

من المصادر الإلكترونية في مكتبة قطر الرقمية ٢٠٢٢/٠١/٢٨ تم إنشاء هذا الملف بصيغة PDF بتاريخ
النسخة الإلكترونية من هذا السجل متاحة للاطلاع على الإنترنت عبر الرابط التالي:

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تحتوي النسخة الإلكترونية على معلومات إضافية ونصوص وصور بدقة عالية تسمح بإمكانية تكبيرها ومطالعتها بسهولة.

"IV تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين ١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد"

المكتبة البريطانية: أوراق خاصة وسجلات من مكتب الهند

IOR/L/MIL/17/15/66/4

١٩٢٧ (ميلادي)

الإنجليزية في اللاتينية

مجلد واحد (٢٦٦ ورقة)

رخصة حكومة مفتوحة

المؤسسة المالكة

المرجع

التاريخ/ التواريخ

لغة الكتابة

الحجم والشكل

حق النشر



حول هذا السجل

هذا المجلد هو المجلد الرابع لنشرة حكومية رسمية، وقد جمعها العميد فريدريك جيمس موبرلي بناءً على طلب من الحكومة في الهند، وتحت إشراف القسم التاريخي في لجنة الدفاع الإمبراطورية. طُبِع التقرير ونُشر في مكتب الأدوات القرطاسية الملكية في لندن.


تقدم محتويات التقرير سردًا للعمليات في الفترة ١٩١٤-١٩١٨ في بلاد الرافدين، استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية بشكل رئيسي.

المجلد عبارة عن جزء واحد بعنوان "الجزء V. الحملة في الجزيرة الفراتية، ١٩١٧-١٩١٨ - شمال غرب بلاد فارس وبحر قزوين، ١٩١٨"، وهو يتألف من الفصول العشرة التالية:


- مايو ويونيو ويوليو ١٩١٧
- أغسطس وسبتمبر ١٩١٧: الاستيلاء على الرمادي
- أكتوبر إلى ديسمبر ١٩١٧ - احتلال جبل حميرين، معركة تكريت وموت الفريق أول ماود
- يناير إلى مارس ١٩١٨: بعثة دنستير فيل ومعركة خان البغدادي
- أبريل ومايو ١٩١٨: العمليات في كردستان وترتيبات مواجهة التهديد التركي-الألماني خلف جناحنا الشمالي
- الخطط البريطانية لوقف تقدم العدو إلى بلاد فارس والسيطرة على بحر قزوين
- سقوط باكو
- التقدم البريطاني نحو أعالي نهر دجلة: المعارك قرب مضيق الفتحة وعلى ضفاف نهر الزاب الصغير
- معركة الشرقاط والهدنة
- النتيجة
- يتضمن المجلد أيضاً أربع عشرة خريطة، عناوينها:
- الشرق الأوسط
- بلاد الرافدين
- الخريطة ٣٤ - العمليات قرب الرمادي: يوليو وسبتمبر ١٩١٧
- الخريطة ٣٥ - العمليات في جبل حميرين: أكتوبر وديسمبر ١٩١٧
- الخريطة ٣٦ - المعارك في الدور وتكريت: ٢، ٥ نوفمبر ١٩١٧
- الخريطة ٣٧ - العمليات على خط الفرات: مارس ١٩١٨
- الخريطة ٣٨ - معركة خان البغدادي: ٢٦ مارس ١٩١٨
- الخريطة ٣٩ - العمليات في منطقة كفري-كركوك: أبريل ومايو ١٩١٨
- الخريطة ٤٠ - قضية الفرسان بتاريخ ٢٧ أبريل ١٩١٨، ومعركة طوز خورماتو في ٢٩ أبريل ١٩١٨

- الخريطة ٤١ - عمليات "قوة دانستر"، ١٩١٨
- الخريطة ٤٢ - العمليات في باكو، أغسطس-سبتمبر ١٩١٨
- الخريطة ٤٣ - العمليات على نهر دجلة: ١٨-٣٠ أكتوبر ١٩١٨
- الخريطة ٤٤ - معركة لواء الفرسان السابع قرب قرية الخضرانية: ٢٩ أكتوبر ١٩١٨
- الخريطة ٤٥ - معركة الشرقاط، ٢٩ أكتوبر ١٩١٨


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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [أمامي] (٥٤٠/١)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد ١٧". [خلفي] (٥٤٠/٢)




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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [صلب] (٥٤٠/٣)




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
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
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
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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [أمامي-داخلي] (٥٤٠/٧)




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
"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ٢] (٥٤٠/٩)




"الشرق الأوسط." [و٣] (٢/١)




"الشرق الأوسط." [ظ ٣] (٢/٢)




"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٤و] (١٢/٥٤٠)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد ١٧". [٤ظ] (١٣/٥٤٠)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٥٠] (١٤/٥٤)



PREFACE

DURING the four years* of warfare we utilised in Mesopotamia, from first to last, the services of 889,702 officers and men, while against us the enemy would appear to have employed only about half that number. Our action destroyed German dreams of dominance which constituted a real menace to the security of our Indian Empire and to our sea communications east of the Red Sea; it brought about the defeat of Pan-Turkish ambitions in Caucasia, Persia and Central Asia; it assured the independence of Persia and Afghanistan; and it opened to Mesopotamia a prospect of prosperity which she had not known for hundreds of years. Despite these achievements, there has been much controversy regarding the justification of so great an effort on our part in what was admittedly a subsidiary military operation, generally on the grounds that the same results could have been attained by action elsewhere with less expenditure of men and material.

In the course of the first year, our small force, ill-equipped as it was for warfare in a land of roadless swamp and desert, attained considerable success. The faulty initial Turkish dispositions by which Mesopotamia was denuded of adequate means of defence, the heavy losses which their Third Army suffered in its attempt to invade the Caucasus and the effort Turkey had to make in defence of the Dardanelles, all contributed to facilitate this success. But it led to our underestimating the enemy's capacity and to our overlooking or disregarding our own insufficient means. As a result, in the next six months, we found ourselves involved in misfortune, attended by heavy loss of life and by much misery and suffering for thousands of our men. For the lack of foresight and the inadequate preparation which were responsible for this disaster several individuals have been held more or less responsible. But there were also other contributory reasons which exemplify the disadvantages under which a democratic government labours

* I.e., from 31st October, 1914, when the Admiralty and the India Office issued their "War" telegrams, to the Armistice on 31st October, 1918.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [ظ] (١٥/٥٤٠)

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
PREFACE

in the direction of war, and it is now generally admitted that, as a nation, we cannot acquit ourselves of blame in the matter.


After the surrender of Kut, it was of advantage to us that instead of pressing his good fortune, the enemy despatched an army corps to invade Persia and left us unmolested on the Tigris to rest and reorganise. This Persian project was a manifestation of the Pan-Turkish aims of the enemy which, throughout the war, dominated his policy to the ultimate detriment of his military operations. The Italian war of 1911 resulted in the loss of Turkey's last African possessions and of islands in the Aegean. The Balkan war of 1912 followed with disastrous military defeat and the Bulgarian attack on Constantinople itself, and the loss of European *wilayets* and of yet other Aegean islands. These humiliating events had given an impetus to the Pan-Turkism which was then beginning to replace in the minds of influential and literate Turks their Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turanian ideals. During the war, whether acquiesced in by Germany or not on the grounds that its action would embarrass both us and Russia, this policy led the enemy time and again to ignore the requirements of his southern fronts in favour of projects which aimed at territorial expansion in Persia and the Caucasus. At the present day the same Pan-Turkism is evident in the uncompromising nationalism of the Turkish State.

We went to Mesopotamia primarily to defend our essential interests at the head of the Persian Gulf and to counter Turco-German designs to embarrass us in the Middle East. As the operations progressed, however, it became increasingly apparent that—owing to the Turco-German attempts to exploit the weakness of Persia, the latent hostility to us in Afghanistan and the unreliability of the tribes on the north-west frontier of India—the presence of our force on the Tigris was of material assistance to the security of India, at a period when the greater part of her army was serving overseas. We were thus presented with an additional incentive to capture Baghdad, a success which we followed up by taking heavy toll of the dispersed Turkish forces. From this period onward the Turks were never able to stop any of our advances, and the close of the campaign found us operating simultaneously on the Caspian, within a few miles of Mosul and near Ana on the Euphrates, i.e., on a frontage of about 600 miles. The extent of this frontage and the great length of our lines of communication in advance of Baghdad are sufficient testimony to the efficiency of our reorganisation.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد VII". [٦] [١٦/٥٤٠]



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٦ظ] (١٧/٥٤٠)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد VII". [٧و] (١٨/٥٤٠)

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF THE CAMPAIGN
IN MESOPOTAMIA, 1914-1918.

I.—THE CAMPAIGN IN LOWER MESOPOTAMIA.

	1914.
British force under Brig.-Gen. W. S. Delamain arrives at Basrah	23rd October.
Turco-German naval raid in Black Sea	29th October.
British Admiralty and India Office issue their "War" Telegrams	31st October.
Russia declares war on Turkey	2nd November.
Great Britain formally declares war on Turkey	5th November.
British landing at Fao	6th November.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. A. Barrett reaches the Shatt al Arabi and assumes command of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force (Force "D")	14th November.
OPERATIONS FOR CAPTURE OF BASRA.	
Affair of Saikan	15th November.
Affair of Sahil	17th November.
Occupation of Basra	22nd November.
OPERATIONS NEAR BASRA.	
First action of Qurna	4th-8th December.
Occupation of Qurna	9th December.
	1915.
Affair of Shaiba	3rd March.
OPERATIONS IN PERSIAN ARABISTAN.	
Affair of Alwasr	3rd March.
General Sir J. E. Nixon succeeds Lieut.-Gen. Sir A. A. Barrett in command	9th April.
OPERATIONS NEAR BASRA.	
Battle of Shaiba	12th-14th April.
OPERATIONS IN PERSIAN ARABISTAN	
Affair of Khalujiya	14th-16th May.
ADVANCE UP THE TIGRIS.	
Second action of Qurna	31st May.
Occupation of Amara	3rd June.
ADVANCE UP THE EUPHRATES.	
Actions for Nairiya	5th, 13th-14th, 24th July.
Occupation of Nairiya	25th July.
OPERATIONS ABOUT HUSHEK.	
Destruction of Diwar	13th-16th August.
Affair at Bushim	9th September.
ADVANCE UP THE TIGRIS.	
Battle of Kut al Amara, 1915	28th September.
Pursuit arrested at Anziya	5th October.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٧ظ] (١٩/٥٤)

vi		CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY	
II.—THE FIRST CAMPAIGN FOR BAGHDAD.			
			1915.
Advance from Aziriya starts	11th November	
Battle of Ctesiphon	22nd-24th November	
Affair of Umm at Tubul	1st December.	
DEFENCE OF KUT AL AMARA.			
Repulse of Turkish assault	24th December.	
FIRST ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE KUT AL AMARA.			
			1916.
Action of Shaikh Saad	8th-8th January.	
Action of the Wadi	13th January.	
First attack on Hanna	21st January.	
OPERATIONS NEAR NASSIYA.			
Affair of Butaniya	14th January.	
Lieut.-Gen. Sir P. H. N. Lake succeeds General Sir J. E. Nixon in command	19th January.	
War Office takes over control of operations in Mesopotamia from India Office	10th February.	
SECOND ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE KUT AL AMARA.			
Attack on the Dujaila Redoubt	8th March.	
THIRD ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE KUT AL AMARA.			
Capture of Hanna Position	5th April.	
First attack on Sannaiyat	6th April.	
Second attack on Sannaiyat	9th April.	
Action of Beit Isa	17th-18th April.	
Third attack on Sannaiyat	22nd April.	
Capitulation of Kut al Amara	29th April.	
III.—THE CAPTURE AND CONSOLIDATION OF BAGHDAD.			
War Office assumes administrative control, in addition to control of operations, of Mesopotamia Force	18th July.	
Lieut.-Gen. P. S. Maude succeeds Lieut.-Gen. Sir P. H. N. Lake in command	28th August.	
OPERATIONS NEAR NASSIYA.			
Action of As Sahlan	11th September.	
BATTLE OF KUT AL AMARA, 1917.			
Advance to the Hai and capture of the Khudhaira Bend	14th December, 1916- 19th January, 1917.	
			1917.
Capture of the Hai Salient	25th January- 5th February.	
Capture of the Dabra Bend	9th-16th February.	
Capture of Sannaiyat	17th-24th February.	
Passage of the Tigris at the Shuman Bend	23rd-24th February.	
PURSUIT TO BAGHDAD.			
Operations against Turkish rear guard	25th-26th February.	
Affair of Lajj	5th March.	
Passage of the Diyala	7th-10th March.	
Operations on Tigris right bank	9th-10th March.	
Occupation of Baghdad	11th March.	

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٨] [٥٤٠/٢٠]

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY vii

OPERATIONS FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE
BRITISH POSITION AT BAGHDAD. 1917.

Action of Mushabiba	14th March.
Occupation of Falluja	19th March.
First action of the Jabal Hamrin	25th March.
Cavalry operations about Delli Abbas	25th-28th March.
Affair of Dugma	29th March.
Affair of Balad	8th April.
Affairs on the Khalis Canal	9th-15th April.
Passage of the Adhaim	18th April.
Action of Isatablat	21st-22nd April.
Occupation of Samarra	24th April.
Action of Adhaim	30th April.

IV.—THE CAMPAIGN IN UPPER MESO-
POTAMIA, 1917-18—NORTH - WEST
PERSIA AND THE CASPIAN, 1918.

EUPHRATES OPERATIONS.

Attack on Ramadi	11th July.
Capture of Ramadi	28th-29th September.

OPERATIONS NORTH-EAST OF BAGHDAD.

Second action of the Jabal Hamrin	16th-20th October.
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TIGRIS OPERATIONS.

Action of Dair	2nd November.
Action of Tikrit	5th November.
Death of Lieut.-Gen. Sir F. S. Maude	18th November.
Lieut.-Gen. Sir W. H. Marshall succeeds to command	18th November.

OPERATIONS NORTH-EAST OF BAGHDAD.

Third action of the Jabal Hamrin	3rd-6th December.
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NORTH-WEST PERSIA. 1918.

Major-Gen. L. C. Dunsterville and Mission start from Baghdad	27th January.
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EUPHRATES OPERATIONS.

Occupation of Hit	9th March.
Action of Khan Baghdadhi	26th-27th March.

OPERATIONS IN KURDISTAN.

Affair of Kulawand	27th April.
Action of Tuz Khurmatli	29th April.
Occupation of Kirkuk	7th May.

NORTH-WEST PERSIA.

Affair of Resht	20th July.
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CASPIAN.

Occupation of Baku	4th August.
Occupation of Krasnovodsk	27th August.
Defence of Baku	4th August— 14th September.


NORTH-WEST PERSIA.

Affairs near Mianeh	5th-14th September.
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ADVANCE ON MOSUL.

Actions of the Fat-ha Gorge and on the Little Zab	23rd-26th October.
Battle of Sharqat	28th-30th October.
Affair of Qaiyara	30th October.
Armistice with Turkey comes into force	31st October.


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
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
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
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2 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA


his dispositions for this will be given hereafter. But he paid great attention to the arrangements for the health and welfare of his officers and men, to help them through a very trying and monotonous period, during which he realised how essential it would be to keep bodies and minds as well exercised as the exigencies of the climate would permit. Only a small part of his force could proceed on leave, and another part would have to hold our advanced positions. But for the remainder camps were laid out on selected sites along the river banks, and were furnished with well organised hospitals, canteens and all possible means of recreation.

In a memorandum which he issued to his chief subordinate commanders on the 7th May, General Maude, after warning them that it was essential to be at all times prepared for an enemy offensive, trusted that the next few months might be a period of well-earned rest for those who had done so magnificently and fought so gallantly. The first step was to make certain points secure defensively, improving the defences week by week, so as to free the bulk of his troops for offensive action as necessary. Simultaneously arrangements were to be made to give the troops the maximum of comfort possible in regard to accommodation and water. The memorandum went on to emphasise the importance of maintaining a high standard of discipline and training, the necessary exercises being carried out, as the heat increased, in the early morning and late evening. Steps were to be taken at once to complete the war equipment of units in every particular; and when granting leave* commanders were to bear in mind, not only the necessity for keeping up the discipline and training of units at a high standard, but also the possibility of their having to take the field at short notice.

A portion of General Pavloff's Russian force was still holding the line of the Diyala in the vicinity of Qizil Ribat; but there seemed little prospect that the Russians would display greater military activity than they had done during the past six weeks. It consequently came as a complete surprise to General Maude to receive, on the night 7th/8th May, a message from General Raddatz, commanding the advanced Russian force on the Diyala, saying that he was crossing that river on the 8th, with the object of capturing Kifri, and asking for British co-operation in the Delli Abbas and Band-i-Adhaim directions. In spite of difficulty, owing to the short notice, in making the necessary transport arrangements, General Maude managed to despatch two small columns on the 8th to divert the enemy's

* By the end of June well over 20,000 officers and men had been sent on leave out of the country to recuperate.

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4 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA

Caucasus Armies, we ought to confine ourselves primarily to the defence of Egypt. In the Mosul-Kifri-Tikrit area in Mesopotamia the Turks could probably supply 200,000 men, three-quarters of them combatants, though it was doubtful if they could maintain that number south of Tikrit to attack General Maude, and it would in any case take them a long time to obtain the necessary transport. General Maude, able to supply 70,000 to 80,000 men at and north of Baghdad and in a central position between the Turkish lines of advance, should be able to deny Baghdad to the enemy. But to prevent the Turks from penetrating into Persia via Kermanshah we might have to send reinforcements to General Maude and provide the additional river and railway transport required to maintain his increased force. Thus, in order to hold Baghdad, no reduction of General Maude's force was possible and it might have to be reinforced.


As regards the East generally, the main conclusion come to was that if Russia made a separate peace the war might be prolonged and we should have to economise more than ever in our shipping. Consequently, in the meantime, we ought to follow a watching policy and limit our forces in the East to the minimum required for the defence of our essential interests.

General Maude replied to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff's telegram on the 22nd May, having delayed his answer to ascertain more clearly the extent to which Russian support might be expected. It appeared increasingly evident, he said, that such support would not be vigorous. Continuing, General Maude said that the Turks might advance towards Baghdad by three lines, i.e., through the Jabal Hamrin and Shahraban, down the Tigris or down the Euphrates; and they could utilise one or more of these lines according to their numbers.

General Maude intended to hold the line Baquba-Sindiya, which was being strongly entrenched, till such time as the Russians occupied Kifri. On the Tigris he had selected a strong position covering Samarra station and another level with it on the left bank of that river. This latter position was not being held for the time being, but it could be occupied and entrenched at short notice.* The position covering Samarra station and a second one, two to three miles in rear of it on the right bank, were being entrenched; while a third position about Istabulat had been selected and would be entrenched should it seem desirable to do so later. On the Euphrates he would hold Falluja. The remainder of his force would ultimately be disposed in the first instance about Sumaika-

* Samarra town was held as a bridgehead, but there were then insufficient troops to hold more; and the desirability of holding the left bank as well as the right bank position would depend on how the military situation developed.

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PROBABLE TURKISH PLANS

5

Balad, with a bridgehead on the left bank of the Tigris near its junction with the Adhaim, so as to be in a position to strike rapidly towards Delli Abbas, Band-i-Adhaim or Samarra as occasion demanded.

These preliminary dispositions seemed to General Maude to be the most suitable to deal promptly and effectively with any reasonable numbers brought against him.

In future operations, mobile bridging trains and transport would form important factors. India had been asked to supply suitable vehicles for a second mobile bridging train; the existing land transport was being reorganised, and the Baghdad-Samarra railway line developed.* General Maude trusted that the despatch of the remainder of the mechanical transport from England, approved in November 1916, might be expedited, and he asked for some motor lorries to facilitate the rapid movement of infantry. He did not like to ask for extra troops, but if India could spare him two infantry brigades and four artillery batteries, he could free a cavalry and five infantry divisions entirely for action on the Diyala and Tigris fronts.†

In the middle of April General Maude had already asked for another air squadron. During the operations in April his one squadron had proved insufficient and none of its aeroplanes were such effective fighting machines as some of those possessed by the enemy. The number of these enemy machines, moreover, was reliably reported as about to be increased.

On the 24th May, the Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office telegraphed to General Maude that a Turkish offensive against Egypt was not expected during the summer; that probably the Turks would reinforce their Palestine army; while they might be expected to transfer troops from their Caucasus front to Mesopotamia or Palestine in case of need, as they considered a Russian offensive there would be impossible for some months to come. On the 26th the Director of Military Intelligence sent another telegram, saying it was reported that in April Mackensen attended a conference at Constantinople at which a Turkish offensive in Mesopotamia via the Diyala line was decided on, and that 10,000 men from the 1st, 11th and 19th Divisions had been sent to Mosul. Vehib Pasha was to command in Mesopotamia and was to be relieved in the Caucasus by Mustapha Kemal. On the 29th, the Chief of the Imperial

* A railway line to Bagdada was also being constructed.

† In a letter to General Whigham, General Maude said that he hated asking for reinforcements, as he realized that Mesopotamia was not a decisive front; but he felt that he ought to represent his views, when the Chief of the Imperial Staff could decide. He was quite prepared for a refusal.

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
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General Staff informed General Maude that he could make no definite engagement to send additional troops to Mesopotamia, as this would depend on the termination of the campaign in East Africa, the progress made in raising new units in India, and the situation in that country.

A few words are here necessary regarding the situation in India. On the 13th May, the Commander-in-Chief in India had telegraphed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that the North-West Frontier situation was less favourable than it had been for a year past. This was due mainly to three reasons—a continuous series of outrages by the Mahsud Wazirs, culminating in three recent incidents in which our somewhat inexperienced troops then garrisoning the border had been rather severely handled; the disturbed conditions in North Persia and Russian Turkestan arising from the military weakness of Russia; and the activities of the Persian Republican Party. All these factors were likely to affect not only the situation in Afghanistan, but also, unless we took prompt steps to show them that we were able to hold our own and exact punishment for misdeeds, the tribes on our North-West Frontier. The Commander-in-Chief estimated that five infantry brigades altogether would be required to punish the Mahsuds; and, as he would have to hold other forces in readiness to watch the rest of the frontier, he found it necessary to detain in India for the time being seven British Territorial and three Indian battalions under orders for Egypt and East Africa respectively.

While realising the undesirability of locking up troops in this manner, H.M. Government left the decision as to the proposed punitive expedition against the Mahsuds to the Government of India, as being in the better position to decide on the course in which lay the least risk. In India it was felt that the military weakness of Russia was having such an effect in Persia that there was every chance of an early revival of the Turco-German plans for an extension of the war eastward through Persia. It was considered that prompt action was necessary to prevent a conflagration on the Indian frontier, the results of which could not be foreseen. The extent and nature of the Mahsud border rendered an effective blockade impossible. The Amir of Afghanistan, thoroughly understanding our situation, was doing his best to intervene on our behalf. The hot weather period of inactivity in Mesopotamia seemed a propitious time for a diversion in Waziristan. Consequently—although it was felt to be unfortunate, both in

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10 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA

Mandali and of strengthening our relations with the *Vali* of Pusht-i-Kuh, so as to add to the security of the Tigris line of communications if the Russians fell back, as seemed possible.

General Maude replied on the 1st June that Sir Percy Cox thought it might be possible to raise some levies about Mandali as though unreliable, their chief was mercenary. Sir Percy also considered that the *Vali* of Pusht-i-Kuh might be induced to maintain benevolent neutrality and to refuse passage to Turkish troops, though, having regard to this chief's character, it was doubtful if he would support us actively. On the same date General Maude sent the Chief of the Imperial General Staff a much fuller telegram, saying that he was not clear as to the policy which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff wished to be followed on the general question, and explaining his own views, which, as they expressed generally those held by most military officers in Mesopotamia in what was and is a controversial matter, are given here rather fully.

He had hitherto resisted constant political demands for detachments from his force, feeling they were militarily unsound and likely to involve him in operations outside his main objective. Similarly he had endeavoured to keep the Arab population quiet, treating them well so long as they took no part in the operations, trading with them and making friends with them, but repressing instantly and vigorously by force any attempt at hostility. When there was no fighting in their vicinity the tribesmen soon settled down, but became restless and disturbed if drawn into the vortex of war. It appeared that our policy was tending towards enlisting the tribes under our banner, though it was not clear exactly how it was proposed to use them. They were quite unreliable and though they might fight for us one day, they were quite likely to take up arms against us the next. They had, moreover, little or no fighting value; because—while, as expert marauders, they would take full toll from a demoralised retreating army—they were quite ineffective, though tiresome, against unbroken regular troops.

General Maude went on to enquire if it was the wish to employ Arabs for fighting purposes. He was already paying considerable sums of money and had given arms to certain individuals who gave little return for it save passive friendship, and it seemed open to question whether this could not be obtained on lower terms. Guerilla warfare by tribesmen was worrying, but had no real bearing on operations as long as

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BRITISH DISTRIBUTION

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regular troops were intact, and it had a disquieting effect on the population. He was not, therefore, in favour of its encouragement broadcast, though special agents could occasionally be employed usefully on such missions as cutting telegraph lines. If, however, the general principle of employing tribesmen to fight was to be adopted, they should be carefully organised under officers who possessed suitable knowledge and wide military experience and they should be used as part of the general plan of campaign under one direction. Otherwise we might only disturb the country needlessly, extend the area of unrest and find ourselves involved in operations which had no bearing on the main issue. General Maude concluded :

"Even if these forces are systematically organised, I am inclined to think that, owing to lack of time and the inadequacy of means for training them, their influence for good will at best be small, whilst they will always represent potential danger in the area of operations."

Sir Percy Cox was, however, he said, investigating the question.

During May punitive operations had to be undertaken against Arabs in the Falluja area, in the neighbourhood of the Baghdad-Samarra railway and to the eastward of Baquba.

The distribution of the British forces in Mesopotamia at the end of May 1917 is given in detail in Appendix XL. Briefly stated, the IIIrd Corps was on the left bank of the Tigris with its advanced line extending from Baquba to Sindiya ; the Ist Corps was on the Tigris right bank from Baghdad to Samarra with detachments on the Euphrates from the Hindiya Barrage to Falluja ; and a portion of the 15th Division was near Baghdad. Riverhead on the Tigris was at Sadiya, where a bridge had been constructed, and communication with the Ist Corps about Samarra was by railway. Reinforcements of four batteries of artillery had recently arrived ; and of these, at the end of May, the 527th Howitzer Battery was at Amara and the 246th, 257th and 269th Siege Batteries were at Basra. The annual floods had been below the average and the Tigris had begun to fall rapidly as early as the 6th May, causing General Maude some anxiety regarding the working of his river transport service during the hot months. But General Grey, Director of Inland Water Transport, before leaving at the end of May* for England, where he was required by the War Office, reported that the arrangements for the low water season were well in hand. The river transport service, which was by this

* He was succeeded as Director of Inland Water Transport by Lieut.-Colonel R. H. W. Hughes.

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time in a very efficient state and was meeting all requirements, was still receiving additional craft from overseas.*

The German and Turkish accounts show that on the 3rd June, General von Falkenhayn, as a result of a personal inspection of the Mesopotamian front and of discussions with Enver Pasha, reported to the German Supreme Command that an offensive against Baghdad was feasible; and he recommended that the German and Turkish forces for this undertaking should be formed into two armies under his command. He considered a British offensive likely in the autumn or winter, both in Palestine and in Mesopotamia, and that the Turks might have to divert a part of the force destined for Mesopotamia to the Palestine front. The German Emperor approved this recommendation and General von Falkenhayn with a large staff of German and a few Turkish officers at once started his preparations, which were thenceforward pushed on continuously. They were largely directed to improving the long and imperfect lines of communication from the Bosphorus to Aleppo and thence to Mosul on the one hand and down the Euphrates on the other. The difficulties were considerable. The capacity of the railway to Aleppo from Haidar Pasha was strictly limited by the still incomplete tunnels through the Taurus and Amanus ranges; the Baghdad railway had only reached the vicinity of Nisibin, whence the indifferent roads and inadequate transport were barely capable of maintaining even the reduced numbers of the Turkish Sixth Army; the only craft it was possible to use on the Euphrates were small launches and the native *shakhs*, besides the *keleks* (rafts) which had to be broken up for transport by land for the return journey up stream; and the desert route from Aleppo to and down the Euphrates valley would require much work to fit it for mechanical transport traffic. Supplies were, however, said to be procurable locally in sufficient quantities.

General von Falkenhayn and his staff took their task in hand with characteristic energy and thoroughness. Arrangements were made for hundreds of motor lorries, for the extension of the Baghdad railway to Mosul, for the improvement of roads leading to the front in this direction, for the construction of thousands of *shakhs* at Jerablus on the Euphrates, for the organisation of a good land line of communications down the

* The records do not contain a statement of the number and nature of river craft in Mesopotamia at this period; but in a telegram to the War Office of the 18th May, 1917, the Commander-in-Chief in India gave 918 as the total number of river craft in Mesopotamia, with 146 more under order from India.

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YILDERIM

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Euphrates valley and for refitting and reorganising the Turkish Sixth Army. Considerable sums of money were also given for the purchase of local supplies, as well as to gain the active co-operation against the British of the Arab tribes in the Euphrates, Tigris and Diyala valleys.

The Germans found, however, that they had not only the natural physical difficulties of the country to overcome. They and the Turks did not work well together; and the friction between the two races increased considerably as the Germans began to take executive control of the great undertaking for which they had now assumed direct responsibility. There seem to have been faults on both sides. The Germans complained of Turkish obstruction, apathy and inefficiency, while the Turks resented German interference which they misunderstood and distrusted and they also disliked German methods which they regarded as unnecessarily arbitrary and arrogant.

At the beginning of June, Enver Pasha moved Turkish General Headquarters to Aleppo and on the 24th of that month he held a conference there, attended by Izzet, Djemal, Mustapha Kemal and Halil Pashas, commanding the Caucasus, Fourth, Second and Sixth Armies respectively. Enver explained to the commanders the role of the "Yilderim" Group of Armies and said that the Seventh Army would march down the Euphrates, concentrate about Hit and then move so as to threaten the rear of the British forces round Baghdad. Djemal Pasha, it is said, did not approve and urged the danger on the Palestine front, but without effect.

It was not long before reports of the Turco-German intentions began to reach the British. On the 6th June the War Office telegraphed to General Maude that they had reliable information that Falkenhayn and staff had left Constantinople on the 13th May for Palestine and Mesopotamia*; that it was uncertain on which of these fronts the enemy intended an offensive, though it would probably be in Palestine, and that the Turks were going to move troops from their Caucasus front to Mesopotamia. Later in the month the War Office sent reports indicating that Falkenhayn had arrived at Jerabius (on his way to Mosul) on the 21st May, that he had urged on Djemal Pasha the advisability of giving precedence to an offensive in Mesopotamia over one in Palestine and that Turkish General Headquarters had been established at Aleppo at the beginning of June. Throughout July General Maude received a series of reports from the War Office and other sources giving further information on the subject. These referred, but only in general terms, to the enemy conference

* General Maude received other reports that it was Mackensen who was visiting Mesopotamia.

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at Aleppo in June, mentioned the constant passage through Constantinople since mid-June of Turkish troops from Europe and a large concentration in progress towards Mesopotamia, and repeated the information that Falkenhayn was to control an offensive by a Turco-German force in Mesopotamia. Turkish reconnaissances from Hit and Ramadi towards Karbala were said to have been carried out; considerable reinforcements were reported to have reached, and to be on their way to, Mosul; and agents spoke of great activity on the railway towards Mosul. In connection with this, a message was mentioned as having been signed "Yilderim," a term which General Maude had hitherto not heard and the application of which he did not understand. There were many other reports contradicting the information summarised above.

The general conclusion come to at the end of July by General Maude was that, though there was nothing really definite on the subject and though an offensive in Palestine appeared to promise the Turks better and more decisive results than one in Mesopotamia, it seemed fairly clear that an enemy offensive in Mesopotamia under German control was intended. The only reinforcements that had really reached Mosul appeared to belong to the Turkish 46th and 50th Divisions. It would be wise not to overlook the chance of an enemy advance by the Euphrates, but General Maude thought an advance against his right, thereby cutting him off from the Russians and opening the way for the enemy into Persia, to be more probable. It seemed certain that some German troops would take part in the offensive, but it was considered improbable that the Central Powers would divert any considerable body so far from the main theatre of operations.

In reply to a query as to future Russian intentions in the Asiatic theatre of war, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed to General Maude on the 14th and 16th June a summary of the situation in Russia, where Kerensky's influence and Brusiloff's appointment as Commander-in-Chief seemed to hold out chances of improvement. Brusiloff was about to take the offensive in Europe, and had ordered that no ground was to be yielded on the Caucasus front, where steps were to be taken to improve the bad conditions. There was, however, little chance of Pavloff's force taking the offensive on the Persian front, where communication and other difficulties might even preclude the maintenance of a fighting force of any value on General Maude's right. To prevent this waste of Pavloff's force, Sir William Robertson proposed the following plan

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RUSSIAN ACTION

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which he would endeavour to arrange with Brusiloff if General Maude considered it practicable:—The Russian Caucasus Armies to maintain the greatest possible pressure, from their existing bases, on Mosul and to garrison adequately Saqqiz, Sehneh, Hamadan, etc., while the bulk of Pavloff's force was transferred to the Diyala to come there under General Maude's direct orders and to be supplied under arrangements made by him by a branch line of communication from the Tigris.* It seemed possible that in this way the fighting value and moral of Pavloff's force might be restored.

General Maude replied on the 18th June welcoming the idea. He said that he could supply a Russian force of 14,000 men and 6,000 horses, which, he suggested, should hold the line of the Diyala from Qasr-i-Shirin to Shahraban. Even if they were incapable of taking the offensive, their presence would give increased liberty of action to his own troops and would make it more difficult for the enemy to strike at his communications below Baghdad. If this plan was agreed to, it was important that Pavloff's force should cease its retrograde movement. The bulk of his force on the Diyala had withdrawn to Pai Taq, leaving only eight squadrons in the Qasr-i-Shirin area, and a Turkish brigade had occupied Qizil Ribat.

Three days later General Maude reported that Pavloff had continued his retrograde movement and that the Turks now occupied both Qizil Ribat and Qasr-i-Shirin. General Maude at once made arrangements to meet this situation by sending a detachment from the IIIrd Corps to occupy Balad Ruz, half way between Baguba and Mandali, both to cover his own right flank and as a step towards the occupation of Mandali if necessary.† Beyond hostilities by Arabs, the occupation of Balad Ruz was completed without incident.

At the end of June small Russian columns occupied Penjwin, but were forced to evacuate it again by the Turks on the 6th July. Consequently, whatever the reason for it, this small local offensive had little effect.

On the 12th July, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed to General Maude that at a conference of the Entente Powers, shortly assembling in Paris to consider future military operations, he proposed to press for Russian co-operation on the Persian and Caucasus fronts; and it was

* The Chief of the Imperial General Staff pointed out that it might be necessary to ship gun and rifle ammunition as well as drafts for Pavloff's force from Vladivostok to Basra and thence up the Tigris.

† It looked as if the Turks meant to occupy Shahraban and Mandali.

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
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probable that he would be asked to what extent General Maude was prepared to assist the Russians in offensive operations. It seemed possible that, owing to the recent Russian successes in Europe, the *moral* of their troops in Asia might improve and that we might get some assistance from them in the winter. In that case and if the Turks did not attack General Maude in force, how far would it be possible for the latter, having due regard to the efficient maintenance of his force, to extend his operations northwards so as to help the Russians to capture Mosul? General Maude was to understand that the question was purely hypothetical and that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had no desire to press him to undertake more than he thought he could safely perform, particularly in view of the length of his communications and the undesirability of diverting more troops to Mesopotamia than had already been arranged.*

This telegram did not reach General Maude till the 15th and he replied at some length the next day. The two main considerations governing the extent to which he could extend his operations up the Tigris to assist the Russians were, firstly, the numbers which the Turks could withdraw from the Russian and other fronts to concentrate against him and which they could supply on the Euphrates and Tigris lines and, secondly, his own service of maintenance. As regards the latter, his river fleet could not work above Baghdad—except possibly a part of it for a few weeks—owing to shallows in the channel and difficult navigation. But by using the railway to Samarra, and provided he received all the mechanical transport already promised him, he would be able to maintain one cavalry and at least four infantry divisions at Tikrit by the beginning of September. He could make no advance beyond Tikrit till he was able to extend the Samarra railway northwards; and this should present no difficulty if he were sent the necessary men and material. But, as the character, vigour and extent of the Russian co-operation would be far more important than the question of maintenance, his further advance must be dependent on the Russian movements. For instance, he would be prepared to take Tikrit as soon as the Russians had rendered his right flank secure by occupying Kifri and pushing forward towards Tuz Khurmatli; and he emphasised the necessity of a vigorous Russian offensive everywhere to prevent the Turks detaching large forces, either to oppose him on the Tigris or, by an advance down the Euphrates, to oblige him to retain a portion of his army near Baghdad.

* This question of reinforcement is dealt with separately hereafter.

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BRITISH REINFORCEMENTS

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General Maude concluded by giving his opinion that the true course to adopt was a vigorous and carefully concerted offensive by the Russians and by his own force. It should be undertaken with the least possible delay, so as to break up the enemy's concentration before he was ready and to obviate the chances of the Russians being stopped by snow before they could make sufficient progress. Owing to the numerical superiority of their left wing as compared with the enemy, the Russians, if they acted with vigour and determination, should be able to ensure the occupation of Kifri and Kirkuk before the enemy could bring up reinforcements.

On the 22nd July, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff repeated to General Maude a telegram from the British Mission with Russian General Headquarters which gave a plan for an offensive against Mosul on a considerable scale to begin at the end of October. General Pavloff had been relieved by General Baratoff, whose troops numbering 14,000 men and 6,000 horses were to re-occupy the line of the Diyala as soon as the climate permitted and were to come under General Maude for operations and supply. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff asked if General Maude could supply them and also said that he had made clear to the Russians the conditions under which General Maude could advance up the Tigris and the extent of such an advance. Here the question of Russian co-operation can be left for a time.


At the beginning of June the War Office agreed to send to Mesopotamia by August another squadron (No. 63) of aeroplanes and twelve additional batteries*; and on the 26th June the Chief of the Imperial General Staff asked, in view of the Russian withdrawal from the Diyala and a probable Turkish attempt to retake Baghdad, what battalions India could spare to reinforce General Maude early in August. Replying on the 28th, the Commander-in-Chief in India said he could despatch six battalions† (some only partly trained) by that date. The formation of nineteen of the twenty-four new battalions‡ had begun, but progress was retarded by the lack of British officers with experience of Indian troops and he asked the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to hasten the return to India of some then serving under the War Office whose services had already been applied for. The operations against the Mahsuds had been

* Nine 6-gun 18-pounder batteries, one 4-gun 60-pounder battery and two 4-gun motor drawn 9-inch howitzer batteries.

† 13th Rajpeta, 49th Bengalis, 83rd Infantry, 85th Burma Infantry, 104th Rifles and 126th Baluchistan Infantry. They all reached Basra in August.

‡ See Volume III, Chapter XXXV.

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
effective ; and the resources of India would be available for reinforcing Mesopotamia, subject to preparations for complications in East Persia and Afghanistan. In regard to these complications, the Viceroy, in a telegram of the 29th June to the Secretary of State for India, stated that the whole political and strategical position had been altered by recent events in Russia. These, the unstable political conditions in Persia and the reported nomination of Mackensen and Falkenhayn to commands in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, led the Government of India to apprehend a renewal of a Turco-German move on Tehran and the progress eastwards towards Afghanistan of organised hostile bodies of troops. Such a project was likely to be more formidable than the previous attempts and India might not only have to guard the Perso-Afghan border single-handed but might have to provide support for Sir Percy Sykes in South Persia. Consequently the extension of the railway from Dalbandin (in Baluchistan) to the Persian frontier was recommended.

On the 2nd July, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff asked General Maude if, with the squadron of aeroplanes and twelve artillery batteries from England and the six battalions from India, he was satisfied of his ability to meet any attack that might reasonably be expected. General Maude replied on the 4th. After explaining how by rearrangement he could garrison Baghdad and certain posts on the Tigris, Diyala and Euphrates with line of communication troops and so release more men of his divisions at the front for active operations, he said that he felt no anxiety as to his ability to meet successfully considerably superior numbers of Turks. He concluded: "In fact, it should not be impracticable to clear the Tigris of Turkish troops by the close of this year if the Russians will co-operate vigorously."

Between the 12th and 18th July further correspondence on the subject of reinforcements took place between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Commander-in-Chief in India. It was arranged that India should send two battalions to relieve two worn out by the operations in East Africa.* The remaining sixteen battalions of the twenty-four under formation, with other divisional units, would not be ready for

* Owing to the excessive wastage in the Indian units in East Africa and to other reasons, it appeared to the Indian authorities that Indian troops were unsuited for service in East Africa and could be more profitably employed elsewhere. But, to further the policy of H.M. Government to terminate the campaign in East Africa as soon as possible, as the readiest means of effecting economy of force, the Government of India agreed to send these two battalions.

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
service till January 1918 and it was still too early to say where they could be most suitably employed. For the time being, General Maude seemed to have sufficient troops and it was undesirable to send him more than he required to secure his hold on the Baghdad *vilayet*, which was still the object of His Majesty's Government. These new troops might possibly be required in Egypt, but that depended on what happened in Palestine, where General Allenby had recently assumed command and where the policy to be adopted had not yet been settled. It was finally decided that these Indian troops should for the time being be regarded as a reserve for the East ready to relieve or reinforce other troops. Owing to an improved flow of recruits,* resulting from recently organised and energetic arrangements the Government of India, were able to suggest that another twenty-one battalions should be raised to provide a reserve for unforeseen future demands; and owing to the improvement in the frontier situation and the reorganisation of the British volunteer corps in India,† the Commander-in-Chief was able to inform the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that the seven British Territorial battalions temporarily detained in India could be despatched to Egypt in August and September.

On the 21st July Sir William Robertson informed General Maude that the war policy of His Majesty's Government in Mesopotamia remained unaltered, but that the War Cabinet was considering a proposal to reinforce General Allenby for an offensive through Southern Palestine commencing about October, which should materially, though indirectly, assist General Maude. The increase of General Allenby's force depended on the withdrawal of troops from Salonika as well as on shipping; and the former question was to be discussed at an Allied conference to be held the next week. At this conference, however, nothing was settled and the question was postponed for consideration at another conference to be held a few days later. In view of the general situation the Allied military authorities agreed that it was necessary to reduce all commitments in secondary theatres of operations to a minimum and to strengthen the Western Front as much as possible. To carry out their part of this agreement the British

* In spite of recruiting difficulties India had by this time raised about 500,000 men since the outbreak of war and had made arrangements to recruit about 400,000 annually until the war was over; and this in a country where compulsion was impossible and where the annual quota of recruits before the war was about 15,000.

† The Indian Defence Force was created.

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General Staff wished to relieve British by Indian troops in Palestine, Mesopotamia and Salonika.


As regards Arab co-operation, General Maude reported to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the 24th June, as a result of investigation by Sir Percy Cox, that some of the leading Shaikhs of the Anaiza, one of the largest groups of Arab tribes between the Euphrates and Syria, were prepared, if given sufficient backing, to assist us by action against the Turkish railways in Syria, by stopping supplies from reaching the enemy* and, if we occupied Ramadi, by bringing in the Dulaim Arabs to make good the country from Ramadi to Sinjar. It would be necessary to consult our Commander-in-Chief in Egypt in regard to action against the Syrian railways; the blockade to keep supplies from the enemy would be expensive and probably only partially effective; the occupation of Ramadi was not yet desirable from a military point of view; and the Dulaim Arabs were causing us no inconvenience for the time being. Though Sir Percy Cox thought that the assistance of the Anaiza would achieve a wide and important effect apart from its precise military value, General Maude was doubtful as to the benefit we should derive; but he admitted that anything they could do in the Euphrates valley towards Karbala and Najaf, where the country was open to enemy agents and influence, would be of service.

Steps would be taken to get into touch with the Chief of the Yezidis at Sinjar to gain assistance for organising raids against the enemy communications under British officers when we were able to send them. But, as regards the tribes along the Persian frontier, the Kuris, instead of co-operating with us as we had hoped, were displaying hostility to the Russians; and little could be done with them unless we occupied Khanisqin, which he regarded as impracticable. We could only expect benevolent neutrality from the *Va'i* of Pusht-i-Kuh.

In concluding, General Maude said that he was in favour of small raids at opportune moments against definite objectives on the enemy's communications; but he was not in favour of encouraging guerilla warfare or promiscuous acts of hostility, as he considered they would do little good and might be productive of harm. Moreover, he thought that the raising of levies would not be worth the expense involved. Apart from this it should be, in his opinion, our primary aim to pacify the country and keep on friendly terms with its inhabitants, thus enabling us to concentrate our energies against the enemy.

* There was still a considerable leakage of supplies to the Turks from the Euphrates area, at too great a distance from the centres held by the British to be effectively controlled by them.

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INCEPTION OF ATTACK ON RAMADI 21

It was found that the authorities in Egypt considered that any action by the Anaiza controlled from Mesopotamia should be exclusively directed against the Euphrates line of communication to Mesopotamia ; and General Maude concurred in their reasons for this opinion, though he pointed out that there were no railways nor railway bridges there offering definite objectives. The recent Arab successes near the Egyptian front, however, led the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to express the hope that effective Arab action against the Euphrates line might force the Turks to retain approximately the same number of men there as General Maude was obliged to keep on his own line of communication ; and he pointed out that *shaktars* floating downstream offered tangible objectives for Arab irregulars.

During June investigations were carried out with a view to reconstructing the Sakhlawiya dam* and thus averting the danger from floods† ; and it was found that, to cover parties working on this dam, it would be necessary to occupy Dhibban. This locality was within twenty miles of Ramadi and on the 5th July General Maude told General Cobbe that the time seemed opportune for combining the occupation of Dhibban with a stroke against Ramadi, which was said to be occupied by a Turkish force of about 120 sabres, 700 rifles and 6 guns.

As requested, General Cobbe at once submitted his proposals for the operation, including arrangements for the mitigation of the effect of the great midday heat on the troops to be employed. General Maude had no intention of occupying Ramadi permanently, but meant to surprise and drive away its garrison, taking as many prisoners and as much booty as possible.


Since the beginning of June the usual daily high temperatures had prevailed, but on the 8th July the heat suddenly increased, the midday temperature rising in Baghdad to over 122° Fahrenheit in the shade and to several degrees higher in tents and dug-outs.‡ General Maude at once raised the

* It had been breached by the Turks in March 1917, see Chapter XXXIV, Volume III.

† For tactical reasons General Maude would have liked to leave it alone, as from it water flooded the whole area west of Baghdad ; but it might prove impossible to control these floods, in which case they would threaten the Samarra and Musaiyib railways and cut off Falluja.

‡ Candler in " The Long Road to Baghdad " says : " According to the Baghdadis it was the hottest season in the memory of man. Most things were too hot to touch. The rim of a tumbler burnt one's hand in a tent. The dust and sand burnt the soles of one's feet through one's boots. Even the hardy Arab and Kurd made such an outcry that one had to water the ground where they worked."

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question of postponing the operations against Ramadi on this account. But, acting on the advice of the local commander at Falluja, General Cobbe said he did not recommend postponement. The weather was unlikely to get appreciably cooler for a considerable time, and General Cobbe was taking all possible precautions to minimise the effect of the inevitable heat.

The force which concentrated at Falluja for the operation consisted of two squadrons of cavalry, fourteen guns, four armoured cars, half a Sapper and Miner company and the 7th Infantry Brigade,* all under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Haldane, then commanding the 7th Brigade. Three aeroplanes were to co-operate with the column; and the 127 motor vans and lorries could assist the infantry by transporting about six hundred men at a time. Among the other special arrangements made to mitigate the effects of the heat the following are worthy of note: all marches were to be carried out at night, tents were to be carried for use by day when the troops were not actually engaged and ice was to be provided for the immediate treatment of any cases of heat stroke.


Dhibban was occupied without incident by an advanced detachment on the night 7th/8th, and the whole force concentrated there on the 10th July. Careful reconnaissances had been made previously of the approaches to Ramadi, where the Turkish garrison, now estimated at 150 sabres, 1000 rifles and 6 guns, was reported to be holding an entrenched line half a mile short of the town and protecting it from the east and south-east. Intelligence received indicated that the enemy's intention was to evacuate Ramadi if the British attacked it.

Half the 93rd Infantry and half a section 133rd Machine Gun Company were left to hold Dhibban. The cavalry and

* The Column consisted of:—

7th Infantry Brigade	1st Connaught Rangers 91st Punjabis 2/7th Gurkhas 93rd Infantry 131st Machine Gun Company One section 133rd Machine Gun Company.
One squadron each, 10th and 32nd Lancers. 215th Brigade, R.F.A. (A and B batteries). 88th Battery, R.F.A. (less one section). One section, 324th Howitzer Battery, R.F.A. 14th Light Armoured Motor Battery (four cars). Two sections, 21st Company Sappers and Miners. 729th M.T. Company with "Star" vans and "Fiat" lorries attached, i.e., 100 Ford and 15 Star vans and 12 Fiat lorries. 111th Combined Field Ambulance. One pack wireless set.	

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armoured cars, followed by the remaining half of the 93rd Infantry and section 133rd Machine Gun Company, moved out from there at 5.30 p.m. and secured the Madhij defile, seven miles to the westward,* without opposition, though soon after its occupation hostile rifle fire was opened on the cavalry. By midnight the whole force had concentrated at Madhij and, after resting and watering there, recommenced its advance at 1 a.m. on the 11th July, the half battalion 93rd and half section 133rd Machine Gun Company being left to hold Madhij. No opposition was encountered till 3.15 a.m., when the leading troops were fired on by an enemy piquet on Mushaid Point, but this was quickly driven off and the point occupied. Owing, however, to the heavy sand along the route it was not till 4.45 a.m. that the whole column concentrated there.

After a personal reconnaissance by Colonel Haldane and his artillery commander from Mushaid Point, whence a good view was obtainable, the armoured cars moved forward at 5.15 a.m. to reconnoitre, with three companies 91st Punjabis, who had been covering the advance, following them; and the cavalry pushed out to the right through the gardens along the river bank. The armoured cars were stopped by fire from the banks of the recently constructed Euphrates Valley Canal, which connected the Euphrates with Lake Habbaniya, and by the soft ground. But they brought back information to Colonel Haldane that the Turkish left in the vicinity of the Regulator House was strongly held and that the canal was impassable for cars.† The advance of the 91st Punjabis was also stopped by artillery fire about 5.25 a.m.; and soon afterwards the 27th Gurkhas, with half the 131st Machine Gun Company to guard their left flank, were sent forward, supported by the 215th Field Artillery Brigade, to attack south of the left of the 91st. Of three aeroplanes, which had left Baghdad at 4.30 a.m. to co-operate, two had already been forced down by the heat and only one remained in action till about 10 a.m.

The enemy now disclosed six guns, two machine guns and a considerable strength in rifles. His shell fire was very accurate, putting our wireless out of action no less than three times and thus preventing effective counter-battery work by the 66th and 524th Batteries. The Gurkha advance, with nearly two miles to traverse, progressed steadily with only slight loss and about 6.30 a.m. the Turks evacuated the canal banks. The Gurkhas, reaching the canal some twenty minutes later, crossed it and, changing direction to the north-west, took up a line along the Ramadi ridge with their right on the canal. Here they came

* See Map 34.

† It was some 150 feet wide, the water in places being three or four feet deep, and the embankments on both sides of it were about 60 feet wide.

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under considerable gun and rifle fire from the south-eastern portion of the Turkish entrenchments about 1,000 yards distant. These entrenchments, consisting of a first line connected with a strong second line of redoubts, were much stronger than had been anticipated and both lines seemed to be held in strength.* The intervening ground was devoid of cover and it was clear that close artillery support would have to be provided before an assault could be undertaken successfully. In the meantime, on the Gurkha right, three companies 91st Punjabist† had crossed the canal under considerable fire from the Turkish left and had advanced a little west of the canal.


At 6.45 a.m. two companies Connaught Rangers were sent forward to reinforce the Gurkhas; and fifteen minutes later our artillery shelled the Aziziya bridge to prevent the Turks withdrawing, as all reports from our artillery observing officers showed indications of an enemy retirement. About 8 a.m., a heavy dust storm came on rendering all observation very difficult; and this kept on almost continuously throughout the day. At 8.15 a.m., when the Connaught Rangers companies joined the Gurkhas, preparations were begun for an assault. At this hour the armoured cars, still east of the canal, were engaged on the right of the 91st within about five hundred yards of the Turkish left, and a section of sappers was sent forward to make a crossing for them over the canal.

A series of misfortunes now occurred and combined with the heat and dust-storm to prevent the operations being carried to a conclusion. Telephonic communication with the 91st Punjabist was cut by shell-fire and linesmen sent to repair it were killed; two artillery forward observing officers became casualties in succession, their telephonic communication was cut and efforts to regain touch by heliograph were frustrated by casualties; and B/215th Battery had two guns temporarily put out of action by direct hits. Consequently, an intense artillery bombardment to cover the assault could not be arranged to commence before 9.30 a.m. But active operations after 10 a.m. would be very risky owing to the intense heat; and Colonel Haldane at 9.20 a.m. felt that he had no option but to cancel his orders for bombardment and assault.

A withdrawal of the advanced infantry during daylight seemed out of the question and all that could be done was to leave them where they were to endure the heat as best they might and to keep them as well supplied with water as possible. By the use of the Ford vans of the 729th Mechanical Transport Company and the untiring efforts of many individuals, a water

* These facts were confirmed soon after 6 a.m. by an airman's report.
† One company held Mushaid Point.

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supply from the river* near Mushaid was soon organised. The first supply of water reached the firing line about 10 a.m. and supply was maintained unceasingly till 4 p.m., by which time a total of some 2,000 gallons had been sent forward, the vans bringing back wounded and exhausted men. At 4 p.m., when the Ford vans had to be used to evacuate casualties to Dhibban, the supply of water was continued by units' first line transport.

Our advanced troops had, however, suffered greatly from the terrific heat and from thirst much intensified by the burning wind and the clouds of dust; and their casualties from heat-stroke had been very heavy. Though their guns continued to shell our advanced troops, the Turks made no attempt at an offensive movement, but there were several unsuccessful attacks by Arabs against our flanks.

Towards evening, reports from the front indicated that the enemy contemplated a retirement and in view of such a contingency our troops endured and held on to their forward positions. The night began to pass quietly, but our patrols still reported the enemy as occupying his trenches in strength; and at 3.15 a.m., as his men were in no condition to carry out an assault, Colonel Haldane decided on a withdrawal. This was successfully effected without interference by the enemy and by daybreak our advanced troops had all reached the palm groves on the river bank north of Mushaid Point. Here, covered by an outpost line of troops who had not been actively engaged, they rested throughout the 12th July, operations being limited to an artillery duel and patrol activities in the morning and evening.


Colonel Haldane came to the conclusion that, owing to its strength, the capture of the enemy's position would necessitate prolonged operations which the great heat rendered prohibitive; and he reported his intention of withdrawing to Madhij early next day. This retirement commenced at 2 a.m. on the 13th July, our rear guard being followed and attacked by about 1,500 Arabs, who were beaten off and severely punished as soon as it got light. Madhij proved to be particularly vulnerable to Arab sniping and in the evening of the 13th the force retired to Dhibban, which was reached by our rear guard about 9.30 p.m.† after further hostilities by Arabs.

In this abortive operation against Ramadi our total casualties amounted to 563. Of these 321 were due directly to the heat, which thus caused us greater loss than the enemy. Both Generals Maude and Cobbe agreed that the force had been handled with ability and judgment and that all ranks had

* The water in the canal was salt and quite undrinkable.

† Sunset was about 7.3 p.m.

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displayed great gallantry and magnificent endurance. The Turks were reported to have sustained about 250 casualties, including about 100 desertions on the day after the fight.


From May to July there was considerable progress in the development of British railway communications. By the end of July the lines from Kut to Baghdad (metre gauge), from Baghdad to Baquba (2 ft. 6 in. gauge) and Sumaika to Sadiya (2 ft. 6 in. gauge) had been completed; a metre-gauge line from Basra to Qurna was under construction; and the future programme included the extension of the Baghdad-Samarra railway and the construction of lines from Baghdad to Falluja and Musaiyib respectively, all on the standard (4 ft. 8½ in.) gauge. In addition to work on railways and roads, preparations had been made to combat in the coming winter the effect of floods, which would probably be higher than those experienced in the exceptionally dry winter months of 1916-1917.

The German unrestricted submarine campaign was at this period taking such a toll of British shipping that attention was directed to the question of the capacity of the port at Basra, where in July, owing to the heat and the *Ramazan*,* there were considerable delays in unloading steamers and where, as it seemed to the authorities in India and London, development had not kept sufficient pace with the improvement of the inland communications and the growing size of the force. On the 31st July the Inspector-General of Communications in Mesopotamia answered a query from India, as to what improvements were in prospect, by summarising the situation. The port consisted of three portions. At Basra proper there was only a timber wharf and all engineer stores were unloaded by lighter. At Maqil, three miles higher up, were ten "along-side" berths and also some ten berths in the stream at which ships were unloaded by lighters. At Nahr Umar, twelve miles above Basra and a station on the railway then being constructed to Qurna, three ships (shortly to be increased to six) were being worked on the open bank aided by short jetties or floating pontoons. Improvements were in progress, chiefly at Nahr Umar. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff also drew attention to the matter at the beginning of August and the question was at once taken up by General Maude in consultation with the authorities in India, with the result that there was soon a considerable improvement, mainly by the development of unloading facilities at Nahr Umar.

During April, May and June considerable discussion and correspondence concerning the civil administration of the

* A period of fasting for Mahomedans.

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our occupation of Baghdad, inspection showed that the weir, although intact, was in urgent need of repairs; and, as the irrigation scheme dependent on the barrage had not been completed, the costly work of the barrage was in a great measure ineffective. The local tribesmen were clamouring for distribution of water; and to keep them tranquil, as well as to provide supplies for his force, General Maude decided to proceed with the development of the Willcocks' scheme of irrigation.


As regards the Air Force, the heat had considerably restricted the activities of No. 30 Squadron, R.F.C.; but it carried out a large programme of photography, for the compilation of maps, covering several hundred square miles. During the heat wave in July it was found impossible to send the Martinsyde machines into the air even slightly before dawn.* Throughout June the enemy's aircraft were more than usually active, his machines being seen on various occasions on all three fronts; and on the 15th of that month, in view of the approaching arrival of No. 63 Squadron, the Air Force in Mesopotamia was organised as the 31st Wing, still under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Tennant.

A short digression is here necessary to refer to the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission, which was published in June 1917 and which dealt with the operations up to the fall of Kut in April 1916.† The rumours of the sufferings of the wounded in Mesopotamia and of the inadequacy of the medical and other arrangements there, in 1915 and early 1916, had given rise to considerable alarm, anxiety and indignation; and with the surrender of Kut came a growing volume of criticism against the whole inception and conduct of the campaign. For these reasons His Majesty's Government appointed in August 1916 a Commission to enquire into the origin, inception and conduct of the operations in Mesopotamia and into the responsibility of the departments of Government concerned in ministering to the wants of the forces employed there.


* Early on the 10th July two German aviators, arriving much exhausted on foot at Samarra, gave themselves up. Two enemy aeroplanes had been forced to descend between Ramadi and Tikrit and had been burnt, two of the four airmen who attempted to walk towards Samarra having dropped from exhaustion. Guided by one of the German survivors, British armoured cars and cavalry went out at once from Samarra but failed to find any trace of men or machines.

† Nothing said here is intended to apply to the portion of the Report which dealt with the medical arrangements, as with these this history is not directly concerned.

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
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to give evidence. This omission and other signs from the evidence that the Commission did not always appreciate the true significance of what it learnt, lends force to the criticism, often made, that, generally speaking, the members of the Commission were lacking in the technical and up-to-date knowledge of military operations and military war organisation required in an enquiry of this nature. It is undoubtedly true that, in a military sense, its report was incomplete and in a few cases inaccurate.


The publication of the Report, with its account of the pitiable sufferings of the wounded, aroused a storm of passionate indignation in the United Kingdom, in which a considerable section of the press and the public, overlooking the fact that the Commission's conclusions could not be accepted as well-founded until legally proved, demanded immediate disciplinary action against those whose conduct had been impugned. The Government at first decided to hold a Judicial Enquiry into the conduct of all persons, soldiers and civilians, affected by the Report. But, soon after the debate on the Report in the House of Commons (12th July 1917), it became clear that the country had little desire for any further protracted enquiry. Consequently this idea was abandoned, and the Government issued orders for executive action in certain cases.

During the debate Mr. Chamberlain, whom the Commission held partly responsible for the untoward advance on Baghdad, announced his resignation of the post of Secretary of State for India. His responsibility in the matter was admittedly little more than technical, and the Prime Minister and the Cabinet pressed him to reconsider his decision; but he declined. Explaining his position in the House of Commons, he said: "It is not possible that I who am named in the Report apart from my colleagues, with whom I acted in common in certain matters, and whose responsibility is sole and undivided in other matters where the Commission administers rebuke or censure, should continue as the head of that office in which my conduct has been censured while such conduct might at any moment be called in question by the judicial tribunal to which you are going to refer these matters." This resignation, which was held to be scrupulously proper and honourable to Mr. Chamberlain, was universally regretted and nowhere more so than in India. Lord Hardinge, who, as Viceroy of India, was also blamed by the Commission, demanded a judicial enquiry and tendered his resignation of the post of Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs no less than three times;


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد ١٧." [٢٩ ظ] (٥٤٠/٦٣)


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General Staff on this matter on the 2nd August, giving his views pending a reply from Baratoff, whom he had asked to give certain details as to when he would reoccupy the Diyala line and as to his supply and transport requirements. General Maude still stipulated for a vigorous Russian offensive everywhere and that his own advance should be conditional on the Russian movements; but he might possibly have to cut down the number of his infantry divisions for the advance from four to three. After going into some factors affecting the maintenance question he said that he realised the governing factor in the problem was what the Russians could do. The advantages of a combined British and Russian offensive if it could be arranged were manifest, for it would give us the initiative, a valuable asset. The Turkish concentration seemed to be behindhand so that, granted an early Allied move, there was a good prospect of breaking up that concentration piecemeal; while the moral effect of our advance would be substantial both in Mesopotamia and in neighbouring countries. A passive attitude by us would allow the enemy to complete his concentration and deliver his main stroke as he thought fit; and though this attitude might be forced on us by Russian inaction, we should not adopt it till it was clear that there was no other alternative open to us. The fact of having unreliable allies need not necessarily paralyse us in the pursuance of war. Should a continued offensive by the whole Russian forces and ourselves be decided on after the receipt of the Russian reply, it must be carried out, said General Maude, on the principles outlined previously with due caution and coinciding, step by step, with Russian progress.


On the 5th August General Maude replied to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff's telegram of the 2nd regarding possible developments in Mesopotamia. Assuming that rumours of movements were accurate and that these had already begun, he calculated that eleven Turkish divisions, numbering approximately 67,000 rifles with 308 field and heavy guns* could be concentrated south of Mosul by the end of September. This number added to the Sixth Army troops in Mesopotamia would give a total of 96,500 rifles and 452 field and heavy guns. The Russian force on the Persian front, consisting of some 22,000 sabres, 31,000 rifles and 102 guns, was being held in check by 10,000 Turks with 36 guns; and as the latter seemed unlikely to detach more than another 5,000 men with 48 guns for this purpose, this would mean that they could bring 81,500 rifles and 370 guns against General Maude. The enemy

* i.e., 24 field and 4 heavy guns per division.

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
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two divisions available to reinforce either corps, to hold the Diyala or Euphrates line or to act as a general reserve. To form this division he would require the following additional troops; three British infantry battalions, two field artillery brigades (each of three 6-gun 18-pounder and two 4-gun 4.5-inch howitzer batteries), three small-arms ammunition sections, one horsed cable and one motor airline section, three brigade machine gun companies, one veterinary section and one sanitary section. "In conclusion," he said, "I should like to make it clear that, as regards immediate future, I am quite satisfied with my position and that I am merely looking well ahead in view of possible developments."


Both the Commander-in-Chief in India and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff agreed as to the necessity for the formation of another division, to be numbered the 17th, and steps were at once taken to provide the additional units required.

There was considerable further correspondence in August and September regarding Russian co-operation. General Korniloff, who succeeded General Brusiloff in chief command of all the Russian armies on the 1st August, sent imperative orders for a Russian force under General Vadbolski to undertake an offensive towards Mosul via Ruwandiz and for General Baratoff's force to re-occupy the Diyala line, where he was to come under General Maude's orders and be supplied by him. Owing to the chaotic state of affairs in Russia and General Korniloff's pre-occupation, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, however, considered it doubtful if Russian General Headquarters could make reliable arrangements for operations on the Persian front, and he instructed General Maude to arrange for any possible co-operation direct with General Baratoff. He himself would continue to press for Russian co-operation, though he had little hope of getting it. Any assistance that we could obtain, therefore, would be so much to the good unless General Maude had to take undue risks in return. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff also said that it was improbable that the Russians would attempt anything on their main Caucasus front. Owing to this last opinion, which was confirmed by other information received by him, General Maude telegraphed on the 17th August that any offensive action by him up the Tigris must be restricted, though he hoped that opportunities might still occur for a limited offensive, thus obviating the relegation of his force to a passive attitude, which would give the enemy his best opportunity and at the same time damp the fighting spirit of his own men.

