



لقد تم إنشاء هذا الملف بنسخة بي دي إف بتاريخ ٢٠٢١/٠٩/٢٨ بواسطة مصادر من الإنترنت كجزء من الأرشيف الرقمي لمكتبة قطر الرقمية. يحتوي السجل على الإنترنت على معلومات إضافية وصور عالية الدقة قابلة للتقريب ومخطوطات. بالإمكان مشاهدتها على الرابط التالي:
http://www.qdl.qa/العربية/archive/81055/vdc_100000000465.0x0002f8

المراجع	IOR/L/MIL/5/798
العنوان	"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)"
التاريخ/ التواريخ	١٢ فبراير ١٩١٩-١٠ أبريل ١٩٢٠ (ميلادي)
لغة الكتابة	الإنجليزية في اللاتينية
الحجم والشكل	ملف واحد (١٠١ ورقة)
المؤسسة المالكة	المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند
حق النشر	<u>رخصة حكومة مفتوحة</u>


حول هذا السجل

يتألف الملف في أغلبه من مراسلات وبرقيات بين مكتب الحرب البريطاني والقائد العام في بلاد الرافدين بخصوص النزاعات والهجمات في كردستان. يتناول الملف الموضوعات المتصلة التالية: تأسيس اللجنة الوطنية الكردية والحركة الكردية؛ مجزرة المسيحيين في كردستان؛ ردود أفعال الرعايا المعادين للبريطانيين والأجانب والمسيحيين؛ الاضطرابات المتعددة في زاخو والعمادية والسليمانية وكركوك؛ الرد البريطاني على الحركة الكردية، مع نقاش للإجراءات العقابية والعمليات الاستراتيجية؛ السجناء والمصابون والقتلى البريطانيون؛ إعادة المسيحيين إلى موطنهم؛ وجبهة الهدنة على الحدود الجنوبية لمنطقة القوات البريطانية في بلاد فارس.

المتراسلون الرئيسيون هم: مكتب الحرب البريطاني؛ القائد العام في بلاد الرافدين؛ مقر القيادة العامة في مصر؛ مقر القيادة العامة في القسطنطينية؛ القائد العام في الهند؛ الوكيل السياسي في بغداد؛ والمفوض المدني في بغداد.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [أمامي] (٢٠٦/١)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [أمامي-داخلي] (٢٠٦/٢)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢و] (٢٠٦/٣)



SECRET.

PARAFIDASHI.

From :- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To :- War Office, repeated Egypt, and India.

Despatched 2015 25th April 1920,
Encs wired 1000 30th April 1920.

X. 0478 cipher April 6th.

Faisakhanjarir - Ibn - Umar on March 31st stated to have held conference on subject of concerted attack on British. Local tribes all represented and notoriously hostile characters were present. Conference agreed to hold at disposal of Faisakhanjarir - Ibn - Umar 4,000 tribesmen. Faisakhanjarir - Ibn - Umar provided abundant munitions and horses. On April 2nd convoy attacked by Barik on route to ^X Akra. 10 Indian other ranks killed, 2 wounded. Report received of tribal authorities on ²³ Tab with intention of attacking us on grounds by Turkish propaganda.

H. Smith, Major General


X 47 miles N.E.
Mesopotamia
1000

C.C. Copies to :-

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Gen.
V.B. of S.
A.S. G.M.G. M.G.O.
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D.M.O. D.D.M.O.
M.C.I. P. Sa. Sb. 2.
T.F.I. D.D.W.I.
M.I.C. Sb. 1. Ia. Ic. 6.
D.S.D.
Liaison Officer.
F.O. (Mr. Osborne).
I.P.S.E.
I.M. (Col. Feggs).
S.O. (Mr. Garrett).
L.I. (D.W.I.).
P.C.I.C.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [ظ٢] (٢٠٦/٤)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [و٣] [٢٠٦/٥]




(P 4197) From Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, 17th December 1948.
(Copy by post to Lodi, and General, Baghdad, via airmail.)
(Received 1948, 11 a.m.)

1543. My telegram of 1st December, 1448. Further operations have been completed. Houses of the principal miscreants blown up. Action is now being taken by the Political Officer with assistance of friendly Kurds to effect capture of two tribes mainly responsible for the murders, who are reported to have been built up in valley near Hawanduz by tribes friendly to us. He reports situation well in hand at Hawanduz which he has visited for a week.

Casual (P Talbot) reports that action taken by us has had good effect on Kurdish tribes near Khaz.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [ظ3] (٢٠٦/٦)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [و٤] (٢٠٦/٧)



OPERATIONS.

SECRET.

REFERENCE.

Despatched 1300 4/12/19.
Received 1700 11/12/19.

From:- G.O.S. Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Repeating G.O.S. Delhi.

X. 1700. December 4th.

Operations against Sibir Kurds now completed and as far as possible punishment for murders exacted. Civil administration restored and our prestige vindicated. Casualties trivial. I am withdrawing troops to Mosul leaving post near Agra to support civil officers. Health of troops good, country as usual very difficult. The force consisted of two columns, one from Amadia, one from Mosul via Agra. Total four Indian battalions, Mountain Battery and three Companies of Assyrians.

C.C. Copies to:-

ARMY COUNCIL

S.M.O. D.S.M.O.

R.O.S. E & A.

D.S.I. D.A.D. H.I.

H.I.P. & E.

H.I.E. & E.

H.I.C.

D.S.O.

Lord Curzon -

F.O. (Mr. Kibb) -

I.O. (Col. Poppy)

Paris


Yorubillas

ad (D.V.T.)

P.P. (I.D.O.S.)




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤٤] (٢٠٦/٨)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥٠] (٢٠٦/٩)



Kurdistan 88²

SECRET.

Operations

MARCHES.

From :- G.O.C. in C., Mesopotamia.

To :- War Office.

Despatched MID 17th November, 1917.
Received 18th 22nd November, 1917.

87


X/7932, November 17th.

Continuation of my X/7892. Akra
is now occupied by our force and a civil post will be
re-established. Excitement dying away again
amongst neighbouring tribes and only one or two
small sections of * re-inforcements are located in
the neighbourhood. No * territorial unit leaving
country (I group under.)

- | | | |
|-------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
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| | Sec. | G.I.I.C. G. G. |
| | F.S. of S. | G.I.S. G. |
| | G.I.S.G. G.C.I. G.S. | G.I.S.S. |
| | G.M.D. G.M.S.O. | G.S.S. |
| | G.O.S. P. G. 3, 4. | G.C. G.M.S. |
| | G.M.S. | |
| | G.S.S. | |
| | Imke. | |
| | Thessiles. | |
| | Lord Curzon. | |
| | I.C. (Dol. Fevre). | |
| | G.D.S.I. | |
| | P.O. (Mr. Kisten). | |
| | I.D.C.F. | |




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥٥] (٢٠٦/١٠)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦ و] (٢٠٦/١١)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦ظ] (٢٠٦/١٢)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧] [٢٠٦/١٣]



SECRET.

PERSIAN.

OPERATIONS.

From :- G.O.S., Mesopotamia.

To :- War Office, repeated India.

Despatched 1245 8th November, 1919.
Received 0600 8th November, 1919.

X, 1261 November 8th.

Regret report Mile political officer Mosul Division and Scott assistant political officer attached I are missing believe killed in district north of Akra which is an edge of hills 20 miles E east northeast of Mosul. Plans sent I over Akra which was B.Q. of local civil administration were heavily fired on from Akra. This district was one of our quiet areas and has never been visited by troops.

Def ar me information if this is local incident of all part of the side Turkish propaganda which produced the Amadia rising in Central Kurdistan.


An clearing up situation. As units of new British units are (I group omitted) or have completed assembly I may have to retain few that are leaving this month for India.

See page 100 + Wigrams "Oradla of Mankind" for general tone of Insularity.

- | | | | |
|------|--------------|------------|---------------------|
| G.O. | copies to :- | S. of S. | E.E.D. |
| | | C.A. of S. | S.O. |
| | | Sec. | G.H.G. |
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| | | S.O.L. | S. Sec. S. |
| | | M.O.S. | Paris. |
| | | D.M.I. | Verailles. |
| | | H.I.L.C. | Lord Curzon. |
| | | | D. S. H. R. S. S. |
| | | | I.O. (Col. Payne). |
| | | | 48 (L.V.I.). |
| | | | F.O. (Mr. Kidston). |
| | | | I.D.C.E. |




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [ظ٧] (٢٠٦/١٤)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨و] (٢٠٦/١٥)



85

PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

From: U.S.A. Mesopotamia.
To: War Office.

Desp. 1908 5.11.19.
Recd. 0950 6.11.19.

X.7643 November 3rd.

Your 81888 W.S.O. October 23rd. In connection with operations in Central Kurdistan on August 22nd one of our aeroplanes having lost direction over hills in mistake for objective on Khaburu dropped bombs on Solégun.


