


# Kurdland Kurdish Identity



Hawre Qandil

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## **A Brief Reflection on Truth**

This work is a call to awaken the conscience of humanity and a dedication to all revolutionaries and martyrs who have walked the path toward freedom and the independence of Kurdistan.

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**Author:** Hawrê Qandil

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## Preface

The question of the Kurdish people has existed for centuries, regarded with utmost seriousness and orderliness by the Kurds themselves. Armed occupiers have repeatedly invaded Kurdistan, forcing the Kurds to take up arms in self-defense. The enemies have refused to recognize the Kurds' very existence, seeking through pressure and massacre to erase their identity and even their name from history. Kurdistan has been partitioned among six brutal occupiers, not merely colonized but subjected to the suppression of its very sense of nationhood—so much so that this national consciousness has been deeply wounded and, in many cases, severed altogether.

Though historically the Kurds have been peace-seeking and have often sought reconciliation—even making concessions to the occupiers of their land—the enemies have never accepted the Kurds' existence, portraying them to neighboring peoples and to the world as a nuisance and an obstacle.

Another cause of the Kurds' statelessness lies in the entrenched individualism that has taken root in the political thought of Kurdistan. Power has frequently fallen into the hands of a single dominant force, and whoever held it ruled autocratically. When one faction became stronger than another, it imposed itself, even within its own ranks. This individualism and clannishness have dealt the greatest blow to the sovereignty of Kurdistan, for Kurdish society has not yet evolved into a unified nation but has remained fragmented at the level of clans and loose associations.

Only when the Kurds, and the various peoples of Kurdistan, consciously and wisely recognize their collective national rights will they be able to reassert their national identity. It is for this purpose—and in order to contribute to the solution of this great national question—that I felt compelled to write *The Kurdland Kurdish Identity* and to lay its foundations firmly on the bedrock of a free Kurdistan.

It must be emphasized that Kurdish history is exceedingly ancient, and writing about it in all its dimensions is no simple task. Throughout history, whenever occupiers attacked Kurdistan, they plundered its resources, killed its scholars, and burned its historical writings. They stole

Kurdish science and heritage whenever possible. For instance, during the era of Arab cultural imposition—carried out under the banner of spreading Islam—the Arab armies burned the libraries of Kurdistan, branding them as “infidel libraries,” and looted the people’s wealth. In the Samanid period, Persian-Tajik rulers standardized their own language by borrowing heavily from the rich Kurdish tongue, meanwhile forcing Kurdish to become a dialect of Persian. The Seljuk Turks and Mongols brought even greater calamities upon the Kurdish people—not only banning their language but also constructing a Turkic identity over the Kurdish nation. At the same time, all the sophisticated elements of Kurdish science and culture—music, cuisine, art—were claimed as part of Turkic civilization, while everything considered negative, primitive, or “barbaric” was ascribed to the Kurds.

It is important to recognize that empires and despots never observed any principle when it came to occupying Kurdistan; rather, they massacred Kurds whenever they could and deliberately distorted or erased their historical sources. During the centuries of occupation, pillage, and the systematic denial of Kurdish identity, the occupiers never granted the Kurds the right to write their own history. Therefore, modern methodology must not restrict itself when recounting Kurdish history, for the ruling powers of the region—even in the 21st century—have yet to honor the most basic human principles when it comes to acknowledging Kurdish nationhood.

This book is the result of two decades of meticulous research. It sheds light on several key events in the history of Kurdistan. Throughout this investigation, no side has been elevated or diminished; the facts of Kurdish history have been written with care and sincerity, for only by telling the truth can errors be addressed.

This work has cost me hundreds of sleepless nights and immense effort. I have met with hundreds of well-known and unknown Kurdish personalities and Kurd-friends, questioning them repeatedly on every topic and refusing to settle until I was convinced of the truth of each event. I even collected information in secrecy when necessary. My journey stretched from the Kurdish tribes of Quchan to Lachin, Aleppo, Qamishlo, Damascus, Istanbul, Diyarbakir, Siirt, Dersim, Van, Bazid, Cizre, Zakho, Duhok, Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Halabja, Qaladze, Qandil, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, Sardasht, Sanandaj, Saqqez, Mahabad, Bokoan, Mariwan, Baneh, Urmia, Khana, Salmas, Kermanshah, Ilam, and beyond—to Lebanon, Cairo, New York, Stockholm,

Cologne, Lausanne, Luxembourg, Brussels, Rome, Paris, London, Edinburgh, Sydney, Israel, and hundreds of other towns and villages across the globe—so that I could gather knowledge and document it with the hope that Kurds, like other nations, might take pride in their history and identity.

For security reasons, the names and exact locations of the individuals I met are not mentioned here; only in the final section of this book do I reference a selection of the sources consulted. In my view, strict adherence to every detail of academic methodology would risk alienating the ordinary Kurdish reader, many of whom are not accustomed to academic works and might be discouraged from reading altogether.

A significant portion of ancient Kurdish history has been preserved by patriotic individuals, passed down from generation to generation. After extensive research, I became convinced that this heritage is priceless and worthy of preservation—so that both the present generation and future generations may take pride in it.

I have not hesitated to expose those pseudo-historians who fabricate lies and distort history, portraying falsehood as truth. These are not genuine authors but mere scribes of deception. Their aim is to erase identity, and even if a thousand years were to pass, they would still misrepresent history as the Pharaohs once did. I believe that one day, humanity will feel ashamed to say that it bowed to the false idols of religion, sectarianism, false democracy, and hollow ideologies such as communism or socialism. In reality, most of these movements were the handiwork of conscienceless opportunists.

True self-recognition and the struggle to attain a national identity for Kurdistan are, in my view, far more sacred than any scriptural reference or manifesto of philosophers such as Marx, Engels, or Darwin. Every Kurd must therefore learn the science of Kurdish identity and defend it against religious dogma, factionalism, and narrow self-interest.

I hope that this knowledge will become a source of inner reconciliation for the Kurdish people and a step toward enabling the long-oppressed Kurdish nation to finally achieve its rightful and universal human rights.

This book is written in the language of everyday life in Kurdistan, using clear and accessible wording, so that every reader can fully grasp its meaning.

## Section One

### 1. What Is Identity?

According to scholars and specialists in geology and astronomy, the Earth emerged as a result of the condensation of primordial matter following the event known as the **Big Bang**. Roughly **14 billion years** after that cosmic beginning, the Earth formed from solar debris; its cooling process unfolded over millions of years, and by around **4.5 billion years ago** the planet had taken on something close to its present form.

The **first life** appeared nearly **4 billion years ago** in the oceans as microscopic organisms. **Dinosaurs** lived on Earth until about **65 million years ago**, when the impact of a massive asteroid altered the climate; the ensuing darkness and cold contributed to their extinction.

The earliest **human ancestors** (hominins) were present on Earth approximately **6–8 million years ago**. **Modern humans** have lived on the planet for roughly **200,000–300,000 years**. As climates shifted, human beings adapted their lives to the changing environment.

Over time, species occupied diverse habitats and differentiated; waters, lands, and communities took shape, and from these processes emerged **clans, tribes, nations, and a variety of languages**.

With the rise of **civilization**, peoples developed their own languages and cultures, which today are recognized as the **identities of nations**. Just as English identity is tied to England, so too should the Kurds hold the conviction that **Kurdistan's existence is inseparable from Kurdish identity**.

A **national (or civic) identity** rests on a set of core factors that bind individuals within a society: people who live together share a common culture and speak a common language—distinct from others—thereby constituting a nation and a society different from those around them.

Once we grasp the meaning of **nationhood**, it becomes natural to speak of **national identity**. In language, culture, and everyday customs, **the Kurds differ markedly** from neighboring

peoples such as Turks, Persians, and Arabs. Yet the occupiers of Kurdistan have often enriched their own languages and cultures by appropriating Kurdish ones. To illustrate: **were all Kurdish elements removed from Persian**, that language would be gravely diminished. Turkish and Arabic, too, are composite tongues shaped by the long history of conquest across the Middle East, spread by sword and coercion.

Although **Kurdish** has long been **suppressed** and denied the breadth of development it deserves, in terms of **originality and expressive power** it is richer than the languages of the three states occupying Kurdistan. For this reason, it is necessary to **affirm the Kurdish identity** and to recognize, at the international level, that the Kurds constitute a **free and distinct nation**, different from Turks, Persians, and Arabs.

Without acknowledging **Kurdish national identity** and the **polity of Kurdistan**, the Kurdish question cannot be resolved. Every delay harms the Kurds and, conversely, benefits Turks, Persians, and Arabs. Therefore, not only the Kurds but also neighboring nations and the wider world must consider this question seriously and **choose the correct course without delay**. Any people who possess their own homeland, culture, and language have the **right to national identity**. The homeland of the Kurds is **Kurdistan**, whose geography is clearly distinct from **Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria**. The **Kurdish language**, across all its dialects, is markedly different from Turkish, Arabic, and Persian. The **daily lifeways and customs** of Kurdish society also differ from those of these neighboring peoples. Taken together, these three principal factors form a **recognized basis for nationhood**, and the Kurds—both within Kurdistan and internationally—must be recognized as possessing a **Kurdistani identity**.

It is self-evident that the **history of the Kurdish people's struggles**—their long, blood-stained efforts for freedom and the defense of their land—stands as compelling proof confirming the **identity of Kurdistan**.

## Section Two

### 2. Key Points in the History of the Kurdish People and the Revolutions of Kurdistan

No one can say with certainty where the Kurdish people came from, nor will anyone ever be able to determine this with absolute precision. Yet we may confidently state: wherever humanity itself first emerged, there too is the birthplace of the Kurds.

Contrary to the view held by some historians who argue that the Kurds are of Indo-European origin and that they migrated from the Caucasus to the Zagros region some 3,000 to 6,000 years before the Common Era, I believe that from the moment humans first appeared on Earth, the Kurds were already living on the land that is today called Kurdistan. If scientific excavations were carried out, the oldest human remains in the world would be found in Kurdistan—serving as undeniable evidence of this fact. Unfortunately, however, every historical or archaeological discovery relating to the Kurds is quickly looted and removed by the occupying powers of Kurdistan, with no respect for its value or significance.

One of the oldest known works of human civilization is the *Epic of Gilgamesh*, inscribed on large stone tablets around 2750 BCE, and discovered in Southern Kurdistan. The poems of Gilgamesh were written more than three thousand years before the revelation of the Qur'an and describe the first cities and urban societies known to humankind—events and themes that are not treated in this way in the sacred books of the Qur'an, Bible, Torah, or Avesta. The life and adventures of Gilgamesh took place in Kurdistan, and the stone tablets were unearthed in the region of Nineveh (modern-day Mosul). Gilgamesh was a king of Sumer and the first figure in recorded history who sought to liberate humanity from primitive existence and teach them the ways of city life.

The word *Gilgamesh* has no meaning in any known language except Kurdish, where it may be understood in several ways: *Kele-Gamêş* meaning “the fierce buffalo,” *Kelle-Gamêş* meaning “the head buffalo,” or *Gel-Gamêş* meaning “the buffalo among the people.” Each interpretation links the name to strength, leadership, and symbolic power.

It is worth noting that the Kurdish people have long been associated with the taming and herding of animals, giving symbolic significance to many creatures as emblems of strength and freedom. Even today, in rural areas, expressions such as “he is like a bull” are used to describe someone as powerful, or “he is like a lion” to praise someone’s courage. Indeed, even common Kurdish names such as *Sherko* (“lion’s son”) derive from this tradition, reflecting admiration for brave and noble animals.

The name *Gilgamesh* would have been used with the same meaning: at that time, most animals had not yet been domesticated, and *Kele-Gamêş* would have been the fiercest and strongest animal in the region. Thus, this name became a title of respect for a heroic figure. It is therefore entirely reasonable—and a matter of pride—to claim that Gilgamesh and the Sumerians were Kurdish, that civilization itself began in Kurdistan, and that the Kurdish nation has lived continuously on its own land—known by its true name, Kurdistan—since the dawn of history.



A statue of Gilgamesh stands today in the garden of the University of Sydney. In this sculpture, Gilgamesh is shown holding a lion in his arms. This powerful image symbolizes that Gilgamesh not only tamed a wild beast but also embodied its strength and majesty—he was as fierce, resilient, and courageous as a lion. The name *Kele-Gamêš* or *Gel-Gamêš* reflects this symbolism: he was the “buffalo” or the “mighty one” among the people, wrapped in his own strength.

Around 5000 years before the Common Era, Gilgamesh ruled in Sumer—an ancient land situated between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers—covering what is now parts of Northern, Southern, and Western Kurdistan and modern-day Iraq. According to tradition, he lived for 126 years. More than half of his life was devoted to seeking a cure for death so that he might live forever. In the end, however, he came to accept the truth that death is an inseparable part of life and that what truly grants immortality is the work and culture one leaves behind for future generations. In this way, Gilgamesh and his scribes preserved their thoughts on clay tablets, leaving behind one of the most profound sources of historical and philosophical knowledge in the entire history of humanity.

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## **2.1 – The Roots of the Kurdish People, 3000 BCE**

(2300 years before the legendary Newroz of Kawa the Blacksmith)


The roots of the Kurdish people can be traced back to the ancient nations known in historical records as the Lullubi, Gutí, Hurrians, Sumerians, Mannai, and Medes.

The Lullubi formed their tribal confederation in the Zagros Mountains and established the earliest Lullubi state. Among neighboring nations, they were known collectively as the *Lullubi Confederation*.

The Lullubi are recorded in history as early as 3000 BCE, and by around 2300 BCE they had established their own kingdom. Their dominion stretched across the Zagros region—from Hulwan to Zohab—including the territories of modern-day Sulaymaniyah, Piran (Shêxan), Sharazur, Kirkuk, Kermashan, and Ilam—lands that remain central to Kurdistan today.



A statue of a wild mountain goat dating back to the Lullubi era, around 3000 BCE (approximately 2300 years before the legendary Newroz of Kawa the Blacksmith).



A human figure sculpture from the Lullubi era, dating back to around 2000 BCE.

## 2.2 – The Roots of the Persian Tribe

The Persian tribe, around 1000 BCE, migrated from Central Asia—specifically from the region of modern northern Tajikistan—into Media (present-day Kurdistan and Iran). They eventually settled as refugees in the region of **Anshan**, which corresponds to today's Shiraz.

It is significant to note that the renowned Kurdish tradition of hospitality was one of the main reasons why other peoples felt welcomed and secure enough to settle on Kurdish land. On the other hand, the natural wealth of Kurdistan—its fertile soil and abundant resources—has historically attracted waves of foreign migration and conquest. In fact, some of history's most significant wars took place on Kurdish soil:

- **Alexander the Great** (the Greek emperor) waged war against **Darius III** (the last Achaemenid Persian emperor) in 334 BCE. During these campaigns, large numbers of Kurds were massacred and their villages destroyed.
- **The Arab Caliphate**, under the name of Islam and during the caliphate of 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb (may God be pleased with him) in the 7th century CE, massacred many Kurds, displaced entire communities, and settled Arab populations in the provinces of Nineveh, Kirkuk, Aleppo, Khanaqin, and Khuzistan (including Dezful).
- **Genghis Khan and the Mongols**, along with their Persian allies, in the 13th century CE carried out widespread massacres of Kurds and devastated the region.
- **The Ottoman Turks and the Safavid Persians**, between the 13th and 16th centuries CE, fought repeated wars in Kurdistan. In their wake, the Kurdish population suffered mass killings and forced displacement. During this period, Turks, Azeris, and Turkmens were settled in the provinces of Tabriz, Urmia, Ardalan, Harput, Erzincan, Erzurum, Sivas, Malatya, Marash, Dilok (Gaziantep), Riha (Urfa), Nakhchivan, Nineveh, and Kirkuk. At the same time, several Persian tribes were settled in Hamadan, Lorestan, Kohgiluyeh, Bakhtiari, and Bushehr.

Thus, throughout history, Kurdistan has been turned into a battlefield—a ground for the conflicts and rivalries of foreign empires—while its people have been repeatedly subjugated. Most of the great empires of the world have marched through Kurdistan, massacring large portions of the Kurdish population and plundering their wealth.

It is worth mentioning that during the 8th to 13th centuries CE, under the Abbasid rulers of Iran, the word “**Parsa**” (Persian) was pronounced “**Fars**” by the Arabs, because classical Arabic lacked the letter “**P**.” The Arabic term *al-Furs* or *Fars* came to mean “horsemen” or “keepers of horses.”

It is striking that the Azeris in Eastern Kurdistan, the Turks in Northern Kurdistan, and the Turkmens in Southern Kurdistan have a presence in the region that only dates back some 900 years—yet today they dominate much of Kurdistan, occupy key positions of authority, and control the economy of our land.




A golden statue from the post-Median period, looted and taken to the Tehran Museum.

## 2.3 – The Median Empire





In 678 BCE, **Deioces (Diyako)** succeeded in uniting the Median tribes and led an uprising against the Persians, establishing the **Median Kingdom**. He liberated the city of **Ecbatana** (modern Hamadan) from the control of the Persian Tajiks and made it the capital of his new empire. Deioces became the first king of Media and formally proclaimed the founding of the Median Empire on the first day of spring.

Deioces ruled for 31 years, until his death in 647 BCE, passing away naturally. His son, **Phraortes (Frawartis)**, succeeded him as king of Media. Upon ascending the throne, Phraortes expanded Median power by conquering parts of the Assyrian Empire. However, after 22 years of rule, in 625 BCE, he was killed in battle by **Ashurbanipal**, the king of Assyria.

After the death of Phraortes, his son **Cyaxares I (Kayxosraw-ê Yekem)** became king. Cyaxares formed a powerful alliance with the Babylonians and, in 612 BCE, succeeded in defeating and destroying the Assyrian Empire. This decisive victory made Cyaxares I one of the greatest monarchs of his age and the most successful ruler of the Median Empire.



A statue from the post-Median period, dating back to around 800 BCE.



Several handcrafted statues from the Median civilization, dating back to around 500 BCE, now dispersed across museums around the world.



The Median Empire during the reign of Deioces.

After the death of Cyaxares I, his son **Astyages** ascended to the throne in 585 BCE. Astyages was a devout adherent of the Zoroastrian faith, believing strongly in its principles of peace and coexistence. Because Zoroastrianism is a religion that promotes harmony and unity, Astyages became increasingly devoted to this worldview and, as a result, entrusted much of the Median army's command to **Cyrus (Kûrûsh)**—one of his trusted and skilled generals.

This Median kingdom was composed largely of Medes, that is, the ancestors of today's Kurds. However, Cyrus belonged to the Tajik-Persian lineage. By this period, the region had experienced nearly five centuries of Persian migration and settlement, which had already begun to alter the area's demographics.

Cyrus eventually asked for the hand of Astyages' daughter in marriage, and Astyages agreed. In 550 BCE, taking advantage of a festive occasion, Cyrus invited the entire royal household of Astyages and his relatives to a great banquet. Poison was secretly placed in the food and wine, and all members of the Median royal family were killed. In this way, Cyrus seized power,

changed his name to **Kûrûsh (Cyrus)**, and founded the **Achaemenid Persian Empire**—ending the independence of the Median state.

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
## **2.4 – Phraortes, Leader of Media, 674 BCE**

In 674 BCE, the Kurdish people, under the leadership of **Phraortes (also known as Kashatourito)**, rose up against the Persians and liberated the region of Hamadan. Phraortes made Hamadan the capital of his authority. Soon afterward, the Assyrians attacked the Median domain. In the ensuing battle, Phraortes was killed, and the Median leadership was broken within the same year.

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## **2.5 – The Establishment of the Median Kingdom under Cyaxares II (625–550 BCE)**

In 625 BCE, under the leadership of **Cyaxares II (Kayxosraw II)**, the Kurdish people reconstituted their state. Cyaxares was a wise and capable leader who managed to unite the scattered Kurdish tribes—previously organized as independent militias—into a single, cohesive army. With



A map of the Median Empire in 580 BCE, at the height of its power, showing borders stretching from the heartland of Media to the Mediterranean and Caspian Seas, encompassing all of present-day Iran, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and the whole of historic Kurdistan.

## 2.6 – The Uprising of Kawa the Blacksmith Against the Tyrant Zahhak (700 BCE)

**Kawa** was a legendary and heroic figure of the Median nation and a master blacksmith. In that era, blacksmithing was a revered craft, and blacksmiths were skilled in working with gold, silver, and copper to create tools, weapons, and symbols of life and power.

**Zahhak (Dehak)** was a brutal conqueror who ruled over the land of Media, oppressing its people and committing countless atrocities. He established his rule in what is now

Mesopotamia and Assyria, making Nineveh (modern Mosul) his capital. Zahhak terrorized the population with a sinister myth: he claimed to have two serpents growing from his shoulders that required him to feed daily on the brains of two young Medes.

In truth, Zahhak had no snakes on his shoulders—only scars from wounds. But he used this lie to keep the people in fear and submission. Under his orders, thousands of young Medes were slaughtered in order to satisfy this false ritual, as part of a campaign to wipe out the Median nation and erase their future.

The man appointed to carry out these killings was a butcher. Though bound by Zahhak's orders, he was secretly a man of conscience. Each day, he would execute one youth, mix the brain with that of a sheep to appease Zahhak, and secretly set the other youth free. He instructed these survivors to flee to the Zagros Mountains—particularly the Qandil range—where they could take refuge and rebuild their lives. Over time, many young Medes gathered in the mountains and formed what became known as the **Kurdish people**. The very first youth whom the butcher saved and sent to the mountains was named **Kurd**, and he would become the ancestor and namesake of the Kurds.

When Zahhak eventually executed two of Kawa's own sons, Kawa left his home in Bistun, traveled to Nineveh, and rallied the oppressed population. With the support of the compassionate butcher and the growing Kurdish force in the mountains, he led a rebellion. Together, they stormed Zahhak's fortress. In the final confrontation, Kawa struck Zahhak down with his blacksmith's hammer, severing his head.

That day became the day of freedom, joy, and peace for the Median people. In celebration, fires were lit across the land to signal the victory. From this moment, the Medes and the Kurds declared unity, and in honor of the Kurdish contribution to liberation, the Median nation gradually became known as the **Kurdish nation**, and their land came to be called **Kurdistan**—the “land of the Kurds.”

The victory of Kawa over Zahhak is commemorated annually by lighting fires to celebrate **Newroz**. The Kurdish calendar begins with this event. Each year, the first day of the Kurdish year is celebrated on **21 March**, marking both the arrival of spring and the anniversary of

Kawa's triumph. For example, 21 March 2013 corresponds to 1/1/2713 in the Kurdish calendar.

To this day, every Newroz, the Kurds honor Kawa the Blacksmith and renew their commitment to the struggle for freedom. The very word *Newroz* comes from *New Roj*—meaning “New Day”—signifying the day that liberty triumphed over tyranny.

After the death of Zahhak, the Median people enjoyed three months of peace and prosperity. Kawa, who was around sixty years old at the time, was crowned King of Media, making Ecbatana (modern Hamadan) the capital of the restored Median Kingdom.

During this golden age, Kawa forged a close friendship with **Fereydun Jamshidi**, a skilled Persian horseman and commander, who publicly pledged allegiance to the Kurdish monarchy. To honor the victory, Fereydun organized a great festival in the city of Anshan (modern Shiraz) and invited Kawa and 200 Kurds as guests of honor. The Kurds were warmly welcomed by over 1,000 Persian hosts.

However, during the feast, contests of horse-riding and wrestling were organized between the Kurds and Persians. The Persians exhausted the Kurds with endless rounds of competition, until they were tired and vulnerable. Then, during the banquet, poison was mixed into the food and drink. Within two hours, the entire Kurdish delegation was massacred, and power was once again seized by the Persians.

Many enemies of the Kurdish nation have tried to dismiss this event as mere legend, but it is in fact a historical episode, deeply rooted in the memory of the Kurdish people. To this day, adversaries of Kurdistan attempt to reinterpret or erase this narrative—reducing Kawa's struggle to folklore and appropriating Newroz for themselves. For instance, the Turkish state, which for centuries opposed the celebration of Newroz, officially declared in 1999 that Newroz is a Turkish holiday, with the President and Prime Minister even striking ceremonial matches over the fire in an attempt to nationalize the festival. Similarly, Persian authorities have turned Newroz into an exclusively Persian celebration, attaching to it rituals such as **Chaharshanbeh Suri**, **Haft Sin**, and **Sizdah Bedar**, stripping away its original Kurdish meaning and reducing its revolutionary symbolism.

## 2.7 – The Uprising of Atropates in 323 BCE

**Atropates** was one of the military commanders serving under **Darius III**. In 323 BCE, he led an uprising against the Persian Empire and founded what came to be known as the **Lesser Median Kingdom**. By 331 BCE, this kingdom had expanded its borders to include the regions of Urmia, Mako, Khoy, Salmas, Naqadeh, Shno (Oshnavieh), Khaneh, Mahabad, Bokoan, Miyandoab, Sardasht, and Baneh. The city of **Urmia** became the capital of this new Median state.

Between 226 and 248 CE, several Persian factions—including the *Pars Awa* and *Pahlavi*—attacked the Lesser Median Kingdom, destroyed its authority, and massacred a large portion of its population, looting their towns and villages. The remaining Median rulers were forced to flee and take refuge in Armenia.

The Lesser Median Kingdom ruled Eastern Kurdistan for 571 years. After its collapse, the Kurdish people remained for centuries under the control of the Persians and other imperial powers in the region.

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## 2.8 – The Arab Invasions of Kurdistan and Iran (634–644 CE)

The Prophet **Muhammad** (peace be upon him) was born in 570 CE in the city of Mecca, Arabia. He was orphaned at a young age and was raised by his uncle **Abu Talib**, the head of the Banu Hashim clan, one of the most influential and powerful families of Mecca.

Muhammad worked in caravan trade between Mecca and Syria and later married **Khadija Khuwailid**, one of the wealthiest widows of the region, which granted him great economic power.

Over time, Muhammad used Khadija's wealth to expand his trade operations, acquire slaves, and establish a small private army. He eventually declared his prophethood and sought to consolidate political and religious authority under the banner of Islam. From 621 to 632 CE, he led his forces into numerous campaigns—*Badr*, *Uhud*, *Khandaq*, *Tabuk*, *Banu Mustaliq*, and *Yarmouk*—against leading Arab tribes such as the Quraysh, including Abu Hakam (later

called Abu Jahl) and Abu Sufyan. These campaigns brought all of Hijaz (Mecca and Medina) under Muhammad's control.

In 628 CE, Muhammad sent a letter to **Khosrow Parviz**, the Zoroastrian Sassanian king of Iran, inviting him to accept Islam. Khosrow, who ruled from 590 to 628 CE from Hamadan, Kermanshah, and other centers, rejected the message and tore the letter apart.

After Muhammad's passing, **Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab** (may God be pleased with him) dispatched a massive army of 60,000 Arab cavalry under the command of **Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf** to invade Kurdistan in 637 CE.

During the **Battle of Nahavand**, led by **Sariyah**, and in the battles of Nineveh under **Iyad ibn Ghanam**, and Mardin and Amid (Diyarbakir) under **Qaqa ibn Amr**, tens of thousands of Kurds were beheaded by the sword, and rivers of blood were shed. Those who resisted were massacred; those who surrendered were taken as prisoners.

Children under ten were spared but forcibly Arabized and converted to Islam under the sword. Arab forces plundered Kurdish homes and lands as spoils of war, labeling them *mal al-kuffar* ("the property of infidels"). In these campaigns, more than one hundred thousand Kurds were killed, and over ten thousand Kurdish women were taken as concubines and sent to Arabia.

After these wars, every Arab soldier who participated in the conquest of Kurdistan was rewarded with twelve dirhams as war booty by Caliph Umar.

Caliph Umar also established a system of local governance in Kurdistan by co-opting certain Kurdish tribal leaders who were given the titles of **Sheikh**, **Sayyid**, or **Agha**. These leaders were tasked with annually collecting *zakat* (Islamic tax) from the Kurdish population and sending it to Hijaz (Arabia).

This system ensured that Arab power was consolidated in Kurdistan and that Arab culture and language gradually spread under the guise of Islam, leading to the slow erosion of the native Zoroastrian faith and culture of the Kurds.

## 2.9 – The Marwanid Kurdish State (990 CE)

The **Marwanid state** was founded by **Bāz, son of Dōst**, of the Marwanid lineage. Through a series of campaigns, Bāz liberated the cities of **Ardīsh, Chāldirān, and Malāzgirt**. Continuing his struggle, he brought **Amid (Diyarbakır), Fāriqīn**, and the surrounding districts under his control.

In **990 CE**, Bāz proclaimed the Marwanid state in **Amid**. At its height, the Marwanid power was formidable and succeeded in liberating the whole of **Northern Kurdistan**.

After Bāz's death, his son **Mamand Marwān** assumed power, followed by Bāz's descendant **Naṣr al-Dawla**. After nearly a century of rule, the Marwanid state collapsed and came to an end with the rise of the **Seljuks**.

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## 2.10 – The Shaddadid Kurdish State (951 CE)

The **Shaddadid Kurdish state** was established in **951 CE** by **Muḥammad, son of Shaddād**, in the region of **Arrān**. The dynasty endured for a considerable period and, within a short time, significantly expanded its frontiers. The cities of **Nakhchivān, Ganja, Tiflis (Tbilisi), Damirqāpi (Derbent), Ani**, and **Dvin** came under Shaddadid rule, and later **Malatya** was also taken. At the same time, the **Marwanids** held authority to the south, while the **Ghaznavids** ruled in the east.

The Shaddadid state lasted **124 years**, but its rule ended in **1075 CE** after the incursions of **Malik-Shāh**, the Seljuk sovereign. For many years the Kurdish **Marwanid** and **Shaddadid** polities governed concurrently; however, lacking unity and alliance, they could not withstand their enemies with sufficient strength.

## 2.11 – Seljuk Oppression (1037–1194 CE)

In **1037 CE**, following victory over the **Buyids**, the **Seljuks** founded their state. From the **11th to the 13th centuries CE**, they ruled across **Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Kurdistan**. In the name of Islam—and branding their opponents as unbelievers—they inflicted severe oppression upon

the Kurdish people, killing great numbers and plundering their wealth. In this way, the Kurds were dispersed and their homeland subjugated.

This violence was especially pronounced under the first Seljuk sultan, **Ṭughril (Tughrul) ibn Seljuk**. Seljuk power was ultimately broken by the **Mongols**, and in **1194 CE** their rule came to an end.

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## 2.12 – The Mongol Invasions of Kurdistan (13th–14th Centuries CE)

During the **13th and 14th centuries CE**, the **Mongols** invaded **Kurdistan**, killing many Kurds and looting their property. The last Ilkhan was **Abū Saʿīd Bahādur Khān**, son of **Sultan Muḥammad Khudābanda**—known as *Bahādur*—who ascended the throne at the age of thirteen.

Subsequently, **Amīr Timūr-i Gurgānī (Tamerlane)** overthrew Bahādur’s dominion, after which several new polities emerged in Iran. At the same time, in **1315 CE**, the Kurds of Eastern Kurdistan established a Kurdish authority known as the **Ḥasan-i Īlkanī** state, founded by **Shaykh Ḥasan-i Gawra (“the Great”)**. This Kurdish rule was short-lived and, after **nine months**, was crushed by Iranian occupiers.

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## 2.13 – Amīr Sharafkhān Bidlīsī (1597 CE)

**Sharafkhān** was a Kurdish scholar and author who, in **1597 CE**, produced the work known as the **Sharafnāma** in the city of **Bitlis**. In his era, Bitlis was a center of learning, arts, and diverse scholarship. Sharafkhān, feeling a deep sense of responsibility, gathered extensive scholarly materials on the Kurdish people in the **library of Bitlis**.

The capital of Sharafkhān’s hereditary principality was **Bitlis**. The family remained influential through the **16th, 17th, and 18th centuries**, and—despite Ottoman Turkish domination—strove to preserve their liberty and autonomy. In the period of **Amīr ‘Abdālī**, a descendant of Sharafkhān, **Malik Aḥmad**, an Ottoman governor (wālī), attacked Bitlis and set fire to

Sharafkhān's library. As a result, **four thousand books**—together with **seventy scholarly manuscripts**—were reduced to ash. Malik Aḥmad plundered the considerable wealth of the Sharafkhān family, laid waste to Bitlis, and in this way brought the principality to an end.

It should be noted that the **Sharafnāma** available today—originally written in **Persian** and later translated into **Russian** and **Kurdish (Kurmanji and Sorani)**—is not believed here to be Sharafkhān's own untouched autograph. According to this account, it is a copy/edited version disseminated by **Malik Aḥmad**, allegedly intended to disparage the people of Kurdistan and distort Kurdish history. Therefore, Kurds should not base their understanding of **Sharafkhān's person** or **Kurdish identity** solely on a manipulated and redacted version of the *Sharafnāma*.



Amīr Sharafkhān Bidlīsī

## 2.14 – Atrocities of the Safavid Dynasty of Iran Against Kurdish Uprisings (1501–1736 CE)

During the **Safavid era** (1501–1736 CE), the people of Kurdistan endured immense suffering, repeated wars, and widespread devastation. **Shah Ismail I**, the first Safavid ruler of Iran, reigned from 1501 to 1524 CE. During his rule, he denied the Kurdish nation any recognition and exploited the Kurdish princes (mir) for his own political gain.

