palgrave
macmillan

The State and Kurds in Turkey

The Question of Assimilation

Metin Heper



The State and Kurds in Turkey

Also by Metin Heper

THE STATE, THE MILITARY, AND DEMOCRACY: Turkey in the 1980s (*Co-editor with Ahmet Evin*)

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY (*Co-editor with Jacob Landau*)

TURKEY AND THE WEST: Changing Political and Cultural Identities (*Co-editor with Ayşe Öncü and Heinz Kramer*)

POLITICS IN THE THIRD TURKISH REPUBLIC (*Co-editor with Ahmet Evin*)

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TURKEY (*editor*)

STRONG STATE AND ECONOMIC INTEREST GROUPS: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience (*editor*)

POLITICAL LEADERS AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY (*Co-editor with Sabri Sayarı*)

POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY (*Co-author with Barry Rubin*)

ISLAM AND POLITICS IN THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST (*Co-editor with Raphael Israeli*)

THE STATE AND PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES: A Comparative Perspective (*editor*)

INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC STATECRAFT (*Co-editor with Ali Kazancıgil, and Bert A. Rockman*)

THE STATE TRADITION IN TURKEY

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF TURKEY (First and Second editions)

İSMET İNÖNÜ: The Making of a Turkish Statesman

The State and Kurds in Turkey

The Question of Assimilation

Metin Heper
Professor of Politics
Bilkent University, Turkey

palgrave
macmillan

First published in 2007 by
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010
Companies and representatives throughout the world.

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin's Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries.

ISBN-13: 978–0–333–64628–1 hardback
ISBN-10: 0–333–64628–2 hardback

This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

To Handan

This page intentionally left blank

Contents

Preface

When the author was a student at Ankara College (secondary high school) from 1956 to 1959, next to him sat a student whose last name was Bahar. It took two or three years for the author to realize that Bahar was a Jewish citizen of Turkey. He found that out on a day in May of either 1958 or 1959. That year, May was a month of the Ramadan, the month the Muslims fast. It was a rather warm day. A group of students, including the author, were going to play soccer during the noon break. They were, however, one player short. The author asked Bahar to join them; Bahar said he did not want to. Thinking that Bahar was fasting, the author tried to persuade Bahar to play with them by saying that it is a warm day all right, but several other students are also fasting (many out of fashion, not because they were practicing Muslims), and that not being able to drink water for another five to six hours, despite the fact we would all perspire a lot, would not be the end of the world. Bahar responded by saying, 'It is not that Metin. Today, I just don't feel like it'. Then he added, 'By the way, Metin, I am not a Muslim'. The author did not pay much attention to the very last sentence, nor did he think about it later. In the mid-1980s, one evening the author went to a fish restaurant in Istanbul. That evening, the proprietor, Zühtü Bey, whom the author had come to know well and who always enjoyed having a chitchat with the author, was not in the mood. Zühtü Bey explained what bothered him: '*Hocam* (Sir), you will not believe what I am going to tell you. I have just been told that late last night, some of my supposedly Turkish waiters beat some of my supposedly Kurdish waiters. What is this? What is going on in this country?'

At the time, armed clashes had already started between the Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*-PKK) and government forces in Turkey; however, Zühtü Bey could not see a relationship between the fight at his restaurant and the large scale 'troubles' taking place in the country.

In the 1980s and later, those who penned works on the Kurdish issue in Turkey have tended to argue that the 'troubles' in question were due to the 'fact' that the state in that country had tried to assimilate the Kurds, or otherwise acted in a rather harsh manner towards them; the Kurds put up a resistance, rebelling from time to time, and the state had made resort to further oppressive acts. Could this be a valid response to Zühtü Bey's query of what had been going on in the country? Could Zühtü Bey be a totally ignorant person or could the above narrative concerning the Kurdish issue in Turkey miss something important? Going back to the 1950s, if such a major event as an attempt at ethnic cleansing had taken place in a country, could

someone with a high school education not pay any attention at all to whether someone he knew well was a Muslim or non-Muslim?

It was with those and some related questions in mind that the author, in 1994, signed a book contract with what was at the time Macmillan Press, and what today is Macmillan Palgrave Press. The author thinks he has come up with a satisfactory answer to both of the queries raised above. He is, however, curious whether readers of this book, too, will find plausible his narrative of what the Kurdish issue in Turkey is all about.

The author is grateful to Professors Ahmet Evin, Clement H. Dodd, Carter Vaughn Findley, Şükrü Hanioğlu, Halil İnalcık, Kemal H. Karpat, Andrew Mango, Sabri Sayarı, late Stanford J. Shaw, and Frank Tachau, who read all or some draft chapters of this book and shared their profound knowledge and wisdom with him. Needless to point out, the author alone is responsible for the final product.

The author also would also like to thank a series of editors of Macmillan Press and/or Palgrave Macmillan, starting with Mr T. M. Farmiloe and ending with Ms Alison Howson and Amy Lankester-Owen who, for the past thirteen years, have never lost hope that one day the publisher was going to receive a manuscript from him!

This page intentionally left blank

1
Introduction

In the twentieth century, from the 1920s onwards, Turkish state's relations with its citizens of Kurdish origin (below, 'Kurds') have at times been rather problematic. Between 1920 and 1938 alone, that country faced 17 Kurdish rebellions, three of them, those of 1925, 1930, and 1937, being major ones. Then, between 1984 and 1999, Turkey had been the scene of protracted armed conflict between Kurdish separatists and government forces. The estimated loss of life from both sides during that second round of 'troubles' was around 35.000.

Turkey has been a suitable milieu for the emergence of a Kurdish issue. A reliable public opinion survey made in May 2006 has found that 'those who spoke with their parents in [any one of the dialects of] Kurdish' constituted 13.2 per cent of the population.[1] Another public opinion survey carried out in March 2007 by one of the leading national newspapers – *Milliyet* – has found that the 'Kurds; comprise 15.6 per cent of the population, or 11.5 million people.[2] In 2007, Turkey's overall population was 73 million. Hence, in terms of numbers alone, the Kurds in Turkey have not constituted a marginal group. Moreover, the Kurds have not been an immigrant group; they have lived in what today is Turkey and adjacent territories for long centuries. Furthermore, although an important portion of the Kurds are dispersed in different parts of the country, quite a few of them still live in southeastern Turkey, which is one of the country's least socio-economically developed regions.

Not surprisingly, there are several studies on the state and Kurds in Turkey. Yet, they have not been able to adequately explain the relations between the state and its Kurdish citizens. As will be elaborated below, the studies on ethnic conflict in general as well as those on the Middle East and Turkey tend to view ethnic conflict as a cycle of (1) efforts on the part of states to forcefully assimilate certain ethnic elements, (2) the resistance of those elements to such efforts, sometimes by resort to rebellions, and (3) the state's suppression of the rebellious elements, followed by the intensification of the efforts to assimilate the still unassimilated. Within the framework of this paradigm, it

is taken for granted that ethnic conflict is virtually a never ending conflict and that it lingers on until either a voluntary or forceful assimilation occurs. It is also assumed that all along rather hostile parties continue to face each other.

In Turkey, however, between the two rounds of 'troubles' mentioned above, that is, from 1938 to 1984, there had been relative peace and quiet. When the third major Kurdish rebellion had been suppressed in 1938, Professor Hans Henning von der Osten, a German archaeologist who traveled in the area, made the following observation: 'The Kurds …, [who] are generally abandoning their nomadic way of life and settling in villages, have come to take pride in considering themselves citizens of Turkey, frequently intermarry with the Turkish population, send their children to the Government schools, and have come to constitute a loyal and law abiding element in the population.'[3] There is another matter that remains an open question in terms of the present paradigm: when Turkey was in a very vulnerable position in the wake of the First World War, that is, when the armies of that country were dissolved and the weapons of that country confiscated by the British, French, and others countries, why did the Kurds not think of taking advantage of that situation, and attempt to obtain their independence from Turkey? Instead, in 1919–1922, during the Turkish War of Independence, the Kurds, together with the other ethnic elements of the population, contributed to the efforts to maintain the very existence of Turkey. In a parallel manner, whenever a conflict between the state and the Kurds seemed to have come to an end, the state tended to act as if the country had not gone through a period of serious confrontations, in which many people lost their lives; during such periods, the state usually acted in a rather 'forgiving manner' towards its Kurdish citizens, as any country would when it comes to a group of citizens whom it would not consider any different from its other citizens. The descendants of Shaikh Said and his associates, who led a major Kurdish rebellion in 1925, were, by 1998, still politically active both within the Turkish Parliament as well as the Kurdish community.[4] All in all, the present paradigm of the assimilation-resistance-assimilation model in respect to ethnic conflict remains less than satisfactory to explain the Turkish case.

As it has been aptly pointed out, 'the resolution of the problem of ethnic conflict depends on the definition of the problem'.[5] One may suggest that the correct definition of the problem itself is conditional upon having an adequate grasp of the empirical reality relating to the problem in question. The latter in turn would depend on whether one has made plausible assumptions and thus posed appropriate questions.

On the whole, when it comes to ethnic conflict, both the general literature and those on the Middle East are informed by the assimilation-resistance-assimilation paradigm mentioned above. The dominant view in the general literature concerning ethnic conflict, as summarized by John Coakley,

derives from the assumption of unequal centre-periphery relations; control of the centre by a dominant ethnic group, and the consequent suppression of other ethnic groups.[6] With respect to the ethnic conflict in the Middle East, a similar approach prevails. For instance, Nader Entessar has argued that, 'the response of the ethnic periphery is normally volatile in cases where the political center is heavily controlled by the dominant cultural entity in the society'.[7] Concerning the Middle East, Arthur C. Turner has also made a related argument: 'Imperial regimes have everywhere crumbled, giving way to successor states that are frequently despotic and sometimes scarcely viable. The sanctity of existing boundaries, whatever they may be, is defended against nationalist or subnationalist threats to them by no one more strenously than the rulers of those nations.'[8]

Present paradigm and its shortcomings

Leading students of the Kurdish problem in Turkey have also perceived the ethnic conflict in the country in the same light. Michael Gunther has argued that 'the official ideology of the Republic of Turkey sought to deny the existence of the Kurdish people in that country. To do this, the authorities attempted to eliminate much that might suggest a separate Kurdish nation'.[9] Martin van Bruinessen has contended that '… there are strong ideological impediments to the recognition of the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group with its own culture, and further concessions are almost unthinkable. The military and civilian elites (which include 'assimilated Kurds') are deeply committed to the Kemalist dogma that the people of Turkey are one homogeneous nation, and they perceive each denial of unity as a vital threat to the state'.[10] Robert Olson has talked of Turkey's 'struggle against Kurdish nationalism'.[11] Anthony Hyman has suggested that 'The official Turkish position on the Kurds is simple; there is no Kurdish problem in Turkey – only in Iraq and Iran.'[12] A student of Turkish affairs who joined the bandwagon of van Bruinessen, Gunther, Hyman, and Olson, was Hakan Yavuz who declared, 'Modern republic treated ethno-religious diversity as a threat to its project of nation-building, and it used every means at its disposal to eliminate the causes and consequences of differences'.[13] Hugh Poulton, too, has attempted to explain the Kurdish question in Turkey in terms of an 'ethnic model' – or 'state repression of all expression of a separate Kurdish national consciousness'.[14] One comes across similar views even in otherwise commendable works on the Kurdish question, such as that of Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow. They have argued that from the 1920s to the 1940s, certain conditions made it 'exceedingly difficult for decision-makers in Ankara to pursue a policy based on real civic integration as opposed to ethnic nationalism'.[15]

The argument that in Turkey there has been a tendency to adopt the policy of disregarding the Kurds altogether does not seem to be persuasive. The views on the state-Kurd relation in Turkey along the lines Bruneissen,

Gunther, Olson and others suggested, had been entertained in that country only by a few intellectuals in the decade of 1900–1910 and the late 1930s and early 1940s.[16] As such, it could hardly be considered as the 'standard' position of the Turkish state on the Kurdish issue.[17] Those views can also be not valid in respect to each and every decade of the Republican period (1923 to the present). Both in the early 1920s, the 1990s and later, the state *openly* recognized the distinct Kurdish identity.[18]

The assumption that the founders of Turkey wished to see that country populated only by ethnic Turks, not surprisingly, led several students of the Kurdish issue to attribute to the founders of the Republic the intention of forging such a Turkey: James Brown stated that, 'the creation by Atatürk of a secular and purely Turkish state was nurtured by the Kemalist ideology of Republican Turkey's national unity and territorial integrity'.[19] Philip Robins has made a similar argument: 'The presence of … a large minority in Turkey [the Kurds] has exposed a serious contradiction in the Kemalist ideology.'[20] Henry Barkey and Graham Fuller concluded that in the post-1923 period, 'The Kurds, who as Muslims had been equals in the Ottoman state, confronted a nationalist regime determined to assimilate them into a Turkish nation, using both education and military force' and that the goal was 'to make a Kurd into a Turk'.[21]

It has also been asserted that the goal of forging one community-turned-nation-state derived from the founders' view that in Turkey, only one ethnic community – Turkish ethnic community – existed. Along those lines, Ayla Kılıç contended that 'with the foundation of the Turkish Republic, … Kurdish intellectuals … felt betrayed by the new interpretation of "populism" (*halkçılık*). … [The latter] became the ideological justification of Turkish nationalism and denied the existence of a separate Kurdish identity'. James Brown also claimed, though in a round about way, that the Turkish state had overlooked the existence of Kurdish identity in that country: 'The myth perpetuated in the past that the Kurds were errant Turks who should regain their Turkishness, either through assimilation or if necessary by force, is no longer a viable strategy'.[22]

It was highly unlikely that the founders of Turkey toyed with the idea of a Turkey populated only by ethnic Turks. Throughout the Ottoman period, the Turks had constituted one ethnic community among several ethnic communities. In the last century of that period – the nineteenth century – the Turks could not even make head or tail of the emerging nationalist movements in their country until rather late in the game. The Turks did not even call themselves 'Turks' and their country 'Turkey' before 1920. Furthermore, until the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, officially, and after that date for some time, unofficially, religion (Islam) was considered to have constituted the major bond among the people in Turkey. How, under the circumstances, Muslim Turks could 'deny' the existence of the Kurds, who were Muslims like themselves, and who, both during the Ottoman period and

during the Turkish War of Independence, had served the country and the state not unlike the Turks, is a critical question that the students of ethnic conflict in Turkey subscribing to the present paradigm would be hard pressed to answer in a persuasive manner. Here it should also be kept in mind that in the Ottoman period the state had allowed the non-Muslim minorities to learn and practice their religions freely.[23]

After having made the assumptions that (1) the founders of the Turkish state set for themselves the goal of developing a nation made up of only one ethnic community, and (2) in the process, they had denied the existence of other ethnic communities, the above students of the Kurdish issue arrived at the conclusion that the state would resort to the forceful assimilation of the still unassimilated. In this context, Kılıç has argued that 'the cornerstone of the assimilation policy [pursued by the state] was to keep the [southeastern] region [of Turkey] underdeveloped'. Here, she has drawn upon the views of Chief of the General Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak in respect to the question at hand: 'According to Field Marshall Çakmak, the mastermind of this policy, economic development and wealth would accelerate the level of consciousness and thus lead to the development of nationalism among the Kurds'.[24] Along the same lines, Michael Gunther has thought that the purpose behind banishing Kurds to the western parts of Turkey (after the Shaikh Said rebellion [1925] was crushed), was to dilute the Kurdish population in order to facilitate their 'forceful assimilation'.[25]

Those who have come up with such views seem to have overlooked several non-ethnic factors, which together hampered the socio-economic development of the southeast. Starting with the 1933 Five-Year Industrialization Plan, the Republican leaders, in fact, acted on the assumption that the resolution of the 'southeastern question' depended upon the 'socioeconomic development' and 'modernization' of the region.

It is true that in the end, the region could not be developed adequately. This was not, however, due to the discriminatory policies on the part of state vis-à-vis that part of the country: First, since the enactment of the Land Code in 1858, large tracts of land were concentrated in the hands of a few local notables, particularly in the east and the southeast of Turkey. Those local notables have not been interested in increasing productivity in agriculture. Secondly, historically, the western parts of the country were provided with the necessary infrastructure by some Western countries, which were interested in importing raw material from those regions. In later periods, this development worked against the other regions, especially the east and the southeast. Thirdly, the United Sates' Chester Railway Project (1908–1913) and Germans' Berlin-Baghdad Railway Project (1914–1989) could not be completed, because the former was dropped by the Americans when the Mosul region remained in the hands of the British, who also blocked the Berlin-Baghdad Railway Project for they had their own eyes on the resources of the Middle East. The Russians, too, hindered the part of the

Berlin–Baghdad railway project because the construction of railroads into the northeast and Caucasus would have helped the Ottomans to more effectively defend themselves against the planned Russian invasion. Fourthly, in the early decades of the Republic, Chief of the General Staff Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had hampered investments in border areas, including the southeast, because 'it would have been difficult to defend them.' And lastly, the post-1960 five-year plans had placed emphasis on industrialization; this policy adversely affected the fortunes of the east and the southeast, which depended upon agriculture. Under the circumstances, it became difficult to attract private sector investments to the east and southeast. This has resulted in the relative impoverishment of the southeast, despite the fact that the public funds channeled to the area were greater than those set aside for several other regions. If, for the 1983–1992 period, per capita investment index for Turkey was 100, the same index was 36 for the Black Sea region, 71 for the (most developed) Marmara Sea region, and 256 for the southeastern region.[26] Furthermore, during the protracted periods of 'troubles', the investments in the region virtually came to a standstill: the number of projects started at the time was reduced, and those that got under way could not be completed because of the Kurdish separatist terror. The terror in question was directed at virtually everybody who did not side with the terrorists. Civil servants did not want to serve in the area because of the terror threat.

More generally, before, during, and after the 'troubles' of the 1920s–1930s and 1980s–1990s, the state has not resorted to forceful assimilation of the Kurds, because the founders of the state had been of the opinion that for long centuries, both Turks and Kurds in Turkey, particularly the latter, had gone through a process of *acculturation*, or steady disappearance of cultural distinctiveness as a consequence of a process of *voluntary*, or rather *unconscious*, assimilation.[27] Consequently, the state had come to the conclusion that over time there had developed a great deal of cultural similarity between the Kurds and the Turks. Thus when the Kurds rebelled, for reasons that the state thought could not be ethnic,[28] the state reversed its earlier policy of recognizing the distinct Kurdish ethnicity, and pursued a new strategy of the *non-recognition* of the ethnic distinctiveness of the Kurds in the hope that by this strategy it could arrest a de-acculturation process on the part of the Kurds, and reactivate the earlier acculturation process.[29]

There is a basic difference between 'denial; and 'non-recognition': in denial, there is a refusal to accept the empirical reality; in non-recognition, there is an acceptance of empirical reality, while not admitting it openly. Thus, when one denies Kurdish identity, one would endeavour to assimilate the unassimilated or inadequately assimilated. When one chooses not to recognize the Kurdish identity, one would not reject the fact that there exists a Kurdish identity; one only hopes that that identity would not become the primary ethnic identity of the Kurds and that it remains as their secondary identity. Consequently, the rationale behind non-recognition is

that of trying to hinder the de-acculturation of the already acculturated, not that of assimilating people who are non-acculturated.

The failure to make the crucial distinction between the processes of assimilation and of attempting to prevent a de-acculturation from taking place, have led some students of Turkey to attribute less than valid intentions to rulers in that country. Heinz Kramer, otherwise an astute observer of Turkish affairs, also seems to have fallen into this trap. Kramer has made the following observation: 'Since the founding of the republic, which had been brought about with the significant assistance of Kurdish tribes during Atatürk's war of independence, the Kemalist state elite has stubbornly defended the doctrine of the unity and indivisibility of the Turkish state, its territory, and its people. … According to the doctrine, there are only one homogeneous people in Turkey; it comprises the totality of the country's citizens who all enjoy the same rights and have the same obligations. Claims based on ethnic difference are unjustified because every Turkish citizen is a first-class citizen, a sentiment that has become the established reason for politicians and state officials to refuse Kurdish demands for minority rights'.[30] What can be problematic about this argument is first the claim that, according to the Kemalist doctrine, there was only one homogeneous people in Turkey; secondly, and more significantly, the very logic behind that statement: if the Kurds had felt themselves ethnically so different and whimsically discriminated against by the Turks so that they would have asked for 'minority rights', the Kurds would have taken advantage of the rather vulnerable position of the Turks in the immediate afterwards of the First World War, but, as noted earlier, they did not. In other words, would not the theory of acculturation rather than that of forceful assimilation provide a better explanation for what had transpired in the wake of the First World War?

Elsewhere in his work, Kramer has reported that 'When, in August 1984, the PKK [the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party] attacked two stations of the gendarmerie, nobody thought it would be the beginning of a protracted military confrontation between the state's forces and Kurdish guerillas [*sic*] that would lead to a deep rift in Turkish society'.[31] Here also, Kramer does not raise a crucial question: why did nobody in Turkey imagine that the attack in question was the harbinger of the worst to come if the Turks and the Kurds in that country had always had a deep ethnic cleavage between them, and, therefore, had developed an intense hostility and suspicion against each other?

In Turkey, as compared to those who live on the plains, the Kurds, who live in the mountains, have not intermingled with the Turks to any great extent. The tribal social structure of the area also rendered difficult the acculturation of the citizens.[32] This would have been an exacerbating factor for the presumed intense hostility to turn Turkey into another Northern Ireland – the country becoming a scene of intermittent bloody communal confrontations

between the Turks and the Kurds. This, too, did not happen. Contrary to Kramer's contention, despite the fact that the armed struggle between the state and the PKK led to an estimated total loss of at least 35,000 lives, it has not on the whole led to a generalized intense hostility on either side.

This was why whenever the armed struggle between the Kurdish separatists and the government forces seemed to have petered out, the state's rigid approach to the Kurdish question became mellowed. The banishment of Kurds to the western parts of Turkey during the times of 'troubles' were efforts at re-acculturation rather than (forceful) assimilation; after all, the Kurdish leaders were sent to those places with their families and, after a while, they were allowed to return to their hometowns.[33] In fact, Gunther has talked of the 'impressive[ness] of the relative leniency … [the military government in 1980] showed toward those accused of terrorism and separatism'.[34] As Kramer himself pointed out in 1991, the use of the Kurdish language in public was allowed once more, and the state adopted a more strict definition of the 'separatist propaganda'; and, as Kramer has also shown, from 1995 onwards, the public discussion of the 'Kurdish problem' did not (almost always) automatically constitute a legal offence.[35] Most significantly, from the early 1990s onwards, the state began again to publicly recognize the ethnic identity of the Kurds.

It is in order to give a few more examples for substantiating the argument of this essay that the studies of ethnic conflict in Turkey need to go through a paradigmatic shift. In 1997, Marvine Howe has reported that for her, the 'most astonishing change, after all the years of death and destruction, was the attitude of the Kurds. They no longer appeared to be afraid to say they are Kurds or speak Kurdish, or openly demand rights for themselves'. Howe indicated this was 'clear from chance conversations in restaurants, cafés, and the bazaar as well as meetings at Kurdish organizations'; 'people [in general] could [now] raise the Kurdish question without automatically being punished'.[36] In 2001, Stephen Kinzer corroborated Howe's observations: 'Despite the years of conflict between Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, [today] Turks and Kurds live together peacefully in cities and towns all over Turkey, often barely conscious of each others backgrounds, and intermarry frequently. During the war [sic], it was considered treasonous for any Turk to express any sympathy for Kurdish demands, but as the fighting died down, some in the Turkish establishment finally felt able to sympathize openly with their Kurdish cousins. Not simply university professors and other intellectuals but ordinary people have begun to view the Kurdish issue more dispassionately'.[37]

Howe and Kinzer's observations support the present argument. However, Howe's conclusions, at the same time, indicate that she too has a picture of two communities always in deep conflict. This was not surprising since she also thought that 'Atatürk's policy could be summed up in one word: [forceful] assimilation. Those who refused were dealt with forcefully . … Kurdish revolts were brutally repressed'.[38]

In his turn, Kinzer is also of two minds: 'A reasonable case can be made that the war was the fault of Kurdish fanatics who roused their people to pointless rebellion and massacred all who stood in their way. An equally credible case might hold that the Turkish state was responsible because it oppressed the Kurds for years and gave them no choice but revolution'.[39] The first part of Kinzer's observation – what the Kurds did and whether or not it was a justified move on their part – does not lie within the scope of this essay. As for the second part of his argument; that the state, by the harsh policies it pursued, left Kurds with no other option but to revolt, one may argue that the suggested scenario could hardly have taken place: if the Turkish state had oppressed the Kurds for years and thus had given them no choice but 'revolution', how could the tables be turned overnight so the Turks and Kurds would start living in a harmonious manner so quickly? It is a well known fact that on the whole, ethnic hatred tends to linger on for quite long periods of time.

Not unlike Kramer, Barkey and Fuller, too, have subscribed to the present paradigm, and thus they have also overlooked the important distinction between forced assimilation and attempts to prevent a de-acculturation from taking place, and consequently they, also, have found the state's policies inconsistent. Barkey and Fuller wrote: The 'Kemalist nationalism [of the state in Turkey] had many internal contradictions. Not only did it discourage interest in "Turks" living in other parts of the world, primarily Central Asia, but it also encouraged a dual understanding of Turkishness, both civic and ethno-national. Its civic character made possible the rise [in society and politics] of assimilated Kurds, while its ethno-cultural aspect formed the basis of forced assimilation and repression of those who refused to accept the "higher" Turkish identity'.[40]

The founders of the Republican Turkey did discourage interest in Turks living outside Turkey, because they did *not* subscribe to ethnic nationalism. The motto of the founders of the state was 'Peace at home and peace abroad' and they diligently conformed to that doctrine when they did not face a serious threat to the territorial integrity of their country. There was no need for the civic characteristic of Turkishness to facilitate the rise in society and politics of the Kurds; in 'normal times', the Kurds could have risen in society and politics in any case because the Kurds had gone through an acculturation process. After all, only during the periods of 'troubles', while Turkishness continued to have its civic character (according to the 1924 Constitution), some restrictions *were* brought to the Kurds' taking up jobs in government. Finally, the term 'ethno-cultural' as used by Barkey and Fuller is a term in contradiction. Ethnic nationalism and cultural nationalism are two distinct phenomena. The markers of ethnic nationalism are religion and/or language, when those markers are used in a discriminatory manner towards some people(s); the cultural nationalism is premised on a constellation of ideals, values, and attitudes that together

contribute to the maintenance of national unity and territorial integrity of a given country.

Here, it should be noted that religion would come into the picture in different ways in ethno-nationalism and cultural nationalism: in ethno-nationalism, religion itself would constitute one of the markers; in cultural nationalism the constellation of ideals, values, and attitudes that make that nationalism may be derived partly or wholly from religion. In the Turkish case, the 'ethno-cultural aspect' that Barkey and Fuller have mentioned, could *not* form the basis of 'forced assimilation and suppression' because the Turkish nationalism was not ethnic nationalism. Cultural nationalism could not lead to 'forced assimilation and suppression', because the Turks and the Kurds had gone through a long process of mutual acculturation, manifesting in the process similar ideals, values, and attitudes and, therefore, there was no reason for the Turks to try to assimilate the Kurds.

On the other hand, in the Turkish case, at least in practice, the cultural nationalism did form the basis of the Turks' view about the reactive de-acculturation process on the part of the Kurds; the Turks came to the conclusion that the Kurds had tended to stray away from the ideals, values, and attitudes 'that they had come to share with the Turks', i.e., instead of stressing their similarity with the Turks, as they had done before, they had started to emphasize their distinctiveness from the Turks. The Turks figured that, as a consequence, the Kurds could attribute 'undue' significance to their secondary identity as ethnic Kurds and that in the process, their secondary identity could replace 'their generic primary identity of being a Turk'.

There are further students of Turkey who cannot make head or tail of some of the policies pursued by the Turkish state regarding the 'Kurdish issue' and who, consequently, find them paradoxical. This is again basically because they subscribe to the assimilation-resistance-assimilation paradigm. Entassar has found the Turks' approach to the Kurdish insurgency as 'two-pronged' [read, 'perplexing']: 'On the one hand, the government has sought to pacify the Kurdish population by directing more economic aid to southeastern Turkey to revive its economy … and by integrating the local Kurdish economy into the mainstream Turkish economy . … On the other hand, the government has continued to implement harsh measures against those promoting ethnic nationalism in an effort to destroy Kurdish ethnic identity.'[41] Similarly, Charles MacDonald has observed that, 'Kurds working within the political system can rise to prominence, but Turkey also worked to destroy the Kurdish ethnic identity'.[42]

What is overlooked here is that the governments in Turkey behaved in a harsh manner to those whom they had perceived as culprits regarding the de-acculturation process among the Kurds. On the other hand, the Turks tried to develop the southeast of Turkey socio-economically, because they wished to act in an egalitarian manner to everybody in Turkey. Kurds working in the political system could rise to prominence because they were not

considered significantly different from the Turks concerning their ideals, values, and attitudes. Consequently, the Turks did *not* 'work to destroy the Kurdish ethnic identity'; the Turks only attempted to put an end to the intensification of ethnic identity among the Kurds, and they endavoured to do that only during, and for some time after, the periods of 'troubles'.

The present essay

Depending upon whether one studies the state-Kurds relationship in Turkey in terms of the present paradigm or, alternatively, with a view to the alternative paradigm proposed here, one would make different assumptions on three matters significant for the present purpose. First, those who subscribe to the present paradigm would take it for granted that both the Turks and the Kurds define themselves exclusively in ethnic terms and, therefore, assume that a deep conflict had been, and continues to be, inevitable between those two ethnic groups. Those who find merit in the alternative paradigm would assume that due to the centuries-old mutual acculturation on the part of the Turks and the Kurds, what those two peoples would end up sharing between them would be greater than on what they differ and that, consequently, for the latter students of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, ethnicity would not be considered as the primary cause of the 'troubles'.

Secondly, within the framework of the present paradigm one would assume that the 'troubles' between the state and the Kurds occurred because the state decided to forcefully assimilate the Kurds. Within the framework of the alternative paradigm, the starting point of the 'troubles' would be thought to be the moment of Kurds, or rather some militants thereof, who for one reason or another, but not for ethnic reasons, became dissatisfied with the pattern of relations they have had with the state.

Thirdly, the proponents of the present paradigm would argue that the state resorted to forceful assimilation in order to assimilate the Kurds. The proponents of the alternative paradigm would suggest that what passes as assimilation has, in fact, been non-recognition, or an effort to prevent a de-acculturation process from taking place so that the Kurds would not again begin to think and act only in terms of their secondary ethnic identity.

All in all, those who study the Kurdish issue within the framework of the present paradigm would assume that the state in Turkey has always considered the Kurds an incorrigible group that could not by its own volition become more like the Turks. Also, when one looks at the situation in Turkey from the perspective of the present paradigm one would arrive at the conclusion that the Republican state subscribed to ethnic nationalism; consequently, one would come to the conlusion that the state could only resort to forceful assimilation of the Kurds. Consequently, those who have adopted the present paradigm would set for themselves the task of discovering in each and every case a non-sympathetic, if not hostile, act against the Kurds

committed by the state and perceive all such 'evidence' as part and parcel of the general strategy of forceful assimilation.

In contrast, those students of the Kurdish issue that work with the alternative paradigm would assume that, in the view of the state, the Turks and the Kurds, along with every other element of Turkish polity and society, have gone through a long process of mutual acculturation and, therefore, came to share a constellation of common ideals, values, and attitudes. Consequently, these students would assume that when the state was faced with 'troubles' in its relations with the Kurds, the state would not resort to a strategy of forceful assimilation; instead, the state would tend to give Kurds the benefit of the doubt, and that, at most, the state would try to prevent Kurds from going through a de-acculturation process.

The chapters that follow, being informed by the alternative paradigm, address themselves to the following general queries: (1) how the state in Turkey viewed its Kurdish subjects/citizens in different periods and why; (2) what kinds of threats the state thought it faced from its Kurds in some periods, and (3) which strategies of conflict management it adopted when it felt itself under threat.

With a view to those general queries, Chapter Two inquires whether, in the Ottoman period, the Turks had a tradition of assimilating peoples under their suzerainty. Chapter Three traces relations between the state and Kurds in the Ottoman period. Chapter Four seeks to find out how the Turks reacted to rising nationalism during the nineteenth century. These three chapters aim to display what kind of a state-Kurd relationship the Republic set up in 1923, inherited from the Ottoman period (circa 1290–1918). Chapter Five investigates Turkish nationalism in the Republican period. Chapter Six presents the perception of the Republican state vis-à-vis the Kurds. Chapter Seven takes up the two crucial rounds of 'troubles' in the Republican era. Chapter Eight provides some general remarks.

The present essay does *not* address itself to the question of whether or not the state's perception of the 'Kurdish question' *did* fit the empirical reality. After all, what shapes thought and action is the *perception* of the empirical reality, and not the objective empirical reality. The essay, however, takes up some developments that would have made at least some impact on the perception of the state in respect to the Kurdish issue. The present essay does not aim to assign guilt among the Turks and the Kurds for what transpired before, during, and after the times of 'troubles'; rather, to the extent possible in an essay of this type, it makes an effort to find out: what really happened and why? In any case, both in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, the Turks and the Kurds always constituted integral parts of the social and political bodies, and their destinies turned out to be intertwined.

2
Tolerance as Acceptance

Was the Ottoman Empire an appropriate milieu for pursuing the forced assimilation of marginal groups? Did one encounter in that realm a dominant majority that was not comfortable with the existence of minorities? Did the Ottoman state's pattern of dealing with its different subjects include ethnic engineering? Did the Ottoman state aim at unity within diversity or did it try to achieve unity by turning difference into sameness? All in all, was the Ottoman world prone to be engaged in the forced assimilation of the 'other'? This chapter addresses itself to these and related issues.

A hybrid society and polity

Not unlike other peoples, the Turks, throughout their history, tried hard to maintain the integrity of their realms. They, too, endeavoured not to easily let go the various ethnic elements with whom they had set up their states. On the other hand, the idea of the forced assimilation of the peoples of the realms they conquered remained alien to them. Indeed, one encounters even in their first homeland in Central Asia a *Pax Turcica* in a multi-ethnic society made up of several tribes and sedentary populations.[1]

One contributory factor here was that the ancient Turks adhered to a religion of peace. They had respect for the religious, cultural, and political characteristics of other communities. The Turks at the time thought of other communities and themselves together constituting a realm of peace and viewing themselves as *ihc-il* (inner realm) and other communities as *dish-il* (outer realm). '*İl*' in ancient Turkish meant 'state'. An *ich-il* could not perceive others as foreign but as another *il*, which was also a temple of peace.[2]

It has been suggested that the Turks' ancient culture continued to have an impact on how they treated other peoples in the ensuing centuries.[3] It has also been argued that the granting of extraordinary concessions by Turks to the communities, comprising peoples who lived and traded in the Ottoman Empire, under the name of capitulations was a consequence of the internationalism that they subscribed to. Also, the fact that the Turks' God of

Heavens (*Gök Tanrısı*) rewarded, not punished, is perceived to have played a role here. The Turks loved, not feared their Gods. In the process, doctrinaire religion that often leads to dogmatism remained alien to the Turks.[4] Consequently, when Turks became Muslims, their relatively liberal approach to religion helped the Turks to adopt sympathetic views towards those whose faith was different.

One cannot, of course, categorically claim an undisputable cause and effect relationship between the relevant Turkish phenomena in different periods separated from each other by several centuries.[5] One does observe, however, in different historical periods similarities between their values, attitudes, and behaviour patterns, including those related to their relationships with people different from them in several respects. One may attribute the constant reproduction of their earlier values, attitudes and behaviour patterns towards the other communities in the later periods, on the one hand, to the fact that for long centuries the Turks lived in close proximity to those communities and thus experienced a great deal of cultural give and take with them, and on the other hand, to the fact that the state had to rule a mosaic of peoples and thus could not afford to impose upon them a particular religious or ethnic garb.

Indeed, before they arrived in Anatolia, their present homeland since the twelfth century, even the Turks themselves spoke different languages and/or subscribed to different belief systems. Before the Oghuz Turks, who eventually formed the Ottoman Empire, came to Anatolia, different clans of Turks lived there as well as in the present-day Iraq and Syria. Some belonged to different forms of Christianity; others adopted Buddhism, Mandaenism, or Manichaenism at various times.[6] At the time, there were in Anatolia also Christians (Armenians and Greeks) and non-Turkish speaking Muslim communities (in particular Arabs, Persians, and Kurds). Consequently, the Ottoman Empire was founded in a complex ethno-religious milieu.[7]

It follows that the Ottoman state was not based on a commonly shared worldview, religion, and political structure. Although that state developed basically as a Muslim polity, in most parts of its European provinces the majority of the population continued to be Christians. Following the conquest of the Anatolian and Balkan regions by the Ottomans, a substantial number of Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians remained in the Ottoman domains and participated actively in the economic and military pursuits, and even in the rule of that realm. These different Christian communities held on to the age-old traditions of Byzantino-Armenian and Byzantino-Slavic cultures; those traditions became additional features of the crucible in which the general Ottoman culture was forged.[8] There also took place intermarriages between the Christians and Muslims, though mostly among the families of the ruling elite. This gave rise to the emergence in the Ottoman society of a new stratum of people called *Mixobarbaroi or Ahriyan*. There were also a rather large group of so-called Muslims hiding their Christianity – *Cryptochistians*.[9]

All this was because the Ottomans *subsumed* rather than *destroyed* the communities and the states that they had subjugated to themselves. In the hands of the Ottomans, the Holy War was intended not to destroy but to bring under their control the non-Muslim peoples, and incorporate the latter into the population of the Empire. Starting with Osman I (r.1299–1324) and Orhan I (r.1324–1359), Ottoman sultans attempted to *accommodate* their Christian neighbours rather than *convert* them to Islam.[10] A fifteenth-century fief register of Rumelia shows that following the entry of the Christian military groups into the service of the Ottoman State, *reconciliation* and *integration*, rather than a *replacement* or *elimination*, took place. Along the same lines, the Ottoman rulers, who wanted to keep their resources intact, resorted to a policy of *istimalet*, that is, 'tolerance and protection' to keep the Christian peasants on their land.[11] Having conquered Constantinople in 1453, Sultan Mehmed II (r.1444, 1451–1481), too, set his mission as 'bringing a new life' to the Byzantine Empire rather than annihilating it. Sultan Mehmed II welded together the traditions of the Byzantine Christianity with those of the Ottoman Islam. He had a good knowledge of Greek history, and respect and concern for his stepmother who was his father Sultan Murad II's (r.1421–1451) half-Serbian and half-Greek wife. Mehmed II quickly appointed a new Patriarch to the Greek Church (Gennadius) and granted a new and rather liberal status to the Orthodox community,[12] and brought the Patriarch to the head of the Armenian Orthodox community to replace the Armenian Catholicos, who had remained outside the Ottoman dominions.[13]

Then and later, the Ottoman rulers maintained the conquered dynasties as vassals under their suzerainty.[14] In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, former Albanian, Bulgarian, and Serbian officers administered some of the fief systems in the Balkans.[15] Having established their Empire by uniting a basically Muslim Anatolia and the Christian Balkans under their rule, the Ottomans allowed Christians and Jews to live according to their faith, and freely exercise their religion. Theirs was a virtually cosmopolitan state, treating all creeds and ethnic groups as equally respectable to the extent it was possible under the circumstances.[16]

As the Ottoman state did not try to transform the culture of the realms it conquered, education was left in the hands of each community, not the state. Rather than attempting to assimilate the peoples in the conquered lands, the Ottomans tried to integrate them to the system by granting them a large degree of cultural and religious autonomy and local self-rule.[17] Under the Ottomans, non-Muslims had not only freedom concerning their religious activities, but they could also freely engage in trade and agricultural pursuits.

It follows that the Ottomans also did not tinker with ethnic identities. They merely managed or superseded ethnic identities by religious-political ones so that the state could establish and maintain its suzerainty on all peoples under its rule.[18] The measures in this regard included sedantarization and resettlement, in the carrying out of which no attention was paid to the

ethnic identity of the people so uprooted. Only those who rebelled faced systematic relocation somewhere else.[19]

Consequently, in the early modern era, the Ottoman Empire was culturally even more fragmented than the continental Europe. Following the expulsion of the Jews in the late Middle Ages and the reformations and counter reformations, most European countries were left with only small minorities. In contrast, the Ottoman Empire comprised Armenian Orthodox, Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Jewish communities of considerable sizes.[20] The Muslim population itself was also not homogeneous. The nomads, that is, the Kurdish tribesmen, the Turcomans, and the Arab Bedouin, led life styles at odds with those of the townsfolk. Also, the Shi'a heterodox sects, concentrated in Iraq and parts of Arabia, adhered to a form of Islam quite different from that of the Sunni Muslims.

In the times of the Ottomans, if not today, when civilizations clashed at the frontiers, the usual outcomes were syncretism and hybridization rather than the hegemony of one over the other.[21] After all, several customs and cults harking back to the pre-Christian period were kept alive among the peoples belonging to different religions. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Ottoman reality too was multiple in its ethnic, religious and, consequently, in its cultural dimensions.[22] It had come into being through the *fusion* of its constituent elements such as Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, the Oghuz Turks, and the Iranians.[23] In the late nineteenth century, Süleyman Nazif (1869–1927), an ardent Turkist, noted that Osman Gazi was a Turk, but that Osman Gazi's forefathers and their followers could not have founded a great state without the support of the native elements (*anasır-ı mahalliye*): 'We find among the founders of this great state, with our respect and gratitude, those whose names are unfamiliar in our language but who are familiar to our minds such as Mihal and Evrenos'.[24] The members of the Albanian, Armenian, Greek, and Serbian aristocracy figured prominently in the early Ottoman ruling stratum, with a number of their titles being absorbed into Turkish – *effendi*, *patrik*, *voyvoda*, and the like.[25] After all, a sizeable part of the early Ottoman state had first been established in the Balkans before it expanded into Anatolia. It added to its territories the Bulgarian and Serbian principalities in 1397 and 1459, respectively. Sultan Mehmed II considered himself not only Khan but also Caesar; the Turks referred to the Balkans as Rumili (Romanland).[26] Mehmed Sokullu had been the most well-known grand vizier at the Ottoman Court in the sixteenth century, while his brother, the monk Makarios, ruled as the Patriarch of the Serbian Church at Ipec.[27]

The Ottoman State and the Muslim Turks

Thus, the Ottoman state was not based on one constituent element. The Kayı clan of the Oghuz, which constituted the Turkish seed, led a nomadic way of life and, as such, it could not have played a leading role in the

formation of the Ottoman state. The members of this clan did not have the necessary skills to administer the flourishing state.[28] From its early decades onwards, the Ottoman state began to be premised on a basically non-nomadic population.[29] In fact, the state attended to the affairs of farmers, merchants, and artisans in addition to those of nomads. The Turkish ethnic identity remained strong only among the villagers and tribal people who for all practical purposes were left to their own devices.[30] Neither then nor in the later periods did the Turks as an ethnic group effectively impinge upon the Ottoman state.

According to one line of thought, the Turks in the Ottoman Empire, along with other Muslims, constituted no more than *millet*, a subject group defined by the faith it professes such as the Armenian Orthodox *millet*, Greek Orthodox *millet*, the Jewish *millet*, and the like.[31] Sultan Mehmed II formed the highest religious office of his Muslim subjects, that of Shaikh-ul Islam, similar to its counterparts in other *millet*s. It is true that Shaikh-ul Islams had the function of issuing *fetva*s (religious decrees) and certified that the state's acts conformed to religion (this was because they also were Grand Muftis); however, those decrees could not prevent sultans from acting as they wished.[32] Not unlike the church law that governed personal and family relations among Christians, the Muslims, too, had their religious law (Shari'a) that regulated the same types of relations. Not unlike his non-Muslim counterparts, the Shaikh-ul Islam was conceived not as the representative of religion, but as head of the religious community in the service of the state.[33]

It is true that there was an Islamic imprint on the Ottoman society. Yet, the Muslims formed a *millet* of their own; they did not constitute a 'majority' in the usual sense of the term.[34] Although the Muslims did not formally *organize* as *millet*s, they *acted* as such.[35] In their imperial decrees the Ottoman sultans referred to 'other *millet*s', a phrase that was used interchangeably with such phrases as 'non-Muslim subjects' and 'various congregations'.[36] The 1889 Ottoman Constitution, too, contained a provision about 'various congregations' (Art. 16). '*Millet*' did not connote common ethnicity or language; it was an administrative lexicon to refer to the people who belonged to the same religion or sect.[37]

In their turn, the Ottoman rulers aspired to Persian, Arab, and Byzantine traditions of rule and conduct in respect to language, culture and legal practice.[38] They thought they should not rule in the interest of a single peripheral ethnic or religious group and a ruling faith, but that they should rule in the interest of the governing class and, above all, in conformity with the principle that 'the Head of the House Osman must be maintained both in the East and the West'.[39] Koçi Bey, the seventeenth-century historian, who taught at the Palace School (Enderun), has noted that after 1570, when the intermittent wars with Iran made necessary the recruitment of thousands of Anatolian youths to the military positions, Turks as well as Kurds, Lazes, Tatars and others were all called *ecnebi*, that is, people who did not belong to

the 'military class', or Ottomans.[40] As the House of Osman had to rule a mosaic of several ethnic and religious groups it could not afford to elevate one (ethnic or religious) element too much above others. This had been particularly the case during the early centuries and the nineteenth century.

For centuries in the Ottoman realm, ethnicities, creeds and cultures were intermingled and, thus, gave rise to a mixed society. Today, even in physical terms, the Anatolian Turks evince only a slight resemblance to their kin in Turkistan, having lost their Mongoloid characteristics.[41] Over the centuries, they have mixed with Arabs, Armenians, Circassians, Georgians, Greeks, Kurds, Persians, Slavs, and other groups.[42] As already noted, intermarriage between Byzantines and Arabs, Greeks and Turks, and the like, was frequent at the level of the ruling stratum. Byzantines' warrior Digenis Akritas was the son of a Byzantine mother and a Christianized Arab commander father. Both Bamsi Beyrek and Kan Turalı, two of Dede Korkut's heroes,[43] chose non-Muslim brides. Osman I, the founder of the Ottoman Empire, had amicable relations with the chieftains of the neighbouring Christian villages and castles. The Greek families of Michaeloğli and Marcojoğli were among Osman's closest companions.[44]

Despite the fact that for several centuries Muslims and non-Muslims had fought each other, there took place a great deal of accommodation and symbiosis between them. More significantly, Persian language, literature, and architecture, Arab social life and language, and the Hellenic and ecclesiastical organization and institutionalism came to have a significant impact in the Ottoman realms.[45] When Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi (1227–1273), mystic, poet, and humanist philosopher, who came to recognize that the secret of all existence is love, died, the Christians and Jews, too, attended his funeral.[46] In 1850, in a Christian funeral procession, a casket was carried out on people's shoulders, as in Islam, rather than on the back of a mule. People like Baronyan and Aaron Joseph published newspapers not only in their mother tongues but also in Turkish. Ones like Güllü Agop staged plays both in Armenian and Turkish. Similarly, Şemseddin Sami, an Albanian-Ottoman, came up with dictionaries, grammar books as well as novels in the two languages.[47] As late as the nineteenth century, some of the local Christians in Söğüt, the first capital city of the Ottoman state, venerated the tomb of Ertuğrul, Osman I's father.[48] One student of Christian-Islam interface has provided an extensive account of the several Christian sanctuaries frequented by Muslims and again quite a number of Muslim sanctuaries attended by Christians.[49]

On the other side of what was in fact a transparent and easily permeable fence, the names of the sons of Sultan Bayezid II (r, 1481–1512) were Isa (Jesus), Musa (Moses), Süleyman (Solomon) as well as Mehmed (Mohammad). During this sultan's reign, a Muslim preacher in the then capital city of Bursa declared from the pulpit that Jesus Christ was not a lesser prophet than Mohammad.[50] In an annual fair in 1572 in a small town of Thrace, which

was held together with a church ceremony, both Christians and Muslims participated in the procession.[51] In many ways, the Muslim folk among the Turks had unorthodox features, bearing signs of not only of Shi'a mysticism, but also of belief in various Christian miracles, saints, and shrines.[52]

Despite the *millet* system, by which different religious communities enjoyed autonomy in their internal affairs, extensive contacts continued among the members of those communities.[53] In the period 1700–1922, residential exclusivity was the exception rather than the rule, though in Istanbul, Armenians lived in greater numbers in Kumkapı, Greeks in Fener, Jews in Balat and Hasköy, and Muslims in Eminönü and Sirkeci. In many regions, wealth rather than religion determined where households were situated. One came across Jewish homes next to a mosque and Muslim homes nestled up to a synagogue.[54] Two Bulgarian Christians made the following remarks towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century: 'Turks and Bulgarians lived together and were good neigbours. On holidays, they exchanged pleasantries. We sent the Turks *kozunak* and red eggs in Easter, and they sent us *baklava* at Bayram (Muslim's religious feast). And on these occasions, we visited each other'; 'In Khaskovo, our neigbours were Turks. They were good neighbours … . Both of my parents knew Turkish well. [At one point] … my father was away fighting [during the Balkan wars with Turks, 1912–1914]. My mother was alone with four children. And the neighbours said: "You are not going anywhere. You'll stay with us. …" So Mama stayed with the Turks. What I am trying to tell here is that we lived well with these people.'[55]

In addition to food, different religious communities shared among themselves music, proverbs, and the like. They rejoiced or mourned at the same events. Following the re-proclamation of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, Armenians and Turks embraced in the streets, thinking that the age of not only freedom but also fraternity had arrived.[56] At Drama, the Ottoman revolutionary officers imprisoned a Turk for insulting a Christian; elsewhere, Turks and Arabs joined in the Thanksgiving services of the Christians.[57] The so-called 'Ottoman' architecture, carpets, clothes, pottery, textiles, and interior decoration reflected an artistic style, which was a synthesis of all the cultural influences the Ottomans were exposed to.[58]

None of this, however, homogenized differences among the members of the communities in question. Bazaar was the most hybrid place in the Ottoman realm. However, when the bazaar closed, everyone went to a place where they acted in accordance with their ethnic-religious identities.[59] One could see one reflection of this state of affairs in *ortaoyunu*, Turkey's *commedia dell'arte*, much liked by the Turks for centuries. The *ortaoyunu* types have included the Black Sea Laz, the Kurd, the Albanian, the Persian and the Arab, the Greek, the Frank, the Armenian, and the Jew. An important feature of the characters in *ortaoyunu* has been that none of them tried to change others.[60]

This was not surprising. In the early stages of the Ottoman state's formation, one's religion did not determine whether one was considered an Ottoman or not. Christians were employed in both the military and public bureaucracy. By the fourteenth century, the Ottoman elite had become a hybrid admixture of Muslims and Christians. What counted first and foremost was ability. On that basis, Christians, too, could rise to positions of prominence. This state of affairs continued to be the case until the second half of the fifteenth century, when being a Muslim became a necessary condition for membership in the Ottoman elite. However, by that time, many of the offspring of the early Christian nobility had converted to Islam by their own volition.[61] The latter, too, rose to the highest positions in the Ottoman state.[62] It must also be noted that both in the second part of the fifteenth century and during later centuries, tax-farming[63] remained open to non-Muslims also.[64]

The conversion of the Christians to Islam was not a consequence of compulsion. Many preferred the order and security under the Ottoman rule to the anarchy in the wake of the gradual collapse of the central administration in the Byzantine Constantinople. As the moral authority of the Orthodox Church declined, they adhered to the new faith. They also appreciated the fact that following their conversion, their origins were soon forgotten. To give a few examples, Sultan Mehmed II and Sultan Bayezid II chose a number of their grand viziers from among the scions of former Christian dynasties. One such grand vizier of Mehmed II was Mahmud Pasha. While this Pasha occupied his post of grand vizier (1455–1474), members of his family continued to exercise power in Serbia. Between 1485 and 1501, Bayezid II appointed Hass Murad Pasha, a member of the Byzantine imperial family, three times as his grand vizier. Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha, son of the Duke of Sava, served five times as grand vizier between 1497 and 1516, that is, during the reigns of Bayezid II and Sultan Selim I (r.1512–1520).[65] Drawing grand viziers from among the scions of the former Byzantine and Balkan nobilities continued until the first part of the sixteenth century.[66]

In the later centuries, too, the multi-ethnic character of the ruling strata lingered on. Albanians, Bosnians, and Caucasians (Abkhazians, Georgians, and Circassians) occupied several state posts. At least until the nineteenth century, all members of the scribal class were Muslims. However, not all were born Muslims; many were converted. One came across at the higher level posts many first or second-generation convert from Christianity.[67] In the later centuries, too, in the recruitment to state posts no discrimination was made on the basis of ethnicity. It is true that there was discrimination on the basis of religion; after all, one had to be a Muslim to enter the ruling class. However, in countries like England and France, too, the practice was not different; one had to belong to the Church of England or be a Catholic to attain higher state posts.[68]

Since they were in need of the services of the non-Muslims, too, the Ottomans acted in a pragmatic manner in such matters. The fact that grand

viziers and other pashas who came from non-Muslim backgrounds had earlier gone through a religious and linguistic acculturation made things easier for them. The grand viziers and other pashas in question constituted a category of pashas different from those with a *devşirme*-origin. While the latter were taken away from their families in their infancy and brought up as Muslims, the former knew their own pasts and their original roots were known to their contemporaries. Still, many of the latter, too, rose to the highest posts.[69]

The fact that the Ottoman Empire was a dynastic empire, in which the only loyalty demanded by the state of all inhabitants was allegiance to the sultan, also helped keep the hybrid social fabric in harmony. It was the loyalty to the person of the sultan, and not religious, ethnic or other such primordial identities, that held the empire together. The Ottoman state did not want to have rivals such as tribes and clans with powers over the subject peoples. When different ethnic groups migrated to Anatolia, the state often tried to settle the leaders and the rest of the people in different places.[70] A related characteristic of the Ottoman Empire was that that state tried to keep each social group in the status and rank that it had originally been assigned. The state did not want any ethnic or economic group to monopolize power. It was assumed that the rulers represented the collectivity, and not any particular group, including the ethnic ones.[71] The concept of *medeniyet* (city-dwelling, or civilization), not any particularistic loyalty, constituted the gist of the self-image of the Ottomans and of its pretensions.[72]

Consequently, the Ottoman state harboured suspicious attitudes towards all traditional authority structures. The state itself came into being through constant struggles against rival principalities. Following the foundation of the Ottoman state (circa 1299), whenever the central authority showed signs of weakening, local notables tried to usurp the prerogatives of the centre. Later, the Empire was surrounded by what the Ottomans considered to be rapacious neighbours on all sides. Always, certain religious brotherhoods in the Empire constituted a threat to the authority of the state. Furthermore, starting in the late sixteenth century, the Ottoman state fell into a decline that lasted for about three hundred years. All this made the Ottoman state rather nervous about granting rights to intermediary groups.[73]

The Ottoman State versus the Non-Turkish Muslims

The groups that were suspect in the eyes of the Ottoman state included the Turcomans, too, for the latter lived not only in the Ottoman realms but also in rival countries. For long periods, in their efforts to keep under control the central Anatolia, the Ottomans were particularly threatened by some confederations of Turcoman tribes to the east. Thus, in order to distinguish the Turcomans close to them from other Turcomans, the Ottomans did not refer to the former as Turcomans, or *Türkmen*s, but as *Yürük*s. Furthermore, presumably in an effort to hold at least their *Yürük*s

together, they avoided talking about different types of *Yürük*s. For instance, they referred to kilims and carpets of western Anatolia with the generic name of 'Bergama' instead of the particular *Yürük* group for each style.[74]

When the state could not ignore the Turcomans not close to them, it made efforts to prevent them from gaining strength and, in any case, to keep them at arms length. Earlier, the Selcuk State (1075–1308), too, had perceived the powerful Turcoman tribes dangerous for its purpose; it, too, had divided and resettled them in places far away from each other.[75] The Ottomans in turn chose to benefit from the services of non-Turcoman groups in order to weaken those Turcomans that kept their distance from them. At times, they bypassed the Turcomans in question and, instead, appointed some Kurdish begs as local administrators.[76] In fact, all ethnic groups in Anatolia as well as Bosnians, Egyptians, and Serbs were employed in equal terms in the various branches of the military and the civil service. In the latter services, one could hardly come across ethnic cliques; ethnic criteria were not decisive in gaining entry to the Ottoman upper class.[77]

When the Ottomans resettled people for political and administrative purposes, they again made no distinction between the suspect Turcomans and the other elements of their empire. For example, if Turcomans in question were engaged in brigandage they too were resettled some place else.[78] Similarly, upon complaints from foreign powers that non-Muslims were being attacked, the state re-settled the disloyal Turcomans as well as Arab, Circassian, and Kurdish nomads somewhere else.[79]

The Ottomans, in fact, came to have even contempt for the Turcomans. In the nineteenth century, Süleyman Nazif, who was a Turkist, expressed this feeling as follows: 'If we return to the Arabs and Persians what is theirs, nothing remains for us except woolen jacket and long sleeves.'[80] Until the late nineteenth century, 'Turk' was for the Ottomans a derogatory term.[81] In 1802, Halet Efendi became angry when he was presented in Paris as 'Turkish' ambassador.[82] It was clear that except during the last decade of their existence (1908–1918), the Ottomans were not after bringing about a Turkish union; and then, as elaborated in Chapter Four, Turkism competed with Ottomanism and Islamism.

In response to the state's prejudice towards them, the disloyal Turcomans, too, kept their distance from the state and, in fact, came to have a hostile attitude towards it. They maintained their tribal life style. To those Turcomans, the notion of 'state' remained alien.[83] They, along with other nomadic groups, did not wish to be part of any kind of social order other than that of the tribal one. Lacking any kind of social discipline, they were not above attacking and looting the merchant caravans, the exposed villages, and poorly defended cities.[84] Those Turcomans even fought against the Ottoman state. When, in 1486, the Mamluks captured (modern Turkey's southern city of) Adana, the nearby Turcoman tribes started an anti-Ottoman rebellion.[85]

It follows that the Ottoman rulers could hardly be interested in legitimizing their rule in terms of a rootedness in a demographic majority. In contrast to the Habsburg and Romanov Empires, the Ottoman Empire lacked an ethnic 'core'. Islam-created categories of Muslim and non-Muslim, which constituted the dominant status groups in society, transcended ethnicity. Although the Ottoman rulers spoke mainly Turkish, they did not assert any ethnic affiliation.[86] Similarly, to the extent ethnic terms were used, they referred to what were actually religious differences. When Ottoman Christians informally spoke of 'Turks', they had in mind 'Muslims'. 'Turk', in turn, had the connotation of Muslims of several sorts – Albanian, Kurdish, and Turkish (but not Arabic) Muslims. Muslim Arabs used 'Turk' for those who had come from outside their region – whether Albanian, Circassian, or Turk.[87] Similarly, the Ottomans used the generic term 'non-Muslim' for all non-Muslims; for them 'Armenian' or 'Jew' did not have the connotation of an ethnic identity. The usage of the term '*millet*' was not dissimilar; each of the *millet*s consisted of several ethnic-linguistic groups. The Jewish *millet*, for instance, included Ashkenazi, Caraite, Romaniote, and Sephardi.[88] Throughout their history, the Turks were either integrated into such other empires as the Mughal Empire, or they themselves set up multi-ethnic (and religious) empires.[89]

In the Ottoman Empire language, too, was not a marker of ethnicity; whether or not one spoke a particular language did not determine one's identity. It is true that both the rulers and the Turks spoke the same language – Turkish. Yet, an ordinary Turk could not understand the written and formal spoken 'Turkish' the state stratum used, for the latter (the mandarin language of the rulers, or 'Ottoman Turkish') was a flowery language heavily loaded with the (distorted versions) of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish words as well as phrases.[90] It must also be noted that knowledge of Ottoman Turkish was not necessary even for employment by the state.[91] There were several grand viziers who managed little Turkish. Hayreddin Pasha, who became Grand Vizier in 1878, was born in Circassia, but brought up in Tunisia. Thus, he spoke excellent Arabic but only a broken Turkish. His written Turkish was even worse.[92]

The groups that were suspect in the eyes of the Ottoman state included not only ethnic groups, but also religious groups, if their adherents did not have an accommodating attitude towards other sects and even religions. This was because the Ottomans' was a frontier civilization. Being made up of Asiatic European, Muslim and Christian, Ottoman and Turcoman, nomadic and sedentary elements, it turned out to be pragmatic in outlook and free from orthodox cultural and social constraints that one came across in the Turcoman principalities farther to the east.[93] As representatives of the state, the rulers' relation to Islam was subordinate to and determined by power interests. Members of various non-Muslim families occupied many offices such as fief holders, commanders of security units, and even army detachments, which were primarily reserved for high-level Muslim functionaries.

Although the Ottoman rulers would not have admitted it, for according to a particular reading of Islam it would have been considered blasphemy, the particular conception of Islam underlining the virtue of fraternization, which the rulers adopted for instrumental reasons, was not different from the prevalent Islamic popular culture in the Ottoman realm. Not unlike their civilization, the Turks' religion was also a frontier religion and remained so. This was especially the case in the Balkans where a great deal of Christian-Muslim mingling took place. The frontier Islam was a mystic, not a doctrinaire, form of Islam, bearing in particular the influence of Ahmed Yesevi, a twelfth-century mystic who had brought the *Sufism* of Central Asia to Anatolia in the thirteenth century.[94] The adherents of mystic Islam in general aspired to become virtually perfect human beings by gradually internalizing the characteristics of the Muslims' God, Allah, as indicated in His 99 names in the holy texts. In the mystic Islam in question, there is no reference to the 'other'; instead, there is an emphasis on *tevhid* (union). The goal is that of bringing back the just order that was lost.[95]

Ahmed Yesevi's disciples exercised significant influence on the Turks' worldview. Being trans-ethnic and trans-national, Yesevism, along with the teachings of Abdal and Haydariye, has aimed to promote social unity. It was open to all, whether destitute, traveler, orphan, Muslim, or non-Muslim.[96] For Yesevi's teaching included a call for altruism, service to good causes, and the protection of the weak. His views could be summed up as 'sacred love based on compassion'. He expounded as poems and in simple Turkish the mystic principles of Islam. Collectively called *Hikmet* (Wisdom), these poems were disseminated by wandering dervishes and served to crystallize similar thinking patterns among the people.[97] Some other great humanists of the same era, who also left their imprint in the hearts and faiths of the Turks, adopted the same philosophy. Yunus Emre (1238?–1320), one such humanist, once declared, 'We like the Created, because of the Creator', implying the potential for the created to become like the Creator; he stressed the need for union; and, thus, for tolerance. Mevlana Celaleddin-i Rumi (1227–1273), another leading humanist of the time, concluded that the secret of all existence was love. Thinking that love was greater than any religion, Mevlana has espoused a doctrine of ecstatic love, as reflected in the quatrain below:

> 'Come, come again, and come! Infidel, fire-worshipper, pagan
> Whoever you are, however you have sinned, Come
> Our gates are not the gates of hopelessness
> Whatever your condition, Come.

As noted, Yesevi's mystic Islam began to spread in Anatolia in the thirteenth century. It became dominant in areas settled predominantly by the Turcomans close to the Ottoman state.[98] The central doctrine of the Shaikh Bedrettin Revolt (1416–1417) was also a mystic love of God. Shaikh

Bedrettin's social and religious movement overlooked all differences of religion and stressed fraternization between Muslims and Christians. The Muslim and Christian peasantry in the Balkans and the Anatolia overwhelmingly supported the revolt. For a time, Shaikh Bedrettin's doctrine tended to become the common faith of all.[99] Shaikh Bedrettin's mother was a Greek and his father an Ottoman Gazi. In his opinion, the Muslim who called a Christian an infidel was himself an infidel. The Shaikh's esoteric interpretations of Islam enabled him to have the support of diverse elements.[100]

Islamic mysticism was particularly prevalent in the Balkans. The Muslims there developed a pluralistic cultural outlook. This outlook, informed by mystical Islam also came to Anatolia via several waves of migrations, the main ones being those from 1862 to 1878 and from 1912 to 1916.[101]

Yesevism also contributed to the establishment of the Bektashi religious order in the Ottoman Empire, which established itself in the Janissaries, the elite core of the Ottoman army. The Janissaries were essentially made up of boys recruited in the conquered Christian realms of the Empire and trained as soldiers. At some stage, they were sent to villages to learn Turkish and adhere to Islam.[102] As a consequence, the members of the Janissary corps were inclined towards the popular (mystical) forms of Islam rather than the Sunni-orthodox (doctrinaire) forms. However, Sunni Orthodox Muslims, too, could join the Janissaries.[103] For Bektashism, too, looked tolerantly at all religions and sects; it attracted even Christians to its fold. Certain Bektashi beliefs and rites themselves seem to have been derived from Christianity. For instance, the Bektashi belief that Allah, Islam's Prophet Muhammad, and Ali (the fourth Caliphate who thought that the line of Caliphate should have continued with his offspring and that Osman should not have been the fourth Caliphate after Muhammad) resembles the Christian concept of trinity.[104]

Particularly important for the present purpose is the fact that Bektashism also had a significant influence on Turkish social and cultural life. Gently ridiculing religious fanaticism and displaying tolerance to all things in the belief that they are all relative and transitory, the order endeared itself to the people in general. The intellectual circles in their turn came under the spell of the teachings of Ibn al-Arabi (1165–1240), one of the greatest mystical theorists in the Islamic world. Shaikh-ul Islam Kemal Paşazade endorsed all his work and Sultan Selim I built a mausoleum on his tomb and a mosque next to the mausoleum. The Ottoman ruling strata were interested in the Mevlevism of Mevlana. All of the Ottoman sultans, in particular Murad II, Bayezid II, Selim I, and Murad III (r.1574–1595) were drawn towards Mevlevism. Mevlevism was particularly popular among the bureaucratic circles.[105]

In the West, on the whole tolerance does not involve an acceptance of difference. With their frontier civilization and frontier religion, the Ottomans' tolerance did imply an acceptance of difference. There was an awareness of the 'other'; yet, no condescension was felt towards the 'other'. People would

have shrugged their shoulders and say, 'Oh, that is the Armenian way, the Greek way, or the Jewish way'. Concerning the differences, people would have thought, 'Well, they think and act in that manner, so what?'[106]

In fact, in the Ottoman Empire differences had to exist. This was because the Ottomans did not like disorder. They tried to *freeze* the particular, not *change* it.[107] N. Batzaria, an Ottoman Subject of Rumanian origin, who served as minister of public works in 1912–1918, made the following observation: 'In conquering the Balkans in the fourteenth century, Turks did not, either at the time or later, think about denationalizing other peoples or imposing upon them a different culture. The Turkish rule may be compared to the snow that covers up the crop and protects them against winter freeze.'[108] The only exception was the policy of the forced uprooting of people and settling them elsewhere. However, the displacement of the people in this manner was rationalized on three grounds that did not include ethnic cleansing. First, as the Empire expanded, the new, non-Muslim lands had to be integrated. Consequently, both the Muslims and the non-Muslims were resettled. Secondly, there was an effort to use the scarce labour in a more rational manner. Resort was made to spatial redistribution of populations so that the surplus product controlled by the centre could stay at its maximum. Thirdly, people were moved around whenever the need for re-establishing law and order and territorial security warranted it.[109] As noted, those who were moved around included the Turcomans, too. The place names in the Balkans and in northern Iraq and Syria are closely identified with Turcoman groups as well as Anatolian areas and cities or famous Ottoman statesmen and warriors.[110]

Since the Ottoman state did not choose to base its legitimacy on being rooted on a particular religious or ethnic group, the majority-minority distinction was also alien to the Ottomans. It is true that the members of different non-Muslim groups in the Ottoman Empire were obliged to wear specific types of outfit, the patterns and colours of which being designated by the state. However, the idea behind this arrangement was only administrative – that of distinguishing among the Empire's different subjects as the latter had to conform to different rules and regulations. After all, the dress codes for each *millet* were different not only for Muslims, but also for each of the other *millet*s. Furthermore, the Muslims, too, were forbidden to dress like non-Muslims.[111] Until the seventeenth century, the Ottomans took surveys and censuses every thirty years. Here, too, the purpose was that of assessing taxes, not for determining the number of individuals in different religious and ethnic communities. Even the censuses of 1831 and 1844, that is censuses in the age of nationalism, had only military (conscription) and tax (collection) purposes.[112] This was another reason why tolerance in the Ottoman Empire implied the acceptance of the other. One poetic (and, of course, exaggerated) description of the Ottomans is as follows: 'Noble, yet does not look down upon others; magnificient, yet does not crush a human being; grand, yet does not frighten.'[113]

Toleration in the Ottoman Empire was not simply overlooking another person's inappropriate behaviour like talking loudly, dressing improperly, and the like, but living harmoniously with people whose worldviews were quite different.[114] Non-acceptance, thus discrimination, implies the adoption of a universalistic conception of justice. In recognizing other religions, Islam, in the Ottoman context, did not insist on own its universalism at the expense of others. Consequently, there was no logical reason to transform the difference into sameness. Groups did not have to be similar for them to have a place in the overall arrangement. Difference between diverse ethnic and religious groups was not eradicated; different ethnic and religious groups were vertically integrated into the state.[115]

This meant that in the case of Ottomans, to the extent inequality existed between the Muslims and non-Muslims, it was not informed by a universalizing project of homogenizing differences and hence not engendering tolerance in its usual sense, that is, toleration without acceptance. In the minds of the Ottomans, no intellectual link was formed between difference and inequality; one came across in that realm the notion of hierarchical difference and the phenomenon of plurality, though, of course, not pluralism;[116] different groups lived side by side, without competing with each other.

In any case, the inequality in question was not all that great. According to Sultan Mehmed II's laws on the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, on penal matters there was no difference between the Muslims and non-Muslims; that is, no allowance was made in favour of any group because of religion, except the fact that each group paid different types of taxes. It is true that the tax burden was not equal; only in some exceptional situations Muslims paid heavier taxes.[117] This was because, service to the state rather than religion constituted the criterion for determining the tax status among the Ottoman subjects. Consequently, just like their Muslim counterparts many Christian groups such as *derbent*s, *dogancis*, and *voynuk*s, who performed a variety of state services, were also exempt from paying taxes.[118]

Ethnic transformation in the Ottoman Empire, to the extent that it existed, emerged as acculturation rather than as forced assimilation. The acculturation in question was voluntary, or even unconscious. Under the Ottoman rule, many Turcoman tribes, too, adopted Arabic, Persian, and even Kurdish as their vernacular when living among a larger group speaking that tongue. The acculturation in question occurred on a local basis rather than across the board.[119]

It is true that, as noted, the Ottoman-Turkish was the ruling language of the state. However, one could not talk of a Turkish national identity. For after having embraced Islam, the Turks to a great extent had forgotten their ethnic identity. One reason was that the Turks' sense of identity was weakened by their newly won Islamic identity. Moreover, in the case of at least some Turks, the Koranic injunction (49/13) that no human being should be held superior to the other, may have played a role in their not stressing their own identity vis-à-vis others in an assertive manner.[120]

It is true that the Ottoman government called Kurds *kara millet* (black nation) and all Turcomans *boz millet* (grey nation), respectively;[121] however, one should not read too much into it. In the Ottoman Empire, all along, Muslims and non-Muslims alike came to have secondary identities defined by ethnicity, tribe, history, and language. The Ottoman government never denied or tried to efface these identities. Instead, it endeavoured to supersede them by religion.[122] Peoples' religion and even sect mattered much more than their ethnic affiliation. For instance, in 1892, the governor of Mosul reported to Istanbul that that city constituted a strategic barrier between the Shi'ites in Iraq and the Shi'ites Iran. For the population of the city was mostly Hanefi or Shafii (two schools in the Sunni sect of Islam) and was therefore deemed reliable.[123]

A related factor here was the Ottoman Imperial tradition, which, as noted earlier, left no room for a state based on an ethnic community. In fact, even before the Ottoman dynasty was established, the Turkic tribes had begun to develop a sense of universal statehood.[124] With the development of the Ottoman state, which later developed into an empire, this tradition was further reinforced. As a consequence of Islamic identity and Imperial tradition, the Turks referred to their country as 'the land of Islam', 'the Imperial realm', 'the divinely guarded realm', and the like. All of these phrases connoted the whole of the Empire; the areas which were inhabited primarily by the Turks, in particular Anatolia, were not distinguished from the others.[125] After all, no distinct privileges were accorded to the latter areas despite the fact they constituted the major source of revenue and of manpower for the military. In any case, at the time, the concept of fatherland, *vatan*, which was derived from the Arabic *watan*, only meant a place of birth or residence. In addition to Islamic legacy and Imperial tradition, another reason why Anatolia could not have any significance in the eyes of the state was that many Ottoman statesmen and officials came from other parts of the Empire.[126]

The degree to which the Turks in the Ottoman Empire sank their separate identity in the Islamic community and the extent to which their ethnic identity was superseded by the Imperial identity also become apparent by their praxis concerning language. The Turks had accepted Arabic script in place of their ancient Runic and Uigur alphabets even before their conversion to Islam. However, as already noted, they also adopted a great deal of Arabic and Persian vocabulary as well as some structural characteristics of those languages. Furthermore, the Ottoman rulers did not try to spread the Ottoman Turkish that they themselves used to all elements of the population who spoke either plain Turkish (*kaba Türkçe*) or other languages. Providing public education was not one of the responsibilities of the state. The rulers needed to know 'Turkish'; the *reaya*, or subjects, had no such need since their relations with the state were handled by intermediaries such as the local heads of the community. As for the non-Muslim communities, having wide internal

autonomy, they retained their educational institutions, including the right to study their own languages.[127]

The Ottoman State and the Non-Muslims

The Ottomans' toleration, which involved an acceptance of difference, extended not only to the non-Turk Muslims but also to the non-Muslims living in their Empire. One cannot deny that the Ottoman state was primarily a Muslim state. Although for the most part Muslims and non-Muslims in that empire lived in harmony, a distinction was still made between the two groups. The Muslims alone were eligible for military service; also in principle it was only the latter who were entitled for the tenure of land (*tımar*, or fief), which was distributed as a reward for service.[128] Strictly speaking, a fief was not a land-holding but an assignment of revenue collection rights over a specific district, where most of the land was held in small holdings by peasants. Particularly in the earlier centuries, non-Muslims, too, were awarded fiefs.[129] Most non-Muslims paid a head-tax (*cizye*) in return for exemption from military service and for the protection given them by the sultan and the state. In the eyes of the Muslims, they had a lower social status than Muslims, particularly in the countryside. On the other hand, most non-Muslims lived in towns and cities, where non-Muslims were engaged in the occupations that were economically more advantageous than the occupations Muslims preferred.[130]

Although the Ottoman state was essentially a Muslim state, it was not a theocratic state. The *ulema* (religious learned men) remained dependent on the sultan, for it was the sultan who appointed them to their respective posts. In fact, the sultan's will determined every stratum's formal status in society.[131] Both old Turkic traditions and Islam came into the picture for resolving only the issue of how the people belonging to different status groups were to be treated.

