

MESOPOTAMIA

1917-1920

A CLASH OF LOYALTIES
A Personal and Historical Record

BY

LT.-COL. SIR ARNOLD T. WILSON

K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.

*Formerly Acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia, Political
Resident in the Persian Gulf, and His Majesty's Consul-
General for Fars, Khuzistan, &c.*

πιστός ἀνὴρ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου ἀντερύσσασθαι
ἄξιός ἐν χαλεπῇ, Κύριε, διχοστασίῃ.


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1931





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IN CONTINUATION OF
'LOYALTIES, MESOPOTAMIA
1914-1917'

'I hate half-hearted friends. Loyalty comes before everything.

Ye-es; but loyalties cut up against each other sometimes, you know.'

GALSWORTHY.

'The unhappy King (Theodosius) now learnt by experience that not even the wisest or most humane of Princes, if he be an alien in race, in customs, and religion, can ever win the hearts of the people.'

(GREGOROVIVUS, *Rome in the Middle Ages*, i. 327.)

By the same Author

THE PERSIAN GULF

An historical sketch from the earliest times to the beginning of the twentieth century. 1928

A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF
PERSIA. 1930

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TAMIA 1914-1917. 1930

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To

GENERAL SIR
EDMUND BARROW

G.C.B., G.C.S.I.

Military Secretary, India Office
1914-17

&

SIR
ARTHUR HIRTZEL

K.C.B.

Assistant Under-Secretary of State
India Office, 1917-21


TO WHOSE UNSELFISH LABOURS AND
WISE JUDGEMENT THE MESOPOTAMIA
EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, AND CIVIL
ADMINISTRATION, AND THEIR
SUCCESSORS, OWED FAR MORE
THAN THEY KNEW



LIST OF GAZETTED OFFICERS OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION WHO DIED OR WERE KILLED BETWEEN
OCTOBER 1920 AND APRIL 1931

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Department.</i>	<i>Date of death.</i>
Dr. A. C. OLDHAM.	Health Service.	19.7.1921.
N. A. MILLER.	Public Works Dept.	21.7.1921.
Captain J. P. CARVOSO.	'Iraq Levies.	27.12.1921.
Lieutenant R. A. SURRIDGE.	" "	29.12.1921.
Captain H. C. FITZGIBBON	" "	13.1.1922.
F. SHOWERS.	Irrigation Dept.	2.4.1922.
L. KLINGER.	" "	2.4.1922.
G. I. GOWAN SMITH.	" "	2.4.1922.
Lieutenant V. T. MOTT.	'Iraq Levies.	1.6.1922.
Captain R. K. MAKANT.	" "	18.6.1922.
Captain S. S. BOND.	" "	18.6.1922.
A. M. THOMSON.	Public Works Dept.	20.7.1922.
Captain C. E. SIMPSON.	'Iraq Levies.	12.8.1922.
Major C. C. MARSHALL, D.S.O.	Ministry of Interior.	4.12.1922.
E. B. SOANE.	Political.	24.2.1923.
Dr. E. A. L. SANSOM.	Health Service.	22.5.1923.
S. H. FRYER.	Posts and Telegraphs.	8.8.1923.
H. PERRY.	'Iraq Railways.	23.8.1923.
Captain W. McWHINNIE.	'Iraq Levies.	5.10.1923.
Lieutenant H. HAMMOND.	" "	23.11.1923.
Captain H. E. BOIS.	" "	5.5.1924.
G. S. ROBOTOM.	'Iraq Railways.	24.5.1924.
Major H. A. GOLDSMITH, M.C.	Political.	31.5.1924.
Major H. C. PULLEY.	Ministry of Interior.	8.3.1925.
Lieutenant J. H. GRIFFITH.	'Iraq Levies.	4.5.1925.
Captain C. W. LAY.	" "	29.5.1925.
Captain I. P. COFFEY.	Defence.	5.6.1925.
Dr. W. CAMPBELL.	Health Service.	22.7.1925.
O. H. VIVIAN.	'Iraq Railways.	21.2.1926.
Lieutenant G. D. E. HEATHER.	'Iraq Levies.	8.7.1926.
Miss G. L. BELL, C.B.E.	Secretariat.	12.7.1926.
J. DOWNIE.	Port Directorate.	31.7.1926.
E. C. O'SULLIVAN.	Surveys.	4.9.1927.
D. F. O'DONOVAN.	'Iraq Railways.	19.9.1927.
Lieutenant S. G. HASERICK.	'Iraq Levies.	9.1.1928.
P. WILLIAMS.	'Iraq Railways.	5.3.1928.
A. W. COLES.	" "	20.6.1928.
Captain J. MACKIRDY.	Port Directorate.	26.7.1928.
Sir GILBERT CLAYTON.	High Commissioner.	11.9.1929.
T. H. STERN. M.C.	Irrigation Dept.	30.3.1931.

'σαλπίζει'



P R E F A C E

'... You have been called hither to save a Nation,—Nations. You had the best People, indeed, of the Christian world put into your trust, when you came hither. You had the affairs of these Nations delivered over to you in peace and quiet; you were, and we all are, put into an undisturbed possession, nobody making title to us. Through the blessing of God, our enemies were hopeless and scattered. . . . And now?—To have our peace and interest, whereof those were our hopes the other day, thus shaken and put under such a confusion; and ourselves rendered hereby almost the scorn and contempt of those strangers who are amongst us to negotiate their masters' affairs! . . . If by such actings . . . these poor Nations shall be thrown into heaps and confusion, through blood, and ruin and trouble—all because we would not settle when we could, when God put it into our hands—to have all recoil upon us; and ourselves . . . loosened from all known and public interests; . . . who shall answer for these things to God?' CROMWELL *Speech*, 12th September 1654.

IN a previous volume entitled *Loyalties Mesopotamia 1914–1917* I have endeavoured to place before the reader a comprehensive account of the salient events, both in the military and the political arena, which culminated in the capture of Baghdad and the occupation of the Baghdad wilayat. The present work is designed to record the successive victories of the armies under General Marshall, whereby, at or shortly after the Armistice, we found ourselves in possession of the Mosul wilayat, and burdened with great military responsibilities in Persia, on the Caspian, and in Russian Turkistan. The political developments and embarrassments which followed these achievements are also dealt with in some detail.

I have found it impossible to endow the record with the structural unity which an historical narrative of this critical period in the annals of 'Iraq, and of Great Britain in the East, should possess. It has been difficult to maintain a strictly chronological sequence, or to offer to the reader a satisfactory analysis of the local reactions to events in other countries. Affairs in 'Iraq during this period were influenced less by the wishes and actions of the inhabitants themselves, or of the representatives in 'Iraq of the British Government, than by events in Europe, in Syria, in Persia, and in Turkey, which were often almost wholly beyond the control of governments.

The nationalist movement, which had its mainsprings in Syria, was many-sided. Patriotism is a plant which bears strangely diverse flowers in different soils and in successive ages, and its fruit is sometimes bitter. It was not an important element in 'Iraq during this period. The conception of Arabia as an independent entity was not unfamiliar to the educated minority, but the idea of 'Iraq as an independent nation had scarcely taken shape, for the country lacked homogeneity, whether

geographical, economic, or racial. Separatist tendencies were strong in Basra; it was scarcely to be hoped that the wilayats of Basra and Baghdad could maintain their existence as an autonomous state without the revenue it was hoped might eventually be derived from the economic resources of the Mosul wilayat. Yet three-quarters of the inhabitants of the Mosul wilayat were non-Arab, five-eighths being Kurdish, and one-eighth Christians or Yazidis. The Kurdish problem proved insoluble. The tribesmen were disunited and intractable; their leaders had no common policy, and agreed only in their opposition to any form of government which would bring them under Arab domination. The Christian communities, Chaldean and Assyrian, were smaller in numbers; to do them justice and to find an agreed place for them in the scheme of things presented great difficulties. The Assyrians, in particular, deserved special consideration. They had played a noble part on the side of the Allies during the war, had shown themselves to be first-class fighting-men, and were organized by the British military authorities into battalions as a Frontier Force to maintain order amongst the Kurds. Their homelands were in possession of the Turks, who proved implacable enemies, or of Kurdish tribes, who could not be ejected except by force. They were hill-men and could not even in favourable circumstances maintain their health and strength in the plains, but attempts to repatriate them failed. The Chaldeans and other Christian communities were less virile: their natural affiliations were rather with their compatriots in Syria, to whom the prospect of a French mandate made a strong appeal. The simpler Arabs of the Basra and Baghdad wilayats were under the influence of the priesthood of Najaf and Karbala—spiritual tyrants whose principal ambition was to stem the rising tide of emancipation.

In England the government of the day was distracted by financial and political problems of the utmost gravity at home and abroad; the press gave no useful guidance in any direction; publicists offered little but the broken lights of sentimentalism and pacificism. The British Empire had won the war, and in so doing seemed to have lost faith in its mission and belief in the obligation, imposed on it alike by self-interest and duty, to uphold the principles of authority and of good government for which it stood, until these principles had taken root and could safely be entrusted to an indigenous authority. I felt then, as now, deeply—even passionately—that the welfare of the people of the Middle East and India, no less than the existence of the British Empire, depended upon our facing our responsibilities. I was convinced that our economic difficulties would be surmounted in the measure that we rose to the height of our opportunities. My innermost beliefs were in all humility those expressed by Cromwell: 'We

are a people with the stamp of God upon us . . . whose appearance and whose providences are not to be outmatched by any story.'

The application in Arab countries of the mandatory principle seemed to me to be inconsistent with the interests of the inhabitants of the territories to which it was applied. If the system was merely a subterfuge to enable the supervising Power to exercise dominion (as in the case of Syria) in substance without the form, and so to pander to the misconceptions of President Wilson, it was unworthy and did not deserve to endure. If, on the other hand, it was intended to be a reality, it was unworkable, for it contained within itself the seeds of decay and dissolution. There was no 'competent authority' to exercise ultimate power: it was the worst kind of diarchy. 'Iraq would need capital for roads, railways, irrigation, and other public works; under the Mandate it would be impossible to obtain it, in the absence of a Treasury guarantee or of adequate sources of revenue available as security. 'Iraq needed expert advisers: under the mandatory system it seemed unlikely that the best available men would be obtained—owing to lack of prospects or permanence—or that their advice would in the last resort be effective. The very foundations of such organized life as existed in 'Iraq had been shaken by four years of war. The first principle to be re-established in men's minds was that of authority. It was difficult to envisage this under the mandatory system.

It was clear that the acceptance of the Mandate, as framed, would be followed almost immediately by a demand for complete and unfettered freedom from any form of tutelage, for which I believed 'Iraq to be unfitted, owing not only to lack of competent administrators or to the absence of national feeling¹ but also on the broadest economic grounds. Its geographical situation, its long history of decay, the low repute of

¹ A very competent observer, with fourteen years responsible administrative experience in 'Iraq, wrote as follows in October 1930:

'There are difficulties common to all branches of the administration in 'Iraq. These arise from more or less permanent factors, and are not at all appreciated by those who do not know the country, nor sufficiently by those who do.

'One of the chief of these factors seems to me the smallness of the governing class. I do not suppose there is in the whole of history another example of a state with a representative government of a modern type, in which the only people who count are two or three hundred at the most. It is in fact a close oligarchy, but without the administrative experience, the education and the tradition of public service, without which as far as I can remember no oligarchies have governed successfully.

'Another factor is the complete absence of any true patriotism. This is not surprising considering the past history of the country. But it means that the foundation of all representative government—the recognition by the individual that the good of the community as a whole is identical with his own private good—does not exist here even in the most rudimentary form.'

its principal products in the world's markets, all pointed to the benefits to be derived from close association with a larger and more advanced unit of government.

I did my best, nevertheless, to give effect to the decisions of His Majesty's Government and to be guided by the spirit of their instructions. How far the result fell short of the standards and ideals at which we all aimed I am painfully aware.

'In India', wrote Lord Curzon in 1921, 'I was magnificently served. The whole spirit of service there was different. Every one there was out to do something.' In applying those words to the Civil Administration of Iraq during the period with which this work deals, I am speaking, I feel sure, for Sir Percy Cox as well as for myself, for at no time was there any substantial difference between us as to our local aims, and seldom as to means. The Civil Administration itself was, indeed, imbued with a unity of aim if not always of method, which would have done credit to a service of thirty instead of three years' standing.

More space has been devoted to a recital of departmental activities than is perhaps justified by their intrinsic historical importance, mainly because no complete account exists elsewhere in any accessible form. For the same reason I have recorded, in some detail, the correspondence that passed on the form of constitution to be set up under the Mandate, and have quoted freely from official correspondence on the subject, believing it to be in the public interest that the essential facts bearing upon the attitude and intentions of his Majesty's Government and of its local representatives should be available while the events to which they gave rise are still comparatively fresh in the minds of men. The study of interactions and interdependencies is but in its infancy and no one can foresee the end.

I have, moreover, written with the specific object of removing certain misunderstandings as to the aims and methods of the Civil Administration during and after the war. These misunderstandings gave rise to much criticism, in Parliament, in the Press, and elsewhere, on the part of many persons, some of whom were entitled by their experience in other fields to a respectful hearing.

In the course of the events here recorded, the attitude of some of those with whom I collaborated sometimes ran counter to my ideas and occasionally caused spectators to place an erroneous interpretation on my intentions; if only for this reason, the task of writing this volume has been neither easy nor agreeable. So far as my presentation of the facts is controversial, it is permissible to add that I have endeavoured to do justice to both sides of the case, and have made no statement the accuracy of which I have not been at pains to verify. *Has meus ad metas sudet oportet equus.*

With the inauguration in November 1920 by Sir Percy Cox of an Arab Government which, in other circumstances, I might have assisted him to instal (though from the first I insisted that Sir Percy Cox himself should, if possible, preside over its destinies), the Civil Administration of 'Iraq came to an end by absorption into the indigenous Government. Yet King Faisal, and his responsible ministers, are not wholly unaware of the debt which they owe to those British officers to whom it fell to wean the tribesmen and cultivators from old ways. The patient labours of political officers in deserts and marshes, their courage in face of difficulties and dangers, and their single-handed devotion to the welfare of 'Iraq did more than anything else to make possible the foundation of a new State. Many who sought in 1920 only to kill and destroy cherish their memory to-day, and the tradition of the efforts of those gallant Englishmen will survive when their names have faded from human memory. In the words of Pericles:

'They resigned to hope their unknown chance of happiness; but in the face of death they resolved to rely upon themselves alone. And when the moment came they were minded to resist and suffer, rather than to fly and save their lives; they ran away from the word of dishonour, but on the battlefield their feet stood fast, and in an instant, at the height of their fortune, they passed away from the scene, not of their fear, but of their glory. . . . The living need not desire to have a more heroic spirit, although they may pray for a less fatal issue. The value of such a spirit is not to be expressed in words. . . . Not only are they commemorated by columns and inscriptions in their own country, but in foreign lands there dwells also an unwritten memorial of them; graven not on stone but in the hearts of men. Make them your examples, and esteeming courage to be freedom and freedom to be happiness, do not weigh too nicely the perils of war.'

I have sought to tell in this volume in what manner Great Britain played her part in 'Iraq during and immediately after the Great War. Those on the spot laboured blindly, not knowing the event, but always aware that the people of 'Iraq, be they Arabs, Kurds, or Assyrians, could not for an indefinite period look to Great Britain to keep internal peace. To attempt to do so, for even a brief period, whilst entrusting to others responsibility for the administration of law, the execution of justice, and the collection of taxes, is a policy that can only bring discredit on both sides and must eventually fail. In 'Iraq as elsewhere a kingdom to be stable must in the ultimate resort be based on the character of rulers, the strength of social bonds, and the assent of the subjects. The path on which we have set the feet of the peoples of 'Iraq is steep and stony; the journey has been made more difficult by the pace at which their leaders have tried to traverse the first stages.

As Sir Henry Maine remarked with reference to India: 'the British

Nation cannot evade the duty of rebuilding upon its own principles that which it unwittingly destroys.' The idea that an Arab government can be reconstituted to-day on an improved native model is a delusion not less dangerous because it is widely believed. A country which has for any length of time been exposed to Western ideas and has come into touch with Western thought can never be the same as before. The new foundations must be of the Western, not the Eastern, type, unless indeed, so much blood be spilt and such anarchy reign that the tradition of the West be obliterated.

But we must, with George Meredith, 'look at the good future of man with some faith in it, and capacity to regard current phases of history without letting our sensations blind and bewilder us,' knowing that though for us all, the wise and the foolish, the slave and the free, for empires and anarchies, there is one end, yet do our works live after us, and by their fruits we shall be judged at the bar of history. If we have worked faithfully, then it is well. It is God who gives and takes away kingdoms. *Potestas Dei est, et tibi, Domine, misericordia.*

St. George's Day, 1931.

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PREFATORY NOTE TO CHAPTER I

Extract from *History of the Peace Conference at Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley, vol. vi, p. 178.

THE entry of Turkey into the war forced us to attack the Turkish Empire through its Arab subjects. The plan was adopted of an advance from the various extremities of the Turkish Empire. In each of these campaigns, and in the Mesopotamian campaign most of all, military success was bound to lead first to the destruction of the existing government, and next to some attempt to construct a substitute. Assuming the actual soundness, from the political point of view of the war, of a campaign in Mesopotamia, there was no reason to stop, in fact there was every reason not to stop, between the landing at Fao and the setting up of an administration for the whole of the occupied territory. If oil protection was the object, it would doubtless have cost us less to protect Abadan and the pipe-line than it actually did cost us to extend our arms and at the same time our civil obligations over the three vilayets of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul, though in the two latter there was also valuable oil. But the advance to these was apparently due to a political desire to avenge the surrender of Kut and to uphold our prestige. If the campaigns in any one theatre cost relatively more than elsewhere, it does not follow that their contribution to the general result is to be dismissed as not worth while.

The conquered territory was administered on the only possible lines, the higher officials and political officers in nearly every case being lent by the army, the subordinate clerical staff drawn from India. In posts between these two grades 'Iraqis were employed, whenever suitable or willing. But these two necessary provisos limited the field of choice. We were at war with the Turkish Empire, and most of its officials, the only people in the country with administrative experience, retired with the Turkish armies.

The Armistice brought under our control an area equal to about half the United Kingdom. The communications of this area consisted, in addition to the rivers, of about 650 miles of railway and 10 miles of macadamized roads. The administration of an area so large and so badly served by communications put a great strain on the army and on the civil government. It was a remarkable achievement, out of the resources at hand, to provide a coherent and efficient form of government for the whole.



CHAPTER I

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN MESOPOTAMIA FROM THE DEATH OF GENERAL MAUDE UNTIL THE ARMISTICE

‘(The English) join the most resolute courage to the most cautious prudence; nor have they their equals in the art of ranging themselves in battle array, and fighting in order. If to so many military qualifications they knew how to join the arts of government; if they showed a concern for the circumstances of the husbandman, and of the gentleman; and exerted as much ingenuity and solicitude in relieving and easing the people of God, as they do in whatever concerns their military affairs, no nation in the world would be preferable to them, or prove worthier of command.’

SAIYID GHULAM HUSAIN KHAN, *Seir Muta'akharin*, II. 341, circa 1783: quoted
(incorrectly) by MACAULAY, *Essay on Lord Clive*.

General Marshall succeeds General Maude. Military Policy. Question of Arab co-operation. Occupation of Middle Euphrates. Operations on Euphrates. Occupation of Kirkuk. Sir Percy Cox leaves for England. Question of advance on Mosul. Operations on Tigris. The Armistice. Occupation of Mosul wilayat.

GENERAL MARSHALL now took over temporary command of the Army, and was shortly afterwards confirmed in the appointment, to which he had other and better claims than those of rank or age.¹ Maj.-Gen. Gillman, who had lately arrived in command of the 17th Indian Division, became his Chief of Staff, and no happier combination could have been devised. The new Commander-in-Chief himself had, as he stated in his book, comparatively little administrative experience, but General Gillman's record compensated for this, and with General Ready and General Stuart-Wortley in full executive charge respectively of the Adjutant-General's and Quartermaster-General's branches at General Head-quarters there was a rapid change for the better in relations between the civil and military branches of the administration, which was reflected in the daily work of every civil department.

The military machine which the new Commander-in-Chief had inherited from his friend and predecessor, General Maude, was very efficient. Its 'morale' was high, its training satisfactory and progressively improving; the departmental situation left nothing to be desired; nor, as will have been gathered from the foregoing pages, was

¹ When General Maude was offered the chief command in Palestine vice Sir A. Murray in March 1917, just after the capture of Baghdad, he declined it, but added that if His Majesty's Government insisted on his going to Palestine, General Marshall was admirably suited to succeed him.

the general progress of the Civil Administration otherwise than satisfactory, though on the Middle Euphrates and generally in the Baghdad wilayat almost everything remained to be done. General Marshall inherited no plans or schemes of any kind from General Maude: 'there was little or nothing on record, or within anyone's personal knowledge, to show what General Maude's intentions or plans for the future had been, either as regards operations, or military and civil organization.'¹ He had at his disposal on the Baghdad front one cavalry and six infantry divisions, with a total strength of some 3,500 sabres, 66,000 rifles, and 302 guns, and reinforcements, in the shape of the first units of the 18th Division, were beginning to arrive. The total ration strength of the force was about 414,000.

A few days after he assumed command, he received from Sir William Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the following telegram, dated 22nd November:

'On your assumption of the command in Mesopotamia I think it advisable to recapitulate the instructions issued to your predecessor.

'1. The prime mission of your force is the establishment and maintenance of British influence in the Baghdad wilayat. Your mission is, therefore, primarily defensive, but, while making every possible preparation to meet attack, you should take advantage of your central position and of the superiority of your communications over those of the enemy to make your defence as active as possible and to strike at the enemy whenever he gives you an opportunity of doing so with success.


'2. You are further charged with the protection of the pipe lines and oil-fields in the vicinity of the Karun river, and with denying hostile access to the Persian Gulf. You should ensure that hostile parties do not work down south across the line Shushtar-Isfahan.

'3. As regards the Russians, the political situation in that country is so obscure as to make it impossible at present to formulate any definite plans, but you should endeavour to enlist the co-operation of the Russians in blocking the Persian frontier, and are authorized to supply such portion of General Baratoff's force as may come forward to the Persian frontier, if you can do so without detriment to the maintenance of your own force.


'4. It is important to enlist the co-operation of the Arab tribes in your theatre, and induce them to harass the enemy's communications and refuse him supplies. For this an active propaganda, which should make the most of our recent successes in Palestine and Mesopotamia, should be undertaken. As to this you will consult and be guided by Sir Percy Cox.

'5. As far as it is possible to judge the situation here, the destruction of the enemy's advanced bases at Ramadi and Tikrit, together with the successes gained in Palestine and the consequent diversion of enemy's reserves to that theatre, make it impossible for the enemy to bring against you this year a force sufficient to threaten you seriously, and make it doubtful whether he can do so before the

¹ *O.H.* iv. 86.



LIEUT.-GEN. SIR WILLIAM R. MARSHALL
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., K.C.S.I.



hot weather of 1918. Much depends on the extension of the enemy's railway to Mosul, and it is important to obtain all possible information as to this, as well as to get timely notice of enemy concentration either on the Euphrates or on the Tigris.

'6. The general situation makes it important that no more troops than are absolutely necessary for the carrying out of your mission, as defined in paragraphs 1 and 2, are locked up in Mesopotamia during the hot weather of 1918, and I therefore wish you to keep in view the possibility of reducing your forces before then, and to make all possible preparation to economize force to the fullest extent by strengthening your defences and improving your communications.

'7. It is of vital importance to economize shipping to the fullest extent, and you will therefore make every endeavour to develop local resources to that end in consultation with Sir Percy Cox.'

The outstanding features of this important communication were:

- (1) an intimation that the force in Mesopotamia might be reduced owing to the unlikelihood of offensive operations on the part of the Turks;
- (2) the continued emphasis on the desirability of enlisting Arabs to harass the enemy's communications and to refuse him supplies;
- (3) instructions to continue to enlist Russian co-operation in Persia.

As regards the first of these points, it may be remarked that all information received by General Maude during the latter half of October confirmed the unlikelihood of any important offensive being undertaken by the Turks, and as early as 20th September information in possession of the War Office pointed in the same direction. Having regard to all the circumstances as then known to us, and to the pre-occupation of the Turks in Palestine, where General Allenby's force was making rapid progress,¹ there seems to have been but little justification for the decision in September to dispatch further reinforcements to Mesopotamia, where nearly 200,000 men were already under arms.

The second point, namely Arab co-operation, requires some comment. As has already been shown, General Maude had at no time shown any desire to lend himself to any adventures in this direction, and had expressed himself strongly on the subject to Sir William Robertson. Yet the latter took the first opportunity after General Maude's death of urging its importance on his successor, subject to the proviso that he was to be guided by Sir Percy Cox, who was known in London to have regarded action on these lines as impracticable earlier in the year. It was more than ever impracticable now. Of the three lines of communication behind the Turkish front, one, via Kirkuk and

¹ Beersheba was captured on 1st November, Gaza on 6th November, Jaffa on 15th November, and Jerusalem on 9th December, 1917.

Kifri, was on the borders of territory occupied by Kurds, whose existence was seldom if ever mentioned by the War Office, though as early as December 1914 Sir Percy Cox had been in touch with Kurdish chiefs whose services might have been of use in the event of an advance on Baghdad in 1915. The country between the Tigris and the Euphrates, along which ran the Turks' remaining lines of communication, was in the hands of the Shammar Jarba', a powerful and warlike group of tribes whose summer quarters, and all but a small fraction of their winter quarters, were still in Turkish hands. They had been uniformly well treated by the Turks, who feared them and had long subsidized their chiefs: not only money, but arms and ammunition in great quantity would be required if anything at all was to be done, and the utility from a military point of view of any probable results was more than off-set, in the eyes of those in Mesopotamia, by the probable reactions after the war, and by the disturbing effect on the pacified area behind us. Nothing that had been achieved in the direction of Arab co-operation on the Palestine front up to this date gave those on the spot any reason to advocate any change of policy. We did not lack British officers capable of directing and leading such movements. Leachman, G. F. Eadie (who had raised and controlled very successfully a band of irregulars from the Muntafiq tribes, known as the Nasiriya Scouts), Dickson and half a dozen other equally competent and experienced men were available and well qualified to work on these lines, but neither Sir Percy Cox nor General Beach, who as head of the Intelligence Branch shared the responsibility for advising the Commander-in-Chief on these matters, was prepared to sponsor any such schemes. Thus it was that in Mesopotamia we ended the war, as we began it, virtually free from all promises, agreements, or other 'commitments', except such, if any, as were implicit in General Maude's proclamation to the people of the Baghdad wilayat. To the people of Basra we had said little; to the people of the Mosul wilayat we said nothing at all. Our only specific commitments were to the Shaikhs of Mohammera and Kuwait.¹

The much-discussed extension of the Baghdad railway towards Mosul by the Turks under the direction of German engineers had made little progress, and rail-head was known to be well to the west of Nisibin: it was not likely that we could find anything in this direction on which raiding-parties could usefully concentrate.

As to the third point, a policy of limited co-operation with the Russians, it is sufficient to mention that by this time Lenin and Trotski had gained the upper hand in Moscow and Petrograd, and

¹ Vide 'Loyalties' page 9.

had called on all belligerent nations to commence peace negotiations at once.¹ The presence of Russian troops in any numbers on our flank was thus likely to be a serious liability; nor at any time had it been an asset. Neither General Bicharakoff nor General Baratoff were loyal as we mean and understand the word. From the first day they drew their rations (for about 50 per cent. more effectives than they had under their command) both men were unreliable, dishonest, and insincere even for that time and place. The men were much better—honest mercenaries according to their lights.

A fortnight later, on 6th December, we heard that an Armistice between Turkey and Russia had been arranged, and on 22nd December peace negotiations opened at Brest-Litovsk. The terms of the Armistice provided for the withdrawal of all Russian and Turkish troops, and though Bicharakoff and his men remained with us, a serious mutiny amongst General Baratoff's men at Hamadan showed us which way the wind was blowing.

General Marshall lost no time in giving effect to the first and seventh paragraphs of Sir William Robertson's instructions, and at once dispatched troops to Musaiyib, the Hindiya barrage, Hilla, Kufa, Abu Sukhair, and Shinafiya on the Middle Euphrates, and shortly afterwards occupied Durraji and Samawa on the Lower Euphrates. Simultaneously he gave instructions to the Third Corps, now under General Egerton, to attack the Turks opposed to him on a line extending from Qara Tappa to the Sirwan River. The 13th Division under General Cayley was west of the Diyala; General Thomson, with the 14th Division, was east of the Diyala on the Qizil Robot plain, with General Bicharakoff's detachment; the Cavalry Division were on the Adhaim, in readiness to strike at the enemy's communications. The operations were completely successful: at a cost of some

¹ The British Socialist party were however several months ahead even of Lenin and Trotski. They met in conference at Leeds on June 3rd 1917 and listened to speeches by Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, Roden Buxton, Margaret Bondfield, C. G. Ammon, Bertrand Russell, Mr. and Mrs. Snowden and others. 'Never had precious harvest been sown with more precious seed', said Mr. Macdonald, who moved the first resolution, 'the long story of oppression and martyrdom had burst into a great flood of light, not only for Russia, but, thank God, for the whole world. The revolution had purified the world, and sweetened and ennobled the thoughts of mankind.' Mr. Snowden moved a resolution declaring that the fall of Tsardom and the consolidation of democratic principles in Russia's internal and external policy would create in the democracies of other nations new aspirations towards a stable peace and the brotherhood of nations. He was appointed, with Mr. Macdonald, Mr. Lansbury and others to assist the formation of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils. The authority for the foregoing is '*The Call*, June 7th 1917', but the general purport of these activities became known in Persia and Mesopotamia through the medium of German and Turkish leaflets, printed in many languages: they had some effect on the morale of our Russian allies, but not elsewhere.

200 casualties we seized the Sakaltutan pass on 5th December, occupied Qara Tappa, and destroyed all military stores there, taking some 250 prisoners and 2 guns, and inflicting appreciable losses on the Turks, whose casualties were estimated at about 300. We did not at this juncture remain in Qara Tappa, but held a line from the Sakaltutan pass to Khanaqin, which we now occupied for the first time.

The way was now clear to Persia, where the situation had, of course, been changed to our disadvantage by the defection of Russia. Sir Charles Marling considered that drastic remedial measures were necessary. On the 15th December he urged General Marshall to take over the protection of the Khanaqin-Hamadan road, in order to promote stability in Persia. That country's Government was being subjected to great pressure by the diplomatic agents of the Central Powers, as well as by those of Russia, and anarchy was spreading in all the provinces except those which were held in strength by the South Persia Rifles under General Sykes. General Marshall declined to accept this addition to his responsibilities, on the ground that it would entail the employment of more troops than he could spare, and would involve him in supply difficulties. In this attitude he was supported by Sir William Robertson until the latter's supersession on 18th February by Sir Henry Wilson.

As things turned out, he would perhaps have done better to accept the suggestion, the adoption of which might have enabled him to exercise a much-needed measure of control over the preliminary movements in North-West Persia of 'The Hush-Hush Brigade', as Maj.-Gen. Dunsterville's individually gallant but collectively ineffective filibusters were called. Before many months had passed General Marshall was called upon to take charge of 'Dunsterforce', and to send two Brigades (36th and 39th), plus two Battalions on the Lines of Communication, to Persia, to occupy Enzeli and Baku. These operations, which had their origin in decisions made by 'The Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet', are briefly mentioned in the following Chapter.

No further forward move took place in Mesopotamia till March, when General Brooking occupied Hit with little opposition, the Turkish Commander Shukri Bey retiring hastily—a prudent act for which he was promptly superseded.¹ General Brooking now proceeded to devise and carry out one of those encircling movements of which he had already shown himself a master. He was assisted by the 11th Cavalry Brigade and two Light Armoured Motor Batteries, under General Cassels, by some extra aeroplanes, and by a mobile column of infantry in 300 Ford vans. On 26th March operations were

¹ It is probable that the decision of his successor, Nazim Bey, to hold on to Khan Baghdadi was not unconnected with this circumstance.

initiated by General Andrew (50th Brigade) who had, during the previous night, advanced from Hit to a point south-east of Khan Baghdadi, followed by General Lucas (42nd Brigade). General Cassels's orders were 'to move with rapidity and boldness and to act vigorously throughout the operations'. General Cassels was doubtless well pleased to receive admonitions so thoroughly in keeping with his own temperament. Attached to him was a flight of aeroplanes for reconnaissance and contact purposes, whose work was of the utmost value. During the day the infantry under Generals Andrew and Lucas pinned the enemy to their position at Khan Baghdadi, until General Cassels, who was making a wide detour to the west, reached, at 5 p.m., a position astride the Wadi Hauran some ten miles to the north. Some sharp fighting followed, in which all arms played a part, the Air Force in particular showing great activity. The end came just after midnight, when the Turks, numbering about 1,000, took advantage of the bright moonlight to surrender.

General Cassels, with his armoured cars under Major Sir T. Thompson, pushed eastwards at dawn and accepted the surrender of another 2,000 prisoners. He then hastened to 'Alus, followed by the mobile column under Colonel Hogg, which occupied Haditha that morning. While the Air Force was relentlessly harassing the retreating and utterly demoralized Turks, the cavalry and the armoured cars pushed on to Fuhaima that evening, collecting on the way a number of prisoners, including Nazim Bey, the commandant of the 50th Division. The local Arab tribes now joined in, on the lines approved in Whitehall, and by pillaging detached parties and murdering stray individuals, encouraged all ranks to surrender to the first British unit they saw.

On the morning of the 28th 'Ana was occupied without opposition, and the armoured cars pushed on in the hope of rescuing Colonel Tennant (commanding the R.A.F. in Mesopotamia) and Major P. C. S. Hobart (Brigade-Major of the 8th Infantry Brigade), who while making an (unauthorized) reconnaissance by air, had been shot down and taken prisoner by Nazim Bey on 25th March.¹ The enterprise of the armoured cars under Captain D. Tod was amply rewarded, for twenty-five miles north of 'Ana they came up unobserved, and, by a combination of good luck and brilliant management, contrived to kill or scatter the Tatar escort, without annihilating the prisoners, who had already twice narrowly missed destruction at the hands of the Royal Air Force. Pushing on to a point seventy-three miles beyond 'Ana, the armoured cars captured the wireless installation and several Germans, including Herr Preusser, head of the German

¹ For a full and fascinating description of these events see Tennant and Hobart.

mission on the Euphrates, who carried with him important documents; they then returned to 'Ana, where our Cavalry were engaged in destroying Turkish munitions. A leisurely withdrawal followed to Fuhaima and finally to Haditha, which until the Armistice was the limit of our advance in this direction. General Brooking's success could scarcely have been more complete: at a total cost of about 130 casualties he had captured over 5,000 Turks, together with 18 Germans, 12 guns, and large quantities of munitions. He had rendered nugatory the systematic efforts of the Turks, of which ample evidence was visible on the road, to strengthen this front, and he had made it virtually impossible for the Germans and Turks to continue the intrigues in Najaf and Karbala, and in the Middle Euphrates, which had been encouraged during 1917 by the absence from this area of any British troops. The action is a classic example of the effective co-operation of all arms, and of the immense value of cavalry and armoured cars under vigorous leadership and skilled direction. There can be little doubt that had a Turkish offensive in Mesopotamia matured, it would have been along the Euphrates, and that tribal risings in the Middle Euphrates area would have been an integral part of Turkish strategy. Thanks to General Brooking, we had no reason to anticipate further trouble on these lines, and the Civil Administration was now for the first time free, with the energetic assistance and goodwill of the Commander-in-Chief, to take effective steps to 'extend British influence' in this part of the Baghdad wilayat.

Disregarding, for the moment, General Marshall's heavy pre-occupations in Persia, attention must now be directed to our right flank, which by this time had become the scene of a further advance by the troops of the Third Corps under General Egerton, including the 13th Division (General Cayley) and a strong force of cavalry under General Holland-Pryor. Kifri was occupied on the 28th, and Tuz Khurmatu on the 29th April, some 1,300 prisoners and 20 guns being taken, and over 200 Turks killed, at a cost of less than 200 casualties. The Turkish prisoners captured were poorly clothed and shod, and their physical condition was deplorable. It was clear that on this front, as in Palestine, they had made their maximum effort and were not likely to be capable of a fresh offensive. It had been hitherto no part of General Marshall's plans to advance beyond Tuz: he had no reason to fear for his lines of communication, but their length made great demands on his limited resources of mechanical transport, and though progress was being made on this flank with railway construction from Baghdad, it would be some months before he could obtain any appreciable relief from this source. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, however, pressed

for an immediate move on Kirkuk and Sulaimani,¹ in order to relieve Turkish pressure on Persian 'Azarbaijan by Enver Pasha, who already dominated Trans-Caucasia and was credited with the intention of occupying Tabriz and organizing a general rising against the British throughout Persia and Afghanistan. General Marshall explained to the War Office that for military reasons he could not occupy Sulaimani nor, owing to transport difficulties and to the near approach of the hot weather, could he hold Kirkuk; nevertheless, he occupied the town with little opposition on 7th May.² It was a hasty step, and, as indicated in Chapter IV, had results little short of disastrous. It was, in my view, the one false step of a man whose career in Mesopotamia was conspicuous for the good judgement displayed in reaching critical decisions. On 10th May the War Office explained that its telegram of 29th April had been sent without full knowledge of General Marshall's difficulties, and suggested the possibility of Kurdish co-operation, on the highly theoretical lines with which previous War Office telegrams had familiarized us. Had General Marshall held his hand till this tardy admission of fallibility had reached him, and kept his troops at Tuz, or had he remained in Kirkuk, the whole position in South Kurdistan during the next two years might have been different. The possibility of a Turkish offensive was remote; the transport situation, though difficult, did not seem insuperable. On 24th May we evacuated Kirkuk, which was immediately reoccupied by the Turks.

The 6th Cavalry Brigade under General Holland-Pryor pushed forward to the Lesser Zab at Altun Köpri, but retired without entering the town. The Turks hastily evacuated the place after destroying a large dump of munitions of war, but did not blow up the bridge, the destruction of which would, at a later stage of the campaign, have greatly incommoded us.

For some months no further military operations took place in Mesopotamia, and General Marshall took the opportunity in July of proceeding on leave to India. Sir Percy Cox was called to Cairo in April for discussion of Arab affairs and went on to London to report to his Majesty's Government. On his way back in August he was called upon by telegram to proceed direct to Tehran to relieve His Majesty's Minister, Sir C. Marling, who was ordered home. He

¹ This, the Kurdish form, is used throughout this book in preference to the Arabic form 'Sulaimaniya' prescribed by the Permanent Committee on Geographical Names (see Bibliography).

² He probably hoped that once he had occupied Kirkuk he would be permitted to restrict his activities in Persia; it was only when he realized that he was to be spread-eagled in both directions that he felt obliged to withdraw from Kirkuk.

passed through Baghdad the first week in September, leaving me, with the concurrence of Sir William Marshall, to continue to officiate in his place as Civil Commissioner.

During the summer months many British units had left for other fronts, their places being taken by newly raised Indian formations, whilst twelve Indian battalions were sent from Mesopotamia to Salonika. It was intended, should the war continue, to increase still further the proportion of Indian troops. India had made preparations to raise no less than sixty-seven new battalions, and to assist in training them most Indian units in Mesopotamia sent contingents of trained officers and other ranks. The Third Corps had also been heavily drawn on for troops for Persia, where the military position was becoming increasingly confused and insecure. The arrival at Baquba, in circumstances which will be explained later, of about 50,000 refugees from North-East Turkey and North-West Persia, who were exclusively dependent on us for food, clothing, and shelter, had added to our transport and supply requirements. Moreover, administrative developments under military auspices, particularly in regard to Local Resources, Agriculture, Military Roads and Works, Irrigation, Port, Railways, and Inland Water Transport, were becoming so vast as to be almost unmanageable.

On 2nd October, General Marshall, who had returned from leave, was informed by the War Office that the defection of Bulgaria and our successes in Palestine and Syria ¹ made a request from the Turks for an Armistice not unlikely. In the circumstances it was advisable that we should advance as far as possible up the Tigris, provided always that operations in Persia and the movement on the Caspian Sea, to which Government, strange as it may now seem, attached immense importance, were not in any way retarded. It was also suggested that General Marshall should send cavalry up the Euphrates towards Aleppo (a distance of 350 miles) with a view to assisting General Allenby, who, in point of fact, was in no need of such help, even had we been able to render any. So heavy had been the demands of the operations in Persia on his transport, that General Marshall replied that not more than 200 Ford vans could be made available for operations up the Tigris from Tikrit; lack of transport prevented him from advancing on Mosul, as he would have preferred, via Kirkuk, Altun Köpri, and Arbil. He deprecated any idea of movement up the Euphrates. The War Office agreed, emphasizing the importance of prompt action; but so obsessed were they with the necessity of pressing forward towards the Caspian that they stipulated that railway construction from the neighbourhood of Khanaqin towards Karmanshah must

¹ Damascus was occupied by our troops on 1st October, Beirut on 8th October, Aleppo on 25th October 1918.

have precedence over the extension of the railway from Tikrit towards Sharqat and Mosul.

The terms of an Armistice were settled at a conference of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy in Paris on 7th October. On 13th October the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid asked the Spanish Government to invite President Wilson to take upon himself the task of re-establishing peace. While this proposal was under discussion, a further Turkish offer of peace was brought by General Townshend, who, at his own suggestion, was set at liberty for the purpose by the Turks, and arrived at Mitylene on 20th October. The terms which he carried, and which he earnestly recommended for acceptance, would, if accepted, have constituted an important political success for Turkey. They are summarized by General Townshend in his book (p. 379) as follows:

1. Turkey wants to be friends with England and demands her protection.
2. England is to stop active operations at once.
3. Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, &c., to be autonomous, under Turkish sovereignty; 'England is to defend this system of Government.'
4. Financial, political, and industrial independence for Turkey.
5. A large loan to be given by England to Turkey, immediately.

'Let England do things quietly and trust Turkey as a gentleman,' said a Turk in authority, quoted with approval by Townshend (p. 380); 'that is what Turkey will appreciate.'

Fortunately for the inhabitants of Syria and Mesopotamia, and for the Zionists of the future, fortunately perhaps for Great Britain, other counsels prevailed, as will appear from the terms of the Armistice finally arranged.

Meanwhile, in Mesopotamia, every effort was made to score as heavily as possible on the Tigris before the whistle blew. This duty was entrusted to General Cobbe, and by 22nd October all was in readiness for an advance. The Turks were strongly entrenched in the Fat-ha gorge on either side of the Tigris, and on the Lesser Zab, to the number of about 5,500 rifles and 42 field-guns, with some 2,500 rifles and 30 guns in and around Altun Köpri and Kirkuk under the command of 'Ali Ihsan Pasha. General Cobbe had at his disposal the 18th Division, under Maj.-Gen. Fanshawe, and the 17th Division under Maj.-Gen. Leslie, operating respectively on the left and right banks of the Tigris. The two Cavalry Brigades were to operate under General Cassels on the left bank, and the Light Armoured Motor Brigade, to which was attached Lt.-Col. Gerard Leachman, was entrusted with a special mission on the right bank.

On the 23rd General Lewin's Brigade evicted the Turks from Taza Khurmatli and drove them back towards Kirkuk. On the night of the

23rd/24th, the Turks, to General Cobbe's surprise, evacuated their position without becoming seriously engaged. Our troops pushed forward through the gorge, but found the road so badly damaged as to be impassable even for pack transport. The Sappers and Pioneers hastened forward to repair the damage, but so thoroughly had the Turks done their work that it was not until midday that progress could be made through the gorge on the left bank, whilst on the right bank guns could not pass till the 25th.

The Cavalry Brigades crossed the Jabal Hamrin during the 23rd October through the Darb-al-Khail and 'Ain Nukhaila passes, which we had occupied on the 18th. Moving rapidly forward, the 7th Cavalry Brigade reached the junction of the Lesser Zab and the Tigris by midday, and a patrol pushed across the Lesser Zab captured several prisoners. The 11th Cavalry Brigade, taking three days' rations in Ford cars, forced a passage across the Lesser Zab a mile below Zarariya under artillery and rifle fire, and before dusk on the 24th had worked round the Turks' left flank and forced them to retire. On the 25th the 7th Cavalry Brigade crossed the Lesser Zab after a sharp skirmish at Shumait (half-way between its confluence with the Tigris and the village of Zarariya) and advanced up the Tigris to within five miles of Sharqat, taking a hundred prisoners on the way. The 53rd Infantry Brigade followed them, and crossed the Little Zab by dusk. Fighting was now in progress on a line running nearly north and south from Sharqat, which the Light Armoured Motor Brigade had found occupied by 1,000 infantry with guns, to 'Ain Dibs and Mushak, on the west and east sides respectively of the north-western extension across the Tigris of the Jabal Hamrin, here known as the Jabal Mak-hul.

The last-named position was strongly held and obstinately defended by the Turks. It was a difficult position to attack, for it dominated the broken ground to the south and east, which itself afforded few positions for our guns. The Turks had made good use of their opportunities, and of their knowledge of the ground, and this was only partially counter-balanced by the progress we had made up the left bank, whence our artillery could afford little effective support. Across the Tigris main channel, a mile south of Mushak, lay the p.s. *Hamidiya*, stranded and abandoned; close by, on the left bank, was a maze of trenches and wire entanglement so well concealed that their presence had not been detected by our airmen. At dawn on the 26th the 51st Brigade under General Hildyard attacked, and at once came under heavy fire from these trenches. The 1st Highland Light Infantry and the 14th Sikhs came under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, and suffered severely, but continued to advance steadily and gallantly till they were checked by the enemy's wire. Our artillery did what they could to support

them, and themselves suffered heavily, the 403rd Battery in particular having 25 casualties, including the 220th Artillery Brigade Commander, Lt.-Col. R. K. Lynch-Staunton, who was mortally wounded. The 34th Infantry Brigade under General Wauchope came to their support, and two companies of the 114th Mahrattas, under heavy artillery and rifle fire, pushed ahead to an island in the bed of the Tigris, which they held for the rest of the day, incurring nearly 100 casualties, equivalent to over a quarter of their strength.

The position which confronted General Cobbe at dusk was one of unusual complexity. The net had almost closed round the Turks, for the Light Armoured Motor Battery was astride the road to Mosul, north of Sharqat. Part of the 11th Cavalry Brigade under General Cassels had with difficulty forded the Tigris just below Hadraniya, and had taken up a strong position across the Sharqat-Mosul road at Huwaish. They were, however, very short of supplies, having eaten all their rations, and being cut off from further supplies for the moment by shortage of transport, which greatly hampered General Cobbe's activities in every direction. On the other hand, the Turks were still undefeated, and the cavalry at Huwaish were not as yet strong enough to resist a determined attempt on the part of the Turks to break through in this direction. Had the enemy, during the night of the 26th/27th, decided to do so, there can be small doubt that they would have escaped with little loss, for our infantry were exhausted, our cavalry partly immobilized by shortage of transport and supplies on the left bank of the Tigris, and our artillery unable, owing to difficulties of terrain, to move rapidly forward. Rail-head was still at Tikrit¹ and communications were difficult.

At dawn on 27th October, the 17th Division, which had been ordered to attack vigorously along the crest of the Jabal Mak-hul, found that the Turks had deserted the Balalij-'Ain Dibs line, and a general advance on both sides of the Tigris was ordered. General Cassels' position at Huwaish seemed somewhat precarious; though his line of communication on the left bank was intact, it was not till 7.45 a.m. that he realized that he no longer had the support of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which had moved back owing to supply difficulties. He was, however, confident that he could hold the enemy till the attack of the 17th Division developed, and the 63rd Squadron R.A.F. was ordered to be in readiness to support him by bombing operations should need arise. On the left bank, General Sanders's column moved forward rapidly to Huwaish before dawn on 28th October, and began to cross the river by the ferry established by General Cassels, who was joined that night after a march of forty-five miles

¹ It reached Abu Rajash, sixteen miles north of Tikrit, on the 29th.

by General Norton with the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which lost several men and horses whilst crossing the river at Hadraniya in the darkness. On the right bank the country was so difficult, and the roads so bad, that touch with the Turks was lost. If only to relieve the pressure on General Cassels, it was essential to push on, and General Cobbe demanded fresh efforts from his hungry and exhausted troops, who responded nobly.

General Wauchope's column started at 3 a.m. on the 28th from Qalat al Bint, north of the Humr plain, Colonel Coningham's started six hours later from Balalij, both converging on the Turkish position south of Sharqat, but such were the difficulties of the ground that it was midday before they came in contact with the enemy, who were as usual strongly entrenched in a well-chosen position. The attack was led by the 2nd Royal West Kents, who were only some 400 strong, owing to a severe outbreak of influenza. It was brilliantly directed by Lt.-Col. Woulfe-Flanagan and boldly executed, but at heavy cost, the West Kents alone losing over a quarter of their numbers. Within an hour the enemy's front-line trenches were entered; the 114th Mahrattas, who had been held in reserve, were pushed in, and half an hour later, at about 2 p.m., the enemy's second line was in our hands, together with 11 machine-guns and some 200 prisoners. To pursue the rapidly retreating Turks was at the moment impossible: men and animals were alike thirsty and exhausted, some of the horses having been without water for sixty hours.

Whilst these hard-fought operations were in progress, General Cassels was heavily engaged at Huwaish. He had been joined by General Sanders's column, with much-needed supplies of shrapnel. He was engaged with enemy detachments to the north, as well as with advanced parties of the enemy's main body to the south, who during the day brought some twenty-four guns into action against him. The situation was saved by his ability to hold his ground and to 'contain' the Turks, owing to the timely arrival at Hadraniya during the afternoon of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which now came under his orders. His line was some four miles long, extending from the Tigris into very broken ground on his right flank, which was covered by the Light Armoured Motor Brigade, and from noon until dusk his force was continuously engaged in an active fire-fight with parties of Turkish infantry which, supported by guns, were endeavouring to break through. Thanks to the accurate shooting of our artillery and of our machine-guns, supported from the air by the 63rd Squadron R.A.F., these efforts, which were maintained throughout the night, were unsuccessful. There can, however, be little doubt that had the Turks pressed the attack more vigorously, they would have been at all events

partially successful. They seem, however, to have been even more hampered than we were by bad communications, owing to the great area over which the fighting was proceeding. For whatever reason, their efforts were half-hearted, and though a few detachments escaped from the net the bulk of the Turkish force were found next morning in their positions of the previous evening. At dawn General Cassels received further reinforcements from General Sanders, including 'V' Battery Royal Horse Artillery. Thus strengthened, and having ascertained from air reports that the main body of Turkish troops was still in position, he sent the 7th Cavalry Brigade northwards to deal with any hostile detachments he might find. General Norton moved out accordingly, only to come under fire from a bluff over a hundred feet above the plain bordering the Tigris bank. It was necessary to capture this position without delay if further progress was to be made. After artillery preparation, and under the protection of an accurate barrage, the 13th Hussars advanced to the attack at the gallop, and succeeded in reaching 'dead' ground at the foot of the bluff without a single casualty. This done, they dismounted, fixed bayonets, and swarmed up the hill, led by their commanding officer, Colonel J. J. Richardson. To quote General Norton's account:¹

'As the barrage lifted, the Hussars, still led by their Colonel, charged over the crest, shot or bayoneted such Turks as still confronted them in the trenches, and then, rapidly forming line to the right, swept along the crest to deal with the Turks who were still holding their position at the north end of the hill. As soon as the Hussars' attack had gained the crest, the 13th and 14th Lancers quickly mounted and galloped round to the west and north, capturing the enemy's two guns, and cut off the retreat of the Infantry, retiring before the attack of the 13th Hussars. Seeing their retreat entirely cut off, the whole Turkish force surrendered. In this successful operation 2 mountain guns, 12 machine guns and 982 unwounded prisoners were taken, and there was a considerable number of Turkish dead and wounded on the hill. This enemy force consisted of the whole of the 13th Regiment which had been sent from the 5th Division in Persia to reinforce the army of Haqqi Bey.'

This bold action greatly facilitated General Cassels's further movements: his northern front was now clear, and he was free to use all the troops at his disposal to strengthen the net in which the Turks were enclosed. A few hours later, at about 4 p.m., the 17th Division launched its attack upon the Turks. The broken nature of the ground, the difficulty of communication, and the exhaustion of all arms of the service made it impossible for the General Staff closely to supervise the successive stages of the attack, and the position was further complicated by shortage of gun-ammunition and by the darkness which

¹ Durand, p. 300.

supervened whilst the fighting was still at its height. British and Indian units fought with equal gallantry, and the casualties sustained, totalling 500 out of 3,000 engaged, testify to the severity of the fighting, which continued till long after dark.

At day-break on 30th October the eyes of the haggard troops were cheered by the sight of a forest of white flags in the trenches opposite them; at 7.30 a.m. the whole of the Turkish force on the Tigris, headed by its commander, Ismail Haqqi Bey, surrendered to our arms, and the destruction of the Turkish Sixth Army was practically complete: all that remained was a force of about 1,650 rifles and 32 guns at Mosul and some 1,500 rifles and 12 guns on the way thither from Altun Köpri, which General Lewin's column had occupied early on the 31st. General Cobbe immediately took steps to exploit his victory to the fullest extent, but shortage of supplies and of transport prevented an immediate forward move except by the 7th and 11th Cavalry and the Light Armoured Motor Brigades, which reached Qaiyara, some forty miles from Mosul, on the evening of 31st October. Advancing on the 1st November, General Cassels was met at Hammam 'Ali, fourteen miles south of Mosul, by a flag of truce from 'Ali Ihsan Pasha, with a letter to General Marshall regarding armistice negotiations. From the officers who bore the message General Cassels learned that an armistice had been signed,¹ and that from noon on 31st October hostilities were to cease. A few hours later he received by aeroplane a note from 1st Corps Head-quarters to the same effect.

So far as concerned hostilities between the Turkish and British forces in Mesopotamia, the last shot had been fired. General Marshall had outmanœuvred, outmarched, and outwitted his opponents: between the 18th and 30th October he had captured over 11,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 2 steamers, and much war material at a cost of about 1,800 casualties, of which 1,500 were from the 17th Division. In spite of very great difficulties he had accomplished, in the most striking manner, all that he set out to do. General Cassels's brilliant leadership of the Cavalry and the Light Armoured Car Brigades, the fine marching and splendid courage of the infantry and the not less remarkable feats of the sorely-tried artillery, the enterprise of the Royal Air Force, and the patient endurance of the transport services—all had contributed to a success which deserves immortality no less than the operations that led to the capture of Baghdad. As Napier said of Albuera: 'The battle is nobly won when the victor reels as he places the laurel upon his bleeding front.' We had defeated 'Ali Ihsan Pasha on the field of battle: it still remained for us to encounter him in

¹ On board H.M.S. *Agamemnon* at Mudros on 30th October, on a table which is on view in the Imperial War Museum.

council. He was to prove himself not less competent as a diplomatist than as a soldier.

It was not until 2nd November that we received at Baghdad from the War Office orders to occupy Mosul, coupled with the detailed terms of the Armistice, including the following conditions which were of special importance to us, viz.:

(5) Immediate demobilization of the Turkish army except for such troops as are required for surveillance of frontiers and for the maintenance of internal order. (Number of effectives and their disposition to be determined later by the Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.)

(7) The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategical points in the event of a situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies.

(10) Allied occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.

(11) Immediate withdrawal of Turkish troops from North-West Persia to behind the pre-war frontier.

(15) Allied control officers to be placed on all railways, including portions of Trans-Caucasian railways now under Turkish control, which must be placed at the free and complete disposal of the Allied authorities, due consideration being given to the needs of the population.

This clause to include Allied occupation of Batum. Turkey will raise no objection to the occupation of Baku by the Allies.

(16) Surrender of all garrisons in Hijaz, Asir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia to the nearest Allied Commander; and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia, except those necessary to maintain order, to be determined under clause Five.

(24) Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of the equipment, arms, and ammunition, including transport, of that portion of the Turkish army which is demobilized under clause Five.

(23) Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

(24) In the case of disorder the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of the six 'Armenian' wilayats.

(25) Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey to cease from noon, local time, on Thursday, 31st October 1918.

Needless to say, these terms were drawn up from a purely naval and military point of view, and were not intended to bear any relation to the territorial settlement to be imposed by the Allies at the Peace Conference. From a military point of view they were, as General Marshall remarks, 'clumsily drawn up, to say the least of it, and out-of-date military terms employed, so that 'Ali Ihsan was prepared to drive a coach-and-four through many of the articles'. From our local point of view everything turned on the meaning of the word 'Mesopotamia', which was not in current official or diplomatic use in Turkey: was it open to us, under the Armistice, to regard Mosul and the Mosul wilayat as forming part of 'Mesopotamia'¹ and to demand the sur-

¹ For a fuller discussion of this point see Report of Commission of League of Nations on

render of all 'garrisons' therein? What did the word 'garrison' mean? Had the Armistice been concluded a few days later, the point would not have arisen. As things stood, it was all-important: it was, however, soon settled, so far as we were immediately concerned, by the terms of the instructions received from the War Office.

For some months past I had, with General Marshall's approval, been in telegraphic communication with Government as to the desirability of extending the scope of our war aims to the Mosul wilayat. I had pointed out that, whether it was ultimately to be in the French or the British 'sphere of interest', it was essential that it should be occupied by British troops before or from the moment that hostilities ceased. I did not, of course, foresee that nearly five years would elapse before the conclusion of peace with Turkey and that it would be nearly eight years before the Turks finally abandoned their claims to the Mosul wilayat, but I contended vehemently that a bird in the military hand was worth many in the thorny thickets of diplomacy, and that in dealing with Turkey a valid post-war title could be obtained by the Allies only by securing possession at the Armistice. I further represented, and rightly or wrongly continued for many months after the Armistice to urge, that whatever form of government might ultimately be established in Mesopotamia, it was vital to its effective continuance that it should cover the three wilayats of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. It is fortunately no longer necessary to refer to the arguments adduced in support of this thesis, which ran counter to the theories underlying the Sykes-Picot agreement, and to the tentative instructions already promulgated by H.M.'s Government as to the future governance of the wilayats of Basra and Baghdad respectively. *Exitus acta probat.* These views were finally accepted by the League of Nations, subject to certain suggested safeguards for the Kurdish and non-Arab minorities,¹ and are embodied in the Treaties which form the charter of the Government of 'Iraq to-day. As the outcome, it may be presumed, of this correspondence, General Marshall had been urged by the War Office, as already stated, to gain as much ground as possible up the

frontier between 'Iraq and Turkey, 1924, c. 400, M. 147, 1925. See also Marshall, p. 323 sqq. and p. 22 below.

¹ Population of wilayat of Mosul, according to census of 'Iraq Government, 1922-4:

Kurds	494,007
Arabs	166,941
Christians	61,336
Turks	38,652
Yazidis	26,257
Jews	11,897

801,090

Tigris towards Mosul, though only a few months previously (on 18th July) they had insisted that priority should be given to railway construction from Baghdad into Persia, and from Nasiriya to Hilla, over the extension of the railway from Samarra northwards to Tikrit and beyond. Commanders in the field, however, still have a certain discretion in the execution of their allotted tasks, and the Director of Railways, General Lubbock, under General Marshall's instructions, contrived to ensure the completion of the line to Tikrit and beyond in time for this advance: without it, we could not have advanced beyond the Jabal Hamrin.

General Marshall was satisfied, from the tenor of the telegrams that had reached me from the India Office, that it was the intention, as it was in the interests, both of the British Government and of the Allies, that he should occupy Mosul, and before the terms of the Armistice reached him he instructed General Cassels, in the cause of law and order, to push on at once to that town. This order reached General Cassels just before midnight of 1st/2nd November, a few hours after he had received from 'Ali Ihsan Pasha a letter requesting him to return to Qaiyara, the point reached by the British force at the moment the Armistice was signed. On the morning of 2nd November, Leachman left for Mosul with a letter in which General Cassels announced that his orders were to advance and occupy Mosul; he hoped to do so without conflict. He requested 'Ali Ihsan Pasha to withdraw his troops at least five miles clear of Mosul, leaving only sufficient guards to prevent disorder till they could be relieved. Leachman returned at midday with the report that 'Ali Ihsan Pasha would not leave Mosul, but would evacuate the hills south of and commanding Mosul, which General Cassels might occupy if he so wished. This was followed by an interview between General Cassels and 'Ali Ihsan Pasha, as an outcome of which General Cassels telegraphed as follows to General Marshall:

'Have just returned after concluding with 'Ali Ihsan an arrangement which under circumstances prevailing this morning is satisfactory from every point of view. I am to advance to a line mutually agreed upon within about two miles of Mosul, which Turks will continue to occupy for the present, giving us every facility for maintenance of law and order which at present is quite satisfactory. In addition have made preliminary arrangements for purchase from Turks direct of supplies to meet our requirements as far as available. To-night I hold hills commanding Mosul and plain in which it lies and will take up forward line tomorrow. Interview throughout most friendly.'

General Marshall at once replied:

'Under Clause 7 of Armistice conditions, Allies have right to occupy any strategical points and War Office have ordered the occupation of Mosul. This



order should be carried out and not limited to location of troops near Mosul as laid down in my former order. Please also note that Clause 16 orders surrender of all garrisons in Mesopotamia to nearest Allied Commander.'

General Cassels thereupon advanced and occupied tactical points surrounding the city and all its main approaches; neither he nor General Cobbe, however, could prevail upon 'Ali Ihsan Pasha to surrender the town, or the force under his command, without specific orders from the Turkish Government, as he claimed that Mosul and its environs was not within 'Mesopotamia' and that he was therefore under no obligation to surrender his force, which was in any case a field army and not a 'garrison'. General Marshall did not wait for a decision on these points from home, but proceeded at once to Mosul to bring matters to a head, and a conclusion. At a conference at Mosul on 7th November, in which I was privileged to take part, General Marshall informed 'Ali Ihsan Pasha bluntly that he was not prepared to argue any of the points raised;¹ that he was determined to take over the whole of the Mosul wilayat, and that if 'Ali Ihsan resisted, he would be held personally responsible for any blood which might be shed. He laid down the following terms, requiring 'Ali Ihsan Pasha to accept and sign them forthwith:

- (1) That he and the whole of his troops should be clear of the Mosul wilayat within ten days.
- (2) That they should move by échelons, the first contingent to start the following day.
- (3) That the infantry might take their rifles and the ammunition in their bandoliers, the field artillery their guns and ammunition in the limbers.
- (4) That all large-calibre guns and howitzers as well as aeroplanes, bombs, arsenals, and stores should be handed over to General Fanshawe, who would give a receipt for them.
- (5) That all échelons moving out should do so via Mosul and pass a British examining post.
- (6) That all British and Indian prisoners of war in the hands of the Turks should be at once released and repatriated.

Stipulations were also made in the interest of the civil population and the local government, for which we should hereafter be responsible.² Civilian prisoners in jail were not to be released, but were to be handed over to us for custody, with proper records of the offences for which they had been convicted or arrested.

No civilians, whether official or unofficial, were to be permitted to accompany the army, either voluntarily or under compulsion. All civil records were to be handed over to us intact, at such time as might be convenient to us, by the competent civil officials throughout the wilayat,

¹ See Marshall.

² See *Official History*.

whom we undertook to repatriate—should they so desire—or to maintain on half pay pending a final settlement of the future of the wilayat. 'Ali Ihsan Pasha was further required to provide us with a list of all places in the wilayat at which troops or civil police detachments were known to exist, and to give instructions to local leaders at such places to assume responsibility for law and order until such time as officials appointed by the British Government could take over from them.

These were generous conditions, but it will be readily understood that they were not acceptable to 'Ali Ihsan Pasha, who protested they went far beyond the terms of the Armistice. General Marshall reiterated¹ that he was not prepared to discuss the question, and eventually, after a conference lasting for several hours, 'Ali Ihsan Pasha signed, under protest, the document prepared for him.

Lt.-Col. Leachman, who was appointed Military Governor of Mosul and Political Officer in charge of the wilayat, lost no time in taking over from the Qadhi; never perhaps in his life was fiery energy and irresistible driving power used to better advantage. Twenty-four hours after 'Ali Ihsan Pasha had signed the conditions set forth above Turkish flags were still flying over every public building, Turkish officers were still busy selling military stores, and Turkish officials, great and small, were secreting or burning Turkish civil records, whilst several Turkish police officials were reported to be raising Kurdish irregulars to resist the extension of our influence in the wilayat. Leachman wasted no time in issuing proclamations: having given verbal orders to all and sundry that any one found abroad after dark would be shot at sight, he made, with the assistance of officers lent him by General Cassels, a series of raids on the houses of Turkish officials, as well as on their offices, impounding the records, and taking into custody those whom he suspected of theft and other malpractices. A few inhabitants found in the act of pillaging were shot: some leading local notables were appointed to official positions, with good salaries, and told to provide local police until permanent arrangements could be made. The outcome was satisfactory to all concerned.

General Marshall's promptitude in action and pertinacity in council had results of incalculable importance. Had he awaited the communication which he received twenty-four hours later from the War Office, he would have been in a far less favourable position to negotiate with 'Ali Ihsan Pasha. This communication directed Admiral Calthorpe, the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, who had charge of negotiations at Constantinople, to request the Turkish Government

¹ See Marshall's dispatch of 1st February 1919. *London Gazette*, 8.4.19 (Supp.) and Turkish Red Book, *La Question de Mossoul*, April 1925.

to issue orders to 'Ali Ihsan Pasha to evacuate 'Mosul' under Clause 7. The telegram added that though, under Clause 16, 'Ali Ihsan should undoubtedly surrender with his 'garrison', H.M.'s Government was prepared to concede this point provided he handed over his arms under Clause 20 and removed his force to such place as General Marshall might direct. As regards Clause 5, continued the telegram, it was not considered necessary that any Turkish troops should remain for the maintenance of internal order in the Mosul wilayat or where General Marshall did not require them. Admiral Calthorpe was to point out to the Turkish Government that failure to comply, within such period as might be specified by General Marshall, would involve the seizure of 'Mosul' by our arms.

It will be observed that the abandonment by the Turks of the Mosul wilayat, was not clearly specified: 'Ali Ihsan Pasha could, once more, have evaded the issue; further *pourparlers* at Constantinople would have been necessary, and as it was, at the time, out of the question for us to advance beyond the environs of Mosul, or to renew hostilities with Turkey on such grounds, the outcome would almost certainly have been that Turkish Civil authorities would have remained, supported by Turkish troops disguised as *gendarmarie*, throughout the wilayat north of the town of Mosul, and we should have had no right or means to eject them.

Thanks to General Marshall we had established, *de facto*, the principle that the Mosul wilayat is part of 'Iraq, to use the geographical expression which, in order to avoid the vague connotations of 'Mesopotamia',¹ we employed after the Armistice to denote the three wilayats. We had done so in accordance with what we had every reason to believe were the wishes of H.M.'s Government and of the Allies, but in spite of rather than by reason of the terms of the Armistice, which were not only ambiguous but inconsistent with the interpretation placed on them by the War Office. A smaller man than General Marshall would have awaited instructions on such a matter, and would have interpreted them meticulously when received. A more choleric man would have insisted on the surrender of 'Ali Ihsan Pasha's army, and thus added to our administrative burdens the duty of feeding another two or three thousand men. General Marshall, with supreme good sense, adopted the happy mean; and by securing the addition of the whole wilayat of Mosul to 'The Territories of Mesopotamia in the

¹ The name Mesopotamia probably came into use among the Greeks after the conquests of Alexander. It is in fact merely a translation of the name Aram-Naharaïm, 'Syria of the two rivers', by which the district was known to the Jews, and doubtless to the other Semitic nations. Arrian expressly tells us (*Anab.* vii. 7, § 3) that it was a native appellation. Among extant Greek authors it is first found in Polybius (v. 44, 48).

occupation of the Armed Forces of His Britannic Majesty' he at once set the coping-stone on his military achievements, and, whether for the woe or weal of the inhabitants it is too soon to say, laid the foundation stone of the future State of 'Iraq. *Καλὸν γὰρ τὸ εἶθλον*: unless the Government of 'Iraq is inspired with wider ideals, consequent on its admission to the League of Nations, and with new resources, we can hardly complete the words of Socrates by adding *καὶ ἡ ἐλπίς μεγάλη*.

CHAPTER II

THE ADVANCE TO THE CASPIAN †

‘The abandonment of the Dardanelles led to the diversion of the Allied military forces on a scale far larger than its most ardent advocates had ever contemplated. . . . Out of the twenty liberated Turkish divisions eleven went to the Caucasus . . . adding to the burdens which Russia had to bear. . . . The three campaigns which had either begun or were imminent from Salonika, from Egypt or in Mesopotamia, all grew rapidly into very great undertakings, and all continued until the last day of the war to make enormous drains upon the British resources. . . .’

W. S. CHURCHILL, *The World Crisis*, ii. 509.

Events in Russia. General Dunsterville's Mission. Occupation of Enzeli. Eastern Committee of War Cabinet. Embarrassments in Mesopotamia consequent on Military commitments in Persia. Famine in N.W. Persia. Persian misapprehension and resentment. Railway Survey from Khanaqin to Hamadan. Christian refugees. Assyrian mountaineers; their military virtues. Attempted repatriation. Developments in Persia. Mr. Edwin Montagu and Lord Curzon.


IT is now necessary for the purpose of this narrative to ask the reader to apply his mind to the course of events in Persia, in the Caucasus, and in the Caspian Sea. Obscure as was the situation in Russia consequent on the Turco-Russian Armistice of 6th December 1917, it was, from the point of view of the Allies, by no means without hope. There were still important elements in Russia which in no way acknowledged Bolshevik authority and disclaimed any intention of making peace with the Central Powers, and these his Majesty's Government decided to support, as the best means of keeping employed enemy troops who would otherwise be available for use against us in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Persia, and possibly further eastward. It was, moreover, incumbent upon us to do what we could to prevent supplies, especially of petroleum from the great oil-fields of Baku, from reaching the Central Powers.

It was with this object and no other that Government decided, in December 1917, to dispatch, under the orders of Maj.-Gen. Dunsterville, a Mission consisting of an armoured car detachment and a number of British officers, charged with the duty of raising and organizing local forces of Armenians and Georgians in the Caucasus, especially at Tiflis. The possession of this town would give the Turco-German armies control of the railway and pipe-lines between Batum and Baku, the mineral wealth of the Caucasus, then as now the sole

† Authorities consulted: Callwell (2), Dickson, Donohue, Dunsterville, Dyer, Ironside, Kennion, Marshall, Moberly, Ronaldshay, Rawlinson, Sykes.



MAJ.-GEN. L. C. DUNSTERVILLE
C.B., C.S.I.



source of manganese ores adjacent to Europe, and would enable them to obtain supplies of grain and cotton from the countries bordering on the Caspian Sea. It was, moreover, necessary to consider the inevitable effect of the Turco-Russian armistice in Persia, where, in December 1917, the Russians were holding the road from Khanaqin to the Caspian. The terms of the Armistice, indeed, provided for the withdrawal from Persia of the troops of both Russia and Turkey, but it was obviously unlikely that Germany or Turkey would consent to give effect to this stipulation so far as it affected their operations against the Allies. One hundred and ten thousand German and Austrian prisoners were interned in Russian Turkistan and half as many more in Siberia, and it was thought that they might easily be organized into a formidable force with which to invade Afghanistan, whose people needed little encouragement to commence hostilities against British India, though it was afterwards learned that not more than 30,000 of the prisoners had survived the ravages of typhus. The ruler of Afghanistan, Amir Habibullah Khan, had hitherto maintained neutrality in face of the strongest pressure, moral and religious, and had told the German Mission that waited on him at Kabul that a German force must appear on the scene before he could venture to repudiate his solemn engagements with Great Britain. It seemed likely that soon the choice before him would be a narrow one—to abandon his British Allies or his throne.

To counteract these and other grave menaces, additional strength was added to the Eastern Persia Cordon stretching from Quetta to Meshed, which had been called into existence earlier in the war by the British and Russian Governments to prevent the infiltration of Turkish and German emissaries into Afghanistan. A Mission under General Malleon was dispatched to Meshed and eventually to Russian Turkistan to organize intelligence and local resources in preparation for a force of considerable size, the dispatch of which to this region was in contemplation to deal with the Turco-German menace, should it mature.¹ With these developments, which were controlled exclusively from India, we are not concerned; one cannot help thinking, however, that it might have been better to avoid the immense dispersal of military effort involved by these adventures, and to concentrate our attention on the Indo-Afghan frontier, where troops could be maintained and supplied easily and cheaply.

To assist in the execution of the policy entrusted to General Malleon's Mission, my friend Lt.-Col. F. M. Bailey, formerly of the 32nd Sikh Pioneers, who was on political duty at Shushtar, was sent, at the request of the Government of India, in February 1918 to Chinese

¹ See Moberly, Dickson, Dyer, Sykes.

Turkistan by way of Gilgit. The only record of his adventures that has hitherto seen the light is his paper read to the Central Asian Society in 1920. His assistant, Captain Blacker, has given to the world an account of the vicissitudes of the Mission, in which fiction blends agreeably with fact.¹ It would scarcely be gathered from its pages that Colonel Bailey was the responsible head of the Mission, which, during its passage through Chinese Turkistan, naturally came under the supreme control of Sir George Macartney, whose unique experience and ripe wisdom was invaluable during those difficult days.

General Dunsterville arrived at Baghdad on his way to Enzeli in January 1918. He was a man of fine physique, great energy, and commanding personality, with some experience of Russians and a good knowledge of their language. By his instructions from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff he was appointed Chief of the British Mission to the Caucasus and also British representative at Tiflis. His sphere of work was to extend over all Russian and Turkish territory south of the main chain of the Caucasus, over which the Federal Republic of the Trans-Caucasian peoples claimed control, i.e. Armenia, Georgia, Azarbaijan, and Daghistan. His Mission was originally intended to consist of 150 officers and 300 N.C.O.'s chosen from every front, but on 10th January, long before his party could assemble at Baghdad, he started off with 12 officers for Enzeli, some 650 miles distant by road, in the hope of reaching Baku. On arrival at Enzeli, on 17th February, he found the Bolsheviks in complete control. They were fully aware of the objects of General Dunsterville's Mission and had received orders to prevent its onward progress. They hesitated, however, to arrest the Mission, as also did a local chieftain, Kuchik Khan, who with his 'Jangali' adherents was at the moment in friendly relations with them and with Turkish and German agents. The Bolshevik Government at Baku had dispatched Red Guards to effect the arrest, but they arrived just too late. It had become clear to General Dunsterville that his 'bluff' had failed; he left Enzeli on 20th February, and on 25th February, without casualties, but not without some loss of prestige, reached Hamadan. Here he found the Russian Generals Bicharakoff and Baratoff with a force of some 1,200 men, known as the 'Partisanski', upon whom little reliance could be placed.²

Neither General Marshall nor I (as Acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia and Chief Political Officer in Western Persia) had any sort of responsibility for 'Dunsterforce', and we both assumed that the War Office, which had dispatched the Mission under instructions from the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet, would realize from the circumstances attending the first reception of the Mission at

¹ *On Secret Patrol in High Asia*. See also Etherton.

² See Kennion.

Enzeli that the position in the Caucasus (where Colonel Pike was British Military Agent) and on the Caspian was unlikely to respond to treatment on the lines originally laid down in their instructions to General Dunsterville. These lines, it may be noted, were broadly speaking in accordance with the views expressed by Sir William Robertson.¹

'What was needed (in Persia and Trans-Caspia) was to despatch to the centres of intrigue and disaffection a few Englishmen of the right type to give our version of the state of affairs, furnish them with money to pay handsomely for intelligence and other services rendered, and provide them with just sufficient escort to ensure their personal safety.'

Sir W. Robertson adds, with reference to the year 1916, that measures of this kind were successfully initiated: I can only say that I know of no such case in Persia. On the contrary, Sir Percy Sykes's Mission, like the Eastern Persia Cordon, led directly to the dispatch of troops from India, and the limited success that attended the effort made was in each case proportionate rather to the number of British and Indian troops involved than to the money expended.

The Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet, undeterred by discouraging reports from Tiflis, Baku, and Enzeli, yielded to the importunities of the British Minister at Tehran, Sir Charles Marling, and General Dunsterville, who had for some time past been pressing for the dispatch to Persia of two Divisions from Mesopotamia, and on 6th March General Marshall received instructions to keep open the road to Kirmanshah, with an intimation that it might be necessary later to develop this policy considerably, and extend towards Hamadan. General Marshall received these orders with surprise and dismay. Only a few weeks before he had sent General Gillman to Cairo to confer on his behalf with General Smuts, who had been deputed by Government to confer with the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and with General Allenby, with a view to advising the War Cabinet on the best use of all our resources. General Marshall was aware that a campaign in the Caucasus, based on Mesopotamia, formed no part of General Smuts's recommendations, and he felt strongly that it could not possibly be successful.

'From a purely military point of view', he writes in his book, 'the creation of another seven hundred miles of communications, and most of that distance through a mountainous country with a mere track as a road, seemed to me to be madness.

'If the Turks moved forces to the Caucasus why should we conform? Why hand over the strategic initiative to one's enemy? Strike at his vitals instead. I suggested that my rôle should be a move in the direction of Mosul and the

¹ Robertson i. 273.

establishment of the Cavalry Division on the Lesser Zab, from whence the whole of the great granary of the Turks, the Arbil District, would come under our control. But Sir Charles Marling and "Dunsterforce", supported by the Eastern Committee, prevailed, and, though for some time bad weather enabled me to postpone the evil day, I eventually received direct orders to carry out this, in my opinion mad, enterprise.'

The Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet, under the forceful chairmanship of Lord Curzon, held very different views. German ambitions in Mesopotamia and Palestine had been foiled, only to be diverted to the Caucasus and the Caspian. In an address to the Imperial War Cabinet on 25th June 1918,¹ Lord Curzon explained at some length the significance to Great Britain of this new menace.

'Germany', he said, 'can afford to give up everything she has won in Western parts, in France and Flanders, if only this door in the East remains open to her. If peace proposals were made now and the representatives of the Powers were seated at a Peace Conference table, Germany could, I venture to submit to you, afford to give back Belgium, to make large concessions in respect of Alsace-Lorraine . . . and she would still have the illimitable range of future ambition and opportunity which I have been describing. . . . It is at India, along these lines of advance that I have been describing, that Germany is striking. And, observe, that if she is unsuccessful now, if she does not push her forces right forward as she is trying to do, or if she is held up by our efforts, the object will not be abandoned, but the attempt will be renewed. . . . Neither Germany nor her Allies must ever again be permitted to occupy Palestine or Mesopotamia; every effort must be made to re-create Russia—even though it may take ten years or twenty years—as a bulwark against German penetration toward India; and, finally, we must endeavour by every means in our power to secure a friendly Persia and a loyal Afghanistan.'

The Eastern Committee and their advisers were not unanimous as to the practicability of the forward policy which Lord Curzon advocated with his customary eloquence and conviction. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, held, like his predecessor Sir William Robertson, that the military forces at our disposal were not sufficiently strong to enable us to pursue these great objectives with success. In Simla counsels were divided. Sir Hamilton Grant, as Foreign Secretary, deprecated all 'adventures' in Persia,² but the Government of India, fortified by the opinion of their military advisers, had made up their mind that a Turco-German drive through Persia and Afghanistan against the Indian frontier was imminent, and were prepared to support any scheme to check it by operations west or east of the Caspian Sea. Other members of the Eastern Committee pointed to the lack of enthusiasm which our operations aroused in the

¹ Ronaldshay, iii. 211.

² See Marshall, p. 308.

breasts of the Persian Government, and thought that we should withdraw our troops, discontinue our subsidies, and allow matters in Persia to take their course, relying upon the consequent increase of our strength in Mesopotamia and on the Indian Frontier to prevent the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. On financial grounds alone there was much to be said for this policy, for our commitments in Persia during 1918 involved an outlay of no less than £30,000,000, no part of which was borne by India. Lord Curzon, however, gave short shrift to his dissenting colleagues on the Eastern Committee. 'I take it', he declared, 'that this policy would please the Persians better than any other, but . . . it would be immoral, feeble, and disastrous.'¹ No country in the world, except his own, had exercised over him a greater fascination than Persia; to infuse a new vitality into the greatest of Eastern monarchies was an object which had for thirty years been very near his heart. He felt himself at last in a position both to formulate and to enforce a policy which might make it possible for Persia, with the benevolent assistance of Great Britain, to regain her prosperity, and with it her independence of support, both financial and military, from foreign powers. He did not realize, and was perhaps temperamentally incapable of understanding, that the Persian Government and nation were unlikely to regard his policy in so favourable a light. The belief that the Anglo-Russian agreement concluded in 1907 by Sir Edward Grey was designed eventually to 'partition' Persia between Great Britain and Russia was deeply ingrained in the Persian nation, and Lord Curzon's policy was widely regarded as an attempt on the part of the British Lion, in the temporary absence of the Russian Bear, to secure the lion's share. There were, indeed, certain Persian statesmen who realized the falsity of these ancient prejudices and endeavoured to secure the consent of the nation to Lord Curzon's schemes, as voiced on the spot by Sir Percy Cox, who had succeeded Sir Charles Marling in September 1918, but the nation as a whole was unconvinced, and their attitude was that of Hecuba in the second Aeneid.

*Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis
tempus eget.*

This is not the place to discuss the subsequent development of British policy in Persia. So far as we were concerned in Mesopotamia, General Marshall's forebodings were amply fulfilled: after immense efforts and at vast cost both in money and materials, a British force reached Baku, but was unable to hold the place in face of the increasing Turco-German pressure, and on 14th September was forced to withdraw to Enzeli and eventually to Qazvin, where it remained till after

¹ Ronaldshay, iii. 213.



the Armistice, when Baku was again occupied. The record of this diversion of military effort is set forth at length in the Official History, and by General Dunsterville in the pages of his book. The troops responded to all calls made upon them, but the staff-work left much to be desired; General Dunsterville and his exiguous corps of officers, many of whom had distinguished records of war service, but few qualifications for the duties imposed on them, did all that was possible in the circumstances. Failure was, as General Marshall had foreseen, inevitable from the first, and disaster was only avoided by General Marshall's bold decision to withdraw, by the fighting qualities of these officers and the troops of the 39th Brigade in Baku in September 1918, and by the diplomatic ability displayed by General Dunsterville in his negotiations with the kaleidoscopic succession of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary committees with which he was surrounded.

The existence of a considerable force in West and North Persia, with communications extending over more than a thousand miles, had important repercussions on the military, and indirectly on the political, situation in Mesopotamia, both before and after the Armistice. In the first place the extension of General Marshall's responsibility to Enzeli placed upon the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia the duty of providing additional political officers, whenever required by the military authorities, along the whole route from Khanaqin to Enzeli and at various places beyond it. It thus fell to me to supervise and co-ordinate their actions with the needs of the military situation on the one hand and with the views and policy of his Majesty's Minister at Tehran on the other. The need of political officers for this purpose had not been foreseen, and it arose at a moment when our resources in this respect were heavily taxed by the demands of the Baghdad wilayat, which we had just begun to administer effectively.

The only political officer available between Khanaqin and Enzeli at the time was Lt.-Col. Kennion, of the Indian Political Department, who had been sent from Mohammerah in August 1916 to join General Baratoff's staff.¹ At a later date he relieved the aged Mr. McDouall as British Consul at Kirmanshah, where he and his talented wife earned the gratitude of Persians, British, and Russians alike.

It was essential that the officers selected should be men of some experience, and that they should speak Persian fluently. No one could be spared from the Persian Gulf: it was therefore necessary to draw upon South-West Persia, and upon the already overworked and depleted staff of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia. Noel, whose boundless energy and ingenuity three strenuous years in South-West Persia had failed to abate, was deputed to accompany General

¹ See Kennion, R. L.



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Indian Political Department

Dunsterville on his second invasion of Resht, but he was eventually captured by the Jangalis whilst endeavouring to reach General Dunsterville with dispatches from Tiflis, and held prisoner, in circumstances of the greatest hardship, from the middle of March until the end of August. Mr. Oakshott, of the Imperial Bank of Persia, and Mr. Maclaren, Vice-Consul at Resht, shared a like fate, but were less harshly treated, as they were obviously not so 'dangerous', and were eventually allowed to escape, whilst Noel remained in a vermin-infested dungeon, loaded with chains. On his release, to quote General Dunsterville, 'he at once put up a scheme for a raid on the enemy's line of communication in a tract of country with which he was previously acquainted . . . schemes of this nature were necessarily extremely hazardous, but their chances of success were considerable.' I shall have occasion hereafter to refer to his strenuous activities in Kurdistan, whither he proceeded shortly after the Armistice, but this is perhaps the proper place to testify to the amazing courage, vitality, and resource which he displayed during his six years of close association with the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force. His adventures would fill a good-sized volume which will, I hope, one day see the light. Of the hundred or so political officers, in the proper sense of the term, attached to the Force, Leachman was the most outstanding character in the eyes of Arabs, Soane of Kurds, and Noel of Persians. These three men had little in common except rare courage, indomitable will, and local experience. They had, perhaps, some of the defects of these qualities, but they so impressed their personalities upon those with whom they came in contact, that their reputations will outlive them for a generation. Of the three, Noel alone survives. Amongst other officers selected for political duty in North-West Persia were C. J. Edmonds, of the Levant Consular Service, who had done brilliant work in South-West Persia, E. T. R. Wickham, of the Indian Political Department, and R. C. Geard; the last named, poor lad, fell a victim in July 1920 to Shahsavan bandits on the Qazvin road, near Tabriz, where he was negotiating for the return to Urmia of Persian, Assyrian, and Armenian refugees.

The difficulties of the Force in Persia were greatly increased by the appalling conditions existing along the road and in North Persia generally. From Khanaqin to Enzeli famine prevailed, unmitigated by public effort, and unrelieved by private charity. During the last months of 1914, and in 1915 and 1916, the whole area west of the Urmia Lake had been stripped bare of supplies and of flocks by the Russians or Turks or, only too often, by both. In the winter of 1915/16, the Russians had penetrated as far as Rowandiz, taking whatever they could and burning what was left. The orchards were

destroyed either by taking the trees for firewood, or by cutting the irrigation channels. Males able to bear arms were killed or driven away, and women and children, old men and dogs alone were left, to starve amidst the smoking ruins of their homes. The dogs survived longest. When the Russians were in the ascendant, it was the Muslim villages that suffered, for they had often shown active sympathy with their co-religionists: when the Turks gained ground it was on the Armenian villages that, for the same reason, they wreaked their vengeance, assisted by such Kurds as survived.

When, early in 1917, Russian troops reached Khanaqin, they had inaugurated a reign of terror all along the road. No traveller outside the town, no woman within, was safe from molestation at the hands of Cossacks. For the first few weeks food was paid for half in silver and half in Russian notes: thereafter in notes only, at arbitrary rates. When the tide of war flowed against them they retreated, destroying crops and such cattle as they could not remove. Only in the largest towns had they been unable to act thus; in Kirmanshah and Hamadan, and Sultanabad, Tabriz, and Qazvin, large stores of wheat existed, notwithstanding the bad harvest of 1917. These stores were in the hands of a few wealthy landowners (including his late Majesty Sultan Ahmad Shah) and grain-dealers, who combined to keep the price up, regardless of the consequences. The wheat was there, but not the money to pay for it. In Hamadan, of a population of 50,000 at least a third were on the verge of starvation, and a score or more deaths from starvation occurred daily; at Kirmanshah the position was not less acute. When I went up the road from Khanaqin in April 1918, I saw a sight I hope I may never again witness—a whole people perishing for want of food. In the bazaar of Kirmanshah sat the traders, sad-eyed but imperturbable, behind their stalls, on which were displayed dates, bread, and food-grains. A few yards away lay some poor Lazarus; flies swarmed about his head, filling nose and mouth; from his mouth oozed a black liquid—yet he was not dead. [It was thus that hundreds of British soldiers had died, just two years before, whilst 'the honoured guests of the Turkish Government', to use Enver Pasha's own words.] Near by sat a woman, nearly naked, having even sold for food the veil of eastern convention. Her dark brown skin was drawn tightly over her sharp bones, and her breasts hung like pieces of parchment down to her waist. Close by her lay three children huddled stark naked on a mat—their limbs wasted—every bone showing through the transparent skin. I saw similar sights in every town and every village that still existed on either side of the road. I was filled with horror at the spectacle and with misery at our inability to alleviate immediate needs. I knew the Khanaqin-Hamadan road



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well; I had several times traversed it before the war and had enjoyed the hospitality of gentle and simple alike in many of the towns and villages. Now it was my part to see the buildings in ruins, and my hosts of five years ago scattered, dead, or dying. We were terribly short of transport, and such grain as we could spare from Mesopotamia was being absorbed by the scarcely less urgent requirements of the Khanaqin *liwa*, which had been reduced to terrible straits by the cruel ebb and flow of war. When I hear, from time to time, Persians and others lamenting the good old days when there were no roads, and when pack-animals were the only means of transport throughout the country, I remember the terrors of those days and the abundant traditional and written records¹ of the no less poignant miseries of earlier famines, such as that of 1872; and I view with thankfulness the motor-lorries and good roads of the present day.

Though we strained every nerve to alleviate famine conditions in Hamadan and elsewhere, the efforts of General Byron, Dunsterville's second-in-command, being particularly praiseworthy, the deaths from starvation at Hamadan for some time reached a total of 200 daily; to such straits were the population reduced that children were slain for food. So far from receiving due credit for our humane efforts to assuage the prevailing misery, we were violently attacked for not doing far more, and were held up to execration as the real cause of Persia's distress. It was at our behest, said the 'democrats' of Hamadan, that Russian troops had invaded Persia, in order to co-operate with us in seizing first Mesopotamia and then, at a later stage, all Persia. Every important town in Persia, except Tehran, had its garrison of British or Russian troops, or of Persian levies under British or Russian officers, the first steps, it was claimed, to the final dismemberment of Persia. Nothing that the British Minister in Tehran could say to the contrary availed to dispel this conviction; the elimination of the Russians from the ranks of the Allies served to concentrate upon Great Britain the resentment and suspicion of the 'nationalist' elements throughout Persia, and the publication twelve months later of the Anglo-Persian agreement of 9th August 1919 did little to allay these gross misapprehensions.²

The completion of the railway from Basra to Baghdad in 1920 made it possible to consign goods from Europe direct to the Persian frontier beyond Khanaqin. The railway line was extended for military purposes to Tiaruq,³ a point just within Persia, and a joint Perso-'Iraqi custom-post was established there. In these circumstances it was natural that active consideration should be given to extension of the

¹ See Brittlebank.

² See *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. vi, and Balfour.

³ The name is a British invention—Qurait written backwards!

line from the Persian frontier via Kirmanshah and Hamadan to Tehran, a distance by railway alignment of $522\frac{3}{4}$ miles.¹ The Persian Government had in mind the eventual construction of a railway line from the Mediterranean to Baghdad, for it needs no imagination to visualize the advantages to Persia of direct communication with Europe by such a line. A special survey party was sent out by Messrs S. Pearson & Son, as agents for the Persian Railway Syndicate, Ltd., and a survey and preliminary estimate of cost of construction were made. The scheme was financially sound, to the extent that of all railways in Persia it was the least likely to be unprofitable; a population of about 650,000 was resident within twenty miles of the line, giving an average density, including Tehran and the other towns served,² of 33 to the square mile, against an average for Persia as a whole of 16 to the square mile. The scheme was eventually rejected by the Persian Government in favour of a line from Khor Musa on the Persian Gulf to Tehran via Dizful and Burujird.

These and other developments had a definite effect upon the course of events in Mesopotamia. The Shi'ah priesthood of Karbala and Najaf were bound to Persia by the closest ties of religion and financial interest and, in many cases, of race; they were in intimate touch with their colleagues in every important town in Persia, and their religious bigotry was informed by a measure of rugged patriotism. Their satisfaction, as testified by their telegram to His Majesty the King, at the disappearance of the Turks in 1917 gave place during the first six months of 1918 to deep-rooted suspicion of our aims in Persia—suspicion which was fed by a stream of virulent but not wholly disingenuous criticism originating in Persia, which no assurances could allay. The uprising amongst the Shi'ah tribes of the Middle Euphrates in 1920 was fostered by and owed its success primarily to the intervention of the *'ulama*, who in their turn were influenced to some extent by British policy in Persia, though mainly by a desire to prevent the establishment in 'Iraq of any form of Government strong enough to be able to ignore them.

I have shown in the foregoing pages that the prosecution in Persia, the Caucasus, and the Caspian of the forward policy of the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet hampered us in Mesopotamia in the following ways:

- (1) it made very heavy demands on the army for troops and transport, and on the Civil Administration for officers;
- (2) it placed upon our shoulders the responsibility for extensive

¹ See Grove, *A Railway Engineer's Journey in Persia*.

² Approximate population of Tehran, 250,000; Hamadan, 60,000; Kirmanshah, 45,000. *C.A.S.F.* ix, p. 1922.

famine-relief operations, and the obloquy for the existence of famine itself;

- (3) it tended to influence the Persian element in the Shi'ah hierarchy of Najaf and Karbala against the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia and especially against the strong British element which at that time it necessarily possessed.

To these embarrassments was added, during the summer of 1918, responsibility for the maintenance and protection in Mesopotamia of Christian refugees from Turkey and from Persian Azarbaijan to the number of over 50,000, of whom two-thirds were Assyrians and one-third Armenians. During the month of June detachments were sent by General Dunsterville to Bijar and Mianeh to act as flank-guards on the west of our weak and lengthy line of communication through Persia.¹ The road from Hamadan to Urmia runs through Bijar, and the arrival of a British detachment at this place inspired with fresh but illusory hopes the Christian tribes in the Urmia region, Assyrians, and Armenians, who had during the early summer made a stout and on the whole successful resistance against Turkish incursions. They asked us for ammunition, machine guns, and money to enable them to continue to fight the common enemy. The original objective of General Dunsterville's mission was, as has been shown, to encourage anti-Turk and anti-Bolshevik elements in the Caucasus by sending thither a few officers with money and arms. One of General Dunsterville's officers reached Urmia in January 1918 and promised British support to the local Assyrians against the Turks. This being the policy of the Eastern Committee, General Marshall² at once decided to comply with the petition of the Christian leaders, notable amongst whom was General Agha Petros, an Assyrian Christian who had earned a deserved reputation for gallantry and for resource in several campaigns with the Russians in the region of Van and Bitlis in 1915-16. Communication with the leaders of the Assyrians was established by Flight-Lieut. K. M. Pennington, A.F.C., who made a remarkable pioneer flight to Urmia, where he was welcomed with enthusiasm. The promised assistance, however, arrived too late. A convoy carrying arms and money for delivery to the representatives of the Christian tribesmen from Urmia was dispatched in July under an escort of the 14th Hussars to

¹ These posts were a liability rather than a protection, owing to their distance from the line of communication, and one of General Thomson's first steps on taking over command in Persia was to bring them much closer in.

² General Marshall's position in relation to General Dunsterville's force was one of extreme difficulty. The latter was in direct communication with the War Office, and not under his orders except when he required further reinforcements; he was then placed momentarily under General Marshall's orders.

Sain Qal'eh (100 miles south of Tabriz). Whilst most of the leaders and many of the leading tribal chiefs were on their way to Sain Qal'eh to take over the arms, the Turks attacked Urmia, driving out the Assyrians and Nestorians, and massacring many as they fled. The Kurdish tribes joined the Turks in pillaging the helpless crowds of old men, women, and children, encumbered with their cattle and family chattels. The slaughter was dreadful. The Kurds and Turks alike, according to their custom, spared neither age nor sex, and though the little detachment of British troops did what it could to drive off the marauders, there is little doubt that the refugees lost in this manner at least a fifth of their numbers. Several thousands, mostly women and children, perished from exhaustion and disease on their way to Mesopotamia, a distance of some 500 miles, though every effort was made by the military authorities at Hamadan and Kirmanshah to provide food and shelter.

The decision to bring the refugees to Baquba was taken with great reluctance, but no alternative course was open to us. Famine conditions still prevailed in and around Hamadan and Kirmanshah, and it was physically impossible for us to transport food-stuffs for another 30,000 mouths, much less the tentage and clothing with which they must be provided if they were to be saved from dying of inanition during the following winter. Fuel, too, was exceedingly scarce and the local Kurdish tribes hostile. Furthermore, all the refugees were drawn from temperate regions, at least 5,000 feet above the sea, and none of them had ever been called on to endure the rigours of a Mesopotamian summer: there was therefore good reason to fear that the mortality from disease would be severe. Experience showed that these forebodings were justified. Towards the end of August the refugees started to pour into the camp selected for them on the right bank of the Diyala, three miles from Baquba and adjoining the railway. All were exhausted, many were suffering from dysentery. Most of the able-bodied men had been retained by General Dunsterville to work on the roads, thus throwing on the old men and women a burden which they were ill able to bear. The death-rate was at this time about sixty a day: typhus broke out amongst them, both on the Khanaqin-Hamadan road and in camp, but was luckily recognized as such by the ever-vigilant Colonel Willcox, and effective measures were taken to prevent the spread of the disease. To quote the *Official Medical History*:¹

'A large quarantine camp was formed, where all refugees were examined as a preventive measure. Few of the medical officers had seen cases of this fever, and had the diagnosis . . . not been made by the consulting physician at the time, the disease would probably have spread to the men of the labour corps.'

Three hospitals were attached to the camp, with a special disin-

¹ Macpherson, p. 401.

fecting plant, and in this and other ways Surgeon-General Blenkinsop, the Director of Medical Services, contrived not only to reduce the inevitably high rate of mortality amongst the refugees, but to prevent their presence from becoming a menace to the Army of Occupation. Once in camp, the mortality rate dropped rapidly, and the average monthly mortality for 1919 was at the rate of three per thousand. This figure compares with 14.6 per thousand in the 'Concentration Camps' in South Africa in 1901, which sheltered about 100,000 souls, as against 40,000 at Baquba.¹ This comparison not only reflects credit on the medical organization, and on the general management of the camp under General Austin and his Adjutant, H. L. Charge, but serves to demonstrate the progress achieved in preventive medicine since 1901. It also shows that the decision reached by Army Head-quarters, to organize a single camp under proper supervision, in preference to a number of small encampments, was amply justified by results.

Of the Armenians some 10,500 came from Bitlis, Van, and the Caucasus, 2,500 from Azarbaijan, and some 500 each from Constantinople and Cilicia. Five hundred of these elected to go to Adana and Aleppo, where the French Government, as mandatory power, was prepared to receive them and to make them grants of land. The greater proportion of the remainder chose to remain in Mesopotamia, where they have since been absorbed into the population of the towns.

Of the 25,000 Assyrians who reached Baquba, about 15,000 were mountaineers from Turkish territory, the balance were Persian subjects from Solduz, Salmas, Targawar, and Margawar. During 1919, with the consent of the Persian Government, these were eventually repatriated. The disposal of the remaining 15,000 was a problem of great difficulty, which awaits solution. Two-thirds of them were tribesmen, or '*ashirat*', from the districts of Tiari (6,000), Jilu (1,000), Baz (1,000), Diz (200), and Tkhuma (1,200), and they were known generally as *Jilus*. The remainder were *ra'yats* from Qudshanis and Berwer, Gawar, Mar Bishu, and Shamsdinan, with a few from Van. Almost all were Turkish, not Persian subjects.

About two thousand of the '*ashirat*' were enlisted as Levies during 1919 and organized into two battalions for the defence of the Mosul frontier. They were as good fighting material as could be wished, ready to fight for the recovery from the hands of the Turks of the upland valleys, which had for centuries been their home. They were not easily disciplined, and on more than one occasion precipitated serious civil disturbances, but during 1919 and in subsequent years they performed invaluable service as an integral part of the Defence Forces of 'Iraq, under the direct control of the High Commissioner.

¹ For this and for other details see *Charge*. For a full account of the Assyrians, see *Wigram*.

Developments subsequent to October 1920 are beyond the scope of this work,¹ but it is of interest to mention that the Arab Government was not slow to realize that the Arab of the town, no less than the Arab of the plain, was unequal to the task of maintaining order amongst the fierce Kurdish mountaineers on the north and north-eastern borders of 'Iraq. The High Commissioner could rely on the fealty of the Assyrians under selected British officers, and made the fullest use of their services, which were willingly given in the hope, as yet unrealized, that a measure of tardy justice would be vouchsafed to this sorely-tried community. But the fact that in this, as in so many other directions, the policy pursued after the creation of the Arab Government was a continuation of, or at least not inconsistent with, that of the temporary administration which preceded it, must not be allowed to obscure the exceedingly untoward result of the Eastern Committee's adventure in Persia. It resulted in the creation in Mesopotamia of yet another minority problem, which need never have arisen had we not attempted to make a cat's-paw of the Christian communities in Persia and the Caucasus. Our action in the matter served to harden the heart of the Turks and to strengthen their resolve to eliminate, once and for all, all non-Turkish minorities in Turkey, by a renewal of those methods of massacre, torture, and starvation which, as recently as 1929, have proclaimed the Turks anew as the most savage of living races.²

This was not, indeed, the only instance of the creation by the Allies during or after the war of fresh minority problems. We lent ourselves, with what wisdom and in what circumstances it is not pertinent here to inquire, to the creation of a minority problem by sponsoring the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home. The creation by the French Government of the States of the Great Lebanon and the 'Alawiyyin, the enrolment of Lebanese Christians and the permanent enlistment of Armenians and Circassians in French Mandated Territory has had somewhat similar results, but on a larger scale, for it seems destined to bring about in the near future an effective equilibrium between the Christian and Muslim communities.³

It remains to mention that the monthly cost of maintaining the refugee-camp at Baquba, which was borne by Army funds, was approximately £150,000 from July 1918 to December 1919, and thereafter about £100,000, or over three million pounds sterling in all, exclusive of the salaries of military personnel employed.⁴

From 1st January 1919 administrative responsibility for all matters

¹ See Cunliffe-Owen and Bentinck.

² See H. A. Gibbons. *The Case of Kurdistan against Turkey*. Princeton, N. J. (U.S.A.), 1929.

³ See Toynbee, p. 21.

⁴ Cunliffe-Owen gives the figure of 500 lakhs of rupees.



MEMORIAL ERECTED TO CHRISTIAN
 ASSYRIANS WHO DIED AS REFUGEES AT
 BAQUBA

connected with the refugees was transferred to the Civil Administration. I was fortunate in obtaining the services of Lt.-Col. Cunliffe-Owen to take charge of the camp from Maj.-Gen. H. H. Austin.¹ He lost no time in initiating a scheme of self-government amongst the various communities within the camp, which proved wholly successful, and within six months the original camp staff of some 20 officers and 120 British other ranks was reduced to 3 British officers and some 6 N.C.O.'s. He organized an effective police and defence service within the camp, and when disturbances broke out in the Baquba area in July 1920 some Arab marauders, who attacked the camp in force one day, were not only repulsed but were chased far and wide over the plain by refugee volunteers, who, regardless of orders, took the offensive and accumulated a small pile of heads at the quarter-guard.

More than half the refugees had by this time been transferred to the Aqra district north-east of Mosul, in the hope that they might be able to return to their homes. There was, moreover, a possibility that those whose return was for any reason impossible might be settled in a small *enclave* which it was proposed to establish in the 'Amadia district, most of the inhabitants of which were Christians. The idea, which originated with Colonel Leachman, was that the Muslim Kurds, who had twice revolted at Turkish instigation and had murdered the local political officers, Captain Willey and Lieutenant Macdonald, should be evicted and their lands given to the Assyrians. The valley in question was fertile and sheltered, within the recognized boundaries of the Mosul wilayat, and sufficiently under our control to make it possible to provide plough, cattle, and seed. The Assyrians, once settled there, would be self-supporting, and would protect not only themselves but the fertile crescent to the south. The number of Kurds to be evicted was small, and there was no lack of land for them on the Turkish side of the frontier or in adjacent valleys. The adoption of this solution in 1919 would have afforded us, as the prospective mandatory for Mesopotamia (to quote from a dispatch which I addressed to the Secretary of State in August 1919), 'an opportunity of doing justice to the Assyrian community in a manner acceptable alike to themselves and to European ideas of right and justice. It will also enable us to solve one of the most difficult questions of religious and racial incompatibility in Kurdistan, to dispose of a grave menace to the future peace of Northern Mesopotamia, and to punish those responsible for the outrages at 'Amadia. Such an opportunity will not recur.' I concluded with the following words:

'The action proposed will in all probability be interpreted, if taken, like that

¹ It was Maj.-Gen. Austin who, whilst in the Intelligence Branch in Simla in 1906, first encouraged me to visit Persia and to take an active interest in things Persian; to him, therefore, I owe a special debt of gratitude.

of the U.S.A. and France, as showing that the policy of H.M.'s Government is to favour the Christian elements in Turkey at the expense of the Mohammedan element, and it is possible that such action might have an unfavourable effect on current negotiations in connexion with the conclusion of peace with Turkey. Our relations with Kurds in other areas, such as they are, can scarcely fail to suffer temporarily, but not to such an extent as to provoke serious hostilities.

'I am strongly of opinion, however, that these considerations do not justify the abandonment of the project. The number of Kurds to be evicted does not exceed 2,000 families, and there is ample room for them in adjoining areas. They are all more or less a party to the recent outrages at 'Amadia, and have forfeited all claims to consideration. I should, nevertheless, propose to give them some compensation in order that their eviction may not press unduly on them, or sow the seed of future trouble in this area.'

The scheme received the approval of Government,¹ and preliminary plans were most carefully drawn up with the assistance of Dr. W. A. Wigram, whose intimate knowledge and sturdy common sense in all matters concerning refugees were of inestimable value to the Civil Administration. Unfortunately, however, serious trouble broke out, at Turkish instigation, in circumstances narrated elsewhere in this work, in Sulaimani and in the Kurdish areas north-east of Mosul. The military authorities declared themselves unable to provide the requisite transport for the refugees from Baquba to Mosul, or for the projected military operations in the 'Amadia region, with the result that the scheme was repeatedly postponed and ultimately, in May 1920, definitely abandoned owing to our military preoccupations elsewhere. In the summer of 1920, when it became apparent that repatriation on these lines was impossible, the camp at Baquba was broken up, the Assyrians being sent north-east of Mosul, the Armenians allowed to fend for themselves in Baghdad and Basra, a small, helpless remnant being left on our hands. These were concentrated at Nahr 'Umar, on the Shatt-al-'Arab, north of Basra. Finally, they too were 'liquidated', in circumstances of much misery and hardship.

The foregoing is but an incomplete and partial summary of the difficulties in which the Civil Administration was involved by the presence in Mesopotamia of these refugees. Such questions, which admitted of no early solution and involved endless correspondence with Egypt, Constantinople, Tehran, and London, were only too numerous during 1918-20. They placed a heavy burden upon the shoulders of men already heavily preoccupied with the pressing problems of the present and future administration of the Occupied Territories, a burden which

¹ The League of Nations Commission on the frontier between Turkey and 'Iraq reported (p. 82) that the British Government was unwilling, at this time, to make any definite decision. This is incorrect. The British Government were willing, but the local military authorities were weak.

could not be shifted or decentralized. They tended, moreover, to unsettle local opinion, and to arouse dormant racial and religious issues.

It remains to refer briefly to further developments of the Persian adventure. A *coup d'état*, for which we were in no way responsible, took place at Baku in July, and the Bolshevik régime was succeeded by a 'Centro-Caspian Dictatorship', which invited British assistance in holding Baku against the Bolsheviks and the Turks. We sent a brigade of British troops thither in August, and General Dunsterville endeavoured to induce the local Russian and Armenian forces, thus supported, to hold the town against the Turks, who had been strongly reinforced. He was unsuccessful in his efforts. Russian and Armenian units alike were undisciplined and disorganized, and ill provided with artillery, ammunition, money, or clothes. General Marshall wisely decided to withdraw to Enzeli, and General Dunsterville contrived to do so without loss on 14th September.¹ The withdrawal was a wonderful feat on the part of the Commanding Officers of the regular units on the spot and their men, and Commodore Norris deserves special praise for his share.

The War Office, or perhaps the Eastern Committee, instructed General Marshall to destroy the oil-wells of Baku before withdrawal.² That such instructions should have been sent is typical of the atmosphere of make-believe with which those who directed from Whitehall the movements of our troops in the Caspian surrounded themselves. 'I had never seen Baku,' writes General Marshall, 'but I did know that it contained some 2,000 oil-wells . . . and how many tons of high explosive would have been required to blow them all up is a question I did not enter into. The inhabitants of Baku . . . would scarcely have looked on, with their hands in their pockets, whilst a few British troops went about blowing their means of livelihood sky-high.' Successful action on these lines would have done nothing to reduce the counter-claims of the U.S.S.R. against the British Government and the Allies!

Maj.-Gen. Thomson, from the 14th Division, now assumed charge of all troops in Persia. 'With his appointment,' writes General Marshall, 'a different complexion was put on the Persian situation and my anxieties and troubles practically disappeared.' My own feelings were very similar to those of General Marshall; General Thomson was the youngest of the Divisional Commanders; he was also gifted with an

¹ See Dunsterville, Rawlinson; also *The Naval Review*, May 1920.

² See Marshall. It is said that this order was given owing to a report that the Turks and Germans were pressing for Baku, as the great raid on England, when several Zeppelins were lost, failed because lubricating oil of the quality required for air-ships could not be obtained from Rumania.

exceptionally clear head, and had been at pains, whilst in Mesopotamia, to keep in touch with the realities of the political situation, and with the methods and the difficulties of the Civil Administration. He virtually became Chief Political Officer so far as his sphere of operations was concerned, and by maintaining close personal touch with the British Minister in Tehran and with me in Baghdad, he soon put the details of political and consular administration on a sound basis. In Colonel C. B. Stokes he had a thoroughly competent and experienced advisor on political questions, of whom he made good use. He had his hands full: influenza raged amongst the troops under his orders; Commodore Norris with a make-shift navy had brought the Caspian Sea under effective control. General Malleson, commanding the East Persian Cordon, with head-quarters at Meshed, was conducting a local war at Marv, for which he commandeered part of the detachment of troops (the Hampshires) operating under General Thomson's orders at Krasnovodsk.

On 19th November it fell to General Thomson, accompanied by representatives of France and the U.S.A. and by General Bicharakoff, to enter Baku in order to ensure its evacuation by the Turks under Nuri Pasha, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. His responsibilities also extended to Tiflis, where the local Georgians and Armenians, and White and Red Russians, together with the exponents of Enver Pasha's dreams of a Greater Azarbaijan embracing parts of Turkey, Persia, and the Caucasus, were endeavouring to put into force President Wilson's views on self-determination, whilst the Italians were solemnly considering the acceptance of a Mandate for the better governance of the whole region. It was a mad world, in which the man on the spot found it almost impossible, in the absence of any clear orders from home, or rather from the Hotel Majestic in Paris, to keep a straight course. Subsequently, General Thomson and his forces in Trans-Caucasia and Trans-Caspia were placed under the command of General Sir George Milne, and the force was, from 1st January 1919 until its eventual withdrawal, administered from Constantinople. The North-Persia force, with head-quarters at Qazvin, remained, however, under Baghdad. But this did not end the tale of our troubles in Mesopotamia arising from our military commitments in Persia, for nearly two years later we still had more combatant troops in Persia, on the road from Enzeli to Khanaqin, than in Mesopotamia, and as soon as the ice melted on the Volga we found ourselves committed to active hostilities on the Caspian with the Bolsheviks, who surrounded and captured the British garrison at Enzeli¹ during the second week of May 1920, whilst the garrison at Batum was threatened with a like fate.

¹ Callwell (2), quoting Sir H. Wilson's *Diaries*, ii. 239.



Photo by Russell

MAJ.-GEN. SIR WILLIAM M. THOMSON
K.C.M.G., C.B., M.C.

Successively in command of 14th Division, North Persia Force, and in Trans-Caucasia

The Cabinet thereupon decided that our forces in North-West Persia should concentrate on Qazvin; thus it was that when the anticipated and inevitable trouble occurred on the Middle Euphrates in the summer of 1920, the first preoccupation of the G.O.C.-in-Chief who, with his principal staff officers, was absent in Persia, was to secure the line of communication between Baghdad and Kirmanshah. These matters will be dealt with in greater detail elsewhere in this book. It is sufficient here to point out the manner in which our military commitments in Persia hampered our military dispositions in Mesopotamia.

The Perso-Caucasian adventure to which a majority in the Cabinet, headed by Lord Curzon, attached the greatest significance, encouraged Christian minorities in Turkey, the Caucasus, and North-West Persia to embroil themselves in conflicts with Muslim majorities which resulted in a renewal of massacres, and in depths of misery appalling to contemplate.

It is, however, necessary to emphasize that our policy in Persia and the Caucasus, upon which I have animadverted at some length in the foregoing pages, was from first to last that of Lord Curzon rather than that of the Cabinet; it was opposed (though not always consistently) by the Chief of the Imperial Staff,¹ and by Mr. Edwin Montagu, then Secretary of State for India. On the subject of Mr. Winston Churchill's views, little has appeared in print. In the concluding volume of his classic work, *The World Crisis*, he makes, possibly of set purpose, almost no reference to his views on British commitments in this region during the period with which he deals. Lord Ronaldshay has, however, revealed how profound was the divergence of view in these matters at a later stage between Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu—a divergence which, he says,² 'was wont to assert itself whenever questions of British policy in Asia came up for decision'.

'I cannot', wrote Mr. Montagu to Lord Curzon on 6th January 1919, 'regard the policy of the Eastern Committee in relation to Persia as satisfactory unless a genuine attempt is made to put our position in Persia on a footing satisfactory to the Persians by re-establishing their confidence in us as being anxious to help but not desirous to control. I have warned the Eastern Committee more than once of the grave difficulty which I am experiencing, and which I shall experience more and more in the future, of getting contributions from Indian revenues to expenditure in Persia. I cannot honestly make the attempt in future if the policy is one in which neither the India Office nor the Government of India concur.'

The two men viewed matters from widely different standpoints, and temperamentally were poles apart. Their representatives on the spot

¹ See Sir Henry Wilson's *Diaries*, ii. 222: 'I showed that Palestine-Mosul-Khanaqin-Burujird was the only possible line and that we should adjust our policy to that line.'

² Ronaldshay, iii. 215.

were respectively Sir Percy Cox, in Tehran, and myself, Sir Percy Cox's former assistant and deputy, in Baghdad. Our policy in Persia was no concern of mine except so far as it reacted upon the policy to be pursued in Mesopotamia. As these reactions increased in scope and gravity, I felt bound to represent my views to Mr. Montagu, who made them the text of repeated admonitions to which his colleague at the Foreign Office was little disposed to listen: Lord Curzon, indeed, received them with unconcealed impatience.

The position of the Civil Administration in Mesopotamia in respect of affairs in Persia in 1919-20 was thus one of peculiar difficulty. On the one hand, it was always clear that the decisive role must be played in Mesopotamia, and that on our success or failure there depended our position in North-West Persia.¹ On the other hand, a contented 'Iraq was the common goal of all efforts: policy in Persia militated against its attainment. A substantial reduction in the military forces in Mesopotamia during 1919 would have greatly facilitated the pacification of the country: policy demanded the retention of large forces in Persia and thus retarded the disappearance of the military régime in 'Iraq. In comparison with the difficulties in which we were involved owing to the failure of the Allies to make peace with Turkey, the Persian imbroglio was itself of secondary importance, but by bringing my Chief, the Secretary of State for India, into acute conflict with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, it tended to create both at home and in relation to the affairs of Mesopotamia and Persia, a dichotomy which, as I shall show later, was partly responsible for the paralysis which supervened when in 1919 Government was called upon to give a decision as to the nature of the administration to be set up in the wilayats of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra.

¹ General Haldane: despatch, 8.11.20. Supplement to *London Gazette*, 5.7.21.

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL RESOURCES, THE GROWTH OF THE POLICE FORCE AND ARAB LEVIES

'Planting of countries is like planting of woods; for you must make account to lose almost twenty years' profit, and expect your recompense in the end; for the principal thing that hath been the destruction of most plantations has been the base and hasty drawing of profit in the first years. . . . moil not too much under ground, for the hope of mines is very uncertain, & useth to make the planters lazy in other things.'

BACON, *Of Plantations*.

Organization of man-power. Jail Corps. Labour Corps. Use of oil fuel and coal. Construction of gunboats. Compulsory service at Abadan and on oil-fields. Gallantry of Robert Lindsay and James Still at Tembi. Failure to substitute oil for coal on rivers and railways. Proposed oil refinery at Baghdad. Agricultural Development Scheme. Mr. Garbett. Sir J. Hewett. Cattle-breeding. Sheep and Wool. Dairies. Chicken-Farms. Department of Local Resources. Brig.-Gen. Dickson. Military Works Department. Police Force. Lt.-Col. Prescott. Shabana and Levies. Bt.-Major Boyle. Loyalty of Levies and Police.