After him, **Shah Tahmasp I** (r. 1524–1576 CE) launched multiple campaigns into Kurdistan. He killed anyone who resisted and destroyed entire regions. Shah Tahmasp also perpetrated a large-scale massacre against the **Dombli tribe**.

Later, **Shah Abbas I** (r. 1587–1629 CE) repeatedly attacked the Kurds of Khoy and crushed the **Mahmudi tribe**, whose leader was **Mustafa Beg**. Mustafa Beg, along with his sons and warriors, resisted heroically in defense of **Maku Castle** around 1608 CE, but the castle ultimately fell. After the siege, the Safavids carried out mass executions, captured thousands of Kurdish women and children, and deported them to **Khorasan** and **Quchan** for forced resettlement.

Following the **Treaty of Istanbul (1590 CE)** between the Safavid and Ottoman empires, more than **50,000 Alevis** from Northern Kurdistan were forcibly relocated to Khorasan and Gilan and used as conscripts in wars against Turkmenistan. Both the Ottomans and Safavids continuously exploited the Kurds as front-line soldiers in their conflicts. Tens of thousands of Kurds were slaughtered in these wars by both empires.

In **1608 CE**, Shah Abbas laid siege to **Dimdim Castle** near Urmia, where the **Bradost Kurds** resisted fiercely. The siege lasted several months, and the defenders fought heroically to the last man. When the castle was finally captured, Shah Abbas personally ordered a massacre of the **Mokri Kurds**, killing many and deporting nearly **15,000 families** to Khorasan.

Despite all these atrocities, the Kurds never surrendered their spirit of resistance. In the 17th century, **Khan Halokhan**, the leader of the Ardalan tribe, rose up and declared Kurdish independence.

After Halokhan's death, his son **Khan Hamakhān** succeeded him and even minted Kurdish currency known as **Gala** in Eastern Kurdistan. Khan Hamakhān established Kurdish governance in 1638 CE. However, in 1639 CE, **Shah Safi of Iran** attacked his forces near Mariwan, defeated them, and forced Khan Hamakhān to seek refuge with the Ottoman Empire. He eventually died in Mosul.

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## 2.15 – The Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin (1639 CE)

The **Battle of Chaldiran (1514 CE)** between the Ottomans and Safavids marked the beginning of a long struggle over the possession of Kurdistan, lasting for nearly 130 years. Throughout this period, Kurdistan alternated between Ottoman and Safavid control.

After suffering a major defeat against the Ottomans in 1590 CE, **Shah Abbas I** was forced to sign a peace treaty, under which Iran ceded territories in Kurdistan, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. After regrouping, Shah Abbas renewed war with the Ottomans in 1603 CE and reconquered Eastern Kurdistan and parts of modern Azerbaijan.

Finally, in 1639 CE, the two empires agreed to the **Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin**, which divided Kurdistan between them. Under this treaty, **Ardalan** remained under Safavid control, while **Mokrian** and **Sharazur** were placed under Ottoman rule. The principalities of **Jazira, Urmia, Soran, and Baban** retained a degree of autonomy as Kurdish emirates.

Kurdish mirs continued to fight on two fronts—sometimes against the occupying Ottoman and Safavid powers, and at times waging fratricidal conflicts with each other. This situation persisted until **1813 CE**, when the Qajar and Ottoman rulers signed the **Treaty of Gulistan** with Russia. This treaty marked the complete subjugation of Kurdistan, which was formally divided between the Ottoman and Safavid (later Qajar) states—each ruling their respective sections in accordance with their own political interests.



The autonomous Kurdish principalities (emirates) and their territories.

## 2.16 – The Uprising of Sheikh ‘Ubaydullah al-Nahri (1879 CE)

In **1879 CE**, nearly **60,000 Kurds and Assyrians** rose up under the leadership of **Sheikh ‘Ubaydullah al-Nahri** and his son, the revolutionary **‘Abd al-Qadir**, against the tyranny and encroachment of Iranian occupation. Like a storm, their revolt struck the occupiers with great force, and within a short time they liberated most of **Eastern Kurdistan**.

In an effort to crush this uprising, the Iranian state requested assistance from **Britain, Russia, and the Ottoman Empire**. These powers jointly conspired against the Kurdish rebellion.

Pretending friendship, they summoned Sheikh ‘Ubaydullah to negotiations, promising: *“Let us make peace together, and afterward we will recognize and grant the Kurdish nation its right to freedom.”*

Trusting their word, Sheikh ‘Ubaydullah accepted an invitation to **Istanbul**. But once there, he realized he had fallen into the trap of his enemies and secretly returned to **Shamzinan**. The Ottoman military forces pursued him, attacked his position, arrested him, and exiled him to **Mecca** in Arabia.

In **1883 CE**, Sheikh ‘Ubaydullah was killed in Mecca—officially reported as having “passed away,” but widely believed to have been assassinated. With his death, the occupying powers crushed the Kurdish revolution and reimposed their control over Kurdistan.

Sheikh ‘Ubaydullah’s son, ‘**Abd al-Qadir Nahri**, traveled to Istanbul in **1908 CE** and later became one of the key figures of the **Sheikh Said Piran Uprising** in 1925. After the suppression of that revolt, ‘Abd al-Qadir was executed by the Turkish authorities in Diyarbakir alongside Sheikh Said.

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## 2.17 – The Revolt of Bedir Khan Pasha (1821 CE)

**Bedir Khan Pasha** made great efforts to unite the tribal leaders of **Hakkari** and forged an alliance known as the **Sacred Pact (Peymani Pirôz)**. Its aim was to establish Kurdish unity, reclaim Kurdish national rights, and liberate Kurdistan from Ottoman occupation. Even the leaders of **Ardalan** in Eastern Kurdistan participated in the pact. With the support of the eastern Kurds, the uprising gained momentum.

Bedir Khan also signed cooperation agreements with the **Assyrian** and **Armenian** communities, pledging to rise together against Ottoman domination. However, before the uprising began, British intervention dissuaded the Assyrians and Armenians from participating, weakening the Kurdish alliance.

In **1821 CE**, Bedir Khan led a successful campaign, liberating the principalities of **Jazira** and **Botan** and bringing them under his rule. He then sought to free all the Kurdish emirates and create a **united Kurdistan**. To achieve this, Bedir Khan reached out to many Kurdish tribal leaders and mirs (princes), urging them to join the struggle. Those who supported him included:

- **Mustafa Beg** and **Darwesh Beg** of the Van region,
- **Ural Beg**, mir of Hakkari,
- **Fattah Beg of Hakkari**,
- **Khalid Beg Zahimi** and **Sharif Beg**, mir of Mush,
- **Hussein Beg**, tribal chief of Qars and Ajar,
- **Pir Yusuf**, mir of Zakho,
- **Pir Hama**, mir of Mosul.

Bedir Khan established a **weapons factory** in Jazira for the production of guns and ammunition. He even sent students to Europe to learn advanced arms manufacturing techniques. In the **Garawi district of Van**, he invested heavily in building shipyards and production sites. During his uprising, Bedir Khan liberated Van, Urmia, Mukriyan, Soran, Mosul, Sinjar, and Weranshar.

The Ottomans, under **Ömer Pasha** and with the support of Britain, launched a massive counter-offensive against Bedir Khan.

In the first major battle near Urmia, the Kurds were victorious. But soon after, **Yezdan Shêr** (**‘Izz al-Dīn Shêr**)—a prominent commander and cousin of Bedir Khan—betrayed the revolt and defected to the Ottoman side. This treachery turned the tide: the Ottomans recaptured **Jazira** and struck a major blow to the uprising.

Although the Kurds later managed to liberate Jazira again, the Ottomans—again supported by Yezdan Shêr—attacked and recaptured it.

Bedir Khan retreated with his forces to the **fortress of Eruh**, where they resisted for eight months despite being besieged by Ottoman troops and betrayed Kurdish collaborators. Eventually, starving and running out of ammunition, Bedir Khan’s forces were defeated. Bedir

Khan himself was captured and exiled to **Istanbul**, and later sent to **Damascus**, where he spent the last years of his life under strict surveillance.

In **1869 CE**, Bedir Khan was killed by the Ottomans in Damascus under the pretext of illness, and he was buried in the Kurdish cemetery there. It is worth noting that during his uprising, Bedir Khan minted a **Kurdish currency known as “Gala”**, which circulated in the territories under his control.

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## **2.18 – The Enlightenment and Nationalist Movement of ‘Abd al-Razzaq Bedir Khan (1912 CE)**

‘**Abd al-Razzaq Bedir Khan** was born in **1846 CE** in **Istanbul**, the son of **Najib Pasha** and the grandson of **Bedir Khan Pasha**. For the study of the Kurdish language, he became a student of the great Kurdish poet and scholar **Haji Qadiri Koyi**, becoming one of the most well-educated Kurds of his era.

‘Abd al-Razzaq devoted his life to the liberation and independence of Kurdistan, launching a movement of **Kurdish enlightenment and nationalism** across the country. In **1912 CE**, he began publishing a Kurdish monthly journal in **Urmia**. When Russian forces later expelled him from Urmia, **Ismail Agha Simko** assumed responsibility for the journal’s publication. The magazine was ultimately shut down by the Iranian authorities in **1914 CE**.

On **24 December 1913**, ‘Abd al-Razzaq founded the **Kurdish Enlightenment Society (Komela Roshnbiri Kurd)** and established a Kurdish-language school where **29 students** received instruction in their native tongue. The Iranian authorities opposed the continuation of the school, attacking it and demolishing the building. In this way, they sought to prevent the Kurdish people from learning their own language.

Thanks to the efforts of Kurdish activists, the regions of **Van** and **Erzurum** became centers of Kurdish intellectual and cultural awakening during the spring of **1913 CE**. Together with **Taha Shamzini**, ‘Abd al-Razzaq organized the **Kurdish Social and Intellectual Movement**, which called openly for the independence of Kurdistan.

Soon, disputes arose among the Kurdish leadership over who would assume the presidency of Kurdistan. ‘Abd al-Razzaq’s movement aligned itself with **Russia**, while **Hasan Beg**, his cousin, sought British support, and **Pir ‘Abd al-Qadir Shamzini** aligned with the Ottoman Empire. These rivalries deepened divisions among the Kurdish leadership, frustrating the goal of Kurdish unity.

During this period, under the leadership of **Malaselim Bidlisi**, the city of **Bitlis** became a hub of the Kurdish movement. This movement paved the way for a **general Kurdish uprising**, in which leaders such as ‘Abd al-Razzaq Bedir Khan, Yusuf Kamil, Taha Shamzini, and Simko participated.

The Ottoman response to the uprising was brutal and merciless. Although the Kurds sought support from Russia, the movement was left without allies and remained divided internally. In **1914–1917 CE**, ‘Abd al-Razzaq, Simko, and Taha Shamzini stayed near **Qeyseri** in Russia and concluded an agreement with Russian officials to cooperate militarily and seek Kurdish autonomy.

After the **October Revolution of 1917**, ‘Abd al-Razzaq returned to Northern Kurdistan, where he was arrested by the Ottomans, sent to the prison of **Mosul**, and executed without trial. After this event, Simko and Taha Shamzini returned from Russia to Eastern Kurdistan.

‘Abd al-Razzaq was deeply knowledgeable in Middle Eastern politics, fluent in several regional and European languages, and even learned Russian during his service as secretary in the Ottoman embassy in Russia. He was among the first Kurdish leaders to draft a **structured plan for the independence of Kurdistan**. He once told Russian officials:

“I will never accept that my nation should remain in the chains of Ottoman Turks or Qajar Persians. Our goal is to liberate our people and our land from these tyrants and occupiers. To achieve this sacred aim, our people must be educated — and the key to this is creating opportunities for learning in the Kurdish language. Help us reach this goal. And if we and our comrades cannot achieve Kurdish independence, the future generations of Kurds will certainly do so and reclaim their freedom.”

## 2.19 – The Armenian Genocide (1915 CE)

**Sultan Abdul Hamid II**, one of the Ottoman rulers, committed severe atrocities against both the Kurdish and Armenian peoples. He created the **Hamidiye regiments**, recruiting many Kurdish aghas, begs, and tribal chiefs into his army, turning them into paramilitary units used against the Armenians. By proclaiming that “we Turks and Kurds are brothers and Muslims, while the Armenians are Christian infidels,” Abdul Hamid mobilized Kurdish forces to participate in campaigns against Armenians.

In this way, the Ottoman state, with the participation of many misled Kurds, carried out a catastrophic **genocide** against the Armenian people — one of the darkest crimes in human history.

In this genocide, **1.5 million Armenians were massacred**, and hundreds of thousands were displaced and scattered. Their wealth and property were plundered by the Turkish state and redistributed among Turks.


After this massacre, Abdul Hamid spread lies to the Kurds, warning them that “the Russian army is coming to annihilate you all,” causing panic and forcing Kurds to abandon their towns and villages, wandering as refugees into the mountains of Kurdistan. Later, Ottoman forces attacked Kurdish regions, massacring tens of thousands and plundering their property, leaving many Kurds dead and thousands frozen to death in the mountains.

By carrying out this genocide, Sultan Abdul Hamid revealed the depth of his hatred against both Armenians and Kurds, committing one of the greatest crimes against humanity.

Abdul Hamid himself is recorded as saying:

“The Armenians are dangerous and cunning, and the whole world supports them. But the Kurds are weak, uneducated, naïve, and trusting. They are an ancient nation with a rich culture and history, and their land is fertile and wealthy. We must absorb the Kurds into the Turkish nation, erase their identity, and claim all their wealth and culture as Turkish.”

These words became the guiding policy for Turkish politicians and military commanders in the 20th and 21st centuries and remain a foundation of Turkish state policy toward the Kurds to this day.



Massacres of Armenians and the Execution of Their Physicians by the Turks

## 2.20 – The Uprising of Sheikh Mahmûd Tamrkhānī (Kurd) in 1919 CE

After the **Afshar Turks** had entrenched themselves in **Urmia**, the Kurds of the district—under the leadership of **Sheikh Mahmûd Tamrkhānī (Kurd)**—regrouped on the **Targawar Plain** and, in **1919 CE**, attacked the **Azeri Turks** of Urmia. After a bloody battle, the Kurds were defeated and suffered heavy losses. A year later, the Kurds of the area, led again by Tamrkhān, rebuilt **Dimdim Castle**, reorganized themselves, and grew stronger. The Afshars learned of this and launched an assault, but under the command of **Ganj ‘Alī Khān** they failed to capture the fortress.

Ganj ‘Alī Khān then appealed for help to his brother **Kalb ‘Alī Khān**. The two brothers gathered all available forces in the region and, in **1924 CE**, mounted a **third** attack on Dimdim. After fierce fighting, the Turks still could not take the castle. They then brought **bitumen/tar** and, for **three days and nights**, cut off the water supply. They circled the fortress to locate where the tar had seeped into the underground channels so the water might flow back into the citadel. Finding the intake, they poured in **kerosene**, igniting and contaminating the water. For several days the defenders drank the fouled water until illness and exhaustion spread.

Kalb ‘Alī Khān and Tamrkhān negotiated a **conditional truce**: the inhabitants would exit unarmed and on foot, and no one would be harmed. The next morning the defenders opened the gates and came out without weapons. After searching the castle, however, the Turks attacked from behind and carried out a **massacre** of the Kurds. In the interior of the fortress they found the bodies of **86 Kurdish women** who, the previous night, had lowered themselves from the walls to avoid capture and abuse. In many campaigns, it had become a grim custom that captured Kurdish young women would be taken away and subjected to humiliation and servitude.

After **Kalb ‘Alī Khān** died in **1924 CE**, the Kurds seized the moment and attacked the Turks; but since the Turks had consolidated their position in Urmia and possessed superior weaponry, the Kurds could not retake the city and were forced to withdraw. That same year the Turks, aided by **Qajar** detachments, assaulted the **Mahmudi** clan’s fortress. After heavy fighting, the Mahmudi were compelled to abandon it and flee to the mountains. With

continued hostility and repeated attacks, the Turks scattered and displaced many clans—**Bradost, Heidari, Jalali, Shikak, Donboli, Pazuki, and Mafi**—either expelling them from their lands or forcing them into exile.

After **ten years** of war and strife between Kurds and Turks, and with support from the **Safavid** and **Qajar** authorities, the Turks entrenched themselves in the provinces of **Tabriz, Ardabil, and Urmia**, taking control of Kurdish lands, castles, and cities. Many Kurds were driven into rural and mountain districts, while those remaining in towns were placed under Turkish domination. With the arrival and coercion of these **Afshar Turks** in the Urmia region, relations between Kurds and Turks worsened by the day. Backed by imperial authority, Turkish forces were given free rein to kill Kurds, plunder property, traffic women as concubines, conscript boys, and enforce cultural assimilation. Many Kurds—unfamiliar with the Azeri Turkish language and religion—could not understand the roots of such hostility toward the Kurds of **Tabriz, Urmia, and Ardabil**.

Even in the **21st century**, this question remains unresolved for many Kurds. Although it is widely known that **Persian (Tajik), Turkic (Mongol), and Arab** powers historically entered Kurdistan as occupying forces, they still dominate Kurdish lands today and often treat Kurds as enemies. Living on Kurdish soil and claiming Kurdish property, they have not, in many cases, accepted Kurds as equals. Even Kurds who cooperate with these powers face discrimination simply for being Kurdish. The Kurdish nation has been marginalized to such an extent that **self-defense of its national identity** appears to be the only remaining option. The policies of occupation have left Kurds without a secure life alongside these dominant powers.

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## 2.21 – The Uprising of Isma‘īl Āghā Shikak (Simko), 1918–1930 CE

The **Shikak** tribe inhabits **Soma** and **Bradost**, west of the cities of **Salmas** and **Urmia**. In **1920 CE** they numbered about **6,000 families**, making them one of the largest and strongest Kurdish tribes of the time. From **1841 to 1893 CE**, they held the Soma region under their authority, which alarmed neighboring occupiers. The leading figures of the Shikak included **Isma‘īl Āghā**, his son **‘Alī Āghā**, **Hama Pasha** (son of ‘Alī Āghā), and **Simko** (son of Hama

Pasha). From ancient times, the Shikak fought occupiers and rejected oppression, though at times they also imposed harsh measures on fellow Kurds.

The Shikak's renown traces back to **Isma'īl Āghā**, Simko's grandfather. In **1759 CE**, with Qajar permission, he attacked the **Mir of Rawanduz**, overthrowing his rule, killing the mir and his family, and plundering the fortress. (The Mir of Rawanduz at that time was **ʿĪsā Muḥammad Pasha**, also known as **Mir ʿAbdullah Pasha**.)

Isma'īl Āghā collected heavy taxes and levies from impoverished Kurds and rendered significant services to **Fath-ʿAlī Khān Qajar**. Later, in a treacherous plot, the Qajar authorities themselves killed him. In **1831 CE**, Fath-ʿAlī Khān invited Isma'īl Āghā to **Kura** for a formal ceremony; once he entered the citadel, they attacked and killed him.

Because the Shikak lived in mountainous borderlands between **Iran** and **Turkey**, subduing them was difficult. At times, one occupying power would use the Shikak against the other. After Isma'īl Āghā's death, his son **ʿAlī Āghā** (Simko's grandfather) became tribal leader. During his time, **Sheikh ʿUbaydullah Nahri's** uprising began. Sheikh ʿUbaydullah sought Shikak support, but the tribe sided with the **Qajar** and **Ottoman** authorities and, in **1880–1881 CE**, fought against Sheikh ʿUbaydullah's revolt—by order of **Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh Qajar**—in the districts of **Urmia**, **Shno (Oshnavieh)**, **Piranshahr**, **Sardasht**, and **Nahri** (near **Maku** and the westernmost Zagros).

Later **ʿAlī Āghā** clashed several times with the Iranian state, seeking to avenge his father against the Qajars. Between **1896 and 1906 CE**, he waged war against Qajar forces in **Salmas** and the **Urmia plain**. After a long campaign across the mountains and valleys, ʿAlī Āghā was defeated and fled as a refugee to **Ottoman Turkey**. By order of **Sultan Abdulhamid II**, the Ottomans arrested him, extradited him to **Moẓaffar al-Dīn Shah Qajar**, and the Qajar authorities **executed** him.

After ʿAlī Āghā's death, his son **Hama Pasha** (Simko's father) became head of the Shikak. Together with **Jawhar Āghā** and their fighters, he battled the Qajars. Moẓaffar al-Dīn Shah then sent Hama Pasha a **Qurʾan as a pledge**, inviting him to **Tabriz** to conclude peace. Having sworn upon the Qurʾan that he would not betray the Kurds, the Shah lured Hama

Pasha, Jawhar Āghā, and **six** of their men to Tabriz in **1905 CE**, where they were killed by **Nezām al-Solṭāneh**, a Qajar commander.

After this, **Simko**—Hama Pasha’s son and Jawhar Āghā’s nephew—assumed leadership of the Shikak and became their foremost cavalry chief. For **25 years** (1905–1930 CE), he exercised authority across **Urmia, Salmas, and Khoy**.

Simko supported other uprisings in **Northern Kurdistan** and resisted the **Qajar** and later **Pahlavi** states. In the **summer of 1918 CE**, he liberated the western shores of **Lake Urmia**, and by **1922 CE** he controlled the administration of **Mahabad, Shno (Oshnavieh), Daryas (Naqadeh), Khaneh (Khaneh/Shahin Dezh), Baneh, and Sardasht**. That same year, **Reza Shah** attacked the Shikak. For **eight years**, Simko resisted Reza Shah’s campaigns until **1930 CE**, when he was enticed by promises of negotiations and agreement, summoned to **Shno**, trapped, and **assassinated**. After his death, Iranian occupation forces moved harshly against the Kurdish populace, carrying out massacres in many places and establishing **gendarmerie posts and forts** to subjugate the people.



**Simko Shikak**

Simko had a younger brother named **Khorshid**, who was killed by the explosion of a grenade sent by the Iranian authorities in an attempt to assassinate Simko. Simko had two children, a son named **Khosrow** and a daughter named **Safiya**, who later lived in **Istanbul** and **Hawler (Erbil)**.



Simko and Several of His Peshmerga Comrades

## 2.22 – The Treaty of Sèvres (1919 CE)

After the end of the First World War in 1919, the Allied Powers, members of the League of Nations, called for the drafting of a peace treaty among the defeated empires.

Representatives of the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish national movement, and the Armenians were invited to the **Sèvres Conference**, held in the Parisian district of Sèvres. The Armenians were represented by **Boghos Nubar Pasha**, while the Kurdish delegation was led by **Sharif Pasha**, who presented the demands of the Kurdish nation before the conference.

The first session of the conference was held on **22 March 1919**, and the second session took place on **1 March 1920**. During this period, Sharif Pasha met with Boghos Nubar Pasha and the two leaders agreed to coordinate their demands and establish a Kurdish–Armenian alliance. Their joint proposal was submitted to the peace conference, and on **10 August 1920**, it was incorporated into the **Treaty of Sèvres**.

In this treaty, Articles **62, 63, and 64** explicitly recognized the Kurdish question and stipulated that:

- An **autonomous Kurdish region** would be established within the framework of the Ottoman state.
- After one year, a **plebiscite** would be held to determine whether the population wished to form a fully independent Kurdish state.
- Should the majority vote for independence, the Allied Powers would support the creation of a **sovereign Kurdistan**.

The proposed territory of Kurdistan included the entirety of Southern Kurdistan, encompassing the regions of **Mosul** and **Kirkuk**.

However, the Treaty of Sèvres remained only **on paper**—it was never implemented and was ultimately set aside and ignored.



Sharif Pasha

## 2.23 – The Erzurum Congress (1919 CE)

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the Allied Powers, under the League of Nations, signed a peace agreement in Paris in 1919 that granted the subject nations of the Ottoman Empire the right to self-determination. In response, the Ottoman state began various political maneuvers to prevent the Kurds from seizing this opportunity.

**Mustafa Kemal Pasha**, the emerging leader of the Turkish nationalist movement, traveled to Kurdistan and convened a meeting in Erzurum with Kurdish tribal leaders, aghas, and notables between **23 July and 7 August 1919**. This meeting became known as the **Erzurum Congress** (formally, the "Congress of the Eastern Provinces").

During the congress, Mustafa Kemal delivered an emotionally charged speech to the Kurds, promising unity and shared struggle:

“O Kurdish people, we are brothers and comrades. The infidels want to place us under their yoke and turn our country over to the Armenians. If that happens, we will lose both our faith and our homeland. I pledge on my honor and dignity that, on one condition, we must stand together against the Armenian infidels and fight them until they are driven from our lands. Then, as brothers, we shall sit together, and I will grant you, the Kurdish nation, your rights.”

These words flattered the Kurds and convinced them to align themselves with the Ottoman cause. As a result, Kurdish leaders withdrew their support for Kurdish autonomy or independence, and over time the hope for a sovereign or even autonomous Kurdistan was abandoned. Consequently, the **Treaty of Sèvres** and its provisions for Kurdish self-determination were sidelined and ignored by the international community.

## 2.24 – The Revolt of Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji (1919–1930 CE)

Following the end of the First World War in 1918, British forces occupied Iraq and Southern Kurdistan, placing the region under colonial administration. At that time, **Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji** was appointed governor of Sulaymaniyah. However, he soon rebelled against British rule, openly rejecting their authority and refusing to accept their deceptive promises. Sheikh Mahmoud courageously proclaimed the **independence of Kurdistan** and began organizing a Kurdish government. His aim was clear: to establish a sovereign Kurdish state.

His call to arms resonated widely—not only with the Kurds of Sulaymaniyah but also with most Kurds across Southern Kurdistan and even some in Eastern Kurdistan. **Sheikh Salim Barzani**, the well-known leader of Badinan (1916–1930), declared his support for Sheikh Mahmoud’s movement. **Ismail Agha Simko**, the leader of the Shikak tribe, also sent several fighters to support the Barzanji revolt.

In response, British and Iraqi forces launched a series of heavy military campaigns against the Kurds. After several fierce battles, Sheikh Mahmoud was eventually captured in the Battle of **Darband-i Bazyan** and exiled to India in an attempt to extinguish the Kurdish uprising.


Sheikh Mahmoud returned from India on **14 August 1922**, resumed the struggle, and was hailed by the people as the **King (Malik) of Kurdistan**. In that same year, he once again declared the independence of Kurdistan and raised the **flag of Kurdistan** over Sulaymaniyah.

The British and their allied Iraqi forces responded with a large-scale offensive, and on **4 March 1923** they bombed Sulaymaniyah from the air. Despite suffering repeated defeats, Sheikh Mahmoud continued his efforts from **1927 to 1930**, rallying Kurdish tribes and forces throughout Southern Kurdistan who were dissatisfied with British rule and with the arbitrary division of Kurdish lands between Iraq, Turkey, and Syria.

In the final stage of his movement, Sheikh Mahmoud declared himself **King of Kurdistan** and consolidated the leadership of most Kurdish factions in the region. However, British forces—backed by modern aerial bombardment—gradually crushed Kurdish resistance. After years of intense fighting and the loss of thousands of lives, Sheikh Mahmoud was captured in 1930, bringing his uprising to an end and restoring British control over Southern Kurdistan.

Sheikh Mahmoud was imprisoned in Baghdad but continued to assert his title as King of Kurdistan. He was eventually released due to illness and spent his remaining years in Sulaymaniyah. He passed away in 1956 in a Baghdad hospital and was buried in his homeland.

Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji became a **symbol of Kurdish national resistance** and a pioneer of the Kurdish independence movement. His struggle inspired future generations of Kurds, activists, and nationalist leaders, keeping alive the dream of an independent Kurdistan at a time when foreign powers and neighboring states sought to erase Kurdish identity.



Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji

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### 2.25 – The Misak-ı Millî (National Pact) of 1920 CE

After Mustafa Kemal Pasha held the Erzurum and Sivas Congresses and secured the support of the Kurdish leaders of Northern Kurdistan, the Ottoman government announced on **18 January 1920** from Istanbul its decision to wage war against the Kurds. This decision became known in Turkey as the **Misak-ı Millî** ("National Pact"). Its core principle stated:

"Northern Kurdistan must remain permanently under Turkish sovereignty, and Southern Kurdistan—including the provinces of Mosul and Kirkuk—must also be annexed to Turkey. The Turkish state must be in a state of constant struggle until this decision is fully implemented."

This decision revealed Mustafa Kemal Pasha's duplicity: from the very beginning, even at Erzurum where he had pledged autonomy to the Kurds, his promises were hollow and deceptive. Throughout history, the Kurdish Question has often been handled in this way — dangled with false assurances when the occupiers were weak, only to be betrayed once they regained power.

Whenever the occupiers of Kurdistan found themselves vulnerable, they lured the Kurds with promises of autonomy or independence, using them as allies until their own position was strengthened. Once they consolidated control, they turned against the Kurds, stripped them of identity and rights, and crushed their uprisings more brutally than before.

This pattern continues into the 21st century. Today, nearly **eight million Kurds** remain stateless and without official recognition of their national identity, despite being the majority population of their historic homeland. Kurdistan's territory is vast, and its population within Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan is larger than the populations of many of those states.

Yet, tragically, many Kurds have become detached from their own cause, siding with the occupiers of Kurdistan and prioritizing their personal survival over national liberation. Others have been ideologically assimilated—through Turkish, Persian, Arab, or pan-Islamic indoctrination—into rejecting their own identity. This has left many Kurds blind to their national dignity and unaware of their historical struggle.

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## **2.26 – The Revolt of Nuri Dersimi (1937 CE)**

Dr. Nuri Dersimi (1893–1973 CE) was a prominent Kurdish writer, intellectual, and revolutionary who played a significant role in the Kurdish struggle for independence during

the early 20th century. Born in the village of Dêrsim (Tunceli), he was the son of Mullah Ibrahim. In 1908, together with several comrades, he co-founded the **Kurdish Ascendancy Society (Komela Bilindayî Kurd)**, where he served as a leading member.

In 1911, he left for Istanbul to study veterinary medicine and became actively involved in Kurdish nationalist activities, joining the **Hevî Association of Kurdish Students**. By 1912, he had been elected **Secretary-General** of Kurdish students in Istanbul.

### **Commitment to Kurdish Independence**

After the Ottoman state ignored the Kurdish provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, Nuri Dersimi, alongside Ali Sher, travelled to Koçgiri in 1920 to participate in the nationalist movement, demanding that the Ottomans implement the treaty clauses that promised Kurdish autonomy. When their requests were denied, Nuri Dersimi took up arms in the **Koçgiri Uprising** (1919–1921) against the Ottoman state. He was eventually captured and imprisoned but later released through the intercession of **Seyid Riza of Dersim**. After his release, he joined Seyid Riza's resistance movement.

During the **Koçgiri Revolt**, Nuri Dersimi advocated for full Kurdish independence within the framework of autonomy. In October 1920, he travelled through Erzincan province, established an office for the Kurdish National Movement, and helped coordinate the uprising.

In the **Dersim Uprising** (1937–1938), Nuri Dersimi became one of its leading figures, playing a vital role in organizing the resistance. The Turkish army launched a brutal campaign, carrying out massacres that killed tens of thousands of Kurds. The uprising was ultimately crushed.

After the defeat of Seyid Riza's rebellion, Nuri Dersimi fled to Western Kurdistan (Rojava) and later Syria, where he continued his political and intellectual activities. He lived the remainder of his life in exile and passed away on **22 August 1973** in Aleppo, Syria, where he was buried.



Dr. Nuri Dersimi

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## 2.27 – The Treaty of Lausanne (1923 CE)

After the Ottoman Empire prevailed in its war against Greece and pushed back the Allied powers, it was admitted to the peace conference convened by the League of Nations on **10 November 1922**. The conference met in **Lausanne, Switzerland**, with **İsmet Pasha** representing the Ottoman/Turkish side and **Lord Curzon** representing **Britain**. The negotiations lasted nearly **nine months**. Throughout, the Ottoman delegation pursued a hardline, nationalist policy against the Kurds, advancing plans that denied Kurdish rights and obstructed any recognition of the Kurdish nation.

On **24 July 1923**, the **Treaty of Lausanne** was signed. It set aside the provisions of the **Treaty of Sèvres**, and Kurdish rights were entirely ignored. No Kurdish representative was admitted to the conference, and no Kurdish claims were considered.

It is evident that the decisions of Lausanne were grounded in coercion and ran counter to the Kurdish people's identity and human rights. Since the Kurds were excluded from representation, the people of Kurdistan retain the moral right to reject this treaty, to demand its reconsideration, and to seek legal redress for the manner in which it was imposed.

Under Lausanne, **Kurdistan was partitioned into four parts**: those Kurdish areas that had been under Ottoman rule were divided among **Turkey, Iraq, and Syria**. At that time, **Britain** and **France** dominated the Middle East and, in line with their economic and strategic interests, divided Kurdistan among several states, thwarting Kurdish aspirations and leaving the nation without sovereignty.

It is also notable that, before Lausanne was concluded, the Ottomans had occupied the **entire island of Cyprus**; meanwhile, **Southern, Northern, and Western Kurdistan** were already under British and French occupation.

