literature) has always been important for the Kurds, partly because other forms of literature have been forbidden (Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 350). On the collective level it has been difficult for Kurds to unite their resistance - which has of course been the aim of the Turkish regime's attempts to kill the Kurdish language. On the other hand, many Kurds have a very strong sense of Kurdish identity, and once they have been able to clearly define it they devote themselves totally to fighting for their nation. I believe that they would be less fanatic if they had been able to develop their national identity in a normal way.

Education as one method of Turkifying Kurds

Turkey has signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, but with reservations concerning Articles 17, 29, and 30. These articles state that children belonging to an ethnic, religious, or linguistic minority or of indigenous origins have the rights of language, education, and cultural identity. (Kwrwxçw and Winrow 1997, 46). Although education in Turkey has been compulsory by law since 1924, up to a few decades ago most Kurds were illiterate. Since there has been no education in their mother language, "illiterate" in this context refers to persons who can not read or write Turkish; usually they cannot speak it either, as they have not been touched by assimilation. In 1965 the illiteracy rate among the rural female population in 14 Kurdish provinces was 93 %[35], and there was one province where it was 99 %. Among the urban female population the illiteracy rate was 72 %. At

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[35] These 14 provinces are: Adiyaman, Agri, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elaziq, Erzincan, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Tunceli, Siirt, Urfa, and Van. The provinces of Batman and Sirnak did not exist in 1965.

that time more than half of the men in the Kurdish provinces, 59 %, were illiterate. (Jafar 1974, 151-152, 154). At the end of the 1970s the illiteracy rate in the Turkish part of Turkey was 41 % and in the Kurdish part 72 % (Kendal 1980b, 49). By 1990, the average literacy rate in Mardin province was 48 % (the average in Turkey was 78 %). At that time only 70 % of the children ever went to school, and of these only 18 % went on to secondary education, with only 9% completing it (McDowall 1997, 435). An exception to the literacy figures of the Southeast is the province of Tunceli, where the literacy rate is 98 % (HRFT 1997, 98).

The increase in literacy after 1950 was due to changes in the tactics of the Turkish government. Until the 1950s, the authorities believed that the most effective way to control the Kurds was to keep them illiterate. But in 1950 the new government adopted a new strategy, using Turkish-language training in the schools as the primary tool of assimilation. (Jafar 1974, 153). As Kinross wrote in 1954, "education has now reached Hakkari itself, since the policy of Turks is no longer to suppress but to civilise these unruly highland clansmen. But as few of the teachers spoke Kurdish and few of the pupils spoke Turkish its progress was slow." (Kinross 1954, 126). Jafar commented in 1974 that "even if some teachers could speak Kurdish they were not permitted to do it" (Jafar 1974, 154). This is the situation even today. There is a little police station in every school in the State of Emergency Region. "For the sake of security", police ensure that the teachers follow the government's will in school. For example, every morning the pupils must properly sing the Turkish national anthem. Even if all the pupils are Kurds, speaking only Kurdish, they are not taught Turkish as if it were a foreign language but as though everybody could speak it fluently. This is also the situation when the teacher is a Kurd[36]. A Kurdish teacher tells of teaching Kurdish children:

> *By law I am not permitted to speak Kurdish with the children; it is also forbidden to use an interpreter. This means that it is very difficult to communicate with Kurdish children who might know only two words of Turkish when they begin school: yes and no. (a teacher in Amed, interviewed in Lodenius 1998c)*

The Committee of the National Front, also the military junta of Kenan Evren decided in the early 1960s to build boarding schools where Kurdish children would be separated from their families and be "Turkicized". These schools are organised according to the same principles as their 19th- century counterparts

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[36] Sometimes even the police who patrol in the schools are Kurds. So ethnic Kurdish policemen are obliged to see to it that Kurdish teachers use Turkish when they teach Kurdish children.

for Native American children, which were the most effective method of killing the languages of Native Americans. According to Skutnabb-Kangas, separating minority children from their parents is a form of physical abuse. Boarding schools for minorities try to eradicate their language, culture, and background and "educate" them for future subordination to the dominant group. Skutnabb-Kangas writes that this fulfils the criteria for genocide according to the UN Convention, as the school transfers the children from one group to another (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, 332). In 1998 there were 88 such boarding schools in Turkey with a total capacity of 49,614 students, and 38 new boarding schools were under construction (US State Department 1999). Kendal writes that initially the idea of assimilation failed totally, for most of the educated Kurdish children became Kurdish nationalists (Entessar 1992, 80; Kendal 1980b, 75).

Many children do not have the opportunity to attend school even under these conditions. The lack of infrastructure in cities after the rapid internal migration of displaced rural Kurds has also meant a lack of schools. Many cities in the Southeast are operating schools on double shifts, with as many as 100 students per classroom (US State Department 1999). There is also a chronic teacher shortage. A teacher interviewed by Lodenius in Amed in March 1998 said that many schools are closed for security reasons, and that about half of the children in the district of Diyarbakir could not go to school. In 1998 there were about two thousand street children in Amed. (Lodenius 1998c; UCTEA 1996, 10). According to medico international and the KHRP, often the reason why children are sent home from school is that they are inadequately dressed (medico international and KHRP 1996, 21).

According to the Turkey Country Report of 1996 prepared by the US State Department, 2,789 of the 6,244 primary schools in the Southeast had been closed. The next year the number of primary schools closed in 22 provinces in the Southeast was 3,223. In 1998 the number of schools that were closed in eleven Southeast provinces was 1,726 primary and secondary schools and two high schools (US State Department 1997, 1998, and 1999). Randal gives a figure as high as four thousand closed in the Southeast in 1994. Ruth-Gaby Vermot-Mangold, rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, reported in 1998 that 2,076 schools were closed and 117,000 students were unable to attend school. One reason schools have been closed is the lack of teachers. Teachers refuse to risk their lives working in the Kurdish villages where the PKK operatives see them as purveyors of Turkish culture and spies who try to get information from the children about the villagers' support of the PKK. Between 1992 and 1997, 122 teachers were killed and 17 were wounded. According to Rugman, in 1994 about a quarter of the teachers assigned to the region refused to go there. According to Vermot-Mangold 6,144 teachers were assigned to teach in the region in 1997, but 3,173 of them

resigned. (Randal 1999, 257; Rugman and Hutchings 1996, 65; Vermot-Mangold 1998, 10).

According to the Constitution and the labour laws, the employment of children under the age of 15 is forbidden, with the exception that children aged 13 to 14 years may engage in light part-time work if it is part of a school programme or vocational training. In 1998 the Ministry of Labour and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) produced a study of child labour in Turkey which showed that almost one-half (44 %) of the children working were under 15. They were paid less than the minimum wage and had no insurance (US State Department 1999).

In İstanbul suburbs with a large Kurdish population there are hundreds of small textile factories which use Kurdish child labour on a large scale. They make cheap clothes for the domestic market and for export, often to the open-air markets of Eastern Europe. Children also work in shops and restaurants and as street peddlers selling water, cigarettes, snacks etc. In İstanbul, even 5- and 6-year-olds can be seen on the street selling tissues and candy, even some girls, although most are boys. When I visited Amed and İstanbul in January 1999, I saw that the street children wore very light clothes, even when the temperature was near zero and it was raining. Many of them did not have proper jackets or even socks. I did not see any child wearing gloves; even a child selling them on the street did not wear them herself. In March 1997, in the countryside in the province of Diyarbakır I saw a group of about ten small boys carrying heavy sacks from a dump.

Kurdification, the Kurdish reactive ethnicity

Kurds had almost no sense of national unity until the beginning of the 20th century. During this time nationalistic ideas were strong in Europe and this movement spread to the Middle East. After World War I, Kurdistan was divided between four states - Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria - which all turned out to be states with strong central governments built around the largest ethnic group. National minorities like the Kurds were absorbed into the main culture, as the ethnic identity of minorities was seen as a threat to the state's unity and security. This division has hampered the process of nation-building in Kurdistan. Kurdish national feelings were born more than anything else as a reaction to the political and cultural domination of the Turks, Persians, and Arabs. Since the 1920s, Kurds have immigrated in large numbers to other parts of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, which has led to two consequences. Many Kurds have lost their roots and been assimilated into the majority culture, but many have also undergone the opposite development. In big cities, they have become conscious of their ethnic identity after encountering other minorities

and Kurds from different places. Being discriminated against for being a Kurd has been the impulse for many to study Kurdish culture and history. (van Bruinessen 1990, 25-26, 35-36; Sheikhmous 1999)

> *Kurds have strong national feelings because they've been dominated for such a long time. It only creates a sense of resistance. Kurds have always lived on their own land. It has been easy to identify the occupiers as strangers. But I don't know what will happen now that so many Kurds have been forced to leave their land. (a Kurdish man, Europe)*

Because of the tribal character of their society the Kurds have not been able to create a state of their own. The occupiers' "divide and rule" policy has led to a situation where Kurds have fought each other more than a common enemy. But the occupiers have not been able to assimilate the Kurds. Ignatieff believes that the reason for this is the traditionalism of the Kurds. Kurdish society is essentially tribal and derives from the largely nomadic and semi-nomadic existence of most Kurdish tribes in previous centuries. Kurdish tribal cohesion is based on a mix of blood ties and territorial loyalty, but a substantial number of Kurds in low-lying areas are not tribal even in a territorial sense. The tribalism of the Kurds is a source of political division and weakness, but it is also a subliminal source of cohesion. The transition from a tribal to an urban sense of national belonging has happened within two generations, so their national consciousness is still shaped by tribal bonds. According to Ignatieff, the Kurds' "very backwardness and stubborn enclosure within tribal loyalties" has protected them from assimilation and integration. (Ignatieff 1994, 181; McDowall 1992, 17). The concept of "I" hardly exists in the context of a tribal culture's value system: "we" (the tribe) predominates. Individuals define themselves entirely in terms of their tribe. An individual is first a member of his or her tribe, then a Muslim. The sense of being a member of a national group, a Kurd, comes a poor third. (Kendal 1980a, 24; van Bruinessen 1992, 6-7). The Kurdish family therapist Braina Kadir says that the individual is not as important as the group:

> *We mix politics, kinship, and emotions in a war, which can be dangerous. As a Kurd you belong to the group, and the group belongs to you. In that sense there is not the same space for private feelings and individual responsibility for one's own life. (Braina Kadir, interviewed in Weigl 1999)*

McDowall asks whether the worst enemy of Kurdish national aspirations is actually the fragmentary nature of Kurdish society and the other than national

aspirations of many of its traditionally minded people. Like many other mountain people, the Kurds are caught between the strength of their long-standing traditional identity and the weakness of their political development. (McDowall 1992, 4-5). The harsh mountainous terrain that has helped save the Kurds from extinction has also hindered the development of a common identity and strengthened locally- and regionally-based clan identities, similar to that of the Scottish highlanders (Ciment 1996, 1-3; Sheikhmous 1999). Among the Maya Indian tribes in Guatemala there is a similar situation: the tribes are not a self-conscious ethnic group. Being divided by language and isolated by their mountainous homeland, they are fragmented into semi-autonomous small-town communities. Indian ethnic consciousness centres on the municipality or, at most, the language group. (van den Berghe 1990, 259). The political manifestation of a tribe is tribalism, not nationalism (Pireh Babi 1999, 66).

McDowall writes that the Kurds began to think and act as an ethnic community only from 1918 onwards. With the exception of the 17th-century poet Ahmed-i-Xani, no Kurds thought in terms of a whole Kurdish people until the latter part of the 19th century. The new sense of national community occurred for the Kurds at the same time that the Turks began to embrace an ethnic sense of Turkish identity instead of the previous Ottoman citizenship. But the Kurds were fatally disadvantaged because they lacked both a civic culture and an established literature. Later, when the Kurdish national movement had increased in strength, educated Kurds understood that Kurdish literature is essential to national formation. (McDowall 1997, 1-2, 4, 408; O'Shea 1994, 174). Pireh Babi sees the rise of the Young Kurds (in comparison to the Young Turks) and the first Kurdish cultural associations between 1908 and 1922 as the first stage of the formation process of Kurdish nationalism. The Young Kurds were important especially because they separated religion and politics in the Kurdish national movement. (Pireh Babi 1999, 91).
The definition of Kurdish culture is important because Turkey has been using the strategy of absorbing some parts of the native arts of the Kurds into the official presentations of Turkish national culture. For example, Kurdish dances have been included in national folk-dance performances; however, they have not been identified as Kurdish but rather as coming from a particular region of Turkey. (Besikçi 1987, 79; Laber 1988, 14).

Kleinman argues that depression has something to do with one's self-perception and a feeling of relative powerlessness (Kleinman 1997b). This sounds logical but it does not fit the Kurds' reaction to their situation. Despite all their difficulties, the Kurdish people do not look as if they have succumbed to depression, quite the opposite: there is a great deal of courage and

collective resistance among them - could it be that Kurdish people and their reactions are different from other people's?

> *If I don't know where I come from, who I am, what language I speak, it is very difficult for me to take care of my things in life. First of all I must fight for my identity: who am I? It is not enough to say that I come from Kurdistan. Also it is not enough to say that I'm a Kurd. My country is occupied, I must fight for its freedom with my sisters and brothers. If one wants to have her identity one must fight, show it in practice. Otherwise one does not feel well psychologically, one gets depressed.* (a Kurdish woman, Europe)

For example, among Iranian refugees who live in the Netherlands there is much reserve and mutual suspicion. The absence of social and cultural group formation means that among them there is a lack of a strong Iranian identity (Ghorashi 1997, 285). Among Kurds the situation is different. According to Lars-Gunnar Eriksson, the former advisor of the Swedish Minister of Immigration, Kurds are one of the most active groups among immigrants in Western Europe. He calls the process of strengthening nationalism *Kurdification*. In Sweden there have been Kurdish guest workers since the 1960s. They were not interested in politics until politically active refugees, who were proud of their Kurdish nationality, started to arrive. They started to form political organisations. Nowadays in Western European countries there are well-functioning Kurdish organisations and social networks. (Eriksson 1992, 91). This same process of awareness and awakening has also been going on in Kurdistan since the 1970s. National ideas among the Kurds can be seen as a natural consequence of the disruption of traditional life and the annihilation of tribal barriers caused by industrialisation and a modern cash economy. Other ethnic groups which have undergone the modernisation process earlier have experienced a similar ethno-national development. Sheikhmous feels that with this national awareness increasing and no possibility for democratic activity, Kurds have been forced into a position of resistance (Sheikhmous 1991, 13). Içduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci write that once ethnicity is politicised it becomes a strong motivating force that often dominates other expressions of identity. Kurds in southeastern Turkey have experienced much insecurity, which has led them to develop a politicised ethnic identity. (Içduygu et al. 1999, 992, 998). Such a process is called by Hettne a *nation-building process,* which means that the group becomes politicised and the process gains new dimensions. This increases ethnic consciousness in the group. (Hettne 1990, 12, 57-58).

Smith lists the six main strategies adopted by ethnic communities incorporated in polyethnic states. They are:

> 1. *Isolation*. The most common strategy for smaller ethnic communities in the past: the ethnic community chooses to stay aloof from the society as a whole.
>
> 2. *Accommodation*. The ethnic community aims to adjust to its host society by encouraging its members to participate in the social and political life of that society and its state. Often individual members become assimilated by the host society.
>
> 3. *Communalism*. A more dynamic and active form of accommodation.
>
> 4. *Autonomism*. There are various forms and degrees of autonomy. Cultural autonomy implies full control over education, mass media, and the courts. Political autonomy covers every aspect of social, political, and economic life, except for foreign policy. Autonomists demand a federal state structure.
>
> 5. *Separatism*. The aim is to secede and form one's own sovereign state.
>
> 6. *Irredentism.* An ethnic community whose members are divided and fragmented, which seeks reunification and recovery of its "lost" territories. (Smith, A., 1981, 15-17)

When thinking about the history and present situation of the Kurds in Turkey, all these categories can be found on a small or large scale. During the Ottoman period and the first decades of the republic, most of the Kurds lived in isolation from the Turkish state. Since the 1950s the state has tried to assimilate the Kurds into Turkish culture; the situation is one of accommodation and communalism. When the PKK was founded in 1978 its goal was an independent Kurdish state, but since the beginning of the 1990s it has declared that it would also accept a federal solution, so the PKK has changed from separatism to autonomism. The core of Kurdish identity is Kurdistan, the Kurdish land area, but because the land is divided and many Kurds live in other parts of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, as well as in Europe, the Kurdish national movement seeks the reunion of all Kurds living in the diaspora, which is irredentism.

The ideas of accommodation and communalism explain why discrimination against the Kurds in Turkey is based on the expression of ethnic identity, not on the mere fact of that identity. A Kurd who identifies himself as a Turk faces no discrimination based on his ethnic heritage (HRW/H 1994, 7; US Department of State 1999). One principle of accommodation is that assimilated

individual members of a minority are encouraged to participate in the political system. In Turkey there are ethnic Kurds among the leading politicians. The late president Turgut Özal had Kurdish blood, as does Erdal Inönü; the Speaker of Parliament, Hikmet Çetin, is a Kurd (van Bruinessen 1994b, 154). In 1994 roughly sixty Turkish parliamentarians were of Kurdish origin, excluding the banned DEP deputies (HRW/H 1994, 7).[37]

Smith writes that wars are often closely associated with the foundation stories and liberation myths of ethnic communities, which suggests that military actions have been decisive for the development of a sense of ethnic community (Smith, A. 1976, 75). Pireh Babi also observes that in Kurdistan military conflicts have played a crucial role in the development of ethnic feelings. Those who have fought and become martyrs are heroes for all Kurds. Almost all Kurdish folk songs contain stories of war and the collective sacrifices of the Kurds. (Pireh Babi 1999, 26-27, 64-65). The most important Kurdish annual celebration is Newroz (21 March), which Kurds celebrate to honour the memory of Kawa the Blacksmith, who conquered King Zohak, an evil king who oppressed the Kurds. This is believed to have happened in Halwan in southern Kurdistan. On a historical level this event has been dated to the victory of the Medes over the Assyrians in 612 BC, which marked the end of the Assyrian polity. The Kurdish national movement cleverly uses the myths connected to Newroz to create a sense of national identity among the Kurds. Kawa is a hero symbolising liberation and the desire to rise up against oppression. The topos "fire" has gained an extremely strong symbolic meaning, which is also visible in the many self-immolations of Kurdish activists as a symbol of protest. (Hirschler 1999, 17-20; Roshani). The mobilisation of ancient myths for present purposes is commonly used by nationalist movements which see that "the ethnic past must not be lost, for within it could be found both the link to greatness as well as the substance of greatness itself" (Fishman 1988, 275).

What are the elements that bind the Kurds together as a nation? What stage has their nationalist development reached today? Maybe one answer could be found by analysing the emotional experience of political violence with the themes of *a feeling of homelessness* and *imaginary wholeness* as described by Halleh Ghorashi. When she did research on Iranian refugee women, she found out that she got the most information by asking the interviewees how

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[37] Besikçi comments on this situation: "Why is it that assimilated Kurds react more strongly than anybody else to violations of the rights of Turks in Cyprus and in Bulgaria, but do not make a sound when villages in Kurdistan are burned and depopulated, when the Kurds' sources of livelihood are destroyed, when Kurdish patriots are kidnapped and killed?" (Besikçi, in: 'everybody...')

they see their future and what they miss the most from their home country. (Ghorashi 1997, 295, 300). For many Kurds, nationalism and Kurdish identity are very important. They are not like refugees missing a lost home country; they miss a country which has never existed, which they have only in their dreams of the future. One impressive creator of future dreams is Kurdish TV, distributed by satellite to Europe and the Middle East. In the programmes there is a very optimistic atmosphere and lots of culture. Farogh Nozhatzadeh, director of the Med-TV Stockholm studio, believes that in these television programmes Kurds have a chance to see a vision of how Kurdistan will be in the future (Nozhatzadeh 1997). His words express in practise what Fishman explained theoretically in 1988, almost ten years before the appearance of Med-TV:

> *(a nationalist movement) makes extensive use of the institutions and techniques of mass society while seeking to counteract the alienating conditions fostered by that society; ...it flourishes in urban centres while searching for the rural roots of the national culture and often (espouses) an anti-urban ideology; and ...it promotes modernisation while locating ethno-cultural authenticity in continuity with the distant past. (Fishman 1988, 99)*

During recent decades many expressions of Kurdish culture in Turkey have become increasingly politicised, so it is difficult to speak of "cultural" and "political" speech as though they were two entirely different types of expression. For example, the most popular theme of Kurdish music is the Kurdish struggle against oppression, and wearing traditional Kurdish clothes is an expression of Kurdish cultural identity but also a political statement. Because of this politicised nature of Kurdish culture, Turkish anti-terrorist legislation, which prohibits "separatist propaganda", is being used to suppress manifestations of Kurdish culture (medico international and KHRP 1997, 3-4).

The governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have not been able to assimilate the Kurds. Sheikhmous believes that this is due to the large number of Kurds, their geographical location in an area which is difficult to rule, their cultural and linguistic identity, and a feeling of being strangers in the context of the majority of the population, a feeling which is caused by ethnic discrimination. The sense of Kurdish identity and national awareness have become stronger when Kurds living in exile have had contact with each other and when there have been traumatic national incidents, like the collapse of the Mahabad republic (1946), the collapse of the Kurdish movement in Iraq (1975), the massacre in Halabja (1988), the flow of refugees from northern

Iraq after the Gulf War (1991), and the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK (1999). (Sheikhmous 1991, 13, 15).

Political changes, and more rights for the Kurds, in any part of Kurdistan will affect all the other parts of Kurdistan. Ignatieff wrote in 1994 that the Kurds in Turkey know that Kurds on the other side of the border (in northern Iraq) can openly state that they are Kurds, freely speak their own language, and talk to a foreigner without the police videotaping the discussion, and that their children go to Kurdish-language schools (Ignatieff 1994, 212). The Turkish government is aware of this, and it has protested and threatened Iran and Iraq every time they have been willing to grant more rights to the Kurds in their respective countries (Iran: 1979; Iraq: 1963, 1966, and 1984) (Sheikhmous 1991, 22). The US has tried to mediate between the KDP and the PUK and build an independent Kurdish state outside the control of Saddam Hussein, Turkey has been strictly opposed to this process, as it could be a dangerous example for its Kurds. Despite their disagreements on other matters, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria have been negotiating since 1992 to prevent the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq (Küpeli 1997, 19).

6.2. The use of the GAP project in the destruction of Kurdish identity

In this chapter I will explain some aspects of how the Grand Anatolia Project (GAP) is being used to assimilate the Kurds. Entessar claims that the government has tried to pacify the Kurdish population since the 1980s by directing more economic aid to southeast Turkey to modernise the region's infrastructure and by integrating the local Kurdish economy into the main Turkish economy, for which purpose the Atatürk Dam project was initiated (Entessar 1992, 98).

According to Klare, low-intensity conflict is generally characterised by a clash between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary processes. It tends to involve a struggle between proponents of radical change and the guardians of the prevailing order. Because of the socio-political character of the conflict, low-intensity operations include both military and non-military modes of combat. (Klare 1987, 75). According to Siegel and Hackel, in low-intensity conflict the real war is the economic war, the political war, and the social war. During the civil war in El Salvador at the beginning of the 1980s, the country's government created various "hearts-and-minds" pacification programs with the financial support of the US. The aim of these projects was to quietly militarise civilian life in the model provinces. (Siegel and Hackel 1987, 119-120).

When State Minister Salih Yildirim spoke at a press conference on 27 January 1997 about the underdevelopment of eastern and southeastern Anatolia he expressed the idea of pacification:

> *Today, the distance covered in fighting terrorism is very significant. Yet the level of success attained in fighting the terror and the terrorist is much above the success obtained in fighting the environment which feeds terror. Hence, all our efforts are aimed at raising the success of doing away with this environment. This must be so since we all know that terrorism is a phenomenon for which we pay very dearly. (State Minister Salih Yildirim, 27.1.1997, ref. Oralalp 1998, 8)*

Jafar points out that Turkish national centres such as ¤stanbul, Izmir, and Ankara have appropriated the Kurdish region's economic surplus. The outcome of industrialisation and trade has been the relative development of the national centres and the deep underdevelopment of the Kurdish region. Before development programs can be implemented in any area there must be an analysis of the reasons for its underdevelopment. In the Kurdish situation the current absence of economic autonomy has meant that the region has no alternative other than to rely on the central government for development. As long as the development programmes do not change this relationship in the sharing of power and resources, they can not bring any real development to the region. And the problems cannot be tackled by economic measures alone; political measures are also needed. (Jafar 1974, 233, 235, 250).

There are enormous economic disparities between western and eastern Turkey. According to McDowall the per capita income in the Southeast is barely 42 % of the national average and barely a quarter of the per capita income in Turkey's richest Aegean/Marmara region (McDowall 1997, 434). The government of Turkey claims that the problems in the Southeast have solely economic causes. The Turkish army claimed a military victory in the late 1990s after the PKK had withdrawn most of its forces from Turkish territory; at this point the Turkish authorities talked of the need to solve the region's socio-economic problems in order to make the military success an enduring one (Lçduygu et al. 1999, 992, 994, 1000).

The largest development project in southeast Turkey is the Grand Anatolia Project or GAP (*Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi*), a plan to build 22 gigantic dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for irrigation and hydroelectricity. GAP is financed partly by the World Bank and it is presented by the Turkish authorities as a development programme to bring well-being to the backward

provinces of Batman, Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, Sanliurfa, Sirnak, and Kilis (Oralalp 1997, 13; internet: http:www.mfa.gov.tr/GRUP/gap3.htm).

McDowall writes that in the GAP plans the government has either failed to understand the economic dimension of the Kurdish question or its intentions have been primarily to wring whatever wealth it can from the Southeast for the benefit of rest of the country. In the GAP region 8 % of the farming families hold over 50 % of the land, 41 % of families hold between 10 and 50 % of the land, and 38 % of families are landless. Without fundamental land reform it is inconceivable that the majority of the farming population would benefit from GAP. There are no plans for land reform connected to GAP. Compensation for people who must move away from the flooding area is paid only to owners of the land, not to sharecroppers who lose the land they have been cultivating. It is also difficult to see how a largely illiterate population could benefit from capital-intensive agriculture or agro-industry. The Kurds have neither capital nor education. (Franz 1989, 190-191; McDowall 1997, 434-435).

In 1989 Erhard Franz criticised the Turkish government for not taking into account the local conditions. GAP is targeted at private enterprise but it is not interested in investing in southeast Turkey, and the result of this is that the electricity produced by the project is transported to western Turkey. According to Franz, the government has not done enough to inform the local population about the new agricultural methods that are necessary because of irrigation. In southeast Turkey there are almost no agricultural co-operatives or organisations for marketing agricultural products, so it is difficult for small farmers or landless people to benefit from GAP. The project is destroying the traditional village social structures, which are based on family, clan, and tribal relationships. This leads to the uprooting of the rural population, which can lead to social instability. (Franz 1989, 190-192).

GAP has very significant international political and military aspects. The construction of dams on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in Turkey would ruin the irrigation and agriculture of two of Turkey's neighbour countries, Syria and Iraq. Water is a natural resource that nowadays is scarce in all of the Middle East. Turkey is already transporting water to northern Cyprus, which is occupied by Turkey, and it has made agreements with Israel to build water pipelines from Kurdistan to Palestinian areas in Israel. Literature exists about the military aspects of GAP, so I will concentrate here on the use of GAP in assimilation and its effects on health issues.

Solid waste and waste water are being dumped into the rivers without any treatment. Amed, which has a population of more than one million people, is located along the Tigris about 100 km. from the planned Ilisu dam. The reservoir would vastly reduce the self-purification capacity of the river. (Berne Declaration 1999). A group of Turkish and American researchers (Aksoy et al).

has warned that dam reservoirs cause a change in the microclimate near them, increasing the incidence of disease among the inhabitants. The amount of disease caused by waterborne parasites is increasing and being spread over large areas by the irrigation water. Earlier dam projects in Senegal, Lake Volta, and Egypt have shown that unless effective measures are taken early, outbreaks can quickly reach epidemic levels. (Aksoy et al. 1997; Stork 1989, 9). The Swiss companies involved in the construction of the Ilisu dam (Sulzer Hydro and ABB) also admit that the Ilisu reservoir would infest the area with malaria and leishmaniasis (Berne Declaration 1999). To anticipate the changing patterns in diseases associated with microclimatic and other environmental changes, knowledge of existing diseases in the region is vital. There should also be appropriate health education and disease prevention measures. As we shall see in Chapter 8, the health care system has almost collapsed in the State of Emergency Region during the 1990s, and the GAP region is no exception to this process.

Speakers of the Turkish Medical Association stated in a 1995 interview with the Anti-Malaria Directorate that the transformation to irrigated agriculture caused by GAP has caused an increase of malaria. Malaria was most prevalent in the districts of Bismil, Ergani, Silvan, and Çinar. In 1995 it was difficult to survey the situation, because for security reasons health care personnel were not allowed to visit the area (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 21). In the spring of 1999 the environmental organisations Friends of the Earth and Berne Declaration announced that the official environmental impact assessment (EIA) of the planned Ilisu dam had been done only for export credit agencies and banks; NGOs and representatives of the affected people had not received copies (Berne Declaration 1999; Friends of the Earth 1999).

The destruction of Kurdish history

During the preparatory work for formulating the UN Convention Against Genocide UN in 1948, the draft committee discussed whether to include linguistic and cultural genocide, which was defined as "destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship, or other cultural institutions and objects of the group" (quoted from Capotorti 1991, 37). Though this definition was not accepted as part of the final convention, it describes well the value of history and historical monuments for ethnic identity.

In ancient recorded history the delta of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers was known as Mesopotamia, but human history in this area goes far beyond that: humankind moved from a hunting and gathering culture to domestication of basic crops and animals on the banks of these rivers, which are considered to

be the oldest agricultural area in the world (Izady 1996, 3). The Kurds believe that they are descendants of the Median people, who lived in what is now Kurdistan four thousand years ago. The Turkish people are descendants of the Ottomans, who arrived in Anatolia from the east nine hundred years ago. Thus the history of the Kurds is much older than that of the Turks in this region. The Euphrates and Tigris valleys are extremely rich in archaeological sites; further research would greatly illuminate the heritage of the ethnic minorities of Turkey.

One method of assimilation is the destruction of the history of nations other than Turks. GAP with its huge dam reservoirs provides useful tools for this strategy: the dams would flood archeologically valuable sites, destroying them so that they can not be studied even after one hundred years, which is the expected lifetime of a modern hydroelectric dam. Hasankeyf, which lies on the Tigris River 40 km southeast of Elih (*Batman*), is just one example of this destruction of Kurdish history. Plans call for the town to be flooded by the Ilisu reservoir, which will cover 299.5 square km. (details of the plan: Internet: http: // **www.mfa.gov.tr /** GRUPC / ilisu.htm). Hasankeyf's original name is Hisn Kayfa, which comes from the Assyrian language and means "rock castle". In the town, which lies on both sides of the river, there are sheer cliffs where hundreds of caves are still occupied by people. Hasankeyf was on the eastern border of the Roman Empire in 60 AD. It was part of the Byzantine empire and until the twelfth century AD it was the capital of the Kurdish Ayyubid dynasty, which was created by Saladin, who is known for fighting Richard I of England during the Third Crusade. It was occupied in 1260 by the Ottomans and by the Mongols in 1516. (The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. III, 1971, 507; The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 7, 1988, 40).