THE assumption by General Marshall of the chief command in Mesopotamia coincided, in circumstances explained in Chapter I, with a period of rapid, and on the whole peaceful growth of the Civil Administration throughout the Occupied Territories. The lines on which we proceeded were dictated by considerations less of political expediency than of military necessity. The steadily increasing strength of the army of occupation, and the shortage of transport, both inland and overseas, made it imperatively necessary to develop to the full every source of supply for military needs. Local resources susceptible of development were, broadly speaking, of five kinds:

- | | |
|-----------------|--|
| (1) man-power; | (4) building and road material; |
| (2) fuel; | (5) local transport, including river-craft and pack-animals. |
| (3) foodstuffs; | |

Man-power. The problem of organizing local man-power was met by the appointment, under the Quartermaster-General's Department, of a Director of Labour, through whose representatives at every military centre local labour of every sort was recruited at standard wages for every grade of skilled and unskilled work; competition between military departments was thus eliminated. The Deputy Quartermaster-General, General Stuart-Wortley, was able, through this department, to adjudicate on the relative urgency of various schemes in hand and, at the same time, to ensure that labour was not withdrawn from the fields at critical periods in such quantities as to imperil the

production of food-stuffs. The Labour Department, under Brig.-Gen. F. D. Frost, was an unqualified success: its inception made it possible to use local labour to the fullest extent in populous regions, and to allocate the organized Labour Corps to areas where able-bodied men were scarce.

Seven Jail Labour and Porter Corps were sent out during 1916 and 1917 by the Government of India¹ under Lt.-Col. W. B. Lane, I.M.S., one of the kindest and wisest men it has been my privilege to meet. They were originally designated 'Disciplinary Military Labour Corps', but the term 'Jail Corps' stuck: there was nothing to do but to accept the popular designation, to rise above the name, and to prove that the Corps were as good as, if not better in their work than, the Free Corps. The men, on the whole, responded well to the opportunity thus given them and to the incentives, which included regular pay, and suspension of all unexpired sentences on the completion of their period of duty in Mesopotamia, which was for the most part for two years or the duration of the war.

Those whose sentences expired whilst they were in the field were transferred to 'Free' companies attached to their original Corps, thus remaining under the eye of their officers, with an increase of pay. The average output of the Jail Corps was some twenty per cent. better than that of the 'Free' Corps, and though habitual criminals caused trouble from time to time, owing in part to defective organization due to the difficulty in the stress of war of providing the right type of

¹ They were launched into being by the following *communiqué*, which was issued by the Home Department of the Government of India in October 1916.

'Some time ago an interesting experiment was made in the direction of giving well behaved and short time prisoners in Indian Jails a "*locus penitentiae*" by granting them a conditional remission of their sentences and employing them as labourers in Mesopotamia. The experiment proved a success, and it has now been decided to extend it on much broader lines. This decision will have the incidental advantage of reducing the demand for free labour, which, in view of the unusually favourable monsoon, is in more than usual demand in India itself. The terms offered have attracted a large number of volunteers from the better-class prisoners in Indian Jails. Their cases have been carefully considered by the local authorities, with the result that several labour and porter corps recruited in this manner are now in the course of formation, and it is probable that more will be forthcoming if necessary. The Corps are organized on much the same lines as those followed in the case of the free corps now employed in Mesopotamia, the chief difference being that they are partly officered in the Indian ranks by warders to whom they are accustomed, who have also volunteered for the purpose. All ranks are attested and enrolled as followers and are dressed and equipped in exactly the same way as members of the free porter and labour corps, but for obvious reasons, the control and discipline exercised will be a little closer than in the case of the free labour corps. The corps will be employed in loading and unloading sea and river-craft, stacking stores, road and hut making and the like. There is, of course, no intention of employing them near the fighting line. Colonel Lane, an experienced Inspector-General of Prisons, will be in administrative charge of the corps. The results of the experiment will no doubt be watched with much interest, both in this country and outside.'

warden and officers, the record of these Corps amply justified the decision to use them in Mesopotamia, and suggests that something might be done on the same lines in time of peace, and not only in India.¹

Apart from the Jail Corps, numbering some eight thousand men, there were some fifteen Indian Labour Corps, each a thousand strong, twelve Indian Porter Corps for loading and unloading ships, barges, and trains, and some forty Local Labour Corps, including Persian and Kurdish as well as Arab units—in all about 71,000 men, apart from unorganized local labour totalling about 50,000. The able-bodied prisoners of war were organized into five Corps, in addition to which there were on the strength of the department Labour Battalions from Mauritius and Sierra Leone, a Corps of Gardeners from Madras, and a Corps of Military Prisoners doing duty in the horse- and mule-lines at the Base.

The first two Labour Corps raised were from the Punjab for services in Gallipoli. One came direct and the other via Egypt. When we asked for more, India very rightly prohibited recruitment in the Punjab because it was draining a source of supply of combatants. Efforts were made to arouse interest and secure recruits in every other Province and Presidency, but without success until recourse was had to the Sonthalis, a people not without merits, but quite useless for work requiring intelligence. What we wanted were Corps with a fair proportion of artisans (masons, smiths, carpenters, &c.) and the remainder intelligent labourers of the type of which thousands are to be found in every Province. No tiresome restrictions were imposed by the Army Staff in Mesopotamia, who were ready to accept any organization that gave them the men, and guaranteed that they would not have to work under fire. The pay and other conditions of service were very liberal.

Had half the number of Labour Corps sent out by India in 1917-18 been available in 1915-16, the troops in Mesopotamia would have been spared many of the needless miseries which were their lot, and much of the acute congestion of traffic at the Base and on the Lines of Communication, which hampered every military movement, would have been avoided. In no direction was the lethargy of the Government of India in the early part of the war so strongly marked as in respect of the supply of Labour Corps for Mesopotamia. There were no conflicting military demands to be reconciled, no equipment to be provided that could not be obtained in unlimited quantity. We in Mesopotamia were in desperate need of labour for purposes directly connected with the war, whereby the task of our fighting forces, in-

¹ In this connexion the attention of the interested reader is directed to Colonel Lane's *Summary* (see Bibliography). See also *Loyalties*, Chapter XII.

cluding a very large proportion of Indians, would have been made easier, their discomforts mitigated, and their fighting efficiency increased. It was a great opportunity for India, with millions of men not suited for combatant service, to take a larger share in the war, and at the same time to help the Indian Army. From all accounts India was burning to get such a chance, yet it was first by forest tribes, such as the Sonthalis, and later by convicts that the ranks of Indian labour were, till 1917, mainly represented.

Sir John Hewett appended to his *Impressions*, published in 1920, an important note by General Frost on the question of labour in Mesopotamia during and after the war. Amongst other tables is included a series of comparative statistics of the relative efficiency of labourers of different nationalities at the Base on different types of work. Turkish prisoners-of-war head the list, Persian labourers come second, and Indian and Chinese third, there being little to choose between the three classes. Arabs were never employed on heavy portage, as they proved physically unequal to the task. The result shows clearly the physical effect even on the hardiest races of a hot climate.

An attempt was made to exploit for military purposes a deposit of so-called coal at Kifri, which had been extensively used by the Turks previous to the capture of Baghdad as a source of fuel for the Baghdad-Samarra railway and for their river-steamers, which had previously relied on coal imported via Basra. They had, indeed, actually constructed a Decauville track from Kifri to the Tigris for the purpose, and increased the output of the mine, from the pre-war figure of 150 tons a year, to over a thousand tons. In so doing they had dug a very deep, open pit which, when we reached Kifri, was full of water. The deposit was examined on behalf of General Headquarters in June 1918 by a geologist in the service of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. His report showed that there was nothing to be gained by exploiting the mine. The 'coal' consisted of a form of solid bitumen (*manjak*), of very low calorific value, and the amount still available was insignificant. The idea was, therefore, abandoned, and efforts concentrated on increasing the supply of fuel-oil, as well as kerosene and petrol, from Abadan.¹

¹ The following figures, indicate the rapid strides made in this direction in the course of the campaign.

Local bunker deliveries (ocean and river craft) at Abadan (in tons):

1914, nil. 1915, 1,300. 1916, 1,500. 1917, 3,800. 1918, 17,700.


Deliveries to Mesopotamia (in tons):

	1914.	1915.	1916.	1917.	1918.
Petrol	3	100	1,400	4,600	18,700
Kerosene	400	1,600	3,900	8,600	15,000
Fuel Oil	—	3,800	10,100	60,900	117,600



THE RIGHT HON'BLE LORD GREENWAY OF STANBRIDGE EARLS

Chairman. Anglo-Persian Oil Co. Ltd., 1914-27



Mesopotamia was not, of course, the only or even the chief outlet for the products of the Persian oil-fields: the demands of the Admiralty increased steadily throughout the war, throwing not only upon the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., but also upon the Army of Occupation and upon the Civil Administration onerous responsibilities. The company had to purchase, at war prices, thousands of tons of tankage and machinery and to obtain freight for it at a moment when shipping was not only strictly controlled, but also extremely scarce. Nevertheless, the refining capacity at Abadan was increased almost fivefold during the war period,¹ under conditions of difficulty which were probably without parallel in any similar enterprise elsewhere. To the services rendered by the oil industry as a whole, ample tributes were paid in Parliament and elsewhere by Lord Curzon, Lord Long, and others: the services of the Chairman of the Anglo-Persian Oil Co., Mr. Charles Greenway (later Lord Greenway of Stanbridge Earls), and his colleagues to the Expeditionary Force can scarcely be over-estimated. The infant industry, the protection of which was one of the principal duties of the force dispatched to Basra in 1914, became, in 1917, the mainstay of its protectors.

It was not only in its legitimate task of supplying petrol, kerosene, and fuel-oil for military needs that the resources of Abadan were taxed. During the years 1914-16 the military authorities placed an almost unbearable burden of miscellaneous engineering work upon the company's engineers. Along with the original Expeditionary Force came a heterogeneous collection of small craft, most of which had to be put in running order and equipped with stores at Abadan before they could be used. Gun-shields were made and supplied to the Royal Navy for river launches; tugs and pontoons in use at Abadan were commandeered to meet urgent military needs, as for example, for landing heavy guns and railway engines. Every spare plate in the refinery was requisitioned, and even steel drain-pipes were dug up for use. The services of the refinery engineers were in constant demand: they were frequently summoned to Basra to assist in overhauling

¹ ABADAN, quantities of crude oil distilled (in millions of gallons):

April 1913-March 1914	38
„ 1914 „ 1915	72
„ 1915 „ 1916	65 *
„ 1916 „ 1917	133
„ 1917 „ 1918	228
„ 1918 „ 1919	261
„ 1919 „ 1920	305

* Decrease due to cutting of pipe-line by enemy action (see *Loyalties*, Chapter II). On the general question of the supply of oil during the war see Lord Long, *Memories*, 1923, p. 257.

aeroplane engines, and during 1916 no fast launch on the river seemed to be able to run for long without their supervision.

To add to their troubles the company were asked to build, under the supervision of Messrs. Yarrow's engineers, no less than twelve shallow-draft gunboats which were sent out in pieces from London to be put together on the muddy foreshore of the Shatt al 'Arab.¹ H.M.S. *Firefly*, whose adventures have been recorded in *Loyalties*, was the first of these craft: she was completed during October 1915 and left Basra for the front on 2nd November, reaching 'Aziziya on the 9th in time to take part in the first fateful advance on Baghdad. After many vicissitudes she is once more at Abadan, in the appropriate role of a fire-float.

The construction of these craft threw an almost intolerable strain on the refinery staff. They were already short-handed, it being exceedingly difficult to recruit qualified engineers for commercial service abroad when every nerve was being strained at home to swell the ranks of Kitchener's Army, or to obtain competent civilian labour in India for work in what was popularly regarded, not without good reason, as a 'war area'. To obtain extra plant and tools was difficult in the extreme. Finally, the construction-plans of a number of the gunboats were carelessly lost in transit, and were only recovered by a lucky chance from the hold of a military transport after they had twice made the journey from Tilbury to Basra. The foreshore at Abadan was for months strewn with the component parts of these vessels, for the handling of which no facilities whatever existed.

There can be little doubt that the decision of the Admiralty to leave the construction of these gunboats to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, assisted only by an Admiralty Overseer, Mr. W. Grant,² was an error of judgement. Though the energies and resources of the refinery workshop engineering and construction staff, both British and Indian, were concentrated on this work during the whole of 1915 and 1916 and part of 1917, it was at the expense of other and not less urgent matters, and the work would have been more quickly done had the Admiralty, or the Government of India, dispatched a special staff of workmen, with the necessary machinery and tools, direct from England or India. Such an organization, had it existed from 1915 onwards,

¹ Corbett (iii. 197) makes the following reference to these gunboats: 'In Nov. 1914, when Lord Fisher returned to the Admiralty he gave Messrs. Yarrow *carte blanche* to design and get built 24 gunboats, 12 small ones known as the "Fly" class for the Tigris, and 12 larger ones, named after insects for the Danube. As the smaller ones were completed they were shipped out in sections to the Persian Gulf. Each carried a four-inch gun, one 12 pounder, one 6 pounder, one 2 pounder pom-pom and four Maxims, but being designed originally for police-work against Arabs, they had nothing but bullet-proof protectors.'

² See Sir Percy Lake's dispatch of 30.4.16.

would have been invaluable for the purpose of erecting barges and river-steamers, for which virtually no provision was made until, in 1917, the Inland Water Transport Department got well into their stride. That so much was done, in such difficult circumstances, reflects the greatest credit on the General Manager, Mr. C. A. Walpole, the Refinery Manager, Mr. R. G. Neilson,¹ and his assistants, Messrs. G. Thomson, L. F. Bayne, R. R. Davidson, and many others.

In 1917 the difficulties of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company were further increased by the fact that many of their staff refused to renew their contracts, and insisted on returning home for military or naval service. The motives of these men were wholly creditable; to natural feelings of patriotism were added the desire to see their relatives and friends, from whom they had been separated since the outbreak of war. Many had been greatly overworked and not a few were suffering from the strain of unremitting toil in a very trying climate. The position was one of great difficulty: the Home Government had no legal powers in Persia such as it could exercise under the Defence of the Realm Acts within the United Kingdom, neither could the Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia exercise over British or Indian civilians on Persian soil the powers vested in him within the Occupied Territories under Military Law. Nor was General Maude, who had repeatedly given public expression to his appreciation of the services that the company and its staff were rendering to the Force, disposed to bring indirect or moral pressure to bear upon individuals in such cases: 'Whatever is done', he remarked in the course of a discussion on the subject, 'must be the same for everybody.' He was prepared, if necessary, to put every man in the Company into uniform, and convert the Company into a military department; his staff were ready and even anxious to adopt this solution, which would, needless to say, have created far more problems than it solved. Not only would it have been distasteful to the Persian Government and to the Persian staff, numbering some 25,000 men, on whose labours the whole concern in the last resort depended, but it would have involved the complicated but efficient organization of the Company in Persia and London in the toils of an administrative machine designed for very different purposes. The solution eventually found was as simple as it was effective. 'The Abadan Munitions Factory Regulation' was issued in August 1917 by Sir Percy Cox as Consul-General, under the Persian Coasts and Islands Order in Council, declaring that as the proper conduct of the Company's business in Persia was a matter of national importance, no member of the staff

¹ For their services to the Expeditionary Force, Mr. R. G. Neilson was made a C.B.E. and Mr. Walpole an O.B.E.

was permitted to leave the Company's service, even though his contract had expired, without the consent in writing of the Consul-General, who at the same time took powers to fix the pay of every British subject in the Company's employ, on the expiry of existing contracts. This King's Regulation,¹ which was in due course approved by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had the desired effect: the staff, with negligible exceptions, accepted this official recognition of the national importance of the work on which they were engaged, and continued loyally to pursue their laborious tasks.

They knew that the maintenance of the Expeditionary Force and other essential war services further afield would be gravely imperilled by any interruption of the steadily increasing supply of petroleum products; they spared no efforts and shrank from no sacrifice to ensure that, come what might, they should not fail in their duty. It was in this spirit that Robert Lindsay, and with him James Still, went to almost certain death when, in July 1917, a serious accident occurred at Tembi Pumping Station. The official version of the heroism displayed, which cost Robert Lindsay his life, is told in the *London Gazette* of 23rd November 1917 in the following words:

"The King has been pleased to award the Albert Medal in gold in recognition of the conspicuous gallantry and self-sacrifice of *Mr. Robert Leiper Lindsay*, late Superintendent of the Tembi Pumping Station of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, on the occasion of the destruction by fire in July last of a part of the Pumping Station, and the Albert Medal to *Mr. James Still*, his Assistant, for the courage and devotion to duty displayed by him on the same occasion.

'On the 9th July 1917, one of the oil-pipe valves at the Tembi Pumping Station of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company burst. The pressure at this point was 700 lbs. to the square inch, so that a great fountain of oil was thrown in all directions to a great height. The burst occurred within thirty yards of the open and glowing furnaces of the boilers, and it was obvious that a disastrous fire, involving the whole station and compound, which was populated by nearly three hundred natives, was a question of seconds.

"The only means of averting a disaster was to turn off the oil fuel supply to the furnaces, thus extinguishing them, and to stop the pumps, thus cutting off the shower of oil.

'Mr. Lindsay was near the furnaces; but to reach them it was necessary to pass through the oil shower, and thus arrive at the furnace doors soaked and dripping with oil. To do so meant almost certainly a terrible death, but Mr. Lindsay did not hesitate. Shouting to his assistant Mr. Still to turn off the pumps, he dashed through the oil, and had succeeded in turning off the first oil cock, when the whole atmosphere burst into flame. He staggered away, but died from his injuries some hours later.

'Meanwhile Mr. Still had succeeded in turning off most of the pumps when

¹ See Appendix I.

the fire burst out. He was cut off from all doors, but managed to escape by a window, stupefied by heat and smoke. He then sought for and found Mr. Lindsay, and having removed him returned to do what he could to limit the damage. Thanks largely to his efforts a new pumping-house, which had just been established, was saved.'

It should be added that it was only by accident that I heard of these heroic actions, when I visited the oil-fields a few days after (vide *Loyalties*, Chapter XVI). I felt strongly that official recognition was called for, and recorded the necessary affidavits, which, a few weeks later, I submitted through Sir G. MacMunn to the Home Office.

The authorities, both in India and the United Kingdom, did not realize the immense economies in ocean-shipping and in personnel that could be attained by fitting all river-craft in Mesopotamia to burn oil instead of coal under boilers: in September 1916 no less than 8,000 tons of coal were being delivered monthly at Basra from India by a fleet of China Coast steamers specially requisitioned for the purpose, and the average monthly consumption of coal during 1918 was 25,665 tons, as compared with a monthly consumption of only 9,500 tons of fuel-oil.¹ A substantial proportion of this total was, of course, required for bunkering ocean-going steamers, but as late as 1918 200 vessels were being supplied with coal every month at 'Amara, as against 130 supplied with fuel-oil, and at Kut-al-Amara in 1918 some 4,590 tons of coal was issued monthly as against 2,000 tons of fuel-oil.

The coal, too, was from Bengal, and of notoriously poor quality. All of it had to be hauled across India to Bombay, and painfully loaded into ships designed to carry very different cargo: the loss of bulk in transit from colliery to up-river depot must have been at least ten per cent. In price, too, fuel-oil was, throughout the campaign, far cheaper than coal. Had more energetic steps been taken, both on the spot, in India, and at home, to arrange for the substitution of fuel-oil for coal on all river-craft, a monthly saving of tonnage of 4,000 tons a month in 1916, rising to about 10,000 tons a month in 1918, could have been secured, and with immense consequential saving in labour, both on ship and on shore. To deal with 25,000 tons of coal a month, without modern appliances, first at Basra, and later at up-country depots, involving at least five separate handlings, entailed the employment of a regular labour force of two or three thousand men, apart from stokers.

The Mesopotamian railways were not quite as slow as the Inland Water Transport Depot to substitute oil fuel for coal, though here, too, more might have been done. The *Official History* records² that

¹ Hall, p. 248; see also p. 150. Colonel Josiah Wedgwood's references on the subject in the House of Commons (Debates, H.C. 23.7.18) were very pertinent.

² iv. 174.

in June 1918 'oil fuel was being substituted for coal on the railways at a saving of some 125,000 shipping tons per annum'. The delay in making the change was the more remarkable because two of the principal Indian railways, with termini at Karachi and Bombay respectively, were using many thousands of tons of oil fuel throughout the war, the deliveries during 1918 from Abadan being nearly 130,000 tons. 'The Allies',¹ said Lord Curzon (disregarding specific gravity), 'floated to victory on a wave of oil': we failed in Mesopotamia to make the best use of this, the greatest of our local resources.

In August 1918 the War Office, in consultation with the Admiralty, decided to ask the Anglo-Persian Oil Co. to dispatch a small refinery plant to Baghdad, to deal with crude oil from the Naft Khana field (near Mandali), in which the Company had rights, granted, as a consequence of the rectification of the Turco-Persian frontier, by the Turkish Government before the war.² A site for the refinery was selected at the confluence of the Diyala River and the Tigris, five miles below Baghdad, and the necessary land expropriated in accordance with Turkish law 'for purposes of public utility' under the direct instructions of Government. A road was hastily constructed at the cost of the Company from Khanaqin to Naft Khana by military labour, assisted by a company of sappers and miners, to carry drilling-material to the spot chosen for preliminary exploration.

Before these developments could take shape the Armistice supervened and put an end to this, as to many other schemes. The refinery plant arrived just before the Armistice, but was never erected; the land was eventually sold, at a considerable loss, to its original owners. The episode is of interest to-day only as showing the urgent need for economizing tonnage, and the efforts made to this end by responsible authorities.

Agriculture. Though, as explained above, the military departments as a whole were slow to realize the value of oil, there was one direction in which its possibilities were exploited to the fullest extent, namely, for agricultural purposes. When we reached Baghdad we found some three hundred oil-driven pumping-plants derelict for lack of fuel, and as many more in the districts. Some had been wrecked by the Turks, others by marauding Arabs. Mr. Garbett, who, with the title of 'First Revenue Officer', was now in charge of the Revenue Department at Baghdad, as well as of the Agricultural Development Scheme to which reference is made below, took prompt steps to render assistance to the owners of pumps. Stolen parts were traced and recovered, and spare

¹ On 21st November 1918 at dinner of Inter-Allied Petroleum Council.

² See Toynbee, p. 467 n.

parts ordered from home. Arrangements were made to supply kerosene at special rates, and engineers and fitters were sent round the country to effect repairs and to advise the owners on the then unfamiliar problems of maintenance. An attempt was also made to obtain additional pumping-sets in India through Government agency; the outcome was not satisfactory, and Sir John Hewett, who was deputed by the War Office in 1919 to investigate various financial matters outstanding between the military and civil branches of government in Mesopotamia, recorded his view that 'so far as the facts connected with this transaction have transpired, there is no ground for debiting either Army funds or civil revenues in Mesopotamia with the loss resulting from it, and I am emphatically of opinion that no portion of it should be met from imperial army funds'.¹ The impetus given to irrigation by means of pumps during 1918 had a great effect on development in later days; each succeeding year has seen a substantial increase in the number of pumps installed on the Tigris and Euphrates, and the number now in commission is approximately ten times as great as it was before the war.

To enable the reader to appreciate the importance attached at this time by the War Office and by General Maude to the development of irrigation and agriculture in the occupied territories,² it is necessary to give some account of the general conditions prevailing when, in the summer of 1917, the scheme for 1918 was devised.

The Hindiya barrage was not under control, and the Turks, while they had done some of the excavation for the canal to be taken off from above the barrage on the west (the Bani Hasan canal) had done practically nothing towards the construction of the eastern canal, now called, after His Majesty, the Georgiya. As a consequence, the crops on the Hindiya branch of the Euphrates below the barrage, which had formerly depended on inundation canals, were entirely deprived of water, and in the Hindiya district there was no crop whatever. Along the Hilla branch of the river there had been heavy sowings in the area commanded by the canals, but owing to the accumulations of silt and to the scanty rainfall the yield of the matured crop had been very light. The town of Karbala and the surrounding lands had been flooded. The cutting of the Sakhlawiya dam, west of Baghdad, by the Turks had so reduced the volume of water in the Euphrates that the rice-crop sown in the Shamiya district, situated to the west of Diwaniya, had largely failed. Some pumps existed in the Diwaniya district, but they

¹ Hewett, *Report*, p. 21.

² See Hewett, *Report*; also "Turkish Rule and British Administration in Mesopotamia," *Quarterly Review*, October 1919, by Mr. C. C. Garbett. Also *Review of Civil Administration of the Occupied Territories*, Cmd. 1061.

were out of action owing to lack of oil, and the canals had long since silted up. There had apparently been a good crop on the Daghara, but the grain was in the hands of two or three speculators and was not available for seed or food.

On the Tigris from Samarra to the vicinity of Baghdad all cultivation had been destroyed by military operations, which were in progress when the crops were ripening. Near Baghdad rain failed, and there had been no flood on the Tigris for the third season in succession. From Baghdad to Kut the Turks had removed the tribes from the river-banks and forbidden all cultivation. On the Diyala they commanded the heads of the principal canals with their guns, and in the Baquba area many acres of grain were destroyed by military operations. When in September the head-works of the canals came into our possession, roads and railways were laid down so rapidly that many water courses had to be blocked.

The canals had everywhere deteriorated. Thus, in the rich Hilla area at the time of our occupation there were 54 canals, all in very bad condition, having, when in working order, an individual command varying from 240 to 22,000 acres. The majority were private property, and no control had been exercised over the proprietors. Seven canals had been left idle for several years, owing to unadjusted disputes between the landlords and tenants. One canal, the property of Government, had also been allowed to fall into disuse; the rest were badly silted up.

Such was the situation which led to the agricultural development scheme of July 1917. Famine was threatening the civil population, and prices were so high that holders were tempted to sell their seed-stores. It was necessary to extend the cultivated area with the utmost promptitude, and it was not possible to secure the increase required without large advances of cash and seed combined with extensive clearing of water-channels, and some addition to existing canals.

The inception of the scheme for 1918 was due to the initiative of Mr. C. C. Garbett, of the Indian Civil Service. The military authorities estimated that, in order to provide for the needs of the army in the advanced area, 90,000 tons of cereals, mainly barley, and 150,000 tons of bhusa (chopped straw) were required. Mr. Garbett's scheme contemplated the provision of these supplies for the army after the needs of the civil population had been met. It was proposed to finance the scheme from army funds. There were no civil revenues available for the purpose, and an addition to the cultivated area was essential alike for military and civil needs.

Mr. Garbett estimated that, in order to provide the grain required, it was necessary to bring 600,000 acres of land under crop. This

area should produce 280,000 tons of grain. He calculated that if left to themselves, the farmers would sow about 15,000 tons of seed, and that another 15,000 tons must be advanced to them. The scheme, therefore, as originally devised, provided for the supply of 15,000 tons of seed, at a cost of £250,000. The sum required for clearing water-channels was estimated at £20,000, and that for agricultural advances at £30,000. The scheme as first prepared did not contain any allotment for original irrigation-works, which were arranged for separately. The total estimate was, therefore, £300,000, the whole of which would be recoverable from the landlords and farmers. To this sum £100,000 was subsequently added for staff, machinery, and transport charges. Final approval was given by the War Office on the 16th September, and Mr. Garbett was appointed Administrator, with specific responsibilities both to G.H.Q. and to the head of the Civil Administration. Under his supervision the detailed arrangements of the scheme were entrusted to the political officers and the ordinary machinery of the Civil Administration, aided by a small additional establishment.

The scheme originally provided for the production of wheat, barley, and straw, and was confined to the areas commanded by the canals on the Euphrates. The estimate of land available was based on inaccurate maps. The administration depended upon very imperfect Turkish records, and the Euphrates area was to a great extent unexplored. It was found necessary to include privately-owned lands as well as Government land in the scheme, thus reducing the quantity of revenue grain which would become due to Government. The final forecast of revenue grain was therefore fixed at 50,000 tons. Further difficulties ensued. Tribal disturbances suspended the work of canal-clearance on two of the most important canals for over a month, and thereby prevented 100,000 acres from being cultivated. Compensation for this was found in other areas. Our advance up the Diyala gave us access to large cultivated areas, and the efforts of the political officers brought back the tribes to the Tigris. The estimate of grain that would be available for the army was eventually increased by 17,000 tons in Baghdad and 10,000 tons in Basra, to a total of 117,000 tons.

I had meanwhile authorized the grant of certain revenue concessions to the leading Shaikhs in the Euphrates area in return for their co-operation, and, in pursuance of this arrangement, the provision of seed for the areas commanded by the Hilla canals was guaranteed by the Shaikhs. As a result the amount of seed to be advanced was reduced from 15,000 tons to 6,000 tons, the remaining 9,000 tons being provided by the tribes themselves from stock which otherwise would have

been sold. The greater portion of the seed required, viz. 4,000 tons of barley and 1,700 tons of wheat, was ordered during August and September from India by the Director of Local Resources, to whose foresight Mr. Garbett made grateful acknowledgment at the time.

In two respects the scheme did not come up to expectations: some of the imported Indian wheat did not give the return expected, not being of the kind best suited to Mesopotamia, and the area irrigated by the two canals taking off from the Hindiya barrage (the Georgiya and the Bani Hasan) was far less than was calculated. When full measurements were received, the area irrigated by the Bani Hasan canal was found to be 20,650 acres and that by the Georgiya 14,000 acres—a serious shortage compared with the estimate of 100,000 acres. It seems that this result was to a considerable extent due to the ground now brought for the first time under regular cultivation being in many places full of deep fissures, so that a very large volume of water ran down the cracks and disappeared. There is, however, little doubt that at least 125,000 tons of the spring crop was directly due to the operations of the Agricultural Development Scheme, and to import that quantity from India would have cost about £2,000,000. The advantages derived from the scheme were, however, not wholly or even mainly financial. The withdrawal of this amount of grain from India when famine threatened there would have added to the difficulties of the Government of India, whilst increasing the congestion of the Indian railway system at a time when the rolling-stock was required for internal needs. Had not the food resources of the country been abundantly supplemented, the famine prevailing in the neighbouring territory of Turkey and Persia might have been reproduced in Mesopotamia.

No less important were the political advantages obtained. For the first time in history the Arab saw an administration devoting every effort to promoting his material benefit and the regeneration of his country. During the disturbances among the townfolk of Najaf, Kufa, and Abu Sukhair during the last three months of 1917 Captain Balfour, unsupported by troops, was able to rely in these rural districts on the help of the leading Shaikhs, 'who', as remarked in my review of the administration for 1918, 'were actively employed in cleaning out their canals with money borrowed from us, with a view to sowing grain provided by us'.

Great credit is due to Mr. Garbett for the enthusiasm and courage with which he initiated a scheme which so amply justified its inception. The difficulties under which his daily work was conducted were very great, and the few mistakes made were such as are inseparable from the conduct of a scheme of this magnitude in a totally undeveloped

country.¹ His health unfortunately broke down under the strain, and he went on leave. After a short rest he was attached to the India Office, where he did valuable work. In October 1920 he was selected to return with Sir Percy Cox to Baghdad.

Entomology, Mycology, and Botany. Arduous as was the work of the R.A.M.C. and I.M.S. in Mesopotamia, much useful entomological research was undertaken by a few enthusiasts in their spare time, notably by Captain P. A. Buxton,² whose work on 'Animal Life in Deserts' is one of the most fascinating books on Mesopotamia. Captain V. H. Dowson also undertook a series of inquiries into various insect pests, such as the 'Abu Dubaila' grasshopper, and the pomegranate borer.

It was not, however, till Major Wimshurst was appointed as a full-time Entomologist that the subject received proper attention: he combined the duties of Entomologist, Mycologist, and Economic Botanist: how valuable his work was may be gathered from his Annual Report for 1919-20. His staff was drawn from India, and included Rao Sahib Ramachandra Rao,³ from the professional staff of the Agricultural College at Coimbatore, and Mr. A. Dutt, of Calcutta, whose original researches were of real scientific and practical value.

Soil Analysis. One of the most important problems presented by any arid, or semi-arid region is the occurrence of alkaline or salt lands. In Iraq large tracts of uncultivated soil exist, over which there appears in summer a white incrustation. Elsewhere patches of damp-looking soil occur which maintain their moisture even in mid-summer. The white incrustation is, of course, the salts of the soil brought to the surface by the soil water which is there evaporated, whilst the darker moist patches consist of hygroscopic salts, similarly brought up. Even when the amounts of these salts are comparatively small, the germination of seed in the land is poor, and subsequent development stunted. As the percentage of salt increases these effects are more marked, and more water is necessary to bring the crop to maturity. Finally, when the quantity reaches a still higher figure, the lands become unfit for cultivation, and are generally known as 'alkali' or 'salt' lands.

The formation of these salts is in general due to climatic reasons. A soil exposed to the natural agencies of rain, drought, heat, and cold, gradually changes its chemical nature. In this process salts are produced. If the rainfall is insufficient to leach out these salts into the sub-soil, whence they would pass normally by springs and rivulets to

¹ See Hewett.

² See Bibliography for further works by this officer, also *Survey of Iraq Fauna, 1924.*

³ See Bibliography.

the main drainage of the country, they accumulate in the upper soil. Some are useful plant foods, and may be assimilated by natural vegetation or by crops. Others are useless or even harmful to crops.

These problems and others of the same nature were investigated during 1919 and 1920 by Mr. J. F. Webster, who was our Agricultural Chemist, and by his Assistant Mr. B. Viswanath. Their reports¹ show that the danger of ruining large areas by excessive irrigation is greater in Mesopotamia than even Sir W. Willcocks anticipated, though he was tireless in his emphasis on the importance of drainage. These and reports by other officers such as Lt. Gautby² showed that it was necessary to proceed with great caution if we were to make the desert blossom like the rose, as hoped by Lord Curzon; but they showed that the potentialities of the soil of 'Iraq from the agricultural point of view were limited only by the amount of water and the population available for agricultural pursuits.

The date crop. Of all the crops that Mesopotamia produced, dates appeared to offer the best prospects of extension and, to a lesser extent, of improvement. The 'Iraq date has a larger percentage of the valuable sugar, less fibre, and less water than the Tunis date. The calorific value of dates is higher than that of any fruit, being approached only by that of raisins: its food value and its relative cheapness has never been brought home to consumers in Great Britain, as has been done in the U.S.A., with the result that the annual consumption in this country averages less than a pound a head.³

In Capt. V. H. Dowson I found the right man to pursue inquiries into the economic potentialities of the date groves, and after labours extending intermittently over three years, he produced a series of reports⁴ which are now classic, and have borne fruit to the extent that a firm with wide-world interests in the fruit trade have acquired lands on the Shatt-al-Arab and have planted a great number of seedling palms of the best varieties, under Mr. Dowson's direct supervision, and the whole problem of marketing dates and of improving the methods of packing and transport has been competently investigated on behalf of the 'Iraq Government.⁵

These and other similar activities during 1919-20 were viewed with satisfaction both by the larger landowners and by individual cultivators: the experimental farms were widely visited, and the Agricultural Directorate as a whole displayed a quality of tact and sympathy which went far to justify their apparently abstruse researches in the eyes of their clients.

The events of 1920 crippled, but did not wholly extinguish their

¹ See Bibliography.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ See Forrester.

activities, which were sponsored and have since been developed by the 'Iraq Government so far as their exiguous means allow.

Cattle-Breeding. Something was done during 1918 to improve the breed of cattle. Some 3,000 Indian cows and buffaloes were introduced for dairy purposes, and 24 Ayrshire bulls for breeding. Some young stock was offered for sale and found ready purchasers amongst the cultivators, but financial stringency prevented any considerable development of this branch of activity. It is, in any case, doubtful whether stock can be permanently improved in Mesopotamia unless the cultivators are prepared to feed their cattle more liberally than is now the custom.

The common breed of sheep throughout alluvial Mesopotamia is the fat-tailed variety known in Persia and India as *dumba*.

Wool is one of the most important economic products of Mesopotamia. Its production is inexpensive and in normal times it finds a ready market. The sheep in the Mosul wilayat are of different types from those in Basra and Baghdad. The chief varieties are (1) a large-legged white sheep with a brown face and brown legs. The males have long and curved horns like the black-faced mountain sheep of Scotland. This sheep has rather coarse wool on the leg, and is not good for mutton. (2) A small black-faced sheep with a long nose and a tuft of brown wool between the ears. This type is a very fine small sheep, short in the legs, with a fine thick heavy fleece, and producing good mutton.

The country round Mosul city has limestone hills and good turf, and there are enormous areas which have splendid grazing for sheep. There are very few black and brown sheep in the Mosul wilayat, and in this respect the flocks there present a striking contrast to those of the two southern wilayats, where black and browns largely predominate. Throughout 'Iraq the length of the wool is good, and it seemed clear that something might be done by judicious breeding and more careful treatment.

A beginning was made in this direction by the importation of selected rams from Baluchistan, but for physical reasons the result was disappointing; our finances did not permit us to pursue the matter further, nor has anything been done, so far as I am aware, in subsequent years. The reason is, perhaps, to be found in Lt.-Col. R. J. D. Graham's note on the subject, from which the following is an extract:

'Any one setting out to improve the quality of Arab sheep must bear in mind that the existing breed has been established for a period beyond calculation and that it is absolutely adapted to the existing conditions. If the object in view is the production of a white wool the probabilities are that it could be obtained, but with a loss of most of the other desirable qualities such as fineness, strength, waviness, lustre, &c. The dark colours of this wool are due to a natural process

of colour protection. If a white-wool breed were produced, absence of protective colouring would reflect on the stamina of that breed, and if this breed were left for a time it would revert again to the original colourings or die out. . . . Suggestions have come from some quarters for the improvement of local breeds by the introduction of Merino blood from Australia. Before such an experiment is tried it seems much more reasonable to attempt the improvement by selection of the indigenous breeds. It is very unlikely that a better type of wool-producing sheep than 'Arabi'¹ can be found in any part of the world where the climatic conditions are such as prevail in 'Iraq.'

The organization of labour, of the supply of petroleum products and cereals, were by no means the only directions in which the military and civil departments co-operated in harmonious emulation to develop the local resources of Mesopotamia. Military dairies were established at all large centres, for the supply of milk, cream, and butter to hospitals, and nurses no longer found small fish in the bottom of a cup of milk that a patient had drained. Grass-farms were organized at 'Amara and elsewhere to feed the dairy-cattle. A chicken-farm was successfully run on quite a large scale by Captain Ezra at Hilla to meet the demand both for chickens and eggs. In April 1918 Ezra, emulating the admirable Vataces,² had some 20,000 birds of all ages in his care, from day-old chicks to laying hens; they were fed from the winnowings of the grain collected for issue to the army and thus cost nothing to maintain.³

Not all the numerous schemes of the Department of Local Resources were equally fortunate: some failed for lack of skilled labour, others for lack of suitable raw material, but few for lack of expert knowledge, for there was almost no branch of trade or industry unrepresented in the ranks of the British and Indian armies in 1918. An attempt

¹ Wool dealers and exporters of Baghdad recognize three distinct varieties of Mesopotamian wools—'Arabi', 'Awassi', and 'Karradi'.

'Arabi' is the name given to wool from the sheep owned by the Arabs of the plains of 'Iraq. It is superior to 'Awassi and 'Karradi and compares very favourably with the best wools of India, China, and the north coast of Africa, including Egypt. This wool is exported to Bradford.

'Awassi' wool comes from a breed of sheep chiefly owned by the Arabs whose habitat is in the region between Mosul and Aleppo. This breed of sheep is said to be a cross between the 'Arabi and Kurdish, or 'Karradi. The wool produced is white in colour, is long-stapled, coarser, and less wavy than 'Arabi, but superior in all respects to 'Karradi.

'Karradi' is a commercial name of the wool of the Kurdish sheep bred to the north and west of Mosul on the Kurdish hills. In colour it resembles 'Awassi; it is longish in staple, and very slightly curled; the fibres tend to coarseness and the fleece-staples are matted into locks characteristic of an inferior breed of sheep.

² See Gibbon VIII. ii.

³ See Marshall, p. 299, and Younghusband, p. 301, who mentions that the barn-door fowls of Lower 'Iraq are occasionally found able to swim strongly up stream and to paddle about like ducks on occasion.

to tan locally some of the many thousand hides and skins that passed monthly through the hands of the Supply Department failed primarily for lack of labour; and a factory to provide the hospital and other laundries with soap was only partially successful. A scheme to brew beer, the immense demand for which was inadequately met by imports from Japan, did not take shape owing to lack of suitable water: a scheme to make marmalade from the abundant oranges of Baquba came to naught, I believe, owing to the impossibility of obtaining the requisite plant to provide this essential ingredient of an Englishman's breakfast on a sufficiently large scale. The army was willing to take a hundred tons a month, but the containers were unprocurable and could not be improvised.

Much criticism, not all of it unjust, was directed against the operations of the Department of Local Resources, owing partly to the somewhat erratic enthusiasms of the rather heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, and partly to a not wholly happy instinct for publicity which inspired at least one of the Deputy Directors. It was to some, for example, a source of annoyance on entering Hilla by 'O'Connor Street', to pass along 'Prior Lane', and 'Dickson Terrace', to 'Resources Square'. Hospitality was sometimes almost too lavish, promises of supplies were made almost too readily, and the credit for a good harvest jointly due to a bountiful Jehovah and an industrious peasantry was sometimes too lightly arrogated to departmental foresight. Nevertheless, the Department as a whole grew, under the watchful but sometimes rather anxious eye of General Marshall, into an integral and valuable part of the military machine,¹ and rendered indirectly and incidentally services of great importance to the Civil Administration by helping to restore agricultural prosperity and by ensuring that sums expended in the country on local purchases should cause as little injury as possible to the civil population as a whole.

Military Engineers. Mention must also be made of the activities of the Military Works Department, who had to depend on the country for road-metalling, bricks, and mortar. They laid Kharag, Bushire, and Kuwait under requisition for stone; from Khor 'Abdulla came sand, from Khor Musa hundreds of tons of fine shell which, when burned, produced excellent lime. A railway line was laid to Jabal Sanam, and great quantities of stone for roads, for cement aggregate, and for railway purposes was obtained from this source. From Shushtar came gypsum mortar, from Ahwaz stone for revetting embankments,

¹ See Repington, i. 599 and ii. 135 for letters on the subject by General Maude, who wrote of the Department on 7th April 1917, 'A capital fellow is running it, and I look forward to great results'. See also Egan, p. 274.

from Zubair and Shu'aiba, and at a later stage from the Jabal Hamrin, gypsum. Bitumen was brought into Baghdad on quite a large scale from Hit, for building-purposes and for pavements. From Hit, too, came quantities of limestone to be burned to make mortar, and on occasion for buildings.¹ Of gravel there was never any serious lack; it was brought from the old bed of the Tigris near Sumaika and Balad, from the Diyala near Jabal Hamrin. The principal difficulty was the supply of bricks. The product of the local kilns was never good; under war conditions it became worse; labour became scarce and dear; the piece-work rates at the brick-kilns above Qurmat 'Ali, north of Basra, were doubled, and later trebled, till small children could earn as much as a grown man before the war. Families came flocking in from the marshes to make bricks, with the result that the price of reeds, which were, at Basra, the sole fuel for brick-making, became prohibitive. Similar conditions reigned at Baghdad soon after our arrival. The Public Works Department were not long in building brick-kilns designed to burn oil fuel under steam pressure. For the first time in history the British type of oblong brick was made in great quantities at Baghdad and elsewhere. Along with the vast temporary deposits of Japanese beer-bottles it will doubtless serve to puzzle the archaeologists of the future. The bricks will, for the most part, crumble into dust, for few permanent structures were built, but the bottles are imperishable. At a low estimate some fifty million were imported during the war, carpeting the Tigris from Baghdad to Fao, and accumulating in dumps at every military centre and outpost, constituting what is destined to be perhaps the most abiding memorial in 'Iraq of the Great War.

There is little or no official record of the doings of the Corps of Royal Engineers in the Military Works Department in Mesopotamia, as distinct from those of the Irrigation, Port, River Conservancy, and Railway Departments and of the Civil Works Department formally constituted in 1919, but no account of the development of Mesopotamia in the war years would be complete without a tribute to the resourcefulness and versatility displayed by them, both in the exercise of their purely military functions and in the execution of works calculated to serve both immediate military and subsequent civil needs.

In December 1918 Dr. H. R. H. Hall of the British Museum arrived to undertake archaeological work on behalf of the Civil Administration, under whose supervision antiquities had been placed by a proclamation of the G.O.C. in Chief. He undertook excavations at Ur, of which he

¹ In the four months ending 1st October 1918 bitumen and lime were produced at Hit for military purposes at the rate of 4,000 and 5,000 tons a month respectively (see General Marshall's dispatch of 1.10.18).

has left on record a most interesting and lively account;¹ he visited Babylon and Nippur and gave us valuable assistance in drafting regulations, which have stood the test of time, for the control of the traffic in antiquities and of archaeological research. Sir George MacMunn lent him a few hundred Turkish prisoners of war, of whom he made good use.

Police. It would have been impossible, even in 1919, to create the organization outlined in this chapter, had not measures been taken at the same time for the maintenance of public order both in the large towns and in the country districts. The Turkish system had completely disappeared; it had never been efficient, and it had been virtually in abeyance, except in Baghdad, since the outbreak of war. It was necessary to start afresh. Lt.-Col. Gregson returned to India, after a short period of leave, to take up fresh and arduous responsibilities on the North-West Frontier and in the Punjab. He had started the police force on thoroughly sound lines and had collected an efficient body of officers to carry on the work at various centres. His place was taken during 1918 by his deputy, Major H. C. Prescott, an Indian Army Officer with special police experience. No better selection could possibly have been made: he was incontestably one of the best administrators in Mesopotamia, with a genius for judging character, for inspiring loyalty, and for training Arabs to occupy positions of responsibility in the official hierarchy. At the time of writing (1931) he is still Inspector-General of Police, with a force nearly all of whom have been trained under his direct supervision.

The principle adopted throughout the campaign was to organize a uniformed and disciplined police force in the large towns immediately after their occupation by the army. The maintenance of order in the districts and smaller towns and on the lines of communication was, on the other hand, left to District Officers, who improvised local levies for the purpose. The regular police were thus left free to build up, under the immediate control of experienced officers, a trained and disciplined body of men. From these were drawn, in later years, as occasion demanded, the necessary nucleus of seasoned Station House Officers and constables for the smaller municipalities, whose representatives invariably pressed the administration, within a few weeks of the military occupation, to furnish a detachment of police, for whose services they were willing to pay.

For the first three or four years the higher police officers were drawn almost entirely from the ranks of the Indian Police Department, both British and Indian; on the occupation of the Baghdad

¹ H. R. H. Hall, *A Season's Work at Ur*, 1930. He died in October 1930.

wilayat a number of British soldiers with police experience in the United Kingdom were added to the force, partly as instructors and partly as Station House Officers. The experiment, which was not made without some misgivings, was remarkably successful. The good temper, common sense, and impassive dignity of the metropolitan or county policeman endeared him from the beginning to all classes. Accustomed to be bullied and beaten by Turkish policemen, whose exiguous salary was perforce supplemented by innumerable petty exactions, the Arabs both in the large towns and in the country districts saw in these men *auspicium melioris aevi*, a worthy embodiment of the new and better régime promised by General Maude. The Arab rank and file willingly abandoned their national dress for the khaki shorts and puttees which, when the Expeditionary Force first arrived, had been a source of mirth mingled with repugnance, for to the Arab bare knees seemed in 1914 to befit a man as ill as we in England then considered short skirts to befit a woman. Arab constables on point duty and on parade imitated, to the verge of mimicry, but in all seriousness, the very intonations and gestures of their British colleagues, as well as their attitude towards the public; they found their reward almost at once in the deference paid to them by the community.

The immediate result of this satisfactory beginning was that by 1919 it began to be possible to enlist Arabs, of good family and of sufficient education, to fill the higher posts for training as police officers, and an Inspectors' Training School was established, where law, police regulations, drill, riding, &c., were taught, while several probationers were sent to India to study the finger-print system. This development proved to be the turning-point in the growth of the police organization. The Turkish police had had a bad name: men of good family would not enter the service, nor was it generally advisable to draw on men who had been employed by the Turks. A small detachment of British-trained Somali police from Aden were tried, as also a few Egyptians, but found unsatisfactory. Up to 1918 the directing hierarchy of the force had been almost entirely British and Indian; from 1919 the Arab element began to enter in responsible capacities; by 1920 the force had begun to maintain its records in Arabic, Arab police prosecutors began to appear, unaided, in the courts, and it was possible for the first time to reduce the number of British police-sergeants, replacing them by trained Arabs.

The Criminal Investigation Department, which was started on Indian lines in 1917 with branches at Basra and Baghdad, included within its orbit the Finger-Print Bureau and the Passport Department; to its activities the country owes much.

In 1916, when we occupied only the Basra wilayat, the total strength of the police force was 400; in 1917, following on the occupation of Baghdad, the strength was 950; at the Armistice in 1918, 1,430. During 1919 Mosul was taken over, and provided with a regular police force, and the total force in 'Iraq raised to 2,000: during 1920 further additions were made to its duties, and the strength of the force increased to 2,638.

An outstanding feature of the revolt of 1920 was the loyalty of the police at every centre: no resignations were tendered, no desire shown by officers or men to shirk the duty of maintaining order in the districts in their charge: in no department was *esprit de corps* more noticeable, or its results more gratifying. It was not, therefore, surprising that Lt.-Col. Prescott was called on greatly to expand the activities of the department in the following year—with the result that by the end of 1922 the force had more than doubled, and stood at nearly 6,000, with an Arab Director-General at its head. Its numbers in 1930 stood at about 6,800, including 40 Arab Commandants and Assistant Commandants, 183 Arab Inspectors, and some 6,500 police.

The system started in 1915 and extended in subsequent years is working to-day on almost precisely the same lines as in 1917, when it was first centralized in Baghdad. The Department has been able to enter into friendly co-operation with the corresponding administrations in India, Palestine, Persia, Syria, and Turkey, with most satisfactory results, and in 'Iraq itself has been usually, though not invariably, free from interference on the part of political chiefs.

It is legitimate to deduce from these facts:

- (1) that the decision to introduce and to maintain the Indian, as against the Turkish or Egyptian police system was sound;
- (2) that the department owes its success to this decision and to the fact that it was founded, and directed throughout, not by amateurs but by police officers *de carrière*, who were, until recently, successful in preventing the force from being made the object of experiments in administration either by the earlier British or the present Arab Administration;
- (3) that the Indian Police Department has good reason to pride itself on the record of its members in 'Iraq, who have not only succeeded in transplanting such parts of the Indian police system as are applicable to 'Iraq, but have contrived to arabicize it from top to bottom, to master thoroughly the spoken and written tongue of the country and a new code of law, and to earn the respect and gratitude of the Government and population respectively in the process.

It should, moreover, be borne in mind that the British police-officers sent from India were not specially chosen for the purpose in time of peace. On the contrary, they were for the most part unwillingly extracted from a harassed Local Government during the war, or dragged protesting from Indian infantry regiments to which they had been attached from the Indian Army Reserve of Officers.

In the record of the 'Iraq police is to be found a good, but by no means unique example of a system founded by British officials on British lines, which has by them been successfully arabicized, without losing as yet the British tradition of public service and private rectitude. The service is at the time of writing freer from corruption, and from allegations of malpractices, than that of any Eastern country within my knowledge, thanks to the sturdy self-respect of the Arab rank and file, who have shown that, given a living wage (though there is room for immediate improvement in this direction), official support, and systematic training, they are as capable as any Western race of doing their duty 'without fear or favour, partiality or affection'.

Up to the end of 1919 we had received in Mesopotamia from India and set at liberty some 15,000 prisoners of war of Mesopotamian origin, including nearly 1,000 former Turkish military or civil officials. The jail population numbered 700 as compared with 680 in December 1918, all sentenced by civil courts in the ordinary course of law, with the exception of twelve men undergoing preventive imprisonment, in each case for crimes of violence or highway-robbery under circumstances which made it impossible or undesirable to prosecute in the ordinary courts, e.g. intimidation or murder of witnesses. Twelve men in all had been deported by the Civil Administration since the Armistice: they were in every case former Turkish officials of Turkish race.

These figures, which are taken from an official return, sufficiently indicate the satisfactory state of public order at this period and the extreme moderation displayed by the police in the exercise of their powers. They show also how baseless were the allegations made in Syria, by British officers, of the harshness of the administration in 'Iraq during this period.

Concurrently with the organization of police in the towns, steps were taken to provide the political officers in the country districts with an armed force on which they could rely to maintain order, to ensure the safety of the network of roads and rivers, and to secure the arrest when necessary of the more ambitious disturbers of the peace. The first steps were taken (vide *Loyalties*, Chapter V) in 1915, when *shabana* were enlisted to patrol the banks of the Tigris and Euphrates, and to prevent piracy. Two years later the Muntafiq Scouts—a body of horsemen under Major J. F. Eadie—were raised under military

auspices at Nasiriya, and did valuable work. When the Baghdad wilayat was added to our responsibilities, local *shabana* were raised by each political officer, and at Khanaqin Major Soane recruited and managed on a system peculiarly his own a most competent body of Kurdish Horse, which restored order at a most difficult moment. It was soon clear, however, that a more centralized system was necessary, if only to ensure the regular supply of rifles, ammunition, and equipment, and uniformity in conditions of service which was essential to avoid ill-feeling and jealousy. Such a feeling was of slow growth, for local feeling was strong, and it was not until some time after the Armistice that it was possible to insist on the wearing of uniform.

The fact that the *shabana*, and later the Levies, were for the most part tribesmen, had advantages, as well as drawbacks. The Turks had never attempted to enlist tribesmen in the service of Government; the fact that we did so was evidence of a new spirit. It tended to weaken the authority of the Shaikhs over their tribes, to deprive them of some of their best men, to break down the hard and fast line between tribes—a necessary preliminary to national unity—and to form the nucleus of a voluntary army. On the other hand, it was clearly possible, and even probable, that in an emergency the influence of the Shaikhs and of the body of tribal opinion might undermine the loyalty of the enlisted men during the early days of the administration. Yet, when disturbances broke out, in no case in the Basra or Baghdad wilayats, with the doubtful exception of Shahraban, did the Arab Levies desert where they were commanded by a British officer. In the Mosul wilayat, where we had not been so long established, the position was different. Both at 'Amadiya and Tel 'Afar the Levies behaved treacherously, but at Rowandiz, Kōi, Arbil, and Sulaimani they behaved well. The Levy officers laboured under great difficulties: they had not as yet the traditional reputation of British military officers in India. Nevertheless, though Arabs are by nature restive under discipline, they showed a genuine respect for and attachment to many officers, such as Boyle, MacWhinnie¹ at Hilla, Littledale at Arbil, Fitzgibbon, Makant, and Bond² at Sulaimani, Gowan at Mosul, Packer at Qilat Salih, and many others who could prove their moral and physical superiority in ways which their men could understand. When they had been led to victory once or twice by such officers, they would follow them with courage and determination.

There were three sources from which Arab officers could be recruited:

- (1) Former officers or civil officials, who have served under the Turkish Government.

¹ He died on 5th October 1923.

² All three were murdered in South Kurdistan in 1922.

(2) Relations of leading Shaikhs.

(3) The ranks.

The first type were valuable owing to their education and sense of discipline, and in some cases their previous military knowledge, but seemed to have little influence with the men.

The second type were very useful in the Shaikhs' own districts, but it was seldom possible to place them in command of men drawn from rival tribes.

The third source proved on the whole the most useful; those selected were generally men of some education, and as discipline improved, and the necessity of personal and tribal influence became less, men were extensively promoted from the ranks. Each category had its advantages, and no more difficult task confronted the Levy officers than to make a wise selection.¹

The total number of *shabana* in Mesopotamia at the end of 1917 stood at about 1,500, of whom 1,000 were in the Baghdad wilayat. In December 1918 they stood at about 2,000: in April 1920 there were about 4,800 Levies in all, of whom about 800 were Kurds; the remainder were Arabs, with a proportion of Persians, who proved a valuable element.

The reader will have gathered from the pages of this book that the Arab of Mesopotamia is not easy to govern or to control, nor is it easy to devise a government suited to his needs, still less to his desires. It should be remembered, however, that the great majority of those men who were, on the outbreak of the disturbances in July 1920, wearing the uniform of Levies, fought gallantly against their own kith and kin, in the interests of law and order, suffering over 100 casualties. Five Arab and Kurdish officers and ten other ranks were decorated for gallantry and devotion to duty in the field during these operations. I have no hesitation in saying that the loyalty of the Levies and of the Police to the Civil Administration contributed more than any other single factor to prevent a general outbreak of anarchy at this period.

They were openly called infidels in the streets, and were refused food in the bazaars and coffee-shops, and vessels from which they had drunk were publicly broken. Their women would crowd round the barracks, calling on their husbands and sons to come to protect them. To stay with the Levies meant to many that they would be disowned by their tribes: in several cases their wives were violated, carried off, or even killed. Trained as the men were to act as a mobile force, they found themselves involved in a series of sieges—at Abu Sukhair, Diwaniya, Hilla, Khidhr, Kufa, Rowandiz, and elsewhere. The British cause seemed hopeless, and it was certain that the new Government,

¹ See *Review of Civil Administration* (1918 and 1920).

whatever shape it took, would feel under little, if any, obligation to these men. Yet the vast majority remained stubbornly loyal. To consider the origin of the loyalty which in equal degree animated the police and some of the civil departments deserves more space than I can here afford to devote to the subject, but a few reflections may be of interest.

Loyalty is a relative term, but it is one which all peoples understand. 'In loyalty, when loyalty is properly defined,' says an American philosopher, 'is the fulfilment of the whole moral law.'¹ But, when the material basis of life changes swiftly, or when the character of social organization is changed by conquest from without, the harmony of institutions is upset, and the conflict of loyalties and obligations develops apace.² This is precisely what happened in 'Iraq and in many other countries after the war. The unsophisticated Arab, Kurd, or Persian is deeply imbued with loyalty to his family and his tribe; his loyalty is willing, practical, thorough, and sustained till death. It is not primarily emotional, and it is largely independent of admiration or affection for individuals. The disturbances of 1920 were essentially a clash of loyalties—loyalty to the behests of religious leaders and Shaikhs, themselves little respected and often openly despised—loyalty to racial ties and to oaths reluctantly made. Of the several thousands of Arabs who were killed in the course of the disturbances, few, if any, had personal ambitions to promote. Their loyalty, however misguided, gave unity and stability to their philosophy of life. Yet those men in the ranks of the Levies, who had for any length of time been in direct contact with and under the command of British officers and non-commissioned officers, found in this new service a fresh centre for their loyalty, and were ready to abandon the ties of family and of tribe sooner than desert the cause to which they were pledged. The same is true of the Police Force. I know of no forces in the annals of history so soon and so highly tried as these young organizations of only a few months standing, assailed by temptations almost beyond the power of human nature to withstand. Major C. A. Boyle, D.S.O., who from March 1918 till 1922 was Inspecting Officer for Arab Levies, and his officers may well be proud of such a record. The Levies were their creation and came almost exclusively under their influence. But even greater credit is due to the rank and file: my respect for the inhabitants of 'Iraq rests upon the knowledge that I acquired in those dark days of the moral courage shown by almost all those Arabs and Kurds who for any length of time had seen service with the Civil Administration.

¹ Royce, *The Philosophy of Loyalty*, 1928.

² Cole, G. H. D., 'Loyalties', paper read to Aristotelian Society on 1st March 1926.

CHAPTER IV

THE GROWTH OF THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION DURING 1918¹

'What answer would the modern Imperialist give to the question of *Quo vadis*? I do not think that the Frenchman, the Russian, the German, or the Italian, if the question were put to any of them, would be much more seriously embarrassed than the ancient Roman to find an answer. Each would reply that his intention was to civilize his alien subjects, but in no way to relax his hold over them. But what would be the reply of the leading Imperialist of the world—of the Englishman? He would be puzzled to give any definite answer, for he is in truth always striving to attain two ideals, which are apt to be mutually destructive—the ideal of good government, which connotes the continuance of his supremacy, and the ideal of self-government, which connotes the whole or partial abdication of his supreme position. Moreover, although after a dim, slipshod, but characteristically Anglo-Saxon fashion, he is aware that empire must rest on one of two bases—an extensive military occupation or the principle of nationality—he cannot in all cases quite make up his mind which of the two bases he prefers.' CROMER, *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*, 1910.

Trouble at Najaf. Captain Marshall murdered. Najaf blockaded. Conspirators hanged. Complicity of German Officers. Captain Balfour presented with sword of honour. Civil Administration introduced. Land Tenure Systems. Position at Samarra. Position at Ramadi. The Blockade. Shammar 'Farba'. Position on the Diyala River and at Khanaqin. E. B. Soane. The occupation, abandonment, and reoccupation of Kirkuk. Baghdad. Red Cross Fêtes. Municipal activities. The Oudh Bequest. Progress in Basra wilayat. Public Health. Irrigation Department. Qurna, Muntafiq, and Amara Divisions. Deportation of Civilians. Justice and Education. Political Uncertainties.

CONCURRENTLY with the great events in the military arena and with the multifarious activities described in the preceding chapter, the civil administrative machine began during 1918 to assume coherent shape in the Baghdad wilayat, and to gather strength in the wilayat of Basra, which remained till the end of the year an administrative unit under the direction of Mr. Howell, who had succeeded me as Deputy Civil Commissioner. In December 1917 Sir Percy Cox had made a tour of the Middle Euphrates area in order to advise the G.O.C.-in-Chief as to the various points where military detachments could best be placed to satisfy administrative needs; and action was taken, before the end of the year, to send garrisons to important points in general conformity with his recommendations.

¹ References: Sir Percy Cox (in Lady Bell's *Letters of Gertrude Bell*); *Review of the Civil Administration in the Occupied Territories of Al 'Iraq*, 1918, Cmd. 1061; *Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, 1920; Administration Reports (for list see Bibliography, Official, Mesopotamia); Hewett, Marshall, Lyall, Hay, *Official History*, Woodyatt.

We were anxious, perhaps unduly so, to avoid placing military garrisons in the towns of Najaf and Karbala, which were held in reverence by Shi'ah Muslims in India and Persia. It was true that the Turks had maintained garrisons there throughout the war, and it soon became obvious to us that in both towns, but especially at Najaf, the lawless elements were being incited by Turkish propaganda and German money to create difficulties for us throughout the Middle Euphrates districts. It was, nevertheless, dangerous for us to assume that we could, without arousing prejudice, undertake what the Turks, as an Islamic Power, had not hesitated to do, and we avoided taking military action till the last possible moment. It has, indeed, been suggested that we were pledged by our proclamation of 1st November 1914¹ not to garrison these towns. This argument was, however, untenable: the proclamation was in general terms, and if literally interpreted might be regarded as applying not only to Najaf and Karbala but to Kadhimain, Samarra, and Baghdad, not to mention Jerusalem, and it had been long rendered obsolete by the course of events.

It was at Najaf that, in October 1917, trouble first developed,² in connexion with blockade questions. Following on Sir Percy Cox's visit to the district in December 1917, a few troops were posted early in January to Kufa, five miles east of Najaf. Their small numbers convinced the Najafis that we were hard pressed elsewhere; a cavalry patrol was shot at from the walls, and an aeroplane which appeared over the town was heavily fired on; the Government offices in Najaf were attacked, and Agha Hamid Khan and his official subordinates—all Mesopotamians—were forced to fly to Kufa. The penalty was a fine of Rs. 50,000 and 500 rifles, together with the surrender of the ringleaders, Haji 'Atiya abu Qulul and Karim ibn Haji Sa'ad. The latter, however, fled, but the leading Shaikhs extorted the amount of the fine, with something in addition for themselves, from leading residents wholly innocent of complicity in the disturbances, and handed in 500 useless rifles. At the same time a battalion of troops was quartered at Kufa with a detachment in barracks outside the walls of Najaf.

On 1st February, Captain W. M. Marshall was sent by Sir Percy Cox to Najaf as Assistant to Captain F. C. C. Balfour, of the Sudan Civil Service, who since October 1917 had been in charge of the Shamiya Division. Captain Marshall, whom Candler somewhere describes as 'one of the best and wisest of men', was singularly well qualified for his difficult task. He spoke Persian fluently and had been for ten months Assistant Political Officer at the Shi'ah town and shrine of Kadhimain, where he was universally respected. He had hoped to

¹ See Appendix, *Loyalties, Mesopotamia, 1914-17*.

² Vide *Loyalties*, Chapter XV.

return to England in the summer of 1918 in order to be married, but when the Najaf post was offered to him he put aside his private affairs for a time in order to undertake work of such great responsibility. He devoted himself to the task with a tact which endeared him at once to the local priesthood, to whom he had brought high credentials from their brethren in Kadhimain.

Early in March, the situation having outwardly improved, the battalion of troops was withdrawn, though not without misgivings experienced and officially expressed by both Balfour and Marshall. Rumours of our impending defeat and the return of the Turks began to circulate with a persistence and wealth of detail that we had learned by experience to be connected with external agencies. On the morning of 19th March a number of Najafis disguised as *shabana* obtained admittance to 'Atiya's *Khan* and, after disposing of the sentry, murdered poor Marshall and severely wounded the Labour Officer who was with him. The Punjabi guard drove out the insurgents. Captain Balfour arrived from Kufa and entered the town. Though heavily fired upon, he succeeded in bringing away half of the Police, two of whom were shot dead in the bazaar; the remainder took refuge in the house of Saiyid Mahdi al Saiyid Salman. Had the Najafis held their hand for a few days, the murder of Captain Marshall and the resulting operations would never have taken place, for a week later, on 26th March, the entire Turkish force at Ramadi on the Euphrates was captured.¹

General Marshall was swift to act. The town of Najaf was promptly blockaded by a Brigade under General Sanders, and the following conditions proclaimed:

- (i) The unconditional surrender of certain persons known to be the ringleaders and supposed to be among the attacking party.
- (ii) A fine of 1,000 rifles.
- (iii) A fine of Rs. 50,000.
- (iv) Deportation of 100 persons to India as prisoners of war.
- (v) Pending fulfilment of the above conditions the town to be blockaded and the food- and water-supply cut off.

It was a critical moment in the history of the Civil Administration: the imposition of these terms was a challenge to the fanatical elements throughout Mesopotamia; it was an assertion of our right, our duty, and our intention to govern without too tender a regard for the arrogant claims of the self-appointed oligarchs of the town, in whose hands the priesthood, themselves for the most part well-disposed to us at this time, were powerless. The tension was acute, and in some quarters unfavourable reactions were feared. The Sunni element in

¹ Vide Chapter I.



CAPT. W. M. MARSHALL
Killed March 19th, 1918



Baghdad added to our difficulties by openly rejoicing that we had been forced to grasp the poisonous nettle; Shi'ah divines throughout Persia and Mesopotamia communicated to the nearest British official their fears of public resentment, and proffered fatuous appeals for clemency or suggestions for 'arbitration'. The Persian Government itself was moved to express to the British Minister its fears lest Persian religious feelings should be dangerously stirred by the news. The Military Censors endeavoured to suppress it, but were bidden by General Marshall to 'publish and be damned'. Official intermediaries besieged my office at Baghdad, bringing unauthorized proposals for 'an amicable settlement'. Anonymous letters were received threatening promiscuous murders. From the Government of India and the India Office came telegrams betraying not unnatural nervousness at the probable outcome of these drastic measures. Sir Percy Cox, whom I kept fully informed, alone maintained a discreet but encouraging silence.

On 7th April a group of mounds dominating the town was taken by General Sanders's Brigade,¹ and the rest of the Government officials remaining in Najaf were evacuated; by 4th May all the important persons named had been surrendered and the blockade was declared at an end. During the course of these operations not a shot had been fired into the town itself, and friendly communication was maintained with the chief Mujtahid, Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi.

A Military Court was assembled in Kufa to try the offenders. The proceedings of this Court resulted in eleven death-sentences and nine of imprisonment varying in period from six years to life. Those sentenced to death included some of the principal secular leaders in the town; the evidence against them was conclusive, and it was reinforced by documents² in the possession of German officers captured on the Euphrates, which showed clearly that here, as in Persia, incitements to murder British officials, backed by ample cash inducements, formed part of the German plan of campaign.³ Plans had in fact been elaborated to murder all the political officers in the neighbourhood; they miscarried only because the conspiracy at Najaf began too soon. The promulgation of the death-sentences was the signal for a fresh stream of letters and telegrams from many quarters urging me to advise the G.O.C.-in-Chief to commute the sentences on the Shaikhs and ringleaders, and to execute only the two men who had actually murdered Captain Marshall. The Islamic law which forbids the execution of more than one man for one murder was invoked, and deputations of *Saiyids*, *mullas*, and minor '*ulama* came to urge the need

¹ See Woodyatt, p. 305.

² See Chapter I.

³ See Marshall, p. 291.

for clemency, prophesying grievous outbursts of popular resentment if the sentences were carried out. Balfour, on whom, as the man on the spot, lay the responsibility for administering the district, set his face firmly against commutation. I accepted his view, as also did General Marshall; and the eleven men were duly hanged in public at Kufa on the morning of 25th May.

The outcome was as surprising as it was dramatic. A few hours after the executions the *Qilid-dar*, or Keeper of the Keys of the shrine at Najaf, held a reception at his house in the centre of the town. I attended the function, accompanied by Balfour and Greenhouse, whom I had brought from Shushtar, where he had done excellent work, to succeed Marshall. Speaking in the presence of the leading surviving notables, and of many of the *'ulama*, the *Qilid-dar* expressed the unbounded satisfaction of the people of the town at their deliverance from the hands of wicked men, and his earnest hope both that the administration of the town would be assimilated to that of the rest of Mesopotamia adding, *si licet parva componere magnis*, his hope that we would assist the townspeople to realize their dearest ambition—a supply of piped water from the Euphrates.¹ He concluded by presenting Balfour with a sword of honour 'wherewith to defend in the future, as in the past, the liberties of the town and its inhabitants', handing to me at the same time a massive gold ring and a silver key, symbolical, he said, of the desire of the people of Najaf that the gates of the town, and of their hearts, might ever be open to the representatives of the Civil Administration. The intention to make this presentation had been kept secret, for many feared that at the last moment some of the leaders might be reprieved.

The executions had a profound effect throughout Mesopotamia, especially amongst the tribes; and I received more expressions of gratification and relief at the outcome of the affair than I had previously received appeals for clemency. The effect in Najaf was altogether good; the power of the rival groups in the town—the Zuqurt and the Shumurt—was broken, and Najaf has never again been a source of serious anxiety to the government of the country. Balfour went home on leave shortly after these events, his place being taken by Ronald Wingate, of the I.C.S., son of Sir Reginald Wingate, and under him the work of organization and administrative reconstruction proceeded apace through the *Shamiya liwa*. A regular police force was installed in Najaf, Arab officials were posted to the *shu'bas* of Umm-ul-Ba'rur, Abu Sukhair, Hor-ad-Dukhn, Mishkhab, and Ghammas; an attempt

¹ The G.O.C.-in-Chief visited Najaf officially a fortnight later, and promised that this matter should receive prompt attention. The promise was kept, to the great benefit alike of townspeople and citizens.

was made to develop irrigation-schemes in a small way and to build roads.

The tribes accepted the new system with alacrity, showing themselves almost too ready to throw off their allegiance to their chiefs and to deal directly with civil officials in regard to revenue and other matters. This tendency showed itself during 1918 in varying degrees in every district of Mesopotamia, and it constituted one of the major problems with which we were faced, for it raised the whole question of the future form of government in 'Iraq. Ought we to aim at a 'bureaucratic' form of administration, such as that in force in Turkey and in Egypt, involving direct control by a central government, and the replacement of the powerful tribal confederation by the smaller tribal or sub-tribal unit, as a prelude to individual in place of communal ownership of land, or should our aim be to retain, and, subject to suitable safeguards, to strengthen the authority of tribal chiefs, and to make them the agents and official representatives of government within their respective areas? The latter policy had been already adopted, in default of a better, in the Basra wilayat, and especially in the Muntafiq division: was it wise to apply it to the Baghdad wilayat? Both policies had their advocates, though it was common ground that the nomad tribes should be dealt with through their chosen leaders.

Our hands were not, of course, entirely free; some fifty years earlier the Turks had taken steps to break the power of the larger tribes in the Shamiya region by allotting part of their lands to smaller tribal groups and to Saiyids. The heads of the smaller tribes had in turn divided the allotted lands amongst the heads of their families, keeping only a portion for themselves. These original heads of families, now known as *sarkals*, have the same rights as their chiefs to their land. This form of ownership is thus nothing more than a lease, the condition of which is the payment of government dues amounting to two-fifths of the gross produce every year. Failure to pay this or to cultivate and use all the land entitles Government to terminate the lease. In practice, Government seldom, if ever, interferes, and the Shaikh or Saiyid is in reality landlord.¹

The conditions of land-tenure were different in every *liwa* according to the degree of effective control exercised by the Turks and to the habits and customs of the inhabitants. No general rules could be laid down, and it was not until 1919 that sufficient data were available to enable the administration, through the Revenue Commissioner, to pronounce with any certainty on the respective rights of Government, tribal chiefs, landlords, holders of fiefs (*'uqr*), and tenants in different

¹ See *Reports of Administration for 1918*, p. 73.

districts. As official knowledge grew, so did the conviction that the break-up of the tribal system was essential to orderly progress under whatever form of organized government might be constituted in the future. This belief was reflected in the gradual functional changes in the organization of the administration during 1919 and 1920 and is even more marked since that date.

South of Najaf, further down the Euphrates, at Samawa, the leading personality, Saiyid Taffar, was an old friend, but the tribes were peculiarly difficult to handle. All were broken up into small sections which were divided by feuds; all had been accustomed to find a livelihood in plundering the river-traffic. On the one hand there was no strong Shaikh whose assistance could be sought, on the other every petty chief and tribesman looked with disfavour on the introduction of order and settled government. Since an early period in the war Samawa had been split into two factions, one chief being actively pro-Turkish, while the other, Saiyid Taffar, was pro-British,¹ and had suffered on that account more than a year's confinement in 'Ajaimi's camp, close at hand in the desert. He was released and allowed to return to Samawa after the fall of Baghdad, but unaided he could not maintain order, and matters went from bad to worse. The Bani Hachaim tribe defied all authority, and when the Political Officer was sent in November, unsupported by troops, an attempt was made to kidnap him. It was necessary to punish the worst offenders by destroying their mud towers; the district was quietened, and trade routes were soon reopened.

On the Euphrates above Ramadi, Sir Harry Brooking's successes had enabled the Civil Administration, before the end of the year, to bring the whole of the Dulaim tribe under effective control and to get into touch with tribal elements round 'Ana, including the 'Aqaidat. We were also brought into close relations with the 'Anaiza under the aged Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal.

The political position in this part of Mesopotamia was of peculiar complexity. We had to deal simultaneously with purely pastoral tribes, dependent entirely on their flocks of sheep and droves of camels; with tribes partly nomadic and partly settled; with sedentary groups only partly organized on a tribal basis; and with comparatively sophisticated townspeople. On the whole, the purely nomadic elements were not difficult to deal with; we subsidized the paramount Shaikhs, as the Turks had done, and they undertook to preserve peace along our borders. So far there was nothing novel in the relations between the inhabitants of the desert and settled land, but, in order to meet the exigencies of war, we were obliged to demand

¹ See *Loyalties*, Chapter XV.

the assistance of the nomad leaders against our foes, whether Turk or hostile tribe, and their co-operation in maintaining the commercial blockade.

The prevention of the passage of goods to the enemy was undoubtedly one of the most irksome of the necessities imposed upon us by war conditions. In spite of the utmost endeavours it was never completely accomplished; the high prices of commodities in Turkish territory, both on the two rivers and in Syria, held out the temptation of large profits and defeated our vigilance. It is true that the outer blockade gave us a contingent advantage. Besides preventing hostile tribes from obtaining more than a modicum of the means of subsistence—for up to this point it fulfilled its purpose—it enabled us to provide for nomad tribes who fled from Turkish tyranny and sought refuge on the edges of our territories. Thus in the winter of 1917-18, the 'Anaiza from the western side of the Syrian Desert, unable to obtain provisions from the Turks and Germans in Syria, came over to us in such large numbers that at one time we were feeding 100,000 Beduin. The shortage of foodstuffs was so great in 'Iraq that without our assistance most of these must have died of starvation. If the migrants did not give us any material military assistance, they were at least giving none to our opponents during the period of their sojourn with us. Nothing, however, can be said in favour of the internal blockade, i.e. the blockade within 'Iraq, except that in the circumstances it was inevitable. It interrupted the flow of commerce, thereby enhancing prices, and was responsible for a large proportion of the petty crime in the Occupied Territories. It was abolished as soon as military considerations permitted.

Fortunately for the future welfare of Mesopotamia, we did not follow the short-sighted policy, so earnestly pressed on us by the War Office, of distributing arms and money to all and sundry in the hope that they would be encouraged thereby to attack the Turks. We suffered however, from the lavish distribution of rifles and ammunition to the Arab forces co-operating on General Allenby's flank. Such rifles were on sale in Mesopotamia within a short time after their issue on the other side of Arabia, and of ammunition there seemed an endless supply, often in full boxes, which, like the rifles, we could identify as having passed through the hands of 'Egypforce'. Great quantities, too, were¹ stolen from the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force itself or from its opponents.

Concurrently with the increasing control exercised over the Euphrates areas we also entered into relations with the Shammar Jarba', a large nomadic group which roams the country from a little

¹ Vide *Loyalties*, Chapter XV.


to the north of Baghdad up to Nisibin. Numbers of these tribesmen are in the habit of coming down to the warm pastures south of Baghdad during the winter, and they appeared among us to the extent of several thousand tents in the autumn of 1917. Short of a strong military cordon between the Euphrates and the Tigris, charged with the duty of shooting at sight all those who drew near, no power could prevent a tribal migration of this kind. Pastures, food, and subsidies were allotted to the Shammar Jarba^s, who conducted themselves reasonably well, and in the fullness of time all but a few individuals returned to the north. There they renewed their vows of fealty to the Turks—they could indeed do no less—but the assistance they vouchsafed to their lawful rulers was not of a nature to do us any harm. By the end of the year we were in occupation of the greater part of the area covered by their wanderings, and though they remained as turbulent and intractable as ever they were never a source of serious anxiety either to the military authorities or to the Civil Administration.

On the Diyala line the problems that confronted us were very different from those described above. South of the Jabal Hamrin the population was purely Arab, but for the most part the tribal system existed only in name. The cultivators were mainly sedentary folk, living in villages on the banks of canals fed by the Diyala. The land was mostly in the hands of large landowners resident in Baghdad, and considerable areas were *waqf*, managed in part by the Naqib of Baghdad and in part by the *Idarat-ul-Auqaf* or Department of Pious Foundations. Much land had been left uncultivated during 1917 owing to military restrictions, and to the fact that the Turks occupied the canal-heads during the spring and summer and prevented any water from passing down. In many cases, moreover, the canals were badly silted up, owing to neglect in previous years, which the war had accentuated. The Diyala was unusually low, and water was scarce. The Irrigation Department made strenuous efforts to improve matters, with some degree of success, but labour was not plentiful, and cultivators and landowners alike viewed their efforts with suspicion. Our object was to provide a moderate amount of water for as large an area as possible, reducing the quantity available for rice-cultivation, and increasing the supply for the growth of wheat and barley. Four times as much water is needed to grow a ton of rice as a ton of wheat or barley; rice was of course the more valuable crop, but it could be imported more easily than corn.

Much imported seed-grain was sown, but the results were indifferent; and locusts completed the tale of trouble. Vegetables also were in great demand, and the oranges of Baquba, which are fully equal to those of Jaffa, fetched very high prices. Even the date-groves



CAPT. F. R. WALKER, M.B.E.
Died November 26th, 1919



(and fruit can be grown in Mesopotamia only under date-trees) had suffered from the scarcity of labour arising from the war. The trees had been left uncleaned, and the ground untilled, for three or four years, and insect pests had multiplied accordingly.

The landowners, for the most part, did little or nothing to encourage the cultivators or to assist the Civil Administration to restore the district to fertility, and the presence throughout the year of large bodies of troops, whilst ensuring public order, placed heavy burdens on local political officers; the military roads were carried over canals by culverts which never seemed to let enough water through; the villagers were for ever inundating fields through which the army required a right of way. Village sanitation menaced the health of the army; energetic medical officers threatened the peace of the villages. With the refugees from Persia came typhus; there was an outbreak of cholera at Mahrut, and in September the world-wide epidemic of influenza caused many deaths.

Notwithstanding these and other handicaps, much work was done, and good progress made in gathering up the threads of organized civil government, by the political officers in the district, notably by Major Barrett, of the Bombay Political Department, and by his successor, Mr. L. F. Nalder, of the Sudan Civil Service, assisted by Captain Walker, Captain Wrigley, Lieutenant Macdonald, Captain Lloyd, and Captain R. F. Jardine. The first three Assistant Political officers all met their deaths during the next two years; Walker died of pneumonia at Mosul in November 1919, Wrigley was murdered at Shahraban in August 1920, Macdonald was murdered by Kurds at 'Amadia in July 1919. Lloyd and Jardine are, at the time of writing, Administrative Inspectors under the Ministry of Interior in 'Iraq, Barrett and Nalder are holding responsible posts under their respective Governments. The Diyala *liwa* owes much to the pioneer work of these sorely tried men during 1918-20.

The Khanaqin *liwa* did not come under any form of civil administration until December 1917, when, for the first time, Khanaqin was occupied by British troops. The district had been ravaged alternately by Russian and Turkish armies, but it was against the Russians that the fiercest resentment of the populace was directed. Disregarding the earnest pleadings of Sir Percy Cox, General Maude had refused to consider an advance in this direction during the summer of 1917 and had left the area to the tender mercies of the Russian detachment under General Baratoff. The inhabitants had already tasted the miseries of a hostile Russian occupation in 1916, but they fondly believed that things would be different in 1917 and that the Russians, who were now co-operating with us as allies in Mesopotamia,

would treat them with greater consideration. They were quickly undeceived.

'A great revulsion of feeling', writes Sir Percy Cox ¹ 'was caused by their behaviour, and in the process we ourselves rapidly lost prestige and sympathy among a race that had always been friendly to us. Military considerations were of course paramount, but this Russian Occupation left us a legacy which gave trouble for a long time to come. After a couple of months the Russian force withdrew and their ravages in the district were completed by the Turks who forthwith re-occupied it, and it was not until December 1918 that we were in a position to assume control ourselves. When we did so we found the town in a state of acute misery, for the Turks, when they retired, had left it in the joint clutches of starvation and disease, and it was with these formidable adversaries that the work of administration was confronted. Major E. B. Soane, the remarkable character to whom the charge was entrusted, and who, in addition to a very strong personality, possessed the then rare accomplishment of a fluent knowledge of the Kurdish language, laboured devotedly for months at his task, which grew in direct ratio to the success achieved, for no sooner did the Kurds on either side of the frontier hear that help was to be had from the British authorities . . . than they poured down from the mountains, starving and typhus stricken, to be brought slowly back to health or else to die in our camps and hospitals.'

Soane was, in truth, one of the most remarkable men it has ever been my lot to meet. He was a scholar, with a first-rate knowledge both of Persian and Kurdish languages and dialects, and with a profound understanding of the mentality of the peoples amongst whom he had lived and worked for many years before the war. He professedly embraced the Shia' faith in 1905, having first equipped himself so thoroughly with a knowledge of the details of religious observances and doctrinal tenets of the Shia' schism that he could take part, with credit to himself, in a religious discussion with the priesthood. He first went to Persia, in the service of the Imperial Bank of Persia, in 1902; his Persian sympathies brought him, before long, into acute conflict with the Russian Consular authorities at Kirmanshah, where he was Branch Manager in 1906. He resigned, not unwillingly, in 1907, and after a brief visit to England set out under the assumed name of Mirza Ghulam Husain Shirazi upon a long journey through Mesopotamia and Kurdistan. He recorded his experiences in a book ² which, in qualities of human interest, personal observation, and literary charm, has no superior in the abundant literature of Eastern travel. In 1909 he joined the staff of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and took charge of their operations at Chia Surkh near Qasr-i-Shirin, where his qualities were recognized by his appointment in 1913 as Honorary British Vice-Consul.

¹ Bell, ii, p. 513.

² Soane, E. B., *Through Mesopotamia and Kurdistan in disguise*, 1912: (second edition, 1926). See also Bibliography. For obituary notice see *C.A.S.J.* 1923, Part II.

Whilst in this region he learned Turkish and picked up more than a smattering of Arabic; he already spoke and wrote French fluently. A short and thick-set man, sharp-featured, and with dark, piercing eyes, he had the power, which no other man in my experience has possessed in anything approaching the same degree, of dominating those with whom he came in contact by sheer force of personality. His autocratic character and his knowledge of human nature were the principal weapons in his armoury: he controlled a race of lawless individualists by his own individuality. He played on their feelings—almost always on their nobler feelings—on their pride of race, and on their personal honour. He scorned to excite cupidity with gold, as was done during the war in western Arabia; he knew well that men do not respond for long to such a stimulant, which has to be administered in ever-increasing quantity and brings demoralization in its train. He paid no subsidies, and he disbursed salaries with a niggard hand, on a scale adequate only to provide for the immediate needs of the recipient. Kurds served him with a loyalty that they scarcely ever vouchsafed to their leaders: their leaders obeyed him because they feared as well as admired him, and because only by obedience could they hope to continue to exercise authority over their countrymen, and of all motives the desire for power is, amongst unsophisticated communities, the most powerful. His defiant, almost fierce demeanour was the reflection of his character. His quiet voice often consorted ill with his mordant, sometimes bitter tongue. Commanding an uncanny gift for ridicule, he was as loyal to his friends as he was merciless to his opponents. Like Leachman, with whom he had otherwise little in common, his weakness lay in his intolerance of authority and his reluctance to conform to the not unreasonable requirements of the official machine. No officer of the Civil Administration had a readier pen; few were so reluctant to use it. When, in response to repeated reminders, a long awaited report arrived, it was sometimes couched in language which verged on the insubordinate and had to be censored before it was passed on; in this, too, he resembled Leachman. In such cases I sent them a copy of my revision of their literary efforts with a request that they would substitute it for the original on their files, but without further comment. The strain on political officers, and especially on those in the newly occupied areas, was so great that occasional temperamental outbursts were pardonable. Like all other political officers holding responsible positions, they were working single-mindedly and with utter disregard of self for a common end. It was not the time to insist on the outward proprieties of official life.

In April 1918 Soane contracted pulmonary tuberculosis (ultimately

to prove fatal¹) and went on sick-leave for six months to Australia. He was succeeded for a time by Major H. A. Goldsmith, an officer of exceptional ability and charm of manner: he contracted the same disease, of which he died some years later.² Soane's principal assistants at Mandali and Qizil Robot respectively, were both officers of exceptional promise, Captain W. R. Hay, who later joined the Indian Political Department, and Captain L. N. Reed, who afterwards entered the Colonial Civil Service and is, at the time of writing, in Nigeria. They would, I fancy, be foremost in admitting the debt they owe to their first instructor in political science.

The administrative work in the Khanaqin *liwa* was, generally speaking, on lines similar to those in other parts of the Occupied Territories. There were no canal problems of importance, the area under irrigation, except at Mandali, being insignificant. The prevalence of famine conditions throughout the district, and in the adjoining areas in Persia, made the maintenance of public order very difficult. Soane took vigorous and effective steps to keep the roads open, and to ensure that grain provided for seed purposes was actually sown: he raised a force of two hundred Kurds, under their own chiefs—Mahmud Beg Dilo, Muhammad Beg Suramiri, Ibrahim Beg Dilo, and Qadir Agha Bajlani. This done, he proceeded to disarm the remainder, a *tour de force* which no political officer succeeded in accomplishing in other areas. These Kurdish Irregulars, organized by Captain R. C. Geard, were the only local force that took part in actual operations against the Turks; they were attached, under the supervision rather than the command of Major Goldsmith, to a column which moved up the Shirwan (Sirwan) River under Colonel Underhill in April 1918, and did credit to themselves on that as on other occasions.³

Relations with the nomad Persian tribes were difficult and delicate. In many cases their flocks had been so depleted by the depredations of the Russians that they had nothing to barter for food, which was scarce and dear. To raid the more fortunate Arabs of Mesopotamia became to many the only means of saving themselves and their families from death by starvation.

Enemy agents were active amongst the tribes and found willing recruits amongst the Sinjabis: our caravans were attacked, and the settled areas within the sphere of our occupation raided, thus adding to our difficulties. Colonel Kennion, the senior political officer in Persia, organized an opposition party from amongst 'friendly' tribes: a pitched battle was fought in which 'Ali Akbar Khan, the Sinjabi

¹ He died at sea on 24th February 1923.

² He died at sea near Suez on 31st May 1924.

³ See Moberly, iv, p. 152 n.

chieftain was wounded, whereafter the land had peace for a space. General Head-quarters at Baghdad followed up this success, at Kenyon's suggestion, by instructing the Director of Labour to raise no less than five Labour Corps in this area. They were quickly recruited, mostly among Persians, of whom the greater part were tribesmen. Organized in this way, they were for the first time in their lives not ashamed to dig. Headmen of sections and greybeards were induced to take service with the title of *sar-falah*, in which capacity they exercised some sort of control over separate gangs. The effect was immediate, highway robberies almost ceased, cases of theft and cattle-lifting decreased, and crimes of violence were reduced to manageable proportions. By the end of the year large areas were again under cultivation, and the completion of the railway to Qizil Robot brought down the price of food to a reasonable figure.

One of the first works that had to be undertaken at Khanaqin was the restoration of the stone bridge over the Alwand—an important link in our line of communication to Persia—and the rebuilding of the town itself. Hundreds of houses had been destroyed by the Turks and Russians, often in sheer wantonness. Soane seized the opportunity to cut a broad avenue through the town and the adjacent date-gardens; he was, among other things, a skilled engineer, and he did not wait for the Works Department to undertake the repair of the bridge, which was in a dangerous condition. The Turks had never repaired it before the war, as it was not the property of the State, having been built as an act of piety by a merchant of Tabriz some thirty years before, for the use of pilgrims on their way to Karbala and Najaf. It was now called on to bear heavy lorries and guns, and was on the point of collapse when we arrived. Soane lost no time in getting skilled masons to undertake temporary repairs; later, a Military Works Company took charge, and completed the good work. Apart from these preoccupations, the political officers in charge of the Division had to cope with the influx of 40,000 Assyrian refugees on their way to Baquba from Persia, and with successive epidemics of disease which took a heavy toll of the half-starved population on both sides of the border.

The Kirkuk Liwa. On 26th April, as mentioned in Chapter I, the Imperial General Staff directed General Marshall to capture Kirkuk and, having done so, to occupy Sulaimani. Kirkuk was entered on 7th May. Bullard accompanied the troops and, under orders from General Head-quarters, took measures, to which he was by long experience accustomed, to get in touch with tribal leaders, to secure order in the town, to relieve destitution, and generally to undergird the

stricken ship. No suggestion was made to me at the time by General Head-quarters, nor by the commander on the spot to Bullard, that the occupation was not to be permanent. I flew up a few days later to discuss the lines on which we could best deal with the many urgent problems arising out of the advance, and in particular to enlist the sympathy and goodwill of the Kurdish tribes, not for operations against the Turks, but to protect our line of communication, and to assist in bringing in supplies of meat, the only local commodity.

Our occupation was welcomed by the inhabitants, who were reduced to a state of destitution not less complete than that of the people of Khanaqin six months earlier. The neighbourhood was completely denuded of supplies and there was no grain; such was the shortage of meat that most of the ewes had been killed during the lambing season. The Christians had seen their Church, a unique fourth-century building, blown up,¹ the principal public offices pillaged and destroyed by the departing Turks. The Jews had been insulted, and despoiled, often under torture, of everything of value that could be removed. A free distribution of food was organized, supplemented by large voluntary contributions from the troops, who were themselves on half-ration. Their largesse was accepted with satisfaction, but without, as a rule, any sign of gratitude.

Letters were received from the Hamawand offering us every assistance, and a meeting of notables was held in Sulaimani at which it was decided to set up a provisional Kurdish Government with Shaikh Mahmud at its head, and to adopt a friendly attitude towards the British forces. Shaikh Mahmud himself wrote 'on behalf of all the Kurdish people on either side of the frontier', offering to hand over the reins of Government to us or to officiate as our representative under the protection of the glorious British flag. The people of Kurdistan, he said, were delighted with our successes, and, freed by the valour of our troops from Turkish despotism, looked forward to prosper under our rule as 'Iraq had prospered. He concluded by asking for an assurance that in no circumstances would we permit the restoration of Turkish authority in Kurdistan.

The decision to leave Kirkuk was just then taken, and I was obliged to reply that we were leaving the vicinity during the hot weather, but hoped to return soon. I accepted Shaikh Mahmud's proposal that he should act as our representative, if he could do so, and actually

¹ This act of vandalism was unjustified by any military exigency, for the church had not been used as a magazine, as had the ancient northern gateway at Baghdad, the Bab-al-Tilism, which was also destroyed when the Turks left the city. I received a brief but eloquent telegraphic protest from the local priest beginning with the words *Ut quid, Deus?* The reference was to the 74th Psalm.

drew up a public proclamation on the subject. Before it could be issued the Turks reoccupied Kirkuk, and shortly afterwards sent a strong detachment to Sulaimani, which was placed under martial law; Shaikh Mahmud was imprisoned, and such notables as had not fled were imprisoned or fined; all were covered with ridicule. This done, the Turks showed a politic leniency to Kurdish leaders. Mahmud was released and allowed to return to his home; money was forthcoming for tribal levies, and provisions needed for the army were paid for in cash.

Our retirement was ascribed by the Turks to the position of the Allied Armies in France, then very critical, and it was regarded as a prelude to the evacuation of Mesopotamia. The story of 'perfidious Albion' cynically using other races to fight her battles was exploited with effect.

'The Armenians', ran one broadsheet, 'were induced by false promises to fight against the Armies of God, and have been betrayed, destroyed, and scattered. The Assyrians of Van and Urmi fell into the same trap: lured by a little gold and by promises of arms which never came, they too have been wiped out, and a miserable remnant of widows and orphans is now on its way to Khanaqin. The Russians, our former enemies, have realized that they too have been the dupes of England, and have left the battlefield to find freedom in Liberty and a Constitution. The Irish, whose mercenaries have shed their blood for England all over the world, have risen at last in revolt. In Persia the Turkish forces have taken Mianeh, Bijar and Senna (all Kurdish centres) and will shortly drive the English from the soil of Persia, which they have too long defiled. In Mesopotamia there is but one British soldier for twenty ignorant Indians; they, poor fools, have yet to learn their lesson. The prison camps of Turkey are full of British and Indian prisoners. The British will abandon you, when it suits them, as they have abandoned others. Be not deceived; the arm of the Turkish Government is long; with the support of Germany it will expel these unbelievers and their black slaves. To those who have been faithful will be given land and honour: from those who have been unfaithful will be exacted a terrible vengeance.'

There was enough of truth in this and similar leaflets to unsettle the stoutest hearts, and our efforts to raise Kurdish levies during the summer were not successful. The Turks, on the other hand, contrived to raise a substantial force of Kurdish cavalry to operate against us in Persia. Only the Kurds in the fastnesses of the Avroman Mountains remained consistently hostile to Turkey; but they would not enter into correspondence with us.

The reputation of the British Administration for humanity, and its solicitude for the welfare of the population as a whole were known to all. The barbarous cruelty with which, after the fall of Kut-al-Amara the Turks treated those inhabitants who had helped us, whether voluntarily or under compulsion, was likewise public knowledge; and the public knew that it was known to us. It never crossed their minds,

nor did it occur to me or to Bullard, that we should ignominiously withdraw from Kirkuk except under the severest pressure of military necessity. 'Before the final withdrawal', says the *Official History*, with the meiosis appropriate to the occasion, 'some sixteen hundred of the local inhabitants who feared the return of the Turks were evacuated as refugees at their own request'; the majority eventually found their way to Basra, spreading as they went the story of British vacillation, or worse. The Kurds, who were by no means ill-disposed to us, became once more a prey to doubts and suspicions.

It seemed clear to them that the assurances of support, freely given by some irresponsible officers, and implicit in the more cautious advances made at Kirkuk by Bullard and at Kifri by Longrigg,¹ were not to be relied on: we were, it seemed to them, playing the Russian game of using unsophisticated tribesmen as cats'-paws. Their leaders, some of whom, including the principal Hamawand chiefs, were on the way to Kirkuk when the withdrawal took place, returned to their homes in high dudgeon. They felt that they had been betrayed by us: we had induced them to show their hand to their enemies the Turks, and had left them in the lurch. The Hamawand leaders, in particular, never forgave us, and remained hostile to us for many years after.

Baghdad. The year 1918 passed smoothly within the walls of the city of Baghdad. Its inhabitants were prospering greatly: the mercantile classes rejoiced to see the road to Persia open once more, and goods coming up the Tigris. The immense sums expended by the army on local labour and local supplies stimulated the demand for piece-goods, sugar, coffee, and tobacco, and the appetite of British and Indian soldiers for articles of diet which even the Field Force canteens did not supply seemed insatiable. Landowners, too, prospered, thanks to the high price of food-stuffs. It was almost impossible to enlist Arab clerks for the purposes of the Civil Administration, for any local man who was reasonably competent was assured of employment in the bazaar at a remuneration far greater than we could offer without upsetting the whole basis of salaries throughout the country. We were obliged to continue to enlist Indian clerks at standard wages, fixed in India; the supply never failed, and the men sent were of almost uniformly high qualifications. No one regretted the necessity of importing Indian clerks more than I did: I realized that not long after the Armistice the demand for their replacement by Arabs would arise, and would have to be satisfied, if only on grounds of economy; for in time of peace Arab clerks would cost less than Indians. For the time being, however, we had no option but to employ even in the districts

¹ The author of a well-balanced and scholarly work, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq*.

a large proportion of Indian clerks. We took steps, however, to print all Government orders and stationery in Arabic as well as English, so as to facilitate the change when the moment arrived.

Throughout the Occupied Territories a great effort was made during May to collect money for the Red Cross; and on 24th May fêtes were held in this connexion, and a number of leading inhabitants at all principal centres were invited to meet the local Military Commanders. Though no sort of pressure was put upon any one to subscribe, a sum of nearly £40,000 (5 lakhs) was subscribed by the inhabitants of the country. I invited the leading notables of Baghdad to meet Lord and Lady Willingdon, who were on a visit from Bombay. I did not know whether to admire more their *aplomb* in dealing with the heterogeneous assembly of representatives, tribal, mercantile, religious, and landed interests, or the courtesy and self-possession displayed by the guests, with whom Lady Willingdon conversed in Hindustani. For the majority, it was the first experience of conversation with a European lady, but most of them behaved as if they had been in the habit of attending garden-parties all their lives.

After the reception a public ceremony took place, at which General Marshall made a speech promising a removal of irksome military restrictions as soon as possible, and reminding his audience that they probably pressed less hardly on the people of Mesopotamia than on the inhabitants of any belligerent country. The success that attended this function encouraged us to repeat the experiment on a larger scale, and on 17th September the principal tribal Chiefs from every part of the Occupied Territories were invited to Baghdad to meet the Commander-in-Chief, who shook hands with each in turn, and exchanged greetings and friendly inquiries with the leading chiefs of each district through the medium of the political officers who had accompanied them. A booklet was printed, and widely distributed, which included photographs of every Shaikh who attended. Sir William Marshall again made a speech which voiced his hopes that Baghdad would soon become the capital of Mesopotamia and a centre of higher education for the whole country. He referred to the fertility of the land and to his belief that, under a stable government, the land would once more be restored to prosperity by works of irrigation, and become a great and prosperous country. His remarks struck a popular note, and the cordiality of the reception accorded to the Shaikhs gave great satisfaction to all.

Scarcely had we reached Baghdad in March 1917 when Sir Percy Cox was reminded from various influential quarters in Karbala and Najaf that 'The Oudh Bequest' had been undistributed since the outbreak of war, and was begged to take early steps to continue the

disbursements which had in time of peace been made through the agency of the British Consul-General at Baghdad. This bequest had its origin in 1825 when, during a period of financial stringency occasioned by a war in Burma, Lord Amherst, then Governor-General of India, accepted a loan from the King of Oudh. The amount of the loan was ten million rupees: the principal was never to be repaid, and the interest at 5 per cent. was to be applied by the Government of India in perpetuity to specified purposes, including benefactions to certain persons and classes of persons at Karbala and Najaf. It is not necessary here to mention, even briefly, the many complications that subsequently arose from the ambiguity of the documents in which these stipulations were embodied, from the suspicion of the Turks that the payments were being made to subserve political purposes, and from other causes. It is enough to say that the annual distribution of this large sum in these towns had tended to draw thither a number of British-Indian subjects, for whom we could not disclaim all responsibility, and that it proved in practice exceedingly difficult to make a just distribution without arousing the fiercest jealousies. The duty of making the necessary arrangements fell largely on Nawab Muhammad Husain Khan; he proved a discreet, courteous, and wise counsellor to successive heads of the Civil Administration, and contrived to make the periodical distributions with a minimum of friction.

In municipal matters progress was apparent on every side, on lines wholly satisfactory to the inhabitants. The water-supply of the town was improved, roads widened, and compensation paid to those whose houses had been demolished by the Turks in anticipation of the construction of Khalil Pasha Street, which we renamed 'New Street'. A second bridge was erected across the Tigris. Civil hospitals were in working order; epidemics were being dealt with on sound lines; an Arab newspaper had begun to appear; the City Police, with the aid of a few Metropolitan Policemen, were steadily becoming more efficient, and were, moreover, recruited wholly from townsmen. Food-stuffs were dear, but cheaper than in Egypt or Turkey and far cheaper than in Persia. Much distress had been prevented by the grant, out of the revenues of the country, of subsistence allowances to former Turkish officials, of pensions to those who, under Turkish regulations, were entitled to them in respect of service in 'Iraq, and of maintenance allowances to the dependents of prisoners of war and deportees. This system, which owed its origin to the dictates of humanity rather than of political expediency, was acceptable to every school of thought; it was carefully administered, and at no time abused. The Municipal Administration was, of course, far from perfect, but it was not expensive,

it was undeniably popular, and it was efficient. On the foundations laid during 1918 was built the system which is in force, with few alterations, to-day.

The Basra wilayat. The districts of Basra, Qurna, and 'Amara, and to a limited extent the Muntafiq region, had by the end of 1918 been under British administration for over three years; Basra itself had been under our governance for four years. The administration had developed on thoroughly sound lines under the expert supervision of Mr. Evelyn Howell, the Deputy Civil Commissioner; the political officers in charge of divisions were thoroughly competent men; there had been few changes in their ranks, and they knew, and were known by, every landowner and chief of importance. Revenue was coming in well, and with a minimum of friction: land registration (*Tapu*) was working efficiently, to the gratification of the landowners and house-owners. The Blockade system had virtually ceased to cause serious irritation. The Police Force, under Mr. Gregson and his very capable assistants, all men with previous experience in this line, was well organized and had the situation well in hand; though crime was rife, it was ascribable less to the settled population, who generally speaking were law-abiding and peaceful, than to the vast number of immigrants attracted from Persia and from the Persian Gulf ports, refugees from Kirkuk and Persia, and the polyglot parasites attracted to Basra by prospects of easy money. Effectively to control the movements of undesirables was impossible: for sixty miles our frontier marched with that of Persia.

Able-bodied men of any age or character could obtain employment in Labour Corps, and thus remove themselves from police control. Military camps were strung out over an area of some fifty square miles. Men of a dozen races were employed in the various military departments, and departmental badges were easily obtained. Money circulated freely, and in every camp were to be found simple souls who fell an easy prey to confidence tricksters. Local variants of the Spanish-prisoner story and the gold-brick trick appeared. Opium was freely smuggled from India and peddled in the camps; attempts were made to introduce cocaine from Egypt; and the Criminal Investigation Department had its hands full. A few Europeans took a part in these illicit trades: members of ships' crews were not averse from making money in this way, and at least one European lady, vouched for by a most respectable master of the mercantile marine, was found, when searched despite indignant protests, to be wearing a petticoat lined with hundreds of little pockets, doubtless designed to hold forbidden drugs.

Public health left much to be desired: the presence in the area of a

population greater by nearly a hundred thousand than that for which accommodation existed previous to the war, made adequate sanitation impossible. Suitable sites for temporary camps were hard to find; the problem of water-supply was energetically tackled, old paths were widened and new roads made, but the most strenuous efforts were inadequate to the needs of the moment. At least 5 per cent. of the deaths in Basra and 'Ashar during the year were due to malaria; small-pox was rife, and plague flared up again, whilst in September the pandemic of influenza smote the district. The monthly death-rate for a time was at the rate of over a hundred per thousand per annum.

The whole-hearted enthusiasm of the officers of the Civil Administration, the dynamic activities of the military departments, and the general increase in prosperity resulting from the liberal expenditure of money by the army on essential public works, had a profound effect on the outlook of the leaders of public opinion. A Municipal Council was formed; the title of Military Governor was abolished towards the end of the year and replaced by that of Municipal Commissioner, the first incumbent being a distinguished member of the Indian Civil Service. The merchants and landowners, principally Arabs, but numbering in their ranks some Jews and Christians, were, for the most, travelled men; they had visited Bombay and Karachi, Cairo and Alexandria, and were fired with the ambition to develop Basra on lines worthy of its geographical situation. The majority emphasized in conversation their desire for what John Stuart Mill called 'a ruler full of the spirit of improvement'. They made it clear to me, when I visited Basra shortly before the Armistice, that they viewed the attitude of the *intelligentsia* of Baghdad with suspicion; they disclaimed any sympathy with or interest in King Husain and the Sharifian party; their sympathies were rather with Ibn Sa'ud, whose agent in Basra, 'Abdul Latif Pasha Mandil, was, like his brother 'Abdul Wahab Pasha, a man of exceptional ability. They envisaged for the future an Anglo-Arab administration, in which they were prepared to play a leading part, on the understanding that Basra would be a British protectorate 'as Egypt now is'. But they made it clear that they could take no overt action until we declared our policy. During my period of office as Consul at Mohammera before the war, and during three years' residence in Basra from December 1914 to October 1917, I had seen much of these men, and with several of them I was on terms of intimacy. They were, to quote Mr. Gordon Walker's Administration Report for 1918,

'men of gentility and pride, occupying a position of influence and status reminiscent of that of the feudal landlords in English history, their *fallāhīn* subject to their will, but showing now a spirit of some independence born of their work in Army

Labour Corps at the base. They are men of little education, but . . . tolerant and fair-minded . . . with many of the feelings which are productive of the best English types. Their sons will, under a sound system of education, form a society of Arab squires and business men which will be a factor of great importance in the political development of this country. . . . The landlord class has naturally suffered much in the impressment of labour and of river-craft in the service of the Army, and the rough methods of military exigency have alienated many men, formerly the friends and admirers of the British. They have, however, shown themselves reasonable, and in the officers of the Civil Administration they have evidence of a character of official treatment and race relationship which goes to soften the bluntness of an army's ways. . . .'

The Muntafiq Division. The year 1918 saw political officers installed at Samawa, Shatra, and Qilat Sikar; revenue was coming in well and public order was more satisfactory than it had been at any time within living memory. As a preliminary to a fresh revenue assessment, the date trees of the Suq-ash-Shuyukh were actually counted without arousing opposition. Some 1,500 Arab Levies (*shabana*) had been raised in the Division and were stationed at a dozen important points. The military garrison in this Division, the most turbulent in all 'Iraq, consisted of a weak Indian battalion and a squadron of cavalry.

A detachment of this size was of no practical value for the maintenance of order; it could not protect the railway, nor was it of value for punitive purposes; it could barely defend its own camp and would be incapable of maintaining any communications. I should have preferred a strong brigade and several gunboats, or nothing, and so informed the General Staff. It was, however, decided to retain it, mainly because it had inherited good quarters and numerous amenities, such as ice-machines and electric power plant, from the larger force stationed there in 1917.

The Irrigation Department's activities were a source of satisfaction and pride to the tribes. Large areas that had long been derelict were brought under the plough; several large canals were cleaned out; tribes such as the Khafaja and 'Azairij, whose lands at the tail end of old canals had received a fair share of water only in exceptional seasons, were the first to benefit. In the past they had been forced to emigrate, or to support themselves by robbery and violence. They surprised their best friends by reverting to agriculture the moment the chance came. Khamisiya, on the western edge of the marsh, was endowed, thanks to the efforts of its first political officer, Captain Marrs, with a new canal, and entered on a new period of prosperity.

Perhaps the greatest change was brought about by the construction of a deep-water channel across the Hammar Lake.¹ The magnitude and novelty of the scheme filled the tribesmen with wonder, and the sight of

¹ See *Loyalties*, Chapters XII, XVI.

the great dredgers at work inspired awe. That a new river, 160 feet broad, 11 feet deep, and 25 miles long, should have been made by the British within twelve months, for their convenience, suggested to the simplest minds a new and not unfruitful trend of thought. The Hammar Lake scheme was not new: it followed in its broad lines the plans of Nasir Pasha, the eponymous founder of Nasiriya, and its possibilities were thoroughly understood by the marsh-dwellers, to whom it would have brought, if completed, comfort and prosperity. It comprised three separate works:

- (1) The complete dredged channel from Bani Hutait to Bani Sa'id.
- (2) The provision of a permanent bund at the southern edge of the channel above high flood level, along the top of the spoil excavated from the dredged channel.
- (3) The building of the Ghabishiyah-Kubaish protective bund.

It was designed to convert a desolate marsh into one of the richest wheat-growing areas in Mesopotamia; at a rough guess some 500,000 acres might have been reclaimed. But it never was completed: work was stopped shortly after the Armistice, in February 1919, and within two years only a few long stretches of mud-banks emerging from the dreary waste of water remained to show what had been, and to suggest what might have been.

Treated simply as a reclamation scheme, it could never have repaid the heavy cost of construction, which is officially estimated at the almost incredible figure of three million pounds.¹ As a military measure to ensure communication by river with Nasiriya all the year round its construction was wholly unjustified, having regard to the ease with which a railway could be built across the desert, and the time required to complete the cut, which could, moreover, have been maintained even by constant dredging for only six months in the year. It was sad, nevertheless, to witness the abandonment of a work on which so much labour, money, and enthusiasm had been lavished.

One chief only of the tribes in this region, Badr al Rumaiyith, of the Bani Malik, maintained throughout the year an attitude of stubborn hostility. Punitive expeditions were sent, but without avail; assurances that he would be treated with honour, notwithstanding his past misdeeds, fell on deaf ears. He remained an unrepentant adherent of his former rulers, harboured their emissaries, accepted their money, refused to pay revenue, and generally defied us. His tents were a local cave of Adullam, his presence a standing challenge to authority. It was not until early in 1919 that he accepted the inevitable and made his submission.²

¹ Hall, p. 291.

² See Bertram Thomas, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, 1931.

The Muntafiq district had its full share of administrative difficulties, to which I cannot even allude here: in no district were Arabs more freely used in the daily work of administration, thanks to the peculiar qualifications of the Political Officer, Major H. R. P. Dickson, whose knowledge alike of the people and their language, combined with patience and suavity of manner, enabled him to cajole many waverers. He was ably seconded by his British assistants, including Bertram Thomas, who later became Financial Adviser to the Sultan of Muscat, and has done some very remarkable work in exploring the unknown deserts of South Arabia, and Captain Ditchburn, who subsequently took service under the Arab Government. He commanded, too, the personal loyalty of many local chiefs and merchants, amongst whom may be mentioned Shaikh Khaiyun al'Ubaid, Shaikh Farhud al Mughashghash, Thamir Beg Sa'dun, Shaikh Hamid of Khamisiya, Kadhim and Haji Hasan Hamdani, Rushdi Effendi, Ibrahim al 'Amari and Saiyid Yusuf al Ba'aj. Even to write their names is a pleasure, for it brings to mind pleasant memories.

The Qurna Division. Of the Qurna Division during 1918 little need be said. Progress was steady, though hampered by the heavy demands for labour on railways and embankments, by the pandemic of influenza, and by pests which attacked the date-trees, owing to the enforced neglect of cultivation during previous years. The work done in every department was of a missionary character. The marsh Arabs, whose characteristics are described with much insight and literary charm by Captain Hedgecock and his wife in their book *Haji Rikkan*, are of all the inhabitants of Mesopotamia the most unsophisticated, though by no means the least intelligent. Much patience was required to make them realize the virtues of continuous labour, and the possible uses of the money so easily earned. The idea of taking service in the *shabana*, as the local police force was first called, was at first repellent to nearly all: the possibility that they might be called upon to serve outside the district struck terror into their breasts. They clamoured for British officers in preference to Arabs to command them. None would consent to wear khaki shorts and putties—not only for reasons of sentiment or for fear of ridicule: in the waterlogged lands of the Qurna Division a man must wade waist-deep across canals every few hundred yards; putties and shorts would make progress in such terrain impossible. They accepted in lieu a long *dishdasha* (cut on the lines of the Egyptian *jibba*, *anglice* night-shirt). Five years later I found that the guard on the British Residency at Baghdad consisted of a smart company of Levies from Qurna and Qilat Salih. Their successful training was largely the achievement of Lieutenant S. V. Packer, who

almost from the first commanded the Qilat Salih-Qurna Levies. The same necessity for instilling confidence as a preliminary to the inculcation of new ideas was noticeable in other departments. Education was successful only so long as the schoolmasters were local men. The popularity of the hospital was strictly proportionate, and, indeed solely, due to the personal popularity of the civil surgeon, who was permitted after a time to perform operations on men, women, and children, which would seldom, if ever, have been permitted before the war, even in Baghdad or Basra.

Shaikh Uqbashi, or Gubashi as he was generally known, contrived to keep pace with the times, and 1919 saw him even more strongly entrenched in his privileges than he was in 1914, but he, too, was anxious for the future, and whenever we met demanded from me a sign—a declaration of policy.

The 'Amara Division. The 'Amara Division was fortunate in its political officers during 1919, as in previous years. Major Mackenzie, who had done much in his eighteen months of office to lay sound foundations, was invalided in the summer of 1918; his very competent successor, Marrs, later Principal of the University College at Colombo, was as good an administrator as he was a scholar. The Shaikhs of the *liwa* were for the most part reasonable men, of substantial means, with many of the instincts of wealthy country gentlemen. They were in most cases directly dependent on the Civil Administration for the positions they held; realizing that their positions entailed corresponding obligations, they co-operated actively with the political officers in suppressing offences against public order. The leading Shaikhs of the Al bu Muhammad tribe, Muhammad al'Araibi, Majid 'Usman, and Falih Saihud—the last named a graceful and dignified figure, with all the strength and cunning of his illustrious father—were consistently friendly and helpful. The Bani Lam Shaikhs, Juwi, Kamandar, Abu Risha, Shabib, and Falih did their duty according to their lights. Of them all Juwi stands out most clearly in my memory—bluff, hasty in word and deed, but genuinely attached to political officers whom he knew well and on whose strength he could lean, such as Leachman, Macpherson, and Mackenzie. He was a favourite with every one except the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh, for whose marauding bands he was more than a match. Whatever view we might take of Juwi's delinquencies, and they were many, his loyalty was not in question. The same could not be said of Ghadhban al Binayah, one of the most unpleasant and treacherous characters with whom we had to deal.

The Shaikhs were prosperous, and their hinds shared the good for-

tune of their masters. There was a ready market for produce of every kind, and the Administration bent all its efforts to adjusting ancient disputes, both tribal and personal. By the end of the year almost no blood-feuds remained unsettled, and the machinery devised by Mr. Dobbs for the prompt and compulsory settlement of fresh quarrels was working well. The Shaikhs had no longer any interest in promoting strife, and their followers readily abandoned a custom from which they were, as a rule, the only sufferers. It was a moral and in some ways a spiritual revolution, and it has endured under the Arab Government, which inherited the system which made it possible and retained it in its entirety.

On the fall of Baghdad political questions ceased to interest the leading Shaikhs and their cultivators. Their thoughts turned once more to agriculture in all its forms. Realizing this, Mackenzie, with the assistance of Pearson (who was killed by the Goyan tribe in the following March), organized an Agricultural Show—the first and, I believe, the only such function ever staged in Mesopotamia. It was an unqualified success: we hoped to encourage similar functions throughout 'Iraq in 1920, but Providence decided otherwise.

