KURDISH ETHNIC NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN IRAN: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY

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Dedicated

to

My Late Father

and

My Wife

Acknowledgements

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Sources: http://www.xs4all.nl/~tank/kurdish/htdocs/facts/map.html

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Chapter 1

Introduction and Methodology

1.1 Introduction

The present territory of the state of Iran with an area of about 1.6 million square kilometres is a part of the Iran plateau. This area is covered with the Alburz Mountains in the north, and the Zagross range in the west and the south. The availability of highlands and valleys with water resources has prepared an appropriate condition for a way of life based on animal husbandry. Climatic variety of this geographical region has brought about the immigration of various ethnic groups. Based on archaeological findings, about 3500 years ago (1500 BC) a group of people known as Aryans immigrated into this territory from the Northeast. They, along with the other ethnic groups who used to live in Iran formed the ethnic background of the Iranians. The immigrant Aryans and the region's native people (Lullubians, Guttians, Kussians) (Behzadi, 1994:263-271), who lived in the highlands established the first Iranian state, the Medians or the Meds, in their capital city, Hekmataneh (today's Hamadan) 2500 years ago. The people who live in western of Iran claim that they are among the country's oldest

inhabitants. Thus, Kurds, who are the original Iranian people. Their language Kurdish (and different dialects like Laki and Luri) is the main source of the Persian (Farsi) language. According to the new Census (1996), the population of Iran is about 60 million i.e. about 65 percent of the people are of Persian (Farsi) stock, 25 percent are Turks, 5 percent are Kurds and 4 percent belong to Semitic groups. Thus, ethnic minorities constitute about one third of the Iranian population.

The geographical distribution of various Iranian ethnic groups is such that whereas the majority of Persians live in the Iranian heartland, all ethnic minorities are located in the peripheral regions of the country i.e. Turks in East and West Azerbijan, Kurds in West Azerbijan, Kurdistan, Kirmanshah, Ilam and other provinces, Baluch in Sistan-va-Baluchestan, Arabs in Khuzestan. Sectarian considerations also acted against such as integration as the majority of Kurds Turkamans, Arabs [(?)] and Baluches adhere to Sunni Islam (Jain, [1994]: 59-60)

1.1.1 Concepts

Explanation of the concepts, nationalism, ethnic, ethnicity social movement and relationships between them may be suitable beginning.

1.1.2 Nation

As Smith (1976:2) said, 'nation is an abstract myth which nevertheless has deep roots in different levels of historical reality; and by fusing citizenship with ethnicity and territory, it has been able to satisfy many needs and inspire immense loyalties'.

'A nation may be seen as a particular type of ethnic community or, rather, as an ethnic community politicised, with recognised group rights in the political system. Nations may be created by the transformation of an ethnic group in a multiethnic state into a self-conscious political entity or by the amalgamation of diverse groups and the formation of an inter-ethnic, composite or homogenous national culture through the agency of the modern state' (Brass, 1991:20).

1.1.3 Nationalism

'Nationalism is both an ideology and a movement, usually a minority one, which aspire to "nationhood" for the chosen group. "Nationhood" in turn comprises three basic ideals, autonomy and self- government for the group, often but not always in a sovereign state, solidarity and fraternity of the group in a recognised territory or "home", and third, a distinctive, and preferably unique, culture and history peculiar to the group in question (Smith, 1976:2). Nationalism has a political leadership, and resources to gain support to make successful demand on the political system (Brass, 1991:48-49). And also Nationalism is a secular movement (Smelser, 1962:270 quoted in Judge, P. S., 1992).

'An ethnic group is a distinct category of the population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own. The members of such group are, or feel themselves, or are thought to be bound together by common ties of race or nationality or culture' (International Encyclopaedia of the Social Science, Volume 5, 1972:167).

In addition, ethnic identity formation is viewed as a process that involves three sets of struggles: one takes place within the ethnic group itself for control over its material and symbolic resources, which in turn, involves defining the group's boundaries and its rules for inclusion and exclusion.

The second takes place between ethnic groups as a competition for rights, privileges and available resources.

The third takes place between the state and the groups that dominate it on one hand, and the population that inhabits the territory on the other (Brass, 1991: 247). In the twentieth century another revolutionary dimension has been added to nationalism. Nationalism has also become a socially revolutionary movement, demanding equal economic and educational opportunities for all members of the national group and the active promotion of the welfare of the socially underprivileged classes. Its aim has become the establishment of classless, theoretically egalitarian national society. By the middle of the twentieth century all "young" nationalist movements had also become "socialist" movements–the word "Socialism" covering as many different manifestation as the word "nationalism"–whereas the "young" nationalist movements of the middle of the nineteenth century had sharply distinguished between nationalism and socialism. Only after Second World War socialism did become an integral part of nationalist revolution, as in Gamal Abdul Nasser's Egypt (I.E. of S. S. Volume 11, 1972: 64).

Finally, nationalism, despite its relatively brief history, has undergone several transformations. It was an elite movement, in the first century, by its

historic role; a "bourgeois" movement in the age of the ascent of the middle classes; it has become, in its second century, a mass movement in which the people at large demand an ever-widening participation in the political, social, and cultural life of the nation.

What remains constant in nationalism through all its changes is the demand of the people for the government of the same ethnic complexion as the majority. Every people awakened to nationalism see political self-determination as its goal (I. E. of S. S, Volume 11,1972:65)

1.1.4 Social Movement

'Social movements are generally analysed within the framework of collective behaviour. But it is not essential that every collective behaviour can be designated as a social movement. As a form of collective behaviour, a social movement must show a durability or sustenance. In a way, a social movement is a durable and sustained collective behaviour. Most of the definitions of social movements include "change" as an essential ingredient' (Blumer, 1957; Smelser, 1962 quoted in Judge, P.S., 1992: 2).

Political and active parties with an organisation are of course important in definitions of social movements.

Finally, the characteristics of great significance of social movements are the elements of consciousness among its participants (Judge, 1992).

1.1.5 Different Kinds of Nationalism

By far the greater number of today's nations and nation-states achieved this status largely through the often revolutionary and violent efforts of nationalist movements. These can be broadly divided into the following types:

1.1.5.1 Ethnic Nationalism

Here, nationalism arises in communities with a distinctive, often unique, culture and history and operates solely on behalf of that ethnic group.

There are two main variants of ethnic nationalism:

a) Renewal   b) Secession

1.1.5.1.1 Renewal: Where the ethnic group possesses formal sovereignty, the nationalist movement comes as a renewal and rejuvenation of social and political life as it happened in the 1890s in Persia which was threatened by British and Russian economic intrusions.

1.1.5.1.2 Secession: This is the commonest route to nationhood; the ethnic group is incorporated allegedly against its will, in a wider, usually an empire (but also a modern national state, such as East Pakistan in Pakistan) and seeks to sever the bond through the act of secession.

1.1.5.2 Territorial Nationalism

The nationalist movement which arises among heterogeneous populations is based upon the territorial unit in which they are forcibly united and administered, usually by a colonial power, the boundaries of the territory made

by the administration of the colony, therefore, the chief referents and focuses of identification of the nation to be. (Smith, 1976: 3-5)

1.1.6 Nationalism: Theories

There are several theories discussed by Glazer (1970), Smith (1976) and Brass (1991). Some of them are discussed briefly below:

The conditions that foster the formation of powerful nationalist movements may be divided into three categories: geo-political frameworks, ethnic bases, and social bearers, which are the factors relevant to the development of nationalism. Taking these categories, the most important and recurrent are:

1.1.6.1 Frameworks

An easily identifiable territory and location, a single political authority and bureaucracy, able to level and homogenise the people.

1.1.6.2 Bases

A myth and cult of common origins and history, other cultural differences like language or colour, partial secularisation of urban elite traditions.

1.1.6.3 Bearers

The growth and exclusion of an urban intelligentsia and alliance between intelligentsia of one or more classes or status groups, usually urban commercial penetration and mercantile assent.

Hence the optimal situation for the development of a strong nationalist movement requires that some of the factors to be at hand; and that the key characteristic of their relations be one of 'imbalance' as between frameworks, bases and bearers. In other words, for a nationalist movement to gain adherents, it must be able to point to some common culture 'materials; some roots or bases', which the chosen population can recognise, and further, for a nationalist claim to originate, it must arise on the basis of idea and sentiments about a specific category which affords a platform for constructing the nation. (Smith, 1976: 9-16).

Two hypotheses on the changing position of ethnic identity in recent years can be suggested:

1.1.6.4 First

Ethnic identities have taken over some of the tasks in self-definition and in definition by others, for example, occupational identities, and particularly working-class occupational identities. The status of the worker has been downgraded; as a result apparently, the status of being an ethnic, a member of an ethnic group, has been upgraded.

1.1.6.5 Second

In the past few decades-international events have declined as a source of feelings of ethnic identity, except for Jews; domestic events have become more important (Glazer, 1970: 34-36).

1.1.6.6 Deprivation Theory and Inequality

Many theories of the politicisation of ethnicity or development of nationalism in ethnic group stress the importance of inequality in the distribution of available resources, social benefits and opportunities between distinct ethnic groups. In its simplest form, the argument contends that nationalism arises in response to objective exploitation of an indigenous group by an alien group or of one social class by another. However, the realisation by many contemporary scholars of ethnicity and nationalism that the mere existence of inequality, on one hand, is not sufficient to produce a nationalist movement and, on the other, that nationalist movements sometimes arise among dominant groups have led to somewhat elaborate statements of this point of view.

One elaboration is the relative deprivation theory, which argues that it is not objective inequality as such that precipitates nationalism but a feeling of frustration or relative deprivation defined as the imbalance between the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled and the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or maintaining, given the social means available to them (Brass, 1991: 41-41).

1.1.6.7 Political Content Theory

The movement from community to nationality involves an inevitable struggle for power between competing ethnic groups. The ebb and flow of nationalism in an ethnic community, the intensity of its drive for power and the

particular form that its demands take, are influenced by the political context. Three aspects of the political context are especially important:

a)   The possibilities for realignment of political and social forces and organisation.

b)   The willingness of the elite from dominant ethnic groups to share power with aspirant ethnic group leaders.

c)   The potential availability of alternative political arenas (Brass, 1991: 55).

1.1.7 The Roots of Nationalism in Europe

Anthony D. Smith has written (1976:85-87) 'the role of neo-classicism as a cultural precondition of early European nationalism, partly because there is still a tendency to see nationalism as an essentially Romantic outgrowth, and also to suggest a different interpretation of early European nationalism. Early European nationalism, then, arose as a political precipitant of the confluence of the three major eighteenth century cultural traditions – a Baroque absolution, new-classicism and early Romanticism.

Both neo-classicism and early Romanticism, in turn, represent rival, but overlapping, revolt against the dominance of state absolution, and they provide nationalism with its ethic of autonomy and its conceptual content. But nationalism's success was due not only to its ability to give concrete political expression to various themes and aspirations of the two cultural traditions, but also to its capacity for harnessing the machine and framework of bureaucracy by appropriating its own ends, the absolutist concept of sovereignty.

At the same time, the rivalry of neo-classicism and early Romanticism has left its mark upon the structure of nationalist ideals and programmes. Indeed, the subsequent history of nationalism in France and Germany, testifies this growing divergence which springs, not only from specific social conditions in each area, but from the ultimate incompatible models of social and political organisation to which neo-classicism and Romanticism aspire. The Romantic ideal, though even less precise and factual, envisage the resuscitations of tightly – knit ethnic communities resembling the kinship and tribal organisation of pre-feudal but post-Roman Europe (often confused with and idealised vision of the more evolved guild and estate organisation of feudal Europe). The two-historicism cults are, in turn bound up with the new social processes, with the impact of commerce, urbanisation and secularism, and the persistence of ethnic ties in eighteenth-century Europe. Until 1800, however, the profound differences between historicism cults, and the conflict between social processes and ethnic bases, were subordinated to an overriding revolt against artifice, absolutism and bureaucratic regimentation. Hence, early Romantics could embrace a neo-classicist ethic of virtue and will, while neo-classicists could accept early Romantic concepts of nature and genius. In the ferment of revolutionary nationalism, which swept Europe between about 1770 and 1819, such historical mobility and conceptual eclecticism appeared both natural and desirable.

In such a period of fluidity and experiment with historical revivals, neo-classicism and Romanticism could for a time merge. It was this dynamic but momentary fusion which nationalism inherited, and tried to synthesis ever since.

Nationalism is a political creed that underlies the cohesion of modern societies and legitimise their claim to authority. Nationalism centres the supreme loyalty of overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state, either existing or desired. The nation-state is regarded not only as the ideal "natural" or "normal" form of political organisation but also as the indispensable framework for all social, cultural and economic activities. Yet nationalism and the nation-state are comparatively recent historical developments.

Unknown before the eighteenth century, when it originated in North-western Europe and northern America, nationalism spread with ever-growing rapidity all over the earth, and since the middle of the twentieth century it has become a universal *idee-force* of contemporary history. It expresses itself in the most varied and opposite ideologies in democracy, fascism, and communism as well as in the search for an "ideology", be it African personality or Arab unity. The nineteenth century Europe has been rightly called the age of nationalism. The twentieth century, in which history has shifted from a European to a global basis, may become known as the age of pan-nationalism. Although certain traits are common to all forms of nationalism, the social structure, the intellectual traditions and cultural history, and the geographic location of the society in which nationalism asserts it condition each contributes to the uniqueness of a nationalist tradition.

Modern nationalism first took hold in England in the seventeenth century and in Anglo-America in the eighteenth century. But this nationalism respected, and was based upon the individual liberties and self-government characteristic of

the development of these nations. The rise of nationalism in the French Revolution was different.

The European revolutions of 1848/1849 and the defeat of their liberal aspirations marked the spread of nationalism to control central and east central Europe, the "awakening" of people. The striving for individual liberty was drowned in the rising tide of national (collective) self-assertion and will to power. The war of 1914, which was started by dynastic empires, partly under popular pressure, replaced the empires with nation-states all over central and East-central Europe. At the same time it helped the spread of nationalism to Asia. Half a century later, nationalism had become the dominant force throughout the non-western world, and the political map of Asia and Africa changed between 1947 and 1969 as completely as had the map of Europe between 1815 and 1920. In the middle of the twentieth century, nationalism everywhere prevailed over supranational ideology. (International Encyclopaedia of the Social Science, 1972, Vol.11).

1.1.8 A Brief History of Kurdish Ethnic Nationalist Movements

During the Second World War, Northwest Iran was occupied by Soviet Union and south and Southwest was occupied by U.K. In 1946 Kurdish nationalist party that depended on the USSR established the first Kurdish Republic in a small city of Mahabad. This Kurdish State collapsed after about one year, but a nationalist party was active for many years (Kutschera, 1994; Kinnane, 1993). After Islamic Revolution of Iran this party was resurrected and

started a new rebellion in Kurdish territory and until now this party is active

against the central government of Iran.   ⌒

1.1.9 Objectives of this Study

1. To examine the historical development of the Kurdish nationalist movement.

2. To examine the social structure and culture of the Kurds of Iran with a view to finding out their role in the nationalist movement.

3. To identify the role of *Hezb-e-Democrat Kurdistan Iran* (KDPI) in Kurdish nationalism.

4. To identify the relation between Kurd nationalism and religion.

5. To find out association between the topography of the region and Kurd nationalism.

6. To examine the formation of Kurd identity in opposition to 'Iranian', 'Turkish', and 'Arabic' identities.

7. To identify the inequality or relative deprivation between Kurds and others as a contributing factor in the rise of Kurd ethnic nationalism.

1.2 Methodology

In the present study broadly speaking the Weberian method; comprehensive – explanation to interpret the growth of nationalist tendency in Kurdistan of Iran is more appropriate. At first we need to make an ideal type of nationalism in this territory and then we would attempt to explore and understand

what when and how did this tendency grow and finally why this social phenomenon took place? Recourse is also taken to use the historical method to locate, what happened? How did it happen? And why did it happen?' It will be necessary at times to revert to the narrative. Although, multiple methods will be used, explanations will be provided sociologically. (Denzin, 1977)

1.2.1 Scope of the Study

As has been said before, Kurdish and different dialects like Laki and Luri are from a linguistic point of view, the main origins of the Persian (Farsi) language and on the other hand, from a historical point of view, Kurds are the founders of the first Iranian state (the Mades) C. 2500 years ago. The emergence and growth of nationalism is a problem that demands more examination. Having referred to Persian and English sources it is evident that no comprehensive work has yet been done on this social phenomenon.

Recently there are several books published about the history of these movements in Iran and Iraq.

The events of recent decades especially after Islamic Revolution in Iran in the Kurdish inhabited areas, which has led to the killing of innocent people and major losses to the economy of this part of the country, are among the most important reasons that make essential the surveying of this social issue. The separatist tendencies in the Kurdish inhabited areas of Turkey and Iraq are different from what is going on in Iran. Among the matters to the surveyed is the need for determining these differences.

1.2.2 Research Design

Some of the main features of the study are mentioned as below:

Type of research is comprehensive-explanation. The unit of the study is household (family) there respondent is one adult (15+) from each sample household.

1.2.3 Techniques of Data Collection

There are several techniques for data collection and each of them depends on many factors such as nature of the research, territory, resources (information – facility), time, and so on. With notion of all factors the triangulation method has been chosen (Denzin, 1977) at all levels.

1) The researcher as a Kurd participant and observed this territory for one decade (from 1981 to 1989 doing sociological research in Kurdistan and carry on in Tehran up to 1991).

2) At the macro level we should mention three main factors: Central government, Kurdish nationalist party or intellectuals, and finally, Kurd population.

    a) Central government policies can raise or decline the nationalist tendency. We used interview – schedule with main and key decision-makers in this territory for collecting primary data. (Details will be explained in sampling design).

b) The second key factor is the policies of nationalist Kurd intellectuals and leaders of nationalist parties. We constructed another interview-schedule for collecting primary data from them.

c) The third element is Kurd's population of the common people that have an especial role in this movement. If they support central government policies, then the nationalist groups will be dead as a fish out of water; if they support the nationalists the strong, militarised government will be defeated, or a third alternative accommodation is possible.

We made the Likert Scale to measure the nationalist tendencies of Kurd population. That will be explained later.

Level one and two are not enough to explore such a complicated case, we ought to use secondary data like historical documents, government codes and of course, all documents that are available from nationalist parties programmes and writings, speeches and declaration of the party leaders and government spiritual leaders and so on.

The mass media such as newspapers, magazines are suitable to check the above documents and writings, as the history of this underground movement after Islamic Revolution (1979) has not been written yet.

1.2.4 Interview - Schedules

Three separate Interview-Schedules/Guides were prepared for data collection.

1.2.4.1 Government Officials

Thirteen open-ended questions have been prepared to gather information about the Kurd's movement according to the perspective of the central government officials. Six of them were about the history, organisation, policies and propaganda of the Kurd's parties that were active in Kurdistan before and after 1979. Two questions were about the policies of central government against the armed conflict in this territory.

Three questions were about causes of the growth of the nationalist tendencies in Kurdistan and causes of its failure or success. The final question was about introducing another person for interview. (Appendix No. 1)

1.2.4.2 Kurd Intellectuals

There were three differences between this interview-schedule and the first one.

One question was about the resources of Kurd's movements (finance, military and political supports).

Another was about the causes of weakness of Kurd's movement (theoretically, politically organisationally and militant). The final question was

an open one, and gave an opportunity to the respondent to talk about everything that he liked (Appendix No. 1)

1.2.5 Likert Scale

Three stages were employed to construct the Likert Scale:

a) At first, 35 sentences were selected that indicate the nationalist or non-nationalist tendencies (both negative or positive) from the Kurd's resources and based on their own culture, customs, language, myths and so on.

b) Then, 20 judges had been asked, 10 from Iranian students that were doing their Ph.D. in Punjab University, three colleagues from the Department of Sociology of Tehran University, and seven colleagues from the Department of Sociology of Mazandarn University in Iran, to check the constant validity of the scale. Every sentence that was not valid was omitted from the scale.

c) The last step was established and sorts the Likert Scale with *24* statements and put these sentences in interview schedule randomly. Each sentence had five choices for respondent ranking from complete agreement to complete rejection. The interviewer point out the answer in the scale square (Rafipoor, 1981)

Table 1.1: Construction of Interview – Schedule

S. No.	Nature of Item	No. of Items
1	Language	7, 9, 15, 20
2	Economic Deprivation	2, 14, 16, 18
3	Cultural Similarity	1, 3, 12, 13
4	Mythical and ancient ceremony	1, 6, 12
5	History (same history)	4, 5
6	Religion	17, 23
7	Race	4, 8

Sources: (Appendix No. 2)

Language

Deprivation Feeling

Culture

Mythical

History

Religion

Race

Spiritual Solidarity
or
Nationalist Tendency

Nation-Building

Figure 1.1

Also we added six personal questions at the end of the Likert Scale to analyse the role of age, education, urban or rural inhabitant, occupation, nomads (if any), province and religion (Sunni or Shia) (Appendix No. 2)

Check questions are also necessary inside the Scale.

1.2.6 Sampling Procedure

The territorial scope of Kurdistan for the nationalist is four provinces of West Azerbijan, Kurdistan, Kirmanshah and Ilam.

However West Azerbijan includes Turks also. It may be noted that the Turks are more numerous.

The people of Kurdistan province are Kurds, except a number of villages nearer Hamadan and Zanjan are Azeris (Turk), in a small minority.

The inhabitants of Kirmanshah and Ilam are Kurds.

The Kurd's of W. Azerbijan are Sunni; those of Kurdistan are also Sunni except in Qorwa and Bijar. However in Kirmanshah and Ilam, they are mainly Shia except in Pavah and Rawansar and two sectors of Jawanrud.

Table 1.2: The Population of Kurds

Name of Province	Number of Kurd Population	No. of Households
1. Ilam	487,886	82,373
2. Kirmanshah	1,778,596	347,007
3. Kurdistan	1,346,383	256,536
4. West Azerbijan	1,248,160	235,316
Total	4,861,025	921,232

Sources: Census 1996

We used the Cochran formula[1.1] (Rafiepoor, 1981: 383) to estimate the total samples. The number samples was 384 with 5 percent error, but we chose 454 samples because we didn't want the valid cases be less than samples that we need in this study (valid samples are 442)

The multi-stage stratified random sampling technique is employed and the numerous stages in the sampling are described as below:

1.2.6.1 Stage 1

At the first stage, a list of cities and districts was prepared and added the population of them one by one:

Table 1.3: The Distribution of Kurds Populations

Name of Province	District	Number of Population	No. of Households
West Azerbijan	Mahabad	171,624	28,882
	Piranshahr (Khana)	86,721	12,707
	Sardasht	93,168	15,262
	Bukan	175,541	29,179
Kurdistan	Baneh	105,606	17,580
	Bijar	114,235	22,217
	Diwandarah	85,367	14,552
	Saqqiz	194,998	35,325
	Sanandaj	359,990	75,467
	Qorwa	199,834	37,935
	Kamyaran	101,237	19,374
	Marivan	185,116	34,086

[1.1] Cochran Formula is:

$$n = \frac{Nz^2}{4NE^2 + z^2}$$

N=921232 Households or Family
E=0.05 Error
Z=1.96 For Significant in level of 5%

Kirmanshah	Kirmanshah	843,125	170,901
	Islam Abad-e-Kharb	215,392	39,709
	Pavah	61,918	12,397
	Jawanrud	109,518	20,010
	Sarpoli Zohab	81,624	13,944
	Sonqor	112,014	21,883
	Sahna	82,043	16,707
	Qasri Shirin	20,006	3,927
	Kangavar	89,181	17,735
	Gelan Kharb	67,756	11,641
	Harsin	96,019	18,153
Ilam	Ilam	213,307	36,626
	Abdanan	45,746	7,891
	Darra Shahr	53,501	8,784
	Dehloran	52,299	8,455
	Shirwan & Chardowel	76,052	12,827
	Mehran	46,981	7,790

Sources: Census 1996

Then, we picked up six districts from 28, randomly, by the method of proportion representation of the population. Finally we distributed the samples as below:

Table 1.4: Distribution of Valid Samples

S. No.	District	No. of Urban Samples	No. Rural Samples
1.	Uromia	0	34
2.	Mahabad	62	18
3.	Bukan	63	0
4.	Sanandaj	77	21
5.	Kamyaran	63	0
6.	Kirmanshah	48	56
	Total	313	129

From the sampled districts, 9 villages/rural areas were selected. (See table 1.5)

Table 1.5: Distribution of Rural Samples.

Name of the District	Name of Village	No. of Respondents
Uromia[1.2]	1. Balanej	
	2. Darin Goleh	34
	3. Nowshan-e-Olya	
Mahabad	4. Esa Kandy	18
Sannandaj	5. Lenge Abad	21
	6. Ali Abad	
Kirmanshah	7. Zelm Abad	
	8. Bagerr Abad	56
	9. Zelm Abad-e-Olya (Najubran)	
Total		129

1.2.6.2 Stage 2

At this step when six cities and nine villages were selected; this question must be answered, that how can we choose the samples in cities and villages randomly?

To answer this question, we chose the building blocks as units factors (both in cities and villages). After distinguishing the block of buildings, a 10 percent systematic random sample was selected. In the villages the same process was applied except that in villages, where the population was not enough all households were interviewed.

[1.2] Uromia is a city with a majority of Turks (Azari) but the population of west villages are Kurds.

1.2.6.3 Stage 3

To interview Kurd intellectuals and active nationalists was the main problem, because in 1979 the Spiritual Leader of Islamic Republic of Iran (Immam Khomeini, 1979) proscribed the Kurdish nationalist parties (Komala and Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI).

After that these parties have armed conflict against the central government. These leaders are not available in Iran and some of them were assassinated in Europe or killed in battlefield. A few of them, inhabitant in Iran, were not ready to answer our questions. In this case, we attempted to use their books, speeches and articles that were available anywhere. In addition, four Kurd intellectuals were interviewed as below:

1.   Former Governor-general of Kurdistan and author.

2.   Former senior member of one of the active groups in Kurdistan and also poet and writer.

3.   One translator, writer who belongs to one of the noble families of Mahabad.

4.   The fourth one, also, a translator and writer, in both Turkish and Kurdish languages.

1.2.6.4 Stage 4

Interviews with senior officials of central government were not as hard as the Kurd leaders. We chose the key decision-makers of Kurdistan of Iran as below:

a)   Former and present Governor – general of West Azerbijan province.

b)   Former Governor – general and present deputy Governor – general of Kurdistan province. Two senior officials of Ministry of Culture and Education in Kurdistan.

c)   Two senior commander from *Sepah-e-Passdaran-e-Englab-e-Islami*. (Revolutionary guards of Iran)

1.3 Limitations of the Study

The main limitations of the present study are:

1.   The Kurd's nationalist movement after and before 1979 in Iran was underground armed conflict. Access to the senior leaders of this movement and internal codes and other direct information are too difficult and some times impossible, invalid and questionable.

2.   Due to the nature of this kind of movements the literature of this research as weakness as one can imagine. Every thing had to be started from scratch.

3.   The limitation of time and availability of resources are other noticeable problems.

4.   The territory of Kurd's inhabitant is a boundary zone with about 750 Kilometres in length and about 100-Km width on the boarder of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Armenian and Azerbijan (former USSR). Collection the samples from this vast area is another story.

Chapter 2

Theoretical Perspective

In this chapter, we will discuss some theoretical perspectives, which are relevant for this work. The discussion will be in four parts. Firstly, we will examine some major concepts and their interrelationship. In the second part we will present the roots of nationalism and history of the nationalist movements. The third part will be about the role of elite, language, and traditions and so on in nationalism. In the last part of this chapter, we will have a short review of the main theories of nationalism that have a strong relation with this thesis.

2.1 Concepts

This section will deal with the definitions of the major concepts, which will be used, in the thesis.

2.1.1 Ethnic Groups

Anthony D. Smith (1988, 1989) defines this concept as follows: 'a named human group of common fictive ancestry and historical memories, shared culture and territorial associations, and sentiments of solidarity (quoted in Fred W.

Riggs, 1991: 295). But Barth (1969) has defined it a little differently: 'a population that has a membership that identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguished from other categories of the same order'. Identification is presumed to be made on the basis of social or cultural markers such as language, religion or custom. This choice of definition implies that ethnicity, at least to the extent of recognition of ethnic differences by the populations involved, precedes solidarity. Barth's definition is minimal, in the sense that many attributes usually associated with ethnicity such as biological self-perpetuation, shared values and bounded interaction are treated as variables to be explained rather than as definitional requirements (Nielsen, Francais, 1985:135). But this term is generally conceived in anthropological/sociological literature to designate a collectively of people who: (a) share fundamental cultural values; (b) make up a field of communication and interaction within a larger social system; (c) have a membership, which identifies itself and is identified by others as having distinguishing characteristics, such as a language, religion and the group's geographical origins or that of its forbears (Cohen, 1974:X; Bergle 1967:1; quoted in Mombeshora, 1990: 433).

The International Encyclopaedia of Social Science (1972:167) explains this term as follows: 'an ethnic group is a distinct category of the population in a larger society whose culture is usually different from its own. The members of such a group are, or feel themselves, to be bound together be common ties of race nationality or culture.

Based on the salient features of all of the above mentioned definitions the following definition will be used: An ethnic group is a human group of common fictive or real ancestry and historical memories, shared culture and territorial associations for a long period of history and sentiments of solidarity with cultural markers such as language and religion in a multi-ethnic society.

2.1.2 Ethnicity

Whilst noting the disagreements over the conceptualisation of ethnicity, one may argue that ethnicity is both an objective and subjective phenomenon. There is, therefore, need for a synthetic definition. A good working definition is provided by Burgess (1978) (quoted in Mombeshora, 1990:434):

'The character and quality of ethnic group membership, based on an identity with and/or a consciousness of group belonging, that is differentiated from others by symbolic 'members' (including territorial, cultural or biological) and is rooted in bonds of a shared past and perceived interests. Glazer (1975:8) tells us that the term refers to a social group, which consciously shares some aspects of a common culture and is defined primarily by descent. He adds that the term is closely related to minority group, race and nation. It is not often easy to make sharp distinctions between them.

A property shared by acknowledged members of a community possessing distinctive cultural features, including a sense of common ancestry or history, as they interact with members of a larger society exhibiting different cultural traits (Riggs, 1991: 288).

Patterson (1975:309 quoted in Mombeshora, 1990:434) points out that ethnic consciousness is an awareness of belonging to an ethnic group, and/ or being different from other ethnic groups. Ethnicity thus becomes the conscious subjective interpretation of these differences that are, in turn, mobilised to press for ethnic interests. Cohen (1974:X quoted in Mombeshora, 1990:434) contends that it is the objective symbolic formations and activities in kinship, marriage, ritual and other types of ceremony that generate the subjective experience of ethnicity and other way round.

According to this view, ethnicity is thus conceptualised as a composite of symbolic members or elements, real or putative that is culturally defined and used in-group differentiation. These may include (Burgess, 1978:269) any combination of the following: Cultural content, such as language (or dialects therefore), religion, customs, emblems, values; territorial content, for instance, region and locality; biological content, for example, kinship and descent. These culturally defined aspects of ethnicity are the 'members' of ethnic group membership and to a large extent determines subjective self-definition.

2.1.3 Primary and Secondary Ethnicity

In previous pages we explained the term of ethnicity but a few elaborations are in order.

A type of modern ethnicity characterised by the aspiration of members of an ethnic community to sustain or revive their identity in an autonomous and independent political entity may be termed as *Primary Ethnicity*. A type of

modern ethnicity characterised by the aspiration of member of an ethnic community to become integrated on the basis of full equality with members; ethnicity of their host society, while retaining their cultural identity may be called *Secondary Ethnicity*. It is primarily found in the 'New World' (The countries of North and South America, and Australia, New Zealand. (Riggs, 1991: 296-297).

2.1.4 Nation

It is another concept that needs to be discussed in detail. The nation is an abstract myth which nevertheless has deep roots in different levels of historical reality and by fusing citizenship with ethnicity and territory it has been able to satisfy many needs and inspire immense loyalties (Smith 1976:2). However, for specialists on ethnicity, a 'nation' will usually (though not always) mean a political entity characterised by a sense of cultural identity (Riggs 1991: 283).

Paul R. Brass (1991:20) said that a nation may be seen as a particular type of ethnic community or, rather, as an ethnic community politicised, with recognised group rights in the political system.

Nations may be created by the transformation of an ethnic group in a multiethnic state into self conscious political entity or by the amalgamation of diverse groups and the formation of an inter-ethnic, composite or homogeneous national culture through the agency of the modern state. Although the two processes of nation-formation have different starting points, and raise quite

different kind of analytical and theoretical questions, the end result historically has sometimes been the same.

Walker Connar (1992:48-50) presented yet another way of looking at the phenomenon:

'In its pristine meanings, a nation is a group of people whose members believe they are ancestrally related. It is the largest group to share such a myth of common descent; it is, in a sentient sense the fully extended family'. From what has already been said, it is clear that the myth of common descent, which defines the nation, will seldom accord with factual history and this divergence is what has led many students of nationalism astray. After noting that most nations can be shown to be offspring of several people, they have concluded that ethnic purity cannot be accepted as a criterion for nationhood.

A nation is the largest ethnic group or a conglomeration of ethnic groups who share myths of common descent, is politicised; has deep roots in historical reality and, which encourages member's loyalties.

2.1.5 Nationalism

The origins of the term 'nationalism' are obscure. The first reference to it appears at Leipzig University, which was founded in 1409 after a religious and scholastic dispute at Prague involving Bohemian and non-Bohemian 'nations'. The sense in which the term was used was restricted: a union to defend the common interests of the compatriots of one of the four nations among the Leipzig professors.

According to Hubner's Stoats – Lexicon (1704), the term was forbidden in the seventeenth century.

In France, nationalism seems to have been used first by Abbe Barnel in 1798; but in the early nineteenth century it is rarely found. It does not appear in the Brockhous or Meyer Lexicon. In England, its first use is theological; the 1836 Oxford English Dictionary gives for nationalism the doctrine that certain nations are objects of divine election (Smith, 1983: 167, 1976: 221).

Brass (1991:48) maintains that 'nationalism is a political movement by definition. It requires political organisation, skilled political leadership, and resources to gain support to make successful demand on the political system'.

Gellner believes that there are two facets of nationalism; sentiment and movement; nationalism as sentiment involves both negative and positive feelings in an ethnic community, and nationalism as a movement takes place when ethnic boundaries are different with political boundaries in state or states.

In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state, a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation, should not separate the power-holders from the rest. We should also add the characteristics of organisation, leadership and supporters of the movement.

2.1.6 State and Nation-State

A discussion of the state may begin with Max Weber's celebrated definition of it, as that agency within society, which possesses the monopoly of legitimate violence. Only the central political authority and those to whom it delegates this right may apply violence. Among the various sanctions of the maintenance of order, the ultimate one-force may be applied only by one special, clearly identified, and well centralised, disciplined agency within society. That agency or group of agencies is the state' (Gellner, 1986: 3).

For Riggs (1991), nation and state are unequivocal synonyms 'any state that promotes (more or less successfully) a sense of patriotism or collective identity among its citizens,' is called Nation-State. Combining the categories used by Weber and Riggs we define the nation state as 'An ethnic community that promotes the loyalty of his members and delegates the monopoly of legitimate violence is nation-state.'

2.1.7 Ethnicity and Language

No doubt, a shared language is one of the most important markers of ethnicity perhaps, globally, the most important one. It underlies the sense of identity of the three Baltic peoples who were seeking their independence from Soviet Union. The identity of the Slovenes and Croats is demanding more autonomy in Yugoslavia, and similarly Hungarian speakers in Romania. Basques in Spain, the Kurds in the Middle East, etc. We cannot, think, really distinguish between "linguistic minorities" and "ethnic minorities". Linguistic minorities are

simply one kind of ethnic community and we may study them in terms of this concept: ethnicity based on a difference of language i.e. Ethnolinguistic Differences. It is important to distinguish between the ethnolinguistic problems associated with modern ethnicity and those found in pre-modern societies. In per-modern multilingual societies, languages were perpetuated through face-to-face interactions and the mass media were non-existent. Ruling elite may even have guarded their own language as a social privilege and little incentive to promote its mass use. Among themselves, members of any *ethnikos* could speak whatever language they knew. Language issues therefore, were typically not salient in pre-modern ethnicity.