Protests from commander of Turkish 15th Corps, not by Second Division, dated August 20th were received at Baghdad September 2nd. A Divisional Commander at once despatched to 15th Corps by the T.R.A.F. & brought letter's communication, a letter regretting mistake. My regrets and intimation of action taken in Constantinople were wired on September 4th to 15th Corps Commanders. Subsequent enquiries indicated that Turkish Commander's statement to effect that casualties had been caused were incorrect.


- C.C. Copies to:
- | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------|
| S. of G. | Paris. |
| C.I.C.S. D.E.I.S.S. | Versailles. |
| D.M.O. D.D.M.O. | Lord Curzon. |
| M.O.S. S.A. S.S. S. 4. | Ad. (S. H. I.). |
| D.M.I. D.M.H.I. | I.O. (C.I. Weyss). |
| M.T.S. S.S. S.S. S.S. 6b. | F.O. (Mr. Kidston). |
| D.S.D. | |
| A.I.L. | |

81888. Ask particulars, regarding to bombing on Turkish side of armistice boundary of the Kurdish village of Solégun.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨ظ] (٢٠٦/١٦)









"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩ظ] (٢٠٦/١٨)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٠ ظ] (٢٠٦/٢٠)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١١ و] (٢٠٦/٢١)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٦ ظ] (٢٠٦/٢٢)









SECRET

SECRET

From- Gallat, Egypt.

To- High Commissioner, Persia reported S.O.C. Mesopotamia
and War Office.

Insp. 1750 17.9.18.
Recd. 2230 17.9.18.

E.A. 2684 cipher September 17th. Your 274.

Have just received following message from 20th
Brigade, Urfa, dated 17th. Begins. Wali Shargat arrived
here having left Heli and Noel 4 hours south of Malatia.
Wali found Turks at Malatia under influence of Mustafa
Emil who is at Sivas. He therefore removed Noel & Heli
and came here to report. Message ends. Full report
follows. Troops are 4th Corps. Sivas-15th Corps
Erzurum 13th Corps Diabekr.


C.S. Copies to :- M.O.I.


M.O.K. Copies to :-

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D.D.M.O. M.O.I.-B. M.O.S.-A-B. M.O.S. D.M.I.
M.I.S.-B. M.I.S.-S. M.I.S.-F. D.S.S. Paris.
Versailles. Lord Curzon. P.O. (Mr. Kidston).
I.O. (Col. Poyss).




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣١ ظ] (٢٠٦/٢٦)









"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤١ ظ] (٢٠٦/٢٨)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٥ ظ] (٢٠٦/٣٠)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦١ و] (٢٠٦/٣١)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦١ ظ] (٢٠٦/٣٢)





Kurdistan

76⁽⁷⁾

Operations. SECRET. Paragraphs.

From G.O.C. Mesopotamia.
To War Office, repeated India. Desq. 1110 3-8-10.
Secd. 1100 5-2-10.

27th Sept.

In Scouts in Kurdistan all quiet.

In Basra plain forces well received and still victor-
ious shortly.

Central Kurdistan. All the fastnesses up to the
armistice line north of Zakho and Hadia have been
visited and their complete accessibility to our troops
demonstrated.

Several skirmishes with hostile sections have
always resulted in loss to enemy with trivial casualties
to ourselves.


Considerable number rifles have been seized and
ammunition expended but tribes too elusive to sustain
serious blow.


Tribes hitherto abstaining from joining rising have
remained steady.

North of Hadia
I am about to withdraw from the Hadia section and from the
Khalab Valley above Zakho to which my Western Column has been
sent to the same purpose. ~~operations~~
operations of my 5 columns (the 2nd) to Hadia Valley in a general
direction of the river. I expect to obtain the complete freedom
of the river instigator of the murders, Hadia and,
has suggested so.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٧ظ] (٢٠٦/٣٤)





FARAFRAH.

75
SECRET

From- G.O.G., Mesopotamia.

To- War Office, repeated Britforce, Constantinople, G.H.Q., S.W.P.,
and B.N.S. do.

Disp. 1150. S.P.19.
Recd. 1000. 6.9.19.

X.7400. Erd.

Year 77950. cipher. M.I. May 18th.

(a). Re information concerning Erzerum and Diyar vilayets.

(b). Average figures of pre-war Armenian population compiled by
Wool on similar basis to Kurdish figures in paragraph (b) - my
telegram No. X.7554, August 15th are as follows:-

In remaining four vilayets Van 165,000, Diarbekr 90,000,
Halis 141,000, Hamat el Arab 90,000. After reference to
Major Wool and further discussion Civil Commissioner estimates
present total 160,000 for these four vilayets including all
refugees to be (1 gr. uninc.)ed thereto.


C.E. - Copies to-
H.O.X.


H.O.X. - Copies to-

C.I.C.S.	M.I.E. Eb.
D.C.I.S.S.	M.I.E. & B.
D.M.O.	M.I.SB.
D.S.M.O.	D.S.D.
M.O.L. Ib.	Paris.
M.O.S. Sa.	Vercallion.
M.O.S.	Lord Curzon.
D.H.I.	I.C. (Col. Peppé).
I.S.O.S.	F.O. (Mr. Kidston).



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٨ظ] (٢٠٦/٣٦)





Kurdistan

74^(R)

SECRET.

Paraphrase.

From:- G.-in-C., Egypt.

To:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia, repeated War Office.

Despatched 0600 25th August, 1919.
Received 0001 27th August, 1919.

R.A. 2637 cipher August 25th.

Mosul telegram 117 of August 20th to Baghdad.
It was arranged that Keel would be under no style in my area (see your 2649 of March 10th). He has been informed that he has nothing to do with policy in this area and is not to wire Baghdad direct on such matters. The cases to which he refers were already under investigation.

G.C. Copies to:- H.O.C.


H.O.C. Copies to:-


- | | |
|--------------------|-------------|
| S.I.G.S. | D.I.I. |
| D.C.I.G.S. | M.I.S. & B. |
| D.M.O. | M.I.R. & B. |
| D.S.M.O. | M.I.S.B. |
| M.O.S. & A & B. | D.S.D. |
| H.O.C. | Paris. |
| Versailles. | |
| Lord Curzon. | |
| F.O. (Mr. Kidston) | |
| F.O. (Col. Popsal) | |
| Sec. Ia D.C.S. | |

Note. H.O.C. unable to trace references.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٩ ظ] (٢٠٦/٣٨)









"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٠٠] [٢٠٠٦/٤٠]








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢١ ظ] (٢٠٦/٤٢)





SECRET.

P. (P. 1000000)

OPERATIONS.

To: O.C.M., Mesopotamia.

From: War Office. Repeated: India.

Despatched: 21.08.75. J.F.
Received: 22.08.75. J.F.

SECRET A.


K. 7975 August 25th.


All quiet in West Kurdistan.

Central Kurdistan. Operations still in progress by 3rd Column containing one and a half battalions each. Health of troops excellent. Tribal centres within operative border of those implicated in ASSYRIA interests have been visited. Sharp engagements with Kurds. Have inflicted loss on them with trivial loss to ourselves. They are very well armed. During advance of the column a party of 1,000 Kurds succeeded in doubling back and attacking our advanced (II group) in the hills at SUKUM, and after some hours fighting were repulsed. Hoped in a couple of weeks to complete operations, restore peace, and, in accordance with plan under discussion between the Civil Commissioner and India Office, prepare arrangements for repatriation of Assyrian refugees. Prompt action against those offending tribes has checked remainder of their treachery and as it (more undisciplined) movement of troops has dispelled widespread belief that Kurds would do us no harm and that we had to be on our guard in country.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٢ ظ] (٢٠٦/٤٤)









"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٣ ظ] (٢٠٦/٤٦)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٤ ظ] (٢٠٦/٤٨)





OPERATIONS. SECRET.

From: G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

Desp. 2510 15.8.18.
Reed. OSEO 16.8.18.


To: War Office repeated India.


Z.9541 August 15th. Reference your 80088 N.O.S. July 20th.