The only shadow cast on the Division during the year was the deportation from 'Amara, under the orders of General Head-quarters, of some eighteen men, some of good status, others obscure men of no position, whom captured documents had proved (to the satisfaction of the Intelligence Branch) to have been in regular communication with the Turks. I did my best to induce General Head-quarters to hold their hand in this matter, but without success. It was not seriously suggested that the presence of these men at 'Amara could in any way menace our political or military position, and the value of the information they could send to the Turks at this stage in the campaign was derisory. I had, moreover, to consider the position that would be created by their return on the conclusion of hostilities. As Clausewitz says, 'War can never be separated from political intercourse'. Each one would be a potential enemy, to combat whose influence the Civil Administration would have no effective weapons. About six hundred Arab civilians were deported during the campaign. Some were denounced by 'informers',¹ the names of others had figured in captured correspondence. Presumed sympathy with and loyalty to the cause of enemy subjects, and the utterance of pro-Turkish sentiments in public were also regarded as valid reasons for deportation. Of the six hundred perhaps a dozen were 'dangerous' in a military sense when they were exiled; it is safe to say that the presence of the remainder in Mesopo-

¹ For an interesting discussion of this subject see Compton Mackenzie, *Gallipoli Memories*, 1929.

tamia at that time had no military significance whatever, but a proportion of them, on their return, became really dangerous. They had seldom been given a chance to answer the accusations made against them, and a few had been seized in their houses and torn from their families without warning. On their return in 1919 they took advantage—not unnaturally—of the freedom then enjoyed by the civil population to air their grievances and proclaim their martyrdom. Some had suffered severe pecuniary losses by their arrest, some had lost their wives, or found themselves supplanted in other ways. The Civil Administration had, indeed, paid subsistence allowances to families who were rendered destitute by the deportation of bread-winners, and to the families of prisoners of war, and not a few came to express their gratitude. It was money well spent, and did much to diminish the volume of ill-feeling in connexion with deportations. It was the relatively wealthy and therefore comparatively influential deportees who expressed themselves most bitterly and did the most harm.

I shall not make any attempt to describe the numerous other branches of administrative activity which were initiated or developed during 1918; some are referred to later on in Chapter VII. Under the guidance of Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter the Judicial Department developed on sound lines, which proved widely acceptable to responsible Arab opinion. The Department of Education was able to make a good start in both wilayats on lines laid down by Major H. E. Bowman of the Egyptian Educational Service, who later became Director of Education in Palestine. Cooke took over the almost bankrupt Departments of Pious Foundations (*Waqf*), and cleansed and revived the administration, which until 1930 had the benefit of his services as Adviser. The Police developed steadily, on the system outlined in the preceding chapter, gaining public confidence in a remarkably short time, thanks to the efforts of Lt.-Col. Prescott, ably backed by Cones and Wilkins and other good men and true.

These officers, with several others who started work in 1918, are still serving in similar capacities under the 'Iraq Government. The Department of Irrigation and Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Public Works, Surveys and Port, were still organized as military units, but were gradually acquiring an orientation which would facilitate transfer of control from the military to the civil side when the time came. In all these matters I found the responsible officers at General Headquarters, more especially General Stuart-Wortley and General Ready, very willing to co-operate, so far as military considerations would allow, with a view both to the future and to immediate civil needs.

So far as could be learned from public statements in Parliament,

and from such official communications as reached us from the India Office during the year, the developments described in the foregoing pages met with the cordial approval of Government. Lord Robert Cecil, as Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in Parliament¹ that 'very satisfactory progress is being made by the Mesopotamian Political Administration in redeeming the country from the state of ruin into which it had fallen under the Turks', and he gave a brief summary of our administrative activities.

At no time during the year did any doubts arise in our minds as to our future intentions in 'Iraq. President Wilson's fourteen points were given to the world on 8th January 1918. The twelfth point stated that: 'the nationalities now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.' This statement, read in conjunction with statements by spokesmen of the Allied countries that the Allied war aims did not include any desire for the annexation of territory belonging to Turkey, seemed to me to be inconsistent with previous declarations and with such indications of policy as had reached Sir Percy Cox and myself, as, for example, the Sykes-Picot agreement. In a rash moment I inquired by telegraph what, if any, significance attached to 'The Twelfth Commandment', and asking what the attitude of Government would be if the nationalities in question desired autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. I was referred, in reply, to the instructions given in August 1917² that 'no large or controversial administrative questions were to be raised'. Thus discouraged, I took no further steps till after the Armistice to inquire of the India Office what, in their view, the future might hold in store. I presumed, perhaps rightly, that if the Oracles were dumb, it was because their doubts were even greater than ours. Our duty as the 'men on the spot' seemed clear—to go ahead and, to the best of our ability, to re-create out of the wreckage of war a system of civil administration adequate to the needs of the people of 'Iraq, so that when peace should come they might seek, not vainly, to trace the pathway to a fitting destiny.

¹ Debates, H.C. 23.7.18.

² See *Loyalties*, Chapter XV, and p. 165 n.

PREFATORY NOTE TO CHAPTER V

Extract from *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley, vol. vi, 1924, p. 180.

... with the beginning of the negotiations for the Peace Treaty, the problem of 'Iraq ceased to be a local administrative problem and became part of a world-wide political problem.

This might seem, indeed, already to have been indicated in the Anglo-French Declaration of the 7th November 1918, which stated that the object of British and French in the East was 'the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations' and to recognize these governments as soon as they shall have been effectively established. This was aimed primarily at Syria and the Hejaz, but was applied of course by 'Iraqis to Mesopotamia. Almost simultaneously the theory of the Mandate made its appearance.

In the sketch given by General Smuts of the working of the Mandatory System there was nothing to show that the work of the Mandatory was to be other than slow or expensive. The discussions on the form of Mandate to be applied to 'Iraq had little effect on, and were equally little affected by, the course of events in 'Iraq. As a matter of fact, scarcely any progress was made in the assignment or drawing up of Mandates until May 1919, and after that the whole question of Mandates over countries formerly in the Turkish Empire was postponed until the announcement of a decision by the United States. The Mandate for Iraq was not formally accepted by Britain until May 1920. The delay in its publication and still more the delay in the signing of the Peace Treaty with Turkey, however unavoidable, had disastrous results in 'Iraq.

CHAPTER V
POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS—NOVEMBER 1918
TO MAY 1919

'We are alone among mankind in doing benefits, not upon a calculation of interest, but in the confidence of freedom and in a frank and fearless spirit.'

PERICLES—*Funeral Oration (Thucydides, ii. 41. Jowett's Trans.).*

'There are two maxims which should always be acted upon in the hour of victory. All history, all experience, all the fruits of reasoning alike enjoin them upon us. They are almost truisms. They are so obvious that I hardly dare to mention them to the House. But here they are. The first is—

"Do not be carried away by success into demanding or taking more than is right or prudent."

'The second is—

"Do not disband your army until you have got your terms."

'The finest combination in the world is power and mercy. The worst combination in the world is weakness and strife.'

MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL, *House of Commons, 3rd March 1919.*

General Marshall's announcement. Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th, 1918. Proposed terms of Peace. Proposals for an Arab Empire. Future Governance of 'Iraq. Arab Bureau. Self-determination in 'Iraq. Miss Bell's views. Commendation of H.M.'s Government. Peace Conference at Paris. Discussion in London. Economic questions and proposals for railways. Alternative and provisional schemes considered and approved.

THE successful conclusion of hostilities with Turkey was announced without delay by the Commander-in-Chief to a hastily summoned assembly of the leading men of Baghdad. His speech was widely distributed in Arabic as well as English throughout the Occupied Territories. After referring to General Maude's proclamation, General Marshall continued:

'So far as this theatre of operations is concerned, the end of the war has come and we are now in a position to show that the promises that have so often been made to you are to be kept at the first possible opportunity. As a present earnest of our good intentions I make the following announcement:

- (1) Prisoners of war other than those of Turkish Nationality who are now confined in India will be allowed to return to their homes;
- (2) Within the limits of the Occupied Territories there will be complete freedom of trade and relaxation of blockade restrictions;

- (3) There will be a similar relaxation of the restrictions on personal movement;
- (4) The conveyance of corpses for burial at Karbala and Najaf will once more be permitted under suitable conditions;
- (5) The routes to the sacred places will be thrown open once again for organized pilgrimages;
- (6) All permanent employees of the Civil Administration from among the local population, who are not actually serving in the ranks of the Army and who have done good work, will be granted a bonus of one month's pay;
- (7) Selected prisoners from amongst those confined in civil jails will be released;
- (8) A distribution of food and clothing will be made to the poor of Baghdad and other towns, and minor relaxations of existing rules will be announced.

'In conclusion, I ask you to believe that the vexations and annoyances which the presence of an Army in your midst have inevitably caused have been due not to our intentions but to military necessity, and I promise in the name of His Majesty the King-Emperor that I will make all possible speed to remove all cause of complaint.'

This announcement was drafted by me, without reference to His Majesty's Government and before any indication of their intentions could reach us; it serves to show the general lines on which it was hoped to proceed, namely, to restore normal conditions as quickly as possible, pending a declaration of future policy.

On 8th November the following declaration was published in Paris, London, New York, and Cairo; the French text was telegraphed by the India Office to me *en clair* on the same day, with instructions to give it the widest possible publicity.

'The end which France and Great Britain have in view in their prosecution in the East of the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and definite liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments and Administrations drawing their authority from the initiative and free choice of indigenous populations.

'In order to give effect to these intentions France and Great Britain are agreed to encourage and assist in the establishment of indigenous Governments and Administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, which have already in fact been liberated by the Allies, and in countries whose liberation they are endeavouring to effect, and to recognize the latter as soon as they shall be effectively established. Far from wishing to impose any particular institution on these lands, they have no other care but to assure by their support and effective aid the normal working of the Governments and Administrations, which they shall have adopted of their free will. To ensure impartial and equal justice, to facilitate economic developments by evoking and encouraging indigenous initiative, to foster the spread of education and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy—such is the role which the two allied Governments assume in the liberated territories.'

This document, which derived from the doctrinaire genius of President Wilson,¹ profoundly modified the political outlook; among

¹ It was widely reported in Arabic papers in Egypt and elsewhere that President Wilson

Syrians and Arabs it was regarded, rightly or wrongly, as superseding or at least qualifying the provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which had been published by the Bolsheviki in November 1917 and was reproduced in translation by the *Manchester Guardian* in January 1918, and a few weeks later by the principal Arabic journals in Egypt and by the *Habl-ul-Matin* in Calcutta. It was evident that nothing in the verbal form of the Declaration was inconsistent with a strict adherence by the Allies to the terms of the Agreement, but the fact that it was considered necessary to make such an announcement, and that it should have been published simultaneously in New York and Cairo as well as London and Paris, was regarded as proof positive that it was intended to supplement if not to supersede previous announcements. The promise that indigenous populations should exercise the right of self-determination regarding the form of national government under which they should live was considered, not unnaturally, to imply that they should also be free to choose whether they desired France or Great Britain to be the mandatory power, or whether they wished their freedom to be limited by any sort of mandate.

Nothing in the political situation in Syria or 'Iraq rendered such a declaration necessary. Unfettered by such an announcement, France and Great Britain could have come to an agreement as regards their spheres of interest, and have proceeded to endow the indigenous populations with institutions calculated to attain the objectives mentioned in the Declaration, which did not take into account the existence in the three wilayats of important minorities—the Assyrians and Kurds—or the deep-rooted divisions existing amongst the population of Syria and Palestine. The pronouncement was, moreover, incompatible with the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 regarding a National Home in Palestine for Jews.

Its promulgation was a disastrous error, the perpetration of which was forced upon the Allied Powers by President Wilson: it encouraged aspirations amongst Armenians and Assyrians, Chaldean and Syrian Christians, which neither the Allies nor the United States did anything to further, nor did these Powers do anything in later years to mitigate the penalty which the Armenians suffered as a result of their confidence in Christendom and in the U.S.A. Well might they say of the latter, with Byron—'Trust not for freedom to the Franks, they have a King who buys and sells.'

The India Office telegraphed a few days later stating that an Inter-Allied Conference was about to assemble as a preliminary to peace

had expressed the opinion that Mesopotamia might be regarded as one of the countries ready for self-determination (see Temperley, *ibid.*, p. 181). Mr. Henry White in conversation with me confirmed this belief, adding, however, that it was 'only a matter of form'.

negotiations; it was probable that Arabian questions would be discussed, and that a representative of King Husain would be present. I was directed to telegraph any points affecting Mesopotamia that should be borne in mind by the British Representatives. I replied twenty-four hours later in the following terms:

'I should not be doing my duty if I did not first of all record my conviction that the Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th, in so far as it refers to Mesopotamia, bids fair to involve us in difficulties as great as Sir Henry MacMahon's early assurances to the Sharif of Mecca.

'It is for the representatives of H.M.'s Government on the spot to make the best of the situation created by this Declaration, and as Government is aware I am trying to do so, but unless the latter is superseded or modified by a pronouncement of the Peace Conference I anticipate that in years to come we shall be faced with the alternatives of evading the spirit whilst perhaps keeping within the letter of this Declaration, or of setting up a form of Government which will be the negation of orderly progress and will gravely embarrass the efforts of the European Powers to introduce stable institutions into the Middle East.

'The Declaration involves us here on the spot in diplomatic insincerities which we have hitherto successfully avoided and places a potent weapon in the hands of those least fitted to control a nation's destinies.

'I would emphasize the almost entire absence of political, racial or other connexion between Mesopotamia and the rest of Arabia.

'If the future status of this country is to be dealt with successfully it must, I am convinced, be treated independently of Arab problems elsewhere.

'The Arabs of Mesopotamia will not tolerate that foreign Arabs should have any say in their affairs, whether those Arabs come from Syria or from the Hijaz. In practice they dislike and distrust both. National unity means for them unity of Mesopotamia, and not unity with either Syria or Hijaz. So, too, they resent the importation of social or administrative institutions or methods that savour of India.

'The average Arab, as opposed to the handful of amateur politicians of Baghdad, sees the future as one of fair dealing and material and moral progress under the aegis of Great Britain, and is clear-sighted enough to realize that he would lose rather than gain in national unity if we were to relinquish effective control. He will learn more quickly than the Indian. But he is still behind him in education and experience.

'Irrespective of this, the tribal element is a constant potential source of dissension and grave public insecurity. Nor can we afford to ignore the mutual contempt and jealousy that exist between townsmen and tribesmen.

'With the experience of my Political Officers behind me, I can confidently declare that the country as a whole neither expects nor desires any such sweeping scheme of independence as is adumbrated, if not clearly denoted, in the Anglo-French Declaration.

'The Arabs are content with our occupation; the non-Muhammadian element clings to it as the tardy fulfilment of the hopes of many generations; the world at large recognizes that it is our duty and our high privilege to establish an effective protectorate and to introduce a form of Government which shall make possible

the development of this country, which in spite of centuries of neglect is still the ganglion of the Middle East.

'If we allow ourselves to be diverted from this path by political catch-words, our soldiers will have fought and died in vain and the treasure we have lavished in this country will in the eyes of the world and of the peoples of the Middle East have been wasted; for it was not merely to defeat Germany that we came here.

'I submit, therefore, that our best course is to declare Mesopotamia to be a British Protectorate, under which all races and classes will be given forthwith the maximum possible degree of liberty and self-rule that is compatible with that good and safe Government to which all nations aspire but so few now enjoy. Our national characteristics and the trend of our policy in this country during the past four years afford the best guarantee that we shall not fail here as in India to make every effort by the spread of education and institutions familiar to progressive states to encourage the growth of a self-contained 'Iraq State.'

In separate telegrams I placed on record my views on certain special points as follows:

OTTOMAN PUBLIC DEBT

'Maintenance of separate administration for the service of this Debt would be intolerable. We must, however, presumably be prepared to accept responsibility for paying such sums as were realized before the war from the territories we occupy, but should not be called upon to allocate particular revenues for this purpose, and should retain right to redeem at our discretion that part of Debt secured on 'Iraq Revenues.

TOBACCO RÉGIE

'Revenues from Tobacco are pledged to the Public Debt Administration, which arranges for the recovery of these revenues.

'This recovery was made by means of a farm given to the Régie, a Company mainly in hands of Germans and Austrians. The Régie paid the Public Debt nearly £1,000,000 yearly for the collection of revenues from tobacco throughout the Turkish Empire and made large profits.

'I submit that we should resist any attempt to re-establish it in any territories we occupy. This is a necessary corollary of the acceptance of the preceding paragraph.

BAGHDAD RAILWAY

All its assets in Mesopotamia should be transferred to the 'Iraq State, pending transfer to a Railway Company to be formed hereafter if desired.

DELIVERY OF ARCHIVES

'Turkish Government to deliver over to 'Iraq Administration the Archives, Documents and Registers relating to the Civil, Military and Judicial Administration of the Ceded Territories.

IDARAH NAHRIA

'Steamers on the Tigris owned by this Company and since captured and all its assets in Mesopotamia to be regarded as Turkish State Property and as such transferred to the 'Iraq State.

PENSIONS

'Iraq State to undertake financial responsibility for payment of pensions at pre-war scale to ex-officials of late Turkish Government whose *bona fide* domicile is in 'Iraq. Liability to be restricted to such part thereof as was earned by service in 'Iraq. It would be preferable not to mention this, but it may be raised by the other side.

PRIVILEGES OF FOREIGNERS UNDER CAPITULATIONS

'If a British Protectorate is established in 'Iraq the capitulations should cease to have effect.

TURCO-PERSIAN FRONTIER

'Boundary as laid down by Frontier Commission in 1914 from Fao to Ararat to be ratified and declared to be binding on the limitrophe powers. The portion of the frontier near Kotur to be as recommended by Russian and British Commissioners.

CONCESSIONS

'All concessions actual or prospective granted by Turkish Government in or for 'Iraq State to be null and void, *e. g.* for oil, for electric tramways, &c., subject to a concomitant undertaking on our behalf to consider cases referred to with a view to grant of compensation at our sole discretion. Tobacco Régie would be included under this head, as also would any special privileges enjoyed by Imperial Ottoman Bank and Euphrates and Tigris S. N. Coy.

SOVEREIGNTY

'Turkish Government when abandoning temporal Sovereignty over 'Iraq to give up at the same time all claim to spiritual sovereignty, *e. g.* in regard to pre-war functions of Shaikh-ul-Islam.'

Other paragraphs dealt with the question of amnesties, religious freedom, and choice of nationality.

As regards the Persian Gulf region, I urged that provision should be made in the Peace Treaties for recognition of the independence of Najd in terms not less explicit than those employed in relation to King Husain and the Hijaz; I suggested that the Treaties of the British Government with all the Principalities of the Persian Gulf should be laid before the Peace Conference, together with a statement as to our *de facto* position in relation to the lighting and buoing of the Persian Gulf, and in regard to Muscat and the Arms Traffic.

I concluded by reminding His Majesty's Government that during the next few months several thousand prisoners of war would be repatriated to Mesopotamia, together with several hundred ex-Turkish officials and others of Arab race whose active anti-British proclivities were the cause of their arrest. Their arrival would be a source of no little embarrassment. The problem had to be faced, and any lack of definiteness in our status, policy, and aims in Mesopotamia during the period of reconstruction would add greatly to our difficulties.

A few days later the India Office communicated a proposal, which had reached them from an unofficial source, for a comprehensive solution of the Arab problem of Arabia. This involved the recognition of the King of the Hijaz as the titular ruler of all Arabia (including Najd but excluding, it may be presumed, 'Oman) except (1) Lower Mesopotamia (from Basra to 'Ana and the Great Zab), (2) Upper Mesopotamia, including Mosul, 'Urfa, Diarbekr, and (3) Syria, including Palestine. These three States to be 'under' 'Abdulla, Zaid, and Faisal, sons of King Husain, who would himself have no position in the three States except such as would be conferred by his recognition in the *khutba* (Friday prayers) as Caliph or Commander of the Faithful. I was asked to telegraph my considered views with as little delay as possible. I replied on the following day that I regarded the scheme as wholly impracticable: I urged, as did Sir Percy Cox in 1917, that the wilayats of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul should be regarded as a single unit for administrative purposes, under effective British control. I deprecated any attempt on our part to touch on the question of the insertion of King Husain's name in the *khutba* or to impose, at this stage, any particular ruling family or form of Government on 'Iraq. To found a dynasty was in any case a far more serious matter than to secure the election of a President. The examples offered by the then ruling dynasties in Persia, Turkey, and Afghanistan were not encouraging. I continued as follows:

'For the past few days public here have been considering the meaning of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th and its probable effect on the future of the country is beginning to be realized. Educated opinion is being widely canvassed and considerable interest has been aroused.

'I have not yet been authorized authoritatively to ascertain public opinion throughout the country, and I am unable to speak with certainty on the subject till I have done so.

'So far as it has been possible under the above limitations to gauge it in Baghdad, educated opinion is running on the following lines:—

1. Idea of restoration of Turkish rule is rejected by all.
2. Idea of Arab Kingdom without British advice, assistance, or control is likewise put aside.
3. Formal annexation by British Government is desired by none.
4. Arab State under an Arab Amir, including Basra, Baghdad and Mosul is considered an ideal solution by all.
5. British High Commissioner and British Advisers in all the Ministries of the Arab State and throughout the country are unanimously desired.
6. All agree in wishing Sir P. Cox to be the first incumbent of the post. This feeling is general to my personal knowledge all over 'Iraq, particularly in

Najaf and Karbala and in the country districts, where his name carries the greatest weight.

7. All agree that opinion of the country must be taken before any decision can rightly be come to, and on the clear understanding on which the inhabitants of the country themselves rely, that a protectorate will in due course be declared and that for the present military administration will continue, I am prepared to arrange for this in a manner consonant with educated opinion and not inconsistent with the maintenance of public order. I do not doubt that our confidence will be justified by results.
8. None agree as to the Amir to be chosen.¹

After discussing the merits of various names¹ that had been unofficially put forward, I stated that such information as was at my disposal indicated that a son of King Husain 'would meet with widespread acceptance in Baghdad and would probably be well received elsewhere, and in particular by the Shi'ahs of Mesopotamia, on account of the well-known latitude of King Husain's religious views'. I added, however, that I had misgivings as to the immediate effect of a Sharifian nominee owing to King Husain's attitude towards Ibn Sa'ud, and on other grounds. (I had been informed that Faisal was not available for Mesopotamia, having been nominated for Syria.)

I concluded as follows:

'A possible alternative has not yet been discussed in Baghdad, but if I might be authorized to suggest it would probably meet with immediate acquiescence in Baghdad and would be even more acceptable to the rural districts, namely, that Sir P. Cox should be appointed High Commissioner for the first five years without any Arab Amir or other head of the State, but with Arab Ministers backed by British Advisers. I earnestly hope that this course will be adopted if it is at all compatible with our national peace policy and the general scheme of things in Arabia.

'Its adoption will save Government, the public in Mesopotamia and the representatives of His Majesty's Government on the spot from being rushed into a premature decision.

'To the inhabitants of this country the ideas on which the Anglo-French Declaration is based are new and unfamiliar, to the Shaikhs almost anarchic. They have yet to hear of the obligations of liberty and to realize the duties of free men. A breathing space during which settled Government would be more firmly established and the thinking classes given some education in the management of their affairs and opportunity to look beyond the City walls would be of immense advantage to the whole country.

'Under such auspices self-determination would be a continuous process; and not a precipitate choice between uncertain courses half understood.'

In a telegram dispatched a few days later, I expressed the view that it was clear that, until political opinion had crystallized, any choice must

¹ Of men all of whom are now (1930) dead.

of necessity be that of a minority, as the weight of the mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala would be thrown into the scales against any possible candidate. I concluded as follows:

'The appointment of an Amir *at the present time* is impracticable and undesirable . . . I do not know whether such an appointment is considered to be a necessary concomitant to the Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th. If so, I anticipate that the path which H.M.'s Government have chosen for this country will prove a thorny one.'¹

I have quoted almost verbatim the foregoing telegrams because they indicate clearly that we in Mesopotamia were prepared from the very outset to work on thoroughly 'liberal' lines. Read at leisure, after a lapse of twelve years, they perhaps appear to lack precision and clarity, and to be unduly rhetorical. It must be borne in mind, however, that circumstances demanded immediate replies to telegrams asking for an expression of view on matters of capital importance, official consideration of which previous to the Armistice had been severely discouraged. During the war postal delays made it useless to attempt to exchange views by post on current topics of importance,² and, owing to the submarine menace, very few State papers had reached us in Mesopotamia; we were thus almost entirely ignorant of the trend of official opinion on the matters dealt with. After the Armistice the foreign policy of H.M.'s Government was conducted simultaneously from Paris, where the Peace Delegates were assembled, and from London; and it would have puzzled Athanasius himself to define in set terms the relative spheres in regard to Middle Eastern questions of the India and Foreign Offices, the Government of India, and the Arab Bureau in Cairo. The function of the last-named office was to co-ordinate Arab policy; it was, however, captured at a very early date by partisans of a policy which sought to impose King Husain and his family upon the whole of Arabia, and at no time did its directors show any desire to look at the problems of 'Iraq from any other angle. From our point of view in 'Iraq the existence of the Arab Bureau was an embarrassment rather than an advantage: the relative proximity of Cairo to Paris and London gave the exponents of the Hashimite policy, themselves for the most part untrammelled by office or by administrative responsibilities, an advantage over the accredited representatives of the British Government in 'Iraq and in the Persian Gulf. Some of these Arab enthusiasts became more fervent believers in the Arabs

¹ At Miss Gertrude Bell's request on 8th December 1918, in reply to a private telegram, I informed Mr. Montagu that she agreed with the telegram quoted above, and with all other telegrams hitherto sent on this subject.

² Communication with Basra was still by river, and letters from England to Baghdad never took less than a month, and often longer.

than the Arabs themselves. In their view, if our engagements to France were incompatible with Arab ambitions, so much the worse for France.¹

It was under these conditions that discussions as to the future of 'Iraq took place. In assessing the intrinsic merits of the policies advocated from Baghdad, due weight should be given both to the strength of the opposition that the idea of a single 'Iraq State encountered amongst certain British officers employed in Syria, and to the fact that we in 'Iraq had been led to believe, until the moment of the Armistice, that the policy envisaged by the British and French Governments in the Middle East was one in which the principles and methods followed by Lord Cromer² in Egypt would, with suitable modification, find acceptance both on the spot and at home. It must be remembered, too, that the League of Nations had not been born, and that the 'mandatory system' had not yet been invented. My library was well-stocked with historical precedents, with the texts of protocols, treaties, and orders-in-council. My imagination envisaged some form of protectorate, which might develop ere long into a fully-fledged Arab State with 'Dominion status' under the British Crown—'tantum est hoc regnum quod regibus imperat ipsis'. The alternative, a small independent state of less than three million souls, seemed a retrograde, almost an anarchic, step, which found at the time no responsible advocates in 'Iraq. I anxiously scanned the pages of *The Times* and of the Parliamentary Debates, and of French journals and periodicals lent to me by the French Consul, in the hope of finding a clue to the real intentions of the Allies. Everything indicated that the French in Syria, and the British in 'Iraq, intended to create effective protectorates, and that the Anglo-French Declaration was not intended to be taken literally.

Arising out of the foregoing correspondence I received, from the India Office on 30th November, the following instructions:

'Intention of Anglo-French Declaration was primarily to clear up the existing situation in Syria which Arab suspicion of French intentions had created. It should be understood by all that the Peace Conference will settle the ultimate status of all Arab provinces. It is laid down meanwhile in the Declaration that His Majesty's Government will as part of their policy assist in the establishment of native government in the liberated area, and do not intend to impose on the population any governments which are distasteful to them. We desire to see the strongest and most settled government in Mesopotamia which is compatible with

¹ See article by Lord Winterton ('W') in *Blackwood's Magazine* for June 1920, p. 754.

² Cf. T. E. Lawrence, *The Observer*, 8th August 1920. 'It would be child's play for a decent man to run Mesopotamia, so long as he ran it like Cromer's Egypt, not like the Egypt of the Protectorate.'

those two conditions, and to further this end we are prepared to render all British assistance that is necessary, including an army of occupation.

'It will doubtless be necessary to establish at first a large measure of supervision by the British and to retain the control of foreign relations entirely in British hands. . . . We do not, however, contemplate annexation, nor, as far as can be seen at the moment, to make a formal Declaration of Protectorate. An analogy might be made to the position of Egypt before the war, exclusive of the capitulations.

'You should take as a guide for your administrative action and official utterances the principles stated above, and it should be possible for you to satisfy our friends that we do not intend to abandon them nor to interrupt the excellent work which we have undertaken hitherto. In the meantime our attention is being given to the question of the best form of Government to set up. We should gladly receive any assistance and advice which you and your advisers can render on this point. We are anxious in particular that you should render us an authoritative statement of the views held by the local population in the various areas affected on the following specific points:

(1) Do they favour a single Arab state under British tutelage stretching from the Northern boundary of the Mosul wilayat to the Persian Gulf?

'(2) In this event, do they consider that a titular Arab head should be placed over this new State?

'(3) In that case, whom would they prefer as head?

'In our opinion it is of great importance to get a genuine expression of local opinion on these points, and one of such a kind that could be announced to the world as the unbiassed pronouncement of the population of Mesopotamia.'

On the same day I forwarded a copy of this telegram and of the connected correspondence to the Political Officers in charge of the nine administrative Divisions into which the Occupied Territories (including the Mosul wilayat) were now divided, with detailed instructions for the taking of a plebiscite.

The idea that a change of sovereignty should be prefaced by such an inquiry, which in its common meaning connotes universal male suffrage, was not new. It was after a plebiscite that Avignon, Savoy, and Nice were annexed to France in 1791-3, and plebiscites were several times held in Italy between 1848 and 1870. The Schleswig question was thus settled in 1866, and the Ionian Islands were ceded by Great Britain to Greece after a vote of the Legislative Assembly, specially qualified by adult suffrage, the proceedings being conducted under the supervision of Mr. Gladstone as Special High Commissioner.¹ Yet the idea was wholly novel to Asia, and the precedents cited, to which may be added that of Norway in 1905, afforded no practical guidance to us in pursuing this delicate task. It was not till the end of January that definite replies from all centres were available.

¹ Vide Monograph on Plebiscites. New York, Oxford University Press, 1920.

Opinion in Basra was summarized by the Political Officer, Major A. S. Meek, in the following words (21st December):

'The majority recognize the need for a period of training during which strong British control is essential; a minority detest the idea of a foreign government. Taking the average sense of the mixed feelings of the various sects and races in Basra we have a demand for the continuance of a British administration liberal to native sentiment under a British High Commissioner and without an Arab Amir. The 'Iraq State should include the Mosul wilayat.'¹

Lt.-Col. Leachman's report (dated 22nd December) on the attitude of the populace in the Mosul wilayat was more definite: it reads as follows:

(1) All classes of Christians now favour direct control by the British. In this are included Chaldeans and Catholics who though formerly pro-French, have now altered their opinion in alarm at the idea of Arab rule. The stories told by refugees from Aleppo, who say that the Arab flag is flying there and the Arabs control the town to the exclusion of the British, has caused a feeling akin to consternation.

(2) I have toured in the district of the Yezidis of Sinjar and found alarm at the presence of an agent of the Sharif at Dair-ez-Zor. They made a formal demand that no Government post should be given in their area to a Muslim.

(3) At least half the population consists of Kurds, who inhabit two-thirds of this division. They are strongly anti-Arab.

(4) The view of the country population is that though we have freed them from Turkey, we have yet to liberate them from the tyranny of landowners who are the only class in favour of Arab Government.'

At this juncture I visited Kut-al-Amara, 'Amara, Qurna, and Basra by air in order to obtain by personal contact some idea of the attitude of the leading Arabs in each division.

The views of the Shaikhs of 'Amara and Qurna were summarized by me in a telegram to Mr. Montagu as follows (22nd December):

'That the wilayats of Basra and Mosul should be united with Baghdad. That the position of British Political Officers should be as it is now, and that the relations between them and the Shaikhs and between the Shaikhs and their tribes should remain unchanged. They add that they will not accept Frenchmen or Americans.

¹ I had, however, heard almost simultaneously from my friend the Rev. J. Van Ess, of the American Presbyterian Mission at Basra, that the main stream of public opinion had turned against us at about the time of the Armistice. Until then it had been almost unanimously in favour of a thorough-going British Administration, but the patience of the leaders had been exhausted by the constant growth of the military machine—port, camps, depots, and the like. Some of the British officers with whom they dealt were exhausted, too, by four years of incessant labour in circumstances of much discomfort, relieved only by bouts of sickness. Nerves were frayed, and the amenities of administrative business suffered. Opinion in Basra was, however, hostile to the hegemony in 'Iraq of Baghdad. Some favoured the return of the Turks: none favoured an Arab Government centred in Baghdad.

This follows a long discussion on the possibility of an Arab Amir. The general opinion on this subject is that whilst in theory it is a good thing, in practice no suitable candidate could be found. There was free discussion of the candidature of a son of the Sharif, which they definitely rejected.

'On the same day and in ignorance of the decision reached in 'Amara, the Shaikhs of Qurna came to almost exactly the same conclusion and presented written documents to this effect. It is difficult to gauge opinion in Basra. The Political Officer has, however, entered into very frank discussion on the subject with leading personalities and has recorded their individual personal views. Opinion is unanimously in favour of direct British Administration with the ultimate aim, as in India, of instructing Arabs in the art of Government. There is a general desire to see the Arab element in the Government encouraged. They regard the appointment of an Amir as in accordance with Arab sentiment, but one practically unattainable, as the Shi'ahs would accept no Sunni candidates and *vice versa*.'

Translations of the numerous declarations and other documents relating to 'self-determination' elsewhere in 'Iraq were prepared and printed for transmission to Paris and London, together with photographic reproductions of the original documents. Their general purport was communicated to His Majesty's Government by telegram from time to time. Miss Gertrude Bell, who, as my Oriental Secretary, had the handling of the papers on the subject, completed on 22nd February a note for the India Office on the whole question, which I make no apology for reproducing at length,¹ omitting only a few personal references which have no direct bearing on the question.

The concluding paragraph of her memorandum, however, merits reproduction here. It ran as follows:

'A few reflections may be permitted in conclusion. Given the short period of time, it would have been difficult to arouse more sound and fury, not to speak of heart-burnings and intrigue, than have been created in Baghdad by the declaration and the enquiries into the will of the people which ensued from it. The only justification which in the light of experience can be put forward for these measures, is that they were called for by considerations of international import foreign to 'Iraq. There can be no question that sooner or later a Nationalist party with inflated ambitions . . . must have sprung to life; as a result of recent proceedings it has come sooner to the birth. Its prematurity has so clearly been manifest that it has found no support among the stable elements of the community. They have, on the contrary, been frightened into closer co-operation with the British Administration. The fact that they sought our support during these agitated days will not readily be forgotten either by them or by ourselves. Nor will those among us who were participants in the drama fail to remember the support which we on our side received from the Naqib and Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi. The value of a darwesh, like that of a mujtahid, has its limitations. Neither can go forth into the lists, neither can afford to risk the criticism which follows the steps of the

¹ Appendix III.

eager partizan, but judgment from their lips delivered *in camera* and couched in language which to our mind may seem lacking in definition, will for many a decade to come weigh heavy in the inconsistent scale of Mesopotamian opinion.⁷

The upshot of these inquiries was that the majority desired no change of régime, a large minority favoured an Arab Amir under British guidance and control, and that no name that we could suggest commanded the acceptance of even a small minority. There is little doubt in my mind that had I been able to announce the alternative scheme put forward in November for a British High Commissioner for five years, with Arab Ministers backed by British Advisers, it would have been very widely accepted, and might have paved the way for an Arab Amir or King at a later stage. The Government, however, felt themselves unable to authorize me to make any immediate announcement, except to deny the statement, made in *The Daily Mail*, that India expected to become the Mandatory for 'Iraq.¹ They agreed, however, to my suggestion that Miss Gertrude Bell should go home and explain the position in 'Iraq in greater detail than was possible by telegram. Her contemporary comments on the proposal are contained in correspondence with her father of 17th and 31st January, which is reproduced in full in her *Letters*.²

I was gratified to receive, on 16th February, the following telegram from Mr. Montagu:

'H.M.'s Government greatly appreciate care and thoroughness with which you have executed delicate task entrusted to you but will take no action if they can avoid it until Miss Bell arrives and can make fuller statement of case. Meanwhile they will be glad if you will telegraph outline of constitution of Arab State or Group of States which you would propose on basis of wishes of inhabitants as disclosed in your telegrams and of necessity of effective and indisputable British control. By the Anglo-French declaration we are committed to an indigenous administration and we must adhere to this not only in letter but in spirit. Our objective should be a flexible constitution, giving full play to the different elements of the population, and recognizing and incorporating local peculiarities and idiosyncrasies such as will provide for Arab participation as time goes on in the actual

¹ I telegraphed on this subject to London on 3rd February: 'All Arab opinion is united in objecting to any appearance of being in any sense under the tutelage of India and expect to be under Whitehall. I beg leave to publish an official denial of the report.'

² She reached Paris on 7th March 1919. A little later she sent me from her home a long letter from which I extract the following: 'This letter has been all business, but I am going to end with a little sentiment . . . all these things have happened since I last sat in this beautiful room of mine, lined with books and looking out on an exquisite country-side. I cannot recapture the former world which this room and its books stood for, nor can I ever quite lay to rest the anguish which lies between that world and this, but I can, and I do, accept with wonder and gratitude what the new world has given me, and in that you play a large part—you yourself, and the Service of which you have made me feel I am one.'

government and administration of the country and will prevent Arab nationalism from being drawn into opposition to British control. These general ideas may not be any great hindrance to you in endeavouring to work out a solution of an extremely difficult problem, and may serve to show you what is in our mind.'

On receipt of this telegram I drafted a reply, which was circulated on 20th February to Sir E. Bonham Carter and Mr. E. B. Howell, as well as to the Political Officers in charge of Divisions, for their opinions. Before their replies could reach me I received instructions to go myself to Paris for personal discussion of the very important issues raised.

I left on 25th February by air for Damascus in an aged D.H.4,¹ piloted by Captain F. Nuttall, M.C., D.F.C., with as escort an equally decrepit D.H.4, piloted by Major O. Boyd, M.C., with Captain D. M. Lapraik as observer. It was the second time that the attempt had been made to cross the desert by air—the first trip having been made by a Handley-Page some months earlier. It nearly ended in disaster: Nuttall had to land with engine-trouble in very bad ground west of Tadmor, and strained a shock-absorber. We managed to take off again, though the machine lurched and bounced unpleasantly over the rough ground, and just before dusk reached Damascus, where we were held up by rain till the 28th. The courtyard of the Damascus Palace Hotel was three feet under water, the aerodrome a sea of mud. When we set off again for Ramleh, it was still cloudy. Engine-trouble again forced Nuttall down. We had no idea where we were, but managed to find a field on the slopes above Lake Tiberias on which we landed, and Boyd beside us. On examination it was found that the split nut on an inlet valve stem had broken; temporary repairs were out of the question, so Boyd undertook to take me on, and to return for his comrades. Taking-off proved difficult, for the wheels were axle deep in the soft ground: we enlisted the local Arabs, who assembled in great numbers, and after an hour's shouting contrived to move the machine to a patch of firmer ground. An hour later we landed at Tul Karaim in search of petrol. The ground was soft and we went on our nose. A trolley took me to Ramleh, whence I was sent by air via Kantara to Cairo. Next day I was conveyed by air to Port Said to catch the outgoing mail steamer, and I arrived at Paris on 20th March. Major Boyd, Captain Nuttall, and Lapraik made the return journey from Cairo in D.H.9 machines some weeks later. On 19th March they left Damascus for Baghdad; the wind was favourable and the journey of 500 miles was completed in 4 hours 10 minutes, which constituted at the time a world's record.

At the Hotel Majestic I was delighted to find Sir Arthur Hirtzel of

¹ See A. E. W. Salt, *Imperial Air Routes*, 1930, p. 40.

the India Office. Experts on Western Arabia, both military and civil, were there in force, but not one, except Miss Bell, had any first-hand knowledge of 'Iraq or Najd or, indeed, of Persia. The very existence of a Shi'ah majority in 'Iraq was blandly denied as a figment of my imagination by one 'expert' with an international reputation, and Miss Bell and I found it impossible to convince either the Military or the Foreign Office Delegations that Kurds in the Mosul wilayat were numerous and likely to be troublesome, that Ibn Sa'ud was a power seriously to be reckoned with, or that our problems could not be disposed of on the same lines as those advocated for Syria by the enthusiasts of the Arab Bureau.

I was privileged to see Mr. Balfour, Mr. Lloyd George, and Mr. Montagu and to outline to them the problem of 'Iraq as I saw it. I was also sent to see Sir Henry Wilson and found him, even at that date, doubtful whether the troops necessary for the interregnum in 'Iraq could be found except by withdrawing entirely from the Caspian and Persia.

Other officers of the Military Delegation, however, were more optimistic, and I was pressed to agree to extend the Mosul wilayat and the boundaries of the future Arab State of 'Iraq to include not only Dair-ez-Zor, which we had already occupied, but the whole of the area east of the Euphrates as far north as Birejik, and including Diarbekr, 'Urfa, Nisibin, and Jazirat-ibn-'Umar. The question of Kurdistan was for the moment shelved by the suggestion that we should constitute in South Kurdistan a fringe of autonomous Kurdish States under some form of British guidance and tutelage. I found it impossible to get any clearer idea as to what was wanted than that contained in the India Office telegram quoted above. Mr. Montagu himself, as the Cabinet Minister responsible for 'Iraq, emphasized that it was for me to make specific proposals: he feared that in preparing them I could obtain little guidance in Paris, but he suggested that Lord Curzon, who was at the Foreign Office in London, might be able and willing to assist in formulating a policy, or at all events to discuss and perhaps sanction any plans I might feel able to put forward.

I left Paris for London, where I placed before Lord Curzon the position in 'Iraq as I understood it, begging him to do what he could to enable me to return to 'Iraq with an agreed scheme on which to build, and an accepted policy by which I could be guided. After lengthy interviews it was decided that I should place my proposals before the Inter-departmental Committee on Eastern Affairs, of which Lord Curzon was Chairman. At his suggestion, I was received in audience by His Majesty the King on 14th April. To quote from the official communiqué issued a few days later: 'His Majesty expressed

pleasure at hearing of the steps taken to repair the ravages of war in districts until recently occupied by the Turks, and to promote the welfare of Mesopotamia in general by restoring irrigation, improving communication, providing medical assistance in large towns and encouraging education in indigenous institutions through the medium of the Arabic tongue. His Majesty expressed confidence in the future prosperity of Mesopotamia and in the progressive spirit of the inhabitants.'

The proposals placed before the Eastern Committee were summarized by me for consideration in the following terms:

'In considering question I make the following assumptions:

'(1) There will be no Arab Amir, but a British High Commissioner.

'(2) Mosul wilayat and Dair-ez-Zor will be included in 'Iraq as also those portions of Kurdistan which are now part of Mosul wilayat and which are not included in the future Armenian State i. e. the whole of the basin of the Greater Zab. This is necessary in order to admit of inclusion of Assyrians.

'(3) British Control however expressed in words will be effective in practice and will be ensured by retention of adequate military and air forces distributed with due regard to their abilities to aid civil power in the maintenance of order.

'(4) Adequate British financial support be given to the 'Iraq State in its early stages, firstly by loan secured on revenue, secondly, by allowing Civil Administration to take over surplus military assets such as Railways, Bridges, Docks, Electric Plant, etc., at a low valuation. This Country has during the war been equipped and administered in some respects on a scale beyond our powers to maintain in time of peace. Only by taking over such assets at a very low valuation and running them as cheaply as possible can we avoid financial instability and consequent political embarrassments.

'Having postulated the above, I submit the following proposals:—

'(1) 'Iraq to be ruled by a High Commissioner, having under him four Commissioners controlling provinces as follows:—

'*Basra*, including the former Basra wilayat, minus Kut.

'*Baghdad*, including former Baghdad wilayat, minus Euphrates Districts.

'*Euphrates*, including the Euphrates Districts from 'Ana to Samawa inclusive, and the towns of Najaf and Karbala.

'*Mosul*, including the whole Mosul wilayat and such areas north of Mosul wilayat as are not included in the new Armenian State. Roughly speaking, the boundary of the latter North of Mosul should be the watershed between Lake Van and the Greater Zab. This will place the Assyrians in 'Iraq as they wish. The grant of some form of autonomy to the Kurds of Kurdistan had better be left to our initiative, and not laid down in the Peace Conference if this can be avoided.

'If, however, Kurdistan be given separate status, there will be five Provinces.

'(2) The Divisional Councils mentioned in my telegram of November 10th, to be made full use of as advisory and deliberative but not as legislative bodies. They will be none the less influential. Experience suggests that elective bodies are unsuited to present conditions.

(3) Provincial Councils to be formed in each of the above provinces from members selected of their own choice by the Divisional Councils. The latter are selected bodies. These Provincial Councils to enjoy considerable powers but not at present to be made responsible for legislation.

'I am of opinion that the legitimate demand for active participation in actual government and administration can best be met not by creating central legislative and deliberative Councils, but by giving carefully selected Arabs of good birth and education belonging to 'Iraq by birth from the very outset positions of executive and administrative responsibility.

* * * * *

'In pursuance of the policy outlined above, I would propose to instal in each case selected Arab officials as Governors of Mosul, Baghdad, Basra, and 'Amara, with a specially chosen British official of ability and character as Municipal Commissioner and Adviser to the Governor, in which dual capacity he could control finance, and mitigate inevitable inefficiency in early stages.

'I am fully alive to the imperfections and inadequacy of the above proposals. They are framed in the conviction that it is only by introducing Arabs into the actual work of the Administration from the very start that we can hope to enlist their cordial co-operation, or prevent a system growing up which will be too elaborate for them to work successfully.

'The problem before us like many others arising out of our position in the Oriental world is in a large measure insoluble. Political discontent, always with us, will increase, the Arab Nationalists will return to Baghdad, "and will grudge if they be not satisfied". These difficulties are inherent in the otherwise favourable position which our army has won for us in the East, and we must not be deterred thereby.'

In a separate memorandum I dealt at some length with the question of economic policy. On 22nd May 1918 I had written on this subject to Sir Arthur Hirtzel as follows:

'If we wish to make our Arab policy, whatever it eventually is, a success, we must develop economic and other practical bonds at the earliest moment, and shape our commercial policy to that end. With railway communication with Syria and Egypt, rapid postal communication, and cheap telegrams: with abundant literature and good universities and schools in Syria, Baghdad and Cairo I believe we could do something, but without these solid bonds I fear we shall never break down Arab provincialism.

'However, all these questions are at the moment a little unreal to me: my daily task is too closely connected with the prosecution of the war to leave me much time to think of larger issues, *video—proboque*—but I have no time to follow them.'

I now attempted to carry these ideas a stage further, and urged H.M.'s Government, when dealing with the political issues, to bear in mind the transcendent importance of improving the communications of 'Iraq with the rest of the world.

'There is already in Syria', I wrote, 'a standard gauge line from Tripoli to Homs, Hama, Damascus, Aleppo, Alexandretta, and beyond. In Iraq we have a standard gauge line from Baghdad northwards to Tikrit and Sharqat. This line is useful for one purpose only—namely as part of a standard gauge line reaching from Baghdad via Tikrit, Albu Kamal, and Palmyra to Damascus and Aleppo, and thence to Cairo via Haifa, and via Constantinople to Europe. If Mosul is to be connected with the Mediterranean it must be via Nisibin: in such matters strategical and political considerations must be subordinated to economic needs. The connexion of Mosul with Baghdad should be via Kifri, Kirkuk and Arbil: the construction of such a line, preferably on metre gauge, will assist the economic development of Southern Kurdistan, and the rich province of Persian 'Azarbaijan can be tapped by a motor road via Rowandiz to Urmia. I know this route personally, and am confident that it will be found to offer no insuperable difficulties.

'If a Federated Arabia ever takes shape, it will be as a consequence of improved communications. If Baghdad can be joined up direct with Damascus, the two great centres of Arab civilization and Arab thought will be united. The products of Syria and Iraq are complementary to each other: amongst the upper classes the family and racial ties between the two capitals are very close. The Muslim intelligentsia of Syria are more sophisticated than those of Iraq, and more energetic: the climate of Damascus and Aleppo is less trying than that of Baghdad.

'I realize that the Sykes-Picot agreement is a difficulty, but I am convinced that in matters of this sort economic arguments, if sound, should prevail over comparatively transient considerations of strategy and politics. I would therefore urge that the whole question of future railway policy be investigated, as soon as may be, by a body of competent experts, with knowledge of existing conditions in Iraq and Syria. Such men are available at the moment but will have been dispersed before long on demobilization.'

Lord Curzon put this memorandum aside with the remark that such interesting speculations were premature, and therefore unprofitable. His attention, and that of the Committee, was concentrated upon the general political and administrative scheme outlined above.

After much discussion it was accepted by the Inter-departmental Committee on Eastern Affairs (which after the Armistice replaced the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet), and shortly after my return to Baghdad I received a telegram indicating that it had received the approval of Government, whose commendation of the efforts of the Civil Administration was conveyed to me in the following letter from the India Office under date 6th June 1919.

'The approval of H.M.'s Government of the proposals submitted in your letter of the 6th April last for the future administration of Mesopotamia was communicated to you in the Secretary of State's telegram of the 9th May, 1919.

'The measures recommended by you were necessarily of a provisional character; but they mark an important stage towards the provision of a definite form of administration for the occupied territories, the ultimate constitution of which must

await the conclusion of peace with Turkey and the final decision of the Peace Conference at Paris.

'The Secretary of State desires to take the opportunity of conveying to you on behalf of H.M.'s Government his sense of the marked care and ability which you and the officers serving under you have devoted to the difficult and delicate problem which you were invited to consider.

'The Political staff in Mesopotamia, under the able direction first of Major-General Sir Percy Cox and subsequently of yourself, have throughout addressed themselves to their task with a zeal that has been as admirable as it has been successful. They have had to work under conditions that must often have been discouraging, and in circumstances involving much discomfort and at times considerable personal danger. But difficulty and danger have merely served as incitements to increased effort in the discharge of their duties. They will find their best reward in the evidence that must confront them on every side of the results achieved by their labours in the public interest. But H.M.'s Government, who have from the first watched the progress of civil administration in Mesopotamia with the closest attention, cannot let the occasion pass without asking you to accept on your own behalf, and to convey to all those serving under you, an expression of their cordial appreciation and thanks.'

In forwarding copies to all Political Officers in Mesopotamia I wrote as follows (24th July):

'Successive G.O.C.-in-Chiefs have, in their published dispatches, intimated their satisfaction with the work of the Department, but I am further desired by Sir George MacMunn to express to you in forwarding the enclosed letter his own appreciation of the work of the Department, which has thus been recognized in so signal a manner by the letter now enclosed.

'To the thanks of the G.O.C.-in-Chief, Sir P. Cox joins his own and asks me to let you know with what keen interest he still watches the progress of events.

'I myself am glad to have this opportunity of expressing my sense of obligation to all members of the Civil Administration for the loyalty and the high sense of duty shown by them whilst I have been privileged to hold this office.'

The foregoing correspondence marked an important stage in the development of the embryo state of 'Iraq; it might have been a decisive stage had not events external to 'Iraq made it impossible for us, as I will presently show, to move forward in this or indeed in any direction.

PREFATORY NOTE TO CHAPTER VI

Extract from *History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, edited by H. W. V. Temperley, vol. vi, 1924, p. 179.

WHATEVER the official view of the future of Iraq, this view ought to have governed the measures taken for the settlement of the country. The transfer, after the fall of Kut, of the control of Mesopotamia from India to the Home Government made no apparent difference to the official policy. The British had a chance if not a duty to improve the social, economic, and political conditions of a backward people. They saw the life of the Arab 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short' without perhaps realizing that the Arab preferred it so. But even if the Arab did prefer it so, it does not follow that the Arab was right, or that we were wrong in trying to improve him. It may be that we went too fast, and that, instead of aiming at the best, we should have been content with the second best. Our proclamation soon after the landing, and General Maude's after the fall of Baghdad, at least implied an obligation to give the Arabs our best. And anything short of that would have exposed us to the more formidable charge of depriving them of one government without giving them anything better in its place.

It must be remembered too that after the fall of Baghdad in March 1917 the battle line was separated from the base at Basra by a distance of 350 miles as the crow flies and 470 miles measured along the shortest possible route by rail, road, or river. An efficient administration of the country, that is an administration by British officials, was essential even with the security of the military occupation.

This administration, surviving the Armistice, was found to be too enterprising and too expensive. It is easy to say that this result ought to have been foreseen. It is not easy to discover either how early it actually was foreseen, or what different system could have been adopted.

CHAPTER VI

UNCERTAINTY IN 'IRAQ AND DISTURBANCES IN KURDISTAN—DECEMBER 1918 TO AUGUST 1919

'Ni hushtar haiwan
Ni Arab insan.'

['A camel is not an animal
An Arab is not a human being.']

Kurdish proverb.

'Thalatha ba-ad-dunya fasad
Al Kurdi al jurdi wa al jarrad.'

['There are three plagues in the world,
The Kurd, the rat and the locust.']

Arabic proverb (quoted by HAY, p. 93.)

Situation in April 1919. Inability of H.M.'s Government to make any statement of policy as regards Mosul. Proposals for constitutional organization. The question of Mosul. San Remo agreement. The Kurdish question. Sulaimani. Captain Noel. Shaikh Mahmud. Sharif Pasha. Saiyid Taha. Rowandiz. Major Soane. Shaikh Mahmud revolts, is defeated, sentenced to death, and reprieved. Position in the Middle East. Question of railway construction. Question of Kurdistan. Murders of Captains Pearson, Willey, and Macdonald. Punitive operations in Kurdistan. Fresh disturbances. Murder of Bill and Scott. Further punitive operations. A period of quiescence.

IT was with a heavy heart that I retraced my steps from London to Paris and Cairo, whence, during the first week of May 1919, I flew back to Baghdad through Aleppo and Dair-ez-Zor. My proposals for the immediate future had, it is true, been accepted, almost without discussion, by Lord Curzon and by the Eastern Committee of the War Cabinet; Lord Curzon had shown himself well informed as usual, and more sympathetic than I had reason to expect, having regard to the strained relations which I knew to exist between himself and Mr. Montagu. He had, however, held out no hopes whatever of the early return from Tehran to Baghdad of Sir Percy Cox, whose appointment as first High Commissioner at the earliest possible moment was of vital importance to the success of the scheme of things propounded by me and approved by the Government. Both Lord Curzon and Mr. Montagu had asked me if I wished to be considered for the post should it be found impossible to spare Sir Percy Cox from Tehran: to both I replied that I did not wish to be considered for the post, but preferred to return to India. I attached great importance to the return of Sir Percy Cox, and had no wish to encourage the idea that he should remain longer than absolutely necessary in Tehran; I said, however, that I was willing to continue as Civil Commissioner until he could return as High Commissioner. These circumstances undoubtedly strengthened my hands both in London and 'Iraq by eliminating as far as possible the personal element from the minds of all concerned.

I knew that I should have to meet the unqualified hostility of certain elements in Syria, including several British officers who were determined to provide thrones in 'Iraq for Sharif 'Abdullah or Sharif Zaid, or both. Emissaries financed by the Arab Government in Syria had already arrived and were busily engaged in arousing prejudice against the administration, both on religious and political grounds, in almost every division. Their efforts in the Mosul Division were supplemented by those of Turkish emissaries, former civil officials for the most part, who were tireless in spreading rumours of the impending restoration of Mosul, if not of the whole of 'Iraq, to Turkey. I was importuned on all sides to make an official statement in order to counter these stories, which were undoubtedly believed by those who spread them and by a majority of their hearers. Not only was I not authorized to make any statement on the subject, but I was strictly enjoined to take no steps whatever from which the conclusion might be drawn that we contemplated a form of administrative or political organization which would place the Mosul wilayat on the same footing as the wilayats of Basra and Baghdad. At no time did His Majesty's Government give any indication that they were gratified at the steps taken by Sir William Marshall, in the course of his negotiations with 'Ali Ihsan Pasha, to include the Mosul wilayat within 'the territories of 'Iraq in the Occupation of the Armed Forces of His Britannic Majesty'. The sale of postage stamps surcharged 'Iraq in British Occupation' at post offices in the Mosul wilayat was prohibited; Turkish revenue stamps were used instead, surcharged 'M.E.F. Postal'.

Official approval to the proposals laid before them was conveyed to me on 10th May, twenty-four hours after my return to Baghdad, in the following terms:

'Constitution for 'Iraq. We authorize you to take in hand the construction of five provinces for 'Iraq proper on the same lines as recommended by Howell in enclosures five and six of your letter of April 6th. You will also proceed with the creation of the Arab province of Mosul fringed by autonomous Kurdish States under Kurdish Chiefs who will be advised by British Political Officers.

'We also approve of the formation of Provincial Councils and the development and institution of Divisional and Municipal Councils.'

The references to "'Iraq proper' and to 'the Arab province of Mosul' were ominous.

It seemed essential that the future status of Mosul should be settled (so far as we could determine it by a unilateral statement) before we proceeded with the measures of constitutional organization approved by H.M.'s Government. On 8th July 1919, in reply to a telegram

dated a month earlier begging authority to make a statement on the subject, I received the following reply:

'It is considered by the Foreign Office politically undesirable at present to take steps such as are likely to form a belief that decisions of the Peace Conference are being prejudged by H.M.'s Government.

'The formation of Councils was only sanctioned as a step towards evolution and decentralization of temporary military administration.

'It must not be assumed that decision connotes a permanent combination of provinces or a permanent guardianship of H.M.'s Government.

'Any action which would give rise in Mosul wilayat or elsewhere to the impression that the future political status of 'Iraq has already been settled should therefore be most scrupulously avoided.'

Further correspondence followed, and I again asked for permission to make a definite statement as to our intentions and to follow it up by action. I eventually elicited the following pronouncement from the Foreign Office (9th August): 'It would be premature to attempt constitutional experiments pending the decision of the Peace Conference as to the Mandatory Power, and nature of Mandate. His Majesty's Government have no desire to prejudice that decision. . . .'

I was not optimistic as to the prospects of success of a predominantly Arab Government; all I had seen and heard led me to believe that Emir Faisal alone would have a fair chance of success in 'Iraq, and he was installed in Syria. I was, however, determined to make the experiment, on the lines already approved by the Foreign Office, and to do my best to make it succeed; it will be readily understood, therefore, that this telegram was a serious blow, not less serious because it was addressed to Cairo, for communication to a group of prominent 'Iraqi officers in the Sharifian service, and was the outcome of telegraphic correspondence extending over four months.

I had already attempted to appoint an Arab Governor of Basra, but those approached declined to accept the responsibility until Government could make a clear statement as to its future relations with and responsibilities for 'Iraq. In Baghdad Naji Beg Suwaidi had been offered, and had accepted, the position of President of the Municipality with a liberal salary, but had resigned after a brief spell of office, and we seemed to have reached a deadlock.

It was difficult for me at the time to understand the reason for the *non possumus* attitude with which the Foreign Office met all proposals connected with the future administration of 'Iraq: Mr. Lloyd George had personally given me to understand that the question of Mosul was settled so far as France was concerned, and that it only remained to negotiate a Peace Treaty with Turkey on lines which would give effect to the intention of Government that Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra

should be constituted into a single Arab State. That he had good reasons for this view there is little doubt, but the story of his negotiations with M. Clemenceau about Mosul is not even now fully known, though important contributions to our knowledge are made by two authorities, one, M. Tardieu,¹ reliable, the other, R. S. Baker,² untrustworthy.

H. W. V. Temperley summarizes³ what is publicly known on the subject as follows:

'M. Tardieu states that M. Clemenceau arrived in London in December 1918 fully primed with the facts. Mr. Lloyd George demanded a British, instead of an international, administration in Palestine and a transfer of Mosul from the Franco-Arab to the British-Arab sphere. M. Clemenceau indicated approval of these demands on three conditions: (1) France to obtain some share in the oil of Mosul by modification of the agreement (15th-17th May 1916); (2) full support to France against American objections; (3) if the Mandate system prevailed—Damascus and Aleppo, Alexandretta and Beirut were to be under one Mandate (the French).

Negotiations were resumed at the Peace Conference and an oil agreement negotiated between M. Berenger and Mr. Walter (Lord) Long (8th April):

- (i) France to receive 50 per cent. of all the oil rights which the two countries could obtain in Russia, Rumania, and Galicia.
- (ii) France to receive 34 per cent. of disposable oil in British Colonies.
- (iii) Great Britain to receive 34 per cent. of disposable oil in French Colonies.
- (iv) France to receive the German share (25 per cent.) of the capital of the Turkish Petroleum Company in Mosul and Baghdad.
- (v) Great Britain to have the right of carrying a pipe-line from Mosul across French Mandated territory to the Mediterranean.

This question of oil concessions was, however, complicated by that of territorial control. On the 21st-22nd May M. Tardieu declares that two discussions (*très vives de ton*) took place between M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George. They ended by M. Clemenceau saying: "If you had told me in December (1918) that the cession of Mosul would entail, in addition, the cession of an immense territory I should, from that moment, have declined to assign you Mosul."⁴ The Berenger-Long Agreement had been ratified by the French Foreign Office on the 16th May but M. Clemenceau declined to assent to it as being contingent on a satisfactory territorial adjustment. An attempt to renew the accord failed again in December, and the question, according to M. Tardieu, was still unsettled when M. Clemenceau

¹ *L'Illustration*, 19th June 1920 and Hansard, H. C., 10th March 1922.

² Baker, R. S., *Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. i, pp. 70, 74, 76.

³ *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. vi, p. 182.

⁴ Tardieu, loc. cit.; according to R. S. Baker, vol. i, pp. 78-9, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau both stated that they knew nothing of the oil agreement till the 22nd May 1919.

resigned on the 20th January 1920. It is usually unsafe to question the facts of M. Tardieu, but M. Briand did so in the French Chamber on the 25th June 1920. He declared that, in one of those informal conversations, of which no record exists, during the Peace Conference, "The French agreed to abandon Mosul and Palestine" at a moment which was full of difficulties for them. M. Tardieu contradicted him in a speech, giving the version of the facts above cited, which seem to be confirmed by Mr. Baker.

The Mesopotamian Mandate assigned. Whatever be the correct explanation, the oil and territorial questions had been settled by May 1920.

San Remo Oil Agreement, 24th April 1920. The San Remo Oil Agreement signed on the 24th-25th April 1920 by Sir John Cadman and M. Berthelot on behalf of their respective Governments was a modification of the Berenger-Long Agreement.

- (i) France was to receive 50 per cent. of oil rights acquired by the two countries in Rumania, but, as regards "the territories of the late Russian Empire" no proportion was mentioned, and also nothing was said about Galicia.
- (ii) and (iii) Great Britain to receive not less than 33 per cent. (instead of 34 per cent.) of disposable oil in British Crown Colonies, same proportion for British in French Colonies in North Africa, but not in Tomini¹ or New Caledonia where oil is reported.
- (iv) and (v) France to receive the 25 per cent. (i.e. German share) of the Turkish Petroleum Company and to facilitate transport of oil by pipe-line or rail from both Mesopotamia and Persia across French Mandated areas to an East Mediterranean port.

The words with which Mr. Temperley concludes his analysis of these conflicting accounts accurately reflect my feelings at the time. 'Whatever', he writes, 'be the true history of these complicated negotiations, it is quite clear that uncertainty and misunderstanding prevailed up to the last moment. The uncertainty as to the policy of the Home Government was naturally reflected in the attitude of the officials on the spot in Mesopotamia and had the worst possible effects.' Let us leave it at that.

The Kurdish question came into prominence almost immediately after the Armistice. It presented itself to the Allies from three distinct but closely related aspects:

- (1) the future of that part of the Mosul wilayat predominantly peopled by Kurds,
- (2) the future of Kurdish areas beyond, i.e. North of the Mosul wilayat,
- (3) unrest amongst Kurdish tribes in Persian territory, fomented by Kurds across the border for their own purposes.

¹ Tomini is in French Guinea: neither here nor in New Caledonia has oil as yet been found in commercial quantities.

The term Kurdistan, like Mesopotamia, is a loose term without any generally accepted geographical significance. The Kurds themselves are an Aryan race, with affinities to the peoples of eastern Europe on the one hand and to the inhabitants of the Persian plateau on the other. So far as they have any definite religious views they are almost all of the Sunni orthodoxy. Their language is perhaps the most ancient tongue in western Asia, with affinities to Avestic and Pahlawi; the numerous dialects differ so much that men of Sulaimani are scarcely understood in 'Amadiya. The Kurds are physically perhaps the finest specimens of the human race in the Middle East, and they resemble Afghans in character and to some extent in physiognomy. They are the direct descendants of the Medes. They live in deep valleys separated from their neighbours by lofty mountains, and until quite recently almost entirely independent of the outside world, with which they had few dealings and no acquaintance. They were until recently almost wholly devoid of racial solidarity: the only law they knew was that of the tribe; the only loyalty, and that readily transferable, was to their tribal leaders. The total number of Kurds in the Mosul wilayat was then estimated and has since been ascertained to be rather more than half the total population of the wilayat. They had supplied irregular cavalry to the Turks during the early part of the war, but had sent few recruits into the ranks of the regular Turkish army. They had suffered grievously at the hands of our Russian Allies and their Armenian and Assyrian dupes, and had taken a terrible revenge on the latter when the opportunity to do so without serious risk presented itself in the summer of 1918. They were, almost without exception, anxious to throw off their allegiance to Turkey, but our sudden retirement from Kirkuk in May 1918 had aroused, as explained in Chapters I and IV, deep apprehension and much resentment. The inhabitants had welcomed us warmly, and presently found themselves left to face the returning Turk. Asylum was indeed given by us to those who helped us most, but their property, villages, gardens, and houses, were destroyed by the Turks in revenge. The resentment eventually disappeared, but the atmosphere of doubt as to our ultimate intention remained, and it was not possible for us to do anything to clear the air, because our intentions were, in fact, in doubt until the northern boundary of the Mosul wilayat was finally laid down by the League of Nations six years later.

The Armistice with Turkey found us once more in occupation of Kirkuk, as well as of Altun Köpri. Arbil was occupied a few days later, in order to furnish essential supplies of grain and fuel. Sulaimani, whither Shaikh Mahmud had long been inviting us, was occupied by Turkish troops. These were withdrawn under the terms of the Armistice and Major Noel was sent to report on the situation there.

He arrived in the middle of November and met with an enthusiastic reception. My instructions to him were as follows:

'You have been appointed Political Officer, Kirkuk Division, with effect from November 1st. . . . The Kirkuk division extends from the Lesser Zab to the Diyala and north-east to the Turco-Persian frontier. It forms part of the Mosul wilayat, the ultimate disposal of which is under the consideration of H.M.'s Government.

'For the present it must be considered as falling within the sphere of military occupation and administration of this Force, and you should proceed on this assumption in your dealings with local chiefs, bearing in mind that it is improbable that the military authorities will see their way to detach troops permanently to Sulaimani or to other places east of our present line. It should be your object to arrange with local chiefs for the restoration and maintenance of order in areas outside the limits of our military occupation, for the exclusion and surrender of enemy agents and for the supply of commodities needed by our troops. You are authorized to incur such expenditure as may be necessary to this end, subject to previous authority in case of large sums and on the understanding, which should be made clear to the chiefs, that any arrangements you may make are of necessity provisional and subject to reconsideration at any time. You are authorized to appoint Shaikh Mahmud as our representative in Sulaimani, should you consider this expedient, and to make other appointments of this nature at Chamchamal, Halebja, &c., at your discretion. . . .

'It should be explained to the tribal chiefs with whom you enter into relations that there is no intention of imposing on them an administration foreign to their habits and desires. Tribal leaders will be encouraged to form a confederation for the settlement of their public affairs under the guidance of the British Political Officers. They will be called upon to continue to pay the taxes legally due from them under Turkish law, modified as may be found necessary, for purposes connected with the maintenance of order and the development of their country.'

On Major Noel's arrival at Sulaimani he at once proceeded to give effect to these instructions and to introduce into the country a temporary system of government which it was hoped would prove acceptable to the people and satisfy their aspirations for a Kurdish administration. Shaikh Mahmud was appointed Governor of the district, and for each of the minor sub-divisions Kurdish officials were appointed to work under the guidance of the British political officers. At the same time, wherever possible, Turkish and Arab officials were at once removed and replaced by natives of Kurdistan, while the Turkish officers and troops in the town were dispatched under escort to Baghdad. Each chief was made responsible to us, generally through Shaikh Mahmud, for the government of his own tribe, and was recognized and paid as a Government official.

Our first task was to deal with the want and famine which prevailed in the land. Under the Turkish régime a large part of the town had

fallen into ruin, trade had been for long at a complete standstill, and the surrounding country was impoverished and famine-stricken. Food-stuffs and seed-grain were imported and steps were taken to assist a revival of internal trade. The principal public buildings and mosques were repaired and salaries were paid to Kurdish *qadhis* and other quasi-religious officials. The restoration of order was gratefully welcomed by all but a small minority of tribal leaders and their predatory associates, and it soon seemed clear that the idea of 'Kurdistan for the Kurds' under British protection was achieving popularity.

On 1st December I visited Sulaimani by air to meet a number of leading Kurdish chiefs. Long conversations followed with Shaikh Mahmud, and with a few of the leaders. I was assured that the countryside would resist by force the return of the Turks, which was still, not unnaturally, regarded as a possibility; the need for some form of British protection was recognized, but there was no unanimity as to the means whereby it should be ensured. Some chiefs were in favour of, others against, an effective British administration in Kurdistan; some insisted that Kurdistan must be under London, not Baghdad; a few told me in secret that they would never accept Shaikh Mahmud as leader, but they could suggest no alternative.

After much discussion Shaikh Mahmud handed me an agreed document, signed by some forty chiefs, to the following effect:

His Majesty's Government having announced that their intention to liberate the Eastern peoples from Turkish oppression and to grant assistance to them in the establishment of their independence, the chiefs, as the representatives of the people of Kurdistan, beg Government to accept them also under British protection and to attach them to 'Iraq so that they may not be deprived of the benefits of that association. They request the Civil Commissioner of Mesopotamia to send them a representative with the necessary assistance to enable the Kurdish people under British auspices to progress peacefully on civilized lines. If Government extends its assistance and protection to them, they undertake to accept its orders and advice.'

Shaikh Mahmud further asked for British officers for all Government departments, including officers for Kurdish levies, stipulating only that the subordinate staff should, wherever possible, be Kurdish and not Arab.

In return he was given a letter stating that any Kurdish tribe from the Greater Zab to the Diyala (other than those in Persian Territory), who of their own free will accepted the leadership of Shaikh Mahmud, would be allowed to do so, and that the latter would have our moral support in controlling the above areas on behalf of the British Government, whose orders he undertook to obey. The tribes and townspeople in the Kifri and Kirkuk divisions were not willing to come under Shaikh Mahmud, and the latter agreed not to insist on their inclusion.

It was explained to the representatives of Kurdish tribes in Persia that our public engagements precluded us from agreeing to their inclusion in the South Kurdistan confederacy under British protection and that they must remain loyal Persian subjects. They accepted the position cheerfully and, on the whole, with relief.

Shaikh Mahmud was, however, in no way satisfied: he claimed that he had a mandate from all the Kurds of the Mosul wilayat and many in Persia and elsewhere to represent to us their desire to form a unitary autonomous State of which he was to be the head under British protection. The possibility clearly deserved the closest consideration, for if feasible it promised greatly to simplify the task of forming an Arab State from the rest of three wilayats.

The idea was not wholly novel. A scheme for an independent Kurdistan under British protection had been broached by a leading chief of the Mukri tribe, in the Sauj Bulaq district of Persia, to Lt.-Col. Kennion, whilst on tour near Saqiz in July 1918, his idea being that a free Armenia in the northern provinces of Turkey would be acceptable to Kurds provided that an independent Kurdistan was constituted between the Armenian State and the Arab State.

Sir Percy Cox, moreover, whilst in London had listened to somewhat similar proposals. A Turkish notable of Kurdish origin resident in Paris, Sharif Pasha, despite absence from his native country since boyhood, had remained deeply interested in the future of Southern Kurdistan, and had actually offered his services to us in December 1914. Sharif Pasha now urged us to take steps to rally the Kurds as a whole, and to announce a constructive policy as soon as possible. His suggestion was that we should guarantee autonomy under our aegis to the inhabitants of Southern Kurdistan, whilst British officials deputed for the purpose should afford administrative assistance and exercise adequate financial control. We should, in fact, do for the Kurds what we proposed to do for the Arabs. He emphasized the importance of setting up a working administration forthwith, without awaiting a formal decision from that Peace Conference which must ultimately be convened. Let us make no annexations, but set up autonomous States and control them. His scheme, in fact, was an intelligent anticipation of the Mandatory system. In October 1918 he wrote to point out that the situation had become more difficult owing to the action of the Turks in fomenting hatred between Kurds and Armenians, with the object of destroying the Armenians and, later, of depriving the Kurds of any chance of national autonomy. He urged, like the Mukri chief, that the only chance of reaching an honourable and lasting settlement was to regard Kurds and Armenians alike as nationalities with an equal claim to national rights in their respective areas.

Though Sharif Pasha had not himself been in close touch with Kurdistan, his views rightly commanded a sympathetic hearing. Public opinion in the Allied countries and in the United States had been deeply stirred by the horrors of the Armenian massacres,¹ and it seemed likely that a solution on these lines would prove acceptable at the Peace Conference, for one of President Wilson's Fourteen Points was that 'the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured . . . an unmolested opportunity of autonomous development'.

The first essential to right judgement was the fullest possible information as to the trend of events and of feeling in other Kurdish areas, and with this object in view officers were dispatched to Aqra and Zakho, east and north of Mosul respectively, to get in touch with Kurdish tribes in those areas. It proved a most difficult task. Owing to the presence of large Christian communities in the towns as well as numerous Christian villages on and across the Kurdish border, Turkish influence was still strong and the Armenian question still acute. Just beyond the frontier were the Turks, busy in spreading anti-Christian and anti-British views, and working on the fears of the credulous tribesmen. 'Before long', ran one leaflet, 'your ears will be deafened by the sound of the bell—the voice of the mu'ezzin will no longer be heard. Christian officials will treat you as did the Russians, and you will have to kiss the feet of Arabs and Chaldeans.'

Support was lent to Kurdish fears of this sort by the action of 'British Relief Officers' acting under the orders of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, in whose instructions the following passage appeared: 'At the present time it is not feasible to investigate cases of minor offenders, but information should be collected and names recorded on the lines shown in Accusation Form A, which may be distributed to Priests, &c., through safe channels.' No better means of fostering racial and religious hatreds could have been devised: any Christian merely by making a plausible statement on oath before an Intelligence or Control Officer could secure the arrest of a Muslim against whom he had a grudge. In the Aleppo district several such cases occurred.

Realizing the folly of such a policy, His Majesty's Government authorized me on 7th May to write to Saiyid Taha, a Kurdish leader in the Rowandiz region, as follows:

'I have been authorized by H.M.'s Government to give you full personal assurance that H.M.'s Government have no intention, so far as they are concerned, of adopting a policy of retaliation towards Kurds in regard to any acts

¹ See Bryce.


they may have committed during the war, but are prepared to grant them a general amnesty. This will not prevent the representatives of the British Government from using their friendly endeavours to make peace between Armenians and Kurds in regard to their personal affairs, and they will also use their best endeavours to settle between the two parties questions relating to land, in a friendly manner without resort to armed intervention. The interests of Kurds, H.M.'s Government wish me to assure you, are by no means being lost sight of at the Peace Conference.'

So far as Saiyid Taha was concerned, the outcome of this letter was wholly satisfactory: he made repeated visits to Baghdad, and though his tribal interests lay for the most part in Shamsdinan, probably beyond our sphere of action, he did his best to avoid conflicts and to quiet the apprehensions of his unruly followers. By a fortunate coincidence he was actually present in Baghdad to receive the above letter in person at the time when Shaikh Mahmud attempted, as described below, a *coup d'état* in Sulaimani.

In Mosul, propaganda in favour of France was giving rise to some uneasiness. It was inspired primarily by French protected persons, and took two forms. In the first place it pointed out to the Christians that, whereas in the eyes of the British all religions were equal, the French had always had the reputation of supporting a Christian supremacy even if the Christians were in a minority, that in the event of the French taking over the country the hegemony of the Christian community was assured, and that therefore it behoved them to ask for French protection. Secondly, it was widely reported that the French were shortly coming and that British administration was only a temporary expedient.

The presence of fifty thousand Christian refugees at Baquba was a further source of disquiet. It was obvious that we should wish eventually to reinstate them in their former home, now in Kurdish occupation, and the Kurds naturally expected that we should show some favour to our co-religionists.

Towards the end of December, Captain Noel left Sulaimani and toured the districts to the west and north as far as Rowandiz, introducing the new system of government as he went. Political officers were posted to Koi, Rania, and Rowandiz, and order was rapidly restored; Turkish officials were sent to the place from whence they came, and our ideas as to the future of Kurdistan were expounded to the tribal chiefs. They all expressed their readiness to accept Shaikh Mahmud as British representative in Kurdistan, and professed themselves eager to join the Kurdish confederacy. Each tribe, however, had at least four candidates for the chieftainship, none of whom were at all enthusiastically supported. The cultivators and villagers looked to us to curb the



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despotic powers of the chiefs and to restore 'bureaucratic' administration on Turkish lines. For the moment, however, they were ready to accept anything we proposed, in the hope that it would restore peace, trade, and prosperity.

Captain Noel returned to Sulaimani a few weeks later to find that Shaikh Mahmud was abusing his authority, and, in the absence of any military garrison, proving intractable. His past record in Turkish times was not one to inspire confidence. He had been continuously in revolt against Turkish rule, though it was whispered that the people in Sulaimani had suffered more from the tyranny of their own chiefs and the Saiyids than from the Turkish officials. We had, however, to face the facts, as known to us, as best we could. The influence of Shaikh Mahmud undoubtedly existed and it was now perhaps even stronger than of old. Without the full measure of co-operation and assistance which he was then giving us, it would have been necessary to bring in a strong garrison, which was held by the military authorities to be out of the question. From the political point of view, too, it was of great importance that we should maintain order in the area and at the same time should avoid the appearance of using force for this purpose.

We were charged with the foundation of an independent Southern Kurdish State under British auspices, but owing to the undeveloped state of the country, the lack of communications, and the dissensions of the tribes, we were forced to work from several bases and to endeavour to restore order at a few centres, reserving to a later date the task of co-ordination. On geographical and commercial grounds it seemed clear that Southern Kurdistan could prosper only as part of Mesopotamia. The only possible markets were Mosul and Baghdad; the only communications ran through Mesopotamia. These facts were realized by many, and a few of the more enlightened Kurdish leaders agreed in private conversation that some form of Kurdish autonomy should be possible within the framework of an Arab State so long as it was under British guidance. It was, however, clear to the great majority of tribal chiefs that the prospect of permanent subordination to an Arab State was distasteful; to a powerful minority independence meant no more than freedom to harry their weaker neighbours.

It was hard to judge at the time how far a national movement for independence existed, and to what extent it was an artificial product of the personal ambitions of the Kurdish leaders. In Sulaimani itself the movement was undoubtedly strong and had to be kept in check by reminders that His Majesty's Government accepted the responsibility for Kurdistan only on the understanding that the people and

their leaders would behave themselves and accept our advice on matters of importance.

It was explained to the people that the personnel of the administration was to be as far as possible Kurdish; levies were to be organized under Kurdish officers, while the Kurdish tongue was to be the official language of government. Laws would be modified to conform with local customs and usage, and the system of revenue collection and taxation devised to meet the needs of the people. Tribal custom law would be respected, and within reasonable limits the recognized chiefs would be allowed to exercise authority over their clansmen as heretofore.

Shaikh Mahmud himself was our most difficult problem. In ignorance, but not in innocence, he was a child, with great ambitions and much natural cunning. He was given to sudden fits of passion and outbursts of cruelty, which suggested to so cool an observer as Soane that he was not always responsible for his actions. Yet with all his faults he had, at this time, a large following. In Southern Kurdistan, for one who opposed his appointment there were four others who professed to welcome it. It was soon clear, however, that such influence as he had could be usefully exercised only in the Sulaimani district, and even here there was an influential minority, consisting for the most part of large landowners and merchants, which preferred direct administration by British officials,¹ on the lines of the former Turkish Government, to a reversion to semi-barbarous tribal rule.


It was by this time clear that we could not prudently lend our active support to Shaikh Mahmud's pretensions to the hegemony of any considerable group of tribes, and, this being the case, it was generally agreed that it was necessary to modify our policy in Southern Kurdistan by the introduction of some sort of administration on lines similar to those in force elsewhere in 'Iraq. After a full discussion of the position, in which Noel, Leachman, Soane, Gordon-Walker, and several others with first-hand knowledge of the facts took part, it was decided, with Noel's full concurrence, that his place at Sulaimani should be taken by Soane, who had hitherto had no personal relations with Shaikh Mahmud, but had exceptional qualifications and an intimate knowledge of the whole area. Noel himself was sent, under the instructions of His Majesty's Government, on an extended tour throughout Kurdistan, to ascertain how far the now popular heresy of self-determination could be applied to the inhabitants.

With the restoration of public order and of trade which followed Major Soane's appointment, came a revulsion of popular feeling against Shaikh Mahmud. It became apparent that many who had

¹ See Hay.



MAJOR E. B. SOANE
C.B.E.



accepted him in the first instance had done so, not from any liking or desire for his rule, but from fear of his power and because he had led them to understand that the British were ready to establish his Governorship, if necessary, by force. The Jaf tribe insisted on being dealt with direct, and other groups followed suit. To meet their views a British officer was sent to Halebja to administer the district. As soon as it became generally known that we had no intention of forcing the tribes to submit to the rule of Shaikh Mahmud, his influence began to decline rapidly, and by the end of April several of the large tribes had broken away from his control. His principal adherents at this time were various members of his own family of Barzinja Shaikhs in Sarochik and at Kirpichina, the Hamawand tribe and the Mikhaili section of the Jaf. The police and levy forces were gradually brought under direct control, but some of the officers had previously sworn allegiance to Shaikh Mahmud in return for substantial subsidies.

A British military garrison in Sulaimani at this time would have enabled us to tide over this difficult period. His Majesty's Government, however, was reluctant to sanction any extension of our military responsibilities, and General Marshall was equally opposed to extending at this juncture his already unwieldy lines of communication.

Troops were leaving the country in large numbers every month, but there was no corresponding reduction of military duties. Fifty thousand Turkish prisoners of war remained, and a like number of refugees. Military dumps of stores of every kind, vast in extent, demanded disposal; that was impossible except by shipment to India and the United Kingdom—and shipping was scarce. Merchants and others returning from Basra and Baghdad to Sulaimani told of soldiers leaving daily by ship and train; and in the minds of many the belief that we would once more evacuate Kurdistan and leave the inhabitants to their own devices, or to the machinations of rival claimants to power, hardened into certainty.

On my return to Baghdad on 9th May I found that Sir William Marshall had gone home and that his place had been taken by Sir George MacMunn, who of all men was incontestably best fitted to succeed to the chief command. He had taken a leading part in creating the immense military machine; he had an intimate knowledge of its workings and of its relations with the civil administrative organization, which he had done much to harmonize. He knew personally every senior officer of the civil departments, and was personally known to most of the leading inhabitants. He had for three years enjoyed the confidence of the War Office and the support of the Government of India. We understood each other. Some friction was inevitable and

some mistakes unavoidable; but his presence was a guarantee that departmental activities would be co-ordinated and errors reduced to a minimum.

Mr. Howell, who had been acting for me, told me that the situation in Sulaimani was delicate. I had arranged to fly there towards the end of May to meet Shaikh Mahmud in person and to endeavour to reach a solution which would make it possible to retain the framework of Kurdish autonomy. Meanwhile, however, I paid a flying visit to Kut, 'Amara, and Basra to regain personal touch with leading Arabs and with the political officers and returned to Baghdad by air on 20th May. Two days later Shaikh Mahmud made a desperate attempt to regain his prestige. He secretly raised a force of some 300 picked men from the Kurdish tribes on the Persian side of the frontier over whom we had no sort of control.

This force, having assembled across the border, suddenly attacked the town. The local levies put up a brave fight but were defeated and routed, and Shaikh Mahmud became master of the situation. The British officers, Major F. S. Greenhouse being in charge in the temporary absence of Soane, were captured and imprisoned, the Treasury was seized, and Shaikh Mahmud declared himself chief ruler of all Kurdistan. He raised his own flag, issued his own postage stamps, and appointed his own retainers to take control of every district. The telegraph line to Kirkuk had been deliberately cut on the morning of the attack on Sulaimani and messengers despatched by Greenhouse to Kirkuk were intercepted. The first news of these events reached the outer world two days later by way of Halabja and Khanaqin.

I at once flew up myself to see what was going on, and saw the six British officers on the roof of their temporary prison in Sulaimani. Next I flew to Halabja, hoping to land and take away Lees, the Assistant Political Officer there, but shortage of petrol made it impossible, and all I could do was to drop him a message telling him to clear out. He had meanwhile been besieged by tribesmen from across the Persian border under control of Shaikh Mahmud's nominee, Hamid Beg, but eventually he managed to escape and reached Khanaqin in safety. The famous Lady of Halabja, Adela Khanum, was instrumental in arranging his escape, for which she was later rewarded with the Indian title of Khan Bahadur.¹

It was an anxious moment for us all. The nearest British troops 'distributed in the support of the Civil Power' to use the words of the official dispatch, were not at the points at which the Civil Power wanted them, but where the military authority found it convenient to keep

¹ For a further description of these events see G. M. Lees, 'Two Years in South Kurdistan', *C.A.S.J.*, xv, 1928.

them, viz. seventy miles from Sulaimani, at Kirkuk, where there was a battalion of infantry, some light armoured cars, and a few cavalry. Eighty miles to the South at railhead on the far side of the Tigris at Ba'a'iji, was a Brigade and some Divisional Troops. In anticipation of a general advance on Sulaimani the Officer Commanding at Kirkuk was ordered to push forward a detachment as far as the Chamchamal plain, and the brigade at Ba'a'iji was ordered to push up to Kirkuk as fast as the heat and problem of water-supply would permit. Unfortunately, the Officer Commanding at Kirkuk, thinking that circumstances justified him in disregarding his orders, endeavoured to penetrate the mountains with some mounted troops, levies, armoured cars, and Lewis guns in Ford vans. This force reached the Tashluja Pass some twelve miles from Sulaimani, where our prisoners were, but was surrounded and compelled to retire, followed closely by Kurds, over twenty-five miles, losing four armoured cars and nineteen Ford vans, and suffering severe casualties.

This 'regrettable incident' confirmed the now general belief of the inhabitants of Southern Kurdistan that we were no longer able to control events; the rebellion spread across into Persian territory, and several tribes arose against the Persian Government, proclaiming themselves partisans of Shaikh Mahmud and of his scheme for a united free Kurdistan. Shaikh Mahmud was not far wrong when he announced to his followers that our troops had left Kurdistan; but the deductions he made from our dispositions were erroneous. The Commander-in-Chief realized that the impression of British helplessness must be removed forthwith. General Fraser, then commanding the 18th Division at Mosul, was directed to assemble at Kirkuk a 'South Kurdistan Force' consisting of two Brigades of infantry with cavalry and armoured cars, and to advance at the earliest date possible. To demonstrate that our mobility in the hills was not less than that of the Kurds themselves a small force of infantry and mountain-guns was sent up from near Khanaqin under Colonel Body of the Sussex Territorials. This column reached Sulaimani in due course, having accomplished its mission with success. By the middle of June General Fraser's force was concentrated at Chamchamal and ready to commence operations. On 17th June, in sweltering heat,¹ General Fraser commenced his advance against Shaikh Mahmud, who was holding the Darband-i-Baziyan pass, in the Qara Dagh range, twelve miles east of Chamchamal. It was the only pass through this range of hills, which con-

¹ Some units, including the 1st/3rd Gurkhas marched from railhead at Ba'a'iji on the right bank of the Tigris and thence via Fat-ha to Kirkuk. The heat and absence of water tried the troops very severely; many Gurkhas fell flat on their faces as they marched, prostrated with exhaustion (see Woodyatt).

sisted of a wall of rock some 4,000 feet high, with a V-shaped gap 1,000 feet lower. This gap had been spanned by a solid but now ruined stone wall, useful as a breastwork, and only ten years earlier had been the scene of a disaster to a Turkish force engaged on a like errand. General Fraser advanced to within striking distance, driving in the Kurdish outposts. The next morning, before daybreak, our troops started to scale the almost perpendicular heights of the Qara Dagh, and were practically on the top when at early dawn the guns opened on the pass. The Kurds, expecting a frontal attack in the Turkish style up the roads, were paralysed to find themselves attacked from above and surrounded.

After a few minutes of hand to hand fighting they were overwhelmed by the 85th Burmans, a battalion composed largely of Kachins, a mongoloid race from the *ultima thule* of Upper Burma, who in this, their first engagement, proved themselves not inferior in military qualities to their Gurkha kinsmen. By dawn the whole pass was in our hands, Shaikh Mahmud and his brother wounded and prisoners, and the whole of this force killed, captured, or dispersed. Forty-eight of the enemy lay dead on the ground and well over 100 were captured, a considerable achievement against mountaineers.

General Fraser, anxious for the safety of the prisoners in the hands of disappointed Kurdish guards, immediately ordered the 32nd Lancers to advance to Sulaimani, a distance of thirty miles. Short of officers, and led only by two junior subalterns, this regiment pushed on with great dash, carried the town by surprise, overpowered the guard before the news of defeat on the Baziyan had arrived, and released the prisoners after ten weeks' close confinement. The main force entered Sulaimani the next morning.

The next six weeks were spent in exacting punishment from the rebellious chiefs, small columns penetrating every mountain fastness. By the first week in August, order had been fully re-established, and General Fraser withdrew after restoring to the Civil Administration full control of the country, leaving a temporary garrison at Sulaimani and establishing the head-quarters of a reduced force at Kirkuk.¹ Thus ended a brilliant little operation, which, despite preliminary reverses, showed that Indian troops, some of which, such as the 85th Burma Rifles, had never before been in action, were more than a match for the Kurds, and that notwithstanding the great and progressive reduction of our military forces they were still capable, given competent generalship, of doing whatever was required of them.

Shaikh Mahmud was brought to Baghdad, where he soon recovered from his wounds. He was in due course brought with his associate

¹ *vide* Sir G. MacMunn's dispatch of 12.11.19. *London Gazette*, 31813, 8.3.20.



Photo by Savaine

MAJ.-GEN. SIR THEODORE FRASER
K.C.B., C.M.G., C.S.I.



Shaikh Gharib before a military court-martial, tried for rebellion, and sentenced to death. The Commander-in-Chief 'now in the midst of judgement remembering mercy' commuted the sentence to a long term of imprisonment¹, partly in view of the fact that Shaikh Mahmud had not molested the prisoners in his hands, and partly on the ground that our status in Southern Kurdistan, having regard to the policy (if it can be so described) of His Majesty's Government, scarcely justified what the Soviet Government call 'the supreme measure of social defence'.

Though I sympathized with the feeling which inspired this act of clemency, I opposed it officially on the ground that so long as Shaikh Mahmud was alive his adherents in Southern Kurdistan would live in the hope, and his enemies in the fear, of his eventual return, and that his death would contribute more than any other single factor to the restoration of tranquillity. I had seen him in office in Sulaimani on three occasions; I had seen him in hospital when, with a magnificent gesture, he denied the competence of any Military Court to try him, and recited to me President Wilson's twelfth point, and the Anglo-French Declaration of 8th November 1918, a translation of which in Kurdish, written on the fly-leaves of a Qur'an, was strapped like a talisman to his arm. Some years later he was pardoned and allowed to return from exile. He has been a source of anxiety and expense to the Governments of Persia and 'Iraq ever since.

The announcement of Sir G. MacMunn's decision was not well received, either in Kurdistan or amongst responsible Arabs in Baghdad. In British military circles it was assumed that MacMunn was acting on my advice, and many were the gibes and sneers directed against me and against 'the politicals' generally in military messes and clubs. I held my peace, however, and did not disclose, even to indignant generals, the documents in the case. Like Sir William Marshall, Sir George MacMunn had throughout the year given every branch of the Civil Administration invaluable practical and moral support; it was worth incurring the displeasure of a few irresponsible persons to maintain with General Head-quarters a united front.

The duties of the post of which I was the temporary incumbent were at this time exceedingly heavy. As Consul-General for Fars, I was responsible for keeping Whitehall and the Government of India informed as to political happenings in South Persia. As Political Resident in the Persian Gulf it was my duty to supervise and on occasion to direct policy in 'Oman and the Arab principalities of Eastern Arabia, including relations with Ibn Sa'ud. As Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia, I was responsible for the administration of

¹ By a further act of clemency this sentence was, in 1921, cancelled and one of banishment substituted.

the Occupied Territories. As Chief Political Officer with the Force, I was responsible to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, and to the Commander-in-Chief for political matters from Kirmanshah to Enzeli. To these responsibilities had been added, in June, the duty of dealing with all Kurdish affairs, whether within or beyond the Occupied Territories, from the region of Aleppo to the neighbourhood of Diarbekr, Urfa, Van, Bitlis, and 'Urmia. This concentration of responsibility, though onerous, had real advantages. In the circumstances then existing it was essential that synchronization and co-ordination within this region should be arranged, so far as possible, on the spot, and from Baghdad. The Government of India were heavily preoccupied in other directions, and had little, if any, desire to exercise influence over policy in these regions—much less to control it. The India Office were precluded from playing their allotted part by the decision of Government to do nothing which would have the appearance of anticipating the terms of the Mandate, and by the fact that the representatives of Great Britain in the other regions involved—Palestine, Syria, Turkey, and Persia—were jointly responsible to the Foreign Office and the War Office.

It was generally useless to refer urgent questions to London, for the administrative machinery at home was so complicated that telegrams seldom elicited a reply in less than a month, and the answers were often insufficiently definite and specific to be useful as a guide to action.

The problem before us in Mesopotamia at this juncture, if not so tremendous, was yet as grave and baffling as any that had presented itself to the Peace Delegates in Paris. The political reactions which would follow upon this or that step, if taken, were incalculable. It was impossible seriously to consider the terms of peace with Turkey until our account with Germany was settled, at all events in principle. The future of Western Asia was at stake. Turkey was for the moment defenceless, beaten to her knees. The whole burden of the campaign against Turkey in the Dardanelles, in Syria, in 'Iraq, and in Persia, had been borne by the British and Indian Forces. Yet our Italian and Greek Allies, with shrill and discordant voices that brooked no refusal, demanded territorial compensations that would have reduced Turkey to a State little larger than pre-war Serbia. The French demanded the fulfilment of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Arabs, represented by their self-constituted champion, King Husain, having obtained, with British assistance, the temporary governance of Syria, talked of a Federated Arabia. Ibn Sa'ud, whose star was just beginning to arise, abode in his breaches like Asher, awaiting the moment when he, too, should make good in his own way his claim to be heard. The Kurdish tribes across the frontier, in Turkey, had been given to understand, by

the Allies, through their representatives in Constantinople, that they, too, were to determine their future government and would be given their independence. The Persian Kurds proposed to join the new Kurdish State. Ismail Agha (Simko), Saiyid Taha and other leaders, saw their chance and were keenly awaiting developments.

So far as 'Iraq was concerned, the facts in the case and the trend of opinion were known to His Majesty's Government only through the voluminous and sometimes contradictory reports transmitted to them by me, as their representative at Baghdad. The facts were of necessity frequently lacking in precision and the trend of opinion was not easy to assess; our presentation thereof was vigorously, if dogmatically, disputed by the self-constituted champions of the Arab régime in Syria, no single one of whom had any first-hand acquaintance with 'Iraq either before or during the war.

It is not my intention to attempt in this work to describe the discussion that took place with regard to the future of the Turkish Empire, and with reference to Armenia and those parts of Kurdistan which lie beyond the boundaries of the Mosul wilayat. Owing to postal delays all communications were necessarily by telegraph; constant reference was necessary to the High Commissioner in Constantinople, as well as to Lord Allenby in Egypt, whose officers in Damascus, Aleppo, and beyond, were following, as already explained, a policy inconsistent with that of His Majesty's Government. There were also negotiations with the French, whose attitude and interests had to be considered, and with the British Representative at Tiflis. The British Minister at Tehran also had to be kept informed, as the Persian Government were not unnaturally apprehensive of the effect that a policy of Kurdish autonomy would have upon Kurdish tribes in Persia.

My personal responsibility both for giving advice to Government and for executive action in the absence of any defined policy was very heavy, and in the nature of things it could not be shared with others.¹ Not less heavy was the burden of responsibility carried by the Political Officers on the spot, carrying their lives in their hands for months at a time. It is due primarily to them that we emerged without lasting discredit from the physical and mental confusion of those strenuous days.

From the welter of correspondence two principles emerged: we were to discourage by every means in our power any attempt on the part of Kurds in Persia to dissociate themselves from the rule of the

¹ I asked the India Office on 19th July to consider deputing an officer of experience and high status to visit 'Iraq and to advise both me and H. M.'s Government. I added that Sir Walter Lawrence, if available, would be very welcome.

Persian Government; we were to leave the Kurds outside the boundary of the former wilayat of Mosul to their own devices and to those of the Turkish Government. The first principle was from the outset self-evident, having regard to our Treaties with and concerning Persia. The second seemed evident to those on the spot, but it was not until the failure of the Allies to obtain Turkish consent to the draft Treaty of Sèvres, which included formal recognition of an independent State of Kurdistan, that it obtained official acceptance at home. The future of the Armenian nation depended on the willingness of the United States to accept a Mandate for Armenia. If they refused this responsibility, the Armenians must be left to Turkey—and to their fate, the probable nature of which was hidden from no one.

The restoration of order in Sulaimani afforded an opportunity to urge on His Majesty's Government the construction of an extension of the Baquba-Khanaqin line to Kifri and Kirkuk,¹ as the best means of pacifying Southern Kurdistan by bringing it into closer touch with Baghdad. On 24th August 1919, the India Office telegraphed as follows:

*'Proposed railway from Qizil Robat towards Kifri and Kirkuk. Whatever may be the ultimate utility of this line its immediate construction is recommended on purely strategical grounds as essential to retention and pacification of South Kurdistan. Apart from financial difficulties, which are exceedingly acute, His Majesty's Government think it necessary to examine whole question of policy underlying strategical arguments before sanctioning extension. Future of Kurdistan is still unsettled, but it may be taken as certain that in no event will permanent responsibilities of His Majesty's Government in these regions go beyond loose political supervision and that there can be no question of anything in the nature of direct British Administration.'*² In these circumstances His Majesty's Government are very reluctant to take what would be in effect first step towards effective military occupation. They have hitherto supported policy of extending British influence to South Kurdistan because they believed that the inhabitants themselves welcomed it, and on this understanding they sanctioned the proposal made in your telegram of May 9th to create a fringe of autonomous Kurdish States under Kurdish Chiefs. It would now appear that belief was misplaced and that inhabitants so far from welcoming British influence are so actively hostile that strategic railways are required to keep them in check. Might it not in these circumstances be better course to withdraw our Political Officers, &c., and leave Kurds to their own devices? Alternative course maintaining order among the recalcitrant mountain tribesmen by force of arms opens up prospect of military commitments which His Majesty's Government contemplate with gravest apprehension. Last thing they desire is to create a new North-West Frontier problem on the very doubtful border of 'Iraq.

¹ This extension was completed in 1925.

² The italics are mine.

I replied as follows:

'Present position is not as suggested. Fact that order was restored by Military Authorities within one month and that normal Civil Administration was established within three months of rising of Shaikh Mahmud, who at no time succeeded in concentrating more than 300 men out of a potentiality of many thousands, is I think proof that the present régime is welcomed by majority of inhabitants.

'We are governing Southern Kurdistan not by force but by consent, but no Government in these days can carry on without force behind it.

'Idea embodied in President Wilson's Fourteen Points and confirmed in the Anglo-French Declaration of November 8th, of substituting nationality, religion or race as the basis of Government in the Middle East in the place of "ability and power to govern" has aroused the dormant animosities of the past hundred years.

'Coming as it did on the top of acute misery arising out of the war, it was eagerly adopted by every race and sect and variously interpreted according to their racial idiosyncrasies. Already the reaction is visible. The acute dissensions amongst political parties in Palestine and Syria are the first signs of it on the Arab side.

'At Sulaimani the tide has already turned. After a brief taste of nationalist anarchy they have no desire to try it again, and the task of organizing a Civil Administration on Kurdish lines with Kurdish officials under effective British supervision is proceeding well. The insistent demand of the people is for more British supervision which lack of officers prevents my supplying; the country and its revenues must suffer accordingly. Even this year the estimated revenue exceeds the estimated expenditure in the division by £20,000 and next year it should be much better.

'This fact alone differentiates the Sulaimani Division from the ordinary frontier district and from rest of Kurdistan. This Division has always been regarded by Turks as part of Mesopotamia; it was so classified in Sykes-Picot Agreement and geographically and strategically it belongs to Mesopotamia, not to Kurdistan.

'Unrest is prevalent everywhere, but I am confident that if we can hold on a year or two longer and steer a steady course on present lines we shall come into smoother waters.

'Shaikh Mahmud's rising has been regarded as a test in all Northern Mesopotamia of our power to maintain order and enforce justice in face of widespread popular belief that all troops had gone.

'Railway and roads are powerful civilizing factors and it is to this aspect of their construction rather than to their strategical value that I look for results in Southern Kurdistan.

'Whatever may be eventual decision with regard to Rowandiz (from which we have at present withdrawn) we cannot afford to leave Sulaimani to its own devices. Disorderly elements would quickly get the upper hand and we should require a larger force at Kirkuk, Kifri and Arbil, than we now have at or near Sulaimani.

'Recent events have in no way altered my view as regards necessity of giving effect to policy approved by H.M.'s Government on May 9th for autonomous Kurdish States, but degree of supervision must depend on needs of country and on strategical considerations.

'Supervision must be relatively closer in the Sulaimani Division, because of its

geographical and strategical situation and because of richness of country and desire of people to have security of tenure in land which is largely in hands of private owners and is capable of great development, district being centre of tobacco industry and rich in pastoral and forest produce.

'Frontier with Persia is well defined. Under new régime in Persia there is a fair prospect that the Persian Government will be able to maintain order on their side of the frontier if we on our side do likewise, but whether or not this is the case, Persian frontier tribes are unlikely to constitute serious menace to Sulaimani whereas inhabitants of Sulaimani Division if left to mercy of their own rulers would be permanent menace to Kifri and Kirkuk and would create a frontier problem requiring more troops than at present.

'Frontier problem will be created only if Kurdistan is left to its own devices. Railways and roads will enable inhabitants to turn their hands to development of their country. We have seen this happen in the last four years on Euphrates.

'As regards the Railway position.

'Line has been recognized by practically every railway expert as being the only alignment likely to be profitable and the fuller investigation of the last two years completely confirms this view. I regard economic advantages as even greater than military benefits. It passes through principal wheat-growing tracts in Mesopotamia, and will tap valuable forest and pastoral area. Prospects of mineral wealth are uncertain but not negligible.

'As regards Rowandiz . . . we are now making experiments there of leaving Kurds to their own devices. The first results are not encouraging either to ourselves or to the Kurds. Trouble in Rowandiz and in Central Kurdistan is, we believe, due almost entirely to Turkish propoganda and to exaggerated rumours of Armenian (not British) domination.'

For some months these views were by no means acceptable in London, where the opinion was strongly held that the frontiers of the future Arab State should, as far as possible, be racial rather than economic or geographical boundaries. After much further correspondence I reverted to the question early in January 1920 in the following telegram:

'I am most reluctant again to press my views as to the alignment of the Northern frontier of Mesopotamia and as to the status of those portions of Mesopotamia inhabited by non-Arabs.


'I am induced to do so only by the great importance of the subject, and by the strength of my own convictions.

'*Firstly.*—As between H.M.'s Government and the Peace Conference, I submit that if we accept the Mandate for Mesopotamia at all we should commit ourselves to no special régime for particular areas such as Arbil or Sulaimani Divisions. The form of Government to be set up in those areas is one of internal policy for the subsequent consideration of the Mandatory Power in the light of experience.

'*Secondly.*—As between ourselves and Turkey or the Peace Conference. I submit that the frontier proposed in my telegram of June 13th, as modified by my



CAPT. A. C. PEARSON
Killed April 4th, 1919



telegram of 15th January, is as good as can be found. [This was substantially the frontier as finally settled by the League of Nations.]

'This line would leave the road to N.W. Persia over the Kaleshin Pass in our hands, and would place within our limits Rowandiz, Aqra, Dohuk and Zakhō.

'These places if in other hands will be a perpetual menace to us. The fact that they are within our limits does not compel us in the future any more than at present to retain troops there. I am confident that before long we should be able to dispense with troops at Aqra; we have never had troops at Rowandiz but we are collecting revenue and maintaining order there by indigenous agency.

'There will be no need for us to administer or to accept further responsibility in the no-man's-land N. of Rowandiz, which would otherwise be in the hands of tribes under some other Government.

'Political Officer, Mosul, and Political Officer, Arbil, concur in considering it far preferable to have our frontier somewhat north of the line which we are actually administering.

'The frontier described above was accepted from the military point of view by Sir George MacMunn and has the support of the present G.O.C.-in-Chief.

'*Thirdly.*—I would urge that it is far safer to leave Sulaimani constituted as at present a Division of Mesopotamia and allow the Chief Civil Authority to grant to that Division such delegation of powers and such local constitution as occasion demands.

'*Fourthly.*—As regards Arbil. At an important meeting of all notables held last month, they made it clear that they were anxious to be united to Mesopotamia. I regard any other solution as wholly impracticable.

'I shall have no difficulty in obtaining an indication of the popular will on this subject, but notables have already made their views known in no uncertain voice upon the subject both in 1918 and during the past few months.

At about this time I received a letter from Soane, who was now in the saddle at Sulaimani, of which the following paragraphs are still of interest as revealing the feelings of an experienced administrator at that time. After expressing the belief that, as long as 'Iraq was peaceful, order could be kept in Southern Kurdistan without military force, provided more motor-roads were built, he continued:

'I think in view of the trend of political opinion in Baghdad, the recent successes of Bolshevism, and the delay of peace with Turkey, that we should not lose sight of the potentialities of the external situation. There is no doubt that the great delay in settling peace with Turkey is an obstacle to administration, and is occupying the minds of the more important people of South Kurdistan. Moreover, the name and tenets of Bolshevism are unfortunately becoming known (mainly through the Kirkuk newspaper, which is not an unmixed blessing here).

'Nor are these the only causes for speculation. The names of Enver Pasha and Husain Kiamil Pasha are well known and many responsible persons consider that even though peace may be signed with Turkey and political bounds delimited, these leaders may have acquired sufficient power to raise an Islamic State inde-

pendent of the Peace Conference, and of a coerced and impotent Turkish Central Government. . . .

'As you know, one of the hardest tasks of an administration is to combat propaganda. Human nature is only too ready to believe the worst, even in the face of present benefits and to attribute generous and profitable actions to the most sinister motives. . . .

'If we can pass another two years without disturbance we can disregard Turkish propaganda and the village priest and the chiefs because the peasant will by that time have acquired an entity independent of both Chief and Islam, desiring only the perpetuation of his prosperity and independence.

Much more correspondence passed before it was finally decided to include Southern Kurdistan within the limits of the Mosul wilayat and of 'Iraq. Whether the decision was in the interests of the Kurds and of 'Iraq, remains to be seen. Further light on the subject will be found in the Report of the League of Nations Commission on the question of the frontier between Turkey and 'Iraq.¹

The relation of the Kurds of 'Iraq to their Arab compatriots is in some respects analogous to that of the Welsh to the English in the seventeenth century. In this connexion it may be recalled that the Act of Uniformity (1662. 13-14 Charles II) provided that the Book of Common Prayer should be truly and exactly translated into the 'British or Welsh tongue'. If the Arab Government can be induced to show a like sympathy with the desire of Kurds and Assyrians to use their own language² and to be ruled by officials of their own race according to their customs, there is some ground for hope that the union of Southern Kurdistan and 'Iraq, accomplished, as has been shown, with so much travail, will be less transitory than it now appears.

These reflections are not, however, germane to this stage of our narrative. It was in the cockpit of Kurdistan rather than in the council-chambers of Europe that the future of the Middle East was being settled. Our Turkish opponents were brave men, and patriotic according to their lights. Their breasts were aflame with the hatreds of the centuries and the miseries of the moment. They were armed with weapons mightier than the pen; in the smiling valleys of Kurdistan they sowed dragon's teeth, and reaped the harvest before the close of the year.

In June 1919 the endless intrigues of Turkish officials across the temporary frontier and the backwash of unrest in Southern Kurdistan began to have their effect on the Kurdish population within our sphere on the northern and north-eastern confines of the Mosul wilayat.


In pursuance of the general policy, approved by Government,

¹ League of Nations Document C. 400, M. 147, 1925, vii.

² Cf. Article 17 of the Organic Law of 1924.



CAPT. R. H. D. WILLEY
Killed July 14th, 1919



of maintaining an effective military occupation of the whole of the wilayat, so far as we were in a position to do so, the General Commanding the 18th Division had, in January 1919, without reference to General Head-quarters, placed garrisons at Zakho and Dohuk, and had pushed forward a small detachment to within four miles of 'Amadiya.

In March, the Goyan tribe, living in the immediate vicinity of the Armistice line, appealed to Captain A. C. Pearson, the Assistant Political Officer at Zakho, to pay them a visit, with a view to their enrolment in the list of tribes within the sphere of our military occupation. They were perhaps the wildest of the tribes with whom we had to deal, and the valley in which they dwelt was peculiarly inaccessible alike from the South and from the Turkish side.

Pearson was, however, young, courageous, and devoted to his task; he was an exceptionally good linguist, and had already shown great skill in previous negotiations with Kurdish and other tribes. To reassure them as to our intentions and, in return for supplies of seed-grain, to induce them to abstain from plundering their neighbours would constitute an important step towards the pacification of the whole region. He accepted the invitation, and accompanied by a Kurdish orderly and a few men of the Goyan started off to meet the Goyan chiefs on their own ground.

Before he reached the trysting-place he was ambushed and killed. The news came to me in Paris, and was the first intimation that all was not going well on the frontier. No punitive action by the military authorities was practicable at that time, or indeed for some months to come: not only were the passes blocked by snow but the 18th Division were short of mule transport, and now that demobilization had commenced were finding it difficult to maintain their numerous detachments at the requisite strength.

The murder of Captain Pearson should have served to show the dangers attendant on attempts by political officers to deal with Kurdish tribes south of the Armistice line without adequate military support. The lesson was not learnt: instead, the incident was dismissed as an isolated occurrence without political significance.

Two months later Colonel Leachman, without reference to me, posted Captain Willey as Political Officer at 'Amadiya, sending with him Captain H. Macdonald and Sapper R. Troup to assist in raising and equipping local *gendarmes*. This was going rather faster than I had wished, having regard to the delicate situation in other parts of Kurdistan: I should have preferred to see a detachment in the first instance at Sulaimani. Once done, however, nothing but harm could have come from a withdrawal, and I contented myself with urging a

policy of caution. Willey, who had been with us since 1915 and had acquired considerable practical experience at 'Ali Gharbi, Badra, Mandali, and Qasr-i-Shirin, set to work with a will. He made substantial advances of money to Kurds and Christians alike for the purchase of seed and plough cattle, raised *gendarmes* from both parties, and endeavoured to restore order and confidence.

There is no reason to doubt that he would have succeeded had not the Commander-in-Chief decided, in May, to withdraw the detachment to a more accessible spot.¹ I had taken exception to the decision to occupy the 'Amadiya valley in January: I had been uneasy at the dispatch of a political officer unsupported by troops to the town; the sudden decision to withdraw the detachment—taken without consideration of its probable effect on the tribal situation—greatly perturbed me, and I pressed strongly for its retention. This having been negatived on military grounds, I urged that the political officers should be withdrawn. Both Leachman and Willey were confident, however, that no untoward results would follow, and strenuously opposed my suggestion. I allowed myself to be over-persuaded and accepted responsibility to the Secretary of State for their retention at 'Amadiya.


Willey was as confident and lion-hearted as was Leachman: he did not allow the removal of the troops to affect in the smallest degree the even tenor of his way. The town of 'Amadiya was rent by a standing feud between two of its leading citizens, supported by their respective adherents. Willey disarmed both parties, and took cash security for good behaviour in future. The local chiefs, known as the *Aghas*, found to their dismay that, in accordance with our established policy in other parts of the occupied territories, advances of seed and of cash were made direct to the cultivators and not through them. *Gendarmes* were being raised from amongst the population and placed under the control of competent Kurdish officers, men of some education drawn from other areas. The chiefs saw their misused privileges threatened and they realized that before long the cultivators themselves would emerge from a state of serfdom indistinguishable from slavery, and would learn to look to the Government rather than to them. Their minds were inflamed by rumours spread abroad by the Turks and others of the forthcoming domination of all Kurds by Christians. The Kurd, be he nomad or cultivator, who has for centuries untold dwelt in his remote valleys, is a stark, uncouth soul, sitting in darkness, fast bound with misery and iron. To their leaders, government was synonymous with tyranny, law with injustice, and order with bondage, the antithesis of the despotic freedom they cherished. In our methods of government they discerned

¹ *Vide* Sir G. MacMunn's dispatch of 12.11.19. *London Gazette Supp.* 31813, 5.3.20.



Taken by Major E. W. C. Noel, C.I.E., D.S.O.

KURDISH TRIBESMEN AT RANIA, 1919



a deep-laid plot to fasten on their shoulders a foreign despotism, hostile both to their customs and to their religion—which in ordinary times meant but little to them.

The *Aghas* took secret counsel, and in their blindness saw no better course open to them than violence. On the night of 14th July they entered the town, scaled the high walls of the Political Officer's house, and forcing their way into the rooms murdered Willey, Macdonald, and Troup. The levies on guard paid for their loyalty with their lives; every man was shot down.

On this occasion it was possible for the 18th Division to act vigorously. An attempt to penetrate to 'Amadiya was strongly resisted, and it soon became evident that several tribes were involved. A Brigade from the 18th Division under General Nightingale assembled at Suwaira, the outpost twenty-five miles from 'Amadiya to which troops had been withdrawn three months previously. A second Brigade under General Wooldridge was sent to Zakho. General Cassels, who now took over charge of the operations, was instructed by Sir George MacMunn shortly afterwards to traverse the whole country thoroughly as the only means of punishing the murderers and generally reasserting our prestige and authority.

It took a fortnight to assemble the force, which had to be drawn in part from Baghdad, as operations on the Sulaimani front were still in progress, but by the end of July all was ready. On the first of August, General Nightingale surrounded the village of Barnurni, capturing a large number of rifles and some of the leading malcontents. This move was followed by punitive operations in all the neighbouring valleys, with sharp fighting, in the course of which considerable losses were inflicted on the Kurds. Several leading *Aghas* known to have been directly concerned in the murder of Political Officers were tried and executed. The column then moved through the Ser 'Amadiya plateau, which rises to a height of some 8,000 feet above the sea, to visit villages and districts beyond, where loss and punishment were inflicted on the Barwari tribes, who were the prime movers in the outbreak.


Whilst these operations, which were not carried through without minor reverses, were in progress, a gathering of more distant tribes from the west of the Khabur River attacked Suwaira in force just before dawn. A height commanding the camp was seized; but our troops, surprised in their camp, behaved admirably, and despite considerable casualties recaptured the height and drove off the enemy, whose ample supplies of Turkish rifles and ammunition suggested that they were incited by the Turkish authorities across the border.

The next phase of operations commenced on 18th August, when General Wooldridge advanced against the Guli tribe, who had led the


attack on Suwaira, whilst General Nightingale again advanced into the less accessible valleys beyond the Ser 'Amadiya. The country was closely wooded in places, and as mountainous as the most difficult parts of the North-West Frontier of India. It was warfare of a type with which the Army in India has long been familiar, but wholly novel to the vast majority of the troops now engaged. It called for great individual enterprise and activity on the part of companies and even platoons. The first move was against Birnuna, a village surrounded by precipitous ridges, covered by a large force of Kurds on an adjacent natural fortress. Our troops had to move through successive gorges, many of them ideally suited for defence by sharp-shooters. It proved impossible to deal adequately with the tribes without further support; this, however, was forthcoming a few weeks later. General Nightingale's force was brought down from Ser 'Amadiya to join General Wooldridge's Brigade; another Assyrian battalion, composed exclusively of Assyrian Christian mountaineers under British and Assyrian Officers, was sent up from Baghdad. 'They proved', writes General MacMunn, 'a most valuable addition to our force, quite equal to the Kurds at their own tactics'. The next few weeks were spent in punitive operations in all the valleys occupied by hostile tribes in the 'Amadiya region, who with few exceptions made their submission by 15th September.

West of the Khabur it took General Wooldridge longer to reach a conclusion. By the middle of September he was on the point of withdrawal, believing his work to have been accomplished, when a large body of Goyan tribesmen appeared in the neighbourhood and made a series of bold attacks. It was soon clear that nothing short of punitive operations in the valleys in which they lived would suffice to prevent a recrudescence of trouble. It is very greatly to Sir George MacMunn's credit that he decided to continue operations forthwith. Both columns were concentrated, and, General Nightingale's Brigade leading, penetrated the gorges. After a stiff engagement on the Balakish ridge, Karoar, the principal village, in the very heart of the Goyan country, was entered and a part of it burnt as a punishment for the murder of poor Pearson. Thus ended a campaign of nearly three months' duration, in which (again to quote Sir George MacMunn's dispatch) 'the exertions of the troops, coming at a time when they might well have looked for rest, were beyond praise. The hills were precipitous and scrub-clad; every day's operations meant ascending and descending two and even three thousand feet.'