The Ottomans began to formalize the relations between the state and their non-Muslim subjects upon their conquering Constantinople, which the Turks called Istanbul, in 1453. Sultan Mehmed II thought it expedient to make use of the traditional skills and tax-paying capacities of the people there. Thus he decided to set up the *millet* system, which was not dissimilar to what the Byzantines had done in their empire before the Ottoman conquest. Mehmed II continued the earlier Byzantium practice and allowed the people in Constantinople internal autonomy.[132] He came up with a decree according to which the churches were going to be protected, and the orthodox were going to marry, divorce, bury their dead, and the like in accordance with their own traditions. Only a few churches, like Aga Sophia, were appropriated and converted into mosques. Also, the people were free to celebrate their religious feasts. The Sultan appointed George Scholarios as patriarch, in line with the tradition of the Ottoman sultans

protecting the Orthodox Church against the Latins.[133] The Patriarch was not asked to perform public service. The 'right' to be free of any public service was later extended to all Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire.[134] The Patriarch performed public service only as head of his own *millet*. Mehmed II adopted similar policies in the other non-Muslim realms that he later conquered.[135]

These policies could be legitimized and also further elaborated in terms of both old Turkic traditions and Islam. In the Turkic state tradition, there was no place for tyranny: 'Being a Beg (ruler) … [was] a good thing; acting in accordance with law … [was] even better; the most important [was] applying the law in an egalitarian manner.'[136] Islam, too, suggests a similar type of behaviour. The Qur'an (2/253) stipulates that there is no compulsion in religion: 'Religion does not allow forcing people to believe and act in a certain manner.' When it comes to the non-Muslims, the latter verse in the Quran has been interpreted to apply to the Christians and Jews, if not for other non-Muslims. There are several other verses in the Qur'an to the effect that one should act in a just manner towards all human beings (*inter alia*, 23/41, 38/2, 42/15, 49.9, and 60/8). In an Hadith, a saying of Prophet Mohammad, too, the Muslims were asked not to proselytize by force the other 'peoples of the Book', i.e., the Christians and Jews.[137] In a related manner, the Prophet pointed out that whoever tyrannizes a *dhimmi* [a non-Muslim under the protection of the Muslim state] or places him under a burden he cannot carry, would himself become an opponent of that person.[138]

The Turks did act accordingly, probably because of such dictums and/or because of their having developed a certain affinity towards the non-Muslims, with whom after all they had lived in close proximity for long periods of time. A Turk would say to a non-Muslim, 'Your faith is a faith and my faith is a faith'.[139] The non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire did not have to conform to the dietary restrictions brought by the Quran. In the seventeenth century Balkans, where non-Muslims lived in large numbers, neither pig breeding nor the consumption of pork was prohibited; indeed, the state gave recognition to both of those two practices by levying a tax on the breeders.[140]

According to Islam, since the Christians and Jews were also the recipients of revealed scripture, they too were 'the people of the book'.[141] The Qur'an (5/45–50) even provided the right of self-determination to those non-Muslims. The latter could thus be given a special status in the Ottoman Empire, that of the *dhimmi*, 'people of the pact', and rendered semi-autonomous. The origins of the system in question went back to the Roman and other medieval empires where there was also the practice of allowing subject communities to retain their own laws and to apply them amongst themselves.[142] In any case, the Muslim law could only be applied to the Muslims. The Sacred Law does regulate the relations of the non-Muslims with the Muslims and the Muslim state; however, it does not regulate the relations of the non-Muslims with one another because it is a

sacred law and the distinction between the Muslims and the non-Muslims is a religious one.[143]

Hence, the council and the head of each community had the authority to deal with the legal problems of its members. They had full jurisdiction in matters of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and the like. Each community could also use its own language and develop its own religious, cultural, and educational institutions. The most important right granted to non-Muslims was the right to maintain independent courts to deal with personal matters. Several *millet*s also enjoyed criminal jurisdiction until 1862. Decisions made by these courts were implemented by the Ottoman authorities.[144] Each *millet* also had its own parallel enforcement authorities, even its own jails. All in all, the state had been indifferent to the 'domestic' affairs of its non-Muslim subjects under the *millet* system. The state did not even monitor the sermons delivered at their churches and synagoues.[145]

In ethnic terms, the *dhimma* was a system of *accommodation*, not of *conversion*.[146] *Millet* was not a nation or an ethnic community, but a form of organization based on religion. The members of each community competed among themselves for posts and prestige, not with members of other communities. The feeling of belonging to a group of one's own made one feel secure and enjoy the prestige thereof. There existed few formal links and, therefore, few conflicts between communities. As already noted, in fact, it was an obligation on the part of the state to prevent conflict arising among religious communities. People did not have to always underline their identity and resist assimilation. They had an autonomous legal status, certified by an *ahidname*, or contract, that provided protection to them.[147] The survival of ancient Jewish and Christian communities in the Middle East as well as the influx of Iberian and other Jews into Islamic lands after 1492 show that the characterization of the *dhimma* as a system of accommodation, rather than conversion, is appropriate.[148]

One should also note here that the *millet* system, on the one hand, allowed religious, cultural, and ethnic continuity within different communities, while, on the other hand, it aimed at the integration of those communties into the administrative, economic, and political systems of the Ottoman state. In the process, one encountered in the Ottoman realms differences of customs, language, and religion among various communities, but also observed similarities in economic, social, and political outlook.[149] This was another manifestation of the subjects of the Ottoman Empire having secondary identities in addition to their primary loyalty to the state.

Consequently, in the Ottoman Empire the various communities lived side by side and in reasonable harmony.[150] As noted, there was no denying that in the Ottoman Empire the Muslim *millet* had a certain edge over other *millet*s. However, this situation did not end up in systematic persecutions of non-Muslims by Muslims, nor in any systematic oppression of the former by the Ottoman state.[151] In fact, as a strategy of providing harmony between

the different religious groups, the *millet* arrangement stood at the opposite polar end of forced assimilation. Since they continued to have autonomy in education, religion, and family law, the non-Muslims maintained their separate identities, and they were under the protection of the state.[152]

This state of affairs continued until the nineteeth century. It is true that following the destruction of the Ottoman fleet at Lepanto in 1571 by the Christian states united in the Holy League, for the first time an open hostility flourished against the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, but it did not last very long.[153] In 1840, a provincial council was created at each provincial centre. Those councils were composed of the *muhassıl* (tax-collector), his two secretaries, the local *kadı* (judge), the mufti (the Islamic expounder of law), the chief of the security force, and representatives of the local population. If the province had not only Muslim but also Christian populations, the representatives consisted of four Muslims, two Christians, and the religious head of the latter community.[154] In the eighteenth century, in his book entitled *Daskalikia*, Jerusalem Patriarch Anthimos mentioned of the Ottoman Sultan as 'the present of the God to the orthodox'.[155]

Thus, in the nineteenth century, the non-Muslim as well as some Muslim *millet*s could evolve into nations and, with some help from European states, obtain their independence. They preferred that option because of the rising nationalism in that age and the role some European states played. Given the relatively harmonious relations between non-Muslims and the Ottoman state for long centuries, the exit strategy that the former adopted could hardly be an upshot of mass discontent on the part of the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire.[156] In the non-Muslim communities, it was mostly the intellectuals who became the leading force behind the separating of ways with the Ottoman Empire and the masses were caught up in the struggles.[157]

In the nineteenth century, that is in the age of nationalism, both in response to the tendency of non-Muslims to sever their relations with the Empire and set up their independent states, and for preventing some European countries from playing a role in the internal affairs of the country with the pretext of acting as protectors of the non-Muslims in the Empire, the Ottomans opted for a transition from the praxis of de facto near equality to the policy of equality on a legal basis between the Muslims and the non-Muslims. The Imperial Rescript of Gülhane (1839) declared equality between all subjects of the Empire regardless of religion and ethnicity. Even prior to the said edict, Sultan Mahmud II (r.1808–1839) had made the following statement: 'I distinguish my Muslim subjects in the mosque, my Christian subjects in the church, and my Jewish subjects in the synagogue, but there is no difference between them. My love and justice for them all is very strong and they are all my children.'[158] This statement should not be viewed as solely an effort to appease the big powers, for it also reflected an important aspect of the Ottoman state philosopy- that the state is obliged to act in a

just and affectionate manner to all of its subjects. This particular responsibility on the part of the state harkened back to the earliest centuries of the Empire.[159]

This doctrine of equality enunciated by the 1839 Imperial Rescript was followed by an affirmation by Sultan Abdülmecit (r.1839–1861) that the 'imperial concessions are extended to all subjects, of whatever religion or sect they may be'.[160] This particular state philosophy was reiterated during the later decades of the nineteenth century. In his opening speech of the new Council of State (Şura-i Devlet), Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861–1876) talked of the adherents of all religions in his realm as 'children of the same fatherland'. His successor Murad V (r. for a while in 1876) expressed the same sentiment in his first Imperial decree. Likewise, the 1876 Constitution with which the Ottomans' First Constitutional Period started,[161] stipulated that all subjects of the Ottoman Empire are 'Ottoman' (*Osmanlı*) regardless of religion or creed they hold.[162]

The 1839 edict was a call to all subjects to band together. It was during the last years of Mahmud II's reign that the term *millet* had begun to lose its religious connotation and become the equivalent of the French '*nation*'. The new goal was a regime based on right and justice. The Grand Vizier Reşid Pasha thought that since 'the new institutions would be administered with wisdom and discernment, everyone would feel the advantages of an immutably established system, [therefore] … affection for the government would increase, and the peoples would rally with all the strength of their hearts to useful and beneficial innovations'.[163]

However, the reforms in question again aimed at 'unity among diversity'. The goal was that of promoting the civic loyalty of all subjects to the Ottoman state; it was not one of molding all elements into a given ethnic or religious entity. In the 1860s, the Grand Vizier of Ali Pasha asked Armenians, Jews, and Greeks to prepare new rules and regulations concerning how they will conduct their internal affairs, and endorsed without any changes the provisions so produced.[164]

During the rest of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans made efforts to act in an egalitarian manner to all their subjects. They now distinguished their subjects from one another as Armenian element (*unsur*), Greek element, and Turkish element, the members of all these elements (*anasır*) being 'an Ottoman (Osmanlı)' in a civic sense, rather than as *millet*s the members of which subcribed to different faiths. In the wake of the 1839 edict, the mixed courts were set up with jurisdiction over conflicts between the Muslims and non-Muslims. In these courts, the non-Muslims too could testify.[165] The non-Muslims could also testify in the Shari'a courts, though according to the Shari'a, their testimony had less weight than that of Muslims, just as the testimony of Muslim women had less weight than that of Muslim men. From the 1840s onwards, non-Muslims took their places in the local advisory councils set up in each province. In later decades, they

could be seen at all echelons of government. After 1844, the sultans did not enforce the death penalty for apostasy from Islam. In 1841, the Military Medical School opened its doors to both Muslims and non-Muslims. In 1846, it was decided to set up a university and admit students to that university regardless of the language they spoke and the religion they professed.[166] In a second Sultanic Decree of Reform (Islahat Fermanı) proclaimed in 1856, it was stipulated that from that date onwards religion and sect were replaced by merit.[167] In 1867, Muslim and non-Muslim students together attended the Galatasaray Imperial [High] School (Mekteb-i Sultani) opened in 1868.[168] In 1869, that school had 622 pupils, of whom 277 were Muslim, 91 Gregorian Armenian, 85 Greek, 65 Catholic Latin, 40 Bulgarian, 29 Jew, 28 Catholic Armenian, and seven Protestant. In both the Military Medical School and Galatasaray Imperial School some of the instructors were non-Muslims and even Europeans, and the medium of instruction was French. Those belonging to the three monotheist religions were admitted on an equal basis to the government schools and the posts in the civil service. While in 1844, 29 per cent of the civil servants at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been non-Muslims, in 1893, that percentage went up to 57 per cent. In the 1860s, several non-Muslims were representing the Ottoman state as ambassadors abroad – Aleko Pasha in Vienna, Fotyades Bey in Athens, and Musurus Pasha in London. In 1868, 13 of the 41-strong Council of State were non-Muslims. During the First Constitutional period of 1876–1877, one fourth of the members of Senate and 46 out of the 69 members of the House of Representatives were non-Muslims. During the Second Constitutional Period of 1909–1918, there were 50 non-Muslims in the 277-strong Parliament.[169]

3
Distant Though Not Rejected

Views differ concerning the origins of the Kurds. The alternative accounts are that (1) they had been the people of Gutium in ancient Sumeria, more or less direct descendants of the Medes, a branch of Turkic or Iranian peoples, (2) they are the same ethnic group as the Partians with an Indo-Persian origin, or (3) they are an ethnically distinct and quite separate group, though having descended from some or all of these ancestors.[1] If the claim that the Kurds is 'one of the longest and purest genealogies of any race in the world' is true,[2] one may suggest that for the most part the bulk of the Kurds must have been an ethnically distinct and quite separate group of people. From the start, their having lived in the fastnesses of difficult-to-reach mountainous areas prevented them from mixing with other people.[3]

The Kurds have lived in an area that they themselves and many outsiders refer to as 'Kurdistan', literally 'the land of the Kurds'. This area lies between Lake Urmiya in the East and the river Euphrates in the West, covering parts of the south of the modern-day Iranian Azerbaijan and Anatolia of Turkey. The leading centre of this entity has been the city of Diyar-ı Bekir, today 'Diyarbakır', in southeastern Turkey.

Kurdish is an Indo-European language. It is part of the Iranian language group. The Kurds speak a number of dialects and sub-dialects. There are three major dialects which are particularly important – Kirmanji, Kurdi and Zaza. Kirmanji comprises Mil and Zil sub-dialects. Kirmanji is the most widely -spoken dialect in Turkey; in the late 1970s, it was used by nearly two-thirds of the Kurdish speakers. The Kurdi is made up of the sub-dialects Gurani and Suleymani. Kurdi is spoken by many Iraqi Kurds and is the most common written language. Zaza is confined to some Kurds in central Turkey; those who speak the other two dialects cannot easily understand it.[4]

The number of Kurds living in the Ottoman Empire in the early 1850s was given as 1.0 million, against 12.9 million 'Ottomans' (Turks), 2.4 million Armenians, 2.0 million Greeks, and 150 thousand Jews.[5] Turkist Yusuf Akçura's figures for the last quarter of the nineteenth century were 8.5 million Turks, 5.0 million Arabs, 1.2 million Kurds, 1.1 million Greeks, and

650 thousand from other ethnic groups.[6] Kemal H. Karpat has reported the (estimated) total Ottoman Kurdish population in the 1880s as 1.5 million.[7] At the time, the Kurds were concentrated in eastern and southeastern Turkey. British Major Henry Trotter, who in 1879 was appointed as Consul of 'Kurdistan', sent a dispatch to the Marquis of Salisbury in which he reported that a certain Mr. Taylor, Consul for many years in the provinces heavily populated by Kurds, had come up with the figure of 848 thousand Kurds and the figures of 649 thousand Christians, 442 thousand Turks, and 200 thousand Kızılbaş Muslims (Turcomans) for the provinces of Erzurum, Diyar-ı Bekir, Harput, and Van.[8]

According to the census data, those in the Republic of Turkey whose mother tongue was Kurdish were 1.4 million in 1935, 1.4 million in 1945, 1.8 million in 1950, 1.6 million in 1955, 1.8 million in 1960, and 2.3 million in 1965.[9] That meant they constituted 9.2 per cent of the population in 1935, 7.9 per cent in 1945, 8.9 in 1950, 6.7 in 1955, 6.7 in 1960, and 7.7 in 1965.

The 1965 census was the last official census where the people's mother tongue was asked for in Turkey. One source estimated that the percentage in 1990 was 12 percent,[10] while another source came up in 1994 with 'four per cent'.[11] According to the first source, in 1990, seven million people for whom Kurdish was their mother tongue lived in Turkey; the second source put it as 'six to seven' million in 1994. During the 1990s and the turn of the century, the Kurds in Turkey have been estimated to number ten to twenty million. It has also been estimated that both in 1965 and 1990, two-thirds of the Kurds lived in southeastern and two-fifths in eastern Turkey.[12] As noted in Chapter One, a public opinion survey carried out in March 2007 found the Kurdish population to be 11.5 million people in a Turkey of 73 million.

Throughout their long history, the Kurds have remained a large and rather distinct ethnic group in the areas they lived. Their numbers in the Ottoman Empire (and in the Turkish Republic) were also relatively high. Furthermore, on the whole, they have kept to themselves. To some extent, they have maintained their language(s), though often as a second language after Turkish. Thus, the Kurds constituted a group of subjects in the Ottoman Empire (and citizens in the Turkish Republic) that the state had to pay special attention to and develop appropriate policies.

Early relations

The Ottomans set up their suzerainty over the lands where the Kurds lived in the wake of the 1514 battle of Çaldıran with Iranians. Subsequently, in an attempt to maintain their semi-independence from both states, in terms of their loyalty, from time to time the Kurds wavered between the Sunnites of the Ottomans and the Shiites of Iran.[13] During the course of the sixteenth century,

when the conflict between the Ottomans and the Safavids, the ruling house in Iran, lingered on, several Kurdish chieftains frequently changed sides.[14]

In time, though, a special relationship developed between the Ottomans and most of the Kurdish chieftains. On the eve of their lands being ruled by the Ottomans, the Kurds had become uncomfortable with the Iranian suzerainty, for the Shah Ismail of Persia had attempted to firmly establish through his governors a direct rule over the Kurdish local rulers. The latter were jealous of their independence and, consequently, resented Shah Ismail's rule.[15] As a consequence, when Sultan Selim I (r.1512–1520) had asked his adviser Mevlana Idris Bitlisi, an influential Kurd in the Sultan's Palace, to secure the Kurdish chieftains' support in the upcoming battle against the Safavids, at least twenty Kurdish chieftains readily declared their allegiance to the Ottoman sultan. These chieftains helped the Ottoman armies at the battle of Çaldıran, facilitating the latter's victory there.[16] In March 1516, Şeref Bey, the Kurdish ruler of Bitlisi, offered his obedience to Sultan Selim I.[17]

Selim I opted, to the extent possible, to establish indirect rule over the Kurds. In the event, three types of ruling arrangements could be observed – direct rule, indirect rule with some autonomy, and full autonomy. In some newly created *sancak*s (second tier administrative entities in the provinces), direct rule was adopted, because of the unresolved dynastic power struggles within the leading Kurdish families.

Right after the battle of Çaldıran, in response to a call by the Sultan, nine Kurdish chieftains had declared themselves for the Ottomans, though they reserved their tribal autonomy. In fact, in these instances, the *sancak*s were referred to as Ekrad Beglikleri (Kurdish districts). In the *sancak*s in question, governorship remained within the Kurdish ruling family. However, the central government appointed every new incumbent (chieftain) from among the members of the Kurdish ruling family, choosing the best for the post. These chieftains were under the same obligations towards the state as the other *sancak*s in the Ottoman Empire; they had to join the military campaigns with a number of auxiliaries and otherwise act in a subordinate position to the Ottoman authorities. For instance, following the battle Çaldıran, a number of chieftains defended the city of Diyar-ı Bekir against the retreating Iranian troops until the Ottoman military units arrived.

By using Idris Bitlisi as a go-between, or negotiator, the Sultan reached an agreement with the remaining fourteen great tribes, the domains of which were located in the fastnesses of the Taurus and Zagros mountains. These chieftains requested from the Sultan recognition of their autonomy and the Sultan acceded to their request. The state promised not to interfere in the succession of chieftains, unless there was a dispute for the title. The rights of the chieftains in these *sancak*s over the tribe and lands passed hereditarily from father to son, they were referred to as *ocaklık* (hereditary family rights given by sultan) and *yurtluk* (estate, domain). The chieftains received official

diplomas of investiture. They could not be asked to pay tribute to the central government nor join the military campaigns. Their only obligation was to remain loyal to the sultan and not to rebel against the state. They were also expected to police the border areas and, in most cases, they did.[18] Referring to this third category of rule, Paul Rycaut, who had been British Consul to the Ottoman Empire at the time he wrote his essay (1668), has noted that 'in the 1660s, five governments called *hukinmet* ['*hükümet*' in today's Turkish] … were free from all duties and impositions except supplying a certain number of soldiers, and [were] … absolute masters of their own lands and estates'.[19]

All in all, in the two years following the battle of Çaldı;ran, the bulk of the Kurdish chieftains had recognized Selim I's suzerainty over their territories.[20] Then and later, the Ottoman government could occasionaly send instructions to chieftains on what to accomplish and what to refrain from. For instance, in the eighteenth century, the government asked the Kurdish tribes not to protect the roving bands in their respective areas.[21]

Yet, the Ottomans' policy towards the Kurds was not one of 'divide and rule', but one of 'revive, unite, and, to the extent feasible, let them rule themselves'. Following the battle of Çaldıran, first the Ottomans re-eastablished the authority of the chieftains, which had shown signs of weakening under the centralized rule of the Safavids. Secondly, the Ottomans tried to create larger and, therefore, more manageable units, often referred to as 'emirates', above the tribes. The Ottomans acted in a responsive manner to the needs and requests of the head of the emirates (also called 'chieftains'), provided that the latter remained loyal to the central government. When a chieftain died without leaving an heir, the government consulted other chieftains and only then made a new appointment.[22]

One rationale behind the granting of as much autonomy as possible to the chieftains was pragmatism on the part of the Ottoman rulers. Many Kurdish tribes living in the hardly accessible mountain ranges near the Iranian border, were always a source of anxiety for the government, for it was extremely difficult to set up effective government in those mountainous areas. Among other things, it proved almost impossible to get to them the regulations drawn up by the central government. When once in a while this was achieved, the regulations were for the most part ignored. Furthermore, the Kurds in the fastnesses of the mountains in question were suspicious of any kind of authority and they clinged on to their tribal ways and their own languages.[23] Not only the Ottomans, but the other empires and kingdoms preceding them – Assyrian, Macedonian, Roman, Partian, Persian, Arab, and Mongol, too, had not been able to bring under their control the Kurds living in those areas.

Still, the Ottomans could have tried to establish a centralized rule in some territories occupied by the Kurds, but they did not. For one thing, the

Ottoman's interest in the areas where the Kurds lived was derived from the need to defend the eastern boundaries of their empire, not necessarily from a desire to subjugate and eventually assimilate the Kurds. Consequently, the chieftains in high mountain ranges were not only granted autonomy regarding the internal affairs of their people, but they were also given *timar*s (fiefdoms) in return for policing the border areas and maintaining their tranquility. The Ottomans opted for such an arrangement for dealing particularly with relatively unimportant instances of conflict with the neigbouring countries along the border areas. This was because the mobilization of the imperial army itself on every such occasion would have been rather expensive and, in any case, it would not have been possible to deploy even some units of that army to such far away places in time.[24] This particular arrangement between the Ottomans and the chieftains in high mountain ranges was also in tandem with the general Ottoman practice of securing loyalty through negotiation and the bestowal of Ottoman titles whenever the local lords and factions in the captured areas could not be absorbed into the Ottoman ruling elite.[25]

Coupled with this pragmatism was 'the constitutive logic of the Ottoman Empire', which, in the Kurdish districts, was crystallized as articulating the tribes, which preferred such an arrangement, to the broader administrative system without doing away with their autonomy.[26] For instance, when Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (r. 1520–1566) annexed the Kurdish districts of Iraq in 1536, by an imperial decree he issued, he, too, recognized the Kurdish chieftains there as the rulers of the province of 'Kurdistan', which he considered as 'one of the appendages of … [his] well-protected domain'. The imperial decree in question turned the domains and the castles there into the personal property of the chieftains ruling in those domains, which was not granted in the central provinces of the empire, allowed the descendants of the chieftains to enjoy the same rights, and had provisions to prevent the Sultans' own sons, administratrators, and tax collectors from intervening with the privileges so granted.[27]

It follows that in the Ottoman Empire, for the most part the Kurds came to have a semi-autonomous status. Indeed, one American author has suggested that the Ottoman 'yoke has sat on [the] shoulders [of the Kurds] very lightly'.[28] The Kurds could for the most part keep their ethnic culture intact despite the fact that, as it has been observed, 'they did not possess a native dynasty, political constitution, ancient religion, sophisticated administrative traditions, or literature to bind them together'.[29]

The Ottomans' disinterest in ethnic management towards the Kurds, as well as the other ethnic elements in the empire, lingered on for several centuries. For example, as late as the nineteenth century, the Ottomans allowed the use of the original Kurdish names of various geographical settlements in 'Kurdistan', as elsewhere in their realm.[30]

Later developments

State employment

The Ottomans refrained from bringing all the Kurds under their direct rule, let alone from forcefully assimilating them; rather they employed them, along with the other elements of the empire, in various state posts while allowing all of them to publicly maintain their distinct secondary ethnic identities. For instance, from the sixteenth century onwards, some former Kurdish chieftains as well as the sons of serving chieftains served even in a special elite corps of the Sultan's Palace, called *müteferrika*. Literally, the meaning of the term in thıs context was 'a place of motley elements', for indeed it included several kinds of officers. In 1535–1537, there were in this special corps first those who performed special services for the Sultan, secondly, the sons and brothers of viziers and other officers, and thirdly, those officials who were retired from active service in various Palace and government posts. Secondly, there were Kurdish chieftains and sons of the serving chieftains along with the members of the Ottoman Imperial family and the sons of vassals or deposed rulers of the conquered lands.[31] Kurds, too, were employed in those special elite corps and considered it an honour to serve the state in such a capacity. This had turned out to be the case despite the fact that the corps in question had been created as a means of control over those serving in them.[32]

The Kurds were also recruited for the Ottoman army at various ranks. For example, in the late sixteenth century, the Ottomans employed Kurds in their military units deployed in modern-day Syria and southeastern Turkey.[33] In the second part of the nineteenth century, Midhad Pasha (1822–1884), Governor of Baghdad, recruited to the Ottoman Sixth Army Kurds rather than Arabs.[34] During the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), too, the so-called *Hamidiye Alayları* (Hamid's regiments), set up in 1891, was made up of Kurdish as well as Turcoman tribes. Each large tribe constituted a regiment, smaller tribes jointly forming a regiment. The tribal chieftains themselves commanded the regiments. Some of these commanding officers were even given high military ranks. Some officers of the regiments were sent to special schools in Istanbul; some of the latter were promoted to high military ranks. The state paid regular salaries to all of these officers.[35]

The *Hamidiye* cavalry was given the task of battling against the non-Kurd nationalist militias as well as against occasional Kurdish rebellions. Under the second type of circumstances, the loyalties of at least some Kurds serving in the *Hamidiye* cavalry could be a question mark. Yet, no such problem arose. For instance, in 1880, Kurdish Shaikh Ubeydullah of Nehri led a rebellion against the state and sought British support. The Sultan decided to use the *Hamidiye* cavalry to enlist the support of the Kurds against such uprisings and obtain their loyalty to himself personally. He was successful; many Kurds even referred to him as 'Bave Kurdan', the father of the Kurds.[36]

In the late nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, the Ottomans continued to recruit large numbers of Kurds to their army.[37] It has even been claimed that at the important military functions in Istanbul the Kurdish members of the Ottoman military were the finest looking soldiers.[38]

Towards direct rule

From the very beginning, that is from the sixteenth century onwards, the Ottoman-Kurdish relations outlined above were not always harmonious. Even during the reign of Sultan Selim I, in the true Ottoman manner, along with others,[39] the government from time to time transplanted the unruly Kurdish highlanders from one area to another.[40] In the following centuries, the influence the Kurdish tribes in Iran exercised over the Kurds in the Ottoman Empire became a matter of concern for the government. The government took a number of *administrative* measures, reducing the powers of the chieftains along the border areas with Iran, and rendering those chieftains accountable to the three Ottoman *vali*s (governors) of Baghdad, Diyar-ı Bekir, and Erzurum.[41] During those centuries, too, the Ottomans again did not think of resorting to *ethnic* management measures vis-à-vis the Kurds.

It was during the nineteenth century that matters came to a head. During that century, the Ottoman Empire began to face a critical threat to its territorial integrity from the European powers and Russia. However, the Ottomans' policy did not change; as late as 1896, Zeki Pasha, Inspector-General of Anatolia and the commander of the Ottoman Fourth Army prepared a report for putting an end to the brigandage by the tribes of Dersim area in eastern Anatolia. This report has not made any reference to the ethnic issue. Instead, it pointed out that people in Dersim were engaged in brigandage, did not pay taxes, and refused conscription, and attributed this state of affairs to the geography of the area and people's being unaware of how to carry out commerce. The report recommended that people in the area should be employed in the construction of the roads, the opening of primary schools in some sub-districts, improving the local administration, and the like.[42] In 1903, another report put together by Arif Beg, governor of a sub-district in Dersim likewise concluded that the efforts of people of Dersim to make ends meet rendered them aggressive and prone to plunder.[43]

As a response to the threat of the disintegration of their realm, the Ottoman rulers (again) resorted to administrative or similar measures, now adopting a policy of centralization as well as the larger project of Westernization. As part of the former policy, they decided to take up more effective measures against the unruly local magnates,[44] including the Kurdish ones, and bring them under the strict control of the central authority. For this purpose, the Ottomans once more preferred a non-ethnic policy – that of extending *direct* control over the eastern borders of the empire, too.[45]

Above it was mentioned that the Ottomans' policy towards the Kurds was that of revive, unite, and let them rule themselves to the extent this

was feasible. In the mid-nineteenth century, this increasingly became a non-feasible policy. Thus, from 1836 onwards, the Ottomans began to convert some groups of Kurdish *emirates* into Ottoman *provinces*. In the late 1840s and early 1850s, the areas where the Kurds lived became one of the 18 *eyalet*s (groups of provinces) into which the Ottoman Empire was divided in Anatolia.[46] It was in the name of 'equality before law', which had been the major aim of the Tanzimat (Reforms) Period of 1839–1876, that the 1870 Law of Provinces did away with the last vestiges of the rights and privileges of the Kurdish chieftains.

In the putting into effect of the new arrangements for securing a more centralized rule, ethnic considerations again did not play a role. This was, for instance, the case in the relocations of some Kurdish tribes; the latter measure was regarded as necessary for the bringing of all the Kurdish areas under the direct control of the central government. Consequently, when necessary, only the rebellious tribes were re-settled, not others. There were also efforts to encourage at least some of the Kurdish tribes to lead sedentary lives so that they would abandon their rebellious attitudes.

The Ottomans did not view the Kurds as an ethnic community, i.e. as Kurds, but neither, of course, did they perceive them as Turks. The Ottoman state took censuses only for tax and conscription purposes, not for determining the populations of different ethnic communities.[47] The Kurds as an ethnic group were neither downgraded nor upgraded vis-à-vis the other elements of the Ottoman Empire. The privileges mentioned above were granted to the chieftains as local rulers. Neither to them nor to the Kurds in general were such privileges accorded as members of an ethnic group.[48] It is true that in Anatolia, all along Turkish was the most widespread language; but Anatolia was also a geographical area where Aramiac Armenian and Kurdish were spoken, and this was viewed as perfectly normal. The Ottomans did not think of altering that situation.

Needless to point out, if the Ottomans had ethnic considerations in mind they would not have adopted the so-called 'unite, revive, and rule' policy, because they would have figured that that policy could have led to the Kurds beginning to develop a common consciousness. Even when there was a threat to the authority of the sultan and to the territorial integrity of the empire the Ottomans did not think of totally subjugating the Kurds, not even when they were in a position to think that they could do it. For instance, right after the battle of Çaldıran, the Kurdish chieftains had requested from Sultan Selim I to appoint one from among them as the paramount administrator of the lands the Kurds lived so that under that person's leadership they would be able to pool their forces together and expel from the Ottoman territories the remaining Iranian military units. The Sultan asked his close adviser İdris Bitlisi, the influential Kurd in the Sultan's Palace, who among the Kurdish chieftains was worthy of such leadership. İdris Bitlisi suggested to the Sultan that 'they are all more or less equal, and none of them will bow his head

before any other. … [Consequently] for an effective and united struggle against the … [Iranians], it will be necessary to put coordinating authority into the hands of a servant of the [Sultan's] court, whom all [chieftains] will obey'. It was only then that the Sultan appointed an Ottoman administrator, Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha, to that position.[49]

Centralization and non-ethnic Kurds

If one reason behind the fact that the Ottomans did not make resort to ethnic management strategies towards the Kurds was the absence of the very notion of ethnicity in their intellectual baggage; the second reason was the fact that for the most part the Kurdish unrest itself, which sometimes escalated into rebellions, did not seem to be based on ethnic factors. One non-ethnic factor here had been religion. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, shaikhs, or religious leaders, who exercised influence over several Kurdish tribes, had kindled several Kurdish rebellions and those rebellions had begun to have messianic dimensions. Those who were involved in such rebellions had assumed that a massive uprising in itself would establish a new and better society. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the war with Russia (1877–1878) also constituted one such occasion for a religiously informed protest of the 'alarming increase in Western penetration'. The apocalyptic visions of a terminal threat to Islam and traditional society seem to have led to the largest rebellion of this type, already mentioned – that of Shaikh Ubeydullah in 1880. As they were aroused to action for safeguarding a religiously legitimated order and, as in the eyes of the followers, the leaders who led these rebellions had charisma, the participants in these uprisings acted in blind obedience to their shaikhs. It has been suggested that since the rebellions in question were devoid of mass support based on a deeply felt ethnic consciousness, the Ottomans had suppressed such rebellions with relative ease.[50] This seems to be a plausible explanation. In the absence of an ethnic awareness and motivation, once the leaders were neutralized the followers must have given up the struggle.

In the Ottoman Empire, there had been other non-ethnic reasons for the restlessness of the Kurds. As noted above, some Kurdish tribes had always wanted to be left alone and therefore had displayed a strong suspicion towards the state.[51] As a consequence, they had been prone to not only register their complaints, but also to often rise against the state when they concluded that the taxes they had to pay were too heavy, administrators serving in 'Kurdistan' were corrupt, prices were high, and the like.[52] In such cases, their resistance to the government could not even be referred to as 'rebellion' but 'civil disobedience', for the simple reason that on such occasions Kurds simply did not wish to pay their taxes and they wanted to govern their domains as they saw fit.[53] Sometimes, the government's abrupt assertion of its authority, too, increased the Kurds' (as well as other elements') alienation from the government.[54] As already mentioned, still another and

a rather significant reason for the Kurdish rebellions was the centralization efforts on the part of the government.

In a sense, in such an ethnically heterogeneous state as the Ottoman Empire, the resistance to centralization was a rather widespread phenomenon. With the central government concentrating more powers into its own hands, after close to four centuries of autonomous life in the margins of the empire,[55] not only tribes but also peasants and, sometimes, artisans, too, had begun to lose their mobility and other such rights, and became rather restless.[56] In the nineteenth century, in addition to the Kurds, such non-Turkish Muslim elements as the Albanians and Arabs, too, joined the caravan of objectors to the Ottomans' policy of centralization. As would have been expected, all these elements had strong reservations against the uniform application of new measures to the different areas of the empire. In the case of the Kurds, for understandable reasons, particularly the highlanders found undesirable the enforcement of conscription amongst their tribes, confiscation of their arms, and the compulsory use of the Arabic alphabet for their Aryan language.[57]

Not surprisingly, the Kurdish chieftains, too, disliked the centre beginning to monopolize authority. When, in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman state tried to set up a more centralized system of rule, some chieftains attempted to maintain their former autonomous status, and when this seemed to be in jeopardy they rebelled. Some others endeavoured to maintain their traditional rights; still others tried to play off the Ottomans and Iranians.

One of the most glaring examples of the chieftains endeavouring to maintain their existing rights was the rebellion in the 1840s of the Chieftain of Botan emirate, Bedr Khan, who had always ruled his people with an iron-hand and who had aspired to exercise greater autonomy vis-à-vis the Ottoman central authority than other chieftains.[58] Prior to his revolt, the central government's plan was that of splitting the Botan emirate between the two *eyalet*s of Diyarbekir and Mosul. Consequently, Bedr Khan organized a revolt, but at the same time, he told two American missionaries who were at the time his guests,that he did not intend to break his pledge to the Sultan.[59] It has been plausibly suggested that Bedr Khan might not be hiding his real intentions because all later nationalists had tried to enlist the help of the major powers through the citizens of the latter whenever they had access to them.[60]

An important factor that induced the chieftains to seek no more than autonomy from the central government was the fact that chieftains had traditional and religious worldviews and, as a result, they identified themselves with the Caliphate in Istanbul.[61] Furthermore, since the chieftains' legitimacy had religious grounds, for them being part of a basically Muslim empire rather than that of an independent Kurdish entity was preferable. In an independent Kurdish entity, the chieftains would have lost their religion-based

legitimacy in the eyes of their followers and, consequently, their status would have changed for the worse.[62]

It should also be noted that even those Kurdish chieftains who revolted, did so individually. While they were acting against the authority of the central government infringing upon their rights, they were also against cooperating with other chieftains since that would have obliged them to give up some of their own powers.[63] This attitude on their part led to sharp splits among the chieftains. They hardly rebelled together, and, in some cases, while some rebelled, others helped the government to suppress those rebellions.[64]

As already noted, the Kurds have been considered to have had in their early history one of the longest and purest genealogies of any ethnic group in the world. As also mentioned, this had been particularly true of the Kurds who led nomadic lives in the highlands rather than settled in villages and towns.[65] Consequently, those Kurdish chieftains who were settled would not turn into Kurdish proto-nationalists because they would have been at least to some extent integrated to the Ottoman life, and those Kurdish chieftains not settled could not become Kurdish nationalists because they would not work together for this purpose.

As a result, in their history, only a few independent Kurdish entities existed and those independent Kurdish entities had been set up in the regions where rarely Kurds had lived for a long time. Furthermore, almost all the such independent Kurdish entities did not survive their founders. In addition, those exceptional Kurdish entities that had autonomy for a long time, like the ones ruled by the princes of Bitlis, too, could not have developed into what may be called proper independent states. This was because they were sometimes obliged to fight on the side of the Ottomans against the latter's enemies. At other times, the Kurdish chieftains trying to have greater autonomy like Muhammad Pasha of the 1820s and 1830s and Badr Khan of the 1840s, could be summarily dealt with.[66]

One other reason why the Kurds could not maintain independent political entities and thus could not turn into true nationalists was already mentioned in passing: Kurds' basic loyalty was always to their tribe. It was difficult for them to commit a breach of tribal custom and ethics, because that would have induced other members of their tribe to turn against them. Moreover, there have always existed deep feuds among the tribes over such matters as grazing rights and marriage partners. Under the circumstances, the tribal cooperation was minimal and when it did occur, as in the case of the Botan Emirate, the pattern it evinced was no more than that of an unruly conglomerate.[67]

The tribal loyalty could perhaps have been overcome if, alongside the chieftains and shaikhs, elites with nationalistic aspirations were around. The latter might not have had an interest in the status quo and, thus, opt for a far-reaching change. However, traditionally, the Kurdish elites often made their careers outside of their native lands. A number of students and lawyers,

journalists, and other professional people did live in their native land, but without an impact on the communities around them.[68]

Even if there had not been an absence of elites with nationalistic aspirations, the lack of a common medium and education among the Kurds would have also created difficulties for cohesive action and, thus, political cooperation among the Kurds. In any case, the Kurds always lacked a national centre or authority to inculcate in them nationalistic aspirations.[69] This made it virtually impossible for them to develop and internalize a notion of common interest.

Variations on the same theme, I: Abdülhamid II and the Kurds

The response of the Ottoman Empire to this state of affairs in the late nineteenth century, that is during the reign of Abdülhamid II, and later, was not that of taking advantage of this situation, further subjugating the Kurds, and thus rendering them ready prey for forceful assimilation. Rather, the policy adopted was that of settling and 'civilizing' the nomads for 'the elimination of their ignorance' and making out of them another worthy element of the empire – an element that would have a status on a par with the other elements of that empire. According to Abdülhamid II, this could be achieved through providing schooling to Kurds and the setting up of municipalities in the areas where Kurds lived so that they would have furnished services that any worthy element of the empire was entitled to. It should be underlined in passing that the state, then and later in the Republican period, did not perceive the Kurds as a genetically backward people unable to make progress. The state regarded the Kurds (as it did other elements of the population, including the Turks) as an uncultured community that needed to be educated so that they would become integrated into the mainstream body social and politic.

Indeed, in order to 'gradually' bring Kurds to the 'fold of civilization', the state made plans to educate them and take to them all kinds of services.[70] For the reason just indicated, that policy did not have the ulterior motive of forcefully assimilating the Kurds. Abdülhamid II himself admitted the irrationality of a project of assimilation. In the Sultan's view, the Muslim and non-Muslim elements that made up the empire would never have given up their communal and religious rights. The Sultan also thought that the empire did not have a common language and that, despite the fact that the Article 18 of the 1876 Constitution stipulated that the official language of the realm was Turkish, none of the elements of the empire would have set aside their tongues and recognize that language as the official language. Abdülhamid II's conclusion was that under those circumstances it was virtually impossible to develop 'a nationalist feeling' in the country.[71] The Sultan attempted to use Islam as a means of uniting various Muslim ethnic elements in the empire in loyalty to himself as the head of the Ottoman dynasty; he did not try to use Islam for rendering the different same. It is

apparent that in the last analysis the Sultan had in mind voluntary integration rather than forceful assimilation.

When he was referring to each of the Ottoman elements that, in his opinion, would have posed difficulties for forging a widespread 'nationalist' feeling in the empire, the Sultan made reference to the Albanians, Arabs, and Kurds as well as the Armenians, Greeks, and Slavs. However, not unlike the Ottoman sultans who were after promoting a special relationship with the Kurds in the sixteenth century, in the late nineteenth century, Abdülhamid II, too, displayed a particular interest in the Kurds and, thus, made efforts to establish closer relations with them. At one point he declared: 'Now we have left behind us those times when we allowed the people who had alien religions to become a thorn on our side.'[72] Here, of course, the Sultan was referring to the non-Muslim elements of the empire. Abdülhamid II also felt that his dynasty should now try to develop the Turkish element as well as obtain the allegiance to the empire of the other Muslim elements, in particular, those of the Kurds: 'We can now tolerate [read, "get along well"] within our borders [with] those who share our religion and [therefore] are one of us. We need to strengthen the Turkish element in Anatolia and [at the same time] give priority to making the Kurds part of us.'[73]

Abdülhamid II's last sentence cited here, too, may be read not to mean an intention on the part of the Sultan to forcefully assimilate the Kurds. As already noted, the Sultan thought assimilation would not be an easy task. Furthermore, he perceived the Albanians, Arabs, Kurds, and Turks as 'the children of a large family' that only 'a union of belief', i. e., that of Islam, and not ethnic ties, i. e. the efforts to assimilate the said elements, would bring them together.[74] In his efforts to hold the empire together, the Sultan pursued a pan-Islamic rather than a solely Islamic policy. This was because Abdülhamid II had not toyed with the idea of turning the disparate elements of the empire into a homogeneous nation; rather, the Sultan was after inducing the various elements of the empire to cooperate and save their empire; he endeavoured to achieve that goal of his by reminding those elements that they were all Muslims and, therefore, they had a stake in the maintenance of their Muslim empire.

As a result, Abdülhamid II's game plan was that of educating the children of the leading Albanian, Arab, and Kurdish families and tribal leaders so that those children would later become civil servants in the areas the Kurds lived rather than follow in the footsteps of their fathers, i.e., become future chieftains. The Sultan gave instructions that the pupils in question should be treated well so that they in turn would treat the people well when they become local chiefs in 'Kurdistan'. In the Sultan's opinion, this would have helped to keep the Kurds, as well as the other non-Turkish Muslim elements, as loyal subjects of his dynasty.[75] The Sultan had in mind a civic, rather than an ethnic, measure for salvaging what was left of the empire.

That the policy adopted did not have ethnic overtones was also apparent in the choice of the students as well the curriculum pursued in the so-called *Aşiret Mektebi* (Tribes School), which started operation in 1892 in Istanbul. The students were to come from those families and tribes that created most problems by not paying their taxes and frequently revolting. The hope was that if the said Kurds in particular were 'civilized', they would 'behave' themselves and would no longer pose a problem for the state.[76]

The curriculum to be pursued in the school was designed to *complement*, not *replace*, the pupil's tribal or other particularistic loyalties with patriotism for the state. The goal was that of the indoctrination of loyalty to the *state*, and not nationalistic values, through formal education. There was, therefore, an emphasis on those courses that had an Islamic content in order to promote the student's respect for the Sultanate and the Caliphate. The students at the school were to pray together and express their submission to Allah, the Prophet, and the Sultan's guidance, 'so that they would abstain from falsehood'. Also, in the courses on the Ottoman history, the services that the Ottoman Empire provided for the Muslims were particularly underlined. One last evidence for the absence of an ethnic motive in the whole project was that the schools were closed when adequate numbers of families and tribal leaders could not be *persuaded*, rather than *forced*, to send their children to the school and, therefore, the student numbers no longer justified the expenses made for the school.[77] Here, it should also be noted that when the Aşiret Mektebi was opened, some Kurdish families had *volunteered*, rather than been *obliged*, to send their children to the school.[78]

Another matter that should be addressed concerning the Aşiret Mektebi is the fact that the medium of instruction employed at the school was Turkish. Furthermore, Kurdish as a medium of instruction was at the time forbidden, because it was considered to be an 'unsophisticated language'.[79] This was a *concern* rather than a *discourteous* attitude on the part of the Ottomans against the Kurds. As already noted, the Ottomans wished to keep the Kurds within the fold of the empire. They thought this would be possible if the Kurds were rendered 'more civilized' through education. In their opinion, Kurdish was not an adequately developed language to be used at schools. In fact, one non-Muslim student of those eras came to the conclusion that the 'education of Kurdish youth, even in Turkish, was a hundred times better than none; it showed the trend of Turkish statecraft in regard to *friendly* tribes'.[80]

It is true that at the time there were rather prominent Kurds who requested education in eastern and southeastern Anatolia in Kurdish. However, they, too, did not have ethnic motives. In the last analysis, the latter's concerns were basically no different from those of the Ottomans. One such Kurd was none other than Said-i Nursî from Bitlis (1876–1960), founder of a significant Muslim movement, whose teachings form the basis of one of the largest and rather influential religious orders in contemporary Turkey – Nurcus

(Followers of Light). This is how Nursî's petition to Abdülhamid II on the issue read: 'The easterners are an important part of the Ottoman nation (sic). … Some modern schools have been opened in Anatolia, but only those who know Turkish can benefit from them. [The solution to this problem] is for the government to open in eastern Anatolia … [modern] schools [where the medium of instruction would be the local languages]. … [These schools] … would become the basis of national education. The foundation [laid by the said education] in turn shall be the basis of unity and togetherness. … Thus … [the people in the east] will become a strong part of our fatherland. And this will give proof of their natural abilities and capacity for civilization.'[81]

As already underlined, on the basis of the frequent usage by the Ottomans of the term 'uncivilized' for Kurdish, one should not arrive at the conclusion that the Ottoman state's dealing with the Kurds was a 'racist' one, despite the fact that on another occasion, Abdülhamid II also referred to the Kurds as 'savage' (*vahşi*).[82] Because of their tribal organization, the Kurds did not have a positive image in the eyes of many at that time, and this could have also left an impact on the Sultan and others. As already noted, the Kurds were presented as an ungovernable people since they were thought to have 'intractable tempers'. Several students of the Kurds have argued, or at least implied, that the Kurds had some other similar character traits and behaviour patterns. For instance, it has been claimed that the Kurds displayed a lack of discipline and they had no respect for order.[83] Another unfavourable comment made about them has been that their main occupation was smuggling and banditry.[84] Still another criticism leveled at the Kurds has been that they took *freedom* as *licence*.[85] At least one author reported of a number of anecdotes relevant to the last point from his travels in the area: 'A short distance beyond, we passed the ruins of a village the peaceful inhabitants of which were driven away by the Kurds, who have long arrogated to themselves these districts'; 'At this point of our journey, our guides began to show many symptoms of anxiety and watchfulness, looking out ahead with evident distrust, and scanning the surrounding heights with suspicious looks; but it was certain that the Kurds were not at this time in this quarter of their migratory establishments, for not a living being was to be seen'; 'The Mütesellim [a local functionary] of Adıyaman … strongly urged us to proceed on to Someisat, and give up our intended visit to Gergen Kalehsi [Kalesi – castle], the Kurds of which were very bad, and would certainly rob, if not kill, us'.[86] Indeed, some have even accused the Kurds of their troops employing 'savage' methods towards their adversaries.[87]

It is in order to point out that there have been also works which have found some of the above criticisms to be exaggerated and, furthermore, offered plausible explanations for some of the claimed 'excesses' on the part of the Kurds. Such works have argued that one cannot attribute the Kurds' generally criticisized behaviour patterns only to their alleged innate

characteristics. The following comments are from such a work, which deserves a lengthy quotation: 'The Kurds are generally known to the outside world as a race of ... brigands. ... They have also been described as treacherous and unbalanced. That such sweeping generalizations are totally misleading I can vouch for from personal experience, for during my two years in Kurdistan, I traveled extensively in remote districts with only a small escort of Iraqi policemen. That brigandage existed sometimes on a large scale in various parts of Kurdistan at different times cannot be denied, but this state of affairs had been due to economic factors and the ineffectiveness of the government as much as to any natural inclination on the part of the Kurds. They share, however, with many other highland races a martial spirit, strengthened and developed, no doubt, by their tribal organization, on which they have relied for their security in preference to the protection offered them by alien governments,'[88]

Despite positive views about the Kurds, unfavourable perceptions concerning them nevertheless persisted over time. Still, the general approach of the Ottoman state towards the Kurds, however, was one of looking the other way whenever they were involved in acts that could not, in fact, be approved by that state. The Ottoman state did not act in this way because it could not do anything else in the tribal areas. In the Ottoman view, since the Kurds were Muslims, they had to be *integrated* into the Ottoman mainstream polity and community, regardless of the fact that they tended to cause all kinds of troubles for the government.[89] Consequently, even if some of their acts would have called for severe measures if they were committed by others, on the whole, the Ottomans treated the Kurds with a great deal of leniency.[90] For instance, the Ottomans overlooked minor acts of illegal behaviour on the part of the Kurds. They punished the Kurds lightly for their more serious illegal acts, seemingly perceiving those acts as no more than misdemeanour. Probably because they have considered the second category of illegal acts as no more than a light offence, after a while they often pardoned the Kurds involved, and, in several cases, even rewarded the Kurdish offenders.[91] They would not have let go such offenders if their generally lenient attitude towards the Kurds (as well as towards Circassians, Lazes, and Turcomans under similar circumstances) arose out of their relative helplessness in the tribal areas. On the contrary, they would have acted in an unforgiving manner 'now that they had captured them'. When after a while they released and even rewarded the Kurdish offenders, it was as if the Ottomans were offering their apologies to them for having punished them in the first place. In hindsight, it is possible to suggest that by acting this manner, at least in some cases the Ottomans did win back the loyalties of the Kurds involved and even of their descendants.

To give a few examples: during the early stages of the Kurdish rebellion in 1830–1847, Kör Ahmed Pasha of Revanduz had been the fiercest fighter in

the ranks of the Kurdish rebels. In 1836, he surrendered on conditions of honourable treatment. The Ottoman government kept its word and sent him with his family and tribesmen to no other place than Istanbul.[92] When Chieftain Bedirhan Beg revolted in 1843, he was captured and exiled to Crete. Upon his return, he was given the title of 'pasha'. His sons remained loyal to the state; they fought valiantly on the side of the Ottomans in the 1877–1878 Ottoman-Russian War.[93] Again in 1843, Chieftain Bedr Khan, mentioned above, was one of the leading culprits in the massacre of the Christian Nestorians. Upon pressure from the British and the French, a strong army was sent to prevent further Christian massacres taking place. In 1847, Bedr Khan was forced to surrender. He and his sons were brought to Istanbul and they were well received there. He was then sent to exile. Later, Bedr Khan's two sons were appointed as military commanders and the sons, too, were conferred the title of 'pasha'.[94]

Needless to point out, Abdülhamid II, too, was well aware of the serious problems the Ottoman state encountered in the administration of the territories where the Kurds lived.[95] However, that sultan, too, employed a great number of Kurds in different state posts. During the First World War, some reserve cavalry regiments comprised only Kurds.[96] Abdülhamid II brought some Kurds to important positions in the Ottoman civil bureuacracy, too. There were Kurds, as well as Albanians, Arabs, and Bosnians among the Sultan's chamberlains, private servants, and other high and low court officials.[97] On his appointing Kurds to such posts, the Sultan had the following to say to his Hungarian guest and adviser, Professor A. Vambéry: 'You see, I do not attribute particular importance to *high birth* or *wealth*. I have always given preference to *mental superiority*, and I have always chosen my chamberlains out of the ranks of the best students in the college or from amongst young men whose achievements appealed to me.'[98]

Abdülhamid II seems not to have favoured members of any Muslim ethnic element of the empire, including the Kurds, at the expense of the others, for he was 'a master-player of the patronage game within the limits possible',[99] though he had a special interest in the Kurds. This could not be otherwise, for, as already noted, the Sultan strived to hold the empire together by using his Islamic credentials. At the time, he was the most prestigious and powerful Islamic sovereign. His general message was that the Muslims could survive the onslaught of their enemies if they acted in unison.[100] It was particularly the Kurds, who, being overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim in religion, came to have an unqualified sympathy and support for their Sultan-Caliph, and considered him as both their religious and political leader.[101]

These mutual bonds of sympathy between the Sultan and the Kurds were, among other things, closely related to the former's general policy in the late nineteenth century of building up Muslim cadres for the state posts and, for this reason, equipping them with modern sciences and foreign languages.[102]

In this policy of the Sultan, one, in fact, comes across a (favourable) ethnic management strategy, that of 'indigenization', or providing uncalled for benefits to an ethnic group, in this case the Kurds.[103] The policy just mentioned was not an isolated one. For instance, there were the efforts of Hafız Pasha, who, from his headquarters in the southeastern city of Malatya, rendered significant services to the region. The Pasha acquainted himself well with the resources of the provinces under his governance and used those resources in the most efficient and effective manner. He built a great post road and made sure that the road was kept safe for travellers. The Pasha helped develop mines, in particular the rich copper mines of Arghana (Ergani) and the abundant iron ores of Divriği. Under his rule agriculture, too, flourished.[104] The building of the Hejaz railway (built in 1904) at this time was another major effort in the same direction. All of the Muslim elements of the empire, including the Kurds but also Albanians, Arabs, Circassians, and Turks, benefited from that project, though, of course, to different degrees.[105]

In fact, whether pursued consciously or unconsciously, one encountered policies of indigenization in the earlier centuries, too. Throughout the Ottoman centuries, the economic life in eastern Anatolia had not remained stagnant. Two major roads were built that connected the region with the western parts of the country and to the present-day Syria and Iran. The road in the western direction started from the city of Erzurum, passed through the city of Erzincan, and ended in the city of Bursa. The second one towards the south originated in Mardin-Bitlis area and extended to Iran via Aleppo. In all of eastern Anatolia, textile and silk industries in particular as well as that of leather flourished, while in the highlands husbandry picked up.[106]

Variations on the same theme, II: Ziya Gökalp, the young Turks and the Kurds

It was under such favourable conditions that one comes across a mutual acculturation process between the Kurds and the Turks. Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), the Ottoman-Turkish sociologist who had significant influence on the views and the policies of the Committee and Union and Progress in the 1910s, as well as some impact upon the founders of the Republic in the early 1920s, contributed to the acculturation process in question by providing to it an intellectual justification. He perceived nation as a cultural entity, and not as a 'geographical, racial, political, or voluntaristic phenomenon'. He thought the Turks and Kurds had been gradually merged both physically and culturally as a consequence of having had a thousand-year old mutual religion, history, and geography.[107] Gökalp has noted that the Kurds shared with the Turks a common religion, that in the past the Kurds scored the same successes and faced the same failures as the Turks, and that the Kurds took their places alongside the Turks when the latter faced existential threats. Gökalp has arrived at the conclusion that,

having internalized the values and attitudes of the Turks, most Kurds came to display 'a complete Turkish spirit'.[108]

At the same time, Gökalp did not fall into the trap of taking the Kurds as 'mountain Turks', as some intellectuals in Turkey of the late 1930s did.[109] Firstly, Gökalp pointed out that ethnically, the Kurds remained as Kurds despite evincing strong Turkish characteristics. Secondly, as already noted, he has argued that the process, or 'de-nationalization' as he put it, had been a two-way street; that is, one came accross both the Turkification of some Kurds who lived in urban areas and the Kurdification of some Turks who lived in rural areas.[110]

Concerning the Turkification of the Kurds (along cultural lines), Gökalp has argued that the people living in Diyarbekir have been 'Turks' since the times of Selcukids, İnaloğulları, and Artukoğulları, and that their Turkishness increased with the arrival of the Khwarizm/Harzem, Akkoyunlu and Karakoyunlu 'Turks'. He has mentioned as evidence 'the collections of lyric poems and past inscriptions on mosques and castles' as well as 'the language, morals, and traditions' of the Turkified Kurds.[111] Marko Polo visited these areas and called them 'Turkmenia'.[112]

Both at the time and later, others, too, found common features between the Kurds and the Turks. One observer of early twentieth-century Turkey has suggested that 'those [Kurds] who led a sedentary life in villages were hardly distinguishable from Turks',[113] a point Gökalp had also made. Recently, too, there have been references to the similarities between the Kurds and the Turks, and this phenomenon has again been attributed basically to the Kurds and Turks having the same faith, and therefore similar attitudes, values, and traditions derived thereof. In such works, it has been pointed out that the fact that (most) Kurds subscribed to the Shafi school and Turks to the Hanefi school of Islam did not make much of a difference.[114]

Returning to Gökalp, given his thinking pattern on the issue, he has suggested that such inter-ethnic mutations could take place because 'Turks and Kurds like each other'. He has even argued that 'if there is a Turk who does not like the Kurds, s/he is not a Turk, and [conversely] if there is a Kurd who does not like the Turks, s/he is not a Kurd'.[115]

Since he defined nation as a product of similar cultures, and since he was of the opinion that the different elements making up the empire would have retained their ethnic identities, and was not troubled by it, Gökalp could not be considered an ethno-nationalist. In the case of the Kurds, not unlike Abdülhamid II, the major question Gökalp thought he had to address himself with was again that of how to 'civilize' the Kurds, not that of how to forcefully assimilate them.

In Gökalp's view, the Kurds had no inspiration for *vatan* (fatherland); rather, they had strong loyalties for their tribes. They ran away from the military service because of that loyalty to the tribe. They did not pay taxes because they made payments to shaikhs as well as religious personages in

their localities. They ignored court orders because they did not know the language in which the rules and regulations have been written. The Kurds' tribal loyalties and ignorance combined to make them lead illegal lives. One cause of this 'deplorable situation they … [were] in' was the geography, which consisted of deserts and mountains. Those who lived in the deserts had to organize themselves as tribes in order to defend themselves against the powerful Arab tribes. Those who lived in the inaccessible mountains had to attack people of the valleys because they had no other resources.[116]

With these views in mind, Gökalp became a partisan not of forceful assimilation of the Kurds, which he could have because according to him the Kurds were in a rather vulnerable situation, but of integrating the highlander Kurds to the mainstream Ottoman life. He called for bringing those Kurds from the fastnesses of their mountains and settling them in valleys by providing land for them. He also suggested the employment of Kurds in construction and reconstruction activities. Not unlike Abdülhamid II, Gökalp, too, came up with the idea that the state should set up local military units and recruit Kurds for those units.[117]

At the time, at least some Kurdish elites thought no differently from Gökalp. In 1908, on the initiative of Emin Bedr Khan, the grandson of the famous Kurdish leader of 1842–1847, Bedirhan Beg, the *Kürd Terakki ve Teavün Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid) was founded in Istanbul. For a while, the Society published a newspaper called *Kürd Terakki ve Teavün Cemiyeti Gazetesi* (Kurdish Mutual Progress and Help Society Newspaper). In the 5 September 1908 issue of the newspaper, Babanzade İsmail Hakkı Beg, a scion of another famous Kurdish family in the nineteenth century, referred to one of the Kurdish tribes as an 'honest tribe [which] is first and foremost Muslim, secondly it is pure Ottoman, and only thirdly Kurdish'.[118]

Recent works on Kurds have also mentioned of the Kurds having had multiple identities. When people were asked in public opinion surveys in ethnically mixed areas of the present-day Turkey whether they were Kurds, Turks, or Persians, on the whole the answers given were that they were Kurds, as well as Persians and Turks. When they were further probed about their original identities, some responded by saying that their fathers spoke all three languages.[119]

The acculturation process in question, which has not ended up in voluntary assimilation (because the Kurds have retained their original ethnic identity, if they chose to), seems to have started as early as the sixteenth century. Şharaf Khan, the ruler of Bitlisi in the sixteenth century, wrote his *Sharafnâma* (an important source on the Kurdish history, penned in 1597) in Persian. In 1667, he had the *Sharafnâma* translated into Turkish, not into Kurdish. In 1861, *Sharafnâma* was again translated into Turkish, this time at the behest of the Kurdish chieftains of Eğil and Palu. In the same century, Şükri, a Kurdish man of letters, wrote a history of the reign of the Ottoman

Sultan Selim I and submitted it as a present to the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent. In one section of the book, where Sükri talks about himself, he wrote: 'Türk ilen Türk ve Kürd ilen Kürdüm' (I am a Turk while being with a Turk and I am a Kurd while being with a Kurd).[120]

The Kurds' internalization of Turkish attitudes and values on the one hand, and their being allowed to openly retain their ethnic identities on the other hand, must have played an important role in their continuing to act as the loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid mentioned above undertook upon itself the task of further promoting both processes. Prominent Kurdish contributors to the newspaper of the Society tried to persaude the readers that 'acquiring … a good language was a key to learning and civilization'.[121] On the other hand, the authors implied, although in a cautious manner, that the language they had in mind was Kurdish. They, in fact, made references to the 'wealth of Kurdish folklore and unwritten language.'[122] At the same time, the authors declared that 'the primary condition of good Turkish citizenship for the Kurds was their being well educated Kurds',[123] an idea that Abdülhamid II as well as Shaikh Said-i Nursî, too, would have wholeheartedly approved of. The Society did not seem to be a separatist organization. It demanded from the government that the latter should appoint to the eastern provinces capable and honest governors, construct a few more major highways, and reform the judicial system in the region so that people would receive just decisions.[124]

At the time, the Kurdish nationalism, to the extent it existed, was a cultural nationalism. It is a fact that, at times, political claims were voiced as in the Barzan, Bitlis, and Süleymaniye revolts in 1914. Yet, during those decades, the Kurdish nationalism continued to be Ottomanist. The Kurdish press, as, for instance, represented by *Kurdistan* (1908–1912) or the Kurdish Mutual Help and Progress Society Newspaper, took being a Kurd in traditional terms, without coming up with claims to independence and sovereignty.[125] It is true that one also heard from the Society the suggestion that a 'national' Kurdish force, apparently a Kurdish army, not just Kurdish units within the Ottoman army, should be set up on the basis of tribal regiments, but those who came up with such ideas were most likely in the minority. After all, the Kurds as a whole did not take the First World War as an opportunity to bolster nationalist feelings amongst their kinsmen vis-à-vis the Turks.[126] Following the war, when the British and French invited Sherif Pasha, a Kurd, son of a former Ottoman Foreign Minister (Said Pasha), and a former diplomat, to the Paris Peace Conference (25 June 1919–12 February 1920) to persuade him to agree upon the borders of 'the Kurdish state to be established', the Pasha received a great many protest telegraphs from people in the esastern and southeastern Turkey, where, it should be remembered, Kurds lived in large numbers, to the effect that he did not represent them.[127]

The Ottoman government's allowing a Kurdish Society to be set up shows that initially the Ottomans had no suspicions concerning the loyalty of the Kurds. This also provides additional evidence about the Ottomans' continuing naivete in the matters of ethnicity: they still could not figure out that such associations could easily be turned into a means of ethnic mobilization.

As earlier, in the 1910s, too, the policy of nationalism adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)-led governments vis-à-vis the various elements of the empire was an inclusive one. After all, again not unlike the earlier view, Ottoman society's being a mosaic of different ethnic communities was taken for granted. In his memoirs, Cemal Pasha, one of the three leaders of the CUP, has stated that the Anatolia was made up of [among others] 'pure Kurd and Turk'.[128] As already noted, except those who were actively seeking an opportunity to leave the empire and establish their own states, the Ottomans invited all the other elements, including the Kurds, to build a new nation in order to salvage the empire, without forfeiting their own ethnic identities.[129]

At this time, the trust in the good faith of the remaining elements of the Empire must also have facilitated the carrying out of some constitutional reforms in a liberal direction. The political rights so granted included freedom of speech, press, and education. Consequently, a lively political party life flourished. It was in such a context that such ethnically oriented associations as the Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid could be set up (May 1919). The Ottoman state must not have seen any problem in granting the right to establish a Kurdish-oriented organization because they still had trust in the Kurds.

This Society was eventually closed (April 1920). However, here again, the closure was not primarily due to ethnic considerations. First, from the very beginning, the Society had fallen foul of inter-family rivalries; some Kurdish chieftains who suspected that their own positions might be adversely affected by the activities of the Society, did not sympathize with it. Secondly, when eventually the Ottomans began to realise that at least some members of the Society had an ethnic project in mind,[130] they reacted by targeting more groups than the Kurds. The Law of Associations enacted on 23 August 1909 forbade all of the political parties as well as the clubs and associations, not just those of Kurds, which, in the view of the government, had similar motives.[131] The spread of nationalism among the subject peoples of the Empire had reached a point such that the Ottoman government had decided to take strong measures against all non-Turkish ethnic groups irrespective of the degree of the threat to the state posed by the individual ethnic communities. Indeed, the Law of Associations in question was followed by the Law for the Prevention of Brigandage and Sedition (27 September 1909), according to which the arms of all non-Turks were to be confiscated and special military units were to be set up to render ineffective those who could have caused trouble.[132] In addition, for the first time preparations were made to

conscript non-Muslims into the armed forces. Furthermore, the state attempted to impose the Turkish language on all non-Turkish Muslims.[133] In the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, all non-Turkish elements of the empire had started to behave in a naughty manner. The time had come to take some stern measures towards them, including the Kurds, which could conceivably be won back.

4
Search for a New Identity

During the course of the nineteenth century, the harmonious relations between the Turks and some of the non-Muslims[1] in the Ottoman Empire came to an end when the latter attempted to obtain their independence and, one by one, except for the Armenians, they succeeded in realizing this goal of theirs. Then, during the first two decades of the twentieth century, it was mostly non-Turkish Muslims such as the Arabs and the bulk of Albanians who also wanted to sever their relations from the empire and they, too, achieved their goals. Since ethnic nationalism had been alien to the Ottomans how did they react to the secessionist tendencies on the part of their non-Muslim and non-Turkish Muslim elements? Did they counter these developments by remembering their forgotten ethnic identity and, thus, play the ethnic card? Or did they try to grapple with these problems by resorting to what may be called non-ethnic management strategies. This Chapter addresses these critical questions.

Ottomanism and Islamism

When the Ottomans started to think about the question of identity, they did not have the necessary concepts in their intellectual baggage.[2] In their centuries-long confrontation with the states of Europe, the Ottomans perceived their relations with those states in terms of Muslims versus Christians, while the latter states regarded their relations with other states in terms of Austrians, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans, and Turks.[3] Throughout the final periods of their demise that came to an end in 1918, the exclusive forms of nationalism remained incomprehensible to the Ottomans. In the eyes of Cevdet Pasha (1823–1895), a member of the *ulema* (learned religious stratum), Ottoman historian, and Muslim legal expert as well as a high level bureaucrat, such virulent forms of nationalism were nothing more than a 'contagious disease' that had begun to spread in the wake of the French Revolution,[4] and, therefore they had to be avoided. In the Ottomans' view, the Arabs' turning against them during the First World

War was nothing but sheer 'betrayal'.[5] The Ottomans attributed such movements to discontent with local conditions, conspiracy carried out by other countries, and/or unfaithful acts on the part of their subjects. Consequently, they tried to bring socioeconomic development to the regions inhabited by those who no longer wished to be part of the Empire; they appealed to the latter's patriotism; and/or they offered them a new form of citizenship based on egalitarianism.