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was impossible to arrive at any definite conclusions in regard to the probable Turco-German intentions. At the beginning of the month it appeared to General Maude that there was no indication of a Turkish move down the Euphrates and that at that time the enemy seemed to attach more importance to his Nisibin-Mosul line of communications. Reports continued to come in of reinforcements being on their way to Mesopotamia and included persistent rumours of the participation in the offensive by German, Austrian and even Bulgarian troops; and by the middle of August it seemed clear that large numbers of motor lorries were reaching Constantinople from Central Europe, some of them said to be for use below Mosul, as well as motor ambulances, many aeroplanes and locomotives and much other military material. The Taurus tunnel was not expected to be ready to take standard gauge rails till the spring of 1918; but General von Falkenhayn was said to have ordered that the railway must be extended to Mosul by the end of October 1917.


On the 15th August General Maude estimated that the total strength in Mesopotamia of the Turkish Sixth Army amounted to 2,280 sabres and 31,280 rifles*; and two days later, in a telegram to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he expressed the opinion that the enemy's plan would include an enveloping movement, in which he would push forward through the Jabal Hamrin and down the Euphrates. Among the reasons which led him to this conclusion were the reports of great activity in road-making between Mosul, Kirkuk and Kifri and the fact that the Turks, who had previously occupied Qizil Ribat and Qasr-i-Shirin on the evacuation of these places by the Russians, were also holding Shahraban and Mandali with small detachments, which might be the advanced portions of a large force or might be with a view to obtaining supplies from those areas.† There had, hitherto, been little definite mention in the reports received of preparations on the Euphrates line, but in the latter half of August these tended to increase and from a captured document it was ascertained that, in June, the Germans had carried out a reconnaissance of routes between Hit and Karbala.

Referring to this and to other information recently received, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed to General Maude on the 30th August that it was probable that the Turks might be planning operations on the Euphrates on a larger

* Appendix XLI gives a comparison of his detailed estimate with an order of battle of this army taken from the Turkish account.

† From Turkish accounts it appears that they were in special need of the supplies from the Mandali area.

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scale than we had hitherto supposed. Consequently, Ramadi appeared to have an increased value, for its occupation would bar the best route described in the German report, and would also threaten an alternative route to the westward. In reply, General Maude said that throughout the summer the possibility of Turkish operations down the Euphrates had occupied his attention constantly, even when the indications of any such Turkish intention were slender. There would be both advantages and disadvantages in the occupation of Ramadi, but he was watching developments and he would not hesitate to act if its occupation seemed practicable and desirable.

There was some doubt, at this time, whether Turkish railhead had yet reached Nisibin or not, but in either case it seemed unlikely that it could reach Mosul by the end of October. Consequently the enemy's attack was unlikely to develop on the scale anticipated before that time, whereas General Maude hoped to have all his own preparations ready by the end of September. To this end he had been working very hard all through the hot weather; and during August the pressure of work increased considerably. He realised that the enemy's difficulties would be as great if not greater than his own, the chief one being transport which the Turks could only hope to remedy by an unlimited amount of motor transport. Moreover, the enemy's three main lines of advance, down the Euphrates, Tigris and Diyala, were separated from each other by areas in which water was generally very scarce, while he himself would have the benefit of interior lines. But the distances involved were very great and to locate the enemy's movements in time he must have excellent intelligence, while to admit of his own troops moving rapidly his internal communications must be as good as possible. In addition, therefore, to strengthening his defensive positions so as to release as many troops as possible for mobile action, he had much to do in making roads and especially bridges. Of the latter he had made seven permanent ones over the Diyala, one over the lower Adhaim, five (including mobile bridges) across the Tigris and three across the Euphrates.* The motor transport promised him had practically all reached Mesopotamia by the end of August and although the Tigris was very low his Inland Water Transport was working excellently. His stores, etc., were consequently coming up satisfactorily and he had tapped the local resources so well that, without having to draw on the area round Baghdad where his main force was, he had been able to establish large reserves of supplies at Balad Ruz and on the Euphrates.

* On the Diyala—four below Baguba, two at Baguba and one above Baguba.
On the Tigris—two at Samarra, two at Sadiya and one at Baghdad.
On the Euphrates—one at Falluja and two to the south.

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On the 20th August a brigade group, composed mainly of units from the 14th Division, under General Thomson, occupied Shahraban, the Turkish garrison offering little resistance and withdrawing rapidly to the Jabal Hamrin. General Maude's intention was to hold Shahraban and a line westward from it to the Diyala, thus covering his right and taking a step towards re-establishing communication with the Russians if and when they advanced to re-occupy the Diyala line.

During August, the first of the infantry brigades, the 50th, for the new 17th Division, was formed and was attached to the 1st Corps, relieving the 7th Brigade of the 3rd Division in the Falluja area.


During the first half of September news of the enemy intentions was still indefinite. The numbers of eleven different divisions were given at different times, and from various sources, as coming to Mesopotamia; and mention was several times made of a Seventh Army which was coming to the Euphrates, but it was not clear whether this army was yet formed. One report said that during the first fortnight of August a continual stream of men totalling over 8,000 Turkish and 600 German and Austrian troops with heavy guns, in addition to a daily average of seven train loads of ammunition, had left Haidar Pasha station for Aleppo; while later news was received that a total of two army corps had left Constantinople for Mesopotamia. Other reports said that all drafts were being sent to Palestine or Mesopotamia, that picked men on the Caucasus front were being formed into attack battalions for Mesopotamia and that a large force from this front accompanied by German officers had already left for the Baghdad front.

Regarding movements from Aleppo towards Mesopotamia there were only vague rumours and it appeared that these had not yet commenced on a large scale and were probably awaiting completion of roads and other line of communication arrangements, as well as cooler weather. General von Falkenhayn was said to have been at Jerusalem at the end of August or beginning of September; and Djemal Pasha was said to have been recalled from Palestine and to be on his way to Berlin, which was taken to signify that Falkenhayn was to assume complete control of both fronts and was to take the offensive in Mesopotamia.

As regards the actual plan of campaign in Mesopotamia, there was nothing definite to guide us.


The Turks had reinforced their garrison at Ramadi and were strengthening the position there; and it was said that wireless installations with German personnel were to be established

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* Information was also received that the Turks had recently disbanded 2,000 Persian levies in the Sulaimaniya area and were sending them to further Turkish aims into Persia, where the Persians were showing an increasing dislike to the South Persia Rifles, a Persian force organised by Sir Percy Sykes. Other German and Turkish attempts to give trouble there were also clear.

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


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As regards the policy we should ourselves pursue, our own General Staff would have preferred from a purely military point of view to carry out an active defensive rather than an offensive policy in Palestine and Mesopotamia, enabling them to concentrate more British troops against the chief enemy on the Western Front. His Majesty's Government on the other hand, doubtful of obtaining a decision owing to the apparent deadlock in the west, considered that the moral and political advantages of an advance in Palestine and Syria offered tangible compensation; while in Mesopotamia one of our main guiding factors was our anxiety for the security of India. In this connection it is worthy of note that by this time Turkey, by containing on both these fronts numerically superior British forces, was conferring a considerable benefit on her European Allies.

On the 9th August the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had informed General Maude that General Allenby was being reinforced by another division and additional artillery, which, it was hoped, would enable him to strike an effective blow in Palestine in September, thus adding to the dissatisfaction and discouragement of the Turks as well as indirectly assisting General Maude. Having heard nothing more of this Palestine offensive, General Maude asked on the 9th September if there had been any modification in the plan. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff replied next day, saying that there had been no modification, that a division from Salonika was on its way to join General Allenby and that additional artillery was being sent him. The actual date for the commencement of operations had not yet been decided, but General Allenby had been warned to be ready to move in September if required and was working to that end. But owing to various difficulties, of which the chief one was water, he would not be fully ready that month. He was anxious not to begin till he was ready and it seemed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, judging by available information, that it would be sufficient if General Allenby commenced in the first fortnight of October. General Maude was asked if he had contrary views, but he must realise that only very special circumstances would justify General Allenby in beginning before he was fully ready. General Maude replied on the 11th September saying that he had only wanted to keep touch with the broad outline of General Allenby's plan and quite appreciated the inadvisability of a premature advance. From the Mesopotamian aspect it would appear sufficient if the Palestine operations commenced in the first week of October.

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to send the Ford vans so as to reach Basra in January and February 1918.

On the 21st September General Maude sent a long telegram to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff describing his constant efforts to encourage the Russians to take the offensive and their then evident intention of adopting instead a passive defensive. This action on their part would limit considerably his offensive action, said General Maude, though he would arrange to lose no opportunity of striking as it offered. But it was for consideration whether for this purpose the force at his disposal would be adequate, owing to the probability of the ultimate offensive by the enemy in superior numbers which he would have to meet on his three fronts, possibly simultaneously. He would endeavour to keep reserves in hand ready to move at short notice to any threatened point, but this might not ultimately be possible when the enemy closed, as his own lateral communications, though improving rapidly, were still unsuited for the speedy movement of troops from one front to another. The time had come, he said, when we should cease to depend on the Russians* and, in order to replace the deficiency caused by their defection, he would ask that such of the additional troops, being prepared in India for despatch to Mesopotamia if necessary, as might be available, complete with artillery and other arms, should be placed at his disposal. He was still reluctant to ask for them and had deferred doing so as long as he could.

In replying on the 24th September, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that he had for some time recognised that General Maude might require reinforcement. At the same time Sir William Robertson reminded General Maude that as his rôle was a defensive one it was undesirable to lock up in Mesopotamia more troops than were necessary to make him absolutely secure against all conceivable eventualities, especially as his ration strength was already about 340,000, of whom some 200,000 were fighting troops.†

* It is clear from private correspondence between General Maude and General Kirkpatrick, Chief of the General Staff in India, that up to this time General Maude had consistently hoped and planned for Russian co-operation and had refused to accept General Kirkpatrick's view, gathered from what he had learnt on a visit to Baghdad in April 1917 and from subsequent information, that it was inadvisable to base our plans on such a contingency.

† On the 29th September General Maude informed the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that his own estimate of fighting troops in Mesopotamia was lower than this: and he gave the following figures, which included A.S.C. and R.A.M.C. personnel but not their Indian counterparts classified as followers.

[continued on next page.]

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QUESTION OF REINFORCEMENT

45

The telegram continued that, as General Maude knew, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had for some time past been corresponding with India regarding new divisions, and he had just arranged for another cavalry brigade to be sent to Mesopotamia, while he had recently arranged for a reserve of shipping in the Mediterranean for conveyance of troops if urgently required. He could send more 6-inch howitzer batteries and would continue to endeavour to meet all other demands General Maude might make ; but he could do no more in the way of sending additional troops than assist India to provide them, as he could only find troops by taking them from France, where the chief enemy was being attacked continuously and successfully. He wished General Maude to state his views after considering the above points. General Maude must, of course, look ahead, but would probably agree that, until his communications had improved greatly, the enemy had a very difficult problem in trying to throw a formidable force against General Maude, especially considering the influence that General Allenby's operations would exert.


On the same day the Chief of the Imperial General Staff informed the Commander-in-Chief in India that it was necessary to ensure the completion, as early as possible, of the new formations which India was getting ready, and he entered into some details concerning the composition of a new division, for which he would provide the artillery and four machine gun companies. He also told General Maude that he was prepared

(continued from previous page.)

Formation.	British all ranks.	Indian all ranks.
1st Corps	11,792	26,018
11th Corps	19,940	14,746
Army Troops	2,778	3,228
15th Division	6,128	11,079
17th Division	5,024	12,785
Cavalry Division	2,248	4,380
Baghdad Garrison	30	2,838
Euphrates Front	1,436	4,311
Karun Front	165	2,234
Tigris Defences	2,501	8,346
Euphrates Defences	1,185	2,380
Administrative Infantry, Lines of Communication	284	5,688
Base, reinforcements	5,350	9,520
	<u>58,887</u>	<u>107,563</u>

Of the above, the Baghdad Garrison and the Administrative Infantry could scarcely, General Maude considered, be reckoned as fighting troops.

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
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to provide from Europe a fourth machine gun company for each of the six infantry divisions in Mesopotamia.

On the 26th, General Maude explained, in reply, that he had been considering the future rather than the present, as owing to the distances involved and the time required to organise and move troops it seemed advisable to look well ahead. Except for the Russian lapse he was absolutely satisfied with his position. The enemy's concentration was evidently being much delayed. His railhead had only reached Nisibin at the beginning of September, his river communications were insufficient for a large force and his land transport would have to contend with long distances and indifferent roads. Moreover, the *moral* of the Turkish troops was generally low, and there was evidence that our blockade was making it difficult for them to obtain local supplies. On the other hand, our own communications, in spite of obvious difficulties, were working smoothly and satisfactorily; rail, river and land transport were well organised, while supplies, stores and munitions were ample; the fighting spirit of our troops was very high; and the development of Basra port facilities promised well. The additional cavalry brigade would be most useful and he would be glad of four 6-inch howitzer batteries if available. In conclusion he said that he realised fully the undesirability of stinting France to fulfil his requirements; and he only wished to represent his views as regards the future in sufficient time.

On the 27th and 28th September the Commander-in-Chief in India telegraphed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, saying that he could send practically all the troops required for a new division, except artillery, to reach Mesopotamia early in 1918. It did not appear as if Falkenhayn could develop superior strength against General Maude in 1917, but as soon as railhead reached Mosul he might be able to do so and restrict General Maude's area of manoeuvre by pinning him to the positions covering Baghdad. To counter this, General Maude would certainly require reinforcements in 1918. Recruiting in India was so good that they would shortly begin there the formation of nine of the twenty-one new infantry battalions which he had mentioned in July; and by the greater development of mechanical appliances he might be able to free a few more units from India for overseas. He also hoped that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff would soon see his way to withdrawing the Indian troops from East Africa and thus enable India to devote her resources to the increasing

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The 1st and 3rd Corps had now each a whole cavalry regiment (32nd Lancers and 12th Cavalry respectively) as Corps cavalry. All the artillery in the force had been reorganised, in which process some batteries had been broken up and others strengthened. One horse, nine field, one sixty-pounder and two 6-inch howitzer batteries had come as reinforcements; two mountain batteries were forming in the country; four 18-pounder and two 4.5-inch howitzer batteries for the 17th Division were due to arrive at the end of October; and four more 6-inch howitzer batteries had also been promised. With the above exceptions and some other slight variations, the reorganisation was complete. When all those *en route* and promised had arrived, General Maude would have a total on the Baghdad front of 324 guns and howitzers.


The 63rd Squadron, Royal Flying Corps, reached Basra in the middle of August. But the unacclimatised personnel succumbed quickly to sickness; and at one time practically the whole squadron was in hospital, with the result that the disembarkation of planes, transport and stores was entirely stopped for a time. An advanced party of the squadron reached Baghdad on the 8th September; but misfortune still pursued it, for on the 25th two of its R.E.8 aeroplanes, which left Baghdad on their first reconnaissance, were lost in an engagement with an enemy machine near Tikrit owing to engine trouble. On the 5th October a third aeroplane was lost and it was not till near the end of that month that the whole squadron was concentrated at Samarra.

17TH DIVISION (GENERAL GILLMAN).

Cavalry and Signals.	Artillery.	Engineers and Pioneers.	Infantry.	Medical.	S. & T. & Veterinary.
Squadron 10th Lancers.	220th Brigade R.F.A.† (1084, 1098 and 1100 six-gun howitzer batteries).	3rd Div. M.C. Coy. and 1st Coy. S. & M. Coy.	34th Brigade (2nd West Kent, 31st Punjab, 1112th Infantry, 1145th Mahrattas, 129th M.G. Coy.)	3, 111 and two other C.F.A.	24th, 202 and 21st Div. Coy.
17th Divisional Signal Coy.	220th Brigade, R.F.A.† (1067, 1048 and a six-gun howitzer battery).	102nd Sikh Pioneers.	AVA Brigade (1st Oxford and Bucks L.L., 6th Jats, 14th Sikhs, 107th Infantry, 29th M.G. Coy.)	1st Sanitary Section.†	17th Divisional Troop Coy.
	Three S.A. A.T. sections.		1st Brigade (1st N.L.L., 12nd Rajputs, 24th Punjab, 110th Gurkhas, 25th M.G. Coy.)		No. 1 Signal Section.†

† Still to be formed or not yet reached the country.

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RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

49

The main work of the Royal Flying Corps during August and the first three weeks of September was photography, amongst others detailed pictures being taken of the enemy's positions at Ramadi, Daur (on the Tigris about twenty miles north of Samarra), Band-i-Adhaim, Delli Abbas and the Jabal Hamria. Enemy aircraft were seen occasionally over our lines, but there were few actual encounters.

During September information was received which seemed to show that under German pressure the Turks might begin to use gas against us. Hitherto both sides in Mesopotamia had refrained from its use and although General Maude had a reserve of gas shells, he only kept them for use in retaliation if this became necessary.

Railway progress was good. On the 28th September General Maude reported to the War Office that it was anticipated that the section of the Basra—Qurna railway from the new port at Nahr Umar to Qurna would be open by the 20th October and that the section from Basra to Nahr Umar by the middle of November, though this depended mainly on the floating bridge at Kurmat Ali, regarding which there was some difficulty. An extension of the Baquba line to Shahraban was in progress* and a line on the metre gauge to Baquba following a different alignment had been commenced, while orders had been issued to push on with the standard gauge railway from Baghdad to Falluja.

The heat wave which had set in in the first week of July lasted till the end of the month, after which the normal high temperatures prevailed, the nights getting gradually cooler as the autumn approached. Thanks to the better conditions under which the force was serving and the great improvement which had taken place in all the medical arrangements, the cases of sickness among officers and men averaged generally less than half what they had been in 1916.

In the second week in September, General Maude decided that the time had come to occupy Ramadi. The operation was entrusted to General Brooking, commanding the 15th Division, and General Maude had a personal interview with him on the 13th September.

The troops to be placed at General Brooking's disposal consisted of the 50th Brigade Group, already in the Falluja

* It was completed on 15th October.

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area*, reinforced by the 6th Cavalry Brigade, the bulk of the 15th Division and certain other units then quartered about Baghdad†.

Orders for the concentration of the additional troops at Falluja and detailed written instructions to General Brooking were issued on the 14th and 15th September respectively. The main difficulty was the question of supply and transport, as the Baghdad—Falluja road was an indifferent one and between Falluja and Ramadi not much assistance could be given by river transport on the Euphrates. For use in advance of Falluja ten Fiat lorries and 350 Ford vans were placed at General Brooking's disposal, as well as fifty cars of the 40th Motor Ambulance Convoy.

The troops from the Baghdad area marched in four echelons at intervals of one day to concentrate at Falluja, the first echelon leaving Baghdad on the 16th September and the last echelon arriving at Falluja on the 22nd. The day temperature was still high, and owing to this and to transport difficulties on the incompletely repaired roads, the concentration was not effected without some inconvenience and hardship to the troops. General Brooking himself reached Falluja on the 18th and, to cover the concentration, moved the first echelon (42nd Infantry Brigade and certain other units) to Madhij and the second echelon (12th Infantry Brigade) to Dhubban, where they arrived on the 20th.


By reducing to a minimum the garrisons there, General Brooking made available from the troops in the Falluja area the 6th Jats, 97th Infantry (less one company) and 100 rifles 14th Sikhs to accompany his striking force; and on the 20th the 97th Infantry crossed the Sakhlawiya Canal‡ and moved up the left bank of the Euphrates, both to protect the right flank

* The troops already in the Falluja area were one squadron 10th Lancers, the 222nd Brigade, R.F.A. (1070th, 1072nd and 77th Batteries), one section 21st Company Sappers and Miners, and the 80th Infantry Brigade (6th Jats, 14th Sikhs, 24th Punjabis and 97th Infantry). Of these, the 24th Punjabis were in four detachments between the Hindiya Barrage and Nakhra and the remainder were at Falluja or above that place, on both banks of the Euphrates, as far as Dhubban and the mouth of the Sakhlawiya Canal.

† These reinforcements consisted of "B" Flight 30th Squadron, R.F.L., 6th Cavalry Brigade (with proportion of cavalry divisional troops, including "V" Battery, R.H.A.), 215th Brigade R.F.A. (1086th, 1088th and 32nd Batteries), 72nd Battery, 246th Siege Battery (less one section), 448th and 451st Field Companies, R.E., Malerkotla Sapper Company, 32nd Sikh Pioneers (less two companies), bridging train detachment, four armoured cars of the 13th Light Armoured Motor Battery, 12th and 42nd Infantry Brigades, five park wireless stations and administrative units.

‡ The men by a footbridge, the animals by swimming and stores by boat.


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* Reconnaissance, except local, was practically all carried out by aeroplanes, the cavalry not being used for any distant work.

† Called alternatively the Habbaniya Escape or Habbaniya Canal.

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trenches at the northern end of the Euphrates Valley Canal. It also seemed probable that if the enemy failed to check our advance he intended to withdraw. The Turkish strength was estimated as about 100 sabres, 3,000 rifles, 10 guns* and 14 machine guns.

General Brooking decided to encourage the enemy's apparent belief that our attack would be carried out along the banks of the Euphrates. To this end he threw a bridge across the river at Madhij and began the construction of a road from it to the north-west along the left bank; he arranged for supplies to be collected by friendly Arabs on the left bank to the west of Ramadi; he camped troops along the river; and he made a display of strength accompanied by active demonstrations by the 6th Cavalry Brigade on the right of his outpost line. Finally, in his Operation order, issued on the evening of the 27th September, his intention was only given as "to seize the Mushaid position with a view to the capture of the Ramadi position."


That night,† at 9.45, the 12th and 42nd Brigades started their advance in line from the vicinity of our outposts. The 12th Brigade (less 43rd Erinpura Infantry and 90th Punjab on outposts) under General Dunsford was on the right astride the Madhij-Ramadi road; and with the 42nd Brigade under General Lucas were the 448th Company, R.E., and a company 32nd Pioneers. The 12th Brigade halted about two miles west of McCudden's Point, where it established a line of strong posts, but the 42nd Brigade continued to advance till it had established a similar line along First and Lower Knolls. This it had done by 12.30 a.m., when artillery positions for the attack on Mushaid Ridge were selected, prepared and then occupied. A further object of this infantry advance was to secure a crossing over the Euphrates Valley Canal at the dam; and General Lucas, deciding to make this good as soon as possible, pushed forward patrols to occupy Habbaniya and Escape Hills as soon as he had occupied Lower Knoll. This having been effected with but trifling opposition, reinforcements secured the crossing, where the dam, only slightly damaged, was made fit for the passage of all arms by the 448th Company, Royal Engineers by 3.30 a.m.

In the meantime the 43rd Erinpuras and 90th Punjab, withdrawn from the outposts, were formed with the 6th Jats into a reserve brigade under Colonel Bourne (6th Jats) and

* According to the Turkish commander captured at Ramadi, his strength was 100 cavalry, 500 artillery and 3,500 infantry with 10 guns.

† Copies of the last aeroplane photographs of the Turkish positions were distributed to the troops before they marched off.

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were concentrated near Force Headquarters* at McCudden's Point, while the 6th Cavalry Brigade, taking over the line of the bank north of this point, demonstrated north-westward. General Brooking's intention was that, after daybreak on the 28th September, the 42nd Brigade, covered by artillery fire and supported by the fire of the 12th Brigade, should seize Mushaid Ridge. Of the artillery, the 215th Brigade was to act under General Lucas's orders while the remainder was to be controlled from headquarters.

Soon after 5.30 a.m., when all was ready and patrols had reported the ridge to be unoccupied, the artillery opened fire with aeroplane observation; and two companies 2/6th Gurkhas advanced. Although they came under a heavy Turkish shell fire, these companies suffered only a few casualties and by 7 a.m. had occupied Mushaid Ridge and Point, both of which places the enemy continued to shell heavily, as well as the ground east of Horse Shoe Lake, where he evidently believed our main attacking force to be.†


At 6.50 a.m. General Brooking ordered the 6th Cavalry Brigade to move south-west, under cover of the Mushaid Ridge, cross the dam and then move to the west of the Aziziya Canal so as to cut the enemy's line of retreat west of Ramadi and attack his rear. Ten minutes later General Lucas was directed to seize Middle and Double Hills and General Dunsford with the 12th Brigade (joined again by the 43rd Erinporas and 90th Punjabis) to cross the dam and support General Lucas. The 6th Jats were to remain near McCudden's Point to guard the right flank.

Moving off at 7.30 a.m., accompanied by the four cars 13th Light Armoured Motor Battery, the Cavalry Brigade crossed the dam about an hour later, coming under some hostile artillery fire, and, continuing in a south-westerly direction, reached the Aziziya Canal, whence a small hostile detachment was quickly driven back on Ramadi. The Aziziya Canal was dry except for some pools, but it was about twenty feet deep with steep sides and the bottom was very soft, horses sinking in it up to their hocks. Ramps had to be made and a bridge constructed, but this was completed by 12.30 p.m. The brigade then continued its advance, first moving due west and then north-west; and, encountering a little opposition from two Turkish cavalry squadrons, had taken up a position astride the road to Hit about three miles west of Ramadi and had cut the telegraph line to

* One hundred rifles, 14th Sikhs formed escort to Force Headquarters.

† After the Turks withdrew from Mushaid Ridge they were unable to see British movements east of that ridge.

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
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Hit by about 4 p.m. Soon after this, enemy guns in barges on the Euphrates opened fire on our cavalry, and maintained it till dark.

To return to our infantry. When General Brooking's 7 a.m. order reached General Lucas at 7.30, the battalions of the 42nd Brigade were somewhat scattered. Half the 2/6th Gurkhas were holding Mushaid Ridge and Point and the other half Lower Knoll and Habbaniya Hill; the 1/4th Dorsetshire were between First Knoll and Mushaid Ridge; the 2/5th Gurkhas were near First Knoll; and the 1/5th Gurkhas (brigade reserve) were between Lower Knoll and Lake Knoll. General Lucas directed the 1/5th and 2/5th Gurkhas to cross the dam and seize Middle and Double Hills respectively, the Dorsets to follow them in support and the 2/6th Gurkhas to remain where they were for the time being. But as these movements might take some time, General Lucas sent General Brooking a message saying so and recommending that if the 12th Brigade was fairly near it should push on. General Brooking accordingly issued orders at 8.45 a.m. for the 12th Brigade to seize Middle and Double Hills and for the 42nd Brigade to reform and follow the 12th Brigade in support. The 1/5th and 2/5th Gurkhas, however, made quicker progress than General Lucas had anticipated, as they crossed the dam after the cavalry at about 8.30 and 9 a.m., respectively. By the latter hour the 1/5th Gurkhas had formed up for attack behind the south-western slopes of Escape Hill and at 9.20 a.m., began to advance against Middle Hill. General Lucas informed General Brooking that the 12th Brigade was two miles behind and in rear of most of the artillery, and that consequently he was not complying with the 8.45 order and was advancing on Middle and Double Hills.

The 1/5th Gurkhas came under considerable shell fire from Turkish guns posted near Jackson's House, but, suffering only a few casualties, occupied Middle Hill about 10 a.m. The 2/5th Gurkhas reached Tel al Rayan at 10.30 a.m., and occupied Double Hill half an hour later. The Dorsets, who had reached Tel al Rayan, remained there in support of the 1/5th and 2/5th Gurkhas; and the 2/6th Gurkhas, who at 9.30 a.m. had received orders to withdraw from Mushaid Ridge and their other positions, were concentrated near the dam as brigade reserve. By this hour (11 a.m.) also, the 215th and 222nd Brigades, R.F.A., having crossed the dam, were in action in close support of the two 5th Gurkha battalions. The section 246th Siege Battery was still in its original position near First

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Knoll and the 12th Infantry Brigade was west of the dam under cover of Escape Hill.

At 11.10 a.m. General Brooking sent orders directing the 42nd Brigade, supported by the 12th Brigade, to capture Ramadi and Aziziya Ridges, but twenty minutes later modified these orders by directing the 42nd Brigade to seize Ramadi Ridge and the 12th Brigade to seize Aziziya Ridge. At the same time he moved his own headquarters to Lalo Knoll, taking with him the 6th Jats, less a road piquet left at McCadden's Point.

For the attack on Ramadi Ridge, General Lucas directed the 1/5th and 2/5th Gurkhas to advance in conjunction with one another at 1 p.m., the Dorsets to move in support and the 2/6th Gurkhas to be held in reserve. The 1/5th Gurkhas began their advance from Middle Hill at 1.10 p.m., but, owing to delay in transit of the order to the 2/5th Gurkhas, that battalion did not move forward from Double Hill till about 2 p.m. Under cover of heavy fire from our guns, the 1/5th Gurkhas experienced no difficulty in seizing Ramadi Ridge. But, on nearing the crest* at about 1.35 p.m., they came under very heavy fire from artillery, machine guns and rifles from the enemy's main positions about 1,000 yards distant and at closer range from machine guns in a number of emplacements along the broken banks of the Euphrates Valley Canal. In a very short time this fire caused the Gurkhas over 100 casualties; but they were not to be dislodged and dug themselves in as rapidly as they could under the heavy fire. Two of the Dorsets' companies came up on the left about 2.15 p.m., also receiving severe punishment as they topped the ridge; a little later the 2/5th Gurkhas came up on the left of the Dorset companies; at 3.30 p.m. another Dorset company came up on the left of the 2/5th; and about 4 p.m. the 2/6th Gurkhas also came up and occupied a line on the right between the 1/5th Gurkhas and the Euphrates Valley Canal. This occupation of the Ramadi Ridge, which pinned the enemy to his position, was particularly well-timed, for it was subsequently ascertained that it caused the recall from Aziziya Bridge of about 1,000 Turkish rifles who had been despatched to deal with the advance of the 6th Cavalry Brigade and to lead the way to a Turkish withdrawal.

* In "The Long Road to Baghdad," Candler describes the ridge. "This low pebbly rise is perfectly smooth, a long and gentle gradient, a bare seventeen feet above plain level. It offered no cover of any kind and our infantry became visible to the Turks a full two hundred yards before they reached the top of the rise."

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At 2.45 p.m. the two leading battalions (90th Punjabis and 2/39th Gahrwalis) of the 12th Brigade, which had begun its advance westward from Escape Hill at 1.30 p.m., had reached Double Hill, with the remainder of the brigade west of Tel al Rayan; and at 3.30 p.m., supported by the fire of the 222nd Brigade, R.F.A., and of eight machine guns, the Punjabis and Gahrwalis moved forward against Aziziya Ridge, which they secured without much difficulty and without much loss. The occupation of this ridge so hemmed in the Turks that, unless they could break through the 6th Cavalry Brigade, they appeared to have little chance of escape.* But it was considered advisable to withdraw the 42nd Brigade to Middle Hill after dark, both to rest the exhausted troops and to place them in a better position to deal with a possible counter-attack. The Turks, however, made no such attempt and our infantry passed a quiet night.

By nightfall, General Holland-Pryor had made all his dispositions to deal with a Turkish attempt to break through the 6th Cavalry Brigade. From a personal reconnaissance towards Ramadi he had come to the conclusion that, owing to the need for water in the heat, the enemy would probably use the track close to the river. Three squadrons 14th Hussars astride the road had their left near the river; on their right two squadrons 21st Cavalry had their right thrown slightly forward; and on their right again, also thrown slightly forward were the 22nd Cavalry and 15th Machine Gun Squadron. "V" Battery was to the right rear of the 22nd, and rather wide on the right flank were a squadron 14th Hussars and the 13th Light Armoured Motor Battery to watch the approaches in that direction. Two squadrons 21st Cavalry were in support of the 14th Hussars with a strong patrol well to the west on the road to Hit, whence reinforcements were expected.† General Holland-Pryor's machine guns were posted to sweep the approaches, on which all important points were registered, and "V" Battery kept up a continuous fire after dark, both on the Turkish gun-barges on the Euphrates and on the Aziziya Bridge. There was bright moonlight till 3 a.m. and soon after this the enemy in considerable strength, with three or four guns, having crossed the Aziziya Bridge, made a determined attempt, under the cover of the fire of their guns on the Euphrates, to break through.

* The dispositions of General Brooking's troops at 6 p.m. are shown on Map 34.

† The brigade had practically no entrenching tools, was not armed with bayonets, and its led horses had to be left under cover some distance in rear. The position was one therefore of considerable risk.

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
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The first report of the enemy's advance was sent in by a standing patrol of the 14th Hussars under Lieutenant G. G. Moule, who, by keeping close touch with the enemy, was able to send in reports giving the exact dispositions of the enemy's leading troops. The Turks, advancing in column along the track near the river, were allowed to come within 200 or 300 yards of our line, when twelve Vickers and forty-eight Hotchkiss guns and every available rifle opened fire on the head and flank of the enemy column, causing it heavy losses and bringing its advance to a standstill. "V" Battery held in check the fire of all the Turkish guns and eventually sank both their gun-barges. The Turks persisted in their attack and also made attempts to push through some low scrub and cover along the river bank. But they failed. The whole action lasted for about an hour and a half, and by daybreak the main Turkish force had fallen back across the Aziziya Canal. A column consisting of the 21st Cavalry, 15th Machine Gun Squadron and 13th Light Armoured Motor Battery then moved up the Hit road for about ten miles to capture any Turks who might have managed to slip past. None was found, however, and the only Turks seen were some cavalry on the opposite bank, who had swum the river at Ramadi. It had been a fine piece of work, for which in his report General Brooking attributed great credit to General Holland-Pryor and his brigade, of which he specially mentioned "V" Battery, the 14th Hussars and the 21st Cavalry.

General Brooking had issued orders for the 12th Infantry Brigade, supported by the 222nd Brigade, R.F.A., to push forward early on the 29th September, seize the Aziziya Bridge and attack eastward under cover of cross and enfilading fire by the remainder of the force. General Dunsford accordingly arranged for the 90th Punjabis and 2/39th Gahrwalis, supported by two companies 1/5th Queen's, all under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Waring (90th Punjabis), to advance along the Aziziya Ridge and seize the western end of the Shaikh Faraja Ridge, whence it was thought that the Aziziya Bridge could be kept under close and effective fire.

At 6.15 a.m. the 90th Punjabis and 2/39th Gahrwalis, in this order from the right, emerged from their trenches and took up preparatory positions. Besides a trench line at the northern end of Aziziya Ridge the Turks were holding Unjana Hill; and the right flank of the Punjabis with some machine guns was thrown back to face this hill. Colonel Waring also found it advisable to order up the Queen's two companies to prolong

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
the left of the Gahrwalis and advance along the low ground between the ridge and the canal. After a five minutes' bombardment of the trenches on Aziziya Ridge and of the Shaikh Faraja Ridge, the 90th and 39th began their advance at 6.35 a.m. But, coming under heavy rifle and machine gun fire, both direct and enfilading, they were checked for a few minutes during which time the Queen's came up on the left of the line. They, the Gahrwalis and a small part of the Punjabis, then pushed on, first capturing the Aziziya Ridge trenches and then, soon after 7 a.m., the western end of the Shaikh Faraja Ridge.

It was found, however, that owing to the walled gardens in its vicinity, the Aziziya Bridge could not be seen nor kept under fire from this ridge. Captain Rodgeron (2/39th Gahrwalis), the senior officer present with the firing line, thereupon decided to advance alongside the Aziziya Canal against the bridge, in which vicinity three Turkish field guns were in action. Taking with him a mixed body of Queen's, Gahrwalis and a few Punjabis and during the advance bringing Lewis gun fire to bear on the Turkish guns, Captain Rodgeron moved forward, finally capturing the guns and securing the bridge. This was about 7.30 a.m. Meanwhile the bulk of the Punjabis had gained the Shaikh Faraja Ridge. Two of their platoons had captured Unjana Hill and, though they were driven off again by a counter-attack and did not re-occupy the hill, the Turks were forced finally to leave it by our gun and machine gun fire.

Though this rapid advance had met with complete success, the leading troops of the 12th Brigade had sustained a good many casualties, and were somewhat disorganised and scattered. At 8 a.m. there seem to have been about 500 effective rifles with Captain Rodgeron at the bridge, and about 200 Punjabis on the Shaikh Faraja Ridge; and, as a Turkish counter-attack against the right of the Punjabis was feared, the question of withdrawing from the bridge to Shaikh Faraja was considered. But the necessity did not arise, as at about 9.15 a.m. Turks in large numbers began surrendering to the Gahrwalis at the bridge.

At daybreak the 42nd Brigade had found the enemy still in occupation of his trenches to the north of Ramadi Ridge; and at 9.30 a.m. General Lucas received orders to advance. As his leading troops began to move forward, white flags went up all along the enemy's line. In the meantime orders had also been sent to General Dunsford to attack eastward, as the enemy in front of the 42nd Brigade was still holding out. In

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neither case, however, was an attack found to be necessary; and by 11 a.m. Ahmed Bey, the Turkish commander, and his entire force had surrendered.

By the resolute and able manner in which he had handled his force General Brooking had gained a complete victory.* We buried 120 dead Turks and took 3,456 prisoners, including 190 wounded. We captured 13 guns (three being pom-poms), 12 machine guns, 2 armoured launches, 2 barges and large quantities of arms, ammunition, equipment, engineering stores, railway material and supplies. Our own casualties from the 27th to the 29th September totalled 985, to which the 1/4th Dorsetshire contributed 176, the 1/5th Gurkhas 189, the 90th Punjabis 182 and the 2/39th Gahrwalis 166. A feature of the casualties was the large proportion of very slightly wounded, due to the high-bursting Turkish shrapnel.

In their reports Generals Brooking and Maude both paid high tributes to the fighting spirit and endurance of the troops engaged and to the manner in which the operations had testified to the excellence of their training and discipline. The day-heat had been considerable and the operations had been only rendered possible by the excellent arrangements for water supply, organised and controlled by Captain Crawford. On the 28th September alone, over 14,000 gallons of water had been sent up in Ford vans to the fighting troops by the untiring efforts of the officers and men of Nos. 729, 730, 783 and 784 M.T. Companies.

On the afternoon of the 29th, General Maude sent General Brooking a telegram suggesting a raid on Hit, thirty-two miles distant, where there was reported to be a wireless station with a good supply of stores and ammunition, and only a small garrison. General Brooking could not arrange for a raiding column that night, and proposed to send it the next; but, owing to delays in the transmission of telegrams, the raid was not carried out till the night 1st/2nd October. Hit was reported to have a Turkish garrison of 200 to 400 rifles, and the raiding force consisted of 24 R.E. officers and men of the 451st Company, and 365 officers and men of the 1/4th Dorsetshire, all carried in Ford vans, four cars 13th Light Armoured Motor Battery and some motor ambulances. The column, which occupied about four miles of road, started about 8 p.m. on the 1st October, but was so delayed† that it only reached a point about five miles

* In describing the action in a letter to General Whigham, General Maude said that General Brooking had handled his troops splendidly: his preliminary dispositions were methodical and he then moved with vigour and dash.

† In addition to having to make or repair the road in two or three places, encountering heavy sand in other places, and missing the road on three occasions, it had to drive at times without headlights to escape observation and was also delayed by the slower pace of the motor ambulances.

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short of Hit at 5 a.m. on the 2nd. All chance of surprise had passed and Colonel J. F. Turner, R.E., commanding the column, had no option but to order a withdrawal. Before doing so, however, he sent forward the armoured cars to reconnoitre and do what damage they could. But they were stopped by soft ground and effected nothing, though exchanging shots with an enemy patrol. The withdrawal was effected without difficulty, though two motor ambulances had to be abandoned.

In "Yilderim," Lieutenant-Colonel Hussain Hasni Amir Bey gives a brief account of the loss of Ramadi, derived from the report of a Turkish staff captain (Tewfik Effendi), one of the few members of the garrison who managed to escape. The British force advancing on the 21st September had been estimated at two cavalry regiments, six batteries and seven infantry battalions and the Turkish commander reported that on the 22nd he had defeated, with the assistance of Arabs, one of these battalions moving along the north bank of the Euphrates.* Till the telegraph line was cut on the 28th the Turkish commander had not fathomed General Brooking's intentions. But, in the absence of news from Ramadi, orders were sent that day by Yilderim Headquarters to the Sixth Army to send a division at once from Tikrit towards Ramadi. Whether this was done or not is not stated; but no news was obtainable of what was happening at Ramadi till towards the evening of the 30th,† when Tewfik Effendi, who had crossed to the north bank of the Euphrates, reached Hit after having been completely stripped by the Arabs.


The 337th Regiment was at once ordered from Tikrit towards Hit and the 157th Regiment, holding posts along the Euphrates, was directed to concentrate at Hit, whose garrison received instructions to retire if attacked by superior forces. The wireless station at Hit was transferred to Khan Baghdadi and all stores, etc., at Hit were to be evacuated as rapidly as possible. The Turkish account continues:—

"The disaster to the Euphrates Group had opened the river to the enemy. As the Group had been completely wiped out, he was free to make any move he wished on the other fronts. The Russians too were reappearing on the scene with fresh troops. The supply difficulties in the

* This evidently refers to the surprise of a platoon part of the 97th Infantry by about 200 Arabs, who killed or captured the greater part of the platoon.

† Early on the 30th an enemy aeroplane was on the point of alighting at Ramadi, when its pilot, discovering that we and not the Turks were in occupation, flew off again. It escaped, says Colonel Tennant ("In the Clouds above Baghdad") owing to the vain efforts to start a "Spad" aeroplane.

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OCCUPATION OF MANDALI

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zone of the XIII Corps would soon necessitate the withdrawal of our left wing on the Diyala. To secure the Euphrates the 157th Regiment at Hit was insufficient protection. The 50th Division, which was at Aleppo, therefore ordered the 169th Regiment and one battalion of artillery from its attached troops to march to Maskina on the Euphrates and from there to proceed to Hit by *shakturs*. An infantry regiment, a battalion of artillery and various formations of the division remained at Aleppo.*

It is also clear that the orders to the Turkish commander at Ramadi gave him complete latitude to retire from there if necessary, though the position was important as commanding the routes to the Euphrates districts whence supplies could be drawn, and also as a good advanced base for operations against our left flank.

For us its capture had a decisive effect locally. As Candler says: "in the Baghdad *vilayet* Ramadi was recognised as the drop curtain for the Turk."

After the operations against Ramadi had started, General Maude arranged to occupy Mandali (twenty-seven miles east of Balad Ruz), the centre of an area from which the Turkish XIII Corps had been drawing supplies for some time past. The enemy detachment at Mandali was reported to consist of 120 sabres with two machine guns† and the Turks were estimated to have the following other troops on the left bank of the Diyala:—at Qasr-i-Shirin, 60 sabres; at Khaniqin, 60 sabres and 150 rifles; and at Qizil Ribat, 300 sabres, 720 rifles, 8 guns and 16 machine guns. British detachments held Shahraban and Balad Ruz.

On the 24th September, General Maude issued orders to General Norton, commanding 7th Cavalry Brigade, to seize and occupy Mandali with his brigade, to which were attached "S" Battery, R.H.A., four cars 14th Light Armoured Motor Battery and other details including two aeroplanes. Leaving Balad Ruz at 9.30 p.m. on the 28th, this column effected its purpose next morning without difficulty, Mandali being occupied by 11 a.m. The enemy garrison offered little resistance and, finding its retreat towards Qizil Ribat and Khaniqin cut off by a detachment diverted by General Norton for that purpose, dispersed north-eastward into the hills.

According to Lieutenant-Colonel Hussain Hasni Amir Bey in "Yilderim," the loss of Mandali so affected the supply situation of the Turkish XIII Corps, that not only had the

* Reports had led General Maude's Intelligence Staff to believe that part at any rate of the 50th Division was at this time in the Mosul area.

† After the capture of Mandali, the garrison was stated to have been composed of 100 sabres, 2 machine guns and 80 men of a local battalion.

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1st Infantry Regiment to be withdrawn to Kirkuk from Kifri, but the cavalry brigade had also to retire to the right bank of the Diyala.* He says further that, after the loss of Ramadi and Mandali, and in order to give any assistance required for the fighting that seemed possible on the Tigris, a large part of the 2nd Division was concentrated at Kirkuk and the 46th Division was sent to the Tigris from Altun Köpri.

The following brief summary, taken from the German and Turkish accounts already referred to, shows generally the enemy plans and intentions during August and September. The fact that by the end of September the enemy had given up for the time being the idea of an offensive in Mesopotamia was not learnt nor realised by us for some time.

The plan of campaign, arranged by General von Falkenhayn by the beginning of August, was that the Seventh Army should concentrate at Aleppo by the beginning of October and that the Turkish portion of it should march down the Euphrates to Hit, where it would be joined by the German Asiatic Corps, moving in motor lorries, so as to start the offensive from there against the British left at the beginning of December. Early in August General von Falkenhayn went to Germany to inspect the Asiatic Corps, and by the middle of August, when he returned to Constantinople, he had doubts as to the advisability of undertaking an offensive in Mesopotamia until the Palestine front was secure.

At that time, according to the Turkish account "Yilderim," the distribution of the Turkish armies was as follows:—

Mediterranean Sea Front	5th Army (eight weak divisions).
Caucasus Front	3rd Army (six divisions), 2nd Army (four divisions, one cavalry brigade and several volunteer detachments).
Mesopotamia Front ..	6th Army (six divisions and several volunteer detachments).
Palestine	4th Army (twelve divisions, one cavalry brigade and Hedjaz column).
Yemen	7th Corps (three divisions).
Rumania	6th Corps (two divisions).
Reserve	7th Army (five divisions).
Total	46 divisions and several detachments.

* Actually, however, it does not appear to have all withdrawn until we advanced to the Jabal Hamrin (see next Chapter).

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This meant that the whole Turkish reserve was being taken to form the Seventh Army for the Baghdad project.

On the Caucasus front the intentions of the Russians were not clear and information was scarce ; but the situation was not dangerous and General Headquarters transferred the 48th Division to the Fourth Army.

In Mesopotamia, the Sixth Army could always be reinforced by troops opposed to the inactive Russians or by the 46th Division, then in reserve on the Great Zab ; but any reinforcement to the Sixth Army involved great difficulty in regard to supply. There was no indication that the British force in Mesopotamia was being reinforced to any serious extent, but it was rapidly improving its communications.* No danger was anticipated on this front, as it was held that the British invasion had reached its natural limits.


On the Palestine front the British had been increasing their strength since their failure at Gaza in April, and were evidently preparing for a renewed offensive on a big scale. This offensive seemed likely to begin about the middle of November.

During August General von Falkenhayn represented to Enver Pasha that it would be necessary to make the Palestine front secure before moving against Baghdad ; but Enver would not agree. The former held to his ground, however, and at the end of August a conference on the subject took place between General von Falkenhayn and Enver and Djemal Pashas, when the only decision arrived at was to send the 24th Division to the Palestine front. General von Falkenhayn then put his proposals in writing before Enver Pasha, hinting that, if the latter still refused to listen, an appeal would be made to the German Supreme Command. Enver then gave a more favourable reply, and suggested that Falkenhayn should make a personal inspection of the Palestine front. Falkenhayn's German Chief of Staff, who had gone in the meantime to Germany to discuss the situation, returned from there at the beginning of September with permission from German Headquarters to postpone the offensive in Mesopotamia, and to move the Yilderim Army, including the German Asiatic Corps, to the Palestine front. On his arrival General von Falkenhayn left Constantinople and inspected the Palestine front ; and by the middle of September Enver Pasha, it is said, realised the danger threatening Palestine.

An additional subject of friction at this time between Falkenhayn and Djemal Pasha was the question of command ; and Mustapha Kemal, commanding the Turkish Seventh Army,

* A British mail bag captured on or about 29th July indicated no likelihood of change in their force, i.e., 3rd, 7th, 12th, 14th and 15th Divisions and one cavalry brigade.

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was also much dissatisfied. But, on this question also, Enver Pasha did not come to any decision till the end of September when he arrived at the following compromise. The forces in Syria and Arabia* were to form the Fourth Army under Djemal Pasha, with headquarters at Damascus; the forces in Palestine, i.e., up to the northern boundary of the Jerusalem province and on the Jerusalem line of communication, were to be formed into a new Eighth Army, which with the Sixth and Seventh Armies were to come under Falkenhayn's command.


The enemy's main attention was thereafter concentrated on operations on the Palestine front, and though preparations in Mesopotamia continued they were only carried out in a lukewarm fashion.

On the 30th September Mustapha Kemal Pasha, commanding the Turkish Seventh Army, sent a letter to Enver Pasha on the general situation, which, being ill-received by Enver, led to Mustapha Kemal's resignation a few days later. This letter is given in full in Appendix XLII, but for easy reference its main contentions are summarised here. Drawing attention to the chaotic state of the country internally, due to the failure and corruption of the civil administration, he said that if the war continued Turkey's greatest danger was probable internal dissolution. It was likely that the war might continue for a considerable time and the Central Powers did not hold the key to peace, while the forces of Turkey were so weak that even if all her resources were collected they would still be insufficient. Constantinople might be attacked from the west. On the Caucasus front the Turks could make no headway, and could not stop a Russian offensive if made, though such an offensive seemed impossible. In Mesopotamia the British, having gained their objective, had no political, economic or military reasons for a further advance; and even if they did continue to advance successfully, the loss of Mosul would not be very serious, and would not affect the general situation. On the Hejaz and Sinai fronts the enemy had not yet attained his political and military objectives, and was known to be preparing to achieve his purpose, which was the subjection of Turkey, the formation of a Christian state in Palestine under British influence, the denuding of Turkey of her most prosperous provinces and the destruction of her last religious predominance.


Thus the exigencies of the military situation required Turkey to be ready to meet an attack from the west and to forestall the enemy's advance on Syria. It was useless to ignore the danger to Syria or to think of recapturing Baghdad—

* i.e., Asir and Yemen.

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CHAPTER XXXIX.

OCTOBER TO DECEMBER, 1917. OCCUPATION OF THE JABAL
HAMRIS, ACTION OF TIKRIT AND DEATH OF
GENERAL MAUDE.

(Maps 35 and 36.)

BY the capture of Ramadi General Maude had obtained information concerning the enemy's intentions and preparations from which it seemed clear that Falkenhayn meant to carry out his main advance with the Turkish Seventh Army down the Euphrates while the Sixth Army operated on the Tigris and towards Mandali. But, early in October, accumulating evidence showed that General Allenby's preparations for an offensive in Palestine were having a considerable effect on Falkenhayn's intentions and preparations. The Turkish Seventh Army about Aleppo had detached one, if not two, divisions to Palestine, while the enemy preparations on the Euphrates, still in a very backward state, seemed to be progressing very slowly. Moreover, his collection of local supplies, only recently begun to any considerable extent, was evidently being hindered by our occupation of Ramadi. The Turkish Sixth Army also seemed unready for serious operations. The constant desertions showed its *moral* to be indifferent; its divisions were still weak in strength, though part of the 50th Division had joined it and the 49th Division was said to be about Altun Köpri; its railhead was still at Nisibin; and it was very short of supplies. Finally, of the two German divisions reported as being prepared for service with the Turks, the first was said to be only leaving Germany for Constantinople at the end of September.*

Although an army corps of the Turkish Seventh Army was said to be still about Aleppo in readiness to move down the

* The composition of these divisions was uncertain. The 701st, 702nd and 703rd Infantry Battalions, preparing for service with the Turks, were located in September as being at Neuhammer in Lower Silesia and news was received later in October of three other battalions there numbered 704th, 709th and 710th, of which the last was a reserve battalion. It was not till late in December that identification of units on the Palestine front gave us a more correct idea of their strength and formation. A German cyclist brigade (4,000 rifles and 40 machine-guns), withdrawn from the Flanders front in September, was also reported as being destined for Auu Mow; but some weeks later it was identified on the Riga front.

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SITUATION ON THE JABAL HAMRIN 67


Euphrates, it was felt, taking everything into consideration, that a serious enemy offensive in Mesopotamia was not imminent. On the other hand there were several indications that the enemy meant to take advantage of the Russian inactivity to send small parties into Persia.

On the extreme British right, British detachments occupied Mandali and Balad Ruz, while the 14th Division held a line which extended from the neighbourhood of Shahraban to and along the left bank of the Diyala as far south as Windiya, westward of which the 13th Division held a line to a point on the Tigris just north of Sindiya.* Opposite the British IIIrd Corps was the Turkish XIII Corps holding a very extended line in no great strength, with its advanced troops along the western slopes of the Jabal Hamrin. In the area Qizil Ribat-Jabal Hamrin, east of the Diyala, it was estimated that the Turks had about 540 sabres, 1,100 rifles, and 12 guns, with a further 60 sabres about Khamiqin; while between Kifri and the Diyala, and including an advanced detachment at Delli Abbas, their total strength was reckoned as about 50 sabres, 3,200 rifles and 28 guns.

When the Russians withdrew from the Diyala General Maude would have liked to occupy the Jabal Hamrin, both to render his right flank more secure and to deny to the Turks this screen for movements against his flank and into Persia. But transportation difficulties and the great heat stood in the way. A further reason for its occupation was that from it the Turks were able to interfere seriously with the supply of water for irrigating the land along the Diyala. But it was not till the beginning of October, when the weather was cooler, the light railway running to Shahraban, the conversion to metre-gauge of the section from Baghdad to Baquba nearing completion and the Turco-German offensive hanging fire, that General Maude felt in a position to carry out this project. On the 7th October he discussed the outline of the necessary operations with General Marshall, to whom he sent orders next day that the IIIrd Corps, with certain cavalry and army troops attached, was to occupy the Jabal Hamrin on the Diyala left bank so as to control the mouths of the various canals fed by the Diyala downstream of Abu Zenabil. At the same time General Marshall was asked to submit to General Headquarters the broad details of his plan, for which the preliminary movements should be commenced so as to enable the column on the Diyala right bank to begin to make its presence felt by the enemy by the 17th October.

* See Map 35.

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General Marshall's plan, which was approved by General Maude, was first to drive the Turks out of their advanced position about Delli Abbas and then to hold them in front while his main attack developed against their left flank. For this purpose, after leaving portions of his Corps to hold the line Mandali-Shahraban-Windiya-Sindiya, General Marshall divided his striking force into three groups. The Right Group, under General Egerton, consisting of the 7th Cavalry Brigade and part of the 14th Division, was composed of three cavalry regiments, four armoured cars, seven infantry battalions and thirty-eight guns. The Centre Group, under General Thomson, was composed of four infantry battalions and twenty guns; and the Left Group, under General Cayley, of two cavalry squadrons, two armoured cars, eight infantry battalions and twenty guns.*

Part of the 30th Squadron, R.F.C., with headquarters at Shahraban, where General Marshall also established his advanced headquarters, co-operated; and nearly 800 Ford vans were detailed for supply and transport purposes.

The forward concentration commenced on the 16th October. On the 18th the Left Group, meeting with little opposition, occupied an east and west line to the northward of Delli Abbas, with its right flank bent back to connect at the Diyala with the line held by the Centre Group to the north of Shahraban. The Right Group was then in three portions: the 36th Infantry Brigade Group at Shahraban, the 37th Infantry Brigade Group on the eastern side of the Ruz canal three miles south of Tel Ibara, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade at Mandali. In the


* The composition of the three groups was as follows:—

Right Group—14th Divisional Headquarters; Headquarters 14th Divisional Artillery; 2nd Battery, R.F.A. (less one section), A, 40th Battery, R.F.A., 66th Brigade, R.F.A. (from 13th Division), one section 26th Mountain Battery; 12th Company Sappers and Miners, 15th Company Sappers and Miners (less two sections), detachment No. 1 Bridging Train, 128th Pioneer (less one company); 36th Infantry Brigade (less 29th Punjab); 37th Infantry Brigade; 7th Cavalry Brigade, with "S" Battery, R.H.A.; 4th Light Armoured Motor Battery (less three sections), one section 6th Light Armoured Motor Battery; and administrative units.


Centre Group—35th Infantry Brigade; 13th Brigade, R.F.A. (8th and 4th Batteries only), 2/104th Battery, R.G.A. (60-pounders), 269th Siege Battery, R.G.A. (8-inch howitzers), No. 80 Anti-aircraft section; 13th Company Sappers and Miners, one company 128th Pioneers, detachment No. 1 Bridging Train; and administrative units.

Left Group—13th Divisional Headquarters; 12th Cavalry (less two squadrons); 11th Divisional Cyclist Company; 55th Brigade, R.F.A. (less one section), No. 92 Anti-aircraft Section (less one gun); two companies 8th Welch Pioneers, 71st and 88th Companies, R.E., detachment No. 1 Bridging Train; 38th Infantry Brigade; 40th Infantry Brigade; and section 6th Light Armoured Motor Battery; and administrative units.

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casualties, it was decided to postpone the attack, at first till after dark and finally till early next morning.

At nightfall the 37th Brigade, with the 7th Cavalry Brigade bivouacking close in rear, was facing north, astride the Shahraban-Qizil Ribat road just north of the Kurdarra river; two miles south of the cavalry bivouac, the 35th Brigade outposts held an east and west line on the Jabal Hamria from the Qizil Ribat road to close to the Diyala; and the 38th Brigade occupied a line extending some three miles to the north-west from Mansuriya. At 8.30 p.m. General Marshall issued orders for General Cayley to establish himself during the night across the river loop east of Mansuriya; while next morning General Thomson was to extend and swing forward his right flank. General Egerton was to use his cavalry to reconnoitre and threaten Qizil Ribat; and all available technical troops were to improve the communications.

Early on the 20th October, General Cayley's troops advanced to attack the enemy's trenches. But the enemy had retired during the night and by midday the 38th Brigade had occupied an east and west line astride the Jabal Hamrin with its right on the Diyala, about one and a half miles northward of Mansuriya, and its left about Mujariyin. The 7th Cavalry Brigade entered Qizil Ribat between 8 and 9 a.m., finding that the Turks had retired across the Diyala and had destroyed their bridge. The armoured cars reconnoitred for six miles towards Khaniqin but saw no signs of the enemy; and in the evening they and the cavalry withdrew to the southward.

General Marshall had gained his objective with the loss of only thirty-seven casualties. During the next few days some sixteen more casualties were incurred in reconnaissance work; and our position in the Jabal Hamrin was consolidated. Work was then commenced in this area to ensure a good system of road communication, with the result that the tangle of hills was gradually traversed by a number of roads suitable for wheeled traffic.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Hussain Hasni Amir Bey in "Yilderim" says that Falkenhayn and Halil Pasha, commanding the Turkish Sixth Army, met on the 5th October half way between Mosul and Ras-al-Ain and arrived at the following decisions. The Diyala front was to be reinforced by the Sulaimaniya group. The cavalry brigade was to remain south of the Diyala and the Sixth Army to continue to hold the Jabal Hamrin, unless difficulties of supply or serious pressure from the enemy necessitated withdrawal.

* This involved much hard work including the construction of some seventy-five bridges over the various canals and watercourses.

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


The Gorge of the Diyala River through the Jabal Hamrin.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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ENEMY PLANS

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
being the enemy's main energies were directed towards the Palestine front. A considerable number of German troops, including probably the 701st, 702nd and 703rd Battalions, after inspection by the Kaiser at Constantinople at the beginning of October, had left for Palestine, where a third, and possibly a fourth, division from the Seventh Army concentration at Aleppo had also gone. All reports agreed that all troop movement towards Mesopotamia had practically ceased and was proceeding towards Palestine instead. It was also reported at the same time that the Turks were mobilising all men up to 52 years of age, irrespective of race and creed. This would certainly increase the already large number of desertions from the Turkish army, and the fact that it was found necessary brought out clearly the straits to which the enemy was reduced for man-power. It also lessened the importance of the news that the Aleppo-Hit road would soon be fit for motor lorries.

The Turks and Germans were still engaged, however, in trying to push forward agents on both General Maude's flanks to create trouble in Persia and among the Arabs to the west of the British lines of communication. It was reported that German officers intended to utilise a large body of Persian gendarmerie, whom the Turks had disbanded and were sending back to Persia,* for anti-British activities there; and General Maude made arrangements with Baratoff to intercept them. The German propaganda amongst the Arabs showed little signs of success. For instance, the Muntafik Shuikh Ajami, who had always been prepared to sell his services to the highest bidder, had to our knowledge been receiving a handsome monthly subsidy from the Germans, ostensibly for the purpose of raising forces against us. But it was clear that he had little influence remaining and had been quite unsuccessful in his recent efforts to raise tribal forces.

Early in October, General Prjevalski, commanding the Russian Caucasus Armies, intimated that his troops would be unable to co-operate with General Maude's force. But, as he wished to do what he could, he suggested that a force of 15,000 Cossacks should be sent to act under General Maude's orders. As it was thought that their *moral* and efficiency had been less affected by the events of the Revolution than those of the Russian infantry, this offer was at first accepted. But it became doubtful if they could reach Mesopotamia in time to be of use or if their co-operation, all things considered, would be of any practical value; and it was decided that it would

* They had accompanied the Turkish XIII Corps in its retreat from Hamadan in March, but had been found useless by the Turks.

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be preferable that, if available, they should be utilised in replacing the unreliable troops with Baratoff to guard the routes into Persia. Moreover, while it was clear that there was no longer any hope of finishing off the war against Turkey by a combined movement by the Russian forces in Armenia and Kurdistan and by ourselves in Mesopotamia and Palestine, the news of the capture by General Allenby of Beersheba and 1,800 Turkish prisoners on the 31st October lessened the necessity for obtaining Russian co-operation in the defence of our positions in Mesopotamia.

Considering that he had a chance of striking a blow at the Turkish force on the Tigris, General Maude in an operation order of the 28th October directed General Cobbe to attack the Turkish position about Daur.* It was estimated that the Turks had 200 sabres, 4,000 rifles, 20 guns and 36 machine guns on the Tigris right bank opposite Daur, with a detachment of 200 sabres and 4 machine guns at Daur; at Auja, 1,100 rifles and 12 machine guns; at Tikrit, 60 sabres, 1,300 rifles, 19 guns and 14 machine guns; and about Fat-ha, some thirty miles north of Tikrit, 40 sabres, 5,000 rifles, 16 guns and 6 machine guns. There was also reason to believe that, if the British attacked, the enemy intended to retire to a prepared position about Fat-ha.

The position opposite Daur was to be attacked at daybreak on the 2nd November by the 1st Corps, reinforced by the Cavalry Division and ten armoured cars, with the object of destroying the 51st Turkish Division, in occupation of this position, before it could be reinforced.

As it was important that the operation should be in the nature of a surprise, all preliminary movements were to be carried out under cover of night and the troops were to be concealed from hostile aeroplane observation as much as possible by day.

Part of No. 63 Squadron, R.F.C., would be attached to the 1st Corps, as well as 500 Ford vans and 10 motor lorries.


The whole force (except the Ford vans and motor lorries) was to be concentrated near the British position north-west of Samarra by daybreak on the 1st November and the forward movement to the points of assembly was to be made during the night 1st/2nd, the troops moving as light as possible.

The Cavalry Division, moving wide round the enemy's right flank so as not to betray its movement, was to reach a point approximately nine miles due west of Daur in time to move forward from there at 4 a.m.† and shell the enemy's

* See Map 36.

† Sunrise was about 6.15 a.m.

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ACTION OF DAUR

75

camps about five miles to the north-westward of Daur. The mission of the Cavalry Division was to surprise the enemy and press vigorously any success which it might achieve; but it was to be careful to guard its northern flank against the advance of hostile reinforcements from that direction.

The advanced troops of the main column with adequate artillery were to be deployed on a line about seven miles south-west of Daur in time to move forward from there at 4.30 a.m. The mission of this column was to avoid an advance so early as to give the alarm prematurely, but to arrive on the scene in sufficient time to exploit to the full any surprise success that the cavalry might achieve and to prevent the enemy from turning his whole attention to the cavalry.

The necessity of careful guiding, extreme secrecy and exact timings during the night march was emphasised; and during the hours of daylight after 4 p.m. on the 1st November reports were to be sent to General Headquarters at least hourly and at other times as necessary.

The Turkish first line of trenches extended in a large southerly salient to a point about five miles west of the Tigris, with a second line in rear whose right flank overlapped the right flank of the first line. For the few days preceding the attack No. 63 Squadron, R.F.C., carried out many special reconnaissances of, and photographed, this position.

The country on the Tigris right bank between the Turkish first line and the British position near Samarra was of a varying nature. Generally speaking, the area adjoining the river for a width of about two miles was a flat low-lying plain; while west of this, also for a width of about two miles, was a strip of broken ground bounded on the west by a low plateau of bare, open and undulating country.

General Cobbe's operation order of the 31st October followed the lines of that issued by General Maude on the 28th.* His striking force was divided into three groups—the Cavalry Division under General Jones, the 7th Division under General Fane and the 21st Infantry Brigade under General Leslie.†


* As usual, General Maude's order had been drawn up as a result of previous discussions with General Cobbe.

† Cavalry Division Group—The Cavalry Division, C/56th Battery, R.F.A., and eight armoured cars of the 13th, 14th and 15th Light Armoured Motor Batteries.

7th Division Group—7th Division (less 21st Infantry Brigade and three batteries 56th Brigade, R.F.A.), 8th Infantry Brigade, 32nd Lancers (less two squadrons), 4th Brigade, R.F.A. and a Heavy Artillery Group (2/56th Battery less one section, 157th Battery and 257th Battery) of six 60-pounders, and four 6-inch howitzers.