I visited Hasankeyf in March 1997. The ruins of a stone bridge built by the Romans could still be seen over the Tigris. Up to the 1980s lots of tourists visited Hasankeyf, but nowadays it is difficult to travel there because of the many military checkpoints. At least at that time there were not yet any village guards in Hasankeyf and people were talking freely with foreigners. They asked for help "to maintain their very, very old town which they do not want to leave because the graves of their ancestors are here". Actually the rich landowners and educated people of Hasankeyf have moved to cities in western Turkey, and those who are left are mainly peasants, many of whom have arrived there only recently from villages destroyed by the Turkish army. After the plans for the dam became known, the inhabitants of Hasankeyf lost their trust in the future, so no one has built or repaired anything there during the past twenty years.

The Southeast is archaeologically the least explored part of Turkey. During the construction work of the three dams that have been completed – Karakaya, Keban, and Atatürk – archaeologists were permitted to go to the reservoir areas only at the same time as the construction workers, and only 38 out of 643 settlements to be flooded by these dam reservoirs were surveyed. The Kurdish historian Mehrdad R. Izady called these surveys last-minute "search and salvage" operations whose research consisted rather of surface collecting than digging and did not throw much light on the question of how the ancestors of the Kurds established the oldest known farming communities on this planet. Every excavation done in this area has demonstrated the need to explore more sites. Izady calls Hasankeyf a living museum. (TACDAM; Izady 1996, 4). It is a cultural heritage that belongs to the whole world. In January 1999 I was told that some people in Hasankeyf are searching for prehistoric relics with metal detectors in order to sell them to private collectors. Usually this practice is strictly forbidden in Turkey, but in Hasankeyf the authorities do not care, "because the place will be destroyed anyway".

The destruction of Kurdish history is practised in Hasankeyf by many methods, and the planned Ilisu reservoir is just one of them. Another method is to prevent experts and tourists from visiting it. Near Hasankeyf, the same method has also been used against the Assyrians, whose churches and monasteries in Midyad are among the oldest in the Christian world. For example, the Midyad monastery, which was founded in the sixth century AD, was a popular pilgrimage site until the 1980s (Brimo 1997).[38]

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[38] Against this background it is quite ironic that Turkish Airlines has a travel advertisement for Hasankeyf in its magazine Skylife. Ayse Önal writes about Hasankeyf:

> ...This city was not the work of a single religious culture, but a summary of all the cultures of a long past, each represented by a single figure, whether atheist, Buddhist, polytheistic, monotheistic, invader, or protector. That is why experts are insisting that Hasankeyf should be rescued from the devouring flood. ...Yet can we sit back and do nothing to save Hasankeyf from drowning together with its secrets? At least we should go and see it, to share its enchantment, if only briefly. And we will acknowledge once again the beauty whose every line reflects a legacy of a multifaceted past. (Önal 1998)

6.3. Research and statistics: denial of the existence of the Kurds

6.3.1. Research

Research about the Kurds

Here I describe and analyze research about the Kurds, especially the Kurds in Turkey. Only a modest amount of research has been done about the Kurds, a nation of about 30 million people. McDowall writes that probably more literature exists about Kuwait, a state with barely half a million citizens (McDowall (1997, XI). There is almost no research about health care in Kurdistan. Nor has the impact of the civil war on Kurdish society been studied much.

On 16 March 1988 Saddam Hussein's air force bombarded the town of Halabja in the Iraqi part of Kurdistan with mustard gas, nerve gas, and cyanide. Five thousand civilians died immediately, and more than ten thousand were injured. (Ignatieff 1994, 197). More than ten years have passed, and those who survived in Halabja have not received any international aid; also, there has been very little research about what effects the biological weapons had on people, biomedically and psychologically. This is really amazing, because researchers do not know much about these issues and Halabja is like a human laboratory where it can be seen what biological weapons do to people.

Nor has much research been done about the Kurdish people. The Kurds are generally ignored in the literature dealing with the people of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Universities in Europe and North America have numerous Arabic, Persian, and Turkish studies programs, but Kurdish studies programs are almost non-existent. This is to a large extent related to the status of the Kurds as a stateless nation: the governments of Turkey and Iran have extended their repression of the Kurds to western academic centres. They often make financial contributions to Middle Eastern studies programmes, provide books and journals to the libraries, and invite academics to visit these countries. One important means of suppressing Kurdish studies is the policy of denying research permits to students interested in studying the Kurds. Southeast Turkey was a military area from 1925 to 1965 where foreigners were denied access, so researchers could not go there to do fieldwork. Research done on the Kurds focuses mainly on linguistics, politics, history, and society. (Chaliand 1980, 13; McDowall 1997, 210; Mojab 1997, 70). The fact that

the Kurds have been marginalised geographically, politically, and economically has meant that they are marginalised even in research.

Nader Entessar wrote in 1992 that many of the recent books on the Kurds are either anecdotal or have been written to support the ideological position of a particular group or political movement. Of the few books written by scholars, most are either now out of date or have a narrow focus. In recent years the situation has changed only a little. (Entessar 1992, vii). With the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in the 1990s plenty of books and magazines about the Kurdish issue have been published in Turkey and Europe by Kurdish groups and various NGOs. But Entessar's criticism applies to them as well. The Kurdish national movement in Europe, for example the Mesopotamya Yayinlari publishing house in Germany, has produced many books in Turkish on the Kurds, but many of them describe the situation without providing any theoretical background. A good example of this type of reporting is provided by the books of Selahattin Çelik, who has written, among other topics, about the Turkish police forces and murdered journalists in Turkey. In his books he gives very detailed information, but without any background information or theoretical connections to larger issues. Books of this kind provide valuable documentation of the current situation, but they need a great deal of processing in order to fulfil the criteria of academic literature. During recent years the biggest development in Kurdology has occurred in the field of linguistics: many linguists have worked on developing Kurdish grammar and creating a lingua franca from the various dialects. This has happened especially for Kurmanci; for Sorani the same work has already been done in some universities in Iraq, and for Zaza this work is still at the beginning. But the majority of linguists who have studied the Kurdish language have kept silent about the deliberate killing of the Kurdish language by the Turkish, Iranian, and Syrian states (Hassanpour 2000).

The policy of linguicide not only denies the linguistic rights of the Kurds, it also violates the academic freedom of linguists who study Kurdish. Hassanpour gives some examples of this. In the late 1950s MacKenzie was writing his Ph.D. dissertation about the Kurdish language. Because he had been denied permission to do his research in Turkey, he collected his material from North Iraq; it was impossible for him to even visit eastern Turkey to obtain material about Kurdish dialects in that area. In 1959 the Turkish army, USAID, and Georgetown University initiated a large-scale programme of adult literacy training for recruits in the army, as the rate of failure was high among non-Turkish, especially Kurdish, speakers. In order to investigate the problem, the American educators collected information about the Kurdish language from teachers in military literacy centres throughout the country. But before they were able to process all the collected data, the Army

confiscated the entire material; only a few items were spared. (Hassanpour 2000).

In Turkey by banning the Arabic script in the 1920s the Kemalists destroyed the memory of the past and rewrote Turkish history as they felt it should have been (van Bruinessen 1994b, 153). The Turkish Historical Thesis and the Sun Language Theory became hegemonic in Turkey in the 1930s. They claim that Turkish- speaking people played the major role in the establishment and development of human civilisation and its diffusion around the world, and that the Turkish language is the source of all existing languages in the world. (Hirschler 1999, 5). Soon after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey the government banned all non-official publications which sought to discuss the Kurdish issue. Historical and literary works, even travellers' tales in Turkish and other languages, were removed from public and private libraries and destroyed if they contained any reference to the Kurds, their history, or their country. (Kendal 1980b, 82-83).

The most important principle in the 1982 Constitution is "the unity and indivisibility of the state with its land and people". From this principle are derived such concepts as "national security" and "national interests". Because of this principle a researcher who, for example, initiates a study of the Kurds and Kurdish society, will face an administrative investigation even before a judicial investigation takes place. The defendant will be advised that this type of research cannot be undertaken because it violates the principle of the indivisibility of the state with its people and land, i.e. the unitary nature of the Turkish state. When students write their theses, their professors check that the text does not include anything that might risk a punishment. (Besikçi 1997c; Besikçi: The Lausanne....; Yildiz 1996). In April 1983 the Turkish parliament passed Law No. 2820, which states that "it is forbidden to claim that minorities exist in Turkey. It is forbidden to protect or develop non-Turkish languages and cultures." (quoted from Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 356)

Many of the books that are forbidden in Turkey are published in Turkish in Europe; as van Bruinessen has observed, it is not hard to get access to these books in Turkey (van Bruinessen 1994a, 176). But what kind of research can refer to books that are illegal in the country where the research is done? In addition to the practical problems that it would surely cause for the researcher, there is also an ethical problem. The authorities are trying to ignore social reality through legislation, and Turkish universities and research institutes have accepted the official ideology without discussion. There has been almost no serious research with the purpose of understanding the Kurdish reality.

Besikçi argues that the official ideology of the state of Turkey, in addition to ignoring the legal rights of the Kurds, is also obstructing the development of scholarship in the whole country. He highlights the relationship between scholarship and official ideology in manipulating minds and thoughts in

Turkey. Instead of questioning the official ideology, Turkish universities perpetuate it. (Besikçi 1987, 54, 61, 85, 97, 98, 122 and 1989, 1-2, 5-6 and 1997a, 44-47 and 1997b). It is easy to give examples of important Turkish topics on which there has been no research or inadequate research. For example, the events in Dêrsim in 1937-38 have been passed over in silence or deliberately misrepresented by most historians, foreign as well as Turkish (van Bruinessen 1994b, 144). After 1965, in the population census people have not been asked about their mother tongue, so there is no official information about the number of Kurds and where in Turkey they live (Mutlu 1995, 35).[39]

Censorship and self-censorship characterise public discussion and research, but they also affect the work of the parliament and many committees and institutions. For example, after the assassination of the well-known journalist Ugur Mumcu in January 1993, the parliament appointed a commission to investigate murders by unknown assailants. After 20 months the committee completed its investigations, but its report was never officially released. Some members of the committee believed that its contents would be too damaging to the prestige of the state and refused to submit it to the parliament. (van Bruinessen 1996b, 22). Another example is the state's expenditures for maintaining a military presence in the Southeast; these figures are not public

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[39] In a research project about migration in the GAP region carried out in 1993 by the Department of Sociology of the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, it can be seen how difficult it is to do sociological research under these circumstances. The text is so carefully written that it gives the impression that the researchers were not able to report everything they saw. During the fieldwork they avoided the theme of ethnicity:

> Conclusions: Ethnic Identity and Other Problems
> There were no direct questions on ethnic identity in the questionnaires of the present research. The inferences about ethnic identity are to be drawn from two questions on the principal spoken language and other languages spoken. On the basis of these data it can be concluded that different ethnic identities exist in the region... On the basis of these findings about the most important problems and their solutions, Mutlu reached the conclusion that issues related to ethnic and/or cultural identities do not constitute one of the most important problems in rural or urban areas. It seems to us that this is a conclusion which should be modified with a deeper interpretation of the findings. This interpretative work should take into account the context of interviewer-interviewee interaction, and other political, cultural, and psychological considerations. We have already indicated that unemployment, underdevelopment, and terrorism, singly and in combination, are the most frequently cited problems. It is possible that these problems were cited to imply the historical, cultural, and ethnic specifics of the region. (Aksit et al. 1995, 69-72)

(Günlük-Senesen 1995, 75). Analyses of the cost of the conflict are based on estimates rather than on facts.

In February 2001 Turkey precipitated a diplomatic crisis with France after the French parliament passed a law in which the massacre of the Armenians was officially acknowledged as genocide. This is just one step in the Turkish state's efforts over many decades to deny and conceal the Armenian genocide. Charny refers to Libaridian[40] when he claims that the government of Turkey has developed a totalitarian attitude towards the issue. Every means of communication and propaganda is used to promote the denial of a historical fact. The government also uses Turkish embassies and Turkish institutions to exert pressure on non-Turkish scholars to re-write history according to its will. Turkey has threatened the US that it will pull out of their alliance if the US Congress recognises the history of the Armenian genocide. (Charny 1991, 4, 13).

The efforts of the Turkish government should also be analysed from the perspective of how these efforts affect the academic atmosphere in Turkey. The government is hindering research about the Armenian genocide as well as other research. It should open the Ottoman Empire archives to Turkish and foreign academics. At present the researchers whose applications to study the archives have been accepted have access to less than one third of the material. Among the Turkish reactions towards the French recognition of the Armenian genocide are plans to ban the teaching of the French language in Turkish schools and universities – plans that are supported by many university professors. Many Turkish cultural institutions and universities have broken off their contacts with their French partners. Some academics and columnists have spoken out against the ban, saying that it damages Turkish interests, but they are not questioning what really happened to the Armenians. They also refuse to deal with the question of the guilt of the Ottomans and the Young Turks, thereby keeping in line with Turkey's official policy. (IMK Weekly Information Service 23.2.2001).

By using Fishman's terms; ethnicity can be explained in terms of paternity, patrimony and phenomenology. Paternity includes inherited biological origins, patrimony is the qualities which are learned, and phenomenology explains how the members of an ethnic group view ethnicity. As was said earlier, pre-modern ethnicity is minimally self-conscious. The phenomenology of pre-modern ethnicity is primarily a self-evident, inward-oriented theodicy (Fishman 1977, 35). The changes in phenomenology mean that the value of ethnicity increases during the modernization and nationalization process. In an

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[40] Libaridian, G.J.: Genocide and Politics: a New Role for the Academic Community. Armenian Assembly Journal, 12 (1), pp. 1, 6. 1985

ethnocidal process the oppressors' main aim is to change the patrimonial elements in the target group's ethnicity. But they want to prevent changes in phenomenology, so that the target group does not become aware of ethnic values. Ethnocidal practices can cause assimilation of the group but they can also lead to a resistance reaction, reactive ethnicity. This causes changes in the patrimonial side of ethnicity among individual members of the group and in the phenomenology of the whole group's ethnicity. When members of a tribal ethnic group start to pay attention to their threatened culture, the whole group becomes aware of ethnic values. Ethnic consciousness is a step towards modernization and away from the tribal way of living. Research can increase an ethnic group's understanding of its own culture, and this can change the phenomenological side of ethnicity. Knowledge about its own culture supports the group's resistance to ethnocide and increases ethnic consciousness and possibly national thinking as well.

Ismail Besikçi was the first, and for a long time the only, Turkish intellectual who publicly criticised Turkey's official ideology and politics regarding the Kurds (van Bruinessen 1994b, 144). Besikçi, a Turkish sociologist and researcher in political science at Ankara University, spent twelve years in prison between 1971 and 1987 for maintaining in his scholarly work that the Kurds constitute a separate ethnic group (Günter 1990, 123; Jafar 1974, 164). The two books that cost him the prison sentence in 1971 are his doctoral thesis *Göçebe Alikan Axireti* (The Alikan Nomadic Tribe) and *Dogu Anadolu'nun Duzeni* (literally The Order of Eastern Anatolia, which, given the sub-title, could be rendered as Socio-Economic and Ethnic Structures of Eastern Anatolia). In his trial Besikçi was found guilty of "disseminating propaganda aimed at weakening the national unity of Turkey and insulting the memory of the founder of modern Turkey, Kemal Atatürk". (Amnesty International 1990; Kendal 1980b, 77). He was in prison again from November 1993 to December 1999 (U.S. Department of State 1997).[41]

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[41] Besikçi has written 36 books, of which 32 are banned in Turkey (Özgür Bakis 2000, 83). He has his own style of writing: there are a lot of detailed examples in his texts, but not much theory or non-Turkish references. His style is not very academic. This can be understood as a consequence of his working conditions: he has written many of his books in prison, and even outside it he has had no access to theoretical sources or good libraries. Ismet Shériff Vanly calls Besikçi's method of doing social science positivistic in Auguste Comte's sense of the term: he does not explain the facts in terms of any doctrine, nor does he derive doctrines from his conclusions; instead, he just observes and analyses the existing situation (Vanly 1997, 59). Sometimes his text is quite emotional; one can recognise his anger over what has been done to the Kurds. For example, he repeats things he has already mentioned in the same text and uses emotionally loaded terms such as "dirty war" instead of "war" or "civil war". Some researchers writing on issues related to war

Research and scholarship are complicated issues, even in societies where no group is carrying out ethnocidal policies towards other groups. The social sciences have become a medium for defining social problems. The social sciences are a construct of modern society, and in periods of change – for example the change from traditional to modern – they have played an important role in defining the construction of new identities (Dittrich and Radtke 1990, 11, 24). When Kurds have been denied permission to do research about their own society, they have been denied the right to obtain the exact information they need in order to understand the changes going on in it. Kurdistan was a tribal society in the 1920s when the Turkish republic was created. The Turkish state has tried to assimilate the Kurds, but in those areas where it has failed, Kurdish society has remained the traditional Kurdish one instead of changing into a modern Kurdish society. Without properly conducted social science it is difficult for the Kurds to understand their own complicated systems in a world which is fast becoming modern. I give one example. Among Kurds the tribal system is one of the main hindrances to their national unity. Tribes are considered a factor that is typical of traditional agrarian societies; in urban areas tribal connections do not have the same meaning. With a few exceptions (such as the research done by Besikçi and van Bruinessen) this phenomenon has not been studied, and not at all on the scale it deserves. Even the little research that exists is out of reach for most Kurds. This is due not only to the lack of research; a more important reason is that the majority of the Kurds in Turkey (and the Kurds in the diaspora who come from Turkey) have very little formal education, and it is difficult for them to understand theoretical and abstract analysis. Many segregated societies have developed unity as they became modernised, and this process seems to now be going on slowly among the Kurds as well.

Problems in doing health surveys

In 1993 the Turkish Ministry of Health and the Institute of Population Studies of Hacettepe University, Ankara, made an extensive survey of the health of Turkish mothers and children, the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey

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and genocide have spoken of the difficulty of writing about horrible things using a normal style, and this difficulty can sometimes also be seen in Besikçi's texts. On some issues Besikçi has come to the same conclusions as researchers on similar themes elsewhere, through it seems evident that Besikçi is not familiar with their work. Viewed from an European perspective, many of Besikçi's conclusions - for example, that Turkish was not the first spoken language on our planet - seem so self-evident that it is really amazing that it has taken so many decades in Turkey for someone to recognise it.

1993 (TDHS), which is part of the world-wide Demographic and Health surveys programme (Içduygu et al. 1999, 1000). For this survey Turkey was divided into five regions. The statistics for each region were provided separately, although the most common categories are only "rural" and "urban" for the whole country. Information from the eastern region can be considered indicative of the situation in North Kurdistan, even though the latter covers a larger area, including parts of 25 provinces. By the time of the survey, martial law had been in force in the Kurdish region for 14 years. It would have been logical to call the State of Emergency Region a separate region in this survey, because the law and the living conditions there were clearly different to the rest of the country. But in the survey, the information about Kurds living under martial law is mixed with information about Turks living under civil law. Because this survey was done in 1993, it describes the situation before the massive deportation of the Kurdish population started.

Regions in Turkish Demographic and Health Survey 1993 (TDHS, p. xviii)

In this survey the information was not collected from statistics about the area, because probably there were not enough detailed statistics. Instead, it was collected by interviewing a sample of women; in the eastern region 933 women were questioned (TDHS 1993, 139). In the TDHS the interviewed women were asked about their mother tongue, that of their parents, and that of their husbands' parents. In their own research, Içduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci counted the families as Kurds if even one of these groups had Kurdish as their mother tongue. They identified 289 Kurdish families in the THDS interviews. According to them, this data provides the first reliable and representative figures on the situation of the Kurds in Turkey. The purpose of the survey was not to study the situation of different ethnic groups, but Içduygu, Romano, and Sirkeci analysed the data in a new way for their own purposes (Içduygu et al. 1999, 991, 1004).

In the chapter on infant and child mortality (TDHS 1993, 77-86, written by Attila Hançerlioglu) the scientific shortcomings of the TDHS are evident. This survey, which received economic support from USAID – the development aid programme of the US, Turkey's foremost military ally – describes in detail matters which are self-evident or irrelevant but ignores the overall situation in Turkey. In this research the sample is 500 interviewed people. For example, concerning infant mortality the researchers found that medical maternity care is an important factor in the reduction of mortality rates during infancy and childhood. Under-five mortality is 55 per cent higher (77 per 1,000) among children born to women who received neither antenatal care nor delivery care from the trained health professional, compared to children whose mothers received either or both of these services (50 per 1,000). (TDHS 1993, 82)

In reading the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey one might almost think that some pregnant mothers did not seek antenatal care or go to hospitals to have safe deliveries just because of their ignorance. The survey report does not provide even basic information about the health care system in Turkey or the economic situation of the population. The target of the research is to gather information for the purposes of family planning, but it does not deal at all with the real situation and the reasons why many Kurdish women in Turkey want to have many children. For many Kurds the large number of children is related not only to the family's concern for survival in the present and in the parents' old age, it is also a question of national survival, because "so many Kurds die that lots of babies must be born, otherwise the Kurds will die out" (a Kurdish woman in Europe).

One gets another perspective on the problems of surveying the health situation in North Kurdistan by talking with the members of the Turkish Medical Association and reading their reports. For planning and organising the health care system it is important to know the health status of the population and the

causes of their ill health (Hooks 1991, 20). Turkish media coverage of the war in the Southeast is unreliable, as it underreports some instances and sensationalises others. Government Decree 430 dictates the self-censorship of all news reporting from or about the Southeast and, upon the request of the regional governor, the Interior Ministry authorises banning the distribution of any news viewed as misrepresenting events in the region. (Helsinki Watch 1991, 13-15; U.S. Department of State 1997 and 1999). Reliable information about the Kurds and North Kurdistan is not available in research done in Turkey, and research and statistics about health care are no exception. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey noted in its annual report for 1997 (HRFT 1997, 130) that it is extremely difficult to collect data about the health situation in the Kurdish provinces, and that the data that is available is not reliable.

In its 1995 report, the Turkish Medical Association notes that for the previous five years surveys and field work could not be conducted either concerning primary health care centres or at the regional level. According to the report, the survey results that reach the General Directorate of Primary Health Care from the regional health centres are far from accurate, and data about health problems is gathered through the limited study of those who apply directly to health institutions. An additional problem is that there has been no trustworthy population census in the State of Emergency Region, as I mentioned in Chapter 6.3. According to the Turkish Medical Association, not all births and deaths are reported and graveyard registrations are still insufficient, as burial warrants are not requested in many cases of death. (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 15).

Poverty means that even patients with serious diseases do not seek medical treatment, as they do not have the money to pay for it, and consequently the authorities do not know the health situation of the population. Because of migration, the authorities can not follow the development of former patients' diseases:

> *The number of tuberculosis cases decreased in our city between 1992 and 1993. Applications due to the disease are decreasing. This seems like a paradox. These figures are expected to increase... We lost patients in rural areas. Letters we wrote are returned, as their addressees cannot be found. We have almost no connections in Kulp. We cannot follow up these patients, our connection with them is severed. (a physician, interviewed in Turkish Medical Association 1995, 38)*

6.3.2. Statistics

Population statistics

Estimates of the number of Kurds in Turkey vary according to the source, between ten and twenty million. Fifteen million is the figure seen most often. (McDowall 1992, 11; Menon 1995). There are no official statistics on the nationalities of the citizens in Turkey – all people living in Turkey are regarded as Turks. The Constitution (Article 66, Paragraph 1) declares that "everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk" (quoted from Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak 1994, 355).
The Turkish national censuses stopped collecting data on the basis of ethnicity after 1965. Before that, people were asked about their mother tongue (Kirisçi and Winrow 1997, 119-120). Kendal writes that many Kurds are very wary of declaring themselves as Kurds as a result of the brutalities they have suffered since the 1920s. He participated in the 1965 population census in Turkey and saw how slum-dwellers who knew not a word of Turkish answered the question "What is your mother language?" by saying, "Better put Turkish, we don't want any trouble." (Kendal 1980b, 48). Frey noted in 1965 that there was a lack of data about the Kurds which was readily available about the rest of the population (Frey 1965, 147), and Jafar, who presented his doctoral thesis in 1974, concluded that Turkish official sources and data are particularly unreliable (Jafar 1974, 123).

To judge from the official statistics of the Turkish State Institute of Statistics, no deportation of people or other problems seem to be going on in the southeastern provinces of Turkey.

Table 3: Population of the Kurdish provinces

	1990	**1995**
Batman	344,669	344,121
Bingöl	250,966	249,047
Bitlis	**330,115**	**330,115**
Diyarbakir	1,094,996	1,096,447
Elaziq	**498,225**	**498,225**
Hakkari	172,479	172,497
Mardin	557,727	558,275
Mus	**376,543**	**376,543**
Siirt	**243,435**	**243,435**
Sirnak	**262,006**	**262,006**
Tunceli	133,143	133,584
Van	**637,433**	**637,433**

Sources:
Year 1990: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1991, 52;
Year 1995: Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1996, 67

Other sources give a very different picture of the situation. The exact number of people forcibly displaced from the villages since 1984 is unknown. Most estimates agree that 2,600 to 3,000 villages and hamlets (settlements of 3-4 houses) have been depopulated (U.S. Department of State 1998). According to Physicians for Human Rights, there has been a breakdown of the government's collection of statistics in the State of Emergency Region. In many rural areas governmental collection of statistics has stopped altogether. (PHR 1996, 20).

Health statistics

The Ministry of Health (*T.C. Saglik Bakanligi*) publishes annually a booklet, "Saglik Istatistikleri - Health Statistics", that gives information about health services in Turkey. Also, the Statistical Yearbooks of Turkey, compiled annually by the State Institute of Statistics, include a chapter called "Health". Both of these yearbooks contain a great deal of very detailed information, but

they provide very few statistics broken down according to provinces; the yearbooks usually describe either the situation in the whole of Turkey or in the categories "rural / urban".

In the annual "Health Statistics" published by the Ministry of Health (for example T.C. Saglik Bakanligi 1992 and 1996), the only information which is given according to provinces concerns the distribution of hospitals and (hospital) beds, the number of health centres, health stations, TBC dispensaries, MCHFP centres (Mother and Child Health and Family Planning, *Ana Çoçuk Saglik ve Aile Planmasi*), and health proficiency high schools, and the distribution of health personnel and personnel of the Ministry of Health. In the Statistical Yearbooks of Turkey, the chapter "Health" gives figures according to provinces only for the numbers of public and private hospitals; hospitals and number of beds in the social security institutions; health centres and patients; health personnel; physicians and population per physician; and pharmacies and pharmacists. In neither of these yearbooks is there any information about the rates and causes of mortality – adult, infant, and child mortality – or the distribution of diseases according to provinces. If one uses only these Turkish government sources, it is impossible to describe the development of the situation in specific parts of Turkey or to make comparisons between the Turkish and the Kurdish provinces.

7. Militarisation of the Kurdish provinces

7.1. The Turkish defence and security systems

State of Emergency rule

Militarisation can be seen in many ways in everyday life. The most important fact is that the Kurdish provinces have been under martial law since 1979 and under a State of Emergency (*Olaganüstü Hal Bölgesi, OHAL*) since July 1987 (McDowall 1992, 43). Civilians have been recruited into the military system as village guards, and a massive ongoing deportation of the populace is taking place. The emergency rule must be renewed every four to six months by the Turkish parliament. In March 1996 it was renewed for the twenty-sixth time. Because the State of Emergency Law has been valid in the Southeast for two decades, a special legal system has been developed only for this region. One example of the double standard of this legal system is the maximum length of custody: until March 1997 it was thirty days in the State of Emergency Region, and after that it was officially ten days, while in other parts of Turkey there is a seven-day limit on custody. (Kirisçi and Winrow 1997, 128; Lawyers' Association of Diyarbakir 1998).

In 1987 the position of Regional Governor of the State of Emergency Region (OHAL area), known as the "Supergovernor", was created. The "Supergovernor" is the commander of the special and general security forces in the region, and he has control over the MIT (National Security Organisation, *Milli Istikhbarat Teskilati*). He has authorisation to impose restrictions on the press, to relocate public employees, to evacuate villages, to supervise the proceedings in civil trials against members of the security forces, and to order provincial governors to take "necessary measures". Under the State of Emergency, the Regional Governor has the authority to approve or reject any lawsuit directed at government authorities. Approval is rare; these constraints contribute to the paucity of convictions for torture. (Gunter 1990, 83; US State Department 1999 and 2000).

By law, the Council of Ministers, with the President as its chairman, after consultation with the National Security Council, may declare a State of Emergency in one or more regions for a period not exceeding six months (State of Emergency Law). In practice the Council of Ministers has been declaring a State of Emergency in southeast Turkey once every four to six

months since 1987, but the number of provinces affected has varied. At the beginning of 1996, the provinces of Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli, and Van were subject to the State of Emergency law (Amnesty International 1996a). At the end of 1996 nine provinces were subject to the law (it was lifted in Mardin in November 1996), in 1997 six provinces were affected (it was lifted in Bingöl, Batman, and Bitlis provinces in October 1997), and in 1998 again six provinces were affected. (US State Department 1997; 1998 and 1999).

The result of the State of Emergency arrangement is that the laws are not the same in the Southeast and other parts of Turkey. With the force of Law No. 430, the Minister of the Interior has the power to ban any publication from circulation in the emergency regions (medico international and KHRP 1997, 27). Some situations are even comical, for example the state of affairs in Amed as reported by the journalist Ismet Bakag in the pro-Kurdish Turkish-language newspaper *Ülkede Gündem*[42] in March 1998:

> *Ülkede Gündem has been published since 7 July 1997. Difficulties and threats started immediately and since 26 September it has been forbidden to distribute the newspaper in the district according to the decision of the security forces and the army. The Supergovernor explained to us that the newspaper was not for the benefit of the district so it's forbidden in Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Van, and other towns in the emergency law district. So since this time we can unfortunately not see in print what we've been writing. Our newspaper is legal in Istanbul, Ankara,and other towns, but if just one copy of it is found here the editorial office can be closed and journalists arrested, according to the emergency law. A friend of mine rang me two months ago and said that he would send me one issue. The telephone was tapped and he was arrested. The prosecutor contacted me also and spoke to me in a very threatening tone although I never received the newspaper. (Ismet Bakag, interviewed in Lodenius 1998b)*

There was a military coup in Turkey in 1980, and the constitution that was drafted in 1982 by the military regime is still valid. The army plays a leading role in the National Security Council (*MGK, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*), which leads the country (Besikçi 1997b). The members of the National Security Council are the President, the commanders of the army, the navy, the air

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[42] The Turkish authorities closed the newspaper Ülkede Gündem on 24 October 1998.

force, and the gendarmerie, the Prime Minister, and the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defence. (Gerger 1997, 10-11; Randal 1997, 63).

The army and the police

As a background to the situation in the Kurdish provinces from 1992 to 1997 I describe briefly the military and police system operating in the State of Emergency Region.

The army/ the security forces are based on universal compulsory military service lasting 18 months. There are different figures concerning the number of men in service. According to Amnesty International the army - infantry, navy, air force, and military police – includes 574,000 troops, of whom 410,000 are doing their military service. There are between 140,000 and 150,000 soldiers from Turkey's second and third army in the State of Emergency Region. According to an article in "Milliyet" on 25 November 1997 (ref. Berger et al. 1998, 13) there were 215,000 soldiers in the State of Emergency Region. The Turkish army is the second largest army in NATO after the US. (Amnesty International 1996b, 3; Berger et al. 1998, 49-50, 113).

The Turkish National Police are primarily responsible for security in urban areas; according to Kürkcü the police force has 120,000 men and according to Berger, Friedrich, and Schneider, 150,000 men (Berger et al. 1998, 79; Kürkçü 1997, 7). The department most relevant to this research is *the Security Police, or MIT (Milli Istikhbarat Teskilati). The counterguerrillas* are one organisation under the direction of the MIT; they were founded in the late 1970s (Andersson 1986, 56). Berger, Friedrich, and Schneider compare the working methods of the MIT, for example the use of code names, to the Gestapo in Nazi Germany. They point out that the MIT also operates outside Turkey; for example, it was involved in the murder of Theophilos Georgiadis, the chairman of the Greek-Cypriot "Kurdistan Solidarity Committee" on Cyprus, on 20 March 1994. (Berger et al. 1998, 100-101).