Reply has been delayed till Major Noel returned from his Mission into Diarbekir and other districts. It is necessary to make certain assumptions before framing my views and I make the following. Government by British High Commission or Deputy High Commission as executive authority with Kurdish Council and Ministers, and Kurdish Governors of provinces with British personnel stiffening departments. (1 group under.) external agencies other than brigades. An efficient striking force is necessary pending formation of reliable Kurdish gendarmerie and military force under British inspectors to make the unit of Kurdish executive run in the land. A mountainous country full of petty chiefs with well armed retainers and tribesmen always in trouble with the Government and with little national spirit or sense of combination for general good, under present circumstances. British and picked Indian troops well equipped for mountain warfare will be necessary until this spirit can be developed. This force will have its real base in Mesopotamia though doubtless it can be fed locally and supplied from Mediterranean ports via Haifa. It is assumed that Kurdistan will consist of Van ~~Bitlis~~ Diarbekir and Al Asia Vilayets with some modification of present boundaries to suit Armenian adjustment. These vilayets are almost entirely Kurdish. Following minimum forces: Cavalry brigade and horse artillery in Diarbekir province. 4 mountain brigades of all arms consisting of infantry brigade mountain battery mounted squadron and engineers company stationed in Harput, Diarbekir and Bitlis Vilayets, with 4th Brigade in Bitlis or Van. Army troops to be



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٥ ظ] (٢٠٦/٥٠)







troops to be 2 battalions pioneers, 1 mountain battery
ambulance. Transport 2 A.S. Corps and 6 Ford Van Companies.
A field ambulance and peak wireless to each brigade.
Stationary hospitals and various ancillary services as required.
Complete railroad between Haidin and Baiji ? probably
unavoidable if we hold this position in Kurdistan. All the
above is dependent on general Kurdish good will. This will
emphatically not exist if any large portion of Kurdistan
proper is added to Armenia, and the report of an Armenian
settlement now being spread will raise a Kurdistan that no
one can manage. From here there seems to be only one main
principle of solving this question, viz., Armenian provinces
vilayet of Erzerum and Trabzon in north, Kurdish provinces of
4 vilayets mentioned above in south, those parts of country where
population is mixed Armenian and Kurd to be under even stronger
guidance than the others. Population in those areas to be
gradually transferred north and south and homogeneous districts
established in Kurdish and Armenian provinces.

Above would not permit reduction for the present of
Mesopotamian garrison. Separate consideration is needed for
? any defensive force requirements.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٦ ظ] (٢٠٦/٥٢)





PARAPHRASE. SECRET.

OPERATIONS.

From G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office repeated India.


Desp. 12.8.19.
Recd. 0700 13.8.19.

X.7335 18th.

Operations in Central Kurdistan. After surprise of enemy on August 1st operating about evening for several days (2 groups undecipherable). Asadia, surprised and (1 word omitted) some murderers of British officers and Christian gendarmes captured with certain hostile notables. Hills north of Asadia cleared of enemy with definite loss to them but isolated companies in gorge during this operation attacked and 1 lost heavily. In occupied districts order being restored and Christians protected. Health of troops very good. Hostility of tribes here and of rebel chiefs in southern Kurdistan rising due undoubtedly to Turkish C.U.P. influence as the tribes themselves well know our intention to foster a settlement in accordance with Kurdish sentiment. Another cause of unrest is apprehension of subjection to Armenia. Southern Kurdistan. As too inaccessible to protect have evacuated civil station in Rowanduz and am sending force to visit the Rania plain to support civil officer and friendly chiefs there. A detachment of the garrison in Southern Kurdistan attacked in gorge by Kurds from Persian border extricated itself well inflicting loss on enemy. Advancement of railroad to Sherghat is simplifying problem of maintenance. In plains temperature 112 degrees to 118.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٧ظ] (٢٠٦/٥٤)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٨ و] (٢٠٦/٥٥)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٨ظ] (٢٠٦/٥٦)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٩ و] (٢٠٦/٥٧)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٩ ظ] (٢٠٦/٥٨)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٠ ظ] (٢٠٦/٦٠)



Trouble has now also broken out in the Kurds area in Central Kurdistan.

The Army Council are of opinion that here, as in other districts, the Kurds are largely influenced by the fear of future domination by Armenians and the jealousy which they suspect is being shown to Christians in general as evidenced by the Greek landing at Smyrna, and that this fear renders them susceptible to anti-British propaganda.

As to the future settlement of the Kurds in a matter affecting our garrisons in the Near East, the Army Council consider that in the interests of our command and of our representatives in Paris, the time has now arrived when His Majesty's Government should consider and decide on a definite policy in respect of the Kurds and the future arrangements for the administration in those Kurdish areas in which His Majesty's Government may be concerned. I am therefore to suggest that a meeting of the Eastern Committee be called upon to discuss the question at an early date before General Clayton returns to Egypt. In the meantime Field Marshal Sir D. Allenby has been asked to telegraph his views regarding the instructions given to the Civil Commissioner, Baghdad, by the Secretary of State for India in his telegram No. 74800 dated the 8th June, 1919.

A copy of this letter has been sent to the India Office with reference to their letter No. 2804 dated the 14th July.

I am,


Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Under Secretary of State,
Foreign Office.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣١] [٢٠٦/٦١]



[P. 4521.] From Political Department 31st July, 1919.

(Repeated to Constantinople, Tehran, Tabriz, and copies by post to India.)

(Received 31st, 5 p.m.)

5343. By telegram No. 7080, dated 7th July and by Mesopotam (corrupt group) 545, dated 4th July, in post. Mesopotam. Baiyid (see) has apparently received information of return to Kurdistan of his rival local leader on a political mission under our auspices. He is consequently intriguing more actively than before with Turks. See (corrupt group) Constantinople telegram 1044, 31st May to Foreign Office.

Independent reports from Political Officer who arrived at Tabriz a few days ago from Mesopotam confirm above and suggest Baiyid (see) is about to throw in his hand with Turks. Of this I am doubtful. It is fairly clear that he will sit on the fence as long as he possibly can and is unlikely to put himself actively in their hands. Moreover independent reliable information indicates that Turks still regard allegations of Baiyid (see) and (see) as uncertain and suspect them of being tools in our hands. He has, however, definitely (that) our proposals for regional Kurdish autonomy, so far as they concern him, possibly because he disbelieves our intention or ability to give effect to them.


*a vice a. Foregoing out of current events in Kurdistan, General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has decided, with my full concurrence that Assistant Political Officer Mesopotam, should be withdrawn to set (Yes), 80(7) miles from west-south-west of former piece, which will be left for the present to manage its affairs as best it can, with such degree of political control as can be exercised from (Mesopotam), in support of which a military detachment will be sent. Government policy to be adopted can then be considered at leisure.

It will be remembered that Russians and Turks between them completed captured from Urmié plain as far as Mesopotam, which could probably without prohibitive expense be converted into water road from Mosul, by construction of which we could repatriate Christians and maintain force necessary for the purpose in Urmié by a much shorter line of communication than anything we now have. Evacuation of Mesopotam will certainly cause some misgivings to our friends, and will encourage disloyalty element, but it is preferable to alternative of having our civil administration there forcibly overthrown, it being impossible to maintain troops there under present circumstances or to govern permanently.

This decision is keeping with the proposal outlined in my telegram (106) 46, dated 15th June, of restricting actual administration to low country, without attempting to govern (mountain, mountains) (tract, tracts) of Kurdistan for the present.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣١ ظ] (٢٠٦/٦٢)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٢ و] (٢٠٦/٦٣)



From Political, Baghdad, 12th June 1910.

(Registered Cairo, Constantinople, Tadmor and by post to Foreign, Amia).

No. 6066.

Copy to General Officer Commanding, Baghdad, who has seen before despatch (Received 14th June 1910, 9.45.)

KURDISTAN. Reference to your telegram of 5th June and your telegram of 11th May, which latter was only repeated to me by Government of India on 10th June. I find it most difficult to reply thereto.

1. The ethnographical map of Eastern Turkestan in Asia as issued by War Office No. 2801, published by Royal Geographical Society, shows that areas are predominantly Kurdish, and is remarkably accurate. This map illustrates forcibly the difficulties of the problem.

2. The (group under-) must presumably form the Eastern limits of area to be recognized as predominantly Kurdish.

For economic and for strategic reasons, and in order to secure to Iraq State the advantage of a mainline trunk, well wooded and capable of great development, it is desirable to include Sulimaniyah, Hama, and Sulimaniyah, within limits of Mesopotamian administration.

Erbil is an integral part of Mosul Vilayet, and when I visited the town by airship on 5th June, leading inhabitants were anxious in their expressions of dismay at the mere prospect of being included in Kurdistan. Erbil, moreover, is on one of the main railway alignments to Mosul, and like Mosul should be excluded of Kurdistan.

Denak and Laska must also be regarded as within Mesopotamia but not Amia.


3. The southern boundary, therefore, might run southward from Khartoum to point 11-45 on 1/1,000,000 sheet, and thence to intersection latitude 37 and longitude 44, and thence to section latitude 37 and longitude 45.

4. I am inclined to think that the southern boundary predominantly Kurdish should run a little north of Jazirah, north of Hama, south of Hama, north of Hama, latitude 37 to Hama, up the Euphrates and thence following boundary of the Vilayet of Sharbat (Sharbat-al-Khalil) with Ven thus enclosing Erbil and Erzurum.

