The Justice and Development Party's discourse on the Kurdish Question

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Abstract

The *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (the Justice and Development Party, JDP) was established under the leadership of Recep Tayip Erdogan on 14 August 2002. The party enjoyed great success in 3 November 2002 elections, obtaining 34.2 per cent of the vote. In the elections of 22 July 2007, the JDP won 46.6% of the popular vote and was allocated 341 seats. The JDP was rooted in the Islamic movement called *Milli Görüş* (National Outlook), however, after the foundation of the party, the JDP defined itself as a 'conservative democratic party,' not an Islamic one. According to the party program, the JDP supports a market economy, indicates foreign capital as the motor of economic growth, aims for Turkey to become a full member of the EU and guarantees secularism.[1] The JDP also adopted a different stance on the Kurdish question. Than the Kemalist Turkish State Discourse historically excluded Kurdish identity and mainly approached the issue as "there is no Kurdish question, but merely terrorism". However, the JDP reconsidered the Kurdish question as an issue of the recognition of ethnic identity which is strongly related to the improvement of human rights and democracy in Turkey.

Key Words: the Contemporary Kurdish question of Turkey, the Justice and Development Party, Kemalism, Islamism, discourse analysis

1.   Introduction

The Turkish Republic was founded by the Kemalist discourse, which claimed to be a modern and homogenous nation state that aimed to ensure that Turkish was the only framework for social identification. In this respect, the Kemalist hegemony was embodied in different key institutions in Turkey. Firstly, the Kemalist discourse was institutionalized in the Turkish constitution and the legal system, then in the military and finally in bureaucracy. Therefore, Kemalism became an institutionalized horizon that turned into a defining framework of the Turkish political field. In other words, counter identities were not able to represent themselves in the political field unless they articulated themselves with Kemalism. This gave no chance to the Kurdish subjectivity to represent Kurdish linguistic or ethnical differences or to address issues relating to Kurdish cultural or social rights. Therefore the Turkish State Discourse (TSD) described the Kurdish Question without mentioning

"Kurdishness". For instance, In early Republic period, the Kurdish Question as an issue of banditry, tribalism and Sheiks ; the multi party era started in 1940s and the period until early 1980s, the Kurdish Question as regional backwardness.[2] Related the current perception of the question TSD associated the Kurdish political struggle with terrorism relied on the war between the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) and the Turkish Armed Forces. However, In the course of the accession process to the European Union (EU) the Kurdish question has managed to identify itself with democracy and has gained the support of the EU as an inevitable component of democratisation in Turkey.

At this point, the significance of the JDP's discourse on the Kurdish question, for is to show how Islamic subjectivity (represented by JDP) created equivalence with the Kurdish political Struggle against to the Kemalist State through using signifier democracy. The JDP uses a discourse promising liberal democracy which identifies the nation with ethnic particularities rather than homogeneity. By making the Kurdish question an issue of satisfying ethnic rights in Turkey, the JDP is able to associate Kurdish identity with the JDP's aim of the construction of democracy by applying liberal democracy (as an alternative to the Kemalist order). Therefore, this paper suggests that we should consider the JDP's discursive strategy through the antagonistic interaction between Islamism and the Kemalist establishment. Therefore, this chapter analyses how Islam historically excluded from Turkish State Discourse (TSD) and how Islamic subjectivity managed to rise and challenge the Kemalist hegemony. Furthermore, it is crucial to briefly explain the JDP leaders' background in the *Milli Görüs* movement and also how the *Milli Görüs* approached the Kurdish Question. Hence, it will be possible to identify the changing discourse of Islamism with JDP and how the party articulates itself with Kemalist modernism by adopting a western oriented democracy and economy. Therefore, we will able to understand that the JDP not only reconceptualized the Kurdish Question as issue of

ethnic identity but also managed to show the limits of Kemalism.

2.   Creating Modern Turkish identity and exclusion of Islam

In the early 1920s, the new Kemalist order aimed at a collective mobilization precipitated by an intense modernization process to introduce a new westernized State with a modern outlook. In this sense, Kemalism articulated the new order as the opposition of the Ottoman system through exclusion of the religious and heterogeneous symbols and values. In contrast to the modern and homogenous Turkish State, the Ottoman Empire was based on a heterogeneous social structure called the *millet* system, regarding the diversity of the nation around the notion of religion by supporting the main stream religious branches within the communities.[3]

The modernization process of the Kemalist regime was based on two main principles: secularization and nationalization of the society and state. To this extent, initially, the Kemalist discourse proposed a unified and modern homogeneous nation excluding all symbols and concepts of the heterogeneous and religious Ottoman identity. On **one** hand nationalization of the State aimed to dissolve the heterogeneity of the ethnic composition of the Ottoman order. On the other hand, for Kemalists, the secularization meant the elimination of religious concepts and symbols representing the Ottoman Order were crucial to construct a secular and modern state.