21st Brigade Group—One squadron 32nd Lancers, 21st Infantry Brigade, two armoured cars 6th Light Armoured Motor Battery, 56th Brigade, R.F.A. (less two batteries), one section 2/56th Battery (60-pounders), and 4th Company Sappers and Miners.

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
The position of deployment for the Cavalry Division was as given by General Maude, but that for the 7th Division was about two miles west of the line given by General Maude, and from that point its advanced guard was to advance two miles northward at 4.30 a.m. and then, at 5.30 a.m., followed by the whole division, north-eastward against the western side of the Turkish salient. The 21st Brigade Group, moving up the Tigris left bank to co-operate with the attack on the right bank by shell fire and to protect our watering parties on that bank, was to reach a point five miles due south of Daur not earlier than 6 a.m., in readiness to push on to Daur. Further, the 9th Infantry Brigade of the 3rd Division was to be in readiness at Samarra to move forward as a reserve if required.

About 4 p.m. on the 1st November, an enemy aeroplane flew over the British concentration area, but it is not known if its occupants observed anything unusual.* The moon rose at 6.49 p.m. on the 1st November and facilitated the long night march. The Cavalry Division had about twenty-four miles to cover to reach its point of deployment, and at about 4.15 a.m. on the 2nd the leading brigade (6th) saw camp fires to the north and north-east which appeared to mark the right flank of the enemy position. Considering that his division was too far to the east General Jones ordered a change of direction to the north-west, and the division, believing it had reached the vicinity of its allotted position, halted about 4.30 a.m. Actually, however, it had halted to the south-west of it. General Fane's troops, one brigade of which had a march of nineteen miles to make, began moving at 5.30 p.m., and reached their position of deployment by 4.30 a.m. without a hitch.


In a personal reconnaissance to the east, carried out shortly before dawn, the commander of the 6th Cavalry Brigade could not find the enemy's camps which he had been directed to shell; and at 6.15 a.m. he moved off in a north-easterly direction with his brigade and "V" Battery, R.H.A., to try and turn the enemy's right flank so as to assist our infantry attack. But, being soon checked by fire from the enemy's second line, the brigade moved further westward so as to threaten the enemy's rear, only to be held off again by considerable hostile artillery fire. At 6.15 a.m. also, the 13th Lancers of the 7th Cavalry Brigade had been ordered to advance towards Auja to guard against any hostile movement from there against the left flank of the Cavalry Division. Mistaking its direction, however, the regiment found itself in front of the enemy second line and was forced to take cover

* Strict orders had been issued for the troops to remain under cover during the hours of daylight; but as the area could be seen by enemy patrols from the neighbourhood of Esaki Baghdad it is possible that they may have had reason to suspect a large concentration at this time.

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whole had occurred in the 28th Brigade.* Including 82 prisoners captured, the Turkish casualties were estimated at about 290.

At 2.20 p.m., after the Cavalry Division had started to turn the Turkish rear guard out of Auja, General Cobbe telegraphed to General Maude proposing to withdraw his force next day to Samarra. But General Maude replied that, as it was probable that the Turks would evacuate Tikrit, General Cobbe's force should not withdraw till this was verified, in which case Tikrit should be visited and the enemy stores there destroyed. General Cobbe accordingly issued orders for the Cavalry Division to push forward into Tikrit next morning and destroy the stores there. Aeroplanes were to reconnoitre Auja and Tikrit as soon as it was light enough to see; the 7th Division was to advance as far as Auja, pushing forward its heavy artillery to shell Tikrit; and the 21st Brigade Group on the Tigris left bank was to be held ready to co-operate in the movement.


On the 3rd November, before it was light, General Cobbe received orders from General Maude that if it was found that Tikrit had not been abandoned the force was to return to Samarra. Auja was occupied at an early hour by the 18th Infantry Brigade, which came under considerable shell fire; and our aeroplanes and cavalry found Tikrit to be held in strength. Consequently, in accordance with his orders, General Cobbe soon after 1 p.m. ordered his troops to withdraw to their previous night's bivouacs. Their total casualties during the day had been 84, of which seven were in the Cavalry Division. In the evening General Cobbe issued orders for withdrawal next day to Samarra.

At 7.10 a.m. on the 4th November General Cobbe received the following message from General Maude:—"In consequence of certain developments† on whole front, no further movements towards Samarra should be made by your troops till further orders. Wire their present distribution." General Cobbe cancelled his order for withdrawal and at 8.40 a.m. telegraphed the dispositions of his force to General Headquarters. At noon he received a further message from General Maude saying that he had received confirmation of his previous information that the Turks might evacuate Tikrit if we advanced and that it was probable that stores were being removed from Tikrit.


* Of these the 26th Rifles contributed 108 and the 51st Sikhs 82.

† There is nothing in the records to show what developments were alluded to. But General Maude had just heard of General Allenby's capture of Beer sheva and he may have had this in his mind.

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150 feet above river level, an excellent view is obtainable, Daur being easily visible. The Turkish trench line, about a mile south of the town, extended from the Tigris bank for about a mile westward and then bent back north-westward and northward for another five miles. For the greater part of its length the first line trench was continuous; second and third lines, connected with the first line, had been constructed in many places; and there were numerous machine gun emplacements. Further, the greater part of the left half of the line, where the broken ground in front afforded some cover, had been made especially strong; while the flat open plain afforded an excellent field of fire to the right half of the line.

General Cobbe had elected to make his attack against a part of the Turkish left centre where his infantry could obtain cover in the broken ground and to which they could readily obtain access by a night march over the open and undulating plain.* From its position of assembly opposite Daur the 7th Division was to move by night due north to a position of deployment about three miles south-west of the distinct angle in the Turkish line and was to regulate its advance from there so as to attack as soon as the artillery could see sufficiently to cover it. Supported by the whole of the artillery, the attack was to be pressed with the greatest vigour.

The Cavalry Division and armoured cars were to be at a point about three miles west of the extreme Turkish right flank by 6.30 a.m., by which time the cavalry patrols were to be in contact with the right half of the Turkish first line. In addition to preventing the enemy withdrawing troops from his right to reinforce his left, the cavalry was to cover the left flank of our own infantry and to watch for any opportunity afforded by their success. The 9th Infantry Brigade, with two field batteries, from Samarra was to form Corps Reserve opposite Daur; and the 21st Brigade Group, moving up the Tigris left bank, would co-operate, if possible, by long range fire.


By 5 and 5.30 a.m. on the 5th November the 7th and Cavalry Divisions had reached their respective allotted positions and the 21st Brigade Group had by daybreak† disposed its guns eastward of Tikrit to co-operate with the right bank attack.

At 5.30 a.m. the 8th Infantry and 4th Field Artillery Brigades, forming the advanced guard to the 7th Division, moved forward to occupy the Jibin Wadi and to advance from there against the enemy's trenches about one and a half miles to the north-east. The infantry had orders to push in at once if

* See Map 36.

† Sunrise was about 6.20 a.m.

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steadiness and determination, these three battalions carried their objective without pause or check and established themselves in portions of the incomplete Turkish third line on a frontage of some eight hundred yards. The trenches had been held only lightly by Turkish infantry, of whom about 85 were taken prisoner. But the casualties of our three battalions had amounted to about 30 per cent. of their strength, due to the enemy's artillery fire and to enfilade rifle and machine gun fire, especially from a high-sited strong point to the left of our attack.

Heavy casualties had also been incurred in the 28th Punjabis and 1st Seaforth Highlanders (19th Brigade) which had moved forward to the right and left respectively of the 8th Brigade to afford covering fire; and it had been found necessary to send forward the 92nd Punjabis to reinforce the 28th Punjabis in view of an enemy counter-attack.


At 12.45 p.m. the 1st Manchester were sent up to reinforce the right of the 8th Brigade firing line and arrived in time to assist in repelling a Turkish counter-attack. Owing to the severance by hostile artillery fire of all cable communications from the front, and to the failure of our infantry to indicate their position to our contact aeroplanes,* it was a long time before General Fane learnt that the 8th Brigade had captured the Turkish trenches. Owing to this and to the fact that three battalions of the 19th Brigade were still heavily engaged on the right and left rear of the 8th Brigade, the original intention of immediately pushing the 19th Brigade northward through the 8th Brigade was not carried out.

The 8th Brigade continued to suffer from heavy enfilade fire from both flanks; and another counter-attack was launched against its right, but was repulsed about 3 p.m. As the strong point to its left was still giving much trouble by its fire, General Peebles, commanding the 19th Brigade, received orders to capture it. Under cover of an artillery barrage, which commenced at 4.20 p.m. and continued for fifteen minutes, the attack on it was carried out with great dash and gallantry by the Seaforth Highlanders and 125th Rifles and met with complete success, the enemy's trenches being occupied about 4.45 p.m. and a number of prisoners taken.


It seemed to the commander of the 7th Cavalry Brigade at this stage that, as the enemy in the trenches to the north-west menaced the left of the Seaforths and 125th, the time had come when the cavalry could materially assist them and also exploit their success; and he accordingly issued orders for the 13th

* It had been arranged that infantry units should light flares as ground signals, but they abstained from doing so in the mistaken belief that it would give their position away to the enemy.

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and the 9th Infantry Brigade in Corps Reserve moved forward from opposite Daur to bivouac at Auja.

During the day the Cavalry Division had successfully detained enemy troops in the long length of trenches opposite it, and the guns of the 21st Brigade Group on the Tigris left bank had kept all roads to the north under shell fire, apparently inflicting loss on the enemy.

At 6 p.m. General Cobbe ordered the Cavalry Division to withdraw to Auja and the 7th Division to hold the line it had gained and to patrol boldly to its front. After reorganising, the 7th Division pushed forward strong patrols at 1 a.m. on the 6th November to secure a line north of Tikrit running westward from the Tigris. Very little opposition was encountered and next morning it was found that the Turks had retreated well to the north.

Our casualties totalled 1,801, of which 161 were killed.* We captured 137 Turkish prisoners and their total casualties were estimated at 1,500, including 300 killed. In addition, a good deal of abandoned material fell into our hands, though much had been burnt or destroyed by the enemy before he retreated, including the river steamer *Julnar*, with which we had attempted to re-victual Kut in April, 1916.

On the 7th November the Cavalry Division started south to Sadiya and on the 10th the remainder of the force began its withdrawal to Samarra. The whole of the Turkish XVIII Corps, including the divisions which had fought at Tikrit, was then located as being at or north of Fat-ha.


During October and the first half of November the activities of the British Air Force, apart from co-operating in the fighting in the Jabal Hamrin and up the Tigris, had been mainly directed to reconnaissance, photography and bombing raids. No. 30 Squadron bombed Kifri aerodrome, apparently with good effect, on the 16th and 31st October,† and during the first half of November No. 63 Squadron bombed the Turkish camps near Fat-ha and No. 30 Squadron those at Qara Tepe. As, however, these camps presented only small and scattered targets as compared with our own camps, it was felt undesirable to continue such projects as likely to lead to retaliatory raids.

At the beginning of November further discussion took place between General Maude and the Chief of the Imperial General

* Cavalry Division 74, Artillery 79, 47th Sikhs 328, 2/124th Infantry 87, 50th Rifles 251, 28th Punjabis 245, Seaforth Highlanders 187, 125th 206, 128, 1st Manchester 115, and other units 89 in all.


† In these two raids four machines were lost, but all but one pilot escaped safely.

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* 27 officers, 510 Cossacks, 336 infantry, 42 mountain gunners, 94 machine gunners, 28 ammunition column = 1,077 combatants; also 173 non-combatants, including a lady doctor and two nursing sisters.

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Some measure of the feelings with which he was regarded was shown by the many striking public marks of esteem to his memory and by the large number of telegrams and letters of sympathy which reached Lady Maude, from the King and Queen, from many public bodies, from all parts of the Empire and from numberless individuals, including soldiers of all ranks.

Lieutenant-General Sir W. R. Marshall was appointed to the chief command in Mesopotamia, General Egerton succeeding him in the IIIrd Corps and General Thomson taking over command of the 14th Division. There was little or nothing on record, or within anyone's personal knowledge, to show what General Maude's intentions or plans for the future had been, either as regards operations, organisation or military and civil administration. It consequently took General Marshall some little time to acquaint himself with all the varied factors affecting the situation. But, as he said in his Despatch, "the *moral* of the army was magnificent, whilst organisation and training had reached a high level of efficiency. The Turkish army, on the contrary, was low in *moral* and desertions from it were numerous and frequent; on the Tigris and Euphrates they had retreated out of rapid striking distance and only on our right flank was there a good opportunity of hitting them."


Details of the composition and distribution of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force on the 18th November, 1917, are given in Appendix XLIII, and a list of the principal officers serving with the force on the 1st December in Appendix XLIV. On the Baghdad front General Marshall had a striking force of one cavalry and six infantry divisions, of a strength in round numbers of 3,500 sabres, 66,000 rifles and 302 guns.* In addition, the 11th Cavalry Brigade had already begun to be formed and the first units of the 18th Division had reached Basra, as well as seven new machine gun companies (one for each division).

* The total ration strength of the force was —


British officers	6,747
Indian officers	2,721
British other ranks	103,551
Indian other ranks	139,905
Followers	158,428

Of the followers, over 121,000 were Indian, and the remainder included 12,700 Arabs, 6,300 Kurds, 2,800 Chinese, 1,500 Persians and a few Japanese, Egyptians, Armenians, Chaldeans, Jews, Burmese and Syrians.


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with Kifri; at which place the headquarters of the Turkish XIII Corps and a force of about 950 rifles and 8 guns had been located.

Preparations for the offensive were carried out with the greatest possible secrecy; and to prevent enemy aerial reconnaissance a bombing attack was made by our aeroplanes on the Turkish aerodrome at Kifri on the night 30th November/1st December. In spite of this, however, an enemy aeroplane flew over our lines at Mansuriya on the 1st December, and next day another aeroplane flying over our Cavalry Division must have observed its movement. Leaving Sindiya with some armoured cars on the 1st, the Cavalry Division reached Satha that evening and was joined there by a mule column, 400 Ford vans and part of the 33rd Motor Ambulance, escorted by the 20th Punjabis, which had marched up the Adhaim from near its mouth. On the 2nd, the Cavalry Division marched to Chai Khana; and its advanced parties, reconnoitring for a passage through the Jabal Hamrin by which the division could move that night to Umr Maidan, came under hostile artillery fire from the foothills. The only practicable route was found to be held by an entrenched force of Turkish infantry with guns and machine guns; and, surprise being no longer possible, the 7th Cavalry Brigade and "V" Battery were sent forward to clear up the situation. Reporting that the enemy's position was too strong to be forced before dark, the 7th Cavalry Brigade remained in touch with it; and the *liaison* officer with the Cavalry Division sent word to General Headquarters that the prospects of breaking through in time were very doubtful. On the morning of the 3rd the enemy's force had increased and the Cavalry Division was unable to break through or to find another passage.*

In the meantime, the various groups of the IIIrd Corps detailed for the converging attack had concentrated by night-fall on the 2nd December as follows. Corps Headquarters were at Qalat al Mufti. East of the Diyala were: Bicharakoff's Russian detachment at Chahriz; 37th Brigade Group (26 guns) at the Kurdarra crossing; 35th Brigade Group (10 guns) on the main road seven miles north-east of Shahraban, with the 14th Divisional Reserve (2 infantry battalions and 12 guns) close in rear; and 14th Division Headquarters one and a half miles south of the Kurdarra crossing, with two 60-pounder

* General Marshall had issued instructions that, if the Turks were found to be holding the hills in strength, no serious attempt was to be made by the cavalry to force a passage.

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PLAN OF ATTACK

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guns and two 6-inch howitzers in position on the Jabal Hamrin about four miles to its north-west. West of the Diyala were: 38th Brigade Group (32 guns) two and a half miles north of Mansuriya; 40th Brigade Group (26 guns) four miles west of Delli Abbas; and the 13th Divisional Reserve (1 squadron cavalry, 1 cyclist company, 1 infantry battalion and 6 guns) near Delli Abbas*.

General Egerton had planned to carry out his attack in two phases. In the first phase the enemy would be engaged along the whole front Qizil Ribat-Suhaniya and both his flanks would be turned, the left by forcing the passage of the Diyala above Qizil Ribat and the right by the capture of Suhaniya and the Sakaltutan pass. The second phase would consist of an advance on Qara Tepe up both banks of the Narin river.


General Thomson, commanding 14th Division, had directed the 35th Brigade Group to secure, during the night 2nd/3rd, the Diyala left bank from close below Qizil Ribat to near Tawila; and the 37th Brigade Group to force a crossing over the Diyala above Qizil Ribat before 5.30 a.m.† on the 3rd, its right being covered by Bicharakoff's Russians who would advance to about Kishuk. During the early hours of the 3rd, in order to assist the 37th Brigade Group, the 35th Brigade Group was to act vigorously all along its front and its patrols were, if possible, to secure footings on the Diyala right bank. After crossing the Diyala, the 37th Brigade Group would secure Tel Baradan and Tel Ahmadiya; and as soon as the latter locality had been captured, the 35th Brigade Group was to advance towards Qara Tepe, its left on the eastern bank of the Narin, in close touch with the troops of the 13th Division issuing from the Sakaltutan pass.

General Cayley, commanding 13th Division, had arranged that the 38th Brigade Group, after establishing itself during the night 2nd/3rd on a three-mile east and west line with its right on the Diyala about a mile south of Abu Zenabil, should advance at 5.30 a.m. towards Suhaniya and the Sakaltutan pass; while the 40th Brigade Group, reaching a point five miles west of Suhaniya by 4 a.m. on the 3rd, was then to advance north-north-eastward to cut off the enemy in the Suhaniya position and to gain the Sakaltutan Pass. Then,


* Each brigade group consisted of an infantry brigade with field artillery, engineers and pioneers, while some of the groups had also heavy or mountain artillery, Stokes' mortars, cavalry, armoured cars and a bridging train detachment.

† Sunrise was about 6.40 a.m.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد ١٧." [٦٠] [٥٤٠/١٢٥]



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After dark on the 3rd December orders were issued for the cavalry at Kishuk to advance next morning towards the Qara Tepe-Kifri road, for the 37th Brigade to withdraw to the eastern bank of the Diyala and for the 35th Brigade Group to advance towards Qara Tepe, being joined after daybreak by the 13th Brigade, R.F.A.* in place of its own artillery immobilised by the inundations. The 38th and 40th Brigade Groups were to capture the Sakaltutan pass at dawn and the 40th Brigade Group was then to push forward to the Narin river.

During the night the Turks were found to have evacuated the Sakaltutan pass, which was at once occupied by the Welch Fusiliers. Early on the 4th December two squadrons 12th Cavalry and the 13th Divisional Cyclist Company (Divisional Troops) crossed the pass and, fording the Narin river† south of Narin Köpri, joined the one and a half squadrons 12th Cavalry and Russian Cossacks advancing from Kishuk. The combined force then advanced into the hilly country north-eastward of Qara Tepe and was engaged throughout the day with an enemy force to the north of Qara Tepe holding positions from which they could not be ejected. At 5 p.m. the Russians were obliged to withdraw to Kishuk owing to their ammunition and food running short and to the exhaustion of their men and horses‡; and the 12th Cavalry withdrew also, joining the 35th and 40th Brigade Groups.

The 40th Brigade Group, meeting no opposition, reached Narin Köpri and halted there. The 35th Brigade Group, much delayed by floods and water channels and joined during the day by the 13th Brigade, R.F.A.§ only reached a point five miles east of Narin Köpri by 6.30 p.m., when it went into bivouac.

That night General Egerton issued orders that General Cayley with the 35th and 40th Brigade Groups was to advance next day on Qara Tepe and drive the enemy from the hills immediately to the north of that place—but he was not to prosecute operations against a succession of enemy rear guard positions to the north—and to remove or destroy all stores and material found in Qara Tepe.

* Belonging originally to the 37th Brigade Group, it was to cross by the bridge near Qiril Ribat.

† The enemy had destroyed all the bridges.

‡ Owing to shortage of food before joining us, neither men nor horses were in good condition.

§ After work all night by the Sappers and Miners and Pioneers, the ramps of the bridge near Qiril Ribat and two bridges over water channels on the Diyala right bank had been completed by 6 a.m. on the 4th.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد VII". [٦٢و] (١٢٨/٥٤٠)



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
During the day the casualties in General Cayley's force totalled 157, of which the 37th Dogras lost 65, the 2/4th Gurkhas 46 and the 5th Wiltshire 29. We took about 40 prisoners, but little in the way of supplies or war material.

In the meantime, the Turkish force facing the Cavalry Division to the westward of Umr Maidan had shown no signs of retiring and our cavalry had been unable to find any other passage through the hills. In the evening of the 5th General Marshall ordered both the Cavalry Division and the IIIrd Corps to withdraw next day, the latter to an advanced line extending from Khaniqin through Qizil Ribat to the Sakaltutan pass. This withdrawal was effected without special incident.

Between the 3rd and the 6th December our total casualties amounted to 29 killed and 190 wounded and those of Bicharakoff's Russians, who had done good work on the two days they had been engaged, to 9. We buried 87 dead Turks and captured 255 prisoners, 2 guns, a machine gun and other war material. The Turkish wounded were estimated at over two hundred. Although the loss we inflicted on the enemy was not as great as had been hoped for, we had strengthened our right flank considerably. It was felt that in future the Turks would experience great difficulty in conducting offensive operations against this flank and also in carrying out their plans for a penetration by small forces into Persia.


On the 1st December the Commander-in-Chief in India telegraphed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that, as the arrangements to despatch units of the 18th Division to Mesopotamia had been completed, he proposed to start the formation of a 19th Division for employment as desired by His Majesty's Government. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff replied on the 3rd that the question of how best India could give further assistance had already been under consideration and he hoped to send a full reply in a few days. In the meantime he sent his views on the general situation as follows. Russia's peace movement and the Italian defeats had greatly increased our burden and rendered concentration of effort more necessary than ever in Europe, where Great Britain and France had each sent six divisions to Italy. Our successes in Mesopotamia and Palestine had rendered this concentration more feasible and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff thought we had over-rated Turkish power. Although our successes had upset the Turco-German plans, he doubted if they had ever been as formidable as reports indicated:

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* This led to a decision not to raise the 19th Division and to send many more battalions from India to Egypt.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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98 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA

On the 6th December General Marshall learnt from the commander of the Russian Caucasus Armies that an armistice between Turkey and Russia had been arranged; and, on the 22nd, peace negotiations opened at Brest-Litovsk. This was the end, so far as Russian co-operation in Mesopotamia was concerned. Although His Majesty's Government was not primarily nor specially concerned with the form or composition of the new Russian Government, it was directly affected by the attitude of Russia towards the enemy powers. There were still large parts of Russia which in no way acknowledged Bolshevik authority and disclaimed any intention of making peace with the Central Powers; and these His Majesty's Government decided to support as the best means of keeping employed enemy troops, who would otherwise be available for use against us or our allies.*


The spirit animating part of the Russian army is well exemplified by the behaviour of Colonel Bicharakoff and his detachment. On hearing of the Russo-Turkish armistice, General Marshall arranged that this detachment should leave his command and rejoin General Baratoff. But, declaring that the Russian peace proposals were shameful and treacherous, Colonel Bicharakoff and his detachment announced unanimously that they desired to remain in Mesopotamia and fight with the British. This was agreed to as a temporary arrangement.

There were several thousand Austrian and German prisoners of war at this time in Trans-Caspia and Russian Turkestan, who, if Russia made peace, might cross into Persia and enter into anti-British activities; and the outlook was rendered more serious by mutinous outbreaks among Baratoff's troops at Hamadan about the middle of December.† Consequently, in view of the doubtful quality and possible withdrawal of Baratoff's troops, the British Minister at Tehran suggested that General Marshall should take over the protection of the Khaniqin-Hamadan road, as being likely to produce a stabilising effect on the Persian Government. General Marshall, however, pointed out that this would be beyond the scope of the mission of his force and that it would, moreover, entail the employment


* We had also to do what we could to save Rumania, to prevent supplies from reaching Germany, to safeguard our flank in Mesopotamia and prevent a Pan-Turkman movement eastward.

† Amongst the terms of the armistice between Russia and the enemy powers was one which provided for the withdrawal from Persia of the troops of both sides. But it was felt that little reliance could be placed on either Germany or Turkey observing this arrangement.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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armoured cars reconnoitring in the desert. No. 51 Section was stationed at Samarra and at the end of December No. 52 Section left Baghdad for Ramadi.

On the Euphrates, above Falluja, the period October to December was occupied by the 15th Division in consolidating its forward positions and in establishing a sense of security amongst the surrounding tribes. Offensive measures were of a minor nature, consisting of air raids, of punitive measures against hostile Shaikhs and of reconnaissances up the river and into the desert on both flanks. Several bridges were constructed across the Euphrates and the development of the forward area was taken in hand to relieve the strain on the transport, which had to bring supplies from Baghdad by road until the Baghdad-Falluja railway was completed on the 21st December.

Good progress had also been made with the development of the other railway communications, the following lines having been completed: through communication between Basra and Amara; conversion to metre-gauge of the Baghdad-Baquba line; and extensions of the 2 ft. 6 in. line from Baquba through Shahraban to the foot of the Jabal Hamrin and from Abu Jera (south of Shahraban) to Abu Saïda on the Diyala.


The 11th Cavalry Brigade was almost complete, the 7th Hussars and "W" Battery having reached Mesopotamia from India; and the 18th Division* was being formed at

* Its composition and distribution on the 29th December, 1917, was as follows:—

53rd Infantry Brigade.	1/9th Middlesex Regiment	Baghdad.
	1/89th Punjabls	Baghdad.
	1/3rd Gurkhas	Baghdad.
	1/7th Gurkhas	Baghdad.
	No. 207 Machine Gun Company ..	En route to Baghdad.
	53rd Brigade Supply and Transport Company	To be formed.
54th Infantry Brigade.	1/5th Royal West Kent Regiment ..	Baghdad.
	1/39th Garhwals	En route to Baghdad.
	25th Punjabls	Basra.
	32nd Sikhs	Basra.
	No. 238 Machine Gun Company ..	En route to Baghdad.
	54th Brigade Supply and Transport Company	To be formed.
55th Infantry Brigade.	1/5th East Surrey Regiment	To come from India.
	1/19th Jats	To come from India.
	1/94th Infantry	To come from India.
	116th Madras	With Baghdad garrison.
	No. 239 Machine Gun Company ..	Amara.
	55th Brigade Supply and Transport Company	To be formed.

[Continued on next page.]

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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18TH DIVISION

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Baghdad. The 11th Lancers (which had relieved the 10th Lancers on the Tigris Defences), the 19th Company Sappers and Miners (to the 15th Division) and the 2/9th (Delhi) Infantry (for administrative duty on the line of communications) had also recently arrived from India.


The heavy artillery had again been re-organized. The 1st and IIIrd Corps had now six batteries each and in both corps these were divided into two groups of one heavy and two siege batteries. In addition, a siege battery was allotted to each of the 15th and 18th Divisions.

(Continued from previous page.)

Two squadrons, 10th Lancers	Attached 52nd Infantry Brigade.
336th Brigade, R.F.A. (A, B, C and D Batteries)	Amara (a).
337th Brigade, R.F.A. (A, B, C and 341st Batteries)	Amara (a).
Three small arm ammunition sections	To come from India.
2nd, 5th and 8th Companies, Sappers and Miners	Amara, Basra and Baghdad respectively.
106th Hazara Pioneers	To come from India.
18th Divisional Signal Company	To come from India.
249th Machine Gun Company	Amara.
18th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company	Basra.
No. 37, 38, 39 and 40 Combined Field Ambulances	The first two at Basra and the other two to come from India.
No. 22 Sanitary Section	Baghdad.
No. 12 Mobile Veterinary Section	Amara.


(a) All 6-gun batteries; A, B and C being 18-pounders, and D/336th and 341st howitzers.

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


* See Vol. I, pp. 19-20, for a brief account of these movements.

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General Marshall could spare. It was realised that their despatch would depend on the condition of the roads and the supply situation, but prompt action was desirable if possible. These measures were, however, only to be regarded as a temporary expedient to meet a critical situation and were not to be looked upon as extending the mission previously laid down for General Marshall's force.

Bicharakoff, however, was already well on his way and would reach Kermanshah long before a British detachment could join him. General Marshall, therefore, arranged, with the approval of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, that the British detachment should not go further than Harunabad till intimation had been received from Bicharakoff that it would be advisable for it to do so.


This mounted detachment—known as "Bridges' Column" and consisting of one section "S" Battery, R.H.A., 14th Hussars, a section 15th Machine Gun Squadron and some administrative details under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. Bridges, 14th Hussars—was at once formed at Sadiya, but owing to heavy rain did not move to Baquba till the 13th January. At that time the road beyond Pai Taq to Harunabad was impracticable for the movement of troops, and, except for brief spells of fine weather, was likely to remain so throughout the winter. No news had been received from Bicharakoff and it was decided that the detachment should remain at Qasr-i-Shirin till General Marshall was in definite touch with that officer.

On the 18th January Bridges' Column reached Qasr-i-Shirin, where Matthews' Column* was already located. Colonel Matthews had returned on the 9th from Pai Taq, where he had gone with a part of his column to meet and escort back wireless and survey sections, which had been attached to the Russian force at Kermanshah, and he had experienced considerable difficulty owing to the indifferent state of the road and bad weather. Arrangements were made to carry out immediate improvement of this road and by the end of the month the bulk of Matthews' Column was located at Surkhadiza Khan, with small detachments at Pai Taq and Sar-i-pul.

General Dunsterville arrived at Baghdad from India on the 18th January. By his instructions from the Chief of the

* Consisting of two troops 12th Cavalry, 28th Mountain Battery (less one section), 1/4th Hampshire Regiment, 186th Machine Gun Company (less two sections), one company 128th Pioneers, two armoured cars 6th Light Armoured Motor Battery and administrative details under Lieutenant-Colonel Matthews, 1/4th Hampshire Regiment.

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DUNSTERFORCE

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Imperial General Staff, issued on the 14th, he was appointed Chief of the British Mission to the Caucasus and also British representative at Tiflis. His sphere of work was to extend over all Russian and Turkish territory south of the main chain of the Caucasus over which the Federal Republic of the Trans-Caucasian peoples claimed control, i.e., Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Daghestan. It was anticipated that he might in the near future need the services of some 150 officers and 300 non-commissioned officers; and a large proportion of these would soon be sent to Baghdad. In the meantime, General Dunsterville himself and such of his staff and personnel as were immediately available were to proceed to Tiflis as soon as possible. He would eventually have under his orders an armoured car detachment (five squadrons of eight cars each) commanded by Commander O. S. Locker-Lampson.*


The Chief of the Imperial General Staff intimated that our primary military object was the maintenance of an effective force on the Caucasus front so as to protect the occupied portions of Turkish Armenia and to prevent the realisation of Pan-Turanian designs; and also indirectly to assist General Marshall in Mesopotamia by helping to cover his right flank on the Persian frontier and by holding as many enemy forces as possible in Caucasia. General Dunsterville was to render the Trans-Caucasus Government every assistance in all matters furthering these objects, more especially as regards the raising, training and equipping of their military forces.

He was informed that he was to maintain touch with the French, who had undertaken the organisation of the loyal Russian forces north of the Caucasus and of the Rumanian army, as well as financial responsibility for Ukraine and the troops under General Alexeieff; and he was also told of the arrangements for forming and financing a Russian volunteer force in North-West Persia which would be under General Marshall's orders.


The only practicable route from Baghdad for General Dunsterville and his mission to follow was via Khaniqin, Kermanshah and Hamadan to Enzeli on the Caspian, a distance of about 635 miles. From the Mesopotamian border to the semi-tropical regions bordering the Caspian, the road, crossing a succession of mountain ranges by passes varying from 5,000 to 8,000 feet in height, was of a very doubtful character as far as Hamadan. It had been made passable for motors by the Russians, but it was difficult in good weather and impassable

* These cars could not reach Mesopotamia before March.

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BRITISH DISPOSITIONS

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weather and the difficulties of the route, he did not reach Kermanshah till the 3rd February.

On the 24th January General Marshall telegraphed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that information from the British *liaison* officer with Bicharakoff showed that the latter was gaining no success in rallying loyal Russian soldiers and that a third of his own detachment was expected to leave him. The political situation in Kermanshah was said to have improved, the local Persians having reconciled their differences, in order, it was said, to avoid giving the British a pretext for occupying that town; and there was general rejoicing at the departure of the Russians.

During January, beyond punitive measures against hostile tribes, there were no operations of importance in Mesopotamia. On the 15th January the general British dispositions there were as follows.

Of the IIIrd Corps, the 14th Division was east of the Diyala. One brigade group was distributed between Qasr-i-Shirin, Khaniqin and Mirjana (3½ miles north of Qizil Ribat); another brigade group was at the main crossing over the Kurdarra river; and the remainder of the division was at Shahraban. The 13th Division, west of the Diyala, held the line of the Jabal Hamrin from Abu Zenabil to the Sakaltutan Pass with a brigade group; and the remainder of the division was between Delli Abbas and Sindiya.

The 1st Corps (3rd and 17th Divisions) was in the Samarra area, less one infantry brigade temporarily attached to the 18th Division.


The 15th Division was on the Euphrates, with one brigade group at Ramadi, another at Madhij and the third at Falluja.

The 18th Division, which was not yet complete and which had the 52nd Infantry Brigade (17th Division) temporarily attached to it, was at Baghdad, furnishing detachments on the Middle Euphrates.*

The Cavalry Division, less three regiments and two guns, was on the Tigris at Sadiya. One regiment was attached to the 1st Corps, and two regiments and two guns to the IIIrd Corps. The 11th Cavalry Brigade, not yet complete, was at Baghdad, one of its regiments being temporarily attached to the 18th Division.

* "Middle Euphrates" was the term used to designate the line between Falluja and Nasiriya. The troops employed there in detachments totalled 7 squadrons of cavalry, 4 guns and 3½ infantry battalions, of which one squadron of cavalry, 2 guns and 1½ battalions were furnished from Nasiriya. Detachments were located at Mussirib, Hirdiya Barrage, Hilla, Kif, Kufa, Abu Sukhair, Shinasiya, Darraji and Samawa.

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108 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA


During January, in addition to five bombing raids carried out against Turkish aerodromes and camps, our Air Service was continuously active in reconnaissance and photographic work. The Turkish aeroplanes were also active; and on the 24th and 25th January they carried out bombing raids over Baghdad, which caused us a few casualties.* On the 23rd January two of our aeroplanes flew to Kermanshah, returning with despatches the next day; and on the 25th Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Stokes, appointed to the staff of H.M. Minister at Tehran, was taken there by aeroplane from Baquba, the journey being successfully accomplished, in spite of bad weather, by the 28th.

The Turkish Sixth Army, from which we had taken during 1917 a total of some 16,000 prisoners and 124 guns, besides inflicting on it heavy casualties, was weak in strength and widely dispersed. Of the Turkish XIII Corps, the 2nd Division was reported to be distributed along the line Alun Kôpri-Kirkuk-Tuz Khurmati-Band-i-Adhaim and the 6th Division to be in the Kifri-Qara Tepe area with detachments on the Diyala to the east of those two places. The XVIII Corps was about Fat-ha on the Tigris and it was reported that its 52nd Division had been broken up and its units distributed between the two other divisions (14th and 51st) of the Corps. Reports were also current that the Turkish Cavalry Brigade and 46th Division were being moved from the Mosul area to Syria.† Two-thirds or more of the 50th Division was said to be on the Euphrates; and in the Sulaimaniya area there was an inconsiderable Turkish force, consisting mainly of frontier troops. The Turkish divisions except the 50th were estimated to be of a strength of about 4,000 rifles each or less, and with the exception of the 50th they were at such distances from us, having regard to the nature of the intervening country, the position of our railheads and our general transport situation, that we could not hope to obtain any decisive success by operating against them. On the other hand, in view of the condition of the enemy's troops, his supply and transport difficulties, his pre-occupation on the Palestine front and the reports that work on the Baghdad railway was at a standstill owing to lack of material, there seemed little chance of a Turkish offensive.


* It was estimated that the Turkish Sixth Army had at this time about 32 serviceable aeroplanes.

† At the beginning of February confirmation was obtained of the disbandment of the 52nd Division and of the move to Syria of the Cavalry Brigade and 46th Division.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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* The armoured car with him had a great moral effect.
† His withdrawal was unopposed, though it was subsequently ascertained that the Jangalis had wished to ambush the party, with the connivance and assistance of the Russian troops withdrawing from Persia. To the credit of the latter, their leaders refused to agree and the project was abandoned.

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
it a Moslem minority. Although the declaration of this Federal Republic was framed so as to leave the country as an integral part of Russia, the Central Bolshevik Government deemed it advisable to try to re-establish its authority there by the despatch in January 1918 of a Bolshevik Armenian chief commissar named Shaoumian. The Tartars, however, would have none of him. They forced him to retire to Baku and adopted an active pro-Turk policy, setting up a Tartar Government at Elizabetopol and arming their tribesmen with rifles and ammunition taken from the Russian soldiers leaving the Armenian front.

The Turks, who were negotiating with the Federal Republic, saw in this great Moslem reserve of men an instrument to aid them in the fulfilment of their Pan-Turkish ideals; and about the middle of February they broke off negotiations with the Federal Government on the score of Armenian excesses against Moslems and commenced an offensive towards Trebizond and Erzinjan. Simultaneously, tribes on the Caucasus frontier closed the roads to Armenian troops proceeding to the front, and outbreaks by Kurds occurred in the vicinity of Erivan. The Armenian troops in the occupied Turkish territory proved incapable of holding their own and retired in disorder, harassed by Kurds, while Turkish troops occupied Trebizond, Balbur and Erzinjan.

The previous reports that several Turkish divisions were moving to Syria from the Caucasus were now contradicted and it appeared that only two divisions had actually been so transferred. It seemed evident, therefore, that the Turkish authorities meant to ignore the calls of their southern fronts and to undertake an offensive towards the Caucasus. It is noteworthy in this connection that peace negotiations between the Central Powers and Russia had begun at Brest-Litovsk in the middle of December, 1917, and that, by the terms of the treaty concluded there at the beginning of March, 1918, the Russians agreed to evacuate the occupied Anatolian provinces and also the districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batum, which had been lost by the Turks as a result of the Russo-Turkish war of 1878.

On the 26th February General Dunsterville telegraphed from Hamadan to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that, as the situation in Persia was in the melting pot owing to the weak Persian Government and having regard to the Russian situation and evacuation, it seemed necessary, with a view to operations in the Caucasus and to safeguard British interests

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GENERAL SMUTS' CONFERENCE

113

in Persia, for us to occupy the line Qasr-i-Shirin—Eazeli. General Dunsterville was convinced that, whatever the politicians might say, the inhabitants of Persia would welcome such a step. All they wanted was security and they did not care who gave it to them. General Dunsterville considered that a small number of troops would suffice and suggested a strength of one infantry brigade, one cavalry regiment, one battery of mountain artillery, one light armoured motor battery and aeroplanes, with headquarters at Kermanshah, Hamadan and Kazvin.

At this time, the threatened advance on Hamadan of Kuchik Khan with his Jangalis seemed to be hanging fire, owing, it was said, to his determination to wait till the Turks, who were urging him to make this advance, had actually occupied Kurdistan.


To return to Mesopotamia. During January there had been discussions in London over the future British policy in Mesopotamia and Palestine. The Government was anxious to continue operations vigorously with a view to eliminating Turkey from the war, and deputed General Smuts to confer in Egypt with General Allenby, the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and General Marshall's representative, with a view to advising the War Cabinet as soon as possible on the best use of all our resources. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed to General Marshall on the 31st January and 3rd February explaining this and requesting that General Gillman, the Chief of the General Staff in Mesopotamia, might be sent to Egypt to represent General Marshall's views and to give General Smuts all possible assistance and information.* The Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that the main operations would probably be carried out in Palestine and that co-operation by General Marshall might consist in detaching troops to join General Allenby or in an offensive in Mesopotamia, or possibly both.

On the 21st February the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed, to the Commander-in-Chief in India and

* General Gillman left Mesopotamia at once and arrived in Egypt on the 20th February, but General Smuts had already telegraphed his recommendations to London. He had met in Egypt General Hopwood, who was on his way to England, and had formerly been Chief of the General Staff in General Maude, and from him had gathered information as to the situation in Mesopotamia. General Gillman rejoined at Baghdad on the 4th April. During his absence General T. Fraser acted as Chief of the General Staff.

† General Sir W. Robertson resigned his appointment as Chief of the Imperial General Staff on the 15th February and was succeeded by General Sir Henry Wilson.

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General Marshall, saying that General Smuts recommended the adoption of a purely defensive rôle in Mesopotamia and the vigorous prosecution of the campaign in Palestine; and that Mesopotamia should feed Palestine with reinforcements from the surplus beyond its reasonable requirements for defence.* General Smuts recommended that two divisions, six batteries of 6-inch howitzers and one cavalry brigade should be transferred from Mesopotamia to Palestine. Sir Henry Wilson said that, provided we maintained an offensive in Palestine, he personally thought that the chances of a Turkish attack in force towards Baghdad were slight. But he would like the views of Generals Monro and Marshall regarding the extent of the reduction in Mesopotamia which, in view of probable future developments, they considered safe.


In reply, General Marshall said that he considered he could safely spare a complete army corps; but General Monro was of opinion that the force in Mesopotamia should not be reduced by more than one division and four 6-inch howitzer batteries. The main reasons for the latter opinion were the chances of further military commitments in Persia and the fact that strength in Mesopotamia afforded the possibility of immediate reinforcement from there to meet serious trouble in India.

On the 1st, 3rd and 6th March, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff sent General Marshall instructions† on the policy which the Government had decided on for the time being in regard to Persia, Mesopotamia and Palestine. In view of the situation on the Persian frontier and the impossibility of his mission getting through to Tiflis, General Dunsterville was to remain in Persia. In order to support him there, General Marshall was to use armoured cars and cavalry, as soon as the road conditions admitted, to keep open the Qasr-i-Shirin—Kermanshah road, and to increase the garrison of Qasr-i-Shirin so as to bring it up to three cavalry regiments and such additional troops as he might think advisable. At the same time the Chief of the Imperial General Staff told General Marshall for his general guidance that it might be necessary later to develop this policy considerably, and extend towards Hamadan. An active defence was to be pursued in

* At this time it was estimated that the Turkish armies totalled 46 infantry divisions, distributed as follows:—Europe, 1; Thrace and Asia Minor, 4; Syria and Palestine, 20 to 21; Caucasus front, 7 to 8; Mesopotamia, 9; Arabia, 5; in transit, destination uncertain, 2. One German division was in Syria and there might be another in Asia Minor.

† Repeated to the Commander-in-Chief in India.

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DEPARTURE OF 3RD DIVISION

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Mesopotamia on the lines of the instructions sent to him on the 22nd November, 1917, when he assumed command* ; and the reinforcement to be found from Mesopotamia for Palestine was limited to one Indian division and four batteries of 6-inch howitzers. In Palestine an offensive campaign was to be carried out. Finally, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff asked General Marshall to report, having regard to these instructions and to the possibility of the extension of commitments in Persia, what railway and inland water transport personnel and labour for railway construction he could spare for Palestine.

The 3rd Division was selected for transfer to Egypt, and during March arrangements were made for its movement, its place in the 1st Corps being taken by the 18th Division.

Matthews' Column remained during February in the vicinity of Pai Taq, where road improvement was in progress though hindered to a considerable extent by stormy weather.† But except for an armoured car which proceeded to Kermanshah at the beginning of the month and could not return because of the snow and bad road, no other troops moved eastward of Qasr-i-Shirin into Persia during February.

In Mesopotamia during February, beyond punitive measures against aggressive tribesmen and Air Force activity, there were no operations of importance except a short British advance in the direction of Hit on the Euphrates. For the previous two months the Turks had been reported to be reinforcing their troops in that neighbourhood, and at the beginning of February it was estimated that the Turkish force about Hit and Sahiliya consisted of part of the 50th Division (157th and 169th Regiments) with a total combatant strength of between 4,000 to 5,000. There appeared to be little change in the enemy's dispositions on the Tigris ; but in the Qara Tepe-Kifri-Kirkuk area there were indications of a concentration of strength to the rear, most of the troops on the Diyala having been withdrawn. This movement was possibly due to supply difficulties, although information that the Turks were making arrangements for flooding the Qara Tepe area indicated some apprehension on their part of an offensive by us in this direction.§


* See page 87.

† The total number of river craft of all sorts then in Mesopotamia, or on order for there, was 1,760.

‡ The snowfall in the mountains during the winter 1917-18 was the heaviest that had occurred for the past ten years.

§ Reports from the Caucasus may have reached them that we were contemplating an advance towards Mosul.

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Hit was a point of some strategic importance and was connected by desert routes with Tikrit, the country to the west and Karbala. Moreover, its bitumen wells were valuable for boats, roads, etc. Early in February General Marshall gave General Brooking (15th Division) instructions to capture Hit and its garrison as soon as he could complete his arrangements and weather conditions were favourable. General Marshall considered that it would be comparatively easy to drive the Turks out of their position and capture the town; but, owing to their experience at Ramadi, the capture of the Turkish force would probably be extremely difficult.

On the 18th February, a strong reconnoitring detachment under General Lucas (42nd Brigade) advanced from Ramadi and, finding Khan Abu Rayan unoccupied, took up a position about ten miles south of Hit.* From here it was ascertained that the Turkish main position was two miles above Hit, behind a depression known as Broad Wadi, and that about two-thirds of the enemy's force was at Sahiliya. Not wishing to commit his troops to serious fighting unless he saw a chance of delivering a severe blow, General Marshall ordered contact with the enemy to be maintained by constant patrolling and reconnaissance, while forward communications were improved and supplies pushed up. The latter operation was facilitated by the completion on the 18th February of the railway extension from Falluja to Dhibban.

On the 1st March, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in addition to ordering General Dunsterville to remain in Persia, asked him to report what action he could best take. General Dunsterville replied that he would be best employed watching the situation and that the presence of his small party† in Hamadan, where he was trying to allay the suspicions of the local Persian notables, was having a good moral effect. He also recommended that he should be allowed to spend money on famine relief. H.M. Government approved these recommendations and famine relief work (mainly road improvement) was begun on the 23rd March. No better means for changing the local prevailing attitude of suspicion and hostility

* See Map 17.

† 13 officers, 62 British other ranks including motor drivers and air interpreter. With his Mission were 6 Ford touring cars, 34 Ford vans and an armoured car detachment (1 armoured car, 1 lorry and 1 Ford van). By this time, there were in Mesopotamia on their way to join his Mission 177 British officers and 331 other ranks.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٧٤و] (١٥٢/٥٤٠)

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


British "famine labour" road making near Karind.

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
neighbouring states and possibly Germany to intervene. Georgia had claims to Batum; the Armenians regarded Ardahan and Kars as theirs; and the Tartars alone favoured the treaty. The Georgians, however, were unlikely to offer military opposition to Turkey and the Armenians could not hope to make an effective resistance. It was indeed the general impression that the Trans-Caucasus Government was likely to conclude peace with Turkey. Consequently, the apparent intention of the Turks to occupy the portion of the Caucasus inhabited by Mahomedans and to exterminate the Armenian population seemed to stand a very good chance of success.* In point of fact, as was subsequently ascertained, Turco-German rivalry in regard to the Caucasus was likely to be the only deterrent. The Germans occupied Odessa on the 13th March and the Turks became alarmed at the German preparations to open the direct European route to the Caucasus.

The Caspian, including the ports of Petrovsk, Baku, Enzeli and Krasnovodsk, was under Bolshevik control; and under the instigation of enemy or Bolshevik agents, the Jangalis had arrested the British consul at Resht and were about to occupy Kazvin, in co-operation with a force of Persian nationalists. Consequently all communications between Persia and the Caucasus were interrupted. The local situation in Kermanshah had improved somewhat, but elsewhere in North-West Persia it gave cause for anxiety; and the Persian Government was adopting an attitude which would endanger not only their own country but our position in Afghanistan and India. H.M. Government, reluctantly forced to the conclusion that they must make themselves responsible for measures against the common danger which the Persian Government were unable or unwilling to adopt, decided to despatch a sufficient force to patrol and keep open the road from Khaniqin to the east. The point to which this force advanced would depend upon the steadying influence which its presence exerted and upon the degree of authority exercised by the Persian Government.

On the 9th March, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed to General Marshall that, if we were to open communication with the Caucasus, it was very important to get troops to Kermanshah as soon as possible. He suggested

* Further evidence of Turkish intentions was obtained at this time by information that, during February, they had called for volunteers from the officers of their Sixth Army for service in the Caucasus, Daghestan and Turkestan "to protect and further the interests of Islam."

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from which the wretched inhabitants had all fled either into tribal territory or into the towns.

In the meantime part of Bicharakoff's detachment had occupied Kazvin, which was threatened by a force of Jangalis. On the 29th March, when the last of the Russians had left Hamadan, motors, sent out by General Dunsterville, brought in to Hamadan twenty men of the Hampshire detachment marching from Kermanshah; and their arrival, says General Dunsterville in his book, rendered his position secure.* The area now under the British IIIrd Corps extended up to and included Kermanshah; the 36th Brigade Group, with headquarters at Qasr-i-Shirin, providing six detachments along the line.†

On the 13th March the Germans had occupied Odessa and by the end of the month the capture of Batum, Ardahan and Kars by the Turks appeared imminent.‡ The new military formations of Armenians and other pro-Ally personnel in Trans-Caucasia were proving unreliable and would take months to become efficient; General Dunsterville's Mission was held up indefinitely in Persia; and heavy fighting was reported between Armenians and Tartars. It was obvious that our chances of organising effective resistance to enemy occupation or control of Trans-Caucasia were much reduced; and the War Office issued orders on the 31st March to try to obtain control of the Caspian fleet.

To return to Mesopotamia. At the beginning of March, in reply to a query from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff regarding his intentions on the Euphrates, General Marshall telegraphed that he intended to attack the Turks at Hit in about three weeks time and to occupy that place as a temporary measure in order to secure possession of the surrounding bitumen fields. Delay was desirable, so that the

* On the 28th a British aeroplane from Mesopotamia arrived at Hamadan, leaving again the same day with despatches for Kermanshah and Bagdad. Its arrival had an excellent moral effect.

† *Sar-i-Pul*. One platoon 1/4th Hampshire.

Pas Tag. One company 1/4th Hampshire (less one platoon) and subsection 186th Machine Gun Company.

Sarkhadra. One section 26th Mountain Battery, 1/4th Hampshire (less two companies and 100 rifles), 186th Machine Gun Company (less three sections), and one company 128th Pioneers.


Sermil. One company 1/4th Hampshire (less one platoon), and one platoon 128th Pioneers.

Kazvin. One platoon 1/4th Hampshire.

Kermanshah. 50 rifles 1/4th Hampshire.

‡ At this time the total rifle strength of the Turkish forces remaining on the Caucasus front was estimated at 30,000 with 170 guns.

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enemy's attention might be diverted elsewhere and our forward reserves of ammunition and supplies completed.

But, on the 8th March, it was reported that the Turks had vacated their Broad Wadi position and were falling back. General Brooking's troops at once advanced and occupied Hit* and Sahiliya on the 9th and 10th March respectively; and the Turks, suffering considerably in their retirement from the attacks of our aeroplanes, withdrew to Khan Baghdadi, twenty-two miles above Hit.† General Brooking's division, with headquarters at Hit, was then distributed in three brigade groups, i.e., at Sahiliya, Hit, and at a point about nine miles below Hit.‡ Railhead was at Dhibban and riverhead was established close to Hit.

As the result of a conference between Generals Marshall and Brooking at Baghdad on the 11th and 12th March, it was decided that General Brooking should commence operations on the 24th. The object of these operations, which might last for ten to fourteen days, was to drive the enemy as far as possible from Hit and to inflict as much damage as possible on him, before withdrawing to occupy a position covering Hit. Describing his intentions to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in a telegram on the 12th March, General Marshall said that he proposed to occupy Hit till the transport requirements of the local harvest and of the troops sent to Persia necessitated withdrawal to nearer railhead. He considered that to make the occupation of Hit easier the enemy should be pushed back beyond Khan Baghdadi; and as reports suggested that, if pressed, he would retire beyond Haditha and might go as far back as Ana, General Marshall proposed a limited pursuit. In conclusion, referring to a doubt which the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had expressed regarding the advisability of a subsequent withdrawal from Hit,§ General Marshall said that he did not think that such a withdrawal would necessarily give the enemy the impression that we did not intend to advance in force later.

In carrying out the preparations for General Brooking's offensive, every precaution was taken to preserve secrecy


* At Hit they captured a few prisoners, two mountain guns and over 100 skeletons, as well as other stores.

† See Map 37.

‡ There were also small detachments at posts from Ramadi to Falluja.

§ In the telegram expressing this doubt sent on the 11th March, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff had approved the occupation of Hit, as our presence there constituted a threat of further advance and kept the enemy in uncertainty. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff did not think it desirable to go farther up the Euphrates.

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regarding our intentions and also to make the enemy think that we were settling down into summer quarters round Hit. A dummy defensive position was dug at Sahiliya, reconnaissance was restricted and the forward concentration of troops was put off till the last possible moment. Work on roads was somewhat delayed by heavy rain; but by the night 25th/26th March—the date to which the advance had been postponed—two good roads to Sahiliya had been completed; and a reserve of five days' supplies for the whole of the striking force had been collected there.*

The Turks were reported to be preparing a position at Khan Baghdadi, of which by the 25th March our airmen had taken several photographs; but several deserters who came in at this period all stated that the Turks intended to retire to Ana.† It was further reported that Nazim Bey had recently taken over command of the Turkish 50th Division from Shukri Bey‡ and that reinforcements of 1,000 Turkish infantry and two heavy guns had left the Tigris for Haditha and Khan Baghdadi, which they might be expected to reach about the 22nd or 23rd March.

On the 22nd General Marshall made a personal inspection of the Euphrates front. He had arranged to try to divert the enemy's attention from the Euphrates by demonstrations on the Jabal Hamrin and Tigris fronts; and these were carried out by the IIIrd and Ist Corps respectively on the 23rd March and two succeeding days. Subsequent information showed that these demonstrations produced the desired effect of mystifying the enemy, causing him to discredit reports of a British concentration on the Euphrates and to withdraw most, if not all, of his aeroplanes from that front.


The 11th Cavalry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier-General R. A. Cassels, left Falluja on the 22nd March to join General Brooking's force; and at dawn on the 25th, after a twenty-mile night march carried out well to the west to avoid any chance of being seen by Turkish spies in Hit, it went into bivouac in palm groves near Sahiliya. On that day also two reinforcing flights of the 63rd Squadron, R.F.C., reached Hit, while the

* Part of these supplies came from Dhabben to Hit by motor vans, of which some 500 were employed, and part by *saahilaz*, the wind proving generally favourable. It was also found possible to overcome the difficulties of navigation above Hit and to bring up to Sahiliya a daily average of 20 tons by river.

† General Brooking did not credit these statements.

‡ It was subsequently ascertained that Shukri Bey had been suspended for his undue haste in retiring from Hit—a fact which may well have affected the action of his successor.

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forward concentration at Sahiliya of the remainder of General Brooking's force was carried out on the nights 23rd/24th and 24th/25th. These movements gave him the following striking force:—

Air Service	..	{	Two flights, 30th Squadron. Two flights, 63rd Squadron. No. 52 Kite Balloon Section.	
Cavalry	..	{	11th Cavalry Brigade. 10th Lancers (less two squadrons). Squadron 1/1st Hertfordshire Yeomanry.	
Artillery	..	{	215th Brigade, R.F.A. 222nd Brigade, R.F.A. 395th Siege Battery, R.G.A.	48 guns and howitzers.
Engineers and Pioneers		{	No. 118 Anti-aircraft Section. 450th and 451st Companies, R.E. Detachment No. 1 Mobile Bridging Train. No. 2 Mobile Bridging Train. 48th Pioneers (less one company).	
Infantry	..	{	12th Brigade (less 1½ battalions).*	
		{	42nd Brigade. 50th Brigade.	
		{	275th Machine Gun Company.	
Light Armoured Motor Brigade		{	8th Light Armoured Motor Battery. 13th Light Armoured Motor Battery. 14th Light Armoured Motor Battery (less one section).	

At 10 a.m., on the 25th March General Brooking held a conference at Sahiliya of his subordinate commanders, at which he explained his plan. The following gives the gist of his operation orders.

The strength of the Turkish 50th Division (157th and 169th Regiments only) was estimated at about 170 sabres, 4,500 rifles and 17 to 21 guns. Of this total, 50 sabres, 1,400 rifles and 5 guns were probably at Haditha or at Ana, and about 320 rifles and sabres were reported as on the Euphrates left bank; so that the enemy strength about Khan Baghdadi was estimated at not more than 100 sabres, 2,800 rifles and 12 to 16 guns.

* 43rd Erinpera Infantry garrisoned Hit and two companies 2/393d Gahrwalis garrisoned Sahiliya.

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The enemy position about Khan Baghdadi* consisted of an advanced entrenched line (known as "P" trenches) about 1½ miles to the south east of that place and of another entrenched area (known as "Q" and "R" trenches) extending to a distance of over four miles to the westward of Khan Baghdadi.

General Brooking's aim was the complete destruction of all the Turkish forces downstream of Ana.

The forward movement was to commence at 9 p.m., when a brigade group under General Andrew (50th Brigade)† was to advance from Sahiliya along the Aleppo road. It was to be followed at midnight by another brigade group under General Lucas (42nd Brigade)‡; and the remainder of the force was to advance at various early hours on the 26th. At 5.20 a.m. on the 26th General Andrew was to close with the enemy and pin him to his ground; or, if the enemy retired, to pursue vigorously.

General Cassels with the 11th Cavalry Brigade and 13th and 14th Light Armoured Motor Batteries (thirteen armoured cars) was to move with rapidity and boldness and was to act vigorously, throughout the operations, against the Turkish right flank or rear as opportunity offered. He was to try to cut the enemy's telegraphic communications; and he was informed that if the main road was open it might be possible to support him with troops carried in Ford vans.

The remainder of the force would be in reserve.

One flight of aeroplanes was attached to the 11th Cavalry Brigade, another to the artillery commander and the other two flights were to carry out reconnaissance and contact work.

A special group under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel J. McK. Hogg, 2/39th Gahrwalis, had been constituted as a mobile column. It consisted of half a battalion each of the 1/5th Queen's and 2/39th Gahrwalis, two machine gun sections and a detachment 450th Company, R.E. (all to be carried in three hundred Ford vans), the 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery, the 1072nd Field Battery (222nd Brigade) with double-horsed teams and part of a motor ambulance convoy. The last named battery was, however, at first to move forward with Andrew's Group.


General Brooking pointed out verbally to his commanders

* See Map 38.

† "Andrew's Group" consisted of the 10th Lancers (less two squadrons), 215th Brigade, R.F.A., 450th Company, R.E., 50th Infantry Brigade, 48th Pioneer (less one company), + pack wireless station and No. 108 Combined Field Ambulance.

‡ "Lucas' Group" consisted of the 222nd Brigade, R.F.A. (less 1½ batteries), 42nd Infantry Brigade and No. 23 Combined Field Ambulance.

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that the operations would extend over a considerable area, that the various groups, though scattered, were strong and that our force was more mobile than the enemy's. To enable him to use his reserve to the best advantage, it was essential, said General Brooking, that he should receive continual situation reports; and he emphasised the fact that success would depend much on the individual action of group commanders, for which the operations offered full scope.

At Hit the alluvial plain of Mesopotamia gives place to a limestone and clay region, in which the Euphrates runs at a considerably lower level than the surrounding country, which consists for the most part of a barren undulating plateau intersected by steep and rocky ravines. Our information regarding the topography of the country between Sahiliya and Ana was scanty; and topographical reconnaissance had been purposely restricted to avoid arousing the enemy's suspicions.* But, from the information we possessed, the ground over which the operations would be carried out appeared generally practicable for all arms; and it was consequently hoped that the proposed action of the cavalry and armoured cars would not be hindered by difficulties of ground.


General Andrew, starting as ordered, halted just before 1 a.m. on the 26th March at a point on the road about ten miles from Sahiliya. He then sent forward one company from each of three infantry battalions against the enemy's "P" trenches, to occupy them if unopposed or if resistance was faint, but to withdraw if the Turks were present in strength. The three companies, after advancing some distance, were checked about 2 a.m. at close range from the trenches by gun, machine gun and rifle fire.† The position was evidently held in strength and the three companies withdrew. General Andrew then moved his group to the west of the road under cover in the low hills, to avoid the area on which Turkish guns were probably registered and to await daylight.

At 3.15 a.m., General Brooking received the report that the enemy's "P" trenches were strongly held. As this news indicated that the enemy had not retired, General Brooking regarded it as satisfactory. By 4.30 a.m. he had established his headquarters at a point west of the Aleppo road about six miles north-west of Sahiliya, near the only suitable site for the landing of aeroplanes.

* General Brooking considered that the British reconnoitring activity had been mainly responsible for the enemy's retirement from Hit.

† They suffered 43 casualties at this stage. Part of them actually entered the trenches but were driven out again.

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When the sun rose at 6 a.m. the general British situation was as follows. Andrew's Group was busy reconnoitring "P" trenches; Lucas' Group was about two miles south-east of General Andrew's headquarters; the 11th Cavalry Brigade (with the armoured cars), which had started at 3.30 a.m. and had turned westward after moving for about six miles along the Aleppo road, was trotting past General Brooking's headquarters to get round the enemy's right; the 395th Siege Battery, Kite Balloon and Anti-aircraft Sections had been ordered to join Lucas' Group; and the remainder of the troops were still at or leaving Sahliya.

As soon as it was light, a British aeroplane flew over the Turkish position and from it messages were dropped before 7 a.m. on Generals Andrew's and Brooking's headquarters, stating that "P" trenches were held in strength but "Q" and "R" trenches only lightly and that there were no signs of an enemy retirement. By this time a Turkish officer and twelve other ranks, taken prisoner from "P" trenches by General Andrew's leading infantry, had reached General Brooking's headquarters; and it was gathered from them that the 157th and 169th Regiments with 16 guns were in the Khan Baghdadi position and that reinforcements of unknown strength were said to have reached Haditha.

General Brooking issued orders, received by General Andrew at 7.45 a.m., that Andrew's Group, supported by Lucas' Group, was to attack "P" trenches. It was arranged that, as the ground facilitated such a move, Andrew's Group should assault the right flank of the trenches, while Lucas' Group attacked along the Aleppo road and pinned the enemy to his ground. The whole of the artillery, under the orders of the C.R.A. (Brigadier-General F. R. Patch), was to support this attack, which was to be carried out when Generals Andrew and Lucas were both ready.

The Reserve Group, consisting of the Hertfordshire Yeomanry squadron, 451st Company, R.E., 275th Machine Gun Company and 12th Infantry Brigade (now consisting of only the 90th Punjabis and half the 1/5th Queen's), had closed up in rear of Lucas' Group on the Aleppo road by 8 a.m.; and between 8.30 and 9 a.m. Hogg's Group had concentrated near General Brooking's headquarters. The Cavalry Brigade and armoured cars, after moving westward from the Aleppo road for about eight miles, had changed direction to the north-north-west; and at 8.30 a.m. General Cassels despatched a message, received by General Brooking at 9.10 a.m., saying that he

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was proceeding in a northerly direction and that, although his contact aeroplane* located the position of the head of his force as being about seven miles west-north-west of Khan Baghdadi, by his own reckoning (unless the map was most inaccurate) it was really about five or six miles west-south-west of that place. He also said that he was detaching a force towards Haditha; that so far it would be quite feasible for the Ford vans to follow the tracks of his armoured cars; and that the ground ahead of him also seemed suitable. Just before 10 a.m., General Brooking sent off an urgent message to General Cassels saying that there appeared every chance of his getting right round the enemy and asking if he advised Hogg's Group being sent to join him. This message reached General Cassels at 11.5 a.m.


About 10 a.m. the movement of General Andrew's troops which threatened the western flank of the "P" trenches caused the Turks therein to begin retiring. News of this reached General Brooking, who ordered an immediate advance, although Lucas' Group was still some distance away. General Andrew had anticipated this order and was already well on the move. By 11.30 a.m. he gained the "P" trenches practically without opposition and took there about one hundred prisoners.

At 9 a.m. General Cassels' right flank guard came under long range rifle fire from the right of "Q" trenches and about twenty minutes later his main body was shelled by enemy guns at long range. This fire had no effect; but before the column proceeded on its way a section of "W" Battery, R.H.A., came into action against the enemy's right and fired about twenty rounds, apparently with effect. At 11.30 a.m., General Brooking heard from General Cassels that he thought it inadvisable to send Hogg's Group to join him, as it would take too long, and he said that his chances of acting against the enemy's rear were good.

At 11.50 a.m. General Andrew reported by telephone to General Brooking that he was hard in pursuit of the retreating enemy, Lucas' Group being about 1½ miles to his right rear. This advance continued till about 1 p.m., when General Andrew's infantry were checked, on a line extending roughly south-westward from the vicinity of Khan Baghdadi, by hostile artillery, machine gun and rifle fire.

* These contact aeroplanes proved of great use in assisting General Cassels to maintain a correct direction.

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At 12.30 p.m., the staff captain of the 11th Cavalry Brigade, who had been sent back in a motor by General Cassels at 10.15 a.m. to arrange for the second line transport to follow the brigade, arrived at General Brooking's headquarters. He brought a message from General Cassels saying that the enemy appeared to be reinforcing his right flank from Khan Baghdadi and that he himself was proceeding with the original plan to get behind him.