To give a few examples, when the Greek-Ottomans on the island of Crete in the Mediterranean demanded independence and merger with Greece, Grand Vizier Ali Pasha (1815–1871) suggested to the Sultan that the state should take measures to develop the living standards of the people on that island. Similarly, when Midhad Pasha (1822–1884) (Grand Vizier in 1872 and 1876–1877), was a governor of the Danube province in the Balkans, he, too, thought socioeconomic development was the measure that should be adopted vis-à-vis the disturbances there. Midhad Pasha created new bureaucratic offices, setting up, among others, the Agricultural Bank and the first municipality in the Ottoman Empire. He was then appointed as head of the Municipalities Section of the Council of State, and later made grand vizier (1872). In 1877, on the occasion of the opening of the new Parliament, in his turn, Sultan Abdülhamid II (r.1876–1909) emphasized the necessity of improving agriculture and reforming the judiciary and bureaucracy with the same ends in mind.[6]

Earlier, in his play, *Vatan Yahut Silistre* ('Fatherland or Silistre') produced in 1873, Namık Kemal (1840–1888), an Albanian Young Ottoman[7] writer, journalist, and a civil servant, addressed all Ottomans – not solely to the Turks – and underlined the patriotic love for the homeland. The play was full of such sentiments.[8] There was an emphasis on the nobleness of giving one's life for the sake of country. Islam Bey, hero of the play, declared, 'the fatherland is everybody's real mother, yet many people who try to exploit it … aren't willing to shed even two drops of tears for it. … I see fatherland as a necessity for you and for me. … Martyrdom is a duty for Muslims and Ottomans'. Heroes in Namık Kemal's play were from various regions of the Empire. The play placed stress not on the ethnicity of the characters, but on their historical relationship to the Ottoman state.[9] Along the same lines, the minstrel poet Âşık Şenlik (1854–1914) of Kars in northeastern Turkey expressed his feelings by formulating the refrain of his *'93 Kopçaklaması* (Heroic Song of AH 1293 [1877]), as 'We shall not give up the homeland (*yurt*) to the enemy as long as we live'.[10]

Parallel to the efforts to improve the socioeconomic lives of the restless subject peoples and to the appeals to the latter's patriotism, there also was an attempt to make a transition from the notion of 'not exactly equal but separate and acceptable' to the 'integrated and equal'. While earlier, Ottomanism (*Osmanlılık*) constituted the identity of the ruling elite, now it was used as supra-communalism for binding together all the subjects of the empire.[11]

The Ottomanism in its new version was a policy for bringing about the 'fusion' and sometimes the 'brotherhood' of all Ottoman subjects. During the Tanzimat (Reforms) Period (1839–1876), it was initially figured that the goals in question could be achieved through granting legal equality to all the subjects of the empire. In turn, the Young Ottomans of the 1860s saw the salvation of the state in a parliamentary system of government; in their view, participation in such a system of government would have promoted in Muslim and non-Muslim subjects alike, a feeling of affiliation to the same fatherland (*vatan*).[12] To Namık Kemal, who played a leading role in the Young Ottomans movement, a representative assembly would have been a great unifying force. For him, freedom was important as a binding element, and a parliamentary system of government would have made political participation and thus union possible.[13] Namık Kemal also put forth the idea that the notion of a union of populations should replace the previous idea of people living side by side in harmony but still separated by religious barriers.[14] He did not see such diversity necessarily as a weakness; in his opinion, if proper policies were adopted diversity could be an impetus for progress.[15]

The 'union' that Namık Kemal had in mind did not have ethnic connotations. Namık Kemal, an Albanian by origin, viewed Ottomanism as a notion that could satisfactorily explain his own 'double identity' as Albanian and Ottoman.[16] He wanted to be useful primarily to the Ottoman state, rather than to his ethnic community.[17] After all, the Young Ottomans perceived the subjects of the Ottoman state primarily as adherents to different religions, and rather secondarily as members of ethnic groups.[18] The 1876 Ottoman Constitution, the handiwork of the Young Ottomans and others like Cevdet Pasha, and even a few non-Muslims, stipulated that all subjects, irrespective of their religion and sect were to be called 'Ottoman' (*Osmanlı*) (Article 8). According to that Constitution, all Ottomans were equal before the law; they all had the same rights and duties towards the country; they would not be discriminated against because of their religion (Article 17); and admission to the public office was dependent only on the knowledge of the official language and on ability (Articles 18–19).

The Ottoman state, too, resorted to various measures so that now all of its subjects would indeed feel themselves to be Ottoman. It established a military unit that comprised both Muslim and Christian volunteers. The flag of that unit had the crescent and cross on it side by side. The press was urged to give wide publicity to this military unit. The newspaper *İttihad* (Union) had news items concerning the Muslim-Christian cooperation. The newspaper tried to persuade its readers that the idea of Ottoman union was widely shared.[19] Now the preference was for the usage of 'Ottoman' rather than 'Turk' even if the reference was to the Ottoman Turks. This was so even though the term 'Turk' had begun to lose its earlier pejorative connotation, and also, for the first time, some Turcologists had started to use it when they made reference to the Turks as members of an ethnic community.[20]

Although the prevalent discourse was one of 'fusion' or 'brotherhood', there were no efforts to set up an educational system by means of which the values of Ottomanism could be inculcated in all subjects.[21] This was not astonishing given the centuries-old reluctance in that empire not to forcefully transform the *different* into the *same*. In the last analysis, the approach of the state was one that did not intend to 'offend any nation'.[22] It is true that, during this era, it was primarily the Turks who identified themselves with the Ottoman state. Yet, the Turks clung on to the idea of a multicommunal empire, all the members of which would live in peace and harmony, irrespective of their religions and ethnicity.[23] On the whole, the longing for the maintenance of diversity within unity lingered on until the very end of the empire (1918). The Islamists and Westernists of the later decades also had at heart a unified and patriotic Ottoman fatherland held together by the loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty.[24]

However, in pratice this policy was doomed to be a failure. The Ottomans could not persuade European countries to give up their policies of inciting the non-Muslim subjects of the empire to adopt an exit strategy. Ali Pasha, the Grand Vizier who prepared the 1856 Reform Edict that granted equality to all the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, tried to convince European statesmen that the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would have critical consequences for the balance of power in Europe.[25] Also, the non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire (Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, and others) were after independence, not just equality and/or representation. Midhat Pasha's efforts to develop socio-economically the province he governed were countered by separatist and revolutionary movements among the Bulgarians. Rumanians and Serbians opposed his plans of converting the Ottoman Empire into a federal state and thus creating the federal state of Rumania and Serbia within the framework of the Ottoman Empire.[26] In the eyes of many Christians, the Ottoman state was a Turkish state run by a dominant Muslim majority that deprived the Christians of freedom and, thus, national fulfillment.[27]

Even when it became clear that it would not be possible to hold the non-Muslims within the fold of the empire, the Ottomans did not think of adopting the ethnic management strategy of forceful assimilation. In any case, it was too late to keep the non-Muslims within the Empire by such means. The Ottomans strove only to keep their lands intact. However, they were not successful. One after another, most non-Muslims managed to set up their own states (in the Balkans). Primarily left with its Muslim subjects, the Ottoman state now preoccupied itself with holding together its Muslim populations, irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds.[28] Once more no resort was made to an ethnic management strategy. Not surprisingly, the goal the state set for itself turned out to that of bolstering the loyalty of the Muslim subjects to the state, represented in the person of the sultan.

Consequently, there was now an emphasis on the 'Muslim character of the state'. Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876–1909) took an open stand against ethnic nationality. In his opinion, the concepts of 'love of fatherland' (if taken to be the land of one ethnic community), and likewise 'Turkishness' and 'Turkism' would have divided the Muslims in his realm.[29] The Sultan was after a Muslim awakening, and turning the Muslim identity so revived into a source for self-esteem, dignity, and pride. He had as his target an Islamic nationalism that would have kept the multi-ethnic Muslim subjects of his empire intact. He thus decreed that in his realm the Islamic characteristics of the people should prevail. By using his title of Caliph, or spiritual leader of Islam, he began to act in a responsive manner to the religious sentiments and aspirations as well as the political aspirations of the Muslims all over the world. In the process, Abdülhamid II became a champion of the 'honour and the rights and independence of *all* Muslims'.[30]

For acting in this manner Abdülhamid II might have found support in a particular interpretation of Islam, according to which the Qur'an makes it possible for Muslims to form associations among themselves by drawing upon their linguistic and other ethnic characteristics, provided that they do not assert those characteristics as superior to those of other Muslims.[31] The Sultan might have also found encouragement in the view expressed by Cevdet Pasha, who had suggested that as societies modernize, the tribal *asabiyyah* (feelings and sentiments) loses its effectiveness and is supplemented by religious *asabiyyah*. … In the process, the two types of *asabiyyah* merge and reinforce solidarity among people.[32] Cevdet Pasha's placing religious community rather than ethnic community as the next stage in the evolution from tribe to nation must have constituted a much-needed argument for Abdülhamid II's project of maintaining social unity by resort to religion.

The Sultan's first and foremost concern was maintaining the loyalty of his Albanian, Arab, and Kurdish subjects to himself as the head of the Ottoman dynasty. For this purpose, Abdülhamid II combined Islamism with Ottomanism and took measures that, in fact, served the interests of the other Muslim elements more than the Turks. It was not long before Arabs, for instance, made up about fifteen per cent of the Ottoman officers. Arab notables became members of the local administrative bodies, and were awarded titles, medals, and pensions. Also, the *vilayet*s (provinces) of these Arab notables and dignitaries were placed at the top of the protocol lists.[33] The Arabs and other such Muslim groups with established languages as the Albanians were allowed to open their own schools in their own languages. They could even promote their own cultures and identities, provided that they did not advocate separatism. This policy was in part a consequence of Abdülhamid's view that ethnic nationalism was something specifically non-Muslim, and, nevertheless, his fear that as the empire had lost most of its Christian subjects, ethnic nationalism could now spread among his Muslim subjects.[34]

In 1900, Abdülhamid II initiated the building of the 'holy' Hejaz Railway to link Anatolia to the pilgrimage cities of Arabia.[35] At the time, the Ottoman educational system did not pay attention to ethnicity and differences of language. Instead, it stressed the unity of faith in order to keep together all of the Muslim subjects of the empire.[36] The considerations of self-defence, too, shaped the type of education that the state provided. Said Pasha (1886–1960), who was nine times grand vizier during the reign of Abdülhamid II and who played an important role in opening several new Western-type secondary and high schools, was of the opinion that everyday it would become more difficult to keep under control the remaining non-Muslim populations of the empire. He thus thought that for this reason the public affairs needed to be conducted more efficiently and effectively and that this could be possible only if the Muslim civil servants were well educated.[37]

Traditional Ottoman histories had hardly paid attention to the history of the Turks prior to the establishment of the Ottoman state. This tradition lingered on during the nineteenth century, too. For instance, the works of Hayrullah Efendi (1817–1876), one of the leading historians of the nineteenth century, did not take up the genealogy of the Turks. Namık Kemal, who came up with an Ottoman history of his own, also started the origin of the Ottomans with the Oghuz clans, not with the ancient Turkic peoples in the Central Asia. In this respect, the works of Ahmed Vefik Pasha (1823–1891), who is considered as the first representative of Turkism in modern Ottoman literature, was no different. In an Ottoman history textbook he penned, he had only perfunctory comments on pre-Ottoman history.[38]

Turkism

Despite the feverish attempts of the Ottoman rulers to hold together all the elements of the Empire under the umbrella of the dynasty by resort first to Ottomanism and then Ottoman-Islamism,[39] the non-Muslim elements rejected the first formula of Ottomanism and the non-Turkish Muslims the second formula of Ottoman-Islamism.[40] In the process, it became incumbent upon the remaining Turks to save the country from coming apart at the seams. This requirement made necessary the development of national consciousness among the latter, which earlier had not had such sentiments. It was figured that national unity arising out of having national consciousness would have enabled the Turks to successfully hold together and defend what had remained of the empire.

This state of affairs created the problem of clarifying what national consciousness implied. Lacking an awareness of such matters, the early Turkists in the Ottoman Empire had to draw upon the works of European Turcologists. Among these were Frenchmen Léon Cahun (*Introduction l'histoire de l'Asie, Paris, 1896*) and J. de Guignes (*Histoire general des Huns, des Mongols, etc., Paris, 1756–1758*), British Arthur Lumley David

(*Grammaire turke*, London, 1836), and the Hungarian Arminius Vambéry (1831/2–1913). These and other European Orientalists had initiated studies on the Turks of Central Asia in the nineteenth century.[41] For instance, Cahun (1841–1900) talked of 'the great Turkic civilizations' and has argued that the Turks had acted as transmitter belts between the Chinese culture and the Persian culture. In general, European Turcologists has insisted that much had been ignored or forgotten about the Turkish history, and thus about 'the Turks' contribution to world civilization'.[42] Vambery, whose works were translated into Ottoman, placed the Turks, along with Hungarians, Finns, and Estonians in the same linguistic and 'racial' group (known as the Turanian group), and explored the language, culture, and civilization of the Turks.[43] Then there were such émigré students of nationalism as Huseyinzade Ali (1864–1941), Ağaoğlu Ahmet (1869–1939), both Russian – Ajerbaijanis, and Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935), a Volga Tatar from Kazan. They all tried to establish an ethnic link between the Turks of the Ottoman Empire and those of Central Asia on the presumed similarity of their languages.

If Turks were to adopt such nationalist ideas, they had to begin perceive themselves as members of a nation and the very word 'Turk' had to be divested of its pejorative meaning.[44] The Turks were aware of their relative lack of modernity and were naturally disturbed by it. In 1896, the daily *Meşveret* noted: 'What remains are the Turks who are underdressed and are suffering'.[45] Following the Ottomans' loss of Macedonia in 1912, Halide Edip Adıvar (1884–1964), writer who later lent moral support to the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922), in a newspaper article addressed to the Sultan, wrote: 'My Sultan! Today those who feel themselves as Turks are utterly ashamed of themselves'.[46]

In the process, the non-émigré Turkist writers of the late nineteenth century became adherents of defensive and thus inward-looking nationalism. It was defensive and inward looking in the sense that its preoccupation was with the conditions and destiny of the Turks, not with the ethnic management strategies that the Turks should have adopted vis-à-vis the other elements of the empire. In the last analysis, as it has been perceptively put, the Turkists had in mind 'simple human beings aspiring to a secure and dignified life in their own country, speaking their own language, and practicing their own culture'[47] and, one may add, wishing others to leave them alone. They in turn would leave others alone as long as the latter did not pose an existential threat to the internal and external security of their country.

Through their writings, Turkists endeavoured to bring up such a people and create such a country. Theirs was a humanist Turkishness; they insisted that ordinary Turks were first and foremost human beings with patriotic feelings, specific aesthetic tastes, ethical principles, and a language in which they could express their pride in being Turkish.[48] They pointed out that Turkish was the language in which they could easily communicate, and that it was not necessarily a symbol of identity. It was therefore taken

as a language that would make it possible for them to develop their inward-looking, non-offensive national consciousness. For example, Şemseddin Sami Frasheri (1850–1904), an Albanian author and linguist who wrote the first Turkish novel and who was also the author of several encyclopeadias and dictionaries concerning Turkey and Turkish, translated into Turkish the works of European students of Turcology in order to nurture the self-confidence of the Turks.[49]

Şemseddin Sami's generation was critical of those who had only contempt for the Turkish stock. That generation was of the opinion that the lack of self-confidence on the part of the Turks had prevented national consciousness from developing among the Turks. They were engaged in the rather gigantic task of enabling the Turks to regain their self-confidence, because they wanted the Turks to have the will power to defend and develop what was left of the Ottoman realm. Resort to the Turkish language was made for the sake of integration, that is, for strengthening allegiance to the state, not for the purpose of assimilation.[50]

Consequently the Turkists attempted to demonstrate the 'positive contributions' that the Turks had made to the mankind. Necib Asım (1861–1935), who at the turn of the century wrote the first Turkish general history, has described the 'inborn capacity of the Turks' as that of 'becoming civilized and to civilize others'. Necib Asım also made references to certain characteristics of the 'Turks' [read 'Ottomans'] mentioned in the Second Chapter above – 'their being not averse to adopting everything that they found desirable in other peoples and thus adapting them to their own customs [particulary during their earlier centuries and the nineteenth century], and not uprooting or otherwise humiliating the dynasties that came under their rule'.[51] Ahmet Vefik Pasha (1823–1891), writer, Minister of Education, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies, and Grand Vizier, claimed that the mother tongue of the Turks in the Ottoman Empire was a dialect of a language that was spoken over wide areas outside the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire.[52] He also argued that the vernacular Turkish was a fairly rich language. In his book *Lehçe-i Osmani* (The Ottoman Dialect), he listed the words of Turkish origin in order to show that such words were numerous in the language that the Ottoman elite also spoke.[53] At the time, there were also efforts to show, through Ottoman history books, the Turks' 'contributions' to the 'grandeur of Islamic civilization' and thus the long duration of the Ottoman Empire.[54]

Still, in the opening years of the twentieth century, Turkish national consciousness was only at its infancy. In 1903, according to Akçura who, as noted above, had sympathy for ethnic nationalism,[55] nationalism in the Ottoman Empire was widespread only among the non-Muslims. Akçura did not think it was possible to create a nation out of the populations of the then Empire. Up until 1913, the Turks hardly conceived of themselves as 'Turks'.[56] Only the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, in which the Ottomans struggled to

cling on to their last piece of territory in the Thrace, constituted a turning point for some Turks' beginning to acquire their national consciousness.[57]

As would be expected, this national consciousness, or Turkism, did not amount to ethnic nationalism. For one thing, the Turks who had earlier been suffused with an inclusive Ottomanism could not be expected to turn into all exclusive ethnic nationalists overnight. In the second part of the nineteenth century, the Ottomanist Namık Kemal could not have thought of any majority, however strong, to have the right to act in a hegemonic manner. He took fatherland, among other things, as an abode of brotherhood. Namık Kemal sometimes substituted 'Turk' for the 'Ottoman' and asked the rhetorical question of 'Are not the Turks the nation in whose madrasas Farabis (870–950), Ibn Sinas (980–1037), Gazalis (1058–1113), and Zemahşeris (1075–1143) propagated knowledge?' He imagined a nation in which ethnically and religiously different populations would display a harmonious symbiosis.[58]

As already noted, in that same century, the attention paid to Turkish language, too, had non-ethnic and, therefore, non-assimilationist purposes behind it. The proliferation of the services provided by it obliged the state to simplify not only the bureaucratic procedures, but also the medium through which such activities would be conducted. The language barriers existing in the Empire, both between the elite and the masses and among different ethnic and religious communities, had made it impossible to explain the reforms to the people and, thus, the people could not appreciate them. There was a need for an all-purpose language, easy to learn and easy to understand so that the people would easily make sense of the new practises and make use of them on a daily basis. Thus, several administrative ordinances made the shift from the flowery and convoluted Ottoman to the simple Ottoman obligatory.[59]

The very creation of the Imperial Academy of Arts and Sciences (Encümen-i Daniş) in 1850 had the same rationale behind it. The constitutive statute of the Academy pointed out that, 'In the past, most writers limited their ambition to making a show of eloquence. … They lived only to over embellish their style with ornamentation and did not go beyond various types of poetry and rhetoric. … Such writings, as may well be imagined, were accessible only to the intelligence of the cultivated minds, the lower classes eliciting no profit from them. Yet it is well known that the salutary goal of general civilization can only be reached by the prior diffusion of diverse kinds of knowledge. Consequently, while encouraging the production of purely literary works aiming to entertain men of discrimination, insistence is [hereby] placed on the drafting of scientific and technological books written in a simple style and fitted to the needs of popular intelligence so as to provide the means of widening and completing its instruction.'[60]

Sultan Abdülhamid II, who added Islamism to Ottomanism, was also for increasing administrative efficiency through the use of a single language. He, for instance, ordered *huzur dersleri* (lessons in 'royal' audience), where young

scholars could challenge the established ulema (authorities on Islam), to be given in Turkish rather than in Arabic, as it had long been the tradition; his goal was that of enabling the large numbers of participants who did not know Arabic to follow the discussions.[61] At a more popular level, writing in simple Turkish was started with the Young Ottomans newspaper, *Tercüman-ı Ahval* (1861–1866), and followed by others.

The attempts at the simplification of Turkish continued in the later decades, too; again, the purpose was not ethnic, that is assimilationist. Here, the activities of Türk Derneği (TD) (The Turkish Association) constitute one example. The TD was set up in 1908. Intellectuals, including the faculty members from Darulfünun (university in Istanbul), constituted the majority in this 42-strong association. The membership was open to everybody irrespective of ethnicity and religion, and foreign Turcologists, too, became its members. The honourary chairman of the Association was Prince Yusuf İzzet. Another person from the establishment, Fuat Rauf, Commander of the First Artillery Regiment, acted as president. The Association aimed at maintaining the unity of 'the Ottoman nation', comprising various ethnic groups, by the simplification of language. The Association also made endeavours to spread the simplified Turkish to the countries around the Ottoman Empire for enabling the empire to have supremacy in trade with those countries.[62] It is true that the Association and its journal with the same name had a Turkish approach on cultural and in particular on linguistic issues, however, there was frequent mention of 'the union and harmony of the Ottoman elements'.[63]

Genç Kalemler Dergisi (Young Authors Journal) is another example of the attempts at bringing together the various elements through a simplified Turkish. That journal, too, advocated the view that such a Turkish would not be alien to the people, and that being able to easily communicate, people could more easily pool their resources for developing the country. A related view was that a literature based on simplified Turkish would not have a cosmopolitan inclination and thus it would distance itself from the common people. In fact, the primary reference of the Journal was the common people, and not necessarily the 'Turks'. In fact, the word 'Turk' was hardly used; the preference was initially for the phrase 'spirit of nation' (*ruh-ı millet*), and later 'spirit that dominates the common people' (*kütle-i avamı idare eden hissiyat*). The contributors to the journal talked of the spirit of the common man, not that of the Turk.[64]

One of the leading authors of the journal was Ömer Seyfeddin (1884–1920), short story writer and a prominent representative of the National Literary Movement. He thought the Turks' salvation depended upon the spread of the ideas of fatherland (*vatan*), and on nationality (*milliyet*) (not nationalism), and strengthening of their character. In his view, the soul of a nation was made up of traditions (*ananeler*), beliefs (*itikatlar*), generalized feelings (*umumi hisler*), and even superstitions (*hurafeler*). According to him, it did

not make sense to identify the nation with the idea of race [read, 'common descent']. Nation comprises people who are tied to each other through a common language, religion, values and attitudes, and education. Every Turk should first learn how to read and write. They should then rise in the arts or commerce and acquire wealth. For a country to make progress there should develop a national literature, performing arts (music, dramatic arts, painting, and sculpture), basic sciences and engineering, and trade. For only such nations attain higher levels of progress, civilization, and welfare. In Ömer Seyfeddin's submission, in a country there may be and there are various ethnic groups, but there cannot be several nationals. It is patent that those who reside in Turkey would not hide their ethnic identity; however, they would at the same time speak Turkish, read Turkish, and adopt Turkish customs and goals. A cosmopolite people can never grapple with the problem of its being exploited politically and economically by others. A Turk and a Muslim should subscribe to the ideas of union and progress.[65] In his short stories, Ömer Seyfeddin regretted the fact that the Turks had never managed to be a nation.[66] In all these instances, it is apparent that the primary purpose had always been *social* and/or *national* rather than *nationalistic*.[67]

The Arabs and other non-Turk Muslims, too, had a similar take regarding writing and conversing in simple Turkish. They did not interpret the efforts in that direction as nascent Turkish nationalism; rather they viewed them as endeavours to create an effective means of communication. It was thus acceptable for Muslim Arabs, Circassians, Georgians, and others associated with the Ottoman establishment to adopt Turkish as their main language; they accepted the new version of Turkish as the language of the state and modernity. Şemseddin Sami who, as mentioned above, had translated the works of European Turcologists and was of the generation of Ottoman Turcologists who were critical of those who had only contempt for the Turkish stock, was born to an Albanian family (Frasheri), had attended a Greek school in Yanya (Janina), and entered the Ottoman government service in 1872. Later, the Fraşeri family in Albania was known as the architects of modern Albanian nationhood and nationalism. Yet, Şemseddin Sami viewed himself as a 'Turk' since he was a member of the Ottoman state elite; he did not think his primary (civic) identity as 'Turk' was in conflict with his secondary (ethnic) identity as Albanian.[68] This was because in the Ottoman Empire of the late nineteenth century, Turkishness had begun to connote an umbrella identity, gradually replacing being an Ottoman, and superseding, but not eradicating, all old ethnic identities, including that of being a Turcoman.[69]

That the goal pursued was indeed not one of assimilation but an upshot of administrative requirements is also apparent from the fact that the number of state schools established for this purpose was small, particularly in the non-Turkish provinces. Moreover, the primary schools in the Arab provinces

continued to use Arabic as the main language of instruction. In addition, various non-Muslim *millets* were not prevented from pursuing their traditional curriculum. If these *millet*s introduced the study of Turkish to their curricula, it was a voluntary act on their part. It is true that this particular arrangement continued until 1894, when a decree issued at the time made the study of Turkish obligatory in all schools. This was, however, justified by the argument that the new arrangement would not only benefit the individual, but also contribute to 'the growth of the nation' *as a whole*.[70]

Indeed, the rationale behind turning Turkish into a widely used language was that of taking it as establishment of a national culture and, thus, of independent national existence. There had developed a resentment of the fact that as late as the last decades of the nineteenth century the Turks had remained indifferent to their language and to its enrichment over time, when Europeans had become zealous students of that language. While all other languages had gone through the same process of development and change, which included coining new words from existing roots and/or borrowing from closely related languages, the Turks had not seen any harm in borrowing from the languages which were not related to theirs and allowing the borrowed elements to keep their grammatical and syntactic patterns, thus making them rule over Turkish. The Turkist linguists like Şemseddin Sami regretted this situation. Şemseddin Sami set for himself the task of proving that 'Turkish was the language of a civilized people' in the name of the ethnic interests *of the Turks*.[71] In a similar vein, Ali Suavi (1839–1878), a revolutionary thinker from madrasa, believed that a simplification of the language was necessary for the intellectual development of the people.[72]

Earlier, Şinasi (1826–1871), poet and journalist who contributed to the development of the new Turkish literature, had made efforts to purify Turkish of its Arabic and Persian accretions. He thought this would have rendered people of being conscious of their *own* distinct identity. In 1894, a government decree required the use of simple and clear language in the state schools. Once again, the target set was that of making possible the widespread use of an all-purpose language, which was easy to learn and easy to understand. Here, too, the goal was easy communication among the different elements of the Empire, not that of assimilating the different elements by obliging them to talk only in Turkish. The Ottoman state 'praise[d] God; [for] in every province each town … [had] a council in which members from each sect … [were] found. All of them … [discussed] affairs in the *official language*'.[73] Reference to the official language implied the existence of secondary languages and a lenient attitude towards them.

In the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, the leading intellectuals of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire were Yusuf Akçura (1876–1933) and Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924). Being a Russian-born émigré, Akçura was interested in creating a link between the Turks in the Ottoman Empire and the Turks in Central Asia. Since, in his opinion, both categories

of Turks have had a linguistic affinity, he took language as the marker of nationalism and therefore his nationalism came close to ethnic nationalism.[74] In contrast, for Ziya Gökalp, who was an Ottoman Turk, the marker of nationalism was culture.[75] However, in the last analysis, both Gökalp and, on the whole, Akçura, too, had been champions of nationalisms that would not render the Turks alienated from the 'other', of either ethnic or religious variety.

Yusuf Akçura was the most influential of all the non-Ottoman born émigrés in the Ottoman Empire. This was because he lived in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey for many years and was in close association with Turkish intellectuals.[76] Akçura was of the opinion that there was a need for a strong Ottoman society built upon secular and 'racist' principles. Akçura underlined the need for secularism, for he considered the modern scientific, that is European, education as the key to all questions of reform. He was thus against a nation the unifying element of which would be religion. In fact, Akçura used the term 'race' to connote a Turkish ethnic group that defined itself without reference to Islam.[77]

Also, when he talked about racism, Akçura did not subscribe to a physiological approach, because for him race signified no more than a cultural heritage.[78] In his opinion, a nation was a human community the social conscience of which displayed unity and fraternity, both of which had their source in 'a common ethnic background'.[79] However, in an article of his in 1911, he did not view assimilation as a viable strategy. In any case, according to Abdullah Cevdet (1869–1932), Ottoman intellectual and journalist who was one of the pioneers of Westernization movement in the Second Constitutional Period (1909–1918), Akçura was a *milelperver*, or *a* defender of the rights of all nations, rather than a *milletperver*, the defenders of the rights of one nation. He supported a Turkish-Hungarian alliance against the danger of Pan-Slavism, but he did not emphasize 'ethnic brotherhood' between these two peoples. Akçura became one of the founders of the Nationalist Constitutional Party (*Milli Meşrutiyet Fırkası*), which defended a state the dominant element of which was to be the Turkish element, but the other elements were to be granted wide (decentralized) powers.[80]

Akçura longed for unity and fraternity because his wish was that of the strengthening of the Ottoman state. A strong state was in the best interest of all its Muslim subjects, the Turks and non-Turks. If the Turks pursued particularistic goals in disregard of the other Muslims they would weaken the state, because they would divide the Muslim community into Turks and non-Turks, and thus create conflict among the subjects of the state.[81] However, for Akçura, union was problematic at least in the short term, because most Turks 'did not remember their past' and, thus, Turkism was only a newly-born baby. Consequently, Akçura was unsure whether one had to pursue Turkism or Islamism.[82]

Ziya Gökalp was born in Diyarbakır, a mixed-Kurdish Turkish area in southeastern Turkey. He spoke both Kurdish and Turkish. Gökalp represented the province of Diyarbekir at the 1909 general congress of the Union and Progress Party (CUP) in Salonica. From 1912 until 1918, the CUP was the real power centre in the Empire. Being a prominent writer and speaker, for a long time, Gökalp served as a member of that party's executive council and was the most influential theoretician of the CUP. Gökalp is recognized as the foremost spokesman and ideologue of Turkish nationalism by those who criticize Turkey on the Kurdish issue.[83]

In Gökalp's view, there was always a progression from tribal communities, to religious communities, and finally to nations. This meant language and race [here and elsewhere on Gökalp's view, read 'ethnicity][84] as the primary bond among the people gradually left its place first to religion and, eventually, to an admixture of universal civilization and indigenous culture. He thought a nation must maintain its culture, because it would be an inspiration for further progress.[85]

Gökalp's emphasis on the indigenous culture alongside universal civilization has not, however, led him to subscribe to ethnic nationalism, even partially. For Gökalp was interested in reviving Turkishness, which was lost, rather than attempting to prove that the Turks as an ethnic group were superior to others. He thought that the Turks 'had succeeded in conquering many places, but were spiritually conquered in all of them'. He thus designated the goal of Turkism as that of 'seeking for the [Turkish] national culture' (*milli harsı aramak*), that is, to 'bring to light what was hidden in the souls of [the Turkish] nation'. The Turks now had to summon up their own personality and re-create their own special culture. He thus called for the establishment of museums of Turkish folklore, ethnography, and archaeology, of libraries containing the available material on the history of Turkish culture, a Turcological society, and a national theatre and conservatoire, all of which would contribute to reviving Turkish culture.[86]

There seems to have been another reason as to why Gökalp defended an inward-looking nationalism. Gökalp was a Muslim with an orientation towards mysticism. By the time he had arrived in Salonica, he was quite well read in Islamic philosophy and mysticism. According to one Hadith (a saying of Prophet Mohammad), 'One who knows himself/herself would also knows God'. In one of his poems, Gökalp has written, 'Know thyself'. A 'sacred Hadith', which conveys meanings that Allah has portrayed in dreams or visions of Prophet Muhammad, runs as follows: 'I had been secret treasure [in human beings' hearts]; I have created people so that they would know me.' According to Gökalp, 'Religion is the science of ecstasy in one's heart'. Gökalp was thus preoccupied with the social function of Islam, not with its theology. Consequently, his interest focused on ethical self-development rather than forceful transformation of others.[87]

The 'universal civilization' dimension of Gökalp's Turkism, too, would not have led to a 'clash of civilizations', to use a modern phrase. It was because Gökalp had one single civilization in mind – Western civilization – and he thought that Turks, too, should belong to it. In his view, 'on top of the morality of fatherland … [the Turks] also need[ed] to have a "morality of civilization", for … [the Turks] belong to not only a national culture, but also to a particular civilization. This mean[t] that … [the Turks] should have sympathy and respect not only towards those people with whom … [they] share a common culture, a fatherland, a language, and a religion, but also towards those people with whom … [they] share a civilization'.[88] In Gökalp's model of the transformation of tribal groups from a tribe to a nation, people belonging to different religious and linguistic groups would not only have developed a non-agressive ethnic bond, but they would have also come to have an affinity towards each other in civilizational terms.

In any case, Gökalp's nationalism could not be ethnic nationalism, for in his submission, nationality was premised solely in upbringing, something people would learn, not be born into. The culture Gökalp had in mind would have provided social solidarity. For it comprised a non-utilitarian, altruistic, public-spirited, and idealistic set of attitudes and values. The well being of an inclusive Turkish nation was a primary value for Gökalp.[89] He has argued that the Turks' 'culture is not an aggressive (*müteaddi*) culture like the French and German cultures, which, therefore, they [the Turks] did not try to impose upon others, but a … culture necessary (*lazım*) for only the Turks'. In Gökalp's view, Turkism did not evince chauvinism and dogmatism; it did not look down upon the cultures of other peoples.[90] Gökalp further elaborated on the last point: 'Even though … [Turkism] channels all its love to its own original culture, it is determined to … [adopt] European civilization completely and systematically. … [Therefore] it does not nourish disdain or contempt for the culture of any nation. On the contrary, … [the Turks] value and respect all cultures. Although … [the Turks] do not approve the political organisms of the nations that have made … [them] the target of many injustices, … [they will] continue to admire their civic and cultural works and to venerate their thinkers and artists.'[91]

In trying to explain this presumed characteristic of the Turks, Gökalp came up with arguments the similar versions of which have been referred to in the Second Chapter: 'Egalitarianism was a well established principle among the ancient Turks. Among the Harzemzede Turcomans one does not see servants and slaves, for everybody was considered equal. When a Turkic political community set up suzerainty over another one, it did not do away with the political organization of the latter. The ruler of the latter would maintain his position; the former would only appoint a commissioner to serve the community brought under its suzerainty. … Ancient Turkish rulers were not imperialists; they were only preoccupied with the Turkish communities.'[92] Consequently, Gökalp argued that Turkism could not have a political

programme; it only aimed at cultural renovation.[93] It was devised as a means to exalt the Turkish nation itself.

Thus, Gökalp could have sympathies for an 'Islamo-Ottoman culture', that spanned both the Turks and Arabs, although each ethnic community in question had their own specific culture and identity.[94] For instance, for him distinctiveness in the sphere of language was a necessary condition to political independence. Yet, he did not consider it appropriate to substitute words formed from Turkic roots for the loan words from Arabic and Persian. He thought every word familiar to the people and in common use as a national asset. A rich language spoken with ease would have promoted simplicity, clearness, and natural expression.[95]

Gökalp could look with favour to cultural exchanges among different ethnic communities, because he distinguished nation from ethnic community and considered nation as being made up of several ethnic communities. He has observed: 'The racist Turkists take nation as a race. Yet, every nation is made up of various races. Ethnic Turkists confuse nation with tribe. People that have pure blood ties characterize a tribe. Yet societies are not pure in terms of their blood. … When people are born, they are not yet social beings; at that moment, they are not part of common conscience.'[96] As noted above, according to Gökalp, people come to internalize that common culture primarily through education.

Although in Gökalp's opinion, when they were not shared, civilizations could become divisive, he nevertheless came to the conclusion that there was also a positive aspect to civilization: the latter carried with it a refined culture, and the persons of refinement would appreciate other cultures as well. Thus Gökalp's nationalism was one that could exist with other nationalisms in peace and mutual respect. He has pointed out that the Turks 'admire the civilizational-cultural products of other countries, too, and have respect for them'.[97]

It was, therefore, not surprising that according to Gökalp, social solidarity rested on cultural unity. The latter was transmitted by education and had, therefore, no relationship with descent. He perceived a sharing of education and culture, i.e., sentiments, as the strongest bond that held people together. Nationality was premised on common consciousness and common ideal.[98]

The question that may be raised here would be what can one make of the following lines that one comes across in a poem by Gökalp: 'To Turks, fatherland is neither Turkey nor Turkestan/Fatherland is a grand and eternal country: Turan' ('*Türklere vatan ne Türkiye ne Türkistan/ Vatan büyük ve müebbet bir ülkedir: Turan*'). Do these lines not imply ethnic nationalism on the part of Gökalp, as the received wisdom has it? The answer to this question should be in the negative. Gökalp has used the word 'Turan' for linguistic and cultural, and not ethnic, purposes. He wished to distinguish the Turks' old relatives such as Kirghizes, Tatars, and Uzbeks, who had created new languages and cultures, from the Turks themselves. As already noted, Gökalp defined a

nation primarily as a group which possesses a culture particular to itself. So he called the constellation of countries who diverted their paths from the Turks in terms of their language and culture as 'Turan'.[99]

Why then did Gökalp still consider Turan as the Turks' fatherland, too, and therefore imply a close tie between the Turks and a certain territory where they no longer live? Did this not show an irredentist motive on the part of Gökalp? The response to this question, too, should be in the negative. What he had in mind was not expansionism and unification, but rather spiritual unity through affinity in language and culture. Gökalp was against 'racist nationalists' who stressed external appearances and physical features and 'ethnic nationalists' who took kinship for nation.[100] Consequently, the idea of a future territorial unity embodied in the concept of Turan was for Gökalp no more than a myth to mobilize and unite youth, rather than a concrete programme for action.[101] It should also be mentioned here that, Gökalp did not make any reference to 'Turan' after 1916.[102]

The development of the interest in Turan (the lands inhabited first by the Turks and then by 'those Turks who had acquired somewhat different languages, cultures, and new names') goes back to a suggestion made to the Ottomans by a Prussian officer, von Moltke who, in the early nineteenth century, was brought from Germany to reform the Ottoman military. (Later General) von Moltke had pointed out that since sooner or later the Ottomans will be obliged to leave their lands in Europe it would have made sense for them to establish a strong state comprising the peoples of Turkic descent in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Towards the end of the century, Arminius Vambéry had also come up with the idea that the Ottoman state could attain its earlier grandeur and power by dominating and re-organizing the East.[103]

In the last decades of the century, Some Turcologists had picked up the idea of Turan and, therefore, Turanism. Necib Asım translated Léon Cahun's *Introduction à l'histoire de l'Asie? Turcs et Mongols des origins à 1405* (1896). He added to this book several sections from a Turanistic point of view, glorifying the Mongols and their pursuits and claiming that the Turks were descendants of the Mongols. For his part, Şemseddin Sami suggested that the name 'Turk' referred to an important nation that extended from the shores of the Adriatic Sea to the frontiers of China and the inner parts of Siberia. He claimed that a strong bond existed between the Turks in the Ottoman Empire and those living in the large part of Turkestan.[104]

Consequently, in the late nineteenth century, the popular press began to publish pieces about the Turks living in the Crimea, China, and Samarkand. They reported with enthusiasm an ethnic awakening among them. In the process, they even underlined 'the need to defend these Turks against the Russians'. However, at that point, Sultan Abdülhamid II brought the activities of the press to a halt, for the Sultan was afraid of inciting another Russian attack on the Ottoman lands. This step taken by Abdülhamid II

re-directed the nationalist activities towards Anatolia, or to Turkism.[105] Consequently, up until the Young Turk revolution of 1908, Turanism remained on the backburner. As mentioned earlier, for Abdülhamid II, at the time, Islamism was a much more effective means of keeping intact what was left of the empire. The Sultan kept his distance from all national movements.

All this changed with the advent of the Young Turks to power. The Young Turks comprised intellectual and bureaucratic elites who, in 1889, formed the secret Association of the Union of Ottomans (Osmanlı Cemiyeti). The association called for freedom and justice, and aimed at toppling the authoritarian Sultan Abdülhamid II. In 1895, the Association took the name of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The Young Turks saw their aims realized when Abdülhamid II felt obliged to start the Second Constitutional Period in 1908. The Sultan was forced to step down the next year. From 1909 onwards the influence of the CUP upon the government began to be felt. From 1912 until 1918, the CUP effectively controlled the government.

Particularly after the Balkan Wars, leaders of the CUP, too, became interested in Turanian views.[106] This was a period when hopes were high that Russia would collapse and all the Turks of Turan would merge.[107] The leaders of the CUP were urged by the proponents of Pan-Germanism to be engaged in such a grand project; they were assured of the ultimate triumph of the Germany in the latter's struggle with Russia.[108]

Not unexpectedly, the CUP leaders, too, were anxious to salvage the empire. For this purpose they wished to pool the resources of the 'Turks' in other countries in addition to the Turks in the Empire. This inclination on their part was apparent in a proclamation that they issued upon the Ottoman Empire's entry to the First World War: 'Our participation in the world war represents the vindication of our national ideal. … [This] leads us towards the destruction of our Muscovite enemy in order to obtain thereby a natural frontier for our Empire, which should include and unite all branches of our race.'[109]

Added to all this was the secession of the Albanians from the empire in 1912. All along the Albanians had been considered as one of the backbones of the body social. They thus had received preferential treatment. Their exit too came as a great shock to the Turks. They felt betrayed by their most 'loyal brothers', and they thought the Arabs could follow suit.[110]

These developments stimulated a new, but not sole, interest in Turanism. The interest in Islamism too continued. In fact, for some Turanism continued to be in the vogue because it was a sufficiently vague idea and as such it could easily be reconciled with Islamism.[111] Both took as target the liberation of co-religionists from the yoke of Christian powers in Europe. Thus both were reactive and defensive ideologies. And both proved to be futile projects in the wake of the Ottoman defeats in the First World War.[112] In 1918, Edwin Pears, a British journalist who had spent some time Istanbul, later

'Sir Edwin', made the following observation about Turanism of the time: 'I express my opinion that the world has nothing to fear from the movement [Turanism], which has been proclaimed in various quarters. … The belief that Turkey may form the rallying point of all Muslim groups in Europe, Asia, and Africa, will have few supporters. … Turanism is a retrograde movement which offends both educated Muslims and the ignorant ones. Ottoman statesmen already recognize that such a movement, founded on common origin, customs, and culture, would conflict with … [Islamism]. Of the two forces, the latter is undoubtedly the most potent, and the fiercely fanatical followers of … [Mohammad] have already become greatly incensed against the … [Turanians] because of their suggestion to Turkify the sacred language and to abandon the Hadj [the Muslim's pilgrimage]. For these reasons the best Turkish statesmen have declined to associate their names with … [Turanism].'[113] Almost a century later, a student of the Ottoman Empire concurred with Mr. Pears: 'As a political programme … pan-Turkism was of rather little importance in the Ottoman Empire, existing more as an aspiration in the imaginings of the romantically inclined; it did not outlast the empire, and was explicitly condemned by Mustafa Kemal [founder of the Turkish Republic set up in 1923] in 1921.'[114]

The leading statesman of the period from 1913 to 1918, Enver Pasha (1881–1922), too, remained an Ottomanist to the very end. It is true that Enver Pasha, who was *primus inter pares* during the so-called 'the rule of three pashas' in the 1912–1918 period, the other two being Cemal Pasha and Talat Pasha, always nurtured the idea of an expanded Ottoman Empire that would include the Turkic peoples in Asia. Nevertheless, Enver Pasha continued to cling on to the idea of Ottomanism as well as Islamism. After all, during those decades, Ottomanism continued to be the primary yardstick in internal politics.[115] It has been suggested that Enver Pasha and his followers seemed pan-Turanistic basically because the Turanians whom they thought of uniting with Turkey were all Muslims.[116]

In the last analysis, all the Young Turk factions and committees were concerned with the survival of the empire. The 1908 revolution had as its target that of rescuing the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, not that of establishing a nation state.[117] The entity that was tried to be saved was not a country made up of the Turks alone; it was a country characterized by the 'union of elements'. Consequently, the Young Turks had in mind a common Ottoman citizenship that would have united all of the Sultan's subjects, irrespective of ethnicity, creed, and language, in a single nationality and loyalty,[118] *without* obliterating the ethnic and/or religious identities of the different constellations of the subjects in question. The basic problem that the Young Turks grappled with at the time was the regeneration of the state and society. They preoccupied themselves with the issues of the degree to which Westernization was needed and acceptable in the Ottoman Empire and with the basis of identification with and loyalty to the future Ottoman state.[119]

Concerning this issue, the Young Turks did not make resort to the doctrines derived from ethnic or religious tendencies. Instead, they arrived at the conclusion that in order to save the Ottoman state there was a need for a leadership group, which was dedicated to rationalism, modernism, and positivism. They had a belief in the value of objective truth, faith in the role of the state as prime mover in society, and an inclination towards change for the better.[120] They complained that although 'the people in the Constitutional period [from 1909 onwards] had overcome tribalism, … they had not become civilized; … [people] were [still] preoccupied with utopia rather than facts; and they had no notion of sciences'.[121]

Being rationalists, modernists, and positivists, and thus perceiving the state as the prime mover in society, the Young Turks wished the state to undertake the task of guiding the community to civilization by, among other things, transforming that community into a nation for this very purpose.[122] After all, as the name of their party also made it apparent, they thought the very salvation of the empire had depended upon 'union and progress'. The progress meant the molding of the community into a nation. It was figured that the emergence of a nation would have engendered the union they had in mind. The union in turn required a yardstick. That yardstick was to be Ottomanism. As already noted, particularly in internal affairs, the Young Turks remained Ottomanists.

Consequently, the nation that the Young Turks tried to nurture was to be an 'Ottoman nation', not a Turkish nation. The new nation had to be an entity comprising various elements such as Albanians, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, Jews, Kurds as well as Turks. It was true that all of these peoples had their own specific languages and/or religions. Yet, they had a *lingua franca* – the Ottoman language. And the differences in faith and religion would not be a hindrance, because 'they were matters of the next world'.[123] The Young Turks invited all the elements of the empire which were not Turkish, to join in the efforts to build a new nation.[124] As mentioned above, earlier, various elements were expected to have loyalty only to the dynasty; now they were expected to form a nation so that they would all feel responsibility for the salvage of the empire and, thus, they would together strive to save it. In this new arrangement the nation would constitute the primary identity of all of the elements, while each of the elements would still continue to maintain their secondary ethnic and/or religious identities.

It is true that only until circa 1913, the date the Balkan Wars ended and the exit of the non-Muslims to set up their own states was completed, the amalgam that would pass as nation would have comprised both the Muslim and the non-Muslim elements of the empire. In the circa post-1913 period, however, the remaining non-Muslims were now begun to be considered as somewhat marginal elements of the amalgam in question. For the latter were now viewed as elements that would not be very enthiusiastic for the success of the Ottomanist nation-building process, although they would continue to have a

protected niche in the body social. It should also be noted that from the beginning of the First World War onwards, that is, when the Arabs, too, opted for an exit strategy, only the Turks were looked upon as the core of the new nation – as the only element that would would try to do everything it could to save the empire. The statesman Ahmed Cevdet Pasha observed: ' … the real strength of the Sublime State lies with the Turks. It is an obligation of their national character and religion to sacrifice their lives for the House of Osman until the last one is destroyed. Therefore it is natural that they would be accorded more worth than other peoples of the Sublime State'.[125]

As a consequence, several journals and associations close to the Young Turks have placed exclusive emphasis on helping the Turks to make progress. One such journal was *Genç Kalemler* (Young Pens). The editor-in-chief of the fırst volume of this journal, a certain Nesimî Sarım, was the secretary of the Central Council of the CUP. Ziya Gökalp, who was entrusted the job of delivering lectures to Turkish youngsters, and Ömer Seyfettin, who was an ardent supporter of the CUP, were regular contributors to this journal. In his short stories, Ömer Seyfettin expressed the sorrow of the Turks for not constituting a nation; however, the author did not put the blame on foreigners, who had tried to divide up the country among themselves, but on the Turks themselves.[126] The journal attached primary significance to the education of the common Turks, 'who had not yet known what education was'. Another journal that involved itself in the same task was *Türk Yurdu* (Turkish Homeland), the organ of the Turkish Homeland Association. It was published by such immigrant intellectuals as Yusuf Akçura, Ağaoğlu Ahmet (1869–1939), who served as a member of the central council of the CUP, and Hüseyinzade Ahmet. The journal delineated its ideal as that of improving the intellectual level of the Turks and making them strong-willed and enterprising.

Türk Yurdu later became the organ of the association, *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths), the most influential nationalist organization in the Young Turk era. The mission of the Association was that of 'striving for the development of the Turkish "nation" and language by promoting national education and by improving intellectual, social, and economic standards of Turks who were the most important [group] among all Islamic "nations"'.[127] The journal aimed at educating the people in a nationalist spirit.

However, since on the whole they remained Ottomanist, the Young Turks never had in mind an exclusivist nationalism. For one thing, what the journals and associations, which for all practical purposes were emanations from the CUP, strove to do was to strengthen a certain element of the empire which was the least developed but which would nevertheless most enthusiastically try to save the Empire. These journals and associations did not aim at improving one element at the expense of the others with the purpose of rendering that one element hegemonic vis-à-vis the others.[128] As already noted, despite the fact that the consensus was that only the Turks would try really hard to salvage what was left of the empire, they neverthless

attempted to pool the resources of all of the elements of that empire for the latter's salvation. It was for this purpose that they tried to create an Ottoman nation out of all the elements. As noted, they adopted the policy of universalization of the Ottoman language so that non-Turks, too, could easily participate in social, economic, and political life.

In order to fullfil the latter goal of theirs, the Young Turks thought that acting in an egalitarian manner to each and every element of the empire would produce the desired result. For instance, in 1908, 1912, and 1914, it was seen to that the ethnic communities were represented in Parliament in proportion to their strength; to make this possible the candidates were nominated with the approval and support of the CUP.[129] For the first time, the non-Muslims, too, began to be conscripted to the army.[130] It did not matter if in the process the non-Turkish Muslims and/or non-Muslims benefited from some of those policies more than the Turks. For instance, from 1908 to 1913, all Ottoman Asia, but particularly those areas where Armenians and Kurds were in the majority, became more prosperous than other areas.[131] Last but not least, for the same purpose the CUP adopted a centralized rather than a decentralized system of government. Cemal Pasha, one of the CUP triumvirate, explained the rationale behind the new policies as follows: 'To those who accuse us of pursuing Turkist policies, here I wish to underline the fact that we adopted Ottomanist, not Turkist policies. If we had adopted the principle of decentralization the [CUP] … then would have been obliged to take a Turkist line and set up local autonomy in those provinces where the Turks were in a majority. … Since we remained loyal to Ottomanism, we maintained the centralized system of government, not wishing to create a division in the army, too. What we tried to do was to elevate the Turks' knowledge and capabilities since it was the only Turkish element that had been left to its own devices and that had no protectors. … I am myself first an Ottoman, and only then a Turk.'[132] It is interesting to note that at the time *Turkish* elites showed signs of becoming wary of their special standing.[133]

Indeed, the Ottomans adopted egalitarian policies in order to maintain the existing multi-ethnic state.[134] Theirs was an attempt to spread the emotive consciousness of belonging to a nation among both the Turks and non-Turks, and enable them to co-operate in a harmonious manner under the same banner at a time when the empire faced an existential threat.[135]

To some extent, the Young Turks were successful in their nation-building project along the lines mentioned here. The liberties provided in the Second Constitutional period (1909–1918) brought about a milieu where the youth of every nation became eager to learn sciences, law, and foreign languages. During that era, among all the elements a common passion for education developed. This led to the glimmers of a common bond forged among the students who met each other at school, public meetings, and social gatherings.[136] For the elite of all these elements, Turkish tended to become a general medium of communication.[137]

Consequently, the elite in question did gradually become 'Ottomanized' in the sense that they identified themselves with the Young Turks' goal of salvaging the empire, although they continued to see themselves as part of other 'nations'. For Turks, many non-Turkish Muslims, and even some non-Muslims, their ethnic and/or religious identity was now beginning to be on a par with their Ottoman identity. And all of the different groups began to acknowledge and respect the double identities of the others.

This was quite apparent in the case of a certain Nicolae Batzaria who was a Rumanian but who at the same time acted as Minister of Public works. The following is his own account of that double identity of his in 1913: 'We who were born in that mosaic of races and religions in the Turkish empire … were officially not "Turkish" subjects, but Ottoman subjects. No document or official act mentioned the name of "Turk", but exclusively that of "Ottoman", or "*Osman*". The Ottomans included all subjects of the Ottoman Empire founded by Osman. The Turks were part of the Ottomans. To be an Ottoman did not mean in the least a Turk. Thus, the fact that non-Turkish Ottomans entered public service, Parliament, or the Cabinet, did not imply that they were Turkicized. … Thus, when the Grand Vizier asked me in Cabinet meetings "What does your [Rumanian] King think of, or what does your government do, about the Balkan War", he was not joking, and least of all was he trying to offend me. Ethnically he regarded me as being Romanian, a former member of the body of Romanian educators [in the Ottoman state] and accepted as natural the sentimental ties, which could exist between me and the Romanians in Romania'.[138]

This was not astonishing in the least. As already noted, the starting point of the Young Turk revolution was not nationalism, if that phenomenon is taken as an effort to transform various ethnic and/or religious communities into one homogeneous entity, i.e. as ethnic nationalism. When the first nucleus of the main Young Turk organization in the Medical Academy came into being, none of the founders were of Turkish origin; instead, they were Albanians, Circassians, and Kurds.[139] The Young Turks pursued strong centralization policies in order to impose uniform imperial standards, not Turkish nationalism.[140] The objections to it did not come only from non-Muslims, but also from the agrarian groups, provincial notables, and most of the Muslim religious establishment.[141] When at some point the Young Turks also experimented with decentralization policies, their goal was that of winning over the Arabs.[142] The 1917 Family Law drew upon on all four of the orthodox Muslim schools.[143] The educational system provided instruction of ethnic languages. For instance, in the province of Iraq, the students had first the texts of reading primers in Arabic or Kurdish or Turkish, and later had those texts in Turkish, though with the Arabic or Kurdish translations provided below.[144] At the non-Muslim primary schools, there were compulsory Turkish lessons, but the education was conducted in the mother tongue. The medium of instruction at the secondary levels became Turkish, although

middle schools were given the option of using local languages.[145] The civil bureaucracy rarely interfered either in the former or the latter category of schools, despite the fact that in time the non-Muslim schools achieved superiority vis-à-vis the Muslim ones. In fact, the former were viewed as a source of emulation by the latter, which had been found dilapidated, retarded, and under-funded. An 1887 imperial decree dictated reform of the Muslim schools in order to correct the glaring contrast between the two systems of education.[146]

As mentioned above, it is true that in the aftermath of the two consecutive Balkan Wars (1912–1913), there was a drift away from Ottomanism and towards Turkism. However, this was a time when not only the very existence of the Empire as a whole but the Turkish homeland itself had faced a grave threat. In the wars that the Turks again had to wage against their former non-Muslim subjects, they suffered massive loss of lives. Those wars had come in the wake of the Bulgarian risings of 1876, the Armenian revolutionary movements of the 1890s, the Cretan insurrection of 1896, and the activities of the revolutionary committees in the Balkans. All these earlier developments as well as the 1912–1913 wars were bound to create on the parts of the Turks a profound distrust towards their Christian compatriots.[147]

Consequently, at this time, Turkism was the only way to salvation for the empire.[148] However, even under those trying circumstances Turkism developed not as an anti-thesis to Ottomanism, but as a corollary to it. Turkism was another name for an inclusive nationalism; it did not connote being a Turk in an ethnic sense. In the last analysis, Turkism stood for solidarism since the Turkists aimed at promoting cooperation among the populace for the sake of saving the country.[149] The political interest of ruling an empire called for Ottomanism even if at the individual level some toyed with the idea ethnic nationalism.[150] The Young Turks, being Unionists, did not attribute much importance to ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences. Thus, they did not favour the Turks at the expense of the non-Turk Muslims; for instance, they were of the opinion that the economic interests of Arabs as well as Turks had been neglected and thus both had to be remedied. They also did not pursue discriminatory policies towards the non-Muslim subjects.[151] As already noted, in the year that the second Balkan War was waged (1913), Nicolae Batzaria, a Rumanian, could act as Minister of Public Works and the Grand Vizier would have no problems with that fact and would have even openly acknowledged it. In fact, in the contemporary sources concerning the make-up of the Ottoman Parliament, the Turkish category was represented as the residual non-Arab and non-Albanian Muslim group.[152]

Turning to the question posed in the introduction to the present Chapter, the Ottoman state did *not* react to the secessionist tendencies on the part of its non-Muslim and non-Turkish Muslim elements in the nineteenth century by making resort to ethnic management strategies. Thus, one could not

expect the state in the Republican period (1923 to the present) to play the ethnic card towards the Kurds, too, when some Kurdish groups also displayed such secessionist tendencies. It is the burden of the next three Chapters to investigate whether or not the Republican state drifted from the said Ottoman tradition vis-à-vis its Kurds in any significant extent.

5
Nation in the Making

The Young Turks did not attempt to mold a new identity for the people.[1] Consequently, the society that the Republic inherited had hardly a notion of Turkish identity.[2] Until the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, there was no name for Turkey in Turkish. The National Pact drawn up in February 1920 by the last Ottoman Chamber of Deputies to express the will of the people to regain their independence, mentioned neither 'Turkey' nor 'Turk'; it merely made reference to the areas inhabited by the Ottoman Muslim majority, which were considered as 'united in religion, race, and aim'.[3] Two months later, in a speech he made at Parliament, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,[4] founder of the Turkish Republic, did use the word '*Türkiye*' ('Turkey' in Turkish).[5] The word '*Türkiye*', however, was first used as the official name of the homeland in 1921.[6] The founders of the Republic refrained from using the name of the dominant ethnic group.[7]

Atatürk took the responsibility himself of forging a new identity for the peoples of the new Republic. Atatürk must have been obliged to address that issue because he and his associates aimed to transform the religious *community* they had taken over from the Ottoman Empire into a secular nation in the Republican Turkey. Indeed, in a 1925 speech, he observed: ' … our present form of government has changed the nature of the common ties among the members of the nation that persisted for centuries; instead of religious and sectarian ties, it now assembles the members of our nation through the bond of Turkish nationality'.[8]

New nation and new Turk

How did Atatürk perceive Turkish nationality? For him, nation was a product of a *common culture*, which in turn had developed as a consequence of peoples of different ethnic background and religious faith living in close proximity for long periods of time. In his own words, 'When people have a rich inheritance of memories from the past, and when they consequently sincerely wish to live together and display a will to safeguard that rich

inheritance, they form a union the name of which is "nation"'.[9] The cultural inheritance that Atatürk had in mind derived from historical affinity (*tarihsel karabet*), common morality (*ahlâksal karabet*), loyalty to a common political entity (*siyasal varlıkta birliktelik*), a common homeland (*yurt birliği*), common roots and descent (*soy ve köken birliği*), and a common language (*dil birliği*).[10]

Atatürk thought that a long *historical affinity* among various elements of a population leads to the forging of a nation. Five decades later, British author David Hotham on the whole agreed with Atatürk on this matter: 'The inhabitants of modern day Turkey, whom we call the Turks, and who of course are the Turks in the sense that they compose the modern Turkish nation, are really a people formed over many centuries, out of a mixture of races such as pre-Hittites, Hittites, Phrygians, Celts, Jews, Macedonians, Romans, Armenians, Kurds, and Mongols. [At some point, a] … handful of Turks from Asia added themselves to the stock, so that the "Anatolian mixture" went on being more or less what it was before. The difference was that a few conquerors were strong enough to impose their stamps on the native peoples, so that the latter became Turkish-speaking and Muslims, and were from now on known as "the Turks", living in a country known as Turkey'.[11] Earlier, Afet İnan, who was a close confidant of Atatürk and a Professor of Anthropology, had made a similar argument: 'In contrast to the view entertained by many, Anatolia had not started to be Turkified from the eleventh century onwards. On the contrary, Anatolia's ethnic structure began to be enriched by the addition to it of new entities coming from the same roots [read, 'coming from the same Indo-European (Aryan) race group]. In 1071 [the date the Turks defeated the Byzantine army and began to occupy Anatolia] is the date of the Turks' meeting with their brothers'.[12]

Hotham has lent support to Atatürk on the issue of the 'Anatolian mixture'. However, while Hotham has been preoccupied with the issue of who came to be superior to whom, Atatürk has addressed himself to the question of to what extent the various elements of the Anatolian population in the early 1920s had come to evince similar ideals, values, and attitudes. Since he came to the conclusion that what the different elements of the population came to share among them far outweighed what they did not share, Atatürk used the words 'Turk' and 'Turkish' as *generic names* (collective references to what was otherwise disparate entities), not *adjectives* (attributing a particular identity to disparate elements that the latter did not necessarily agree with). That is why he pointed that people in Turkey *together* made up a nation.

At this particular juncture, Atatürk seemed to adopt an inclusive concept of nationalism, one that did not leave, at least in its face value, any element of the population out of its scope. We say 'at least in its face value' because, at the time he made that statement, whether or not Atatürk also included the non-Muslims in his generic term 'Turk' is a moot point. After all, during the Turkish War of Independence, Atatürk's major preoccupation was that of

pooling the resources of the Muslim elements in the population against the country's non-Muslim adversaries in Europe. In 1923, when Atatürk's close colleague İsmet İnönü (Prime Minister from 1924 until 1937 and President between 1938 and 1950) had to make a reference to the peoples of Anatolia, he, too, had talked about (two) Muslim elements – Kurds and Turks – but not about any of the non-Muslim elements. İnönü had stated: 'The Kurds are included in the term "Moslem majorities" of the National Pact. Turks and Kurds [together] form one nation. The populations of both are taken into account as one element'.[13] It seems that in the early 1920s, Turkey adopted partial civic nationalism, which, if not explicitly then at least implicitly, left out the non-Muslim elements of the population.

Although in the early 1920s Atatürk had declared that even by that date the disparate communities in Anatolia had already developed into a nation, he and his colleagues must have been aware of the fact that the entity they had put together comprised a number of communities that had not yet fully developed into a nation; that what Atatürk was engaged in at the time was, in fact, a self-fulfilling prophecy. While there was talk of the existence of a nation, there were at the same time efforts to bolster what was shared by the disparate communities and, where possible, develop additional ideals, values and attitudes, with the hope that the latter would be internalized by the disparate elements in question. For instance, a need was felt to elaborate what being a Turk meant. It was concluded that it involved having pride in the history and traditions of Anatolia.[14] Similarly, efforts were made to instill a sense of patriotism vis-à-vis the Republic to all members of the population, irrespective of their ethnicity and religion.[15]

As compared to the Ottomanism of the earlier decades, the Turkism of the early Republic was less inclusive. Ottomanism had invoked a pluralistic, mosaic-like ethnic and religious population.[16] At least at a discursive level, it had meant equality before law for all elements of the population. This was not the case in that of the Turkism of the 1920s and particularly the 1930s. Despite the fact that Atatürk's generic usage of the term 'Turk' could be taken as inclusive of the non-Muslims, and despite the 1924 Constitution that did not restrict civic nationalism in terms of either faith of ethnicity,[17] in practice, the non-Muslims were nevertheless given a cold shoulder.

Furthermore, in those decades, there was a special interest in the ethnic Turk itself. According to the founders of the Republic, it was now primarily the ethnic Turk who had to undertake the responsibility of enabling Turkey to 'catch up with the contemporary civilization and even try to surpass it'. Thus, it had become imperative to upgrade the Turk so that it could successfully fulfill this mission.

This meant that the history, language, and culture of the ethnic Turk had to be carefully studied. Ahmet Ağaoğlu (1869–1969), an intellectual and politician, provided a graphic account of what was being attempted at the time as follows: 'What we have tried to formulate so far had to do with the

envelope (*zarf*) (read, 'the outer covering', i. e., giving generic names to the collectivity and attributing an identity to it); what we now needed to do was that of explicating the contents (*mazruf*) of that envelope. According to Ağaoğlu, the contents – those characteristics that made up the nation – comprised language, aesthetics, elite and popular literature, law, music, and religion of the ethnic Turk.[18] At the Third General Congress of the ruling Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP), which was convened in May 1931, nation was defined in a similar fashion – 'a social and economic community connected to one another through language, culture, and ideals.'[19] The ultimate aim was that of transforming the mosaic-like social structure inherited from the Ottoman period into a more integrated whole, by further enriching the ideals, values and attitudes mentioned above and instilling them in both the ethnic Turks and, to the extent possible, the other members of the nation.

Did that mean that a corollary of the ultimate aim in question was that of assimilating the Muslim elements other than ethnic Turks, such as the Kurds, as well as non-Muslims into the mores of the ethnic Turk? That was not the case, for at least two reasons. First, the efforts to disseminate the mores of the ethnic Turks to the other elements of the nation had a defensive purpose, i.e., that of rendering all the elements of the nation *integrated* with each other, not that of trying to *assimilate* the non-ethnic Turks and non-Muslims into ethnic Turks. Secondly, becoming integrated with the ethnic Turk was left to the discretion of the non-ethnic Turks; those who were not ethnic Turks could adopt the mores of the ethnic Turks by learning Turkish and internalizing the mores in question or they could choose not to do so. There was, of course, a pressure on the non-ethnic Turks to go through such a transformation, because if they did not they would have deprived themselves of such benefits as holding some public offices. For instance, from the early years of the Republic to the present (2007), Christians and Jews were not allowed to attend military schools and academies.[20]

The defensive rationale behind this approach to the issue at hand was apparent in a speech Atatürk made on 13 February 1931, in the city of Adana in southern Turkey: 'The language is one of the essential features of a nation. A person who inspires to be [an integral] part of the Turkish nation should before everything else … speak Turkish. … Those who speak another language may collaborate with others and act against us.'[21] While in the last analysis the state left non-ethnic Turks' becoming an integral part of the nation to the discretion of the latter, it also took measures to facilitate that transformation should non-ethnic Turk elements show a willingness to learn Turkish and adopt the mores of the ethnic Turks. Atatürk made the Turkish Hearths responsible for helping to bring about the integration in question.[22] On the other hand, what the Hearths endeavoured to do in this connection was far from being assimilative. In the absence of a definition of the dimensions (*mazruf*), the Hearths went on to instill in the people the ways of Western

civilization.[23] And when Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, a Professor of fine arts and politician, was appointed as the head of the Hearth and he tended to adopt assimilative policies, he was quickly sent to Rumania as ambassador.

According to Atatürk, among the common values of the members of a nation a rather significant one was that of common conscience (*ortak vicdan*), to which Atatürk also referred to as 'common morality' (*ahlâksal karabet*). 'On the whole, the Turks have a common morality', Atatürk said. He continued: 'When I say morality, I do not have in mind the notion of morality that one comes across in books on ethics. … Morality also has a national dimension; as such, it is a reflection of common conscience'.[24]

Atatürk was of the opinion that the people, who have a common conscience, would display loyalty to the same political entity, or state. He figured that national conscience would become identical with patriotism: 'It is the national morality that leads people to attend to the needs of the country, if necessary to make all the sacrifices, and, if [absolutely] required, sacrifice his life for the order, security, happiness, progress of the country and for enabling that country to reach higher levels of civilization'.[25]

Atatürk's statement that those who have a common conscience would display loyalty to a common political entity should not be interpreted as an inclination on his part towards irredentist policies. Atatürk's notion of a common homeland (*yurt birliği*) involved only the territories of the Republic of Turkey. On one occasion he observed: 'In the past, the Turks' territories were more extensive than they are today. Today, however, the Turkish nation is well-satisfied with its present territories; it considers them sufficient for its ongoing existence. It believes that in its present realm, it can maintain the sacred inheritances it received from its ancestors and further enrich them.'[26] On another occasion, he declared: 'Neither Islamic union nor Turanism can be … a logical policy for us to adopt. Henceforth, our policy will be that of living independently and enjoying sovereignty within our national frontiers.'[27]

Atatürk had considered common roots and descent (*soy ve köken birliği*) as another important dimension of nation, and he had talked about 'the sacred inheritances people received from their ancestors'. Could this be one instance where Atatürk had been inclined towards ethnic nationalism? When he talked about common roots and descent, Atatürk did not think that the members of the Turkish nation had descended from the *same ancestors*; rather, for him, it was a sociological fact that the people in Turkey had come from *ancestors who, while maintaining their sub-identities, had for a long time lived in close proximity*. The past was important for him to show that in time disparate elements in question had gradually formed a nation.

It is true that sometimes Atatürk used the terms *kavim* (clan) and *ırk* (race). However, the occasions on which he used the term 'race' were those when he was discussing *affinity* between the peoples, not the *inherent characteristics* of the peoples concerned. Consequently, he was not interested in *differences*

among the peoples, and thus in the question of whether or not a particular people was superior to other(s); he was preoccupied with *similarities*, and consequently he focused his attention on whether or not the peoples who had differences among them formed an integrated whole.

It is also true that Atatürk talked about the *physical* similarities and differences among the people in Turkey. However, he did so again without comparing and ranking different categories of the people in question among themselves. Instead, he said: 'Each and every member of the Turkish nation displays [physical] similarities. Yet, the fact that there continues to be some differences among them should not astonish us. For the members of the Turkish nation are descendants of those who lived in Mesopotamia, Egyptian valleys, pre-historic Central Asia, Russia, the Caucasus, ancient and present Greece, Crete, pre-Roman central Italy. … They lived together with peoples from different roots. … Consequently, is it possible for the descendants of the mosaic in question to exactly resemble each other? Nowhere and at no time had the children of even the same family looked alike.'[28] Secondly, Atatürk often used terms like 'clan' and 'race' not in an ethnic sense; instead, he utilized those terms interchangeably with culture (*kültür*). He had at least two non-ethnic rationales for his usage of these two terms interchangeably with culture – (1) in order to be able to refute unsympathetic perceptions of other peoples about the Turks, and (2) to introduce to the discourse on nation and/or nationalism some new concepts that would constitute alternatives to such culturally still popular concepts as *ümmet* (religious community); the founders of the Republic had wished to debunk the latter concepts, because they invoked phenomena contrary to their project of modernization.[29] Thirdly, Atatürk employed ethnic-sounding terms when he appealed to Turkish national pride,[30] though in a defensive, that is in an inward-looking, thus, in the last analysis, non-ethnic manner. For instance, the 1920 National Pact, in the drawing up of which Atatürk must have played a leading role, described the then Ottoman-Muslim community as 'being united in religion, race, and aim, … imbued with sentiments of mutual regard, … prepared for individual sacrifice, … and [having] an absolute respect for one another's racial rights and social circumstances'.[31]

It must be noted in passing that as time went by, what would have surely sounded like self-fulfilling prophecies at the time must have had an impact on the cultural make-up of the Turks. In later decades, feeling pride in being a Turk has indeed invoked in the minds of many people in that country such non-ethnicity oriented qualities as generosity, hardiness, honesty hospitality, physical courage, and sobriety.[32]

The last dimension of the Atatürkist nation is *common language*. Atatürk did not attribute to the Turkish language, too, an ethnic function. During the Young Turk period, the general inclination had been that of rendering language a factor to *unite* rather than *divide* people. Atatürk and his associates adopted the same policy. In Atatürk's view, there was a strong relationship

between language and nationalist feeling; according to him, if the language was rich and indigenously developed, it would have played a primary role in the flourishing of nationalist feeling.[33] He thought Turkish was 'a common language that would revive and consolidate national ideals and morality, feelings, enthusiasm, and memories and traditions shared by all as well as a common past, history, conscience, and thinking patterns. The Turkish language [liberated from the yoke of foreign languages] would help to rediscover the genius of the Turkish people.[34] The Turkish nation was aware of the fact that despite the several calamities it has lived through, it was because of its language that it could safeguard and maintain … everything that together had forged it into a nation'.[35]

Atatürk, who took language as a practical rather than ethnic instrument, perceived Turkish not only as a bond for the ethnic Turks, but also as the means to instill the common ideals, values, and attitudes of the majority to every other citizen of the Republic, including the 'minorities and illiterates'.[36] It was for this reason that the goal was to produce a language more precise, more Turkish, and less difficult to learn.[37] Consequently, Atatürk thought the Latin alphabet was necessary for Turkey's progress: 'At most in two years', he said, 'the Turkish nation will learn the Latin alphabet [which was indeed adopted in 1928], and … with its maturing intellectual ability, that nation will take its place among the civilized world.'[38]

Concurrent identities

Since all citizens of the Republic were considered Turks irrespective of religion and ethnicity, one can argue that Atatürk attributed to his citizens an identity deriving from *civic nationalism*, and not from *cultural nationalism*. The civic nationalism is a *subjective* identity; a person himself/herself decides whether or not s/he considers herself/himself the citizen of a country. In this type of nationalism, the professing of loyalty to a state is adequate to render a person a citizen of that state. In contrast, in cultural nationalism citizenship is an *objective* identity; a person is considered a citizen only if that person has certain characteristics such as sharing with others specific ideals, values, and attitudes, speaking a certain language (sometimes speaking it properly), professing a certain faith, and the like.

Atatürk once declared 'How happy is s/he who *calls* herself/himself a Turk', not, 'How happy is s/he who *is* a Turk'.[39] On the basis of this statement it is possible to arrive at the conclusion that Atatürk entertained an identity for his compatriots derived from civic nationalism. Atatürk's right-had man İsmet İnönü seemed to have subscribed to the same view. İnönü said: 'To be a Turk, it is sufficient to want to be a Turk and to love being a Turk.'[40] İnönü insisted on the same point on another occasion, too: 'Turkish nationalism is free of monopolizing tendencies and fanaticism. Every citizen who accepts Turkish nationalism is considered a Turk.'[41]

However, the issue seemed to be more complicated than that. Atatürk's statement – 'How happy is s/he who calls herself/himself a Turk' – must have been made by keeping in mind not only the ethnic Turks, but also the other citizens of the Republic, that is both Muslims and non-Muslims. In the case of the ethnic Turks, this statement must have been part of Atatürk's efforts to enable his compatriots to gain their self-confidence so that they can contribute to Turkey's officially set goal of 'catching up with the contemporary civilization and, if possible, surpassing it'.