5. Within this area which includes Mesopotamian Vilayet, I understand from Major Noel and from other sources that Armenians are in a very small minority, and I regard it as an improper attempt to place them in a position of superiority or inferiority. Left to themselves they would probably have no difficulty in maintaining their position under European auspices. For the rest of the United States of America might be prepared to give them a livelihood, fair treatment, and prospects of development in Erzurum and Trabzon Vilayets, and be governed and administered cooperatively easily and not be too much for ourselves to handle.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٢] (٢٠٦/٦٤)





7. Kurdistan is split up into two groups, the pro-British party who under suitable management might be pro-British and pro-Turkish party who are fanatically inclined anti-Christian and anti-foreign. Either party could obtain effective control of the country with some extensive support and so have to choose between them. If, however, Turkish authority is re-established in Armenian Kurdistan the idea of Kurdish and Iranian states falls to the ground.

8. Numerous and virile as Kurds are and strong as the national feeling is they are so scattered and geographically so split up by mountain ranges that it is impossible to see that they can be united except under a strong foreign administration with its centre at Silla or Van and based on Mahomedan feeling in Middle East being partly to current Greek and Italian action is at present admittedly somewhat unfavourable to any acceptance of the tutelage of Christian Powers, but is more likely to accept British guidance than that of any other Power.

Action on the spot cannot for such longer be confined to collecting information and conveying vague assurances to one side or the other. It is from a local point of view necessary that a decision regarding policy should be reached... instructions issued by both.

9. The foregoing proposals may be briefly summarized. Trebizond and Erzerum Vilayets to form a single Armenian State under predominantly American auspices. The remaining four Vilayets to form a Kurdish State under presumably British auspices. Mosul Baghdad and Mesopotamia Vilayets to form an Arab State likewise under British auspices. The only alternative (if I see) to this scheme is the re-establishment of Turkish authority over all six Vilayets under some form of European supervision.


10. I need hardly say that I view the prospect of the extension of our commitments to Kurdistan with no little apprehension, and should prefer to see America, or even Turkey in charge, but the question will no doubt be considered by His Majesty's Government in all its bearings before a decision is taken.


11. I propose visiting Aleppo about 10th June to meet Major Peel and after my meeting with him shall be in a position to make more specific proposals if desired.

12. I am well aware that foregoing proposals constitute a considerable extension of the proposals made in previous telegraphic correspondence in that they involve a new principle of principle of a Kurdish State within British sphere guided by British Agents, with alternative of a re-constituted Turkish Empire, and I submit them with all diffidence for consideration of His Majesty's Government.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٣ظ] (٢٠٦/٦٦)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٤ ظ] (٢٠٦/٦٨)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٥ و] (٢٠٦/٦٩)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [ظ ٣٥] (٢٠٦/٧٠)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٦ و] (٢٠٦/٧١)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٦ظ] (٢٠٦/٧٢)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٧و] (٢٠٦/٧٣)



(P 4330)

From Bagdad, 21st July 1919.

(Despatch Mosul, Cairo, Constantinople, Tehran. Copy to General, Bagdad, who has seen before despatch.)

(Received 6 p.m., 28th.)

8167. See General Bagdad, telegram X. 7949, dated 19th July, reporting the transfer of two Politicals, one British sergeant and two Indian telegraphists at Amadia on evening of 14th July.

1. I visited Mosul yesterday to confer with General Officer Commanding, Mosul, and Political Officer on political aspect of occurrence.

2. It is clear that outbreak was not connected with the personalities of the two murdered officers. Capt. Willey had only just arrived there and was an experienced and capable officer. Capt. Macdonald, who was in charge of gendarmerie, was a zealous and efficient officer, who was always regarded as being very popular with his men, with whom he was on excellent terms. Both officers had returned that afternoon after a week's tour in Tikrit district to east of Amadia and had telegraphed that all was quiet in Mosul that everything was quiet.

3. The outbreak as far as can be ascertained has a definite anti-Christian, as well as anti-Government origin. Numbers of Christians in the neighbourhood have been murdered and many Christian villages have been pillaged.


4. A detachment of troops was originally sent to Amadia to facilitate the repatriation of Christians now at Bagdad by restoring order in the district. It had a useful effect in both directions, but was withdrawn with our concurrence last month, as its position was unsatisfactory from a military point of view.


5. It seems fairly clear that the ten officers were killed by local gendarmes at the instigation of local people, and that nearly all the leading Mohammedan notables are more or less concerned. It is yet to estimate probable effect of the event on Kurdish communities in other portions of Mosul Vilayet, but there is every probability, unless drastic punitive measures are undertaken, similar outbreaks will occur elsewhere.

6. The Kurds in this area have been treated with great forbearance and generosity during the past eight months. Christians and Kurds alike have been given considerable advances in cash and in kind to enable them to rehabilitate themselves. The leading (if not omitted) Mosul have been amnestied for their misdeeds, and every attempt made to patch up a reconciliation between them and the Christians. The Kurd is notoriously treacherous, and this is the latest example of his natural propensity.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٧ظ] (٢٠٦/٧٤)






From Political, Baghdad, 20th July 1919.


(Reputed to Mosul.)

(P 4108) No. 8123. Deeply regret to report Capt. D. Wilby and Lieut. H. Macdonald, M.C., 13th Hussars, both killed in action at Amadia about 10th July last. Circumstances will be reported when known.
I am proceeding to Mosul by air on 20th July to confer on the subject with General Officer Commanding and Political Officer.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٨ظ] (٢٠٦/٧٦)









"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٩ظ] (٢٠٦/٧٨)









"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤٠ ظ] (٢٠٦/٨٠)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٤٤١ظ] (٢٠٦/٨٢)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٤ و] (٢٠٦/٨٣)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٢٤ ظ] (٢٠٦/٨٤)





SECRET

OPERATIONS.

Memorandum.

From: S.O.C., Mesopotamia.

To: War Office.
S.O.C., S.P.P.

Despatched: 15.30 S.V.19.
Received: 17.30 S.V.19.

X.7106 July 5th.


Have just returned from South Kurdistan.

Owing to smash up and capture of Sheikh Mahmud and other leaders at Hasiyar pass situation there very satisfactory. These difficult valleys are now being visited by mountain Y forces. For next 2 or 3 months propose to leave brigade with mountain artillery and cavalry to support civil power and withdraw remainder of force. After that it may be necessary to leave small mixed force on Hasiyar pass which is suitable site.

(1) Troops also recently visited Farsiya levies with 2 aeroplanes to disperse Kurdish (group under) in hills east of border. As carrying out sufficient road (2) making this (3) group critical) to improve access to important centres. Majority of people want law and order and southern Kurdistan should remain (4) strong and prosperous if we can control the Kurds and reduce their armed following. The Kiri-Kar'chi line will render situation easy to handle.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٣٤٤ظ] (٢٠٦/٨٦)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤٤ و] (٢٠٦/٨٧)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤٤ ظ] (٢٠٦/٨٨)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥٤] [٢٠٦/٨٩]






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥٤٥] (٢٠٦/٩٠)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦٤:٤] (٢٠٦/٩٢)





Kurd

SECRET

52


From General Baghdad.
To War Office, London.


26.6.19.

A.4588. 17/6. Reference your telegram 76679 cipher^x
M.I.B. June 6th. Following are the names required
Major A.E.Daniels 3rd Skinners Horse; Major F.S.
Greenhouse 94th Hussars Infantry, 2nd Lieut. (Temp.Capt.)
E.J.Rood, General List, Lieut. L.A.Gregan, Ind.Posts Dept.
2nd Lieut. K.C.Martin RFA M.G.Coy., 240050 C.S.R.
P.Head 1/5th Queens B.W.H.Batt., 2840 Sqdn. McBride
13th Hussars, 73740 A. Sergt. Allan R.E. 3rd Corps Signals
241417 Pte.White 1/5th Buffs, 56061 Sapper McLellan
13th Div. Signals, M/348998 Dvr.Hook R.A.S.C. M.F.
55633 Bomb. Blackwell B.Battery R.S.A. 8793 A/Sergt.
Woods, Sgt R.W.Kent R. attd. G.L.Dept., 91741 Gnr.Bankin
74th Coy. R.S.A. Captured by Kurds whilst escorting
convoy to Salaimaniyah 9430 Sergt. Stewart E.A. 213
Lancers and 136963 A.Sergt. Barr A.J. 17th Ind. M.G.
Batt.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٤:٤٧] (٢٠٦/٩٤)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤٨ظ] (٢٠٦/٩٦)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤٩ و] (٢٠٦/٩٧)



OPERATIONS. SECRET. PARAFRASE.

From: G.I.G. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office requested India, Cairo, Hiera Constantinople.


Disp. 2160 20.6.19.
Recd. 1430 21.6.19.


X.7127 20th June.

Situation southern Kurdistan. Yesterday
main body of 1500 men force reached Sulaiman Tych.
Sheikh Ahmad himself seriously wounded was amongst
prisoners taken on June 17th. It is probable that the
rising will now collapse.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤٩ ظ] (٢٠٦/٩٨)





From G.H.Q. Mesopotamia.

To War Office, repeated C. in C. India and High
Commissioner, Constantinople.

