

**ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԸ ԱՄՆ ՊԵՏԱԿԱՆ
ՊԵՊԱՐՏԱՄԵՆՏԻ 1917-1920 թթ.
ՓԱՍՏԱԹՂԹԵՐՈՒՄ**

Կազմող Գ.Գ. ՄԱԽՄՈՐԻԱՆ

**ARMENIA IN DOCUMENTS
OF THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1917-1920**

Compiled by GAYANE G. MAKHMOURIAN

ԿՐԹԱԿԱՆ ԿԵՆՏՐ
YEREVAN 2020



REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
INSTITUTE OF HISTORY

ARMENIA IN DOCUMENTS
OF THE U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1917-1920

Compiled and translated by
GAYANE MAKHMOURIAN

ARCH. MESROB ASHJIAN
BOOK SERIES
208



ՄԵՍՐՈՊ ԱՐՔ. ԱՇԽԵԱՆ
ՄԱՏԵՆԱԿԱՐ
208

YEREVAN
2020

ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԻ ՀԱՆՐԱՊԵՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ
ԳԻՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԱԿԱԴԵՄԻԱ
ՊԱՏՄՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏ

ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԸ
ԱՄՆ ՊԵՏԱԿԱՆ ԴԵՊԱՐՏԱՄԵՆՏԻ
1917-1920 թթ. ՓԱՍՏԱԹՂԹԵՐՈՒՄ

Ժողովածուի կազմող և թարգմանիչ
ԳԱՅԱՆԵ ՍԱԽՄՈՒՐՅԱՆ

АРМЕНИЯ
В ДОКУМЕНТАХ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО
ДЕПАРТАМЕНТА США 1917-1920 гг.

Составитель сборника и перевод
ГАЯНЭ МАХМУРЯН

ԵՐԵՎԱՆ ԵՐԵՎԱՆ
2020

UDC 930.2

Published in accordance with the decision, delivered by the
Scientific Council of the Institute of History,
National Academy of Sciences of Armenia

Compilation of collection and translation by
Doct. of Sc. in Hist. Gayane Makhmourian
Editor PhD in Hist. V. R. Aglyan

First edition of this collection had been published in 2011
in Russian by the Institute of History, National Academy of
Sciences of Armenia

Armenia in Documents of the U. S. Department of State, 1917-1920. /Compiled and transl. by Gayane G. Makhmourian. Ed. V. R. Aglyan.- Yerevan: Institute of History NAS of Armenia; 2020.- 560 pages.

This book with documents and materials from the U.S. Department of State, stored at the National Archives of Armenia, recounts the process of shaping of the U.S. policy course, accompanied with generation of relief and assistance, afforded to Armenian people in overcoming its extremely grave conditions and terrible plight of the Republic of Armenia in 1918-1920. The book gives an account of the top-level negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, concerning the future of Armenians and their State; as well as represents the trip counsel by J. Harbord's Military Mission; and also the activities of Armenian Government, aimed at cooperation with American Administration.

Our readers will acquaint themselves with exchange of letters between Executives of the Republic of Armenia and President of the USA W. Wilson or President to-be H. Hoover; they will find out practically all that covers Armenia and its problems at parley, conducted in Paris.

This volume may attract both students and specialists in Humanities, as well as all those, who are interested in Armenian History and in realm of foreign relations.

ISBN 978-9939-860-99-2

© Gayane G. Makhmourian, 2020
© Davit G. Makhmuryan, 2020

Introduction

This collection of archival materials presents to you, my gentle reader, the U.S. Department of State's correspondence of 1917-1920. It reports on conditions in the Republic of Armenia and Western Armenia, throws light upon manifold aspects of their life activity. Selected documents had been published in part in the official "Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Russia," in 3 vols., vol. I-II; further, "1918. The World War," of the same series, in 2 vols., vol. I.; following 1919, in 2 volumes, vol. II; "1919. The Paris Peace Conference," in 12 volumes, vol. 1-3, 5-12; in the book of the same line, 1920, in 3 volumes, vol. III. Broad extent of data had been picked up from the collections of microfilm rolls № 36-38, 46, 49 of the National Archives of Armenia in Yerevan, T1192 "Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Armenia, 1910-1929," Washington, 1975; as also from the collections of microfilm rolls № 35: T1193 "Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between Armenia and Other States, 1910-1929," Washington, 1975; № 2 and 4: M820 "General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1931, American Delegation, Field Mission of the American Delegation, Harbord Military Mission to Armenia," Washington, 1970. All this corpus was delivered from the U.S. National Archives; and next to them we broadly used funds 200 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, together with fund 275 Diplomatic Missions of the First Republic of Armenia.

The first block of documents had been scattered in volumes of the U.S. Government Printing Office, in books which had been kept at special custodies and virtually had not been intensively handled by Soviet Armenian scholars. During last twenty years I had been probably the only one expert who profited from the new juncture of affairs, introduced this material to public and researched it. Meantime, letters and memoranda, composed by employees of the State Department, contain a lot of interesting information on socio-economic situation and political course in the Republic of Armenia, on Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, on plight of the refugees and obstacles, that hampered in relief operations. Appraisals, made by American diplomats, as well as peculiarities

of the U.S. regional policy, of their relationship with Russia, England and France deserve the reader's consideration.

The second block of documents is stored on microfilm rolls, and only 30 to 40 per cent of them has been studied by now. We made a selection from this great heap, concentrated within the collection M820, a number of papers compiled by J. Harbord's mission in September - October of 1919. One of such items, cited in scientific writings in short, has a title of the final "Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia" for the U.S. Congress. It had been published in many works, let us bring as an example a piece of this report in monograph "Foreign Relations of the Republic of Armenia 1918-1920" by R. Hovannisian, which had been translated into Russian by myself. Meanwhile, the Mission worked its way from Adana to Mardin, Kharberd, Diarbekir, Sebastia, Erzerum, Kars and Yerevan, they gathered 53 volumes of documents. At every point of their stopover Officers met with local people and captured written evidences. During such interviews they talked not only to Armenians, including authorities of the Republic of Armenia and its Army, but equally to American missionaries, who spent decades as permanent residents in Western Armenia and were very much aware of actual situation.

We involved in this collection the very first report by J. Harbord for the Secretary of State, composed on shipboard, and supplemented it with a number of records, made by the members of his Mission. Total amount of papers, selected for this book, depends on extent of research and on degree, to which microfilm rolls were mastered. By now this kind of material covers some one hundred pages.

The third, rather compressed block, holds letters by incumbent U.S. President W. Wilson and the Secretary of State Robert Lansing, as well as a number of letters by H. Hoover, the U.S. President to-be, and Head of international relief service, founded at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The letter by W. Wilson in English and correspondence by H. Hoover, translated into Russian in the same 1919, are kept at funds 200 and 275. They refer to management of aid, provided to the Republic of Armenia and certainly should have been included in this book. The very same consideration applies to the number of appeals addressed to the President W. Wilson from Yerevan or from A. Aharonian; to the agreement on relief, signed on April 8, 1919, in Paris by H. Hoo-

ver on the one side, and by Boghos Nubar with A. Aharonian on the other; as well as to the limited number of other documents.

It's quite natural that the bulk of selected papers is in English. However, some documents were executed in Russian and French; therefore, they were translated for our collection. Besides, to be precise with letters by H. Hoover, we addressed the U.S. National Archives in Washington and made an attempt to trace them in American repositories. By now our colleagues did not achieved success, and so paraphrases, included in this volume and made on the basis of Yerevan kept messages, are the only ones of their kind. It should be noted that Yerevan-based archival material gave an ample opportunity for comprehension of time and social environment, for assimilation of numerous facts and their due selection.

In this regard I consider to be my duty to make specially mention that my efficient work at the National Archives of Armenia has always been conditional on high professional skills of its staff, on people, who not solely keep, but excellently know their funds, who are aware of the materials and are a good hand at help to scholar. In rather hard labour conditions they keep, process, publish and augment the data base, promoting new and advanced studies in Modern and Contemporary History of our nation.

Editor of this collection in English, PhD in Hist. V. Aglyan should be praised in the same way, together with my associates at the Institute of History. Their valuable observations, already published monographs and articles considerably improved characteristics of my research, submitted currently to the reader.

As far as an important bulk of the book has been made up of material, picked up from volumes of American Government Printing Office, it's impossible to bypass in silence those splendid, full of special content hours that Fundamental Library of the Armenian National Academy of Sciences awarded to me. Scientist in general, and a Historian in particular, will not proceed successfully without professional writings, rich in content, without reading halls and people, who ensure their activities. There is our first and possibly our main working room among the bookshelves.

All documents of the book in toto, including extracts from proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference, throw light upon economic and political questions, on Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes for Zangezur, Karabakh and Nakhijevan, upon refugees and

repatriation issues, on feasibility of American Mandate for the Republic of Armenia, 1918-1920, and Western Armenia. The material itself is surely interesting and will be helpful to scholars, lecturers, teachers, students and to all those who practice politics, as well as to the general reader.

Incorporated archival sources:

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Russia. In 3 vols., vol.I-II. Wash., US GPO, 1931-1932

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Supplement 1 The World War. In 2 vols., vol. I. Wash., US GPO, 1933

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919. In 2 vols., vol. II. Wash., US GPO, 1934

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919. The Paris Peace Conference. In 12 vols., vol. I-III, V-XII. Wash., US GPO, 1942-1947

Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1920. In 3 vols., vol. III. Wash., US GPO, 1936.

Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Armenia, 1910-1929. Microfilm publications. Wash., the National Archives Records Service, General Services Administration, 1975; microfilm rolls T1192, Roll 1; the National Archives of Armenia, collection of microfilm rolls № 49 (following: NAA, MR

Roll 2, NAA, MR № 38

Roll 3, NAA, MR № 37

Roll 6, NAA, MR № 46

Roll 7, NAA, MR № 36.

Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between Armenia and Other States, 1910-1929. Microfilm publications, Wash., the National Archives Records Service, General Services Administration, 1975; microfilm rolls T1193, Roll 2, NAA, MR № 35.

General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1931, American Delegation, Field Mission of the American Delegation, Harbord Military Mission to Armenia. Microfilm publications, Wash., the National Archives Records Service, General Services Administration, 1970; microfilm rolls M820,

Roll 230, vol.204, NAA, MR № 2

Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4.

DOCUMENTS

№ 1 Supplementary report of the special diplomatic mission to Russia E.Root - for the Secretary of State R.Lansing Plans for American Cooperation to Preserve and Strengthen the Morale of the Civil Population and the Army of Russia

Washington, August 1917

Secretary R.Lansing's personal file: Russia-American diplomatic mission; in: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Russia. In 3 vols., vol.I. Wash., US GPO, 1931, p.147-153 (following: 1918 Russia)

"Germany has been and is waging an able propaganda in Russia to weaken and destroy the fighting spirit of the people. We found evidences that this effort is generously financed, that it is conducted on a large scale, and that it has been most effective. It can be counteracted and overcome only by means of an adequate campaign of education. ...

We came to the conclusion, ...that if the situation is to be met, and met in time, the United States must take the matter in hand. America has the necessary resources. America has evolved the most effective methods. America has available men trained for such educational work.

There has been no time when American cooperation in this sphere would count so much in Russia as the present. ...Russia is ready to listen to America, and is eager to learn from her. ...The liberties of Russia - all that the Russian revolution has made possible - are endangered by Germany.

From the point of view of winning the war, it is vitally important that Russia be kept in the war, and, to this end, that her people shall be led to realize vividly what is at stake, and that they shall be inspired with hope in the successful outcome of the struggle. If, through our failure to keep alive the interest of the Russian people and to maintain among them a realizing sense of the significance of the sacrifices already made, Russia should lose heart and virtually be eliminated from the war, the consequences will be the most serious. Russia is possibly the most isolated nation among all the Allies. This is due to her geographical position and the very poor means of communication with the outside world. It takes a longer time to receive letters and periodicals in Russia from the other Allies than in the case with

any other Allied country. Moreover, the Russian press has the most meager and unsatisfactory foreign cable service. ...

The plans we propose call for an expenditure the first year of approximately \$5,500,000. Members of our mission were told by those who are in a position to estimate facts that Germany has spent in her propaganda of intrigue in Russia since the revolution 48,000,000 rubbles, or \$3,000,000 a month. It is estimated that it costs the Allies \$10,000,000 to keep one regiment one year at the front. The proposed campaign of education is directed to helping to develop a spirit which will hold on the Eastern front 640 regiments of over 3,000 men each. The combined daily expenditures of the Allies have amounted to over \$75,000,000. This vast outlay is devoted almost exclusively to providing for the *material* factors essential to the proper prosecution of the war. Is it not desirable to devote the relatively small sum suggested to insure... the *moral* factor in that area of the war, where the situation is so critical?

America, as well as Russia, has much at stake. If Russia can be helped to hold her armies in being and to keep her men in the trenches, it will make it necessary that the enemy countries maintain on the Eastern front over 140 divisions of troops. This has a most direct bearing on the extent of the exertion and sacrifices of America in the war. ...

Russia has called to the colors since the war began not less than 13,200,000 men. This constitutes the largest army assembled by any one nation in the history of the world. Of this vast number it is estimated that fully 2,000,000 have already been killed or have died as the result of wounds or diseases occasioned by the war. Another 2,000,000 are to-day prisoners of war in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Another 2,000,000 may be classified as permanently ineffective, chiefly those who have been seriously mutilated in warfare or shattered by disease. This leaves 7,200,000 men as comprising the total strength of the Russian army of to-day. ...Of this army of to-day probably 2,100,000 are to be found in the seventy corps on the European front and the five on the Asiatic front;* 1,000,000 in the depots or reserves; 1,000,000 in connection with garrisons and communications - thus leaving a little over 3,000,000 in training, on leave, or otherwise, not immediately available for military operations, but potentially a most important asset.

On this vast host of Russian men and boys rests the tremendous responsibility of maintaining and pressing the war on the long-drawn-out Eastern front. The effectiveness and faithfulness with which they perform this critical duty will determine, far more largely than we in America have realized, the extent of the exertions and sacrifices, and the laying down of life and substance, of the American people in connection with the great struggle. Whatever can be done, therefore, to insure and develop the highest working efficiency and truly triumphant spirit of the Russian soldier, has a most direct, practical, and vital bearing on the destiny of America and the other Allies."

* Five corps on the Caucasian front constituted 140,000 men, approximately.

№ 2 despatch from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith - to the Ambassador to Russia D.R.Francis; copy - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Tiflis, October 19, 1917 (received November 27)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/734/Encl.; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.578-580

"...I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt last week of the Embassy's instruction of October 5, 1917, in reply to several requests made by this office in connection with the political and military situation in this district. In answer to my repeated requests for the Embassy's support in the reorganization of the army on this front by the transfer to it of Armenian and Georgian troops from the other fronts, I note that Embassy considers this step one relating to internal affairs in which the Embassy can take no action.

Though I am fully aware that my request under ordinary circumstances would not be fully in accord with the established policy of the United States, yet in view of the intensive German propaganda conducted here and throughout Russia and the great difficulties with which the Provisional Government has to contend, I believe it my duty to do all I can to counteract such propaganda, and to advise and help both the military and civil authorities. In adopting this course I was guided by the President's message to Russia, in which he states, as reported, that the United States is ready and willing to assist Russia against both her external and internal enemies.

Without our active help, advice and participation in the internal affairs of the country, it is difficult to imagine or hope for the reestablishment of order by next spring, particularly when the agents of the central powers are most active in sowing discord and distrust both in the army and among the civil population.

I found the authorities here at times so discouraged by the difficulties of the situation and the apparent lack of support from Petrograd that, if it had not been for the encouragement and support I was able to give them, they would have allowed matters to drift. It is in great measure owing to my efforts that... the most pressing needs in regard to supplying the army and the population have been met. A number of my suggestions in regard to transportation on the Black Sea also been adopted. It is owing to my interference with the internal politics of the Caucasus that German intrigue establishing a bloc between the Moslems and Georgians has failed, and more friendly relations have been established with the Armenians and the Cossacks of the north. ...

Since last July the general conditions throughout Russia and the rapid development of events have forced me to somewhat revise the opinions which I had the honor to report both to the Ambassador and Senator Root. There seems to be a total lack of patriotism and national spirit towards this country as a whole, and every effort of the Provisional Government to meet this situation has only tended to aggravate it. The Provisional Government has heretofore tended to discourage the local national spirit, considering it as a disruptive force, but recent events have shown that practically the only hope of union and peace lies in the encouragement of this racial or national spirit. ...

A union is now on its way between the Armenians, Georgians and Cossacks of the Terek and the Kuban; the latter are in close understanding with the Cossacks of the Don and are coming to an agreement with a purified Ukraine; this combination in turn finds influence and support among the other Cossack settlements throughout the country. ...Though there appears at this time little hope of the Russians being able to assume an offensive on the main front by next spring and even strenuous efforts must be made to have them maintain a defensive, conditions on this front are totally different and by the regroupment, in favor of which I requested the Embassy's support, an effective offensive could be relied on at small cost and less sacrifice. If this measure is not

adopted and once and carried out, this district will be gravely menaced and it will cost us a hundredfold to remedy the damage done and we will be guilty as well as the greatest injustice and injury to the Christian population of the Caucasus.

As I have previously stated my advice has been eagerly accepted and followed by the authorities in many instances, but to make such advice continuously effective it is essential to render some material aid, to obtain which I hope I can rely on the Embassy's cooperation and support."

№ 3 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith -
to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Tiflis, November 9, 1917 (received November 10)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/639; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.580-581

"The Prime Minister left St.Petersburg for army headquarters. All other Ministers prisoners in Winter Palace. It is reported from Moscow Maximalist Committee getting control there. Caucasus population and army refuse to unite with Maximalist movement but I have doubt about their ability hold out much more than five days without financial aid which it is of vital interest for the Allies to extend. Recommend that I be authorized if necessary draw \$10,000,000 by telegraph for this purpose. Please instruct me what attitude should be adopted if approached on the subject by local government and Central Committee."

№ 4 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith -
to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Tiflis, November 23, 1917 (received November 24)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/711; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.582

"Saturday I shall be present at the meeting for organization government of Caucasus which will unite with Southern federation and repudiate armistice or a separate peace. Essential to give them financial support as indicated in my telegrams of 9th, 18th. Anxiously awaiting instructions. This aid is requested both by representatives the Provisional Government and commander in chief."

№ 5 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith -
to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Tiflis, November 25, 1917

copy № 2864 forwarded by the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. Ambassador in France W.G.Sharp

Washington, November 27, 1917

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/719; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.582-583

"For Colonel E.House:

...In the presence of high commissioners, commander in chief, consuls and military agents the Allies, a meeting of representatives all local nationalists, parties, and assemblies was held yesterday at which it was decided to establish temporary separate government of Trans-Caucasus and to continue war upon this front. Full loyalty to Russia was expressed and the fact that this government was created solely to keep out anarchy until time true representative government of Russia may be established to which this government would revert was specially emphasized. All executive and legislative powers were given to members of Russian national Assembly for Caucasus, numbering 36, to be convened December 28; until that date power vested in special committee appointed; excludes various national and party committees." ...

Consul indicates that this temporary separate government of Trans-Caucasus expressed full loyalty to Russia but definite opposition to Bolshevik government at Petrograd." He also requests a fund of \$10,000,000 for the troops on Caucasus front. "Department understands that British Embassy is recommending to British Government that more financial relief be given. The American Consul at Tiflis will not be given authority to recognize *de facto* government until it is evident that such action will not tend to foster sectionalism or disruption of Russia or civil war."

№ 6 telegram from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith

Washington, November 26, 1917

US NA, RG 59, 861.51/244; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.582

"Your telegram November 23 and previous telegrams. Please advise how under circumstances you describe the financial support you propose will not tend to encourage sectionalism or disruption of Russia or civil war. Department cannot encourage tendencies in any of these directions."

№ 7 telegram from the special representative of the U.S.
Government in Europe E.M.House - to the Secretary of State
R.Lansing

Paris, December 2, 1917 (received December 2)

US NA, RG 59, 763.72/7926; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.583-584

..."December 1, 4 P.M. ...I was in conference with Prime Ministers of England, of France, and of Italy discussing this very situation. The inclination of England, of France and of Italy is to give encouragement to the Transcaucasian movement. Personally I consider it dangerous for the reason that it is encouraging internal disturbances without our having any definite program in mind or any force with which to back up a program. On the other hand if they are not given money or encouragement they may go to pieces. At conference it was decided by France, Italy and England to send a French and British military mission from Rumania to Tiflis to Kaledin's headquarters* to confer with him and to ascertain what his program is." ...

* I. e. in Novocherkassk.

№ 8 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith -
to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Tiflis, December 4, 1917 (received December 7)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/779; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.584-585

"...I do not exclude possibility of Germany's using Russian troops against the Allies. The Prime Minister of Trans-Caucasus* told me to-day his government might be able to hold out for a short time but forces unpaid. Russian army on this front and total lack funds might oblige this government to recognize Maximalists and follow their lead notwithstanding that entire population is opposed to the latter. This would involve loss of Armenia and render most likely the concentration of Turkish-German forces against British in Baghdad. Am not certain of success if policy submitted is adopted but it appears to offer less risk than any other alternative and would certainly afford greatest embarrassment to the enemy chiefs. British and French military mission here agree with the above conclusions and believe it of the utmost importance to confer with governments separate State south Russia with the object of placing before them definite proposals.

Please instruct me as to position I shall assume towards the three governments in this district." ...

* E.Gegechkori.

№ 9 telegram № 7999 from the delegate of the U.S. Treasury to the Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance
O.T.Crosby - to the Ambassador in Great Britain W.H.Page
copy forwarded by the Ambassador - to the Secretary of State
R.Lansing

London, December 18, 1917 (received December 19)

US NA, RG 59, 763.72/8200; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.591-592

"About ten days ago British Government authorized agents in southern Russia to offer £10,000,000 to one group, £10,000,000 to another, and sum not fixed to Armenians and Georgians in order that latter might offer resistance against anticipated attacks from Turks who are presumed to be arming themselves with rifles sold by Russian soldiers. ...I feel it unnecessary for us to offer just now to share liability though British have been given to understand we will consider sharing in any wise effort. Views of French Government similar to British. ...O.Crosby

W.Page: I should go further than O.Crosby and decline to risk money in an enterprise so doubtful and about which so little is known either by British Government or ourselves. I should surely wait till these people give some hopeful evidence of their strength and spirit."

№ 10 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith -
to the Secretary of State R.Lansing*

Tiflis, December 18, 1917 (received December 19)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/839; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.592-593

"General O.Shore, head of British Military Mission has received instructions by cable accepting the plan which I submitted to the State Department in my telegram of December 11, which was on the same date forwarded by him to London. ...Am sending Vice Consul** this evening to Ekaterinodar with personal letter to V.Kharlamov suggesting Cossacks' corporation with the Allies... Armenian and Georgian troops to disarm... returning soldier mobs of which there are about half million in this district. ...

I hope the Department will authorize the loan of 60,000,000 rubles referred to in my telegram of December 13. It is necessary to support this Government by checking Maximalist movement which if successful would greatly impede if not entirely stop

formation national troops. I have to suggest all financial aid to this or the federal government be granted only if expenditures will be under control Allied commission. Referring to my telegram of November 30 for Armenian Relief Committee, recommend that our Government grant or advance committee \$1,000,000 for manufacture clothing for use units now forming. ...Owing to vast increase work at this office require the assistance of at least two additional consular officers. Communication with Embassy interrupted. Please instruct."

* Its entire record had been published in: Великая Октябрьская социалистическая революция и победа Советской власти в Армении. Сб. док. Сост. А.Н.Мнацаканян. Ер., Айпетрат, 1957, с.149-150 (following: Великая Октябрьская).

** Hooker Austin Doolittle.

№ 11 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith -
to the Secretary of State R.Lansing*

Tiflis, December 19, 1917 (received December 21)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/848; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.594-595

"Armistice concluded between Turks and Russia along the whole Caucasus front December 18, duration until final treaty of peace is declared. May be terminated by either side on fourteen days' notice. Line already demoralized from Trebizond to Lake Van, reserves and corps were separately draining their front. ...Russian troops already reported leaving their positions without orders in First and Second Corps, and staff endeavouring to form everywhere local volunteers." ...

* At greater length and in slightly other wording had been published in: Великая Октябрьская, с.152.

№ 12 memorandum by the Inquiry, USA

submitted December 22, 1917

Inq. doc. № 887; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919. The Paris Peace Conference, vol.I. Wash., US GPO, 1942, p.41-53 (following: Paris)

"The Present situation: the war aims and Peace terms it suggests.

Our objectives

...5. We must aim the neutralization and the internationalization of Constantinople and the Straits.

6. We must see that the control of the two military terminals of Berlin-Baghdad remain in the hands of an administration friendly to the western nations.

7. As a result of the accomplishment of the foregoing, we must secure a guarantee autonomy for the Armenians, not only as a matter of justice and humanity but in order to re-establish the one people of Asia Minor capable of preventing economic monopolization of Turkey by the Germans. ...

A suggested statement of Peace terms.

Turkey

It is necessary to free the subject races of the Turkish Empire from oppression and misrule. This implies at the very least autonomy for Armenia and the protection of Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia by the civilized nations. It is necessary also to establish free intercourse through and across the straits. Turkey proper must be justly treated and freed from economic and political bondage. Her war debts to Germany must be cancelled." ...

№ 13 telegram № 8090 from the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain
W.Page - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

London, December 29, 1917 (received December 30)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/3478; 1918 Russia, vol.I, p.330-331

[On December 29, 1917] the Foreign Office has given me the following memorandum:

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [A.Balfour]... has the honour to transmit herewith... a copy of a confidential memorandum regarding policy of the Allies in Russia which was agreed to at the conference held at Paris on the 22d instant. ...

Circulated to the King and War Cabinet. Memorandum prepared for Lord A.Milner and Lord R.Cecil, ...and accepted by M. [G.]Clemenceau and M. [S.]Pichon on December 22, 1917.

"At Petrograd we should at once get into relations with the Bolsheviki through unofficial agents. ...We propose to send Sir George Buchanan on leave for reasons of health but we shall keep a Chargé d'Affairs there. ...

We should represent to the Bolsheviki that we have no desire to take part in any way in the internal politics of Russia and that any idea that we favour a counter-revolution is a profound mistake. ...But we feel it necessary to keep in touch as far as we

can with the Ukraine, the Cossacks, ...Siberia, the Caucasus. ...We should carefully refrain from any word or act counter to condoning the treachery of the Russians in opening peace negotiations with our enemies but we should continually repeat our readiness to accept the principles of self-determination and this includes that of no annexation or indemnities. ...Meanwhile powers of [Bolshevik's] resistance are melting away and they will soon be, if they are not now, at the mercy of the German Kaiser. ...They should be told that it is now probably too late to do anything to save the personnel of the army, but the material of the artillery can still be preserved and at the very least it should not be transferred to our enemies to be used against the western democracies.

Most important of all, the Bolsheviki should prevent if they can the wheat districts of Russia, such as the Ukraine, falling into the control of or being made available for the Central powers. ... Finally we are bound to protect, if possible, the remnant of the Armenians not only in order to safeguard the flank of our Mesopotamian forces in Persia and the Caucasus, but also because an Armenian union, if possible, is the only barrier against the development of a Turanian movement that will extend from Constantinople to China and will provide Germany with a seaport of even greater danger to the peace of the world than the control of the Baghdad Railway.

If we could induce the southern Russian armies to resume the fight that would be very desirable, but it is probably impossible to secure these objects. The first thing is money to reorganize the Ukraine, to pay the Cossacks and Caucasian forces. ...The sums required are not... very enormous, but the exchange presents great difficulties. If the French could undertake the finance of the Ukraine, we might find the money for the others. It is understood that the United States will assist.

Besides finance, it is important to have agents and officers to advise and support the provincial governments and their armies. It is essential that this should be done as quickly as possible. ...It is for consideration whether we should facilitate the return to southern Russia of the numerous Russian officers at present in France and England."