In the case of the other citizens of Turkey, a distinction needs to be made between the Muslim and non-Muslims citizens of that country. Concerning the Muslims, the statement must have been made as part of Atatürk's endeavours to discourage any aspirations towards a de-acculturation on their part. In the case of the non-Muslims, the statement must have been another gentle pressure placed on the members of that group so that they would try to learn Turkish and adopt the mores of the ethnic Turks.

In 1919–1922, Atatürk's primary concern was that of bringing under one umbrella the remaining Muslim elements in Turkey; he viewed Islam as the primary bond that would hold people together.[42] At the time, Atatürk indeed felt himself obliged to pool the resources of all of the Muslim elements of the population in order to ward off the threat posed for Turkey by that country's non-Muslim adversaries – Armenians in the east, Greeks in the west, and their supporting states in Europe. For instance, in October 1919, while making some comments on the frontiers in Anatolia as set out in the National Pact by the last Ottoman Parliament, Atatürk made the following points: 'Within this border, there is one nation, which is representative of Islam. Within this border, there are Turks, Circassians, and other Islamic elements [who together make up that nation]. … All those groups who live together are totally blended and, for all practical intents and purposes, [they constitute] … fraternal communities.'[43]

The phrases in this statement of 'one nation' and 'totally blended' should not be taken to mean that Atatürk was arguing that the different ethnic communities in question had one single identity – that of being an ethnic Turk. This is apparent from his referring to 'fraternal communities', i.e., referring to those communities in the plural. This fact came out even more clearly in a speech he made six months later (May 1920), on the same issue: 'What is intended here is not only Turks, not only Circassians, not only Kurds, not only Lazes, but the Islamic ethnic elements comprising all these peoples … [that together constitute] a sincere community.'[44] At the time, Atatürk seemed to subscribe to cultural nationalism, inclusive of only the Muslim citizens, with Islam providing for national unity.

According to Atatürk, the disparate ethnic elements that made up the Turkish nation had not only pooled their resources together in order to save the country against the foreign encroachments in the wake of the First World War, they had also developed a mutual respect for each other. In

May 1920, Atatürk made the following speech in Parliament: 'The people who constitute this exalted Assembly are not only Turks, or Circassions, Kurds, or Lazes. They are composed of all the Islamic elements, and they together constitute a coherent whole. Consequently, the aims pursued by this Assembly for safeguarding of rights, life, honour, and reputation of the people as a whole, do not pertain only to a single Islamic element [i.e., the ethnic Turks]. They pertain to an aggregate, which comprises the totality of Islamic elements.'[45] It was because of this emphasis on Islam as a bond among the Muslim elements of the Empire that it was only in 1921 that the word 'Turkey' took its place in official documents.

On the other hand, the 1924 Constitution took the Turkish nation as an entity made up of all disparate elements, that is, both ethnic Turks and non-ethnic Turks as well as both Muslim Turks and non-Muslim Turks. Initially, some deputies met with consternation the Article 88, which read, 'The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are Turks'. One such deputy, Celal Nuri from Gelibolu, expressed his concerns as follows: 'We formerly used the adjective "Ottoman", and this applied to all the people.. Now we are deleting it. … All the people of Turkey are not Turkish and Muslim. What shall we call these? If we do use the adjective "Turkish" not in respect to them, how else can we refer to them?' As a response to this query, it was suggested that *from the point of view of citizenship*, all of the people were going to be considered as Turks. This formulation was adopted, and the draft Article 88 was amended to read, 'The people of Turkey, regardless of religion and race, are Turks as regards citizenship'.[46] The makers of the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions, too, adopted this formulation.

It follows that the 1924 Constitution did away, at least legally, with the notion of the nation as an Islamic union, for it stipulated that secularism was one of the pillars on which the Republic has been founded.[47] At least in terms of citizenship, non-Muslim Turks, too, were now recognized as citizens. On the other hand, the recognition of the non-Muslim as citizens was only in *legal*, not in *sociological*, terms. It is because, in the minds of the bulk of the people and the political-bureaucratic stratum, religion, that is Islam, lingered on even to the present, as an important dimension of the national identity.[48]

The legal change from an emphasis on religious to secular ties among the people of Turkey as reflected in the 1924 Constitution, was basically a consequence of the proclamation of the Republic in 1923 and the fact that the mission of the Republic was re-formulated. There was now an open acknowledgement of what had earlier been admitted in a rather cautious manner – the supremacy of the West vis-à-vis Turkey.[49]

It was, of course, Atatürk who led the way to declare this 'fact' once and for all: 'Let us not deceive ourselves; the civilized world is miles ahead of us. We have to catch up with it and enter the circle of civilization. Gentlemen, uncivilized people are trodden under the feet of civilized people.'[50] Atatürk

took as a target the values and attitudes that the Republic had inherited from the Empire, for he was after a cultural revolution.[51] In Atatürk's view, Turkey needed a nation-state that could successfully carry out the gigantic transformation in question.[52]

It follows that the nation that Atatürk had in mind was a 'progressive and civilized nation', which, he thought, was the trademark of nations in Europe. In his view, the European civilization was secular and international.[53] Atatürk and his associates identified that civilization with a popularized version of the nineteenth-century European positivism, that is scientific rationalism. These leaders were of the opinion that only the adoption of scientific rationalism would enable the Turks to modernize their country.[54]

At this time, nationalism was perceived as pursuing the latter goal in question. That goal necessitated the adoption of a new cultural pattern, an important dimension of which was to be a new language. In the 1931 programme of the ruling Republican People's Party, nation was defined as a 'political and social entity, the members of which are bonded together by culture, language, and common ideals'.

It is true that in this formulation, it was the language that could have stamped an ethnic dimension to the Republic. Yet, the language the founders of the Republic had in mind was not mother tongue. A person could go on speaking his/her mother tongue; however, if that person also spoke Turkish and gave his/her children Turkish names and adopted the mores of the ethnic Turks, s/he, too, would have met the nationality condition.[55]

The praxis in question should not come as a surprise; because, as noted earlier, despite the feverish talk about the need for a new (Republican) culture, the particular contents of that culture, what Ağaoğlu had referred to as *mazruf*, were not elaborated. At the time there were very few texts that took up the national basis of the new state in any depth. Those texts which one would have expected to reflect upon the problems of nation and nationality, too, had very little to say on the issue at hand. For instance, one such source could have been the journal *Ülkü*, which was published from 1932 to 1951 by the People's Houses (*Halk Evleri*), which had served as the educational arm of the Republican People's Party (RPP). Yet, as already noted, the articles in *Ülkü* had virtually the singular aim of spreading general knowledge (as part of the policy of enabling the Turks 'to catch up with the contemporary civilization and if possible to surpass it'). Similarly, the important textbook entitled *Course Notes on the* [Turkish] *Revolution* by Recep Peker, who was Secretary-General of the RPP on several occasions between 1923 and 1936, Prime Minister from August 1946 until September 1947, and the self-appointed ideologue in the 1930s of the Republican Revolution, also did not discuss the issues of the nation and nationality, despite the fact that, Peker, at the time was considered an ardent nationalist. Rather, his textbook was full of praises for the national unity of Turkey, without a single paragraph on the nature of Turkey's new identity.[56] Furthermore, when that same 'ardent

nationalist' Peker had been Minister of Education, his ministry sent the following circular to the primary schools: 'From the very first day the younger generation starts school, it should develop social powers and abilities so as to adapt itself physically and spiritually in the most useful way to the national community and the Turkish Republic. … Care must be taken that competition either in class or games, in the same school or between schools, should be reasonable and moderate, not creating deep animosity in individual or group games.'[57] In general, that textbook placed stress on patriotism and cooperative attitude.[58] In fact, Peker could be named one of the state-oriented elites rather than a nationalist, for on one occasion he declared that 'nation by itself is nothing more than a crowd; it can gain significance only when it becomes part of the state'.[59]

Not surprisingly, in the Constitutions, which the Republic adopted in later decades, there was also a studious avoidance of references to nationalism in an ethnic sense. In the preparation of the 1961 Constitution by the Constituent Assembly, this issue was discussed at length, and in the course of deliberations, a conflict arose concerning the matter at hand. However, not one member of the Assembly came up with an argument that smacked of ethnic nationalism. In any case, in the 1961 Constitution there was reference to the term 'nationalism' only once; it was in the Preamble and the 'nationalism' in question had to do with integrating the people of Turkey around national ideals and conscience. In its draft form, Article Two of the 1961 Constitution that listed the characteristics of the Turkish state, had not included the term 'nationalist'. The absence of the term in the said Article had led to a debate in the Constituent Assembly. Those who were against the inclusion of the term in the said Article argued that in the past there had arisen a tendency to interpret nationalism in an ethnic sense, and that this had led to a rift among the people. It was possible that some people may again take it to mean the hegemony of the Turks over the other elements of the nation. It was reasoned that such an unfavourable development would work againt national unity.[60] The Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, Professor Enver Ziya Karal, a student of the history of Turkey, agreed with the last point. 'Nationalism has a doctrinaire meaning', he said. 'The insertion of nationalism in the body of the Constitution', Karal continued, 'might give some the temptation to wrench it in different directions; this would result in the unity of the Turkish nations becoming endangered'.[61] Professor Tarık Zafer Tunaya, a student of Constitutional Law and Political Science and the Rapporteur of the Constitutional Committee, concurred with Karal; Tunaya pointed out that the term should not be included, because it might lead to various 'perverted' interpretations.[62]

Those who were for the inclusion of the term in Article Two also did not have ethnic nationalist inclinations. They suggested that nationalism is a means of defending the national existence. Turkish nation does not interpret

nationalism as ethnic nationalism; in its view nationalism is a matter of will and culture. Therefore, there should be no hesitation to insert the term into the Constitution. In the event, no reference was made to nationalism in the Article Two of the draft 1961 Constitution.[63]

Then the draft Constitution was sent to the National Unity Committee (NUC), made up of the 1960 military interveners, acting at the time as the upper legislative body. The members of that body, too, were divided on the issue of nationalism.[64] One of those members who were for the inclusion of the term was none other than General Cemal Gürsel, who was the former Commander of the Land Forces, and who had been coopted by the revolutionaries to lead the intervention once it was carried out. General Gürsel argued that the nation-building process in Turkey had still not been completed. He continued by saying, 'Europe solved its problem concerning nationalism a century ago. Are we in the same situation? Go to a village in Anatolia and ask a villager, "Who are you?" His answer will be, "Thank God, I am a Muslim". He would not say, "I am Turkish". His consciousness has not yet been awakened. … Let us insert nationalism in the Constitution, let us take it out after Turkish consciousness has been awakened in this country.' Two other members of the NUC, Ahmet Yıldız and Suphi Gürsoytırak, were also for the inclusion of the term, similarly for the sake of national unity and harmony, or opposing a possible de-acculturation process taking place on the part of some elements of the population. Yıldız and Gürsoytırak made the following observations, respectively: 'When we say we are nationalists, we do not mean we are for a religious union (*ümmetçi*) or we entertain pan-Turanist ideas. For us, nationalism invokes being against division in the country'; 'Can we exist forever in this land of ours if we do not bring up the youth with similar worldviews and beliefs?'

Those who did not favour the inclusion of the term in the body of the Constitution included Mucip Ataklı and Haydar Tunçkanat. Ataklı cherished nationalism; however, he thought it might be exploited and become a justification for separatist movements. Tunçkanat, in turn, was of the opinion that first, 'Such a provision did not exist in the constitutions of many countries and its non-existence has not caused people to forget their nationality', and secondly, he thought that 'It is all a matter of culture, a matter of unity of culture'. In the event, the term 'national' rather than 'nationalist' was inserted in the Constitution.

Article Two of the 1982 Constitution of Turkey did have the term nationalism; however, what it stipulated was no other than the statement that 'the Turkish Republic is a state that subcribes to Atatürkist nationalism'. This could have been only expected, for General Kenan Evren, the leader of the 1980 military intervention (as a consequence of which the 1961 Constitution was replaced by the 1982 Constitution), made in January 1982 the following remarks: 'Atatürk was a nationalist. However, Atatürk was not a selfish nationalist. For his nationalism was not a racist nationalism; instead, it was

a nationalism that aimed to integrate people. Atatürk's nationalism was one in terms of which people led joyous lives because they shared the same fate, grief, and happiness. It was, therefore, an altogether novel and realistic nationalism. Atatürk became internationally renowned because of his love and respect for the humanity.'[65]

Throughout the Republican period, the basic aims of citizenship education in Turkey turned out to be reaching higher levels of civilization and the inculcation of patriotism.[66] Atatürk placed emphasis on the 'union of will and ideal' as the major characteristic of the people that make up nation; he never toyed with the idea of ethnic nationalism.[67] In any case, in the early Republic, one could hardly talk about a hegemonic ethnic community. At the time, one could only come across a slowly emerging commitment to an 'imagined nation'.[68] Under the circumstances, it had become incumbent upon the state to create its own nation. Turkey emerged as a *state-nation* rather than as a *nation-state*. With reference to Turkey, A. V. Sherman talked about a 'constructive nationalism' in the sense that the nationalism as formulated by the founders of the Republic was going to create a new nation, *not vice versa*.[69] In the Turkish case, there had been no cause and effect relationship between ethnic Turk and 'Turkishness'.[70]

The adoption of a Western system and mentality continued to be the gist of Atatürkist nationalism. Atatürk pointed out that the Turks could become members of the fully civilized Western world.[71] The Turk's distinguishing characteristic had to be nothing else but 'civilizational grandeur'. Such a fundamental transformation on the part of the people would make possible the emergence of 'the proud and self-assured Turk'.[72] Atatürk asked his fellow countrymen to be proud of and have trust in themselves, and work hard.

Atatürk made several statements in which he commended the 'favourable' qualities of his compatriots, which included even the claim that 'a Turk was equal to the whole world' and that the 'strength that the Turkish youth will need in order to be able to act as the guardians of the Republican principles was in their noble blood'. Such discourse was a calculated strategy on Atatürk's part to improve the characteristics of the new nation; that they were not to be the upshot of an ethnicist/racist orientation. It has been argued that the last statement about the 'noble blood' was a call for the youth to have confidence in themselves and that it had not its roots in a 'race-related worldview'.[73] In the late 1940s a pious Prime Minister, Şemsettin Günaltay, too, used the word 'race' in his book, *Zulmetten Nura* ('From Darkness to Light'), in the same sense.[74] Atatürk's nationalism was rationalist, civilized, inclusive, and peaceful.[75] It was the end result of the efforts to create a modern nation and state, and thus a new mentality, and a new way of life for all of the Turkish citizens.[76]

In any case, Atatürk always acted in a humane manner. He had a gentlemanly talk with the Greek Commander Trikupis when the latter had fallen prisoner at the end of the Turkish War of Independence war. Atatürk refused

to tread on the Greek flag that was laid out at his feet upon his arrival in the western city of Izmir. In 1934, he stated that the 'The Australian dead of the Anzac [the Australian-New Zealand Army Corps at Gallipoli during the First World War] who had fought on the Allied side against the Turks, had, too, become the sons of Turkey'. Particularly significant for the present purpose was that while authoritarian and racist dictatorships had emerged in Europe in between the two World Wars, Atatürk was least affected by such currents. In 1933, he even invited to Turkey German academics who had been dismissed from their universities by the Hitler regime, because they were Jews or they were considered dissident for some other 'reason' by that regime.[77] Atatürk once said, 'The Turkish nation is responsive … to the values of humanity. It is proud to carry in its conscience a respect for universal values. … The Turkish nation … is a voluntary member of the human cosmos'.[78] When Atatürk made favourable comments about the Turks, he had no intention of exalting that nation at the expense of other nations.

It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that Atatürk did not have hostile attitudes towards the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey, let alone non-ethnic Turkish Muslims. He underlined the Ottoman 'tolerance as acceptance': 'No nation had respect for the faith and customs of foreign elements than our nation. … [Ottoman Sultan] Fatih Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1444, 1451–1481) did not tinker with the religious and national [read, 'ethnic'] set up that he had founded in Istanbul [when he captured that city in 1453]. … The extensive privileges that the non-Muslims were granted since the capture of Istanbul constitute clear evidence that, in religious and administrative terms, our nation has been a most tolerant … nation.'[79] Atatürk also let it be known that if the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey declared their loyalty to the state and acted as such, the Republic would reciprocate, because the Turkish Republic is a modern state: 'If our non-Muslim citizens … tie their fates and fortunes to Turkish nationalism, the civilized Turkish nation with its noble morality would certainly not view them as an alien community.[80] Atatürk did think that non-Muslims, too, could have as their primary identity being a Turk in a generic sense: 'There is a primary element [the ethnic Turks] that has established the Turkish state. Then there are other elements, which have joined their endeavours and their histories with those of the primary element. In this country, we have citizens from among these latter elements, too.'[81]

Some exceptions to the rule?

Establishment views and statements

In the early years of the Republic, Atatürkist nationalism had not been ethnic nationalism. Did that situation change in subsequent decades as it is often claimed? One 'evidence' that those entertaining the ethnic nationalism idea make resort to is a leadıng text-book of the time – *Türk Tarihinin Ana*

Hatları ('An Outline of Turkish History') by Afet İnan.[82] A much quoted passage from this textbook is the following: 'In today's Europe, major nations have no close relationship with a race; in none of them has a particular race kept its conspicuous characteristics. In contrast, the Turkish race, which initiated the greatest movements in history, is a race that preserved to a great extent its well-known features. That race maintained its organic characteristics, its organic intellect (*dimağ*), and its language. … This is both a great strength and honour that very few societies possess.'[83] Those who take this passage as an evidence of ethnic nationalism consider the usage of the word 'race' and 'the exalting of the Turkish nation' in particular as supportive of their argument.

It has already been argued that in the late Ottoman and the early Republican periods, the term 'race' was used in a sense different from how it has been taken in the general literature on ethnicity, and 'the exalting of the nation' in the Turkish case has not been made vis-à-vis other nations. The author of the textbook simply points out that the Turkish 'race' (in this particular context, read, 'Turkish people') maintained their *integrity* (in the textbook, 'preserved their well-known features') and they are quite pleased that as a consequence, they came to have an *ability* (in the textbook 'strength') to realize great feats. This is what Atatürk, who subscribed to a civic-cum-cultural nationalism, would have approved of. Also, the author of the textbook exalts the Turkish 'race' for the same reason that Atatürk exalted that nation – to help people regain their self confidence. The suggested similarities between the views of Atatürk and İnan should not astonish the reader; after all, as pointed out, the text-book *was* prepared by İnan who was rather close to Atatürk and 'under the directions and guidance of Atatürk himself' (*Atatürk'ün irşad ve rehberliğinde*).

The proponents of the ethnic nationalism argument have also made references to some statements by a number of statesmen during the 1920s and 1930s, in which the ethnic Turks were presented as the 'real owners' or 'reals sons' of their country. One such statement by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, Minister of Justice from 1924 to 1930, is as follows: 'One of the things that revolutionaries should be careful about is the fact that whether or not their work will be preserved in the future may in the end depend upon those people who may turn out to be unreliable in this regard … Every revolution should be carried out by the real sons ('*öz evlatlar*') of the nation and safeguarded by them. For instance, the Turkish revolution should be kept alive by the Turks.'[84]

The view that the 'real sons' of the country should take the responsibility themselves of seeing to it that what the founders of the Republic managed to achieve should not be undone at a future date must have derived from these statesmen's always remembering the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire over a period of three centuries, and from their attributing the responsibility for this 'unfortunate unfolding of events' to the 'infidelity of the non-Turk

elements of the Empire'. Mahmud Esat Bozkurt had been first and foremost a state-oriented politician rather than an ethnic nationalist; for once, he, too, said: 'An individual would gain national identity through its close affinity with the state, which enables that person to survive in the modern era.'[85] That the lingering memories of how difficult it had been to salvage the last piece of land and turn it into their new homeland in their hard fought War of Independence in the wake of the First World War, rather than pursuing ethnic nationalist policies, continued to shape the thought patterns of the statesmen of the early Republic was apparent in the way public agencies recruited new personnel during those years: while such an agency as the General Directorate of Forestry which was responsible for non-security related tasks, set as one of its conditions 'being a citizen of Turkish Republic' (*'Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tebaasından olmak'*), such agencies as the Military Veterianary School and the Air Force School, both of which were saddled with security-related tasks, formulated one of their conditions as 'being a citizen of Turkish Republic and an ethnic Turk' (*Türkiye Cumhuriyeti tebaasından ve Türk ırkından olmak*).[86] If the general policy that the governments pursued at the time was ethnic nationalism, it would have been logical to adopt by all agencies the formula of 'being a citizen of Turkey and a member of the Turkish race'. One came across the same security rationale in the recruitment to the civil service and the right to establish boy scouts units or other scouting groups, too.[87]

During that era, the security rationale on the part of the state played a significant role concerning some other issues, too. One such issue was how to treat the immigrants and refugees to Turkey. Here, too, differential treatment was accorded to immigrants and refugees depending upon whether they were or they were not considered as the 'real owners of the country'. Only those taken as the real owners of the country were considered as not posing a threat to national unity and were given a favourable treatment. A similar issue was whether or not to grant citizenship to the non-Muslims who had applied for it. Among the non-Muslims who had applied for citizenship, only specific groups were accorded favourable treatment and not others.[88] The first such group comprised the Istanbul Greeks who had been settled in that city for a considerable period of time (*établis*). They were granted Turkish citizenship if they converted to Islam or at least adopted Turkish names. The second group consisted of Christians and Jews from Central Europe. The members of this group, too, had to convert to Islam and/or adopt a Turkish name. The third group were the Christians who were from the Balkans; the members of this group were required to convert to Islam. Service to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey as a civil engineer, train driver, orchestra director or marriage to a Turkish Muslim helped. There were even cases of granting Turkish citizenship even if a Turkish last name was not adopted. The least leniency was shown towards the Armenians. However, even here some exceptions were made. For example, a certain Gigork Karpic

and his wife were granted Turkish citizenship. They were the owners of Karpic, Ankara's most popular restaurant during the interwar years.[89] The same security concern led the state to make discriminations even when the ethnic Turks were involved. According to the Denaturalization Act of 1927, 'those Ottoman subjects who had stayed abroad during the Turkish War of Independence and had not returned to Turkey since then; those who were in the country, but had not participated in the war; those who insisted to speak other languages' could be deprived of their Turkish citizenship.[90]

Turkish History Thesis

The three most important seeming parentheses to the civic-cum-cultural nationalism of the early Republic were the Turkish History Thesis, the Sun-Language Theory, and the Turanist 'tendencies'. All three have been presented as different incarnations of the presumed ethnic nationalist policies pursued by the state in the early Republican Period.

According to the Turkish History Thesis, which was debated at length at the First Congress of Turkish History in 1932, the roots of all ethnic groups in the world, referred to as 'races', were Turks. Can this seemingly overt reference to descent as a marker of the Turks' identity be taken as providing fodder for the ethnic nationalism argument? This one cannot. For the 'Thesis', too, was a tool to boost national morale and pride by 'proving' that the Turkish nation was a nation with a long and glorious past. Atatürk explained what his colleagues and he were actually preoccupied with at the time: 'What we are particularly interested in is the emergence of the Hittite, Sumerian and other pre-historical civilizations as well as those nations that contributed to the rise of those civilizations.'[91] He then clarified exactly what they were trying to do: 'We are working to prove scientifically that we are an old nation residing in the environs of Izmir [Smyrna, on the western (Aegian) coast of Turkey] before the Greeks [read, ancient Hellenic peoples]'.[92] Atatürk pointed out why this was important: 'If the memory of the deeds performed for the nation is not kept above all memories, it would not be possible to appreciate the notion of national history. … [We place] extraordinary importance on our citizens' knowing the profound history of the Turks. This knowledge is a sacred treasure that nourishes the Turks' ability and might, feeling of self reliance, and his indestructible resistance against all currents that would harm the national being.'[93] Atatürk then pointed out that proving their view could enable them to declare that 'The Turks … [were] noble in civilization.'[94]

The first point to note concerning the 'Thesis' is that once again we come across an inward-looking, that is defensive, thus, a non-ethnic nationalism. The people over whom there is an attempt to prove the Turks' superiority is neither any of the elements of the present day Turks or Greeks, but the ancient Hellenic peoples. The project was pursued after having made peace and established friendly relations with the Greeks following the war with

them in 1919–1922. Consequently, 'picking on' the ancient Greeks did not derive from a lingering hostility towards the Greeks of the 1920s. The 'Thesis' was part of the nation-building process of the Turks of the early Republic, without any regard to other peoples inside or outside Turkey.

Secondly, there was a genuine effort to try to prove scientifically what has been hypothesized, rather than making statements without an effort to substantiate those statements with hard evidence. This kind of behaviour was only to be expected from a leader who had declared that the most important guide in life was science. Such an approach could not be expected from a leader with ethnic nationalistic views.

Lastly and perhaps most importantly, Atatürk initially supported the project, which in the end was claimed to have 'proved' that the Turks *were* the most ancient people. However, at the end of the day, Atatürk was not convinced about the plausibility of the 'Thesis', and he did *not* endorse those findings.[95] A leader with ethnic nationalist views would have readily used those 'findings', even if s/he knew that they did not make sense much, and even worse if they were 'doctored' for her/him, in good faith or otherwise. For all practical purposes, Atatürk's eventually keeping his distance from the 'findings' of the project was the death verdict for the 'Thesis', at least as far as the state was concerned. Following the Second World War, the 'Thesis' was altogether abandoned even by those who had continued to find merit in it.[96]

Sun-Language Theory

The Sun-Language Theory, the second important claimed exception to the civic-cum-cultural nationalism, was developed in the mid-1930s. Within the framework of this 'Theory', it was argued that Central Asia, the ancient homeland of the Turks, was the birthplace of all languages and civilizations, and that consequently the Turkish language was the original mother tongue of all human beings.

There is no need to dwell upon the fictitiousness of this 'Theory', too. Again, the question to be addressed is whether or not this so called 'Theory' was intended to prove the superiority of the Turks vis-à-vis other peoples; in other words, whether or not it was part of the ethnic nationalism attributed to the Turkish state of the 1930s.

There were several reasons for making resort to this 'theory'; however, none of them derived from ethnic nationalism. First, it was considered as another means to enable the Turks, who had felt humiliated by the repeated defeats at the hands of their adversaries in Europe and the consequent loss of their empire, to regain their self-esteem.[97] Indeed, Falih Rıfkı Atay, a writer and politician close to Atatürk, has noted that the 'Theory' 'was perceived not so much as a scientific theory, but rather a remedy to be used in the treatment of the inferiority complex' of the Turks'.[98] The founders of the Republic could not achieve this by referring to the golden age of the Ottoman Empire (circa the middle of the fifteenth century to the end of the

sixteenth century); given the fact that by the 1930s the new Republic had come to adopt, at least legally and overtly, a secular mission for itself. Under the circumstances, Atatürk and his associates had come to the conclusion that they could not afford to glorify their relatively recent Muslim-Ottoman past. Thus, they chose to fulfill this particular goal of theirs by going back to their ancient roots in the pre-historical periods.[99]

The second reason was somewhat related to the first one. In the nineteenth century, a number of German linguists had come up with the argument that the languages were the store houses of the experiences and cultures of nations, in addition to being the media of communications. According to these linguists, all human languages fell under three categories of *isolating*, *agglutinative*, and *inflectional* ones, which, in that order, reflected ascending levels of civilization and human achievement. This was because each of those categories of languages allowed different degrees of creativity and articulation. Those who spoke inflectional languages, that is Indo-European (Aryan) peoples, were considered to be more creative and civilized than those whose languages were isolating or agglutinative. The reaction of the founders of the Republic to this theory was two-fold. On the one hand, they claimed that the distinction between the agglutinative and inflectional languages was not all that precise and, on the other hand, they argued that Turkish was also an Indo-European and thus an inflectional language, since 'originally it was the mother-tongue of all human beings'.[100]

The third reason was that of preventing the 'purification of the language' (throwing out foreign, basically Arabic and Persian, loan words) from going too far, that is, doing away with every non-Turkish word, however common in use. If one could successfully present all civilizations ultimately Turkish in origin, then it would have been possible to argue that there was no harm in retaining some of the words that earlier were thought to be 'foreign' in origin.[101] This policy was also part of the nation-building efforts on the part of the founders of the Republic.

Concerning the last point, Atatürk also realized that depriving Turkish language of every loan word from other languages would have weakened the language and rendered communication among the people difficult. Consequently, he himself put an end to the frantic purification project.[102] This is significant for the present purpose, for, along with the above mentioned considerations behind the Sun-Language Theory, Atatürk's changing his mind on an important line of policy for the justification of which the Theory was formulated, provides still another evidence that here, too, we are face to face with a practice for which ethnic nationalism did not constitute a rationale.

Turanism

Turanism had been the third and the most important of the claimed parentheses to the civic-cum-cultural nationalism; after all it was a world view that

attributed utmost importance to ethnic descent. Turanism had been the handiwork essentially of a few members of the intelligentsia; although some politicians and higher civil servants also developed an interest in it. Three persons played leading roles in awakening an interest in Turanism. One of them was Zeki Velidi Togan (1890–1970), a Professor of History. Togan was interested in uniting the Turks of Asia with Turkey in order to develop a racialy [ethnically] pure Turkish state. He had plans to overthrow the government in order to put his goal into effect as soon as Germany's victory in the Second World War was assured.[103] The second leading proponent of Turanism was Reha Oğuz Türkkan (1920–), a Professor of Psychology. According to Türkkan, the Turkish race was above all races. His ideal was to bring happiness to all members of that race [ethnic community]. In Türkkan's view, the mixing of blood and, thus, eventual rule by 'foreign blood' caused the fall of nations.[104] The last and most vocal proponent of Turanism was Nihal Atsız (1878–1975), a high-school teacher, poet, and author. In Atsız's view, it was neither citizenship nor culture that could be viewed as markers of nation. What really made up a nation was 'people of the same racial [read, "ethnic"] origin', that is, 'belonging to the same "blood kinship"'. He had in mind Göktürk and Oghuz Turks [the Turkic groups in Central Asia before Turks began to migrate towards various western geographies and some of them to settle in Anatolia], Selcuk [of the Selcukid Empire, which was the predecessor Empire to that of the Ottomans], and lastly the Ottomans. Atsız thought all these 'Turkish' groups descended from the same racial stock. For Atsız, 'Turkishness' invoked 'a large family of Central Asian-originated Altaic-Turanian race'. In his opinion, the 'Turkic race was endowed with superior moral traits like loyalty to the state, heroism, self-sacrifice, honesty, and bravery, [which were] transmited from one generation to another by pure blood'. He suggested that in the education of the young, special emphasis should be placed on hero cult.[105]

As noted, there had also been a certain degree of sympathy towards Turanism among some high-ranked officers and politicians. In 1942–1943, on different occasions Mahmud Şevket Esendal, Secretary-General of the ruling Republican People's Party, Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of the General Staff, and Suat Hayri Ürgüplü, Minister of Customs and Monopolies, sent their signed photographs to the Turanist journal *Büyük Doğu*. Among them, particularly Field Marshal Çakmak was thought to have a particular interest in Turanism. Some others in government with such tendencies included Hüsrev Gerede (Turkey's Ambassador to Bonn) and officers Ali Fuat Erden, Hüsnü Emin Erkilet, and Ali İhsan Sabis.[106] Both the views of Atsız, Togan, and Türkkan and the favourable attitudes towards those views on the part of some government circles as well as some isolated practice along the same lines noted earlier, have been taken as evidence by the proponents of the ethnic nationalism argument for 'the pursuance of ethnic-nationalist policies by the state in the late 1930s and early 1940s'.

For several reasons this claim, too, is dubious at best. For one thing, the so-called 'Turanists' were not properly Turanists. Their views were inward-looking; they did not have irredentist inclinations. For instance, Atsız's major concern was the lot of the Anatolian villages and the impoverishment of the peasants.[107] He was not primarily preoccupied with the enlargement of Turkey, although in his more romantic moods he wrote poems about 'the flag assembling in its shadow in lost homelands'.[108] For their part, Togan and Türkkan took as target Communists, not any ethnic community.[109]

The 'threat of Communism' was probably the only issue on which all Atsız, Togan, and Türkkan seemed to have a consensus. To quote from a letter that Atsız sent to Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu: 'Communism in Turkey is forbidden by the [1924] Constitution. The State … [in Turkey] is based on nationalism, yet the Communists are playing quite an active role in this country. They mask themselves as proponents of populism, which is one of the six planks of the ruling Republican People's Party. … The Communists present themselves as populist patriots; however, they sabotage nationalism in Turkey by the slogan of "Down with the fascists" and take the nationalists as their greatest enemy. … The Communists try to do away with racism, which is the foundation stone of nationalism.'[110] In addition, the traits of the Turks that Atsız, for instance, praised were those that would have been emphasized by those who subcribed to civic rather than ethnic nationalism – loyalty to the state, heroism, self-sacrifice, honesty, and bravery.[111]

Secondly, the Turanists, to the extent that they were Turanists, could not have left much impact on the body politic. Among other things, they were divided among themselves. Togan and Türkkan were members of different secret societies. Atsız and Türkkan had a very low opinion of each other, so much so that neither thought the other as fit to carry the banner of Turanism. In Atsız's view, Türkkan was an Armenian, while in the latter's opinion, the former was a Circassian, and they used those terms in a pejorative sense. Thus each accused the other of not being a 'real Turk'.[112] All in all, in respect to Turanism, one could hardly talk of a 'movement', because the proponents of Turanism had no acknowledged leader and the leading figures passing as Turanists were at loggerheads among themselves.

Thirdly, although they were members of the educated stratum, the primary proponents of Turanism such as Atsız, Togan, and Türkkan were outside the policy-making circles; consequently they had little or no leeway to make an impact on the official policy of the state.[113] Furthermore, the numbers of Turanists as a whole were small, probably at most times several hundred to a few thousand members, except during the First World War, and later during certain periods; moreover, Turanists were supported only by some students and certain middle-class towns people.[114] As for the sympathizers of the Turanists in government, they, too, did not form a large group. The latter also had little influence on policy-making. The most senior figure among the sympathizers was Field Marshal Çakmak, Chief of the General

Staff from 1922 until 1944. Yet, he had little influence on Prime Minister İnönü concerning the Turanist issue. In fact, all along there had been considerable tension between İnönü and Çakmak.[115] In 1944, the former did not extend the latter's active duty.

It should also be noted that those in the state circles that had a certain degree of sympathy towards the Turanists did not necessarily agree fully with the views of the latter.[116] For instance, in August 1942, Şükrü Saracoğlu, Prime Minister from July 1942 until March 1943, made the following observation: 'We are Turks, Turkists, and will always stay as such. For us Turkism is a matter of blood, but much more so it is an issue of conscience and culture.'[117] At its face value, this statement seems paradoxical, for it gives the impression that Saracoğlu made references to both ethnic and civic nationalism. In actual fact, Saracoğlu must have made a reference to patriotism (civic nationalism) when he talked about 'blood' and thus set himself apart from the 'Turanists'.

In Turkey, for the bulk of the people, just as the word 'race' does not invoke a set of physical characteristics (regarded as the consequence of descent from the same roots and assumed that those characteristics render some people superior to others), 'blood', too, does not necessarily invoke descent from the same roots. In general usage, 'race' means a particular community of people and (having certain kinds of) 'blood' means strength arising from such factors as patriotism. To give a rather significant example, in 1927 (President) Atatürk completed his four-day speech in Parliament (in which he presented the trials and tribulations of the Turkish War of Independence and of the founding of the Republic, and some of the events from 1923 to 1927) by entrusting the future of Turkey to the good hands of the youth and, at this point addressing the youth, he added that 'the strength you [the youth] will need [to accomplish this mission] flows in your [youth's] veins'. Atatürk had subcribed to civic nationalism and could not have used the term 'blood' in an ethnic sense. In fact, Saracoğlu who had declared that Turanism for him was a 'matter of blood', had on another occasion pointed out that geographically, the union of the Turks of Anatolia with their kindred in Central Asia could only be possible after the reordering of Russia [read, 'the Soviet Union']; thus, in a sense he had discouraged utopian views on that issue, and had added that, 'the autonomous governments [in the Soviet Union] could rely on Turkey for [only] cultural assistance'.[118]

In any case, where his President, some top ministers in the cabinet as well as the Secretary-General of his party had taken a determined stand towards the Turanists, Prime Minister Saracoğlu's taking a contrary path would not have been probable. On 19 April 1944, in a critical speech he had delivered on nationalism, President İsmet İnönü made the following observation: 'At our village institutes as well as other schools and institutes … we are trying to melt everybody in our Republican crucible for bringing up Turkish patriots. It is not an inappropriate and wrong policy to render the children of

this country subscribing to honest ideals … and establishing a nation the members of which would extend a helping hand to each other. We would not let the children be a subscriber to a subversive and divisive trend that the racists are trying to promote. We cannot allow racists to tear our society into pieces. … We are facing an attempt … , which constitutes a deadly threat to the very premises of the Republic.'[119] Exactly a month later, İnönü made another speech along the same lines, except that now he took as target (teacher) Atsız, though in a round about way: 'The major difficulty that we face in our efforts to educate our youth and help them to internalize the national culture is the teachers who have been politicized. Nothing could be more harmful to a country than some people … teaching youngsters only their own viewpoints.'[120] In his turn, Numan Menemencioğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared: 'We only wish happiness to the Turks outside the boundaries of Turkey. Our Turkism concerns the Turks within our own boundaries. In this country, we do not pursue a racist policy.'[121] Similarly Hasan Âli Yücel, Minister of Education, was of the opinion that the Turanist views were 'incompatible with the principles of … [Atatürkism] and the programme of the party'; he sent instructions to all schools and universities on the first day of the 1944–1945 academic year to the effect that the curricula of the courses on civics, the Turkish Revolution, history, and sociology should be designed with a view to the principles set forth in the President's speech.[122] In his turn, Mahmud Şevket Esendal, Secretary-General of the Republican People's Party, conveyed to the RPP organization a circular, in which he pointed out that he shared İnönü's views.[123] Esendal was one of those leading politicians who, along with others, had earlier expressed sympathy for the Turanist views. This is another case that supports the argument made in this essay that those who displayed a certain degree of support for Atsız et al did not necessarily share their ideas. The Turkish press, too, on the whole approved of the views of the President and the other leading statesmen of the time.[124]

These views of the President, Prime Minister, and some top cabinet ministers as well the Secretary-General of the ruling RPP were reflected in the policies pursued by the state both before and during the period that Turanism was salient. The Republican state, as represented by the leading statesmen, had always kept its distance from ethnic nationalism of any sort. As mentioned earlier, the so-called Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*) was set up to reinforce national sentiments through education and other means. As noted above, at times, the Hearths, under the direction of people with a proclivity towards Turanism had displayed what may be loosely referred to as Turanistic characteristics. One such head of the organization, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, had made the following remarks in his closing address at the Second Annual Congress of the Hearths in 1925: 'After long centuries of separation, we have reached the time of reunion. … At this moment, hands are outstretched to every corner of the Turkish world, seeking their distant

brethren. Do the political boundaries separate nations? [If] you build a wall through a forest, [but] the roots of the trees beneath the wall and their branches above embrace one another, of what use are the boundaries? The entire Turkish world has begun to recognize the inevitability of unity with their brethren.'[125] The Republican regime, however, did not approve of the expression of such sentiments on the part of the Hearths. In a 1927 amendment in the bylaws of the Hearths, it was stipulated that 'the scope of the active operations of the Turkish Hearths is limited by the boundaries of the Republic of Turkey'.[126]

In the 1940s, too, the Turkish state did not provide official support to Atsız et al.[127] Not only by its words, but also by its deeds, the state displayed its reservations to views of the Turanists. When in the early 1940s German Foreign Minister R. Ribbentrop talked of promoting and keeping 'alive the hitherto somewhat dominant Turkish imperialistic tendencies following up on the Turanian idea', the Republic displayed disinterest in the idea.[128] During the Second World War, when Germany came up with plans to obtain Turkey's collaboration by conceding to that country the right to re-organize the Turkic speaking areas and in addition offer the Iranian Azerbaijan to Turkey, İnönü and the cabinet rejected the plan and made it known that 'Turkey's hands are busy to fully develop its own country and it does not have the slightest interest in the acqusition of additional territory'.[129]

That there had been no collaboration between the state and the Turanists has also been corroborated by at least two other and more direct evidences. The first relates to Atsız's two open letters in April 1944 to Prime Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu in the pro-Turanist periodical *Orhun*. In the first of those letters, Atsız responded to a statement that Saracoğlu had made: 'We are Turks, Turkists, and will always stay as such. For us Turkism is a matter of blood, but much more so it is an issue of conscience and culture', and registered his complaints about that statement as follows: 'The Turkism of the Prime Minister remained only in words and not in deeds … [and this had been the case] when leftist views, which constitute the greatest threat to our country, have been flourishing'. In his other open letter, Atsız called for the resignation of the Minister of Education because of the fact that the Communists had penetrated that ministry and the Minister himself was responsible for it. As a reaction, the state dismissed Atsız from his job as a teacher at a public high school in Istanbul. Another development relevant to the present argument started when Atsız accused Sabahattin Ali, a member of the leftist intelligentsia, who had been accused by Atsız of being a 'promoter of Communism in Turkey' and thus of being a 'traitor'. Ali took Atsız to court. The next day, a nationalist student beat up Ali and the nationalist militants burned Ali's books. Thereupon, Atsız, Togan, Tükkaya, and another Turanist, Ferit Cansever, were taken under custody on the grounds of having been involved in the 'racist-Turanist' demonstrations. The Turanists were tried on the grounds of disseminating subversive ideology and setting up an illegal

organization to pursue their goals, and were handed by the First Martial Law Court of Istanbul prison sentences of varying lengths, ten years in the case of Togan (March 1945).[130] On 26 October 1945, the Military Court of Cassation demanded that those found guilty be retried by the Second Martial Law Court of Istanbul and released.[131] On 31 March 1947, the first Court's decision was overruled and the accused were acquitted, well after they were freed. The reason for this abrupt reversal of policy towards the Turanists, which is rather significant for the present purpose, will be taken up below.

As far as the presumed responsiveness of the state towards the Turanists, it should be noted that concerning the key policy makers in the government, there were no documents to substantiate the claimed close relationship between the state and the Turanists. It has been reported that the American intelligence could not unearth any evidence for any special relationship between İnönü-Menemencioğlu's team who together formulated Turkey's foreign policy until 1944, on the one hand, and the Turanists, on the other.[132]

Still, there remain two interrelated and rather crucial questions: If Turkish governments have had an unfavourable attitude towards Turanism, (1) Why did they allow the Turanist texts to be published even for a short period of time (1941–1942), when, in fact, under the single-party, semi-authoritarian regime of the time those publications could easily be banned? (2) Why were the Turanists freed in such a relatively short period of time?

The response to the first question would be that all along, Turkish governments were trying to adapt their policies to some important developments in the international arena. One country particularly important in this regard was Germany. From the late nineteenth century onwards, close relations had developed between Germany and Turkey, when Great Britain no longer adhered to the principle of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a barrier to Russian expansion towards the south. As those relations had important repercussions in respect to the military issues, the German influence was particularly effective vis-à-vis at least some officers in Turkey.

It was for this reason that in the early 1940s, quite a few admirers of the Turanist project came from among the military ranks. During the First World War, in which Turkey, along with Germany, fought on the side of the Central Powers, Germany urged Enver Pasha to pursue Turanist policies and action. Enver Pasha did not remain disinterested to such encouragement.

During the Second World War, Turanism once more came to life due again basically to the German influence.[133] Following the War, the names of some Turanists were discovered in some of the secret documents, which were seized in the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Allied Powers. These names included those of Atsız and some other Turanists.[134] That these were not in all probability fake documents is corroborated by the fact that, as early as 1938, Türkkan was reported to have confided to one of

his associates the following: 'We shall bring a sudden coup with the help of the Regiment of the Guard. We are in permanent contact with a foreign power, which will help us with arms. … Here is the poison-gas revolver, which I obtained from Germany for my part in the revolution.'[135]

Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, a student of the early republican Turkey, has also pointed out that Germany provided funds to Turanists.[136] At the time, difficulties experienced in the German-Turkish relations had led Turkey to an appeasement policy towards Germany. The tolerance accorded the Turanist publications seems to have been part of this latter policy.[137] Not only this tolerant attitude towards the Turanist publications and other activities, but also Esendal's and Ürgüplü's sending signed photographs to the Turanist journal *Büyük Doğu* as well as Saracoğlu's reference to ethnic nationalism, though as a lip service, must have derived from the same concern.

From 1944 onwards, the tide turned. During the War, Stalin put pressure on Turkey to enter the war on the side of the Allied Powers. In May 1944, the Soviet Union occupied Crimea. Consequently, there had arisen a need to placate the Soviet Union towards which a Turanist policy must ultimately have been directed. It was for this reason that at this critical juncture Atsız, Togan, Türkkan, and other Turanists such as Cansever were taken under custody, tried, and handed relatively heavy sentences, and their suppression was given great publicity, despite the fact that Turanism had not posed a serious threat to Turkey.[138]

Following the War, the tide turned again, for now the Soviet-Turkish relations became sour; this was because the Soviets had come up with even more critical demands and had done so in a more forceful manner: the Soviets denounced the 1921 Turco-Soviet Friendship Treaty; they asked Turkey to share responsibility with the Soviets for the military defence of the Turkish straits, and the Soviets made territorial demands in the border region of the Caucasus. However, with the backing of the United States and Great Britain, Turkey rejected these claims. It was upon these developments that Atsız et al were set free and then acquitted.

Concerning the first and second questions posed above – 'Why did the government allow the Turanist publications even for a short period of time (1941–1942), when, in fact, under the single-party semi-authoritarian regime of the time they could ban those publications?' and 'Why were the Turanists freed in such a relatively short period of time?' – we have already come up with at least with one explanation – the international exigencies that Turkey faced at the time. The second factor here seems to have been the sympathy generally felt towards the Turanists in some quarters, which was not a consequence of the German influence mentioned above, but that of Turkish civic nationalism and the patriotism the latter involved. This state of affairs became evident, at least in the legal justifications that the Military Court of Cassation that overruled the decision to hand to the Turanists prison sentences came up with, and those of the Second Martial Law Court

of Istanbul that acquitted the latter. In the view of the former court, 'the idea of racism was not in contradiction with the Article 88 of the (1924) Constitution that defined the Turkishness in terms of citizenship and did not preclude the recognition of different racial origins within the Turkish nation';[139] according to the latter court, '[Turanism] was an expression of a nationalist ideology against a non-national ideology [read "Communism"]'.[140]

Yet, one should not read too much into that generalized sympathy towards a 'racist' stance, and take it as another sign of the tendency towards Turanism, for at least two reasons. First, those who had shown such an inclination continued to subscribe to civic nationalism, and not to ethnic nationalism. The second reason was mentioned by Carter Findley who wrote, 'Whatever may be said about the substantive merits of Turkish theorizings of the 1930s, they were another sign of the country's growing synchronizations with the modern world. Countries all across the political spectrum produced analogous ideas, *sometimes with far more harmful consequences than occurred in Turkey*'.[141] Another eminent student of Turkey who arrived at a similar conclusion about Turanism was Bernard Lewis, who in turn observed: 'The Nazi propaganda was active in Turkey before and still more so during the Second World War. It evoked a limited response, mostly confined to extremist pan-Islamic and more especially pan-Turkist groups. Both were naturally drawn to a power that seemed to promise the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the freeing of its Muslim and Turkish peoples, at least from the Soviet yoke. All in all, however, *the impact of racism in Turkey was limited*'.[142] One may suggest that the harm inflicted on Turkey by such 'ideas' and 'models' was even less than implied in these statements, for in the footsteps of the founder of Republic, the Turkish establishment continued to keep its distance from ethnic nationalism.

6
Turks' Brothers

The public policies towards the Kurds, and for that matter towards any sub-group of the population, have been shaped primarily by the state's approach to matters of nationalism. In the Turkish case, one observed a state creating its own nation, and not vice versa. Within the context of this particular nation-building process, the kind of nationalism that the state chose to adopt would have been the consequence of the preferences and priorities of the state itself, and not that of one element of society or a particular constellation of the societal elements. The Turkish Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire a tradition of not pursuing ethnic nationalism, and it remained loyal to that tradition.

In the present chapter, it is suggested that the state adopted a similar policy in the case of the Kurds, too. It is obvious that this could have been possible if, in this regard, the nationalism issue that the Republic encountered had not been significantly different from the one the Empire had had to deal with. In the Republic, the nationalism issue did evince features similar to those in the Empire, so that in that period too, policies similar to those in the Empire could be pursued. In the Republican period, for a long period of time the Kurds continued to display life styles, values and attitudes similar to those they have had in the Empire, and this situation played an important role vis-à-vis the manner in which Republican policies on the Kurdish issue were formulated.

Kurds in the early Republic

For a long time, the Kurds in the Republican Turkey were not bothered by the fact that they had a rather low rate of literacy. Even as late as 1950, that rate was only three per cent,[1] while that same year the general literacy rate in Turkey as a whole was 33.6 per cent. In the early 1960s, when a certain Muzaffer, guide to a foreign traveler in the region where Kurds lived in great numbers, suggested that there must be more primary schools in the valleys, Raşit, an old local Kurd, responded to him by saying, 'Hakkari [the town

Raşit lived] is not Istanbul. In summer, children are busy with livestock; in winter the valleys are snow-bound'. 'As for learning Turkish', he continued, 'the young men pick it up in the army.' To Raşit, educating girls made even less sense: 'They are stupid to learn. Their job is to make butter and bake bread.'[2]

Not unlike the Ottoman times, the image of the Kurd as an 'unpolished person' lingered on in the early Republican period, too. In 1924, Parliament was described by Eliot Grinnel Mears as one that '[varied] in type from the most polished gentlemen to the rough Kurds, who can neither speak nor write Turkish'.[3] Mears has further noted that no Kurdish man was expected to work. His life was 'the life of a robber'. No Kurdish girl would marry to a man who was not a successful 'robber'.[4] Ernest Jackh, in turn, has referred to the Kurds as 'a backward people in both geographical and spiritual sense.[5] According to Mears, 'at bottom … [Kurds'] vices … [were] chiefly those of the restless life they … [led] in a land in which organized government has been unknown for the past eight centuries'.[6]

Furthermore, the Kurds mostly lived in the poorest and least developed parts of Turkey. Although the other population groups, including the Turks, living in the same areas that the Kurds lived were equally deprived, the latter were convinced that they were discriminated against by the former, because, they argued, they were not considered an integral part of the population.[7]

In the 1960s and the 1970s, the eastern and southeastern Turkey continued to be comparatively poor and, consequently, the Kurds as Kurds were represented only in the radical leftist movements in that country. Kurdish students attending major universities frequently came up with demands for the development of the regions they came from. However, on the whole, they were not engaged in propaganda calling for independence.[8] Although these students felt that their regions were ignored by Ankara,[9] there has not been a widespread Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, either in the early Republic or later.[10]

Until the mid-twentieth century, Islam continued to be the principal public expression of Kurdish communal identity. Martin van Bruinessen has shown that the Khalidiya branch of Nakshibandi religious order provided the central values and the particular ways of behaving as a Kurd.[11] In 1955, Geoffrey L. Lewis reported that many marriages in the east and southeast were conducted by local imams (religious functionaries), not by civil authorities as required by the Republican laws. In fact, the census figures have shown no official divorces in the areas in question. Lewis concluded that 'the writ of the sacred law still ran the east'.[12] When in 1925 the government prohibited the wearing of the fez, the traditional Muslim headgear for men, and encouraged sporting a Western style hat, in certain districts, riots and revolts were the consequence.[13] In 1950, upon the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*-CHP) government's leaving office and the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP) forming the new government, there

was an outbreak of fez-wearing in the eastern provinces. The Democrats were expected to be more tolerant of reversions to the old religious ways of life.[14]

Not only particular faiths, but also sects within those faiths supplied guidelines for public as well as private life in the east and southeast. In the early 1920s, the Alevi Kurds, who have been closer to the Shia sect of Islam in Iran, remained more nationalistic than those Kurds who subscribed to the Shafi legal school of the Sunni sect of Islam.[15] The Alevis had no taste for a Sunni government; the bulk of the Kurds did not wish to be ruled by 'secular Turks'; but none had any objections to a rule by Muslim rulers.[16]

In fact, for all practical purposes, the Kurds were ruled by shaikhs, chieftains, and other local notables, and not by the agents of the central government. In the city of Dersim (today Tunceli), at a certain point, Shaikh Rıza owned 230 villages. He collected taxes from the people in these villages, even at times when those people moved elsewhere. A man called Musa from the town of Mutki who held a good part of the plains of the province of Muş, in addition to taxing people on his lands, also collected tribute money from the passers-by and taxes from some Kurds who lived in other parts of country. The expenses of the so-called congregation in the district of Mucur of the city of Kırşehir were met by 362 villages specified by Musa.[17] While the tribal Kurds retained their kin-based social structure, the tribal councils constituted by the no-kin Kurds performed such functions as assigning grazing rights and overseeing the annual migration between the lowland and upland meadows in summer and winter.[18]

Kurds seemed to be quite content with their isolated lives and had little contacts with the central government. They wished that kind of an arrangement to continue. Above, a part of a conversation between the guide, Muzaffer, and the old local Kurd, Raşit, was reported. In that same conversation, Muzaffer, thinking that Raşit was finding excuses in relation to the suggestions that he was making in good faith in order to improve the region socio-economically, said angrily, 'What you really mean is that you all prefer to be left alone'. The response of the old man and other Kurds present was a grin, as if they were all thinking; 'Now you got it'. 'After a while, officials only bring trouble' said the old man. 'Let the soldiers leave us alone, by God', put in another Kurd.[19]

The Kurds, who traditionally have had considerable (de facto) autonomy from the central government, were always fragmented among themselves. For one thing, they were dispersed geographically. In addition to their living in six different countries: Afghanistan, Baluchistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey too, not all of them had made the southeast their home region. Furthermore, their numbers in other parts of Turkey kept increasing. Secondly, the Kurds were divided along sectarian lines, too, the majority subscribing to the Shafi legal school of Sunni Islam and the rest being Alevis. Kurdish nationalists could awaken nationalist feelings only among the Alevis, and not among the Sunnis. It is significant that there were rifts

among the Alevis themselves, too; during the First World War, some Alevi Kurds supported the government, others gave a hand to the Armenians and the Russians.[20]

Furthermore, the Kurds did not have a common dialect. During his rebellion in the early months of 1925, Shaikh Said could not persuade the tribes beyond the Zaza-speaking areas to commit themselves unequivocally to that revolt, despite the fact that he had issued a fatwa (religious decree) declaring that the *jihad* (holy war) was an obligation for all Muslims irrespective of their specific confession or *tariqa* (religious orders).[21] As recently as the 1990s, when a former Kurdish separatist leader, Seyfi Cengiz, tried to convince villagers in his region that they were Kurds, the latter responded to him with the following words: 'We are Kırmancı [a sub-dialect that some Kurds speak]. You are saying we are Kurdish. We are not Kurdish.'[22]

Moreover, different groups of Kurds belonged to different tribes. Consequently, they did not have a single voice underlying their common identity to the extent that such an identity did exist.[23] On 19 April 1920, British Prime Minister Lloyd George made the following observation: 'When it comes to Kurdistan, it is difficult to decide which policy to adopt. … Once it was thought that separating Kurdistan from Turkey and granting autonomy to it would have been the best policy. Yet, it has never been clear what exactly the Kurds themselves preferred. On the basis of a study of this issue that I had asked to be made in Istanbul, Baghdad and elsewhere, I now have the impression that a Kurd does not represent any entity other than his own tribe. … It seems that they have gotten used to rule by Turks.'[24]

The situation did not change during the later decades, too. In 1952, Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Fry came up with the following view: 'Statements, and they are frequent, which imply the existence of an all embracing, coherent Kurdish nationalism operating in Turkey as well as in Iraq and Iran, should be largely discounted as either propaganda or irresponsible journalism.'[25] Turkish politician Ferit Melen, who acted twice as Minister of Finance and twice as Minister of Defence and was Prime Minister between 22 May 1972 and 10 April 1973, once said: 'I lived among Kurds for years and thus I came to know even the most radical nationalists among them. Excluding the extremists, among the Kurds, particularly among the Kurdish masses, one does not come across the idea of separating themselves from the Turks and setting up their own state. All they want are those of being treated properly, not to be beaten up, not to be humiliated, and receiving from government what is due to them.'[26] David Hotham, too, did not think nationalism was prevalent among the Kurds. He pointed out that it was difficult to say how much Kurdish nationalism there was in Turkey. According to him, 'there were noisy Kurdish students in the universities, and if one went to the southeast, especially Diyarbakır, one found only a few restless Kurdish intellectuals'.[27]

The observations along these lines have been corroborated by survey data obtained during the 1990s. A 1994 opinion poll had a sample of 1000

respondents representing the Turkish public opinion in general and 500 Kurds from urban and rural areas in the southeastern Turkey. Only 4.3 per cent of the Kurds perceived the question at hand as that of establishing a Kurdish state. Those Kurds, who regarded the problem in question as an issue of gaining autonomy within Turkey's borders, amounted to only 6.4 per cent of all Kurds. 28.1 per cent of the Kurds thought the problem was economic and social deprivation, and the majority, 51 per cent, as one of 'ruthless suppression by the state'.[28] Another survey made in 1995 had drawn its sample from among the self-identified Kurds in three heavily Kurdish provinces in the southeast and three provinces in the south, which had received massive Kurdish migration during the post-1984 'troubles'. 13.0 per cent of the respondents in this second survey expressed their wish as that of cultural autonomy for themselves, associating it with the Constitutional guarantees for those rights; 42.5 per cent favoured a federal administrative structure; and, this time, another 13.0 per cent sought an independent Kurdish state. When the respondents who opted for federalism were asked what 'federalism' denoted to them, they defined it as an arrangement that would allow for a freer exercise of cultural rights and more favourable conditions for living as Kurd (rather than a change in the present political structure of the state).[29]

Furthermore, to the extent to which Kurds have subscribed to nationalism, here, too, there has not been a consensus among them. At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, different categories of Kurds have subscribed to different versions of nationalism.[30] One group of Kurds who have been acculturated to the mainstream ideals, values, and attitudes in Turkey and who have been for this reason called 'occasional Kurds' by their detractors among other Kurds, constitute the bulk of the Kurds in Turkey and are an integral part of the country's socio-economic and political life.

Another group of Kurds may be referred to as Muslim-Kurds. They place emphasis on Islamic values and, as such, normally identify themselves with religion rather than ethnicity. However, when they have to make a choice between Kurdish and Turkish identity, they opt for the Kurdish identity. This second group of Kurds is divided into two sub-groups. One sub-group comprises those Kurds who have sympathies towards moderate Islam. They are not sympathetic towards the Republican principles of nationalism and secularism. When involved in politics, these Kurds join such centre-right political parties as the Democratic Party (1945–1950), Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*-AP) (1960–1980), True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi* – 1983 to the present), Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) (1983 to the present), and the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*-AKP) (2001 to the present). Their numbers may be less than the first group; in any case, these Kurds, too, have been integrated to the mainstream socio-economic and political life in Turkey. Another sub-group consists of those Kurds who take Iran's radical Islam as a model for themselves. They did set up a militant

Kurdish Islamic organization referred to as the Kurdish Hizbullah (army of Allah) (KH). The KH was responsible for the killing in 2000 of many prominent moderate Kurds. The KH regarded the militant Marxist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) as its main rival and became involved in a bloody conflict with it. Eventually, the state successfully suppressed the KH.

The third group of Kurds have been those in the ranks of the Marxist secessionist PKK and such political arms of the PKK as the People's Toiling Party (*Halkın Emek Partisi*-HEP) (1990–1993), Democracy Party (*Demokrasi Partisi*-DEP) (1993–1994), People's Democracy Party (*Halkın Demokrasi Partisi*-HADEP) (1994–2003**)**, and Democratic Society Party (*Demokratik Toplum Partisi*-DTP) (2005 to the present). The members of this last group, too, could not be said to have reached significant numbers.

The PKK adopted an ethnic-nationalist stance and accused the Republican state of acting like a 'colonial power' towards its Kurds. What is, of course, significant for the purpose of this essay is that many of those who participated in the PKK activities or only provided material support to it seemed to have acted out of *fear* and not out of *sympathy* for that 'party'. Earlier, too, an ethnic-nationalistic disposition had not motivated Kurdish moves against the state. Until the 1960s, Kurdish initiatives towards the state were led by local shaikhs and aghas who wished no more than maintaining their autonomy from that state. Then, from the 1960s onwards, Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals and youth alike acted in unison and pursued a leftist action plan. This project came to an end as a consequence of both its inability to formulate realistic policies and its repression by the state, particularly in the wake of the 1971 and 1980 military interventions. Thereupon, the 'younger, inexperienced, resentful, and adventurist rural cadres' came upon the scene and started an armed struggle against the government forces,[31] a development which is taken up at length in Chapter Seven.

Here, suffice it to suggest that while the Kurdish aghas and shaikhs had popular support basically among their own tribes and, in times of troubles, among some other tribes, too, Kurdish intellectuals and their followers among the Kurdish youth had the support of a fewer number of Kurds. The PKK itself has had even less support among the Kurds. When in the early months of its terror the PKK had distributed proclamations and declared itself the Kurdistan Liberation Front (1984), local people denounced its militants to the authorities. For the PKK had forced families to send their young men to join its ranks or else face harsh reprisals. It started to attack villages in 1987 when some local people were enrolled as government-paid village guards. For instance, between 1987 and 1991, the PKK fell on 33 villages and killed 36 people, which included 16 children and eight women. It was a clear indication that the PKK was losing support among the people who, it had thought, would have readily lent their support to the 'cause'.[32] In 1989, no other than the separatist leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, complained about the lack of support for the 'party' among the local people: 'When we

look at the experience of other countries, we see that they started with 300 guerillas. Within two years, their number rose to 10,000. We also started with 300, but we are still only 1,500.'[33]

All in all, as it was the case in the Ottoman Empire, in the Turkish Republic, too, even during the 'times of troubles' (1925–1938 and 1984–1999), the Turks and Kurds managed to live together in the same country and did so without serious conflict. After all, to the bulk of both groups of people ethnic nationalism continued to be an alien idea. This, in turn, was no doubt a consequence of the initial 'live and let live attitude' on the part of the Ottoman and Republican states and, later, their mutual acculturation.

Consequently, on the eve of the foundation of the Republic of Turkey and during the later decades, Kurds decided to share their destiny with that of the Turks. Following the First World War, for a while central government in Turkey was either non-existent (1919–1920) or rather ineffective (1920–1921). Furthermore, this was a period when nationalist feelings were widespread among some Kurdish intellectual elite, both in Istanbul and in the Kurdish regions. It has been argued that during those years, if they so wished they could obtain foreign recognition and support for a unified Kurdish movement aiming at statehood. However, Kurds did not pursue such a policy; instead, they chose to take their sides with Atatürk and his associates.[34]

Can one take exception to this view and argue that at the time the Kurds sided with the Turks because of their concern that an independent Armenia would have posed a serious threat to them? Here it should be pointed out that one observed Kurds not taking advantage of the Turks' momentary weakness in the aftermath of the Second World War, too, when Turkey for a while stood alone against the Red Armies, which were deployed on Turkey's eastern (Circassian) and western (Bulgarian) borders and the Soviet Union threatened Turkey with the prospect of an independent Kurdistan. Again the Kurds did not lift a finger.[35]

In fact, in normal times, the Kurds' sympathy towards the Turks went so far as displaying a genuine willingness to be integrated with the latter. On the eve of the start of the Turks' struggle for their independence, the Sultan's government in Istanbul had arranged the signing of a fatwa by some *müftü*s (Muslim doctors of law) sympathetic to that government; the fatwa questioned the legitimacy of the efforts of Atatürk and his associates to start a resistance movement and prevent the partition of the bulk of Anatolia and the Thrace among the Allied Powers from taking place. When Atatürk and his associates arranged a counter fatwa, the Kurdish *müftü*s in such eastern or southeastern cities or towns as Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Doğu Bayezıt, Hınıs, Silva, Siverek, Urfa, Van, and Viranşehir joined Turkish *müftü*s in signing the counter fatwa.[36] During the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922), at some point the Turkish forces were obliged to withdraw to the lines not far from the capital city of Ankara. At the time, it was suggested in Parliament

that it might be necessary to move that body from Ankara to Kayseri, a city farther to the east. Thereupon, a Kurdish MP, Diyop Agha from Dersim, tersely posed the following question: 'Gentlemen: did we come here to fight and die or leave this place and escape?'[37]

Following the war, when the Turkish Delegation was about to leave for the Lausanne Peace Conference where the future status of Turkey was to be agreed upon between that country and the Allied powers, several Kurdish MPs mentioned to the members of the Delegation of 'the close ties that existed between the Kurds and the Turks' and asked them to keep that fact in mind during the negotiations in Lausanne. What follows are some examples of the views along those lines expressed in Parliament: 'We [Kurds and Turks] are no different from each other. … We have no conflict among ourselves. We have neither a Turkish nor a Kurdish problem. We are all brothers' (Diyop Agha, cited above); 'If you can lay bare the true sentiments of the Kurds and the Turks, you would see that they have the same vision for the future of this country. In fact, during the course of several centuries, the Turks and the Kurds became so mingled together that our nation that … [the Allies] are trying to tear apart, constitutes one single entity' (Necati Bey from Erzurum whose mother was a Kurd); 'In the invitation to the Conference, there is the term "non-Turks". I am a Kurd. … I beg our delegates to tell everybody that that the Turk and the Kurd together constitute one single nation. I ask our delegates to reject such a reference to the Kurds in the strongest terms possible' (Kurd Necib Bey from Mardin); 'In the struggle against the enemy, up until the last moment, both the Kurds and the Turks continued to shed their blood and, thus, there is no room for such a term as "minority" [in the Treaty to be drawn up in Lausanne]' (Kurd Hakkı Bey from Van).[38]

Also, during the Lausanne Peace Conference, some Kurdish notables back in Turkey publicly let it be known that they were happy to live among the Turks.[39] In the wake of the 1925 Kurdish revolt,[40] Parliament enacted a special law establishing two extraordinary 'Tribunals of Independence' with powers to impose capital punishment in disloyalty cases;[41] the law was passed by 122 votes to 22 with 37 MPs from Kurdish provinces voting with the government.[42]

It was also a fact that whenever Kurds could manage to hold some land for themselves in the southeast, which were thus not controlled by local notables, they wished to live under the rule of the central government. For in such circumstances, schools were opened and several Kurds learned Turkish. The Kurds who attended such schools were taught only in Turkish, which they later on used in their public and professional lives. In contrast, whenever Kurds were obliged to live under the authority of aghas and shaikhs, with the latter controlling all the land, schools could not be opened and Kurdish remained the dominant language.[43] The bulk of the Kurds preferred the first option, because they knew that their future depended on their functional competence in the official language of the Republic. For instance, in

Diyarbakır the library and the reading room that held books and other reading material in Turkish were heavily used.[44] Some Kurdish men also learned Turkish in the army or improved their Turkish there.[45]

In addition to attaining capability in a common language, Kurds' large scale migration to cities outside of the southeast and thus their getting mingled with Turks in large numbers also helped the former's integration with the latter. The fact that the two people are indistinguishable in their outlook as well as in their religious practices also helped Kurds' integration into the mainstream society. It has been estimated that by the end of the twentieth century there were about one million mixed families in Turkey and that at least one-fourth of the deputies elected to Parliament since 1923 have been of Kurdish origin.[46] This situation might have been an additional reason for the practice in Turkey that unless a person declared his/her being a Kurd publicly and demanded political rights for the Kurds, the state has not made an issue of Kurdishness.[47]

Following the Second World War when the Turks made a transition to multi-party politics, Kurds took an even more active part in politics. As politicians, they could defend regional, if not avowedly ethnic, interests. In the 1950s, local civil service posts in the provinces where Kurds made up a significant portion of the population, were staffed by the local people rather than by the civil servants sent from the capital. Since the founding of the Republic, Kurds served as deputies in Parliament, ministers in the Cabinet, mayors in municipalities, and as state prosecutors, and directors of large companies.[48] Concerning this phenomenon Hotham has summarized the situation as follows: 'Many Kurds in Turkey (though their ethnic origins is never publicly referred to) have reached high positions in the Turkish state, and enriched many walks of life, in the same sort of way it seems to me, as Scotsmen, Welshmen, or Irishmen, have done in Britain.'[49]

Consequently, the efforts of the state to prevent the communalization of the conflict during the times of troubles from taking place have been successful. This was achieved basically by separating conceptually the rebels of the 1920s and the 1930s and the PKK of the 1980s and the 1990s from the other Kurdish issues.[50] As a result, barring some exceptional cases, throughout the Republican period, even at the height of the periods of troubles, there has never been a generalized and lingering hostility between the Turks and the Kurds.

The State and the Kurds – views and policies

The Idea of granting autonomy to the Kurds

During the early stages of the Turkish War of Independence, Atatürk toyed with the idea of granting autonomy to the Kurds once that national struggle was brought to a successful end. In a telegram he sent to the Deputy Commander of the 13th Army Corps, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, and other

high-ranking officers in the southeast, Atatürk had made his view on this issue clear: 'I am in favour of granting all manner of rights and privileges in order to ensure the attachment to the state and the prosperity and progress of our Kurdish brothers, on the condition that the Ottoman state is not split up.'[51] In June 1920, Atatürk also sent the following note to Nihat Anılmış Pasha, commander of the southern front: 'In the areas inhabited by Kurds, we consider it a necessity to set up gradually a local government. … It is expected that the Kurds by that time would have completed the setting up of their local government. … The general lines of … [our] policy concerning local government include … win [ning] for us the hearts of the Kurds and [fortifying] the links that bind Kurdish leaders to us, by appointing them to civil and military positions.[52] These statements by Atatürk were followed by the enactment of the Republican Turkey's first Constitution (20 January 1921), which stipulated that provinces were autonomous in their local affairs (Article 11).

It is significant for the purpose of this essay that the state continued to pursue similar policies and was not diverted from its path even by a minor (Koçgiri) rebellion Kurds staged in April 1921. In February 1922, Parliament ('the Grand National Assembly') decided to establish autonomous administrations in those provinces where large numbers of Kurds lived; it was also agreed that the administrations in question were going to be designed 'in harmony with the Kurds' customs'.[53] Among others things, a Kurdish Assembly was to be elected by universal suffrage; the primary duty of which was to be that of founding a university. In the event, this autonomy plan could not be put into effect because of the chaos the eastern and south-eastern Anatolia faced in the subsequent months.[54]

Were Atatürk and his associates just trying to save the day and as soon as a pretext presented itself, did they then take that opportunity and change their minds? This does not seem to be the case. First, the policies adopted with a view to the Kurds and other Muslim groups were on the whole a continuation of the policies adopted in Ottoman times. Both Namık Kemal's ideas on nationalism and Ziya Gökalp's emphasis on culture as a crucial dimension of nationalism were not lost on Atatürk.[55] In both Namık Kemal's and Ziya Gökalp's versions of nationalism, there was a genuine concern for the Muslim 'other'. In a parallel manner, as noted above, for the Kurds, too, Islam was an important aspect of their identity.

Secondly, Atatürk had come into close contact with the Kurds when he was dispatched to the command of an army corps in Diyarbakır in March 1916. Then, at the start of the struggle for independence, he had written letters to those Kurds and requested that they keep him up to date concerning the developments in their areas and contribute to the efforts to save the country.[56] During this second phase of his contacts with Kurds, Atatürk had developed friendships with some Kurdish notables in the region. In May 1919, Atatürk had spoken of his intention to visit his 'old friends' in

Diyarbakır.[57] One may argue that by that time, Atatürk had known Kurds well and developed sympathy for and trust in them.

Thirdly, from the start of the struggle for national independence in 1919 until around the year 1922, Islam did play an important role to bind people together in Anatolia. It should be remembered that in their efforts to mobilize people behind them, both the Sultan in Istanbul and Atatürk and his associates in Anatolia had made efforts to obtain religious decrees in their favour.