3.   The rise of Islamism in Turkey

3.1   Reconsideration of Islam as apart of Turkishness

Although Islam was excluded form Turkish State Discourse by Kemalism, it was always a signifier that used to represent the traditional and religious masses living in Anatolia. Historically, center right parties such as *Demokrat Parti* (the Democrat Party, DP) and *Adalet Partisi* (the Justice Party, JP)

employed Islam to mobilize the masses while they also associated it with Kemalist modernism.[4] Concerning experience of political Islam in Turkey, the first pro-Islamic parties were established by Necmettin Erbakan during 1970s.[5]

However, the main practice that pioneered the rise of Islamism was the 1980 military coup and following three years military regime. The military coup aimed to undermine the multiple forms of antagonism (mainly between Leftist and Rightists) and reconstruct an authoritarian order based on Kemalism.[6] To this extent, the regime emphasized to re-create social and political stability which constituted 'national unity'. In order to reach the national unity the military's perspective supported nationalism and Islamism that reconsidered Islam as one of the main elements of Turkish identity.[7] This perception allowed the rise of Islam through the 1980s and in the 1980s Erbakan established a new political party; *Refah Partisi* (the Welfare Party, WP) The WP developed a discourse of Muslim unity against western imperialism.

The WP also perceived the Kurdish question as a subject of "Muslim brotherliness". [8] In this respect, the party was opposed to the War between Turkish Armed Forces and the PKK since an independent Kurdish state was not compatible with the Islamist desire of uniting the whole Muslim world. However, the WP `s publicly expressive Islamic discourse raised the tension between Kemalist secularism and Islamism. And the party was closed down by the Turkish Constitutional Court in 1997 due to violating secularism.[9] After the Welfare Party was closed down by court order, and its leader Erbakan was banned from politics, presently, two new parties *Saadet Partisi* (the Felicity Party, FP) and *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (the Justice and Development Party, JDP) began to represent the Islamic movement. In this sense, the conservatives that adopted the same principles as the WP chose to join the FP while the reformists chose to side with the JDP.[10]

3.2　　The JDP in the Power

The JDP was established in 2001, under the pressure of the secularist challenge to pro- Islamist political parties. However, the JDP was aware of the antagonistic relationship between Kemalist secularism and the WP and did not want to pose a direct challenge to the Kemalist regime again, which could potentially cause a radical exclusion of the party. Although the JDP leaders entered politics through Erbakan's pro-Islamic *Milli Görüş* Movement, they constantly denied any connection with Erbakan's Islamic agenda. In the JDP's official statements, senior members of the party emphasized that the JDP was not Islamist or even an Islamic. In contrast the party revealed as a western orientated liberal party that aimed at the European Union membership. In this respect, Erdogan claimed that they were 'conservative democrats'.[11]

'Reform', 'transition', 'democracy', 'pluralism' and 'conservatism' structured the ideology of the JDP. The JDP's first victory in the election (in 2002) was perceived as a big challenge to secularism and seen as a threat to Kemalist Republic by the secularists. In this respect, the Kemalist intellectuals, and political parties such as the *Cumuhuriyet Halk Partisi* (the Republican People Party, RPP) and *Demokratik Sol Parti* (the Democratic Left Party, DLP) that were mostly associated with Kemalism did not hesitate to raise their concerns that the JDP might have a secret Islamic agenda.[12]

In opposition to the JDP's discourse of democracy, the Kemalist regime attempted to operate its democratic tradition using the signifier of secularism.[13] The reaction of Kemalism to counter Kurdish and Islamic identities was reducing social diversity and rearticulating the Kemalist hegemony through emphasizing national unity and secularism. At the same time, the JDP rearticulated Islamic discourse with pluralism and democracy while the party tried to balance the tension between Islamism and the Kemalist establishment. Never the less, the JDP's pluralist democratic discourse made it possible to see the limits of the Kemalist hegemonic state discourse.