№ 14 telegram № 2325 from the U.S. Ambassador in Russia
D.R.Francis - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing*

Petrograd, February 2, 1918 (received February 7)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1062; 1918 Russia, vol.I, p.364-366

"Third Congress of All-Russian Workmen-Soldiers-Peasants' Soviets** adjourned 3 yesterday morning. It made declaration proclaiming Russia [Soviet] Republic. It proclaimed the socialization of land; all woods, mines, waters, estates to be national property. It transferred factories, works, mines, railways to the Council of Workmen and Peasants, and confirmed action in placing them under control of workers. The first blow dealt to international banking financial capital, the Third Congress of Councils sees in the Council's decree about the annulling of loans concluded by the Government of the Tsar. It approves the transfer of all banks to the State. It decrees to organize army of workers and peasants and to entirely disarm the propertied class. It approves of the publication of the secret treaties, and advocates attaining at all costs and by all revolutionary methods of a democratic peace, without annexations and contributions on the basis of the free self-determination of peoples. It [rejects] the policy of the bourgeois, which founded the welfare on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of the populace in Asia, in the colonies generally and in the small countries. It commends recognition of Finnish independence, withdrawal of armies from Persia and champions the right of free self-determination to Armenia. It advocates a complete and sound union of all nations in Russia in federation. It creates Central Executive Committee, consisting of seven" political forces.

* Plural suspension points are omitted for the purpose of making this text more definite.

** Convened on January 10-18 (i.e. 23-31) 1918.

№ 15 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith -
to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Tiflis, February 12, 1918 (received February 13)

US NA, RG 59, 763.72/8861; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.618-619

"Caucasian front practically abandoned by Russian forces. Line Erzerum, Van, Erzinka* occupied by Armenian troops and coast towns east and west Trebizond seized or attacked by irregular Turkish bands. Large military stores at Trebizond and all

along the line threatened by Kurds and local Mohammedan population. Sardar of Maku refuses to permit Armenian troops through his territory without permission Persian Government. South Caucasian and Vladikavkaz railroads harassed by Mohammedan bands. Communication cut at many points. Grozny reported pillaged by Mohammedans; much oil property destroyed. Formation national troops is progressing slowly for lack of funds. ...

E.Gegechkori, Prime Minister, assures me there will not be separate peace even with Turkey. It is doubtful under present conditions the government will be able to resist Mohammedan and pacific pressure in favour of such peace. ...Armenian leaders showing tendency to come to an understanding with maximalists. This is merely protective move against the Mohammedans. ...Telegraphic communication open only via India."

* Inscribed in the text as Erzingan.

№ 16 telegram № 1612 from the U.S. Minister in Sweden

I.N.Morris - to the State Secretary R.Lansing

Stockholm, March 4, 1918 (received March 5)

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/1430; 1918 Russia, vol.I, p.434

"Swedish press reports via Berlin peace treaty with Russia signed 5 o'clock Sunday.

Petrograd's telegram bureau wires from Petrograd peace delegation Brest accepted all German peace terms and telegraphed Lenin and Trotsky:

"As we anticipated deliberations on peace treaty useless. In view Germany refusing discontinue military operations until signing had taken place, we decided sign peace treaty without revision and then leave Brest immediately. The most significant change to peace terms of February 21 is as follows: The districts of Ardahan, Kars and Batum shall be separated from Russian territory. This done under pretext of right of nations to dispose of themselves. [L.]Karakhan, Secretary."

Swedish press comments as follows:

"Turkey will recover what was lost to Russia at Congress Berlin 1878. Kars of strategical importance as barricading fort in mountains, but Batum is place of most value to Turkey as pipes run there from great petroleum center Baku on Caspian Sea. The tremendous petroleum trade at Baku will come under Turkish control."

№ 17 telegram from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith

Washington, March 30, 1918

US NA, RG 59, 763.72/9405a; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.623

“...The United States is not in a position to support active military operations on Caucasus front. Summary of your reports has been communicated to British Government. Messages to J.L. Barton and Red Cross also delivered. Department will advise whether any measures possible to relieve situation among civilian population.”

№ 18 telegram № 7116 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain W.H.Page

Washington, April 3, 1918

US NA, RG 59, 763.72/9295; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.623-625

“Consul, Tiflis* sent Vice Consul H.A.Doolittle to Teheran to dispatch telegrams dated Tiflis, March 10, 11 and 12. American missionary E.Yarrow informs J.L.Barton and American Red Cross Caucasian situation most critical. Turks advancing. Surrounded by unfriendly Tatars. Armenians in real danger of extermination. If properly led and financed latter possess great potential military force. British mission must use more adequate efforts if situation is to be saved. Russian Red Cross work disorganized. E.Yarrow urgently appeals for \$400,000 to reorganize hospitals and \$100,000 monthly for maintenance. Red Cross here asking London whether credit can be made available in Caucasus.

Consul telegraphs Secretary of State German plan of utilizing native Moslem population being accomplished. Tatars and Turkish troops disguised as natives, pro-Turk Moslem leaders supplied with abundant cash, feverishly active in creating disturbances. Fighting between Moslem tribes and Terek Cossacks. Armenian villages and detachments constantly attacked by armed Moslems, although latter usually repulsed. Situation aggravated by inactivity of Allies. Turkish demand of part of Caucasus brought Georgians' desire to join hands *with Armenians. Defense of front depends entirely on latter whose present forces are 15,000 Ottoman subjects and 25,000 Russian subjects.* With proper assistance probably force of 30,000 Georgians can be raised. Prime Minister** requests help and states Armeno-Georgians will resist Turkish advance, but without instant financial aid and hope of

future British military assistance, Turks may occupy as much Caucasian territory as they please. *Without most urgent measures such occupation and massacre of Armenians within two months practically certain.*

Prime Minister stated Black Sea Russian fleet offering to sell his Government cruisers, torpedo boats, transports and supplies, and that these would be sold to Turkish Government unless purchased by Allies.

Consul suggests placing in London to the credit of head of British mission at Tiflis, 2,000,000 rubles to be used at his discretion for military purposes and possible purchase of Black Sea and Caspian fleets. Dunsterville, Tapping, or other tactful person could be charged with negotiations. Also credit of 2,000,000 roubles should be placed in London at disposal in Tiflis to provide for safety of Armenian people and prevent total extermination. The plan is to provision and supply the three mountain fastnesses in Russian Armenia, where, in case of disasters, troops at front may fall back and hold out probably for six months. If above is done Prime Minister promises hold Baku to keep open communications with British and North Caucasians.***

As United States is not at war with Turkey this Government is prevented from taking actions in the above premises. You may, however, inform Mr.A.Balfour of foregoing; telegraph results to the Department.

Since drafting the above Department received telegram March 28 from H.Doolittle still at Teheran stating that immediate return impossible, that Persian chieftain [Kuchuk Khan],^{4*} with 3,000 well-armed natives under German influence and fostering anti-Ally sentiments in north Persia; that British authorities at Teheran have lost hope of saving Caucasian situation.

Please inform Department what information British Government has."

* F.W.Smith.

** E.Gegechkori.

*** On April 25, when R.Lansing has forwarded this text to Paris, for the U.S. Ambassador in France W.G.Sharp, he added: "The Washington special envoy of the Armenian Catholicos^{5*} has suggested that if American Consul at Tiflis be authorized to guarantee a loan it would probably be possible to raise it from local Armenian financial and commercial firms which would probably

seize the opportunity to place their cash beyond the reach of extreme Socialists as well as of Turco-Germans.

Please inform Allied war Council of the above, drawing attention to the stated number of Armenian volunteers. It is reported here that since above dates number of Armenian soldiers has increased. If they have really recaptured Van and successfully fought against Tartars at Baku the reports may be true" US NA, RG 59, 867.22/22.

^{4*} See: US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1787, 2200.

^{5*} Garegin Pasdermajian.

№ 19 memorandum № 407 by the British Ambassador to the USA
R.Reading - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Washington, April 16, 1918 (received April 19)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1629½; 1918 Russia, vol.I, p.499-501

..." Everything should be done to stiffen resistance to German and Turkish invasion in Transcaucasia, and to keep the control of the Black Sea in Russian hands."

№ 20 telegram № 372 from the U.S. Consul General at Moscow
M.Summers - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, April 18, 1918 (received April 22)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1642; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.625

""Following substance of report just received Moscow, from British agent in Caucasus.

Strength of Armenian and Georgian national units reorganized loyal armies, which left front in November, is about four army corps. They are in need of war materials. Turks have taken Erzerum, Ardahan and approaching Kars and Batum. Wholesale massacres of the Armenians. Persia putting forward claims compensation Persian inhabitants who have suffered through war. ... Transcaucasian parliament does not recognize Soviets and carries on peace negotiations with Turkey on its own. ...Bolsheviks predominate in Baku. Civil war in interior between Tatars and Armenians in the south and mountaineers and Mussulmans in the north. In Baku region Russian Bolsheviks fighting Tatars. Railway communication between Mineralnye Vody and Baku, and Baku [and] Tiflis has been cut for two months. ...Rapid [contagion] prevails in Trans-Caucasus especially among Armenian refugees. Local currency has been issued in Tiflis. Germans having taken

Kharkov and advancing toward the Volga and isolation of the Caucasus from Russia is possible. The Black Sea completely under German control. Turks negotiating with whole of Crimea with a view to annexation with autonomous Government under their protection."

№ 21 telegram № 402 from the U.S. Consul General at Moscow
M.Summers - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, April 22, 1918 (received April 25)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1671; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.626-628

"It is becoming more and more evident that the purpose of the German advance in the south may be not only to secure the natural and industrial wealth of the Ukraine and the Donets[k] Basin but also the occupation of Rostov, Tsaritsyn, and possibly Astrakhan, and a junction with the Turks in the Caucasus. The complete overthrow of public order in the Caucasus and the resulting supplies reaching the Georgian and Armenian units are enabling the Turks to advance from the south." ...

№ 22 telegram № 434 from the U.S. Consul General at Moscow
M.Summers - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, April 27, 1918 (received May 16)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1810; 1918 Russia, vol.I, p.507-508

"In Caucasus, Turks having taken Batum and Ardahan, are advancing on Kutais on way to Tiflis. Probably aim at complete control railway to Baku on route to Turkestan."

№ 23 telegram № 505 from the U.S. Consul at Moscow DeWitt
C.Poole, Jr. - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, May 9, 1918 (received May 11)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1779; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.629

"According official Soviet gazette for May 9 Turkish diplomatic representative Moscow has delivered note to Commissariat Foreign Affairs, stating that peace negotiations have been opened between Turkey and the government of the Caucasus. Note explains that Caucasus government at Tiflis, basing action on Article 4 of Brest treaty, requested Turkey and Germany to open negotiations for regulation of territorial and other questions, that Turkish Government has acceded to request, and that German and Turkish Governments will accordingly send delegates to Batum." ...

№ 24 telegram № 529 from the U.S. Consul at Moscow DeWitt C.Poole, Jr. - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, May 17, 1918 (received May 24)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1856; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.630

"...Letter dated April 18 received to-day by courier from F. W.Smith, Tiflis. He outlines plans for defence of Trans-Caucasus against Turks but peace conference now in progress Batum indicates that further resistance found impossible. No telegraphic communication with Tiflis."

№ 25 telegram № 52 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing - to the U.S. Consul at Moscow DeWitt C.Poole, Jr.

Washington, May 28, 1918

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1856; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.631

"Your telegram 529, May 17, ...Department will be pleased to learn plans for defence of Trans-Caucasus furnished by [F.W.] Smith."

№ 26 telegram № 593 from the U.S. Consul at Moscow DeWitt C.Poole, Jr. - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, June 2, 1918 (received June 14)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/2015; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.631

"Official Soviet gazette publishes radiogram received from Tiflis May 28, of which following substance.

"May 27, The Transcaucasian government sent telegram to Ministers for Foreign Affairs of all countries announcing that on May 26 Caucasian republic fell to pieces and no longer exists. The parliament has given up its authority and declared itself dissolved. An act has been passed making Georgia independent democratic republic. German-Caucasian chamber of commerce being established at Tiflis."

Turkey has sent Transcaucasian government ultimatum: The following districts go over to Turkey: Nakhichevanski district except Ordubad, half Sharuro-Daralagezski district, half Erivanski district except Erivan, Surmalinski district, almost whole E[t]chmiadzinski district, part of Alexandropolski district, with town Alexandropol, whole of Akhalkalaksi district. Besides this Turks demand unhindered transport their troops on all Transcaucasian railways. Troops also must be provided with food supplies. Answer to this note must be given within seventy-two hours beginning at

7 p. m., May 26, after which the attitude between two governments will be made clear."

№ 27 telegram № 609 from the U.S. Consul at Moscow DeWitt C.Poole, Jr. - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, June 7, 1918 (received June 17)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/2041; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.631-632

"Department's [telegram] 52, May 28. ...Substance of [F.W.] Smith's letter as follows:

"Vote at meeting of Diet March 30, first resolution adopted for continuing war. Order for immediate general mobilization has just been issued. It is hoped something will be accomplished to stop Turkish advance and prevent probable German invasion. Batum fallen to Turks owing lack discipline among Georgian troops. Small patriotic forces might have held out indefinitely. Turks aided by local Mussulman element which will always render Caucasia's situation difficult and complicated. Advance of Armenian troop [who] were acquitting themselves more creditably. Baku, fighting between Armenians and Bolsheviks on one side against Tatars on the other side. Is it possible this conflict be stopped by central authorities Moscow in order to prepare common defence against Turks? Tiflis isolated. In absence of instructions we are working to aid and encourage local elements and consider recent decision of Diet decided victory against always active German and Turkish influences. Heavy responsibilities on our part especially in realm of finance. Supreme council of defence of Transcaucasia has just been formed constituting dictatorship of three."

№ 28 telegram № 616 from the U.S. Consul at Moscow DeWitt C.Poole, Jr. - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, June 8, 1918 (received June 16)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/2070; 1918 Russia, vol.I, p.554-555

"...There is rumour of a divergence between the views of [W. von] Mirbach and his Government. While Berlin must offer at least certain evil [civility], they are said to favor the reestablishment of Russia under monarchy. [German] policy, is said [to aim] at the creation of several remissions [separate governments, but] do not oppose [federation]. ...The external evidence suggests that the latter plan is being followed for the present. There are

indications that White Russia is about to be made into a separate government. From Simferopol the definite formation of a Crimean government is reported. Recent developments reported in № 593 and other telegrams, though not clear in detail, maintain a similar policy in the Trans-Caucasus." ...

№ 29 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith,
temporarily in Moscow - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, June 16, 1918 (received July 4)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/2200; 1918 Russia, vo.II, p.632-633

"On April 23, after declaration in favour of continuing war and union with Russia, the government of [E.]Gegechkori was forced to resign by vote of Armenian and Georgian majority in Diet, pro-German [A.]Chkhenkeli and [N.]Ramishvili succeeding to power. From that time all effective armed resistance to Turkish advance ceased and territory from Kars, Alexandropol, and Vorontsovka as well as railroad to Julfa were occupied by Turks. Batum and southeast provinces are also occupied by them under the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Railroads Baku, Rostov-on-Don, and part of Baku-Grozny line are held by native Moslems under Turkish officers. Up to date of my departure Persian road Enzeli to Resht was held by Kuchuk Khan's [Kurds] Jangalis amounting to about 3,000 men.

May 26 Georgia was declared independent and a de facto German protectorate accepted. [N.]Ramishvili has informed me the day before that Georgians might be forced to this step to protect Tiflis from invasion by approaching Turkish forces. After dissolution of Diet, Moslem delegates are reported to have established State of Azerbaijan under Turkish protection, see previous telegrams. All Transcaucasia and railroad systems with the exception of Baku now controlled by enemy and Turkish advance on Baku is under way. Turkish regular troops employed in Transcaucasia do not exceed 20,000. They are supplied entirely by military stores found on occupied territory. In the absence of German troops attempt is being made to arm prisoners and concentrate force in Turkestan. Number available limited. Tatar and Kurdish bands cooperating with Turks, roughly estimated at 50,000 well armed.

[Armenian] troops under General [T.]Nazarbekian,* after being ordered by [A.]Chkhenkeli government to evacuate Kars,

were dispersed by occupation of Alexandropol and the railroad by Turks. Armenian policy when leaving was to follow Georgian lead and appeal to Germany for protection. Turco-German friction relied on by Armenians and Georgians I believe is not serious as reported. ...Conquest of [Batum?] is more due to belief in the existence of such friction than to active Turkish military operations. Baku is still held by Bolsheviks, estimated total force about 6,000 Russians and 5,000 Armenians. This force cannot hold out for more than six weeks on account lack of supplies and backbone which latter can only be strengthened by nucleus of really efficient foreign troops." ...

* Inscribed as Nazarbekov.

№ 30 telegram № 647 from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith,
temporarily in Moscow - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, June 18, 1918 (received July 5)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/2210; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.633-634

..." Impressions received from conversations with and reports from representative people of all classes, confirmed by what I had occasion to observe on my way from Tiflis to Moscow, are that military intervention would be welcomed; that such intervention, unless on large scale would not only be futile but would do harm; that there would be no objection to Japanese troops if accompanied by small forces of Americans both military and administrative; that it would be impossible to supply large force in northern Russia; that an active military campaign must be in the south where troops could live on the country. ...Participate in [people look on?] the intervention as a hand stretched out to a drunken man. They prefer the hand of a friend but an enemy's is better than none."

№ 31 Statement issued by the Georgian Information bureau

London, June 26, 1918 (received July 30)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/2386; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.634-637

"Georgia and Transcaucasia

...In Transcaucasia, after the appearance of the Bolsheviks in Petrograd, a separate State was formed consisting of three nationalities: Georgians, Tatars, and Armenians. It was a federal republic with the capital in Tiflis and a national army consisting of Georgians and Armenians.

As is well known the Bolsheviks at the Brest-Litovsk conference ceded the large districts of Batum and Kars to Turkey behind the back of the Transcaucasian government. This was not recognized by the Transcaucasian government, which government mobilized the army in order to prevent Turkish invasion of the provinces. Being entirely isolated from Allied assistance, after stubborn fighting they lost Batum and Kars, which Turkey occupied. After this, Turkey offered to send delegates for peace negotiations, but the negotiations were broken off as the Transcaucasian government would not agree to the terms proposed by Turkey. Fighting was resumed and the Turks penetrated into the eastern part of Transcaucasia where they joined hands with Tatars, who broke away from Transcaucasia and came under the influence of Turkey. At this stage Germany intervened and invited the Transcaucasian government to send delegates to Batum for negotiations. After this negotiations the Transcaucasian government, which consisted only of Georgians and Armenians, was compelled to accept the loss of Kars and Batum districts, but would not agree to abandon the important port of Batum, on the Black Sea, chief outlet of Transcaucasia. Germany and Turkey agreed to return Batum, but suddenly Turkey made a new claim to the Sukhum district on the Black Sea. This was prevented by the concentration of the Georgian troops in that town. ...

It is quite evident that Turkey, having lost Mesopotamia, Arabia and Palestine, is determined to compensate herself at the expense of the Georgians and Armenians. This intention is very much disproved by the conservative press of Berlin. ...

On the 19th June, thirty-two Georgian and Armenian delegates arrived in Constantinople from Transcaucasia. The leader of the Georgian delegation is Mr.[E.]Gegechkori, the former Prime Minister, and the leader of the Armenian delegation is Mr.[A.] Aharonian. This delegation is going to attend a special conference with the Central powers. ...

It is [once more] evident that the center of gravity in the eastern contest between the British Empire and Central powers is Transcaucasia and Georgia which countries are entirely isolated from immediate contact with the Allied forces and therefore left to mercy of the Central powers. This is more clear as, according to a recent message from Tiflis, the Turkish Government is demanding the disarmament of Georgian and Armenian troops. Should this

plan succeed, Transcaucasia will be left entirely undefended. The Turkish occupation of Tabriz provides them with the best base for operations in Transcaucasia, and the deplorable state of affairs in Persia is a further convenience to them.

On the face of all this happenings it is very remarkable that the Bolsheviks have surrendered various economic concessions to the Central powers, which gives Germany excuses for penetrating into the Middle East. In this way, Germany is gradually completing her scheme of threatening India and Afghanistan along the road Berlin-Constanza-Batum-Krasnovodsk-Kushka and through Erivan to Tabriz."

№ 32 telegram № 712 from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis F.W.Smith, temporarily in Moscow - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, July 15, 1918 (received July 24)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/2458; 1918 Russia, vol.II, p.637-638

"Food conditions at Baku, June 25, greatly improved, shipments being received from Astrakhan. Garrison 8,000 Armenian troops, Bolshevik 2,500. Caspian fleet cooperating with the above. Enemy force 25,000: 800 German troops, 2,000 Georgians, 5,000 Turkish regular, balance Tatar irregular formations under Russian and Turkish officers. Germans reported landing inadequate forces at Poti. Armenian here urge landing of small British force at Baku within four weeks would enable Baku to hold out against present enemy force. ...The government here informed Baku has been captured by Ottomans. Report not confirmed. Yesterday's Moscow papers report capture of Mosul and Tabriz by British. Please confirm this report.

The new Armenian State reported recognized by Germany and Turkey is limited to 12,000 [square] kilometres, boundary from Dilijan southwest to Alagez,* from there south to Etchmiadzin and east to Erivan, from the latter to Lake Sevan. State includes the counties of Erivan, Etchmiadzin, and Novo-Bayazet. ...

Armavir** is reported occupied by Cossacks; 30,000 Armenian refugees concentrated there."

* I. e. Aragatz.

** F.W.Smith implied neither the city Armavir, which had been established by Argishti I in the Ararat valley in 776 BC and later had become first capital of the Armenian kingdom, IV-III centuries BC, nor a contemporary town, situated to the East of the older

one. Actually, he meant his fellow-city built in Krasnodar Territory in 1839, this one possessed domestic self-government, including Armenian judicature.

№ 33 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Moscow DeWitt C.Poole, Jr. - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Moscow, September 5, 1918 (received October 29)

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/3072; 1918 Russia, vol.I, p.581-582

"I have the honor to furnish herewith, for the information of the Department, a translation of a report made by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs [G.]Chicherin at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, September 2. ...

I would also invite the department's attention to the paragraph dealing with Ukrainian relations, which discloses the extent of the German territorial aspirations in south Russia and the Caucasus.

The attempt to separate the United States and Japan from the other Allies and to embroil these two with each other has been a *leitmotif* of Bolshevik foreign policy."

Report of the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs

G.V.Chicherin - to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

"Izvestia," M., 3.09.1918.

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/3072/Encl.; p.582-585

..."The Turkish Army had lately been advancing on our territory. Notwithstanding the frequent promises of the German Government the Turkish Army has now advanced on Baku, which fact led to the temporary victory of the *bourgeoisie* and compromisers. With the ignorant sailors of the Caspian Sea they treacherously called the English to Baku. However, they [the English] will not be able to defend Baku from the advance of the Turks, if our negotiations with Germany will not lead to the retreat of the latter army. We shall send troops to Baku to drive out the English as well as the Turks."

№ 34 telegram № 5779 from the U.S. Ambassador in France W.G.Sharp - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Paris, November 9, 1918

US NA, RG 59, 600.001/591:Telegram; Paris, vol.II, p.729-731

"War Trade Boars [from J.McFadden]. ...The following is submitted for your consideration: ...

Second. The importance of the military and naval support of the United States will hereafter greatly diminished, but our economic, financial support will be essential to the Allies in the post-war period. For example: (a) The United States and Great Britain, in the post-war period will be logical and vigorous competitors for the world's... trades. The United States by reason of her supplies of raw materials, exportable surplus of certain characters of merchandise, merchant marine and financial resources should have the better of the competition as the United States will be independent economically of Great Britain, ...while Great Britain will be dependent upon the United States for certain food supplies (particularly wheat and fats), commodities, ...not only for domestic needs but also in order to re-establish her foreign trade. (b) France, however, will not be a competitor for the world's trade. ... As regards Italy, this nation will be even more dependent than France upon the United States in the post-war period for food, raw materials, metals merchandise, financial support. ...W.G.Sharp."

№ 35 telegram № 2920 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. Chargé in Great Britain I.B.Laughlin

Washington, November 20, 1918

US NA, RG 59, 867.48/1093a:Telegram; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919. In 2 vols. Vol.II. Wash., US GPO, 1934, p.817 (following: Papers 1919)

"American Committee Armenian and Syrian Relief, a long established relief society operating in Asia Minor with the support and approval of this Government, desires to undertake at once relief measures for rehabilitation of the oppressed nationalities of Turkish Empire in Constantinople and Asia Minor. It proposes to despatch a ship with a cargo of foodstuffs, clothing, agricultural machinery, seed, medical supplies and the like, together with some 300 doctors, relief workers, mechanics, agriculturalists and so forth. The ship would sail from an American Atlantic port through the Dardanelles to a port on the coast of Armenia, and there discharge its supplies and personnel.

Please so inform Foreign Office, stating that this plan enjoys complete approbation this Government and is part of Hoover's food scheme, and inquire if any objection exists on part of British authorities to proposed action by the Committee." ...

№ 36 telegram № 740 from the U.S. military attaché at London
S.Slocum - for the Chief of Staff, War Department, P.March

London, November 27, 1918

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/2874½:Telegram; Paris, vol.I, p.
408-409

"Confirming general idea in dispatch 6835, Foreign Office unofficially inform Embassy the following outline of Government's present policy, which has not been communicated to France and Italy because England wishes to consult America first. These plans also indicate differences in details between D.Lloyd George and Foreign Office.

Near East. ...Armenia, ...and Persia need trustship administrative help of European or American State under mandate League of Nations; thus Great Britain in Mesopotamia, America in Palestine, Constantinople and the Straits; France probably in Syria; Turkey under control League in...* Anatolia. Greek and Italian claims in Asia Minor to be disregarded. ...

Inform State Department. ...France informed."

* Omission in the text of telegram.

№ 37 telegram № 4347 from the U.S. Chargé in Great Britain
I.B.Laughlin - to the Acting Secretary of State F.L.Polk

London, December 5, 1918 (received December 6)

US NA, RG 59, 867.48/1100:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.
818

"I have just received a note from the Foreign Office of which the following is the substance:

"December 3. ...His Majesty's Government cordially welcome this proposal and are prepared to afford a mission* of this character every assistance in their power.

His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople... is authorized... to arrange for British officers to be attached to the various branches of the expedition on its arrival in accordance with a plan which is understood to have been already agreed upon between [Admiral R.]Webb and Doctor C.Gates. ...

The efforts of the American Mission are supported from the south by the independent action of the administration of the British Armenian fund."

* Of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief.

№ 38 copy of telegram from the Foreign Office -
to the British Ambassador at Rome J.R.Rodd

London, December 13, 1918

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/3147; Paris, vol.II, p.277-278

"While in London the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated a memorandum containing the following statements:* ...

2. That if Turkey continues non-compliance with the terms of the Armistice regarding Tripolitania, Italy will on her own account proceed to occupy some locality in Anatolia to which she is entitled, in accordance with the Inter-Allied agreement regarding Turkey. ...

As regards 2. You were instructed on November 29th to point out to the Italian Government that the failure of the Turks to comply with the Armistice terms regarding Tripolitania offered no sufficient ground for action in Asia Minor without previous consultation with the Allies. ...You should point out again that such action on the part of Italians will certainly provoke similar steps by the Greeks and... in such event [we] would find it impossible to oppose the Greek claims. ...You should add that... [our] Government see no objection to Italian troops proceeding to Turkey and Thrace, and that the necessary arrangements to this end are being made by General [L.]Franchet d'Esperey."

* On December 16, 1918, the British Embassy at Washington had already transmitted this text to the Department of State.