Consequently, the founders of the Republic were to subscribe to cultural nationalism, with Islam being regarded as the major source of the ideals, values, and attitudes commonly shared by different communities that professed that religion. Article One of the National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*) drawn up in 20 January 1920, had the phrase 'Ottoman-Turkish' nation, instead of just 'Turkish nation'; at the time, the term 'nation' was still denoted a community of believers. On 20 April 1920, several Islamic rituals accompanied the opening of the Parliament in Ankara. That body had its first meeting right after the Friday prayers. On 1 May 1920, Atatürk addressed Parliament as follows: 'The gentlemen making up your august Assembly are not only Turks, or Circassians, or Kurds, They are a sincere gathering of all Islamic elements and that they are held together by a powerful bond.'[58]

Also, Atatürk and others often referred to the 'nation of Turkey' ('*Türkiye milleti*'); that phrase on the one hand implicitly invoked national identity and, on the other hand, constituted an umbrella concept for all the Islamic groups in Turkey. On 18 June 1922, along the same lines, Atatürk employed the phrase 'people of Turkey' (*Türkiye halkı*). In November 1922, the text of the decision abolishing the Sultanate, too, included the latter term.[59] Furthermore, the text of the new state's National Anthem, penned during that period, contained strongly-worded religious themes.[60] In recognition of his military victories that played a crucial role in saving the country from the enemy, Atatürk himself was conferred by Parliament the title of *Gazi*, or fighter for Islam.[61]

As the above accounts make it clear, there is ample evidence to substantiate the claim that the Atatürkist discourse on Islam, Kurds, and Turks was not an effort to save the day. Although he admitted that the Kurds constituted a distinct ethnic group, Atatürk did not think of adopting ethnic management strategies towards them. In his view, as compared to ethnicity, Islam was a much more important dimension of the identity of the Kurds, and, thus, Atatürk arrived at the conclusion that Islam could function as a strong tie between the Kurds and Turks. In a speech he made on 1 May 1920, Atatürk pointed out that '[in Turkey], there are Turks and Kurds. We do not separate them. … Nation is not made up of one element only. … Our interests are bound together. The unity we are trying to create is not only Turkish or Circassian. It is a mixture of one Muslim element.'[62] In a speech in Parliament, too, he dwelt on the same theme: 'As long as there are fine

people with honour and respect, Turks and Kurds will continue to live together as brothers around the institution of Caliphate, and an unshakeable iron tower will be raised against their internal and external enemies.'[63] Atatürk and his associates seriously thought of granting autonomy to the Kurds and, in fact, they took some important steps in the way the 1921 Constitution was written to realize that goal.

Meanwhile, some Kurds began to act in a hostile manner towards the Turks. The year Parliament passed some laws to grant a certain degree of autonomy to the Kurds, Nihat Pasha, who, it must be remembered, was at the time the commander of the southern front, reported in Parliament how some Kurds were displaying their enmity towards officers in the southeast: 'In Diyarbakır, in such public places as coffeehouses and reading rooms the local people are saying to officers, "What business do you still have here?", "When will you pack up and go away?"'[64]

However, on 16 January 1923, at a press conference in the city of Bursa in northwestern Turkey, Atatürk was still talking of granting local autonomy to Kurds, although now only in those provinces where the Kurds were in the majority. Having observed the increased inter-mingling of Turks and Kurds, Atatürk had now come to the conclusion that granting autonomy to the Kurds in all provinces that they lived would not have been feasible.[65] He pointed out that, 'Within the national boundaries of Turkey, many Kurds live. However, they are settled in such a way that they are in the majority only in a few places. As Kurds have spread out from the places where they had lived before and started to live among Turks, a situation had arisen such that if one wanted to draw a boundary around some places where Kurds also lived, that would have led to the disintegration of Turkey. This was because if such a policy is adopted the boundary in the west would need to go as far as not only Erzurum, not even as far as Erzincan, but as far as Sivas or Harput. One sees Kurdish tribes even in the plains of Konya. According to the 1921 Constitution, if a certain area was designated as Kurdish, the state would have been obliged to grant autonomy to the Kurds living in that area. However, such an arrangement no longer made sense.'[66]

This change of heart on the part of Atatürk, of course, did not imply a lessening of sympathies towards the Kurds. For example, when in August 1924 a Kurdish delegation put forward some claims in respect to local autonomy, the state did not come up with reprisals.[67] This pro-Kurdish policy came to an end only as a consequence of some further disruptions in the southeast and because of the newly arisen non-cooperative attitude of some Kurdish chieftains and shaikhs, who had earlier co-operated with the government.[68] In later years, on this very matter former prime minister Melen narrated what İnönü had told him as follows: 'Atatürk *had* plans to grant the Kurds extensive local autonomy. However, when the British, in order to pressure the Republic, incited Kurds to revolt, Atatürk changed his mind and gave orders to suppress the Kurds.'[69]

It has also been plausibly suggested it was at this time that Atatürk had come to the conclusion that the Kurds with their particular social and administrative traditions constituted an obstacle to his Westernizing project. Indeed, it was in 1922 that the Minister of Interior Affairs for the first time in the Republican era had talked publicly of the need to bring the Kurds to a higher level of 'civilization'.[70] Atatürk, who earlier had used the term 'Kurd' as one of the Ottoman-Muslim elements, too, gradually left that discourse. On 1 March 1923, for the first time, he talked about 'Turkish nation'. From 29 October 1923, the day Turkish Republic was proclaimed, onwards he also stopped using the phrase, 'People of Turkey'. That same year, in a speech he made in Diyarbakır, when he started to talk about different categories of people in the country he did not refer to them by their ethnic origin. Instead, he grouped them by the cities they came from.[71]

In a parallel manner, it was at this time that in the southeast Turks rather than Kurds began to be appointed to practically all senior and to a fair number of the junior posts in the civil service; increasingly Turkish names replaced Kurdish names; and Kurds serving in the army began to complain of ill-treatment and abuse. By March 1924, the state insisted on the sole use of Turkish in the law courts and schools. During the deliberations on the 1924 Constitution, no longer the issue of local government was brought up; rather, it was pointed out that such an administrative restructuring in a 'backward region' would have stood in the way of building a modern nation.[72] The ditching of the local government project, which at first sight may be labeled as an example of 'Turkification', was *not* informed by ethnic nationalism; Ankara followed such a policy as a consequence of the deep disappointment it had begun to feel towards the Kurds.

As noted earlier, Atatürk had developed close relations with some Kurdish notables from 1916 onwards. That did not prevent him from taking strong measures towards the Kurds when he came to the conclusion that his major aim of enabling Turkey 'to catch up with the contemporary civilization and even surpass it' began to dictate it. Not unlike Mears and Jackh, Atatürk and his associates must have thought that the Kurds badly lacked modern socio-economic capabilities. In fact, as early as 1914, Atatürk had bluntly noted in his diary that the Kurds were 'poor and backward'.[73]

This particular conception about the southeast was, of course, nothing new. Given the characteristics of the southeast both in Ottoman times and in the early Republican period and the 'leave us alone' attitude on the parts of the Kurds, Atatürks' thinking along the same lines should not come as a surprise. Yet, as in the Ottoman times, during the Republican period, too, the state kept its distance from ethnically informed policies. The reason was that while the non-Muslim elements of the empire had led lives isolated from the rest of the population and later chosen the strategy of exit rather than one of staying and coming up with ethnic demands, the Muslims

elements that stayed, did not emphasize their ethnic identities at the expense of their joint Muslim identities, and were to a great extent integrated among themselves.

Concerning the Republican period, there was a second reason why the state stayed away from ethnically informed policies. The state prioritized trying to create a nation out of the primary ethnic group (the Turks) rather than being engaged in efforts to assimilate other Muslim ethnic groups into that primary ethnic group. The assimilation of the latter groups into the former group could not be on the cards, because all of the Muslim ethnic groups, in particular Bosnians, Circassians, and Lazes, were regarded as adequately integrated with the Turks. The least integrated were the Kurds. However, this was basically because at least in the the early Republican period the Kurds were geographically the most segrated group and not because of ethnic reason.

On the other hand, as it has been demonstrated above in this Chapter, while the Kurds had adopted 'a leave us alone' attitude towards the Turks, Turks certainly did not have a hostile attitude towards the Kurds and, in fact, felt a certain degree of sympathy for them. This was another reason why the state did not think of assimilating the Kurds. Instead, the state endeavoured to bring about further integration of the Kurds with the other elements, in particular with the Turks. The Republic had inherited from the Empire the policy of holding people together without necessarily rendering different same. It is now in order to take up, at some length, the Republican version of this well-established policy in Turkey.

From cultural nationalism to civic nationalism

In the Ottoman Empire, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, the state-Kurd relations were not close; however, for the most part, those relations were not conflictual either. It is true that in the nineteenth century, some Kurds were engaged in disloyal acts; yet, their goal was not that of setting up an independent state. In fact, during that century and the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Kurds increasingly came to occupy important posts in the state hierarchy. And, during the Turkish War of Independence, the Turks and Kurds cooperated in saving their common homeland from the enemy.

It was with the Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920), which the Sultan's government was forced to sign and Atatürk and his co-nationalists rejected, that for the first time the idea of an 'independent Kurdish state' had come to the political agenda. However, the Treaty did not specify the boundaries of this new state, and the setting up of that state was made conditional both on its acceptance by the Kurdish people (by plebiscite) and the decisions of the Treaty signatories about 'the Kurds' preparedness for independence'.[74] It is true that following the signing of the Treaty, some Kurds staged two, albeit minor, rebellions against the state (Koçgiri rebellion in 1921 and Beytusebab

rebellion in 1924); however, neither of those rebellions had the goal of obtaining independence for the Kurds.

Not unexpectedly, Atatürk and his associates did not accept the proposition for an independent Kurdish state. They were determined to save and keep the homeland intact, which would have also included the Kurds. Atatürk defined the goal behind the formation of the Association for the Defence of the National Rights of the Eastern Provinces in the wake of the start of invasion of Turkey in 1919, as that of 'defending … the historical and national rights of the Muslim population of these provinces.'[75] Consequently, there were efforts to pool the resources of all Muslim elements of the country for the impending national struggle. As constituting one of the Muslim elements that together made up the nation, the Kurds, too, were expected to take part in that struggle.

Between May 1919 and April 1920, Atatürk sent twenty telegrams to the Deputy Commander of the 13th Army Corps in Diyarbakır, concerning a conflict that had arisen between a Kurdish Club and Turks in that city. In one of those telegrams, Atatürk pointed out that 'allowing the external enemy to make use of the problems which should be settled within the family … would constitute the greatest treachery'.[76] In another telegram, he let it be known that 'Kurds and Turks are true brothers [*öz kardeş*, i.e., children of the same family] and cannot be separated'.[77] In the proclamations made at the Erzurum Congress (July 23–7 August 1919) and Sivas Congress (4–11 September 1919), too, both of which were convened for the political mobilization of the people for the national struggle ahead, the idea of 'true brothers' were repeatedly emphasized. At the same time, that the 'true brothers' had also distinct identities was also admitted. In April 1920, Atatürk declared that 'around each Islamic element living within … [the] homeland's borders, there … [was] a recognition and mutual acceptance in all honesty to their race, tradition, and environment'.[78]

Both in the early Republic as well as later, Atatürk's inclination to regard Kurds as brothers was shared by other statesmen, too, even though towards the proclamation of the secular Republic (29 October 1923), the nationalism began to lose its Islamic flavor. During the negotiations of the Lausanne Peace Treaty (signed on 24 July 1924), the head of the Turkish Delegation, İsmet İnönü, argued that the Kurds were no different from the Turks. Although they had a different language, descent, belief, and customs, the Kurds had become one and the same with the Turks. At the Conference, İnönü also pointed out that because of this reason granting minority status to them would not make sense.[79] As far as Atatürk and his associates were concerned, the concept of minority denoted those groups that did not have an inclination to internalize the ideals, values and attitudes cherished by the primary ethnic group (the Turks). With the same logic, at the Conference İnönü defended the view that the bulk of the population of Mosul was Kurdish. The Kurds had nothing in common with the Arabs and naturally

wished to be united with their 'brothers in Anatolia'. Mosul, therefore, had to belong to Turkey.[80]

Celal Bayar, who served as Minister of Economy (1921–1924 and 1932–1937), and Minister of Reconstruction and Resettlement (1924), Prime Minister (1937–1938), and President of the Republic (1950–1960), stated in April 1946 that he and other statesmen subscribed to a notion of nationalism that was based on the view that among the citizens of the country there were strong ties that derived from shared culture and ideals, that those shared culture and ideals in turn were products of a common history. Bayar added that as such their nationalism rejected making discrimination among the people.[81]

More than two decades later, Turgut Özal, who was Prime Minister from 1983 until1989 and President of the Republic between 1989 and 1993, took Islam as the strongest bond among the people in Turkey. According to him, it was possible to overcome ethnic differences by resort to Islam. After all, Özal argued, in Ottoman times, being a Turk meant being a Muslim. In one of his visits to the southeast, he repeated to the people there the Maide Verse, 103, in the Qur'an, which stipulated that the 'Muslims should together hold on to Allah's rope'.[82]

Alparslan Türkeş, who was the founder of the Nationalist Action Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP) and led that party from 1969 until he died in 1997, too, perceived at least in his later years a close affinity between being a Turk and being a Muslim, by referring to Islam as an important dimension of Turkish national heritage.[83] The MHP took Islam as a surrogate identity for Turkishness.[84] The party's position on this issue was that a Turkish-Islamic synthesis, or an 'Anatolian Islam', could provide a historic solution for the seemingly incompatible claims over national identity.[85] The Anatolian Islam that the MHP talked about was an Islam that different Muslim ethnic groups could live with;[86] it was, therefore, a particular version of Islam around which all ethnic groups could unify.[87]

The fact was that, the designation of secularism, as one of the important premises on which the Republic was founded, led the founders of that Republic to supplement Islam-based cultural nationalism with civic nationalism. For a while, cultural nationalism was *supplemented* but not *replaced* by civic nationalism, because in the perception of both the state elite and the people and, therefore, in praxis, Islam continued to constitute an important dimension of Turkish identity. Islam was regarded as helping people to become a genuine Turk, a desiratum increasingly spelled out by the agents of the state. It was important for the population to be made up of genuine Turks, because it was only they who really cared for the salvation and welfare of the country.

On the whole, this particular criterion of being the real owner of the country did not work against the Kurds and other Muslim elements, but it hurt the non-Muslims who could never transform from a (constitutional) citizen,

to being a real owner of the country. On the other hand, at least at the level of discourse though not necessarily that of praxis, the statements that amounted to civic nationalism became widespread and, as time went by, civic nationalism relegated cultural nationalism to the sidelines in the Kurd-related policies of the state.

One example here is the manner in which the views of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) evolved over the years. Initially, the MHP had subscribed to ethnic nationalism; in the 1960s, its leader Türkeş for a while claimed that those who had a different accent could not be considered a Turk.[88] In time, Türkeş thought that only those people who have similar ideals and aspirations made up a nation; he now was of the opinion that the Turks and the Kurds had a common culture and that they were among those elements that together constituted a homogenous nation.[89]

Consequently, the nationalism of the MHP gradually drifted towards cultural nationalism. The party attributed significance to common culture and history as makers of nation. A party report on cultural issues suggested that 'the disparate ethnic groups that comprise the Turkish nation came together through a historic compromise'.[90]

Later, on the part of the MHP there was a switch to civic nationalism. There emerged a consistent praise on patriotism as the ultimate value and a call was made for self-sacrifice for the well-being of the motherland. One also came across an emphasis on idealism in the sense of serving one's nation for enhancing its security and well-being.[91] The 2000 Programme of the party defined nation as a social entity the members of which would have a will to live together and think that they share a common destiny.[92]

As noted above, in his April 1946 statement, Celal Bayar had come up with a cultural nationalist discourse. Yet, in the same statement he also made remarks that had a civic nationalist tinge to them: 'We conceive all of our citizens as Turks, irrespective of their religions and race [read, 'ethnic identity']. In our view, all law-abiding persons are good citizens.'[93] In later years, too, Bayar emphasized civic nationalism. In one of his speeches, he made a general statement concerning the issue: 'It is our political party view to regard all citizens who fulfill citizenship duties as good citizens.'[94] In his other speeches where he again placed stress on civic nationalism, Bayar implicitly made references to the Kurds: 'We regard our country as the homeland of a number of people. Easterners and Westerners, men from central Anatolia all have the same political rights. … Eastern provinces [too] have valiantly shed their blood in defence of their fatherland';[95] 'I think, from time to time, in the minds of some people a doubt arises on the question of whether or not there is a difference between people residing in the eastern parts of this country and those residing in the western parts of the country? … We should stop thinking in that manner. For in our view, there is neither a West nor an East, rather there is one unified nation; governments should serve each member of that nation in an egalitarian manner.'[96]

Not unlike Celal Bayar, Süleyman Demirel, who was Prime Minister in 1965–1971, 1975–1977, 1979–1980, and 1991–1993, and President of the Republic in 1993–2000, too, emphasized civic nationalism. However, unlike Bayar, Demirel never made a reference to cultural nationalism. In fact, in one of his statements, Demirel, in passing and somewhat implicitly, indicated his opposition to cultural nationalism: 'Everybody who is proud of the flag on which there is star and crescent [the flag of Turkey] … everyone who is proud to belong to this nation, is a child of this country. Everybody, including the state, *will not seek any other condition*.'[97] On another occasion, Demirel expressed his opposition to cultural nationalism explicitly rather than implicitly: 'Atatürkist nationalism is to some extent tainted with chauvinism. … That nationalism, in actual fact, takes the Turk as the primary element of the nation.'[98]

In the statement in which he registered his opposition to cultural nationalism, Demirel also made clear that he regards the Kurds from the same perpective: 'There are people in this country who speak Kurdish. … They are also good citizens. [They] have proven their loyalty to the state; … they have displayed many fine examples of sacrifice for the country.'[99]

In 1987, Demirel made it publicly known that 'Turkey had to recognize its Kurdish reality'. For Demirel, the recognition of Kurdish reality did not mean regarding Kurdish ethnic identity as the primary identity of the citizens of Turkey with Kurdish origin. For Demirel, what he said was a call for the open recognition of the secondary identity on the part of the latter: 'It does not make sense to insist that someone is not Kurdish when, in fact, s/he *is* Kurdish.' For Demirel, the marker of citizenship was allegiance to the state. In the last analysis, to him the recognition of 'Kurdish reality' meant publicly expressing the need to attend to the needs of the socially excluded Kurds. In all his political life, Demirel pursued populist policies and he did so primarily because he cared for the people.[100]

Demirel's call for the recognition of Kurdish reality could not be informed by ethnic nationalism. Demirel subscribed to civic nationalism; he expressed this particular inclination on his part by calling for 'constitutional citizenship' ('*anayasal vatandaşlık*'). Demirel defined constitutional citizenship as the citizenship of those who felt allegiance to the Turkish state and regarded themselves as members of the Turkish nation.

Demirel's constitutional citizenship constituted a *political* approach in terms of which ethno-cultural differences would be recognized and accepted as normal state of affairs. In Demirel's view, everybody in Turkey was a 'first class citizen'; this appellation was another term Demirel used for those who subscribed to constitutional citizenship. As far as he was concerned, ethnicity was not a constitutive element in defining either the nation or the different communities that made up the nation. Demirel recognized and accepted the differences among different communities not by regarding them as an outcome of the secondary identities of those communities, but as a consequence

of basic rights and liberties that everybody as an individual or group enjoyed. As he put it, 'Everybody in Turkey is equal and all are first class citizens. The rights to study, protect, and develop one's mother tongue, one's own culture, history, folklore, and religious beliefs are ensured by basic rights and liberties that one enjoys.'[101]

Such views on Demirel's part were a reflection of his thinking that for several centuries, peoples in Anatolia had lived in peace and harmony. He talked of the city of Istanbul as a city where three monotheistic religions co-existed, where more than thousand churches, mosques, and synagogues stood side by side, and where the voice of the *müezzin* (he who calls Muslims to prayer) became mixed up with the bells of churches. He made an earnest appeal to the people for maintaining the brotherhood they had enjoyed for long years.[102]

In Özal's view, people in Turkey constituted an integrated whole. He pointed out that in Turkey there were no serious differences among the various elements making up the nation. Those various elements had fought together in the Dardanelles in the First World War and in Dumlupınar in the Turkish War of Independence. According to Özal, in any given place and time some people might be Kurd, some Laz, some Bosnian. Yet, everybody would say, s/he is a citizen of the Turkish Republic.[103]

Özal once pointed out that he did not know who his ancestors were and that he, too, might have some Kurdish blood flowing in his veins. On another occasion, he said: 'I found out that my mother was a Kurd from Malatya', and immediately added, 'So what?' He let it be known that he considers himself a Turk. Özal made reference to the multi-cultural nature of Anatolia, to its colourful mosaic structure, and he argued that the Circassian, Georgian, Laz and others feel that they are Turks. According to Özal, Atatürk had in mind a single-nation state; however, that state was not to be based on ethnic premises. He took Atatürk's statement – 'How happy is s/he who says s/he is a Turk' – as a proof of this. Not unlike Atatürk of the early 1920s, Özal, too, has argued that the population of Turkey is made up of different ethnic groups, but that those ethnic groups constitute one single nation.

Özal pointed that concerning this particular issue Turkey resembled the USA.[104] Here, he even came up with a novel idea: 'The name of the USA does not invoke an ethnic identity. Jews, Latinos, Muslims … [too] live there. If the name of Turkey had been "Anatolia" rather than Turkey, it would have been more appropriate. Then the Turks, Kurds and every other ethnic group could [comfortably] say, "I am Anatolian".'[105]All in all, in Özal's view, it would not have made sense to act in a discriminatory manner to some elements of the people because they were perceived as different. These views on his part placed Özal on the company of those who favoured civic nationalism.

On the other hand, Özal talked of Islam as a crucial bond among the Muslim population in Turkey. He argued that Islam is another name for union.[106] Here he seemed to take his place on the side of the cultural

nationalists. However, this is a moot point. After all, Özal argued that all citizens of Turkey have the same rights and freedoms, and he attributed that state of affairs to the fact that 'there were democracy and respect for human rights in Turkey'. He also made the point that in Turkey, the term 'Turk' refers to everybody, not only to those who came from the Central Asia. Here, not unlike Atatürk of the early 1920s, Özal took the term 'Turk' as a generic name, and not as an adjective. For, as mentioned, he drew attention to what Atatürk had said, 'How happy is s/he who *says* s/he is a Turk', and to what Atatürk had not said, 'How happy is s/he who *is* a Turk'. It may be suggested that as far as Özal was concerned, in Turkey Islam constituted a strong bond among a cross section of the population without pitting that particular group against other groups.[107]

Erdal İnönü (1926–), who is son of İsmet İnönü and a Professor of Physics, and who was Chairman of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) from 1986 until 1993 and deputy Prime Minister between 1991 and 1993, did not think that the southeast problem was a Kurdish problem, for he did not think that the Kurds in Turkey wanted to separate themselves from the Turks. In his view, irrespective of their ethnic origins the bulk of the people in Turkey did not attribute much significance to separatist propaganda. According to E. İnönü, the southeast problem was basically an upshot of the harsh treatment of Kurds by security forces, including the military. He also thought such treatment of the Kurds was partly caused by the PKK terror.

In E. Inönü's view, under the circumstances. the solution was no other than introducing more democracy in the region. 'The prohibition of talking, writing, and communicating in Kurdish brought about by the military regime of 1980–1983 was a crime against humanity', wrote E. İnönü.[108] He was of the opinion that such stern policies would not be adopted in a democratic polity. According to E. İnönü, since the Kurds had no intention of opting for an exit strategy,[109] one could both safeguard the unitary nature of the state as well as maintain democracy. On the eve of the 1991 general elections, he, as the leader of the SDPP, even formed an election coalition with a Kurdish group of politicians whose connections to the PKK was well known.[110] E. İnönü thought that under a democratic system of govenment, by exercising the basic rights and liberties granted to them, the Kurds could seek remedies to and compensation for the wrongs incurred to them in a peaceful manner.

E. İnönü, too, was for recognizing the secondary identities of the Kurds. He had a philosophical-humanitarian approach to life: 'It is a fact of life that people with different ethnic origins would have different world views. We should not let that situation work against some people. After all, nobody can decide where s/he is going to be born and which language s/he is going to speak. Also, barring some exceptional situations, people inherit their religion and sect, too, from one's family and from where one is born and where one lives. Consequently, some people's language and faith should not create

difficulties for them. In addition, we should not forget that one would come to know oneself and the whole world through the medium of one's mother tongue, which is, therefore, very precious for that person. One's mother tongue and one's childhood years lead one to adopt different cultural patterns. Everybody should have respect for such differences among peoples.'[111]

Such views and sentiments on the part of E. İnönü derived from his thinking that people in Turkey had diverse ethnic origins. According to him, different linguistic, ethnic, and sectarian groups that one comes across in Turkey are a sociological fact and it would be impossible to deny it. It would be a mistake to perceive differences among the people and the existence of various languages as obstacles to the territorial integrity of the country. He called on everybody to keep in mind that the very premise of the Republic was taken to be the shared political consciousness among the people who all owed loyalty to the same political entity.[112]

It has been noted above that the views of the Nationalistic Action Party towards nation evolved from ethnic nationalism to cultural nationalism and then to civic nationalism. Devlet Bahçeli, who became the leader of the party following the death of Türkeş (1997) and who himself served in 1999–2002 as Deputy Prime Minister, subscribed to civic nationalism ever since the days he had come to limelight (late 1990s). Bahçeli's nationalism is based on measured patriotism. He once opposed even the term 'nationalism' and preferred 'national', because, according to him, the former term might be used in an exclusionary manner, and thus might become a means of discrimination.[113]

Bahçeli's sympathy towards civic nationalism has become apparent from the following statement of his: 'It is not important which particular identity people in the southeast feel they belong to. What is important is that they should think that Turkey is indispensable for them.'[114] On another occasion, he showed his balanced approach towards primary and secondary identities: 'Every society evinces a mosaic of cultures though in different degrees. What is required is that those who feel that they belong to one of those cultures should also think of themselves as belonging to the larger collectivity and demonstrate loyalty to that collectivity.'[115]

Another leading political leader who adopted civic nationalism vis-à-vis the Kurds was Mesut Yılmaz who served as minister of state, culture and tourism, and foreign minister between 1983 and 1991, as prime minister between July 1991–November 1991, March 1996–June 1996, and July 1998 and November 1998, and as deputy prime minister in 1999–2002. For some time, Yılmaz was of the opinion that concerning the Kurdish issue an approach that prioritized democracy, freedoms, and cultural rights rather than the war against terror was a more appropriate strategy. In December 1999, he said: 'The state in Turkey lags behind the times. With a people alienated from its state and with a state that does not have a confidence in its people, Turkey cannot be a country befitting the modern times.'[116] Yılmaz

had no scruples concerning education in Kurdish. He thought that in general Kurds in Turkey wished to retain the language of their mothers and fathers while not toying with the idea of severing their ties from their country. He once observed: 'In this country nobody demands the addition of a second official language to the one s/he already has. If we wish to maintain the loyalty of the Kurds to the state, the Kurds should no longer be subjected to various proscriptions and they should not face innumerable obstacles in their daily lives.'[117]

Turkey's present President of the State, Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, too, are advocates of civic nationalism, and both recognize and, in fact, welcome the secondary identities of the Kurds. Sezer, who had been President in 2000–2007, once stated that the notion of Turkish nation has always been taken as the primary identity of the people in Turkey. He then pointed out that, 'Turkish state has no problems with secondary identities among people as long as no efforts are made to carry the latter identities unto the public space and challenge the indivisible nature of the unitary state. After all, in the view of the state secondary identities constitute the riches of our country. … According to our Constitution, nationalism in Turkey is based upon common fate, joy, despair, ideal, and a will to live together, not ethnic roots, language, religion and/or sect.'[118] In his 2006 New Year Message, too, Sezer has suggested that Turkey has a multi-cultural society: 'Turkey has a unitary state. The unity is provided in a multicultural society by the idea of national state. It is the most effective means of maintaining the co-existence … [of the different elements of the nation] while safeguarding diversities. Acknowledgement of every citizen as Turk does not mean rejection of additional identities. On the contrary, it ensures equality among citizens.'[119] In Sezer's view, the stipulation in the Constitution to the effect that sovereignty belongs to the Turkish nation without any conditions and qualifications is a reference to the nation as a whole, not to a majority.[120]

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister since March 2003, once declared: 'In this country, we have such ethnic elements as Kurds, Lazes, Circansians, Georgians, and Albanians. These are seconday identities. We have one single primary identity; that is the citizenship of Turkish Republic.'[121] Earlier he had said: 'I am from [the city of] Rize [in northeast of Turkey]. My wife comes from [the city of] Siirt [in the southeast]. We in Turkey have long been accustomed to such marriages. In Turkey, Kurd is married to Turk, Azeri to Georgian. They have all become like flesh and nail; you cannot separate them from each other'.[122] On another occasion, Erdoğan has argued that 'the values that tie people together in Turkey … have been entrusted to us by our ancestors. We have the same vision that our ancestors cherished. Those who think otherwise should turn their gaze towards Gallipoli (where, in the First World War, Turks had fought valiantly against the enemy and many had died there). … When they visit cemeteries where our dead from those battles have been buried and where the names of the towns inscribed

on the tombstones, they would come across vivid evidence for what I am trying to say'.[123]

Need for a new administratve–political philosopy

In the 1930s, Bayar thought there was a need to reverse the harsh policies towards the Kurds, which were adopted in the wake of the deep disappointment felt towards them from the early 1920s onwards. In Bayar's view, the state should have served the Kurds well and with affection. Consequently, in a report entitled 'Eastern Problem', which he had prepared in December 1936 when he was minister of economy, Bayar noted that the country had to revamp not only its administrative structure, but also the whole philosophy behind it. He pointed out that the army and gendermarie were certainly needed to grapple with the problem, but that they had to be supplemented by a capable and regularly functioning civil service. This was necessary because there was a need to bring services to the people and not be satisfied only with a policy of suppressing people by resorting to harsh disciplinary measures. A regularly functioning civil service would help people to think that they are not left to their own devices and that the state cared for them. Under such circumstances, the people in the east would feel that they were not perceived as an alien element in the social body and that they would think that they, too, constituted an integral element of the nation. With these thoughts in mind, Bayar also arrived at the conclusion that in addition to instituting a regularly functioning civil service there was a need to train civil servants on the economic and social needs of the region. Bayar had observed that the civil servants in the area were not knowledgeable concerning those issues.[124]

Bayar also noted that for the effective implementation of the above measures, there was a need to eliminate the hold of the local aghas and shaikhs on the people. While trying to serve the people well and with affection, the state was also under the obligation of freeing the people from the tyranny of the local notables in question. For only this reason, Bayar approved of forcefully moving the aghas and shaikhs in the southeast to other parts of the country. In his opinion, people in the region, too, would support such a policy. According to Bayar, the measures along those lines would have helped resolve the Kurdish question even in the city of Dersim, tradionally the worst hotbed of 'troubles'.[125]

While Bayar indicated that the state had not acted affectionally to the Kurds in a rather circumspect manner, Demirel was more outspoken and came up with strong criticisms of Turkey's past record on this issue. Demirel pointed out that 'wounds' were inflicted by the state on Turkey's Kurdish population during the single-party years of the Republican People's Party and by the military in the aftermath of the 1960 military intervention.[126] He even said, 'You should not act as an invading force [against the Kurds]',[127] implying in no uncertain terms that that was practically what

had been done. That he was against unlawful acts against the Kurds came out also in a conversation that had taken place between himself as President of the Republic and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. Demirel narrated that talk as follows: 'After having formed the government in 1993, one day Tansu Çiller came to me and said, "I shall deal with this terror by employing special forces". I told her that such forces would one day be an intractable problem for her. I said, "You cannot keep them under control. You would end up finding yourself in a rather awkward situation. This country cannot have two armies; you should solve this problem with the army that you have".'[128]

While Demirel was against unnecessarily harsh measures against the Kurds, he approved of taking a determined stand against the PKK terror. 'If they shoot your soldier or civil servant, you should immediately capture and punish them' he once said.[129] He did not support the idea of making compromises with the PKK before the terror came to an end and the guilty parties gave themselves up, for 'compromises made by the state could enable the terrorists to tell people in the region that terror did the trick and ask people to join them'.[130] He repeatedly stated that 'the state could not bargain with terrorists.'[131]

On the last issue of dealing with the PKK terror without making any compromises, Özal was no less determined than Demirel. Özal once stated: 'One cannot think of terror and the southeast problem as one and the same. I am for carrying out our struggle with terror to the bitter end. I reject giving in to any of the PKK demands. The Republic of Turkey is obliged to adopt all the measures necessary to bring the terror to an end.'[132] On the other hand, Özal suggested that while the state should deal with the terror with all the means at its disposal, it should also think of other options for resolving the issue once and all, including the political ones.

Consequently, Özal thought that the state should give serious thought to setting up in the region democratic local governments. He proposed that those local governments should be headed by elected officers, for officers brought to those posts through elections would be responsive to local needs and would make substantial contributions towards the resolution of the 'southeast problem'.[133] Along the same lines, Özal suggested that Turkey should debate the federation option, too, though he added that he was against it. Özal proposed that a debate on option would be useful, so that 'everybody would realize that it was not a feasible option'.[134] After having indicated that the state investments in the area were far above the tax revenues the state collected from that area, he asked, 'If a federative system is set up, who will channel funds to the region for such investments?'[135] Thus, according to Özal, in the event of establishing a federative system, not only would the life standards of those remaining in the southeast have gone down, but also those living in the western parts of Turkey would have been subjected to discriminatory behaviour.[136]

According E. İnönü, who was for the Republic to maintain its territorial integrity and national unity, not only was the unitary structure of the state needed to be maintained, but also Turkish as the official language of the state had to be retained. On the other hand, E. İnönü opposed the policy of having regional governors in the southeast with extraordinary powers, In his view, such an adminitrative arrangement would have made it difficult to have a democracy in the region with no strings attached.[137]

Contemporary civilization, education, and the Kurds

Bayar, not unlike Atatürk, was not interested in rendering Kurds Turks; like Atatürk, Bayar, too, was interested in upgrading the general cultural level of the Kurds. In one of his speeches in the city of Erzurum in eastern Turkey, he made an indirect reference to this problem: 'In the Middle Ages and later periods, your beautiful city was a rather prosperous and civilized place. … The monuments from those times are testament to this fact. It is our obligation to return [such] places [as Erzurum] to their historical grandeur.' In another speech of his, Bayar explicitly addressed the particular issue: 'Our foremost ideal is that of elevating our nation to the level of most developed and civilized countries. … [In the east, we need to build an educational complex], which should (comprise) all … levels of education … from primary schools to institutions of higher learning. I think we should immediately get on with this project and build cities of culture. What a felicitous act it would be to bring up enlightened youth in eastern provinces.'[138] On still another occasion, Bayar called for mobilizing Turkey's all available resources for an educational campaign and set up several schools in the east.[139] According to Bayar, it was incumbent upon the higher institutions of learning to equip the youth with high ideals. He pointed out that one of the last wishes of Ataürk was the starting of a university in the east.[140] During Bayar's Presidency (1950–1960), Atatürk University was opened in the city of Erzurum (1957).

Concerning the education to be provided for the Kurds, Bayar was of the opinion that, not unlike their inability to solve the socio-economic problems of the East, a point made above, the civil servants in the East did not have any inkling about what to do concerning the issue of education, either. Some of them were not even quite sure whether or not the Kurds were to be educated at all and/or recruited for government offices. Bayar proposed that civil servans on the ground should be provided with clear and positive guidelines on such matters.[141]

Demirel's perception of the relationship between nationalism and 'civilizing mission of the state' was somewhat unique. Ever the leader who had a genuine affection for the people as a whole, Demirel equated meeting the essential needs of the people with rendering them the members of the civilized world. According to Demirel, the civilizing mission of the state elite was an obligation that nationalism had imposed upon that elite: 'The

notions of nationalism and civilization are intertwined. … Taking water to the villagers in [the cities of] Urfa and Mardin [in the southeast] is nationalism. … Providing schools to the illiterate village of Köprü near Mount Ararat is nationalism. … Opening a university in that region is nationalism.'[142]

Demirel's constitutional citizenship did not entail granting special rights and benefits to any specific community. Not *rendering* everybody equal, but *perceiving* everybody equal in respect to both entitlements and obligations constituted the particular philosophy behind his constitutional citizenship. Demirel's motto was 'equality before law and benefiting equally from the general welfare of the country'.[143] He once pointed out that one should not pursue a policy of developing only the eastern provinces while neglecting to do the same vis-à-vis other parts of the country. For this reason Demirel was against the distribution of land in the southeast, even though the rationale behind that project was that of doing away with the traditional social structure there.

Here, too, Demirel rejected identifying the southeast problem as the outcome of ethno-nationalist policies and therefore its solution through ethnic management strategies. He argued that the relative lack of development in the southeastern and eastern provinces was not an inter-regional issue that pitted the interests of the people living in that region against the people living in the other regions of the country. According to Demirel, the underdevelopment of the region was the upshot of centuries-long neglect and the hardships caused by long years of war, invasion, and migration. Consequently, there was a need for multi-faceted and long-term measures and to respond to several economic and social problems of the region.[144] Demirel was unwilling to respond favourably to even the innocent needs and demands of the Kurds basically because they were articulated by the terrorist and separatist PKK.

As mentioned above, Özal was of the opinion that while the state was engaged in an armed struggle in the southeast, it should have also approached the issue in a more liberal manner and even resorted to some political means for this purpose. The latter strategy was anathema to the military; no other leading statesperson had even mentioned it. Özal did talk about it. He was also rather blunt in his criticism of the past praxis. Özal said it was a mistake to approach the Kurdish issue following the Turkish War of Independence with 'the strategy of harshly disciplining the Kurds'.[145]

According to Özal, the problem in the southeast was that the people there felt that they were left to their own devices, if not oppressed. He thus toyed with the idea of granting to Kurds not only cultural rights, but also group rights. As part of the first category of rights, he, for instance, came up with the idea that the local TV stations in the area should be allowed to broadcast in Kurdish, because 'that would show to the people there that they were regarded as an integral part of the nation'.[146] While Özal pointed out that Turkey should have only one official language, he thought that everybody

should be free to use his/her mother tongue in the public sphere. As part of the group rights, Özal argued that at public schools education in Kurdish should be offered.[147] In Özal's view, the solution for the southeastern problem depended upon granting the freedom of expression to and starting a dialogue with the people of the southeast.

As would have been expected, from the 1990s onwards, the state gradually expanded the scope of the cultural rights for Kurds, while it did not act as generously when it came to group rights. For instance, Kurds began to publish and broadcast in Kurdish in local TV stations and talk Kurdish in the public sphere without hindrance, but they were not allowed to receive education in Kurdish in public schools.

Socio-economic development of the southeast

Bayar considered the socio-economic development of the east as an absolute necessity. For instance, he drew attention to the necessity of bringing down Kurds from the fastnesses of the mountains around Dersim and giving them land in productive parts of the country or employing them as workers in factories in other parts of the country.[148] Bayar also sought ways and means of developing economically the east itself. For him, the economic isolation of the east was an important problem, for it condemned the east to a closed economic system. Thus, there was a need to improve transportation to and from the region; this needed to be complemented by the exploitation of the natural resources, increasing the density of the population, and improving meat industry.[149] Bayar pointed to plains suitable for starting cotton industry and places for sugar factories and butter and cheese workshops.[150] In order to achieve all this, the distribution of land to Kurds was imperative and it had to be complemented by providing loans, the means of production, and marketing opportunities as well as training the people in agriculture, animal husbandry, and trade.[151]

As already noted, Demirel was against policies specific to the southeast, yet he was aware of the fact that there was a need to develop that area economically for bringing the terror to an end. He thus initiated some grand projects from which both the people in the southeast and the people living in the adjacent regions could benefit. He gave priority to water resources and land development projects in the southeast as well as the east. They included the building of individual dams in the region and the south as well as starting an interconnected infrastructure and development project known as the Southeast Anatolian Project.

Özal was against the migration of Kurds to the western parts of the country, the result of which would have been that of the well-to-do settling in the west and the have-nots staying in the region.[152] In Özal's view, it was very difficult for the bulk of the people in the southeast to make the ends meet and under those circumstances those people would not be able to move to the west. Consequently, the state should have made it possible for the poor

people living there to migrate to the western parts of the country. Being an economist, he knew that investment in the southeast was economically very expensive due to the lack of adequate infrastructure; with the same amount of investment in the western parts of the country the return would have been been three times high. In addition, the small settlements would sooner or later be deserted and all the expenditures incurred in order to take electricity and water to such places and build roads would have gone down the drain. However, otherwise being pragmatic person, Özal figured that all that was worth it because it would make people happy there.[153] Özal wished the Kurds to see that he was acting towards them as their affectionate father. He wanted to help them, serve them, and nourish in them a genuine interest in the Republic. In the last analysis, Özal was an Ottoman, though in his own way.[154]

Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Action Party, has been one of those leaders who envisaged the southeastern problem essentially in socioeconomic terms. He once said: 'Right from the beginning, we have never considered the southeastern Anatolian problem as a Kurdish issue. We [the Nationalist Action Party] have taken the problem to be the consequence of the growing disparity in income levels. This state of affairs and the exploitation of that situation by some people have lingered on for a long period of time.'[155] However, Bahçeli also placed emphasis on some other dimensions of the problem at hand: 'When the Republic of Turkey was founded, the notion of "nation" was taken as an entity that bound people together. The most important element in the development of the Turkish national identity was people's being conscious of a common and honourable history and a common destiny as well as the difficulties endured together and the joy and pride experienced together. … What we underline are not the ties arising out of having the same blood or descent, but the ties deriving from being citizens of the same state. Our placing emphasis on Turkish citizenship and Turkish national identity does not lead us to deny the different ethnic origins, religions, and languages of some of our Turkish citizens. [On the other hand], the Turkish flag, our primary national symbol, is the common sanctum of all of our citizens.'[156]

The State and Kurds – praxis

The political leaders whose views on the Kurdish problem have been summarized above were the ones who were most vocal concerning that problem and, one might have argued, they occupied posts such that they could pursue policies in conformity with their views. Have they indeed had the opportunity to act as they thought fit in respect to the problem at hand? It is difficult to respond to this question in the affirmative. In Turkey, concerning some matters, politicians did not always have a free hand. One of those issues has been the Kurdish issue.

In 1991, during a visit of his to Diyarbakır, Süleyman Demirel bluntly noted that the military in Turkey had a veto power and it used that power on some matters. He added: 'In this country, it is difficult to pursue a policy not supported by the military.'[157] On that same trip, Demirel also stated: 'It seems the military decided to improve his views on the Kurdish question. This is a welcome development.'[158] Demirel's finding the change of heart on the part of the military as a welcome development shows that if such a change had not taken place, no improvements could have been made in the policies regarding the Kurdish problem.

That the policies formulated by politicians on Kurdish problem were not always approved by the military as well as the particular policies that the military effectively opposed, also, became apparent from a report prepared in 1992 by Adnan Kahveci, a close confidant of and advisor to Turgut Özal and an MP from Özal's Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*-ANAP). The report, which was penned upon Ozal's instructions, pointed out that, 'The military measures were not effective in succesfully dealing with ethnic questions; in fact, those measures turned out to be responsible for the eruption of a civil war. Not unexpectedly, Turkey's ethnic question, too, turned into a political crisis [because of the military's close inviolvement in the efforts to deal with that issue]. Consequently, we need to take some courageous measures, including the recognition of Kurdish reality, Kurdish identity, and Kurdish language, and granting to the Kurds their political rights'.[159]

In 1992, Mesut Yılmaz delineated at some length the then competing strategies formulated vis-à-vis the Kurdish problem and the one, according to him, the military preferred to pursue. At the time, he also narrated some cases of the military obliging the political leaders to alter their policies: 'Concerning the southeast problem, so far Turkey has adopted three different strategies. First strategy was that of denying the Kurdish identity and trying to suppress it by all the means available. One may call it the "Dersim rationale".[160] It may come as a surprise, but one still comes across people both in the civilian and military circles that cling on to that strategy. Second strategy is exactly the opposite of "Dersim strategy"; it prioritizes according of cultural rights and freedoms and co-opting the adversary through democracy and human rights. The third strategy is that of first putting an end to terror and then granting cultural rights Upon becoming Prime Minister, both Turgut Özal and I had adopted the second strategy of granting cultural rights and freedoms and co-opting the adversary through democracy and human rights, despite the fact that terror had continued. When one becomes prime minister in this country one opts for that particular strategy for dealing with the Kurdish problem. Demirel too had done the same thing.[161] However, after a while one realizes that it is not possible to insist on that strategy. This is because in such instances pressure comes from some conservatives among the civilians and, in particular, from the military. Those opposing the strategy in question perceive the southeast problem first

and foremost as a matter of national unity and, consequently, they do not trust civilians for the resolving of that [critical] problem.'[162]

The instances of the military having its own way in respect to the Kurdish issue go back to the 1930s. During that decade, Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of the General Staff, sent a circular to all military units to the effect that all decisions on such matters as road construction, electrification of certain areas, and starting of new factories could be implemented only after obtaining permission from his Office.[163]

In more recent decades, one came across similar phenomena particularly in the wake of the 1980 military intervention. Following that intervention, Ambassador Kamuran Gürün, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (number two person in the ministry after the minister), told the military interveners that it would be appropriate for the Ministry to come up with a white paper on the Kurdish issue. However, Gürün was told by officers he should leave the matter to the good hands of the military.[164]

In early 1989, Turkey signed the Final Document of the Conference for European Security and Co-operation (OSCE). The Document has rather liberal norms concerning cultural rights. The Foreign Ministry felt Turkey should make some amendments in its own legislation on such related matters as speaking and singing in Kurdish. The matter was taken up at a meeting of the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*-MGK). At the time, the members of that Council included chief of the general staff, commanders of the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie as well as another four-star general who acted as the Secretary-General of the MGK. The prohibition on talking and singing in Kurdish was lifted. However, the members of the military expressed concern about singing songs in Kurdish in the public realm, because 'it could give rise to ugly incidents', and they effectively prevented removing the ban on giving Kurdish names to newly born children.[165]

When Tansu Çiller became prime minister in 1993, initially she wished to solve the Kurdish issue herself and she at some point suggested that Turkey should perhaps adopt the Basque model. She was advised by the military that she better not concern herself with that problem and Çiller readily complied.[166]

The Kurdish question, in particular the PKK terror, has presented an existential threat to Turkey. The military has felt it is they who are most competent to deal with that threat and it is their constitutional responsibility to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of Turkey.[167] In October 1981, General Kenan Evren, Head of the State following the 1980 military intervention, emphasized the importance of preserving the 'integrity of the land and the nation'.[168] When during his presidency (1989–1993) Turgut Özal came up with the idea of starting a debate on the option of a federative system of government for the southeast, though with the specific purpose of rendering people aware of its unfeasibility, General Doğan Güreş, then Chief

of the General Staff, told him that it was not the right time for even its discussion, for 'it would have had adverse effects on the morale of the armed forces, police, and the people engaged in a [life and death] struggle against a despicable group'.[169] In 2005, General Hilmi Özkök, then Chief of the General Staff came up with a similar view: 'The singularity of the concept of nation is tried to be destroyed by some discussions … on the definition of nation. … The concept of nation is not a decomposing, but an integrating concept. Nation is one single entity, it cannot be considered as an entity consisting of disparate parts. If it is not perceived as such, each part would display a tendency to have one part of the country for itself. And this would pave the way to the disintegration of the country.'[170]

Having come to the conclusion that the country faced an existential threat to its national unity and territorial integrity because of the Kurdish problem and, furthermore, having lost many of its members in the armed struggle with the rebels/terrorists, the military on the ground tended to resort to harsh measures against those rebels/terrorists. In some instances those measures bordered on and, at times, turned out to be outright human rights violations. A report prepared by Parliament's Unsolved Political Killings Commissioned alleged many 'mystery killings'. In accordance with a controversial village evacuation policy, some villages were forcibly evacuated and often also razed to ground in order to prevent them from being used by the PKK for obtaining supplies. A village headman pointed out that villagers 'became slaves of the military during day time and the slaves of the PKK at night'.[171]

The thinking on the part of the military high command that the country continues to face an existential threat could have been the consequence of the reports that it received from the ground. For instance, the April 1979 Report of the Head of a Gendarmerie Supervisory Unit in the region read as follows: 'Separatism has become widespread in the southeast, particularly in the border areas. In such areas, it is no longer possible to employ two-strong military patrol teams. It has become a rather courageous act to enter a village and try to get hold of an accused person with a detachment of less than 20 gendarmes. … People in such areas increasingly behave towards our officers as if the latter were members of a colonial army.'[172] In June 1983, no other than Kenan Evren, who it should be remembered was chief of the general staff between 1978 and 1980 and the head of the military junta in June 1983, made the following observation: 'We went to the city of Hakkari by helicopters. Up until that point, I had not known how steep the mountains there really were. I now realize how difficult the struggle is with the brigands there.'[173] During both the rounds of major troubles (1925–1935 and 1984–1999) and sometimes even during normal times, the military seems to have regarded the Kurds involved in the rebellions as much more 'naughty' than civilians would have perceived them. In the 1930s, those persons presumed to have taken an active party in the rebellions were seen as 'enemy',

so much so that, at the time, rebels and the government forces were referred to as 'red units' and 'blue units', respectively.[174]

Consequently, during the military operations in the 1930s, an instruction sent to military units ordered the burning of villages and expropriation of animals if a whole village was involved in the shoot-out with the government forces and asked for the hot pursuit and annihilation ('*yok etmek*') of those who witdrew or ran away with their weapons. In a document that he penned on 18 September 1938, Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of the General Staff, has noted that he had asked for 'the chastisement (*tedib*) and extirpation (*tenkil*) of people in the villages of Aşkırık, Gürk, Dağbey, and Haryi, which had brought great harm to the economy and were primarily responsible for the absence of law and order in that region'.[175] Along the same lines, Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak had sent a circular to all military units to the effect that the most harsh measures were to be taken against the roving brigands, which were recently spotted in the southeast.[176]

Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak served as chief of the general staff for 22 years, from 1922 to 1944. During those years, both officers and officials sent to the southeast were given licence to suppress the Kurds so that they would not again rebel against the state. Consequently, Kurds were subjected to harsh and humiliating treatment, which in turn contributed to further unrest among the Kurds.[177] Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak also opposed educating the Kurds, saying, 'What schools are you talking about? We cannot deal effectively even with the ignorant ones, our job would be far more difficult with the educated ones'.[178] It was, therefore, not surprising that at the time, Dr. Nuri Dersimi, a Kurdish activist and one time member of the Association for the Progress of Kurds (*Kürt Teali Cemiyeti*) in Istanbul, complained to General Abdullah Alpdoğan, governor of Dersim (Tunceli), that when the Kurds say they are 'Turks' they are told that they are not 'Turks', they are Kurds, and when the Kurds say they are 'Kurds', they are hit hard and told that they are not Kurds, they are Turks.[179]

The military took a tough stance towards Kurds during the later decades, too. In the wake of the 1960 military intervention, General Cemal Gürsel who was co-opted to lead the intervention after it was launched, had played an important role in the formulation of a governmental decree for the surrender of arms by the people in the southeast; when compliance with this decree was less than satisfactory, 55 Kurdish leaders were deported to the western parts of Turkey.[180] That during the second round of 'troubles', the military acted harshly towards practically all Kurds in the southeast comes out quite clearly, for instance, in the memoirs of Erdal İnönü, who served as deputy prime minister in 1991–1993: 'I talked with my co-party members in the city of Hakkari and the town of Çukurca. They have requested that the innocent people should not be roughed up during search operations and interrogations.'[181]

However, on the whole, during the second round of troubles, the military high command have come to the conclusion the suppressive measures by

themselves were not adequate to resolve the Kurdish question, and that those measures should have been complemented by socio-economic ones. In 1984, General Kenan Evren, as President of the Republic, pointed out that the government should realize that the terror cannot be brought to an end only by police measures, and the needs of the region should be met at once.[182] In 1991, right after they had formed a coalition government, Demirel as Prime Minister and E. İnönü as Deputy Prime minister had made their first trips to the city of Diyarbakır upon the suggestion of General Doğan Güreş, Chief of the General Staff.[183] Three years later, General Güreş, still occupying the same position, made the following observations: 'When in March 1993 the PKK declared a "cease-fire", I was quite pleased … happy, although I did not show it. Now, there was some hope for the ending of hostilities for good. Were those on the mountains going to come down? Were we going to withdraw our forces and pass on to normal times? If those developments had materialized it would have been the responsibility of the government to adopt the appropriate measures, including the economic and social ones. … Yet, with the Bingöl massacre by the PKK, my joy came to an abrupt end.'[184]

In 1996, General Güreş started talking about rights and freedoms for the Kurds on top of the betterment of the social and economic conditions in the region: 'We should not identify all Kurds with terror. We cannot afford to grant collective [read, "group"] rights to them; however, we can accord individual rights and freedoms [read, "cultural rights"]. The military's struggle with the terror will continue. Yet, this is only one dimension of the problem. There are also the issues of freedoms, social reform, and the like. How we will be able to do both at the same time? This is the crux of the matter'[185]

In 2005, by his following remarks, General Hilmi Özkök, Chief of the General Staff, went one more step forward and took the Kurds as an ethnic group on a par with the Turks. He argued that 'Atatürk, with his well-known statement, "How happy is s/he who says I am a Turk", adopted a generic notion of being a Turk as the premise on which the Republic of Turkey was to rise. Consequently, it has been possible to integrate those religiously and ethnically different into the country. As a result, 'the Turks went a long way to create a Turkish nation that everybody [irrespective of his/her ethnicity or religion] has come to regard as his/her own.'[186] In 2006, General Yaşar Büyükanıt, present Chief the General Staff, echoed General Özkök's views: 'Turkey is not a republic based on race [read, "ethnicity"]. Our Constitution is premised on the idea of citizenship. Atatürk has made a well-known statement concerning this issue: "Those who set up the Republic of Turkey are referred to as Turks." Who founded Turkey? The Turk founded Turkey; the Arab founded Turkey; the Circassian founded Turkey; and the Greek founded Turkey'.[187]

Once Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had pointed out that it was not befitting great states not to keep in mind the past mistakes and, therefore, not

to draw lessons from them.[188] Presently, not only a great majority of civilian leaders but also several top military commanders in Turkey seem to have been acting in accordance with that maxim. In the past, the military opposed broadcasting in Kurdish. It then went along with the view that news in Kurdish can be broadcast with the proviso that the broadcast should be made on one of the state television channels and at given hours. Similarly, earlier, the military did not approve any kind of education in Kurdish. Later it looked with sympathy at special courses being offered to fourth and fifth-year students of primary schools following the regular class hours.[189]

7
Times of 'Troubles'

Not unlike the Ottoman state, the Republican state in Turkey, too, has regarded the Kurds as an integral part of the population and, in normal times, both of those states adopted friendly policies towards them. These states never expected the Kurds to revolt. On the eve of the Shaikh Said rebellion in 1925, initially Ankara did not pay much attention to the telegrams from the civil servants on the ground.[1] Consequently, when that rebellion eventually did erupt and quickly spread, Ankara was taken by surprise.[2]

At the start of the second round of troubles in 1984, the course of events did not turn out to be any different. On 16 August 1984, there was a news item in newspapers stating that in the southeastern towns of Eruh and Şemdinli, terrorist groups had staged separatist demonstrations, opening fire with automatic guns, killing one soldier and wounding six soldiers as well as a number of civilians, and then had escaped. That day, nobody paid any attention to this news item. Couple of days later, the Turkish News Agency circulated another news item on the events of 16 August to the effect that the terrorist group in Eruh was approximately 50-strong, six to seven of them were girls, they affixed posters on buildings, entered the local mosque and chanted some slogans via the loudspeakers of mosque, and opened fire with automatic guns at the gendarmerie station in the town.

It must have had now become clear that the Eruh incident was a pre-planned act carried out by trained militants. However, on 23 August, Prime Minister Turgut Özal stated that what transpired in Eruh was no more than a mere propaganda effort with the aim of inciting the government to take harsh measures against innocent citizens, and that he had asked the officials to be careful concerning such plans. On 15 September, the Martial Law Authority in the area disclosed that the culprits had been caught and legal action was to follow. At the time, for Ankara that announcement seems to have closed the case.[3]

On both occasions, when Ankara finally realized that the events in Eruh had, in fact, opened 'Pandora's Box', and pondered what the reasons were behind it, that those involved were separatists did not even cross its mind. As

far as Ankara was concerned, the basic reason behind the rebellion was religious reactionism, and foreign complicity, too, must have also played a role.

The measures taken to deal with the 'troubles' were chosen accordingly. In the last analysis, Ankara acted on the assumption that what it faced was not an ethnic uprising, but was a threat of a de-acculturation process on the part of the Kurds and, thus, that capital made efforts to prevent such a transformation from taking place so that Turkey's national unity and territorial integrity would be kept intact. Hugh Poulton has summarized succintly an important part of what is suggested here and elsewhere in this essay: 'Since Islam was seen as the most important aspect of cultural unity between the Kurds and Turks, the Kurdish insurrections … [have been] envisaged as no more than a "fratricidial … [conflict]" between the Kurds and Turks'.[4]

Ethnic factor?

It is true that the ethnic motive was not entirely absent in at least some Kurdish rebellions in the Republican period, although it did not constitute the deciding factor. Erik Zürcher has argued that there were both nationalist and religious factors behind the 1925 Shaikh Said rebellion. He has noted that officers belonging to the clandestine Kurdish nationalist *Azadi* (Freedom) Organization had become disenchanted with the government in Ankara, because the latter had not kept its promises of granting autonomy to the Kurds. Consequently, these officers played a key role in the 1925 rebellion. Zürcher has pointed out that there was also the religious factor; after all, a religious Shaikh had led the rebellion and the rebels demanded the reinstatement of the Shari'a and the Caliphate; the latter had been abolished the year before.[5]

The officers from the *Azadi* Organization *were* after setting up an independent state of Kurdistan. However, those officers did not have the support of the Kurdish masses. As a result, they needed the cooperation of influential shaikhs in the southeast in order to enlist mass support for their struggle against the state and, for this purpose, they approached some of the shaikhs in question. At that point, government authorities became suspicious and rounded up the Azadi officers. With the *Azadi* Organization thus crushed, the rebellion was organized and carried out by a network of shaikhs and tribal chieftains mainly from the area where the Zaza group was settled, and was led by Shaikh Said.[6]

According to those who take the present paradigm as given, all Kurdish rebellions had an ethnic motive behind them. If the initial stages of the Azadi episode are kept in mind and not how it eventually unfolded, it would not be inappropriate to regard that episode as supportive of those who make the claim just mentioned. Being aware of how that episode had transpired from its beginning to its end, however, Ankara could not come to the conclusion that it was the ethnic motive that led to that Kurdish rebellion. In

any case, neither the bulk of the population nor the majority of shaikhs and tribal chieftains supported the 1925 Kurdish rebellion. Among the Kurdish tribes, there had always been certain tribes ready to defect when faced with a superior force. Furthermore, in the course of the rebellions, as soon as the government forces seemed to have the upper hand, several tribes had changed side and supported the government forces. For the tribes, nothing seemed more important than their own factional interests.[7]

Besides the case of nationalist Azadi officers initiating one Kurdish rebellion (but then failing), there have been other developments, which might also have led those students of the Kurdish problem who take the present paradigm as granted to attribute an ethnic rationale to Kurdish rebellions. One obvious example here was the activities in the 1910s of the Association for the Progress of Kurds (*Kürt Teali Cemiyeti*) in Istanbul. This Association had called for Kurdish independence and the establishment of a Kurdish state. From 1918 onwards, a number of educated Kurds had joined this Association. The leader of the Association was Seyid Abdülkadir, a Kurd, who in the 1910s had been member of a number of Ottoman cabinets. Yet, Abdülkadir was 'fanaticaly religious'; he never lost the hope that the time would come and the last Ottoman Sultan Vahdettin would be brought back to throne.[8]

The Republican leaders did not attribute the rebellions to ethnic motives. İsmet İnönü, who played a key role throughout the first round of 'troubles' could not envisage a Kurdish rebellion arising out of an ethnic divide between the Turks and Kurds. On this issue he once made the following observation: 'We have to be careful while trying to figure out why the Shaikh Said revolt took place. During the [Turkish] War of Independence and the Lausanne Peace Conference, Kurds were on the whole on the side of the Turks and contributed to maintaining a unified government for the sake of safeguarding the territorial integrity of the country. We reciprocated by referring to us as "we Turks and Kurds"'.[9]

During that round of 'troubles', the Office of the Chief of the General Staff (OCGS) regarded the Shaikh Said rebellion as an attempt to bring about a counter revolution in secular Turkey. The OCGS had also a very low opinion of the Kurds. According to that Office, Kurds did not even have an inkling of what it means 'to be a human being'. Consequently, for the OCGS, it was out of question to indoctrinate them into any ideology, including nationalism.[10] These views entertained by the OCGS were not, of course, politically correct; however, as will be argued in this Chapter, they were not necessarily ethnically informed. It should also be kept in mind that at the time, if not later, the centre in Turkey has always had a condescending attitude towards the periphery as a whole; in the case of the Kurds, the centre's patronizing manner had been only more evident.

Here one may, of course, raise the following question: since the 1925 rebellion had lasted a relatively long time and one witnessed fierce fighting by

some Kurds, could it not have been a sign of ardent nationalism on the part of at least some Kurds, and if that indeed had been the case, how could İnönü and the OCGS fail to notice that particular motive on the part of the rebels in question? This would, of course, be a logical question to ask; however, the facts at hand do not support the implied argument. That the rebellion could not be suppressed more quickly was due to some rather unfavourable climatic conditions experienced at the time (February–April 1925). Moreover, railway lines and roads were either non-existent or were made impassable by winter snows, both making the troop movements difficult.[11] Moreover, as already noted, Ankara could not easily forget the Kurds' cooperation with the Turks in the recent national struggle and, thus, continued to have sympathy towards them. There were also several other factors why Ankara would not have perceived Kurdish rebellions as an outcome of ethnic motive. We have already briefly mentioned two such factors – those of religion and foreign complicity. It is now in order to discuss those factors, including the religion and foreign complicity, at some length.

Religious factor

Kurds and Islam

Islam had always been of great significance for the Kurds. As already mentioned, Kurdish leader Seyid Abdülkadir would have been prepared to live under the rule of the Turkish state as long as that state was an Islamic one. Following Atatürk's resignation from the Ottoman army and the start of the National Struggle in May 1919, Sultan Vahideddin in Istanbul had tried to put an end to Atatürk's efforts to enable Turkey to regain its independence by making use of the Kurds' loyalty to his throne; that loyalty had its roots in the latter's strong religious feelings. At the time, Sultan Vahideddin had sent orders to Ali Galip, Governor of the city of Malatya in eastern Anatolia, to mobilize Kurdish tribesmen and arrest the delegates to the Sivas Congress (4–11 September 1919) convened by Atatürk and his co-nationalists. This particular attempt of the Sultan's was frustrated by the nationalists. However, the Sultan later again successfuly incited the Kurds to minor revolts in the east.[12] The latter included the Shaikh Recep revolt, and revolts in Akdağmadeni, Boğazlıyan, and Yozgat.[13]

It should be noted in passing that, at the start of the nationalist struggle in 1919, other ethnic groups or some independent rebels, too, were disturbed by the early signs of the secularist tendencies on the part of Atatürk and his colleagues and, consequently, some other revolts had also taken place. For instance, in October-December 1919, there had occurred the Shaikh Eşref revolt at the town of Bayburt, situated to the north of the city of Erzurum, which had as its goal that of establishing a traditionalist Muslim regime. Similarly, Ahmed Anzavur, a retired gendarme lieutenant who earlier had served as District Governor in the then town of İzmit not far from Istanbul,

rose up several times from September 1919 until May 1920 against, among other things, the nationalists' inclination towards a secular regime.[14]

Here it is necessary to further elaborate the fact that the Kurds almost always preferred to live under an Islamic rather than an all-unifying nationalist government. They displayed such a preference because they had always had a strong loyalty to the Caliphate. Most Kurds had readily rallied to the Sultan's call when the latter, in his capacity as Caliph, had declared *cihad* (holy war) at the outset of the First World War against the Empire's non-Muslim adversaries. At the time, the Russians had attempted to buy some Kurdish chieftains' loyalties by offering them large sums of money; however, such attempts on the whole had proven to be unsuccessful. Emotional appeals made by the Kurdish nationalists had also lost out to the Caliph's word.

It was for this reason that the Kurds were greatly disturbed when the secular Turkish Republic was founded (1923): that state closed the traditional-cum-religious centres of education (*medrese*s) and replaced them with modern Western-type schools. The Republican state also abrogated the Caliphate (1924), which was the very embodiment of Islam.[15] John Palmer and Charles Smith summed up, though with some exaggeration, the situation at the time as follows: 'Mohammedan fanaticism was outraged by Mustafa Kemal's policy of secularization.'[16]

The Kurdish revolts in the early Republican period had indeed the signs of being mainly religious uprisings against the secular policies of the Republican state.[17] For one thing, on the whole, the top leaders of the rebellions were not tribal chieftains, but shaikhs.[18] The shaikhs exercised authority over several tribes, as they combined religious leadership with temporal authority.

That religion rather than ethnicity provided impetus for the Kurdish revolts was also evident in the fact that, as earlier noted, during the rebellions the orthodox Sunni Muslims and those Muslims who belonged to the Alevi sect tended to act at cross purposes. In general, the Alevis had welcomed Atatürk's secularizing reforms, because they had suffered under the Sunni hegemony and dominance in the Ottoman Empire. In the 1925 rebellion, several local Alevi tribes fought against the tribes loyal to Shaikh Said and, for instance, prevented Said's forces from controlling such cities as Bitlis and Muş.[19]

As an evidence of the salience of religion over ethnicity among the Kurds as well as Turks at the time, it may also be noted that in some instances the Alevi sect itself constituted an umbrella entity over both those who spoke Turkish and those who spoke Kurdish. It is true that all of the population that lived in the areas where the Koçgiri tribe was settled were Alevi by sect, yet they were divided among themselves along linguistic lines. Twelve of the thirteen clans that made up the tribe spoke Kurdish; however, the language of the remaining one clan, *Kirveler*, was Turkish. Furthermore, among the

Alevis endogamy was practiced on a religious rather than ethnic basis. A Kurd marrying a Turk instead of a Kurd was acceptable, but not an Alevi marrying a Sunni. The latter act was regarded as a serious breach of the religious sensitivities.[20]

Under the circumstances, the shaikhs as religious leaders had great influence over their followers. The followers believed that the leaders were not any ordinary mystics, but that they had special spiritual powers. The latter were, in fact, regarded as saints who could achieve miracles: for instance, they could ward off danger and evil influences with their hand-written amulets and treat illnesses with their spittle. According to some followers, the leaders could even take their disciples across the bridge into the abode of eternal bliss.[21]

Furthermore, prior to his revolt in February 1925, Shaikh Said gave sermons in several towns and cities and vehemently condemned the secularist policies of the government. In a sermon that he delivered in the town of Piran, he complained that: 'The *medrese*s, where people learn their religion and gain spritual knowledge (*irfan*) were closed. … The Ministry of Religion and Pious Foundations has been abrogated. … Newspapers openly insult our religion … Our beloved Prophet is defamed. … [Under the circumstances] Muslims are obliged to defend their faith. If I had the physical ability, I would grab a weapon, gird on a sword, and start the fighting for my religion.'[22]

On other occasions, Shaikh Said claimed that the religion had lost its significance and, with the abolishing of the Caliphate, atheists had begun to rule the people. In his view, the dynasty and Caliphate were absolute necessities for the survival of Turkey. He made known his great dissatisfaction with the plans for a new civil law according to which a man could marry no more than one wife and sons would not be entitled to more inheritance than daughters.[23] In a letter to the other Kurdish shaikhs, Said wrote the following: 'Earlier, we had a common Caliphate, and this gave to our religious people a deep feeling of being a part of the community that the Turks also belonged to. Since the abolition of the Caliphate, the only thing we are left with is Turkish repression.'[24]

Once the 1925 rebellion was under way, Shaikh Said continued with similar kind of propaganda for mobilizing more support for the 'cause'.[25] According to one of his grandsons, K. Fırat, after having observed the 'Turkish betrayal' of Islam, Shaikh Said adopted the goal of making the Kurds the leading nation of Islam.[26]

When their Shaikh made such arguments, rebels accompanying Said shouted to crowds, 'O you Muslims: follow us'![27] Rebels also distributed written statements to people to the effect that women were being turned into prostitutes as they were not now wearing headscarves and, thus, going out 'naked'.[28] Furthermore, by resorting to Islamic symbolisms, rebels frightened not only people but also for a while government forces out of their wits. For instance, it has been reported that as rebels appeared before the army lines

outside the city of Elazığ with the Qur'an tied to their bayonets, soldiers took to flight rather than engage in a shoot out with them.[29]

As a spritual leader, Shaikh Said had great influence over the people who saw him in person. During the 1925 rebellion, whenever Shaikh Said entered a town, people bowed and scraped before him while at the same time they chanted together, 'Allah is the greatest and there is no one greater than Him'.[30] The religious propaganda carried out and orchestrated by the Shaikh was so effective that even those people who otherwise might have helped government forces did not do so.

Under the circumstances, many people turned against the rebels only when the latter began to be engaged in large-scale looting of their properties upon entering their town or village.[31] Earlier, many people had not been disturbed by the looting by the rebels of the houses of officers, military depots, gendarmerie stations, and court houses in addition to the houses of the rich and local companies. That was because the rebels had been regarded as constituting an Islamic army.[32] Indeed, it has been suggested that 'the Kurds fought for God and the Book, and they did not hide it'.[33]

The State and the rebellions

Bernard Lewis came to the conclusion that it would not be unreasonable to accept the Republican state's description of the 1925 Kurdish rebellion as a religious reaction against the secularizing reforms.[34] Indeed, Ankara could easily take the Shaikh Said rebellion as a religious uprising rather than an ethnic one. Its stated goal, its planning, the tactics and means used in mobilizing people, the people's positive response to those efforts, and the nature of divisions among the Kurds mentioned above could have been interpreted as evidence of Islam being the basic impetus behind the said rebellion.

Ankara *did* perceive the rebellion as such. In 1922–1923, General Kazım Karabekir, commander of the eastern front, sent several messages to Ankara to the effect that religious fanaticism were being used to incite the Kurds to rebellion.[35] Also, civil servants on the ground informed Ankara of Shaikh Said's sermons and the rebels' tactics and activities.[36] President Atatürk and Prime Minister İsmet İnönü knew that the slogan, 'We have lost our religion' was being used to incite the people against the government. It also seems that at the time, there was little doubt in Atatürk's mind that in many parts of the country, shaikhs had a strong religious influence over the people.[37]

After all, only two weeks before the Shaikh Said rebellion, Ziyaeddin Efendi, the opposition Progressive Republican Party (*Terakkiperver Cumhuriyetçi Parti*-TCP) MP from Erzurum, had come up with criticisms about the way people were immorally conducting themselves in the public realm. Ziyaeddin Efendi had made the following claims: 'The [Republican] reforms brought nothing to Turkey but carousel, dancing, and partying on the beaches. Prostitution is on the rise. Muslim women are on the verge of losing their morality. Drunkenness is being protected and even encouraged.

Most important of all, people's religious feelings are hurt. The new regime brought [to Turkey] only immorality. The Republic is facing moral bankruptcy.'[38] As already noted, these remarks had their parallels in the slogans used by Shaikh Said and his supporters.

In 1925, the date the Shaikh Said rebellion broke out, Ankara declared a close relationship between Islam and the rebellion. On 23 February 1925, in a speech he made in Parliament, İnönü, as the ruling Republican People's Party leader and prime minister, gave several examples of the incitement to revolt made by pro-old regime politicians and Islamic reactionaries. He pointed out that a revolt of the kind that they had at hand was bound to occur, if not on that particular date, then before long, because for some time the enemies of the new regime had been using religion for political purposes.[39] The next day, again in Parliament, General Kazım Karabekir, now the leader of the opposition TCP, similarly stated that 'Those who are placing in peril the territorial integrity of the country by using religion are committing treason against their country'.[40] In November of the same year, Inönü made a similar statement in Parliament, but now in even less ambigous terms: 'You know the nature of the problem: in the eastern provinces, a great reactionary religious movement has surfaced.'[41]

In its turn, the Office of the Chief of General Staff, which, as mentioned above, had a very low opinion of the Kurds, asserted that Kurds did not even know what Republic meant. Similarly, the OCGS thought the Kurds had no idea of even 'what lies behind nearby mountains'. Under the circumstances, for propaganda to make any kind of an impact on these people it had to draw upon religion. If the Shaikh Said had not claimed that the religion faced a deadly threat, these people would not have rebelled against the government.[42]

Foreign complicity

In addition to the religious factor, Ankara blamed the Soviets and the British for their having incited people to rebel against Ankara. Indeed in their efforts to destabilize the Middle East, the Russians had frequently used the Kurdish card.[43] In the case of Turkey, when, in the 1910s, they could not bring eastern Anatolia under their control with the help of the Armenians, the Soviets had attempted to draw the Kurds, too, into the picture. On the eve of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, pro-Kurd Şerif Pasha, who had acted as the Head of the Council of State in the Empire, and Armenian Nobar Pasha, who had risen to the rank of general in the same Empire, jointly declared in Paris that the Armenians and Kurds were brothers, and soon they started an anti-Turkey propaganda in that city.[44]

The Soviets attempted to use the Kurds against Turkey during the later decades, too. In 1945, they tried to set up a Kurdish government within the borders of Iran in order to destabilize this time both Iran and Turkey, and

bring about a 'grand Kurdistan'.[45] In the 1970s, some Kurdish militants took part in the Soviet-supported terror in Turkey. This was followed by the Soviet endeavours in the 1980s to subvert Turkey by fostering Kurdish militancy. The latter Soviet activities gave rise to the militant Kurds forming alliances of convenience with extremist Armenian exile groups.[46]

As for the British, Major E. M. Noel, who had previously been a political officer in the Süleymaniye area of Iraq and who was dispatched in March 1919 to eastern Turkey by the British Intelligence, advocated the setting up of three Kurdish confederations under British influence: two of those confederations were going to be established in Iraq and one in the city of Diyarbakır in southeastern Turkey. Major Noel also toyed with the idea of a British mandate over all eastern Anatolia, whereby the Armenians would control the north and the Kurds the south of that region. With these projects in mind, he got in touch with the leading Kurdish chieftains in the southeast. At the time, another British officer from Aleppo encouraged Shaikh Abdülkadir, who controlled the provinces of Diyarbakır, Elazığ, and Urfa, to declare their independence under British protection.[47] These efforts on the part of the British turned out to be somewhat successful: in 1920 the *Milli Aşiret* tribe, in 1921 the *Koçgiri* tribe, and in 1924 the *Nasturi* Christian religious community staged revolts.