The gendarmerie (Jandarma) is the rural police force; it is also responsible for the transport of prisoners. Their intelligence service is *JITEM (Jandarma Istihbarat Terörle Mücadele, Anti-Terror Security Organisation of Jandarma)*, which was founded in the late 1980s. JITEM is widely believed to be involved in the murders and kidnappings, or "disappearances", committed by "unknown assailants" and also in the heroin trade. (Berger et al. 1998, 65, 205; van Bruinessen 1996b, 21; Çelik 1999, 79-83; Özgürlük 1999). In the Kurdish provinces there are about 50,000 gendarmes and 40,000 policemen (Berger et al. 1998, 113). The Lawyers' Association of Diyarbakir (1998) observed that because the police forces, which carry out interrogations, also

participate in battles, they treat people taken into custody not as suspects but as enemies.

The Special Teams (Özel Tim) were founded in November 1993 by Prime Minister Tansu Çiller "to fight the militants with their own methods". Heavily armed members of the security forces are trained for close combat with guerrillas; they act under the authority of the Interior Ministry, so they are part of the police force despite the fact that they are commonly known as "soldiers". In 1994 their number was estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000. (Berger et al. 1998, 83-84; HRW/H 1994, 27; UNHCR 1994). In April 1994 Prime Minister Çiller stated that "the coming days will be a turning point in the fight against terrorism", but commentators noted that "in fact, it (the Çiller administration) has given full control of the Kurdish issue to the military and is only waiting to see what will happen and whether the army can actually keep its promise" (HRW/H 1994, 9).[43]

Ignatieff describes southeast Turkey as a vast military camp: helicopters roar overhead, F-16s scream over Kurdish villages, armoured personnel carriers and tanks stand on every major intersection in rural areas, and in towns there is a man with a walkie-talkie (a radiotelephone used by police) in every café (Ignatieff 1994, 209).

The official population in the twelve provinces under the State of Emergency[44] is 5,073,000 people (Statistical Yearbook of Turkey 1995, 61). In the nineteen

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[43] In Kurdistan Special Team members are known as *Rambos*. Some Kurds work in the Special Teams, and they are very valuable because of their knowledge of the Kurdish language. A Kurdish woman whose close relative died as a PKK guerrilla tells of other relatives who worked for the Special Teams:

> A cousin of mine was a Rambo soldier; he was doing it for the sake of the money. Some Kurds do it for money; Turks do it for money and because of their own will to support the Turkish nation. When he came home for the holidays after the first year, he did not want to go back. He told his brother that they are sent first (into danger). They are Kurds, and they are sent first, even inside the Rambo forces. But his father forced him to go back, for the money. They paid him 50 million; it's good money. Now it's maybe 100 million. Then he came back another time and said "not on my life". He did not go back.... Another relative of mine was also a Rambo soldier, he left as well. He said most of them are fascists, he was not able to continue. (a woman, Europe)

[44] These provinces are Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Elaziq, Hakkari, Mardin, Mus, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli, and Van, which were named in the State of Emergency Law of 1996. The number of provinces covered by this law has varied during the 1990s.

Kurdish provinces[45] the population is 9,885,000 people. They are kept under control by 150,000 soldiers, 40,000 policemen, 50,000 gendarmes, 110,000 village guards, and 20,000 special-team members, 370,000 men in all (Berger et al. 1998, 13, 50, 83-84, 113). If all of these policemen and soldiers were stationed in the State of Emergency Region there would be one policeman/soldier for every 14 civilians. If the same number of security personnel were stationed in all the Kurdish provinces, there would be one police officer/soldier for every 27 civilians. The soldiers are relocated according to the military situation, so their number in the different provinces at a given time varies. Thus in Kurdistan, for every Turkish police officer/soldier there are an estimated 14-27 civilians. It is not possible to give an exact number because there is no trustworthy population census; the number of military personnel varies as well.

The number of policemen and security personnel is so huge that one might expect that all criminals are caught and arrested. Yet there have been hundreds of murders committed by unknown assailants, and hundreds of people have disappeared. Laber drew attention to this anomaly in 1994 when she reported that mysterious anti-Kurdish death squads are operating with impunity despite the heavy presence of soldiers and police (Laber 1994, 47).

The army, the Special Teams, the gendarmerie, and the MIT work openly on orders of the Turkish government and the National Security Council, so there is at least some possibility of getting information about their actions and those responsible for making decisions. But there are also powerful paramilitary organisations whose members, working methods, and links to the power elite are very difficult to study. The most important of these organisations is *the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar)*, the armed youth section of the extreme right-wing MHP party. The Grey Wolves believe that it is their duty to expunge "the enemy within" (McDowall 1997, 411). The position of the Grey Wolves is comparable to the SS (*Schulzstaffeln*) in Nazi Germany; the SS were the elite guard of the National Socialist Party during the period when the party was not yet in power (Lemkin 1944, 15; The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 11, 1988, 193).

There are various estimates of the government's expenditures for the war. Günlük-Senesen of Istanbul Technical University estimates that Turkey's military expenditures constitute about five percent of its GNP, but this ratio does not include all of the expenditures of the military and paramilitary operations in the Southeast. Such data is not available from official sources (Günlük-Senesen 1995, 75, 86). In addition to the expenditures of the Ministry of

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[45] In addition to the previous 12 Kurdish provinces, other provinces with large Kurdish populations are: Adiyaman, Agri, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gaziantep, Malatya, and Sanliurfa.

Defence, some armament expenditures are included in the budget of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, which arms the police forces. According to Laizer and Randal, Turkey spent more than one fifth of its entire budget in 1994 on fighting the PKK. The war in the Southeast costs the Turkish government eight billion dollars a year. (Gerger 1996, 4; Laizer 1996, 83; medico international and KHRP 1996, 23; Randal 1999, 257).[46] The Turkish journalist Ertugrul Kürkçü estimates that in 1993 the defence and security expenditures comprised 40 per cent of the state budget (Kürkçü 1996, 7).

The war affects the Turkish economy in two ways. First, it absorbs so much money that there is not much left for investment. The high cost of the war has forced the government to cut public expenditures in every sector, which has in turn led to political instability. Eight billion dollars makes about 120 dollars for every person in Turkey, every year, which is funnelled away from public services: education, health care, transport, and research.

According to official sources, the amount of defence expenditures has always been much higher than that of the Ministry of Health. An examination of the state budget shows clearly how health care, for example, is neglected in Turkey:

Table 4: Defence and Health Shares of the General Budget of the State of Turkey (Realised Figures):

	Ministry of Defence (1)	Ministry of Health
1985	11.6	2.3
1986	13.5	2.6
1987	11.4	2.9
1988	10.4	2.9
1989	11.6	1.5
1990	11.7	4.7
1991	10.4	1.3
1992	11.3	4.6
1993	8.9	3.9
1994	9.5	3.5

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[46] Tansu Çiller said that Turkey had spent $27 billion in "fighting terrorism" during five years at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. According to a Parliamentary Commission report, in 1994 Turkey spent $6 billion to fight the PKK (Günlük-Senesen 1995, 89. She is referring to Jane's Intelligence Review-Pointer, April 1994, p. 2).

Secondly, the economic resources of North Kurdistan are no longer being fully utilised; the area used to be an important producer of agricultural products. According the Turkish Agriculturists Association, in 1994 the decline in agricultural production was $350 million. There has also been huge destruction of forests as one method of counterinsurgency: the army has burnt down large forest areas in order to prevent the guerrillas from hiding there. In 1989 it was estimated that the security forces burnt down about 25,000 tons of wood annually, at the same time that the Department of Forestry was investing money in protecting the forests in Turkey, including the Southeast (Lawyers' Association of Diyarbakwr 1998; medico international and KHRP 1996, 22-23).[47] The economy of Turkey has been very weak during the 1990s. One indicator of this is the high inflation rate: in 1996 80 %, in 1997 91 % and in 1998 54 %. (Besikçi 1997a; US State Department 1997 and 1999). The other economic aspect of the war is the increase in black-market activities, for example the drug and arms trade, and the increase in corruption. There are many people and companies that benefit from the war; for them, peace would mean the end of a profitable business (Küpeli 1997, 20).

7.2. Paramilitary groups

Hizbullah (Party of God) is an Islamic armed group active in Turkey, which is not related to the Lebanese Hizbullah. Most of its members are Kurds. They are turbaned and bearded, wear baggy trousers, and carry clubs and butchers' cleavers. Murders committed with these cleavers came to be recognised almost as a signature of Hizbullah. Many Kurds believe that the Turkish government founded Hizbullah in the 1980s in order to target the PKK and its sympathisers. While critics charge that the security forces have been involved in many of the mystery killings, the government blames many of them on Hizbullah. In 1996, for example, a court case was opened against Hizbullah for the 1993 murder of the DEP parliamentarian Mehmet Sincar, whereas human right groups consider it a mystery killing. Sincar was shot dead on a street in Batman. In 1997-98 there were four trials against 89

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[47] The army's most systematic burning of forests occurred in autumn 1994 in Tunceli-Erzincan in a unique forest area designated for protection by the Department of Forestry (medico international and KHRP 1996, 23).

Hizbullah members for 113 murders. (van Bruinessen 1996b, 22; US State Department 1997; 1998 and 1999; UNHCR 1996).

In paramilitary groups the command authority is concealed. In North Kurdistan the military and paramilitary forces act without joint leadership, army troops and the Special Team members are under different ministries, and so are the gendarmerie and the police. Each of the paramilitary groups - like the Special Teams, the JITEM, the counterguerrillas, the Grey Wolves, and private armies consisting of village guards - has its own organisation and leaders, the *warlords,* who often benefit from the conflict. The Minister for Human Rights, Algan Hacaloglu[48], visited Dêrsim from 8-10 August 1995 and spoke of his impressions after the journey:

> *It is a common suspicion that the village evacuations are not directed from one centre. While I was there, the governor was also surprised by a directive given to a village: "You will empty this village before the 15th of this month." In the governor's opinion, these directives came from very low-ranking officers and were never known to the commanders. Anybody is able to evacuate a village.* (Minister of Human Rights Algan Hacaloglu, ref. HRFT 1997, 96)

In November 1996 a traffic accident occurred in the town of Susurluk in western Turkey which gave very clear evidence of the connections between organised crime, the MHP, and the authorities responsible for security, especially in the Southeast. In the car that crashed into the back of a commercial lorry, three of the four passengers died. They were Abdullah Çatli, a former leader of the Grey Wolves and right-wing militant wanted by Interpol on charges of murdering seven Labour Party members in 1980; Hüseyin Kocadaq, the former Deputy Police Chief of İstanbul; and Gonca Uz, a former beauty queen and Çatli's girlfriend. The only survivor was Sedat Bucak, an ethnic Kurdish MP and clan leader with an important stake in the government's village-guard programme. A government report about the incident was released in January 1998, in addition to a parliamentary report from 1997. The links between the authorities and illegal gangs that were revealed raised serious concern over corruption and the security forces' abuse of power. Interior Minister Mehmet Aqar was linked to the victims of the accident and had to resign. In April 1998 a trial was brought against him. In September 1998, State Minister Eyüp Açik resigned amidst allegations of involvement with organised crime leader Alaattin Çakici, who was apprehended abroad with a Turkish diplomatic passport. (US State Department

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[48] Hacaloglu is an MP from Istanbul and represents the Republican People's Party (CHP) (Erdogan 1998).

1997 and 1999). The Turkish media kept on covering the scandal for months. One of the highlights was the allegation that Çatli had been an official government killer for more than a decade, in addition to his unsavoury role in arranging the 1978 jailbreak of the Grey Wolf member Mehmed Ali Agca, the man who later tried to assassinate the Pope. There was always one common dominator: the infiltration of the army, the security forces, the government, and the parliament by organised crime. (Randal 1999, 253).

Village guards

Seyfi Cengiz, a former member of *Kurtulus*[49], which fought a guerrilla war for three years against government forces after the military coup in 1980, said about this period:

> *The countryside has central importance for guerrilla strategy, because the countryside is the weakest point of the state. We must have our base first in the countryside. (Cengiz 1996)*

The government of Turkey in turn increased its strength in the countryside by creating the system of village guards. On 4 April 1985, the government headed by ANAP with Turgut Özal as Prime Minister added two articles to the Turkish Village Law which created the conditions for the government to hire "temporary village guards" (*koruculuk*) in the State of Emergency Region. A paramilitary system to supplement gendarmerie operations, the village guards are armed by the authorities and paid to fight against the guerrillas and deny them access to and support from villagers. (Berger et al. 1998, 92; Imset 1996, 29; Muller 1996, 44). Initially the village guards only patrolled their own villages, but now they take part in offensive operations (HRW/H 1994, 25). Among the 40,000 soldiers the Turkish army sent to northern Iraq in May 1997 were 10,000 village guards (Hürriyet 15.5.1997, ref. Berger et al. 1998, 93).

McDowall assumes that at the beginning of the 1990s probably over 50 % of the Kurds were neutral or hostile to the PKK's activities (McDowall 1992, 47). The government used this fact, as well as the disagreements between Kurdish tribes, in its establishment of the village-guard system, which is built on the traditional social structures of the region. According to some estimates, 90 % of all village guards live in villages where the tribal (*axiret*) system still

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[49] THKP-C (*Türkiye Halk Kurtulus Parti-Cephesi*, Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front) was in the 1960s a militant leftist group that split into three groups; *Kurtulus* is one of them. Disagreements concerning the Kurdish question were the main cause of the split. Later a group called *Tekosîn* separated from Kurtulus (Cengiz 1996).

functions. This system is characterised by large land holdings grouped around a tribal leader who is a landlord. Members of the *axiret* usually do not own land, but work on the landlord's holdings. Although the state forces many Kurds to serve as village guards, in the provinces of Hakkari and Xwrnak many tribes participate in the system voluntarily (HRW/H 1994, 26). One tribal aspect of the system is that village guards increase the power of the landlord, as they function like a private army of the clan leader. The government pays their salaries - which were in 1997 about $110-135 per month - but the salaries are often paid as a lump sum to clan leaders, who keep a large proportion for themselves. For example, Sedat Bucak, the clan leader who was the only survivor of the Susurluk accident, is the commander of ten thousand armed men. When village guards are used like private armies it also means that they lack a joint leadership. In the local elections of 1993, many landlords who were actively supporting the village-guard programme were elected as mayors. Besikçi describes these landlords as the "agent class", as they are co-operating with the state power structures. (Berger et al. 1998, 14, 95-98; Kirisçi and Winrow 1997, 132).

Village guards grow up in the area where they serve, and they know the mountains. Turkish soldiers come from the western parts of the country and many of them have grown up in cities, so they would not be able to move around in the mountains without the village guards as guides (Berger et al. 1998, 90).

> *Without the village guards, the Turkish state could not act there. Our mountains are quite high and very rough. People can not even walk, it is so difficult. The village guards know the area, they grew up there. In every district there are village guards who know the area. The soldiers can not manage without them. If something happens, the village guards are sent first. So they die first. And the village guards know it. If there are problems, they're blamed...it comes out in the Turkish mass media that the failures are because of the village guards. (a woman, Europe)*

The aim of the system is to separate the "good" Kurdish villages from the "bad" ones. The village-guard system is the phenomenon which brought the war to civil society. It divides Kurdish society into groups which fight each other - the aim of the Turkish government is to "let the Kurds kill each other". This system has caused such deep wounds in Kurdish society that if this war ends one day with the victory of the Kurdish side, their healing will demand more than one Truth Commission of the South African type.

In theory, recruitment into the village-guard corps is voluntary, but refusal by individuals or villages to participate in the system is considered by the

Turkish authorities as passive or active support of the PKK (UNHCR 1994).[50]
In creating this system, the Turkish authorities have exploited the differences
and disagreements between the Kurdish clans, which have increased and
deepened. Osman Baydemir, Vice Chairman of the Diyarbakir branch of the
Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD), explains:

> *In no district have people become village guards of their own free
> will. Kurds still live in a clan system, in a feudal system. In some
> areas there are problems between the clans. The village guard
> system has been one way to exploit these conflicts. People who have
> become village guards have also started to commit other crimes.*
> (Osman Baydemir, interviewed in Lodenius 1998a)

In March 1997 I visited the village of Samanyolu in Batman, which had
agreed to take up arms on the side of the Turkish army. In the village there
were about one thousand people; there were 26 paid village guards and five
men were doing the work voluntarily, without payment. There is no special
training to become a village guard; the only demand is that the village guards
have completed five years of primary school. As there was no school in
Samanyolu when they agreed to become village guards, it remains unclear
whether these 31 men had been to school. The village guards considered their
salary pretty good, and they also had enough free time to do farming. There
were many new buildings under construction in the village, and the villagers

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[50] Village guards from five villages in the province of Sirnak complained of
difficulties when they wanted to stop acting as village guards. The following letter
was sent on 19 September 1991 to the Governor of Sirnak, the Regional Governor
of the OHAL area, and other Turkish authorities, embassies, and international
human rights organisations:

> For some while we have been acting as village guards. As soon as we
> started, our relations with the inhabitants of our villages and those of
> neighbouring villages worsened.... The villagers began to make
> accusations against each other.... We can no longer travel and we can not
> do our shopping. As village guards we are boycotted by the population...
> As village guards, we are often put under surveillance without our families
> being informed. As for us, we went to the Bassa barracks in Güçlükonak to
> hand in our weapons. But they refused despite all our pleas.... The Turkish
> state is armed to the teeth; the State has thousands and thousands of
> policemen and gendarmes. Why does the State need us? .... Since we
> began acting as village guards, we have lost everything we had. Even our
> children are beginning to insult us; if they could, they would kill us.... We
> want the government to agree to our request and take back its weapons.
> (ref. Kurdistan Committees 1992, 10)

had received a school with five teachers and a health station; however, the latter could not be used, as the physician and the two nurses who were supposed to visit the village regularly refused to come. With about ten MIT policemen and fifteen gendarmes listening, the village chairman, an old man in his sixties with two wives and nineteen children, explained the villagers' decision to join the system:

> *We did not do it because of the benefits. We were between two fires. We had no choice after the PKK held me and my son as prisoners for 24 hours. And during three years we have been at peace with both sides. But at the beginning it was difficult. The PKK was threatening to burn the village. We told them that we wanted only to protect our village. If saw the PKK going through our fields from far off, but not attacking us, I wouldn't do anything. It was a very serious decision to become village guards. Actually it is shameful to carry guns against our own people but we had no choice.* (a village guard in Samanyolu, interviewed in Backström 1997)

The aim of the PKK has been to gain support among villages and deter villagers from joining the paramilitary system. In 1987 the PKK's Decree on Village Guards called for their mass destruction. Its methods of deterrence have been ruthless. Villages with village guards have been raided, collaborators have been killed, and often their whole families have been killed. In several cases, houses have been burnt to the ground and villagers have been forced to flee. While Turkish soldiers taken prisoner by the PKK are often exchanged, captured village guards have been subject to summary execution. (Imset 1996, 24; HRW/H 1994, 26). Some village guards are known to have paid taxes to the PKK and even provided it with ammunition in order to avoid reprisals (Rugman 1996, 34).

The number of village guards has increased rapidly. In 1987 there were about 6,000 village guards; in 1990 about 24,000; in 1995 about 62,000; in 1996 about 70,000; and in 1997 about 110,000 (Berger et al. 1998, 13; Gunter 1990, 81; McDowall 1992, 47; HRFT 1997, 134; Imset 1996, 29).[51] They have a reputation for

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[51] In 1995 the number of village guards per province was as follows: Batman 3,487, Bingöl 2,715, Diyarbakir 5,858, Hakkari 7,263, Mardin 3,738, Siirt 4,801, Sirnak 7,597, Tunceli 384, Van 7,936, Adiyaman 1,655, Elaziq 2,320, Mus 2,053, Agri 1,969, Gaziantep 646, Maras 2,350, Kars 691, Ardahan 125, Igdir 423, Malatya 1,402, and Urfa 1,109 (HRFT 1997, 134). The low figure for Tunceli is noteworthy. As Tunceli is an area of almost regular battles between the ARGK and security forces, one would expect that there would be many village guards.

being the least trained and disciplined of the government's security forces and they have been accused repeatedly of corruption, common crimes, and human rights abuses. Village guards have been involved in such crimes as smuggling, theft, robbery, kidnapping women, and rape. (Berger et al. 1998, 94; KHRP 1996, 5; US State Department 1998). Sinan Yerlikaya, Vice Secretary of the CHP party, declared in August 1997 that "the PKK is a danger to the state; the village guards, to the people" (Yeni Yüzyil 11.8.1997, ref. Berger et al. 1998, 92). In 1995 the Parliamentary Commission to Investigate Murders by Unknown Assailants demanded in its report an end to the village-guard system because village guards used the authority vested in them to engage in smuggling and raiding villages (HRFT 1997, 133). One reason for these problems is that there is no civilian control over the village-guard system (Vermoth-Mangold 1998, 19).

The system also has many critics among the Turkish people. One reason for this is the fear that the village guards may not be loyal to the government in a crisis situation. In 1991 in northern Iraq it was the village guards turning their guns against the Iraqi army who settled the post-Gulf War crisis of Kurdish autonomy, not the KDP and PUK guerrilla forces. In 1993, when Tansu Äiller became the prime minister and headed the government of the DYP and SHP coalition, she promised that the village-guard system would be eliminated, though without giving a timetable (Avebury 1995). In 1994, President Demirel also promised to end the village guard system (Laber 1994, 47; HRW/H 1994, 7).

7.3. Pacification methods used against the civilian population

Destruction of Kurdish villages

President Özal advocated forced mass migration as one component of the assimilation of the Kurds. Medico international and the KHRP refer to one of Özal's letters, which was published after his death in November 1993 in Turkish Probe and Turkish Daily News. In the letter, Özal estimated that no more than 200,000 villagers needed to be evacuated, and stated that it was essential that they be given employment priorities. The evacuation was to be permanent: "To prevent the locals' return to the region, the building of a large number of dams in appropriate places is an alternative." Özal assumed that given the long-standing pattern of economic migration westwards, only two to three million Kurds would inhabit the region in the future. (medico international and KHRP 1996, 18).

The evacuation of human settlements was made possible in 1987 by the Law on the State of Emergency in Decree No. 285, which grants the Governor of the State of Emergency Region the power to order the temporary or permanent evacuation of villages and land in the interests of "general security" (Akduvar v. Turkey 1996, 9; McDowall 1992, 48; medico international and KHRP 1996, 5). Actually the village evacuation had already started earlier. Within eight weeks of the first PKK attack on Turkish troops in August 1984, the government decided to create along its border with Iraq - whence the first attacks were believed to have come - a cordon sanitaire of 50 border villages (medico international and KHRP 1996, 7).

In 1992 the Turkish army underwent a shift in its counterinsurgency strategy to combat the PKK. Army units, which had previously pursued a reactive strategy, shifted their tactics "to bring the war to the PKK". They would seek out and attack guerrilla strongholds in urban areas and forcibly depopulate villages suspected of providing support to the PKK. Freeman says that the military decided that all villages above a certain altitude would be emptied in order to force the guerrillas out from the hilltops. The army also began to use methods of low-intensity conflict. This strategy faced strong opposition in the National Security Council from President Turgut Özal and Gendarme High Commander General Esref Bitlis. Both of them died within the next year. (Freeman 1999; Kürkçü 1997, 8-9). The method used to displace the Kurdish population was the same as that of "population and resource control" used by the US army in Philippines in 1898 and later in Vietnam and El Salvador.

According to medico international and the KHRP, in 1990 the villages in North Kurdistan most likely to be evacuated were:

> 1. villages close to PKK food and ammunition caches found by security forces
> 2. villages suspected of providing logistic support to the PKK
> 3. villages close to areas of PKK activity
> 4. villages close to the border
> 5. villages where the inhabitants refused to join the village guards
> (medico international and KHRP 1996, 9)

The IHD, KHRP, and other human rights organisations have provided a great deal of information on how the villages have been destroyed. The village of Kelekäi in the province of Diyarbakir was evacuated in 1992. It was the first

village to appeal to the European Court of Human Rights[52] to condemn the Turkish state and provide compensation for the villagers' losses. During the court case villagers explained how the village was burnt:

> *On the evening of 10 November 1992 members of a "special team" of soldiers entered their village of Kelekçi and instructed the mayor to evacuate all the inhabitants immediately. While the mayor attempted to call the people together, the soldiers set fire to a number of houses including houses belonging to applicants here. A total of nine houses were burnt to the ground with their contents. As a result, most of the applicants moved to Diyarbakir, where some moved in with relatives. Others were left homeless. On 6 April the security forces returned to the village and set fire to the rest of the houses. Kelekçi, formerly a village of 500 inhabitants, is now completely evacuated. (Akduvar v Turkey 1996, 5)*

A woman deported from another village told how the villagers were not permitted to take anything with them when soldiers forced them to leave their homes:

> *The soldiers burned everything in the village, including our animals, furniture and clothes. We had a donkey but they killed it. Our fields were burned, and we were not permitted to take any vegetables with us from the fields. The soldiers stayed for three days in the village, then the people went to Amed. (a woman, Amed)*

Osman Baydemir from the IHD in Diyarbakir (ref. Lodenius 1998a, 8) reported that the army tries to force people to become village guards; those who accept are allowed to keep their houses, while in the same village the houses of those who refuse are burnt. Some villages the army destroys totally. A deported woman whom I met in Amed told me that some people from her village escaped to Amed, while others agreed to became village guards. They stayed in the village and took over the fields of those who had left. Sometimes the military has also placed landmines around burnt villages in order to prevent the villagers' return and to create a "no man's land" which the PKK can not use. (Kurdistan Committees 1992, 9).

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[52] Since 1987 Turkish citizens have had the right of individual petition to the European Commission of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Between 1991 and October 1995 at least 778 cases were filed against the Republic of Turkey, many of which were connected to the war in the Southeast, especially village burnings and evacuations (HRW/H 1996, 13).

According to medico international and the KHRP, since 1990 it has been very difficult to monitor village evacuations because of the government's restrictions on reporting about the situation. At the beginning of the 1990s the policy of the Turkish authorities was to deny the evacuations; not until 1994 did they publicly admit that village evacuations were part of their strategy against the PKK. (medico international and KHRP 1996, 9). There are no trustworthy statistics available about the evacuation of villages. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey gives the following figures: the burning and evacuation of villages started in 1991. By 1993, 871 villages had been evacuated; according to official data, 2,115 villages had been evacuated by 1994, and by June 1995 the number was 2,505 villages. (HRFT 1997, 98).

In August 1995, the former State Minister for Human Rights Algan Hacaloglu compared the situation of civilians in Tunceli to that of refugees in Bosnia and Palestine:

> *The images of the people of Tunceli differ little from the people of Bosnia and Palestine in their hunger and distress. Yes to the struggle against terror, but the right to shelter, subsistence, and life must be observed. If Turkey says no to this it doesn't have the right to join the European Union. (Algan Hacaloglu, Cumhuriyet 13.8.1995, ref. HRW/H 1996, 12)*

In the Balkans, the empty houses of members of an ethnic group that have fled or been killed are usually quickly occupied by people who have fled from their own homes. In Kurdistan this does not happen; burnt villages remain empty. Turks do not want to move to the Southeast, even though unemployment is a big problem in western Turkey and there is a lack of educated labour in the State of Emergency Region. In 1994, Jeri Laber met human rights activists in Turkey who said to her, "This is not ethnic cleansing, this is *human cleansing;* the villages are not repopulated, they are destroyed." (Laber 1994, 47) So plans made at the beginning of the 1930s are now being implemented: in June 1934 Law No. 2510 announced a plan to divide Turkey into three zones, the third zone being "regions to be completely evacuated" (Kendal 1980b, 66-67).

"Food embargoes"

The army also uses economic and psychological pressure to force people to leave their villages. The army encircles some villages, the aim of this being to deprive the villagers of their means of subsistence and thus force them to leave. During the encirclement no villager may leave the village without permission. The farmers may not cultivate their fields or vines, nor can they

milk their animals or take them out to pasture. The purchase of food in town and visits to the doctor are forbidden even to sick people. (Kurdistan Committees 1992, 9-10). This process, also known as *a food embargo,* was used in the province of Sirnak in 1992 and the next year in the provinces of Sirnak and Hakkari. In August 1994 the security forces applied a food embargo to 117 villages in the province of Bingöl. During the encirclement, the villagers had to give a list of their needs to a gendarme station and the securing of necessities was subject to the arbitrary decisions of the gendarmes. If they lacked permission or documents, many villagers were forced to sell their goods but bring back nothing to their villages. The result of this practice is that people suffer from hunger and eventually migrate. (Kurdistan Committees 1994, 13-14).

There are references to the use of siege tactics even before 1992. For example, Jeri Laber, who travelled in the Turkish part of Kurdistan in 1988 and visited Dêrsim and Mêrdin, wrote that much of the country seems to be under a continual state of siege (Laber 1988, 16). The HRFT reported that in 1995 food embargoes were implemented mainly in Tunceli and Hakkari provinces (HRFT 1997, 110). Laber reports about the journey:

> *We were told that certain villages suspected of helping the terrorists "live in hell, under surveillance all the time." The villagers are so closely watched that if someone buys two kilograms of sugar, the gendarmes ask: "Why? That's too much. Where did you get the money? You must be feeding the terrorists." (Laber 1988, 16)*

The Centre for Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action (CIEPAC), which monitors the situation in Chiapas in southern Mexico, has reported on the similar behaviour of the Mexican army towards Indian *campesinos*. People claim that everything rots in the fields because the soldiers prevent them from working in their fields. Soldiers patrol the villages with heavy weapons and helicopters fly low over them as though ready to land at any time, hoping to drive the peasants crazy with fear. The overt violence is intended to threaten supporters of the Zapatista movement. In addition to these individual occurrences the situation also has long-term consequences, as the presence of the army in the villages breaks the agricultural cycle, the festival cycle, and the daily life of the communities. It causes conflict and tension among the people when men cannot go to work and women cannot leave the village to collect firewood or do laundry. (Castro Soto 1998a).

Deportation of Kurds to shanty towns in western Turkey

Some Kurdish organisations claim that deportation is part of the Turkish regime's plan to destroy the Kurdish identity (Gunter 1990, 45). It is collective punishment for villagers' refusal to join the village-guard system or for real or suspected support of the PKK (HRW/H 1994, 10).

The PKK sees the displacement of Kurdish villagers as a deliberately planned action to *dekurdify* Kurdistan. According to their estimates, almost half of the Kurdish population was forced to leave Turkey's southeastern provinces between 1982 and 1997. (Mater 1998). Lord Avebury estimates that half of the Kurdish population in Turkey now lives outside the Kurdish provinces (Avebury 1995). The Kurdish Red Crescent (1999, 6) gives an even higher figure, estimating that as much as 80 % of the Kurdish rural population have been forced to leave their communities since 1990.

Regional Governor Ünal Erkan said on 13 July 1995 in the newspaper *Söz* (Amed) that 2,667 villages and hamlets had been depopulated and 311,229 people displaced (ref. Avebury 1995). According to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the US State Department, the Turkish government reports that through 1997 the total number of evacuees was 336,717 (US State Department 1998). The IHD reported in 1996 that 2,540 villages had been destroyed and three million people displaced since 1984; the UNHCR gave the same figure for 1996, but added that some of the Kurds had moved because of economic reasons (Avebury 1995; UNHCR 1996).[53] Mrs. Zeynep Baran, Chairperson of K.Kadav, an organisation which tries to assist Kurdish women who live in İstanbul, estimated in March 1998 that as many as four million Kurdish people have been forced to flee to the big Turkish cities (Lodenius 1998a, 10).