Dep. 15.10. 19.6.19.
Recd. 03.45. 20.6.19.


X. 7133 19th.

Situation Southern Kurdistan.

On June 17th General Fraser advanced towards
Baxyan Pass and at dawn June 18th captured pass which
was defended by forces of Shaikh Mahmud's. This pass
is 3,000 feet in height with surrounding hills 1,000
feet higher and in 1910 Kurds destroyed Turkish
forces here. Not being accustomed to meet troops
trained in mountain warfare Kurds lost several
killed, over 100 prisoners, 3 machine guns, some horses
and other material. Our casualties were very slight, forces
continued advance after capture of Baxyan pass and
cavalry pushed on to Suleiman Iyeh in evening, where
all prisoners were rescued. Remainder of forces
continuing advance expected to reach Suleiman Iyeh
today.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥٠ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٠٠)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥١ و] (٢٠٦/١٠١)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥١ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٠٢)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥٢ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٠٤)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥٣ و] (٢٠٦/١٠٥)



Kurdistan

⑤
46

OPERATIONS. SECRET.

From G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To: War Office repeated G.O.C. India, Foreign India,
G.O.C. Egypt, Constantinople and India Office.

Desp. 1535 16.6.19.
Recd. 2025 17.8.19.


X.7122 16/6.


South Kurdistan situation.

Khalid M. ^{is still} attempting to recruit from
various Kurdish tribes without apparent success. Several
villages near Chemchamal involved in hostilities have been
(?) visited during past few days, hostages taken, government
property recovered and defences destroyed in cases where
evidence of hostile action of inhabitants clearly proved.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٥٣ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٠٦)





COPY OF TELEGRAM.

From G.S.C., Baghdad.
Dated 13. 6. 18.
Received 13th, 10.30 a.m.

PRIORITY.


13th. June 13th. South Mosul situation. Communication received from prisoners in Sulaiman lyah. All safe up to June 7th but under restraint.


Expected main advance on Sulaiman lyah will commence about June 15th.


Addressed Troopers, repeated G.S.C. State, Foreign, State, Secretary of State for India, Egyptian Egyptian and Constantinople.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤٥٥] (٢٠٦/١٠٨)











COPY OF TELEGRAM. I. ③


From C.O.C., Baghdad.
Dated 6. 6. 17.
Received 10.30.a.m., 10th.


1917. June 6th. Situation in South Kurdistan. The actual force to advance on Sulaiman ^{lyah} is now concentrated between Kirkuk and Chomahmal but further advance cannot commence till lines of communication defence troops arrive and supplies and stores ready which will still take a few days. meantime the concentration has steadied the whole border and certain tribes who had joined Bahad are reported to have left him. Report from Persian Kurdistan however indicates movement among tribes across border to join Bahad on part of pan Kurdistan.


addressed Troopers, repeated C.O.C. Siala, Foreign, Siala, Secretary of State for India, Egypt, and Constantinople.














Kurdistan.

SECRET.

OPERATIONS.

EIGHTY.

From:- G.O.S., Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Reported:- G.O.S., India.
G.H.Q., Egypt.
India Office.
Foreign Office.
G.H.Q., Constantinople.

Handed in:- 21.30 P.M. 19.
Received:- 02.00 P.M. 20.

X.7000 June End.

Situation on Kurdish frontier has been straightened out by our daily increasing strength at Harabek, all beleaguered advanced posts relieved, Kurds driven off with definite loss, dust war has mitigated (sic).


Chambani now held in strength and mountain road leading thence occupied and planned as fast as troops arrive.


Enemy held in force Harabek. Intelligence good.

Remainder of Kurdistan quiet.

Operations last week on lower Tigris have resulted in rout of hostile Arab gathering.


See previous report of this operation.








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦٠ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٢٠)





38⁽⁶⁾

SECRET.

Operations.

From 1- S.S.A. Mesopotamia.

Gen. War Office, reported Secretary of State for India & the
S.S.A. Office, Foreign Office & India, S.S.A. Egypt,
High Commissioner Constantinople.


Despatched 11.10.1918.
Received 20.10.1918.


X.7007 June 1st.


Situation unchanged. Between enemy and our positions
there has been sharp skirmishing and unsuccessful
attacks on our advanced posts covering our concentration
at Karwand.





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦١ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٢٢)


























"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦٦ و] (٢٠٦/١٣١)



Kurdistan

33(6)

SECRET.

From G.O.C. Mesopotamia.
To War Office repeated C. in G. India.


Dep. 1700 30th May 1919.
Recd. WMO 31st May 1919.


L.7037. May 30th

South Kurdistan situation unchanged. Owing to
severe heat wave concentration at Kirkuk delayed.
Events being watched by rest of Kurdistan. Prisoners
unharmd.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦٦ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٣٢)





32

SECRET.

OPERATIONS.

Despatches 1300 20.5.19.
Newspaper 6800 30.5.19.


From: G.O.C. in C. Mesopotamia.


To: War Office,
repeated India.

X.700 58th.

Continuation by X. 700 of 58th. The situation is now as follows. 28 officers and 6 W.C.O.s interned at Sulaiman Iyeh unharmed. By June 1st strong force of all arms will be concentrated at Kergour, our reconnaissance force Kergour driven back to Chamsheh which is held. At present Bahman force consists of considerable bodies of Kurds from Persia. He appears anxious and has asked for interview with Civil Commissioner but has been told that unless he sends the British Officers in he can only interview troops. He seems to be likely to do this. Other tribes are waiting on events and Northern and Central Kurdistan are quiet. Wilson is awaiting question of attack on Mahmed from South West with J. confederation. I now solicit from Government definite orders as to whether they wish Northern Kurdistan occupied by force or merely sufficiently contained to prevent spread of disturbance to Mesopotamia. In the event of former I will occupy at once Sulaiman Iyeh and indicate improvement of required communication. Probably there will entail immediate extension of zone south to Kergour on [1 group under] alignment recommended by De Candolle. In acting we will best maintain prestige and arrest and extricate prisoners pending receipt of definite policy.

Army Council. D.M.O.(2) D.D.M.O. G.O.C. H.O.S. G.O.S.(2)
G.O.C. H.D.M.O. H.I.C. H.I.C.(2) H.I.C.(2)
H.I.C.(2) H.I.C. H.I.C. Versailles. D.S.D. D.S.D.
I.D.S.D.(10) Col. Dyer(2)





From Baghdad, 23rd May 1919.

(Repeating Telegram, Teheran, Constantinople, Cairo, and Aleppo for No. 1, Copy to General, Baghdad, who has approved before dispatch.)

(Received 21st, 2.30 p.m.)

No. 1867. Kurdistan. My telegram dated 15th May and General, Baghdad, telegram to-day.

On 22nd May it was reported that serious troubles had broken out at Sulaimaniyah, Sheikh Mahmud having seized reins of Government, looted treasury, and imprisoned all British officers and staff, after defeating our Kurd (Iraqi) forces. Some casualties among British officers and men reported, but not yet confirmed. Outbreak was wholly unexpected locally as Sheikh Mahmud had been steadily being ground and was becoming personally unpopular with influential elements. Air reconnaissance showed Sulaimaniyah in hands of hostile Kurds. Halabja, Koi (? Keri), Harin all quiet on 24th May.

Telegram from Consul at Tehran, dated 23rd May, reports increasing gravity of Persian Kurdish agitation there, and reports attack on Simko, from whom I have recently received cordial letters, and whose close friend, Sayid Taha, is now our guest at Baghdad. Telegram from Simko of same date shows Sheikh Mahmud has relied mainly on support from Persian Kurdistan, whose some 1,000 men have come to his help. It also appears clear his action is direct outcome of movement for independence of Kurdistan, including Persian Kurdistan, which, as already reported, has been growing for some time past.


General Officer Commanding-in-Chief has already despatched several columns to Chahchamal to hold main pass and strong force has left Tigris for Kirkuk.


General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and I am considering possibility of occupying Sulaimaniyah as a source of present trouble on the following grounds:—

- (1) It is certain that powerful tribes in this area, who are now standing aloof, will be drawn into movement, which is purely anarchistic, unless we at once suppress Sheikh Mahmud. Meanwhile, two most powerful groups, viz. Pash, west of Sulaimaniyah, and Tal, east of Sulaimaniyah, have offered fullest co-operation with us in suppressing him.
- (2) It may be taken as certain that, unless promptly suppressed, movement will find an echo in Persia and in Mosul, and may make military position in those areas serious. It will also have effect in Mesopotamia.
- (3) Failure to suppress it will probably encourage similar anarchistic movements in north-west Persia and northern Kurdistan to great detriment of important Allied interests there.
- (4) Only means of suppressing movement is to occupy Sulaimaniyah. This step would be popular locally, where our administration is rapidly gaining popularity with all except M. and his entourage, whose last effort this is.
- (5) Numerous communications received show that movement at present by no means commands general support and can be suppressed by military action.
- (6) It will be borne in mind Sulaimaniyah district occupies peculiar position, viz. a-viz, Baghdad and Mosul Vilayets and Persian Kurdistan, which makes its situation under effective control of more importance than any other part of Kurdistan.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٦٨ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٣٦)





30 69

SECRET.