Behind the scenes at Lausanne—though not publicized among the Kurds—the following understandings were reached among **Britain, France, Greece, Italy, and Turkey**:

- Turkey ceded **Cyprus** to **Britain**; in return, Britain and France formally recognized the sovereignty of the new **Turkish Republic** and divided **Kurdistan** between **Iraq, Turkey, and Syria**.
- Turkey, Iraq, and Syria were granted concessions whereby Kurdistan's **oil and agricultural products** would be exported to **Britain and France at low prices**; in exchange, Britain and France supplied **arms and military materiel** to Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.
- The Western powers pledged, by all means, to **support the occupiers of Kurdistan**, placing their own interests above those of the Kurds.

Because of these economic interests and such inhumane arrangements, Western states—down to the present—have **not supported** the emergence of a **sovereign Kurdish polity**.

## 2.28 – The Uprising of Sheikh Sa‘îd Pîrân (1925 CE)

**Sheikh Sa‘îd of Piran** was a prominent religious leader who, in **1925 CE**, led a Kurdish national uprising for the independence of Kurdistan and against Turkish occupation. The revolt, known as the **Sheikh Sa‘îd Uprising**, was rooted in Kurdish national thought and patriotism.

In **1923**, **Yusuf Ziya Bey** contacted Sheikh Sa‘îd to connect him with the clandestine organization **Komela Azadî (Society of Freedom)**, which advocated Kurdish self-rule.

As Turkish authorities moved to pre-empt and arrest Kurdish organizers, the revolt broke out in the **Piran district** on **13 February 1925**. Sheikh Sa‘îd’s supporters rose up, sparking a widespread popular insurrection. The Turkish state moved against **Komela Azadî**; **Khalid Beg Jibran**, the organization’s head, and **Yusuf Ziya Bey** were captured near Erzurum and imprisoned. Sheikh Sa‘îd then assumed the leadership of Komela Azadî and launched the uprising against the Turkish state.

It is worth noting that, after **Lausanne**, the Turkish authorities repeatedly deceived the Kurds with empty declarations, exploiting them and obstructing their rights. In response, Sheikh Sa‘îd and his comrades organized resistance to Turkish occupation.

To coordinate the movement, Sheikh Sa‘îd convened several meetings: the first on **4 January 1925** at **Girikân**, the second at **Kaniyê Spî**, and the third at **Malakânê**. Seeking popular support across Northern Kurdistan, he and a cavalry of ten thousand undertook a political-organizational tour, visiting:

- **Çebexçur** on **12 January 1925**,
- **Darahrenê** on **15 January 1925**,
- **Lice** on **21 January 1925**,
- **Hênê (Hani)** on **25 January 1925**,
- **Piran** on **5 February 1925**.

These appeals won broad local backing. Realizing the scope of the movement, **Mustafa Kemal** ordered suppression; a force under **Hüseyin Hüsnü** was dispatched to **Piran**, where it clashed with Kurdish fighters and suffered casualties, igniting full-scale hostilities.

The uprising liberated **Hênî, Genç, and Darahenê**, and **Genç** was declared the **temporary capital** of the Kurdish-controlled area. A provisional Kurdish administration was formed, with **Faqê Husên** as head of government and **Sheikh Sa'îd** as commander of the Kurdish forces. On **14 February 1925**, Sheikh Sa'îd proclaimed **Darahenê** the capital of Kurdistan.

Between **16–20 February 1925**, Kurdish forces captured a string of towns—**Darahenê, Maden, Siverek, Ergani**—and advanced toward **Diyarbakır**. On **20 February**, they seized **Lice**, which hosted the headquarters of the Ottoman/Turkish Fifth Army Corps.

On **21 February 1925**, Ankara ordered a **general crackdown** on the uprising and issued decrees for **mass repression** across Northern Kurdistan. Between **7–11 March 1925**, the Kurdish revolutionary army liberated **Diyarbakır**; with roughly **10,000** fighters, they pushed Turkish forces out of the city. Despite repeated counter-attacks, Kurdish forces held out, and on **11 March** Diyarbakır was fully in their hands.

On **26 March 1925**, the Turkish military launched **aerial bombardments** of Diyarbakır, followed by sustained ground and air assaults that gradually retook previously liberated districts. Ultimately, through an **internal betrayal**, Sheikh Sa'îd was captured on **15 April 1925** near **Varto**, at the **Karbo Bridge**.

On **28–29 June 1925**, Sheikh Sa'îd and **47** Kurdish comrades were tried before a Turkish military tribunal—without genuine right of defense—and **executed by hanging**.



Sheikh Sa'id of Piran



At the Time of His Execution (1925 CE)



The Execution of 25 Leaders of the Uprising and Companions of Piran

## **2.29 – The Qadamkheir Uprising of 1925**

Qadamkheir, known as “the Daughter of Qandi Qalawandi,” was a prominent figure and one of the Kurdish rulers (Mirs) of Lorestan. From 1900 until 1928, the Kurdish principalities of Lorestan enjoyed a significant degree of autonomy. However, this autonomy came to an end in 1925 when Reza Shah Pahlavi ordered the killing of the last Mir of Lorestan, Shamerad Khan — who was also Qadamkheir’s cousin.

In response to this assassination, Qadamkheir took up arms in the name of Kurdish freedom and launched an armed uprising against Reza Shah’s forces, proclaiming the demand for an independent Kurdistan. The uprising was centered in Lorestan, located in Eastern Kurdistan.

In retaliation, the Iranian army invaded Lorestan, massacring civilians, burning villages, and looting entire districts. Despite this brutality, they failed to achieve a decisive victory and could not fully subdue the Kurdish tribal forces of Lorestan.

Realizing that military force alone could not crush Qadamkheir’s rebellion, Reza Shah resorted to deceit. He sent Qadamkheir a copy of the Qur’an with a written pledge of unconditional amnesty for all the fighters who laid down their arms. Many of the rebels, trusting this solemn promise, surrendered and handed over their weapons to the Iranian army.

Only Qadamkheir and seventeen of her closest comrades refused to surrender, knowing there would be no true amnesty for them. Nevertheless, they were eventually captured alive. The Iranian forces executed most of the rebels immediately, while Qadamkheir and the seventeen leaders of the uprising were transported to Tehran.

The following day, all seventeen of Qadamkheir’s companions were publicly hanged in Tehran. Qadamkheir herself was subjected to horrific torture: she was tied by the hair to the tail of a galloping horse and dragged until she lost consciousness and bled profusely. Even after this brutal ordeal, she was thrown into prison, gravely wounded.

Despite her pain and injuries, Qadamkheir remained unyielding, refusing to ask Reza Shah for mercy. After a week of suffering in prison, she succumbed to her wounds, dying as a proud and defiant martyr.

Qadamkheir was a fearless and uncompromising revolutionary who considered Kurdistan dearer than her own life. Her vision and greatest hope were to see Kurdistan liberated from occupation and oppression. She never wavered in pursuit of this noble goal, and even in the final days of 1928, she continued her struggle for freedom until the very end.



Qadamkheir

## 2.30 – The Uprising of Ihsan Nuri Pasha (1926)

Ihsan Nuri Pasha (1892–1976) was a renowned Kurdish military officer and nationalist leader who played a decisive role in the Kurdish struggle for independence in the early twentieth century. He initially served as an officer in the Ottoman army but later emerged as one of the leading figures of the Kurdish national movement, most notably as commander of the Ararat Uprising in Northern Kurdistan.

Ihsan Nuri was born in 1892 in Bitlis, Northern Kurdistan, and belonged to the Jalali tribal confederation. He received his primary education at the Gök Meydan Mosque in Bitlis before enrolling in the military school of Erzurum. Upon completing his studies, he was admitted to the Ottoman Military Academy, graduating in 1910 with the rank of officer. During his student years, he became connected with Kurdish student circles.

Following graduation, he was conscripted for 33 months of compulsory service, participating in Ottoman operations against the Albanian revolts and later in campaigns in Yemen. During the First World War, he was deployed to the Caucasus Front, where he was wounded, and subsequently assigned administrative duties in Georgia.

After the war, Ihsan Nuri became actively involved in Kurdish nationalist activities. In regions such as Diyarbakir, Siirt, and Bitlis, he sought to unite influential Kurdish personalities and collaborated with emerging Kurdish political organizations. In early 1919, he published an article about U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points in the Kurdish journal *Jîn*, advocating for Kurdish national rights and autonomy.

By 1926, he joined the newly formed *Xoybûn* ("Independence") Society, established by Kurdish revolutionaries in Western Kurdistan (Syria) following the collapse of Sheikh Said Piran's uprising. Under Ihsan Nuri's leadership, the society launched three major uprisings in the Ağrı region against the occupying Turkish state.

Acting under Ihsan Nuri Pasha's orders, the Xoybûn Society established a provisional civil administration under the leadership of Ibrahim Pasha and, on 27 October 1927, formally declared the independence of Kurdistan. For the first time, the flag of Kurdistan was raised on the peaks of Mount Ararat, symbolizing the rebirth of Kurdish national aspirations.



The Flag of the Ararat Rebellion

The uprising led by Ihsan Nuri Pasha consisted of three major phases, taking place between 1926, 1927, and 1930. In 1926, Ihsan Nuri organized a force of well-trained Kurdish fighters, equipping them with modern weapons and drilling them in infantry tactics. This armed force launched the Ararat Rebellion, liberating significant areas, including Mount Ararat, Bitlis, Van, and many of the villages surrounding Lake Van.

On 5 October 1926, the organization *Biroya Heske Têlê* joined the rebellion, and Sheikh Abdulqadir Jalal also lent his support. The fighting spread widely, involving regions such as Iğdır, Tendurek, Ardeş, Çaldıran, Van, Botan, Bitlis, and Amed (Diyarbakir).

In response, the Turkish army unleashed a campaign of extreme brutality against the rebellion, turning Kurdistan into a killing field soaked with the blood of Kurdish children, youths, and elders. The Turkish forces burned and destroyed villages in Hakkari, Beytüşşebap, and Şemzinan, which had become bases for Ihsan Nuri Pasha's fighters.

Under the command of Kemaleddin Sami Pasha, the Turkish army carried out mass killings in Van and surrounding areas, massacring tens of thousands of Kurds all the way to Çaldıran. Iranian military forces, allied with Kemalist Turkey, also attacked Kurdish villages along the border, showing once again how these two regimes historically collaborated in the oppression of the Kurdish nation.

On 12–13 July 1930, the Turkish army launched a large-scale assault on the Kurdish population in Ağrı, Bazid (Doğubayazıt), and the surrounding villages, killing an estimated 15,000 innocent people in what became known as the **Zilan Massacre**. The atrocities were

staggering: women were raped, pregnant women were disemboweled in front of their families, girls as young as twelve were publicly violated, and Kurdish boys were executed in front of their parents before being mutilated. These crimes were carried out under the command of Turkish General Salih Omurtak.

During this campaign, the Turkish authorities destroyed 660 villages, plundered 15,206 Kurdish homes, and set entire regions ablaze. The families of the Kurdish rebels were forced to abandon their towns and villages and were deported to the Turkish city of Izmir. Many of them perished along the way from hunger, exposure, and exhaustion. When they finally reached Izmir, Turkish militias attacked them, robbing them of their gold and possessions and subjecting them to torture and humiliation. As part of a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing, the survivors were forcibly resettled among Turkish populations and were prohibited from ever returning to Kurdistan.

The Turkish state also committed an unprecedented massacre in and around Ağrı city, exterminating a large portion of the local Kurdish population in an attempt to eradicate all support for Ihsan Nuri Pasha's forces.

It is noteworthy that two Kurdish commanders of the uprising, Heske Têlê and Bavê Tojo, fought to the last bullet on the heights of Mount Ararat. Several times, the Turkish army attempted to negotiate their surrender through family intermediaries, but these two leaders chose to fight until death rather than submit.

In the summer of 1930, the Turkish state escalated its campaign, deploying nearly 66,000 soldiers with the support of 100 warplanes to carry out a comprehensive military operation. Heavy aerial bombardment and coordinated ground assaults eventually forced the Kurdish rebels to retreat. By 17 September 1930, the uprising was effectively crushed, and Turkish forces reoccupied all previously liberated territories.

In the aftermath, thousands of Kurds were buried alive in mass graves. On one of these mass graves, the Turkish army erected a sign reading:

**"Here lie Kurdistan and the Kurdish people."**

Half a century later, in 1984, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) symbolically detonated this grave marker and erected a new inscription in its place, declaring:

**"From here, the Kurdish revolution and the struggle for the freedom of Kurdistan begins."**

The efforts of Ihsan Nuri Pasha had a profound and lasting impact — both inspirational and cautionary — on the Kurdish national liberation movement for generations to come.



Ihsan Nuri Pasha and His Wife, Xecîc Yaşar. Ihsan Nuri Pasha was born in 1893 in the city of Bitlis. On 25 March 1976, he was assassinated in Tehran, at the entrance of his own home.

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### **2.31 – The Dersim Uprising of Seyid Rıza (1937)**

Seyid Rıza Dersimi (1863–1937) was a prominent Kurdish Alevi Zaza tribal leader from the Dersim region of Northern Kurdistan. In 1937, he led a major Kurdish uprising against the

Turkish occupation forces, demanding recognition of the Kurdish identity and autonomy for Kurdistan within the borders of Turkey.

Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk) introduced a nationalist policy that sought to impose “Turkishness” on all peoples of Northern Kurdistan. These policies included the imposition of the Turkish language, the enforcement of Turkish-only education, mass resettlement of Kurds to western Turkish provinces, the confiscation and redistribution of Kurdish land to Turkish settlers, the creation of racist paramilitary units, and the systematic exclusion of Kurds from all positions of power. The ultimate goal was to erase the Kurdish national identity in both Northern Kurdistan and Turkey as a whole.

Between 1920 and 1937, the Kurds of Dersim retained partial autonomy and remained outside the full control of the Turkish state. The local population refused to perform military service for Ankara, refused to pay taxes, and consistently demanded autonomy for all of Northern Kurdistan. In response to these demands and the continued independence of Dersim, the Turkish state began preparing for a large-scale military campaign. For several years, it strengthened its army, stockpiled weapons, and devised a comprehensive plan for invasion.

In 1936, Mustafa Kemal appointed General Abdullah Alpdoğan as governor and military commander of the Dersim region, granting him full authority to suppress Kurdish resistance. Military checkpoints were established throughout Dersim, troop numbers were reinforced, and warplanes began conducting regular flights over the area to intimidate the population.

As tensions escalated, Seyid Rıza attempted to negotiate peace, sending his own son as a delegate to meet Alpdoğan. However, the general had his son hanged and intensified military operations. By early 1937, Dersim, Erzincan, and Koçgiri were effectively under Seyid Rıza’s control. He gathered the tribal leaders of the region and launched an attack on a Turkish military convoy, inflicting a major defeat on the occupying forces.

The Turkish government then devised a sinister plot to eliminate the Kurdish military commander Alişêr, a close ally of Seyid Rıza. He was assassinated through the betrayal of a relative of Seyid Rıza, a man named “Rehber,” who later delivered Alişêr’s severed head to

Mustafa Kemal. As a reward, Mustafa Kemal presented him with gold. The Turkish forces subsequently beheaded Rehber as well and looted his possessions.

Alişêr was regarded as a heroic and capable leader. Even his wife, Zarife, fought alongside him in every battle for Kurdish freedom, embodying the spirit of resistance.

Under Mustafa Kemal's direct orders, more than 25,000 Turkish troops, supported by heavy aerial bombardments, were deployed to crush the Dersim uprising. Despite being outnumbered and poorly armed, the Kurdish forces put up fierce resistance, and the fighting lasted throughout 1937.

In the autumn of that year, General Alpdoğan proposed peace talks. This was a ruse: under the pretext of negotiating autonomy, the Turkish authorities invited Seyid Rıza to Erzincan, arrested him, and took him to Elaziz (Harput). Seyid Rıza, his 16-year-old son, and eight other commanders of the uprising were detained.

On 15 October 1937, without trial, Seyid Rıza was executed by hanging. Before his execution, his teenage son was hanged before his eyes. One by one, the rest of his family — including even his youngest children — were executed in public.

Simultaneously, the Turkish state carried out widespread massacres in Dersim and Erzincan, resulting in what is considered one of the largest genocides against the Kurdish people in modern history. Over 100,000 Kurds from the region were killed, and countless others were hanged.

Surviving Kurdish children were taken from their families, deported to Turkish cities, and placed in special boarding schools where they were indoctrinated with anti-Kurdish propaganda and forbidden to speak Kurdish. Many of these children grew up unaware of their true Kurdish identity, having been linguistically and culturally assimilated from an early age.

In schools across Turkey, where Kurdish children were present, “language spies” were appointed to ensure that no child spoke Kurdish. The ultimate goal was to erase the Kurdish language, memory, and sense of identity.

It is important to note that the people of Dersim were Alevi Kurds, which added a sectarian dimension to the massacre. For this reason, the genocide of 1937–1938 is often referred to as the **Dersim Massacre** or the **Alevi Genocide**.



Seyid Rıza Dersimi (1863–1937)



Alişer

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## 2.32 – The Republic of Kurdistan in Mahabad (1945–1946)

With the outbreak of the Second World War, in 1942 British and American forces occupied southern Iran, while the Soviet Red Army, under Stalin’s leadership, advanced into northern Iran and Eastern Kurdistan. The Soviet forces remained in the region for four years, creating a unique political environment that allowed Kurdish nationalist activities to flourish.

During this period, the first modern Kurdish political organization was founded: the **Komeley Jiyanewey Kurd** (“Committee for the Revival of Kurdistan,” abbreviated as Komala JK). It was established on 4 September 1943 in the city of Mahabad by a group of Kurdish intellectuals and revolutionaries, with the explicit goal of liberating Kurdistan from foreign occupation. Qazi Muhammad, a respected judge and nationalist figure, was soon invited to join the organization and was elected as its leader.

On 16 July 1945, Komala JK transformed itself into the **Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)**, formally establishing itself as a political party dedicated to Kurdish national liberation. At that

time, much of Eastern Kurdistan was under Soviet control, creating favorable conditions for the establishment of a Kurdish autonomous administration.

On 22 January 1946, with the strong support of the local Mukriyan population, Qazi Muhammad (widely referred to as **Peshawa**, “the Leader”) proclaimed the **Republic of Kurdistan** in Mahabad’s main Chwar Chira Square. The republic had its own parliament, which convened for the first time on 11 February 1946, with members taking an official oath of office. On 23 April 1946, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed between the Kurds and the neighboring Azerbaijani national movement.

For the first time in Kurdish history, women played an active role in politics, participating in the parliament and in the governance of the Republic. The Soviet Union provided support for the republic for nearly eleven months, giving it time to consolidate its administration and institutions.

However, by late 1946, the geopolitical situation changed. The Soviet Union reached an agreement with the Iranian government and withdrew its forces from Iran and Eastern Kurdistan. The Mahabad Republic, which had only controlled Mahabad, Bokerjan, Darias (Naqadeh), Shno (Oshnavieh), Khana, parts of Urmiya, Sardasht, and Baneh, was left vulnerable and isolated.

The Iranian Pahlavi monarchy seized the opportunity and sent its army to reoccupy Kurdistan. The first target was the city of Tabriz, where the Azerbaijani movement was crushed. The Iranian army then turned its attention to Mahabad.

Peshawa Qazi Muhammad, unwilling to subject the Kurdish people to mass slaughter, refrained from declaring war against the overwhelming Iranian military force. Fully aware of the consequences, he chose to surrender peacefully in order to prevent a massacre. On 17 December 1946, Iranian troops re-entered Mahabad, dismantling the republic after only eleven months of existence.

On 22 January 1947, Qazi Muhammad, along with his brother Sadr Qazi and his cousin Seifi Qazi (who had been Minister of War in the Republic), was executed by hanging in Mahabad’s Chwar Chira Square.


At the same time, twenty loyal followers of Peshawa and other leaders of the Republic were also executed in the cities of Mahabad, Saqqez, and Bikan.

General Mustafa Barzani, commander of the army of the Republic, withdrew his forces in an organized manner before the arrival of the Iranian army, following Peshawa's orders to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. The Barzani fighters retreated first to Naqadeh and Shno, where they waged a three-month-long defensive campaign against Iranian forces, and eventually crossed the Aras River into Soviet territory, seeking refuge and survival.

The fall of the Mahabad Republic marked both a tragedy and a milestone in Kurdish history. Although short-lived, it became a powerful symbol of Kurdish national aspiration and continues to inspire Kurdish movements to this day.



The Flag of the Republic of Kurdistan



Pêşewa Qazi Muhammad



Pêşewa Qazi Muhammad



Seifi Qazi



Sadr Qazi

## 2.33 – The 1961 Uprising of General Mustafa Barzani

Mela Mustafa Barzani was one of the most prominent Kurdish national leaders of the 20th century and the charismatic head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). For decades, he dedicated his life to the struggle for Kurdish rights and self-determination, particularly in Southern Kurdistan (Northern Iraq).

Born on 14 March 1903 in the Barzan region, Mustafa Barzani came from a renowned Kurdish family. His brother, Sheikh Ahmad Barzani, was the head of the Barzan tribal confederation and played an important role in Kurdish resistance. Between the 1920s and 1940s, Barzani participated in numerous uprisings against British colonial rule and the central government in Iraq. His first major military campaign came in 1943, when he led a revolt against Baghdad's authority and British influence, as part of a wider Kurdish struggle for autonomy. Although the uprising was eventually suppressed, Barzani and his forces retreated into the mountains of Kurdistan and continued their armed struggle.

During and after the Second World War, Barzani spent several years in the Soviet Union. This period (late 1940s–early 1950s) shaped his political outlook, exposing him to socialist ideas and reinforcing his belief in the necessity of strong Kurdish unity. His ties with the Soviets would later influence his strategies for seeking international support for the Kurdish cause.

Upon his return to Iraq (1958–1961), Barzani reorganized the Kurdish movement and strengthened the *Peshmerga* (Kurdish armed forces). After the fall of the Iraqi monarchy and the rise of General Abdul Karim Qasim's republic, the new government initially promised Kurdish autonomy. When these promises were not fulfilled, tensions escalated into open conflict.

From 1961 to 1963, Barzani led a large-scale Kurdish revolt against Baghdad. The Peshmerga fought effectively across Southern Kurdistan, liberating much of the countryside and establishing de facto Kurdish control over many areas.

Between 1964 and 1970, Barzani sought international backing for the Kurdish national cause. Although initially supported by the Soviet Union and some Western states, shifting

geopolitical alliances eventually reduced their support. Nevertheless, Barzani maintained the struggle, both politically and militarily.

On 11 March 1970, Barzani reached a historic Autonomy Agreement with the Iraqi government, then led by President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. This agreement promised official Kurdish autonomy within Iraq and granted Barzani significant administrative and military authority over Southern Kurdistan. However, the agreement was poorly implemented, and Baghdad failed to honor its commitments, leading to growing frustration among the Kurds.

After Baghdad formally annulled the 1970 Agreement, Barzani resumed armed resistance in 1974. This time, the Kurdish movement initially made major gains, thanks in part to overt support from Iran, which provided weapons, funding, and training as part of its strategic rivalry with Iraq.

By 1975, however, the Kurdish forces suffered a catastrophic defeat after the signing of the **Algiers Agreement** between Iraq and Iran. Under the terms of this accord, Iran withdrew its support for the Kurds, leaving Barzani and his forces militarily and politically isolated. The uprising collapsed, forcing Barzani to retreat into Iran with thousands of Peshmerga fighters and civilians. Many Kurds were killed, and thousands became refugees.

The defeat marked one of the greatest setbacks in modern Kurdish history. Barzani went into exile, spending his final years in the United States, where he died in 1979.



General Mustafa Barzani

## 2.34 – The Algiers Agreement (1975)

The **Algiers Agreement** was signed in 1975 in Algiers between the governments of Iran and Iraq, with representatives from Turkey, Syria, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Algeria present as witnesses. This treaty effectively nullified the **11 March 1970 Autonomy Agreement** between the Iraqi government and the Kurds.

The participating states agreed to cooperate in suppressing Kurdish revolutionary movements across all parts of Kurdistan. The agreement granted both Iraq and Iran a 10-kilometer security zone along their shared borders, allowing joint military operations and intelligence cooperation against Kurdish insurgents.

One of the key clauses specifically committed both Baghdad and Tehran to the mutual **extradition and suppression of Kurdish guerrilla forces**, thereby sealing the fate of the Kurdish national liberation movement in Southern Kurdistan. The treaty marked a turning point, resulting in the withdrawal of Iranian support for Mela Mustafa Barzani's uprising, which soon led to the collapse of the Kurdish revolution in Iraq in 1975.

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## 2.35 – The Uprising of Ahmad Tawfiq (Abdullah Ishaqi) in 1950

In 1950, a group of young Kurdish revolutionaries in Eastern Kurdistan launched a clandestine movement aimed at reviving the dream of the Mahabad Republic and continuing the struggle of **Pêşewa Qazi Muhammad** against Iranian domination.

In Mahabad, key leaders included Ahmad Tawfiq, Ghani Bolurian, Suleiman Mo'ini, Amir Qazi, and Ismail Sharifzadeh. In Saqqez, Mullah Rashid Hosseini emerged as a leader; in Piranshar, Abdullah Zaki; and in Sardasht, Mullah Khidr Abbasi and Mullah Awara (Ahmad Shalmashi). Together they reorganized the **Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)** and assumed its leadership.

Ahmad Tawfiq was elected as the party's secretary, guiding the movement's strategy.

Because political activity was outlawed in that part of Kurdistan, the Kurdish struggle was

conducted underground. This secret political work continued until 1954, when Ahmad Tawfiq and several of his comrades, under intense military and police persecution, fled to Southern Kurdistan. From there, they adopted **guerrilla warfare tactics**, transforming the Kurdish struggle into an armed partisan movement that laid the groundwork for later Kurdish revolts.



Ahmad Tawfiq (Abdullah Ishaqi)

Under the leadership of **Ahmad Tawfiq**, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) continued both its political and armed struggle inside and outside Eastern Kurdistan until **1957**, when the party's leadership sent **Dr. Abdolrahman Ghassemlou** to Tehran to build ties with Kurdish students.

In Tehran, **Dr. Abdolrahman Ghassemlou** and **Ismail Ghassemlou** were arrested by **SAVAK** (Iran's intelligence and security service). While in prison, Dr. Ghassemlou quickly pledged cooperation with SAVAK and was released within **24 hours**. SAVAK then dispatched him to Southern Kurdistan. Upon meeting Ahmad Tawfiq and other KDP leaders, Ghassemlou admitted: *"I have been recruited by SAVAK; I gave them a false pledge of cooperation, and that is why I was released."*

SAVAK informed **Ismail Ghassemlou**—Dr. Ghassemlou's cousin—about the latter's "voluntary" cooperation. In exchange for his own release, **Ismail** provided SAVAK with the names of **250** capable, clandestine KDP cadres. In a subsequent sweep, SAVAK arrested and imprisoned these 250 individuals. Among them were **Ghani Bolurian** and **Aziz Yousefi**, who

were incarcerated for **25 years** and resisted the Iranian regime with remarkable courage from inside prison.

As a result, the KDP leadership **lost confidence** in Dr. Ghassemlou and, after questioning him, sought to put him on trial.

At that time, the **Iraqi Communist Party** held significant influence in Iraq and maintained close friendship with **Iran's Tudeh Party**, as both aligned with the Soviet Union. Dr. Ghassemlou, who was secretly a member of the Tudeh Party, used the assistance of the Iraqi Communist Party to escape prosecution; from **Sulaymaniyah** he traveled to **Baghdad**, where he obtained a post as a **civil servant** in Iraq's **Ministry of Budget and Finance**.

*Note:* Employing an Iranian national from Eastern Kurdistan as a formal state employee in Iraq was highly irregular and widely viewed with suspicion.

In **1964**, the KDP held its **Second Congress** in the village of **Suneh** near **Qaladze**. **Ahmad Tawfiq** was elected **General Secretary**. At the same congress, **Dr. Abdolrahman Ghassemlou** was **expelled** from the party on charges of collaboration with SAVAK and betrayal of the Kurdish national struggle. **Ghani Bolurian** and **Aziz Yousefi**, who had shown extraordinary steadfastness in SAVAK prisons, were elected to the party's **Central Committee**.

Before the congress closed, **Salah Mohtadi**, then a KDP member, split from the party and founded the **Kurdistan Liberation Party**; many defectors from the **Mukriyan** region joined him. It later became apparent that Salah Mohtadi was a SAVAK operative sent to sow division and carry out espionage within the KDP. After being exposed, he returned to SAVAK's patronage and became a leading **collaborator** ("head of the jash") in Mukriyan.

**Ahmad Tawfiq** rendered exceptional service to the Kurdish revolution in Southern Kurdistan and to **Mela Mustafa Barzani** personally. For many years he fought as an armed partisan alongside his comrades against the Iraqi occupiers. His tireless efforts aimed to **unify all wings of the Kurdish struggle** across the four parts of Kurdistan.

After **Mela Mustafa Barzani** established ties with the Iranian regime in **1968**, several KDP leaders—including **Sadiq Hanjari** and **Mela Rahim Marjalani**, both Central Committee

members—were detained and **disappeared** by Barzani's order. In the spring of **1968**, **Suleiman Mo'ini** and **Khalil Shawbash** were arrested by Barzani's forces and, in the autumn of the same year, were **killed** and handed over to the Iranian authorities. Around the same time, **Saleh Lajani** and two other comrades were captured and delivered to Iran at the **Haj Omran** border; SAVAK **buried Saleh Lajani alive** with two comrades in the village of **Jaldyani** (near **Khana**), in front of local residents. Others were imprisoned and **disappeared**; only a man named **Sheikhê Girdênê** was released due to documented Iraqi citizenship.

In the wake of these events, **Ahmad Tawfiq**, fearing that Mela Mustafa Barzani might hand him over to Iran, left Southern Kurdistan for **Baghdad** at the end of **1969** and applied to the Iraqi authorities for **political asylum**.

At the same time, **Dr. Ghassemlou**, seeing an opportunity, conspired against Ahmad Tawfiq with **Karim Hisami**, **Mela Hassan Rastgar**, and **Mela Abdollah Hassanzadeh**. In **1971**, at **Koya**, in the home of **Mela Hassan Rastgar**, a meeting of party cadres was convened with **32 participants**. There, **Karim Hisami** proposed **kidnapping and killing** Ahmad Tawfiq; the majority opposed the proposal. In the same meeting, Hisami announced that the party could no longer provide financial or security support for those cadres. Consequently, **Ahmad Nastani**, one of the participants, left with **15 Peshmerga** to join **Ahmad Tawfiq** in Baghdad.

**Dr. Ghassemlou**, a formal employee and **intelligence collaborator** of the Iraqi Ba'ath regime, then set about planning against Ahmad Tawfiq. In Baghdad, with the help of **Mela Abdollah Hassanzadeh**, he infiltrated Tawfiq's circle through Ahmad Nastani, and soon **Iraqi authorities arrested** Ahmad Tawfiq and transferred him to **Abu Ghraib** prison.

In **1971**, Dr. Ghassemlou—together with certain opportunists from Eastern Kurdistan who traveled freely in Iraq and some of whom were on the payroll of **Ba'ath intelligence**—staged a gathering at the **Baghdad Sheraton Hotel**, presenting it as a “cadres’ conference.” Several KDP cadres were invited:

- **Abdollah Zaki (Qandil)** – senior political officer of the KDP
- **Poet Mamosta Salar (Ali Qotbi)** – political cadre
- **Kak Khodri Bardareshan**
- **Awlay Mam Sa'idi**

- **Mela Mohammad Khana-Khal of Sardasht**

These five **formally objected** and told Dr. Ghassemlou:

“You were expelled at the Second Congress for betraying the party. Until the Kurdistan Democratic Party reinstates you, you have no right to attend party meetings—let alone convene conferences or congresses.”

Other attendees, being aligned with the Iraqi authorities, remained silent. The five departed for **Koya**, reported the matter to party members, and those cadres inside Southern Kurdistan convened a **conference in spring 1972** at **Werta** (on the lower slopes of Qandil) in the house of **Abdollah Zaki**, where they formed the **Temporary Executive Committee** of the KDP.

In **1972**, **Ahmad Nastani** returned from Baghdad to Southern Kurdistan and was summoned before the Temporary Executive Committee. He testified: *“In Baghdad, Mela Abdollah Hassanzadeh told me: ‘If you help us arrest Ahmad Tawfiq, we will give you rank and position and guarantee your security.’ I agreed.”*

Nastani further stated: *“On Dr. Ghassemlou’s orders, Mela Abdollah Hassanzadeh tasked me to carry a letter from Baghdad to Kurdistan. I asked: What is the letter and to whom? They said it is written in the name of **Ahmad Tawfiq** and addressed to **Mela Mustafa Barzani**. Then we will arrange for it to be seized at the **Kirkuk** checkpoint by Ba’ath security so its contents are ‘revealed’. After my arrest I should confirm the letter is genuine, and claim that **Ahmad Tawfiq** is aligned with **Barzani** and **America**, and that he pressured me to carry out this mission.”*

He added that they reassured him: *“Do not worry, Kak Ahmad Nastani; we will release you afterwards. In this way, we will remove Ahmad Tawfiq and take control of the KDP ourselves.”*

Events unfolded according to **Dr. Ghassemlou’s** plan: **Ahmad Tawfiq** was arrested by the Iraqi authorities and sent to **Abu Ghraib** prison.