Had they taken place prior to the Armistice, such operations and achievements, mainly the work of raw troops, would not only have preoccupied the contemporary Press, but would undoubtedly have



J. H. H. BILL, I.C.S.
Killed by Kurds, November 2nd, 1919



gained a permanent and detailed chronicle in the Official History of the Mesopotamian Campaign. They were, in truth, its sequel. To pierce the fastnesses of Kurdistan amongst fierce and well-armed tribes who had never known defeat was a task that would have tried the mettle of troops well-skilled in hill-warfare. That these operations should have been brought to a successful conclusion by units made up for the most part of inexperienced drafts, with a small leaven of old soldiers who, during four years of war, had been in the trenches or campaigning in the plains, bears remarkable testimony to the military prowess of General Cassel's forces, and to the leadership of the Brigade and unit commanders.

The casualties incurred during the operations in Central and Southern Kurdistan totalled 331, including 137 killed, all but 37 of these being Indian troops, on whom the brunt of the fighting fell, and to whom the principal credit is due.

The year was not to close without a further loss to the Civil Administration of valuable lives. Shortly after the Armistice, an Assistant Political Officer had been sent to 'Aqra, which lies north-east of Mosul near the edge of the plain about half-way between 'Amadiya and Rowandiz. The mountains which separate 'Aqra from the Greater Zab are the home of the Zibari Kurds, while on the opposite bank of the river are the territories of the Shaikh of Barzan. Barzan had had a stormy history in Turkish times. The Shaikh, 'Abdu-'s-Salim, had suffered at the hands of the Ottoman Government, and in 1909 the Turks sent an expedition against him with very moderate success. In 1910 Nazim Pasha was placed in supreme charge of the three wilayats of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, and he patched up a peace. In 1911, however, Nazim fell, and with him the arrangement he had succeeded in making. By the outbreak of the war the Shaikh of Barzan was becoming forced, in self-defence, to accept the overtures which the Russians had frequently made to him, and to seek their protection.

There was a bitter feud between Barzan and Zibar, and the Turks, following familiar lines of procedure, made use of Faris Agha of Zibar, and with his aid entrapped and hanged the Shaikh of Barzan.

His successor, Shaikh Ahmad, inherited his feuds, but not his wits. When British administration was established in the district, he keenly resented being placed under 'Aqra, which he regarded as coloured by Zibari influence, and was at one time anxious to move into the Rowandiz district; but the project met with no encouragement from us. Faris Agha was, however, forbidden to cross the Zab into Barzan territory. The attempt to hold the balance antagonized both parties and left a promising field for Turkish propaganda, skilfully conducted from Van by an ex-governor, Haidar Beg. Reports were current in the

early winter of 1918-19 that Enver Pasha had arrived at Van with reinforcements consisting of Turks and Russian deserters, and that he was in active correspondence with Situ Agha of Oramar, north of 'Amadiya, the Barwari, and other malcontents. Through Turkish mediation the quarrel between Faris Agha of Zibar and Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan seems to have been adjusted temporarily. Agents from Syria were engaged at the same time in disseminating doctrines to which the Aghas turned a favourable ear, for these doctrines offered the prospect of a distant and ineffective Islamic control under which the Aghas would be left with the real authority. The tribal cultivators, who would be forced to remain in complete subjugation to their chiefs, did not, however, appear to view the matter in the same light.

This was the situation when, in October 1919, Mr. J. H. H. Bill, I.C.S. an officer of the Indian Political Dept., with long experience of the North-West Frontier and in Persia, took over charge of Mosul from Colonel Leachman. I had felt for some time that a change was necessary: in dealing with Arabs, particularly with nomad tribes, Leachman had qualifications unrivalled in Mesopotamia and not excelled by any British officer in all Arabia; he was not, however, at his best with Kurds, just as Soane was never at ease amongst the company of Ishmael. Each had imbibed some of the racial dislikes of the people he knew best. I felt, too, the need of some one in Mosul who would devote more attention to the administrative side, and would keep me better informed of developments. I had no desire unduly to hamper the initiative of the man on the spot, but I had a heavy responsibility towards his Majesty's Government and the Commander-in-Chief, and was perturbed at the apparent lack of insight into Kurdish psychology disclosed by the circumstances surrounding the murders of Pearson, Willey, and Macdonald. Their deaths I felt keenly, for I had known all three officers well.

I felt particularly grateful to the Government of India for placing the services of Mr. Bill at the disposal of the Civil Administration on his relief at Bushire by Trevor. Bill was an old friend, and I confidently looked forward to an improvement as soon as he should be enabled to gauge the position. Being new to the wilayat, he wished to make himself personally acquainted with it, in order especially to form conclusions on the Kurdish question. Accompanied by Captain K. R. Scott, M.C., he visited 'Aqra at the end of October, imposed a fine on two Zibari chiefs, Faris Agha and Babakr Agha, whose followers had sniped our gendarmerie, and on 1st November crossed the Zab in order to inspect the levies of a local chief.

The two Zibaris, enraged at having been called to order and fined, communicated with Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan, who sent his brother

with some twenty men to their assistance. These, with Faris, Babakr, and their followers, amounting in all to about 100 men, ambushed and shot both Mr. Bill and Captain Scott close to Bira Kapra, Babakr's village. They were accompanied by four gendarmes. Two were killed, one of them an Assyrian, the other an 'Aqra man who tried to defend his officers. The other two were Zibaris and went over to the enemy.

All evidence goes to show that the murder of the two British officers was not planned beforehand, but followed upon one of the sudden fits of anger which are typical of Kurdish temperament. But, once accomplished, it gave the signal for rebellion. The Zibaris and Barzanis attacked and pillaged 'Aqra, and the British gendarmerie officer with difficulty escaped to Mosul. Within a day or two the tribes quarrelled among themselves over the spoil, and the Barzanis went home. Several of the local tribes sent us offers of help and protestations of friendship, and when, on 9th November, Captain Kirk, Assistant Political Officer at Batas, made his way into 'Aqra accompanied only by Kurdish levies, he found the townsmen praying for the return of the British Administration. Sir George MacMunn at once dispatched a punitive column. On its arrival in the Zab valley, most of the villages flew white flags and appeared to be in genuine fear of their Aghas and to welcome protection against them.

Our troops burnt the houses of the Zibar chiefs, and crossing the Zab inflicted the same penalty on Barzan; but following the practice enjoined on them in the 'Amadiya expedition did not molest the villagers. The rebels were unable to rouse the neighbouring tribes, largely owing to the loyalty to us of the leading man near 'Aqra, 'Abdul Qadir Agha of Shush; and no resistance was offered to our advance.¹ The four culprits, Faris and Babakr of Zibar, Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan and his brother, escaped into the hills.

No sympathetic disturbance took place in 'Amadiya, and Saiyid Taha of Shamsdinan refused to listen to the suggestion of the Qaimmaqam of Neri, where the Turks kept a small garrison, that he and Situ of Oramar should co-operate on behalf of the Zibaris. His attitude caused the Qaimmaqam uneasiness as to his own safety, and he left Neri for Bashqal'a. When operations were concluded it was decided that we should draw in our frontier to 'Aqra and make for the moment no further attempt to hold the Zibar country between 'Aqra and the Zab.

Thus by the end of the year we had ceased to administer the mountain borders of Northern Kurdistan. From Rowandiz the British outpost had been removed some eighteen miles south-west to Batas; thence

¹ For details see Woodyatt.

the line ran to 'Aqra and Dohuk, excluding the mountain-system which flanks the right bank of the Greater Zab, and leaving 'Amadiya and Zibar outside our zone. Our arrival in the first instance had been in every case welcome because we provided means to combat the ruin and famine left by the Turks. We distributed relief with complete impartiality to Muslims and Christians, and it is probable that our help saved what remained of the agricultural population. But we made no secret of our intention to repatriate the Christian refugees who had sought our protection and were continually pressing on us their desire to return to their home, and this just design furnished the subject-matter of the propaganda directed against us. That we could have avoided rousing the hostility of the *aghawat* was from the first impossible.

'The position of the average Kurdish agha', observed Colonel Nalder in commenting on the Zibari rising, 'is incompatible with our own or any other Government. Like a feudal baron of the Middle Ages, he keeps a body of armed retainers and tyrannizes over the cultivators at his will. The lands owned by Faris Agha and his brother would not assure them an income of £500 a year; their wealth depends entirely on extortion from the villages and the influence from the fact that they spend the money thus acquired in maintaining the armed bands which enforce their authority. Such men cannot but view the advent of any form of settled government with concern, and when to this prejudice anti-Christian sentiments and extensive Turkish propaganda are added, the present feeling on the border of northern Kurdistan is sufficiently explained.'

The Kurdish barons had for the time being defeated the Administration, and anarchy prevailed in Central Kurdistan. In Southern Kurdistan, where Shaikh Mahmud, who combined the role of unruly baron with that of turbulent priest, had been eliminated by force of arms, unbroken peace prevailed throughout 1920. In the Arbil Division, including Kōi, there was also peace.

W. R. Hay, who had been transferred in November 1918 from Mandali to Kōi and Arbil, had been obliged, as stated above, to leave Rowandiz temporarily to its own devices. His experiences there, and at Arbil and Kōi, are recorded, with rare freshness and sympathy, in his book *Two Years in Kurdistan*. That work merits special mention not only for its intrinsic qualities, but also because its author is the only political officer in Kurdistan who has, as yet, given to the world a detailed account of his stewardship.

From December 1919 until the late spring no developments of importance occurred in Kurdistan or elsewhere in 'Iraq. The mountain valleys were in the grip of winter, making communication difficult; in the plains the grateful rain had fallen, and every able-bodied man was busy ploughing. Never in living memory had so large an area been



Photo by Major E. W. C. Noel, C.I.E., D.S.O.

LOOKING TOWARDS THE PERSIAN FRONTIER
NEAR RAYAT



available for sowing: seed-grain, thanks to the Revenue Department, was plentiful: prices were still high, and the Irrigation Department had cleared several canals on the Middle Euphrates and had reconstructed others. We were well established on the Euphrates at Dair-*ez-Zor*; the Turks had ceased to exercise any semblance of authority in the Mosul wilayat, and the action taken in Kurdish areas had made it unlikely that there would be any recrudescence of trouble there for some months to come. Reports from every *liwa* in Iraq indicated that the country was settling down.

The primary problem of the shape that the administration was eventually to take was, however, still unsolved, and every month's delay made it more difficult to introduce the Arab form of government. The serious disturbances in Kurdistan had delayed progress in this direction in the Mosul wilayat, and I had been specifically forbidden to anticipate the decisions of the Peace Conference with respect to this region. In Baghdad and Basra I had found it impossible to do anything pending a decision on, and public announcement of, the future policy of the Government.

On 18th December 1919 the Prime Minister did indeed assure the world,¹ like Mr. Snodgrass, that 'he was going to begin'. For the rest, though 'the oracles were dumb', 'words deceiving' echoed through the bazaars of every town and in the cloisters of the Great Shrines.

¹ See p. 212.

CHAPTER VII

THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION DURING 1919

Agricola . . . took to heart the lesson which the experience of others suggested, that little was accomplished by force if injustice followed. He decided, therefore, to cut away at the root the causes of war. He began with himself and his own people. . . . He made it his business to know everything, if not always to follow up his knowledge; he turned an indulgent ear to small offences, yet was strict to offences that were serious; he was satisfied generally with penitence rather than punishment. . . . In order that a population scattered and uncivilized, and proportionately ready for war, might be habituated by comfort to peace and quiet, he would exhort individuals and assist communities to erect temples, market-places, and houses. . . . He began to train the sons of the chieftains in a liberal education, and to give preference to the native talent of the Briton as against the plodding Gaul.

TACITUS, *describing the Conquest of Britain by Agricola, c. A.D. 80.*

Trans. by Hutton.

Administrative difficulties. Temporary contracts. Government of India demands return of its Officers. Delays in Transit. Divided control in Whitehall. Parliamentary references to Mesopotamia. Departmental reductions. Irrigation Department. Sir John Hewett's Mission and Reports. Organization of Civil Administration. Judicial and Educational organizations.

THE relief which the Armistice brought to the war-weary troops was not shared by the Civil Administration, which was confronted with the certainty of immediate dissolution unless it could reorganize itself, however provisionally, on a peace basis.

The British Staff in December 1917 stood at about 100, of whom 20 were drawn from the Indian Civil Service and Civil Departments of the Government of India. At the date of the Armistice these numbers had increased to 164, of whom 58 were from India; we had at the same moment shouldered responsibility for the Mosul wilayat, and it was clear that we should shortly be required to take over from the Army the Directorates of Irrigation, Agriculture, Posts and Telegraphs, Railways, and other essential services. As soon as negotiations with the Turks at Mosul were ended and arrangements for the plebiscite mentioned in a previous chapter were in train, I telegraphed (22nd December 1918) as follows to the India Office:

“The Civil Administration of Mesopotamia and quasi-Civil Departments such as Irrigation, Agriculture, and other Departments at present on a military basis, which must very shortly be converted to Civil requirements, such as Railway, Medical, Telegraphs, Works, and Port Directorate, are faced with a very serious situation as a result of demobilization now in progress.

'I have not yet been authorized to take over Agriculture or Irrigation but demobilization threatens to disperse the highly qualified technical staff of these departments and of the other departments referred to above.

'Many officers have already been recalled to India and others are unwilling to stay after demobilization except on contract for a definite period with prospects of permanence.

'If such terms cannot be offered and these men are dispersed it will be practically impossible to get together a similarly trained body of officers.

'I am unaware of the decision of H.M.'s Government in regard to the Commission which it was originally proposed should visit this country to deal with these and other questions. It can now scarcely be usefully dispatched until after the results of the Peace Conference are known, i. e. it would not reach here until next autumn and could not report to H.M.'s Government before the Spring of 1920.

'The suggestion which I now submit, with the full approval of the G.O.C.-in-Chief, is that I may be authorized by H.M.'s Government, as the temporary head of the Civil Administration, to conclude contracts and settle terms of employment with such officers and men as are required to run the above Departments after demobilization. Period of contract to be one to three years according to circumstances, so as to make gradual reduction possible.

'H.M.'s Government doubtless realize that post-war conditions are not less abnormal here than elsewhere. We in Mesopotamia have few of us had leave home for four years. Many have had no leave for seven years. It is impossible to give permanent officers of Government of India the leave they desire, the best temporary officers if they are to be induced to remain and to forgo the prospect of an early return to their former profession must be given definite terms and some prospect of permanence.

'In the case of permanent officers of the Government of India or of the Sudan the sanction of the Government concerned will be obtained in every case before contracts are finally concluded. Contracts, the general lines of which I shall shortly be able to formulate for approval, will include provision for pay, leave, and gratuity or pension as circumstances dictate, and will thus be basis for permanent rules under which in due course suitable men would be allowed to take on.

'I am fully alive to the diffidence which Government may feel in delegating these powers. I am aware that to grant them will involve a change in the present system whereby the Government of India is responsible to H.M.'s Government for detailed control of certain aspects of the Civil Administration of this country. I am very appreciative of the urgent need for economy and of the importance of not creating, as happened in South Africa after the War, a civil service more expensive and elaborate than the country can hope to bear.

'I am determined that no avoidable charge shall be placed on H.M.'s Treasury even though some temporary loss of efficiency may result from a policy of retrenchment and modest beginnings, and I shall not fail to report in detail all my proceedings in this matter, but it is my duty to warn Government that unless they are prepared to grant to the head of the Civil Administration in this country the

discretion now asked for, it is not within my power to prevent a breakdown of the Civil Administration and of the Departments referred to immediately after, if not before, demobilization.'

The India Office, a month later, agreed, with the proviso that contracts should not be concluded with officers for more than one year, unless absolutely necessary. The Government of India, after a further delay of a fortnight, accepted these proposals so far as they were concerned. Their telegram concluded:

'While the Government of India can undertake no responsibility for recruitment for the permanent Civil Services in Mesopotamia they will do their best to assist Civil Commissioner in his present needs. But as regards their Civil officers though every effort will be made to meet the requirements in respect of retention of those now serving in Mesopotamia, Government of India's own needs render any further appreciable supply practically impossible. Only a limited number of officers of regular army can be spared for retention in Civil Administration, and it is suggested that greatest use possible should be made of Indian Army Reserve Officers who have no permanent Government appointments and who can be locally demobilized.

With the best of intentions, however, the Government of India were unable to withstand the pressure of Provincial Governments and of the Civil Departments, and by June 1919 the number of officers drawn from India fell from fifty-eight to thirty (excluding the Irrigation, Agriculture, and Railway Departments, which were still technically military). It was only possible to obtain from the Sudan, Egypt, and the Levant Consular Service nine officers, and some of our most experienced men were on duty in Central Arabia, Kurdistan, South-West and North-West Persia, and the Persian Gulf.

The proposal originally made in 1917 was that such British officers as were needed in Iraq should be drawn from a service to be amalgamated with the Sudan and possibly also the Levant Consular Service; it was probably the best solution, but it had many objections. The cadre would still be small, and therefore exposed to all the difficulties and objections that attach to small cadres, notably periods of stagnation alternating with unduly rapid promotion and the lack of a fair proportion of prize appointments. 'It seems', wrote the Government of India, 'wise to recognize from the outset that Mesopotamia offers but few amenities and that if a really good stamp of man is to be attracted, liberal leave concessions, and generous local allowances will in all probability be called for. Without these or similar attractions, it seems to us doubtful whether many of our officers now serving in Mesopotamia will willingly abandon their career in India or will volunteer for any but a temporary transfer to a new service'.

By the end of September, 67 officers had been given three-year contracts and 212 one-year contracts had been signed.¹

The terms of the telegram quoted above, and the small number of three-year contracts given, suffice to indicate that it was not intended to create a large British Civil Service. The numbers would have been much smaller but for the fact that it was imperatively necessary to give leave at an early date to the majority of officers, only one in ten having had any home leave during the previous four years. Shortage of transport prolonged the leave period by at least three and generally four months. Men were held up in Basra and again in Bombay for weeks at a time, and it was sometimes not possible for them to get a transport home till a month after the expiry of the leave. I concluded a dispatch to the Secretary of State in September 1919 in the following terms:

'Every department is in process of construction or re-construction, and until we have a mandate for the country it would appear premature to fix cadres. Personnel in all branches is still limited to immediate requirements and there is a shortage in almost every branch: moreover in view of the proposals for a single civil service for the Levant, Sudan, Aden, and Iraq it seems desirable not to recruit more than is absolutely necessary at present.

'The limits of the responsibilities of this Administration are still uncertain. Muscat, Bahrain and Koweit are still nominally staffed by officers of the Political Department of the Government of India, though actually at present by officers of this Administration. Our responsibilities in Kurdistan are undefined, and eight officers are on political duty with this Force in S.W. or N.W. Persia.

'In connexion with the proposed amalgamated Civil Service it will be borne in mind that most of the officers now serving with the Civil Administration are entitled to volunteer for permanent transfer. This undertaking, though given in the first instance in respect of British Officers of the Indian Services is even more applicable to temporary officers of the British and Indian Services, many of whom have abandoned careers elsewhere to devote themselves to this country.

¹ The following table shows the allocation between Departments:

<i>Name of Department.</i>	<i>Three-year.</i>	<i>One-year.</i>
Political	42	71
Irrigation and Public Works	4	32
Levies	2	27
Health	4	23
Customs	7	2
Postal and Telegraph	—	14
Agriculture	1	13
Finance and Accounts	2	7
Judicial	3	3
Police	1	10
Education	—	3
Miscellaneous	1	7
	<u>67</u>	<u>212</u>

'Had it been possible or desirable for this Administration to offer definite prospects of permanent employment, there is little doubt that several highly qualified men, not in permanent Government Service, who have now left 'Iraq, could have been secured. The limit of three years, however, whilst insufficient to attract relatively senior men of experience, has not deterred competent junior officers from accepting service with the Civil Administration and the small number of officers who have voluntarily left the Administration demonstrates at once the solidarity of this young service, the keen interest and devotion of its members and the attractions of pioneer work even though devoid of amenities and fraught with worry and difficulty.'

It was a hard struggle to maintain continuity of administration, and the anxieties that beset those at head-quarters during the twelve months succeeding the Armistice were in some ways as great as those of 1920. It is pleasant, however, to record that of the seventy officers who, in September 1919, accepted three-year contracts, more than half were ten years later still in 'Iraq. The outstanding feature of these years is not that mistakes were made, nor that the administration was composed of officers some of whom had comparatively little experience, but that it was possible to create, in the main from the material available in an Expeditionary Force, without any certainty or even fair prospects of permanency, any sort of Civil Administration. The outstanding feature of the administration by the Colonial Office of the mandated territories of 'Iraq and Palestine in the last ten years is the failure to devise any system whereby the advisory and executive staff of British officials in these areas could be fitted into the framework of an Imperial administrative service in which they would find reasonable prospects of promotion and of financial security, both in regard to salary and pension. At no point is our stewardship of these regions more open to criticism. By throwing upon the 'Iraq Government the whole burden of salaries and provident fund contributions, by refusing to grant pensions to those not already entitled thereto by virtue of their membership of an existing British military or civil service, a real injustice was done to many. The system, or lack of system, struck at their independence by depriving them of security, and made it impossible for the Governments concerned to exercise real freedom of choice. The nature of the work is such that, however well it be done, it is no qualification for commercial employment, with the result that after endeavouring for ten or fifteen years 'to uphold the standards of administration of His Majesty's Government', good men have been turned adrift, the Colonial Office and Treasury accepting no sort of responsibility for their future. The lack of definite prospects, on the other hand, made it impossible for some of the best-qualified men in the employ of the Civil Administration in 1920 to remain as Advisers to

the Iraq Government. They reverted to their own services, to achieve, in many cases, high office and further distinction. The situation in Palestine in this respect is almost equally unsatisfactory.

I have referred elsewhere to the difficulties and the sense of isolation caused by the slowness and paucity of written communications between Whitehall and Baghdad. The former was mitigated by the constant stream of travellers passing through Baghdad on their way to Persia, to most of whom I was able to offer such rough hospitality as was afforded by the cramped quarters of the Political Office at Baghdad. Sir Sydney Armitage-Smith, of the Treasury, fresh from the Peace Conferences, passed through early in 1920 with his small staff of coadjutors on his way to take up the post of Financial Adviser to the Persian Government. Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, likewise from Paris, also stayed some days with me before leaving for Tehran, where he was British Representative on the Anglo-Persian Tariff Committee. Both these men were of outstanding eminence in their respective spheres, with a long record of achievement in international negotiations, and I gratefully acknowledge the advice and help they gave to the Civil Administration during their brief stay. With Armitage-Smith were experts in several branches of administration such as law and public works. Conditions in Persia proved inimical to their respective Missions, but of their single-minded desire to assist the Persian Government to become financially strong and administratively free there can be no doubt. To discuss, even briefly, British policy in Persia is beyond the scope of this work; the facts are set forth by Temperley¹ and, with somewhat unhistorical bias, by Toynbee.² Time will show whether the alternative path marked out for Persia by the compelling genius of Riza Shah will lead to the Elysian fields of national prosperity. In 1920 his star had not yet risen, and there was on the horizon no personality likely to command general obedience and acceptance. Time will not, however, show what might have happened in Persia had the well-chosen band of British advisers been retained. They might have done for Persia under the direction of Riza Shah all that was done by Mr. A. C. Millspaugh and his devoted band of assistants, and perhaps more. But fate ruled otherwise, and speculation is unprofitable.

Diplomatic visitors to Baghdad were numerous; I had the opportunity of meeting and sometimes of entertaining members of almost all the Legations in Tehran. Sir Charles and Lady Marling passed through in 1918, and with them the young Grand Duke Dimitri, who had been exiled to Persia by the Czar owing to his complicity in the events leading to the elimination of Rasputin of infamous memory. In

¹ *History of the Peace Conference*, vi. 212.

² *Survey of International Affairs*, 1924, p. 219.

1919 General Baratoff passed through, and several members of the French and Italian Legations. In 1920 came Mr. C. Van H. Engert, of the United States Legation at Tehran, a young man of exceptional breadth of view and catholicity of interest, even for a diplomat, with whom I later had some interesting and suggestive correspondence. He had as I have related in 'Loyalties', spent two years as First Secretary at the United States Embassy in Constantinople during the war, and had taken a very prominent and creditable part in assisting British prisoners of war. He was held up for some weeks in Baghdad owing to the disorders on the road to Persia. These and other travellers did much to keep me in touch with the outside world, and I endeavoured to arrange for some British officials in Syria and Palestine to visit Baghdad and to exchange views. The suggestion was not well received, and at no time did any officer in authority in those regions visit us, though several of them were expressing very freely to all and sundry their views as to how Mesopotamia should be governed.

Although, as explained in the previous chapter, some difficulties arose in Iraq as the result of the concurrent jurisdiction in various parts of Kurdistan of British authorities in Syria and Constantinople, of French emissaries and of the representatives of the Turkish, Persian, and Russian Governments, as well as of the shadow Government of the future Armenian State,¹ these difficulties affected us less in practice than the conflict in progress on the Home Front between the Foreign and India Offices, which soon developed into an open breach. On 30th June 1919, in a written answer to a question in the House of Commons, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed the House that questions of policy relative to Mesopotamia 'are decided, except in cases where reference is made to the Cabinet, by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in consultation with the Secretary of State for India'. In point of fact the instructions of His Majesty's Government on other than military matters in Mesopotamia had invariably issued in the name of the Secretary of State for India, after consultation when necessary with the Foreign Office and the Government of India. Mr. Montagu's protests were, however, ignored.

On 8th July, in reply to a question in Parliament, the Foreign Office spokesman in the House of Commons announced that Government were 'quite satisfied with the present provisional arrangements for the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, and saw no necessity for a change'.

¹ When at Paris earlier in the year I had some conversations with one of President Wilson's colleagues at the Peace Conference, the late Mr. Henry White, who was convinced that the United States would accept a mandate for Armenia and urged me to act on that assumption. (See Nevins, *Henry White*, 1930.)

A week later the Secretary of State for War (Mr. Winston Churchill) stated¹ that local Levies were *not* being raised and trained in Mesopotamia, and that future policy with regard to the policing of Mesopotamia could not be definitely laid down 'till we receive a Mandate to administer the country'. As regards the Army of Occupation, our future policy was to cut it down as much as possible, and to employ as large a proportion of Indian and other native troops as possible. The extent, however, to which local troops could be employed depended on their efficiency, which was at present an unknown quantity. It was hoped to make considerable use of the Air Service with a view to economizing troops and their maintenance in the outlying unsettled districts.

This sort of thing made me feel rather desperate. Our budget for 1919, which had been sent to the India Office long before, provided a sum of £335,000 for Levies, which numbered about four thousand, stationed at almost every important centre, under British and Arab officers. They had done uniformly good work, and had demonstrated their reliability without exception, wherever they were under the command of a British officer. They had worked on numerous occasions with troops, and in several instances had received awards for gallantry in the field, including two Military Crosses and several Military Medals—awards very sparingly given to irregulars. I was constantly urged to increase their numbers, so as to relieve regular units, and General Head-quarters at no time made any difficulty about providing extra officers and equipment. Yet the very existence of the force was denied in Parliament!

Though Mr. Montagu, as Secretary of State for India, was the Cabinet Minister responsible for the civil administration of 'Iraq, he himself made no public reference whatever to the subject in Parliament in 1919, except in answer to occasional questions put to him. A few words from him or from Lord Curzon would have carried weight in political circles in Baghdad and in Syria, but notwithstanding several suggestions from me as to the expediency of a public statement of our aims and intentions no statement was forthcoming. In the House of Lords 'Iraq was only once referred to, and then by Lord Curzon, as Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who spoke as follows:²

'The advance that has been made in the last two years in the development of Mesopotamia in respect of irrigation, agriculture, planting, the introduction of agricultural machinery, the education of children, and in many other ways, has been amazing. More has been done in two years for those places than has been done in the five preceding centuries; and I cannot imagine a more proud experience for any Englishman than if he were now to go out to Mesopotamia and see what is being accomplished there.

¹ 118 H.C. Deb. 55.

² Deb., H. L., 20.2.19.

'And lest it be thought that I am unduly blowing the trumpet of my own race, I should like to read one sentence from a report which reached me the other day from a very distinguished American¹ who had recently, in the interest of relief, visited that part of the world. He said of Mesopotamia:—

"The work accomplished by the British since their Occupation has been excellent in all respects. The populations are free and happy. Justice is administered, life and property are secure. There are no shadows in this picture."

'My Lords, that is a glowing, but not I believe an exaggerated, tribute.'

No word of criticism, benevolent or otherwise, reached me from the Foreign Office during 1919, but I was painfully aware, from current departmental correspondence and from other sources, of the extent of the divergence of opinion between the Foreign and India Offices, and of the inability of both offices to control the vagaries of the War Office, which appeared at the time to be an almost autonomous department of His Majesty's Government.

In spite of these difficulties, and though it was clear that the machinery of Government in Whitehall for dealing with the Middle East in general and 'Iraq in particular was not working well, the wheels of the civil administrative machine within the Occupied Territories continued to revolve with very little friction or noise. The system of collaboration between the civil and military departments evolved over a period of four years worked well, thanks in large measure to the goodwill and tolerance displayed by Sir William Marshall and his successor, Sir George MacMunn, and by their staff at General Head-quarters. On 1st March the Agricultural Directorate was transferred to the Civil Administration, and retained intact, though on a much reduced scale. At about the same time the Irrigation Directorate was handed over, as a branch of the Revenue Secretariat. In each case, however, the difficult and painful task of reducing the staff and drastically cutting down expenditure in every direction fell upon my shoulders. We took over a machine designed for war purposes, composed for the most part of highly efficient and well-qualified specialists. It was impossible to provide in the civil budget a tithe of the funds necessary to carry out the schemes prepared during the war period, or to employ more than a small proportion of the staff. Yet we inherited from the military administration a number of half-finished schemes of immediate value; if they were not completed, every penny spent on them to date would be wasted. The Hindiya barrage, on which the welfare of the Middle Euphrates depended, urgently

¹ The reference, I do not doubt, is to the late Dr. H. P. Judson, President of Pennsylvania University, Chicago, who visited Mesopotamia and Persia in 1919 on behalf of the Near East Relief Fund.

required repair. It had been designed by Sir William Willcocks on the assumption that the Habbaniya escape would be simultaneously constructed, so as to relieve the barrage of the heaviest floods. War broke out before the Turks could do anything in this direction; whether they ever intended to do so is doubtful. A technical department is a delicate thing at the best of times; a department created within eighteen months under war conditions with temporary officers lent by Governments or drawn from civil life is an even more fragile entity. The demands of the Government of India for the return of the officers lent by them soon became insistent, and in the difficult circumstances of India were fully justified. Good men drawn from civil life were obliged for the most part to return to their previous occupations unless we could offer them definite contracts for a longer period than three years. To do so was to anticipate the terms of the Mandate, and the future of the country: each contract given was a mortgage on the revenues of 'Iraq, for the employment of specialists in irrigation presupposed the future expenditure of considerable sums on new works and on maintenance.

The work of the Irrigation Department, as also in its own way that of the Directorate of Agriculture, was indisputably popular: in every part of Mesopotamia the landowners and cultivators called for the services of representatives of these branches. In very many cases free labour was offered, and in most cases we were able to satisfy ourselves that the works proposed would be financially remunerative. There were, too, some fifty thousand Turkish prisoners of war still in the country. It was far better to keep them employed on construction work than to condemn them to idleness. To have closed down all works would have caused active and justifiable resentment, and would have defeated the common object of all our efforts, namely, the rehabilitation of the country on lines congenial to its inhabitants. A middle course was adopted, with the inevitable result. The people at large saw the prospect of immediate developments fade; the Treasury pointed out that we were spending more than we could afford, seeing that 'Iraq would in due course be called on to bear its share of the Ottoman Public Debt, of the cost of railway construction, and of the numerous public works undertaken by the Army for the benefit alike of the armed forces of the Crown and of the inhabitants. *Medio tutissimus ibis* is a motto by no means universal in its application.

The very heavy cost of these works, and the fact that expenditure was in some cases (e.g. Railway and Port) continuing after the war on a scale almost as large as before, inevitably aroused criticism, which was directed in the first instance against the War Office. I had long ago privately urged Mr. Montagu¹ to consider the possibility of dis-

¹ Mr. Montagu had intended to visit Mesopotamia during the spring of 1918 in company

patching a small Commission to investigate on the spot all major questions relating to the Civil Administration, and in particular to adjudicate upon the charges which it could properly be called upon to bear, and could reasonably be expected to pay, in respect of the various schemes in course of development which would further the attainment by the Civil Administration of its legitimate aims. I suggested that such a Commission should be sent out by the Government and should deal comprehensively with the numerous questions which it seemed impossible to solve by an exchange of letters and telegrams, however voluminous. For various reasons it was found impracticable to give effect to this proposal; instead, the War Office, on its own behalf, sent a very distinguished Indian Civil Servant, Sir John Hewett, G.C.S.I., to Mesopotamia, just before the Armistice, with instructions to report to the *Army Council* on:

'(a) the administration and finance of the schemes already put forward for the development of irrigation and agriculture in Mesopotamia, and their control on behalf of the Imperial Government.'

'(b) whether, in other respects, expenditure in Mesopotamia charged ultimately against Imperial Army Funds is being duly confined to such services as are presently necessary for the prosecution of the war.'

He was further directed to report 'how far civil funds can currently or eventually be called on to bear, in place of army funds, the cost of various schemes being developed in Mesopotamia, which would largely benefit the civil population, and the best way of giving effect to such an arrangement'.

He was accompanied by two irrigation engineers of experience and distinction, Mr. A. B. Buckley of the Irrigation Department in Egypt, and Mr. W. Roche of the P.W.D., India, by Mr. L. C. Porter,

with the Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, on his way back from India, but the idea was discouraged by the Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, who was anxious for his return. Writing in February 1918 (*My Indian Diary*, p. 250) the Secretary of State seems to have had in mind some sort of colonization scheme for Mesopotamia, in the belief that such a project would be welcome to the inhabitants; but both Sir Percy Cox and Sir Hamilton Grant (then Foreign Secretary to the Government of India), whom he mentions in this connexion, disclaim having ever held such an opinion or having wittingly expressed themselves in any way calculated to give rise to Mr. Montagu's impression. Indeed all our actions and our policy, so far as we could have one, tended in the opposite direction. Thus Sir Arthur Hirtzel, then Assistant Under-Secretary of State for India, wrote to me as follows on 12th March 1918:

'Entirely different currents are flowing now, and we must shape our course to them if we are to get what we want in 'Iraq. The old watchwords are obsolete, and the question is how we are to secure what is essential under the new ones. The thing can be done, but a certain re-orientation is necessary. The "Arab façade" may have to be something rather more solid than we had originally contemplated.'

I.C.S., and Sir Harry Verney. He reached Basra in December 1918 and left in March 1919.

Sir John Hewett was formerly Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh in India and had retired in 1912 after a career of exceptional distinction in the Indian Civil Service. Had he come out at the head, or as a member, of a Commission at the instance of His Majesty's Government, or of the Secretary of State for India, who, as already explained, was the member of the Cabinet responsible for the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, and had his instructions been wider, his mission might have had most valuable results. He was, however, the emissary of the War Office, and had no responsibilities towards the Secretary of State for India. The terms of his instructions did not authorize him to report on the broader aspects of the future administration of the country, nor was I authorized to discuss such questions with him. His views as to the future Government of India were radically opposed to those of the Secretary of State for India, and to those of the Cabinet as a whole, and he was not at pains either in England, India, or 'Iraq to conceal the fact. On the contrary, he gave, in January, a lecture at Baghdad, which all the British Commissioned and Warrant Officers were invited to attend, in a strain at once so pessimistic, and so frankly hostile to the terms of the Government of India Bill then before Parliament, that for some weeks afterwards I was inundated with applications from officers in the service of the Government of India to join the Civil Administration on the grounds that so eminent an authority as Sir John Hewett regarded the services in India as doomed to early extinction. This in itself was from one point of view an advantage to the Civil Administration, for it confirmed many waverers in their decision to remain in 'Iraq if possible. From another point of view it was disadvantageous. What I knew, or thought I knew, of the trends of events in India and elsewhere in the East had brought me to the conviction that a change of the speed and in some measure of the direction of our policy was necessary. Providence was shaping our ends in 'Iraq; I was rough-hewing them as best I could. In dealing with the Indian reforms Sir John Hewett had wielded a rhetorical sledge-hammer, with devastating effect on his hearers; his views had an obvious application to the scheme for the future Government of 'Iraq that I had submitted less than two months before, and indeed to the principle underlying the public pronouncements of the Allies and of H.M.'s Government on the subject. The repercussion of public opinion in Baghdad, which was at the moment in a state of flux, was immediately apparent, and was embarrassing. I telegraphed, whether privately or officially I do not recollect, to Mr. Montagu, protesting against Sir John Hewett's activities as a

publicist. I received no reply, but in November the matter was raised in an unsatisfactory and inconclusive form in the House of Lords.¹

Sir John Hewett's inquiries in Baghdad were as thorough as his restricted² terms of reference permitted. On the general question he recorded his verdict in the following terms:

'We are unanimously and emphatically of opinion that there is no ground for the suggestion that the expenditure of Army funds has been prompted by the desire to provide for after-peace developments, and we consider that they have been uniformly expended with the primary object of securing the efficiency and comfort of the force. That there are a number of instances in which Army funds have been used for undertakings which will be only temporarily of value to the Army, while they will be of permanent value for the development of the civil government and the resources of Mesopotamia, is a matter of common knowledge. . . .'

After assessing the amount due to Army Funds from Civil Revenues at about £2,000,000,³ exclusive of railways, his report continues:

'I have been informed by the acting Civil Commissioner that no budget has yet been prepared of the revenue and expenditure of the occupied territory for the current year. The net receipts for 1915-16 were £130,000, for 1916-17 £270,000, and for 1917-18 £100,000, according to the telegram from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India of the 5th February, 1918. It is evident from these figures that the Civil Administration is not likely, at an early date, to be able to pay the bill set out above. In his letter No. 18791 of the 8th September last to the Chief of the General Staff at Baghdad, Lieut-Colonel Wilson wrote, "I am assuming that in the case of railways, works, power plant and other assets of the kind erected in the country and required for post-war purposes, they will be assessed and handed over at a valuation to the civil administration, which will hand over to the Treasury an equivalent of Mesopotamian Bonds in lieu thereof, the interest and sinking fund on which will be payable annually. An arrangement of this nature seems to be the only one to meet the case; details of it will depend on the status which the Peace Conference may assign to Mesopotamia in the future."'

This was really all that could be said, and nothing more could be done. No action was taken on Sir John Hewett's *Report to the Army Council*, which was published by the Stationery Office for the War Office in December 1919. It was not, from the point of view of the Civil Administration, a very satisfactory document: my objections to accepting very large debits for works which could not be regarded as essential post-war needs were for the most part summarily, even scornfully, dismissed.

¹ 37 H.L. Deb. 53.

² He was, for example, debarred from reporting on the dredging of a channel through the Hammar Lake at a cost of three *crores* of rupees, equivalent at the then rate of exchange to about three million pounds sterling.

³ See Hewett (1), p. 40.

In June 1920 the Stationery Office published, at the behest of the War Office but without reference to the India Office, and with the inscription 'Crown copyright reserved', a foolscap pamphlet of twenty-three pages entitled *Some Impressions of Mesopotamia in 1919*, by Sir John P. Hewett, G.C.S.I., K.B.E. As was to be expected, having regard to the experience and distinction of its author, it was an interesting and in some respects valuable document, but the circumstances in which it was compiled precluded it from being otherwise than superficial in its judgements. It dealt with matters wholly outside the scope of the author's mission, such as the importance of instituting Medical and Agricultural Departments on sound lines. Irrigation projects which had come to Sir John Hewett's notice were discussed, altogether without reference to the views that the head of the Civil Administration or his advisers might have as to their suitability. He recorded his opinion that the personnel of the Civil Administration was not adequately equipped with 'knowledge of such very important branches of the administration in an oriental country as revenue and police'. Yet the Revenue Department had been started by Sir Henry Dobbs (specially deputed by the Government of India and exceptionally qualified for the purpose) and developed by members of the Indian Civil Service with expert knowledge of Revenue matters, such as Mr. E. B. Howell and Mr. C. C. Garbett, with the assistance of other members of the I.C.S., all of whom had Revenue experience. The Police Department was wholly in the hands of trained Police officers. It is possible to say with confidence, after a lapse of more than ten years, that in no departments have fewer changes in system or in personnel been made by the Arab Government.

Of the future development of the country Sir John Hewett wrote:

'The determination—for such I believe it is—to exclude persons from Great Britain and the Dominions from taking part in the development of the country seems to me to be very regrettable. I understand that it is based on the view that the country should be developed in the interest of the Arab population. On this very ground the introduction of Englishmen and Australians will be very beneficial. There are large areas of crown lands which they could develop without in any way trenching on tribal rights. If Mesopotamia is to take the place it ought to in such enterprises as cotton cultivation, the manufacture of beet sugar, and sheep breeding, the impetus will, in my judgement, have to come from the white man.'

Though he made no reference to political questions, he gave it to be understood that the post-war garrison was to be two divisions of infantry and two cavalry brigades, and suggested that a force even of this size might be inadequate for the maintenance of order.

That this essay, dealing with matters wholly beyond the purview of the War Office, should have been printed at the public expense, and

by the orders of the Army Council published by the Stationery Office, remains inexplicable. I was aware that the Secretary of State for India, as the responsible Minister, had not been consulted, and I felt sure that the Secretary of State for War (Mr. Winston Churchill) had not seen the pamphlet, which ran counter to his views as indeed to those of the Coalition Government, so far as they were known to me, and also to those of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Henry Wilson. The incident was a noteworthy example, but by no means the only one, of the extent to which, by June 1920, the disorganization of the machinery of Government in Whitehall had proceeded.

In the absence of any possibility of an early decision as to the future of 'Iraq, we could only continue to administer the country to the best of our ability, on a temporary basis, on lines designed to facilitate the change-over to a new system when the time came.

The Occupied Territories were for administrative purposes divided into sixteen divisions,¹ under political officers who corresponded direct with the Civil Commissioner, with the Secretaries to the Civil Commissioner in charge of the Revenue, Finance, Judicial, Public Works and Health Departments, and with the various Departments.

The Departments under the Revenue Department were those of Irrigation, Agriculture, Survey, and Land Registration (Tapu). Those under Finance included Customs, Government Presses, and Enemy Trading. The Medical and Quarantine Departments and the Weather Bureau came under the Secretary for Health. The Public Works Secretary was intended in due course to take under his wing the Railway Department and the Port of Basra, when transferred to the Civil Administration, and Civil Stores, Posts and Telegraphs; pending his appointment those departments were, together with the Police Department (Major Prescott) and Education Department (Major Bowman), directly under the control of the Civil Commissioner. It was, on paper, a highly centralized system: in practice, decentralization existed and was effective. The political officers in charge of divisions were almost without exception men of real ability and wide experience. The Secretaries—E. B. Howell, I.C.S. (Revenue), W. S. R. May from the Sudan (Finance), Sir E. Bonham Carter also from the Sudan (Judicial), and Lt.-Col. W. R. Battye (Health) were senior men with distinguished records in their particular line. Police, Tapu, Waqf, were respectively under Prescott, Royds, and Cooke, who ten years later were still the responsible advisers of the 'Iraq Government in the same Departments.

The Revenue Department dealt with the following matters: Land

¹ 'Amara, Baghdad, Baquba, Basra, Dair-ez-Zor, Diwaniya, Dulaim, Hilla, Khanaqin, Kirkuk, Kut-al-Amara, Mosul, Muntafiq, Samarra, Shamiya, Sulaimani.

Revenue, Koda (tax on cattle), Special Revenues and Miscellaneous Taxation, Excise on liquor and opium, Stamps (other than postal), Public Debt, Tobacco Monopoly, Tapu, Surveys, Land (tenancies, leases, relations between landlord and tenant), Advances to Cultivators, Agricultural and Irrigation projects, Municipalities (other than Baghdad and Basra).

It will thus be seen that the name Revenue Department was rather misleading. The Revenue Department might in fact be regarded rather as the Land Agency Department, 'Iraq being regarded as an estate, held in trust for a future Government.

Every political officer was the chief Revenue authority in his Division and the bulk of his work fell under the head of 'Revenue', as thus described.

The Finance Secretary was responsible for dealing with expenditure and for budgets and currency questions, and directed all currency-chest and resource operations both for civil and military requirements. He was also responsible for the Accounts and Audit Departments. One of the first steps taken was to recruit and train a staff of clerks capable of handling accounts in Arabic. The commercial demand for literate Arabs for some time after the war was such that the Civil Administration could not compete with the salaries offered, the grant of which would have disorganized the wage-scales of the whole administration. It was decided, as a matter of financial expediency, to use Indian clerks for the time being until Arabic-speaking clerks could be secured at reasonable rates of pay.

The Judicial Department was more fortunately placed: almost every British officer therein was an Arabic scholar, with wide experience in Arabic-speaking countries. It was able to draw upon the civil population for its clerical requirements, as well as for a large proportion of its superior personnel. The Waqf Department came under the Judicial Secretary, questions of policy being considered by the *Majlis el 'Ilmi*, a Council of Arab religious authorities. There was also a Legislative Section and Translation Bureau, under a Legislative Draftsman, and an Advocate-General and Government Solicitor, for advisory work and for litigation.

The Civil Courts followed in general the organization of the former Nizamia Courts, which were themselves based on French models. Courts of First Instance of three judges were established at Baghdad, Hilla, Baquba, Basra, and Mosul. Each of these Courts was composed of a British President and two Mesopotamian Judges, subject to the exception that the second chamber of the Baghdad Court was presided over by a Mesopotamian Judge of the Jewish faith.

The Court of Appeal, under the Presidentship of a British Judge, sat

at Baghdad. Small Cause Courts, known as Peace Courts, were established in the principal Divisions. In the less settled Divisions civil justice was administered by political officers under special regulations.

Shar'ah Courts were reopened wherever a considerable Sunni population existed, to deal with questions of marriage, divorce, family relations, successions, and other questions of personal status relating to Sunni Mohammedans. A Court of Revision (*Mejlis Tamyiz*) for dealing with appeals from the Sunni Mohammedan Law Courts was established at Baghdad. It was composed of three Arab religious lawyers. Shi'ah jurists were attached to several of the Civil Courts, and, in cases arising between Shi'ahs, exercised a similar jurisdiction to that exercised by the Mahakim Shar'ah for Sunnis.

Criminal Courts in each Division consisted of:

(1) Sessions Courts of three Magistrates, presided over, in places where there was a Civil Court, by the President of the Court of First Instance, and elsewhere by a Magistrate of the First Class.

(2) Courts of Magistrates of the First, Second, and Third Class, who could pass sentences of imprisonment not exceeding respectively two years, six months, or one month.

Powers of confirmation and revision were exercised by the Civil Commissioner assisted by the Judicial Secretary.


It was the prerogative of the G.O.C.-in-Chief, acting on my advice, to confirm sentences of death and to exercise clemency. Only once was advice so tendered not accepted, and I have never ceased to regret that I did not make the occasion a question of confidence. When it first fell to me to perform this function, as an integral part of the legal system, I felt it my duty to attend several executions, and to hear in person whenever possible appeals for mercy of convicted persons and of their relatives. These often poignant experiences did not shake my conviction as to the necessity for capital punishment, but it helped me 'in the midst of judgment to remember mercy', and the procedure gave added weight in the public eye to the decision finally promulgated. It probably served to increase the number of reprieves, without detriment to the public safety.

The Law applied by the Criminal Courts was the Baghdad Penal Code, partially based on the Ottoman Penal Code, which itself derives from the Code Napoléon.

The Judicial Branch was exceedingly fortunate both in its first head, Lt.-Col. S. G. Knox of the Indian Political Department, a Barrister-at-Law, and a Judge of much experience, and in his successor, Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, who enjoyed great personal prestige, and was remarkably successful in building up on sound lines a legislative code which



SIR EDGAR BONHAM-CARTER
K.C.M.G., C.I.E.



stood the test of time so well that in it few important changes have since been made. 'Whatever', he wrote in January 1919, 'may be the shortcomings and defects of the judicial system, the plan drawn in General Maude's proclamation has been faithfully followed. The foundations of the fabric of justice have been laid under British supervision, but by Arab hands, on the firm rock of the native law and customs of the people.'

The Health Department dealt amongst other matters with Medical and Sanitary personnel, sanitation of towns, food and drink (quality and adulteration), registration of births and deaths, registration of medical practitioners, pharmacists, and midwives, epidemic diseases and vaccination, the pilgrim and corpse traffic from Persia and India, quarantine, lunacy, jails and reformatories.

The Education Department was not less fortunate than that of Justice in its Chief, H. E. Bowman of the Egyptian Education Department, later Director of Education in Palestine. His inspiring personality and his missionary zeal enabled him, in the demoralizing atmosphere of war, to organize his Department and recruit his staff almost exclusively in 'Iraq, having recourse to the Sudan and Egypt in only a few cases. In December 1918 we had 125 schoolmasters, by the end of 1919 some 300 were on the pay-roll. Commercial and Technical Education was not neglected, and before the end of the year a Training College for teachers had been established at Baghdad, followed in 1920 by a Law School.

To Major Bowman's initiative was due the establishment in the *sarai* of 'The Government Bookshop' under the late Mr. W. Mackenzie, who died in 1928 and was succeeded by his brother. Mr. Mackenzie was a book-lover as well as an expert bookseller; starting with a loan from the civil treasury, he obtained a large and extraordinarily comprehensive stock of books covering almost every department of general and technical literature; the demand exceeded his most sanguine expectations, and the business prospered greatly till in 1924 it was 'decontrolled' and acquired by Mr. Mackenzie on terms profitable alike to himself and to the 'Iraq Government.

Both from internal and external evidence there is no doubt that the system of education in Mesopotamia under the Turkish régime was far from satisfactory. It is true that Government Schools existed in all towns of importance, with Training Colleges in Baghdad, Mosul, and Basra, and Technical Schools in one or two centres. Over all was the Minister of Education at Constantinople, with a hierarchy of Mudirs with their head-quarters and inspecting staffs in each wilayat. Regulations dealing with curricula, discipline, attendance, &c.—all

excellent on paper—were in force, and to the outside observer at least it must have seemed that the Turks were at last beginning to pay a regard to education almost equal to that devoted to it in Europe and America.

The results of the system, as we found it, were deplorable. Almost without exception the youth of the country were without any real education; they could speak and write Turkish and had a nodding acquaintance with the elements of History, Geography, and Arithmetic, but were as a rule unable to write a letter in Arabic without grammatical and orthographical mistakes; of Mathematics and Science, of the History and Geography of the ancient and modern world, of Literature and of Art, they knew nothing.

From the early days of the occupation the education of the children of the country attracted our attention. Government Primary Schools had been reopened in Basra and the immediate neighbourhood in 1915, a Training College was instituted at Baghdad in 1917, with Primary Schools in Baghdad and elsewhere, and grants-in-aid voted to Denominational Schools¹ from 1916 onwards. But it was not until September 1918, when the Directorate was first formed, that an educational policy was framed and the system co-ordinated.

With this system behind us, it was no easy task to decide on the initial steps. It was obvious that the old system must be gradually eradicated, and something more solid and lasting erected in its place; but this meant time and money, and both were lacking. It was clearly the duty of Government to make a beginning with what material was available. It was decided to begin with Primary Education, and to open schools where the need seemed most pressing. The chief lack was efficient schoolmasters; most of the Turkish teachers had been absorbed by the war, and those that were left were of little use. The latter, however, were appointed whenever possible, and the American Mission at Basra and later the Training College at Baghdad were able to turn out men who, though far from efficient, were at any rate better than those trained under the Turks.

¹ I personally attached much importance to the maintenance and encouragement of denominational schools. I did not believe it possible or desirable to introduce a system of compulsory education on undenominational lines in State schools in a country in which racial and religious minorities had existed for twenty centuries or more, and whose civilization and educational system rested upon a religious basis. The idea of an *état unitaire* seemed neither practicable nor desirable. The broad lines agreed upon were as follows: (1) Schools to be administered by the religious heads: the head masters to be priests if so desired. (2) The scholastic programme to be subject to agreement between the Education Department and the religious leaders. (3) No teachers to be transferred without the consent of the religious leaders. (4) The books used to be subject to concurrence of the religious leaders.

This line of policy was followed without divergence up to the end of 1920; in spite of appeals and criticisms the Department resolutely refused to contemplate Secondary Education until assured firstly, that capable teachers were available, and secondly, that the human material at our disposal was sufficiently prepared to profit by it.

Secondary Education in 'Iraq was in its infancy, being confined to certain Denominational Schools, such as the Alliance Israélite Schools in Basra and Baghdad, the American Mission at Basra, and the Latin and Chaldean Schools in Baghdad. It was intended in time to develop Secondary Education in the larger towns and eventually to make the course in a Secondary School the principal route to Government Service.

Higher Education in the real sense hardly existed. But an attempt was made to give a more advanced form of training in certain directions, where circumstances indicated the need, notably in the Training College and the Commercial School, both of which were in Baghdad. In neither of these institutions had the student sufficient previous education to undergo a very advanced course, but the instruction given was on a wider basis than in other schools, and the courses, two years in the one case and three in the other, were arranged to fit the capacity of the students.

Female education was almost unknown under the Turks. The existing Girls' Schools were chiefly confined to those organized by certain denominational bodies, notably the Alliance Israélite and the French Sisters of Mercy; those for Muslim girls, numbering very few, were very backward, and were in fact little more than kindergartens. A beginning was made by Major Bowman on cautious lines, but it met with a mixed welcome. The supply of teachers was a very great difficulty. Muslim women of good family are not easily induced to leave their relations and to take up work in a community of strangers.

The Department lacked buildings, books, and furniture: none the less the zeal of the Director and his staff,¹ both British and Arab, and the popularity of the Department with all classes, compelled progress. Yet there can, I fear, be little doubt that in matters educational we went too fast. That we did so was not due to the Anglo-Saxon instinct for efficiency, nor to the infectious enthusiasm of Major Bowman, but to an insistent popular demand, which we felt bound to meet, in this as in other matters, to the best of our ability. The great problem was always to find teachers: their quality proved to be in inverse proportion to their numbers, and those who were loudest in their demands for

¹ The Department of Education was responsible, in September 1918, for organizing a very creditable Art Exhibition.

more schools were the first to criticize the type of teacher who was sent to inaugurate the new régime.

The medium of instruction in the majority of Elementary and Primary Schools was Arabic. Turkish, Persian, or Kurdish was, however, substituted for Arabic in districts in which those languages are paramount. Arabic was taught in the latter districts as a second language, while English was introduced only in those places where a real need for it existed.

The question of religious instruction was one of considerable difficulty. On the one hand, it was urged that a British Administration should not countenance any religious instruction of a type not definitely Christian, and that, should this seem inexpedient in a mainly Muslim country, it would be better to omit it altogether. On the other hand, recent experience seemed to show that a syllabus containing no religious teaching lacked certain elements essential to the upbringing of a child, and that what was known as 'undenominational teaching', or instruction in mere ethical and moral principles, failed in its object owing to its unavoidable vagueness and lack of definitely religious basis. The Civil Administration, taking up its stand on the latter argument, laid down its policy, which was to teach to each child the religion of its parents. This policy, though severely criticized in some quarters, met with general approval.

An attempt was made, not without success, to draw up a religious syllabus for Muslims which was intended to be applicable to Sunnis and Shia'hs alike. The syllabus was accepted without demur in all places where either Sunni pupils alone or Sunni and Shia'hs together were assembled, though objections were raised to it in one of the exclusively Shia'h centres. For schools with a quarter or more of the pupils belonging to another denomination, a teacher was engaged at Government expense; where the number was less, arrangements were made whereby the pupils could have religious instruction either in their homes or in the school, but in this case the teacher's salary, if any, was found by the parents. In the Government Christian Schools at Mosul the religious syllabus was drawn up by the Head Priest, and was not interfered with by the Administration. Needless to say, no boy belonging to one denomination was compelled to attend the religious instruction of another; but in principle every boy in a Government School was obliged to receive instruction in his own faith for as many hours as were laid down in the time-table.¹

Major Bowman's compelling zeal extended beyond the classrooms and workshops. Troops of Boy Scouts were organized, each with its own uniform and distinguishing badge, within each religious com-

¹ See Bowman, H. E., *Memorandum on Educational Policy*, 1919.

munity, and every effort made to inculcate 'the scout spirit'. The movement was not universally popular, and its inception was beset by the perils that surround new methods in old countries, but it was at first prolific of new ideas and a sense of discipline, of which the youth of 'Iraq, as of other countries, is ever in need.

I have described the work of the Department of Education at some length, not only in view of its intrinsic importance, but because it seems to me to show, even more clearly than that of other Departments, the spirit in which the administration approached the Herculean task of creating a new State and a new nation.

Under the Turks every boy attending school was compelled to wear the local travesty of European dress and a fez, to salute the Turkish flag, and to receive instruction in Turkish. We encouraged Arab dress, and the Arabic or other mother tongue of the pupils. There was, as yet, no flag to salute, and we did not substitute the British for the Turkish flag, nor was any political officer, or even the Civil Commissioner, entitled to fly the Union Jack; that was the prerogative of the Army of Occupation, and of the Commander-in-Chief. Wherever it was possible, amid the uncertainties of international politics, to give the administration a definitely national and indigenous bias, we did so. I doubt whether in any circumstances a more rapid move towards the goal of an Arab Government could have succeeded. The fabric of society had been shaken to its foundations, which were less deeply rooted in convention and custom than those of the Commonwealths of Europe. As Pindar says (*Pyth.* iv. 12):

'Mean men a state may shake;
But 'twere a giant's task to make
Secure the shaken state again,
Unless the kindly God should guide
For mortal hand the ruling rein.'

I have deferred until a late stage of my narrative any detailed reference to the joint activities of the Army of Occupation and of the Civil Administration in regard to the execution of detailed surveys, the construction of railways, and the growth of Basra from an anchorage in a large river to a well-equipped modern port.

In each case the work was planned and carried out on a scale which, but for the peculiar circumstances of the war, would have been wholly beyond the resources of the country. It was essential for military purposes; had it not been undertaken the Turks could not have been driven from 'Iraq. The Civil Administration and, at a later stage, the 'Iraq Government, thus inherited from the army assets of great value and of immediate utility, to pay for which at the most moderate valuation was far beyond the financial capacity of the country.

Amongst these assets must be reckoned the work of the Survey of India,¹ which from the outset provided the personnel for the military survey-parties and at a later stage for the Civil Administration. During the first six months of 1914 a Boundary Commission was engaged in demarcating the frontier between Turkey and Persia from Fao northwards. To this Commission was attached a Survey Party under Lt.-Col. Ryder of the Survey of India; this party mapped a narrow strip of country on either side of the frontier from Fao to Ararat. They little foresaw the military importance that would attach to their maps a few months later.

Towards the end of December 1914, Lt.-Col. Pirrie, of the Survey of India, arrived with two surveyors, and soon after commenced a systematic system of triangulation and of detailed mapping of areas of military importance, which was extended in every direction whenever practicable. Colonel Pirrie, who was in charge of these operations almost continuously from the beginning to the end of 1920, set a most soldierly example by his endurance of hardship, his determination in the face of difficulties, and his readiness to tackle every kind of work with his own hands whenever the occasion offered. He was always in the closest touch with Sir Percy Cox or myself, and it is pleasant to look back upon his professional enthusiasm to survey and map an area the moment that the military or political situation made it possible to do so without grave risk.

For the first two years surveys were limited for the most part to the vicinity of the Tigris and the Euphrates. In the lower reaches of these rivers the banks are lined with palm-trees restricting the view on either side for a distance of from one to three miles. Beyond the belt of palms, low-lying desert, liable to inundation, extends for many miles. The effect of mirage is such as to render distant low-lying objects invisible or to distort them in appearance; they are thus useless as landmarks. North of Qurna great areas are covered by marshes, north of 'Amara even greater areas are waterless in summer, but inundated and impassable in winter. Accurate surveys made in such circumstances demand special qualities of endurance and enthusiasm, which were displayed by no branch of the force in more ample measure than by Colonel Pirrie's assistants, both British and Indian.

To these activities Sir Percy Lake referred in his dispatch of 12th August 1918 in the following terms:

'The Survey Department has performed valuable, if unostentatious work, often under very adverse conditions.

'A noticeable feature of the work has been the entire absence of friction with the peculiarly uncertain elements of the population, settled and nomad, of the

¹ For further details see *Records of the Survey of India*, vol. xx, 1925, and Hubbard.

tracts surveyed; a fact which speaks as highly for the professional advice and assistance rendered by the Political Department as for the tact and intelligence exercised by the Survey Staff.'

When the first advance was made to Ctesiphon in 1915 Colonel Pirrie begged for permission to press forward his surveys from 'Ali Gharbi northwards. Sir John Nixon felt unable to supply the escorts which would have been necessary owing to the hostility of the Arab tribes. As a result of this decision it was impossible to make an accurate survey of the area between Shaikh Sa'ad and Kut, and this explains why, in January 1916 and during the subsequent desperate attempts to relieve General Townshend's force, the army was dependent on hasty reconnaissances and air sketches. It was thus not the fault of the Survey parties that the Army was not provided with maps, and the aspersions of the Official History on the accuracy of the maps supplied (Moberly ii. 322) must be read in the light of this explanation. Though Sir John Nixon probably had no option but to refuse military escorts, there are reasons for thinking that tribal escorts could at this period have been obtained, had the political officers with the force been instructed to provide them. Some risk was inevitable, and was worth taking, but Sir John Nixon in his optimism seems to have disregarded the possibility of a reverse. Had even preliminary triangulation been carried out, its value later on as a basis for air photography would have been priceless.

A point of minor importance to the conduct of the war, but one which distressed certain experts, was the spelling of names. Both officers and men failed lamentably to distinguish between such letters as *g* and *q*. However, the fiat went forth, and the coughed-up guttural of Mesopotamia became the finished *q* of polite Arabia. Magasis, the mud fort, became Maqassis, with visions of marble halls. Shaikh Gadban, the throat-slitter, became Ghadhdban, the potentate! It became the duty of the Survey of India to keep its maps clean in this respect. But when the frivolous soldiery busied themselves with the manufacture of new names, or sought out the authority of the Bible in christening small features in the desert with such names as the 'Pools of Siloam', 'Lot's Wife', the 'Tower of Babel', and the 'Pillar of Salt', the matter became more serious, and the Survey of India had to assume the duties of strict censorship. It was, therefore, with the utmost delight that the army found that Sodom and Gomorrah, those ancient cities of iniquity, whose charred remains are said to lie beneath the waters of the Dead Sea, had been born again in Mesopotamia. First entered on a 3rd Divisional sketch by a facetious reconnoitrer, they became accepted by the general staff and corps head-quarters. Officers and men wrote home of the glories of the past. The fame of the re-

discovered cities grew. More than a year afterwards, these names escaped the blue pencil in India and they found their way on to the 1/M sheet 2. Sodom had now become Fort Sodom; Gomorrah was Indianized to 'Gomarah'.¹

The development of air photography in other theatres was watched in Mesopotamia with envy. In the early days there were no machines available, and when a few arrived they could not be spared for systematic photography. Early in 1916, however, a start was made, and some experience gained, and at a later stage in the campaign such surveys assumed great importance.

By taking advantage of the political situation whenever possible, the survey of practically the whole area in our occupation in Southern Mesopotamia—to Kut on the Tigris, to Nasiriya and beyond on the Euphrates, to Dizful and Shushtar north of Ahwaz on the Karun, and from Umm Qasr to Kuwait on the Persian Gulf—was finished when the troops entered Baghdad. The total area thus surveyed on the half-inch or larger scales since January 1915 was over 13,000 square miles.²

Our subsequent victories led to a great extension of survey responsibilities, for not only was there the whole length of communications from Kut to Baghdad to be triangulated and mapped, but a connexion from Baghdad to the Persian boundary, to the Euphrates, and to Samarra, became desirable. At the same time, accurate operation and position maps of the new battle-fronts were urgently required, in view of a possible Turkish counter-offensive.

Colonel Pirrie organized a new centre of triangulation near Baghdad, from which radiated a series of triangles in all the main directions. This centre was later connected with the system based on Basra, and extended to Kirmanshah, Mosul, Dair-*ez-Zor* and Aleppo.

Shortly after the Armistice two levelling detachments were sent out from India to run a series of levels in areas in which the Irrigation Department was likely to work. The total output was about 1,000 miles of simultaneous double levelling, in the course of which the height of about 900 bench marks were determined. The results were printed in a levelling pamphlet published in India at Dehra Dun. The outcome of these and other activities, such as the preparation of detailed surveys from air photographs of the principal towns, was that the new State of 'Iraq started life with a complete system of major and minor

¹ At last, in 1925, these names were expunged from Indian maps. Their brief glory has departed, though they still have a certain vogue amongst the Germans, who always paid the Survey of India the compliment of copying its maps wholesale. This footnote and the paragraph to which it refers are taken from *Records of the Survey of India*, vol. xx, p. 13.

² General Maude's dispatch of 10.4.1917.

triangulation covering the whole country, with accurate knowledge of levels along the main rivers and of the principal irrigable areas, and with accurate surveys on the half-inch and one-inch scales of practically all cultivable areas and of the frontier regions. In this respect 'Iraq is to-day better off than any Asiatic State except British India. Accurate surveys are an indispensable preliminary for economic development of any sort. The scientific foundations were well and truly laid, and a body of competent 'Iraqi surveyors trained to carry on the work. Time will show whether the 'Iraq Government is able to make use of this and other assets which it has inherited from the patient labours of those who blazed the trail of progress in earlier days. Enough has been said to show that no pains were spared to ensure that the scientific knowledge of the west should be applied from the outset and its results available for the public benefit.

One of my first preoccupations at home was to find the right man to take over from the Army the responsibility for Public Works and Communications in Mesopotamia, including Irrigation, Railways, and the Port of Basra. It was necessary that he should be a soldier, as the whole existing mechanism was military; it was important that he should be a man of established reputation and high rank, to enable him to deal with the military departments on equal terms; it was desirable that he should not have served in 'Iraq during the war, so that he could approach our problems with a fresh mind. Sir George Macdonogh, whom I consulted at the War Office, suggested that Maj.-Gen. (later Sir Edwin) Atkinson, who had served with great distinction in France, was the best possible selection, if he could be induced to accept the post. I saw him at once, and outlined the nature of the task that was in store for him. He agreed to come out as Secretary for Public Works, on the understanding that Communications would come under him in due course. His arrival towards the end of 1919 completed the list of Secretaries to the Civil Commissioners in the various departments. They were men that any Government might count itself lucky to have at the head of affairs.

General Atkinson had scarcely time to do more than formulate his plans for a joint Civil and Military Works Department, and to make a thorough examination of the great area for which he was responsible, before the outbreak of disturbances in 1920. His organizing capacity so commended itself to the G.O.C.-in-Chief that he borrowed General Atkinson from me to take charge of a column operating northwards from Basra. He was too big a man to remain for long in 'Iraq, and in 1921 he was appointed Director of Military Works in India, and later Master-General of Supply.

In addition to the four 'Secretaries to Government' named above,

I appointed Lt.-Col. W. R. Battye of the Indian Medical Service on 1st April 1919, as Secretary for Health. It was intended that he should gradually build up an organization which might under the new Government become a fully-fledged Ministry on the lines of the Ministry of Health which was constituted in Great Britain in that year. It was my ambition gradually to develop a really efficient state medical service which should clean up the country, destroying the conditions, especially in the towns, which create disease, and at the same time, jointly with the Education Department, teach the people how to prevent the recurrence of the appalling epidemics which had prevailed in the past.

It was, of course, impossible to do very much except at large centres; we could not afford to pay the staff, nor were local practitioners available in anything like adequate numbers, though we set about training them in earnest long before the Armistice.

It is to be remembered that from 1904 to 1920 'Iraq had been visited with a continuous succession of severe epidemics, to some of which I have referred in a previous work. The death-rate had been heavy, the suffering terrible. Plague, cholera, smallpox, and typhus had in turn played havoc in Basra and Baghdad, as well as in other centres; malaria had become more acute than before the war, probably owing to the infection of the local mosquito with the virus of more severe forms imported by troops from India and elsewhere. I had been a constant visitor to all civil hospitals from the outset of the campaign. The sights that I saw and the vivid reports which reached me from every district of the inefficiency and degradation caused by ignorance and lack of medical attention, made a deep impression on my mind. Familiarity with the awful toll of human suffering, which is the true key-note of daily life in Asia, made me desire above all else to put medicine and sanitation in the forefront of our administrative programme. Without a considered scheme of hygiene, energetically administered, money spent on education would be largely wasted, and our efforts in every other channel of human endeavour would be thwarted. There was good reason to think that the population of 'Iraq had been slowly decreasing for many decades: medical and sanitary measures rather than irrigation works were a primary need.

Great progress had been made during the war. Medical officers on duty with units at out-stations had been untiring in their efforts to serve the civil population: under pressure of military necessity the principal towns had been cleansed and several provided with a supply of clean drinking-water—though the process of chlorination, often imperfectly performed, sometimes produced a fluid so heavily impregnated that the population preferred, not unreasonably, the old ways

to the new. The medical officers lent to the Civil Administration were enthusiastic and of a high average of skill. Had a Rockefeller come forward at this juncture, we might have worked wonders. The disturbances of 1920 put an end to Colonel Battye's well-laid schemes, as to many others: we could not afford to do more than maintain at the largest centres a skeleton cadre, composed in the main of specialists, including a few civil Matrons and Nursing Sisters, most of whom we obtained through the good offices of the devoted and competent Matron-in-Chief of the M.E.F., Miss Beatrice Jones, now, alas, no more. It is nevertheless well, ten years later, to place on record the ideas which underlay the comparatively large sums which were provided under the heading of Medical and Sanitary Services in our early budgets—a provision which in later years excited the wrath of the exponents of the 'back to Basra' policy.

I have referred elsewhere to the construction for war purposes, under the supervision of Sir George Buchanan, of wharves and sheds at Ma'qil, four miles above Basra, at an inclusive cost of about £750,000. These wharves,¹ which were later connected with the Basra-Baghdad railway, had a continuous frontage on the river of 4,000 feet, and enabled six ocean-going steamers to be discharged simultaneously. They were made of teak, and should last till 1950 or longer. Other wharves were made at Nahr 'Umar, seventeen miles up-stream from Basra, and at the Khora Creek, below 'Ashar, but these were lightly built and designed only for temporary purposes. The decision to build wharves at Ma'qil was from the first made inevitable by the course of the deep channel of the Shatt-al-'Arab, which here and nowhere else runs for some two miles close under the right bank of the river instead of in mid-stream.² The site was so situated that it could be linked without difficulty with the Basra-Nasiriya and Basra-Qurna-'Amara railway lines, and it was convenient for transshipment of goods and troops to river steamers. A concrete road, running from Ma'qil to Basra and Ashar, linked the new port with the older mercantile centre.

The management of the port was from an early stage in its existence in the hands of Commander J. C. Ward of the Royal Indian Marine, who, when his Department was absorbed by the Inland Water Trans-

¹ The Special Correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, Sir Percival Phillips, in a pamphlet published in 1923, has made the port of Basra the excuse for the fiercest denunciation of 'the military mind'. He ignored, or was ignorant of, Sir John Hewett's report, or the references to the subject in the report of the Mesopotamia Commission; the statements of facts contained in his pamphlet are usually erroneous, his deductions puerile, and I will not waste a drop of ink, or the patience of my readers, in rescuing his views or those of others of his kidney from a salutary oblivion.

² The locality had for this reason been selected in 1911 by the agents of the Anatolian Railway Company for the transshipment of heavy railway material for Baghdad.

port Department, became for the period of the war Temporary Lt.-Col. of the Royal Engineers, which rank he has since retained. The control of the port was, until May 1919, vested exclusively in the Inspector-General of Communications. From that date till 1st April 1920, Lt.-Col. Ward was responsible to the civil and military authorities jointly. On 1st April 1920 the control was handed over to the Civil Administration, which was unquestionably most fortunate in inheriting not only the Port, and the whole machinery for the control of the Shatt-al-'Arab and the bar, but also the staff to manage it. J. C. Ward, who is still (1931) Port Director and Director-General of Navigation, was a man of outstanding capacity: indeed, in departmental administration he ranks in my estimation second only to Prescott. Both were officials of the Government of India, and in common with the great majority of their fellows were welcomed by Arabs both as heads of departments and as colleagues. There was never an allegation more utterly groundless than that made (by men who had never served in India or in 'Iraq) that British officers from India were by training and temperament unfit for service in Arab lands. Ward had acquired some experience of Port management before the war whilst in the Royal Indian Marine, from which service Port Officers are furnished to the principal Indian ports, and he was quick to apply it to the novel conditions of Basra, and to familiarize himself with every form of activity connected with his work, which soon extended to the survey of the river, the dredging of the bar, and the management of various lighthouses and buoys in the Persian Gulf. In the course of a few years he converted a machine designed solely for military needs into an efficient civil organization, which has from the first been self-supporting but is rendering services at a substantially lower rate than most ports of the same type in the East. The primary object of the Port Administration during the war had been to minimize the time spent by ships in harbour; shipping was so scarce that no expenditure of money was grudged to this end. For some years after the war the need for a speedy turn-round was almost as urgent, and no effort was spared to maintain and even to improve upon the standard set during the war. The railway lay-out was improved, the transit area and warehouses completed, and every facility given to merchants to tranship their goods direct from the port warehouses to river-steamers or to the railway for dispatch to Baghdad and beyond. The inherent difficulties of the task were increased by extraneous factors, amongst which must be reckoned the reluctance of the commercial community, both British and Arab, to accept the new system and to make the best use of it. This was due less to mere obscurantism than to the fact that the firms principally concerned had invested large sums of money before the war on the

foreshore in the vicinity of Ashar below Ma'qil, and in river transport. The construction of the wharves at Ma'qil and the completion of the railway tended to depreciate these assets. There were other vested interests too, which suffered; the old grain-market was abandoned, and merchants found it cheaper to store their goods at Ma'qil than in Basra. Motor-boats took the place of *ballams*, and motor-cars ousted the donkeys of Bahrain and the two-horse shay of unregretted memory. Such changes are the inevitable concomitant of progress, and it is greatly to the credit of the 'Iraqi mercantile community as a whole that in these directions as in so many others they readily adapted themselves to modern methods.

The bar has now (1931) been fully dredged, to an average depth on the centre line of 20 feet at low water, which gives with a normal rise of 10 feet at high water, a navigable depth of 30 feet. The total amount of material removed in the process up to the end of 1930 is estimated at some 15,000,000 tons.

The trade of Basra itself shows no tendency to increase, as the former extensive through traffic to Persia via Baghdad is being to some extent diverted into other channels, but there is a steady increase in the number of ships entering the Shatt-al-'Arab, owing to the increase of traffic at Abadan.

This is not the place to deal at greater length with the growth of the port of Basra or with the navigation of the Shatt-al-'Arab. Here, and here only in 'Iraq, have developments proceeded generally on the lines laid down in 1919-20. The results are financially satisfactory, and had it been possible to embark upon a programme of capital expenditure on irrigation-works, concurrently with moderate expenditure on agricultural research and animal husbandry, there is little doubt that they would have been even more remunerative. This much is certain, that the foresight of Sir George Buchanan, the original author of the scheme, and those associated with him, and of the Civil Administration, which made itself responsible in 1919-20 for its completion, has been amply justified by results.

CHAPTER VIII

THE ROYAL ARMY CHAPLAINS' DEPARTMENT, THE Y.M.C.A., THE CHURCH ARMY, THE CANTEENS, AND THE IMPERIAL WAR GRAVES COMMISSION

'This is the only mode in which, in my opinion, we can touch these meetings. The meeting of soldiers in their cantonments to sing psalms, or hear a sermon read by one of their comrades, is, in the abstract, perfectly innocent; and it is a better way of spending their time than many others to which they are addicted; but it may become otherwise: and yet, till the abuse has made some progress, the Commanding Officer would have no knowledge of it, nor could he interfere. Even at last his interference must be guided by discretion, otherwise he will do more harm than good; and it can in no case be so effectual as that of a respectable clergyman. I wish, therefore, you would turn your mind a little more to this subject, and arrange some plan by which the number of respectable and efficient clergymen with the army may be increased.'

The DUKE OF WELLINGTON to the Adjt.-Gen. of the Forces, 6th February 1811.

The supply of Chaplains. Episcopal visitations. Ecclesiastical Reorganization. General Maude's attitude towards religious observance. His last hours. Christian refugees. The Church Army. Christian principles and the Civil Administration. The Y.M.C.A. The Order of St. John of Jerusalem. The British Red Cross. The Joint War Committees. Expeditionary Force Canteens. The Imperial War Graves Commission. The Basra War Memorial. The Maude Memorial.

THE spiritual and cultural needs of the Army in Mesopotamia did not differ materially from those of other armies in the field during the Great War, but all the circumstances surrounding this campaign endowed this side of army life with added importance. The troops, particularly the British units, were almost completely cut off from home and from home traditions. Home leave, so liberally granted in France, was an impossibility: letters took from five to eight weeks in each direction. The amenities of life were, for the first two years, almost completely lacking and were at no time available except to a small proportion.

At the beginning of the war the campaign in Mesopotamia was, as explained elsewhere, under the control of the Government of India. The Indian Ecclesiastical Establishment was the only agency of the Government and of the Churches which could supply chaplains to the Force; it was barely equal to the task of meeting peace requirements and was wholly unable to provide for the needs of a large expeditionary force. In 1914 there was one Chaplain for the whole Force—the Rev. M. A. Kirwan; it is no exaggeration to say that the effort to do his duty under impossible conditions caused his death. When the Bishop

of Lahore, Dr. H. B. Durrant, visited Mesopotamia in September 1915 there were four Chaplains, the Rev. Ormond W. Birch¹ of Calcutta (with the 15th Division), the Rev. A. Tibbs of Bombay at Basra, the Rev. H. Spooner of Calcutta and the Rev. H. N. Bridge of Madras (with the 6th Division).

'It was little enough that we could do,' wrote Dr. Durrant, who was present at the first battle of Kut.

'The High Command were in the fullest sympathy with us and our work, and could not have been kinder and more helpful. General Townshend, in particular, was anxious to hold a great massed service just before the advance on Kut, the biggest operation in the campaign up to that point, and this was held at Sannaiyat somewhere about September 20th. It was, of course, held out in the open, with the whole force formed in a hollow square, and an aeroplane hovering overhead. I shall never forget that Evensong at which I had the privilege of giving the address. . . . Each morning that week we had celebrations of the Holy Communion in different parts of the great camp and a great number of officers and men made their Communion.'

Of the many men confirmed during the Bishop's visit a large proportion was killed in the subsequent fighting.

The Rev. H. Spooner was one of the Kut garrison, and of him General Townshend wrote (p. 314): 'He was a great help to me in the siege, for he was always cheery and brave under fire; he was loved by the men. I shall always have the greatest respect, esteem and affection for him.' Lieutenant Bishop writes (p. 25): 'A feature of Kut which will not be forgotten was the little chapel which our padre rigged up in one of the few remaining upper rooms of the battered *sarai*. . . . He was indefatigable doing everything he possibly could in the hospitals in addition to his other duties.' Nor are these the only contemporary tributes to his zeal and competence. A Roman Catholic chaplain, known to the garrison as 'Father Tim',² was also in the besieged town. During the retreat from Ctesiphon the chaplains could do little but help the doctors to alleviate the miseries of the wounded.

'I came down the river', writes the Bishop of Lahore, 'on a P. boat—a name that will evoke memories of horror in many a man who was wounded in Mesopotamia—with 180 very badly wounded men and officers—all stretcher cases. We had no beds, and the men lay on straw so close together that it was difficult to get round without treading on them. They got bed-sores long before we reached Basra. . . . There were two doctors, men whose utter devotion I shall remember with admiration all my life, and one nursing orderly. . . . all I could do was to take my coat off and give myself almost wholly to doing what an untrained man could do to help the experts in caring for the suffering.'

¹ Mentioned in Sir Percy Lake's dispatch of 30.4.16.

² See Mousley, p. 97.

It was the Bishop's function to consecrate isolated graves.

'What sticks in my memory', he writes on this subject, 'is the attitude of the men towards their dead comrades. No trouble was too great for them, and of their own free will they have marched with me mile after mile across the desert, under the blistering Mesopotamian sun, looking for places where some of their comrades fell, and when we got there standing reverently to attention while I blessed the grave and committed the soul of the man whose body lay there to the hands of God.'

Of the work of the Chaplains on the Tigris during the early part of 1916 there is to the best of my knowledge no extant record: it is briefly summarized in Sir Percy Lake's dispatch of 30th April 1916, in the following terms: 'I am anxious to place on record my deep sense of the good effect produced throughout this force by the Army Chaplains of all denominations, whose devotion to duty and contempt of danger whilst performing it deserve the highest commendation.'

To such words of praise it remains only to add that up to the end of 1916 ten Chaplains had been mentioned in despatches, one (Rev. W. R. F. Addison)¹ had been awarded the V.C. and one (Rev. O. W. Birch)² the Military Cross: one (Rev. R. H. Fulford) was killed in action on 15th December of that year.

When in July 1916, in circumstances fully dealt with elsewhere, the War Office assumed administrative responsibility for the campaign in Mesopotamia, the Rev. A. C. E. Jarvis (later Chaplain General to the Forces), who had served in Gallipoli and Egypt, was sent out to report on the Chaplain's Department. He found that his branch of the service was as understaffed and inconveniently organized as were most of the others. The Church of England Chaplains were under the Bishop of the Diocese in India from whence they came, and were liable to recall for civilian work by their Bishops at any time. The status and duties of the Principal Chaplain (Rev. E. O. Jervis) were not clearly defined. Questions of rank were causing difficulty, not because the chaplains themselves were interested in such matters, but because these details made it difficult to secure a simple working organization. The Chaplains sent to Mesopotamia from the Indian Ecclesiastical Establishment were subject to Army Regulations, India, which state that: 'The

¹ For most conspicuous bravery. He carried a wounded man to the cover of a trench, and assisted several others to the same cover, after binding up their wounds under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire.

In addition to these unaided efforts, by his splendid example and utter disregard of personal danger, he encouraged the stretcher-bearers to go forward under heavy fire and collect the wounded. Subsequent to the award he was twice wounded in action.—*London Gazette*, 26th September 1916. He is now (1931) Chaplain to the Forces at Shoeburyness.

² Now (1931) Canon of Calcutta Cathedral.

Chaplains in India are not Military Chaplains, and hence are not subject to the Military Authorities. They are Chaplains of Stations, not of Regiments; but wherever troops are stationed, their spiritual wants have the first claim upon the time and attention of the Chaplains.' The regulations as to seniority amongst them differed from those in force in the Royal Army Chaplains' Department, which had supplied a number of clergy of various denominations to the force. It is, however, due to the Chaplains from India to place on record here that, taken as a whole, they commanded more influence with all ranks than did the majority of those from home, who for the most part lacked experience with troops. A radical change was, however, necessary, and General Maude was not slow to introduce a better organization, which was placed under Rev. A. C. E. Jarvis, who succeeded the Rev. E. O. Jervis as Principal Chaplain. All Chaplains and missionaries from India were transferred temporarily or for the duration of the war to the Royal Army Chaplains' Department on condition that they suffered no disability as to status and pay and that their service towards pension counted as though they had continued in the Indian Ecclesiastical Establishment. This obviated dual and multiple control; for the period of the war the Church Militant was united. Reinforcements were provided from home on condition that an agreed number of men from India were continuously employed, their replacements being provided from India. A reserve was provided and retained in Bombay, and placed at the disposal of the Military Authorities there for temporary employment. This was essential owing to the 8,000 miles which separated us from the Home Base. All Chaplains of the Royal Army Chaplains' Department except the Principal Chaplain were placed on a consolidated rate of pay. All Hospital Ships running between Basra and Bombay were placed under the jurisdiction of the Principal Chaplain for spiritual oversight. The care of the Cemeteries and the custody of all Burial Records and Registers was the duty of the Principal Chaplain, and this continued until the appearance of the Graves Registration Commission.

With these preliminaries agreed upon and made effective, the new system of administration gradually evolved. There was no precedent, because Mesopotamia from beginning to end presented difficulties peculiar to itself.

The Principal Chaplain attached to General Head-quarters was responsible for the spiritual and moral welfare of the Command, with sole administrative authority over all denominations. Five Senior Chaplains of Denominations to the Forces were appointed and graded as Chaplain to the Forces 1st Class (temporary)—i. e. Church of England, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, Wesleyan, and United

Board—one to each communion. They had pastoral charge of a unit or formation, and were generally stationed at the Base. Their duty was to advise the Principal Chaplain on denominational questions, and to supervise and co-ordinate the work of the Chaplains of their own denominations. For this purpose they were allowed a periodic tour of inspection. In each area the Chaplain senior in rank of each of the recognized denominations was regarded as Senior Chaplain to the Forces of his own denomination within the area. His duty was to see to it that adequate facilities for worship and spiritual care were provided for every man according to his faith.

This system worked smoothly, and enabled the Chaplains' Department to keep in systematic touch with every unit in the Force. In one direction, however, it proved inadequate. One of the most surprising developments in India—that country of surprises—was the number of Indian Christians, children of our Missionary Societies, who responded to the recruiting appeal in India and Ceylon. This created a new situation altogether. After prolonged negotiation five Indian Chaplains were appointed—two Church of England, one Presbyterian, one Wesleyan, one by the United Board. They did good work, and won the esteem of all.

General Maude's interest in the work of the Chaplains attached to his force—an interest to which the Bishop of Nagpur bears testimony (p. 87)—did not arise merely from his workmanlike desire to ensure that every part of the machine at his command should be fitted to the task required of it. It sprang from the lifelong practices of religious exercises and from those deep convictions which made him kin with Sir Philip Sidney, General Gordon, Sir Charles Colley, Lord Roberts, Lord Haig, and many another great leader of men in battle. He was persistent in inquiry, unflinching in solicitude, in all that concerned the Chaplains' Department, and the spiritual and moral welfare of the men, and insisted from the first on an adequate establishment of Chaplains. 'He was', writes General Ready, 'a deeply religious man; few, if any, Sundays passed that he did not attend an early celebration of the Holy Communion.'¹ He was at pains to attend an administration of the Lord's Supper immediately before the great advance on Baghdad commenced, and remained in the tent long after the service in silent prayer.

Of General Maude's last hours the Rev. A. C. E. Jarvis writes: 'He died as he had lived. The simplicity of his life was reflected in everything about him, the ordinary camp bed, the army blankets—he never carried more than the normal officer's kit allowance. For physical reasons he could not partake of the elements of the Sacrament; but, delirious and semi-delirious as he was for the

¹ Callwell, p. 306.

greater part of the time, he knew that he was in the presence of the Reserved Sacrament; he joined in all the prayers and, suffering as he did, the calm joyous peace light which irradiated his face betokened that, whilst temporal shadows were receding, the glory of the spiritual world was already becoming more real.

'At the end it was all very beautiful. His immediate personal staff, the doctors, nurses and orderly stood round the bed. Outside the measured tread of the Gurkha guard. A peaceful calm filled the room. I began the service of Commendation at five minutes past six, and at twenty-five minutes past, just as I was uttering the words:

"Rest Eternal grant to him, O Lord,
And let Light Everlasting shine upon him",

he peacefully entered Paradise.¹

I have felt justified in dwelling in this chapter upon the religious beliefs and observances of General Maude, as known to us from published documents, not because they were peculiar to himself, but because they are representative, in my belief, of the inner feelings of many men of all ranks. I have quoted the Principal Chaplain's account of General Maude's last hours, because the same observances, the same beliefs, and the same consolation, marked the last hours of very many hundreds of dying men, and helped to sustain thousands of men of all denominations wounded in spirit as well as in body, in the course of the campaign.

'The Englishman', wrote Milton,² 'of many other nations is least atheistical, and bears a natural disposition of much reverence and awe towards the Deity; but in his weakness and want of better instruction . . . he may fall not unlikely sometimes, as any other landman, into an uncouth opinion.'

To very many soldiers there is nothing incongruous in the spectacle of the sword hanging stark upon the sharply outlined cross of a War Memorial. Both are to him symbols of sacrifice. This is no place for theological discussion, but it is appropriate here to suggest that the generally negative and always slovenly criticisms of the practice of organized religion in the field that have appeared in recent years in books purporting to represent the views of soldiers should be received with caution. I am far from suggesting that only untrained minds accept the negative conclusion, but I am confident that the number of those whose unspoken beliefs and silent desires find their best expression in organized religion is greater than a superficial observer may be led to suppose.

The flight to Mesopotamia (see Chapter II) of some 50,000 Christian refugees created fresh problems for the Chaplains' Department. With them came their Bishops, Priests and Deacons, Nestorian,

¹ Callwell, p. 311.

² *Against Prelaty.*

Chaldean, Armenian, Orthodox and Armenian Catholic. They, too, for spiritual oversight came within the jurisdiction of the Principal Chaplain. The problem of finding a Senior Chaplain for each of the ancient Churches of the East from amongst the Refugee Bishops at Baquba was only one of the questions which the Principal Chaplain was called upon to solve. The climax was perhaps reached when he was charged with the duty of arranging for the consecration of a Patriarch (Mar Shimun having been killed by the Turks). The late Patriarch's hereditary successor was a layman, and this involved a service extending from Saturday morning until Sunday midday, and proceeding as it did through each of the nine Orders of this particular Church.

In August 1916 and again in 1919 the Bishop of Nagpur, the Rt. Rev. E. Chatterton, D.D., made episcopal visitations to Mesopotamia. His experiences are recorded in two pamphlets.¹ He, too, confirmed several hundred men, besides some fifty Baghdad Christians, and consecrated both cemeteries and isolated graves. These visitations were of real value, both to the Chaplains and to the Army; they also helped to impress upon the local religious communities in Mesopotamia that the Church of England, too, had its religious hierarchy, to whom no less respect was due from and was paid by all ranks in the Army than was paid to the high priests of the Eastern confessions.

The Bishop of Nagpur mentions in one of his pamphlets that when Ibn Sa'ud was being brought to Basra by a British warship, he asked leave to be present at Divine Service on Sunday, which was conducted in the absence of a Naval Chaplain by Rear-Admiral Sir D. St. A. Wake. Ibn Sa'ud is reported to have expressed his appreciation alike of the reverence shown by the congregation, and of the fact that the Admiral himself conducted it. Let none underrate the effect of the incident upon the mind of a man who was at once our ally and the titular head of the most powerful body of Muslims that exists to-day.

To Sir Percy Lake's testimony to the work done by the Chaplains should be added that of his successors. General Maude wrote (10.4.17) —'The Chaplains—always to the fore where danger calls—have been untiring in their attention to the spiritual needs of the troops and in their ministrations to the sick and wounded, not only in the field ambulance and hospitals, but also on the battlefield.' General Marshall recorded his approval in the following terms (29.8.18)—'The Chaplains of all denominations have continued to devote themselves to the spiritual welfare of the troops, and have carried out their duties to my

¹ *Two months with the Troops in Mesopotamia*. Government Press, Nagpur, 1917. *Mesopotamia revisited*. Government Press, Nagpur, 1919.

entire satisfaction. I am indebted also to the Church Army¹ for the provision of tents for social and religious purposes, which have not only afforded opportunities for recreation to the troops, but have assisted the chaplains in their work.'

These are not perfunctory tributes: they are authoritative expressions of contemporary opinion, against which the more recent outpourings in the form of war-stories by disgruntled intellectuals are as 'the small dust of the balance'. From the outbreak of the war to the Armistice, 286 Chaplains of all denominations served in Mesopotamia. Of these, four, Rev. F. J. H. Humphrey, Rev. A. E. Knott, Rev. A. Macfarlane, and Rev. R. J. B. Irwin, were awarded the D.S.O., the last named receiving in addition a Military Cross and bar thereto. Six others received the Military Cross: Rev. H. Spooner, Rev. O. W. Birch, Rev. J. W. Bullen, Rev. E. Colley, Rev. E. J. Thompson, and Rev. F. J. Hazledine. Twenty others were gazetted to various grades of the Order of the British Empire, whilst the Rev. A. C. E. Jarvis, who had already received the Military Cross for distinguished service in the field, was gazetted C.M.G. and later received the degree of D.D. at the hands of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the late Lord Davidson.

Where so many showed such gallantry and did their work finely, it may seem invidious to mention names. From the point of view of the troops, however, certain Chaplains stood out amongst their fellows. These included Dr. W. Ewing, D.D., who was with the Seaforths: he earned a Military Cross in Gallipoli and, at the age of over sixty years, was wounded in 1917 near Baghdad. Another remarkable man, was the Rev. C. H. Hemming,² a Punjab missionary of the S.P.G., who did duty with the 14th Division single-handed for a year, and drew every one to his services. He afterwards (1923-8) became Chaplain of Simla, where he had distinguished himself as a very young man by haranguing Lord Curzon on Dives and Lazarus. Two other outstanding men were the Rev. A. Macfarlane and the Rev. R. J. B. Irwin, afterwards Archdeacon of Dorking, who was severely wounded and died from the effects of his wounds in 1930.

There was another aspect of the ecclesiastical representation, in Mesopotamia, of the English nation to which I am constrained to refer. It was to some of us the outward sign of the faith by which many of us were supported in those strenuous days. The faith that was in us was

¹ This organization was represented in Mesopotamia by Colonel J. H. Stanley, who was also Red Cross Commissioner. It co-operated actively with the Principal Chaplain, arranging for Church Army huts wherever required, which were placed in charge of the local chaplains. Towards the end of 1917 they sent out one or two agents, who also did good work.

² Now Rector of Wexham in Oxfordshire.

this, that Britain's contribution to the welfare of mankind is to infuse the principles of Christianity into its governance. We believed of 'Iraq, as did Herbert Edwardes of India, that the British Government held 'Iraq in trust, that 'Iraq needed something more than the advantages of material civilization, and that our policy should be first to fit 'Iraq for freedom and then to set her free. We believed that till 'Iraq was leavened with the principles of Christianity she would be unfit for the exercise of freedom. Once those principles were recognized and applied by popular consent 'Iraq would be enabled to enter its heritage of freedom as one of the nations of the earth. We could then leave the country with its resources developed, its peoples awakened and enlightened with wider and nobler ideals, no longer isolated but linked with the civilized races of the world. The solidarity of the human race is implicit in Christianity and in Christian principles. The foundations of material prosperity were laid, and the new learning that we brought to 'Iraq included much that was good: if it was not given to us to do as much as we should have wished to promote a Christian outlook in public affairs, the desire to do so inspired many and unconsciously underlay the activities of nearly all. We felt this long before the Covenant of the League of Nations had been drafted, for the idea of trusteeship was part and parcel of the daily life of every British official in Eastern countries. But Christian principles of government are of slow growth, and we underestimated the war-weariness of the British nation, and its financial straits. Had we been able to look into the future we should have viewed with satisfaction every important development between 1920 and 1930, but we should have felt that the structure of government would have had better prospects of permanence had it been erected with greater deliberation, and that 'Iraq would have had a better opportunity of attaining the full stature of its nationhood within the British Commonwealth of Nations.¹


¹ T. E. Lawrence, though he approached the subject from a very different angle, held at this time the same view (vide letter to *The Times* 22.7.20). In a later letter (*The Daily News*, 31.12.28) he expressed himself on the subject as follows:

'When people talk of Arab Confederation or Empires they talk fantastically. It will be generations, I expect—unless the vital tempo of the East is much accelerated—before any two Arab States join voluntarily. I agree that their only future hope is that they should join; but it must be a natural growing together. Forced unions are pernicious, and politics, in such things, should come after geography and economics. Communications and trade must be improved before provinces can join.

'I think there's a great future for the British Empire as a voluntary association; and I'd like it to have Treaty States on a big scale attached to it. We've lots of Treaty States now from Nepal downwards; let's have Egypt and 'Iraq, at least, to add to them. We are so big a firm that we can offer unique advantages to smaller businesses to associate with us if we can get out attractive terms.'



MEMORIAL IN WAR CEMETERY OUTSIDE NORTH GATE AT BAGHDAD



'Haec est in gremium victos quae sola recepit
 humanumque genus communi nomine fovit
 matris, non dominae ritu, civesque vocavit
 quos domuit nexuque pio longinqua revinxit'¹.

* * * * *

The Young Men's Christian Association played an important part in ameliorating the lot of the British and to some extent the Indian troops in Mesopotamia, both in sickness and in health. The first centre was established at Basra in July 1915 under the control of the Indian National Council at Calcutta, which before the capture of Baghdad in March 1917 had established no less than 27 centres staffed by 52 men, while in addition work was being done in 16 hospitals. Of these hospitals 11 were British, and of the 27 centres 16 were amongst British troops, the remaining 11 centres being used exclusively by Indian troops and staffed by Indians. At the date of the Armistice there were 102 branches in the country, serving both British and Indian troops. Two motor launches, obtained by the efforts of the Countess of Chesterfield and the Y.M.C.A. Auxiliary Committee, helped to make the Service to some extent independent of military transport. Before the arrival of Field Force Canteens, the Association's Canteen Service filled a great and urgent need, and long after their arrival it was very popular amongst all ranks, who found that it offered them a greater variety than the official canteen services offered, and a greater readiness to obtain, whether from India or in the bazaars at the Base, whatever articles were in immediate demand. As mentioned in *Loyalties*, Chapter XI, the official ration was wholly inadequate in 1915 and 1916 to maintain men in decent health. The Y.M.C.A. canteens did much in early days to supply not merely luxuries but also necessities. The staff, led by Mr. Leonard A. Dixon, a Canadian, now (1931) working in Southern India, were almost without exception University men from Great Britain or the U.S.A., whose status was beyond question, and whose independence of official control enabled them to think ahead and to act quickly. Through them, and through them alone, came supplies of hockey and football requisites, writing materials, gramophone records, and literature. They alone organized concerts and cinema shows for units unable to provide anything of the sort for themselves; they alone catered for troops at out-stations as well as in the towns of Basra and 'Amara and later Baghdad. In the Indian centres the special needs of Indian troops were met, as nowhere else.

¹ 'Tis she alone who has received the conquered into her bosom like a mother, not an empress, protected the human race with a common name, summoning those whom she has defeated to share her citizenship and drawing together distant races with bonds of affection.' Claudian, *De Consulatu Stilichonis*, iii. 150-4 (Platnauer's Trans.).

Indian games such as *pachisi* were supplied, gramophone records in Indian tongues, Indian cigarettes and Indian sweetmeats, brought pleasure and relief to hundreds of thousands. For those who could not read or write a special secretarial service was maintained by a devoted band of volunteers: only those who have experience of Indian troops and realize the difficulty of arranging any such service within a regiment, can appreciate the importance and value of this branch of the work. A somewhat similar service on a smaller scale was rendered to the Turkish prisoners of war.

Religious work was as always an integral part of the activities of the Y.M.C.A. amongst British troops, and had its reward in unexpected places and in divers ways. Nor was the widespread desire of the troops to know something of the land in which they were fighting left unsatisfied. An attractively written booklet¹ was prepared by Dr. Edwyn Bevan, D.Litt., LL.D., and nearly 100,000 copies were distributed before the end of the war. It found its way all over the earth. Nothing better of its kind has ever been written.

Their work in Mesopotamia was uniformly assisted by the General Staff and widely appreciated by all ranks. Rear-Admiral Wake's testimony to the work done, written in March 1918, of which the following is an extract, reflects views widely held:

'I am lost in admiration of the organization and commonsense ability with which the Y.M.C.A. is managed, and I am only sorry that it has been left for me to discover so late in life what a national asset it is to the country.'

Their services were referred to by Sir Percy Lake in his dispatch of 30th April 1916, in the following terms:


'The Young Men's Christian Association, through its able officials, among whom I would specially mention Mr. L. A. Dixon, Revd. B. H. McLain, Revd. T. S. Riddle, and Mrs. Webley, has contributed most materially to the well-being, physical and moral, of the troops in general outside the hospitals in a manner deserving of the highest admiration.' General Maude wrote (10.4.17): 'The Young Men's Christian Association has been indefatigable in its exertions to enliven and improve the surroundings of the troops, and has with my approval opened additional branches throughout the country, which have been immensely appreciated.' General Marshall wrote (29.8.18): 'The activities of the Y.M.C.A. have extended considerably during the last six months. There are now a total of seventy centres, and the system of soldiers' clubs has been initiated throughout the country. I greatly appreciate the excellent work of this society in undertaking the management of these recreational centres, which tend so largely to the well-being of the troops.' Eight months later he wrote: 'Since the cessation of hostilities I have had under consideration a scheme for educational training in

¹ *The Land of the Two Rivers*. Bevan, 1916; 2nd edition, 1918 (London, Edward Arnold).



TURKISH COAT OF ARMS

Taken from Custom House at Basra and erected, with inscription, in the grounds of Government House at Bombay, as a memorial to the Sixth Indian Division



the force with a view to preparing men for civil life pending demobilization. This is now in operation, and will, I believe, stimulate the desire for study, and help men in their work when they return home. In the theoretical portion of the scheme I have received great assistance from the Y.M.C.A., while technical and practical instruction is being given by the various directorates.'

* * * * *

The spiritual and cultural activities of the Royal Army Chaplains' Department and the Y.M.C.A. were supplemented during 1916 by the labours of the Indian Council of the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem and the British Red Cross Society, including its Indian Branch. These organizations were at first independent, but were soon united under the direction of the late Lt.-Col. Jay Gould, I.M.S., who was in charge of the Red Cross organization and at the same time represented the Indian Council of the St. John Ambulance Association. Their work was at first hampered, rather than assisted, by the Military Medical authorities in India, who insisted¹ that 'all offers of Red Cross assistance should go through the office of the Director of Medical Services in India and that the gifts should be distributed in consultation with the Military Medical authorities to prevent overlapping'. No such claim was at any time made by the Home Government.

The office of the D.M.S. in India was notoriously inefficient, and wholly out of touch with requirements overseas, with the result that the bitter needs of troops both in Mesopotamia and elsewhere were not met, though there was no lack in India of goodwill, money, and personal help.

It is obvious that from a military point of view, not only Red Cross work but all work in an area of war must be carried out under the direct supervision and control and with the consent of the Military Authorities. But this elementary rule has nothing to do with overlapping, and, in connexion with Red Cross gifts, it must be remembered that unless either the Government or the Red Cross respectively neglect or exceed their respective functions there can be no overlapping in the sense of wasteful duplication; for Red Cross effort is primarily intended to provide additional comforts, as distinct from necessities which it is the duty of Government to supply.

And with regard to distribution, any gift may, of course, be declined; but to decline a gift is a different thing from the exercise of any claim to decide its destination, unless in some military emergency it should be necessary for the authorities to commandeer whatever they required, in which case the goods commandeered would cease to be gifts.²

¹ See *Loyalties*, Ch. XI.

² *Reports by the Joint War Committees of the British Red Cross Society and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England* (Stationery Office, 1921), p. 487.

During 1915 repeated offers of help were transmitted to Basra by the Indian and British Joint War Committees; their offer of gifts, and of engineers to man Red Cross launches, were refused or ignored. As late as 28th December 1915, when things were at their worst in Basra and on the Tigris, with hospitals short of elementary requirements of comfort, decency, and health, an offer of 'comforts, garments or surgical necessities' received after a fortnight's delay the answer signed 'Nixon', but presumably sent by his Director of Medical Services, Surgeon-General Hathaway—'nothing required at present. If anything needed will not hesitate to ask you.' Those who seek to excuse the medical and other authorities in Basra for their action, or inaction, in 1915 by blaming 'the Government of India' or 'the system' will find it hard to explain, still more to justify, these and other mendacious telegrams.¹

The Joint War Committee, however, on its own initiative, had dispatched a consignment of stores to Basra on 10th September 1915, and further consignments were sent in January, February, and March 1916.

Lt.-Col. Gould's head-quarters during 1916 were at Basra, whilst Major (afterwards Colonel) S. M. Moens, C.I.E., C.B.E., took charge of the branch at 'Amara. With Lt.-Col. Gould was Mr. E. A. (later Sir Aurelian) Ridsdale, British Red Cross Commissioner. They were later joined by Lt.-Col. J. H. Stanley, C.B.E., who assumed charge at Baghdad as Red Cross Commissioner. These men, nobly assisted by Lady Willingdon from Government House in Bombay, and by the parent bodies at home, were able to supplement in many ways the gross deficiencies in essential medical equipment and in hospital and other comforts, that the supineness and lack of foresight of the military medical authorities had allowed to accumulate, e. g. in Red Cross launches, medical comforts, surgical dressings, and in some cases, instruments such as Record Syringes, &c.

Colonel Moens has placed on record² a comprehensive and finely written account of the work done by these organizations in Mesopotamia and Northern Persia: its quality is not higher than the work it records, which ranks among the highest efforts of the Red Cross in war. In his covering letter he refers by name to but one officer of the Medical Service—Colonel W. H. Willcox, 'to whose labours the immense and progressive improvement in the health of the Troops was so largely due, and by whose never-failing help the Red Cross profited beyond all measure'.

Of this organization Sir Percy Lake wrote (27.8.16):

'The thanks of the whole force in Mesopotamia are especially due to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, the British Red Cross Society, including its Indian

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 488.


² *Op. cit.*, p. 491.



MEMORIAL ERECTED AT RAMADI TO THE MEMORY
OF THE 15th DIVISION



MEMORIAL ERECTED ON THE RIGHT BANK OF THE
DIYALA RIVER NEAR BAGHDAD
To commemorate the crossing of the river by the Lancashire Brigade
in March 1917



branch, who through their representative, Lt.-Col. J. Gould, have devoted their resources to supplementing the medical appliances and comforts provided by the State for the care of the sick and wounded. All officers and men who have passed through the hospitals at any time would desire to express their gratitude to these Societies.'

General Maude wrote (10.4.17):

'The British Red Cross Society has worthily maintained its splendid record throughout this campaign. The sterling work performed by its personnel, and its bountiful provision of motor launches, motor ambulances, and gifts, have been the means of alleviating much suffering.

'The ceaseless labours of the organizers and committees of the various war-gift societies, both in England and India, and the liberality of the subscribers to these funds, have contributed largely to the comfort and well-being of the troops, especially in regard to their recreations, and our heartfelt gratitude is due to them all.'

To these tributes General Marshall, in more general terms, added his own (29.8.18) in the following terms:

'To all those ladies and gentlemen who have so generously worked for, and contributed to, the comfort of the troops by the provision of war gifts, hospital ships and launches, and in numberless other ways, I can only, on behalf of this Force, tender our very grateful thanks and assure them that their kindness will never be forgotten.'

In a subsequent dispatch (20.2.19) he recorded, on behalf of the Force, his grateful thanks to

'Indian Comforts for the Troops Fund (H.E. Lady Chelmsford), Women's Branch Bombay Presidency War and Relief Fund, Sind Women's Branch of Bombay Presidency War Relief Fund (H.E. Lady Willingdon), Mesopotamian Comforts Fund (Marquess of Sligo), Indian Soldiers' Fund (Sir Trevredyn Wynne), Lady O'Dwyer's Punjab Comforts Fund (Lady O'Dwyer), Central Provinces Comforts Fund (Lady Robertson), Shanghai Comforts Fund (Mrs. Sausmarez), who have so generously provided gifts of money and in kind for the benefit of the troops.'

One of the most valuable funds, 'The Stella Maude Comforts Fund,' escaped mention in any official dispatch; it was, however, one of the best administered of them all, and none was more appreciated by the troops.

The effect of these abundant evidences of private generosity on the spirits of the force can scarcely be overestimated. The feeling that Mesopotamia was a 'side-show', and that the troops taking part in it were neglected and forgotten not only by Government, but by their countrymen, was dispelled. There was little waste of money and effort: the occasional errors of kindly good-nature in early days—when packets of Basra dates were sent out at no small expense from England

for distribution to the troops—were accepted as evidence of affectionate interest, rather than scoffed at as examples of ill-directed zeal. The management on the spot was competent, and there was no red tape. The personal touch was never lacking, and many soldiers will gratefully remember the kindly hospitality and discriminating common sense with which the efforts of the official organizations were supplemented at Basra by Lady Cox, and by Mrs. Knox, the wife of the Senior Judicial Officer, who organized a lending library which was of very real value to many British soldiers in the Base Depots at Basra.

* * * * *

In no sphere of operations was it more necessary, or more difficult, to cater for those 'comforts' which the Supply Services could not be expected to supply, and which the troops were willing and anxious to purchase for cash. Except in the towns of Basra and 'Amara and later at Baghdad, private enterprise was wholly unable to meet more than a small proportion of the legitimate demands for foodstuffs and drinks to supplement the official ration. The Y.M.C.A. did much, but it could not touch more than the fringe of the problem. In the early years of the war in Mesopotamia, whilst under the control of the Government of India, little or nothing was done in this direction. The system under which regimental canteens were let out to contractors was almost universal in India, as in England. 'The outward attraction of this system was the rebate which the contractor undertook to pay; but its inward defect was that contractors could pick and choose the canteens which it would be remunerative to conduct, and in many cases to dictate the rate of rebate which they would grant. Bribery and corruption flourished; the quality of goods delivered was often poor and the soldier suffered.'¹

When the War Office assumed control of the 'Expeditionary Force Canteen' which had been magnificently successful in France and elsewhere, it extended its operations to Mesopotamia, and the Army Canteen Committee (afterwards the Navy & Army Canteen Board) sent out a competent staff and large supplies. They laboured at first under great difficulties. Ice and mineral waters were not luxuries but necessities, and could not be purchased elsewhere and imported. The great majority of the troops were Indians, with many peculiar needs. The 'E.F.C.' were primarily dependent on the United Kingdom for supplies: the distance was great and tonnage was scarce. A floating canteen on a stern-wheel steamboat, the Mas'udi, was inaugurated in the autumn of 1916,² and by the Armistice there were no less than 37

¹ Fortescue, *A Short Account of Canteens in the British Army*, 1928.

² This vessel reached 'Aziziya on the Tigris an hour after the capture of the village: see also Vredenburg.

branch canteens in Mesopotamia and on the lines of communication in Persia.

The work was admirably done, for it was in the hands of experts who had learned in their ordinary vocations in England to manage large concerns such as hotels and restaurants. It was done without any direct charge on the National Treasury.

'The soldier on active service was better cared for than he ever had been. The soldier at home enjoyed greater facilities for comfort at a smaller expense than ever before. Both obtained better value for their money than at any previous time. . . . No contractor was enriched at the cost either of the taxpayer or the soldier.'¹

This magnificent organization was permanently established, when the war ended, as the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institute, which belongs to the officers and men of the armed forces of the Crown, and to them alone. 'It is their very own. There is nothing like it in any country in the world. It is the crowning work of the regimental officer of the Army.'²

For the first two years of the War in Mesopotamia there was little or no systematic attempt to place identifying marks over the graves of those killed in action. Soldiers were content to say, with Maecenas, '*non tumulum curo; sepelit natura relictos*'. More often than not they were buried close to where they fell, in one or more graves, and in places far from centres of population no mark was left which might attract the attention of the local population, who were very apt to disinter the dead for the sake of the blankets in which they were wrapped, articles of clothing or even brass buttons. At military centres every effort was made to bury our dead in consecrated ground, and to mark individual graves; at Basra and 'Amara, Ahwaz, Mohammerah, Qurna, Nasiriya, and Kut, cemeteries were established as early as 1915, the grave registers being in the hands of the local chaplains. Wooden crosses were put up, and the traditional observances of Christian burial observed. In 1916 Grave Registration Officers were for the first time appointed, and in 1917 the Imperial War Graves Commission came into being. The Governments of the different States of the Empire having decided that the cost of fittingly honouring the dead should be shared by all, the Commission was organized as a department responsible financially and administratively to these Governments, who provide out of public monies the funds required for their work.

The cost of the work is borne (as the Imperial War Conference of 1918 decided) by each of the participating Governments in proportion to the number of the graves of their dead; and, as the British Government (on whom over 80 per cent. of the cost thus fell) agreed, all these

¹ Fortescue, *ibid.*

² Fortescue, *A History of the British Army*, vol. xiii, p. 575.

Governments co-operate in the control of the Commission's administration and finances. Thus was created the first truly autonomous Imperial Administrative organization.

One of the most important principles underlying the decisions of the Imperial War Conference of 1917 was that of securing the permanence of the War Graves. Speaking in the House of Commons on 4th May 1920, Mr. Winston Churchill, as Chairman of the Commission said:

'The cemeteries which are going to be erected to the British dead on all the battlefields in all the theatres of War, will be entirely different from the ordinary cemeteries which mark the resting place of those who pass out in the common flow of human fate from year to year. They will be supported and sustained by the wealth of this great nation and Empire, as long as we remain a great nation and Empire, and there is no reason why, in periods as remote from our own as we ourselves are from the Tudors, the graveyards in France of this Great War, shall not remain an abiding and supreme memorial to the efforts and the glory of the British Army, and the sacrifices made in that great cause.'

The application to 'Iraq of this decision to ensure perpetuity in sepulture, itself a concession to human conventions, offered peculiar difficulties. The dead were scattered over a greater area than on any other front, except perhaps German E. Africa: the nature of the soil, the liability to floods of the principal battlefields, and the idiosyncrasies of the inhabitants made the identification of individual graves in very many cases impossible. The acquisition of land for graveyards has, in 'Iraq, been a matter of special difficulty, whilst in some places the chemical action arising from the presence of salts in the soil has affected the headstones. Hindu and Muslim cemeteries have been constituted at several places, for the work of the Commission is limited to no particular religion. The remains of some 1,246 British officers and men who had died in captivity in Asia Minor were in 1928 transported to Baghdad and there reinterred in consecrated ground. It is not without reluctance that I offer, however diffidently, criticism of decisions taken by a body so representative, and so well qualified to decide such matters. Yet it is perhaps permissible here to voice the opinion, which is, as I believe, shared by many military men, that this almost superstitious desire to make a show of removing the poor handfuls of dust that in most though not in all instances alone remained, was carried in this and similar instances beyond the bounds of reasonable convention. Military customs of the army in past centuries lends no sanction to the practice, and the cost was great. On grounds of sentiment it is perhaps possible to justify the ceremonial removal of these remains to the soil that gave them birth, but to transport them to Baghdad, to the inhospitable wastes



Architect Mr. E. P. Warren

THE BASRA WAR MEMORIAL

which had witnessed their miseries, was surely out of keeping with the spirit which inspired the Commission. I am reminded thereby of the inimitable Herbert's epitaph on the East India Company's gallant commodore, Captain Shilling, who died at Jask in the Persian Gulf in 1621 of wounds received in action:

'Here is buried one Captaine Shilling, unfortunately slain by the insulting Portugall: but that his bones lack sence and expression, they would tell you the earth is not worthy his receptacle, and that the people are blockish, rude, treacherous and indomitable.'

Of the 51,978 'death casualties' known to have occurred amongst the force in Mesopotamia, the graves of only 10,928 have been identified: these are for the most part concentrated in 15 cemeteries.¹ In Persia, of 4,025 'death casualties' only 426 have identified graves; these, too, are concentrated in 15 cemeteries.²

On the 27th March 1929 the late Sir Gilbert Clayton, as High Commissioner for 'Iraq, unveiled a Memorial at Basra to those who fell in the War, and have no known graves, *cuius nomen non imposi- tum, in libro vitae sit inscriptum*. It was designed by Mr. Edward Warren, F.R.I.B.A., and is shown in the illustration that faces this page.

It may be said at once that it is the only Memorial in 'Iraq of any architectural merit. It is nearly 260 feet in length, and 42 feet in width. The centre is formed by a semicircular bay, 50 feet in width, in the midst of which rises an obelisk, square in section, to a total height of 55 feet. This starts from a base 14 feet high, and bearing a bronze plaque upon its front, which is inscribed as follows:

TO THE GLORY OF GOD AND TO THE HONOURED MEMORY OF
THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE ARMIES OF THE BRITISH
EMPIRE WHO FELL IN THE IRAQ CAMPAIGN IN THE YEARS
1914-1921, AND WHOSE GRAVES ARE NOT KNOWN.

The whole of the walls, including those of the two ends, were especially constructed to form an open fronted colonnade, 260 feet in length, including the central semicircle, for the placing of commemorative tablets, which are ranged along the wall behind the Colonnade in their due order. This Colonnade is divided into bays by arched piers, and roofed in so as to afford shelter from the formidable

¹ At Mosul three, at Baghdad four, at Basra three, at 'Amara two, at Kut and Samarra one each.