There are different estimates of the number of burnt villages and hamlets. The Lawyers' Association of Diyarbakir concluded that, according their investigations, a total of 3,211 villages have been forcibly evacuated in the region between 1990 and 1997. It gives the following annual figures:

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[53] UNHCR refers to following sources: Jane's Intelligence Review 1.4.1994; Turkish Daily News 12.7.1995; Le Monde diplomatique Mar. 1995; HRW/H Oct. 1994; Freedom Review May-June 1995; Der Spiegel 9.1.1995.

Table 5: The number of villages evacuated annually:

1989-1993	923
1994	1,800
1996	175
1997	118
Total	3,211

Source: Lawyers' Association of Diyarbakir: Regional Report, 1998, p. 5

According to the UNHCR the population of certain southeastern cities such as Amed, Sêrt, Dêrsim, and Cizire has doubled or tripled in size with the arrival of displaced Kurds. In Sêrt the most dramatic spurt in population occurred in 1993 and 1994, when the population increased from 70,000 to 130,000. Amed's population grew from 300,000 to 900,000 in 1994, and in 1998 it was said to be 1.5 million[54]. In Dêrsim the population rose from 24,000 to 40,000 in one year. In Culemêrg (*Hakkari*) the population increased from 35,000 to 83,000 in 1995. In June 1995, Turkey's Interior Minister Nahit Mentese (ref. Rugman 1996, 16) announced that 2,200 villages and hamlets had been fully or partially destroyed since 1984. HRFT estimates that two to three million people had been forced to leave their villages by 1995. In every part of Kurdistan the refugees have triggered a crisis in social services, housing, and employment (HRFT 1997, 109; Lodenius 1998a, 7; medico international and KHRP 1996, 19; UNHCR 1994; UNHCR 1996). The population of Adana has grown from 900,000 to 1.5 million or two million and that of Mersin from 550,000 to one million (UNHCR 1996; HRFT 1997, 109). Most refugees have gone to Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara; since 1995 Istanbul has received 1,442,000 new immigrants (Turkish Daily News 12.6.1995, ref. UNHCR 1996; UNHCR 1994).

The KHRP gives the following estimates of the number and location of the displaced Kurds. It is referring to information provided by Mazlum-Der.

Table 6: Estimated influx of displaced Kurds

Amed	1,150,000

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[54] The population of Amed was only 30,000 in the 1930s and 65,000 in the 1950s (McDowall 1997, 401).

Adana	1,200,000
Sanliurfa	450,000
Gaziantep	350,000
Mêrdin	250,000
Elih (*Batman*)	230,000
Mazra (*Elaziq*)	70,000
Culemêrg (*Hakkari*)	50,000
Meletê	35,000

Source: KHRP: Surviving for Living: Report on the Current Conditions of Kurds in Turkey, 1996, pp. 5-6

If these figures are reliable, the numerical estimate is that approximately 3,750,000 people have been displaced.

Some towns have faced the opposite development. The mountain town of Sirnex (Si*rnak*) was totally destroyed by military bombardment from 18 to 20 August 1992, after which 18,000 – 25,000 people left the town (Avebury 1995; HRFT 1997, 92; McDowall 1997, 435; medico international and KHRP 1996, 10). When looking at the statistics about Sirnex in the Statistical Yearbooks of Turkey one can not imagine that Sirnex was the scene of fierce battles whose aftermath resembled that of an earthquake, also witnessed by foreign observers. I visited Sirnex in March of 1997, when the quiet town was controlled by security forces and village guards belonging to a Tatar clan. The roads were closed to traffic at 4 p.m. Very many of the houses seemed to be empty, but there were terraced houses and two huge mosques under construction.

In December 1994, Prime Minister Çiller announced a plan to build "compound villages" for the hundreds of thousands of Kurds whose homes had been destroyed by her army, following the example of Saddam Hussein's "model villages" in Iraq. She presented a plan for building 548 collective villages where it would be easier to provide health, education, and protection *for those Kurds who agreed to co-operate*. (Laizer 1996, 140; Rugman 1996, 67). In 1996, the government initiated an "emergency support program" to expedite resettlement in the Southeast. The funds - $2 million in 1996 - are being used to rebuild houses and roads, and for animal husbandry and beekeeping programmes. In October 1996 the Foreign Ministry of Turkey stated that 15,314 people had returned to their villages. In 1997, 7,608 people returned to 61 villages. (US State Department 1997; 1998 and 1999).
According to the KHRP the destruction of agricultural production, as well as factories and workshops in towns, may have been a deliberate attempt to

reduce the economic capacity of the area and thus increase unemployment. This has increased the dependency of the displaced people on the government and has made them more likely to enrol in the village-guard system. (KHRP 1996, 10).

The KHRP estimates that 50 % of Turkey's Kurdish population now lives outside the Kurdish region. The loss of land represents more than merely material loss: it is the loss of a way of life which has been maintained in families through generations. The Kurds have been identified socially and culturally with their land and territory. Once this culture is destroyed it is impossible to recreate it. (KHRP 1996, 16; medico international and KHRP 1996, 24).

Human rights organisations such as the IHD, HRFT, and Amnesty International have recorded the number of destroyed villages and deported people, but in their reports there is almost no mention of what happens to them after they enter the shantytowns of Turkish cities. Most of the Kurds who have fled to western Turkey live in shantytowns known as *gecekondus* ("built overnight") on the outskirts of the large cities.

> *They take their children and go, live in a tent, in a plastic tent, it is not even a real tent, they just go and buy a few metres of plastic and make a tent and live under it summer and winter. (a woman, Europe)*

Officially the deported Kurds do not have the status of refugees. According to the UNHCR they are internally displaced persons. Many of them do not have valid identity cards, so they can not work legally in Istanbul or other towns and their children are not accepted in schools. They do not receive humanitarian aid from the UNHCR or the Red Cross. The UNHCR only assists refugees who are outside their own country and the international Red Cross only gives assistance when their local organisations ask for it.

Human Rights Watch/Helsinki has declared that the Turkish government's programmes to assist the displaced people have been late in implementation, inadequate in scope to deal with the problem, and poorly executed. In 1995, the government provided $5.7 million for housing, clothing, health care, and education to 32,260 people in the Southeast. Since mid-1994 two programmes have been created to solve the housing crisis in the Southeast. The first programme, the "central villages" project announced by Prime Minister Tansu Äiller, was postponed because of insecurity in the financing by the Council of Europe. The Social Development Fund of the Council of Europe rejected Turkey's application for funds amounting to $252 million for the project because it feared that the money could be used for forced resettlement. In mid-1995 the "Return to the Villages Project" was announced, but it was shelved

at the end of the year after various problems occurred. Attempts by displaced people to get state compensation for destroyed crops, homes, and belongings have usually been unsuccessful. (HRW/H 1996, 1, 6-8). Medico international and the Kurdish Human Rights Project explain that when European delegations have travelled to southeast Turkey to see the "central villages" or other replacement housing promised by the government, they have found them only on a very limited scale (medico international and KHRP 1996, 18). When a "migration report" prepared by the Parliamentary Migration Commission was presented in the Turkish parliament in June 1998, only 20 MPs out of 550 participated in the discussion of the report (Erdogan 1998).

When I visited Amed in January 1999, the town was full of street peddlers, there seemed to be hundreds of taxis, and everything was available in the streets, from fruits and vegetables to china tea sets, umbrellas, clothes, and services like shoe polishing and hair cutting. The only thing that was missing were customers.

The collapse of the economic infrastructure caused by the displacement of the population has led to extreme poverty. According to Mahmut Kilinc, a member of the Kurdistan Parliament in exile, the unemployment rate in Amed is 71 % and more than half of those who have a job have only a temporary job. While the average annual income in Turkey is $3,000 per capita, in Amed it is $238, according to Kilinc. (Kilinc 1998). The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers & Architects (UCTEA) found in its survey in 1996 that the unemployment rate in Amed is 60 %, the per capita income of the city is 14 % ($297 annually) of the Turkish average, and over half of the urban populace lives below the famine level. Vermoth-Mangold estimates in a report made to the Council of Europe that over 60 % of the population of the Southeast lives below the poverty line and the mortality rate there is 50 % higher than in the other parts of Turkey. In a research project carried out by the Middle East Technical University in 1993 to investigate population movements in the GAP region, the researchers estimated that in the recently formed shantytowns most of the households are scarcely above the poverty level, though definitely above famine level. Amed has been saved from social collapse by the Kurdish social philosophy based on the importance of co-operation according to family and blood ties within traditional social values. (Aksit et al. 1996, 65; UCTEA 1996, 10, 14, 18; Vermoth-Mangold 1998, 11). Human Rights Watch/Helsinki claims that only the extended kinship relations of Kurds have prevented an even larger crisis, as the displaced villagers have sought shelter with members of their extended families (HRW/H 1996, 3). Kurdish migrants residing in Europe send money to their relatives in Turkey. As there has not been any international assistance to the deportees, this has been one important factor in their survival. Many deported families depend entirely on money sent by their relatives in Europe.

Kurds who migrate to western Turkish cities bring with them their Kurdish culture and village identity. When they arrive in the cities under such extraordinary conditions they are suspicious, lacking in confidence, and unprepared for urban life. Instead of being assimilated into Turkish culture they form distinct Kurdish islands in the shantytowns. Kurds face discrimination and there is increasing tension between Turks and Kurds in the overcrowded cities, which is also stimulated by the anti-Kurdish propaganda in the Turkish media. Some Kurds work as day labourers or as vendors, but many are without any source of income. Displaced people are everywhere subject to police harassment and pressure to leave. None of the cities is eager to accommodate more unemployed and unemployable people, and the newcomers are routinely suspected of PKK sympathies. During the 1990s there was a polarisation of society into Kurdish and Turkish factions which is characterised by "Kurdish workers being threatened, Turkish farmers being intimidated not to employ seasonal Kurdish labour, and refusals to provide accommodation to Kurds". (HRFT 1997, 111; medico international and KHRP 1996, 20; Randal 1997, 282; UCTEA 1996, 13; UNHCR 1996).

The conditions of survival emerge clearly in Randal's description of the life of Kurds in an ¤stanbul shantytown:

> *Without proper papers, neither he nor anyone in the family could work legally. But they were enterprising and always found black-market jobs in construction and other ill-paid trades where papers were not required or questions asked. A bribe here and there so far kept the police away from the door... Some of their children attended school, thanks to a Turkish friend who claimed that they were hers and registered them under her name. (Randal 1999, 286)*

Yahya Munis, chairperson of the Mersin Migrants' Association (Göç-Der)[55], described the situation in September 1995:

> *The state always considers them to be potential criminals. Not even stepsons, they are treated as enemies. The Mayor never pays a visit to the migrants. Nor does the Governor, the Deputy, or the Minister. Who does? The police. These people have already run away from the police. (Yahya Munis, ref. HRFT 1997, 112)*

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[55] The government closed down the Mersin Migrants' Association in April 1998 (US State Department 1999).

Deportation to the cities has not only added to the insufficiency of the infrastructure but it has also deepened the inequality in the use of existing facilities. The process has weakened the urban inner dynamics so that instead of urbanisation, urban areas have turned into villages. (Aksit et al. 1996, 66; Turkish Medical Association 1995, 52). In September 1998, I saw Kurdish villagers tending cattle and ducks in İstanbul suburbs and baking bread in traditional Kurdish ovens dug into the soil. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of new people has caused problems, especially in the areas of employment, traffic, education, and health care. "The problems of the Southeast are being shifted to Istanbul and other cities," declared Yahya Munis in September 1995:

> *The Siteler, Güneydogu, Yenipazar, and Çay quarters (in Mersin) are all like eastern Turkey. Eastern Mersin is like Hakkari, Uludere, Semdinli, Cizre. The highway divides the city into two. The western part is like Izmir and Istanbul. The person who migrates from Hakkari, from Sirnak finds Hakkari and Sirnak once again in Mersin. This being the case, he thinks that the real problem stems from being Kurdish, not the backwardness of Hakkari.* (Yahya Munis, ref. HRFT 1997, 111)

Many displaced Kurds living in the shantytowns around Amed and the western cities were not permitted to vote in the March 1994 local elections. On 12 June 1995 the Turkish Daily News reported (ref. UNHCR 1996) that at least 1.5 million people who had immigrated to İstanbul can not vote because they are not registered, and that the same problem also exists in cities like Adana, Ankara, Bursa, Amed, İzmir, and Gaziantep.

8. Health care in North Kurdistan

8.1. Kurdish health care practices

When Turkish village women[56] were asked what good health means they usually described a person as healthy when she can cope with normal tasks and meets gender- and age-related expectations. A healthy person is physically strong, has a good appetite, can lift heavy items, and walk and work for long periods. For Kulu women, being ill was equivalent to being incapable of performing daily tasks, which consisted, for example, of keeping the house clean, carrying water, and preparing food. Turkish women in the countryside are accustomed to working hard. Their labour is essential for the survival of the family so they do not give up easily in case they fall ill. The condition of a sick woman has to become very serious before she will be distracted from her daily responsibilities. There are many reasons why symptoms may be suppressed until a late stage. Expert help may be difficult to obtain and assistance from outside the home is expensive. (Sachs 1983, 54, 103; Ståhl-El Mallah 1983, 33-34).

Lisbeth Sachs explains the reactions of her hosts in Kulu after she herself became sick with the giardias parasite:

> *I told my hosts that I was ill, mentioning the temperature and diarrhoea. The oldest woman of the family took my hands in hers, brought them to her mouth, brushed my forehead with her mouth and then said with a smile that I was not particularly hot. As to my watery faeces, they all had that quite often in the heat of the summer. She asked her daughter-in-law to prepare me some ayran. (Sachs 1983, 214-215)*

Hansen's descriptions of South Kurdistan at the end of the 1950s present a similar, quite unconcerned attitude towards disease. A patient was kept in bed only if he could not stand up, and neither the sick nor the dying were isolated

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[56] Since there are no surveys of the health care practises of Kurds, for background information I refer to Lisbeth Sachs' "Evil eye or bacteria?" (1983), in which she collected ethnographic information from a small Kulu town (Konya province) and among Kulu people in the Stockholm suburb of Tensta. This is the closest available research on this subject, and many observations from the Central Anatolian countryside are also relevant to Kurds living in Turkey and using the same health care system.

even if it had been possible to arrange a sickroom in the house. Headache patients were given a bandage round the forehead and they often went to sleep in the house where guests would appear later in the evening. During an influenza epidemic, no measures were taken to isolate the eating and drinking utensils of the sick from those of the rest of the family. Influenza patients were taken on evening visits to the neighbours. (Hansen 1961, 139). Everyday symptoms such as fever, diarrhoea, headache, and cough are generally either ignored or treated at home by the people themselves. Many medicines can be bought from pharmacies without a prescription. (Sachs 1983, 58-59). Many travel reports tell of situations where people try to treat their diseases by themselves, as they can not afford to go to a doctor or hospital, but they do not tell much about the methods used.

People go to a hospital only when they are very seriously ill, or in the case of a childbirth when there are unexpected complications. The hospital is definitely seen as the last resort for a disease, so the patients often arrive too late. Hospitals are considered dangerous places where people die. This opinion results in people putting off a visit to the hospital even longer. (Sachs 1983, 59; Salomonsson 1983, 17).

Patients expect concrete help from health care workers, and medicine as well. People in Turkey are accustomed to receiving several different types of medication when they are sick.

> *People (in Kurdistan) are habituated to getting medication in bags, in very big amounts, when they go to a doctor. One must get lots of medicines to become healthy... Most doctors and pharmacists work in co-operation. He writes 10 to 20 prescriptions, so the pharmacist earns more and gives part of that to the doctor. (a woman, Europe)*
> *The Kulu women want medicines that kill pain, promote sleep, revive their appetite and act as stimulants. All these kinds of medicine, as well as some types of antibiotic, may be included in a single prescription from a Turkish private practitioner. (Sachs 1983, 33)*

The physicians prescribe medicine both in pill form and as an injection. Patients regard injections as the most effective way of taking medicine (Sachs 1983, 32). Physicians often write prescriptions for antibiotics. One reason for this is that if a patient does not get medicine and become healthy quickly he will go to another doctor (Alfgren 1983, 20). Patients stop taking medicine when the symptoms disappear, because medicines are expensive and people want to save them for the next time they get sick (Sachs 1983, 59, 199-200). The over-consumption of medicines is called the "drug mentality"; it is also common in

some other third-world countries. It affects both health-care staff and patients. Garfield and Williams say that in Nicaragua this "drug mentality" and commercialism have reached absurd proportions; for example, in a survey made in Nicaragua in 1984 more than half of the interviewed people believed that colourful pills are more effective than white pills. In Nicaragua during Somoza's regime the wealthy minority consumed too many drugs while the majority of the population depended on home remedies and traditional medicines. The "drug mentality" also affects health care administration: the misuse and over-consumption of medicines use up funds which could instead be used, for example, to develop laboratories, X-ray facilities, and transport. (Garfield and Williams 1989, 151-152, 158-161).

In southeast Turkey, childbirth usually takes place in the home attended by the women of the household and some of the neighbours. Laizer writes that all village women seem to be experienced midwives (Laizer 1991, 35). The delegation of Swedish health care workers that visited Midyad in 1983 found it difficult to get information about pregnancies and deliveries, as it was not considered suitable for strange people to ask such intimate things. Many male doctors found their interest strange: "to give birth to babies is not so special here". The delegation felt that there was a great difference between the picture of health care painted by the Turkish authorities and the information they got from the Assyrian population. (Ahlin 1983, 7).
Childbirth is a health risk mainly for very young mothers and elderly mothers. In Turkey the age limits are considered to be below 20 years and over 34 years (UNICEF Türkiye Temsilciligi etc. 1992, 41). Kurdish women are represented in both of these categories because they marry very young and often give birth to children during their whole reproductive life. A girl who died during her first childbirth, who was told about by a woman who visited Kurdistan, is a typical example of these problems:

> *When I was in Kurdistan some years ago I heard that one of my relatives had died in childbirth. As the baby had already been born, the midwife didn't want to come to see her. But she was bleeding very much, and as they were taking her to a hospital she died in the car. The child is alive. She was a young girl; it was her first baby. (a woman, Europe)*

According to the Quran, the ideal period of nursing is two years. The Swedish health care delegation found that in the area around Midyad the women usually nurse their babies for 1-2 years. If the mother does not have enough milk, babies are given cow's or goat's milk mixed with water. At the beginning of the 1980s in Turkey milk substitute became available, but it was too

expensive for village people. (Hjelm 1983, 19). Hansen found at the end of 1950s that many women were unable to nurse their children, perhaps because of the lack of protein in a diet with little variety. Milk powder was sold in the *suq* in Sulaymania; it was bought and used, but with poor results, as it was not mixed with adequate care and hygiene. (Hansen 1961, 107).

The level of hygiene in villages is not high. All washing of dishes is in cold water; the only domestic utensils that come into contact with boiling water are tea glasses while tea is being served. The hands of women and many children are chapped and cracked like the bark of an old tree from washing in icy cold water, exposure to wind, and hard work. Both Hansen and Laizer note the fact that people do not often change their clothes. They do not undress when going to sleep; women sleep in the same clothes they wear during the day. Clothes are changed when one feels that they have become dirty. Clothes are washed in warm water which is boiled in rice pots over a fire, and rinsed in cold water. (Hansen 1961, 51; Laizer 1991, 37-39).

8.2. Health care in southeast Turkey

It is difficult to get information about health standards in southeast Turkey during the 1970s and 1980s, as Turkish governmental sources do not give much information on the situation in various provinces and merely describe the overall situation in the country.

In 1963 the government of Turkey committed itself to a programme of public health services in rural areas and to the development of both preventive and curative services in its first five-year plan. During the 1970s, public health services were developed to cover 32 provinces out of the existing 67, mainly those in eastern Turkey, where the need for health services was greatest. The services were free of charge and they included primary health care, environmental sanitation, control of communicable diseases, immunisation, health education, maternal and child health care, and family planning. (WHO 1980, 250-251).

Most of the health services were concentrated in the towns of the region despite the fact that three quarters of the population lived in villages. There were very few specialised doctors or dentists. In the 1960s, no province in the Kurdish region approached the national levels for health services; the only exception was the number of hospital beds in the province of Elazwq. In 1955, five of the fourteen Kurdish provinces had no dentist, one had one dentist, and two had only two dentists each. In 1965, two provinces were still without a dentist, and three still had only one dentist each. (Jafar 1974, 146-150).

During the 1970s, the major health problems in Turkey were related to infectious and parasitic diseases. Malnutrition reached 40 % in the country - also most probably in the Kurdish area. The WHO's sixth report on the world health situation states that because of a lack of manpower and communication there were difficulties even reporting deaths and births and infectious diseases. In the 1970s, the communicable diseases most frequently reported were measles, infectious hepatitis, whooping cough, meningococcal infections, and bacillary dysentery. (WHO 1980, 250). In the Kurdish region, 2.5 % of the population suffered from tuberculosis, and measles and trachoma epidemics were common among village children (Jafar 1974, 145).

During the 1970s the Department of Public Health in the Ministry of Health ran some single-purpose programmes. For example, the tuberculosis control programme had 253 dispensaries and 38 mobile X-ray teams, and the trachoma control programme had 41 dispensaries and 70 treatment units. However, more emphasis was placed on campaigns to control bacterial and viral enteric infections and malaria through peripheral health units integrated with other services. (WHO 1980, 251).

The infant mortality rate in southeast Turkey decreased continuously from the 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s, but the rate of decrease was lower than the national average. For example, between 1967 and 1982, while the national infant mortality rate decreased 27 % (from 149 to 109 per 1,000) it decreased only 1 % in Van, 3 % in Bingöl, and 11 % in Hakkari. From 1982 to 1990 the infant mortality rate decreased 45 % in Turkey (from 109 to 60 per 1,000) but the rate of decrease was only 26 % in Van, 27 % in Bingöl, and 32 % in Hakkari (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 25). McDowall refers (1997, 419) to an article in *Le Monde* on 16.6.1983 by a journalist who had visited a hamlet in the province of Mardin. The villagers told him that the child mortality rate was 30 %.

Language problems

One of the problems of health care in Kurdistan is the language problem. This has two aspects. First, as Kurdish has been a forbidden language in Turkey, the natural development of it has been difficult. Because Kurdish is very much limited to an everyday colloquial vocabulary, many concepts which have arisen since the 1920s, in medical research for example, do not have an equivalent term in Kurdish (Abdulkarim 1989, 10). Patients might not be able to explain in detail their symptoms because they do not know much about human physiology.

Secondly, most physicians and other health care personnel in the Kurdish provinces are Turks and do not speak Kurdish, so there are lots of communication problems, as most of the patients speak only Kurdish (SES, Diyarbakir section 1997, 48; Joachheim 1997, 161). In the Amed health centres, more than half of the physicians need a third person in order to communicate with patients and more than half of the nurses and midwives face difficulties in immunisation procedures due to the language problem (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 44-45). The German delegation which visited Wan in 1996 were told that less than 25 % of the rural population in the district speak Turkish (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 44).

> *In Turkish Kurdistan, most doctors are Turks. And there are really big conflicts and difficulties in understanding exactly where the patient is feeling pain. Patients are treated very badly, they are even sent home merely because they can not explain what problem they have. Only because they do not speak Turkish. The patients can easily explain their symptoms in Kurdish, but the doctors don't understand Kurdish, so the communication between doctor and patient is very difficult. They must take someone with them to translate, a friend, a child, husband or wife. And maybe he or she is also not so good in Turkish. There is really a great deal of misunderstanding.* (a woman, Europe)

In Midyad, four languages are spoken: Turkish, Kurdish, Assyrian, and Arabic. In the local hospital in 1983 there was a sign on the wall saying that only Turkish was permitted to be spoken in the hospital (Hjelm 1983, 2). It is not only the health care staff's lack of knowledge of the Kurdish language which makes communication difficult; they also lack a knowledge of Kurdish culture (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 44). A Guatemalan nurse interviewed by Margaret Hooks says that in Guatemala the health professionals are one of the greatest obstacles to people's health, because they have no idea of the reality of people's lives. Health programmes focus on Western-style medicine, ignoring the living conditions and traditions of the target group. (Hooks 1991, 21).
When women go to a physician they are not obliged to undress for an examination (Sachs 1983, 32).

> *Where I come from there was a doctor who spoke Kurdish; he had come from Syria. Simply because he could speak Kurdish, everyone went to him, even the women. For us it's very, very difficult for women to see a male doctor. They went to him, but in any case he could not examine them properly, he could not listen to their chest, he could not listen to their back. If the doctor is a man, women don't show their bodies to him.* (a woman, Europe)

In addition to the doctors' lack of knowledge of Kurdish, Kurds complain that Turkish physicians and nurses are prejudiced towards them. This kind of story has been told to me many times:

> *The health care staff is from Western Turkey. They are full of hate and prejudices towards Kurds. They treat us in an unfriendly manner. If a woman screams because of pain in delivery they beat her and say that pain is normal when giving birth to a baby. Rich women who dress well are treated in a friendly way, but not deported Kurds.* (a woman, Amed)

Lack of economic resources and the labour force

It is a political question who gets health care, and what kind of care: whether the resources are being used primarily to improve nutrition, sanitation, and the health of the population base, or to acquire expensive technologies and medicines. In 1978 at a meeting in Alma Ata the WHO set a goal of "health for all by the year 2000". Primary health care was declared to be the appropriate strategy to meet this goal. It emphasises prevention rather than cure, and it targets children and women as most vulnerable to preventable infectious diseases. (Stork 1989, 4-5).

There are two sectors of Turkish health care: public and private. Doctors who work in the public sector usually also have a private practice and they advise patients who can afford it to come to the private clinic, where the medical treatment is better (Ståhl-El Mallah 1983, 8-9). Some Kurds in Amed told me that the administration of public health care is very ineffective and that there is a lot of corruption, which is very common overall in Turkish administrative bodies. Corruption - in public health care or other Turkish administrative bodies - is an issue that I do not deal with in this research. It seems to be a common part of life in Turkey, but in research about Turkey it is not often mentioned. In the Kurdish provinces, all the hospitals are public except for one hospital in Amed.

In late 1991 there was a reform in the Turkish health care system to raise the quality of care and equality of access, in accordance with the goals of the WHO conference in Alma Ata. There are health centres in villages - which are usually staffed by a physician, nurse, midwife, health technician, and medical secretary - or health posts, staffed by midwives. (PHR 1996, 30; WHO 1994, 276).

Medical education in the university takes six years. In addition to this, physicians must do one year (formerly two years) of practice in the countryside or in other underdeveloped areas. Placements are made by

allotment. This system was started at the beginning of the 1980s to ensure the provision of medical services throughout Turkey. (Alfgren 1983, 14; IPPNW etc. 1996a, 33).

According to the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, there is one general practitioner per 2,194 people on average in Turkey (HRFT 1997, 131). In some Kurdish provinces the figures are as follows:

Diyarbakir   1995: 1,692
Diyarbakir   1998: 4,429
Mardin   1995: 6,062
Batman   1995: 4,870
Siirt   1995: 4,080
(Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 83; Hanife 1998)

In 1993 there were no physicians in the districts of Kulp, Hazro, and Cüngüs and only one in the districts of Ergani, Lice, and Dicle. In Turkey there is on average one specialist per 2,268 people; for the Kurdish provinces the figures are, for example, in the province of Sirnak one specialist per 43,668 people; in Bingöl one per 22,815 people; and in Tunceli one per 22,191 people. (HRFT 1997, 131). When one compares these figures to the numbers of security staff - a policeman or soldier for every 14-27 people - the level of militarisation in North Kurdistan becomes more vivid. All these figures are only estimates, as there has been no trustworthy population census.

In rural areas it is more difficult to get medical treatment than in towns. In the countryside there are usually no physicians other than those who must do their compulsory one-year practice (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 33). Many villages are so isolated that patients with acute disease or an accident can not be taken to hospitals.

> *No one helps a Kurd who gets sick or has an accident in a remote village. But if just one peshmerga is seen in the same place, hundreds of soldiers are sent there to search for him.* (a Turkish physician)

There are economic and practical difficulties in the provision of medical treatment. Visits to a doctor and medication are very expensive for peasants, and travel to remote towns can be impossible because of weather conditions, especially during the winter. All these problems came out clearly in a story told by a physician from Amed:

We do not get information from distant villages even when someone dies. One father told me that his five-year-old daughter had contracted measles and was very sick. As there was no possibility of bringing her to the nearest town, the relatives tried to treat her by themselves. They spent every day hoping that she would be soon get well. But all their hopes were in vain. When her condition became very serious, the father walked to the nearest town through the snow - though he knew that it was impossible to reach a doctor. This is everyday life here. (ref. Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1996, 82)

Treatment is not free in the public sector. People who need a medical operation but have no money can turn to the Governor (*Vali*) and ask to get treatment free of charge (Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 30). Hospital patients must also pay for the medication they take and the blood used in transfusions. Even very sick people are turned away from hospitals if they can not pay. I myself saw one such situation in March 1997 in the Seyrentepe refugee camp near Amed. When I visited the camp they had just held a funeral for a 30-year-old woman. The previous day she had suffered breathing difficulties and she was taken to a hospital. The woman and her relatives did not have any money to pay the hospital fee, so she was sent back to the camp, where she died a few hours later.

The health care that exists is not free. If one doesn't have money he can not go to a doctor. He can only stay at home and try to recover. If he is really, really sick he will try to borrow money to go to a doctor. If he can't do that, he just lies in bed at home and maybe dies. (a woman, Europe)

When a patient goes to the emergency room the first thing they check is whether he has enough money to pay. It is up to the head of the hospital whether they take care of a person who has no money. Some days ago I saw on Turkish TV the news that two hospitals had refused to treat a sick person, and on the way to the third hospital, he died. Now some argue in Turkey that it should not be like this. When a person is in the hospital he can not go home until he has paid the bill. A woman who has given birth to a baby must stay in the hospital until her husband pays the bill. (a woman, Europe)

A Kurdish woman residing in Adana told how she got treatment for her daughter in a hospital without paying for it:

When we Kurds bring our sick to a hospital and say that we have no money they tell us that our sick people will die. In the hospital one must pay first. From that, one gets a receipt. With the receipt one goes to the doctor or gets a blood test. The fee must be paid before the check-up. The following thing happened to me: I was at work. When I returned home I noticed that my daughter had had an accident. I took her to the hospital. She had to be operated on. The operation lasted five hours. They put a paper in my hand and sent me to the pay desk. They gave me a bill for 12.5 million lira. I did not have that much. When I came back they asked if I had been to the pay desk. I said yes. Just then a police officer came and asked me why I had not paid. I explained to him that my oldest child was six years old and the others were smaller. I could not pay the money. From there they took me to the director. The director agreed to deduct two million from the bill. Even then I could not pay. Then they told me that the child must stay. I asked a man whom I knew to wait there with his car. Then I waited till it was a busy time in the hospital. Then I took my child and simply went home with her. (a woman interviewed in Kurdischer Roter Halbmond 1997, 30)

Health care is free of charge for people who are insured via their employment. This excludes the peasant population. As health care is based on commercial interests, it is beyond the reach of the rural population. The large cities are far away and people can not afford to spend large sums on health care. (Sachs 1983, 58-59). About half of the population in Turkey have health insurance, but according to International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, in Kurdish provinces the proportion is remarkably lower (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 51). For example, in Adana one third of the people who are working, and should have the insurance, do not have it.