№ 39 letter from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. representative in the Inter-Allied Supreme War
Council General T.Bliss

Paris, December 16 1918

US NA, RG 256, 185.112/3; Paris, vol.I, p.296-297

"...I am convinced that the two principal governments, with which we are to deal, have come to a working understanding and will endeavour to frustrate any plan which will defeat their ambitions. We are peculiarly strong because we have no territorial cravings, no selfish interests to serve. If they could succeed in tarring us with that stick, they would gain a decided advantage. I believe that it will be attempted by tempting us with an African colony or starting a controversy in regard to the Pacific islands. Possibly a protectorate over Armenia or Palestine will be the bait.

Whatever it is, I feel sure that we will have to be on our guard, since nothing would be pleasing to the diplomats of those countries as to be able to point to the United States and say that our unselfishness was a sham and we really wished territorial acquisition. If they can do this our pre-eminence would be lost and we would be unable to carry out our program."

№ 40 note № 1396 by the Counsellor of the British Embassy
C.Barclay - to the Assistant Secretary of State W.Phillips

Washington, December 19, 1918

US NA, RG 59, 867.48/1119; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.818-819

"On December 10th Mr.H.Chilton handed to Mr.R.Jones a copy of a telegram* from His Majesty's Representative at Constantinople [with] a message from Dr.C.Gates to the Department of State. ...Dr.C.Gates asks that the following may be transmitted to the State Department:

"When will the Relief Expedition fitting out for Turkey sail? Greatest need of haste.

Conditions here are becoming desperate. Turkish currency much depreciated. Expedition should bring gold and as much coal as possible."

* Dated December 5, 1918.

№ 41 letter № 1396 from the Assistant Secretary of State
W.Phillips - to the Counsellor of the British Embassy C.Barclay

Washington, December 23, 1918

US NA, RG 59, 867.48/1119; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.819

"I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your note of December 19th, quoting a message from Doctor C.Gates. ...

A copy of this message has been handed to Doctor James L. Barton, chairman of the Relief Expedition. ...Doctor J.Barton and the members of the Commission expect to sail from New York on December 31st, and the ship carrying the relief in kind and the corps of relief workers will sail about the middle of January, direct for Constantinople. It will, of course, not bring gold or coal, as the amount which they could carry would not be sufficient to justify the use of space on the vessel needed for other supplies. A reply is being cabled to Doctor C.Gates through our Legation at Athens."

№ 42 memorandum by the technical advisers to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace J.B.Scott, D.H.Miller Skeleton Draft of Peace - for the secretary of State R.Lansing

Paris, December 30, 1918

US NA, RG 256, 185.1/15; Paris, vol.I, p.298-315

"Exclusions.

The large number of nationalist groups which are now making claim to political independence will doubtless ask a hearing at the Peace Conference. Whether any new States will be recognized, as desired by these respective groups, is so uncertain that it seems unnecessary to have them included among possible signatories to the Treaty of Peace.

In Russia, particularly, separatist movements have been numerous. The Ukraine has succeeded in establishing some measure of independence, and purported to deal independently at Brest-Litovsk. Georgia claims an independent existence, which the Germans and Russians purported to recognize in the agreement drawn up at Berlin, 27 August, 1918. ...

In Turkey also separatism has been at work. The separate kingdom of Hedjaz has to some extent been recognized by Great Britain, and independence is claimed for Armenia. It is possible that an independent State may be created in Palestine, but also possible that all of the peoples redeemed from Turkish domination will desire some connection with existing States. ...

It seems unlikely that any of these nationalist groups will be included as signatories to the Treaty of Peace whatever plan is adopted for their expression of their assent to provisions for their future." ...

№ 43 telegram № 138 from N.H.Davis, American Commission to Negotiate Peace - to the Acting Secretary of State F.Polk

Paris, January 3, 1919 (received January 4)

US NA, RG 59, 033.1140/114:Telegram; Paris, vol.II, p.552-553

..."2. As I cabled A.Rathbone yesterday, it was decided that a special Inter-Allied Board should be created to coordinate relief work... and the President designated H.Hoover and myself the American representatives." ...

№ 44 telegram from the American Commissioner at
Constantinople L.Heck - to the Ambassador in France W.G.Sharp
Pera, January 4, 1919 (received January 9)

US NA, RG 256, 867.00/48:Telegram; Paris, vol.II, p.280-283

...“It would be advisable for most Armenians to remain where they are until spring, or until future status of Armenian State is defined, but they are already beginning to return to their homes, only to find these destroyed or occupied by immigrants. ...The Armenians have on the whole... been moderate in their claims avoiding all agitation which might provoke further trouble in the interior. ...

If an independent Armenia is to be established, official announcement should be kept in abeyance until either a firm Allied Military Control is established in Asia Minor, or until a large number of the persons guilty of the previous massacres have been placed under arrest in order to show to the Turkish population the danger of indulgence in further massacres. ...

General attitude among Turks is one of *hopelessness*, waiting the outcome of the Peace Conference. They resent permission accorded to Armenians and other racial elements to send representatives to Paris, while such permission had been refused to them. As publicly expressed, their chief hope is in the application of the President's principles of nationality and self-determination, as they feel that other Allied Powers are likely to be more severe than the United States. An Armenian Delegation of two members is about to proceed to Paris, consisting of Archbishop [Eghishe] Dourian* and Professor [A.Ter-]Hagopian of Robert College. At present Turks are trying to create friction between British and French by praising the former, and criticizing letters at every opportunity. However large French investments and financial interests in the country are counted on in some circles to secure French support for the future maintenance of independent Turkish Government. ...

Nothing new to report concerning American interests in Turkey, but we are cut off from Syria and Palestine, so that the situation there should be followed from Egypt..” ...

* Inscribed in the text as Tourian.

№ 45 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, made by its secretary at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, January 12, 1919, 14:30

Tasker H.Bliss Papers; Paris, vol.III, p.495-507

"President W.Wilson: ...There was great doubt in his mind as to whether Bolshevism could be checked by arms, therefore it seems to him unwise to take action in a military form before the Powers were agreed upon a course of action for checking Bolshevism as a social and political danger.

D.Lloyd George: was in entire agreement with President W.Wilson upon this point. ...There were 1,200,000 of [Russian] prisoners [of war]... who were now crossing the frontier; they were asked by Bolsheviks either to join their party or to have their throats cut. ...

The President W.Wilson felt that Russia itself was in a condition which the Allies did not like and could not control." ...

№ 46 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, made by its secretary

Paris, January 12, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/2; Paris, vol.III, p.482-494

..."4. The Representation of Russia at the Conference.

...D.Lloyd George said that... the Allies... ought to decide whether to withdraw their troops [from Russia] or to reinforce them. Unless reinforced, they were of no use whatsoever. ...[In this country] the peasants accepted Bolshevism for the reason... that it gave them land. The Bolsheviks were the *de facto* Government. ...To say that we ourselves should pick the representatives of a great people was contrary to every principle for which we had fought. ...He wishes to protest against an attempt to select representatives for some hundred million people. ...

It was agreed that Russia should not be represented at the Conference, but the persons... could be interviewed personally or asked to supply memoranda."

№ 47 letter № 4095 from the Acting Secretary of State F.L.Polk - to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain J.Davis

Washington, January 16, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 867.48/1144:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 819-820

"The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief are sending three ships to Turkey: The United States Naval Transport *Mercurius* now ready to sail with five members of the relief expedition and carries cargo for Constantinople only; The United States Naval Transport *Pensacola* with between 30 and 40 members of the relief expedition and a cargo of supplies to be discharged partly at Beirut and partly at Constantinople, sailing about January 21; and the *Western Belle* sailing shortly from New York with a cargo of approximately 8,000 tons of flour to be discharged at Constantinople and possibly Beirut. Before authorizing these vessels to sail from the United States, the Naval Overseas Transportation Service desired to have full assurance that these vessels will encounter no obstacles in passing the Dardanelles and entering the port of Constantinople, and also that the *Pensacola* and *Western Belle*, if so ordered, will be able to enter the port of Beirut. ...Immediate reply is requested.

Repeat to Paris as № 6997."

№ 48 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, made by its secretary at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, January 17, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/8; Paris, vol.III, p.612-622

"S.Pichon suggested that President W.Wilson's proposal regarding a list of subjects to be discussed, should be used as the basis for... the work of the Conference. ...[Its] five following subjects [are:] 1. League of Nations, 2. Reparations, 3. New States, 4. Territorial boundaries, 5. Colonial possessions.

D.Lloyd George hoped that one of the questions that the delegates would be asked to report on, would be the question of the punishment of those who had been guilty of infringement of the Law of Nations. ...[He] suggested that the delegates also be asked to report their views on the questions of the responsibility of the authors of War." ...

№ 49 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, made by its secretary

Paris, January 17, 1919, 15:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/9; Paris, vol.III, p.601-611

..." President W.Wilson thought that demobilization could not take place before their work had been completed. Demobi-

lization up to a certain point was taking place at present and could go on as at present. But could they hasten the final demobilisation except by making peace?

S.Sonnino thought that if all questions which would facilitate demobilization were to be considered first, the territorial questions should take precedence of all others.

G.Clemenceau said that he agreed with President W.Wilson that peace alone could settle the questions of demobilization. ... He understood that the Delegations would be invited to submit reports on all questions which might interest them. These reports would be sent to the Secretariat for transmission to the five Great Powers.

The attention of the Delegations would be specially invited to two of these questions, [first of them:] - Responsibility of the authors of the war and penalties for crimes committed during the war."

№ 50 telegram from the Acting Secretary of State F.L.Polk -
to the U.S. Commissioner at Constantinople L.Heck

Washington, January 21, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 123H35/60a:Telegram; Paris, vol.II, p.810-811

..."2. In instructing you to return to Constantinople in capacity of Commissioner, Department merely desired to have official representative stationed at Constantinople from whom it could receive information of interest and importance. ...It is not necessary that you should have at present any official relations with Turkish Government. It is highly important that you maintain friendly and intimate relations with the representatives of the Allied countries in Constantinople and cooperate with them generally. ...Your chief mission consists in keeping Department and Embassy at Paris fully informed of conditions in Turkey; political conditions in general, present attitude of Turkish Government towards Americans and American institutions and towards naturalized citizens of Ottoman origin; the relations of the several Allied representatives, the aspirations of foreign governments in Turkey; military, economic and financial situations, conditions of travel, etc. You should bear in mind that your mission is not identical with the Allied High Commissioners sent to Constantinople by the Governments at war with Turkey.

Rear Admiral [M.L.]Bristol is proceeding from England to Constantinople as senior American Naval officer. He will take precedence over you in rank."

№ 51 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten,
made by its secretary

Paris, January 23, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/15; Paris, vol.III, p.693-703

..."D.Lloyd George was informed by the British War Office that... a British Army of 1,700,000 men must be kept with the colours. This was a very serious demand which would not be readily accepted by the country. ...

9. Breaches of Laws of War.

G.Clemenceau read a draft resolution submitted by Mr. D.Lloyd George. ... The following final text was adopted: -

"That a Commission, composed of two representatives apiece from the five Great Powers, and five representatives to be elected by the other Powers, be appointed to inquire and report upon the following: -

(1) The responsibility of the authors of the war.

(2) The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their allies on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.

(3) The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, or other individuals, however highly placed.

(4) The Constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate to the trial of these offences.

(5) Any other matters cognate or ancillary to the above which may arise in the course of the inquiry, and which the Commission finds it useful and relevant to take into consideration."

11. Territorial and Colonial Questions.

G.Clemenceau said that a number of territorial and colonial questions remained to be discussed. Of these the territorial were the most delicate problems. ...

D.Lloyd George: ...Oriental questions and Colonial questions were less involved and to economize time he suggested that these matters might be tackled at once. ...

President W.Wilson: The world's unrest arose from the unsettled condition of Europe, not from the state of affairs in the

East, or in the Colonies, and the postponement of these questions would only increase the pressure on the Delegates of the Peace Conference. He would therefore prefer... to hasten a solution of European questions. ...

G.Clemenceau: He understood Mr.D.Lloyd George to propose giving precedence to Oriental and Colonial questions, while President Wilson preferred to begin with European ones.

D.Lloyd George: Entirely agreed with the President, ...and he had only suggested dealing with the East and with the Colonies in order to save time while the various delegations were preparing their case. ...

G.Clemenceau: A date [would]be fixed by which all Delegations should be required to state their cases in writing.

It was decided that the Secretary General should ask all Delegations representing Powers with Territorial claims to send to the Secretariat their written statements within 10 days. ...

12. A resolution [was adopted] ...concerning the international regulation of Ports, Water-ways & railways. ...

13. Financial Questions. ...

S.Sonnino: The questions of Public Debts and paper money were especially difficult.

W.Wilson: [Could] these problems be isolated from territorial problems?

A.Balfour: ...Some general principles of financial obligation should be laid down.

W.Wilson: These questions varied so much that their settlement should not be subjected to any general rule.

S.Sonnino: ...A common principle could be found, ...to what extent were new States responsible for the debts of the older States they replaced. ...

D.Lloyd George: [These questions related to] the Turkish Empire, large part of which would be parcelled out. What part, if any, of the Ottoman debt must be taken over with each portion? Who the Mandatories would be was not yet settled, but what their relations would be to the monetary obligations of the Turkish Empire was a difficult problem. Would they, for instance, be compelled to take over the debt at par or at the present value? Was Palestine to bear a share of the burden, and Syria, the Armenians and the peoples of the Caucasus?

W.Wilson: suggested that these problems be drafted in the form of resolutions on which the representatives could take action.

S.Sonnino: ...An expert committee would be [appointed] to frame these questions in appropriate terms.

It was decided that the Great Powers should appoint a Committee of five, ...to set in order the financial questions requiring solution.

14. Claims for Reparations.

D.Lloyd George: One of the problems requiring solution was whether claims for reparation should take precedence of the national debt in the enemy countries. It was agreed that this... should be referred to the committee above mentioned."

№ 52 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, made by its secretary

Paris, January 27, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/18; Paris, vol.III, p.729-737

..." A.Balfour: wished to know whether those elements of old Russia which he hoped would succeed in forming separate States such as Estonia, Georgia, possibly Russian Armenia and Daghestan, were invited to the meeting on Prince's Islands.

It was decided that all such elements... were invited to attend. ...

D.Lloyd George: Were we going to discuss the whole question of the Colonies or only some portion?

President W.Wilson: The case as a whole interested many Powers. ...There would be a number of partial discussions followed by a general discussions. ...

A.Balfour: Underlying the whole discussion was the question of the mandatory principle. When this was to be discussed?

W.Wilson: ...A decision [should be] reached as to whether the mandatory principle should, or should not, apply in [one] area. The discussion might then move to another quarter and investigate whether or not the principle was applicable there." ...

№ 53 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, made by its secretary

Paris, January 27, 1919, 15:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/19; Paris, vol.III, p.738-748

..."President W.Wilson: The basis of this idea [i.e. trustship

by the League of Nations through the appointment of mandatories] was [aimed] against further annexation. ...We [should develop] the country for the benefit of those already in it. ...It was not intended to exploit any people; it was not intended to exercise arbitrary sovereignty over any people. ...

Further, where people and territories were undeveloped, to assure their development so that, when the time came, their own interests, as they saw them, might qualify them to express a wish as to their ultimate relations - perhaps lead them to desire their union with the mandatory power. ...

The League of Nations would lay down certain general principles in the mandate, namely, 1) that districts be administered primarily with a view to the betterment of the conditions of the inhabitants. 2) That there should be no discrimination against the members of the League of Nations, so as to restrict economic access to the resources of the district. The expense of its administration would be met by fiscal arrangements, which if they involved customs duties, would be the same for all nations; ...all countries would pay the same duties, all would have the same right of access. ...

Preference... would be excluded, ...but, with the elimination of that exception, there would be no administrative difference between his scheme and annexation. It was in the mind of many people that the mandatory power might be subject to... constant interference by the League of Nations. ...In so far as the administration by the mandatory power became a financial burden, it was clearly proper that the League of Nations should bear a proportion of the expense. ...If successful administration by a mandatory should lead to union with the mandatory, [I] would be the last to object. ...The only difficulty which might arise would be that associated with the dangers of aggression. ...

W.Hughes: ...Was it proposed to appoint mandatories to the New States to be created in Europe? ...There was nothing to be gained by the mandatory system that could not be got by direct Government, except that the World said to dread annexations.

D.Lloyd George: ...[President Wilson] saw a practical difficulty... as regards the expenditure of money. Colonies, as far as Great Britain was concerned, did not mean a division of spoils, but rather the incurring of expenditure. ...The same consideration would present itself were the mandatory system applied to Meso-

potamia, Syria and other parts of the Turkish Empire. Whoever took Mesopotamia would have to spend enormous sums of money for works which would only be profit to future generations. It might pay in the future, but who was to pay at present? Was the League of Nations to pay? ...It would be necessary to have a levy from all members of the League... in order to make good the annual deficit. ...

President W.Wilson: ...Great Britain had carried the burden of their [Colonies'] development up to the point where they were prepared for independence and self-Government. They were then admitted to a little family of nations. It was just the burden which he wanted the League of Nations to take up. ...Undoubtedly, the obligation of defending the territory would rest upon the mandatory, but part of the expense of the defence, if too heavy, would be borne by the League of Nations." ...

№ 54 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten,
made by its secretary

Paris, January 28, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/20; Paris, vol.III, p.749-757

"Mandatory System: (a) Attitude of the British Empire.

D.Lloyd George: ...In so far as the territories conquered by troops from the United Kingdom (in distinction from those conquered by Dominion troops) were concerned he saw no insuperable difficulty in reconciling the views of Great Britain with those expressed by President Wilson. There certainly were practical difficulties, but there were always practical difficulties in attempting to realize any ideal. ...

[The Dominions stress the contiguity of the territories they claim.] Another point he would like to put to the Allied Powers, including France, was that there was no large difference between the mandatory principle and the principles laid down by the Berlin Conference, under which Great Britain, France and Germany held many of their colonies. This Conference had framed conditions about the open door, the prohibition of the arms and liquor traffic, which resembled those President Wilson had in view in many respects, except that no external machinery had been provided for their enforcement. It followed, therefore, that by adopting the mandatory principle wherever possible Great Britain would not be altering Colonial regime to any appreciable extent.

He would be very glad to hear the French view. ...

S.Pichon: He thought there would be no differences between France and Great Britain.

G.Clemenceau: There were certain Franco-British conventions relating to the Germany colonies. ...He asked whether these conventions should be produced before the Council.

D.Lloyd George: Any arrangements made during the war should be placed before the meeting. ...

V.Orlando: Italy also has a convention with France and Great Britain. ...

S.Pichon: asked if V.Orlando referred to the Pact of London.*

V.Orlando: replied in the affirmative.

President W.Wilson: If drafts were submitted to the Council, no sense of finality should be attached to them.

D.Lloyd George: *entirely agreed*.Any proposal submitted should be provisional.

W.Massey: ...The Congress of Vienna... had been gathered in order to frame universal peace. The results of its labours had been a failure. He hoped that this Congress would not end in the same way. ...No individual would put the same energy into a leasehold as into a freehold. It would be the same with governments. ...Financial burdens [of my country] during this war were very heavy. ...It had [sent volunteers] willingly and... had incurred 100 millions of debt. The financial value of [its territorial demand] was a mere trifle in comparison. ...[If the colonists would be given charge of the vast territories in North America as mandatories of the League of Nations,] the United States would not have grown into one of the greatest Powers of the World." ...

* An agreement between France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy, signed on April 26, 1915. See: Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers. LI Command Papers, 4th series 1915-1958, Cmd.671, Miscellaneous № 7. Lnd., HMSO, 1920.

№ 55 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten,
made by its secretary

Paris, January 28, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/21; Paris, vol.III, p.758-771

"G.Clemenceau: He would ask M. H.Simon, the French Minister for the Colonies, to submit the French case. ...

H.Simon: ...He could not favour the system of a mandate to be given to one power by the League of Nations. The system still remained to be considered - that of annexation, pure and simple, which he had to come to support that day. ...The French formally [adopted] the "Open Door" system, without differential tariffs. Everybody would be able to enter and to trade... without let or hindrance. France accepted... the stoppage of traffic of arms... [and] that the natives should take part in the management of their own territory. ...[Our country] had spent 9 milliards of francs on the Mediterranean coast. ...

The Principle of mandatories.

D.Lloyd George: It would be better in the first place to come to a decision on the general principle. ...Were annexations to be permitted? Or was some other method to be adopted?

W.Wilson: *The discussion so far had been, in essence, a negation in detail... of the whole principle of mandatories.* The discussion had been brought to a point where it looked as if their roads diverged. It would be wise to discontinue this discussion... say until the next day, as he feared it might lead to a point where it would otherwise appear as though they had reached a serious disagreement, and this he particularly wished to avoid.

A.Balfour: ...British Delegates did not reject the idea of a Mandatory Power. ...[As far as] the greater part of the areas conquered by British arms and managed from London were concerned, they regarded that idea with favour. ...He was strongly in favour of the principle. But he was conscious that it had not been worked out. ...Any decision come to now would be premature. As regards the general principle, however, the British Empire favoured it. Moreover, the delegates of the United Kingdom were prepared... to accept the idea [for the areas which fell to them]. He only spoke for himself. He had not consulted the Prime Minister.

D.Lloyd George: He had some discussion... with the representatives of the British Colonial Department, who raised no difficulties. They thought the difficulties were more imaginary than real. He had been greatly struck by the fact that M. H.Simon... had... appeared to be bitterly opposed to the whole idea, but... he had detailed as acceptable... the whole list of conditions proposed for a mandatory, except the mane. ...He himself could not stay here indefinitely, therefore he would ask his colleagues... to come

to a decision. ...Until the principle had been adopted no conclusion on the details could be come to.

W.Wilson: agreed with Mr. A.Balfour that there were many points to be cleared up. In the first place, the composition of the League of Nations... had left the lead to the Great Powers. ...He wished that he could agree with Mr. D.Lloyd George that there was no great difference between the mandatory system and M. H.Simon's plan. The former assumed trusteeship on the part of the League of Nations; the latter implied definite sovereignty. ...The two ideas were radically different and he was bound to assume that the French Colonial office could not see its way to accept the idea of the mandatory.

[Australia, Japan, France] claimed sovereignty over [the Colonies]. The Imperial British Government... appeared to be the only exception to the rejection of the idea of trusteeship on the part of the League of Nations. ...It was unfortunate that the United States... held none of the territories in dispute. [However, he did not wish] to have a greatly increased navy and maintain a large standing army. ...The people of the world would not permit the parcelling out among the Great Powers of the helpless countries conquered from Germany. ...He desired the acceptance of the genuine idea of trusteeship. ...

R.Borden: He understood that the five Great Powers would form a Council controlling the work of the League. Therefore the difference between making the decision now or leaving it to the Council of the League of Nations was not great. He would, therefore, ask whether President Wilson would take that suggestion into consideration.

W.Wilson: He had himself, informally, made that suggestion.

V.Orlando: As regards Colonial questions, the Italian point of view was extremely simple. Italy would readily accept whatever principles might be adopted. ...He did not wish to make the slightest allusion to article 13 of the pact of London [signed in 1915], because... its principles were so just that they would be applied as a matter of course. ...He fully understood Mr.Lloyd George's contention that an adjournment would not of itself lead to a solution of the difficulty, whilst an indefinite adjournment would naturally be a confession of impotence. But President Wilson had proposed that a short adjournment should take place in order that the delegates might... consider... the practical aspect

of the question. ...

G.Clemenceau: The French Colonial office had expressed its views, but it did not mean that he himself was not ready to make concessions. ...All his sentiments were in agreement with those of President Wilson. ...The League of Nations, he thought, was to be a League of Defence to ensure the peace of the world. ...The idea of an unknown mandatory acting through an undetermined tribunal gave him some anxiety. ...

However, since Mr.Lloyd George was prepared to accept the mandate of a League of Nations he would not dissent from the general agreement, [too]. ...He would at once take up the question of a League for the preservation of peace. He greatly favoured such a League, and he was prepared to make all sacrifices to attain that object. ...If the nations pledged themselves not to attack any one without the consent of the members of the League, and to defend any one of them who might be attacked, the peace of the world would be assured. ...Such an alliance might well be termed a League of Nations. Such procedures, and tribunals, as might be thought necessary could be added. He would accept all these. ...

D.Lloyd George: He agreed with M. Clemenceau. ... [Although] he regarded the system merely as a general trusteeship upon defined conditions. ...He trusted the President Wilson would not insist on postponing the selection of mandatories until after the League of Nations had been established. ...As long as all these questions were unsettled, everything would be unsettled. ...Great Britain now occupied territories where they had no intention of remaining even if the League of Nations asked them to stay. For instance British troops occupied Russian Armenia and Syria. They did not wish to be there, but some one had got to be there. Was Great Britain to be compelled to keep its troops there until the League of Nations was a going concern? ...They were now maintaining... over 170,000 British troops alone in Syria, Caucasus... and other out-of-the-way places. These troops must sooner or later be withdrawn, but they could not do that without knowing who would take their place. They could not withdraw and leave the people to massacre each other. They would be compelled to hand the country to some one. Therefore, he would leave the settlement to this tribunal, and an early solution was urgently needed. ...He asked whether he had correctly interpreted M. Clemenceau's views

to the effect that he was prepared to accept trusteeship.

G.Clemenceau: Although he did not approve of it, he would be guided by the judgment of his colleagues. ...

W.Wilson: It was the determination of the pressing European questions which was all-important. They could address themselves to the solution of those European questions while waiting for a solution of the Colonial questions. As to what Mr. Lloyd George was so kind [to say], ...his difficulty was to prevent the assignment of mandatories, if they were to be the Great Powers, from appearing to the world as a mere distribution of the spoils.

...N.Makino: enquired whether the principle of a mandatory had been accepted.

G.Clemenceau: *Negative*, the question had merely been adjourned."

№ 56 Draft Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories,
by D.Lloyd George

Paris, January 29, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/24/App. Draft Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories; Paris, vol.III, p.795-796

"1. ...The Allied and Associated powers are agreed that in no circumstances should any of the German Colonies be restored to Germany.

2. For similar reasons [of the menace to the freedom and security of all nations], and more particularly because of the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine ad Arabia must be completely severed from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that advantage should be taken of the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, to apply to those territories the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in the constitution

of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study they are satisfied that the best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsibility, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League of Nations.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers are of opinion that the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

6. They consider that certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the mandatory power.

7. They further consider that other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory subject to conditions which will guarantee the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the military training of the natives for other than police purposes, and the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the League of Nations.

8. Finally they consider that there are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the Islands in the South Pacific, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the mandatory State, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the mandatory State as integral portions thereof, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the mandatory State shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge."

№ 57 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten,
made by its secretary

Paris, January 30, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/24; Paris, vol.III, p.785-796

"1. Resolution regarding the application of the mandatory system. ...

D.Lloyd George: He had circulated a document... to each of the representatives of the Great Powers. ...Great Britain had deliberately decided to accept the principle of a mandatory; ...the Dominions, however, were prepared to accept the conclusions reached in the document as a compromise, because they fully realized that there could be no greater catastrophe than for the delegates to separate without having come to a definite decision. It had been decided to accept the doctrine of a mandatory for all conquests in the late Turkish Empire. ...

But three classes of mandates would have to be recognized, namely: -

Firstly: Mandates applicable to countries where the population was civilized but not yet organized - where a century might elapse before the people could be properly organized. ...In such cases it would be impossible to give full self-government and at the same time prevent the various tribes or units from fighting each other. It was obvious that the system to be applied to these territories must be different from that which would have to be applied to cannibal colonies, where people were eating each other.

Secondly: Mandates applicable to tropical Colonies situated a long way from the country of the possible mandatory. ...In these Colonies the full principle of a mandatory would be applied, including the "open door."

Thirdly: Mandates applicable to countries which formed almost a part of the organization of an adjoining power, who would have to be appointed the mandatory.

He wished to emphasize the fact that the memorandum was intended to deal only with those parts of the Turkish Empire... which had actually been conquered. Districts such as Smyrna, Adalia, the North of Anatolia were purposely excluded. Such territories would have to be considered separately on their merits.