It is noteworthy that **Tahiri**, a comrade of Ahmad Tawfiq, and **Ghafouri**, Ahmad Tawfiq’s cousin—both detained with him in Abu Ghraib—later testified that **Hamadamin Siraji**, acting on **Dr. Ghassemlou’s** orders, **tortured** Ahmad Tawfiq. Tawfiq asked Siraji:

“Why are you torturing me so mercilessly? I recognize you in every uniform, you shameless sell-out. What wrong have I ever done to you?”

Siraji replied:

“These are Dr. Abdolrahman Ghassemlou’s orders; you must be **dissolved in acid.**”

Thus the leader of the contemporary Eastern Kurdistan revolution and **General Secretary of the KDP, Ahmad Tawfiq**, was **murdered in acid** by **Hamadamin Siraji**, on the orders of **Dr. Ghassemlou** and **Saddam Hussein**, and his body was **disposed of without a trace.**

From **1950 to 1971**, until his disappearance, Ahmad Tawfiq had served as leader of the Eastern Kurdistan revolution and General Secretary of the KDP. A devoted revolutionary, he never wavered in political work. So patriotic was he that he would say: *“Kurdistan is my captor; until Kurdistan is free, I will not rest.”* He remained committed to the goal of Kurdish independence until his death.

**Qandil (Shahid Qandil)** said shortly before his own martyrdom:

“Ahmad Tawfiq was an extraordinarily capable leader—unmatched among the Kurds. He understood things other Kurdish leaders did not. Tireless and steadfast, he was always in the mountains with his Peshmerga, weapon on his shoulder, marching on foot, never distancing himself or acting superior. For that reason, the traitors and occupiers focused on eliminating him—and to this day have not found another like him.”

In **1972**, with the help of the Iraqi Ba’ath regime, **Dr. Ghassemlou** convened a **secret meeting in Baghdad**, styling it the **Third Party Congress**, and created a new organization called the **Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)**. The Ba’ath regime added the word “Iran” to the party’s name and appointed **Dr. Ghassemlou** as **General Secretary.**

After **Barzani’s defeat in 1975**, members of the KDP’s leadership who had been Ahmad Tawfiq’s comrades were harassed by both Iranian and Iraqi authorities and decided to seek **political asylum** from Iraq. **Fifty-five** KDP officials gathered in the small town of **Sangasar** (Southern Kurdistan) and, with the help of **Bayzi Habasaghai Sarkapkan** (a local tribal chief), applied for asylum. They were held for **nine days** in **Raniya**; the Iraqi authorities then approved their asylum and told them they were free to settle where they wished. **Two days**

later, however, **Karim Haddad** and **Hamadamin Siraji**, dressed in Iraqi **commandos' uniforms**, arrived with several military trucks and soldiers, loaded the 55 men aboard, transported them to **Kirkuk** and **Khanaqin**, and **the same day** handed them over at the **Khosravi** border crossing to Iranian **Gendarmerie**.

In this way, a **joint plan** orchestrated by **Dr. Ghassemlou**, **Mela Abdollah Hassanzadeh**, **Mela Hassan Rastgar**, **Karim Haddad**, **Hamadamin Siraji**, and **Karim Hisami**, with the collaboration of **Saddam Hussein** and the **Ba'ath** authorities, was consummated—an episode remembered in Kurdish history as the **“Theater of Treason.”**

Those extradited remained in prison until the **Shah's regime collapsed** amid the popular uprisings of Kurdistan and Iran on **11 February 1979**. When Kurdish demonstrators **broke open the prisons**, Ahmad Tawfiq's comrades were freed and learned that a revolution had occurred and **Eastern Kurdistan was liberated**. With the fall of the Shah, the Iraqi Ba'ath regime **armed and funded** Dr. Ghassemlou's camp and sent it into Eastern Kurdistan; under the banner of the **KDPI**, the Ba'athists **seized control** of the area.

Some members of the **Temporary Executive Committee** of the KDP, once freed, sought to **prevent internal conflict** by founding, in **1979**, the **Komala-ye Yeksanî Kurdistan** (“Union of Kurdistan”). Under that name they fought the Iranian occupiers; many of their leaders **sacrificed their lives** for Kurdish independence.

Komala-ye Yeksanî Kurdistan believed Kurdistan must fight for independence **without dependency** on any occupier. Hence, they lived and died honorably for the sacred soil of Kurdistan—unlike **Dr. Ghassemlou**, who, they argued, would undertake **any bargain** to attain a landlord's share of power.

It is worth noting that, after the **chemical bombing of Halabja**, Dr. Ghassemlou said in an Iraqi television interview:

“Halabja was chemically bombed by the Iranian regime. Iraqi Kurds have their autonomy. If Iranian Kurds were granted similar rights—to study and write in their own language—we would have no further demands.”

In that interview he **did not utter a single word** about the **martyrs of Halabja**.

After the **murder of Ahmad Tawfiq** and the **rendition of the 55 comrades**, one of Dr. Ghassemlou's associates, **Seyid Resuy Babî Gewre**, asked him: *"Why did you hand over all the KDP leaders to Iran, yet kill Ahmad Tawfiq yourself?"* Dr. Ghassemlou replied:

"Ahmad Tawfiq was far more intelligent and capable than I am. Wherever he went, he would build a party stronger than mine. I could not confront him; I removed him so I could serve as secretary in peace. As for the others who were handed to SAVAK, prison would tame them; they would be taught never to challenge me again."

Some of those who **surrendered to Iranian SAVAK** under Dr. Ghassemlou's **"Theater of Treason"** include:

- **Mamosta Rashid Hosseini (She'day Kurdistan)** – KDP Central Committee member; Secretary-General of **Komala-ye Yeksanî Kurdistan**; and head of the **Kurdistan Farmers' Union**. He fell in battle against the Iranian regime's forces on **17 August 1979** in the **Karaftoo** region near **Saqqez**. He is buried in **Saqqez Cemetery**.
- **Abdollah Zaki (Qandil)** – senior political officer of the KDP; member of the leadership of the Temporary Executive Committee; later a Central Committee member of Komala-ye Yeksanî Kurdistan. He fell in battle against Iranian forces on **28 August 1982** in **Badinaveh** near **Piranshahr**. He is buried in **Terkeshi** village cemetery near Piranshahr.
- **The great Kurdish poet Mamosta Salar Hawrami (Ali Qotbi)** – a capable KDP cadre and Central Committee member of Komala-ye Yeksanî Kurdistan. He fell in combat against the **Rescue Army** (Iraqi-backed auxiliaries) on **29 July 1980** in **Bê saran** near **Marivan**. He is buried in **Bê saran**.
- **Mamosta Khidr Qader (Khidr Kurdistanî)** – from **Sardasht**, an active KDP executive cadre and senior member of Komala-ye Yeksanî Kurdistan, who fought steadfastly against Kurdistan's enemies and later was forced into a life in exile.
- A respected figure known as **Qader Agha**, who **died under torture** in SAVAK custody in **1975**.



**From the right:** Salar Hawramî (Ali Qotbî); Amir Qazi; Ahmad Tawfiq (Abdollah Ishaqi); Rashid Hosseini (“She’day Kurdistan”); Abdollah Zaki (Qandil).

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### 2.36 – The Uprising in Northern Kurdistan under Abdullah Öcalan (Apo) – 1970s

In Northern Kurdistan, the use of the word *Kurd* and the Kurdish language had been banned. Anyone who spoke openly about Kurdish identity risked immediate arrest and execution by the Turkish occupying authorities. In this climate of oppression and cultural erasure, **Abdullah Öcalan** (popularly known as **Apo**) – then a young student and activist – awakened to a sense of Kurdish identity and nationalism. He recognized that the occupying powers were systematically attempting to annihilate Kurdish identity. Determined to revive the Kurdish nation, Öcalan embarked on a life of revolutionary struggle.

At Ankara University, Apo gathered around him a circle of like-minded students, including **Kemal Pir**, **Cemil Bayık**, **Mazlum Doğan**, **Mehmet Hayri Durmuş**, and **Haki Karer**. Their first

meeting took place in Ankara on **21 March 1974**, under a tree, where they decided to form a revolutionary group.

Their second meeting was held in Ankara's Dikmen neighborhood in **1976**, where they decided to expand their work by returning to Kurdistan and organizing the masses. That same year, they formed what they called the **Ideological Group**, and their movement became popularly known as the **Apoists**. In 1976, their comrade **Haydar Aydın Gül** was assassinated by Turkish fascists in Dersim.

On **27 November 1976**, the first congress of the Apoists was held in the village of **Fîsî**, near **Lice** in the province of Amed (Diyarbakir), where they formally established the **Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)**.

Shortly afterwards, on **18 April 1977**, their comrade **Haki Karer** was assassinated in the city of **Antep (Dilok)** by a Kurdish opportunist organization known as "Pesheng."


In **1979**, Öcalan's first comrade and early mentor, **Kemal Pir**, together with **Mehmet Hayri Durmuş**, was captured by the Turkish authorities in **Xarpêt (Elaziz)** and imprisoned in Diyarbakir Prison – notorious for its cruelty.

**Mazlum Doğan**, a member of the PKK Central Committee, famously set himself on fire on **Newroz 1982** inside Diyarbakir Prison, refusing to surrender to the enemy and transforming his death into a beacon of defiance. His self-immolation became a symbol of light in the darkness and inspired his comrades to resist.

In the same period, **Kemal Pir** and **Mehmet Hayri Durmuş** staged a historic hunger strike under the slogan "*Freedom or Death.*" After two months of refusing food, they became martyrs on **14 July 1982**, immortalizing their struggle as an act of ultimate resistance.



Kemal Pir



Mehmet Hayri Durmuş



Mazlum Doğan

To continue the revolutionary struggle, **Apo (Abdullah Öcalan)** was forced in **1979** to leave Northern Kurdistan and relocate to **Syria and Lebanon**.

The **Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)** was established with the ultimate aim of achieving **independence for all of Kurdistan**, and on this basis, it continued its struggle. On **15 August 1984**, under the leadership of **Comrade Agit (Mahsum Korkmaz)** — the Commander-in-Chief of the Kurdistan Liberation Army — the PKK launched its first major **armed offensive** against the Turkish occupying state.

Comrade Agit, originally from **Farqin (Silvan)** near **Amed (Diyarbakir)**, became a legendary figure in Kurdish history. On **28 March 1985**, during a fierce battle against Turkish forces in the **Gever (Yüksekova)** mountains, he fell as a martyr, solidifying his place as a symbol of Kurdish armed resistance.



Agit (Mahsum Korkmaz)

## **The Kurdish Freedom Struggle and the PKK–Turkey Peace Process (1990s–2025)**

In **1993**, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) declared a **unilateral ceasefire**. In a historic move, Turkish President **Turgut Özal** dispatched a delegation of Kurdish parliamentarians from Northern Kurdistan — accompanied by **Jalal Talabani** and several journalists — to Damascus to open dialogue with **Abdullah Öcalan (Apo)** regarding a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. However, before the delegation returned, the Turkish state announced Özal's death, claiming he had died of a heart attack. Many Kurds believe he was assassinated to derail his efforts toward a peaceful settlement. Özal, himself of partial Kurdish descent and sympathetic to Apo's message, had represented the most significant opportunity for dialogue between Ankara and the Kurdish movement — an opportunity that was lost.

It is worth noting that, after **68 years of the Kurdish language being banned**, President Özal legalized **speaking Kurdish** in Turkey and Northern Kurdistan in **1991**, an unprecedented and symbolic step.

By **1988**, Turkey — backed by NATO and supported by the United States — had exerted heavy pressure on Syria, forcing Damascus to expel Öcalan. On **9 October 1998**, Apo left Syria, first traveling to **Greece**, then to **Russia** and **Italy**. He presented himself to European governments, seeking a **peaceful and political solution** to the Kurdish question. In Italy, Apo even requested the convening of an **international conference** to resolve the Kurdish issue. However, world powers — particularly the United States and Germany — rejected his appeals, prioritizing their economic interests and strategic alliance with the Turkish state over the rights of the Kurdish people.

Eventually, under intense pressure from Turkey, the United States, and Germany, the Italian government forced Apo to leave the country. His plane was denied landing rights across European airspace, and he was forced to move from country to country — Russia, Tajikistan, Greece, and finally Kenya. There, in a covert joint operation by the **Israeli Mossad** and the **U.S. CIA**, Apo was abducted on **15 February 1999**, sedated, and handed over to the Turkish state.

Global powers had hoped that by capturing Öcalan they could suppress the Kurdish revolution while keeping the war in Kurdistan simmering — a situation that allowed them to

protect their geopolitical and economic interests in the region. Instead, his abduction sparked a wave of **mass Kurdish uprisings** across all four parts of Kurdistan and in the diaspora. More than **150 Kurds set themselves on fire** in acts of protest, expressing their rage at the betrayal of international powers and the continued occupation of Kurdistan.

In Eastern Kurdistan (Iranian Kurdistan), mass demonstrations were brutally suppressed. In one day alone, **27 Kurds** were shot dead in Sanandaj — including a bride and groom on their wedding day — while two more were killed in Urmia, and dozens were injured and imprisoned. In Germany, Kurdish demonstrators stormed the Israeli embassy, and embassy guards opened fire, killing four Kurdish youth and injuring many more.

Following the PKK's popular uprisings in Northern Kurdistan and across Turkey, a wave of pro-Kurdish political organizing emerged. On **7 June 1990**, Kurdish intellectuals and activists founded the **People's Labor Party (HEP)**. However, the party was soon banned, its leaders were arrested, and some were assassinated while others went into exile. Kurdish activists then formed the **Democracy Party (DEP)** on **7 May 1993**, which was also banned by the Turkish state on **16 June 1994**. This pattern repeated itself:

- **HADEP** (People's Democracy Party) was founded on **23 May 1996**, banned in 2003.
- **DEHAP** was formed after HADEP's closure and later succeeded by the **Democratic Society Party (DTP)**, which was also banned.
- Finally, the **Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)** was created, which in the **2007 elections** won **21 parliamentary seats** and took control of **99 municipalities** in Northern Kurdistan.

The Turkish state responded with mass arrests, targeting thousands of Kurdish activists. In **2016**, both co-chairs of the BDP — **Selahattin Demirtaş** and **Figen Yüksekdağ** — were arrested and imprisoned, alongside hundreds of party members.

In **2023**, the BDP was officially banned, leading to the formation of the **Party of Equality and Democracy (DEM)** on **15 September 2023**. Despite state repression, the DEM Party achieved significant electoral success, winning **62 seats in the 2023 Turkish parliamentary elections** and gaining control of nearly all major municipalities in Northern Kurdistan, including **Van**,


**Mardin, Diyarbakir (Amed), Batman, Şirnak, Cölemêrg (Hakkari), Siirt, Bitlis, Dersim (Tunceli), and Iğdır.**

On **21 March 2013**, Apo initiated a **peace process** with the Turkish state. However, this process collapsed in **summer 2015**, when the Turkish military resumed large-scale operations against Kurdish regions. On **27 February 2025**, Apo called on the PKK to **lay down arms** to allow the Kurdish question to be resolved peacefully. Following its historic 12th Congress, the PKK announced its **dissolution on 12 May 2025**, officially ending nearly fifty years of armed struggle.

Despite this historic step, the Turkish state has taken no meaningful action toward peace. History has shown that, whenever unable to defeat the Kurds militarily, the Turkish state uses the language of “peace” as a strategy to **stall, deceive, and weaken the Kurdish movement**. The current situation suggests that, rather than genuine reconciliation, Ankara’s goal remains to silence and neutralize Kurdish aspirations once and for all.



Apo During His 1999 Military Tribunal



Crimes of the Turkish Fascist State Against the Kurdish People

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### 2.37 – The 1991 Popular Uprising in Southern Kurdistan

In the summer of 1990, the Iraqi regime invaded Kuwait without provocation. This aggression prompted a global reaction, and under the leadership of the United States, an international coalition operating under the banner of the United Nations launched a war against Iraq. The conflict was not primarily driven by a love for Kuwait's people or a defense of human rights, but by **strategic and economic interests**, particularly oil.

On **17 January 1991**, coalition forces began bombing Iraq. The war lasted forty-one days, ending on **28 February 1991**, leaving over **100,000 Iraqis dead**, hundreds of thousands wounded, and much of the country's infrastructure in ruins. Iraq was forced to withdraw from Kuwait, suffering a crushing defeat.

At this moment of Iraqi weakness, the people of **Southern Kurdistan** seized the opportunity to rise up. Beginning on **5 March 1991** in the city of **Ranya**, the uprising quickly spread across the region. Within a short time, nearly all of Southern Kurdistan was liberated from Ba’athist control. On **Newroz (21 March) 1991**, the city of **Kirkuk** was also freed by Kurdish civilians.

Many Kurds believed that, just as the United States and its allies had intervened militarily to protect Kuwait, they would now protect the Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s regime. Instead, the international coalition turned a blind eye to the Kurdish uprising, fearing that the emergence of an autonomous Kurdish entity would destabilize the region.

The Iraqi regime, emboldened by this international green light, launched **a brutal counteroffensive**. Saddam Hussein’s forces threatened chemical attacks and bombarded Kurdish cities with artillery and aircraft — despite a declared no-fly zone. In this onslaught, **over 10,000 Kurds were killed**, Kirkuk and Mosul were reoccupied, and hundreds of thousands fled in terror, fearing a repeat of the **1988 Halabja chemical attack**.

This mass flight created one of the worst humanitarian crises of the late 20th century: over **two million Kurds** fled toward the borders of Iran and Turkey. Both countries closed their borders and initially refused to admit the refugees. Thousands died from cold, hunger, and exhaustion in the mountains. In several cases, Iranian gendarmes opened fire on refugees near Piranshar, killing and wounding dozens, while Turkish border guards massacred Kurdish refugees near Silopi and Şemdinli.

Under mounting international pressure, the United States and its allies declared a **no-fly zone above the 36th parallel**, banning Iraqi aircraft from flying over Erbil, Duhok, and Sulaymaniyah. These areas became known as “safe havens,” effectively placing two-thirds of Southern Kurdistan under international protection. However, **Kirkuk and Mosul were excluded**, leaving these key cities under Saddam’s control.

After the uprising, most of the Kurdish political leaders returned from exile in Iran. Instead of consolidating national unity, they entered into power-sharing negotiations with Saddam Hussein and **compromised the achievements of the revolution**. A unified parliament was formed, but soon split due to power struggles between the **Kurdistan Democratic Party**

**(KDP)** under the Barzani family and the **Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)** under the Talabani family.

What followed was one of the darkest chapters in modern Kurdish history: a **civil war** that lasted four years and claimed the lives of over **10,000 Kurds** in fratricidal fighting. By the war's end, Southern Kurdistan was effectively divided into two separate administrations — PUK controlling Sulaymaniyah with Iranian support, and KDP controlling Erbil with logistical and even military assistance from Saddam Hussein's Iraq.

On **31 August 1996**, after peace negotiations collapsed, the KDP invited Saddam's forces into Erbil, resulting in a bloody campaign in which hundreds of Kurds were executed and political opponents massacred. The city of Erbil fell under joint control of KDP and Iraqi forces, while the PUK — with help from Iran's Revolutionary Guards — retook Sulaymaniyah and purged it of KDP presence.

Although the collapse of Ba'athist control in much of Kurdistan was a moment of national pride and hope, the internal war that followed inflicted **deep wounds** on the Kurdish national movement, displaced thousands, and strengthened foreign influence. Southern Kurdistan became a **battlefield of intelligence agencies and foreign militaries**, undermining the goal of building a united and independent Kurdish state.



Flag of Southern Kurdistan

It is truly alarming that for more than **thirty-four years**, the Barzani and Talabani families, through their respective parties and networks, have systematically plundered the wealth of the Kurdish people of Southern Kurdistan with complete impunity. Instead of building strong and transparent institutions to serve Kurdistan, they have converted the region's resources into private capital, transferring vast sums into the banks of the occupiers of Kurdistan and international financial institutions.

Rather than laying the foundations of a free and independent society, Southern Kurdistan has been turned into a **hub for Islamist, nationalist, and sectarian interests** of Turks, Persians, and Arabs. Under the pretexts of religion, culture, education, security, and commerce, the occupiers have established **intelligence networks and ideological indoctrination centers** targeting Kurdish youth. They provide special educational programs for the children of Kurdish officials, shaping the next generation of leaders into loyal collaborators with Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi intelligence services.

The two ruling parties of Southern Kurdistan — **the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)** and **the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)** — have also allocated a portion of their revenues to supporting these external powers and financing foreign agendas, ensuring that the profits from stolen Kurdish resources benefit those very forces that seek to suppress Kurdish freedom.

It must be recognized that the **parliament and governing institutions** of the Kurdistan Region, dominated by the KDP and PUK, exist primarily to control the population and legitimize their own power. Should the Kurdish people attempt to establish an independent administration outside the control of these two parties, the KDP and PUK — as history has repeatedly shown — would align with all of Kurdistan's occupiers to crush and dismantle such a project, even if that new administration were democratically elected and more committed to the national interests of the Kurdish people.



Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani

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### 2.38 – The Kurdish Uprising in Red Kurdistan (1992)

After the First World War, a small part of Kurdistan came under Soviet control. Following the 1915 Ottoman campaign in Northern Kurdistan, tens of thousands of Yezidi (Zoroastrian) Kurds were displaced and resettled in **Red Kurdistan** and other parts of the Soviet Union. Under the early socialist regime, all Soviet nationalities were granted recognized cultural and administrative rights, and the Kurdish people were briefly granted **autonomy**. However, under Stalin's policies, Kurdish autonomy was abolished, the Kurds were reclassified as a "tribal minority," and their population was divided across Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

In the 1990s, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many of its constituent nations declared independence. At that time, the Yezidi Kurds of Red Kurdistan, under the leadership of **Wekil Mustafa**, formed the **Kurdish People's Army** and declared the independence of Red Kurdistan, designating **Lachin** as its capital.

In 1992, the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan engaged in open war over control of Red Kurdistan. Armenia called on Wekil Mustafa and the Kurds to ally with them and fight against Azerbaijan, promising that, in the event of an Armenian victory, **autonomy would be granted** to Red Kurdistan. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan — invoking Islamic solidarity and the principle of protecting Kurdish rights — encouraged Muslim Kurds to support its own cause.

What followed was a bloody war lasting three years, during which thousands of Kurds were killed and tens of thousands more were forced to flee the region, leaving Red Kurdistan largely depopulated.

In 1995, Armenia and Azerbaijan reached an agreement to divide the territory of Red Kurdistan between them. Most of the Kurdish revolutionaries were expelled from the region, becoming refugees across the Caucasus, Russia, and Europe. In this way, the **Kurdish uprising of Red Kurdistan was crushed**, and the territory was once again occupied and brought under foreign control.



Wekil Mustafa

## 2.39 – Uprisings and Revolts Across Kurdistan in the 19th and 20th Centuries

Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, numerous Kurdish uprisings erupted across all parts of Kurdistan. Many of these revolts were brutally suppressed by occupying powers, preventing them from reaching their full national potential and wider recognition. Most of their leaders were executed or hanged by the occupiers. The following list highlights some of the most significant uprisings:

### Northern Kurdistan (Bakur):

- **Begi Botan (1852–1855)** – A major resistance movement against Ottoman rule.
- **Hakkari Uprising (1895)** – Led by Kurdish tribal leaders in the Hakkari region.
- **Yezidi Uprising (21 September 1920)** – Led by Dawud al-Dawud and Rashê Qulo, defending the rights of the Yezidi Kurdish community.

### Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhilat):

- **Sardar Rashid Juwanro** – Local Kurdish leader who resisted Qajar control.
- **Jafar Soltani of Hawraman** – Leader of a prominent regional uprising.
- **Mala Khalili of Mirawa, Sardasht** – Religious leader and freedom fighter.
- **Popular uprisings in Diwandara** – Grassroots movements against Persian domination.
- **Omar Pasha Uprising (1934–1935)** – Armed rebellion in the Sardasht region.

### Southern Kurdistan (Başûr):

- **Rahman Pasha Baban Revolt (1806)** – Early 19th-century struggle against Ottoman forces.
- **Mir Hamay Rawandizi (“Pasha Kora”) Revolt (1826)** – An influential attempt to establish Kurdish autonomy.
- **Sheikh Abdul-Salam Barzani Revolt (1911–1912)** – An early Barzani uprising against Ottoman authority.
- **Sheikh Said Barzinji Revolt (1913–1914)** – Anti-Ottoman movement in the Sulaymaniyah region.

- **Gowan Revolt (Zakho, 4 April 1919)** – A localized resistance effort.
- **Ibrahim Khani Delo Uprising (22 August 1920)** – Revolt against British-backed forces in Southern Kurdistan.
- **Sheikh Ahmad Barzani Revolt (1921–1932)** – A major series of uprisings that set the stage for later Barzani resistance.



Rahman Pasha Baban

## 2.40- The Uprising of the People of Rojava (Western Kurdistan), 2011–2025

Prior to **2011**, and indeed throughout much of modern history, the **Ba'ath regime in Syria** denied the **Kurds of Rojava** any recognition of their **national identity**, treating them as **stateless foreigners** in their own homeland. They were systematically deprived of **citizenship, property rights, political participation**, and even the legal right to speak their language or celebrate their culture.

When the **Syrian uprising** began in **2011**, the Kurds of Rojava seized the opportunity for liberation. Through **unity, grassroots organization, and strategic coordination**, they rapidly **liberated all major cities of Western Kurdistan**, including **Qamishlo, Serekaniye, Afrin, Hasakah, Kobani, and Manbij**.

In the early phase of the revolution, the people of Rojava established the **Democratic Union Party (PYD)** and two key military forces:

- **YPG (People's Protection Units)**
- **YPJ (Women's Protection Units)**

These forces were tasked with defending Kurdish-inhabited areas, upholding public security, and promoting a **pluralistic and gender-equal political vision**.

From **2014–2015**, the **Turkish government** openly supported **Sunni Islamist extremist groups**, particularly **ISIS**, to destabilize Kurdish-controlled areas. ISIS launched **coordinated assaults** on both **Southern and Western Kurdistan**, committing atrocities that shocked the world:

- **Thousands of Kurds were massacred.**
- **Thousands of women and children** were abducted, enslaved, and sold in **markets across Arab cities**.
- Survivors endured **systematic sexual violence**, forced conversions, and indefinite separation from their families.
- As of today, **over 3,000 Kurdish women remain captive**, many in the homes of **Arab and Turkish men**, subjected to ongoing abuse.

These crimes **echoed a historical pattern** dating back **1,400 years**, when **Quraysh and Umayyad Arab armies** invaded Kurdish territories such as **Tisfun (Baghdad), Kharaiba (Basra), Nasiriyah, Raqqa, Aleppo, Mosul, and Khuzestan**, enslaving Kurdish women under **religious pretexts** that sanctioned their exploitation.

In **2014–2015**, ISIS launched a massive offensive against **Kobani**. After **three months of intense urban combat**, Kurdish defenders—backed by **international coalition air support**—successfully repelled ISIS.

This **historic victory**:

- Became a **global symbol of Kurdish resilience**.
- Embodied the revolutionary philosophy of **“Women, Life, Freedom”**.
- Marked the **turning point** in the war against ISIS, preventing further advances into Rojava.

Following Kobani’s liberation, Kurdish forces gradually **cleared all towns and villages of Western Kurdistan from ISIS control**.

### **Autonomous Administration and Governance**

Under the leadership of **Mazloun Kobani**, the Kurds of Rojava established an **Autonomous Administration** with a focus on:

- **Democratic self-governance**
- **Gender equality**
- **Multi-ethnic inclusion**
- **Community-based justice**

This model of governance became internationally noted for its **discipline, inclusivity, and stability** despite ongoing threats from **ISIS, the Syrian regime, and Turkey**.

In **2018**, the **Turkish military**, alongside **extremist Islamist militias** (including many former ISIS members), **invaded Afrin**.

In **2019**, they captured **Serekaniye and Tel Abyad**.

Consequences:

- **Over 400,000 Kurds were forcibly displaced.**
- The occupied regions were placed under **Turkish gendarmerie control.**
- International human rights bodies identified these operations as **acts of ethnic cleansing and demographic engineering.**
- Despite global awareness, **no decisive international action** was taken to halt Turkey's aggression.

Over the past **14 years**, the **Rojava Revolution** has become a **living example of grassroots democracy, gender liberation, and social justice** in the Middle East.

Its **legitimacy** derives not from the **Syrian state** or foreign intervention, but from the **will, sacrifice, and organization of the Kurdish people** themselves.

To this day, the **strength of Rojava** lies in its **unwavering commitment to self-determination**—despite ongoing wars, sieges, and diplomatic isolation.



General Mazloum Kobani


## Part Three

### 3 – Key Geographic Features of Kurdistan

#### 3.1 – Location of Kurdistan

Kurdistan is situated in the northern part of the Asian continent, at the heart of the Middle East. Its borders are generally described as follows:

- **North:** Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Black Sea, and Turkey
- **South:** Iran and the Median highlands
- **East:** Iran and the Caspian Sea
- **West:** Iraq and Syria



Kurdistan has four natural maritime routes, yet the occupying powers forcibly displaced the Kurds from these regions and resettled Turkic, Persian, and Arab populations in their place.

### 3.2 – Geography of Kurdistan

Kurdistan covers an area of approximately **550,000 square kilometers**, roughly equal to the size of France. However, Kurds today inhabit only about **230,000 square kilometers** of their ancestral homeland.

The policies of the occupying powers—**Arabization, Turkification, and Persianization**—have deliberately displaced the Kurdish population and resettled Arab, Turkic, and Persian populations in many strategically important regions, such as **Kirkuk, Mosul, Khanaqin, Harput, Erzincan, Erzurum, Gaziantep (Gazi Teppe), Aleppo, Urmia, Naqadeh, Miyandoab, Hamadan, Malayer, Ilam, Kermanshah, Kohgiluyeh, Shahr-e-Kurd, Dezful, and Khuzestan**. These policies have been aimed at depopulating Kurdish areas, redrawing the map of Kurdistan, and erasing the Kurdish presence.

Through these state-led demographic engineering strategies, the occupiers have, with deliberate planning, attempted to erase Kurdish identity from Kurdistan.

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### 3.3 – Major Cities and Provinces of Kurdistan

Kurdistan is composed of around **40 provinces** and **220 cities**.

The **capital of Kurdistan** is the city of **Amed (Diyarbakir)**, whose population in 2013 was estimated at approximately **1.9 million**.

The **largest city of Kurdistan** is **Kermanshah**, with a population exceeding **2 million**.

#### **Provinces of Kurdistan:**

##### **Northern Kurdistan (19 provinces):**

Gaziantep, Siirt, Riha (Urfa), Adiyaman, Amed (Diyarbakir),  
Dersim, Bingöl, Harput (Elazığ), Malatya, Marash,  
Van, Bitlis, Muş, Erzurum, Erzincan,  
Hakkari, Iğdır, Ağrı, Bingöl.

**Eastern Kurdistan (10 provinces):**

Khuzestan, Lorestan, Kermanshah, Urmia, Sanandaj (Sine),  
Kazerun (Bushehr region), Bakhtiari, Kohgiluyeh, Ilam, Shahr-e-Kurd.

**Southern Kurdistan (6 provinces):**

Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah, Khanaqin,  
Duhok, Nineveh (Mosul), Erbil.

**Western Kurdistan (3 provinces):**

Afrin, Hasakah, Qamishlo.

**Red Kurdistan (2 provinces):**

Lachin, Aras.

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### 3.4 – Population of Kurdistan

Kurdistan is an **occupied land**, and obtaining accurate statistics about the Kurdish population is extremely difficult. None of the occupying states are willing to recognize the Kurds as a distinct nation, and their official censuses often underreport Kurdish numbers.

According to censuses conducted by the occupying powers up to 2012, the Kurdish population was reported to be around **25 million**.

However, this figure is certainly an underestimation. Many Kurds refrain from registering as Kurds out of fear of persecution, while in some regions they have been forcibly registered as Turks, Persians, or Arabs. Others have willingly or unknowingly identified as Turks due to assimilation policies. Some Kurds, in order to avoid discrimination in employment, education, and social life, have also chosen not to declare their ethnicity.

According to surveys carried out by Kurdish institutions such as the **Kurdistan National Congress (KNK)**, the Kurdish population is estimated at **42 million**.

Even this figure is considered conservative, given that Kurdistan remains under occupation and the Kurds are denied the right to conduct an official census of their own.