During recent years there has been an attempt in Turkey to give poor people access to health care through the *green card system*. Holders of this card have admission free of charge to certain health services. (SES, Diyarbakwr section 1997, 54). The card must be applied for at the local gendarme station (KHRP 1996, 8). The card is valid only in the holder's home village or town. When Kurds flee from villages which security forces have burnt it is very difficult for them to get a green card in their new place of residence even if they have had one previously. When someone applies for a green insurance card, he must produce a family card that shows that he is registered at the centre for population registry of that place. The Kurdish Red Crescent delegation which visited Adana in April 1997 were told that only a few Kurds there have a green card, as most of them avoid contact with the authorities and do not want

to be registered (Kurdischer Roter Halbmond 1997, 32). A beneficial system has turned into something that is widening the gap between Turks and Kurds, as health services for the people who are internally displaced are not improving in the same way as they are for other people.

The Kurds whom I interviewed told of many problems with the green card system:

The treatment is not good, the doctors are very busy, they just write a prescription for medicines. You must pay if you stay in the hospital. The medicines are very expensive. (a woman)

The police raided the HADEP office here in Amed. They were especially cruel towards the green-card holders. They said the government is helping these people, so they should be thankful. (a woman, Amed)

Some time ago, they changed the system so that to get a green card, one must make an application in the police station. They won't issue one if there is a politically active person in the family. (a woman, Amed)

The Ministry of Health has selected Priority Development Provinces in terms of health care. According to this selection, 23 provinces are at First Degree Priority level and 14 are at the Second Degree Priority level. All the provinces in the State of Emergency[57] are in this program. Elaziq is at the Second Degree Priority level and the other 11 provinces are in the First Degree Priority level programme, which also includes five other provinces with a large Kurdish population: Adiyaman, Agri, Erzincan, Kars, and Sanli Urfa. (Ministry of Health of Turkey web pages: http://www.health.gov.tr/statistics/s121_eng.htm).

In the Kurdish provinces health care went downhill during the 1990s. There is only basic health care, and even that is scarce. Hospitals in district towns do not have specialised doctors or the competence to provide special health care. There is no respectful bedside manner. The atmosphere created by the clashes has caused a migration of physicians out of the region. (HRFT 1997, 131). According to Ali Ürküt (ref. IPPNW etc. 1996a, 28), who was the chairman of Saglik Sen in Amed in 1996, people do not want to work in the Southeast. If

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[57] The provinces which were under the law in 1996 as described in the introduction, page 14.

someone voluntarily applies for work there it causes suspicion among the authorities that the person sympathises with the Kurdish movement.

The authorities have tried to solve the labour problem through a rotation system. Physicians from western Turkey are sent to work for a period of one to two months in the Kurdish provinces. Dr. Rodi, a physician and member of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile living in Germany, sees this system only as an attempt to improve the public image of the Ministry of Health. The physicians who are sent there just try to pass the time somehow. It is not possible to work effectively during such a short stay. (ref. Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 93). A German delegation which visited the state hospital in Dêrsim in 1996 were told that the doctors are from western Turkey and stay only one month in Dêrsim (Berliner Newroz Delegation 1996, 15).

An additional problem is the lack of even very basic technical equipment. As a rule health centres lack laboratories, and they even have problems with heating during the winter (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 44). The hygiene in hospitals and health centres is bad. There are very few ambulances, so the transport of sick people is difficult. (SES, Diyarbakir section 1997, 46). In Amed there is only one maternity hospital where women can go in case of complications in childbirth. In 1996 this hospital did not even have the facilities for examination by ultrasound. (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 28). In Amed there are only two topography instruments (Joacheim 1997, 162). Even if well-trained staff members were working in the hospitals and health centres, they would be very limited in what they could do. After visiting health centres and hospitals in Amed, the team of the Turkish Medical Association reported that the Baqlar Health Centre had not been repaired or painted for ten years. "The centre is so dark that lights were needed even in the daytime. All of the personnel suffer from arthralgia because of the cold and darkness." (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 22).

8.3. Working conditions under the State of Emergency Law

Everyday life in the Kurdish provinces is very violent; the most immediate problem for people living in the region is staying alive (HRFT 1997, 130). In addition to the patients who suffer from disease, the hospitals must treat many patients who are wounded in firefights. In 1995, a delegation of the Turkish Medical Association interviewed general practitioners working in the emergency room of Diyarbakir State Hospital; they reported that every day they treat 7 to 8 cases of attacks by unknown assailants, and that it is forbidden to provide medical aid to suspected terrorists (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 39). This increases the amount of work in a situation where

resources are already scarce. Violence and fear of violence affects the everyday routines of hospitals and health centres:

> *A nurse went out to give a vaccination. There was a murder in the street where she went. A man shot someone; another one was running, and he was chasing him. This happened in the daytime. She returned to the health centre immediately. This event took place just near the centre.* (a physician in Amed, interviewed in: Turkish Medical Association 1995, 39)

Because Kurdish towns are places where many people have "disappeared", people try to go out only in daylight. In January 1999 in Amed, I myself saw how peddlers packed up their items and how most of the shops were closed by 5 p.m. As soon as it became dark, the streets were empty. Because of this, treatment in health centres is restricted to the daytime hours, and patients have to leave early in order to reach home before nightfall. In the region, the transfer of emergency cases to health centres is difficult; especially when there is a curfew (Dr. Rodi, interviewed in Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 94; Turkish Medical Association 1995, 16).

> *A relative of mine, a 70-year-old man, was sick. He walked from our village to Amed to go to a doctor. He never returned home; he disappeared while walking back to the village.* (a woman, Amed)

Physicians must co-operate with the police and the military. There is a police station in every hospital in the State of Emergency Region (OHAL). When I visited a hospital in Tux (*Tatvan*) in March 1997, the hospital staff told me that this was necessary for the sake of security. Some refugee women I interviewed in Amed said that the duty of the police in the health centres is to monitor the staff and make sure that the doctors and nurses do not get too interested in the Kurdish patients. If they do so, they will be sent away from Kurdistan. A nurse (Hanife 1998) stated that when injured people are brought to a hospital they are first interrogated by the police, who may insist on being present while a medical history is being taken. The security forces interfere with the medical treatment of patients and sometimes delay or prevent the patients from being seen if it is thought that they might be sympathetic to the guerillas. Lord Rea was also told of similar situations when he visited Amed from 4-8 April 1995 (Rea 1995). This situation is similar to the health care situation in Chiapas. There as well, there are police and military interrogations in health stations for the purpose of assuring that those who are ill are not organised (Castro Soto 1998b).

Laber tells of a meeting with Kenan Nehrozoglu, a parliamentarian from Mardin, who told her that he had investigated what happened in April 1988 in

six villages in the Gercus region (Mardin province) when the army rounded people up for three days. Many of the villagers had broken arms and legs after being tortured. Mr. Nehrozoglu told her that "he had brought some of the victims to a doctor almost by force, they were so afraid to go". (Laber 1988, 16).

Since 1991, there has been a law in Turkey that arrested people must be taken to a health centre after the interrogation to find out whether they have been tortured. An anonymous member of the SES (Trade Union of Health Care Workers, *Saglik Sendikasi*) from a section which was later closed by the authorities told a Finnish delegation in March 1998 in Amed that the use of every type of torture is the rule during detentions in Turkish police stations. He said that when police take arrested people to the check-up and the physician writes the "wrong" certificate, he is threatened and the police simply order a more suitable certificate from another physician. (Lodenius 1998a, 7).

TTB (Turkish Medical Association, *Türk Tabipler Birligi*) chairman Kizilkan said at the TTB's press conference in Amed on 14 March 1996 that physicians could not freely practice their profession in the region that is ruled under the State of Emergency Law. In the statement published by the TTB on the same day, the organisation demanded that physicians be allowed to do their work freely, which also includes writing medical certificates for people who have been arrested. (Kurdistan Sol 6/96, 11). The TTB announced in 1996 that the authorities' treatment of suspects and arrested persons does not comply with either Turkish or international regulations ensuring professional confidentiality, and that it violates medical ethics (IPPNW etc. 1996b, 8).

Health care staff can not work independently in the State of Emergency Region. Permission from the Ministry of Health or the Regional Governor is needed even for many routine activities. The Regional Governor chooses the doctors who head the hospitals and health centres and he can also interfere in the work done at the health care centres. He determines the limits and prohibitions of working in the health care profession. Physicians and nurses are forced to participate in military operations where their duty is to treat wounded soldiers. (Nazlwkul 1996, 51). It is absolutely forbidden to treat PKK members and sympathisers of the PKK. In September 1991 the State Security Court in Amed sentenced a nurse, Yildiz Alpdogan, to 12.5 years of imprisonment for giving medical help to wounded PKK guerrillas in the district of Sirnak (Kurdistan Committees 1992, 12). Dr. Abdullah Bolca, the director of Cizre Hospital in Mardin province, was detained for 15 days in September 1989 for treating a patient whom the police believed to be a PKK member. Dr. Bolca was dismissed from his position and sent to Yozgat in western Turkey. He said after his release: "My duty as a doctor is to give medical care to whoever is in need. I cannot know if the patient is a terrorist

or not. Furthermore, I am not obliged to verify it; it is not my duty." (Helsinki Watch 1991, 32).

There are two health care labour unions in Turkey: the independent Saglik Sen (SES) and the Confederation of Health Workers (KESK). SES has 70,000 members, about 1,300 of whom live in Amed (Kurdistan Report 26/1998, 23). SES was founded in 1991, and in Amed its activities have been continuously restricted by police observation. One SES member reported in June 1997 that the police keep records of everybody who visits the SES office. SES members have been arrested and have disappeared. From 1991 to 1997, 16 members were murdered by "unknown assailants" and 124 members were arrested. SES publications have regularly been confiscated. (Joacheim 1997, 164-165). In Turkey public employees, including health care staff, do not have the right to strike (Kurdistan Report 26/1998, 24). The government's State of Emergency Decree 430, issued by the Council of Ministers on 9 April 1990, gives the governor of the OHAL region the right to control or prohibit all union activities and transfer "harmful" state employees (Helsinki Watch 1991, 13).

Some of the basic problems of providing health care in Kurdistan are described in the following interview with a physician:

> *The labour situation in health care is very bad. All the people who work here want to go away... It is impossible to work here independently without choosing sides... A doctor treated a man free of charge, took X-rays and gave him orthopaedic treatment. After three months, the man was arrested for suspected PKK membership. When they searched his house, they found the X-rays. The doctor was sentenced to three years and nine months of imprisonment. The case was sent to the European Court. Meanwhile, the doctor was set free but he is not permitted to work in the public sector... There are many such. examples. Actually, one can not work here at all. It is understandable that no one comes here voluntarily. The area is backward in every aspect, even socially and culturally. One must be very strong and have lots of strength to work here. (Dr. Ipekyüz, ref. IPPNW etc. 1996a, 65)*

The physician who treated a patient's hand free of charge in 1992 is Dr Dilken. He was sentenced to three years and nine months of imprisonment for assisting a member of an illegal organisation (Article 169/2 of the Turkish Penal Code) (PHR 1996, 175). In 1996 he said in an interview:

When a patient comes to me, he can just as well be village guard, a supporter of the forbidden organisation or a policeman or soldier. I treat all of them the same way, because all I see is a human being. It is a pity that because of fear there are not more doctors who feel this way... It should be self-evident to see a patient not as a friend or an enemy, but a person whom I can help. (Dr. Dilken, interviewed in IPPNW etc. 1996a, 65)

Seyfettin Kizilkan, the Chairman of the Medical Association of Diyarbakir and the head doctor of the Diyarbakwr Public Hospital, told a German delegation in April 1996 about his principle that it is the special duty of physicians to observe human rights and to act when they see crimes against human rights (Dr. Kizilkan, interviewed in IPPNW etc. 1996a, 65). Soon after the delegation's visit, Kizilkan was arrested on 5 May 1996. He was accused of hiding bombs and supporting the PKK. In the search of his house police claimed they found bombs on the balcony of his daughter's room. The balcony is located three metres above the street and 30 metres from the nearest security service checkpoint, and is permanently under surveillance by an automatic video camera. (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 33, 38-39; PHR 1996, 170-173, 184-185). Dr. Kizilkan was sentenced to 3 years and 9 months of imprisonment by the State Security Court in Amed. The US-based organisation Physicians for Human Rights believes that the case was fabricated and that the Turkish authorities were retaliating against Dr. Kizilkan for his work on behalf of democracy, human rights, and health care. The authorities refused Ali Ürküt, chairman of the Diyarbakir section of the SES, permission to travel to Hamburg to participate in the Kurdish Red Crescent seminar "War and Health in Kurdistan" on 28-29 June 1997 (Kurdistan Report 26/1998, 23).

8.4. Collabse of preventive health care

Preventive health care, such as vaccination and maternity care, has practically ceased to exist in the State of Emergency Region region. Many health stations and centres have been closed or put to military use both in towns and in the villages where people still live. For example, in 1997 in the district of Diyarbakir only 14 out of 112 small village health stations with nurses were functioning, and many larger health centres staffed by physicians had also been closed. According to the Diyarbakir section of the SES, the main reason for closing the stations was the lack of staff. In 1996 in the Kulp district (Diyarbakir province) there was only one health centre left. (IPPNW 1996a, 28, 32; Hanife 1998; SES, Diyarbakir section 1997, 46).

In 1974 the WHO launched its Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI). As a result, by 1995 over 80 % of the world's children had been immunised against diphtheria, tetanus, whooping cough, polio, measles, and tuberculosis - in 1974 the same figure had been less than 5% (WHO 1998a, 49). The WHO recommendations include the following vaccinations: BCG and polio at birth, PDT at 6, 10, and 14 weeks, and measles at 9 months (Perrin 1996, 136). The BCG vaccination (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin) protects against tuberculosis, and PDT provides immunity to diphtheria, whooping cough (pertussis), and tetanus.

In the Kurdish provinces, the level of immunisation was lower than the average in Turkey even before the deportation of people started.

Table 7: Vaccinations in the State of Emergency Region, 1991 (%)

	PDT	BCG	Measles
Average in Turkey	73	40	68
Diyarbakir	55	15	47
Hakkari	19	1	21
Mardin	34	9	38
Tunceli	38	15	38
Van	77	10	77

Source:
UNICEF: Türkiye'de Anne ve Çoçuklarin Durum Analizi 1991, ref. Türk Tabipler Birligi: "Güneydogu'da saglik hizmetleri ve saglik personelinin durumu" Raporu. Mart 1994, p. 20

BCG vaccination protects against tuberculosis; PDT, against diphtheria, whooping cough, and tetanus.

The figures given in the 1993 Turkish Demographic and Health Survey are quite different. According to their estimate the immunisation coverage rate among children aged 12-23 months was about 90 % for BCG and the first two doses of PDT and polio, and half of the children received these

vaccinations before the age of one. In the eastern region, coverage was estimated at 41 %. (TDHS 1994, XVII).

Vaccination programmes have almost totally fallen apart in the countryside of the State of Emergency Region (Ürküt, ref. IPPNW etc. 1996a, 65; Hanife 1998). In Amed their scope has also decreased substantially.

Table 8: Immunisation coverage in Amed 1990-96 (%)

Year	Whooping cough	Diphtheria Polio		Tetanus	Measles	BCG
	1st vaccination			2nd vaccination	3rd vaccination	
1990	88	77		68	58	32
1991	86	72		66	57	28
1992	74	57		54	52	24
1993	61	49		39	42	30
1994	44	38		34	29	29
1995	35	25		21	26	20
1996	75	62		37	73	29

Source: SES, Diyarbakir section: Gesundheitsbericht der Region Diyarbakir 1997, p. 53

BCG vaccination protects against tuberculosis.

International comparisons help one to understand how bad the immunisation situation is in North Kurdistan. Bangladesh and Ruanda are among the least developed of poor third-world countries. During the 1990s, floods and other natural disasters have regularly affected Bangladesh and Ruanda suffered a civil war. Both countries receive international development aid from governmental and UN organisations and NGOs.

Table 9: Immunisation coverage (%) in PDT, measles and BCG, 1996

	PDT	Measles	BCG
Diyarbakir	37	73	29
Turkey	84	84	69
Bangladesh	97	96	100
Ruanda	95	36	93

Sources: Diyarbakir: SES, Diyarbakir section: Gesundheitsbericht der Region Diyarbakir 1996, p. 53, Turkey, Bangladesh, Ruanda: WHO: The World Health Report 1998, p. 225-227

BCG vaccination protects against tuberculosis; PDT, against diphtheria, whooping cough, and tetanus.

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An additional problem in immunisation is that because of the frequent breakdown of the electrical supply, vaccines cannot be kept safely refrigerated, and their effectiveness is decreased (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 19). A Turkish physician told me that the same problem also exists in Turkish provinces. Some women in Amed told me they are afraid that the vaccines given to Kurdish children have passed their expiration date.

Because the PKK has placed land mines on roads in rural areas, the roads are not safe, so health teams are afraid to travel to remote villages to vaccinate children (PHR 1996, 204). When a health care team wants to go to some village in the State of Emergence Region to vaccinate the children, they are escorted by soldiers and gendarmes (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 44). Sometimes the gendarmes do not permit health personnel to visit villages to vaccinate children (HRFT 1997, 132). A nurse tells of the problems of vaccination:

> *Some years ago some doctors tried, on their own initiative, to carry out a highly essential programme of polio inoculation of the children in the villages around Diyarbakir. The doctors were accused of supporting activities hostile to the state amongst the population, and were arrested. (a nurse, ref. Kurdistan Report 26/1998, 23)*

Another problem with vaccinations is the suspicion of the population towards them:

> *In any case, a large part of the population refused the polio inoculations, because their distrust of the state authorities is so great that it extends even to public health measures, in the fear that the Turkish state will abuse such projects in order to sterilise*

Kurdish women when they undergo medical treatment. (a nurse, ref. Kurdistan Report 26/1998, 23)

Elvan Dumlu, a nurse in lstanbul, also reported in March 1998 (ref. Lodenius 1998a, 10) that many Kurds who live there do not accept vaccinations because they do not trust the state.

8.5. Lack of environmental health care

Many diseases are spread by polluted water and there is always the danger of an epidemic. The German IPPNW delegation that visited Amed in the spring of 1996 heard about an enteritis epidemic in villages near Amed:

Two people had died of enteritis and many children were in the hospital in Diyarbakwr. The employees of the local health station reported their observations to their director but nothing happened. Then they made a complaint about the director. The lawyer who was prosecuting the claim was threatened with deportation. Nothing was done about the polluted drinking water which had caused the epidemics. (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 28)

I have read and heard many times of similar situations: the authorities are aware of the problems but nothing is done to solve them. "Water and food samples are taken. The existence of coliform bacteria in the water sample is determined and yet the situation is left as it is," said one specialist in the 1995 report of the Turkish Medical Association. The report also mentions that there are even cases where no chlorine is added to the water because the municipality officer keeps the chlorine machine locked for security reasons. (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 18-19, 24).

One of the main problems which causes an increase in the incidence of diseases is the poor environmental conditions, especially contaminated water. When the deported villagers arrive in the shantytowns in Kurdish and Turkish towns and cities there is no increase in the infrastructure, water and sewage systems. The Turkish Medical Association gives an example of a health station where they had 2,000 Household Documentation Cards in an area where there were five street fountains in 1993. Two years later the number of the fountains was the same, but the number of Household Documentation Cards was 20,000. (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 19).

It is meaningless to advocate cleanliness in an area where water is provided once every two days from the city network and (where) the public reacted to the proposal that they should boil their water by

> *saying they feared that doing so would cause them to run short of gas. (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 24)*

In Istanbul there is a scarcity of water but in Kurdish towns the lack of clean water is paradoxical, as there is plenty of good water in the area where both the Euphrates and the Tigris and many other smaller rivers flow. Turkey has made agreements to sell water from these rivers and build a water pipeline from Kurdistan to Israel. Turkey is already transporting water to northern Cyprus.

Similarly, in the case of malaria the increase of the disease has not led to any measures to change the environmental conditions.

> *I know that earlier helicopters flew over and sprayed against malaria mosquitoes, but they don't do it any more, which really amazes me. (a woman, Europe)*

In the districts of Silvan and Çinar in 1994, the authorities could not obtain any pesticides from the Anti-Malaria Department (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 21). This is just one example; I have not been able to collect exact information about malaria prevention measures.

According to the WHO, effective anti-malaria activities require community participation, and they should be improved and expanded during the process of developing primary health care. The WHO gives advice on how health care staff can motivate the population towards malaria prevention. (WHO 1984). This kind of advice does not fit into the Kurdish situation, because the increase in malaria is not due to people's ignorance.

9. Morbidity in the 1990s in North Kurdistan

9.1. Health care in emergency situations

In the existing literature about low-intensity warfare there is not much information about health care and diseases of the civilian population in Mexico. After its delegation made a journey to Chiapas, the Committee for Health Rights in the Americas (CHRIA) criticised the Mexican government for its misuse of health care as a weapon of low-intensity warfare. The government denies health services to perceived Zapatista sympathisers and provides them to government supporters, but the short article in the Internet (http://citysearch7.com/E/E/SFOCA/0011/49/57/) does not give any detailed information (Committee for Health Rights in the Americas 1998).

Medical needs in emergency situations are basically similar to those of normal times. The difference lies mainly in their extent and the speed with which they arise. In a newly created camp for displaced people, medical needs are multiplied two or three times over. (Perrin 1996, 301). There is a close link between the nutritional status of deported people and their chances for survival in a different physical and socio-cultural environment. Very often, coping mechanisms that are efficient in the original environment are temporarily destroyed and people are more vulnerable to illness. (ICRC: Guidelines…; Stork 1989, 9) The health care system is one of the earliest casualties of the social and economic disruption of a country in conflict. Hospital doctors and nurses may not be able to perform their normal duties. They may go unpaid or be unable to reach the hospital, or they may be discriminated against for doing their job. These factors and the fear of violence have a considerable impact on their motivation and capacity for work. (Coupland 1994, 1694).

The health standards in North Kurdistan have declined in every category in which information is available. The same has also happened in southern Mexico among the supporters of the Zapatista movement: there has been an increase in malnutrition, diabetes, hypertensive coronary disease, metabolic and degenerative diseases; even the incidence of hemorrhagic dengue and pulmonary tuberculosis has increased (Castro Soto 1998a). The increase in morbidity is a logical consequence of the worsening of living conditions. Malnutrition and non-fatal diseases weaken people's resistance to other diseases; Kurdistan, and most probably Chiapas as well, are areas where many diseases have long been endemic. Endemic means that some disease is common in certain area, but not outside it. Even when the disease is thought

to be under control, many people are symptomless carriers of it, they distribute it further, and if conditions change, they can easily fell ill. In such conditions there is always the danger of epidemics.

In Brazil, diseases once thought to be safely under control - typhoid, dengue, malaria, polio, tuberculosis, leprosy, and bubonic plague - resurfaced during the 1980s to claim new victims, especially children. Scheper-Hughes writes that these kinds of diseases are often thought to be tropical diseases arising from the more or less "natural" interactions of climate, geography, and human ecology, but they should be considered diseases of poverty or diseases of "disorderly development" in which the social relations that produce rural to urban migration, unemployment, shantytowns, illiteracy, and malnutrition are the primary culprits behind the epidemics (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 31).

One method of using health care as a weapon in low-intensity warfare is *ignorance*. When health care staff force a woman with childbirth complications to deliver her baby in front of the hospital building, as has been reported from Adana (Kurdischer Roter Halbmond 1997, 30), they are fully aware that this can cause the death of both the mother and the baby. But no one is directly responsible for murdering them. This is, in brief, the goal of the whole strategy: when people die of disease it looks like a natural death. This is connected to the principle of low-intensity warfare that the war must be kept invisible so that the international mass media and the peace movement do not come to disturb the warfare.

Morbidity in North Kurdistan

During the entire period of Turkey's independence the health of the rural population has improved, but in the 1990s there was a clear backward movement. Diseases such as typhoid, malaria, and tuberculosis, which had already almost vanished from Turkey, again became common. In southeast Turkey the health standards were lower than the average in Turkey but there was constant improvement up to the end of the 1980s, partly owing to some WHO projects. (Lord Rea 1997, 16-18).

The greatest health risks for internally displaced people living in the slum areas of big cities are inadequate housing, malnutrition, and a lack of clean drinking water and sewage systems. People suffering from undernourishment are weak and often die of diseases whose treatment is routine in other parts of the world. (Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 82, 84). An anonymous Kurdish nurse told about the present health conditions in Amed:

> *Numerous infectious diseases are spread by dirty water. The lack of provision of drinking water, food, and a clean space to live in is the*

principal factor arousing anxiety as far as the state of public health in the region is concerned. Of course the social and economic situation of the refugees is poor, so they can not afford medical help and often seek professional medical attention only at a late stage of an acute illness. For this reason it is extremely difficult to give exact numbers for the rise in infectious diseases, without which you lack another important precondition for effective preventive measures or treatment. In Diyarbakır we face, amongst other things, infectious hepatitis, cholera, and epidemics of diarrhoea, different types of dysentery, and tuberculosis. In 1997, 776 cases of tuberculosis were registered. In Diyarbakır alone occur 27 % of the cases of malaria and 24 % of the cases of brucellosis for the whole of Turkey. These are the official figures of the Diyarbakır health department; we estimate that in reality the number of cases of these infectious diseases is at least double that. (a nurse, ref. Kurdistan Report 6/1998, 23)

The Turkish Medical Association states in its report on the health services in the Southeast that under the conditions of armed conflict and increased immigration, the rendering of ordinary health services has become almost impossible. Although the situation is extraordinary, health personnel are expected to work as if conditions were normal. In 1995, the Turkish Medical Association demanded that health personnel in the region must be informed on how to render services under such circumstances. They advised that the training of personnel should be arranged using the seminars of the World Health Association as a basis for recommendations. (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 7, 51).

It is not possible to get exact information about the situation. Due to the mass exodus no trustworthy statistics are available (Lord Rea 1997, 17). Many villages are so remote that the authorities do not even know when some epidemics occur. A Kurdish nurse blames the Turkish government for purposefully hiding information about health conditions in the State of Emergency Region. Offers by international organisations such as Médecins sans Frontières or the International Committee of the Red Cross to carry out epidemiological studies have been consistently blocked by the Turkish authorities. (Kurdistan Report 26/1998, 23; Niskala 1999; Vermot-Mangold 1998, 12).
In spring 1996 the German IPPNW delegation heard from an anonymous health care employee that at that time dysentery epidemics were occurring in Siirt and Silopi. The towns had been put in quarantine but the epidemics were kept secret by the authorities (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 47).

For example, salmonella and brucellocis epidemics are a problem every summer and we try to prevent them. But as fighting such epidemics depends on informing the population, one could draw a parallel between infectious diseases and the lack of democracy in Turkey. (a health care employee, ref. IPPNW etc. 1996a, 47)

In this research I describe the health situation in North Kurdistan and especially the following diseases: diarrhoea, pneumonia, measles, malaria, and tuberculosis. It is these diseases which regularly come up in the reports which I have used. There has been hardly any mention in these reports of cancer, diabetes, coronary disease, or other chronic diseases that cause death in Europe. The diseases of which people die in Kurdistan are diseases which are easily treated in other parts of the world. Kurds die of these diseases before they get cancer or have a heart attack.

When the WHO was founded after World War II, the diseases of great public health concern included those affecting maternal and child health, malnutrition, tuberculosis, malaria, venereal diseases, endemic treponematosis, smallpox, plague, cholera, and yellow fever (WHO 1998a, 28). Looking at the present situation in North Kurdistan, the most serious health problems are the same as those of 50 years ago; time has stood still in terms of the health of the population. There are huge problems in maternal health but I have not described them in this study because the issue is so complicated that it can not be dealt with as briefly as I have dealt with other diseases. Malnutrition among the Kurds is rather the rule than an exception. The incidence of malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera has increased during the 1990s. I can not say whether the situation is better with other diseases such as meningitis and yellow fever. I have focused on certain diseases in order to show their development after the internal displacement of the Kurdish population, since it is neither possible nor meaningful to describe the evolution of every disease in a research project which is a sociological analysis, not a disease chronology. Venereal diseases are nowhere in Islamic countries a serious public health problem.

9.2. Diarrhoeal diseases

Diarrhoea is one of the most important causes of mortality among Kurdish children.

The available statistics are not exact but they offer a clear idea of the situation. The National Control of Diarrhoeal Diseases was implemented in Turkey in 1986. The main aim of the programme is the prevention of deaths

of diarrhoea patients by prevention of dehydration (Biliker et al. 1993, 103). In eastern Turkey this programme has failed. A 1993 survey revealed that 18 % of the children in eastern Turkey had had diarrhoea during the previous 24 hours. Institutes working under the Ministry of Health carried out this research (Biliker et al. 1993, 103).

According to the Diyarbakir section of the SES, in 1994 in 24 % of the cases of death among children in the town the cause was infectious diarrhoea (SES Diyarbakir section, 1997, 59). According to research done at Dicle University in Amed (ref. IPPNW et al. 1996a, 53) every year about 30,000 children die of diarrhoeal diseases in the State of Emergency Region.

Ayse Bakac from the Mersin section of the SES reports that in the summer of 1996 in Çukurova, six children out of one hundred died because of diarrhoea. The Çukurova area covers Adana, Mersin, and Iskenderun provinces. Bakac does not mention her sources or the ages of the children affected (Bakac 1997, 61-61).

Malnutrition

Many children's diseases are a consequence of malnourishment. Scheper-Hughes, who studied infant mortality in northeast Brazil, writes that immunisation programs do not have much value when children are suffering from chronic malnutrition:

> *In the interior of northeast Brazil today, many poor infants and babies still manage to escape vaccination until they reach school age, but they are generallyprotected against the old scourges of childhood - measles, smallpox, diphtheria, whooping cough and so on - by the immunisation of the majority, which reduces the risk for all. But there is no immunisation against malnutrition and chronic diarrhoea. Oral rehydration therapy can "save" a poor infant on the brink of death a half dozen times or more until, finally, the little one simply refuses and dies of hunger several weeks or months later. (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 285)*

A Nicaraguan physician said the same thing:

> *Diarrhoea has to do with water, food, nutrition, and people's education. At the hospital we would treat a malnourished child for diarrhoea and send him home to the same conditions. Soon he would be back in hospital. It would go on like that until he died. This was obviously not a medical problem but a social one. Doctors were part of the problem, because we taught the people that*

hospitals and dangerous medicines were the answers to their problems. (a Nicaraguan physician, interviewed in Garfield and Williams 1989, 118)

Children are defined as malnourished when their weight falls below 80 % of the average weight for their height. Young children are more vulnerable to malnutrition than adults. One reason for this is that they are growing quickly, so their relative needs for nutrients are greater. Severe malnutrition may be due to lack of access to food, but it may also be related to infectious disease. Every episode of diarrhoea weakens the nutritional condition of a child and decreases his resistance to other infections. Recurrent diarrhoea and related infections and malnutrition cause 30-40 % of deaths due to diarrhoea among children. In such cases it is difficult to identify the exact cause of death. Cold weather worsens the effects of malnutrition - due to the cold, people need additional caloric intake - but people affected by famine often lack proper clothing and accommodation as well. This lack of protection from the cold also favours the development of malnutrition. (Hakewill 1999; Perrin 1996, 8, 112; Vesikari 1989, 326-327).

The consequences of poor health in childhood, including malnutrition, become apparent in adulthood, particularly for women of childbearing age. In many developing countries women give birth to children under societal pressure to have many children. There are inadequate maternal health services, and many pregnant women are anaemic. Their children are at risk of being born underweight, which is defined as a weight at birth of less than 2,500 gr. Both as newborns and into infancy and childhood, low-birth-weight infants are at much higher risk of mortality and contracting fatal diseases than other infants. Compared to full-term infants, they have a 3-4 times greater risk of dying from diarrhoeal disease, acute respiratory infection, or, if they have not been immunised, measles. They are more likely to be malnourished at the age of one year. (WHO 1998a, 7, 67-68).