OPERATIONS.

PRIORITY.

From:- G.C.C., Mesopotamia.

To:- War Office.

Despatched:- 14.45 20.10.30.
Received:- 20.10 20.10.30.


In E of
Kerkuk


X.YOODS-2524. In Southern Kurdistan a serious rising has occurred. Bandarmaric have been defeated. Apparently British Officers and British Troops have been taken prisoners and the wires cut at Baleisan Iyah. The movement which is headed by Sheikh Mahmud of latter place is due to Turkey's Kurdish intrigues and there is considerable threat of all Kurdistan including Persian Kurdistan being in a blur. I have seized passes dominating entrance to Baleisan Iyah plain with small detachment. A strong column is moving to Kerkuk from Balji. My immediate object is to emphasize European display of force and secure jumping off place for giving effect to military and political policy which may appear necessary when situation crystallized. A detailed account of situation in its political aspect will be wired by the Civil Commissioner. Questions of maintenance are difficult as distances are considerable.

F

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|--------------|--------------|----------------------|
| S.I.S.S. (2) | W.S.S. (3) | M.I.S.S. |
| S.C.I.S.S. | M.I.S. | S.I.S.S. |
| D.M.O. (2) | D.M.H.I. | S.I.S.S. |
| S.D.S.S. | M.I.S. | Forwarding. |
| M.S.S. | M.I.S. | S.I.S.S. |
| M.S.S. | M.I.S.S. (2) | S.I.S.S. |
| M.S.S. | M.I.S. (2) | S.I.S.S. |
| M.S.S. | M.I.S. | S.I.S.S. (2) |
| M.S.S. | M.I.S. | F.O. (T.S.S.S.) (10) |
| | D.M.H.I. | F.S. |

Handwritten signature or initials





From Chief Commissioner, Baghdad, 12th May 1918.
(Revised Scale, Takeran, Cairo, Constantinople. Copies to Aleppo and to
General, Baghdad.)
(Received 12th, 2.29 a.m.)

29 (10)

6251. I submit following pertinent Constantinople telegram of 1st May and preceding correspondence — I have not had time since my return on 7th May to examine Kurdish situation so closely as I would wish to, but, after studying Major Noel's reports, and after a general discussion with Sheikh Taha (vide my separate telegram), I endorse the views expressed by the High Commissioner, Constantinople. Abdul Qadir has been so long away from Kurdistan and is on such bad terms with Sheikh Taha, that he will be of no use to us, I fear, unless he is prepared to restrict his activities to Kurdish areas west of longitude 42. Long residence in Constantinople is a bad training for active work in Kurdistan, and it may be best to keep him in Constantinople and use him there. The Badr Khaw family might be of immediate use on the spot. I suggest the trustees should be sent from Constantinople to meet Major Noel at Aleppo where they may be joined by Suraya from Egypt and proceed with Major Noel on a mission to Western Kurdistan, if our relations with France and progress of the peace negotiations so permit.


I recommend that we should adopt the third course proposed in Constantinople telegram of 1st May, and give full assurances of amnesty and freedom from Armenian domination in areas predominantly Kurdish so far as working of Amman Railway, without, however, committing ourselves to acceptance of a mandate for Kurdish areas beyond the Mosul Vilayet till we see how affairs are moving.


To give effect to this policy it is necessary that Kurdish questions should be dealt with from a single centre as far as possible, and I therefore recommend that I be authorized to deal with the matter on behalf of His Majesty's Government in all areas east of the Taurus, through Major Noel, keeping Egypt, France and Constantinople fully informed. I should make it my business to prevent this policy from drawing His Majesty's Government into military commitments beyond our present sphere, and would make it clear to all concerned that the mission to quinine was not intended to commit His Majesty's Government to more than the maintenance of order in this area in cooperation with the Turkish authorities on the spot, pending result of the Peace Conference.

Major Noel
is concerned




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٠ظ] (٢٠٦/١٤٠)









"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧١ظ] (٢٠٦/١٤٢)










"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٢ظ] (٢٠٦/١٤٤)









MEMORANDUM

Despatched 1208 20/4/1947
Received 1208 4/5/1947

From- G.O.C. Basra India.

To- HQ P.W.S.
reported India.

12081, April 30th.

Reference is made of 15th February paragraph re
Loss of Comm. Section and memo.

1. I have not reviewed situation in Mesopotamia and visited large part of area under our control.

2. In view of large accumulations of demobilized material requiring protection at present, there are some 20,000 P.W.'s mostly within, in scattered areas and large bodies of foreign industrial European labour working in districts on railways irrigation etc. I shall not be able therefore to return more than one of the fourteen battalions in May.

3. Number of battalions retained will be cut down as speedily as possible as accumulations of material and P.W.'s and other labour are reduced.

4. I am strongly of opinion that the 2 Divisions and 2 Cavalry Brigades forming the army of occupation should be a complete mobile field army free of all other responsibilities for garrison duties and local protection of railways labour and P.W.'s bearing a high general standard as evidenced in Egypt India and Kurdistan.


5. The large number of troops sent away from Iraq in a short period has given rise to rumours of withdrawal and led to symptoms of restlessness in the local population. This has been counteracted by retention of additional troops there.

6. I am of opinion that armies of this country must contain sufficient battalions in addition to above force for some considerable period to allow latter to be mobile and free.

7. Also one Cavalry Brigade is not available as such since it





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٤ظ] (٢٠٦/١٤٨)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٥ظ] (٢٠٦/١٥٠)





24

SECRET.

From:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia.
To:- War Office, repeated India and Egypt.

Depd. 17.12 22.4.19.
Recd. 17.30 24.4.19.

I.0887 April 28rd.

Year 77159 April 17th.


Being to gradients and absence of water a light line to Mosul presents some difficulty and in such country such light material and locomotives as are available would be of no use. We shall therefore require 181 miles of track for 2 1/2" gauge with rails not lighter than 35 pounds per yard, 18 heavy locomotives capable of hauling 500 tons gross load up one per cent gradients, 25 engine wagons of 12 tons capacity preferably covered wagons, 10 brake vans of 10 tons each, and 10 travelling water tanks each 2,000 gallons capacity. We have no data for any existing accurately value of above but anticipate total cost not under 2400,000. We estimate 2 1/2 months to reach mile 40 and 1 1/2 months in all to Mosul. Country is easy as far as mile 40 but difficult beyond. In view however of delay which must ensue in waiting for material and as it is essential to improve our communications with Mosul as early as possible I strongly recommend following alternative:- To pull up existing standard gauge Baghdad-Orbilah line and substitute 2 1/2", for which the available material and rolling stock are suitable. Standard gauge material as released to be laid down as far as mile 40 which is 5 miles distant from the Tigris, with short branch line to our Battalion on the Tigris at Fikahergat. Sufficient standard gauge stock and engines are available for this proposal. From mile 40 propose to carry on 2 1/2" with new material when supplied. Under this scheme we shall only need 21 miles of 2 1/2" track 18 heavy locomotives as specified above, 21 wagons, 10 brake vans and 10 travelling water tanks. Cost of scheme for pulling up Orbilah line and re-laying to Sherpet is 247,000 and 232,500 for 2 1/2" line from mile 40 to Mosul. We should be able to reach Sherpet within 3 months of date of execution which will be immense relief to road transport and in event of any emergency strengthens our position at Mosul. Saving in cost will be 230,000 as compared with first scheme. Above estimates of time and cost are based on German (V) method of which we have details. Further survey will of course be undertaken but railways are doubtful if any easier method can be found for construction and survey to Sherpet and we shall have to employ officers attached for Persian survey. Our ability to construct beyond Sherpet depends on detention of officers and we are making proposals regarding this.

- G.O.C. copies to:-
Army Council
M.A.L. S. S.
D.D.N.O.
M.O.S.A.
F.L.S.
D.S.S.
D.C.S.O.
S.D.S.
F.V.S.
S.F.
D.S.T.

- M.O.W. copies to:-
C.I.O.S.
D.C.I.S.S.
D.M.S.
M.O.S.
M.L.S.S. (2)
D.S.S.I.
P.S.S.
India Office.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٦ظ] (٢٠٦/١٥٢)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٧و] [٢٠٦/١٥٣]




From:- General Bagdad,
To:- War Office, London,

Q/18 1/8 with reference to your 79416 cipher M.I.C.
Please see my X 8008 April 1951.

M.O.K. Copies to:-
C.I.S.S.
D.C.I.C.S.
D.M.C.
D.D.M.C.
M.O.S. a & b.
M.O.S.
M.I.S. a & b.
D.S.D.
Col. Fiddon.
Mr. Kingston.
I.D.C.S.