² The registered figures for the British War Dead throughout the world are as follows;

Number of names registered	1,089,919
Identified and buried in known graves	585,114
Found but not separately identified	174,050

Mesopotamian sunshine, and the infrequent but hardly less formidable torrents of rain. The whole is built in White Dholpur Indian Stone, which was mainly worked in India by Indian masons. The front of the Monument is protected by simple iron railings about 7 feet high, and the entrance is by double gates in the centre of this fence, flanked by stone piers.

In the centre of the War Cemetery outside the North Gate at Baghdad stands the 13th Division War Memorial, which also marks the grave of Sir Stanley Maude. The four panels record the names of the units of which the Division was constituted and the battles and engagements in which it took part. The Memorial, the cost of which was provided by the various units, suffers from the fact that the names of some engagements are not those subsequently chosen by the Battles Nomenclature Committee, and are now difficult or impossible to identify.


It was erected in place of the obelisk at 'Table Mountain', a spur of the Jabal Hamrin North of Shahraban, and is maintained by the Imperial War Graves Commission out of funds privately subscribed. A private Memorial tablet was erected in 1921 by their former chief in the French Dominican Church at Mosul to the memory of certain political officers who lost their lives in the Mosul wilayat during 1919-20. The 15th Division has its own Memorial at Ramadi, a simple obelisk with a brief inscription. No permanent Memorials have been erected in Iraq by other units. The sole tribute to the 6th Division is a massive piece of Mosul marble, representing the emblems of sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, which was taken from the Customs House at Basra as a war trophy in January 1915 and erected in the grounds of Government House, Bombay. The public memory is short; for some unexplained reason a subsequent Governor of Bombay (without the knowledge or consent of those responsible for the erection of the Memorial within the grounds of Government House) saw not fit to keep in his charge a monument to the memory of the finest Division that ever left Bombay. The stone has since been removed to the Archaeological Section of the Prince of Wales Museum at Bombay, where, bereft of the inscription originally fashioned to connect it with the 6th Division, it lies forlorn in the limbo of forgotten things. Perhaps a kindly Curator will some day place on the Memorial a museum ticket on which is inscribed Deuteronomy xxvii. 17.

To the Turkish soldiers who fell in Mesopotamia during the War only one Memorial exists, erected during the siege of Kut al Amara on the outskirts of that town. Responsibility for its maintenance has very properly been assumed by King Faisal's Government. In fairness to



Sc. Sir W. Goscombe John, R.A.

SKETCH MODEL OF THE EQUESTRIAN STATUE ERECTED
AT BAGHDAD TO LIEUT.-GEN. SIR STANLEY MAUDE



our former enemies I append to this chapter the translation of a leaflet, copies of which were found in possession of captured Turkish soldiers in 1916. It appears to have been published before our first advance on Kut and Ctesiphon. It should be read in conjunction with 'Loyalties', Chapter IX.

It remains to refer to the equestrian statue of General Maude, executed by Sir W. Goscombe John, R.A., and erected from funds subscribed, for the most part in Mesopotamia, as a memorial to the man whose name will for ever be associated both with the conquest by British military valour of Mesopotamia, and with the decision of the British Government to create an independent Arab State. The statue, which stands on a pedestal (designed by Mr. Edward Warren) near the British Residency on the right bank of the Tigris at Baghdad, is worthy of the man whose memory it will serve to recall to future generations, but there are many who would have preferred to see it erected in the country of his birth, to remind the passer-by of the sacrifices of blood and money made by the British Empire in the cause of freedom.

'There be of them, that have left a name behind them, that their praises might be reported.

And some there be, which have left no memorial; who are perished, as though they had never been; and are become as though they had never been born; and their children after them.

But these were merciful men, whose righteousness hath not been forgotten.'

Ecclus. xlv. 8-10

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VIII
 TRANSLATION OF TURKISH DOCUMENT FOUND IN
 POSSESSION OF CAPTURED TURKISH SOLDIERS
 IN 1916

RULES AND REGULATIONS TO BE OBSERVED
 DURING HOSTILITIES

Soldiers:

1. Our Holy Commander, the Beloved Sovereign, has sent you to fight the enemy soldiers only, and not peaceful citizens. Wage war, therefore, on the troops exclusively. Never use arms against non-combatant inhabitants. Only enemy subjects actually bearing arms should be treated as combatants.

2. Fight with enemy troops in an honourable manner. Protect those who seek mercy and surrender their arms. Do not fire on the enemy's clergy, on wearers of the Red Cross badge, on Sanitary Sections or Hospitals; nor on collections of wounded men, nor on their armed guards. Do not forcibly enter places reserved for the wounded.

3. Ruses and stratagems against the enemy are allowable: but any one failing to treat with respect the enemy's soldier and his signalling flag, and national standard, and his uniform, and his non-combatant flags, or attempting to use poison against him, is not an honourable man, because such acts are against God's commandments, and the honourable and noble sentiments of the Turk.

4. Respect enemy's soldiers and citizens living peacefully in our territory: do not destroy enemy's places of worship, because God commands us to respect all religions.

5. Tyrants and tyranny are both hateful to God—His curses lie on both. Our Moslem friends who practise oppression lay themselves open to being treated as our enemies. Oppression merely adds numbers and strength to the enemy. Victory is not consonant with tyranny: therefore, peaceful enemy subjects should be respected. Do not confiscate their belongings. Do not destroy or burn enemy's villages, houses or huts, unless sanctioned by the Commandant. Always refer to your Commandant for instructions. Prevent your friends from going to such extreme lengths. Honour enemy's women and young girls as you would honour your own wives and sisters.

6. Feed (the enemy) wounded immediately after an action. If you are in charge of them treat them as your own wounded, for a wounded man is not your enemy. He is a trust from your God and your Commander. If you are put on guard on the enemy's wounded, give them every protection.

7. Treat prisoners with humanity and do not in conversation with them refer to religious subjects. Do not lay hands upon their belongings. Should a prisoner try to escape, shoot at, but do not kill him. Ask for help, but if he tries to use arms against you, then act similarly. A prisoner of war is a Government prisoner. You have no right to release him at your own free will. A spy caught should be punished by the military authorities, and you are not to strike or kill him.

8. Shooting with a revolver at the enemy wounded is a dishonourable act and

liable to heavy punishment. Money and private letters found on the enemy wounded or prisoners remain their property. Belongings of enemy dead being property of their heirs, are trusts in the hands of Government and must, therefore, be honourably kept.

9. Do not lay hands on the wearers of the Red Cross.

10. A white flag signals a desire to converse and should not be fired upon. Neither the bearer of this, nor his interpreters, nor his bugler, should be touched, but the party should be directed to one of your officers.

11. If you do not follow the advice given above you render yourself liable to severe punishment. You will be responsible to God. The enemy opposed to you may have issued similar injunctions to his own troops, subjects, &c. If you act up to these behests and are killed in action you will gain the honour of a patriot, and a martyr. And should you return alive to your home, you will have the reputation of having held up the honour and prestige of the Ottoman Nation: May God bless you.

Dated 31st August 1915.



CHAPTER IX

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS 1919-20

'Three Brains in contradictory council brooding incessantly
Neither daring to put in act its councils, fearing each other,
Therefore rejecting ideas as nothing and holding all Wisdom
To consist in the agreements and disagreements of ideas.'

BLAKE, *Jerusalem*.

The Treaty of Versailles. The Covenant of the League of Nations. The Mandate. Municipal and Divisional Councils. Popular feeling in 'Iraq. Peace Tarries. Monsignor Martin. French Government Officials. Sir John Cowans. Question of pre-war rights and concessions. Disposal of War Stores. Disposal of River Craft. Lord Inchcape. Transfer of I.W.T. & Railways to Civil Administration. Civil Budget of 1920. Civil Expenditure for 1920.

ON 28th June 1919 was signed the Treaty of Versailles, Article 22 of which reads as follows:

THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

'To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

'The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

'The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. . . .'

The publication of this Article did nothing to ease the position in 'Iraq, nor did it assist H.M.'s Government or the Allied and Associated

Powers to reach a decision as to the policy to be pursued in the immediate future in the country.

Although it was generally, but not universally, assumed that the Mandatory Power in 'Iraq would be Great Britain, I was, as already explained, not authorized to make any announcement concerning our intentions. The words 'mandate' and 'mandatory' moreover when they first appeared were widely misinterpreted—not only by Arabs—being understood in their primary or normal sense of 'an order' (*amr*) and 'the one who issues an order' (*mamur*). Mr. Churchill had already referred in Parliament to the prospect of our obtaining 'a mandate to administer the country', and neither my own mind, nor the instructions that had reached me from the India Office, were very clear as to the extent of the responsibility which Great Britain, as mandatory power, was expected to assume under the Covenant.¹ The only indications previously received of the views of His Majesty's Government were contained in a telegram of 30th November 1918 from the India Office which read as follows:

'... His Majesty's Government will as part of their policy assist in the establishment of native government in the liberated area, and do not intend to impose on the population any governments which are distasteful to them. We desire to see the strongest and most settled government in Mesopotamia which is compatible with those two conditions, and to further this end we are prepared to render all British assistance that is necessary, including an army of occupation. . . .

'We do not, however, contemplate annexation nor, as far as can be seen at the moment, to make a formal Declaration of Protectorate. An analogy might be made to the position of Egypt before the war, exclusive of the capitulations.

'You should take as a guide for your administrative action and official utterances the principles stated above, and it should be possible for you to satisfy our friends that we do not intend to abandon them nor to interrupt the excellent work which we have undertaken hitherto. In the meantime attention is being given here to the question of the best form of Government to set up. We should gladly receive any assistance and counsel which you and your advisers can give on this point.'

As a first step towards the inauguration of wider measures of self-government and the furtherance of indigenous institutions we had, during 1918, devoted some time and thought to the development of Municipal and Divisional Councils.

Our intentions in regard to Municipalities were communicated

¹ President Wilson's views on the subject, so far as concerns the proposed American mandate for Armenia, may be gathered from a statement made by him on 28th February 1919 to a party gathering at the White House, in the following terms:

'I am not without hope that the people of the U.S.A. may agree to be the trustee of the interests of the Armenian people and see to it that the unspeakable Turk and the almost equally difficult Kurd have their necks sat on long enough to teach them manners.'

(Tumulty, p. 377.)

to the Secretary of State on 10th November 1918 in the following telegram:

'Apart from the tribal organization which it has been our policy consistently to maintain and develop, the municipalities of the principal towns were almost the only indigenous institutions which afforded the local population an opportunity of partaking in the management of their public affairs.

'These municipalities are now emerging from financial stringency due in the first instance to the departure of Turkish officials and the removal of municipal funds and records, followed by prolonged period of war conditions, and necessity on military grounds for maintaining sanitation, etc., at a level previously undreamed of but now generally appreciated. They are now financially in a fairly sound condition.

I am instituting with effect from 1st January, both at Basra and Baghdad, Municipal Councils on lines evolved by Mr. E. B. Howell, I.C.S., Military Governor, Baghdad, in consultation with the principal notables of Baghdad.

'These Councils will consist partly of nominated and partly of elected members, and will enjoy considerable financial power in respect of Municipal revenues, *viz.*, Rs. 5,000 for a single payment and up to Rs. 150 a month for recurring payments subject in both instances to the existence of budget provision.

'The President, Vice-President and Secretary will for the present be officials.

'Copies of constitution and rules are being posted.

'Similar Municipal Councils where they do not already exist will be set up in other towns but, the general level of education and civilisation being there lower, with more restricted powers and under somewhat closer tutelage.'

Divisional Councils were dealt with in a separate telegram of the same date which read as follows:

'To secure the full benefit of co-operation by tribal leaders and large landowners in the administration of these territories I am reviving forthwith the institution of Divisional Councils which already existed in somewhat nebulous form in Turkish times.

'These are quite distinct from the Municipal Councils mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram but are intended to perform similar functions for rural districts. They will however at first be purely advisory.

'In several Divisions informal Councils of this nature have already come into being and are popular. It is now proposed to give them more definite shape and more formal status, for which a demand has already appeared. They will consist of not more than twelve members all of whom will, for the present, be nominated by the Divisional Political Officer, and they will hold meetings at regular intervals.

'The present administrative Divisions are a continuance of the Turkish system, modified in accordance with local and tribal sentiment. They form administrative units of convenient size, each coherent and homogeneous. They are not too numerous to be dealt with direct from Baghdad, from which they are all easily accessible. This close touch is much appreciated by shaikhs.

'The constitution of a future advisory or legislative assembly for the whole of

Mesopotamia, when the time is ripe, will be much facilitated by the development of these bodies and of the Municipal Councils, from which representative delegates can be chosen.

'The resuscitation of these Divisional Councils has been for some time under consideration and was to have been matured more at leisure. In view however of the terms of the Anglo-French declaration published on the 8th November, it has seemed expedient to hasten the inception of these developments which are assured support locally, and to give local publicity forthwith to our intentions.

'Action on these lines will, I hope, serve to show the public, both here and elsewhere, that our policy in Iraq is being shaped as far as possible in conformity with pronouncements in Europe.'

The preparation of detailed regulations both for Municipal and Divisional Councils was the responsibility of Mr. E. B. Howell, whose views may be deduced from the following extract from his covering letter on the subject of Municipal Councils to me (dated 9th November).

'The draft to a great extent explains itself, but a few remarks are necessary.

'The allied Governments have over and over again declared freedom and self government for the peoples now liberated from the Turk to be a cardinal object of their policy. The first steps on the path leading towards this goal must be in connection with the administration of municipal and local affairs. The lessons there learnt may then be applied in a wider sphere. The intention of the innovations now proposed is to provide the elementary lesson.

'It is for this reason that for the present there has been little recourse to the elective principle. That will come in time, but the time is not yet, although of course in making nominations the President will consult and in part be guided by the opinions of representative bodies.

'It was my original intention to allow the elected representatives of the mukhtars (who are to be on the Council to stand for the poor and illiterate) to have a position in all respects similar to that of the nominated members. These latter however objected so strongly that it has been necessary to modify original scheme. This fact is in itself, I think, enough to demonstrate the necessity for patience before adopting the elective principle throughout.

'For the rest the aim of the constitution is to give the Council a real measure of power and responsibility, while providing the requisite tutelage to be at hand when required.'

By the middle of 1919 Municipal Councils had been established on the lines adumbrated above, both at Baghdad and Basra, and on less ambitious lines at most other centres. It was no easy task to set them on foot: the preparation of an electoral roll alone was a formidable undertaking.

Moreover, H.M.'s Government had declined to permit elections, even to municipalities, pending the conclusion of peace with Turkey. The Ottoman Laws, still nominally in force, gave ample facilities to litigious minded persons to raise difficulties. We were obliged, for

example, to restrict membership to Ottoman subjects, thus excluding numerous Persian and British and Indian residents long domiciled in the country.

The inception of these Councils aroused but little interest among the masses, and the politically minded élite took no part in their deliberations. They did not like the system of nomination, though it was worked with complete impartiality, and no other system was at the time legally permissible. I have no doubt that I made a mistake in not attaching a salary to the post of Municipal Councillor: it might have made a great difference; at that time it seemed, however, unjustified by the work involved.

Divisional Councils were somewhat more successful: the meetings were really representative and often lively, and but for the troubles of 1920 they might have developed into valuable institutions, with more popular support behind them than a salaried assembly centralized in Baghdad could have.

It is noteworthy that the first act of the Hilla Divisional Council was to reaffirm the petition of January 1919 in favour of a distinctively British administration under a British High Commissioner.¹ In another case, however, that of the Shamiya Division, the members of the newly appointed Council resigned in a body on the ground that till the future of the country was decided they did not feel themselves to be in a position usefully or freely to express their opinions. This incident, which took place in February 1920, was directly connected with the course of events in Syria. It was not purely factious: the inability of His Majesty's Government to make any statement on the subject of the Mandate, or to authorize me to make one, filled thoughtful Arabs with alarm, for the return of the Turks was a possibility still uppermost in their minds.

Stories were current of the Arab Government in Syria paying princely salaries to all and sundry (the British Government were subsidizing it to the tune, I believe, of £150,000 a month). There was in Damascus an Arab army with many hundreds of Arab officers, all on high rates of pay: the same régime applied to 'Iraq, a larger country and a richer, would, it was claimed, provide lucrative posts to thousands. The massacres perpetrated by the Greek army in Smyrna in May 1919 had aroused indignation in some quarters, and the progress of the national movement in Turkey under the leadership of Mustafa Kamal Pasha was being closely watched.

On 6th November the Financial Secretary to the War Office added to my troubles by expressing in the House of Commons regret that he

¹ See G. L. Bell, p. 132.

could not say anything definite with regard to the administration and government of Mesopotamia.

'The matter', he said, 'cannot be settled without a great deal of careful study and conference with the Indian authorities and others. . . . We are doing our best to bring back the white troops from Mesopotamia as rapidly as possible, and I hope we shall not have to contemplate the maintenance of anything like a white garrison of 20,000 troops who are there now.'

This statement was interpreted by some Arabs in Baghdad as meaning that the idea of investing India with the control of Mesopotamia was being considered. The reference to the withdrawal of 'white troops' coupled with Mr. Winston Churchill's previous announcement, helped to stir the embers of racial feeling. The responsible Minister, Mr. Montagu, was silent.

At last Mr. Lloyd George the Prime Minister explained, on 18th December, why so much delay had taken place in concluding peace with Turkey. His reference to the subject deserves quotation in full:

'Then there is Anatolia, which was referred to by an hon. Member, and there are Christian communities in Asia Minor which have to be considered. Would America take any share, and, if so, what share? France has great burdens, Britain has great burdens, Italy has great burdens. Much depended on whether America, which has no great extraneous burdens and which has gigantic resources, was prepared to take her share in this great task of civilization, in this renowned and historic land. But until America declared what she would do, any attempt to precipitate the position might have led to misunderstandings with America, and would have caused a good deal of suspicion.

'We regard a good understanding with America as something which is so vital that, whatever it cost in the way of increased burdens upon our shoulders, and the possibilities of revolt, we considered it worth while not to precipitate the decision which we were prepared at any moment to take. That is the reason why we could not make peace with Turkey. . . . I do not know what the decision of America will be, but it does not look promising.

'If one felt confident that America would come in, it might be worth while waiting another two or three months. But those are now, speaking quite frankly, the indications at the present moment. Therefore, we consider now, without any disrespect to our colleagues at the Peace Conference, and without in the least wishing to deprive the United States of America of sharing the honour of guardianship over these Christian communities, that we are entitled to proceed to make peace with Turkey. We propose to do so at the earliest possible moment. . . .'¹

This announcement came several months too late: in January 1920, the nationalist movement in Turkey which had been for some months steadily growing in strength, took definite shape. A new cabinet and

¹ The Treaty of Sèvres, designed to make peace with a dismembered Turkey, was signed by all concerned except Turkey on 10th August 1920 (Cmd. 964).

a new assembly with strongly nationalist tendencies assumed control of events and issued the national pact. This manifesto proposed self-determination for the Arab provinces south of the Armistice line, and demanded, either explicitly or implicitly, that Turkey should retain the Mosul wilāyat. By awaiting the pleasure of the United States we had, in the language of commerce, lost the market: it was no longer possible to make peace with Turkey on the lines of the Treaty of Versailles. The 'writing on the plaster of the wall' and 'the part of the hand that wrote' were visible to practically every British representative in the Middle East, but not to all the Allied statesmen. They had faced worse situations in the past few years, and had overcome them: they were undaunted, and being too busy in other directions to read aright the signs of the times, proceeded to draft and negotiate the Treaty of Sèvres, while the permanent officials, in Whitehall and Constantinople, Simla, Cairo, and Baghdad, ran like Cassandra wild-eyed down the corridors of Foreign Offices and Chanceries. They were under the curse of Apollo and their prophecies were discredited.

* * * * *

The daily round of administrative duties in connexion with the matter briefly outlined in the preceding pages was enlivened, and generally complicated, by the arrival of various visitors, both official and unofficial, each of whom imported some fresh element of difficulty into the situation.

An early visitor was Monsignor Martin, the Apostolic Delegate,¹ fresh from Rome (and Paris) with instructions to gather together the scattered remnants of his flock, to ensure that they received the fullest measure of benevolence from the Civil Administration, with a guarantee of maintenance of all privileges and immunities that as French protégés they had enjoyed under the Turks. He had, as may be imagined, many requests to make, each one involving questions of principle which could not well be discussed until after the Peace. He was followed by the Armenian and Chaldean Patriarchs, the head of the Assyrian Church and Nation, and by rival claimants to the headship of the Yazidis of Jabal Sinjar. There were emissaries from the Wali of Pusht-i-Kuh, the Kalhur and the Sinjabi tribes, Kurdish chiefs with boundary disputes for adjustment and claims against Arab marauders, and Shaikhs innumerable. It was impossible to follow Jethro's advice to Moses, and decentralize effectively the work of dealing with these questions, for pending the conclusion of peace with Turkey no general

¹ He arrived without credentials, or even unofficial advices, owing presumably to uncertainty in Vatican circles as to the diplomatic status of Iraq.

THE WALI OF PUSHT-I-KUH

1909


1919



MIR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN (*with beard*) and MIRZA SUHBAT (*Luristan*)

WALIULLAH KHAN (*Luristan*)

Photos by C. J. Edmonds



principles could be laid down, and each case had to be handled empirically.

With Monsignor Martin arrived Monsieur Roux of the French Consular Service, who had long languished in Basra owing to the refusal of General Head-quarters on various pretexts to permit him to take up his residence at Baghdad. I was never able to understand Sir William Marshall's views or those of his military advisers in regard to Monsieur Roux; as the representative of our chief Ally it seemed to me incumbent on us to treat him as one of ourselves. On the pretext of shortage of transport neither he nor Commandant Sciard, the French Military Attaché, was permitted to visit Mosul for some months.

'I was not altogether satisfied', writes General Marshall,¹ 'that Commandant Sciard was confining himself to his legitimate role of Military Attaché, so, as military operations had come to an end a cable was sent home suggesting his recall and Sciard informed of the fact. This action nearly created an international situation. Sciard cabled to his Government, complaining that he was being sent away, against his will, and eventually I had to retain him.'

The annoyance of the French Government was not surprising: in view of the purely political and sometimes (in effect) anti-French activities² of British officers attached to the Arab Army in Syria, it was not for us in Iraq to object to the presence in our midst of a French Military Attaché, even though his objects were by no means wholly military,³ and his attitude, in the words of a compatriot, *un tant soit peu bellâtre*. The French claims in the Mosul region were legitimate and could only be extinguished by agreement: for us to raise gratuitously questions of this sort merely served to make the tasks of the peacemakers in Paris more difficult.

The policy which I adopted, so far as the policy pursued at G.H.Q. permitted, was to maintain cordial personal relations, and welcome the French representative on every public platform alongside the local G.O.C. So far as Monsieur Roux was concerned, I did my best to allay the not unnatural suspicions and resentment which his treatment had aroused; and both at Basra and later at Baghdad our relations were always cordial.

To keep on terms with Monsignor Martin was more difficult. His chief interest at the moment was the maintenance of certain schools, principally in the Mosul wilayat, long in existence under French auspices, for the education of children of parents of the Roman Catholic confession. His claim was that the supervision and control

¹ Marshall, p. 328.

² See Lowell Thomas, Lawrence, Winterton.

³ I was well aware of Cmdt. Sciard's activities, but never regarded them as a political embarrassment, much less a danger to, the Civil Administration.

which Government could exercise over the schools could not be so effective as that of local religious institutions directly interested and moved by other motives than the dispassionate zeal of the good official. His representation dealt only with the then existing situation, but there was a far-away look in his eyes. He, too, was dreaming dreams.

Considerable embarrassment both to the Civil Administration and to His Majesty's Government was also caused during 1919 and 1920 by emissaries of certain commercial groups, whose object was 'to explore the situation in Mesopotamia'.¹

The principle by which I was guided, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, in dealing with every sort of pre-war claim, whether in respect of oil, tramways, or railways, was that no discussion, still less settlement, was possible until peace had been signed. It would then be for the new Government to deal with such matters. Some of these concession-hunters, however, would not take 'no' for an answer, and remained on the spot for some months. The daily press in the U.S.A. and Europe was during the latter part of 1919 and the whole of 1920 full of reference to the fancied connexion between the reputed oil-deposits of Mesopotamia and the acceptance by Great Britain of the Mandate, and nothing that British statesmen could say or do availed against the attacks and innuendos appearing in the daily press of Europe and the U.S.A. So loud was the clamour that it attracted attention in Baghdad, where the presence of 'oil-men' and their not always discreet interest in current controversies, threatened to create fresh difficulties for us.

On the other hand, it is due to the U.S. Consul, Mr. Oscar Heizer, to say that he never for a moment lent himself to the agitation. He had seen Baghdad before, and during the War, under Turkish as well as British governance, and his counsels, when asked, were invariably sage and moderate.

I asked leave to make a public statement on the subject, but permission was withheld; pending the grant of the Mandate, the Foreign Office felt it undesirable, &c. . . . The views of the average officer of the Civil Administration on the subject are very fairly expressed by J. S. Mann (afterwards killed at Kufa) in a letter to Professor Gilbert Murray on 21st May 1920:

'I suggest that there is something to be said for good government *per se*, and that when you do get a chance to restore the prosperity of a great and ruined section of the world, there are some arguments for doing that. . . . I agree that silly things

¹ See Repington, ii. 501, 507, and Chapman-Huston and Rutter, ii. 291. I have a strong fellow-feeling for that Bithynian praetor whose justice has been immortalized by Catullus (x). The elder Cato also had his troubles with commercial emissaries in Sardinia, vide Livy, xxxii. 27, who describes him as 'asperior tamen in fenore coercendo habitus'.

have been said about the oil and wheat. The latter, however, is to my mind beside the point. The Arab is going to get the price of the increased crops, and it seems to me the more wheat there is in the world the better. It is the League of Nations' job to deal with Preference, and Protection is a world-problem. Oil is rather different, because it appears in barren lands and can't be exploited by the Arab. Further, the oil interests in England and America are very dangerous. (We had an American in at Najaf one day prospecting for the Standard Oil Co.; . . .). But it's certain, at all events, that someone's going to develop this oil, and until you internationalise the whole of the world's trade under the League, I suppose you will always have trouble with Trusts, etc. It is not the case that we occupied Mosul in order to get the oil area: we occupied Mosul to hit the Turk. I do not think that any political or military officer cares a blow who gets the wells as long as we get a decent frontier which doesn't break up tribal and other divisions; and I have seen a lot of correspondence with the Home Government which certainly "The Nation" would approve of, and not a word of exploitation about it. Of course, one doesn't know what devilish compacts (certain financial magnates) have made with (certain leading statesmen), but I trust our Wilson to beat them.'

'Our Wilson' was in fact at issue in several directions with great commercial interests. It was not a case of devilish financial compacts being made by or with British statesmen, but of rival financial groups, of different nationalities, led by men of great ability and unquestioned probity, who desired to safeguard the vast commercial interests of which they were the appointed custodians, by securing the right to participate in the development of the natural resources of the country, and of its transportation systems.

My position in these matters was clear. I was for the time being the head of a provisional government; it was my duty to place the local aspect of various questions before His Majesty's Government in good time, and, having made sure that they were in full possession of the facts, and their local implications, give effect to the final instructions of the Secretary of State for India, if and when received. Circumstances immediately after the War were, however, wholly exceptional. The problem of 'Iraq was at the time many-sided, and several departments of State were simultaneously dealing with various aspects, often without consultation with each other. There was virtually no correlating authority in Whitehall: each question had to be fought out as it arose, generally by telegraph, both as to the principles involved and as to their local application.

One such problem arose in connexion with the disposal of the great fleet of river steamers, docks, workshops, &c., which had been brought together for the purposes of the War in Mesopotamia. With this problem was linked up the whole question of disposing of the vast surpluses of military stores of every kind accumulated in the country. General MacMunn had constituted at Baghdad, with the approval of


the War Office, a 'Sales Board',¹ to co-ordinate the disposal of the various military departments under the presidency of the Director of Ordnance Services of such items as were suitable for sale in Mesopotamia. The Secretary, Lt.-Col. F. F. Mackay, was an officer in the Civil Administration. The results attained were very satisfactory: sales were spread over a wide area, according to local needs, and care was taken not to throw unduly large quantities on the market at any one place or time. Whatever could be sold locally was disposed of by public auction, through an official auctioneer, Captain Ladd, whose accumulated experience soon enabled him to detect the existence of 'rings'. River craft were, however, excluded from its operations, and it was announced in September that a special officer would be sent out by the Ministry of Munitions Board to deal with them on the lines proposed by me at a conference at the India Office in April. These were as follows:

- (a) All rivercraft declared by the Military authorities to be surplus to military requirements should be reported at once to the Sales Board, Baghdad.
- (b) the Sales Board should be authorized to dispose by sale of all such craft as may be reported to them, calling for sealed tenders in the case of large vessels, but with discretion to sell small craft by auction if considered desirable;
- (c) conditions of payment, etc., should be decided by the Sales Board who will have discretion to allow credit, on adequate security being given, up to a maximum of 12 months;
- (d) the Civil Commissioner should have the right to veto any tender, without

¹ Forbes writes on this subject as follows (iii. 293):

'To deal with surplus goods a Sales Board was formed with the Director of Ordnance Services as president, the members being other Directors, such as those of Supply and Transport, Railways and Inland Water Transport, the Financial Adviser and representatives of the Civil Government. Each Director was responsible for the details of his own work, the Civil Commissioner had the first call at a valuation on anything that was to be got rid of, and the Board as a whole co-ordinated methods of procedure and dealt with matters of policy. Qualified temporary officers were appointed as auctioneers, and rubbish, such as old boots, waterproof-sheets, and pots and pans, sold like wild-fire. But there the matter ended. The small local market was quickly glutted and there was no outlet for the large surplus stocks of articles of real intrinsic value. The remedy appeared simple. After handing over to the Civil Government anything wanted for developing the country, mainly railways, wharves and river craft, the Sales Board could have disposed of the balance under instructions from the Disposals Board in London, either by shipment elsewhere or by destruction.

'But the Disposals Board thought otherwise. It replaced the Sales Board, which cost the taxpayer nothing, by a large and expensive staff of its own, with Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners, auctioneers and clerks whose salaries amounted, if I remember aright, to some £10,000 a year, and who had not the intimate knowledge of the goods to be dealt with possessed by the members of the Sales Board. The Disposals Board itself was so alarmed at the cost of its establishment in Mesopotamia that, some time after my return to England, I was sent for and questioned as to the need of all this staff. I could only reply that in my opinion the expense was not justified.'



CAPT. J. S. MANN
Killed in action, July 22nd, 1920



- reason assigned: this condition is considered essential in order to prevent vessels falling into undesirable hands;
- (e) the Anglo-Persian Oil Company should be given the option of purchasing oil barges, tugs, launches, etc., required for the purposes of their business, subject to satisfactory arrangements as to purchase price, conditions of payment, etc.

It must be remembered that at this period the railway between Basra and Baghdad was unfinished, and there were many (amongst whom I was not numbered) who refused to believe that it could compete with river transport. There were many more who viewed with real alarm the prospect of a monopoly of river transport by a single firm. The freight charge for sea-transport of goods from Basra to Bombay averaged £8 a ton (three times the pre-war rate), from Basra to Baghdad £6 a ton. Freight from London or India to Basra was the monopoly of a single firm, which was believed to be desirous of securing a monopoly of river transport from Basra to Baghdad and was contemplating taking an interest in road transport to Persia. In November 1919 the India Office informed me that it had been decided after full consideration that the Civil Administration would own and run only such river craft as were required for military and civil needs (for the latter purposes only two 'stern-wheelers' and thirty-five launches had been asked for). The Anglo-Persian Oil Co. would purchase the oil fleet and bulk installations on shore. The balance would be disposed of. I replied as follows:

The necessary consequence of the now declared policy of H.M.G. is that Government itself should develop and control Railways and Port and should not permit acquisition of these public services by private firms, no matter how unexceptionable their antecedents nor how undoubted their power to give effect to their undertakings.

'I shall shortly apply for a considerable quantity of rolling stock, without which the Basrah-Baghdad Railway, now nearing completion, cannot be used to any extent for civil traffic, and I trust that the question will be considered favourably in the light of above remarks.

'The Railway will not begin to pay its way until we have equipped it for commercial traffic which we have not yet begun to do.

'I think considerable progress might be made towards a satisfactory understanding if I could be authorized to enter into preliminary negotiations with representative of Inchcape with a view to comprehensive agreement between his group and this Administration as regards maximum river freights, preferential freights by sea and river to goods carried by Civil Administration, river dues, and issue of through bills of lading from London to Baghdad by sea to Basra and by Railway onwards. The results of preliminary negotiations as proposed above would of course be submitted for the prior approval of H.M.G. before any binding agreement was made. I believe we have at Baghdad all the requisite material information and technical advice to come to an equitable working arrangement on these subjects. . . .

The personality referred to as 'Inchcape' was, of course, Viscount Inchcape, who had been entrusted by His Majesty's Government with the disposal of a large number of ocean-going steamers to the value of £33,000,000 sterling, which he distributed entirely at his own discretion amongst British steamship owners without advantage to himself, personally, or to the Companies with which he was associated, on terms satisfactory to Government. He was now invited to dispose of the River Fleet in 'Iraq on similar terms, 'on the distinct understanding', to use his own words, 'that I do not make a penny piece for myself either directly or indirectly, or for my Companies, to the disadvantage of others, on the transaction'.

I now asked that local Arab firms might be given a fair chance of purchasing steamers, and that reasonable credit should be allowed, failing which they could scarcely compete. In reply to this telegram I was informed (January 1920) that

'the Treasury are prepared to sanction your furnishing firms of good standing with advances from local revenue for term not exceeding probable life of craft. Interest to be charged at current local rates minimum six per cent. per annum. It is understood that there is considerable floating capital in Baghdad. I recommend that firms pay cash to Inchcape arranging credit either with you under terms quoted or with local financiers. Loans made by you to be reported.'

The India Office added that no right of veto on the purchase of boats was reserved to the Civil Administration, as I had originally suggested. I therefore telegraphed pointing out that

'The arrangement with Lord Inchcape appears to assume that Tigris and Euphrates are open to free navigation. This is not at present the case.

'Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company may be regarded as having acquired prescriptive right to run three boats with the necessary barges with one boat in reserve. No other existing firm has such rights.

'It is intended to grant licences under proper precautions to approved companies and individuals domiciled in 'Iraq but on the grounds both of general policy and in the interests of navigation and of the welfare of passengers no one can be allowed to run steamers on the river without obtaining a licence and to withhold such a licence would be tantamount to the exercise of a veto. It may however save trouble if right of Civil Administration to exercise veto is formally authorized by H.M.G. and brought to notice of Lord Inchcape.'

Lord Inchcape was unfortunately unable to visit Basra or Baghdad in person, and decided to effect *in Bombay* the sales of craft surplus to military requirements in Mesopotamia. This obviously handicapped Arab firms in Baghdad and Basra, and aroused a storm of resentment,

¹ This point was disposed of by Lord Inchcape's decision to sell craft only to firms already domiciled in Mesopotamia.

which was increased by the fact that General Head-quarters, deprived of the strong hand and robust common sense of Sir George McMunn, declined to allow any lists of surplus craft to be published locally, on the ground that they could not be sure that they were surplus, and that for a long time to come they would require their own river transport service. Bacon, it was pointed out, might be packed along with supplies for Indian troops, if civil firms were allowed to handle military cargoes, and other 'insuperable' obstacles to any reduction of military establishments were urged! The local Arab, moreover, could not believe that in disposing of the fleet Lord Inchcape was acting on behalf of H.M.'s Government disinterestedly and from motives of the broadest and most sincere patriotism. They saw him only as the authority who controlled amongst other concerns the British India Steam Navigation Co., the Peninsula & Oriental Steam Navigation Co., and the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Co.

Mass meetings of merchants were held at Basra and Baghdad to protest against the sale in Bombay, which was fixed for a date so near at hand that, in the absence of published lists (a fact of which, of course, Lord Inchcape was unaware), they could not put forward tenders.

Ancient prejudices and old enmities were aroused: it was recalled that in 1909 Messrs. Stephen Lynch & Co.'s attempt to acquire the Turkish Navigation Company caused the fall of the Turkish Cabinet in Constantinople and resulted in an unprecedented exhibition of public resentment in Baghdad itself.

Even the British Chamber of Commerce in Baghdad took a hand, urging a postponement of the sale in a letter signed by the Chairman (Mr. T. D. Cree) which included the following paragraph:

'Having regard to the ambiguity of the advertisement, lack of information and shortness of time . . . a sale under the conditions proposed and at Bombay, would certainly create a situation amounting to a virtual monopoly on the Tigris . . . and would cause great dissatisfaction.'

This was followed by a strongly worded telegram from Basra signed by every Arab of importance, demanding that the sale should take place in Basra:

'The prosperity of the country . . .', they said, 'depends greatly on river communications, and the local merchants should be given the means of participating in the trade. We firmly hope that you will see to it that the people of this country will not be deprived of free competition.'

The Baghdad (Arab) Chamber of Commerce weighed in with an even stronger representation, and questions were asked in the House of Commons.¹

¹ Deb. 23.2.20.

It was a storm in a teacup, but one full of ominous possibilities, for it was the first time that public opinion had become vocal on any issue. Lord Inchcape did his best to meet it: he twice postponed the date of the sale, and I was authorized by the Secretary of State to override General Head-quarters and the War Office in the matter of the publication of Lists. The British Chamber of Commerce at Baghdad returned to the charge with a further lengthy protest,¹ which concluded as follows:

'The Chamber views the whole transaction with the greatest concern, intensified by its intimate knowledge of native opinion on the subject. . . . The chief concern of the Chamber arises not from the financial interests involved, but from the fact that the circumstances of this sale² will reflect, in the eyes of the 'Iraqi community, on His Majesty's Government. . . . The 'Iraqi community will believe that its interests have been set aside . . . and the Chamber's belief is that this conviction will grow and will cause serious damage to the good name of the British Government. The Chamber solemnly warns His Majesty's Government that (unless the sale is placed in the hands of an independent government official) a weapon will have been forged for the political enemies of the British Occupation of Mesopotamia. Already, 'Iraqis are contrasting unfavourably the action of His Majesty's Government in this matter with the action of the Turkish Government which several years ago gave way to the feeling of the country against the projected sale to Lord Inchcape's Company of the Turkish steamers then running on the river, and thus blocked the first scheme for an absolute and unshared monopoly of river navigation.'

Before this protest reached me, I had satisfied myself that Lord Inchcape had done all that he could reasonably be expected to do, and the correspondence, of which the foregoing is but the briefest summary, was brought to an end by the following telegram from Lord Inchcape on March 3rd:

'Many thanks for your telegrams. You may rely on my working hand in glove with you. I am sure that if we had only met everything would have been settled to your complete satisfaction in half an hour.'

Lord Inchcape was right in his belief that had he been able to meet the merchants of Basra and Baghdad a settlement would have been reached without difficulty. He would, I fear, have found General Head-quarters at this period less reasonable: they were telegraphing to the War Office demanding the retention for military purposes of 50 per cent. of the 1919 fleet, and declining altogether to entrust the

¹ I afterwards ascertained that it was motived primarily by a wholly unauthorized but widely believed report that Lord Inchcape contemplated buying the Basra/Baghdad Railway from the War Office—a form of rationalization for which the public sentiment was unprepared.

² The total sum realized by the sale of river craft in Mesopotamia on War Office account by Lord Inchcape was £1,080,000.

carriage of military stores and personnel by river to commercial agencies. Nor were they willing to see the control of railways pass to the Civil Administration. The Railway was only able, at this period (March 1920), owing to shortage of rolling stock, to handle 200 tons a day, and military requirements were 800 tons daily.

'The lines of communication in this country', they telegraphed, 'are delicate and even if the firmest and most specific guarantees are obtained that military requirements are met both in peace and war the transition period of selling the fleet and handing over the railways to the Civil Administration must be a period of anxiety to the Army. The guarantees required are unobtainable here, and it is useless for us to deal. . . . Until settled we cannot agree to any transfer from military control of the railway or river fleet.'

My comments on this decision were as follows:

'General Headquarters have . . . informed the War Office that they cannot agree to hand over railways except on terms which can in no case be settled for some months to come. . . . It is perhaps convenient that I should explain the general principles underlying my attitude in regard to the transfer of Departments from military to civil.

'Financial Aspect. As far as I can gather the cost of the military services in Iraq during the financial year will, unless drastic steps are taken to cut down expenditure and to transfer certain services to the civil administration, exceed £30,000,000, a figure which may prove fatal to the retention of the Mandate for this country.

'It is my belief that the necessary reduction can best be effected by placing various public and quasi-civil services on a peace basis at the earliest possible moment, and by introducing peace methods of cost-accountancy and finance. There will be some inconvenience and temporary loss of efficiency, but it must be faced.

'Political Considerations. It is desirable that departments having extensive relations with the public should come under the civil administration at the earliest possible moment in order that preliminary steps may be taken to replace Indian by Iraqi personnel into every branch as far as possible.

'Commercial Reasons. It is desirable to foster trade with Persia by every means possible, and to use the railway as an instrument to this end.'

The decision not to maintain a Civil Marine Service, in which military requirements could be incorporated, was arrived at after full inquiries had brought me to the conclusion that military demands were unduly large and would have involved the Civil Administration in undesirable responsibilities, and that the existing staff and administration, which I should have had to take over, would find themselves in practice unable to observe the rigid parsimony by which alone it would be possible to maintain a Civil Marine Service.

I have dealt with this question at some length because the correspondence indicates, I think decisively, the extent to which, at every opportunity, I committed myself to a policy of drastic reduction,

stringent economies, and the introduction of Arabs into the public services. In the pursuit of this policy I was thwarted at every turn, partly by political uncertainties in Europe, and partly by the existence in Iraq of military forces and military departments on a vast scale but, as was later to be shown, of comparatively little use for the maintenance of order. The Civil Administration, as such, was already self-supporting, but it was not to be expected that customs-duties and other sources of revenue which depended in part upon the large number of troops in the country, would continue after the end of 1920.

The position on 1st April 1920 was as follows:

PROVISIONAL ESTIMATED RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE 1920-1

<i>Receipts.</i>		<i>Expenditure.</i>	
Land Revenue	158,15,000	Revenue	27,98,000
Date Tax	18,37,000	Tapu and Waqf	6,45,000
Kodah	21,37,000	Land settlement	2,80,000
Tapu	5,72,500	Surveys	6,00,000
Miscellaneous revenue	14,54,790	Irrigation	57,17,000
Surveys	70,000	Finance	8,00,000
Agriculture	50,000	Agriculture	6,77,000
Customs	257,82,000	Customs	44,00,000
Judicial	7,82,800	Political and General	64,00,000
Jails	2,71,500	Judicial	12,00,000
Political and General	2,11,550	Jails	7,55,000
Police	70,000	Public Works	94,00,000
Education	37,000	Police	70,00,000
Medical	1,17,000	Levies	45,00,000
Press	6,60,000	Education	18,35,000
Publications	1,85,000	Medical	45,00,000
Interest	30,000	Transport by land and	
Posts	47,93,600	water including cost of	
Telegraphs	45,81,000	transport for Public Works	
Transport	4,00,000	and all other Departments	70,00,000
Stores	4,50,000	Stores	7,50,000
Public Works (Military con-		Posts	38,14,000
tribution towards upkeep		Telegraphs	35,89,000
of roads)	3,00,000	Presses	8,20,000
Miscellaneous	6,96,000	Publications	1,68,000
Remounts	65,000	Miscellaneous	48,000
Payment for revenue grains		Subsistence allowances, etc.	18,54,100
sold to the Army in 1918	35,00,000	Remounts, etc.	10,82,000
Contributions from Army for		Stationery	3,00,000
Quasi-military duties of		Ecclesiastical	20,000
Levies and Police	18,00,000	Archaeological	1,00,000
Total Rs.	666,68,740	Total Rs.	710,52,100

There was a current deficit of about 44 lakhs of rupees, against which we had an accumulated surplus of 31 lakhs. Railways and Port

Budgets were dealt with separately on a commercial and self-supporting basis. Ottoman Public Debt was likewise excluded, on both sides of the account. The estimates were moreover subject to substantial downward revision, and much expenditure was of a non-recurring kind. The Administration was thus nearly, but not quite, self-supporting in its first year.

The Finance Department had from the outset been in sound and experienced hands, first those of Major W. S. R. May of the Sudan Finance Department, who did much to organize a workable system, and later of Lt.-Col. S. H. Slater of the Indian Civil Service, later Financial Adviser to the Arab Government.

Their task was one of extreme difficulty; expenditure was largely dictated by military exigencies: it was impossible to cut down departmental cadres suddenly without creating chaos. Transport by sea, as already stated, was often unobtainable for months at a time, and until men reached England or India their salary was a charge against the administration. The cost of materials was rising, but bills took six months or more to reach us: freights were being decontrolled and reached unheard-of figures. We were much under-staffed, and in many matters were entirely in the hands of the military departments, who were wont to balance their own budgets by wrecking ours. It was an exceedingly difficult period, and I cannot praise too highly the manner in which Slater rode the storm.

So long as we remained independent of a grant-in-aid from the Imperial Parliament, we could claim some degree of financial autonomy, and it was clear to all that 'Treasury Control' on normal lines would be so difficult and complicated, having regard to the transitional state of the administration and to the difficulties of communication, that it would be really unworkable, and if attempted would lead to serious dislocation.

In a circular issued to political officers in April 1920 I reminded them of Lord Morley's dictum¹ in a letter to the Viceroy of India, 'In a poor country, economy is as much an element of defence as guns and forts'! I asked all concerned to co-operate in reducing expenditure to a point which would enable us to balance our budget. I am confident that we should have succeeded had conditions remained normal.

On the general question of Treasury control I telegraphed as follows (May 1920):

'This year's budget, like last year's, indicates that the administration should be in a position to pay current non-military expenditure without making application to Parliament for a grant-in-aid. . . .

¹ *Recollections*, ii. 241.

'Constitutional proposals now before H.M.G. involve the assumption by the Council of State and eventually by the Legislative Assembly of full control under the aegis of the High Commissioner of the finances of the country and much confusion and resentment is bound to arise if the power of the executive in this country to give effect to the decisions of the Council of State is limited as suggested by the Treasury.

'On practical grounds I submit following observations:—

'Submission of a large number of questions for detailed consideration of several departments of H.M.G. at home will involve employment of highly skilled imported clerical labour and additional experienced Administrative Officers who are not available and whom we cannot afford.

'Great delay is inevitable owing to distance of Iraq from London and owing to heavy pressure of work at home in all offices concerned.

'The Administration is still in a highly transitional state and will so remain for another 12 months. The taking over of various departments from the Army has been greatly delayed and will not be complete before the end of the year. Each fresh transfer involves additions and alterations in the budgets of a dozen other departments.

'The necessity of living within our means imposes automatically upon the Administration the obligation to enforce rigid economy in all departments and I submit this is best done under present arrangement whereby full financial authority is in practice vested in the Civil Commissioner advised by his Financial Secretary.

'I therefore recommend that present arrangements be allowed to continue for another 12 months subject to further consideration by H.M.G., on receipt of the budget for 1920-1.

'Questions of financial control and of audit seem to me inseparable from general question of degree of control to be exercised by mandatory state and should be considered in light of this and last year's budget.

'Apart from these general considerations however, matters are in such a highly fluid and transitional state that I should view with great apprehension the introduction of fresh arrangements during present financial year and earnestly trust that it may be found possible to defer consideration of question for present.'

If the disturbances which commenced six weeks later did nothing else, they at least released Iraq from the bugbear of financial control by Whitehall of the petty details of administration—of a type such as that which, in Palestine, has had more to do with the lack of enthusiasm of Palestinians for the present system of Government under the Mandate than is generally realized.

CHAPTER X

THE FIRST FOUR MONTHS OF 1920

Athenian. Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation this our city is.

Cleinias. What had you in your mind when you said that?

Ath. I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are ordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. Now a man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can easily receive laws at their first imposition. But if we could anyhow wait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have been nurtured with them, and become habituated to them, take their part in the public elections of the state; I say, if this could be accomplished, and rightly accomplished by any way or contrivance,—then, I think that there would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state thus trained not being permanent.

PLATO, *Laws*, VI (Jowett's Trans.).

Political atmospherics. The Syrian regime. Frontier between Syria and 'Iraq. 'Ana. Dair-ez-Zor seized by filibusters. Ramadhan-al-Shallash. The War Office bungle matters. We decline to reoccupy Dair-ez-Zor. Maulud Pasha. Faisal proclaimed King of Syria. 'Abdulla proclaimed 'Amir of 'Iraq'. References to 'Iraq in Parliament. Proposal to maintain order in 'Iraq through Royal Air Force. Mr. Winston Churchill's proposals. Mr. Asquith's views. Fresh Constitutional Proposals. Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter's Committee.

IF a political weather forecast on conventional lines had been constructed in the beginning of December 1919 on the basis of the reports transmitted almost daily to the Civil Commissioner's office from every administrative centre in 'Iraq, it would have shown a deep depression, originating in Syria, moving steadily from Damascus to Dair-ez-Zor: subsequent charts would show that this depression travelled steadily from Dair-ez-Zor to Tel 'Afar, causing grave atmospheric disturbances and much material damage at both places. The chart would show a falling barometer at Baghdad, Karbala, and Najaf, all three well-known storm centres; elsewhere the political barometer would appear to be 'set fair', with local thunder, the air being surcharged with electricity owing to the absence of lightning conductors. I will endeavour in the present chapter to elucidate the origin and course of these phenomena which were the precursor of more serious internal disturbances.

In October 1918 an autonomous Government under Amir Faisal had been set up from Aleppo to Damascus; the façade was Arab, but British officers were on the spot and presumably provided guidance whilst H.M.'s Government provided funds, on the scale to which the Arabs of

Western Arabia were by now accustomed. Many of the leading men in Amir Faisal's entourage were of Mesopotamian origin. They had always contended that they fought the Syrian campaign for the liberation of their own country, and as early as the winter of 1917-18, during the hostilities before Ma'an, they formed a society called the '*Ahd al 'Iraqi*, the object of which was to secure the independence of 'Iraq from all foreign control and its close union with an independent Syria, under the family of King Husain of the Hijaz. This society, led by Yasin Pasha, who on the fall of Damascus was taken prisoner and exchanged his high position in the Turkish army for that of Chief of Faisal's General Staff, was responsible for the rapid acceleration of nationalist ambitions in 'Iraq. It is doubtful how far it had the support of Faisal himself, who was more embarrassed than aided by the chauvinism of its political leaders. On several occasions he denounced actions which were unquestionably engineered by the League; but since, through the participation of 'Iraqi officers, it controlled the army, he was powerless to direct it. The amorphous character of the romantic urge of nationalism that began to overflow into 'Iraq from Syria at this period made it exceedingly difficult to deal with administrative questions on broad lines. The movement had, during 1919, no leaders in 'Iraq, nor even accredited representatives. It gained impetus from the disillusionments bred of the war, but its local manifestations were fluctuating and uncertain. I saw in it seeds of promise, but I felt that an uncritical surrender to its tendency could lead to nothing but disaster. In Eastern countries the non-rational element is not less dominant in times of stress in political matters than in questions of race or religion; historical and economic considerations are a bad second. Factual truths are swept aside by the protagonists of political progress, for it is pleasant to be able to absolve oneself from the simple duty of loyalty to facts.

At the date of the Armistice the frontier between Syria and 'Iraq had not been defined. Under Turkish rule the Baghdad wilayat had embraced the Qadha of 'Ana, which extended up the Euphrates to a few miles above Qaim. Between Qaim and Raqqa, the southernmost town in the Aleppo wilayat, lay the *mutasarriflik* of Dair-ez-Zor, which was included in neither wilayat, but was directly dependent on Constantinople. For a short period before the war these administrative divisions had been altered and the province of Dair had received a large increase to the south, including 'Ana, whither I sent at the earnest request of its leading inhabitants, after the retreat of the Turks, a British Assistant Political Officer.

Towards the end of November the inhabitants of the town of Dair-ez-Zor, situated on the Euphrates some 400 miles from Baghdad,

likewise clamoured for the dispatch of a British officer to preserve law and order. I was reluctant to extend our responsibilities in this direction, and General Marshall declined to extend his sphere of military protection upstream of El Qaim, but it seemed dangerous to leave a no man's land between 'Iraq and Syria, within easy reach of the Turks. The matter was accordingly referred to H.M.'s Government who, on 13th December, in spite of a protest from the Arab Government at Damascus, ordered the dispatch of an officer of the Civil Administration to take charge as a temporary measure, pending the decision of the Peace Conference (i. e. on the same basis as our occupation of the Mosul wilayat).

Captain Carver was accordingly sent from 'Ana to Dair, only to find, on reaching Albu Kamal, that a *Qaimmaqam* (Deputy Governor) representing the Arab Government and sent by order of the Governor of Aleppo, with a subordinate staff and some forty *gendarmes*, had arrived there on 23rd December and had instructions to occupy 'Ana. An Arab *Mutasarrif* (Governor) in the meantime reached Dair, and was engaged in appointing large numbers of officials and in the enrolment of *gendarmes* at a rate of pay far higher than was offered in 'Iraq. The necessary funds were of course being drawn from His Majesty's Treasury through the good offices of the British Advisers of the Damascus Government, who had omitted to inform General Allenby at Cairo, or H.M.'s Government, or Baghdad, of the action of their protégés, by whom, indeed, they seem to have been ignored. I was thus in complete ignorance whether the Military Governor of Aleppo, who was said to have issued the orders, was an Englishman, a Frenchman, or an Arab. On reference to Aleppo he was found to be Shukri Pasha al-'Ayyubi, who declared, three weeks after the event, that the Arab officials had proceeded to Dair and Albu Kamal contrary to instructions, and was constrained to order their immediate withdrawal.

Though the question was thus settled amicably for the time being, it left an impression of rival and incompatible ambitions, of which the 'Ahd-al-'Iraqi did not fail to make use. In February, and again in July 1919, an agent of the 'Ahd-al-'Iraqi, who was ascertained later to have been one Ramadhan-al-Shallash, canvassed the tribes of Dair and obtained documents in favour of the Arab Government. Ramadhan was himself by origin a *mukhtar*, or headman, of one of the local tribes, the Albu Sarai, cultivators and sheep-breeders above and below Dair. He had been an officer in the Turkish army and had deserted at Madina to the Sharif.

The propaganda carried on by the League was not confined to Dair. Continuous correspondence was carried on by the 'Iraqis in Syria and

their relatives and friends in 'Iraq, the purport of which was to urge the latter to combine with Syria in demanding complete independence. Funds were sent from Syria to help the 'Iraqis in the diffusion of these views.¹

As already stated, I was not an enthusiastic advocate of the inclusion of the Dair-ez-Zor region within the boundaries of 'Iraq. It had been regarded from the earliest historical times as part of Syria,² the boundary being in the neighbourhood of Salahya. Military considerations made its exclusion advisable, for troops could not be maintained at a point so far distant, and local levies could not be relied on. For eight months, however, Captain Carver and, later on, Captain Chamier and Lieutenant A. Boyes, M.M., with the assistance of two armoured cars under the redoubtable Captain Goring, maintained peace and kept the road up the Euphrates open, though the nearest military detachments were at Ramadi and Mosul. I visited them frequently by air and was thus able to keep in fairly close touch with events. Though they were virtually without military support they contrived to re-establish the authority of Government and to reduce the price of food, in consequence, to less than half the figure at which it stood before their arrival—a matter of primary concern to the poorer classes in the town. The state of affairs redounded to their credit, but it was of necessity a temporary administration, of a type that put a great strain on the officers concerned.

A provisional boundary proposed during the summer of 1919 by H.M.'s Government, namely a line crossing the Euphrates some miles below Dair at the mouth of the Khabur, and following up that tributary, was not held to accord with local conditions. The same tribes occupied both banks of the Khabur, and in the interests of peace it was essential that they should be placed under a single mandatory. Nevertheless, in the conversations between Great Britain and France in September 1919, it was decided 'provisionally' to maintain the Khabur as a frontier. The Amir Faisal was at that time in Europe, and was present at some of the conferences, but it is not certain whether he was aware of the exact nature of the decision which was reached, though he undoubtedly knew that it was the intention of the Allied Governments to exclude Dair itself from the 'Iraqi State. The impression in Syria seems to have been that Great Britain would evacuate the whole of the *mutasarriflik*, the southern boundary of which could be variously stated as being at Qaim, the old Turkish administrative frontier, or below 'Ana at the point temporarily adopted by the Turks. Attempts to obtain information from London were unsuccessful:

¹ For some indication as to the actual amounts see G. L. Bell, p. 134 note.

² On this subject see Musil, *The Middle Euphrates*.

no one seemed to know what had actually been decided: there were no protocols, and nothing seemed to have been settled in writing.

During October 1919 the British forces evacuated Syria. A few days later Captain Chamier, now Political Officer at Dair-ez-Zor, heard that a Turkish *Qaimmaqam* had arrived at Hasaqa, north-east of Dair; at the same time letters were circulated among the tribes, announcing the immediate return of the Turks. I sent Captain Chamier to Hasaqa, to interview the *Qaimmaqam*, at whose suggestion he went on to Ras-al-'Ain, whence he telephoned to the Turkish Commandant at Mardin, and asked for an explanation. The Commandant replied that he had understood that we had evacuated Dair, but since that was not the case he would recall the *Qaimmaqam*. There was nothing in the terms of the Armistice to preclude action on these lines by the Turks, for Dair-ez-Zor was administratively neither in Syria nor part of the Mosul wilayat.

On 19th November the High Commissioner at Cairo telegraphed that Ramadhan-al-Shallash had left Aleppo with instructions from the Damascus Government to proceed to Dair. He reached Raqqa early in December, and began actively to intrigue among the tribes, styling himself Governor of the Euphrates and Khabur. All the information reaching us at this period indicated that relations between the leading Arabs of the Damascus Government and the Turks were becoming closer, as was indeed natural, seeing that most of them had been in the Turkish army until the Armistice. I was inclined, therefore, to believe that this movement was inspired from Turkish sources rather than from Damascus; I could scarcely believe that the British officers there were consenting parties, and I had received nothing on the subject from them, or from the India Office.

On 11th December Dair-ez-Zor was entered by tribesmen from the south who, together with the townsmen, raided the hospital, church, one or two mosques, and the Political Office, where the safe was broken open and its contents taken. The petrol-dump was blown up, with some ninety casualties among the assailants, and all prisoners were released. An armoured car, which went out to make a reconnaissance of the town, was fired at and badly damaged, and later in the morning fire was opened on the barracks. The machine-guns, which had been mounted on the roof, replied, but were soon put out of action by the enemy's fire. Shortly afterwards Captain Chamier was invited to come down to the town for a conference with the Mayor and the leading citizens. They seemed anxious to make a truce, and it was evident that, having got the tribesmen into the town, they found themselves unable to control them. He also met the shaikhs who had led the rebellion; they were in a great state of excitement. Their general

view was that, having gone so far, they might as well kill the British officers and staff; and they would possibly have acted on this threat but for the fortunate appearance of two aeroplanes sent by General Head-quarters from Mosul, which proceeded to machine-gun the town. The shaikhs changed their tone at once, and begged Captain Chamier to stop the bombardment. When the aeroplanes had left they concluded an armistice for twenty-four hours.

Ramadhan-al-Shallash reached Dair in the afternoon; he sent immediately for Captain Chamier, and announced that, just as the British had been invited in December 1918 to come in and preserve peace and order, so they were now requested to leave. Captain Chamier replied that he had no instructions to vacate Dair, but that as he was unable to make any resistance he was willing to leave if Ramadhan would undertake to preserve order and not to take action against the Arab officials who had served under the British administration, or against the Christians. (There were a number of Armenian refugees¹ in Dair, for whose safety he was justifiably concerned.) Ramadhan agreed to these conditions, but during the night he changed his mind and asked Captain Chamier to guarantee that after his safe arrival in the British lines Dair should not be attacked by land or air. This promise Chamier was unable to give, but he agreed to attract the attention of an aeroplane and induce the pilot to land. He did so in the course of the day—no small praise being due to the pilot for venturing to land—and a message was sent to the British authorities explaining that the British in Dair were held there as hostages for the safety of the town.

Once he had entered Dair, Ramadhan's propaganda consisted in giving appointments to every one who came to his assistance, the salary to be fixed at a later date. He informed the tribal shaikhs that it was the intention of the Arab Government to initiate local institutions under the shaikhs themselves. A number of *mukhtars* of the tribes along the river and the majority of such shaikhs of the 'Anaiza as were hostile to our staunch ally, Fahad Beg, came in to visit him, but though they professed loudly that it was necessary to raise the tribes against the British and even to carry the war into India, all the more important shaikhs, after they had received gifts of money and gauged the situation, returned to their tents and took no further action. There is no doubt that Ramadhan was badly misled as to the extent of support which he would receive from the tribes.

¹ For references to the circumstances of these refugees in 1916 see *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the U.S., Washington*, 1929. See also *Kemal's Slave Market and the Lausanne Treaty*, by M. T. Manning, New York, 1925, and *The Lausanne Treaty, Turkey and Armenia*, by B. J. Cannon, New York, 1926.

On 18th December, after all this had happened, there came from the War Office a telegram dated 21st November,¹ which after several repetitions was only partly decipherable, stating that it had been decided by the Peace Conference that Dair-*ez-Zor* was not to be within the British mandate. On the same day we received a copy of a telegram sent by Amir Faisal, then in Paris, to his brother and deputy at Damascus, the Amir Zaid, repudiating in the strongest terms the action of Ramadhan-al-Shallash and ordering the Arab officials to withdraw from Dair. He added that all who were responsible for what had occurred would be punished as rebels. This message was dropped in Dair by our aeroplanes on 22nd December, together with a letter from the Commander-in-Chief requiring Ramadhan to send the British officers and men in safety to Albu Kamal, otherwise action would be taken against Dair. Ramadhan was no doubt aware that the seizure of Dair could not be justified, though he supported it by claiming that Dair had been assigned to the Arab Government by the Peace Conference. He was also undeniably anxious as to Turkish movements, a natural anxiety seeing that he was a very recent deserter from the Ottoman army. On 19th December he told Captain Chamier that the Turks were concentrating in Ras-al-'Ain; he was good enough to add that he had no wish to make war on the British Government, and asked whether, in the event of a Turkish attack, they would support him, at any rate with money.

On 21st December two officers arrived from Aleppo, Rauf Beg and Taufiq Beg, the latter being the Aide-de-Camp of Ja'far Pasha, then Military Governor of Aleppo, a loyal adherent of the Amir Faisal and deservedly trusted by General Allenby and his staff. Rauf Beg brought a letter from Ja'far Pasha to Captain Chamier, which he was not allowed to communicate to him until two days later. In it Ja'far Pasha asked the British officer to consult with Rauf as to the best means of restoring order. Rauf Beg informed Captain Chamier that he had instructions to dismiss Ramadhan from his post as *Qaimmaqam* of Raqqa and to send him under arrest to Aleppo. But as the representatives of the Arab Government had no power to enforce these orders, and as Ramadhan alone stood between the British officers and the fanaticism of the local tribesmen, Captain Chamier suggested that action should be postponed, and that Lieutenant Taufiq, with one of the British officers, should go to Albu Kamal to interview the British authorities. I had flown up to Albu Kamal that day, and was urged by Taufiq Beg

¹ *London Gazette*, Suppl. 32379, 1.7.21. The India Office made no communication to me on the subject, presuming that I should hear through the G.O.C. from the War Office. Had they telegraphed to me direct the incident would never have arisen, and the subsequent course of events might have been very different.

to arrange for the ejection by British troops of Ramadhan-al-Shallash. My reply was that we had never desired to hold Dair except to maintain order, and that as Ramadhan had produced the existing state of anarchy, it was the duty of the Damascus Government to right matters. A letter to the same effect was also dropped by aeroplane in Dair, and it was intimated to Ramadhan that if the British officers and men were sent in safety to Albu Kamal within forty-eight hours, Dair would not be touched. The prisoners were released on 25th December, and left after receiving assurances that no harm should come to the Christian population of the town. In the light of after events it is arguable that, as has been suggested,¹ my judgement was at fault in this matter, and that I should have pressed Sir George MacMunn to restore the *status quo* by force of arms, pending an amicable settlement with the Syrian Government on diplomatic lines. On the other hand, it is to be remembered:

- (1) that Dair-ez-Zor had been allocated to Syria;
- (2) that we had been placed by the ineptitudes of the War Office, the Syrian Government, and the British liaison officers attached to it, in a radically false position;
- (3) that shortage of transport and troops, consequent on demobilization, made military operations at such a distance from our base at Baghdad almost impossible, and that in the event of any sort of trouble it would be impossible to maintain communication between Dair-ez-Zor and Baghdad or Mosul.

In all the circumstances it would seem that the decision reached was the only possible one.

On 12th January, the Arab Government at Damascus, in a telegram to Cairo, protested against the provisional Khabur boundary, using the same argument that had been urged six months earlier from Baghdad, namely, that it split tribal units. They asked that Mayyadin and Albu Kamal should be included in the Syrian zone. The methods adopted by Ramadhan-al-Shallash were more direct. He took up from the first an attitude of defiance to the Amir Faisal's orders, and declared that the British must withdraw to the Wadi Hauran, some fifty miles below 'Ana, asserting that this was the frontier adopted by the Peace Conference. Incidentally he announced his intention of going on to Mosul. He collected taxes wherever he could within British boundaries, encouraged the tribes to rob and raid, sent threatening messages to the Political Officers at Albu Kamal and inflammatory letters to the shaikhs in British territory. To these letters he received replies of a discouraging character, but he had greater success in his efforts to excite such sections of the 'Aqaidat as had joined him. The

¹ See Haldane.

prospect of unlimited highway robbery was very much to their taste, and they were ready enough to raise any cry, religious or political, which justified looting. The situation was regarded in a different light by the merchants of Baghdad, who were engaged in buying gold in Syria and transporting it at great profit to Mesopotamia. Their tales of the danger of the road and the losses they had experienced usually ended with a description of their heartfelt satisfaction when they reached Abu Kamal, a British garrison, and safety.

Official protests against Ramadhan's acts of hostility were conveyed by aeroplane to Mayyadin and Dair. He was warned that if he continued to trespass within the British boundary the Commander-in-Chief would be forced to make reprisals, and that any representations which he had to make on the subject of the frontier should be addressed to his own Government, which was in amicable discussion with the other Governments concerned. He replied by denying that he had been informed of the agreement which had been reached, and the violent threats with which his letter ended were followed on 11th January by a determined attack on Abu Kamal, carried out by his tribesmen, who entered the suburbs, looted the houses of Arabs who were in British service, and violated their women. Nor were matters improved when, in the middle of January, Ramadhan left for Aleppo and was superseded by Maulud Pasha al Khalaf, who had previously been in command of a division in Damascus. Like his predecessor, Maulud was a Mesopotamian (he hailed from Mosul) and a prominent member of the 'Ahd-al-'Iraqi. His first step on assuming command was to write to the Commander-in-Chief at Baghdad, informing him that the Khabur frontier was impossible to maintain for tribal reasons, and urging immediate withdrawal to the Wadi Hauran—an alternative which would have been equally open to objection, since it would have involved the arbitrary division of the Dulaim tribe. At the same time he suggested the reopening of post and telegraph services.

No answer to such letters as these was possible except that which had already been given to Ramadhan, namely, that the boundary had been provisionally agreed to in Europe and could not be discussed except through the usual diplomatic channels. Reinforcements were dispatched to Abu Kamal, but in order to avoid unnecessary friction and bloodshed the territory up to the Khabur was not occupied. We continued to assume that the Arab Government was not responsible for what was done by its officers and that a state of war did not exist, but it was an assumption increasingly difficult to maintain. Maulud was as actively engaged in hostile propaganda as his predecessor. His letters reached the shaikhs as far down as 'Amara, and he appeared to be amply supplied with funds (doubtless provided by H.M.'s Govern-

ment) which he distributed among such tribal leaders as he thought capable of causing disturbance within our sphere. Our forbearance strained the loyalty of our own supporters, who were unable to understand why the British Government did not deal summarily with an enemy as insignificant as Maulud and his handful of marauders, and why we did not extend immediate help and protection to those within our boundaries who were ready to stand by us if they were assured against reprisals. With a view to stabilizing this position, we advanced at the end of January to Salahiya, half-way between Albu Kamal and the Khabur. Maulud made this advance an excuse for fresh hostilities, declaring that he was unable to restrain the fury of the tribes. Led by Arab officers, the tribesmen attacked Albu Kamal in the middle of February, while British lines of communication as far south as Qaim were subject to continuous raids. A warning letter was addressed by Sir George MacMunn to Maulud, and at the same time the Arab Government in Damascus was informed by H.M.'s Government that it would be held responsible for any encroachment on the provisional boundary by tribes or officials under Maulud, and that the continuation of the subsidy which was still being paid to the Arab Government by Great Britain would be dependent on its ability to enforce its orders.

These expostulations were as vain as those which had preceded them. Ramadhan was permitted, or ordered, to return to Dair. Maulud brought back with him small reinforcements of regular troops from Aleppo, and an 'Iraqi noted for the violence of his sentiments was appointed Governor of Mayyadin. Propaganda of a fanatical character issuing from these sources reached Karbala and Najaf. The British Treasury's subsidy to the Syrian Government, however, was not stopped, or even reduced.

While Maulud was issuing incitements to *jihad* on the Euphrates, Amir Faisal returned to Damascus from Paris. He at once dispatched letters to Cairo expressing his regret for what had happened at Dair-*ez-Zor*, coupled with an assurance that he was taking steps to prevent further occurrences of a like nature, but pointing out that the provisional frontier-line cut across tribal lands and divisions, and was likely to give rise to misunderstandings and disorder. He therefore suggested that a mixed commission of British and Arabs should be appointed to modify the arrangement which had been reached in January. I agreed readily to this proposal, the more so as at the moment Maulud's attitude seemed to be growing somewhat more reasonable. Ramadhan-*al-Shallash*, who had come down to Mayyadin, was recalled at the request of the Commander-in-Chief and returned to Dair, where he fell out with Maulud and went back to his tribe, who were not far off. Early in May, after exacting fines and tributes from the hostile tribes

round Salahiya, our advanced post was moved back to Albu Kamal, where the boundary between Syria and 'Iraq runs to-day.

Before the meeting on the Euphrates took place, a Syrian Congress assembled in Damascus, and on 11th March proclaimed Faisal King of Syria, while a second body, purporting to represent Mesopotamia, composed of officers of 'Iraqi origin in Syria, nominated his brother, the Sharif 'Abdulla, 'Amir of 'Iraq'. Amongst them were men of real ability and courage, who had earned the confidence of British officers in Syria. They had for some time been encouraged to believe that the mandate for Syria might be awarded not, as they feared, to France, but to Great Britain, and they did their utmost, in their own fashion, to secure this consummation. About this time they realized that these hopes were doomed to disappointment, and they turned their eyes to 'Iraq. They had been given every reason to believe that the Anglo-French declaration of November 1918 would be applied to 'Iraq by Great Britain, yet the form of government there at the time was that of a Military Occupation. They were unaware of the diplomatic considerations which had served to prevent H.M.'s Government from authorizing me to take any steps towards inaugurating an indigenous administration: certain British officers in Syria, equally in the dark and, though with less justification, wholly ignorant of the complications consequent on troubles in Kurdistan, the maintenance of a large force in Persia, and the custody of over 100,000 prisoners of war and refugees, encouraged them to believe that the so-called 'Indianizing policy' of the Administration at Baghdad was the sole obstacle to their ambitions.

It was at about this time that the leaders seem to have reached the conclusion that a vigorous offensive against the Civil Administration was the only practical means open to them of realizing their political ambitions. There was, indeed, some justification for their views, for H.M.'s Government had firmly refused either to make any public announcement themselves in regard to Mesopotamia, in amplification of the Anglo-French declaration of 8th November 1918, or to permit me to do so.

When the Imperial Parliament reassembled in February, Lord Curzon, in addressing the House of Lords¹ on the subject of foreign policy, was studiously vague. He said that owing to the attitude of the United States of America, whom we should have welcomed as mandatory for the whole Ottoman Empire, there was great delay in concluding peace with Turkey. For this delay the whole world was paying heavily. It was, however, out of the question that we should accept a mandate for Basra without Baghdad. As to Mosul he was silent.

¹ Debates, H.L. 10.2.20.

In the House of Commons,¹ a few days later, all that Mr. Bonar Law could say was that:

'the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia is under the direction of the Secretary of State for India. The Military Administration is controlled by the War Office. A civil administration cannot be effected until peace has been concluded between the Allies and Turkey and the status of the various parts of the former Ottoman Dominions decided.'

Of the nature of the future Government not a word was said, and Mr. Montagu, with whom I pleaded for some specific announcement, was unable to commit H.M.'s Government in any direction. On 23rd February, Mr. Winston Churchill, as Secretary of State for War, spoke as usual with greater freedom and more clarity than any of his colleagues on the general question of our military commitments.

'Mesopotamia', he said, 'is disturbed by the excitements of the Arabs due to the situation in Syria and by the increasing movement and power of the Turkish nationalist forces in Asia Minor, and by Bolshevik advances in the North.'

'No further relief can be looked for till a real peace can be made with Turkey. We have lost ground steadily throughout the year, and I trust that having dispersed our armies we shall not now take steps which will drive the Turkish people to despair, or undertake any new obligations, because our resources are not equal to the discharge.'

These were wise words, but the policy he advocated was not translated into terms of action by the Cabinet. He went on to outline a scheme whereby the chief command in Mesopotamia would be vested in an officer of the Air Force, with ancillary troops at his disposal. This idea had been elaborated some months before by Air-Vice-Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond and Air-Commodore Drew, after a careful examination of the situation on the spot during the previous year. I had, since the beginning of 1918, used aeroplanes as a means of transport almost to the exclusion of other modes of travel. The machines provided were not such as would commend themselves to the pilot or passenger of 1931—B.E. 2 C., R.E. 8, Bristol Fighters, and D.H. 4's: the aerodromes at out-stations were often deplorable, and the pilots' enterprise sometimes outstripped their judgement. I had taken part in bombing certain Kurdish villages whose occupants had murdered Political Officers, and in machine-gunning Shaikh Mahmud's insurgents, and had thus learnt something of the possibilities latent in this new arm; the idea of controlling Iraq from the air with the assistance of local forces had from the first greatly commended itself to me, and I strongly recommended the scheme, for the inception of which I was, I believe, to some extent responsible, having specifically

¹ Debates, H.C. 15.2.20.

pressed it in memoranda of September 1918 and April 1919. These views, however, found little support in Simla or at General Headquarters, Baghdad. As Maj.-Gen. Seely remarked:¹

'A great many of the older school of soldiers (in 'Iraq) do not believe in the air . . . they will not let air-power be used as it should be used. If you have a completely separate air-power and enable it to work under the political heads, you will save millions of pounds and thousands of lives.

Our forces in 'Iraq at the beginning of the year were 17,000 British and 44,000 Indian: in Palestine, with one-tenth the population, 10,000 British and 13,000 Indian troops. The cost of the garrison of the two countries was put at £35,500,000.

Mr. Winston Churchill's views were, as usual, useful and constructive, though they did not bring us in 'Iraq any nearer a solution of the problem of the moment. It is undeniable that the decision to control 'Iraq by means of the Royal Air Force made it possible to retain the Mandate: under any other system the cost of the garrison, however reduced in numbers, would have been prohibitive, and its efforts ineffectual owing to the great length of communications involved. The Royal Air Force, on the other hand, could not have dealt effectively with the orgy of riot and rebellion in 1920, and it is fortunate that they were not called upon to do so.

Mr. Winston Churchill's views as to the treatment of Turkey cited above coincided entirely with my own, for I had recorded, in April 1919, a note on the subject from which the following is an extract:

'The Armistice with Turkey was signed on October 31st: the Allies have not yet declared their intentions as regards Constantinople and Anatolia, and it is common knowledge that they are not in agreement as to the steps to be taken to give effect to their intentions in other portions of Turkey, viz., Syria and Armenia.

'The uncertainty thus created has aroused the hopes of Turks, the fears of Christians. Muslims all over the world, including Mesopotamia, were prepared as a result of the war to see Turkey lose the Arab provinces, and even Constantinople, but they will join with the Turks and Kurds in actively resenting the dismemberment of the rest of the Turkish Empire and its partition by a Christian Peace Conference on selfish lines.

'We cannot do now what we might have done three months ago. In the East as in the West there is a new spirit in men's minds. The Turkish Empire cannot now be destroyed: it is the embodiment of the Muslim ideal of temporal rule on earth of Muslim rulers, which the inability of Christian Powers to agree has aroused, at a moment when Western peoples are exhausted and averse from further

¹ Debates, H.C. 23.2.20.

wars. The only solution I can now see is the recognition of a Turkish Empire from Constantinople to the Caucasus—both exclusive: with Armenian and Nestorian enclaves and European control at Constantinople by an international body. . . .

'This will commit us to support Turkey—and to this extent will be satisfactory to our Muslim clients.

'It need not involve recognition of nominal suzerainty over Arab countries, though this may conceivably follow as the outcome of a popular movement: it need not prevent the internationalization of Constantinople.

'This policy will avoid annexation or protectorates contrary to popular will: it should prove acceptable to the advanced political parties in Allied countries, including the U.S.A. whose views must be reckoned with if we are to ensure continuity.

'The restoration of Turkish authority under foreign (preferably British) advisers in the Northern provinces would ease the position on the Northern frontier of Mesopotamia—and in Kurdistan, where a political officer was recently murdered as a direct result of Turco-Kurdish intrigues'.

As regards 'Iraq, however, nothing had been published since President Wilson had emerged from the fogs of Versailles like Moses on Sinai from the thick darkness, bearing with him the tablets of the Covenant of the League of Nations, only to find, like Moses, shortly afterwards, that his people were a-whoring after the old gods, rather than following the new dispensation. I made one more attempt to induce H.M.'s Government to let me go ahead with constitutional measures. In a telegram dated 19th March I asked for leave to set up 'a Central Legislative Council, with the High Commissioner (when he should arrive) as President, and Arab members in charge of Departments, with British Secretaries'. I emphasized that, whether peace was concluded with Turkey or not, some announcement on these lines must be made. 'But', I added, 'one of our principal obstacles in giving effect to any reform scheme will be difficulties with military authorities in regard to administrative matters. If Government wish me to carry on here for the next six months without serious detriment to the situation, I shall need a greater degree of support at home in my differences with the military authorities than I have hitherto thought it necessary to seek.' To this telegram I received no reply; the Foreign Office had to be consulted, and Lord Curzon's frequent absence through illness was causing great congestion of public business.

A few days later, on 25th March, a debate of great importance took place in the House of Commons. It was initiated by Mr. Asquith, who, with the support in later debates of Sir C. Townshend, urged that we should confine our direct obligations in 'Iraq to 'the zone of Basra' in which, he stated, quite incorrectly, by far the greater part of our prospectively remunerative expenditure in that country had been incurred.

Mr. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister, wholly dissented from this advice.

'We might', he said, 'abandon the country altogether. But I cannot understand withdrawing from the more important and more promising part of Mesopotamia. Mosul is a country with great possibilities. It has rich oil deposits. . . . It contains some of the richest natural resources of any country in the world. It maintains a population now of a little over 2,000,000. . . . What would happen if we withdrew? . . . If we did not undertake the task probably some other country would, and unless some country were to undertake the task, Mesopotamia would be exactly where she is to day, or probably much worse. After the enormous expenditure which we have incurred in freeing this country from the withering despotism of the Turk, to hand it back to anarchy and confusion, and to take no responsibility for its development would be an act of folly and quite indefensible. . . . If you take away the only central government they (the Arabs) have, you must put another in its place. They have been consulted about their wishes in this respect, and, I think, almost without exception, they are anxious that the British Government should stay there. They are very divided as to the kind of independent government they would like. It is not proposed that we should govern this country as if it were an essential part of the British Empire, making its laws. That is not our point of view. Our point of view is that they should govern themselves and that we should be responsible as the mandatory for advising, for counselling, for assisting, but that the government must be Arab. . . . We will respect the solemn undertaking which we gave to the Allies in November, 1918, upon that subject, but it would be fatal unless some country undertook the responsibility, the supreme responsibility, of constituting this Government and advising it. What other country will undertake that responsibility except Great Britain? To hand it over to anyone else would be contrary to the wishes of the Arab population there. They absolutely agree that they do not want Turkish rule again. They are also agreed that they want the British Government and British supervision. When they come to consider whether they would have a member of the Sharifian family over them, or somebody else, they are hopelessly divided, and that is one of the difficulties. We have no right to talk as if we were the Mandatory of Mesopotamia when the Treaty with Turkey is not yet completed. When that has been finally decided, and the question of who the mandatories are has been settled, we shall certainly claim the right as the Mandatory Power of Mesopotamia, including Mosul.'

Though none of the members who spoke in the debate had visited 'Iraq, there was general unanimity amongst all parties that the mandate should be accepted and an Arab Government set up. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, whose criticisms of the policy of Government in Mesopotamia were in general both far-sighted and practical, had stated, in the debate on Army Estimates a few days earlier, that

'we are going to undertake the gigantic task of restoring to production the 14,000,000 acres that once formed part of the cultivable area of Mesopotamia which was once the granary of the world, but now, owing to man's destructive

zeal, has become a desert. . . . The development of Mesopotamia is one of the things which must be looked to to reduce prices and increase the produce of the world. . . .'

It was on this note that the debate ended, but there was still no indication as to when and what steps would be taken in 'Iraq to give effect to the policy now reaffirmed by the Prime Minister. It was, however, clear to me that the scheme that I had submitted in April 1919, though then approved by H.M.'s Government, was not now adequate, and that we should have to omit the first stage and proceed forthwith to the second. I therefore appointed a Committee to prepare proposals for a Constitution for 'Iraq in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations and the published declarations of H.M.'s Government. The Committee, which sat under the Chairmanship of Sir Edgar Bonham-Carter, a former Legal Secretary in the Sudan Government, consisted of E. B. Howell,¹ H. H. F. M. Tyler,² F. C. C. Balfour (later Governor of the Red Sea Province of the Sudan), and R. W. Bullard, of the Levant Consular Service, who had intimate personal knowledge of Turkey and of 'Iraq both before and during the War. It was a strong Committee, with a 'liberal' bias, and in the course of its deliberations the questions at issue were freely discussed with individual notables of local standing. I make no apology for quoting in full the salient passages in their unanimous report, if only to show that the Civil Administration in 1920, as in previous years, was far from blind or deaf in regard to such matters.

'We think it necessary that a more thorough attempt should be made to ascertain what the wishes of the people are, but we consider that before this can be done with hope of success:—

- (a) The mandate must be granted.
- (b) The government of the country must be carried on for a short time under a provisional constitution to allow the country to settle down after the disturbances caused by the war.

'Until a mandate is granted it is impossible to elicit a frank expression of opinion. The great majority of the population accept the occupation and are content to accept such form of Government as the Occupying Power may set up. But there are various sections of the population which are not so content. These include some of the most important religious authorities; a small but active section of political agitators, mostly centred in Baghdad; all the pro-Turk party; and a small Syrian party.

'We have already experienced the influence which they are able to exert in Baghdad and Najaf by appeal to religious and national feelings. It is difficult for

¹ Later Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

² Later Sir Henry Tyler; formerly Secretary to the Madras Government and, in 1929, Secretary of the Indian Central Committee appointed to sit in joint free conference with the Statutory Commission under the Chairmanship of Sir John Simon.

men of moderate views to resist the pressure which the extremists can bring on them by representing that in accepting tutelage by a Christian Power they are betraying their faith and their race. The extremists have on their side all the strength of an appeal to emotion and to religious prejudice, and all the possibilities of corruption.

'It would not be fair to the supporters of the policy of a mandate that they should again be liable to be abused as unbelievers and traitors; and in the absence of any declaration of future policy on our part we cannot expect the indefinite continuance of support. With the possibility that the Turk will return, no honest opinion can be expected from a considerable section of the population. To allay unrest and to enable the British Government to define and explain their policy, the mandate should be granted as soon as possible.

'We therefore recommend that a mandate should be granted at the earliest possible date. Following the wording of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the effect of the mandate will presumably be to entrust to the Mandatory Power the tutelage of Mesopotamia to be exercised by them on behalf of the League. We consider it desirable that the mandate should state that the Mandatory Power is vested with the necessary powers to carry out the mandate, *e.g.* (in the words of the Covenant) to secure "the well-being and development of the people".

'It appears to us that there would be very great difficulty in ascertaining the wishes of the people immediately the mandate has been granted. It is true that a definite announcement of the conditions on which His Majesty's Government have accepted the mandate for this country would put an end to much fishing in troubled waters; but the effect of Turkish intrigues, of the disturbed state of Syria, and of the inevitable restrictions which the conditions of war have imposed on Iraq, will continue to be felt for some time. Moreover, the people are entirely unused to free debate, and to the expression of their opinions in public; and it is considered that the body which is to give its opinion on a matter of such moment as the constitution should have an opportunity to see constitutional government at work for a short time and to realise the consequences of any decision they may give.

'It is therefore proposed that the opinion of the Legislative Assembly (as described below) on the constitution should be ascertained, but not necessarily immediately. It should be stated, as soon as the proposals for the elections to the Assembly are published, that the Assembly will be invited, not later than the third session, to discuss the constitution (within the limits imposed by the terms of the mandate), and that until then the government of the country will be carried on under the provisional constitution outlined below. It would be advisable to retain for the High Commissioner the power to dissolve the first Assembly and to put the constitutional issue before its successor.

Rights of Mandatory Power.

'We consider that the document establishing the constitution should make it clear that the Mandatory Power possesses the necessary powers to fulfil the Mandate.

'As regards external affairs, foreign relations, including treaties and war, should be reserved to the Mandatory Power.

'As regards internal affairs it should be made clear that the Mandatory Power has the right to insist that its advice on matters which it considers essential for the "well-being and development of the people" (to quote the Covenant of the League) be followed.

'If these powers are laid down in the Constitution much future misunderstanding will be avoided.

'A great deal of the bitterness of the opposition now existing in Egypt is due to the undefined position which Great Britain has occupied in that country.

Nomination of Ruler of 'Iraq.

'The easiest method of forming a Government which complies with the declarations of the British Government, would be to have at the head of the Government an Amir who was willing to co-operate with the Mandatory Power and was at the same time acceptable to the people—if such a man could be found.

'There is no doubt that when the notables of the country were consulted as to whether or not they desired an Amir, the large majority of the population were opposed to an Amir.

'There is no person in the country of a sufficiently outstanding position to be generally acceptable as an Amir. Since the notables were last consulted, owing to the elimination of other candidates and to the fact that Faisal has for the time being made good his claims to Syria, the party in favour of having one of the sons of the Sharif of Mecca as Amir has grown in strength. If the issue whether or not there should be an Amir were now put to an Assembly we think it possible that the answer would be in the affirmative and that Abdulla, or one of the other sons of the Sharif, would be chosen. It by no means follows that the same would be the case a few months hence.

'Having regard to the divisions in religious opinion in the country and to local jealousies, no one who has been mentioned as a candidate up to the present would be able to retain his position except through the support of the Mandatory Power. On the other hand an Amir, who did not loyally accept the mandate, would be a source of embarrassment to the Mandatory Power and of weakness to the country. If the stories which have reached this country of posts and appointments made by Abdulla, or in his name, to his Syrian supporters are true, it would not, we think, be possible to accept his nomination; and there is the general objection to the establishment of any member of the Sharif's family as Amir of 'Iraq, that the appointment would be extremely unpopular with the Amir of Najd and with other independent Arab Rulers.

'These considerations, in our opinion, strengthen the arguments for delay which we have set forth above.

'In the rest of this report we assume that during the period of the Provisional Constitution there will be no Amir.

Council of State or Council of Ministers.

'(1) We recommend the establishment of a Council of State to act as the principal executive authority of the State, and, as explained later, as a Second Chamber of the Legislature.

'(2) The Council of State to consist of a President and say eleven members, each

appointed by the High Commissioner and removable from the Council at his pleasure.

(3) The President to be an Arab, the first President to hold office until the constitutional question has been submitted to the Assembly. He should not necessarily be connected with any departmental work. As he would be in a sense the Arab head of the State, he ought to be a person of good social status and prestige, and have leisure for social functions. It might not be possible to find such a man who would be willing and capable of departmental work.

(4) The Members of Council to be either Members for a particular Department of State or Secretaries of a Department of State. A Member who is unable to attend to be represented by a Deputy.

(5) The Constitution should not lay down how many members of the Council should be Arab and how many English. We contemplate that in practice, to start with, a majority of the members would be English. If the members excluding the President are eleven in all we suggest that to start with six should be English and five Arab.

Departments which were not directly represented on the Council would be represented by one or other of the members of the Council: thus if the Secretary of Commerce is not a member he might be represented by the Secretary for the Interior.

(6) The President of the Council to have a vote only in case of equality of votes.

(7) The High Commissioner to have the power of over-ruling the decision of the majority of the Council, and thereupon the decision of the High Commissioner to be deemed for all purposes the decision of the Council.

(8) The Council of State to be the Chief Executive Authority of the State. State executive decisions, and executive decisions of the various departments issued to the public, should be issued in the name of the Council of State.

(9) The British Secretary of a Department, *to begin with*, to be the Chief Executive Official of the Department. Arab Members of Council to be attached to various departments, to be consulted by the Secretary on all matters of importance and to have access to all departmental papers: and to have the right to refer to the Council of State any difference of opinion between themselves and the Secretaries. Other departments (except perhaps some of the technical departments, *e.g.*, Public Works) in which there were no Arab members of Council, would yet ordinarily have Arab Advisers or Assistants.

(10) Arab Members of Council not to be necessarily selected from the Legislative Assembly, but to be *ex-officio* members of the Assembly with the right to vote.

British Secretaries of Departments and other heads of Departments to have the power to attend the Legislative Assembly and to speak, but not to vote.

Legislative Assembly—Constitution.

(1) We think it necessary that the Legislative Body either be elected, or, which seems to us preferable, appointed by Local Bodies who will themselves be elected. This would however not apply to the Arab Members of the Council of State who, we have advised, should be *ex-officio* members of the Legislative

Assembly. The present Divisional Councils are in fact probably more representative of the people than they would be under a system of election, but as they are nominated bodies, a Legislative Council elected by them would be open to the objection that they were the nominees of the British Authorities. The method of election requires further study and consultation with local authorities, and we are not in a position to submit final recommendations; but we submit in Appendix C¹ methods of election which, subject to modifications to suit local requirements, we believe to be practicable.

(2) The exact composition of the Legislative Assembly also requires further study. We suggest provisionally it should include:—

- (a) Elected members for the towns and country districts approximately proportionate to their population on the basis of one to 50,000 inhabitants;
- (b) elected members representing the Jewish and Christian Communities;
- (c) Arab members of the Council of State who, as we have already advised, should be *ex-officio* members.

(3) On the above lines we calculate that the total number of members of the Legislative Assembly, including the *ex-officio* members of the Council of State, would work out at about 50.

(4) The President of the Legislative Council should be an Arab nominated by the Council of State. He should not necessarily be an elected member, as it may very well be found that among the elected members there is no suitable candidate for the post.

(5) In spite of the disadvantages under which they would labour, we think that, in view of the difficulty of finding competent Arab members of the Executive Council, British Secretaries of Departments should have the right to attend the Assembly and to speak and introduce measures but not to vote.

(6) There should be a British Joint-Secretary to the Assembly to assist in matters of Procedure.

(7) Members of the Legislative Assembly would receive a fixed allowance per session.

Legislation Assembly—Functions.

(1) The Egyptian Organic Law of 1913 may serve as a precedent subject to modifications.

(2) Laws to be issued and taxes imposed by the Council of State—

- (a) normally with the concurrence of the Legislative Council;
- (b) but if the Assembly refuse to pass the Law in the way desired by the Council of State, the Council of State after conferences and again submitting the Law, to have power to issue without their consent.

We consider it essential that the Council of State should in case of necessity have power to pass laws without the concurrence of the Legislative Assembly.

(c) There might be a provision that Bills submitted to the Assembly, if not rejected before prorogation, may be deemed to have been passed.

(3) As under the Turkish Constitution, the Council of State to have power to issue Temporary Laws, which however must be submitted to the next session of the Legislative Assembly

¹ Not reprinted.

'(4) Private members to have power to initiate Legislation, except as regards constitutional matters and taxation.

'(5) The Assembly to have power to pass resolutions as to matters concerning internal government of Mesopotamia. If Government does not accept them it must explain reasons.

'(6) Annual Budget to be issued by Decree of Council of State, to be previously submitted to Legislative Assembly for advice and observation. If advice offered not accepted, reasons must be given.

'No existing rate of taxation to be increased or new tax imposed except by a Law.

'(7) Annual accounts to be submitted for remarks.

'(8) Members may ask questions in writing.

'In conclusion we advise that, besides the examination of the constitution provided for above, there should be at the end of a fixed period of years (say seven) an enquiry into the working of the system of Government, the growth of education, and matters connected therewith, with a view to making recommendations whether and to what extent it is desirable to modify the system of Government and to extend or restrict the power of self-government.

'Presumably the enquiry would be undertaken by His Majesty's Government. If so, the arrangement should be set out in a recital rather than placed in the body of the document establishing the Constitution.'

A full summary of this report was telegraphed to the India Office on 27th April 1920, with an earnest request for permission to make a public announcement in Baghdad on these lines at the earliest possible moment.

Expectans expectavi. The India Office was willing, but the Foreign Office still demurred to making any announcement regarding the future of Mesopotamia till the Peace Treaty with Turkey had been signed and the terms of the Mandate settled, and on 7th June the Prime Minister so informed the House of Commons.¹

¹ These legalistic sentiments did not, however, prevent the appointment in June, consequent on disorders in Jerusalem, of Sir Herbert Samuel as High Commissioner for Palestine, and the inauguration by him on July 1st of a Civil Administration in advance of the Mandate and of the Peace Treaty.

CHAPTER XI

THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE MANDATE—AND AFTER

'I am sometimes amazed, and a trifle horrified, when I contrast the loose free and easy way in which politicians form their judgments with the strict standards of proof, evidence, fact, observed by every conscientious critic or historian. So little evidence goes a long way when once your mind is made up, and circumstances are calling for decision and act.'

VISCOUNT MORLEY, *Recollections*, ii. 190.

Acceptance of Mandate at San Remo announced in 'Iraq. Constitutional proposals. Reception of Mandate by Nationalists. Popular attitude. Disturbances during Ramadhan. The challenge of the Nationalists. Their demands answered. Views of Basra and Hilla notables. Views of Tribal Leaders. Kurdish opinion. Return of Sir Percy Cox announced. Constitutional proposals accepted. Commendation of His Majesty's Government. Sir Percy Cox passes through Baghdad. Discussions in Parliament. Saiyid Talib Pasha al Naqib. Disorders in Diyala. Views of Sir Percy Cox.

ON 1st May 1920 the news reached us that Great Britain had accepted, at the San Remo Conference, the Mandate for Mesopotamia; I decided to issue a *communiqué* on the subject forthwith, to appear in the public Press simultaneously with the reference on the subject in Reuter's telegrams. It was not possible to say much, for the future of Mosul was undecided, and our constitutional proposals were still under examination at home, but with or without permission, something had to be said to amplify the bald announcement from San Remo. The *communiqué* ran as follows:

'THE MANDATE FOR 'IRAQ

'The announcement has been made by Reuter in London that the San Remo Conference has decided to entrust Britain with the mandate for 'Iraq and Palestine, and France with the mandate for Syria.¹ The inhabitants of 'Iraq may rest assured that the British Government has not accepted the allotted task without full realization of the responsibility it implies. The position of Mandatory makes high demands upon any Power which strives to fulfil the intentions of the League of Nations under which it works. The ideal at which it must aim is the creation of a healthy body politic, guided and controlled by healthy public opinion. Care for the material prosperity of the mandated country would not alone suffice for the

¹ The Arabic words used were: *Intidab* انتداب for Mandate, *Daulat muntadibeh* دولت مندوبه for Mandatory. These words are derived from the root *nadaba* نذبه to choose. The same root from which *mandubin* (the deputies or delegates) comes. The words simply indicate 'the Govt. selected' and the 'selection'. These words were doubtless chosen for the sake of euphemy and to avoid using the hated expressions given in the Arabic dictionary for Mandate and Mandatory (Amr—and Amir or Mamur).

attainment of this end. It is the duty of the mandatory Power to act the part of a wise and far-seeing guardian who makes provision for the training of his charge with a view to fitting him to take his place in the world of men. 'Iraq has suffered under centuries of misrule during which the versatility of her people and the productivity of her lands have been checked or stayed. The memorials of her past, strewn over the length and breadth of 'Iraq, bear witness to the civilization which was created by the ancestors of the existing population out of resources which have not diminished. It is the creative power of the people which has been held in abeyance by the lethargy and indifference of their rulers.

'Reconstruction will not be the work of a day, but with a race such as the Arabs, quick to learn and eager to seek advantage from the attainments of science, progress should be rapid. Already the signs of revival are everywhere apparent; security has replaced disorder, the barren waste blossoms into fertility, the poor man is safe from oppression and the rich enjoys his wealth in peace. Such results could not have been accomplished without the help and co-operation of the people themselves and it is upon this spirit of co-operation that the British Government relies. The establishment of Civil Administration will give an ever widening field to native energies, while the diffusion of education will enable the inhabitants of 'Iraq to profit by the opportunities which the future holds in store. And as the guardian rejoices over the growth of his ward into sane and independent manhood, so will the guardian Power see with satisfaction the development of political institutions which shall be sound and free. Herein lies the proof of success in the work which has been undertaken and here is to be found a stable basis for mutual goodwill and enduring amity.'

On 5th May I received instructions to publish an announcement in the following terms:

'At meeting of Peace Conference held at San Remo to settle terms of treaty with Turkey, steps were taken in fulfilment of promises that have been made to Arab peoples, to sever for all time the territories inhabited by those peoples from dominions of Sultan. 'Iraq has now been rescued from Turkey by military conquests, and armies of the British Empire are in military occupation of the country. His Majesty's Government have on more than one occasion declared their firm intention to promote the creation therein of a form of civil administration based upon representative indigenous institutions which would prepare the way for creation of an independent Arab State of 'Iraq. Important steps have already been taken in this direction by gradual substitution of civil for military administration, and by creation of representative divisional and municipal councils in different parts of the country.

'The time has now arrived for 'Iraq to reap the fruits of this course, and for a further forward step to be taken in the development of national life of the people. His Majesty's Government have accordingly directed the Civil Commissioner to take immediate measures in consultation with the Councils and with approval of local opinion in all parts of the country to frame definite proposals with above named object. Their conclusions will be of material assistance to Peace Conference in its earnest endeavour to provide peaceful settlement and future progress of the East.'

The telegram concluded by reminding me that the proposals of the Bonham-Carter Committee were still under consideration and that further instructions would follow.

This message, with its emphasis on further ascertainment of local opinion, placed us in a difficult position. The principle of such consultations was embodied in the terms of the Mandate, and was essentially a sound one, but the long delay had aroused violent passions amongst a group of politically-minded men who enjoyed influence and some prestige in Baghdad. After reference to the Bonham-Carter Committee I replied as follows:

'The second portion of your telegram apparently commits us here to further specific consultation and discussion with the people of this country with the object of reaching conclusions in time to be of assistance to the Peace Conference.

'It is with great regret that I find myself compelled to ask His Majesty's Government to reconsider this portion of their announcement.

'I submit that it is for H.M.G. as Mandatory Power to prescribe what form of Government shall be set up in the immediate future. To refer the question afresh to Divisional Councils and to "local opinion" can have but one result. The extremists who following the example of their colleagues in Syria are demanding absolute independence for 'Iraq with or without 'Abdullah will by threats and by appeals during the coming month of Ramadhan to religious fanaticism win over moderate men who have hitherto looked to Government for a scheme offering a reasonable chance of success and which they can support. The moderates cannot afford to oppose extremists unless they know that Government is prepared to give them active support. Similar sentiments have been repeatedly expressed to me by other leading Arabs.

'If during the next seven days I can be authorised to announce that H.M.G. provisionally approve of the Constitutional proposals made by me and have instructed me to communicate them to leading inhabitants with a view to giving effect to them in the autumn, there are grounds for hoping that we shall be able to count on the support of a strong block of moderate opinion. Once this is done we shall be in a position to deal with extremists.

'An announcement that Sir Percy Cox will shortly return as High Commissioner would also be of great value in this connection.

'I beg for orders on these lines at the earliest possible date.

'As a staff officer of the G.O.C.-in-Chief I have a responsibility towards him also in that I could not properly without his approval take action which would imperil his forces and the numerous women and children and lengthy L. of C. in his charge. Further consultation with local opinion at this juncture will in my opinion have this result.'

In a separate telegram I communicated the views of the Bonham-Carter Committee, as follows:

'Committee are of opinion that the immediate publication of the announcement contained in the Secretary of State's telegram would be premature. If their pro-

posals are accepted, some modification of the announcement will be necessary. The Committee consider that the first step should be the publication of the terms of the Mandate, including the substance of paragraph 2 of Article 22 of the Covenant as well as of para. 4. When the decision of H.M.G. on the proposals for the constitution has been received, a summary of the proposed constitution should be published either simultaneously with or shortly after the publication of the Mandate. It is considered that for the reasons indicated in report the consultation of Divisional Councils on the form of the Constitution would, from local point of view, serve no useful purpose and may have serious consequences as regards public order. The Divisional Councils are constituted for local and not national purposes and have no authority to give an opinion on a national question: serious difficulties would be caused if different Councils expressed opposite opinions. Committee draw attention to the fact that few members of Divisional Councils have any political knowledge or experience and to the possibility of a dangerous outbreak of extreme nationalism and religious fanaticism, and mention as an example of the state of education in the country that four out of six of the tribal members on the 'Amara Divisional Council cannot read or write. Committee maintain the view already expressed in report that the proper policy is to issue a provisional constitution and to allow the Legislative Assembly some experience of its working before asking them to express an opinion on matters the consequences of which they have neither the knowledge or the experience to realize.'

Finally, on 20th May, the India Office telegraphed as follows:

'H.M.'s Government greatly appreciates care and ability expended by Bonham-Carter's Committee in preparation of scheme. Their recommendation will receive fullest and most attentive consideration. Framing of the mandate for 'Iraq is now engaging the active attention of H.M.'s Government and as you have realized, orders on your proposal, which may have to take a different shape, cannot be passed until a decision has been reached on this point. Publication of the announcement conveyed in my telegram of 4th May may be postponed in view of your proclamation of May 3rd. Meanwhile no further action should be taken on announcement made. I hope to be able to send you fuller instructions shortly.'

I was dismayed at the news that the framing of the Mandate was only 'now' engaging active attention, but there was nothing to be done by us in 'Iraq but to stand and wait, in the Miltonian sense, and to do what we could to meet the rising storm.

The announcement that Great Britain had accepted the Mandate spurred the Nationalists to claim immediate and complete independence on the Syrian model. They had received, or thought that they had received, from certain British officers attached to the Damascus Government, tacit if not explicit encouragement in their resistance against the authority in Syria of the French, as the mandatory power. They had hitherto received from the British Treasury ample moral and financial assistance towards the creation in that region of an independent Arab State. Why should they accept less in 'Iraq?

They took exception, moreover, to the terms of all announcements made in regard to the Mandate and to the mandatory power. The word 'mandate' has in English two separate and distinct meanings,

- (1) an imperial command, executive order, or judicial or ecclesiastical injunction.
- (2) in Roman law, a commission by which one person requested another to¹ act for him gratuitously, undertaking to indemnify him against loss. The word has a somewhat similar meaning in Scots law.

The word is commonly used only in the former sense, which it still bears² in the language of diplomacy, and its selection by General Smuts to denote the idea of trusteeship, though explicit in the terms of the Covenant, was in some respects unfortunate. The Covenant created a new status, but although the mandatory system bore a Roman name, it was not a new conception;³ it was the offspring of the English Law of Trust, implicit in the Proclamation of Queen Victoria promulgated at Allahabad in 1858. It has been the guiding principle of British statesmanship for 100 years and has been applied by us in practice on the Arab Coast of the Persian Gulf and elsewhere for over a century. The word nevertheless created prejudice at the outset: the Nationalists understood it to imply a superior body having the power and authority to command—a status which they could not reconcile with trusteeship. It was so understood in Europe by the Press and the public alike: it was constantly used in this sense by British statesmen in Parliament and elsewhere; it still has this meaning and no other in France and in Syria, and scarcely any other connotation can be applied to it in Palestine. Had the terms 'Government by Trustee' been adopted, some Arab objections, and some popular suspicions in England and the U.S.A. might have been avoided. These views, however, were confined to a small and critically minded group of ambitious men—most of the leaders were frankly hopeful of taking a leading part in the new Arab State. The populace as a whole were little interested in such arguments. The Civil Administration, far from being, as often represented in Parliament (notably by Sir J. D. Rees and Lord Islington), unpopular with the masses, commanded by every test that could be applied a greater degree of popular acceptance than had ever been

¹ *Oxford English Dictionary*, vol. vi, 1906. The definitions and examples of the use of the word make no reference to the term 'trust'.

² Cf. Cmd. 3480, 1930. 'H.M.'s Government have had under consideration the Mandate issued by the Chinese Government on 28th December on the subject of extra-territoriality.'

³ A good theoretical exposition of the Mandatory principle is contained in a lecture delivered under the Cecil Rhodes Benefaction at University College, London, in 1921 by D. Campbell Lee, entitled 'The Mandate for Mesopotamia'.

vouchsafed to its predecessors. There was no function of the administration, and no departmental activity, that was not stimulated by a genuine popular demand, which found energetic expression in every quarter. On the other hand, vested interests such as absentee landlords and tribal overlords looked with disfavour on cadastral surveys, which would help to establish the prescriptive rights of cultivators who were nominally 'tenants-at-will'. Some politicians yearned after the salaries formerly paid to the deputies nominated to represent 'Iraq in the Assembly at Constantinople. The priesthood of Karbala, Najaf, and Kadhimain were, with notable exceptions, frankly hostile to organized secular government of whatever kind, though their revenues had been greatly increased by the resumption of pilgrimages to the shrines from all parts of 'Iraq and Persia on an unparalleled scale. As many as 50,000 pilgrims had assembled at Karbala and nearly as many at Najaf for the 'Id-ul-Adha: the arrangements for their comfort, and for public health and order, made by the political officers (notably at Karbala by Captain Bray) had elicited the warmest letters and telegrams of thanks to the Civil Government, signed by many leading divines. The majority held aloof; they were clear-sighted enough to see that the existence of a well-organized and efficient administration, bent on bettering the lot of the masses, and with a liberal educational policy, would ere long undermine their influence, and imperil their conception of a theocratic government. They were not sufficiently far-sighted to realize that the tendency was world-wide, and inevitable. They allied themselves to the nationalist movement in its most reactionary aspects, and lent the weight of their authority to arguments which would be understood by the most ignorant. They sought and found their opportunity in an appeal to religious fanaticism. For some time past it had been obvious to the nationalists that it would be necessary for them to present a united Islamic front. The deep prejudices which separate the Sunni and Shi'ah sects were temporarily overcome. The first symptom of a *rapprochement* had occurred in the summer of 1919, when on two occasions Sunnis attended the religious meetings which were held in memory of the deceased Shi'ah *mujtahid*, Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi. But it was not till the following month of Ramadhan, which began on 19th May 1920, that the political significance of the reconciliation became apparent. We were well aware of the danger, and had in March and April pressed for leave to make some announcement before the Great Fast began: the authority to do so came, as stated, early in May, but too late to be of use. Services known as Mauluds, in honour of the birth of the Prophet and other Muslim saints, were held in every Sunni and Shi'ah mosque in turn, members of both sects attending by invitation of the authorities in charge of the mosque, or

the heads of the quarter in which it was situated. On some occasions the reading of the Maulud, which is distinctively a Sunni celebration, was followed by a Taziya, the Shi'ah service of ritual mourning on the martyrdom of Husain, but in all cases the main features of these gatherings were the political speeches and recitations of patriotic poetry which followed the religious ceremony. The Arab is peculiarly susceptible to oratory, and the fervent appeals which were made to religion, and patriotism, and to the Amir 'Abdulla, urging him to hasten the advent of his holy kingdom, roused extreme enthusiasm. Prominent in one of the first Mauluds was a young clerk in the *Auqaf* Department, who indulged in a speech which was judged dangerous to public order. His arrest was made the excuse of a meeting the avowed object of which was to arrange for his release by force. Armoured cars were sent to patrol the main street of the town, but met with no organized resistance.¹ The leaders were officially warned that no breach of the peace would be permitted, but after discussion with Lt.-Col. Prescott, the Commissioner of Police, and Lt.-Col. Balfour, the Governor of Baghdad, I decided against resorting at that moment to measures of repression. I have come to the conclusion in the light of after events that this was a grave error of judgement on my part. I underestimated the influence of the Nationalists; and the susceptibility to their propaganda and that of the dissident 'ulama of the mass of the people on the Middle Euphrates. I knew that we were on the eve of initiating an indigenous Government. I was most reluctant to imprison or deport members of a group some of whom would almost certainly, within a few months, be called upon to assist us in the task of forming a Government.

The Mauluds were therefore allowed to continue, and those who viewed with disfavour the holding of political gatherings in mosques were afraid to refuse subscriptions to defray the expenses incurred or to fail in attendance, lest they should be labelled as infidels and traitors to Arab liberty. Rumours of impending disturbance were circulated mainly through the agency of teachers in the Nationalist school, with the result that the bazaar was repeatedly closed and the normal life of town interrupted. The progressive drawing-in of our frontier on the Euphrates, and the attacks on Tel 'Afar and the Mosul road, gave substance to the belief that our military position was not such as would enable us to hold the tribes if they could be roused. Early in June 'Ali Sulaiman, one of the most consistent of our supporters among the

¹ The local military commander, remembering the case of General Dyer, asked me to accept responsibility *vis à vis* H.M.'s Government for any repressive action he might have to take. I agreed, provided that he fired to begin with not more than five shots, and that these shots were aimed at the heads of ringleaders and not over the heads of the crowd, thus endangering innocent lives.

tribal shaikhs near Baghdad, sounded a grave note of warning, and at the same time, on the Euphrates, the paramount shaikh of the 'Anaiza, who had turned a deaf ear to the propaganda which had been addressed to him, solemnly declared that unless we could score some striking success he could no longer answer for his tribesmen. He urged the reoccupation of Dair; but whatever might have been the merits of the scheme, it was far beyond our powers of performance. While well-wishers were alarmed at our failure to put an end to tribal disorder, and by the sufferance accorded to the antics of the extremists, articles in the English papers were quoted by the latter as evidence that the mandate was as unacceptable in London as in Baghdad.

The imperfect telegraphic summaries received through Reuter's of the debates in the House of Commons were also utilized by the Nationalists as evidence that the acceptance of the Mandate was unpopular in England, and that, if they acted energetically, it would be abandoned by the British Government.

It was under these unfavourable conditions that it fell to me to make a declaration of policy. A self-chosen committee of fifteen persons, all of Baghdad, styling themselves *mandubin*, i.e., appointed delegates, asked for an opportunity to lay their views before me for transmission to H.M.'s Government. I was unable to accept them as representatives of the 'Iraq nation; a large body of sober-minded opinion doubted the wisdom of their programme (which included the rejection of the mandate), disapproved of their methods, and questioned their good faith. I therefore invited by name some forty persons, all notables of Baghdad, regardless of their political affiliations, including representatives of the Jewish and Christian communities,¹ and all the *mandubin* to meet me at the *sarai* on 2nd June, and opened the proceedings by addressing them in the following terms:

'I understand that some of you wish to make a representation to me to-day for the consideration of H.M.'s Government with regard to the future of this country. I need hardly say that I welcome the opportunity that this affords me of explaining to you so far as I am in a position to do so the general trend of the policy of H.M.'s Government in this matter. You have read the Anglo-French declarations of November 8th 1918, and Article 22 of the League of Nations Treaty. These declarations represent the policy of H.M.'s Government from which it has at no time diverged. H.M.'s Government desire to set up a National Government in this country and it is their intention that this shall be done as soon as possible. No one regrets more than I do the delay that has occurred. It is due to causes beyond our control—the prolongation of the war; the difficulties of making peace; and the disturbed conditions of our borders both towards Persia, towards Turkey, and

¹ This step was violently attacked in the correspondence columns of *The Times*, on the ground that the inclusion of these persons was tantamount to packing the Assembly with nominees of the Civil Administration.

towards Syria have prevented a Civil Government being established here as quickly as we could wish, but I would not have you believe that this delay could have been avoided, and I can assure you that those individuals in Baghdad who have sought from patriotic or other motives to hasten the establishment of a Civil Government here by incitements to violence and by rousing the passions of ignorant men are doing and indeed have already done a great disservice to the country. There is no hope for the establishment of a Civil Government on the lines that you desire unless public order is maintained during the period of transition. Those who are encouraging disorder and inciting men against the existing régime are arousing forces which the present Administration can and will control, but which may prove too strong for the national institutions which we propose to set up whilst in their infancy. It is my duty as the temporary head of the Civil Administration to warn you that any further incitements to violence and any future appeals to prejudice will be met by vigorous action both by the Military authorities and by the Civil Administration. We have the power and the intention to maintain order in this country until a Civil Government is established. I shall not hesitate to ask the Military authorities to apply any degree of force necessary to ensure this, and they will not be backward in meeting my requests. It is my earnest hope that I shall not again have to say this to you, and that there will be no further occasion for the use of troops or for the adoption of other special measures to maintain public order.

‘I will now turn to the question of the future form of Government to be established in this country; that is a matter upon which it is our intention as soon as we can do so to consult public opinion, and for weeks past, as most of you are aware, I have been in consultation with H.M.’s Government and with the principal officers of the Civil Administration with the object of devising a Provisional Civil Government which can function until we have had time in consultation with you to devise a permanent scheme.

‘Proposals that have been made to H.M.’s Government in this connection have been in print for some weeks past. H.M.’s Government have found themselves unable to authorize me to make them public until accounts have been settled with Turkey, or, at all events, some progress made to that end, but I may tell you that, broadly speaking, the lines on which we have been proceeding are as follows:

‘We desire to establish a Council of State under an Arab President to hold office until the question of the final constitution of ‘Iraq has been submitted to the Legislative Assembly which we propose to call. The public will thus be given the opportunity of forming a considered judgment and of making their views known through the Legislative Assembly when formed. There is no advantage to be gained by hasty action.

‘Finally, I would remind you that ‘Iraq is one of the very few countries of the world which has been a field of battle and which is not suffering from the results of the war. From Syria, Turkey, the Caucasus and from parts of Persia, reports reach us of high prices, disorganisation, and in Turkey and Syria of extreme want, and acute popular dissatisfaction. We should be false to our trust if we allowed ourselves to relax the reins of Government until we are in a position to hand them over to the National Civil Government which we propose to set up in the future. Do not be misled by appearances. ‘Iraq has been under an alien Government for 200

years, and with the best will in the world an indigenous National Government cannot be set up at once. The process must be gradual or disaster is certain. I ask you to believe that I and all my officers are animated with a common wish to give effect to the declarations that I have read to you, but we cannot do impossibilities. Our interests are yours.

'I must thank you for having listened so patiently to what I have had to say. I shall be glad now to hear any representations you may wish to make. I shall not fail to transmit them to H.M.'s Government who are giving the most anxious attention to the whole question of the future of 'Iraq.'

The delegates then produced a document in which they demanded the immediate formation of a Convention for 'Iraq, elected in conformity with Turkish electoral law, which would be empowered to draw up proposals for a National Government for 'Iraq as promised in the Anglo-French declaration of 8th November, 1918. I had foreseen at the time (vide p. 104) that this ambiguous pronouncement would involve us in serious difficulties; I had anticipated even earlier that a situation might arise in which the wishes of the people in the selection of a Mandatory might run counter to the decisions of the Powers.¹ These difficulties were now upon us, for it was no secret that the intention of the delegates was to arrange for a declaration by the Convention of the independence of 'Iraq, followed by the rejection of the British Mandate, as had already been done by the Convention in Syria, whose similarity with 'Iraq was much emphasized.

The proceedings were conducted with the dignity and restraint that had marked all previous negotiations. On entering and leaving the *sarai*, however, Bonham-Carter, Howell, Balfour, and I were greeted with shouts of abuse and hisses from groups of students and ex-Turkish officials. It was the first demonstration of its kind and was intended as a sort of declaration of war. I reported the requests of the delegates to the India Office that afternoon (2nd June) and expressed my own views on the matter as follows:

'It is unnecessary for me to emphasise that had I been permitted to make the announcement asked for in my telegram of 8th May, before the beginning of Ramadhan, namely the 19th, we should not now be faced with a movement in its present uncompromising form, backed as it is by skilfully fomented public excitement.