In the Kurdish areas there are outbreaks of diarrhoeal diseases like typhoid, cholera, and dysentery, especially during the hot summer months. Many people's resistance to disease has decreased because of malnutrition and undernourishment (KHRP 1996, 8; Nazlikul 1996, 51-53).

Everybody can understand the importance of preventive activities like vaccinations in a climate which provides ideal living conditions for many pathogens - especially when the nutritional status of the population disastrously decreases their resistance to infectious disease. Children in particular suffer from this, as their immune

system has not yet fully developed. The result is a high rate of infant mortality. (Dr. Rodi, ref.Koordinationsbüro Newroz et al. 1995, 94)

The Canadian delegation which visited Amed during Newroz 1995 felt that all the children they saw looked undernourished and sick (Koordinationsbüro Newroz 1995, 192). This was also my own experience during a short stay in the Eminönü district of Istanbul in August 1997. Many children had thin hair, brown teeth, and skin infections. When some children were given biscuits after being photographed they gulped down everything immediately and faster than I have ever seen children eat anything in Finland.

Phenylketonuria, rachitis, and anaemia are common among Kurdish children living in Adana and Mersin (Kurdischer Roter Halbmond 1997, 10). According to research done in Amed (Türk Tabipler Birligi 1994, 21), about 32 % of children aged 0-6 years were under the normal height for their age group. 85 % of the children had anaemia, and 65 % had severe anaemia.

In one survey done in Amed, in the area of Baglar in 1990 (Toksöz and colleagues 1990, ref. Turkish Medical Association 1995, 32) it was found that 88 % of pregnant women were anaemic. In another survey (Toksöz 1991, ref. Turkish Medical Association 1995, 33) it was determined that 48% of the people have insufficient caloric intake. In addition, protein, calcium, iron, vitamin A, and vitamin C insufficiencies were determined to be at serious levels. Both of these surveys were done before the mass internal displacement of people had started.

Typhoid

Typhoid is a disease of the intestinal tract which causes toxification of the whole body. The disease starts with lethargy, headache, and fever. Stomach pain and diarrhoea start after some days. During the second week of the disease, the toxification becomes worse, the spleen is enlarged, and the mucous membranes of the intestines weaken and bleed. The patient loses weight rapidly. Usually the third week is the turning point: the clinical condition either improves or worsens. The direct cause of death of typhoid patients is often peritonitis caused by rupture of the intestines or pneumonia. Patients who recover from the disease secrete typhoid bacteria in their excrement for many months, possibly for the rest of their lives. The spread of the disease among the populace can be prevented only by strict hygienic measures. Small children seldom fall victim to typhoid; most of the patients are between ten and thirty years old. (Peltola 1979, 176-178).

From the following statistics published by the SES labour union, it can clearly be seen that the incidence of typhoid started to increase in Amed at the same time (1992) as the forced displacement of Kurds from their villages:

Table 10: Registered typhoid cases in Amed 1990-1996

Year	Cases
1990:	2,905
1991:	3,669
1992:	2,641
1993:	5,817
1994:	5,186
1995:	8,789
1996:	10,523

Source: SES, Diyarbakir section: Gesundheitsbericht der Region Diyarbakir 1996, p. 52.
SES refers to the State Institute of Statistics

In 1992, 22 % of the reported cases of typhoid fever in Turkey were in Amed (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 35).

Murine typhus is infectious diarrhoea caused by salmonella bacteria. The disease has symptoms similar to those of typhoid but they are much less serious. Patients have fever, stomach pain, and diarrhoea, which last two to five days. Murine typhus is not harmful for healthy adults but it can be very serious for children and old people - especially if they, like the people in Kurdistan, are already in poor health. In this disease as well, people who have recovered from it secrete salmonella bacteria in their excrement, so that strict hygiene is needed to stop the spread of the disease. (Peltola 1979, 171-172). The incidence of salmonella infections has increased in Kurdistan (Hanife 1998). One could also expect that this disease is not registered very carefully, because it is not a particularly serious disease. The symptoms of brucellosis are similar to typhoid, but contaminated dairy products spread the disease. It is also linked to malnutrition (Kurdistan Report 26/1997, 24).

Cholera

Cholera is a type of infectious diarrhoea which often leads rapidly to death if no suitable treatment is available. Usually death occurs when 10 to 15 % of the total body weight has been lost; in severe cases this may take only a couple of hours. Typical symptoms of cholera are watery faeces and vomiting. Patients usually vomit a lot and spread the *Vibrio cholera* contagion. A lack

of liquids and salts leads rapidly to serious dehydration and the needed treatment is intravenous transmission of liquid. Cholera is mainly transmitted by contaminated water, but also by food. Insects can carry the contagion from one place to another. (Hakewill 1999; Peltola 1979, 186-187). Cholera is one of the diseases of which every case must be reported to the WHO. Cholera is endemic in many parts of the world, and is considered to be responsible for 5 % of all cases of diarrhoeal disease. (Perrin 1996, 170).

A German delegation that visited Amed in March 1995 was told that there had been many cholera cases the previous summer. It was told that the outbreak of the disease was due to the mass exodus of Kurdish people, with many people forced to share a room, and no proper sanitation in the slum areas. (Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 85-86). An anonymous nurse (Hanife 1998) stated that there was an outbreak of cholera in the summer of 1997, but it was not reported.

Nazlikul criticises the Turkish health care authorities, saying that they do not inform the WHO of all cases of cholera and that they do not do enough to prevent the disease. The Turkish state blames the cholera epidemics on the lack of hygiene and poor nutritional status of slum inhabitants, but it refuses to speak about the reasons behind these problems. (Nazlikul 1996, 52). On 17 August 1994, medico international demanded (ref. Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 86). that the WHO press Turkey to reveal the true situation of cholera in the country. According to medico international, Turkey's refusal to do so is harmful not only to its own poor population but also to the international community trying to eliminate cholera. The organisation argues that Turkey is sheltering a reservoir of cholera bacteria which can invade cholera-free areas.

Parasitic diseases

Dysentery is an overall name for diseases of the intestinal tract which cause bloody diarrhoea. It can be caused, for example, by the *shigellosis* bacteria or by the *amoebiasis* protozoan. People can get this disease at any age, but it is most common in children between one and two years old. Most forms of dysentery are not severe, but the patient hosts the bacteria or protozoan for months in his body and continues to transmit the disease. (Peltola 1979, 179-183). Many people who carry the amoeba in their intestines have so much resistance that it does not cause any harm or symptoms. However, they can develop serious amoebiasis when their immune system is weak, for example after contracting measles or as a result of malnutrition or pregnancy. (Gilles and Migasema 1989, 387).

The giardia lamblia protozoan causes giardiasis and it is transmitted mainly by contaminated water. People can contract this at any age but it is most

common among children aged six to ten. Symptoms are usually minor, such as diarrhoea. The disease is more severe for children than adults. Patients who have giardiasis for a long time lose weight. Children can get absorption disorders in their intestines, which can lead to severe malnutrition, stunted growth, and a number of diseases. Giardiasis carriers secrete the protozoans in their excrement so that the disease is transmitted further in poor hygienic conditions. Many people carry giardiasis without having any symptoms, but it can cause them severe malnutrition and anaemia, as well as stunted growth in children (Gilles and Migasena 1989, 387, 390-391; Peltola 1979, 185-186).

Dysentery and amoebic dysentery are mentioned in many reports from Kurdistan (for example IPPNW etc. 1996a, 45; Hanife 1998). According to a study done in Diyarbakir (Türk Tabipler Birligi 1994, 21) more than 60 % of the children have intestinal parasites, which increases the effects of malnutrition. In another study consisting of 22,500 samples (Duran; Mete 1993, 17: 35, ref. Aksoy et al. 1997) it was found that over 90 % of the examined children from infancy to five years of age carried intestinal parasites, and that 60 % of the samples contained *Giardia intestinalis*. In 1989, a survey conducted among one thousand children in four elementary schools in Sanlwurfa found parasites in 88 % of the stool samples examined (Unat et al. 1989; 13: 75, ref. Aksoy et al. 1997). This research was conducted before the massive internal displacement started. Sanliurfa is also in the Kurdish region.

Statistics on amoebiasis from Amed show that the incidence of this disease increased there after 1992 in much the same way as typhoid.

Table 11: Registered cases of amoebiasis in Amed and Turkey 1990-1996

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Amed	1,023	1,499	2,043	2,615	3,056	5,242	5,347
Turkey		5,256	6,743	8,493			22,141

Source: SES, Diyarbakir section: Gesundheitsbericht der Region Diyarbakir 1996, p. 52.
SES refers to the State Institute of Statistics.

In 1992, 30 % of the reported cases of amoebic dysentery Turkey were in Amed.

9.3. Pneumonia

Often pneumonia starts as a simple cold, which then goes down to the chest. There the virus causes inflammation of the lung tissues, and this allows any bacteria to bypass the local immune system and set up a secondary infection. This is especially likely to happen if the child is already weak because of malnutrition. (Hakewill 1999). Pneumonia and other respiratory infections are the most serious disease among infants under one year old. The mortality rate is three to ten times as high as that of 1- to 4-year-olds. World-wide about 70 % of the deaths from acute respiratory infection occur before the patient's first birthday. (Ruutu 1989, 337; WHO 1995, 8).

The World Health Report for 1995 counted more than four million annual deaths due to acute respiratory infection in the developing world (WHO 1995, 8). A quarter of these deaths were linked to malnutrition, and another quarter were associated with pulmonary complications of measles, whooping cough, malaria, or HIV/AIDS. Measles decreases resistance in children, and in about 15 % of the cases of respiratory infection leading to death the patients have also had measles. Other risks that increase mortality are polluted air, poor hygiene, poor housing, and lack of treatment. The mortality rate of pneumonia patients can be reduced if there are fewer premature babies, if infants and children have better nutrition, and if good immunisation programmes exist. Properly funded basic immunisation programmes against measles, whooping cough, and tuberculosis would decrease the mortality rates for respiratory infections by 25 %. (Ruutu 1989, 335, 337).

Pneumonia is the greatest cause of child mortality in Turkey. In 1994 in Amed respiratory infections were the cause of death in 37 % of cases (SES, Diyarbakwr section, 1997, 50). According to a study done at Dicle University in Amed (ref. IPPNW etc. 1996a, 53), about 50,000 children die annually from pneumonia in the State of Emergency Region.

The high rate of pneumonia and other respiratory infections among Kurds is connected to poor housing conditions. Refugees live in slum houses which they have built themselves of bricks, sometimes even of plastic. Médecins sans Frontières advises that even in refugee camps a minimum dwelling area of 3.5 square metres per person is recommended to prevent chest infections, because the micro-organisms that cause them are spread by coughing and sneezing (Hakewill 1999). Heating systems are primitive, for example iron stoves. The temperature goes below zero during the winter months, especially at night, in places like İstanbul, Ankara, and Amed. There is also a lot of rainfall, which makes the cold houses humid and causes influenza. Under prolonged conditions such as those above, influenza when left untreated can become pneumonia. In industrialised countries, pneumonia is quite an

uncommon disease, as influenza patients recover from the disease before it gets worse. Pneumonia can also be treated effectively by antibiotics, so it need not be fatal.

Poor housing conditions also lead to other health problems such as hypothermia. A German delegation that visited Wan in 1996 was told that during the previous winter three children had frozen to death in the cold barracks of a refugee camp. In the Edremit camp near Wan they were told that two people had recently died of carbon monoxide poisoning in houses heated by coal, and that on the university campus in Wan ten people had been in the hospital because of coal-gas poisoning. (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 41-42; 47). In February 1999, I heard on the news in Turkey that in one İstanbul suburb a family of nine had died of carbon monoxide poisoning. When I talked about the case with some people, they said that such accidents are very common in Turkey. Fires are also common, partly because of the poor quality of heating and electricity systems.

> *We rig the electric ourselves, so we don't pay for it. We are Kurds and electricity comes from the Kurdish rivers, so it belongs to us. (a woman, Amed)*

9.4. Malaria

Malaria is caused by an ague parasite, a monocellular protozoan belonging to the genus *Plasmodium*. It lives in the salivary glands of ague mosquitoes. Plasmodium protozoans live in the blood and liver of human beings. When talking about the prevention of malaria, attention is usually paid to the malaria mosquito, but when it is question of eradicating the disease from a specific area, not the prevention of the disease in individuals, the role of human beings as carriers of the disease is as important as the role of the mosquitoes in transmitting it. Animals can not permanently host the types of plasmodium protozoans which cause malaria in human beings. (Peltola 1979, 230-235).

Plasmodium protozoans live in the red blood corpuscles. Repeated malaria attacks destroy red blood corpuscles, which increases anaemia during the malaria season, especially among infants and children. The general condition of the carriers becomes weaker. Other diseases secondary to malaria are vascular disorders and occasionally enlargement of the spleen. Years as a carrier of the malaria parasite can also lead to immunity to the disease, although then the carrier continues to host some malaria protozoans in the blood - and transmits the disease further. (Peltola 1979, 230, 238-239; Whittle 1989, 378).

Malaria is an especially dangerous disease for pregnant women. A pregnant woman who is anaemic is more likely to die of post-partum haemorrhage, which means blood loss during delivery. Regardless of previous immunity, for women having their first pregnancy malaria causes spontaneous miscarriages in up to 60 % of the cases and maternal mortality in up to 10 % of the cases. (Hakewill 1999; WHO 1998a, 95). Malaria also leads to economic and social hardship. Adults who are weakened by the parasite cannot work properly or take care of their children. (Hakewill 1999).

During the contra war in Nicaragua in the mid-1980s the increase of malaria epidemics was the most evident effect of the war on the health of the population. Before the war, the risk of getting malaria was almost equal in both the war zone and the non-war zone. Then malaria control was severely hampered in the war zone, as malaria workers were reluctant to go into many areas. The result of this was that in the late 1980s the risk of malaria was ten times greater in the war zone than in other areas. (Garfield and Williams 1989, 70-71).

At the beginning of the 1980s, malaria existed in Turkey almost only in the Çukurova area (Alfgren 1983, 14). In Kurdistan there have been occasional cases of malaria, but in the 1990s the disease is clearly on the rise. According to data from the Malaria Division of the Turkish Health Ministry, the reported cases of malaria in Turkey rose from 8,680 in 1990 to 82,096 in 1995 (State Institute of Statistics 1991, 142 and 1996, 168). According to the Turkish Medical Association (TTB), malaria is endemic in southeast Turkey. The Anti-Malaria Directorate of Diyarbakir reported an increase of more than 270 % in cases of malaria from 1992 to 1993 in Amed, with an estimated 30,000 active cases of malaria (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 21).

Most malaria cases in Kurdistan are *plasmodium vivax* malaria. There have also been some cases reported in Turkey of a more dangerous type, *plasmodium falciparum* malaria, which can lead to death in a few days if it is not treated. There have been no reported cases of drug-resistant malaria. (Aksoy et al. 1997).

These are the experiences of a Kurdish woman residing in Europe after a visit to Kurdistan in summer 1997:

> *All of those who live in the villages and in small towns - maybe also in big towns - have malaria. And when they are not treated they have it their whole life. When one sees that someone is shaking, one knows that it is malaria again. It has become a common disease and there's no treatment available.* (a woman, Europe)

There is also a major question as to how reliable the statistics are and how many malaria cases are not reported, since only those people who have money to pay for it seek medical help from a doctor. Some Turkish sources (for example the Turkish Medical Association 1995, 21) also mention that patients who get malaria medicine give it to ill neighbours. A Kurdish woman who visited Kurdistan felt that the official number of malaria cases was too low:

> *These numbers can not be true. The number of the cases is not only 80,000. It is at least ten to twenty times more, maybe even more than that. When the villagers are sick, maybe only one person goes to the doctor and gets medicine for the whole family. (a woman, Europe)*

Malaria is a clear example of how the conditions in health care have changed and worsened during the 1990s in Kurdistan. According to the WHO 1995 World Health Report, the worst health indices usually are a sign of extreme poverty and social disadvantage (WHO 1995, 1). This explains why most of the malaria cases in Turkey are in the Kurdish provinces. In 1994, 63 % of the reported malaria cases in Turkey were in the area of Diyarbakir-Mardin-Siirt-Sirnak-Batman (SES, Diyarbakir section, 1997, 50). According to the WHO, in southeast Turkey there is a potential malaria risk from April through October. In the tourist areas in the west and southwest of the country there is no malaria risk (WHO 1999a, WHO 1999b).

A clear change in the attitude of the Turkish health authorities towards malaria can be seen in statistics on the number of people who had malaria and received preventive treatment between 1971 and 1995. At the beginning of the 1970s, malaria was almost non-existent in Turkey. When the number of people contracting the disease started to increase in the middle of the 1970s, efforts to counter it were initiated rapidly. In 1974, 111,000 people received preventive treatment, and in the next year the number was 1,485,000. The culmination was in 1978, when 88,000 people had malaria and 8,235,000 people got preventive treatment. After this, the number of malaria cases and preventive-treatment cases also decreased, so that in 1990 only 8,700 people had malaria and 310,000 got preventive treatment. Then the number of cases of malaria again started increasing rapidly: 82,000 people had malaria in 1995. But during the 1990's there was no increase in preventive treatment. In 1995, only 248,000 people got preventive treatment against malaria. This is only 3 % of the amount of preventive treatment in 1978 despite the fact that the number of people suffering from the disease was almost the same during these two years.

Malaria cases and eradication activities in Turkey 1971-1995

Reported malaria
cases

120 000
100 000
80 000
60 000
40 000
20 000

1970   1975   1980   1985   1990   1995

The incidence of malaria in Turkey at the end of 1970s and since the mid-1990s.

People who got malaria
prevention (millions)

8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

1970   1975   1980   1985   1990   1995

During the 1970s, malaria prevention increased, but in the 1990s this has not happened.

The Diyarbakir section of the SES has paid attention to the prevention of malaria but it feels that its concern has not had any effect on the authorities. Instead its activities have been hindered (SES, Diyarbakir section, 1997, 48).

> *Earlier they distributed quinine to the villages. Now they have stopped doing so because they think that peasants will give the medicine to PKK guerrillas... And maybe they do, the guerrillas are their children, their brothers, their husbands. If a Kurd whom they know and who is very sick knocks on the door, it's not surprising that the village people share their medicine. (a woman, Europe)*

9.5. Tuberculosis

Tuberculosis is a lung disease caused by *Mycobacterium tuberculosis* bacteria. The disease destroys lung tissues and the bacteria can also spread to the lymphatic system, bones, nervous system, intestines, and other parts of the patient's body. The disease causes weakness and a slow atrophy in the patient (Peltola 1979, 223-224). It also causes a variety of respiratory problems; for example, tuberculosis patients are more susceptible to contracting pneumonia than other people.

As a disease, tuberculosis is closely connected to poverty and unhygienic conditions; the bodily fluids of tuberculosis carriers, especially the spittle, transmit tuberculosis bacteria. When a sick person coughs, the bacteria stay in the air and can enter the lungs of people nearby. Small children up to the age of five are especially vulnerable to contracting tuberculosis. When adults come down with tuberculosis, it is usually not a question of a fresh infection; it is more likely that they have long been carriers of the disease, which has risen up after the body's defence mechanisms have collapsed. This can happen, for example, when living conditions become more difficult or when the patient comes into contact with strong tuberculosis bacteria. (Peltola 1979, 224-225). Also, malnutrition and infectious diseases such as measles can cause the activation of tuberculosis bacteria to disease proportions (Kuusi 1989, 432). The World Health Report for 1995 (WHO 1995, 21) uses the analogy of a cobra in a basket to describe the process of tuberculosis breaking out. When the immune system of a tuberculosis carrier is weakened by disease or malnutrition, the lid is lifted off the basket and the cobra emerges.

There are effective medicines to treat tuberculosis, but the treatment is a time-consuming process and the patient should be under regular medical attention. The treatment takes a minimum of six months. During the first two months, the patient should simultaneously take four different medicines. In developing countries it has been difficult for medical workers to encourage patients to continue taking the medicines for the needed period. At the end of the 1980s,

it was estimated that in developing countries 40-50 % of the patients who started receiving treatment for tuberculosis did not continue for the needed period. Without treatment, mortality can be expected within two years in about 50 % of tuberculosis cases. (Kuusi 1989, 431-432, 439; Perrin 1996, 149).

The Diyarbakir department of the SES considers the increase of tuberculosis to be the greatest health problem in the Kurdish area. The incidence of the disease in the areas of Cizre, Silopi, Sirnak, and Kulp is as common as that of third-world countries. In Amed the number of registered tuberculosis cases in 1993 was 222 and in 1996 it was 726. The incidence of tuberculosis increased especially rapidly after 1994 (SES, Diyarbakir section, 1997, 53, 55). The chairman of the Medical Association of Van-Dr. Metin Akin -has stated that tuberculosis in Turkey is a disease specific to the Kurds (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 65).

Preventive treatment of tuberculosis is easy, as an effective vaccination exists. But in the Kurdish provinces only about 15 % of the children get this vaccination. In Hakkari at the beginning of the 1990s only 1 % of the newborn children received the BCG vaccination, which protects against tuberculosis (Türk Tabipler Birligi 1994, 20).

A physician in the district of Diyarbakir reported that when the doctors diagnose a patient with tuberculosis, it might be the last time they see him and they do not even know if he survived the disease (Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 82). In 1996 in Wan, treatment of tuberculosis was free of charge even for those patients who did not have a green card (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 45).

9.6. Polio

Three types of polio virus transmit polio. Like tuberculosis bacteria, the polio virus is also found mainly in unhygienic conditions. In tropical and subtropical countries where polio is common, most of the inhabitants are carriers of the virus but the disease breaks out in only one of a hundred carriers. The carriers carry the virus their whole lives and transmit it to other people. (Peltola 1979, 195-196). These kinds of areas are known as endemic areas as opposed to polio-free areas.

After the virus is contracted, the incubation period of the disease is one to three weeks. At the beginning the symptoms of polio are much the same as those of influenza, and for most patients the disease is over in a few days. If the severity of the infection increases and concentrates in the nervous system, polio can cause paralysis, which is sometimes fatal. As polio is a viral disease, there is no cure available; only the symptoms can be treated. Polio can strike at any age, but it mainly affects children who are under three years old (over 50 % of all cases). (Peltola 1979, 195-197; WHO 1999c).

In the twentieth century polio has been considered one of the most serious diseases world-wide. In industrialised countries, polio has almost completely

disappeared after a vaccination against it was developed at the beginning of the 1950s. Because there is no treatment available, the prevention of it - the interruption of polio virus transmission - is considered particularly important. (Peltola 1979, 195, 197).

The WHO is leading a world-wide campaign against polio. Medical officer Rafi Aslanian in the WHO's Egyptian office finds two aspects critical in the campaign against polio: there must be a continuous commitment to the campaign from the highest to the lowest political levels in the concerned countries, and there must be sufficient funding (WHO 1998b, 2). A cornerstone of the polio eradication campaign is ensuring high levels of routine immunisation among children under one year of age (WHO 1999c).

Polio has already been eradicated from a large part of the world. The only major remaining reservoirs of virus transmission are in southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (WHO 1999c). At the beginning of 1997 the WHO campaign staff thought that in the European region, which consists of 51 countries, they would say goodbye to the last polio virus by 1998. But between July and October 1997, six confirmed polio cases turned up in the southeastern provinces of Turkey, and between January and October 1998 13 new polio cases were reported to the WHO. (WHO 1998b, 2; WHO 1998c).

In collecting the data, the WHO is aware that not all polio cases are being reported, and it estimates that the real number of polio cases is about ten times as high as the official number (WHO 1998b, 2). Looking at the reliability of Turkish statistics, one must be especially critical when considering the number of polio cases reported for southeastern Turkey. Even in 1996, the German delegation which visited the Wan hospital was informed that the hospital treated polio patients (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 45, 47). The delegation was told that in 1995 there were about 60 cases of polio in Turkey. A Kurdish nurse (Hanife 1998) has stated that polio was previously uncommon in Kurdistan, but now it is on rise.

After the polio cases had been reported to the WHO in four southeastern provinces of Turkey (the WHO does not identify the provinces) the WHO organised a major polio eradication campaign in autumn 1998 in the areas on the borders of Turkey (11 provinces), Iraq (nine governorates), Iran (four provinces), and Syria (the border governorates). The WHO does not even once mention the word "Kurdistan" in the article about this campaign. From 4-12.10.1998 and 7-15.11.1998, about 2.3 million children under the age of five were targeted to receive additional polio vaccines during an intensive door-to-door campaign. In an article distributed in the Internet (http: // www. who.int / gpv-news / news / 251098. momentum.htm) the WHO does not give any details of how the vaccination campaign succeeded in the southeastern

provinces of Turkey that are governed by the military, and with a major part of the population hostile towards all Turkish authorities, including health care staff. The WHO only reports that the project mobilised tens of thousands of health workers and volunteers and was implemented by the Health Ministries of the four countries concerned, with support from the WHO, Rotary International, UNICEF, and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Dr. George Oblapenko, the WHO officer responsible for polio eradication in WHO's European region, stated that "as long as the polio virus has not been completely eradicated from Turkey and neighbouring countries, there is a significant risk that polio will reappear in Europe or elsewhere in the world" (WHO 1998c).

9.7. Measles

In Europe, measles is just considered an ordinary children's disease which has almost disappeared because of vaccinations. But in third-world countries it is one of the most common causes of child mortality. The WHO World Health Report for 1998 calls it the leading killer among vaccine-preventable childhood diseases (WHO 1998a, 53). In areas where the measles vaccine coverage is below 50 %, the danger of an epidemic always exists.

When a child has measles, the rash covers not only the skin but also the internal body surfaces of the affected person. This is what causes the complications of measles. The rash affects the intestines, which leads to diarrhoea. It affects the inner surfaces of the lungs, which allows secondary infections to take hold, leading to pneumonia (Hakewill 1999). Complications have more severe effects on undernourished children than on others, so in all programmes where the target is to control measles, the improvement of children's nutritional condition is important in addition to vaccinations. (Perrin 1996, 162, 165). The danger of complications remains high for months after the child has recovered from measles. The most common complications leading to death are pneumonia and diarrhoea. (Aaby 1989, 441, 443, 448). Vaccinations against measles actually decrease infant mortality due to diarrhoea more than do diarrhoea vaccinations (Vesikari 1989, 332).

In September 1998, a physician in Istanbul reported that measles was increasing rapidly among Kurdish children, as the vaccination programs, which had previously been carried out effectively in Turkey, were failing. According to the physician, measles is now the third most important cause of child mortality after diarrhoea and pneumonia.

As is the case of other diseases, there are no trustworthy statistics about the frequency of measles in Kurdistan, although in visitors' reports there are lots of separate comments about it. For example, the German delegation (IPPNW

etc. 1996a, 41-42) which visited a refugee camp in Edremit near Wan in 1996 was told that four children had just died of measles. The Turkish Red Crescent administered this camp, which consisted of 53 families with a total of 294 people. The delegation also visited a camp near Van University where 88 families, 435 people in all, were living in a former student hostel where each family had one room. Eleven children had recently died there, the most common cause being measles.

9.8. Other diseases and a general view of morbidity in the 1990s

When we look at other diseases there is the same sad picture of poor health. All kinds of diseases can be found in Kurdistan. The disease figures of the area resemble those of a tropical African country more than those of Turkey's Mediterranean neighbours. There are cases of leprosy and anthrax (splenic fever), which is actually an animal disease.[58] The situation is worse in the countryside and in small towns than in large towns like Amed. (Dr. Rodi, ref. Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 93, 95).

Leishmaniasis is a disease of the skin and mucous membranes caused by a parasitic protozoan. In Central America the disease is known as "mountain leprosy". It is transmitted by biting sandflies, and there is always the danger of an epidemic. Carriers of Leishmaniasis transmit the disease further, and some animals like dogs and mice can also host the protozoan. (Garfield and Williams 1989, 18; Peltola 1979, 253-255). In Sanli Urfa, near the Atatürk Dam, there are cutaneous forms of Leishmaniasis which are increasing rapidly. In 1990 the number of Leishmaniasis patients in Sanli Urfa was 552, and during the first nine months of 1994 there were more than 3,000 cases. In 1991, 80 potential cases of visceral Leishmaniasis, kala-azar, were found. (Aksoy et al. 1997). Kala-azar is the most serious form of Leishmaniasis, and it is nearly always fatal if left untreated. Its carriers are vulnerable to contracting other diseases such as tuberculosis. (Peltola 1979, 254; The World Health Report 1995, 28).

Because of poor hygiene, the incidence of skin diseases like scabies has also increased (Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 84; PHR 1996, 202; Turkish Medical Association 1995, 35). Scabies is usually a disease that affects the whole family. A mother having no visible symptoms often transmits it to her children

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[58] In Zimbabwe there was a large anthrax epidemic at the end of the civil war in 1979 which affected only the black rural population; white farmers and their cattle remained healthy. Meryl Nass (1992, 12-17, 61) asks whether the epidemic was caused by a natural occurrence or by biological warfare. For example, the biological warfare program of the US focused on the development of anthrax and botulism weapons. Nass states that spreading animal and human diseases can be one counterinsurgency strategy, and every epidemic with an unusual epidemiology must be analysed.

(Paajanen 1989, 362). When volunteers of the GIYAV Foundation (*Göç Ve Insani Yardim Vakfi*, the Human Aid Foundation) visited Vedat Dalokay near Mersin in 1997, they saw 17 Kurdish families living there in a vegetable storage hall. More than 100 people used two toilets, drinking water was carried from the distance of half a kilometre, and other water was taken from a small canal and collected from rainwater. People said that they washed themselves once in 3-4 weeks, and that it was very difficult to wash clothes. (Jaakkola 1998; Göç Der Haber Bülteni 1/1998). According to the standards of Médecins sans Frontières, even in emergency situations there should be one latrine per twenty people and a minimum of ten litres of clean water per person every day (Hakewill 1999).

When I asked a displaced Kurdish woman in Amed how often she washed her children, she found the question very funny. After I repeated the question, she answered:

> *I have one basin and a gas kettle. Every Sunday I heat water to wash the children. I would like to do it more often but gas is very expensive. I don't have money to go to a hamam. (a woman, Amed)*

The WHO hopes to eliminate trachoma, a transmissible eye disease that is the most common cause of blindness in the world, by the year 2020 with a program of long-lasting antibiotics (WHO 1998a, 53). In Turkey, most of the trachoma cases are in the province of Sanli Urfa near the Atatürk Dam. The disease is said to be endemic there. Number two in the trachoma statistics is Diyarbakwr province; 62 % of all the trachoma cases in the mid-1990s in Turkey were in these two provinces. Only 17 % of the registered trachoma cases were outside the southeastern provinces (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 35, 37). As is the case for many other diseases, the population in Urfa has almost no access to the necessary medical treatment, nor have there been any attempts to clean the area of trachoma by increasing hygiene (Koordinationsbüro Newroz etc. 1995, 86).