W.Hughes: ...Australia desired direct control. But, Australia fully recognized that... the fate of humanity was at stake, and,

therefore, he did not feel justified in opposing the views of president Wilson and those of Mr. Lloyd George. ...His colleagues were to meet for [considering all details] that afternoon and he felt compelled, therefore, to withhold his assent until they had communicated their decision. ...

2. W.Wilson: Each morning in the Paris press, printed in English, appeared a great deal more information regarding the meetings that was given in the official communiqués. He referred especially to the comments on President Wilson's idealistic views. ...If these articles continued to appear, he would find himself compelled to publish his own views. ...[We] had been extremely scrupulous that nothing should come from them that implied that there were divergences of views. ...If these articles continued to appear a public discussion would become inevitable, and such a public discussion would be fatal at this juncture. ...The time might come when he would be compelled against his own wishes to make a full public exposé of his views. ...

[The document circulated by the Prime Minister of Great Britain] brought them to within an easy stage of final agreement. On the other hand he did not think they could have a final decision immediately. ...So far these were merely the exchange of general views in an attempt to arrive at a decision. ...Mr. Lloyd George was disturbed with regard to the number of troops which had to be maintained in different parts of the world - troops which could not be withdrawn until Peace was signed. Even if an understanding could be reached with another country to replace these troops, the world would ask "Are you exchanging territories before peace is made?" For instance, it had been suggested that America should act as a mandatory. The people of America would be most disinclined to do so. He himself had succeeded in getting the people of America to do many things, and he might succeed in getting them to accept this burden also. But even if it was suggested that American troops should occupy Constantinople, or Mesopotamia, it was evident that they could not do so as they were not at war with Turkey. Therefore, it would, in his opinion, be extremely unwise to accept any form of mandate until they knew how it was intended to work. ...

The mandatory system [designed]... to care for, protect and develop the people for whom it was intended. Consequently to hand over distinguishable people to a mandatory in perpetuity

[without having their opinion] would be contrary to the principles of that Conference and contrary to the principles of self-determination accepted by it. ...Whilst accepting the paper of Mr. Lloyd George as a precursor of agreement, it did not constitute a rock foundation. ...The whole idea on which this principle dependent should be put forward. ...And to make the document presented by Mr. Lloyd George valid, they were bound to complete a preliminary peace. He thought that could be done in a few weeks. ... They could then arrive at a conclusion [on the new frontiers to be created in Europe] quickly, ...and the League of Nations would thereby be established. ...

D.Lloyd George: Should this attitude be taken about each question, no agreement would ever be reached, ...[and] the result would be disastrous. ...It was only with the greatest difficulty that the representatives of the Dominions had been prevailed upon to accept the draft submitted. ...These gentlemen were not enamoured of the mandatory system. ...They had accepted his proposals, but only as a compromise. ...He begged them to accept it as such and to get to business. ...He was only pleading for immediate peace. ...At the present moment the British Empire was maintaining 1,084,000 troops, including 300,000 British troops, in the Turkish Empire alone, and the settlement of that part of the world was, therefore, important. ...if the delegates continued to adjourn questions, because they were not as important as others, no final decision would ever be reached. ...

W.Wilson: He had said nothing which need justify discouragement. He was willing to accept Mr. Lloyd George's proposals, subject to reconsideration [later]. ...He did not wish to delay any decision and he was ready to accept any provisional arrangement. ...He would urge his colleagues to press on the drafting of the League of Nations.

D.Lloyd George: enquired whether the actual constitution itself of the League of Nations would have to be settled before... the delegates could discuss the Italian, French or Polish question.

W.Wilson: Negative, in the future only definite propositions should be discussed and meanwhile the drafting of the constitution of the League of Nations should be pressed forward. ...He expressed his readiness to accept as provisional arrangement the resolutions proposed by Mr. Lloyd George.

4. Temporary mandates.

V.Orlando: ...If Mr. Lloyd George's resolutions were accepted it would mean that all territories of... Turkey... would be reserved to the League of Nations. He thought that was agreed. The League of Nations would administer these territories through mandatories. ...[meanwhile] temporary mandatories would be established, subject to further changes. Was that agreed or was the status quo to be maintained, namely, a military occupation in virtue of the armistice, by troops (chiefly British)? ...He would ask ...that Italy obtain its share of mandates or territories to be military occupied. ...

N.Makino: Expressed his satisfaction that a provisional agreement had been reached on the question of mandatories. As regards the League of Nations, ...his Government was quite ready to associate itself with the work of this very important organization. Frankly, ...his Government was not quite certain how it would work. ...

W.Hughes: The world looked to them for decision.

R.Borden: ...He would beg them... not to impose too heavy a burden on [the organization] in the first instance. ...The world was looking to the proceedings of the Conference and might become tired in face of delay.

W.Wilson: ...He suggested that further discussion of the question should be postponed until the afternoon meeting." ...

№ 58 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten,
made by its secretary

Paris, January 31, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/25; Paris, vol.III, p.797-817

"W.Massey: ...He supported the proposal of a League of Nations. He... believed it would do much to prevent war in future. ... He believed that if war was not to be renewed in the near future - from 25 to 50 years hence, - ...they had not only to see that justice was given... to those who had suffered in this war, ...but to those who had broken the laws of civilisation during the last 4½ years. ...And he was prepared to shoulder that responsibility. ...

L.Botha: It was only... through the influence of Mr.Lloyd George that the resolution [of January 29] had been handed in that morning. ...He supported Mr.Lloyd George but he sincerely trusted that president Wilson would also agree. ..He knew that...

the League of Nations would consist mostly of the same people who were present [here], ...and who would not make it impossible for any mandatory to govern the country. That was why he said he would accept it. ...

D.Lloyd George: He would like to suggest that they take [his resolution] as a provisional decision subject to revision. ...

V.Orlando: He had come to the conclusion that the solution was to give provisional mandates. If that were so, he asked whether those mandates would be distributed by a further resolution of the conference.

D.Lloyd George: [My] resolution did not deal with the distribution of mandates at all, but only laid down the general principles.

G.Clemenceau: said that was accepted. ...

W.Wilson: He had a suggestion to offer. The maintenance of the status quo involved the difficulties which the Prime Minister of Great Britain had pointed out about the maintenance of large forces of troops. It ought to be possible by agreement among the Allies. He said that because the United States could not participate at present, as they had not declared war against Turkey. By agreement with the Allies, the military control of those several parts of the Turkish Empire could be arranged as they pleased by substitution. Would not that be better than going through the difficult form of provisional mandate?

G.Clemenceau: thought that they were to discuss M. V. Orlando's proposal. His proposal was that as France, England and her Dominions had had their share, Italy wanted to have her own share. That was what he understood.

D.Lloyd George: The problem put by M. V.Orlando was one that they would have to face. He said, either they could leave... the mandatories to be settled by the League of Nations, and the occupation go on exactly as at the present moment - or they could have a provisional mandate, leaving the definite final thing to be settled by the League of Nations; or they could now say they were the League of Nations and settle the business finally. ... Frankly, he would rather face [these points] at once, ...*they might not then be able to have the advantage of the presence of the President of the United States at the League of Nations.*

They could not accept the status quo. ...Coming to the Turkish Empire, ...they had 1,084,000 men there. It was true that

only between 250,000 and 300,000 were British troops, but they had to maintain the lot, and it was an enormous expense. The difficulty was to keep all this various tribes in some sort of peace with each other. If they kept them there until they had made peace with Turkey and until the League of Nations had been constituted and had started business, and until it was able to dispose of this question, the expense would be something enormous, and they really could not face it especially as they had not the slightest intention of being mandatories of a considerable number of territories they now occupied, such as Syria and parts of Armenia. He thought the same thing applied... to the Caucasus [too], although they had rich oil-wells.

He did not think that they had the slightest intention of being mandatories even for the oil-wells of Baku, but somebody had to be there to protect the Armenians and to keep the tribes and sects in Lebanon from cutting each other's throats and attacking the French or Turks, or whoever also might be there. ...He was afraid... that Parliament would want to know: - Why should they keep 1,084,000 men there? Did they really mean to occupy the country? ...Unless the Conference was prepared to relieve them of that responsibility, he would really have to press very hard for a definite appointment of the mandatories, which he should have thought was the most satisfactory way of dealing with it.

As to remarks made by President W.Wilson in regard to Turkey, Mr. D.Lloyd George did not think that was a conclusive reason. Matters could easily be arranged with Turkey. It would not be regarded as a hostile act by the Turk. He knew he was not going to Armenia and Syria, and he also knew that that was going to be taken away from him, and the Turk would not object to the United States going there instead of the British; in fact, he might object much less, for the reason that the United States had not been fighting him for the last four or five years, whereas the British had.

W.Wilson: ...Many of these mandates would constitute a burden - by no means a privilege - and a very serious burden, but while he should not be disinclined to see the United States get any advantage out of this war, he should be equally disinclined to see her shirk any burden or duty. But he could think of nothing the people of the United States would be less inclined to accept

than military responsibility in Asia. If the United States of America, therefore was to be asked to share a burden of mandates, the request would have to be postponed until he could explain the whole matter to them, and try to bring them to the point of view which he desired them to assume. ...The question in the meantime was chiefly a military question, and he wished to suggest that the military advisers of the Supreme War Council should have this question of the military occupation and control of these various regions referred to them for recommendation to that Council as to the distribution of the burden, so that they should have something definite for the military authorities to consider.

There was no objection to this.

D.Lloyd George: This would clarify the question. ...

G.Clemenceau: Everything dependent on the situation in Russia. The French had troops in the East, the British had troops in the Caucasus, the French had troops in Odessa, as also had the British and the Italians. As long as they did not know exactly what they would do with Russia, he doubted if they could do anything at all. It was very difficult to recall troops.

W.Wilson: It was a question of redistribution and substitution.

D.Lloyd George: Supposing the British agreed to withdraw from Syria altogether, he would like to know the attitude of the military authorities. This was a point put to him by Mr. A.Balfour.

W.Wilson: Or from Mesopotamia.

D.Lloyd George: ...[We] had troops in Persia [too.]" ...

W.Wilson: And let's pass to Poland. ...

G.Clemenceau: "President W.Wilson had proposed that they should begin to deal with territorial questions. ...Now they had come to Europe. ...If it was suggested that they should leave out the Colonial questions, ...if they did not courageously deal with the European questions, what else was there for them to do? ...

D.Lloyd George: He had not the slightest objection to Rumania.

W.Wilson: He wanted to hear the full Rumanian case.

D.Lloyd George drew attention to a paragraph which had appeared in the "Daily Mail,"* published that morning. ...One might have thought that there was a battle going on between them. President W.Wilson had called his attention to it that mor-

ning. ...He thought the language of the President had been very restrained and very moderate. ...He did not see how that Conference could be conducted at all. ...

W.Wilson: They should say that they had arrived at a satisfactory provisional arrangement with regard to dealing with... Turkish territory outside Europe. Then they should say... that the military advisers of the Supreme War Council should make a report to the Conference as to the best and most advisable disposition of troops to take care of the Turkish territories that are now outside Europe and were now being occupied.

This was agreed to.

D.Lloyd George read the draft terms of reference to the Supreme War Council on the Turkish question:- "The Military Representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers at Versailles are directed to meet at once and to present a report as to the most equitable and economic distribution among these Powers of the burden of supplying military forces for the purpose of maintaining order in the Turkish Empire,** pending the decisions of the Peace Conference concerning the Government of the Turkish territory."

* "Daily Mail," Lnd., 31.01.1919.

** On February 1, 1919, "Trans-Caucasia" was also inserted in the text.

№ 59 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten,
made by its secretary

Paris, February 1, 1919, 15:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/27; Paris, vol.III, p.835-855

"3. Allied troops of occupation in Turkish territory and Transcaucasia.

G.Clemenceau read the reply received from the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council, Versailles, with reference to the resolution passed... on the 30th January, 1919, on the subject of the proper distribution of the Allied Military forces required for the maintenance of order in the Turkish Empire and in Transcaucasia:

"The Military Representatives consider it necessary for them to be further advised on the three following subjects:

1. *The territories to be occupied* in view of the fact that certain parts of the Ottoman Empire are not at the present time

occupied.

2. The total number of troops required to maintain order in these territories as estimated by the local military commanders.

3. Whether a joint occupation of these territories is intended, or whether definite zones are to be attributed to the interested Powers, who would be designated by the Great Powers."

G.Clemenceau: The Conference had put certain definite questions to the Military Representatives, who had merely asked the same questions in reply.

D.Lloyd George: It was the duty of the Military Representatives to reply to the questions set to them. ...

W.Wilson: The answer to the last question would be that... there would be no joint occupation.

After some further discussion, it was agreed to transmit the following reply to the Military Representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles through the secretaries:

"1. *The Conference does not contemplate a joint occupation of any territories.*

2. *The Conference did not contemplate the military occupation of any territories other than those already occupied, unless the Military Representatives think that the occupation of additional territory is desirable.*

3. The Military Representatives should themselves obtain and *submit estimates regarding the number of troops required for the maintenance of order in the occupied territories.*

4. The Minutes of the Meeting of the 30th January, 1919, relating to the question under reference, shall be supplied to the Military representatives of the Supreme War Council at Versailles."

№ 60 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten,
made by its secretary

Paris, February 4, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/29; Paris, vol.III, p.867-875

"E.Venizelos: ...What regions should... be submitted to Turkish sovereignty? A broad and generous interpretation must be given to the principles contained in President W.Wilson's 12th Article [of his "14 Points"], if Turkey was to retain as large a territory as possible, whilst admitting the grant of autonomy to all suppressed nationalities. Unless this procedure were followed, it

would, for instance, be impossible to solve the Armenian question and so put a stop to the sufferings of those people, who had lost through massacres over one million people during the course of the war. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, a wide latitude of action was admissible, because Turkey had signed the Armistice without conditions. Again when the Emperor of Austria had announced on the 7th of October, 1918, his willingness to apply the autonomous principle to the various parts of his Empire, President W.Wilson has replied that he was no more free to accept simply the autonomy of those peoples as a basis of peace and he insisted that it was they, and not he, who ought to judge what action on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government would give satisfaction to their aspirations and to their conception of their rights and their future as members of the League of Nations. The same principle must obviously be applied to the Ottoman Empire. ...He would explicitly state that... no territory previously belonging to Turkey could remain a part of the future Ottoman Empire unless it contained an absolute majority of Turks. ...

In a reply to an enquiry which had been addressed to him by President W.Wilson he explained that Trebizond, containing a population of 360,000 Greeks, had claimed to be formed into a small Republic. He did not favour this proposal as he thought it would be very undesirable to create a large number of small States, especially as the country surrounding the town comprised a very large number of Turks. In his opinion the vilayet of Trebizond should form part of the State of Armenia.

Armenia.

D.Lloyd George enquired whether M. E.Venizelos had any idea as to what should constitute the Armenian State.

E.Venizelos: ...The Armenian State should include the six Armenian vilayets, together with Russian Armenia and the vilayets of Trebizond and Adana.

D.Lloyd George enquired whether Cilicia would be included in the Armenian State.

E.Venizelos: Affirmative, Armenia would contain all the territories around Mount Ararat.

W.Wilson: The whole question was mixed up with humane considerations. The American missionaries had said that *the Turks had also treated the Turks very badly* at the time they were ill-treating the Armenians. Could you throw any light on this report?

E.Venizelos: *No Turks had been ill-treated*; but Mahomedans, such as Arabs, Kurds, etc. had certainly been persecuted, and that was quite natural. It might with justice but asked whether conditions in the interior would be rendered extremely difficult by the surrender of Western Armenia to Greece. He thought the question could be answered in the negative, for, on the South side, as well as on the North side, Anatolia would have free outlets to the sea.

[V.Orlando sustained E.Venizelos.]

It was agreed [to appoint] an expert committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, The British Empire, France and Italy. It shall be the duty of this Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits and make recommendations for a just settlement. The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned."

№ 61 minutes of the meeting № 3, session of talks № 13
of the Supreme War Council

Paris, February 10, 1919, 15:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/34; Paris, vol.III, p.945-956

"5. Occupation of Territories in the Turkish Empire and Trans-Caucasia.

G.Clemenceau: The next question to consider was the report submitted by the Military Representatives at Versailles.

Lord A.Milner: He came new to the question. There might, therefore, be arguments... which, at first sight, somewhat surprised him. As he understood the case, the reason for the reference to the Military Representatives was there was a desire to discover whether the military forces occupying the Turkish Empire were not excessive and whether they could not be reduced. In his opinion, that was quite a proper question, ...namely [on] the amount of force to occupy those territories. But not only had a most startling reduction in forces been proposed, but the report went on to specify the particular nature of the forces. It did not merely say that so many forces were required to hold Palestine, or Syria, or Trans-Caucasia, but it went on to show that the forces holding each of those places should be either British, or French, or Italian, as the case might be. In his opinion that was a big

political question and not a military one, and very large issues had thereby been raised. For instance: he thought that the suggestion that Italy should occupy the Caucasus not only implied very serious operations, but raised the question very directly on the future political problem of this country, a problem of which had not yet been before this Conference. ...It was not a question for the Supreme War Council, but for the Peace Conference. ...

W.Wilson: It was only fair to the Military Representatives to say that they had not gone further than they had been authorized to go. D.Lloyd George had expressed anxiety as to the number of forces the British Empire was compelled to keep in these territories and the Military Representatives had been asked to estimate the number of troops actually needed and to advise on an equitable distribution of the burden amongst the Allies, it being understood that this distribution would not prejudice any arrangement that the Peace Conference might subsequently make. Mr. D.Lloyd George had... expressed the hope that the United States of America would share the burden. [However,] whilst agreeing with the sentiment, he [W.Wilson] doubted his authority to order American troops into the territory of a country with which the United States was not at war. He agreed with Lord A.Milner that the recommendation made by the Military Representatives tied so closely with the possible future of these areas that it was not a matter for the Supreme Military Council but for the Peace Conference to decide. ...

Lord A.Milner: Desired to maintain his contention. ...

G.Clemenceau: The solution was a simple one. The representatives of the Great Powers need only convert themselves into a Peace Conference today. Otherwise, the question could be adjourned the following day.

It was agreed to adjourn. ...It was also decided to place... on the agenda paper of the meeting to be held on 11th February, 1919, at 3 p.m.: -

2. Occupation of territories in the Turkish Empire and Trans-Caucasia."

№ 62 telegram № 7188 from the U.S. Ambassador in France
W.G.Sharp - to the Assistant Secretary of State F.L.Polk

Paris, February 13, 1919 (received February 13)

US NA, RG 59, 600.119/2201:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II,
p.814

"[For] War Trade Board, [from V.McCormick]:

...Supreme Economic Council,* to whom the authority has been delegated by the Supreme War Council covering question [of] this character, has approved the abolition of trade restrictions with Bulgaria, Turkey, Asia Minor and ports of the Black Sea. ... Publication of this abolition of trade restrictions will be made by the Associated Governments on February 15."

* Established at W.Wilson's insistence, SEC held its meetings from February 17, 1919, till February 7, 1920. R.Cecil served as its Chairman, and V.McCormick, H.Hoover, Norman H.Davis, B.M. Baruch and E.N.Hurley entered this Council as its U.S. representing members.

№ 63 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten,
made by its secretary

Paris, February 13, 1919, 15:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/38; Paris, vol.III, p.1013-1038

"3. Syria: Statement by Dr.H.Bliss.

H.Bliss: ...My plea is this: that an Inter-Allied or a Neutral Commission, or a Mixed Commission, be sent at once to Syria in order to give an opportunity to the people of Syria - including the Lebanon - to express in a perfectly untrammelled way their political wishes and aspirations, viz: as to what form of Government they desire and as to what power, if any, should be their Mandatory Protecting Power. ...

I left Beirut on January 9th, 1919,...[and] it [was] practically impossible for the people... to express their opinion with any sort of freedom. ...[We should enquire] the desire for the erection of a State or States looking eventually to complete independence but at present seeking the guardianship of a Mandatory Power. ... There should be an absolute separation between religion and the State [there].

S.Pichon: Whether Dr.H.Bliss' proposal applied to all the population, who had been living under Ottoman rule in the Ottoman Empire - in Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia and Armenia,

or did these proposals apply only to Syria?

H.Bliss: ...He thought his remarks should apply also to other religions and to other populations.

A.Balfour enquired from H.Bliss: whether he would apply his system without qualification to Armenia also, although the Armenians were in a minority as compared with the Mussulmen, so that self-determination would probably not lead to an improvement in the conditions of the Armenian minority. ...

H.Bliss: The Committee should not merely be a machine, adopting the same method everywhere. ...[It] must... develop some method which would do the largest justice to the various people concerned. But he wished to make his point perfectly clear that he merely spoke for Syria, because he lived there and knew what had been done there. On the other hand, he thought that the proposal should apply to all liberated areas.

A.Balfour: ...He gathered that the authorities had hampered the free communication of the wishes of the population to the statesmen assembled [here.]

H.Bliss: ...Numerous restrictions [were] imposed by the Military Authorities.

Lord A.Milner: ...Were [the local] views being suppressed because they might be unpleasant to the British?

H.Bliss: Those who lived in Syria would gladly accept a mandatory Power, ...whether French, American or British. [If] the promise held out to the people to express themselves had been [not] fulfilled, the probable outcome would be discontent, sullenness, resentment and even bloodshed.

A.Balfour: Anybody reading the evidence given by Dr.H. Bliss would suppose that the British censorship had been exercised to prevent opinions unfavourable to Great Britain being expressed. If this was a correct interpretation, ...an enquiry should be held. ...

A.Milner: A matter of national honour was involved. The impression left in his mind was that the British censorship was being used to suppress the expression of pro-French or other non-British sympathies.

H.Bliss: Negative. The censorship was being used to suppress the expression of all opinions.

A.Milner agreed." ...

№ 64 minutes of the session of talks № 14,
Supreme War Council of Allies

Paris, February 14, 1919, 18:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03101/39; Paris, vol.III, p.1039-1044

"A.Balfour: He was sorry to be responsible for calling together a meeting at that unusual hour. He had, however, two urgent matters to put before the Council which he thought required solution before President W.Wilson's departure. ...

2. Meeting of the Russian representatives at Prinkipo.

W.Churchill: On the previous day there had been a cabinet Meeting in London, at which great anxiety had been manifested concerning the Russian situation, particularly in respect to the policy of the Prinkipo* meeting. ...Great Britain had soldiers in Russia who were being killed in action. Their families wished to know what purpose these men were serving. Were they just marking time until the Allies had decided on policy, or were they fighting in a campaign representing some common aim? The longer the delay continued, the worse would be the situation of the troops on all the Russian fronts. The Russian elements in those forces were deteriorating rapidly because of the uncertainty of the support they might expect from the victorious Allies. ...

W.Wilson: He felt that he should express what his personal thoughts on the subject were. ...He had a very clear opinion about two points. The first was that the troops of the Allied and Associated Powers were doing no sort of good in Russia. They did not know for whom or for what they were fighting. They were not assisting... to establish order throughout Russia. ...His conclusion, therefore, was that the Allied and Associated Powers ought to withdraw their troop [from all parts of Russian territory]. ...

The second related to Prinkipo. ...In their reply [to our invitation] the Bolsheviks offered a number of things which had not been asked for, such as repayments of debts, concessions and territorial compensations. This answer was not only uncalled for, but might be thought insulting. ...If the other Russian governments would not come to Prinkipo, to meet the Allies, why should the Allies not imitate Mahomet, and go to them? What we were seeking was not a rapprochement with the Bolsheviks, but clear information. ...

W.Churchill: Complete withdrawal of all Allied troops was a logical and clear policy, but its consequence would be the des-

truction of all non-Bolshevik armies in Russia. These numbered at the present time about 500,000 men and though their quality was not of the best, their numbers were nevertheless increasing. [If we quit], there would be no further armed resistance to the Bolsheviks in Russia, and an interminable vista of violence and misery was all that remained for the whole of Russia.

W.Wilson: The existing forces of the Allies could not stop the Bolsheviks, and not one of the Allies was prepared to reinforce its troops.

G.Sonnino: Whether the Allies might not continue to supply arms to the non-Bolshevik elements?

W.Wilson: They made very little use of them when they had them.

W.Churchill agreed that none of the Allies could send conscript troops to Russia. He thought, however, that volunteers, technical experts, arms, munitions, tanks, aeroplanes, etc. might be furnished.

W.Wilson: [We should] know what use would be made of these forces and supplies. In some areas they would certainly be assisting reactionaries. ...Conscripts could not be sent and volunteers probably could not be obtained. ...The United States had in Russia insufficient forces, but it was not possible to increase them.

W.Churchill: He would like to know whether the Council would approve of arming the Anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia should the Prinkipo Conference prove a failure.

W.Wilson: He hesitated to express any definite opinion on this question. He had explained to the Council how he would act if alone. He would, however, cast in his lot with the rest."

* The biggest of the Princes' Islands in the Sea of Marmora, 2,3 km south-east of Constantinople. Was used as a place of exile for Byzantine royalty and notables.

№ 65 minutes № 3 of the Plenary session of the preliminary Peace Conference - submission of the report prepared by the Commission on the League of Nations, concerning its work

Paris, February 14, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.0201/3; Paris, vol.III, p.208-239

"Rustem Haidar [concerning Article 19 of the draft Covenant]: Regarding nationalities which till now have been under the domination of the Turks. ...The word "Mandate" what does it

mean? ...[We] intend to remain free to choose the Power whose advice [we] will ask. A secret agreement to dispose of these nations had been prepared about which they have not been consulted. ...I express the wish that this agreement should of full right be pronounced null and void." ...

№ 66 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, February 18, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/15; Paris, vol.XI, p.49-53

"6. ...The Commissioners agreed that if Mr.W.Westermann were asked as to the attitude of the United States in regard to the London Agreement of April 1915 and the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916, he should reply that we did not recognize either of these agreements as having any bearing upon the final settlement ... in the Near East. In fact, the United States intends to completely ignore these agreements in the discussion of these problems unless by chance, they happen to contain certain provisions we consider to be just and proper, in accordance with our declared principles."

№ 67 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, February 21, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/18; Paris, vol.XI, p.63-66

"10. It was decided... that Admiral M.Bristol should not be given credentials which would put him in control of the work of all American agencies in Constantinople.

R.Lansing: We were not at war with Turkey and we should not therefore have a military or naval official as our chief representative."

№ 68 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, February 26, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/22; Paris, vol.XI, p.76-79

"5. Mr.H.Hoover [reported that] there was also a difficulty in shipments to Armenia.

R.Lansing: The Congressional act especially mentioned Armenian relief and therefore contracts could be created without

danger."

№ 69 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace

Paris, March 6, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/29; Paris, vol.XI, p.97-99

"9. Memorandum № 141 was read regarding the sending of a field mission to Turkey. Mr.L.Dominian's letter in the premises was read in full. The Commissioners felt that proposed mission was very numerous and that the estimated expenses rather too great. They are not quite clear as to why such a large mission should be sent, and what the particular interest of the United States was in obtaining any more than political information for so large a tract of Asia Minor, Syria, the Caucasus, etc. They therefore ask that Dr.I.Bowman be requested to attend the meeting of the Commissioners tomorrow, March 7th, 1919, in order to explain in detail the purpose of the mission and the necessity for having so large a personnel."

№ 70 letter from the director of the American Food Administration
H.Hoover - to the Paris-resident director of the AFA in the Near
East A.C.James

Paris, March 7, 1919

National Archives of Armenia (NAA), fund 200, reg.1, file
193, pt.2, folios 336-337

"My dear Mr. [A.C.]James,

With regard to the earnest request made by the Armenian National Delegation for seed wheat required for the relief of Armenia, I understand that you agree with the idea that it is too late to bring any seed wheat from North America in time for the spring planting.

I agree entirely in your proposition, however, that clothing and other supplies now belonging to the Mission for Relief in the Near East in Constantinople be sent at once to Kuban for trading purposes in order to obtain there available seed wheat and transport same to Armenia. The Commission for Relief in the Near East has available a very much larger personnel in this district than we have, and I should think that the most practicable plans would be for you to take entire charge of this transaction.