'It is probable that in the present temper a proposal that the country should submit even for a limited period to a provisional Constitution as to which they

¹ The relevant passage of Article 22 reads:

'Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. *The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.*'

had not been consulted would be met on the part of Nationalists by a Declaration of Independence. Such proposals would be represented as contrary to the Anglo-French Declaration, the real meaning of which is little understood and widely misrepresented, and would harden public opinion against us, while if the present temper continues the proposed Legislative Assembly would on being summoned convert itself into a Constituent Assembly though not so authorised.

'Having regard to the Anglo-French Declaration I therefore see no other course open to us but to issue an announcement that when the Mandate is granted steps will be taken to summon a Constituent Assembly to consult on the future form of Government.

I would suggest that Sir Percy Cox should spend a few days in Baghdad on his return journey with a view to seeing the leading men and discussing Constitutional questions with them before proceeding home. It is unnecessary for him to take over formally from me for this purpose, and as I said before the anticipation that he will return to this country as High Commissioner would undoubtedly do much to restore public confidence, which has been shaken.'

I had visited Basra a week before, there to receive His Imperial Majesty Sultan Ahmad Shah, and had seen the leaders of the Arab community there; they had emphatically dissociated themselves from the proceedings of the Nationalists in Baghdad. I now left Baghdad by air before dawn on the following day to meet the leading tribal chiefs and other notables, as well as the Political officers, at Hilla, Karbala, and Najaf. It was the height of the summer season: a pall of hot air hung at a height of some 2,000 feet above the sultry plain, and the R.E. 8 in which I was a passenger failed to pierce it: again and again the pilot tried, but on each occasion the engine overheated, and only a prompt descent saved it from seizing up altogether. Another machine was tried, this time successfully, and I reached the first stage, at Hilla, black with the exhaust from the engine, and almost blistered by the heat, to receive, after a hasty wash, a dignified delegation of tribal chiefs and local merchants and landowners at the Municipal Office. They told me that efforts had been made by the son of the chief *mujtahid* of Karbala to excite popular feeling against the Mandate, but in their view with little success. Letters had been issued by a group of Syrian and ex-Turkish officers now in the Amir Faisal's employ, urging the tribes and people of Najaf to follow the example set by Baghdad and to rise against the British: these appeals too had met hitherto with little response. The leading chiefs, however, warned me earnestly that movements such as those current in Baghdad were bound to spread unless checked, and insisted that the best course for us to take was to deal drastically with the ringleaders while we could, and to make it absolutely clear that we had accepted the Mandate and intended to act up to our responsibilities. They reminded me that the majority of the *mandubin* in Baghdad were

members in Turkish days of the Committee of Union and Progress, who had for the past two decades objected to every form of government; this fact did not make their opposition less dangerous, but tended to discount the value of their advice. The *Mandubin* had in fact at this period no constructive policy: to oppose the Mandate was at once their object and the limit of their immediate ambitions, though some talked of proclaiming Sharif 'Abdulla as Amir, or even King of 'Iraq, and others were making secret approaches to the United States and (*mirabile dictu*) the French Consulate, with the idea that they might in some way be used against us. A few influential men were toying with the idea of asking for the appointment of Turkey as Mandatory power!

I had during April and May made repeated journeys by air to almost every administrative centre in 'Iraq, and had had lengthy conversations with individuals representing every community and almost every large tribe and shade of political opinion. The opinions which were expressed at these interviews, both individual and collective, at centres far removed from one another, were almost uniformly adverse to the early inception of a 'constitutional' régime. Some aspects of the military occupation, such as the retention as 'billets' of large numbers of private houses, were resented, but of the civil administrative régime there was little or no criticism. They wanted not less Government but more. The towns wanted the tribes brought under control: the tribesmen wanted title-deeds to secure them, against the legal owners, in the enjoyment of the lands they occupied by prescription. Merchants wanted Law Courts and laws; municipalities wanted powers, money from central revenues, and hospitals. Landowners and cultivators alike clamoured for canals, roads, railways and tested seed, bulls for breeding purposes and veterinary aid. Progress was in the air. Revenue was paid without difficulty and was being collected without tears.

The subsequent reports from political officers at various centres up to the beginning of June were to the same effect. The Basra and Baghdad wilayats were predominantly Sh'iah: the Nationalist agitation in Baghdad and in Mosul was almost wholly Sunni, and would therefore not appeal to the multitude, who, as Shi'ahs, had long been oppressed by the Sunni Turks. The recommendations of the Bonham-Carter Committee had been in print, in English and Arabic, for some months, and were well known to leading Arabs in every district, who had received them without enthusiasm and in many cases with genuine alarm; they regarded such proposals as revolutionary and a generation ahead of the times.

A few days later I visited Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaimani by air. All reports agreed in representing the Kurds as quiescent and with no sympathy and with little understanding of Nationalist demands. Kirkuk

had always been a stronghold of Turkish officialdom, and pro-Turkish views here and to some extent in Mosul were a disturbing element. Sharifian intrigues directed from Dair-ez-Zor and liberally financed from Damascus and Aleppo, where H.M.'s Government was still paying large sums monthly for the construction of the façade of an autonomous Syrian Government, were the principal source of danger. British arms and ammunition, handed over to the Sharifian Government in large quantities long after the Armistice, made their appearance in 'Iraq. Nevertheless, nothing indicated that the popular mind was seriously exercised over the Mandate, or that the Administration had fallen into disfavour except amongst a small group of politically minded men, whose salaries came from Damascus.

On my return to Baghdad from Mosul on 9th June, I received from Mr. Montagu a telegram (dated 7th June) which, had he been able to send it three months earlier, might have saved most of if not all the lives which were lost during the next three months.

'I am glad to say that I am now in a position to furnish you with authority for which you ask to announce impending return of Sir Percy Cox. H.M.'s Government feel that as Cox is to inaugurate new régime it is right that he should be consulted as to constitution, etc., of councils which it will be his task to control. For these reasons it is not considered practicable immediately to give effect to your proposal. *But subject to reservation on points of detail your recommendations are accepted in principle as furnishing a generally suitable basis on which to construct provisional institutions such as are postulated by Mandate.*

'Without committing yourself or H.M.'s Government on points of detail such as exact constitution of Councils of State, allocation of portfolios, etc., you may make immediate announcement.'

In a separate telegram Mr. Montagu was good enough to convey to me the acknowledgements of H.M.'s Government in the following generous terms:

'Considerations that have guided H.M.'s Government in deciding that Cox shall return to Mesopotamia to inaugurate the new régime are doubtless appreciated by you. H.M.'s Government regard it as specially fitting that the man who has laid first foundations of provisional Civil Administration should also supervise final stages of construction. But they do not overlook magnificent work which has been accomplished in intermediate period and which alone has rendered practicable the further advance now in contemplation. They take this opportunity of conveying to you their most cordial and grateful acknowledgements of the high ability and unflagging zeal with which during the past two-and-a-half years you have devoted yourself with such markedly successful results to your difficult and laborious task.'

It is in no spirit of pride or of self-satisfaction that I reproduce this telegram, but rather as an indication of the substantial identity and

continuity of official views both in Baghdad and in London during this most difficult period. Though, as was natural and inevitable, there were occasional divergencies of opinion, and moments when the exchange of views upon particular aspects of the questions dealt with became lively, throughout the period of nearly three years during which I was in direct correspondence with the India Office, I felt assured of Mr. Montagu's personal support and sympathy, and of the active co-operation of the India Office, in the persons principally of Sir Arthur Hirtzel and Mr. (later Sir) John Shuckburgh, in adjusting, so far as they were able, difficult issues involving other Departments of State. I was accorded all the discretion and authority that I could reasonably require as the man on the spot; I was allowed the utmost freedom in the expression of opinion. I can recollect no case of any importance in those three years, nor indeed for the previous period of three years, during which I was deputy to Sir Percy Cox, in which the Civil Administration had reason to complain of or take exception to a decision reached by the India Office on matters within its competence. The difficulties that proved insoluble were those arising from the delay in making a clear announcement of our intentions, in the belief that 'the East could wait', and from the failure of the War Office and of its representatives in Mesopotamia (as indicated in the next chapter) to accommodate themselves to the exigencies of the political situation. Neither Sir Arthur Hirtzel nor Mr. Shuckburgh had visited Mesopotamia, Persia, or the Persian Gulf, but they had an understanding of 'the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen' that made their official memoranda generally more reliable and often more enlightening than those of Arabian experts. *Coelum non animum mutant qui trans mare currunt* is an aphorism seldom applicable to Englishmen in the service of their country abroad. They saw our problems with a salutary detachment, in relation to those of adjacent countries of which we on the spot had little or no knowledge. They were always sympathetic, and seldom, if ever, censorious; their all too rare private letters were enlightening and stimulating. They knew how to secure from us, in the ultimate resort, compliance with the decisions of their political chiefs; conversely they were skilled in representing the point of view of the man on the spot to the responsible Ministers. The curb was in our mouths, but we felt only the snaffle.

The machinery of Government for dealing with the Mandated Territories was, as I have shown, cumbersome and inherently defective: these men and their coadjutors made the system tolerable and prevented a complete breakdown.

After this brief digression, which may serve to show the personal relations existing between responsible authorities in Whitehall and

Baghdad respectively, it is necessary to revert to the position at Baghdad during the second week of June. It was still the month of Ramadhan, a period normally marked by some degree of religious excitement amongst Muslims, who find, especially when Ramadhan falls in the hot weather, the observance of the fast to be a severe trial to their nerves and tempers as well as to their digestions. I therefore decided to defer making an announcement till the end of the Islamic month, and telegraphed as follows to the India Office on 9th June:

‘Announcement on lines ordered in your telegrams of June 7th, will be made at end of Ramadhan, about June 18th.

‘It will evoke lively protests from extremists who demand complete independence, and further demonstrations may be engineered.

‘I propose to meet situation by suggesting that a deputation from ‘Iraq of not more than eight persons in all from various parts of the country should proceed to England to lay their views before you. There is reason to think that this proposal will be favourably received.

‘As soon as the deputation has started or been decided on, I consider that we shall have gone as far as we can in the direction of conciliation, and I shall feel myself strong enough to take drastic action against the irreconcilables, whose increasing influence constitutes a public danger and whose suppression is urged on me almost daily by leading men all over country.

‘This will put heart into the moderates and facilitate the formation of a centre party, which does not at present exist, with the result that the extremists have the stage to themselves.’

I followed this up by telegraphing as follows to Sir Percy Cox, who had left Tehran on his way to London via Baghdad:

‘I have before me an unanimous recommendation by Judicial Secretary, Revenue Secretary and Military Governor, Baghdad, that you should spend a few days in Baghdad and see leading people before going home. I should have unhesitatingly recommended this course in first instance but for fact that your arrival coincides with end of Ramadhan, on which date I may find myself compelled to arrest several malcontents in Baghdad and Najaf, and possibly elsewhere, for deportation. There will undoubtedly be strong protests from Chief Mujtahid, Karbala, and possibly from elsewhere, and riots in Baghdad are not unlikely. Every preparation has been made to meet them and we are all agreed that strong action against principal malcontents, who are nearly all people of little standing, will rally moderates to our side and will tend to convince tribes at large that our pledge to establish independent Government under British Mandate does not necessarily involve disappearance of lawful authority and general anarchy, which is present opinion in tribal Districts many of which I have visited by aeroplane during the past few days.

‘Your presence in Baghdad at this juncture may possibly embarrass you by committing you to some sort of support of these measures. In view, however, of strong consensus of opinion I think it best that you should stop here for a few days, and I am arranging accordingly.’

Sir Percy Cox, after reference to H.M.'s Government, agreed to this course. He arrived on 18th June, and on 20th June, after further correspondence with Mr. Montagu, an announcement in the public Press under my signature was made in the following terms:

'H.M.'s Government having been entrusted with the Mandate for 'Iraq anticipate that the Mandate will constitute 'Iraq an independent State under guarantee of the League of Nations and subject to the Mandate of Great Britain, that it will lay on them the responsibility for the maintenance of internal peace and external security, and will require them to formulate an Organic Law to be framed in consultation with the people of 'Iraq and with due regard to the rights, wishes and interests of all the communities of the country. The Mandate will contain provisions to facilitate the development of 'Iraq as a self-governing State until such time as it can stand by itself, when the Mandate will come to an end.

'The inception of this task H.M.'s Government have decided to entrust to Sir Percy Cox, who will accordingly return to Baghdad in the autumn, and will resume his position on the termination of the existing Military Administration as Chief British Representative in 'Iraq.

'Sir Percy Cox will be authorized to call into being, as provisional bodies, a Council of State under an Arab President and a General Elective Assembly representative of and freely elected by the population of 'Iraq. And it will be his duty to prepare in consultation with the General Elective Assembly, the permanent Organic Law.'

This statement was communicated to the House of Commons by Mr. Montagu on the 23rd June. In the House of Lords, two days later, Lord Islington claimed that it had been made mainly owing 'to persistent pressure, very properly applied by the public and by the Press for some time past'. By comparing the revenue collected in Basra and Baghdad wilayats in the lean year immediately following the Occupation with the revenue collected in the wilayats of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul during the following year, and treating as 'revenue' payments made by the Army to the Civil Administration, he was able to show that the complete revenue collected within one year showed a rise of 437 per cent. By including the Port of Basra, Railways, and Irrigation, he satisfied himself that 'expenditure' had risen by 490 per cent. From these premisses he had no difficulty in making deductions which bordered on the ludicrous, claiming that the political unrest was due primarily to heavy taxation; he declined to believe the Prime Minister's statement that the announcement could not have been made earlier. Neither he nor subsequent speakers made any reference to the situation in Syria. Lord Sydenham ascribed our troubles to Turks and Bolshevists. Lord Goschen, who alone of all the speakers had visited 'Iraq in 1919, paid a warm tribute to the officers of the Civil Administration:

'They are scattered', he said, 'through the deserts of Mesopotamia, living in

circumstances of the greatest difficulty, of hardship and of danger, not knowing what was to be the future of the Government of the country. They have had various trainings and various upbringings, but they are bound together by a desire to develop the country, in which they have the greatest faith. . . . For their loyalty, their zeal and their singleness of purpose these young officials have deserved our gratitude and . . . I am sure that if the people of this country knew more of what they are doing, their gratitude would be greater'.

The debate was concluded by Lord Curzon, who, in speaking in the House of Lords, always gave it to be understood that the Foreign Office, not the India Office, was ultimately responsible for administrative matters connected with 'Iraq. Had he been better posted he could have shown Lord Islington that the land-revenue receipts for 1919-20 were substantially lower than in Turkish times, and that the cost of administration, excluding Port, Railways, and Irrigation, was no higher. In these matters, however, he had to admit himself unprepared with figures, but he stated frankly that the delay in dealing with the question of Mesopotamia had been occasioned primarily by the difficulty of finding time, in the congested state of public business, to get that consideration, discussion, and acceptance by the Cabinet that were necessary. He added that the proclamation itself was based upon the Reports of the Bonham-Carter Committee, 'which also, has been in existence and in print for months'. He claimed that H.M.'s Government had never consciously departed from the principles which they laid down in the early stages of the war, that the delay in giving effect to these principles was due to causes, already explained, beyond the control of the Allies, and that it was still, as always, intended to set up some form of self-government acceptable to the people of 'Iraq. 'No announcement', he said, 'would be more welcome to us than a genuine and general expression of opinion in favour of a particular system, or even of a particular Ruler.' Lord Curzon concluded by emphasizing the disinclination of local notables to assume executive authority during the period of transition.

'Anyone', he said, 'who knows the mentality of Oriental peoples will at once appreciate that they were weighing in their minds what was likely to happen. They would not come forward to help us and their reasoning was this: "Supposing we hold aloof now and the British remain, they are generous and will forgive us. On the other hand, if we throw ourselves into their cause now, and the Turks come back, we shall suffer terrible retribution." That is what happened in the case of Kut, as anybody knows who has read the story of the executions inflicted upon the wretched people of Kut after our people were compelled to evacuate that place. That was the fear in the minds of the local population.'

It was an able exposition of the realities of the position in 'Iraq, but it might have been much more effective: the nature of the Sharifian

intrigues which were the mainspring and almost the sole source of our troubles was not mentioned, nor was there any reference to the difficulties attendant upon the maintenance of the position which we sought to create in Persia by the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919. Yet our military expenditure in Persia during 1920 was estimated at £5,000,000.

I have quoted from these Parliamentary Debates because they exercised a powerful effect upon the situation in 'Iraq. I followed them with the greatest care, and had them reprinted and given the widest circulation, as the best antidote to the views of a certain section of the London Press.

On 21st June, after discussion with Sir Percy Cox, I issued a proclamation, of which I had given three days' previous notice to Mr. Montagu, stating that the British Government, being responsible for the maintenance of internal peace and internal order in 'Iraq, had no intention of withdrawing any of its troops, but on the contrary would continue to maintain a Force sufficient to fulfil its obligations.

I hoped that this proclamation would give pause to the Nationalist leaders and render measures of repression unnecessary. It failed in its purpose: the movement was already out of their hands. They met once more, to repeat their demand that a General Council should be summoned to decide, as of right, the future of 'Iraq. This was the last occasion on which they figured as a united body. Dissensions amongst them became increasingly frequent. The rapid development of tribal disturbance detached the more moderate of the group, who were alarmed by the results of the agitation they had started and were unable to control. The claim of the delegates, even when united, to represent 'Iraq was manifestly untenable. The members of the Divisional Council at Basra had on 22nd June condemned their action unanimously and expressed confidence in the British Government. In 'Amara efforts had been made to secure support for a petition in favour of independence, but no signatories could be found, and the petition was torn up. Mosul also was unrepresented. A further announcement made on 12th July had the advantage of bringing these neglected elements into play, while making provision for the immediate discussion of the Turkish electoral law, which was admittedly inapplicable to existing conditions. The announcement ran as follows:

'H.M.'s Government has authorised the Acting Civil Commissioner to invite the leading representatives of various localities to co-operate with the Civil Administration in framing proposals under which election to the General Assembly will, in due course, be held, and in making the necessary arrangements for electoral areas, the preparation of the registers of electors and other matters preliminary to the election of the General Assembly. Inasmuch as there are at present in 'Iraq

individuals who were the representatives of 'Iraq in the Turkish Senate or the Turkish Chamber of Deputies, and who therefore have experience in matters relating to elections and in the discussion of public affairs, all these ex-Senators and ex-Deputies have been invited by the Civil Commissioner for the above-mentioned purpose. . . . This Committee will be invited to elect a President from among their number, and to co-opt additional members from areas which, owing to the absence or death of the former Deputies, or from some other cause, are not already represented.'

Among the ex-Deputies was the most prominent figure in Basra, and perhaps in 'Iraq, Saiyid Talib Pasha, eldest son of the Naqib of Basra. He had returned to his native land in February 1920, after spending the years of the war in voluntary exile in India and Egypt. His renown was due largely to the determination with which he had pursued political ends under the Turkish régime, but he had undoubtedly figured before the war as the spokesman of national aspirations, and had been so regarded by the Nationalist party in Syria. Since his return he had lost no opportunity of testifying to his conviction that the welfare of 'Iraq was dependent on the acceptance of the British Mandate. Together with the other ex-Deputies of Basra and elsewhere he did not hesitate to comply with the invitation. Nor did the ex-Deputies in Baghdad refuse to attend the Committee, though two had signed the petition of 2nd June as *mandubin*.

The Committee held its first meeting on 6th August, and, after a formal opening by the Civil Commissioner, elected Saiyid Talib Pasha as President. At the second meeting on the following day they proceeded to nominate additional members, including Yusuf Effendi Suwaidi, Saiyid Muhammad Sadr, and other advanced thinkers. Thus constituted, the Committee could not be accused of being unrepresentative of any brand of opinion.

The two leaders of the *mandubin* refused the invitation, and at the same time it became known that they intended to make a final appeal to the Baghdad mob by holding a *Maulud* in one of the principal mosques, followed by a demonstration in the town. Serious disorder and violence could not have failed to have resulted, and the order was issued for the arrest of four of their number.

All except one succeeded in escaping and fled the country, but the decision to arrest, accompanied as it was by a proclamation forbidding further *Mauluds*, restored some degree of confidence. The occupation of Damascus and Aleppo by the French on 25th July, and the fall of the Sharifian Government in Syria, also had a sobering effect. It meant the end of subsidies from H.M.'s Treasury for the free-lance Nationalists in 'Iraq.

Before leaving Baghdad Sir Percy Cox summarized the position

in the following communication to the India Office (of 22nd June):

'I hesitate to express a confident opinion after a hurried visit following on protracted absence, but the situation is undoubtedly a very difficult one, and it is not easy to see more than a few weeks ahead. The immediate urgency is to keep it under control and avert for the next three or four months any serious outbreak in the provinces, and at the same time to take such action as will bring the moderates into the open on our side and prevent them from making common cause with the extremists.

'To achieve this object it is necessary to give them some immediate material for discussion and proof of the *bona fides* of our constitutional intentions. It is hoped that this will be provided by discussion of the electoral law. If this does not suffice (and there seems a general disposition to attempt to refuse to accept the Mandate), then I think the only course is to allow a deputation to proceed to London.

'If His Majesty's Government are extremely desirous of avoiding this expedient, the alternative would be to promise a visit of enquiry in the autumn by a Secretary of State, or a Commission on his behalf.

'The extremists are at present in a numerical minority, but all discontented and reactionary elements tend to join them. If these elements cannot be kept in check for the time being by conciliatory measures and show signs of breaking out into active disturbance I see no alternative but to nip it in the bud with repressive measures. Every endeavour will be made to avoid this in Baghdad itself, but it may be necessary in the provinces.'

A few days later widespread disorders broke out on the Middle Euphrates and the Diyala: had our military dispositions been more effective, they might have been suppressed. How these disorders arose, and why we failed effectively to check them will be shown in the succeeding chapter.

Before concluding this chapter it is perhaps worth while to describe the outcome of an effort made by me, just after Sir Percy Cox had left, to get into personal touch with some of the leaders before ordering arrests to be made. It was essential that any such negotiations should be kept secret, for the leaders were little trusted by the crowd, and knew that if it was suspected that they were in communication with me they would be accused of treachery. The well-disposed element, on the other hand, whilst unable, or unwilling, like 'moderates' all over the world, to enter the lists or to commit themselves wholeheartedly to the policy of the Government of the day, would have viewed askance any open negotiations with the rebellious minority. A meeting was arranged at midnight on neutral ground—in the house of a mutual friend, 'Abdul Qadir Pasha Khadhairi—I went escorted by one trusted Arab messenger; only two others knew of my destination or intention. Three men in close touch with the Nationalist leaders were present. We sat in the moonlight in a secluded corner of the terrace overlooking

the river, and by the light of candles sipped interminable cups of coffee.

After an interchange of courtesies and some small talk on foreign politics, we turned to the business of the evening. My opponents listened with interest and with some sympathy to my explanation of the cause of the intolerable delays of the past two years—of the inability of H. M.'s Government to anticipate the decision of the League of Nations anent the Mandate, or to make specific proposals pending the conclusion of peace with Turkey.

They replied that they accepted as true all that I had said 'but', they added, 'between us and you there is a great gulf fixed'. It was known to the world, they said, that the Mandatory system was a disguised form of annexation. The French had said so, and were acting accordingly; we had denied it, but our proceedings in Palestine were not in keeping with our professions, nor had we hitherto given proof positive of our intention to set up a National Government in 'Iraq. The scheme that I had outlined (see p. 256) was inadequate and unacceptable. For them in 'Iraq to accept anything short of complete independence would be disastrous, for it would involve the acceptance of a similar scheme under French auspices in Syria, and they distrusted the French more than the British.

I warned them that H.M.'s Government would be compelled to maintain, or if need be to restore, order by military force—I begged them to realize the bloodshed that this policy must entail. They replied that it would be a small price to pay for independence. I retorted that revolution might postpone for a decade the realization of their hopes. They answered, without cynicism, but as a commonplace of politics, that as between nations liberty was not given, but taken; that a rebellion, whether successful or not, was not only the best but the sole way to advance the cause of freedom. 'The nations of Europe', they concluded, 'always yield to force: Great Britain has yielded in the case of Afghanistan,¹ it is weakening in Egypt,² it has yielded even in India, and will eventually give way in Ireland.' 'The British nation', they concluded, 'is weary of wars and will make no more sacrifices; once the Mandate is granted and its terms settled we shall lose the chance of obtaining complete independence; nothing short of this will satisfy us, nothing else is worth having.'

I reminded them that only the Mandate stood between them and the resumption by Turkey of her former position in 'Iraq. This shot went home, but one of the three remarked that the Turks were after all

¹ An Afghan Mission under Mahmud Beg Tarzi was at this time in Simla and was known to be adopting an intransigent attitude.

² Zaghlul Pasha had just arrived in England to negotiate with H.M.'s Government.

Muslims and were prepared, in the terms of the National Pact of September 1919, to give 'Iraq autonomy. I mentioned the Kurdish minority, and the powerful Shi'ah element on the Euphrates (my three interlocutors were Sunnis); they replied that both groups were ignorant peasants who could easily be kept in their place, the former by the mutual jealousies of their leaders, the latter by the same agency and through the priesthood, who, they said, were at one with the Nationalist party. After nearly two hours of conversation on these lines, conducted with courtesy and restraint, it became clear that no compromise or understanding was possible. I concluded by assuring them that we should do all in our power to maintain order. They replied that the troops and 'all the Generals' were in Persia and could not return, that the Police and Levies were not to be trusted (in this they proved wholly mistaken) and that the railway up the Euphrates would be cut when the word was given and communication by river interrupted. (The first prophecy was fulfilled, but not the second.)

We parted ceremoniously; that morning I received the usual daily Police report: it contained a list of political personages who had left Baghdad at dawn—it included the names of my three friends of the night before. I saw them in Baghdad four years later; we did not need to ask each other where we had last met.

CHAPTER XII

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN 1920

'But who will bid mad Insurrection cease firing?
To Insurrection you cannot speak; neither will it, hydra-headed, hear.'

CARLYLE, *The French Revolution*.

Sir A. Haldane replaces Sir G. MacMunn. Military difficulties. Stores. Women and children. Prisoners of War. Refugees. Position in Persia. Tal 'Afar attacked. Political Officers killed. General Haldane leaves for Persia. Karbala. Diwaniya. Shahraban Officers murdered. Kifri Political Officer murdered. Arbil. Sulaimani. Falluja. Kufa. Political Officer killed. Leachman killed. Samawa. H.M.S. Greenfly's crew killed. Officers of Royal Air Force killed. Karbala. Hilla. Manchester Regiment. The Rebellion quelled. Punitive measures.

TO understand the progress of affairs in Mesopotamia it is essential to bear in mind the chronological sequence of events as they presented themselves to those in authority. The forces of destiny were moving forward in converging columns over a broad front: the historian is constrained to follow and record the doings first in one then in another part of the field of action, leaving for subsequent narration developments not immediately germane to his theme.

I have already referred to the organizing capacity and broad-minded sympathy which Sir George MacMunn brought to bear upon the multifarious problems of Mesopotamia. On his appointment in February 1920 to fill the important post of Quartermaster-General in India, Mr. Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for War, selected for the chief command in Mesopotamia Lt.-Gen. Sir Aylmer Haldane, who in 1898, as A.D.C. to Sir William Lockhart had procured for him a military sinecure post on the Staff, and a year later in South Africa led him, unknowingly, into and helped him out of captivity.¹

Before General Haldane's arrival during the third week in March, at the commencement of the hot weather, General MacMunn had left for India, and General Haldane was thus deprived of the advantage of personal discussion on the spot of the difficult problems with every aspect of which his predecessor had, during the previous three years, become thoroughly familiar. Sir Aylmer Haldane, who at the time of his appointment was on half-pay, was 58 years of age, and thus the senior in years of any commander in Mesopotamia since Sir Percy


¹ See Haldane, A. L., *How we escaped from Pretoria*, 1900, p. 31; also W. Churchill, *My Early Life*, 1930, p. 17.



Photo by Russell

GENERAL SIR J. AYLMER L. HALDANE
G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.S.O.

Commander-in-Chief in Mesopotamia, 1920-1



Lake; he was physically far from fit: almost all his previous service had been with British Troops, whereas 90 per cent of the troops in Mesopotamia were Indian. The administrative position was complicated and the political situation delicate: both demanded special experience and qualifications which had not been lacking in previous Commanders-in-Chief.

Sir Aylmer Haldane was slow to comprehend the nature of the task before him. On page 5 of *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920*, he writes: 'At that time' (i.e. during the voyage out to Basra) 'I had no conception of the system on which we governed Mesopotamia, for it had not been possible to obtain much information regarding it.' The information required was available at the India Office, but General Haldane's curiosity seems not to have been importunate,¹ for his passage out was delayed and he had a reasonable opportunity of studying the files. Only some months after landing did he discover the existence of a Port at Nahr 'Umar, above Basra, where 'two deep-sea wharves and eighteen large jetties, as well as quarters for the Inland Water Transport, had been constructed' (p. 8 *ibid*).

The military position with which he was confronted was one of extreme difficulty. The ration-strength of the force under his command stood at 133,000, of whom only 47,000 were combatants. Of the latter number only 4,200 British and 30,000 Indian ranks were available for duty in Mesopotamia, the balance being in Persia, sick, or in transit. Of this exiguous force, 4,700 were gunners and not of great value for the maintenance of civil order. He had thus at his disposal only 29,500 men, of whom 2,900 were Indian cavalry, 2,900 British and 23,700 Indian infantry. He was charged with the custody of some 14,000 Turkish prisoners of war, guards for whose camps absorbed the greater part of an Infantry Brigade: the War Office had been repeatedly begged to transfer these elsewhere, but had professed itself unable to do so, pending the conclusion of peace with Turkey. They were eventually dispatched in August 1920 via India to Constantinople, whither they might well have been sent a year earlier.

Military stores of all sorts, including immense quantities of ammunition, were still in the country in military custody; the Disposals Board had taken all arrangements in regard to surplus stores out of the very competent hands of the Sales Board and the Royal Army Ordnance Corps,² and were dilatory to a degree in shipping unwanted articles out of the country. These dumps had to be guarded, at an annual cost

¹ This incurious attitude of General Haldane can be paralleled. It was by accident that the British Military Adviser to the Arab Government discovered in June 1921 that Sulaimani Division was not in Persia and that it was administered by British officials.

² See Forbes.

which almost certainly exceeded their total realizable value. General Haldane had, moreover, to contend with the difficult situation created by the arrival in the country under the auspices of the War Office during January 1920 of 550 British women, the wives of British officers and men, with some 400 young children. The arrangements for their accommodation in the Persian Hills near Karind had already been made, on the authority received from the War Office during the previous summer; and General Haldane felt that the matter had gone too far to justify his cancelling this much valued privilege. In the decision to bring them to Mesopotamia,¹ I had concurred at the time, considering it unlikely that the prevailing unrest would reach such proportions that their presence might be a serious embarrassment. They were sent to Karind during April and May and remained there till September, when, in circumstances of considerable difficulty, they were sent out of the country.

The Lines of Communication in Mesopotamia, the maintenance of which was necessary for military purposes, totalled some 2,000 miles; there were, too, some 50,000 Assyrian and Armenian refugees in camp at Baquba and elsewhere; they could protect themselves from sudden attacks, but they were to some extent a liability. Thus it was that on 1st June General Haldane had at his disposal as a mobile force only 500 British and 2,500 to 3,000 Indian troops, of which one battalion only was in a position to reach the Middle Euphrates area within twenty-four hours. The British troops were, almost without exception, new to the country, and without previous military experience. The railway was unable to transport, at this period, more than a quarter of the tonnage needed by the Force, with the result that the army was dependent upon two separate lines of communication, the Tigris and the railway; both had to be guarded, and each involved the retention, under military orders, of some 10,000 non-combatants in the I.W.T. and Railway Directorate respectively.

Before General Haldane had been two months in the country the Bolsheviks occupied Enzeli, and the military situation in North-West Persia became so perilous that he was obliged, under instructions from the War Office, to divert two battalions of British troops, forming part of the Mesopotamian garrison, to Qazvin, a distance of some 400 miles from railhead at Quraitu near Khanaqin. He was urged by Sir Percy Cox, H.M.'s Minister at Tehran, and by the General Officer Commanding the troops in North-West Persia, to send artillery and further troops from Mesopotamia to stabilize the situation. It was clearly desirable that he should go to Qazvin and thence to Tehran in person, to see things for himself and to confer with those responsible. He was,

¹ See MacMunn.

however, obliged to defer his visit in order to discuss, with Air Vice-Marshal Sir Geoffrey Salmond, the proposals then under consideration for garrisoning Mesopotamia by the Royal Air Force. Sir G. Salmond's arrival was unexpectedly delayed, and was followed a few days later by the return via Mesopotamia to his native country of H.I.M. Sultan Ahmad, Shah of Persia. The motor transport required by the royal visitor and his entourage could be supplied only by the Army, and it was for various reasons undesirable that Sir Aylmer Haldane should precede him to Qazvin and Tehran. He was, therefore, obliged to defer his visit to Persia until 6th June.

By this time the political situation both in Baghdad and elsewhere had become alarming, and I pressed him urgently yet again to defer his departure. He felt, however, that his long-delayed tour of inspection to Persia should have precedence, and took a more optimistic view of the position in 'Iraq than I was able to do. On grounds of health too, he needed the change of climate and scene that the Persian plateau would afford. It is clear from his book that his hopes and desires warped his judgement. His optimism was not shared by the General Staff in the 'Operations' and 'Intelligence' branches, nor by his Divisional Commander, but their representations were not heeded.

It was on 26th May that we first received definite reports of a Sharifian force on the Khabur River, under the control of Jamil Beg Midfa'i, who was later appointed to high office by King Faisal. Two days later came reports of a tribal movement towards Sharqat on the Tigris and of an advance on Zakho by Turkish troops. Mosul was the centre of endless intrigues, mainly by ex-Turkish officials in the interests of their government. Whether Jamil Beg was acting independently of or in league with the Turks, we did not know. Captain J. E. Barlow, D.S.O., M.C., the Political Officer on the spot, warned us of the universal belief that Tal 'Afar was Jamil's objective. Captain Barlow's request for military support was recommended by the Political Officer at Mosul, and urged by me upon G.H.Q. A garrison of one company would have sufficed—nothing was done. The incident is a good illustration of the practical working of General Haldane's motto—*Festina lente*. Two armoured cars were dispatched to Tal 'Afar somewhat tardily from Mosul: just before they arrived, on 4th June, the Arab Levy Officer, Captain Stuart, was shot dead in the street. His assistants, Sergeants Lawlor and Walker, were, after a gallant resistance, killed by a bomb on the arrival of the Sharifian agents, all of them former Turkish officers, who for the previous two years had been in the service of the Damascus Government, and had been paid with the assistance of a subsidy from H.M.'s Treasury. Captain Barlow, who had been taken prisoner on the previous evening,

evaded his captors; they followed him and shot him dead, two miles west of the town. The armoured cars were ambushed, and the crews, numbering two officers and fourteen men, were callously killed.

This murderous exploit, for the incident can be called by no other name, was the work of the Sharifian force, assisted by the townspeople, whose treachery was afterwards punished, however inadequately, by the destruction of the houses of those principally implicated. A column set out from Mosul on 5th June, and on 9th June reached Tal 'Afar, a distance of 35 miles. On the way out, it destroyed much of the harvest on which the garrison of Mosul depended for its sustenance; it chased the entire population of Tal 'Afar, innocent and guilty alike, into the desert, but was not able to inflict any punishment on the murderers.

A further incident occurred on 11th August, when a small column left Mosul and found some recalcitrant Shammar about eleven miles from the town. 'The Assistant Political Officer, escorted by a squadron, rode forward some three miles, while the remainder of the column halted, lest the knowledge of the presence of a force of such size should cause a failure in the negotiations' (Haldane, pp. 232-3). The reason given for this curious procedure is as difficult to understand as the subsequent retreat of the column (three squadrons and two field-guns), with the loss of a British officer not mentioned by General Haldane, before a tribe estimated at about 70 tents. I had anticipated the possibility of a repetition of the tactics successfully adopted by Ramadhan-al-Shallash at Dair-ez-Zor; and had pressed the claims of Tal 'Afar for a small garrison in support of the local Levies. Neither General Haldane nor his predecessor had felt able to accede to my request. Both felt that the policy of sprinkling small detachments over the country was unsound: they preferred to retain such forces as were available in the form of mobile columns. We were thus on the horns of a dilemma from which, for the Political and Levy Officers at out-stations, there was no escape. To the steadfast courage, which, without a single exception, they displayed, General Haldane has in his book¹ paid a generous and well deserved tribute. The strain was very great and they had to bear it alone. They met death as they had faced life. They took the reputation of their country in their hands, and added lustre to it by the manner of their death. They stood in lonely places not only for their country, but for the ideals of justice which, as the world will some day come to realize, transcend those of nationality. Amongst the barbarous and indomitable races with whom they had to deal, they maintained the good name of England; and created traditions of uprightness and devotion to duty which served the new State in good stead.

¹ *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia, 1920.*

On 19th June Sir Aylmer Haldane returned from Persia at my earnest solicitation, and I pressed him to ask for reinforcements. He was disinclined at the time to do so. To quote his own words:

'As I had no reason then to fear a combination of the tribes, having no idea that our system of government deliberately tended towards such an end, and as I was convinced that the London Temple of Janus would never open its gates until "the fat was in the fire", I continued to maintain an optimistic attitude. Moreover, as I have already pointed out, I did not place great faith in the reports that came in steadily and voluminously,¹ and if even for a time, we lost the Euphrates railway, it could be regained; while as a line of communication, the Tigris river, which could not be tampered with, would still remain. Indeed, should the tribes be foolish enough to cut the railway line, the extremists in Baghdad, who were greatly responsible for the unrest in the country, would, with the population, be the earliest sufferers, for all our steamers on the Tigris would be required to feed the troops. In such a case, the extremists would have good reason to put pressure on the tribes, provided, as shortly occurred, the whirlwind they were about to raise did not get beyond control. Any thought of obtaining an addition to my troops was limited by the knowledge that I was expected in the autumn to effect a reduction of a brigade of infantry and two regiments of British Cavalry.'

The underlying assumption, viz. that the prospect of interruption of navigation on the Tigris would deter the nationalist leaders or appreciably inconvenience the mass of the civil population was, as any one could have told him, wholly erroneous. Ample supplies of imported produce were available in Baghdad, and neither the nationalist leaders nor the tribes were likely to be troubled with any fear that their activities might embarrass the townspeople.

Apart from this, however, the fact that the interpretation normally placed by Sir Aylmer Haldane on the reports that arrived daily from Political Officers in charge of divisions differed from my own and from that of his Divisional Commander and his principal staff officers was a source of very real embarrassment to me. I had placed at his disposal, in print, every communication of importance that had passed between Baghdad and the India Office during the previous three years, together with copies of all administrative reports and standing instructions to Political Officers that might even indirectly bear upon the situation in its political and military aspects. He had not, however, the benefit either of the accumulated practical experience of his predecessor, nor had he been able to meet more than a few of the Political Officers at out-stations and then only for a few minutes. His book

¹ General Haldane adduces in support of his attitude a private letter from Miss Bell; it was, to say the least, imprudent of him to prefer her private miscalculations to the measured misgivings, amply supported by reports from all centres, of her official superior. When I taxed Miss Bell with having written the letter, she admitted the offence, adding, no doubt with perfect truth, that she had quite forgotten having written anything on the subject.

shows him to have been under the impression that they were 'mostly tyros': yet those on whom I relied, almost without exception, were senior men with long experience in their respective areas. Indeed all were experts, and practically all were either selected to continue in 'Iraq as advisers to the new Government, or returned to the services from which they were drawn, to fill important posts of even greater responsibility.

During the third week in June a series of arrests were made in Karbala and Hilla; including Mirza Muhammad Riza, the son of the chief mujtahid of Karbala. Before this action had been taken, however, reports from various centres indicated that responsible leaders had taken alarm at the growth of tribal unrest: the payment of revenue was resumed, and the total sums received up to the end of June were about the same as for the corresponding period during 1919. There was no question of forcible collection, nor even of normal pressure on the part of Political Officers, who had every inducement to do all in their power to keep matters in their districts from coming to a head. The tribes in the Muntafiq Division, which was inaccessible to troops, were restless, but Bertram Thomas, whom I sent there for a second tour of duty at about this time, was optimistic,¹ and with some reason. Khayyun-al-'Obaid, the paramount chief in the district, was all-powerful there, but he had pledged himself to keep the peace and, to his credit be it said, did so, in circumstances of great difficulty. Elsewhere, all was quiet. In Kurdistan there was no word of trouble, and up to the end of the month large caravans were passing between Sulaimani and the towns of Bana and Saqiz across the Persian border, and from Arbil into Persia through Rowandiz and Rayat. We still hoped to weather the storm, but there was still a strong revolutionary under-current in Baghdad, which was the centre of organized disaffection. There were frequent attacks on solitary officers and men from the last week in May onwards; sudden panic several times seized the bazaars, and shopkeepers put up their shutters, thus adding to the public uncertainty. Political meetings in the mosques were a nightly occurrence, but the movement of troops to the hills continued.

Sir Aylmer Haldane and, to an even greater degree, one of his senior staff officers, were not at pains to conceal their opinion that I had been unduly pessimistic in my estimate of the situation, and returned complacently on 24th June to the hill-station at Karind, where the bulk of Head-quarters staff were already established.

I had energetically opposed the proposal to establish this hill-station, which seemed to me to offer no such military advantages or amenities to health as to outweigh the obvious political disadvantages.

¹ See his book *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, 1931.

entailed, and I had appealed unsuccessfully to the Secretary of State for India to induce the War Office to veto it. The expense was very great; the gain to health problematical, for great as is the heat in Mesopotamia during the summer months, the actual-sickness rates in Persia during the previous hot weather had been uniformly higher than in Mesopotamia, and the admission-rate to hospitals for the troops in Mesopotamia during 1919 was considerably better than the average for the whole of India. General Haldane, however—to quote his own words—‘made no secret of the fact that he disliked the idea of remaining in Baghdad throughout the hot weather, where it was not easy, except for an hour or two in the late afternoon, to obtain sufficient exercise to preserve health’. His health, as I have stated, was not of the best, but though I sympathized heartily, I felt that such considerations afforded inadequate justification for his departure. With his estimate of the potentialities for trouble in the near future of the general situation I was in complete disagreement, but he had the same material as I had on which to form his opinion.

The personal factor was all-important. Differences of temperament and of outlook and of age are not easily overcome. Looking at the correspondence of those days through the spectacles of time, I see much that might have been better said, and some things that had been better left unsaid. Sir Aylmer Haldane has in his book criticized with some asperity various aspects of the policy followed by the Civil Administration during and after the war; with some of these criticisms I shall deal briefly elsewhere. I trust, however, that the reader will believe that I do so without rancour, and with a just appreciation of the difficulties of the military command in those days.

A week after General Haldane's return to Baghdad a fresh outbreak occurred, this time at Rumaitha, a small town in the Diwaniya Division; the immediate excuse for this outbreak was trivial in the extreme. The Shaikh of the Dhawalim section of the Bani Huchaim, who had failed to repay an agricultural loan of the preceding year amounting to less than £100, was sent for by the Assistant Political Officer, Captain P. T. Hyatt, who pressed him for repayment. He was so truculent and insolent that Captain Hyatt felt that he had no option but to send him by train that evening to Diwaniya. That afternoon, following an example which had been set at Samawa a few weeks earlier,¹ his supporters broke into the *sarai* and forcibly released him. The neighbouring tribes to the north did their utmost to prevent the Dhawalim from entering their territory, but the latter had received definite orders from the Shamiya division (Najaf and Kufa) to rise. They were encouraged by assurances that, under the terms of the Mandate, Great

¹ For details see *Review*.

Britain was precluded from using military force, and that practically the whole of our available forces had been withdrawn either to Persia or to India. The news fell upon fertile soil. The railway was cut in three places, isolating both Samawa and Rumaitha; 56 men of the 114th Mahrattas reached the latter place from Samawa on the 1st July and nearly twice as many from Diwaniya next day, followed on 3rd July by a company of the 99th Infantry under Captain Bragg, who assumed command of the garrison, which numbered 4 British officers and 300 Indian ranks, with some 200 Indian non-combatants, mostly of the Railway Department. On 4th July the siege of Samawa began, the Arab tribesmen adopting trench-tactics on lines which left little doubt that they were directed by Turkish officers: on 20th July, the siege was raised by a strong column from Baghdad under Brig.-Gen. Coningham, only just in time, for the garrison's supply of food was almost exhausted.

General Coningham, to whose handling of the Column Sir Aylmer Haldane pays a warm tribute, did not reach Rumaitha without severe fighting, in which the 45th Sikhs, under Lt.-Col. McVean, and the 1/10th Gurkhas, under Lt.-Col. H. L. Scott, especially distinguished themselves. The casualties incurred by the relieving force were 35 killed and 150 wounded, of whom 5 were British officers, the rest Indian ranks. The Rumaitha garrison lost about one-third of their number. Mr. E. W. L. Harper of the Railway Directorate is mentioned by Sir Aylmer Haldane as having displayed special gallantry during the siege, which would probably have had a tragic outcome but for the success of the Royal Air Force in dropping ammunition and food for the garrison, and in bombing the Arabs investing the place. The Assistant Political Officer, Lieutenant P. T. Hyatt, acted throughout—in General Haldane's words—'with courage and good sense'. On the 21st the whole force retired to Diwaniya, which was reached on 25th July after a series of harassing engagements with the Arabs.

Whilst these events were in progress several isolated posts were attached. Captain Priestley-Evans was cut off with a few Arab Levies at Khan Jadwal and died fighting, after a gallant defence in which Captain Wyatt-Hughes, of the Military Works Department, played a distinguished part.

The state of the country was likened by General Haldane¹ to 'a sheet of parchment, which rises at any point where a weight is lifted from its surface'. The dispatch of troops from Hilla to Diwaniya now resulted in a rising in the Hilla district, where a section of Bani Hasan had seized the town of Kifl on the 20th July. It was rightly decided that a display of force in that direction was necessary, and a column consisting of three companies of the 3rd Manchesters, one


¹ Sir A. Haldane's dispatch of 8.11.20, *London Gazette*, No. 32379, Supp., 5.7.21.



Photo by Russell

MAJ.-GEN. G. A. J. LESLIE
C.B., C.M.G.

Commanding 17th Division



company of the 1/32nd Sikh Pioneers, and two squadrons of the 35th Sind Horse, with a battery of Field Artillery, were sent out. The heat was great, and the organization and management of the column were deplorable; no adequate arrangements had been made for extra water for the men's needs.

The column spent the first night some 6 miles south of Hilla; General Leslie, who was at Diwaniya conducting the operations for the relief of Rumaitha, had warned them not to move beyond this point. They went on, however, another nine miles next day to a point within five miles of Kifl and fifteen miles distant from Hilla, and took up a particularly strong position: the march did not commence till after 9 a.m. and when the Manchesters arrived at the camp shortly before 1 p.m. they were completely exhausted. The camp was attacked during the afternoon; owing to faulty distribution and handling the enemy was able to get to close quarters at dusk. The Commander then decided to retire on Hilla, as he had been instructed to do if necessary, in order to avoid being engaged with superior forces. But his force was in no condition to retire: the Indian troops did their best to protect their British comrades; and the artillery maintained the tradition of their Corps. The retreat became a rout: some of the Manchesters lost their way in the darkness, and less than half their number reached Hilla next morning.

The retreat¹ cost us 180 killed, 60 wounded, and about 160 were taken prisoners, with heavy loss of transport—vehicles and animals. They were not ill-treated in captivity, and of the 79 British prisoners only 1 died in Arab hands. 'This unfortunate affair', writes Sir A. Haldane, 'could not have occurred at a more inopportune moment. From the outset the prospect of any advantage being derived from

¹ For most conspicuous bravery and self-sacrifice on this occasion the Victoria Cross was conferred posthumously on Captain G. S. Henderson, D.S.O., M.C. 'On the evening of the 24th July 1920, when about fifteen miles from Hilla (Mesopotamia), the Company under his command was ordered to retire. After proceeding about 500 yards a large party of Arabs suddenly opened fire from the flank, causing the Company to split up and waver. Regardless of all danger, Captain Henderson at once reorganized the Company, led them gallantly to the attack and drove off the enemy.

'On two further occasions, this Officer led his men to charge the Arabs with the bayonet and forced them to retire. At one time when the situation was extremely critical and the troops and transport were getting out of hand, Captain Henderson, by sheer pluck and coolness, steadied his command, prevented the Company from being cut up and saved the situation.

'During the second charge, he fell wounded but refused to leave his command, and just as the Company reached the trench they were making for he was again wounded. Realizing that he could do no more, he asked one of his N.C.O.'s to hold him up on the embankment, saying—"I'm done now, don't let them beat you". He died fighting.' *London Gazette*, 29th October 1920.

sending out so small a force was more than doubtful.'¹ No one with the column had knowledge of either Arab warfare or the country.

There are several indications that the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief was dissatisfied with the conduct of operations by Maj.-Gen. Leslie, to whom it would have fallen to take control had anything happened to General Haldane. 'After the Manchester affair', writes General Haldane (p. 129) 'the delegation of authority for movements of troops was much restricted', and the retreat from Diwaniya was minutely directed by wireless from Baghdad. At page 137 of his book an example occurs of the inconvenience and weakness of this system of control. The principle that officers to command in detached operations should first be carefully selected and then given the utmost possible freedom of action will no doubt continue in the future as in the past, to be accepted in theory and denied in practice. It is impossible here to discuss the question whether General Haldane's strictures on Maj.-Gen. Leslie were well founded, but it is noticeable that while circumscribing his initiative General Haldane was at pains to postpone his supersession until Kufa had been relieved and the rising had been put down, mainly by the troops under Leslie's command. Nothing, however, can excuse the failure of G.H.Q. to keep General Leslie informed as to current events. He wrote to me on 3rd September—'I am more obliged than I can tell you for the information you have sent me in your messages to your officers and in your confidential print. Without these, I should have been as ignorant now of important military happenings as I was at the time of their occurrence.'

The immediate effect of this reverse was to bring to a head the trouble brewing in the Middle Euphrates region. Kufa was already closely invested, and the military camp at Hilla was repeatedly attacked by the local tribes, who were repulsed with considerable loss to themselves. The Arab Levies under Major Boyle remained loyal in spite of the efforts of their compatriots to detach them from their allegiance. Their wives were vilified, taunted, and even molested, their children ill-treated, and they themselves threatened with death and their wives with violation if and when the insurgents gained the upper hand. That they, and with them the Police force, stood firm and with negligible exceptions remained at their posts, is the best possible testimony, if such be needed, to the tact and abilities of the individual Levy and Political Officers responsible for their recruitment and training.

¹ The dispatch of this column, on the recommendation of the Officer Commanding at Hilla, was ordered by Maj.-Gen. Leslie after telephonic reference to G.H.Q. Baghdad, in presence of a Staff Officer; General Haldane not only approved the dispatch of the column, but specified the exact point to which it should go. This fact, of which I have documentary record (dated 23rd July 1920), seems to have escaped his memory.

There was nothing for it but to withdraw from Diwaniya; the operation was successfully carried out by General Coningham. The movement of the column was restricted to the railway, many miles of which had been destroyed. Shortage of rolling-stock made it necessary to bring with the columns every available engine and truck—totalling six locomotives and some 250 vehicles—the whole forming a train about a mile long. General Haldane has given a vivid description of the operations of the column and of his own feelings during these days. My own anxieties were not less than his. I had to consider the future, as well as the immediate present: and to gauge the situation at a dozen different points, occupied only by Political Officers supported by Levies, where the infectious madness of revolt had not yet gained the upper hand. Each of these Political Officers was, at the moment, worth a battalion of troops. If they could hold on, and maintain the façade of Civil Administration in their respective districts, while the army dealt with the areas in open revolt, there was every reason to believe that we could prevent a general rising until the arrival of reinforcements now on their way from India. They all knew of the murder of Captain Barlow and Lieutenant Stuart at Tel 'Afar; the majority were similarly circumstanced, that is to say they were holding isolated spots where no troops were available within fifty miles.

During and after the siege of Rumaitha, Captain W. F. Webb remained at 'Afaj, a small town east of Diwaniya, supported only by a handful of Levies. His presence there served to guard the flank of the Diwaniya column: he was aware of plots to capture him and of ambushes on the road. No aeroplanes could be spared to bring him to safety, and he was told to get away as best he could: not all his men could be trusted—they had wives and families with them, and could not be expected to incur the whole-hearted enmity of the powerful Shaikhs who surrounded the town. The only means of communication was by Arab messengers, of whom one was killed.

Captain Webb succeeded, nevertheless, in getting away and joined the Diwaniya column forty-eight hours before it began to retire on Hilla. Bertram Thomas at Shatra and Crawford at Qilat Sikar were in like case: the latter was ambushed when returning to his headquarters after enjoying the hospitality of a friendly Shaikh, but escaped unscathed. A fortnight later Captain Thomas was compelled to leave Shatra by air, after entrusting the reins of Government to Khayyun al 'Obaid, who justified the confidence reposed in him,¹ and the authority which had during the previous year been placed in his hands by Dickson and Thomas, by maintaining order in the district. It may be mentioned here, in passing, that Sir Aylmer Haldane's state-

¹ See Thomas, *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*, 1931.

ment in his book that the unrest at Shatra owed its origin to a novel system of revenue-collection, involving the measurement of crops by chain, is based on a misunderstanding. No such system could possibly work or was even contemplated. Revenue was payable under Turkish Law, in cash or in kind according to the yield of the crop. This had previously been fixed by the skilled but arbitrary decision of official (Arab) valuers. A system was introduced in some areas, with the concurrence of the Shaikhs, whereby an agreed sample patch of one square metre was measured on the ground, cut, garnered and weighed, and from the result the value of the crop was fixed and the Government dues calculated. It was not a perfect system, but it gave better results than the earlier arrangement, and was very generally accepted as preferable. When unrest is in the air any peg is good enough to hang a complaint on; that it constituted a genuine grievance is most improbable.

Further operations on the Euphrates, described in detail in General Haldane's book, were without exception successful, and were not marred by further reverses. Musaiyib was occupied on 12th August and the Hindiya barrage on the 14th, and a series of successful punitive operations undertaken by General Leslie. By the end of August the military situation was well in hand; we controlled the canal-system, and were in a position to prevent the spread of anarchy. Kufa was still besieged, but was in no need of immediate relief, nor was it practicable to dispatch a column in that direction, for a fresh outbreak of disorder had occurred at Baquba and Shahraban, which for a time severed our communications with Persia. The railway line was cut near Baquba on 9th August; on 12th August the Political Officer was obliged to leave. This followed upon the disorder into which a column of all arms was thrown by a fortuitous encounter with a party of about fifty raiders.¹ The Civil Staff remained at their posts in Baquba till the last moment, and when finally refused military assistance, escaped with difficulty from the town, which was then sacked by Arabs.

The abandonment of Baquba was described in writing at the time by one of the senior General Officers in 'Iraq as 'disgraceful', and I see no reason to dissent from this judgement, which was shared by many others. Published records are insufficient to admit of allocation of responsibility between G.H.Q. and the local Commandant, but as the precipitate withdrawal of the latter, with such disastrous results, was followed by no disciplinary measures, it is legitimate to assume that it was consistent with the orders that reached him. It is certain that G.H.Q. were suddenly possessed with the fear (at no time shared


¹ Haldane, pp. 152-5.



CAPT. E. L. BUCHANAN
Killed August 13th, 1920



CAPT. W. T. WRIGLEY, M.C.
Killed August 13th, 1920



by the Civil Administration) that Baghdad itself might come under the control of our enemies. For long General Haldane had disregarded warnings; when his eyes were opened to the true state of affairs the reaction was proportionately severe.

The belief that we were evacuating the country, sedulously spread by nationalist emissaries, grew in the minds of tribesmen to a certainty. Shahraban, twenty-seven miles further north, was now isolated: there were no troops nearer than Baghdad on one side and Karind on the other. The Assistant Political Officer in charge was Captain W. T. Wrigley; with him were Captain Bradfield, commanding the Arab Levies—of whom about fifty were at Head-quarters—and two British Levy Instructors, Newton and Nesbitt. There was also resident at the time at Shahraban Captain E. L. Buchanan of the Irrigation Department. Unknown to me, he had taken his wife—an English lady—with him; her name, moreover, did not appear on any of the monthly returns that reached my Office from the Director of Irrigation showing the location of his staff and of their wives. I had never met Captain Buchanan, and when I visited Shahraban by car early in August, Wrigley had referred with appreciation to Buchanan's work, but had not mentioned that his wife was with him. Had I known, I should of course have insisted on her going to Baghdad. Wrigley had told me—about 4th August—that the tribes and townspeople were getting restive. It was not suggested that they had any particular grievance, but they were under the influence of the wave of unrest passing over the country, and of the knowledge that our forces had suffered repeated reverses. I told him, as I had told others, to remain at his post as long as he possibly could and to keep me and the Officer Commanding troops at Baquba informed daily of the position by telegraph. He did so up to 11th August. On 12th August the line was cut by Arabs and Baquba precipitately abandoned by the British garrison, no attempt being made to ensure the safety of the staff at Shahraban. On 13th August the townspeople of Shahraban rose, and tribesmen invaded the town: the Levies deserted and all the five Englishmen were killed. Mrs. Buchanan, who was slightly wounded, was taken to the house of a local landowner, who protected her until 9th September, when order was restored by a column from Baghdad under the ubiquitous General Coningham, co-operating with another column working southwards from Qizil Robat under Lt.-Col. Greer. John Baines, who was in charge of the Military Grass Farm at Shahraban, was severely wounded and captured, but not molested.

Mrs. Buchanan has written the story of the tragedy at length in her book *In the Hands of the Arabs*. Sir Aylmer Haldane does not refer in his book to this record. His account of the attack and of its out-

come is clearly based on Arab reports collected after the event and is, I think, in some respects less reliable than the testimony of Mrs. Buchanan. On the other hand, her references to the part played by the Levies is at variance with other contemporary evidence officially recorded at the time.

From Mrs. Buchanan's account it is clear that all the officers concerned, the Levy Instructors, and John Baines behaved with the utmost gallantry. From Sir Aylmer Haldane's account, it is equally clear that he was not prepared to send troops from Baghdad to go to their rescue. Why he should say that he was unaware of the existence of these officers at Shahraban is inexplicable; not only had their names appeared regularly in every printed list of Political Levy and Irrigation Officers furnished to General Head-quarters, but the decision to retain Levies at Baquba, Shahraban, Qizil Robat, and Khanaqin under British officers had been reached a few months before after a full discussion with the General Staff, who had accepted a substantial charge against Army Funds in respect of these detachments, which had relieved troops for the past twelve months of duties connected with the security of the railways.

Of Wrigley and Bradfield I had seen a good deal; both had been specially selected for their respective duties on the strong recommendation of the Divisional Commander. They had very good records as regimental officers, and Wrigley had won a Military Cross in Mesopotamia. Captain Buchanan, too, had a good record with the Royal Air Force previous to demobilization. All three were quite young. Their deaths were a personal grief to me as well as a serious loss to the Administration.

The area of trouble spread rapidly during the latter half of August. Captain Lloyd was taken prisoner by insurgent tribesmen at Deltawa, but was not ill-treated. The town of Kifri was invaded and pillaged by tribesmen and the Political Officer, Captain G. H. Salmon, captured and a few days later murdered in prison. He had been pressed to move his quarters to the railway station at Kangarban, where two platoons of Indian Infantry were stationed, but he declined, as also did his wife, rightly feeling that the moral effect of his presence among the inhabitants of the town, to whom the tribal element was hostile, was great, and that it was his duty to remain at his post till the last possible moment. About 22nd August he left the town to parley with some tribesmen on a hill close by. He was seized and not allowed to return to the town. His wife was escorted to the military camp, a few miles from the town, by the townspeople. Two days later the tribesmen entered the town and, on the 28th, murdered Captain Salmon, though they had no possible grudge against him or excuse for so doing.

His decision to remain at Kifri till the last moment cost him his life, but it probably saved the military situation in this area; our military position was precarious and every day gained was of importance. Two days later Kifri was occupied by a detachment from Kirkuk, and no further trouble arose in this area.

Salmon's murder, to which General Haldane makes but brief allusion, caused much comment at the time, and though the Commandant of the Camp was exonerated as having merely followed his instructions when he refused assistance to the Civil Staff at Kifri, there still remains the question—how far were these instructions reasonable? General Haldane states that on 17th August the garrison of Kangarban, near Kifri, was reduced from two and a quarter companies and some details to two platoons, a force insufficient to protect the perimeter of the camp. The remainder, as it appears, were being utilized on that date to protect and supply two minor posts on the railway. The 17th, however, does not appear to be the relevant date, though General Haldane does not specify the exact day on which Captain Salmon was made a prisoner. Nor does he state the number of raiders who attacked the town, which is easily defensible on the side from which they approached. Indeed, he seems to feel himself on his defence throughout his perfunctory treatment of the affair, and to be glad to escape from it. The matter deserved fuller treatment because, whether the defence of Kifri was possible or not, the idea was allowed to spread that the military authorities, while no doubt recognizing that the general object of the operations was the defence or re-establishment of the Civil Government, were apt in particular cases to regard their wired camps, their supplies, and their lines of communication as ends in themselves. In the instance under discussion, there is some reason to suppose that Kifri might have been saved, but that the discretion of officers was so cramped as to prevent any display of initiative except by those whose independence of spirit amounted to insubordination. General Haldane's Circular of 13th August, printed as an Appendix to his book, entitled 'Responsibility of Officers', should be read in this connexion. None of his predecessors would have issued such a document.

The disturbances now spread to the Arbil *liwa*. Captain W. R. Hay had been attacked in the Rowandiz gorge on 12th August, narrowly escaping with his life. Captain F. C. Kirk was compelled on the 3rd September to leave Kōi. These two officers, and those with them, behaved throughout with coolness and gallantry, in circumstances of extraordinary difficulty. The prevailing unrest had little if anything to do with the system of government of which they were the representatives. The Kurds had no sort of sympathy with Arab Nationalist ideas; though a small group of former Turkish officials and landowners in

Arbil were busily engaged in fostering the belief that the Turks would shortly return, the tribes themselves were known to be hostile to any such idea. Our difficulties in this area were enormously increased by our inability to make any statement whatever as to the future of the Mosul wilayat or of South Kurdistan. On this subject His Majesty's Government were adamant. Whatever their intentions might have been, they refused to authorize any sort of announcement on the subject, although two years before, in November 1918, I had been instructed to ascertain the views of the local population as to whether they were in favour of a single Arab State under British tutelage stretching from the northern boundary of the Mosul wilayat to the Persian Gulf (see Chapter V). Upon this subject, opinions were in 1918 and 1919 unanimous: all agreed that the Mosul wilayat should be included within 'Iraq.

The Levies in the Arbil *liwa*, commanded by the gallant Captain Littledale, behaved, as stated by Sir Aylmer Haldane, magnificently, and incurred heavy casualties without loss of morale. They had no option but to withdraw from Rowandiz and from Batas to Arbil, but the great majority never faltered in their allegiance to their British officers, whose soldierly example encouraged them, as well as their Kurdish officers, to remain loyal to a greater cause than any that had inspired them in earlier years. I flew up to Arbil during these difficult days, combining a visit to Captain Hay with a raid on two centres of rebellion in the neighbourhood, which we bombed and pelted with machine-gun fire till all our ammunition was exhausted. At Arbil I met some of the Kurdish Levies and their officers. Their talk was all of their British officers: they would follow *them* anywhere. In the causes of the disturbances and in developments in other areas they took little interest. *Loyal Devoir* was their motto. Captain Littledale was awarded the M.C., and his Assistant, Saiyid 'Ali, the Military Medal for their services.

Of these difficult and perilous weeks Captain Hay has left a vivid but modest account in his book, which does not appear to have been known to General Haldane, who makes no reference to it in his own work. His cool judgement and tenacity were worth a Brigade to us at this juncture. He knew that the Political Officers at Khanaqin and Baquba had been evicted and their offices burnt; that chaos reigned on the Diyala; that the Political Officers at Kifri and Shahraban had been killed, and Lloyd at Deltawa captured. I had told him that if any trouble occurred at Arbil we could not help him with a single aeroplane, much less with a detachment of troops. One attempt had already been made to assassinate him at Arbil; on another occasion men tried to set fire to the house in which he was resting; a few days later an ambush was laid for him in the gloomy gorge of Rowandiz,

so often the scene of murder and sudden death. Two months earlier one of his men, Sergeant Methuen, had been shot dead¹ whilst arresting a local *Agha* bent on creating a disturbance.

Captain Hay was not yet twenty-seven years of age, and he was senior in years to his assistants; he might well have been unnerved by his experiences, and have prudently withdrawn with his staff to the shelter of the nearest military detachment at Kirkuk. He did nothing of the sort. Arrangements were made to send the contents of the Civil Treasury, some £20,000 in all, to Kirkuk, together with his clerical staff. Khurshid Agha, a local chief, entered the town with his retainers, overawed the little force of Levies and Police who remained faithful to their British officers, and virtually took charge of the town. Yet so long as Captain Hay was on the spot, and Captain Littledale was in the *sarai* with his little band, it was possible to retain the semblance of authority.

Such was the situation at Arbil when I flew up from Baghdad on 8th September, hoping by a brief visit to instil confidence into the local notables. I was met by a swarm of Kurdish horsemen, headed by a group of genial and indeed obsequious chiefs, who had a few days before forcibly seized nearly all the ammunition in possession of the Levies. They escorted me to a house near the aerodrome where I learned, as I broke my fast after a stormy flight of over 200 miles, how desperate was the situation. The tension was such that the smallest incident might result in an upheaval, in which every member of the Administration in Arbil would assuredly be engulfed, as had happened at Shahraban and elsewhere. When I entered the aeroplane I had in my pocket a copy of *Bacon's Essays*. On the page at which I opened it I found the following phrase—'Boldness is bad in council though good in execution . . . for in council it is good to see dangers, and in execution not to see them unless they are very great.' It was clearly a moment for execution, not for council, and I received successive deputations of Kurdish chiefs at the *sarai* with a show of confidence which I was far from feeling. I praised their efforts for the maintenance of order, and warned them of the wrath to come; their spokesmen, Khurshid Agha and Ahmad Effendi, replied briefly, assuring me of their firm intention to maintain order and to support the Civil Administration, 'but', they added, 'we require of you two things—firstly, an assurance that the Turks will not be permitted to return, and that Arabs shall not be allowed to govern us Kurds, and secondly, the immediate dispatch of troops to Arbil, to show the mischief-makers that the arm of the

¹ He was buried just outside the Christian village of 'Ain Kawa, on a mound beside the tomb of one of the local Saints. Not content with such fitting sepulture, the local representative of the Imperial War Graves Commission, without the knowledge or consent of the Civil Authorities, disinterred the body for re-burial at Baghdad.

British Government is still long and strong'. To reply in public to these deputations was a painful ordeal, for I could give no assurance whatever as to the future of the Arbil *liwa*. I had with me a loose-leaf pocket-book in which was recorded every public statement made by responsible Ministers in regard to 'Iraq. I extracted one leaf, and after translating it, handed it to Ahmad Effendi. It ran as follows:

July 25th. 'Replying in Commons to Mr. Lambert, Mr. Lloyd George said that our present difficulties in Mesopotamia were temporary. He was convinced that they would be overcome. His Majesty's Government saw no reason to abandon the British Mandate for Mesopotamia.'

'I can say no more than that,' I replied, 'and it should suffice for you. I have myself spoken with Mr. Lloyd George, the statesman who did more than any other man to lead the Allies to victory; he is not deterred by obloquy, nor moved by assassinations: I repeat, after him, that we shall not abandon our trust.' This was begging the question, and to avoid cross-examination I dealt with their demand for troops. They would arrive, I said, but how soon I could not say. I spoke of the punitive action already undertaken on the Middle Euphrates and on the Diyala, and appealed to them not to allow their tribal fellows to fall victims to the wave of madness that had affected the Shi'ah Arabs of the Middle Euphrates and Diyala regions. There was no disorder on the Tigris from Basra to Baghdad; in Baghdad itself no outbreak was possible. Sulaimani, under Soane's stern hand, was peaceful; the worst was over, I assured them, and the makers of trouble would soon be going to earth like foxes at the break of day. (The fox has the reputation in Persia and in Kurdistan, as in the pages of Æsop, for cunning and for the power to mislead the simpler animals.) They were only half assured, but the air was clearer.

After the deputation had left, I saw Khurshid Agha and Ahmad Effendi privately and thanked them for their services to the Civil Administration. To them I spoke more freely of reinforcements arriving and of punitive operations in contemplation. Again they raised the question of the future of the Mosul wilayat. 'If the Turks return', they said, 'they will kill us, rape our women, and despoil our heirs. Can you give us no assurance that they will not be permitted to return here?' I brought out my pocket-book once more, and found therein Mr. Lloyd George's statement of 5th January 1918¹ in which he used the following words:

'While we do not challenge the maintenance of the Turkish Empire in the homelands of the Turkish race with its capital at Constantinople. . . . Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are in our judgment entitled to

¹ Reprinted as Appendix III to Report of War Cabinet for 1917. Cd. 9005.

a recognition of their separate national conditions. What the exact form of that recognition in each particular case should be, need not here be discussed, beyond stating that it would be impossible to restore to their former sovereignty the territories to which I have already referred.'

'The man who said that', I remarked, 'will keep his word if he can, and he has an immense majority in the House of Commons, all the Lords are in this matter with him, and by Mesopotamia he means the three wilayats of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul.' They departed, somewhat easier in their minds, and I returned to lunch at the house near the aerodrome. On the roof was a large party of Police and Levies with a Lewis gun, for an attack appeared imminent, and a report arrived during lunch that a party of tribesmen were on their way to destroy our machines; it was a false alarm, but indicative of the extreme tension. I took my leave of that gallant little band, urging Hay to hold on, at whatever risk, as long as he possibly could, but it was with a heavy heart that I saw the last of the party, smothered in dust as our aeroplanes roared upwards. Between the Political Officers in charge of divisions and districts, and between them and myself as their head from 1918 to 1920, there was in most cases a link not merely of friendship but also of comradeship, springing from mutual understanding, from common perils and common hopes, which rose on occasions such as these to an intensity of feeling on both sides which mere friendship could not attain. It could not, in the nature of things, outlast the conditions in which it had its origin, but during the whole period with which this work deals it was perhaps the greatest asset of the Civil Administration. It had nothing in it of self-interest, but much of self-sacrifice, and of the sense of duty, to 'Iraq rather than to Great Britain, and of loyalty to the new trust imposed on us by the outcome of the war.

It was the old army tradition, applied to a new service. The unity of purpose that animated the little groups of administrative officers at out-stations was no less striking. Officers of departments freshly transferred from military to civil control sometimes had difficulty in finding their place in the local hierarchy, but the normal processes of adjustment and lubrication, and an occasional transfer, sufficed to restore harmony. In the Mosul wilayat, however, there were no departments; the Political Officer was the sole executive authority in the *liwa*, and enjoyed proportionately greater responsibility.

Captain Hay has described in his book the shifts to which he was put in order to retain a foothold in Arbil until the arrival of troops from Mosul. They arrived on 14th September¹ to the joy of our supporters,

¹ Arbil can be reached from Mosul by cavalry within twenty-four hours, if the road by Kelek is followed. General Haldane does nothing to explain the delay which so nearly

Ahmad Effendi and Khurshid Agha. The first-named was in some measure protected against possible Turkish reprisals by his sanctity. He had for two years been President of the Municipality, and had devoted himself whole-heartedly to the welfare of the town and the protection of the poor classes from the injustice and rapacity of the feudal landlords. He saw the people for whom he cared, the artisan and shopkeeper, the orphan and the widow, in danger of being pushed back into the pit of misery from which they had emerged since the Armistice.

Khurshid Agha was a born leader and stubborn, and he held to the promise he had made to Ibrahim Agha as he lay dying, to support the new Government in the interests of the Kurdish people. 'In no Kurd', writes Captain Hay, 'have I seen such determination and such unselfish unity of purpose as was displayed by Khurshid Agha during those dark days.'

There was no further disturbance in the Arbil *liwa*, which owes its freedom from the misery and destruction that insurrection brings in its train to the cool courage and stout hearts of two young men—Hay and Littledale—and their little band of British and Kurdish assistants.

In Sulaimani, which I also visited by air during September, all was quiet; the lesson learnt in 1919 had not yet been forgotten, and though unsupported by troops, Soane and his very competent assistants pursued the sober tenor of their way. Had Arbil been given up to pillage they could scarcely have held their own, but so long as the outward signs of Government were visible there and at Kirkuk, the tribal chiefs were well able to deal with itinerant mischief-makers. There were many such on the move at this period. Some were Bolshevik emissaries who combined the fiercest xenophobia with a passion for the rights of man in general and for the support of law-breakers in particular. They had contrived to secure Turkish arms and ammunition in considerable quantities, and drove a thriving trade. Others were adherents of Shaikh Mahmud, and cherished hopes that he would be restored to power. How far their loyalty was genuine, and how far it arose from the desire for power, pillage, and personal revenge, it is impossible to say. They were to be found chiefly amongst the Hama-wand, of all tribes the boldest and the most predatory. They prided themselves on being the wolves of Kurdistan, and they were not less elusive and difficult to deal with than their eponymous prototypes.

sacrificed the lives of the officers in Arbil and the security of the loyal population. He mentions that on the arrival of troops 'the area subsided into peacefulness'. He forgets that Rowandiz was never reoccupied, with the inevitable result that Sulaimani was later the scene of fresh disturbances.

The Naqshbandi Shaikhs¹ followed the example of the Naqib of Baghdad and his family and threw all the weight of their influence into the scales in favour of the new administration. Thanks in some measure to them, but mainly to the quality of the local administration and to the punitive measures of the previous summer, the peace of the district was unbroken during the year.

The Kurdish tribes east and north-east of Mosul caused us anxiety, but they, too, had learnt their lesson during 1919, and only the Surchi of the Aqra district rose in rebellion. They were ineffectively dealt with by a column from Mosul during the second week of September, and were not finally defeated until some 600 of them had the misfortune to attack an Assyrian repatriation camp thirty miles north-east of Mosul. The Assyrians, though heavily outnumbered, made short work of their assailants. With a loss of only 4 killed and 8 wounded, they slew 60 of their opponents, and drove the rest back across the Zab, in which 140 are said to have been drowned.² In this engagement the Kurds suffered losses greater than were inflicted by all the punitive expeditions undertaken against the Northern Kurds by regular troops in 1919-20. 'But for this entirely fortuitous support,' says General Haldane, 'it is possible that a large portion of the Mosul Division might have been swamped in the wave of anarchy.' Perhaps so; but the support of the Assyrians was not 'fortuitous'. At the suggestion of the Civil Administration they had been armed and trained, and they were commanded by British officers. Since their use was denied to the Civil Authorities for the relief of Arbil or the maintenance of order in Mosul Division, it must be assumed that they were at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief. Perhaps, like Wellington at Waterloo, General Haldane forgot the existence of a portion of his forces, and so attributes to a lucky chance what really was due to the imprudence of the Surchi Kurds in attacking very mobile troops which were prepared to exercise initiative without awaiting instructions from G.H.Q. This successful stroke on the part of the Assyrians, coming at a critical moment, was of the greatest value; there was no further outbreak, and General Haldane was able to concentrate his attention on the Middle Euphrates and the Diyala regions, to which I will now once more direct the reader's attention.

¹ Sunnis of the Shafi persuasion are broadly speaking of two denominations—(a) Naqshbandi; (b) Qadiri.

The Naqshbandis follow the teachings of Shah Naqshband (alias Shah Bukhari), a Khalifa who succeeded the Twelve Imams, and the present Shaikhs are his direct descendants.

The Qadiris follow the precepts of Shaikh Abdul Qadir Gilani, whose tomb is in Baghdad, its custodians, the Naqibs of Baghdad, being in the direct line of descent from the Shaikh.

² Haldane, p. 247.

Until 12th August no actual outbreak occurred between Baghdad and Ramadi, or on the Euphrates about Falluja; Shaikh 'Ali Sulaiman of the Dulaim remained staunch, the Zoba' tribe under Shaikh Dhari, were sullen but inactive. On the 11th Leachman came in by car to discuss the situation: he was fairly confident that so long as 'Ali Sulaiman could retain his hold over the Dulaim there would be no serious trouble between Baghdad and Falluja, or further north. He left my office at about eleven o'clock next morning, saying that he would be in Falluja by three o'clock and would telegraph fully to me. He added that he had told Shaikh Dhari to meet him at Khan Nuqta, midway between Baghdad and Falluja, and asked for authority to waive the repayment by Shaikh Dhari of certain advances made to him for the purchase of seed-grain during the previous year. What happened at the interview, so far as known to us, is recorded by Sir Aylmer Haldane in his book (p. 171) in the following words:

'About 12.30 Leachman drove up in his car, having with him only his servant and driver, and joined Dhari at the entrance to the *khan*, discussing with him until 2 p.m. matters connected with crops and revenue. About that hour a motor-car with a party of Arabs arrived, and stated that they had been stopped and robbed about two miles from the *khan* in the direction of Baghdad. Leachman at once sent a shabana officer and ten men, as well as five of the Zoba', to arrest the robbers, but ordered the party not to proceed further than two miles from the *khan*. During their absence Dhari and the remainder of his men left the *khan*, after, it is believed, a heated discussion regarding the reported robbery, for which the Zoba' were considered responsible; but soon returned, when Dhari asked the sentry to grant him admission in order to speak to the Political Officer. Orders were given to admit him, upon which two of his followers, one of whom was his son Sulaiman, fired at and severely wounded Colonel Leachman. As he fell to the ground Dhari came into the *khan*, and Leachman asked him why he had shot him, as he had never done him an injury. Thereupon Dhari drew his sword and killed him.'

Leachman's death was a heavy blow to me personally, for I had known him since 1904 and we had been closely associated since April 1915. He was, as I have said elsewhere, an outstanding personality throughout the Arabic-speaking portions of 'Iraq. His personal courage, his mobility, and his intimate knowledge of the people with whom he dealt, had made his name a household word amongst Arabs, and children named after him were to be found in every tribe on the Tigris. His death was the signal for a series of outbreaks on the Euphrates between Falluja and Hit, and probably hastened the outbreak at Shahraban a few days later. His murder was avenged by punitive columns during September, as detailed in General Haldane's work, but it was nearly eight years before Shaikh Dhari himself was arrested by an Arab motor-driver, who recognized him and knew that

there was still a price on his head. He died in prison of heart-failure in January 1928, less than two days after a life-sentence had been passed on him by the High Court. It is an interesting commentary on the psychology of the inhabitants of Baghdad that his burial was made the occasion of a demonstration, some eight thousand persons being present.¹

Colonel Leachman's body was taken to Falluja for burial, but now rests in the Military Cemetery at Baghdad.

Troubles now came upon us thick and fast. An attempt to arrest the leaders in Baghdad of the movement—which had now got out of their control—miscarried. On 10th August, a defence vessel, the *Greenfly*, was stranded on the Lower Euphrates five miles above Khizr, and all attempts to tow her off were unavailing. Had the ship been abandoned and the crew removed, much loss of life would have been saved, but other counsels prevailed. When it was too late every effort was made to relieve the crew, who were finally forced by starvation to surrender on 3rd October and were murdered by tribesmen. General Haldane has reprinted in his book (p. 327) a letter dated 30th September from the Captain of the *Greenfly*, Lieutenant A. C. Hedger of the I.W.T., every line of which breathes rare courage.

'Cooped up', writes Sir A. Haldane, 'in the unbearable heat of summer, with nothing to drink but the hot muddy water of the river, slowly to starve and not know that every effort was being made to relieve them, such was the fate of those on board.' Yet the Commander, only three days before the end, wrote:

'My G.O.C.'s (Brigadier-General Hughes, Inland Water Transport) esteem is highly appreciated by all on board, and in return we wish to thank him for his appreciation of our duties and to confirm the fact that what we have endured in the past can be endured in the future until the troops arrive. It's very pleasing to know that help is on the way. We can still hold on (and more so if the villagers of El Bab are our friends) provided we get food and no heavy casualties; and I would again like to say that we are all willing, and have both spirit and heart (although perhaps not strength at present) to stick out as long as possible—and that is to the very last. We all thank the garrison for its kind feeling, and hope we shall see you all soon.'

If the original of this letter still exists, I hope it may some day find an honoured place in the archives or exhibits of the Corps of Royal Engineers. It is worthy of Scott of Antarctic fame—and is the best proof, if such be needed, that the spirit that sustained men during the war continued to animate those whose duty required them to contend with bloodthirsty savages in the foetid marshes of Iraq.

The Juwaibir tribe, responsible for the murder of the crew of the *Greenfly*, also murdered in cold blood two officers of the Royal Air

¹ *The Times*, 1st February 1928.

Force who were shot down on 22nd September whilst trying to convey rations by air to the doomed vessel.

Towards the end of August the position at Samawa became a source of grave anxiety; a river convoy carrying provisions thither from Nasiriya was attacked, and one steamer, the *S. 9*, which ran aground, was captured and burnt, the crew being massacred. A barge loaded with ammunition also ran aground near Samawa and was abandoned. The rest of the convoy reached their goal in safety. On 3rd September an armoured train close to Samawa, but out of touch with the garrison, was attacked by Arabs, and captured, almost every man in it being killed, most of them being sowars of 10th Hodson's Horse. General Haldane has given in his book (p. 208 et seq.) a vivid account of the action, which was marked by desperate courage in face of overwhelming odds. The Commander of the detachment, Captain O. Russel, M.C., who with Captain G. S. Henderson, D.S.O., M.C., had some weeks earlier discussed with me the possibility of joining the Civil Administration, fought to the last with heroic determination; few men during the war can have sold their lives more dearly than they did, in the course of a fight lasting for two or three hours. With them was Captain Pigeon of the Indian Medical Service, who, as the fight was drawing to a close, threw ten-rupee notes from the train, and as the Arabs rushed to pick them up, hurled bombs among them, killing and maiming several scores. The gallantry displayed by these men and by the sowars with them will be remembered on the Euphrates long after the origins of the rising have been lost in merciful oblivion.

Less military interest attaches to the belated rising north-east of Baghdad. It was endowed with a fictitious importance and attained considerable extent after the unfortunate affair of 12th August near Baquba, but never had the intensity of the movement on the Euphrates. The solidifying element of Sharifian officers supported by the British subsidy to the Government of Syria was lacking, and the rising in this quarter was therefore half-hearted and sporadic. There was little concerted action between the tribes, and though the murderous raids which occurred were such as are to be looked for in these regions when the civil government is temporarily in abeyance, opposition collapsed at once before a respectable show of force. In September, Baquba, Shahraban, and Deltawa were reoccupied without difficulty. At the last-named place Captain Lloyd, the Political Officer, had been detained in a kind of honourable captivity by the local shaikhs, for which, to quote General Haldane (p. 168) 'on the arrival of the troops due punishment was inflicted'. This phrase hardly does justice to the disproportion between the impotent leniency shown at Shah-

raban, where the British officials had been massacred, and the severity (to use no harsher term) with which Captain Lloyd's preservers were treated by the punitive column. The complete destruction of Deltawa was fortunately averted by the strong remonstrances of an Agricultural Officer who accompanied the troops in a political capacity.

In his account of the operations north-east of Baghdad General Haldane has omitted the diverting story of the Medical Officer who, owing to his own gallant conduct, having been taken prisoner by insurgents at Khanaqin, was rescued by the troops and immediately put under arrest. After a long delay he was charged with spreading alarm and despondency by writing under duress to a non-existent addressee a letter which never reached its destination and contained nothing of a harmful character. He was brought before a Court of Inquiry and acquitted, in the convenient absence on duty elsewhere of all important military witnesses.

It remains to record the progress of events at Kufa, which had been invested since 20th July. Thanks to the foresight of the Political Officer, Major Norbury, a good provision of food had been obtained locally, and General Haldane was thus able to deal with the military situation in that region at his leisure.¹ But for the successive reverses which our military forces had suffered, first south of Hilla and later at Rumaitha and Samawa, the tribes in the Shamiya division would not have risen. They had no grievances; the Civil Administration as a whole; and its individual representatives, notably Major Norbury and Captain Mann, were respected and even popular; the predecessors of these officers, Balfour and Wingate, had used their authority wisely and well, and the punishment inflicted on Najaf for the murder of Captain Marshall was fresh in the minds of all. The sole preoccupation of the Political Officers was to prevent an outbreak of active disorder; they very nearly succeeded. Major Norbury had considerable influence in Najaf, where news of the arrest at Karbala on 22nd June of Mirza Muhammad Riza, son of the chief *mujtahid* of Karbala, was received with unexpected calm. On 1st July Major Norbury arranged to meet the chief leaders of the Fatla tribe at the head-quarters of its nominal head, the enormously stout and genial Muqbil al Fara'un. It was inconclusive, and was marked by a pre-arranged demonstration of hostility on the part of certain individuals. A further conference took place on 5th July between Captain Mann and Shaikh Marzuq of the 'Awabid tribe, whose lands are adjacent to Umm-al-Ba'rur. This conference, too, was without result. It was notable for a declaration of Saiyid 'Alwan, who voiced a widespread feeling when he said: 'You have offered us independence: we never asked for it, nor dreamt of

¹ Haldane, pp. 141, 168, 176 et seq.

such a thing till you put the idea into our heads. For hundreds of years we have lived in a state as far removed from independence as it is possible to conceive: now we have asked for it, you imprison us.'¹

In his mind, as in that of others, the offer or promise of independence involved no collateral duties. It connoted tribal independence, and the maintenance in the future by the chiefs of the almost absolute power wielded by them over the lives and properties of the tribesmen who, *adscripti glebae*, like the serfs of the Roman Empire, could seldom transfer their allegiance without losing all that they held dearest in life, their tenure in land, their family connexions, and their tribal status, which meant to them all that and more than nationality means to the average European.

The problem was now to keep the Bani Hasan from allying themselves with the disaffected Fatla, and to secure the neutrality of the Khaza'il and their followers the Shibl. The second aim seemed to have been attained by a conference held at Umm-al-Ba'rur on 6th July, between Major Norbury (accompanied by Captain Mann) and three Khaza'il sheikhs, when the latter undertook to support the British in return for a promise that they should eventually be put in possession of the lands which had been wrongfully transferred from them to the Fatla by the Turks.

But the Bani Hasan could not be won over. At the risk of his life Mann, latterly accompanied by Marzuq with an armed Arab escort, toured the division visiting them. Almost nightly he and the other British Political Officers were warned by their servants not to expose themselves, and to sleep indoors and not (as usual in the hot weather) on their roofs; and there is reason to believe that he escaped assassination on one of his journeys only because he returned by a different route. One of the most friendly and most influential of the Bani Hasan sheikhs, Lafta Shamkhi, was too ill to see him: the Fatla leaders bribed another, 'Alwan al Hajji Sa'dun, with £1,000, and were offering large sums, behind the Khaza'il, to the Shibl, a tribe which, though not connected with the Khaza'il by descent, usually followed them in war. The British Administration met these offers by an advance of pay amounting to £2,000 to be given through the Khaza'il to the Shibl on their impending mobilization, so that they would not be so open to influence from outside. But the disaffected sheikhs had obtained a great asset in the support of a very rich man of great influence, Saiyid Nur. Meanwhile, the Fatla began on 13th July to surround Kufa.²

¹ Cf. my telegram of 30th November 1918 (p. 107): 'To the inhabitants of this country the ideas on which the Anglo-French Declaration is based are new and unfamiliar, to the Shaikhs almost anarchic. They have yet to hear of the obligations of liberty and to realize the duties of free-men.'

² See Mann, p. 292.

On 20th July the siege began. Two days later Mann was shot dead by Major Norbury's side whilst engaged in the defence of Kufa. It was not until 20th October, after the siege was raised, that the news reached Baghdad. His death meant a very real loss to the Administration: he had shown an aptitude for work of the type on which he was engaged which amounted to genius; he was endowed with exceptional linguistic ability, and with rare moral and physical courage. He had, I gathered, grown up in an atmosphere of somewhat doctrinaire Radicalism; the change of outlook consequent upon his first contact with the practical business of administration and the tangled skein of post-war politics is shown in several most interesting letters addressed to his friend Professor Gilbert Murray and to *The Nation*, which bear testimony to his rapidly maturing judgement and his insight into the nature of the men with whom he came in contact.

On 17th October, after a siege which had lasted for almost three months, Kufa was relieved by a column from Hilla. Of the garrison, which had subsisted on rice and horseflesh for the last three weeks, twenty-five were killed and twenty-seven wounded. They were frequently under shell-fire, for the Arabs had captured on the 24th July an 18-pounder gun, with which they destroyed the *Firefly*, lying anchored close to the houses held by the garrison; attempts were made by the Arabs to set fire to the buildings and later on to explode a mine. The failure of these efforts discouraged them, and the siege resolved itself into an attempt to starve out the garrison. Thanks entirely to Major Norbury's foresight in arranging for ample supplies from local sources, this policy too was doomed to failure, but the principal credit for the successful issue of the siege belongs to the detachment of 115 Arab Police and Levies, including a number of Persians, who formed about a quarter of the effective strength of the garrison. They were subjected before and during the siege to the severest moral pressure to abandon their allegiance to their British officers, and to join their co-religionists in purging the sacred places of Islam and the holy soil of Iraq of the presence of unbelievers. Their loyalty was equal to the test; scarcely a man amongst them obeyed the exhortations of the religious leaders; the rude invectives of their compatriots and friends in the coffee-shops, and the poignant appeals of their women-folk, did not deflect them from the honourable path which they had elected to tread. The leading *mujtahids* of Najaf, headed by the venerable Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi, retained a terrified silence, but the lower orders of the priesthood vied with the Nationalist leaders in appealing to the masses, on grounds alike of religion and race, to extirpate the last traces of the military occupation. The arguments used were almost identical, both in substance and in the manner of

presentation, with those advanced in favour of the deliverance of the Holy Land by the prelates of the Church of Christ in the eleventh century;¹ they were reinforced by every artifice that ingenuity could suggest. The Islamic rules of burial were refused to those who had died in the service of the Civil Administration; the wives of those who remained loyal to us were in some cases compelled to return to their fathers' tents, in other cases publicly² violated, and their children cruelly beaten in the streets.

The Levies and Police, with negligible exceptions, remained true to their British officers, those 'tyros' of whom Sir Aylmer Haldane sometimes speaks so scornfully; scarcely less creditable was the conduct of the Indian troops—Muslims all—with whom they were associated, for the garrison included only a handful of British soldiers. The British units in Mesopotamia were throughout 1919 and 1920 composed for the most part of men who, by reason of their youth and inexperience, were of little military value. It was the Indian Army that endured the hardest and worst brunt of the fighting in Mesopotamia.

At Najaf, a few miles from Kufa, were collected about 170 prisoners of war, of whom about 80 belonged to the Manchester Regiment. The first news of them after their capture on 24th July came from a first cousin of His Highness the Agha Khan,³ Agha Hamid Khan, who had been the representative at Najaf of the Civil Administration since December 1917 and had in this capacity rendered the most valuable and loyal services. In spite of the obloquy of his friends and the threats of his enemies he had remained at his post at Najaf. He reported that the prisoners had been harshly treated by the tribes, having been forced to march to Kufa and thence to Abu Sukhair bare-foot and almost naked. Some were interned at Najaf, but afterwards removed owing to the fanatical demeanour of the inhabitants. Eventually, however, all were collected at Najaf, where Agha Hamid Khan was tireless in his efforts for their welfare, promising the notables of the town that all money spent by them on the prisoners would not only be refunded, but would be counted for them for righteousness on the day of reckoning. That in the end their treatment had been good was evident from their healthy and well-nourished appearance when released, only one having died in captivity.

¹ See Gibbon, vii. 318.

² See MacMunn.

³ His Highness the Agha Khan is quoted by Sir Aylmer Haldane (who commends his wisdom) as saying that he did not like the idea of native levies, and favoured the judicious bestowal of *bakhshish*, accompanied by the formation in 'Iraq of a number of small republics, whose denizens would be allowed to work out their own salvation! I deduce from these reported *obiter dicta* that His Highness had not the advantage of discussing such matters with his cousin Agha Hamid Khan.

This is, perhaps, the place to deny the correctness of Sir Aylmer Haldane's statement, in reference to the Arabs of 'Iraq, that 'their cruel methods of dealing with their prisoners are notorious, and recall the most horrible of those described in Fox's *Book of Martyrs*.'

Of the cruelty of the Turks to their prisoners I have already spoken in *Loyalties*. Under Turkish guidance both Arabs and Kurds were on occasions guilty of cruelty; I have quoted numerous instances of the killing of wounded and prisoners by Arabs, due partly to a lust for blood and partly to religious feeling,¹ but I can recollect no case in the voluminous records of the Intelligence Branch or of the Political Service of deliberate or calculated torture of prisoners by Arabs.

Great as were the difficulties with which we were confronted at Najaf, they were equalled, if not exceeded, by those with which we had to contend at Karbala, where ten leaders of the insurrection had been arrested on 22nd June by the local police with the assistance of the Khan Bahadur Mirza Muhammad, C.I.E., who was the representative of the Civil Administration in this hotbed of religious fanaticism. Amongst those arrested was the son of the chief *mujtahid*, Mirza Muhammad Taqi, from whom I had on more than one occasion endeavoured unsuccessfully to procure a disavowal of the numerous documents, circulating amongst the tribes, to which his signature had been forged. The old man—to quote Gibbon's description of Pope Leo IX—was 'a simple saint, of a temper most apt to deceive himself and the world, whose venerable character would consecrate with the name of piety measures least compatible with the practice of religion'; and he was not fortunate in his offspring. Obsessed with the claims to secular authority which he believed to be due to his theocratic pre-eminence, he had shown scant courtesy to the ruler of Persia, who had made the pilgrimage to Karbala some months earlier. He had, indeed, refused to put his name to a *fatwa* enjoining upon his Muslim followers, who included practically all the tribesmen of the Middle and Lower Tigris and Euphrates, the religious duty of *jihad*. He had even refused formally to declare a state of *dafa'*, in which it becomes the duty of a Muslim to take measures of defence against the spiritual or civil enemies of Islam, should it be menaced by the malice or power of infidels. Yet when his signature to such a document was forged, he lacked the courage, or perhaps the conviction, to disclaim responsibility. He did not long survive the reverses of fortune which befell his misguided followers a few months later, but the sectarian feelings of which he and his friends were chosen exponents were still,

¹ The word *Kafir*, or unbeliever, has come to have in Arabic almost the same derived meaning as *meccreant* or *miscreant*, which originally meant a heretic or unbeliever, and now means one who is base or villainous.

a decade later, a source of occasional embarrassment to the national Government of 'Iraq.

Khan Bahadur Mirza Muhammad was in every respect a remarkable man. A Persian subject, born in Bushire of a family which for two generations had been in the service of the British Residency and Consulate General, he had, as Oriental Secretary to Sir Percy Cox, been engaged before 1914 in many important negotiations in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 'Oman. He was a fluent Arabic scholar, and spoke and wrote excellent English; the list of the English classical and other works translated by him into Persian for the benefit of his compatriots is a long one. He had an unusually good knowledge of the Indian and Turkish Codes, and of the shara' or customary religious law, and had for two years acted as a Judge under the aegis of the Judicial Department. He, too, had to endure the reproaches of his compatriots and the menaces of the Nationalists, who were stronger in Karbala than at Najaf: their methods, moreover, were more subtle; the printing-press was constantly at work for them producing ingeniously devised broad-sheets. One of these, of Egyptian origin, took as its text a reference by Mr. Lloyd George to Lord Allenby's campaign in Palestine as 'the last and greatest of the crusades'. It gave a brief and impassioned account of the ruthless atrocities and barbaric fanaticism of the early crusaders, and called upon all true Muslims to meet with the sword the insidious attempts of the Christian powers alike in Palestine, Syria, and 'Iraq to undermine their religion and debase their customs by agencies such as state schools, educational facilities for girls, public hospitals, sanitary laws, and the like impieties. It was illustrated by a clumsy reproduction of a *Punch* cartoon of 19th December 1917 entitled 'The Last Crusade'. Such appeals had some effect in Karbala; elsewhere they were disregarded, for they overshot the mark. The Bolsheviks, too, seemed for a time to find a spiritual home in Karbala, and included in their programme not only the liberation of oppressed nationalities but the abolition of landlords and of privileged orders of society. This frank appeal to tribal cupidity was too much for the Nationalist leaders, who soon sought to dissociate themselves from such allies, though they brought not inconsiderable gifts in the form of money. Emissaries of other nations, including some of the Allied and Associated Powers, were also at work in Karbala, but made no progress, as they lacked the skill and knowledge to direct the funds at their disposal into fruitful channels.

Through these troubled waters Mirza Muhammad steered a straight course; though he was not unacquainted with those guiles and wiles which Eastern diplomatists deem admirable, he maintained, as did Agha Hamid Khan, a reputation for honourable dealing, alike with

friends and foes, that will not be forgotten so long as there are living men who can call to mind those turbulent days. His departure from Karbala was unobtrusive; it was followed on 14th August by the cutting of the canal which supplied the town with fresh water. This step had no appreciable effect upon the progress of events: it involved little hardship on the inhabitants, though it was hotly contested by the tribal forces, who fought throughout with remarkable courage. General Haldane, who sometimes leaps and sometimes stumbles in the gulf between his record of military events and his interpretation of their effect upon the civil population, holds that the cutting of the canal had important results, but he offers no evidence in support of a claim which is contrary to all the evidence obtainable at the time.

The insolence of the priesthood has in recent years been curbed with firm and skilful hands by Muslim monarchs, alike in Turkey, Persia, and in Iraq. These countries will doubtless in course of time once more fall a prey to intestinal disorders, but it is unlikely that the people will respond again to the dictates of their religious leaders. Yet the confusion and religious excitement of those months was such that had an outstanding personality appeared, like Hamdan the Carmathian at Kufa in the tenth century, to direct and organize the well-armed forces of disorder and to arouse their latent fanaticism, Iraq might have been overwhelmed for a time by bands of zealots not less formidable than the Wahhabis of Central Arabia.

By the middle of October the principal object of the operations of the forces under Sir Aylmer Haldane had been achieved. Notwithstanding serious set-backs, due in part to avoidable causes, but mainly to the unfortunate decision to remove troops to summer quarters in Persia, General Haldane had defeated the insurgents at every point, and had restored communications, by means of an elaborate and carefully-planned system of blockhouses, with every important centre. It is greatly to his credit that he now decided, in the short time still left to him, to do whatever lay in his power to prevent the possibility of a recurrence of such disorders. 'The tribes', he writes, 'had chosen to risk the arbitrament of arms; they had been overcome and must be made to pass beneath the Caudine Forks.' The historical reference is obscure, but his meaning is plain. He determined to punish, and as far as possible to disarm, those who had fought against the Army of Occupation, as the best means of ensuring a fair chance of success to the Arab Government which was about to come into existence. Until he had done so, he was not prepared to consider the grant of amnesties, and the resumption of friendly relations that would follow.

This decision made it possible for Sir Percy Cox, who reached Baghdad on 11th October, almost simultaneously with the collapse of

the rebellion, to take immediate steps for the inauguration of the new régime in counsel with the moderate elements without exposing himself or H.M.'s Government of the charge of pandering to the extreme exponents of nationalism or of shaking hands with men of blood. The fury of the distemper which had seized upon the Arab population was spent, and his efforts were, as the whole world knows, crowned with a degree of success as remarkable as it was unexpected. I have sometimes had occasion to criticize General Haldane and, more often, to traverse controversial statements made by him in his account of his stewardship: but I am glad to bear testimony to the sound instinct and pertinacity he displayed in pursuing measures of punishment as well as of pacification after the fires of the rebellion had burnt themselves out. In so doing he contributed far more than is generally realized to the success of the measures taken during 1921 to found the Arab State.

Tragedy, according to Aristotle,¹ purges the emotions through pity combined with fear. It excites emotion, only to allay it, and in the calm which follows the storm, the cure of emotional disorder is found. Milton² regards it as a form of homoeopathic treatment, a *Katharsis*, curing emotion by means of an emotion like in kind, but not identical.

The disturbances of 1920 in Iraq were in this sense truly tragic. 'In revolutions', says Macaulay, 'men live fast: the experience of years is crowded into hours: old habits of thought and action are violently broken.'³

Neither in its nature, judged by this criterion, nor in its results, was the rising of 1920 a revolution: it was a tragedy.

The true sorrow of humanity consists in this, not that the mind fails, but that the course and demands and actions of life so rarely correspond with the dignity and intensity of human desires.

(WORDSWORTH.)

¹ *Poet.* vi. 2.

² Preface to *Samson Agonistes*. See Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*. 1895.

³ Macaulay, *Hist. of England*, vol. ii, p. 504.

CHAPTER XIII

POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, JUNE—OCTOBER, 1920

Asiatic Turkey contains populations of many races and creeds, possessing no capacity for self-government and no aspirations for independence, but owing their tranquillity and whatever prospect of political well-being they possess entirely to the rule of the Sultan. But the Government of the Ottoman dynasty is that of an ancient, but still alien conqueror, resting more upon actual power than upon the sympathies of common nationality.

The Marquess of Salisbury to Mr. Layard (British Ambassador at Constantinople), 30th May, 1878, quoted by Sir J. Headlam Morley. *Studies in Diplomatic History, 1930, & State Papers, Vol. LXIX, p. 1347.*

J'afar Pasha. Foreign Office refuse to permit him to visit 'Iraq. Events in Syria. Proposal to offer Emir Faisal throne of 'Iraq. French action in Syria. Question of Sovereignty. What is a rebel? Staff difficulties. Sir Stanley Reed. Causes of rising. Criticism at home. Objections to Mandatory system. Valedictory Messages. Criticism at home. Sir Percy Cox returns.

I HAD been informed on 7th July (vide Chapter XI) that H.M.'s Government had in principle approved my recommendations as furnishing a generally suitable basis on which to construct provisionally the institutions postulated by the Mandate. The Mandate had been conferred on and accepted by Great Britain, and Sir Percy Cox had been entrusted with the heavy task of inaugurating the new régime. In these circumstances I was entitled to expect that such further steps as could be taken locally to further these aims would be approved without delay. I was soon to learn that this was not the case.

On 1st July Lord Allenby telegraphed to me that the Governor of Aleppo, J'afar Pasha al 'Askari, in whom he had complete confidence, had offered to resign his position and to proceed to Baghdad to remove misunderstandings regarding the attitude of Faisal's Government towards the Mesopotamian Administration—misunderstandings which had been fostered rather than allayed by certain British officers in Syria. Lord Allenby strongly recommended that he should be asked to go to Baghdad as soon as possible.

J'afar Pasha was at that time scarcely known to me personally, but his reputation was of the best. After distinguished service in the German and Turkish armies, he had been chosen by Enver to organize the levies of the Senussi. He crossed the Mediterranean by submarine, welded the wild tribesmen into the semblance of a fighting force, and showed tactical ability against the British in two battles. Then he was captured and lodged in the Citadel at Cairo. He escaped one night, slipping down a blanket-rope towards the moat; but the blankets failed under

the strain; he fell heavily and was retaken helpless. In hospital he gave his parole, and was given his liberty after paying for the lost blankets. One day he read in an Arabic newspaper of the Sharif's revolt; and of the execution by the Turks of prominent Arab Nationalists—his friends—and he realized that he had been on the wrong side.¹

His conversion was as sudden as that of St. Paul, and as complete. He served later with Faisal in Transjordan, and was decorated by Lord Allenby with a deserved C.M.G., which hangs on his breast along with the Iron Cross which he had won two years before. This is not the place to refer in detail to his subsequent career. He was for some time Prime Minister of 'Iraq, he has twice been Minister of Defence, and gave an example of energy and enterprise to his compatriots by passing his Law Final in January 1930. He was duly called to the Bar and left England for 'Iraq, two months later, to serve once more as Minister of Defence. He is now (April 1931) 'Iraqi Minister in London.

I telegraphed at once saying that I should be very glad indeed to see him, and suggesting that he should come either via Tel 'Afar and Mosul, or by sea. I added that I was only waiting for authority to make the announcement suggested in my telegram of 20th June in order to telegraph its purport through the Egyptian authorities to Damascus and Aleppo, and to invite selected Baghdadi officers to come to Baghdad to assist in framing an electoral law, as a preliminary to further developments.

My suggestion was negatived by the Foreign Office, and I was so informed by Clear Line telegram on 8th July. No reasons were given either at the time or subsequently, but on 20th September *The Sunday Times* published correspondence between Lord Curzon and Mr. Ormsby-Gore (later Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) in which the former declared that the whole of his actions and opinions had been directed to the speedy institution of an Arab form of Government in Mesopotamia. 'While defending to the best of his ability the band of Anglo-Indian officials in Mesopotamia he wished it to be clearly understood that neither His Majesty's Government nor he in any way sympathized with the Indianization or Anglicization of Mesopotamia, nor with the introduction of bureaucratic administration into the country.' I can scarcely be blamed for having at the time regarded his attitude as that of Satan rebuking sin. The reference to Anglo-Indian officials was, as I reminded him at the time, little justified by the composition of the Administration, and the word bureaucracy was clearly designed to import prejudice: all governments are bureaucratic, none more so than Eastern governments, but even in 1920 the bureaucracy was Arab rather than English, and, whatever its defects, was of necessity based upon the model of its Turkish predecessor.

¹ See Lawrence, T. E., *Revolt in the Desert*.

A fortnight later events in Syria reached a climax. It had been decided by the Conference at San Remo on 24th April that both Syria and 'Iraq should become independent States, subject to a Mandate only until they were able to stand alone. The Conference further decided that the Mandates for 'Iraq and Palestine should be assigned to Great Britain, and for Syria to France. This decision gave rise to many protests throughout Syria, and to the strongest indications of hostility to France as Mandatory. In deference to the feelings of his people, the Amir Faisal announced that as King of Syria¹ he could not acquiesce in any part of Syrian territory being placed under foreign domination. On 14th July, General Gouraud, who commanded an army of some 90,000 men in Syria, dispatched an ultimatum to the Amir, requiring among other things the unconditional recognition of the French Mandate.

The Amir Faisal accepted the ultimatum, but popular feeling was too strong for him. An attack on 20th July by Syrian horsemen on a French outpost was the signal for a general French offensive, resulting in the rout of the Syrian Army with great loss in men and material, and the occupation on 25th July of Damascus, followed immediately by the deposition of Amir Faisal. 'So fell', writes Temperley, the accomplished historian of the Peace Conference, 'the Amir Faisal's independent Syrian State—a State created and fostered by Great Britain in partial fulfilment of her pledge to the Arabs. It fell because its existence was in direct conflict with French ambitions, in circumstances which prevented British influence being made effective for its preservation.'² Henceforward France and Great Britain were destined to pursue diametrically opposite policies in their capacity as Mandatory powers of Syria and 'Iraq respectively.

Immediately the news of Amir Faisal's deposition reached Baghdad, I telegraphed suggesting that H.M.'s Government should offer him the headship of the Mesopotamian State. His personal courage, high birth, and diplomatic skill were well known and had given him a unique position in Arab counsels. Everything that I had heard indicated that he was far more likely than any of his brothers to make an effective head of the 'Iraq State. I realized that the proposal was likely to meet with opposition from the French Government—as indeed it did—but I felt that the risk was worth taking and the experiment worth making. The telegram read as follows:

'Your telegram of the 30th July states that Emir Faisal has left by order of the

¹ A congress of Syrian notables sitting at Damascus on 10th March had offered the crown of Syria and Palestine to the Amir Faisal and that of 'Iraq to Amir 'Abdulla. Their action was repudiated by the Governments of Great Britain and France.

² For a full discussion of the position in Syria in 1920 see Temperley, *History of the Peace Conference*, vol. vi.

French for Dera'a, in the British sphere. As seen from Baghdad this may mean one of two things : he may be on his way back to the Hijaz, or he may be intending to remain in that part of Syria under British influence. If he remains at Dera'a and still claims to be King of Syria he will gather round him a considerable number of his former officials and will be a constant source of trouble to the French, but if he withdraws his claims to Syria and only claims paramountcy in Palestine his presence will make things very hard for French and will put us in a very difficult position. . . .

'Will His Majesty's Government consider possibility of offering him Amirate of Mesopotamia? Objections entertained on this side to creation of Amirate have hitherto been primarily that no suitable person could be found. We have always regarded Faisal as booked for Syria. Nothing that I have heard during the last few months has led me to modify my views of unsuitability of 'Abdulla and our experience of last few weeks in Baghdad makes it fairly clear that no local candidate will be successful in obtaining sufficient support here to enable him to make good. Faisal alone of all Arabian potentates has any idea of practical difficulties of running a civilized government on Arab lines. He can scarcely fail to realize that foreign assistance is vital to the continued existence of an Arab State. He realizes danger of relying on an Arab army. If we were to offer him the Amirate of Mesopotamia not only might we re-establish our position in the eyes of the Arab world, but we also might go far to wipe out accusation which would otherwise be made against us of bad faith both with Faisal and with people of this country, and if His Majesty's Government eventually decides drastically to restrict its commitments in this country there would be better prospects of it being done with Faisal here than by any other possible arrangement.'

The proposal was well received by Mr. Montagu, who a few days earlier had welcomed me as 'a late convert to the idea of an Arab State'. The phrase was not wholly justified, for, though I had made no secret of my doubts as to the success of indigenous governments adumbrated in the Anglo-French Declaration of 8th November, 1918, I had from the very first expressed the belief that Amir Faisal was more likely than any other candidate to preside successfully over the destinies of 'Iraq.

An announcement on the subject would have rallied to our cause and my side all Nationalist elements in 'Iraq, but H.M.'s Government maintained a massive silence and I was not authorized even to discuss the proposal with leading Arabs. I gathered some months later that it was Foreign Office opinion that once again stood in the way. Lord Curzon had favoured Amir 'Abdulla's candidature for 'Iraq; others had inclined towards the selection of an eminent notable of Baghdad or Basra as provisional President of the new State. The adoption of Amir Faisal was too much for Lord Curzon to swallow at one gulp. He had of course to consider the probable effect that the offer would have on French opinion, and to sound the French Government: he did so a month later with the result anticipated. The Quai d'Orsay made it

clear that 'the employment in Mesopotamia of Amir Faisal immediately after his expulsion from Syria would be regarded by French opinion as an unfriendly act'. (The emphasis in this sentence must be placed on the word *immediately*.) News of this decision reached me on 13th September; five days later I telegraphed: 'Insurgents have made their maximum effort, and further additions to their strength are improbable. This is I think also true of the situation in Mesopotamia as a whole, and . . . there is good reason to think that by the middle or end of October affairs will be ripe for a settlement.'

I will make no attempt to deal with the numerous difficult problems which arose in the course of these discussions, but two points, one serious and one trivial, deserve mention. In the first category comes the question of sovereignty. I was asked to state in whom sovereignty would vest during the transition period, i.e., after the commencement of constitutional Government on the lines I had suggested, and before the selection of a ruler. My reply was as follows :

'In accordance with terms of Article 22 of Covenant, Mesopotamia will be under "tutelage", which connotes some restrictions of sovereignty, and involves the ultimate exercise of authority by the Mandatory Power. It is of the utmost importance that this fact should be specifically recognized and incorporated in the Mandate in some form.

'The word "sovereignty" should I submit find no place in our vocabulary in this connection. The Mandatory system introduced by the League of Nations has introduced conceptions of Government which transcend those associated with the word "sovereignty".

'The ultimate source of authority in respect of a Mandatory area is now the League of Nations, which in the case of Mesopotamia has decided to delegate its executive functions to Great Britain.'

This view, which still appears to me to be good in law and in logic, was not acceptable to the India Office, which was anxious that sovereignty should be vested from the outset in the head of the new State, whether King, Amir, President, or Council of State had still to be decided. I could sympathize with this desire, but it seemed to me to be inconsistent with the intention of the Covenant. The French have hitherto avoided the creation of any sovereignty, even of strictly limited scope, in Syria. Great Britain has in 'Iraq chosen what we may hope is the better way and, after modifying the Mandate by treaty provisions, with the consent of the League, has created a fully sovereign State. Let us hope that the kings of our choosing are more successful than the constitutions of our devising.

The other question arose out of protests in Parliament and in the columns of *The Times* against the use in War Office and other communi-

*qué*s regarding affairs in 'Iraq of words such as 'rebels' or 'sedition'. It was officially suggested to me that I should substitute 'anarchists' or some similar expression not conveying the suggestion that allegiance is due from Arabs to Great Britain. I replied (24th August) in the following terms:

'Word rebel was chosen after discussion with General Headquarters, who originally used word enemy. I do not myself recollect using word sedition.

'Oxford English dictionary does not bear out view that terms rebel or sedition convey implication of allegiance, though term sedition carries that implication in English Law.

'Chapter XIV Manual of Military Law, para. 444, specifically states that illegitimate hostilities in arms by inhabitants of invaded, i.e. occupied territory is usually called rebellion.

'I will however use word insurgent in future in place of rebel.

'On the general question I submit that we must either take the view that our assumption of the Mandate is in accordance with wishes of majority or alternatively uphold right of Supreme Council to confer Mandate despite wishes of people. In either case existing Government in Mesopotamia is lawful authority and obedience is due to it.'

During these critical months our difficulties were increased by the insistence of the various governments on the return to duty of nearly all the most experienced senior officials of the Civil Administration. In March 1917 the Secretary of State for India had intimated that British officers of Indian services serving in Mesopotamia would be permitted to volunteer for service in Mesopotamia. This was not allowed in practice. The Government of India announced, for example, that R. Marrs, an officer of exceptional influence and capacity (later Principal of University College, Colombo) would not be allowed to remain in 'Iraq after 1st June 'by which time the future of Mesopotamia will be settled'. Failure to return would involve his resignation. The Punjab Government insisted on the return of Philby and Thomson. Practically every officer of the Indian Medical Service was withdrawn, and with two exceptions every member of the Imperial or Provincial Public Works Department was told that unless he returned to India at once, further employment could not be guaranteed.


The Sudan Government clamoured for the return of Balfour and Nalder; the Egyptian Government insisted on the surrender of Bowman, the Director of Education, a man of liberal views, much liked, and of outstanding ability, with whom I frequently took counsel. Similar pressure was brought to bear on me in regard to Police, Customs, and other Departmental experts, such as Graham, the Director of Agriculture. Leading Arabs of all classes made journeys to Baghdad from places so far distant as Basra to reinforce the protests



SHAIKH 'ALI
*Sulaiman of
the Dulaim*

SALIM AL M'ARAWI
*Government Agent
at Kibbaisa*

Died of wounds, August 1920



they had made by telegraph. *Mazbatas*, or round-robins, came almost every week from various centres, complaining that British officials of proved worth and practical experience were being withdrawn at a time when their services were most needed. After placing the facts before Secretary of State I concluded my telegram with the following words:

'The resulting state of affairs in this country is in the highest degree dangerous. It is destructive of public confidence and it is placing a burden upon the remaining Officers of this Administration which is heavier than they can bear.

'I would emphasise that I do not require any considerable additional staff nor do I consider it necessary to import a fresh batch of senior Officers from other countries. All I ask is that the Imperial Government which has assumed temporary responsibility in Mesopotamia will use their influence with Local Governments to ensure that the operation of local interests elsewhere is not allowed to culminate in a break-down here and that I am allowed to keep those officers who still remain with me until policy is settled.'

I telegraphed again on 20th June as follows :

'Local Government concerned have insisted on return of Bowman, Marrs, and Philby, all three admittedly experts in the affairs of country, and all of them I believe anxious to be employed here and there is reason to fear that the few remaining Political, Police, Irrigation, and Agricultural Officers whose services I have obtained from India will be likewise before long withdrawn or forced to return by threats of supersession or loss of prospects.

'I deduce from the fact that H.M.'s Government have never felt able to intervene officially to retain the above or other officers in 'Iraq, that they have no power at present to obtain loan of expert assistance for a Mandatory area from Provincial Governments. If this is the case I suggest that necessary powers should be obtained, for if Provincial Governments continue to withdraw their officers public opinion here will before long declare openly what instructed people have for some time been thinking, namely that Great Britain is neither able nor willing to provide the expert assistance to this country promised in Article 22 of Treaty.'

These representations had little or no practical effect. All the Governments concerned were in difficulties which differed only in degree from those under which we laboured in 'Iraq. There was serious trouble in India. Sir Stanley Reed, at that time Editor of *The Times of India*, with whom for a time I corresponded regularly, and whose views carried weight, wrote to me on 31st July:

'I wish I could send you encouraging news from India, but there is none. I have been here twenty-five years and I never knew a time when in the view of responsible authorities the political situation was more anxious, or when men of all classes were more apprehensive. We have returned to days of bitter controversy and acute racial feeling and I see no gleam of light.'

Egypt was in turmoil, and widespread disturbances were taking place. The Sudan was quiet, but all available officers were needed,

owing partly to the necessity of giving leave of absence to many men who had been on duty continuously for six years.