4.   The JDP and the Kurdish Question

4.1   Kurdish question as the subject of human rights and democracy

According to Yavuz and Özcan, the JDP's approach to the Kurdish Question was based on 'the Muslim brotherhood".[14] The sharing of a 'Muslim identity' between Kurds and Turks was a productive factor in the JDP's discursive strategy on the Kurdish question, however religious identity does not form the basis of the JDP's strategy for dealing with the Kurdish question.[15] First of all, the JDP's discourse defined Kurds as not based on the religion but ethnicity and represented them as a different ethnic group. Since the founding of the JDP, the rhetoric of the party leaders referred to the Kurdish question as a subject of consolidation of democracy in Turkey. Furthermore, the policies designed to satisfy the Kurdish demands occurred in a reformist manner consulting democracy and human rights practices through the EU's requests. In this respect, the Kurdish struggle allowed the JDP to show that the Kemalist establishment was not capable of sustaining democratic pluralism which could represent democratic differences. In other words, the JDP redefined Kurdish identity as an ethnic and democratic identity thus became able to show and challenge the limits of Kemalist discourse.

Secondly, the JDP's discursive strategy weakened the Kemalist symbolization of the Kurdish question. In the 1990s, the clash between the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) and the Turkish Armed Forces dominated the Kurdish question in the Turkish State Discourse and thus any attempt to grant more cultural and political rights to Kurds were strongly opposed on the grounds that this threatened the territorial and national integrity of the country.[16] As Kirişçi emphasized, in the 1990s, there was no free discussion of the Kurdish question, anybody calling for a political solution to the Kurdish question ran the risk of punishment for making 'separatist propaganda'.[17]

The Kemalist order created political frontiers through emphasizing the antagonism of friend versus enemy, or the

Kurdish identity versus the Turkish identity. Meanwhile, there was also the systematic resistance against the Kurds in the national elections in addition to the PKK's intense Kurdish nationalism.[18] In The 2007 election, the *Democratik Toplum Partisi* (Democratic Society Party, DSP), a pro-Kurdish party, won seats in Parliament. After the many years of closing down pro- Kurdish parties, blaming support for the PKK and threatening Turkey's unity, the DSP succeeded in becoming the first Kurdish party to gain a strong presence in Parliament. However, the party managed this by running its candidates as independents in order to circumstance the 10-percent limit that a party would need to achieve in order to actually win seats.

In this context, the JDP sustained their aim of pluralisation and democratization of the society by implemented EU reforms and thus was able to reinterpret the Kurdish question as the subject of human rights and democracy. The JDP government passed five major political reform packages in 2003 and one in May 2004, introducing changes to different areas of legislation. The fourth and fifth reform packages included reforms expanding freedom to use Kurdish in broadcasting and election campaign periods In 2005, Erdogan made a significant speech relating the Kurdish question in Diyarbakir, which is the symbolic capital for Kurds.

> The state had made mistakes in the past in its relation with the Kurds…[T]he Kurdish problem is everyone's problem and mine in particular… all problems would resolved with more democracy, more civil rights and more prosperity.[19]

Erdogan's speech was historical in terms of being the first Turkish Prime Minister to admit that the state had made mistakes in the past. In other words, this speech indicates the JDP's attempt to redress the Kurdish Question in the Turkish State Discourse as a democratic institutionalization process by promoting Kurdish rights. To this extent, in 2005, Erdogan offered a new definition for the Turkish identity that aligned him

against the Kemalist establishment. He declared that 'Turkish identity" was a supra-identity for both the Kurds and Turks.'[20] Once again, Erdogan highlighted the limits of Kemalist discourse constituted by its hegemony into the national identity. This new identification of Turkishness proposed by Erdogan was antagonistic with Kemalist discourse since it was based on the heterogeneous structure of Turkey. However, the Kemalist reaction to Erdogan was quick. Soon after Erdogan's suggestion for a new identification for the people living in Turkey, General Ilker Basbug made a statement emphasized the "unitary state structure".

> Those who live on Turkish territory and are bound to each other through ties of common aims are defined as the Turkish nation in a unitary state structure. [21]

Furthermore the issue that dominated the 2005 the National Security Council meeting was the debate over primary and sub-identity which was started by Erdogan a short before the report stated:

> Turkish people who live on Turkish territory and [are] bound to each other through ties of common aims in the unitary state structure."…. Turkish people are defined as a nation in a unitary state structure. Opening up the unitary state structure to debate is unacceptable." The report also said, "The debates on primary and sub-identity would erode the national identity, and micro-nationalism would endanger Turkey's unitary structure and would harm integrity and unity.[22]

The military's report shows two basic symbolizations of the Kemalist State. The first one shows the military as the safeguard of the Kemalist State and secondly that Turkish citizenship represented a homogenous nation dominated by Turkishness. These symbolizations prove that Kemalist

discourse was deeply institutionalized in the State discourse which did not allow any counter debates.