Based on estimates published by the **European Union in 2013**, the Kurdish population is distributed as follows:

- **Northern Kurdistan & Turkey:** 15 million
- **Eastern Kurdistan & Iran:** 9 million
- **Southern Kurdistan & Iraq:** 5 million
- **Western Kurdistan & Syria:** 2 million
- **Red Kurdistan, Caucasus & Russia:** 400,000
- **Germany:** 300,000
- **United Kingdom & Ireland:** 100,000
- **France:** 60,000
- **Lebanon:** 50,000
- **Netherlands:** 40,000
- **Austria:** 30,000
- **Sweden:** 30,000
- **Switzerland:** 20,000
- **Italy:** 15,000
- **Denmark:** 13,000
- **Greece:** 12,000
- **Belgium:** 10,000
- **Norway:** 10,000
- **Finland:** 5,000
- **Cyprus:** 4,000
- **United States:** 60,000
- **Australia:** 30,000
- **Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait:** 15,000
- **Israel:** 100,000

### 3.5 – Economy of Kurdistan

The economy of Kurdistan is largely **agrarian**, as its climate and soil are highly suitable for agriculture.

Kurdistan is also one of the richest oil-bearing regions in the Middle East. Significant oil reserves are found across all four parts of Kurdistan, with the largest deposits located in **Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk** in Southern Kurdistan.

It is worth noting that Kurdistan's economy has never been allowed to develop independently. Instead of becoming a source of prosperity for the Kurdish nation, oil has become the primary reason for the continued **occupation** of Kurdistan by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

While oil wealth has brought **prosperity** to many Arab states, in Kurdistan it has brought **destruction, displacement, and massacres**.

In addition to oil, Kurdistan is rich in mineral resources such as **iron, gold, copper, and granite**, which have been systematically extracted and plundered by the occupying states.

Kurdistan's land is full of untapped potential, yet the occupiers have consistently exploited these resources without allowing local development. Every day, thousands of tons of valuable minerals are extracted from Kurdistan's mountains and transported to the interior of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

This exploitation is one of the main reasons the occupying states refuse to relinquish control of Kurdistan. They understand that despite all the wars, massacres, and repression, their greatest profit still comes from the resources of Kurdish land.

For this reason, they actively prevent scientific and technological development in Kurdistan, obstruct Kurdish progress, and attempt to keep Kurdish society dependent.

The occupiers focus on building mosques, religious schools, and theological institutions to influence the population ideologically, promoting cultural assimilation through Turkish, Persian, and Arabic music, and discouraging Kurdish cultural and intellectual growth.

Simultaneously, they spread **addictive substances, cigarettes, unemployment**, and appoint morally corrupt individuals to official posts to weaken Kurdish social structures. Through these strategies, the occupiers seek to reshape and erase the authentic Kurdish national identity.

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### 3.6 – Oil Fields of Kurdistan

Kurdistan is among the wealthiest regions in the world in terms of oil resources, with **dozens of major oil fields** discovered to date. Some of the most notable oil fields and their locations are:

#### Northern Kurdistan

- **Raman Field** – near the city of Batman
- **Siirt Field** – near the city of Amed (Diyarbakir)

It is noteworthy that since **1954**, the Turkish state has been extracting and exploiting oil from these fields.

#### Western Kurdistan

- **Karachok Field** – near the town of Malikiya in the Qamishlo province
- **Suri Field** – located south of Karachok
- **Rumeilan Field** – near the Suri Field

Since **1980**, the Syrian government has been extracting up to **520,000 barrels of oil per day** from these fields.

#### Southern Kurdistan

- **Hainzala Field** – in the northern countryside of Mosul
- **Batma Field** – near Mosul
- **Baba Gurgur Field** – near Kirkuk, where more than **150 oil wells** have been drilled. This field alone accounts for roughly **6% of the world's oil production**.
- **Bay Hassan Field** – north of Kirkuk

- **Zabur Field** – southeast of Kirkuk
- **Naftkhana Field** – south of Khanaqin
- **Shewashok Field** – near the town of Taqtaq in the Erbil province

Since the year 2000, several additional fields have been discovered in the provinces of Sulaymaniyah, Erbil, and Duhok, which were subsequently sold off at low prices by the Barzani and Talabani ruling families.

### Eastern Kurdistan

- **Aghajari Field** – located in the city of Aghajari; its oil is extracted via pipelines and refined in Abadan, producing more than **100,000 barrels per day**
- **Pazanan Field** – located on the road between Behbahan and Aghajari
- **Gachsaran Field** – located in the city of Gachsaran
- **Masjed Soleyman Field** – located in Masjed Soleyman
- **Sefid (White) Oil Field** – in the northern part of Haftkel
- **Shah Oil Field** – extending into the southern Zagros Mountains

It is important to note that beyond the oil fields listed above, **dozens of undeclared oil fields** also exist, the revenues of which are entirely appropriated by the occupying powers. Indeed, the income from Kurdish oil is used to finance weapons and munitions that are then deployed to suppress, displace, and kill the Kurdish population.

If even **50% of the revenues** from these oil resources were invested back into Kurdistan, the region could compete with the world's most industrialized and technologically advanced nations.

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### 3.7 – Mineral Resources

Kurdistan is rich in **hundreds of mineral deposits**, which are systematically exploited by the occupying powers from all directions. These include deposits of **marble, iron, zinc, chromium, manganese, sulfur, lead, phosphate, copper, uranium, gold, silver, diamonds**, and many others.

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### 3.8 – Water Resources of Kurdistan

Kurdistan is one of the most water-rich regions in the Middle East and is considered a **major global freshwater reserve**. Its annual water resources amount to **billions of cubic meters**. However, a significant portion of this water flows freely into the **Mediterranean Sea, the Caspian Sea, and the Persian Gulf** without being harnessed for local benefit.

Globally, the importance of water is increasing every year, and experts predict that in the near future, water will surpass oil in value and strategic significance.

Turkey has already begun projects to divert water from Northern Kurdistan to its interior and to other countries, while Iran has been diverting water from Eastern Kurdistan into the central Iranian plateau.

History demonstrates that the occupiers of Kurdistan and their allies have previously attempted to burn the Kurds by igniting the oil fields of Kurdistan. If Kurds are not vigilant, it is possible that in the future they may be **choked by the very waters of their own homeland** through diversion projects that deprive Kurdistan of its vital lifelines.

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### 3.9 – Major Rivers of Kurdistan

The two longest rivers of Kurdistan are the **Euphrates (Furat)** and the **Tigris (Dijla)**.

- The Euphrates, the longest river of Kurdistan, flows **2,800 km** from its source until it joins the Tigris. Approximately **2,170 km** of its course lies within Kurdish territory. The Euphrates rises in the mountains of Northern Kurdistan and is formed by the confluence of the **Karasu River (46 km)** and the **Murat River (615 km)**.
- The Tigris originates from **Lake Gölcük** in Northern Kurdistan and flows **1,900 km** until it meets the Euphrates, with **847 km** of its length running through Kurdish lands.

### 3.10 – Forests of Kurdistan

Nearly **10% of Kurdistan's landmass** is covered with forests. Of this:

- **65%** consists of oak forests
- **20%** of poplar groves
- **5%** of pine forests

The remaining share includes a variety of other tree species, such as fig, mulberry, pomegranate, plane, oak, and willow.

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### 3.11 – Highest Mountains of Kurdistan

Kurdistan is a mountainous land, with peaks ranging from **500 meters to over 5,000 meters** above sea level. Notable mountains include:

- **Kuh-e Zard (Yellow Mountain):** 4,548 m – Lorestan
- **Greater Ararat (Agri):** 5,137 m – near Ağrı
- **Rashko Teppe:** 4,134 m – near Hakkari
- **Dinar:** 4,409 m – near Dehloran
- **Oshtoran Kuh:** 4,050 m
- **Sipan:** 4,058 m
- **Mor:** 3,807 m
- **Little Ararat:** 3,896 m
- **Qaradagh:** 3,752 m
- **Samri:** 3,794 m
- **Spirin:** 3,668 m
- **Bashtaq:** 3,684 m
- **Garineh:** 3,645 m
- **Andruk:** 3,660 m
- **Dardarash:** 3,608 m
- **Bardarash:** 3,608 m
- **Halgurd:** 3,607 m

- **Sumbul:** 3,607 m
  - **Murat Baş Aladağ:** 3,510 m
  - **Siya Kew:** 3,578 m
  - **Shaho:** 3,390 m
  - **Qandil:** 3,452 m
  - **Paro:** 3,357 m
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### 3.12 – Climate and Seasons

Kurdistan experiences a **wide temperature range**, with summer temperatures exceeding **+50°C** and winter temperatures dropping below **–30°C**.

The country enjoys **four distinct seasons**, each lasting roughly three months: **spring, summer, autumn, and winter**.

Southern and Western Kurdistan are generally warmer, whereas Northern and Eastern Kurdistan are more mountainous and colder.

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### 3.13 – Literacy Rates in Kurdistan

As of **2013**, the literacy rate in Kurdistan was estimated at **around 35%**, which is relatively higher than in many neighboring countries.

This relatively low literacy rate is primarily the result of Kurdistan's occupation. The occupying states, prioritizing their own political and economic interests, have historically **neglected education** in Kurdistan, seeking to prevent the Kurds from advancing, recognizing their identity, and asserting their fundamental rights.

In many countries, primary education is offered in the **mother tongue**; however, in most of the four parts of Kurdistan, children are compelled to receive education in the language of the occupying power.

It is particularly noteworthy that even in the language of the occupiers, **not all Kurds are granted access to education**. Rather than investing in education and development, the occupying states prioritize **warfare and internal destabilization**, manufacturing weapons and munitions to destroy Kurdistan instead of developing science and technology.

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### 3.14 – Agriculture

Kurdistan is **one of the most agriculturally prosperous** countries in the Middle East. All major cereals and pulses—such as **wheat, barley, rice, chickpeas, mung beans, lentils, beans**, and others—are produced here. The land is also rich in **fruits and vegetables**. Among the fruits are **pears, apples, grapes, apricots, pomegranates, sour cherries**, and more; among the vegetables are **onions, tomatoes, cucumbers, spinach**, and others.

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### 3.15 – Livestock

Kurdistan is **wealthy in animal husbandry**. Livestock such as **equines** (*horses, mules, donkeys*) and **household stock** (*sheep, goats, cattle, water buffalo, camels, pigs*) can thrive here.

A wide variety of **poultry and game birds**—including **chickens, turkeys, geese, quail, pigeons, partridges**, and others—also live in Kurdistan.

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### 3.16 – The Kurdish People

The Kurdish nation comprises speakers of **Kurmanji, Sorani, Luri, Kalhuri, Bakhtiari, Gorani, Zazaki, and Hawrami**. Because **mother-tongue education has been restricted**, Kurdish dialects have drifted apart. Even so, most Kurds can, to some extent, understand another Kurdish variety and use it when needed.

As in many other nations, **multiple dialects** may be mutually hard to understand, while the **official and instructional language** is standardized. In several countries, **linguists and language academies** have convened to develop a **unified national standard**. This is also a suitable path for Kurds: once sovereignty is achieved, a **standardized Kurdish language** can be adopted for writing and education.

For **writing systems**, the **Latin script** aligns more closely with contemporary global usage and everyday life; therefore, in the future it would be preferable to employ **Latin (Kurmanji) orthography**. Using Latin letters would bring Kurds **closer to the world's scientifically and technologically advanced communities**, especially since much of modern scholarship is published in **Latin script** rather than **Aramaic-based scripts**.

It should also be noted that the **Assyrian and Syriac peoples** regard themselves as **Kurdistani**, and they constitute **nearly two percent** of Kurdistan's population.

## Part Four

### 4 – Religions of Kurdistan

Religion is a human-made construct created to achieve power, fulfill desires, and impose order. Throughout history, humankind has sought **authority and wealth**, and has expressed this desire through various systems such as **deities, prophethood, empires, monarchies, and political ideologies**, all of which were projected onto surrounding societies. Many of these systems of power were temporary, and often they contradicted one another—yet they all shared a common aim: the pursuit of **power, resources, and control over human behavior**.

In many belief systems, "God" is portrayed in human-like form, whereas in others, God remains unseen. Each society, according to its own cultural and historical context, produced its own gods and prophets. Over time, **hundreds of gods and prophets** were created, most of which were designed to serve the interests of ruling elites rather than to represent objective truth or scientific understanding.

The Kurds, too, have had their own deities and prophets throughout history, which often conflict with one another in terms of practice and philosophy. The notable point here is that other nations of the world have utilized their religions to consolidate wealth, reinforce their identity, and strengthen their sense of national unity, whereas the Kurds, in stark contrast, have allowed religion to **undermine their sense of national identity and belonging to Kurdistan**.

As a result, many Kurds today identify only nominally as Kurdish. In practice, particularly among Muslim Kurds, religious devotion has created a psychological and cultural alignment with **Arabs, Persians, and Turks**—to the extent that Kurdish individuals pray daily, facing Mecca, **seventeen times a day for the Arab God**, often without reflecting on the deeper implications this has for their own cultural survival.

Most Muslim Kurds have **fully embraced Arab, Persian, or Turkish religious identity** and follow the rules dictated by those traditions without perceiving this as a form of self-erasure or betrayal of their own nation.

In my view, if there were a court of accountability beyond this world, every Kurd who has adopted **Arab culture in the name of Islam** would be summoned for questioning and given the **severest sentence** for failing to preserve their Kurdish identity and culture.

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#### 4.1 – Noah’s Ark

Most religious texts mention **Noah’s Ark** and its story begins with Noah calling upon the people of his time to abandon their corruption so that society might live in peace and harmony, and all human beings might enjoy equality and security. According to the narrative, Noah’s efforts failed, and in order to purge humanity of the wicked, he built a **large ark**, placing within it his followers and a pair of every animal species—male and female.


He then prayed for God to send a **global flood** to drown the wrongdoers. After the floodwaters subsided, the ark is said to have floated for some time before finally coming to rest on **Mount Judi** in Northern Kurdistan. In this way, according to the tradition, the righteous were saved from the corrupt.

It is worth noting that **specialist researchers** have claimed to have discovered the remains of Noah’s Ark, which they describe as measuring **170 meters in length and 45 meters in width**, and historians date the event to roughly **100,000 years ago**.

Nearby lies **Noah’s Tomb**, which measures **2 meters high and 9 meters long** and is located in the city of Jazira in Northern Kurdistan, at the foot of Mount Judi. If this tomb were universally recognized as genuine, it would be one of the **most sacred shrines in the world**. However, the occupiers of Kurdistan have neither preserved nor promoted it; indeed, they refuse to allow any Kurdish city to become a site more sacred than Mecca, Karbala, or Jerusalem. Were it possible for them to relocate Mount Judi or Noah’s Tomb to their own countries, they would likely have done so.



Mount Judi (the Resting Place of Noah's Ark)



The Outline (Remains) of Noah's Ark

## 4.2 – Zoroastrianism

After the earlier faiths of **polytheism, Marduk worship, and solar cults**, Zoroastrianism emerged as the oldest recognized **national religion of the Kurdish people**, its origins tracing back to nearly **a thousand years before Christianity** (approximately **300 years before the legendary Newroz of Kawa the Blacksmith**).

**Zoroaster (Zarathustra)** was born in the region of **Urmia (modern Sardasht)** into a family known as **Spitamā**, a name which in Avestan means “*wholly white, wholly righteous, wholly pure.*” His personal name, **Āsho Zarathustra**, derives from the Avestan word *āsho* (meaning *peaceful*).

From childhood, Zoroaster was exceptionally intelligent. At the age of **30**, he withdrew from society to engage in spiritual reflection, philosophical reasoning, and personal development. Through deep contemplation, he formulated a vision for the **social and moral order** of his time, framing it within a new religious-philosophical system.

At **40 years of age**, on the banks of the **Aras River**, Zoroaster called upon the people to embrace his teachings and proclaimed the message of **Ahura Mazda (the Wise Lord)** to the Medes as *Gāthās* (hymns).

The **Aras River** springs from the mountains between **Northern Kurdistan and Red Kurdistan**, flows through Eastern Kurdistan, and empties into the **Caspian Sea**. Today, the river forms a **political border** artificially drawn by occupying powers, dividing Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Iran.

As Zoroaster’s reputation grew, the **Medes** and later the **Persians** embraced Zoroastrianism. To spread his religion, Zoroaster approached **King Vishtaspa (Gushtasp)**, whose domain encompassed the land of Iran and the entirety of historical Kurdistan.

King Vishtaspa accepted Zoroastrianism, and Zoroaster continued to teach his faith until he took part in the war between Vishtaspa and **Arjasp**, the king of Turan (ancestral homeland of the modern Turks and Azeris). Zoroaster was killed during this conflict.

After **37 years** of preaching and reform, Zoroaster was martyred at the age of **77**.

According to Zoroastrian doctrine, the universe is divided between the two opposing forces of **light and darkness**, locked in an eternal struggle. The leader of light is **Ahura Mazda**, while the leader of darkness is **Ahriman**. Ahura Mazda is said to have **seven archangels**, while Ahriman commands **three demon-like spirits**.

Zoroastrianism teaches that the soul does not perish with death. For three days and nights, the spirit experiences a foretaste of joy or suffering before standing trial in the **Court of Judgment**, presided over by three divine judges. A person's good and bad deeds are weighed on the **scales of justice**:

- If the good outweighs the bad, the soul enters **light and bliss**.
- If the bad outweighs the good, the soul remains in **darkness and torment**.
- If good and bad are equal, the soul experiences both joy and sorrow.

To reach the **highest spiritual rank**, Zoroastrianism teaches that one must pass through three stages:

**Good Thoughts, Good Words, and Good Deeds.**

It is noteworthy that all Kurds were originally Zoroastrians, but after the **Arab conquest of Kurdistan**, Arab armies—through **sword, bloodshed, and massacres**—forced their culture and faith upon the Kurds in the name of Islam. The word *Islam* means *submission*, which in Kurdish connotes **surrender and subjugation**. Those who refused to submit to Arab forces—those who would not bow, pray, or pay tribute—were labeled *kafir* (infidel) and executed or buried alive.

The **holy book of Zoroastrianism** is the **Avesta**, written in the Avestan language. Its chapters are called **Gāthās**, meaning *utterances* or *hymns*, regarded as the direct words of Zoroaster.

Significantly, Zoroastrianism prescribes **no caste system, no human bondage, and no social restrictions**. Zoroaster did not place barriers to progress; instead, he encouraged **hope, learning, and personal growth**. The Avesta does not dictate dietary laws or prohibitions, nor does it demand ritual submission—it calls for a **just and harmonious social**

**life.** Men and women are considered **equal**, with equal rights in marriage, and each is entitled to only **one spouse**.

It must also be noted that most **Zoroastrian temples and historical sites** have been **destroyed or burned by Muslims** following the Arab conquest. In Kurdistan, archaeological sites are still being discovered, but the occupying authorities quickly loot the artifacts, steal the gold, and demolish the remains to erase the Kurdish-Zoroastrian heritage.

For example, in **Sardasht**, regarded as the capital of ancient Zoroastrianism, several ancient temples, statues, and settlements have been unearthed in recent decades, only to be confiscated and destroyed by the Iranian authorities.

Some of the remaining Zoroastrian archaeological sites include:

- **Tappeh-ye Nowshijan (Hill of Nowshi-jan):** located 60 km south of Hamadan and 20 km west of Malayer, measuring 80 m in length, 30 m in width, and 37 m in height.
  - **Tappeh-ye Babajan:** located about 100 km southwest of Tappeh-ye Nowshijan.
- Both sites contain ancient **fire altars**, as fire symbolized **purity and divine light** in Zoroastrianism.



Zoroaster (Zarathustra)

### 4.3 – Judaism

The prophet **Moses** began spreading the religion of Judaism in **14th century BCE** among the people of Jerusalem and presented them with the holy book of the **Torah**.

The presence of Judaism in Kurdistan dates back to **587 BCE**, when the Babylonian army under **King Nebuchadnezzar II** captured a number of Jewish tribes from Jerusalem during a military campaign and deported them to Babylon. From Babylon, some of these Jewish communities eventually migrated into Kurdistan and integrated with the local population.

Following the later re-establishment of the **Kingdom of Israel**, many of those Jews who had lived in Kurdistan and had been born there returned to Israel. Interestingly, many of these returning communities still retain **Kurdish cultural traits and identity markers** to this day.

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### 4.4 – Christianity

The prophet **Jesus** was born to **Mary**, a young woman from Bethlehem, and was crucified at the age of **33** while spreading his message.

Christianity spread into Kurdistan through the work of **apostolic disciples**, and became particularly established in cities such as **Edessa (Urfa)** and **Diyanan**, where Christian communities formed and flourished.

The **holy book of Christianity** is the **Injil (Gospel)**—a word that in Kurdish means “*glad tidings*.”

Today, approximately **10% of Kurdistan’s population** is Christian. The **Assyrian and Syriac communities** form an important part of Kurdistan’s Christian population and have historically played a significant role in preserving Christianity in the region.

## 4.5 – Islam

Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), from a young age, achieved considerable success as a caravan trader and merchant. Over time, however, ambitions of power and wealth began to grow. After consolidating many of the Arab tribes and acquiring thousands of camels, he was able to assemble a strong, well-organized army. Whenever the Prophet's army set out, it attacked any caravan or settlement it encountered. This was because the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) had been granted permission to kill and plunder anyone who resisted them. Wherever they attacked, they displaced the local population and killed anyone who refused to submit.

As a result, the Prophet's forces managed to defeat most of the armies in the region of Mecca and Medina and bring them under their control. After obtaining political authority and the wealth of the Hijaz (Arabia), the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) expanded his military campaigns beyond Arabia, framing them as wars in the name of Islam. Anyone who refused to surrender to the Prophet's forces was killed, in the name of Allah:

وَقَاتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ وَاعْلَمُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ سَمِيعٌ عَلِيمٌ

*Fight in the way of Allah, and know that Allah is All-Hearing, All-Knowing. (Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 244)*

Muslims regard the holy Qur'an as the most valuable scripture in the world, holding that it contains no contradictions, as Allah himself declares:

أَفَلَا يَتَذَكَّرُونَ الْفُرْعَانِ وَلَوْ كَانَ مِنْ عِنْدِ غَيْرِ اللَّهِ لَوَجَدُوا فِيهِ اخْتِلَافًا كَثِيرًا

*Do they not then reflect on the Qur'an? If it had been from anyone other than Allah, they would surely have found in it much discrepancy. (Surah An-Nisa, Verse 82)*

Yet throughout history, every ruler has interpreted (or "tafsir") the Qur'an in a way that served his own political interests. This is because interpreters have understood that if the Qur'an were read strictly as it is written, its internal contradictions would become obvious. Below, we present several examples of such contradictions regarding the creation of humankind:

خَلَقَ الْإِنْسَانَ مِنْ عَلَقٍ

*He created man from a clinging clot of blood. (Surah Al-'Alaq, Verse 2)*

خَلَقَ الْإِنْسَانَ مِنْ نُطْفَةٍ فَإِذَا هُوَ خَصِيمٌ مُبِينٌ

*He created man from a sperm-drop; yet behold, he becomes an open adversary. (Surah An-Nahl, Verse 4)*

وَلَقَدْ خَلَقْنَا الْإِنْسَانَ مِنْ صَلْصَالٍ مِّنْ حَمَإٍ مَّسْنُونٍ

*We created man from sounding clay of dark, moulded mud. (Surah Al-Hijr, Verse 26)*

خَلَقَ الْإِنْسَانَ مِنْ صَلْصَالٍ كَالْفَخَّارِ

*He created man from dry clay, like pottery. (Surah Ar-Rahman, Verse 14)*

وَهُوَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ مِنَ الْمَاءِ بَشَرًا فَجَعَلَهُ نَسَبًا وَصِهْرًا وَكَانَ رَبُّكَ قَدِيرًا

*And He it is who created man from water and made for him relations by blood and marriage. Your Lord is ever All-Powerful. (Surah Al-Furqan, Verse 54)*

وَمِنْ آيَاتِهِ أَنْ خَلَقَكُمْ مِنْ تُرَابٍ ثُمَّ إِذَا أَنْتُمْ بَشَرٌ تَنْتَشِرُونَ

*And of His signs is that He created you from dust, then you became human beings spreading throughout the earth. (Surah Ar-Rum, Verse 20)*

أَلَمْ نَخْلُقْكُمْ مِنْ مَّاءٍ مَّهِينٍ

*Did We not create you from a humble fluid? (Surah Al-Mursalat, Verse 20)*

فَلْيَنْظُرِ الْإِنْسَانُ مِمَّ خُلِقَ

خُلِقَ مِنْ مَّاءٍ دَافِقٍ

يَخْرُجُ مِنْ بَيْنِ الصُّلْبِ وَالتَّرَائِبِ

*Let man then consider from what he was created. He was created from a gushing fluid that issues from between the backbone and the ribs. (Surah At-Tariq, Verses 5–7)*

A brief reflection on these verses raises serious questions: from what exactly did Allah create man? From water, clay, mud, sperm, or blood? Are all of these to be taken as literal descriptions of human origin? Moreover, the Qur'an suggests that humans came into existence suddenly and then spread across the earth, whereas modern science shows that human gestation takes nine months, followed by years of upbringing and development.

In Islamic jurisprudence, a girl as young as nine years old may legally be married, and a boy, at a similar age, may be required to work, fight, and even kill.

Is this not quite distant from reality? The claim that human life originates from a fluid between the backbone and ribs is irreconcilable with modern medical science. Therefore, one must think critically and seek the truth—rather than living blindly, ignoring reality.

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هُوَ الَّذِي خَلَقَ لَكُمْ مَا فِي الْأَرْضِ جَمِيعًا ثُمَّ اسْتَوَىٰ إِلَى السَّمَاءِ فَسَوَّاهُنَّ سَبْعَ سَمَاوَاتٍ وَهُوَ بِكُلِّ شَيْءٍ عَلِيمٌ

*He it is who created for you all that is in the earth, then turned to the heaven and fashioned them into seven heavens, and He is Knowing of all things. (Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 29)*

**Commentary:** The idea of seven heavens stands in direct contradiction with modern scientific knowledge. If the Qur'an is truly the word of God, it should not contain such cosmological inaccuracies.

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لَيْسَ عَلَيْكَ هُدَاهُمْ وَلَكِنَّ اللَّهَ يَهْدِي مَن يَشَاءُ وَمَا تُنْفِقُوا مِنْ خَيْرٍ فَلَأَنفُسِكُمْ وَمَا تُنْفِقُونَ إِلَّا ابْتِغَاءَ وَجْهِ اللَّهِ وَمَا تُنْفِقُوا مِنْ خَيْرٍ يُوَفَّ إِلَيْكُمْ وَأَنْتُمْ لَا تُظْلَمُونَ

*It is not upon you to guide them, but Allah guides whom He wills. Whatever good you spend is for yourselves, and you spend not except seeking the Face of Allah; whatever good you spend will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wronged. (Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 272)*

**Commentary:** In Surah Al-Baqarah, Verse 244, Allah commands fighting and killing unbelievers in His cause, while in Verse 272 of the very same surah, He says that converting people to Islam is not your responsibility — for Allah guides whom He wills and misguides whom He wills. This creates a theological paradox: belief and disbelief are presented as entirely the work of God, yet humans are commanded to wage war on those who disbelieve. This inconsistency is fundamental, as Muslims have historically carried out jihad based on Verse 244, compelling others to convert under threat of death.

وَمِنْهُمْ مَّن يَسْتَمِعُ إِلَيْكَ وَجَعَلْنَا عَلَى قُلُوبِهِمْ أَكِنَّةً أَنْ يَفْقَهُوهُ وَفِي آذَانِهِمْ وَقْرًا وَإِنْ يَرَوْا كُلَّ آيَةٍ لَا يُؤْمِنُوا بِهَا حَتَّىٰ إِذَا جَاءُوكَ يُجَادِلُونَكَ يَقُولُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا إِنَّ هَٰذَا إِلَّا أَسَاطِيرُ الْأَوَّلِينَ

*Some of them listen to you, but We have cast veils over their hearts, lest they understand, and deafness into their ears. Even if they see every sign, they will not believe in it. When they come to dispute with you, the disbelievers say: “This is nothing but fables of the ancients.” (Surah Al-An‘am, Verse 25)*

وَلَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ لَجَمَعَهُمْ عَلَى الْهُدَىٰ

*If Allah had willed, He would have united them all upon guidance. (Surah Al-An‘am, Verse 35)*

وَالَّذِينَ كَذَّبُوا بِآيَاتِنَا صُمٌّ وَبُكْمٌ فِي الظُّلُمَاتِ مَن يَشَاءِ اللَّهُ يُضِلِّهُ وَمَن يَشَاءِ يُجْعَلْهُ عَلَىٰ صِرَاطٍ مُّسْتَقِيمٍ

*Those who deny Our signs are deaf and dumb in darkness. Whomsoever Allah wills, He leaves astray; and whomsoever He wills, He places on the straight path. (Surah Al-An‘am, Verse 39)*

فَمَن يُرِدِ اللَّهُ أَنْ يَهْدِيَهُ يَشْرَحْ صَدْرَهُ لِلْإِسْلَامِ وَمَن يُرِدْ أَنْ يُضِلَّهُ يَجْعَلْ صَدْرَهُ ضَيِّقًا حَرَجًا كَأَنَّمَا يَصَّعَّدُ فِي السَّمَاءِ

*Whoever Allah wills to guide, He opens his breast to Islam, and whoever He wills to misguide, He makes his breast tight and constricted as though he were climbing into the sky. (Surah Al-An‘am, Verse 125)*

**Commentary:** These verses clearly indicate that disbelief is not the fault of the disbeliever but rather the will of Allah. He chooses whom to guide and whom to misguide. It is therefore contradictory for Muslims to force conversions at swordpoint or kill non-believers for their disbelief, since both belief and disbelief are described as preordained acts of God.

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مَنْ يُضْلِلِ اللَّهُ فَلَا هَادِيَ لَهُ وَيَذَرُهُمْ فِي طُغْيَانِهِمْ يَعْمَهُونَ

*Whomsoever Allah sends astray, no guide can lead him, and He leaves them in their transgression, wandering blindly. (Surah Al-An‘am, Verse 186)*

**Commentary:** This verse removes responsibility from religious leaders entirely, yet clerics still demand that people be “brought back” to faith, even when the Qur’an states that disbelief is divinely decreed. By doing so, they act against the very command of Allah.

وَمَا أَرْسَلْنَا مِنْ رَّسُولٍ إِلَّا بِلِسَانٍ قَوْمِهِ لِيُبَيِّنَ لَهُمْ فَيُضِلُّ اللَّهُ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَيَهْدِي مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَهُوَ الْعَزِيزُ الْحَكِيمُ

*We did not send any messenger except with the language of his people, so that he might make (the message) clear to them. Then Allah leads astray whom He wills, and guides whom He wills, and He is the Mighty, the Wise. (Surah Ibrahim, Verse 4)*

**Commentary:** Here, a question arises: where is the prophet sent to the Kurds, speaking their language? Where is the Qur'an, the Gospel, the Torah, or the Psalms in Kurdish? Allah Himself claims that no prophet was ever sent except in the language of his own people — and yet there is no revelation in Kurdish, Chinese, Japanese, Russian, or countless other languages. This strongly suggests that Islam was intended only for the Arabs. Imposing it on the Kurds or any other nations by force contradicts this verse and runs against the will of Allah.

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وَعَلَى اللَّهِ قَصْدُ السَّبِيلِ وَمِنْهَا جَائِرٌ وَلَوْ شَاءَ لَهَدَيْكُمْ أَجْمَعِينَ

*Upon Allah rests the explanation of the right path, and among the paths are those that are crooked. Had Allah willed, He would have guided you all together. (Surah An-Nahl, Verse 9)*

**Commentary:** If guidance is purely the will of Allah, then what guilt is left for the disbeliever? Why do religious scholars insist on punishing those whom God Himself chose not to guide? By punishing them, these clerics oppose divine will and disobey the very scripture they claim to uphold.

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وَلَوْ شَاءَ اللَّهُ لَجَعَلَكُمْ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَلَكِنْ يُضِلُّ مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَيَهْدِي مَنْ يَشَاءُ وَلْتَسْلُنَ عَمَا كُنْتُمْ تَعْمَلُونَ

If Allah had willed, He would surely have made you one nation; yet He leads astray whom He wills and guides whom He wills. And you will surely be questioned about what you have done. (Surat An-Nahl, 16:93)

**Commentary:** Would it not have been better for all peoples to be one nation with one language—without the divisions of ethnicity and religion and without anyone being killed for

deviating from a prescribed path? Or is this diversity and the resulting conflict what God desired?

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أُولَٰئِكَ الَّذِينَ طَبَعَ اللَّهُ عَلَىٰ قُلُوبِهِمْ وَسَمِعِهِمْ وَأَبْصَرِهِمْ وَأُولَٰئِكَ هُمُ الْغَافِلُونَ

Those are the ones upon whose hearts, hearing, and sight Allah has set a seal; they are the heedless. (Surat An-Nahl, 16:108)

**Commentary:** If God Himself seals the hearts, ears, and eyes of the unbelievers, then that sealing is His act and responsibility. Yet religious scholars strive—by force if necessary—to “remove” what God has put in place. In doing so, they oppose the divine stance.

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إِنَّا جَعَلْنَا عَلَىٰ قُلُوبِهِمْ أَكِنَّةً أَنْ يَفْقَهُوهُ وَفِي آذَانِهِمْ وَقْرًا وَإِنْ تَدْعُهُمْ إِلَى الْهُدَىٰ فَلَنْ يَهْتَدُوا إِذًا أَبَدًا...