At 12.25 p.m., General Brooking ordered his reserve group to move forward; at 1.5 p.m. he sent instructions to General Lucas to push on vigorously; and at 1.40 p.m. he directed Hogg's Group to move up the Aleppo road, picking up the 1072nd Battery, and come under General Andrew's orders for vigorous pursuit. The 215th and 222nd Field Artillery Brigades had, meanwhile, started advancing by alternate batteries to afford close support to General Andrew's infantry. But the going was rough and heavy, it took time for our guns to come up, and the enemy's gunfire was severe.* Further time was necessary for registration, and especially for the location of the enemy machine guns.

The Turkish position was a strong one and from their trenches, sited on and near the crests of the cliff-like slopes rising from a deep ravine, they were able to sweep with fire the plateau on the southern side of this ravine. General Andrew was unwilling to commit his infantry to a further advance without adequate and accurate artillery and machine gun support. About 4 p.m. the leading battalion (1/4th Dorsetshire) of Lucas' Group came up on the right of the line, followed in rear by the 2/5th and 2/6th Gurkhas. About the same time the Reserve Group reached "P" trenches and half an hour later received orders from General Brooking to reinforce Lucas' Group. At 4.20 p.m. General Brooking sent instructions to General Andrew to use the Maxim and Lewis guns of Hogg's Group, if they had not been already otherwise committed, to bring enfilade fire on to "R" trenches (where the enemy's main strength appeared to be) from the cliffs to the eastward, under which the Aleppo road ran and to which it afforded an approach from Khan Baghdadi. At 4.45 p.m. General Brooking asked General Andrew to report the situation at once and heard, in reply, at 5.15 p.m. that the whole line was held up by rifle and machine gun fire and that he and General Lucas were going to attack at 5.30 p.m.,† but that they anticipated that it would be costly.


* The 1088th Battery (215th Brigade) especially came under heavy fire, suffering casualties and having one gun put out of action.

† Sunset was about 6.15 p.m.

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24th Punjabis, 1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and 6th Jats (all 50th Brigade) in this order from the right; and they were to commence their advance on a frontage of nine hundred yards at 5.30 p.m. The 2/5th and 2/6th Gurkhas (42nd Brigade) were to follow the Dorsets in support and the 1/5th Gurkhas were kept by General Lucas as reserve. In the 50th Brigade the 97th Infantry were to support the other three battalions. Three sections 256th Machine Gun Company were disposed to cover the crossing of the deep ravine by overhead fire; Hogg's Group was to co-operate against the left of "R" trenches; and the Reserve Group was to follow Lucas' Group.

When the advance began, our supporting artillery opened its barrage at a slow rate of fire for the first fifteen minutes and then increased to an intense bombardment for fifteen minutes. This fire was accurate and so effective that, under its cover and that of our machine guns, our infantry were able to advance practically without a check and with very few casualties.* Some machine guns in "Q" trenches gave the left of our line a little trouble; but the commander of the 6th Jats detached a company, which soon stormed the ridge on which these machine guns were and captured four of them with a battalion of the Turkish 168th Regiment (12 officers and 250 rifles). The remainder of our infantry encountered little opposition and overran "R" trenches, capturing four guns and many prisoners.

As it grew dark our advanced infantry got somewhat scattered in the broken ground and inter-communication became difficult. At 8.20 p.m., therefore, General Andrew issued orders for the troops to bivouac where they were; and at 11.30 p.m., after visiting units, he issued orders for a further advance at 5 a.m. next morning.

General Brooking with his headquarters had established himself by 5.30 p.m. at a position (within two miles of Khan Baghdadi), from which he could see that the bombardment was effective. But after sunset, the dust and growing darkness with the temporary interruption of telephone communication made it impossible for him to find out accurately what had happened till about 9 p.m. Our own casualties had evidently been light, air reports estimated that we had captured over

* Our guns had gradually got forward into positions from which they could fire at ranges of 1,800 to 2,200 yards, and in front of them farther down the slopes were our machine guns. In addition to the actual effect of this fire, the dust it raised afforded a most efficient screen to our advancing infantry.

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to move at dawn, either towards Haditha or Khan Baghdadi, according to circumstances or as General Brooking might direct.

The excellent work during the 26th March of the British Air Force had contributed greatly to the success gained. The assistance given to General Cassels, both by guiding the direction of his force and by furnishing him with constant information of enemy movements and of our infantry operations had been invaluable. In addition to co-operating with the artillery of the main attack, its reconnaissance had afforded much useful information; and it had continuously harassed the enemy with bombs and machine gun fire. During the morning it located Turkish guns firing from barges on the left bank of the Euphrates and five aeroplanes set out to bomb them in the afternoon. The barges, however, were already being towed upstream and although no direct hits were obtained one of them ran into the bank and was sunk.

The anticipated Turkish attempt to break through General Cassels' force materialised just before midnight 26th/27th, the enemy's main effort being directed against the right centre of the British line, i.e., where it was strongest. After about three quarters of an hour's sharp fighting the enemy, beaten back, displayed tokens of surrender*; and two squadrons 23rd Cavalry were sent forward on foot to collect the prisoners, who totalled over 1,000 with several machine guns.

At 5.45 a.m.† on the 27th March, Major Sir T. Thompson (commanding the Light Armoured Motor Brigade), under orders from General Cassels, moved eastward with eleven cars‡ of the 13th and 14th Batteries and, at the Aleppo road crossing of the Wadi Hauran, found a mass of over 2,000 Turkish troops displaying white flags. These were taken prisoner and then, in accordance with orders, six cars of the 13th Battery were sent off along the road towards Haditha to capture any enemy troops that might have slipped through. In the meantime, leaving small parties to guard his prisoners, General Cassels directed the remainder of his brigade to move to the Aleppo road and then along it to concentrate at the Alus bend, before proceeding in pursuit to Ana, which had been indicated by General Brooking as the next operation for the cavalry to carry out.

* There was moonlight.

† Sunrise was about 6 a.m.

‡ Two armoured cars had been detached to escort the second line transport, which had not yet reached General Cassels' force.

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BRITISH PURSUIT

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At 5.35 a.m., General Brooking telegraphed congratulating General Cassels and directing him to get back Colonel Tennant, commanding the Air Force* ; and at 6 a.m. General Brooking sent a further message to General Cassels saying that a battalion of the 42nd Infantry Brigade was moving to relieve him of his prisoners, that he was then to raid Ana and that Hogg's Group had been ordered to Haditha.

At 6.30 a.m. General Brooking issued his orders for a general pursuit. Hogg's Group, with the double-horsed 1072nd Field Battery and a wireless set carried in Ford vans, was to seize Haditha, where he was to be joined by the Hertfordshire Yeomanry and 10th Lancers' squadrons and from where he was to send back at least two hundred Ford vans to report to the Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General by 5 p.m. ; and the Reserve Group (under Colonel Brodrick), reinforced by a battery, was to march to the Wadi Haqlan (about four miles south of Haditha).

By 7 a.m.—when the total British captures amounted to between 3,000 and 4,000 prisoners, ten guns, many machine guns and much war material—the situation was briefly as follows. Six cars of the 13th Light Armoured Motor Battery, with the remainder of the Light Armoured Motor Brigade (including the 8th Battery from Hogg's Group) preparing to follow them, were well on their way to Haditha, towards which place Hogg's Group was also advancing. The 11th Cavalry Brigade was concentrating about Alus ; Andrew's Group had reached the Wadi Hauran ; Lucas' Group was within four miles of it to the southward ; and the Reserve Group had just started to advance from the vicinity of Khan Baghdadi. Andrew's and Lucas' Group were to clear the battlefield and the 215th Field Artillery Brigade and the 395th Siege Battery were to move back to Sahiliya to ease the supply situation. General Brooking was on his way by motor to see his infantry brigade commanders and General Cassels.

Capturing a number of Turkish transport wagons with their escorts *en route* and also about 100 prisoners after a short action southward of the town, the 13th Light Armoured Motor Battery reached Haditha† without difficulty ; and Hogg's Group, following it, arrived there about 10 a.m. Continuing to advance for some miles beyond Haditha, these

* An aeroplane, piloted by Colonel Tennant, and carrying Major Hobart (Brigade Major, 8th Infantry Brigade) as a passenger, had been shot down on the 25th March near the Khan Baghdadi position ; and both officers had been taken prisoner.

† It was found that the Germans here had burnt their wireless installation.

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troops found the road littered with abandoned carts, animals, camp equipment and personal effects of all kinds; and sent back to Haditha groups of Turks, totalling over 300, who as a rule had surrendered without resistance. The demoralisation of the fleeing enemy had been much added to by the bombing and machine gun fire of our aeroplanes, which were also pushing on in the hope of seeing some signs of Colonel Tennant and Major Hobart.


General Brooking caught up General Cassels in the vicinity of Alus about 10 a.m., and gave him the following further instructions. All the troops—11th Cavalry Brigade, Light Armoured Motor Brigade, 1072nd Battery, R.F.A., and part of Hogg's Group to be carried in 100 Ford vans—carrying on the pursuit beyond Haditha, were to be under General Cassels' orders. He was to occupy Ana, try and rescue Colonel Tennant and Major Hobart, destroy or evacuate the wireless installation and stores at Ana and try and find 18,000 gold liras said to be meant for Ajaimi.* His stay at Ana was to be limited.

Having issued orders for the 11th Cavalry Brigade, after rationing and getting rid of all superfluous personnel and impedimenta, to be ready to move from Alus at 1.45 p.m., General Cassels left by motor to catch up Colonel Hogg and the Light Armoured Motor Brigade. General Cassels joined Colonel Hogg beyond Haditha about noon; and gave him orders to form a post at Haditha, to send back 200 Ford vans at once to Khan Baghdadi and with as many men as he could carry in the remaining 100 vans to proceed, together with the Light Armoured Motor Brigade, to Fuhaima. The 11th Cavalry Brigade would arrive at Fuhaima in the evening; and the next morning (28th) the whole force would advance on Ana. General Cassels then proceeded to reconnoitre the route to Ana from an aeroplane and, flying back, rejoined his Cavalry Brigade at Alus at 12.45 p.m.

These arrangements were carried out without a hitch and by nightfall, more Turkish prisoners having been captured in the meantime, the force was bivouacking about Fuhaima. Among the prisoners were Nazim Bey, commanding the Turkish 50th Division, and some of his staff, who had slipped away during the previous night and had been hiding in the hills about Haditha. That evening also the Reserve Group, after a march of about twenty-two miles, went into bivouac at the Wadi Haqlan.

* The report that this sum was in the vicinity was, however, considered doubtful.

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PURSUIT

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The Light Armoured Motor Brigade passed through Ana without opposition at 8.30 a.m., on the 28th March. Hearing of this a quarter of an hour later, General Cassels motored straight there leaving orders for the Cavalry Brigade and Hogg's Group to follow.* By questioning the chief inhabitants, General Cassels gathered that Colonel Tennant and Major Hobart had left Ana for Aleppo on camels on the morning of the 27th, that some Germans and the wireless installation had left on the evening of the 27th, and that the very few Turks and Tartar cavalry† in the town had scattered in all directions on hearing of our approach that morning. General Cassels then gave orders for the despatch of some armoured cars along the Aleppo road with the object of rescuing Colonel Tennant and Major Hobart and of capturing the wireless, the Germans and the influential Arabs accompanying them.

The 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery, which was leading, commanded by Captain Tod, was detailed for this operation. It had already, about five miles above Ana, captured the Turkish commandant of Ana and about twenty other officers‡; and it now proceeded to advance again, with orders to push on, if necessary and possible, for one hundred miles to carry out its task. After going some distance, the battery encountered a party of about 150 Turks, whom it captured after some slight resistance; and from one of the captured officers Captain Tod gathered that Colonel Tennant and Major Hobart had been hurried forward from there on camels about two hours previously. Captain Tod at once pushed on again, succeeded in overtaking the two British officers and, by his skilful handling of his cars, in rescuing them, at a point about thirty-two miles west of Ana.§ The battery also captured the Ana wireless installation; and, after proceeding about fifty miles beyond Ana, returned to that town.

At Ana, as at Haditha, large quantities of war material and large numbers of *shakties* were found; but as only a small part of these stores could be evacuated in the available transport, the greater part was ordered to be destroyed.

During the 28th March the Reserve Group reached Haditha. On the 29th the 13th Light Armoured Motor Battery went

* They reached Ana between 10 and 11 a.m.

† Mainly deserters from the Russian army.

‡ In the war diary of the battery this commandant is said, evidently by mistake, to have been the commander of the 50th Division, who had really already surrendered at Haditha the previous afternoon.

§ Details of this stirring rescue are given by Colonel Tennant in his book "In the Clouds above Baghdad." For his action Captain Tod was awarded an immediate D.S.O.

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seventy-three miles beyond Ana in an unsuccessful search for the gold liras ; and all General Brooking's troops not actually required in the forward areas were moved back to Hit in order to lessen the demands for supplies.

The stores at Ana were blown up on the 30th March and General Cassels' troops withdrew to Fuhaima, from which a gradual withdrawal continued for the next few days. By the 6th April,* the British advanced dispositions on the Euphrates consisted of a brigade group at Haditha, a small post at Alus and the headquarters of the 15th Division with another brigade group at Khan Baghdadi.

The striking success achieved by General Brooking was all the more notable in that their recent experience at Ramadi must have imbued the Turks with the necessity for special vigilance. Success was due, in the first place, to General Brooking's complete preparatory arrangements, to his skilful dispositions and to his immediate and resolute pursuit ; while in the execution of his plans, the gallantry, dash and endurance of his officers and men, the fine leadership of General Cassels, the excellent co-operation by aeroplanes and the work of the armoured cars and mechanical transport all contributed to the decisive results. Although the early mornings had been cool and pleasant, it had been very hot daily from about 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. ; and this and the dust had proved very trying, though mitigated to some extent by the excellent arrangements for the supply of drinking water by the motor vans.


During the operations, in which practically the whole of the Turkish 50th Division was accounted for, the total British casualties only amounted to 159, including 36 killed or missing. We buried 40 Turkish dead, others being buried by the Turks, and we captured 5,254 prisoners, including 18 Germans. In addition we took 12 guns, 47 machine guns and large quantities of arms, ammunition and other war material.

These operations revealed how much the road down the Euphrates above Khan Baghdadi had been improved recently. With only one exception, all the crossings over the numerous ravines had either been bridged† or made passable for motor traffic ; and in many places the road had been regraded. On

* Between the 31st March and 3rd April there was much rain, which caused high floods in all the ravines and interfered considerably with movement.

† For instance at the Wadi Haqlan two new masonry bridges, one of eleven arches and the other of three, had been made.

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NAJAF CONSPIRACY

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the Euphrates itself Germans had organised a flotilla of launches and barges carrying guns, of which we had sunk or captured four launches and two barges.


There had, in the meantime, been trouble lower down the Euphrates. On the 19th March the British political officer at Najaf (Captain W. M. Marshall) was murdered in that city. Captain Marshall, in common with the majority of our young military-political officers, was distinctly popular among the local inhabitants, and as General Marshall said in his Despatch (1st October, 1918) the murder was due to enemy agency. General Marshall's description of the subsequent events is worth quoting as it illustrates well some of the difficulties and dangers of our occupation of the country behind our fighting fronts.

"... among the evilly disposed inhabitants of Najaf a conspiracy, fostered by German gold,* had been organised The roots of this conspiracy were in Najaf and its branches extended both up and down the Euphrates valley. To put down this conspiracy, therefore, and to mete out stern justice to those actually concerned in the murder was from every point of view an urgent necessity. It was not desired to treat the city, which contains one of the most holy shrines of the Shiah and is surrounded by a very high wall, in an ordinary way, i.e., by shelling or by direct assault. A strict blockade was, therefore, ordered and gradually the blockade line closed in and occupied the bastions of the walls as well as holding the entrance gates. Every consideration was shown to the holy *Ulema* and to the theological students (most of whom were Persian subjects) and had it been necessary to proceed to extremities all these would have been given an asylum Eventually by the 30th April† the proscribed persons had been handed over and the blockade was raised The firmness with which the situation was handled, the fairness with which the law-abiding inhabitants were treated and the scrupulous care which was taken to avoid damage to holy persons and places, created a most favourable impression on all the surrounding tribes and contributed in no small degree to the subsequent establishment of friendly relations"

* Full evidence to this effect was found in German documents captured on the Euphrates.

† Despatch says 19th, a clerical error.

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In the middle of March confirmation was obtained of previous reports that part, or all, of the Turkish 6th Division had moved back from the Kirkuk to the Mosul area ; but beyond this, the operations already mentioned and some minor punitive measures, there was little incident of military importance in Mesopotamia during March.


On the 14th March, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief in India and to Generals Allenby and Marshall a summary of his appreciation of the situation in the Near East resulting from the Russian and Rumanian collapses. Broadly speaking, he said, Germany had aimed at world domination by obtaining facilities for naval expansion to contest British supremacy and by gaining complete control of Central Europe and the Near East with a view to expansion eastwards. But the course of the war had modified her original methods of attainment. She was now placing reliance on her unlimited submarine warfare ; and—her plans for gaining control of the Balkans, Egypt and the Persian Gulf having been foiled—she hoped to take advantage of the state of Russia to gain a new route to the East by the Black Sea, Caucasus and Caspian.

Natural difficulties of communication and the spread of Bolshevism threatened to cut us off from Armenia and even the Caspian ; and Germany would be quick to take advantage of the situation. The Russians were evacuating Batum and that port was open to enemy parties. Although it was unlikely that Germany would be able, in the near future, to place any considerable bodies of troops in this area, we must expect a highly organised propaganda, backed by small bodies of German troops who would neglect no means of undermining British power in the East.

We must answer, said the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, by establishing a barrier to German progress eastwards. If Germany were left free to turn our flank by the north, our efforts based on Mesopotamia and India might be ineffectual. We should, therefore :

- (a) arrange immediately for Japanese intervention in Siberia ;
- (b) maintain our position in Mesopotamia and continue our pressure in Palestine ;
- (c) extend from Baghdad to the Caspian and build up local organisations on a foundation of military strength, working forward into the Caucasus in order to win over Armenia and make our influence predominate in the eastern ports of the Black Sea ; and

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Each infantry brigade now included a light trench mortar battery and a small arms ammunition section as integral parts of the brigade.

The heavy artillery had again been reorganised. The 1st and 3rd Corps now each contained two heavy artillery groups, each of a 60-pounder and two 6-inch howitzer batteries; and two siege batteries of 6-inch howitzers formed part of "Army Troops."


Nine mechanical transport companies had arrived in Mesopotamia in January and February; and the personnel of the mechanical transport companies was being diluted with Indians.

At the end of April, 1917, the naval forces in the country had been merged in the Persian Gulf Division and Rear-Admiral D. St. A. Wake had taken over command in Mesopotamia from Captain Nunn. In January, 1918, eight of the "Fly" class gunboats were handed over to the army, their naval personnel being withdrawn to help cope with the submarine peril in Europe. These eight vessels were transferred to the Inland Water Transport Service for use as river steamers, their guns being used to form anti-aircraft sections "M," "N," "O," "P" and "R."


Owing to the difficulties of navigation of the Tigris above Baghdad, none of the naval gunboats had at the beginning of 1918 gone further upstream than the mouth of the Adhaim. The three Turkish steamers *Baghdad*, *Hamidiya* and *Burhanish* had retired above this, but no charts of this part of the river were available and there were known to be many shallows, rapids and hidden rocks. Between January and March, 1918, the *Caddisfly*, steaming up at times when the river was swollen by winter rains, managed to get up to Tikrit and charted the river with some accuracy between that place and Samarra.* In March, owing to the continued call for naval personnel to deal with the "U" boats, the remaining eight gunboats were also transferred to the army. From four of them the guns were withdrawn and sent to England, the ships themselves becoming ordinary river steamers. The other four, however, remained as fighting ships, being commissioned as such under military control; officers and machine gunners being found by the Inland Water Transport Service and gun crews by the Royal Artillery.

* For details of this trip, see "The Tigris above Baghdad," by Lieutenant-Commander A. S. Elwell-Sutton, R.N., in the "Geographical Journal" of July, 1922.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد ١٧." [٨٩ظ] (١٨٣/٥٤٠)




"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٩٠ و] (١٨٤/٥٤٠)




"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٩٠ ظ] (٥٤٠/١٨٥)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٩١] (١٨٦/٥٤٠)



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irregular forces, under British leaders, from the Kurds and other warlike tribes inhabiting the areas along the probable Turkish lines of advance. The bad weather hindered the despatch of reinforcements from Mesopotamia, but during the month General Dunsterville was joined at Hamadan by a total of 35 British officers and 40 British other ranks for duty with his Mission, by one squadron 14th Hussars and three armoured cars of the 6th Light Armoured Motor Battery.


As the month passed, the enemy's intentions became clearer. It was learnt that in March a military mission under Nuri Pasha (brother of Enver) had left Turkey for the Caucasus to organise there, with German support, a force of local Mahomedans* to fight the Armenians and Bolsheviki and gradually to occupy Persian Azerbaijan. This latter movement was ostensibly to cover the enemy operations in the Caucasus, but was actually intended as a first step towards penetration into Persia. On the 15th April the Turks occupied Batum, whence at this time their line ran roughly south-westward via Ardahan and east of Sarikamish to a point near Lake Van. On this front, where their force was estimated at about six divisions with a total strength of some 25,000 combatants, the only opposition to their advance was from the Armenians who were unlikely to be able to withstand them for long. Later in the month the Turks captured Kars, and small bodies of their troops were reported as having entered Persian Azerbaijan in a movement evidently converging on Tabriz from the north-west, west and south-west. A Turkish division was said to be advancing against Urmia from the northward, in co-operation with a force of some 2,500 troops detached from the Turkish Sixth Army in Mesopotamia via Ruwandiz; and in this area a body of Assyrians and other Christians† was said to be offering a stubborn resistance to the Turkish advance. In their advance on Persian Azerbaijan via Urmia, the Turks were trying to gain the co-operation of the Kurds and other warlike tribes in this area, i.e., the same elements which General Dunsterville was reckoning on to oppose the Turkish advance.

The situation in Trans-Caucasia was chaotic. The Federal Government, which still kept nominal control, declared the

* This was the so-called "Islam Army," of which reports began to reach us in May.

† The generic term of "Jelas," applying to the various Christian tribes operating in this area, was used in the reports of the period; and this nomenclature will be followed in the ensuing narrative.

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GERMAN INTENTIONS

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
independence of the Republic on the 22nd April and tried to re-open negotiations with Turkey, but Turkish troops continued to advance eastward. It was clear that the Georgians meant to come to a separate agreement with Germany, that the Mahomedans, resenting our support of the Armenians and largely under enemy influence, were strongly anti-British, and that our only chance of effective intervention lay in an arrangement with the Armenians and Bolsheviki. Having regard to our attitude towards the loyal elements in Russia, an agreement with the Bolsheviki would not be easy. But the way seemed clearer when, in the middle of April, the Bolsheviki requested British assistance in reorganising the Russian Black Sea fleet; a request which was due apparently to the virtual annexation of the Ukraine by Germany and a German advance towards the Crimea. On the 1st May the Germans occupied Sevastopol and seized part of the Russian Black Sea fleet. Besides giving Germany control over the greater part of the Black Sea littoral, this movement would open to her the main railway from European Russia to Baku along the north of the Caucasus range, where loyal Russian elements were still holding out with French support against both Bolshevism and Germany. The whole situation was thus extraordinarily complicated.

By German influence, however, Turkey was brought to accept the policy of concluding peace with Georgia and Armenia, and German and Turkish delegates arrived at Batum on the 6th May to conduct the negotiations.

The enemy dispositions in Mesopotamia during April appeared to be little changed. On the Euphrates, where we had effectually stopped, for the time being, any idea of an enemy offensive by the destruction of his advanced depots of ammunition and stores; small Turkish detachments re-occupied Ana and Haditha towards the end of April, but there were no other signs of coming activity. The XVIII Corps on the Tigris still held positions at and above Fat-ha; and the troops of the XIII Corps, whose headquarters were at Kirkuk, were widely scattered to the east and south-east of Mosul, being believed to be generally disposed as follows.* The headquarters of the 6th Division was located at Erbil and during the month part of it (apparently including part or all of the 16th and 22nd Regiments) was believed to have moved from Mosul to Ruwandia; while the 18th Regiment, with three or four

* See Map 39.

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frontier battalions, was at Sulaimaniya and near the Persian frontier about Saqqiz,* Bane, Penjwin and Halebja. Of the 2nd Division, whose headquarters with a battalion and eight guns were at or near Tuz Khurmatli, a battalion was believed to be at Taus, another battalion with two guns at Abu Gharaib, a cavalry squadron, a battalion and the divisional assault company at Kifri, and a cavalry squadron, four battalions and eleven guns in the neighbourhood of Qara Tepe. There were no indications of any reinforcements being sent to Mesopotamia and it was unlikely that the Turks would divert any from Syria. Reliable information had been received that the Turkish railhead was still west of Nisibin and that work had ceased on railway extension owing to lack of material. The Turks were also known to be suffering from raids on their lines of communication by Arabs and Yezidis; and there was confirmation from several sources that their men were badly fed, short of clothing, on bad terms with the Germans and heartily sick of the war.† Moreover, deserters were still coming in to us regularly, the total number during April being about two hundred.

General Egerton, who was placed in command of the coming operations in the Tuz Khurmatli-Qara Tepe area, issued his orders on the 12th April, in conformity with the plan decided on between General Marshall and himself. This plan, while simulating a converging attack upon Qara Tepe and Kifri, really aimed at striking at Abu Gharaib and Tuz Khurmatli so as to cut off and destroy any force to the east and south-east of those places.

Four columns—termed A, B (subdivided into B.1 and B.2), C and D§—were organised for the purpose. Bridging material

* About seventy miles north-east of Sulaimaniya.

† In a letter written by a German officer in Mesopotamia in February 1918 and captured by us on the Western Front, the condition of the Turkish soldiery was described as so bad that the writer considered that if we advanced we could take Mosul without difficulty.


§ COLUMN A (under General Holland-Fryer, 6th Cavalry Brigade)

6th Cavalry Brigade { 21st and 22nd Cavalry, 15th Machine Gun Squadron (less one section), No. 2 Field Troop Sappers and Miners, and administrative units;

13th Hussars } from 7th Cavalry Brigade.
7th Cavalry Brigade }
Field Troop, R.E.

8th Cavalry and one section 61st Batteries, R.F.A., double-horsed; "N" Anti-aircraft Section; a special raft unit from 11th Cavalry Brigade; Nos. 8 and 13 Light Armoured Motor Batteries; Infantry Lewis gun detachment in fifty Ford vans (150 rifles and 2 Lewis guns); and administrative units.

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BRITISH CONCENTRATION

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was to be carried with each column; and, as they would be operating for considerable distances from railhead over a wide and difficult area, elaborate arrangements for their supply were made, necessitating the use of some 1,200 mechanical transport vans for Columns A, B and C and of a further 100 vans for Column D. Six aeroplanes each were allotted to Columns A and B, three each to Columns C and D, and a further two flights for such general assistance as might be necessary.

The British preliminary movements were somewhat delayed by heavy rain, but by the 24th April the columns had concentrated as follows:—Column C at Mirjana on the Diyala, Columns A and B near Delli Abbas and between that place and the Jabal Hamrin, and Column D at Satha on the Adhaim. Great care had been taken to maintain secrecy and the Turks appeared to be in ignorance of the impending attack.

The strength of the Turkish 2nd Division units, whose general dispositions have already been given, in the Tuz Khurmatli-Abu Gharaib-Qara Tepe-Kifri area was estimated at 100 sabres, 2,900 rifles and 23 guns, their nearest reinforcement—a battalion of about 350 rifles—being at Tanq, twenty miles north-west of Tuz Khurmatli.

The movements of the various British columns from the 24th to the 27th April were to be as follows. Column A,

COLUMN B. (under General Cayley, 13th Division).

B.1.

12th Cavalry (less three squadrons); B.55th and one section 60th Battery, R.F.A.; one section 26th Mountain Battery; No. 92 Anti-aircraft section; one section 71st Company, R.E.; 38th Infantry Brigade (less 6th South Lancashire and one section machine gun company); 9th Royal Warwickshire, from 39th Brigade; half company 8th Welch Pioneers; 13th Divisional Cyclist Company; one section 273rd Machine Gun Company; and administrative units.

B.2.

Advanced Headquarters 13th Division; one squadron 12th Cavalry; 55th Brigade, R.F.A. (less one battery and one section); 384th Siege Battery, horse-drawn; 26th Mountain Battery (less two sections); 40th Infantry Brigade; 7th Gloucestershire from 39th Brigade; 273rd Machine Gun Company (less one section); one section each 71st and 88th Companies, R.E.; half company 8th Welch Pioneers; and administrative units.

COLUMN C. (under General Marischlan, 37th Infantry Brigade).

Headquarters 37th Infantry Brigade, with the 2nd Norfolk, 82nd Punjab and half No. 167 Machine Gun Company; one squadron 14th Hussars; headquarters 13th Brigade, R.F.A., with 44th and C.69th Batteries; 2/104th Heavy Battery, R.G.A.; one section No. 15 Light Armoured Motor Battery; 15th Company, Sappers and Miners; and administrative units.

COLUMN D. (under General Norton, 7th Cavalry Brigade).

14th Lancers; "V" Battery, R.F.A.; one section No. 14 Light Armoured Motor Battery; and administrative units.

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advancing northward via Ain Laila was, on the 27th, to surprise and destroy the Turkish force at Tuz Khurmati and Yanija Buyuk. Column C, which was not to advance from the Diyala till the 28th, was to close on Qara Tepe on the 27th and hold the enemy to his position there, while Column B.2, having advanced via Narin Köpri, was to be disposed so as to prevent the enemy withdrawing to the north-west from Qara Tepe. On the left, Column D was to demonstrate against Abu Gharab so as to induce the Turkish force there to occupy its positions on the Jabal Hamrin facing south and thus enable Column B.1 to surprise and destroy it by an advance from Umr Maidan early on the 27th.

By evening of the 26th April General Egerton's columns had reached the following positions:—

General Egerton's headquarters—Ain Laila,

Column C—Sadda,

Column B.2—Narin Köpri,*

Column B.1—Umr Maidan (accompanied by a detachment under Colonel Crocker, 8th Cheshire, from B.2),

Column A.—Three to six miles north of Umr Maidan,*


Column D.—In contact with the enemy south of Abu Gharab.

On the morning of the 26th an air report indicated some enemy withdrawal towards Kifri from Qara Tepe. But later reports showed no signs of any general Turkish retrograde movement, and Column A only encountered small enemy patrols during the day.

During the night of the 26th/27th, the different columns, experiencing difficulty owing to the squally and rainy weather, advanced in the following directions—Column C on Qara Tepe, Column B.2 on Umr Maidan, Colonel Crocker's detachment on Abu Aliq, Column A on Tuz Khurmati and Column B.1 towards Abu Gharab. The move of Colonel Crocker's detachment was intended to head off any enemy withdrawal to the north-westward from Qara Tepe; and Column B.1 was to attack, in co-operation with Column D, the Abu Gharab detachment at 6 a.m. on the 27th. But during the night the Turks withdrew rapidly from Qara Tepe towards Kifri and from Abu Gharab towards Tuz Khurmati; and on the morning

* Column B.2 constructed a bridge across the Narin at Narin Köpri and Column A constructed a bridge across the Lesser Naft at a point, about three miles north of Umr Maidan, whence a track led north-eastward to Kulwan and Tuz Khurmati.

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SOUTHERN KURDISTAN

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of the 27th April, our troops occupied Qara Tepe, Abu Aliq and Abu Gharuib without opposition. Column B.2 reached a point about four miles north-west of Umr Maidan; and Column A, having experienced difficulty in traversing the waterlogged area and in crossing a series of ravines, arrived at a point about ten miles south of Kulawand by daybreak.*

A great part of the country over which these operations were being carried out was a fertile undulating plateau lying about a thousand feet above sea-level and intersected by only a few low ridges (averaging two to three hundred feet in height) until it merged into the hills and mountains to the northward. It was well watered by streams, flowing in some places through deep ravines and in others through ground which quickly became swampy and difficult after rain. At this period, much of the area was covered with long stretches of clover, wild oats and barley and with magnificent crops of corn, not quite ripe; while the vivid green of the landscape was besprinkled with patches of white daisies, scarlet poppies and other flowers recalling an English June. For officers and men, the change from the Mesopotamian plain was very pleasant, enhanced as it was by the coolness of a late season; and the animals revelled in the splendid grazing. It was clear that the loss of this fertile district, just before the harvest, would be very serious for the badly fed enemy.


After a short halt at dawn on the 27th April, Column A continued its northward advance (covered by a wide screen of the 13th Hussars to its front and by a squadron 22nd Cavalry pushed out on its right to cut the telegraph line along the Kifri-Tuz Khurmatli road) till, about 8.15 a.m., when, about five miles south of Kulawand, it came under hostile shell-fire from the north-west and halted. Reconnaissance in that direction disclosed about fifty Turkish infantry with one gun, evidently the rear guard of the Abu Gharuib detachment; and about the same time an air report was received which stated that the enemy, some 600 strong, was holding a position covering Kulawand.†

General Holland-Pryor directed the 13th Hussars, supported on their right by the 21st Cavalry, to advance straight on this position, the 22nd Cavalry with the artillery and machine guns to follow in support on the left rear of the Hussars, and the light armoured motor batteries with the Lewis gun detachment


* Sunrise was about 5.20 a.m.

† See Map 40.

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there and the coal mines were found to have been flooded by the enemy, but were otherwise undamaged. During the night of the 27th/28th, Column B.2 closed up to a point ten miles south of Kulawand.*

Preceded by two strong detachments, sent out before dawn to reconnoitre Tuz Khurmatli and the Khasradala ford on the Aq Su respectively, Column A started to advance north-westward at 6.30 a.m. on the 28th April. At 10 a.m. General Holland-Pryor established his headquarters four miles west of Kulawand where he was joined, first by General Cayley and then by General Egerton. The detachment sent to reconnoitre Tuz Khurmatli, consisting of two squadrons 13th Hussars with some armoured cars, found the enemy in occupation of the trenches south of that place; and here these two squadrons remained in close contact with the enemy for the rest of the day. The detachment of two squadrons 21st Cavalry sent to the Khasradala ford reached it without opposition at 9 a.m.; and one squadron crossing there occupied a knoll one and a half miles to its north. Meanwhile the 21st Cavalry (less two squadrons), sent at 8 a.m. to move on Yanija Buyuk, had found that it was held strongly by the enemy.


As the result of the discussion at General Holland-Pryor's headquarters, it was decided that Column A should cross the Aq Su by the Khasradala ford so as to get behind the enemy and cut him off from Tauq. By noon Column B.1, which had left Abu Gharaib at 5 a.m., had reached a point six miles west of Kulawand; and Column B.2 was to start again in the afternoon for Kulawand.†

The bulk of Column A concentrated at Khasradala by 3 p.m., but had to halt there while the ford was made passable for the wheeled traffic. Enemy guns (between Tuz Khurmatli and Yanija Buyuk) shelled the ford throughout the afternoon and evening; and in the afternoon the guns from General O'Dowda's Column B.1, moving forward to support Column A, came into action about two miles south of Yanija Buyuk.

* On the 26th April, a small column under Lieutenant-Colonel G. Underhill (one troop 14th Hussars, one section 8th Field Battery, one section 27th Machine Gun Company, one company 62nd Punjab and 100 mounted irregulars under the local Political officer) left Khaniqin and, on the 27th, the infantry crossed the Diyala, in pontoons with much difficulty, at a point directly between Khaniqin and Kifri. No opposition was encountered, as the enemy had evacuated his posts in that area; and the column arrived back at Khaniqin on the 28th. The irregulars had given useful assistance and the local inhabitants had been friendly.

† It reached the vicinity of that place after dark, sunset being about 6.30 p.m.

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BRITISH OPERATION ORDERS

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From here they registered the Turkish gun positions with a view to operations next morning. During the day, our aeroplanes, meeting with no opposition in the air, reconnoitred actively, besides bombing and firing with their machine guns on all enemy troops observed. From their reconnaissance and that of the cavalry, General Cayley gathered that enemy guns were in position near Yanija Buyuk and north-east of Tuz Khurmatli and that his infantry and machine guns were covering the Aq Su crossing south of Tuz Khurmatli from trenches on the right bank.

At 5.25 p.m. General Cayley issued the following order :

"General plan to-morrow's operations is for Column A to get astride Tuz-Tauq road by 5 a.m. 40th Brigade by 5 a.m. to be at a point about two miles north of Kulawand* and attack northwards. Column B.1 by 5 a.m. to be across the Aq Su north of Khasradala* whence attack will be made on Yanija and Tuz. Column A will report time Tuz-Tauq roads will be reached, on receipt of which information definite orders will be issued. It is probable that four battalions Turks are still in Tuz. Khasradala ford is now in our hands."


At 8.45 p.m. General Cayley's headquarters received a telephone message from Column A, which was understood to mean that the cavalry were already roughly on a line from the Aq Su, just west of Yanija Buyuk, north-eastwards astride the Tuz-Tauq roads to the hills. In point of fact, the cavalry were not yet on this line.† But, in the belief that they were and that Yanija Buyuk had been evacuated by the enemy, General Cayley at once modified his previous instructions, saying that the only route of escape for the Turks was the track leading north-eastward from Tuz. The 40th Brigade was by 5 a.m. to be at a point about a mile south of the left bank of the Aq Su opposite Tuz, having pushed one of its battalions during the night through the Naft Dagh to reach and block as early as possible next morning the routes leading north-east out of Tuz; and Column B.1 was to be at Yanija Buyuk at 5 a.m.

As these instructions were being issued, however, a report came in from Column B.1 that their 12th Cavalry patrols had been fired on heavily at dusk from Yanija Buyuk; and

* In the actual order these points were denoted by map square references.

† It is impossible, from the available records, to explain the mistake.

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PROGRESS OF BRITISH ATTACK 155

At 10.15 p.m. General Cayley issued orders that after Tuz was occupied Column A was to send armoured cars to Tang, and that two squadrons 12th Cavalry* and the divisional cyclists under Lieutenant-Colonel Deane (12th Cavalry) were to pursue the enemy along the road and through the hills north of Tuz.


At 11.30 p.m. the 21st and 22nd Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel L. A. G. Hanmer, 21st Cavalry, moved forwards towards Yanija Kuchuk; but, owing to the swampy ground and frequent irrigation channels and to having to make a detour about 1 a.m. to avoid a Turkish post, they made very slow progress. Reaching a knoll about two miles to the south-westward of Yanija Kuchuk at 4.45 a.m. on the 29th, the 21st Cavalry halted to take up its allotted line to the eastward. The 22nd Cavalry continued north-eastward and as day broke came under heavy machine gun and gun fire from positions in the vicinity of Yanija Kuchuk; this caused the 22nd to dismount and engage in a fire action with the hostile machine guns. About daybreak also the 13th Hussars (still less two squadrons), supported by the fire of B/66th Field Battery, engaged the enemy at Yanija Buyuk.

On the British right the 8th Royal Welch Fusiliers, with a machine gun section and a section 26th Mountain Battery, had started from Kulawand at 1.30 a.m. on the 29th April with orders to reconnoitre the enemy positions astride the Kifri road to the south of Tuz and, if these were held by the Turks, to work along the Naft Dagh so as to turn the position and, eventually, to cross the Aq Su and cut off enemy retreat to the north-eastward. They were to be supported by the remainder of General Lewin's group, leaving Kulawand at 3 a.m.

At 3.30 a.m. the leading Fusilier company found that the trenches astride the road were held by the enemy, apparently in some strength; and the next company, with the two mountain guns, was detached to seize the high ground to the north-east. On approaching the lower slopes of this ridge, however, this company was driven back by heavy rifle and machine gun fire; and the whole battalion finally took up a position in a watercourse close, and parallel, to the road. By this time (about 4.30 a.m.) the main body was approaching and General Lewin at once ordered his leading battalion (5th

* One squadron was with General O'Dowda, and the half squadrons with Generals Cayley and Lewin were to join Colonel Deane at Tuz as opportunity offered.

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Wiltshire) to relieve the pressure on the Fusiliers by capturing the crest of the Naft Dagh to the north-east. This was gained at about 5 a.m. without much difficulty, but the further advance of the Wiltshire was checked by the fire from an enemy strong point, which crowned a commanding feature of the ridge, and by the fire from four guns and four machine guns which could not at first be located. To support the Wiltshire, our artillery came into action about 5.30 a.m. and the 4th South Wales Borderers were pushed forward on the Wiltshire left, with the result that the strong point was captured at about 8 a.m. and the ridge, up to the Aq Su, cleared of the enemy by 9 a.m.

In the British centre, General O'Dowda's group, less its field artillery,* had left its bivouac at 1 a.m., to cross the Aq Su. Having moved through a ford a mile to the west of Khasradala, the main body commenced its advance on Yanija Buyuk at 4.45 a.m. The leading line of the infantry,† its right directed on the southern end of that village, consisted of the 6th King's Own (on the right) and the 6th Loyal North Lancashire; the 6th East Lancashire moved in rear of the North Lancashire in readiness to outflank the enemy from the north; and the 26th Mountain Battery section followed in close support. About 6 a.m. the infantry passed through the 13th Hussars, who were then withdrawn and sent by General Holland-Pryor to join the 21st and 22nd Cavalry and get astride the Tuz-Tauq roads. When about 1,500 yards from Yanija Buyuk, the Lancashire battalions began to come under considerable rifle and machine gun fire and also some artillery fire. But, with the effective support of their own artillery and of the well-directed fire of their machine gun sections, they pushed on steadily in good order and captured the village and three enemy guns, with only slight loss, before 7 a.m.


General O'Dowda had established his headquarters at the knoll one and a half miles north of the Khasradala ford, whence a good view was obtainable. Here he was joined, first by the 12th Cavalry squadron and divisional cyclist company under Colonel Deane‡ and then by the 7th Gloucestershire. At 7 a.m. Colonel Deane's detachment moved north-eastward with orders to close any gap between the cavalry of Column A and the left

* The artillery remained to come into action in its previous positions south of Yanija Buyuk.

† The cavalry, cyclists and armoured cars had been left behind, to cross the river at daybreak.

‡ The 14th Light Armoured Motor Battery had been unable to cross the ford.

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the left bank of the Tauq Chai. But, coming under hostile machine gun and artillery fire from the right bank, they stopped there and finally returned to Tuz.

The operations on the 29th April had been most successful. Though a number of the Turkish troops managed to escape into the hills, their losses were severe, apparently owing to some extent to their poor physical condition* rendering them incapable of sustained rapid movement. We buried over 200 of their dead and captured 1,300 prisoners, 12 guns, 29 machine guns, and large quantities of ammunition.† Our own casualties totalled only one hundred and ninety-four.‡

On the 30th April the 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery ascertained that the Turks had withdrawn from Tauq also.

In the meantime, General Marshall had taken another step to protect his Persian line of communication. The Sinjabis, one of the turbulent border tribes in German pay in the area north-east of Qasr-i-Shirin, became embroiled about this time in a local quarrel with their neighbours, the Kalhur and Guran tribes, who were friendly to us. Our local political officer at once represented that this afforded us a good opportunity to deal with the Sinjabis, the tribe most likely to give us trouble, by giving the Kalhur and Guran active military assistance. General Marshall agreed; and a column under Major Ivens (28th Punjabis), consisting of one squadron 14th Hussars, one section 26th Mountain Battery, two companies 26th Punjabis and a machine gun, was sent to co-operate.


A brief action took place on the 25th April in which our aeroplanes assisted most effectively, in spite of the unfavourable weather. The general results were very satisfactory. The defeated Sinjabis suffered heavy casualties and lost large numbers of their animals; German influence became thoroughly discredited, while British prestige increased; serious raiding stopped; the senior Sinjabi chief, together with tribal representatives in Kermanshah, went to our Consulate there and made submission; and our action was welcomed by the Persian public, who had suffered considerably in the past from these raids. As General Dunsterville said in a letter of the 5th May, this action "has enormously improved the situation

* They were very short of food and clothing and badly shod.


† About half the prisoners, two guns and nine machine guns were taken by the cavalry of Column A.

‡ Units incurring the heaviest losses were the 6th King's Own, 42; 8th Loyal North Lancashire, 20; 8th Royal Welch Fusiliers, 63; 26th Mountain Battery, 13; 21st Cavalry, 23; and 22nd Cavalry, 14.

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
and he explained his views in the following telegram of the 2nd May to the War Office :

" With portion of IIIrd Corps in Tuz Khurmatli area and with mobile column from 1st Corps based on Tikrit I am making arrangements to capture Kirkuk. Underlying difficulty is one of maintenance. For IIIrd Corps, distance from railhead near Shahraban to Kirkuk is 120 miles over hill road with frequent river beds to be crossed, some of which are a mile wide and cause great delay to mechanical transport. To capture Kirkuk and maintain by this line the troops necessary to hold it entails placing the whole corps, while operations last, on reduced rations. By sending a mobile column from Tikrit I relieve to a certain extent the supply situation of IIIrd Corps, but this move necessitates my holding the Ain Nukhaila pass (twenty-five miles north-east of Tikrit) with a brigade of all arms in order to protect my seventy-five mile line, from Tikrit to Kirkuk, from the Turkish XVIII Corps, part of which holds the Jabal Hamrin from Fat-ha to Ain Nukhaila. I can maintain troops permanently at Kirkuk only by supplying them from Tikrit. This will necessitate strong posts along that road to prevent raids by the Turks from the line of the Little Zab, as well as the establishment in a strong position at Ain Nukhaila of at least one brigade. I should also have to extend the Samarra railway to Tikrit. I cannot but feel, as the summer is now commencing, that the formation of these posts coupled with the lack of shelter and water at Ain Nukhaila would seriously affect the health of the troops and would react on their subsequent efficiency. I do not think the distances in this country are fully realised, while the climatic conditions due both to rain and heat are a constant difficulty.

I would recommend that the limit of my forward posts in IIIrd Corps area be Tuz Khurmatli, as Kirkuk is so difficult of access. I can maintain a mobile column at Tuz, which will, I feel sure, be able to deny to the Turks the use of the Kirkuk-Sulaimaniya road for their wheeled traffic. The occupation of Kirkuk will, however, be ineffective as the proposed occupation of Tuz in blockading the pack roads leading to Sulaimaniya from the north.

As regards sending troops to Sulaimaniya I am unable to do so. Only goat tracks exist leading north-east from

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this was open to all the objections of heat and exposure as well as the necessity for railway extension from Samarra.

This telegraphic discussion continued, but, before giving an account of it, it is necessary to describe the operations for the capture of Kirkuk. For these, in order to meet supply requirements, the following readjustment of our dispositions, involving the withdrawal of some troops, was made. General Egerton's advanced force was reorganised into two commands, i.e., a striking force under General Cayley and a force to hold the line of communication under General Lewin. General Cayley's force was divided into two Columns, "A" (under General Holland-Pryor), consisting of one field battery, two light armoured motor batteries, two cavalry regiments and the mobile Lewis gun detachment and "B", consisting of one squadron of cavalry, eighteen guns and an infantry brigade. General Lewin's force comprised two squadrons of cavalry, eight guns, an infantry brigade and a machine gun company with a proportion of technical and administrative troops.* The line of communication to Tuz Khurmatli, which had hitherto run from near Delli Abbas via Ain Laila and Umr Maidan, was also altered to the route through Narin Köpri, Qara Tepe and Kifri.

On the 2nd May, the strength and dispositions of the Turkish Sixth Army (on the Tigris and in Kurdistan)† were estimated as follows. At Mosul, Army headquarters, 100 sabres, 1,150

* The composition of Generals Cayley's and Lewin's forces was as follows:—

Column A.—Headquarters 8th Cavalry Brigade, B/66th Battery, R.F.A., 8th and 13th Light Armoured Motor Batteries, 13th Hussars, 21st Cavalry, 15th Machine Gun Squadron less one section, No. 2 Field Troop Sappers and Miners, "M" Anti-aircraft section, 150 rifles with 32 Lewis guns carried in 50 Ford vans, and administrative units.


Column B.—12th Cavalry less three squadrons, 55th Brigade, R.F.A. less two batteries, one section 384th Siege Battery, 26th Mountain Battery less one section, 38th Infantry Brigade (with the 7th Gloucestershire from 39th Brigade in place of the 6th South Lancashire), and a proportion of technical and administrative units.

A flight of No. 30 Squadron, R.A.F., was also placed at General Cayley's disposal.

General Lewin's Force.—Two squadrons 22nd Cavalry, two batteries 55th Brigade, R.F.A., 40th Infantry Brigade, No. 273 Machine Gun Company, and a proportion of technical and administrative units.

† On the Euphrates, the Turks were reported to have a total of about 1,600 rifles and 9 guns, with small detachments at Asa and Halitha.

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ADVANCE ON KIRKUK

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rifles and 12 guns; about and above Fat-ha, the XVIII Corps,* 230 sabres, 7,080 rifles and 63 guns; and in the Erbil-Kirkuk-Ruwandiz area, the XIII Corps, 270 sabres, 7,900 rifles and 40 guns. The XIII Corps (2nd and 6th Divisions) was widely dispersed, its distribution being thought to be as follows:—Kirkuk-Altun Köpri, 120 sabres, 1,400 rifles and 12 guns; Erbil area, 1,250 rifles; Chemchemal-Sulaimaniya, 1,200 rifles and 4 guns (some of these might be reinforcing Kirkuk); Saqqiz-Penjwin, 1,600 rifles (irregulars); Ruwandiz and vicinity, 150 sabres, 2,450 rifles and 24 guns (part or all reported as moving towards Urmia).

The advance of General Cayley's force from Tuz Khurmatli towards Kirkuk was to start on the 4th May. To co-operate with this movement, the 1st Corps at Samarra was to detach a mobile column to seize and occupy the Ain Nukhadia pass and at the same time to move troops up both banks of the Tigris to beyond Tikrit, whence they were to keep the Turkish XVIII Corps under close observation, so as to take immediate advantage of any enemy advance from Fat-ha made with the object of relieving British pressure on Kirkuk.

The weather during the first week in May was stormy with much rain. From the 1st to the 3rd, General Cayley's armoured cars reconnoitred to the front† and on the latter date encountered a few Turks holding a position immediately to the south of Taza Khurmatli. This force was still in its position on the 5th May, when General Cayley's advancing force camped for the night at a point about two and a half miles north-east of Tauq. But on the morning of the 6th General Cayley occupied Taza Khurmatli without opposition and his force continued its advance, Column A gaining touch with the enemy about two miles south-west of Kirkuk. In the evening very heavy rain set in and Column A, after reconnoitring till after dark, went into bivouac about four miles west of Kirkuk, while Column B bivouacked seven miles north of Taza Khurmatli.

That night General Egerton reorganised his force into four portions, each under his direct orders, i.e., 6th Cavalry Brigade, Cayley's Force, Lewin's Force (concentrated near Taza

* 14th Division (3rd, 37th and 43rd Regiments) and 51st Division (7th 9th and 44th Regiments).

† They crossed the Tauq Chai by a bridge, left standing by the Turks, to the north-east of Tauq.

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Khurmatli) and Line of Communication troops* ; and at 12.20 a.m. on the 7th May, issued orders for the 6th Cavalry Brigade and Cayley's Force to reconnoitre in the morning northward to westward of Kirkuk. But the heavy rain continued throughout the night and, as this rendered the roads almost impassable, General Egerton at 6.40 a.m. telegraphed to his three forces that the day's operations would be limited to defensive reconnaissances and that the troops were to concentrate on the maintenance of road communication. Moreover, owing to the difficulty of transport movement caused by the rain, it had been necessary to put the force on half rations.

Owing, however, to the storm having caused a breakdown of communications, General Egerton's second order only reached General Cayley at 10 a.m., four and a half hours after his advanced guard (12th Cavalry less three squadrons, 6th East Lancashire Regiment, a machine gun section and a section of a field battery), under Colonel Deane, had started. This force saw at dawn that Kirkuk was on fire in places ; and soon afterwards, ascertaining that the town had been evacuated by the enemy, entered it at 8.45 a.m. Colonel Deane then proceeded to occupy the heights some two miles to the north of the town and sent his cavalry squadron to reconnoitre towards Altun Köpri. During the morning, patrols from the 6th Cavalry Brigade, which was mainly occupied in reconnoitring north-westward, also entered the town. In the afternoon this brigade went into bivouac to the south of Kirkuk, but the main body of Cayley's Force remained in its previous night's position. The heavy rain had ceased at 8 a.m., but there were showers during the day and in the evening there was a violent thunderstorm. The supply situation gave cause for considerable anxiety.

* 6th Cavalry Brigade (General Holland-Pryor).—13th Hussars, 21st Cavalry, B.96th Battery, R.F.A., 2nd Field Troop Support and Mice, two pack wireless stations and administrative units.

Cayley's Force.—12th Cavalry (less three squadrons), 55th Brigade, R.F.A. less two batteries, one section 384th Siege Battery, 38th Mountain Battery less two sections, 'M' Anti-aircraft Section, 38th Infantry Brigade, two sections 373rd Machine Gun Company, 8th and 10th Light Armoured Motor Batteries, mobile Lewis gun detachment, one pack wireless station and a proportion of technical troops and administrative units.

Lewis's Force.—One squadron 22nd Cavalry, two sections 55th Brigade, R.F.A., one section 28th Mountain Battery, half 40th Infantry Brigade, 27th Machine Gun Company less two sections, one pack wireless station and a proportion of technical troops and administrative units.

Line of Communication Troops.—Remainder of force firmly under General Lewis, with two armoured cars.

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
"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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British transport entering Kirkuk.

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Köpri, where a big explosion occurred about 7 p.m. At dark, General Holland-Pryor withdrew in accordance with his orders, his only casualties having been 7 wounded. Reconnaissance next day showed no signs of any enemy to the south of the Little Zab.

Concurrently with General Egerton's operations, troops from the 1st Corps had moved forward to the vicinity of Tikrit and to the Ain Nukhaila pass ; but the bad weather stopped attempts by armoured cars to move from Ain Nukhaila to Kirkuk. As a result of the constant reconnaissances* of the Fat-ha area by the 1st Corps aeroplanes, armoured cars and troops, it appeared that the Turks had withdrawn many of their advanced troops, leaving the Fat-ha position only lightly held. But we were not prepared for further operations and on the 15th May the columns of the 1st Corps, which had moved forward, started to withdraw and by the end of the month were back in their positions about Samarra.


On the 10th May, replying to General Marshall's and Monro's telegrams of the 2nd and 3rd, the War Office explained that its telegram of the 29th April had been sent without a full knowledge of General Marshall's maintenance difficulties. The main object, in order to ease the situation in Persia, was to strike hard at, and keep up the maximum pressure on, Turkish forces within reach ; and it was left to General Marshall to decide whether he could do this best by operations on the Kirkuk or the Tigris line. For the latter an extension of the railway to Tikrit would be approved.

The War Office said that General Dunsterville's operations must be regarded as a necessary part of the policy to be adopted, and their success would depend on the pressure which General Marshall could exert on the Turkish forces. It was obvious that General Dunsterville could neither make good the Caspian nor deny Persia to the enemy, if the Turks continued to enjoy full liberty of action in and through Persian Azerbaijan, and the size and mobility of Dunsterforce was limited by the amount of transport which General Marshall could make available without sacrificing the efficiency of the force necessary to establish British influence among the southern Kurds and to clear out the enemy on General Dunsterville's left flank.


As the tribal situation in South Kurdistan seemed favourable, the maintenance of a British force well forward there might develop Kurdish co-operation to an important extent.

* The enemy positions were also harassed by frequent air bombardments.


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i.e., to reach the Caspian and to maintain a force about Kazvin sufficient to secure Tehran. The risks entailed in the War Office proposal were fully justified by the far-reaching results of success; and it should not be abandoned till its execution had been proved to be impossible. The only danger to small bodies of our troops on the Persian road appeared to be from formed bodies of the enemy, who was still 150 miles off and for whom it would be as, or more, difficult to advance as it was for us. The levies being raised by General Dunsterville should assist us materially in the protection of the road and in giving us timely warning of any serious hostile approach. Every effort would be made to send General Marshall another ten mechanical transport companies before the end of the year. In the meantime a full report was required of local supplies in Persia, whose famine-stricken state did not appear to preclude altogether its ability to feed a small force.


On the 27th General Marshall said that the proposed motor column could carry petrol for 100 miles and that its radius of action could be increased by the establishment of petrol stores at Karvin, Tehran and other suitable points, while it was possible that petrol could also be obtained locally near the Caspian. The column would be able from Hamadan to reach Kazvin in fifteen hours and Tehran or Enzeli in another ten hours, while its headquarters could be moved to Kazvin as soon as petrol arrangements were assured. There appeared to be no reason why, if we employed the motor column, we should not reach the Caspian by the end of June. Owing to its great mobility, General Marshall considered that it would maintain much more effective control from Hamadan to Enzeli than a cavalry regiment and an infantry brigade. He was still of opinion that it was inadvisable to send the latter as he could not maintain it and, even if it succeeded in subsisting on local resources,* he doubted if it would be effective for the purpose required.

In conclusion, he suggested that the motor column should be given a trial. If it was unsatisfactory, its infantry and mechanical transport would be available on the spot and the War Office proposal could be proceeded with.

On the 28th May, the War Office sanctioned General Marshall's scheme with a view to securing command of the Caspian and asked for his proposals for armed launches or other craft, crews, etc.

* General Marshall sent a report on these separately.

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that Nuri Pasha was mainly occupied in forming a Turco-Tartar Islamic army for operations in south-eastern Caucasia and northern Persia. The movement via Urmia was checked by the gallant and stubborn opposition of the Jelus (helped by some Armenians), who, though isolated without support and short of ammunition, inflicted a serious defeat on parts of the Turkish 5th and 8th Divisions in this region in the middle of May.

At Baku the Social Revolutionary Party, with more moderate ideas than the Bolsheviki and favouring British assistance, seemed to be gaining in power. The Bolsheviki, too, alarmed by the progress of the German and Pan-Turkish schemes, declared themselves hostile to the Jangalis and invited Bicharakoff, who with 400 Russians and a British armoured car was still at Kazvin, to deal with the Jangalis and take command of the Baku-Gilan front. Bicharakoff agreed, but stipulated for British assistance; and to this the Bolsheviki gave a grudging and partial assent.


On the 11th May General Dunsterville telegraphed to Baghdad that he was convinced that an attempt could be successfully made to occupy Baku and control the Caspian* and that Bicharakoff was willing to try. But, as General Dunsterville had no troops to replace his,† Bicharakoff could not be spared from Kazvin; and it was impossible to say how long the opportunity would remain open.

On the 12th General Dunsterville left Hamadan to pay short visits to Kazvin and Tehran. After meeting Bicharakoff at Kazvin, General Dunsterville reported that they both agreed that it was in our mutual interests to hold the Karvin-Enzeli road, control the Caspian and free Bicharakoff to undertake operations in the Caucasus. But British assistance would be necessary. After seeing Sir Charles Marling at Tehran, General Dunsterville arrived back at Hamadan on the 18th May. On the 21st he heard from Colonel Clutterbuck (British liaison officer with Bicharakoff) that, in the opinion of Bicharakoff, news he had received showed that the situation demanded immediate action. The Germans were advancing on Northern Caucasia and Astrakhan, and the British would be welcomed

* The Caspian fleet of five gunboats was at Baku, manned by armed merchant crews, who could be bought.

† The squadron 14th Hussars from Hamadan had reached the vicinity of Kazvin on the 7th May; and there only remained at Hamadan, besides the special duty officers and men of the Mission, three armoured cars and a platoon of the 1/4th Hampshire Regiment.

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
"John Hampshire"

A Kurd boy (whose parents died of starvation on the Pai Tag Pass in spite of British efforts to save them), who was adopted by the 14th Hampshire and remained with the battalion till it left Persia in 1919, when he was sent to an orphan school.

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TROOPS REORGANISED

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proportion of divisional troops. In the same month the heavy artillery was reorganised into three brigades, 38th, 74th, and 101st,* as part of Army Troops; and these brigades were attached, respectively, to the IIIrd Corps, 15th Division and 1st Corps. In April also the 31st Mountain Battery arrived from India. The heavy British casualties in France in March had necessitated an urgent call on India for additional units for service overseas; and, to help India, Mesopotamia was called upon to provide a complete infantry company from each of sixty Indian infantry battalions. In this way fifteen trained battalions were furnished ready for immediate service elsewhere; while the sixty original battalions were filled up with recruits from India.

Early in May the Turkish air unit in Mesopotamia was reinforced by some new "Scout" machines, which resulted in a marked increase of hostile aerial activity; but it was found that in the numerous air combats the enemy generally broke away before a decision was obtained. Our air force was also very active in reconnaissance, offensive operations and photography. At the end of May the units of the 31st Wing, Royal Air Force,† were located as under:—

- 30th Squadron—Baquba, Kifri and Ramadi;
- 63rd Squadron—Samarra;
- 72nd Squadron—Baghdad, Samarra, Mirjana and Hamadan;
- 23rd Kite Balloon Company (51st and 52nd Sections)—Baghdad, Samarra and Ramadi;
- Aircraft Park—Baghdad.


* 38th Brigade.—2/104th Heavy Battery (60-pounders, horse-drawn), 269th Siege Battery (6-inch howitzers tractor-drawn) and 384th Siege Battery (6-inch howitzers, horse-drawn).

74th Brigade.—177th Heavy Battery (60-pounders, tractor-drawn), 257th Siege Battery (6-inch howitzers, tractor-drawn) and 395th Siege Battery (6-inch howitzers, tractor-drawn).

101st Brigade.—2/86th Heavy Battery (60-pounders, horse-drawn), 157th Heavy Battery (60-pounders, tractor-drawn), 159th Siege Battery (6-inch howitzers, horse-drawn) and 246th Siege Battery (6-inch howitzers, tractor-drawn).

† Designation changed on 1st April.

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TURCO-GERMAN ACTION

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was said that the Turks, alleging that British and Armenian troops had driven Turkish troops back from near Julfa, had begun to advance again. There appeared to be seven Turkish divisions (about 21,000 rifles and 250 guns) on this front, with their main strength in the Poti-Alexandropol area. German troops* were reported to be guarding the railway from Batum to Tiflis; and, though Turkish efforts to form bodies of local troops were reported to have met with little success, it was estimated that the enemy would be able to attack Baku in about a month's time.

It appears that on the 8th June the Georgian Government signed a treaty of peace with Germany, by which Georgia was to receive German financial aid and also military assistance to prevent Turkish infringement of Georgian rights and neutrality; and Germany was, in exchange, to receive priority in mineral concessions. On the 9th June German troops began landing at Poti and on the 12th occupied Tiflis. On the 8th June also, Turkey, acting apparently under German pressure, concluded treaties with Georgia and Armenia, recognising their independence. In return for such recognition, however, Armenia was forced to agree to a Turkish military occupation and to the free passage through its territory of Turkish troops. Thus, by the action of Germany, Turkey was denied the military use of railways through Georgia, the immense prejudicial effect of which on Turkish plans in regard to Baku and Russian Azerbaijan is evident from a glance at the map† According to German accounts this was justified by the arrangement come to between Turkey and Germany that Turkish military operations were to be confined mainly to an offensive into Persian Azerbaijan and that Baku was not to be occupied by Turks.


During June information was received that the 51st Turkish Division on the Tigris had been broken up and that at least three Turkish battalions had left Kirkuk for the Urmia front. It was also reported that 70,000 to 80,000 prisoners of war, who were fit for service, had returned to Turkey from Russia. On the other hand, an insurrectionary movement by the many thousands of deserters in Anatolia was said to be growing, though lack of organisation would probably militate against its having any great effect.

For his part, General Marshall contemplated no offensive in Mesopotamia during the hot weather. Many of his officers

* Apparently a local formation composed of released prisoners of war and a battalion from the Ukraine.

† See Map 41.

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and men were on leave; and, apart from climatic considerations, his orders to secure the Khaniqin—Hamadan—Enzeli road and to gain control of the Caspian required the employment of much of his transport. In the meantime, in view of possible eventualities in the autumn, he had started work on the extension northwards of the Samarra railway.

The wide dispersion of General Marshall's force at this period is noteworthy. The advanced detachments of the IIIrd Corps on his right extended from Kazvin* to Kifri and Tur Khurmatli; his Ist Corps was about Samarra on the Tigris; and the 15th Division, with headquarters at Ramadi on the Euphrates, had detachments at Hit and Sahliya.


The supply situation had improved owing to the completion, at the end of May, of the Baghdad—Hilla railway, which opened up a rich supply area and tended to relieve congestion on the line of communications. It was also estimated that, owing to the excellent harvests in the Hamadan area and to the amount of rice obtainable in the Enzeli district, sufficient supplies could be purchased in North-West Persia to feed 5,000 British troops.

On the 1st June General Marshall informed General Dumsterville that the mobile motor column, forming for the purpose of securing the Hamadan—Enzeli road, would probably be concentrated at Hamadan by the middle of the month. The column, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. L. Matthews (1/4th Hampshire), would consist of the 1/4th Hampshire, less two companies, (i.e., 400 rifles), two companies 1/2nd Gurkhas, (i.e., 600 rifles), one section 21st Mountain Battery and a detachment 20th Combined Field Ambulance. All the personnel of the column, with their equipment, ammunition, baggage and rations, were to be carried in five hundred Ford vans.