In accordance with the suggestion contained in the cable from Messrs.[C.H.]Dodge & [C.]Vickrey to you of February 22nd, the American Relief Administration will be very glad to pay one-half of the entire cost of this operation to the Armenian Relief, and Mr.[H.C.]Heinz, Chief of the American food Mission at Constantinople, will assist the operation to the full extent of his ability.

In view of the provision of our Appropriation Act that expenditures shall be reimbursed as far as possible by the governments of the population to whom relief is furnished, it would be desirable if you could obtain from the Armenian National Delegation, and any other body representative of the Armenians, an agreement that they will ultimately pay the cost of this operation in case a government is later established and that you should also take steps to obtain such reimbursement from any government which may be subsequently established.

Yours very truly, Herbert Hoover."

№ 71 telegram from the director of the American Food Administration H.Hoover - to the director of the AFA in Constantinople H.Heinz

Paris, March 10, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 193, pt.2, f.332

"On the basis of the populations over which our resources must be divided compared to the populations served by Far Eastern Commission, they are entitled to about one five thousand ton cargo of cereals, flour, rice, beans per month. Proposed ration of one pound* per day is nearly double most nations under relief. My view is to supply one cargo per month as above beginning April first.

Please take up matter with Dr.[J.L.]Barton and if he agrees to this arrangement settle that he secures undertaking to pay by Armenian provisional government. Suggest Doctor [J.] Barton's Committee** try to secure outward goods from Armenia to U.S. to be consigned to his committee in New York for realization for their purposes. There is no hope of securing American seed in time for planting. [H.]Hoover."

* 453,59 grams.

** The Armenian Relief Committee had been established by J.Barton in September of 1915 (see his own book: Barton J.L., Story of

Near East Relief (1915-1930). NY, Macmillan, 1930, p.5-6, 12; see also: Վրացյան Ս., Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն: Եր., Հայաստան, 1993, էջ 251-254; Trask R.R., The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1971, p.9-12, 21, 30, 105, 171). It transformed into the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, with the headquarters in New York.

№ 72 telegram from the director of the American Food Administration H.Hoover - to the director of the AFA in Constantinople H.Heinz

Paris, March 10, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 193, pt.2, f.335

...“Bread.

...In view of threatened scarcity of shipping cannot spare flour for Kouban but instead am willing to join fifty-fifty with Commission for Relief Near East in sending cargo clothing and supplies which am informed Dr.[J.]Barton can forward from his stocks Constantinople to Kouban in exchange for seed wheat for Armenia. Am willing to pay half entire cost this operation to the Armenian Relief the details of shipping barter and distribution to be handled by Dr.[J.]Barton's organization but with your approval and cooperation.

In view of the provision our Appropriation Act that expenditures shall be reimbursed as far as possible by Governments to whom relief is furnished, it is desirable you obtain from Armenian national Delegation and any other body representative of Armenians an agreement that they will ultimately pay the cost of this operation when a Government is later established.

Above proposition is in line with cablegram of February 22nd to [A.C.]James from [C.H.]Dodge and [C.V.]Vickrey after consultation meets with approval of [A.C.]James.”

№ 73 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, March 13, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/33; Paris, vol.XI, p.115-119

“2. Dr.I.Bowman, Major R.Tyler and L.Dominian entered the meeting.

I.Bowman: He understood that he and his colleagues had been called into the meeting... to explain the necessity of so large a Mission to the Near East as had been proposed by Mr.L.Dominian in Memorandum № 141 of March 5th. There were many questions in the Near East which would require determination by the Peace Conference, and it was essential for us to have first hand information in the premises. Among these questions he mentioned the Armenian claims, the boundaries between Armenia and Georgia, ethnic questions etc.

R.Lansing: He was not in favour of studying the boundary questions any further at the present time, and he was not practically interested in the districts mentioned. He felt that the three great questions in the Near East which required decisions were: (1) Mandatories, (2) Syria and (3) Greek claims in Asia Minor. He felt that on these questions we would receive as much information as possible, but he understood that both Dr.J.Barton and Mr.O. Glazebrook were or would be reporting to the Commission on these matter.

In principle he was opposed to the sending of large Missions to these districts because he foresaw no benefits coming from them but that they would inevitably cause dissatisfaction among the people when it was learned that the members of the Commission were not in a position to take any authoritative action, or even to guarantee that the recommendations which they made to their Government would be followed.

I.Bowman: Whether this argument did not apply equally to the Missions which had already gone to Germany and Austro-Hungary?

R.Lansing: These objections did exist, but not to such extent.

It was decided, that the proposed Mission should be cut down to about four or five field observers who should, if possible, go under the guise of food investigators.

R.Tyler offered to submit a new project in the premises.

Dr.I.Bowman, Major R.Tyler and L.Dominian withdrew."

№ 74 letter from employee of the Standard Oil C° of New York
H.C.Cole - to the Acting Secretary of State F.L.Polk

New York, March 15, 1919 (received March 18)
US NA, RG 59, 467.11St25/32; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.250-252

"We quote below from a letter addressed to us by Ismail H. El Housseini, written from Jerusalem under date of September 14th, 1918. The writer is an Arabian gentlemen with whom we entered an agreement in May, 1914, to develop certain oil bearing properties in Jerusalem, owned jointly by him and his partner, Suleiman Bey Nassif, an Armenian:

"On or about the 30th August, 1918, I was asked by an officer belonging to the staff of the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration to open to him your offices in order to see your plans which are connected with your claims in Palestine. I declined to entertain his demand without the written consent of the representative of the American Consulate in this town and who is at present - the Spanish Consul. On the following day the same officer [Lieutenant Goodrick] handed me a written order from the General [A.W.]Money, the chief administrator of the Occupied Enemy Territories, ...to allow [him] to inspect maps. ...Accompanied by Suleiman Nassif... we opened your office and... lent him three plans containing the first 18 claims. ...These papers have since been returned."

A former employee of our Company, an American who has since visited Palestine, comments on the incident as follows: "...By every means possible British will prevent any American Petroleum Company from operating or producing in any territory which they may retain after the war. They did everything possible to find our claims in Palestine and finally when they were unsuccessful, they forced Ismail Bey to produce all the plans of the various claims, which they proceeded to copy."

In explanation of the agreement... made at Jerusalem, Palestine, on March 28, 1914, between Ismail Hakki Bey El-Husseini, Suleiman Nassif Bey, Charles Ayyub* Bey and our Company and transferred to us seven mineral prospecting licenses granted to the three first mentioned parties on February 3, 1914, and confirmed by the Imperial Department of Commerce and Agriculture on March 26, 1914. The three holders of these licenses guaranteed that they were the exclusive holders of all the mining and mineral rights granted by these licenses. The transfer of these licenses was made to... Trustees for our Company by due process before the competent Ottoman authorities. ...Eighteen claims cover properties for which our Company received mining licenses and permits direct from the Ottoman Government in 1914. The validity of all

of these licences has not been affected by our inability to develop them during the war, as we were advised by our Constantinople office on March 12, 1915, that they had arranged to protect the licences by making... to approve the extension of the terms for all permits for one year after the war.

As the plans referred to are the property of an American firm, we feel that the action of the British authorities constitutes a very grave offense and we respectfully place the matter before you for consideration.

Assuring you of our appreciation of whatever action you may take in this connection."

* Inscribed as Ayoub

№ 75 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, March 18, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/34; Paris, vol.XI, p.119-121

"3. Memorandum № 165 was read with regard to the proposed Mission to Turkey. The Commissioners felt again the personnel of the proposed Mission was too numerous, and requested that the matter be reviewed once more. They were unable to see that [certain nominees] had any of the necessary qualifications to go as field observers, but said that they would be glad to reconsider their cases if further material was furnished in the premises."

№ 76 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, March 20, 1919, 15:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/101; Paris, vol.V, p.1-14

Syria and Turkey.

"S.Pichon [addressed] to the agreement of May 1916 (Sykes-Picot)* ...and to the principles of disposition [of the French and British zones of influence] on a map.** ...[Then he] read the British-French declaration of November 9, 1918:

"The aim which France and Great Britain have in view in prosecuting in the east the war let loose by German ambition is the complete and final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations. ...

France and Great Britain have agreed to encourage and assist the establishment of native governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, already liberated by the Allies, and in the territories which they are proceeding to liberate, and they have agreed to recognise such governments as soon as they are effectively established. ...The function which the two Allied Governments claim for themselves in the liberated territories is to ensure impartial and equal justice for all; to facilitate the economic development of the country by encouraging local initiative; to promote the diffusion of education; and to put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish policy."

The President of the Council, on his visit to London in December 1918, had asked Mr.D.Lloyd George to confirm the agreement between the two countries. Mr.D.Lloyd George had replied that he saw no difficulty about the rights of France in Syria and Cilicia, but he made demands for [Mosul], ...which under the 1916 agreement, was in the French zone of influence. ... M.G.Clemenceau had, on his return to Paris, ...ordered a scheme of agreement to be prepared, with the inclusion of Mosul in the British zone of influence, and this had been handed to the British Government on the 15th February, 1919. ...

On January 30 of this year Mr.D.Lloyd George had urged the Conference to reconsider the distribution of troops in Turkey and the Caucasus with the object of lightening the heavy burden which fell on Great Britain. As a result, the Military Representatives had been asked to prepare a plan. The scheme of Military Representatives provided for: -

The occupation by France of Syria and Cilicia, with 2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade;

The occupation by Great Britain of Mesopotamia, including Mosul, by 2 divisions and 1 cavalry brigade;

The occupation by Italy of the Caucasus and Konia.

The economy which Great Britain would achieve by this plan would have amounted to 10 divisions of infantry and 4 divisions of cavalry. The plan of the Military Representatives had been placed on the Agenda paper of the Conference, but at Lord A.Milner's request the subject had been adjourned and had never been discussed.

About this time a conversation had taken place between M. G.Clemenceau and M.S.Pichon and Mr.D.Lloyd George and Mr.A.

Balfour, as a result of which Sir Maurice Hankey had handed M.S.Pichon a map containing a British counter proposal to the French proposal of February 15. ...Recently Lord A.Milner had left a map with M.G.Clemenceau containing yet another project, which... greatly circumscribed the French area. It was evident that the French Government could not look at this scheme either, even though they had the greatest desire to reach an agreement. ...

D.Lloyd George: M.S.Pichon had opened as though the question of the mandate for Syria was one between Great Britain and France. ...If the Conference asked us to take Syria, we should reply in the negative. The British Government had definitely decided this. ...

But if there was a French public opinion there was also a British public opinion, and it must be remembered that the whole burden of the Syrian campaign had fallen upon Great Britain. ...The British Empire and India had maintained from 900,000 to 1,000,000 troops in Turkey and the Caucasus. Their casualties had amounted to 125,000, the campaign had cost hundreds of millions of pounds. ...M.S.Pichon seemed to think that we were departing from the 1916 agreement... in respect to Mosul and Palestine. In fact, we were not M.S.Pichon had omitted in his lucid statement to explain that the [French] area... did not include Damascus, Homs, Hama, or Aleppo. ...

W.Wilson: He would, however, like to point out that one of the parties to the 1916 agreement had been Russia, and Russia had now disappeared. Hence, the partnership of interest had been dissolved, since one of the parties had gone out. This seem to him to alter the basis of the agreement. ...He recalled that in the Council of Ten, Resolutions had been adopted in regard to mandatories, and they contained a very carefully thought out graduation of different stages of mandate according to the civilisation of the peoples concerned. One of the elements in those mandates was the desire of the people over whom the mandate was to be executed. ...Cilicia, for example, from its geographical position, cut Armenia off from the Mediterranean. If there was one mandatory in the south, and another in the north of Armenia, there would be a great danger of friction, since the troublesome population lived in the South. Hence, the controversy broadened into a case affecting the peace of the whole world in this region. He hoped, therefore, that the question would be discussed from this

point of view. ...

The Turkish Empire at the present time was as much in solution as though it were made of quicksilver. Austria, at any rate, had been broken into pieces, and the pieces remained, but the Turkish Empire was in complete solution. The Councils of the world would have to take care of it. For his part, he was quite disinterested, since the United States of America did not want anything in Turkey. They would be only too delighted if France and Great Britain would undertake the responsibility. Lately, however, it had been put to him that he must approach his own people on this matter, and he intended to try, although it would mean some very good talking on his part. He admitted that the United States of America must take the responsibilities, as well as the benefits, of the League of Nations. Nevertheless, there was great antipathy in the United States of America to the assumption of these responsibilities. ...If we... invite France to occupy the region of Syria, even as narrowly defined, what would the result be? ...

E.Allenby: ...There would be serious trouble and probably war. ...

W.Wilson: The fittest men that could be obtained should be selected to form an Inter-Allied Commission to go to Syria. Their object should be to elucidate the state of opinion and the soil to be worked on by any mandatory. ...

G.Clemenceau: The inquiry must not confine itself to Syria. Mandates were required for Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, and other parts of the Turkish Empire as well as Syria. The peoples of these districts were not isolated. ...Subject to these provisions, he was prepared to accept President W.Wilson's proposal in principle.

D.Lloyd George: He had no objection to an inquiry into Palestine and Mesopotamia, which were the regions in which the British Empire was principally concerned. Neither would he object to an inquiry into Armenia, *in which they were no so closely concerned.*

W.Wilson: He saw *advantages in a unified inquiry into Turkish mandates.*

D.Lloyd George: If this extension was to be given to the Commission, it was essential it should get to work at once, as the burden of military forces in Turkey fell mainly on the British.

A.Balfour: He felt these proposals *might postpone the*

making of peace.

W.Wilson: This was not so. For the purposes of peace all that was necessary to tell Turkey was that she would have nothing.

D.Lloyd George: Turkey was entitled to know who would be the mandatory for Turkish territory.

W.Wilson: It was rather that they ought to know how much was to remain Turkish.

D.Lloyd George: The question of who was to be the mandatory of Anatolia would make all the difference for the arrangements for Turkey.

W.Wilson: Turkey was entitled to know if she was to have territory of her own, and that other parts of Turkey were to be placed under the League of Nations. Subsequently she would be informed who would be her next-door neighbour.

D.Lloyd George: He supposed that if the evidence were so overwhelming that, for example, the British Empire was ruled out of Mesopotamia, they would be free to consider whether they could take a mandate elsewhere in Turkey?

W.Wilson: This was an administrative matter and not one of sovereignty. Turkey was entitled to knowledge on all questions affecting the sovereignty. ...

D.Lloyd George: There was no suggestion that the Commission was to travel beyond Armenia.

At Mr.D.Lloyd George request; - President W.Wilson undertook to draft a terms of Reference to the Commission."*** ...

* "Current History," NY, 1920, March, vol.XI, pt.II, p.499.

** No map accompanied Department's file of the minutes.

*** Here is a key aspect of the Big political Game, when territorial issues are settled in permanent correlation of one to another. In December of 1918 the English had raised a point in favour of revision of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, as far as they strived to obtain Mosul. They had never received comprehensible answer, so on January 30, 1919, D.Lloyd George did menaced to withdraw his armed forces from the Ottoman Empire; at the same time he ceded in words the Caucasus to Italy. The Prime Minister of France was afraid that he could not retain his positions in the Near East single-handed; and he ceded Mosul to the British on February 15. Thereupon the English tried to oust the French from Syria. The latter, as well as a mandate for the whole Ottoman

Empire, had been attractive to the USA, too.

It is particularly important, that W.Wilson disputed necessity to honour the rights of Russian in Western Armenia; at the same time, he asserted reluctance of his country to obtain a tutelage in the same region. The Prime Minister of the Great Britain shared his disinclination to assume responsibility. Then W.Wilson mentioned Cilicia, Syria or all Ottoman areas as an attractive addition to the America's holding. Later on, in May of 1919, this hot issue had been discussed at much greater length.

№ 77 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, March 20, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/36; Paris, vol.XI, p.125-129

"11. Memorandum № 165 regarding the sending of a mission to Turkey which had been read at a meeting of the Commissioners on March 18th, was brought up for reconsideration. The personnel of this Commission had been cut down to five officials, ...being struck from the original list and the Commissioners approved of the sending of the Mission consisting of five officials and four Field Clerks, and believed that a sum of \$18,500 to pay the expenses of this Mission would not be excessive."

№ 78 instructions from the Peace Conference for Commissioners of the International commission on mandates in Turkey*

Paris, March 25, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 181.91/49; Paris, vol.XII, p.745-747

"Instructions for Commissioners from the Peace Conference to make inquiries in certain portions of the Turkish Empire which are to be permanently separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of Governments acting as Mandatories for the League of Nations. - Agreed to by President W.Wilson, Mr.D.Lloyd George, M.G.Clemenceau, and M.V.Orlando [in accordance with discussion in the Council of Four, of March 20, 1919.]

It is the purpose of the Conference to separate from the Turkish Empire certain areas, ...for example Palestine, Syria, the Arab countries to the east of [them], Mesopotamia, Armenia, Cilicia and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor, and to put [them] under the guidance of Governments which are to act as mandatories of the League of Nations. It is expected that this will

be done in accordance with the resolutions adopted by the Representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan at a Conference held... on January 30, 1919. [Then it was resolved:]

"2. ...Because of the historical misgovernment by the Turks of subject peoples and the terrible massacres of Armenians and others in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers are agreed that *Armenia*, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia *must be completely severed* from the Turkish Empire. This is without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire." ...

It is agreed that the administration of these mandates shall be in the spirit of the following document which was formally presented to the President of the United States on behalf of the Governments of Great Britain and France. ...

The Conference therefore feels obliged to acquaint itself as intimately as possible with the sentiments of the people of these regions with regard to the future administration of their affairs. You are requested, accordingly, to visit these regions to acquaint yourselves as fully as possible with the state of opinion there with regard to these matters, with the social, racial, and economic conditions, a knowledge of which might serve to guide the judgement of the Conference, and to form definite opinion... of the divisions of territory and assignment of mandates, which will be most likely to promote order, peace, and development of those peoples and countries."

* King-Crane Commission.

№ 79 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, March 27, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/39; Paris, vol.XI, p.133-137

"3. Field observers to Syria.

H.White: He had been informed that the President wished to send Mr. [C.]Richard Crane and Mr.[H.C.]King, the President of the Oberlin College, as field observers to Syria. The President felt these two men were particularly qualified to go to Syria *because they knew nothing about it*.

R.Lansing asked Mr.C.Herter to see whether there was any written record of the president's wishes in this matter of the dis-

posal of the Commission in order that the question of the whole Mission to Turkey could be settled accordingly."

№ 80 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, March 31, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/42; Paris, vol.XI, p.139-141

"2. Regarding proposed mission to Turkey.

Memorandum № 190 was read. This memorandum was taken up on March 27th as well as a draft of telegram to the Department of State regarding the proposed Mission to Turkey and Syria. This whole has now been held up because of the rumoured appointment by the President of Messrs. [H.]King and [C.]Crane as the American Representatives to go on some sort of a Mission to the Near East. As it has been impossible up to date, however, to ascertain just what Mission the President desired the two above named gentlemen to go on, or just what their sphere of investigation is to be, it is impossible for the Commissioners to take any action in regards to the proposed Mission to Turkey. As soon as the details are available with regard to the purpose of the trip which Messrs. [H.]King and [C.]Crane are about to take, it will be possible for the Commissioners to reconsider these two documents."

№ 81 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, April 3, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/45; Paris, vol.XI, p.145-146

"3. Mission to Turkey.

Memorandum № 205 was read suggesting that four officers at present attached to the Peace Commission, be assigned to Messrs.[H.]King and [C.]Crane, whom the President had appointed as the American representatives on an Inter-Allied Committee to investigate conditions in those portions of Turkey which are to be permanently separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of Governments acting as mandatories for the League of Nations. The Commissioners agreed that it would undoubtedly be wise to assign the officer in question to Messrs. [H.]King and [C.]Crane, but believed that the Commission had no authority to do this unless the last named gentlemen requested this extra assis-

tance. It was therefore suggested that Messrs. [H.]King and [C.] Crane be spoken to informally about this matter, and that if they concurred in the advisability of being given expert assistance, they write a letter to the Commissioners requesting it. ...

The Commissioners agreed, that if any party was to be assigned to Messrs.[H.]King and [C.]Crane, it would be advisable to refrain from sending Mr.[L.]Dominian as a member of this party. They thought that unless these circumstances, it would be best for Mr.[L.]Dominian to return to the State Department at once where his services appear to be badly needed. They likewise felt that the allotment of \$18,500 which they had previously approved should probably be put at the disposal of Messrs.[H.]King and [C.]Crane."

№ 82 agreement № 2773 between director of the American Relief Administration H.Hoover - and chairman of the Armenian National Delegation Boghos Nubar and representative of Government of the Republic of Armenia A.Aharonian

Paris, April 8, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 303, f.13; Վրացյան Ա., Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն: Եր., Հայաստան, 1993, էջ 637-638

"Whereas the Armenian Republic and the Armenian National Delegation have appealed to the United States, France and Great Britain for foodstuffs in order to prevent starvation among the people of Turkish Armenia and assist the Armenian Government in the maintenance of order and to stop the spread of anarchy.

Whereas it is the desire of the American Relief Administration to furnish some part of such foodstuffs and it is therefore intending to ship five thousand tons of flour for delivery during the month of April and if possible to continue such deliveries during the month of May, June and July and

Whereas the American Relief Administration is willing to extend credit for the purchase of such food, if necessary, such credits to be upon such terms as the American Relief Administration may approve.

Therefore it is agreed,

(1) That the Armenian Republic and the Armenian National Delegation for themselves and for any successors to them in the government of Armenia or any part of Armenia will accept deli-

very of all foodstuffs, which may be shipped by the American Relief Administration to Armenia on approval off port and will pay the same in dollars in New York, or if not able to do so will deliver to the American Relief Administration such governmental obligations as may be satisfactory to the American Relief Administration. To the extent that the American Relief Administration can use local currency in payments of expenses, or otherwise, the Armenian Republic and the Armenian National Delegation will arrange for the payment of the aforesaid foodstuffs in local currency in preference to any payment through government obligations.

(2) The agents of the American Relief Administration will furnish the Armenian Republic and the Armenian National Delegation with statements of account which shall be accepted as final and conclusive, as to amount, value and delivery for all foodstuffs furnished under this contract, and the Armenian Republic and the Armenian National Delegation will pay all expenses subsequent to delivery including port and unloading charges. The foodstuffs supplies will be delivered at coast, representing the purchase process in the United States plus all transportation and other charges with a sufficient margin to protect the American Relief Administration against loss.

(3) The Armenian Republic and the Armenian National Delegation agree that if they can export commodities or provide international exchange in any other form they will offer such exchange to the American Relief Administration in reduction of this credit, and generally the American Relief Administration shall have the right to claim the same terms with regard to credits, cash or exchange value for foodstuffs supplied as may be agreed to with any other parties for imports.

(4) The distribution of foodstuffs so supplied shall be carried out equitably subject to the general approval of the American Relief Administration.

In witness whereof the parties have hereunto set their hands this 8th day of April 1919.

The above agreement made at Paris between Herbert Hoover representing the American Relief Administration, party of the first part and Boghos Nubar of the Armenian National Delegation to Paris and A.Aharonian of the Armenian Republic, parties of the second part, is hereby subscribed to and confirmed."*

* On April 28, 1919, the very same text was subscribed in Yerevan between Director of the American Relief Administration office at Constantinople H.Heinz and Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia H.Kajaznuni.

**№ 83 report "On the work of the Communications Section"
of the Supreme Economic Council**

Paris, April 7 and 9, 1919, 10:00 (composed April 5)
US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/11/App.66; Paris, vol.X, p.129-134

"...The Council on the 17th March, 1919, authorised Technical Missions to be sent by the following Powers to investigate and report on immediate requirements: - ...

Great Britain - Don and Caucasus,

France - Greece, Turkey in Europe, Ukraine and Donetz[k].

...Trans-Caucasus.

Railways are being controlled by a British Technical Mission under General A.Brough. He is endeavouring to organise an efficient service between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, in spite of the difference between the various local Governments concerned, and the corruption and inefficiency of the local managements."

**№ 84 report from the Director General of Relief H.Hoover
"Regarding relief measures effected during March, 1919" -
for the Supreme Economic Council**

Paris, April 10, 1919 (heard April 14)
US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/12/App.83; Paris, vol.X, p.166-171

"Review of relief measures effected by the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy during the month of March through co-ordination of the Supreme Economic Council. ...

Turkey.

2,298,000 kilos of foodstuffs have been distributed during the month in Constantinople. In addition further supplies are being distributed by the military authorities, but again inland transportation conditions make any relief extremely unsatisfactory.

Armenia.

There were supplies from the Relief Administration 4,521,000 kilos of breadstuffs and 731,000 kilos condensed milk. In addition

to these, three shiploads of food, clothing and medical supplies have been delivered for the Far Eastern Relief Commission. Again the difficulties of inland transportation render assistance extremely difficult." ...

№ 85 report from the President of Robert College Caleb F.Gates -
for the U.S. High Commissioner L.Heck

Constantinople, April 10, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/5/Encl.1, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR
№ 49

"I have just returned from a journey to Aleppo, accompanying Dr.[J.L.]Barton. Visited Konia, Adana, Tarsus, Mersin, Aleppo, Aintab, Marash, Urfa, for relief purposes.

Food conditions better than I expected. Political conditions worse. Increasing bitterness between Armenians and Turks. The employment of armed Armenian soldiers in Cilicia created a very bad impression throughout the country. The Turks fear reprisals; they are fully armed and refuse to give up their weapons, believing that the Armenians will retaliate for injuries inflicted upon them. The Turks understand that the creation of an Armenian kingdom means that the Turks placed in that kingdom will be placed under the control of Armenians. It is to be feared that the proclamation of an Armenian kingdom will be the signal for a serious trouble all over the country. I am strongly convinced that the wisest course will be to place an undivided Turkey under the control of some Power that will administer it, giving equal justice to all races and nationalities. This would allow for the settlement of difficulties in time through natural forces, by education and the development of commerce and manufactures. The British Government employing Indian soldiers in the regions they occupy, with great success. They are well disciplined, obedient to orders, and capable of enduring hardship.

The people desire an American protectorate first, and after that a British. I believe the British are better prepared to deal with the situation. The long delay in deciding the fate of this country is giving opportunities for increased tension and intrigue. Agents of the Committee of Union and Progress are active all through Asia Minor, and the Turks are not at all disposed to submit passively to unwelcome decisions which may be imposed upon them. Unless great care is taken in forming the Government for this country, a

large army of occupation may be needed. Armenian refugees are returning to their homes as fast as the authorities will permit, in great need of clothing, bedding, tools, oxen and houses. In some places all the houses have been destroyed. Relief expeditions are proceeding into the interior as fast as they can obtain transportation."

№ 86 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, April 18, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/52; Paris, vol.XI, p.154-155

"4. American commission to Syria.

Memorandum № 231 was read with regard to the sending of an American Mission to Syria at the present time. The Commissioners noted carefully the views presented by Drs.W.Westermann and H.King, Mr.C.Crane and Prof.A.Lybyer, in this matter. After some discussion they agreed that it would be best to give up entirely the sending of a purely American mission to Syria at the present time inasmuch as such a mission could scarcely furnish data upon which the Commissioners could base their decisions with regard to the problems in the Near East in a sufficiently short time, and inasmuch as the arrival of such a mission in the Near East might be construed as indicating the special interest of the United States in certain regions and thereby arousing either false hopes or create local disturbances."

№ 87 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four
of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, April 21, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/110; Paris, vol.V, p.106-111

"1. Italian claims.* ...

At Mr.D.Lloyd George's request, M.G.Clemenceau produced a map giving a new scheme for the distribution of mandates in Turkey,** whereby Italy would secure a mandate over a considerable part of Anatolia touching territory mandated to Greece in the region of Smyrna, and the territory mandated with Constantinople, and Armenia.