By contrast, language has usually become the most important basis for modern primary ethnicity. The mass media and expanding literacy have made the spread and protection of language a truly controversial issue. Conquered ethnolinguistic communities struggle to achieve autonomy or independence so that they can freely develop the infrastructure of schools, mass media and public discourse needed in order to maintain and cultivate their own language. This phenomenon has become increasingly widespread and urgent throughout the old world-all of Asia and Europe and Africa.

By contrast, the language question is less important in areas of secondary ethnicity. Most immigrants, as noted above, struggle for acceptance and integration in the host land to which they have moved. As one of the costs of integration, they strive to learn and use the new languages that will most conveniently enhance their ambitions. Many of the children and descendants of

such immigrants have lost or never learned their ancestral languages. This is not to say that language is not an issue in secondary ethnicity. Indeed many immigrant communities do struggle to maintain their own language, to promote bilingualism in the schools to have their own newspapers, radio and TV programmes, and even to attract pupils to voluntary language schools. However, the language question is typically secondary to issues involving economic, social and political integration in the host society (Riggs, 1991: 446-447).

2.1.8 Ethnicity and Religion

Again, we ought to distinguish between ethnic and religious minorities. Instead, we need to work with the following concept:

Ethnicity based on difference of religion: Ethnoreligious Difference.

Researchers on ethnicity need to focus on inter-ethnic problems rooted in religious differences. In pre-modern societies such differences played a far more salient role than language differences. Although ethnoreligious conflicts persist today, I would guess that they have become much less salient than ethnolinguistic controversies. I believe ethnoreligious conflicts are also more likely to prevail in contexts of primary ethnicity than in those of secondary ethnicity. This difference may help us understand why in the United States, ethnoreligious and ethnolinguistic issues have seemed less important than problems based on ethnoracial questions; whereas in the Old World contexts ethnoreligious and, especially, ethnolinguistic conflicts have attracted much more attention. (Riggs, 1991: 448).

Ethnicity depends on four factors: race, kinship, language and religion. The main question must be answered is this: which one of these factors is more important and why? At first we can't answer these questions clearly. We can reply to this question with two new ones: In which society and in which specific time?

It is obviously that we explain these concepts in society with primary ethnicity that includes more than two ethnic groups. In different societies one of these factor may be more important than in others.

2.1.9 Further Notes on Ethnic Nationalism

Nationalism is both an ideology and a movement, usually a minority one, which aspires to 'nationhood' for the chosen groups; and 'nationhood' in turn comprises three basic ideals, autonomy and self-government for the group, often but not always in a sovereign state, solidarity and fraternity of the group in a recognised territory or 'home', and third, a distinctive, and preferably unique, culture and history peculiar to the group in question (Smith, 1976: 1-2).

2.1.10 Historical Taxonomies

Two historical sequences form the essential background of Smith's model of the rise of ethnic nationalism. They are:

| Empire | → | Scientific State | → | Nation-State |

| Possessive State | → | Scientific State | → | Nation-State |

These two progressions are, of course, ideal type; there are many deviations from them, and there is no inevitability about these sequences. For all its trappings the Soviet Union could be called an 'empire' for example. The key to his analysis is the concept of the 'scientific-state'. It is a polity, which seeks to homogenise the population within its boundaries for administrative purposes by utilising the latest scientific techniques and methods for the sake of 'efficiency'. The rulers use the bureaucratic machine and the fruits of scientific research and technological application to harness resources and mobilise the people in their territory. The features bequeathed by empires to the 'scientific-state' are of two sorts. First, there is the element of 'conquest'. The first stage of many empires is a 'conquest' one, where the new conquerors form a dominant caste and monopolise all the high status position in the empire. The Egyptian New kingdom seems to have done this in Palestine and Syria; and the Achaemenid Persian empire with its satrap administration, kept the governmental and high status positions for their own conquering ethnic group (Smith, 1983).

An illuminating account of the evolution of the western type of 'possessive state', from its inception in the Norman experiments in eleventh-century Sicily to the great Tudor and Bourbon dynastic state of the early modern era, is presented by Adda Bozeman. Such states are typically viewed as the personal possession of their rulers, client polities of individuals, whose resources and population could be harnessed for personal-political ends. They are generally based on secular law, divorced from any theocratic nations. They are unified under a strong central government, whether of monarch or an oligarchy of

powerful families; their aim is to weld together into compact solidary unit, diverse cultures and religious groups. They insist on their absolute sovereignty over their territory, which they look on as their personal resource. This was the ideal of the Normans and Frederick II in Sicily, of Philip the Fair and his Legalists C. [1300] in his dispute with Papal authority in France, and of the Tudor and Bourbon monarchs in England and France (Smith, 1983: 235)

By far the greater number of today's nations and nation-states achieved this status largely through often revolutionary and violent efforts of nationalist movements. They are divided into two main types:

1. **Ethnic Nationalism:** Here nationalism arises in communities with a distinctive, often unique, culture and history and operates solely on behalf of that ethnic group.

2. **Territorial Nationalism:** The nationalist movement, which arises among heterogeneous population, is based upon the territorial unit in which they are forcibly united and administered, usually by a colonial power. The boundaries of the territory and the administration of the colony, form therefore the chief referents and focuses of identification of the nation to be (Smith, 1976: 3-5).

Historically the nationalist movements in Middle East is closer to the model of 'empire' the European ones approximate the possessive state' model.

2.1.11 Sociological Taxonomies

In contrast to the historical schemes that focus on the ideological formulations, sociological taxonomies take the national group, or the nationalist movement, as the unit of analysis. One of the earliest sociological taxonomies is that of the political scientist, Handman. His scheme is in terms of groups. He distinguishes four types of nationalism 'irredentism', 'oppression', 'precaution', and 'prestige'. 'Irredentism' seeks the unification of an independent state with co-nationals under foreign domination; 'oppression' signifies the reaction of the small ethnic (e.g. East Timorese) nationalities to their discriminatory conditions. The cited examples, however, tend to blur this distinction; no differentiation is made between the explicitly cultural basis of, say, Serbia or Ruthenion nationalism, the more politically oriented Irish movement, the irredentism of the oppressed Poles and the Diaspora elements in the Armenian movement. All nationalism can claim some measure of oppression, and none more so than small groups. It is what they try to do about their condition that interests a sociological taxonomy of nationalism. 'Irredentism' is one such attempted solution; the converse and counterpart is surely 'secession' from the oppressive political unit (Smith, 1983).

The other pair of distinctions is more helpful. Precaution nationalism is the identification of commercial interests with national security and prosperity under the stimulus of competitively organised states, and it leads to imperialism. 'Prestige' nationalism is a cultural sentiment of inferiority, which springs from a perceived lack of esteem for past achievements and unrealised potentialities.

Handman's examples are Action Francaise, Carradini's Fascism and pre-1921 Germany. The distinction here is between an economic state nationalism and Fascism. We argued that it is unhelpful to call Fascism a type of nationalism, and perhaps Handman is really drawing attention to the exclusive and messianic elements in Pan movements, when he cites a special 'prestige' category of nationalism. On the other hand, 'precaution' nationalism is particularly valuable in pointing up the economic role of the state in promoting nationalism in conditions of independence.

One of the better-known sociological schemes is that of Louis Wirth. His typology of 'hegemony', 'particularist' (secession), 'marginal' (frontier) and 'minority' nationalities defines them as conflict groups. It is not clear whether 'hegemony' include irredentism as well as state-directed expansionist movement; nor how such irredentism relate to the 'frontier' type; nor whether the latter arise indigenously, or in the 'homeland', or both. The 'secession' category on the other hand, is clear. But Wirth's 'minority' type, which includes Negroes (in U.S.) and Jews, who cling to their own culture-unlike the border group (e.g. Alsations, Silesians) of the 'marginal' category is odd. After all, many minorities have held to their traditions for centuries, like Copts, Kurds and Tajiks, but only recently have they been touched by the winds of nationalism (Smith, 1983: 200).

Smith (1983) also added that 'Ethnic' movements are of three kind:

a) Secession   b) Diaspora   c) Irredentism

2.1.11.1 Secession

The most common course for a movement that claims to speak for a culturally homogeneous group within a larger political unit, is to break away and form a state of its own. Unlike the 'territorial' type which base their claim to independence on the factual or alleged wish of the colonised population to choose its own rulers and rules, the 'ethnic' types interpret the democratic 'right of self-determination' is the historical 'duty' to realise the culturally defined nation. The commonest referent of 'uniqueness' is language (and custom), but religion may set a group apart from all others or a combination of cultural traits may bring about the same result.

2.1.11.2 Diaspora

By contrast this group nationalism is as rare as the former was common. It is similar to the 'secession' type in solving a problem of 'incorporation' through division and separation, amounting to total withdrawal. But here the dilemma is far graver from the nationalist standpoint.

2.1.11.3 Irredentism

Both division and 'incorporation' characterise the situation of this important category. Many movements have, in addition to their separatist aims, the opposite drive to unification of all co-nationals in a state. Members of the projected 'group' live within the boundaries of other political units than that in which the main bodies of the 'nationals' reside (for example Germany). (Smith, 1983).

Similarly, irredentism, as defined here, contains two subtypes: the attempt to detach land and people from one state in order to incorporate it in another, as in the case of Somalia's recurrent irredenta against Ethiopia, and the attempt to detach land and people divided among more than one state in order to incorporate them in a single new state – a "Kurdistan", for example, composed of Kurds now living in Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Both forms of reconstituted boundaries would qualify as irredentism. Despite their elasticity, the definitions of the two phenomena are conceptually distinct. Irredentism involves subtracting from one state and adding to another state, new or already existing; secessions involve subtracting alone (Horowitz, Donald L. 1992: 119).

According to Kahn's famous typology, there are two forms of nationalism: the one political and rational, the other cultural and mystical, and the emergence of one or other as dominant is determined by the level of development of the community (Kahn, 1946: 3-4 quoted in Hutchinson John, 1992). First to appear was political nationalism in the "West" (defined by Kahn as England, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, USA and the British Dominian), in population which possessed a secular urban vernacular culture, dating back to the Renaissance, and distinct ethno-political boundaries. When nationalism formed, all that was required was the transformation of the existing state into a people's state, and it had practical and constitutional objectives articulated by a rising middle class. When nationalism arose later in the "East" (defined as Central and Eastern Europe and Asia), it was an imitative response to the nationalist culture of the "West". These territories were agrarian peasant

societies, with only a tiny middle class, dominated by a reactionary aristocracy, and where frequently, there was a lack of consensus between ethnic and political boundaries. Unable, therefore, to identify with a concrete territorial polity, and aware of their backwardness compared to the "West" nationalists turned to myth and legends to conjure an ideal nation that possessed an ancient historic mission and unique cultural attributes. Against the rationalist citizenship models of the "West", they celebrated the superior organic bonds between peasant, land and community as the mode of national integration.

This was a cultural nationalism led by historians and poets who operated as an educational force, building up a sense of loyalty to the national model. This furnished a basis for later political nationalist movements. Nonetheless it was essentially a backward-looking phenomenon incapable of directing social change (Kahn, 1946 quoted in Hutchinson John, 1992).

The combination of Smith and Kahn's classification is suitable for better perception of nationalism than others, because the classification of all such scholars are limited in space and time. They perceived only European nationalism but Kahn and Smith have gone further. The classification of Kahn took place with nation as a platform of these movements. He has presented secular urban vernacular of middle class as a basis for these movements. In Asia, Africa and Middle East it was an imitative response to the nationalist culture of the 'West'.

The nationalist movements maybe classified by three criteria:

a)   Status of nationalist groups in a community

b)   Goals and aims of the movement

c)   The origin of the movement.

a)   **Social Status of Nationalist Group:** When the nationalist group has a majority in its own territory or state, the arising movement may be hegemony or precaution or even imperialism. By contrast when the nationalist group is in a minority in its own territory or state, irredentism, prestige, particularise, secessionism, Diaspora nationalisms are more likely. In addition, a new kind of nationalism usually as a reaction against the colonial, imperialism, fascism or any kind of oppressive tendency taking place; renewal or "oppression" nationalism, may be the outcome.

b)   **Aims and Goals of Nationalism:** According to this criterion one of the three basic ideals may be the goal of nationalist movement. In first level only distinctive and preferable unique culture and history was chosen as distinction. In second level they try to achieve autonomy or self-government. Finally sovereign state are chosen as extreme aim of the movement.

c)   **Basic Origin of the Movement:** By excluding the anti-colonial nationalism, two kinds of nationalism are visible; the first one has deep root in its own history and tradition community as nationalism in Europe after Renaissance. The second is the imitative of western thought trading as nationalism took place in Middle East in 19th and 20th centuries, as Kahn believed.

2.2 The Emergence of Nationalism

In many situations the emergence of nationalism among ethnic groups is rooted in the political structure, the policies pursued by the government, the role of the intelligentsia, absolute and relative deprivation etc. The historical context within which these factors operate is always crucial.

2.2.1 Political Structure

Government policies and institutional mechanisms may be critical factors in influencing a group's capacity or desire to survive as a separate entity, its self-definition, and ultimate goals. The policies available to government to prevent the maintenance of separate ethnic identities or to limit the influence of ethnic groups range from the most extreme form of repression, including genocide and deportation, to policies designed to undercut potential bases for ethnic group mobilisation through assimilation in the schools or through the integration or co-operation of ethnic group leaders in the structure of power and wealth in the society. Alternatively, government may choose to follow explicitly pluralist policies such as federation or by conceding different ethnic groups the right to receive education through the medium of their mother tongue and to protect, preserve, and promote their culture in a variety of ways. Government may also indirectly influence the development of ethnic conflict through policies that distribute state resources and opportunities for government employment (Brass, 1991:50; Nielson, 1985: 135)

Examples of institutional mechanisms that may influence the development of separatist movements are the demarcation of administrative areas to conform the presumed ethnic boundaries, the establishment of system of autonomy and the creation of a federal system of government based upon cultural linguistic-territorial groups.

Among the institutional mechanisms available to multiethnic or multinational states for satisfying national demand within a common political framework is federalism (Brass, 1991: 51). Government may also adopt two or many official languages. They may adopt one or more languages for administrative use at the federal level and others at the provincial level.

The kinds of language policies chosen may be very important in influencing whether or not an ethnic group becomes assimilated or demands recognition as a nationality.

Another type of government policy that may influence the development of nationalities from communities is the way in which the state distributes the economic resources and public service jobs at its command. Nationalist movement makes both economic and political demands Experience in both Eastern Europe and South Asia demonstrates that they cannot be mollified by policies that deal with only one set of demands (Brass, 1991: 52-55).

2.2.2 Political Context

The movement from community to nationality involves an inevitable struggle for power between competing ethnic groups. The ebb and flow of

nationalism in an ethnic community, the intensity of its drive for power and the particular direction that its demands take are influenced by the political context. Three aspects of the political context are especially important:

a) The possibilities for realignment of political and social forces and organisation.

b) The willingness of elites from dominant ethnic groups to share power with aspirant ethnic group leaders.

c) The potential availability of alternative political arenas. (Brass, 1991: 55).

Possibilities for political realignment occur when existing political organisation fails to keep in tune with social changes that erode their support bases. A general political realignment presents new opportunities for nationalist political organisations to arise and to present an effective blend of culture and economic appeals. The outcome in a situation of this sort cannot be predicted on the basis of culture differences between rival ethnic group, but depends upon the patterns of elite competition for power in local party and government structure, upon the ability of competing elite to communicate effectively across class lines and new social classes, and upon the relative skills and effectiveness of competing leaders and organisations.

The second political context, variable that may affect the movement of an ethnic group from communal consciousness to national status concern the willingness of elites group to share political power. Where that willingness does not exist the society in question is headed for conflict, even civil war and

secessionism. However, where such willingness does not exist, the prospects for pluralist solutions to ethnic group conflicts are good. No regime, even the most authoritarian, can avoid confronting the issues of power sharing and pluralism in modernising multiethnic societies.

The third political context variable concerns the availability of and the relative costs to be borne by an ethnic group in shifting to an alternative political arena. In unitary and centralised states that contain the geographically concentrated minorities, it is certain that at some point, when the political demands of a minority are not being satisfied adequately by the state authorities, the demand will be made for administrative and/or political decentralisation of power (Brass, 1991).

2.2.3 Urbanisation

Some scholars like Smith (1983) maintain that urbanisation (and the communication possibilities this allows) is an important background factor in the diffusion of nationalism. Most nationalist movements are urban-based, though as in China, they may fail to secure sufficient support and enlist the peasants. At the same time, they originate in the town and yet their imagery is full of nostalgia and idealisation for the countryside and folk virtues. One would not wish to claim that this is the primary leitmotif, but it does provide a consistent spatial colouring for the nationalist dream of fraternity. It would indeed be remarkable if the recent experience of urbanisation were not reflected in their imagery.

But Wirth (1938) and Mombeshora (1991) think otherwise. Ernest Gellner (1986) presented the final factor as platform of nationalism. He believes that the monopoly of legitimate violence has a major role to play. When this is understood, then the imperative of nationalism, its root, not in human nature as such, but in a certain kind of now pervasive social order can also be understood. One may not invoke a general substrate to explain a specific phenomenon. The substrate generates many surface possibilities. Nationalism, the organisation of human group into large, centrally educated culturally homogeneous unit, is but one of these and a very rare at that. In this specific roots which alone can properly explain it. In this way, specific factors are superimposed on to a shared universal human substrate.

The roots of nationalism as the distinctive structural requirements of industrial society are very deep indeed. This movement is the fruit of neither ideological aberration nor of emotional excess. Although those who participated in it generally, indeed almost without exception, fail to understand what it is they do, the movement is nonetheless the external manifestation of a deep adjustment in the relationship between polity and culture which is quite unavoidable.

The other factors seem to work as philosophical platform. As Brass (1991) said, the process of nationality-formation is one in which objective differences between ethnic groups acquire increasing subjective and symbolic significance are translated into a consciousness of and a desire for, group solidarity and become the basis for successful political demands. There are two stages in the

development of nationality. The first is the movement from ethnic category to community.

The second stage of the transformation of ethnic group involves the articulation and acquisition of social, economic and political rights for the members or for the group as whole.

But Ernest Gellner (1986:39-49) has other ideas. Most of mankind enters the industrial age from the agrarian stage. The social organisation of agrarian society, however, is not at all favourable the nationalist principles. All this being so, the age of transition as industrialism was also an age of nationalism, a period of turbulent readjustment, in which either political boundaries or cultural ones, or both were being modified, so as to satisfy the new nationalist imperative which now, for the first time was making itself felt.

There is also a link between nationalism and the process of colonialism and imperialism and de-colonisation.

Nationalism sees itself as a natural and universal ordering of the political life of mankind, only obscured by that long, persistent and mysterious somnolence. As Hegel expressed this vision: Nations may have had a long history before they finally reach their destination that of farming themselves into states. Hegel immediately goes onto suggest that this pre-state period is really 'pre-history'. So it would seem that on this view the real history of a nation only begins when it acquires its own state. Critics of nationalism who denounce the political movement but tacitly accept the existence of nation, do not go far enough. Nation as a natural, God-given way of classifying men as an inherent

though long delayed political destiny is a myth. Nationalism which some times takes you to pre-existing cultures and turn them into nations, sometimes invent them and often obliterates pre-existing culture: that is a reality for better or worse and in general an inescapable one.

2.2.4 The Role of Intellectuals in Nationalism

Nationalism is the drive of a relatively thin stratum of intellectuals who absorbed the skills and values of advanced countries, towards rapid modernisation in opposition to the aristocracy and independently of the colonial industrial powers. This is because they are now under-employed and culturally displeased in their traditional societies. So that nationalism in under developed countries is the product of quite different forces than those, which produced nationalism in Europe. It is really opposition to the colonial economic status and its native beneficiaries, and has nothing to do with language, as in Eastern Europe.

Kautsky agrees with Warsley that capitalist colonialism is its own gravedigger. Its aims are contradictory. It tries to preserve the political status of 'us' so as to exploit the colonies, labour and resources more easily. But it simultaneously, by its modernising impetus, has to create new skilled groups to provide this labour force. In particular, three new groups emerge: a native bourgeoisie, a small urban working class, and most important, typical of agrarian societies-aristocrats, peasants and an artisan middle class. The intellectuals especially attack capitalists for shoring up the traditional regimes and demand native industries and redistribution of wealth. They see that colonial capitalism

dose not want industries in the colony to compete with its own industries in the colony. The intellectuals' desire for rapid industrialisation produces their nationalism, just as their anti-colonialism fits with their need for quick modernisation. The result is an ambivalent attitude to the West. They want what the West apparently denies them, and turn against it exactly because they admire it (Smith, 1983).

The intelligentsia does, indeed, play a definitive part in the rise of nationalist movements everywhere. Kautsky places more emphasis on the independent actions and desires of the intellectuals. It is not just their objective position in a traditional society under the onslaught of capitalistic colonialism that counts; what matters even more is the fact that they, and they alone, perceive this situation and react to it in a number of ways, though within a basic pattern.

The merit of this approach lies in the possibility of its extension to other groups, and in the possibility that cultural motives may influence action as much as economic interests.

The other merit of 'interest group' theory is its stress on the 'displacement' and uprooting of key groups, particularly the intelligentsia. This is not again just matter of economic loss; it is as much a loss of status and a problem of cultural alienation 'at home'. This breeds nostalgia for an idealised past, which forms one element in the ideology of nationalist movements (Smith, 1983: 83-84).

Gellner is quite clear about the overriding importance of the intelligentsia in nationalist movements. Really, nationalism's primary function is the resolution of the crisis of the intelligentsia. The broad character of the ideology is

largely a reflection of the problem and concern of its original adherents or 'bearers', to use Weber's term.

We are not arguing that nationalism is *simply* a movement of the intelligentsia. It is manifestly not. After all, it is an urban movement, which may on occasion be transported, actually or figuratively, into the countryside of peasants or tribesmen. The growth of communication and mobility obviously help to spread nationalism, as it does every other ideology, to outlying groups.

2.3 Myth, Language, Elite and Nationalism

In the earlier section I have examined the relevant concepts, background factors and a brief history of the emergence of nationalism. Nationalist movements, however, are carried out by human agents who use symbols in their myriad form for identifying themselves and for providing a supportive ideology. In this section attention will be paid to these aspects.

2.3.1 Myth and Nations

Nations need myths to live by. Nationalists look back to a golden age, if not always to an original ancestor. They generally have an account of how and when their people established themselves in their homeland, the trials and tribulations that they have survived and which have in turn helped in their political reawakening and the successful claim to nationhood as their birthright, i.e. an independent nation state. Nationalists are also, more often than not utopians. Students of nationalism are inclined to be more sceptical. They point out that the assertion of a national culture is functionally necessary if a modern

state is to survive (Gellner: 1983), or that the myth, rituals and symbols through which the myth is celebrated are a deliberate political invention (Hobsbawm and Ranger: 1983 quoted in Mayall 1992) but while nationalist and student may disagree on the antiquity (and reality) of the nation, there is little disagreement that the nation-state is a uniquely modern political formation, which nonetheless relies crucially on the past (Mayall, James, and et al., 1992 :10).

Smith (1976:17-18) explains the status of myth and religion in ethnicity and ethnic movement as below: This lack of correlation between the strength of historical memories (and records) of distinctive ethnicity, and the intensity of nationalism illustrates that it is 'historicism' rather than ethnic history itself which is the essential 'base' for nationalist movements.

The essence of a sense of ethnicity lies in a *myth or common origins and historical traditions*, often in conjunction with an association with particular territories or migration routes.

From the later eighteenth century, there has been a revival of ethnicity in new forms; even territorial nationalism has returned to myths of common origins, history and migration/ territory memories. Such a return, however, is deliberate and conscious, part of an overall conception of society and life, one, which applies organic and historical nations to the explanation of all phenomena. And Smith continues his analysis by language and culture. In addition, any cultural trails which serve to differentiate a population from its neighbours will tend to strengthen nationalism, once it has emerged; while secondary cultural traits which subdivide the population may provide the basis for subsequent

'secession' nationalism, as has occurred in Flanders, Biafra and Bangladesh. Both historians and sociologists interested in the cognitive dimension of social life have tended to embrace this linguistic account, and they point to the way in which language does appear to define new identities in Poly-ethnic states like Belgium, Canada or Yugoslavia. There are, however, a number of objections to this inflation of the linguistic factor. To begin with, there are several powerful nationalisms, which do not invoke language, and indeed avoid it as far as possible; India and Burma are obvious cases. Irish American, Argentinean (nineteenth-century) Swiss, Serb, Pakistani, even Algerian nationalism, let alone those of tropical Africa - none of those depended upon language as their main focus of solidarity or identity.

Brass (1991: 30-31) explains it under the title of language, religion and ethnic group differentiation where both religious and linguistic symbols are potential bases for differentiating one ethnic group from another, it is easy to understand how the process of promoting multi-symbol congruence begins. In early modernising societies it is often, however, a mistake to assume either that such symbols are likely to be congruent to begin with or that is a pre-existing congruence that predisposes ethnic group towards differentiation and conflict. Rather, it is more often the case that the choice of the elite group that takes up the ethnic cause. Religious elites will usually select the group's religion as the leading symbol and language will be used, in so far as possible as a secondary reinforcing the symbol of unity. Moreover, the religious elite will attempt to

promote the congruence of language with religion by promoting education and by publishing religious pamphlets in the vernacular.

In some cases it is easier to promote such a congruence of linguistic and religious symbols than in others. The strength of modern Polish nationalism, based primarily on language, has been reinforced by the fact that nearly all Poles are also Catholics and are to be distinguished, therefore, an both linguistic and religions grounds from other Slav peoples.

Smith and Mayall believe that myth is necessary for nation. This myth may be an original ancestor or common origins or historical tradition and so on. They also add that essence of nation or ethnicity depends on myth and key factor for sense of nation is mythology.

Every distinctive character that differentiates one ethnic group from another are religion, language and different culture, which of them dominates in a particular case may vary. It is also possive that the conjection of two or more factors is different from one movement to another.

For Brass combination of religions and linguistic symbol may be more important in most cases.

The role of each factors from one movement or ethnic movement to another different. The role of each factor change by the different history and tradition. There are no general rules for analysis every case by same styles.

2.3.2 Language and Vitality of Ethnolinguistic Nationalism

Language and linguistic differentiation is one of the most important factors in nationalist and ethnic nationalism movement. Smith, Brass and others in this field stress its role as a dominant factor in many active nationalist movements up to now.

Language identity is present in many movements and in several of them has a key-role and function, for instance, Arab nationalism during World War I and before. Kurds nationalism in Turkey and Iraq after Second World War and also among industrial countries the track of this tendency are visible like in Canada and so on.

In previous section, we have pointed out the role of this factor but one of the best exploring of vitality of it in Ethnolinguistic groups presented by Howard Giles (1977:308-318) in 'Language, Ethnicity and Inter-groups Relation'. He explored the function of language in wide area like socio-economic, historical, demographic field and also pointed out the institutional support for this factor below.

The structural variable most likely to influence the vitality of Ethnolinguistic group may be organised under three main headings: the Status, Demographic and Institutional Support factors. The status variables of that which pertain to a configuration of prestige variable of the linguistic group in the inter-group context. The demographic variable is related to the sheer number of group member and distribution, Throughout the territory institutional support variable

refers to the extent to which a language group receives formal and informal representation in the various institutions of a nation, region or community. These three types of structural variables (figure 2.1) interact to provide the context for understanding the vitality of Ethnolinguistic group.

Status Factor: Four factors can be listed under this heading and will be discussed in turn: economic status, ascribed status, socio-historical status and language status.

Economic Status: This refers to the degree of control a language group has gained over the economic life of its nation, region or community.

Social Status: Very closely aligned to economic status and perhaps an equally potent factor, is social status. This refers to the degree of esteem a linguistic group affords itself; often, this amount of group's self-esteem closely resembles that attributed it by the out-groups.

Vitality		
Status Factor	**Demography**	**Institutional Support**
Economic Status	National Territory	Mass Media
Social Status	Concentration	Government Service
Socio-historical Status	Proportion	Industry

Language Status
Within   Without

Demography:
Absolute
Birth Rate
Immigration
Emigration

Institutional Support:
Industry
Religion
Culture

Figure 2.1

Socio-historical Status: The histories of many Ethnolinguistic group contain the period in which members of such groups struggled to defend, maintain or assert their existence as collective entities. Regardless of the outcome of these struggles, historical instances can be used as mobilising symbols to inspire individual to bind together as group members in the present.

Language status: The fourth factor is the status of language spoken by the linguistic group both within and without the boundaries of the linguistic community network. As it happens in this century, language such as English, French and Russian have international importance as media of technology, business, science, culture and communication. A language's history, prestige value and the degree to which it has undergone standardisation may be sources of pride or shame for member of linguistic community.

Demographic Factors: Eight demographic variable are described here as contributing to the vitality of entnolinguistic group and these will be discussed under two headings namely, Group Distribution and Group number factors.

Group Distribution Factors: Three factors will be discussed under this heading National Territory, Group Concentration and Group Proportion. National territory is related to the nation of ancestral homeland. Through wars, allegiances, pacts and promises, the tradition homeland of linguistic group have often been divided or enlarged to suit the immediate need and ambitions of distant rulers and empire. Indeed, Lieberson (1972) has shown that immigrant linguistic minorities usually assimilate more quickly into the dominant culture by

loosing their language than indigenous linguistic minorities who still occupy their traditional homeland.

The concentration of Ethnolinguistic group member across a given territory century or region also contributes to group vitality. Widespread diffusion of minority group members as individual may discourage group solidarity as often is the case of migrant workers. The proportion of speakers belonging to the Ethnolinguistic in-group compared with that belonging to the relevant out-group is a third factor likely to affect the nature of the inter group relationship.

Group Number Factor: Five factors will be discussed under this heading, *absolute numbers, birth rate, mixed marriages, immigration and emigration.*

Absolute number: Simply refers to the number of speaker belonging to an Ethnolinguistic group.

A group's **birth rate** in relation to that of the out-group's can also be an important factor in assessing to vitality. For instance, the fact that an out-group is increasing its number at a greater rate than the in-group is providing the latter with a more substantial entity with which to contend.

Increases in the proportion of Ethnolinguistically - **mixed marriages** between in-group and out-group can also affect a group's vitality. In such situations, it appears as though the high status variety has a better chance of surviving as the language of the home and hence of child rearing than the low status variety.

Immigration patterns are factors, which enhance or decrease the vitality of linguistic minority groups.

Emigration can also affect the vitality of Ethnolinguistic groups. Adverse social and economic conditions can force vast number of young and active member of linguistic minorities to leave their traditional communication in search of better occupational and economic opportunities elsewhere.

Institutional Support Factor: Institutional Support refers to the degree of formal and informal support a language receives in the various institutions of a nation, region or community. Informal support refers to the extent to which minority has organised itself in terms of pressure group. It is suggested that a linguistic minority is vital to the extent that its language and group members are well represented formally in a variety of institutional settings. These domains of usage include the mass media, parliament, governmental departments and services, the armed forces and the state supported arts of crucial importance. For the vitality of Ethnolinguistic group is the use of the minority language in the state education system at primary, secondary and the higher level.

We have described how various types of structural variables can affect the vitality of ethnolinguistic group. Three factors were singled out as especially relevant, and it must be noted that their relative weights require further research. It is, however, only by carefully evaluating the combined effects of three main (and possible other) factors that one can determine the relative vitality of an Ethnolinguistic group. For instant, an Ethnolinguistic group may be low on status and institutional support factors, but very strong in terms of the demographic

variables. Howard Giles presented only an ideal type of the main factors that have role in vitality of Ethnolinguistic group the amalgamation of this factor a precise analysis in real community.

2.3.3 Marxism and Nationalism

Some Marxist scholars believed that class consciousness is compromised by ethnic or nationalist consciousness as Bell (1975) said that the reduction in class sentiment is one of factors one associate with the rise of ethnic identification (Bell, 1975:157 quoted in Nielson, 1985:144).

The standpoint of classical Marxist and neo-Marxist are different because classical Marxist theorists believed that state nationalism is the instrument of bourgeoisie for domination of proletarian. Moderate neo-Marxists believe that ethnic struggles are stronger than class struggles now. Brass (1991:250-251) presented a short brief of this view as below: 'At the other extreme from the group pluralist view of the state as a neutral arena are the formulations of some Marxists and neo-Marxist view, the state is not only partial rather than neutral, it is the instrument of one class, the bourgeoisie. It is an organ of class domination; an organ of oppression of one class by other.

Those associated with the centre-periphery and internal colonial perspectives particularly, have modified the classical Marxist position in another direction by bringing ethnic struggles to the forefront.

The first group of neo-Marxists have noted that the modern capitalist state has played a protective and even an emancipator role in relation to some minority and disadvantaged groups.

The second group of neo-Marxist theorists, however, has gone much further and has argued in fact that, under present conditions, ethnic struggles are more pervasive and salient than class struggles. The reason for this state of affairs is that the capitalist world economy and imperialist state expansion have led to a differential distribution of state resources and valued employment opportunities among ethnic groups.

T.K. Oommen (1997) recently explained the sources of ambiguity about nations and nationalism in Marxism. These are mainly two kinds, First, the belief staunchly held in the *Communist Manifesto* that, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie and the world market, freedom of commerce and uniformity in the mode of production, national differences and antagonisms between people will gradually disappear (Marx, 1932: 340). Second, the ambivalence regarding the principle of 'self-determination of nation'. Trotsky explains this perspective clearly as follows:

> 'We give full support to the principle of self-determination, whenever it is directed against feudal, capitalist and imperialist states. But whenever the fiction of self-determination in the hands of the, bourgeoisie becomes a weapon directed against the proletarian revolution, we have no occasion to treat this fiction differently from the other "principles" of democracy perverted by capitalism' (Trotsky 1922: 86 quoted in Oommen 1997: 116-117).

We can conclude the Marxists views from antagonist to complete agreement with nationalism and ethnic consciousness. As classical theorists (Marx, Engles, Lenin, Stalin, Trotsky) were opposed to nationalism as false consciousness on one side of spectrum and neo-Marxist on the other side completely accept that ethnic struggles are more powerful and efficient than class conflict in present conditions of the world.

2.4   The Theories of Nationalism

2.4.1 Competition Theory

Competition is a backbone of many theories in this field with different stress. Many theorists focus on geographical factors and named as 'Ecological Theory'. When the theorist just focus on the competition between two or more ethnic groups we classify as 'Competition Theory'. Some scholars' analysis their theories depending on the goal or interest of ethnic groups that bring it here as 'Interest group theory'.

2.4.1.1 Ecological Competition

Lauwagie Berverly Nagel (1997) suggests the theory. He was influenced by Barth (1956, 1969) and Hannan (1979) and modified it further.

Barth had (1969) argued that ethnic boundaries coincided with productive niches of groups in the same region.

Ethnic identities will tend to form around the distinctive properties of the niches. And resources for food shelter and also economic resources in modern

society are the group's fundamental niche and two or more groups in the region compete to achieve them. The ecological model of competition is based on two central assumptions (1) if two groups have very similar niches and exist in the same region, competition will lead to the exclusion of one group and (2) larger groups will have an advantage in competition. This model has proved useful especially in the study of ethnic separatist movements in modern states (Nielson, 1977; Olzak 1978 quoted in Nagel, 1997:311-336).

This theory can explain the conflict between peasants and nomads in Kurdistan during the Mahabad Republic in 1946.

2.4.1.2 Economic Competition

Several scholars in this field have mentioned this Theory e.g.; Hechter (1976); Ragin (1979); Nielsen (1977, 78a, 78b, 85), Sarah Belanger and Mourice Pinard (1991) and Medrano (1994). And also it has been cited in others like: Deritsch (1953); Van, Den Berghe (1967); Barth (1969); Hannan (1979).