General Dumsterville was still engaged in raising levies at Hamadan, and a party of his British officers and non-commissioned officers at Zenjan were taking steps to raise levies or to subsidise the local tribes between there and Tabriz.

* The British troops on the road from Khaniqin to Kazvin were distributed as follows. From Khaniqin to Kermanshah (inclusive) the troops, under the IIIrd Corps, were the 30th Infantry Brigade (less one company, 1/4th Hampshire), 14th Hussars (less two squadrons), 12th Company Sappers and Miners, one company 128th Pioneers and one section each of the 8th Field, 2nd and 20th Mountain, and 6th Light Armoured Motor Batteries. Eastward of Kermanshah the area was under General Dumsterville and here there were at Hamadan one company 1/4th Hampshire and two armoured cars of the 6th Light Armoured Motor Battery and at Kazvin four armoured cars of the same battery and one squadron 14th Hussars.

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BAKU PROJECT PREPARATIONS

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Early in June he sent another party to Bijar with the same object and also to try to gain touch with the Jelus in the Urmia area, though this was not easy, as they were in an isolated situation and the local Persian officials and soldiery were actively hostile to them. Good progress had also been made recently, under General Marshall's orders, in raising a mounted levy corps of Kurds, recruited from the Khaniqin—Kifri—Sulaimaniya area, to check enemy hostilities on the line of the Upper Diyala.


On the 4th June General Marshall telegraphed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff that General Dunsterville was at Kazvin,* where he had Bicharakoff under his orders. As soon as the Dunsterforce armoured car squadron† and the mobile motor column arrived to hold the Kazvin—Enzeli line, Bicharakoff would go to Baku and Astrakhan. General Dunsterville proposed to send the leading armoured car squadron with Bicharakoff, followed later by such troops as could be made available; as this seemed to be the best opportunity which had so far occurred. Thinking that it was not too late to save the Baku oil and Krasnovodak cotton and obtain entire control of the Caspian, General Dunsterville desired eventually to proceed to Baku himself. He considered that no effect would be obtained by sending only one or two British officers to Baku, which town looked to us for effective support, and that there was no need to destroy the oil fields. General Marshall recommended that General Dunsterville should be given a free hand in regard to sending British troops to Baku on the condition that he retained control over them.

Replying on the 6th, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff said that H.M. Government did not object to General Dunsterville making preparations to send an armed force to Baku, but that, until the mobile motor column had arrived and consolidated the position on the Kazvin—Enzeli road, they did not consider that General Dunsterville, any British troops, or Bicharakoff and his Russians, should go to Baku. They considered that even then the movement on Baku should not take place without further reference to London and definite instructions from there. It was thought that the situation in Trans-

* General Dunsterville had just transferred his headquarters there.

† Formed in England in January 1918, mainly of personnel from Commander Locker-Lampson's armoured car unit which had returned from Russia at the end of 1917, the brigade was to consist of five squadrons (eight armoured cars each), a motor transport column, a mobile medical unit and a wireless section, all under command of Colonel J. D. Crawford (Indian army). The advanced party reached Baghdad on the 6th May and at the beginning of June one squadron was on its way to Kazvin.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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Caucasia would have cleared by the time the mobile column had reached the Caspian. Meanwhile General Marshall was to send a full appreciation of the situation, taking into account the reported transfer of two German battalions from the Ukraine and the reported advance of Turkish troops on Baku.

When this telegram was sent, reports received in London showed that the Bolshevik power appeared to be waning and that, as the universal hatred to the Bolshevik leaders in Russia increased, the separatist tendencies of the various races there were becoming more marked. But there was no party capable of inspiring public confidence sufficiently to replace the Bolsheviks and it consequently seemed evident that the enemy's designs in Russia could only be frustrated by Allied intervention. British troops were already operating to that end in North Russia; and the Allied Governments of Great Britain, France and Italy agreed to ask Japan to take action in Siberia, though—apparently for political reasons—the President of the United States of America demurred at Japanese intervention.

On the 9th June General Marshall telegraphed his appreciation. The enemy appeared to have complete command of the Black Sea. The Turks were believed to be holding Batum, Poti, Alexandropol, Tiflis, Marand, Bayazid and the railways connecting those places; while a short advance would give them Tabriz, though repairs to the railway might cause slight delay.

East of Tiflis progress would be facilitated by the Tartars, who had been recently fighting the Armenians and Bolsheviks near Baku. The Turkish force in Trans-Caucasia and the Urmia region was estimated at 1,500 sabres, 28,000 rifles and 124 guns, excluding irregular elements of the Islam army. Kurdish irregulars and artillery captured from the Russians. Portions of a German depot division were believed to be landing at Poti and a locally raised German regiment with about 800 Ukrainian troops was known to be in Tiflis. The enemy's regular troops were thus estimated at 35,000 and he had control of sea and railway communications to Tabriz and through Tiflis eastwards to within about one hundred miles of Baku.

The Tartars, who comprised the finest fighting material, appeared to be solidly pro-Turk and were believed to be able to produce 30,000 irregulars. The Armenians, except those fighting in company with the Jelus in the Urmia region and those at Baku, appeared to have made peace with the Turks.*

* This news had been just received.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٣ و] (٥٤٠/٢٣٠)




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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد VII". [١١٣ظ] (٢٣١/٥٤٠)

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


The road between Kaavin and Manjil.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١١٤ و] (٥٤٠/٢٣٢)




"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد VII". [١١٤ظ] (٢٣٣/٥٤٠)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV." [١١٥] (٥٤٠/٢٣٤)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٦ و] (٥٤٠/٢٣٦)



The Manjil bridge.

TURKS OCCUPY TABRIZ 183

the Caspian fleet or preventing it from falling into the enemy's hands. But the despatch of troops there or the assurance of armed help seemed to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff both inexpedient and dangerous.


On the 12th June Bicharakoff—with his Russians, one squadron 14th Hussars, two armoured cars of the 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery and two British aeroplanes—found his way to Enzeli barred at the bridge at Manjil by a Jangali force under German officers. After a vain attempt to parley on the part of the Germans, Bicharakoff attacked and dispersed the Jangalis without difficulty. Leaving the squadron 14th Hussars to hold the bridge, he then pushed on and reached Resht and Enzeli a few days later. General Dunsterville persuaded Bicharakoff to hold the road till British troops arrived; and, reporting this on the 14th, General Dunsterville hoped that a brigade each of infantry and artillery would be pushed up from Mesopotamia so that if opportunity offered he could show some force in Baku. He anticipated that he could arrange for their supply in Baku, and would require nothing except ordnance stores, comforts and some groceries from Mesopotamia.

About this time Bicharakoff decided to turn Bolshevik, as being the only means by which he could gain a footing in the Caucasus; and he accepted the post of commander of the Red Army in the Caucasus. After visiting Baku, where he reported the situation to be obscure owing to conflict between the pro-British and anti-British parties, Bicharakoff returned to Enzeli on the 22nd June and began to embark his troops.

Turkish troops occupied Tabriz on the 14th June and General Dunsterville sent a small detachment to Mianeh to watch for any further southward Turkish movement. At the same time he asked if General Marshall could send him any more troops, as, though the local tribes were friendly to us and hated the Turks, they were unlikely to resist a Turkish advance unless supported by British troops. General Marshall replied, as he reported to the War Office on the 18th, that General Dunsterville was not to count upon any increase to his force. General Marshall explained that he was already having extreme difficulty in supplying Dunsterforce with lubricants, petrol, ordnance stores, ammunition and spare parts* and could not guarantee to maintain any larger force. General Marshall also said that General Dunsterville had asked for authority to

* The rocky, mountainous road was causing excessive wear and tear on all mechanical transport vehicles.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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improve and metal the road from Kazvin to Tabriz, which would take about five months. But he did not recommend this, as it would facilitate the movement south from Tabriz of a force larger than we ourselves could maintain at Kazvin. About a week later it was reported that Turkish troops had occupied a pass about twenty miles to the south-eastward of Tabriz, the Turkish force at Tabriz then being estimated as about 2,000 strong with two guns.

The advance of the British mobile motor column towards the Caspian was delayed by want of lubricants, and that of "A" Squadron of the Dunsterforce Armoured Car Brigade by its rubberine tyres* proving unequal to the heat and to the strain of the bad roads. But by the end of June General Dunsterville had secured the whole of the road to Enzeli,† in spite of active hostilities against his force by the Jangalis. The thickly wooded country and the wet rice fields favoured the guerilla tactics of this tribe. But the Hampshire and Gurkhas acquitted themselves well and impressed the Jangalis with a considerable respect for their fighting qualities. The armoured cars had also a good effect, though they were seldom able to move off the roads.


Reports from various sources confirmed the disagreement between Germans and Turks in the Caucasus and showed that their differences were serious. It was stated that the treaties made by the Turks with the Tartars, Georgians and Armenians were absolutely contrary to the previous agreement come to between the Germans and Turks, as was also the Turkish advance on Baku. The Georgians and Armenians were reported to have appealed to the Germans saying that the Turks had obliged them to sign these treaties by force; and the Germans, it was said, had requested the Turks to withdraw to their 1877 frontier and had also issued instructions to their local officers and agents to prevent a Turkish advance on Baku. This led to the Turks being unable to use the railway through Tiflis towards Baku and to their advancing mainly by road independently of the railway.‡ It was also reported that the Germans had received permission from the Bolshevik Government to occupy Baku, and that the Turks resented this and other

* These rubberine tyres were fitted to meet the intense cold of a Russian winter. In the heat the plastic filling solidified and broke back axles at an alarming rate.


† He had moved three platoons 1/4th Hampshire (on foot) from Hamadan to Kazvin.

‡ It was evidently due to this that the Turkish advance on Baku was so much delayed as it was.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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under the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia, who would also be responsible for the oil-fields in Arabistan and the Bakhtiari country.

As regards South Persia, General Sykes' force remained invested in Shiraz by hostile tribes acting under the instigation of the anti-British elements in Persia and assisted by German agents, among whom Wassmuss especially was still active. Towards the end of June, however, General Sykes was able by political means to bring about dissensions among his opponents which in addition to the arrival of reinforcements, from India, at Bushire and Bandar Abbas promised to relieve the situation. There was some anxiety lest the Bakhtiari should become involved and so endanger the oil-fields. But General Marshall was able to maintain cordial relations with the Bakhtiari chiefs; and, to assist the leading chief to restore security along the Ahwaz-Isfahan road, General Marshall placed a section of the 31st Mountain Battery at his disposal with most satisfactory results.*


As regards North-West Persia, the phase in the operations of Dunsterforce concluded by the securing of the road to Enzeli had been successful to a definite extent. Though too late to carry out its original object in the Caucasus, it had for the time being checked the advance of Turco-German agents and small armed bodies into Persia, had definitely stopped the German-Jangali movement southward and had maintained peace and security in the Kermanshab-Hamadan area. In fact, but for its restraining influence, the enemy's plans, to embarrass us by a rising in Persia as a preliminary to an attack on our Mesopotamian communications and to hostile action against our Indian frontier, would probably have reached a much more advanced stage. But much still remained to be done.

On the 28th June the War Office sent the following telegram to General Marshall:

"H. M. Government are not satisfied that we are taking full advantage of our opportunities or that in North-West Persia and on the Caspian our maximum effort is being made. Whole situation should be reviewed by you in light of more recent information regarding lack of enemy activity in the plains of Mesopotamia and local supplies. Information shows that, at any rate for some time to come,

* General Marshall said in his Despatch: "It is worthy of record that this section of an Indian mountain battery in the hottest season of the year covered a distance of 395 miles in 28 marching days and returned with men and animals in most excellent condition."

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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and that, in order to accomplish our objects at Baku, on the Caspian and at Tehran, a supreme effort will be made by you to utilise as many troops as you are able to maintain in North-West Persia."

On the 30th June General Marshall informed the War Office that their instructions had been communicated to General Dunsterville and that he would telegraph further when he knew General Dunsterville's latest opinion. In the meantime he was making every preparation to get ready the troops which General Dunsterville had previously asked for.* A telegram from the latter, dated the 28th, stated that, after a full discussion, Generals Dunsterville and Bicharakoff agreed that the situation in Baku was more favourable than had been represented and that there was a great possibility of organising its successful defence, saving the oil-fields and securing the fleet by using Bicharakoff's force as a nucleus. The most essential thing was to strengthen Bicharakoff with palpable proof of British support. About the 1st July four armoured cars† would embark for Baku and General Dunsterville proposed to send later a company of the 1/4th Hampshire to escort the British officers with Bicharakoff. General Dunsterville was very anxious to go to Baku himself, but must await a more favourable opportunity. Bicharakoff had promised him that this would not be delayed when all parties had agreed to receive him and sink dissension for the common object of offering resistance to the Turks.

On the 2nd July the War Office requested General Marshall to instruct General Dunsterville to send, as early as possible, a mission of two or three officers to report on the situation at Krasnovodsk and to ascertain whether a British force would be welcome there‡ and if local supplies were sufficient for its maintenance. If the results of this reconnaissance were favourable, the situation in Turkestan was such that H.M. Government were prepared to risk a small force. The Mission should also report on the possible purchase by H.M. Government of the total accumulated cotton crop in Trans-Caspia,§ should ascertain whether all enemy agents and prisoners of war there could be


* This apparently meant the artillery and infantry brigades asked for by General Dunsterville on the 14th to enable him to show some force in Baku.

† Of the Dunsterforce Armoured Car Brigade.

‡ A Turkestan Mission in the Caucasus had asked our Military Agent there that a small British force might be sent.

§ It was reported that two years' store of cotton lay on the Central Asiatic railway and that the chief German agent had failed to export it, though he had offered 58,000,000 roubles for it.

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190 HISTORY OF THE WAR : MESOPOTAMIA


reference. As General Dunsterville had repeatedly asserted that an infantry and an artillery brigade could live on the country east of Hamadan, the primary necessities were supplies *en route*, and subsequently petrol, lubricating oil, spares and ammunition, clothing, medical requirements, ordnance stores, etc. Of these the supply of petrol was the most difficult, but this should be easier if we held Baku. General Marshall concluded :

"The wish of H.M. Government to show as much force as possible in North-West Persia is thoroughly realised and only space and the lack of means to overcome that space limits my efforts to carry out that policy."


On the 3rd July Bicharakoff accompanied by a few British officers and four British armoured cars sailed from Enzeli for Alyat, thirty-five miles south-west of Baku, intending in co-operation with the Red forces from Baku, to seize the only bridge over the Kura river, 150 miles to the westward.

On the 5th July General Marshall repeated to the War Office a telegram of the 3rd from General Dunsterville, which said that the situation at Enzeli and Baku was most complex. He considered it advisable to avoid an open rupture with the anti-British Bolshevik Committee at Enzeli who had 300 Red Guards there but who did not dare to interfere with him. All classes at Baku appeared determined to defend it against the Turks and desired British aid, but the Bolsheviks objected to any attempt on our part to reach Baku and the Caspian. In these circumstances it was quite impossible for the time being to establish British control of the Caspian ; and the only possibility of our securing a footing in Baku lay in our connection with Bicharakoff, who would deal fairly with us if we did so by him. At the same time Bicharakoff's position was extremely difficult owing to his connection with us. Consequently, as not to alienate the Bolsheviks and make them force Bicharakoff to cut adrift from us, General Dunsterville had not taken over the Russian wireless at Enzeli and had limited the size of his detachment there to 50 rifles. But, as Bicharakoff's men and the Red Guards evacuated Enzeli, this detachment would be increased until we effectively controlled Enzeli. He intended a similar policy at Baku, but it was essential that we should have at Enzeli a force ready to seize an opportunity which might occur at any moment through the downfall of the central Bolshevik Government or any other cause. All hope of controlling the Caspian would be lost if Baku fell.

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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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General Marshall's force, though not immediately threatened, was very extended and his communications on his right flank appeared to be perilously exposed, especially when winter came; while the enemy's effective line of communication to Tabriz, which was beyond our reach and open in winter, gave him an advantage which might enable him to dominate Tehran and menace General Marshall's right flank. In Trans-Caspia the situation was too chaotic to admit of any reliable forecast.


It thus appeared, said General Monro, that General Marshall's forces might be exposed to a dangerous extent and that, for the time being, the British strategic role in the East must be a defensive one. Consequently, to meet contingencies in the East, it seemed necessary to have a central reserve whose strength and distribution the Chief of the Imperial Staff alone could decide. For its location India had certain advantages.

Referring to these views General Marshall telegraphed on the 6th, offering the opinion that neither India nor the War Office seemed fully to realize the difficulties of keeping a force fed and equipped in Persia. He was verifying the estimate of supplies locally procurable, but he thought it improbable that a larger force than was then in Persia and under orders to go there could be maintained. For at least five months in the winter the road would be practicable only for light traffic, and he had therefore to send from Mesopotamia anything not obtainable in Persia for the accumulation of the necessary reserves.

It was not safe to rely on getting petrol from Baku. If he did not do so, he would have to supply it from Mesopotamia, and the large number of lorries required for its transport could not work after the wet weather set in. The supply of clothing and equipment would leave him no mechanical transport to spare and would take away some which he had reckoned on for the harvest in Mesopotamia. Further, as the evacuation of sick and wounded from Persia might be delayed for considerable periods in the winter, he would have to increase the medical units there and form a five months' reserve of medical stores.

In conclusion he said that, owing to the extensive mechanical transport requirements of Persia, any advance beyond Baghdad on the Tigris and Euphrates fronts would be out of the question, while the IIIrd Corps would only have the mechanical transport then being used for its maintenance. It seemed unlikely that the additional ten Ford van companies promised him would be available before the end of the year.


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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٢١] (٥٤٠/٢٤٦)




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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٢١ظ] (٢٤٧/٥٤٠)




"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV." [٢٢١ و] (٢٤٨/٥٤٠)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد VII". [١٢٢ ظ] (٥٤٠/٢٤٩)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV." [٢٣ و] (٥٤٠/٢٥٠)



TURCO-GERMAN DISPOSITIONS

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Russia as to give them a strong economic hold on the country. But it seemed possible that Germany might organise a counter-revolution under her own auspices, which would attract the separatists to her. In any case, the necessity of immediate Allied intervention appeared to be imperative.

In the Caucasus, the Germans, who were estimated to have about 3,000 troops guarding the railway from Batum to Tiflis, were said to have prohibited Turkish troop movements by railway until the Turks withdrew from Georgia to the pre-arranged line. But the Turks, evidently intending to occupy Baku in defiance of the Germans, continued to advance in that direction by road from Alexandropol and Julfa. News was also received that the Turks contemplated an early advance into North-West Persia with their recently formed Ninth Army,* of which one army corps had been instructed to concentrate on the line Dilman—Khoi—Julfa with a detachment at Tabriz to watch British movements and prevent a junction between the British and Armenians. There was little news of the progress made in raising the "Islam Army,"† but the formation under Turkish auspices of the independent "Union of Caucasus Mountaineers" disclosed Turkish success in winning over many of the Mahomedan tribes. Parts of the weak 5th and 6th Turkish Divisions were practically surrounding the Jelus at Urmia, but the latter were successfully holding their own. On the 10th July a British aeroplane flew there from Mianeh and arranged with the Jelus to make a sortie to the south, in order to meet and take over at Sain Kala on the 22nd a convoy of ammunition for them sent by the British. A small British column from Kermanshah had also about this time moved out and occupied Sehneh, anticipating a Turkish movement from Sulaimaniya to seize that place.

In the meantime, Bicharakoff's plan to secure the bridge over the Kura river had failed, owing to the pusillanimous behaviour of the Red troops from Baku; and he had been obliged to fall

* The British understood that this army consisted of six or seven divisions, whose titular numbers were uncertain. It has since been ascertained from Turkish sources that this army was formed on the 9th June of the I and IV Caucasus Army Corps and that in July it consisted of the 5th, 9th, 10th and 11th Caucasus Divisions and of the 12th and 15th Divisions, the last having come recently from Rumania.

The title "Caucasus" was originally used in 1916 in the reorganisation of the much depleted Turkish Third Army, the 5th, 9th, 10th and 11th Army Corps, becoming "Caucasus" Divisions with the same titular numbers, and their original component divisions similarly becoming Caucasus regiments. The 36th and 37th Divisions were also named Caucasus divisions at this time. Subsequently, the term "Caucasus" was further applied to units and formations of the Islam Army.

† There was still uncertainty as to its constitution and scope.

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back towards Baku, delaying the Turkish advance as much as possible. But he found that he could place no reliance on the Red troops,* and this gave rise to a feeling of hostility between them and his own men.


On the 15th July the War Office telegraphed to the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia that—owing partly to his unwillingness to break with the Bolsheviks at Enzeli and Baku and partly to his confidence in Bicharakoff which they did not entirely share—General Dunsterville seemed to be drifting into a policy of inactivity. If the General Officer Commanding considered it feasible, General Dunsterville might be authorised to strike at Bolshevik influence at Enzeli by the removal of dangerous individuals; and also, if the General Officer Commanding considered that circumstances rendered it desirable or possible, with due regard to the safety of the Hamadiz-Enzeli road, for General Dunsterville to send officers or a small force to Baku, the War Office would be glad to see it done. Their information about the situation at Enzeli, Baku and on the Caspian was inadequate and they lacked information about the fleet and the shipping. The situation seemed to be less favourable than it was a fortnight previously and they asked urgently for all the information that General Dunsterville could send.

In reply to this, General Dunsterville denied that he was inactive. His endeavour to hold Enzeli might lead to open hostilities with the Bolsheviks, as they were infuriated at the refusal of H.M. Government to recognise them and were more firmly determined than ever not to accept British military aid in any form, except ammunition and money in return for petrol. Any form of activity by him in regard to Baku would be an actual conflict with the Bolsheviks. Bicharakoff's trustworthiness could only be tested by results, but General Dunsterville was sure that Bicharakoff was working in Allied interests, and if his plans succeeded he could save Baku and hold the Caspian, where the fleet was friendly to him. Over two hundred steamers were available on the Caspian at any time, but were useless to us so long as hostile Bolsheviks held all the ports.

In forwarding this reply to the War Office on the 18th July, General Fanshawe added his opinion that, as Bicharakoff's troops were then about one hundred miles west of Baku, our troops could enter that place only by consent of the

* A British armoured car fell into Turkish hands at this time owing to the Red troops having abandoned a supporting point against orders.

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DIVERGENT VIEWS

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garrison and that—even if it were possible—to send a small force there would achieve no result.


General Dunsterville paid a visit to Baghdad from the 18th to the 20th July, going part of the way there and back by aeroplane and arriving back at Karvin on the 24th. On the 19th the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia informed the War Office that, if the Jelus succeeded in meeting the convoy of ammunition from Hamadan, General Dunsterville would send some officers and non-commissioned officers to assist them, communication with them would be kept open and more ammunition sent them. General Dunsterville wished to send a mountain battery and 500 infantry to Urmia to assist them and to threaten Tabriz, so as to help Baku by diverting Turkish troops from the Caucasus. But he himself did not agree. Dunsterforce was already much split up, further dispersion seemed undesirable and, in any case, till their transport reached Hamadan about the 5th August, the 39th Brigade Infantry could not leave that place.* A threat to Tabriz, in which area the Turks had two divisions with two more reported on their way there, might precipitate a Turkish attack on the Jelus from the north and across Lake Urmia. In this case the Jelus would have to retire to the south, and it would be impossible to evacuate their population of 80,000.

Knowing the dilatoriness of the Turks and that they were fully occupied in the Caucasus, the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia did not wish to bring matters to a head by sending troops where he would find it very difficult to maintain them; and he preferred to limit his assistance to arms, ammunition and money. It was true that this limited assistance would not prevent the ultimate defeat and probable massacre of the Jelus if the Turks made an attack on them in force. But if it was our policy to protect them in every way possible, this could best be done by an advance, when the weather permitted, to Altun Köpri, if transport was available. For, once we were established on the Little Zab, the Turks would evacuate Sulaimaniya and we should be in a better position to establish touch with the Jelus and to help them. Finally, as the Turkish troops on the Baku front were different† from those in the Tabriz area, the General Officer Commanding did not think that any action about Urmia would affect the Baku situation.


* By the 16th July about 1,100 infantry of the 39th Brigade had reached Hamadan.

† This expression in the telegram presumably refers to the reports that the Turks on the Baku front belonged to a different army to those in the Tabriz area.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [٢٥١ و] (٥٤٠/٢٥٤)



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at Sehneh of a squadron 14th Hussars, a section 21st Mountain Battery and one hundred rifles 1/4th Hampshire.


With a view to gaining naval control of the Caspian the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, had been instructed on the 10th July by the Admiralty (following discussions with the local naval authorities) to consult with the General Officer Commanding in Mesopotamia as to establishing a seaplane base at Enzeli, removing gunboats and as many ships as possible from Baku to Enzeli, and arming merchant ships with 4.7-inch guns. He was also, if necessary, to send a naval officer to obtain information at Enzeli. Soon after this, a party of five naval officers and 86 ratings, with twelve guns, mountings and ammunition, were sent by the Naval Commander-in-Chief from Bombay to Mesopotamia; and Commodore D. T. Norris, already in Baghdad, was placed in charge of naval operations in the Caspian and was ordered to proceed at once to Resht. Two naval parties from the *Moth* and *Mantis*, with one 4-inch and two 12-pounder guns,* left Baghdad on the 27th July for the Caspian and were followed next day by Commodore Norris.

The Turks had, in the meanwhile, been pushing forward towards Baku. The only really effective resistance to their advance was that offered by Bicharakoff's men, who held together in spite of attempts to destroy their discipline and of intrigues against their commander by the Bolsheviks, who showed an increasing distrust of Bicharakoff's intentions. On the 25th July, however, when the situation appeared hopeless, the best men of the Red Army came to Bicharakoff and promised to re-organise their troops. Early next morning, as the result of an all-night sitting, all the Bolshevik members of the Baku Government resigned; and the new Government, termed itself Centro-Caspian, asked for British aid and handed over supreme military command to Bicharakoff.

In telegraphing the results of this *coup d'état* to General Dunsterville, Colonel Clutterbuck† said that Bicharakoff's intention was to hold the line till help came and that the Centro-Caspian Government requested that staff officers, instructors and troops should be sent and that the first instalment, even though small, should come at once. Transports for them had already been sent to Enzeli and the fleet was on our side.

* These guns were conveyed by lorry with considerable difficulty.
† Liaison officer with Bicharakoff.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٢٧ و] (٥٤٠/٢٥٨)



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BAKU SITUATION

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General Dunsterville, although he had only a few officers* and troops available, decided to accept the invitation from Baku by sending a small party of the 1/4th Hampshire with Colonel C. B. Stokes to announce the impending arrival of other troops. This information, together with an extract from Colonel Clutterbuck's telegram of the 26th July, was telegraphed to the War Office by General Fanshawe on the 29th. On that day the first lorry echelon of the 39th Infantry Brigade was still short of Kazvin, the second lorry echelon was due at Hamadan and the third lorry echelon was at railhead, while the guns and transport marching by road in two echelons were due at Hamadan on the 4th and 5th August.

On the 30th and 31st July, before Colonel Stokes' party could leave, General Dunsterville received reports from Baku showing that the town would be in enemy hands before British troops could arrive and that Bicharakoff's detachment was moving northwards towards Derbend, where Bicharakoff recommended that Dunsterforce troops should land, instead of at Baku.† It appears that when these reports were sent from Baku the Turks were in full possession of the heights above it and were within 3,000 yards of the wharves with no troops opposing them. But, after the reports had been sent, they fled suddenly for some unexplained reason and this emboldened the Baku local forces to pursue them. It may be noted, however, that these men being without adequate military control did not follow up the Turks far enough to take proper advantage of their retreat and thus allowed them to retain possession of the high ground west of the railway, an invaluable position from which it was subsequently found impossible to dislodge them.


General Dunsterville offers the opinion that the movement northward of Bicharakoff's detachment,‡ though apparently justifiable at the time, was a mistake which contributed mainly to the ultimate fall of Baku. On the other hand, Bicharakoff's position had become very critical owing to the failure of the Baku leaders to provide him either with ammunition or supplies; he had cause to fear treachery on their part and he saw no

* Most of the special duty officers and non-commissioned officers of his Mission were by this time employed on work in Persia from which they could not be spared.

† This proposal was not agreed to by us.

‡ Bicharakoff was accompanied by the British officers with his detachment and by three armoured cars of the Dunsterforce Armoured Car Brigade under Captain Crossing. They returned to Enzeli at the end of September, when Bicharakoff telegraphed a testimonial to the gallantry they had displayed during the operations.

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hope of stopping the Turkish advance. There were indications also that they were moving to cut him off from the northward. He decided, therefore, to maintain his force by withdrawing it towards Derbend where he hoped British troops would join him, and in this case, if Baku still held out, he could give it assistance by operating against the Turkish left flank.

General Maleson at Meshed, learning from General Dunster-ville that the fall of Baku was imminent, suggested that the British troops previously destined for Baku should be sent to Krasnovodsk, where we might be able to maintain them by sea as the Caspian fleet was reported to be on our side. At this period the Bolsheviks in Turkestan were threatened from several sides, and we had moved a small detachment of Indian troops (175 rifles of the 19th Punjabis) from Meshed to the Persian frontier, with a view to affording some support to the Menshevik party in their efforts to keep the Bolsheviks out of Trans-Caspia. The War Office were inclined to agree to General Maleson's proposal and requested General Fanshawe to consider it should Baku fall. But General Dunster-ville, having heard of the fate of the Turkish attack on Baku, had already sent Colonel Stokes and a small party there* to report on the situation and had decided that, if there appeared to be a reasonable chance of saving the town, the first portion of the 7th North Staffordshire, due at Enzeli on the 3rd August, should leave on the 4th for Baku, to be followed by the remainder of the battalion as it arrived.†


Colonel Stokes reached Baku on the 4th August and, even though the small size of his detachment was very disappointing to the Baku authorities, his arrival put a fresh spirit into the defence. He thereupon telegraphed to General Dunster-ville asking that the first party of the North Staffordshire should be despatched, as from a military standpoint the situation was more hopeful than he had anticipated. His view of the situation appeared to be justified on the 5th August by the way in which the local troops, inspired by his arrival, beat off a Turkish attack that day.

On the 4th August, Lieutenant-Colonel Keyworth, R.A., with a party of artillery officers and non-commissioned officers, two armoured cars, half a machine gun company formed of

* 44 officers and men, 1/4th Hampshire.

† It is noteworthy that the Caspian fleet, which was friendly to Bicharakoff rather than to us, might not have agreed to the move of our troops to Krasnovodsk, this being contrary to Bicharakoff's instructions to them, which were to bring the British troops to Derbend.

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BRITISH REACH BAKU

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the personnel of "B" and "C" Squadrons Dunsterforce Armoured Car Brigade* and 150 rifles 7th North Staffordshire, sailed from Enzeli, reaching Baku next day, when Colonel Keyworth took over command of the British troops there. On the same day General Dunsterville left Kazvin with his headquarters for Enzeli, where the Bolshevik leaders had just been arrested by us.† On the 6th August a second party, consisting of two armoured cars, two machine gun sections and 130 rifles 7th North Staffordshire, left Enzeli for Baku; and on the same day a small mission under Colonel Battine reached Krasnovodsk.

On the 5th Colonel Stokes reported that he had received no reply to telegrams he had sent to Bicharakoff, but that the fleet had received a message saying that he was coming to Baku. Colonel Stokes considered that, if Bicharakoff arrived within two days, Baku might be saved with British assistance and he recommended the despatch there of a British infantry brigade with artillery. The local defence troops, about 8,000 in number, were, he said, under five different political organisations independent of one another, but he hoped to arrange co-ordination of their operations under a central control. In the event of the fall of Baku, arrangements—which could not, however, be relied on implicitly—had been made for all shipping to leave there for Krasnovodsk, Asterabad and Enzeli. But it had been found impossible to arrange for the destruction of the oil-fields, owing to the opposition of the pro-Turkish Tartar workmen and a number of Russians who were unwilling to destroy their means of livelihood.


In the meantime, in order to have sufficient shipping to withdraw the British troops from Baku in case of necessity, General Dunsterville had secured at Enzeli the steamer *President Kruger* and Colonel Stokes at Baku had secured the *Kursk* and the *Argo*. The Centro-Caspian Government tried on several occasions to persuade General Dunsterville to give up control of these ships, but he managed to maintain his hold on them to the end, keeping armed British guards on board them to ensure it.

On the 7th August Colonel Keyworth telegraphed that the Baku local forces had no organisation and that the whole of Dunsterforce was required at Baku if the situation was to be

* Their armoured cars had either not yet arrived or were immobile.

† Documentary evidence of their treacherous complicity with the Tadjalis had been obtained and this enabled General Dunsterville to justify their arrest to the Baku Government.

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saved. There were sufficient supplies at Baku for 2,000 British troops ; but the friendly Centro-Caspian Government was in a precarious situation and might come in conflict with the Bolsheviks at any moment. General Dunsterville thereupon authorised Colonel Keyworth to support, if necessary with force, the Centro-Caspian Government against the Bolsheviks.

It appears that on the 2nd August a Bolshevik leader, Petroff, had arrived in Baku, apparently from Astrakhan, with 1,300 men and two guns and had succeeded in obtaining the release of the Bolshevik leaders who had been confined after the *coup d'état*. But although Petroff had given valuable aid in defending the town against the Turkish attack on the 5th August,* he and his colleagues were working ceaselessly to re-establish Bolshevik control.


In the meantime at Urmia the Jelus had encountered disaster. During the absence of 2,000 of their men, who under their leader Aga Petross had met our convoy of ammunition between Sain Kala and Bijar on the 3rd August, the Turks attacked Urmia. Regarding resistance as hopeless, the whole Jelu population of about 80,000 left their homes and fled southward after Petross, suffering very great losses from the pursuing enemy as well as from sickness and privation. The enemy pursuit was checked at Sain Kala by the 14th Hussars, but only some 50,000 Jelus succeeded in reaching Bijar. From there the majority were evacuated by batches to a large refugee camp formed for them at Baquba, but men capable of bearing arms were formed at Hamadan under British officers and non-commissioned officers into four battalions termed the Urmia Brigade, while other men were employed on work such as road-making. The feeding of this large mass of men, women and children almost depleted the reserve of supplies which had been so laboriously built up for the use of our troops in the winter ; and, as they had no idea of discipline or organisation, their movement, which was not an easy matter to arrange,† practically stopped all troop movements into Persia for the time being.

This Jelu retreat added to the difficulties of the military situation, for it would free more Turkish troops to advance southward into Persia against our vulnerable line of communication with the Caspian. The Turks, who had at least one division


* Although the Bolsheviks did not object to a German occupation, they did object to one by the Turks.

† Its successful accomplishment was due to the good work of the British staff under Colonel A. W. H. M. Moens, on the Persian Line of Communication.

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TRANS-CASPIA

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the Shah to dismiss his anti-British Government and to appoint one more friendly to us.*

The doubts whether we could save Baku and the necessity for preventing the enemy gaining control of the Caspian increased the importance of the measures we were taking in Trans-Caspia. It is impossible in the space available to explain in any detail the various factors affecting the situation, which appeared to be as chaotic and complicated as that in the Caucasus. Briefly, the Trans-Caspian Government was formed by members of the Russian Menshevik party† and controlled the area along the railway from the Caspian to the eastward of Merv. Assisted by some of the Turkoman tribes, the Mensheviks were trying to prevent the Bolsheviks, who were established strongly at Tashkend and whose forces largely consisted of enemy prisoners of war of low moral,‡ from ousting them and gaining the Caspian. The Mensheviks were also nervous lest the Turkomans, of their own accord or under Turkish instigation, should obtain control of Trans-Caspia. Among both Mensheviks and Turkomans were many who were distrustful of British intentions. A widespread anti-Bolshevik movement which was in progress in Central Asia rendered the Bolshevik control of part of Turkestan precarious and they were nervous of the Bokharans and Afghans, whose attitude, though neutral for the time being, was uncertain.

Owing to the intrigues rampant everywhere, which made it very difficult to ascertain the truth, General Malleon at Meshed had a very difficult problem to face.§ It had been impossible to give him any clear-cut instructions, while, owing to the long and difficult line of communication connecting him with India, it was impracticable to maintain more than a very small force of troops in Khurasan. At the beginning of August he had been authorised to afford the Trans-Caspian Government support in their struggle against the Bolsheviks; and for this purpose, among other measures, he had moved a detachment of 175 rifles of the 19th Punjab and a machine gun section to the Persian frontier, where they would threaten the flank of a Bolshevik advance towards the Caspian. In the first week of August, a Bolshevik force advanced against the Merv


* Vosuq-ed-Douleh was appointed Prime Minister on the 7th August.

† The Russians at Askabad, though just as revolutionary in spirit, had quarrelled with the Bolsheviks and had set up their own "committee," calling themselves Mensheviks.

‡ They were unable to return to their homes as the railways to Europe were still partly in the hands of loyal Russian elements.

§ This was rendered no easier by the fact that enemy agents in British uniforms were impersonating British political and military officers in the area under his control.

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
oasis; and, as the Trans-Caspian Government depended on this area for supplies and Turkoman support, it appealed for support to General Malleison. He sent the machine gun section to the east of Merv to assist the Trans-Caspian forces and, by depleting Meshed and its vicinity of troops, arranged to increase the 19th Punjabis' detachment on the frontier to 500 rifles. At the same time he telegraphed to India urging that a British detachment should be sent from Enzeli to Krasnovodsk, which the Trans-Caspian Government feared would be seized by Bolsheviks from Astrakhan. General Malleison said that he could send the 19th Punjabis' detachment to Krasnovodsk from the Persian frontier, but had no guns to send with it and guns were a prime necessity. On the 12th August the Bolsheviks defeated the Trans-Caspian forces and drove them through Merv to Dushak, their retreat only being saved from degenerating into a disastrous rout by the fine work of the Indian machine gun section.

On the 12th August, in a review of the situation telegraphed to the War Office, General Cobbe* said that there were then about 400 British troops in Baku (who had taken over a section of the defences), that three more companies would reach there in a few days and that the total would be made up to two battalions as soon as the mechanical transport could be put in running order. A third battalion was also being sent to Enzeli for such use as the situation might demand; and an advanced party of a field battery had sailed for Baku, the remainder of the battery being on the road between Kazvin and Enzeli.


Colonels Keyworth and Stokes reported that the troops in Baku other than British were unreliable and that to hold the town a British division would be required. As the War Office had limited the force for Baku to two battalions and a battery, General Dumsterville asked that before he went there he should be told definitely what troops would be sent, as, if these were insufficient, it would be necessary to decide whether Baku was to be evacuated or whether we should hold out there as long as possible. It might be possible, he said, to arrange at once for the evacuation, but this would mean the immediate surrender of the Baku garrison and the complete collapse of British prestige and influence. On the other hand, if we held Baku as long as possible it would mean the ultimate loss of all British troops there, as it would be impossible, once the

* On return from leave, General Cobbe had assumed officiating command in Mesopotamia.

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were declining to go to the front. Food was scarce, nothing having been imported for two months,* and there was only a week's supply in hand. But Colonel Crawford had joined the Food Control Board and it was hoped that matters would shortly improve.


Transport was a difficulty, as motor vehicles could not go everywhere and animals could not be fed in any numbers; and this hindrance to movement in the intense moist heat made supervision of the long front very difficult.

General Dunsterville, accompanied by Commodore Norris, left Enzeli on the 16th August in the *President Kruger* and reached Baku next day. In his book† he describes the town as lying in a crater-like cup, the ground on the west and north rising gradually for about two miles till it reached the line of cliffs, whence it fell precipitously for over 500 feet to the bottom of the desert valley through which ran the railway from Tiflis. Outside the town the whole country was open and barren, consisting mainly of sandy desert and salt lakes partly dried up. The chief oil fields were at Binagadi, Balakhani and Bibi Eibat, with the main oil refineries at Black Town, and there were two miles of wharves at Baku.

At daybreak on the 18th August General Dunsterville made a personal inspection of the line of defence. On the left, a mile west of Bibi Eibat, where the high ground ran down in a series of rocky spurs to the sea, the position was a good one with a fair field of fire and a naturally guarded flank. The 7th North Staffordshire, who held this section, had dug well-sited trenches; and this had inspired the Armenian battalion on their right to make an effort also in the same direction. The line then ran due north, first along seven miles of cliffs and then gradually down through low ground to Dirty Volcano, where it turned east to Binagadi. General Dunsterville considered that the line should have continued due north from Dirty Volcano to the sea; an extension that would have required comparatively few men for its defence, as the Masazir Salt Lake provided a natural obstacle for half the distance. This part of the line had been left open by the withdrawal of Bicharakoff's detachment; but, till the arrival of the British, the Baku authorities had taken no steps to fill the gap. Consequently the Turks had got well round this flank, and all the villages, mainly Tartar, to the north and east of the town were full of small enemy parties and Tartar levies.

* This was said to be due to the nationalisation policy.
† "The Adventures of Dunsterforce."

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arrived, or till some other factor arose to improve the situation. As there were always long gaps in the line of defence, owing to the failure of the local troops to take up or hold their allotted positions, it seemed clear that at any moment a determined Turkish attack might take the town; and, as it was full of German and Austrian released prisoners of war and the Tartar population was mainly pro-Turk, the enemy was certain to have detailed information of the conditions prevailing.

By this time the whole of the 7th North Staffordshire (20 officers and 539 other ranks under command of Major J. W. Ley) had reached Baku and parties of the 9th Royal Warwickshire had begun to arrive. On the 17th August a company of the North Staffordshire had moved out to the neighbourhood of Digya to co-operate with a detachment of about 600 local troops in driving the Turkish parties out of Fatmai and the neighbouring villages. But during the fighting on the 18th four-fifths of the local troops retired hastily to Baku, and, as this left both its flanks uncovered, the North Staffordshire company had no option but to retire and entrench a position to the north of Digya. It fortunately only incurred three casualties.

On the 20th August General Dunsterville sent General Cobbe a telegram saying that he had just received a despatch from Bicharakoff. The results of our intervention at Baku were becoming apparent and it was necessary to regard the whole situation from a new point of view. Bolshevik influence had been practically eradicated* and everybody, including Mahomedans, in the Caspian and Caucasus regions looked to Great Britain to save Russia and the Caucasus. The Daghestanis had offered to assist Bicharakoff and the British; Russian colonists in Lenkoran were awaiting the arrival of a British Mission to organise their forces for co-operation in the relief of Baku; the Georgians were wavering; and Bicharakoff promised to return to Baku with 10,000 fresh troops from Northern Caucasia. General Dunsterville deprecated strongly any idea of withdrawing from Baku, as this would not only result in military disaster but would have a very bad political effect in Persia and Trans-Caspia. All depended on whether we could hold Baku for the period necessary to enable the above movements to take shape. The situation was critical

* It was reported that Alexieff, who was pro-British and anti-German, had occupied Astrakhan; and the Baku Government was at last disarming Petruff's men and retaking possession of the guns and munitions they had tried to make off with.

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fifty rifles 1/2nd Gurkhas were despatched towards Mianeh from Kazvin.* On the 22nd a British aeroplane reconnaissance over Tabriz observed no enemy movement south of Yusufabad where there were twelve tents, while at Saidabad, ten miles nearer Tabriz, there were thirty tents and two batteries. On the 23rd, the British advanced patrols fell back for about twelve miles when some 300-400 Turkish troops made an advance of about ten miles from Yusufabad; and on the 25th another detachment of the 1/2nd Gurkhas (ninety rifles) left Kazvin for Zenjan.


Although the Turks made no further advance on this line for another fortnight, various reports were received, from apparently trustworthy sources, that the Turkish IV Corps intended to advance from Sanj Bulag by the two roads via Saqqiz and Sain Kala. In consequence of this, the movement towards the Caspian of the 2nd Field Battery, 7th Gloucestershire and one company 9th Worcestershire was stopped on the 27th and 28th August, the battery being halted not far from Kazvin and the other two units at Hamadan.

General Dunsterville had taken with him to Baku his advanced headquarters only, leaving his main headquarters at Kazvin, where General Lewin took over temporary command of the troops south of the Caspian and charge of all operations in North-West Persia under direct orders from Baghdad. On the 29th August the General Staff at Kazvin appreciated the situation as follows. Of the Turkish I Corps, the 11th Caucasus Division (4,250 rifles) was at Tabriz with detachments thrown forward to the south-eastward, and the 9th Caucasus Division (4,000 rifles) was on the line of communication between Alexandropol and Julfa. The 5th Division (4,000 rifles) of their IV Corps was south of Urmia, with advanced detachments towards Sanj Bulag, Miandab and Sain Kala, the 12th Division (4,000 rifles) was near Dilman, and a mounted brigade was in the Sanj Bulag-Miandab area. The greater part of the 15th and 36th Divisions were in reserve at Alexandropol† and the 6th Division was in the Ruwandiz-Saqqiz-Sanj Bulag area. For a Turkish advance the Tabriz-Mianeh-Kazvin, Miandab-Sain Kala and Sanj Bulag-Saqqiz roads were the only ones fit for wheeled and mechanical transport, the remainder being

* The field batteries belonged to the 13th Brigade, R.F.A., recently arrived, and the mountain guns and infantry were furnished from the Mobile Motor Column.

† From subsequent information it is doubtful whether the greater part of these two divisions had not then moved towards the Baku front and their place been taken by the 10th Caucasus Division.

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Lewin* replied that the local situation precluded the despatch of any troops ; and this reply was concurred in by General Headquarters, Baghdad. On the same day half a battalion Gloucestershire and a section 21st Mountain Battery were ordered to Bijar from Hamadan.


To return to Baku, where the British were doing all they could, in the face of great difficulties, to effect an improvement in the fighting efficiency of the local forces. The training of local units was taken in hand, arrangements were made to regulate the supply of ammunition, the ammunition and arms in the Arsenal were examined and set in order and measures were taken to improve the discipline of the local troops. But in practically every direction the British encountered great opposition, owing not only to suspicion of the ultimate British intentions and the feeling that the introduction of law and order signified the commencement of a counter-revolution, but also owing to the prevalent anti-British and Bolshevik propaganda and to the general distrust of one another among the local population which prevented any cohesion among them. Moreover, the reference of every single matter to the committees, which existed in every unit, brought about endless procrastination. Some improvement was, however, apparent owing to our efforts, though the people of Baku persisted in the belief that since the British had arrived all was well and that further effort on their part was unnecessary. In regard to the gunboats and shipping General Dunsterville could see no immediate prospect of securing control.

On the 24th August he left for Enzeli to settle the final terms of peace with Kuchik Khan† and to secure the release of Captain Noel and other British prisoners. Having arranged these matters, General Dunsterville arrived back at Baku on the 27th. Lieutenant-Colonel Faviell, temporarily commanding the 39th Infantry Brigade, reached Baku with his brigade headquarters on the 24th and assumed command of the British infantry there, consisting of the 7th North Staffordshire (under 350 strong), the 9th Royal Warwickshire (under 450 strong), a company 9th Worcestershire (about 100 strong) and a platoon 1/4th Hampshire. Colonel Keyworth still remained in command of the whole British force, which had

* On the 31st General Bateman-Champain (commanding 36th Infantry Brigade), who with his headquarters had arrived at Karvin a few days previously, took over command of the troops in North Persia from General Lewin, who then paid a visit to Baku.

† It is of interest to note that henceforward Kuchik Khan acted as our contractor for the supply of rice from Gilan.

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
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Dirty Volcano was in full view of the rest of the defensive line, but the local troops failed to give the North Staffordshire any support or assistance. It was subsequently ascertained that the two Armenian battalions who should have been in support at Baladjari Station were not there, while it was said that the local artillery failed to open fire owing to the absence of all their officers. About 70 rifles of the North Staffordshire and 70 of the Warwicks moved out in lorries from Baku about 2.30 p.m. under command of Major Ley (North Staffordshire), but it was not till about 4.30 p.m. that they and a section of the 8th Field Battery, which had only reached Baku the previous day, arrived on the scene, being followed soon after by the company of the Worcestershire.

During the attack on Dirty Volcano, Lieutenant Craig's company of the North Staffordshire near Digya received orders to support an Armenian battalion which was holding the hill immediately west of Binagadi; but on arriving near the hill about 2.15 p.m. found that it had been evacuated. Pushing on, however, they reached the crest as an enemy party, about 250 strong, occupied the lower northern slopes; and these the North Staffordshire drove back with heavy loss. Soon afterwards, the enemy, having re-formed, made another attack; but this was beaten back without difficulty and the enemy fell back to cover out of range. In this affair the North Staffordshire suffered ten casualties, including Lieutenant Craig and another officer wounded. The hill they had occupied was christened Stafford Hill.

It was not until he reached the railway line on the Digya road that Major Ley learnt from a Russian officer that Dirty Volcano had been lost. No other information could be obtained from this officer, but Major Ley's interpreter informed him that the North Staffordshire company from the Volcano was about half a mile from the derricks at its foot. To this point Major Ley sent the party of North Staffordshire which had come out with him in lorries; and he ordered his Warwickshire party to occupy some rising ground about 2,000 yards due east of the Volcano. He himself proceeded to the latter point, which was christened Warwick Castle, and saw Lieutenant Craig's company of North Staffordshire occupying Stafford Hill. In the meantime the "lorry" party of North Staffordshire, coming under fire, had reached within half a mile of Dirty Volcano derricks, when it was ascertained that the survivors from the Volcano had fallen back to the northward of Baladjari; and here they had been joined by the Worcestershire company

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The North Staffordshire drove back a strong enemy patrol just before sunrise, i.e., about 5.30 a.m.; but soon after this about 500 Turkish infantry were seen massing for attack at the foot of the western slopes of Stafford Hill. They were supported by about twelve field and mountain guns and by several machine guns firing from behind shields in the open. The British 8th Field Battery came into action,* and the Warwicks gave what support they could with rifles and machine guns from Warwick Castle. But their fire in this direction was much restricted by the existence of many oil-derricks; and the enemy managed to work gradually up the western and northern sides of Stafford Hill, enfilading many of the Staffordshire trenches.


At an early stage in the attack, Lieutenant Petty sent to ask the Russian commander of the reserve of two local battalions in Binagadi village to assist by making a counter-attack. But although it appeared to our officers that this could easily have been done, it was not attempted till too late. The forward observing officer of the 8th Field Battery was forced by the advancing Turks to leave his post on Stafford Hill and it was some time before another observing officer reached Warwick Castle. Lieutenant Petty was killed and many of his men either killed or wounded; and it was only with difficulty that the North Staffordshire continued to hold on in the hope that the local troops in Binagadi village, to whom Colonel Faviell had also sent an urgent request for support, would come to their assistance. By 8 a.m., however, it became clear that the hill was no longer tenable; and, some forty per cent. of their number having been killed or wounded, the North Staffordshire company fell back on Warwick Castle. Officers and men had displayed great gallantry and had only failed to hold their ground through lack of support.

At 8 a.m. Colonel Faviell had sent an order for the headquarters and one company of the Warwicks to move from Digya to the centre of the Binagadi oil derricks† and remain there in reserve. But the order did not reach the Warwickshire headquarters till 6.45 a.m. and they and "B" Company did not reach the neighbourhood of the derricks till 8 a.m. Even then they could not get into communication with brigade


* One section was in position near Binagadi village during the attack on Stafford Hill, but its subsequent position and that of the remainder of the battery are not given in the records, though they were evidently north of Balidjari. It is noteworthy that this battery was then much below its proper establishment.

† Apparently rather over a mile south of Binagadi village.


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headquarters, so they remained in ignorance of the situation. But, seeing some local troops retiring, half "B" Company moved out and covered their retirement, coming under some hostile machine gun and rifle fire at about 1,400 yards range.

The local troops in Binagadi village appear about this time to have made an attempt to move towards the eastern slopes of Stafford Hill. But it was too late and the movement was unsuccessful. About 8.30 a.m. Turkish infantry were seen swarming over the top of Stafford Hill and the second forward observing officer of the 8th Field Battery reached Warwick Castle just in time to turn the guns on to them with good effect. By this time the section of the battery at Binagadi had been obliged to withdraw hastily, as enemy infantry had got within one hundred yards.

About 10 a.m. the Turks advanced from Stafford Hill against Warwick Castle, which was held by a Warwickshire company and the survivors from Stafford Hill. An Armenian battalion on the left of the Warwicks retired at once, leaving this flank open; and by 11 a.m. the enemy had worked round three sides of the position, being then within forty yards of its northern face. Its evacuation was clearly necessary if the garrison was to evade capture or annihilation. Withdrawal to the south eastward was therefore ordered and was successfully carried out under the covering fire of Lieutenant Russell's party of North Staffordshire ordered forward for the purpose.

A further short retirement to the south was made and the whole line re-formed. The 5th Russian Battalion* is mentioned in the war diaries as having done very well in this retirement, the only instance in which the local troops took any effective part in the fighting. The others had all retired across the railway line, the first place where it was found possible to rally any of them.

The line of defence now ran northward from Baladjari village to near the Binagadi derricks and thence to Digya. But there were large gaps in the line, which the few weak companies of British infantry and the 5th Russian Battalion (about 150 strong) were insufficient to fill, and there was no reserve. Colonel Faviell reported this unsatisfactory state of affairs and obtained permission to fall back after dark to a line along the railway embankment from Baladjari to the west end of the Beyuk salt marsh, leaving two companies of the Warwicks still at Digya. The total British casualties for the

* Apparently this was one of the battalions from Binagadi village.

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day amounted to 44, most of which had occurred on Stafford Hill ; * and all reports agreed that the enemy's losses had been considerable.

General Dunsterville, who had been at the front during the attack on Stafford Hill, wrote a letter that afternoon to the Baku Government giving his opinion of the military situation. He recapitulated how, in reply to an invitation to assist, he had brought as many troops as possible to Baku, and that though the small size of the force had occasioned disappointment in Baku, he had never promised to bring any exact numbers. He explained the British difficulties and showed how it had become necessary to divert some troops, intended for Baku, to meet a Turkish advance which threatened to isolate his force by cutting his line of communication ; and he said that no great additional reinforcement of British troops was to be expected. He went on to describe how that morning most of the Baku troops had retired instead of fighting and how, in consequence, it would shortly be necessary to withdraw to the railway line, the last possible position for defence. He considered that even then the town and port could be saved if the Baku troops developed—what they did not then possess—the spirit to fight and the determination not to yield. But if they continued to retire whenever they came under fire, further defence would be a waste of time and life. While he was willing with his troops to continue the defence to the bitter end, it was quite hopeless to endeavour to do so with troops who had no intention of fighting.

That night, a Council of War, consisting of all the various Committees, and attended by General Dunsterville, sat for many hours without achieving anything useful.

The next morning a force of about 600 Turkish infantry accompanied by a large body of irregular cavalry attacked the Digya sector, which was held by Russian and Armenian battalions with two companies of the Warwicks in reserve. The loss of Stafford Hill and Warwick Castle had weakened the position at Digya and during the night 31st August/1st

* The effective strength at Baku of the 39th Infantry Brigade on the night 31st August-1st September was :

	British Officers.		British other ranks.	
Brigade Headquarters	4	..	84
9th Royal Warwickshire	16	..	437
7th North Staffordshire	13	..	425
9th Worcestershire	4	..	102
Total	37	..	1,048

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the dictators.* To this they replied that the British troops could only be permitted to leave the town at the same time and on the same terms as their own troops and after the evacuation of non-combatants.

In the meantime, on the 28th August—before news of the Turkish attack on the 26th reached him—General Cobbe, referring to a report he had received from his liaison officer who had left Baku on the 22nd, telegraphed his views on the Baku situation to the War Office. He estimated that when the whole of the 9th Worcestershire Regiment reached Baku, the total British force there would be about 2,000† and it would have to be fed from North Persia. The Turks opposite Baku numbered 5,300 regulars with 26 guns and 8,000 Tartar irregulars under Turkish officers; another 1,000 regulars were due there; of 6,400 German regulars with 20 guns in the Poti-Tiflis area, probably 4,000 with the guns could reach Baku within a month; and, if more troops were required, the Turks had another 5,000 men and 50 guns available, who could also get there within a month.

The extrication of the British from Baku would be extremely difficult, especially if they were defeated, and this seemed ultimately certain. In the meantime General Dunsterville had failed to obtain control of the shipping, his presence at Baku appeared to be harmonising the Turco-German differences, and Russian reinforcements from outside Baku seemed unlikely to materialise. Consequently General Cobbe had asked General Dunsterville if he considered that the force in Baku could withstand a Turco-German attack; and, if not, how he proposed to carry out his orders to obtain and arm shipping for the control of the Caspian and to prepare for the ultimate withdrawal of his troops from Baku.

The War Office telegraphed in reply on the 31st August expressing entire concurrence in the views expressed and in the orders sent to General Dunsterville. But they suggested that he should also be instructed to destroy the oil-plant at Baku before withdrawal, if it could be done without compromising his troops.

General Marshall, who arrived back from leave on the 1st September, informed the War Office that day that, owing to the Turkish concentrations at Tabriz and Sanj Bulag, he had

* In this connection see the summary of General Dunsterville's official telegraphic report of 1st September given hereafter.

† He did not then know how weak the units were.

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
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He had 900 British troops* and about 1,000 Russians on whom he could rely, the remainder of the Baku force being negligible. The enemy had about 6,000 regulars and 8,000 irregulars and the town swarmed with enemy sympathisers and agents. Although he had kept the War Office orders secret, the Baku authorities were beginning to think that our only object was to destroy the oil wells, gain control of the fleet and then abandon them after removing their only means of making terms with the enemy—a reply to their appeal for assistance which they regarded as dishonourable. It was consequently difficult for him to obtain any concessions or arrange for the oil destruction. But he was consistently pressing for ships on which to mount naval guns and he had at last been allotted two on the condition that their crews remained Russian. He had stated all along that it was impossible to control the fleet or to deny the oil fields to the enemy unless we continued to hold Baku; and he trusted that H.M. Government were under no illusions on the subject and were aware that if Baku fell we should incur odium and accusations of bad faith.

After the 1st September the Turks did not renew their attacks for nearly a fortnight, though they carried on intermittent artillery bombardments of the town and wharves, their fire being specially directed on the British headquarters. On the 3rd September General Dunsterville telegraphed that he had made preparations for evacuation, but that the local government had informed him that the British troops could only be permitted to leave Baku on the same terms and at the same time as their own troops. On the 4th he reported that his refusal to recognise control over British troops by the local government had achieved a salutary effect: ten ships had been placed at his disposal for arming, subject to the condition that only the gun-crews should be British. On the 5th he telegraphed that he had received the order to withdraw, but considered it impossible to do so under the guns of the fleet. He also said that Bicharakoff had captured Petrovsk and had promised to send 1,000 infantry to Baku within a week. The local situation appeared more promising and General Dunsterville had told the local government that he would remain with them to the end, withdrawing only if matters became hopeless.

* In addition to the 900 odd rifles of the Warwickshire, Staffordshire and Worcestershire battalions, there were the Headquarters 39th Infantry Brigade, the 5th Field Battery, three armoured cars of "A" Squadron Dunsterforce Armoured Car Brigade, half a machine gun company formed by the same brigade, a platoon 1/4th Hampshire and two aeroplanes.

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defence should be undertaken and depots of stores and munitions should be formed. In conjunction with these measures a railway should be developed from the Diyala, preferably north of the Jabal Hamrin, towards the head-waters of the Little Zab, with the object of maintaining a force to act offensively against the flank of any Turkish force advancing from Urmia—Tabriz against Sehneh—Zenjan. The War Office went on to suggest the route for this line to follow, whether it was wholly railway or composed partly of rail, road and ropeway.


It was also desirable, they said, for the ultimate security of the Hamadan-Kazvin road to develop at least a road line of communication from Ahwaz (in Arabistan), or Amara, to Hamadan; and they asked that reliable technical information should be obtained as to its possibilities and best alignment. They concluded by saying that the future priority of railway construction in Mesopotamia was to be: (i) extension to Pa Taq, (ii) extension towards Kirkuk, (iii) Nasiriya-Hilla.*

On the 2nd September the Commander-in-Chief in India telegraphed his views on the War Office proposals. On the assumption that the enemy's first objective after Baku would be to obtain control of the Caspian, he considered that the enemy's main effort in North-West Persia would be directed along the Tabriz-Mianeh road or along the road north of it through Ardebil to Astara on the Baku-Enzeli road. It appeared to him that, having regard to various topographical, political and military considerations, (which he detailed), the Turkish force about Urmia was only a flank guard. Consequently he was of opinion that we should concentrate, before winter set in, on the improvement of the route to Enzeli and on the defence of the sector securing our position against attack on the Tabriz road west of Zenjan and of the coast road north-west of Enzeli, with such counter-offensive measures as opportunity might offer. The preparation of the Zenjan-Bijar-Sehneh line should, he considered, be regarded as a secondary matter, except in so far as it could be executed by purely local labour.

He did not agree with the proposed construction of a railway from the Diyala towards the head-waters of the Little Zab, owing to the military operations and dispersion of force it would entail, to its length through hilly country delaying construction, to its limited effect and to its vulnerability to enemy attack from the Mosul direction.

* The railway to Tikrit was completed on the 1st September except for the watering arrangements.

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If this view was concurred in, he recommended that the dangerously exposed detachments at Enzeli and Resht should be withdrawn and that if the detachment at Krasnovodsk could not be sent back to him it should be administered by General Malleson.


On the 9th September, on receipt of the delayed telegrams of the 4th, 5th and 6th from Baku, General Marshall telegraphed to General Dunsterville that it was difficult to understand the situation at Baku thoroughly but that he did not seem to be attempting to carry out General Marshall's orders for withdrawal and that accordingly events in the whole of Persia were likely to be compromised. On hearing next day of this action by General Marshall,* the Commander-in-Chief in India at once telegraphed his views to the War Office as follows. General Dunsterville appeared to be holding his own, to be improving his position in Baku and to have obtained possession of a portion of the Caspian fleet. Bicharakoff's success at Petrovsk offered sufficient prospect of his ability to reinforce Baku to justify considerable risk in retaining our troops there. In fact his troops might then have reached Baku. After General Dunsterville's undertaking to remain with the Baku people to the end and in view of the impossibility of his withdrawal, except with the assent of the fleet, General Monro did not agree with General Marshall's action in again reminding General Dunsterville of the orders to withdraw, nor did he understand how the latter's action could compromise events in the whole of Persia. General Monro recognised, however, that there might be good reasons of which he was unaware for General Marshall's action. Unless however, the War Office considered these very convincing, it was for consideration whether General Marshall should not be urged to reinforce Enzeli with all available troops in readiness to take advantage of any favourable development in the situation at Baku. This chance of retrieving our position on the Caspian, thereby securing a short sea-line of communication between Baku and Enzeli, would enable us to act on interior lines against the Turkish wings at Baku and Tabriz.†

On the 10th September General Marshall telegraphed that he had received no further report from General Dunsterville but that Colonel Clutterbuck, who was sick and had left Baku on the evening of the 6th, gave the following information at Enzeli on the 7th. The hostile bombardment had been renewed

* General Marshall's reports to the War Office were always repeated to India.

† This telegram does not appear to have been repeated to General Marshall.

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
it; and, having command of the sea, its Government could move troops and supplies there without opposition. Bicharakoff's first echelon had arrived that day and he promised 5,000 men in another fortnight. Lenkovan had 4,000 men ready to move. Reorganisation of the Baku forces would produce about 3,000 reliable troops. So that, with the backing of one British brigade, he confidently believed that the above force could hold Baku against anything the enemy could bring against it. The alternative was complete disaster and the permanent loss of all objects we had been working for.

On the 11th the War Office telegraphed to General Marshall that, having regard to the situation reported in his telegram of the 10th, i.e., Colonel Clutterbuck's report, H.M. Government considered that, for the time being, British troops should hold on to Baku. They were also anxious that the British force on the Hamadan-Enzeli road should be increased at an early date.

On the 12th September, General Marshall informed the War Office that he was sending General Thomson, commanding 14th Division, to take command in North-West Persia and was ordering to Baku the remainder of the details of the three British infantry battalions there, some naval ratings and some Ford vans. But an outflanking advance that day by 1,500 Turks with four guns, which obliged the British detachment on the Kufan Kuh to evacuate its position and retire in the direction of Zenjan, led him to modify these orders. General Marshall reported that, though the British detachment was too weak to stop the Turkish advance, this could be delayed sufficiently to enable him to draw in to Kazvin the troops between there and Enzeli, so as to avoid the risk of their being cut off; and that consequently only those details of the 35th Infantry Brigade which were between Kazvin and Enzeli would go to Baku. General Marshall added that he had for some time been collecting local transport to enable him to send reinforcements to North-West Persia and that in three days time he would be able to despatch, from railhead, two infantry battalions and drafts, which should reach Hamadan four weeks later.

By this time the force in Baku had been reinforced by headquarters and two companies 9th Worcestershire and by 500 of Bicharakoff's men with ten machine guns. Good progress had been made in wiring and improving the defences, including the reorganisation of the telephone communications. But it had been found impossible to get the Armenian troops to

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* General Dunsterville had tried to bring the local troops under proper discipline by linking three of their battalions with a British battalion, the brigades so formed being under the command of the latter. But he met with much opposition and also objections to a British officer assuming command—though the local officers had not the necessary experience; and the scheme was still under discussion when the end came.

† The truth of this is uncertain.

‡ Colonel Straker had been appointed Chief of Staff to the local Commander-in-Chief and other British officers were in charge of the arsenal, the machine guns and the combined infantry of the defensive line.