Here it must also be noted that when some of Shaikh Said's men were caught by the nationalist forces, they had on them foreign monies. Also captured were some brochures, letters, and offers of some foreign weapons addressed to 'The Defence Ministry of Kurdish Emirate'. Still another evidence of foreign complicity was the fact that the circulars Shaikh and his men distributed could not be printed by them, simply because at the time they were not in the possession of the necessary printing equipment.[48]

Under the circumstances, Ankara could not be unaware of what was going on regarding the British involvement in Kurdish affairs. The revolts of *Milli Aşiret*, *Koçgiri*, and *Nasturi*, mentioned above, were all suppressed and, eventually, Atatürk and General Kazım Karabekir managed to counter the activities by a few individual British officers, which London disowned, by securing the loyalty of many Kurdish tribes in the area.[49] Having a first hand knowledge at the time of the machinations of the British in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey, it was only natural that while Atatürk and his associates did not attribute ethnic impetus to the uprisings in the area, they did think that alongside Islamic fanaticism, foreign complicity, too, incited the Kurds to revolt. Atatürk later talked about this matter as follows: 'The Kurds were the key to Mosul and the oil in Iraq. England was using this backhanded blow to force Turkey to give up Mosul.'[50] Here it should be noted that in Atatürk's view, one came across foreign complicity not only in the Kurdish revolts in the southeast, but also in other parts of the country during the Turkish War of Independence. He attributed the non-Kurdish uprisings in Bala, Keskin, Konya, Umraniye, Yozgat, too, to the same factor.[51]

At the time, İnönü, too, made a number of similar statements. In October 1923, he declared: 'Foreign countries are always interested in the internal situation of another country. Now, among others, Great Britain, too, has been engaged in inciting resort to treason in Turkey against the Republican state. … The British want to weaken Turkey by creating divisions in the country.'[52] In July 1930, İnönü came up with a more general statement about the foreign complicity: 'Some organizations set up in an artificial manner beyond our borders are playing a role in urging people in our country to come up with some demands, and inciting people to rise against their government'.[53]

One comes across the view that some foreign groups were responsible for the separatist activities in the early 1920s also in the official documents of the Office of the Chief of General Staff: 'One end of the rope around the neck of the separatist terrorists is in the hands of Turkey's enemies abroad. … For long centuries, the enemy continuously had tried to implement in an insidious manner its policy of "divide, take apart, and invade" vis-à-vis the Ottoman realms. … At the end of the First World War, they wanted to partition among themselves the last portion of the homeland that the Turks held on to – Anatolia. … They wished to keep the Kurds under their control and make use of the oil in Turkey. … The British spent money and made propaganda for spreading and reinforcing the idea of independence among the Kurdish tribes and chieftains. … [A case in point here is the 1924] Kurdish Nasturi uprising; it was supported by the forces, which were under the command of the British.'[54]

During the 1925 uprising, several newspapers published at the time also carried news items on foreign complicity in Kurdish rebellions. For instance, on 18 February 1925, Istanbul daily *Cumhuriyet* reported the developments regarding the Shaikh Said rebellion as follows: 'Shaikh Said and 150 horsemen accompanying him are in the town of Genç. It turns out that the rebels are incited and helped by the British.'[55]

During the second round of 'troubles' (1984–1999), foreign complicity in particular was taken as *the* factor leading to unrest among Kurds. In October 1984, General Kenan Evren, who, at the time, was the President of Republic, made the following statement: 'These anarchists and separatist terrorists get help from foreign sources. In other words, they are no more than slaves at the disposal of others. That is, in fact, how they gain their livelihood.'[56] In a sense anticipating General/President Evren's remarks on the issue in 1984, as early as 1963 the Office of the Chief of General Staff had attributed again to the outside groups the rise of leftist views, which, in turn, was to be instrumental in the development of Kurdism on the eve of the second round of 'troubles': 'Some countries always wanted to create unrest in Turkey, which is situated in a strategically important geography between the East and West. The revolts of Shaikh Said, Ağrı [1930], and Dersim [1937] were brought about by a number of countries inciting certain

tribes to rebellion. … In recent years, those who incite and those incited are no longer the same. In the past [during those years before the second round of 'troubles' erupted in earnest], the culprits posed as nationalists; now they turn out to be communists; earlier, they preferred to use tribal chieftains and shaikhs for their purpose, now they try to draw to their side the elite stratum.'[57] In the late 1980s, too, the military thought the foreign involvement played an important role in the eruption of 'troubles'. For instance, in August 1989, the Chief of General Staff, Necip Torumtay accused the PKK of receiving support from foreign powers.[58]

Other factors behind the first round of 'troubles'

Ankara could attribute the 1925 Shaikh Said rebellion, and the subsequent two major and several minor rebellions that lingered on until 1938 in the first round of 'troubles', to several other factors besides the religious impetus and foreign complicity. Those additional factors included the Kurds' displeasure with the emerging centralized state system, individual restlessness and discomfort due to hostile and harsh acts towards them by agents of government on the ground or a mere expectation on the part of the people that they might be subjected to such acts.

Centralization

It has been plausibly argued that the 1925 Shaikh Said revolt conformed to the well-established pattern of revolts in the Ottoman Empire – that of the re-negotiation of the tacit contract between the centre and the periphery concerning the issue of the rights versus obedience and the periphery granting legitimacy to the centre. In Turkey of the 1920s, tribes would obey the central authority and attribute legitimacy to it provided that they maintained their autonomy from that authority.[59] As in the Ottoman era, in the Republican period, too, the tribal chieftains and shaikhs wished to protect their land, continue to dominate the markets for their livestock, and control the legal system.[60] However, the Republican state was not willing to grant to the local notables such privileges. For now, that state had to create its own nation out of the disparate elements, all of which, in the past, had had certain degrees of autonomy from the centre.

It is noteworthy that the disturbances against the centralizing policies of the state did not occur only in the southeast. Such revolts in central Anatolia as those of the Çapanoğulları chieftains in the east of Ankara (1920) and those of the Bozkır tribes between Isparta and Konya (1920), too, took as target the Government of the Grand National Assembly, which was set up by the nationalists on 23 April 1920. The tribes tried to resist the efforts of the central government to establish its own authority in the areas these tribes had controlled for long periods; they endeavoured to prevent the government from conscripting their men and collecting taxes from the leading

families of the tribe.[61] Tribes' resort to rebellion not only in the southeast but also in the other parts of the country following the establishment of a state with centralizing tendencies is another clear evidence of the fact that rebellions had not been primarily motivated by an ethnic factor.

Rough treatment accorded to Kurds

Some minor revolts turned out to be the upshot of the displeasure of the people in the southeast with some purposeful or not so purposeful acts on the part of civil servants and members of the security forces on the ground. For instance, if someone in a locality was killed by government agents for one reason or another, people often put up resistance to members of the security forces who, for instance, attempted to search for weapons as part of their efforts to maintain law and order. Similarly, if an official had come to a town or village to carry out an arrest order, and in the process let it be known that it will now be compulsory for every man to wear a Western style hat in place of the traditional fez, that type of behaviour, too, sometimes gave rise to a minor-revolt. Such minor revolts also erupted if there was a fear of gendarmerie coming to a village and taking the chieftains there to a nearby town or there existed a fear of the imposition by the government of a new tax on villagers. All in all, sheer mismanagement and local abuses, which were prevalent, constituted the main reason for most minor Kurdish revolts.[62]

Radical left and the second round of 'troubles'

If Islam and foreign complicity played significant roles in the first round of 'troubles' that occurred in the 1920as and 1930s, the radical left appears to have greatly contributed to the emergence of the second round of 'troubles' in the 1980s and 1990s. The 1961 Constitution, which had been drawn up in the wake of the 1960 military intervention, had expanded the scope of the basic rights and liberties. This was because that Constitution had been made as a reaction to the drift of Turkish politics in the late 1950s towards one-party authoritarianism under the Democratic Party governments. The political liberalization in question made possible, among other things, the spread of leftist views and organizations among a cross-section of the intelligentsia.

It was at his juncture that the Kurdish elite, too, took their place in the political arena. In the 1960s, a group of left-leaning Kurdish intellectuals set up their own 'cultural associations'. In the summer of 1967, illegal demonstrations were organized in 19 cities and towns in the east and southeast. These demonstrations were the handiwork of the illegal Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Kürdistan Demokrat Partisi*-TKDP), which was set up in Diyarbakır in 1965. The TKDP was the Turkey branch of the Barzani movement in Iraq; that party called for the designation of a region within the boundaries of Turkey as 'Kurdistan', with Kurdish as the official

language in that area, and the representation of this region in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. In 1968, the TKDP was banned.[63]

In general, the Turkish left set the stage for the development of autonomous Kurdish movements in Turkey. The Kurds, who had earlier joined several Marxist and Marxist-Leninist organizations, later founded their own separate socialist and communist nationalist associations. The most important of these was the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (*Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları*-DDKO). It was set up in 1969 by the so-called Eastern Group (*Doğulular Grubu*) who were active in both the Workers Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*-TİP) and the Marxist Intellectual Clubs (*Marksist Fikir Klüpleri*). Abdullah Öcalan, who was to become the separatist leader of the militant Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan*-PKK), was initially active in the DDKO. The DDKO pursued a 'revolutionary policy' and, thus, it opposed Kurdish chieftains and shaikhs. The members of the DDKO were arrested, tried, and were handed prison sentences following the March 1971 military intervention, which was carried out in order to put an end to the armed clashes between the militant groups of the radical left and the radical right.[64]

That the Kurdish question was a matter awaiting a solution was brought to Turkey's agenda for the first time in 1970 at the Fourth Congress of TİP. The solution proposed was a federal state of the Kurds and Turks. Between 1960 and 1980, the Kurdish initiatives other than those within the framework of the nationwide socialist political parties like TİP, which also had Kurds among its members, adopted separatist and pan-Kurdish policies. In the 1970s, there were 12 such separatist Kurdish movements with a Marxist-Leninist orientation; they all called for an independent Kurdish state. However, they could not agree upon the manner in which that goal should be realized. In the 1970–1980 periods, pro-Kurdish publications in Kurdish multiplied.[65]

TİP defined the Kurdish problem as the 'Eastern Problem'; it held a series of meetings in the region. That party had initially perceived the 'Eastern Problem' as an economic problem. At the time, most of the leftist political movements regarded the economic woes of the southeast as a result of 'feudal structures and economic exploitation'.[66]

As time went by, at the suggestion of the Kurds in the TİP, the Kurdish question came to be regarded as a problem of ethnic discrimination and cultural suppression. Accordingly, the party distributed handbills that addressed the Kurds alongside the Turks, Lazes, and Circassians, and asserted that the TİP considered the Kurds as equal partners with the Turks. The TİP came to the conclusion that 'Kurds, too, would contribute to the struggle of the working class and its representative TİP'.[67] It is noteworthy that the TİP could not garner more than three per cent of the general vote in the two (free) national elections that it contested – those in 1965 and 1969, when the Kurds in Turkey were estimated to constitute anywhere between one-fifth and one-third of the population.

In the mid-1970s, Kurdish leftist groups began to differ in their perceptions of the Kurdish problem from their Turkish counterparts. The Kurdish groups thought the problem could not be resolved by putting an end to the economic exploitation of the region and, therefore, they viewed the socialist revolution policy of the Turkish leftists in the TİP as inadequate. All of the Kurdish groups adopted a Marxist perspective and, alongside the more radical leftist groups in Turkey of the 1970s, they regarded the problem as that of 'Kurdistan' being a colony of Turkey, and held the view that the Kurds had the right to decide their own destiny themselves.[68]

Among the latter Kurdish groups, there was a Pro-Apo (Abdullah Öcalan) Group (*Apocular*). Earlier, the members of this Group had been active in the Federation of the Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (*Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu*-'Dev-Genç'). The 'Dev-Genç' had recruited some Kurdish youth into its ranks and talked of a distinctive 'Kurdish people', which at the time was considered as inciting the Kurds against the state. The 'Dev-Genç' had a programme of struggle against 'fascism and imperialism' and, thus, to achieve the liberation and independence of peoples, including that of the Turks and Kurds.[69]

The Pro-Apo Group separated itself from the 'Dev-Genç' in 1974 and founded in 1978 the Kurdistan Workers Party or the PKK, briefly mentioned above. The PKK's view was that the late 1970s was the era of transition from capitalism to socialism and proletarian revolutions. The PKK defined 'Kurdistan' as a colony partitioned among four 'colonial' states – Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey; it perceived the 'feudal' Kurdish chieftains and Turkish state, which 'together kept the region as a semi-feudal colony', as its principal enemies. The PKK set its goal as that of fighting against feudalism and colonialism and setting up an independent and unified 'Kurdistan'. The revolution was going to be led by a revolutionary party of the proletariat. That party had to be formed by patriotic youth and intellectuals, who were to be disassociated from material production. The PKK made a resolution to establish a Marxist-Leninist 'Kurdistan' so that the Kurdish villagers and proletariat would obtain their genuine independence. This could be possible via a radical revolution and the use of violence.[70] The widespread armed clashes between the PKK and the government forces started in 1984 and continued until 1999, during those years an estimated 35,000 Turks and Kurds lost their lives.

In 1999, Öcalan was captured, tried, and given a life sentence. In the post-1999 period, the PKK scaled down its goals. Instead of an independent 'Kurdistan', it began to emphasize the deepening of democracy and the granting of cultural rights to the Kurds. From his prison cell, Öcalan, too, called for a 'democratic Republic'. He pointed out that the demand for a separate state, federation, autonomy and the like had not led the Kurdish cause anywhere. Thus, there was a need to focus on democracy as the way out. According to Öcalan, one should not have had challenged the Republic and

its ideal of a common fatherland; one should have instead insisted on more democracy where cultural rights would have been granted to the Kurds.[71]

The discourse of separatism and the practice of terrorist activities the Kurds resorted to with the goal of setting up their own independent state left a deep imprint on Turkish politics and particularly on the military. The civilians differed among themselves on the question of whether to grant some rights to the Kurds despite the fact that terrorist activities lingered on, or to first suppress the terrorist activities and then grant those rights. The military viewed Kurdish rebellions as a deadly threat to the national unity and territorial integrity of Turkey. Until recent years, this particular perception of the Kurdish issue on the part of the military led that institution to assume in the post-1984 period a rather hawkish stance concerning the measures that should be adopted to deal with that issue. From the late 1990s, the European Union (EU), too, entered into the picture, since Turkey wished to be a full member of the EU and thus accelerated its efforts to conform on many matters to the EU *acquis communataire*. The EU's involvement in the equation, even in a round about way, has had a favourable impact on granting cultural rights to the Kurds. More on these matters below.

Measures adopted against the rebellions

As noted above, the state in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic had for centuries viewed the Kurds as not too different from the Turks. Consequently, when the Kurdish restlessness in the southeast became apparent in the early 1920s, nationalist leaders dispatched to the primarily Kurdish areas, where the glimmers of Kurdish uneasiness had become visible, the so-called 'Counselling Missions' (*Nasihat Heyetleri*). These missions were to give advice to those, who were not happy with their lot, that what they seemed to have in their mind (causing trouble) was not the proper thing to do.[72] It seems that only after such efforts did not seem to succeed in achieving their intended goal that Ankara turned to other measures, which we will now take up.

Maintaining law and order

When faced with major rebellions, Ankara set its first priority as that of establishing law and order. Following the 1925 Shaikh Said Rebellion, first of the three major rebellions, one of the first steps that were taken was the appointment of İsmet İnönü as Prime Minister; İnönü had always taken such threats to the state very seriosly.[73]

Soon after he became Prime Minister, in an address to the Parliament, İnönü declared: 'We shall continue to try to resolve this problem no matter what difficulties we face, so that those intransigent local notables will realize our determination and change their ways.'[74] The government's determination to deal with the rebellions once and for all as reflected in İnönü's

address above, led to the adoption in March 1924 of the Maintenance of the Order Law (*Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu*), which gave the state virtually dictatorial powers: the government quickly eastablished two Tribunals of Independence (*İstiklâl Mahkemeleri*), one in the East and one in Ankara. The Tribunal of Independence in the East was given the powers to apply capital punishment against which no appeals could be made. This made it possible for the authorities to stifle 'all reaction and rebellion, all instigation and encouragement thereof, and the publication of anything against the order, tranquillity, or social harmony in the country'.[75]

These measures were followed by the efforts of the government to disarm the tribes, station gendarmes throughout the area where rebellions had taken place, build new railways to facilitate troop movements, and banish some Kurdish tribes, especially their leaders from the troubled region.[76] For security reasons or preventing them from engaging in disruptive acts against the state, Kurds were also removed from even relatively unimportant positions in the economy. For instance, in some branches of the Ottoman Bank in the southeast all 'non-Turkish' employees were replaced by their Turkish counterparts.[77]

It should be mentioned here that Ankara was careful to match the harshness of the measures adopted against the Kurds to the gravity of the situation it faced. In June 1935, Prime Minister İsmet İnönü made a tour of the Black Sea, eastern, and southeastern regions of Turkey. In the so-called 'Kurdish Report' he wrote afterwards,[78] İnönü indicated that the situation in the province of Dersim (today's Tunceli) was particularly critical, and there was therefore a need to set up particularly in that province a rather repressive regime. Inönü proposed the appointment of officers as civil servants in Dersim and giving them wide powers, including the authority to hand out death sentences.

Accordingly, in December 1935, the Tunceli Law was enacted.[79] It placed the Dersim province under a newly created Inspectorate-General, which was to be headed by a governor-general with wide administrative and legal powers. The governor-general could arrest or deport people; the accused had no right of appeal, nor even the right to know the charges leveled against them. In his speech at Parliament concerning this Law, Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya stated that the province had seen 11 military operations since 1876 and that the area was a 'disease', which demanded more substantial 'treatment' than other places.[80] Ankara's policy indeed appears to have been guided by the principle of applying measures commensurate with the level of threat posed at any given time and particular location.

Since the state had never developed an intrinsic hostility towards the Kurds and not tried to assimilate them, the re-establishment of law and order in the east and the southeast was not envisaged just for its own sake; rather, it was considered as a pre-requisite for the socio-economic development of the area. For example, in his 1935 Report, İnönü mentioned the need to set

up a number of inspectorates-general, which would not only monitor the security situation in their respective areas, but they would also look after the area-wide problems of economy and transportation. On some occasions, law and order measures were, in fact, accompanied by those aimed at developing the troubled regions socio-economically. For instance, in the spring of 1937, the state had faced the Dersim (Tunceli) rebellion and felt itself obliged to suppress it, if necessary by resort to harsh measures. At this point, the state also announced that it was going to accelerate reforms, which included modernization of agriculture and development of education in that recalcitrant region. It was also made known that the city of Van was selected as the cultural centre of the region where first primary and secondary level schools were going to be opened and, when students graduated from the said schools, a university, too, was also going to be started.[81] A contemporary American observer of Turkish affairs, with a certain degree of disbelief, had made the following remarks during the first round of 'troubles' under discussion: 'After rather serious revolts in the Kurdish region, the government is still talking about reforms for these people.'[82]

During the second round of 'troubles', too, on the whole, law and order measures continued to be on the agenda of the state. However, again the rationale behind those measures was not one of assimilation. In 1958, a military coup took place in Iraq. Qassem extended the Kurds' autonomy; his successors restricted it. Qassem's concessions encouraged Kurdish nationalism and worried the Turkish authorities.[83] The Turkish national security agencies became alarmed of a potential spill over of such unrest to Turkey. Consequently, following the 1960 military intervention in Turkey, the junta took into custody more than 200 Kurdish chieftains, who were charged with having been involved in separatist activities. Fifty five of those detained were eventually banished to western Turkey.[84]

The perceptions of increased threats arising out of the Kurdish issue leading to greater activism on the part of the government forces repeated itself in later years, too. In 1970, when the Baath Party and Mesud Barzani made an accord in Iraq, Ankara was again alarmed. Once more expecting its contagious effects to destabilize the situation in southeastern Turkey, Ankara sent to the region military commandos that searched for separatist activities in villages.[85]

It is true that such measures in many instances often ended up in gross human rights violations. For instance, a State of Emergency Law (*Olağanüstü Hal Kanunu*) was enacted in 1987 and, until 2002, it was extended 57 times. Under this Law, particularly in the wake of the major PKK attacks, which caused heavy casualties on government forces, such extreme human rights violations as illegal executions, murders by unknown persons, deaths while in custody, forceful evacuations of villages, and molestations and torture did take place. Similarly the Village Guards system, whereby some Kurds sympathetic to the state were made responsible for the defence of their villages

against the PKK assaults, itself gave rise to such criminal acts as molestation, murders, smuggling, drug trafficking, and the illegal seizure of money and property.[86]

It is not, of course, possible to condone such practices. Those practices, however, were not necessarily the official policy of Ankara; after all, on those occasions where the culprits could be identified and captured, they were tried and given prison sentences; however, it seems that more than not, the guilty could get away with what they had done. Moreover, given the mix of Kurds and Turks among the wrongdoers, such as the village guards, an overall ethnic motive cannot be claimed. Several of those involved in acts of violence must have thought they were acting as patriots trying to maintain the national unity and the territorial integrity of the country, while others, the majority of whom must have been village guards, must have been engaged in such illegal activity for such reasons as inter-tribe rivalry, blood-feud, taking personal revenge, conflict arising out of drug-trafficking, and the like.

The policy of non-recognition

As mentioned earlier, at its inception the Republican state had wished both the Turks and the Kurds as well as other elements of the population to share a common primary identity, i.e. that of being 'Turk' in a *generic*, that is in a non-ethnic sense, while maintaining their distinct secondary identities as 'Turks', 'Kurds', and the like in an ethnic sense. However, in the wake of the 1925 rebellion, the reports that Ankara received from some officials serving in the southeast reflected a deep pessimism about the situation on the ground. In February 1926, Hamdi Bey, an Inspector of the Ministry of Interior, informed Ankara that Dersim was being 'Kurdified' day by day.[87] That same month, Cemal Bey, the Governor of Diyarbakır, while implicitly supporting Hamdi Bey's view about 'Kurdification', suggested that Ankara should adopt a new strategy in respect to the issue at hand: 'If more appropriate policies are pursued, people in Dersim would become very loyal and devoted guardians of the Republic'.[88]

Such reports must have made Ankara rather concerned about the possibility of the Kurds drifting away from 'sharing' a primary identity with the Turks and elevating their secondary identity, that is being a Kurd in an ethnic sense, into a primary identity of their own. Atatürk elaborated the resultant new thinking on the part of Ankara as follows: 'Within the social and political unity of today's Turkish nation, there are *citizens* and *co-nationals* who have been encouraged to think of themselves as Kurds, Circassians, Laz, or Bosnians [as their primary identities]. But these erroneous appellations – the product of past periods of tyranny – have brought nothing but sorrow to those members of the nation, with the exception of a few brainless reactionaries, who became the enemy's instruments. [The] … members of the nation who feel sorrow due to such misplaced appellations, [in fact] … share with the generality of Turkish society the same past, history, and the

constellation of morals and laws [and, therefore, should continue to think of their primary identity as Turk in a generic sense].'[89]

Noteworthy in this statement by Atatürk is his reference to 'co-nationals'. It is clear that even in the heat of a major Kurdish rebellion, while Atatürk still thought that the Turks and the Kurds together made up the nation, he also openly recognized the fact that the Kurds had a secondary identity of their own. It is significant in this context that in his 1935 Report, İnönü in turn differentiated between 'some cities inhabited by pure (*som*) Kurds', i.e. those cities in the southeast where being a Kurd in an ethnic sense was the primary identity of the bulk or the majority of the Kurds residing there, and some other 'cities not inhabited by pure Kurds', i. e. those cities in that region where being a Kurd in an ethnic sense was only the secondary identity of the bulk or the majority of the Kurds living there.

Consequently, according to Ankara the problem to be tackled was not that of rendering different secondary identities same, but preventing the primary identity presumed to be shared by all from being supplemented by parallel primary identities. Thus, in order to prevent such a de-acculturation process from taking place among the Kurds the state took a number of measures. As would have been expected, the measures adopted did not amount to *assimilation*, but to *non-recognition*.

Here it must be underlined that the official policy in question was not the *denial* of the secondary Kurdish identity, as it has been suggested by those students of the Kurdish problem who subscribe to the present paradigm, but that of the Kurds' secondary identity not being openly *recognized*. As already noted, denial denotes refusal of the existence of a phenomenon; non-recognition means not acknowledging openly the existence of a phenomenon. The Republican leaders such as Atatürk and İnönü, whose various statements about the Kurds as a distinct ethnic group have been quoted above, could not be expected to turn around one day and *deny* their existence. The Kurds' ethnic identity was denied by only a handful of students of the Kurdish affairs and a number of politicians, civil servants, and officers in the late 1930s and the early 1940s; those students of the Kurdish issue who work with the present paradigm, have presented the views and practice of the latter as the official policy of the Republican state.

The official policy of the state was not the denial of the Kurdish ethnicity; it was non-recognition of that ethnicity; the latter policy was adopted when and to the extent to which the Kurds were presumed to be making an effort to substitute their secondary ethnic identity for the generic primary identity of being a Turk that the Republican state wished to maintain in respect to all ethnic communities.

For instance, in his 1935 Report, İnönü indicated that there was no benefit in providing schooling to the Kurds and Turks separately. According to İnönü, 'the Turks and Kurds should receive their primary education together',

because 'that would help "Turkify" the Kurds'. Given that the Republican state was still endeavouring to replace the *Muslim community*, which it had inherited from the Ottoman Empire, with a *secular nation*, İnönü's statement seems to be referring to building awareness of common nationhood among Turks and Kurds –Kurds being Turk in a generic sense, while maintaining their ethnic secondary identities – rather than to the assimilation of Kurds – trying to deprive the Kurds of their ethnic identity.

Those were the times when for the bulk of both the Turks and the Kurds, being a Muslim competed with being a member of a non-religious community. As late as as the 1960s, when asked 'How do you see yourselves … ', as many as 37.5 percent of the workers in a textile factory in the city of Izmir, a major urban centre on the Aegean coast in western Turkey, considered themselves as 'Muslims'.[90] Under those circumstances, one would have expected that one of the major policies of the Republican state would have been that of promoting the generic primary identity of being a Turk instead of a Muslim.

As already noted, the policy of the non-recognition of the secondary ethnic identity of the Kurds was adopted when the Kurds showed tendencies of substituting their secondary ethnic identity for the generic primary identity of being a Turk. One such measure within the framework of this policy was the prohibition of the use of Kurdish as a written language, and in broadcasting on the radio and, decades later, on the television.[91] In December 1925, the Ministry of Education came up with a proclamation on 'The Efforts of Trying to Undermine Turkish Unity', in which the usage of such terms as '*Çerkes*' (Circassian), '*Kürt*', *Kürdistan*, and *Lazistan* referring to non-Turkish ethnic communities and the areas they inhabited, were banned. Among other things, these and other such terms were taken out of the teaching material used in schools.[92] Later, the names of villages with Kurdish names were given Turkish names and parents were forbidden to give Kurdish names to their children. The state even tried to keep incidents of suppression of the Kurdish unrest out of the public eye.[93]

For a while, but particularly in the 1930s, the Kurds were referred to as 'Mountain people'.[94] This particular appellation regarding the Kurds, too, has been taken by the subscribers to the present paradigm not as a manifestation of non-recognition policy, which, as already noted, does not reject the secondary identity of the Kurds, but remains silent about it because it does not wish to exacerbate the de-acculturation process; it has rather been taken as part and parcel of the assimilation policy that they claim the state had adopted. What is overlooked here is not only the fact that the Republican state never adopted asimilation as its official policy, but also the fact that the Kurds were called 'Mountain People' ('*Dağlılar*') in the Ottoman Empire too,[95] and that those who called the Kurds by that name might have loaded into that phrase a meaning only in geographical sense.

The measures taken within the framework of the policy of non-recognition did not only consist of the prohibition of the use of Kurdish and giving Kurdish names to people and places. As already noted, in the 1960s and 70s, some leftist groups had supported the Kurdish separatism. Particularly for this reason, the state and the army refused to acknowledge the existence of a separate Kurdish existence in Turkey.[96] The 1982 Constitution, too, took Turkish not as official language, but as mother tongue. Consequently, the Article 26 of that constitution stipulated that 'no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought'. And a law enacted the next year indicated that 'It is forbidden to express, diffuse or publish in any language other than the official language of the states recognized by the Turkish state'. Also, until 1992, Kurds were not allowed to be engaged in cultural activities and perform songs and plays in Kurdish, or identify certain customs as Kurdish. In all such legislation there was no direct reference to 'Kurd' or 'Kurdish'.[97]

In their work published in 1993, four American students of Turkey came to the conclusion that 'Turks knew very little about their Kurds'. They added, 'Neither does anybody else'.[98] As already noted, from 1965 onwards, Turkish censuses taken every five years provided no information on ethnic identity and language use among the people. The state discouraged and, in fact, prevented both foreigners and Turks from doing work on Kurds from ethnolinguistic, sociological, economic, and/or political point of view.[99] Publications in Kurdish language and advocacy of cultural rights for the Kurds remained illegal, and the accused were heavily punished when this rule was violated.[100] In 1970, the Worker Party of Turkey (TİP) stated that there were 'Kurdish people in Turkey';[101] the party was closed down immediately after the 1971 military intervention.

As late as the 1990s, people in Turkey rarely referred to the Kurds as an ethnic group. This was all the more so as far as official documents and the mainstream public discourse were concerned. Mainstream newspapers tended to avoid writing about Kurds as a distinct ethnic group and, in particular, they made sure that to the extent possible they did not refer to any group in Turkey as 'Kurds'.[102] For instance, in 1984–1985, one such leading national daily, *Hürriyet*, published only 25 articles that could be categorized as being related to ethnic Kurds in Turkey; only three of these 25 pieces (12 per cent) used the word 'Kurd' one or more times.[103] However, this situation started to change in the early years of the 1990s; now the Kurds began to be re-recognized: in 1991–1992, *Hürriyet* published 658 articles concerning the Kurds in Turkey; in 304 of them, nearly half, the word 'Kurd' was used at least once.[104]

It has been suggested that one could see the fırst signs of the transition from the policy and praxis of non-recognition of Kurds and Kurd related matters to a praxis of initially hesitant and cautious recognition of those matters from 1988 onwards. That particular year the state had acted

sympathetically to the Turkish refugees from Bulgaria, but not sympathetically to the Kurdish refugees from Iraq, and that this discriminatory behaviour towards the two sets of refugees, it is argued, awakened many people in Turkey to the fact that in the official view, the Kurds were clearly different from the Turks.[105]

Whether or not there is any substance to this view, it is a fact that from 1988 onwards, Kurds and related matters indeed began to be openly recognized, if not by the state, then at least by members of an opposition political party; some Kurdish members of the opposition Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) started to talk about the cultural rights of the 'Kurds', that is about the rights of an ethnic community officially still unrecognized. This intiative met with resistance both within and outside the party. When seven of those Kurdish members of the SHP attended an international conference on the Kurdish question in Paris, they were summarily expelled from the party.

The SHP, however, continued to be attentive to the Kurdish issue, though from the perspective of basic rights and freedoms. In its lenghty 1990 Report, the party recommended such reforms as free expression of the Kurdish ethnic identity and the granting of cultural rights to that ethnic group, the abolition of the Village Guards system, doing away with the region-wide super governorship, and the lifting of the state of emergency in the southeast, and proposed a major programme of regional development for the region.[106] The next year, as mentioned above, Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister in the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*-DYP)-SHP coalition government, declared to a cheering crowd in the city of Diyarbakır in the southeast that Turkey had recognized the Kurdish reality. Soon after, in joint declaration, the DYP and the SHP government underlined the following two points: Diversity does not weaken a democratic and unitary state; everyone's right to carry out research in a topic of his/her choice as well as preserving and developing one's mother tongue, culture, history, folklore, and religious beliefs are part of one's basic rights and freeodoms'.[107]

Later, again as briefly noted above, some cultural rights were granted. It became possible to broadcast in Kurdish on the TV and radio, though with some strings attached. From August 2003 onwards, the Turkish Radio and Television started to broadcast in the two dialects of Kurdish, Kirmanci and Zaza, as well as in Arabic, Bosnian, and Circassian. However, only the broadcasts of news, music, and traditional cultures were allowed; moreover, the broadcasts could last at most 45 minutes per day and four hours every week. What was not allowed were, of course, group rights. Regional broadcasts and broadcasts for the purpose of teaching the language and dialects could not be made. furthermore, demands for the adoption of Kurdish as mother tongue and conducting education in Kurdish were rejected.[108] As noted, it must have been figured that compared to cultural rights, group rights could lead to the development of a tendency on the part of Kurds to elevate their seondary identity to the level of primary identity.

Modern state with a civilizing mission

In the last analysis, Ankara perceived a close relationship between bringing civilization to the people in the southeast and dealing with the Kurdish problem. Becoming civilized was considered extremely important, because, it was thought, a civilized person would have 'good manners' (*görgü*)[109] and, thus, would not get involved in 'troubles'. One of the foremost protagonists of this view was no other than İsmet İnönü, who virtually saw a one-to-one relationship between becoming civilized and calming down. It should be noted here that the state sought to fulfill its self-defined civilizing mission not only in the southeast, but also in other parts of the country.

Thinking along these lines, and having also arrived at the conclusion that religious fanaticism had played a major role in the eruption of particularly those Kurdish rebellions that had occurred following the abrogation of the Caliphate, Ankara decided to close down certain religious institutions, and to put an end to some traditional folk practices, which, it thought, had constituted the root causes of religious fanaticism among people. Religious sects and orders, dervish monasteries, and mausoleums of local saints (*türbe*s) were closed. Fortune telling of any sort was made illegal. In February 1925, a change in the High Treason Law rendered the political use of 'religion and sacred religious notions' treasonable offences; the Penal Law, adopted from Italy in 1926, made illegal the forming of associations on a religious basis.

It is significant for the purpose of this essay that these measures were implemented nation-wide and not only in the southeast. In May 1925, the opposition Progressive Republican Party was closed down on the grounds that the party's programme had expressed respect for religious sentiments. Also, education was completely secularized and the state took over responsibility for training religious students.[110] Atatürk implied the already noted rationale behind the above measures in a polemical question that he later posed: 'Could a civilized nation tolerate a mass of people who let themselves be led by the nose by a herd of shaikhs, *dede*s, *sayyid*s, *chelebi*s, babas, and *amir*s?'[111]

Ankara was also of the opinion that the people would become civilized to the extent to which their loyalties lay with the state and not with the local notables of one sort or another. Consequently, parallel to the measures to prevent religious fanaticism from being salient in the southeast and elsewhere, Ankara wished to impress the people with the majesty of the state. Along those lines, in his 1935 Report İnönü recommended improving outward appearances of government buildings and installations. He underlined the need for well-constructed and impressive buildings. In this context, İnönü drew particular attention to military headquarters and civil service buildings; he insisted that these should be transformed into awe-inspiring structures. İnönü also thought it useful if officers and civil servants lived in well-built houses and soldiers wore brand new uniforms, for, according to him, these, too, would elevate the prestige of the 'august state' in the eyes of the people.

Not unexpectedly, the emphasis on elevating the majesty of the state and civilizing the Kurds was paralelled by endeavours to de-legitimize the chieftains, who were now referred by Ankara as 'outlaws', 'brigands', 'bandits', and/or 'smugglers'.[112] It has been suggested by Nicole Watts that the major consequence of Ankara seeing chieftains in the southeast, and in particular in the Dersim area, as no more than incorrigable trouble makers, had been the policy of resettling them and their tribes in other places 'where they could be turned into "pure Turks"'.[113] However, it is not only Watts who has made that suggestion with respect to the 1934 Resettlement Law and the way in which that law was implemented. Virtually all students of Turkey, who think that the state in that country adopted an ethnic management strategy towards its Kurds, hold the same view.

This view, however, has been successfully refuted by Fikret Babuş, who has persuasively argued that focusing on just one dimension of the law in question – resettling Kurds in the western parts of the country and mingling them with Turks – would lead to a false conclusion.[114] Babuş has persuasively shown that the Resettlement Law (*İskân Konunu*) of 1934 was informed by several concerns – the need to increase the population and productive capacity in the country as a whole, to create a qualitatively better mix of people, inculcate in immigrants and refugees the national culture, open more arable land for agricultural activities, provide land to nomads, modernize life in Turkey by decreasing the hold of the local chieftains on people, teach everybody the Turkish language, impress upon them the mainstream culture and enable them to benefit from citizenship rights; in brief, create a nation loyal to its state, and protect the territorial integrity and national security of the country. It is now in order to elaborate these factors by drawing primarily upon Babuş.

During the First World War, Turkey had lost 30 per cent of its population, which at the time had lived within its present boundaries, while the productive capacity of the rest of the population within those boundaries had experienced a considerable decrease. Therefore, one of the aims behind the Resettlement Law was that of resettling the immigrants and refugees that had streamed to Turkey since the middle of the eighteenth century as a consequence of the loss of territory by the Ottoman Empire, in such a way that the capabilities and abilities of the newcomers and locals would complement each other socio-economically and Turkey would have a qualitatively better mix of population.[115]

In the early years of the Republic, land problems, too, had preoccupied governments. As a consequence of long years of warfare, arable lands were left unused, the bulk of the tilled lands were pillaged, and the public lands remained unattended. Consequently, another goal of the Resettlement Law was that of moving people without land to areas where land was plentiful and productive. According to the Law, in 1934, the year the Law was enacted, the state was obliged to provide land to several categories of people. They

comprised (1) immigrants from other countries, (2) refugees, (3) those who were resettled in Turkey, and (4) those that had paid their taxes, served in the army, and participated in the Turkish War of Independence.[116]

Among other things, the early Republic had been preoccupied with the twin goals of liberating people from their traditional shackles and enabling them to lead 'contemporary' [read, 'modern'] ways of life. Back in 1927, Minister of Interior Şükrü Kaya had pointed out that when the Republic was set up, the 'modern' worldview and practice was challenged by the 'caravan' (pre-industrial) world view and praxis, and the state had to see to it that the former would replace the latter.[117] It had thus become obligatory for the state to abrogate the privileges of the local chieftains and shaikhs. In any case, as loyalty to the state was perceived as an important sign of modernity, it had become imperative for the state to cut the ties of the people with the local chieftains and shaikhs.[118] Furthermore, following the Turkish War of Independence, one of the priorities of the state was that of creating a nation, the members of which would be integrated with each other through a common language, historical affinity, cultural ties, and common sentiments and ideals. As a result, when people were resettled, a chieftain or shaikh and several people around him were not together resettled in a designated area, instead, only father, mother and their unmarried children were resettled together in such areas.[119]

Still another reason why the Resettlement Law was enacted were the serious problems the nomads had for a long time posed to the state. It had not been possible to transform nomads into socio-economically productive people and benefit from the work force they would so constitute without tying them to specific lands and developing in them a sense of citizenship. Consequently, the law also aimed at granting land not tilled for quite some time to the nomads.[120]

The consideration of national security was an additional factor that played a role in the enactment of the law. The first wave of resettlements had occurred in the wake of the Shaikh Said rebellion. When that rebellion was successfully suppressed, the state had put an end to resettlements, which had been made for security purposes. Resort was made to resettlements again when 'troubles' had once more become widespread. At such periods, officials with extraordinary powers were sent to the troubled spots; those officials were empowered to send people to other places if the latter were regarded as likely to incite people to once more revolt against the state.[121]

It is apparent that with the 1934 Resettlement Law the state tried to kill not two but several birds with one stone, and those birds were flying around even before the major 'troubles' had started to take place. This is one reason why one cannot argue that that law in question was enacted with the specific purpose of assimilating the Kurds. The second reason why such an argument cannot hold water is that the law really aimed at creating a new nation through *integration* (different ethnic communities sharing attitudes, values, and ideals and, thus, living together harmoniously while maintaining their

particular ethnic identities) rather than assimilation (forcing one ethnic community to adopt the ethnic primary identity of another ethnic community). It is in order to elaborate the second point, again by drawing primarily upon Babuş.

To reiterate, the Resettlement Law was to contribute to molding a *nation* rather than an *ethnic community* out of disparate elements. In the Justification section of the Law, it was noted that a state without a harmoniously functioning society was not desirable: 'Tanzimat [the Reform Period of 1839–1876] had aimed to create *Osmanlılık* [Ottomanism] out of different ethnicities and sentiments. However, the absolutist dynasty obstructed that project, because absolutism could be maintained only if there existed different elements that could not get along with each other. Incoming immigrants [from the Balkan countries] were not distributed among others; instead each group was settled apart from others so that each group would maintain its own ethnic cultural characteristics. Under the circumstances, even the ethnic Turks among the migrants could not be integrated with the local ethnic Turks and thus remained as communities culturally different from the local ethnic Turks.'[122] A part in the minutes of the Interim Committee of Parliament on the Resettlement Law indicated that such a situation had its adverse effects: 'During the Balkan and First World Wars, those elements with different religions and language did great harm to the [ethnic] Turks.'[123]

The 1934 Law was one of the measures to avoid such a situation in Republican Turkey. It was part of the educational, cultural, organizational, social, and political efforts of the Republican state to create a well integrated nation.[124] The goal was to have citizens whose languages, sentiments, cultures, and ideals would be similar. However, this new nation was to be molded by *integrating*, not *melting* together of different elements; as Babuş put it, the new nation was to be forged 'without discriminating against one or the other, without applying different sanctions to different groups'.[125] This point was, in fact, underlined, in the Justification Section of the Law. There it was indicated that the rationle behind the new lagislation was that of achieving 'cultural unity' ('*vahdet-i hars*'), not ethnic homogeneity.[126]

That what was targeted was integrating, and not melting comes out quite clearly also from the Parliamentary proceedings on the Law. When the government's Bill was read in Parliament, Reşit Bey, MP from Samsun, made the following remark: 'If the word "*soy*" ["descent"] in the Bill is used interchangeably with *ırk* ["race", read ethnicity], it should be deleted. … I propose "Turkish language", "Turkish culture", instead of descent.' Rasih Bey, MP from Antalya concurred with Hasan Reşit Bey. Interior Minister Şükrü Kaya, too, agreed that '*soy*' denotes 'family'. In the event, the amendment proposed by Reşit Bey was adopted.[127]

There is further supporting evidence for the fact that the ultimate aim of the Resettlement Law was integrating the Kurds with other elements, and not assimilating them. The law had made life easier for many people, and

consequently, it received the approval of several groups in the population. After all, those provisions of the Law which had not received the approval of public opinion and/or the chieftains were quickly amended. For instance, when it was observed that efforts to neutralize the persons who were likely to incite further uprisings by removing them caused some practical problems, it was decided to bring them under some kind of discipline in their own home towns/villages. Also, the policies of (1) depriving the chieftains of powers to keep their people under their own control and (2) not resettling those who did not speak Turkish were both abandoned.[128]

It is true that as part of the implementation of the Law, initially around 500 shaikhs and chieftains were banished to the western parts of Turkey. According to the game plan, their lands were to be distributed to peasants. However, by 1942 all of these shaikhs and chieftains had been sent back to their home places and their lands were returned to them.[129] This could easily be done because while the shaikhs and chieftains were away, except those in the northeast province of Kars, the peasants who were settled in the lands of the shaikhs and chieftains benished were not granted title deeds. Consequently, the Law itself and the manner in which it was implemented were not criticized at the time it was implemented; criticisms came later.

Effective public administration for delivering goods and services

Ankara felt the need to establish a more effective public administration in the 'troubled' areas not only for restoring law and order, but also for providing better public services to the people. In his 1935 Report, İnönü stated that the government should render the East not only an area of peace and harmony, but also an area where people could pursue productive activities. Aware of the fact that Ankara did not have adequate numbers of qualified civil servants in the region, he suggested the enlargement of the Civil Service School in Ankara, and the employment of retired military personnel until new qualified personnel were trained.

It is noteworthy that Ankara saw a close relationship between government's providing adequate services, on the one hand, and voluntary 'Turkification' on the part of Kurds (Kurds not insisting on a parallel primary identity of their own, and the state acknowledging the Kurds' distinct secondary identity), on the other. In his 1935 Report, İnönü perceived 'Diyarbakır … [as] advanced enough for promoting Turkism'. On this matter, he continued to make the following observations: 'If Bitlis was left to its own devices, the city might have turned into a Kurdish town. [On the other hand] if the government could start even a small industrial plant there, it might turn things around. Malazgirt is unbelievably underdeveloped; it will be very valuable if this place is recreated as a new Turkish city without any problems. Towns like Mardin and Midyat have enthusiasm for Turkism; in such places I have come across people who are willing to have

Turkish surnames. Christian Chaldaens are industrious and respectful; their only concern is to be able to go on living where they are settled. If we can set up an effective administration responsive to local needs, we can keep such elements loyal to the state'. It is apparent that concerning non-Turkish Muslim citizens, not unexpectedly, İnönü had in mind (voluntary) *cultural* nationalism and thought that providing adequate services would be instrumental for those citizens' voluntarily adopting Turkism in a generic sense. In the case of non-Muslim citizens, he had in mind *civic* nationalism; he figured that providing adequate services would suffice to render those citizens loyal to the Republic.

That Ankara considered providing adequate services to the southeast as the number one positive measure for dealing with the Kurdish unrest is another manifestation of the fact that Ankara had not seen the 'troubles' as an upshot of ethnic unrest. As noted above, in Ankara's view the harshness of the measures should depend on the level of threat the country faced. It was also pointed out that for Ankara the Dersim rebellion had posed the greatest threat, and accordingly Ankara had adopted rather harsh measures during that rebellion. At the same time, because Ankara envisaged a close relationship between providing services and loyalty to the state, that is, subscription to the primary identity of Turkism in a generic sense, Ankara came up with relatively more services in the case of Dersim than it did in other spots of trouble. In his memoirs, İnönü has proudly indicated that when he left office (Presidency) in 1950, that is when the Republicans had lost the 1950 general elections and were turning over government to the Democrats, Tunceli 'had more primary schools than any other province in the country'.[130] It should also be noted that when İnönü as President allowed Celal Bayar to form the opposition Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*-DP), one of the conditions he set was that Bayar's party was to complete 'the grand programme of primary school education in some key cities in the east', including Tunceli.[131]

The DP governments in turn placed emphasis on rural development and agricultural mechanization and modernization in the Kurdish provinces, as well as in the rest of the country. Also, the populist democracy and clientalist policies of the DP opened a political space for the Kurdish shaikhs and chieftains. The latter began to exercise leverage over political parties and, consequently, began to constitute a relatively large percentage of the MPs in Parliament.[132]

However, these policies could not have been fully implemented. Despite the good intentions of the state to deliver as many goods and services as it could to the areas of 'troubles', what was achieved in this regard remained far behind what was needed. The basic reason was that the state simply did not have enough resources to make good what it intended to do. It has, in fact, been suggested that this was the primary reason behind the state's playing off different tribes by making use of long-lingering hostilities, blood feuds,

and clash of interests between those communities and, in addition, secretly bribing tribal leaders as part of its efforts to co-opt them.[133]

As noted above, during the second round of 'troubles', channeling of as much funds as possible to the southeast continued; relatively speaking the funds set aside for the southeast were greater than those set aside for other regions. The bulk of the said funds, however, came from the state coffers: because of the underdeveloped stage of infrastructure and the threat the PKK posed to the life and property of those who did not support it. In the event, the private sector remained unwilling to invest in the southeast. If more funds were channeled to the southeast, that region could be socio-economically more developed and the game plan of the PKK – that of trying to mobilize people for its cause with the propaganda that the state left the southeast underdeveloped – could be frustrated.

Lingering forgiving attitude towards the Kurds

It is a fact that from time to time Ankara made resort to harsh measures in order to effectively deal with the problems in the southeast. On the other hand, due to the fact that Ankara did not see ethnicity as the root cause of the those problems, the harsh measures were not applied all the time. Whenever a Kurdish rebellion erupted, whether or not harsh methods were used to suppress it, Ankara thought it was a miscalculated move on the part of the Kurds and that the latter would soon realize that what they did was a mistake and would be willing to rectify it. It was for this reason that, as noted above, sometimes Ankara's first reaction to the restlessness on the part of the Kurds was to try to help the latter to accept the fact that they had made a mistake and that they should change their ways.

Ankara had reasons to think along those lines. Soon after the November 1920 Kurdish Koçgiri rebellion started, local notables in the town of Zara sent word to Ankara that they were very much grieved about what was taking place and they were ready to turn over the rebels to the government forces. In the process, in March 1921, one of the leaders of the rebellion, Haydar Bey, was reinstated in his old job of being the head of the sub-district (nahiye) of Ümraniye, by requesting unqualified amnesty for his tribe.[134] It was for this reason that Ankara had sent a 'Counselling Mission' to the rebels when the very first rebellions had taken place in the early 1920s.

That the state would not feel a grudge against the rebels and welcome them back to its fold was underlined by İnönü when he said that there was a need to 'persuade the chieftains who err that the only way out for them is that of finding salvation in the just and forgiving bosom of the government'.[135] During the three major Kurdish revolts of 1925, 1930, and 1937, from time to time Ankara adopted a forgiving stance towards Kurds. Even during the most critical Dersim rebellion of 1937, on the eve of a new offensive by the government forces, leaflets were dropped in the areas of rebellion,

in which Ankara indicated that it was prepared to embrace the people with affection and make their life joyous if the latter realized that the rebels were acting in 'a discourteous manner towards the state' and people turned them over to the state. It was added that if the people did not act in the said-manner they, too, would suffer and suffer unnecessarily.[136] Following the suppression of this rather dangerous rebellion, too, the state did not act in a hostile manner to the people in the region. The policies adopted at the time comprised rounding up the weapons, endeavouring to set up a just and effective judicial system, and trying to resolve economic problems, including that of providing jobs for the people.[137]

In less troublesome periods, the state acted even more generously towards the rebels. For instance, in the early months of 1928, one witnessed a period of relative moderation in Ankara's policy towards the Kurds. At the time, one İbrahim Tali was appointed as Governor-General of the eastern provinces. He immediately arranged for a partial amnesty. In April of that year, many Kurds who earlier were involved in the uprisings in one way or another and were banished to the western parts of the country, were allowed to return to their home towns or villages in the southeast. Two months later, many rebel leaders too, were able to return to their hometowns, thanks to an Amnesty Law enacted by Parliament. Among the latter were two of Shaikh Saids brothers and two of his sons. İbrahim Tali also started a road-building programme, and suggested to Ankara the re-distribution of the large estates of the Kurdish chieftains. Although its implementation left much to be desired, in June 1929, a law made possible the break-up of chieftains' big estates to grant them to peasants.

One came across such non-hostile attitudes towards the Kurds during the later periods, too. 55 chieftains sent to western Turkey in the wake of the 1960 military intervention were allowed to return to their home towns and villages the next year.[138] It should also be reiterated that despite the fact that the full scale armed conflict between the PKK and government forces during the second round of troubles lasted around 15 years, and the casualties on both sides reached around 35,000, one did not observe a generalized hostility towards the Kurds on the part of the Turks.

Parallel policies and praxis

Officials on the ground

Not all civil servants on the ground, however, followed the generally moderate policy lines adopted by Atatürk, İnönü, and other top statesmen of the Republic in respect to the Kurds. Officials on the ground tended to continuously act towards the Kurds in a rather harsh manner and did not seem to feel much compassion for them. There seems to have been three major reasons for this state of affairs, none of which could have been the consequence of an ethnic motive. First, on the whole, there were not clear lines of

communications between Ankara and the localities, including the southeast. Secondly, to the extent those lines of communications existed, there was a discrepancy between what signals officials could have received from Ankara and the actual practice on the part of the officers on the ground, which for the most part they must have observed at close hand.[139] Thirdly, throughout the Republican period, the officials have always looked down upon the people as a whole. They must have had an even more condescending attitude towards the Kurds, because whatever signals they could receive from Ankara must have persuaded several of them, if not all of them, that the Kurds were uncivilized people who did not deserve a mild treatment by others. As already noted, although Ankara did think that the Kurds were 'uncivilized' people, it also thought that the Kurds could be educated and rendered 'civilized'. Consequently, not only during the normal times but also in the times of 'troubles', Ankara tended to think that the Kurds should not be subjected to unfair treatment. Nevertheless, officials must have continued to act in a discriminatory manner to the Kurds, because until recently Ankara's projects not only on this matter but also on other matters on the whole could hardly be fully carried out, because of either 'recurring troubles' or the intransigence of officials on the ground and officers in particular, both in Ankara and on the ground.

That in different periods the Kurds in the southeast were not treated in a fair manner was admitted either directly or indirectly by various members of the establishment in Ankara. In the early 1920s, some MPs in Parliament accused officials on the ground of treating people in the southeast rather badly and thought of this as one of the reasons behind the local uprisings[140]. In the mid-1930s, Celal Bayar, then Minister of Economy, acknowledged that the state was also responsible for the 'unrest in the East'. He noted that officials in the region did not have a clear idea of which policy they were supposed to implement in that region. He implied that it was because of this reason that officials there were 'guilty' of acting in a discriminatory manner towards the Kurds. In this connection, Bayar also pointed out that some citizens of the Republic were being deprived of education or not being recruited for government jobs because they were Kurds.[141] In 1937, İnönü in Parliament went so far as apologizing for the manner in which Kurds were treated by the sceurity forces: 'I would like to express the sorrow of the Grand National Assembly for those who had been subjected to harsh disciplinary action by the government for the wrongful acts that they committed deliberately or otherwise.'[142] In 1989, Prime Minister Turgut Özal indicated that the past policies of repression when there was no need for it was a mistake.[143] In 1993, in the coalition protocol signed by Tansu Çiller, leader of the True Path Party and Erdal İnönü, leader of the Social Democratic Populist Party, it was stated that while the fight against the terrorism would continue, there should be full respect for human rights.[144]

Officers

As compared to their civilian counterparts, officers often acted in a harsher manner towards the Kurds who were involved or suspected by the officers of having been involved in the uprisings. Following the 1930 Rebellion, which had started in the Province of Ağrı, Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, Chief of General Staff, sent a note to the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Interior, in which he noted: 'I have considered it necessary to demolish the villages of Açkırık, Gürk, Dağbey, and Henzi, because they … were responsible for the extensive disorder in the province of Erzincan. Within the city of Ercincan, there are ten thousand Kurds. They are trying to Kurdify the Turkish villages by spreading Kurdish. Some civil servants in Erzincan are Kurds by race [read, 'ethnicity']. … These civil servants should be appointed elsewhere as soon as possible.' In a separate note to the Ministry of Interior, Field Marshal Çakmak also wrote: 'Kurds are settling in Turkish villages in a systematic manner. They are hiding and guiding brigands. These harmful families should be banished to the Thrace [northwestern tip of Turkey].'[145] Field Marshal Çakmak had other ethnically informed views, too: he did not want to see military officers with a Kurdish descent; he also made it a rule not to admit to the military schools students who had a particular type of abscess in any part of their body; at the time, that type of abscess was thought to be widespread in people living in eastern and southeastern Turkey. It has been argued that Field Marshal Çakmak's 'racist and provocative policies and views' rather than those of the government, which were not ethnically motivated, often carried the day.[146]

The military continued to play the hawk rather than the dove for quite some time during the second round of 'troubles', too, and they often made resort to rather harsh means to suppress the PKK. In 1990, the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), in its lengthy Report mentioned above, recommended easing the tension created in the southeast by the rough methods employed by the military.[147] The next year, as again noted above, Prime Minister Demirel declared that Turkey recognized its Kurdish reality. None of these two initiatives had any recognizable impact on the state-Kurd relations in the southeast. For in the view of the military, any compromise on the Kurdish issue before the total suppression of the PKK would have demoralized the military. In any case, according to the military, the resolving of the conflict in the southeast depended upon the adoption of the necessary socio-economic measures, which could only be translated into action once the PKK surrendered without any conditions and qualifications.[148] The next political leader to make an open recognition of the Kurds was Tansu Çiller who had become Prime Minister when Demirel was elected President of the Republic in 1993. Çiller, too, mentioned the need to remove the obstacles to free speech by citizens based on their ethnic, cultural and linguistic identities. However, Çiller was also persuaded by the military not to insist on that

issue, and she quickly shelved her project.[149] In addition, Çiller granted full authority to the military high command for dealing with the southeast problem in the manner they saw fit.

However, such policies and practice on the part of the officers seem to have been informed by their concern for the national unity and the territorial integrity of the country and their fears of an ideological fragmentation taking place in the country, and not by an ethnic management strategy. Consequently, the policy favoured even by Field Marshal Çakmak was that of distancing oneself from differences rather than eliminating them. It must have been because of this reason that from the late 1990s onwards, the state in Turkey could recognize the Kurdish reality and begin to grant the Kurds their cultural rights.

8
Conclusion

It is now in order to present a summary of the primary findings of the present essay, make a brief evaluation of the present paradigm in the light of the findings of our essay, and offer some additional observations, which may be useful for studying the Kurdish issue in Turkey from a comparative perspective.

Primary findings of the present essay

The Ottomans did not destroy the communities they brought under their suzerainty; instead, they subsumed them. They superseded ethnic identities by religious and 'political' ones. The ultimate goal was that of integration rather than forced assimilation. In the Ottoman realms one came across syncretism and hybridism rather than the hegemony of one element over the others. The elements that consituted that society experienced a great deal of accommodation and symbiosis. The latter process, however, did not end up in the homogenization of the syncretic and hybrid. The Ottoman state lacked an ethnic 'core'. The 'Turks' in the Ottoman Empire were one of the *millet*s. The Ottoman ruling stratum acted as the representative of the state rather than one or more elements of the periphery. The centre endeavoured to represent the collectivity of all of the elements. The state differentiated the elements it ruled into the categories of Islam and non-Islam; that conceptualization transcended ethnicity. In the Ottoman Empire, there was a tendency to subscribe to a frontier Islam – a mystic, not doctrinaire, form of Islam. The 'other' remained alien to that Islam. Toleration as acceptance became salient. The ideal pursued was living harmoniously with the different. The Ottomans, in fact, attempted to freeze the difference, not change it.

The ethnic transformation in the Ottoman Empire took the form of, initially mutual and, later for the most part one-way, acculturation; the Ottomans did not resort to forced assimilation. Every element, including the non-Muslims, maintained their secondary identities, which derived from ethnicity, religion, history, and/or language. Each religious community enjoyed extensive autonomy in respect to faith and education.

The Ottomans did not pursue a policy of forceful assimilation towards the Kurds either. Furthermore, particularly in respect to the Kurdish tribes situated in the stronghold of the inaccessible mountains, the Ottomans developed a special policy of 'revive, unite, and let them rule themselves to the extent feasible'. It was difficult for any group to turn the Kurds into nationalists, because their basic loyalty was to their tribes. The Kurdish uprisings, which, during Ottoman times, took place in the nineteenth century, had only such non-ethnic causes as the threat the 'alarming increase in Western penetration' posed to Islam and traditional society, complaints about their socio-economic conditions, the manner in which local Ottoman administrators treated them, and, in particular, the centralization policy of the state.

The Ottomans acted with a great deal of leniency towards the Kurds. Their efforts to render the elements of the realm worthy subjects of the Ottoman state focused particularly on the Kurds. The educated Kurds were favoured for state employment at all levels. In the late nineteenth century, the Kurds were given priority for being integrated with the Turks. On the whole, the Kurds appreciated such policies and remained loyal subjects of the Ottoman state. In the Ottoman Empire, one generally came across harmonious relations between Kurds and the state. In the view of Ottomans, Anatolia was made up of 'Kurd and Turk'.

In the nineteenth century, the state declared equality among all elements of the Empire, regardless of religon and ethnicity. The goal was again that of providing unity within diversity. In that nineteenth century, however, the non-Muslims tended towards an exit strategy; some of them did set up their own state. Thereupon, the earlier formula of 'not exactly equal but separate and acceptable' was replaced by that of 'integrated and equal'. When this policy did not work in the case of the non-Muslims, Ottoman-Islamism was adopted. The state now wanted to hold together at least the Muslim elements of the Empire. When this policy, too, could not prevent all the Muslim elements of the Empire from exiting, it was concluded that the 'Turks' themselves had to salvage the Empire. Consequently, the nationalism of the Turks turned out to be inward-looking and defensive. Emphasis was placed upon enabling the Turks to regain their self-confidence and act in patriotic manner. At the start of the twentieth century, leading Turkish intellectuals did not act as proponents of views that would render the Turks hostile towards the different, of either ethnic or religious variety. Until the very end of the Ottoman Empire (1918), Ottomanism and Islamism kept their salience, since a longing for common Ottoman citizenship lingered on. Although the view that only the ethnic Turks could save their country kept its salience; there was again no resort to exclusivist nationalism with emphasis instead placed on egalitarianism. In the Young Turks' view, the universalization of the language was necessary for enabling the non-Turks to participate in and make contributions to the social, economic, and political

life of the country. The Turkism of the Young Turks developed as a corollary to Ottomanism. Their Turkism stood for solidarity; it did not favour the ethnic Turks at the expense of the other elements of the Empire.

With the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic, an effort was made to replace the religious community with a secular nation. The notions of *unity*, deriving from common culture, and *variety*, a reflection of the fact that the common culture in question was not the culture of one community but a culture that various communities shared, led initially to the adoption in Turkey of cultural nationalism. Cultural nationalism was later supplemented by civic nationalism. In that country, not only civic nationalism, but also cultural nationalism was inclusive nationalism at least vis-à-vis the Kurds and other Muslim elements, if not to non-Muslims elements. In later decades, civic nationalism became preponderant. From the very beginning, the word 'Turk' was not used as an *adjective*; it remained a generic *name* denoting the primary identity of all those peoples who shared a common culture and/or thought themselves as the citizens of Turkey. In the process, such projects as the Turkish Historical Thesis, the Sun-Language Theory and even Turanism had no ethnic foundations. The 'Thesis' and 'Theory' were inward-looking and defensive projects; they were formulated to help people to regain their self-confidence and come to have national consciousness. In any case, before long those at the highest echelons of the state changed their minds about the Turkish Historical Thesis and Sun-Language Theory; the same leaders had never supported Turanism.

In the Republican period, a great majority of Kurds had become integrated with the Turks, and took part in national life and politics. Consequently, even during the periods of 'troubles', no generalized and lingering hostility developed between the Kurds and Turks. The founders of the Republic even toyed with the idea of granting the Kurds autonomy in the areas they lived. The founders changed their mind only when they realized that the Kurds did not all live in separate enclaves, but were spread out in many parts of the country. The founders wished to unite the Turks and the Kurds on a common platform of 'contemporary civilization', although they were aware of the fact that Islam continued to constitute an important dimension of the value systems and attitudes of not only the Kurds, but also of the Turks. Consequently, despite the fact that Turkey had constitutionally adopted civic nationalism, in practice that nationalism was for a long time supplemented by cultural nationalism; one could become a real Turk to the extent to which one adopted the ideals, values, and attitudes of the ethnic Turks. This particular approach, of course, worked against the non-Muslim citizens of Turkey, but not against the Kurds. There was a difference between the civilian and military arms of the state when it came to the implementation of the state policies. On the whole, officers preferred to act in a more suppressive manner towards the Kurds than did the officials. At times, this has

resulted in rather harsh treatment of Kurds, which in some cases ended in the loss of lives on the part of the latter. On the other hand, such treatment accorded to Kurds was not because officers subscribed to ethnic nationalism, but because they securitized the issue and thought they were in the best position to deal with it. They must also have over reacted to the many soldiers and civilians being killed by the PKK. On the problem of how to deal with the Kurdish issue, more often than not, the military displayed a dominant role. During the first round of 'troubles', particularly on the ground the military often prevailed over the civilians; during the second round of 'troubles', not only on the ground, but also in Ankara, the military often played a critical role From the 1960s onwards and particularly during the 1990s, the military came to the conclusion that the forceful suppression of the Kurds should be supplemented by other kinds of measures, too. This development plus the European Union factor facilitated granting the Kurds some cultural rights.

Since the assimilation of the Kurds has not been the official policy of the Republican state, that state attributed the first round of 'troubles' basically to Islamic factors and foreign complicity, and the second round to the radical left movement. From time to time, but particularly towards the end of the second round of 'troubles', the state also admitted that the harsh treatment that the Kurds were subjected to might also have played a role in the Kurdish restlessness. Consequently, the measures adopted by the state in order to deal with the 'troubles' were also non-ethnic. They have comprised (1) maintenance of law and order, sometimes for its own sake, and during other times, particularly during the second round of 'troubles', for also being able to act responsively to the socio-economic needs in the southeast, (2) the policy of non-recognition, but not denial, for preventing the secondary ethnic identity of the Kurds from replacing their 'presumed' primary identity of being a 'Turk' in a generic sense, (3) establishment of a modern state so that the loyalties of the Kurds from shaikhs and chieftains could be diverted to that state and the Republican national identity would substitute the tribal identity of the Kurds, (4) 'civilizing' the Kurds, as a consequence of which they would not revolt and they could even be integrated into the mainstream socio-economic and political life, and (5) setting up an effective public administration, for delivering goods and services in the southeast, too. All along, at least at its higher echelons, the state displayed a sympathetic, if not a compassionate attitude, towards the Kurds and acted accordingly even in the heat of 'troubles'.

Present paradigm versus present essay

Concerning the Kurdish issue in Turkey, present author arrived at the conclusions presented above, because that author have posed a number of questions that others who have worked on the same issue by subscribing to the

received paradigm, have not raised. Those questions included the following:

- Is it possible to account for all the periods during which the Kurdish issue has been with us in terms of the assimilation-resistance-suppression paradigm? How can one explain the periods of relative peace and quite in the state-Kurd relationship by that paradigm?
- Would the rulers of a country in which, for centuries, peoples of different faiths and ethnic origins had been able to live in relative harmony, decide one day to assimilate one of those peoples, particularly the one, which, compared to some others, displayed less difference?
- When it comes to issues like the present one, is it not necessary to distinguish official policy from other views? Is it not also necessary to differentiate policies developed at the centre from the manner in which they have been implemented on the ground?
- Should one not make the assumption that there may be myriad reasons behind each and every policy measure and, therefore, should one not jump to the conclusion that there would be only one single reason behind those policy measures?

The bulk of the literature on the Kurdish issue in Turkey have not raised the above and similar questions while studying that issue. Many seemed to have started with the assumption that the 'assimilation-resistance-suppression' paradigm was the most appropriate one. Whenever they came across a certain statement or event that seemingly supported their assumption, they readily used it for providing additional fodder to the received wisdom based on the *assimilation-resistance-suppression paradigm*. The present essay has developed out of the view on the part of the present author that the present paradigm turns out to be less than adequate when one raises the above questions and it should be replaced by the *acculturation-concern for de-acculturation-non-recognition paradigm for the* following reasons:

- The works drawing upon the present paradigm suggest that the state attempted to assimilate the Kurds; the Kurds resorted to rebellion; and the state tried to suppress those rebellions so that it could continue to assimilate the Kurds. The present essay proposes that there had been a long acculturation process between the Kurds and Turks; at some points, for non-ethnic reasons, the Kurds resorted to rebellions; in reaction, the state adopted a non-recognition policy for it was concerned about the start of a de-acculturation process on the part of the Kurds which could promote the secondary (ethnic) identity of the Kurds at the expense of their primary identity of being Turk in a generic sense.
- Those working with the received paradigm argue that the state denied the existence of ethnic Kurds; it tried to render 'errant Turks' into genuine Turks. The present essay points out that the state did not deny the

existence of the ethnic Kurds; during the periods of 'troubles', it did not openly recognize that fact with the hope that such a policy would prevent Kurds from stressing their secondary ethnic identity and thus find it difficult to live with the primary identity of being a Turk in a generic sense.

Some additional observations

The present essay does not have a comparative perspective. This is because it was figured that the first priority was that of coming up with a more valid narrative of the Kurdish issue in Turkey than has been provided by the received wisdom. In a comparative study of the Turkish case, it may be useful to keep in mind the following points.

Since there has been an acculturation between Kurds and Turks for many centuries, there was in Turkey no reason for the state to resort to not only forced assimilation but also to *accommodation*, that is the state responding to demands from the Kurdish ethnic community by changing its own political system in order to provide formal recognition of the ethnic diversity in the country. Given the presumption of an adequate degree of cultural homogeneity at least among the Muslim citizens of the state, except for a while in the early 1920s, no need was felt either for *political accommodation arrangements* (consociation, or power sharing at the level of the central government, or federalism, or territorial autonomy granted to component units of the state, both in accordance with ethnic principle) or for *group rights* (going beyond merely recognizing the equality of citizens and setting up a separate legal framework and creating devolved institutions with non-territorial jurisdiction), for the provision of rights in the areas of culture, language, and education. It was only from the late 1990s onwards that the state began to grant *cultural rights* to the Kurds. Here, Turkey's efforts to become a full member of the European Union (EU) as well as the more liberal attitude adopted by the military, rather than demands made by Kurds, have played a significant role.

One did come across the granting of group rights in the Ottoman Empire in the case of the non-Muslims, who were recognized as *millet*s and granted autonomy in their internal affairs in such areas as religion and education. In the post-1923 Republic, those same non-Muslims have been considered as 'minorities', and granted similar group rights. In contrast, the state considered the Kurds as well as other Muslim communities of non-Turkish ethnic origin as 'first class citizens', and thus has not granted them such specific rights. In the view of the state, the granting of groups rights to the Kurds would have amounted to discrimination against a cross-section of the population who were not 'minorities' and who were, in contrast, 'an integral part of the mainstream population'.[1] When in 2004 the state began (limited) TV

broadcasting in Kurdish, as well as in some other ethnic languages, an uneasiness has arisen among several ethnic groups in Turkey; the latter registered their opposition to such broadcasting by arguing this would be tantamount to the state viewing them as 'second class citizens'.[2]

In the last analysis, in normal times, the state's strategies of conflict management towards the Kurds fluctuated between one of non-recognition (in the times of troubles and for some time afterwards) and *indigenization*, or unsolicited state policies of cultivation of ethnic communities in general by making concessions in the political and cultural domains where no such concessions were sought. The state acted in an egalitarian manner to all Muslim ethnic groups including the Kurds, not because the state believed in cultural pluralism, but because it envisaged all Muslim ethnic groups as equally valuable parts of the 'near homogeneous Turkish nation'.

It should also be noted that the Republican Turkey came to have a Jacobinist state, which considered itself above society.[3] As Faruk Birtek has put it, the state in Turkey acted as the initiator and guardian of 'universalism ... by distancing itself from rather than attempting to transform or incorporate the cultural periphery in the countryside'.[4] It is true that Kurdish insurrections during the early Republican era were, among other things, a response to the state's efforts to uproot Kurds' authority structures at the local level. However, those efforts were not the upshot of the state's unsympathetic views towards the Kurds, but were a consequence of its notion of the state-society relations, which, not unlike the French case, always viewed intermediary structures between the state and the individual as suspect. According to this view, intermediary structures in question always promoted partial interests, and this state of affairs prevented the state from acting towards its citizens in an egalitarian manner. As a result, in 'normal' times, *indigenization* policies were adopted; the Kurds, along with other Muslim ethnic communities, were not treated differently in the provision of education, in employment, in politics, in having opportunities to be employers and in carrying out their professions, in owning real estate, in living in places they chose to settle and the like.