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٧ظ] (٢٠٦/١٥٤)






"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٨ظ] (٢٠٦/١٥٦)









"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٧٩ظ] (٢٠٦/١٥٨)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٠ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٦٠)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨١ و] [٢٠٦/١٦١]





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨١ظ] (٢٠٦/١٦٢)





Invest in Northern Iraqistania.

63
18

SECRET.

From:- G.S.C. Iraqistania.
To:- War Office repeated G.S.C. Target and C in C, India.

Comp. 1550 21.4.44.
Need. 2250 24.4.44.

X. 2014 April 18th. 14
Your 17078 D.M.C. April 14th.


Have already taken all possible measures in this direction. See my X. 2709 March 18th and X. 2831 April 6th in this connection. 21


G.S.C. Copies to:- M.O.S. S. Sb.
M.O.X.
D.D.M.C. 98

M.O.X. Copies to:-
C.I.F.S. W.I.I. Mr. Kington.
D.C.I.S.S. M.I.S.S.
D.M.C. M.I.S.S.S.
D.D.M.C. M.I.S.S.
M.O.S. A.A.S.S. A.S.
M.O. 4 (104) D.D.M.C.
D.D.M.C. Col. Padden



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٢ظ] (٢٠٦/١٦٤)





MEMORANDUM.

SECRET.

From G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

201 War Office repeated Egypt Constantinople and Hiale.

Resp. 0060 21.4.19.
Head. 0010 23.4.19.

X.5760 Plan.

My X.5760 of April 2nd. I propose in view of present situation and the impossibility of exercising military control in area beyond the boundary of Mosul Vilayet not to repatriate Assyrians of areas north of Mosul to their own homes. With a view to finding suitable locations for these refugees within our boundary in the vicinity of Amadiyah investigations are being made. The occupation of Sulimark and Dize is contemplated in these circumstances.


H.A.R. copies to:-
C.I.G.B.
Dist. G.O.C.
D.M.C.
D.D.H.C.
H.Q. S.A. & B.
H.O.S.
D.D.M.I.

H.R.D.
Col. Fardon.
E. Dept. F.O. & Y.
Mr. Aldrich. F.O.
I.D.C.E.
Paris.

* About 15 miles
I by E. of Mosul
by way of Yan
F.O.
* about 20 miles
by E. of Mosul
about 10 miles west
of Mosul & opposite
west of Amadiyah




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٣ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٦٦)







"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٤ و] [٢٠٦/١٦٧]





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٤ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٦٨)





SECRET


15


From - G.H.Q. Egypt. Despatch 13,46 22.4.19.
 To - D. M. I. Road. #6.00 23.4.19.
 Re: High Commissioner to G.H.Q. Constantinople & Baghdad.
 I 8829/A Dist. Baghdad's X 8836 of April 5th. and High
 Commissioner Constantinople 108 April 13th. (not received)
 An individual of unknown reliability was informed by the Head
 man of Sheikhan and Kisberli Kurds living between Soverak
 and Urfa that Soverak contacts arranged with G.U.F. leaders
 at Diarbekr and with Turkish authorities at beginning of March
 to organize Turkish troops and tribes in area of Diarbekr,
 Soverak, Urfa. Their object was to oppose the British advance
 towards Diarbekr and to clear the country east of Euphrates
 of British. H.M.C. Ibrahim, Chief of Milli and Abdul Kadir
 Dorsu Chief of the Karakeshli and Sheikhan who were then
 imprisoned for disloyalty were accordingly released by the
 Turks. He... agreed to call up his and neighbouring tribes
 including Kisberli-Baderli and Jais who have been persuaded
 by G.U.F. to cooperate. 1st (I.G.F.) regiment now at
 Soverak. Milli are estimated at about 4000 rifles including
 200 mounted. Karakeshli and Sheikhan regiments and the rest
 Soverak under Abdul Kadir Dorsu 3000 rifles. (1) Kisberli
 16 miles northeast of Urfa 300 rifles. Radalli 20 miles north
 of Urfa 200 rifles. Jais Arabs east of Urfa 500 rifles.
 On April 6th it was stated by Sheikhan Kurds that two brothers,
 cousins of Abdul Kadir Dorsu, and enemies of latter and will
 help the British.

G.H.Q. Copies to - D.M.I.
 H.M.C. Copies to -
 H.M.C. & C.
 Att. General
 del. J. Ashmole (10)
 F.O. Mr. Kingston (12)
 Secy. to G.H.Q. (12)




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٥ظ] (٢٠٦/١٧٠)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٦ظ] (٢٠٦/١٧٢)






1. 2. 3.
This state of things is
serious & there is no doubt
here to expect to long so the
Commission is leaving about 10
first year is not made with
Turkey.


At
1914

Note in particular that the
Turks are temporarily & will be
Sulaimaniyah Kurds. This district
is 50 to 60 miles & equidistant
from Mosul & Baghdad.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٧ظ] (٢٠٦/١٧٤)









"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٨ظ] (٢٠٦/١٧٦)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٨٩ظ] (٢٠٦/١٧٨)





SECRET

From G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To High Commissioner, Constantinople, repeated
War Office and G.O.C. Egypt.

Dep. 10.10. 9.4.19.
Recd. 14.00 9.4.19.


T.2500 24h. Continuation by T.2502 April 24h.
Following is report from Political Mosul. It is
reported that Shermakh Jazira and Hadlat Kurds are
preparing for hostilities with intention of moving
one party on Bakha and raising Bakha Pasha with
another. It is stated by 3 three Christians ex
Jazira night 7th/8th that Kurds by order of Wali
of Harbek are collecting munition and ammunition
and to be at Eberit Haffan near Awkh. Notables
of Jazira and Hira section of Gubar tribes are
assisting. Latter now encamped in direction of
Hirbin between Mosul and that place.

Strongly urge immediate action through Turkish
Government be taken.

Copy to P.O. Sec.
C.O. Off.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩٠ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٨٠)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٩١١ و] (٢٠٦/١٨١)



M E S S A G E

From: G.O.C. Mesopotamia. Despatch No. 1240 S.M. 1911.
To: High Commissioner, Constantinople. Recd. 12.05 S.M. 1911.
Re: Egypt & War Office.


Clear the line. X 5649 April 8th. Received following from Mosul April 7th. Begins. Representatives of Kurdish national committee at Constantinople, leaders of whom are Sheikh Abdul Qadir & Doctor Abdallah Jazir, passed through Mosul about March 25th. for Sulaiman Iyeh with letters to tribes calling on them to cast off British yoke & declare their independence under Turkish suzerainty. Representative is named Khalusi, aged 45 & (2 yrs. undoc.) Imam. Sulaiman Iyeh Kurd who has for about 20 years been in Constantinople as a Muslim. He is potentially dangerous as the activities & propaganda of Constantinople committee were undoubtedly responsible for recent outrages at Zakho. I would urge prompt necessity of removing Abdul Qadir & Doctor Jazir from Constantinople. Ends. Following dated April 8th (Begins) Report from Jazir that Quimshan has left and there are only few troops and these are leaving. Khalusi notorious as being instigator of Christian massacres in Jazir and neighbourhood, is travelling among the Kurdish tribes urging them to occupy Jazir on behalf of the Kurdish Govt. which is about to be formed. Have received letter from Azakh a Christian town west of Jazir which owing to its largely armed population has always stood up against Turks and Kurds. They now state they can no longer defend themselves against tribes. Abdur Rahman powerful Aga of Shermah north-east of Jazir who has much influence with neighbouring tribes now appears to be at the bottom of the trouble in Zakho district and many tribes of Jazir are behind him. Ends.


C.S. Copies to:- H.O.C.

- | | | | |
|--------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| H.O.C. Copies to:- | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |
| | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |
| | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |
| | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |
| | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |
| | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |
| | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |
| | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |
| | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |
| | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. | Col. F. G. G. G. |



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩١ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٨٢)





9A. (92)

SECRET.

From: G.D.C., Mesopotamia.
To: War Office.

Despatched: 16.45 8.4.19.
Received: 07.00 10.4.19.

X.2323 R. I have received information from Officer Commanding
Aixi Wing R.A.F. that there is dissatisfaction among his
deselectable personnel, numbering about 200, who have to be
retained though eligible. I very much appreciate anything
which might interfere with their efficiency as I am dependent
on R.A.F. for taking prompt action against troublesome tribesmen.
Could a draft be sent early if so categories required can be
given.

If this cannot be done could Air Board be asked to give
assurance similar to yours in No. 72827 A.C.I. March 1918 that
early in the autumn this class of personnel will be relieved.
Aviation Baghdad in his D.P.50 March 29th has already asked
Forward Cairo for re-inforcements.