The basis of this theory is that the competition between ethnic groups in same region occurs as consequence of industrialisation and modernisation. The process of competition takes place as follows: as culturally heterogeneous populations become industrialised, there is a spread of market economy and increasing bureaucratisation. In this situation members of different groups find themselves increasingly is a position to compete for the same occupations and the same rewards. The competitive tensions are manifested by a heightening as solidarity within the groups involved. And ethnic competition leads to ethnic

movement and ethnic conflict if, and only if the competition perceived to be unfair.

2.4.1.3 The Interest Group Competition

This Theory is explained by Smith (1983) and Brass (1991). Its can be classified as kind of competition theory with difference in the role of state in ethnic group conflict. Brass believed that the state is usually neutral in interest group competition. He continued that the results of interest group conflict might be influenced by the policies, distribution of resources, help particular categories of the population. Those policies, resources and agencies themselves may then become catalysts for further interest group organisation. The state is viewed neither as dominated by the group that contest in its arena nor as autonomous force in relation to them. In nutshell the policies of state are the products of the encounter of groups in conflict.

2.4.2 The Developmental Perspective

This theory has been profounded by Lipset and Rokhan (1967); Hechter (1975) Charles C. Ragin (1979).

Briefly, the theory holds that different types of political cleavages predominate during different phases of development of the modern polity. The geographical or cultural cleavages are superseded by functional cleavages. The predominance of functional cleavage was the product of industrial revolution. In the longer run tended to cut across the value communities within the nation and to force the enfranchised citizenry to choose sides in terms of their economic

interest. For the transition of functional interest in the political arena the political cleavage to become reality in a nation scale, it is necessary for the process of structural differentiation to engulf or at least reach the various "value communities" contained within the boundaries of the nation state (Lipsed and Rakhan 1967: 1-64 quoted in Ragin 1979).

2.4.3 Modernisation Theory

This Theory is presented by; Nielsen (1985); Brass (1991) and Keorney Hugh (1991). The rise of nation-state was one of the signs of modernity (Hugh 1991). The main function of modern state is promoter of equality and distributive justice among regions, classes, and ethnic groups and distributor of privilege (Brass). The crucial articulation is that individuals in society have available a large variety of identities. Each one of them can be used to distinguish subsets of population (Nielson). When ethnic groups occupy distinct territories, state sponsored modernisation and the increased geographic "patchiness" of centralised decision making increase the homogeneity of interested members of an ethnic group and its carrying capacity of participation.

Modernisation and homogenisation of the socio-economic system over the entire territory increases the carrying capacity of participation of ethnic solidarity, especially on the basis of an inclusive definition of ethnicity syncretic ideological trapping, and this is the type of event that is labelled a resurgence of ethnicity by observers (Nielsen 1985: 144-147).

2.4.4 The Reactive Theory

The reactive theory of ethnic change suggests that ethnicity arises from the salience of cultural distinctions in the system of stratification (Barth 1969: 9-38; Gellner 1969, Chapter-7, Hechter 1971 quoted in Hechter 1974: 1154). When individuals are assigned to especial types of occupations and other social roles on the basis of observable cultural traits, or markers, this may be appropriately termed a "cultural division of labour". These terms may be existing regardless of the level of structural differentiation in society (Hechter 1974: 1154). Nielsen (1985:133) states this theory briefly like this, 'ethnic solidarity is a reaction of the culturally distinct periphery against exploitation by the centre... with cultural division of labour, ethnic boundaries tend to coincide with lines of structural differentiation and ethnic solidarity is increased'.

Ragin (1979) and Nilsen (1985) believe that ethnicity resurfaces in Hechter theory in same way with different work, that is this. In this theory entails a particularistic allocation of roles and resources accompanied by structural differentiation. The most desirable rewards are reserved for members of the core cultural group while members of the peripheral cultural group are assigned to inferior positions and receive inferior rewards. This "cultural division of labour" may occur at any level of structural differentiation.

2.4.5 Nationalism Makes Nations

This theory is presented by Ernest Gellner (1986:55) in his famous book 'Nations and Nationalism'. He explained background of his theory at first as

follows: 'The great, but valid, paradox is this; nation can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather than, as you might expect, the other way round. It is not the case that the "age of nationalism" is a mere summation of the awaking and political self-assertion of this, that, or the other nation. Rather, when general social condition make for standardised, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire population and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified culture constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify. The cultures now seem to be the natural repositories of political legitimacy. Only *then* does it came to appear that any defiance of their boundaries by political units constitutes scandal.

Under these conditions, nations can indeed be defined in terms both of will and of culture, and in terms of the convergence of them both with political units. In those conditions, men will to be politically united with all those, and only those, who share their culture. Politics then will to extend their boundaries to the limits of their cultures and to protect and impose their culture with boundaries of their power'.

The main idea of Gellner (55,56 and 94) is explained as below:

In fact, ethnicity enters the political sphere as 'nationalism' at times when cultural homogeneity or continuity (Not classlessness) is required by the economic base difference become noxious, while ethnically unmarked, gradual class differences remain tolerable.

2.4.6 Diffusion Theory

The main architect of this theory is Anthony D. Smith (1971,1983,1992). The main question of this theory is this nationalism as an ideology is central to in West Europe and diffusion to East Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East and Latin America. The main assumptions of this theory can be classified as below:

1. All men need security and desire to belong to a human group of same kind.

2. Nationalism is an ideology, which creates new group, which can substitute for the last security afforded by the old.

3. There is a universal assumption that the mechanism of the spread of nationalism dependent the faculty of imitation (Smith 1971,1983). This imitation took place in extreme high and all levels (Smith, 1992: 68). The intelligentsia of Africa, Asia and so on were nevertheless imitating, not only the historicism of European intellectuals, but also their revolutionary Chiliasm. He also continued that spread of nationalism might be a mixture of imitation and reaction against the European imperialism and colonialism.

The other hypothesis that has a strong relationship with the diffusion theory is this: international and domestic events have more influence on the rise of feeling of ethnic identification or ethnicity. (Glazer and et. al., 1970)

First and Second World War as two international events have changed the political map of Middle East. These events had an especial trace on the Kurdish nationalist movement. The fall and declining of Ottoman Empire and the nationalist movement of young Turks and Arabs nationalist and establish many states like Turkey and other Arabs countries that surrounded Kurd's territory as domestic events arising and more influence on Kurd population. The increase of nationalist feeling of Kurd's people in Turkey and Iraq may have diffused to Iranian Kurds.

This theory has been supported by late spiritual leader of Iran- Roohollah Khomeini (1982) and others like Rezaii (1997), Marandi (1997).

2.4.7 Deprivation Theory

This theory has been associated with the name of Paul R. Brass (1991). Other scholars like Anthony D. Smith (1976) and Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (1975) also voiced similar views. In its simplest form, the argument contends that nationalism arises in response to objective/subjective exploitation of an indigenous group by an alien group, or of one social class by another of one ethnic group by another.

Ethnic competition for state power or share of state power and state resources is the heart of the matter of ethnic group formation.

This Theory has been supported by many leaders of the Islamic revolution of Iran like (Khomeini, Roohollah, 1979; Chamrran, Mustafa[2.1], 1985) and many

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[2.1] He was one of the National Supreme Defence Council members of Iran.

key decision makers in Kurdistan like Mohammad Broojerdi, (quoted in Ghafghazi Zadeh, 1997), governor-general of West Azerbijan (Saadat 1997), (Najafy, Amir[2.2], 1997), (Rezaii, Jabbar, 1997), (Jamshidian, Mas'ud, 1997), (Marandi, Mehadi, 1997).

Of the various theories discussed here, the last three will be used extensively in the discussion of Kurdish nationalist movement.

[2.2] He was one of the High Commander of Hamzeh Headquarter (it is an alias).

Chapter 3

The "Kurds" And "Kurdistan": A Historical Overview

3.1 Introduction

There are two assumptions about the origin of the word 'Kurd'. Some scholars and nationalists believe that this word is derived from the ancient names of tribes like *'Kardu'* or *'Qordu'* (Barzani, Mustafa, 1997, original 1948)[3.1] who inhabited the Zagross Mountains about 3000 BC. David Mc Dowall (1992) believed that the tribes who mauled Xenphan's ten thousand during their famous retreat to the Black Sea in 400 BC was *'Kardu'*, may be the ancestry of today's Kurds (cited in Kreyenbroek; 1992). But Vassili Nikitine (1987, original 1955) believes that the apparent similarity between ancient and today words in pronunciation may cause several mistake because the ancient words from ancient language have many pronunciation, this kind of similarity should be studied carefully.

[3.1] Mullah Mustafa Barzani was the leader of Kurdish rebellion 1930-1980 in Iraq.

Nikitine agreed with Professor Minrowsky about the origin of the Kurd.

He said that, *"Kurmandj"* is the name that today's Kurds express themselves by

this word is made up of three parts, *"Kur + man + dj "*. 'dj' is suffix and should

be omitted. Minrowsky explained that '*man*' has a strong relationship with

Medes or *Mannai*. '*Mards*' was ancestory of Medes or *Mannai*. According to

Minrowsk's explanation, this assumption was supported by Mas'udi (Arab

historian from tenth century) when he explains the ancestry of Kurds as below:

Kurds from *Mard* from Sae Sae from etc. (Sharafnamah, 1597(1985). Finally, it

is possible that two ancient tribes like *Mards* or *Kurti* may be the ancestors of

today Kurds. The pronunciation of these two words in ancient Medes language is

same (Nikitine, Vassili, 1987).

The other scholars explain it clearly that Arabs were the first to call these

people 'Kurds' in the seventh century. This term was beginning to be applied as

an ethnic description of the Iranicised tribes. (O'Ballance Edgar, 1996, Kinnane

Derk, 1964:21)

Ehssan Nuri[3.2], explained it why Arabs described all Iranian as 'Kurd'

plural of '*Akrad*' as below:

1)   The first and important battle between Muslim Arabs and Iranians took

place in Kurdish area Hilwan, today Sarpoli Zohab (Zaki Beg, 1996: 106)

and Nahavand. The battles were one against one. Each warrior

pronounced his name and father's name and dynasty and described

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[3.2] General Ehssan Nuri Pasha was the Chief Commander of Ararat Kurdish rebellion 1926-1930 against Turks Nationalist in Turkey.

himself as *'Gurd'* meaning brave, heroic, valiant. 'K' in Arabic and "G" in Farsi have same shape and pronunciation and same dictations.

2)   The second evidence that the Arabs the first named Iranians by the words Kurds is pointed out in the Book 15, Chapter 17, by Strassboon like this: The Persian trained their teenager sons to be so brave that they could fight in any condition and every where in cold winter and hot summer, in mountains and plains in raining and snowing weather. This young brave fighter was called *"Kardak"* (Nuri, Ehssan, 1954, Yassami, 1984). Arab's historian instead of *"Kardak"*, noted *"Gurd"*, 'Kurd' that has same pronunciation in Arabic.

Shahnamah Ferdowsi, an epic and legendary history of Iran is one of the main resources of today Farsi Words, uses both *Kurd* and *Gurd* interchangeably. Even today a battalion is called *"Gurdan"* and a major is *"Sar Guard"* (The commander of battalion). Historical and geographical evidences support the assumptions of Minrowsky (Nikitine, 1987) and Arabic origin for the word of Kurd. In addition, Amir Sharaf Khan Bittisi in Sharfnamah (1597: 21, 28, 29) support this assumption at several places.

Historical evidence shows that the first tribal waves emigrated from Turkmenistan plains to Iran Plateau about fourth to second milleniums BC. These first human settler waves to Iran were called *'Asiatic'* by some historians (Nuri Ehssan, 1954: 19-10, Yassami Rashid, 1984). In Azerbijan, Iranian Kurdistan and northern Iraqi Kurdistan, they were known as *sumerians* or *Guti.*

In what today is Luristan and Hamadan they were called *Lullubians* and towards the south as '*Kassian*'.

The second waves of tribal immigration to Iranian Plateau named "Aryan" or *"Ary"*. This historical event took place from third to first milleniums BC (Alae Dien Sajjadi quoted in Nuri, 1954; Yassami, 1984; Behzadi, 1994).

One part of this new immigration gradually had gone to Punjab and Indus valley (about 2500 BC) (Nuri, 1954). In this period of time (2000-1000 BC) The information about the settlers on Zagross Chain was more clear than the '*Asiatic*' period.

As the names of *Gutian, Lullubian, Kassian* were disappeared, names like Aryan *Madai, Mannai, Urartians* and *Parsumash* came on view (1000 BC) (Behzadi, 1994) and also *Kardu, Khaledi* (Nuri, 1954). The Aryans, skillful cavaliers had settled on Zagross Mountains. Either by assimilating or displacing the previous inhabitants, the new kingdoms were founded in first millenium BC, (Kinnane, 1964). In second or third decades of eighth century BC the *Mannai* kingdom was founded around Uromia (Kabudan or Kaboadan) Lake East and West up to the Arass river (today East and West Azerbijan, Hamadan and part of Zanjan provinces) Petty Medies. One century later this kingdom became the basis of Mediean empire culture, economy and language (Behzadi, 1994). The *Parsua* emigrated from West of Uromia Lake to south east of Zagross Ranks and had settled on *Anzan* (or *Anshan*) between 844 to 836 BC. Less than two centuries later the second Iranian dynasty was founded i.e. *Parsian* on south and west of

Iranian Plateau. *Parsuamash* was the new name of the territory (Sharafnomah, 1597 (1985); Behzadi, 1994).

In 850 BC another kingdom was founded by *Urartians* in the neighbourhood of *Mannaian* (West). This tribal federation was named *Uruatri-Nairi* (Behzadi, 1994).

A few scholars like N. G. Marr, Vassile Nikitine (1989) and others have believed that the ancestors of modern Kurds were not immigrants but were indigenous like *"Allabaria" "Kharkhar"*, *"Ellipi"* and descended from *"Jopheth"* (Sharafnamah, 1597 (1983), introduction). It is not deniable that this area absorbed many tribal waves which immigrated from 4000 BC up to 600 BC. The culture of these peoples combined with dominant by Indo-European Aryans (Nikitine, 1987: 54-60). The Iranicised tribes who had settled in the heart of Kurdistan are the cultural progenitors of the modern Kurds (Kinnane, 1964: 21).

Manniaian or *Mard* were the precursors of the first Iranian Kingdom founded by a federation of tribals had settled in North and West of Iran and were named *Medes*, *Mada* or *Medians*, in 675 or 715 BC[3.3]. In 612 BC 'Khshathrita', powerful Kings of Medes defeated 'Assyrian' for the first time and captured Ninevah (capital of this dynasty) and this historical event has been the basis of Kurdish or Madians calendar (Nuri, 1954; Yassami, 1984; Behzadi, 1994).

[3.3] The *"Central Asian and Caucasian Review"* has believed that Median dynasty founder on 708 BC.

The second and fourth Iranian Empires *"Achaemenian"*, (559-330 BC) and *"Sassanid"* (212-652 AD)[3.4] without doubt comprised tribals of Zagross, *"Achaemenian"* from *"Parsua"* and *"Sassanid"* from *"Shabankareh"* tribes (Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972; Yassami, 1984; Central Asia J, 1992). Only the *"Parthians"* or *"Arcadias"* (227BC–224AD) descended from the Aryans of Eastern of Iran (Mardookh Kurdistani; 1972, Central Asia J, 1992).

3.1.1 Kurds (650-1500 AD)

By the advent of Islam (621 AD) the 'Kurd' as a name was more in vogue for Arab historians than the ancients one. After the conquest of the *Sassanid* Empire's capital – Tesiphon –in March 637 AD), the remainder of the Persian army were stationed in Hilwan (today Sarpli Zohab in Kirmanshah Province) around the reign of the last Sassanid Empiror King Yazdgird III. After several bloody battles, the Muslim army defeated the Persians and crushed their resistance in 639 AD (18 AH), and it is the first Kurdish contact with the Muslim army (Zaki Beg, Muhammad Amin, 1996; Yassami, 1984). It wasn't the last bloody battle between Muslim forces and the defenders of Persian Empire (Kurd) this resistance continued city by city, at first in Ahwas, Fars, Nahavand, Darabgird (639-649 AD) and other areas later like Azerbijan, Gillan, Tabarestan (today Mazandaran) up to 726 AD (108 AH).

After Iranians lost the land, this resistance and violence continued by supporting any opposition movements against Umayyad dynasty.

[3.4] The *"Central Asia and Caucasian Review"* belive that "Sassanid founded 224 AD and also Nicholos Sims, 1998: 129.

At the time of the Abbassid's call to rebellion against Umayyad Empire, Persians (Kurds) under the commander – in – chief, Abu-Muslim Khurassani, which supported Abbassids and defeated their enemy and founded new Islamic Empire in $770^{3.5}$ AD (148 AH), which lasted for more than five centuries (Sharafnamah, 1597 (1985); Yassami, 1984; Zaki Beg, 1996).

Revolts also took place in Isfahan, Jibal (today Luristan and Ilam), Fars (today Fars and Kohkilloyeh) in 846 AD (231AH) and they similarly took part in the Sahib Zanj Rebellion in 875 AD (262AH). The Barzikani dynasty founded a local Kurdish government at today's Kirmanshah, Hamadan, Luristan, Ilam and parts of Khuzistan in 959AD, which lasted until 1089 AD$^{3.6}$ named 'Hassanwayhid' (Sharafnamah, 1597(1985); Yassami, 1984; Zaki Beg, 1996).

During the Turkish invasions specialy Seljuq [Seljuksi] dynasty as central government of Persia (Iran), all Kurdish local governments were crushed except the Shabankarh tribes, which continued their local autonomous government from 1042 AD (421AH) to 1377 AD (756AH) in Fars (Yassami, 1984:192).

One of the Kurd's historians – Zaki Beg (1996: 119) – has explained this period of Kurd's life as below:

'Overall, they have never completely and willingly submitted to the domination of any king or government. It is no surprise then, that in the eleventh to sixteenth centuries AD, the Kurds demonstrated more activity, tenacity and courage in battlefield that was expected by the caliphs (Abbassid) and Turkish Sultans sought their help in wars and hard times.

[3.5] Sharafnamah believed that the founded of Abbasid took place 750 and lasted up to 1258 AD.
[3.6] Zaki Beg noted that this dynasty lasted only 58 years (up to 1015 AD).

3.1.2 Kurds During Safavid Empire (1502-1736 AD)

By the foundation of Ottoman Empire (1299-1924 AD) and Safavid dynasty (1502-1736 AD) (Sharafnamah appendixes, 1597 (1985); Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972), the Kurd's life and history changed completely because the main battles between these two empires took place in Kurdish territory. Ottoman Empire claimed legitimisation of Islamic Caliphat as third Islamic Empire (Omayyah, Abbassid) in Islamic World. After noticeable victory in Balkans, Egypt, Amasya, all west part of Islamic world (from Baghdad to Istanbul) had been under the control of Ottomans. The main barrier against the expansion of Ottoman Empire to the east was Safavid Empire. The main battles between them took place in Kurdistan and Mesopotamia for more than two and a half centuries, and after Safavid dynasty up to twentieth century.

3.1.2.1 Ottoman's Policy in Kurdistan

This Empire by having two centuries' experience of ruling other ethnic groups, like Arabs, Serb and so on, implemented a sensible policy in this area. They used a famous intellectual and nobleman Mawlana Sheikh Hakim-al-Din Idris of Bitlis to take several tours into Kurdistan and contact Kurdish Princes and tribal leaders and provoked them against the Shia and their chief master, the Safavid Shah Ismail (Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972; Yassami, 1984; Zaki Beg, 1996).

The wise policies and great effort of Idris brought the chieftains or Amirs of difficult region of Kurdistan under the rule of the Ottoman dynasty by the consent of its inhabitants without blood-shed, in fact, Idris successfully had the

entire Kurdish land to rebel against Safavid dynasty (Mardookh, Kurdistani, 1972; Zaki Beg, 1996) and 25 of tribal leaders accepted the rule of Ottoman Empire (Yassami, 1984) and First Sultan Selim under these condition signed the treaty with Kurdish leaders:

1) The Kurd leaders can form the autonomous local government (not independent) on hereditary area.

2) Whenever Ottomans went to war with other countries they must support central government by militia, weapons and so on.

3) The Kurd's chieftains must pay a certain amount of money to Ottoman as *"Hedyeh"* (gift) every year (Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972, Vol. II,: 2-4) undoubtedly this was a significant in history of Kurds.

3.1.2.2 Safavid Policies

In contrast with Ottomans, Safavid emphasized on Shia religion (Ottomans emphasized on Sunni) and replaced all Kurdish leaders by Qizilbash Chieftain (The tribes which supported Safavid as militia part of Shahsavan tribes) against the Ottomans (Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972; Yassami, 1984).

The wise Ottoman policies in this territory had resulted in Chaldiran on 23 August 1514 AD, with the help of Kurds; Sultan Selem's army defeated the forces of Shah Ismail Safavid at northwest of Uromia Lake on the plain between khoy and Maku. From this date, the first partition of Kurd territory took place. Two thirds of this area separated from Persia (Iran) and felt under Ottoman

Empire [3.7]. (Arfa, Hassan, 1960 quoted in Jalaiepoor, Hamid Reza, 1993; Ghassemlou, 1982; Tarikhi, Mostafa, 1988).

The border conflict in Kurdish territory not only continued for more than two centuries between these two empires, but also after Safavid up to 1914 AD and First World War. The last treaty between Ottomans and Qhajar dynasty ended the wars that started in the sixteenth century. Finally, the western borders of Persia (Iran) and Easter borders of Ottoman (Turkey) stabilized (Tarikhi, 1988).

Nevertheless the Iranian Kingdoms and their policy changed and also Ottoman's policy had been fluctuating from time to time but with the long struggle between these states, the Kurdish tribes were able to extend their powers and position even further. Both empires sought to stabilize the borders after the decisive Ottoman victory over the Safavids at Chaldiran and both sought the cooperation of the Kurd tribes to achieve this.

On both sides, Kurdish paramount chiefs or Amirs, were appointed and given fiefdoms sometimes in area hitherto unoccupied by the Kurd tribes, in return for policing the border and ensuring its tranquillity (Mc Dowall, David, 1992).

[3.7] National Foreign Assessment Center noted on a Research Paper, PA 79-10330D August 1979 that three quarters falling under Ottoman rule.

3.1.3 Iranian Kurds in Eighteenth Century

In this period for the fourth time in the history of Iranian Kurds, they founded a vast empire – the Zands-by Karim Khan Zand in 1752 AD and set up their capital at Shiraz (I.J. of Kurdish Studies, Vol. 11, Nos. 1-2, 1997) [3.8]

For the first time, Karim Khan named himself Advocate of People *(Vakill-e-Al-Rooaya)* instead of King or Shah.

As the former Kurdish nationalist leader (KDPI) wrote in his book, this period of time is the best time of Kurd's life during the last four centuries. This golden time ended in 1795 by Ghajar dynasty (Ghassemlou, 1965).

3.1.4 Kurds in Nineteenth Century

At the beginning of this century both Ottoman Empire and Ghajar dynasty crushed all local Kurdish government like Ardalan, Luristan and Mukrian in Iran, Bitlis, Hakkari, Butan, Soran, Badinan and Baban in Ottoman territory and central government ruled these area directly (Saleh, 1994).

At the end of this century a confederation of Kurd tribes was established in Mukrian including Mangur, Mamash, Piran and Baldak tribes and some of them supported Sheikh Ubidollah Shamzini's rebellion in 1880, (Saleh, 1994; Ghorianss, Eskandar, 1977).

[3.8] International Journal of Kurdish Studies believed that the founded for Zand dynasty emerged in 1750.

3.1.5 Kurds in Twentieth Century

The second historical disaster in Kurd's life took place after First World War in Kurdistan. The areas-under the Ottoman Empire were redistributed as follows:

1. The first part of this territory, which is rich oilfields, was annexed by Iraq as a new state under the English mandate.

2. The second part-near the coast of Tigris River, Cizer (*Ibn-e-Omar-Iland*) and Nisibin was annexed to Syria as a new state under the French mandate.

3. The Third part was annexed Turkey as a young Nationalist Turk state.

The stabilized borders between these new countries have much influence on Kurd's economy and cultural life especially for tribal nomads (Tarikhi, 1988).

For the first time a new dynasty controlled the central government in Iran, which has not a tribal basis (1921). Reza Shah as a founder of Pahlavi dynasty, in his attempt to establish a strong central government, he took a harsh line against the tribal chiefs in all of Iran. Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, any attempt at rebellion against the central government – which usually ran parallel with the tribal leader's personal aggrandizement – met with a severe response. Tribal leaders were forced to live away from their tribal domains and sent to exile and sometimes were hanged.

The rule of Reza Shah left the Kurds, Lurs, Arabs and other ethnic groups memories of killing and looting by the regimme (Koohi-Kamali, Fereshteh, 1992).

During the Second World War, Soviet Union and England invaded west and south part of Iran. Reza Shah replaced by annexation countries as alliance of Germany and supported his young son as king of Iran. Throughout the 1940's because of invasion of Iran and social crisis in country the central government decreased its repression against the people and ethnic groups of Iran. (Mc Dowall, David, 1992).

3.2 A Socio-economic Profile

3.2.1 Kurdistan Province

The name Kurdistan denoting the land occupied by the Kurds, was first applied by Sultan Sandjar Seljuqi in the 13th century when he created a large province of that name. This large province included, Kirmanshah, Hamadan, Luristan of today. The capital of Kurdistan at that time was Bahar (a city near today Hamadan) (Nuri, 1954).

Hamdollah Mostufy in his book (*Nozhatol Gholub*-1361 AD) had noted this large area included sixteen districts (Yassami, 1984). Safavid had divided this large province for better administration; Hamadan and Luristan were separated for the first time (Nuri, 1954).

Today Iranian administration has divided Kurdistan of Iran into four provinces. The central area with capital Sina (Sanandaj), is officially referred to as Kurdistan, the northern province is called Western Azerbijan and the southern is known as Kirmanshah and Ilam. Nevertheless, ethnically speaking one should also include Luristan (capital Khuramabad) and Hamadan.

Historians believe that the Kurds are divided into four major groups or Tribes: *Kurmandj*, *Lur*, *Kalhoor* and *Guran* (Sharafnamah, 1597(1985); Nuri, 1954).

Kurmandj: is very big tribe, which lived, in Iraqi Kurdistan and also part of Iranian Kurdistan.

Lurs: are living in Luristan, Esfahan, Kirmanshah, Ilam and Khuzestan (include *Bkhtiari-char leng and Haft leng*)

Kalhoor: spread in Kirmanshah province.

Guran: include six tribes; Ghalkhani, Bebiani, Neerige, Kany Zanjiri, Rizhoo and Gahvareh; mostly in west district of Kirmanshah province.

The main tribe *"Lak"* (100,000 thousand) are spread from Iraqi Kurdistan, Luristan and Homadan to Arak (central province)(Mordookh Kurdistani; 1972). Seeah Mansuri, Chegini and Zangeneh are also added to this large list as Iranian Kurds [Sharafnamah, 1597 (1985)].

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION OF IRAN

W. Azerbijan
E. Azerbijan
Caspian Sea
Gilan
Zanjan
Mazanderan
Kurdistan
Tehran
Semnan
Hamadan
Kirmanshah
Khorasan
Ilam Luristan
Esfahan
C.M. Bakhtlari
Khuzestan
Yazd
K. Boierahmad
Fars
Kerman
Bushehr
Hormozgan
Sistan Baluchestan
Persian Gulf
OMAN SEA

Shia Kurd
Sunni Kurd

0   250
Kms.

3.2.2 Population

The estimate of Kurd population depends on how we define Kurd's territory, when the boundary of Kurdistan is equivocal, the estimate of population is also not clear. In one side of spectrum, several historians (Mordookh Kurdistani, Nuri, Yassami) believe that all inhabitants of Zagross and Alborz chains are Kurds-Although the language of Azerbijanian has changed. In this perspective, the population of Kurds and Iran approximately are same with some minority like Arabs and Turkmen exception.

If we agree with their author of Sharafnamah's (1597) classification and boundary of Kurd territory, which included 10 provinces i.e. West Azerbijan, Kurdistan, Kirmanshah, Ilam, Luristan, Hamadan Arak (Central Province, Charmahal-va-Bakhtiari, Kahkilloyeh and Fars). According to the recent Census (1996) in Iran, the population of Kurds is about 16 million.

The third option of Kurd's population estimate depends on the geographical division of Kurdistan territory by Dez River (Ghossemlou, 1965, International Jour of Kurdish Studies map). The north of this River is Kurds. This area also coincides with the general understanding in the West. In this approach the population of Kurds being about 8 million (Census, 1996).

The fourth option, the idea according to extremist nationalist (Yaunesi, 1993, 1997), the Kurd's population of four provinces West Azerbijan (37 percent), Kurdistan, Kirmanshah and Ilam. It is about 4.5 million (A Shayer-E-Kurd 1994, Census, 1996).

When we classify Kurds by the growth of nationalist tendency as a few Kurds intellectuals claim, Benez, (1985), Younesi (1997), the Kurds population in Iran is less than 2.5 million (Census 1996).

In this study, we focus on four provinces, which all scholars and nationalist intellectuals agree on. The other Kurds enclave inside of Iran like; north of Khurasan, Birjand, Gochan, near Shiraz, South of Tehran, South of Zahadan in Baluchistan are omitted because the trustworthy statistics and information are not available, and also there are no attempt to identify themselves from majority population around them.

3.2.3 Education

Education is one of factor and indication of development throughout the country and comparable among provinces in one country. Literacy rate as low level of education and higher education rate as high levels are both noticeable here.

Table 3.1: Literacy rate among the population 1991, 1996

Province/Country	Per-cent Literacy 1991	Percent Literacy of 1996
Ilam	69.9	76.74
Kirmanshah	69.2	76.57
Kurdistan	59.4	68.27
West Azerbijan	62.3	69.02
Iran	74.3	79.5

Sources: Census 1996.
Kurdistan Statistical Year Book 1995.

This table shows that illiteracy rate in these four provinces are higher than the average of country. But during five years (1991 up to 1996) growth of

literacy was about 5 percent in Iran, where as it was 7 percent for W. Azerbijan

and Ilam, 7.5 percent for Kirmanshah and in Kurdistan about 9 percent.

3.2.4 Higher Education

The following Table will show that rate of higher education (2 years, BA,

MA, Ph.D.) in these provinces are about half of the country.

Table 3.2: Higher Education (Numbers/Rate)

Province/Country	Population	No. Students (2 years, BA, MA, Ph.D.)	Percent
Ilam	488,000	4,398	0.9
Kirmanshah	1,779,000	13,909	0.8
Kurdistan	1,346,000	8,337	0.6
West Azerbijan[3.9]	2,500,000	22,579	0.9
Iran	60,000,000	874,047	1.45

Source: Census 1996.

3.2.5 Agriculture

Table 3.3: Area under Wheat production in 1992/ in Hectare

Province/Country	Area (Hectare)	Average of Farm	Dry Farming	Irrigated Farming
Ilam	19,086,000	6.69	83,135	24,706
Kirmanshah	23,622,000	7.59	284,500	44,000
Kurdistan	28,203,000	11.82	395,000	360,000
West Azerbijan	37,559,000	7.94	-	-
Iran	1,633,189,000	6.95	-	-

Source: Kurdistan Statistical Year Book 1995: 623, 634, 641.

[3.9] Approximately 900,000 of Population are Kurd the rest are Turks

Table 3.4: Average of Domestic Animals per Family in 1988

Province/Country	Goats	Sheep	Number of Nomad	Percent
Ilam	36.4	57.5	10,565	2.16
Kirmanshah	13.17	3.85	9,855	0.55
Kurdistan	9.8	21.5	0	0
West Azerbijan	11.22	50.3	40	0.01
Iran	19	31.36	-	-

Source: Kurdistan Statistical Year Book 1995.

In two provinces, (W.Azerbijan and Ilam) the average of goats and sheeps is about two times more than the average of country. In contrast, Kurdistan and Kirmanshah are more agriculture than animal husbandry.

3.2.6 Infrastructural Facilities

We have selected piped water, electricity, and telephone and roads per-square kilometer as main infrastructural factors of development.

Table 3.5: Infrastructural Facilities

Province/Country	No. of Telephone per 100 person	Piped Water %	Electricity %	Road/in Km^2
Ilam	4.28	92.19	97.72	6.36
Kirmanshah	4.05	84.88	96.30	9.81
Kurdistan	3.46	81.86	92.49	5.73
West Azerbijan	3.62	78.10	90.39	8.55
Iran	5.50	87.22	95.32	4.41

Sources: Kurdistan Statistical Year Book 1995.
Census, 1996.

This Table shows that deprivation in Kurdistan and W. Azerbijan, at all level is more than Kirmanshah and Ilam. The percent of telephone number for hundred populations is lower than the average of Iran in all four provinces.

The average of families who use electricity in their house in Kirmanshah and Ilam are above the average of country rate and again the two others provinces (W. Azerbijan, Kurdistan) rate of using electricity in their houses less that the country.

The other facility (piped water) rate only in Ilam is been over the average of others Iranian families.

In contrast the length of road in Kurdish area over the average of the country. In two provinces (W. Azerbijan and Kirmanshah) two times more than the average of country; and Kurdistan road is weaker the others three Kurdish provinces.

3.2.7 Cultural Facilities

We have selected two items to compare these facilities among the Kurdish provinces and country as a whole:

a) The national budget for culture, science and arts programmes per thousand persons.

b) Duration of TV and Radio Programmes in one year.

Table 3.6: Cultural Budget and Mass Media in 1993

Province/Country	Budget/Per-thousand Rials	Radio Broadcasting hrs p.a.	TV Broadcasting hrs. p.a.
Ilam	423.6 (14)$^{3.10}$	1553 (14)	159 (21)
Kirmanshah	502.7 (9)	1352 (16)	436 (3)
Kurdistan	1050.9 (4)	550 (23)	355 (11)
West Azerbijan	467.4 (11)	3528 (3)	749 (2)
Iran	886.93	-	-

Source: Kurdistan Statistical Year Book1995: 650-651

The table shows that the allotted budget for Cultural purposes in three provinces is less than the average of country but only in Kurdistan, Cultural Budget is over the country's rate.

West Azerbijan stood in the third place among the other provinces according to the hours allocated to the local programmes in 1993, but Kurdistan has lowest position among the other provinces.

West Azerbijan and Kirmanshah acquired second and third position on the quantity of local programme among other provinces, Kurdistan was in middle but Ilam was one of the lowest positions among other provinces as producing local programme and broadcasting.

West Azerbijan being bilingual (Kurdish and Turkey) is one of the main factors, which promoted the position of W.Azerbijan among others in producing and broadcasting local programme.

[3.10] Number in parenthesis shows the ranks of the province among the other 24 provinces.

3.2.8 Health Facilities

The last indicator is number of doctor per-thousand, number of hospital beds and percent of rural population covered by rural health programme.

Table 3.7: Health facilities in Kurdistan in 1992

Province/Country	No. Doctors Per-thousand persons	No. of Hospital Beds Per-thousand persons	Rural Health Centers Per-cent of villages
Ilam	0.36	1.35	90.14
Kirmanshah	0.19	1.28	89.65
Kurdistan	0.18	1.00	81.11
West Azerbijan	0.20	1.00	85.23
Iran	0.23	1.46	71.40

Source: Kurdistan Statistical Year Book 1995: 631-33.

Table 3.7, shows that the availability of medical facilities is usually lower than the national rates. Only in Ilam the number of medical doctor for per thousand were over the rate of country.

In contrast, in rural area of four provinces, the population that was covered by the health centers was over the rate in Iran.

3.2.9 Occupation

One of the main economic indicators for analyzing economic situation of a country or province is the distribution of occupation among three main sectors of Agriculture, Industry and service. One of the main indicators of developing area is the percentage of industrial occupation sector.

Table 3.8: Occupation in Main Economic Sectors (Percent)

Province/Country	Agriculture	Industrial and Mining	Service	No Response
Ilam	29.71	19.91	48.14	2.25
Kirmanshah	26.47	22.45	49.07	2.00
Kurdistan	32.00	28.94	38.02	1.04
West Azerbijan	34.64	25.77	49.25	1.34
Iran	23.04	37.56	39.40	1.76

Source: Census 1996

This Table 3.8 shows that the agriculture and service are the main sectors of the occupation in Kurds territory. In these two sectors, four provinces rate are over the country rate (except Kurdistan Service Sector).