Where one comes across ethnic discrimination, those who act in a discriminatory manner do not consider the other ethnic group(s) as worth enjoying any of the above rights. Those subscribing to the present paradigm, have argued that such opportunities were granted only to 'Turkified Kurds', not to the 'Kurds proper'. It should be kept in mind that such rights were granted both during the Ottoman times and also from the very inception of the Republic, that is, during the times when Kurds could hardly be 'Turkified'.

In 'normal times', the state granted to the Kurds the right of cultural expression, because it has not denied the ethnic identity of its Kurdish citizens. In such times, the state concluded that since considerable acculturation had already taken place, the adoption of an exit strategy by its Kurdish

citizens was not likely. However, even then, the state granted to the Kurds rights for cultural expression, not within the framework of group rights but as part and parcel of individual rights and freedoms.

During the Republican period (from 1923 to the present), there was an additional reason why the state would not have attempted a forceful assimilation of the Kurds. It is true that according to the 1924, 1961, and 1982 Constitutions of the Republican Turkey, the official policy of the Republic has been *civic nationalism*, that is, those who professed loyalty to the state were considered a Turk, irrespective of culture, religion, and language. In actual fact, the civic nationalism had been supplemented by cultural nationalism both before and after civic nationalism had been adopted: those who internalized the constellation of ideals, values and attitudes that give rise to a 'we' feeling have been considered real Turks. Islam has been taken as a crucial dimension of the cultural nationalism in question.[5] The masses in turn accepted said nationalism by identifying it with religion.[6] Consequently, in normal times, the state perceived the Kurds, too, who are Muslims, as 'first class citizens'.

Though the situation started to change, though rather gradually, from the 1990s onwards, even at the turn of the century, the state in Turkey continued to view only its non-Muslims citizens – Armenians, Greeks, and Jews as no more than 'minorities' both in legal and actual terms.[7] At least at its face value, a seemingly justifiable criticism may be made concerning the last point made here: if the non-Muslims in Turkey are viewed as 'minorities' and treated as such, that is, if they are discriminated against because of their religion, and given the fact that in general religion is one of the markers of ethnicity, how can one claim that Republican nationalism is a civic-cum-cultural nationalism, and not an ethnic nationalism? The criterion that the state in Turkey has used concerning the question of who is a minority and who is not, is not a nominal affiliation to a religion; it is the degree to which one's values and attitudes derive from religion, for the latter facilitates or makes difficult the internalization by that person of a certain set of ideals, values, and attitudes. All along the state figured that Islam as ethics and morality has been part and parcel of the culture of the (Muslim) people, and that the internalization of the Islamic tenets of ethics and morality accelerated the process of one's being acculturated to the mainstream ideals, values, and attitudes. In the state's view, from this perspective, the non-Muslim citizens were at a disadvantage; because they were believers of different religions and thus it was more difficult for them to go through the same degree of the required acculturation that Muslim citizens could.

This has not meant that the state has perceived the ideals, values, and attitudes that its non-Muslim citizens have displayed as completely different from those held by the Muslim ones. It is fitting to remember here that in 1921, Atatürk had pointed out that as a consequence of having lived

together in Anatolia for several centuries, people of Turkey, irrespective of their ethnicity *and* religion, had gradually become a 'nation'. It is significant that in making this point, Atatürk had talked about the *amalgamation* of ethnic traditions and cultures, and not *incorporation* or *absorption* of those traditions and cultures. This means that as far as the state has been concerned, the non-Muslims in Turkey, too, have been 'Turks', not only because they have professed loyalty to the state, but also because they have shared common ideals, values, an attitudes, even though not as much as the Muslim citizens have done so. What is particularly important for the present purpose is that in the case of either Muslim or non-Muslim citizens of Turkey, ethnicity has not been a marker of nationality.

Still another reason why the state in Turkey did not resort to a forceful assimilation of the Kurds was that the founders of the Republic attributed the demise of the Ottoman Empire to the manner in which Islam could be used to frustrate the efforts of modernizing the Empire.[8] Consequently, subscribing to the Enlightenment philosophy, the primary concern of the founders of the Republic was that of creating a new Turk who, when faced with a problem, would use his/her own reasoning faculties rather than turning to the Book. Thus, the nationalism project of the founders was that of replacing the *religious community* the Republic had inherited from the Ottoman Empire with a *secular nation*, and not by a *completely homogeneous ethnic community*.

In the last analysis, what one observed at the inception of the Republic was a 'state-nation', rather than a 'nation-state', or a state preoccupied with what was considered as the existential task of modernizing its own nation *in its totality* and obtaining the loyalty of all ethnic groups to the central authority by acting towards them in a just and egalitarian manner. Under the circumstances, nation-building in Turkey did not turn out to be that of reifying one ethnic group at the expense of others. Rather, the founders of the Republic were engaged in a project of civilization; they set the goal of the new Republic as that of 'catching up with the contemporary civilization and even surpassing it'; they also aimed at bringing civilization to each and every element of the nation-in-the-making, Kurds, Turks, and the others.

An attempt to study the Kurdish issue in Turkey from a comparative perspective should also take into account the fact that, in S. N. Eisenstadt's terminology, Turkey has had an imperial-bureaucratic antecedent regime and not an imperial-feudal or a patrimonial antecedent regime.[9] Consequently, in Turkey one came across a ruling stratum that could exercise inordinate control over the society, and was not controlled by it, as has been the case in realms with an imperial-feudal antecedent regime. Also, the ruling stratum in question was quite autonomous from society, and the situation was not the other way round, as one would have observed in realms with a patrimonial antecedent regimes. These two characteristics of the ruling stratum in

Turkey made possible the emergence of a state that had not been rooted on an ethnic core. As already noted, in that country this situation seems to have eventually led to the phenomenon of a Jacobinist 'state-nation' rather than 'nation- state; the consequences of which have been the absence of a hegemonic ethnic community and thus also of forceful assimilation.

Notes and References

1 Introduction

1 Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Değişen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* (Istanbul: TESEV, 2006), p. 29.
2 *Milliyet* (Istanbul daily), 22 March 2007.
3 Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 112–113.
4 Henry J. Barkey and Graham Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (New York: Rowman and Little, 1998). p. 11.
5 Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985), p. 356.
6 John Coakley, 'The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology', *International Political Science Review* 13, no. 4 (1992), p. 344.
7 Nader Entessar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992), p. 159.
8 Arthur Campbell Turner, 'Kurdish Nationalism' in *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*, Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 379.
9 Michael M. Gunther, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 43.
10 Martin van Bruinessen, 'Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems', in *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, Philip Kragenbrook and Stefan Speri, eds. (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 65.
11 Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, 1880–1925* (Austin: University of Austin Press, 1989), p. 161.
12 Anthony Hyman, 'Elusive Kurdistan: The Struggle for Recognition', *Conflict Studies*, no. 214 (1988), p. 8.
13 M. Hakan Yavuz, 'A Preamble to the Kurdish Question: The Politics of Kurdish Identity', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18, no. 1 (April 1998), p. 3.
14 Hugh Poulton, *Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic: Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent* (London: Hurst, 1997), pp. 317ff.
15 Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 97.
16 This point is elaborated in Chapters Four and Five.
17 This argument is developed at length in Chapter Six.
18 This point is elaborated in Chapter Six.
19 James Brown, 'The Turkish Imbroglio: The Kurds', *The Annals*, 541 (September 1995), p. 1.
20 Philip Robins, 'The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and Kurdish Issue', *International Affairs* 69, no. 4 (October 1993), p. 658.
21 Henry J. Barkey and Graham Fuller, 'Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities', *Middle East Journal* 51, no 1 (Winter 1997), p. 63.
22 Brown, 'The Turkish Imbroglio', p. 17.
23 This is point is taken up at length in Chapter Two.

24 H. Ayla Kılıç, 'Democratization, Human Rights, and Ethnic Policies in Turkey', *Journal of Muslim-Minority Affairs* 18, no. 1 (April 1998), p. 6. Field Marshal Fevzi Çakmak, a member of the close entourage of Atatürk during the Turkish War of Independence, served as Chief of the General Staff from 1922 to 1944.
25 Gunther, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*, p. 5.
26 Mustafa Sönmez, *Doğu Anadolu'nun Hikayesi. Kürtler: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarih*, second edition (Ankara: Arkadaş Yayınevi, 1992). Also see, Mehmet Turgut, *Türkiye Modeli ve Bask Modeli* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1994), pp. 52ff.
27 For this definition, and the definitions of terms related to the ethnic management strategies, the author either derives upon or else has been inspired by John Coakley, 'The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology', *International Political Science Review* 13, no. 4 (1992): 343–53.
28 Those reasons are taken up in Chapter Six.
29 For the distinction between non-recognition of ethnicity and forced assimilation, see P. L. van den Berghe, 'Protection of Ethnic Minorities: A Critical Appraisal', in R. G. Virsing, ed., *Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1981), pp. 343–55.
30 Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 40.
31 Ibid., p. 37.
32 Ahmet Evin, personal correspondence, August 2006.
33 The policy of breaking up collectivities and resettling their members in different parts of the country was an often-resorted to strategy of both the Republican and Ottoman rulers. See, Şerif Mardin, 'Power, Civil Society, and Culture in the Ottoman Empire' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 12 (1969), p. 265. For an elaboration of the rationale behind the banishments during the times of 'troubles', see Chapter Seven.
34 Gunther, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*, p. 404.
35 Ibid., pp. 37–38.
36 Marvine Howe, *Turkey Today: A Nation Divided over Islam's Revival* (London: John Murray, 1997), pp. 83 and 79, respectively.
37 Stephen Kinzer, *Crescent and Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds* (New York: Farrar, 2001), p. 133.
38 Howe, *Turkey Today*, p. 76.
39 Kinzer, *Crescent and Star*, pp. 134–35.
40 Barkey and Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, p. 12.
41 Entassar, *Kurdish Ethnonationalism*, p. 98.
42 Macdonald, 'The Kurds', p. 131.

2 Tolerance as Acceptance

1 Carter Vaughn Findley, *The Turks in World History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 43.
2 Ibid.
3 M. Fuad Köprülü, *Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (Prolegomena)*, translated from Turkish and edited by Gary Leiser who also wrote the Introduction (Salt Lake City: Utah University Press, 1993), p. 5.
4 Ziya Gökalp, *Principles of Turkism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), pp. 26–27, 117.
5 Professor Şükrü Hanioğlu, personal correspondence, September 2005.
6 Köprülü, *Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion*, pp. 4–5.

7 Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman Empire* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), p. 2.
8 Speros Vryonis, Jr., 'The Byzantine Legacy and Ottoman Forms', paper read at a symposium entitled, 'After the Fall of Constantinople', held at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1968, pp. 268, 270.
9 Halil İnalcık, 'The "Ottoman Civilization" and Palace Patronage', in *Ottoman Civilization*, Halil İnalcık and Günsel Renda, eds. (Ankara: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004), p. 17.
10 Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany: State University of New York, 2003), pp. 131–132.
11 İnalcık, 'The "Ottoman Civilization" and Palace Patronage', p. 16.
12 Kinross, Lord [John Patrick Douglas Balfour, Baron], *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Morrow Quill, 1977), pp. 112–113.
13 Professor Stanford J. Shaw, personal communication, August 2005.
14 Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2002), p. 129.
15 Halil İnalcık, 'Tarihsel Bağlamda Sivil Toplum ve Tarikatlar', unpublished manuscript, pp. 1, 4.
16 Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600*, trans. by Norman Itzkowitz (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 7. The Muslim community had a certain edge over the Christians and Jews, and the Jews over the Christians. The Ottoman state was in the last analysis a Muslim state. The Jews had no homeland and, therefore, posed less of a threat to the Ottoman state than the Christians.
17 Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Ethnicity Problem in a Multi-Ethnic Anational Islamic State: Continuity and Recasting of Ethnic Identity in the Ottoman Empire', in *Ethnic Groups and the State*, Paul Brass, ed. (Totowa, N. J.: Barnes and Noble, 1985), p. 95.
18 Ibid., p. 104.
19 Reşat Kasaba, 'Göç ve Devlet: Bir İmparatorluk-Cumhuriyet Karşılaştırması', in *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e: Problemler, Araştırmalar, Tartışmalar*, compiled by Hamdi Can Tuncer (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), pp. 338, 340.
20 Suraiya Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 7.
21 Carter, *The Turks in World History*, pp. 65–66.
22 Aron Rodrique, 'Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire', Interview by Nancy Reynolds, *Stanford Humanities Review* 5, no. 1 (1995), p. 89.
23 Masami Arai, *Nationalism in the Young Turk Era* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), p. 67.
24 Ibid., p. 66.
25 Vryonis, 'The Byzantine Legacy and Ottoman Forms', p. 270.
26 Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman Empire* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 280.
27 Kemal. H. Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire: From Social States to Classes, From Millets to Nations*, Research Monograph No. 39, Center for International Affairs, Princeton University, 1973, p. 39. For other examples of such ethnic intermingling, see Halil İnalcık, 'Ottoman Methods of Conquest', *Studia Islamica* II (1954), pp. 115–116.
28 Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, p. 135.
29 Köprülü M. Fuad, *Osmanlı'nın Etnik Kökeni* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999), p. 92.
30 The Ottomans granted self-rule to villages and the tribes; the latter came to have a de facto autonomy. Halil İnalcık, 'The Yürüks: Their Origins, Expansion, and

Economic Role', in *Oriental Carpets and Textile Studies, II: Carpets of the Mediterranean Countries, 1400–1600*, Robert Pinner and Walter B. Denny, eds. (London: Hali OCTS Ltd., 1996), pp. 39–43.

31 Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, p. 311.

32 In fact, when the Office of Shaikh-ul Islam was created in the fifteenth century, the purpose was that of bringing about a separation between the state and Islam; that office began to issue *fatwa*s in the following century. Kemal H. Karpat, personal correspondence, July 2006.

33 It is true that the Muslim *millet* was not as homogenous as other *millet*s. There was a serious rift between the Sunnis and Shiites. The Sunnis, which were in the majority, were less tolerant towards the Shiites, who challenged the mainstream Islam of the Sunnis, than they were towards non-Muslim *millet*s. However, from the perspective of the present purpose of this essay, this has not created a problem, for the majority of the Kurds have been Sunni Muslims. On the other hand, the sharpening of the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in the early sixteenth century, introduced the 'different' into the Ottoman scene. (Professor Carter Vaughn Findley, personal correspondence, August 2005). This, too, has not changed the general picture a great deal, for the Sunni-Shi'a conflict was an Ottoman-Iranian and inter-sectarian issue rather than one between the Ottomans and the Kurds. This was probably the case because it was basically the Shi'a in the countryside that opposed the state, not those in the cities. (The second part of the last sentence draws upon Findley, personal correspondence, August 2005).

34 Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 38–39.

35 Karpat, *Politicization of Islam*, p. 311. This view is a sort of compromise between those who suggest that alongside others there was a Muslim *millet*, too, and those who deny that there was one. Shaw, personal communication, August 2005.

36 Bilal Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi* (Istanbul: Ağaç Yayıncılık, 1992), p. 11.

37 Ibid.

38 Nergis Canefe, 'Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules of Exception', *Nation and Nationalism* 8, no. 2 (2002), p. 134.

39 Sir Harry Luke. *The Old Turkey and New: From Byzantium to Ankara* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955), p. 124. First published in 1936.

40 Halil İnalcık, 'Periods in Ottoman History: State, Society, and Economy', in *Ottoman Civilization*, İnalcık and Renda, eds., p. 133.

41 George G. Arnakis, 'Turanism: An Aspect of Turkish Nationalism', *Balkan Studies* 1 (1960), p. 26.

42 Charles Warren Hostler, *The Turks of Central Asia* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1993), p. 14.

43 Dede Korkut stories were tales in the line of epic literature. They were converted into written form around the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries.

44 Kinross, Lord, *The Ottoman Centuries*, p. 26.

45 Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1939), pp. 42–43.

46 Fuad. M. Köprülü, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluşu*, second printing (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1972), p. 108.

47 İlber Ortaylı, *Ottoman Studies* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004), p. 11.

48 Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, pp. 74, 84.
49 F. W. Hasluck, *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, Volume I (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000), pp. 96–118. First published in 1929.
50 Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, p. 137.
51 Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan*, p. 183.
52 Roderic H. Davison, *Essays in Ottoman Turkish History, 1774–1923*: *The Impact of the West* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), p. 120.
53 Daniel Goffman, 'Ottoman *Millets* in the Early Seventeenth Century', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 11 (Fall 1994): 135–158.
54 Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 177–178.
55 Interviews with Simeon Radev and Iveta Gospodarova, respectively, cited in ibid, p. 174.
56 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 210–211.
57 Sir Harry, *The Old Turkey and New*, pp. 135–136.
58 Andrew Mango, *The Turks Today* (London: John Murray, 2004), p. 19.
59 Rodrique, 'Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire', p. 89.
60 Metin And, 'Ortaoyunu', *Skylife* [Turkish Airlines] 23, no. 260 (March 2005), pp. 134–135.
61 Webster, *The Turkey of* Atatürk, p. 42. From the sixteenth century onwards, Christians were employed in the state service only in exceptional situations, for instance, when nobody could be found among the Muslims to do translations from or into Western languages. When it was attempted to recruit a Muslim for such a post in 1821, only a convert from Judaism could be found, and with great difficulty. Şükrü Hanioğlu, personal communication, September 2005.
62 Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, pp. 131, 133–135. This is what a non-Muslim student of Turkey observed in 1939: 'The Christian heretics … welcomed the overthrow of the Byzantine Empire by the Selçuks and especially their successors, Osmanlıs [Ottomans]. Quite naturally they drifted into the religion of the invaders and were dissolved in that remarkably solvent fluid, Islam. Despite the prejudices of our early instruction, we must admit that these conversions were not forced.' Webster, *The Turkey of* Atatürk, p. 42.
63 The assignment in the Ottoman Empire of revenue producing units to tax farmers who had to pay in return fixed annual sums to the treasury each year. Tax farmers kept the balance of their collections for themselves.
64 Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650*, pp. 2–3.
65 Kinross, Lord, *The Ottoman Centuries*, pp. 26, 33; Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650*, pp. 162–163.
66 Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, p. 117.
67 Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650*, pp. 2–3.
68 Shaw and Evin, personal communications, August 2005 and August 2006, respectively.
69 Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman Palace*, pp. 115–117. The basic rationale behind the conversion system in question was not ethnic, but that of preventing the Muslim families with social status from impinging upon the state. As a consequence of this pattern of recruitment, former non-Muslims who did not have social power, rather than Muslims who did have such power, were brought to the higher echelons of civil and military bureaucracies and the sultan's court.
70 Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650*, pp. 3, 48.

71 Halil İnalcık, '[Turkey]: The Nature of Traditional Society', in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A Rustow, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 43.
72 Şerif Mardin, 'Power, Civil Society, and Culture in the Ottoman Empire', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 12 (June 1969), p. 270.
73 Ibid, passim.
74 İnalcık, 'The Yürüks: Their Origins, Expansion, and Economic Role', pp. 47–48.
75 Köprülü, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluşu*, p. 86.
76 Halil İnalcık, 'Sosyal Bilimler Kavşağında Doğu Meselesi', *Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi*, no. 128 (August 1996), pp. 18–19.
77 Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan*, p. 40.
78 Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskânı* (Istanbul: Eren, 1987), p. 31.
79 Fuat Dündar, *İttihat Terakkinin Müslümanları İskân Politikası, 1913–1918* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, p. 54.
80 Cited in Arai, *Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, p. 66.
81 Stanford J. Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume One. The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1908* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 262.
82 Rıdvan Akın, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Dağılma Devri ve Türkçülük Hareketi* (Istanbul: Kaynak, 1992), p. 270.
83 İnalcık, 'The Yürüks: Their Origins, Expansion, and Economic Role', p. 5.
84 Köprülü, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluşu*, pp. 94–95.
85 Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650*, p. 39.
86 Rodrique, 'Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire', p. 84.
87 Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922*, p. 173.
88 Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 7.
89 François Georgean, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura*, trans. from French by Alev Er (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986), p. 14.
90 Rodrique, 'Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire', pp. 87–88.
91 Karpat, 'The Ethnicity Problem in a Multi-Ethnic Anational Islamic State', p. 101.
92 Hanioğlu, personal communication, September 2005.
93 Kinross, Lord, *The Ottoman Centuries*, p. 26.
94 Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 24–25.
95 Halil İnalcık, 'Tarihsel Bağlamda Sivil Toplum ve Tarikatlar', pp. 5–7.
96 Müjgan Cumbur, *Anadolu'nun Bütünleşmesinde Ahmed Yesevi'nin Yeri* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 1997), pp. 40–42.
97 Yusuf Oğuzoğlu, *Osmanlı Devlet Anlayışı* (Istanbul: Eren, 2000), pp. 192–194.
98 Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire*, p. 25. In the adoption of Islam by the Turks, the popular Islam, heterodox beliefs, and the mystic religious orders, rather than High Islam, played a crucial role. See, inter alia, Turgut Akpınar, *Türk Tarihinde İslamiyet*, second printing (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), pp. 77, 88.
99 Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, p. 138.
100 İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire*, pp. 188–190.
101 Ibid., pp. 341–343.
102 These former Christians, too, could rise to top positions in the state hierarchy.
103 Taha Akyol, *Osmanlı Mirasından Cumhuriyet Türkiyesine: İlber Ortaylı ile Konuşmalar* (Istanbul: da Yayıncılık, 2002), p. 103.

104 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, pp.197–198.
105 Ibid., p. 202.
106 Ibid.
107 Rodrique, 'Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire', pp. 85–86.
108 Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: The Young Turks and Nationalism', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (1975), p. 293.
109 İlhan Tekeli, 'Involuntary Displacement and the Problem of Resettlement in Turkey from the Ottoman Empire to the Present', in *Population Displacement and Resettlement*, Seteney Shami, ed. (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1994), p. 204.
110 Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 9–13.
111 Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi*, p. 41
112 Ibid., p. 24.
113 Hilmi Yavuz, *Osmanlılık, Kültür ve Kimlik* (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1996), p. 114.
114 İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Barışı* (Istanbul: Ufuk Kitapları, 2003), pp. 48–55.
115 Rodrique, 'Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire', pp. 82–84.
116 Ibid., p. 90.
117 Karpat, *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 25–26.
118 Kemal H. Karpat, '*Millets* and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era', in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, Volume I, The Functioning of a Plural Society*, Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds. (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1982), p. 150 and Hanioğlu, personal correspondence, September 2005.
119 Karpat, '*Millets* and Nationality p. 143.
120 Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East', in *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*, M. J. Esman and I. Rabinovich, eds. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 149.
121 Ibid., p. 143.
122 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 310.
123 Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999), p. 100.
124 Karpat, '*Millets* and Nationality', p. 38.
125 Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp. 329–332.
126 David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), pp. 50–51.
127 Ibid.
128 Initially, fiefs were granted to non-Muslims, too. Kemal H. Karpat, personal correspondence, July 2006.
129 In the fifteenth century, Christians held half of the fiefs. See İnalcık, 'Ottoman Methods of Conquest', p. 114.
130 Kinross, Lord, *The Ottoman Centuries*, p. 33.
131 İnalcık, '[Turkey:] The Nature of Traditional Society', pp. 26–27.
132 On the *millet* system in the Ottoman Empire, see, inter alia, Karpat '*Millets* and Nationality', passim and Kamel S. Abu Jaber, 'The Millet System in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', *Muslim World* 57, no. 3 (July 1967), p. 213.
133 Halil İnalcık, 'The Policy of Mehmed II Toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City', paper prepared for the Symposium entitled, 'After the Fall of Constantinople', held at Dumbarton Oaks, May 1968, and read by Professor R.J. Jenkins, pp. 236–237.

134 Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi*, pp. 21, 22. Here it should be noted that this was not a right that the non-Muslims demanded and obtained. The latter were not allowed to serve in the bureaucracy; one had to be a Muslim to be a member of the Ottoman ruling class.
135 Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time*, William C. Hick, ed.; Ralph Manheim, trans. from German (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 177.
136 Mehmed Niyazi, *Türk Devlet Felsefesi* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 1996), p. 217.
137 Islam has recognized Abraham and Moses, Jesus and Mary as authentic prophets and took them as forerunners of their own prophet, Mohammad.
138 The pro-Greek Lord Byron (1788–1824), the well-known English Romantic poet, once observed: 'The Turks are neither turncoats, nor cowards, nor mass murderers. Neither do they burn heretics. They are loyal to their Sultan ... and they serve their God, too, without indulging in inquisitions.' Even more generously, Benjamin Disraeli (1804–1881), the British statesman and novelist who twice served as Prime Minister, referred to the Turks as 'the gentlemen of the orient'. Both cited in Ernest Jackh, *The Rising Crescent: Turkey, Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944), p. 26.
139 Roderic Davison, 'Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire', *in Nationalism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*, William W Haddad and William Ochsenwald, eds. (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1977), p. 120.
140 Ibid.; Faroqhi, *Subjects of the Sultan*, p. 207.
141 The Muslims view Judaism and Christianity as the predecessors of Islam. Their list of prophets includes Adam, Noah, Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Lot, Moses, Aaron, David, Solomon, Jesus, John the Baptist, and other Biblical figures. See Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities in the Middle East* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), p. 118.
142 H.A.R Gibb and Harold Bowen, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East. Volume One. Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century, Part II* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 212.
143 Ibid.
144 Niyazi, *Türk Devlet Felsefesi*, p. 217.
145 Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi*, p. 35.
146 Findley, *The Turks in World History*, p. 64. In fact, the Ottoman sultans granted more rights to non-Muslims in their realms than did the French King or the Habsburg Emperor to their non-mainstream subjects. See Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 175.
147 Ortaylı, *Ottoman Studies*, p. 19; *idem, Osmanlı Barışı*, pp. 21, 22; *idem*, 'Ottoman Cosmopolitanism in the Balkans and its Gradual Transition', paper presented at the International Conference on 'Minorities and Related Problems in the Balkans', Bilkent University, Ankara, 27–29 October 1994, p. 2. On *ahidname*, also see İnalcık, 'Periods on Ottoman History: State, Society, and Economy', in *Ottoman Civilization*, İnalcık and Renda, eds., p. 38.
148 Findley, *The Turks in World History*, p. 65.
149 Karpat, '*Millets* and Nationality', pp. 141–142.
150 Eleazar Birnbaum, 'Turkey: From Cosmopolitanism to Nation State', in *Introduction to Islamic Civilization*, R.M. Savory, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 180.
151 Davison, *Essays in Ottoman History*, 1774–1923, p. 113.

152 S. D. Salamone, 'The Dialectics of Turkish National Identity: Ethnic Boundary Maintenance and State Ideology', *East European Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 37, 40, 41.
153 İnalcık, 'The "Ottoman Civilization" and Palace Patronage', p. 18.
154 Halil İnalcık, 'Centralization and Decentralization in the Ottoman Administration', in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, eds. (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977), p. 43 and *idem*, personal communication, September 2005.
155 Karpat, personal correspondence, July 2006.
156 See on this point, Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1923*, p. 187.
157 Findley, personal communication, August 2005.
158 Inter alia, Şükrü Hanioğlu, '*Millets*, Elements, and Minorities: The Change of the Official Ottoman State Ideology and its Impact on the Relations Among Various Ethnic and Religious Groups in the Ottoman Empire', paper presented at the Mellon Seminar, 'Diversity, and the Body Politics in Middle Eastern Societies', Princeton University, 11 April 1999, p. 2.
159 Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, p. 131.
160 Davison, *Essays in Ottoman History*, p. 114. For the original text, see, *inter alia*, Önder Kaya, *Tanzimat'tan Lozana Azınlıklar* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2004), p. 161.
161 Parliament was convened in 1877 and prorogued by Abdülhamid II the next year.
162 Davison, *Essays in Ottoman History*, p. 115.
163 Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottomam Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 174–175, 188, 190.
164 Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi*, pp. 81–82. In the event, the rules and regulations concerning the Armenian *millet* somewhat changed, while those related to the Jewish *millet* remained the same. For the last point, Hanioğlu, personal correspondence, September 2005.
165 Kaya, *Tanzimat'tan Lozan'a Azınlıklar*, p. 72.
166 Ibid., p. 74.
167 Ibid., p. 93. The original text, too, in *inter alia*, ibid., p. 166.
168 Davison, Essays in *Ottoman History*, p. 115.
169 Eryılmaz, *Osmanlı Devletinde Millet Sistemi*, pp. 65ff.

3 Distant Though Not Rejected

1 Paul White, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers: The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2000), p. 14; M. A. Ubicini, *Letters on Turkey: An Account of the Religious, Political, Social, and Commercial Conditions of the Ottoman Empire; The Reformed Institutions, Army, Navy, etc. etc.* Trans. from French by Lady Easthope (London: John Murray, 1856), pp. 17, 22.
2 Burton, H. M., 'The Kurds', a lantern lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society, U.K., 16 December 1942, p. 65.
3 Ibid., p. 72.
4 George S. Harris, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds', *ANNALS*, AAPSS, no. 433 (September 1977), p. 113.
5 Alfred de Bessé, *The Turkish Empire: Its Historical, Statistical, and Religious Conditions; Also its Manners, Customs, etc. Translated from the Fourth German*

Edition, with Memoirs of the Reigning Sultan, Our Pasha, The Turkish Cabinet, etc., etc., by Edward Joy Morris (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakston, 1854), p. 185.

6 Naci Kutlay, *İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler* (Ankara: Beybun Yayınları, 1992), p. 14. In the Ottoman population statistics, different types of Muslims were not differentiated. All populations were listed by religious affiliation, by ethnic or linguistic group. Consequently, the basic ethnic and linguistic split between Kurds and Turks was concealed by the religious criterion in question. See, Justin McCarthy, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), p. 30.

7 Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 57. Karpat has pointed out that in 10–15 Ottoman statistics that he had seen, the population of the Armenians has never been reported more than 1.4 million, and that the British, too, came up with that figure. Personal correspondence, 7 July 2006.

8 Ibid., p. 52. Since the Ottoman census data had been collected on the basis of religion rather than ethnicity, it is difficult to come up with reliable statistics about Muslim ethnic groups, including the Kurds. According to Haniğolu, in 1850 or anytime before the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), the Armenian population could not be more than the Greek population and that the reported 1850 Armenian population of 2.4 million seems rather exaggerated. Personal communication, October 2005.

9 Servet Mutlu, 'Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 4 (November 1996), p. 520.

10 Ibid., p. 527.

11 Mehmet Turgut, *Türkiye Modeli ve Bask Modeli* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1994), pp. 42–43.

12 All these figures are rough estimates and, therefore, they should be taken with a pinch of salt. For the year 1970, while one writer has indicated a population of 1.5 million, another has suggested 6.6 million. The figures were affected not only by computation mistakes but even worse by the author's attitude towards the Turkish authorities. See, *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, compiled and edited by Peter Alford Andrews, with the assistance of Rüdiger Benninghaus (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989), p. 111.

13 W. S. Monroe, *Turkey and the Kurds: An Account of the Lands, the Peoples and the Institutions of the Ottoman Empire* (Boston: L. C. Page and Company, 1907), pp. 98–99.

14 Hakan Özoğlu, '"Nationalism" and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman-Early Republican Era', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (2001), pp. 14–15.

15 V. J. Parry, 'The Reign of Sulaiman the Magnificent, 1520–1566', in *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, M. A. Cook, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 71.

16 Özoğlu, '"Nationalism" and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman-Early Republican Era', p. 12.

17 Halil İnalcık, 'Periods in Ottoman History: State, Society, and Economy' in *Ottoman Civilization*, Halil İnalcık and Günsel Renda, eds. (Ankara: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004), p. 104.

18 Özoğlu, '"Nationalism" and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman-Early Republican Era', pp, 12–13; Halil İnalcık, 'Tarihsel Bağlamda Sivil Toplum ve Tarikatlar', unpublished typescript, pp. 3–4; İnalcık, 'Periods in Ottoman History: State, Society, and Economy', p. 105; Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha,*

Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan (London: Zed Books, 1992), pp. 158–159; Baki Tezcan, 'The Development of the Use of "Kurdistan" as a Geographical Description and the Incorporation of This Region Into the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century', in *The Great Ottoman, Turkish Civilisation. Vol 3. Philosophy, Science and Institutions*, Kemal Çiçek et al. eds. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000), p. 545; Arshak Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan* (London: Harvill Press, 1948), p. 40.

19 Paul Raycaut, *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire. Containing the Maxims of the Turkish Polite. The Most Material Points of the Mahometan Religion, Their Sects and Heresies, Their Convents and Religious Votaries, Their Military Discipline, with an Exact Computation of Their Forces by Land and Sea* (London: John Starkey and Henry, 1668), p. 521. In Turkish, '*hükümet*' means government; by using this term Raycaut must have underlined their autonomy from central government. Also see, Halil İnalcık. 'Autonomous Enclaves in Islamic States: *Temlîks*, *Soyurghals*, *Yurdluk-Ocaklıks*, *Mâlikhâne-Muḳâṭa 'as and Awqâf'*, in *History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East'*, Judith Pfeiffer and Sholeh A. Quinn, eds., in collaboration with Ernest Tucker (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2006), p. 127.

20 Colin Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650* (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2002), p. 40.

21 Yusuf Hallaçoğlu, *XVII Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p. 45, 291.

22 Özoğlu, '"Nationalism" and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman-Early Republican Era', p. 18.

23 Raphaela Lewis, *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey* (New York: Dorset Press, 1971), pp. 190–191; Dennis Hills, *My Travels in Turkey* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964), p. 180. On the defiant attitudes of the Kurds, see also Josiah Conder, *The Modern Traveller. A Description of the Various Countries of the Globe. Thirty-Three Volumes. Vol. XIV. Turkey* (London: Thomas Tegg and Son [1826]), pp. 211–212. For the Ottoman's pragmatism concerning the fiscal matters in general, see Wolf D. Hütteroth, 'Ottoman Administration of the Desert in the Sixteenth Century', *Asian and African Studies* 19 (1985), passim.

24 David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996), p. 13.

25 Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 319.

26 Mesut Yeğen, 'The Turkish State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity', in *Turkey: Identity, Democracy and Politics*, Sylvia Kedourie, ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p. 218.

27 Tezcan, 'The Development of the Use of "Kurdistan" as a Geographical Description and the Incorporation of This Region into the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century', p. 547. One student of Ottoman history has referred to these entities as 'sovereign *sancak*s'. See Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 191.

28 Lucy M Garnett, *Turkey of the Ottomans* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), p. 14.

29 Ibid.

30 William Francis Ainsworth, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea, and Armenia, Volume One* (London: John W. Parker, 1842), p. 234.

31 İ. Metin Kunt, *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650* (New York: Columbia Press, 1983), p. 39.

32 Carter Vaughn Findley, personal correspondence, August 2005.

33 Imber, *The Ottoman Empire*, p. 310.

34 *Midhat Paşa'nın Anıları*, comp. by Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1997), p. 90.

35 *Kamil Paşa ve Said Paşa'nın Anıları*, comp. by Gül Çağalı-Güven (Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1991), p. 410; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume Two. Reform, Revolution, and the Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, 1880–1925* (Austin: University of Austin Press, 1989), p. 9.
36 White, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers*, p. 61; van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p. 186
37 Monroe, *Turkey and the Kurds*, p. 100.
38 Ibid.
39 According to sixteenth century decrees about them, there were variety of purposes behind such settlements – restoring prosperity to a deserted city or countryside, creating a potential source of wealth for economic activities, moving people from an overpopulated to an under-populated region, providing a means of livelihood to a landless community, and breaking up and removing to a distant territory a rebellious population or a refractory tribe of nomads. See Halil İnalcık, 'The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City', a paper prepared for the Symposium entitled. 'After the Fall of Constantinople', held at Dumbarton Oaks in May 1968, and read by Professor R. J. H. Jenkins, p. 235. None of these policies had the aim of assimilating the re-settled people.
40 Warksworth, Lord, MP., pseud (Henry Algernon George Percy), *Notes from a Diary in Asiatic Turkey* (London: Edward Arnold, 1898), p. 134.
41 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 45.
42 Vecihi Timuroğlu, *Dersim Tarihi* (Ankara: Yurt Kitap-Yayın, 1991), pp. 14–16.
43 Ibid., p. 31.
44 The efforts along these lines, which were made basically in the non-Kurdish areas, go back to the seventeenth century. See Halil İnalcık, 'Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration', in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, eds. (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977).
45 For the ensuing armed conflict between the central government on the one hand and Kurdish chieftains on the other hand, see Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 10–11.
46 de Bessé, *The Turkish Empire*, p. 188.
47 On this last point, see Lewis, *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey*, pp. 186–187.
48 Tezcan, 'The Development of the Use of "Kurdistan" as a Geographical Description and the Incorporation of This Region Into the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century', p. 548.
49 van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, pp. 143–144.
50 Ibid., pp. 249–252; White, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers*, pp. 33– 34.
51 Perhaps with a little bit of exaggeration, one student of the Kurds depicted the situation in the mid-nineteenth century as follows: 'Judged by the standards of an organized state, the tribes had been practically always in a state of rebellion amidst the chronic anarchy prevailing in both neigbouring empires.' Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 50.
52 Kutlay, *İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler*, p. 45.
53 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 50.
54 Stephen Duguid, 'The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy of Eastern Anatolia', *Middle Eastern Politics* 9, no. 2 (May 1973), p. 140.

55 In the case of the Kurds, their princes governed parts of eastern Anatolia up to the Reign of Mahmud II (1808–1839). See, Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), p. 78.
56 Carl Max Kortepeter, *Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation Europe and the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 1972), p. 236.
57 Garnett, *Turkey of the Ottomans*, p. 6.
58 The last point: Şükrü Hanioğlu, personal correspondence, October 2005.
59 van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, pp. 202–203.
60 Ibid.
61 White, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?* pp. 68–69.
62 David McDowall, 'The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review', in *The Kurds: A Contemporary Review*, Philip K. Kragenbrook and Stefan Speri, eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 17
63 Ibid., p. 15.
64 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 51. That the Kurds did not seek independence and were to be quite satisfied having a certain degree of autonomy is not considered here as an unexpected phenomenon in a context where the Kurds and the dynasty to which the former owed allegiance shared the same set of religous values, and where the leaders of this particular entity of the Empire would have benefited from the legitimacy of the dynasty that acknowledged them as local rulers. The point made here is that, unlike the non-Muslim elements, by not pursuing independence but by merely demanding something that some other local aspirants, too, had always wanted, the Kurds did not shatter the assumption the Ottomans made that in principle they continued to be the loyal subjects of the dynasty.
65 Hugh Poulton, *Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic: Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent* (London: Hurst, 1997), pp. 40–41.
66 Burton, 'The Kurds', pp. 70–71.
67 van Bruneissen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, pp.177–79; Harris, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds', p. 114.
68 Arthur C. Turner 'Kurdish Nationalism' in *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*, Peter J. Chelkowski & Robert J. Pranger, eds. (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 387–388.
69 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, pp. 64–65.
70 Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: The Ideology and the Legitimating Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1786*–1909, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), p. 41.
71 Ibid., p. 93.
72 Kutlay, *İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler*, p. 27.
73 Ibid.
74 Sultan Abdülhamid, *Hatıratım* (Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları, 1974), p. 180.
75 Alişan Akpınar, *Osmanlı Devletinde Aşiret Mektebi* (Istanbul: Selçuk Kitapevi, 1997), pp. 17, 20–21, 23.
76 *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Cilt I, Cumhuriyete Devreden Düşünce Mirası. Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet Birikimi*, Mehmet Ö Alkan, ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 391–392.
77 Eugene L. Rogan, '*Aşiret Mektebi*: Abdülhamid II's School for Tribes, 1892–1907', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 1 (February 1996): 83–107; Akpınar, *Osmanlı Devletinde Aşiret Mektebi*, pp. 20–22, 28, 43, 70.
78 Rogan, '*Aşiret Mektebi*', p. 100.
79 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 68.

80 Ibid. The author's emphasis.
81 Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman Empire* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 319.
82 Sultan Abdülhamid, *Hatıratım*, 84.
83 Duguid, 'The Politics of Unity', p. 143.
84 Ibid.; Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, Great Britain and the Baghdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923), p. 9.
85 Garnett, *Turkey of the Ottomans*, p.14.
86 Ainsworth, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea, and Armenia*, pp. 235, 236, 267.
87 William Miller, *The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 1801–1927* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936), p. 495.
88 Burton, 'The Kurds', p. 68.
89 Hütteroth, 'Ottoman Administration of the Desert in the Sixteenth Century', p. 154.
90 William H. Hall, ed., *Reconstruction in Turkey*. A series of reports compiled for the American Committee of Armenian and Syrian Relief. (New York: n. p., 1918), p. 17.
91 Duguid, 'The Politics of Unity', p. 145.
92 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 53.
93 Nazmi Sevgen, *Doğu ve Güneydoğuda Kürt Beylikleri: Osmanlı Belgeleri ile Kürt Türkleri Tarihi* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1982), p. 119.
94 van Bruneissen, *Agha, Shaikh and State*, p. 181. For further examples of leniency displayed towards Kurdish chieftains, see Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, pp. 63, 68.
95 Abdülhamid II had complaints not only about the Kurds, but also about his own administrators, too: 'As for the wrongs which the Armenians have to suffer at the hands of the rapacious and disorderly Kurds, you must not imagine that I am unaware of the gross neglect of my civil officers in the interior … . [However] I cannot cure all the evils at once.' See, Jeremy Salt, *Imperialism, Evangelism, and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878–1896* (London: Frank Cass, 1992), p. 67.
96 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 7.
97 Armenius Vambéry, 'Personal Recollections of Abdul Hamid II and His Court', *The Nineteenth Century* 65 (January–June 1909), p. 989.
98 Ibid. The author's emphasis.
99 Findley, personal communication, August 2005.
100 Duguid, 'The Politics of Unity', p. 140.
101 White, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?* p. 26.
102 İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı Barışı* (Istanbul: Ufuk Kitapları, 2003), p. 25. The Sultan also had preference for Syrian Arabs whom he appointed to high positions in the secret service and censorship office. In fact, he had greater trust in non-Turkish Muslims than he had in the Turks. Stanford J Shaw, personal communication, August 2005.
103 'Indigenization' is the term one used to translate into English the *korenizatsiya* policy that made the Soviet Nationality policy into the largest affirmative action programme in world history. Findley, personal correspondence, August 2005.
104 Ainsworth, *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea, and Armenia*, p. 296.
105 *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce, Birinci Cilt: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet Birikimi*, Alkan, ed., p. 271.

106 Halil İnalcık, 'Sosyal Bilimler Kavşağında Doğu Meselesi', *Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi*, no. 128 (August 1997), p. 19.
107 [Ziya Gökalp], *Ziya Gökalp'in Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikleri*, comp. by Şevket Baysanoğlu (Ankara: Sosyal Yayınlar, 1992), p. 118.
108 Ibid., p. 122.
109 This issue is taken up at length in Chapter Five.
110 *Ziya Gökalp'in Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikleri*, comp. by Baysanoğlu, p. 125.
111 Ibid., p. 122.
112 Halil İnalcık, personal correspondence, July 2006.
113 Hall, ed., *Reconstruction in Turkey*, p. 16.
114 See, White, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers*, p. 30; Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent* (London: Hurst, 1977), p. 36, note 7.
115 *Ziya Gökalp'in Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkındaki Sosyolojik Tetkikleri*, comp. by Baysanoğlu, p. 125.
116 Ibid., pp. 39, 45–48.
117 Ibid., 47.
118 Alpay Kabacalı, *Tarihimizde Kürtler ve Ayaklanmaları* (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1991), p. 23.
119 White, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers*, p. 44. Also see, Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1998), pp. 21 and 138–139.
120 Tezcan, 'The Development of the Use of "Kurdistan" as a Geographical Description and the Incorporation of This Region Into the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century', p. 549.
121 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 71.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Kabacalı, *Tarihimizde Kürtler ve Ayaklanmaları*, p. 23.
125 Hamit Bozarslan, 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Control to Rebellion (1919–1925)', in *Essays on the Origin of Kurdish Nationalism*, Abbas Vali, ed. (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2003), p. 167.
126 White, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers*, p. 68.
127 Turgut, *Türkiye Modeli ve Bask Modeli*, pp. 50–51.
128 *Cemal Paşa: Hatırat*, fifth printing, compiled by Metin Martı (Istanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996), p. 345.
129 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and the Modern Turkey, Volume Two. Reform, Revolution and the Republic*, p. 310.
130 McDowall, 'The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review', p. 16.
131 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 61–62.
132 Kutlay, *İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler*, p. 231.
133 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 218–219.

4 Search for a New Identity

1 The Ottomans' relations with the Jews remained harmonious; it was only with the Christian subjects that there were troubles.
2 Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Kimliği* (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1986), p. 116.

3 Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1998), p. 22.
4 Ümid Meriç, *Cevdet Paşa'nın Cemiyet ve Devlet Görüşü* (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1975), p. 76.
5 Roderic Davison, *Essays in Ottoman History, 1774–1923: The Impact of the West* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), p. 119.
6 Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II. Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 182.
7 The Young Ottomans formed a secret association in 1865 that called for freedom and justice, which was later transformed into the Young Ottoman Society.
8 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 158.
9 Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 331, 332, 333.
10 Sarah G. Moment Atis, 'Turkish Literature', in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, John L. Esposito, Editor-in-Chief, vol. 4. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 247.
11 The inspiration for this point comes from Carter Vaughn Findley, *The Turks in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 160.
12 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II*, p. 132.
13 Cemil Koçak, 'Namık Kemal', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce. Cilt I. Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet Birikimi*, Mehmet Ö. Alkan, ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 247, 248.
14 Şerif Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 328.
15 Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 339.
16 Ali Engin Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1995), p.186.
17 Selim Deringil, 'The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namık Kemal to Mustafa Kemal', *European History Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (April 1993), pp. 183–184.
18 Davison, *Essays in Ottoman History*, *1774–1923*, p. 119.
19 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 31.
20 David Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908* (London: Frank Cass, 1977), pp. 21–22.
21 Şükrü Hanioğlu, '*Millets*, Elements, and Minorities: The Change of the Official Ottoman State Ideology and its Impact on the Relations Among Various Ethnic and Religious Groups in the Ottoman Empire', paper presented at the Mellon Seminar, 'Diversity and the Body Politics in Middle Eastern Societies', Princeton University, 11 April 1996, p. 4.
22 Şerif Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895–1908*, fourth printing (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p. 72.
23 Hugh Poulton, *Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic: Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent* (London, Hurst, 1997), p. 62.
24 David Thomas, 'Yusuf Akçura and the Intellectual Origins of "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset"', *Journal of Turkish Studies* 2 (1978), p. 130. More on this issue below.
25 Bernard Lewis, 'Ali Pasha on Nationalism', *Middle Eastern Studies* 10, no. 1 (January 1974), pp. 77–79.
26 Davison, *Essays in Ottoman History*, 1774–1923, pp. 118–119.
27 Kemal H. Karpat, *An Inquiry Into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations*, Research

Monograph No. 39, Center for International Affairs, Princeton University, 1973, p. 92.

28 A major problem at the time was that Muslims from different provinces of the Ottoman Empire – Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia and the like – came out of different cultures and had problems in getting together in the Ottoman Empire. Stanford J. Shaw, personal communication, August 2005.
29 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 303.
30 Karpat, *An Inquiry Into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State*, p. 107; idem, *The Politicization of Islam*, pp. 325, 329–330.
31 For the suggestion that this particular interpretation of the Qur'an is possible, see Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 310.
32 Meriç, *Cevdet Paşa'nın Cemiyet ve Devlet Görüşü*, p. 31.
33 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 321.
34 Ibid., pp. 324–325.
35 William Ochsenwald, 'Islam and the Ottoman Legacy in the Modern Middle East', in *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, L. Carl Brown, ed. (New York: Columbia Press, 1996), p. 270.
36 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 291.
37 Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 180.
38 Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 27.
39 For the relationship between Ottomanism and Islamism in the late nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire, see Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, pp. 315–328.
40 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II*, p. 260.
41 Eric J. Zürcher. *Turkey: A Modern History*, second edition (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 134.
42 Uriel Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London: Harvill Press, 1950), p. 105.
43 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II*, p. 261.
44 Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, p.10.
45 Cited in Hanioğlu, '*Millets*, Elements and Minorities', p. 11.
46 Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakkinin Müslümanları İskân Politikası, 1913–1918* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 37.
47 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, pp. 361–362.
48 Ibid.
49 Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu*, p. 203.
50 The last sentence is a reformulation of a point made in Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), p. 92.
51 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, pp 30–31, 37–38.
52 Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 105.
53 Oba, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu*, p. 190.
54 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II*, p. 263.
55 Akçura's nationalism was premised on linguistic similarity.
56 François Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura: 1876–1935*, trans. from French by Alev Er (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986), p. 7; Thomas, 'Yusuf Akçura and the Intellectual Origins of "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset"', p. 136; and Roderic Davison, 'Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire', in *Nationalism in a*

Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald, eds. (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1977), p. 26.
57 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Hürriyetin İlanı: İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Hayatına Bakışlar* (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1959), p. 20. More on this issue below.
58 Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp. 302, 327, 329.
59 Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 56, 90–91.
60 Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, pp. 226–227.
61 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 339.
62 Masami Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992), pp. 8, 23, 72.
63 Füsun Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1919–1931* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), p. 25.
64 Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, pp. 26–27.
65 Ömer Seyfettin, *Türklük Üzerine Yazılar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993), passim.
66 Emin Alper, 'Ömer Seyfettin', *in Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce. Cilt I.*, Alkan, p. 191.
67 Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 58–59.
68 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 339.
69 Ibid., p. 344.
70 Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, p. 96.
71 Ibid., pp. 62–62, 71, 79. The Turkism of Şemseddin Sami was linguistic Turkism. See Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri*, p. 62.
72 Mardin, *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, p. 372.
73 Jethro O. Miller, 'Giving Voice to the Dialogue: Namık Kemal and the Ottoman Theory of Representative Government', paper presented at the annual meetings of the Middle East Studies of North America, Newport, Rhode Island, USA, November 1996, p. 5. The author's emphases.
74 All the Turkic languages are related to each other, even in cases where they are not mutually intelligible. Within the various subfamilies, mutual intelligibility usually exists (as among Azeri, Turkish, and Turkmen).
75 Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, p. 4.
76 Kushner, *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 13–14. Akçura came to Turkey when he was a little child. Only a few times and during summers he went back to his place of birth. He also graduated from the War College in Istanbul.
77 Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri*, p. 40.
78 Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976), pp. 33–34. Under the influence of Social Darwinism, the meanings and uses of the terms 'race and 'nation' tended to merge around 1900. British writers very often used 'race' when they meant 'nation'; for example, the English, Irish, Scots, and Welsh were referred to as 'races' in some official usages as late as 1939. Carter Vaughn Findley, personal communication, August 2005.
79 Yusuf Akçura, *Türkçülüğün Tarihi* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1998), p. 18.
80 Georgeon, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri*, pp. 44–45, 56.
81 Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, p. 26.
82 Ibid., p. 36.
83 Sabri Sayarı, personal correpondence, November 2005.
84 Sometimes, Gökalp also used 'race' and 'ethnicty' interchangeably, as it will be apparent below.
85 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II*, p. 305.

86 Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 109–115.
87 Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876–1924* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985) p. 26, 38; Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 375; Kâzım Nazım Duru, *Ziya Gökalp* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1949), pp. 10–11, 16, 39.
88 Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1955), p. 59.
89 Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp*, pp. 34–38.
90 Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, p. 71.
91 Ziya Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 75.
92 Ibid., p. 118.
93 Ibid., p. 110.
94 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 377.
95 Heyd, *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism*, pp. 115–121.
96 Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, p. 10.
97 Ibid., p. 71.
98 Gökalp, *The Principles of Turkism*, pp. 13, 57.
99 Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, pp. 17, 19.
100 Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp*, p. 36.
101 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 375.
102 Kemal H. Karpat, personal correspondence, July 2006.
103 Rıdvan Akın, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Dağılma Devri ve Türkçülük Hareketi* (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1992), p. 8.
104 Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism* (London: C. Hurst, 1981), pp. 29–30.
105 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II*, p. 263.
106 T. Lothrop Stoddard, 'Pan-Turanism', *American Political Science Review* 11, no. 1 (1917), pp. 18–19.
107 Tunaya, *Hürriyetin İlânı*, p. 22.
108 René Pinon, 'The Young Turk Policy in Asia', *Current History* 11, no. 2 (November 1919), p. 335.
109 Sir Harry Luke, *The Old Turkey and the New: From Byzantium to Ankara*, new and revised edition (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955), p. 151.
110 Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 154; Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, pp. 368–370.
111 Politically speaking, pan-Turanism had no clear boundary and a well formulated definition and explanation. See *House With Wisteria: Memoirs of Halidé Edib*. With an Introduction by Sibel Erol. (Charlottesville, Virginia: Leopolis Press, 2003), p. 259. First published in 1926 as *Memoirs of Halidé Edib*.
112 Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, p. 155.
113 Edwin Pears, 'Turkey, Islam, and Turanianism', *The Contemporary Review* 114 (July- October 1918), p. 379.
114 Caroline Finkle, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923* (London: John Murray, 2005), p. 549.
115 Sir Harry, *The Old Turkey and the New*, pp. 146–147.
116 *House With Wisteria*, p. 263.
117 Finkle, *Osman's Dream*, p. 549.
118 Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 233.
119 Zürcher, *Turkey*, p. 132.
120 Ibid., p. 137; Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 371.

121 Tunaya, *Hürriyetin İlânı*, pp. 62–63.
122 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 328.
123 Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Preparation for Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 301–302; Akın, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Dağılma Devri ve Türkçülük Hareketi*, pp. 48–49.
124 Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II*, p. 310.
125 Finkle, *Osman's Dream*, p. 548.
126 Alper, 'Ömer Seyfettin', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce. Cilt. I*, Alkan, ed., p. 186.
127 Arai, *Turkish Nationalism in the Young Turk Era*, pp. 40, 44–47, 48–60, 71, 75.
128 It has been pointed out that *Türk Yurdu* constituted one of the *intellectual* preoccupations of many members of the Union and Progress, but that no effort was made to make a *political* tool of the Turkish Homeland Association that started the publication of *Türk Yurdu*. See, *House With Wisteria*, p. 264.
129 Ahmad, *The Young Turks*, pp. 28, 155.
130 Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 218.
131 Arshak Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan* (London: Harvill Press, 1948), p. 72.
132 Martı, Matin, compiler. *Bahriye Nazırı ve 4. Ordu Komutanı Cemal Paşa*, fifth printing (Istanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996), pp. 350–351.
133 Landau, *Pan-Turkism in Turkey*, pp. 29–38.
134 Karpat, *An Inquiry Into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State*, p. 111.
135 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 71; Sina Akşin, *Essays in Ottoman-Turkish Political History* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000), p. 12, 19.
136 Safrastian, *Kurds and Kurdistan*, p. 71.
137 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 356.
138 Kemal H. Karpat, 'The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: The Young Turks and Nationalism', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (1975), p. 290. For other cases of double identity among the non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire (as well as attempts at deliberate acculturation among the latter), see Arus Yumul and Rifat N. Bali, 'Ermeni ve Yahudi Cemaatlerinde Siyasal Düşünceler', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce. Cilt I.*, Alkan, ed., pp. 362–366.
139 Hanioğlu, '*Millets*, Elements and Minorities', p. 7.
140 Donald Quataert, *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 188.
141 Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam*, p. 368.
142 Zürcher, *Turkey*, p. 126.
143 Ibid.
144 Benjamin C. Fortna, *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 66.
145 Poulton, *Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, p. 80.
146 Fortna, *Imperial Classroom*, pp. 72–74.
147 Akşin, *Essays in Ottoman-Turkish Political History*, p. 12, Nergis Canefe, 'Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules of Exception', *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 2 (2002), p. 143, Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, p. 340.
148 Tunaya, *Hürriyetin İlanı*, p. 74.
149 Mardin, *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895–1908*, pp. 244–246.
150 Findley, *The Turks in the World History*, p. 167.

151 Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks*, p. 83.
152 Ibid., pp. 79–80.

5 Nation in the Making

1 Nuri Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 65.
2 Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 77.
3 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University of Press, 1961), p. 352.
4 In 1934, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was conferred the surname 'Atatürk' ('father of the Turks) as a symbol of gratitude of the Turkish people for his great services to his country. In this essay, he is referred to by that surname even if the period under discussion is in the pre-1934 period.
5 George S. Harris, personal correspondence, 5 December 2006.
6 Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow*, p. 17.
7 Doğu Ergil, 'The Kurdish Question in Turkey', *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 3 (July 2000), p. 124.
8 Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004), p. 71.
9 Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal'in El Yazmaları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1969), p. 369.
10 Ibid., pp. 369–371.
11 David Hotham, *The Turks* (London: John and Murray, 1972), p. 72.
12 Taner Timur, *Osmanlı Kimliği* (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1986), p. 122.
13 Eliot Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey: A Politico-Economic Interpretation, 1908–1923 Inclusive, With Selected Chapters by Representative Authorities* (New York: Macmillan, 1924).
14 Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, p. 78.
15 David Kushner, 'Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey', *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 2 (1997), p. 222.
16 Şerif Mardin, 'Patriotism and Nationalism of Turkey', in *Nationalism, Patriotism, and Liberalism in 'Liberal Democratic' Societies*, Roger Michener, ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House, 1993), p. 198.
17 The 1924 Constitution stipulated that, 'In Turkey, irrespective of religion and ethnicity everybody is called "Turk" by citizenship'. ('*Türkiye ahalisine din ve ırk farkı olmaksızın vatandaşlık itibariyle (Türk) ıtlâk olunur*.')
18 Füsun Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete – Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912–1931* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), p. 208.
19 Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 44.
20 Ömer Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition* (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 63.
21 Hamit Bozarslan, 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919–1925)', in *Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism*, Abbas Vali, ed. (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2003), p. 178. The author's emphasis.
22 H. E. Wortham, *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1931), p. 203.
23 Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete*, pp. 135, 147.
24 İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal'in El Yazmaları*, p. 358.

25 Ibid., p. 362.
26 Ibid., sections 3–4.
27 Cited in Henry Elisha Allen, *The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development in Turkey* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935), p. 541.
28 Önder Göçgün, 'Atatürk'e Göre "Millet" Kavramı', *Türk Kültürü* 30, no. 355 (November 1992), p. 644.
29 Parla and Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey*, pp. 72–74.
30 Ibid.
31 Walter Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and Its Aftermath* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), pp. 241–242.
32 Eleazar Birnbaum, 'Turkey: From Cosmopolitan Empire to Nation State', in *Introduction to Islamic Civilization*, R. M. Savory, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 187.
33 Mehmet Eröz, *Atatürk, Milliyetçilik, Doğu Anadolu* (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1987), p. 63.
34 Uriel Hyde, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey* (Jerusalem: The Israel Oriental Society, 1954), p. 19.
35 İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal'in El Yazmaları*, p. 351.
36 Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks: Pioneers of the Republic, 1920–1950* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 2.
37 Richard F. Nyrop, Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, Melissa J. Cutler, Ahmet Ö. Evin, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki, *Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing House, 1973), p. 96.
38 Göçgün, 'Atatürk'e Göre "Millet" Kavramı', p. 643.
39 *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, Cilt I* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 1989), p. 319.
40 *Weiker, Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey*, p. 242.
41 *Milli Şefin Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları*, Kemal Kadri Kop, comp. (Ankara: Akay Kitabevi, 1945), p. 197.
42 Dankwart A. Rustow, 'Kemalizm'e Dair', in *Atatük, Milli Egemenlik ve Gençlik Paneli*, proceedings of a conference held in Istanbul on 20 May 1985 (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1985), p. 29.
43 Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: *The Quest for Identity* (Oxford, U.K.: One World, 2003), p. 80.
44 Ibid., p. 81.
45 Yerasimos Stéphane, 'The Monoparty Period', in *Turkey in Transition*, Irvin C. Shick and Ertuğrul Tonak, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 73–74.
46 Suna Kili, *Turkish Constitutional Developments and Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961* (Istanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1971), p. 60.
47 Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution read: 'The State of Turkey is republican, nationalist, populist, statist, secularist, and reformist. Its official language is Turkish. Its capital is Ankara.'
48 Birnbaum, 'Turkey', p. 186.
49 It has been noted that the Turks were the first Asiatic people to come to the conclusion that Europe had come to have a higher type of civilization than their own. Wortham, *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey*, p. 18.
50 Christopher Houston, *Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation* (Oxford: Berg, 2001), p. 159.

51 Şerif Mardin, 'Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971): 197–211.
52 Erik J. Zürcher, ' "Fundamentalism" as an Exclusionary Device in Kemalist Turkish Nationalism', in *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century*, Willem van Schendel and Erik J. Zürcher, eds. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), p. 210.
53 Birnbaum, 'Turkey', p. 184.
54 Zürcher, ' "Fundamentalism" as an Exclusionary Device in Kemalist Turkish Nationalism', p. 210.
55 Sevan Nişanyan, 'Kemalist Düşüncede "Türk Milleti" Kavramı', *Türkiye Günlüğü* 33 (March-April 1995), p. 134.
56 Ibid., pp. 211–212.
57 Allen, *The Turkish Transformation*, pp. 104–105.
58 Ibid.
59 Tanıl Bora, 'İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği', *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 71 (Winter 1996), p. 178.
60 Fahir Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii*, second volume (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965), p. 450.
61 Kili, *Turkish Constitutional Developments and Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961*, p. 87.
62 Ibid., p. 89.
63 Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii*, second volume, p. 450.
64 Here and below, for the views expressed in the NUC, see Kili, *Turkish Constitutional Developments and Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961*, pp. 90–93.
65 Kenan Evren, *Seçme Konuşmalar, 12 Eylül 1980–6 Kasım 1989* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2000), p. 78.
66 Ayşe Kadıoğlu, 'Citizenship and Individuation in Turkey: The Triumph of Will over Reason', *Cahiers d'etudes sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien*, no. 26 (July-December 1998): 23–40.
67 Ibid.
68 Caroline Finkle, *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire* (London: John Murray, 2005), p. 550.
69 A. V. Sherman, 'Turkey: A Case in Constructive Nationalism', *Commentary* 30, no. 2 (August 1960), p. 93.
70 David Shankland, *Islam and Society in Turkey* (Hemingford Grey, U.K.: The Eothen Press, 1999), p. 22.
71 Kushner, 'Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey', p. 230.
72 Nergis Canefe, 'Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules of Exception', *Nations and Nationalism* 9, no. 2 (2002), p. 137.
73 Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii*, second volume, p. 455.
74 Bozkurt Güvenç, *Türk Kimliği: Kültür Tarihinin Kaynakları* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), p. 32.
75 Turhan Feyzioğlu, 'Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik', in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Yetmişbeşinci Yıl Armağanı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1998), p. 32.
76 Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow*, p. 19. On Atatürkism as mentality, also see Ergun Özbudun, 'Established Revolution versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey', in *Authoritarian*

Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds. (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

77 Sina Akşin, *Essays in Ottoman-Turkish Political History* (Istanbul: ISIS, Press, 2000), p. 211. In the event, the professors from Germany did come to Turkey; they taught at Istanbul and Ankara Universities, and made significant contributions to Turkish scholarship.

78 İnan, 'Medeni Bilgiler ve Atatürk'ün El Yazmaları', p. 369.

79 *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, Cilt II* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 1989), pp. 8–9.

80 İnan, 'Medeni Bilgiler ve Atatürk'ün El Yazmaları', p. 375.

81 Andrew Mango, *The Turks Today* (London: John Murray, 2004), p. 14.

82 Afet İnan, *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* (Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1930).

83 Ibid., pp. 134–135.

84 Nişanyan, 'Kemalist Düşüncede "Türk Milleti" Kavramı', p. 136.

85 Cited in Bora, 'İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği', p. 177.

86 Ibid., p. 134.

87 Soner Çağaptay, 'Citizenship Policies in Interwar Turkey', *Nations and Nationalism* 9, no. 4 (2003), p. 603.

88 The non-Muslims had applied for Turkish citizenship in accordance with the 1928 Law on Turkish Citizenship.

89 Çağaptay, 'Citizenship Policies in Interwar Turkey', pp. 610–613.

90 On 29 October 1923, with the proclamation of the Turkish Republic, Ottoman subjects became Turkish citizens.

91 Mahmut Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet, 1931–1938* (Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1974), p. 67.

92 Parla and Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey*, p. 78.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Goloğlu, *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet*, p. 67.

96 Parla and Davison, *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist* Turkey, p. 124.

97 Namık D. Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict* (Huntingdon, UK: The Eothen Press, 1994), p. 193. It must be noted in passing that the cropping up of the same rationale in respect to several policies the Ottoman rulers and Turkish statesmen pursued concerning nationalism and identity should not be interpreted by the reader as a pretext, but as being grounded rather in a genuine reason, for, as it has been rightly pointed out by Şerif Mardin, 'The history of nationalism [in the Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic], is partly the history of the increasing prestige of the term "Turk" from the nineteenth to the twentieth century'. Mardin, 'Patriotism and Nationalism in Turkey', p. 197.

98 Frank Tachau, 'Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform', *Review of Politics* 26, no. 2 (April 1964), p. 202.

99 Akşin, *Essays in Ottoman-Turkish Political History*, p. 13.

100 İlker Aytürk, 'Turkish Linguists against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Turkey', *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (November 2004), pp. 7–8.

101 Heyd, *Language Reform in Modern Turkey*, pp. 34–35.

102 Ibid., p. 34.

103 Alexander Henderson, 'The Pan-Turanian Myth in Turkey', *Asiatic Review* 41, no. 145 (January 1945), p. 88.

104 Günay Göksu Özdoğan, 'The Case of Racism-Turanism: Turkism During the Single-Party Period, 1931–1944. A Radical Variant of Turkish Nationalism', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 1990, pp. 225–226, 230.

105 Ibid., pp. 201, 207, 211.
106 John M. Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938–1950* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), pp. 65–66.
107 Özdoğan, 'The Case of Racism-Turanism', p. 201.
108 [Nihal] Atsız, *Yolların Sonu*, fourth printing (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1975), p. 76.
109 Özdoğan, 'The Case of Racism-Turanism', p. 231 and Jacob M. Landau, *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 89. Also see, Ord. Prof. Dr. A Zeki Togan, *Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine* (Istanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970), pp. 51, 80–87.
110 Henderson, 'The Pan-Turanian Myth in Turkey', p. 88.
111 Özdoğan, 'The Case of Racism-Turanism', pp. 200, 211.
112 Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, p. 108.
113 There has been traditionally a centre-periphery rift in Turkey. See Şerif Mardin, 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics', *Daedalus*, 102 (1973): 169–190; Metin Heper, 'Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century', *International Political Science Review* 1, no. 1 (1980): 81–105. In the 1930s, that rift was still very much apparent in the country.
114 Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), p. 184.
115 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam: İsmet İnönü*, Volume Two (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1968), pp. 244–245; Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998), p. 129.
116 Edward Weisband, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, trans. from English by M. A. Kayabal (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1974), p. 295.
117 Orhangazi Ertekin, 'Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçülüğün Çatallanan Yolları', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce. Cilt 4. Milliyetçilik,* Tanıl Bora, ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002), p. 366.
118 Özdoğan, 'The Case of Racism-Turanism', p. 176.
119 Ibid.
120 Giritlioğlu, *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii*, second volume, p. 357.
121 Weisband, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, p. 297.
122 Mahmut Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi, 1939–1945* (Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1974), pp. 245, 247, 248, 250–252.
123 *Özdoğan*, 'The Case of Racism-Turanism', p. 111.
124 Ibid., p. 94.
125 Frank Tachau, 'The Search for National Identity Among the Turks', *Die Welt Islam*, no. 8 (1963), p. 175.
126 Ibid.
127 Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, p. 65.
128 Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, volume two, pp. 244–245.
129 Vanderlippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy*, p. 66.
130 Henderson, 'The Pan-Turanian Myth in Turkey', p. 88.
131 Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi: Dönemin İç ve Dış Politikası Üzerinde Bir Dekerlendirme*, second volume (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), p. 229.
132 Weisband, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, p. 308.
133 George Arnakis, 'Turanism: An Aspect of Nationalism', *Balkan Studies* 1 (1960), p. 31.
134 Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, second volume, pp. 244–245; Henderson, 'The Pan-Turanian Myth in Turkey', p. 88.

135 Henderson, 'The Pan-Turanian Myth in Turkey', p. 88.
136 Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, second volume, p. 243.
137 Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, second volume, p. 210.
138 Ibid., pp. 229–230 and Henderson, 'The Pan-Turanian Myth in Turkey', p. 89.
139 Özdoğan, 'The Case of Racism-Turanism', p. 115.
140 Ibid., p. 116; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi, 1939–1945*, pp. 254–255.
141 Carter Vaughn Findley, *The Turks in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 208.
142 Bernard Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1998), pp. 44–45.

6 Turks' Brothers

1 Eleanor Bisbee, *The New Turks: Pioneers of the Republic, 1920–1950* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951), p. 74.
2 Denis Hills, *My Travels in Turkey* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964), p. 164.
3 Eliott Grinnell Mears, *Modern Turkey: A Politico-Economic Interpretation, 1908–1923* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), p. 424.
4 Ibid., p. 140.
5 Ernest Jackh, *The Rising Crescent: Turkey Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944), p. 36.
6 Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 22.
7 Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 218.
8 George S. Harris, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds', *ANNALS*, AAPSS, no. 433 (September 1977), p. 118.
9 The emerging Kurdish intelligentsia formulated Kurdishness in terms of the key themes of the Turkish political left, emphasizing distributive justice, and civic and social rights. The Workers Party of Turkey (*Türkiye İşçi Partisi*) became their primary interlocutor in articulating their dissent. See David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 211 and Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, 'Historicizing the Present and Problematizing the Future of Kurdish Problem: A Critique of the TOBB Report on the Eastern Question', *New Perpectives on Turkey*, no. 14 (1996), p. 8.
10 David Hothams, *The Turks* (London: John Murray, 1972), p. 180.
11 Martin van Bruinessen, 'Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems', in *The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview*, Philip Kragenbrook and Stefan Speri, eds. (London: Routledge, 1992).
12 Geoffrey L. Lewis, *Turkey* (New York: Praeger, 1955), p. 184. Lewis refers to the eastern and the southeastern Turkey just as 'east'.
13 Jackh, *The Rising Crescent*, p. 36.
14 Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 130.
15 Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918–1923. A Documentary Study* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), p. 749.
16 Mears, *Modern Turkey*, p. 537.
17 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938–1950*, second volume (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1968), pp. 79, 298.
18 Richard F Nyrop, Bery Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, Melissa J. Cutler, Ahmet Ö. Evin, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki, *Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Houes, 1973), p. 104.

19 Hills, *My Travels in Turkey*, p. 164.
20 McDowall, *A Modern History of Turks*, p. 186.
21 Ibid., p. 197.
22 Paul White, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers: The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey* (London: Zed Books, 2000), p. 48.
23 Lewis, *Turkey*, pp. 85–86.
24 Abdurrahman Arslan, *Samsun'dan Lozan'a: Mustafa Kemal ve Kürtler* (Istanbul: Doz Yayıncılık, 1991), p. 47.
25 Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Fry, *The United States, and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 78.
26 Mehmet Ali Birand, *Apo ve PKK* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1992), p. 61.
27 Hotham, *The Turks*, pp. 178–179.
28 Ümit Cizre, 'Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Border, Identity, and Hegemony', in *Rightsizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders*, Ian Lustick, Brendan O'Leary, and Thomas Callagy, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 222.
29 Ibid., p. 224.
30 M. Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Özcan, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party', *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 106–107.
31 Doğu Ergil, 'The Kurdish Question in Turkey', *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 3 (July 2000), p. 126.
32 Andrew Mango, *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone* (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 36–38.
33 Ibid., p. 38.
34 Hamit Bozarslan, 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919–1925)', in *Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism*, Abbas *Vali, ed*. (Costa, Mesa: California: Mazda Publishers, 2003), pp. 163–164, 170.
35 Nuri Eren, *Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization* (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 244.
36 Mustafa Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek. Yanlış Giden Neydi? Bundan Sonra Nereye?* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2006), p. 70.
37 Mahmut Goloğlu, *Cumhuriyete Doğru, 1921–1922* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1971), p. 171.
38 Ibid., pp. 110–111.
39 Aydemir, *İkinci Adam: 1938–1950*, p. 299.
40 This revolt is discussed at length in Chapter Seven.
41 Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), p. 151.
42 Andrew Mango, 'Atatürk and the Kurds' *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (1999), p. 19.
43 Ibid., p. 307.
44 McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 210–212; Ergil, 'The Kurdish Question in Turkey', p. 126.
45 Learning Turkish for Kurds must not have been very difficult, at least with respect to individual words. The Kurdish contains a significant number of loan words from Turkish. According to a Kurdish dictionary published by Petersburgh University Language Academy in 1879, at the time, Kurdish consisted of 8378 words and 3080 of those were loan words from Turkish. See Yusuf Sarınay, *Atatürk'ün Millet ve Milliyetçilik Anlayışı* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1990), pp. 69–70.
46 Ergil, 'The Kurdish Question in Turkey', p. 126. Intuitively, the second figure seems somewhat exaggerated.
47 Ibid.