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opposite Baku and he estimated their maximum strength at 7,000. All the cavalry were irregulars, but the majority of the infantry were regulars.* He believed that there were thirty-two field or mountain guns with the force, though he himself had only seen four. The 5th Caucasus Division, which had been concentrated west of Baladjari, had moved over to the Turkish right and the 15th Division was, he believed, being moved over to the left. The Turks, whose intelligence was bad, believed that there were in Baku 3,000 British, 4,000 Russians and 6,000 Armenians; and feeling sure that the Armenians would not stand they meant to capture the town. If the attack failed this time, they would bring up the 10th Caucasus Division as a reinforcement.


This information enabled Colonel Keyworth to make some preparation to meet an attack next day, though he was uncertain whether it would fall on his left or about Baladjari. It also led General Dunsterville to countermand an operation against the enemy's line of communication, which Colonel Rawlinson was to have left Baku on the 13th to carry out from Lenkoran.

By 9.30 p.m. on the 13th September the general disposition of the troops holding the line of defence was as follows. Westward of Bibi Eibat, "A" Company, North Staffordshire (about 60 strong under Captain Bollington) held the left of the line, with an Armenian battalion (about 100 strong) in local reserve; at Wolf's Gap was a Russian detachment with two machine guns; and Headquarters and "C" Company North Staffordshire (about 80 strong) with 20 rifles Warwicks and Worcestershire, under Major Ley, had just moved out from general reserve in the town and had occupied a commanding position in rear of "A" Company, near a local battery of field guns and howitzers. Colonel Keyworth had sent out this reserve to meet the contingency of a night attack against his left, and meant to withdraw it in the early morning if not required.


"B" Company, North Staffordshire, under Captain Turkington, apparently about 100 strong, which had just moved from local reserve south of Baladjari, held about eight hundred yards of the line north of Wolf's Gap, near two batteries in position. Northward of them, for two-and-a-half miles or more, to the point forming the right of the Left Section of the defence, the line was held by Armenian troops, with two

* He said that the Turks had not yet begun to employ the irregular infantry they had recruited.


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
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that the Turks, whose losses are said to have been very heavy,* were unable to interfere with our withdrawal. The stand made by the three British battalions, totalling altogether less than 1,000 rifles, is worthy of our highest admiration; and senior British officers on the spot were of opinion that, had another 1,000 British infantry been available as a reserve, the situation could have been restored.

Only one of the two British aeroplanes present had been fit to take the air during the day; and during its reconnaissance flight at dawn the clouds and mist had prevented identification of the enemy troops north of Wolf's Gap. But its Lewis gun fire had been directed against enemy reserves halted on the western slopes of the Turkish ridge. During the morning two further reconnaissances were carried out and the enemy troops fired at, till mechanical trouble necessitated a return to the Baku aerodrome. This having been remedied, two further flights took place, when the enemy troops were again fired at from a height of 1,500 feet. The aeroplane was hit several times by enemy rifle and machine gun fire and at 3 p.m. both the British aeroplanes, being unfit for further immediate work, were ordered to be destroyed.

The British casualties during the day amounted to about 125, of which 50 occurred in the North Staffordshire, 40 in the Worcestershire and 26 in the Warwicks. That they were not greater, as was at first feared,† was mainly due to the extraordinarily bad shooting of the Turks.

The plans for evacuation had been carefully drawn up beforehand and the actual withdrawal was carried out successfully and without special incident. It had been anticipated that the local inhabitants or troops, resenting the evacuation, might attempt to oppose it by force. But they did not do so until it was too late for them to stop it. General Dunsterville notified the Dictators in the afternoon of his intention and they raised no objection at the time. The sick and wounded with some other details embarked in the *Kursk* and *Argo* and the greater part of the force with General Dunsterville and his staff in the *President Kruger*, while munitions were loaded in the *Armenian* by Colonel Rawlinson.

By 10 p.m. all the men were on board the *President Kruger*, the *Argo* having already left and the *Kursk* being about to start. Two of the Dictators had just arrived at the wharf

* Colonel Faviell estimated them at 2,000.

† Owing to the darkness and dispersion of the force, the totals were not known till after Enzeli had been reached.

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
encountered in landing them and moving them eastward. These difficulties were only just being overcome and an advance to Baku arranged when the news arrived that the Turks had taken that place.

On hearing of the evacuation of Baku, the War Office telegraphed to General Marshall on the 16th September, asking how much shipping was controlled by General Dunsterville and the enemy at Baku respectively, what damage was done at Baku before evacuation and whether any troops had been sent to Krasnovodsk. They also asked General Marshall for his plans regarding North-West Persia and emphasised the increased importance to us of Krasnovodsk.

In his reply on the 17th General Marshall said that he had asked for definite information regarding the shipping. He understood that we had taken over two ships for arming on the 13th and begun work on one of them; while on the previous day General Dunsterville had telegraphed from Enzeli that all ships at Baku had been ordered to Petrovsk or Astrakhan and that the fleet was pro-British and wished to come either under our control or that of Bicharakoff. General Dunsterville requested, however, that any action regarding Krasnovodsk might be taken before the attitude of the fleet possibly changed into one of hostility. Beyond putting the permanent wireless station at Baku completely out of action, no damage had been done before evacuation, though a subsequent report said that the oil reserves were on fire. No more troops had been sent to Krasnovodsk, where the maximum that could be supplied was said to be a battery and a battalion. General Malleon asked for ample ammunition for the battery, but General Marshall was unable to transport this to Krasnovodsk, and the guns at Kaakha had already expended much of what they had. India proposed that General Malleon should take over command of Krasnovodsk.

As regards his plans in North-West Persia General Marshall thought that a reconsideration of the situation there and in Trans-Caspia was necessary. We had narrowly escaped disaster at Baku, we had extremely small prospects of controlling the Caspian fleet—which would be useless without the oil fuel obtainable only from Baku—and we appeared to have only a very few merchant ships in our hands. Having regard to supply and maintenance difficulties he was opposed to sending more troops to Krasnovodsk and would even advocate the return to Persia of the detachments already sent there. The Turks about Sauj Bulag threatened the approaches

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
Reports from Commodore Norris in the next few days showed that the fall of Baku, with its Centro-Caspian Government, had really facilitated his task as it removed the main obstruction he had hitherto encountered. In fact, he found that the number of ships he could arm was limited only by the material, labour, personnel and time available.

In Trans-Caspia the fall of Baku caused much anxiety to the local government, lest it might lead to the Turks crossing the Caspian and declaring a *Jihad* among the Mahomedan tribes in Turkestan and Central Asia. On the 11th September the Bolsheviks had attacked Kaakha but had been repulsed, owing largely to the accurate and effective shooting of the British field guns (44th Battery); and on the 18th the Bolsheviks again attacked this position, but, being unsuccessful, retired so disheartened that they made no further attacks for many months. General Maleson had sent reinforcements of two squadrons 28th Light Cavalry, which were on their way there. But the British force there was still very weak in numbers and the situation had many elements of danger in it which would affect us materially in Afghanistan and India. On the 24th September the War Office, in consultation with the Admiralty, issued orders that steps must be taken immediately to gain control of the Caspian, by drastic measures if necessary.

By the time these orders were received, Commodore Norris had already begun to make good progress towards organising both Enzeli and Krasnovodsk as naval bases, in collecting material and in other necessary arrangements. On the 27th September he reported that the Caspian fleet was disorganised and under the complete control of Bicharakoff; that he proposed to ignore it as long as it was not hostile; and that when his armed ships were ready he would take all further action required. The armed flotilla which he was preparing would ultimately comprise twelve ships, six of them being small vessels for inshore work; and on the 30th September General Marshall reported to the War Office that the first of these vessels would be ready by the 6th October and that work had commenced on a second vessel.

Since the 12th September, the part of the 11th Caucasus Division which had forced our detachment to evacuate the Kufan Kuh had made no attempt to advance in force further southward and was reported to be collecting supplies in the Mianeh area. The general disposition of the remaining Turkish divisions in and around Trans-Caucasia was believed to be as follows. At Baku, 5th Caucasus, 15th and part of the 36th,

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Divisions : Alexandropol, 10th Caucasus, and part of the 36th, Divisions : Erivan-Julfa area, 9th Caucasus Division ; Dilman-Urmiya, 12th Division ; Sauj Bulag, 5th Division, with 6th Division in detachments near there and towards Ruwandiz ; and the 37th Division at Batum. After the fall of Baku it was reported that the 10th Caucasus Division* was to come to Tabriz. A few days later it was reported from a reliable source that Nuri Pasha at Baku had received orders from Enver Pasha that of the seven regiments there, one was to remain at Baku, one was to clear the Derbend-Petrovsk area and the other five were to be withdrawn from Baku and in communication with Halil Pasha were to furnish a force to clear the south-western shores of the Caspian† and occupy Enzeli. About the same time news was received that a small Turkish detachment, apparently from Tabriz, had occupied Ardebil, which Persian Cossacks had abandoned after a feeble resistance.

On the 16th September, the troops on the Persian line of communication from Qasr-i-Shirin (inclusive) to Hamadan (exclusive) consisted of the squadron Hertfordshire Yeomanry, 26th Mountain Battery, 72nd Field Company, R.E. (less one section), 5th 12th and 15th Companies Sappers and Miners, 48th and 128th Pioneers, 26th and 62nd Punjabis and administrative units ; and the North Persia Force (late Dunsterforce) comprised the 14th Hussars, one section 15th Machine Gun Squadron, 13th Brigade, R.F.A., 21st Mountain Battery, one section 72nd Field Company, R.E., 36th Infantry Brigade (1/4th Hampshire, 1/2nd Gurkhas, with 36th Sikhs and 1/6th Gurkhas under orders from Mesopotamia), 39th Infantry Brigade (9th Royal Warwickshire, 7th Gloucestershire, 9th Worcestershire and 7th North Staffordshire), 6th Light Armoured Motor Battery (less one section) and Dunsterforce Armoured Car Brigade.‡ There were also two and a half flights of the 30th and 72nd Squadrons, R.A.F.

* This was the division which the Arab officer deserter at Baku on the 13th September had said was held in reserve for the attack on Baku.

† A small British mission was still in Lenkoran, where the Russian settlers were debating whether to surrender to the Turks.

‡ The distribution of the North Persia force was approximately as follows :—
Kazaku—Kras 1904V, 44th Battery, R.F.A. (less one section), and 136 rifles 1/4th Hampshire.

Enzeli—8th Battery, R.F.A.
Headquarters 39th Infantry Brigade, with 9th Royal Warwickshire, 9th Worcestershire (less one company) and 7th North Staffordshire.
One platoon 1/4th Hampshire. (Continued on next page.)

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
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On the 17th September General Thomson, who proposed to establish his headquarters at Hamadan, issued orders for a gradual redistribution of his force, which aimed at concentrating his main strength at Zenjan, Kazvin and Hamadan in accordance with the plan telegraphed by General Marshall to the War Office on that date. On or before the 21st, however, news was received that the movement to Tabriz of the 10th Caucasus Division had been cancelled and that it had been ordered to proceed urgently to Constantinople. There were several reasons which might account for this order. For some time past the Turks had been strengthening their coastal defences and removing Greeks from the littoral districts as they feared that a concentration of Allied ships at Mudros indicated an intention to make a landing in support of the revolutionary movement that was forming in Turkey. An Allied advance in the Balkans, based on Salonika, was steadily gaining ground. General Allenby had just gained a great victory in Palestine. In France and Flanders also, affairs were progressing well for the Allies. It was significant, too, that Germany had just made a definite peace offer to Belgium and that Austria had

[Continued from previous page.]

- Resht area*.—100 rifles 1/4th Hampshire, 238 rifles 1/2nd Gurkhas and two armoured cars (8th Light Armoured Motor Battery).
Kazvin—Resht road.—140 rifles 1/2nd Gurkhas.
Kazvin.—Headquarters North Persia Force.
13th Brigade, R.F.A., headquarters and one section each 2nd and C/8th Batteries.
Headquarters 36th Infantry Brigade and details.
Two sections 39th Brigade Machine Gun Company.
Zenjan line (or on route there).—One squadron 14th Hussars (reduced to 16 sabres).
One section each, 44th and C/88th Field and 21st Mountain, batteries.
One company each, 7th Gloucestershire and 9th Worcestershire, 150 rifles 1/4th Hampshire and 180 rifles 1/2nd Gurkhas.
39th Brigade Machine Gun Company (less two sections).
Two armoured cars 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery and four of the Dunsterforce armoured cars.
Bijar line.—14th Hussars (less two squadrons).
Section, 15th Machine Gun Squadron.
Section, 72nd Field Company, R.E.
Section, 21st Mountain Battery.
7th Gloucestershire (less one company).
Selmeek line.—One squadron, 14th Hussars.
Section, 21st Mountain Battery.
Hamadan and vicinity.—2nd Battery, R.F.A. (less one section).
50 rifles 1/4th Hampshire and headquarters and 220 rifles 1/2nd Gurkhas.
186th Machine Gun Company.
Three Dunsterforce armoured cars.
Above is exclusive of levies and irregulars, whose number and dispositions are unknown.
Pack, wagon or lorry-wireless sets wire with each detachment.

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TRANS-CASPIA REINFORCED

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asked the United States of America to arrange for a peace conference.

General Marshall, having ascertained that the levies and irregulars raised by General Dunsterville had not proved to be of much military value, decided to disband them (or utilise them only as road guards or tribal police) and to concentrate on the organisation of the four battalions of the Urmia Brigade.*

On the 23rd September the War Office ordered General Marshall to complete the detachment in Trans-Caspia to a battery and a battalion, sending with them warm clothing, stores and ammunition sufficient for at least four months. Meat, grain and forage would be arranged for locally by General Malleson, under whose orders this detachment would come. This arrangement had been agreed to by the Commander-in-Chief in India who said, however, that the detachment could best be maintained from Enzeli. But to meet the contingency of the loss of Enzeli he was issuing orders to push on with the railway extension to Mirjawa on the Indo-Persian frontier. He also asked that the supply of some Ford vans previously asked for should be expedited to enable him to supply a brigade in advance of Meshed by the spring of 1919. The 9th Royal Warwickshire and a section of the 39th Brigade machine gun company left Enzeli for Krasnovodsk on the 29th September and the last section of the 44th Field Battery was to follow them shortly.†

For a few days after the fall of Baku, the attitude of the Jangalis appeared to be uncertain, but it was then reported that they were ready to co-operate with us in resisting a Turkish invasion of Persia, subject to the approval of the Persian Government. This Government was by this time friendly to us; and, with a view to strengthening it in this attitude, the War Office, on the 25th September, sent the following summary of the general military situation in the Middle East to the Military Attaché at Tehran for the information of Sir Percy Cox, who had arrived ten days previously from Baghdad to

* The organisation laid down for this brigade was for Nos. 1 and 4 Battalions to be composed of Jelu Assyrians and Nos. 2 and 3 of Armenians. Each battalion was to consist of four companies (one being mounted) with two British officers and three British non-commissioned officers per company; while each battalion was to have a British commandant, adjutant, quartermaster, sergeant-major, quartermaster-sergeant and orderly room sergeant. It was proposed to utilise two battalions on the Zenjan line and one each on the Bijar and Sehneh lines.

† It did not sail till a month later owing to influenza, of which an epidemic at this time was the cause of a high sick rate among all the troops.

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replace Sir Charles Marling as British Minister at Tehran on the latter's departure to Europe on sick leave.*


"The complete destruction of the whole Turkish army in Palestine leaves Syria open to invasion. Every anti-Turkish element in the country will support the advancing British. The communications of the Turkish force in Mesopotamia are thus seriously threatened and in all probability it will be forced to abandon Mesopotamia altogether. Arabia is completely lost to them and the fall of Medina is now imminent. Turkey, in addition to being faced with the loss of three-quarters of her Asiatic territory, is gravely threatened in Europe by the Allied advance in the Balkans, which, since 15th September, has continued uninterrupted. The Bulgarian army is in a critical situation and a slight further advance by the Allies will sever it in two. To meet all these dangers on so many fronts the Turks have only one army left, which is now in the Caucasus and Persia. General Allenby's victory has already compelled them to transfer to Constantinople a division which was destined for Tabriz; and the situation in the Balkans and Palestine will completely paralyse Turkish operations in the Middle East, and in all probability will lead very soon to the evacuation of Persia. Thus the whole situation has been transformed in the last few days and the Turks must now think only of protecting their own territory and not of further aggression."

On the 27th September, Bulgaria asked for an armistice; and it was reported that the Germans intended to withdraw their troops from the Caucasus and that the Turkish Government wished to do the same. As it turned out, however, both German and Turkish troops remained there for some weeks longer; though danger of a further Turkish advance into Persia became almost negligible. Colonel von der Goltz says† that he was sent to represent German interests at Baku and set out for that place by railway from Tiflis with a large escort on the 2nd October. His party was stopped by armed Tartars before he reached Elizabetopol, but Nuri Pasha invited him four days later to Baku, where he soon afterwards arrived, and

* Sir Percy Cox would have preferred to remain at his post in Mesopotamia till the end of the war, and only responded to the call to Tehran at the express wish of the Viceroy of India and of General Marshall, who felt that his intimate knowledge of the personnel and problems of the Mesopotamia Force would make his presence in H.M. Legation helpful to them at that juncture.

† "Meine Entsendung nach Baku."

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organised in India, where it was proposed to raise 67 new infantry battalions. Of these, 40 were to replace British battalions in Salonika, and the other 27 were to be used to expand the 13th Division and 56th Infantry Brigade in Mesopotamia into three new mixed divisions. To assist India in the organisation of these new battalions, most Indian units in Mesopotamia furnished contingents of trained officers and other ranks. In addition, in September Mesopotamia was called on to send twelve Indian Infantry battalions to Salonika at once. To furnish these, an Indian battalion was taken from each infantry brigade in the 14th, 15th, 17th and 18th Divisions, which left them each with only three battalions.

The regiments composing the 6th Cavalry Brigade were now the 11th Lancers, 21st Cavalry and Patiala Lancers. The 14th Hussars were in Persia and the 22nd Cavalry were attached to the 15th Division on the Euphrates front.

The troops in Persia had for the most part been detached from the IIIrd Corps, in which the 13th Division had now only two infantry brigades (38th and 40th), and the 14th Division was still short of an artillery brigade (13th).*

Medium trench-mortar batteries no longer formed part of Corps Troops, but the artillery of each division included a battery of 6-inch Newton trench-mortars, which had replaced the 2-inch mortars. The artillery of the 17th Division had also been increased by a Volunteer and an Anglo-Indian battery (each of four 18-pounders) taken from the line of communication defences, which had been further reduced by three-and-a-half infantry battalions.†


Each division had a divisional train in place of each of the Supply and Transport companies with each brigade; and the mechanical transport had been increased by the arrival at Basra in September of a motor ambulance convoy and the landing portions of twelve additional motor transport companies.

Leave to India, Ceylon and the United Kingdom had been granted during the summer to officers and men on a fairly generous scale; and, owing to this and the excellent arrangements for the care of the health of officers and men remaining

* The 27th Hampshire (from L. of C. Defences) had been attached as an additional battalion to the 40th Brigade; the 50th Brigade had been allotted to replace the 30th Brigade in the 14th Division; and the 82nd Punjabs had replaced the 1/2nd Gurkhas in the 37th Brigade.

† Four battalions withdrawn and two companies Nabha infantry joined from India.


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
* The arrangements at Bombay and Colombo for disposing of those who had gone on leave were much appreciated.

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WAR OFFICE INSTRUCTIONS

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Regiment, one mountain battery and gendarmerie—total 50 sabres, 4 guns, 720 rifles and 10 machine guns.

Rucandic Group, with detachments at and towards Bane: divisional squadron, divisional artillery (8 guns), 16th and 22nd Infantry Regiments*, divisional assault, signal and engineer companies (all lately belonging to the 6th Division), and one frontier and one gendarmerie battalion—total 80 sabres, 8 guns, 1,840 rifles and 40 machine guns.


General Marshall also said that he had received information that the Turks, expecting us to assume the offensive on the Tigris front, had ordered the 5th Division (then concentrated at Sauj Bulag), with all the details of the IV Army Corps† headquarters and half the corps administrative units, to join the Sixth Army immediately. The strength of the 5th Division was estimated at 70 sabres, 25 guns, 2,400 rifles and 47 machine guns, but General Marshall did not consider that it could be fully concentrated at Fat-ha before the 24th October.

At this time H.M. Government felt it advisable to exploit at once the effect of General Allenby's success in Palestine, so as to eliminate all Turkish influence south of the Taurus mountains. For, if the Turks were given time to rest and to foment quarrels among the local populations, the situation would almost certainly deteriorate to our disadvantage. Consequently, on the 2nd October the War Office telegraphed to General Marshall that, as the Turks had been placed in a position of extreme difficulty by the British victories in Palestine and the collapse of Bulgaria, a request from them for the cessation of hostilities in the near future might result. In the circumstances, it was advisable that we should gain as much ground as possible up the Tigris. At the same time the work of the line of communication to the Caspian should not be retarded in any way, as its development was of primary importance. Further, as General Allenby's cavalry might be pushed on towards Aleppo, the feasibility of assisting them by a cavalry raid up the Euphrates should be studied. General Marshall was to send his proposals for carrying out either or both of these operations, bearing in mind that, to be effective, any action must be initiated without delay.

* It was subsequently reported that the 22nd Regiment had absorbed the 16th.

† The other division (12th) of this corps, with the corps cavalry, artillery, engineers, etc., was to remain in the Urma area.

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MARSHALL'S INTENTIONS

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General Marshall, learning, even before the capture of Damascus on the 1st October, that, owing to General Allenby's victories, the Turks were hurriedly withdrawing troops from the Caucasus* and that there was no longer any danger of an enemy advance on Karvin, agreed fully that the time had come to take the offensive against the Turkish force covering the approaches to Mosul. The main part of this force was holding a position of great natural strength, astride the Fat-ha gorge, which the Turks had been preparing for nearly eighteen months, with a second strong position astride the Tigris at its confluence with the Little Zab.

General Marshall would have preferred to make the Turks fight on ground of his own choosing by carrying out his main advance via Kirkuk. But the lack of available transport, owing to the requirements of Persia and of the collection of the Mesopotamian harvest, prohibited such a course, so that the only alternative was a direct advance up the Tigris.

At a conference at Baghdad on the 5th October, attended by General Cobbe, General Marshall explained his intentions and gave general instructions for the operations. The main advance up the Tigris would be carried out by the 1st Corps and 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades under the command of General Cobbe, his right flank being covered by a small column from the IIIrd Corps. This column, commanded by General Lewin, was to advance on the line Tausq-Kirkuk-Alfun Kôpri and prevent the enemy forces in that area from moving down the Little Zab. Further, the 56th Infantry Brigade was to move from the Euphrates to assist in constructing the railway line northward of Tikrit.

A good many preliminary movements of troops† not required for the operations would be necessary, to bring them back to the railways so as to release transport required for the advance; and these movements with other necessary preparations would, it was considered, take about twelve days.‡

* It was reported that four Turkish divisions were being withdrawn.

† The disposition of General Marshall's force at the beginning of October was briefly as follows. Troops amounting to nearly a division were on the Persian line of communication and in Persia; the 14th Division, east of the Diyala, was distributed from Khamisîn to Shahrâban; the 13th Division, west of the Diyala, had one brigade group in the Qara Tape-Kifri-Tuz Khurmati area and the other about Deilî Abbas; the 17th Division was in the vicinity of Tikrit on the Tigris right bank; the bulk of the 18th Division was about Samarra, with a brigade at the Tigris-Adhaim junction; the 15th Division was on the Euphrates with its advanced troops at Sahilyx to the north of Hit; and the 6th, 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades were at or near Shahrâban, Baghdad and Falluja respectively.

‡ By the 13th October it became clear that they would take longer.

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The opinion of H.M. Government that Turkey would propose peace was confirmed early in October. On the 4th it was learnt on good authority that the Turkish Government had telegraphed to Berlin that it was about to ask for peace, as the Central Powers could no longer give adequate assistance, and that Germany had replied that she was ready to help Turkey in every way, that the communications between the two countries would not be interfered with and that measures had already been taken for the military occupation of Bulgaria. It was also reported that German troops were being sent by sea from Russia to Constantinople. In the next two or three days Turkish emissaries attempted to open peace negotiations through the British diplomatic representatives in Greece and Switzerland, but, as these emissaries were not accredited by the Turkish Cabinet, there was nothing to be gained by discussing proposals with them.

It was said that the Sultan of Turkey, with considerable support, was endeavouring to free the Turkish Government of the influence wielded by the Committee of Union and Progress. This report gained further credence when news was received on the 8th October that the Turkish Cabinet, including Talaat and Enver Pashas, had resigned, that Tewfik Pasha had been appointed Grand Vizier and that, in spite of German objections, the new Turkish Government was about to inform the United States of America of its desire to negotiate for peace. But a few days later information was received that the Sultan's and Tewfik's efforts to form a Cabinet free of the influence of the Committee of Union and Progress had been frustrated and that Izzet Pasha had been appointed Grand Vizier and had formed a Cabinet. In the meantime, H.M. Government, deeming it advisable to be prepared for an offer of peace, had ordered terms for an armistice to be drafted by the British Admiralty and War Office.

The whole question of peace with Turkey was considered at a conference of the Prime Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy at Paris on the 7th October, when it was decided that, while terms of peace could only be discussed at the end of the war, an armistice might be concluded by any of the three Powers whom the Turkish Government might approach on the subject. The terms of such an armistice were also approved, being those already drafted in London with some slight additions and alterations.

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
difficult obstacle to movement. The Jabal Makhul flanked the right bank of the Tigris closely from the gorge to Ain Dibs, where there was a practicable pass across the range, and continued in a north-westerly direction till it gradually merged into the plain to the westward of Sharqat. Above the Humr bend, also, the right bank of the Tigris was closely flanked by another and similar range of hills—the Jabal Khanuqa—which extended nearly to Sharqat, while the area between the Jabal Khanuqa and the Jabal Makhul was a jumbled mass of low hills and ravines.

On the right bank of the Tigris, two roads led from Shuraimiya to the neighbourhood of Sharqat. One went along the river bank through the Fat-ha gorge and crossed a succession of ravines, of which the largest had been bridged by a wooden structure which the Turks would be sure to destroy as they retired; while the other lay over the waterless desert westward of the Jabal Makhul, which it crossed near Balalij. On the left bank of the Tigris the road which led from opposite Tikrit over the Ain Nukhaila pass was passable, but difficult, for wheels, and the only other practicable route over the Jabal Hamrin between Ain Nukhaila and Fat-ha was a steep and difficult bridle path over the Darb-al-Khail pass. There were springs or wells of water at both these passes, but the water in them was insufficient for a force of any size. There was also a road along the left bank of the river, but, after passing through the Fat-ha gorge, both the road and the country adjoining it were completely commanded by the hills on the Tigris right bank.

The Turkish position on the right bank at Fat-ha consisted of a succession of trench lines, which ran westward from the Tigris along the forward slopes of the Jabal Makhul for about three miles and then bent back to the north-west. The crest of the Jabal Makhul was naturally very difficult of access owing to the steep and precipitous nature of its slopes; and every possible track across it was protected by Turkish trenches and guns. On the left bank of the Tigris, the trench lines extended for some five miles along the crest line and the forward slopes of the Jabal Hamrin.

Fifteen miles to the rear, the second Turkish position extended from the vicinity of Ain Dibs across the hilly and broken ground to the Tigris south of Mushak and continued for some ten miles along the northern bank of the Little Zab. This bank was generally precipitous and commanded the southern


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TURKISH DISPOSITIONS

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bank, while the Humr section of the position, where the Turks had a bridge across the Tigris, completely dominated all the ground on the left bank about the confluence of the Little Zab and the Tigris.

At the beginning of October, the infantry of the Turkish 14th Division were believed to be disposed as follows:—About Fat-ha, 43rd Regiment and divisional assault company; about Humr, 9th Regiment; and at Sharqat, 7th Regiment. Each regiment had a strength of about 1,200 rifles. By the second week in October the news of the transfer of the 5th Division to Mesopotamia had been confirmed, and, as it was reported that part of the 2nd Division had already reached the Tigris from Altun Kōpri and was being followed by the rest of the division, it looked as if the units of the 5th Division were relieving those of the 2nd in the Altun Kōpri area. Information had also been received that the troops in the Sulaimaniya group had withdrawn from the frontier and were concentrating. The 7th Regiment had apparently moved forward from Sharqat to Humr, and six 15 cm. howitzers were reported to have been withdrawn from the Tigris front and sent to Aleppo, where practically all the Turkish troops from the Euphrates front were believed to have gone also.

On the 21st October, the enemy's dispositions and numbers were estimated as follows:—

Fat-ha (both banks of the Tigris): 14th Divisional Cavalry and assault company, 9th and 43rd Regiments= 90 sabres, 2,620 rifles and 28 field guns; *

Ain Dibs-Humr-Little Zab: 7th and 22nd Regiments (the latter having come from the Kuwandiz area)=30 sabres, 2,910 rifles and 14 field guns; *

Sharqat: about 200 rifles.

Altun Kōpri-Kirkuk-Tara Khurmalih area: 2nd Division = 330 sabres, 2,240 rifles and 30 guns. Some of these might be on their way to the Tigris.

The advent of Ali Ihsan to the command of the Turkish Sixth Army had evidently effected a considerable improvement in its discipline and *moral*. Its men were said to be well fed and to have great confidence in Ali Ihsan, who had rid himself of all the unpopular German staff. It was also reported that he had warned his troops that an attack up the Tigris by six British divisions was imminent and that the Turkish hold on the Fat-ha position must be maintained.

* It was reported that all the heavy guns had been sent to Aleppo. This report was confirmed a few days later.

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In the meantime, General Cobbe, who felt that a direct attack on the Fat-ha position would be a costly and indecisive operation, had assured himself by careful reconnaissance that, owing to lack of water, a turning movement round the enemy's right was impracticable, except for armoured cars. He decided finally to turn the enemy's left, secure a crossing over the Little Zab* and drive the enemy across to the Tigris right bank, where he hoped to cut off the larger portion of the enemy's force covering Mosul and to destroy it.

With the limited amount of transport available it was impossible to initiate our attack from Tikrit as a surprise, while it was necessary to form advanced depots of ammunition and supplies as far forward as possible and to develop and prepare the water supply at the Ain Nukhaila and Darb-al-Khail passes. To obtain such measure of surprise as was possible, depots of supplies were openly formed on both banks of the Tigris—about Jift, constant reconnaissances were carried out towards the enemy's right, Arab agents were used freely to make enquiries indicating our intention to move in that direction, and the preparation of the water supply on the Jabal Hamrin passes was postponed till the last possible moment.

The two divisions (17th and 18th) of the 1st Corps were comparatively new formations and but few of their units had previous war experience. Each of their infantry brigades had also been reduced by an Indian infantry battalion transferred to Salonika, and from each of the remaining Indian battalions one company, as well as many officers and non-commissioned officers, had been withdrawn to form in India the nuclei of new battalions. Moreover, at this time the numerical strength of every unit was considerably reduced by an epidemic of influenza.

The forward depots, providing seven days' supplies for the force and ammunition, were completed on the 18th October. On that day the Ain Nukhaila and Darb-al-Khail passes were occupied and, away on the right flank, General Lewin's column†

*Until a few days before his advance General Cobbe was uncertain whether the Little Zab was fordable.

† H.Q. 40th Infantry Brigade, with 4th South Wales Borderers, 5th Wiltshire and two machine gun sections.

12th Cavalry (less one squadron) and one machine gun section.


A 86th Battery, R.F.A. (less one section) and one section 61st Battery, R.F.A.

One section 71st Company, R.E.

13th Light Armoured Motor Battery.

No. 30 Squadron, R.A.F. (less half flight) and one flight No. 72 Squadron.
Administrative units.

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COBBE'S OPERATION ORDER

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occupied Tauq, after a night march from Tuz Khurmatli. The Turkish cavalry at Tauq withdrew to Taza Khurmatli, leaving twenty-seven prisoners in our hands.

On the same day General Cobbe issued an operation order in which he announced his intention of attacking the enemy holding the Fat-ha position, with a view to securing the passage of the Fat-ha gorge preparatory to advancing to the line of the Little Zab. He organised his force into the following groups.

- (a) 18th Division Group (operating on left bank) under Major-General H. D. Fanshawe.*
- (b) 17th Division Group (operating on right bank) under Major-General G. A. J. Leslie.*
- (c) Corps Reserve.*
- (d) 63rd Squadron, R.A.F. (less half flight) and one flight 72nd Squadron, R.A.F.

The heavy artillery was to move into positions near the Tigris banks during the night 22nd/23rd October to commence counter-battery work on the 23rd.

The 7th Cavalry Brigade was to be concentrated north of the Darb-al-Khail pass on the 23rd.

The 18th Division Group was to attack the enemy holding the Fat-ha left bank position on the 24th, using the 7th Cavalry Brigade to turn and attack this position in reverse, and to bring fire to bear on the enemy on the right bank. The objectives of this group were (1) to capture the Fat-ha left bank position, (2) to cut off the retreat of the enemy holding this position, (3) to co-operate by fire with the 17th Division Group operating against the right bank position and (4) to guard against an enemy advance from the direction of the Little Zab.

Careful arrangements were to be made to enable our infantry on the Jabal Hamrin to show their positions to the 7th Cavalry Brigade and to our troops to the south.

The 17th Division Group was to operate on the right bank so as to facilitate the attack on the 24th October of the 18th Division Group. During the night 23rd/24th the 17th Division was to be disposed on a wide front, so as to keep down the fire from the enemy's right bank position, with its own main strength on its right ready to push forward along the river as the 18th Division attack progressed. Its field artillery was to be disposed so as to afford heavy covering fire to its advance.

* The composition of these groups underwent some alteration after this order was issued and is given later.

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and it was to be prepared to assault the right bank position on the morning of the 25th.

Preparations for throwing a bridge across the Tigris at Jift were to be completed by 6 p.m. on the 22nd.

During the next few days, while the forward concentration of troops was proceeding, further reconnaissances were carried out and, as a result of these* and of conferences with his subordinate commanders, General Cobbe made some modifications in his original orders, including the organisation of the different groups.

The 18th Division Group included the 7th Cavalry Brigade, two squadrons 32nd Lancers, D/336th Battery, R.F.A., 337th Brigade, R.F.A., 74th Brigade, R.G.A., (2/86th Heavy and 159th Siege Batteries), 2nd Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade (25th and one section 34th Batteries), 53rd, 54th and 55th Infantry Brigades, 2nd, 6th and 8th Companies Sappers and Miners, one section 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery and the 249th Machine Gun Company, giving a total strength of about 1,400 sabres, 7,700 rifles and 48 guns.†

The 17th Division Group included the 32nd Lancers (less two squadrons), 220th, 221st and 336th (less D Battery) Brigades, R.F.A., 101st Brigade, R.G.A. (157th Heavy and 246th, 257th and 395th Siege Batteries), 34th Mountain Battery (less one section), 34th, 51st and 52nd Infantry Brigades, Malerkotla and Tehri-Gahrwal companies of Sappers and Miners, 1/32nd Sikh Pioneers, one section 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery and the 276th Machine Gun Company, giving a total strength of about 200 sabres, 7,700 rifles and 82 guns.

The Corps Reserve had at first included the 11th Cavalry Brigade, 14th Light Armoured Motor Battery, 56th Infantry Brigade and 448th and 450th Field Companies, R.E. On the 20th October, however, General Cobbe heard from General Marshall that, while he approved generally of the proposed plan, he did not agree to the 56th Infantry Brigade being withdrawn from railway construction to take part in the operations. The 11th Cavalry Brigade and armoured cars had also only been included in the Reserve to preserve secrecy in regard to General Cobbe's intentions, and on the 21st and 22nd he issued separate

* It was ascertained that the Little Zab was fordable in places, that the country between the Jabal Hamrin and the Little Zab was practicable for cavalry, and that water was obtainable en route.

† The R.F.A. batteries of the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades were equipped with 18-pounder guns and teams of eight horses.

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Early on the morning of the 23rd October General Lewin's column, having advanced from Tauq, entered Taza Khurmatli without opposition and, gaining contact with an enemy detachment five miles to the northward, drove it back towards Kirkuk.

By the same morning, the forward concentration of General Cobbe's force was complete. On the previous day two of his infantry brigades* had advanced and established themselves on a line within about a mile of the enemy's trenches at Fat-ha gorge, to cover the positions which some of his artillery would take up during the ensuing night and to allow of artillery reconnaissance by the remainder.

On the morning of the 23rd General Cobbe's force was disposed as follows:—

Thirty-two guns (i.e., all except the mountain guns and those with the 7th Cavalry Brigade) of the 18th Division Group were in position on the left bank of the Tigris, covered by the 55th Infantry Brigade.

On the crest of the Jabal Hamrin at Darb-al-Khail was a column under General Nightingale consisting of one troop 32nd Lancers, 2nd Mountain Artillery Brigade (eight guns), 8th Company Sappers and Miners and 54th Infantry Brigade, all equipped with pack transport.

Moving north of the Jabal Hamrin to a water supply depot† at the northern end of the Darb-al-Khail pass were the 7th Cavalry Brigade and one section D/336th Battery R.F.A.

At Ain Nukhaila were one troop 32nd Lancers, 116th Mahrattas (less two companies), 2nd Company Sappers and Miners (less two sections), half the 55th Brigade machine gun company and one section 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery.

The remainder of the 18th Divisional Group were in reserve. The 11th Cavalry Brigade was on its way from the Tigris, opposite Tikrit, to the northern exit of the Ain Nukhaila pass.

On the right bank of the Tigris, the 101st Heavy and 230th Field Brigades of artillery were in position, covered by the line of the 51st and 52nd Infantry Brigades. The remainder of the 17th Divisional Group were in reserve about Shurainiya.


The Light Armoured Motor Brigade was at Abu Rajash.

During the 23rd October the artillery, which was in position, registered and engaged any enemy batteries that could be located from the air, the enemy's guns replying intermittently.

* The 55th on the left bank and the 52nd on the right bank.

† The water from local springs had been supplemented by water in tanks sent on camels from the Tigris.

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FAT-HA GORGE CAPTURED

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On the left bank it appeared to the 55th Infantry Brigade about midday that hostile activity to its front had decreased and it sent forward patrols. But these found the enemy still occupying his trenches. At 2 p.m. the 54th Brigade Group started to advance along the crest of the Jabal Hamrin, where, owing to the winding nature of the path, the distance to be traversed proved to be nearly twice as long as it appeared from the map. Various defensive positions were found to be unoccupied and, no opposition having been encountered, the column reached a point about six miles from the gorge at 6.30 p.m.

At 9.30 p.m., when the moon rose, a strong reconnoitring party from the 55th Infantry Brigade advanced and at 1 a.m. reported that the trenches on the left bank were empty. The brigade then at once moved forward and occupied the mouth of the gorge. In the meantime, the 54th Brigade Group had also restarted its advance at 9.30 p.m. and it entered the enemy's position at 1.30 a.m. The night march of the 7th Cavalry Brigade round the enemy's left was also carried out without opposition, a point about three miles north-east of Fat-ha being reached at 3.30 a.m. on the 24th.

On the right bank our infantry made no advance till dusk on the 23rd, when the 51st and 52nd Infantry Brigades advanced their line for about half a mile and all three brigades of field artillery moved forward into positions to support the attack at dawn by the 18th Division. During the night, enemy piquets on the right bank continued firing until 3.30 a.m. But by 5 a.m. it was definitely ascertained that the enemy had abandoned his position on this bank also; and his trenches were occupied by our infantry at daybreak*.

The enemy's speedy evacuation of his whole position came as a surprise to the British. General Cobbe had hoped that an assault on the Turkish right bank positions would not prove necessary and that the successful action of the 18th Division Group on the left bank on the 24th would lead to a general enemy retirement. But the retirement on the right bank took place twenty-four hours earlier than had been anticipated.

At 5.30 a.m. on the 24th October, the 7th Cavalry Brigade sent out a detachment (13th Lancers, two R.H.A. guns and a machine gun section) to cover its right flank, and did not learn till 6.30 a.m., after it had sent the 14th Lancers towards the enemy position on the Jabal Hamrin, that the Turks had retired.

* Sunrise was about 6.10 a.m.

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
The main body of the brigade then concentrated to the north of the position about a mile from the Tigris and, seeing small bodies of the enemy retiring along the right bank road, sent orders to the flanking detachment to move in towards the Tigris and fire on them. This it did, firing on some enemy transport with its guns. The 7th Cavalry Brigade then proceeded towards the junction of the Little Zab and the Tigris.

The 53rd Infantry Brigade was ordered by the 18th Division to pass through the gorge, followed by the 337th Brigade, R.F.A., and the 74th Brigade, R.G.A.; the 2nd and 8th Sapper and Miner Companies and the 55th Infantry Brigade being directed to improve the road and assist with the traffic. The road proved to be very bad and it was not till 8.30 a.m. that the 53rd Infantry Brigade and C/337th Battery, R.F.A., began to debouch from the gorge and to move northward. A half squadron 32nd Lancers joined them later and one section 2/86th Battery, R.G.A., also pushed on, but, delayed by the difficulties of the road, failed to join the 53rd Infantry Brigade that day.

On the right bank, 17th Division Headquarters issued orders at 4.40 a.m. to meet the contingency of an enemy retirement, directing the 32nd Lancers' squadron and one section 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery to start from their bivouac near Shuraimiya at 6 a.m. and reconnoitre the enemy's trenches in the gorge. Orders were also issued to the 34th Mountain Battery (less one section) to start at the same hour and join the 51st Infantry Brigade, which was directed to organise a column of one battalion, two sections of a machine gun company and these mountain guns to act as a flank guard moving along the crest of the Jabal Makhul. When it was ascertained definitely that the enemy had retired, the cavalry and the armoured cars were ordered to push ahead of the 51st Infantry Brigade through the gorge.

Just before 8 a.m. General Cobbe received an air report that the rear of a two-mile long column of enemy infantry and transport was about four miles north of Fat-ha on the right bank. This information was at once sent with orders to the 17th Division to press forward and engage this column before it could gain the cover of the position covering Humr. But the 17th Division was unable to comply, as it had just learnt that the road through the gorge had been so badly damaged as to be impassable even for pack transport. Sappers

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about 5 p.m.* and went into bivouac below Tel-ad-Dhahab,† in which vicinity the 53rd Infantry Brigade also bivouacked.

During the afternoon General Leslie, commanding the 17th Division, inspected the right bank road through the gorge and reported that the road had been repaired for about three miles but that transport carts could only be got through by man-handling. This was due not so much to the damage done as to the nature of the road, which was generally only eight to twelve feet wide and crossed numerous ravines or dry water-courses where the gradients were excessive and the bends of a hairpin type. Pack transport could traverse it quite well and this was being organised to supply the 32nd Lancers and 51st Infantry Brigade.‡ The gorge might be avoided by crossing and recrossing the river by bridges, said General Leslie. But he had no reason to suppose that the road was any better further upstream and he was not yet in cable communication with the 51st Brigade. The cable wagon had been unable to get along the road and cable was being laid by hand; visual signalling had proved impossible, and communication was being maintained by runner or mounted orderly.

In a 1st Corps operation order issued at 6.30 p.m. it was stated that on the right bank the enemy had retired to positions running westward from Mushak and on the left bank to the Little Zab. The British advance was to be continued next day. The 17th Division was to gain touch with the enemy and drive him back to his positions, assisted by the fire of the 18th Division heavy artillery from the left bank. The 18th Division was to assist the advance of the 17th Division and to secure a crossing over the Little Zab, pushing the 7th Cavalry Brigade across that river to threaten the enemy's left flank.


General Cobbe had previously issued orders for a bridge to be completed that night across the Tigris at Fat-ha, so that the eight mountain guns might cross from the left to the right bank and the 336th Brigade, R.F.A., might cross from the right to the left bank. The bridging train itself was to accompany the 18th Division.

* Sunset was about 5.20 p.m.

† The cavalry brigade had to change its first bivouac near the Little Zab and move farther south to get out of range of enemy shells. Its wireless equipment was temporarily lost, which caused delay in getting information and orders through.

‡ The Army Transport carts were of the Indian pattern, i.e., drawn by two mules wearing pack saddles. Thus, by leaving the carts behind, the mules could be used as pack animals, carrying about half the load they could draw.

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bank. From there they started to work round the enemy's right and this movement, combined with the accurate fire of our guns, caused the Turks to retire north-westward under cover of a rear guard, which the 7th Hussars engaged till after dark.

The main body of the brigade reached the Little Zab just before it was dark, having marched about 77 miles in the previous 39 hours, and bivouacked on the left bank, while the 7th Hussars, who had suffered 15 casualties, held a position on the right bank covering the crossing. General Cobbe received news of this successful crossing at 5 p.m.

On the extreme British right General Lewin's column had, during the day, pushed forward towards Kirkuk, where the enemy displayed some strength.* As the rôle of his column was to contain the Turkish force in this area, General Lewin saw no reason to risk heavy casualties by an attack, and therefore contented himself with maintaining close contact.


At 7.30 p.m. General Cobbe received a wireless message from the Light Armoured Motor Brigade reporting that it had reached the vicinity of Hadr without seeing any of the enemy.

During the 25th October the Turkish force at Kirkuk maintained its position till dusk, when it began to withdraw towards Altun Köpri. General Lewin's column, which had kept in close contact with the enemy throughout the day, occupied Kirkuk and a line to the north of it after dark.

At dawn on the 25th the Turks on the Tigris were found by our advanced troops to be still holding a line from the southward of Mushak to the crest of the Jabal Makhul; but the enemy detachment, with which the 11th Cavalry Brigade had been engaged on the Little Zab the previous evening, had withdrawn, apparently to the Tigris. Reports that the enemy was holding the Mushak position were received by General Cobbe from his airmen between 7 and 8 a.m. and further air reports received at the same time gave him the following information. The Light Armoured Motor Brigade had been seen at 6.45 a.m. some twenty-six miles due west of Sharqat, evidently proceeding towards that place; four enemy battalions with eight guns had been seen at 7.30 a.m. three miles north-eastward of the Hurr bridge proceeding in a north-easterly direction, probably towards the Little Zab; and the 11th Cavalry Brigade was engaged in crossing the Little Zab.

* From subsequent statements of prisoners the enemy's strength appears to have been about 150 sabres, 1,000 rifles and 8 guns.

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BRITISH CAVALRY PROGRESS 277

In the meantime, the British advance up both banks of the Tigris had re-commenced. On the left bank, at 5 a.m. the 7th Cavalry Brigade started for the Shumait ford across the Little Zab, by which its patrol had crossed the previous day, and the 53rd Infantry Brigade with C/337th Field Battery advanced up the road with orders to throw a bridge across the Little Zab and to establish a bridgehead. The advanced guard of the 53rd Brigade (1/7th Gurkhas) had received orders to secure the left bank of the Little Zab and to reconnoitre for a ford below Shumait. At 5 a.m. also D/338th, A/337th and 341st Field Batteries and the 74th Brigade of heavy artillery left Fat-ha, escorted by the 1/5th Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment (54th Brigade), to cover the advance of the 17th Division up the Tigris right bank.

At 7.15 a.m. the advanced guard of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (13th Lancers and a section of the machine gun squadron) crossed the Shumait ford after a sharp skirmish; and by 11.15 a.m. the main body had also crossed, with several casualties from shell fire incurred while crossing. The 13th and 14th Lancers were pushed on at about 11 a.m. with orders to move to the north and then to circle westward to the Tigris, so as to cut off any of the enemy there. General Cassels, whose first necessity was to establish a bridgehead and ferry at the Zarariya ford, had received (by aeroplane) at 7 a.m. a copy of General Cobbe's operation order and instructions to co-operate with the 7th Cavalry Brigade in threatening the enemy's left flank. At 10.20 a.m. two cars of the 8th Light Armoured Motor Battery,* which he had despatched at 8.30 down the left bank of the Little Zab to gain touch with the 7th Cavalry Brigade, returned with information that the brigade was crossing at Shumait. Thereupon General Cassels, taking with him the 23rd Cavalry and one section each from the horse artillery battery and machine gun squadron, started down the right bank of the river. The remainder of his brigade was told to be ready to move at short notice and the Ford van convoy was directed to return to Fat-ha with the wounded and six prisoners taken the previous evening by the 7th Hussars.

The 1/7th Gurkhas (advanced guard, 53rd Infantry Brigade), on approaching the Little Zab about 10.30 a.m., came under accurate hostile shell fire and also some machine gun and rifle fire, which caused them some casualties. It was not long, however,

* These had escorted General Cassel's Ford van convoy from Ain Nakhalla.

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before they found a ford some two miles above the Little Zab-Tigris junction.


On the right bank of the Tigris, the 34th Infantry Brigade (less 2nd Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment), with the eight guns of the 2nd Mountain Artillery Brigade which had crossed from the left bank during the night, moved forward from the Fat-ha gorge about 6 a.m. to join the 51st Infantry Brigade, which began to push forward half an hour later. The 403rd and 404th Field Howitzer and the 246th six-inch Howitzer Batteries were to follow the 34th Infantry Brigade, with the West Kents to assist them through the gorge. The advanced guard (one squadron 32nd Lancers and 1st Highland Light Infantry) of the 51st Infantry Brigade at about 8.20 a.m. reached the vicinity of Qala Jabbar, where it came under effective shell fire from hostile mountain guns and where the brigade received instructions (originating from Corps Headquarters) not to become too closely engaged before sufficient infantry and artillery support could reach it. Its flanking detachment, under Colonel Coningham, moving along the crest of the Jabal Makhul, also came into contact with the enemy about 9.15 a.m. Both these bodies of troops continued to advance, and at noon the advanced guard of the 51st Brigade was about two miles north-west of Qala Jabbar with Colonel Coningham's detachment* roughly abreast of it—though separated from it—on the Jabal Makhul. By this time the 34th Infantry Brigade with the mountain guns had reached 17th Division headquarters at Qala Jabbar. But the 403rd and 404th Field Howitzers had only managed to reach a point about two miles beyond Fat-ha, having lost several vehicles in traversing the gorge. It had been found quite impossible for the six-inch howitzer battery to get on at all; and the remaining batteries of the 220th Field Artillery Brigade had been ordered forward with infantry parties to help them.

It was further found that carts on the road completely blocked all traffic in the opposite direction. It was therefore decided to use pack transport only and, as the number of mules with the division was limited, those attached to the 52nd Infantry Brigade had to be utilised to supply the other two brigades.

On the Tigris left bank, also, the difficulties of the road had delayed the advance of the artillery. By noon, however, the three field batteries and one gun of the 2/86th Heavy

* Communication with this flanking detachment was difficult.

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moving fast towards the Humr bridge; and large numbers of troops crossing this bridge.

At 1.50 p.m. General Cobbe heard from the 18th Division that the 53rd Infantry Brigade had started to cross the Little Zab at a ford about two miles from the Tigris. This report, taken in conjunction with the air report of the movement of the two cavalry brigades, led him at 2.10 p.m. to send off an order by aeroplane to General Cassels, saying that, as the enemy had apparently been driven across the river off the Tigris left bank, he was to push on at once with the 11th Cavalry Brigade, if he could find himself, to ford the Tigris above Sharqat.

Receiving a message at 3 p.m. that the whole of the 53rd Infantry Brigade had crossed the Little Zab, General Cobbe issued orders for the construction of a pontoon bridge there and the improvement of the approaches to it so as to facilitate the passage of a Ford van convoy to supply the 11th Cavalry Brigade. He also sent orders to the 17th Division to press its attack vigorously and to the 18th Division to support the 17th by pushing on to the Humr bend. Actually the 53rd Infantry Brigade was still crossing the Little Zab and the whole did not get over till dusk.* But the 341st Field Battery moved forward to close range and came into action near the Little Zab-Tigris junction. Here it came under such accurate and steady shell fire from the hostile guns that eventually only two of its guns and wagons were brought out of action.


At 4.30 p.m. General Cobbe heard from the 18th Division that both cavalry brigades were retiring to the Little Zab and he sent another order (issued by wireless at 4.55 p.m.) to General Cassels to push on to Sharqat at once, cross the Tigris north of that place and cut the enemy's line of retreat. At the same time he asked General Fanshawe† if he could detail a column to leave next morning and push up the Tigris left bank to prevent the enemy from crossing and to support the 11th Cavalry Brigade.

At 6.45 p.m., half an hour after receiving an air report that the enemy had started to break up the bridge at Humr, General Cobbe issued his orders for further operations. The enemy, the order said, having been driven across to the Tigris right


* The records do not give the actual message, so that it is not clear how the mistake occurred.

† In the message to General Fanshawe it was stated that the enemy was blowing up his guns. General Fanshawe, however, felt sure that what had been reported to General Cobbe as the enemy's guns being blown up was in reality the guns of our 341st Battery being destroyed by hostile fire.

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infantry with guns and had been forced to retire. The brigade then swept to the northward, engaging enemy infantry and transport columns on the road to Mosel apparently with good effect. General Cobbe received news of its action at 5.45 a.m. on the 26th.

At 11 p.m. on the 25th October the dispositions of General Cobbe's force were as follows.


On the northern bank of the Little Zab the 11th Cavalry Brigade was at Zurariya, the 7th Cavalry Brigade at Shumait and the 53rd Infantry Brigade, with C/337th Battery, R.F.A., two miles from the Tigris junction. The bridging train, which had been much delayed in its march from Fat-ha by the bad road, did not reach the Little Zab till after dark. Six batteries of the 18th Division artillery were south of the Little Zab, almost opposite Mushak, with the 54th Infantry Brigade, which had moved forward from Fat-ha during the day, bivouacking close by. Headquarters of the 18th Division were at Tel-ad-Dhabab and the remainder of the division (less the Ain Nulhaila detachment) were at Fat-ha, the greater part having been employed during the day on road improvement.

The 51st Infantry Brigade covered a wide front on the Tigris right bank. The Highland Light Infantry were holding the advanced line astride the road and along broken hills to the west of it at a point about a mile south of Mushak; and in rear of them in support were eight mountain guns. To the left, about one and a half miles south-west of the Highland Light Infantry, Colonel Coningham's column of the 1/10th Gurkhas, four mountain guns and two machine gun sections was on the crest of the Jabal Makhul.* The remainder of the brigade group, with 51st Brigade headquarters, were bivouacked on the road about a mile in rear of the Highland Light Infantry. At Qala Jabbar were the 17th Division headquarters, the 34th Infantry Brigade (less 2nd Royal West Kent) and the 403rd and 404th Field Howitzer Batteries. These two batteries, of which the 403rd was pushed forward during the night to join the 51st Brigade Group, had been brought up only by dint of great exertion and resolution. The 1064th and 1066th Field Batteries had also, after great effort, got through the Fat-ha gorge, but were still five miles short of Qala Jabbar. The remainder of the 17th Division Group were at, or south of, the gorge.

At 11 p.m. General Cobbe sent orders to the 18th Division to be ready to move at dawn and to send patrols with machine

* The supply of this column had been extremely difficult owing to the nature of the ground.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٧٠ظ] (٥٤٠/٣٤٥)

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Just after 6 a.m., the two leading companies of the Highland Light Infantry started to advance on their own initiative. But they were quickly compelled to fall back again. The 14th Sikhs, near brigade headquarters, began at 6 a.m. to deploy into artillery formation to the east of the road, and at 6.25 a.m. advanced, with their left on the road, on a frontage of five hundred yards. Two of their companies were in first line and two in support, while a section of the brigade machine gun company moved to their right rear; the intention being that, when their line came abreast of the Highlanders, both battalions should assault the enemy's trenches.


The Sikhs' advance was directed against the enemy's left, which—as subsequent inspection showed—the Turks had made especially strong. The road from the Fat-ha gorge to Mushak ran closely under the hill sides and practically the only flat ground to the east of it was a two-mile-long low-lying strip, covered with thick thorn and scrub (three to five feet high), whose northern end terminated about a mile south of Mushak. Near this point the Turks had dug a line of trenches, covered by wire entanglement, which extended east of the road for a few hundred yards to the Tigris. In this vicinity the Tigris bed was then practically dry up to the main channel* which flowed east of the islands shown on Map 43. To protect themselves against an attack advancing along the river bank and bed, the Turks had dug on the slopes of the hills west of the road well-sited trenches and machine gun emplacements which faced eastwards. So well had these been concealed that our troops were unaware of them; and, even when suspected, they proved almost impossible to locate.

As soon as the 14th Sikhs began to advance they came under a galling artillery fire and, shortly afterwards, under heavy machine gun and rifle fire, the machine gun fire from their left front being especially effective. In spite of severe casualties† they continued to advance steadily and gallantly until about 7.30 a.m., when they were definitely checked not far from the enemy's wire and could make no further progress. Their left company then joined up near the road with the Highlanders, while the remainder of the battalion, reforming, took up a line in a shallow depression about three hundred yards from the enemy's line, where they remained under fire for the rest of the

* Across the main channel the Turkish steamer *Hamsivis* lay stranded.

† During the day their total casualties amounted to 223, including six of their eight British officers. Most of these casualties were incurred between 6.30 and 7.30 a.m.

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CHECK ON RIGHT BANK

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day. Their attack had been supported by the fire of the right mountain guns in position on the hill slopes west of the road and of the 403rd Field Howitzer Battery in position to the east of the road. But the mountain gun shells had little effect on the well-entrenched enemy, while the fire of the field howitzers was neutralised by that of an enemy howitzer battery, whose accurate shell fire put the 403rd Battery temporarily out of action about 8 a.m.*

General Wauchope, commanding the 34th Infantry Brigade, got into touch with General Hildyard, commanding the 51st Infantry Brigade, just as the 14th Sikhs' advance came to a stop. It was clear that they were under heavy fire, and, as he understood that their right was in danger of an enemy counter attack, General Wauchope sent forward two companies 114th Mahrattas to secure this flank. These Mahratta companies pushed forward with great steadiness under a heavy artillery fire till 9.30 a.m. when they reached an island in the Tigris bed, well beyond the flank of the Turkish first line; and here they remained for the rest of the day under constant artillery and machine gun fire.†

In the meantime, owing to the heavy fire from the hills to their left front, the Highland Light Infantry had been unable to do more than hold on stubbornly to their trenches near and across the road. Neither the Brigade nor Divisional headquarters were in touch with Colonel Coningham's men on the crest of the range, and, learning the situation, General Leslie at 8.30 a.m. ordered the 34th Infantry Brigade forward to support the attack and to secure the high ground to the left of the Highland Light Infantry. Twenty minutes later General Leslie received a report (by runner)‡ from Colonel Coningham saying that his infantry had been in touch with the enemy all through the night, that he was meeting with considerable opposition, and that the ground was precipitous and difficult.

At 10 a.m. the 404th Field Howitzer Battery reached the front and came into action not far from the position of the 403rd Battery; and at the same hour General Leslie sent orders to General Wauchope to take control of the forward troops. At

* The 403rd Battery had 25 casualties, and the 229th Artillery Brigade commander (Lieutenant-Colonel R. K. Lynch-Staunton) was mortally wounded here at this time.

† They incurred a total of 82 casualties.

‡ Visual signalling was impracticable. At 9 a.m. learning that touch had been lost, General Cobbe sent two armoured cars along the desert road to try and get into communication with Colonel Coningham. But they returned to Corps Headquarters at 9.50 p.m. without having been able to do so, though they had seen Colonel Coningham's troops on the range.

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10.30 a.m. General Wauchope ordered the 112th Infantry and a machine gun section to advance on to the hills to the west of the Highland Light Infantry so as to secure the left of that battalion and gain connection with Colonel Coningham's Gurkhas. The 112th effected this successfully at the cost of only one casualty, gaining touch about midday with the Gurkhas, who were then about two miles south-east of Ain Dibs.


At 10.40 a.m. General Wauchope went forward to make a personal reconnaissance and to discuss the situation with the officer commanding the Highland Light Infantry, and a little later General Leslie also went to the front to see the situation for himself. By this time a section 1064th Field Battery had also arrived and come into action, and the 2nd Royal West Kent Regiment* had been ordered up from the Fat-ha gorge to rejoin the 34th Brigade. Before he left his advanced headquarters, General Leslie sent General Cobbe a report timed 11 a.m. In this, he summarised the situation showing that the enemy had developed unsuspected strength near Mushak; he pointed out that the 52nd Infantry Brigade was immobile, and he suggested that a bridge should be thrown across the Tigris near Qala Jabbar with a view to effective co-operation by the 18th Division.

At this stage it is necessary to turn to the operations on the Tigris left bank. General Fanshawe had issued orders at 11.25 p.m. on the 25th that the 7th Cavalry Brigade, two troops 32nd Lancers, 337th Brigade, R.F.A., and one section 2/80th Battery, R.G.A., should push on up the Tigris bank at 6 a.m., and that the 53rd Infantry Brigade was to follow them as soon as it had been relieved by the 54th Infantry Brigade.

By 6 a.m. on the 26th October General Fanshawe with his advanced headquarters had reached the Little Zab, where the pontoon bridge had not yet been completed. The approaches to the bridge presented difficulties and it consequently appeared unlikely that the ration convoys would be able to get across the river before dark. Learning of this, General Cobbe at 7.15 a.m. cancelled the forward movement of the column previously detailed and gave directions that the 7th Cavalry Brigade was to advance towards Sharqat, so as to give support to the attack on the Tigris right bank by the 17th Division and to prevent any enemy escaping to the left bank. The 7th Cavalry Brigade proceeded accordingly, but, as men and horses had consumed

* This battalion was only about 400 strong, owing to influenza, and did not reach the front till dusk.

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COBBE'S ORDERS

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all their rations,* it received orders to return at dusk to the Little Zab. The 337th Brigade, R.F.A., one section 2/86th Battery, R.G.A., and the 54th Infantry Brigade (less 1/5th Royal West Kent Regiment escorting guns) were at this time all moving forward towards the Little Zab.


By 9.15 a.m. General Cobbe had heard that the 11th Cavalry Brigade had left Zarariya for Sharqat at 6 a.m., that the Turks were holding in strength the Ain Dibs-Mushak position and that their artillery was shelling heavily the advanced troops of the 17th Division and also the 7th Cavalry Brigade. At 9.25 a.m. he sent a message to General Fanshawe saying that the enemy might possibly hold on to his right bank position while withdrawing his heavy material and a portion of his force, unless he could be threatened in rear. It appeared probable that he meant to retain Sharqat and to effect a junction with his 5th Division, whose strength was estimated at 2,500 rifles and 25 guns. His 1st Regiment and a battalion of his 18th Regiment were still being contained by General Lewin. It appeared, therefore, continued General Cobbe, that General Fanshawe had a sufficient force on the Little Zab to secure the bridgehead there and also to send a small column with part of the bridging train to support the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades, so as to enable them to cross the Tigris above Sharqat and to prevent the Turkish 5th Division joining the Turkish 14th Division south of the Great Zab. General Fanshawe was told at the same time to arrange for the supply of the 11th Cavalry Brigade.

At 10 a.m. the bridge across the Little Zab was completed and an hour later General Fanshawe reported that most of the divisional artillery had crossed and that the 7th Cavalry Brigade was assisting the 17th Division attack. At the same hour he informed General Cobbe that the 7th Cavalry Brigade had eaten its emergency, and all its horse, rations. In consequence of this last information General Cobbe, not knowing that it had already started, sent orders that the 7th Cavalry Brigade should not move forward.

By 12.30 p.m. the 337th Brigade, R.F.A., and section 2/86th Heavy Battery were in action north of the Little Zab against hostile batteries in the Humr area, being covered by patrols pushed well forward by the 53rd Infantry Brigade, which also kept the Humr bridge under observation. The remainder of the 74th Heavy Artillery Brigade were in action in their previous day's positions supporting the attack of the 51st and 34th Infantry Brigades.

* Its ration convoy had been delayed by the bad road.

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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٧٣ظ] (٥٤٠/٣٥١)

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gun section from the 52nd Brigade were on arrival to form Divisional Reserve.*

In the meantime, the 11th Cavalry Brigade, encountering no opposition, had reached a point some miles eastward of Huwaish at 1 p.m. when General Cassels learnt from an air report that the Light Armoured Motor Brigade was astride the Mosul road north of Sharqat and had cut the enemy's telegraph cable. General Cassels had a good view of the right bank of the Tigris, where the gorge at Huwaish seemed to offer him a good position to make for in the first instance. But he had first to find a ford. As the result of reconnaissance on a wide front a ford was found opposite Hadraniya, about thirteen miles above Sharqat, at 3.30 p.m. The crossing was a difficult one, involving the passage of three branches of the river. In the last the ford followed for about five hundred yards, a narrow ledge where the swiftly flowing stream was about four and a half feet deep, with water at least a foot deeper immediately above it and much deeper just below it.


By 4.30 p.m. the Guides Cavalry, the leading regiment, had crossed to Hadraniya, where there was a Turkish hospital under a small guard. From Hadraniya General Cassels with the Guides proceeded at a gallop to Huwaish, five miles distant, orders being left for the 23rd Cavalry, the machine gun squadron and a section "W" Battery, R.H.A., to join General Cassels at Huwaish as soon as possible after they had crossed. Huwaish was reached soon after 5 p.m. without encountering any of the enemy, and General Cassels, finding the position there a strong one, decided to hold it, at any rate for the night. The position taken up was one facing south, astride the road, on the north bank of the Wadi Muabba. The 23rd Cavalry machine gun squadron and horse artillery section also reached here by 6.30 p.m.