W.Wilson: the real trouble was that Greeks and everyone

else appeared to dread the Italians as neighbours. The Patriarch of Constantinople had called on him the other day and had expressed strong objections to having Italians as neighbours. ...

D.Lloyd George: the Italians should merely have a sphere of influence and it should be made clear that their authority was limited to commercial and railway development, and that they were not to interfere with the people more than necessary.

W.Wilson: The trouble was that the Turks could not govern anyone.

D.Lloyd George: The Turks did not interfere much in railways; they were a quiet and docile people except towards Armenians and those whom they did not like.

G.Clemenceau agreed with this.

W.Wilson: He did not like, as it were, paying the Italians for something they had no right to.

D.Lloyd George: There was some strength in the Italian case that they had come into the war on the basis of a certain agreement and that Baron S.Sonnino's position would be extremely difficult if it were not fulfilled." ...

* D.Lloyd George and W.Wilson had conferred in regard to Italy this morning, minutes of this meeting not found in the State Department's file.

** No map accompanies the file.

№ 88 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, April 22, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/55; Paris, vol.XI, p.160-161

"4. Transportation of petroleum products in Russia.

Memorandum № 235 was read regarding the American government's taking any initiative with the respect to permitting the Nobel Brothers Oil Company of Russia to sending shipments from the Baku region into Soviet Russia. The Commissioners felt that inasmuch as the whole transportation problem of Russia was very intimately connected with the feeding problem of that country, it would be most advisable to submit the whole dossier on this subject to Mr.H.Hoover with a request for the latter's views in the premises."

№ 89 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace

Paris, April 30, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/61; Paris, vol.XI, p.171-172

"4. Regarding Syrian & Armenian Relief Commission.

Memorandum № 258 was read regarding a suggestion made by the Department of State that a paraphrase of a telegram from Dr.J.Main,* Commissioner in the Caucasus of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief respecting the situation in the Armenian districts on the former Turko-Russian border be communicated to the British and French Governments. The Commissioners felt that inasmuch as this was a very delicate subject, and that the communication of such a message to the British Delegation at least, would undoubtedly elicit the suggestion that the American Government take appropriate action to put an end to the critical situation in the districts in question, it would be more prudent not to communicate the text of the telegram referred to at the present time."

* See also Memorandum by the NER, dated November 11, 1919, in this volume.

№ 90 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 2, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/137; Paris, vol.V, p.407-417

"1. Caucasus.

W.Wilson: The representatives of Azerbaijan were anxious to come to Paris. They had had a deputation at Constantinople for a long time, waiting for permission to come to Paris. He understood that the French Government had not given the necessary authorisation. The Georgians and other representatives of the Caucasus republics were all in Paris, and there seemed to be no reason for this exception.*

G.Clemenceau and D.Lloyd George undertook to look into the matter.

2. The Italian situation. Action to be taken. ...

W.Wilson: ...He had learnt that very morning from Mr.D. Lloyd George that [the Italians] had sent a battleship, two cruisers and a destroyer to Smyrna. This confirmed what M.V.Orlando had told the United States ambassador in Rome that they would not go into the League of Nations unless they got what they wanted. At

Brest there was one of the latest United States battleships to take him home, but this could be sent to Smyrna or Fiume.

G.Clemenceau, D.Lloyd George: They would sent it to Fiume.

W.Wilson: Of course the danger was if a force was sent, some incident might happen. The Italians seemed to be sending forces to several places.

D.Lloyd George: He had sent Lieut.Harmsworth to M.E.Venizelos with a telegram, that... indicated that the Turks, stimulated by some outside power (this, no doubt was Italy), were continuing their policy of oppression and massacre; and the telegram concluded by asking for forces to be sent. M.E.Venizelos had replied that the Italians were undoubtedly stirring up the Turks, and no doubt there was an understanding between them. This strengthened the view that an Inter-allied force should be sent to Smyrna.

W.Wilson: The Italians would probably say they were sending battleships to Smyrna to protect their compatriots in Turkey.

D.Lloyd George: The three nations should all send forces. Great Britain had a battleship in the Black Sea.

G.Clemenceau: France had battleships in the Black Sea also.

W.Wilson: He would see Admiral W.Benson about it at once. ...

G.Clemenceau: Great Britain and France were bound by the Treaty of London which President W.Wilson could not recognise. We ought to let [the Italians] know beforehand that by not coming to Versailles they had broken the Pact of London to which they had adhered, and by which it was agreed not to make peace separately. We should show that if they broke the pact of London, we were not bound.

W.Wilson: It depended upon how the promise not to make a separate peace was interpreted. ...

G.Clemenceau: We should let them know that if they withdraw they are breaking the Pact of London, and we are not bound by the Treaty. We must let them know that if Italy breaks it, she must take the consequences.

W.Wilson: It must be made clear that it was Italy and not France and Great Britain that were breaking the Treaty. ...

D.Lloyd George: He had told the Marquis G.Imperiali that if Italy abstained from being present it would be an end to the Pact

of London. Unfortunately there was no note of this conversation.

W.Wilson recalled that Mr.D.Lloyd George had told him.

1. It was agreed that the question should be studied by M.G.Clemenceau and his advisers, and by Mr.D.Lloyd George and Mr.A.Balfour, and that a form of communication to Italy should be prepared for consideration."

* This is the noteworthy intercession by W.Wilson, considering undisguised cooperation of Azerbaijan with Turkey not only in the course of war, but over the post-war months, too.

№ 91 article in regard to Russia in the Treaty of Peace with Germany*

Paris, May 2, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/138/App.III; Paris, vol.V, p.424

..."Germany acknowledges and will fully respect the *inalienable independence of all the territories* which were part of the former Russian Empire.

Germany definitively accepts the *annulment of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk*** and of all treaties or arrangements whatever they might have been which Germany concluded since the Maximalist Revolution (November 1917) with any Government or political groups formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire.

The Allied and Associated Governments formally reserve all rights for Russia to obtain from Germany the restitutions and the satisfactions based on the principles of the present treaty."

* Approved for incorporation in the Treaty of Peace by G.Clemenceau, President W.Wilson and D.Lloyd George.

** See: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Russia. In 3 vols., vol.I. Wash., US GPO, 1931, p.442.

№ 92 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 5, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/144; Paris, vol.V, p.463-473

"4. The position with Italy. ...

D.Lloyd George: In Asia Minor the Italians had occupied the harbour of Marmaris. ...They had a battalion at Konia, which had been sent there by agreement. They had landed troops at Adalia without consulting the Allied and associated Powers and other movements were reported. ...

The British had a division and a half in the Caucasus. He

would like to have *examined the effect of bringing them back from the Caucasus.*

W.Willson recalled the report of the Military Representatives on the distribution of forces in Turkey.*

D.Lloyd George *thought the question ought to be re-considered.* Any day it might be found that the Italians had captured Anatolia and it would be difficult to get them out of there once they had occupied it. The mandates for Turkey could not be settled now, owing to the decision to send out a Commission. He thought, therefore, that we should fall back on his original proposal of a re-distribution of the forces of occupation. *The United States troops ought to go Constantinople and to provide troops for Armenia.* The British would come out of the Caucasus and the French might put a garrison in Syria, while the Greeks should be allowed to occupy Smyrna, since their compatriots were actually being massacred at the present time and there was no one to help them.

G.Clemenceau: The Italians had seven battleships at Smyrna.

D.Lloyd George: He would like to settle the forces of occupation in Turkey before the Italians returned to Paris:** this afternoon, if possible.

W.Wilson: He could not do it so hastily.

D.Lloyd George: if we discussed it with the Italians, they would anticipate us.

W.Wilson: He did not know where he was to find the American troops. Marshal F.Foch would be nervous if he withdrew United States' troops from the occupied zone in Germany.

H.Wilson: One United States' division would be required for Constantinople and the Straits to replace one British division and the few French battalions that were there. He could not estimate the number required for Armenia, as this would depend on how far into the country they had to penetrate. At the present moment, the British were under an agreement to let the Italians go to the Caucasus.

D.Lloyd George: All he had said was that he would like the British to come out of the Caucasus and the Italians had said they would like to go in, as there was oil there.

W.Wilson: He did not approve of the Italians going to the Caucasus.

G.Clemenceau: I had made no agreement on the subject.

D.Lloyd George recalled the report of the Military Representatives, which, however, ...had never been formally approved. He understood that, in any event, the British were coming out.

W.Wilson: Why any troops should replace the British?

H.Wilson: Unless some civilised Power was in occupation, there would be the most terrible massacres.

D.Lloyd George agreed, and... we could not persuade A.Denikin from entering Georgia.

H.Wilson: He was most anxious to get the British troops out.

W.Wilson: The British troops were the only ones accustomed to this kind of business, although the French had some experience. United States' officers would be quite unaccustomed to it.

D.Lloyd George: The United States' troops would be wanted in Armenia and would not meet with difficulties, although it was not the same in the Caucasus. He feared the effect of the Italians going to the Caucasus would be very serious. He was convinced that the forces of occupation should be settled at once then the Commission could go out.

W.Wilson: *This was too important a matter to be settled in a hurry.* He must confer with his military advisers.

H.Wilson: The British problem was very simple as it merely involved taking the troops out of the Caucasus.

D.Lloyd George: It had been proposed to put this troops in the regions of Constantinople for the present, in order to have them ready to counter any move by the Italians

G.Clemenceau: He, himself, intended to take action today as regards Bulgaria.

W.Wilson: He was not at all sure as to what military troops he could dispose of.

D.Lloyd George: There was a general idea that the British were imperialistic in their desires, but as a matter of fact they were not willing to take any more responsibility.

W.Wilson: *It did not seem a question of assuming more responsibility but a question of their withdrawing their existing responsibilities.*

D.Lloyd George: The Caucasus was very rich, but it would be a big job to look after it and the British Empire could not assume those additional responsibilities.

W.Wilson feared that *to let the Italians into the Caucasus*

would prove to be very serious and threaten the peace of the world.

D.Lloyd George: To take one and a half British divisions from the Caucasus and put them in Constantinople would safeguard the position against the Italians. Otherwise the Allied and Associated Powers might find their hands forced. The situation ought to be tackled at once to avert the possibility.

It was agreed:

1. That General H.Wilson should at once see General T. Bliss, to whom President W.Wilson sent a message by telephone, and should post General T.Bliss with the whole situation, in order that General T.Bliss may confer with President W.Wilson in the afternoon.

2. That the Naval Authorities should be invited to co-operate, when the naval elements entered into the problem. ...

14. Mandates.

D.Lloyd George: *He was very anxious to settle the question of the mandates before the Treaty of Peace.*

W.Wilson: It hardly could be settled in 48 hours. *In regard to Turkey in particular, it was impossible for him to give a decision at present as to whether the United States could take a mandate.*

D.Lloyd George: As far as Great Britain was concerned he would make no objection to a settlement of the Turkish mandates, though he realised President W.Wilson's difficulty. What he was pressing for at present was the German Colonies." ...

* According to the report submitted by the Supreme War Council on February 10, 1919, the Caucasus should be occupied by Italian soldiers.

** Indignant over their partners' behaviour Italian delegation abandoned the Peace Conference in protest.

№ 93 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 6, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/145; Paris, vol.V, p.474-490

"13. The Position with Italy. ...

G.Clemenceau: He had bad news of Italian military movements.

D.Lloyd George asked what the result of President W.Wilson's enquiries in regard to the proposed Military re-disposition of forces in Turkey had been.

W.Wilson: He regretted to have to say that this legal

advisers informed him that he had no authority to send troops to Turkey. One result of the United States policy of isolation had been that laws had been placed on the Statute Book restricting the movements of troops outside of the United States. Under existing laws it would not even be possible for him to agree to send troops to Turkey, nor could he send them unless at war with Turkey. He had tried his best to find some way out but could not. The most he could do at present, and thought that was not much it might do to steady the Italians, was to express his willingness to propose to Congress legislation on the subject when he submitted the Treaty of Peace. Such legislation would practically form part of the scheme of mandates.

D.Lloyd George: In the meanwhile Italy might establish herself in Anatolia.

W.Wilson: In that case Italy would be compelled to get out again. *The United States was the only country where Italy could get credits for essential purposes.*

D.Lloyd George: No discussion had taken place in regard to the mandates for Anatolia.

W.Wilson: Certain authoritative Turk had expressed the view that the whole of Turkey ought to be under a single mandate. He himself thought that this was more than he could induce the United States to undertake. The Turks were hated in the United States, and the only ground on which a mandate would be accepted in Turkey, would be to protect subject races against the Turks. ...

16. Turkey.

D.Lloyd George: He thought some attempt ought to be made to proceed further in regard to Turkey. *Otherwise the Italians would establish themselves there.* M.G.Clemenceau on the previous day had told them that Italy had seven battleships at Smyrna. This meant that they intended to land troops. It was said that Italy was making trouble between the Greeks and Turks, and having done so they would land troops with the ostensible object of keeping the peace.

W.Wilson: They would have to be informed that if they did not evacuate they would get no money.

D.Lloyd George: America had had a good deal of experience of bankrupt countries in central America, and Europe had had a good deal of experience of the same kind in the Balkans and

Turkey. The one thing these countries could always do was to make war." ...

№ 94 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 7, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/147; Paris, vol.V, p.496-500

"4. Russia.

...D.Lloyd George: He and General H.Wilson had both formed a very high opinion of M.[N.]Chaikovski. He thought that his colleagues ought to see them. He was sent to Siberia by the Czarist Government owing to his liberal views and was urging that the Allies should prevent Russia from becoming Imperial again. He himself feared that more than he did Bolshevism.

G.Clemenceau was afraid of both.

W.Wilson: Bolshevism must collapse whereas an Imperial Russia might remain. ...He asked what the assistance given to Russia consisted in.

D.Lloyd George: Arms and supplies.

W.Wilson asked *if they had been able to build up stocks.*

D.Lloyd George *thought not.*" ...

№ 95 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 7, 1919, 12:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/148; Paris, vol.V, p.501-505

"1. Despatch of Greek troops to Smyrna.

H.Wilson, in reply to Mr.D.Lloyd George, said that, between Salonika and the Dardanelles, the Turks only had about three divisions. During the war the strength of the Turkish division had been reckoned at about 6,000 men but towards the end of the war they had died down to almost nothing. Of course, however, a division could be filled up. ...*Probably there was no very formidable Turkish force in this region.*

D.Lloyd George suggested that the British ships at Smyrna might supply some information.

G.Hope: doubted if they had any facilities for obtaining information as to the military forces.

H.Wilson: *His news all came from Constantinople.*

W.Wilson: He supposed that the Armistice gave the Allies the right to send troops. ...Whether the Turkish Government ought to be warned of the intention to land troops?

E.Venizelos: I think that they ought, but only just before the landing took place. He, himself, knew the Turks well and he thought that if they received no warning, except just before the event, no resistance would be offered. Of course, however, there were some risks. All the facilities for landing were available.

D.Lloyd George asked whether there was not a danger that the Commander of the Fort *would fire* on the Greek ships *when the landing began*.

E.Venizelos: *The danger would be of their firing from the forts when the ships were entering the Gulf of Smyrna.*

W.Wilson: *I think they would not fire on the transports.*

E.Venizelos agreed that *they probably would not fire, if the transports were convoyed.*

G.Clemenceau suggested it would be safer to warn the Turks.

W.Wilson agreed that this would undoubtedly be the correct procedure. But if the Turks were warned too far in advance they would make preparations. ...

E.Venizelos: ...The ships should be dispatched as soon as possible. ...

Mr.D.Lloyd George was reminded by Sir M.Hankey that Admiral [S.Gough-]Calthorpe, who was at the same time the British Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and Diplomatic representative at Constantinople, ...wished to be able to make such dispositions as might be necessary to safeguard against the reaction of these movements in other parts of Turkey.

D.Lloyd George: The fewer people who were informed, the better. ...

W.Wilson suggested that Admiral [S.Gough-]Calthorpe should be cautioned as to the great importance of secrecy.

E.Venizelos: It would be extremely difficult to keep the matter secret as the concentration of ships would soon become known."

№ 96 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 9, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/4; Paris, vol.V, p.526-536

..."D.Lloyd George: General H.Wilson had told me he was... rather alarmed at the rapid withdrawal of the United States forces. I had asked him to speak to General T.Bliss on the matter before

it was raised at the Supreme Council.

W.Wilson: At present the United States were *shipping 300,000 men a month homewards*. ...He had always been of opinion that the proper policy of the Allied and Associated Powers was to clear out of Russia and leave it to the Russians to fight it out among themselves."

№ 97 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 13, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/10½; Papers, vol.V, p.579-588

"D.Lloyd George: ...The feelings they [the Italians] had, sprang... over the whole field of the Treaty of Piece. They were not being treated quite as a great first class power. ...They knew the question had arisen, for example, as to whether the United States could take in hand certain parts of Turkey, an onerous and difficult task. No one, however, was asking Italy to undertake this burden. ...

We were saying to Turkey "we cannot leave you to run alone any longer; you have got into a rut; and you will remain in it until some big country comes along and pulls you out." ... Whether Italy should not be asked to take charge? ...They were amazingly good engineers and had created the most wonderful roads. ...Italy was a very poor country. It contained no coal and no iron. Yet it had produced a vigorous and manly race.

G.Clemenceau referred to the remarkable emigration from Italy to the two Americas. ...

D.Lloyd George: He was not proposing that Italy should be offered a mandate for the whole of Anatolia, but why, he asked, should they not be invite to police, and develop a part of Anatolia, where they would find a country not dissimilar from their own. He understood that inland, there were great patches of desert, but they contained lakes, and, as in Mesopotamia, there were possibilities of irrigation. He was told that before the war, Italian emigration had been as great as 800,000 to 900,000 a year. Why should these not be diverted to Turkey, which had not the population to develop Anatolia. He felt that the whole frame of mind of the Italian representatives would change if the questions could be discussed as a whole. ...

W.Wilson agreed that Mr.D.Lloyd George had stated the case on right principles. He would like, however, to set out the

plan in parts. [Let's consider] first the part of Anatolia which needed supervision. ...

D.Lloyd George left the room to fetch the map.

President W.Wilson explained his proposals on the map.

D.Lloyd George made a suggestion on the following lines. The United States should take a mandate for Armenia; France should take a mandate for Northern Anatolia; Italy for Southern Anatolia; and Greece should be dealt with as proposed by President W.Wilson. The United States, he earnestly hoped, would also take a mandate for Constantinople.

W.Wilson: He could not settle this question until he had returned to the United States and definitely ascertained whether the United States would accept a mandate. He remained his colleagues that it had been represented to him that certain influential and important elements in Turkey were very anxious that Turkey should not be divided, but that it must be subjected to guidance. There should be a single mandate for the whole. The principle was the same as that which he had contended in the case of the Arabs, namely, that the mandate should not be divided. He felt there was much to be said for this proposal.

D.Lloyd George: He did not think this could be done in practice.

W.Wilson: his idea was that the southern parts of Anatolia should be economically developed, involving a question of administration. In northern Anatolia, however, the mandate should be limited to advice and guidance.

G.Clemenceau: to be frank it was not so easy to distinguish between a mandate for development and administration, and a mandate for guidance.

W.Wilson: I think, there was a great difference between guidance and administration.

D.Lloyd George turned to the map of Anatolia. ...

W.Wilson again repeated that he thought the Greeks ought to have a mandate outside the purely Greek zone. He felt that the whole district included in the western slope of the mountains should be treated as one geographical unit, and ought not to be divided. ...

D.Lloyd George: He personally would like to add Cyprus to Greece, although there were considerable difficulties. He thought that such an act would deprive the whole transaction of any at-

mosphere of "grab."

W.Wilson: It would be great thing if Mr.D.Lloyd George could accomplish that.

D.Lloyd George: Of course the Turks had a right to be in Turkey, but they had no right to make it wilderness.

W.Wilson: people who knew the Turks well said that the body of the population were really docile people. They were really all right so long as they were not put in authority. Under a guidance of a friendly power they might prove a docile people.

G.Clemenceau agreed, but he was very anxious not to cheat anyone out of what belonged to.

W.Wilson: his conception of a mandatory for Turkey was a guide, but a guide who must be obeyed. If advice was rejected, it might be necessary to exercise pressure. ...

G.Clemenceau: *The United States would not have an easy task in Armenia.*

W.Wilson: He had at the present moment before him reports on affairs in Armenia of such an appalling nature that he found it difficult to read them.

G.Clemenceau: The first thing to be done was to decide what was to be allotted to Italy.

D.Lloyd George: Whether the Turks would stand the Italians as mandatories? The Italians, he thought, were a more efficient executive race than the Greeks, and always had been in history. The Greeks had more ideas, but the Romans had been the superior executive nation.

W.Wilson: He was rather anxious about putting a superior executive race as mandatory round the Greeks at Smyrna. The effect might be ruinous. ...

Could Mr.D.Lloyd George draw up a complete picture of the settlement?

D.Lloyd George: ...If President W.Wilson would draw up a scheme for Dalmatia, he would draw up a scheme for Asia Minor.

...W.Wilson: Italy should have a mandate for the remainder of the Southern part of Anatolia, for which the Council would be glad if Mr.H.Nicolson could draw a line on an economic basis. ...

8. Peace with Turkey.

D.Lloyd George asked whether the Turks were to be invited to Paris, or whether they should be met somewhere else.

W.Wilson: As only some of the Allied and Associated Po-

wers had been at war with Turkey, it might be better to agree on terms and then send a Commission to meet the Turks. His own position in the matter was that as a member of the League of Nations, the United States would have to guarantee the arrangement.

D.Lloyd George: *Their position was a good deal more than that, since he hoped the United States would accept the mandate.*

It was agreed that in view of the pressure of work on the Drafting Committee, the Treaty with Turkey should not be put in hand just yet."

№ 98 minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 14, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/13½; Paris, vol.V, p.614-623

"The Council had before it two resolutions prepared for Mr. D.Lloyd George by Mr.H.Nicolson of the British Delegation.

D.Lloyd George: These proposals had been prepared as part of a comprehensive scheme to be presented to the Italian Delegation.

2. Mandate for the United States of America.

W.Wilson: he would accept the resolution contained in Appendix I in regard to the acceptance of a Mandate by the United States of America for Armenia and another for Constantinople and the Straits, subject to the assent of the Senate. The only alteration he wished to make was the inclusion in paragraph 2 of the Italian Delegation among the Powers to agree on the frontiers of the mandate in regard to the Straits. ...

D.Lloyd George produced a map which had been prepared by H.Nicolson of the British Delegation to accompany the resolutions in Appendix II. ...

W.Wilson: ...When the United States' experts had proposed [to diminish]... the Greek zone, they had done so in the Turkish interest and on the supposition that there would be an independent Turkish State. *The present scheme, however, was not providing for a separate Turkey independent of mandate.* ...

W.Wilson read Appendix II. In Resolution № 3, the following sentence: "In view of the fact that the Turkish Government has not shown itself able to protect the interests of Christian populations under its sovereignty" was altered by the omission of the word "Christian" and the substitution of the word "the." ...

4. Armenian mandate.

W.Wilson pointed out that the boundaries of the Armenian Mandate had not yet been drawn. He suggested that the map in the ante-room, which had been drawn by American experts, provided suitable boundaries.

The Council then adjourned to the ante-room and studied [this] map.

W.Wilson pointed out that the Southern boundary was drawn so as to leave Alexandretta south of the Cilician boundary.

D.Lloyd George pointed out that the Western boundary in the region of the Black Sea differed somewhat from the line prepared by the British experts. He handed a map drawn by British experts to President W.Wilson, who undertook to consider it in consultation with his own experts.

The Council returned to the Library. ...

11. Nature of mandates & sovereignty in Anatolia.

D.Lloyd George: What was the nature of the mandate contemplated for the Italians in Anatolia?

W.Wilson: he had in mind the Moslem feeling about not wiping out the Turkish race. His idea had been to set up a Turkish State in the north of Anatolia and to put it under the supervision of France. ...

G.Clemenceau: What difference did you contemplate in regard to the Turkish population in the Italian and French mandates in Anatolia?

W.Wilson: He had understood that in the north the population was more purely Turkish. ...If what Mr.D.Lloyd George said was correct, it would be better not to extent the sovereignty of Northern Anatolia over Southern Anatolia, otherwise both France and Italy would have advisers at the Turkish capital dealing with different parts of Turkish territory.

D.Lloyd George: that was the great argument against dividing Anatolia.

G.Clemenceau: What sort of mandate was contemplated in each case?

W.Wilson: It was substantially the same. ...In regard to a proposal in the memorandum [by A.Balfour] providing for prior claims in regard to concessions for the mandatory Power, he pointed out that this was contrary to the principle provided for in the League of Nations' Covenant for equal opportunity to all Nations in mandated territory. This did not mean that the United

States of America would rush in everywhere. Direct American enterprise was certainly not to be expected in Anatolia. There would certainly be a natural priority to the Mandatory but there should not be a priority of claim.

D.Lloyd George quite agreed. ...

W.Wilson: His idea would be to organise [Southern Anatolia] as a self-governing unit, to elect its own Governor-General with Konia as its capital. ...

D.Lloyd George: Another scheme was that the Sultan should remain in Constantinople exercising supervision over the whole of Turkey. France would then overlook one part of Anatolia, Italy another part, Greece a third, *while the United States overlooked the Sultan.* ...

W.Wilson: Southern Anatolia would have to be constituted as a separate unit. ...He asked if the Turks could not elect a Governor.

D.Lloyd George: *This would make a Republic.*

W.Wilson: He had no objection to this. ...

On President W.Wilson's suggestion, it was agreed in principle that Anatolia should be separated politically into two parts, the method of separation being left for further consideration." ...

№ 99 resolution by H.Nicolson - for the Council of Four

Paris, May 14, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/13½/App.I; Paris, vol.V, p.622

Agreed to by G.Clemenceau, President W.Wilson and D.Lloyd George as part of a proposal to be made to the Italian Delegation

"The President of the United States of America, on behalf of the United States, and subject to the consent of the Senate thereof Accepts:

1. A mandate over the Province of Armenia as constituted within frontiers to be agreed upon between the United States, British, French and Italian delegations, whose recommendations, if unanimous, shall be accepted without further reference to the Council.

2. A mandate over the City of Constantinople, the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and a small contiguous territory the frontiers of which shall be determined be

agreement between the United States, British, French and Italian Delegations, whose recommendations, if unanimous shall be accepted without further reference to the Council."

№ 100 resolution II by H.Nicolson - for the Council of Four

Paris, May 14, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/13½/App.II; Paris, vol.V, p.622-623

Agreed to by G.Clemenceau, President W.Wilson and D.Lloyd George as part of a proposal to be made to the Italian Delegation

"It is resolved,

(1) That Turkish sovereignty shall cease over Constantinople, Turkey in Europe, the Straits, and the Sea of Marmora.

(2) That the ports of Smyrna and Aivali and the connected district, ...as well as the islands of the Dodecanese and the island of Castellorizo, shall be ceded to Greece in complete sovereignty.

(3) That what remains of Anatolia east of the frontier suggested for Armenia shall constitute the future State of Turkey, and be treated as follows:

In view of the fact that the Turkish Government has not shown itself able to protect the interests of the populations under its sovereignty and is not now in a position to develop the natural resources of the country, it is realised that the future State of Turkey will stand in need of external guidance. ...It is felt that the mandate to assist Turkey should preferably be entrusted to three Powers.

It is proposed therefore: -

(1) That in the west Greece should be granted complete sovereignty over the region and Islands above mentioned together with a mandate over the contiguous region... as shown on the map.

(2) that Italy should be granted a mandate over the southern sea-board stretching from a point to the west of the port of Makri to the point where the suggested frontier for Armenia strikes the Mediterranean ...

(3) The mandate for the remaining position of the future Turkish State shall be entrusted to France." ...