Just on the other side, Industrial Sector-including handicrafts, carpet industry and small industry factory-the rate of Kurd's provinces below the normal of country.

This factor is very important for analysing the deprivation theory in next chapters.

3.2.10 Religion

The dominant religion before advent of Islam, was Zorostrianism. The prophet of this religion (Zoroster) was born in Uromia in 660BC[3.11].

He started propagating in his birthplace, but his idea was not accepted there. Then he migrated to Sistan and Balkh.

He finally returned to his homeland. He has written his holy book *Avesta* in native language Media. (Nikitine, 1987, Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972).

[3.11] Ehssan Nuri has written that a majority of orientalist believed that Zoroster was born in 1200-800 BC.

Probably, Zoroster is not a noun but an adjective of religious leaders. *Zar-Thusht-Ra (Zarthusthra)* means the golden ray of sun. Zorostrians have believed that the name of first *Zoroster* was "*Mahabad*". The name of second Zoroster was "*Hushangh*" and the name of last Zoroster was "*Ibrahim*". Today the *Ezadi* Kurds (*Yazidi*), named their spiritual leader "*Zar- thushther-va-tmah*" means the great leader of *Mogh*, and the eldest son inherits this status. (Nuri, 1954:79).

The greatest fire temple (*Atash Kadeh*) of ancient Iran *Azar Ghoshasspe* (The Kings Fire) was in Takht-e-Soliman in Kurdistan. The Sassanid Emperors went there for religious worship of fire as Zorostrian (Yassami, 1984; Nikitine, 1987). The Anahita temple (in Kangavar) and Pavah firetemple (in Pavah) are another evidence, which showed Iranian, and Kurd ancient religion was same (Yassami, 1984).

Recently archaeologist had found a latter manuscript in Pahlavi script in Sulaymania which explained the situation of Zorostrian temple (firetemple) and Zorostrian people in Kurdistan during the advent of Islam and supported the theory that the ancient religion of Kurds was Zoroastrian (Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972; Yassami, 1984).

After the advent of Islam, the religious tenets of Zorostrianism have continued in some measure Kurdistan under the *Ezadi* or *Yazidi* sects, (Yassami, 1984). Professor N. Marr pointed out that the concept of *Ezad* is an Iranian word meaning God. This sect was founded by Shiekh Hadii-who was born in Syria (1073-1078)- near Senjar Mountains. After Hadaii or Adii passed away the sects followers split. They pray only for sunray's at the moment of sun's rising

secretly and kiss the first place of sun's shining. Nobody of other religions are not allowed to see them and they are not allowed to see other religious members. They believed in a Lost Black Book (*Mosshef Rash*) in Cizre. It has been written in Kurdish language and all praying and worships takes place in Kurdish.

The religious organization of this sect is very similar to Sufism. This sect has been influenced by many other religions but the worship of the light is one of the factors, which is based on Zorostrianism (Yassami 1984:129)

3.2.10.1 Islam

By the advent of Islam, a majority of Kurds converted to the new religion gradually after 630 AD. By rough estimate two third are Sunnis and one third are Shias (Benez Jamal: 1985-86). But Edger O'Ballance believes 85 percent are Sunnis and 15 percent are Shias, the Shias being mainly situated in Persian territory (1996:3). The other scholar Martin Van Bruinessen (1992) noted that only 80 percent of Kurds are Sunnis but Shias is the dominant religion in south of Iranian Kurdistan and also south of Iraqi Kurdistan [Faili].

These differences in estimating Kurds religion depend on the boundaries of Kurds population in Iran, because the Shias of southern Kurdistan (Kirmanshah, Ilam, Hamadan, Luristan and....) never played any part in the Kurdistan nationalist movement (Bruinessen, Martin Van, 1992).

The Kurds of W. Azerbijan (925,000) and Kurds of Kurdistan except two cities (Gorwah and Bijar) are Sunnis; (1,031,931) and also in Kirmanshah province the population of two cities; Pavah (61,918) and Javanrud (109, 518) are Sunnis; the Sunni Kurds is 2,128,367 (Census 1996).

The population of Shia Kurds is Ilam (488,000) plus Kirmanshah provinces except Pavah and Javanrud are 1,607,564 plus Gorwah (199,834) and Bijar (114,235) are 2,409,633 (Census 1996).

According to this calculation from, 4,538,000 Kurds of Iran; 53 percent are Shias and 47 percent are Sunni.

If we add the population of Hamadan and Luristan provinces to this amount; the Kurds population of the Shia school of Islam increases to 6,289,800 of which only 34 percent are Sunni (Census 1996).

The majority of Sunni Muslim Kurds of the *Shafi'i* (about 98 percent) and 2 percent of the *Hanafi* and about 5 thousand *Hanbali* School of jurisprudence (Ashayer-e-Kurd, 1994). Part of Shakak tribes only faith to *Hanafi* and *Hanabali* school jurisprudence (Tarikhi, 1988).

3.2.10.2 Sufi Mysticism

Many Kurds are drawn to the various *Dervish* orders; *Ghaderi* (founded by Shiekh Abdul Ghadere Gilani 1077-1116) and *Naghshebandi* (Mohammad Bahoo-al-Din Bokhari 1317-1389) have more followers in any part of Kurdistan than the others (National Foreign Assessment, 1979; Tarikhi,. 1988; Kinnane, 1993).

3.2.11 Language

Only two Old Iranian languages are attested by texts, namely *Avestan* and *Old Persian* (Nicholos, Sims-Williams, 1998:127). Others, such as *Median* and *Seythian*, are only known to us through occasional words and names transmitted in texts in other languages (Nicholas, 1998; Minrowsky quoted in Nikitine 1989).

However, it is not doubtable that the *Median* had a special role to establish the northern-west Iranian language.

Kurdish is a western Iranian language, a member of the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family of languages (Nuri, 1954; Ghassemlou, 1965; Sharafnamah, 1597; (1985) Introduction, Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972; National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979; Yassami, 1984; Nikitine, 1987: 17, 42-44, 54, 55, 58, 59, 585, 617; Tarikhi, 1988; Kreyenbroek, 1992: 70; Kinnane, 1993; Koohi-Kamali, Fereshteh, 1992; Kendal, 1993; International Journal of Kurdish Studies, Vol.: 11, 1997).

The root of Kurdish is *Median* or *Avestan* which was spoken by Aryans C. 3000 BC (Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972). E. Rodiger and A. F. Patt believed that Zand was the root of Kurdish and Farsi, but Minrowsky pointed out that Kurdish was the root of many languages which separated from Atropakan (today Azerbijan) to other parts of Zagross chain. Nevertheless the importance of Median to form the Kurdish language is not deniable (Nikitine, 1987). Finally a French orientalist- Darmess Teter- believed that Kurdish, Pashtun and Afghani are derived from Median (Nuri, 1954; Kendal, 1993). Most of the scholars believed that Kurdish and Farsi have a strong relationship with each other. 'Kurdish is the sister of Farsi', 'Kurdish is very similar to Farsi', 'Kurdish is more ancient than Farsi', 'Kurdish is akin to Persian' (Nation Foreign Assessment center, 1979; Kreyenbroek, Philips G., 1992; International Jou. of Kurdish studies, Vol.: 11, 1997).

A majority of orientalists and scholars believe that Kurdish is not a separate language, but a dialect of Farsi (O. Manne, Salmann Anderss, Meillet, Lentz quoted in Yassami, 1984; Garzani (1787), Saldini quoted in Nikitine, 1987; Tarikhi, 1988; Minrowsky quoted in Sharafnamah, 1597, (1985) Introduction).

In contrast with others, Nikitine (1954: 17, 33, 34, 585, 617) believed that Kurdish and its dialects are different from Farsi; (Kinnane, 1993; Kendal, 1993).

A member of scholars noted that Kurdish language is more pure than Farsi (Mokri Mohammad quoted in Tarikhi, 1988; Minrowsky in Sharafnamah introduction, 1597 (1985).

If we accept the theory of Nikitine, Kinnane and Kendal; Kurdish as a language, then this language have five main dialects as below:

1. *Kurmanji:* as one dialect of Kurdish is accepted by most of scholars, orientalists and also nationalist intellectuals (Sharafnamah, 1597; (1985); Ghassemlou, 1965; Mordookh Kurdistani, 1972; National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979; Tarikhi, 1988; Yassami, 1984; Kinnane, 1993; International Journal of Kurdish Studies, Vol.: 11, 1997).

   The Kurds who speak this dialect live in northwest of Uromia including Shakak, Jalali, and Milan and Zilan tribes.

2. *Surani:* is the second dialect of Kurdish language. This dialect is spoken by the population south of Uromia of Kurdistan and part of Kirmanshah proviences (Ghassemlou, 1965; National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979; Tarikhi, 1988).

The areas, which speak *Surani* and *Gurani* coincide, and may be these dialects are same with different names.

3. *Gurani:* is the third dialect spoken by the people of Kurdistan, and parts of Kirmanshah provinces (Sharafnamah, 1597(1985); Yassami, 1984; Kinnane, 1993; International Journal of Kurdish Studies, vol. 11, 1997). This dialect of Kurdish has two subdivision *Laki* and *Houramani* in Iran (International Journal of Kurdish Studies vol. 11, 1997)

4. *Kalhoor:* is fourth dialect of Kurdish and is famous as *Kirmashani*. It is spoken by the Kurds of Kirmanshah and Ilam provinces and also part of Hamdan and Luristan (Sharfnamah, 1597(1985); Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972; Yassami, 1984; Tarikhi, 1988).

5. *Luri:* which was spoken by the Kurd branch which is famous by this name in Iran and live in Luristan, and population of many provinces like Fars, Esfahan, Bakhtiari.... (Sharafnamah, 1597(1985); Mardookh Kurdistani, 1972; Yassami, 1984).

Figure 3.1

Kurdish

Gurani

Kurmanji   *Surani*   *Laki*   *Houramani*   *Kalhoor*   *Luri*

In spite of political borders and although the first partion of Kurds territory took place about four centuries ago from the main land; Farsi was the official language of Kurdistan territory in Turkey (Ottoman) and later Iraq. The local governor of these areas have written their official communication, letters, to Ottoman ruler in Farsi. The famous history book and the oldest one-Sharafnamah and the complete works of poetry have been written in Farsi, for example the complete works of Sheikh Reza Talebani and Mollah Khader (Kezer) (1836-1894), Baba Taher's famous couplets. The complete works of Hafez, Saadi, Ferdowsi, Mulavi are found in all Kurd houses in Iraq and Turkey (Nikitine, 1956; Yaunesi, 1993; Tarikhi, 1988).

Chapter 4

The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iran

4.1 Introduction

The history of this movement could be classified in four period. First, we review this movement before World War I. The second stage is between the two World Wars. The third part of this movement extends from 1946 up to 1979. After Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) the history of this movement is another story.

Before examining the history of this movement, it is necessary to discuss the factors, which contributed to it directly or indirectly.

4.1.1 Contributing Factors to Kurdish Nationalism

4.1.1.1 Geography

As it had been noted before, the Kurdistan territory of Iran located is on the main part of Zagross chain in west of Iran. These mountains and land have a large forest cover.

Nevertheless the highest peaks of mountain are in W. Azerbijan (Mt. *Darreh Rash* 3608m. to west of Uromia, Mt. *Seeyah Kuhh* 3578m. (Map No. 206), southwest of Oshnavieh [Shnu] from north into south of Kurdistan area in

Iran. The valleys are narrow. Most part of these mountains is located in a triangle of Marivan Saqqiz and Sanandaj called *Chehel Cheshmeh.* (Map No: 193), These mountains are the source of many rivers, like; *Zarrineh Roud, Simmineh Roud, Ghezel Uzen, Ab Sirwan* in Kurdistan. Again from Kurdistan province into kirmanshah and Ilam the height decreases and give way to planing. In the East and west of Hamadan into Kirmanshah and Ilam mountains extend up to the Iraqi borders.

Shahoo (Shah Kouh) starts from north west of *Kirmanshah* like a wall and continues to north of Rawansar, Pavah up to Nowsud to border of Iraq with peak 3225m. (Map No. 1522; Ezzati; 1993; Inter. Jou. of Kurdish studies, vol. 11, Nos. 1-2, 1997).

The mountains from west of Mahabad up to south Marivan, Kirmanshah and Ilam are covered by forest (Ezzati, 1993). The sources of water, meadow and pasture prepare a suitable condition for animal husbandry style of life or nomadic one.

These high parts of Zagross Mountain also have another function, it isolated the Kurds from others, as for six months in a year many villages are isolated by heavy snowfall (Rezaii, Jabbar, 1997; Saleh, 1994). The slogan 'Kurds and their mountain synonymous' arises from this fact. Kurds as a distinct people have survived only when living in mountains (Inter. Jour. Of Kurdish Studies, 1997 Vol. 11, Nos. 1-2: 176).

4.1.1.2 The Structure of Kurd Society

Suitable meadow and pasture, enough water in valleys, mountainous terrain and isolated territory; contributed to a dependence on animal husbandry. The people have to move in search of pasture. The population of tribes and also herds increases from time to time, but pasture and meadow are limited. This leads to two kind of conflict:

a)   Conflict among tribes to achieve more meadow for their animals.

b)   Conflict among rural population and tribes; shifting from winter to summer quarters destroy rural farms.

These two kinds of conflict, plus struggle with mountainous climate in winter makes use of armed force as a necessity of tribal culture (National Foreign Assessment Center 1979; Nickitine, 1987; Saleh, 1994; Rezaii, 1997). These experiences establish a tribal order as an organization that the chieftain is the commander and militia has to obey and protect tribe against outsider. Many tribes live here; Zilan, Jalali, Milan, Kurmandj, Shakak are settled in north and west of Uromia. Harki, Sadat, ZerZa, Mamash, Piran on west and south of Uromia and around Oshnavich and Piranshahr. Mangur, Govark, Dehbokre around Mahabad (Ashayer-E-Kurd, 1994; Ezzati, 1993). Govark Fizollah Bigi, Malkary Beryaje around Sardasht and Saqqiz. Ardalan around Sanandaj. Kalhoor, Guran, Sanjabi, Ahmadvand [Hamavand] Jamouri and Zangeneh around Kirmanshah, Malekshahi, Lak in Ilam province (Ezzati, 1993). Over the centuries, it was the tribes that received the primary allegiance of most Kurds, and even Kurds who have settled outside. Such fervent tribal loyalty supports

tribal freedom and independence against any central government (National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979; Nikitine, 1987; Saleh, 1994).

4.1.1.3 Historical Events

As it has been noted in previous chapter, the great wars between East and West took place in this area; Achaemenion Empire and ancient Roman (Xenophan 400 BC), after advent of Islam these wars continued between Muslim and Christian (Armenians) for many centuries in this area. The wars between Ottomans and Safavid Empire and after them Qhajar continued for more than four centuries. Kurds participated on all of them.

The mountainous area, tribal structure, a battlefield, geographical isolation led the Kurd to believe that they have no friends but the mountains. Feelings of 'insider' (*La-Khoamana*), 'outsider' (*Jash*) developed (Rezaii, 1997).

4.1.1.4 International Conflicts and Their Impact on Kurdistan

The Main battles among major powers took place in Kurdistan. Ottoman Empire and German against Russia, England and France (19th and 20th centuries) Germany's spies (Shevenman and Latian) use Kurd tribes against enemies successfully in 1916 (Kheri, Reza, 1986) in Kirmanshah province.

The Ottomans at the last century of their rule chose ethnocentrism as a policy. They use Turk as dominant ethnic group against other ethnic groups like Kurds, Arabs, Serb and so on. The other powers (Russia, England and France) had encouraged nationalist groups (like Arabs and Kurds) and support them to crush the Ottoman Empire and its allies (Rezaii, 1997).

The stabilizing borders of new countries like Turkey, Syria, Iraq has

He believed that it is better to attack Persian Kurdistan because the central government of Iran was weaker than the Ottoman. Also the Kurdistan of Iran is richer than other areas. This economic resources may be useful to make attack on Ottoman's Kurdistan (Saleh, 1994). The tribal army of the Sheikh was divided into two branches:

First was under the command of his son (Abdul Ghader) with the assistantance of Hamzeh Agha the chieftain of Mangur tribes. They occupied Mahabad and Miandoab. In Miandoab they killed 800 civilians and burnt the city and plundered and looted non-Kurd people. Then they attack Bonab, but they couldn't occupy this city.

Sheikh Ubaidollah as high commander of other part of this tribal force surrounded Uromia but they couldn't occupy this city and withdrew from the area. The son's of Ubaidollah also retreated from Bonab. Sheikh Ubaidollah and his son's army had been defeated and returned back to Nehri from Oshnavieh without any success (Ghorianss, Eskandar[4.1], 1977). Sheikh Ubaidollah with his first statement and declaration presented himself as first founder of Kurd nationalism, but with two revolt, 1879 (Badinan) and 1880 (Persia) and burnt, plundered and killed many civilian and city of Miandoab (Kutschera, Chris, 1994).

[4.1] Eskandar Ghorianss was an eyewitness Christian who had sent to exile to Mahabad by Russian in 1880s.

4.1.3 Simko Rebellion

Ismail Agha, known as Simko the son of Mohammad Agha the chieftain of Shakak tribes, which included two thousand families in 1918. His father and grandfather also have been the leaders of Shakak tribes before.

Mohammad Agha called for rebellion in 1882 but Iranian Central Government army defeated him and he escaped to Turkey. But after one year, the Ottoman government sent him to Iran. He died in Tabriz jail after short time (Kheri, 1986).

The elder brother of Simko (Jaefar Agha) was the next Chief of Shakak tribes. Jaefar Agha as rebellious man had some problem with Central government. He was nominated as governor of *Chehrigh* for a short time, but he returned to have habit as looter and bandit. He looted rich people and distributed part of the wealth among poor people (Nikitine, 1987). He was finally invited to Tabriz by the regent of Central government and assassinated in the city in 1905 or 1907[4.2] (Kheri, 1986; Nikitine, 1987; Kutschera, 1994).

In 1909 again, the regent of central government of Iran sent a parcel-bomb to Ismail Agha as a new chief of Shakak tribes to assassinate him, but his brother Ali was killed (Kheri, 1986).

In 29 December 1914 Russia occupied East and West Azerbijan for supporting Qhajar dynasty against the Constitutionalist Movement and invaded part of Iran up to the end of First World War (1918) (Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994). During this invasion Ismail Agha (Simko) controlled west part of Uromia

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[4.2] Chris Kutschera believed that Jaefar Agha killed in 1907.

Lake from north to south up to Uromia City. Weaknesses of Qhajar dynasty in last days of life also helped Simko's expansion over the territory.

In summer 1919 Simko Tribesmen occupied Uromia and looted the city. Two years later October 6, 1921 the Simko forces under the command of Syeed Taha- the grandchild of Sheikh Ubaibollah and also son-in-law of Simko's brother (Jaefar Agha) (Kutschera, 1994) made an attack on Mahabad. Next day (October 7, 1921) Simko reinforced them by two thousand cavalry tribesmen. They occupied Mahabad and killed six hundred[4.3] of gendarmes, which defended the city. The tribesmen looted and plundered the people again (Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994). After several attacks and more victory, the Kurds controlled the territory from Khoy to Baneh under Simko (Kutschera, 1994).

Finally in Shkar Yazi, the Iranian Army defeated Simko on July 25, 1922. At the beginning of the battle (in the morning) Simko had ten thousand tribesmen but in the evening only one thousand of his men remained (Kutschera, 1994).

4.1.3.1 Simko and Other Kurds Movement

In 1921, the Kurd Club of Istanbul sent Mustafa Pasha as envoy of this Club. They wanted to coordinate the Kurd movement in Kurdistan. But Simko didn't show any interest in their plans and preferred strong relationship with Turks (Turkey) nationalist because they supported him with weapons. Mustafa Pasha had written a letter to his son saying that Simko is a fool and the rebellion will fail (Kutschera, 1994).

[4.3] Kutschera has written 550 gendarmes were killed.

4.1.3.2 Simko and Superpowers

Simko sent many messages and envoys to Britain for support to his rebellion but they didn't accept (Kutschera, 1994; Saleh, 1994). Russia and France also didn't support Simko because of his policy. (Kutschera, 1994)

4.1.3.3 Simko Policy

He not only killed and looted and oppressed many non Kurd civilians of West Azerbijan but also killed and oppressed many Assyrian and assassinated their leader Mar Şhimun (Kheri, 1986). This policy of Simko had shown that he is not a 'Kurd' nationalist as such but a tribal one (Tarikhi, 1988; Kinnane, 1993; Saleh, 1994).

A. R. Ghassemlou former KDPI leader (1982:117) explained the position of Simko as below: 'Simko with false promises, committed the tragic error of killing Mar Shimun, the Assyrian Leader. His position was substantially weakened as result '.

4.1.4 Republic of Mahabad

4.1.4.1 Contributing Factors

Before explaining the foundation of Mahabad Kurdish Republic, it is necessary to point out the contributing factors, which led to founding this small Kurdish Republic.

4.1.4.2 Central Government Policy

Reza Shah throughout the 1920s and 1930s in his attempt to establish strong central government took a harsh line against the tribals in Iran (Khomeini Roohollah, 1979; Koohi-Kamali, Fereshteh, 1992). The Reza Shah programme

for modernization represents one interesting aspect of the history of the Kurds in these two decades in Iran. He strove for an Iran, which would be free of religious influence, tribal rebellions, and ethnic distinctions. Western type education institutions were to be established, communications networks and factories were likewise created (Yassin, Burhanedin, 1997).

A great number of tribal chiefs were deported, placed in forced residence in Tehran or elsewhere. The rule of Reza Shah left the Kurds and other Iranians with bitter memories of killing and looting by the regimme. Such measures were aimed primarily at weakening the power of the tribes both as a political/military force and as an economic institution. Thus, despite apparent difficulties, Reza Shah largely succeeded in imposing the central government's authority on the nomadic tribes, which at that time constituted one-sixth of the Iranian population (Koohi-Kamali, 1992; Yassin, 1997).

Furthermore, the programme involved a policy of assimilation of ethnic groups. A fundamental aim of the programme was the transformation of Iran from a multi-ethnic empire into one unified state with a single people, nation, language, culture and political authority (Yassin, 1997).

4.1.4.3 German Policy-WWI

The German spies (Shivenman and Letian) were active during World War I and before. They succeeded in 1916 to cut the Russian and British armies at Kirmanshah by the support of Kurd tribesmen (Kheri, 1986) During the later half of the 1930s, German sought to extend its influence into the Middle East and especially into Iran and Turkey. In Iran, German industry secured unchallenged

predominance in two strategic fields, namely communication and armament. The Soviets soon concluded that German influence in Iran in these two spheres could seriously threaten Soviet interests throughout the region. The German plan of industrialization of Iran not only seemed adopted to German army's ultimate push to the east but also conformed with Reza Shah's modernization programme (Yassin, 1997).

4.1.4.4 Second World War (SWW)

By the beginning of Second World War, Reza Shah proclaims neutrality. Nevertheless he had continued his secret relation with German government. The Allies didn't respect Iranian neutrality, on August 25, 1941, Soviet and British troop simultaneously invaded Iran.

The Russian troops invaded main part of Iranian Kurdistan up to Sanandaj and Baneh in north and British forces after invasion of oilfield of Khuzaistan occupied the other part of Iranian Kurdistan; Kirmanshah, Hamadan and Ilam.

Russian Red Army withdrew from Sanandaj Baneh and Mahabad after a short time. The front line stabilized from Miandoab to Oshnavieh. The British troops occupied Sanandaj only. Sardasht, Saqqiz were under the influence Zone of their troops and Mahabad was under the influence Zone of Russia. Mahabad. Sardasht and north of Saqqiz were neutral zone or "no man's land" (Kutschera, 1994; Yassin, 1997).

4.1.4.5 Tribal Structure

As the Soviet and British troops invaded western part of Iran, the Kurdish resistance to Iranian Central Government was at first politically unorganized. The movement was spontaneous and was led by tribal groups that had lost their power in connection with Reza Shah's modernization programme. In the absence of effective Iranian authority, the Soviets maintained direct relations with the Jalali in the north, Shakak in the mountains west of Salmass, and the Harki west of Uromia. The chiefs of these tribes were allowed to manage their own affairs by the Soviets.

At first the two main centers of disturbance were Marivan and the Howraman Mountains; where Mahmmud Khan of Kani-Senan establish unstable hegemony; and Baneh where Hama Rashid Khan, long in exile in Iraq, had founded fiefdom which included Saqqiz and Sardasht. Both of these Tribals Chiefs were recognized by the weakened Iranian Central Government as semi-official governors of their areas, but were then driven into Iraq by the reorganized Iranian Army. But finally all of Kurdistan south of the Saqqiz-Baneh-Sardasht line was again firmly in central government hands (Roosevelt Jnr. Archie[4.4], 1982 original 1947; Yassin, 1997).

[4.4] Archie Roosevelt Jr., was one of the four Americans to visit Mahabad. He served as U.S.A. Assistant Military Attack in Tehran from March 1946 to February 1947; His article is first hand material on the Mahabad Republic as eyewitness of this event.

4.1.4.6 Great Britain's Kurdish Policy

Yet the British refrained from direct support of Kurds since such action would have been perceived by the Iranians as interference with Iran's domestic affairs. The British recognized the fact that the tribes traditionally represented an important element in Iranian domestic as well as foreign affairs. Although they therefore paid close attention to this aspect of policy-making, the British approach was mainly based on support of the central government of Iran (Yassin, 1997: 133-135).

4.1.4.7 The Soviet Union's Policy in Kurdistan

One of the K.G.B member has written that they were interested in Kurd problem from 1924, and done many researches on the Kurd tribes and chiefs and selected Mahabad as headquarter of spy networks in area. During the Second World War these networks were productive for Soviet Union (Agha Bakov Memoir quoted in Tarikhi, 1988).

The Soviet armed forces offered some type of indirect protection to the Kurds against Iranian forces in the Soviet Zone, whose freedom of movement was at times, hindered by local viet authorities.

It was claimed in official circles that the Soviets had dismissed all of the police and gendarmerie in their zone. In times of Kurdish uprising, the Soviet forces refused to support the Iranian government in its efforts to restore order. This was a typical instance of the general Soviet attitude. (Yassin, 1997).

4.1.4.8 Organization

In 1938, a number of intellectuals in Iranian Kurdistan founded a group called the *Komala-i-Azadi Khwazan-i-Kurdistan* (Association of the Freedom-Seekers of Kurdistan). Because of Reza Shah's policy and oppression and lack of experience, after one year they didn't make any progress. They asked the *Hiwa* (hope) leadership for help and thought them the *Hiwa*'s experience (Ahmed, Ibrahim[4.5], 1997:10-11; Yassin, 1997)

Amin Rewandusi (one of well-known leaders of *Hiwa*) sent Ibrahim Ahmed as an envoy of *Hiwa* (Kurdish nationalist organization in Iraq) to help Iranian Kurd nationalist when he was publishing *Galawezh*_(morning dew) magazine in Baghdad (Ahmed, 1997). A number of Iranian Kurd nationalists (for example A. R. Ghassemlou, 1988 quoted in Yassin, 1997) wanted to decrease the rule of *Hiwa* and other organizations on Iranian Kurdistan (Yassin, 1997; Kutschera, 1994).

After invasion of Iranian Kurdistan by Soviet Red Army (25 August 1941), *Hiwa* sent two of its knowledgeable patriots, Mir Haj Ahmed and Mustafa Khoshnow. At a meeting in Haji Dawud's garden near Mahabad, a group of young, educated and nationalist Kurds decided to found the *Komalai-i-Zhianwa-i-Kurd* (Association for the Resurrection of Kurds) on September 16, 1942 (Kheri, 1986; Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994; Ahmed, 1997:12; Yassin, 1997).

In April 1943 about 100 members of Komala met at *Khoda Parastin* garden near Mahabad (Ahmed, 1997). Komala formed a central committee and

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[4.5] Ibrahim Ahmed is one of the trustworthy eyewitnesses of the Kurd's movement in Iraq during this century.

secret cells were organized under Soviet guidance. Its under ground activities began to spread into other parts of Kurdish Iranian territory under the Soviet military occupation (O' Ballance, Edgar, 1996; Ahmed, 1997:14). Among their important decisions were to issue a publication entitled *Nishtiman* ("Homeland") and augment ties with other parts of Kurdistan to establish Komala Branches there (Ahmed, 1997).

The communication between *Hiwa* and Komala were continued and mutual assistance also, for a long time. *Hiwa* had asked the Komala leadership for better and more frequent contact with Soviet Union as refuge of world's oppressed peoples (Ahmed, 1997)

In 1944, the *Xaibun* or *Khoyhaun* (independence) party from Turkey, *Hiwa* from Iraq and Komala from Iran and other Kurd nationalists met on Dalanper Mountain in Koolij village near the frontiers of Iran and Iraq and Turkey near Piranshahr for better coordination and debate on Kurd's problems in those countries. Hamza Abdullah, Verdi, Syeed Abdul Aziz Gilanizadeh, Mir Haj Ahmed and Mustafa Khosnow came from Iraqi Kurdistan. Ghazi Mullah Vahab joined them from Turkey. Abdol Rahman Zabihi, Ghassem Ghaderi. Mohammad Delshad and Haji Rahmane Ilkhanizadeh attended this meeting as envoys of nationalist Kurds of Iran. This meeting led to a treaty, which called as "Three Borders Treaty". The main outcome of this treaty is "striving to found great independent Kurdistan" (Kheri, 1986).

4.1.4.9 First Steps of Mahabad Republic Foundation

The hard line policy of central government against the Kurds for more then two decades and invasion of Iran by USSR and UK and semi-nomadic lives of Kurd's Soviet instigation against Iranian authority, establishment of nationalist party in-Mahabad - "no man's land"- combined to establish an independent small Kurdish state.

Tudeh (the masses) as Marxism-Leninism Party was founded in 1941, with the aim of becoming a mass party (Ghassemlou, 1982). During the invasion of Azeribijan and Kurdistan by the Soviet Red Army, this party changed its name to Democrat Party (in Azerbijan) (Kinnane, 1993).

Just three months after invasion of Iran in November 25, 1941 a number of tribal chieftains and noblemen were invited to Baku. The names of Ghzai Mohammad, Amir Asad, Haji Baba Sheikh, Rashid Beg and Zero Beg Harki, Mohammad Ghassemlou (Father of A. R. Ghassemlou the ex-leader of KDP of Iran) were notable in the invitation list (Kheri, 1986; Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

In this meeting Bagherov (President of Azerbijan) promised them that USSR supported the idea of foundation of independent country in suitable condition, when the ordinary people were ready after the War (Kinnane 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

As USSR achieved decisive military victories in the SWW against German the role of this country increased in Kurdistan of Iran (Yassin, 1997).

After one year[4.6] Ghazi Mohammad was invited and joined Komala, (Kinnane, 1993). In September 12, 1945 for the second time, the chiefs of the main Kurdish tribes, accompanied Ghazi Mohammad, Seif Ghazi, Manov Karimi, Ali Reehani, Ghassem Ilkhanizadeh, Abdollah Ghadri, Nuri Bigizadeh (Roosevelt, 1982 original 1947; Kheri, 1986; Kutschera, 1994) were invited and taken to Baku.

'Bagherov harangued them regarding the wrongs they had suffered under Reza Shah and said that the Soviet Government would help the "new Democrat Party" which was dedicated to freedom for the oppressed and which he strongly urged them to join. The results of the expedition were soon apparent. Shortly after his return, Ghazi Mohammad called a meeting of Kurdish notables to announce the formation of the Democrat Party of Kurdistan, which he urged all to join' (Roosevelt, 1982 original 1947: 140). Other scholars give similar versions (Kheri, 1986; Tarikhi, 1988; Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera 1994).

However, the question of whether the Soviet authorities were directly involved in the establishment of the KDP, or acted on behalf of the Komala or reduced the differences among the Kurdish nationalist is not clear. Many observers maintain that the KDP was founded at the incitement by the Soviets also direct instruction in Baku in September 1945 (Roosevelt, 1947:225; Eagleton 1963:56; Arfa 1966:79; Howell, 1965:366; Nariman Yalda, 1980; Entessar, Nader, 1992; 14; quoted in Yassin, 1997:173; Kinnane 1964:50; Kheri 1986; Jalaiepoor, 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

[4.6] Roosevelt believed that Ghazi joined Komala in April 1945.

This approach not only confirmed by trustworthy historians an eyewitness like Roosevelt, and Eagleton but also by the Kurd nationalist eyewitness like Ibrahim Ahmed (1997:25).

The other historical evidence also sustain this idea that Soviet Union was the main guidance of establishing KDP in Iran and Iraq as Ibrahim Ahmed (1997:21-22) had written in his personal memoirs like this: 'Hamza Abdollah had given me a letter and told me it was from Mullah Mustafa to me. The Soviet view is now that we are to establish a democratic Party styled after the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) [of Iranian Kurdistan] and call it the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq, which should be headed by Mullah Mustafa'.

4.1.4.9.1 Mass Proclaiming of Mahabad Republic

There were many Red Army agents who wandered freely among the tribesmen in Kurdish dress-there were 100,000 Kurds living in USSR in that time Abdullahov as a Red Army agent met one of the Komala founders in a wine-shop. The Kurd brought him to a private home and the Komala moved directly into the Soviet orbit. As the Komala had grown too big to continue meeting in private house, the leaders now asked the Soviets to found a branch of cultural relations' societies in Mahabad. The Soviets readily complied, and it was founded, not as branch of the Iranian-Soviet Relations Cultural Society, but as the *Anjoman-i-Farhangi-i-Kurdistan-va-Shuravi* (Kurdistan-Soviet Cultural Relations Society).

In this cultural house in April 1945, that the Komala finally came into open. The Soviet consul from Uromia and the chief of VOKS (The Soviet

International Propaganda Organization) in Azerbijan (Iranian) were honoured guest. The main feature of the programme was an 'opera' [Theater] named "*Daik-i-Nishteman*" (homeland's mother). At this ceremony the future head of the Kurdish State, Ghazi Mohammad was finally admitted to the Komala, to the gratification of the Soviets (Roosevelt, 1982 original 1947).

In November and early December 1945, Soviet agents circulated among the tribes, telling them to mobilize for the coming struggle for independence and ordering the chiefs to assemble in Mahabad.

The fall of Tabriz was the cue for Ghazi Mohammad to declare his own area independent, which it had long been in fact (Roosevelt, 1982:142).

At end of December 1945, Ghazi Mohammad had met Pishevari (President of Iranian Azerbijan Government) at Tabriz to discuss the prospects of proclaiming a Kurdish Republic. Ghazi returned to Mahabad and upon his arrival announced publicly that he intended to open a Kurdish Nationalism Assembly. He also brought up various demands, which were similar to those of the Azeris. The head of KDP, Ghazi Mohammad officially proclaimed before a great number of Kurds among them several tribal and religious leaders from Mahabad and from surrounding areas gathered at *Chwar-Chira* Plaza in Mahabad. The Kurdish People Government as first Kurdish Republic established on January 22, 1946 (Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994; Yassin, 1997:181). And raised the Kurdish flag of the *Khoyboun* Party which they had received from Lebanon (Ahmed, 1997) instead of Iranian flag.

Mullah Mustafa (KDP leader of Iraqi Kurds) and three Soviet officers in a jeep and armed with Tommy-guns attended this ceremony.

Seif Ghazi, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Amr [Omar] Khan Sharifi from Shakak tribes, Hama [Ahmed] Rashid Khan Banei, Zero Beg Harki[4.7] received the rank of "marshal" and were provided with Soviets uniforms (Roosevelt, 1982). The Iranian Kurdish area which fell inside the republic was pitifully small, not only Saqqiz, Sanandaj and Kirmanshah as biggest cities of Kurdistan were incorporated with Mahahad Republic, but also this Republic was unable to attract the tribes outside Mahabad itself to the nationalist cause (Mc. Dowall, 1992). Taking advantage of the internal and international situation as explained before, the Kurds were able to establish this Republic in 1946. The republic, which was established under the influence Soviet Union lasted only eleven months (Koohi-Kamali, 1992).