C.R. Copies to:-


- ADJUTANT GENERAL.
- D.C.I., G.S.
- D.C.S.
- D.C.S.D.
- D.C.S.
- D.O.
- G.S.I.
- D.S.Mob.
- M.S.I. (India)
- D.S.Mob. G.S.C.
- FOR. S.S.R. 10.
- S.D.S.S. (M.S.C.)
- D.I.P.O.
- S.H.I.C.
- V.O.S.S.
- H.O.A.


H.Q. Copies to:

- G.I.C.S.
- D.S.
- H.O.S.
- India Office.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩٢ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٨٤)





Operations.

SECRET.

From- G.O.C., Mesopotamia.

To- G.H.Q., Egypt.

Reported:- War Office,
G.H.Q., Constantinople.

Despatched:- 12.15 8.4.19.
Received:- 14.20 10.4.19.

1.0629 April 8th.

Your H.A.8345 April 8th.

Area referred to is beyond reach of this force. Any advice given from here could not be supported by military action. When you occupy Hialbin and Jasiro you will be able to deal with situation better than I am.

Request that you repeat your H.A.8345 to Constantinople.


USqS.


For info remember that the Comd of 7th Div at the 7.0. Conference, & that it was recommended that Mesopotamia should be authorized to construct a light railway to Hialbin. This enabling troops to get to the district & remain there to deal with the situation.

YOG.
9. 5. 19.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩٣ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٨٦)





SECRET

Operations.

From the FAR Office.

To: SAC, ERPG, Forward O.C., Baghdad.

Dispatched 15:40 P.M. 1948.


REF: a/c R.F.E.


With reference to telegram A.S. 504 of 24 April from O.C.O. Baghdad. Your L.A. 2214 of February 1948. Can you reconsider decision conveyed in latter cable. It is considered imperative that Takho and Jafir Ibn Umar should be occupied without delay.

M.C.K. Copies to:-
D.L.M. O.
M.C.I.
M.O.I. B.
M.O.C.
M.O.S. A.
S.M. T.
D.P.W. I.
S.I. I.
M.I. B. V.
M. S. B.
M. I. B. B.
M. I. B. B.
M. I. B. B.
M. I. B. B.
Col. Fadden.
Mr. Kildston
I. B. C. B.
Att. Gen.
*




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٤٩٩] (١٨٨٨/٦٠٦)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩٥ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٩٠)





SECRET.

OPERATIONS.


From:- G.O.C. Mesopotamia. Despatch 19.01. 6.4.19.
Re: War Office and H.M.F. repts. Constantinople.


X 5613. 6. Continuation X 5753 March 21st. On April 4th
Goyan Kurds attacked and believed to have killed political
officer Capt. [unclear] between Dale and Mergi about 30 miles
north northeast of (?) Jekho (Haunsella sheet of Eastern
Turkey in Asia Number 20) whether he had proceeded to
investigate reports of massacres & establishment of gendarmerie.
Root of trouble appears to be in Fortukire. Occupation of
Jekho will cut off Goyan from communication westward and is
imperative for prevention of tribal trouble along whole of
harrisee. This occupation is not possible from this side
while railhead is over 100 miles short of Mosul. Strongly urge
Jekho be occupied without delay from Aleppo.

M.O.S. Copies to:- D.D.M.O., M.O.L.S. B., M.O.S. B.,
D.M.I., D.D.M.I., M.I.L.,
M.I.S. B., M.I.S. B., M.I.S. B. & L.,
S.I.P. B., Mr. Kidston, I.D.S.S.,
Att. Gen.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩٦ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٩٢)





5
SECRET

From G.O.C. in C. Egypt.

To G.O.C. Mesopotamia, repeated War Office.


I.L. 2341. 5th.


It appears that some three months ago instructions were given to the British chiefs of Mosul and Jebel Tur by Sir Dick Green not to furnish supplies to Ali Ishaq Pasha who was then intriguing amongst Mesopotamian Kurds.

Messenger has now returned with messages from Ali Hatto Agha and Rashid Agha of Mosul and from chosen Janabites of Surabdin. They state that chiefs are being urged by Turkish Kaimakan Mosul together with Saifi Shukri Effendi to sign demand for British independence. Pending instructions from British they have refused and ask for British troops at Mosul when they will support with their contingents. They desire to come under British influence and have no wish for independence. They are opposed to Kurds of Hurdin and Diarbekr in this attitude since the latter have been successfully tempted with by Ali Ishaq and his messengers. Messenger has been asked to obtain reply from British authorities. Instructions are being given to messenger to inform Aghas that their loyal and helpful attitude is much appreciated and that we rely on their friendship, but that they are recommended to apply to the Mesopotamian authorities for guidance since they are more accessible to them. These Chiefs lie outside my present sphere of occupation and control.



"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩٧ظ] (٢٠٦/١٩٤)





COPY OF TELEGRAM.

From Political, Mosul,
Dated 7th April, 1910,
(Recd. HQ, 11 a.m.).


Clear the line.

2944. Following for Wilson. Mosul. For the past three weeks we have been receiving reports of anti-British and anti-Christian intrigues in Kurdish tribal areas to the north of Mosul Vilayet. These reports have been only communicated to High Commissioner, Constantinople, where the headquarters of the movement are. Local centres in Jezireh Ila Bahis (near Mosul) and Sulaymaniyah, Mosul, reported that measures of Christians had started in Geyan country 20 miles north of Bahis. Report was subsequently found much exaggerated, but disturbances had undeniably taken place. On 4th April, Capt. Pearson, I.S.O. Bahis, who was proceeding from Hala, where he had established headquarters west to maintain order, with Bijra (different from Hala) to Bahis, was ambushed and killed at a Geyan village called Karwar. Map of these regions very un-reliable and Russell's sheet 23 shows Bahis 20 miles north-north-east Bahis. Political Mosul, describes Bijra as within our area and only road from it to Karwar runs past Karwar, which is admittedly outside our limits. Presumably, however, clause 24 Article 109 would cover Pearson's action. General Headquarters here are unable to take any military action, but have pressed Egypt forces to expedite occupation of Jezireh. London considers that aeroplanes could effectively bomb Geyan (Geyanah) and strongly urges that this should be done even at cost of infringement of the frontiers. Failing other means, he also advocates tribal action by Sindi and Hivani tribes, although parties of latter are certainly in our area. I share his views as to absolute necessity of punitive action if trouble is to be kept from spreading. Delay in the despatch of this telegram due to absence an account of sickness.

Addressed to Wilson; repeated to Tehran.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩٨ ظ] (٢٠٦/١٩٦)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩٦ و] [٢٠٦/١٩٧]



3 (B)

SECRET

From G.O.C. Mesopotamia.

To War Office repeated G.S.G. Egypt,
Constantinople and G. in C. India.


Dep. 1305. 1st April 1919.
Send. 2200. 4th April 1919.

X.5765. 2nd.

I propose occupy by political officers and
(1 gr. unloc.) office Mosul and Jalmar in the Van
Vilayet about middle of May, in order to safeguard
Assyrians of the area north of Mosul during and
after registration and in addition occupation of
Jezirah Ibn Omar by a detachment of Egyptian
Expeditionary Force (9) from Haidin (see Egypt E.L. 2014
Feb. 12th).
Will you please confirm this.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [٩٩ظ] (٢٠٦/١٩٨)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٠٠] (٢٠٦/١٩٩)



SECRET.

Despatched 1410 21/2/39.
Received 1430 2/2/39.

From- D.C.O. Mesopotamia.

To- War Office.
repeated regarding Coler.

X.8780. 31st.


To deal with local disturbances in widely dispersed localities heavy demands are necessary on aeroplanes. As this is likely to continue request that number 55 squadron be brought on to 4 flights. I require complete flight personnel and 8 pilots to do this. Further request early despatch with 4 months supply of spares of 30 D.H.9's or similar type of machine.

C.S. Copies to:-
M.C.G.
D.C.A.
M.C. 3A
D.C.M.C.
D.C.S.D.
D.P.S.
C.M.I.

M.S.M. Copies to :- D.C.I.O.S.
D.M.C.
M.O.S.
India Office.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٠٠ظ] (٢٠٦/٢٠٠)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٠١و] (٢٠٦/٢٠١)



20

SECRET

From G.O.C. Mesopotamia.


To G.H.Q., Constantinople, repeated War Office.


Deep. CO. 25. } 21.3.19.
Road. OB. 15. }

I. 5703 Marsh 21st.
reports
Useful information that in Imayen district
north of Sakho) measures of Christians by Kurds
taken place. Kurds probably incited by Turks.
Country too distant to reach except by aeroplane.
Can do no good by bombing with numbers of these
available. Can you bring pressure to bear on
Turks.




"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٠١ظ] (٢٠٦/٢٠٢)








"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [١٠٢ظ] (٢٠٦/٢٠٤)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [خلفي] (٢٠٦/٢٠٥)





"الاضطرابات في شمال بلاد الرافدين (الأكراد)" [خلفي-داخلي] (٢٠٦/٢٠٦)