№ 101 report from the Director General of Relief H.Hoover -
for the Supreme Economic Council "Relief Operations
in Europe during April, 1919"

Paris, May 15, 1919 (heard May 19)

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/19/App.148; Paris, vol.X, p.277-
279

"Armenia and Turkey - 3,953 Metric Tons of breadstuffs. ...

General Food Situation. - While undernourishment exists in several localities, leading to high mortality through non-resistance to disease, there was no acute starvation during the month, except in Armenia, certain sections of the Carpathians and Bolshevik Russia. Armenia is solely a problem of internal transportation, and every human effort is being made to overcome the difficulties. The Carpathians are as yet inaccessible. The situation in the Baltic States, outside the Bolshevik areas, which was last month of so acute a character, is being rapidly improved."

№ 102 memorandum by A.Balfour - "The problem of Italy and
Turkey in Anatolia"

Paris, May 16, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/15½/App.; Paris, vol.V, p.669-672

"The scheme provisionally accepted on Wednesday last at a meeting of the "Three," contemplated the final destruction of the Turkish State. This is already condemned, and I think rightly, to the loss of its *European possessions, its Arab-speaking population, and Armenia*. It is therefore in any case reduced, as far as the area of its Empire is concerned, to a mere fraction of its former self; this fraction... we originally proposed to preserve thus leaving to the Sultan that great block of Anatolia lying west of the meridian of Constantinople, ...which contains within its boundaries most of the Turkish race. For this scheme has now been substituted one which cuts this region into two separate States, with different capitals, different sovereigns and different mandatories.

I look with much misgiving at this proposal. ...Now I believe there are only two kinds of scheme possible: ... - the scheme of partition advocated by the "Three," and the scheme which I ventured to lay before them. ...

Under my scheme Turkey remained an undivided State without a Mandatory. Its status was substantially that of the historic Turkish Empire. Its territories were, indeed much diminished;

it could no longer count as a Great Power; but in other respects the Sultan would reign at Brussa* or Konia as his predecessor had formerly reigned at Constantinople. ...

The alternative scheme, which found favour on Wednesday, ...cuts Turkey into two halves; and puts each half under a separate Mandatory. ...

Italy is not, under my plan, intended to occupy the position of a Mandatory in these regions, the general principle - that no mandatory has a right to exceptional trade advantages in the country which it controls - is not violated. ... A.J.B."

* Nowadays: Bursa.

№ 103 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 17, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/15½; Paris, vol.V, p.668-669

..."D.Lloyd George handed round a memorandum from A. Balfour,* which he described as a powerful one, in regard to provisional decisions taken on the subject of Anatolia. He felt considerable doubt as to whether this provisional conclusion was a correct one. In any case, if the Italians continued on their present line, *it might be better to have only one mandate for Anatolia.*

G.Clemenceau: For his part he did not want it.

W.Wilson produced an ethnographical map of Anatolia and pointed out how much ore mixed the population was in the southern half of Anatolia than in the north, where it was almost wholly Turkish.

D.Lloyd George: It has to be borne in mind that the whole Mohammedan world would be aroused by this partition of Turkey, and this affected France just as much as it did Great Britain.

It was agreed that Mr.D.Lloyd George should prepare the draft of the memorandum for consideration, and possibly for subsequent presentation to M.V.Orlando, on the subject of the Italian landing on the Coast of Asia Minor."

* See previous document of May 16, 1919.

№ 104 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 17, 1919, 16:15

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/17; Paris, vol.V, p.686-689

"3. Mandates in Turkey. Constantinople and Caliphate.

D.Lloyd George: ...If the Turkish capital were removed to

Brussa, ...there would always be ferment and intrigue. *He, himself, was in favour of keeping the Caliphate at Constantinople.* The United States of America, *the probable mandatory of Constantinople and the Straits*, could be relied on to be absolutely impartial. He felt himself more or less pledged by the declaration he had made on behalf of the Turkish Empire. M.G.Clemenceau had sent him a telegram approving this declaration.

G.Clemenceau: *He could not recall it.*

D.Lloyd George: He would let M. G.Clemenceau have a copy. The British Empire had nearly a million men fighting the Turks when no-one else had more than two thousand. He asked his colleagues to consider the desirability of keeping the Caliphate at Constantinople."

№ 105 stenographic notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 17, 1919, 16:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/18; Paris, vol.V, p.690-701

"E.Montagu: ...I am accompanied here this afternoon by my two colleagues of the Imperial British Indian Delegation who are both Hindus. ...

The Agha Khan: ...As you are aware, the fall of Turkey was a great deal due to our efforts from India. The larger number of troops sent against Turkey were Indian troops. It was Indian blood and Indian treasure, Mohammedan blood and Mohammedan treasure, which was shed and used to bring about the great result, and while that war went on, we were convinced, and we are still convinced, ...that this war was a real crusade for modern principles of justice and fair play toward all men, and that behind the hatred and death on this war, lay the principle that you were preaching. ...Now, we maintain that this principle of nationality is sacred one and does not apply to one country and not to another, - to big countries and not to small ones. For these reasons we pray that where the Turkish race has its home, where it has been for centuries and centuries, such as Asia Minor, Thrace, the town of Constantinople and Asia Minor proper, which is the home of the Turkish-speaking race, - we pray that that country should remain Turkish. We appeal to the principle of nationality. We appeal to your speeches. We appeal to the interests, the vital interests of France and Italy in the development of their future commerce and industry in those countries, that the final break with this Moham-

medan nations should not take place. We appeal to N° Twelve of your Fourteen Points,* Mr.President, and to the speeches that you have made, Sir. We beg of you to bear in mind the principles for which we have fought, like all of you, and to apply them without fear or favour wherever they can be applied, if you will put into this, our case, a judicial mind. ...

[The Turkish races ought to be promised that they will enter the League of Nations.] It does not matter whether Turkey is small or great, but if they are a nation, if they are one language, you mustn't punish the future generations still unborn for the sins of the people of this generation.

Another point which I bring before your notice is the *Eastern provinces of Turkey, the Northeastern provinces of Turkey, and the Southwestern provinces of the Caucasus of Russia*. They are Armenians, Mohammedans, Kurds, Turks - they are so to speak the real Macedonia of the Eastern races. The frontier between Turkey and Russia even before 1877 was a purely political frontier. It was not an ethnological or geographical frontier south of the Caucasus. We appeal to you, sir, that whatever the form of government which is to be established for what is called Armenia, it should at least apply to the whole of those areas, and that it should be equality for all races, all religions and all peoples within those confines. There have been undoubtedly in the past in these countries terrible bloodshed and fighting and so on, but let us at least see that those things do not happen to the Armenians or to the other people. I don't care particularly to mention them, but nobody now tries to decimate or reduce the Mohammedan population there, and they should have the same equal rights, no fear and no favour, but fair play. ...

E.Montagu: The Sultan of Turkey has a spiritual authority far exceeding his temporal possessions as Caliph of the Mussulmans, which makes his destiny and the fate of his people of peculiar and particular interest to the Mohammedans of the world, even though they are not connected with Turkey. ...

Aftab Ahmad: ...Not only in the other theatres of war, but even against Turkey herself, the Mussulmans of India fought for the principles of justice, freedom and self-determination - principles to which the great Allied Powers are definitely committed and to the benefit of which all races and credits are equally entitled.

Having stood successfully the most severe test during a long

period of trial and trouble, the Mussulmans of India are now naturally and, I think, rightly interested in the future settlement of the Turkish Empire, the only surviving Mahomedan power in the world and the seat and centre of the dearly cherished Caliphate. But now it is said that the Turk is to be turned out of Constantinople, and that Asia Minor is to be cut up into pieces and distributed among France, Italy and Greece. We have also heard that Mesopotamia, Arabia, Syria and Palestine are to be placed under non-Moslem governments. As regards Constantinople, Thrace and Asia Minor, we would earnestly appeal to the principles proclaimed by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain as bearing upon their war aims in general, and on this part of the Turkish Empire in particular. ...

It is clear from what the Peace Conference has so far decided that the future of the enemy territories is settled upon the principle of nationality. We beg and pray that the same principle may be applied to the case of Turkey. ...Any such dismemberment of Turkey and subjugation of the Turkish race to foreign domination will be most strongly resented by the Moslems of India and will be regarded by them as due to the fact that Turkey is a Mohammedan power. ...We earnestly appeal that the Sultan should not only be allowed to possess complete sovereignty, but that in due course Turkey should be admitted to the League of Nations. ...

I may, in conclusion, be permitted to observe that upon the issue of your deliberations with regard to the future fate of Turkey depend, to a large extent, not only the future relations between the Indian Mussulmans and the Empire, but the situation in the whole Islamic world. We are most anxious to avoid the causes of that general unrest which is discernible in so many parts of the world at the present time and which may have most disastrous results. ...

Yusuf Ali: ...It is well known how much strain was put upon the loyalty of the Indian Mohammedans when Turkey went into the war against us, but I claim, ...that the Indian Mohammedans stood that test steadfastly and loyally; and I think that they are entitled to have a voice in the settlement. ...

It seems to us that sometimes Europe is apt to forget Islam, to forget the power that is behind it, ...and, at any rate, it is our duty clearly to point out that that power still exists, and if it is

forgotten or neglected, it will only mean further complications in the future. ...

[Ganga Singh Bahadur,] the Maharajah of Bikaner: ...In Mesopotamia, in Africa, ...and in every theatre of war, the Mohammedans have fought, and ...though they recognized the Caliph as their spiritual ruler, yet they fought against him: before and after fighting, ...they were offering prayers for the Caliph, while still fighting for the King and the Allies in the cause of civilization. ...

I would beg with a full sense of responsibility to say that if the Sultan and the Turks are deprived of Constantinople and there is a partition of Turkey, there will be grave unrest, hatred and trouble in the future, not only for India, not only for the British Empire, but for the whole world at large. ...

D.Lloyd George: Surely, ...the Mohammedans of India must know that most of the fighting has been done amongst the Christians.

E.Montagu: The fighting has been done amongst the Christians, but the peace terms dictated to our Christian enemies will strike them as so much more moderate than the peace terms which lead to the complete disappearance of our only Mussulman State.

...W.Wilson: Of course, I think we all recognize that *the trouble in Asia Minor has been the rivalry and clash of nationalities and religions*, and that the problem is complex because the mixture is so complex and the competition so sharp."

* See: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, supp.1, vol.I, p.15-16.

№ 106 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 19, 1919, 11:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/18½; Paris, vol.V, p.705-715

"6. The Italian claims.

D.Lloyd George: On the previous day... M.V.Orlando had shown him the proposals he had made to Dr.D.H.Miller of the American Delegation. ...He had ended by making an appeal for the mandate for the whole of Anatolia. Mr.D.Lloyd George had replied to him that it was quite hopeless. ...To put the Turks under the Italians when they thought themselves better men than the latter, would put the whole Mohammedan world in revolt. At the risk of appearing to vacillate, he would like to reconsider the provisional decision already taken.

W.Wilson: He did not in the least mind vacillating, provided the solution reached was the right one.

D.Lloyd George: His present attitude was that it would be best to get Italians out of Asia Minor altogether. Frankly, he had changed his mind on the question of dividing Anatolia. He thought that it would be a mistake to tear up this purely Turkish province.

W.Wilson: ...He and Mr.D.Lloyd George had said they would not destroy Turkish sovereignty. He had forgotten this until reminded of it on Saturday. (Mr.D.Lloyd George said he had also forgotten it). ...Could not the Sultan be left his sovereignty over Anatolia and merely required in certain specific matters to take advice, of, say, the French Government? For example, he might have to take their advice in regard to financial and economic matters and perhaps in regard to international relations. ...

D.Lloyd George: He had been thinking of some similar shame. ...In this case France... should, in his view be confined to guiding the Sultan in regard to finance, concessions, and commercial matters. He was opposed to interference with matters of Government as it would only cause great anger in the whole Mohammedan population.

G.Clemenceau: The terms would have to be drawn very carefully as the *Turkish Government was a very bad one*.

D.Lloyd George: He was reminded that the matter of Gendarmerie would be a difficult one. It had always been found necessary to maintain an *International Gendarmerie* for the purpose of keeping order. *In this case, however, the main Greek and Armenian populations were being withdrawn from Turkish rule* and there would only be relatively unimportant minorities under the Turks. ...

W.Wilson: What he was suggesting was in effect to give a mandate to France without calling it a mandate. That is to say, France... would be in a similar position as an independent friendly country advising the Turkish Government under treaty stipulations. The terms of the Treaty, therefore, would be more limited than the terms of the mandate.

D.Lloyd George: If France took a position of this kind towards the whole of Asia Minor, which would be a very important trust, he would have to ask for a re-examination of the whole question of mandates in the Turkish Empire.

W.Wilson: This solution would leave the Italians out entirely. ...The Americans were willing to take up this position that Italy could have any territory in dispute, the population of which would vote for Italian sovereignty. ...

D.Lloyd George again insisted on the importance of getting the Italians out of Asia Minor. If this were not done there would always be trouble there *as well as in Armenia where America would have the mandate*. The Mohammedan deputation were also very strongly opposed to an Italian mandate in the Caucasus." ...

№ 107 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 19, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/19; Paris, vol.V, p.716-731

"7. Russia.

W.Wilson: ...A.Kerensky and his friends hoped that there would be no recognition of A.Kolchak or anyone else as representative of all the Russians. And that as a condition of further assistance, certain agreements should be exacted from all the parties opposed to the Bolsheviks, by which they would pledge themselves to a certain progressive policy. They should be informed that a departure from this would cause them to lose the support of the allied and associated Powers. This seemed to provide the rudiments of a policy.

D.Lloyd George agreed that it was important to impose conditions.

W.Wilson: *These Russian groups could be broken down at any time by our failure to support.*

D.Lloyd George: He was amazed at the amount of material that had been supplied. They had received something like £50,000,000 of armaments and munitions."

№ 108 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 21, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/20½; Paris, vol.V, p.754-771

"4. Italian claims.

D.Lloyd George: ...Great Britain was, perhaps, the greatest Mohammedan power. ...About one and a quarter millions of troops had been raised in India, a large portion of the fighting men being Mohammedans. These had done the bulk of the fighting against the Turks. ...The Mohammedan world realised this. Un-

doubtedly, the partition of the Asia Minor would cause anger in the Mohammedan world. The more he thought the matter over, the less was he, as head of the Power which had done nine-tenths of the fighting against Turkey, willing to agree to the partition of Asia Minor. This was the view of the British Cabinet. Not only would it create permanent trouble in the East, but they had come to the conclusion that it would be unjust. ...

The Allies had a perfect right to say that the Turks should not rule over alien races like the Greeks, Armenians and Arabs, whom they had always misgoverned. But this argument did not apply in those parts of Turkey where the population was overwhelmingly Turk. If Smyrna, Constantinople and Armenia were ruled out, the population of Anatolia would probably be more than 90% Turk. Supposing Anatolia were divided, with the French in the North and the Italians in the South and the Sultan were at Brusa, would it be possible for the French to avoid interference? How could they help it with the Sultan in their sphere?

M.G.Clemenceau himself had said that this was an impossible situation and he suggested that there should be two Sultans, one in the North and one in the South. But this was unjustifiable to tear the population in half. It would cause constant unrest and trouble throughout the Mohammedan world and the British Delegation could not agree to it. He would like the same power which had the mandate for Constantinople to have the mandate for *Anatolia*. This was the view of the British Delegation after two days largely devoted to the study of the question. They considered that one power ought to control both, and that power should be one in Constantinople. *In Armenia and Mesopotamia and in Syria where there were non-Turkish races, other powers could govern.* But in case of Anatolia there should be some sort of Government by men of the Turkish race. Some sort of control, however, was desirable. Otherwise there might occur massacres of such Greeks and Armenians and the inhabitants of such other races as remained. The British Delegation would prefer America to exercise the control. The reason for this - and it was necessary to speak very plainly in considering these great problems affecting the future of the world - was that the United States of America would be more acceptable to the Mohammedan world than any other party. One reason was that America was known to have a very great respect for liberty and would consequently be expected to be very fair.

Another reason was that America had no past in dealings with Mohammedans. This was not the case either with France or Great Britain. The Mohammedans were honestly afraid lest the Algerian experiment should be tried in Turkey, involving the complete subservience of Mohammedans to Christians. No doubt there would be the same feeling towards Great Britain. A second reason was that if France were given the mandate for Anatolia, Italy would have the right to complain under the Treaty of London. ... Italy must also be ruled out from a mandate for the whole of Anatolia. ...Hence, he could see nothing for it but for the United States of America to accept the mandate.

If, however, the United States could not see its way to accept a mandate, he saw no alternative but to continue the present system with the Turks in entire control. In reality, however, it would not work like the present system. America would have a mandate for Armenia and for Constantinople and it would not be possible for the Turk to remain absolutely free to misrule as he wished. As far as he knew the Turk never had perpetrated any very serious atrocities in Anatolia, even if he had never governed it particularly well. ...There was a debt under an International Board. ...As regards concessions, this was probably a more nominal than real difficulty, since no one, except the United States, had any money. ...Moreover, his proposal gave France a provisional mandate for Syria until the report of the Commission was received. If the report was against France, there might have to be some consideration by the Powers in common. It was, however, essential for President Wilson to get home before very long, and the same applied to himself, and some provisional arrangement was necessary. ...Finally, until Russia was settled, he thought it would be necessary for the United States to control the Caucasus also. The British were in control at present, but they could not see their way to remain there. ...

W.Wilson: ...There was a close similarity between Mr.D. Lloyd George's plan and his own proposals. He himself, had suggested that the Turks should retain full sovereignty in Anatolia but the Sultan... would not be hampered in his administration of Anatolia by the Mandatory of the Straits though he might sometimes be guided by the Mandatory's advice. If the United States were the Mandatory of the Straits they would not in the least object if the Sultan were advised in stipulated matters by other

Powers on the subject of the government of Anatolia.

D.Lloyd George considered that if the United States could not take a Mandatory over Anatolia, it would be better for the Sultan to clear out of Constantinople. ...

W.Wilson: Since Saturday he had been considering the question very carefully and he doubted the advisability of accepting a mandate for Anatolia. If the same Power was mandatory in Constantinople and in Armenia, it would be very difficult for the Sultan to cause much trouble.

He then adverted to the Commission for Syria. The Delegates whom he had nominated* were men of such standing that he could not keep them waiting any longer in Paris, consequently he had instructed them to leave for Syria on Monday and to await there their colleagues on the Commission.

D.Lloyd George: The same applied to the British Delegates and he thought he would give them the same orders.

G.Clemenceau: In this case he must drop out. The promises made to him had not been kept. General Sir Henry Wilson had apparently not been in a position to discuss with M.A.Tardieu the question of the sphere of occupation in Syria. ...

In the Autumn of 1918... he had come to London and had asked Mr.D.Lloyd George to say exactly what he wanted Mr.D. Lloyd George had said Mosul and Palestine. He had returned to Paris and in spite of the objections of M.S.Pichon and the Quai d'Orsay, he had conceded it. Then Mr.D.Lloyd George had said that France and Great Britain would get along all right. Nevertheless they had not succeeded in getting along all right. Early in the year the proposal had been made for the evacuation of Syria by British troops and the substitution of French troops. Lord A.Milner had asked him to put this aside for the moment and had undertaken to discuss it with him. He had never done so. ...After this, Lord A.Milner had produced a map by which Syria was divided in order to provide a railway for the British to Mesopotamia. Later, Mr.D.Lloyd George had suggested that President W.Wilson should have part of Cilicia. He had even agreed to this. This he had given up Mosul and Cilicia and some more territory for the sake of the British Railway. ...

France, having given up Mosul and some region required for the Railway and Cilicia, thought she had a right to compensation. He had then suggested that France should have a Mandate

over part of Anatolia. *Of course he recognised that no promises had been given, but the idea had been proposed in the course of their conversations.* ...Only yesterday it had been suggested that France should have a mandate for the whole of Anatolia. To-day, however, Mr.D.Lloyd George came forward with fresh combinations. He knew the cause of this. It was the arrival of Lord G. Curzon. He had heard all about this from London where Lord G. Curzon had spoken very freely. Lord Curzon was the fiercest friend France had in England. He regarded it as a good thing to take from France Mosul and part of Syria for a railway and Cilicia, and to do nothing in return. He had another objection. ...France being the country with the greatest financial interests of any country in the world in Turkey surely ought not to be expelled from Asia Minor on two such grounds as the Mussulman question and the Italian question. ...He considered it dangerous to introduce the United States of America in Asia Minor. *To say that the United States were to have a Mandate not only for Constantinople and Armenia, but for the whole country between them would cause a bad ferment and division in the whole European world.* ...He recognised that the United States had done a great deal for France. They had struck the last blow in the war, and France was eternally grateful for it, but if the idea got about that Great Britain had brought the United States in to get France out, public feeling in France would not stand it. ...Rather than sign any such agreement, he would not leave the Conference but it might be necessary for him to leave the Government. ...Hence he begged that it would not be decided to keep France out as well as Italy by bringing in the United States of America. ...

If his colleagues really wished to induce him to believe that Mesopotamia and Palestine should go to Great Britain and Asia Minor to America, he was quite ready to think the matter over. ... He would do his duty to the peace of the world, but he hoped before any further discussion, his colleagues would think these matters over.

D.Lloyd George: ...On the occasion of the London visit, [he] had promised Syria to France provided that he gave up Mosul. ...

He recalled the proposal that he had made for a redistribution of the forces in Turkey in order to relieve the British Army which had a very large force there, occasioning demobilisation difficulties. He himself had gone away to London and for some

reason he had never quite understood, the scheme had fallen through. On his return, President W.Wilson had proposed the Commission to Syria. The United States and Great Britain and Italy had their Delegates all ready. It was France who had never appointed their Delegates.

This was a formal document and had been signed by all of them. M.G.Clemenceau had not carried out his part of bargain. He did not say that M.G.Clemenceau had not kept faith, but he certainly had not carried out the bargain. ...

As regards the railway to Syria, this was part of a proposal under which half the oil of Mesopotamia was to be given to the French. The railway was essential to the transport of the oil and was in the interests of the French. ...As regards Asia Minor he had never heard of a French claim until the previous day. There had never been the smallest indication that France wanted a mandate for Asia Minor. ...It was not true that France had the greatest claim in Turkey. ...Great Britain was found to have the largest trade, Germany the second, France being a bad third. It was true that France had a large claim in the Baghdad railway, but the Baghdad line would not run mainly through the part of Anatolia which had been contemplated in the French mandate. It would run through all the mandated territory, American, French and British. Hence the basis of this claim was not in the French zone at all. He did not believe that French public opinion had made any claim for a mandate for Anatolia. ...Great Britain was the largest Eastern Power, and now the greatest of all Mohammedan Powers. This was the reason for the objections made to a French mandate over Anatolia. ...It was solely in the interests of peace in the east that he had been unable to agree to a division of Anatolia. It was for this reason that he had come to the conclusion that the better plan would be for the United States of America to have the mandate. If M.G.Clemenceau said that this was because Great Britain was jealous of France, he made a suggestion that was not very a very worthy one to a Power that had done and guaranteed so much for France.

W.Wilson: He hoped, in the first place, the consideration of this question would be postponed for a time, since great issues were involved. He must say at once that *the United States would find it very difficult to take any part in Asia Minor* where they had no material interests. ...It was difficult for her to take a mandate

even for Armenia, where she had permanent interests of long standing, and where a good deal of money had been spent by Americans for the relief of the Armenian people. As regards Constantinople, he thought that even some of the public men who were opposed to him politically, would support him in taking a mandate. He did not, however, think that he could persuade them to accept a mandate for Asia Minor. Although he did not exclude the possibility of altering his opinion, his present conviction was, that *it would be better not to divide Anatolia*, and that *the Sultan should be left in Constantinople*. If that caused too great complications, he should be removed to Brusa. ...He thought that M.G. Clemenceau had misunderstood his proposal that the United States Delegates on the Syrian Commission should proceed to Syria to await their colleagues. At any rate, they were men of such standing that he could not keep them waiting in Paris. If they did not go to Syria they must go back to the United States.

D.Lloyd George: he thought they ought to go to Syria." ...

* Henry C.King and Charles R.Crane.

№ 109 memorandum submitted by D.Lloyd George - to the Council of Four "Scheme for settlement in the Turkish Empire"

Paris, May 21, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/20½/App.III; Paris, vol.V, p.770-771

"Constantinople and the Straits.

1) The United States of America to have a full mandate over Constantinople and the Straits of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus.

2) *First Alternative*: The United States of America to have a light mandate over the whole Anatolia. The Sultan of Turkey and the Government to remain at Constantinople.

Second alternative: If the United States of America cannot accept a mandate over the whole of Anatolia this region to remain subject to the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey without a mandatory.

3) In either alternative provision to be made for access from Anatolia to the Mediterranean, Sea of Marmora, and Black Sea.

...Armenia and Cilicia. 5) *The United States of America to have a full mandate over Armenia and Cilicia.*

Caucasus. 6) The mandate for Armenia to include a *provi-*

sional mandate over Russian Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the whole Caucasus region pending a solution of the Russian problem.

Syria. 7) France to have a provisional mandate over Syria pending the report of the Commission which is proceeding to the Near East.

Mesopotamia and Palestine. 8) Great Britain to have a provisional mandate over Mesopotamia and Palestine pending the report of the Commission that is proceeding to the Near East.

Arabia. 9) To be independent." ...

№ 110 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 23, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/26; Paris, vol.V, p.861-872

"3. Russia.

...W.Wilson asked whether it was proposed to recognise [the Omsk] Government as representing all Russia, or merely as a local Government.

G.Clemenceau: As representing all Russia.

W.Wilson: He could not do that.

D.Lloyd George: He also was opposed to that. ...

It was agreed: - To discuss Mr.P.Kerr's draft letter to the Russia de facto Government, in the afternoon."

№ 111 letter compiled by the President of the German Delegation U. von Brockdorff-Rantzau - to the President of the Peace Conference G.Clemenceau, translation of the Observations of the German Delegation on the conditions of Peace

Versailles, May 29, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 185.1/165; Paris, vol.VI, p.795-901

5. Self-determination.

"Mr.D.Lloyd George mentioned on the 5th January 1918 as among the chief war aims "a territorial settlement based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed." ...On the 11th February* 1918 President W.Wilson stated in Congress "that peoples and provinces were not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game. Peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. Self-determination is not a mere phrase. It is imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril. We cannot have general peace for

the asking or by the mere arrangements of a Peace Conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful States." A similar sentiment was expressed in the President's message to the senate of January 22nd 1917. "No peace," he wrote, "can last or ought to last which does not recognise and accept the principle that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property." ...

In four Points of President W.Wilson's speech in Congress on February 11th, 1918, ...[had been said:]

"The principles to be applied are these:

First, that each part of the final settlement must be based upon the essential justice of that particular case and upon such adjustments as are most likely to bring a piece that will be permanent.

Secondly, that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game, even the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power, but that

Thirdly, every territorial settlement involved in this war must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned and not as a part of any mere adjustment or compromise of claims among rival States.

Fourthly, that all well defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the world."

Moreover, Point 2 of President W.Wilson's speech at Mount Vernon on 4th July, 1918,** is also applicable, which begins:

"The settlement of every question, whether of territory or sovereignty, of economic arrangement or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery."

* The date inscribed in the text is January 11, 1918.

** See: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United

States, 1918, suppl.1, vol.I, p.268, 270.

№ 112 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, May 31, 1919, 17:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/43; Paris, vol.VI, p.130-137

"8. Turkey: the proposed Commission to Syria, Mesopotamia, etc.

D.Lloyd George: ...He felt the moment had come to decide whether the Commission was to be sent out. Personally, he would prefer that the Commission should proceed at once. The United States Commissioners had already left for Syria. He himself, did not wish to send out British Commissioners unless the French also sent Commissioners, but in this case, he must inform General E.Allenby. ...