[4.7] O' Ballance believed that four general were appointed on 31 of March.

Map of Mahabad Republic

Sources: Roosevelt, 1947

4.1.4.9.2 Education and Mass Media

Ghazi Mohammad was the superintendent of education department of Mahabad for five years (1926-1931) (Kutschera, 1994) and also he had studied theology and his ancestors and himself were *'Ghzai'* means 'Judge' in Kurdish and Persian languages. Education is a sector his government paid more attention to.

At first they taught the Kurd adults and children from Farsi formal books translated to Kurdish (Kutschera, 1994). Later they received Kurdish alphabet books from Souran Region (Iraq) which were sent by *Hiwa* (Ahmed, 1997).

Ghazi also sent sixty young Kurds to Army School of Baku after finishing primary school in Mahabad.

The other activities of this new Republic were publishing many newspapers and magazines, which included. *"Kurdistan"* gazette as official newspaper of Mahabad Republic; *"Nishteman"* who Abdol Rahmane Zabihi was been the editorial chief. *'Hawar'* as a literary magazine, and also a especial magazine for women intitled *'Helaleh'* (tulip) by the printing- machine which was sent by Soviets (Kutschera, 1994).

The radio transmitter, which was sent by Russians only can, covered Mahabad. This radio used to from May 10, 1946 (Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

4.1.4.9.3 Mahabad Army and Armed Activities

The army of Mahabad Republic had three sections:

a) The backbone of this forces depended on the Barzani tribesmen which were withdrawn by the Iraqi forces from north of the country in winter

1945 (Tarikhi, 1988; Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994) and it was estimated about 1200-2000 fighter (Kutschera, 1994).

b)   The other main part of Mahabad Army were the tribesmen of Shakak (the chief of this tribes Omar Khan Sharifi was one of the fifth marshal of Republic), Harki (Zero Beg was another marshal), Hama Rashid Khan Banei Tribesmen (just returned from Iraq) and also sustained by Jalali tribesmen (Pisyan, Najafgholi, 1949; Roosevelt, 1982 original 19 47).

c)   Beside the Barzani and Iranian tribesmen, Ghazi Mohammad established an official army, which included Seventy officers, forty sergeants and 1200 soldiers (Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

Red Army supported the Mahabad Army. During the autumn 1945, the Russians secretly delivered 1200 rifles to Kurd nationalist, taken from the Iranian gendarmerie (Kinnane, 1964; Yassin, 1997).

For the second and last time Russians armed the Republic by delivering 10,000 rifles, 20 army lorrys and 10 jeeps (Kinnane[4.8], 1993; Kutschera, 1994). The training of Mahabad army was done by four Kurd officers who joined Barzani during the rebellion in Iraq (Kinnane, 1993: Kutschera, 1994) and also another Russian Kurd, captain Salah-Al-Din Kazemov- who was famous in Kurdistan as *Kak Agha*. He was promoted by Ghazi Mohammad as lieutenant colonel in Mahabad Republic army on March 1946 (Pisyan, 1949; Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

[4.8] Kinnane had written 9000 rifles and 10 jeeps.

The clash between Mahabad Republic and Iranian Army took place towards the North of Saqqiz and around Sardasht, Baneh, Takab and Shahindej garrisons. The Mahabad tribesmen besieged them because the tribesmen loyal to the Republic controlled the other territory north of Saqqiz-Baneh road. The main battle took place at *Gharawa* (Ghar Abad) a few kilometers north of Saqqiz on April 29, 1946[49]. The tribesmen of Barzani and Hama Rashid killed 49 and injured 18 of Iranian army (Pisyan, 1949:184-185; Kutschera, 1994).

During May and up to the middle of June these battles continued and non-Iranian garrison collapsed. (Pisyan, 1949:186-199). The last main clash took place when the tribesmen of Mahabad strove to besiege Saqqiz on June 16, 1946. In this clash, 28 of Iranian land forces were killed and 41 were injured but the forces of Hama Rashid and Mir Haj Ahmed Barzani withdrew (Pisyan 1949:199-201).

About four thousand of the tribesmen of Shakak, Fizolah Bigi, Ghovark reinforced the Saqqiz war line (Pisyan, 1949) with suitable arms and equipment. Mahabad Republic had an offensive plan for capture of Sanandaj but Hashemov (Russian Consul in Uromia) asked Ghazi Mohammad to cancel these plans and he accepted.

From 16 June 1946 up to September both armies declare cease-fire (Pisyan 1949; Kutschera; 1994).

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[49] Venue of this battlefield April 29 not 24 as Kutschera had written, and the victims of the event were, 21 killed, 17 injured and 40 captured by Mir Haj Ahmed Barzani.

4.1.4.9.4 Independence or Autonomous Region

There were many evidences, which show that Mahabad Republic was an independent state and not an autonomous region. Some of them are noted below:

In the first meeting (September 1941) between Kurd delegation and Bagherov (President of Azerbijan), the Kurds asked for Soviet support to establish a Kurdish state. Bagherov replied that their policy is to support establishment of a small nation. But the situation is not suitable now (Kutschera, 1994).

In the second meeting (September 1945) in Baku again Kurd delegation repeated their demands for arms and other equipment to establish their independent state in Mahabad and again received same answer (Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

Before the second meeting Russians moved toward the aim of supporting the Kurd idea founded on Kurdish-Soviet Cultural Relations Society instead of Iranian-Soviet one (Roosevelt, 1982). Russians not only opened the Cultural House as a symbol of independence but also encouraged tribes to support this new government by sending agents among various tribes, telling them to mobilize for coming struggle for independence and ordering the chiefs to assemble in Mahabad to declare the Republic of Mahabad in January 1946 (Roosevelt, 1982).

There are also many internal evidences that Mahabad Republic was an independent state as Ghassemlou (1982:119) former KDP Leader has written that the cabinet was composed of thirteen Ministers, including a War Minister and a

Foreign Secretary. Appointment of War and Foreign Ministers are clear evidence, which shows that Mahabad was an independent Republic State.

The second internal factor which shows the identity of this republic was the effort made by Ghazi Mohammad to have his government recognised by Britain and Russian one month before the proclamation (Kutschera, 1994). After proclaiming Mahabad Republic and Tabriz autonomous (or independent) government tried to establish diplomatic relations (Kutschera, 1994).

The Mahabad independence and border conflict and stabilizing frontiers between these two satellite governments of USSR led to the negotiations between Pishevari and Ghazi Mohammad and Soviets. A Kurdish Azerbijani Treaty was signed on April 23. 1946, which provided for military alliance, and common diplomatic action towards the central government of Iran (Kutschera, 1994; Yassin, 1997:191).

4.1.4.9.5 Collapse of Mahabad Republic

On May 10, 1946 the Soviet troops evacuated Iranian Azerbijan and Kurdistan (Kutschera, 1994). This evacuation psychologically prepared the condition of collapsing of Mahabad Republic, because the Kurdish government of Mahabad was crucially dependent on the presence of the Soviet forces in this part of Iran. In fact, it was generally assumed that when the Soviet troops withdrew, the Kurdish government would undoubtedly collapse (Yassin, 1997).

One of the internal factors for the weakness and the rapid collapse of the Mahabad Republic lie in the fact that many tribal chieftains shifted support from the Republic, to a position of hostility. Tribal chiefs began to switch sides,

becoming neutral or even taking the side of the Iranian government and were sometimes used as vanguard of the Iranian Army (Roosevelt, 1982; Yassin, 1997) and many traditional leaders quietly left the area rather than prejudice their previous relations with the Tehran government (O'Ballance, 1996).

The Mahabad government in its final days was distrusted by many Kurds, because of his seeming friendship with the godless Soviets and the sad memories of the First World War when the Russians had sacked the city (O' Ballance, 1996). In September 1946, Iranian government asked the leader of Mahabad Republic to surrender but Ghazi Mohammad's reply was negative as the hoped for the Soviets' support (Kinnane, 1993).

On November 15, 1946, Mohammad Reza Shah decided to send forces to recapture Azerbijan and Kurdistan from the rebellious government.

On December 5, 1946 Ghazi Mohammad called a meeting in Abbass Agha-Mosque. The council of war included political leaders and Marshals of the Mahabad Republic. The outcome of this meeting was the decision to resist the Iranian army (Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994). The resistance of Azeris and Kurdish tribesmen and army continued only four days (7-11 of December 1946) at Shahindij-Miandoab road on hills. After the Tabriz government was brought down by the people, the Iranian army was stationed in Miandoab on December 13, 1946 (Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994),

On 16 December Ghazi Mohammad went to Miandoab to surrender himself to the Iranian authorities, and the following day, one column of Iranian troops from Miandoab and other columns from Sardasht garrison marched

toward Mahabad and entered the city. They were accompanied by Sheikh of the Shakak, tribesmen of Harki, Mamesh, Mangur and other tribes, who conveniently switched loyalties, some more than once (Pisyan, 1949:267; O, Ballance, 1996; Kutschera, 1994).

The Iranian Troops were given a great reception when they entered the city, thus bringing to an end about eleven month-old Mahabad Republic (Roosevelt, 1982).

The following days, all members of Ghazi's government were asserted (only Haji Baba Sheikh remained at liberty) and after an examination by a military court, condemned Ghazi Mohammad, Seif Ghazi and Sadr Ghazi to death.

At early morning on March 31, 1947, they were hanged in the *Chwar Chira* plaza of Mahabad (Roosevelt, 1982; Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

4.1.5 Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iran (1947-1979)

After the collapse of Mahabad Republic in 1947 until Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Shah's government was able to keep Kurdistan of Iran relatively quiet (National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979; Jalaiepoor, Hamid Reza, 1993) by maintaining a large-scale military presence selectively arming-tribesmen, Kurds loyal to central government, exiling tribal leaders suspected of antigovernment activities (National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979). During these three decades a few clashes took place.

In 1950, to the north west of Kirmanshah, Iranian Army made an attack on Jawanrudi tribes, because they resisted to hand over their rifles (Kinnane, 1993).

On August 16, 1953, for the first time after collapse of Mahabad Republic a big demonstrations was organized in Mahabad to support Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadgh against Mohammad Reza Shah who was sent in to exile for a short while by Prime Minister and people (Kutschera, 1994).

In 1958 a Pan-Iranian Kurdish Party was set up under the leadership of Ehssan Nuri Pasha, the leader of Ararat rebellion (1927-1930 against Turkey). This party devoted was to the protection of the Iranian heritage from Semitic and Turkish threats (Kinnane, 1964). Perhaps the Iranian government supported this party.

The last clash between Iranian Army with the Kurd activists took place in 1967-1968, when radical part of KDP split and established a Revolutionary Committee and entered Iranian Kurdistan from Iraqi territory.

This committee had eleven members who included Soliman and Abdollah Moini (the sons of Interior Minister of Mahabad Republic) Mollah Ahmed (Hassan[4.10]) Salmassi (Mollah Avareh), Ismail Sharifzadeh, Mohammad Amin Raund and Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou and others.

They set up a sporadic guerrilla campaign in the Mahabad-Baneh-Piranshahr triangle. This small group with about one hundred and fifty members was brought to end by killing 23 (included five members of central committee) of them arrest 104 and surrender 28 of them (Mc. Dowall, David, 1992; Jalaiepoor, 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

[4.10] Jalaiepoor recorded Hassan as first name of Mollah Avareh.

4.2 Active Nationalist Parties in Iranian Kurdistan

Before following the history of this movement after 1979, it is better to have a short glance at the active parties in this period in Iranian Kurdistan.

Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), has been the largest and most significant and active party in this region.

The second party is Komala the communist party. It is different from the Komala of 1940's. The full name of this party is the Revolutionary Organization of Toilers.

The third one is *Maktabe Gharan* (School of Koran) which was established and led by Ahmed Moftizadeh.

All opposition parties have an active branch in Kurdistan, but they worked under the shadow of one of these parties.

4.2.1 Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)

As it has been noted before, in the middle of September[4.11] 1945, KDPI was formed in Kurdistan. The name of this party was also suggested by the Russians (Kinnane, 1964; Kheri, 1986; Tarikhi, 1988, Kheri [1985], Kutschera, 1994; Yassin, 1997).

4.2.1.1 History

After the collapse of Mahabad Republic, leaders, central committee members and many of the KDPI cadres were arrested and the organization of this party was completely destroyed. Early in 1948, Kurdistan Communist

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[4.11] Only A.R Ghassemlou believed that KDPI was established on August 1945.

Committee (KCC) under the leadership of Rahim Soltanian strove to resurrect the KDPI as a branch of *Tudeh* Party (Kutschera, 1994).

In early 1950's there was no single organization to cover the Kurd activists in Iranian Kurdistan, but a local committee was established by Aziz Yousefi, Ghani Bulorian, Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou, Rahim Soltanian, Karim Ovaysi, Abdullah Eshaghi (Ahmed Toufigh) in Mahabad, and another one was established by Shariati in Sanandaj.

In 1954, these two local committees joined together and Central Committee of KDPI was formed again.

In May 1955 first conference of KDPI set up and 20 members of this party had a meeting in a village near Mahabad (Kutschera, 1994). In this year also KDPI cut all communication with *Tudeh*. (Kutschera, 1994).

The causes of this split are controversial. Kutschera (1994) believes that when *Tudeh* withdrew its armed conflict policy, KDPI decided to go alone. But Tarikhi (1988) believed that withdrawal of Soviet support of Mahabad Republic and the role of SAVAK[4.12] were the main reasons of this split.

In 1956, first constitution and programme of new generation of KDPI, for autonomy released.

In 1958-1960 SAVAK arrested Aziz Yousefi, Ghani Bulorian and Shariati and 250 members of the party.

In 1964, the second Congress of KDPI was established at Suneh village near Ghala Diza in Iraq. In the meeting Abdullah Eshaghi (Ahmed Toufigh) was

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[4.12] SAVAK is the abbreviation of intelligent service of Shah before 1979.

elected as Secretary-General of the party. It also condemned Ghazi Mohammad for treason.

In 1967, the first split took place in KDPI, and they established Revolutionary Committee. All the members of this committee were killed or arrested as it was noted before except Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou who he was in Europe in that time.

In 1969, the second conference of the Party was founded. In this meeting, Abdullah Eshaghi was expelled (Kutschera, 1994). In the third conference of KDPI, the first draft of constitution and programme of the party were prepared, Central Committee, Politburo, Secretary-General (Abdol Rahman Ghassemlou) were elected (Koohi-Kamali, 1992; Kutschera, 1994).

In September 22-26, 1973 the third congress of the party was opened. In this congress, constitution, programme and armed conflict policy against central government of Iran were approved (Kheri, 1986; Kutschera, 1994). In March 1980, fourth congress of the Party was opened. In this meeting the Party cadres explored the Party's activity from 1973 up to 1980. After this Congress, seven members of Central Committee split from the Party. Ghani Bulorian, Himan, Faroogh Keekhosravi, Ahmed Azizi, Navid Moine, Foozieh Ghazi and Rahim Safe Ghazi let this split. Rahman Karimi, Sanar Momadi and Ismailzadeh also joined them in summer 1980.

Many of these ten former members of KDPI joined *Tudeh* Party because they have communist tendency. Himan and Keekhosravi abandon party activity (Kheri, 1986; Tarikhi, 1988).

The fifth congress of KDPI (November 1981) approved the new policy of the Party under the slogan of 'overthrow the Islamic Government' for the first time formally. In this year also KDPI joined National Resistance Council in Paris, founded by *Mojahedin-e-Khalgh*, but KDPI left it in 1984 after disagreement with the leader of *Mojahedin* (Kheri, 1986; Koohi-Kamali, 1992).

In sixth (January 1983), seventh (November 1985) congresses so on the policy of KDPI was not changed and overthrow the central government was the main policy of the Party by using armed conflict tactic (Kheri, 1986; Najafy, 1997).

In the last decade of the Party's life, there were not noticeable events, except the third split, which was organized by Hassan Rastegar and his followers in central committee in April 1988. After the eighth Congress of the Party, Ghassemlou was challenged by fifteen leading figures in the KDPI. This new faction, calling itself "KDPI Revolutionary Leadership" published a ten-point statement which criticized Ghassemlou personally for taking the party to the right by uniting with "Western liberal-democratic elements", distancing himself from the socialist camp' and being ready to enter negotiations with the government in Tehran. Membership of the new faction includes the following: one member of KDPI Politburo, eight member of central committee, four deputy members, and two councilors (Koohi-Kamali, 1992:189) and joined together later (Tarikhi, 1988; Shahbazi, 1997).

4.2.1.2 Organization of KDPI

As we had noted before, first decade of KDPI life acted as a local branch of *Tudeh* Party. The organizational Chart of the Party was a copy of communist parties. Figure 4.1 shows the political chart of KDPI.

Congress: is the supreme manager, administrative and policy maker of the Party. It composed of all members of central committee, reserve members of central committee, consultant plus representative of all members from *Malhands,* counties, cities, rural district. The congress was founded once in every each two years.

Conference: If the foundation of congress is not possible or the central committee cannot solve a problem, the conference on behalf of Congress, composed of central committee members, reserves and consultants and representative of county committee and also all attached committees of central committee like publicity and publication committee were to meet. (Constitution of KDPI, 1984).

Central Committee: is in charge of managing party between two congresses. It has an elected secretary-general and Vice Secretary, and Politburo members. This Committee must have meeting three times a year (Constitution of KDPI, 1984). Central Committee has 25 members (Najafy, 1997).

Politburo: is in charge on behalf of the central committee between two sessions. Politburo must have regular meeting. The number is less than central committee (Constitution of KDPI, 1984).

Cell: the smallest part of KDPI organization is cell, the numbers of it should not be less than three cadres.

Committee: In village the committee of village, is rural district, city, county committees organize all party fairs. The members of this committee are elected by the cadres of that area. (Constitution of KDPI, 1984*)*.

*Malband***:** KDPI use this Kurdish concept to divide Kurdish Territory of Iran into three Section; north of this area cover *by Malband Shomal*, central part of Iranian Kurdistan managed *by Malband Markaz*; south which included Kirmanshah and Ilam provinces command *by Malband Jonoob* (Najafy, 1997).

Figure 4.1: KDPI Organization

Sources: Hamavand, 1997
Najafy, 1997
Constitution of KDPI, 1984.

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4.2.1.2.1 Militant Organization of KDPI

From the third congress (1973), KDPI approved armed conflict policy and for execution of this aim and policy, foundation of armed branches seemed to be vital. Each county committee has *a Hiz* (battalion) an armed division, which acts under the commander of county committee. The militant organizational Chart of KDPI is in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: KDPI Militant Branch

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                    ┌──────────────────┐
                    │ County Committee │
                    └──────────────────┘
                             │
                             ▼
                    ┌──────────────────┐
                    │  Hiz (battalion) │
                    └──────────────────┘
              ┌──────────────┼──────────────┐
              ▼              ▼              ▼
      ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
      │Lakh (company)│ │Lakh (company)│ │Lakh (company)│
      └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘
       ┌────┼────┐     ┌────┼────┐     ┌────┼────┐
       ▼    ▼    ▼     ▼    ▼    ▼     ▼    ▼    ▼
     │Pal││Pal││Pal│ │Pal││Pal││Pal│ │Pal││Pal││Pal│
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
Sources: Najafy, 1997
Marandi, 1997
Afrooz, 1997.

Hiz (battalion): is the biggest unit of the militant branch of KDPI. The number of *Hiz* fluctuates from time to time. For example, in 1980 at the best situation of party, 1000 militias formed a *Hiz*. One year later (1981), 500 formed *a Hiz*. In 1997 one *Hiz* included only 25 militias or cadres (Najafy, 1997; Marandi, 1997; Afrooz, 1997).

Lakh (**Company**): Eac*h Hiz* included thre*e Lakh* and the number also one third

o*f Hiz.*

Pal (**Platoon**): Eac*h Lakh* consisted of thre*e Pal* and the cadres of *Pal* are one

third of *Lakh.*

Patrol: There are also small groups, which are composed of four to six members.

These cells are not guerrillas, but act as intelligence services of party. Their

functions include; propaganda, supporting militants by gathering information

about enemies, geography of the area, receive and obtain money, food, shelter

and so on (Marandi, 1997).

4.2.1.2.2 Financial Sources and Aid

KDPI claim (Constitution of Party, 1980, 1984) that much of their income

depends on the regular payment by the cadres, Party Commercial Institute and

Friends aid, but the Party didn't say anything about these friends.

These friends may be the International Socialism which has strong relationship

with former KDPI leaders; (Sheikh Attar, Ali Reza, 1997).

They may be the Kurds of Iraq like PUK under the leadership of Jalal

Talibani which pulled for Iranian Kurds and KDPI with forces, logistic and

financial support many times in 1979 and 1980 and so on (Afrooz, 1997;

Younesi, 1997; Tarikhi, 1988).

These friends may be Iraq, from 1973, which supported KDPI against

Iranian Government (Kutschera, 1994; Hamavand, 1997). We may also mention

the Reagan doctrine (ex-President of U.S.A) for destablising a radical state like

Iran by supporting ethnic insurrection in 1980's (Rojer Mohan quoted in Tarikhi,

1988:177). CIA was asked to create insecurity in west Iran (like Homan Ghazi and his kinship Sardar Jaff) (Secret-document No. 13: from USA Embassy in Tehran). During the war (1980's) Iraq established defence line on Kurdistan frontiers between Iran-Iraq, which was more than 25 kilometers inside Iranian Kurdistan (Top Secret- Document of defence minister of Iraq-10 Dec. 1980, quoted in Tarikhi, 1988); It is understandable why Iraq bribed Iranian Kurds (KDPI, Komala). KDPI became more active in the north and to divert military attention away from the central and southern fronts. One of the consequences of the Iranian offensives from Kurdistan to Iraq is disrupted KDPI supplies from Iraq (O' Ballance, Edgar, 1996: 123-136).

Communist Party of Iran, publicized a document which shows that NATO paid 9 millions US $ to KDPI (Golam, Ali, 1997; Najafy, 1997). But income resource of KDPI is top secret up to now (Kutschera, 1994; Najafy, 1997; Hamavand, 1997).

4.2.1.2.3 Publicity and Propaganda of KDPI

As it has been noted before, one committee attached to the central committee is doing these jobs. The publicity system of Party mainly depends on oral propaganda and equipment for this purpose is Radio transmitter broadcasting and sometime by face to face meeting with common people. The publication system of Party is too poor (Najafy, 1997; Hamavand, 1997; Afrooz, 1997; Marandi; 1997; Golam, 1997).

4.2.1.2.4 Leadership and Structure of the Party

As Archie Roosevelt (1947) noted that leaders of Kurdish nationalist movement mostly come from the more enlightened townships and military strength had to come from tribes.

The leaders of KDPI are educated, and trained in *Tudeh* Party (Sheikh Attar, 1997; Najafy, 1997; Marandi, 1997).

A few scholars believe that the majority of the Party leaders belong to landlords or chiefs of tribes and are educated (National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979; Golam, 1997; Afrooz, 1997; Marandi, 1997).

But Hamavand (1997) believed that last generation of the leaders were landlords or chiefs but new generation of KDPI leaders belong to the middle class urbanites.

The social bases of a majority of Party leaders was landlordism (Ghassemlou, Gadani) or noble family (Like Ghazi, Sharafkandi both Rahman and Yousef) or religious cleric (like Ghazi Mahammad, Himan, Ezzadin Hosseini). The majority of military commanders of this Party were to the tribal chiefs either educated or non-educated like Mohammad Agha Simko the grandson of Ismail Agha (alias of him is Gagarin), Sanar Momadi from Sakak tribes, Eraj Ibrahim Zadeh from Neesani tribes, Jaleel Gadani from tribes around Mahabad and so on.

A number of *Hiz* commanders were in Iranian Army who fled and joined Party like captain Nazari the Commander of *Dallahoo Hiz*, major Abbassi the

high commander of militant branch of KDPI (National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979; Hamavand, 1997; Marandi, 1997)

Majorities of KDPI cadres are also educated and belong to all parts of Kurd society. You can also find Party's cadres distributed in all ages but middle ages are more than the other ages. The majority of militias are from rural area or tribes (Najafy, 1997; Hamavand, 1997; Afrooz, 1997; Marandi, 1997)

4.2.1.3 Changing Policies and Programmes of KDPI

From the first manifesto of KDP (1945) and the last one (1984) the programme and goals of the Party basically are not changed. Nevertheless a few change are visible. Some of the presents ones are given below:

1. The Kurd people of Iran should have freedom and self-government in the administration of their local affairs and obtain autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State;

2. The Kurdish language should be used in at level of education and be the official language in local affairs;

3. The supreme Provincial Council of Kurdistan, elected by people, be formed to run local government of autonomous Kurdistan.

4. The final goal of KDPI is establishment of socialist community based on scientific socialism. (Constitution of KDPI, 1980)

5. The strategic slogan of the Party is Democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan (Constitution of KDPI, 1980, 1984; Yassin, 1997; Ghassemlou, 1965).

After fourth congress (1980) as the distance of KDPI from *Tudeh* Party increased the goal of "scientific socialist community" changed to the "democratic socialist community" is understandable and economic aid of NATO is also understandable (Constitution of KDPI, 1980, 1984). Secondary data also supported above idea and debate (Kheri, 1986; Jalaiepoor, 1993; Kinnane, 1993; Kutschera, 1994).

As it was noted before, from the third congress (1973), KDPI had approved armed conflict policy to obtain their goals. The Kurdistan Democratic Party only in fourth congress didn't approve armed conflict policy officially but in the next congress (November 1981) the policy of "overthrow of Central Government" was approved and this policy is not changed yet up to now (Constitution of KDPI, 1981, 1984; Kheri, 1986).

4.2.2 Revolutionary Organization Of Toilers of Kurdistan (Komala)

The second significant organization, which was active in Kurdistan, was Komala. This party was at first composed of leftist students from Iranian University. These communist students were concentrated in Sanandaj. After Islamic Revolution (1979), they gathered around the "Freedom Defender Society" (or *Jameiat- Defa-As-Azaddi)*, which was established in Sanadaj (Jalaiepoor, 1993; Golam, 1997) just one month after Revolution (Golam, 1997).

The "Revolutionary Organization of Toilers of Kurdistan" was the outcome of first conference which was held on Bukan in February 16, 1979 (Kheri, 1986).

The leadership of this organization is in the hands of the educated and urban communists (Bruinessen, Martin Van, 1992). Nevertheless a numbers of feudal or tribesmen or clan are also visible in the leadership of this group, Fouad Mostafa Soltani the feudal of Almaneh, Yousef Ardalan one of the biggest feudal of Kurdistan, Saed Vatandust the landlord of Malekshah village, Abdullah and Salah Mohtady both are famous in Bukan as also Omar Ilkhanizadeh (Golam, 1997).

In the first meeting the central committee composed of these five members: Foud Mostafa Soltani, Abdullah Mohtady, Saed Vatandust, Ibrahim Alizadeh and Mohssen Rahimi, which were elected by body meeting (Kheri, 1986).

In the first real congress (March or April 1981) at a village (Zambill) near Bukan, first constitution of Komala was approved on the lines of the other communist parties. The Annual Congress is the supreme part of the organization. In this Congress eight members were elected as Central Committee (Kheri, 1986) Komala considers itself Marxist organization, in this congress (1981), it went through a period of self-criticism about its extremist part, and stressed the need for strong links with proletariat (Kheri, 1986; Koohi- Kamali, 1992).

The distance of Komala from Maoism increased in this congress and the ideology of this party gradually approached the other line of communist; Komala is the Kurdish branch of the communist party of Iran, which was established in 1983 by the "Union of Communist Fighters (*Sahand*). It is the political category were known in Iran as the "third line", and had been strongly opposed to the

Tudeh Party and Soviet Union and also famous as Albanian kind of Marxist (Kheri, 1986; Koohi-Kamali, 1992; Golam, 1997).

In this Congress *Sahand* was appreciated, because they helped Komala to solve the ideological problem. In the next congress (1982), they accepted the programme of *Sahand* and finally Komala named itself as a Kurdish branch of Communist Party of Iran (Kheri, 1986).

4.2.2.1 Financial Sources and Aid

Iraq is the main supporter of this party. They received a measure of financial, armed, logistic support. KDPI says, "If we are (KDPI) washing our hands in pool of Iraq, Komala is diving into this attached pool" (Bruinessen, 1992; Golam, 1997).

The second significant supporter is PUK of Iraq under the leadership of Jalal Talebani.

The communist parties of Iraq are the other supporters of Komala as in the second war of Sanandaj (1980) the communist parties engaged directly in war against Iranian forces. The high commander of Komala's militias were Mullah Mohammad Jawanrudi- one of the main leaders of Communist Party of Iraq- and Jabbar Kakuie from Iraqi Kurdistan (Golam, 1997).

4.2.2.2 Leadership and Structure of the Party

The leadership of this Party is in the hands of the educated and urban classes and also noble clan from rural area, which were educated. The body of Komala composed students (both boys and girls) which have communist tendency and majority of them from cities.

The other communist groups of Iran have a place in Komala, for instance, *Peekar, Shafaghe Soorkh,* Ashraf Dehghani and *Aghaliat* Branches of *Fedian Khalgh, Sahand* but in the last years of its life, rural members of this party increase. Majorities of fighters belong to the rural area (Najafy, 1997; Afrooz, 1997; Sheikh Attar, 1997).

4.2.2.3 Publicity and Propaganda

Radio is the main tool for the party's propaganda like KDPI. Publications are also in use because a majority of their militia and cadres are educated (both rural and urban areas). (Golam, 1997).

4.2.3 Islamic Movement in Kurdistan

There were two kinds of Islamic Movements in Kurdistan; one kind upholds Islamic ideas but support autonomous Kurdistan like Komala and KDPI. Moftizadeh and his followers, *Khabbat* and *Razgari* should be included in this category. Another faction supports Central Government of Iran as Islamic State. The main centres of both movements were in Sanandaj, Marivan, Pavah and Kamyaran.

4.2.3.1 Moftizadeh and His Followers

There is no doubt that a majority of young Sunni Muslims gather around Ahmed Moftizadeh as an intellectual clergy (*Alem*) in Kurdistan provinces (Jalaiepoor, 1993). These young Muslims founded *Maktabe Ghoran* (School of Koran).

In the middle of 1976 a number of Muslim in Marivan established a center for religious activity against *Bahaee* as branch of SAVAK. At the end of this

year, Ahmed Moftizadeh in his third journey to Marivan opened this center. He had programme to establish a modern school to teach Koran from primary up to diploma and plus two years after high school, but the Minister of Education didn't permit, because his degree was not eligible for the activity (Rezaii, Jabbar, 1985). But he opened *Maktabe Ghoran* in Sanandaj without permission of Shah Government.

As 1978 is very important for the process of Islamic Revolution in Iran, in Kurdistan this year is important for growth of Marxist and non-Marxist groups. Many of them present themselves, as defender of toilers and worker class, in spite of the number of many may be not more than four or five. *Mossavat* (equality)- the following of Moftizadeh-and Young Muslim Organization was established in 1978 (Kheri, 1986).

In October 8, 1978 the people of Sanandaj under the leadership of Moftizadeh formed first demonstration. By this demonstration, Kurd people joined the melting pot of other part of Iran only a few months before the fall of King of Iran (Rezaii, 1985).

In the first election for the Council of Sanandaj (April 13, 1979) after a crisis, the followers of Mofitizadeh achieved majority -8 members from the 11 members-of this council belonging to the Islamic group (Rezaii, 1985). In Sanandaj gradually the leftist (Komala and Allies) dominated the Sanandaj by the help of governor-general (Ibrahim Younesi). In Marivan the followers of Mofitzadeh were killed or immigrated to the other cities like Tehran, Kirmanshah.

In the first months of 1981, Moftizadeh tries to establish a group of Sunni *Alems* (clergies) which was intitled "Central Council *of Sonnat or (Shams).* In this council he was elected as leader of this group. But after a short time Iranian government arrested him and a few years later he died in jail. (Rezaii, 1985). The purpose of this group, as they claimed, was to change one or two chapters of the Islamic Republic Constitution which present that "president should be Shia" and 'the official religion of Iran is Shia" (Rezaii, 1985).

4.2.3.2 *Khabbat and Razgari*

The followers of Jalale Din Houseini (the brother of Ezzadin) named themselves *Khabbat* (fighters) and the followers of Sheikh Ottoman the spiritual leader *of Naghshbandi Daravish* and his sons named themselves *Razgari* (salvation), these small groups were armed a little by Komala in Kurdistan province (Tarikhi; 1988; Golam, 1997).

4.2.3.3 *Pishmargan Mosalman* Kurd (Muslim Kurd Pishmargas)

In the early 1980 as opposition parties (KDPI, Komala and allies) dominated Kurdistan area, the Muslim activists who followed the Central Islamic Government fled or immigrated to other part of Kurdistan which was controlled by central government like Kirmanshah and Hamadan or other cities like Zanjan and Tehran. The chief commander *of Pasdaran* (Revolutionary guard) Mohammad Broojerdi organized them under the title. Supreme Council *of Pasdaran* and National Revolutionary Council also accepted this organization as a part of non-official army at first (Ghafghazi Zadeh, Bijan, 1997).

In Pavah, Nowsud, Biyangan, Kamyaran, Kirmanshah, the first branch of *Pishmangan Mosalma*n is founded. Other Kurdish cities, which were recaptured by Iranian government, branches of this organization were established and the Muslim Kurds who supported to the Central Government were armed (Ghafghazi Zadeh, 1997; Ghorbani, Mohammad Ali, 1997).

4.2.4 Kurdish Branch of Opposition Parties

Many opposition groups and organizations had a Kurdish branch. Among them, active one, was the *Fadaiyan-e-Khalg*h (Ashraf Dehghani an*d Aghaliiat* branch) which believed in guerrilla policy (Koohi-Kamali, 1992). Many of these groups or parties had roots in other part of Iran. Many members of these groups are educated and sometime have Marxist tendency, who were isolated in native territory and fled to Kurdistan as a free zone, which was not under control of Central Government. Some of them are mentioned below *Razamandegan* (fighters*) Shafagh Soorkh* (red twilight)*, Toofan* (Storm)*, Rahe Kargar* (the way of workers)*, Hezb-e-Nejat* (rescue party)*, Pikar* (fight) (Kheri, 1986; Afrooz, 1997; Najafy, 1997).

And also a few of the royalist generals, such as Palizban, Ovesi, also set up headquarters in Kurdistan with the claim of building a "Liberation Army" there (Koohi-Kamali, 1992:181-182).

4.3.1 Kurd Nationalists Activity After 1979

Each insurrection or rebellion has five stages; hiding, first activity, partisan warfare, guerrilla warfare and full-scale war. Duration of each stage depends on many internal and external factors. Different culture, language,

religion effect as internal factors, Geography, dominant power and political geography worked sometime as intensify factors.

Cultural, economic and political oppression as external factor may aggravate the internal factors.

Insurgent leadership combine internal and external factors wisely and rebellion go ahead stage by stage (Najafy, 1997).

Kurdish movement passed all five stage one by one and today they are back to the first stage (hiding) (Najafy, 1997). In short, the movement after revolution (1979) has three sections, before September 1979 and after March 1980 up to now 1997 and between September 1979 March 1980.

This movement passed stage 1 and 2 (hiding and first activity) from October 1978 up to February 11, 1979. In these four or five months the leaders and cadres of KDPI entered Kurdistan from Iraq. They organized their members and for the first time the slogan of Kurd became different from the other part of Iran, "Democracy for Iran and Autonomy for Kurdistan" has appeared in the common demonstration of people.

Partisan and guerrilla warfare stages started just four days after fall of the Monarchy in Iran. In the summer of 1979, the Kurdish activists were ready for the last stage (full-scale war) and only two or three garrisons remained under the control of Central government. From Mahabad in (north) to Kamyaran and Pavah (in south), the autonomous Kurdistan was a reality, only they need that Central Government recognized this Autonomous Kurdistan officially. From the early 1980 up to the end 1983, these stages passed conversely. (Najafy, 1997; Marandi,

1997; Afrooz, 1997; Jalaiepoor, 1993; Koohi-Kamali, 1992). The detail of these stages will be explained more.