...Indeed, We have placed coverings over their hearts lest they understand, and deafness in their ears; and if you call them to guidance, they will never be guided then—ever. (Surat Al-Kahf, 18:57)

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أَلَمْ تَرَ أَنَّا أَرْسَلْنَا الشَّيَاطِينَ عَلَى الْكَافِرِينَ تَؤُزُّهُمْ أَزًّا

Have you not seen that We have sent the devils upon the disbelievers to incite them with fierce incitement? (Surat Maryam, 19:83)

**Commentary:** Why do preachers not proclaim such verses from the pulpits every day? If God has dispatched devils to mislead disbelievers, and has revealed verses instructing you not to interfere, why insist—by pressure and coercion—on making people Muslim? Is this not in opposition to God’s own verses?

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وَلَوْ شَاءَ رَبُّكَ لَأَمَنَّ مَنْ فِي الْأَرْضِ كُلُّهُمْ جَمِيعًا أَفَأَنْتَ تُكْرِهُ النَّاسَ حَتَّىٰ يَكُونُوا مُؤْمِنِينَ

Had your Lord willed, everyone on earth would have believed—all of them entirely. Will you then compel people until they become believers? (Surat Yunus, 10:99)

**Commentary:** Here, God admonishes Muslims to leave people be, since He has already decreed who will believe and who will not. He did not will that the entire world become Muslim. Therefore, unbelievers will continue to exist. Hell, then, is not of human making; God fashioned it and will populate it by His will—hardly a task that needs human enforcement. Is resisting God’s decree not itself a kind of unbelief?

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وَلَوْ شِئْنَا لَآتَيْنَا كُلَّ نَفْسٍ هُدًى وَلَكِنْ حَقَّ الْقَوْلُ مِنِّي لَأَمْلَأَنَّ جَهَنَّمَ مِنَ الْجِنَّةِ وَالنَّاسِ أَجْمَعِينَ

If We had willed, We would have given every soul its guidance; but My word has been decreed: I will surely fill Hell with jinn and humans all together. (Surat As-Sajdah, 32:13)

**Commentary:** These verses indicate that God determines belief and unbelief, leaving humanity powerless before their destiny. Does God, then, desire conflict and bloodshed by sowing such divisions among humankind? Are people to be blamed for deeds that God Himself facilitates by veiling hearts and ears? Should not a peace-loving, humane deity speak differently—or are these verses human compositions, attributed to God for worldly ends? And why do religious leaders refrain from discussing these tensions openly, instead interpreting verses to suit their own interests?

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لَا شَرِيكَ لَهُ يُدْعَىٰ إِلَيْكَ أُمِرْتُ وَأَنَا أَوَّلُ الْمُسْلِمِينَ

He has no partner; thus I am commanded, and I am the first of the Muslims. (Surat Al-An‘am, 6:163)

مَا كَانَ إِبْرَاهِيمَ يَهُودِيًّا وَلَا نَصْرَانِيًّا وَلَكِنْ كَانَ حَنِيفًا مُّسْلِمًا وَمَا كَانَ مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ

Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian; rather, he was an upright man, a Muslim, and he was not among the polytheists. (Surat Aal-‘Imran, 3:67)

**Commentary:** Abraham lived roughly in the 19th–20th centuries BCE (c. 1800–2000 years before the Common Era). Prophet Muhammad was born in 570 CE. This yields a gap of approximately 2,300–2,600 years. If Abraham died at least 2,300 years before Muhammad’s birth, how can the Qur’an state both that Muhammad is “the first of the Muslims” and that Abraham was himself a Muslim? Such claims raise serious questions about authorship and coherence: would an all-knowing God produce such contradictions—or are these the products of human thought, which naturally contains inconsistencies?

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يٰۤاَيُّهَا اٰدَمُ لَا يَفْتِنَنَّكَ الشَّيْطٰنُ كَمَا اَخْرَجَ اٰبَوَيْكَ مِنَ الْجَنَّةِ يَتَزَوَّجُ مِنْكُمَا لِیَاسِسَ بِهِمَا لِبَاسٌ لَّیْسَ لَكُمَا ۚ اِنَّهُ یُرِیْكُمْ هُوَ وَقَبِیْلُهُ مِنْ حَیْثُ لَا تَرَٰهُمْ اِنَّا جَعَلْنَا الشَّیْطٰنَ اَوْلِیَآءَ لِلَّذِیْنَ لَا یُؤْمِنُوْنَ

O children of Adam, let not Satan tempt you as he drove your parents out of the Garden, stripping them of their covering to show them their nakedness. Indeed, he and his tribe see you from where you do not see them. We have indeed made the devils allies to those who do not believe. (Surat Al-A‘raf, 7:27)

**Commentary:** God says He created Satan and made him the ally of those who disbelieve—so why are humans blamed for actions that, by this account, God enables through Satan? Moreover, if Adam and Eve were made for one another, why was it forbidden that they see each other’s nakedness? Why does the “best and newest” of sacred books speak of human sexuality in such a way? As a human being supposedly created by God, I write these lines with a sense of shame. Or perhaps the Qur’an is the imaginative literature of the Quraysh Arabs, composed to influence their contemporaries—and later used, in God’s name, to control populations while conferring power on those who wield religion for political ends.

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یٰۤاَيُّهَا الرَّسُوْلُ لَا یَحْزَنْكَ الَّذِیْنَ یَسْرِیْعُوْنَ فِی الْكُفْرِ مِنَ الَّذِیْنَ قَالُوْا ؕ اٰمَنَّا بِاَقْوَاهِهِمْ وَلَمْ تُؤْمِنْ قُلُوْبُهُمْ وَمِنَ الَّذِیْنَ هَادَوْا سَمْعُوْنَ لِلْكَذِبِ سَمْعُوْنَ لِقَوْمٍ ؕ اٰخَرِیْنَ لَمْ یَأْتُوْكَۤا یُحَرِّفُوْنَ الْكَلِمَ مِنْۢ بَعْدِ مَوَاضِعِیْ یَقُوْلُوْنَ اِنْ اُوْتِیْتُمْ هٰذَا فَخُذُوْهُ وَاِنْ لَمْ تُؤْتَوْهُ فَاحْذَرُوْا ۚ وَمَنْ یُّرِدِ اللّٰهُ فِتْنَتَهُۥ فَلَنْ تَمْلِكَ لَهُۥ مِنْ اِلٰهِ شَیْءٌ ؕ اُولٰٓئِكَ الَّذِیْنَ لَمْ یُرِدِ اللّٰهُ اَنْ یُّطَهِّرْ قُلُوْبُهُمْۚ لَّهُمْ فِی الدُّنْیَا خِزْیٌ وَلَهُمْ فِی الْاٰخِرَةِ عَذَابٌ عَظِیْمٌ

O Prophet! Do not grieve over those who hasten into disbelief... Whoever God wills to misguide, you can do nothing for them. They are those whose hearts God has not willed to purify. They will face humiliation in this world and a severe punishment in the Hereafter (Surat al-Ma'idah, verse 41).

**Commentary:** If God Himself has chosen not to purify certain people's hearts, why did He send a Prophet to struggle with them? This raises a theological paradox: why hold the Prophet accountable if their fate was already determined by divine will?

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أَوَلَمْ يَرِ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا أَنَّ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ كَانَتَا رَتْقًا فَفَتَقْنَاهُمَا وَجَعَلْنَا مِنَ الْمَاءِ كُلَّ شَيْءٍ حَيٍّ أَفَلَا يُؤْمِنُونَ

Do those who disbelieve not see that the heavens and the earth were once joined together before We split them apart? We made every living thing from water. Will they not then believe? (Surat al-Anbiya, verse 30).

**Commentary:** This verse claims that the heavens and the earth were once fused and later separated. Modern scientific research does not confirm such a literal scenario. The Qur'an describes the heavens as if they were a solid structure covering the earth, and it never refers to the earth's spherical form or rotation. This indicates that the cosmology in the Qur'an reflects the limited worldview of seventh-century Arabia rather than universal knowledge.

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وَجَعَلْنَا السَّمَاءَ سَقْفًا مَحْفُوظًا وَهُمْ عَنْ آيَاتِهَا مُعْرِضُونَ

We made the sky a protected canopy, yet they turn away from its signs (Surat al-Anbiya, verse 32).

أَلَمْ تَرَ أَنَّ اللَّهَ سَخَّرَ لَكُم مَّا فِي الْأَرْضِ وَالْفُلْكَ تَجْرِي فِي الْبَحْرِ بِأَمْرِهِ وَيُمْسِكُ السَّمَاءَ أَنْ تَقَعَ عَلَى الْأَرْضِ إِلَّا بِإِذْنِهِ إِنَّ اللَّهَ بِالنَّاسِ لَرَّءُوفٌ رَحِيمٌ

Do you not see that God has made everything on earth subservient to you, and that the ships sail the seas by His command? He holds back the sky from falling upon the earth except by

His permission. Truly God is compassionate and merciful toward humankind (Surat al-Hajj, verse 65).

**Commentary:** Scientifically, the sky is not a solid object that could collapse on the earth. This is an outdated conception of the cosmos. Furthermore, the claim that God is simultaneously wrathful and merciful raises a contradiction: how can the one who burns and punishes also be described as compassionate? Such verses appear to reflect the intellectual horizon of their time and may have served to strengthen religious authority.

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قُلْ مَنْ رَبُّ السَّمَوَاتِ السَّبْعِ وَرَبُّ الْعَرْشِ الْعَظِيمِ

Say: Who is the Lord of the seven heavens and the Lord of the mighty Throne? (Surat al-Mu'minun, verse 86).

**Commentary:** Modern astronomy shows that there are no seven stacked heavens. Space is infinite and the earth is a rotating sphere, not a flat plane beneath a throne. This suggests that these verses reflect the cosmology of the Quraysh rather than scientific reality.

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لَا تَجْعَلُوا دُعَاءَ الرَّسُولِ بَيْنَكُمْ كَدُعَاءِ بَعْضِكُمْ بَعْضًا قَدْ يَعْلَمُ اللَّهُ الَّذِينَ يَسْتَلْلُونَ مِنْكُمْ لَوَادًّا فَيَحْذَرُ الَّذِينَ يُخَالِفُونَ عَنْ أَمْرِهِ أَنْ تُصِيبَهُمْ فِتْنَةٌ أَوْ يُصِيبَهُمْ عَذَابٌ أَلِيمٌ

Do not treat the Prophet's summons as you treat one another's calls. God knows those who slip away stealthily. Let those who oppose his command beware, lest a trial or a painful punishment befall them (Surat al-Nur, verse 63).

**Commentary:** This verse has been used to demand obedience to the Prophet and to Arab rulers. However, history shows that peoples of Europe, America, Australia, Canada, Russia, China, and Japan have long disobeyed the Prophet and God without experiencing divine calamities. Instead, they have led the world in science, technology, and civilization. Meanwhile, some Muslim societies have invoked the Qur'an to justify jihad, instilling fear in others, and have celebrated this as a divine mission.

فَلْ أُنَبِّئُكُمْ لَتَكْفُرُونَ بِالَّذِي خَلَقَ الْأَرْضَ فِي يَوْمَيْنِ وَتَجْعَلُونَ لَهُ أَندَادًا ذَٰلِكَ رَبُّ الْعَالَمِينَ

Say: Do you truly disbelieve in the One who created the earth in two days, and set up rivals with Him? That is the Lord of the worlds (Surat Fussilat, verse 9).

فَقَضَاهُنَّ سَبْعَ سَمَوَاتٍ فِي يَوْمَيْنِ وَأَوْحَىٰ فِي كُلِّ سَمَاءٍ أَمْرَهَا وَزَيَّنَّا السَّمَاءَ الدُّنْيَا بِمَصَابِيحَ وَحِفْظًا ذَٰلِكَ تَقْدِيرُ الْعَزِيزِ الْعَلِيمِ

Then He completed them as seven heavens in two days, and inspired in each heaven its command. We adorned the lowest heaven with lamps and guarded it. That is the decree of the Mighty, the All-Knowing (Surat Fussilat, verse 12).

اللَّهُ الَّذِي خَلَقَ السَّمَوَاتِ وَالْأَرْضَ وَمَا بَيْنَهُمَا فِي سِتَّةِ أَيَّامٍ ثُمَّ اسْتَوَىٰ عَلَى الْعَرْشِ مَا لَكُمْ مِّن دُونِهِ مِن وَلِيٍّ وَلَا شَفِيعٍ أَفَلَا تَتَذَكَّرُونَ

It is Allah who created the heavens, the earth, and all that is between them in six days, and then established Himself upon the Throne. You have no protector or intercessor besides Him. Will you not then reflect? (Surat al-Sajda, verse 4).

**Commentary:** The author of the Qur'an appears not to have noticed the contradiction between these verses. Two days plus two days equals four, not six. Yet in another verse, it claims the entire creation was completed in six days. This numerical inconsistency challenges the claim of divine precision.

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وَكَذَٰلِكَ أَوْحَيْنَا إِلَيْكَ قُرْآنًا عَرَبِيًّا لِتُنْذِرَ أُمَّ الْقُرَىٰ وَمَنْ حَوْلَهَا وَتُنْذِرَ يَوْمَ الْجَمْعِ لَا رَيْبَ فِيهِ فَرِيقٌ فِي الْجَنَّةِ وَفَرِيقٌ فِي السَّعِيرِ

Thus We have revealed to you an Arabic Qur'an so that you may warn the Mother of Cities (Mecca) and those around it, and warn of the Day of Gathering, about which there is no doubt: a group will be in Paradise and a group will be in the blazing Fire (Surat al-Shura, verse 7).

**Commentary:** This verse reveals that the Qur'an's message was originally intended for Mecca and its surrounding area. The author does not show awareness that the earth is round, or that humanity exists on distant continents such as the Americas and Australia where people do not speak Arabic. This raises the question: is the Qur'an truly a universal message, or was it meant primarily for the Arabs of its time? After reading such verses, one must ask

whether humanity should remain bound to a seventh-century Arabian tribal worldview, or break free from it and move toward universal human values.

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ثُمَّ أَخَذْتُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا فَكَيْفَ كَانَ نَكِيرِ

Then I seized those who disbelieved — so how was My punishment! (Surat Fatir, verse 26).

**Commentary:** Yet, despite the majority of people in China, Japan, America, Australia, Europe, and Canada being non-believers by Islamic standards, they have not been struck by divine punishment. On the contrary, these societies have prospered, becoming centers of science, innovation, and human progress. Meanwhile, the lands of many Muslim societies have been plagued by war, extremism, and regression.

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وَالشَّمْسُ تَجْرِي لِمُسْتَقَرٍّ لَهَا ذَلِكَ تَقْدِيرُ الْعَزِيزِ الْعَلِيمِ

The sun runs to its appointed place of rest. That is the decree of the Mighty, the All-Knowing (Surat Ya-Sin, verse 38).

لَا الشَّمْسُ يَنْبَغِي لَهَا أَنْ تُدْرِكَ الْقَمَرَ وَلَا اللَّيْلُ سَابِقُ النَّهَارِ وَكُلٌّ فِي فَلَكٍ يَسْبَحُونَ

It is not for the sun to overtake the moon, nor does the night outstrip the day. Each is swimming in its orbit (Surat Ya-Sin, verse 40).

**Commentary:** These verses suggest that the sun and moon are both in motion relative to the earth, implying a geocentric worldview. Modern science, however, shows that the earth rotates on its axis and orbits the sun — not the other way around. This discrepancy points to a seventh-century understanding of the cosmos, not divine omniscience.

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أَفْتَرَبَتِ السَّاعَةُ وَانْشَقَّ الْقَمَرُ

The Hour has drawn near, and the moon has split (Surat al-Qamar, verse 1).

**Commentary:** This verse was revealed more than 1,400 years ago, yet the Hour has not come, nor has the moon been split. Such unfulfilled predictions should prompt critical reflection: why are these verses still recited without question? For centuries they were used to instill fear, but in modern times their literal meaning appears hollow, suggesting that these texts may no longer hold the same authority they once did.

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مَنْ ذَا الَّذِي يُقْرِضُ اللَّهَ قَرْضًا حَسَنًا فَيُضَاعِفَهُ لَهُ وَلَهُ أَجْرٌ كَرِيمٌ

Who is it that offers God a goodly loan, so that He may multiply it for him, and for him there will be a noble reward? (Surat al-Hadid, 11).

**Commentary:** Many verses state that God is free of need from everyone—so why would He ask for a “loan” from people? Did the Prophet lack funds and therefore frame appeals in this way? Was part of the pilgrimage financed by such loans from ordinary people to support the interests of the Quraysh clan, or is this akin to a divine “bank” managed by the Saudi royal family?

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هُوَ اللَّهُ الَّذِي لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا هُوَ الْمَلِكُ الْقُدُّوسُ السَّلَامُ الْمُؤْمِنُ الْمُهَيْمِنُ الْعَزِيزُ الْجَبَّارُ الْمُتَكَبِّرُ سُبْحَانَ اللَّهِ عَمَّا يُشْرِكُونَ

He is Allah: there is no deity but He—the Sovereign, the Holy, the Source of Peace, the Giver of Security, the Guardian, the Mighty, the Compeller, the Supremely Great. Exalted is Allah above what they associate with Him (Surat al-Hashr, 23).

**Commentary:** If God remedies all wrongs and protects the oppressed, why have Turks, Azeris, Arabs, and Persians occupied Kurdistan and shed Kurdish blood for generations? Shouldn't God have shielded the Kurds from such cruelty, especially when these acts are committed in His name? The ancient Zoroastrian sanctuary of the Kurds in the city of Nafar was, by many accounts, holier and more splendid than Mecca and Medina—so why did 'Umar ibn al-Khattab destroy it, decapitate faithful Kurds, and bury their sacred sites? And if anyone dared to strike Mecca or Medina today and justify it verse by verse, what would the Saudi authorities do?

إِنْ تَقْرَضُوا اللَّهَ قَرْضًا حَسَنًا يَضَاعِفْهُ لَكُمْ وَيَغْفِرْ لَكُمْ وَاللَّهُ شَكُورٌ حَلِيمٌ

If you lend to God a goodly loan, He will multiply it for you and forgive you. God is Most Appreciative, Most Forbearing (Surat al-Taghabun, 17).

**Commentary:** If the Qur'an says God needs nothing from anyone, why does it call for loans? And if interest is forbidden, why does God promise multiplied returns? Through whom are these loans delivered to God? If prophets and imams once acted as intermediaries, are today's leaders—Erdogan, Khamenei, or Saudi sheikhs—now the recipients of people's money and gold on God's behalf? If this is not a contradiction, what is? One must use reason: the Qur'an here reads like political rhetoric and a mechanism of control. Religious elites understand these inconsistencies but, out of self-interest, keep people obedient and paying. If the public realized these texts served manipulation, the business of clerics and power-holders would collapse—and they would lose their favored status.

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يَا بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ اذْكُرُوا نِعْمَتِيَ الَّتِي أَنْعَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ وَأَنِّي فَضَّلْتُكُمْ عَلَى الْعَالَمِينَ

O Children of Israel, remember My favor which I bestowed upon you, and that I preferred you above all peoples (Surat al-Baqarah, 40).

**Commentary:** Here, God appears to differentiate among nations He Himself created, which undermines claims of universal equality. Is this truly God's word—or the voice of the Quraysh clan? Either God or the Quraysh must bear responsibility for this inequality. Surely God would not create humanity only to render them subjects of Arab supremacy. This suggests a human authorship for such passages rather than divine origin.

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فَوَيْلٌ لِلَّذِينَ يَكْتُبُونَ الْكِتَابَ بِأَيْدِيهِمْ ثُمَّ يَقُولُونَ هَذَا مِنْ عِنْدِ اللَّهِ لِيَسْتَرْوُا بِهِ ثَمَنًا قَلِيلًا فَوَيْلٌ لَهُمْ مِمَّا كَتَبَتْ أَيْدِيهِمْ وَوَيْلٌ لَهُمْ مِمَّا يَكْسِبُونَ

So woe to those who write the Book with their own hands and then say, "This is from God," so that they may gain a small price thereby. Woe to them for what their hands have written, and woe to them for what they earn (Surat al-Baqarah, 79).

**Commentary:** This verse condemns people who author texts and falsely claim divine origin. But why would God threaten those writers rather than simply present a clearer revelation beyond dispute? In our time, if someone criticizes a scripture and writes a stronger counter-text, society can debate and choose. If such a domineering stance is attributed to God against His “servants,” it would be unacceptable today—more consistent with the posture of the Quraysh than with a universally compassionate deity.

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ثُمَّ أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ سَكِينَتَهُ عَلَى رَسُولِهِ وَعَلَى الْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَأَنْزَلَ جُنُودًا لَمْ تَرَوْهَا وَعَذَّبَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا وَذَلِكَ جَزَاءُ الْكَافِرِينَ

Then God sent down His tranquility upon His Messenger and upon the believers, and sent down hosts you did not see, and He punished those who disbelieved. That is the recompense of the disbelievers (Surat al-Tawbah, 26).

**Commentary:** If unseen armies can be dispatched, why not send them to expel Arab, Persian, Turkish, and Azeri occupiers from Kurdistan? Let this divine support be the Kurds’ light—toppling the thrones of those who wrong them. Kurdish religious leaders ought to declare this openly in mosques day and night if they truly believe it.

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فَإِذَا انسَلَخَ الْأَشْهُرُ الْحُرُمُ فَاقْتُلُوا الْمُشْرِكِينَ حَيْثُ وَجَدْتُمُوهُمْ وَخُذُوهُمْ وَأَحْصُرُوهُمْ وَأَقْعُدُوا لَهُمْ كُلَّ مَرْصِدٍ إِن تَابُوا وَأَقَامُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَءَاتَوْا الزَّكَاةَ فَخَلُّوا سَبِيلَهُمْ إِنَّ اللَّهَ غَفُورٌ رَحِيمٌ

When the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them, capture them, besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every outpost. But if they repent, establish prayer, and give alms, then let them go their way. Truly, God is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful (Surat al-Tawbah, 5).

**Commentary:** Put plainly, this legitimizes militant action. The Qur’an advises distance from unbelievers when weak, then issues harsher commands when power is gained—manipulating the people of the day. It becomes clear that Qur’an and Islam were leveraged for Arab interests—especially those of the Quraysh. Since that project succeeded, other states copied it, and even in the twenty-first century many peoples remain swayed by the same template.

يَا أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ جَاهِدِ الْكُفَّارَ وَالْمُنَافِقِينَ وَاغْلُظْ عَلَيْهِمْ وَمَأْوَاهُمْ جَهَنَّمُ وَبِئْسَ الْمَصِيرُ

O Prophet, wage jihad against the disbelievers and the hypocrites, and be harsh with them. Their abode is Hell—what a wretched end (Surat al-Tawbah, 73).

يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا قَاتِلُوا الَّذِينَ يَلُونَكُمْ مِنَ الْكُفَّارِ وَلْيَجِدُوا فِيكُمْ غِلْظَةً وَاعْلَمُوا أَنَّ اللَّهَ مَعَ الْمُتَّقِينَ

O you who believe, fight the disbelievers nearest to you; let them find severity in you, and know that God is with the God-fearing (Surat al-Tawbah, 123).

**Commentary:** From these verses it appears that Islam is a religion of warfare and killing rather than peace, forgiveness, and generosity.

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خُذْ مِنْ أَمْوَالِهِمْ صَدَقَةً تُطَهِّرُهُمْ وَتُزَكِّيهِمْ بِهَا وَصَلِّ عَلَيْهِمْ إِنَّ صَلَاتَكَ سَكَنٌ لَهُمْ وَاللَّهُ سَمِيعٌ عَلِيمٌ

Take alms from their wealth to purify and cleanse them thereby, and pray for them—your prayers bring them tranquility. And God is All-Hearing, All-Knowing (Surat al-Tawbah, 103).

**Commentary:** The Prophet, under this pretext, appropriated people's wealth—hence why today certain Kurdish landowners take zakat, “offerings,” and donations for themselves.

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لَكُمْ دِينُكُمْ وَلِيَ دِينِ

Your religion is yours, and my religion is mine (Surat al-Kafirun, 6).

**Commentary:** When power was in his favor, the Prophet decreed killing and jihad; when he faced weakness, he said, “Your religion for you.” We do not accept Islam on those terms.

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قَدْ مَكَرَ الَّذِينَ مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ فَأَتَى اللَّهَ بُنْيَانُهُمْ مِنَ الْقَوَاعِدِ فَحَرَّ عَلَيْهِمُ السَّقْفُ مِنْ فَوْقِهِمْ وَأَتْلَهُمُ الْعَذَابُ مِنْ حَيْثُ لَا يَشْعُرُونَ

Those before them devised plots, but God came upon their buildings from the foundations, and the roof fell upon them from above; then punishment came upon them from where they did not perceive (Surat al-Nahl, 26).

**Commentary:** Are You not better than Turks, Azeris, Persians, and Arabs—why, then, do You not bring down their houses upon them?

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وَإِنْ مِنْ قَرْيَةٍ إِلَّا نَحْنُ مُهْلِكُوهَا قَبْلَ يَوْمِ الْقِيَامَةِ أَوْ مُعَذِّبُوهَا عَذَابًا شَدِيدًا كَانَ ذَلِكَ فِي الْكِتَابِ مَسْطُورًا

There is no town but that We will destroy it before the Day of Resurrection or punish it with severe punishment; that is written in the Book (Surat al-Isra', 58).

وَمَنْ أَعْرَضَ عَنْ ذِكْرِي فَإِنَّ لَهُ مَعِيشَةً ضَنْكًا وَنَحْشُرُهُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ أَعْمَى

Whoever turns away from My remembrance will have a constricted life, and on the Day of Resurrection We will raise him blind (Surat Ta-Ha, 124).

**Commentary:** These passages are filled with threats and fear. From a psychological perspective, they drive people toward submission and self-suppression under the faith. Muslims thus live in fear both in this world and the next. Words of fear, punishment, fire, burning, threat, and grave are repeated more than 691 times in the Qur'an. The Prophet proved to be a master psychologist of his age; by incessant repetition he could successfully manipulate the minds of the peoples around him.

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وَقِيلَ لِلَّذِينَ اتَّقَوْا مَاذَا أَنْزَلَ رَبُّكُمْ قَالُوا خَيْرٌ لِلَّذِينَ أَحْسَنُوا فِي هَذِهِ الدُّنْيَا حَسَنَةٌ وَلَدَارُ الْآخِرَةِ خَيْرٌ وَلَنِعْمَ دَارُ الْمُتَّقِينَ

And it is said to those who are God-fearing, "What has your Lord sent down?" They say, "Good." For those who do good in this world there is good, and the Abode of the Hereafter is better; how excellent is the dwelling of the God-fearing (Surat al-Nahl, 30).

جَنَّاتُ عَدْنٍ يَدْخُلُونَهَا يُجْرَى مِنْ تَحْتِهَا الْأَنْهَارُ لَهُمْ فِيهَا مَا يَشَاءُونَ كَذَلِكَ يَجْزِي اللَّهُ الْمُتَّقِينَ

Gardens of perpetual residence which they will enter; rivers flow beneath them; whatever they desire will be there for them. Thus does God reward the God-fearing (Surat al-Nahl, 31).

**Commentary:** God's promise of reward is reiterated more than 182 times in the Qur'an. Such repetition has been a principal tool for conditioning the peoples of the region, and in the end Islam has been steadily losing adherents.

وَمَنْ كَانَ فِي هَذِهِ أَعْمَىٰ فَهُوَ فِي الْآخِرَةِ أَعْمَىٰ وَأَضَلُّ سَبِيلًا

Whoever is blind in this world will be blind in the Hereafter and even further astray (Surat al-Isrā', 72).

**Commentary:** God Himself created the blind—how, then, can He speak of them with contempt and disrespect? Should God belittle His own creation? Does this not reveal the Qur'an to be a human composition?

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يَا أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ إِنَّا أَحْلَلْنَا لَكَ أَزْوَاجَكَ الَّتِي ءَاتَيْتَ أَجُورَهُنَّ وَمَا مَلَكَتْ يَمِينُكَ مِمَّا أَفَاءَ اللَّهُ عَلَيْكَ وَبَنَاتِ عَمَتِكَ وَبَنَاتِ خَالَكَ وَبَنَاتِ خَالَاتِكَ الَّتِي هَاجَرْنَ مَعَكَ وَامْرَأَةً مُّؤْمِنَةً إِن وَهَبْتَ نَفْسَهَا لِلنَّبِيِّ إِنْ أَرَادَ النَّبِيُّ أَنْ يَسْتَنْكِحَهَا خَالِصَةً لَّكَ مِنْ دُونِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ قَدْ عَلِمْنَا مَا فَرَضْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ فِي أَزْوَاجِهِمْ وَمَا مَلَكَتْ أَيْمَانُهُمْ لِكَيْلَا يَكُونَ عَلَيْكَ حَرَجٌ وَكَانَ اللَّهُ غَفُورًا رَّحِيمًا

O Prophet, We have made lawful to you your wives whose dowries you have given, those your right hand possesses from what God has granted you in war, the daughters of your paternal uncles and aunts, the daughters of your maternal uncles and aunts who emigrated with you, and any believing woman who offers herself to the Prophet if the Prophet wishes to marry her—this is exclusively for you, not for the believers. We know what We have prescribed for them regarding their wives and those their right hands possess, so that there be no constraint upon you; and God is All-Forgiving, Most Merciful (Surat al-Ahzāb, 50).

**Commentary:** Why would God grant the Prophet personal license to marry at will, including with slave-women without marriage, while ordinary Muslims had no such choice? Is keeping many wives and concubines for personal pleasure a virtuous human act? Is this not enough to prompt Muslims to reconsider whether “Islam” means submission to the Prophet’s private wishes and, more broadly, to an Arab tribal order?

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هُوَ الَّذِي يُحْيِي وَيُمِيتُ فَإِذَا قَضَىٰ أَمْرًا فَإِنَّمَا يَقُولُ لَهُ كُن فَيَكُونُ

He is the One who gives life and causes death; when He decrees a matter, He only says to it “Be,” and it is (Surat Ghāfir, 68).

**Commentary:** Then why does God not decree, “Let the occupiers of Kurdistan—Persians, Azeris, Turks, and Arabs—depart,” and end the killing and occupation? Or command the

religious scholars to tell the Kurdish people the truth, lest His will turn against them and a severe punishment await them in the Hereafter?

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أَتْلُ مَا أُوحِيَ إِلَيْكَ مِنَ الْكِتَابِ وَأَقِمِ الصَّلَاةَ إِنَّ الصَّلَاةَ تَنْهَى عَنِ الْفَحْشَاءِ وَالْمُنْكَرِ وَلَذِكْرُ اللَّهِ أَكْبَرُ وَاللَّهُ يَعْلَمُ مَا تَصْنَعُونَ

Recite what has been revealed to you of the Book and establish prayer; truly prayer restrains from indecency and wrongdoing. And the remembrance of God is greater, and God knows what you do (Surat al-‘Ankabūt, 45).

**Commentary:** ‘Umar, Khomeini, Khamenei, Saddam Hussein, Bashar al-Assad, and Tayyip Erdoğan all prayed—so why did their prayers not prevent them from oppression and the killing of innocent people in Kurdistan? Does prayer become a means of conditioning the peoples of Kurdistan to the point that they kill their own Kurdish brothers while ignoring the brutality of Arab, Turkish, Azeri, and Persian occupiers?

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أَمَّا الَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوا وَعَمِلُوا الصَّالِحَاتِ فَلَهُمْ جَنَّاتُ الْمَأْوَى نُزُلًا بِمَا كَانُوا يَعْمَلُونَ

As for those who believe and do righteous deeds, for them are Gardens of Refuge as hospitality for what they used to do (Surat al-Sajda, 19).

**Commentary:** Are we to believe that ‘Umar, Khomeini, Saddam, Erdoğan, and all their lieutenants will be hosted in paradise beside rivers of wine and honey, while tens of thousands of enslaved Kurdish women and the hundreds of thousands of Kurds slaughtered by ‘Umar and his men, the 182,000 victims of the Anfal campaign, the tens of thousands killed by Khomeini’s jihad, and the 150,000 Kurds killed from Mustafa Kemal Pasha to Tayyip Erdoğan, will burn in hell—simply for being Kurds and lovers of freedom rather than rebels and occupiers?

أَوَلَمْ يَهْدِ لَهُمْ كَمْ أَهْلَكْنَا مِنْ قَبْلِهِمْ مِنَ الْقُرُونِ يَمْشُونَ فِي مَسْكَانِهِمْ إِنَّ فِي ذَلِكَ لَآيَاتٍ أَفَلَا يَسْمَعُونَ

Has it not become clear to them how many generations We destroyed before them, as they now walk in their dwellings? Surely in that are signs—will they not then hear? (Surat al-Sajda, 26).

**Commentary:** Should God not side with the Kurdish people and destroy, in their own houses, the Persians, Azeris, Turks, and Arabs who have occupied Kurdistan? Should God not write a verse for the salvation and freedom of forty-two million Kurds?



Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) was born in the year 570 CE in the city of Mecca. In 610 CE, in the cave of Hira, located about three kilometers from Mecca, it is said that God revealed the Qur'an to him through the angel Gabriel. In 622 CE, Muhammad migrated from Mecca to Medina, an event known as the Hijra. During this period, he gained many followers, and in 642 CE he launched an attack and brought Mecca under his rule. In other words, throughout his entire life, the Prophet was only able to convert a portion of the inhabitants of Mecca and Medina to Islam.

Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) had nine officially recognized wives. Among them were Aisha, the daughter of Umar, and Salma, the daughter of Abu Bakr, who were both married to him. Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet, was married to Ali, and Umm Kulthum, another daughter, was married to Uthman. These relatives later became the caliphs of Islam.

The caliphs themselves were not always in agreement over religious or political matters; indeed, Aisha (may God be pleased with her) once rode into battle on a camel near Medina against Ali (may God be pleased with him) in what became known as the Battle of the Camel. The Prophet of Islam passed away in 632 CE at the age of 63, leaving behind several wives and concubines.

The spread of Islam into Kurdistan dates back to the 7th century, between 634 and 644 CE. During this time, Caliph Umar (may God be pleased with him) launched military campaigns into Kurdistan under the banner of Islam. He is said to have declared to his forces: “O Muslims! Attack the infidels (the Kurds and the Zoroastrians), kill them in the name of God, plunder their wealth, and take their women and girls as sexual slaves (concubines).”

Thus, under the pretext of Islam, the Arabs invaded Kurdistan. They killed as many Kurds as they could and ravaged the land. At that time, the Kurds were Zoroastrians and believers in God, but Caliph Umar (may God be pleased with him) refused to acknowledge their God and declared: “There is no god but Allah (lā ilāha illā Allāh).” The Arabs, seeking to impose Arab culture and eradicate Kurdish culture, massacred Kurdish men, and forcibly taught Kurdish children to pray and fast in the Arab manner. The companions of the Prophet considered Kurdish women lawful (ḥalāl) captives, and subjected them to sexual exploitation. Thousands of beautiful Kurdish girls were selected, taken from their families, and transported to the Hejaz. Caliph Umar (may God be pleased with him) is said to have taken 113 Kurdish girls as his own sexual slaves.

Clearly, the Kurds did not accept Islam willingly. They were converted under the sword and through bloodshed. The Arabs’ goal was to plunder Kurdistan’s wealth, kill the innocent, and bury the dead in mass graves. Many Kurds were wounded or killed, and those who resisted Arab swords were enslaved, humiliated, and publicly paraded.

The remains of the Arabs’ atrocities still exist in Kurdistan today, with large mass graves scattered across the land. Beneath these mounds lie the bones of countless patriotic Kurds who refused to submit to the Arab Muslim invaders and gave their lives for dignity and freedom. Ironically, the graves of Arabs who died in the conquest of Kurdistan have been

turned into shrines (maqāms) and places of pilgrimage for some Kurds, even though these companions were in fact the enemies of our ancestors and shed Kurdish blood on our soil.

It must be recognized that one of the main reasons the Kurds have remained stateless and have not, like other nations, achieved independence and a recognized homeland is that since the era of Caliph Umar (may God be pleased with him), the Arabs deliberately divided the Kurds among several tribal and religious leaders. This division continues to plague the Kurdish nation even in the twenty-first century. The Arab armies remained in Kurdistan for several years until they fully entrenched their base in the region. By force and coercion, they also recruited local collaborators, giving them titles such as Sayyid (descendant of the Prophet), Sheikh (elder), Pir, Darwish, and Sufi. These figures served Arab interests, gathered Kurdistan's wealth, and delivered it to their Arab masters.

Although much of the Kurdish population has been culturally brainwashed and no longer knows the true history of these events, and many have become Muslims, today most of Kurdistan's wealth still falls into the hands of outsiders, and its resources continue to be exploited by occupiers.

The occupiers of Kurdistan have always used Islam as a tool to deceive the Kurdish people, to dominate them, to exploit their resources, and to strip them of their history. They have prevented Kurds from learning their own history and knowing their national interests. They have deliberately distracted many Kurds with endless religious disputes and promises of paradise so that they remain preoccupied with sectarian divisions rather than uniting to pursue their national freedom.

If Kurdistan were at peace today, it could be a paradise on earth. But as it stands, its wealth and joy are reaped by the occupiers, while much of the Kurdish population remains shackled by religious indoctrination and empty promises of a distant, unseen paradise.

Within Islam itself, there are numerous sects and schools, each claiming superiority over the others: Shafi'i, Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, the Qadiri order, Naqshbandi order, Rifa'i order, Bektashi, Ahl-e Haqq (Yarsanism), Shabak, Qalem Haji, Bawari, Feyli, Alevis, and the Twelver Shia.

## 4.6 – The Yezidi Religion

The Yezidi faith is one of the indigenous religions of the Kurdish people. Yezidis worship God in the Kurdish language and believe that God Himself speaks in Kurdish. Some Yezidis consider their religion to be a continuation or branch of ancient Zoroastrianism, though it has undergone certain changes over time and has survived repeated invasions and massacres by Muslims under the name “Yezidism.”

Yezidis believe in one supreme God, whom they call **Yazdān**, the creator of the universe, the seven archangels, and humanity. The greatest of these angels is known as **Melekê Tawûs** (the Peacock Angel), who plays a central role in their faith.

According to Yezidi belief, after death, every soul faces a form of divine judgment conducted by the seven archangels.

- Those whose misdeeds outweigh their good deeds fall into darkness.
- Those whose good and bad deeds are balanced are sent to a place called **Zinağa**, where they experience both joy and suffering.
- Those whose good deeds outweigh their sins are admitted into paradise.

This moral and spiritual system emphasizes personal responsibility and the ultimate triumph of good over evil.



The principal sanctuary of the Yezidis is **Lalish**, located near the city of Mosul in Southern Kurdistan. Lalish is considered the holiest site in the Yezidi faith and serves as a spiritual center for the community.

Each year, on the first day of the month of **Rezber** (October), Yezidis undertake a pilgrimage to Lalish to visit the tomb of **Pir Awde**, one of their most venerated saints. This annual pilgrimage is a deeply significant ritual, symbolizing renewal of faith, purification, and communal unity.

## 4.7 – The Yarsan (Ahl-e Haqq) Faith

“Pir Binyamin Shahoyi” is often cited as one of the earliest figures associated with the foundation of the Yarsan (Ahl-e Haqq) faith, but its formal establishment is attributed to **Sultan Sahak Barzinji**, who proclaimed the faith in 1250 CE.

The sacred book of the Yarsanis is called the **Daftar** (Daftar-i Pirdiwar), also known as the **Great Divan** or **Daftar-i Sar-Anjam** (“Book of Conclusion”). This scripture contains the teachings and verses of “Bahlul” and “Pasha Khwoshin of Luristan.” Additional religious books were composed over the centuries, including the **Daftar-i Ilbegi Jaf** in the fifteenth century, as well as the **Daftar-i Khan Ilmas**, **Daftar-i Pir Amir**, and **Daftar-i Baraka Goran** in the eighteenth century. “Sawa” and “Goran” are considered the most recent of the Yarsan religious texts.

According to the Yarsan faith, God manifests Himself through a series of divine incarnations and spiritual leaders, including **Brahim, Zoroaster, Sultan Sahak, Pir Musa, Dawud Doodani, Baba Yadgar, Daye Ramzbar**, and others. The faith also venerates great sages and philosophers such as **Kaykhosrow, Kawa the Blacksmith, Plato, Socrates, Hafiz, Bahlul Mahi, Baba Sarhang Doodani, Baba Naus Jaf, Baba Jil, and Pir Shaho**, who are believed to have been divinely inspired.

The Yarsanis have two principal spiritual centers (or “shrines”):

- The **inner sanctuary**, known as **Dastgāh-i Khawandgari** (Jem),
- And **Pirdiwar**, located near the village of Piran (Sheikhan) in the Hawraman region of Eastern Kurdistan.

The shrine of **Sultan Sahak** and the tombs of many great Yarsan saints are located in this region.

Unlike many other religions, the Yarsan faith does not teach a belief in eternal heaven or hell. Instead, it teaches that human deeds are recorded by **Pir Musa**, and that souls are reincarnated according to the quality of their actions. A person with virtuous deeds is reborn

into a higher and more noble form, whereas one with evil deeds may be reborn as an animal or in a lower state of existence.

It is worth noting that certain sects such as the **Haqqa** and the **Kakai** are sometimes considered offshoots of Yarsanism due to their close association with some Yarsan spiritual traditions and teachings.

## **Part Five**

### **5 - Factors Behind the Underdevelopment of Kurdish Society**

Kurdistan is a colonized country, and the occupiers have denied the Kurdish people the space to advance and, like other nations, to consolidate their identity and existence in a modern, progressive way.

Kurdish society has had nearly all avenues of progress blocked; consequently, it has not advanced as required in the economic, technological, governance, philosophical, cultural, and social domains.

The occupiers of Kurdistan, in pursuit of their economic interests, have imposed a coordinated and premeditated plan upon the people of Kurdistan. Any Kurd who has tried to make personal or collective progress has been directly suppressed by the reactionary enemies and occupiers of Kurdistan through killing, imprisonment, displacement, and exile. In this way, the Kurds have been prevented from reaching their goals and, unlike other peoples, from living in development, civility, and peace. The occupiers have produced illiteracy and ignorance, entrenched a clan-based culture, fostered manipulative organizations and armed forces, and elevated self-interested figures within Kurdish society.

So long as Kurdistan remains divided into four parts—and organizations themselves are fragmented in their approaches and interests—Kurdish society will remain underdeveloped and subordinated.

Kurdistan will take its first real step forward when all organizations actively work, in deed not just word, to secure national identity and to build a just, egalitarian society.

It is worth noting that the Kurdish people have repeatedly had valuable opportunities to move forward, but each time obstacles and crises have stood in the way.

The following factors are the primary reasons Kurds have not been able to capitalize on historic opportunities as needed:

### **1) Absence of a Kurdish National Institution**

There is no Kurdish national institution capable of representing all Kurds within Kurdistan and internationally. Such a national body should have the capacity to unify Kurdish constituencies and to advocate for and establish a Kurdish national identity at home and abroad. To date, Kurdistan has lacked a strong, charismatic institution of this kind.

In 1999, the **Kurdistan National Congress** was established in Brussels and issued a national manifesto, which had some impact at Rojava's level. Although it has not functioned as effectively as needed, it could be developed further.

Kurdistanis and Kurdish organizations should support a patriotic national institution to confront crises and challenges and to carry out national duties actively. Broad support from all patriotic currents would strengthen the Kurdish cause internationally. A truly national institution can craft unified programs and strategies to address challenges.

### **2) Lack of National Unity and Peace among Kurdish Organizations**

Because the Kurdish people were fragmented and Kurdistan was divided among four predatory occupiers, a strong Kurdish national unity has not taken shape to defend Kurdish identity and nationhood. This fragmentation has spawned diverse organizations in Kurdistan; some have used the name "Kurdistan" merely to serve their personal or party interests. Not only have certain self-interested groups failed to play a constructive role in resolving the Kurdish question, they have become sources of internal conflict—sometimes even collaborating with the occupiers against other Kurdish organizations.

### **3) Clientelist and Personalist Politics within Some Kurdish Organizations**

Artificial borders imposed by the occupiers and the constant conflict between occupying regimes—both among themselves and with the Kurds—have produced numerous organizations in Kurdistan. Some have thought only of personal gain, turning "Kurdism" into a business. Such groups do not solve the Kurdish question; rather, through ties and dependency on one or more occupiers, they have deepened the crisis and instability. This politics is unsustainable; leaders and cadres must rethink their paths, recognizing that such

policies push the national cause backward and ultimately harm all Kurds—including those very factions in the end.

As history shows, the absence of proper leadership and integrity within certain Kurdish organizations has weakened them and led to their collapse. The historic duty of every organization, member, and supporter is to focus on solutions to the Kurdish question and to devote their work solely to the national interests of all Kurds. Every Kurd must distance themselves from organizational and personal gain. Whenever national interests are endangered, members should correct their leaders—or at least refuse to follow misguided policies—especially those that spark fratricidal conflict under any name or banner. It is every Kurd's duty to refrain from participating in, or supporting, any plan that leads to Kurds killing Kurds.

Internal war is never in the Kurdish interest: on one side, occupiers exploit it; on the other, it serves the narrow interests of certain individuals, families, or organizations. In the end, the war-making leaders escape unscathed while, after thousands of Kurds kill one another, they reconcile. For example:

- **KDP vs. PUK:** Several rounds of internecine war cost thousands of Kurdish lives; later, Barzani and Talabani reconciled. Neither suffered losses—indeed, they profited, filling their banks with funds from Iran, Turkey, and Iraq.
- **Komala of Iranian Kurdistan vs. Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI):** Thousands were killed, yet no harm reached the families of Dr. Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Abdullah Mohtadi, Ebrahim Alizadeh, or Mansour Hekmat.
- **KDPI vs. KDPI–Revolutionary Leadership:** While the families of Abdullah Hassanzadeh and Jalil Ghadani lived safely in Europe and secured comfort for their children, hundreds of Kurdish fighters killed each other—only to reconcile years later.
- **Frequent clashes** between KDPI led by Mustafa Hijri and KDP led by Abdullah Hassanzadeh have sown chaos among the people while leaders continued to profit, using media spin to manipulate society and polish their personal histories.

#### 4) Kurdistan's Strategic Location and the Three Major Nations

Kurdistan sits amid three historically rival nations—**Turks, Arabs, and Persians**—none of whom, throughout history, has accepted the existence of the Kurdish nation. Each has contested Kurdish lands, turning Kurdistan into their battlefield. At the same time, all three have sold wars to the Kurds and unleashed brutal massacres in Kurdistan and the wider region.

The problem also lies with the regimes of **Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria**, which have never been liberty-minded or reformist, but rather self-interested dictatorships addicted to war and bloodshed. Sensing the wealth of Kurdish lands, they each sought larger slices of Kurdistan to increase their leverage over the others. None would acknowledge Kurdish nationhood; instead, they fought to absorb Kurdish territory and extract its resources. This policy has fueled their own national “progress” by constantly calling for war and training their peoples in violence, while the world’s advanced nations have invested in technology and science. Worse, this warlike mindset has been taught to their children as the ideal.

These nations must realize that peace and stability in the region are prerequisites for their own development. Without peace, they will fall further behind the technological world. Peace nurtures healthier psychology among peoples and leaders, and enables cultural and scientific progress. In embracing peace, Turks, Arabs, and Persians could rightly take pride—like other peoples—in liberty and advancement, harnessing the latest technologies for their own and others’ benefit.

To reach such progress and stability, regional regimes must develop **vision** and **self-restraint**. They should open the door to dialogue with the Kurdish nation and resolve identity issues peacefully. If the identities and rights of all peoples in the region are recognized and freedom and equality are secured, peace and progress will take root—becoming a source of pride and strength for the Middle East in the eyes of the world.

## 5) Strategic Mistakes of Kurdish Organizations and Their Recurrence

Some Kurdish organizations possess enough power and autonomy that they could take bold steps for peace in Kurdistan; yet they lack self-reflection and sound policy toward the Kurdish cause, thinking only of power, office, clan strength, and armed might. They are prepared to commit inhuman, unprincipled political acts—even to ignite fratricidal wars and take the lead in doing so.

(For example: **PDK, YNK, KDPI, KDP-Iran, all communist organizations, and Islamic groups.**)

First, leaders must understand that **Kurdistan belongs to all Kurds**, not a family estate or an organizational property to be traded for narrow personal or factional gain. Such organizations must correct themselves quickly and step back from erroneous politics. They should think seriously about solutions and take bold, peace-oriented steps.

It is a **national duty** for every political actor to place the national interest above organizational interest, and to labor with all strength to stabilize internal peace and resolve the Kurdish question at its roots. Organizational gains are temporary; national gains are enduring and will become a source of historic pride for all Kurds.

## 6) Weak National Consciousness and the Absence of a Kurdish Identity Among Many Kurds

One major reason for the non-establishment of a Kurdish state, and for the persistent problems of individual Kurds, is the **weakness of national feeling** and the reluctance to declare with pride: “I am Kurdish/Kurdistani.”

Most nations are sovereign and proud of their countries. Even small nations without a state possess strong national identity and unity in facing their national challenges.

Historically—even in the modern, globalized era—peoples with strong national consciousness have achieved independence and international recognition.

Of course, social problems cannot be solved by national sentiment alone; every member of society must also respect human rights and uphold solidarity and equality with all peoples.

But to solve any nation's problems requires **collective action**. Without strong national feeling, unity is impossible and nationhood remains out of reach. Think of Swedes, Japanese, and British: they proudly uphold their nation, flag, land, and language. Ask any one of them where they are from—they answer with pride. By contrast, many Kurds—inside Kurdistan or in the diaspora—identify themselves as Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, or Syrian and take pride in it. This is a tragedy: a psychological illness produced by occupiers who have taught Kurds to be ashamed of themselves, while instilling pride in their own children from early childhood.

Kurdistan has constantly been the target of cultural and national assaults. The greatest attacks have aimed at Kurdish children—training them from childhood to deny their Kurdishness. Through phrases like “I am Iranian/Iraqi/Syrian/Turkish,” the occupiers have colonized Kurdish minds, a process of **assimilation** so deep that many Kurds, even as adults, cannot recognize their true identity and proudly assume the occupier's. Even in the so-called “free” society of Rojava, many Kurds transmit this mindset to their children, teaching the occupier's ideology and introducing them to the world under the occupier's identity.

From classrooms and national anthems to cartoons, films, music, and cultural festivals, Kurdish children are indoctrinated with the occupier's identity. Textbooks are filled with pseudo-historical myths far from science; students must learn them to pass. This kills curiosity and saturates minds with religious superstition, leaving no time to study genuine Kurdish history or scientific inquiry. Meanwhile, occupiers deliberately fund regressive religious networks—Salafis, Ikhwan, madrasa movements, Mujahideen, Komala, the Islamic Movement, and Islamic Union—to keep Kurdish society distracted.

All of this is intentional and planned. Why do occupier nations invest heavily in their own history, geography, and religion, yet refuse to allow Kurds to study their language, history, and homeland? They know that if the Kurdish child's mind is colonized early, benefits will flow to the occupier later. It is no surprise that many Kurdish youths—even those with high-school or university degrees—know little of Kurdistan's true history and geography.

The psychological impact runs so deep that many Kurds living in free countries do not publicly identify as Kurdish; instead, they feel shame and take pride in being Iranian, Iraqi, Turkish, or Syrian. This is a **virus**—a deadly affliction—passed down generations. Kurdish consciousness

has been so eroded that even in Europe some Kurds feel ashamed to say they are Kurdistani and proudly adopt occupier labels. You will never hear a Turk, Arab, or Persian in Germany say “I am German” as a replacement for their own nationhood. This **deficit of national feeling** grips our people like a claw; if left untreated, it will consume future generations.

Some Kurds have been **psychologically hypnotized** into believing Kurds have no right to national identity because such claims are “nationalist,” while being Iranian or Iraqi is touted as “internationalist.” But why is Kurdish nationhood condemned as nationalism, while the occupiers’ ideologies—under the guise of “internationalism”—are promoted? Such groups preach internationalism but practice chauvinism, deceiving simple, uninformed Kurds. If they are truly humanist, why do they do nothing for Kurds and refuse to build a Kurdish internationalism? Why not struggle for the liberty and socialist emancipation of the peoples they themselves oppress? Kurds are poorer and more rightless than Persians, Arabs, and Turks. Why is love for Kurdish nation and land deemed a crime, while occupier ideologies are celebrated? In practice, these groups represent the occupiers’ power and work to derail the Kurdish national movement. (For example: **Komala and all wings, the Communist Party of Iran, socialists and the “left” across the four occupier states.**)

Some Kurdish organizations and figures, for their everyday comfort, collaborate with the occupiers. Cooperation must only occur within the framework of **Kurdish national interests**. In such sensitive ties, Kurds must act wisely, and teach the next generation the Kurdish language, culture, and national consciousness so they become more capable, aware, and Kurdistan-oriented.

## **7) Another Obstacle: 22 Arab Dictatorships**

There are **22 Arab states** that have consistently backed Iraq and Syria against the Kurds; all Islamic countries also support their co-religionists in Iran. Turkey, a key NATO member, receives comprehensive support from Western powers against Kurdish liberation movements. Because of regional and global economic and geopolitical interests, the Kurds have remained **without allies, without friends, and without recognition**. Those states pretending to be friends of the Kurds use the Kurds for short-term gain while rejecting Kurdistan’s independence and Kurdish identity.

Therefore, Kurds and Kurdish organizations must recognize their rights and national interests and take **united, determined steps** toward shared liberation. Every Kurd and every Kurdish organization should be clear about their plans and work within the framework of liberating the four parts of Kurdistan.

If Kurdistanis act in unity and wage a relentless **social struggle** free from narrow organizational interests under the banner “**Independence for Kurdistan—Occupiers Out,**” they can realistically reach liberation. Neighboring nations will also be freed from the historic afflictions of the Middle East. After success, the **public vigilance** of the Kurdish people will be essential to protect national gains.

If the enemies of Kurdistan realize that Kurdish unity and public solidarity are transforming the balance of power, compelling recognition of an **independent Kurdistan** at the level of international organizations, implementation will become far easier. Then, states that today use the Kurdish cause as a **geopolitical bargaining chip** will compete to build economic and diplomatic ties with Kurdistan.

#### **8) Lack of Modern Industry and Economic Opportunity**

Because of widespread unemployment, rooted largely in the **absence of modern industry** in Kurdistan, many people are forced to migrate to cities in the occupier states. **Poverty, joblessness, and hunger** have eroded cultural life and national identity in Kurdistan.

#### **9) Occupier-Mindedness—Even Among Some “Nationalist” Kurdish Organizations**

Some Kurdish “nationalist” groups are themselves **pro-occupier**—presenting themselves as “more Iranian than any Iranian” and promoting **pan-Iranianism**. Under banners such as autonomy, federalism, and similar slogans, they have, in effect, turned their backs on the Kurdish revolution and shared in the rule of the occupiers. By day they eat at the occupier’s table; by night they call themselves Kurdistanis, and by day again they are Iranian or Iraqi, etc. (For example: **Komala in all wings, the Communist Party of Iran, royalists, KDPI, KDP-Iran, PDK, YNK, all Islamic and leftist groups.**)

These currents must understand that slogans like “**I am more Iranian than any Iranian**” or “**Kurdistan is a poet’s fancy**” find no genuine audience—neither among the occupiers nor among the opposition. By prolonging these misguided policies, they serve the occupiers and further disgrace themselves in Kurdish public opinion. They must return to themselves as soon as possible and adopt a **Kurdistani national path**, striving honestly for **Kurdistan’s independence and reunification of all its parts**. As the proverb says: *“If your friend is flawed, correct him; do not smear mascara after the eyelid is torn.”*

## Part Six

### 6 - The Fundamental Rights of the People of Kurdistan

Possessing a national identity, equality before the law, freedom of thought and expression, the right to free voting, and the right to a referendum are among the fundamental rights of the people of Kurdistan.

It must be emphasized that these rights—of which every individual in any society should partake—have been stripped from Kurds by the occupiers of Kurdistan. The Kurdish individual, as a Kurdistan person, has not been granted the right to exist and to defend that existence. Instead, in order to prevent Kurds from owning an identity and a sovereign polity, the occupiers' identities have been imposed upon them.

Despite the occupiers' plans, part of the Kurdish people have not surrendered; rather, they have bravely taken to the arena and waged century-long struggles for national liberation and for the attainment of human values.

Those who have waged a tireless struggle for the independence of the sacred land of Kurdistan—and who have given their lives on this path—hold a special place in the hearts of patriots and are forever honored. The path of these patriots—toward the final goal of establishing Kurdistan's identity and securing a free and egalitarian life for all Kurdistanis—is sustained by the continued, unwavering struggle of the people of Kurdistan.

For the advancement of Kurdistan society, we need leadership that truly represents the people—men and women of conscience, freedom-seekers, and patriots—empowered to decide. The rule of law and the institutions of this society must operate under the oversight of competent civil bodies and work to realize the democratic demands of citizens. All residents must, without discrimination, enjoy equal rights before the law.

To establish and govern such a society, the people must build **popular organizations**. The intellectuals of this society must feel responsibility and, in order to construct it, take up leadership within civil organizations. They must also foster national unity, elevate public demands vis-à-vis power, raise awareness among the people, and guide them to claim their

inalienable rights. When public awareness reaches the level at which demands can be presented peacefully and humanely to those in power—and when these demands are pursued in a unified, organized way—then the people can compel the authorities to comply, and even initiate change. Thereafter, general elections can be held and the true representatives of the people can assume office within a new administration. That new authority must, through a **short transitional process**, implement the people's demands.

From day one, essential rights—freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, freedom of movement, and the freedom to form democratic associations—must be publicly proclaimed by the authorities. If power attempts to curtail these freedoms, the people must remain vigilant and, from the outset, demand them clearly, rejecting any present or future equivocation.

Improving people's economic conditions and advancing science and technology must form part of the state's plan and be addressed within a short time frame. A government deriving its legitimacy from the people must meet citizens' daily needs. Officials must work in line with public demands; if they cannot, the people must be strong enough to **lawfully change the government**.

Building such a popular order within Kurdistan entails specific difficulties. These challenges originate in Kurdistan's partition and in the fragmentation of Kurdish society—not only by the four occupying powers, but also within each Kurdish region itself, where society has been divided into social castes such as tribal chiefs, aghas, sheikhs, sayyids, and Kurmanj. This fragmentation was not the Kurds' choice; it was engineered by global forces and occupiers who imposed misfortune and partition upon Kurdistan. Consequently, the Kurdish road to freedom and independence is long, steep, and arduous; it demands a luminous vanguard and tireless revolutionary dedication.

To establish **popular sovereignty**, national consciousness must be greatly elevated, and the people of Kurdistan must correctly recognize their fundamental rights. To reach this objective, Kurds must resolve their internal obstacles—tribalism, agha-rule, clericalism, collaborationism, and hereditary privileges. In a modern society, the people are not divided

into castes; rather, every individual enjoys an equal place and opportunity. Unless the people of Kurdistan bring about this transformation within themselves, they will remain in the rear.

Kurdish youth and students must not repeat the mistakes of their forebears. To live alongside the advanced world, they must, in the realms of **human rights** and **progress**, work scientifically to transform society.

## Part Seven

### 7 - The National Culture of the Kurds

A set of components such as language, traditions, and shared values bind together the members of a society, and this collective system is called the **culture of that nation**.

#### 7.1 – The National Language

The most important and foundational element uniting the members of a nation is its language. Through language, a nation is able to preserve its culture and present its identity to the world. **The Kurdish language** is the most crucial marker distinguishing Kurds from neighboring nations, and for this reason it is regarded as the primary symbol of Kurdish national identity.

Kurdish is divided into several dialect groups:

- **Northern Kurdish (Kurmanji, Shikaki, Badini)**

Spoken by approximately **45% of the Kurdish population** in the regions of Northern Kurdistan (Bakur), Rojava (Western Kurdistan), the provinces of Duhok and Mosul in Southern Kurdistan, Urmia in Eastern Kurdistan, and among Kurdish communities in Syria, Khorasan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Lebanon.

- **Central Kurdish (Sorani)**

Spoken by roughly **30% of the Kurdish population** in the provinces of Sanandaj (Sine), Mukriyan, Sulaymaniyah, Erbil (Hewlêr), and Kirkuk.

- **Southern Kurdish (Kalhuri, Luri, Ilami)**

Spoken by around **20% of the Kurdish population** in the regions of Kermanshah, Luristan, Khuzestan, and Ilam.

- **Gorani (Hawrami, Zazaki or Dimilki)**

Spoken by approximately **5% of the Kurdish population**, mainly in the Hawraman region of Southern Kurdistan (Khanaqin), Eastern Kurdistan (Paveh), Dersim, Rojava, and along the Euphrates River basin.

A significant step in modern Kurdish language development was made by **Celadet Bedir Khan**, who in **1931** created the first **Kurdish Latin alphabet** alongside the existing Aramaic-based script. Between **1932 and 1943**, he published the influential Kurdish journal *Hawar* in Damascus. Up to issue No. 23, *Hawar* was printed in both Latin and Aramaic scripts; from issue No. 24 onward, it was published exclusively in the Latin script, which remains a cornerstone for the standardization of Kurdish Kurmanji today.



Celadet Bedir Khan (1893–1951)

## Main Challenges in the Kurmanji Alphabet

| Kurmanji Word                      | Sorani Word                     | Challenge  |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| Heîran, Herewez, Hefrîn<br>(Efrîn) | حه‌یران، هه‌ره‌وه‌ز،<br>هه‌فرین | Absence of the letters ح and ع – both replaced by <i>E</i> or <i>H</i> |
| Raz, Mizar                         | راز، مه‌زار                     | Lack of the letter ر – replaced by <i>R</i>                            |
| Gûl                                | گول                             | Lack of the letter گ – replaced by <i>L</i>                            |

## Proposed Solution:

- Write ع / ح as **ĥ / Ĥ**
- Write ر as **ř / Ř**
- Write گ as **ġ / Ğ**

**Note:** The Arabic letter ع is not an original Kurdish sound and may be written as ح without changing the pronunciation.

Example:

- Instead of هه‌لێشێش write **Ĥalîşîş**
- Instead of با‌هه‌ با‌ع write **Baĥe ba ĥ**

It should also be noted that Kurmanji is still written in the **Arabic-based script** in some regions. Zazaki is also written with the same script when not using Latin.

## Latin Kurdish Alphabet Proposal

For proper representation of Kurdish phonetics, **34 letters** are required in the Kurmanji Latin alphabet:

- **Vowels (10):**  
**A, E, Ê, I, Î, O, U, Û, W, Y** (short/long forms are carefully distinguished)

- **Consonants (24):**

**B, C, Ç, D, F, G, H, Ê, J, K, L, Ł, M, N, P, Q, R, Ê, S, Ş, T, V, X, Z**

This system ensures clear differentiation between sounds such as **ڤ vs ځ, ڙ vs ښ**, and distinguishes pharyngeal sounds lost in ordinary Latin writing.