The 1997 Statistical Yearbook of Turkey gives a much more tidied-up picture of the situation than does the Turkish Medical Association. According to the Yearbook,

> *The fight against this disease, which has been a major health problem for many years, has been going on since 1925... Preliminary work included the establishment of trachoma dispensaries and hospitals in provincial and district centres where the disease was common. These establishments have been gradually improved over time. (State Institute of Statistics 1997, 141)*

Hepatitis B is a viral infection affecting the liver; it causes 60-80 % of all primary liver cancer, which is one of the three most common types of fatal cancer in east and southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Hepatitis B is transmitted by sexual intercourse and blood transmission and, in developing countries, most often in childbirth from mother to child. There exists an effective vaccine for hepatitis B, which 90 countries have integrated into their national immunisation programmes. In Turkey 1-2,4 % of population is affected by hepatitis B. (Lumio 1989, 474-475; WHO 1998a, 54-55). A Turkish physician reported that "about half of the population in Amed are carriers of hepatitis B". A delegation of the Kurdish Red Crescent which visited Kurdish refugees in Adana in 1997 was told that hepatitis is one of the eight most common diseases among the refugees (Kurdischer Roter Halbmond 1997, 31).

Diphtheria is mentioned a few times in travel reports from Kurdistan. For example, a German delegation mentions a discussion in an airport bus with a young Turkish physician doing her training in Culemêrg (*Hakkari*) (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 18). There had been six cases of diphtheria in Culemêrg during a few months in 1996. The physician found her work very difficult, as the people in Culemêrg are very poor and can not buy the needed medicines nor can the health centre give them medicine free of charge. The prevention of diphtheria is easy, as an effective vaccine exists, the triple vaccine PDT. But at the beginning of the 1990s, only 19 % of the infants in the province of Hakkari had received a PDT vaccination (Türk Tabipler Birligi 1994, 20).

Turkey does not permit international organisations to survey health conditions in the State of Emergency Region, nor does it publish reliable reports or statistics about the situation. The information that can be found in visitors' reports and reports compiled by Turkish labour unions and human right organisations shows that morbidity has increased since the deportation of Kurdish peasants intensified at the beginning of the 1990s. The health situation in the Kurdish provinces at the end of the 1990s looked similar to the situation of the whole of Turkey in the 1970s. Instead of moving towards the universal target of "health for all by the year 2000" that was set by the WHO meeting in Alma Ata in 1978, the health standards in the Kurdish provinces are declining.

The poverty and increased morbidity of the Kurdish people who have been deported is a vicious circle, a process that feeds itself. Malnourished people are weak and vulnerable to contracting diseases which they could resist under better conditions. Parasites and malaria are very common, and for their carriers the effects of other diseases, for example measles and diarrhoea, can be serious. Most of the victims of increased mortality are children who are under five years old. Many diseases which are easily treated in other parts of

the world are fatal for the displaced Kurds. For example, influenza often leads to pneumonia if the patient is undernourished and lives in a cold, damp house, without proper clothing. Pneumonia is the greatest cause of child mortality in Turkey. In 1994 in Amed respiratory infections were the cause of death in 37 % of cases (SES, Diyarbakwr section, 1997, 50). According to a study done at Dicle University in Amed (ref. IPPNW etc. 1996a, 53), every year about 50,000 children die of pneumonia in the State of Emergency Region.

Increased morbidity in North Kurdistan is connected to several factors, not only to the poverty caused by deportation. Health care in North Kurdistan is organised the same way it is in other parts of Turkey despite the fact that the circumstances are different. There has been no serious attempt to solve the basic problems. The Ministry of Health has ignored, for example, the fact that a large proportion of Kurdish patients do not understand Turkish. In the absence of a mutual language it is difficult to organise preventive health care. Kurds have traditionally not had access to health services and they lack knowledge about health care. The level of hygiene is poor in the villages, and Kurdish peasants do not pay much attention to caring for the sick, for example by isolating them in order to restrict the dissemination of infectious diseases. The worsened living conditions due to deportation have intensified the health problems that already existed before the civil war.

The international community has not done much to help the Kurdish internal refugees after the government of Turkey denied humanitarian organisations permission to deliver aid to them. The international community has also quietly accepted the fact that Turkey neglects its duty to inform the WHO of cases of transmissible diseases like cholera and polio. When non-governmental organisations report that there is evidence of such diseases in North Kurdistan, a proper survey is needed to confirm the claims. Instead of doing this the Western countries have accepted the fact that North Kurdistan (and maybe also South Kurdistan) has become a reservoir from which communicable diseases can spread to other countries as well. Polio is one example of this. A German delegation which visited Wan hospital in March 1996 was informed that the hospital treated polio patients. The delegation was told that in 1995 there were about 60 cases of polio in Turkey (IPPNW etc. 1996a, 45, 47). One might expect that the staff of a state hospital which tells foreigners about polio cases would also inform the Ministry of Health about the disease. Then the Ministry should implement the agreement Turkey made with the UN and send information about the cases to the WHO, which is leading a world-wide campaign against polio. But the WHO was not informed about the six confirmed cases of polio in North Kurdistan until autumn 1997 (WHO 1998b). It arranged a massive vaccination campaign against polio only in

October and November 1998, two and half years after the German delegation was told about the polio cases.

10. Infant and child mortality in North Kurdistan

For most third-world countries the infant mortality rate is the best available overall indicator of health and development. It reflects the socio-economic development of a country (WHO 1995, 5). Child mortality is usually registered in two categories: mortality of infants (0 to 12 months) and mortality of children (0 to 5 years). The strongest determinants that set the different levels of child mortality rates around the world are the living conditions of families, the prevalence and modes of transmission of infectious disease agents, and the nutritional status of children. Improvement in at least one, but preferably all three, of these elements is required in order to effect a significant overall decline of the rates. (WHO 1998a, 61).

In the developed world the mortality rate of children has decreased rapidly since the end of the 1940s. Now a similar decline in specific diseases is occurring in the developing countries, mainly as a consequence of general improvements in sanitation, water supply, education, and access to preventive and curative health care. These improvements are similar to those which took place earlier in Europe and North America, but the progress has been more rapid because of the historical lessons learned and the new knowledge and technologies that influence prevention, treatment, nutrition, and fertility regulation. (WHO 1998a, 61-62).

70 % of the children under five who died in the developing countries in 1990 died from one or, frequently, more than one of five conditions: malaria, malnutrition, measles, acute respiratory infections, and diarrhoea. Often it is impossible to know what actually led to the death of the child, because of difficulties in distinguishing the signs and symptoms of some of these diseases from one another. Every disease episode makes a child weaker; he has loss of appetite and decreased caloric intake, despite the increased demands on the child's energy due to the illness. Most of these deaths could be easily prevented by a combination of immunisation, improved maternal health, family planning and improved nutrition. (WHO 1998a, 62, 67).

According to the 1998 World Health Report, the mortality rate of moderately underweight children who are under five years old is 2.5 times higher than that of normal-weight children, and 5 times higher for severely underweight children (WHO 1998a, 132).

According to TDHS (Tuncbilek 1994, 114-115), malnutrition is a serious problem in eastern Turkey. In a study conducted in rural areas of Diyarbakir (Toksöz

1992, ref. Turkish Medical Association 1995, 30) the height of 32 % of the children in the 0-6 age group was determined to be shorter than the norm. The rate of malnutrition was determined to be 24 %, and 85% of the children were found to be anaemic; 65 % of them had severe anaemia.

In the Kurdish provinces before the war, the infant mortality rate was already higher than in other parts of Turkey. The Turkish Medical Association, referring to official statistics, gives the following figures for 1992: infant mortality: Turkey 60 per thousand, Diyarbakir 87 per thousand, Hakkari 98, Bingöl 108, Mus 115; and child mortality (under the age of five years): Turkey 78 per thousand, Diyarbakir 114 per thousand, Hakkari 139, Bingöl 144, Mus 154. Only in Tunceli were the rates under the average for all of Turkey: infant mortality 58 and child mortality 75 per thousand (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 25).

One reason why Kurdish families want to have many children is the high child mortality rate. Before the war started, Ferda Turan wrote in 1983 that in Kurdistan there is no basic health care, no vaccinations, and a shortage of nutritious food. Many Kurds live in villages which are totally isolated by snow during the winter. All of this leads to a situation where even ordinary child diseases lead to death. (Turan 1983, 11). Traditionally there has been a certain fatalism concerning the death of infants. People are so accustomed to the high infant mortality rate that a child's life is not considered assured until he begins to eat with adults (Hansen 1961, 107).

> *We know that the weak children do not survive, there's not much that we can do for it, and maybe it's good because life here is hard (a doctor in Midyad 1983, ref. Alfgren 1983, 20).*

The Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) does not show figures for infant and child mortality by district in Turkey, but it gives some background information: infant mortality is more common in rural than in urban areas, when mothers are under 20 or over 40 years of age, when the baby is born less than 24 months after a previous birth, or if the child is the seventh or more of the same mother (TDHS 1993, 83).

A large part of the population was already living in poverty before the war and the deportation of people started, and malnutrition was common. Where vegetables are rare the usual diet consists of unleavened bread, goat's cheese, milk, and yoghurt (Laizer 1991, 9).

I asked some deported Kurdish women what they usually eat.

We usually make chorba (soup) and eat it with bread and rice. We eat more vegetables during the summer than the winter because they are cheaper then. We eat meat two to three times a year. Milk, cheese and yoghurt are so expensive that we cannot buy them, not even for the children (a woman, Amed).

I also asked them what food mothers from their village usually give to small babies if they are not able to breastfeed. "They mix bread with tea and give it to their babies," was the answer. This surprised the interpreter, who asked the women to tell about other foods given to infants, but this was the only practice the women knew.

No exact information is available about present-day infant and child mortality rates in the State of Emergency Region. Because the population census collapsed there during the 1990s, the following figures are only estimates that show the direction of the development rather than exact statistics. Dr. Metin Akin, chairman of the Van Medical Association, told a German delegation in 1996 that in the State of Emergency Region every year about 50,000 infants die of respiratory infections and 30,000 children die of diarrhoea (ref. IPPNW 1996a, 65). Lord Rea explained at the conference "War and Health in Kurdistan", held on 28-29 June 1997 in Hamburg, that in some parts of Amed the child mortality rate is 90 per thousand. The Turkish Medical Association cites the same number when referring to the results of local research at Dicle University (Public Health Department) (Turkish Medical Association 1995, 17). Some physicians who work in Amed give as high a figure as 120 per thousand (Rea 1997, 17-18). Mahmut Kilinc, chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Kurdistan Parliament in Exile, wrote in an open letter in January 1998 that the infant mortality rate in Diyarbakir is 95 per thousand (Kilinc 1998). Necdet İpekyüz, the Secretary of the Medical Association of Diyarbakir, Mardin, Siirt, Batman and Sirnak, estimated in May 1995 (ref. HRFT 1997, 132) that the child mortality rate in the State of Emergency Region is two or three times the overall average for Turkey. The Turkish Demographic and Health Survey done in 1993 in co-operation with the Ministry of Health concluded that infant and child mortality rates in the eastern region are about 15 % higher than the national average (TDHS 1994, 81).

The situation in North Kurdistan becomes understandable when it is compared to areas facing similar political or economic problems. One example is Northern Brazil, where Scheper-Hughes studied infant mortality at the end of the 1980s. The infant mortality rate there was then 116 per thousand, which is comparable to the poorest parts of Africa. Official statistics are only an approximation of an under-reported phenomenon. The

inefficiency of public health care means that there is no diagnosis of the cause of death in about two-thirds of the cases. (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 279). There was a military coup in Brazil in 1964, and infant mortality started to increase soon afterward. William Leser (Leser 1972, ref. Scheper-Hughes 1992, 282) examined the evolution of infant mortality in São Paolo between 1909 and 1970 and noted a general tendency of decline until 1961. After that the rates rose again. Roberto Macedo (Macedo 1988, ref. Scheper-Hughes 1992, 282) examined the effects of the growing economic crisis on the health, welfare, and mortality of children in São Paolo in the 1980s. The rising rates of urban unemployment, worsening income distribution, and decline or stagnation in the production of basic food staples over the period 1975-85 were closely correlated with the rise in infant mortality and an increase in the percentage of low-birth-weight infants. Charles Wood found in his research (Wood, 1977, ref. Scheper-Hughes 1992, 283) that there was a direct negative correlation between real wages and infant mortality.

International comparisons help us to understand better how high the infant mortality rate is in southeastern Turkey:

Table 12: Infant and child mortality rate (per 1,000) in 1997

	infant mortality	child mortality	GNP per capita in $US 1995
Amed (1)	90	120	238
Turkey	45	58	2,780
Finland	5	6	20,580
Bosnia and Herzegovina	14	20	
Bangladesh	80	104	240
Tanzania	81	123	120
Mozambique	112	163	80
Afghanistan	156	246	

Sources: Amed, infant and child mortality: Lord Rea, Die stärkste Belastung trägt das Volk. 1997, p. 18. On GNP per capita: Kilinc, letter to the member states of the European Union, distributed by AKIN via Internet, January 1998.
Countries: WHO, World Health Report 1998, pp. 221-223.

(1) The sources do not mention the year these figures were gathered.

The highest figures are in Afghanistan, which has endured two decades of civil war. This table shows clearly the importance of international humanitarian aid and the long-term development programs of the WHO. Despite the recent civil war, the infant and child mortality rates in Bosnia are not much higher than a normal European level. Bosnia received intensive humanitarian aid throughout its crisis.

In Nicaragua during the last year of Somoza's regime, 1979, the infant mortality rate was 90-120 per thousand, which is quite similar to present-day figures in North Kurdistan (Garfield and Williams 1989, 117).
Scheper-Hughes calls the dying children the most immediate victims of Brazil's "quiet and bloodless" military coup. In the slum area where she worked in 1965 as a public health worker in the Peace Corps, 44.5 % of those who died were children younger than five. The high proportion of child to adult deaths did not change during the next two decades (Scheper-Hughes 1992, 295-296). In Kurdistan as well, the mortality of children is much higher than the mortality of adults. In 1995 Lord Rea visited the graveyard of the Seyrentepe refugee camp near Amed. He noted that there were ten graves of adults and more than 50 graves of children (Rea 1995).

Information about the level of infant and child mortality in North Kurdistan is alarming. Child mortality is connected to malnutrition and poverty, and both of them increased among the displaced Kurds during the 1990s. There is a great need for an international survey of the situation, as the child mortality rate is a practical tool to analyse the standard of living of a certain group and estimate how their situation has developed.

11. Health problems as a consequence of war, a method of low-intensity warfare, and a reflection of ethnocide

Lack of humanitarian aid as a method of low-intensity warfare

Is the deterioration of health conditions a method of low-intensity warfare against the Kurds or a consequence of the war? There seem to be elements of both. The fundamental difference between low-intensity warfare and the "normal" consequences of war is that in low-intensity warfare the problems of the civilian population are *intentionally* caused. The results of low-intensity warfare can mix with the unintentional effects of the war and lead together to new consequences.
Some situations are clearly consequences of the militarisation of the civilian sector of the society. Both health centres and schools have been closed because of the conflict. The main reason is that there is a lack of staff in both

sectors, in education and in health care. Another reason is that the army has taken some buildings for its own use. Health care staff must participate in military operations and treat wounded soldiers. The daily routines in health centres are hampered by the permanent presence of the police, and many people are afraid to seek medical help. The effective working hours in the health centres are short because patients want to reach home before it gets dark.

Many of the problems in the health sector are elements of low-intensity warfare, even though they might look like a consequence of the war. Some practices are not only a method of low-intensity warfare, but a part of normal warfare in civil war without traditional front lines. Health care staff must co-operate with the police and the army; policemen might intervene in the treatment and interrogate the patients. It is forbidden to treat people who are suspected of working against the state. Health care staff are not free to do their work; they need permission from the Regional Governor of the State of Emergency Region even for many routine duties.

When analysing low-intensity warfare in North Kurdistan, the *methods* the army uses must be analysed separately from the *consequences* of the acts. A look at the Turkish army's warfare in North Kurdistan reveals some typical examples of low-intensity warfare methods. For example, the army has encircled Kurdish villages to force people to migrate. Encirclement is a mixture of military, economic and psychological warfare. Restricting admission to health services is also used as one method of warfare. The green cards, the "tickets" for free visits to physicians, must be applied for at police stations, and services are denied to people who do not support the government.

The increase in morbidity in North Kurdistan looks like a consequence of war, but it is at least partially caused by low-intensity warfare. Many details show that the Turkish authorities have not done much to prevent or minimize the problems caused by the displacement of Kurds. When arranging medical services in an emergency situation, the first thing is to admit that a crisis exists. Then the activities must be planned accordingly. The destruction of three thousand villages and the internal displacement of three million people in Turkey fulfil all the criteria of an emergency situation. Nonetheless, the health services in the State of Emergency Region and in the slum areas of western Turkish cities, where many Kurds have arrived, are still organised as though conditions were normal. Turkey is not letting international humanitarian organizations deliver aid to the people who need it. Turkey is also neglecting its commitments to register and inform WHO about communicable diseases like polio and cholera, despite the fact that it has signed international agreements about these diseases.

I will next analyse the health conditions in North Kurdistan from the perspective of how the increase of two diseases - malaria and polio - fits the criteria of low-intensity warfare. The amount of malaria increased tremendously during the 1990s. I consider the lack of malaria prevention in the 1990s as a method of low-intensity warfare. The Turkish authorities claim that they have not been able to carry out the necessary preventive measures because of problems caused by "terrorists", but as described in Chapter 9.4 the situation is so totally different from that of the 1970s (when there was an equally enormous increase in the number of malaria cases) that there must be more than just practical reasons behind it. The Kurdish provinces have not been totally out of the control of the Turkish authorities. Another aspect is that unlike some other infectious diseases, malaria mosquitoes can transmit the disease to guerrillas even if they do not visit the villages. So the increase of malaria and the lack of quinine has effects both on the guerrillas and the civilian population.

Another example is polio. The disease has been eradicated from a large part of the world and the WHO is leading a world-wide campaign against it. Every found case of polio must be reported to the WHO. A German delegation of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) which visited Van in 1995 was told that there were about 60 cases of polio in Turkey. But Turkish authorities informed the WHO in summer 1997 about only six cases of polio. This led to a massive vaccination campaign in 1998 in the Kurdish provinces that was supported by some international organizations.

In the material which I have reviewed, this vaccination campaign is the only example of international humanitarian organizations being permitted to work in North Kurdistan. In autumn 1998 2.3 million children in the Kurdish area in four countries were vaccinated against polio. But as the disease is endemic there, if newborn infants are not vaccinated it is only a question of time before new cases of polio will appear.

The distribution of humanitarian aid shows clearly the difference between ordinary warfare and low-intensity warfare. Usually during a war the authorities try to keep the suffering and mortality of displaced civilians to a minimum by giving them shelter, food, and medical care. There are international agreements to secure this.

For years various NGOs have reported on the suffering of the displaced Kurds and asked for permission to deliver humanitarian aid to them. The International Red Cross (ICRC) has offered humanitarian aid for the Kurdish region for more than 15 years, but the Turkish government has not permitted the ICRC to deliver it (Niskala 1999). Turkish security authorities have rejected

proposed donations of medicines by Médecins sans Frontières (KHRP 1996, 10). Medico international and KHRP argued in 1996 that because of the scale of the problem Turkey needs professional and financial assistance to carry out humanitarian relief and rehabilitation of the displaced people. They suggested that a special assistance agency should be created to ensure that the displaced people have access to shelter and subsistence. They also demanded that the ICRC and the UN Commission on Human Rights be given free access to monitor the situation in Turkey. (medico international and KHRP 1996, Recommendations, 35). In 1998 the Council of Europe rapporteur Vermoth-Mangold demanded access for international humanitarian organisations to the Southeast and the implementation of a major programme to encourage the return of the Kurdish population to their homes, with financing from the Council of Europe's Social Development Fund (Vermoth-Mangold 1998, 3). These are only a few examples of international demands on behalf of the Kurds. But nothing has happened as yet. Despite the exceptional conditions in the State of Emergency Region, the health care system there is organised as though the situation there were normal.

Humanitarian aid was used as a low-intensity warfare method of pacification during the Ethiopian civil war in the 1980s. There was a serious famine in 1984 due to drought. The majority of its victims in Eritrea and Tigray resided in areas administered by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Tigray People's Liberation Front. In 1985-86 Ethiopia received over one billion dollars in famine-related assistance of which the US was the largest contributor. Over 80 % of this assistance was allocated to the government, despite the fact that it had access to less than half of the famine victims. An estimated one million people died to hunger in the guerrilla-held areas of Tigray and Eritrea. Millions of people were forced to leave their lands and migrate, and the majority of them were lost to the Eritrean liberation movement. According to Gayle Smith it was partly due to assistance from the West that the Ethiopian government was able to force hundreds of thousands of peasants out of guerrilla-held areas. (Smith, G. 1987, 31-37). The same elements exist in the situation in Turkey: control of humanitarian aid is one method by which the Turkish government has forced Kurds to leave their native areas. While the Ethiopian government directed international aid to its own supporters, the Turkish government controls humanitarian aid by denying it entry into the country.

While the government of Turkey prevents international humanitarian organisations from being active in North Kurdistan, what is the target of its own development programmes there? These programmes seem to be one method of pacification. For example, soon after the detention of the PKK

leader Öcalan in February 1999 State Minister Ecevit announced that TL 30 trillion would be transferred to the Investment Promotion Fund in order "to provide financial support for the manufacturing industry, the health care system and the education system, and to increase both production and employment" in the Southeast (Turkish Daily News 20.2.1999). Observers should be asking what kind of development programmes the government is willing to introduce in the Kurdish provinces at the same time that it is denying international organisations permission to deliver any assistance to the Kurds.

Low-intensity warfare in the shadow of ethnocide

The Turkish authorities' restriction of international support for the Kurdish movement is one important component of low-intensity warfare. Öcalan's arrival in Rome in October 1998 was an important turning point which brought the Kurdish issue to the attention of the Western mass media, but during his stay in Rome and later during the first months of his detention, the media only described the ongoing situation of Öcalan and the PKK without giving much information about the background of the Kurdish question. The term "media embargo" best describes the situation of the Kurdish question in the Western mass media before October 1998. Former BBC Ankara correspondent Jonathan Rugman believes that two reasons for the underreporting of the war are that the Kurds have only a few experienced politicians and that no government is supporting the PKK (Rugman 1996,20).

When the government of Turkey restricts Western journalists' free access to information about the situation in the Kurdish provinces, it uses both visible and invisible methods. A visible method is to restrict travel to the area (as was done after the detention of Öcalan when there were demonstrations in Kurdish towns) and to escort journalists who travel there "for their own protection" so that people dare not to speak with them (Laber 1994, 49). News reports about North Kurdistan rely mainly on information supplied by the Turkish government (Laber 1988, 16).
The deportation of Kurdish peasants is the most important LIC method. Plans to deport the Kurds were a part of Turkish law as early as the 1930s, when the Kurdish rebellions had only a local character. Since there was no need for counterinsurgency, deportation was not a method of warfare. Kurds were forced to migrate to western Turkey after they had lost their rebellions. Plans to deport Kurds to western Turkey to locations where they would not exceed five percent of the population were in fact plans to assimilate the Kurds, not methods used to win a military conflict. Deportation can be analysed from various perspectives. In some cases deportation of the civil population is a consequence of war and in some others it is a method of low-intensity

warfare. But it is always something more: it is one method of ethnocide. Ethnocide of the Kurds has been a goal of the Turkish state since the creation of the republic.

Lack of information in various forms - from limitations placed on journalists' travels to bans on academic research and institutions - is one method of both ethnocide and low-intensity warfare, but its meaning is very different in these processes. The process of ethnocide has been continuous since the beginning of the 1920s, but the army has used various methods of warfare, for example counterinsurgency, only when there has been a military conflict. In the process of ethnocide the state's aim in hiding information about the Kurds is to deny their existence. As a method of low-intensity warfare the purpose has been to win the war. The present Kurdish uprising is one aspect of a process which has continued for decades: it is one of the Kurdish reactions to the ethnocidal suppression of their existence.

Low-intensity warfare is one method of putting down the Kurdish resistance and letting the ethnocide continue. Lack of information about the conflict serves both the army's short-term military purposes and the state's long-term ethnocidal purposes. The tradition of ethnocide is supporting the Turkish government's aim of hiding the low-intensity warfare that is going on in North Kurdistan. The ethnocidal prohibition against communicating background information supports the aim of low-intensity warfare to keep the suffering of the war victims away from the international mass media.

One important question is how the Turkish government has been able to hide both the civil war and the displacement of at least two million people as well as its ethnocidal denial of the existence of the Kurds in Turkey.

Besikçi writes that the West is the firmest supporter of the war in Kurdistan (Besikçi 1997b). It behaves as though it does not see, or hear, or know anything about the burning, destruction, and displacement of millions of people which is going on in Kurdistan. (Besikçi 1997b).

Sheikmous points out that from the 1960s to the 1980s the catastrophic situation of the Kurds was covered in the European mass media but it did not lead to any action at the political level. The Kurds were merely featured in cover stories that won international prizes in journalism and photography. (Sheikmous (1999).[59]

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[59] In addition to ignoring the war in Kurdistan, the US mass media pay only negligible attention to other events that happen in Turkey. Laber wonders why the American mass media did not even mention that the US embassy in Ankara was stormed on 10 April 1994 by angry Muslim demonstrators who had heard on Islamic television broadcasts that chemical weapons had been used against Bosnian Muslims in Gorazde. This was the worst threat to the embassy's security in the history of US-Turkish relations (Laber 1994, 49-50).

Also, the KHRP and medico international claim that European countries can not be unaware of the forced displacement of the Kurds:

> With regard to the legal remedies, the international community has a clear role to play. Every member state of the European Community is represented diplomatically in Ankara. Not one of them can be unaware of the massive devastation and forced migration taking place in the Southeast. Nor can they be unaware of the way in which this breaches international law, particularly the provisions of the European Convention.
> It is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that the human rights dimension of Turkey's conflict with the PKK has been firmly subordinated to the political and economic interests of these governments. US government reports on Turkey's human rights record shows it fully understands what is happening.
> Though their provision of war equipment and alongside their knowledge of Turkey's serious human rights violations, *other governments are also accomplices in this process*. (medico international and KHRP 1996, 36, 38, 39, italics KK)

David Barchard wrote in February 1984, three and half years after the military coup:

> *What happens in Turkey, happens in some sense also in Europe. If there is a conspiracy of silence to hide the appalling misuse of authority in Turkey, the effects will spill through into Europe in a variety of ways. If we value our own liberties, we should value those of Turks as well. (Barchard 1984, 6)*

Skutnabb-Kangas and Bucak claim that the international community is aware that Turkey is pursuing a policy of genocide, physically and culturally, and violating several articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but it seems to covertly accept the violations which the Turkish government is committing (Skutnabb-Kangas)

12. Summary and discussion

Low-intensity war against the Kurds

The strategy of low-intensity warfare was developed in the US, Turkey's most important military ally. Turkey's army imported this strategy from the US along with other military knowledge. Instead of conventional warfare against the PKK, Turkey's army started to use low-intensity warfare methods when Tansu Çiller became prime minister in 1993 and set up the Special Teams for guerrilla warfare. The best-known principle of low-intensity warfare is "to dry up the sea if you can not catch the fish by normal methods". This means cutting off the guerrillas' supply routes by deporting the local population which supports them.

In North Kurdistan the most intensive destruction of the countryside was carried out from 1992 to 1996. The army has razed about three thousand villages and there are at least two million internally displaced Kurds living in the shantytowns of Kurdish and Turkish cities. (Amnesty International 1996b, 3). The number of Kurdish civilians, mainly children, dying in this invisible war is many times higher than the number of people dying in the battles. The conditions of the displaced Kurds are very bad and their standard of living is very low: there is lack of food, lack of adequate housing, lack of hygiene and lack of preventive and curative health care. Many social problems can be called health problems, and in any society the poor have the most diseases. The World Health Report for 1995 states that poverty is the greatest cause of ill health in the world, and the worst health indices usually are a sign of extreme poverty and social disadvantage. (Kleinman 1997a and 1997b; WHO 1995, 1). In North Kurdistan, or parts of it, many infectious diseases such as malaria, measles, tuberculosis, polio, leishmaniosis and trachoma are endemic. Malnutrition has created conditions where carriers of a disease fall ill without showing any symptoms beforehand. The incidence of all the infectious diseases for which it is possible to get information has increased. Diseases - especially diarrhoea, measles and tuberculosis - are easily communicated to other people. While the incidence of disease has increased in the State of Emergency Region, the number of health stations and centres and the number of health care staff have decreased. Also, the amount of

environmental health care, immunisation and surveys about the situation has decreased.

The health situation in the Kurdish provinces at the end of the 1990s looks similar to the situation of the whole of Turkey in the 1970s. In the 1970s the major health problems in Turkey were related to infectious and parasitic disease, and measles was among the most common communicable diseases. (WHO 1980, 250). In the 1970s, 2.5 % of the population in the Kurdish region suffered from tuberculosis, and measles and trachoma epidemics were common among village children. (Jafar 1974, 145). So, instead of reaching the universal target of "health for all by the year 2000" which was set by the WHO at its 1978 meeting in Alma Ata, the health standards in the Kurdish provinces have gone backward. The situation in North Kurdistan - both the incidence of diseases and the organisation of health care - has deteriorated to a level that is common in the Third World. It resembles the conditions in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa more than those in the western parts of Turkey.

One important method of low-intensity conflict (LIC) is to minimise international solidarity for the guerrilla movement and its supporters. This means a news embargo about the war as well as blockage of humanitarian aid for the war victims. These elements are connected to each other, and both of them can be found in North Kurdistan. The deported Kurds need humanitarian aid. The economy of Turkey was very weak during the 1990s, but that is not the main reason for the lack of aid for the deported Kurds, as international humanitarian aid would have been available. But Turkey is not permitting the UN organisations or international humanitarian organisations such as like the Red Cross or Médecins Sans Frontières to survey the situation of the deported Kurds or to deliver humanitarian aid to them. (PHR 1996, 8; interview in Saqlik Sen Diyarbakir 22.2.2001). Because the international mass media keeps silent about the suffering of Kurdish civilians, there is no international pressure on the government of Turkey to force it to permit humanitarian organisations to work in North Kurdistan.

Poverty and morbidity have increased among displaced Kurds. The basic problems of health care in North Kurdistan are now the same as they were before the civil war - the problems are not a consequence of the war, the war has just made the existing problems worse. Let us look for example at the case of polio, a disease which in the WHO's European region (which consists of 51 countries) can be found only in Southeast Turkey. The WHO is leading a world-wide campaign against polio. According to the WHO, two aspects are critical in the campaign against polio: there must be a continuous commitment to the campaign from the highest to the lowest political levels in the concerned

countries, and there must be sufficient funding. (WHO 1998b). In the State of Emergency Region in Southeast Turkey both of these conditions are missing. There can be no real success in solving the health problems of a region if there is no acknowledgement of the real causes of high morbidity. The status of funding is connected to this factor. The war has increased the problems connected with health care; there is a lack of health-care personnel, and health centres have been taken over for military use. But even before the war, there was no political will to solve the elementary problems of health care in North Kurdistan.

Kurdish ethnocide in Turkey

The Kurdish ethnocide can be analysed by means of the concept of the UN Convention on Genocide, and also by Lemkin's theories about genocide. According to Lemkin, genocide has two aspects: the destruction of the national pattern of the target group and the replacement of it with the national pattern of the oppressing group (Lemkin 1944, 79). The second aspect of these is evident in North Kurdistan. Even the existence of the Kurds as an ethnic group has been denied, and Kurds have been assimilated by force into the Turkish culture through many methods, from banning the Kurdish language to presenting Kurdish native arts as Turkish culture. Turkish universities and institutes have accepted the official ideology without discussion - instead of questioning the official ideology, they disseminate it. (Bexikçi 1997b).

When the Ottoman Empire became the Republic of Turkey, it took over the concept of minorities that prevails in modern Europe and North America and applied it in its own Middle Eastern context: minorities were no longer regarded as a permanent and distinct part of a multi-verse, but instead they were seen as special groups whose adjustment to overall society is "incomplete". There was a change from the Ottoman Empire, the land of Muslims inhabited by numerous millets, to Turkey, the habitat of one Turkish nation as imagined by the Turkish rulers.