4.3.1.1 History of Kurdish Movement after Revolution (1979)

Only four days after Revolution (February 15, 1979) The Police Station of Saqqiz was captured by Kurds, two days later (February 17, 1979) the Police Station of Mahabad. During February and half of March, many outposts, military garrison of Mahabad, part of military garrison of Sanandaj, gendarmrie station of Sanandaj were captured by Kurds nationalist (Najafy, 1997; Jalaiepoor, 1993; Koohi-Kamali, 1992, Younesi, 1997). They seized a considerable quantity of weapons, tanks, artilleries (Koohi-Kamali, 1992, Younesi, 1997, Najafy, 1997). The Kurds captured Mahabad garrison again on February 20, 1979 and killed a number of soldiers, officers and seized 18 tank, 36 heavy artilleries and thousands of weapon. With these weapons they besieged Sanandaj military garrison and killed 21 soldiers and captured several buildings but the resistance continued tile reinforcements were received from Kirmanshah (Chamrran, Mostafa, 1985).

Three members of Revolutionary Council (Bani Sadrr, Rafssanjany, Beheshti) and Interior Minister (Sader Haj Syeed Javadi) plus, Pak Negad and Ibrahim Younesi as governor-general of Kurdistan went to Sanandaj under Ayotollah Taleghani as leaders of delegation. They prepared a condition for mass election for the council of city and also cease-fire (Rezaii, 1985; Younesi, 1997). The first war of Sanandaj was organized by Communist party as they wanted to

capture Sanandaj military garrison as their allies had done in Mahabad (Rezaii, 1985).

In April 1979, the Kurd Nationalists and their allies Communist Party and others controlled all part of Kurdistan. Only one city remained under the control of Central Government, Nagadeh with two third Shia population. KDPI organized an armed march within the city and seeking to establish a branch in the last mainly Shia town, if KDPI could capture this city, military garrisons of Piranshahr and Pasveh and Jaldian barrack easily captured by KDPI militias. KDPI came into violent confrontation with local revolutionary committee who opposed this project. Street fighting broke out and continued up to 20 April when a cease-fire was signed in this city. The KDPI backed down on this occasion (Jalaiepoor, 1993; O' Ballance, 1996).

The strategy of the Kurds nationalists and their allies at this stage captured all of Kurdish territory and they were ready for fifth stage of insurrection (full-scale war). All parts of Kurdistan controlled by them and they organized about 50,000 armed militias which was supported by PUK (*Yekati*) of Iraq and communist allies from Iraq and Iran also (Jalaiepoor, 1993; O' Ballance, 1996; Najafy, 1997; Afrooz, 1997; Marandi, 1997).

They also founded a political branch "Council of Kurdish People" with Izzedin Hosseini at the head, Ghassemlou as its spokesmen. For a period, this council acted as the representative of the Kurds in negotiation to persuade the Islamic government to recognize autonomy of Kurdistan, which had been already founded by armed forces. (Koohi-Kamali, 1992).

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The second step for control of Kurdistan by Kurd activists, set upon the followers and of Islamic leaders who did not support them. They attacked all *Maktabe Ghoran* (School of Koran) and killed or arrested many leaders and followers. At the peak of this tactic they killed 25 members of school of Koran in Marivan on July 14, 1979 (Chamrran, 1985; Jalaiepoor, 1993; Golam 1997;). They assassinated 50 *Sunni Alems* (clergy) and many other civilians from 1979-1985 that they did not accept their programmes (Jalaiepoor, 1993).

Only one Sunni city was controlled by government and their defenders included 60 Kirmanshahi *Pasdars* and 250 Kurds *pasdar* (Chamrran, 1985). On 17th August 1979, about 2000 KDPI *Pishmargas* and allies attacked and occupied the frontier town of Pavah, driving out the *Pasdars* by killing many of them. Only 16 Pasdars with Dr. Mostafa Chamrran controlled a small part of the city as representative of spiritual leader in Supreme Defense Council.

On 18th August 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini as Commander-in-chief of Army ordered the land force, Air force. *Pasdars,* gendarmes to work together and asked them to break the Pavah siege. The government banned KDPI. Reinforcements arrived and in the counter attack, backed by helicopters, regained possession of Pavah on August 19, 1979.

After Pavah, Nowsud, Marivan, Baneh, Sardasht, towns fell into the hands of the government forces only after 15 days campaigning. Mahabad, Bukan, and Saqqiz fell without shooting a single bullet. The last town, which fell in the hands of government forces, was Sardasht on the September 9, 1979. (Kurdistan and Freedom, 1983; Chamrran, 1985; Khoohi- Kamali, 1992; Jalaiepoor, 1993;

O' Ballance, 1996; Najafy, 1997; Afrooz 1997). The role of Chamrran was very important in this campaign because he was expert in anti-guerrilla warfare in Lebanon, and he had fought there fore many years against Israeli invasion.

Iranian forces launched their campaign from the peak of hills or mountains with helicopters and special counter insurrection forces (Chamrran, 1985).

By pushing the Kurd activists to Iraq, the first war of Kurdistan ended in less than one month.

4.3.1.2 Negotiations

From September 1979 up to March 1980 both sides preferred negotiations. At the end of November 1979 Izzedin Hosseini, as head of "Council of Kurdish People", presented a plan for autonomy to the government representative entitled "*Heeat-Hossne-Nieeat*" (goodness intention) who visited Izzedin at Mahabad. The government delegation rejected the Kurd plan for autonomy and instead offered fourteen-point settlement allowing self-administration; but disagreement over the precise area to be included. Kurds wanted to embrace all Western Azerbijan, Ilam and Kirmanshah.

Negotiations broke down and full-scale war rumbled on (Koohi-Kamali, 1992; O' Ballance, 1996).

4.3.1.3 Final Battle

During the negotiations both sides tried to reinforce themselves and to find new allies. Iraqi government, Communist Parties of Iraq, PUK of Iraq, (*Yekati*), KDPI, Komala and all Communist groups who fled to Kurdistan from

other parts of Iran, were supporting Kurdish activist (O' Ballance, 1996; Younesi, 1997; Golam, 1997; Hamavand, 1997). Iranian forces, *Pasdaran, Pishmargan Mosalman Kurd*, Gendarmeri, Police from other side established common headquarter in South (Kurdistan) and North (West Azerbijan).

Again Kurd activists were in peak power and resisted against government in full-scale warfare (stage fifth of insurrection) (Najafy, 1997).

1980: Iranian troops and *Pasdaran* and allies resumed their offensive against the Kurds at Kamyaran (March 1980) (Najafy, 1997). On May 13, 1980, after one month armed conflict Sanandaj was fell in the hands of Iranian forces (Kurdistan and Freedom, 1983; Jalaiepoor, 1993; Golam, 1997; Najafy, 1997;).

The war between Iran and Iraq didn't have too much effect on Kurdistan.

1981: In this year, the other cities were recaptured by Iranian Government (O' Ballance, 1996; Najafy, 1997).

1982: In this year the main road, which connected the Kurdish cities fell in the hands of Iranian troops. In this year Hamzeh Headquarter was founded by Mohammad Broojerdi, which commanded all Iranian forces (Army, *Pasdaran*, Gendarmeri, *and Baisg*) under its order (Jalaiepoor, 1993; Najafy, 1997; Afrooz, 1997; Marandi, 1997).

In September, Iranian troops resumed their offensive against the Kurds in Northern Iran, concentrating on closing KDPI and Allies' (Komala) supply routes. They successfully seized and held 120-kilometer sections of the Sardasht-Baneh road, which ran almost parallel and closed the Iraqi Kurdistan frontier and

this disrupted KDPI and Allies' supplies from Iraq. (O' Ballance, 1996:127; Ghafghazi Zadeh, 1997)

1983: In the spring and summer Iranians launched three large offensives that drove the KDPI and Allies from certain areas:

1. In Nowdesheh (near Nowsud), KDPI was getting ready to launch an attack but was beaten by Iranian who launched their own offensive in the second week of March, well ahead of the KDPI. They eventually had to back away and revert to guerrilla warfare tactics.

2. In July, one of Iran's main operations took place in wide Runwanduz Valley, just inside Iraqi Kurdistan. The valley was a main supply route for both the KDPI and Iraqi PUK operating inside Iran, in which were located the KDPI, H.Q, base camps and families of *Peshmargas*.

3. In mid October Iranians launched another major offensive against Iraq on a wide front, one prang being directed of the Panjwin and Garmark military garrisons to cut Kurdish resistance routes. (O' Ballance, 1996).

In this offensive, last part of Iranian Kurdish territory which had previously been controlled by KDPI, like Allan, Marzan Abad, Beetoush, hospital, Radio transmitter, Doletoo jail of KDPI were in the hand of the Iranian army and the revolutionary guards (*Pasdaran*). 300 Km^2 of Iranian territory 700 km^2 of Iraqi Kurdistan and 200 Iranian *Pasdars* and army were released from Doletoo jail (Kurdistan and Freedom, 1983; Koohi-Kamali, 1992; Mc. Dowall, 1992; Jalaiepoor, 1993; *Karnameh Sepahe Islam*, 1996; Najafy, 1997)

At the end of this year, Iranian's Nationalist Kurds were at as poor a position as ever in their struggle. They reverted to stage 4 and 3 in their insurrection (Guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare) (Mc. Dowall, 1992; Najafy, 1997; Afrooz, 1997; Marandi, 1997)

1984: In the summer, the KDPI showed its interest in negotiations with the Islamic government; the negotiation however, did not progress. This move by the KDPI angered the *Mojahedin*, and resulted in the KDPI withdrawing from the council [National Resistance Council in Paris] (Koohi-Kamali, 1992:187).

1985: In last days of June, and July the government began a fresh offensive against guerrilla resistance and senior military commander Karim Aliyar was killed, in this year also a spate of fighting breakout between Komala and KDPI. This conflict deepened since, and continued to undermine the activities of both organizations (Koohi-Kamali, 1992; O' Ballance, 1996).

Establishing of *Ramazan H.Q* (Ramathan) which coordinated the Iranian troops offensive inside Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurds resistance was pushed far from Iran-Iraq borders in Kurdistan and military activity was too difficult and urban, rural guerrilla warfare or partisan warfare became also impossible (*Karnameh Sepahe Islam*, 1996; Afrooz, 1997; Marandi, 1997; Najafy, 1997).

1986-87: In these years the Kurd activist return to the second Stage (first activity) propaganda by radio, and secret publicity were the main activity of them (Najafy, 1997; Marandi, 1997; Afrooz, 1997).

1988: In April, after the eighth congress of KDPI, a new split within the party took place. This new faction which included fifteen leading figures calling itself

"KDPI Revolutionary Leadership" and loyal to armed conflict policy. Ghassemlou branch entered secret negotiation with Government of Tehran (Koohi-Kamali; 1992).

1989: In July KDPI's leader was assassinated during secret negotiation with government representatives from Tehran in Vienna.

1980-1993: During the last 12 years, activity of Kurds nationalist in Iran, a noticeable number of them were killed in battles and 8,000[4.13] of them surrendered most of them belonging to KDPI, 2000 of them stationed in Iraq (1500 KDPI, 500 members of Komala). Both Radio transmitters broadcasting one hour a day for Kurdistan (Jalaiepoor, 1993).

1997: After a wave of assassinations during the last decade, two branches of KDPI joined together. The other group like Komala didn't have any activity. KDPI is only a party, which is alive in Kurdistan. About 650-800 of the party militants and cadres stationed in Iraqi Kurdistan under the protection of KDP of Iraq. Ten *Hiz* of the KDPI remain; *one Hiz* from south (Kamyaran*) (Malband Jonoob)*. Two *Hiz* from *Malband Markaz* (central Kurdistan). Six *Hiz* from *Malband Shomal* (West Azerbijan). One *Hiz* also protect the Central Committee of KDPI (Najafy, 1997; Shahbazi, 1997).

4.3.2 Islamic Republic Policies in Kurdistan

For analyzing the policies of revolutionary government in Tehran we should have both insurgents and counter-insurgents opinions.

[4.13] Sheikh Attar believed up to 1985, 9000 surrendered themselves.

If the people support one side (central government or Nationalist leadership), the other side defeats the campaign. Both sides try to play ace in the hole and expose the Achilles heel of other side to have victory in the game (Najafy, 1997). The stable strategy of both sides was to gain support of the population (Najafy, 1997).

Central government should chose affirmative action policy to remove all kind of oppression as main tactic. On contrary thee rebel leadership tries to increase the distance between ethnic group. The stable policy of Kurdish nationalist (both Nationalists and Communist) is withdrawal the central government of Iran.

The policy of Islamic Republic from the end of 1980 ups to now as tit for tats crush the armed anti-revolution. (Broojerdi, 1993; Najafy, 1997; Marandi, 1997; Kazemi Naser quoted in Ghorbani, 1997; Broojerdi quoted in Ghafghazi Zadeh, 1997; Afrooz, 1997).

The policies of Islamic government can be classified in four categories; cultural policy; political policy; economic policy and armed policy. Before explanation of these policies, a comment is necessary, The first year after Revolution (11 February 1979 up to March 1980) the central government had binary policy. Prime Minister late Mehdi Bazargan and his followers fearing from the loose federation of well armed Kurdish tribal, religious and political leaders backed by guerrilla forces - sent delegations to persuade the Kurds to accept a compromise and sometime to bribe them by choosing governor - general like Ibrahim Younesi who was a famous communist and nationalist acceptable to

all Kurds. Later it was felt that the armed conflict is only a way which is more efficient that the first one. Nevertheless they held peace negotiations up to the end (Khomeini, Roohollah, November, 17, 1979; National Foreign Assessment Center, 1979; Jalaiepoor, 1993; Rezaii, 1997; Afrooz, 1997).

4.3.2.1 Cultural Policy

Islam as a political system contradicts nationalism as ideology or political terms, but in Islam, all kinds of discriminations like skin colour, racial, ethnicity or ethnocentrism is condemned (Khomeini, 17.11.1979; 19.12.1979; 6.8.1980; 12.9.1980; 11.2.1981). All people are equal before the law and differences in language, culture tribe etc. should not matter. KDPI in fourth congress confessed that Islamic government did not believe in ethnocentrism (Constitution KDPI Intro. 1980, 1984; Tarikhi, 1988).

The official employees of central government sometimes wear Kurdish clothes, marry with Kurd girls, attended Sunni Muslim prayers, and prepared tours for about 300,000 Kurds to visit other parts of Iran to show them what is propaganda and what is reality (Najafy, 1997; Marandi, 1997; Sheikh Attar, 1997; Jalaiepoor, 1993). The strategy of the government was "Suppress the anti-revolutionary and be kind to common people" (Jamshidian, Masuad, 1997; Sheikh Attar, 1997; Najafy, 1997; Marandi, 1997; Jalaiepoor, 1993; Afrooz, 1997; Kazami, quoted in Ghorbani, 1997; Shams, quoted in Ghafghazi Zadeh, 1997).

The policy can be seen in original and approved draft of Islamic Constitution of Iran. It stipulated that Farsi should be used for official

communication throughout Iran but permitted the use of local language and in schools and in local press. The final version of it, however, stated that local languages could only be used alongside Farsi, and the school textbooks would be in Farsi only (Kreyenbroek, Philip G., 1992:80; Constitution of Islamic Republic Chapter 2, Article 15, 1993). The government supports *Serweh* as literary magazine from 1984, *Ashabe Englab* (Follower of Revolution), *Abidar* from 1997 shows that in Iran, much the same reasoning may apply: as long as majority of millions Iranian Kurds continue to live in Kurdish speaking communities, there seems little likelihood that their language will die out (Kreyenbroek, 1992; Sheikh Attar, 1997).

4.3.2.2 Political Policy

In all elections, which took place during the last two decades Kurd people have been active like other people of Iran. Many have also joined various security forces (Najafy, 1997; Kazami quoted in Ghorbani, 1997; Broojerdi quoted in Ghafghazi Zadeh, 1997; Afrooz, 1997; Sheikh Attar, 1997; Marandi, 1997). Today *Pishmargan Mosalman Kurds* is part of *Pasdaran*.

4.3.2.3 Economic Policy

One of the main purposes of the Government is to reduce the discrimination in economic sector. Affirmative action is the tool to achieve equality with other part of Iran. It built many bridges, roads, schools and established small economic units to help Kurds to achieve economic equality.

For example half of all tractors were distributed in Kurdish area because they were used for transportation also. The other activity in agriculture sector

was land reform. During the first years of revolution (1979-1983), distribution 120,000-acre land between small cultivators was done (Jalaiepoor, 1993; Jamshidian, Masuad, 1997; Sheikh Attar, 1997; Najafy, 1997).

The combinations of above policy finally reduced the external factors and have affected internal factors.

It seems that Central Government could absorb the population more than opposition groups.

Chapter 5

Present Perception of Kurds on the Nationalist Movement

5.1 Introduction

Theories of Nationalism and ethnicity can be classified in three categories; competition theories, (including ecological, interest group and competition). Development theory and modernization, reactive theories is the second type and Gellner's Theory (Nationalism make Nations), diffusion theory and deprivation one is the third type.

The assumption of competition is; two or more groups should compete in same territory and interlinked with each other. But in Kurdistan of Iran, this assumption is not tenable because the Kurd population is not mixed with other groups.

The second category of theories is the outcome of development process and the platform of these is the industrialization of country or region. These kind of ethnic nationalist processes sometime take place among the ethnic groups in developed country. Iran is not a developed country by comparison with western countries but Kurdistan is less developed than other parts of Iran.

The combination of deprivation, diffusion and Gellner's Theory may cover the ethnicity or nationalism of Kurdistan. The Weberian method (comprehensive-explanation) was employed to explain Kurdish Nationalism and to examine these theories. The Likert Scale was used to gain empirical data evidence included 24 indicators or statements, five statements or indicators were omitted (4,6,15,16, 18) because the correlation coefficient of them are less than 0.150 (r. 109, 0.134, 0.133, 0.081, 0.025) (Rafipoor, 1981: 249-255, Appendix No. 2) along with other factors of the scale.

5.1.1 Nationalist Tendency

As it has been noted before (Chapter 1) the scale scored from one to five. The maximum scores for the scale as a whole is 95 and minimum is 19. The result of 442 respondents on the Likert scale shows, that the mean of nationalist tendency among the Iranian Kurds is 45.13. These scores show that nationalist tendency in this territory is moderate and much less than the Kurdish Nationalist Parties claimed.

The following table shows it.

Table 5.1: The mean of Nationalist Tendency Among Iranian Kurds

Nationalist Tendency	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	Max.	Min.
Total	442	45.13	7.69	.37	78	25

Source: Appendix No. 3

The data will be used to examine the Deprivation, Diffusion, Gellner Theories one by one.

5.2   Deprivation Theory and Kurdish Nationalism

As it has been explained in the previous Chapter (2), inequality in the distribution of economic resources, social benefits and opportunities between distinct groups develop ethnic nationalism among them. But a number of scholars pointed out that when the ethnicity is politicialised, nationalism appeared. And also inequality among intelligentsia was more important than among other strata.

Both Kurdish nationalist leaders, intellectuals and majority of Islamic Revolution leaders believed that ethnicity or nationalism among Iranian Kurds took place at the level of deprivation.

For analyzing the role of deprivation on Kurdish nationalist tendency; we'll classify it into four parts; cultural deprivation, political deprivation, economic and religious deprivation.

5.2.1 Cultural Deprivation

What distinguishes one group from other ethnic groups? As it has been explored in previous chapter, sometimes-different race, history, religion, language, culture, mythical, geography, tribes make one ethnic group different from the others. These factors are basically used as platform to distinguish different groups but the role of each factor from time to time or place to place are different. Ethnic groups use one of these factors or some of them to clear its boundary from the others. Then one ethnic group manipulates economic resources, social benefits and other opportunities for its group (insiders) and exclude others and tries to impose its own will on other ethnic group. When this

occurs in one region, country or territory the deprivation feeling grows among excluded ethnic group. Sometimes the leaders of these ethnic groups focus on one of these factors and exaggerating a lot about of them to persuade their members that their deprivation is based on their separate ethnic origin.

In chapter 3 and 4, it was seen that the race of Iranian and Kurds as one of Iranian ethnic group is same (Aryan). Not only the Kurds and other ethnic groups of Iran have same history but also several Iranian dynasties were founded by Kurds like Median, Sassanid, Zand and so on. Not only the Kurds territory was part of Iranian Empire from 3000 years ago but also they defended Iranian heritage against all invaders several times.

Zoroastrianism as ancient Iranian Religion not only was a religion of all Iranian ethnic groups but also, Zoroaster arises from Kurds territory (around Uromia Lake). Language, myths and ancient ceremonies (like *Nowrooz* and *Chahr shanbeh Soori*) is celebrated more in Kurdistan than other parts of Iran.

Sheikh Mahmmud Barzanje (The king of Iraqi Kurdistan, 1922) said Iranians should help the Kurds because the Kurds and Iranians have the same race. Iranians lost the way and their approach to Kurdistan problem is wrong because the Kurds are interested in Iran more than in the others' (Kendal, 1993: 10).

Ghazi Mohammad: 'himself thought the Kurds were the descendants of the Medes, and like to give his own etymology of Mahabad - 'abode of the Medes'. (Roosevelt (1947), 1982: 145).

Ghazi Mohammad again in Mass media interviews (1941) in Tehran said, 'There are no non-Iranian Kurds. Kurds of the world are Iranian nationals be they geographically in Iran today or not' (Tarikhi, 1988: 143-147).

Hassanzadeh (today first secretary of KDPI) also approved this claim (1997).

Mollah Mustafa Barzani: 'Iran is our historical homeland, we have the same race, language, culture with other Iranians. We are part of Iran, our compatriot or countrymen should help us against Iraqi government' (Tarikhi, 1988: 143-147).

Ibrahim Younesi: 'Kurds are pure Iranian, has same culture with other part of Iran' (Keyhan, April 12, 1979 quoted in Tarikhi, 1988: 143-147).

Mohammad Ghazi (author), Ahmad Ghazi (Editor in chief of *Servah*), Seyed Abdullah Ayyobian, Dr. Fiznejad and Ali Mullavi have same idea and many of them believed that the other part of Kurdistan must annex to homeland (Iran). (Tarikhi, 1988: 143-147; Nikitine, 1987: 15). The irredentism tendency among the Kurds is not peculiar to the Iranian Kurds but have followers in Kurd territory of Iraq and Turkey. For instance the PUK leader-Jalal Tollibani believes: 'It is possible that the United Kurdistan joined Iran instead of separate Kurds of Iran' or 'Feraidun Abdul Ghader member of PUK Politburo said (1986), 'we are not interested to remain in the political framework of Iraq because we have different culture, history and race with Arabs, but we are interested to join Iran as homeland of Kurds' (Tarikhi, 1988: 143-147).

Ehssan Nuri (1954: 2) has written in introduction of his book: 'I don't want to write the history of Kurd or Kurdistan but I want to defend the history of an Iranian ethnic group whose descent is ignored by the Turks and Arabs and defend the Iranian identity of Kurds'. The other Kurd leaders also like Ezzedin Hosseni, Ghassemlou and so on supported it. Derk Kinnane also believes that the irredentism idea was supported by many Kurds nationalist leaders (1994: 134).

5.2.1.1 Race

Two indicators of the Likert scale measure the social distance between Kurds and other Iranian ethnic groups based on race, 'Kurds are among the ancient inhabiting Iran Plateau'. Indicator No. 4 is omitted because of low correlation coefficient (r: 0.134) with other statements (Appendix: No. 2).

The second statement which directly measure the opinion of the common people (No. 8, Appendix No. 2) about the race of them; 'Kurds, Lures and Persians (Farsha) are belonging to one common race' [Aryan].

Table 5.2: Kurds, Lures and have same Race

Item	N	Mean	Std. Error	Variance
Same Race	442	1.86	0.0524	1.215

Source: Appendix No. 3

This table shows that the common Kurd people agreed that the Kurds and other Iranians have same race. Here it is understandable why Minrowsky said, 'it is a great tragedy of Kurds history, why Iranian and the Kurds, which belong to same race, common cultural heritage, feeling social distance and couldn't solve their problem? Nikitine (1987: 404) or Kinnane (1964: 21) has written 'In any event, either by assimilating or displacing the previous inhabitants the heart of

Kurdistan was settled, probably by the seventh century BC by Iranicised tribes. These tribes are the cultural progenitors of the modern Kurds'.

5.2.1.2 History

As it has noted before, national identity formed by many factors, like common race, culture, language, religion geography and history. History is one of the main factors among the others, because history as a melting pot, and historical events, gradually forming nation building in common senses of population of one nation or country. As it has been noted in chapter two some scholars have believed that the role of history is more important than the other factors. May be a group of people have same race, culture, territory, the other factors which formed the nation or worked as platform of establishing one nation, but desire to be together with another group is the main factors (Bitlisi, 1597; Smith, 1976; Yassami, 1984; Tarikhi, 1988; Jalaiepoor, 1993).

In chapter three it was shown that the Kurd as one group of Iranian people have long common history and also historians have written that many Iranian dynasty established by Kurds as one group of Iranian from 2000 years of BC. Empirical evidence also supports that the idea that Kurds have desire of being together with other Iranian as one nation is very strong. The statement No. 5 of Likert scale measures this tendency (Appendix No. 2). The common people of Kurd are showing more tendencies that the Kurds are part of Iranian people.

Table 5.3: Desire of being together

Item	N	Sum	Mean	Std. Error	Variance
Kurds are Iranian	442	624	1.41	0.0285	.356

Source: Appendix No. 3

This table shows most Kurd people believed that they completely agree with this statement. Among the other indicator this feeling is one of the strongest (1.41). About 14 percent (62) of the responses are surprised about this question and stress on the being Iranian. This historical evidence and the feeling of common people and reaction of common people support the idea of the Kurd consciousness and other Iranian groups have one nation.

5.2.1.3 Myths, Legends and Culture

Myths and legends prepare the condition to form a nation. Iran as one of the ancient civilizations in the world like Greek, Egypt, China and India have many myths and legends. Iranian Mythology helps us to understand the soul of Iranian people. Iran's history continues from ancient era up to now and *Shahnameh* as an epic and legendary history of Iranian people was compiled by Ferdowsi about one thousand years ago. All Iranian ethnic groups claim these heroes or heroines for themselves. *Mazanian* believed that *Roostam* (one of the famous mythical heroes of Iran) was born in Mazandarn, Sistanian believed that this hero from East-South of Iran and so on. Nevertheless Ferdowsi has written that *Roostam* was from Sistan but Amir Sharaf Khan Bitlisi has written in his famous book Sharafnamah (1597) that *Roostam, Ghorghin Milad* were Kurds (Bitlisi, 1985: 28-29). The Kurd common people not only believed that *Roostam*

is their legendary hero. About 10 percent also believed that he was a Kurd (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4: *Roostam* was a Kurd.

Item	W. Azerbijan	Kurdistan	Kirmanshah	Total
Roostam is Kurd	12	20	9	41
Respondent	177	160	105	442
Percent	7	12.5	9	9

Eidd Nowrooz (New day) (21st of March) is the ancient Iranian celebration, which starts on the Wednesday (*Chahar Shanbeh Soori*) before *Nowrooz* and continues up to thirteenth day after *Nowrooz* (*Sizdeh-be-Dar*). This *Eidd* (happy day) is common among all Iranian ethnic groups also in ancient Iranian Empire including Iran, Afghanistan Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, North of Iraq, Syria. This *Eidd* is not only celebrated in all parts of Kurdistan (Turkey and Iraq and Syria) but a few Kurds are believe that *Nowrooz* is a special Kurdish *Eidd.*

Table 5.5: Nowrooz is Kurdish Eidd

Item	W. Azerbijan	Kurdistan	Kirmanshah	Total
Nowrooz (Kurdish *Eidd*)	47	32	12	91
Respondents	177	160	105	442
Percent	27	20	11	21

This Table (5.5) shows that one fifth of Kurds believed that *Nowrooz* is only a Kurdish *Eidd.* From north to south 27 percent of Azerbijan Kurds believed to this

idea, in Kurdistan province 20 percent and in Kirmanshah only 11 percent support this idea.

In scale, question numbers 1,3,12,13 measure the cultural distance between Kurds and other Iranians. The Table 5.6 shows that cultural deprivation took place or not.

Table 5.6: Cultural and Myths and legends Similarity

Items	N	Sum	Mean	Std. Error	Variance
1. *Nowrooz*	442	860	1.95	0.0444	0.872
3. Frontiers	442	775	1.75	0.0396	0.694
12. *Fars-ha*	442	655	1.48	0.0419	0.776
13. *Soori*	442	834	1.89	0.0378	0.631
Average	442	781	1.77		

Source: Appendix No.2
Appendix No.3

Table 5.6 shows that cultural deprivation or feeling distance between Kurds and other Iranian groups is very weak. The score 1.77 from 5 is less than we have expected before. This score shows that Kurd as an ethnic group feels more solidarity with other Iranian ethnic groups. The consequences of this table show that legends, myths and culture of Kurds are similar to other part of Iran.

We can conclude that the race, history, culture and myths and legend of Kurd as platform of nationalism are weak and solidarity of Kurd with Iran is strong among common people. The empirical evidence also support the cultural, racial, historical similarity between Kurd and other Iranian.

5.2.1.4 Language

As it has been noted in chapter two, the role of language in ethnic nationalism is quite important. Many scholars' (Riggs, 1991: 446) use the term Ethnolinguistic Differences to stress the role of language is modern primary ethnicity. Others Gellner (Smith, 1983: 148) also emphasize the role of this factor.

There is no doubt that language plays a powerful role in the struggle of the Kurds recognition as a different people from their Arab and Turk neighbours (Kreyenbroek, 1992). Also it has pointed out by many scholars that there are strong ties between Kurdish and Farsi language (Nikitine, 1987; Kreyenbroek, 1992; Khoohi-Kamali, 1992; Golam, 1997; Rezaii, 1997,). And also in final draft of Islamic Constitution of Iran it has been written that local language could be used alongside Farsi as official language of the country (Kreyenbroek, 1992; Chapter 2, Article No. 15, 1993).

Thus there have been no serious attempts to suppress Kurdish language in Iran. Most Farsi-speakers regard Kurdish as no more than one of the many dialects of Persian; indeed some believe that Kurdish, which sounds archaic to them, is a "purer" form of that language. Consequently the Kurdish language as such has seldom been regarded as a challenge to national unity in Iran, and perhaps the Iranian Kurds have been less strongly motivated than their brothers in Iraq to cultivate written Kurdish (Kreyenbroek, 1992).

The statement number seven (Louri and Kurdish are two branches of Persian (Farsi) and nine (Kurdish is purest Persian language (Farsi) and twenty

(There is no differences between reading and writing in Farsi and Kurdish), in the Likert scale are used to measure feeling distance between Farsi and Kurdish among Kurdish speakers. The average of these three indicators shows that the distance score between Farsi and Kurdish is about 3 from 5 (2.98). The comparison between language and other factors shows that, this score is about two times more than those of Race, Culture, Myths and history scores. Table 5.7 shows it

Table 5.7: Kurdish-Farsi Distance Score

Items	N	Sum	Mean	Std. Error	Variance
20	442	1394	3.15	0.0590	1.541
9	442	1414	3.20	0.0625	1.724
7	442	1149	2.60	0.0591	1.542
Average	442	1319	2.98		

Source: Appendix No. 2
         Appendix No. 3

These consequence shows that language is one of the main factors among the other which common use as identification factor. We conclude that in cultural deprivation only in language differentiation the Kurd common people feel distance between Farsi and Kurdish.

5.2.2 Political Deprivation

Many scholars believe that political marginalisation is one of the main factors that may causes nationalist tendency among minority groups. Many decision-makers of Islamic Revolution in Kurdistan felt that for many decades Kurd leaders and also Ghajar and Pahlavi dynasties from the nineteenth to

twentieth centuries; especially by Reza Shah and his son excluded people in their territory.

Nevertheless, Kurd common people attended all presidential and parliament election during last two decades; and many Kurds joined central government forces and also participated in campaigns against nationalist, communist group and parties in Kurdistan. They supported central government, but deprivation during a period of history by the Iranian Central Government generated a feeling of marginalisation.

The indicator number ten (The government employees in Kurdistan should be Kurds) and question number eleven (only Kurds should try for prosperity and development of Kurdistan) (Appendix No. 2) in the scale were used for measuring political marginalization among common Kurds (score 5 for strong agreement).

Table 5.8: Political Marginalize in Kurdistan

Items	N	Sum	Mean	Std. Error	Variance
10	442	1379	3.12	0.062	1.698
11	442	1547	3.50	0.0618	1.688
Average	442	1463	3.31	-	-

Source: Appendix No. 2
        Appendix No. 3

This tables (5.8) shows that political deprivation among the common people is higher than cultural deprivation. Political deprivation score is 3.31 from 5 and it is the highest score.

5.2.3 Economic Deprivation

In spite of affirmative action policy, which was followed during the last two decades to reduce inequality in Kurdistan and other less developed regions in Iran. Yet we have seen in Chapter 3 that economic disparities persist (See chapter 3 Socio-economic profile).

Empirical evidence also supports that economic deprivation took place in Kurdistan area. Indicators number two (Industrial sector in Kurdistan has grown less than the other under developed regions in Iran) and fourteen (The deprived people of Kurdistan are the same as other deprived people of Iran) (Appendix No. 2) used for measuring deprivation feeling among Kurds.

Table 5.9: Economic Deprivations

Items	N	Sum	Mean	Std. Error	Variance
2	442	1758	3.98	0.0510	1.151
14	442	1408	3.19	0.0626	1.734
Average	442	1583	3.59	-	-

Source: Appendix No. 2
Appendix No. 3

Table 5.9 shows that economic deprivation earn 3.59 score from 5. It is the highest score that common people agree on. Kurd people believe that Kurdistan is the poorest area among other deprived regions in Iran.

This economic deprivation may be due to two reasons;

a)   The private economic investment did not take place because of insecurity and continuation of crises.

b)   Discrimination policy of Pahlavi dynasty (1921-1979) had a deep effect on Kurdistan for about half of century. They supported feudalism in Kurdistan.

Nevertheless, Ghassemlou (1982: 127) has written that, 'Although Kurdistan of Iran is still one of the most under developed parts of Iran, it is the most developed part of all Kurdistan'.

5.2.4 Religious Deprivation

There is no doubt that different religion is one of the bases for arising nationalism among ethnic groups. (Riggs, 1991). He was also pointed out that in pre-modern societies, religious differentiation played more important role than language (Riggs: 1991).

As it has been noted in chapter three, from the seventh century BC Kurds like others Iranian ethnic groups were the followers of Zoroaster; and even after advent of Islam (AD 630) the ancient Iranian religion continues in Kurdistan in form of *Ezadi* or *Yazidi* and a few Zorostarian. Nevertheless majority of Kurds like other Iranians converted to Islam. Majority of Iranian Kurds are Shias (53 percent) and the other Kurds follow *Shafai'i* school of Islam (Sunnis) (46 percent), *Naghshehadi* and *Ghaderi* as two branches of Sufi Mysticism, which have more followers among Sunnis than among others.

From ancient era (26 centuries ago) the religion of all Iranian ethnic groups has been common.

We have seen earlier that ethnic nationalism is such strong (46.09) in Sunni majority northern parts of Kurd area and weak in Shia (41.95) pre-

dominant southern area. Over 90 percent of Iranians a Shia and they dominate all aspects of society.

Table 5.10: Religious Deprivation

Items	N	Sum	Mean	Std. Error	Variance
17	442	715	1.62	0.0420	.781
23	442	691	1.56	0.0462	.945
Average	442	703	1.59	-	-

Source: Appendix No. 2
　　　　　　Appendix No. 3

In table 5.10, the indicators number 17 and 23 in Likert scales are used for measuring religious identity (Appendix No. 2). We asked the respondent to introduce himself by Kurdish identity or religious identity. As the mean of this table shows (1.59), Kurdish identity is weaker against Islamic identity. The score of Kurdish identity in this table supported the idea of Nikitine and others that believed religious identity are priority with national identity in Islamic World. Nationalism as secular movement has weaker base among common people of Kurds in Iran.