4.2   The Democratic Opening

The reform porcees remarkably slowed down after 2005. Never the less , In July 2009, the JDP declared that they are preparing a comprehensive plan concerning the solution of the Kurdish question called the "Kurdish opening". Interior Minister Beşir Atalay, the coordinator of the government's campaign, held meetings with political parties and some non-governmental organizations. Atalay claimed that, with respect to the Kurdish question, they have been working on the democratic initiative for a while and the JDP government is moving towards an increase in the standards of democracy in the country. As a result of the debates among NGOs and political parties, the "Kurdish opening" was subsequently renamed as "the democratic opening". However, without actually revealing what was in the democratic opening, Atalay asserted that the plan has "two special primary goals", firstly concerning the PKK, ending terror in the country and concerning Kurdish rights, and secondly the expansion of democracy. Erdogan also promoted his discursive strategy on ethnical and cultural differences and indicated a process to satisfy ethnic and cultural rights which also engage in a democratic dialogue between sides

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First and foremost is the question of terror, the democratic opening encompasses all problem areas are included within this process. Within this are all the components of the problems faced by ethnicities. Here, in this package are the problems of my Kurdish citizens, the problems faced by my Turkish citizen, the Laz, the Bosnian, the Albanian, the Roma and whoever else you can think of... There are the problems of ethnicities and the steps to be taken for these problems to be resolved. If you deal with only one ethnic groups problems, that would be discrimination and we will not allow for such discrimination. [23]

Redefining the demands of other ethnic groups in Turkey with the demands of Kurds, the JDP symbolically identified them with the interests of Kurdish ethnicity. This allows the party to spread the issue to wider ground to maintain the claim that the Kurdish question is related to democratization of Turkey in terms of the rising cultural rights of minorities. As a result, the JDP managed to develop a differentiated discourse to differences which have historically been excluded from the Kemalist discourse.

As a reaction to the democratic opening, the RPP accused the prime minister of negotiating with terrorists. Furthermore, the party asserts that they are opposed to involvement in negotiations with the PKK. The reaction of Kemalism to the democratic opening is the traditional tendency of the TSD to shape the Kurdish question into one which refers to it as a separatist movement that undermines national unity. The RPP stressed that they will not accept a meeting with the government unless a plan would be publicized since, according to RPP the plan could injure the unitary regime of the country and could end up with a change of the official language. Furthermore, the RPP leader Baykal claimed that the whole process was imposed by the United States. [24]

When the unanimous decision by Turkey's high court to ban the DSP over alleged terrorist links in December, the Democratic Opening process has blocked before any measure taken. Despite the DSP has not claimed that the party has organic links with the PKK, the party members did not accept to denounce PKK as a terrorist organization; they rather defined PKK as an important actor in the solution of the Kurdish question and a legitimate representative of the Kurdish subjectivity.

The reaction of the Kemalist camp to the democratic opening is within the limits of the traditional discourse which defines the Kurdish question as a question of national unity and security. The closing down of the DSP, shows the JDP`s own dilemma concerning the Kurdish Question. On one hand, the

JDP promises to promote dialogue between the Turkish State and the Kurds while on the other hand recognizes the PKK as a terrorist organization. Hence although the JDP 's discourse aims to consider the Kurdish Question not as an issue of security and terror but as a question of identity, their acknowledgement of the PKK as a terrorist group obstructs the possibility of a dialogue with the Kurdish side.

Conclusion

The democratic opening implied constitutional changes to the official language and citizenship was revealed as the biggest challenge to the JDP that show the limits of Kemalist discourse. The Kurdish question plays a crucial role in the JDP's political strategy to promote a radical different articulation by issuing a challenge to the Turkish national identity by using the Kurdish identity. In this sense, Kemalist discourse is against any representation of Kurdishness in TSD . Basically, concerning the debates on the democratic opening, they were opposed to any practices that implement the Kurdish language. The reason for this is that acceptance of the Kurdish language would subvert the symbolization of national unity with one flag, one nation and one language. At this point, we have to evaluate the JDP s discourse as a subversive counter discursive strategy aimed at creating an alternative framework to the Kemalist conceptualization of Turkish identity which is both secular and national.