When one analyses the situation of the Kurds through Lemkin's description of genocide, most aspects of this concept can be found in North Kurdistan since 1923. According to Lemkin, genocide is a synchronised attack on the target group:

1. in the political field: Kurdish self-government systems were destroyed in the 1920s and 1930s by deporting local leaders to western Turkey.
2. in the social field: The social cohesion of Kurdish society has been broken and its normal development hindered by killing and removing important

groups such as intellectuals and religious and political leaders. After some quiet decades since the 1950s, these operations intensified in the 1990s.

3. in the cultural field: Kurdish schools, associations, publications, and religious fraternities were closed in 1924 and the use of the Kurdish language in public places was forbidden until 1991.

4. in the economic field: While western Turkey has been developed towards a modern economy, production in the Kurdish provinces is still based on feudal land ownership and the same farming methods that were used during the Middle Ages. There is almost no industry; the Kurdish area is like a colony, which produces raw materials and a labour force for western Turkey.

5. in the biological field: The Turkish state has implemented its policy of depopulation on a massive scale. This intensified during the 1990s.

6. in the field of physical existence: During the 1990s morbidity and mortality increased among the displaced Kurds, but the Turkish government is still denying international humanitarian organisations permission to deliver food and medicine to them.

The situation is not so clear with the two final definitions given by Lemkin, in the fields of religion and morality. Kurdish madrasas were closed in 1924, but Islam still plays an important role in the lives of the Kurds. But Islam is not a national force – even when Islamists are politically active, they are part of the Turkish political system, not part of the Kurdish national movement.

The ideas of *accommodation* and *communalism* (Smith, A. 1981, 15-17) explain why discrimination is based on the expression of ethnic identity, not on the mere fact of that identity[60]. When a minority is assimilated into the host society in accordance with the policy of accommodation, individual members of the minority often are assimilated into the host society. The host society encourages the members of the minority to participate in the social and political life of the majority. None of the deported Kurds have been assimilated. During the 1990s the government's plan to assimilate the Kurds by deporting them did not succeed; instead, it has been an additional burden on the weak Turkish economy that about five per cent of the country's inhabitants have been made homeless and unemployed. Through the deportation, "the problems of the east have been shifted to the west". Instead of being assimilated into the Turkish society the deported Kurds have turned urban areas into Kurdish villages. The result of the deportation has been quite

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[60] A fact which often amazes commentators on the situation of the Kurds in Turkey is that many Kurds, like the Parliament Speaker Hikmet Çetin, have reached high positions and have not been discriminated against because of their Kurdish origins.

the opposite of its original aim: a national awakening process is taking place among the Kurds, a process which can be called reactive ethnicity. I think that the main reasons why the Kurds have survived the deportations as an ethnic group are their long tradition of resistance, their large numbers and the fact that there is a large Kurdish community in Europe assisting the Kurds in Turkey at both the individual level and the organisational and political level. The Kurds constitute about one fifth of Turkey's population, 12-13 million people out of a population of 65 million. In Turkey many national minorities such as the Lazers, Tatars, and Circassians have been assimilated. Because they lack a geographical territory of their own and a large enough population, they have not been strong enough to resist assimilation, but there are simply too many Kurds to be all killed, assimilated or deported.

The UN Convention on Genocide defines genocide more narrowly than Lemkin does. According to the former, genocide means, in addition to killing members of the group, for example "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part". This is near to aspects five and six of Lemkin's definition: genocide includes killing "by a policy of depopulation and by introducing a starvation rationing system and by mass killings". Is international displacement of the Kurds a method of genocide? According to the UN Convention, genocidal acts are committed *with intent to destroy a group*. In the Nigerian civil war in the 1960s the massive deaths within the civilian population were caused mainly not by battles but by diseases. But, as du Prees says about the Biafran war, even if the famine was deliberately imposed by blockade, the war was not within the scope of the UN definition of genocide, as there was no intent to systematically eliminate an ethnic group after the Nigerian army had attained its goal. (du Prees 1994, 27). Many indigenous people have nearly vanished as a result of epidemics of communicable diseases; the mortality of many groups has reached genocidal proportions. They were caused by unwitting human actions, but they could not have been intended, because knowledge of the causes of the epidemics was not yet available. (Jonassohn 1992, 20-21). The situation of the Kurds who were deported in the 1990s is not comparable to that of the deported Armenians and Native American tribes: on the one hand, knowledge about communicable diseases is available today, and on the other hand, the deported Kurds have not been totally isolated. They have received support from their relatives from Turkey and abroad. Because of this, the Kurds have survived displacement better than many other displaced groups during the past centuries.

It seems evident that although the increase in mortality among Kurdish civilians is very serious, the increase in morbidity - even if it has been

purposefully caused – is not a method of genocide. The aim of the Turkish state is not to eliminate the Kurds, but to assimilate them.

Skutnabb-Kangas analyses linguicide from the perspective of how it matches the UN Convention on Genocide. Formal education, which teaches children the dominant language at the cost of their own language, is genocidal. Learning new languages should happen *in addition* to their own languages. If there are no alternatives in education, the children's loss of their first language and their transfer to the majority language group happens by force. According to Skutnabb-Kangas, this fits the criteria of the UN definition of genocide as "causing serious bodily or *mental* harm to members of the group". Minority children's non-identification with their mother tongue leads to an interruption of the transgenerational transmission of the language. According to Skutnabb-Kangas, this means that children from one group have been forcibly transferred to another group, which is part of the UN's definition of genocide. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000a; Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, 332). In the analysis, the difference between *'members of the group'* and *'the group'* is problematic. The target of ethnocide is to eliminate an ethnic group as a cultural entity. The aim is to cause changes in the group as a whole, not just in its individual members.

Ethnocide and low-intensity warfare in Turkey

Low-intensity conflict is a military strategy in which the war should not look like war. It is used for defeating an enemy in armed conflicts, not for assimilating a minority. Ethnocide is a long-term practice used to eliminate an ethnic group as a separate cultural entity. Low-intensity warfare can be one of the various methods which an oppressive government is using to destroy an ethnic group. There can be resistance against ethnocide but it does not always reach the armed level. In many cases the strategies of ethnocide and low-intensity warfare support each other. When the outside world receives as little information as possible about the target group, the warfare is easier to hide. According to Castro Apreza, one of the most important components of low-intensity warfare in Chiapas in southern Mexico is the government's effort to minimise international solidarity with the Zapatista movement. (Castro Apreza 1998). Deportation is a method used both in low-intensity warfare and in ethnocide, even in genocide, as it is an attack on the target group's biological and physical existence. (Lemkin 1944, xi-xii).

The deportation of the Kurds is usually seen as a method of low-intensity warfare rather than a method of ethnocide. Analysis of this research shows that although there are elements of both, deportation is basically an ethnocidal

practice. A program for the deportation of the Kurds was worked out by Enver and Talat Pasha, the two Unionist leaders who were the main initiators of the massacre of the Armenians. Kurds were to be deported for resettlement in West Anatolia, in locations where they were not to exceed five per cent of the population. (Kendal 1980a, 44-45). The deportation of the Kurds in the 1990s must be seen against this historical background. When the army started to evacuate Kurdish villages at the beginning of the 1990s, it was claimed that this was being done in order to cut off the PKK's supply routes. But these village burnings are just one link in the long history of Kurdish deportation.

Lack of research as one method of ethnocide

What is the role of research: how does it affect cultural genocide and how does it affect low-intensity warfare? Information collected by research can help people - both the target group of ethnocide/low-intensity warfare and outsiders – to better understand the process. It can be said in a rather pointed way about their differences that in ethnocide the oppressors want to prevent changes in the behaviour of *the target group* when they prevent research and other forms of information. When this is seen as a method of low-intensity warfare, the target group is *the international public*; by hiding information from it an oppressive state is trying to prevent its enemy from getting international support. The difference between these two situations is not clear: usually a government which is using low-intensity warfare methods against an ethnic minority also practises other forms of oppression, maybe even ethnocide. So research has different effects on ethnocide and on low-intensity warfare. Deeper knowledge about the group can increase its members' awareness of the group's ethnic identity and change the phenomenological side of their ethnicity. It can strengthen the process of reactive ethnicity among them. When there are surveys and news reports that break the mass media embargo caused by low-intensity warfare, they affect outsiders rather than the target group.

Researchers disagree about whether ethnocide is a form of genocide that should be included in research about cases of genocide. Research about ethnocide is clearly outside the mainstream research about genocide, and there is very little theoretical analysis of it. Kuper says that though cultural genocide was not mentioned as a crime in the UN Convention on Genocide, it is commonly treated as such. He defines cultural genocide as acts with intent to extinguish, utterly or in substantial part, a culture. Ethnocidal acts include depriving the group of opportunities to use a language, practice a religion, create art in customary ways, maintain basic social institutions, preserve memories and traditions and work in co-operation towards social goals. (Kuper

1981, 31). As with the definitions of other forms of genocide, one problem is that the term was created for use in international law, not for research; this makes the use of the UN definition of genocide problematic in research.

All ethnic groups have the right to understand their culture and society, and research is a tool in this process. I have seen no one apply the term "ethnocide" to the *prevention of research*. The definitions which Kuper, for example, mentions describe forms of culture which disseminate already existing information, with the exemption of "creating art in customary ways". (Kuper 1981, 31). Research creates new information about the ethnos. Usually the word *intent* makes it problematic to define genocide: there may be a victim and there may be a victimiser, but there is no genocide in the absence of an intent to destroy a group. (du Prees 1994, 9). But when research about an ethnos is not permitted, the question of intent does not arise: research and surveys are always done after previous planning. For example, when the Turkish authorities decided after 1965 to stop questioning people in the population census about their mother language, this certainly could not have happened by accident.

Fein suggests a social-scientific definition for the term "genocide" which is broader than the UN one. In her definition, genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and *social reproduction of group members*, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim. (Fein 1992, 3, italics KK). Widely understood, the suppression of research also fits this definition of genocide - in our modern times, how can an ethnic group be socially reproduced when there is a lack of even such basic information as the number of its members?

Lemkin's description of genocide is also compatible with the suppression of research. According to him, genocide means not only the immediate destruction of a nation, it means also *a destruction of the essential foundations* of the life of an ethnic group, with the *aim of annihilating the group itself* (Lemkin 1944, xi-xii, italics KK). When looking at this definition it is good to keep in mind that he made his formulation in the 1940s. Since that time, life has changed a lot, and we might nowadays see "the essential foundations" in a different way than he did sixty years ago. For example, folklore and oral traditions have in many countries been replaced by mass media and formal education, and research has gained more importance as the information it provides is used by various institutions. Lemkin does not speak about research or researchers, but he mentions that genocidal acts include "killing or removing important groups like intellectuals" and "prohibiting or

destroying cultural institutions and activities, by substituting vocational education in the liberal arts in order to prevent humanistic thinking, which is dangerous because it promotes national thinking". Research fits very well into this context; for example, research about Kurdish history could promote Kurdish national thinking.

Ethnicity is not a static state of being but a continuously changing process. Pre-modern ethnicity is, so far as the ordinary actor is concerned, minimally self-conscious. Ethnicity has characterised national development in the Western world since the sixteenth century and in most other parts of the world since the nineteenth century. (Fishman 1977, 35). Methods of ethnocide are also acts aiming *to change the natural development process* in a way which harms the group. When tribalism decreases and is replaced by nationalism, one consequence is that ethnic groups want to form national states. When a modern group controls a tribal group it is logical that it will try to keep the oppressed group in the tribal stage and hinder it from reaching the modern level.

Academic research is a phenomenon of modern times. Social sciences are one way to understand the change from traditional to modern ways of living, for example the change from tribalism to nationalism. Lack of research about a minority group can be one method for the majority to hinder it from reaching a modern stage. It is not possible for an ethnic group to understand properly the present situation without knowing its own background. By denying research about a minority, the majority can keep it traditional while developing its own society in a modern way. In the Kurdish context this means, for example, that if there had been a proper understanding among the Kurds about their tribal system, it might have been possible for them to overcome the lack of unity which the system imposed on them.

Creating new information about an ethnos is usually not mentioned in definitions of ethnocide. Ethnocide is described as acts targeting forms of culture which disseminate information that already exists. The *destruction* of a building that is part of a cultural heritage, for example a national library, is described as a form of ethnocide by Selbmann; but *preventing* the creation of a national library is also an ethnocidal policy. (Selbmann 1998). Often genocidal and ethnocidal acts are understood to happen fast, perhaps over several years, but not over many decades and many generations. But the target and the effect are the same, even if the destruction takes a longer time. If the bombardment of the Bosnian National Library is considered an ethnocidal act, the *lack of* national libraries for many minorities should also be considered ethnocide. The issue is very complicated, since there is not only a lack of literature about

the group but also a lack of the idea of a national library and all it represents. Even though the Bosnian National Library has been destroyed, the ideas which it represents remain. The situation is different for groups that have never had a national library and do not know what one is.

Lack of research about the Kurds in Turkey

The development of academic life in Turkey during the 1900s must be seen against the background of the change from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey. The Ottoman state was a multicultural society and the Ottoman governments allowed the various ethnic groups to live autonomously. When Ottoman citizenship changed to Turkish citizenship, the government started to "teach" the people to be Turks. Among other things, education and academic life were also tools in this policy: the Sun Language Theory and the Turkish Historical Thesis were created to promote Turkish nationalism. The change from Arabic script to the Latin alphabet helped the authorities to practise censorship: after one generation, people could no longer read texts written before the Kemalist regime seized power.

Until the 1950s the Kurds lived in tribal communities with oral communication, and research as understood in the modern sense was not a part of their culture. They had a rich culture with poetry, music and folk dances but almost no tradition of literacy. Their centuries-old system of education was destroyed in 1924 when the Turkish authorities closed Kurdish medreses, or Quran schools. Primary education has been compulsory in Turkey by law since the creation of the Republic but until the 1950s most Kurds had never attended a school. At that time Turkey started to build primary schools in the Kurdish provinces and in the 1960s boarding schools where Kurdish children are separated from their families. The target of both primary and secondary education for the Kurds is to Turkicize them.

Only very few Turkish or Kurdish researchers have studied the history, language or sociology of North Kurdistan. Since the 1950s some foreigners have tried to do research, but the Turkish authorities have stopped them whenever possible, for example through travel restrictions: Southeast Turkey was from 1925 to 1965 a military zone where foreigners needed a travel permit. There are travel limitations even now. Since 1965 there has been no mention in Turkey of a population census in which members of ethnic groups are identified. Statistical information about North Kurdistan is lacking or falsified. Concerning the 1980s and 1990s, "suppression of truth" best describes the level of Turkish research about North Kurdistan. Critical information (such as the findings of the investigations of the murder of Uğur

Mumcu that were carried out by the order of Parliament or investigations about the environmental effects of the GAP project) is often declared confidential.

The establishment of the PKK has led to a mass movement which is the first Kurdish rebellion with a national rather than a tribal character. In the 1990s its popularity among the Kurds increased, which has led to a politicising of the people and the flourishing of Kurdish culture, especially music. Educated Kurds have come to understand the value of written literature to a national movement. Books, magazines and newspapers in Turkish and Kurdish have been published in Europe, and since the end of the 1990s increasingly also in Turkey. But until now there has been very little understanding within the national movement about the significance of academic studies.

In Turkey, Turkish and Kurdish ethnic identities have developed in totally different ways. By the World War I, Turkish ethnic consciousness had reached the national stage, while the Kurds still lived in the tribal stage. After the founding of the Turkish Republic, Turkish ethnicity was supported systematically by the state; even academic life became part of this process by assuring Turks of their superiority. Kurdish ethnic identity has developed under unstable conditions, and the difficulties in its development have been not only political. The phenomenology of ethnicity (what ethnicity means for the members of a group) is different for Turks and for Kurds. For Turks their ethnic identity is part of their normal life, whereas for Kurds their Kurdish identity is a political choice, because it has developed as a reaction to oppression. Tribal societies and modern societies reproduce their social structures by different methods. Academic research is a phenomenon of modern thinking and modern administration. In Turkey research has been one tool used to construct a Turkish national identity and to modernise the Turkish parts of the country. For the Kurds, research has been prevented, as has the natural development of many other sectors in their communities. By preventing the development of their society towards modernity, Turkey has kept the Kurds in a tribal system where awareness of ethnicity and national ideas do not belong. In addition, the Turkish state has also prevented Kurdish communities from developing in traditional ways. They have faced serious problems when their traditional administrative systems have been destroyed by the deportation of local Kurdish leaders to western Turkey. After receiving a Turkish education many Kurdish aghas and their families have been Turkicized and they have not continued in their traditional positions as local leaders.

Censorship and self-censorship characterise public discussion and research in Turkey. The Armenian genocide is one example of this. The Turkish state has developed a totalitarian attitude towards this part of its history. Instead of questioning what really happened to the Armenians, every means of communication and mind control is used to promote the denial of a historical fact. The Turkish government also threatens other countries that it will pull out of co-operation with them if they recognise the genocide. Here the meaning of research is very clear: the genocide happened more than eighty years ago but the genocidal process still continues actively in the form of denying and hiding the facts. Academic life reflects political development in a society which has committed genocide. After World War II Germany went through a process of confessing its past. The role of academic life in this process is to try to find the truth, and the politicians' role is to draw conclusions and possibly to apologise to the victims.

There are similarities in the research - or lack of it - in Turkey about the Armenian genocide and about the Kurdish question, and there are important differences. Historical facts about both issues are hidden: the details of how the Armenians were deported and executed, as well as how the Kurdish peasants were killed after their suppressed uprisings. In some aspects these processes are very different, as the main actions against the Armenians were the mass killings in 1915-1918, but the Kurds have been targeted for assimilation rather than total destruction. Lack of research about the Armenian genocide is one method of hiding the destruction, which was carried out by methods other than assimilation. In the case of the Kurds the lack of research is one method of demonstrating that such a group does not exist. The boundary between these differences is not very clear: Kurds have also been killed in mass murders (especially in Dêrsim in 1938), and the concealment of these facts serves the same purposes as the concealment of the details of the Armenian genocide. But more than that, lack of research is part of a larger process by which the Turkish state has tried to keep the Kurds in a tribal stage to prevent their development towards a national stage. One of the effects of the genocide on Armenian society has been that sociological and other research has developed slowly because of the small number of survivors. But by denying the genocide and banning research about it the Turkish state is not claiming that the Armenians do not exist as an ethnic group. As ethnic groups Armenians and Kurds have different position in Turkey: the Armenians are described in the Lausanne Treaty as a minority group, but there is no mention of the Kurds. For the Armenians, lack of research means denying historical facts but not denying the existence of the group, as is the case for the Kurds.

The problems of the social sciences in Turkey are connected to the other problems of the country and can not be solved before the general problems are solved. For example, censorship will remain an essential part of academic life as long as it suppresses public discussion. The present situation can not be changed without changing the founding ideology of the Republic of Turkey; as long as the concept of one nation dominates all public thinking in Turkey, it will be impossible to study the cultures of Muslim minorities.

Need for research about North Kurdistan

As there is a lack of research about the Kurds, a researcher studying the Kurdish issue is creating research traditions at the same time as she does her research. Despite the fact that research about the Kurdish culture, language, history and political situation has increased a great deal during the past twenty years, there is a lack of administrative infrastructures to support Kurdish studies. Researchers who deal with this issue co-operate with one another through personal contact rather than through agreements and links between their institutions. The formation of the International Kurdish Women's Studies Network in 1996 is one example of how researchers and activists have built links with one another. This network's lack of resources is also one example of how difficult it is for people doing Kurdish studies to raise funds and gain acceptance for their work.

There is a need for more research about the present conflict from various perspectives. In some articles about it the term "low-intensity warfare" is mentioned, but usually the analysis investigates only its effects on the PKK and its military activities, not its effects on Kurdish civilians. Some newspaper articles mention "taking water away from the fish", but there is no serious analysis of what then happens to the water. I have not found any academic research analysing the low-intensity warfare methods of the Turkish army, so there is a great need for such research. It should also pay attention to the role of the US as the main military supporter of Turkey. The low-intensity warfare methods which the Turkish army is using should be compared with the similar strategies of Latin American armies, which are also supported by the US and which are fighting against guerrilla movements. The Guatemalan army used low-intensity warfare methods when it was fighting for thirty years against guerrilla movements. Since the war in Guatemala ended there has been some anthropological research about the life of civilians during the conflict. Some American anthropologists have studied it. But no one has compared the life of civilians during the armed conflict in Turkey and in Guatemala. I think there would be interesting similarities, so I hope such research will be done.

One important research topic would be the effects of the assimilation policy during the existence of the Republic of Turkey. In this research I have not studied it, but I hope someone will do it. The deportation of Kurds and the depopulation of Kurdistan seem to be carried out according to a plan which is at least as old as the Republic of Turkey. The Young Turks were making plans to assimilate the Kurds even before the Republic existed. After more than 75 years of an active assimilation policy, how has the plan of the Young Turks succeeded? What proportion of the Kurdish population has been assimilated into Turkish culture? It is also important to analyse how the official concept of one nation has affected the ethnic identity of the Turkish people.

Another important question is why the Kurdish national movement is not interested in academic life. Why has the wave of Kurdish nationalism, which during the past twenty years has created a flourishing cultural life, had only little effect on Kurdish studies? Izady argues that Kurdish communities are unsympathetic to any educational contribution that could establish a recognised field of Kurdish studies in the West. Many simply consider such philanthropy equal to alms-giving. They fail to see such support as fostering their own rapidly eroding heritage. (Izady 1995). The reason for the lack of research can not be lack of money. The expenditures of some institutes with qualified researchers would be very small compared to what an army of 20,000 guerrillas or a satellite-operated TV channel cost. The national movement led by the PKK wants to modernise Kurdish thinking but it also has its roots in the traditional tribal culture and indigenous knowledge. This has many consequences: the organisations are not flexible, and neither the people. Because of a lack of education and political experience (caused by oppression over many generations) it is difficult for these Kurds and their leaders to widen their viewpoint and adopt new information and ideas, for example about academic life. This national movement started with armed struggle and although it is now trying to change its methods towards diplomacy, the movement is led by people who have military rather than political experience. Because they have grown up in a country where the educational system and academic life have never offered them anything positive, it seems to be hard for them to understand that they could benefit from research. In Fishman's terms, the phenomenology of premodern ethnicity is a self-evident, inward-oriented theodicy (Fishman 1988). Kurdish society has in recent years become aware of its ethnicity, but the character of the tribal culture still dominates the Kurdish opinion leaders' thinking. Many of them

are so introverted with regard to Kurdish culture that they assume that only Kurds can create any progress in the issue.[61]

Research done on the Kurds focuses mainly on linguistics, politics and history and it has a narrow focus even within these fields. For example, Kurdish linguists' aim is to create a Kurdish lingua franca, and the majority of them keep silent about the deliberate killing of the Kurdish language by the Turkish, Iranian and Syrian states (Hassanpour 2000). There are many Kurdish Institutes (in Berlin, Brussels, Istanbul, Paris, Stockholm and Washington) but even while they talk about the oppression of the Kurds, they are doing very traditional research about Kurdish grammar, not sociological research about Kurdish linguicide. A well-functioning network of ERNK bureaus all around the world spreads information about the war to Kurdish communities in the diaspora, but they only have the resources to handle individual acute crises. They describe the situation and give orders to their supporters, but they are not able to make in-depth analyses about the war. They pay attention mainly to the conventional warfare between Kurdish guerrillas and Turkish soldiers, not to the suffering of the civilian population, or to the whole context.

The Armenian community has reached out for international support in a totally different way. Turkey is facing international pressure to admit the Armenian genocide. The French National Assembly passed a resolution in January 2001 acknowledging the occurrence of the Armenian genocide in 1915. Some other countries, for example the US, are preparing similar declarations. The background of the Armenian lobby for many years has been the Armenians' support of academic research about their case. Probably this has been encouraged by their need to get information and understand what happened to their ancestors. The majority of chairs of Armenian studies in

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[61] One example of this kind of thinking is my discussion with Dr. Ismet Cheriff Vanly, the chairman of the Kurdish National Congress, in Helsinki in February 2001. He told me that "during recent years Kurds have written many books. Maybe they can not use the same methods as qualified researchers in other countries but they are doing their best". Poorly educated Kurds do everything by themselves, and in their institutes in Europe their activists can not co-operate with local universities and researchers because of the lack of a mutual language. So Kurdish intellectuals stay outside contemporary academic developments and do research in European cities as if they were living in the Kurdish mountains. This inward orientation can also be seen in Medya-TV, whose programmes have a centuries-old tribal character. Most of the programme time is used for discussions – the people who are watching the shows with satellite antennas are like villagers listening to their local leaders arguing.

American universities have been donated by Armenian philanthropists such as Kevorkian and Zohrab. Izady comments on this that the Kurds should take a lesson from their ancient neighbours the Armenians:

Self-help is the only help. All communities support only those activities which they know as promoting their communal agendas. If Kurds need a dedicated body of full-time Kurdologists, they need to give. The choices are clear: with Kurdish funds establish and support institutions and academic chairs that treat you first class; or, while waiting for Godot, take what little the "part-time" Kurdologists are willing to give - biased or not. (Izady 1995)

The ethics of studying wars

Surveying the suffering of people is emotionally demanding for researchers. They must have a professional attitude towards their subject. Chalk and Jonassohn advise that researchers should study genocide like any other topic and not let their work be disturbed by their emotions. (Chalk and Jonassohn 1990, 3-4). On the other hand, researchers should not become inured to the violence they see. It is important to keep human feelings, but the autobiographical side of the research process should be analysed; in anthropological fieldwork the researcher's personal and professional roles mix. The researcher's personality and life experience are part of the process, as they enable particular kinds of insights. If the informants are also the researcher's friends, her personal and professional lives are interwoven into the research. Doing research under war conditions is a special situation, as the pain and the fear bind the observers together with the victims. (Sandlund 1999). Robben and Nordstrom call the situation when ethnographers studying violence experience bewilderment on first seeing it *an existential shock*. It is a disorientation about the boundaries between life and death, which appear erratic rather than discrete. Such a fieldwork crisis may deepen the ethnographers' understanding of the people with whom they associate and the violence they study. (Robben and Nordstrom 1995, 13-14).

A researcher might herself have gone through a personal development process to learn to cope emotionally with a violent research subject. But it is not only writing about suffering that is difficult; reading about it is also painful. What can the researcher do if the audience is not ready to receive the information she gives? The style of writing about violence and death is problematic, especially if the writer herself is full of anger because of what has been done to the victims. Sensitive writing about suffering is important, as there is a danger of dehumanising the victims, practising sensationalism and thus creating a form of social pornography. (Feldman 1995, 245). Many writers - like

Bauman, Fein and Hassanpour - tell about this difficulty. Fein argues that when Europe became aware of the Holocaust, in the beginning there was no word adequate to label and make the murder of the Jews emotionally understandable. Bauman explains about studying the Holocaust that it was an event that was not at all easy to comprehend in habitual, "ordinary" terms. (Bauman 1989, VIII; Fein 1979, 3; Hassanpour 2000). It is very difficult to explain in ordinary language situations that are not ordinary, and it is impossible to write with beautiful words about ugly things. In writing about linguicide Skutnabb-Kangas uses harsh terms like 'language murder' and 'a killer language'. She explains that such highly emotionally loaded terms can be used because they describe the issue. But when emotionally loaded words are used, they need to be defined. (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000b and 2000c, xxxi-xxxii). In practise, attaining a sensitive style which shows everything in the right light might require re-writing the text several times.

Doing research about low-intensity conflict means choosing a side in one way or another. One of the most important methods of low-intensity warfare is a media embargo about it. Choosing a research topic related to the war is an opinion, a commitment in itself in situations where there is no war according to one of the parties involved. As it is not possible to remain neutral when describing such a conflict, it is important that the researcher makes it clear from whose perspective she is looking the topic. In this research I have taken the perspective of the deported Kurdish civilians. By contrast, the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) presents its information as though it had been gathered from a neutral perspective, but actually it takes the government's perspective: according to the government there is no war going on in Southeast Turkey, and so the TDHS presents a picture in which the main differences between East and West Turkey are economic ones. It does not even mention that part of the survey has been done in an area administered under military law.

Academic communities have carried on little discussion of researchers' social responsibility. Traditionally anthropologists are advised to make sure that the information they collect about a group can not be used against them. I believe that the issue should be seen from a broader viewpoint. Skutnabb-Kangas feels that researchers have a responsibility, based on their knowledge, to disseminate information about the problems which they survey. Bourgois argues that researchers have a historical responsibility to address larger moral issues. The traditional research subjects in anthropology -people in remote Third World settings- are being violently incorporated into the world economy in a manner that often includes political repression. Skutnabb-Kangas and Falla describe themselves as messengers and spokesmen. (Bourgois 1990, 43-44;

Skutnabb-Kangas 2000a). It is not enough to describe some problems; researchers must also explain why the problems exist, and they must ask uncomfortable why-questions (even at the risk of their own academic and economic marginalisation). (Skutnabb-Kangas 2000c, xxvii).

Falla explains his reasons for writing about the massacres in Guatemala:

> The more terrible the account of what he witnessed, the more awesome the reality that he announces: I am alive. Our book undertakes to relay his message and that of hundreds of other witnesses, who are eager to tell the people of Guatemala and the whole world that, incredibly, they are alive.

I am only the conveyor of this proclamation, not a firsthand witness. But I have been entrusted by change or by history, whatever you wish to call it, to transmit what those firsthand witnesses have seen, smelled, touched, heard, surmised, thought, struggled with. They have told their astounding story and I can not keep silent. (Falla 1994, 2)

I have very little to add to these words of Falla. Western researchers have a responsibility to use their knowledge for the common benefit, based on the fact that they often are privileged compared to the target group of their research. When studying massacres and genocides, all who are alive are very privileged compared to the target group. I am optimistic about the future: today our world is facing enormous problems, but it is possible to influence them. Horrifying genocides and ethnocides occurred in the last century, but humankind can learn from them and prevent similar ones from happening again. In order to do so, the dynamics of genocide and ethnocide must be properly understood. Cases of genocide must be studied from a wider perspective than has been done until now.

For me, doing this research has been a painful journey through pain and cruelty. But after many difficulties I have learned to cope with the Kurdish tragedy. I have become an optimist during the process of writing about this research: many bad things happen in the world, *but also many good things. It is possible to influence their development.* The duty of intellectuals is to tell about genocides and other atrocities so that people outside academic circles can also understand them. Art, literature, and academic writings are the mutual inheritance of humankind. Drakulic tells that after living through the war in Croatia, her need to write about it become stronger and stronger: "I still, despite everything, believe in the value of words, in the need to communicate. Now it is the only thing that I for sure know that I believe in."

(Drakulic 1995, 14). Fein argues that although one may be able to grasp the essence and entirety of the Holocaust only through art, there is no intrinsic reason to assume that what we do not yet understand can not be understood by reason. (Fein 1979, XV).

My existential crisis was a certain feeling of guilt about my own well-being while seeing the suffering of the Kurds. It taught me to search for my own place: this research is one little component of a struggle against low-intensity warfare. I have often remembered a discussion in Cizre in March 1997 (on my second day in Kurdistan), when Jouni Pirilä said: "One should not feel guilt because one was born in a rich country, but appreciate the fact that one is privileged and use it in the right way." What one person can do in any discipline, for example in Kurdology, is limited, but one person does not have to do everything - other people and other generations will continue the work. I believe that research is very important in any liberation process. It helps the political actors to understand the context more deeply. They can also use it to influence international policy, as the Armenian lobby for recognising their genocide has shown.

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