48 Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth Winrow, *The Kurdish Question in Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnıc Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 113.
49 Hotham, *The Turks*, p. 180.
50 Yavuz and Özcan, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party', p. 103.
51 Mango, 'Atatürk and the Kurds', p. 7.
52 Ibid., p. 33.
53 McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, pp. 188–189.
54 Ibid.
55 Selim Deringil, 'The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namık Kemal to Mustafa Kemal', *European History Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (April 1993): 165–169 and Ercümend Kuran, 'Atatürk and Ziya Gökalp', *Cultura Turcica* 2 (1965): 137–146.
56 For some of these letters, see Sadi Borak, *Atatürk'ün Resmi Yayınlara Girmemiş Söylev, Demeç, Yazışma ve Söyleşileri* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1980), pp. 311–312.
57 Mango, 'Atatürk and the Kurds', p. 6.
58 Kirişçi and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey*, p. 12.
59 Ibid, pp. 92–94.
60 Dankwart A. Rustow, 'Mehmed Akif's "Independence March": Religion and Nationalism in Atatürk's Movement of Liberation', *Journal of the American Institute for the Study of Middle Eastern Civilization* 1, nos. 3–4 (Autumn-Winter 1980–1981), pp. 112–114.
61 Yusuf Sarınay, *Atatürk'ün Millet ve Mlliyetçilik Anlayışı* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1990), p. 18.
62 McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 188.
63 Ibid., p. 187.
64 Arslan, *Samsundan Lozan'a*, p. 89.
65 Bozarslan, 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey', p. 175.
66 Shaw, *From Empire to Republic*, p. 745.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., p. 191.
69 Birand, *Apo ve PKK*, p. 62.
70 Ibid.
71 Faik Bulut, *Belgelerle Dersim Raporları* (Istanbul: Yön Yayıncılık, 1991), p. 10.
72 Ibid., pp. 16–19. It should also be noted that there was no vocal demand for local self-rule. See Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 22.
73 Mango, 'Atatürk and the Kurds', pp. 2–3.
74 S. D. Salamone, 'The Dialectics of Turkish National Identity: Ethnic Boundary Maintenance and State Ideology', *East European Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 35–36.
75 *A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – 1927* (Istanbul: ÜçDal Publishing Company, 1985), p. 11.
76 Mango, 'Atatürk and the Kurds', p. 6.
77 Ibid.
78 McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, p. 188.
79 Birand, *Apo ve PKK*, p. 53
80 Grace Ellison, *An Anglish Woman in Angora* (New York: E. P. Dutton, [1923]), p. 311.
81 *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri: Demokrat Partinin Kuruluşundan İktidara Kadar Politik Konuşmalar, 1946–1950*, comp. by Özel Şahingiray (Istanbul: İş Bankası, 1999), p. 48.
82 Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek*, p. 221.

83 Jacob M. Landau, *Middle Eastern Themes: Papers in History and Politics* (London: Frank Cass, 1973), p. 284.
84 M. Hakan Yavuz, 'The Politics of Fear: The Rise of the Nationalist Action Party in Turkey', *Middle East Journal* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002), p. 211.
85 Alev Çınar and Burak Arıkan, 'The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists', in *Political Parties in Turkey*, Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, eds. (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 27.
86 Bülent Aras and Gökhan Bacık, 'The Rise of Nationalist Action Party and Turkish Politics', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6, no. 4 (Spring 2000), p. 56.
87 Sultan Tepe, 'A Kemalist-Islamist Movement? The Nationalist Action Party', *Turkish Studies* 1, no. 2 (Autumn 2000), p. 66.
88 Metin Heper, 'Turkey: Between East and West', in *The Convergence of Civilizations: Constituting a Mediterranean Region*, Emanuel Adler, Federica Bicchi, Beverly Crawford, and Raffaella A. Del Sarto, eds. (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 2006), p. 280.
89 Alparslan Türkeş, *Milliyetçilik* (Istanbul: Hamle, 1966), p. 76.
90 Çınar and Arıkan, 'The Nationalist Action Party', p. 36.
91 Jacob M. Landau, 'Alparslan Türkeş: A Colonel Turmed Politician', in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds. (New York: Lexington Books, 2002), pp. 156–157.
92 Metin Heper and Başak İnce, 'Devlet Bahçeli and "Far Right" Politics in Turkey, 1999–2002', *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (November 2006), p. 876.
93 *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri*. Comp. by Şahingiray, p. 48.
94 *Celal Bayar'ın Seçim Kampanyalarındaki Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1946–1950–1954*, comp. by Özel Şahingiray (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999), p. 48.
95 Lewis, *Turkey*, p. 125. For Bayar, 'east' seemed to have denoted both 'east' and southeast'.
96 *Celal Bayar'ın Seçim Kampanyalarındaki Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1946–1950–1954*, comp. by Şahingiray, p. 58.
97 Yeşim Oruç, 'From Development to Constitutional Citizenship: Demirel on the Kurdish Question', unpublished paper, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2001, p. 10. The author's emphasis.
98 Hasan Cemal, *Kürtler* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003), p. 122.
99 Ibid., p. 13.
100 Ibid., pp. 19–20.
101 Ibid., p. 23.
102 Abdullah Uraz, *Millet Devlet Kucaklaşması* (Ankara: Press Matbaası, 1994), pp. 22, 160.
103 Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, 'Turgut Özal'ın Güneydoğu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakışı', in *Kim Bu Özal? Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, eds. (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2001), p. 129.
104 Cemal, *Kürtler*, pp. 10–12.
105 Muhittin Akman, 'Özal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Policy in the 1980s', *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 4 (October 2002), p. 129.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid., pp. 129–130.
108 Erdal İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler I* (Istanbul: İdea İletişim, 1996), p. 248.
109 Erdal İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler III* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2001), p. 87.
110 However, E. İnönü was disappointed when the MPs from the People's Worker Party attempted to take their part of oath in Parliament in Kurdish. He thus came to the conclusion that resolving the Kurdish issue was made difficult both by

some conservative groups and some small groups of Kurds who demanded everything under the sun. E. İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler I*, p. 266.
111 Ibid., p. 248.
112 Ibid., p. 277. The phrase E. İnönü used in Turkish was '*siyasal bilinç Cumhuriyeti*'.
113 Heper and İnce, 'Devlet Bahçeli and "Far Right" Politics in Turkey', p. 880.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., p. 881.
116 Bahar Şahin, 'Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu: Açılımlar ve Sınırlar', in *Türkiye'de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları*, Aykut Kaya ve Turgut Tarhanlı, eds. (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005), p. 118.
117 Cemal, *Kürtler*, pp. 55–56.
118 *Hürriyet* (Istanbul daily), 29 October 2004.
119 Yavuz and Özcan, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party', p. 119.
120 *Milliyet* (Istanbul daily), 1 January 2006.
121 *Milliyet*, 13 December 2005.
122 Ibid.
123 *Hürriyet*, 22 March 2006.
124 Nurşen Mazıcı, *Celal Bayar: Başbakanlık Dönemi, 1937–1938* (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1996), pp. 29, 30, 35.
125 Ibid., pp. 30–31.
126 Oruç, 'From Development to Constitutional Citizenship: Demirel on the Kurdish Question', p. 6.
127 Cemal, *Kürtler*, p. 76.
128 Ibid., p. 228.
129 Ibid., p. 76.
130 Ibid., p. 59.
131 Ibid., p. 67.
132 Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal'ın Anıları* (Istanbul: Sabah Yayınları, 1994), p. 149.
133 Gençkaya, 'Turgut Özal'ın Güneydoğu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakışı', p. 134.
134 Chief of General Staff, Doğan Güreş, confirmed Özal's account of what transpired at the time concerning the federation option; 'I discussed this issue with Özal. I told him that accordıng to media reports he was for federation and asked him what was really in his mind. He told me that the idea is against the principle that the Republic is a unitary state; however, if that idea is debated, people would be persuaded that it was not a feasible option. Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000), p. 337.
135 Barlas, *Turgut Özal'ın Anıları*, p. 150.
136 Gençkaya, 'Turgut Özal'ın Güneydoğu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakışı', pp. 131–133.
137 E. İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler*, p. 278.
138 *Celal Bayar'ın Seçim Kampanyalarındaki Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1946–1950–1954*, comp. by Şahingiray, p. 175
139 Mazıcı, *Celal Bayar*, p. 34.
140 *Celal Bayar'ın Seçim Kampanyalarındaki Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1946–1950–1954*. Comp. by Şahingiray, p. 58.
141 Ibid., p. 30. Also see, Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek*, p. 77.
142 Oruç, 'From Development to Constitutional Citizenship: Demirel on the Kurdish Question', p. 12.
143 Cemal, *Kürtler*, p. 123.

144 Oruç, 'From Development to Constitutional Citizenship: Demirel on the Kurdish Question', p. 10.
145 Cemal, *Kürtler*, p. 77.
146 Gençkaya, 'Turgut Özal'ın Güneydoğu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakışı', p. 137.
147 Cemal, *Kürtler*, pp. 120, 128, 133.
148 *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları: 1930'dan 1950 Yılına Kadar: Atatürk ve İnönü Devirlerine Ait Seçme Fıkralar* (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1966), p. 238.
149 Before the transition to multi-party politics in 1945, the railway lines in Turkey were extended to Ergani and Diyarbakır in the southeast. Barbara Ward, *Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 81.
150 *Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri*. Comp. by Şahingiray, pp. 175–176.
151 Mazıcı, *Celal Bayar*, pp. 35–36. Since the 1950s, schemes such as health services centred in the city of Muş, the Keban Dam on the Euphrates for the electrification of the east, and Atatürk University in Erzurum were completed. Also, as of 1972, the CENTO railway had connected Turkey to Iran via Lake Van and the CENTO motorway was being built through very high mountain ranges to link the Tigris valley to western Iran. Hotham, *The Turks*, p.181. Today, economically, eastern regions of Turkey has been integrated with western regions of Turkey. Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek*, p. 211.
152 Gençkaya, 'Turgut Özal'ın Güneydoğu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakışı', p. 131.
153 Barlas, *Turgut Özal'ın Anıları*, pp. 150–151.
154 Mehmet Ali Birand and Soner Yalçın, *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2001), p. 473.
155 Yavuz, 'The Politics of Fear', p. 217.
156 Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek*, pp. 151–152.
157 Cemal, *Kürtler*, p. 51.
158 Ibid.
159 Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, p. 335.
160 One of the major Kurdish rebellions in the early Republican period took place in the province of Dersim, today called 'Tunceli'.
161 In 1991, Süleyman Demirel had stated that it was necessary to recognize the Kurdish reality; by 1993, he stated that as long terror continues cultural issues cannot be debated. Kirişçi and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey*, p. 143.
162 Cemal, *Kürtler*, pp. 55–56.
163 Ibid., p. 56.
164 Ibid., p. 55.
165 Ibid., pp. 172–173. The prohibitions imposed because of the Kurdish question are taken up in more detail in Chapter Seven.
166 Ibid., *Kürtler*, pp. 55–56.
167 Christopher Houston, *Islam, Kurds, and the Kurdish Nation* (Oxford: Berg, 2001), p. 97.
168 Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, UK: The Eothen Press, 1985), p. 132.
169 Arcayürek, *Kriz Doğuran Savaş*, p. 337.
170 Bastian Konijnenbelt, 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: An Analysis of Public Statements Made by the Turkish General Staff', in *Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey*, Sami Faltas and Sander Jansen, eds. (Groningen, Netherlands: The Centre for European Security Studies, 2006), p. 178.
171 Kirişçi and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question in Turkey*, pp. 129, 131.
172 Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları, I* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990), p. 255.

173 Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları, II* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), p. 243.
174 Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), pp. 155–158.
175 Ibid.
176 Cemal, *Kürtler*, p. 55.
177 Ibid., p. 61.
178 Birand, *Apo ve PKK*, p. 62.
179 Kirişçi and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey*, p. 105.
180 Stowers Johnson, *Turkish Panorama* (London: Robert Hale, 1968), pp. 113–118.
181 E. İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler, III*, p. 87.
182 Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları, V* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), p. 132.
183 Cemal, *Kürtler*, p. 51.
184 Ibid., p. 60.
185 Ibid., p. 68.
186 *Hürriyet*, 29 October 2005.
187 *Hürriyet*, 3 November 2006.
188 Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek*, p. 13.
189 Heper, 'Turkey Between East and West', p. 285.

7 Times of 'Troubles'

1 Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, 16 October 1925, reproduced in *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de "Kürt Sorunu", 1924–1938: Şeyh Sait, Ağrı ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları*, comp. by Bilâl Şimşir (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991), p. 188.
2 H. E. Wortham, *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1931), p. 80.
3 Erdal İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler, III* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2001), pp. 59–60.
4 Hugh Poulton, *Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic: Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent* (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 97. The present author took the liberty of replacing the word 'war' with the word 'conflict' in the phrase 'fratricidal war', since, at least as far as the Turkish state was concerned, what transpired was a *conflict* arising from a misunderstanding between two ethnic communities; it was not a '*war*', since wars take place between two or more nations.
5 Erik Zürcher, '"Fundamentalism" as an Exclusionary Device in Kemalist Turkish Nationalism', in *Identity Politics in Central Asia and Muslim World: Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century*, Willem van Schendel and Erik J. Zürcher, eds. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), p. 215.
6 Martin van Bruneissen, 'Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism, and Rural Revolt: The Rebellion of Shaikh Said in Turkey', in *Religion and Rural Revolt*, James M. Bak and Gerhard Benecke, eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 288–289, 292.
7 George S. Harris, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds', ANNALS, AAPSS, no. 433 (September 1977), p. 114 and Metin Toker, *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı* (Ankara: Akis Yayınları, 1968), p. 87.
8 Irfan Orga and Margaret Orga, *Atatürk* (London: Michael Joseph, 1962), p. 255.
9 *İsmet İnönü. Hatıralar. İkinci Kitap* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), p. 202.
10 *Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları. Önsöz: Korgeneral İbrahim Kemal Ersun* (Istanbul: Güney Yayıncılık, 1992), pp. 114–115.

11 Arnold Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, *Turkey* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 223.
12 H. C. Armstrong, *Grey Wolf Mustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator* (London: Arthur Barker, 1935), pp. 193, 145.
13 Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918–1923. Documentary Study. Volume I.* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), p. 165.
14 Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918–1923. Documentary Study. Volume II.* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000), p. 736.
15 Bruneisen, van, 'Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism, and Rural Revolt', pp. 282–283.
16 John Palmer and Charles Smith, *Modern Turkey* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1942), p. 12.
17 David Hotham, *The Turks* (London: John Murray, 1972), p. 29.
18 David McDowall, *A Modern History of Kurds* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p. 194.
19 Ibid., pp. 287, 289, 292.
20 Günter Seufert, 'Between Religion and Ethnicity: A Kurdish Alevi Tribe in Globalizing Istanbul', in *Space, Culture, and Power: New Identities in Globalizing Cities*, Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland, eds. (London: Zed Books, 1997), pp. 160–161.
21 Bruinessen, van, 'Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism, and Rural Revolt', pp. 293–294.
22 İsmet Bozdağ, *Kürt İsyanları* (Istanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2004), p. 39.
23 Toker, *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı*, p. 33.
24 Hamit Bozarslan, 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion, 1919–1925', in *Essays on the Origin of Kurdish Nationalism*, Abbas Vali, ed. (Costa Mesa, California: Mazda Publishers, 2003), p. 180.
25 Bruinessen, van, 'Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism, and Rural Revolt', pp. 282–283.
26 Bozarslan, 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey', p. 181.
27 Bozdağ, *Kürt İsyanları*, p. 42.
28 Toker, *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı*, p. 43.
29 Bruinessen, van, 'Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism, and Rural Revolt', p. 290.
30 Toker, *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı*, pp. 30–31.
31 Behçet Cemal, *Şeyh Sait İsyanı* (Istanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955), p. 20.
32 Bruinessen, van, 'Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism, and Rural Revolt', p. 290.
33 Wortham, *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey*, p. 185.
34 Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 266, 409–410.
35 Andrew Mango, 'Atatürk and the Kurds', *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 1 (1997), p. 19.
36 Toker, *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı*, p. 39.
37 Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), pp. 49–50.
38 Ibid., pp. 13,19–20.
39 *Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları*, p. 151.
40 Cemal, *Şeyh Sait İsyanı*, p. 47.
41 *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'indeki Konuşmaları, Volume One, 1920–1938*. Ali Rıza Cihan, comp. (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1992), p. 223. During the first round of 'troubles', people often talked about 'the east' and sometimes 'the east and

southeast', while during the second round of 'troubles', people usually talked about 'the southeast'.
42 Ibid., pp. 121–122.
43 Hotham, *The Turks*, p. 93.
44 Mahmut Goloğlu, *Üçüncü Meşrutiyet* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1971), p. 85.
45 [Asım Us], *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları: 1930'dan 1950 Yılına Kadar Atatürk ve İnönü Devirlerine Ait Seçme Fıkralar* (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1966), p. 662.
46 Graham Fuller and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkey's New Geo-Politics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 25.
47 Shaw, *From Empire to Republic, Volume II*, pp. 744–745.
48 Toker, *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı*, p. 41.
49 Stanford J. Shaw, *From Empire to Republic. Volume II*, pp. 736, 744–745.
50 Armstrong, *Grey Wolf Mustafa Kemal*, p. 268.
51 Abdurrahman Arslan, *Samsun'dan Lozan'a: Mustafa Kemal ve Kürtler, 1919–1923* (Istanbul: Doz Yayıncılık, 1991), p. 91–92.
52 Ali Rıza Cihan and Abdullah Tekin, *Çağdaş Devlet Adamı: İsmet İnönü* (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1989), p. 49.
53 Mahmut Goloğlu, *Devrimler ve Tepkileri, 1924–1930* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1972), p. 275.
54 *Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları*, p. 110. There is also the view that Britain was not all that interested in 'Kurdish nationalism': Kurdish rebellions continued long after the resolution of the Mosul question in 1926. See, Ömer Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition* (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 81. The counter argument here may be that the rebellions that took place up until 1926 might have played a role in the resolution of that question. In any case, what is significant for the present purpose is not whether or not there was a British complicity at the time; what is important is that there were signs that such a complicity was present and even more critically, Turkish leaders did think that Britain was involved in the 'troubles'.
55 Cited in Toker, *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı*, p. 13.
56 Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anıları, Volume Five* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991), p. 122.
57 Cited in Mesut Yeğen, *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), pp. 151–152.
58 James Brown, 'The Turkish Imbroglio: Its Kurds', *The Annals*, no. 541 (September 1995), p. 119.
59 Bozarslan, 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey', pp. 186–187.
60 Robert Olson, *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, 1880–1925* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), p. 154.
61 Shaw, *From Empire to Republic, Volume II*, p. 736.
62 Bozdağ, *Kürt İsyanları*, pp. 59ff and Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Turkey in My Time* (Norman: University of Oklahama Press, 1956), pp. 150–151.
63 Mustafa Akyol, *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek. Yanlış Giden Neydi? Bundan Sonra Nereye?* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2006), pp. 132–134.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey*, p. 90.
67 Bahar Şahin, 'Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu: Açılımlar ve Sınırlar', in *Türkiye'de Azınlık ve Çoğunluk Politikaları: AB Sürecinde*

Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, no ed. (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005), p. 109 and Jacob M. Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974), p. 146.

68 Şahin, 'Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu', pp. 110–111.

69 Landau, *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, pp. 44, 86.

70 Ali Kemal Özcan, *Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan* (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 100.

71 Şahin, 'Türkiye'n in Avrupa Birliği Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu', p. 112.

72 Arslan, *Samsun'dan Lozan'a*, p. 91.

73 Metin Heper, *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998), pp. 17, 58 and Mango, 'Atatürk and the Kurds', p. 19.

74 *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları, Birinci Cilt (1920–1938)*, comp. by Ali Rıza Cihan (Ankara: TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu, 1992), p. 173.

75 McDowall, *A Modern History of Kurds*, p. 195.

76 Harris, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds', p. 116.

77 McDowall, *A Modern History of Kurds*, p. 201.

78 Here and below, on this Report, we draw upon 'İsmet Paşa'nın Kürt Raporu', compiled from the original Report by Saygı Buket and published in the Istanbul daily, Hürriyet, 7–10 September 1992 and Hüseyin Koca, *Müfettişliklerden Olağanüstü Hâl Valiliğine. Birinci Kitap* (Konya: Mikro Yayınları, 1998), pp. 425, 427, 430, 436–434, and 440.

79 It was at this time that the name 'Dersim' was replaced by 'Tunceli'; 'Dersim' was the name given to an unspecified region, while Tunceli referred to a more specific province. Nicole Watts, 'Relocating Dersim: Turkish State Building and Kurdish Resistance, 1931–1938', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 23 (Fall 2000), p. 15.

80 Ibid., p. 16.

81 Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1939), pp. 111–112, 221.

82 Ibid., p. 282.

83 Andrew Mango, personal communication, February 2007.

84 Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey*, p. 88.

85 Ibid., p. 93.

86 Şahin, 'Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu', p. 114.

87 Vecihi Timuroğlu, *Dersim Tarihi* (Ankara: Yurt-Kitap-Yayın, 1991), pp. 33–34.

88 Ibid., p. 35.

89 Shaw, *From Empire to Republic, Volume I*, p. 20. The author's emphasis.

90 Şerif Mardin, *Din ve İdeoloji* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), p. 132.

91 Harris, 'Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds', p. 116.

92 Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), pp. 200–201.

93 Henri J. Barkey, 'The Struggles of a "Strong" State', *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000), p. 93.

94 David McDowall, 'The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review', in *The Kurds: A Contemporary Review*, Philip G. Kregenbrook, eds. (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 13.

95 Nizâm-ül-Mülk, *Siyâset-Nâme*, comp. by Mehmet Altay Köymen (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1999), p. 72.

96 William Hale, *Turkish Politics and the Military* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 178.

97 Fuller and Lesser with Henze and Brown, *Turkey's New Geopolitics*, p. 22.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid., p. 21.
100 Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey*, p. 91.
101 Ibid., p. 92.
102 Murat Somer, 'Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context and Domestic and Regional Implications', *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004), p. 247.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid., p. 246
105 Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey*, pp. 101–102.
106 Ibid., p. 102.
107 Ibid., p. 104.
108 Şahin, 'Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu', p. 120.
109 *İsmet İnönü: Hatıralar. İkinci Kitap* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987), p. 269.
110 Palmer and Smith, *Modern Turkey*, p. 149; Bruneisen, van, 'Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism, and Rural Revolt', p. 282; Erik J. Zürcher, *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924–1925* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), p. 81.
111 McDowall, *A Modern History of Kurds*, p. 196.
112 Watts, 'Relocating Dersim', p. 24.
113 Ibid.
114 Fikret Babuş, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Etnik-Sosyal Politikalar Çerçevesinde Göç ve İsyan Siyaseti ve Uygulanması* (Istanbul: Ozan ayıncılık, 2006), passim.
115 Ibid., p. 299.
116 Ibid., pp. 121–122.
117 Ibid., p. 136.
118 Ibid., p. 75.
119 Ibid., p. 301.
120 Ibid., p. 31.
121 Ibid., pp. 145, 302.
122 Ibid., p. 177.
123 Ibid., pp. 194–195
124 Kirişçi, Kemal, and Gareth Winrow. *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), p. 103.
125 Babuş, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Etnik-Sosyal Politikalar Çerçevesinde Göç ve İsyan Siyaseti ve Uygulanması*, pp. 300–304.
126 Faik Bulut, *Belgelerle Dersim Raporları* (Istanbul: Yön Yayınları, 1991), p. 218.
127 Ibid., pp. 230–231.
128 Ibid., pp. 176, 276, 286.
129 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam: İsmet İnönü, 1938–1950* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1966), p. 311. It has been reported that in 1934, 25,830 persons from 5,074 households were resettled in the western parts of Turkey; in 1942, 22,516 persons from 4,128 households returned to their home places. İlhan Tekeli, 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğundan Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer Değiştirmesi ve İskan Sorunu', *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 50 (1990), p. 49.
130 Watts, 'Relocating Dersim', p. 269.
131 Vecihi Timuroğlu, *Dersim Tarihi* (Ankara: Yurt Kitap-Yayın, 1991), p. 84.
132 Arthur Campbell Turner, 'Kurdish Nationalism', in *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*, Peter J. Chelskowski and Robert J. Pranger, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 391.

133 Timuroğlu, *Dersim Tarihi*, p. 62.
134 Arslan, *Samsun'dan Lozan'a*, p. 91.
135 *İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'deki Konuşmaları, Birinci Cilt (1920–1938)*, comp by Cihan, p. 431.
136 Timuroğlu, *Dersim Tarihi*, p. 74.
137 Ibid., p. 77.
138 Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey*, p. 88.
139 We take up that practice below.
140 Arslan, *Samsun'dan Lozan'a*, p. 97.
141 Nurşen Mazıcı, *Celal Bayar: Başbakanlık Dönemi, 1937–1939* (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1996), p.160.
142 Timuroğlu, *Dersim Tarihi*, pp. 86–87.
143 Brown, 'The Turkish Imbroglio: The Kurds', p. 120.
144 Ibid., p. 123.
145 Timuroğlu, *Dersim Tarihi*, p. 48.
146 Ibid., pp. 75, 112.
147 Taşpınar, *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey*, p. 100.
148 Ibid., p. 105.
149 Brown, 'The Turkish Imbroglio', p. 123.

Conclusion

1 The situation had similarities to the way the French treated Algeria, 'which was considered to be a normal French colony, with the Algerian Muslims considered as French citizens', Stanford J. Shaw, personal correspondence, August 2005. In the Turkish case, there was also the similarity of religions.
2 *Hürriyet* (Istanbul daily), 8 October 2004.
3 Şerif Mardin, 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?' *Daedalus* 102 (1973): 197–211 and Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, UK: The Eothen Press, 1985).
4 Faruk Birtek, 'Prospects for a New Center or the Temporary Rise of the Peripheral *Asabiyah?*', in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), p. 225.
5 In the late 1930s, the state did not allow the Turkish-speaking Gagauz Turks living in Rumania to come to Turkey, because they were Christians. However, that same state let the Muslim Bosnians to immigrate to Turkey, despite the fact that the Bosnians did not speak Turkish and they were ethnically Slavic.
6 Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: Transition to Multiparty Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 254.
7 This is, in fact, the arrangement one comes across in the Lausanne Peace Treaty concluded between the Allied Powers and Turkey in 1924, following the Turkish War of Independence. Their perception of majority-minority distinction being neither numbers nor ethnicity, but religion, the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne Peace Conference refused to accept the argument that ethnically based minorities did exist in Turkey. Such observations as 'Kurds are not a recognized minority in Turkey, but populate much of the Eastern portion of the state, and are found in the urban areas' [Charles G. MacDonald, 'The Kurds', *Journal of Political Science* 19 (1991), p. 131] miss this crucial point.
8 Nur Yalman, 'Islamic Reform and the Mystic Tradition in Eastern Turkey', *Archives Européennes des Sociologies* 10 (1969): 41–60.

9 For these regime types, see S. N. Eisenstadt, 'Strong and Weak States: Some Reconsiderations', in *The States and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective*, Metin Heper, eds. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987). The author has used this particular classification of antecedent regime types in the following studies: Metin Heper, 'Transitions to Democracy Reconsidered: A Historical Perspective', *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives*, Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds. (New York: HarperCollins, 1991) and Metin Heper, 'The "Strong State" and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective', in *Democracy and Modernity*', S. N. Eisenstadt, ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992).

Works Cited

A Speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – 1927 (Istanbul: Ministry of Education, 1963).

Abdülhamid, Sultan. *Hatıratım* (Istanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1984). First published in 1974.

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993).

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914* (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1969).

Ahmad, Feroz. *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950–1975* (London: Hurst, 1977).

Ahmad, Feroz. *Turkey: The Quest for Identity* (Oxford, UK: One World, 2003).

Ainsworth, William Francis. *Travels and Researches in Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Chaldea, and Armenia. Vol. I* (London: John W. Parker, 1842).

Akçura, Yusuf. *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976).

Akçura, Yusuf. *Türkçülüğün Tarihi* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1998).

Akın, Rıdvan. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Dağılma Devri ve Türkçülük Hareketi* (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1992).

Akman, Muhittin. 'Özal Leadership and Restructuring of Turkish Ethnic Policy in the 1980s', *Middle Eastern Studies* 38, no. 4 (October 2002): 123–42.

Akpınar, Alişan. *Osmanlı Devletinde Aşiret Mektebi* (Istanbul: Selçuk Kitabevi, 1997).

Akpınar, Turgut. *Türk Tarihinde İslamiyet*, second printing (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları:1994)

Akşin, Sina. *Essays in Ottoman-Turkish Political History* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000).

Akyol, Mustafa. *Kürt Sorununu Yeniden Düşünmek: Yanlış Giden Neydi? Bundan Sonra Nereye?* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2006).

Akyol, Taha. *Osmanlı Mirasından Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sine* (Istanbul: da Yayınları, 2002).

Allen, Henry E. *The Turkish Transformation: A Study in Social and Religious Development in Turkey* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935)

Alper, Emin. 'Ömer Seyfettin', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce. Cilt I. Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet Birikimi*, Mehmet Ö. Alkan, ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

And, Metin. 'Ortaoyunu', *Skylife* [Turkish Airlines] 23, no. 260 (March 2005), pp. 134–135.

Arai, Masami. *Nationalism in the Young Turk Era* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992).

Aras, Bülent, and Gökhan Bacık. 'The Rise of Nationalist Action Party and Turkish Politics', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 6, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 48–64.

Arcayürek, Cüneyt. *Kriz Doğuran Savaş* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2000).

Armstrong, H. C. *Grey Wolf Mustafa Kemal: An Intimate Study of a Dictator* (London: Arthur Barker, 1935). First published in 1932.

Arnakis, George G. 'Turanism: An Aspect of Turkish Nationalism', *Balkan Studies* 1 (1960): 19–32

Arslan, Abdurrahman. *Samsun'dan Lozan'a: Mustafa Kemal ve Kürtler, 1919–1923* (Istanbul: Doz Yayıncılık, 1991).

Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları, 1930'dan 1950 Yılına Kadar. Atatürk ve İsmet İnönü Devirlerine Ait Seçme Fıkralar (Istanbul: Vakit Matbaası, 1966).

Atatürk'e Göre Yurttaşlık Bilgileri, compiled and adapted to contemporary Turkish by Nuran Tezcan (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1989).

Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, I–III (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 1989).
Atis, Sarah G. Moment. 'Turkish Literature', in John L. Esposito, Editor-in Chief, *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, vol. 4 (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Atsız, [Nihal]. *Yolların Sonu*, fourth printing (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1975).
Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *İkinci Adam, 1938–1950*, second volume (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1968).
Aytürk, İlker. 'Turkish Linguists against the West: The Origins of Linguistic Nationalism in Atatürk's Turkey', *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (November 2004): 1–25.
Babinger, Franz. *Mehmed the Conqeuror and His Time*, ed. by William C. Hickman, trans. from German by Ralph Manheim (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).
Babuş, Fikret. *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Etnik-Sosyal Politikalar Çerçevesinde Göç ve İskan Siyaseti ve Uygulamaları* (Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık, 2006).
Bahriye Nazırı ve 4. Ordu Komutanı Cemal Paşa, comp. by Matin Martı (Istanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996).
Barkey, Henri J., and Graham Fuller. 'Turkey's Kurdish Question: Critical Turning Points and Missed Opportunities', *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 1 (Winter 1997): 59–79.
Barkey, Henri J., and Graham Fuller. *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (New York: Rowman and Little, 1998).
Barkey, Henri J. 'The Struggles of a "Strong" State', *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no. 1 (Fall 2000): 87–105.
Barlas, Mehmet. *Turgut Özal'ın Anıları* (Istanbul: Sabah Yayınları, 1992).
Bedirxan, Celadet Alî. *Kürt Sorunu Üzerine* (Istanbul: Avesta, 1997).
Berghe, L.van den. 'Protection of Ethnic Minorities: A Critical Appraisal', in R. G. Virsing, ed., *Protection of Ethnic Minorities: Comparative Perspective* (Oxford, Pergamon Press, 1981).
Bessé, Alfred de. *The Turkish Empire: Its Historical, Statistical, and Religious Conditions; Also its Manners, Customs, etc. Translated from the fourth German edition, with Memoirs of the Reigning Sultan, Our Pacha, The Turkish Cabinet, etc., etc, by Edward Joy Morris* (Philadelphia: Lindsay and Blakston, 1854).
Birand, Mehmet Ali. *Apo ve PKK* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1992).
Birand, Mehmet Ali, and Soner Yalçın. *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2001).
Birnbaum, Eleazar. 'Turkey: From Cosmopolitan Empire to Nation State', in *Introduction to Islamic Civilization*, R. M. Savory, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
Birtek, Faruk. 'Prospects for a New Center or the Temporary Rise of the Peripheral *Asabiyah?*', in *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds. (San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1994).
Bisbee, Eleanor. *The New Turks: Pioneers of the Republic, 1920–1950* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951).
Bora, Tanıl. 'İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği', *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 71 (Winter 1996): 168–190.
Borak, Sadi. *Atatürk'ün Resmi Yayınlara Girmemiş Söylev, Demeç, Yazışma ve Söyleşileri* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1980).
Bozarslan, Hamit. 'Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey: From Tacit Contract to Rebellion (1919–1925)', in *Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism*, Abbas Vali, ed. (Costa, Mesa: California: Mazda Publishers, 2003).

Bozdağ, İsmet. *Kürt İsyanları* (Istanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2004).
Brown, James. 'The Turkish Imbroglio: The Kurds', *The Annals*, 541 (September 1995): 116–129.
Bruinessen, Martin van. 'Popular Islam, Kurdish Nationalism, and Rural Revolt: The Rebellion of Shaikh Said in Turkey (1925)', in *Religion and Rural Revolt*, James M. Bak and Gerhard Benecke, eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
Bruinessen, Martin van. *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992).
Bruinessen, Martin van. 'Kurdish Society, Ethnicity, Nationalism and Refugee Problems', in *The Kurds*: *A Contemporary Overview*, in Philip Kragenbrook and Stefan Speri, eds. (London: Routledge, 1992).
Bulut, Faik. *Belgelerle Dersim Raporları* (Istanbul: Yön Yayıncılık, 1991).
Bunsen, Victoria de. *The Soul of a Turk* (London: Hohn Lane the Bodley Head, 1910).
Burton, Major H. M. 'The Kurds', a lantern lecture given to the Royal Central Asian Society on 16 December 1942.
Çağaptay, Soner. 'Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 8, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 67–82.
Çağaptay, Soner. 'Citizenship Policies in Interwar Turkey', *Nations and Nationalism* 9, no. 4 (2003): 601–619.
Çağaptay, Soner. *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge, 2006).
Canefe, Nergis. 'Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules of Exception', *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no. 2 (2002), pp. 133–155.
Celal Bayar'ın Söylev ve Demeçleri: Demokrat Partinin Kuruluşundan İktidara Kadar Politik Konuşmalar, 1946–1950, comp. by Özel Şahingiray (Istanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999).
Celâl Bayar'ın Seçim Kampanyalarındaki Söylev ve Demeçleri, 1946–1950–1954, comp. by Özel Şahingiray (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1999).
Cemal, Behçet. *Şeyh Sait İsyanı* (Istanbul: Sel Yayınları, 1955).
Cemal, Hasan. *Kürtler* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2003).
Cemal Paşa. *Bahriye Nazırı ve 4. Ordu Komutanı*, comp. by Matin Martı, fifth printing (Istanbul: Arma Yayınları, 1996).
Cemal Paşa: Hatırat, fifth edition, comp. by Metin Martı (Istanbul: Arma, 1996).
Çınar, Alev, and Burak Arıkan. 'The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists?' in *Political Parties in Turkey*, Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, eds. (London: Frank Cass, 2002).
Cihan, Ali R. and Abdullah Tekin. *Çağdaş Devlet Adamı: İsmet İnönü* (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1989).
Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, Ümit. 'Historicizing the Present and Problemitizing the Future: A Critique of the TOBB Report on the Eastern Question', *New Perspectives on Turkey* 14 (Spring 1996): 1–22.
Cizre, Ümit. 'Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Border, Identity, and Hegemony', in *Rightsizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders*, Ian Lustick, Brendan O'Leary and Thomas Callaghy, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
Coakley, John. 'The Resolution of Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Typology', *International Political Science Review* 13, no. 4 (1992): 343–53.
Conder, Josiah. *The Modern Traveller. A Description of the Various Countries of the Globe. Thirty-Three Volumes. Vol. XIV. Turkey* (London: Thomas Tegg and Son [1826]).
Cook, M. A. 'Introduction', in *A History of The Ottoman Empire to 1730*, idem, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

Cunbur, Müjgan. *Anadolu'nun Bütünleşmesinde Ahmed Yesevi'nin Yeri* (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi, 1997).
Davison, Roderic. 'Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire', in William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald, eds., *Nationalism in a Non-National State: The Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire* (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1977).
Davison, Roderic. *Essays in Ottoman History, 1774–1923? The Impact of the West* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990).
Deringil, Selim. 'The Ottoman Origins of Kemalist Nationalism: Namık Kemal to Mustafa Kemal', *European History Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (April 1993): 165–191.
Deringil, Selim. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimacy of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909*, paperback edition (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1999).
Duguid, Stephen. 'The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia', *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 2 (May 1973): 139–155.
Dündar, Fuat. *İttihat ve Terakkinin Müslümanları İskân Politikası, 1913–1918* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001).
Duru, Kâzım Nami. *Ziya Gökalp* (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1949).
Earle, Edward Mead, *Turkey, Great Britain and the Baghdad Railway*: *A Study in Imperialism* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923).
Ellison, Grace. *An English Woman in Angora* (New York: E. P. Dutton, [1923]).
Entessar, Nader. *Kurdish Ethnonationalism* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1992).
Eren, Nuri. *Turkey Today and Tomorrow: An Experiment in Westernization* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).
Ergil, Doğu. 'The Kurdish Question in Turkey', *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 3 (July 2000): 122–135.
Eröz, Mehmet. *Atatürk, Milliyetçilik, Doğu Anadolu* (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1987).
Ertekin, Orhangazi. 'Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçlüğün Çatallanan Yolları' in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce. Cilt 4. Milliyetçilik*, Tanıl Bora, ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002).
Eryılmaz, Bilal. *Osmanlı Devlet'inde Millet Sistemi* (Istanbul: Ağaç Yayıncılık, 1992).
Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey, comp. and ed. by Peter Alford Andrews, with the assistance of Rüdiger Benninghaus (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989).
Evren, Kenan. *Kenan Evren'in Anıları, I* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1990).
Evren, Kenan. *Kenan Evren'in Anıları, III* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991).
Evren, Kenan. *Kenan Evren'in Anıları, IV* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991).
Evren, Kenan. *Kenan Evren'in Anıları, V* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1991).
Evren, Kenan, *Seçme Konuşmalar, 12 Eylül 1980–6 Kasım 1989* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2000).
Faroqhi, Suraiya. *Subjects of the Sultan: Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).
Faroqhi, Suraiya. *The Ottoman Empire and the World around It* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).
Feyzioğlu, Turhan. 'Atatürk ve Milliyetçilik', in *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Yetmişbeşinci Yılı Armağanı* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1998).
Findley, Carter Vaughn. *The Turks in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
Finkle, Caroline. *Osman's Dream: The Story of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1923* (London: John Murray, 2005).
Fortna, Benjamin C. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

Fuller, Graham E. and Ian O. Lesser with Paul Henze and J. F. Brown. *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China* (Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford: Westview Press, 1993).

Garnett, Lucy M. J. *Turkey of the Ottomans* (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1914).

Garnett, Lucy M. J. *Turkish Life in Town and Country* (London: George Newness, n.d.[early twentieth century]).

Gençkaya, Ömer Faruk. 'Turgut Özal'ın Güneydoğu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakışı' in *Kim Bu Özal? Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*, İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, eds. (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 2001).

Genelkurmay Belgelerinde Kürt İsyanları. Önsöz: Korgeneral İbrahim Kemal Ersun (Istanbul: Güney Yayıncılık, 1992).

Georgean, François. *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura, 1876–1935*, trans. from French by Alev Er (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986).

Giritlioğlu, Fahir. *Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin Mevkii*, Birinci Cilt (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1965).

Göçgün, Önder. 'Atatürk'e Göre "Millet" Kavramı', *Türk Kültürü* 30, no. 355 (November 1992).

Gökalp, Ziya. *The Principles of Turkism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968).

Gökalp, Ziya. *Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkında Sosyolojik Tetkikler*. (Ankara: Sosyal Yayınlar, 1992).

Gökalp, Ziya. *Türkçülüğün Esasları* (Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları, 1955).

Goloğlu, Mahmut. *Üçüncü Meşrutiyet* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1970).

Goloğlu, Mahmut. *Cumhuriyete Doğru, 1921–1922* (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1971).

Goloğlu, Mahmut. *Tek Partili Cumhuriyet, 1931–1938* (Ankara: Kalite Matbası, 1974).

Goloğlu, Mahmut. *Milli Şef Dönemi, 1939–1945* (Ankara: Kalite Matbaası, 1974).

Gunther, Michael M. *The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990).

Gunther, Michael M. *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

Güvenç, Bozkurt. *Türk Kimliği: Kültür Tarihinin Kaynakları* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993).

Gibb, H.A.R., and Harold Bowen. *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East. Volume One. Islamic Society in the Eighteenth Century, Part II* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

Goffman, Daniel. 'Ottoman *Millet*s in the Early Seventeenth Century', *New Perspectives on Turkey* 11 (Fall 1994): 135–158.

Hallaçoğlu, Yusuf. *XVIII Yüzyılda Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun İskân Siyaseti ve Aşiretlerin Yerleştirilmesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991).

Hall, William H. ed., *Reconstruction in Turkey*. A Series of Reports Compiled for the American Committee of Armenian and Syrian Relief (New York: n. p., 1918).

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. '*Millet*s, Elements, and Minorities: The Change of the Official Ottoman State Ideology and its Impact on the Relations Among Various Ethnic and Religious Groups in the Ottoman Empire', paper presented at the Mellon Seminar, 'Diversity and the Body Politics in Middle Eastern Societies', Princeton University, Princeton, N.J., USA, 11 April 1996.

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. *The Young Turks in Opposition* (London: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. *Preparation for Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Harris, George S. 'Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds', *ANNALS*, AAPSS, no. 433 (September 1977): 112–124.
Hasluck, F. W. *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, Volume I (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000). First published in 1929.
Heper, Metin. 'Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century', *International Political Science Review* 1, no. 1 (1980): 81–105.
Heper, Metin. *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Walkington, UK: The Eothen Press, 1985).
Heper, Metin. 'Transitions to Democracy Reconsidered: A Historical Approach', in *Comparative Political Dynamics: Global Research Perspectives*, Dankwart A. Rustow and Kenneth Paul Erickson, eds. (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).
Heper, Metin. 'The "Strong State" and Democracy: The Turkish Case in Comparative and Historical Perspective', in *Democracy and Modernity*, S. N. Eisanstadt, ed. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992).
Heper, Metin. *İsmet İnönü: The Making of a Turkish Statesman* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1998).
Heper, Metin. 'Turkey: Between East and West', in *The Convergence of Civilizations: Constituting a Mediterranean Region*, Emanuel Adler, Federica Bicchi, Beverly Crawford, and Raffaella A. Del Sarto, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006).
Heper, Metin and Başak İnce. 'Devlet Bahçeli and "Far Right" Politics in Turkey, 1999–2002', *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (November 2006): 873–888.
Henderson, Aleaxander. 'The Pan-Turanian Myth in Turkey', *Asiatic Review* 41, no. 145 (January 1945): 88–92.
Heyd, Uriel. *Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp* (London: The Harvill Press, 1950).
Heyd, Uriel. *Language Reform in Modern* Turkey (Jerusalem: The Israel Oriental Society, 1954).
Hills, Denis. *My Travels in Turkey* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1964).
Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985).
Hostler, Charles Warren. *The Turks of Central Asia* (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger, 1993).
Hothams, David. *The Turks* (London: John Murray, 1972).
House with Wisteria: Memoirs of Halidé Edib. With an introduction by Sibel Erol. (Charlottesville, Virginia: Leopolis Press, 2003), p. 259. First published in 1926 as *Memoirs of Halidé Edib*.
Houston, Christopher. *Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State* (Oxford: Berg, 2001).
Howe, Marvine. *Turkey Today: A Nation Divided over Islam's Revival* (London: John Murray, 1997).
Hütterroth, Wolf D. 'Ottoman Administration of the Desert in the Sixteenth Century', *Asian and African Studies*, 19 (1985): 145–155.
Hyman, Anthony. 'Elusive Kurdistan: The Struggle for Recognition', *Conflict Studies*, no. 214 (1988): 1–25.
İçduygu, Ahmet, Yılmaz Çolak, and Nalan Soyarık. 'What is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Debate', *Seventy-Five Years of Turkish Republic*, Sylvia Kedourie, ed. (London: Frank Cass, 2000).
Imber, Colin. *The Ottoman Empire, 1300–1650: The Structure of Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
İnalcık, Halil. 'Ottoman Methods of Conquest', *Studia Islamica* II (1954): 103–129.
İnalcık, Halil. '[Turkey:] The Nature of Traditional Society', in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

İnalcık, Halil. 'The Policy of Mehmed II toward the Greek Population of Istanbul and the Byzantine Buildings of the City', paper prepared for the Symposium entitled, 'After the Fall of Constantinople', held at Dumbarton Oaks, May 1968, and read by Professor R. J. Jenkins.

İnalcık, Halil. *The Ottoman Empire: The Classical Age, 1300–1600*, trans. by Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973).

İnalcık, Halil. 'Centralization and Decentralization in Ottoman Administration', in *Studies in Eighteenth Century Islamic History*, Thomas Naff and Roger Owen, eds. (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977).

İnalcık, Halil. 'The Yürüks: Their Origins, Expansion, and Economic Role', in Robert Pinner and Walter B. Denny, eds. *Oriental Carpets and Textile Studies. II: Carpets of the Mediterranean Countries, 1400–1600* (London: Hali OCTS Ltd., 1996).

İnalcık, Halil. 'Sosyal Bilimler Kavşağında Doğu Meselesi' *Türk Dünyası Tarih Dergisi* no. 128 (August 1997), pp. 18–19.

İnalcık, Halil. 'The "Ottoman Civilization" and Palace Patronage' in *Ottoman Civilization*, Halil İnalcık and Günsel Renda, eds. (Ankara: Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Culture and Tourism: 2004).

İnalcık, Halil, 'Periods in Ottoman History: State, Society, Economy' in Ibid.

İnalcık, Halil. 'Autonomous Enclaves in Islamic States: *Temlîks*, *Soyurghals*, *Yurdluk-Ocaklıks*, *Mâlikhâne-Muḳâṭa 'as* and *Awqâf*' in *History and Historiography of Post-Mongol Central Asia and the Middle East*, Judith Pfeiffer and Sholeh A. Quinn, eds., in Collaboration with Ernest Tucker (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrasowitz Verlag, 2006).

İnalcık, Halil. 'Tarihsel Bağlamda Sivil Toplum ve Tarikatlar', typescript.

İnan, Afet. *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları* ('An Outline of Turkish History') (Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1930).

İnan, Afet. *Medeni Bilgiler ve Mustafa Kemal'in El Yazmaları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1969).

İnönü, Erdal. *Anılar ve Düşünceler. I. Cilt* (İstanbul: Idea İletişim, 1996).

İnönü, Erdal. *Anılar ve Düşünceler. II. Cilt* (İstanbul: Idea İletişim, 1998).

İnönü, Erdal. *Anılar ve Düşünceler, III. Cilt* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2001).

İsmet İnönü. Hatıralar. İkinci Kitap (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1987)

İsmet İnönü'nün TBMM'indeki Konuşmaları, Birinci Cilt, 1920–1938. Ali Rıza Cihan, ed. (Ankara: TBMM Basımevi, 1992).

Kabacalı, Alpay. *Tarihimizde Kürtler ve Ayaklanmaları* (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1991).

Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. 'Citizenship and Individuation in Turkey: The Triumph of Will over Reason', *Cahiers d'etudes sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde Turco-Iranien* no. 26 (July–December): 23– 40.

Kafadar, Cemal. *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).

Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. *Turkish Dynamics: Bridge across Troubled Lands* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

Kâmil Paşa ve Said Paşa'nın Anıları, compiled by Gül Çağalı-Güven (Istanbul: Arba Yayınları, 1991).

Karpat, Kemal H. *Turkey's Politics: Transition to Multiparty Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959).

Karpat, Kemal H. 'Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire', in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: Nineteenth Century*, William R. Polk and Richard Chambers, eds. (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968).

Karpat, Kemal H. *An Inquiry Into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations*, Research Monograph no. 39, Center for International Affairs, Princeton University, 1973.

Karpat, Kemal H. 'The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: The Young Turks and Nationalism', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 6 (1975): 276–299.

Karpat, Kemal H. '*Millets* and Nationality: The Roots of Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era', in '*Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society*, Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis, eds. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1982).

Karpat, Kemal H. *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985)

Karpat, Kemal H. 'The Ethnicity Problem in a Multi-Ethnic Anational Islamic State: Continuity and Recasting of Ethnic Identity in the Ottoman Empire', in Paul Brass, ed., *Ethnic Groups and the State* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble, 1985).

Karpat, Kemal H. 'The Ottoman Ethnic and Confessional Legacy in the Middle East', in *Ethnicity, Pluralism, and the State in the Middle East*, M. J. Esman and I. Rabinovich, eds. (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988).

Karpat, Kemal H. *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman Empire* (London: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Kasaba, Reşat. 'Göç ve Devlet: Bir İmparatorluk-Cumhuriyet Karşılaştırması', in *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e*: *Problemler, Araştırmalar, Tartışmalar*, comp. by Hamdi Can Tuncer (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998).

Kayalı, Hasan. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997).

Kaya, Önder. *Tanzimat'tan Lozan'a Azınlıklar* (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2004).

Keyder, Çağlar. *The State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development* (London and New York: Verso, 1987).

Kili, Suna. *Turkish Constitutional Developments and Assembly Debates on the Constitutions of 1924 and 1961* (Istanbul: Menteş Matbaası, 1971).

Kılıç, H. Ayla. 'Democratization, Human Rights, and Ethnic Policies in Turkey', *Journal of Muslim-Minority Affairs* 18, no. 1 (April 1998): 91–111.

Kinross, Lord, [John Patrick Douglas Balfour, Baron]. *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Morrow Quill, 1977).

Kinzer, Stephen. *Crescent and Star: Turkey between Two Worlds* (New York: Farrar, 2001).

Kirişçi, Kemal, and Gareth Winrow. *The Kurdish Question in Turkey: An Example of Trans-State Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

Koca, Hüseyin. *Yakın Tarihten Günümüze Hükümetlerin Doğu-Güneydoğu Politikaları: Umumi Müfettişliklerden Olağanüstü Hal Bölge Valiliğine. Birinci Kitap* (Konya: Mikro Yayınları, 1998).

Koçak, Cemil. *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi: Dönemin İç ve Dış Politikası Üzerinde Bir Değerlendirme*, second volume (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996).

Koçak, Cemil. 'Namık Kemal', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce. Cilt I. Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet Birikimi*, Mehmet Ö. Alkan, ed. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

Konijnenbelt, Bastiaan. 'The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics: An Analysis of Public Statements Made by the Turkish General Staff', in *Governance and the Military: Perspectives for Change in Turkey*, Sami Faltas and Sander Jansen, eds. (Groningen, the Netherlands: The Centre for European Security Studies, 2006).

Köprülü, M. Fuad. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Kuruluşu*, second printing (Ankara: Başnur Matbaası, 1972).

Köprülü, M. Fuad. *Islam in Anatolia after the Turkish Invasion (Prolegomena)*, translated, edited by Gary Leiser who also wrote the Introduction (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1993).
Köprülü, Fuad. *Osmanlı'nın Etnik Kökeni* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1999).
Kortepeter, Carl Max, *Ottoman Imperialism During the Reformation Europe and the Caucasus* (New York: New York University Press, 1972).
Kramer, Heinz. *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).
Kunt, I. Metin. *The Sultan's Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
Kushner, David. *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908* (London: Frank Cass, 1977).
Kushner, David. 'Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey', *Journal of Contemporary History* 32, no. 2 (1997): 219–233.
Kutlay, Naci. *İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler* (Ankara: Beybun Yayınları, 1992).
Jackh, Ernest. *The Rising Crescent: Turkey, Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944).
Jaber, Kamel S. Abu. 'The *Millet* System in the Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Empire', *Muslim World* 57, no. 3 (July 1967): 212–223.
Landau, Jacob M. 'The Militant Right in Turkish Politics', in *Middle Eastern Themes*, idem, ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1973).
Landau, Jacob M. *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974).
Landau, Jacob M. *Pan-Turkism in Turkey: A Study in Irredentism* (London: C. Hurst, 1981).
Landau, Jacob M. 'The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey', *Journal of Contemporary History* 17 (1982): 587–606.
Landau, Jacob M. 'Alparslan Türkeş: A Colonel Turned Politician', in *Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey*, Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı, eds. (New York: Lexington Books, 2002).
Lewis, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).
Lewis, Bernard. 'Ali Pasha on Nationalism', *Middle Eastern Studies* 10, no. 1 (January 1974): 77–79.
Lewis, Bernard. 'Watan', in *The Impact of Western Nationalisms*, Jehuda Reinhard and George L. Moss, eds. (London: Sage, 1991).
Lewis Bernard. *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1998).
Lewis, Geoffrey L. *Turkey* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1955).
Lewis, Geoffrey L. *Turkey* (London: Ernest Benn, 1959). Second revised edition.
Lewis, Raphaela. *Everyday Life in Ottoman Turkey* (New York: Dorset Press, 1971).
Linke, Lilo. *Allah Dethroned: A Journey through Modern Turkey* (London: Constable, 1937).
Lowry, Heath W. *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).
Luke, Sir Harry. *The Old Turkey and the New: From Byzantium to Ankara*, new and revised edition (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1955). First published in 1936.
MacDonald, Charles G. 'The Kurds', *Journal of Political Science* 19 (1991): 121–139.
Mango, Andrew. 'Atatürk and the Kurds', *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 1 (1997): 1–25.
Mango, Andrew. *The Turks Today* (London: John Murray, 2004).
Mango, Andrew. *Turkey and the War on Terror: For Forty Years We Fought Alone* (London: Routledge, 2005).

Mardin, Şerif. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).
Mardin, Şerif. *Din ve İdeoloji* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969).
Mardin, Şerif. 'Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 12 (June 1969): 258–261.
Mardin, Şerif. 'Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971): 197–211.
Mardin, Şerif. 'Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?' *Daedalus* 102 (1973): 197–211.
Mardin, Şerif. *Jön Türklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895–1908*, fourth printing (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992).
Mardin, Şerif. 'Patriotism and Nationalism in Turkey', in *Nationality, Patriotism and Liberalism in 'Liberal Democratic' Societies*, Roger Michener, ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: Paragon House, 1993).
Mazıcı, Nurşen. *Celal Bayar: Başbakanlık Dönemi, 1937–1939* (Istanbul: Der Yayınları, 1996).
McCarthy, Justin. *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983).
McDowall, David. *Kurds*, second edition (London: Minority Rights Group, 1989).
McDowall, David. 'The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review' in *The Kurds: A Contemporary Review*, Philip G. Kragenbrook and Stefan Speri, eds. (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).
McDowall, David. *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997).
Mears, Eliot Grinnell. *Modern Turkey: A Politico-Economic Interpretation, 1908–1923 Inclusive, With Selected Chapters by Representative Authorities* (New York: Macmillan, 1924).
Meriç, Ümid. *Cevdet Paşa'nın Cemiyet ve Devlet Görüşü* (Istanbul: Ötüken Yayınevi, 1975).
Midhat Paşa'nın Hatıraları. comp. by Osman Selim Kocahanoğlu (Istanbul: Temel Yayınları, 1997).
Miller, Jetro O. 'Giving Voice to the Dialogue: Namık Kemal and the Ottoman Theory of Representative Government', paper presented at the annual meetings of the Middle East Studies Association of North America, Newport, Rhode Island, USA, November 1996.
Miller, William. *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801–1927* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1936).
Milli Şefin Söylev, Demeç ve Mesajları, comp. by Kemal Kadri Kop (Ankara: Akay Kitabevi, 1945).
Moltke, Feldmareşal Helmut von. *Moltke'nin Türkiye Mektupları*, trans. by Hayrullah Örs (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1995).
Monroe, W. S. *Turkey and the Turks: An Account of the Lands, the Peoples and the Institutions of the Ottoman Empire* (Boston: L. C. Page and Company, 1907).
Mutlu, Servet. 'Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 4 (November 1996): 517–541.
Nişanyan, Sevan. 'Kemalist Düşüncede "Türk Milleti" Kavramı', *Türkiye Günlüğü* 33 (March–April 1995): 127–141.
Niyazi, Mehmed. *Türk Devlet Felsefesi* (Istanbul: Ötüken, 1996).
Nizâmü'l-Mülk. *Siyâset-Nâme*, comp. by Mehmet Altay Köymen (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999).

Nyrop, Richard F., and Beryl Lieff Benderly, William W. Cover, Melissa J. Cutler, Ahmet Ö. Evin, Newton B. Parker, and Suzanne Teleki. *Area Handbook for the Republic of Turkey* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing House, 1973).

Oba, Ali Engin. *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu* (Ankara: İmge Yayınevi, 1995).

Ochsenwald, William. 'Islam and the Ottoman Legacy in the Modern Middle East', in L. Carl Brown, ed., *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East* (New York: Columbia Press, 1996).

Oğuzoğlu, Yusuf. *Osmanlı Devlet Anlayışı* (Istanbul: Eren, 2000).

Olson, Robert. *The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, 1880–1925* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989).

Orga, [Irfan], and Margarette. *Atatürk* (London: Michael Joseph, 1962).

Orhonlu, Cengiz. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskânı* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1987).

Ortaylı, İlber. 'Ottoman Cosmopolitanism in the Balkans and its Gradual Transition', paper presented at the International Conference on 'Minorities and Related Problems in the Balkans', Bilkent University, Ankara, 27–29 October 1994.

Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı Barışı* (Istanbul: Ufuk Kitapları, 2003).

Ortaylı, İlber. *Ottoman Studies* (Istanbul: Bilgi University Press, 2004).

Oruç, Yeşim M. 'From Development to Constitutional Citizenship: Demirel on the Kurdish Question', unpublished paper, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2001.

Özbudun, Ergun. 'Established Revolution versus Unfinished Revolution: Contrasting Patterns of Democratization in Mexico and Turkey', in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems*, Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore, eds. (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

Özbudun, Ergun. 'Antecedents of Kemalist Secularism: Thoughts on the Young Turk Period', in *Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change*, Ahmet Evin, ed. (Opladen: Leske Verlag and Budrich GmbH, 1984).

Özdoğan, Günay G. 'The Case of Racism-Turanism: Turkism During the Single-Party Period, 1931–1944. A Radical Variant of Turkish Nationalism', unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 1990.

Özoğlu, Hakan. '"Nationalism" and Kurdish Notables in the Late Ottoman-Early Republican Era', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 33 (2001): 383–409.

Quataert, Donald. 'Rural Unrest in the Ottoman Empire, 1830–1914', in *Peasants and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, Farhad Kazemi and John Waterbury, eds. (Miami: Florida International University, 1991).

Quataert, Donald. *The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Palmer, John, and Charles Smith. *Modern Turkey* (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1942).

Pamukçu, Ebubekir. *Dersim Zaza Ayaklanmanın Tarihsel Kökenleri* (Istanbul: Yön Yayıncılık, 1992).

Parla, Taha. *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876–1924* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985).

Parla, Taha, and Andrew Davison. *Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order?* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004).

Parry, V. J. 'The Reign of Sulaiman the Magnificient, 1520–1566', in *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*, M. A. Cook, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

Pears, Edwin. 'Turkey, Islam and Turanianism', *The Contemporary Review* 114 (July–October 1918): 371–379.
Pinon, Rene. 'The Young Turk Policy in Asia', *Current History* 11, no. 2 (November 1919): 331–336.
Poulton, Hugh. *Top Hat, Grey Wolf, and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic* (London: Hurst, 1997).
Robins, Philip. 'The Overlord State: Turkish Policy and Kurdish Issue', *International Affairs* 69, no. 4 (October 1993): 657–677.
Raycaut, Paul. *The Present State of the Ottoman Empire. Containing the Maxims of the Turkish Polite, The Most Material Points of the Mahometan Religion, Their Sects and Heresies, Their Convents and Religious Votaries. Their Military Discipline, with an Exact Computation of Their Forces by Land and Sea* (London: John Starkey and Henry, 1668).
Ramsaur, Jr., Ernest Edmondson. *The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).
Rodrique, Aron. 'Difference and Tolerance in the Ottoman Empire' (interview by Nancy Reynolds), *Stanford Humanities Review* 5, no. 1 (1995): 81–90.
Rogan, Eugene L. '*Aşiret Mektebi*: Abdülhamid II's Schools for Tribes', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28, no. 1 (February 1996): 83–107.
Rogan, Eugene L. *Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
Rustow, Dankwart A. 'Kemalizm'e Dair', in *Atatük, Milli Egemenlik ve Gençlik Paneli*, proceedings of a conference held in Istanbul on 20 May 1985 (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1985).
Safrastian, Arshak. *Kurds and Kurdistan* (London: Harvill Press, 1948).
Şahin, Bahar. 'Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu: Açılımlar ve Sınırlar', in *Türkiye'de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları*, Ayhan Kaya and Turgut Tarhanlı, eds. (Istanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005).
Salamone, S. D. 'The Dialectics of Turkish National Identity: Ethnic Boundary Maintenance and State Ideology', *East European Quarterly* 23, no. 1 (March 1989): 33–61
Salt, Jeremy. *Imperialism, Evangelism, and the Ottoman Armenians, 1878–1896* (London: Frank Cass, 1992).
Şapolyo, Enver Behnan. *Ziya Gökalp: İttihat ve Terakki ve Meşrutiyet Tarihi* (Istanbul: Güven Basımevi, 1943).
Sarınay, Yusuf. *Atatürk'ün Millet ve Milliyetçilik Anlayışı* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1990).
Sevgen, Nazmi. *Doğu ve Güneydoğu'da Türk Beylikleri: Osmanlı Belgeleri ile Kürt Türkleri Tarihi* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1982).
Seyfettin, Ömer. *Türklük Üzerine Yazılar* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993).
Seufert, Günter. 'Between Religion and Ethnicity: A Kurdish-Alevi Tribe in Globalizing Istanbul', in *Space, Culture, and Power: New Identities in Globalizing Cities*, Ayşe Öncü and Petra Weyland, eds. (London: Zed Books, 1997).
Shankland, David. *Islam and Society in Turkey* (Hemingford Grey, UK: The Eothen Press, 1999).
Shaw, Stanford J. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume One: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280–1908* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume Two, Reform, Revolution and the Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

Shaw, Stanford J. *From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918–1923. A Documentary Study. Volume I.* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000).
Shaw, Stanford J. From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918–1923. A Documentary Study. Volume II. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000).
Sherman, A. V. 'Turkey: A Case in Constructive Nationalism', *Commentary* 30, no. 2 (August 1960): 93–101.
Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, 16 October 1925, reproduced in *İngiliz Belgeleriyle Türkiye'de "Kürt Sorunu", 1924–1938: Şeyh Sait, Ağrı ve Dersim Ayaklanmaları*, comp. by Bilâl Şimşir (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991).
Somer, Murat. 'Turkey's Kurdish Conflict: Changing Context, and Domestic and Regional Implications', *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 235–253.
Sönmez, Mustafa. *Doğu Anadolu'nun Hikayesi. Kürtler: Ekonomik ve Sosyal Tarih* (Ankara: Arkadaş Yayınları, 1990).
Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti Merkez Yürütme Kurulu. 'Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Parti'nin Doğu ve Güneydoğu Sorunlarına Bakışı ve Çözüm Önerileri', typescript of a report, Ankara, July 1990.
Stoddard, T. Lothrop. 'Pan-Turanism', *American Political Science Review* 11, no. 1 (1917): 12–23.
Stowers, Johnson. *Turkish Panorama* (London: Robert Hale, 1968).
Tachau, Frank. 'The Search for National Identity among the Turks', *Die Welt Islam* 8 (1963): 156–176.
Tachau, Frank. 'Language and Politics: Turkish Language Reform', *Review of Politics* 26, no. 2 (April 1964): 191–204.
Taşpınar, Ömer. *Kurdish Nationalism and Political Islam in Turkey: Kemalist Identity in Transition* (London: Routledge, 2005).
Talât Paşa'nın Anıları, comp. by Alpay Kabacalı, second printing (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1990).
Tekeli, İlhan. 'Involuntary Displacement and the Problem of Resettlement in Turkey from the Ottoman Empire to the Present', in *Population Displacement and Resettlement*, Seteney Shami, ed. (New York: Center for Migration Studies, 1994).
Tekeli, İlhan. 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğundan Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer Değiştirmesi ve İskan Sorunu', *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 50 (1990): 49–71.
Tepe, Sultan. 'A Kemalist-Islamist Movement? The Nationalist Action Party', *Turkish Studies* 1, no. 2 (Autumn 2000): 59–72.
Tezcan, Baki. 'The Development of the Use of "Kurdistan" as a Geographical Description and the Incorporation of This Region Into the Ottoman Empire in the 16th Century', in *The Great Ottoman, Turkish Civilisation. Vol 3. Philosophy, Science and Institutions*, Kemal Çiçek, Editor-in-Chief, Ercüment Kuran, Nejat Göyünç, and İlber Ortaylı, eds. (Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000).
Tezel, Yahya S. *Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi, 1923–1950* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982).
Thomas, David. 'Yusuf Akçura and the Intellectual Origins of "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset"', *Journal of Turkish Studies* 2 (1978): 127–140.
Thomas, Lewis V. and Richard N. Fry. *The United States and Turkey and Iran* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1952).
Timur, Taner. *Osmanlı Kimliği* (Istanbul: Hil Yayın, 1986).
Timur, Taner. 'The Ottoman Heritage', in *Turkey in Transition*, Irving. C. Shick and Ertuğrul A. Tonak, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Timuroğlu, Vecihi. *Dersim Tarihi* (Ankara: Yurt Kitap-Yayın, 1991).

Togan, Ord. Prof. Dr. A. Zeki, *Türklüğün Mukadderatı Üzerine* (Istanbul: Kayı Yayınları, 1970).
Toker, Metin. *Şeyh Sait ve İsyanı* (Ankara: Akis Yayınları, 1968).
Toynbee, Arnold, and Kenneth P. Kirkwood. *Turkey* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927).
Tunaya, Tarık Zafer. *Hürriyetin İlanı: İkinci Meşrutiyetin Siyasi Hayatına Bakışlar* (Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1959).
Türkeş, Alparslan. *Milliyetçilik* (Istanbul: Hamle, 1966).
Turner, Arthur C. 'Kurdish Nationalism', in *Ideology and Power in the Middle East: Studies in Honor of George Lenczowski*, Peter J. Chelkowski and Robert J. Pranger, eds. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988).
Turgut, Mehmet. *Türkiye Modeli ve Bask Modeli* (Istanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1994).
Ubicini, M. A. *Letters on Turkey: An Account of the Religious, Political, Social, and Commercial Conditions of the Ottoman Empire; The Reformed Institutions, Army, Navy, etc. etc*. Translated from French by Lady Easthope (London: John Murray, 1856).
Uraz, Abdullah. *Millet Devlet Kucaklaşması* (Ankara: Press Matbaacılık, 1994).
Üstel, Füsun. *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları, 1912–1931* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997).
Üstel, Füsun. *Yurttaşlık ve Demokrasi* (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 1999).
Vambéry, Arminius. 'Personal Recollections of Abdul Hamid II and His Court, I', *The Nineteenth Century* 65 (January–June 1909): 980–993.
Vambéry, Arminius, 'Personal Recollections of Abdul Hamid II and His Court, III', *The Nineteenth Century*, 66 (July–December 1909): 69–88.
Vanderlippe, John M. *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938–1950* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).
Volkan, Namık D., and Norman Itzkowitz. *Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict* (Huntingdon, U.K.: The Eothen Press, 1994).
Vryonis, Jr., Speros, 'The Byzantine Legacy and Ottoman Forms', paper read at a Symposium entitled, 'After the Fall of Constantinople', held at Dumbarton Oaks, May 1968.
Ward, Barbara. *Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1942).
Warkworth, Lord, MP., pseud. [Henry Algernon George Percy], *Notes from a Diary in Asiatic Turkey* (London: Edward Arnold, 1898).
Watts, Nicole. 'Relocating Dersim: Turkish State Building and Kurdish Resistance, 1931–1938', *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 23 (Fall 2000): 5–30.
Weber, Frank G. *Eagles on the Crescent: Germany, Austria, and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance, 1914–1918* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1970).
Webster, Donald E. *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Processes in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 1939).
Weiker, Walter F. *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973).
Weisband, Edward. *İkinci Dünya Savaşında İsmet İnönü'nün Dış Politikası*, trans. from English by M. A. Kayabal. (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1974).
White, Paul. *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers: The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey* (London: Zed Books, 2000).
Wortham, H. E. *Mustafa Kemal of Turkey* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1931).
Yalman, Ahmet Emin. *Turkey in My Time* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956).
Yalman, Nur. 'Islamic Reform and the Mystic Tradition in Eastern Turkey', *Archives Européennes des Sociologies* 10 (1969): 41–60.

Yavuz, Hilmi. *Osmanlılık, Kültür ve Kimlik* (Istanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1996).
Yavuz, M. Hakan. 'A Preamble to the Kurdish Question: The Politics of Kurdish Identity', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 18, no. 1 (April 1998): 9–19.
Yavuz, M. Hakan. 'The Politics of Fear: The Rise of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) in Turkey', *Middle East Journal* 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 200–221.
Yavuz, M. Hakan, and Nihat Ali Özcan, 'The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party', *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 102–119.
Yeğen, Mesut. 'The State Discourse and the Exclusion of Kurdish Identity', in *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, and Politics*, Sylvia Kedourie, ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1998).
Yeğen, Mesut. *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999).
Yerasimos, Stéphane. 'The Monoparty Period' (trans. by Rezan Benater and Irvin C. Shick), in *Turkey in Transition*, Irvin C. Shick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
Yumul, Arus, and Rıfat Bali. 'Ermeni ve Yahudi Cemaatlerinde Siyasal Düşünceler', in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce. Cilt I. Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyet Birikimi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001).
Ziya Gokalp'in Kürt Aşiretleri Hakkındaki Sosyolojik Tetkikleri, compiled by Şevket Baysanoğlu (Istanbul: Sosyal Yayınları, 1992).
Zürcher, Erik J. *Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic: The Progressive Republican Party, 1924–1925* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991).
Zürcher, Erik J. *Turkey: A Modern History*, second edition (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997).
Zürcher, Erik J. '"Fundamentalism" as an Exclusionary Device in Kemalist Turkish Nationalism', in *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century*, Willem van Schendel and Erik J. Zürcher, eds. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).

About the Author

Metin Heper, a Professor of Politics, is Dean of the Faculty of Economics, Administrative, and Social Sciences at Bilkent University, Ankara, and Founding Member of the Turkish Academy of Sciences. Professor Heper had been a Research Fellow at Harvard University, Lester Martin Research Fellow at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Fulbright Scholar and Visiting Professor at the University of Connecticut (USA), Simon Senior Research Fellow at the University of Manchester (UK), Madeleine Haas Russell Visiting Professor of Non-Western and Comparative Politics at Brandeis University (USA), and Fulbright Research Fellow and Visiting Professor at Princeton University. He is editor or co-editor of *The State, the Military, and Democracy: Turkey in the 1980s, Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey, Turkey and the West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities, Politics in the Third Turkish Republic, Local Government in Turkey, Strong State and Economic Interest Groups: The Post-1980 Turkish Experience, Political Leaders and Democracy in Turkey, Political Parties in Turkey, Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East, The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective, and Institutions and Democratic Statecraft*, and author of *The State Tradition in Turkey, Historical Dictionary of Turkey* (first and second editions), and *İsmet İnönü*: *The Making of a Turkish Statesman*.

Index