The ford, which was difficult by day, was too dangerous to cross after dark, and the rest of the cavalry brigade remained for the night on the left bank, being joined about 8 p.m. by the transport column. General Cassels then sent off a wireless message to General Cobbe, reporting his position and asking that the officer commanding the Light Armoured Motor Brigade† might be directed to report to him next morning. General Cassels, who was without information regarding the progress made by the main body of General Cobbe's force, also

* Actually they did not reach Divisional Headquarters.

† This brigade had seen the 11th Cavalry Brigade across the Tigris during the day, but had been unable to gain communication with it.

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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد VII." [١٧٤ظ] (٥٤٠/٣٥٣)

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During the night of the 26th/27th October, the guns of the 18th Division Group to the north of the Little Zab continued to engage the hostile batteries about Humr, while patrols and machine guns from the 53rd Infantry Brigade demonstrated actively near the Humr bridge, both to prevent its reconstruction by the enemy and to lead him to believe that we intended to cross there ourselves. Two sections 238th Machine Gun Company were also sent back to the south of the Little Zab and they dug themselves in near the left bank of the Tigris, to the north-eastward of Mushak, so as to support the 17th Division attack next morning.

Early on the morning of the 27th October, however, patrols from the 17th Division found that the hostile trenches to their front had been evacuated.

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continuing to press forward towards Ain Dibs and Balalij. The 45th Sikhs and 258th Machine Gun Company, after a long and arduous march, had joined him at 6.15 a.m.*

On the Tigris left bank it appeared evident to 18th Division headquarters soon after dawn that the Turks on the right bank had retired; and, this being confirmed by reconnaissance, the 53rd Infantry Brigade closed its outposts and made preparations to advance.

About 8 a.m., when it was clear from aerial and other reconnaissance that the enemy had evacuated his whole line and was retiring towards Sharqat, General Cobbe issued orders that the 7th Cavalry Brigade was not to cross the Tigris at Fat-ha and that the 18th Division was to push forward a column at once along the Tigris left bank. The composition of this column was left to the discretion of General Fanshawe, but it was to be strong enough both to block the ferry near Sharqat and to send troops to support the 11th Cavalry Brigade. It was also to be accompanied by a few pontoons for rafting.

General Fanshawe detailed a column, under command of Brigadier-General G. A. F. Sanders, consisting of two troops 32nd Lancers, A/337th and one section 341st Field Batteries, one section 286th Heavy Battery and the 53rd Infantry Brigade, with orders to push on to opposite Sharqat to prevent the enemy crossing the Tigris in that vicinity and to assist the 11th Cavalry Brigade in every possible way. By 9 a.m. the leading troops of this column had begun to advance and the whole group was on the move by 11 a.m. except for the pontoons, which joined the column before dark. In his report, General Cobbe expressed his appreciation of the despatch with which this column was sent forward.

General Cassels, commanding 11th Cavalry Brigade, had not learnt, till just after midnight 26th/27th October, of the lack of progress made by the 17th Division on the 26th and of the probability that enemy reinforcements from Erbil had reached Sharqat.† In reply, General Cassels asked for information concerning the situation on the Tigris left bank below his position and the whereabouts of the 7th Cavalry Brigade. He also asked for more 18-pounder shrapnel.

* His column now consisted of 34th Mountain Battery, 1/10th Gorkhas, 45th Sikhs, two sections 267th Machine Gun Company and 258th Machine Gun Company (less one section).

† The message containing this information had been sent off by General Cobbe's headquarters just before dusk on the 26th, but it had been dropped by an aeroplane by mistake on the 7th Cavalry Brigade, by whom it had to be sent to 18th Division headquarters for transmission to General Cassels.

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push forward independently. This convoy, it may be noted here, reached the ferry above Huwaish at 10 p.m. after a march of thirty-five miles.


At 11.15 a.m. General Cassels received a message (despatched from Corps headquarters at 8.40 a.m.) confirming the evacuation of the Turkish position below Humr and informing him of the despatch of General Sanders' column. About an hour later General Cassels sent a squadron 7th Hussars to hold in check a Turkish detachment of about four hundred infantry, which, he heard from one of his patrols, was about fourteen miles to the north on the Mosul road and was advancing southward. In the meantime air reports showed that there had been no enemy movement between Sharqat, where large numbers were concentrating, and the Turkish detachment two and a half miles to the south of his own position.

His attack on the latter was launched at 12.30 p.m. Supported by the fire of "W" Battery, R.H.A. and by the active co-operation of the Light Armoured Motor Brigade on their right, the 23rd Cavalry and a section 25th Machine Gun Squadron advanced rapidly down the road and their main body attacked the left of the enemy's position with conspicuous dash. The enemy at once disclosed his exact position and his strength, which was evidently 800 to 1,000 infantry with four guns. Thereupon, General Cassels decided not to persist in his idea of ejecting the Turks from their position and he ordered the 23rd Cavalry to withdraw, but "W" Battery to keep up a steady fire and to make an accurate register of targets for future use. General Cassels had effected one of his main objects and hoped that he had effected both.* The 23rd Cavalry drew out of action successfully, having sustained forty-nine casualties including five British officers.

In this affair the armoured car of the Light Armoured Motor Brigade commander, while attacking the enemy's flank at close range, was wrecked by a direct hit from a Turkish shell, and Major Thompson himself and his crew of three were taken prisoner. Soon after the attack had been broken off, Captain Somerset, who succeeded Major Thompson in the command of the Light Armoured Motor Brigade, received orders from General Cassels to send two armoured cars to reconnoitre northwards along the Mosul road for twelve miles and to keep the remainder of his brigade in observation five miles to the south-west of Huwaish.

* The Turkish commander subsequently stated that he estimated that we had two cavalry brigades at Huwaish that day.

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
1064th Field Battery reached the Humr plain after dark and bivouacked there for the night. For the greater part of the day General Leslie was out of communication with Colonel Coningham,* but at 3 p.m. General Cobbe, learning from an air report that Balalij was clear of the enemy, at once ordered the headquarters 101st Heavy Artillery Brigade with one section each of 60-pounders and 6-inch howitzers, escorted by two troops 32nd Lancers, to join Colonel Coningham at that place.

To return to General Cassels, who at 2.45 p.m. judged from information received that the whole Turkish force was on the right bank of the Tigris. Some 2,000 to 3,000 of its infantry appeared to be entrenching a line two or three miles south of Sharqat, another 1,000 infantry were about two and a half miles south of his own position, apparently 4,000 to 5,000 more infantry were in the vicinity of Sharqat and there was a detachment twelve to fourteen miles north of him being watched by a squadron of the 7th Hussars. As regards our own troops he understood that General Sanders' column was moving up the Tigris left bank in his own direction and that the 7th Cavalry Brigade was at or on its way to Shuraimiya, but he had no recent information regarding the situation of the 17th Division. At 3 p.m., therefore, when he sent General Cobbe a situation report and announced his intention of fighting any enemy sent against him, he asked what progress had been made by the 17th Division. This message crossed one sent by General Cobbe at 3.20 p.m. (but only received by General Cassels at 10 p.m.) saying that General Sanders' column would arrive opposite Sharqat about 6.30 p.m. and would be able, if necessary, to reinforce General Cassels with infantry during the night and also that the 7th Cavalry Brigade, which would be sent up the Tigris left bank early next morning, should begin to reach the Hadraniya ford between 10 and 11 a.m. Immediately after sending this message, General Cobbe visited the 7th Cavalry Brigade and gave General Norton orders to start very early next morning and push forward as speedily as possible to join General Cassels.


At 4.35 p.m. General Cassels sent an officer with a message to General Sanders giving a summary of the situation and expressing the opinion that it was possible that the Turks would make a determined effort to break through the 11th Cavalry Brigade. The best help that General Sanders could

* Hearing this, General Cobbe sent an aeroplane at 2.30 p.m. to locate this column and give it information regarding the enemy.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٧٨ و] (٥٤٠/٣٦٠)




"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٧٩و] [٥٤٠/٣٦٢]



* Sunrise was about 6.15 a.m.
† The number of these was difficult to estimate. By evening General Cassels estimated that the Turks had 24 guns in action.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٧٩ظ] (٥٤٠/٣٦٣)




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of the Wadi Muabba and a branch ravine. Well handled, and making skilful use of the ground, the Hussars surprised the enemy about 9.15 a.m. by suddenly coming into action dismounted against the left of his advancing infantry. These at once fell back for some distance with considerable loss and the Hussars continued to exploit their success with boldness till about 10.30 a.m. when, threatened themselves by an outflanking movement, they drew out of action. Their object had been well effected at the cost of about 30 casualties. In the meantime, General Cassels, hearing that the 7th Hussars squadron to the north had been obliged to retire for about a mile, had sent it a reinforcement of half a squadron of the same regiment from the Tigris left bank.

The Turks to the south of General Cassels now changed their tactics. They recommenced their frontal attack with only a weak, widely-extended line advancing astride the road, while their intention of turning General Cassels' right was evident from the large columns seen two or three miles away moving in that direction. To counter this, General Cassels sent the 7th Hussars (less two squadrons) to prolong his right flank to the north-westward and to cover the guns of "W" Battery. These guns opened fire on the enemy columns, apparently with good effect, but they continued to make progress—though it was slow—past the British right; and at 12.15 p.m. General Cassels had to extend his line further to the north-west by sending the 23rd Cavalry to take up a line on the right of the Hussars.

At 1 p.m. the situation was generally as follows. Two and a half regiments of the 11th Cavalry Brigade were holding a convex line some four miles long, the Guides Cavalry on the left facing south astride the road, the 7th Hussars in the centre facing southwest and the 23rd Cavalry facing the same way on the right of the Hussars. The Light Armoured Motor Brigade was operating against the enemy about four and a half miles southwest of Huwaish. Groups of Turkish infantry to the southwestward, totalling 2,500 to 3,000, were moving north either trying to escape or to turn the British right, and another 300 to 400 to the southward were advancing widely extended towards the high ground south of the Wadi Muabba opposite the Guides Cavalry. Some of the Turkish guns were taking the line of the 7th Hussars in enfilade. To the north, a squadron and a half of the 7th Hussars and two armoured cars were retiring southward very slowly before an enemy detachment which was some two and a half miles

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17TH DIVISION PROGRESS

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searching the heights on either side of the road, a lengthy and difficult operation in the dark. Owing to this and to the number of deep ravines which could generally only be crossed with difficulty, progress was slow. At 7.15 a.m., when about seven miles from the enemy's position, General Wauchope sent the 112th Infantry and the 25th Mountain Battery to move along the crest of the Jabal Khanuqa with a view to attacking the enemy's left.* It had originally been General Wauchope's intention to halt the remainder of his column for an hour at this stage to give the Mahrattas time to get abreast. But, as the information that General Cassela was being heavily attacked made it important to lose no time, the main column, headed by one squadron 32nd Lancers and the 2nd Royal West Kent Regiment, continued its advance at once.

By 8 a.m. the 32nd Lancers had gained touch with the enemy and an airman had reported that some 2,000 Turkish infantry were holding the trenches to the south of Sharqat. At this hour General Leslie joined General Wauchope and, assuming direct command, issued orders that the column was to push on but that its infantry were not to be committed to the attack without adequate artillery support.†

At Balalij Colonel Coningham, who had been out of touch with Divisional headquarters since the previous day, did not receive his orders to advance till 8.25 a.m. At 9 a.m., as he was starting, communication (by heliograph) was re-established and he was told to co-operate on General Wauchope's left flank. With Colonel Coningham were two troops 32nd Lancers, headquarters 101st Heavy Artillery Brigade with one section each of the 157th and 246th Batteries, the 1/10th Gurkhas and two sections 257th Machine Gun Company. The 45th Sikhs with three sections 258th Machine Gun Company were on the march from Ain Dibs and passed through Balalij at 11 a.m. on their way to join Colonel Coningham.

The difficult nature of the ground continued to delay the progress of General Wauchope's column. Even the infantry and pack animals experienced difficulty in crossing many of the numerous deep dry watercourses, and the field artillery only managed to get along with very great difficulty. In the meantime the 32nd Lancers, reconnoitring well and boldly, furnished most accurate reports of the enemy's position and strength,


* They also had orders to get into communication with the 18th Division on the Tigris left bank.

† The field artillery was even then, apparently, some way behind the infantry, owing to the bad road.


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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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SITUATION EVENING 28th OCTOBER 307

In this affair the British casualties amounted to about 140, of which 112 were incurred by the 2nd Royal West Kent Regiment.

Men and animals were by this time greatly exhausted owing to the heat of the day, the shortage of water and their recent exertions. At 3.30 p.m. General Wauchope reported that his infantry were consolidating the captured trenches and that their patrols had been unable to keep up with the rapid retreat of the enemy, most of whom had passed out of sight. He strongly urged that his brigade should halt for the night near the West Kent headquarters, where a good watering place was handy.

The 51st Infantry Brigade had started from its bivouac at 2 a.m., reached Qalat-al-Bint at 6.30 a.m. and, after halting there for an hour for rest and water, had pushed on again. It had been held in reserve during the attack.

Concurring in the necessity for rest and water,* General Leslie decided that the pursuit was not to be pressed further that day.

The general situation at nightfall on the 28th October was as follows.

The Turkish Tigris Group was between the 17th Division and General Cassels' force. The 18th Division barred its way eastward across the river, and the difficult waterless country was bound to hamper its escape westward as an organised force. To the north of General Cassels' force were two Turkish detachments,† apparently of no great strength, one being near Hadraniya and the other twelve miles further to the north. Both appeared to be trying to advance southward.

With General Cassels were the 7th and 11th Cavalry Brigades and the 1/7th Gurkhas, a total of about 2,300 sabres, 800 rifles and 12 guns, of which 100 sabres and 6 guns were on the left bank of the Tigris. A/337th Field Battery was moving towards the Hadraniya ford to join General Cassels but could not cross till next morning, and the 1/39th Gahrwalis had not yet reached General Sanders' position. The Light Armoured Motor Brigade was about eight miles west of Sharqat.

With General Sanders, near the left river bank to the south-east of Huwais, were the 53rd Infantry Brigade (less 1/7th Gurkhas) and 16 guns (D/336th, C/337th, one section 341st and 2/86th Batteries) and south of his position three troops 32nd Lancers were watching the river line as far as Sharqat.

* The horses of one battery are said to have been without water for sixty hours.

† As subsequently ascertained these were, respectively, the 13th Regiment with two guns and the 14th Regiment with four guns, both of the 5th Division.

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General Fanshawe, with 18th Division headquarters, No. 8 Company Sappers and Miners and B/336th and C/336th Field Batteries, was at Nami, to which place the 159th Heavy Battery was on its way from the Little Zab. The 54th Infantry Brigade (less 1/39th Gahrwalis) and A/336th and 341st (less one section) Field Batteries were at the Little Zab bridgehead. Between Fat-ha and the Little Zab were the 32nd Lancers (less three squadrons), who had been sent by General Cobbe to patrol that river and so release more infantry. The remainder of the 18th Division was about Fat-ha and furnishing the detachment at Ain Nukhalla.

With General Leslie to the south of Sharqat on the Tigris right bank were one and a half squadrons 32nd Lancers, 220th Field Artillery Brigade (403rd less a section, 404th, one section 1064th and 1068th Batteries), 101st Heavy Artillery Brigade (one section each 157th and 246th Batteries), 2nd Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade, 34th and 51st Infantry Brigades, 45th Sikhs, three sections 258th Machine Gun Company and the 276th Machine Gun Company. This gave him a total of about 150 sabres, 3,200 rifles* and 34 guns.


The remainder of the 17th Division, which was south of the Fat-ha gorge, had been organised by General Cobbe at midday as a mobile column for use as a Corps Reserve.

At 7.20 p.m. General Leslie reported to Corps Headquarters that the advanced portions of his division had concentrated on the heights above Sharqat and would advance again at 6 a.m. on the 29th. General Cobbe, however, did not concur in this. At 8.35 p.m. he sent an order to General Leslie pointing out that the enemy appeared ready to surrender and that it was imperative to push on to the assistance of General Cassels, whose troops had been holding up the enemy force and had been engaged for two days. The moon would rise at 1.25 a.m. and at 1.45 a.m. the 17th Division was to advance vigorously, and at all costs brush aside any opposition by outflanking the enemy rear guards on a wide front. General Cobbe expected the 17th Division to get into touch with General Cassels' force by 7 a.m. on the 29th. He had sent Ford vans with water up the road to Balalij and they were to be pushed on to supply the most advanced troops.

General Leslie replied at first that this order would be complied with. But after consultations with his subordinate commanders he sent another reply deprecating a night advance.

* i.e., 34th Infantry Brigade about 1,200, and the 51st Infantry Brigade (including 45th Sikhs) about 2,000.

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
to the right bank and by 5.30 a.m. all the cavalry horses were saddled up and ready to move. It seemed probable to General Cassels, as he stated in a situation report to Corps Headquarters at 6 a.m., that some of the Turks had already escaped to the north, passing west of his line, and that more of them might be following from the Sharqat direction with the 17th Division on their heels. He had consequently instructed General Norton to move northward and northwestward with the object of rounding up any Turks who had passed and of intercepting any who might follow.

Before dawn the main body of the 7th Cavalry Brigade had moved into a covered position under the river bank near the ford; and "V" Battery, R.H.A., and the 13th Hussars' squadron on the left bank were ordered to cross the ford as soon as there was sufficient light. The moment the squadron began to cross, however, two Turkish guns about 3,000 yards away to the northwest shelled the ford heavily and, though the squadron managed to get through without casualties, it was considered advisable for "V" Battery to wait till the hostile fire had been subdued. The battery came into action on the left bank about 7 a.m. and soon caused the enemy guns to withdraw. In the meantime, one squadron 13th Lancers, which had been ordered to push up the Mosul road at dawn, had also encountered shell and machine gun fire and had taken up a position on a detached under-features which was known as Cemetery Hill (see Map 44). Here it remained under fire from commanding heights to the north.


At 7 a.m. the two leading companies 1/39th Gahrwalis arrived at General Cassels' position and the officer commanding, who reported that the remainder of the battalion was following shortly, received orders to relieve the 23rd and Guides Cavalry as soon as possible, to enable those regiments to join the 7th Hussars in reserve.

To the south of Sharqat the progress of the 17th Division advanced guard (No. 2 Mountain Artillery Brigade, 51st Infantry Brigade and three sections 258th Machine Gun Company), which had left its bivouac at 1.45 a.m., had been slow. The ground was broken and difficult and in the dim moonlight considerable difficulty was experienced in keeping to the ill-defined road. At dawn a squadron 32nd Lancers pushed forward to join the advanced guard and the main body of the Division also started from its bivouac. About an hour later, when about three miles north of Sharqat, the Lancers gained


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV." [١٨٤و] (٥٤٠/٣٧٢)



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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد VII". [١٨٤ظ] (٥٤٠/٣٧٣)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV." [١٨٥] و [٣٧٤/٥٤٠]



TURKS' FINAL POSITION

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touch with enemy infantry holding the high ground to the west of the road.

The country to the east of the road for about seven miles north of Sharqat was flat and low-lying, but to the west a broken hilly plateau rose steeply from the road and was intersected by many deep ravines and watercourses.* These were dry and were generally passable by pack animals, but, while they afforded some cover, they tended to break up the regularity of an advance. Making skilful use of these natural advantages for delaying action, the Turkish infantry fell back slowly before our advance. This was by then being carried out on a broad front to the west of road, the Highland Light Infantry (on the right) and the 1/10th Gurkhas being in first line and the 14th Sikhs in support in rear of the Gurkhas. The 45th Sikhs, forming 51st Brigade reserve, moved forward, under the crest of the plateau, just west of the road.


At 8 a.m., when a field and a mountain battery came into action to support the advancing infantry, General Leslie joined the advanced guard. The situation was not clear and, though his advanced guard continued to make steady though slow progress, it was not till 11 a.m. that he learnt from an air report that the enemy's main position lay on the plateau about three miles south of Huwaish. Its general line extended westward from the road for about two miles and then bent backwards to the northwest for another mile or so. It had evidently been hastily prepared and its trenches were not in continuous or regular lines, but were arranged in depth in numerous short lengths, and were sited so as to take full advantage of the irregular and broken ground. The position was very difficult to discern or define.

To return to General Cassels, who at 7.30 a.m. could see large numbers of troops about three miles to the southward, but could not be certain whether these were Turks or the 17th Division. If the latter, it confirmed his former suspicion that part of the enemy force had escaped by passing to the west. Consequently he warned General Norton to be ready, if necessary, to move northward, in which case the 11th Cavalry Brigade would follow the 7th. A short time afterwards, hearing that A/337th Field Battery was crossing the ford, General Cassels ordered it to join General Norton.


At 8 a.m. General Cassels received an air-report which placed the most advanced troops of the 17th Division at a

* See Map 45.

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hit.* Dismounting and fixing bayonets, the Hussars swarmed up the almost precipitous slopes led by their Colonel† The shells of both the supporting batteries were bursting with great accuracy along the crest and the barrage was not lifted till the Hussars were within a few yards of the top, while the Vickers guns also kept up a heavy fire. Largely as a result of this effective covering fire, the Hussars incurred only seven casualties in the short burst of close fighting which ensued after they reached the top. At 1.45 p.m. the Turks began to surrender and by 2 p.m. the 13th were in complete possession of the plateau, having taken about 730 prisoners and 12 machine guns.

In the meantime the 13th and 14th Lancers had come up on the enemy's flank and, pursuing for some distance, they took two guns and about 260 more prisoners, which made a total of 985 officers and men captured, i.e. the whole of the Turkish 13th Regiment. Having thus cleared General Cassels' northern front effectively, the 7th Cavalry Brigade swung round and by dusk had dug itself in on an extended position about four miles north-west of Huwaisb facing southward so as to block the retreat of any Turks attempting to escape past General Cassels.

The Turkish guns which had been in action against General Cassels the previous day were still silent, having possibly withdrawn to oppose the 17th Division.‡ General Cassels could see no sign of the latter's advance, but just before 3 p.m. he received a message from General Fanshawe§ saying that the "zero" hour for the 17th Division attack would not be before 3.30 p.m. Soon afterwards, hearing sound of gun-fire to the southward, General Cassels directed "W" and C/337th Batteries to join in what was evidently the bombardment of the enemy's main position.|| At 3.30 p.m. he received an air report which gave him a very clear idea of the respective positions of the Turks and our own forces; and soon afterwards he ordered the Light Armoured Motor Brigade to take up a position about six miles west of Huwaisb which would close the only exit left open to the enemy.

At 3 p.m. the 159th Siege Battery joined General Sanders and came into action. The 1/5th Royal West Kent Regiment

* One man was hurt by his horse falling and two horses were wounded.


† Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Richardson, D.S.O.

‡ General Cassels considers it more probable that the guns had run out of ammunition.

§ 18th Division Headquarters were at Tulal-al-Aqr.

|| General Cassels was not in direct communication with the 17th Division.


الخريطة ٤٤ - خريطة مبدئية لتوضيح معركة لواء الفرسان السابع قرب قرية الخضراية. ٢٩ أكتوبر، ١٩١٨. [١٨٧ و] (٢/١)



الخريطة ٤٤ - خريطة مبدئية لتوضيح معركة لواء الفرسان السابع قرب قرية الخضرانية. ٢٩ أكتوبر، ١٩١٨. [١٨٧ظ] (٢/٢)



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GENERAL SITUATION

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was also on its way from the Little Zab to join him, having been ordered forward from there at 7 a.m. after airmen had reported no signs of any Turkish movement from the direction of Altun Köpri.

At 4.20 p.m. General Cassels learnt from an air report that the enemy's position was unchanged and that the 17th Division guns were still carrying out a bombardment. About 5 p.m. he saw two Very lights which had been fired on the west flank of the main Turkish position, but had no idea what they indicated; at 5.15 p.m. he was joined by the 1/3rd Gurkhas; and at dusk he was still without any information in regard to the result of the 17th Division attack. He decided that, during the night, he would actively engage the enemy facing him and that his guns should bombard the area to the south-west, across which the enemy might try to effect his escape. He directed General Norton to do the same, but heard that the latter's guns were practically without ammunition. At 10 p.m., however, he heard from Corps Headquarters that the 17th Division had not met with complete success, that the situation there would not be clear till the morning and that, although the 17th Division would hold what it had gained, it had no hope of making progress during the night.

At dusk, there were still no indications of any enemy movement down the Little Zab and the headquarters 55th Infantry Brigade, the 1/5th East Surrey Regiment, two sections 249th Machine Gun Company and B/337th Field Battery were on their way there from Fat-ha.* Consequently the remaining battalion and machine gun sections of the 54th Infantry Brigade left the Little Zab at 7 p.m. to join General Sanders.


The details, given in the different war diaries and in all other accounts, of the 17th Division operations after midday on the 29th October are very conflicting and it is consequently only possible to be certain of the general trend and results of the fighting. The extended front, the broken nature of the ground, the exhaustion of men and animals and the shortage of cable† for communication seem to have been the main reasons for this uncertainty, which persisted till well after dark.

By midday the leading ranks of the Highland Light Infantry and 1/10th Gurkhas had gained positions within about four hundred yards of the enemy's trenches; but the greater part of these two battalions seem to have been about one thousand

* Under orders issued by General Cobbe at 8 a.m.

† Only one cable wagon had come up to the front and cable had to be laid by hand.

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yards further back. Their men had become somewhat scattered and they covered a frontage of about two miles, with a gap between the Highlanders and the Gurkhas and another gap further westward where the left company of the Gurkhas, in feeling for the enemy's right flank, had lost touch. The 14th Sikhs were about half a mile in rear of the Gurkha centre, the 45th Sikhs were near the road over a mile to the right rear of the Highland Light Infantry and the 34th Infantry Brigade was on the road half a mile in rear of the 45th Sikhs. The strength of the enemy force holding the trenches in front of the 17th Division was uncertain and it was not till later that it was estimated at about 4,000 infantry and six batteries of artillery.

General Leslie, the numbers of whose available attacking force amounted to about 3,000 rifles and 34 guns, decided to organise an assault on the enemy's left front on a frontage of eight hundred yards. The 45th Sikhs were to lead the attack, with their right on the edge of the plateau above the road, and were to pass through the Highland Light Infantry, with the 34th Infantry Brigade following them in support to confirm success. The eighteen field guns and howitzers were to bombard the frontage of assault from "zero" hour till the assaulting infantry were within one hundred yards of the position and were then to lift three hundred yards for three minutes, the signal for the "lift" being given by the discharge of rockets and by forward observation officers. The mountain guns were to bombard the portion of the enemy's line not being assaulted; and the four heavy guns were to carry out counter-battery work. A message was also sent giving "zero" hour as 3.30 p.m. and asking for co-operation by the guns of the 18th Division on the Tigris left bank.

Ground reconnaissance and artillery registration took longer than had been anticipated, and eventually "zero" hour was fixed at 4 p.m. In regard to artillery registration, the forward observing officers found it difficult to discern the enemy's trenches clearly or to arrange communication back from the front; no aeroplane was available till too late for observation work; and there was a shortage of gun ammunition due, in the first place, to the transport difficulties. Further, apparently by an oversight, the fact that it had been found necessary to postpone "zero" hour from 3.30 p.m. to 4 p.m. was not communicated to the 18th Division. Consequently its guns and those with General Cassels stopped firing at 3.30 p.m.

During the early afternoon the 45th Sikhs and 34th Infantry Brigade, moving up on to the plateau, concentrated about a

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١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد VII". [١٨٩ظ] (٣٨٣/٥٤٠)

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which was held by Turks. But these fled precipitately and the 112th, pushing on across the ravine, charged and captured some Turkish trenches about 350 yards north of the ravine, the enemy again retiring rapidly. It was by this time almost dark; the battalion found itself under hostile fire from three directions; and beyond a small party of 45th Sikhs which had joined in the last assault, there was no sign of any of the other infantry of the division. As a further advance was obviously out of the question, the 112th consolidated their position and took steps to get into touch with 34th Brigade headquarters and with the 114th Mahrattas to the right rear.

The various reports received by dark at 17th Division headquarters were conflicting and it was some time before anything definite concerning the situation could be learnt from the infantry brigade commanders, who took some time themselves before they could ascertain what had occurred. It was, however clear to General Leslie that the attack had not met with complete success. The field gun ammunition was practically exhausted and firing was still going on—in fact it continued throughout the night. About 6.30 p.m. orders were issued for the infantry to maintain the positions they had gained and to reorganise as soon as possible.

This reorganisation was gradually completed. The Highland Light Infantry, 14th Sikhs, 114th Mahrattas and 112th Infantry formed the first line, in this order from the right; the 2nd Royal West Kent Regiment and 1/10th Gurkhas formed supports in rear of the 114th Mahrattas and 112th Infantry respectively; and the 45th Sikhs provided the reserve behind the centre of the line.


Although the 17th Division had failed to capture the enemy's position, it had pinned him to his ground and had thus partly achieved its object. Its exhausted officers and men had responded finely to the call upon them and their casualties, amounting to about 500* out of 3,000 engaged, attest their gallantry.

Throughout the day General Cobbe had received but few situation reports from the 17th Division and had been mainly dependent on his air reports to keep him in general touch with the situation.


At daybreak on the 30th October, when white flags were seen to be flying all along the enemy's front opposite the

* 45th Sikhs 180, 114th Mahrattas 163, 1/10th Gurkhas 64, 112th Infantry 46, 14th Sikhs 27, Highland Light Infantry 23.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩٠] [٥٤٠/٣٨٤]



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩٠ ظ] (٥٤٠/٣٨٥)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV." [١٩١] (٥٤٠/٣٨٦)



CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

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remainder of his force was directed to advance from Qaiyara on the 2nd November.


A portion of the Turkish 2nd and 5th Divisions had already been captured and it was estimated that, including the remainder of these divisions, the following Turkish forces were at, or on their way back to, Mosul:—At Mosul about 170 sabres, 1,850 rifles and 32 guns, and on the way there from Altun Kôpri about 130 sabres, 1,500 rifles and 12 guns. To delay the movement of the latter body, one squadron 32nd Lancers pushed up the left bank of the Tigris early on the 31st October to destroy the bridge over the Great Zab at Quwair,* where the Altun Kôpri-Mosul road crossed that river. But on arrival there about midday the 32nd Lancers found that they were unable to effect their object as the bridge was defended by about 400 infantry with 8 guns. They, therefore, returned having taken 10 prisoners and having incurred a few casualties. Early that day General Lewin's column occupied Altun Kôpri without opposition.

General Cassels had to get his transport across the Tigris at the Hadraniya ford and some necessary stores across the Huwaih ferry. This and other arrangements for the move on Mosul took a little time, so that it was not till the evening of the 31st October that the 7th and 11th Cavalry and the Light Armoured Motor Brigades were concentrated at Qaiyara. Advancing on the 1st November, General Cassels' advanced troops were met in the morning at Hammam Ali, twelve miles south of Mosul, by a flag of truce sent by Ali Ihsan Pasha, commanding the Turkish Sixth Army, with a letter to General Marshall regarding armistice negotiations; and General Cassels was told by the Turkish officers that the armistice had become operative at noon on the 31st October.

At 2.30 p.m., as General Cassels' force was settling down to bivouac at Hammam Ali, he received a message (dropped by aeroplane) from 1st Corps Headquarters to say that an armistice had been signed with the Turks, with effect from noon on the 31st October, and that hostilities were to cease.

* Seven miles above the Tigris junction.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩١١ظ] (٥٤٠/٣٨٧)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩٢] (٥٤٠/٣٨٩)

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EIGHTEEN.—Surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata, to the nearest Allied garrison.

NINETEEN.—All Germans and Austrians, naval, military and civilian, to be evacuated within one month from Turkish dominions : those in remote districts as soon after as may be possible.

TWENTY.—Compliance with such orders as may be conveyed for the disposal of the equipment, arms and ammunition, including transport, of that portion of the Turkish army which is demobilised under clause Five.

TWENTY-ONE.—An Allied representative to be attached to the Turkish Ministry of Supplies in order to safeguard Allied interests. This representative to be furnished with all information necessary for this purpose.

TWENTY-TWO.—Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allied Powers. The release of Turkish civilian prisoners and prisoners over military age to be considered.

TWENTY-THREE.—Obligation on the part of Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.

TWENTY-FOUR.—In the case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them.

TWENTY-FIVE.—Hostilities between the Allies and Turkey shall cease from noon, local time, on Thursday, 31st October, 1918.


Signed in duplicate on board His Britannic Majesty's Ship "AGAMEMNON" at Port Mudros, Lemnos, the 30th October, 1918.

(Signed)

ARTHUR CALTHORPE.
HUSSEIN RAOUF.
RECHAD HIKMET.
SAADULLAH."

Intimation that an armistice had been signed was received by General Marshall from the War Office on the 1st November, but the detailed terms were not received by him till next day. In the meantime, however, reports had reached him that the Turkish troops were evacuating Mosul and that, in consequence, there was a danger of the lawless elements there creating trouble. He, therefore, sent orders for General Cassel to push on at once to Mosul in the interests of law and order.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩٣] (٥٤٠/٣٩٠)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩٣ظ] (٥٤٠/٣٩١)

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this morning is satisfactory from every point of view. I am to advance to a line mutually agreed upon within about two miles of Mosul, which Turks will continue to occupy for the present giving us every facility towards ensuring maintenance of law and order which at present is quite satisfactory. In addition have made preliminary arrangements for purchase from Turks direct of supplies to meet our requirements as far as available. To-night I hold hills commanding Mosul and plain in which it lies and will take up forward line to-morrow. Interview throughout most friendly."

The situation was, however, altered by the receipt of the following order from General Marshall.


"Under Clause 7 of Armistice conditions, which follow this telegram, Allies have right to occupy any strategical points and War Office have ordered the occupation of Mosul.* This order should be carried out and not limited to location of troops near Mosul as laid down in my former order. Please also note that Clause 16 orders surrender of all garrisons in Mesopotamia to nearest Allied commander."

General Cassels accordingly issued orders for an advance on Mosul next day and for its occupation. In view of the change in the situation, General Cassels went ahead of his troops early next morning to see Ali Ihsan again. At noon he reported that he was at Mosul with his headquarters and that his troops occupied tactical points surrounding the city and all the main approaches. General Cassels foresaw delay in obtaining literal compliance with Clauses 7 and 16 of the Armistice terms, which Ali Ihsan said he had not yet received. General Cassels also said that relations with Ali Ihsan, in whom he had complete trust, were perfectly friendly and there seemed to be no reason for undue haste.


General Cobbe arrived at Mosul by aeroplane at 1.30 p.m. and paid a visit to Ali Ihsan, giving him General Marshall's reply to his letter of the 1st November. In his letter General Marshall made it quite clear that Clauses 7 and 16 of the Armistice terms were to be complied with. But Ali Ihsan replied that he was unable to do so till he received orders to that effect from his own Government.

* This order and the Armistice terms were sent by the War Office on 31st October but did not reach Baghdad till 2nd November.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩٤٤] (٥٤٠/٣٩٣)



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and ammunition with them,* but all arms and war material in depots and magazines were to be handed over to General Fanshawe. There were also detailed instructions on other necessary points. Ali Ihsan, who said that he had not received instructions from his Government, agreed to carry out these orders under protest.

On the 9th November Admiral Calthorpe telegraphed to the Admiralty that the Turkish Government had ordered their commandant at Mosul to evacuate the town, hand over his arms and remove his troops to such place as the British General might direct. With these orders the commandant at Mosul complied and our troops took over the entire occupation of Mosul on the 10th November, the Turkish troops withdrawing to Nisibin for disbandment.

Clause 4 of the Armistice terms stipulated for the collection of all British prisoners of war at Constantinople. But, for the majority of the prisoners, who were working in the Taurus and Amanus mountains or on the Baghdad railway line east of the Euphrates, this would have involved considerable hardship and delay. Consequently Generals Allenby and Marshall considered it unnecessary to adhere strictly to this Clause. On the 1st November Lieutenant-Colonel E. H. Keeling, who had been taken prisoner as one of the Kut garrison and who had escaped from Kastamuni, left Baghdad with orders to visit the camps in Upper Mesopotamia and arrange for the evacuation of our men by whatever route seemed best.†

During October there had been few incidents of importance elsewhere in Mesopotamia. The Turkish detachment on the Euphrates withdrew towards Aleppo during the latter half of the month and at the end of October our troops advanced, occupying Ana without opposition by the 1st November.


Details of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force on the 19th October, 1918, are given in Appendix XLVI. From this it will be seen how much the size of the force had expanded, especially in the matter of administrative units. Its total ration strength, excluding enemy prisoners of war, was over 414,000, of which about 217,000 were officers and other ranks in combatant and administrative units, while the balance were "followers." Only about 112,000, however, were "fighting troops," i.e., a little over a quarter of the total ration strength.

* Local conditions rendered this necessary.


† Ali Ihsan had resigned his command and gone to Nisibin.

‡ An interesting account of Colonel Keeling's experiences in carrying out these orders is given in his book "Adventures in Turkey and Russia."


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩٥] [٥٤٠/٣٩٤]




"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩٦ و] (٥٤٠/٣٩٦)




"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV". [١٩٦ظ] (٣٩٧/٥٤٠)



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV." [١٩٧] [٥٤٠/٣٩٨]



"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين"
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV. [١٩٧ ظ] (٥٤٠/٣٩٩)



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8th Infantry Brigade.	{ 1st Manchester Regiment. 47th Sikhs. 39th Rifles. 2/124th Baluchistan Infantry. No. 132 Machine Gun Company. 8th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.	} Tigris right bank, on railway line of communication southward from Samarra station as far as Sumalka. Brigade headquarters at Balad.
9th Infantry Brigade.	{ 2nd Devonshire Regiment. 83rd Infantry 108th Mahrattas. 1/1st Gurkhas. No. 133 Machine Gun Company. 9th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.	} Tigris right bank, on railway line of communication south of Sumalka and in area just south-west of Baghdad. Two companies at Musayyib (on Euphrates). Brigade headquarters near Kadhiman.

Artillery.	{ 4th Brigade, R.F.A. (7th, 14th and 69th Batteries)=18 guns. 215th Brigade, R.F.A. (A and B Batteries)=8 guns. 524th Howitzer Battery, R.F.A. =4 guns. R69th Howitzer Battery, R.F.A. =4 guns. Three small arm ammunition sections.	} Balad, less 69th Battery at Falluja and Buzan. Near Divisional Headquarters. One section, Balad; one section, Falluja. Balad.
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
Engineers and Pioneers.	{ 18th Company, Sappers and Miners. 20th Company, Sappers and Miners. 21st Company, Sappers and Miners. 34th Sikh Pioneers	} Near Kadhiman. With 8th Brigade, in Balad area. Falluja and Buzan. Near Divisional Headquarters, less one company with 7th Division at Samarra.
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3rd Divisional Signal Company.
3rd Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
3rd Division Supply Column.
Nos. 110, 111, 112, 113 Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 11 Sanitary Section,
No. 3 Mobile Veterinary Section.

7th Division.—On Tigris right bank, north of Samarra station (except where otherwise stated).

10th Infantry Brigade.	{ 1st Seaforth Highlanders. 28th Punjab. 92nd Punjab. 125th Rifles. No. 134 Machine Gun Company. 10th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.	
21st Infantry Brigade.	{ 2nd Black Watch.—Samarra, on Tigris left bank. Guides Infantry. 29th Punjab. 1/8th Gurkhas.—Samarra, on Tigris left bank. No. 135 Machine Gun Company. 21st Brigade Supply and Transport Company.	

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
١٩١٤-١٩١٨. المجلد IV." [١٩٨ ظ] (٥٤٠/٤٠١)




336 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA

- 39th Infantry Brigade. { 9th Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
7th Gloucestershire Regiment.
9th Worcestershire Regiment.
7th North Staffordshire Regiment.
No. 39 Machine Gun Company.
39th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- 40th Infantry Brigade. { 8th Cheshire Regiment.
8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
4th South Wales Borderers.
5th Wiltshire Regiment.
No. 40 Machine Gun Company.
40th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- "D" Squadron, 1/1st Hertfordshire Yeomanry.
13th Divisional Cyclist Company.
- Artillery. { 55th Brigade, R.F.A. (A, B, C and D Batteries) = 16 guns.
60th Brigade, R.F.A. (A, B, C and D Batteries) = 16 guns.
A. 69th Howitzer Battery, R.F.A. = 4 guns.
72nd Howitzer Battery, R.G.A. = 4 guns.
Three small arm ammunition sections.
- Engineers and Pioneers. { 71st, 72nd and 88th Field Companies, R.E.
8th Welch Regiment (Pioneers).
- 13th Divisional Signal Company.
13th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
10th Field Bakery.
31st Field Butchery.
13th Division Supply Column.
39th, 40th and 41st British Field Ambulances.
No. 28 Sanitary Section.
No. 24 Mobile Veterinary Section.

14th Division.—Headquarters at Baquba.

- 35th Infantry Brigade. { 15th Buffs (East Kent Regiment).
37th Dogras.
102nd Grenadiers.
24th Gurkhas.
No. 185 Machine Gun Company.
35th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- 36th Infantry Brigade. { 14th Hampshire Regiment.
26th Punjabis.
62nd Punjabis.
82nd Punjabis.
No. 186 Machine Gun Company.
36th Brigade Supply and Transport Company. } Garrison of Baghdad city.
- 37th Infantry Brigade. { 2nd Norfolk Regiment.
47th Punjabis.
1/2nd Gurkhas.
29th Gurkhas.
No. 187 Machine Gun Company.
37th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- Artillery. { 13th Brigade, R.F.A. (2nd, 8th and 44th Batteries) = 12 guns.
C. 69th Howitzer Battery, R.F.A. = 4 guns.
Three small arm ammunition sections.

"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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APPENDIX XL.

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Engineers and Pioneers. { 12th, 13th and 15th Companies, Sappers and Miners.
128th Pioneers. (Temporarily on Tigris right bank, with 3rd
Division) }

14th Divisional Signal Company.
14th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
14th Division Supply Column.
Nos. 20, 21, 22, 135 Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 13 Sanitary Section.
No. 1 Mobile Veterinary Section.

Corps Troops.

Two squadrons, 32nd Lancers.
No. 134 Howitzer Brigade, R.F.A. (60th and 61st Batteries) = 12 guns.
2/104th Battery, R.G.A. (90-pounders) = 4 guns.
Nos. 126, 137, 138 Trench Mortar Batteries.—At Kut.
Nos. 80 and 82 Anti-aircraft Sections.
11th Corps Signal Company.
No. 2 Printing Section.
No. 2 Lithograph Section.

Attached. { Two pack stations, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
No. 20 British Field Ambulance.
These sections, No. 1 Indian Field } Convalescent
Ambulance. } Depot.

ARMY TROOPS.—In Baghdad area, except where otherwise stated.

No. 14 Kite Balloon Section, R.N.A.S.—Basra.
No. 30 Squadron, Royal Flying Corps.
Independent Divisional Ammunition Column.
No. 1 Bridging Train.
No. 2 (Mobile) Bridging Train.—Samarra.
Malerkotla Sappers and Miners Company.
Tehri-Gahwal Sappers and Miners Company.
One section, Field Searchlight Company.
Army Signal Company.
Headquarters 1st (Anzac) Wireless Signal Squadron, with one wagon
station. (One wagon station was temporarily with the Russians at
Qasr-i-Shirin.)
"A," "B," "C," "D," "E," "F," "G," "H," "I," "J," Stokes Mortar
Batteries.—At Kut.
No. 13 Light Armoured Motor Battery.—At Samarra.
No. 14 Light Armoured Motor Battery.
32nd Sikh Pioneers.—En route from Basra.
64th Pioneers.
Army Troops Supply and Transport Company.
4th, 5th and 6th Camel Corps.
No. 33 Motor Ambulance Convoy (with transport of No. 773 Mechanical
Transport Company, A.S.C.).
Nos. 783 and 784 Mechanical Transport Companies, A.S.C. (Ford vans).

15th Division.—Assembling on Tigris Front.

Headquarters.—Qarada camp, on Tigris left bank about three miles south of
Baghdad.

42nd Infantry Brigade. { 1/4th Dorsetshire Regiment.
1/5th Gurkhas.
2/5th Gurkhas.
2/6th Gurkhas.
No. 130 Machine Gun Company.
42nd Brigade Supply and Trans-
port Company. } Qarada camp.

(1918)

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"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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
- One squadron, 12th Cavalry.
Headquarters Divisional Artillery.
222nd Brigade, R.F.A. ("A" Battery) - 4 guns.
Headquarters Divisional Engineers.
No. 8 Lithograph Section (attached).
15th Divisional Signal Company (less two sections).
15th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company (less detachments).
15th Division Supply Column.
Half No. 23 and No. 105 Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 16 Sanitary Section.
No. 6 Mobile Veterinary Section.
- 34th Infantry Brigade. {
Brigade headquarters.
31st Punjab.
112th Infantry.
114th Mahrattas.
No. 129 Machine Gun Company.
34th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- 12th Cavalry (less three squadrons).
C/222nd Battery, R.F.A. - 4 guns.
Divisional Ammunition Column.
Three small arm ammunition sections.
2/39th Gahrwalis (12th Infantry Brigade).
One section, 15th Divisional Signal Company.
Detachment 15th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Half No. 23 and No. 10 Combined Field Ambulances.
- 448th, 450th and 451st Field Companies, R.E.
48th Pioneers.
- 12th Infantry Brigade. {
1/5th Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey).
43rd Erinipura Regiment.
90th Punjab.
No. 128 Machine Gun Company.
12th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- 2nd Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment (34th Brigade).
Detachments, 15th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Detachments, 15th Division Supply Column.
No. 108 Combined Field Ambulance.
No. 27 Casualty Clearing Station.
- Qarada camp.
Amara, en route to Tigris front.
Basra, en route to Tigris front.
Nasiriya, under orders for Tigris front.

EUPHRATES FRONT.

NASIRIYA.

- Headquarters, Euphrates front.
Two squadrons, 12th Cavalry.
26th Mountain Battery - 6 guns.
Volunteer Battery, less detachments (six 15-pounders and one 5-in gun) - 7 guns.
9th Company, Sappers and Miners.
"B" Troop, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.

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APPENDIX XI.

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- 1/4th Somerset Light Infantry.
6th Jats.
1/10th Gurkhas.
84th Punjabis.
No. 24 Combined Field Ambulance.
No. 31 Sanitary Section.
" S " Company, Supply and Transport (forming).
Attached from { 1922nd Battery, R.F.A. = 4 guns,
77th Howitzer Battery, R.G.A. = 4 guns.
15th Division. { Part of 15th Divisional Ammunition Column.
One section, Field Searchlight Company.
Detachment, Engineer Field Park.
Detachment, Works Company.
" M " Stokes Mortar Battery.
No. 2 Camel Corps.
Detachment, No. 8 Labour Corps.
Advanced Supply Depot, Supply and Transport.
No. 83 Combined Stationary Hospital.
No. 8 Advanced Depot of Medical Stores.
Detachment, No. 23 Motor Ambulance Convoy (three cars).
KRASHITA.
Detachment, Volunteer Battery (one 15-pounder).
42nd Deoli Regiment (less one company).
Sog AHI SHIVPURH.
Detachment, 113th Infantry.
BANI SAAD.
Detachment, Volunteer Battery (one 15-pounder).
One company, 42nd Deoli Regiment.
JUNCTION CAMP.
Detachment, Volunteer Battery (one 15-pounder).
113th Infantry (less detachments).
ARAIKA.
One company, 113th Infantry.
KARUN FRONT.
AHWAZ.
Headquarters.
23rd Cavalry (less two squadrons).
One section, 21st Mountain Battery = 2 guns.
Detachment, Anglo-Indian Battery (15-pounders) = 2 guns.
8th Rajputs.
97th Infantry (less one company).
" C " Troop, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron (less one pack station).
Detachment, No. 596 Mechanical Transport Company, A.S.C.
No. 4 Indian Field Ambulance (two sections).
No. 5 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).
No. 30 Casualty Clearing Station.
SHUSS.
Two squadrons, 23rd Cavalry.
One pack station, " C " Troop, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
TAMRIS.
One company, 97th Infantry.
TIGRIS DEFENCES.
No. 1 Section.
QURNA (with detachments at Kurmat Ali, Kubabih, Sakrikiya, Ezra's Tomb
and Qala Salih).
44th Merwara Infantry.

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AMARA.

Headquarters Tigris Defences.
Headquarters No. 1 Section, Tigris Defences.
Half squadron, 10th Lancers.
Anglo-Indian Battery (less detachments), two 15-pounder = 2 guns.
1/4th Devonshire Regiment.
36th Sikhs.
45th Sikhs.
No. 2 Section, Line of Communication Signal Company.
No. 9 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).

No. 2 Section.

MOONLAK.

One company, 4th Rajputs.

ALI GHARBI.

One company, 4th Rajputs.

SHAIKH SAAD.

Headquarters No. 2 Section, Tigris Defences.
10th Lancers (less three squadrons).
C/215th Battery, R.F.A. (less one section) = 2 guns.
1st Highland Light Infantry.
4th Rajputs (less two companies).
8th Bhawal Infantry.
One pack station, "A" Troop, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
"N" Company, Pack Pony Corps.
Two armoured cars.
No. 8 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).

No. 3 Section.

WADI.

1 detachment, Anglo-Indian Battery (one 15-pounder) = 1 gun.
One company, 14th Sikhs.

ARAB VILLAGE.

14th Sikhs (less three companies).

KIT AREA.

Half squadron, 10th Lancers.
Detachment, Anglo-Indian Battery (one 15-pounder) = 1 gun.
Half section, Field Searchlight Company.
2nd Rajputs.
Two companies, 14th Sikhs.

SHUMRAN (to be withdrawn).

Detachment, Anglo-Indian Battery (one 15-pounder) = 1 gun.
Two companies, 119th Infantry.

BUGHAILA.

Headquarters No. 3 Section, Tigris Defences.
One squadron, 10th Lancers.
One section, C/215th Battery, R.F.A. = 2 guns.
One pack station, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
96th Infantry.
119th Infantry (less two companies).
"M" Company, Supply and Transport.
No. 6 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).

No. 4 Section.


SHARBI.

One company, 1/6th Gurkhas.


AZIZIVA.

Headquarters No. 4 Section, Tigris Defences.
One squadron, 10th Lancers.
One 4-inch post gun = 1 gun.

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KUT AL AMARA.

Detachments, No. 5 and No. 10 Labour Corps.
Detachment, No. 6 Porter Corps.

SHUMRAN.

Post Headquarters.
No. 3 Bridging Train.

ALHILYA.

Headquarters Administrative Post.
Detachment, Egyptian Labour Corps.
One wagon station, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
Detachment, 48th Pioneers.
Detachment, Advanced Supply Depot.
Detachment, 19th Casualty Clearing Hospital.
Detachment, 14th Sanitary Section.

BAGHDAD. (Advanced Base).

Headquarters Advanced Base.
One company, Anglo-Indian Battalion.
Army Ammunition Park.
Advanced Signal Park.
Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 11 Labour Corps.
1st, 2nd (three companies), 3rd, 4th, 5th (detachments), 6th (one company)
and 8th Porter Corps.
Advanced Supply Depot.
Detachment, No. 1 Line of Communication Supply Company, A.S.C.
Mysore Transport Company.
Advanced Transport Depot.
Headquarters Baghdad Works Directorate.
Expeditionary Force Canton.
Detachment, Advanced Remount Depot.
Nos. 7 and 16 Field Veterinary Sections.
Detachments, Ordnance Depot.
Rest Camp.
Nos. 15, 16 and 20 Casualty Clearing Hospitals.
Nos. 23 and 31 British Stationary Hospitals.
Nos. 61 and 70 Indian Stationary Hospitals.
Officers' Hospital.
British Convalescent Depot.
Infectious Hospital.
No. 48 Sanitary Section.
Officers' Convalescent Depot.
Convalescent Depot.
Detachment, No. 23 Motor Ambulance Convoy (nine cars).
Nos. 5 and 6 Advanced Depots of Medical Stores.
No. 19 Casualty Clearing Station (Jadida).

OTHER UNITS ON LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS.

BAGDA.

246th, 257th, 269th Siege Batteries, R.G.A. = 12 guns (with Nos. 901,
902 and 903 Mechanical Transport Companies, A.S.C. attached).
116th Mahrattas.
Aircraft Park, R.F.C.
One company, 2nd Garrison Battalion, Essex Regiment.
Band, 97th Infantry.

AMARA.


327th Howitzer Battery, R.F.A. = 4 guns.
Advanced Echelon, Aircraft Park.

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		Corps Troops (excluding technical).	{ One cavalry squadron, 31st Cavalry. Twelve guns. Four machine guns.
(b) <i>On line of Diyala.</i>			
6th Division.	{ 16th Regiment. 18th Regiment. Irregulars (500). One cavalry squadron.	{ 100 sabres; 2,900 rifles; 12 machine guns.	{ 16th Regiment (3 battalions and 6 machine guns). 18th Regiment (3 battalions and 6 machine guns). 1/156th Regiment (with 2 machine guns). 2/156th Regiment (with 2 machine guns). One cavalry squadron. Sixteen guns.
13th Cavalry. 1st Lancers. 4th Depot Cavalry.	}	= 1,200 sabres.	
		Cavalry Brigade.	{ 1st Cavalry Regiment (with 4 guns). 13th Cavalry Regiment (with 4 guns). One field battery (4 guns). Two frontier battalions. One battalion, Persian gendarmerie.
		Corps Troops (XIII Corps) (excluding technical).	{ 1st Regiment (4 battalions and 4 machine guns). One troop cavalry. One storm company, 31st Cavalry Regiment. Sixteen guns. Eight machine guns.
(c) <i>Persian Front, from Sulaimaniya southward.</i>		<i>Sulaimaniya Group.</i>	
2nd Division.	{ 1st Regiment. 5th Regiment. 6th Regiment. One cavalry squadron.	{ = 500 sabres; 11,700 rifles; 36 machine guns.	{ 5th Regiment (4 battalions and 16 machine guns). 6th Regiment (4 battalions and 16 machine guns). One Persian gendarmerie battalion (with 3 machine guns). One frontier battalion. 3/156th Regiment (with 4 machine guns). 33rd Cavalry Regiment. One squadron, Persian gendarmerie, with 2 guns. Fifteen guns.
3rd Regiment. 44th Regiment. 3/64th Regiment. 3/158th Regiment. 3/38th Regiment. Seven frontier battalions. 11th Depot Regiment. 33rd Cavalry.	}		
		2nd Division. (XIII Corps.)	

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APPENDIX XLI.

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(d) Moral.

Two battalions, 36th Reserve Regiment = 1,200 rifles, 4 machine guns.

General Maude also estimated that possibly the following had joined the Sixth Army :—

9th Division. { 46th Regiment.
144th Regiment.
"Albanians." } = 10,800
rifles ;
36
machine
guns.

17th Regiment.
26th Regiment.
143th Regiment.

Also, possibly, the 50th Division.

Moral Group.

22nd Regiment (3 battalions and 1 machine gun company).
One battalion at Rowandiz.
Four guns.

Above does not include the 46th Division, which had arrived in the Sixth Army area. Location not stated, but it was independent of the XIII and XVIII Corps.

46th Division. { 144th Regiment (3 battalions and 12 machine guns).
145th Regiment (3 battalions and 12 machine guns).
191st Regiment (3 battalions and 6 machine guns).
One cavalry squadron.
Twelve guns.
There were also 25 guns with "Army Troops."

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APPENDIX XLII.

*Copy of Letter from Mustapha Kemal to Enver Pasha, dated
30th September, 1917.*

I beg to forward the following observations on the general situation. They are submitted to Your Excellency, who is responsible for the direction of the country's destiny, after deep consideration and not in any spirit of panic or pessimism.

1. The general state of the country should be considered before everything else. The war has been brought home to our people more than to any other country. The link between the people and its Government has been broken. Those that remain in their homes are fortunate in escaping the attention of the central authority, for though the people—women, cripples or deserters—have not enough to live on, the civil and military administrations are compelled to be more and more severe in their levies of supplies. The Government finds it impossible to control the general situation, which is sinking into anarchy. The measures it takes in the name of the people are opposed to the latter's rights, and the population is becoming more and more discontented.

The weakness of the civil administration has been further increased by want, corruption, profiteering, inferior officials, and the breakdown of justice. The evils are apparent in every part of the country. There are strong indications of disaster in ordinary trade and the provision of supplies. Consequently, if the war continues, the greatest danger by which we are confronted is the probable internal dissolution of the Empire, threatened as it is in every direction.

2. The military situation gives no sign of an early cessation of the war. Our allies are intent on a peace obtained by the aid of military forces, and will have no discussion as to terms. The Germans' possibilities are limited, and they can only say to their enemies: "Come, try and conquer us." The Entente Powers have shown that they will not make peace separately, and it is obvious that they will continue the war, as long as we can hold out, in the hope of saving their own countries and obtaining favourable terms. The war, therefore, is likely to continue for a considerable time. Our side does not hold the key to peace, but somehow we have to win.


3. The military situation of Turkey is as follows. Our forces are very weak. Compared with what they were at the beginning of the war, the strength of many armies has decreased by eighty per cent. The resources of the country in man power cannot bring them up to strength. Fifty per cent of the 54th Division which was sent to me was composed of immature youths of 17 to 20 or unfit men of 48 to 55.

The battalions of another of the best divisions left Stamboul 1,000 strong and arrived at Aleppo with 500 each. The reason of this is the unsatisfactory lot of the people and the state of the civil administration. My illustration shows that even if all our resources were collected we should not be sufficiently strong. It is unnecessary to mention the deficiencies in the corps of officers in quality and quantity.

The situation at all the points is as follows:—

In the West we are not in contact with the enemy. But, as Stamboul is on one of the maritime highways of the world and is our richest province, it is quite probable that the enemy will strike at it from the west. In the Caucasus the situation is one of stalemate, and it is impossible for us to make headway. The internal situation of Russia and the Russian dependence on Europe makes an offensive impossible. But if for some reason they did advance, we are not in a position to hinder or threaten them. The Russians

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APPENDIX XLII.

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do what they can with the means at their disposal, and they have halted against their will. In Iraq the British have gained their objectives. Consequently I am of opinion that there is no political, economic or military reason for a further advance on their part. However, if they continue northwards and are successful, the addition of Mosul to our toll of losses would not be a very severe blow to the country. It may be said that such an event would not affect the general situation, so on this point we can only wait and see.

On the Hijaz and Sinai fronts the enemy has not yet attained his political and military objectives, and, as we know, is making every preparation to achieve his purpose. To create a Moslem power subservient to Britain, to form a Christian state in Palestine under British influence, to tear from Turkey her most prosperous provinces as well as to destroy her last religious predominance, are the British aims. For us this means that our life itself is to be extinguished. Thus the exigencies of the military situation require us to be ready for an attack in the West and to forestall the enemy's advance which he is preparing on the borders of Syria. In the present state of affairs it is useless to think of the recapture of Baghdad with our last reserves. The nearest enemy, the most powerful and most prepared, is in Sinai. He cannot be ignored.

Secondly, the Baghdad project is physically impossible. The effectiveness of the divisions which would carry out the venture are weak and low in value. After two months' marching they would be nothing more than a rabble—to use a slight exaggeration. Our *shakhs* and camels cannot compare with the enemy's railways and ships to Baghdad. Finally, one of the surest indications of the futility of the plan is that after two days' marching regiments would melt away.

What are my deductions from this short study of the situation? One stage of the war is finished and we cannot alter the past. I do not see the good of writing of the greatest perils before us out of pure pessimism; while there is life and hope, we must search for a road out of our troubles.

In my opinion the decisions we should take to-day are:—

(a) Internally strengthen the administration, and security of life. Officers for the gendarmerie, reorganisation as far as possible of justice, commerce and food supplies, to check corruption, or at least to confine it to its narrowest limits, so that the country will have a firm and healthy base from which to work. If a prolongation of the war brings more trouble and calamity to us, we shall at any rate have our country and people behind us. We must not allow them to be a broken reed.

(b) Our military policy should be defensive, and every possible reserve should be religiously nursed. Not a single reserve should be permitted to serve outside the Empire. The question as to whether the Sinai front can be best secured by attack or defence cannot be decided to-day. The enemy in that quarter is superior to us in men and means. It is practically impossible to expect all our reinforcements in Sinai before some months have passed. It is probable that the enemy will try to gain a decision against the troops now in front of him before others arrive. Besides, while we are despatching troops to the front, the British can also call upon more reinforcements with the aid of their perfected communications. Consequently even if the enemy does not attack now, it is within the bounds of possibility that we should be still more inferior after our concentration. Thus, as it is impossible to say when our troops from Aleppo will arrive at the Sinai front, it is essential that orders be issued for the immediate despatch of the Seventh Army. To exactly determine at the moment how these troops will be finally employed with the utmost economy is impossible, from a study of maps, from a military point of view. When the Seventh Army has been sent south the best way out of all our difficulties is as follows:—

Up to now all Syria and Hijaz have been under the orders of a Muslim, and the Sinai operations have been entrusted independently to another Muslim. The road of the country requires this system of command. I am satisfied that Fakhrahayn's advent, his management of the coming events,

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
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the confirmation of von Kress's position, and lastly the dominating influence of the Germans are opposed to the interests of the State. I do not suppose we shall be deprived of a voice in questions regarding the life of the people, nor that, in the execution of his duty, Falkenhayn will do anything prejudicial to the interests of the State. But if the defence of Sinai is carried out by two armies under the orders of von Kress and the Seventh Army Commander respectively, and Falkenhayn is in supreme command, the interests of the country will not be well served. All difficulties would be avoided if General Falkenhayn comes under the orders of the man who is in command of Syria and Hejaz. By this arrangement the senior official would be a Turk responsible to our Government, and having in his hands all internal political and administrative matters. Falkenhayn would exercise a command restricted to military questions only, while the lines of communication, administration of the districts, supplies and areas behind the front, would be under one of our own race.


With regard to my remaining in command of the Seventh Army, till now I have been an independent army commander. If the interests of the country require it, I should not object if relegated to an inferior position. But there is a delicate point to be considered first. When the Seventh Army has been despatched, future operations will tend to mingle my troops with those of von Kress. It would be bad policy to allocate troops to each commander and it would be preferable to put them all as they arrive under von Kress. In that case my Army Headquarters would become superfluous and von Kress would gradually assume command of all troops in the field. If the situation in the future develops in this way, and the interest of the country requires it, I am resigned to my role as a spectator. My duty will be to command without demur the smallest part of the front where my troops may intervene. That is to say, if my troops are to act independently I shall command. This point must be decided.

If the administration of Syria is not handed over to Falkenhayn, Your Excellency can trust me not to obstruct the Germans in any way. Though it is necessary to escape from the predicament in which we find ourselves in company with Germany, I am opposed to their policy of taking advantage of our misfortune and the prolongation of the war to turn us into a German colony and exploit all our resources. Our Government must be jealous and independent like the Bulgarians. I assure you that when the Germans understand that we mean to guard our independence, they will respect us more than the Bulgarians. To continually keep oneself in the background will not inspire respect or justice in any ally, especially the Germans. The more we give the more they will grasp. Falkenhayn, even now, is bold enough to say that he is a German before everything and that German interests come first. In Aleppo and Syria and on the Euphrates it is impossible to be blind to what German policy and German interests mean. If a German commander is in a position to order Turks to die by thousands, it is obvious that the interests of the State are not being watched. From the day on which Falkenhayn arrived, he sent German lieutenants to the chiefs of the tribes to establish direct relations--"The Arabs are enemies of the Turks. We can gain their friendship as we are neutral," said Falkenhayn to me, an army commander. He understood from the very first that the Iraq project was hopeless, so he has adopted the exploitation of the country as his aim. In truth, he has taken all Arabia under German protection, and has now begun the second phase of his plan. Abandoning his Iraq objective, he now discusses the chance of an offensive in Sinai. What will it be in two months, attack or defence? The talk of an offensive is only an alluring pretext by which the Germans hope to seize Syria and Arabia. If in two months the offensive is unfavourable and the defence of Palestine with all the troops proves feasible, there is no doubt we shall be very indebted to Falkenhayn if he gains a great success. But in that case the Government and country will pass from our hands and we shall become a German colony. To this end Falkenhayn is wasting the gold in our Treasury and shedding the blood

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APPENDIX XLIII.

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- 8th Infantry Brigade. { 1st Manchester Regiment.
47th Sikhs.
59th Rifles.
2/124th Baluchistan Infantry.
No. 132 Machine Gun Company.
8th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- 9th Infantry Brigade. { 2nd Dorsetshire Regiment.
53rd Infantry.
105th Mahrattas.
1/1st Gurkhas.
No. 133 Machine Gun Company.
9th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- Artillery. { 4th Brigade, R.F.A. (7th, 14th, 66th and B/69th Batteries)
— 22 guns.
8th Brigade, R.F.A. (372nd, 373rd, 374th and 72nd
Batteries) — 22 guns.
Three small arm ammunition sections.
- Engineers and Pioneers. { 18th, 20th and 21st Companies, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
1/34th Sikh Pioneers.
- 3rd Divisional Signal Company.
No. 271 Machine Gun Company (at Basra).
3rd Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Nos. 110, 111, 112 and 113 Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 11 Sanitary Section.
No. 3 Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached. "A," "B" and "C" Light Trench Mortar Batteries.*
- 71A Division. (Headquarters at Samarra.)
- 19th Infantry Brigade. { 1st Seaforth Highlanders.
20th Punjabis.
92nd Punjabis.
125th Rifles.
No. 134 Machine Gun Company.
19th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- 21st Infantry Brigade. { 2nd Black Watch.
1st Guides Infantry.
20th Punjabis.
1/8th Gurkhas.
No. 135 Machine Gun Company.
21st Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- 28th Infantry Brigade. { 2nd Leicestershire Regiment.
51st Sikhs.
53rd Sikhs.
56th Rifles.
No. 136 Machine Gun Company.
28th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- Artillery. { 9th Brigade, R.F.A. (19th, 20th, 28th and D/69th Batteries)
— 22 guns.
56th Brigade, R.F.A. (A, B, C and 527th Batteries)
— 22 guns.
Three small arm ammunition sections.
- Engineers and Pioneers. { 1st, 3rd and 4th Companies, 1st Sappers and Miners.
121st Pioneers.