Notes

1 The JDP Party Program (recent accessed 29 Nov,2009): <http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/index.html>

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  M Yeğen,. *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu [the Kurdish Question in State Discourse].* Iletişim Istanbul,1999

3 For further argument on millet system see; B Braude "Foundation Myths of the Millet System" in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the functioning of a plural society,* B Braude and B. Lewis (1982)., Holmes & Meier Publishers, New York.1982, p70.

4 The DP was founded after multi-party system launched in 1945, The DP period (1946-1960) was a turning point for the expression of Islamic demands. The DP managed to recognize the gap between the demands of religious population and Kemalist discourse. In this respect, the DP articulated liberalism with an anti -elitist discourse and voiced especially to the inhabitants of the Anatolian periphery who adopted religious and traditional ways of life. The AP was seen as the successor to the outlawed Democratic Party, the party also emphasized the traditional values along with liberal economy. For further argument about the AP see; W.B Sherwood, W.B. "The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey". *World Politics*, Vol. 20, No. 1 ,October 1967, pp 54–65

5 The rise of political Islam with the pro- Islamic parties was launched in the 1970s under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan. To this extent, *Milli Nizam Partisi* (MNP) (the National Order Party) was founded by Erbakan in 1970; however in 1971 the party was closed down by the Constitutional Court due to violating the "nature of a secular state".2 years later, Erbakan reorganized his party and founded the National Salvation Party *(Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP)* with similar principles. The leader, Erbakan, summarized their aims and the principles under the name *Milli Gorus* (National Outlook). The MNP`s Party program emphasized developing the moral values and conceptualized democracy around the moral system of Islam.

6 Both left and right groups began to fight for the control of streets and university campuses. Moreover, students robbed banks and kidnapped US services, and the university professors who criticised the Government were bombed by ultra nationalist militants. See; F Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey.* Routlegde, London 1993, pp.148-181

7 In the late 1970s, the theory Turkish-Islam synthesis (Türk İslam Sentezi) became very popular in the political right. This ideology claims that there was a special attraction with Turks and Islam. There were a number of similarities between the Turkish culture in pre- Islamic era and Islamic civilization. A deep sense of justice, monotheism and belief in immortal soul and strong emphasis on family life and morality are the characters that are shared by both Islam and Turkish culture. Moreover, according to this theory, Turks are the special one since their mission is to be soldiers of Islam. This theory was taken by both Kenan Evren , the military, and also Turgut Özal's government. See; E.J Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History.* I.B.Tauris ,London, 2004. p. 288

8 C Karakas, "Turkey: Islam and Laicism : Between the Interests of State, Politics, and Society", *Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF)*, no. 78, 2007, p 26

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 The main event that caused the party's downfall ensued in January 1997. The RPP organized "Jerusalem Day" in Sincan, close to Ankara, as a day of Muslim protest against Israel .The crowd's slogans emphasized that: "a true Muslim fights to the end" and, "the foundation of the Shariah will be laid here." The military reacted quickly. On the following morning the army rolled through Sincan with

about twenty tanks and an armoured personnel carrier. Soon after, the General Staff began to give briefings about the reactionary activities with regards to judges, media, education and the business world. The chief prosecutor opened a case in the Constitutional Court, arguing that the Welfare Party endangered the basic tenets of the secularist Turkish state and the WP was outlawed

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W Posch, "Crisis in Turkey : just another bump on the road to Europe?", *Occasional Paper of the European Union Institute for The Security Studies,* (67), 2007 p. 13

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The statement of Erdogan declared the JDP as "conservative democrat" can be found in Turkish leader warns of terror wave if EU rejects membership, the Times December 13, 2004

12 Baykal's 'secularism' warning to JDP: (recent accessed 2 Dec,2009):
<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/h.php?news=baykals-secularism-warning-to-akp-2002-11-19>

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The tension between secularists and the JDP rose after Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan nominated Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul as the president. Gul's wife wore the Islamic headscarf and she would be the first woman to wear it inside the presidential palace which symbolized the secular State structure. The Kemalist establishment was mobilized by the RPP, Kemalist intellectuals and the military perceived the candidacy of Gul as a risk to the secular symbolization and thus they reacted very quickly. Furthermore, the opposition party, the Kemalist RPP had deliberately boycotted the first round of the presidential election and then called upon the Constitutional Court to declare it null and void. As a result of these warnings, almost a million demonstrators, who believed their secular lifestyles were under threat, took to the streets. Finally, the crisis between the military and the government caused an early general election. The demonstration indicated that the Kemalist discourse was still able to mobilize some political groups. However, the elections of 2007 ended with JDP's victory. After the election, JDP recorded the highest vote percentage with almost 47% of the votes while RPP gained 21% and MHP 14% of the votes.