Empirical evidence shows that common people feel deprivation in economic field. The economic deprivation obtains one of the highest score (3.59 from 5) among other factors. After this, political deprivation gets second rank by obtains 3.31 score from 5, political and economic deprivation feeling; as it has been noted before classified as external factors.

Among, race, history, religion, myths and culture, language, which distinguish one ethnic group from the others, only language obtain high score (2.98), which is a little more than the average of nationalist tendency (2.38) in

whole. The lowest score obtained by feeling same history (1.41), the religious deprivation (1.59), Mythology and Culture got third rank (1.77) and race by 1.86 score is the other factors, which common Kurds people show their feeling with other Iranian ethnic group. Consequently, Deprivation Theory shows its ability to cover part of Kurdish nationalism or ethnicity in Iran. Nevertheless this tendency is weaker than that we expected before. These evidences also supported the deprivation theory.

5.3   Diffusionist Theory and Kurdish Nationalism

This theory has been explained in chapter two, nation and nation building is one of the productions of Industrial Revolution, which took place for the first time in West Europe. Nationalism as an ideology has heart-center in Europe and diffused to East Europe at first, Asia, Africa, Middle East and Latin America in the next steps. As it has noted before, local intellectuals of each region have a key role in the process of imitating this ideology and transmitting to their homeland.

The diffusion of nationalism to Kurdistan besides the role of intelligentsia depends on many other factors; like the process of breakdown of Ottoman Empire, the national interest of super power and their role in Kurdistan area and finally the Geopolitics of Kurdistan have a especial role in the field.

5.3.1 Historical Events

The process of breakdown of Ottoman Empire, First and Second World Wars, were three historical events, which catalyzed the process of diffusion of nationalism in Middle East and especially in Kurdistan.

Ottoman Empire (1299-1924): This Islamic Empire was the last resistance against colonialization policy of western countries and also threatened them in the heartland of Europe (Balkan) by many wars, which took place between Ottoman, and western industrialized countries after Renaissance.

The powerful Empire also ruled a vast area from South Europe, North Africa, Middle East including all Arab countries, which were rich in raw materials, which are essential for the new western industrial countries. By existence of this Empire, western countries were faced with many problems at all levels. This powerful force at first was a military threat for independent new nation, the land roads to East like India and Asia were controlled Bosfor and Dardanel straits, colonialization of the vast area of Ottoman territory was not possible. The western countries didn't have any military solution for this problem. External factors didn't lead to breakdown of the Empire. Safavid Empire was the only barricade in the way of this powerful Empire in East. Long warfare between these two Islamic Emperors had more benefit for industrial countries. During the Ottoman Empire, religion was the main factor of identification and division. Kurds, Arabs, Turks were grouped together in 'the house of Islam'. (Kirisci, Kemal and et al., 1997).

Ottoman in last century of its life changed its policy against ethnic groups, which were ruled by this Empire. They preferred Turks and discriminated against other ethnic groups like Arabs, Kurds and so on. This wrong policy prepared best situation for arousing nationalism in the area. Nationalism as powerful idea little by little penetrates to Middle East. Arabs, Kurds, Turks' intelligentsia imitated

this new ideology from West European countries. (Rezaii, 1997; Sheikh Attar, 1997; Afrooz, 1997). Western countries, strong nationalist movement and First World War combined with each other and Ottoman Empires broke down. Turk nationalists finally established new Turkey on the ruins of Ottoman Empire.

Arabs, Turks, Serb, and others established independent states on the ruins of this empire but Kurds as one of the biggest ethnic groups, who were ruled by Ottomans, were distributed between three new states, Turkey, Iraq and Syria. The Kurds supported Ottoman Islamic Empire up to the end days of its life. But finally this ethnic group that was separated from motherland (Iran) four centuries ago, found themselves alone and felt that they have no friends but mountains.

When the Turk nationalists ignored the Kurd identity and named them as 'Mountains Turks' and Arab nationalists used the assimilation policy against them in Iraq, Kurds were compelled to stress on their race, language and revolted against Turks and Arabs. At first these rebellions were led by Tribal chiefs or charismatic religious leaders (Kirisci, 1997), and going on by nationalist or communist parties up to now. The Second World War caused that Kurdish nationalism penetrated to Iranian Kurdistan, which was explained in chapter four.

5.3.2 Super Powers and Kurdish Nationalism

From the last decades of nineteenth century and last century of the Ottoman life, the role of western countries in the Kurdistan territory increased by supporting nationalist movements in the part of Middle East. They supported all nationalists who fight against Ottomans. Kurd leaders supported Ottoman government as Islamic Power but when this Empire brokedown and Arab and

Turk nationalists finally ignored the rights of Kurds to have own state. The divided Kurds fight against Iraq and his allies Britain, and also young extremist Turk nationalists in new country Turkey. By the end of First World War, USSR as new super-power plays its game in Kurdistan territory. As it was noted USSR established headquarter of spies' network in Mahabad in 1920's and 1930's. After that during the Second World War, the role of USSR increased in Kurdistan by supporting or establishing KDP in Iran, Iraq territory and in 1940's their attempt for established satellite states in Mahabad and Tabriz was not successful. The role of USSR of supporting Kurdish nationalist accompanies many problems for this country because they adhered to Marxist ideology, which contradicted nationalist ideology. The splits of KDP from 1940's were a reflection of this contradiction.

From 1960's as Baath regimme took power in Baghdad as new allies of Russia. The other super power was supporting Kurdish nationalists to destabilize the Baath government of Baghdad. From 1960's up to 1980's Iran as gendarmes of Persian Gulf on behalf of America supported Barzani movement in Iraq. Consequently, supporting Kurdish nationalist movement by Super Power and local government this movement was used as tool for their national interests.

This idea is not only supported by many Iranian scholars and leaders (Chamrran, 1985; Sheikh Attar, 1997; Afrooz, 1997, Marandi, 1997: Tarikhi, 1997; Najafy, 1997; Rezaii, 1997; Shahbazi, 1997) but also by the ex-leaders of KDPI that believed if the super power supported Kurdish movement it shows that radical changes took place in that country (Ghassemlou, 1985: 6 Trans.).

International support of Kurdish movement in Iran approved Ghassemlou's idea. We add also that super powers worked as catalyzers of nationalism in the region.

5.3.3 Geopolitics of Kurdistan and Kurdish Nationalism

The Kurdish territory (Iran, Iraq and Turkey) is a mountainous area, and many parts of it are covered by jungle. This natural climate prepared a suitable situation for tribal and nomadic and semi-nomadic styles of life. The density of mountains in Iran, Iraq and Turkey's Kurdistan more than Syrian Kurdistan. The density of the mountains also increases near the borders of Iran, Iraq and Turkey; as the highest peak, Ararat *(Agree Dagh)* is located in this area. The political boundaries of these three countries are not coinciding with ethnic boundary. Arabs and Turks surround the Kurds as an ethnic group on three sides. The language, race, culture history of Kurds is different from Arabs (language is Arabic, race is semantic, the culture and history are same with tribal Arabs who lives on desert) and Turks (language is not Indo-Iranian, tribal who immigrated from Central Asia to this region, race and history and culture are completely different). This isolation led the Kurds to self-recognition or consciousness that drew their ethnic boundary with Arabs and Turks (Giles, Howard, 1977).

This social isolation, mountainous area, and the society prepared a suitable platform for growth of ethnicity or nationalism. Political boundary also have another function on Kurd Society; these artificial boundaries between these three countries divided many tribes into two or three parts, one part in each country for example, Harki Tribes have two part, one is Iran and other in Iraq and so on. Tribal relation is stronger than political boundary; In spite of political

boundary, communication between two parts of one tribe continuing for more than four or five century, the density of the mountain also made it easy.

Artificial political boundary, mountainous area and nomad structure of the society led the Kurdish nationalist movement to irredentism one. This irredentism movement contains two subtypes: the attempt to detach land and people from one or two state in order to incorporate them in homeland (this type have many follower among Iranian Kurds intellectuals like Mohammad Ghazi, Ibrahim Younesi, and so on); or and attempt to detach land and people divided among more than one state, in order to incorporated them in a single new state (Horowitz, Donald L. 1992: 119). (PKK, Komala may be an example for this type).

The other side of Kurds is homeland (Iran). As the irredentism identity formed in Iraq and Turkey near the Iranian Kurds, naturally this new identity diffused to other side. Not only the majority of Iranian Scholars believed in this theory (Najafy, 1997; Rezaii, 1997; Marandi, 1997; Tarikhi, 1988, 1997; Sheikh Attar, 1997) but they also believed that inside Iran also those Kurds who have Iranian Azaris, as neighbours show more nationalist tendency than other Kurds of Iran (Tarikhi, 1988, 1997; Saadat, 1997). As the demands of the Kurds of W. Azerbijan is only release from Azaris governor or in charge in this province. The empirical evidence also supports this idea. W. Azerbijan, which includes Kurds and Azaris obtains 47.02 score from 95 among the other provinces (Kurdistan 45.12 and Kirmanshah 41.96 from 95).

At the level of cities also these differences are visible. Mahabad and Bukan, which are located at Azaris neighbours in W. Azerbijan obtain 48.4 and 47.59 mean scores (Sanandaj 46.38, Kamyaran 45.19, Kirmanshah 42.52). This differentiation is also visible at the level of rural areas. The mean scores of Uromia rural area is 44.97, mean scores of rural area of Bukan 44.33 which located in W. Azerbijan, Kurdistan rural area mean score is 40.19 and Kirmanshah 41.41.

Besides the deprivation factors, which have effect on Iranian Kurdish nationalism or ethnicity, many historical events like breakdown of Ottoman Empire and international historical events like First and Second World Wars combine with role of Super Power as external factors, also have special effects on Iranian Kurdistan. Ethnic boundary of Kurds with Arabs and Turks in Iraq, Syria and Turkey not only catalyzed the nationalism into Iranian Kurdistan but also geography and isolated mountainous area of Kurdistan increased this tendency in W. Azerbijan province along with other factors.

5.4 Gellner Theory and Kurdish Nationalism

The main claim of this theory is that nationalism is prior to nation or nationalism is not the product or consequence of nation. Nation is formed by nationalism as collective action of a group.

The other key word of this theory is that this collective action takes place in special period of time, which was named as "age of nationalism". As explained in chapter two, he is also noted that this collective action may take place in tribal society like Kurdistan.

The role of intelligentsia or intellectuals is important because this group or not only organize the followers of the idea but also guided this movement up to formation of a nation and state.

Anthony D. Smith (1976, 1983) also supports the Gellner theory by its stress on the role of intelligentsia in nationalist movement.

A short review on the Kurdish nationalist movement during the last two centuries in chapter four, makes it clear that majority of Kurd leaders were clergies and sometimes belonging to the Sufi orders of *Naghshbandi* or *Ghaderi*.

Daravesh orders formal clergies of religion and feudal lord plus chiefs of tribes provided prestige and charisma to leaders.

'All Kurdish nationalist leaders belong to religious or Sufi order (Saleh 1994: 240-241, Kinnane, 1964: 24 Hossaini, Ezzidin interview with Med. T.V. PKK satellite Programme quoted in Tarikhi, 1997).

By establishing *Hiwa* and Komala in late 1930's and KDP in 1940's in Iran and in Iraq gradually traditional orders of the Kurdish organization changed with party organization. Nevertheless these spiritual leaders were nominated as leaders of the parties. Mullah Mustafa Barzai as chieftain of Barzani Tribes was elected KDP leader. Ghazi Mohammad as religious judge of Mahabad was chosen as Kurdistan Democratic Party leader. And also the chiefs of tribes or nobleman occupied other key position of the leadership of these new parities. Many Iranian scholars also approve the role of KDPI in expansion of nationalist tendency among common Kurds people in Iranian Kurdistan (Jalaiepoor, 1993;

Rezaii, 1997; Sheikh Attar, 1997; Marandi, 1997; Afrooz, 1997; Najafy, 1997; Tarikhi, 1997).

The expansion of reading and writing of Kurdish language and translated many books on Kurd history, language literature from Farsi, English, French, Germany, Arabic, were another function of Kurd intellectuals (Tarikhi, 1997).

Empirical evidence also supports this view that charismatic religious leaders, parties and intellectuals as organizer of nationalist movement have strong effect on Kurdish nationalist, which organized fifty thousand militants (Najafy, 1997) in 1980, in Iranian Kurdistan and attended full-scale war with central government in Iran and highest mean score of nationalist tendency in Mahabad along with other factors as headquarter and birth place of the party (48.40 from 95) shows the role of KDPI in Iranian Kurdistan. Cultural and historical effect of this party remains in Kurdistan.

5.5 Tribes and Kurdish Nationalism

Tribal structure of Kurds society is based on nomadic and semi-nomadic life styles. Suitable meadows and pastures make animal husbandry a dominant economic activity. Continuous feuds, both between and within between with rural agrarian population, led to Kurds taking to arms. Seasonal migration and continuous conflict gave rise to strong leaders to maintain order among these tribes. The Chieftains organized an order like a government on small scale.

Over a period of time, they formed a self-sufficient and self-supporting community. This independent community little by little formed a special identity among their tribesmen like a national identity among civilian of a nation.

According to the Kahn's famous typology, there are two forms of nationalism one political and rational, which appeared in western countries, the other cultural and mystical, and its emergence of depends on the level of development of the community (Kahn, 1946, quoted in Hutchinson, John, 1992). The second kind appeared in eastern society with agrarian peasant or tribal societies. The cultural nationalism led by historians, poets, who operated as educational forces (intellectuals). This kind of nationalism may furnish a matrix for political nationalism.

A short review of the history of Kurdish nationalism in Iran from Simko rebellion to Mahabad Republic and also after Islamic Revolution of 1979 shows that tribes and their chieftains were the backbone of all Kurdish rebellions in Iran.

As it has noted in chapter four, 60 percent of KDPI militants (6 *Hiz* from 10) belonging to *Malband Shomal* (W. Azerbijan) felt, that the tribal structure in this province was more strong than in other parts of Kurdistan.

Besides the highest score of W. Azerbijan nationalist tendency (mean: 47.02) among other Kurdish provinces (mean of Kurdistan score 45.12, Kirmanshah mean score is 41.96) shows that tribal structure in the area should be considered as a major factor.

Although about half of the respondents (50.5 percent) claimed that they have tribal bases but the statistical relationship between nationalism and nomad isn't significant for Kurdistan as a whole. It is applicable only to W. Azerbijan, where the tribal structure is stronger than in other parts.

5.6   Statistical Analysis

In this part we will try to analysis the role of some factors that were assumed to have significant role in Kurdish nationalism. We expected age, education, and occupation at the level of individuals, nomadism, religion, province and urbanization at the level of groups to have significance. At first we analyse above factors one by one then the share of each factors will be shown by Multiple-Regression analyses.

5.6.1 Age and Kurdish Nationalism

At first we classified the age of respondents into 10 categories, with a class interval of five years. The distribution of mean scores show that as the age of respondents increases the nationalist tendency decreases. Group one (15-19) achieved nationalist tendency mean scores 45.95 (N= 20). Second group (20-24) achieved 47.61 scores (N= 56), third group with 84 respondents achieved 47.25 scores.

The forth, fifth and sixth groups scores decrease as 44.98, 44.95, 45.24. Only the seventh group (46.40) with 30 numbers achieved the nationalist tendency scores like the groups 1-3, which should be noticed later on.

The nationalist tendency scores of other groups (eight, ninth and tenth) again decrease up to 41.03.

Later instead of five years intervals we chose fifteen years for better analysis the role of age in Kurdish Nationalism, the table 5.11 shows it.

Table 5.11: Age and Nationalism

Age → Nationalism Scores ↓	15-29	30-44	45-59	60-74	75+	Total
19-37	14	21	17	14	4	70
38-56	130	109	58	34	11	342
57-75	15	8	4	1	0	28
76-95	1	0	1	0	0	2
Total	160	138	80	49	15	442

Source: Appendix No. 3   Chi-Square $=20.897$ (df $=12$) $p \leq 0.5$

$F_{4,437} =4.475$ $P \leq .01$

Both the Chi-Square and F tests are significant.

Now it is possible to understand why as the age increase, the nationalism scores decreased. The Kurdish nationalist movement was active, after 1979 for the younger generation. But the people between 30 to 45, belong to the era when the movement have not very active.

The Kurds between 45 to 50 years old are may have been affected or may remember the Mahabad Republic activity in 1940's in Kurdistan or 1968 guerrilla activity in this region.

5.6.2 Education and Kurdish Nationalism

The education in Iran like in many countries is classified in five rangs, Illiterate is the rank of people who can't read and write. The second level is those who have studied up to 'primary school' (1-5). The third level includes people who study in 'guided schools' or have finished it (6-8). The students who are studying in High School or finished it is classified as forth level (9—12). The

final level includes the people who got university degrees (BA, MA or Ph.D.) (12^+).

The relations of the means of nationalism score with education, shows that the lowest score are obtained by the Illiterate people (41.92) and the highest scores for nationalism by those who have university education and degree (48.66). The following Table shows the distribution of nationalism with education.

Table 5.12: Education and Nationalism

Education → Nationalism Score ↓	1-5	6-8	9-12	12^+	Illiterate	Total
19-37	22	9	11	6	22	70
38-56	84	52	103	42	61	342
57-75	2	7	6	12	1	28
76-95	0	1	0	1	0	2
Total	108	69	120	61	84	442

Source: Appendix No. 3   Cho-Square = 44.960 (df = 12) $p \leq .01$

$F_{4,437} = 7.920$ $p \leq .01$

Both the Chi-Square and F tests are significant.

5.6.3 Occupation and Kurdish Nationalism

The occupation of 442 respondents was classified into five major categories that are common in Kurdistan. (1) Farming and (2) animal husbandry are two categories, which covered most of the population in rural areas and semi-nomad herders in Kurdistan. (3) Official employment included all jobs like teacher, government official etc that received salaries from government. (4) The fourth important jobs, which many people in Kurdistan are engaged in, are

private profession like shopkeeping, frontier business and private job. (5) The last category is "other", which included unemployed, student, and other who did not declare their job to interviewers.

A glance at table 5.13 the result shows that mean score of 'others' which includes students etc. (46.73) and private profession (46.20) are the highest and the mean of nationalist tendency of farmers (42.63) and those engaged in animal husbandry (41.08) are the lowest.

Table 5.13: Occupation and Nationalism

Occupation→ Nationalism Scores ↓	Farmer	Animal Husbandry	Official	Private	Others	Total
19-37	21	4	15	23	7	70
38-56	71	9	69	144	49	342
57-75	2	0	7	15	4	28
76-95	0	0	0	2	0	2
Total	94	13	91	184	60	442

Source: Appendix No. 3 Chi-Square = 14.149 (df =12) $p \leq .29$

$F_{4,437} = 2.999$ $p \leq .02$

Chi-Square and F test are not significant in level of 1percent.

5.6.4 Nomadic Life and Kurdish Nationalism

As it has been noted before, Kurdistan with its valleys and steams, rivers, from ancient have best situation for nomad and semi-nomad style of life. From north of this territory into south, these bases become weaker.

One of the hypotheses of this research is it that nationalism among tribes is more than the agrarian and rural society. The following table shows the distribution of respondents with nationalist tendency.

Table 5.14: Nomad and Nationalism

Nomad Status→ Nationalism Scores ↓	Nomad	Non-nomad	Total
19-37	36	34	70
38-56	168	174	342
57-75	13	15	28
76-95	2	0	2
Total	219	223	442

Source: (Appendix No. 3) Chi-Square = 2.269 (df= 3) $p \leq .51$
$T_{1,440} = -.034$ $p \leq .973$

This table shows about half of the respondents believed that they don't have any nomad basis.

The mean of this two group have not show many difference (mean of non-nomad is 44.93 the others are 45.33). Chi-Square (2.269) shows that the effect of nomad on Kurdish nationalism is not significant.

5.6.5 Urban-Rural Residence and Kurdish Nationalism

Another factor, which may have effect on Kurdish nationalism, is the residence of people. Many scholars believe that nationalism is an urban movement, or some believed that the backbones of much nationalist movement were formed by educated urban intellectuals (chapter 2). As it is clear in the table 5.15, the means of urban Kurds nationalist tendency distinguishably different and also more than rural Kurd's nationalist tendency.

Table 5.15: The means of Urban-Rural Nationalism Score

Urban area	Mahabad	Bukan	Sanandaj	Kamyaran	Kirmanshah
N	62	63	77	63	48
Mean	48.40	47.59	46.38	45.19	42.52

Rural area	Uromia	Mahabad	Sanandaj	Kirmanshah
N	34	18	21	56
Mean	44.97	44.33	40.19	41.41

Source: Appendix No. 3

The trend of decreasing the mean scores as we move from north into south (both urban and rural areas) and also between urban and rural area, is evident.

The following table (5.16) shows the distribution of nationalist score according to Urban-Rural residents.

Table 5.16: Urban-Rural Residence and Nationalism Scores

District→ Nationalism Scores ↓	Urban	Rural	Total
19-37	38 (13%)	32 (22%)	70 (41%)
38-56	233 (78%)	109 (76%)	342 (77%)
57-75	25(8%)	3(2%)	28 (6%)
76-95	2(1%)	0	2(.5%)
Total	298 (100%)	144(100%)	442

Source: Appendix No. 3   Chi-Square=12.637 (df = 3) p≤ .01
$T_{1,440}$ =3.540   p≤ .01

This strong relationship between nationalism and residence shows that:

a)   The educated are mainly urban based and also have access to mass media making communication easier; feeling of relative deprivation are visible and shared;

b)   The role of urban intellectuals and propaganda of KDPI and communist parties (like Komala, *Fedaiian Khalgh*), which found in cities than in rural area, and much of publicity, takes place in cities (except militant activity) than villages;

c)   It supports the Gellner's notion that nation building is formed more in urban area than in rural. The lowest Kurdish nationalist tendency in rural area (40.19) also supports the idea that bases of communist party are urban. We will explore the role of this factor when we use multi-regression for all factors.

5.6.6 Province and Kurdish Nationalism

The province lived in will have effect on nationalism as the topography, history and politics differ in each. The means of nationalist scores are different from one province to others. West Azerbijan with mean score 47.02 achieved highest score, Kurdistan with 45.12 is on second rank, Kirmanshah with 41.96 achieved the lowest score among the Kurdish province.

Table 5.17 shows the distribution of nationalism scores among these three provinces.

Table 5.17: Province and Nationalism

Province→ Nationalism Scores ↓	W. Azerbijan	Kurdistan	Kirmanshah	Total
19-37	18	23	29	70
38-56	141	128	73	342
57-75	18	7	3	28
76-95	0	2	0	2
Total	177	160	105	442
Mean	47.02	45.12	41.96	45.13
Std. Deviation	7.65	7.64	6.79	7.69

Source: Appendix No. 3   Chi-Square = 24.716 (df = 6) $p \leq .01$

$F_{2,439} = 9.057$ $p \leq .01$

West Azerbijan has the highest score. As seen earlier the northern province has historically seen most conflicts and are a minority (60% Azeris) in their own territory. Politically it has always been in the thick of things.

The southern province of Kirmanshah has lowest score. This is a Shia dominated area and closest to Iranian govt. influence.

The mean score of Shias (41.95) is distinctly less than Sunni Kurds (46.09) nationalist tendency.

The following Table (5.18) presents the distribution of Religion and nationalist tendency.

Table 5.18: Religion and Kurdish Nationalism

Religion→ Nationalism Scores ↓	Sunni	Shia	Total
19-37	43	27	70
38-56	270	72	342
57-75	25	3	28
76-95	2	0	2
Total	340	102	442
Mean	46.09	41.95	45.13
Std. Deviation	7.72	6.71	7.69

Source: Appendix No. 3   Chi-Square =13.267 (df=3) $p \leq .01$
$F_{1,440}=13.038$ $p \leq .01$

5.6.7 Final Point

We have tested age, education, urbanization, occupation, nomadism, province and religion with Kurdish nationalism one by one. Some of them have significant effect on Kurdish nationalism some of them not. But nationalism as a social factor, in real society, is not affected by these factors separately. This

tendency is affected by all factors simultaneously. A real analysis should explore and test all factors at same time.

Statistical technique of Multi-Regression can do this, and also could separate share of each factor and distinguish it for us among others. By entering all seven factors, 'F' test (13.896) shows that all seven factors operating with each other significantly effect nationalism. Correlation coefficient R^2 of all these factors explains only 9.6% percent of Kurdish nationalism variance.

In the other hand 90.4% of Kurdish nationalism variance should be explain with other factors.

The following table (5.19) shows the share of each factor, which explain the variance of Kurdish nationalism.

Table 5.19: Important Factors and Nationalism

Items	R	R Square	Percent
Age	.194	.038	3.8
Age, Province	.273	.074	4.7
Age, Province, Urban-Rural	.310	.096	9.6

Source: Appendix No. 3

Religion, Education, Occupation and nomad only explain 0.4% of variance of nationalism.

This method (Multi-Regression) pointed out that only three factors (Age, Province and Urban-Rural) explain the variance of nationalism. The four other factors are weak.

Both statistical analysis and comprehensive-explanation of the political, cultural, historical and cultural phenomenon of ethnic nationalism give us a holistic picture. Perhaps the later has been more productive than the former.

Chapter 6

Summary of Findings and Conclusions

6.1 Summary

To begin with we examined the geographical terrain of Kurdistan and found that it is a mountainous and relatively isolated region. Aryan is the back ground of all Iranians, Kurd or Iranians who, it is believed immigrated from Central Asia or from around the Caspian Sea to Iran plateau from 1500-500 BC. In the second chapter we examined the concepts, related to the study i.e. ethnicity nation, nationalism, social movement and so on; paying special attention to nationalism. After a detailed discussion of various theories of nationalism it was found that Deprivation, Diffusion and Gellener's Theory are particularly relevant for our work.

On review of Kurdish ethnic nationalist movement in Iran, we noted that the establishment of the Republic of Mahabad (1946) was a watershed.

Some of the major questions, which were to be examined, were: did the Kurds developed ethnic nationalism, despite similarity of language and common Aryan origins with other Iranians? Which historical and social structural factors were responsible? What was the role of nationalist parties and religion? And finally, what were the linkages with the Arab and Turkish neighbours?

Comprehensive-explanation (Weberian Method) it was felt will be suitable for exploring Kurdish ethnicity or nationalism. To understand the present perceptions and activities of Kurd people a random sample of 442 respondents drawn from 5 cities and 9 villages of Kurd territory, was studied with the help of an Interview-Schedule. One of the major objectives was assess the ethnic nationalist orientation.

For this purpose we prepared Likert type Scale, separate Interview Schedules were prepared for data collection from Kurd leaders and Central Government official. Secondary sources such as address, speeches, books, newspapers were also used.

Theoretical perspectives are discussed in four sections (Chapter 2). The first part of this chapter includes definitions of concepts. After examining a number of definitions, the one most comprehensives were chosen. Sometimes a modified version was prepared; for example, ethnic group: as a human group of common fictive or real ancestry and historical memories, shared culture and territorial association for a long period of history and sentiments of solidarity with cultural markers such as language, religion in multi-ethnic society, has been modified. Ethnicity, primary and secondary ethnicity, nation, nationalism, nation-state, language and religion are other concepts, which were explained in this section. Historical and sociological taxonomies were also examined.

Political structure, political context, urbanization were the main issues in emergence of nationalism. The role of intellectuals or intelligentsia was

explained as the last factor. It was seen as important for arising nationalism as collective action of the ethnic group on a large scale in a region or territory.

Without history of nationalism as one production of industrial revolution, this section is not complete. In history of nationalism, it has been explained, shows this movement appeared in heartland (west Europe) in 18th and 19th centuries and how, it spread all over the world after less than two centuries, and changed the political map of the new world.

In section three of this chapter, the key concepts for building a nation like myths, language, religion, elite, etc, have been explained.

Last section of theoretical perspective includes the main theories of nationalism.

In this part, seven important theories of nationalism were explored. Three theories (ecological, competition and interest) have been classified under-competition and it was explained why these theories are not suitable for Kurdish ethnicity or nationalist tendency.

Modernization and reactive theories are the fourth and fifth, which have efficiency to analyze nationalism as reactive against colonial power.

Gellner's Theory (nationalism make nation), deprivation, and diffusion were found as efficient theories, for ethnic or nationalism among Iranian Kurds.

Nationalism as an ideology diffused to Iranian Kurds territory between two World Wars as an outcome of Ottoman Empire's breakdown. The policies of Ghajar and Pahlavi dynasties also prepared the platform for this diffusion. The Kurd's charismatic leaders (19th Century) and nationalist political party after

Second World War, skillful used these situations to arouse Kurd nationalism.

Chapters 3 include two main parts; a historical review of Kurd's and Kurdistan and a socio-economic profile.

Some scholars believed that "Kurd" is the present name of ancient tribes like *Kurdu, Qor*du.

Others believe that, Iranians use *Gurd* for brave hero in Farsi. It was applied to all Iranians who fought against Muslim Army in 630's AD. Historical events also support this assumption about origin of 'Kurd'.

The ancestors of all Iranian ethnic groups are the tribal, who emigrated to Iranian Plateau from Central Asia or north of Caspian Sea from 4000 BC up to 1000 BC, which are famous as *"Asiatic"* at first and *"Aryan"* as second wave of emigration.

These emigrants mixed with indigenous population and formed the Iranian ethnic background.

The main historical event, which has more influence on Kurd's life was the clash between Ottoman and Safavid Empires for more than two and a half centuries.

After Chaldiran War (1514 AD) for the first time about two thirds of Kurd territory was separated from motherland (Iran) and was ruled by non-Iranian government (Ottomans).

The second historical disaster in Kurd's life took place by breakdown of Ottoman Empire (1920's). In this event again the Kurdistan territory, which was ruled by Ottomans, was distributed into three countries, part of them were

annexed to Iraq, Turkey and Syria as three new countries under mandate of England, France and extremist Turk nationalists.

Majority of Iraq and Syrian population was Arabs and also about 70 percent of Turkey population are Turks, who have nothing in common with Kurds racially, linguistically, culturally and so on.

In second section (a socio-economic profile), the geography of Kurdistan according to the historian approach, nationalist approach and also according to the official administration of Iranian Government was seen.

The classification of Kurd's according to the tribes and language shows five major groups (*Kurmandj, Lurs, Kalhoor, Guran* and *Lakh*).

The number of Kurd's population in Iran is as equivocal as the boundary of Kurd with other Iranian ethnic groups.

In one point of view, the population of Kurd's is equal to Iranian population as whole.

The estimate of Kurd's population according to historical definition is about half of Iranian population.

According to the nationalist classification, which are accepting only four provinces as Kurdish territory, this population is about 4.5 millions.

According to the extremist nationalist classification, which depends on "Kurdish nationalist tendency" only about 2 million Kurds are inhabitant in Iran. About 53 percent *Shias* 47 percent are *Sunnies*.

In the last part of this section, education, higher education, industrial, cultural facilities, and several economic factors like agriculture, Cultural Budget,

health facilities, occupation on different economic sectors (agriculture, industrial, services) have chosen and compared these four province with the country (Iran) to show the differentiation and prepare a platform to examine the theories on Kurdish nationalism.

The history of Kurdish movement was been classified in four periods; before First World War, from 1918 up to 1947 (after Second World War). After collapse of Mahabad Republic up to Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) and the last two decades (1979-1997).

At the beginning of the Chapter (4), we review contributory factors, which have effect on this movement like geography, structure of the society, and the role of superpowers.

During the first period, the rebellion of Sheikh Ubaidolloh Shamzine (1880s) and Simko (1914-1922) were the earliest attempts of Kurdish nationalists.

The rebellion of Shamzine also took place in Kurdistan territory, which was ruled by Ottoman Empire.

It is not deniable that first major Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran in the modern sense appeared during the invasion of Iranian Kurdistan and Azerbijan by Red Army of USSR. Although, the harsh line policy of Reza Shah, and the characteristics of Kurd society, prepared a platform for this movement, but the role of *Hiwa* and USSR is more important than the other factors. Komala party, however, was established before invasion of Iran by USSR and Britain but

the Russians helped this movement to expand in order to increase its sphere of influence.

Not only did Russians disarm the Iranian army in Azerbijan and Kurdistan (W. Azerbijan), but also supported the chieftains of tribes and nationalist organizations by barricading the Iranian authority in the region.

Ghazi Mohammad as leader of KDPI on January 22, 1946 declared the first Kurdish People's Government and raised the Kurdish flag instead of Iranian flag.

Mahabad Republic couldn't last more than eleven months under the influence of Soviet Union on small area of Mahabad and countryside. The main cities like Saqqiz, Sanandaj, Kirmanshah remained under the control of Central Government of Iran.

This independent Republic collapsed as the Soviet troops evacuated Iran.

After the collapse of Mahabad Republic in 1947 up to 1979, The Kurd' activist didn't have any visible movement. Only in 1967-68 a partisan campaign was set up on triangle of Mahabad-Baneh-Piranshahr by a small groups of KDPI, members, which split from the party.

In this part of the Chapter 4, the organization, history and the policy of Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala (Communist Party), and the other groups was explained briefly.

KDPI as an oldest and also more active nationalist party in Kurdistan was established in 1945. During the long period of activity, it experienced many

fluctuations in its fortunes. During the last three decades of its activity, it was an underground movement.

After 1979, this party has been openly waging war against Central Government. The organization of KDPI like other parties in Kurdistan area, is a copy of communist party.

The policy of this party from 1950's up to now is establishing autonomy for Iranian Kurdistan.

The second significant and active organization in Kurdistan after 1979 was Komala as communist party or as Kurdish branch of Communist Party of Iran in this region.

Komala was established after 1979 in Iranian Kurdistan, the organization, and policy of it same to KDPI, with a little difference as Komala stress on worker class campaign like other Communist party.

There were many groups also, which have Islamic bases, but as the nationalist parties (KDPI and its allies) controlled and dominanted Kurdistan territory, they were defeated or disarmed, or absorbed by central government or nationalist parties.

The history of Kurdish movement after 1979 began with many crises with Revolutionary Government.

After five months of Civil War it was defeated by the Central Government.

From 1983 up to 1997 these parties returned back to underground activity and many of them were destroyed.

In Chapter 5, we analyzed the theoretical efficacy of ethnic nationalism theories. The deprivation, diffusionist and Gellner theories have more efficiency for the Kurdish nationalism.

The empirical data show that the mean of Kurdish nationalist tendency is 45.13 from 95. This score also make it clear that nationalist tendency among Iranian Kurds is weak and less than expected.

a) In cultural deprivation, we clearly pointed out that race, culture, language, same history, myths and legend, religion, territory as sometimes make an ethnic group different from others. These cultural factors can be used as base for many nationalist movements. The result of 442 interview with Kurds people shows that social distance between Iranian ethnic group is weak. The common Kurd people believed that the race of Kurd and Iranian is the same (mean 1.41), legends myths (1.77) and culture (1.77) have same position. Only Kurd thought that Kurdish and Farsi languages are different (mean 2.98). The average of it a little more than average of nationalism in whole.

b) The second kind of deprivation is political deprivation. The common Kurd people feel that in political arena, Kurd as an ethnic group is marginalized, as the mean is 3.31 much above the midpoint of 25.

c) Economic deprivation also obtained the heighest mean score (3.59) among all kind of inequality.

d) The Sunni Kurds show strong ethnic nationalism and the Shia weak.

Many historical events helped nationalism as an ideology diffused imitated to this area.

One of main important event was breakdown of Ottoman Empire as last barricade against western country during the colonial era. Nationalism, which spread from West Europe to East and Middle East, helped the super powers in their fight against the Ottoman Empire.

The national interests of superpowers and the geography of this territory as two catalyzers, helped many nationalists to establish their state on the ruins of Ottoman Empire. Nationalism at first had many followers among the Ottoman Kurds. Iranian Kurds also adopted it from their brothers on other side of political artificial frontiers. The third theory, which shows enough efficiency to explain the Iranian Kurdish nationalism or ethnicity, is Gellner theory. As he has believed, nationalism as collective action of nationalist groups, gradually prepare the platform to found a nation among ethnic group.