* Each consisted of four 3-inch Stokes Mortars.

(1948)

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7th Divisional Signal Company.
No. 272 Machine Gun Company (at Basra).
7th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Nos. 127, 128, 129 and 130 Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 12 Sanitary Section.
No. 2 Mobile Veterinary Section.
Attached. "D," "E" and "F" Light Trench Mortar Batteries.*

Corps Troops (1st Corps).

32nd Lancers.
1st Corps Heavy Artillery Brigade (80-pounder guns).
2/86th and 157th Heavy Batteries, R.G.A. = 8 guns.
1st Corps Siege Artillery Brigade (6-inch howitzers) (158th, 246th and 257th
Siege Batteries, R.G.A.) = 12 guns.
Nos. 788, 789, 901 and 902 Mechanical Transport Companies. (Caterpillar
Tractors.)
Nos. 133, 134 and 135 Medium Trench Mortar Batteries.†
1st Corps Signal Company.
No. 1 Printing Section.
No. 1 Lithograph Section.

Attached. { Nos. 89 and 93 Anti-aircraft Sections.
No. 2 Mobile Bridging Train and detachment No. 3
Bridging Train.
One section, Field Searchlight Company.
One wagon station, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
No. 40 Motor Ambulance Convoy.

IIIrd Corps. (Headquarters at Baquba.)

13th Division. (Headquarters at Abu Saïda.)

38th Infantry Brigade. { 8th King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster).
8th East Lancashire Regiment.
8th Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire).
8th Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire).
No. 38 Machine Gun Company.
38th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

39th Infantry Brigade. { 9th Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
7th Gloucestershire Regiment.
9th Worcestershire Regiment.
7th North Staffordshire Regiment.
No. 39 Machine Gun Company.
39th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

40th Infantry Brigade. { 8th Cheshire Regiment.
8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
4th South Wales Borderers.
5th Wiltshire Regiment.
No. 40 Machine Gun Company.
40th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

13th Divisional Cyclist Company.


Artillery. { 35th Brigade, R.F.A. (A, B, C and 60th Batteries‡) = 24 guns.
36th Brigade, R.F.A. (A, B, C and 61st Batteries‡) = 24 guns.
These small arm ammunition sections.

* Each consisted of four 3-inch Stokes Mortars.

† Each consisted of four 2-inch trench mortars.

‡ Note.—The 60th and 61st Batteries were each equipped with six howitzers instead of the normal four in a howitzer battery.

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*En route from Basra.

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Nos. 136, 137, 138 Medium Trench Mortar Batteries.
IIIrd Corps Signal Company.
No. 2 Printing Section.
No. 2 Lithograph Section.

Attached. { One section, 29th Mountain Battery = 2 guns.
Nos. 80 and 92 Anti-aircraft Sections.
No. 1 Mobile Bridging Train (less detachments).
Half section, Field Searchlight Company.
Two pack stations, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
Convalescent Depot. { No. 20 British Field Ambulance.
Three sections, No. 1 Indian Field
Ambulance.
No. 39 Motor Ambulance Convoy.

15th Division (Headquarters at Falluja).

12th Infantry Brigade. { 1/5th Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey).
2/39th Gurkha Rifles.
1/43rd Erinipura Regiment.
80th Punjab.
No. 128 Machine Gun Company.
12th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

42nd Infantry Brigade. { 1/4th Dorsetshire Regiment.
1/5th Gurkhas.
2/5th Gurkhas.
2/6th Gurkhas.
No. 130 Machine Gun Company.
42nd Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

60th Infantry Brigade. { 1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
8th Jats.
24th Punjab.
1/97th Infantry.
No. 256 Machine Gun Company (at Baghdad).
60th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

"D" Squadron, 1/1st Hertfordshire Yeomanry.


Artillery. { 215th Brigade, R.F.A. (1086th, 1088th, 2/1st Notts,
624th Batteries) = 22 guns.
222nd Brigade, R.F.A. (375th, 1070th, 1072nd, 77th
Batteries) = 22 guns.
Three small arm ammunition sections.

Engineers and Pioneers. { 448th, 450th and 451st Field Companies, R.E.
44th Pioneers.

15th Divisional Signal Company.
No. 275 Machine Gun Company (at Basra).
15th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Nos. 23, 34, 105 and 108 Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 16 Sanitary Section.
No. 6 Mobile Veterinary Section.

Attached. { One squadron, 10th Lancers.
No. 118 Anti-aircraft Section.
Detachment, No. 1 Mobile Bridging Train.
Half section, Field Searchlight Company.
Two pack stations, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
"M," "N," "O," Light Trench Mortar Batteries.

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APPENDIX XLIII.

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17th Division (Headquarters at Baghdad).

- 2nd Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment.
31st Punjab.
1/112th Infantry.
114th Mahrattas.
No. 129 Machine Gun Company.
34th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- 1st Highland Light Infantry.
1/2nd Rajputs.
14th Sikhs.
1/10th Gurkhas.
No. 257 Machine Gun Company.
51st Brigade Supply and Transport Company (*forming*).
- 1/6th Hampshire Regiment.
48th Sikhs.
84th Punjab.
1/113th Infantry.
No. 238 Machine Gun Company.
52nd Brigade Supply and Transport Company.
- One squadron, 10th Lancers.
- 220th Brigade, R.F.A. (1064th, 1066th Batteries)* = 12 guns
(*en route from Basra*).
221st Brigade, R.F.A. (1067th, 1068th Batteries)† = 12 guns
(*en route from Basra*).
Three small arm ammunition sections (*en route from Basra*).
- Sirmur Sapper and Miner Company.
Malerkotla Sapper and Miner Company.
Tehri-Gabwal Sapper and Miner Company.
1/32nd Sikh Pioneers.
- 17th Divisional Signal Company.
No. 276 Machine Gun Company (*at Basra*).
Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company (*to be formed*).
Nos. 3, 19, 35 and 36 Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 1 Sanitary Section.
No. 7 Mobile Veterinary Section (*en route from Basra*).

18th Division.

This division had begun to be formed; but the bulk of its units (most of which were to come from India) had not yet arrived in Mesopotamia on the 18th November, 1917. The following of its units were in Mesopotamia (all at Basra) :-

- Nos. 207, 238 and 239 Machine Gun Companies.
336th Brigade, R.F.A. (A, B, C, and D Batteries)‡ = 24 guns.
337th Brigade, R.F.A. (A, B, C and 341st Batteries)‡ = 24 guns.
2nd, 8th and 19th Companies, 1st Sappers and Miners.
249th Machine Gun Company.

Baghdad Garrison.

- 49th Bengal.
116th Mahrattas.
119th Infantry.
Attached—No. 208 Anti-aircraft Section.

* 403rd Howitzer Battery of this brigade was due shortly from England.
† 404th Howitzer Battery of this brigade was due shortly from England. Each of these batteries was equipped with six howitzers.
‡ D/336th and 341st were six-gun howitzer batteries.

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Army Troops.

Nos. 59 and 93 Anti-aircraft Sections* (with 1st Corps).
Nos. 80 and 92 Anti-aircraft Sections (with 11th Corps).
No. 118 Anti-aircraft Section (with 15th Division).
No. 208 Anti-aircraft Section† (with Baghdad garrison).
Railway Anti-aircraft Section‡ (attached Advanced Base).
Independent Divisional Ammunition Column.
Nos. 1 and 2 Mobile Bridging Trains (attached to 1st and 11th Corps and 15th Division).
No. 3 Bridging Train (detachment with 1st Corps).
Field Searchlight Company (Headquarters at Basra. Detachments at shown elsewhere).
Nos. 5 and 8 Lithographic Sections.
Nos. 5 and 6 Printing Sections.
Army Signal Company.
Headquarters 1st (Australia and New Zealand) Wireless Signal Squadron, with three wagon stations (One wagon station with Russians at Kermanshah).
Wireless Press Station.
31st Wing, (Nos. 30 and 63 Squadrons).
Royal Flying Corps (No. 21 Kite Balloon Company)§ (Nos. 51 and 52 Sections).
No. 5 Light Armoured Motor Battery (less two sections).
No. 13 Light Armoured Motor Battery.
No. 14 Light Armoured Motor Battery (less two sections).
No. 15 Light Armoured Motor Battery.
64th Pioneers.
"A" to "O" Light Trench Mortar Batteries (distributed among divisions).
Army Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Nos. 729, 730, 783, 784, 815, 818, 853, 954 and 971 Mechanical Transport Companies (Ford vans).
No. 976 Mechanical Transport Company (Packards and Fiats).
Detachment, No. 596 Mechanical Transport Company (Peerless lorries).
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Mule Columns.
4th, 5th and 6th Camel Corps.
No. 33 Motor Ambulance Convoy.
No. 39 Motor Ambulance Convoy (attached 11th Corps).
No. 40 Motor Ambulance Convoy (attached 1st Corps).
Nos. 11 and 12 X-ray Units.
Western Persia Survey Party (with Russians).

NASIRIYA FRONT.

NASIRIYA.

Headquarters, Nasiriya Front.
14th Mountain Battery — 6 guns.
Volunteer Battery (seven 15-pounders and one 5-inch gun) — 8 guns.
Patiala Lancers (less two squadrons).
9th Company, Sappers and Miners.
"B" Troop, 2nd (Line of Communication) Wireless Signal Squadron (less one pack station).
Nasiriya Front Signal Company.
174th Somerset Light Infantry.
13th Rajputs (less six platoons).
142nd Deoli Regiment.

* Each consisted of two 13-pounder guns.

† Consisted of two 12-pounder guns.

‡ Consisted of four 2-pounder pom-poms.

§ This Company had recently arrived in Mesopotamia, but was still deficient of much of its necessary stores and equipment, and no balloon could as yet take the air.

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360 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA

No. 2 Section.

ALI GHARBI.

One company, 2/6th Devonshire Regiment (less one platoon at a marching post).

SHAIKH SAAD.

One squadron, 19th Lancers.

One section, 26th Mountain Battery = 2 guns.

Detachment, Anglo-Indian Battery = 1 gun.

2/6th Devonshire Regiment (less one company).

4th Rajputs (less two companies, one of which was distributed in four marching posts).

Section No. 1 India Machine Gun Company.

One pack station, "A" Troop 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.

No. 32 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).

42nd Male Corps.

Headquarters Mobile Column.

WADI.

Detachment, Anglo-Indian Battery = 1 gun.

One company, 4th Rajputs.

HANNA.

One platoon, 126th Baluchistan Infantry.

SUWADA.

One platoon, 126th Infantry.

KOT.

Detachment, Anglo-Indian Battery = 2 guns.

Two searchlight sets.

9th Bhopal Infantry.

One armoured car.

BIGHAULA.

Headquarters No. 2 Section, Tigris Defences.

Headquarters Mobile Column.

10th Lancers (less three squadrons).

26th Mountain Battery (less two sections) = 2 guns.

Section, No. 1 Indian Machine Gun Company.

One pack station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.

126th Baluchistan Infantry (less two platoons).

96th Infantry.

"M" Company, Supply and Transport (forming).

"N" Company, Supply and Transport (Pack-pony Corps) (less detachments).

No. 30 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).

No. 3 Section.

ARZIYA.

Headquarters No. 3 Section, Tigris Defences.

Headquarters Mobile Column.

One squadron, 10th Lancers.

One pack station, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.

2/7th Hampshire Regiment.

1/6th Gurkhas (less 3/4 companies).

Section, No. 1 Indian Machine Gun Company.

"L" Company, Supply and Transport.

No. 31 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).

Distributed among eight railway stations (and marching posts) between Kut (exclusive) and Diyala (inclusive).

Three and three-quarter companies, 1/6th Gurkhas.

87th Punjab (less 1/4 companies).

One 4-inch post gun (at Diyala) = 1 gun.

At two posts (Cassels' Post and Coningham's Post) between Diyala and Bagdad.


One and a quarter companies, 87th Punjab.

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362 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA

No. 1 Works Company.
Reclamation Section.
Base Park Company (less detachments).
Headquarters Electrical and Mechanical Section.
No. 2 Electrical and Mechanical Company (less detachments).
Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 9 Labour Corps.
Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, 30 Local Labour Corps.
Mauritius Labour Corps.
Sierra Leone Labour Corps (for Inland Water Transport).
No. 2 Porter Corps.
Detachment, No. 10 Porter Corps.
Headquarters 2nd (Line of Communication) Wireless Signal Squadron.
"E" Troop, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron (on river ships).
Headquarters and No. 1 Section Line of Communication Signal Company.
Signal Service Park and Depot.
Aircraft Park, R.F.C.
79th Carnatic Infantry (less detachments).
80th Carnatic Infantry (less detachments).
33rd Wallajahbad Light Infantry.
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 British Base Depots.
Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Indian Base Depots.
Indian General Base Depot.
Supply Reinforcement Depot.
Base Supply Depot.
Base Transport Depot, "A" to "G" Companies.
Base Mechanical Transport Depot (No. 895 Mechanical Transport Company)
(less detachments).
Repair Workshops (No. 902 Mechanical Transport Company).
Detachment, No. 596 Mechanical Transport Company.
No. 1 (Lucknow) and No. 2 (Cawnpore) Bullock Corps.
Headquarters Military Forwarding Officer.
Nos. 3, 33, 40, British General Hospitals.
Nos. 8, 9, 10, 20, 22, 25, 27, Indian General Hospitals.
Officers' Hospital.
British and Indian Convalescent Depots (Mohammerah).
Isolation Hospital.
Nos. 10, 19, 27, 29 and 99 Sanitary Sections.
Base Depot of Medical Stores.
No. 23 Motor Ambulance Convoy (less 27 cars) (No. 656 Mechanical
Transport Company).
Medical Reinforcement Camp.
Depot, River Sick Convoy Unit.
Headquarters Base Remount Depot.
One remount squadron.
Military Prisoners' Suez Corps.
Veterinary Convalescent Depot.
Nos. 6 and 18 Field Veterinary Sections.
No. 2 Base Depot Veterinary Stores.
Base Ordnance Depot.
Nos. 35, 55 and 111 Companies, Army Ordnance Corps.
Indian Ordnance Detachments (two companies).
No. 35 Ordnance Mobile Workshop.
Base Post Office.
Base Stationery Depot.
Prisoners of War Camp.
NAIR UMAR.
Headquarters Administrative Post.
Detachment, 80th Carnatic Infantry.
No. 10 Porter Corps (less detachments).
No. 29 Local Labour Corps.

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364 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA

Intermediate Supply Depot.
Nos. 5, 8 and 7 Porter Corps.
Detachment, Mysore Transport Corps.
Military Forwarding Office (sub-depot).
No. 183 British General Hospital.
No. 24 Indian General Hospital (less detachments).
No. 7 Advanced Depot of Medical Stores.
Depot, River Sick Convoy Unit.
No. 101 Sanitary Section (less detachments).
Ordnance detachments.

ARRIVA.


Headquarters Administrative Post.
Headquarters Advanced Supply Depot.
Detachment, No. 2 Labour Corps.
Detachment, No. 24 Indian General Hospital.
Detachment, No. 101 Sanitary Section.

Advanced Base Section.

BAGHDAD (Advanced Base).

Headquarters Advanced Base.
Headquarters Directorate of Railways.
Two railway armoured cars.
Army ammunition park.
Advanced signalling park.
Advanced Echelon, Aircraft Park.
No. 3 Works Company.
300th Electrical and Mechanical Company, R.E., and Works Depot.
Engineer Field Park.
Inland Water Transport Workshops.
Nos. 2, 3, 4 (less detachment), 10 (one company), 11 (less detachments),
12, 26, 28, 32 and 35 Labour Corps.
One company, Anglo-Indian Battalion.
73rd Carmatic Infantry (less detachment).
Rest Camps.
Advanced Supply Depot.
Nos. 312 and 313 Depot Units of Supply.
No. 1 Line of Communication Supply Company (less detachment).
Advanced Transport Depot.
Expeditionary Force Canteen.
Assistant Military Forwarding Office, Advanced Base.
Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 8 Porter Corps (less detachments).
British and Indian War Gifts Depot.
Mysore Imperial Service Transport Corps.
Nos. 23 and 31 British Stationary Hospitals.
Nos. 61 and 70 Indian Stationary Hospitals.
Officers' Hospital.
Officers' Convalescent Depot.
Combined Convalescent Depot.
Isolation Hospital.
Nos. 5 and 6 Advanced Depots, Medical Stores.
Depot, River Sick Convoy Unit.
Nos. 15, 18 (less detachments), 27, 30 Casualty Clearing Stations.
Twelve cars, No. 23 Motor Ambulance Convoy.
Nos. 14 and 100 Sanitary Sections.
Ceylon Sanitary Section.
Advanced Remount Depot.
Two and a half remount squadrons.
Advanced Depot, Veterinary Stores.
Veterinary Hospital.
Nos. 7, 10, 12, 16 Field Veterinary Sections.

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APPENDIX XLIV.

Principal officers serving with the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force on the 1st December, 1917.

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief..	Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Marshall.
Chief of the General Staff	Major-General H. B. Hopwood.*
Brigadier-General, General Staff (Operations).	Brig.-General R. A. Cassels.
Brigadier-General, General Staff (Intelligence).	Brig.-General W. H. Beach.
Major-General, Royal Artillery	Major-General C. M. Ross-Johnson.
Engineer-in-Chief	Major-General J. C. Rimington.
Deputy Adjutant-General	Major-General F. F. Ready.
Deputy Quartermaster-General	Major-General the Hon. A. R. M. Stuart-Wortley.
Inspector-General of Communications	Major-General Sir G. F. MacMunn.
Deputy Inspector-General of Com- munications.	Brig.-General E. L. Sullivan.
Director of Ordnance Services.. ..	Brig.-General Sir C. M. Mathew.
Director of Works	Colonel E. C. Ogilvie (officiating).†
Director of Remounts	Brig.-General G. L. Holdsworth.
Director of Supply and Transport	Brig.-General P. C. J. Scott.
Base Commandant (Basra)	Brig.-General D. A. C. Brownlow.
Director of Railways	Brig.-General G. Lubbock.
Deputy Adjutant General, 3rd Echelon	Brig.-General W. N. Campbell.
Director of Inland Water Transport ..	Brig.-General R. H. W. Hughes.
General Officer Commanding 1st Corps	Lieut.-General Sir A. S. Cobbe.
Brigadier-General, General Staff, 1st Corps.	Brig.-General L. H. R. Pope- Hennessy.
Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster- General, 1st Corps.	Brig.-General C. Rattray.
Brigadier-General, Royal Artillery, 1st Corps.	Brig.-General G. F. White.
General Officer Commanding 3rd Division.	Major-General A. R. Heakins.
C.R.A., 3rd Division	Brig.-General H. K. Peck.
General Officer Commanding 7th Infantry Brigade.	Brig.-General S. H. Davidson.
General Officer Commanding 8th Infantry Brigade.	Brig.-General S. M. Edwards.
General Officer Commanding 9th Infantry Brigade.	Brig.-General C. C. Luard.
General Officer Commanding 7th Division.	Major-General V. B. Fans.
C.R.A., 7th Division	Brig.-General A. D. Musgrave.
General Officer Commanding 19th Infantry Brigade.	Brig.-General E. J. M. Wood.
General Officer Commanding 21st Infantry Brigade.	Brig.-General G. A. J. Leslie.
General Officer Commanding 28th Infantry Brigade.	Brig.-General C. H. Davies.
General Officer Commanding IIIrd Corps.	Major-General Sir R. G. Egerton.
Brigadier-General, General Staff, IIIrd Corps.	Brig.-General T. Fraser.

* Was succeeded on 17th December by Major-General W. Gillman.

† Brig.-General E. Stokes-Roberts (Director of Works) died on 22nd
November, 1917.

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Corps Troops, 1st Corps.

32nd Lancers.

1st Corps Heavy Artillery:—

"A" Group (286th Heavy Battery; 246th and 392nd Siege Batteries)

= 12 guns.

"B" Group (157th Heavy Battery; 159th and 257th Siege Batteries)

= 12 guns.

No. 788, 789, 901 and 902 Mechanical Transport Companies (caterpillar tractors).

"X," "Y" and "Z" Medium Trench Mortar Batteries.

1st Corps Signal Company.

No. 1 Printing Section.

No. 1 Litho Section.

No. 50 Ordnance Mobile Workshop.

1st Corps Troops Supply and Transport Company.

63rd Squadron, R.F.C.

51st Kite Balloon Section, R.F.C.

22nd Cavalry.

No. 59 and 93 Anti-aircraft Sections.

Attached. No. 3 Bridging Train.

Detachment, No. 7 Bridging Train.

One wagon station, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.

No. 12 Mobile X-ray Unit.

3rd Division.

This division (late of the 1st Corps) was in process of movement to Basra, preparatory to departure from Mesopotamia to Egypt.


IIIrd CORPS - Headquarters at Bagdab.

134th Division - In area west of the Diyala and east of the Tigris rivers.

Headquarters at Delli Abbas.

38th Infantry Brigade.	{	6th King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster).	} Occupying Jabd Hamrin from the Diyala to the Sakatstaa pass. Brigade headquarters north-east of Delli Abbas.
		6th East Lancashire Regiment.	
		6th Prince of Wales' Volunteers (South Lancashire).	
		6th Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire).	
		No. 38 Machine Gun Company.	
39th Infantry Brigade.	{	38th Light Trench Mortar Battery.	} Occupying the Widdiya-Sindiya line. Brigade headquarters at Iltawa.
		38th Small-arm Ammunition Section.	
		38th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.	
		39th Royal Warwickshire Regiment.	
		7th Gloucestershire Regiment.	
40th Infantry Brigade.	{	9th Worcestershire Regiment.	} About Seraijk.
		7th North Staffordshire Regiment.	
		No. 39 Machine Gun Company.	
		39th Light Trench Mortar Battery.	
		39th Small-arm Ammunition Section.	
40th Infantry Brigade.	{	40th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.	} About Seraijk.
		8th Cheshire Regiment.	
		8th Royal Welch Fusiliers.	
		4th South Wales Borderers.	
		5th Wiltshire Regiment.	
40th Infantry Brigade.	{	No. 40 Machine Gun Company.	} About Seraijk.
		40th Light Trench Mortar Battery.	
		40th Small-arm Ammunition Section.	
		40th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.	
		40th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.	

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372 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA

14th Divisional Signal Company.
No. 274 Machine Gun Company.
14th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Nos. 20, 21, 22 and 135 Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 13 Sanitary Section.
No. 1 Mobile Veterinary Section.

Corps Troops, IIIrd Corps.

12th Cavalry.
IIIrd Corps Heavy Artillery.
" C " Group (2/104th Heavy, 269th and 364th Siege Batteries) - 12 guns.
" D " Group (177th Heavy, 364th and 387th Siege Batteries) - 12 guns.
Nos. 903, 907, 908, 909 Mechanical Transport Companies (caterpillar tractors).
Nos. 126, 137 and 138 Medium Trench Mortar Batteries.
IIIrd Corps Signal Company.
No. 2 Printing Section.
No. 5 Litho Section.
No. 49 Ordnance Mobile Workshop.
IIIrd Corps Troops Supply and Transport Company.

Attached.

30th Squadron, R.F.C. (less two flights).
6th Cavalry Brigade (less 22nd Cavalry and headquarters and two sections, 15th Machine Gun Squadron).
26th Mountain Battery.
Nos. 80 and 92 Anti-aircraft Sections.
No. 1 Mobile Bridging Train (less detachments).
Two wagon and two pack stations, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
No. 39 Motor Ambulance Coy.

CAVALRY DIVISION - Headquarters at Sadiya.

6th Cavalry Brigade - Attached to IIIrd Corps. Brigade headquarters at Shahraban.

14th Hussars.
21st Cavalry.
22nd Cavalry (attached 1st Corps).
15th Machine Gun Squadron (headquarters and two sections; attached 11th Cavalry Brigade).
No. 2 Field Troop, Sappers and Miners.
6th Cavalry Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

Attached.

" S " Battery, R.H.A. - 6 guns.
One pack station, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.


7th Cavalry Brigade.

13th Hussars.
15th Lancers.
14th Lancers.
18th Machine Gun Squadron.
7th Cavalry Brigade Field Troop, R.E.
7th Cavalry Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

Cavalry Divisional Troops.

" S " Battery, R.H.A. (attached 6th Cavalry Brigade) - 6 guns.
" V " Battery, R.H.A. - 6 guns.
" S " and " V " Battery Ammunition Columns.
Cavalry Divisional Signal Squadron.
One pack station, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
Cavalry Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Nos. 119 and 121 Combined Cavalry Field Ambulances.
No. 30 Sanitary Section (less detachment).
Nos. 4 and 5 Mobile Veterinary Sections.

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374 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTANIA

Engineers
and
Pioneers.

448th, 450th and 451st Field Companies, R.E.
48th Pioneers.

15th Divisional Signal Company.
No. 275 Machine Gun Company.
No. 34 Ordnance Mobile Workshop.
15th Divisional Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Nos. 23, 34, 105 and 108. Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 16 Sanitary Section.
No. 4 Mobile Veterinary Section.

Attached
to 15th
Division.

11th Cavalry Brigade.
Two flights, 30th Squadron, R.F.C.
No. 52 kite Balloon Section.
395th Siege Battery, R.G.A. - 4 howitzers.
No. 118 Anti-aircraft Section.
Independent Divisional Ammunition Column.
Nos. 8, 13 and 14 (less one section) Light Armoured Motor
Batteries.
19th Company, Sappers and Miners.
Detachment, No. 1 Mobile Bridging Train.
No. 2 Mobile Bridging Train.
No. 8 Litho Section.
Two pack stations, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
17th Gurkhas.
No. 1 Combined Field Ambulance.
No. 27 Casualty Clearing Station.
No. 12 Mobile X-ray Unit.
No. 33 Motor Ambulance Convoy.
No. 40 Motor Ambulance Convoy (less ten cars).

56th INFANTRY BRIGADE - En route to the Hills area.

1/4th Somerset Light Infantry.
1/42nd Duff's Regiment.
95th Infantry.
164th Rifles.
56th Light Trench Mortar Battery (to be formed).
56th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

Attached.


Patiala Lancers (less one squadron).
Espirites 13-pounder Q.F. Section.
14th Mountain Battery.
9th Company, Sappers and Miners (less two sections).
No. 2 Indian Machine Gun Company (less one section).
No. 2 L. of C. Signal Company.
One pack station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
No. 30 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).
No. 31 Sanitary Section (less detachment).

KARUN FRONT - Headquarters at Ahwaz.

Attached-

5th Cavalry (less two squadrons).
One section, 21st Mountain Battery - 2 guns.
One section, Anglo-Indian Battery (15-pounders) - 2 guns.
Detachment, Electrical and Mechanical Section.
One section, Machine Gun Squadron.
8th Rajputs (less two companies).
Section, No. 1 Indian Machine Gun Company.
Karun Front Signal Section.
One lorry and one pack station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.

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APPENDIX XLV.

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Detachment, No. 895 Mechanical Transport Company.
No. 29 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).
"O" Company, Supply and Transport.

Skash—
Two Squadrons, 5th Cavalry.
Gun pack squadron, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
Tembak (Maidasi-i-Naftan ulfichki)—
One company, 8th Rajputs.
Band-i-Qi—
One company, 8th Rajputs.

ARMY TROOPS.

(At Baghdad, unless otherwise stated.)

31st Wing	{	30th Squadron (less two flights)	..	attached IIIrd Corps.
Royal Flying Corps.	{	Two flights, 30th Squadron	..	attached 15th Division.
	{	63rd Squadron	..	attached Ist Corps.
	{	No. 23 Balloon Company.	{	1st Kite Balloon Section attached Ist Corps.
			{	2nd Kite Balloon Section attached 15th Division.
Euphrates		18-pounder Q.F. (2 guns).		Section attached 15th Infantry Brigade.
595th Siege Battery, R.G.A. (4 6-inch howitzers).				attached 15th Division.
398th Siege Battery, R.G.A. (4 6-inch howitzers).				
26th Mountain Battery (8 guns)			..	attached IIIrd Corps.
Nos. 59 and 93 Anti-aircraft Sections			..	attached Ist Corps.
Nos. 80 and 92 Anti-aircraft Sections			..	attached IIIrd Corps.
No. 114 Anti-aircraft Section			..	attached 15th Division.
No. 208 Anti-aircraft Section			..	attached Advanced L. of C. Defences.
"M" Anti-aircraft Section			..	attached 11th Cavalry Brigade.
"N" Anti-aircraft Section			..	attached Advanced L. of C. Defences.
"O" Anti-aircraft Section			..	forming.
"P" Anti-aircraft Section			..	
"R" Anti-aircraft Section			..	
Independent Divisional Ammunition Column.				attached Advanced L. of C. Defences.
9th Company, Sappers and Miners (less two sections).				attached 5th Infantry Brigade.
Two sections, 9th Company, Sappers and Miners.				attached Euphrates Defences.
19th Company, Sappers and Miners			..	attached 11th Division.
No. 1 Mobile Bridging Train			..	attached IIIrd Corps, less detachment with 15th Division.
No. 2 Mobile Bridging Train			..	attached 15th Division.
No. 3 Bridging Train			..	attached Ist Corps.
No. 7 Bridging Train (half train)			..	attached Ist Corps.
Field Searchlight Company			..	Headquarters at Basra; detachments at other places.
64th Pioneers.				
No. 2 Litho Section.				
Nos. 5 and 6 Printing Sections.				
Cinema Company.				
Disciplinary Military Labour Company				attached Advanced Section L. of C.
Army Signal Company and Cable and Aerial Sections.				
Headquarters 1st (Australia and New Zealand) Wireless Signal Squadron (with one wagon and one pack station).				

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
376 HISTORY OF THE WAR: MESOPOTAMIA

- No. 4 General Headquarters Wireless Observation Group.
Headquarters Light Armoured Motor Brigade.
- No. 5 Light Armoured Motor Battery {
One car at Hamadan.
One car at Kermandah.
Two cars at Khanisqin.
Four cars at Baghdad.
at Basra.
- No. 7 Light Armoured Motor Battery
(less four cars).
- No. 8 Light Armoured Motor Battery .. attached 15th Division.
No. 13 Light Armoured Motor Battery attached 15th Division.
No. 14 Light Armoured Motor Battery Three sections attached 15th Division,
One section attached 56th Infantry
Brigade.
- No. 15 Light Armoured Motor Battery attached 1st Corps.
No. 2 Indian Machine Gun Company .. attached 56th Infantry Brigade,
except for one section.
- Army Troops Supply and Transport Company.
" L " Company, Supply and Transport.
" N " Company, Supply and Transport (Pack Pony Corps).
No. 1 Mechanical Transport Column Bulk with 15th Division.
(Nos. 818, 971 and 1014 Companies).
No. 2 Mechanical Transport Column Bagdad-Khanisqin.
(Nos. 784, 815 and 954 Companies).
No. 3 Mechanical Transport Column Headquarters at Baghdad. Detach-
ments at Khanisqin and with
Dunsterforce.
(Nos. 729, 730 and 789 Companies).
No. 4 Mechanical Transport Column Headquarters at Baghdad.
(Nos. 596, 883 and 976 Companies).
No. 1013 Mechanical Transport Company With 15th Division.
No. 1014 Mechanical Transport Company With 15th Division.
No. 1015 Mechanical Transport Company En route to Baghdad.
No. 1016 Mechanical Transport Company With 15th Division.
No. 1017 Mechanical Transport Company En route to Baghdad.
No. 1018 Mechanical Transport Company Baghdad.
No. 1019 Mechanical Transport Company Basra.
No. 1020 Mechanical Transport Company Basra.
No. 1023 (Burma) Mechanical Transport Headquarters at Hilla.
Company.
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Mule Columns.
3rd, 4th, 5th and 8th Camel Corps.
No. 1 Combined Field Ambulance .. attached 15th Division.
No. 30 Combined Field Ambulance attached 56th Brigade
(modified).
No. 33 Motor Ambulance Convoy .. attached 15th Division.
No. 39 Motor Ambulance Convoy .. attached 11th Corps.
No. 40 Motor Ambulance Convoy (less attached 15th Division.
10 cars).
Two sections, No. 20 British Field attached Advanced Base.
Ambulance.
No. 11 Mobile X-ray Unit at Samarra.
No. 12 Mobile X-ray Unit attached 15th Division,
Water Examination Unit.
No. 31 Sanitary Section attached 56th Brigade, less Detach-
ment with Euphrates Defences.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

- ADVANCED LINE OF COMMUNICATION DEFENCES - (Headquarters at Baghdad).
4th Rajputs.
36th Sikhs.
80th Carnatic Infantry.

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APPENDIX XLV.

377

90th Infantry.
119th Infantry.
Railway Armoured Motor Battery.
"P" Company, Supply and Transport.
Attached. { No. 208 Anti-aircraft Section.
"N" and "R" Anti-aircraft Sections.

Note.—On the 3rd January, 1918, the designation of "Baghdad Garrison" was changed to "Advanced L. of C. Defences," and its role was extended to include the defence of railways radiating forward from Baghdad up to railheads inclusive, and along the Diyala river between Diyala Post (exclusive) and Baquba (inclusive).

On the 30th March, 1918, the troops of the Advanced L. of C. Defences provided detachments garrisoning three stations on the Baghdad-Palauja railway, ten stations on the Baghdad-Samarra railway and its offshoot to Sadiya, and six stations on the Baghdad-Baquba-Shatrah railway.

TIGRIS DEFENCES - (Headquarters at Amara).

No. 1 Section.—From Kurmat Ali to Amara, inclusive. Section headquarters at Amara.

44th Marwara Infantry.
Detachments, 9th Bhopal Infantry.
1/4th Devonshire Regiment.
2/7th Hampshire Regiment.
Anglo-Indian Battery (less three sections).
One pack station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
No. 1 Indian Machine Gun Company (less three sections).
No. 33 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).

No. 2 Section.—From Ali Gharbi to Imam Mahdi, inclusive. Section headquarters at Kut, where also was the bulk of the troops.

2/8th Devonshire Regiment.
9th Bhopal Infantry (less detachments in No. 1 Section).
1/6th Gurkhas.
49th Bengalia.
11th Lancers and Machine Gun Section.
15th Mountain Battery.
Two sections, Anglo-Indian Battery.
Two searchlight sets.
One section, No. 1 L. of C. Signal Company.
One pack station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
One armoured car.
Two sections, No. 1 Indian Machine Gun Company.
"M" Company, Supply and Transport.
No. 33 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).

No. 3 Section.—From Imam Mahdi (exclusive) to Diyala (inclusive). Section headquarters at Anziya.


126th Baluchistan Infantry.
87th Punjabis.
No. 31 Combined Field Ambulance (modified).

EUPHRATES DEFENCES - (Headquarters at Nasriya).

No. 1 Section.—From Shamba along the Baqra-Nasriya railway to Tal al Lam. Section headquarters at Shamba.

One troop, Patiala Lancers.
21st Mountain Battery (less two sections).
108th Infantry.
Two armoured trains.
Detachments, "Q" Company, Supply and Transport.

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No. 2 Section.—Headquarters at Nasiriya. Small detachments at Samarra, Shuyub and Madaya.

One squadron (less one troop), Patiala Lancers.
Volunteer Battery (nine 15-pounders and one 5-inch gun).
10th Devonshire Regiment.
99th Infantry.
Two platoons, 13th Rajputs.
One pack and one lorry station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
One section, No. 1 L. of C. Signal Company.
One section, No. 2 Indian Machine Gun Company.
"Q" Company, Supply and Transport (less detachments).
No. 24 Combined Field Ambulance (less one section).
Attached. — One section, 9th Company, Sappers and Miners.
One section, Field Searchlight Company.

No. 3 Section.—Headquarters at Samarra. Small detachments at Shinafiya and Darraji.

One squadron, Patiala Lancers.
One section, 21st Mountain Battery.
13th Rajputs (less two platoons).
Two pack stations, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
Detachment, "Q" Company, Supply and Transport.
One section, No. 24 Combined Field Ambulance.
Attached. — One section, 9th Company, Sappers and Miners.

ADMINISTRATION.


Headquarters of Inspector-General of Communications at Basra.

For—
Details, Royal Artillery (with one 18-pounder and one 4-inch gun).
Detachment, Electrical and Mechanical Section.
Attached. — One section, Field Searchlight Company.


Base—
3rd Echelon, General Headquarters.
Headquarters, Line of Communications.
Headquarters, Base.
Headquarters, Directorate of Inland Water Transport.
Headquarters, Directorate of Port Administration and Co-terminancy.
Headquarters, Directorate of Sea Transport.
One section, R.F.A. (18-pounder)—Base Depot.
Headquarters, Works Directorate (L. of C. and Base).
Headquarters, Engineer Field Park and No. 47 Base Park Company.
No. 1 Works Company.
Reclamation Section.
Detachment, Electrical and Mechanical Company, R.E.
Electrical and Mechanical Composite Company, R.E. (less detachments).
Headquarters 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron (detachments as shown elsewhere).
Nos. 32 to 37 ship stations, River section (on river ships).
Signal Service Park and Depot.
Headquarters and two sections, No. 1 L. of C. Signal Company.

Base
Section.

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APPENDIX XLV.

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Kut of Amara—

Headquarters Administrative Section.
Detachment, Works Directorate and Electrical and Mechanical
Section.
Detachment, Engineer Field Park.
One lorry station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
Two companies, 122nd Infantry.
Rest Camp.
Detachment, "N" Company, Supply and Transport.
Intermediate Supply Depot.
Detachment, Mysore Transport Corps.
No. 10 Labour Corps (less detachments).
Detachments, Nos. 4, 8, 11 and 31 (total) Labour Corps.
Nos. 5, 6 and 7 (less detachments) Porter Corps.
Military Forwarding Office (Sub-depot).
No. 133 British General Hospital.
No. 24 Indian General Hospital.
Five cars, No. 23 Motor Ambulance Convoy.
Nos. 2 and 4 (forming) Hospital Trains.
No. 7 Advanced Depot Medical Stores.
Depot, River Sick Convoy Unit.
No. 101 Sanitary Section (less detachments).
Ordnance detachments.

Kut
Section-
cwd.

Assiut—


Headquarters Administrative Post.
Detachment, Works Directorate.
Headquarters, Advanced Supply Depot.
Detachment, No. 4 Labour Corps.
Detachment, No. 5 Porter Corps.
Post Hospital.
Detachment, No. 101 Sanitary Section.

Baghdad—


Headquarters, Advanced Section L. of C.
Army Ammunition Park.
Advanced Signal Park.
Advanced Echelon, Aircraft Park.
Headquarters Works Directorate and Electrical and Mechanical
Section.
No. 3 Works Company.
300th Electrical and Mechanical Company, R.E.
Inland Water Transport, R.E., Workshops.
Engineer Field Parks, Advanced Base (right and left banks).
One company, Anglo-Indian Battalion.
73rd Carnatic Infantry (less detachments).
Machine Gun Corps Centre.
Stokes Mortar School.
Physical and Bayonet Training School (forming).
Signal School.
School of Cookery.
Rest Camps (right and left bank).
Advanced Supply Depot.
Nos. 312 and 313 Depot Units of Supply.
No. 1 L. of C. Supply Company (less detachments).
Advanced Transport Depot ("F" and "H" Companies,
Supply and Transport).
Mysore (Imperial Service) Transport Corps.
No. 2 (less detachment), 3, 10 (one company), 11 (less detach-
ments), 26, 28, 32, 35 and 40 Labour Corps.
Nos. 1, 3 (less detachments), 4 (less detachments) and 8 Porter
Corps.

Advanced
Section.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استناداً إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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
APPENDIX XLVI.

*Distribution of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force on the
19th October 1918.*

	Baghdad.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS	On the Tigris, at and north of Tihrit.
1ST CORPS	
17th Division--	
34th Infantry Brigade.	{ 2nd Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment. 1/112th Infantry. 114th Mahrattas. No. 129 Machine Gun Company. 34th Light Trench Mortar Battery. 34th Small-arm Ammunition Section.
51st Infantry Brigade.	{ 1st Highland Light Infantry. 14th Sikhs. 1/10th Gurkhas. No. 257 Machine Gun Company. 51st Light Trench Mortar Battery. 51st Small-arm Ammunition Section. 10th Hampshire Regiment. 1/113th Infantry. 45th Sikhs.
52nd Infantry Brigade.	{ No. 258 Machine Gun Company. 52nd Light Trench Mortar Battery. 52nd Small-arm Ammunition Section. 220th Brigade R.F.A. (1064th, 1066th, 403rd* and Anglo-Indian Battery)† -- 22 guns. 221st Brigade R.F.A. (1067th, 1068th, 404th* and Volunteer Battery)† -- 22 guns. X(17 Medium Trench Mortar Battery.
Artillery.	{ Malerkotla Sapper and Miner Company. Tehri-Garhwal Sapper and Miner Company. Sirmur Sapper and Miner Company (attached IIIrd Corps).
Engineers and Pioneers.	{ 1/32nd Sikh Pioneers. 17th Divisional Signal Company. No. 27th Machine Gun Company. 17th Divisional Train. Nos. 3, 19, 35 and 38 Combined Field Ambulances No. 1 Sanitary Section. No. 7 Mobile Veterinary Section.
18th Division--	
53rd Infantry Brigade.	{ 1/9th Middlesex Regiment. 1/3rd Gurkhas. 1/7th Gurkhas. No. 207 Machine Gun Company. 53rd Light Trench Mortar Battery. 53rd Small-arm Ammunition Section.
54th Infantry Brigade.	{ 1/5th Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regiment. 52nd Sikhs. 1/3rd Garhwals. No. 238 Machine Gun Company. 54th Light Trench Mortar Battery 54th Small-arm ammunition Section.

* Six-gun 4.5-inch howitzer battery.
Four-gun 18-pounder battery.

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APPENDIX XLVL

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- 55th Infantry Brigade. { 1/5th East Surrey Regiment.
118th Maharashtra.
87th Punjab.
No. 229 Machine Gun Company.
55th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
55th Small-arm ammunition Section.
- Artillery. { 338th Brigade R.F.A. ("A," "B," "C" and "D" *
Batteries) = 22 guns.
337th Brigade R.F.A. ("A," "B," "C" and
341st* Batteries) = 22 guns.
X/18 Medium Trench Mortar Battery.
- Engineers and Pioneers. { 2nd, 6th and 8th Companies, Sappers and Miners.
100th Pioneers (attached IIIrd Corps).
18th Divisional Signal Company.
No. 249 Machine Gun Company.
18th Divisional Train.
Nos. 37, 38, 39 and 40 Combined Field Ambulances.
No. 22 Sanitary Section.
No. 12 Mobile Veterinary Section.

Corps Troops, 1st Corps.


- 2nd Lancers and machine gun section.
1st Corps Signal Company.
No. 1 Printing Section.
No. 1 Litho Section.
1st Corps Troops Supply and Transport Company.
Nos. 50 and 61 Ordnance Mobile Workshops.

Attached.

- 83rd Squadron, Royal Air Force (less half flight).
Half flight, 72nd Squadron, Royal Air Force.
7th Cavalry Brigade = 6 guns.
11th Cavalry Brigade = 6 guns.
50th Infantry Brigade.
74th Brigade R.G.A. (2/88th Heavy and 159th
Siege Battery) = 8 guns.
101st Brigade, R.G.A. (157th Heavy, 240th, 257th
and 395th Siege Batteries) = 16 guns.
No. 2 Indian Mountain Artillery Brigade = 12 guns.
Independent Divisional Ammunition Column.
Nos. 59 and 118 and "O" Anti-aircraft Sections.
8th and 14th Light Armoured Motor Batteries.
448th and 450th Field Companies, R.E.
One section, Field Searchlight Company.
Detachment, No. 1 (Mobile) Bridging Train, Sappers
and Miners.
No. 2 (Mobile) and No. 3 Bridging Train, Sappers
and Miners.
No. 1 Welding Bridging Section, Sappers and Miners.
No. 67 Motor Airline Section.
No. B. X. Cable Section.
One cable section, Army Signal Company.
One wagon and one motor station, 1st Wireless
Signal Squadron.
One pack station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
Nos. 40 and 45 Motor Ambulance Convoys.
No. 33 (Local) Labour Corps.

*Four-gun 4.5-inch howitzer battery.

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IIIrd Corps Headquarters near Shahraban.

13th Division—Headquarters at Delli Abbas. The division covered a large area west of the Diyala river, from about Delli Abbas as far north as Taouq.


39th Infantry Brigade.	<p>6th King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster). 6th East Lancashire Regiment. 6th Prince of Wales' Volunteers (South Lancashire). 6th Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire). No. 38 Machine Gun Company. 38th Light Trench Mortar Battery. 38th Small-arm Ammunition Section. Attached—2/7th Hampshire Regiment.</p>	About Delli Abbas.
40th Infantry Brigade.	<p>8th Cheshire Regiment. 8th Royal Welch Fusiliers. 4th South Wales Borderers. 5th Wiltshire Regiment. No. 40 Machine Gun Company. 40th Light Trench Mortar Battery. 40th Small-arm Ammunition Section.</p>	Much split up. In Taouq-Kirkuk area.
Artillery.	<p>55th Brigade, R.F.A. ("A," "B," "C" and 60th* Battery) — 24 guns. 66th Brigade, R.F.A. ("A," "B," "C" and 61st* Battery) — 24 guns. X/13 Madam Trench Mortar Battery.</p>	
Engineers and Pioneers.	<p>71st and 88th Field Companies, R.E. 8th Welch Regiment (Pioneers). 13th Divisional Cyclist Company. 13th Divisional Signal Company. No. 273 Machine Gun Company. 13th Divisional Train. 10th Field Bakery. 31st Field Butchery. Nos. 39 and 41 British Field Ambulances. No. 28 Sanitary Section. No. 24 Mobile Veterinary Section.</p>	

14th Division—Headquarters at Mirjann, near Qiril Ribat. The division was located east of the Diyala river and distributed from Shahraban northward to Khaniqin.

35th Infantry Brigade	<p>1/5th Buffs (East Kent Regiment). 37th Dogras. 102nd Grenadiers. No. 185 Machine Gun Company. 35th Light Trench Mortar Battery. 35th Small-arm Ammunition Section.</p>	
37th Infantry Brigade.	<p>2nd Norfolk Regiment. 82nd Punjabis. 29th Gurkhas. No. 187 Machine Gun Company. 37th Light Trench Mortar Battery. 37th Small-arm Ammunition Section.</p>	

*Six-gun 4-5-inch howitzer battery.

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


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- 42nd Infantry Brigade (Head-quarters at Ramadi). { 1/4th Dorsetshire Regiment.
1/5th Gurkhas.
2/5th Gurkhas.
No. 130 Machine Gun Company.
42nd Light Trench Mortar Battery.
42nd Small-arms Ammunition Section.
- 50th Infantry Brigade (Head-quarters at Hit). { 1st Devonshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry.
6th Jats.
1/97th Infantry.
No. 256 Machine Gun Company.
50th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
50th Small-arms Ammunition Section.
- Artillery: { 215th Brigade R.F.A. (1085th, 1088th, 816th and 524th* Battery) = 22 guns.
222nd Brigade, R.F.A. (375th, 1070th, 1072nd and 429th* Battery) = 22 guns.
X/15 Medium Trench Mortar Battery.
- Engineers and Pioneers. { 44th and 45th Field Companies, R.E.—With 1st Corps.
451st Field Company, R.E.
45th Pioneers—With Persian L. of G.
- 15th Divisional Signal Company.
No. 275 Machine Gun Company.
15th Divisional Train.
No. 34 Ordnance Mobile Workshop.
Nos. 34, 105 and 108 Combined Field Ambulances
No. 16 Sanitary Section.
No. 6 Mobile Veterinary Section.
- Attached. { Half flight, 6th Squadron, R.A.F.
22nd Cavalry (less two squadrons) and machine gun section.
10th Lancers and machine gun section.
177th Heavy Battery, R.G.A. = 4 guns.
14th Mountain Battery = 6 guns.
No. 89 Anti-Aircraft Section.
10th Company, Sappers and Miners.
No. 7 Bridging Train.
One section, Field Searchlight Company.
No. 8 Litter Section.
No. 1 L. of C. Signal Company (less three sections).
Two pack stations, 1st Wireless Signal Squadron.
One pack station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
No. 2 L. of C. Signal Company (less one section).
7th Light Armoured Motor Battery (less three sections).
No. 27 Casualty Clearing Station.
No. 12 Mobile X-Ray Unit.
No. 1 Combined Field Ambulance.
No. 21 Sanitary Section (less detachment).
Nos. 3 and 5 Porter Corps.
Nos. 8 and 12 (Indian) Labour Corps.
No. 34 (Local) Labour Corps.
No. 1 Disciplinary Military Labour Company.

* Four-gun 4.5-inch howitzer battery.

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38th Infantry
Brigade.

6th Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
7th Gloucestershire Regiment.
8th Worcestershire Regiment.
7th North Staffordshire Regiment.
No. 39 Machine Gun Company.
39th Light Trench Mortar Battery—Attached
Bombing and Light Mortar School.
39th Small-arm Ammunition Section.
39th Brigade Supply and Transport Company.

13th Brigade, R.F.A. (2nd, 8th, 44th, and C/49*
Battery) — 22 guns.
21st Mountain Battery — 6 guns.
72nd Field Company, R.E.
"A," "B" and "C" Squadrons, Dunsterforce
Armoured Car Brigade.
North Persia Force Signal Company.
No. 20 Combined Field Ambulance.
No. 40 British Field Ambulance.
Dunsterforce Armoured Car Brigade Medical Unit.
"L" Company, Supply and Transport.

Attached—
One flight, 30th Squadron, R.A.F.
14 flights, 72nd Squadron, R.A.F.
One wagon and one pack station, 1st Wireless
Signal Squadron.
Three pack and four lorry stations, 2nd Wireless
Signal Squadron.
One station, No. 5 Wireless Signal Squadron R.E.
9th Light Armoured Motor Battery (less one
section).
15th Light Armoured Motor Battery.
Detachment, No. 16 Casualty Clearing Station.
Detachment, No. 33 Motor Ambulance Convoy.


PERSIAN LINE OF COMMUNICATION.

Headquarters at Hamadan.
"D" Squadron, 1/1st Hertfordshire Yeomanry.
26th Punjab.
62nd Punjab.
20th Mountain Battery — 6 guns.
One wagon station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
Special supply sections.
Two sections, No. 30 British Field Ambulance.
No. 31 Motor Ambulance Convoy.
No. 32 Combined Field Ambulance.
No. 1 British General Hospital.

Attached—
5th, 12th, 15th and 61st Companies, Sappers and
Miners.
48th Pioneers.
128th Pioneers.
No. 33 Motor Ambulance Convoy (less detachment).
No. 41 Sanitary Section and Divisional Disinfection
Section.
Field Remount Section.
Nos. 41, 43 and 55 (Local) Labour Corps.

* Four-gun 4.5-inch howitzer battery.

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APPENDIX XLVI.

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KARUM FRONT.

Headquarters at Ahwas.

5th Cavalry and machine gun section.
31st Mountain Battery (less one section) — 4 guns.
8th Rajputs.
Section, No. 1 Indian Machine Gun Company.
Karum Front Section, Sappers and Miners.
Detachment, Electrical and Mechanical Section.
Karum Front Signal Section.
One cabinet station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
Two pack stations, 2nd Wireless Signal Section.
Detachment, No. 895 Mechanical Transport Com-
pany, A.S.C.
"O" Company, Supply and Transport.
No. 29 Combined Field Ambulance.
Ahwas Post Hospital.

ARMY TROOPS.


At Baghdad, except as otherwise noted.

31st Wing, Royal Air Force*—Headquarters.

30th Squadron	Attached 11th Corps and North Persia Force.
63rd Squadron	Attached 1st Corps and 15th Division.
Headquarters 72nd Squadron.	
½ flight, 72nd Squadron ..	Attached 1st Corps.
1 flight, 72nd Squadron ..	Attached 11th Corps.
1½ flights, 72nd Squadron	Attached North Persia Force.
Aircraft Park.	
10th Lancers	Attached 15th Division.
22nd Cavalry (less two squadrons) ..	Attached 15th Division.
14th Mountain Battery	Attached 15th Division.
No. 2 Mountain Artillery Brigade (25th and 34th Batteries) ..	Attached 1st Corps.
No. 29, 30, 92, 93, 118 and 205 Anti- aircraft Sections	Attached at chosen slaughter.
"M," "N," "O," "P," "R" Anti- aircraft Sections	Attached at chosen slaughter.
Independent Divisional Ammunition Column	Attached 1st Corps.
38th Brigade, R.G.A.	Attached 11th Corps.
1/104th Heavy Battery.	
260th Siege Battery.	
No. 903 M.T. Company.	
384th Siege Battery	
No. 985 M.T. Company.	
74th Brigade, R.G.A.	Headquarters attached 1st Corps.
177th Heavy Battery.	
No. 969 M.T. Company ..	Attached 15th Division.
286th Heavy Battery	Attached 1st Corps.
169th Siege Battery.	
No. 788 M.T. Company ..	Attached 1st Corps.

* Note.—No. 23 Balloon Company was in process of being withdrawn from Mesopotamia overseas.

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101st Brigade, R.G.A.	Attached 1st Corps.
167th Heavy Battery.		
No. 759 M.T. Company.		
246th Siege Battery.		
No. 901 M.T. Company.		
252th Siege Battery.		
No. 902 M.T. Company.		
396th Siege Battery.		
No. 1029 M.T. Company.		
9th Company, Sappers and Miners.		Attached 15th Division.
19th Company, Sappers and Miners		Attached Advanced Detachment.
22nd Company, Sappers and Miners		Attached Persian L. of C.
21st Company, Sappers and Miners		Attached 1st Corps.
No. 1 Weldon Bridging Section	..	Attached 111rd Corps.
No. 2 Weldon Bridging Section	..	Attached 111rd Corps.
No. 1 Mobile Bridging Train	..	Attached 1st Corps.
No. 2 Mobile Bridging Train	..	Attached 1st Corps.
No. 3 Bridging Train	..	Attached 15th Division.
No. 7 Bridging Train	..	Headquarters of Basra; detachments as shown elsewhere.
Field Searchlight Company	..	

Nos. 5 and 6 Printing Sections, Sappers and Miners.

No. 2 Litho Section, Sappers and Miners.

Two field survey companies.

Cinema company.

Headquarters 1st (Australia and New Zealand) Wireless Signal Squadron, with
one motor station. (Remaining stations distributed elsewhere).

No. 4 G.H.Q. Wireless Observation Group.

No. 5 Wireless Section, R.E.

Army Signal Company.

Attached to Army Signal Company.	{	No. 63 Airline Section.
		No. 67 Motor Airline Section.
		HX Cable Section.
		DA Cable Section.
		DH Cable Section.

64th Pioneer Attached 111rd Corps.

Disciplinary Military Labour Company Attached 15th Division.

Light Armoured Motor Brigade—

No. 9 L.A.M. Battery	..	With North Persia Force.
No. 7 L.A.M. Battery (less three Sections)	..	With 15th Division.
No. 8 L.A.M. Battery	..	With 1st Corps.
No. 13 L.A.M. Battery	..	With 111rd Corps.
No. 14 L.A.M. Battery	..	With 1st Corps.
No. 15 L.A.M. Battery	..	With North Persia Force.

Army Troops Supply and Transport Company.

"L" Company, Supply and Transport. Attached North Persia Force.

"N" Company, Supply and Transport.

No. 26 Ordnance Mobile Workshop.

No. 1 Mechanical Transport Column
(720, 763, 971, 1023, 1034 Companies).


No. 2 Mechanical Transport Column
(590, 780, 784, 815, 954, 976, 1016, 1019, 1054, 1055 Companies).

No. 3 Mechanical Transport Column
(808, 1013, 1015, 1018, 1020 Companies).

No. 4 Mechanical Transport Column
(953, 1014, 1017 Companies).

Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 Mule Columns.
3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Camel Corps.

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APPENDIX XLVI

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No. 1 Combined Field Ambulance	Attached 15th Division.
No. 33 Motor Ambulance Convoy ..	Attached Persian L. of C.
No. 39 Motor Ambulance Convoy ..	Attached IIIrd Corps.
No. 40 Motor Ambulance Convoy ..	Attached Ist Corps.
No. 45 Motor Ambulance Convoy ..	Attached Ist Corps.
No. 11 Mobile X-Ray Unit ..	Attached Advanced Defences.
No. 12 Mobile X-Ray Unit ..	Attached 15th Division.
Water Examination Unit.	
No. 11 Sanitary Section	Attached 15th Division and Euphrates Defences.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION.

ADVANCED DEFENCES.

(Headquarters at Baghdad, with detachments garrisoning the railway lines Baghdad—Tale Mountain, Baghdad—Tikrit, Baghdad—Dhihisan, Baghdad—Hilla).

1/4th Rajputs.
80th Carnatic Infantry.
1/94th Infantry.
1/96th Infantry.
1/118th Infantry.
Railway Armoured Motor Battery
"P" Company, Supply and Transport.

Attached { No. 208 Anti-aircraft Section.
"N" and "R" Anti-aircraft Sections.
82nd Company, Sappers and Miners.

JELUS' REFUGEE CAMP, BAGDAD.

No. 42 Indian General Hospital and Disinfection Station.
No. 2 British General Hospital.

Attached { One squadron, 11th Lancers.
One squadron, Patials Lancers.
1/4th Devonshire Regiment.

ADMINISTRATION AND DEFENCES.*

FAG AND KHARAG ISLANDS.

Headquarters, Administrative Post.
Detachment, 2/9th Delhi Infantry.
Royal Artillery details, with three guns.
Two platoons, 83rd Walleahbad Light Infantry.
One cabinet station, 2nd Wireless Signal Squadron.
One section, Field Searchlight Company.
Detachment, No. 1 Works Company.
Detachment, Electrical and Mechanical Section.


Base Section.

BASSA.


Third Echelon, General Headquarters (with Nos. 8 and 10 Printing Sections).
Headquarters, Lines of Communication.
Headquarters, Base.
Headquarters, Inland Water Transport Directorate.
Headquarters, Port Directorate.

* At the beginning of October 1918 the Inspector-General of Communications took over control of defences, in addition to administration, on the Tigris line.


"تاريخ الحرب الكبرى استنادًا إلى وثائق رسمية. الحملة في بلاد الرافدين
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
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
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APPENDIX XLVII.

*Principal Officers with the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force
on the 1st November, 1918.*

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief—Lieut.-General Sir W. R. Marshall.
Chief of General Staff Major-General W. Gillman.
Brig-General, General Staff (In-
telligence) Brig-General W. H. Beach.
Deputy Quartermaster-General .. Major-General Hon. R. Stuart-
Wortley.
Deputy Adjutant-General Major-General F. F. Ready.
Engineer-in-Chief Major-General J. C. Birmingham.
Major-General, Royal Artillery .. Major-General Sir C. M. Ross-Johnson.
Director of Ordnance Services .. Brig-General Sir C. M. Matthew.
Director of Works Brig-General C. H. Roe.
Director of Remounts Brig-General G. L. Holdsworth.
Deputy Adjutant-General, 3rd Echelon Brig-General W. M. Campbell.
Director, Supply and Transport .. Brig-General P. C. J. Scott.
Inspector-General of Communications Major-General Sir G. F. MacMunn.
Deputy Inspector-General of Com-
munications Brig-General H. C. Sutton.
Director of Railways Brig-General G. Lubbock.
Director of Inland Water Transport .. Brig-General K. H. W. Hughes.
Commanding at Baghdad Brig-General E. H. Boone.
Commanding Exploitation Defences .. Brig-General F. R. E. Lock.
Buss Commandant Brig-General D'A. C. Brownlow.
Inspector-General, Cavalry Major-General L. C. Jones.


G.O.C. 1st Corps—Lieut.-General Sir A. S. Cobbe.

Brig-General, General Staff, 1st Corps Brig-General L. H. R. Pope-
Hennawy.
Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster-
General, 1st Corps Brig-General C. Rattray.
C.R.A., 1st Corps Brig-General G. F. White.
G.O.C. 17th Division Major-General G. A. J. Leslie.
C.R.A., 17th Division Brig-General L. A. Smith.
G.O.C. 24th Infantry Brigade .. Brig-General A. G. Wauchop.
G.O.C. 51st Infantry Brigade .. Brig-General R. J. T. Hildyard.
G.O.C. 82nd Infantry Brigade .. Brig-General F. A. Andrew.
G.O.C. 18th Division Major-General H. C. Fanslow.
C.R.A. 18th Division Brig-General H. R. Stockdale.
G.O.C. 53rd Infantry Brigade .. Brig-General G. A. F. Sanders.
G.O.C. 54th Infantry Brigade .. Brig-General R. W. Nightingale.
G.O.C. 55th Infantry Brigade .. Brig-General G. M. Morris.

G.O.C. IIIrd Corps—Lieut.-General Sir R. G. Egerton.

Brig-General, General Staff, IIIrd
Corps Colonel W. H. Norman (offg.)
Deputy Adjutant & Quartermaster
General IIIrd Corps Brig-General M. E. Willoughby.
C.R.A. IIIrd Corps Brig-General R. A. Bright.
G.O.C. 13th Division Brig-General J. W. O'Dowda (offg.)
C.R.A. 13th Division Brig-General W. L. P. Davies.
G.O.C. 38th Infantry Brigade .. Brig-General J. W. O'Dowda.
G.O.C. 49th Infantry Brigade .. Brig-General A. C. Lewin.

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APPENDIX XLVIII.


List of Indian cavalry, infantry and pioneer regiments which served with the Mesopotamia Force during the War, 1914-1918; giving their titles as they were in 1918 (which have been used in this history) and their present designations (1926).

CAVALRY.	
<i>Designation in 1918.</i>	<i>Present Designation.</i>
4th Cavalry	2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse).
5th Cavalry	3rd Cavalry.
7th Lancers	18th King Edward's Own Cavalry.
10th Lancers	4th Duke of Connaught's Own Hodson's Horse.
11th Lancers	5th King Edward's Own Probyn's Horse.
12th Cavalry	
13th Lancers	6th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers (Watson's Horse).
14th Lancers	20th Lancers.
15th Lancers	
16th Cavalry	6th Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers (Watson's Horse).
21st Cavalry (Frontier Force) ..	11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force).
22nd Cavalry (Frontier Force) ..	12th Cavalry (Frontier Force).
23rd Cavalry (Frontier Force) ..	11th Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (Frontier Force).
32nd Lancers	13th Duke of Connaught's Own Bombay Lancers.
33rd Light Cavalry	17th Queen Victoria's Own Poona Horse.
Guides Cavalry (Frontier Force) ..	10th Queen Victoria's Own Corps of Guides Cavalry (Frontier Force).


INFANTRY AND PIONEERS.

<i>Designation in 1918.</i>	<i>Present Designation.</i>
2nd Rajputs	1st Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.
3rd Brahmans	Disbanded.
4th Rajputs	2nd Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.
6th Jats	1st Royal Battalion, 9th Jat Regiment.
7th Rajputs	3rd Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.
8th Rajputs	4th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.
9th Bhopal Infantry	4th Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment.
10th Jats	3rd Battalion, 9th Jat Regiment.
11th Rajputs	5th Battalion, 7th Rajput Regiment.
12th Pioneers	2nd Battalion, 2nd Bombay Pioneer.
13th Rajputs	10th Battalion, 6th Rajputana Rifles.
14th Sikhs	1st Battalion, 11th Sikh Regiment.
20th Infantry	2nd Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment.
22nd Punjab	3rd Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment.
24th Punjab	4th Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment.
25th Punjab	1st Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment.
26th Punjab	2nd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment.
27th Punjab	3rd Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment.
28th Punjab	4th Battalion, 15th Punjab Regiment.
31st Punjab	2nd Battalion, 16th Punjab Regiment.
32nd Sikh Pioneers	2nd Battalion, 3rd Sikh Pioneer.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN INDEX.

Bn.	Battalion.
C.F.A.	Combined Field Ambulance.
C.G.S.	Chief of the General Staff.
C.G.S.I.	Chief of the General Staff, India.
C.I.G.S.	Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief.
C. of S.	Chief of Staff.
D.C.I.G.S.	Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff.
D.I.W.T.	Director of Inland Water Transport.
D.M.I.	Director of Military Intelligence.
E.E.F.	Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
G.H.Q.	General Headquarters.
H.Q.	Headquarters.
I.A.	Indian Army.
I.E.F.	Indian Expeditionary Force.
I.O.	India Office.
I.W.T.	Inland Water Transport.
K.B.Co.	Kite Balloon Company.
L.A.M.B.	Light Armoured Motor Brigade/Battery.
L. of C.	Lines of Communication.
M/G.	Machine Gun.
M.T.	Mechanical Transport.
R.A.F.	Royal Air Force.
R.F.C.	Royal Flying Corps.
S. & M.	Sappers and Miners.
S.N.O.	Senior Naval Officer.
S. of S.	Secretary of State.
U.S. for F.A.	Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
W.O.	War Office.
W/T.	Wireless Telegraphy.

Note.—For divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, etc., see under "Artillery," "Cavalry," "Infantry."

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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