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M.H Yavuz, & N.A Özcan,. "The Kurdish question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party ", *Middle East Policy*, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. spring 2006.

15
M.K. Kaya, "Kurdish Problem forces Erdoğan to shift to the right", *Silkroad Studies*, November 21, 2008

16
F Bila, *Satranç Tahtasındaki Yeni Hamleler:HANGİ PKK?*.[New Strategies on the Chess Board: Which PKK?] Ümit Yayıncılık ,Ankara, 2004 pp.151-78

17 Kirişçi, K. & Winrow, M. (1997). *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict.* London: Frank Cass, p. 140

18 In Turkey's political history, there has been a longstanding closure proceeding against pro-Kurdish parties. The Constitutional Court of Turkey closed pro-Kurdish parties on the grounds that it was violating the principle of territorial/national integrity and indivisibility. The Constitutional Court of Turkey's has ordered since the founding of Halkın Emek Partisi,(HEP) (People's Labor Party) in 1993 .The Court saw that the existence of this political party as separatist action through to Law of Political Parties. After closure of the HEP a new pro-Kurdish party, Demokrasi Partisi (DP)(Democracy Party) was founded as successor of the HEP: However, at March 1994, leaders of the party Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle,Orhan Doğan and Selim Sadak were accused supporting PKK after they spoke in Kurdish and wore Kurdish colors during their inauguration in the Parliament. The trial sentenced them to imprisonment for 15 years. Before DP was closed, one mount ago Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP) (People's Democracy Party) was founded in 1994. In 1995's general election HDP got the 4 .17 % of the votes after its campaign that advocates 'recognition of Kurdish cultural

identity'They gained most of their votes from Kurdish provinces of Southeastern part of Turkey. The HADEP also entered the 1999's general election and won the 4.72 % of votes.(this election happened after the capturing of Öcalan) However, the HADEP shared the destiny with other pro-Kurdish parities and at 2003 it was closed down by the Constitutional Court .It charged of supporting the PKK and committing separatist act. Therefore, after PDP's closure The Demokratik Halk Partisi (DEHAP) (Democratic People's Party)was founded as the continuation of the HADEP. The DEHAP got more than 6 per cent of the total national vote in the previous general election in November 2003. At the 2004's local election their slogan was coalition in the Left. In this regard, they acted together with Sosyalist Halk Partisi (SHP)(Socialist People Party,) which is not a pro -Kurdish Party. By this coalition they gained the election in 4 cities and 28 towns At the meanwhile, also the President of the DEHAP was investigated for saying 'goodbye' in Kurdish during an election meeting. Finally, in 2005 the D EHAP announced its merger into the Demokratik Toplum Partisi(DTP) (Democratic Society Party)before it was closed down. For further argument on pro- Kurdish political parties see : F Bila, *Satranç Tahtasındaki Yeni Hamleler:HANGİ PKK?*.[New Strategies on the Chess Board: Which PKK?] Ümit Yayıncılık ,Ankara, 2004 pp.61-3

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 Erdogan's statement: (recent accessed 2 Dec,2009): <http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=161333>

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 Erdogan's statement (recent accessed 2 Dec,2009): <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2005/08/22/siy107.html>

21
 Hilmi Özkök, "Yillik Degerlendirme Konuþmasi on April 20, 2005," in *Genel Kurmnay Basini Bilgilendirme Toplantilari ve Basina Açik Ana Faaliyetleri* [the Press statement of the Chief of the General Stuff, 2005] (Ankara: Genel Kurmay Genel Sekreterligi: Ankara, 2005), p. 215.

22 The statement of the General Stuff (recent aceessed 1 Dec,2009): <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2004/10/29/siy101.html>

23
Erdogan's statement (recent accessed 2 Dec,2009):
<http://www.aksam.com.tr/2009/10/12/haber/siyaset/3474/erdogan__demokratik_acilim_herseyi_icerir.html>

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