On 5th August, when troubles were at their height, I received a telegram from the Secretary of State (dated 2nd August and marked Clear Line!) asking for a full statement by telegram of the causes and objectives of the rising. I give below the text of the telegrams sent the same day in reply:

'My telegrams for last 18 months have recorded steady inflow of propaganda from Syria and to a less degree from Turkey supported by ample funds. So long as our military weakness was not apparent this propaganda, the objects of which were largely foreign to ideas of people at large, had little success except in Baghdad, Karbala and Najaf where leaders have always been more or less in sympathy with idea of purely Islamic State. . . .

'It was not however until our enemies in Syria demonstrated to the people of Mesopotamia that we could be dislodged by armed force that the movement became dangerous. We successively evacuated Dair-*ez-Zor*, *Albu Kamal* and *Al Qaim*, on each occasion under pressure from the Syrian Government.

'Trains were derailed between Baghdad and Mosul and our Officers were murdered at *Tel 'Afar*. Public confidence in our ability to maintain order began to wane. Extremists began to hope that they might be successful in attaining their object, viz., complete independence and freedom from all foreign interference by direct action. Karbala and subsequently Najaf became the principal centres of agitation. (It will be remembered I had to deport a number of men from Karbala in September, 1919, to prevent a rising, and Najaf was the scene of disturbances in 1918.)

'The arrest of Mirza Muhammad Riza and others at Karbala in June and of certain minor personages at Hilla stabilized the situation in the Hilla Division, but owing to our military weakness we were unable to take similar action in Shamiya Division where we only had some 300 men and 2 guns.

'This Division, which has a bad reputation, became the focus of intrigues.

'Meanwhile the announcement of the terms of peace with Turkey had, as anticipated, an unfavourable effect on public opinion and enabled the extremists to rally to their cause much useful material in the form of ex-Turkish officials, and the fairly large body of public opinion who wished for the maintenance of the Turkish Empire and resented the acquisitions of Greece. Coming as it did at the beginning of Ramadhan and synchronizing with our evacuation of *Enzeli* and *Resht*, and reports of Bolshevik successes in other parts of the world, it gave the extremists an opportunity of which they were not slow to avail themselves to represent us on the one hand as pursuing an anti-Islamic policy and on the other hand as rapidly growing weaker.


'At this point other foreign influences commenced to make themselves felt. . . . In this connection we know that £7,000 in Turkish gold reached the extremists in Karbala during May and June.

'Certain Shamiya Chiefs, whom we were as already explained unable to arrest, directed their energies to cause a rising in the *Samawa Rumaita* area, realizing no doubt that this is strategically the most vulnerable point in our com-



Photo by Maj. E. W. C. Noel, C.I.E., D.S.O.

THE ROWANDIZ GORGE



munications in Mesopotamia. This area has never been penetrated by our troops and is in fact impenetrable: for the past year it has been in an unsatisfactory state. The outbreak occurred at Rumaitha on July 3rd: had we been able to despatch troops in adequate numbers promptly to the scene it would not I think have spread and the situation in Shamiya where no rising took place for another 15 days, would have been dealt with by diplomatic means. But we were not in a position to do so and the rising slowly spread in consequence.

'The tribes have been led to believe that it is a holy war and the Chief Mujtahid of Karbala is actively preaching jihad and has sent hundreds of emissaries all over the Middle Euphrates districts in this connexion. The chiefs of tribes in Hilla and Diwaniya Divisions have mostly followed their tribesmen rather than led them. The demands of the rebel leaders so far as formulated are the complete expulsion of the British from Mesopotamia and an "Islamic Kingdom". To the Mujtahids this means the theocratic State which is their ideal. To the tribes it means no Government at all, or Government by chiefs whom they can ignore at will: to a small minority of townspeople it connotes an Amir.

'I do not think that the rebels have any agrarian grievances: taxation is light and the harvest good: were there any such grievances the area of disturbance would not be limited as now to the Shi'ah districts within reach of Najaf and Karbala. Tribes do not of course like paying taxes any more than other people, but this would not of itself have been cause of rising had we not been weak and had not external causes above referred to existed.'

A week later, on 12th August, I telegraphed in the following terms:

'My telegram of the 5th August dealt with more immediate causes and objectives of the present rising on the Middle Euphrates, the most important factor in which was propaganda from Baghdad. I did not deal with the reasons underlying the loss by the Civil Administration of that degree of popularity which it first enjoyed.

'(1) In the light of our experience of the past three months I think we must plead guilty of going too fast in certain administrative matters affecting tribes-people. The blame for this must be distributed about equally between the Administration and the Shaikhs and other tribal leaders. We have as a matter of policy backed the Shaikhs and supported their authority. They in their turn have tried to place too great a burden on their tribesmen with the laudable intention of improving cultivation and ensuring good crops by extensive work on clearing canals and making bunds, and incidentally have lined their own pockets very substantially. The Shaikhs have discovered too late that they did not possess the influence that they were supposed to have over their tribesmen and are suffering accordingly.

'(2) Another fact, not peculiar to Mesopotamia, which has tended to cause discontent is the gradual appearance of what may be called post war conditions. High prices, shortages of certain necessaries, &c. These are neutralized in the case of certain classes of the population by the wealth which is brought into the country by the Army of Occupation, but large classes feel the pinch, and we as the victors in the world war have in Mesopotamia as elsewhere to bear the odium of having brought these conditions about.

'(3) Perhaps first in order of relative importance comes perception of our military

weakness. To kick a man when he is down is the most popular pastime in the East sanctioned by centuries of precept and practice.

'(4) Adverse influence of Shi'ah Mujtahids who have been against all Governments since the days of the Caliphs.

'(5) President Wilson's 14 points and agitation created thereby and stimulated by Sharifian, Turkish and Bolshevistic agencies both voluntary and paid.

'(6) Difference of race and religion between British and Arab, used more as an excuse than as a cause in itself.

'(7) Delay in defining status of 'Iraq and in consequence maintenance of direct British Administration long after armistice. If my recollection serves me right, as recently as October, 1919 I was warned against taking any action or making any announcement such as would give the impression that we had been given or would accept the Mandate for 'Iraq.

'(8) The influence of Syria where liberal British subsidy enabled Sharifian Government to pay to its officials, particularly in the Army, emoluments far in excess of those which this or any other Administration organized on a self supporting basis could afford.

'(9) Demands for labour on flood banks. The Arab would rather risk a flood, an act of God, than do heavy work on flood banks, the work of the English. In this matter circumstances of military occupation have been partly responsible. We have throughout been, and indeed still are, subjected to considerable legitimate pressure from the military authorities to maintain bunds in such a state of efficiency as will preclude any risk of railways being cut or cantonment areas being flooded. It was on this condition that the Irrigation Department was taken over by the Civil Administration.

'(10) Collection of land revenue and other taxes.

'(11) Fear of exploitation by Western commercialism.

'(12) Use of aeroplanes against recalcitrants.

'(13) Disappointment of landed interests, who reject the idea that landlords have duties as well as rights and resent as "illegal" any attempt to withhold the full measure of their pound of flesh from cultivators who in their turn resent any attempt on the part of Government to use forces of law and order for the recovery of dues on behalf of the landlords. Complexities of Turkish law on this subject often make position of Political Officers exceedingly difficult.

'(14) It is held by many here both British and native that I made a mistake in not dealing with prominent agitators here drastically before the movement had reached its present dimensions. This however is a matter of opinion. An Administration of this sort at such juncture must necessarily have great difficulty in deciding at what point a constitutional movement becomes so dangerous as to demand or justify repression. Impracticable as are their aims they have for the most part been endorsed at one time or other in official pronouncements of His Majesty's Government and having regard to the wording of Article 22 of the League of Nations Treaty I doubt whether we should have been justified in arresting those who now declare themselves to be unwilling to accept a British Mandate so long as their attitude did not endanger public order.'

I have felt justified in quoting at length from these and other

telegrams reprinted in this volume, for two reasons. In the first place I feel it both my right and my duty to explain, after a lapse of ten years, the manner in which we in 'Iraq tried to carry out the onerous task entrusted to us by H.M.'s Government. In the second place I owe it to the members of the Civil Administration of 1920 to make public, as best I can, certain relevant facts which find no place either in Sir Aylmer Haldane's work, *The Insurrection in Mesopotamia*, or in the *Official History of the War in Mesopotamia*.

My actions, real or supposed, were at the time very sharply, even abusively, criticized both in the Press¹ and in Parliament.² No papers on the subject have been presented to Parliament, with the exception of the late Miss Gertrude Bell's *Review*. This document which, as already mentioned, was prepared by her jointly with me does not deal with events after 15th August, 1920, and being intended for immediate publication was necessarily strictly limited in its scope. My official chief, the late Mr. Edwin Montagu, as Secretary of State for India, felt himself unable to deal with Mesopotamia at any time either in the House of Commons or elsewhere; though on more than one occasion he made generous personal reference to me in Parliament. His abstention arose, I do not doubt, from motives of loyalty to the Cabinet of which he was a member, for, had he expounded his views on the subject in the House of Commons, he could hardly have avoided acute controversy with his colleague, Lord Curzon.

In one respect only, so far as I can judge, does my presentation of the political situation, as I saw it at the time, differ materially from that here set forth. I have quoted at some length from memoranda and telegrams from the date of the Armistice with Turkey onwards, on the subject of the framework and fabric of the Arab State. These quotations, to the best of my belief, correctly represent the whole: a few modifications have been made to avoid giving needless offence to individuals, or to friendly nations. They show that from the outset I did my best to induce H.M.'s Government to allow me to introduce a very large Arab element into the Civil Administration on lines consistent with the views of those who at Versailles were striving at the roaring loom of Time to refashion the fabric of the world's governments on democratic lines. These attempts were repeatedly renewed, though without success, in circumstances that became progressively more difficult.

I have not, however, referred, except incidentally, to my misgivings as to the probable outcome of these constitutional beginnings.

¹ Notably by T. E. Lawrence in *The Daily Herald* and *The Times* and by Sir George Buchanan, *The Times*.

² Amongst others by Lord Islington in the House of Lords.

These apprehensions found expression in a dispatch of 15th November 1919 in which I set forth the difficulties of the situation as it appeared to us in Baghdad. The document is too long to quote in full, but the following is a fair summary.

I doubted whether the Shi'ah elements would accept an Arab Government which was predominantly Sunni; I was sure that the Kurds would not do so. The prestige of the Turkish Government was still strong: 'if an Arab Government is constituted by decree of the League of Nations and maintained for a period by our arms and our money, it is my belief that the Arab public at large would after a few years actively favour the return of the Turks.' The supremacy of the Sharifian family would be challenged by other Arabian potentates, and they could not reckon on popular support. No Government which we could set up would for long exist unless we were prepared to support it by our armed forces. Events in Smyrna, the repeated announcements of European statesmen regarding the Armenian State, the behaviour of French troops in Syria and the pro-Armenian attitude of representatives of the U.S.A. had tended to harden popular feeling against us as the local embodiment of an anti-Muslim league. In these circumstances it seemed impossible to create autonomous Kurdish States: in any case, till the northern boundary of 'Iraq had been settled we could not give potential rulers of such States such assurances as would encourage them to espouse our policy.

Apart from purely military expenditure and assets, I estimated British capital investments in Iraq in 1919, including Railways and Port, at some sixteen million pounds sterling, and I emphasized that our forward policy in Persia depended in some measure upon the policy to be followed in 'Iraq. I concluded this dispatch in the following terms:

'I believe that the Divisional Councils provisionally sanctioned and now in process of formation, if allowed to develop and assisted to assume a due share of local responsibility, will in a comparatively short space of time give the public at large that measure of participation and control of their local destinies which is necessary to ensure stability of the Administration, and will serve as a training ground for the administrative talent which may fit the people of these countries ultimately to control their own destinies. Many years will not elapse before the people of this Country will be at least as well equipped as the people of Egypt or India now are for Western forms of Government, but for the present the population is so deeply divided by racial and religious cleavages, and the Shi'ah majority after 200 years of Sunni domination are so little accustomed to hold high office that any attempt to introduce institutions on the lines desired by the advanced Sunni politicians of Syria would involve the concentration of power in the hands of a few persons whose ambitions and methods would rapidly bring about the collapse of organized Government.

'Finally, if I may be permitted to make a personal reference, I beg leave to assure Government that by birth, by training and by temperament, I am in sympathy with a democratic as opposed to a bureaucratic conception of Government, and if I find myself unable to advocate the immediate introduction of a logical scheme of Arab Government into 'Iraq it is because I believe that the results would be the antithesis of a democratic Government and that the creation and maintenance at this stage of an indigenous Arab Government is inconsistent with the changes which we are now endeavouring to introduce into the Governments of India and Egypt, changes the necessity for which I fully recognize and with which I am broadly speaking in sympathy.'

That I did not allow myself to be unduly influenced by these misgivings, is I hope sufficiently clear from the full description given in Chapter XI of the constitutional proposals put forward between November 1918 and June 1920. I felt, however, that I should not be doing my duty if I failed to point out the possible dangers ahead, though I was aware that the views expressed were contrary to the intentions and desires of H.M.'s Government, and indeed to the declarations of the Allied and Associated Powers so far as they were susceptible of precise definition. It is easy to see, after a lapse of ten years, that I was perhaps unduly sceptical, but the disturbances of 1920 in Syria, Palestine, and 'Iraq and the vigorous repressive measures which followed in all three countries were still in the womb of the future: the Turks had not abolished the Caliphate, nor the fez, and still retained the respect of devout Muslims. I had no confidence in the stability of the Arab Government of Syria: I did not think that King Husain would long rule at Mecca, and I could not believe that 'Iraq could develop successfully, independently of the rest of Arabia, as a constitutional monarchy. Nor were these the only grounds for my fears for the future. In a 'private' letter of about the same date I put forward another conundrum for the consideration of my superiors.

'Our duty under the Covenant', I wrote, 'is to render administrative advice and assistance until such time as the 'Iraqis can "stand alone". In practice it is not so much a question of their ability to "stand alone" as their ability to move forward more or less in step with their neighbours and with Europe. Constitutional and cultural progress, in the Western sense, must depend on economic progress. This in turn depends on the provision of capital on a fairly liberal scale—about £20 a head or say fifty million pounds sterling during the next twenty years, for expenditure on productive works, mostly on river training and irrigation and railways, on improving the type of cereals produced¹ and the class of cattle and

¹ I do not wish it to be deduced from this passage that I regard heavy capital expenditure on irrigation works as desirable in the altered conditions of 1931. The economic situation of the world in regard to the production of cereals has profoundly changed since 1920. The factors that make for low wheat-prices are already numerous, the cost of production is

sheep kept. Under the Mandatory system will the Treasury lend the money? I think not. Will the Treasury guarantee a loan, as to a British Colony? I fear it is improbable. Will the banks lend 'Iraq money without a guarantee? My conversations with . . . & . . . [leading bankers] lend no support to the idea. Will Western capitalists build railways or canals in 'Iraq as commercial ventures?—&—[prominent industrialists] say that it is out of the question, and I agree with them. They want a degree of security which an Arab state cannot offer them, unless oil is struck in great quantities, in which case the royalties may some day suffice to float a large loan. But if oil was struck to-morrow it would be ten years before exploitation could reach the dividend paying stage, and no one can yet hazard a guess as to whether oil is present in 'Iraq in workable quantities. (The stuff produced by the Germans at Qaiyara, and now being handled on a small scale by the army, will make no one's fortune.) Without capital, 'Iraq will stagnate, whilst Persia, Turkey and perhaps Syria and Palestine, all with better climates, a more sophisticated population, and larger resources, will progress. I want to see 'Iraq go ahead at the same pace as its neighbours. For this reason, and for no other, I hold that a strong British element will for some time be necessary—though the pace will be quicker than in most eastern countries.'

In a subsequent letter I wrote (8th July, 1920):

'My own views are (1) if an oriental country can avoid being the catspaw of foreign Powers, and can treat foreign subjects well and its own subjects not too badly, it ought to be allowed to carry on without interference. (2) England ought not to take on any responsibility in the East that she can avoid without danger to herself or treachery to the oriental population concerned.'

Over ten years have passed since those letters were written. Some of my anticipations have been fulfilled, some have been falsified by the march of events, on others the verdict of time has yet to be pronounced. It is, however, legitimate to hope with some confidence that the ultimate outcome will be less unfavourable than I had feared, thanks primarily to the qualities of His Majesty King Faisal and to the abilities of some of his Ministers, but also to the plan on which the foundations of the new State were laid by Sir Percy Cox. It does not detract from the greatness of the achievements of King Faisal that the main foundations were those laid down by the Civil Administration between 1916-20; nor would I underestimate the contributions of Sir Percy's suc-

almost certain to diminish further as years pass, and there is little likelihood of any considerable increase of world consumption. Individual farmers in Canada and the U.S.A. can handle as much as 500 acres of grain with one hind. Better seed and improved methods are being adopted in every great wheat-growing country. There is no pressure of population on the land in 'Iraq: the trouble is that the quality of wheat and barley grown is uniformly poor. The introduction into general use of a 'strong' wheat is of primary importance: until this is done, there will be little if any sale in the world's markets for cereals grown in 'Iraq. The development of agriculture should in existing circumstances have precedence over new schemes of irrigation.



Photo by Maj. E. W. C. Noel, C.I.E., D.S.O.

KURDISTAN, PIZHDER AND MANGUR CHIEFS 1919

The two central figures are BAHAKR ACHA, head of the Pizhder, and

AGHA BAIK, head of the Bilbas



cessors in office, who have each had to face the peculiar problems of the hour. To King Faisal and Sir Percy Cox is due the credit for taking the first and most difficult steps, at a time when Arab opinion, where it was not hostile, was usually far from enthusiastic.

Much was at one time said in Parliament and elsewhere of the hostility of Arabs to Indians employed by the Army or the Civil Administration, and to the Indian Army as a whole. In no single case were these views voiced by any one who had any first hand acquaintance with Mesopotamia, or with the Indian Army, and they were, I believe, erroneous. Such prejudice as existed was confined to Baghdad and Basra, and was of a purely economic type—viz., it was felt that they were holding positions which might be held by 'Iraqis. It was definitely not racial, nor religious. The Administration could not at the outset have been carried on without them, any more than the Turks could have been defeated without the Indian Army, which after the Armistice did far more than its share of fighting.

My acknowledgments of the services of Indian officials were expressed in the following telegram to the Government of India, which was communicated to the Legislative Council in September 1920:

'I beg that His Excellency the Viceroy will be pleased to take a suitable opportunity, if possible in Legislative Council, to express on behalf of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia my wholehearted appreciation, admiration and gratitude for the very notable services rendered to this Administration during the past six years, and particularly during past few difficult months, by officials of Indian origin employed in Administration. Without the skilled assistance of Indians of all grades and of all departments the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia could never have taken shape or been maintained. Their services, ungrudgingly given for a long period of years, often in circumstances of great difficulty and danger, have been invaluable, and I have no reason whatever to think that they have by their actions or by their example done anything but enhance India's good name abroad. I have seen little to justify the statements made at home regarding the prejudice of Arabs against Indians as such. On the contrary both in executive and in administrative work they have proved their worth not merely to their departmental superiors but to the public.

'May I finally be permitted to draw the attention of the Government of India to the very notable services rendered to Government during the last few months by Indian railway, telegraph, postal and other civil officials in Mesopotamia. They have remained and often died at their posts with a steadfastness which has commanded the admiration and respect of all. They have worked whole-heartedly for the common good and have placed alike the people of this country and the military and civil authorities under an enduring obligation.

'As my tenure of this post is drawing to a close I trust that this spontaneous expression of my sense of obligation to the Government of India and to Indian officials serving under me may receive publicity.'

On 20th September, I expressed in public for the last time my own view of current events, the occasion being a complimentary dinner given to me by the Railway Directorate, headed by General Lubbock and a very competent triumvirate—Tainsh, Rothera, and Kiernander. It is perhaps worth reproducing here part of what appeared in the columns of *The Baghdad Times*, if only because it shows the views that I held at that time.

‘I now turn to current events in this country.

‘The last few months have saddened us all; doubt has replaced hope. Why, we ask, should these things have occurred? I believe the truth to be that the world is swayed now, even more than of old, by moral rather than by material forces; by ideas and theories rather than by Governments and facts. Time was when ideas which had their birth in the East had a profound influence on Western thought. We are now seeing the opposite process at work.

‘The end of the nineteenth century witnessed the revival of Nationalism in Europe and Asia—a reaction of the man in the field and in the street from the conception and existence of great Empires. The people had their part in these Empires in which the common interests rather than the differences of the component parts were emphasized, but they could not see it. They preferred something smaller which they could feel to be their own. Nationalism is the basis of the latest Peace Treaties. We entered the war to protect the rights of small Nations and no idea appealed more widely to the many races composing the British Empire. Critics of Nationalism as a constructive policy were silenced; doubters were perforce dumb; Nationalism held the field, and every official utterance of the Allies, and of the spokesmen of the Associated Powers, emphasized this as the basis of future policy.

‘The seed of Nationalism was sown broadcast at home, but the Army that landed at Basra in 1914 was animated by no such ideas. Our mission was to beat the Turk and we did so. Meanwhile, to quote Lord Hardinge’s words when he visited Basra in 1915, “We were not fighting single-handed and we could not lay down plans for the future without a full exchange of views with our Allies, but we were confident that henceforth a more benign Administration would bring back to Mesopotamia that prosperity to which her rich potentialities gave her so clear a title.’

‘On this nebulous basis we went ahead until the capture of Baghdad. The seed of Nationalism had grown in Europe meanwhile, and the plant had borne fruit in the East. The Sharif’s revolt was proclaimed as a national movement of Arabs against the Turks, and in return for the co-operation of Arab forces the Allies pledged themselves to respect and further Arab aspirations. The prowess of the Armed Forces of the Crown in Mesopotamia resulted in the capture of Baghdad, and the devoted labours of the officers of the Civil Administration made it possible for His Majesty’s Government to conceive as a practicable possibility the application to Mesopotamia of the policy enunciated by General Maude in 1917, and lately embodied in the Turkish Peace Treaty, viz., the creation of independent States from those parts of the Turkish Empire inhabited mainly or wholly by non-Turkish races.

'Each fresh victory in Mesopotamia involved a further advance inland until as a result of the Armistice we found ourselves responsible for the wilayats of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra, pledged to the policy enunciated by General Maude, but still unable without reference to our Allies to give effect thereto. It was not until six months after the Armistice that the application to Mesopotamia of the Mandatory system as laid down in the Peace Treaty was decided, and nearly a year after the Armistice we were warned against doing anything which might give rise to the impression that the future political status of Mesopotamia had been decided, or that the decisions of the Peace Conference were being anticipated. At the same time we were given reason to hope that peace with Turkey would be concluded not later than the autumn.

'Our local action was thus limited to carrying on an Administration. We in Mesopotamia could not build, though in Syria an Arab Government, practically independent, was set up immediately after the Armistice, which coincided with the eviction of the Turks from Aleppo, and Syria attained complete independence on the evacuation of that country by our forces in November, 1919. Thus while in Baghdad our hands were tied by the long delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey, the pledges given by the Allies had already in Northern Syria reached fulfilment. This discrepancy of treatment gave rise to active propoganda on the one hand and not unnatural discontent in certain quarters on the other. We had been told that we could not act until the Peace Conference had come to a decision. The months passed and peace with Turkey still tarried pending the decision of the United States as to whether they would undertake the Mandate for any part of Turkey. On our borders there was war. Mesopotamia itself was quiet, but the seed we ourselves had sown was growing; the new wine was fermenting in the old bottles. The temporary military administration and continuance of war conditions in the large towns became extremely irksome to certain classes, but we could do little to guide the growth of public opinion. Our orders were clear; we were not to build. We could not know what the Peace Conference would decide, but we could, and did foresee that delay meant trouble. Demobilization however went on until on May 1st last we only had 5,000 British and 30,000 Indian combatants in Mesopotamia.

'During this month the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference conferred the Mandate for Mesopotamia on Great Britain, but took no decision as to the form of Government to be set up; that was held to involve consultation with local opinion—no easy task. It was at this critical moment in the history of Mesopotamia that certain men, more ambitious, more short-sighted, more impatient and less wise than others, saw fit to foment under a constitutional guise a movement which within two months became frankly revolutionary, fanatical and anarchic. In July the outbreak came, and with it destruction of life and property, from which the country will take years to recover. The worst is now over. With cooler weather and with the advent of the ploughing season, the present disturbances will be finally suppressed. Until that has been done a constructive policy cannot be initiated.

'It is to this task that Sir P. Cox has been called, and my regret at parting from an Administration in which I have taken so much pride, and from my friends here, both official and non-official, whose work I have admired and whose interests have

always been very near my heart, is more than compensated for by the pleasure that I have, and that I know you will share, in his return.

'I have unabated trust in the potentialities of this country and of its inhabitants; in the wisdom of His Majesty's Government, and in the strength of the moral and material forces at its disposal: by the help of God we will with patience bring to a successful conclusion the task to which we have set our hands. Officials come and go; Administrations change, but we may be sure that the spirit in which we approach the task will be that which we have been proud to declare has actuated us elsewhere and that our first consideration will be the interests of the people of this country.'

Holding these views, and conscious as I was that every attempt I had made since November 1918, to induce H.M.'s Government to let me initiate constitutional measures had been vetoed as premature, it was a little hard to find myself pilloried, week by week, during the summer of 1920, in leading articles in *The Times*, *The Observer*, *The Daily Herald*, and elsewhere as a sun-dried bureaucrat intent on 'Indianizing' Mesopotamia. (It is a consolation to me that the post of High Commissioner has been filled almost continuously ever since by members of the Indian Political Department.) I caused all unfavourable comments to be published in full in the local papers and reprinted the Parliamentary Debates on Mesopotamia in the Official Gazette.¹ The effect was encouraging: the contrast between local realities and the world of the phrase-makers was so great as to be almost ludicrous even to the Nationalists. The frequent references to the glories of the Arab Government of Syria, and the coming Bolshevization of a republican Persia,² and the suggestion, made by Colonel T. E. Lawrence himself, that the chosen King of Mesopotamia might not be an Arab, but an Englishman,³ produced a healthy reaction, particularly amongst Arabs, for Lawrence was at this time unknown in 'Iraq even by name. The letter to *The Times*⁴ of Sir George Buchanan, creator of the Port of Basra and the great docks of Ma'qil, on the importance of rigid control of expenditure on public works and of the duty of the head of the Administration

¹ T. E. Lawrence, *Daily Herald*, 9.8.20.

² *Ibid.*, *Daily News*, 25.8.20.

³ *The Times*, 21.6.20.

⁴ I did not, however, accord complete freedom to the daily press. The literate inhabitants lacked the experience to judge between truth and falsehood, and were unlikely to be furnished with much of the former. Had Milton lived in Baghdad in 1920 he would not have written *Areopagitica*. I held with Dryden:

That private reason 'tis more just to curb,
Than by disputes the public peace disturb,
For points obscure are of small use to learn:
But common quiet is mankind's concern.

(*Religio Laici.*)

to scrutinize the estimates of Sir George Buchanan's brother engineers imported a welcome element of humour into the controversy.

Nothing could have exceeded the kindness of my colleagues, whether military or civil, at the various farewell ceremonies they were good enough to arrange. Nor were the local communities and the Chamber of Commerce backward in their display of those courtesies which do so much in the East as in the West to sweeten official life. The notables of Basra presented me with a valedictory address and a sword of honour, than which I have no more valued possession. The occasion was a farewell dinner, presided over by Sir Percy Cox himself, an unusual conjunction of guests, but in keeping with the almost filial relationship that had existed between us for more than a decade. Arabs of all parties were present, the principal speakers being my friends 'Abdul Latif Pasha Mandil and Muzahim Beg Pachachi.¹ The latter described himself as 'an extreme Nationalist and one of the founders of the general Arab movement since 1906'. From his speech I extract the following:

'I very much regret that the follies of some individual Arabs have served to disappoint the British nation in its honourable undertaking. These acts were committed partly owing to unattainable dreams and partly owing to selfish material interests. The present movement is not purely an Arab movement, but it is mixed with an alien element, who have been, to my deepest regret, successful in using Arab fame, wealth and blood for their own benefit, in the hope of weakening the position of Great Britain elsewhere. Do not believe in appearances, which are mostly deceptive, especially in the East. Do not consider that the present revolt of some nomad tribes is really a national revolt seeking for independence. Such a movement cannot be taken as representing the feeling of the whole community. The influential families of Baghdad have no sympathy with a movement which has ruined their country.

'Such are the feelings of the people whose views carry weight. They are anxious to convey what they think and feel to those in England, who are advocating the withdrawal of Britain from this country. They cannot realize that withdrawal means no less than the breaking up of law, and the ruin of a people, followed by anarchy throughout the country, which might involve an Asiatic war, in which Britain could not stand aside.'

On 4th October I restored the keys of the office of Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia to the permanent incumbent, Sir Percy Cox, for whom I had acted for 2½ years. Twenty-four hours later I left Basra. Three weeks later, on 28th October, after thirteen years of almost continuous duty in the Middle East, I handed over charge to Lieut.-Col. Trevor of the office of Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and H.M.'s Consul-General for Fars and Khuzistan. It was the feast of St. Simon

¹ Now (April 1931) Minister of Communications and Works.

and St. Jude, who perished in Mesopotamia and Persia, and were revered by our forefathers as the patrons of Lost and Hopeless Causes.

Yet it was not with such thoughts that I left 'Iraq. Neither in 'Iraq nor, later, in Bombay, where I stayed for a few days with Lord Lloyd, did I find any trace of despondency or lack of belief in our duty, our ability, and therefore our right to exercise at our discretion in foreign countries whither our armies had penetrated, so much authority as would enable the populations concerned to keep in step with the rest of the world, and under our aegis, to develop in a political and economical sense. 'Defeatism', which may be defined as the anticipation of moral or physical defeat, and the acceptance in advance of its implications, was nowhere evident. Our friends, and our allies, still trusted us. I then believed, as did Lord Curzon twenty years earlier, that the eastward trend of our responsibilities was destined to increase and not diminish, entailing a greater strain on our wisdom, but bringing also a mutually beneficial increase of international commerce. I felt it to be in our power, as in that of no other people, to seek justice and ensue it—to protect minority interests—the fair treatment of which is the best rough test of any civilization. With the historian Hutton I felt, and still feel, as did Freeman,¹ that a single act of avoidable injustice committed with our knowledge and under our aegis is a greater stain on our reputation than much larger errors of policy or judgement. I recognized, like Bentham, that the necessary motive-spring of human endeavour is self-interest, but remembered that, in nature, self-interest is the guiding principle of the happiest and most fruitful forms of symbiosis.

Eastern history shows that at no period of which we have any record has any considerable race been content or, indeed, able to govern itself without exercising rule, generally with the utmost rigour, over other races. The situation appeared in 1920, and still appears, to be a transitional state of things, which the diplomatists of Geneva fondly hope may develop into a permanent settlement of an hitherto insoluble question, but of which reason and history can say only that we know not what a day may bring forth. There seemed in 1920 no sufficient reason why we should prematurely surrender the reins of government in the East, or seek to hand on a torch which as yet burnt so feebly, and I had at that time no reason to think that the policy of His Majesty's Government would be any other than the fulfilment of the spirit as well as the letter of Article 22 of the Mandate.

Much has happened since those days. We have for the moment lost faith in ourselves. For a beacon-light we have substituted a round

¹ Freeman, *Life*, ii, 113. Letter dated 13.12.1878.


table, and we tend to rely on the pious resolutions of Geneva to accomplish much that could be more hopefully and more nobly secured by unilateral action.

‘Valiant, indeed, and prosperous to win a field; but, to know the end and reason of winning, injudicious and unwise: in good or bad success, alike unteachable. . . . Hence did their victories prove as fruitless, as their losses dangerous; and left them still languishing under the same grievance that men suffer conquered: which was indeed unlikely to go otherwise; unless men more than vulgar bred up, as few of them were, in the knowledge of ancient and illustrious deeds, invincible against many and vain titles, impartial to friendships and relations, had conducted their affairs.

Many whose ignorance was more audacious than the rest, were admitted . . . to bear no mean sway among them, both in church and state. . . . What could be expected . . . but confusion in the end?’¹

Thus wrote Milton in 1670 of the state of his country in the fifth century, but with special reference to conditions when he wrote. Less than a century later, England had attained at home and abroad a greatness of which he had not dreamed. May it be so again.

¹ Milton, *History of England*, vol. iii.



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APPENDIX I. (*See Chapter III*)

PERSIA

Notice.

The following King's Regulation, made by His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars and Coasts and Islands of the Persian Gulf and Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and declared to be urgent, is published for general information..

Basrah,
3rd August, 1917.

P. Z. COX,
H.M.'s Consul-General for Fars, etc.

King's Regulation under Section 55 (a) of the Persian Coasts and Islands Order in Council, 1907, as amended by the Persian Coast and Islands (Amendment) Order in Council, 1912.

No. 1 of 1917

In exercise of the powers conferred upon him H.M.'s Consul-General is pleased to declare as follows:—

WHEREAS the proper conduct of the business of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited) and Allied Companies is a matter of national importance, and whereas for the effectual working thereof it is essential that certain individuals now employed therein should remain at their posts in the employ of the Company notwithstanding that the period for which they contracted may have expired, or be about to expire.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no person now in the employ of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company or Allied Companies shall leave his present employment unless with the consent in writing of the Consul-General or of his authorized representative, which shall not be withheld except after due enquiry.

2. This regulation shall have effect for the period of the War.

3. Whenever the Consul-General or his authorized representative withholds his consent as above he shall at the same time, if requested, fix conditions of employment and the amount of salary payable by the Company to the employee for the further period of his employment.

4. This regulation is numbered as King's Regulation No. 1 of 1917 and may be cited as Abadan Munitions Factory Regulation.

P. Z. Cox.

His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c

Approved by H.M.'s Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs. October 1917.

APPENDIX II

REGULATIONS RESPECTING THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR ON LAND (Annexed to Hague Convention of 1907)

SECTION III. *On Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile State.*

Article 42

Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.

The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.

Article 43

The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.

Article 44

It is forbidden a belligerent to force the population of occupied territory to furnish information about the army of the other belligerent, or about its means of defence.

Article 45

It is forbidden to compel the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile Power.

Article 46

Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected.

Private property cannot be confiscated.

Article 47

Pillage is formally forbidden.

Article 48

If, in the territory occupied, the occupant collects the taxes, dues, and tolls imposed for the benefit of the State, he shall do so, as far as is possible, in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence in force, and shall in consequence be bound to defray the expenses of the administration of the occupied territory to the same extent as the legitimate Government was so bound.

Article 49

If, in addition to the taxes mentioned in the above article, the occupant levies other money contributions in the occupied territory, this shall only be for the needs of the army or of the administration of the territory in question.

Article 50

No general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally responsible.

Article 51

No contribution shall be collected except under a written order, and on the responsibility of a commander-in-chief.

The collection of the said contribution shall only be effected as far as possible in accordance with the rules of assessment and incidence of the taxes in force.

For every contribution a receipt shall be given to the contributors.

Article 52

Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the army of occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such a nature as not to involve the population in the obligation of taking part in the operations of the war against their country.

Such requisitions and services shall only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied.

Contributions in kind shall, as far as possible, be paid for in cash; if not, a receipt shall be given and the payment of the amount due shall be made as soon as possible.

Article 53

An army of occupation can only take possession of cash, funds, and realizable securities which are strictly the property of the State, depots of arms, means of transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to the State which may be used for the operations of the war.

All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transmission of news, or for the transport of persons or things, exclusive of cases governed by naval law, depots of arms and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, may be seized, even if they belong to private individuals, but must be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.

Article 54

Submarine cables connecting an occupied territory with a neutral territory shall not be seized or destroyed except in the case of absolute necessity. They must likewise be restored and compensation fixed when peace is made.

Article 55

The occupying State shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct.

Article 56

The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity, and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property.

All seizure or destruction of, or wilful damage to, institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.

APPENDIX III

SELF-DETERMINATION IN MESOPOTAMIA

Memorandum by Miss G. L. Bell, February 1919

The publication of the Anglo-French declaration, whatever may have been its political significance elsewhere, was at best a regrettable necessity in the 'Iraq. Though it did little but reiterate the intentions which had already been announced on the occupation of Baghdad, it differed from the former pronouncement in one important particular, namely that whereas the Baghdad proclamation was issued while the upshot of the war was still extremely doubtful and for that reason was regarded mainly as a military expedient, the Anglo-French declaration was published after the victory of the Allies and commanded belief. Previous to its appearance the people of Mesopotamia, having witnessed the successful termination of the war, had taken it for granted that the country would remain under direct British control and were as a whole content to accept the decision of arms. The declaration opened up other possibilities which were regarded almost universally with anxiety, but gave opportunity for political intrigue to the less stable and more fanatical elements. It is indeed remarkable that it created so little stir. It must be remembered that its publication occurred very shortly after the return to Baghdad under the terms of the Armistice of a number of persons undesirable in the interests of public tranquillity. Men of Arab race who had been in Turkish Civil or Military employment and had thrown in their lot with the Turks after the occupation, active members of the Committee of Union and Progress (the Party to whom the entrance of Turkey into the war against Great Britain was directly due) and others who had not ventured to remain in Baghdad on account of their well-known Turkish sympathies came back from Mosul early in November, many of these engaged at once in anti-British propaganda. Their direct influence, such as it was, seems to have been confined to Baghdad and Kadhimain, but the extremist party in Baghdad canvassed the towns of Ba'qubah and Najaf, as well as the Shamiyah District, with some effect, and in both Ba'qubah town and the Shamiyah it is believed that the Sharif has had agents for some months past. The effect of the declaration was no doubt heightened by the news which appeared in Reuter that the Sharif Faisal had gone to the Peace Conference as the representative of an independent Arab State. Rumours of the condition of affairs in Syria produced divergent effects. The Christians of Mosul, for example, were alarmed by this concrete example of Arab rule and as a whole men of wealth and position, of whatever creed, were not encouraged by the little that they heard. On the other hand accounts of the flying of Arab flags and the appointment of Arab Military Governors cannot have failed to inflame the thoughts of the professional or would-be professional politicians of Baghdad.

Over the rest of Mesopotamia the declaration has produced nothing more than the occasional expression of a pious preference for an Amir under British protection, but to this view the petitioners were careful to attach a rider to the effect that no individual capable of filling the post can be found at present. Nor

was the preference by any means universal. On the Tigris the great tribal and agricultural Division of 'Amara and the smaller Qurna Division, on the rich Diyala lands the tribal elements of Ba'quba division, Kifri district to the north, the whole of the Khanaqin Division, and on the Euphrates the whole Hilla Division including Hilla town, ask for the continuance and extension of the present régime. Hilla town, the centre of Euphrates grain trade, was particularly emphatic in its demand. Not content with madhbatahs from the Districts of Hilla, Hindiya, Nasiriya and Diwaniya signed by the leading tribal Shaikhs and notables, the citizens of Hilla presented a supplementary petition bearing 400 signatures practically every man of note in the town being included. This second petition was elicited by an attempt on the part of an individual of pro-Turk leanings to get up an anti-British petition as a counter to the original madhbatah.

As regards the 'Iraq tribes there can be no doubt that the policy of the British Administration has met with approval. The Shaikhs of 'Amara and Qurna expressly desire that tribal disputes should not be referred to the Courts but dealt with by the Shaikhs themselves with the assistance of the Political Officer, *i.e.*, in accordance with present arrangements. A request from the 'Amara Shaikhs that their lands should not be put up to auction so long as the tenant is rendering sincere service to Government, shows that they appreciate the system introduced by us. It is to be noted that wherever Sir Percy Cox is well known, as also in Hilla, though he has had little opportunity of making himself personally known there, he is specially named as the High Commissioner who would be acceptable. In one or two cases, notably in the Nasiriya Division, a definite pronouncement was made against the Sharif as a possible Amir. . . .

In Baghdad, where political opinion is more highly developed than in the provinces, the Anglo-French declaration produced instant results. The idea of an Arab Amir suggested itself to all as a reasonable solution of the problem of self-determination, but there was considerable variance as to the individual who should be selected. A son of the Sharif was the obvious choice, but many would have preferred the head of the famous 'Umari family of Mosul, Hadi Pasha, a man who has held high office in Constantinople. Some, rather tentatively, suggested an Egyptian, a son of the Sultan of Egypt or another; the Naqib of Baghdad was twice mentioned by visitors to the Political Office.

The Naqib's attitude was, however, in marked contrast to that of others. In private conversations with political officers he pronounced firmly against the appointment of an Amir, on the ground that the country was not ripe for any form of Arab rule. He advocated the continuance of a British Administration which should co-operate with the inhabitants of the country and employ them in gradually increasing measure. He laid stress on the need of British garrisons for the maintenance of peace, and from first to last he expressed surprise and regret that public opinion had been consulted as to the future.

It is highly improbable that any pressure which might have been brought to bear upon him would have persuaded him or any members of his family to accept the cares and responsibilities of head of an Arab State; one of his nephews who is regarded as a possible successor to the position of Naqib, contemplated the prospect with nothing short of dismay. (See the Naqib's remarks on the subject, Annex A.) But in any case the wisdom of applying pressure would be open to grave doubts. . . .

Meantime a campaign of political agitation was being organized in Baghdad. The leaders of the movement were men under 30, two of them being members of good families, while the rest were of no position, social or economic. The greater number had recently returned from Mosul and a considerable proportion of the group were ex-Committee men; one at least was a Turk by race. The first symptom of the agitation was a request for permission to start a newspaper, a request which developed into a project for the founding of a club of which the newspaper was to be the organ. While this project was pending, a significant incident occurred at Najaf. That town had been visited by the Acting Civil Commissioner who had met the Sharif, representing divines and tribal Shaikhs and explained to them that their opinion was to be asked on the three points which were being put before the country; in the first place did they consider that the Mesopotamian State should include the Mosul wilayat, secondly, should it be presided over by an Amir, and thirdly, if an Amir was desired, what individual would they select. The gathering was unanimously in favour of the continuance of British protection from Mosul to the Gulf without an Amir. Two days later one of the younger Shi'ahs of Baghdad went to Najaf, nominally on private business, and proceeded to engineer a deliberate plot, the object of which was to dissuade the people of Najaf and Shamiya by playing on their religious feelings and on personal pride of certain Shaikhs, from signing a petition on the lines which had been agreed upon. The author of this agitation is a man of considerable reputation as a writer. He had been employed by us in the Police and had been dismissed for brutal conduct about a year previously. As he himself subsequently signed one of the Baghdad madhbatahs in favour of the continuance of British control, his value as a witness on the other side is negligible. On his arrival at Najaf, he gave himself out as a secret agent of the Government and on that ground was subjected to a couple of weeks' imprisonment after he had been returned to Baghdad by the Political Officer of Shamiya. As a result of his activities the original petition was not sent from Najaf and Shamiya but in its place a series of documents which from a practical point of view differed from it but little. They asked for an Amir under British protection when the country should be ready for the change, but designated no individual.

It must be noted that the greatest of all Shi'ah ecclesiastics, Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi, holds opinions similar to those of the Naqib of Baghdad. In spite of much pressure he refused to express himself unfavourably to foreign intervention in 'Iraq and has even allowed it to be known that his sympathies are on the other side. This is as far as a man wholly devoted to religion can be expected to go. If he overstepped this mark his influence as a religious leader would suffer and the value to ourselves of his tacit support would diminish correspondingly. It was not only the Najaf episode which threw light on the ultimate designs of the Baghdad group. Private warnings as to their aims were received from the Naqib and from others. The request for a club and newspaper was therefore discouraged and after the imprisonment of the Najaf emissary it was not further pressed.

The agitation, however, continued, and achieved its next partial success in Karbala. The Persian priesthood of that town issued a fatwah to the effect that any person who desired other than a Muhammadan Government was an infidel.

The principal men of the town hesitated, in face of this pronouncement to express their views in writing, while verbally assuring the Assistant Political Officer of their adherence to ourselves. The tribes, less easily intimidated, demanded the continuance of British Administration without alteration.

The most prominent figure in the movement at Karbala was the son of the aged Mirza Muhammad Taqi. Muhammad Taqi occupies a position in the Shi'ah world second only to that of Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi, but he is almost in his dotage, and is completely dominated by his son, Muhammad Ridha, who was in close touch with malcontents at Najaf. Like all the leading Mujtahids of Mesopotamia, Mirza Muhammed Taqi is a Persian, and up to the present he has been on the best of terms with ourselves.

Exaggerated accounts of the proceedings at Najaf and Karbala reached the inhabitants of the third Shi'ah holy city, Kadhimain, where feeling was already running high. There is evidence to show that at Kadhimain agents from Constantinople had been at work, and they found suitable material to their hand. . . . When, therefore, the town of Kadhimain was asked to give its views on the three questions which have already been mentioned, the 'Ulama threatened with excommunication and exclusion from the mosque anyone who voted for British occupation. In spite of impending interdictions several of the leading citizens and local Shaikhs held out, and their courage is not a little remarkable. The anti-British petition was carried at night into the great mosque and a few of the recalcitrants were won over, but clerical culminations and eloquence did not dissuade the head of the municipality, who is also the principal merchant of the town, from starting a counter-petition in favour of British rule. He obtained the signatures of other merchants and of most of the local Shaikhs and British Indian subjects. The latter belong to families which have long been settled in Kadhimain and enjoy a high reputation. If they are to be regarded, from a Mesopotamian point of view, as aliens, the Persian divines who issued the fatwah cannot escape the same criticism.

The decision in Baghdad was taken a few days later. The Naqib and the Qadhi of the Shaikhs were asked to select from the Ashraf of Baghdad twenty-five spokesmen for each of their respective creeds, the grand Rabbi, twenty leading Jews and the heads of the Christian communities, ten Christians. This representation erred on the side of liberality to the Muhammadans who formed three-fifths of the assembly, whereas they amount to no more than five-eighths of the population of the town. The Naqib, following his almost unbroken habit¹ of refraining from public intervention in political affairs, refused to act, and agreed to the propriety of substituting for himself the Qadhi of the Sunnis. In calling upon the Qadhi the British Civil authorities were actuated by the desire to place the nomination of representative Ashraf in the hands of men who would be recognized by all as official leaders of the Muslim Communities and at the same time could not be accused of any pro-British bias. The post of Qadhi of the Shi'ahs is a creation of

¹ To the best of our information it has been broken on one occasion only. On the first advance to Ctesiphon in 1915 a meeting of Arab Liberals was held in the house of the Naqib to decide whether assurances of support should be despatched privately to the British Commander. The Naqib was against the suggestion, on the ground that he had been the subject of the Sultan of Turkey all his days and could not at this late hour renounce his allegiance.

the British Administration, no Shi'ah Qadhi having been recognized by the Turks, but the incumbent is a weak and colourless individual whose self-effacing piety is his best recommendation. . . .

The Qadhis, instead of electing representatives as they had been asked to do, called meetings of their communities for the purpose of selection. At both gatherings extremely inflammatory language was used and the delegates chosen were bound down to ask for Arab Government without European protection. These undertakings were prepared before-hand and presented to the meetings by the Qadhis. In the case of the Sunni pledge an original has been obtained. It lays down that the Arabs are fully competent to govern themselves and bears forty-five signatures, headed by that of the Qadhi over the official seal of the Shi'ah Court in which he presides. The Sunni gathering, did not, however, pass without incident. The head of one of the principal families and largest landowners of the town, Musa Chalabi Pachaji, left the meeting in disgust, declaring that he would take no share in such folly, while two others among the Ashraf raised a protest against the proceedings and were howled down with cries of infidel and traitor. Of the twenty-five men chosen as representatives of the Sunnis, seven subsequently refused to act. They included two of the Naqib Zadah and two of the Jamil Zadah, and these families, which in wealth and position are second to none in Baghdad, are unrepresented on the final petition.

To replace the seceders, five delegates were added to the original list, but the complement of the Sunnis remained below strength by two. The Shi'ah signatures number twenty-four instead of twenty-five by reason of the secession at the last moment of —, a well-known landowner of Baghdad who has formed cordial friendships with the Political Officers of his acquaintance. He himself favoured, or at least saw no harm in, the idea of an Arab Amir, but an administration wholly in Arab hands seemed to him to be an absurdity. He told the Military Governor, however, that he could not face the religious obloquy which would have resulted from open protest and that he had determined to drop out and offer no explanation.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the animosity and intrigue which attended these incidents, the eager canvassing undertaken by the anti-British group and their high-flown eloquence in the coffee-shops. The echoes of this clash of words resounded through the Political Offices for, as the Naqib rightly observed: 'The British Government can dispense with spies in this country, since it is the nature of every Arab to confide to the authorities the doings of all other Arabs.' . . .

It is said that the insurgent groups of Moslems in the town were not slow to reassure their fellow citizens of other religious persuasions that the unnatural importance which, in Moslem eyes, they had acquired under British Administration was likely to come to an abrupt end. The Jews, immediately after the publication of the Anglo-French Declaration, which caused them considerable alarm, had petitioned that they might be allowed to become British subjects. They now went into conference with the Christian sects and agreed with them upon a common line of action. Accordingly, when on January the 22nd the seventy-seven delegates met together, the Jews and Christians steadfastly declined to affix their signatures to the petition drawn up by the Moslems. This petition was so worded that no exception could have been taken to it if the circumstances which had

attended its birth-throes had not been universally familiar. The Sunni and the Shi'ah communities expressed their desire for an Arab State extending from the northern limit of Mosul Wilayat to the Persian Gulf, headed by a Mohammedan king who should be one of the sons of the Sharif. The petition went on to say that the king should be guided by a local council and that he should reside in Baghdad. No allusion of any kind was made to foreign protection but, as one of the few prominent men who signed said in intimate conversation with a Political Officer whom he visited the same afternoon in order to explain away his own conduct: 'we were not asked to express an opinion on the subject of foreign protection. I took for granted that the British Government would extend to us its advice and help, which are essential to our well-being.'

Great efforts were made at the meeting to move the Jewish and Christian delegates. — addressed himself to the latter and asked them what they had to fear, since Jews and Christians would each have a representative in the proposed council. His words roused additional anxiety in the bosoms of those to whom they were addressed. 'It was clear to us', observed one of the Jewish delegates, 'that a complete scheme of Moslem Government had been thought out.' — brought his eloquence to bear upon the Jews, his peroration was as follows: 'Did not the Prophet Moses lead you for forty years through the wilderness in order to effect your purification? We, following his example, bring in for your regeneration a pure Khalif from the wilderness.' Trembling with terror, his listeners refused to embrace the prospect set before them. They signed a separate petition plumping for British Administration, and the Christians followed suit.

It was not here alone that the Moslems by their violence had defeated their own ends. During the following days, Sunnis and Shi'ahs, other than those who had signed the Kadhimain and Baghdad petitions, frequented the Political offices and declared their intention of recording protests in the form of counter petitions. The Baghdadis pointed out with justice that the document which had been delivered could not by any extension of language be held to represent the opinion of the Ashraf of the town. A large proportion of names were unknown, while leading families were unrepresented or represented only by junior members. Several counter petitions have already materialized. The first was signed mainly by Sunni merchants but included also the names of the chief Mukhtar of the city and of one of the Suwaidi family, of which the head, Yusuf Suwaidi, was deported by the Turks to Constantinople, whence he has not yet been able to return. The family are descended from the 'Abbasids and Yusuf Suwaidi is held in personal esteem. The signatories of the first petition asked for British rule, and no other Government. If this was not to be, they, like the Jewish community, requested that they might become British subjects. The second petition asked for a local Arab Government from Northern Mosul to the Persian Gulf, with British help and guidance and Sir Percy Cox as first High Commissioner. Laws previously accepted were to be applied, equality of rights among all communities was to be observed and complete liberty granted to the local Government in dealing with internal and financial affairs. It bore seven signatures and others are still coming in. The first six of the seven original signatories are all men of the greatest weight in the town, while the seventh belongs to the same class as they but is personally of less importance.

It is highly significant that all seven had expressed themselves immediately after the publication of the Anglo-French Declaration in favour of an Amir under British protection and control. So greatly have they been alarmed by the Anti-British agitation which supervened that they have abandoned the idea lest it should lead to perilous positions. The third counter-petition was from the Shi'ahs of Baghdad West, including Shaikhs of local tribes. . . . This petition declared that Arab Government was an impracticable proposition and asked for British Administration under Sir Percy Cox.

Before bringing this curious history to an end it may be added that the Ashraf who signed the second counter-petition represented to the Acting Civil Commissioner that vigorous propaganda was still being carried on in the coffee shops by the anti-British group. They begged that some of the leaders might be deported, on the ground that they were a danger, not to the British Government, but to the stability and tranquillity of the 'Iraq. Ten arrests have been made among members of the C. U. P., and men who have recently returned from Mosul, and another is contemplated. . . .

A few reflections may be permitted in conclusion. Given the short period of time, it would have been difficult to arouse more sound and fury, not to speak of heart-burnings and intrigue, than have been created in Baghdad by the declaration and the enquiries into the will of the people which ensued from it. The only justification which in the light of experience can be put forward for these measures, is that they were called for by considerations of international import foreign to the 'Iraq. There can be no question that sooner or later a Nationalist party with inflated ambitions must have sprung to life; as a result of recent proceedings it has come sooner to the birth. Its prematurity has so clearly been manifest that it has found no support among the stable elements of the community. They have, on the contrary, been frightened into closer co-operation with the British Administration. The fact that they sought our support during these agitated days will not readily be forgotten either by them or by ourselves. Nor will those among us who were participants in the drama fail to remember the support which we on our side received from the Naqib and Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi. The value of a darwesh, like that of a Mujtahid, has its limitations. Neither can go forth into the lists, neither can afford to risk the criticism which follows the steps of the eager partisan, but judgment from their lips delivered *in camera* and couched in language which to our mind may seem lacking in definition, will for many a decade to come weigh heavy in the inconsistent scale of Mesopotamian opinion.

ANNEX A

POLITICAL VIEWS OF THE NAQIB OF BAGHDAD

I went by appointment to see the Naqib on the morning of February 6th in order to bid him farewell, as I was leaving on the 8th for England. I arrived at the house earlier than he expected and was received by his son, Saiyid Hashim, with whom I sat talking several minutes before the Naqib came in. The Naqib has been living since the occupation in his house opposite the Takiyah of 'Abdul Qadir, of which he is the head, the house which he usually occupies on the river



SIR SAIYID ABDUL RAHMAN, G.B.E.
Naqib of Baghdad



next to the Residency having been taken as a billet, with his consent. His domestic arrangements are studiously simple. The room in which he receives visitors is on the first floor, with windows looking into a small garden court planted with orange trees. Hard, upright sofas, covered with white calico, are ranged round the wall. In one corner of the room, by the window, where the Naqib sits, there is a small table covered with a white cloth on which some book or pamphlet is always to be found. The walls are whitewashed and the room unadorned save by its spotless cleanliness. The Naqib is an old man bowed by years and somewhat crippled by rheumatism. His dress is a long-sleeved robe, reaching to the feet, made of white linen in summer and black cloth in winter, and opening over a white linen under-robe which is confined at the waist by the folds of a wide white band. On his head he wears a white turban folded round a red tarbush.

At his entrance Saiyid Hashim withdrew and the Naqib gave orders that no visitors were to be admitted. I then told him that I was leaving Baghdad rather earlier than I had intended as I had been summoned to Paris and I added that there were probably minor details, such as decisions as to frontiers, where local knowledge might be called for. I instanced the question of the Mutasarrifiq of Dair from which place the ex-Rais Baladiyah had recently arrived with a request that the Mutasarrifiq might be attached to the Mesopotamian State, and I asked the Naqib for his opinion.

He replied that he had seen the man in question and was acquainted with his brother, who was an important citizen of Dair. Our visitors had been to the Naqib and had asked his advice on the future status of the district. A number of persons had however been present and the Naqib, characteristically unwilling to commit himself in public, had bidden the inquirer return on the following day when he himself would have had time to consider the matter. 'He is waiting to see me now, and since we are talking confidentially I will tell you the answer I intend to give him. I shall say to him: "My son, you will do well to come under the British Government, for the British are known throughout the world for justice and fair dealing." But I will make clear to you', continued the Naqib, 'what is in my thoughts. I do not like the French.' (It must be understood that he is taking for granted that the French will control Syria up to the boundaries of the Mesopotamian State.) 'Yes, I admire their learning and I delight in their cultured minds. But I do not like their Government. It is not concealed from us that the Muhammadan population of Algeria has suffered under their administration. These things are known. It is my desire to keep the French as far as possible from Baghdad. Khatun Sahib, I am speaking now for your ear only, and I must pray you to forgive my words. I fear an inevitable conflict between the French and the British. For when the British have put their foot down, they do not lift it; what they hold they maintain. They will encounter the ambition and jealousy of the French and even if it meant a war of fifty years' duration they will not give way. I am a darwish: my concern is not with the things of this world. But I have a long experience of men and affairs, and I lay bare to you my apprehensions.'

After embroidering this theme for some moments (for the Naqib is discursive in speech) he inquired, as is his invariable custom whenever I visit him, when we might expect the return of Sir Percy Cox. 'Khatun', said he, 'there are a hundred

and a thousand men in England who could fill the post of Ambassador in Persia, but there is none but Sir Percy Cox, who is suitable for 'Iraq. He is known, he is loved and he is trusted by the people of 'Iraq. He is a man of sober years. Never,' asseverated the Naqib, with a conviction which I fear is far from being justified, 'never until the day of Resurrection will he fly to Mosul in an aeroplane. He will travel by motor. Moreover, he is a man of great standing in London. He will act as our spokesman. If the government wishes to know our thoughts he will be able to give the necessary information and his word will be accepted. I bear witness in God that if Sir Percy Cox had been in Baghdad we should have been spared the folly of asking the people to express their wish as to the future. It has been the cause of great unrest, and the agitation in the town is not yet allayed. You know that I have taken no part, and I forbade my family to meddle with the business. My son, Saiyid Mahmud, was the first to resign his appointment as delegate to the Majlis. I told him to have nothing to do with it. But many have come to me asking for my advice or pressing me to agree to their views. I replied. The English have conquered this country, they have expended their wealth and they have watered the soil with their blood. The blood of Englishmen, of Australians, Canadians, Muslims of India and idolators has drenched the dust of 'Iraq. Shall they not enjoy what they have won? Other conquerors have overwhelmed the country. As it fell to them, so it has fallen to the English. They will establish their dominion. Khatun, your nation is great, wealthy and powerful: where is our power? If I say that I wish for the rule of the English and the English do not consent to govern us, how can I force them? And if I wish for the rule of another, and the English resolve to remain, how can I eject them? I recognize your victory. You are the governors and I am the governed. And when I am asked what is my opinion as to the continuance of British rule, I reply that I am the subject of the victor. You, Khatun (the Naqib was so kind as to observe), have an understanding of statecraft. I do not hesitate to say to you that I loved the Turkish government when it was as I once knew it. If I could return to the rule of the Sultans of Turkey as they were in former times, I should make no other choice. But I loathe and hate, curse and consign to the devil the present Turkish Government. (The Naqib was alluding to the C.U.P.) The Turk is dead; he has vanished, and I am content to become your subject.

'You are going to London; you will see and converse with the great and this is what you shall say. Let Sir Percy Cox return to the 'Iraq and let there be an end of military rule. It would be a great wrong if it should continue. I do not speak against the Commander-in-Chief. His nobility is apparent in his face. I have visited him, though it is not my custom; when Sir Percy Cox asked me to visit Sir William Marshall (the Naqib grappled somewhat unsuccessfully with the Commander-in-Chief's name) I consented. It would not have been fitting if I had refused. I also visited Maude. Your country owes Maude great praise, and we also owe him gratitude. He was beloved in Baghdad. But in the days of peace, power should be in the hands of statesmen and not of soldiers. You must keep an army in this country for the preservation of order, but the army must not govern. This is what you shall say: "We wish to be governed by Sir Percy Cox." But do not say', added the Naqib with some astuteness, 'even though it be

true, that you yourself have become a Baghdadi and that your mind is wholly occupied with the welfare of 'Iraq, for that will cause your words less weight in London and we shall have the less profit from you.'

After this word of warning, the Naqib returned to the theme of self-determination.

'What is all this talk', said he, 'and what is its value? I trace it to America and I hear the voice of (President) Wilson. Does Shaikh Wilson know the East, and its peoples? Does he know our ways of life and our habits of mind? You English have governed for 300 years in Asia and your rule is an example for all men to follow. Pursue your own way. Do not submit to guidance from Shaikh Wilson. Knowledge and experience are your guides.'

With this opening it was not difficult to draw the Naqib back to the discussion of recent events in Baghdad.

'Most of those who have spoken against you', said he, 'are men without name or honour. — is not of the slightest consideration; he is moreover possessed of the evil one (majnun). Who has ever heard of — ? He does not belong to the Ashraf of the town. But I tell you to beware of the Shi'ahs. I have no animosity against the Shi'ah sect', he hastened to assure me and I was careful to give no hint of my underlying doubts. 'They love and respect me and I am regarded by them as their Shaikh. But turn your eyes on the pages of history and you will see that the salient characteristic of the Shi'ahs is their levity (Khiffah). Did they not themselves murder Musa Ibn 'Ali whom now they worship as a God? Idolatry and mutability are combined in them. Place no reliance upon them.'

I then told the Naqib that we had a full list of those who had led the anti-British agitation, that, at the request of the Ashraf, it had been decided to arrest six or seven of their members and that to the best of my belief the arrests had already taken place. He was stirred to the deepest interest and begged me to give him the names of those who had been arrested. I happened to have in my pocket a first and incomplete draft of the list of agitators, but I did not remember with precision which of these men were to be deported. At the head stood the names of — and —, but these I omitted, as there was no intention of proceeding against them. The remainder of the names I read to the Naqib. There were only two of whom he had any knowledge. One of these two he knew too slightly to express any opinion about him; with the other, —, he was sufficiently well acquainted to pronounce with assurance that he was a rogue. I recollected that this man was not among those whom it had been intended to arrest and the Naqib asked me to give the Acting Civil Commissioner a message from himself to the effect that — should not be allowed to remain in Baghdad. I then folded up the paper and said that all these men were known to have made inflammatory speeches every evening in the coffee shops of the town, and though they were of so little account that the Naqib had never heard of them, they had undoubtedly done harm. There were, however, I added, two others who were still more harmful because they were men of high reputation. I alluded to — and —. Owing to their position . . . it was not possible for us to take steps which would silence them effectually. The Naqib listened with attention and remained for a moment in thought. Finally he said:

'No, you cannot either imprison or deport them. The scandal would be too

great. But if I know that I have the approval of Colonel Wilson, I will send for both of them and express to them my condemnation of their line of conduct. I know that they have been actuated by religious motives and that religious considerations have formed the substance of their arguments. On any point which touches religious interests, I speak with authority.'

I thanked the Naqib warmly for this offer and said I had no doubt that Colonel Wilson would accept it with gratitude. A letter to this effect was despatched to the Naqib on the following day.

The conversation had now reached a point of such intimacy that I ventured, with apologies, to put a searching personal question to the Naqib. He, unintentionally, led up to it by speaking of the candidature of the Sharif, or of one of his sons, for the position of Amir of Mesopotamia.

'I am', he said, 'a relative of the Sharif, I come of the same stock and I share the same religious opinions. You therefore understand that I am not actuated by difference of blood or of thought when I tell you that I would never consent to the appointment of himself or of his son as Amir. The Hijaz is one and the 'Iraq is one, there is no connexion between them but that of the Faith. Our politics, our trade, our agriculture are all different from those of the Hijaz.' I interposed that in my view it would be linking the dead to the living. The Naqib accepted the simile and added: 'The Hijaz is the holy land of Islam. It must remain a separate and independent state by which all Moslems can profit. Similarly with Jerusalem, which is a place of the highest sanctity to Moslems and also to Christians. (He made no allusion to Jewish interests, nor did I see fit to embark on that thorny subject.) The rights of the Moslems and Christians alike should be guaranteed by the powers that all may reap advantage from their sacred shrine. As regards the government of Mesopotamia my detestation of the present Turkish administration is known to you, but I would rather a thousand times have the Turks back in 'Iraq than see the Sharif or his sons installed here.'

Upon this I said, 'If for political reasons which we cannot at present foresee, it were necessary to put an Amir at the head of the 'Iraq State, would you, in order to avoid the selection of an Amir from Hijaz, accept the responsibility, with our help and support?'

My hand was lying upon the wooden arm of his sofa; he gave it two or three reproving blows with his fingers and leaning forward said laughingly, but with great emphasis:

'How can you put such a question as that to me? I am a darwish—does not my habit protect me?' He made the familiar gesture of shaking open his black robe. 'It would be contrary to the deepest principles of my creed to become the political head of the State. In the time of my ancestor, 'Abdul Qadir, the 'Abbasid Khalifs were accustomed to consult him, as you and your colleagues consult me; but he would never have consented to take an active part in public affairs. Neither would I, nor any of his descendants consent to do so. This is my answer on the ground of religion, but I will also give you an answer based on personal reasons. I am an old man. This five or six years of life which remain to me I wish to spend in reflection and in study. When you came to-day, I kept you waiting. I was busy with my books. They are my constant preoccupation.'

He broke off and I also kept silence, for I was profoundly touched by his words.

But he was yet dissatisfied with the reply he had given me, and raising his voice he said slowly:

'Not if it were to save 'Iraq from complete destruction would I alter what I have now spoken.'

The interview had lasted an hour and a half, and after a few words of excuse for my last question, excuses which he waved aside as needless, I begged permission to take my leave. Before he let me go he was so good as to express his personal affection for me and to remind me of our ancient friendship, which as he said, dates from several years before the war. I told him how greatly I valued it and thanked him for the confidence he had reposed in me by speaking so openly during the conversation which had just ended. He replied by asking me to regard him as a father, and saying that he hoped for an early renewal of our intercourse, he bade me go in peace.

G. L. B.

APPENDIX IV

RECORD OF SERVICES OF OFFICERS, GAZETTED (PT. I) AND NON-GAZETTED (PT. II), WHO SERVED WITH THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF MESOPOTAMIA ('IRAQ) FROM THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE MILITARY OCCUPATION IN NOVEMBER 1914 TO OCTOBER 1920, COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL PUBLISHED LISTS AND ARRANGED ACCORDING TO DEPARTMENTS AS SET FORTH BELOW

- NOTES: (1) The rank and decorations given are in each case those shown in the latest lists.
 (2) Where an officer served in more than one department he is generally shown under that in which his service commenced; in one or two instances names are given in more than one department.
 (3) It will be realized that owing to leave, resignations, reversion to civil life, demobilization, sickness, and deaths, the number of officers actually doing duty in any given department in 1920 was seldom more than two-fifths of the numbers shown in this record.

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- 1. General. Notes as to Abbreviations*
- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>A. or Asst. Assistant.
 Acqn. Acquisition.
 Civ. Civil.
 Comdt. Commandant.
 Comr. Commissioner.
 C.C. Civil Commissioner.
 D.C.C. Deputy Civil Commissioner.
 Dep. Deputy.
 Dept. Department.
 D. or Dir. Director.
 A.D. Assistant Director.
 D.A.D. Deputy Assistant Director.
 Ed. Education.</p> | <p>Fin. Finance.
 Inspr. Inspector.
 Irrign. Irrigation.
 Magis. Magistrate.
 M.E.F. Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force.
 Mun. Municipal.
 O. Officer.
 P.A. Personal Assistant.
 P. or Pol. Political.
 Rev. Revenue.
 S.D. On Special Duty.
 Supt. Superintendent.
 Vernac. Vernacular.</p> |
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Further abbreviations are given at the head of Departmental Lists. In addition certain other abbreviations—such as are commonly accepted or are clear from the context—have been adopted for reasons of space.

I. ACCOUNTS, AUDIT, AND FINANCE

PART I

Abbreviations.

A.O. Accounts Officer.	D.A.G. (P. & T.). Deputy Accountant
A.F.S. Assistant Financial Secretary.	General (Posts and
D.F.S. Deputy " "	Telegraphs).
D.A.P.O. Deputy Assistant Political Officer.	F.A. Financial Assistant.
D.A.G. (Civ.). Deputy Accountant General (Civil).	T.O. Treasury Officer.
	A.T.O. Assistant Treasury Officer.
	Inspg. O.A. Inspecting Officer, Accounts.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
ABBOTT, E. A.	A.O.	Basra (Port) ..	21.3.20	
AUSTIN, Lieut. A. P. M.	A.F.S.	Baghdad ..	15.5.19	
BROCKES, Lieut. E. H.	Dep. A.O.	"	25.1.19	
BROWN, H.	A.O.	"	9.8.20	
BROWNE, Lieut. M. B.	Dep. A.O.	"	1.3.19	
CORREA, C. M.	Dep. F.A. to C.C.	"	9.5.18	
	D.A.G. (Civil)	"	1.5.19	
	Agent for Civ. Admin. of M.	Bombay ..	1.12.19	
FRASER, Major J.	A.O. (P.W.D.)	Baghdad ..	15.4.20	
GOUT, E.	A.O.	"	7.3.18	
		Basra	22.6.18	
HANSON, C. G.	A.O.	Baghdad ..	7.3.18	
LESTER, Capt. G. A.	A.O. (Audit)	"	25.11.19	
MASSEY, R. L.	T.O.	"	1.4.17	
MILLS, Lieut. H. S.	A.O.	"	23.2.20	
	Attd. Police	Diwaniya ..	1.5.20	
MORRIS, Lieut. L. J.	A.O.	Baghdad ..	14.1.18	
	F.A. to D.C.C.	Basra	1.6.18	
MUNRO, Lieut. A.	A.O. (Audit)	Baghdad ..	18.12.19	
NICHOLL, C. T.	A.O.	Basra (Port) ..	22.6.20	
NICHOLS, Lieut. C. L.	A.O.	Baghdad ..	9.2.20	
PARLBY, J., O.B.E.	F.A. to C.C.	"	23.4.17	
	D.F.S.	"	19.12.18	
PEAD, T. D.	A.O.	"	15.8.19	
PRICE, P. W.	A.O. (Audit)	"	9.7.20	
MUZAFFAR SHAH,	T.O.	'Amara	1.2.17	
KHAN BAHADUR (<i>see</i> also No. 11. Political)	Dep. Administr. Auqaf, Saniya, &c.	Basra	1.11.17	
FERNANDES, M. A.	T.O.	"	1.8.16	
ALLAH BAKSH	T.O.	'Amara	1.9.16	
MUHSIN, M. H.	S.D. Acc. &c.	Basra	1.12.16	

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>						
D'SA, I.	T.O.	Baghdad	..	20.5.17
					Basra	..	1.7.18
SEQUEIRA, E. M.	T.O.	Baghdad	..	26.10.17
	A.O.	"	..	19.2.18
L. MANGLA RAM, RAI	T.O.	"	..	18.2.18
SAHIB	A.O.	"	..	21.10.18
	Inspg. O.A.	"	..	1.8.19
FERREIRA, P. A.	T.O.	'Amara	..	9.4.18
					Hilla	..	5.12.18
					Mosul	..	12.3.19
*NIZAM-UD-DIN	T.O.	Hilla	..	20.4.18
					Mosul	..	14.12.18
	Inspg. O.A.	"	..	1.8.19
ANDREWS, G.	T.O.	Baghdad	..	20.8.18
GELA RAM	A.T.O.	Basra	..	25.11.18
	T.O.	Kirkuk	..	1.10.19
FERNANDEZ, B. M.	T.O.	Baghdad	..	20.12.18
GASKIN, J. C.	Attd. Fin. Dept.	"	..	23.12.18
	T.O.	Hilla	..	1.3.19
	Excise Insp.	Baghdad	..	4.11.19
MARTIN, R.S.M., A. B.	A.O.	"	..	24.2.19
JONES, Sgt. E. W.	A.O.	"	..	1.3.19
	Inspg. O.A.	Basra	..	1.8.19
SAWAN MALL	T.O.	Kut	..	1.4.19
MUHAMMAD KIFAYAT	T.O.	Diwaniya	..	1.4.19
'ABDULLA KHAN	Supt. Rev. Records	Baghdad	..	1.6.20
SAIYID 'ABDUL HAJI,	T.O.	Baquba	..	1.5.19
KHAN SAHIB	D.A.P.O.	Kermanshah	..	2.9.19
HAJI AHMAD	T.O.	Kufa	..	28.7.19
BISSELL, A. C., B.A.	T.O.	Baquba	..	25.8.19
	Asst. Supt. (G. Sect.),	Baghdad	..	1.3.20
	Accts. Office			
SADHU RAM	T.O.	Hilla	..	1.10.19
LOBO, H.	A.T.O.	Nasiriya	..	1.10.19
	T.O.	"	..	1.3.20
SAIYID MUHAMMAD	T.O.	"	..	1.10.19
ISMAIL							
MUHAMMAD SHAFI'	T.O.	Ramadi	..	1.10.19
QURAIISHI							
BOWEN, A. E.	A.O.	Baghdad	..	7.10.19
DE SOUZA, E. F.	T.O.	Sulaimani	..	17.11.19
UMAR HAYAT, KHAN	T.O.	Kirkuk	..	28.12.19
SAHIB							
DU BOIS, D. A.	A.O. (P. & T.)	Baghdad	..	1.2.20
MUHAMMAD DIN	T.O.	Arbil	..	4.2.20
MIRZA FIRUZ-UD-DIN	T.O.	Baquba	..	24.2.20
WATTS, J. E.	Inspg. O.A.	Baghdad	..	1.3.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
WIR BAN SIKKA, B.A.	Supt. Audit Sec. (Irrign.)	Baghdad	..	1.3.20
XAVIER, A. E.	Asst. Supt. Audit Sec. D.A.G. (Civ.)	"	..	1.5.20
PRATER, J. H. G.	A.O.	"	..	19.5.20
SHAKIR BEG HILLAL	Supt. Civ. Stores Accts.	"	..	14.6.20
SCHOFIELD, S. C. A.	A.O.	"	..	12.12.18
SLATER, Lieut.-Col. S. H., C.I.E.	Fin. Secy.	"	..	23.3.19
SMITH, Lieut. N. F.	A.O.	"	..	1.7.19
SWAN, Lieut. L. M.	A.F.S. D.A.G. (Civ.) ..	"	..	19.12.18 18.12.19
THADDEUS, M.G., M.B.E.	Dep. F.A. to D.C.C. ..	Basra	16.1.16
	"	Baghdad	..	1.8.17
	A.O.	"	..	1.3.18
	S.D.	Basra	1.8.20
WENDT, R. E. G.	D.A.G. (P. & T.) ..	Baghdad	..	11.9.19
WHITTAKER, W.	A.O.	"	..	10.12.19

2. AGRICULTURE

Note: The Agricultural Department taken over by the Civil Administration from the M.E.F., on 1st March 1919.

PART I

Abbreviations.

A.A. Agricultural Adviser.
C.O. Circle Officer.

A.C.O. Assistant Circle Officer.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
ANSON, Lieut. R. I. R.	C.O.	Baghdad	..	5.10.19
		Mosul	1.5.20
BARKER, Capt. J. W., M.C.	C.O.	Baquba	..	1.3.19
BIRCH, Lieut.-Col. J. M., D.S.O.	A.D. C.O.	Mosul	1.3.19 1.1.20
CALDER, Capt. C. C.	Botanist	Baghdad	..	1.3.19
CAMERON, Major G. S., M.C.	C.O. Dep. Dir.	Hilla	1.3.19
CHEESEMAN, Major R. E.	A.A. C.O.	Baghdad	..	1.12.19
		Basra	1.9.16
		Upper Tigris Khadimain	..	1.3.19
	P.A. to High Comr. for 'Iraq	1.9.20
DOWSON, Capt. V. H. W.	C.O.	'Amara	1.3.19
		Musaiyib	..	1.5.20
ELLIOTT, Lieut. R. A. D.	A.C.O.	'Amara	1.3.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
EVANS, Col. G.	Dir. of Agriculture	1.3.19
GARBUPT, Capt. W. D.	P.A. to Dir.	..	Baghdad	1.3.19
	C.O.	..	'Amara, Kut	1.2.20
GAUTBY, Lieut. C. A.	C.O.	..	Baghdad	11.8.19
			Baquba	1.1.20
GRAHAM, Lieut.-Col. R. J. D.	Dir.	..	Baghdad	1.3.19
HEURTLEY, Major E. W. de C., M.C.	C.O.	..	Khanaqin	1.3.19
NICHOLLS, Major E. M., M.B.E.	C.O.	..	Hilla	1.3.19
NOBLE, Capt. A. G.	C.O.	..	Khadimain	2.5.19
O'BRIEN, Capt. D. P.	C.O.	..	Ramadi	1.3.19
PORTER, Capt. N.	C.O.	..	Nasiriya	1.3.19
			Baghdad	19.1.20
ROBERTS, Lieut. C.	S.D., Development Scheme		"	24.11.17
SHERRARD, Capt. G. C.	A.A.	..	"	19.11.17
THOMAS, Capt. R.	O. i/c Cotton Experimental Farm		"	4.10.17
	Dep. Dir. Research	..	"	1.3.19
	Dir. (Offg.) & Cotton Expert		"	26.7.20
WATSON, Capt. G. A.	O. i/c Govt. Gardens, &c.		'Amara	1.3.19
WEBSTER, Capt. J. F.	Chemist	..	Baghdad	1.3.19
WHITE, C. L.	C.O.	..	"	4.2.20
			Musaiyib	18.5.20
WILLIAMS, Lieut.-Col. C. A.	Dep. Dir.	..	Baghdad	1.3.19
WIMSHURST, Major C. R.	Adviser, Development Scheme		"	19.1.18
	Entomologist	..	"	1.3.19

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
AHMAD 'ALI SUFI	S.D.	..	Baghdad	27.2.18
	Manager, Cotton Farm		"	1.4.19
RAMACHANDRA RAO, V., M.A.	Asst. Entomologist	..	"	5.11.19
VENKATAKRISHNA-MUDLIAR, S. R., B.A.	Asst. Mycologist	..	"	5.11.19
PARANJPYE, H., B.A.	Asst. Botanist	..	"	13.11.19
VISWANATH, B., F.C.S.	Asst. Chemist	..	"	13.11.19

3. BLOCKADE AND CUSTOMS

PART I

Abbreviations

B.O.	Blockade Officer.	D.C.C.	Deputy Collector of Customs.
A.B.O.	Assistant Blockade Officer.	A.C.C.	Assistant Collector of Customs.
C.C.	Collector of Customs.		

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>								
CONNOLLY, Lieut. E. P.	B.O.	Zubair ..	8.5.17			
					Baghdad ..	1.7.17			
					Nasiriya ..	26.9.17			
					Kuwait ..	1.4.18			
COOPER, Capt. H. L.	A.C.C.	Basra ..	6.5.18			
					Baghdad ..	19.5.19			
DAVIDSON, Major J.	D.C.C.	" ..	5.7.19			
					D. of B. & C.C.	..	" ..	2.5.18	
FOX, Lieut. C. B.	D.C.C.	" ..	17.6.20			
					Khanaqin ..	24.7.20			
FRENCH, Lieut.-Col. W., D.S.O. M.C.	C.C.	Basra ..	5.7.20			
					GUEST, Capt. S. V.	A.B.O.
HARRIS, Capt. F. J.	A.C.C.	Baghdad ..				
					D.C.C.	Khanaqin ..	14.11.18
					D.C.C.	Sulaimani ..	5.7.20
					D.C.C.	Baghdad ..	7.1.19
HOOGWERF, Capt. V. H.	A.B.O.	" ..	10.5.18			
					A.C.C.	" ..	1.12.18
					D.C.C.	Sulaimani ..	3.7.19
					D.C.C.	Mosul ..	14.7.20
IBBITSON, Capt. A., M.C.	D.C.C.	Basra ..	2.3.19			
					MACLEOD, D. G.	D.C.C.
MONK, Lieut. H. M.	D.C.C.	" ..	24.5.20			
					Baghdad ..	6.8.20			
MURRAY, Capt. M. J., M.C.	D.C.C.	" ..	24.8.19			
					Khanaqin ..	1.6.20			
PEASE, Lieut. E. (<i>see also</i> No. 15. Govt. Press, &c.)	B.O.	Basra ..	2.7.17			
					RINGROW, Capt. N. V. V.	A.B.O.
Baghdad ..	5.8.18								
A.C.C.	Kirkuk ..	14.11.18					
D.C.C.	Sulaimani ..	1.3.19					
SIEVWRIGHT, A.G.H., M.B.E.	Major	B.O. & D.C.C.	Mosul ..	1.7.19			
					Baghdad ..	1.6.20			
					" ..	2.5.18			
					D. of B. & C.C. (Offg.)	..	26.9.18		
TUFFIL, Major H.	C.C.	Basra ..	27.12.19			
					Baghdad ..	11.8.20			
					D.C.C.	Basra ..	24.11.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
WARD, Capt. W. J.	D.C.C.	Basra	..	14.10.18
WARREN, Lieut. H. F.	A.B.O.	Baghdad	..	2.5.18
	D.C.C.	Basra	..	13.9.18
WATKINS, C. R., C.I.E.	Chief C.C., M.E.F.	"	..	5.8.15
	Secy. for Commerce	Baghdad	..	1.4.20
	(& EX OFF. Chief C.C. M.E.F.)			
	On Deputation	Bombay	..	31.8.20

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
NA'UM TAJAR EFF.	D.C.C.	Baghdad	..	1.3.18
WILLIAMSON, A. F.	A.C.C.	"	..	1.4.19
EATWELL, F. E.	Chief Insp. Customs	"	..	23.3.19
KHAMBATTA, P. M.	Chief Appraiser Customs	"	..	11.12.19

4. EDUCATION

PART I

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
BASE, Capt. E. H.	Dep. Dir.	Mosul	..	18.11.18
	Actg. Dir.	Baghdad	..	22.8.19
BOWMAN, Major H. E., C.B.E.	Dir. of Ed.	"	..	22.8.18
FARRELL, Capt. W. J.	A.D.	"	..	12.9.19
		Mosul	..	20.1.20
GLEN, J. A.	A.D.	Baghdad	..	7.4.20
KELLY, Miss J. M. W.	Principal, Girls' School	"	..	7.10.19
McTURK, Capt. N. A., O.B.E.	Asst. Rev. O. (Ed.)	"	..	22.6.18
	A.D.	"	..	1.12.18
NEWLAND, Capt. H. O.	Principal, Commercial School	"	..	4.4.20
NORTHCOTE, Capt. H. B. S.	A.D.	"	..	8.3.19
RILEY, F. B.	A.D.	"	..	10.10.19
		Basra	..	1.1.20
SMITH, Lieut. A. Lionel F., M.V.O. (<i>see also</i> No. 11.	A.D.	Baghdad	..	14.2.20
Political)	Dir. of Ed. (Offg.)	"	..	1.8.20
SNELL, H. S.	Principal, Tech. School	"	..	19.3.19
SPENCER, Capt. J. A.	Dep. Dir.	"	..	11.2.20
STOW, Capt. V. A. S.	Dep. Dir.	"	..	6.1.19
WILLIAMS, Lieut. T. P.	Asst. Rev. O. (Ed.)	"	..	27.4.18
	A.D.	"	..	1.12.18

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
HEWSON, G. A.	Supt. Phys. Trng. and Games	Baghdad	..	26.2.19
MACKENZIE, K.	Supt. Bookshop and Ed. Stores	"	..	4.4.20
PRIOR, W. J.	Supt. Phys. Trng. and Games	Mosul	..	1.3.19
SOMMERVILLE, J.	Inspr. of Schools	Baghdad	..	29.10.19
HUSNI 'ABDUL-HADI	Mudir of Ed.	"	..	1.10.19
MUHAMMAD, 'ABDUL 'AZIZ SA'ID	S.D.	"	..	13.12.17
SA'DUN BEG AL SHAWI	Principal Trng. Coll. . .	"	..	1.1.19
	P.A. to Dir. of Ed. . .	"	..	19.9.18
	P.A. to Dir. of Auqaf & Inspr. of Properties	"	..	1.10.19
YUSUF BEG 'IZZUDDIN	Mu'awin to Dir. of Ed.	"	..	1.10.18
SALIM HASSIM EFF.	Inspr. of Schools . .	Mosul	..	1.3.19
'ABDUL KARIM CHALABI	Supt. Arabic Office . .	Baghdad	..	1.6.19
PIR MUHAMMAD NAWAZ KHAN, B.A.	Inspr. of Schools . .	Basra	..	1.7.19
HAJI 'ALI EFF. AL 'ALUSI	Member Mejlis-al-Ma'araf	}	..	Baghdad
HAMDI BEG BABAN	Member Mejlis-al-Ma'araf			
PÈRE ANASTASE MARIE AL CARMALI	Member Mejlis-al-Ma'araf			
JA'FAR CHALABIAL HAJI DAUD ABU TIMMAN	Member Mejlis-al-Ma'araf			
SHUKRI EFF. AL 'ALUSI	Member Mejlis-al-Ma'araf			
JAMIL SIDQI EFF. AL ZAHAWI	Member Mejlis-al-Ma'araf			
'ABDULLAH MUZAF-FAR EFF.	P.A. to Dir. of Ed. . .			
MUHAMMAD KHALIL EFF.	Saiyid Asst. Master of Method Trng. Coll	17.1.20

5. IRRIGATION

NOTE: The Irrigation Department was taken over from M.E.F. as at 1st April, 1919.

PART I

Abbreviations.

I.O. Irrigation Officer.

A.I.O. Assistant Irrigation Officer.

D.I.O. District Irrigation Officer.

Sub. Div. O. Sub Divisional Officer.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
AITKEN, Major A. B., O.B.E., M.C.	D.I.O.	Hilla	1.4.19
	Dir. of I. (Offg.) ..	Baghdad ..	18.7.19
ANDERSON, A.	D.I.O.	'Ali Gharbi ..	8.4.20
ASHWORTH, Capt. T. B.	A.I.O.	Hindiya Barrage	1.4.19
ASTON, Capt. H. R.	D.I.O.	Baghdad ..	1.4.19
BARRY, Lieut. J. H. A.	A.I.O.	Hilla ..	24.7.19
		Baghdad ..	24.3.20
BATES, Lieut. R. I. W.	A.I.O.	" ..	13.1.20
		Falluja ..	30.4.20
BOOR, F. A. E.	D.A.D.	Baghdad ..	1.4.19
BOWERS, Col. P. L., C.I.E. M.C.	Dep. Dir.	Euphrates ..	1.4.19
BROWNE, Lt.-Col. D. R. H.	A.D.	Baghdad ..	1.4.19
BUCHANAN, E. L.	A.I.O.	Shahraban ..	10.1.20
CHANCE, Capt. P. V.	D.I.O.	Diwaniya ..	1.4.19
		Ramadi ..	17.6.19
CHAND, Lieut. S.	A.I.O.	Baghdad ..	1.4.19
COLLINGWOOD, Lieut. C.	D.I.O.	Nasiriya ..	17.12.19
COLVIN, C. J.	A.I.O.	Baghdad ..	8.1.20
COOPER, Lieut. F. A.	A.I.O.	Dali 'Abbas ..	1.4.19
	D.I.O.	Diwaniya ..	10.2.20
COOPER, Lieut. W. H.	A.I.O.	Hammar Lake ..	1.4.19
	D.I.O. (Offg.) ..	Nasiriya ..	1.6.19
EVERSHED, Capt. W. A.	A.I.O.	Diwaniya ..	1.4.19
FITZHERBERT, Capt. J. R. F.	A.I.O.	Balad Ruz ..	1.4.19
	D.I.O.	Baquba ..	1.6.19
FITZHERBERT, Capt. T. C.	A.I.O.	Baghdad ..	1.4.19
	D.I.O.	Hilla ..	10.6.19
		Baquba ..	1.12.19
		Kufa ..	1.5.20
FRANKLIN, R. E.	A.I.O.	Baghdad ..	3.10.19
FRENCH, Lieut. A. J.	A.I.O.	Falluja ..	23.1.20
		Baghdad ..	18.5.20
	D.I.O.	Nasiriya ..	1.8.20
GARROW, Colonel R. G., O.B.E.	Dep. Dir.	Tigris ..	1.4.19
GATES, H. F.	A.I.O.	Kut ..	10.1.20
		Baghdad ..	2.4.20
GLASS, Capt. F. C.	D.I.O.	" ..	1.4.19
GOSLING, J. E.	D.I.O.	Baghdad ..	1.4.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>					
GRANT, Capt. J. L.	A.I.O.	Hilla	1.4.19			
	D.I.O.	Kufa	17.10.19			
GRIGG, Lieut. E.	A.D.	Baghdad	8.6.19			
GRUNDY, F., M.C.	A.I.O.	Hilla	13.2.20			
GUNN, Major J. P.	A.I.O.	Baghdad	1.4.19			
	D.A.D.	"	18.7.19			
	A.D.	"	17.11.19			
HAMMOND, Capt. L.	D.I.O.	Abu Sukhair	1.4.19			
		Hindiya Barrage	30.6.19			
		Baghdad	5.12.19			
HARDMAN, B. J.	A.I.O.	"	10.1.20			
		Diwaniya	1.5.20			
HARTLEY, Capt. P. G.	A.I.O.	Hindiya Barrage	5.10.19			
HEMSWORTH, Capt. T. G. F.	A.I.O.	Hilla	1.4.19			
HENDRY, Lieut. J. T.	A.I.O.	Shatra	11.12.19			
HOWE, Capt. E.	A.I.O.	Baghaila	1.4.19			
JACKSON, Major J. D.	D.A.D.	Tigris	1.4.19			
	& D.I.O.	'Amara	1.4.19			
		Nasiriya	17.11.19			
JEFFERIS, Major C. E.	D.I.O.	Falluja	1.4.19			
JONES, Major O. I.	D.I.O.	'Amara	1.4.19			
KHOSLA, Lieut. A. N.	A.I.O.	Baghdad	1.4.19			
LAKE, Capt. C. F. F.	D.I.O.	Diwaniya	26.6.19			
	S.D. i/c Bridge Constn.	"	26.9.19			
LEWIS, Major A. E.	D.I.O.	Baquba	1.4.19			
LEWIS, Brig.-Gen. Ll. W.,	Dir. of I.	"	1.4.19			
MACARTHUR, Lieut. D. F. S.	A.I.O.	Mahmudiya	1.4.19			
		Diwaniya	24.11.19			
MACKINTOSH, Major	D.I.O. (River Con-	'Amara	1.4.19			
	servancy)					
MILLER, Lieut. B. L. St. C.	A.I.O.	Deltawa	1.4.19			
MILLER, Wm.	A.I.O.	Baghdad	20.5.19			
MOORE, Capt. E. C.	D.I.O.	Hindiya Barrage	29.3.20			
MORRISON, Lieut. A. D.	A.I.O.	Kut	1.8.20			
NIGHTINGALE, Capt. A. W.	A.I.O.	Baghdad	1.4.19			
	D.I.O.	"	10.6.19			
POLLARD, Major A. R.	D.I.O.	Hindiya Barrage	1.4.19			
POUND, Major W. G. W.	D.I.O.	Kut	1.4.19			
PRENDERGAST, Lieut.	A.I.O. (River Con-	'Amara	10.5.19			
	servancy)					
PURVES, F. M.	D.I.O.	Hilla	1.5.20			
ROBERTS, H. J. W.	A.I.O.	Baghdad	10.1.20			
ROBERTSON, Capt. G. L.	A.I.O.	Table Mountain	1.4.19			
ROBEY, Lieut. C. A.	A.I.O.	Karbala	1.4.19			
		Musaiyib	16.10.19			
	D.I.O.	Kut	5.3.20			
ROMAINE, E. C. St.	A.I.O.	Sakhlawiya	1.4.19			
		Ramadi	24.12.19			

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
RUNDLETT, Lieut. L. St. C.	A.I.O.	'Amara	1.4.19
SELLIER, Major P. J.	D.I.O.	Musaiyib ..	1.4.19
		Hindiya Barrage	1.9.19
SETHI, Lieut. A. R.	A.I.O.	Baghdad ..	1.4.19
SHARPE, G. O.	D.I.O.	'Amara	8.8.19
SHERIDAN, C. M. H.	A.I.O.	Baghdad ..	2.12.19
		Diwaniya, Kufa	7.6.20
SHOWERS, Lieut. F.	A.I.O.	Ramadi	1.4.19
		Baghdad	13.5.20
SIMPSON, Lieut. H. M.	A.I.O.	Baghaila ..	1.4.19
SMITH, G. I. G.	A.I.O.	Tuwairij ..	10.1.20
SMITH, Capt. R. H.	A.I.O.	Shahraban ..	1.4.19
STEEL, Capt. W. M.	D.I.O.	Baquba	1.4.19
STEPHENS, Capt. V. F.	D.I.O.	Kut	1.4.19
		Falluja	14.3.20
STRACHAN, J.	A.I.O.	Baghdad	10.1.20
		Daltawa	31.5.20
SULLIVAN, Lieut. J. H.	D.I.O.	Nasiriya ..	1.4.19
SYKES, Major E. F.	D.A.D.	Tigris'	1.4.19
		Dep. Dir.	18.7.19
TOWNSEND, Major F. A., D.S.O.	D.I.O.	Diwaniya	}
TRUELOVE, Major C. W.	D.A.D.	Euphrates	}
WALTON, Major H.	Dep. Dir.	Tigris	
		D.I.O.	
WARBRICK, Major P., M.C.	D.I.O.	Baghaila	}
WATAL, Lieut. A. P.	A.I.O.	Baghdad	}
WILLIAMS, H. N.	A.I.O.	"	
WILLIS, Capt. A. C.	A.I.O.	Kufa	1.4.19
		D.I.O.	Diwaniya ..
WILSON, C. E.	A.I.O.	'Amara	16.5.20

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
ANDERSON, A.	Sub. Div. O.	'Ali-Gharbi ..	1.4.19
ASKHAR, J.	Sub. Div. O.	Baghdad	1.4.19
		Ramadi	18.6.19
GEORGE, Joseph	Sub. Div. O.	Falluja	1.4.19
		Radwaniya ..	15.9.19
JONES, R. S.	Sub. Div. O.	Khalis, Khan	}
		Bani Sa'ad	
JOSHI, S. P.	Sub. Div. O.	Diwaniya	1.4.19
MISPELAAR, D. R.	Sub. Div. O.	"	}
		Baquba	
		Balad Ruz ..	30.6.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
SINGLETON, W.	Sub. Div. O.	Nasiriya
VAUGHAN, J. B.	Sub. Div. O.	Qalat Salih
WILSON, C. E.	Sub. Div. O.	Tuwairij
ALI RAFAAT EFF.	Sub. Div. O.	Rumaitha
FIDA HUSSAIN	Sub. Div. O.	Hilla
KANSHI RAM	Sub. Div. O.	Shamiya- Ghammas
			Rumaitha .. 26.8.19
RAM NARAIN	Sub. Div. O.	Baghaila .. 1.4.19
TOTA RAM	Sub. Div. O.	" .. 1.4.19
	A.I.O.	Sera .. 1.5.20
AGOP ALASHAMIAN	A.I.O.	Tuwairij .. 1.4.19
			Shaikh Sa'ad .. 6.1.20
BAREKH SOMEKH	A.I.O.	Tuwairij .. 1.4.19
ISWAR SINGH	A.I.O.	Hindiya Barrage
			Kufa .. 26.2.20
KESAR SINGH KASLAY	A.I.O.	Nasiriya .. 1.4.19
MENEZES, J. A. S.	A.I.O.	Musaiyib .. 1.4.19
			Karbala .. 23.6.19
RASHID EFF. F.	A.I.O.	Hindiya Barrage
			Shahraban .. 31.10.19
HUSSAIN FAUZI EFF.	Sub. Div. O.	Jarbu'iyah .. 18.2.10
IBRAHIM FAUZI BEG	A.I.O.	Karrada .. 22.4.20
JOWALA SINGH	Sub. Div. O.	Shaikh Sa'ad .. 28.5.20

6a. JUDICIAL

PART I

Abbreviations

Ct.	Court.	Sen.	Senior.
Jud.	Judicial.	M.G.	Military Governor.
Jun.	Junior.	Pres.	President.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
ABRAHAMAS, S. S.	Advocate-General	Baghdad .. 2.4.20
ALEXANDER, Major G.	Pres.	Mosul Ct. .. 25.2.20
BELL, B. H.	Asst. Jud. O.	Baghdad .. 31.5.18
	Pres.	Baghdad Ct. .. 25.10.18
BONHAM-CARTER, Sir	Sen. Jud. O.	Baghdad .. 29.9.17
Edgar, K.C.M.G., C.I.E.	Jud. Secy.	" .. 1.1.19
BROS, Major H. A.	Jun. Jud. O.	" .. 6.5.18
	Pres.	Baquba Ct. .. 3.11.18
DROWER, Major E. M.	Jun. Jud. O.	Baghdad .. 7.8.18
	Pres.	Mosul Ct. .. 1.1.19
			Basra Ct. .. 10.11.19
ELLIOTT, Capt. M. L. F., LL.B.	Asst. to Sen. Jud. O.	Basra .. 15.6.17
	Jun. Jud. O.	" .. 8.12.17

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
FORBES, H. F., C.I.E., I.C.S.	Jun. Jud. O. . . .	Basra	12.1.17
		Baghdad	1.1.18
	Pres.	Basra Ct. . . .	1.1.19
		Ct. of Appeal, Baghdad	5.7.19
GILBERT, Major A. S., I.C.S.	Jud. O.	Baghdad	28.5.19
	Pres.	Basra Ct. . . .	16.6.19
HOLMDEN, Major T. N., M.C.	Asst. Jud. O. . . .	Baghdad	22.10.18
	Pres.	Hilla Ct. . . .	24.12.18
KNOX, Lieut.-Col. S. G., C.S.I., C.I.E.	Sen. Jud. O. . . .	Basra	7.4.15
	Pres.	Ct. of Appeal, Baghdad	1.1.19
MACLAREN, Capt. A. I., M.C.	Asst. Jud. O. . . .	Baghdad	3.11.18
	Pres.	Baquba Ct. . . .	9.6.19
MACROBERTS, Capt. R. A. K.	Supt. Office of Sen. Jud. O.	Basra	8.12.17
	P.O. & Actg. M.G.	„	11.3.18
MOSSE, Major A. A. E.	Jun. Jud. O. . . .	Basra	1.9.16
MOUSLEY, Capt. E. O.	Legislative Draftsman	Baghdad	3.10.19
NORTON, E. L., I.C.S.	A.P.O.	Qalat Salih . . .	30.9.17
	Jun. Jud. O. . . .	Basra	30.11.17
		Baghdad	9.3.18
	Sen. Jud. O. . . .	Baquba	1.5.18
	Vice-Pres.	Baghdad Ct. . . .	3.11.18
O'MEARA, Capt. A. J.	Asst. Jud. O. . . .	Baghdad	11.1.20
PRITCHARD, Major J.	Pres.	Mosul Ct. . . .	11.9.19
WALKER, Lieut.-Col. A. L. Gordon, I.C.S.	1st Cl. Magis. (<i>see also</i> No. 11. Political)	Basra	5.4.20
		„	17.11.16
WOODMAN, Lieut. J.	Jud. O.	Baghdad	21.2.20
	Pres.	Baquba Ct. . . .	8.6.20
MIRZA MUHAMMAD, KHAN BAHADUR, C.I.E. (<i>See also</i> No. 11. Political)	Asst. Jud. O. and Pres. Court of Awards	Basra	15.6.15
	Judge of the Civil Court	„	1.1.19

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
CHAPGAR, F., B.A. & LL.B.	Asst. Legal Remem- brancer & Govt. Ad- vocate	Basra	17.3.16
	Registrar, Court of Small Causes	„	1.12.16
	Asst. Jud. O. . . .	'Ashar	5.3.18
'ABDUL WAHAB EFF.	Judge	Peace Ct., Baghdad	2.7.17
	Judge	Shara' Ct., Baghdad	2.7.17
'ALUSI ZADA HAJI 'ALI 'ALI EFF.	Asst. Judge	Shara' Ct., Baghdad	1.11.17

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
'ABDUL MAJID EFF. bin MULLA YASIN	Judge	Civil Ct., Basra	13.12.17
NURI YAQUB, NA'UM EFF.	Notary Public	Baghdad ..	1.1.18
JAMIL ZADA 'ABDUL JABBAR EFF.	Judge	Civil Ct., Baghdad ..	1.1.18
DAUD SAMRA EFF.	Judge	Civil Ct., Baghdad ..	1.1.18
		Ct. of Appeal, Baghdad	1.11.19
MEHTA, M. P., B.A., LL.B.	Registrar, Ct. of Small Causes	Basra	15.2.18
	Judge, Peace Ct. ..	„	1.1.19
HAJI SHUKRULLAH	Naib-el-Ja'fariya: Shia'h Jurist—Ct. of 1st Instance	Baghdad ..	17.2.18
DIKRAN EKMEKJIAN	Supt. Office of Sen. Jud. O.	„ ..	7.4.18
AHMAD HAMDI EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct. ..	Kirkuk	1.5.18
SAIYID SA'ID EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct. ..	Kifri	1.5.18
SAIYID SALIH EFF. bin SAIYID AHMAD	Judge, Ct. of 1st Instance	Baquba ..	16.5.18
	Member, 2nd Chamber, Civ. Ct.	Baghdad ..	1.9.18
FAIQ EFF.	Judge, Peace Ct. ..	Khanaqin ..	1.6.18
MULLA HUSSAIN EFF.	Qadhi of Baquba ..	„	1.6.18
	Judge, Civil Ct. ..	Baghdad ..	1.10.19
SHAIKH MUHAMMAD bin MAHMUD	Naib-el-Ja'fariya ..	Hilla	1.6.18
PIR ALI MUHAMMAD KHAN	Public Prosecutor ..	Basra	16.6.18
MUFTI ZADA SA'ID EFF.	Pres., Majlis of Appeal	Baghdad ..	1.7.18
KAZIM EFF.	Member, Majlis of Appeal	„ ..	1.7.18
SAIYID KHIDHR EFF.	Member, Shara' Ct. of Appeal	„ ..	1.7.18
	S.D.	„	14.3.19
	Judge (Offg.), Civil Ct.	„ ..	1.3.20
MUHAMMAD FAHMI EFF.	S.D.	„	1.7.18
SAIYID MUHAMMAD AMIN EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct. ..	Shahraban ..	1.12.19
	Qadhi of Mandahi ..	„	1.7.18
QUBA ZADEH 'ABDUL AMIN	S.D.	Baghdad ..	19.7.18
	Naib-el-Ja'fariya ..	Baquba ..	1.1.20
AHMAD IZZAT EFF. EL HIJAZI	Member, 2nd Chamber, Civ. Ct.	Baghdad ..	23.7.18
	Judge, Civ. Ct. of 1st Instance	Baquba ..	30.8.18
	Judge, Civ. Ct. ..	Baghdad ..	6.4.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
M. RUBIN BATTAT	Member, 2nd Chamber, Civ. Ct.	Baghdad	.. 23.7.18
'ABDUL MALIK SHAWAF EFF.	Member, Shara' Majlis of Appeal	"	.. 1.8.18
'ABDUL LATIF EFF. RAWI	Qadhi of Khanaqin 21.8.18
MUHAMMAD SA'ID EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Ramadi	.. 1.9.18
SAIYID SHIHAB EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Hit	.. 1.9.18
AHMAD EFF. AL KHALAF	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Falluja	.. 1.9.18
MUHAMMAD EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Kubaisa	.. 1.10.18
TALATI, A. P.	Supt. Law Cts.	Baghdad	.. 1.10.18
'ABDUL HAMID EFF. MIDHAT	Judge, Civ. Ct.	Hilla	.. 30.10.18
HAJI MUHAMMAD bin EL SAIYID SALIH	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	'Ana	.. 1.11.18
'ABDUL HAQQ EFF. MUHAMMAD SA'ID EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct. Judge, Peace Ct.	Hilla .. Kifri 26.11.18 .. 1.12.18
MUHAMMAD EFF. SHARIF	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Albu Kamal	.. 15.12.18
SULAIMAN FAIZI EFF.	Judge, Civ. Ct. Judge, Ct. of Appeal	Basra .. Baghdad 1.1.19 .. 1.11.19
AHMAD FAKHRI EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Tel 'Afar	.. 8.1.19
SAIYID AHMAD EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Dair-ez-Zor	.. 14.1.19
MULLA EFF. TAHA	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Samarra	.. 27.1.19
SHAIKH QASIM bin HAJI MUHAMMAD ZIA-'UD- DIN-SHA'AR	Judge, Shara' Ct.	Basra 1.3.19
AHMAD EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Amadia	.. 1.3.19
ISMA'IL EFF.	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	Zakho 1.3.19
KHIDR EFF.	Judge, Peace Ct.	Dair-ez-Zor	.. 14.3.19
SHAIKH JA'FAR AL WASH	Naib-el-Ja'fariya	Hilla 18.3.19
AHMAD EFF. bin SA'ID EFF.	Judge, Civ. Ct.	Baghdad	.. 1.4.19
MOHAMMAD KHUR- SHID EFF.	Judge, Peace Ct.	Kirkuk 1.4.19
SAIYID SA'ID EFF.	Qadhi	Kifri	} .. 1.5.19
AHMAD HAMDI EFF.	Judge, Shara' Ct.	Kirkuk	
MUHAMMAD RASHID EFF.	Judge, Shara' Ct.	Arbil	
DARWISH DANISH EFF.	Judge, Peace Ct.	Arbil	
SADIQ MIDHAR EFF.	Judge, Peace Ct.	Mosul	
SAIYID AHMAD EFF.	Judge, Shara' Ct.	"	
MUHAMMAD RA'UF EFF.	Judge, Civ. Ct.	"	
SAIYID LUFTI EFF.	Judge, Civ. Ct.	"	
SAIYID KHALIL EFF.	Qadhi & Judge, Peace Ct.	Diwaniya	.. 15.5.19
GHALIB THOMAS EFF.	Notary Public ..	Basra 1.6.19
MUHI-'UD-DIN EFF. IBN MUHAMMAD YAHYA	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	'Amara 15.6.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
'ABDUL MAJID EFF. AHMAD JAMIL	Judge, Peace Ct.	.. 'Amara 19.6.19
SAIYID 'ALA-UD-DIN AL 'ALUSI	Qadhi, Shara Ct.	.. Tikrit 26.6.19
'ATA MOHAMMAD	Public Prosecutor	.. Basra 1.7.19
SAIYID MUSTAFA IBN SAIYID 'ALI	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	.. Qizil Robot 1.9.19
MUHAMMAD 'ALI EFF.	Judge, Civ. Ct.	.. Hilla 12.8.19
SHAIKH MUSTAFA bin SHAIKH MUHAMMAD	Qadhi, Shara' Ct.	.. Qizil Robot 1.9.19
NASH'AT EFF. AL SANAWI	Govt. Advocate	.. Baghdad 11.9.19
SALIH EFF. PACHACHI	Judge, Civ. Ct.	.. " 3.11.19
AHMAD HILMI EFF.	Legal Asst. to Jud. Secy.	.. " 10.11.19
'ABDULLA EFF. ibn 'ABDUL SALAM AL- 'ADHAMI	Judge, Civ. Ct.	.. Basra 17.11.19
AKRAIM EFF.	Notary Public Mosul 1.1.20
SHAIKH MUHAMMAD FADHIL	Naib-el-Ja'fariya	.. Karbala 6.1.20
'ABDUL HAMID EFF. bin MULLA AHMAD	Judge, Peace Ct.	.. Khanaqin 8.1.20
SHAIKH 'ALI bin SHAIKH MUHAMMAD	Naib-el-Ja'fariya	.. Baquba 6.4.20
MIRZA AHMAD DARA	Asst. Judge, Peace Ct.	.. Najaf 1.2.20
JAMIL EFF. AL ZAHAWI	Pres. Jud. Transl. Comn.	.. Baghdad 1.3.20
SAIYID MAHDI TEHRANI	Naib-el-Ja'fariya	.. " 1.3.20
'ABDUL MAJID EFF.	Naib-el-Ja'fariya	.. Mandali 10.3.20
'ABDUL MAJID EFF.	Pres. Mun. Ct.	.. Kirkuk 1.4.20

6b. CIVIL JAILS

(See also No. 8. Medical and Health Service.)

PART I

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
FINNIMORE, G.	Supt. Baghdad Jail 1.10.18
LANE, Lieut.-Col. W. B., C.I.E., C.B.E.	Inspr. Gen. of Jails Actg. Secy. for Health Baghdad " 1.2.19 .. 1.11.19
WATSON, Lieut. G. L.	Supt. Baghdad Jail 26.7.18

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
NEALE, C. A.	Supt. Basra Jail 13.3.20
QUINLAN, J. T. H.	Supt. Mosul Jail 13.3.20
HOLMAN, H.	Supt. Office of I.G. Jails, Baghdad	.. 13.3.20

7. LEVIES: SHABANA: GENDARMERIE

PART I

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
AMOS, Lieut. A.	Comdt. Sagwand Levies	Dizful	10.3.20
BADDELY, Lieut. P. T.	Attd. 4th Euphrates ..	Diwaniya	..	13.12.19
BARKE, Capt. C. R.	Asst. Inspg. O. Arab Levies	Baghdad		3.5.20
BARLOW, Lieut. R. F.	Attd. Gendarmerie ..	Mosul	22.7.19
BEREY, Capt. C. E.	Attd. Levies	Hilla	29.7.18
	Comdt. Dulaim Levies	Ramadi	1.12.18
	Comdt. Diyala Levies	Baquba	15.6.19
BEVAN, Capt. A. H.	Comdt. Levies	Ezra's Tomb	..	22.9.18
	also Actg. A.P.O. ..	Qalat Salih	..	1.1.19
	Comdt. Levies	'Amara	1.3.19
	Comdt. 3rd Tigris ..	Qalat Salih	..	12.3.19
	Comdt. 2nd Tigris ..	Kut	29.3.20
BOURNE, Lieut. J.	Attd. Levies	Sulaimani	..	2.8.20
BOYES, Capt. A., M.M.	Attd. Levies	Hilla	7.11.18
	Attd. 2nd Tigris ..	'Aziziya	..	1.5.19
	Comdt. Levies	Dair-ez-Zor	..	11.9.19
	Comdt. Dist. Police ..	Diwaniya	..	6.1.20
BOYLE, Bt. Major, C. A., D.S.O.	Comdt. Levies	Hilla	30.12.17
	Inspg. O. Arab Levies	Baghdad	..	12.3.19
BRADFIELD, Lieut. J. T.	Attd. Diyala Levies ..	Baquba	12.2.19
	Comdt. Diyala Levies	"	11.12.19
BRUCE, Capt. A. H. C.	Attd. Levies	Zubair	21.5.19
		Nasiriya	..	1.1.20
BUCK, Capt. H.	Attd. 2nd Euphrates ..	Hilla	21.11.19
	Adj. Arab Levies ..	Baghdad	..	7.4.20
BUTTOLPH, Lieut. W. G.	Attd. Levies	'Aziziya	..	30.8.18
	Attd. 3rd Euphrates (Levies)	Kufa	1.5.19
	Comdt. 4th Tigris (Levies)	Qurna	31.7.19
	Comdt. Dulaim Gendarmerie	Ramadi	8.4.20
CARVOSSO, Capt. J. P.	Attd. Gendarmerie ..	Mosul	14.7.19
CASTELLO, Lieut. E.	Attd. Levies	Sulaimani	..	13.9.19
	Asst. to P.O.	"	..	10.4.20
CAUNTER, Lieut. H. E.	Attd. 2nd Tigris ..	Kut	4.10.19
	Attd. Dulaim Gendarmerie	Ramadi	1.4.20
CHANING-PEARCE, Capt. M. S.	Attd. Levies	Hilla	7.6.18
		Diwaniya	..	1.12.18
	Adj. Arab Levies ..	Baghdad	..	21.9.19
	Inspg. O. (Offg.) ..	"	..	16.11.19
DANIELS, Bt. Major A. M.	Comdt. Levies	Sulaimani	..	2.12.18
DAVIES, Lieut. J. F.	Attd. 3rd Euphrates ..	Nasiriya	..	21.10.19
DUNSTON, Lieut. A. E. A.	Attd. Levies	Zubair	4.6.18

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
EDDOWES, Lieut. E. G. B.	Attd. 2nd Tigris	..	Kut	..	17.4.20
FITZGIBBON, Capt. H.	Comdt. Levies	..	Sulaimani	..	25.5.19
GARBETT, Capt. R. B. L.	Attd. 2nd Euphrates	..	Hilla	..	19.4.19
	Comdt. 1st Tigris	..	Samarra	..	1.12.19
	Attd. 2nd Euphrates	..	Hilla	..	1.6.20
GOLDNEY, Lieut. A. L. T.	Attd. Levies	..	"	..	10.1.19
	Attd. 4th Euphrates	..	Diwaniya	..	12.3.19
GOWAN, Capt. C. H., M.C.	Comdt. Gendarmerie	..	Mosul	..	12.11.18
GREENHOUSE, Capt. R. E.	Attd. 2nd Euphrates	..	Hilla	..	13.3.19
HAKE, Lieut. H. D.	Attd. 3rd Tigris	..	Qalat Salih	..	20.3.19
HALL, Capt. F. W.	Comdt. Levies	..	Nasiriya	..	20.8.18
HAUSER, Capt. S. B.	Q.M. Arab Levies	..	Baghdad	..	12.4.19
HUGHES, Capt. D.	Attd. Levies	..	Hilla	..	15.10.18
	Comdt. 2nd Euphrates	..	"	..	12.3.19
HUTCHINSON, Capt. L. A., M.C.	Attd. Gendarmerie	..	Arbil	..	1.6.20
JONES, Capt. J.	Attd. 3rd Euphrates	..	Kufa	..	25.5.19
	Attd. Diyala Levies	..	Baquba	..	15.5.20
KENNY, Lieut. H. T.	Attd. Diyala Levies	..	"	..	28.1.19
LEWIS, Capt. C. C. C.	Comdt. Levies	..	Qurna	..	26.8.18
	A.P.O.	..	"	..	16.6.19
LITTLEDALE, Capt. C. E.	Attd. Gendarmerie	..	Mosul	..	8.4.19
	Comdt. Gendarmerie	..	Arbil	..	1.12.19
MACDONALD, Lieut. H., M.C.	Attd. Gendarmerie	..	Mosul	..	1.3.19
MACHAN, Capt. D. P.	Attd. Levies	..	Kut	..	1.1.19
McNEARNIE, Lieut. H.	Attd. Gendarmerie	..	Mosul	..	13.9.19
McWHINNIE, Lieut. F. J.	Attd. 2nd Euphrates	..	Hilla	..	1.6.20
McWHINNIE, Capt. W.	Comdt. Shamiya Levies	..	Najaf	..	11.3.18
	Comdt. 3rd Euphrates	..	Kufa	..	1.8.18
	Comdt. 2nd Euphrates	..	Hilla	..	1.7.19
MAKANT, Capt. R. K., M.C.	Asst. Inspg. O. Arab Levies	..	Baghdad	..	1.4.19
	Attd. Levies	..	Sulaimani	..	1.10.19
MARGRETT, Lieut. T. A.	Attd. Levies	..	Hilla	..	7.9.18
		..	Ramadi	..	1.12.18
		..	Basra	..	1.3.19
MARTIN, Capt. W. G.	Attd. Levies	..	Sulaimani	..	2.2.19
MATTHEWS, Capt. L. G.	Attd. 1st Tigris	..	Samarra	..	29.5.19
	Attd. 3rd Euphrates	..	Kufa	..	17.9.19
	Comdt. 3rd Euphrates	..	Abu Sukhair	..	1.12.19
MOYSEY, Lieut. R. A. Z.	Comdt. Levies	..	Khanaqin	..	9.9.18
O'BRIEN, Capt. D. P. (<i>see also No. 2. Agriculture</i>)	Attd. 1st Euphrates	..	Ramadi	..	1.5.19
	Attd. 4th Euphrates	..	Diwaniya	..	1.8.19
	Comdt. 4th Euphrates	..	"	..	16.11.19
O'CONNOR, Capt. R. L.	Attd. Levies	..	Hilla	..	11.11.18
	Comdg. 4th Euphrates	..	Diwaniya	..	12.3.19
	Adjt. (Offg.) Arab Levies	..	Baghdad	..	16.11.19
	A.P.O.	..	Abu Sukhair	..	22.3.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
O'REILLY, Capt. D. O.	Attd. 3rd Euphrates ..	Abu Sukhair ..	11.12.19
PEDDER, Capt. G. R.	Comdt. Diyala Levies ..	Baquba ..	29.5.18
RAMSAY, Lieut. H. S.	Attd. Diyala Levies ..	„ ..	1.8.20
SIMPSON, Lieut. E. C.	S.D.	Baghdad ..	17.3.19
	Attd. 3rd Euphrates ..	Nasiriya ..	31.5.19
STUART, Lieut. B., D.S.O.	Attd. Gendarmerie ..	Mosul ..	13.4.20
TERRY, Lieut. T. B.	Attd. 3rd Euphrates ..	Kufa ..	21.1.19
	Attd. 2nd Euphrates ..	Hilla ..	1.8.19
	Attd. Gendarmerie ..	Mosul ..	13.12.19
THOMAS, Lieut. D.	Attd. 2nd Euphrates ..	Hilla ..	22.2.19
THOMAS, Capt. E. C.	A.P.O. (for Levies) ..	Ana, Albu Kamal	26.1.19
	Comdt. 1st Euphrates	Ramadi ..	15.5.19
WHITE, Capt. S. H. V.	Attd. Shamiya Levies ..	Najaf ..	22.9.18
	Attd. 1st Tigris ..	Samarra ..	12.3.19
	Attd. Gendarmerie ..	Mosul ..	14.11.19
WILLIAMS, Capt. L., M.B.E.	Attd. 1st Euphrates ..	Ramadi ..	1.4.20
	Comdt. Dulaim Gen- darmarie	„ ..	15.5.19
SARDAR 'ABDUL RAH- MAN EFF. Capt.	Attd. Levies	Sulaimani ..	6.2.19

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
'ALI AL MANSUR	Comdt. Nasiriya Scouts	Nasiriya ..	1.3.18
HIZAM BEY YUZHASHI	Attd. Nasiriya Scouts ..	„ ..	1.3.18
	Squadron Leader, Mun- tafiq Horse	„ ..	1.1.19
FAISAL AL MUSHARI	Squadron Leader, Mun- tafiq Horse	„ ..	1.1.19
SHAGBAN AL 'ALI	Squadron Leader, Mun- tafiq Horse	„ ..	1.1.19
YASIR AL NAHI	Squadron Leader, Mun- tafiq Horse	„ ..	1.1.19
YUZHASHI KHALIL	Attd. 1st Euphrates ..	Ramadi ..	1.7.19
MUZAFFAR	Attd. 2nd Euphrates ..	Hilla ..	6.7.19

8. MEDICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES

PART I

Abbreviations.