## The Complete Kurdish Latin Alphabet (34 Letters)

To accurately represent all Kurdish sounds in writing, **34 letters** are required in the **Latin-based Kurdish alphabet**. These are divided into **10 vowels** and **24 consonants**:

### Vowels (10 letters)

| Letter     | Sound                        | Example (Kurmanji)      |
|------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>A a</b> | /a/ as in <i>av</i> (water)  | <i>av</i>               |
| <b>E e</b> | /e/ short                    | <i>em</i> (we)          |
| <b>Ê ê</b> | /e:/ long                    | <i>dêr</i> (monastery)  |
| <b>I i</b> | short bizroke (unstressed i) | <i>bira</i> (brother)   |
| <b>Î î</b> | /i:/ long                    | <i>pîr</i> (old)        |
| <b>O o</b> | /o/                          | <i>roj</i> (day)        |
| <b>U u</b> | /u/ short                    | <i>gur</i> (grave)      |
| <b>Û û</b> | /u:/ long                    | <i>çû</i> (went)        |
| <b>W w</b> | /w/ glide                    | <i>welat</i> (homeland) |
| <b>Y y</b> | /y/ glide (consonantal y)    | <i>yar</i> (friend)     |

## Consonants (24 letters)

| Letter       | Sound                      | Example (Kurmanji)       |
|--------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| <b>B b</b>   | /b/                        | <i>bajar</i> (city)      |
| <b>C c</b>   | /dʒ/ (j)                   | <i>cîhan</i> (world)     |
| <b>Ç ç</b>   | /tʃ/ (ch)                  | <i>çav</i> (eye)         |
| <b>D d</b>   | /d/                        | <i>dil</i> (heart)       |
| <b>F f</b>   | /f/                        | <i>ferheng</i> (culture) |
| <b>G g</b>   | /g/ hard g                 | <i>gund</i> (village)    |
| <b>H h</b>   | /h/                        | <i>heval</i> (friend)    |
| <b>Ê ê</b>   | pharyngeal /ħ/ (for ع / ح) | <i>êal</i>               |
| <b>J j</b>   | /ʒ/ (zh)                   | <i>jîn</i> (life)        |
| <b>K k</b>   | /k/                        | <i>kurd</i> (Kurd)       |
| <b>L l</b>   | /l/                        | <i>law</i> (boy)         |
| <b>Ł ł</b>   | velarized /ɫ/ (for ل)      | <i>got</i> (flower)      |
| <b>M m</b>   | /m/                        | <i>mal</i> (house)       |
| <b>N n</b>   | /n/                        | <i>nav</i> (name)        |
| <b>P p</b>   | /p/                        | <i>pirtûk</i> (book)     |
| <b>Q q</b>   | uvular /q/                 | <i>qes</i> (short)       |
| <b>R r</b>   | flap /r/                   | <i>roja</i> (day)        |
| <b>Êr êr</b> | trilled /r/ (for ر)        | <i>roj</i> (sun)         |
| <b>S s</b>   | /s/                        | <i>sivîk</i> (small)     |
| <b>Ş ş</b>   | /ʃ/ (sh)                   | <i>şev</i> (night)       |
| <b>T t</b>   | /t/                        | <i>tav</i> (sunlight)    |
| <b>V v</b>   | /v/                        | <i>vîn</i> (love)        |
| <b>X x</b>   | /x/ (kh)                   | <i>xwe</i> (self)        |
| <b>Z z</b>   | /z/                        | <i>zarok</i> (child)     |

The Kurdish alphabets of Central Kurdish (Sorani), Southern Kurdish, and Hawrami consist of **33 letters**, of which **seven are vowels** and **twenty-six are consonants**. They are written as follows:

#### Kurdish Alphabet with English Pronunciation

| Letter | Pronunciation (English)           |
|--------|-----------------------------------|
| ر      | r (rolled)                        |
| د      | d                                 |
| خ      | kh (like German “Bach”)           |
| ح      | ḥ (voiceless pharyngeal “h”)      |
| چ      | ch (as in “chair”)                |
| ج      | j (as in “jam”)                   |
| ت      | t                                 |
| پ      | p                                 |
| ب      | b                                 |
| ء، ا   | ’, a (glottal stop and “a” sound) |
| ق      | q (deep “k” sound)                |
| ڤ      | v                                 |
| ف      | f                                 |
| غ      | gh (voiced “kh”)                  |
| ع      | ‘ (voiced pharyngeal stop)        |
| ش      | sh                                |
| س      | s                                 |
| ژ      | zh (like “measure”)               |
| ز      | z                                 |
| ړ      | rr (strongly rolled r)            |
| وو     | û (long “oo” sound)               |
| و      | w or short “o” (depending on use) |

| Letter | Pronunciation (English)    |
|--------|----------------------------|
| ه      | h                          |
| هـ     | h (word-initial form of ه) |
| ن      | n                          |
| م      | m                          |
| ل      | ɫ (dark l, velarized "l")  |
| ل      | l                          |
| گ      | g                          |
| ک      | k                          |
| ئ      | ê (long "e" sound)         |
| ی      | y or î (depending on use)  |
| ۆ      | o (short "o" sound)        |

## Two Main Issues with the Central Kurdish Alphabet

| Latin Alphabet   | Aramaic Alphabet  | Issue  |
|--|---|--|
| <b>Tifinik</b> (Latin) is easier to write than Aramaic. For example, the word "تفنگ" (meaning <i>gun</i> ) is written more clearly in Latin. | "ئ" نه‌ووسینی بزۆینی - ١<br>که به بزۆکه ناسراوه.<br>به‌لام به لاتینی زۆر باش<br>جیاکراونه‌ته‌وه | <b>1 – Lack of a clear distinction</b> between the short vowel "i" (known as <i>bizroke</i> ), whereas in the Latin alphabet this distinction is much clearer.                 |
| <b>Zerdeştî / Zerdeştyar</b> – in the Aramaic alphabet, both words are written with the same "ی".  | نه‌بوونی هیچ - ٣<br>جیاوازیه‌ک له نێوان "ی"<br>له‌گه‌ڵ "ی" ی کورت.<br>"y" له‌گه‌ڵ "ئ" به‌لاتینی | <b>3 – No distinction</b> is made between "ی" representing the long vowel î and the consonant y. In the Latin alphabet, this difference is clearly represented as "î" and "y." |

## 7.2 – Character and Disposition

The modes of living—feeling and comportment, sitting and dining, social interactions, and, in general, the everyday patterns that bind a people together—constitute the character and disposition of that nation.

The following points broadly describe aspects of Kurdish character and disposition:

- **Hospitality.** Hospitality is one of the most celebrated Kurdish virtues. Yet it has also fostered a certain openness that, historically, others have exploited—arriving first as guests and later becoming occupiers and rulers over the Kurdish people. For example, the arrival of Azeris in the regions of Urmia, Salmas, Khoy, Miandoab, Shahindej, Naqadeh, and Mahabad; Turkmen and Arabs in Kirkuk, Mosul, and Khanaqin; Turks across the cities of Northern Kurdistan; and Arabs throughout the towns of Western Kurdistan.
- **Self-perception and comparison.** A common weakness is the tendency of each individual Kurd to regard themselves as more knowledgeable, alert, industrious, honest, courageous, important, and sensitive than other Kurds, yet to feel smaller when measured against Turks, Arabs, or Persians. In short: a lion at home, deferential outside. This disposition often begins at the most basic social unit—the family—then spreads into society at large and even into Kurdish organizations.
- **Religiosity without depth.** Another pervasive issue is excessive attachment to religious identities. Many Kurds are intensely religious and take pride in their piety, but when confronted with theological questions they frequently adopt firm positions without real understanding—captured in the saying, “A man unaware of the cost of his own beads.” Much of life then passes without grasping worldly realities or seeking knowledge, and expressions such as “Leave it to God,” “By God’s will,” “Only God can mend it,” and “Lower your head and worship” become default responses.
- **Repetition as ritual.** It is worth noting that constant repetition of anything can become mere habit; living by habit turns life into an ailment. Consider the Kurdish tendency—caricatured as repeating the same statement seventeen times a day in another language—without recognising what is being said. No one needs to introduce themselves seventeen times a day to the same person. Likewise, one need not pray seventeen

cycles daily simply to announce belief; if the faith is genuine, a single sincere affirmation suffices. Once the inner compulsion subsides, one may live wholesomely and attend to other challenges. Yet these ritualised habits have been encouraged by neighbouring powers to keep Kurds preoccupied with identity disputes and sectarian concerns rather than inquiry and progress.

- **Self-sacrifice and its opposite.** Kurdish culture can be extraordinarily self-sacrificial—and equally, at times, its reverse. A Kurd may readily risk life for a friend, yet if conflict arises with that same friend, it can seem natural to level accusations, insult, or even seek revenge.
- **Time and punctuality.** Kurds are often imprecise with time, routinely setting their own “Kurdish hour” behind the clock, with delays of four to five standard hours not uncommon.
- **Historical roots of collaboration.** There is a deep-rooted tradition of collaboration that has harmed Kurdish collective interests. The figures known as *jash* (collaborators) and *sîxor* (informants) have, at times, outnumbered *peshmerga* and guerrilla fighters many times over. The underlying cause lies in the economic degradation imposed by occupiers, which has pushed many Kurdish families to focus solely on day-to-day survival. Some have become so deprived that they scarcely reflect on their own identity.
- **Inequality in family and society.** In many Kurdish households and communities, equality is not truly observed. The rights of women, children, and people with disabilities are often openly curtailed. Patriarchy dominates; women are treated as servants of the household, marketable commodities, or “half persons,” subjected to controlling behaviour. Disputes instigated by men within extended families are sometimes “resolved” through the coerced marriage of a girl, or even by handing over a girl from one clan to another—practices unthinkable were the genders reversed.
- **Female genital cutting.** The cutting of girls (*khatanakirdin/mitkabrrîn*) remains a harmful practice in some areas. Many Kurdish women undergo it in childhood. It is often treated as a religious duty, with little awareness of its lasting damage—diminished sexual health and the deprivation of natural pleasure. This is a wrongful, inhumane act.

- **Falsehood and calumny.** Lying, slander, and defamation are hallmarks of those who have occupied Kurdistan and, over time, some Kurds have internalised these behaviours. For some, it has become commonplace to claim that an event occurred when it did not, or to disparage another Kurd through fabrication—behaviour some would never direct toward occupiers, against whom they prefer silence or compliance.
- **Empty formalities.** Performative, meaningless politeness is widespread. Shopkeepers may repeatedly insist “Be my guest,” “It’s on me,” or “Allow me to pay,” even while hoping to extract the highest price. When neighbours exchange home visits, both may extend earnest invitations to each other’s homes while fully aware neither will follow through. When a group must settle a bill, a showy dispute can ensue over who pays—behaviour that, among truly urbane people, appears unseemly. Good form would be to decide beforehand, or, if one offers to pay, for the others to accept graciously.
- **Violence against women.** So-called “honour” killings and assaults on girls and women are grievous blots that some Kurds, regrettably, have even treated as points of pride. Those who perpetrate or justify such acts suffer from deep moral and psychological sickness; through these inhumane practices, they have stained the Kurdish nation’s reputation before the world. Reactionary honour-killing traditions, amplified by the sensation-seeking media of occupying powers and Kurdish adversaries, have distorted global perceptions of Kurds. Some men habitually accuse their wives, subject them to insult, beatings, and even prolonged psychological and physical abuse—behaviours rooted in inner corruption and a worldview that projects their own darkness onto others.
- **Hygiene and public health.** It is lamentable that some Kurds remain careless about hygiene. A person may handle intimate areas and, moments later, shake hands or break bread without washing. At communal feasts, unwashed hands may pass through shared dishes and sweets. Customs of kissing and cheek-to-cheek greetings spread viruses during visits and gatherings. Carelessness is especially evident around meal preparation, and traditional foods—from herb mixes to dairy and meat—are sometimes handled without proper cleanliness.
- **Reading and judgment.** Kurds, generally, do not read enough. Unless pressured by requirement or necessity, many pay scant attention to books, newspapers, or

journals. People often pronounce judgments on subjects they have not studied, engaging in blind adjudication. This is a societal ailment that few acknowledge. Kurds must read more widely and weigh diverse perspectives; then, when speaking, do so with humility—“this is how it seems to me”—rather than with claims of absolute certainty. No field of knowledge is truly absolute; most subjects admit many reasoned views.

- **Newroz as national festival.** A distinctive unifying trait is the celebration of Newroz as the national festival. With Newroz, the Kurdish new year begins, spring arrives, and the natural world of Kurdistan is renewed.



## Chapter Eight

### 8 – Tragic Disasters in Kurdistan at the End of the Twentieth Century

The eight-year bombing campaign against Eastern and Southern Kurdistan by the occupying forces of Iran and Iraq stands as one of the darkest chapters in Kurdish history.

The popular uprising of the peoples of Iran—and particularly of the Kurds in Eastern Kurdistan—in the winter of 1979 marked the downfall of the dictatorial and racist Pahlavi monarchy. Soon after, several clerics under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, with the support and sponsorship of France and Britain, took power and turned their repressive rule against the peoples of Iran. At the same time, the group led by Dr. Abdulrahman Qasimlou, with the financial and military backing of the Iraqi regime, under the name of the *Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran*, began to seize control of Eastern Kurdistan.

When all of Eastern Kurdistan's territory had been liberated, the Iranian army initially tolerated Kurdish control for several months. But soon, Ayatollah Khomeini issued a *jihad* (holy war) decree against the Kurdish people, commanding his troops: *“Do not unlace your boots until all of Kurdistan is occupied.”*

It must be noted with regret that the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), following the order of Masoud Barzani, sided with the Iranian military, helping them reoccupy the liberated lands of Eastern Kurdistan. This betrayal resulted in the massacre of tens of thousands of Kurds and drenched the dream of a free Kurdistan in blood.

In late summer 1980, the Iraqi regime—supported by the United States—launched a military invasion of Iran, capturing the strategic city of Khorramshahr. This marked the beginning of a long and brutal war between Iran and Iraq. Western powers refrained from stopping the conflict, eager to sell off the surplus weapons left over from the Second World War and to maintain control over the oil and arms market. In the end, it was the Kurds who suffered the most, as Kurdistan was devastated on all fronts.

For eight consecutive years, Iraqi forces bombarded the cities of Baneh, Sardasht, Piranshahr, Bokoan, Mahabad, Saqqez, Kermanshah, and other areas of Eastern Kurdistan on

a daily basis. In retaliation, Iranian forces bombed Southern Kurdish cities such as Qaladze, Sangasar, Ranya, Diyanah, Halabja, Dukan, Choman, Khanaqin, and many more.

On 8 March 1985, Iraqi warplanes bombed the city of Piranshahr, killing over 500 people, injuring 5,000, and destroying thousands of homes. Between 22 February and 6 September 1988, the Iraqi regime conducted the infamous *Anfal* campaign—mass arrests, executions, and mass burials—which resulted in the extermination of around 182,000 innocent Kurdish civilians.

The word *Anfal* is taken from a verse of the Holy Qur'an, which was used during the occupation of Kurdistan and the genocide of the Kurds to justify the atrocities. Allah revealed *Surat al-Anfal* to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), commanding the Arab Muslims to wage war against the non-believers, slaughter them, plunder their property, and enslave their women. As Allah says in the Qur'an:

إِذْ يُوحِي رَبُّكَ إِلَى الْمَلَائِكَةِ أَنِّي مَعَكُمْ فَتَيَّبُوا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا سَالِفِي فِي قُلُوبِ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا الرُّعْبَ فَاضْرِبُوا فَوْقَ الْأَعْنَاقِ وَاضْرِبُوا مِنْهُمْ كُلَّ بَنَانٍ

This verse is interpreted as divine permission to strike the necks and limbs of those who do not believe. In practice, it gave theological justification for the mass killing of Zoroastrian Kurds, who were monotheists yet not Muslims. Zoroastrians prayed and fasted, and even the words for “day” and “prayer” in Kurdish are inherited from Zoroastrian religious tradition.

يَا أَيُّهَا النَّبِيُّ حَرِّضِ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ عَلَى الْقِتَالِ إِنْ يَكُنْ مِنْكُمْ عَشْرُونَ صَابِرُونَ يَغْلِبُوا مِائَتَيْنِ وَإِنْ يَكُنْ مِنْكُمْ مِائَةٌ يَغْلِبُوا أَلْفًا مِنَ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا بِأَنَّهُمْ قَوْمٌ لَا يَفْقَهُونَ

مَا كَانَ لِلنَّبِيِّ أَنْ يَكُونَ لَهُ أَسْرَى حَتَّى يُبْخَنَ فِي الْأَرْضِ تُرِيدُونَ عَرَصَ الدُّنْيَا وَاللَّهُ يُرِيدُ الْآخِرَةَ وَاللَّهُ عَزِيزٌ حَكِيمٌ

These verses also suggest that taking captives was discouraged until the enemy had been completely subdued through bloodshed. Even by human standards, killing prisoners of war is considered a grave crime, yet here it was legitimized as part of a divine mission.

Following this same ideological foundation, Saddam Hussein issued his own *prophet-like* order to carry out the Anfal campaign against the Kurdish people. The Iraqi regime then escalated its atrocities by using chemical weapons—even in areas firmly under its own

control. In spring 1987, within a mere 48 hours, 24 Kurdish villages were bombarded twice with chemical agents. The regions of Sheikh Wasan, Kanî Bard, Pasyan, and Kotiman were struck, resulting in the deaths of 130 people and the severe poisoning of over 5,000 others—many of whom continued to suffer life-long health effects.

On 28 June 1987, the city of Sardasht was attacked with chemical bombs by Iraqi aircraft, killing 200 civilians and injuring more than 20,000 others. On 16 March 1988, during an Iranian military offensive near Halabja, Iraqi forces retaliated with a chemical weapons strike against the civilian population. Over 5,000 people were killed, and tens of thousands more were injured or permanently disabled. The genetic effects of these weapons are still visible in the children and grandchildren of survivors today.

Despite these atrocities, so-called “humanitarian” world powers remained silent. Western governments refused to condemn Iraq’s crimes and instead protected the Ba’ath regime diplomatically. It is noteworthy that the chemical bombs dropped on Kurdistan by Iraq had been supplied by Germany and the Netherlands.





Crimes of the Iraqi Regime in Halabja

The crimes committed by the Iraqi Ba'ath regime in the city of Halabja remain one of the most infamous atrocities of the late twentieth century. On **16 March 1988**, during the height of the Iran–Iraq War, Iraqi aircraft carried out a devastating chemical attack on the civilian population of Halabja.

Thousands of men, women, and children were exposed to a lethal combination of chemical agents—including mustard gas and nerve agents—resulting in a massacre that killed over **5,000 civilians** within hours. Another **tens of thousands** were severely injured, many left with lifelong disabilities, respiratory illnesses, blindness, infertility, and genetic damage that continues to affect subsequent generations.

The attack deliberately targeted a densely populated civilian area at a time when there was no active combat inside the city. This constitutes a clear violation of international humanitarian law and is widely recognized as an act of genocide. The purpose of the attack was not only to terrorize the Kurdish population into submission but also to punish them collectively for their perceived support of Iranian forces.

Even after the attack, the Iraqi regime obstructed humanitarian aid and attempted to conceal the scale of the disaster from the international community. Western powers, despite having evidence of Iraq's use of chemical weapons, failed to hold the regime accountable and in some cases continued to supply it with material support.

The Halabja massacre became a symbol of Kurdish suffering and a turning point in Kurdish collective memory—an enduring reminder of the vulnerability of stateless nations in the face of state-sponsored extermination campaigns.

## Chapter Nine

### 9 - Notable Revolutionary Figures of Kurdistan

#### 9.1 – Mala-yi Jazîrî

Mala-yi Jazîrî was a renowned Kurdish poet and intellectual of the fifteenth century. Through his patriotic and humanistic poetry, he played a significant role in nurturing national consciousness among the Kurds. His literary works educated hundreds of Kurds, inspiring a sense of identity and pride.

He was born in 1407 CE in the city of Jazîra, located in Northern Kurdistan, and passed away in 1481 CE.



Mala-yi Jazîrî

## 9.2 – Ahmad Khani (Xani)

One of Ahmad Khani's most celebrated masterpieces is the epic romance **"Mem û Zîn"**, a work recognized not only throughout Kurdistan but also in other parts of the world. The story of Mem û Zîn is said to have taken place on Newroz (the Kurdish New Year) in 1695 in the city of Jazîra, Northern Kurdistan.

Mem and Zîn are two lovers whose devotion to one another is so deep that they cannot be united in life, yet they are ultimately joined in death. Mem was a poor young man of the Kurmanj tribe, with an elder brother. Zîn was the daughter of the local Mir (prince) of the Jazîra and Botan region, and she too had an elder sister. Mem fell passionately in love with Zîn, and later Mem's elder brother fell in love with Zîn's elder sister. Mem's father, aware of this, offered all his wealth so that the Mir would allow both his sons to marry the Mir's daughters.

According to Kurdish customs of the time, the elder siblings were married first, and there was an agreement that Mem and Zîn would be wed afterward. However, one of the Mir's courtiers, wishing to prevent Zîn from marrying Mem, created intrigue and sowed discord. As a result of this treachery, the Mir imprisoned Mem.


After a year in prison, Mem became physically frail and consumed with longing for Zîn, refusing to eat. When Zîn learned of his suffering and was denied permission to see him, she too fell ill with grief. Eventually, Mem was poisoned by the Mir's courtier and died in prison. When Zîn heard the news of Mem's death, she went to the mountains and threw herself into a ravine, ending her life.

Overcome with remorse, the Mir ordered that Mem and Zîn be buried together with great honor. During the funeral, Mem's elder brother, in a fit of rage, killed the treacherous courtier with a dagger in front of the Mir.

According to local legend, two red flowers grow on the grave of Mem and Zîn every spring, intertwining as though living a single life together. Their tomb remains in the city of Jazîra, Northern Kurdistan, and has become a symbol of eternal love and Kurdish cultural identity.



Ahmad Khani (Xani)



Ahmad Khani was born in 1650 in the city of Bazid, Northern Kurdistan, and passed away in 1706. His tomb, known as **Gulkoyê Khani**, is located in Bazid and holds deep cultural and spiritual significance for the Kurds of the region. It is commonly said among Northern Kurds that every Kurd should make a symbolic “pilgrimage” to Khani’s tomb at least once in their lifetime, honoring his legacy as one of the most influential literary and philosophical figures in Kurdish history.

### 9.3 – Haji Qadir Koyi

Haji Qadir Koyi was one of Kurdistan's greatest poets and scholars, a pioneering figure whose revolutionary verses gave powerful expression to the Kurdish national spirit. Through his poetry, he urged his people toward knowledge, progress, and unity, taking a bold and patriotic stance against backwardness and foreign domination.

In 1880, Haji Qadir Koyi famously called upon Kurdish leaders to unite and establish an independent Kurdistan. Throughout his life, he educated many in Kurdish literacy and scholarship, leaving a lasting legacy as both a teacher and a reformer.

His collected poems, known as his *Diwan*, were published in 1986, preserving his revolutionary thought and his vision of a free and enlightened Kurdish nation for future generations.



Haji Qadir Koyi was born in 1815 in the village of Gorqerecî, near the city of Koya, and passed away in 1892. He was laid to rest in the Qaraj Ahmad Cemetery in Istanbul, where his grave remains a place of respect for admirers of his work and vision.

#### 9.4 – Miqdad Medhet Bedirxan

The newspaper **Kurdistan** was the first Kurdish-language newspaper in history. It was founded and first published on 22 April 1898 in Cairo by Miqdad Medhet Bedirxan.

Miqdad came from the prominent Bedirxan family of Northern Kurdistan and published the newspaper while living in exile. Through *Kurdistan*, he sought to raise awareness among Kurds, promote education, and strengthen national consciousness during a period of great political and cultural upheaval.




Miqdad Medhet Bedirxan

### 9.5 – Yûnis Reuf Dildar

Yûnis Reuf Dildar was a celebrated Kurdish poet, teacher, and nationalist activist. While imprisoned by the Iraqi authorities, he composed the stirring poem “**Ey Reqîb**” (“Oh Enemy”), which later became the **national anthem of the Kurdish people**.

Dildar earned his law degree from the University of Baghdad in 1945. He passed away in 1948, leaving behind a legacy as one of the most powerful literary voices of Kurdish patriotism and resistance.



Yûnis Reuf Dildar (20 February 1918 – 12 November 1948)


## **9.6 – Margaret George**

Margaret George was a young Assyrian woman from Southern Kurdistan who, at just 20 years old, joined the ranks of the Peshmerga fighters in 1961. She quickly became a fearless and skilled commander on the battlefield, leading operations against the Iraqi occupying forces.

Margaret's courage and leadership gained widespread attention, and she soon emerged as one of the first female Peshmerga commanders in modern Kurdish history. Her growing influence reportedly concerned Mela Mustafa Barzani, who feared she might become the leading figure of the entire Kurdish revolution. He summoned her to Barzan.

According to accounts, when Margaret arrived, three armed Barzani fighters attempted to assault her at night on Barzani's orders. However, Margaret, undeterred and fiercely determined, killed all three attackers in self-defense.

The following morning, Barzani, realizing his plan had failed, ordered Margaret and seven of her companions to take the front line in a battle. They were ambushed by nearly 200 Barzani fighters. At that moment, Margaret understood she had been betrayed. Refusing to surrender, she fought to the last bullet and died in 1969 as a symbol of uncompromising resistance and revolutionary defiance.



Margaret and her younger sister



Margaret and her father

## 9.7 – Mamosta Cegerxwîn

Cegerxwîn (1903–1984) was born in the city of Mardin, in the village of Hesare. Following the First World War in 1914, he and his family were displaced and resettled in the village of Amûdê. At the age of eleven, he began his formal education in the schools of Kurdistan. He completed his religious studies but chose not to become a mullah, instead dedicating his life to writing poetry about the Kurdish people and their plight.

Throughout his life, Cegerxwîn made a remarkable contribution to Kurdish literature and culture, producing dozens of revolutionary poems that called for freedom, justice, and Kurdish unity. His activism and writings forced him into exile, and he eventually settled in Sweden.

Cegerxwîn passed away in 1984 and was buried in Qamişlo, in Rojava (Western Kurdistan), where he remains celebrated as one of the greatest poets and voices of the Kurdish liberation movement.



Mamosta Cegerxwîn

## 9.8 – Leyla Qasim

Leyla Qasim was born in the city of Khanaqin and became a student of literature at the University of Baghdad. At the same time, she was an active member of the Kurdistan Students' Union.

On 28 April 1974, Leyla, along with her fiancé Jawad and three other companions, was arrested by the Iraqi authorities in Baghdad. After a show trial, she was executed by hanging on 13 July 1974.

Leyla Qasim is remembered as the first Kurdish female political activist of her generation to be executed by the Iraqi regime. She faced her death with extraordinary courage, and it is said that she recited the Kurdish national anthem **“Ey Reqîb”** on the gallows, turning her final moments into a symbol of defiance and patriotism.



Leyla Qasim

### **9.10 – Mastura Shaswari (Tewar)**

Mastura Shaswari, known by her nom de guerre *Tewar*, was the first female Peshmerga martyr of Eastern Kurdistan. At the age of 19, in 1979, she was wounded during fighting in the city of Sanandaj and captured by Iranian regime forces.

Sadeq Khalkhali, the infamous representative of Ayatollah Khomeini, personally demanded that Mastura submit to him. In a moment of fearless defiance, she spat in his face. Enraged, Khalkhali ordered her execution by firing squad.

Mastura was not only a courageous Peshmerga fighter but also a dedicated cadre of the Komala Party of Kurdistan. Her sacrifice became a lasting symbol of resistance and the determination of Kurdish women to fight for freedom and dignity.



Mastura Shaswari (Tewar)

### 9.10 – Mamosta Hêmin Mukriyanî

Mamosta Hêmin Mukriyanî was born in 1921 in the village of Lachin, near Mahabad, and passed away in 1986 in Mahabad. He was one of the most prominent poets of the short-lived Republic of Kurdistan (1946), a passionate patriot, and a committed advocate of Kurdish unity.

Throughout his life, Hêmin composed dozens of revolutionary poems, lending his voice to the Kurdish cause and expressing the pain and hope of a nation under oppression. His *Diwan* (collected works) include some of the most renowned pieces in modern Kurdish literature, such as “**Tarîk û Ron**” (“Darkness and Light”) and “**Naleyê Cudayî**” (“The Lament of Separation”).

Hêmin’s poetry remains a cornerstone of Kurdish nationalist literature, celebrated for its clarity, emotional depth, and unwavering call for freedom and dignity.



Mamosta Hêmin Mukriyanî

### 9.11 – Musa Anter (Apê Musa)

Musa Anter, affectionately known as **Apê Musa** (“Uncle Musa”), was a prominent Kurdish intellectual and writer from Northern Kurdistan who dedicated his entire life to advocating for the rights of the Kurdish people. He played a pioneering role in Kurdish journalism and became one of the most influential public voices in the struggle for Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights, particularly in Northern Kurdistan.

Musa Anter was also a teacher and mentor to many young Kurds, inspiring them through his lectures and writings. He was the first author to produce a Kurdish–Turkish cultural lexicon and made invaluable contributions to the preservation and development of Kurdish language and literature.

Because of his work, the Turkish state considered him a threat. On 20 September 1992, Musa Anter was assassinated in his home in the city of Amed (Diyarbakir), a loss that deeply shook Kurdish society. Today, he is remembered as a martyr of free expression and a symbol of intellectual resistance.



Musa Anter (Apê Musa)

### 9.13 – Mamosta İsmail Beşikçi

Dr. İsmail Beşikçi was born in the city of Çorum, Turkey. Although ethnically Turkish, he devoted much of his life to documenting the truth about the Kurdish people and the realities of Kurdistan.

Beşikçi earned a doctorate in sociology and taught at several Turkish universities for a number of years. However, because of his outspoken views and publications on the Kurdish question, he was sentenced to a combined total of 111 years in prison. He spent 18 years incarcerated in Turkish prisons before finally being released in late 1999.

Dr. Beşikçi has written dozens of influential works on the Kurds, the most significant of which is his landmark book **“Kurdistan: An International Colony.”** His scholarship has made him one of the most respected non-Kurdish voices advocating for Kurdish rights and historical truth.



Dr. İsmail Beşikçi

## 10 – Conclusion

In the twenty-first century, the global discourse increasingly emphasizes peace and equality of human rights, and the vast majority of the world's nations now possess their own recognized states and sovereign identities. It remains a profound shame for humanity that the Kurds—one of the world's largest nations—still lack an internationally recognized state and have yet to see their national identity formally acknowledged.

It is a moral and historical obligation upon the United Nations, international human rights organizations, and all those who value freedom and justice to work toward safeguarding Kurdish rights. This includes supporting a **referendum** to formally recognize the Kurdish identity and establish a sovereign Kurdish state on the historical territory of Kurdistan.

The Kurds have often been treated as a minority within the states in which they live. Yet the Kurds are a distinct nation—possessing their own language, culture, and homeland—and thus cannot rightly be called a minority in their own land. Just as no one would claim that the Scots or the Welsh are mere minorities in Britain—since they possess their own unique culture and identity separate from the English—so too should Kurds refuse to accept being labeled a minority by the governments of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

The Kurds may be considered a minority in Baghdad, Damascus, Ankara, or Tehran, but within Kurdistan they are the overwhelming majority and must therefore be the rightful decision-makers over their own land.

The key points emphasized throughout this book affirm the existence of the Kurdish nation, living upon its ancestral land known as Kurdistan—a homeland that has never been ceded to any occupier. The Kurdish nation possesses a distinct language, culture, and even a unique historical religious tradition, setting it apart from Turks, Arabs, and Persians. It is therefore imperative that Kurds assert their rightful existence on the world stage and that the international community is compelled to formally recognize them. As the famous saying goes: **“Rights are not given—they must be taken.”** Other nations of the world have won recognition through uprisings and sustained international pressure; the Kurds must do the same to secure their future.

Kurdish identity is the shared cause of all segments of Kurdish society: workers, peasants, students, intellectuals, and revolutionaries alike. This struggle requires both intellectual activism within and beyond Kurdistan as well as organized national movements that can advance a mass-based, democratic campaign for the recognition of Kurdistan's identity on the global stage.

Kurdish politics must transition from armed confrontation and factionalism toward **mass, organized, and cooperative civil struggle**, prioritizing social peace within Kurdistan and uniting around common goals of progress and fundamental rights. By embracing collective action, the people of Kurdistan can achieve further advancement in science, language, culture, human rights, and economic reform—paving the way for a freer and more secure future.

Genuine friendship and reconciliation among the Kurds, Assyrians, Turks, Arabs, and Persians are essential to achieving lasting peace and stability in Kurdistan and the broader region. Without peace, all peoples of the Middle East will continue to suffer harm and insecurity.

To reach this goal, every Kurd, wherever they live, must work actively to promote Kurdish identity, protect the rights of the Kurdish people, and advance the collective cause of freedom and justice for Kurdistan.

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## Comparison of the Kurdish Calendar with the Khayyam and Gregorian Calendars

| Kurdish Year | Khayyam Year | Gregorian Year |
|--------------|--------------|----------------|
| 2713         | 1392         | 2013           |

### Months of the Year

| Kurdish Month                     | Khayyam Month | Gregorian Equivalent      |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| Xakelêwe (خاکه‌لێوه)              | Farvardin     | 21 March – 20 April       |
| Banemer, Guṭan (خاکه‌لێوه، گولان) | Ordibehesht   | 21 April – 20 May         |
| Cozerdan (جۆزەردان)               | Khordad       | 21 May – 20 June          |
| Puşper (پوشپەر)                   | Tir           | 21 June – 20 July         |
| Gelawêj (گه‌لاوێژ)                | Mordad        | 21 July – 20 August       |
| Xermanan (خەرمەنان)               | Shahrivar     | 21 August – 20 September  |
| Rezber (ڕەزبەر)                   | Mehr          | 21 September – 20 October |
| Gelarêzan (گه‌لارێزان)            | Aban          | 21 October – 20 November  |
| Sermawez (سەرماوەز)               | Azar          | 21 November – 20 December |
| Befranbar (بەفرانبار)             | Dey           | 21 December – 20 January  |
| Rêbendan (ڕێبەندان)               | Bahman        | 21 January – 20 February  |
| Reşemeh (ڕەشەمە)                  | Esfand        | 21 February – 20 March    |

## The Use of the Kurdish Calendar

The administration of Kurdistan should avoid relying on the Gregorian calendar, since the names of the Gregorian months are derived from Babylonian and Hebrew languages and are not of Kurdish origin. Kurdish months align with the Kurdish calendar and have purely Kurdish names.

Therefore, the names of months should always be used in Kurdish in all official records and documents. If the Gregorian calendar is used alongside the Kurdish year, it is preferable that **the names of the months still be written in Kurdish.**

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## Months to Avoid and Recommended Kurdish Equivalents

| Foreign Month Names (to Avoid) | Origin            | Recommended Kurdish Name |
|--------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| Adar, Azar                     | Hebrew            | Xakelêwe = March         |
| Nîsan                          | Hebrew            | Banemer = April          |
| Guîtan                         | (Already Kurdish) | Guîtan = May             |
| Hezîran                        | Babylonian        | Cozerdan = June          |
| Tîrmeh                         | Persian           | Puşper = July            |
| Tebax, Ab                      | Babylonian        | Gelawêj = August         |
| Îlon, Îlul                     | Hebrew            | Xermanan = September     |
| Çirîya Pêşîn (Cotmeh)          | Non-Kurdish       | Rezber = October         |
| Çirîya Paşîn (Mijdar)          | Non-Kurdish       | Gelarêzan = November     |
| Çileyê Pêşîn                   | Non-Kurdish       | Sermawez = December      |
| Çileyê Paşîn                   | Non-Kurdish       | Rêbendan = January       |
| Sibat                          | Babylonian        | Reşemeh = February       |

# The Identity of Kurdistan



Being Kurdistan is the national identity of every citizen of Kurdistan