As it has been noted before First and Second World Wars, the chief of tribes, or clergy were the leaders of nationalist movement in Kurdistan. Gradually, this function of Charismatic leaders shifted to nationalist parties. Nevertheless, the traditional leaders had key positions in these parties.

The role of tribal structure of Kurd's society is another factor, which should be noted, because ethnicity or autonomy or finally nationalist tendency is congruent with tribal style of life than nationalism as product of industrial revolution in western countries.

We have concluded Chapter 5 by statistical analysis. At first we have expected that Age, education, Occupation, religion, nomad, urbanization and province have effect on Kurdish nationalism or ethnicity, but when we analyzed

the effect of these factors on nationalism, by using Multi-Regression methods. Only three factors among seven factors were found to have significant effect on ethnic nationalism. These three factors are, age, urban-rural residence, and provinces.

6.2 Assessment of this Movement.

Assessment of Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran, without mention to the base is not complete.

An essential cultural condition vital for arising of ethnic revival, is a measure of secularization among elites in the cities (Smith, 1976) and also growth of middle class in a community. This intellectuals or elites diffused nationalism to their own territory by imitating this ideology from west Europe or the tendency diffused to other area as a culture.

Many scholars (Smith, 1976, Mowlana, 1997) believe that nationalism in Middle East and Islamic World is different from other place.

From 621 AD up to 1920's, three religious empire ruled this wide area. As Smith (1976) noted, in these areas, nationalism is even more closely intertwined with religion, as Mowlana (1997) has written that, in many current analyses, great confusion arises from the failure to make a distinction between a nation-state and Islamic-state. The main difference is based on sovereignty rests in God and not in thrones individuals or common people. And also in Islam, religion is not a private affair, it is a public affairs.

Race, colour, ethnic group, tribes and nation have no place in distinguishing one member of the community from the rest. Nationalisties,

cultural differences, and any other kinds of differences are recognized, but domination based on them is rejected.

Assessment of Kurd nationalist movement is classified into four as below: Theoretical weaknesses, Political weaknesses, Organization and Militancy weaknesses.

6.2.1. Theoretical Weaknesses

As the Kurds' nationalist leaders ignored the above context and imitated nationalism as an ideology, their movement became weaker and the cleavages between leaders and common people increased. This study shows that common people of Kurds preferred Islamic identity instead of Kurdish identity.

In an ideal type of Kurdish nationalism in Iran, it has shown, the combination of internal factors (as based for nationalism) like race, myth, history language and religion with external factors like any kind of deprivation are necessary as based along with other factors to arise a social movement.

The Kurds nationalist movement in Iran has largely arisen out of the internal factors. The language differentiation has helped the leaders in raising the movement. The other factors, which are more important for establishing a separate nation are absent. Political and economic deprivation from external factors support the nationalist leaders, but any change in these factors in a short period of time is possible (Najafy, 1997; Rezaii, 1997; Tarikhi; 1988, 1997; and et al) This claim is also support by many Kurds' intellectuals like Hamavand (1997), Ghazi, (1997), Golam (1997) and etc.

6.2.2. Political Weaknesses

Two kinds of political weakness are visible in this movement after 1979.

a)   The armed conflict policy was unchanged by KDPI and Komala against a government, which had high peoples mandate (98 percent vote Islamic regimme in 1979) among common people of Iran.

b)   The Kurdish autonomous is expected from other power and these leaders sometimes ignored or forget the role of internal factors. This movement not only after 1979, but also from the first attempt in Iran, begged support of other countries for their desire of autonomy i.e. Simko rejected the support of Kurd's Club of Istanbul because he hoped that extremist Turk nationalist or Britain helped him. Ghazi Mohammed extremely depended on the USSR supports. Kurds activist after 1979 also has same mistake (Kutschera, 1994; Golam, 1997; Tarikhi, 1997).

6.2.3 Organization

The combination of above mistake (both theoretical and political) shows itself in organization weaknesses.

The organization of this movement from Mahabad Republic up to now has been faced with this dilemma, while the leaders and main body of the parties come from enlightened townpeople, its militia strength, have tribal or rural bases (Roosevelt 1947 (1982); Younesi, 1997; Tarikhi, 1997; Yassin, 1997; Golam, 1997; Afrooz. 1997; Marandi, 1997).

The mistakes of leadership should also be mention. In 1980 they organized about 50,000 militias against Central Government, but after a short

time only one-fifth of them remain active. May be was because of education or propaganda weaknesses or theoretical and political weaknesses.

6.2.4 Militancy Weaknesses

The leaders of the movement didn't have strategy in their armed conflict tactic. Full-scale war against one of the strongest army in the Middle East and one of sovereignty regimme shows inefficiency in 1979, but after six month (1980), this tactic had be chosen by them again.

The second mistake of these leaders was that the arm policy of them was crucially based on the Iraq's victory in the war with Iran. They though that the result of war would lead to many changes in political arena of Iran.

The third mistake of the Kurds leaders was that of War being fought in a small area (Kurdistan and part of W. Azerbijan). They could not expand their violence into other part of Iran.

Appendices

Appendix No 1.

Section 1: Interview-Schedule for Kurd Leaders and Intellectuals

1. What is the history of Kurdish Nationalist Movement before and after 1979?

2. Which have been the ideology, tactics and strategies of main Kurdish Nationalist Parties?

3. Will you tell something about the social background of the leaders and active members?

4. Please give details of the organization of these parties.

5. Was there a change in tactics and strategy of these parties after 1979?

6. What is the Propaganda system of these parties or groups?

7. What is the in campaign system in achieving their goals?

8. What is the relationship between these parties with other Kurd or non-Kurd parties in Iraq and Turkey?

9. What kind of aids are they receiving from other Kurd Parties (Political, Militant or Financial)?

10. Did they receive any support from other countries is (Financial, Military, or Political support)?

11. Which are the most prominent weaknesses of these parties (Theoretical, Organizational or armed activities)?

12. What is your point of view about the Kurdish Movement in Iran in the future?

13. If you have any suggestion, do not hesitate to talk about this movement.

14. Do you recommend others to help us and have any information about this case, Please give me the address?

With a lot of thanks

Section 2: Interview-Schedule for Government in charge in Kurdistan or key decision-makers in Kurdistan

1. Would you please, explain the history of Kurdish Nationalist Movement after the Islamic Revolution (1979) in Kurdistan?

2. Please inform me about the age, education, social Status of the separatist leaders, main body of the Kurdish Nationalists in Kurdistan.

3. What are the Organizations (details) of KDPI, *Komala, Khabat, Razgari* in Iran.

4. Is there any change in the policies, theories and organizations of these parties or group (inside and outside)?

5. Please explain the propaganda system and militant's shelter of these parties.

6. Which are the strategies and tactics of the government in confronting these parties?

7. Which are the strategies and tactics of these parties against the Central Government of Iran.

8. What is impact of this Movement on Kurdish literature?

9. Which are the main factors to reinforce ethnicity or nationalistic tendency among the Kurds as an ethnic Iranian group (Parties, Geography, Religion and Language differentiation or external powers)?

10. Which of the above factors are more important and why?

11. Why did not this Movement have any success in Iran?

12. If you have any suggestion or know other colleagues, who can help us, do not hesitate to inform me.

With a lot thanks.

Appendix No. 2

Likert Scale (English)

In the name of God

This is a research being done to gather information about the Kurds.

The answers to following questions will help the researcher to achieve this goal.

You have been chosen randomly, as sample of Kurd people. The researcher uses

the information given only for his Survey and keeps it secret.

Thank you for your kind co-operation.

	Full Agree 1	Agree 2	Neutral 3	Not Agree 4	Reject 5
1. *Nawrooz* is one of the greatest *Eidds* in Kurdistan.					

	5	4	3	2	1
2. Industrial Sector in Kurdistan has grown less than the other under developed regions in Iran.					

	1	2	3	4	5
3. Kurds are the zealous frontier guards of Iran.					

	1	2	3	4	5
4. Kurds are among the ancient inhabitants of Iran Plateau.					

	1	2	3	4	5
5. Kurds are a group of Iranian people.					

	1	2	3	4	5
6. *Roostam,* one of the heroes in Shahanamah, is my Mythical Hero.					

	1	2	3	4	5
7. *Luri* and Kurdish are two branches of Persian (Farsi).					

	1	2	3	4	5
8. Kurds, *Lurs* and Persians *(Farsha)* belong to one common race [Aryan].					

	1	2	3	4	5
9. Kurdish is purest Persian (Farsi) language.					

	5	4	3	2	1
10. The government employees in Kurdistan should be Kurds.					

	5	4	3	2	1
11. Only Kurds should try for prosperity and development of Kurdistan.					

	5	4	3	2	1
12. *Nawrooz* is a Persian *(Farsha) Eidd* [Feast].					

	1	2	3	4	5
13. *Chahar Shanbeh Soori* is celebrated every year in Kurdistan.					

	1	2	3	4	5
14. The deprived people of Kurdistan are the same as other deprived people of Iran.					

	5	4	3	2	1
15. Kurds should learn reading and writing in Kurdish.					

	5	4	3	2	1
16. Kurds are among the poorest Iranian People.					

	1	2	3	4	5
17. I am first a Muslim then a Kurdish speaker.					

	1	2	3	4	5
18. Industry has not grown in any under developed region in Iran.					

19. If I had a son, I would permit him to have non-Kurd wife.

1	2	3	4	5

20. There is no difference between reading and writing in Farsi and Kurdish.

1	2	3	4	5

21. There is no difference between Kurd and non-Kurd government employees, they should do their duty well.

1	2	3	4	5

22. If I had a daughter, I wouldn't permit her to have non-Kurd husband.

5	4	3	2	1

23. I am a Kurd first and then a Muslim.

5	4	3	2	1

24. In Kurdistan T.V. and Radio programmes should be broadcast in Kurdish only.

5	4	3	2	1

Personal Information of Respondent

1. How old are you?

	Primary	Guided	High school	University	Illiterate
2. What is your level of education?	1-5	6-8	9-12	12+	0

3. Where are you from?

1	2
Urban	Rural

4. What is your main job?

1	2	3	4	5
Farmer	Animal Husbandry	Govt. Employees	Private Employee	Other

5. What is the name of your tribe if there is any?

1	2
Non-nomad	Nomad

6. Sect.

1	2
Sunni	Shia

7. Province

1	2	3
W. Azjerbijan	Kurdistan	Kirmanshah

The Interviewer's Point of View

	1	2	3
1. How much do the respondent trust you?	Low	medium	High

2. Name of the interviewer.

3. Name of the controller.

4. The place of interview (explain it)

5. What is your point of view (interviewer) as a whole [give examples in detail]?

شمارهٔ پرسشنامه

هوالحق

ما جمعی از دانشجویان دانشگاه مازندران هستیم که بعلت علاقه‌مندی به کردستان و مردم آن قصد داریـم راجع به کردستان تحقیقی انجام دهیم. سؤالهایی که می‌پرسیم بـرای بـررسی و شـناخت هـمین کـار است. پاسخهای دقیق و صمیمانه شما ما را در این بررسی و تحقیق کمک خواهد کرد. علت اینکه شما برای مصاحبه انتخاب شده‌اید فقط برحسب تصادف می‌باشند و به مصداق مشت نمونه خروار. ضمناً مطالبی کـه مـطرح می‌فرماید فقط برای استفاده در دانشگاه است و در جای دیگر نقل نمی‌شود و ما امانتدار آن هستیم.

«از همکاری صمیمانه شما کمال تشکر را داریم»

کاملاً مخالف ۵	مخالف ۴	بی‌نظر ۳	موافق ۲	کاملاً موافق ۱

۱. عید نوروز یکی از بزرگترین عیدها در کردستان است.

۵	۴	۳	۲	۱

۲. صنعت در کُردستان از سایر نقاط محروم ایران کمتر رشد کرده است.

۱	۲	۳	۴	۵

۳. کُردها غیور ترین مرزداران هستند

۱	۲	۳	۴	۵

۴. کُردها یکی از قدیمترین قومهای ساکن سرزمین ایران هستند.

۱	۲	۳	۴	۵

۵. کُردها جزئی از مردم ایران هستند.

۱	۲	۳	۴	۵

۶. رستم که در شاهنامه از آن یاد شده قهرمان افسانه‌ای ماست.

۱	۲	۳	۴	۵

۷. لُری و کُردی دو شاخه از زبان فارسی هستند.

۱	۲	۳	۴	۵

۸. کُردها، لُرها و فارسها از یک نژاد هستند.

۱	۲	۳	۴	۵

۹. زبان کُردی همان فارسی خالص است.

5	4	3	2	1

۱۰. کارمندان ادارات دولتی در منطقهٔ کُردستان باید کُرد باشند.

5	4	3	2	1

۱۱. خود کُردها باید به فکر پیشرفت و آبادی کُردستان باشند.

5	4	3	2	1

۱۲. نوروز عید فارسهاست.

1	2	3	4	5

۱۳. چهار شنبه سوری باید هرسال در کُردستان جشن گرفته شود.

1	2	3	4	5

۱۴. محرومیت مردم کُردستان مشابه محرومیت سایر مناطق ایران است.

5	4	3	2	1

۱۵. کُردها باید خواندن و نوشتن به زبان کُردی را بدانند.

5	4	3	2	1

۱۶. کُردها فقیرترین مردم ایران هستند.

1	2	3	4	5

۱۷. من اوّل مسلمانم و بعد زبانم کُردی است.

1	2	3	4	5

۱۸. در هیچکدام از مناطق محروم ایران صنعت رشدی نداشته است.

1	2	3	4	5

۱۹. اگر پسر داشتم یک دختر غیر کُرد برای او میگرفتم.

1	2	3	4	5

۲۰. خواندن و نوشتن به زبان فارسی و کُردی فرقی ندارد.

1	2	3	4	5

۲۱. کارمند چه کُرد باشد چه غیر کُرد تفاوتی ندارد. بلکه باید کار مردم را درست انجام دهد.

5	4	3	2	1

۲۲. اگر دختر داشتم آن را به یک پسر غیر کُرد شوهر نمیدادم.

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۵	۴	۳	۲	۱

۲۳. من اوّل کُرد بعد مسلمانم.

۵	۴	۳	۲	۱

۲۴. برنامه‌های رادیو و تلویزیون در کُردستان باید به زبان کُردی باشد.

---

۱. ببخشید چند سال دارد. . . . . .؟

سواد ۱	زیر دیپلم ۲	زیر دیپلم ۳	دیپلم ۴	دیپلم به بالا ۵

۲. چند کلاس سواد دارید؟

شهری ۱	روستایی ۲

۳. اهل کجا هستید؟

کشاورز ۱	دامدار ۲	کارمند ۳	آزاد ۴	هرکار دیگر نام برید ۵

۴. شغل اصلی‌تان چیست؟

بدون عشیره ۱	عشیره‌ای ۲

۵. اگر به ایل یا طایفه‌ای تعلّق دارید آن را نام ببرید

کرمانشاه ۱	کردستان ۲	غربی ۳

۶. أستان

شیعه ۱	سنّی ۲

۷. مذهب

زیاد ۱	متوسط ۲	کم ۳

۱. تا چه حدی توانستید نظر پاسخگو را جلب کنید.

۲. نام و ناو خانوادگی پرسشگر . . . . .

۳. نام و نام خانوادگی کنترل کننده . . . . . .

۴. محل انجام مصاحبه و تاریخ . . . . .

۵. برداشت کلی خودتان را از مصاحبه بنویسید.

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بسمه تعالی

مصاحبه با رهبران و روشنفکران کرد

۱ لطفاً تاریخچه‌ای از جنبش ناسیونالیست کرد قبلی وبعداز انقلاب اسلامی بیان فرمایند.

۲ احزاب فعال ناسیونالیست در کردستان کدامند؟ عقیده و دیدگاه و تاکتیک واسترانژی آنهاچیست؟

۳ سران واعضای حزب دموکرات بیشتر از چه قشرهای هستند ؟ رهبران بیشتر به چه قشرهای بستگی دارند ؟ اعضای حزب از نظر سنی ، آموزشی ، شهری یا روستایی به چه قشری وابستگی دارند ؟

۴ لطفاً مختصری از تشکیلات حزب یا احزاب نامبرده را در کردستان توضیح دهید.

۵ استرانژی و تاکتیک این احزاب در کردستان چیست و چه تغییراتی در آن حاصل شده است ؟ (منظور بعد از انقلاب اسلامی)

۶ سیستم تبلیغاتی (گفتار و نوشاری) این احزاب چیست ؟

۷ نحوهٔ مقابله و مبارزه احزاب ناسیونالیست برای دستیابی به هدفشان چه بوده است ؟

۸ - ارتباط احزاب ملّی‌گرای کرد در داخل و خارج با احزاب همانند در کشورهای ترکیه و عراق چه بوده است ؟

۹ - کمک احزاب کردی خارجی از ایران بیشتر در چه زمینه های بوده است ؟ (مالی ، سیاسی ، نـیروی نظامی ....)

۱۰ بنظر شما کدام کشور به کردهای ایران کمک رسانده است و در چه زمینه ای (مالی ، نظامی ، سیاسی).

۱۱ - مهمترین ضعف جنبش کرد کدام است (تئوریک ، سیاسی ، تشکیلات و با ضعف نظامی) .

۱۲ آیندهٔ جنبش کرد را در ایران چگونه می بینید ؟

۱۳ - در صورتی که مسئله ای که از نظر ما دور مانده است و احتیاج به توضیح دارد ما را راهنمائی بفرمائید ؟

۱۴ چه کسانی را می شناسید که در این رابطه می تواند به ما کمک کند ؟ آدرس و ....

با تشکر

بسمه تعالی

سؤالات مصاحبه با مسئولین حکومتی در کردستان

۱   ضمن معرفی خود ، تاریخچهٔ مختصری از حرکت ناسیونالیستی در کردستان ایـران بـعد از انـقلاب اسلامی بیان فرمائید.

۲   رهبران جنبش جدایی طلب کُرد بیشتر از چه اقشاری بوده اند ، سنین آنها ، میزان سواد ، روستایی یا شهری بودن دانش آموزان و دانشجویان چه درصدی از اعضای این جنبش را تشکیل می دهند.

۴-   تشکیلات احزاب ناسیونالیست در کردستان را توضیح دهید ؟ (حزب دمـوکرات ، کـومله ، خـبات ، رزگاری ،

۵   مشی سیاسی و عقیدتی این احزاب از نظر داخلی و خارجی چه تغییراتی کرده است و چه بوده است .

۶   سیستم تبلیغاتی (نوشتاری ، گفتاری و ...) و چگونگی مخفیگاه اعضای نظامی آنها ؟

۷ -   استراتژی و تاکتیک جمهوری اسلامی برای مقابله با گروههای فوق چه بوده است و چه تغییراتی در آن حاصل شده است ؟

۸   گروههای ناسیونالیست برای مقابله با این تاکتیک ها چه اقداماتی اندیشیده است و تغییرات آن ؟

۹   نتایج سیاسی ، فرهنگی و تأثیر این جنبش در ادبیات کُردی بعد از انقلاب چه بوده است ؟

۱۰-   علل رشد ناسیونالیسم در کردستان ایران را چه می دانید و با توجه به اینکه قوم کُرد یک قوم ایرانی است چه عواملی در بروز این پدیده مـؤثر بـوده است (بـرای مـثل : احـزاب نـاسیونالیست ، تفاوت مذهبی ، موقعیت جغرافیایی ، تفاوت زبانی ، عامل خارجی و ...)

۱۱-   کدامیک از عوامل بالا مؤثر بوده است ؟ چرا ؟

۱۲   بنظر شما چرا این جنبش در ایران موفق نشد و به اهداف خود نرسید ؟

۱۳-   در صورتی که نظر دیگری دارید و یا کسانی را می شناسید که بتواند به این سؤالها جواب بدهد ما را راهنمایی بفرمایید .

با تشکر

Appendix No. 3

1. Age and Ethnic Nationalism Scores

NATIONALISM		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
AGE	1	20	45.95	5.12	1.15	43.55	48.35	35	54
	2	56	47.61	8.78	1.17	45.26	49.96	30	78
	3	84	47.25	6.97	0.76	45.74	48.76	32	65
	4	56	44.98	7.85	1.05	42.88	47.08	25	58
	5	40	44.95	6.32	1.00	42.93	46.97	32	60
	6	42	45.24	7.84	1.21	42.80	47.68	31	70
	7	30	46.40	9.92	1.81	42.70	50.10	29	78
	8	30	43.83	6.87	1.25	41.27	46.40	33	59
	9	20	42.20	6.55	1.46	39.13	45.27	33	53
	10	64	41.03	6.57	0.82	39.39	42.67	29	59
	Total	442	45.13	7.69	0.37	44.41	45.85	25	78

2. Education and Ethnic Nationalism Scores

NATIONALISM		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
EDUCATION	1	108	43.75	6.60	0.64	42.49	45.01	29	59
	2	69	45.97	8.57	1.03	43.91	48.03	30	78
	3	120	46.35	6.49	0.59	45.18	47.52	29	66
	4	61	48.66	9.07	1.16	46.33	50.98	32	78
	5	84	41.92	7.29	0.80	40.34	43.50	25	61
	Total	442	45.13	7.69	0.37	44.41	45.85	25	78

3. Residence and Ethnic Nationalism Scores

NATIONALISM		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
URBAN-RURAL	1	298	46.33	7.85	0.45	45.43	47.22	29	78
	2	144	42.65	6.73	0.56	41.54	43.76	25	61
	Total	442	45.13	7.69	0.37	44.41	45.85	25	78

4. City or Rural and E. N. Scores

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
NATIONALISM CITY-Village 11	62	48.40	7.85	1.00	46.41	50.40	29	66
12	63	47.59	7.87	0.99	45.61	49.57	32	70
13	77	46.38	7.76	0.88	44.62	48.14	33	78
14	63	45.19	7.32	0.92	43.35	47.03	30	62
15	48	42.52	6.83	0.99	40.54	44.50	29	60
21	34	44.97	6.62	1.13	42.66	47.28	33	61
22	18	44.33	7.02	1.65	40.84	47.82	33	61
23	21	40.19	6.21	1.36	37.36	43.02	27	50
25	56	41.41	6.81	0.91	39.59	43.24	25	58
Total	442	45.13	7.69	0.37	44.41	45.85	25	78

5. Nomadic Status and E.N. Scores

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
NATIONALISM NOMAD 1	219	45.33	8.02	0.54	44.27	46.40	29	78
2	223	44.93	7.36	0.49	43.96	45.90	25	66
Total	442	45.13	7.69	0.37	44.41	45.85	25	78

6. Province and E. N. Scores

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Lower Bound	95% Confidence Interval for Mean Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum
NATIONALISM PROVINCE 1	177	47.02	7.65	0.58	45.89	48.16	29	70
2	160	45.12	7.64	0.60	43.93	46.31	27	78
3	105	41.96	6.79	0.66	40.65	43.28	25	60
Total	442	45.13	7.69	0.37	44.41	45.85	25	78

7. Religion Sects and E. N. Scores

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean		Minimum	Maximum
						Lower Bound	Upper Bound		
NATIONALISM RELIGION	1	340	46.09	7.72	0.42	45.26	46.91	27	78
	2	102	41.95	6.71	0.66	40.63	43.27	25	60
	Total	442	45.13	7.69	0.37	44.41	45.85	25	78

8. Mean Scores in Whole

	N		Mean		Median	Mode	Std. Deviation	Variance	Skewness	
	Valid	Missing								
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error
NATIONALISM	442	0	45.1312	0.3658	45.0000	41.00	7.6902	59.1392	0.478	0.116

9. Race and E. N. Scores

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean		Std. Deviation	Variance
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Statistic
NATIONALISM	442	53	25	78	19948	45.13	0.3700	7.69	59.139
V8	442	4	1	5	821	1.86	0.0524	1.10	1.215
Valid N	442								

10. History and E. N. Scores

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean		Std. Deviation	Variance
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Statistic
NATIONALISM	442	53	25	78	19948	45.13	0.3700	7.69	59.139
V5	442	4	1	5	624	1.41	0.0284	0.60	0.356
Valid N	442								

11. Myths and E. N. Scores

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean		Std.	Variance
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Statistic
NATIONALISM	442	53	25	78	19948	45.13	0.3700	7.69	59.139
V1	442	4	1	5	860	1.95	0.0444	0.93	0.872
V12	442	4	1	5	655	1.48	0.0419	0.88	0.776
V13	442	4	1	5	834	1.89	0.0378	0.79	0.631
Valid N	442								

12. Language and E. N. Scores

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean		Std.	Variance
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Statistic
NATIONALISM	442	53	1	78	19948	45.13	0.3700	7.69	59.139
V7	442	4	1	5	1149	2.60	0.0591	1.24	1.542
V9	442	4	1	5	1414	3.20	0.0625	1.31	1.724
V20	442	4	1	5	1394	3.15	0.0590	1.24	1.541
Valid N	442								

13. Nation-Building and E. N. Scores

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean		Std.	Variance
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Statistic
NATIONALISM	442	53	25	78	19948	45.13	0.3700	7.69	59.139
V10	442	4	1	5	1379	3.12	0.0620	1.30	1.698
V11	442	4	1	5	1547	3.50	0.0618	1.30	1.688
V19	442	4	1	5	914	2.07	0.0540	1.13	1.288
V22	442	4	1	5	900	2.04	0.0558	1.17	1.377
V23	442	4	1	5	691	1.56	0.0462	0.97	0.945
V24	442	4	1	5	1426	3.23	0.0574	1.21	1.454
Valid N	442								

14. Economic Deprivation and E. N. Scores

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean		Std.	Variance
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error Statistic	Statistic	Statistic
NATIONALISM	442	53	25	78	19948	45.13	0.3700	7.69	59.139
V2	442	4	1	5	1758	3.98	0.0510	1.07	1.151
V14	442	4	1	5	1408	3.19	0.0626	1.32	1.734
Valid N	442								

15. Religion and E. N. Scores

	N	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Sum	Mean		Std.	Variance
	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error Statistic	Statistic	Statistic
NATIONALISM	442	53	25	78	19948	45.13	0.3700	7.69	59.139
V17	442	4	1	5	715	1.62	0.0420	0.88	0.781
V23	442	4	1	5	691	1.56	0.0462	0.97	0.945
Valid N	442								

16. ANOVA Test: Age with Nationalism Scores

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
NATIONALISM Between Groups	4.042	4	1.011	4.475	0.001
Within Groups	98.691	437	0.226		
Total	102.733	441			

17. ANOVA Test: Education with Nationalism Scores

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
NATIONALISM Between Groups	6.944	4	1.736	7.920	0.000
Within Groups	95.789	437	0.219		
Total	102.733	441			

18. ANOVA Test: (City-Rural) Residence with E. N. Scores

NATIONALISM	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.433	1	2.433	10.675	0.001
Within Groups	100.300	440	0.228		
Total	102.733	441			

19. ANOVA Test: Residence (City-Rural) with E. N. Scores

NATIONALISM	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.845	1	2.845	12.533	0.000
Within Groups	99.888	440	0.227		
Total	102.733	441			

20. ANOVA Test: Occupation with E. N. Scores

NATIONALISM	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	2.744	4	0.686	2.999	0.018
Within Groups	99.989	437	0.229		
Total	102.733	441			

21. ANOVA Test: Nomadic Status with E. N. Scores

NATIONALISM	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	0.000268	1	0.000268	0.001	0.973
Within Groups	102.733	440	0.233		
Total	102.733	441			

22. ANOVA Test: Provinces with E. N. Scores

NATIONALISM	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	4.071	2	2.036	9.057	0.000
Within Groups	98.662	439	0.225		
Total	102.733	441			

23. ANOVA Test: Religion with E. N. Scores

NATIONALISM		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
	Between Groups	2.957	1	2.957	13.038	0.000
	Within Groups	99.776	440	0.227		
	Total	102.733	441			

24. Age and Nationalism

NATIONALISM		AGE						Total
		15-29	30-44	45-59	60-74	75+		
	19-37	14	21	17	14	4		70
	38-56	130	109	58	34	11		342
	57-75	15	8	4	1	0		28
	76-95	1	0	1	0	0		2
Total		160	138	80	49	15		442

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp.Sig.(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	20.897[a]	12	0.052
Likelihood Ratio	22.310	12	0.034
Linear-by-Linear Association	16.575	1	0.000
N of Valid Cases	442		

a. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.07.

25. Education and Nationalism

	EDUCATION					
NATIONALISM	1-5	6-8	9-12	12+	Illiteracy	Total
19-37	22	9	11	6	22	70
38-56	84	52	103	42	61	342
57-75	2	7	6	12	1	28
76-95	0	1	0	1	0	2
Total	108	69	120	61	84	442

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp.Sig.(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	44.960[a]	12	0.000
Likelihood Ratio	41.516	12	0.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	0.007	1	0.934
N of Valid Cases	442		

a. 7 cells (35.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.28.

26. Residence and Nationalism

	URBAN-RURAL		
NATIONALISM	City	Village	Total
19-37	38	32	70
38-56	233	109	342
57-75	25	3	28
76-95	2	0	2
Total	298	144	442

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp.Sig.(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	12.637[a]	3	0.005
Likelihood Ratio	14.238	3	0.003
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.213	1	0.000
N of Valid Cases	442		

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.65.

27. Occupation and Nationalism

		OCCUPATION				
NATIONALISM	Farmer	A. Husbandry	Official	Private	Other	Total
19-37	21	4	15	23	7	70
38-56	71	9	69	144	49	342
57-75	2	0	7	15	4	28
76-95	0	0	0	2	0	2
Total	94	13	91	184	60	442

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp.Sig.(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	14.149[a]	12	0.291
Likelihood Ratio	15.979	12	0.192
Linear-by-Linear Association	9.081	1	0.003
N of Valid Cases	442		

a. 8 cells (40.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.06.

28. Nomadic Status and Nationalism

NATIONALISM	NOMAD		Total
	Nomad	Non-Nomad	
19-37	36	34	70
38-56	168	174	342
57-75	13	15	28
76-95	2	0	2
Total	219	223	442

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp.Sig.(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	2.269[a]	3	0.518
Likelihood Ratio	3.042	3	0.385
Linear-by-Linear Association	0.001	1	0.973
N of Valid Cases	442		

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.99.

29. Provinces and Nationalism

NATIONALISM	PROVIENC			Total
	W. Azerbijan	Kurdistan	Kirmanshah	
19-37	18	23	29	70
38-56	141	128	73	342
57-75	18	7	3	28
76-95	0	2	0	2
Total	177	160	105	442

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp.Sig.(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	24.716[a]	6	0.000
Likelihood Ratio	24.124	6	0.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	16.458	1	0.000
N of Valid Cases	442		

a. 3 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.48.

30. Religion Sects and Nationalism

		RELIGION		Total
		Sunni	Shia	
NATIONALISM	19-37	43	27	70
	38-56	270	72	342
	57-75	25	3	28
	76-95	2	0	2
Total		340	102	442

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp.Sig.(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	13.267[a]	3	0.004
Likelihood Ratio	13.099	3	0.004
Linear-by-Linear Association	12.692	1	0.000
N of Valid Cases	442		

a. 2 cells (25.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.46.

31. T-Test: Nomad and Nationalism

NATIONALISM	NOMAD	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
	Nomad	219	1.91	0.50	0.0340
	Non-Nomad	223	1.91	0.46	0.0309

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		T-Test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Mean	Lower	Upper
NATIONALISM	Equal variance Assumed	0.336	0.563	-0.034	440	0.973	-0.00156	0.0460	-0.0919	0.0888
	Equal variance not Assumed			-0.034	435.230	0.973	-0.00156	0.0460	-0.0920	0.0889

32. T-Test: Religion Sect and Nationalism

NATIONALISM	RELIGION	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
	Sunni	340	1.96	0.47	0.0256
	Shia	102	1.76	0.49	0.0286

Independent Samples Test

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		T-Test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Mean	Lower	Upper
NATIONALISM Equal variance Assumed	14.424	0.000	3.611	440	0.000	0.19	0.0538	0.0885	0.30
Equal variance not Assumed			3.533	160.982	0.001	0.19	0.0549	0.0856	0.30

33. T-Test: Residence and Nationalism

	Residence	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
NATIONALISM	City	298	1.97	0.49	0.0283
	Village	144	1.80	0.45	0.0376

Independent Samples Test

	Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		T-Test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Mean	
	F	Sig.	t	df	Sig (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Mean	Lower	Upper
NATIONALISM Equal variance Assumed	7.788	0.005	3.540	440	0.000	0.17	0.0484	0.0761	0.27
Equal variance not Assumed			3.637	303.415	0.000	0.17	0.0471	0.0786	0.26

34. Regression Nomad with Nationalism (ANOVA[b])

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	0.000268	1	0.000268	0.001	0.973[a]
	Residual	102.733	440	0.233		
	Total	102.733	441			

a. Predictors: (Constant), NOMAD
b. Dependent Variable: NATIONALISM

35. Regression Province with Nationalism (ANOVA[b])

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3.834	1	3.834	17.057	0.000[a]
	Residual	98.899	440	0.225		
	Total	102.733	441			

a. Predictors: (Constant), PROVIENC
b. Dependent Variable: NATIONALISM

36. Regression Province with Nationalism (ANOVA[b])

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2.957	1	2.957	13.038	0.000[a]
	Residual	99.776	440	0.227		
	Total	102.733	441			

a. Predictors: (Constant), RELIGION
b. Dependent Variable: NATIONALISM

37. Regression Age with Nationalism (ANOVA[b])

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3.861	1	3.861	17.183	0.000[a]
	Residual	98.872	440	0.225		
	Total	102.733	441			

a. Predictors: (Constant), AGE
b. Dependent Variable: NATIONALISM

38. Regression Education with Nationalism (ANOVA[b])

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	0.00158	1	0.00158	0.007	0.935[a]
	Residual	102.731	440	0.223		
	Total	102.733	441			

a. Predictors: (Constant), EDUCATION
b. Dependent Variable: NATIONALISM

39. Regression Residence with Nationalism (ANOVA[b])

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2.845	1	2.845	12.533	0.000[a]
	Residual	99.888	440	0.227		
	Total	102.733	441			

a. Predictors: (Constant), URBAN-RURAL
b. Dependent Variable: NATIONALISM

40. Regression Occupation with Nationalism (ANOVA[b])

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	2.116	1	2.116	9.251	0.002[a]
	Residual	100.618	440	0.229		
	Total	102.733	441			

a. Predictors: (Constant), OCCUPATION
b. Dependent Variable: NATIONALISM

41. Regression of All Factors with Nationalism (Model Summary)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	0.318[a]	0.101	0.087	0.46

a. Predictors: (Constant), RELIGION, AGE, NOMAD, OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, URBAN-RURAL, PROVINCE

ANOVA[b]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	10.389	7	1.484	6.975	0.000[a]
	Residual	92.344	434	0.213		
	Total	102.733	441			

a. Predictors: (Constant), RELIGION, AGE, NOMAD, OCCUPATION, EDUCATION, NATIONALISM, URBAN-RURAL, PROVINCE
b. Dependent Variable: NATIONALISM

42. Regression Main Factors with Nationalism (Model Summary)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
Age	0.194[a]	0.038	0.035	0.47
Age, Province	0.273[b]	0.074	0.070	0.47
Age, Province, Urban-Rural	0.310[c]	0.096	0.090	0.46

a. Predictors: (Constant): AGE
b. Predictors: (Constant): AGE, PROVINCE
c. Predictors: (Constant): AGE, PROVINCE, URBAN-RURAL

ANOVA[d]

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Age	Regression	3.861	1	3.861	17.183	0.000[a]
	Residual	98.872	440	0.225		
	Total	102.733	441			
Age, Province	Regression	7.631	2	3.816	17.613	0.000[b]
	Residual	95.102	439	0.217		
	Total	102.733	441			
Age, Province, Urban-Rural	Regression	9.882	3	3.294	15.538	0.000[c]
	Residual	92.851	438	0.212		
	Total	102.733	441			

a. Predictors: (Constant): AGE
b. Predictors: (Constant): AGE, PROVINCE
c. Predictors: (Constant): AGE, PROVINCE, URBAN-RURAL
d. Dependent Variable: NATIONALISM

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