Asst. Surg. Assistant Surgeon. D.A.D.M.S. Deputy Assistant Director
 Sub Assist. Surg. Sub Assistant Surgeon. of Medical Services.
 C.S. Civil Surgeon. M.O.H. Medical Officer of Health.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
BASSETT, Capt. F. L.	Chief Chemical Examiner Central Lab.	Baghdad	.. 11.12.19
BATTYE, Lieut.-Col. W. R., D.S.O.	D.A.D.M.S. (Civil) Secy. for Health 13.8.18 .. 1.4.19
BISHOP, Major T. H.	C.S. & Supt. of Jail	.. Basra Baghdad 6.6.16 .. 1.4.17
	C.S. 'Arabistan	.. Ahwaz 1.9.17
BORRIE, Capt. D. F., O.B.E.	Asst. Secy. for H.	.. Baghdad 1.4.19
BRAHAM, Capt. G. N., M.C.	C.S. & Supt. of Jail M.O.	.. Basra Baghdad 21.5.15 .. 8.5.19
BUIST, Capt. T. P.	Asst. Secy. for H. 22.4.19
BULL, Capt. L. J. F.	C.S.	.. Basra 30.4.19
CAMPBELL, Capt. C. G. H.	C.S.	.. Kut 5.3.19
CAMPBELL, Dr. W.	Asst. M.O.H. & Port H.O.	.. Basra 4.4.20
CAMPBELL-MACKIE, Dr. W.	Surg. Specialist, Gen. Hosp.	New Baghdad	.. 9.3.20
CAREY-EVANS, Major T. J., M.C.	M.O. 13.9.17
CLOUGH, Dr. J. R. B.	C.S.	.. Samarra 22.3.20
CONYBEARE, Capt. I. I., M.C.	M.O. New Gen. Hosp.	.. Baghdad 16.2.20
CORBIN, Major H. E.	M.O.H. 2.12.17
CORNER, Capt. W., O.B.E.	M.O. New Gen. Hosp. M.O. (Rlys.) Basra 22.3.19 .. 5.8.20
DAKEYNE, Dr. D. I.	Bacteriologist, New Gen. Hosp.	.. Baghdad 4.4.20
DALLAS, Capt. D. C. McC.,	Chief M.O. (Rlys.) & Actg. Dir. X-Ray Inst. 13.5.20
DICKIE, Capt. J.	C.S.	.. Baquba Khanaqin 18.4.19 .. 26.7.19
DOUGLAS, Lieut. T. H. J.	M.O. (S.D. New Gen. Hosp.)	.. Baghdad 25.3.19
DOW, Dr. R.	C.S.	.. Sulaimani 22.3.20
DUNLOP, Capt. W., O.B.E.	Dir. New Gen. Hosp.	.. Baghdad 16.4.19
FINCH, Capt. G.	Port M.O.H.	.. Basra 4.10.16
FLOOD, Capt. J. W.	C.S.	.. Qizil Robot 1.3.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
FOOTNER, Dr. B. M., M.B.E.	Dir. New Gen. Hosp.	Baghdad	..	13.5.20
GRAHAM, Lieut.-Col. J. D., C.I.E.	Dir. M. & H. Services	"	..	24.5.20
GRAHAME, Capt. M. C. R.	M.O.H.	"	..	30.4.18
GRICE, C. R.	P.A. to Dir.	"	..	29.5.20
HALL, Capt. A. H.	C.S.	Diwaniya	..	27.3.19
HALLEY, Capt. F. M.	C.S.	Mosul	16.12.18
		Rowandiz	..	10.1.19
		Najaf	6.6.19
		Basra	1.4.20
HALLINAN, Capt. T. J.	M.O.H.	Basra	1.4.20
HEGGS, Major T. B.	M.O.H.	Baghdad	..	7.8.18
HOCKIN, Lieut. F. W.	i/c Med. Stores ..	"	..	15.2.19
HOWAT, Capt. W.	M.O. (S.D. New Gen. Hosp.)	"	..	15.2.19
JAMIESON, Capt. E.	C.S.	Sulaimani	..	4.12.18
		'Arabistan	Ahwaz
KERR, Dr. J. F.	M.O. New Gen. Hosp. C.S.	Baghdad	..	13.2.20
		Ramadi	18.4.20
KIRK, Capt. J. B.	M.O. & A.P.O. C.S. 'Arabistan M.O.	Hai	26.3.18
		Ahwaz	1.9.18
		Baghdad	..	21.1.18
KNEE, Lieut. & Q.M. W.	i/c Med. Stores ..	Basra	10.6.19
LAMONT, Mrs. M., M.D., B.S., D.P.H.	Asst. M.O.H.	Baghdad	..	9.12.18
LEWIS, Capt. J. B. S.	C.S. 'Arabistan	Ahwaz	4.4.19
MACCONAGHEY, Major C. B., I.M.S.	M.O.H.	Baghdad	..	20.3.17
MACDOUGALL, Capt. D. K.	C.S.	Mosul	24.2.19
MACKENZIE, Capt. J.	Port M.O.H.	Basra	9.10.18
MCLEOD, Dr. T. H.	C.S. M.O. i/c Isoln. Hosp.	Diwaniya	..	15.5.20
		Baghdad	..	26.8.20
McRITCHIE, Dr. P., M.C.	Ophthalmic Surg. ..	Basra	18.5.20
MARTRET, A. A.	Asst. Med. Stores O. ..	Baghdad	..	2.5.20
MECREDY, Dr. R. J. R.	C.S. M.O. Cent. Admin. ..	Karbala	..	27.3.19
		Baghdad	..	22.8.20
MERRIN, Lieut. B. D.	C.S.	Ramadi	22.2.19
MILLER, Capt. J. H. H.	C.S.	Sulaimani	..	11.4.19
		Köi	7.8.19
MILLS, Dr. E. A.	M.O. Civ. Hosp.	Mosul	4.4.20
MILNE, Lieut. A.	C.S. also A.P.O. (Offg.) ..	'Ali Gharbi	..	19.7.18
		"	..	1.9.18
	
MITCHELL, Capt. C. A. D.	Chemist, Central Lab.	Basra	28.4.19
		Baghdad	..	11.8.19.
NORE, Dr. H. I.	C.S.	Mosul	5.1.20
NAPIER, Major A. H.	C.S. & A.P.O. C.S. 'Arabistan C.S. (& Dir. Med. Stores)	Basra	14.2.17
		Kut	16.4.17
		Ahwaz	7.11.18
		Basra	6.5.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>	
NICHOLSON, Capt. M. A.	C.S.	Mosul 8.1.19
NORMAN, Major A. C.	Dir. X-Ray Inst. New Gen. Hosp.	Baghdad 1.8.19
OLDHAM, Dr. A. C.	C.S. 'Arabistan ..	Ahwaz 7.5.20
OLIVER, A/Major T. H.	C.S.	Basra 22.2.19
PATERSON, Capt. A. I. F., D.S.O.	M.O.H.	" 3.12.19
PATERSON, Dr. J.	C.S.	Mosul 30.4.20
PATTERSON, Capt. J. W.	M.O.H.	Basra 25.1.19
PFEIL, Dr. (Miss) E. M.	M.O. Civ. Hosp. ..	" 11.2.20
PIM, Capt. D. C., D.S.O.	M.O.	Baghdad 25.3.19
RAMSAY, Dr. J. D.	C.S.	Basra 9.6.20
RAMSAY, Capt. R. C. B.	M.O.H.	" 15.9.19
ROBERTSON, Capt. J. M.	M.O. i/c Isoln. Hosp.	Baghdad 17.3.20
SANDFORD, Dr. (Miss) E. L.	M.O. Civ. Hosp. ..	" 18.7.20
SANDISON, Dr. J. F. W., O.B.E., M.C.	Actg. Dir. H. Services	" 13.2.20
SANSOM, Dr. E. A. L.	C.S.	Najaf 22.3.20
SAUNDERS, Capt. B. T.	Asst. M.O.H.	Baghdad 21.3.19
SCOTT, Major N. E. H., C.I.E.	M.O. (and i/c Jails) ..	Basra 30.12.14
	S.D.	Baghdad 2.4.17
	On Temp. Deputation to	Mohammerah .. 1.6.19
SHELTON, Dr. C. F.	C.S.	Nasiriya 22.3.20
SINDERSON, Capt. H. C.	Asst. Secy. for Health	Baghdad 27.3.19
	C.S.	Hilla 11.7.19
SOMMERVILLE, Capt. T. V., O.B.E., M.C.	M.O. Cent. Admin. ..	Baghdad 10.1.20
SPENCER, Capt. G. W.	Ophthalmic Surg. New Gen. Hosp.	" 1.8.19
TAPPING, Capt. A.	C.S. & Supt. of Jail ..	Basra 23.1.19
TAYLOR, Major J., D.S.O.	M.O.H.	Baghdad 28.12.18
	M.O.H.	" 1.4.19
THORBURN, Major H. H. C.I.E. (I.M.S.)	C.S.	Khanaqin & Qasr-i-Shirin .. 1.7.18
	S.D. with Urmiya Refugees	Baquba 26.8.18
	C.S. & A.P.O.	Hamadan 23.10.18
TRACEY, Dr. H. E. H.	M.O. (Dental Surg.) ..	Basra 4.4.20
WAKEFIELD, Dr. (Miss)	M.O.	" 3.6.19
WHITE, Capt. J. P.	M.O. i/c Isoln. Hosp.	Baghdad 22.2.19
WILLIAMS, Capt. W.	C.S.	Köi 4.4.19
		Sulaimani 7.8.19
WILLIAMSON, Dr. H.	C.S.	Arbil 22.3.20
WITH, Capt. P. A.	C.S.	'Amara 1.7.19
WOOD, Capt. T. H.	M.O.H.	Basra 27.12.16
WOODMAN, Capt. G. S.	C.S.	Kirkuk 25.2.19
YOLLAND, Capt. R. H.	Asst. M.O.H.	Basra 3.12.19

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
ARMSTRONG, O. V. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. S.D. 24.5.19 Qurna 9.10.19
BRODIE, A. H. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. Baghdad 19.6.20
BROWN, J. M. M. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. Basra 14.6.20
COUTTS, J. S. P. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. Khanaqin 19.6.20
EVANS, P. S. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. Basra 7.6.20
FORBES, R. B. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. " 7.6.20
GALE, R. C. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. " 10.6.20
GOODMAN, J. G., M.C. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. S.D. 3.5.19 Basra 24.2.20
MARKS, E. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. Baghdad 6.6.20
MERLE, F. S. Le (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. Basra 21.10.17
PATEMAN, E. A. T. (I.M.D.)	Asst. Surg. " 5.6.20
DOCTOR MAMENDI	'Amara 3.6.15
" NURULLAH	Baghdad 1.4.17
" T. KURDIAN	" 1.8.18
" 'ISA NURI	Kirkuk 1.11.18
" KHAYATT	Mosul
" SA'ATI	" 1.11.18
" YAHYA BEG	"
" QALIAN	"
" FATHULLAH	Kirkuk 1.12.18
" S. ADATTO	Baghdad 14.12.18
" SABRI MURAD	" 23.12.18
" N. FAUD	Koi 7.2.19
" JAMIL	Kifri 21.2.19
" F. BANNA	Baghdad 23.3.19
" RA'UF	Mosul 25.3.19
" K. S. VAJABEDIAN	Sulaimani 1.4.19
" FAIQ SHAKIR	Baghdad 11.4.19
" STAVRUS ANAGNASTIDIS	" 1.5.19
" N. Y. FARAGE	Baquba 21.6.19
" OGOB TCHOBANIAN	Baghdad 28.7.19
" B. H. SARSAM	Arbil 1.11.19
" B. M. ALTUNIAN	Mandali 18.2.20
" S. H. CHURUKIAN	Baghdad 26.5.20
KHAN SAHIB G. B. KHAN (I.M.D.)	Sub.Asst. Surg. 1st Grade S.D. 26.3.15 Tikrit 30.10.19
RAI SAHIB DEV. RAJ. (I.M.D.)	Sub.Asst. Surg. 1st Grade Nasiriya 18.10.15
SAIYID SARFARAZ HUS-SAIN (I.M.D.)	Sub.Asst. Surg. 1st Grade S.D. 30.9.16 Kadhimain 16.8.19
'ABDUL HAMID (I.M.D.)	Sub.Asst. Surg. 1st Grade S.D. 19.1.18 Suq-ash-Shuyukh 18.1.20
JAHAN KHAN (I.M.D.)	Sub.Asst. Surg. 1st Grade Samarra 4.2.18
MANGALSINGH (I.M.D.)	Sub.Asst. Surg. 1st Grade Hilla 29.10.18

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
HALDERI, S. A. S. (I.M.D.),	Sub. Asst. Surg. 1st Grade	Sulaimani	1.4.19
GOBIND SAHAI (I.M.D.)	Sub. Asst. Surg. 1st Grade	Baghdad	8.6.19
MUHAMMAD KHAN (I.M.D.)	Sub. Asst. Surg. 1st Grade	Sulaimani	11.1.20
SAIYID K. ALI (I.M.S.)	Sub. Asst. Surg. 1st Grade	Qalat Salih	9.2.20
BANERJEE, J. S. (I.M.S.)	Sub. Asst. Surg. 1st Grade	Fao	11.2.20
DHANI RAM (I.M.S.)	Sub. Asst. Surg. 1st Grade	Basra	7.7.20
RUTTER, R. (I.M.S.)	Chief San. Inspr. Ashar	„	11.1.20

9. NURSING SERVICE

NOTE The Hospitals or like Establishments maintained by the Civil Administration (as from 1st January, 1919) were designated as follows:

At Basra: Civil Hospital; Civil Nursing Home.

At Baghdad: New General Hospital; Maternity Hospital; Isolation Hospital; Serai Nursing Home.

At Mosul: Civil Hospital.

The names of the Matrons of these Institutions from time to time are given in the List; the Nursing Sisters were employed at one or other of the Institutions in Basra, Baghdad, or Mosul, as stated against their names at the dates mentioned.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
ASHLEY, Miss A. B.	Matron Civ. Hosp.	Basra	1.6.19
BARKER, Miss N., M.B.E.	Matron Civ. Hosp.	„	1.1.19
BARTON, Miss E. M.	Sister	Baghdad	29.6.19
BEESTON, Miss H. T.	Sister	Mosul	20.4.19
CRONIN, Miss R. P.	Sister	Baghdad	18.4.20
DAVIES, Miss E.	Sister	Mosul	12.2.20
DAVIS, Miss A. B.	Sister	Basra	12.2.20
EMUSS, Miss E. A.	Matron, Maternity Hosp.	Baghdad	18.4.19
	Matron, Serai Home	„	6.10.19
GOWAN, Miss F. W.	Sister	„	11.2.20
HAWKINS, Miss J. E.	Sister	„	11.2.20
ILES, Miss H. L.	Sister	„	10.4.19
JACKSON, Miss G. L.	Sister	„	11.12.19
KIDD, Miss E.	Sister	Basra	11.2.20
LORRAINE, Miss E. M., M.B.E.	Sister	„	31.3.19
LORRAINE, Miss R. E.	Sister	Baghdad	9.3.19
LUNDIE, Miss E.	Sister	„	1.10.19
McCLURE, Miss M. A.	Sister	Mosul	20.4.19
McKAY, Miss E.	Sister	Basra	16.3.19
McQUEEN, Miss M.	Sister	Baghdad	18.6.19
MARTIN, Miss M. J.	Matron, New Gen. Hosp.	„	25.3.19
	Matron, Civ. Hosp.	Mosul	11.11.19
MARTIN, Miss W. M.	Sister	Baghdad	1.2.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>					
MORRISON, Miss R. E.	Sister	Baghdad	.. 9.3.19
POPE, Miss M. J.	Sister	"	.. 9.3.19
PRATT, Miss A. M.	Sister	"	.. 11.2.20
REID, Miss E. M.	Sister	Basra	.. 11.12.19
SNELLGROVE, Miss A. G.	Sister	"	.. 22.4.19
SPENCE, Miss M. J.	Sister	"	.. 18.9.19
WADE, Miss A. F.	Sister	"	.. 17.5.20
WHEATLEY, Miss K. H.	Matron, Civ. Hosp.	Mosul	.. 11.4.19
	Matron Isoln. Hosp.	Baghdad	.. 20.3.20
WHERRY, Miss A.	Sister	"	.. 1.2.20
WILSON, Miss G. I.	Sister	"	.. 18.12.19

10. POLICE

PART I

Abbreviations

I.G.P. Inspector General of Police.	D.C.P. Deputy Commissioner of Police.
C.P. Commissioner of Police.	A.C.P. Assistant Commissioner of Police.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>					
ARMSTRONG, T. B. S.	Lieut.	A.C.P.	Baghdad .. 1.8.17
BION, Capt. A. E.		A.C.P.	Basra .. 30.10.17
BOIS, Capt. H. E.		A.C.P.	" .. 17.4.19
						Najaf .. 1.12.19
						Baghdad .. 15.1.20
						Attd. Gendarmerie .. Arbil .. 1.4.20
BRIGHT, Capt. F. C.		A.C.P.	Basra .. 1.9.16
						'Amara .. 30.4.17
						Kadhimain .. 10.9.17
BURN-MURDOCH, N. K.	Lieut.	A.C.P.	Basra .. 1.12.14
BUTLER, Capt. C. J.		A.C.P.	Baghdad .. 6.10.19
						Mosul .. 15.2.20
CABOT, Capt. P. A.		A.C.P.	Mosul .. 28.2.20
						Kirkuk .. 28.4.20
CLARK, Lieut. L. W.		A.C.P.	Samarra .. 9.7.20
CONES, Capt. H. M. A.		A.C.P.	Baghdad .. 11.1.18
						D.C.P. .. 1.4.20
COOPER, Capt. A. V.		A.C.P.	" .. 16.9.19
						" .. 21.1.20
						Najaf .. 21.1.20
CORRY, Capt. C. E.		A.C.P.	Baghdad .. 1.3.20
DAVIS, Major T. W. G.		D.C.P.	Basra .. 4.3.18
FURNEAUX, Capt. T. E.		A.C.P.	Baghdad .. 26.10.19
						Samarra .. 15.11.19
GAGLIARDI, L. P.	Sec. Lieut.	A.C.P.	Basra and later 'Amara 1.9.16

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
GERRARD, Major F. W., C.I.E.	A.C.P.	Basra	5.7.16	
		Nasiriya	1.1.17	
		Baghdad	1.4.17	
		Basra	1.10.17	
	D.C.P. (C.I.D.)	"	4.3.18	
GRACE, Capt. J. H.	A.C.P.	Baghdad	1.7.17	
GREGSON, Lieut.-Col. E. G., C.M.G., C.I.E.	C.P.	Basra	24.11.14	
		Baghdad	27.3.17	
	Attd. Bushire Force	"	25.9.18	
GROWDEN, Lieut. W. E. N.	A.C.P.	Baghdad	9.7.20	
HARDY, Capt. H. Le-L.		'Amara	5.7.16	
		Basra	1.9.17	
HARRISON, Capt. C.	A.C.P.	Baghdad	15.2.20	
HILL, Capt. R. E.	A.C.P.	"	24.4.17	
	A.P.O. (Police)	Mosul	1.12.18	
HOLLAND, Lieut. W. H.	A.C.P.	Basra	1.1.16	
JENNINGS, Capt. P. W.	A.C.P.	"	18.9.18	
JOHNSON, Capt. E. J.	A.C.P.	Baghdad	30.9.18	
		Samarra	3.11.19	
	A.C.P. (Rlys.)	Baghdad	1.4.20	
KEARSEY, Capt. S. H.	A.C.P.	Baghdad	26.9.19	
		and Advanced Base, Kirkuk		
LYNCH-BLOSSE, Capt. C. E.	A.C.P.	Basra	4.3.18	
McINTOSH, Capt. E. P.	A.C.P. (C.I.D.)	"	27.10.18	
MACRAE, Lieut. A. R.	A.C.P.	"	1.12.14	
MORGAN, Capt. D. L.	A.C.P.	Baghdad	18.2.19	
OSMOND, Capt. L.	A.C.P.	Basra	15.4.20	
PRESCOTT, Lieut.-Col. H. C., C.I.E.	D.C.P.	"	6.6.17	
		Baghdad	19.2.18	
	I.G.P.	"	1.4.20	
REEVE, Capt. F.	A.C.P.	"	19.12.19	
RIVETT-CARNAC, Lieut. J. C. T.	A.C.P.	Basra	8.7.18	
ROBERTS, Capt. A. H. (<i>see</i> <i>also</i> No. 11, Political)	A.C.P.	'Amara	28.4.20	
SARGON, Capt. A. I., D.S.O.	A.C.P.	"	7.5.19	
		Basra	10.1.20	
SCRAFTON, Major J. E. B.	D.C.P.	Baghdad	25.4.17	
	A.P.O.	Baquba	19.2.18	
	Asst. M.G.	'Amara	12.4.18	
TODD, Capt. H. J.	A.C.P. (C.I.D.)	Baghdad	9.1.19	
WALL, Capt. E. J.	A.C.P.	'Amara	12.6.19	
		Baghdad	12.6.20	
WILKINS, Capt. J. F.	A.C.P.	Basra	8.10.17	
		'Amara	1.12.17	
		Kadhimain	28.5.18	
	A.P.O. (Police)	Mosul	3.4.19	
	Asst. to I.G.P.	Baghdad	1.4.20	

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>					
WILKINSON, Capt. L. C. R.	A.C.P.	Baghdad ..	9.9.18
					Kirkuk ..	2.2.20
WILLETT, Capt. H. G.	A.C.P.	'Amara ..	31.3.17
					Basra ..	1.9.17
WILLIAMS, Lieut. G. E. L.	A.C.P.	" ..	1.12.16

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>					
DADINA, K. M.	P.A. to C.P.	Basra ..	1.1.17
					Baghdad ..	1.4.17
SAIYID LAL SHAH, KHAN SAHIB	P.A. to C.P.	" ..	1.7.17
IKHLAS-UD-DIN, KHAN BAHADUR	Actg. A.C.P.	Basra ..	1.2.18
KHEM CHAND RAI SAHIB	Dept. Supt. Police (Arms Traffic, Persian Gulf)	'Amara ..	1.5.20
					24.11.14

II. POLITICAL (Including *Revenue, Waqf, Tapu*)

PART I

Abbreviations:

C.P.O. Chief Political Officer.	R.O. Revenue Officer.
D.C.P.O. Deputy Chief Political Officer.	A.R.O. Assistant Revenue Officer.
P.O. Political Officer.	M.G. Military Governor.
A.P.O. Assistant Political Officer.	D.M.G. Deputy Military Governor.
D.A.P.O. Deputy Assistant Political Officer.	

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>					
ALBAN, Lieut. E. C. H.	A.P.O.	Aqra ..	1.5.20
ALDERMAN, Capt. R. E., C.I.E., O.B.E.	A.P.O.	'Amara ..	13.11.19
					Basra ..	3.5.20
ANDERSON, Major M. G.	A.P.O.	Qasr-i-Shirin ..	3.5.18
ASHTON, Capt. F. J.	A.P.O.	Rumaitha ..	4.10.18
					Samawa ..	14.3.19
ASTON, Capt. C. C.	A.P.O.	Hilla ..	21.11.18
					Musaiyib ..	11.5.20
					Mahmudiya ..	1.8.20
BALFOUR, Lieut.-Col. F. C. C., C.I.E., M.C.	A.P.O. Shamiya	Kufa ..	28.7.17
	P.O. & M.G.	Baghdad ..	17.12.18
BANISTER, Capt. F.	A.P.O.	Khanaqin ..	29.4.19
					Hamadan ..	29.8.19
BANON, Capt. H. M.	A.P.O.	Mosul ..	15.8.19
					Dohuk ..	6.9.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
BARKER, Capt. R. E.	A.P.O. Kōi & Rania .. 27.12.18
BARLOW, Major J. E., D.S.O., M.C.	A.P.O. Tel 'Afar .. 5.1.20
BARNES, Capt. W. C.	A.P.O. Baquba .. 13.6.19
BARRETT, Major C. C. J., C.I.E.	Asst. to C.P.O. A.P.O. 'Ali Gharbi .. 6.11.15 P.O. Baquba .. 1.9.16 Baquba .. 5.4.17
BARRETT, Capt. J. L. M.	A.P.O. Qalat Sikar .. 28.12.18 Kut .. 1.8.20
BEADON, Capt. W. A. C.	A.P.O. Nasiriya .. 25.7.20
BEALE, Capt. C. T.	Asst. to D.C.C. .. Basra .. 2.7.17 D.M.G. Ashar .. " .. 1.9.17 Fin. Asst. to D.C.C. .. " .. 15.10.17 A.P.O. Sulaimani .. 1.12.18 Kōi .. 1.3.19 Rowandiz .. 1.6.19 Halabja .. 1.6.20
BELL, Capt. G. F. St. J.	A.P.O. Baquba .. 30.1.18 Dali Abbas .. 9.5.18 Asst. to P.O. Diyala .. 17.11.19
BELL, Miss Gertrude Low- thian, C.B.E.	S.D. for Arab Bureau .. Basra & .. 26.6.16 Baghdad
BERKELEY, Capt. C. S. J.	A.P.O. Hai .. 13.8.18 Suq-ash-Shuyukh .. 7.12.18 Shatra .. 20.7.19
BERRY, Major E. S.	A.P.O. Samarra .. 29.3.18 P.O. Balad .. 8.6.18 Samarra .. 1.11.18
BILL, J. H. H.	" Mosul .. 13.10.19
BIRDWOOD, Capt. R. L.	Asst. to C.P.O. 1.10.14
BLES, Lieut. D. G.	A.R.O. Baghdad .. 20.5.18
BLOMFIELD, Capt. H. M.	A.P.O. Hamar Lake .. 1.9.16 Shaikh Sa'ad .. 1.10.16 'Ali Gharbi .. 1.3.17
BOND, Capt. S. S.	A.P.O. Cham-chamal .. 2.2.19
BOOTH, Lieut. A. J., M.B.E.	i/c Rev. Survey .. Hilla .. 1.1.20
BOURDILLON, Major B. H., I.C.S.	A.P.O. Basra .. 30.5.18 Land Acqn. O. .. Baghdad .. 14.3.19 Settlement O. (Rev.) .. " .. 26.11.19 Dist. Magis. .. " .. 1.8.20
BOVILL, Major W. J.	A.P.O. Karbala .. 5.11.18 Tuwairij .. 7.9.19
BOWEN, Capt. H. C.	" Qizil Robot .. 11.12.17 Khanaqin .. 23.3.18
BRADSHAW, Capt. J. R. L.	Editor <i>Basra Times</i> 9.10.18 A.P.O. (Gendarmerie) .. Mosul .. 9.12.18 A.P.O. Arbil .. 5.10.19 Kōi .. 1.5.20
BRASHER, C. G.	A.P.O. Kut .. 7.4.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>	
BRAY, Capt. N. N. E., M.C.	A.P.O.	Karbala 5.5.18
	S.D.	Bahrain 1.12.18
BROMILOW, Major G., D.S.O.	A.P.O.	Tel 'Afar 23.12.18
	BROWN, Capt. L. N., I.C.S.	A.R.O. and Dep. Dir. Tapu
Land Acqn. O.		Ma'Qil 1.12.18
P.O.		Qurna 10.4.19
Land Acqn. O.		Baghdad 14.6.19
Cypher O.		" 6.5.20
BROWN, W. D. BULLARD, Major R. W. C.I.E.	A.P.O. (Land Rev.)	Qalat Salih 1.9.16
	A.R.O.	Baghdad 1.4.17
	P.O.	Kifri 1.5.18
	R.O.	Baghdad 2.8.18
	S.D.	Tehran 1.10.18
	A.P.O. Rev.	Mosul 17.11.18
	Dep. Rev. Secy.	Baghdad 27.6.19
	M.G. & P.O.	" 1.7.20
BUTLER, Lieut. F. A.	A.P.O.	Kadhimain 12.2.18
BUTTERS, Capt. O. A.	A.P.O.	Ahwaz 1.9.16
CAMPBELL, Capt. A. H. S.	A.P.O.	'Ali Gharbi 29.8.18
CAMPBELL, Capt. W. F.	A.P.O.	Baghdad 5.12.18
	D.M.G.	Baghdad (West) 11.4.19
	A.P.O.	Baghdad & Kadhimain 1.10.19
CARVER, Capt. F. E.	A.P.O.	Ramadi 10.4.18
		'Ana 1.11.18
		Dair-ez-Zor 15.12.18
		Albu Kamal 13.2.20
CATES, Capt. B. H.	A.P.O.	Balad 22.9.18
CHAMIER, Capt. A.	A.P.O.	Sharqat 9.11.18
		Dair-ez-Zor 21.2.19
		Baghdad 18.10.19
CHAPMAN, Capt. A. F.	A.P.O.	Baghdad & Kadhimain 14.1.20
		Mianeh & Zinjan 14.5.20
CHARDIN, Capt. F. W.	Asst. to P.O.	Mosul Divn. 11.12.19
	A.P.O.	Mosul 13.3.20
CHESNEY, Major H. G.	A.P.O.	Basra 1.4.19
	Mun. Comr.	" 1.7.19
CHESTER, S. C. R.	Asst. Land Acqn. & Settlement O.	Baghdad 7.5.20
CHITTY, C.	A.P.O.	Diwaniya 21.5.20
	Asst. to C.C. (Personnel)	Baghdad 26.8.20
CLAYE, Lieut. A.	A.P.O.	Shahraban 1.12.18
CLAYTON, Capt. J. N.	S.D.—Asst. to M.G.	Baghdad 9.6.20
CLEGG, Capt. S.	Vice-Consul	Bushire 1.1.20
COLE, Capt. W. J. I.	A.P.O.	Sulaimani 31.7.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
CONNAL, J. K.	Cypher O.	Baghdad	.. 6.4.20
COOK, Capt. J. G.	A.P.O.	Sulaimani	.. 26.11.19
				Rania	.. 1.1.20
COOKE, Capt. R. S.	A.R.O. (Auqaf)	Baghdad	.. 22.5.18
				Dir. of Auqaf	.. 1.2.19
COX, Hon. Major General Sir P. Z., G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., K.C.M.G.	Civ. Comr. in Mesopotamia and <i>ex off.</i> C.P.O., M.E.F. Also Pol. Resident in the Persian Gulf and H.M.'s Consul General for Fars, Khuzistan &c. 16.10.14
				On Special Duty from	.. 1.3.18
				H.M.'s Actg. Minister Tehran	.. 16.9.18
				High Commissioner for 'Iraq	.. 1.9.20
CRAWFORD, Capt. W. F.	S.D.	Baghdad	.. 10.10.19
				Qalat Sikar	.. 28.2.20
				Mosul	.. 26.8.20
CREEDY, Capt. H. D.	A.P.O.	Hilla	.. 13.7.18
				Hai	.. 24.10.18
				Suwaira	.. 10.7.19
				Mosul	.. 20.4.19
CURTIN, Lieut. A. F. S.	A.P.O.	Tel 'Afar	.. 3.5.19
				Baghdad	.. 25.7.19
				Bushire	.. 26.11.19
CURTOYS, Lieut. O. F.	Asst. Pensions O. Second Asst. to Dep. Pol. Resident in Persian Gulf
DACRES, Capt. J. S. L., I.C.S.	A.P.O.	Diwaniya	.. 14.2.18
				P.O.	.. 21.2.19
DALY, Capt. (Bt. Major) C. K.	A.P.O.	Falluja	.. 1.5.17
				Baghaila	.. 1.10.17
				Diwaniya	.. 10.4.18
				P.O.	.. 22.2.19
DICKINSON, Capt. F. G. C.	A.P.O.	Arbil	.. 11.2.20
			 24.9.15
DICKSON, Major H. R. P., C.I.E.	A.P.O. (S.D.)	Suq-ash-Shuyukh	1.9.16
				Basra	.. 1.2.17
				P.O.	.. 1.9.17
				Pol. Agent	.. 6.11.19
DITCHBURN, Major A. H.	A.M.G.	Basra	.. 17.7.17
				A.P.O.	.. 5.6.18
				P.O.	.. 12.6.19
				Rev. Comr.	.. 1.12.16
DOBBS, H. R. C., C.S.I., C.I.E., I.C.S.	Rev. Comr.	Basra	.. 1.12.16
DOUGLAS, Capt. E. J.	A.P.O.	Kirkuk	.. 23.12.18
				Kifri	.. 7.7.19
				Sulaimani	.. 1.7.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
DRIVER, Capt. C. E., M.C.	A.P.O.	'Amara	4.4.20	
DRUMMOND, Capt. F. B. H., M.C.	P.A. to M.G. & P.O. Mun. Comr.	Basra	12.2.20	
DUFF, Capt. A. C., I.C.S.	R.O. & 1st Cl. Magis.	"	27.3.20	
EADIE, Major G. F., D.S.O.	A.P.O.	'Ana	28.9.18	
	P.O. (Offg.)	Dulaim	11.5.20	
EDMONDS, Major C. J. Levant Consular Service	P.A. to C.P.O.	Basra	1.7.20	
	A.P.O.	Shushtar	1.5.15	
	Vice-Consul Arabistan, Bakhtiaristan, Luristan & Pusht-i-Kuh	Dizful	1.12.16	
	A.P.O.	Ahwaz	31.3.17	
	P.O.	Sulaimani	2.4.18	
	P.O.	Qasvin	30.6.19	
ELDRIDGE, Capt. F. L.	Asst. to P.O. Shamiya	Najaf	27.8.19	
ELKINGTON, Capt. E. H. O., M.C.	A.P.O.	Ahwaz	22.3.19	
ELLIOTT, Capt. G. F., M.B.E.	A.P.O.	Baghaila	2.6.19	
EMPSON, C.	Cypher O.	Hai	6.6.18	
EVANS, L. G. L., I.C.S.	A.R.O.	Baghdad	1.4.19	
	A.R.O. (Ed.)	Basra	1.8.20	
	Asst. Secy. Rev.	"	6.4.18	
	A.P.O. (for Land Acqn.)	Baghdad	1.9.18	
EVANS, Capt. M. Priestley	Asst. to P.O.	Basra	19.12.18	
FAIRLEY, Lieut. J. W., V.D., I.S.O.	Supt. C.C.'s Office	Diwaniya	21.11.19	
	Supt. Cypher Dept.	Basra & Baghdad	25.8.19	
FISHER, Capt. G. T.	A.P.O.	"	16.3.16	
FLAXMAN, Capt. H. J. M.	A.P.O.	Kufa-Najaf	23.2.19	
	A.P.O.	Qizil Robot	21.3.18	
		Aqra	22.10.18	
		Mosul	4.4.19	
		Tel 'Afar	2.4.20	
FLETCHER, Capt. W. T.	A.P.O.	Shinafiya	1.6.20	
FORTESCUE, Capt. L.S.	A.P.O.	"	16.1.18	
FOWLE, Capt. T. C. W.	A.P.O.	Qasvin	17.2.19	
	P.O.	Ahwaz	6.11.15	
		'Aziziya	1.3.17	
		Khanaqin	23.1.18	
		Samawa	4.4.18	
FRASER, Capt. D. de M. S.	A.P.O.	Badra	6.12.17	
		Shushtar	17.2.18	
		Dizful	15.3.18	
		Attd. Bushire Force	25.9.18	
FRASER, Capt. J. D.	A.P.O.	Arbil	4.1.19	
FREEMAN, Lieut. A. F.	A.P.O.	Zinjan	3.1.19	
FULLER, Flight Lieut. N. B., M.B.E.	P.A. to C.C.	Baghdad	28.3.19	
	Asst. to C.C.	"	1.10.19	

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
GARBETT, C. C., L.L.B., C.I.E., I.C.S.	A.P.O. (Rev.) 30.12.16 First Rev. O. (<i>ex off.</i> Ad- ministrator, Agricultural Development Scheme) 22.3.17
GARRETT, Lieut. G. T., I.C.S.	P.A. to D.C.C. 1.3.18 A.P.O. 'Ali Gharbi 12.5.18
GEARD, Capt. R. C.	A.P.O. Khanaqin 5.12.17 Shushtar & 26.10.18 Dizful Urmiya 30.6.19 Enzeli 16.11.19 Tabriz 26.1.20
GEARY, Lieut. A. B., Levant Consular Service	A.R.O. Basra 1.10.16
GEIDT, Capt. P.	A.P.O. Manjil 14.7.20
GERARD, Lieut. C. E.	Asst. to M.G. & Con- troller, Mun. Markets Baghdad 19.11.17
GILLAN, Capt. (Bt. Major) G. V. B.	A.P.O. Baghdad 1.4.17 Asst. to C.C. " 13.2.19 P.O. & M.G. Basra 27.3.20
GLOVER, Capt. J. W. T.	A.P.O. Dizful 6.12.17
GOLDFRAP, Major H. W., D.S.O., M.C.	A.P.O. Mosul Dist. 1.6.20
GOLDSMITH, Capt. (Bt. Major) H. A., M.C.	A.P.O. (Camel Purchase) A.P.O. Basra 14.7.16 Hilla & 1.4.17 Musaiyib Samawa 6.11.17 P.O. Khanaqin 17.4.18
GORDON, Major J. de la H., O.B.E., M.C.	M.G. Basra 19.9.16 D.M.G. Baghdad East 21.3.17
GRAVES, Lieut. T. F. H.	Asst. to P.O. Qasvin 9.1.20
GREENHOUSE, Capt. (Bt. Major) F. S.	A.P.O. Shushtar & 8.12.16 Dizful Kirmanshah 22.1.18 Qasr-i-Shirin 1.4.18 Najaf 6.6.18 Sulaimani 10.9.18 P.O. Kirmanshah 1.6.20
GREY, Capt. A. J. H.	A.P.O. Ahwaz 1.4.16
GRIEVE, Capt. A. M.	A.P.O. Suq-ash-Shuyukh 6.5.20
GRIFFITHS, Capt. R. G.	A.P.O. 'Amara 3.12.18
HAMILTON, Lieut.-Col. R. E. A.	S.D. 9.8.15 Pol. Agent Kuwait 25.6.16
HARGREAVES, Capt. P. S., M.C.	A.P.O. Qizil Robot 20.8.18 A.P.O. (Levies) Khanaqin 1.12.18
HART, H. G.	A.P.O. Qasvin 1.2.19
HARVEY, Major R. O., O.B.E.	Actg. M.G. 'Amara 17.2.17 D.M.G. Basra 6.7.18 A.P.O. Nasiriya 5.8.18

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
HAWKE, Lieut. E. A. F.	P.A. to D.C.P.O.	..	Basra	..	1.7.17
HAWKER, Brig.-Gen. C. J., C.M.G.	M.G.	Baghdad	..	18.3.17
HAY, Major W. R.	A.P.O.	Mandali	..	8.12.17
			Altun Köpri & Köi	..	1.11.18
			Arbil	..	1.6.19
	P.O.	"	..	30.11.19
HAYSOM, Capt. R. A.	A.P.O.	Nasiriya	..	4.5.17
	"	Suq-ash-Shuyukh & Shatra	..	9.9.17
HEDGECOCK, Capt. S. E.	A.P.O.	Qalat Salih	..	7.1.18
			'Amara	..	1.10.19
	P.O.	"	..	17.4.20
HENNESSY, Capt. L. J.	A.P.O.	Kirmanshah	..	1.2.19
HICKS-GOWER, A. J.	P.A. to P.O.	Mosul	..	13.10.19
HILES, Major M., O.B.E.	A.P.O.	Qalat Salih	..	18.5.16
			'Amara	..	1.2.17
	P.O.	'Aziziya	..	10.2.18
			Khanaqin	..	14.10.18
			Baquba	..	29.11.19
HOLLAND, R. E., C.I.E., I.C.S.	D.C.P.O.	Basra	..	1.11.15
HOLT, Capt. V.	Asst. to P.O.	Sulaimani	..	20.12.19
	A.P.O.	Cham-Chamal	..	1.5.20
HOPKINS, Capt. E. M.	A.P.O.	'Aziziya	..	27.3.17
			Baghdad	..	30.4.17
			Qurna	..	30.6.17
			Najaf	..	13.6.19
			Abu Sukhair	..	1.7.19
	Asst. to P.O. Shamiya		Najaf	..	8.12.19
HORRIDGE, Capt. J.	A.P.O.	Kirmanshah	..	20.11.18
			Hamadan	..	31.1.19
			Khanaqin	..	10.9.19
HOWELL, Lieut.-Col. E. B., C.S.I., C.I.E.	P.O.	'Amara	..	13.10.16
			Nasiriya	..	1.2.17
	D.C.C.	Basra	..	1.10.17
	M.G.	Baghdad	..	23.9.18
	Rev. & Fin. Secy.	"	..	19.12.18
	D.C.C. & Offg. C.C.	"	..	1.4.19
	S.D. as C.P.O.	Middle Euphrates	..	1.9.20
HUNT, Capt. W. E.	A.P.O.	Hilla	..	23.12.18
			Hindiya	..	12.2.19
			Tuwairij
			Karbala	..	21.1.20
HYATT, Lieut. P. T., O.B.E.	A.P.O.	Rumaitha	..	13.10.19

Name and Rank	Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto
JARDINE, Capt. L. W.	A.P.O. Shamiya .. 1.1.19 Abu Sukhair, .. 9.5.19 Kufa-Najaf Hilla 11.1.20
JARDINE, Capt. R. F.	S.D. " 1.8.20 A.P.O. Daltawa .. 27.12.17 Kifri 8.5.18 'Amadia 30.4.19 Mosul 1.11.19 Dohuk 10.12.19
JEFFREYS, Capt. J. F. D.	A.P.O. Baghaila .. 24.11.17 A.P.O. Offg. as P.O. Kut 17.6.18 A.P.O. Azizia & Suwaira Daltawa 16.7.19 Suwaira 1.12.19 Kut 24.2.20
KENNION, Lieut.-Col. R. L., C.I.E.	P.O. (Offg.) " 26.3.20 Consul Kirmanshah .. 10.4.15 and <i>ex off.</i> Asst. to Pol. Resident in Persian Gulf 17.8.16
KERR, Lieut. E. T.	P.O. Qasvin 1.10.18 S.D. Baghdad 22.6.17 A.P.O. Hilla 15.8.17 Ahwaz 8.5.18
KETTLEWELL, Capt. L., D.S.O.	A.P.O. Qalat Salih .. 17.2.19 Shahraban 23.5.19
KING, Lieut. H. S.	A.P.O. Balad Ruz .. 26.11.17 Dali 'Abbas 1.3.18
KIRK, Capt. F. C.	A.P.O. Baquba 4.12.18 Sulaimani 1.3.19 Rowandiz 31.5.19 Aqra 27.11.19
KITCHING, Captain G. C.	A.P.O. Nasiriya .. 18.2.20
KNAPTON, A. G. L.	Cypher O. Baghdad 6.4.20
LEACHMAN, Bt. Lieut.- Col. G. E., C.I.E., D.S.O.	A.P.O. 6th Divn. & .. 12.3.15 G.H.Q. 1st Corps 1.9.16 S.D. Shamiya 1.3.17 S.D. Cairo 1.6.17 P.O. Desert, Euphrates .. 20.7.17 Mosul 11.10.18 Dulaim, 29.2.20 Ramadi
LEES, Capt. G. M., M.C., D.F.C.	P.A. to C.C. Baghdad 1.1.19 A.P.O. Halabja 14.3.19 Asst. to P.O. Sulaimani 1.6.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
LEVY, Capt. R.	A.P.O. Khanaqin 20.11.18
	P.O. (Offg.) " 24.8.19
	S.D.—Jud. Dept. Baghdad 20.12.19
LINCOLN, Asst. Surgeon C. H., I.M.D.	Vice-Consul & Actg. Consul Mohammerah 23.6.16
LIVESEY, Capt. T. R.	A.P.O. Hilla 5.1.18
LLOYD, Capt. H. I., M.C.	Musaiyib 2.11.18
	A.P.O. Dali Abbas & Shahraban 9.9.18
	P.O. (Offg.) Baquba 1.6.19
LOCH, Capt. P. G.	A.P.O. Daltawa 18.11.19
	Political Agent Kuwait 15.3.18
LONGRIGG, Major S. H.	A.P.O. Dali 'Abbas 10.4.18
	Kirkuk-Tuz 9.5.18
	Khurmatli
LOWIS, Lieut. H. R.	P.O. Kirkuk 26.10.18
	P.A. to C.C. Baghdad 1.11.19
LYELL, Capt. T. R. G.	A.P.O. Qizil Robot 11.6.17
	Shamiya, Najaf 12.5.19
	Asst. to Dir. Tapu Baghdad 1.2.20
LYON, Capt. W. A.	Offg. Dir. Tapu " 1.6.20
	A.P.O. Mosul 27.1.19
MACCOLLUM, Capt. D. V.	A.P.O., Asst. C.H.T.C. & Editor <i>Basra Times</i> Zubair & Basra 5.2.17
	Blockade O. & A.P.A. Kuwait 15.2.18
	Offg. Pol. Agent & on S.D. " 1.12.18
MACDERMOTT, Capt. J. D., C.I.E.	A.P.O. (S.D.) Masqat 4.2.20
	D.M.G. Basra 1.12.17
MACDONALD, Lieut. L. T.	A.P.O. & Blockade O. Nasiriya 4.3.18
	A.P.O. Baquba 22.6.17
MACKARNES, Capt. H. J. C.	Daltawa 10.9.17
	A.P.O. (C.P.O.'s Office) Baghdad 31.3.17
	Asst. to P.O. Shamiya, Umm-ul-B'arur 2.2.19
MACKENZIE, Major C. F. C.I.E.	A.P.O. S.D. 12.3.15
	Basra 1.9.16
MACKIE, Capt. J. B.	M.G. & P.O. & Dist. Mag. 'Amara 8.5.17
	A.P.O. (Blockade) Basra 16.10.16
	Qurna 1.2.17
MACNEAL, Capt. A. S. D.	P.O. " 15.4.17
	Asst. Rev. Secy. Baghdad 17.4.19
	A.P.O. Kut 25.9.19
MACPHERSON Major C. F., C.I.E.	Attd. 2nd Euphrates Levies Hilla 1.6.20
	A.P.O. S.D. 1.6.15
	M.G. 'Amara 1.9.16
	A.P.O. Attd. 3rd Corps & G.H.Q. 1.2.17
	Falluja 30.4.17
	P.O. Hilla 22.11.17

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
McCORMICK, Capt. H.	A.P.O. Dali Abbas . . 18.7.18
McDONALL, W., Levant Consular Service—Retd.	A.P.O. Badra 16.11.17
MAIDEN, Capt. R.	Asst. to M.G. Baghdad . . 2.10.18
MAINWARING, Lieut. A. I.	Pensions O. „ 20.5.18
MANN, Capt. J. S.	A.P.O. Umm-al-B'arur 15.8.19
MARRS, Major R., C.I.E.	A.P.O. (S.D.) Khamisiya 28.2.15 Zubair 1.3.16 Baghdad 1.9.16 Baghdad 31.3.17 Baghaila 21.5.17 'Amara 22.2.18
MARSHALL, Major C. C., D.S.O.	M.G. & P.O. A.P.O. Aqra 6.7.20
MARSHALL, Capt. J., M.C.	A.P.O. Rowandiz . . 28.12.18
MARSHALL, Capt. W. M.	A.P.O. Kadhimain . . 23.3.17 Kufa-Najaf 26.1.18
MASTERSON, Capt. E. G.	A.P.O. Sharibazar . . 1.5.19 Asst. to P.O. Sulaimani . . 20.1.20 A.P.O. Khanaqin . . 24.4.20
MAY, Major W. S. R., Sudan Civ. Ser. Retd.	Rev. & Fin. Secy. Baghdad . . 21.2.18 S.D. 19.12.18
MEAD, Capt. R.	A.P.O. Shatra 4.4.20 P.A. to P.O. Nasiriya 30.6.20
MEADE, Major W. L.	A.P.O. Dizful 11.3.19
MEEK, Major A. S.	M.G. & P.O. Basra 1.5.17
MILLER, Capt. A. F.	A.P.O. Kirkuk 1.3.19
MINCHIN, Capt. H. C.	A.P.O. Mosul 26.11.18
MOORE, Capt. J. H.	Asst. to P.O. Kirmanshah . . 26.9.19
MORE, Major J. C., D.S.O.	Pol. Agent Kuwait 6.5.20
MORE, R. E., O.B.E.	Agent for M. Civ. Ad- min. in Egypt & Sudan Cairo 1.5.20
MURRAY, Major S. G. C., C.I.E.	P.A. to C.P.O. Basra 18.10.16 Baghdad 21.3.17 P.O. Samarra 28.4.17 Arbil 9.11.18 Asst. to C.C. (Personnel) Baghdad 22.3.20
MUSGRAVE, Capt. T. P.	Asst. to M.G. „ 30.11.17
MYLLES, Capt. C. C.	A.P.O. Qurna 2.3.18 Qalat Sikar 23.7.18 'Ana 1.12.18 Albu Kamal 14.12.18 Asst. to P.O. Ramadi 14.2.20
NALDER, Lieut.-Col. L. F., C.I.E.	P.O. „ 5.9.17 Dulaim Dist. . . . 8.11.17 Baquba 3.7.18 Mosul 9.11.18
NEAL, Lieut. G. E.	A.P.O. Diwaniya . . 16.6.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
NOEL, Major E. W. C., C.I.E., D.S.O.	A.P.O. (S.D.)	31.3.15
	Vice-Consul, Arabistan- Bakhtiari, Luristan & Pusht-i-Kuh	Ahwaz	1.9.16
	A.P.O. (S.D.)	Caucasus	1.2.18
		Tehran	1.9.18
	P.O.	Kirkuk, Sulaimani	1.11.18
	S.D.	Rowandiz & Kurdistan	1.2.19
NORBURY, Major P. F.	Mun. Comr.	Basra	30.7.18
	P.O.	Najaf	12.4.19
NORMAND, Lieut. C. W. B.	S.D., Weather Bureau	Baghdad	1.11.18
OAKSHOTT, R. S.	A.P.O.	Resht	12.10.18
O'CONNOR, Capt. K. K., M.C.	A.P.O.	Tikrit	1.1.19
ORGILL, Capt. T. C.	A.P.O.	Muntafiq & Nasiriya	15.6.18
		Falluja	3.10.17
O'SULLIVAN, Capt. J.	A.P.O.	Ramadi	9.11.17
		Musaiyib	1.4.19
		Hilla	10.2.19
OUTLAW, Lieut. W. H.	Asst. to P.O.	"	8.7.19
	A.P.O.	"	8.7.19
PEARSON, Capt. A. C.	A.P.O. & D.M.G. ..	Basra	26.3.18
		'Amara	22.5.18
	A.P.O.	Zakho	23.12.18
	Pensions O.	Baghdad	30.12.17
		A.P.O. (Comdt. Levies)	Baquba
PEDDER, Capt. G. R.	A.P.O.	Daltawa	1.5.19
	P.A. to M.G. & P.O. ..	Basra	31.1.20
	A.P.O.	Suwaira	25.3.20
	PEEL, Capt. E. G. B., C.I.E.	A.P.O.	Ahwaz
Vice-Consul, Arabistan- Bakhtiari, Luristan & Pusht-i-Kuh			"
PEFFERS, Capt. A.	Asst. to P.O.	Mosul	5.6.20
PERRY, E. R.	Asst. to C.C. (Personnel)	Baghdad	1.3.20
	Agent for M. Civ. Ad- min. in India	Bombay	1.9.20
	A.P.O. (Asst. to M.G.)	Baghdad	11.4.18
PETROCOKINO, Lieut. A. PHILBY, H. St. J. B.	Dep. Rev. Comr.	Basra	20.11.15
	A.P.O.	'Amara	1.2.17
	S.D.	Baghdad	1.6.17
		Arabia	23.10.17
	On Deputation to	Egypt	1.12.18
	Asst. to High Comr. for 'Iraq	Baghdad	1.9.20
	PHILLIPS, Capt. A. G.	A.P.O.	Shinafiya
Samawa & Rumaitha			20.12.18
Mun. Comr.		Basra	30.4.19
S.D.		Bahrain	1.6.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
PHILLIPS, Major N. K.	Agent for M. Civ. Admin.	Cairo	1.1.20
PICKTHALL, Capt. C. M.	A.P.O.	Samarra	1.3.19
PITCAIRN, Lieut. G. D.	A.P.O.	Dulaim & Ramadi	2.5.20
PLATTS, Capt. A.	A.P.O.	Tikrit	1.7.18
		Suq-ash-Shuyukh	16.7.19
POSTANCE, Capt. J. F. A.	A.P.O. & Mun. Comr.	Basra	18.12.19
PROTHERO, Capt. J. E. D.	A.P.O.	Baghaila	11.12.17
		Abu Sukhair	10.1.18
PULLEY, Major H. C.	A.P.O. (S.D.)	Baghdad	10.6.17
	A.P.O.	Karbala	15.9.17
		Attd. Bushire	23.9.18
		Force	
		Tel 'Afar	8.11.19
		Hilla	1.3.20
	P.O.	"	1.6.20
RABINO, Capt. J. F.	A.P.O.	Basra	17.7.17
		Zubair	7.1.20
RAYNOR, Lieut. R.	A.P.O.	'Amara	1.8.20
REED, Capt. L. N., M.C.	A.P.O.	Qizil Robat	7.3.18
		Kadhimain	16.7.18
	Asst. Land Settlement O.	Baghdad	1.10.19
REID, A. C.	Supervisor, Imp. Otto-	Basra & Baghdad	21.4.17
	man Bank		
RICE, Capt. J.	P.A. to M.G. & P.O.	Basra	17.7.19
RIVETT-CARNAC, Capt.	P.A. to C.C.	Baghdad	7.12.17
H. G.	A.P.O.	Falluja, Hit	1.3.18
		'Amara	11.8.18
ROBERTS, Capt. A. H. (<i>see</i>	A.P.O.	Zubair	2.3.18
<i>also No. 10 Police</i>)		Rumaiitha &	8.4.19
		Shinafiya	
ROGERS, Lieut. A. C. C.	A.R.O. (Mechanical Ad-	Baghdad	1.1.18
	viser—Rev. & Irrign.)		
ROSS, Major E. I., M.C.	A.P.O.	Rowandiz	18.1.19
	A.P.O. (S.D.)	Baghdad	1.7.19
	Asst. to P.O.	Sulaimani	25.8.19
	A.P.O. (S.D.)	Baghdad	1.2.20
ROYDS, Capt. G. F.	A.R.O. (Tapu)	"	1.3.18
	Dir. of Tapu	"	19.12.18
RUNDLE, Capt. C. A. G.,	A.P.O.	Sulaimani	26.3.19
M.C.		Köi	1.5.19
RUSHFORTH, Lieut. F. V.	A.P.O. (Fin. & Super-	Basra	1.9.16
	visor Imp. Ottoman Bank)		
	S.D.	Simla	1.5.17
ST. JOHN, F. R., D.C.M.	i/c Civ. Base Depot	Basra	1.3.20
SALMON, Capt. G. H.	A.P.O.	Kirkuk	13.6.19
		Kifri	26.1.20
SCIAMA, Lieut. A.	A.P.O. (Asst. to M.G.)	Basra	10.5.18
SCOTT, Capt. K. R., M.C.	Asst. to P.O.	Mosul	17.11.18
	A.P.O.	Aqra	9.10.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
SCOTT, Capt. T. T.	A.P.O. Zubair 16.9.18
	Asst. M.G. Basra 1.11.18
	Mun. Comr. " 12.5.19
SHELLOWELL, Capt. G. H.	A.P.O. Hit 1.10.18
	Albu Kamal 25.10.18
	'Ana 26.3.20
	Samawa 7.6.20
SHULDHAM, Capt. W. F. Q.	A.P.O. (S.D.) Attd. Bushire . . 18.12.18
	Force
SKLIROS, J.	A.P.O. Diwaniya 26.12.19
	A.R.O. Hilla 14.3.17
	Attd. Dept. Agriculture
	S.D. Urmiya Refugees
SMITH, Lieut. A. Lionel F.	A.D. Civ. Stores Baghdad 3.7.19
	Asst. to (and Actg.) P.O.
	Shamiya & Najaf
	18.1.19
SOANE, Major E. B., C.B.E.	A.P.O. Dizful 1.9.16
	Controller, Hostile
	Trading Concerns
	Baghdad 27.3.17
	A.P.O. (S.D.) Kurd Bureau 1.8.17
	Mandali 30.10.17
	P.O. Khanaqin 5.12.17
	P.O. (S.D.) Kurd Bureau 1.2.19
	P.O. Sulaimani 25.4.19
	Fraser's Force 1.6.19
Baghdad 3.8.17	
STAFFORD, F. E.	Attd. Rev. Dept. " 1.3.20
STEPHENSON, Capt. G. C.	A.R.O. " 7.6.17
	Asst. to C.C. " 26.11.18
	S.D.—Agent for M. Civ.
	Admin. London 17.8.19
STEVENS, Capt. R. H.	Asst. M.G. Baghdad 1.2.19
STEWART, Major H., C.I.E.	A.P.O. & M.G. Basra 1.2.17
STILWELL, J. G.	Asst. to P.O. Mosul 1.8.20
STURGES, R. S. M.	A.P.O. Qurna 4.4.20
SUTER, Capt. N.	A.P.O. Nasiriya 2.7.17
	P.O. Samawa, Rumaitha 14.8.18
TALBOT, Capt. J.	A.P.O. Samawa, Rumaitha 5.8.18
TAUNTON, Capt. I. H.	A.P.O. Samawa 23.4.18
	Basra 5.8.18
TAYLOR, Capt. J. M. G.	A.P.O. (& Blockade O.) 'Amara 25.5.17
TEGETMEIR, Lieut. P. A.	A.P.O. Samarra 14.6.20
THOMAS, Capt. B. S.	A.P.O. Suq-ash-Shuyukh 6.3.18
	Shatra 6.2.19
	Asst. Rev. Secy. Baghdad 13.2.20
	S.D. Nasiriya 1.7.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
THOMSON, Capt. J. S., (I.C.S.)	A.R.O. Baghdad . . . 8.6.17
	A.P.O. Musaiyib . . . 21.10.17
	Hindiya, Tuwairij 2.11.18
	Hilla 13.2.19
	Dep. Rev. Secy. Baghdad . . . 1.7.20
TOZER, Lieut. P. H. S.	Asst. to P.O. Hilla 9.12.19
TREVOR, Lieut.-Col. A. P., C.S.I., C.I.E.	Dep. Pol. Resident, Persian Gulf Bushire 6.11.19
TYLER, Major H. H. F. M., C.I.E. (I.C.S.)	A.R.O. & A.P.O. Tuwairij 4.11.17
	P.O. Hilla 16.11.18
VENNING, Capt. E. G.	P.A. to P.O. 'Amara 18.2.20
WALKER, Lieut.-Col. A. L. Gordon, B.A., LL.B., Bar. at-Law (I.C.S.)	A.P.O., Legal Remem- brancer & Govt. Advoca- cate Basra 17.11.16
	R.O. " 1.6.17
	Dir. of Tapu, Legal Rembr. & Govt. Adv. Baghdad 17.11.17
	A.P.O. (Rev.) Sulaimani 1.12.18
	M.G. & P.O. & Dist. Magis. Basra 12.5.19
WALKER, Capt. F. R.	A.P.O. Baquba 29.6.17
	Daltawa 30.10.17
	Shahraban 5.12.17
	Zakho 1.12.18
WALLER, Major A. G.	A.P.O. (S.D.) " 7.1.16
	D.M.G. Baghdad 9.9.17
WALLIS, Capt. C.	A.P.O. Mosul 22.2.19
WARBURTON, Major H. G. (I.C.S.)	A.P.O. (Judicial) 'Amara 21.4.18
	D.M.G. " 1.11.18
	P.O. (Offg.) " 1.12.18
	S.D. Tehran 1.1.19
	Tiflis 1.6.19
WARREN, Capt. M. C.	A.P.O. Enzeli 12.1.19
WARREN, Capt. W. J.	A.P.O. Dizful 5.7.17
	Shushtar 15.3.18
	Senna 20.11.18
	Diwaniya 23.12.18
WEBB, Capt. W. F.	'Afaq ('Afaj) 1.4.19
	Basra 30.8.20
WEIR, Major J. R. L.	Asst. to P.O. & M.G. Basra 30.8.20
	A.P.O. Kirmanshah 1.4.18
	P.O. (& Offg. Consul) " 1.10.18
WELDON, Capt. S. W.	A.P.O. (City Magis.) Baghdad 7.10.19
WESTLAKE, Lieut. A. R. C.	Asst. to P.O. Mosul 1.5.19
	Asst. to Dir. of Auqaf. Baghdad 16.6.19
WHITLOCK, Capt. D. K.	Asst. to P.O. Kirmanshah 11.8.20
WICKHAM, Lieut.-Col. E. T. R.	P.O. Qasvin 20.11.18
	S.D. under H.M.'s Minister Tehran 11.8.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>	
WIGAN, Capt. T. K.	A.P.O.	Najaf 13.10.19
WIGLEY, Capt. P. J. R., M.C.	A.P.O.	Mandali 10.3.19 Zakho 21.11.19
WILLEY, Capt. D.	A.P.O.	'Ali Gharbi 7.4.17 Badra 4.5.18 Mandali 30.12.18 Qasr-i-Shirin 8.4.19 'Amadia 28.6.19
WILLIAMSON, R. H.	A.R.O. Dep. Rev. Secy. Rev. Secy. (Offg.)	Baghdad 5.10.18 " 19.12.18 " 1.4.19
WILSON, Capt. A. D.	A.P.O.	Kut 23.11.18
WILSON, Bt. Lieut.-Col. Sir A. T., K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O.	A.P.O. D.C.P.O. D.C.C. Offg. Civ. Comr. in M. and Actg. Pol. Resident in the Persian Gulf, H.M.'s Consul-General for Fars, Khuzistan &c., and <i>ex off.</i> C.P.O. in Eastern Arabia, Kur- distan and N.W. Persia 29.12.14 1.12.16 23.10.17 1.3.18
WILSON, J.	Joint Trade Comr. Com- mercial Dept.	Basra 1.2.17
WILSON, Capt. T. Carroll	Controller Hostile Trading concerns	Basra & Baghdad 19.3.16
WILSON, Bt. Major W. F. C. A.	A.P.O. (S.D.) A.P.O. P.O. 8.2.16 Qurna 1.9.16 Kut 16.4.17
WINGATE, R. E. L.	A.R.O. Actg. Collr. of Customs P.O. Shamiya Pol. Agent	Baghdad 26.10.17 " 1.4.18 Najaf 7.6.18 Masqat 17.10.19
WISE, Lieut. J. H.	A.P.O.	Basra 1.5.16
WRIGHT, Capt. O.	A.P.O.	Khamisiya 1.9.16 Suq-ash-Shuyukh 1.9.17
WRIGHT, Capt. S. A.	A.P.O.	Kifri 16.11.18 Sulaimani 24.12.19
WRIGLEY, Capt. W. T., M.C.	A.P.O.	Baquba 9.4.18 Daltawa 8.5.18 Mandali 27.12.19 Shahraban 8.5.20
YETTS, Major L. M., M.C.	A.P.O. P.O. Dulaim	Hit 23.4.18 Ramadi 23.10.18
YOUNG, Capt. H. W.	A.P.O. A.P.O. Attd. Controller Local Purchase	Nasiriya 1.9.16 Suq-ash-Shuyukh 1.2.17 Baghdad 1.4.17

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
MIRZA MUHAMMAD, KHAN BAHADUR, C.I.E.	(For earlier services see No. 6A. Judicial)	15.6.15
	A.P.O.	Karbala	14.9.19
	A.P.O. (S.D.)	Baghdad	15.8.20
MUZAFFAR SHAH, KHAN BAHADUR	(For earlier services see No. 1. Accounts, Audit & Finance)	1.2.1
	D.A.P.O.	Basra	1.8.19
		Samarra	22.12.19
NAWAB MOHAMMED HUSSAIN KHAN	Pol. Attaché to C.C. . .	Baghdad	20.3.17
HAMID KHAN, AGHA, M.B.E.	A.P.O. (S.D.)	Najaf	1.8.17
	P.A. to P.O.	"	1.2.18

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
ABBAS, AGHA	Mudir	Fao	1.9.18
		Abul Khasib	1.3.19
		Shatt-al-Arab,	15.6.20
		Girdelan	
ABBAS FADHLI	Adviser to R.O.	Basra	1.1.18
		Sulaimani	1.12.18
	Mutashar, Rev.	"	1.4.19
	Mufetish, Tapu	Baghdad	10.3.20
'ABDUL AZIZ, EFF.	Mufti	Sulaimani	1.4.19
'ABDUL HUSSAIN, SAIYID	Mudir, Chabaish	Qurna	1.11.17
	Asst. to P.O.	"	1.8.18
'ABDUL KARIM, HAMADANI	Asst. to A.P.O.	Shattra	1.12.18
'ABDUL ILLAH, EFF.	D.A.P.O.	'Ana	1.4.19
'ABDUL KARIM, SHAIKH	Mudir	Qara Tappa	1.4.20
'ABDUL KARIM, AGHA	Mudir	Zangana	1.4.20
'ABDUL LATIF CHAL- LABI - AL - ATRAQCHI, MIRZA	Rev. Asst. to A.P.O. . .	Aziziya & Suwaira	1.10.18
	D.A.P.O.	Deltawa	1.8.19
		Aziziya & Suwaira	5.5.20
'ABDUL MAJID BEG-AL- SHAWI	S.D. Auqaf	Baghdad	1.4.17
	Mutashar, Auqaf	"	1.8.18
	Rais Baladiya	"	1.8.19
'ABDUL MAJID YASIN	Mudir	Fao	1.3.19
'ABDUL MAJID	Mudir Mal	Samarra	1.1.20
'ABDUL QADR, BEG	Mudir Mal	Kirkuk	1.4.20
'ABDUL RAHMAN, BEG	Mudir, Tapu	Mosul	1.1.19
'ABDUL WAHAB-AL- NAAMA	Asst. to P.O.	Basra	1.1.19
'ABDUL WAHAB, EFF.	Asst. to A.P.O.	Suq-ash-Shuyukh	1.6.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
'ABDUL WAHID, BEG	Mudir Mal	Diwaniya ..	22.5.17	
'ABDULLA BEG	Mudir	Abul Khasib ..	5.12.16	
	Rais Baladiya	Basra	1.3.19	
'ABDULLA BEG	Mudir	Jabbari, Tekia ..	8.8.19	
'ABDULLAH EFF. ibn HAJI TAHA SALMAN	Asst. to Rais Baladiya ..	Basra	1.6.20	
'ABDULLA HUSSAIN	Mudir	Warmawa ..	15.7.19	
'ABDULLA JASSIM	S.D.	Tikrit	8.6.19	
	Mudir	"	1.4.20	
'ABDURRAHAMAN, AGHA	Mudir	Serochik, ..	15.7.19	
		Gilderra		
		Qara Dagh, ..	15.5.20	
		Zardiawa		
ADHAR, HAJI	Mudir	Hartha, Basra ..	1.2.15	
AFNAN, H. A.	Supt. Vernacular Sec., C.C.'s Office	Baghdad ..	31.5.19	
AHMAD BEG	Qaim Maqam	Halabja ..	1.4.19	
AHMAD BEG	Mudir	Surdash ..	20.7.19	
AHMAD BEY	D.A.P.O.	Balad	25.6.19	
AHMAD DARA, MIRZA	D.A.P.O.	Qizil Robot ..	1.6.19	
AHMAD DAUD EFF., SAIYID	Mudir of Auqaf	Baghdad ..	22.2.18	
AHMAD EFF.	Rais Baladiya	Arbil	11.11.18	
AHMAD EFF.	D.A.P.O.	Kut	1.10.19	
	Muffettish	"	8.6.20	
AHMAD IZZET	Mudir, Tapu	Basra	1.3.20	
AHMAD MUKTAR EFF.	Mudir, Tobacco & Pub- lic Debt	Sulaimani ..	15.11.19	
AKHTAR, K. M. J., B.A.	Rev. Asst.	Basra	1.1.19	
'ALI, EFF.	Mufettish, Land Settle- ment Office	Baghdad ..	1.12.19	
'ALI, EFF.	Mudir	Tuz	1.4.20	
'ALI EFF., SAIYID	Mudir	Altun Kupri ..	1.4.20	
'ALI EFF., bin SARHAN AGHA	Mudir, Tapu	Baghdad ..	1.12.18	
	Mutashar, Tapu	"	1.4.19	
'ALI ES SA'AD	Mudir	Dair Shafi ..	21.9.16	
'ALI ISSA, SHAIKH	Naib-al-Jaafariya ..	Balad	15.2.20	
'ALI KEMAL, EFF.	Mudir	Cham-Chamal ..	1.1.20	
ALLAH BAKSH, CHAUDRI, B.A.	S.D., Municipality Secy. Municipality ..	Basra	1.5.17	
	Pres. Court of Wards ..	"	1.1.18	
	P.A. to Rev. Secy. ..	Baghdad ..	1.7.20	
'ALWAN AL HAJI SA'ADUM SHAIKH	Govt. Agent	Kufa District ..	1.7.18	
AMIN, EFF., ibn MULLA RASHID	Member, Mejlis-al-'Ilmy (Waqf)	Baghdad ..	1.5.17	
AMIN EFF.	Mudir	Rania	1.4.19	
AMJAD EFF., ZAHAWI	Mushawar Huquq, Auqaf	Baghdad ..	15.6.20	

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
AMUR BEG	Mudir	Mawit ..	1.7.19
'AUNI EFF.	Mudir	Qara Dagh, Zardiawa	15.8.19
		Sarchenar (W.), Kani Jina	15.5.20
ASHWORTH, A.	Conservancy Supt. ..	Basra	11.1.20
BABEKR AGHA	Hakim Shara'	Qala Diza ..	1.4.19
BAHADUR ALI SHAH, KHAN SAHIB SAIYID	Asst. to A.P.O.	Mandali ..	1.1.19
	D.A.P.O.	" ..	1.4.20
BELL, J.	Asst. Supt. Cypher Sec. C.C.'s Office	Baghdad ..	19.1.19
BISHAN SINGH	Supt. Establishments, C.C.'s Office	" ..	1.1.19
BUHAJJAT EFF.	Mudir	Qalat Salih ..	6.7.19
CHAVANIS, Monsieur N. K.	Civ. Engr., Waqf ..	Baghdad ..	13.6.17
CHILL, H. E.	Mun. Secy. & Senior Mun. Inspr., Ashar	Basra	25.7.18
CURMI, E. J.	Supt. Vernac. Office ..	Baghdad ..	1.5.18
DAUD EFF.	D.A.P.O. Eastern ..	Umm-al-Ba'rur	1.8.19
	Shamiya		
DAUD MINASSIAN	Mudir, Saniya ..	Basra	1.1.19
DAUD YUSUFANI	Asst. to P.O.	Mosul	22.3.19
DILOTTI, G. S.	P.A. to A.P.O. ..	Kadhimain ..	1.6.18
EDWARD MIRIAMKHAN	P.A. to A.P.O. ..	Najaf	1.1.19
EMIL EFF.	Mudir Mal	Hilla	1.6.20
ENVER EFF.	Mudir Mal	Arbil	1.4.20
FAIQ BEG	Mudir of Tapu ..	Sulaimani ..	1.4.19
	Qaim Maqam	Cham-Chamal ..	20.8.19
FARHUD - AL - MUGH-ASHGASH, SHAIKH	Mudir	Hakika & Hamar Lake	1.4.16
FARIS, AGHA	Mudir	Shaikh Bazani, Sarchenar	1.4.19
FERNANDEZ, R., M.B.E.	Supt. Records	Baghdad ..	1.11.18
FONSECA, F. G.	Excise Inspr.	Basra	1.4.19
GEORGIUS, G.	P.A. to P.O.	Samawa ..	1.6.18
	D.A.P.O.	Shinafiya ..	1.1.19
	P.A. to P.O.	Samarra ..	1.5.19
GHA Fur AGHA	Rais Baladiya	Sulaimani ..	20.8.19
GHA Fur KHAN	Mudir	Nabdasht Lewja	1.4.19
GHULAM, RABBANI	Mudir, Land Settlement Office	Baghdad ..	1.1.20
HAFADH EFF.	Mudir, Tapu	" ..	1.4.19
HAMAD HAMDI EFF.	Asst. to P.O.	Dair-ez-Zor ..	1.5.19
	S.D., Office of Rev. Secy.	Baghdad ..	1.1.20
HAMAD AL KHAMIS	Mudir	Khamisiya ..	1.4.16
HAMDI EFF., ibn-al-A'DHAMI	Admin. Inspr. (Waqf)	Baghdad ..	14.9.18
HAMID EL MIR JAFIR, SHAIKH	Mudir	Medina	4.12.16

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
HAMUDA bin MUZAI'IL AL-BUSHARAH, SHAIKH	Mudir Al Hasan .. 1.4.16
HAMID-AL-SOZ	Mudir Karadi 1.7.18
HANNA ABBO, MICHAEL	P.A. to P.O. Kut 11.6.20
HASAN RIDHA, EFF.	Lawyer, Auqaf Dept. .. Baghdad .. 25.11.19
HASAN, SHAIKH	Mudir Qala Sioka, Aglyalar .. 1.4.19
HASAN AL HUSAINI, SAIYID	Nasir Shariat Sulaimani .. 1.4.19
HASHIN KHAN	Asst. to A.P.O. .. Musayib .. 1.2.18
HASSAN BEG	S.D. Mosul 10.11.18
	Rev. Insp. " 1.2.19
HAZRAB SHAH, KHAN SAHIB, I.O.M.	D.A.P.O., Karrada .. Baghdad .. 15.8.19
HIFDHI EFF., UMAR	P.A. to Dir. of Auqaf .. Baghdad .. 20.10.18
HUSAIN EL SAIYID JAB- BAR, SAIYID	Mufettish, Land Settle- ment Office Hilla 4.12.19
HUSAIN, bin SAIYID ISSA	Asst. to P.O. Nasiriya .. 5.6.20
HUSSAIN EFF.	Govt. Agent Shinafiya .. 31.7.18
IBRAHIM ABU GUFAYAH, SAIYID	D.A.P.O. Beni Said .. Nasiriya .. 1.6.19
IBRAHIM AL AMARI	Mudir, Beni Hutait .. Qurna 1.11.16
	Asst. to P.O. " 1.7.19
IBRAHIM AL BAJ, SAIYID	Mudir Diwaniya .. 1.7.18
IBRAHIM EFF. AL RAWI, SHAIKH	Member, Majlis al Ilmy, (Waqf) Baghdad .. 1.5.17
IBRAHIM EFF.	Asst. to P.O. Hilla 1.7.18
	Mudir Mal Samawa .. 1.4.19
ISMAIL AGHA	Mudir Chenaran, Khudran .. 1.4.19
ISMAIL BEG	Wakil Hakim Rowandiz .. 16.12.19
ISMAIL EFF.	Mudir Sarchenar E. Darbarula .. 1.4.19
	Sangao, Kirpichna 1.4.20
ISMAIL EFF.	D.A.P.O. Falluja 1.8.20
IZZAT BEG	Rais Baladiya Sulaimani .. 1.4.19
IZZAT EFF.	Mudir Zab, Sarchenar .. 1.7.20
IZZAT SARKIS	Asst. to A.P.O. Qalat Sikar .. 1.12.18
JAD GHAWI, EFF., M.B.E.	P.A. to P.O. Shamiya Kufa 7.1.18
	D.A.P.O. Umm-al-Barur .. 1.8.18
	A.P.O. Najaf (Town) .. 1.7.19
	P.A. to P.O. & M.G. Basra 10.4.20
JAMIL AGHA	Asst. Hakim Sha'ar .. Koi 16.12.18
JAMIL EFF.	S.D. (Rev.) " 5.5.17
	Mudir Mal Afek 15.12.19
JAMIL EFF., bin ABD- EL-KARIM	Chief Insp. Waqf Baghdad .. 27.10.17
JEMAL BEG	Mudir Merga 20.10.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
JOSHUA, Sergt. N.	Supt. Pol. Base Depot	Basra	5.1.19
JOWHAR, H. M. H.	Mudir, Baladiyah ..	Karkh	1.10.19
KADHIM HAMADANI	Asst. to A.P.O. ..	Suq-ash-Shuyukh	1.12.18
	D.A.P.O.	Albu Saleh ..	1.6.19
KHAIRI EFF., AL	Rev. Asst. to A.P.O. ..	Aziziya	1.4.18
	Asst. to A.P.O. ..	Diwaniya	1.8.18
KHAIRI EFF., SAIYID	Rev. Asst. to A.P.O. ..	Hilla	1.9.19
KHIDR, SAIYID	Asst. to A.P.O. ..	Nasiriya	8.12.18
KHONEY, MICHAEL	Head Translr. Vernac.	Baghdad	1.9.19
	Sec. C.C.'s Office		
KHOURY, MICHAEL M.	P.A. to P.O.	Samarra	1.9.19
LAFTA EFF.	Mudir	Girdelan	1.6.18
MAHMUD NADIM EFF.,	S.D.	Abu Sukhair ..	1.2.18
TABAQCHALI, SAIYID	D.A.P.O.	Baghaila	1.4.19
MAHMUD NADUN	Mutashar, Rev. Dept.	Baghdad	1.2.18
TABAQCHALI	D.A.P.O.	Kut	1.4.19
	Mudir	Balad &	1.3.19
		Samaicha	
	Rais Baladiya	Samarra	23.7.19
MAHMUD EFF.	Mudir, Saniya	Basra	1.1.20
MAHMUD EFF.	Mudir Mal	Köi	1.4.20
MAJID EFF.	Mudir	Sarchenar (W.),	15.7.19
		Kani Jina	
		Tanjero,	1.12.19
		Kharagiam	
		Tauq	1.4.20
MANSHAD AL HUBAYIB	Mudir	Batha, Nasiriya	1.1.18
MELKONIAN, V.	P.A. to A.P.O.	Aziziya	1.8.19
METHA, E. R.	Supt. P.O. & M.G.'s Office	Basra	1.4.19
MIAN MOHAMMAD SA'ID	Mudir, Land Settlement Office	Hilla	19.10.19
MIDHAT EFF.	S.D.	1.8.17
	Asst. to A.P.O.	Hindiya	1.1.19
	P.A. to A.P.O.	Deltawa	12.5.20
MIRANI ABDUL QADR BEG	Hakim Sha'ar	Shaqlawaw	1.2.19
MIRZA MUHAMMAD, KHAN SAHIB	Head Mirza, Office of A.P.O.	Dizful	1.4.17
MUHAMMAD SAIYID	Asst. to P.O.	'Amara	1.10.18
MUHAMMAD SAIYID	Hakim Sha'ar	Sulaimani	1.4.19
MUHAMMAD AGHA	Hakim-Sha'ar	Köi	16.12.18
MUHAMMAD AGHA EFF.	Govt. Agent of Qazian	Mendali	1.5.18
MUHAMMAD ALI SUFI, KHAN SAHIB	Supt. Vernac. Sec. M.G. & P.O.'s Office	Basra	1.12.18
MUHAMMAD AMIN AGHA	Hakim Sha'ar	Bazian,	1.4.19
		Cham-Chamal	
MUHAMMAD FAUD BEG	Mudir	Serochik,	7.3.20
		Gilderra	

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
MUHAMMAD GHARIB, SHAIKH	Hakim Sha'ar	Shahr Bazar, ..	1.4.19	
MUHAMMAD IBRAHIM	Supt. Translating Office	Baghdad ..	1.12.18	
MUHAMMAD JA'AFER bin SAIYID AHMED, SAIYID	Naib-el-Ja'fariya ..	Basra	1.3.19	
MUHAMMAD KIFAYE-TULLAH KHAN	Supt. Rev. Office ..	Sulaimani ..	1.4.19	
MUHAMMAD MAHDI TABATABAI, SAIYID	Asst. to P.O.	Karbala ..	1.2.18	
MUHAMMAD NADIM EFF., SAIYID	Asst. to P.O. Shamiya	Kufa	1.2.18	
MUHAMMAD NURI	Mudir, Sakricha ..	Qurna	1.9.17	
MUHAMMAD RASCHID AGHA	Mudir	Shiwakal ..	12.8.19	
MUHAMMAD SA'ID EFF. bin ABDULLA AGHA	Mudir, Waqf	Basra	1.1.19	
MUHAMMAD SALEH BEG	Mudir	Mawit	1.7.19	
MUHAMMAD SARWAR KHAN, RISALDAR	P.A. to A.P.O. ..	Karbala ..	24.1.19	
MUHAMMED SHAFI, QAZI, B.A.	Secy. Municipality ..	Kadhimain ..	13.9.19	
MUHI-UD-DIN EFF.	Mudir of Tapu ..	Basra	11.3.18	
MULLA MA'ARUF EFF.	S.D.	1.3.19	
MULLA MOHAMMED EFF.	Mudir	Jabbari Teki ..	1.2.19	
MUSA EFF.	Hakim Sha'ar	Sulaimani ..	1.7.20	
MUSTAPHA EFF.	Hakim Sha'ar	Sulaimani ..	20.6.19	
MUTTANAH, B. P.	Hakim Sha'ar	Köi	16.12.18	
MUZAFFAR ABDUL AZIZ	Asst. to A.P.O. ..	Qalat Sikar ..	10.3.20	
	D.A.P.O.	Abu Sukhair ..	26.8.18	
		Western Shamiya	23.3.20	
	i/c Tapu Survey ..	Basra	1.7.19	
		Baghdad ..	1.1.20	
	Supt. Office D.M.G. ..	Baghdad (E.) ..	1.12.18	
	D.A.P.O., Karrada ..	Baghdad ..	12.5.19	
	Mudir, Baladiya Risafa and Secy. Mun. Council	24.8.19	
NAJI EFF.	S.D.	Rumaitha ..	1.7.19	
NAJIB EFF.	Mudir Mal	16.3.20	
NAMIQ BEG	Mustantiq-i-Sulh ..	Sulaimani ..	20.6.19	
NAOMI AZZO	Mudir	Penjvin ..	15.7.19	
NASIR-UD-DIN, EFF.	Head Draughtsman ..	Baghdad ..	1.3.20	
OMAR HIFDHI EFF. bin SALEH-AL-MILLI	D.A.P.O.	Albu Kamal ..	15.3.19	
PIROT AGHA	P.A. to Dir. of Auqaf ..	Baghdad ..	20.11.18	
PORDHALAKIS EFF., C. A.	Mudir	Merga	1.4.19	
	Supt. Vernac. Sec. C.C.'s Office	Baghdad ..	1.1.20	

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
QASSIM EFF.	Member, Majlis al Ilmy, Waqf	Baghdad	.. 28.7.17
RAFIQ EFF.	S.D.	Diwaniya	.. 11.4.17
	Rev. Insp.	"	.. 15.6.18
RAFIQ BEG	D.A.P.O.	Badra	15.7.19
RAJAB NA'AMA	Rais Baladiya	Ashar	1.8.19
		Basra	15.6.20
RASCHID JABRAN	S.D., Rev. Dept.	Baghdad	.. 17.12.18
	Rev. Insp.	"	.. 27.3.19
RAUF BEG	Mudir	Sangao	27.7.19
		Kirpichna	
RAUF ibn ABDULLA	Asst. Mudir, Tapu	Baghdad	.. 1.3.20
REZA BEG, BIMBASHI	Qaim Maqam	Shar Bazhar, Chwarta	.. 22.7.19
RIAZUL HASSAN, SAIYID	Supt. Tapu Survey	Basra	7.4.20
RUSHDI EFF.	P.A. to P.O.	Nasiriya	.. 1.2.18
	D.A.P.O., W. Shamiya	Abu Sukhair	.. 7.8.19
	A.P.O.	Kufa, Najaf	.. 23.3.20
SA'ADAT HUSSAIN	P.A. to A.P.O.	Hindiya	.. 3.5.19
KHAN JAMADAR			
SA'ID EFF.	S.D.	Penjvin	.. 30.7.19
	Mudir	"	.. 1.4.20
SA'ID EFF.	Mudir	Khormal	.. 31.7.19
SA'ID EFF., ibn ABDUL	Mudir, Land Rev.	Basra	1.8.18
HAFIZ	Muffetish, Land Rev... ..	"	1.4.20
SAJJAD HUSSAIN	Supt. Vernac. Sec. M.G. & P.O.'s Office	"	13.8.19
RIDHWI, SAIYID			
SALEH EL HEJJAZI HAJI	Mudir of Dair	Shafi	14.3.20
SALEH EFF., AL MILLI	S.D., Auqaf	Baghdad	.. 8.6.17
	Dep. Dir. Auqaf, & Member Majlis al Ilmy	"	.. 21.8.18
SALEH EFF.	S.D.	Diwaniya	.. 29.6.17
	D.A.P.O.	"	.. 1.2.18
SALIM AL KHAYYUN, SHAIKH	Mudir	Chabaish	.. 29.9.19
SALIM AL MARAWI	D.A.P.O.	Ramadi	.. 1.7.19
SALMAN JAWAIDAH	Asst. to P.O.	'Amara	25.2.20
SARKIS EFF., M.B.E.	S.D.	Kufa	1.8.17
	Mun. O.	"	1.8.18
	D.A.P.O.	Baquba	.. 12.5.20
SHAKIB EFF.	Mudir	Shuan	1.4.20
SHAKIR AL NAMAH	Asst. to P.O.	'Amara	1.8.18
	D.A.P.O. (Offg.)	Ali Gharbi	.. 25.2.20
SHAMS-AL DIN EFF.	Member, Majlis al Ilmy	Baghdad	.. 1.5.17
ALUSI	(Auqaf)		
SHAWKAT BEG	Mudir	Malha	1.4.20
SHER JANG, KHAN	S.D.	Turco-Persian	11.12.19
BAHADUR		Frontier	
SHUKRI ARBOUSH	Mudir Mal	Ramdai	.. 15.3.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
SHUKRI BEY, HAJI	Mudir	Mamuhdiya ..	16.4.20
SION BAGHDADI	D.A.P.O.	Ali Gharbi ..	6.6.19
SION GURGI	Hon. Attaché to C.C. ..	Baghdad ..	23.10.17
ST. JOHN, Sergt.-Major F.R., D.C.M.	Supt. Pol. Base Depot	Basra	28.3.19
SULAIMAN UL NAS- RULLAH	Mudir	Albu Salih, Nahiya ..	10.5.18
TAHA AL ZAIRAT	Mudir	Shattra ..	16.7.18
TAHVI SULMAN, HAJI	Mutashar, Saniya ..	Basra	1.3.19
TAIQ EFF. AL ALUSI	Mamur Sajalat ..	Baghdad ..	10.1.20
TANNER, Sergt. G. H.	Supt. Store Sec. C.C.'s Office	"	8.1.19
TAQI AGHA	P.A. to P.O. Shamiya ..	Najaf	1.5.18
TATOONCHIE, MICHAEL N.	Supt. Vernac. Sec. P.O. & M.G.'s Office	Baghdad ..	15.7.20
TAUFIQ EFF. bin HAJI ADHAR	Asst. to P.O. D.A.P.O.	Nasiriya .. "	1.8.18 5.6.20
TAUFIQ EFF., SAIYID	D.A.P.O.	Falluja	1.12.19
THOY, H. D.	Mudir	Fao	1.4.18
TOMLINSON, J. H.	Actg. Mudir	"	1.6.18
UQBASHI ES SA'AD, SHAIKH	Mudir	Sakricha Ne- hairat, Qurna	21.2.18
UMAR DARAZ KHAN, KHAN SAHIB	Supt. Rev. Board .. P.A. to Secy. Rev. & Fin. D.A.P.O.	Baghdad .. " Samarra ..	1.5.17 29.1.19 25.6.20
UMAR EFF., SAIYID	Hakim Wilat (Mutasar- rif)	Sulaimani ..	1.4.19
UTHMAN EFF.	Mudir	Kifri	1.4.20
WASSEF EFF.	Mudir, Land Rev. ..	Basra	1.4.20
WILSON, P. D.	Supt. D.C.C.'s Office .. i/c Pol. Base Depot .. Cypher Asst. C.C.'s Office	" " Baghdad ..	21.5.18 3.10.18 24.3.19
YAHIR BEG	Supt. Records (Personnel)	"	1.4.20
YAHIYA BEG	Hakim Sha'ar, Gulambar	Halabja ..	1.4.19
YASIN ibn TAHAR, HAJI	Mudir	Dera	1.4.20
YUNIS EFF.	D.A.P.O.	Hit	1.4.20
	S.D.	"	1.2.19
	Mudir	Bazian, Mortka	1.7.20
YUSUF-AL-BAJ	Mudir	Beni Said ..	1.4.16

12. PORT DIRECTORATE—BASRA

NOTE The Port Directorate, Basra, was taken over from M.E.F. as at 1st April, 1920, and the officers previously appointed and then still in the service of the Civil Administration were absorbed in the establishment.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>					
ABBOTT, E. A.	Accts. O.	21.3.20
BALLANTINE, L. F.	Asst. Engr.	}	1.4.20
BARKER, R. J.	Traffic O.					
BARNARD, A. W.	Harbour Master					
BINGHAM, Commander A. G., C.I.E. (R.I.M.)	Port O., and Supt. Mer- cantile Marine	23.9.16
	Asst. Dir.	1.4.20
BROWNING, H. E.	Harbour Master	}	1.4.20
BYFORD, C.	Traffic O.					
FORDHAM, L. W. N.	Harbour Master					
GRAY, T. S.	Harbour Master					
GRIFFITHS, L. W.	Traffic O.					
HALLEY, F. W.	Harbour Master					
HARRISON, W. H.	River Surveyor					
JONES, E.	Harbour Master					
LOCKE, Capt. C. E. L.	Traffic O.					
McKIRDY, J.	Pilot Master					
METCALFE, R.	Traffic O.	}	1.7.19
ODHAM, J. H.	Asst. Engr.					
O'RORKE, Lieut.-Col. G. M., M.B.E.	Chief Engr. Dredging	1.7.19
PRATLEY, H.	Attd. Dir'te	22.5.20
RAWSON, Lieut. G., C.B.E.	Port O. (Offg.) & Supt. Mercantile Marine	19.8.18
	Asst. Port O.	1.4.20
SALMOND, Commander S. C.	Port O. & Supt. Mer- cantile Marine	1.9.16
SPROTT, H. T.	Harbour Master	}	1.4.20
STRICK, R.	Asst. Dir. & Chief Engr.					
SWANN, Major G. J.	Asst. Dir. Traffic					
TWEDDLE, W. H.	Traffic O.					
WARD, Colonel J. C., C.I.E., D.S.O., M.B.E. (R.I.M. & I.W.T.)	Director					
WEEKS, C. A. R.	Engineer, S.V. <i>Alert</i>					
WILLIAMS, Capt. E. H.	Traffic O.					
WILSON, C.	Attd. Dir'te	6.5.20

13. POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS

NOTE M.E.F. Posts and Telegraphs were taken over as at 1st April 1919, prior to which date only five officers (see below*) of the Indian Postal Department had been employed on Civil Postal Services.

Abbreviations.

P. & T. Posts and Telegraphs.	D.A.G. (P. & T.). Deputy Accountant General (Posts & Telegraphs).
D.P.S. Director of Postal Services.	E. Engineer.
D.D.P.S. Deputy Director of Postal Services.	E.E. Executive Engineer.
A.D.P.S. Assistant Deputy Director of Postal Services.	A.E. Assistant Engineer.
	T. Telegraphs.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
ANGELO, Major Alfred, O.B.E.	D.D.P.S. Baghdad .. 29.3.20
ARKELL, Lieut. C. B., M.S.M.	A.E. T. Basra 1.4.19 Supt. T. " 1.11.19
ARKLIE, Lieut. E. V., M.B.E.	A.E. T. Baghdad .. 1.4.19
AUGIER, Capt. N. R.	P.A. to D.P.S. " .. 1.1.20
AZEVEDO, Lieut. A. E., M.B.E.	P.A. to D.P.S. " .. 1.5.19
BAMFORD, W. C.	Chief Storekpr. T. .. Basra 1.11.19
BELL, Lieut. C. H.	i/c Head Post Office .. " 13.5.19
CARTER, W.	A.E. T. " 1.11.19 E.E. T. Baghdad .. 1.5.20
*CLERICI, Major E., C.I.E., O.B.E.	D.D.P.S. " .. 1.6.18 D.P.S. " .. 1.5.19
COMBES, Lieut. G. G. E.	A.D.P.S. Ramadi .. 1.4.19 Kirkuk 8.11.19
*CREAGAN, Lieut. L. A.	A.D.P.S. Sulaimani .. 2.2.19
CUMMING, A. C.	A.E. T. and T'phones .. Baghdad .. 6.5.20
ECCLESTON, Lieut. H. C., M.B.E.	P.A. to D.P.S. " .. 1.5.19
EDIE, G. R.	A.E. T'phones .. Basra 1.11.19
FERGUSON, Lieut. J., M.B.E.	A.D.P.S. Baquba .. 8.5.19 Baghdad 1.8.20
*FRASER-KALBERER, Capt. R.	A.D.P.S. Basra 1.7.18
GAULD, Capt. H. A., M.C.	E.E. T. Mosul 1.4.19 A.D. T. Hamadan .. 1.5.20
GRANT, Lieut. L. I., M.B.E., M.M.	A.E. T. Baghdad .. 1.4.19
GREENE, H. E.	Supt. T. " 1.11.19
GREGSON, J.	Supt. T. Basra 14.5.20
GUMBLEY, D. W., O.B.E., I.S.O.	E.E. T. " 1.4.19 D.D. & E.E. T. " 1.11.19 Offg. D. of P. & T. .. Baghdad .. 13.8.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
HAMILTON, C. G.	A.D.P.S.	Baghdad	.. 11.3.19
	D.D.P.S.	"	.. 1.5.19
HARRIS, Major E.	A.D. T. (Persia)	"	.. 1.11.19
HEDGES, Major H. E.	E.E. T.	"	.. 1.4.19
	A.D. T.	Hamadan	.. 5.1.20
	E.E. T.	Baghdad	.. 1.6.20
HOGG, H. C.	Traffic Supt. T.	"	.. 1.11.19
KALBERER, Capt. J. F.	A.D.P.S.	Ramadi	.. 29.8.19
	A.D.P.S. (Offg.)	Basra 4.5.20
LEE, J. A.	A.E. T.	Baghdad	.. 9.6.20
LITTLE, E. F.	A.E. T'phones	Basra 5.2.20
LITTLE, Lieut. S. G.	A.D.P.S.	Hilla 1.4.19
MARTIN, A. H.	Supt. T.	Baghdad	.. 3.5.20
MAYHEW, Lieut. H. G.	A.D.P.S.	Basra 14.5.20
		Baghdad	.. 5.8.20
MOORE, Major A. G.	E.E. T.	"	.. 1.4.19
	A.D. Traffic	"	.. 1.11.19
ROBINSON, W. E., M.S.M.	A.E. T.	Hamadan	.. 1.4.19
		Baghdad	.. 1.11.19
*SEN, Lieut. K. C., M.B.E.	A.D.P.S.	"	.. 24.7.18
SHIYA'UD-DIN KHAN	A.D.P.S.	"	.. 16.5.20
SHUJ'AT 'ALI, Lieut., M.B.E.	A.D.P.S.	Kut 1.5.19
		Hilla 1.3.20
		Baghdad	.. 1.5.20
SMIDT, Lieut.-Col. G. E. O. de, D.S.O.	Dir. of Telegraphs	"	.. 1.4.19
	Dir. of P. & T.	"	.. 1.4.20
*SMITH, Lieut. N. S.	A.D.P.S.	Baghdad	.. 24.11.18
		Mosul 2.2.19
		Kirmanshah	.. 25.3.20
TOWNLEY, Capt. N. P.	Camp Comdt. T.	Baghdad	.. 1.11.19
URE, H. O.	A.D.P.S.	Mosul 13.2.20
WENDT, R. E. G.	D.A.G. (P. & T.)	Baghdad	.. 11.9.19
WHITE, Lieut. W. H.	Supt. T. Stores	"	.. 3.12.19
WHITEHOUSE, Capt. A. G.	Camp Comdt. T.	Basra 1.11.19
'ABDUL QADIR EFF.	Stamp Mudir	Baghdad	.. 16.11.19
BARUCHA, C. D.	Head Postmr.	"	.. 13.12.18
BIR BAR	P.A. to D.D.P.S.	"	.. 16.5.20
EVERETT, E. V.	Dep. Postmr.	Basra 11.10.19
KATRAK, F. M.	Dep. Postmr.	" 19.1.20
MIRZA HUSSAIN AGHA	Supervsr. D.A.G. (P. & T.)	Baghdad	.. 1.2.20
MOTI RAM	Dep. Postmr.	Basra 1.5.19
PEREIRA, J. A.	Dep. Postmr.	" 1.5.19
REBELLO, D. I.	Head Postmr.	" 1.9.18
S. CHANDRA PAUL	Supervsr. D.A.G. (P. & T.)	Baghdad	.. 26.6.20
THURSLEY, M. W.	Dep. Postmr.	Basra 1.5.19

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
VANVELU MUDLIAR, K. S.	Supervsr. D.A.G. (P. & T.) Baghdad .. 14.6.20
WATKINS, A.	Dep. Postmr. " .. 1.5.19
YUSUF QURAIISHI, S. M.	P.A. to D.P.S. " .. 22.5.20

14. PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT (Civil)

PART I

Abbreviations.

P.W.D. (Civ.).	Public Works Department (Civil).	E. Engineer.
D.W.O.	Divisional Works Officer.	A.E. Assistant Engineer.
A.D.W.O.	Assistant Divisional Works Officer.	E.E. Executive Engineer.
		A.E.E. Assistant Executive Engineer.
D.A.D.	Deputy Assistant Director.	Archt. Architect.
		Mun. Municipal.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>
ATKINSON, Major-General E. H. de V., C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E.	Chief Engr. and Secy. for P.W.D. (Civ.) Baghdad .. 29.10.19
BANERJI, K. C.	A.E. Basra .. 1.9.16
BARDON, J. W.	A.D.W.O. Qalat Sikar .. 1.6.20
BARRET, Lieut. A. H.	Stores O. Basra .. 13.2.19
BELL, G. S.	Chief Engr. " .. 1.1.17
BENNETT, Capt. S. G., M.C.	A.E.E. Baghdad .. 10.11.19
	D.W.O. " .. 1.6.20
CABLE, Lieut. R. W.	Asst. to D.A.D. " .. 27.1.19
CAREY, Lieut.-Col. A. B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	Dir. P.W.D. (Civ.) " .. 6.5.20
CARRIE, Major S. M.	A.E.E. " .. 15.8.19
	Asst. Secy. P.W.D. (Civ.) " .. 4.2.20
CLARKE, C.	Asst. Archt. " .. 1.3.20
CLAY, Capt. A. S., B.Sc., A.M.I.C.E.	A.E.E. " .. 1.8.19
DEARING, S. A.	Supt. E. Stores " .. 10.1.20
DUNCAN, Capt. A. C.	E.E. Basra .. 1.9.16
FORSTER, Lieut. T.	A.E.E. Baghdad .. 5.3.19
	D.W.O. 'Alwiya Baghdad .. 2.3.20
FRASER, Major J.	Accts. O., P.W.D. (Civ.) " .. 15.4.20
FRY, R. C.	A.D.W.O. Sulaimani .. 7.7.20
JEFFERY, C. A.	Asst. Archt. Baghdad .. 1.3.20
LAMONT, Lieut. J.	Asst. to D.A.D. " .. 13.2.19
LAWRENCE, A. G.	Supt. Mun. Gardens " .. 2.2.20
LYNAM, Major C. T., M.C.	A.E.E. " .. 30.9.19
	D.W.O. Hilla .. 10.10.19
McANDREW, Major G. D.	E.E. Basra .. 18.7.17

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
MASON, H. C.	Asst. Archt.	Baghdad .. 18.4.20
MORGAN, Capt. E. B.	A.E. 'Alwiya	" .. 25.2.20
MULVANY, Lieut. J. L.	A.E.	Basra .. 1.7.19
PIKE, Lieut. J. P.	A.E.	" .. 25.11.17
PITT, Lieut. J. P.	A.E.	" .. 1.12.17
POVER, Major W. A.	A.D.W.O.	" .. 1.6.20
SCOTT, O. R.	A.D.W.O. 'Alwiya	Baghdad .. 1.7.20
SLATER, A. R.	A.D.W.O. Hinaidi	" .. 1.9.20
SPENCER, Capt. H., M.C.	A.E.E. & Archt.	" .. 13.9.19
STABLER, Lieut. C.	A.E.E.	" .. 14.8.19
	P.A. to E.E.	" .. 4.2.20
	P.A. to Dir.	" .. 6.5.20
STEPHENS, Major F. W.	D.W.O.	Basra .. 1.7.20
THORNE, Lieut. H.	A.E.	" .. 4.2.19
	A.D.W.O.	" .. 1.2.20
WHEATLEY, H. H., O.B.E., M.C.	P.A. to C.E.	Baghdad .. 1.7.20
WILSON, Major J. M.	D.A.D.	" .. 30.11.18
	Govt. Archt.	" .. 1.3.19

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
MIDDLETON, F. J.	Mun. E.	Baghdad (West) 20.9.18
	Advisory E.	" " 1.2.20
MOUGEL, L.	Mun. E.	Baghdad (East) 1.10.18
PACHACHI HASSAN FAHMI	Asst. Mun. E.	" " 1.1.19

15. PRESS AND NEWSPAPERS (Government)

PART I

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
BOWEN, Capt. H. C.	Editor, <i>Basra Times</i> 9.10.18
CAMERON, Lieut. D. W.	Editor, <i>Basra Times</i> 24.2.20
COLE, Lieut. H. S.	Editor, <i>Basra Times</i> 29.6.18
LORIMER, Mrs. D. L. R.	Editor, <i>Basra Times</i> 1.9.16
MACCOLLUM, Capt. D. V.	Editor, <i>Basra Times</i> 30.4.17
PARRY, D. G.	Editor, <i>Basra Times</i> 6.5.17
	Supt. Govt. Press	Basra .. 28.8.17
PEASE, Lieut. E.	Editor, <i>Basra Times</i> 5.12.17
THORNILEY, J. H.	Editor, <i>Basra Times</i> 4.4.19
	Editor, <i>Baghdad Times & Al 'Arab</i> 15.3.20

Name and Rank	Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto
VILLIERS-STUART, Capt. G. A.	Editor, <i>Basra Times</i> 20.8.17 Editor, <i>Baghdad Times & Al'Arab</i> 16.12.17
WEAKFORD, C. F., M.B.E.	Supt. Govt. Press .. Basra .. . 1.4.16 .. Baghdad .. . 10.6.17

PART II

Name and Rank	Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto
'ANIS ZAKHUR SIDAWI	Editor, <i>El Mosul</i> 21.3.19

16. RAILWAYS

NOTE: The Railway Department was constituted, as from April 1920, by transfer *en bloc* from the Military Department.

Abbreviations.

E. Engineer.	A.T.M. Assistant Traffic Manager.
A.E. Assistant Engineer.	D.T. Supt. District Traffic Superintendent.
D.E. District Engineer.	Loco. Supt. Locomotive Superintendent.
E.E. Executive Engineer.	Constn. Construction.
T.M. Traffic Manager.	Rly(s). Railway(s).

Name and Rank	Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto
ANDERSON, Major J. E.	D.E. Baghdad
ANDERSON, R. E.	Asst. Loco. Supt. .. Shu'aiba
ARNOLD, R. F.	Asst. Loco. Supt. .. Baghdad
AYLEN, L. B.	A.E. Baiji
BARCLAY, N. B.	Supt. Waggon Ferry .. Baghdad
BARTON, Capt. F. V.	Camp Comdt. " 1.4.20
BEATTIE, G. H.	A.E. Baquba
BICKERTON, W. H. B.	E.E. Baghdad
BLACKWOOD, V. P. O'R.	Dep. T.M. "
BLAKE, D.	Asst. Auditor Basra
BLYTON, P. G.	D.E. " 25.5.20
BOURN, D. G.	A.T.M. Baghdad
BRABSON, A. C.	Supt. Stores Basra
BRYANT, Major F. W., M.C.	Dep. Chief Engr. Baghdad
BURNS, L. D.	Paymaster Basra
BUTCHER, Capt. W. H.	A.E. Baghdad (West) 1.4.20
BUTTERFIELD, Lieut. J. E. C., R.E.	A.E. Hilla
CHALLONER, Capt. P. A.	Asst. Loco. Supt. .. Shu'aiba
CHAPMAN, F. G.	Supt. Stores Baghdad

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>	
CLARKE, Capt. W. H. C., M.C.	A.E.	Ur Junction
COLES, A. W.	D.T. Supt.	Basra
CORFIELD, H. R.	A.E.	Kut
DALEY, Capt. F. M.	D.T. Supt.	Basra
DAVIES, D. T.	E.E.	"
DILLON, E. Y., M.C.	P.A. to C.E.	Baghdad
DIXON, R. M.	A.E.	Baquba
DODGE, F. C.	D.T. Supt.	Basra
ELLIOTT, A.	Comdt. 133rd Rly. Constn. Coy.	Baghdad (West)
EWING, A. G.	A.E.	Samawa
FERRARIO, J. E.	Asst. Loco. Supt. (Elec. Engr.)	Shu'aiba
FERRY, E. S.	Dep. Loco. Supt.	Baghdad
GOFF, Lieut. C. A.	Asst. Supt. Stores	Basra
GRAY, Major P.	Camp Comdt.	"
GRIFFIN, Capt. A. C., O.B.E., R.E. (S.R.)	Asst. Gen. Manager	Baghdad
HALL, S. A.	A.E.	"
HARDING, F. M.	A.E.	Basra (Ma'qil)
HARPUR, E. W.	Comdt. 121st Rly. Constn. Coy.	Diwaniya
HAYMAN, B. S.	Examiner of Accts.	Basra
HEINEMANN, S. O.	Dep. C.E.	Baghdad
HEWSON, R. B.	D.E.	"
HOLMES, C. E.	Asst. Supt. Stores	Basra
HORSFIELD, R.	Asst. Loco. Supt.	Baghdad
HORSFIELD, R. S.	Asst. Auditor	"
HOWGILL, R. J. F.	Asst. T. Supt.	"
INGOLDBY, Capt. E.	Asst. Loco. Supt.	"
JAMES, R. F.	Asst. Loco. Supt.	Basra
KIERNANDER, O. G.	T. M.	Baghdad
LAMB, G. H.	Asst. Loco. Supt.	Shu'aiba
LAWIN, P. A.	Dist. Loco. Supt.	Baghdad
LAWRENCE, C. W.	A.E.	Ur Junction
LEE, Major W. H.	Dist. Loco. Supt.	Shu'aiba
LEWIS, Capt. G. H. D.	Dist. Loco. Supt.	Baghdad
LIGHTBODY, E. C.	A.E. (J.S. Quarry)	Basra
LOCK, T. H.	A.E.	Qaraghan
LUBBOCK, Colonel G., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.	Dir. of Rlys. & Gen. Manager	Baghdad
LUBBOCK, M. G.	A.E.	Diwaniya
MABBETT, Major P. W.	Dep. Supt. Personnel	Basra
MAIN, G. D.	Dep. Chief Auditor	Baghdad
MILNE, W. S.	A.E.	Basra
MOFFAT, W. J.	A.E. (Brickfields)	"
MOLE, J. A.	D.T. Supt.	"
MOSS, D.	Comdt. 124th Rly. Constn. Coy.	"

1.4.20

25.5.20

1.4.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
MUIRHEAD, A. K.	Supt. Stores & Actg. Asst. Dir.	Basra	1.4.20
NAGLE, J. E.	D.T. Supt.	Baghdad	.. 25.5.20
NOLAN, H. M.	Paymaster	"	
O'DONOVAN, D. F.	A.T. Supt.	"	
OLLIFF-LEE, O.	D.E. (Designs)	"	
PERRY, H.	Asst. Supt. Personnel	Basra	
PIRIE, J. H.	Asst. Supt. Stores	"	
RAEBURNE, H. G.	Dep. Chief Auditor	"	
ROAN, Capt. W.	Asst. Supt. Personnel	Baghdad	
ROBINSON, A.	Secy. Rly. Dept.	"	
ROTHERA, P., O.B.E., M.I.C.E.	Chief Engr.	"	
RUSSA, G.B.S.	O.C. Engrng. & Labour (Light Rlys.)	Basra	
SHEAT, F. H.	D.T. Supt.	Baghdad	
SIMPSON, H.	A.E.	"	
SMITH, Lieut. K. L.	Camp Comdt.	"	
SMITH, Capt. M. I. L.	Comdt. 132nd Rly. Constn. Coy.	"	.. 1.4.20
STANBURY, S. J.	A.T. Supt.	"	
TAINSH, J. R.	Loco. Supt.	"	
TAYLOR, Capt. G. R. F.	Comdt. 138th Rly. Constn. Coy.	"	
TAYLOR, W. S.	A.E.	"	
THOMPSON, H. W. H.	A.E.	"	
VIVIAN, O. H.	A.T. Supt.	Basra	
WATSON, Capt. A. W.	Camp Adjt.	"	
WHITFIELD, J. M.	D.E.	Diwaniya	
WILLIAMS, P.	A.E. i/c Workshops	Basra	
WILLIS, F.	Paymaster	Baghdad	
WRIGHT, I. J.	Chief Auditor	"	
YATES, Major D.	Works Manager	Basra	

17. REFUGEES AND REPATRIATION

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>		
ALLARD, Lieut. G. H.	Attd.	Refugee Camp, Baquba	1.12.19
ARNOLD, Lieut. N.	Attd.	"	1.12.19
BACON, Capt. S. F.	A.P.M.	"	1.3.20
BURN, Lieut. V.	Attd. Urmiya Battn.	"	18.2.20
CHARGE, Lieut. H. L.	Attd.	"	11.5.19
CLARK, Capt. D.	Attd.	"	1.5.20
COWPER, Lieut. R. H.	Q.M., Urmiya Battn.	"	1.12.19
CUNLIFFE-OWEN, Lieut.- Col. F., C.M.G.	Comdt. Dir. of Repat.	"	1.8.19 1.1.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
FORD, Lieut. E. C.	Coy. Comdr., Urmiya Battn.	Refugee Camp, Baquba		7.4.20
GIBSON, Lieut. F. J.	Repat. O. (Assyrians) ..	" "		1.12.19
GRAY, Capt. A. J.	Coy. Comdr., Urmiya Battn.	" "		1.12.19
HOLMES, Lieut. J.	Repat. O. (Assyrians) ..	" "		1.12.19
LEWIS, Lieut. V.	Asst. to Dir. of Repat. ..	" "		4.4.20
LONDON, Capt. A. G.	Coy. Comdr., Urmiya Battn.	" "		1.12.19
NORTHCOTE, Lieut. D. S.	Repat. O. (Armenians)	" "		1.12.19
REED, Capt. G. S.	Attd. Urmiya Refugees	14.12.18	
RYND, Major F. F., D.S.O.	Dep. Dir. of Repat. ..	Baquba & Nahr 'Umar		7.7.20
SHIMMIN, Lieut. W. E.	Repat. O. (Assyrians) ..	Refugee Camp, Baquba		1.12.19
THORNBURN, Major W., M.C.	O.C. Urmiya Battn.	" "		1.12.19
TYNDALL, Capt. C. T. A.	Adjutant Urmiya Battn.	" "		1.12.19
WYGRAM, The Rev. C. A., D.D.	S.D. with Urmiya Refugees	22.2.19	
WRIGHT, Lieut. W. S.	Camp Q.M.	" "		1.12.19

18. STORES AND TRANSPORT (Civil)

Abbreviations.

St. Stores.

Forw. Forwarding.

Tpt. Transport.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>			
BEST, Lieut. L. W.	Tpt. O.	Basra		1.8.20
BOOTH, Lieut. W. M.	Shipping O.	"		28.4.20
HAND, Lieut. H., M.M.	Forw. O. St.	"		26.4.20
	S.D. Refugee Camp ..	Nahr 'Umar ..		1.8.20
JACKSON, Lieut. T. L.	St. O.	Basra		29.3.20
MACDONALD, Capt. A.	A.D. Tpt.	Baghdad		8.9.19
MACKAY, Lieut. F. F., M.B.E.	A.D. St.	"		21.1.19
MILLER, Capt. G. T.	St. O.	Basra		9.3.19
	St. O.	Baghdad		15.8.19
MOCATTA, Major V. E., O.B.E.	Dir. St. & Tpt. (<i>ex off.</i> Secy. Sales Board)	"		1.4.19
MORGAN, Lieut. H., D.C.M.	St. O.	"		1.3.20
PIERPONT, Lieut. W.	Tpt. O.	"		30.5.19
PITT, Lieut. T. A.	Forw. O. St.	Basra		16.12.19
RANDALL, Capt. W. F.	A.D. St.	"		15.8.19
RIDING, C. R.	St. O.	Baghdad		17.8.20
ROBERTSON, A. W. M., Lieut.	Tpt. O.	"		29.3.20

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
RUSSEL, Capt. F.	St. O.	Baghdad	..	24.11.19	
	S.D. Refugees Camp ..	Nahr 'Umar	..	1.8.20	
SCALLON, J. I. T.	St. O.	Baghdad	..	18.4.20	
SELLERS, Lieut. H.	Tpt. O.	Basra	7.5.19	
		Baghdad	..	1.8.20	
SKLIROS, J.	A.D. St.	"	..	3.7.19	
SMART, A. L.	St. O.	"	..	1.4.20	
TANNER, G. H.	St. O.	"	..	1.3.20	
WATKINS, Lieut. J. L.	Tpt. Workshops O. . .	"	..	23.1.20	
WILLIAMS, Lieut. B. L.	St. O.	"	..	15.4.20	

19. SURVEYS

NOTE: This Department was constituted, as from 1st January 1920, by transfers from the Military Department.

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
BOURKE, Capt. D. R. S.	S.D., Forest Survey	7.1.19	
CRUTCHLEY, Lieut. W. H.	S.D., Surveys	13.1.19	
FITZGIBBON, Lieut. L. B.	i/c Survey Trng. School	}	Baghdad	..	1.1.20
MORTON, Lieut. V. W.	Actg. Dir. of Surveys				
NEWLAND, Lieut. B. C.	i/c Drawing & Re-				
	production Sect.				
O'SULLIVAN, Lieut. E. C., D.C.M.	i/c Topograph. Sect. (for Mil.)				
PIRRIE, Colonel F. W., C.M.G., C.I.E.	Dir. of Surveys				
STRONG, Lieut. W. H., M.B.E.	i/c Topograph. Sect. (for Civ.)				

20. VETERINARY

NOTE: This Department was constituted, as from 1st January 1920, by transfers from the Military Department.

PART I

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
CHADWICK, Major C. R.	Director	1.1.20	
EASON, Capt. R. W., D.C.	Assistant	20.1.20	
SCOTT, Capt. T. T.	Assistant	21.2.20	

PART II

<i>Name and Rank</i>	<i>Post(s) occupied and Date of First Appointment thereto</i>				
A. M. GHOSH	Inspector	22.1.20	
S. R. IYER	Inspector	24.2.20	
D. K. MUKERJEE	Inspector	22.1.20	
M. N. SARKAR	Inspector	1.4.20	

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