G.Clemenceau: His position was... that he was willing to send French Commissioners as soon as the relief of British troops by French troops was begun. As long as Syria remained entirely in British military occupation, ...it was useless to send French Commissioners. Nevertheless, he would undertake not to send any more French troops against the wishes of the British Government. He was sending some troops to Cilicia,* although there was not much object in this from the French point of view, if Cilicia* was to go to the United States. As soon as General E.Allenby would let him know that the replacement of British troops by French could commence, so that people of Syria knew that they were not exclusively under British force, he would send Commissioners.

D.Lloyd George: He had thought it right before taking action, to let his colleagues know exactly what he proposed to do. He would not send Commissioners if the French did not. General E.Allenby showed clearly that if French troops went to Syria now, there would be very serious trouble. ...[This man] was the British representative on the spot, and he could not afford to neglect his advice. Mr.D.Lloyd George then read a copy of the telegram he proposed to send to General E.Allenby. ...

V.Orlando: He would not send Commissioners until the British and French Governments sent them."

* Pronounced as: Silesia.

№ 113 draft telegram from D.Lloyd George - to the British High Commissioner in Egypt E.Allenby

Paris, May 31, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/43/App.III/Encl.II; Paris, vol.VI, p.137

"...Until arrangements have been made for the French to relieve the British troops in Syria, the French Government will not send out their Commissioners. As agreement on this question cannot be reached, French representatives will not proceed. Under such conditions we deem it inadvisable for our representatives to proceed. ...it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that the [American] Commissioners should receive every facility in the execution of their enquiries, and rely upon you to see that this is done. ...

In further reply to telegram received from you № E.A. 2484, you seem to be under the impression that future of the different ex-Turkish territories is to be decided by the Commission, but this is not the case. They are not empowered to make any decisions. When they have completed their examination of the various problems they will be asked to give their advice to the Council of the Heads of the Principal Allied States, by whom the final decision will be taken."

№ 114 note № 80443/M.E./44 from the British Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs G.Curzon, written by W.Tyrrell - to the U.S. Chardé d'affaires in Great Britain J.B.Wright

London, June 3, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 467.11St25/33/Encl.; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 254

"Sir: With further reference to the Note which the United States Ambassador [J.W.Davis] was so good as to address to me on April 10th (№ 253). ...The enquiry to which... the note refers was conducted in order to ascertain... what concessions had in fact been granted by the Ottoman Government.* The offices of the Standard Oil Company... were only entered after proper application had been made to the Spanish Consul, who was... representing American interests. [He] stated that in his books Ismael el Husseini and Suleiman Bey Nassif were not registered as holders of American rights. These gentlemen raised no objection to the investigation at the time and, in fact, offered to assist in every

way. The information obtained has been treated as strictly confidential.

I trust that the above explanation will satisfy you that the action of the British Military authorities was in no way arbitrary nor designed to prejudice the Company's claims"

* They are talking about maps with oil facilities in possession of the Standard Oil C°.

№ 115 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, June 5, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/82; Paris, vol.XI, p.224-225

"5. Attack and robbery of members on American Military Mission to Caucasus.

Memorandum № 334 was read with regard to an attack and robbery of Mr.B.Moore and Lieutenant H.Khachadoorian, of the American Military Mission to the Caucasus. The Commissioners felt that a grave mistake had been made by Major R.Tyler in sending off the telegram of May 20th, approaching the action of Mr.B. Moore in demanding reparation from the Georgian Government for the damages which he had suffered, inasmuch as official action of this sort was practically tantamount to a recognition of the Georgian Government, which the United States had no intention of recognizing at the present moment. The Commissioners therefore requested that a statement be obtained from Major R.Tyler as to his reason for having taken the action indicated in the premises."

№ 116 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, June 6, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/49½; Papers, vol.VI, p.210-218

"3. Italian claims.

W.Wilson: ...What Italy really cared for was not the islands, but only Fiume. ...*The Italians* were not afraid of the Yugoslav fleet. What they *were afraid* of was that *Yugoslavia might form an alliance with a Naval Power*. The only possible Naval Powers were France and Great Britain.

D.Lloyd George: There was one Power which was constantly overlooked in this Conference, namely, Russia. At the moment it had gone to pieces but *in five years who could tell what it would*

be.

W.Wilson suggested that Russia would be bottled up, owing to the fact that some other Power would hold the straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.

D.Lloyd George: ...He recalled that twice within modern times Great Britain had been in danger of war with Russia, first in Lord Beaconsfield's* time - but, of course, he was very Turcophile - and later when W.Gladstone was Prime Minister. In spite of the fact that Mr.W.Gladstone was very pro-Russian, the Panjdeh incident had almost brought on war, and Mr.W.Gladstone had had to go to the House of Commons for a vote of credit. This showed the danger of Russia, when in the hands of dangerous bureaucrats. Now new great Slav States were being created, and Russia might eventually dominate 160 millions of people. ...

W.Wilson: The moment M.V.Orlando refused to give Fiume to the Yugoslavs, [France and Britain] were free of the Treaty of London. ...As far as he could learn the Italian majority in Fiume was not an influential majority, ...whilst the big interests, including the bank and shipping interests were Yugoslav."

* I. e. B.Disraeli.

№ 117 letter № 74 from U.S. Commissioner at Constantinople
G.B.Ravndal - to the Acting Secretary of State F.Polk

Constantinople, June 13, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/9, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"Doctor James L.Barton, Chairman of the American Commission for Relief in the Near East, has returned from a tour of several thousand miles throughout the interior of Armenia and Anatolia during which he visited Mardin, Diarbekir, [K]harput, Malatia, Caesarea, Sivas and Marsovan. In other words, the principal places not occupied by Allied troops. His general impression is that the Armenians should be at once guaranteed ultimate independence and that if such guarantee is furnished by League of Nations, deported and self-expatriate Armenians will return to their native land which under fair government will become prosperous and self supporting. As things stand, an appalling depression, resulting from fear of the Turks paralyzes the race. With the possible exception of the Marash district, which lies within the British zone of occupation, one finds nowhere any spirit left in the Armenians. It will take fully a generation before the

Armenians can gather up sufficient vitality and self control to govern themselves. In the meantime a strong mandatory power should administer the affairs of the country of Armenia, employing all local elements including Turkish and Kurdish for national reconstruction. The Kurds are more friendly to the Armenians than to the Turks, but it is quite possible to have all races work together. The greatest foreseen need of the Armenians is neither bread nor safety, but release from fear of the Turks as they have been for 2.000 years without arms and have become presently demoralized by repeated massacres. The rehabilitation of Armenia begins only when a strong mandatory gives assurances to the population of entire independence from the Turkish Empire. The economic situation of the so called Armenian provinces is deplorable as there is no money available and no feeling of security. The officials as a rule are well meaning, but lamentably powerless against the still existing unionist organizations which is unrepentant. Doctor [L.]Barton speaks of the Armenian orphans as a problem for the future. Of these there are three hundred thousand under proper care in different places. Please repeat to Washington." ...

* Sentence regarding two thousand years of being defenseless is artistic exaggeration.

№ 118 report of Communications Section of the SEC - for the Supreme Economic Council of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, June 19, 1919 (heard June 23)

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/24/App.207; Paris, vol.X, p.398-405

"VIII) Trans-Caucasia. - The railways in the Trans-Caucasus and Armenia are at present being controlled by a British technical Mission under General [A.]Brough.* He is endeavoring to organize an efficient service between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, in spite of differences between the various local Governments concerned and the corruption and inefficiency of the local managements.

The Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council are trying to increase the imports of relief into Armenia from 5,000 to 15,000 per month. An American transportation officer had been sent out to work in liaison between the American Food Administration and General [A.]Brough, but until further rolling stock is available, and until the mutual distrust of the local Governments

can be broken down, great difficulty will be experienced in effecting a substantial improvement."

* Out of 59 men in toto, whom the SEC had been authorized to employ, 18 officers worked at the A.Brough's Mission (US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/24/App.209).

№ 119 record compiled by the Director General of Relief

H.Hoover - for the Supreme Economic Council

Analyses of contributions of the various countries towards

relief from 1st December, 1918, to 31st May, 1919

Paris, sine data, included in batch of documents,

prepared June 19, 1919 (heard July 10)

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/26/App.236; Paris, vol.X, p.455-458

"Table I. Total delivered December 1, 1918 to May 31, 1919

United States	2.053,485 total tonnage	\$529,550,763 estimated value
United Kingdom	238,832 tons	\$48,190,157
France	12,842 tons	\$2,402,500
Italy	325 tons	\$72,000

Financed by United States, Italy, France and England

jointly	228,535 tons	\$59,362,575
other countries	85,792 tons	\$16,950,430
total	2,619,811 tons	\$656,528,425

Table II. ...Furnished on credit and for cash

country	for cash	on credit
United States	\$118,161,548	\$411,389,215
United Kingdom	\$32,140,569	\$16,049,588
France	\$1,600,500	\$802,000
Italy	\$72,000	

Financed by United States, Italy, France and England

	in cash	on credit
jointly		\$59,362,575
other countries	\$16,950,430	
total	\$168,925,047	\$487,603,378

Table IV. Total relief delivered by United States of America, December 1, 1918, to May 31, 1919 ...

Turkey	15,170 metric tons of breadstuffs	\$3,109,850
Armenia	12,030 metric tons of breadstuffs	
	619 tons of beans and peas	
	513 tons condensed milk	\$2,950,258"

№ 120 letter from the Director General of Relief H.Hoover - to the Supreme Economic Council

Paris, June 22, 1919 (heard June 23)

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/24/App.216/Encl.; Paris, vol.X, p. 427-429

"Table I. Summary of all relief supplies delivered December 1, 1918, to June 1, 1919 (metric tons).

Russian prisoners in Turkey	10,944 tons of breadstuffs
	3,305 tons miscellaneous
Armenia	18,758 tons of breadstuffs
	619 tons of beans and peas
	459 tons of condensed milk

Table II. Total delivered during May 1919

Armenia	12,307 tons of breadstuffs 282 tons of condensed milk
Turkey	5,550 tons of breadstuffs"

№ 121 translation of the note-memorandum from the Turkish Delegation, Damad Ferid - to the President of the Peace Conference G.Clemenceau "Concerning the new organization of the Ottoman Empire

Paris, June 23, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/92/App.X; Paris, vol.VI, p.691-694

"Sirs: I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency here-with a memorandum concerning the new organization of the Ottoman Empire. This is the memorandum the despatch of which I announced at the meeting of the supreme Council of Peace on the 17th of June. ...

2. Asia Minor.

In Asia the Turkish lands are bounded on the north by the Black sea, on the East by the *Turco-Russian* and Turco-Persian frontiers *as they were before the war*, including on the south the vilayets of Mosul and Diarbekir, as well as a part of the province of Aleppo as far as the Mediterranean. ...

4. Armenia.

If the Armenian republic established at Erivan is recognised by the Powers of the Entente, the Ottoman Delegation will consent to discuss *ad referendum* the frontier line which is to separate the new republic from the Ottoman State. The Imperial Government would grant to the Armenians who wish to expatriate themselves in order to establish themselves in the new republic, all facilities in its power. As regards these who might wish to remain in Turkey, and who are scattered in Thrace, the Caucasus and elsewhere, they would enjoy, like the other minorities, free cultural, moral and economic development. ...

The Ottoman Government, having stated above its opinion as regards the new organization of the empire, reserves the right also of communicating subsequently to the Peace Conference its point of view regarding financial, economic and juridical questions.

It is understood that as soon as this organization is settled, the Inter-Allied forces of occupation shall be withdrawn from Ottoman territory in a short time which shall be settled by agreement unless their provisional retention is necessary in some parts of Arabia.

Nobody in Turkey is unaware of the gravity of the moment. The ideas of the Ottoman people are however well defined: -

It will not accept the dismemberment of the empire or its division under different mandates. No government may oppose the will of the people among whom are counted [so numerous] populations. ...

From the manifestations of a great number of patriotic Committees formed in the provinces, and from the great meetings held at Constantinople (in which hundreds of thousands of citizens took part on every occasion) and from the language of the telegrams which the Government daily receives from all classes of the population, there emanates but one constant thought: unity and independence.

Trusting in the sentiments of justice of the Peace Confe-

rence the Ottoman people does not despair of reaching a solution in conformity with its legitimate aspirations and one fitted to ensure in the East that durable peace which is so greatly needed."

№ 122 telegram from employee of the ARA Major J.C.Green -
to the Acting Secretary of State F.Polk

Paris, June 24, 1919 (received June 25)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/10, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

Reply to the inquiry about a state of the Armenian question.

"The status of the Armenian question appears to have undergone little change from the state which it had reached when resolutions concerning mandates were adopted by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan at the conference held at the Quai d'Orsay on January 30th, 1919.

In the meanwhile what appears to be a solid French administration has been established in Cilicia, which province the French may be expected to insist on retaining.

Within the Armenian delegation, scission between Turkish-Armenians led by Nubar and Russian-Armenians led by [A.]Aharonian gives rise to friction. Nubar's party favors American mandate unconditionally where as [A.]Aharonian's party desires to retain as full measure of independence as possible for the government of the unrecognized republic. Nubar also appears to have very intimate connection with French leaders and officials. Department is informed also that [A.]Aharoni[an] is in constant correspondence with [V.]Cardashian while Nubar deals preferably with [M.]Svaslian."*

* Inscribed in the text as: Sevasly.

№ 123 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four
at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, June 25, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/92; Paris, vol.VI, p.669-696

"16. Turkey.

D.Lloyd George asked that the question of Turkey might be considered. President W.Wilson would shortly be leaving. It was unreasonable to maintain a state of war with Turkey for the next two months. Would it not be possible to agree on some Peace Terms which would put Turkey out of her misery, outlining the frontiers of Turkey, but leaving the final dispositions of the terri-

tory that had not to remain Turkish until it was known whether the United States would accept a mandate?

W.Wilson agreed that the final disposition of Turkey ought not to be left for two months. His colleagues knew his mind on the subject, and could discuss the future arrangements of Turkey. He suggested, that the portions which Turkey was to lose might be cut off and the Treaty might provide that she should accept the dispositions of the Allied and Associated Powers in regard to them. ...

G.Clemenceau pointed out that this involved the question of Constantinople.

W.Wilson: The amputations would involve Mesopotamia, Syria and Armenia. The Allied troops would remain there to keep order until the final settlement between the Allied and Associated Powers.

D.Lloyd George: What would be done about Armenia? There were no Allied troops there. Turkey at present had some responsibility for the maintenance of order. If Armenia was cut off from Turkey, the Turkish troops would be withdrawn, and the Armenians would be left at the mercy of the Kurds. It would involve putting in some garrisons.

G.Clemenceau: What would be done about the Italians in Asia Minor?

W.Wilson: This would not concern the Turks. He thought some formula might be worked out.

D.Lloyd George: The district in question either belonged to the Turks or it did not. If it did, the Turk would say "What are the Italians doing here?", and the Allies could only reply that the Italian occupation had been made without their knowledge or consent.

S.Sonnino demurred to this statement.

W.Wilson: His proposal in regard to Turkey would be to cut off all that Turkey was to give up; and to oblige Turkey to accept any conditions with regard to oversight or direction which the Allied and Associated Governments might agree to. His present view was that a mandate over Turkey would be a mistake, but he thought some Power ought to have a firm hand. Constantinople and the Straits should be left as a neutral strip for the present, and it was already in Allied occupation. He would make the Sultan and his Government move out of Constantinople and he would

say what was ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers. He was only arguing now as to what could be legally settled as a basis for a Treaty, and *he was not attempting to decide an ultimate settlement*. He only proposed an arrangement similar to what was being made in the case of Austria.

D.Lloyd George pointed out that this involved the question of whether the Turk was to go out of Constantinople.

W.Wilson: So far as his judgment was concerned, that was decided. He has studied the question of the Turks in Europe for a long time, and every year confirmed his opinion that they ought to be cleared out. ...

22. Note from the Turkish delegation.*

D.Lloyd George: ...It would be a great advantage if a short sharp Piece with Turkey could be decided on while the Turkish delegation were still in Paris.

G.Clemeceau: He was not very hopeful of reaching a result.

...25. Mandates.

D.Lloyd George insisted on the importance of setting the form of the mandates.

W.Wilson agreed, but said he wished to read the question up."

* See document № 121.

№ 124 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, June 26, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/93½; Paris, vol.VI, p.710-715

"4. Turkish missions.

D.Lloyd George: What reply was to be given to the Turks?

W.Wilson: Mr.A.Balfour had already made a reply.

D.Lloyd George: ...He wished to know whether the Turks were to be allowed to go or whether they were to be asked to meet the Representatives of the Powers, or should they be sent a letter suggesting that they should go home and return later on when summoned.

W.Wilson expressed the opinion that it would be better to let them go. They had exhibited complete absence of common sense and a total misunderstanding of the West. They had imagined that the Conference knew no history and was ready to swallow enormous falsehoods.

D.Lloyd George: This was Turkish Diplomacy.

W.Wilson: No promise had been made to reply to what they might say.

G.Clemenceau agreed. ...

W.Wilson: The Conference had given them sufficient attention. They had been treated favourably. They had been asked to come to the Conference and all they had wished to say had been listened to. ...

D.Lloyd George: the question he had alluded to on the previous day was whether it was expedient to try and make Peace with Turkey without coming to a decision of the question of Mandates.

W.Wilson: He had reflected on this subject. It might be possible to tell the Turks that they must abandon their possessions in Europe and in certain specified territories in Asia, or else they might be told "Your territory will be bounded as follows - Turkey must renounce all rights over territories outside this boundary and accept in advance the disposal of these areas to be made by the Allied and associated Powers." ...This appeared to him to be practicable and settlement of all other questions could be adjourned.

D.Lloyd George: This proposal was practicable if it be decided at once to take Constantinople from the Turks.

W.Wilson: Constantinople was not a Turkish City; other races there were in the majority.

D.Lloyd George: This amount to a final expulsion of the Turks from Europe.

G.Clemenceau: he had an objection to make. If this solution were proposed to the Turks, they would refuse and would remain where they were. There was nothing ready to enforce immediate execution. What could the allied and Associated Powers do? The whole of this question could only be settled at one time. For his part he agreed that Constantinople should not remain Turkish. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks had been, when it occurred, a very great event which had shaken up all Europe. Since then Europe had made every effort to maintain the Turks there.

W.Wilson: Doubtless because no successor could be found for them.

D.Lloyd George: It was chiefly by reason of the fear of Russia.

G.Clemenceau: What immediate solution was in view? Constantinople had been offered to President Wilson, but he did

not seem anxious to accept it.

W.Wilson: He would take the proposal to the Powers but for the situation brought about by Italian action. The Italians had continued to land troops in Asia Minor. M.T.Tittoni no doubt would cause these troops to advance still further. Conflicts were to be feared. What Italy aimed at was to obtain a position such that *she could not be evicted without hostilities*. Should she continue this Policy, she would place herself outside the law. A great Nation which behaved in this manner lost all its rights. The problem of Asia Minor would be easily settled if Italy were not concerned. ...

G.Clemenceau reminded the meeting that the Indian Mohammedans had protested against any division of Turkish Asia.

D.Lloyd George: They meant Anatolia.

G.Clemenceau pointed out that the Greeks were in Smyrna and were extending up to Aydin. This was part of Anatolia. ...As to the Italians, ...he did not think that they would withdraw if asked to by the Council. ...

W.Wilson expressed the opinion that the Italian Government would not last. It would come to Paris and make claims which would not be accepted. These claims would be categorically refused and the Italian Government would be forced to withdraw.

G.Clemenceau: He was inclined to refuse discussion of Asiatic questions with the Italians for the present. ...

W.Wilson: He agreed.

G.Clemenceau: Any haste in dealing with the Turkish question would be dangerous. ...France had a disagreement with Great Britain. He did not wish to raise this question until Peace with Germany had been signed. Fortunately, *public opinion was not for the time being exerting any pressure*. This was a piece of good luck. ...

W.Wilson: For the time being all he proposed was to fix the frontiers of Turkey.

G.Clemenceau: That was all that could be done and as no immediate means of execution existed, the result would be deplorable.

D.Lloyd George: The Italian danger in Asia Minor was a matter of deep concern to him. The Italians were advancing straight before them and seizing in the interior everything that suited them. ...M.T.Tittoni said that what Italy desired in Asia was

mining concessions, but the Italians were now seizing everything that might be of use to them.

W.Wilson: What they wanted was things it would be impossible for them to obtain under a mandate.

D.Lloyd George: *Italy along among the Powers had not demobilised.* ...She had her troops and she was sending them to Asia Minor, to the Caucasus, and wherever she wished.

W.Wilson: He had reason to anticipate a period of *famine* in the Caucasus, when British troops were withdrawn, by reason of a momentary *influx of population*. This was a problem to which his attention has been drawn and which must be borne in mind. As to the Italians, he thought they should be asked clearly to state whether they remained in the Entente or not. If they did, they must take part with their Allies in the negotiations with Turkey and do nothing independently. ...He could not go back and tell the United States Senate "here is a treaty re-establishing peace," if Italy were left a free hand. It would be on the contrary a treaty preparing war and could not be guaranteed by the Powers.

G.Clemeceau: As far as he was Concerned, he would put the question to the Italians as clearly as possible. ...This was a state of war [in Fiume]. Was this the intention of the Treaty of London? The Italians were breaking their word there and everywhere else. ...They had gone so far in the last few days as to ask France for a small bit of French territory in the County of Nice to improve their frontier which according to them was ill drawn.

D.Lloyd George: This was madness."

№ 125 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, June 27, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/96; Paris, vol.VI, p.723-734

"9. Future work of the Piece Conference.

W.Wilson suggested that after he himself and Mr.D.Lloyd George had left, the main work of the Conference should revert to the Council of Ten at the Quai d'Orsay. Mr.R.Lansing's presence was required for a time in the United States of America, and Mr.F.Polk would temporarily take his place.

D.Lloyd George agreed in the new procedure.

It was agreed that on the departure of President W.Wilson and Mr.D.Lloyd George, the Council of ten should be re-established at the Quai d'Orsay as the Supreme Council of the

allied and Associated Powers in the Peace Conference.

10. Turkey.

D.Lloyd George: He understood that the upshot of recent conversations was that the Turkish question must be postponed until it was known whether the United States of America could accept a mandate.

It was agreed: -

1. That the further consideration of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey should be suspended until such time as the Government of the United States of America could state whether they were able to accept a mandate for a portion of the territory of the former Turkish Empire.

2. That the Turkish Delegation should be thanked for the statements they have made to the Peace Conference, and that a suggestion should be conveyed to them that they might now return to their own country."

№ 126 letter from H.Hoover, on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council - to President W.Wilson

Paris, June 27, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/97/App.I; Paris, vol.VII, p.31

"Dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your discussion with Mr.H.Morgenthau and the several discussions with myself in connection with Armenia, we make the following joint recommendation to be brought to the attention of the Chiefs of States before your departure.

1. We suggest that a single temporary resident Commissioner should be appointed to Armenia, who will have the full authority of the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy in all their relations to the de facto Armenian Government, as the joint representative of these Governments in Armenia. His duties shall be so far as he may consider necessary to supervise and advise upon various governmental matters *in the whole of Russian and Turkish Armenia*, and to control relief and repatriation questions *pending the determination of the political destiny of this area*.

2. In case the various Governments should agree to this plan immediate notification should be made to the de facto Governments of Turkey and Armenia of his appointment and authority. Furthermore, he will be appointed to represent the American

Relief Administration and the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, and take entire charge of all their activities in Russian and Turkish Armenia.

The ideal man for this position would be General J.Harbord, as I assume under all circumstances it would be desirable to appoint an American. Should General J.Harbord be unable to undertake the matter, I am wondering whether you would leave it to us to select the man in conjunction with General J.Pershing.

I assume that the personnel of this Mission would be necessarily comprised of army and navy officers who would retain their rank and emoluments and I understand from the Commission for the Near East that they would be prepared to supply such funds as were required for incidental expenses until such other arrangements could be made. Faithfully yours, Herbert Hoover."

**№ 127 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four
of the Paris Peace Conference**

Paris, June 28, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/97; Paris, vol.VI, p.740-745

"5. Armenia: proposed resident Commissioner.

The Council had before them a letter addressed by Mr.H. Hoover to President W.Wilson, suggesting the appointment of a single temporary Resident Commissioner to Armenia, who should have the full authority of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy, in all their relations to the de facto Armenian Government, as the joint representative of these Governments in Armenia.

The proposal was accepted."

№ 128 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, June 28, 1919, 17:00

held in the Foyer of the Senate Chamber of the Chateau at Versailles shortly after the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/99; Paris, vol.VI, p.751-758

"7. Armenia: proposed resident Commissioner.

M.Hankey: He had encountered difficulty in giving effect to the decision taken at the meeting in the morning to appoint a single temporary resident Commissioner to Armenia. It appeared

to him that the matter required a good deal of administrative action.

It was agreed that the Council of Ten should be asked to concert the necessary administrative steps to give effect to this decision."

№ 129 notes of a meeting of the Council of Four

Paris, June 28, 1919, 18:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/99½; Paris, vol.VI, p.759-762

"1. Asia Minor: proposed statement to the new Italian Delegation.

...Declaration by France and Great Britain on the one hand, and by the United States of America, on the other hand, to the new Italian delegation... was approved, subject to some small amendments. ...

Sir M.Hankey was instructed to obtain the signature of Mr. D.Lloyd George before his departure, and subsequently that of M. G.Clemenceau, who undertook to communicate [this, approved redraft of statement] to the Italians." ...

№ 130 redraft of the Allied Statement, by A.Balfour -
to the Italian Delegation

Paris, June 28, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03401/99½/App.I; Paris, vol.VI, p.760-762

"...There is no doubt that the present uncomfortable condition of affairs is largely due to the complications which the development of political and military events has brought about since the Treaty of London was signed in 1915. Since then the aspect of the world has changed. The Treaty was contracted with Russia, France and Britain, but Russia is no longer in the war. ...The Austro-Hungarian Empire had ceased to exist. [The Treaty] assumed, that if Turkey was completely defeated, fragments of the Turkish Empire might be assigned to the victors; but while Turkey has indeed been completely defeated and the alien peoples which she misgoverned are to be separated from her Empire, they are not to be handed over in possession to the conquerors, while any spheres of influence which the latter may acquire will be held by them not independently, but as Trustees or mandatories of the League of Nations. In 1915 America was neutral; but in 1917 she

entered the war unhampered by any Treaty, and at a period when the development of this order of political ideas, to which she gave a most powerful impulse was in process of rapid accomplishment.

...The Treaty of London with which the history may be said to open was from the very beginning not strictly observed. Italy has undertaken to employ all her resources in prosecuting the war on common with her Allies against all their enemies. But she... took no part in the war against Turkey. ...[And] we feel bound to add that the difficulties have been greatly augmented by the policy pursued in Asia Minor by the Italian Government and Italian troops. ...President W.Wilson, Monsieur G.Clemenceau and Mr.D.Lloyd George complained in the strongest terms of the proceedings... in South-Western Anatolia. They drew the sharpest contrast between the policy of the Greek Government, which moved no troops except with the cognisance, and usually at the request of the Allied and Associated Powers, including, of course, Italy herself while Italy... landed troops and occupied important positions without giving the least inkling of her proceedings to those whose counsels she shared, whose general policy she professed to support, but whose remonstrances on this point she persistently ignored. ...

At first sight it might seem to be animated by the idea that *territories occupied by troops of a given nationality would be assigned to that nationality* by the final terms of Peace. ...We venture to quote a paragraph on the subject to which the Italian Representative induced:

"No State will be rewarded for prolonging the horrors of war by any increase of territory; nor will the Allied and Associated Powers be induced to alter decisions made in the interests of Peace and justice by the unscrupulous use of military methods."

...Let... America, France, Britain and Italy consider together with a fresh mind... whether some solution cannot be found which is consisted both with the material interests of Italy, her enduring aspirations and the rights and susceptibilities of her neighbours. ... It is wholly useless in our judgement to discuss Peace Terms in Paris, ...while one of our number is elsewhere pursuing an independent and even antagonistic course of action. If, for example, Italy insists, after our earnest protests, on maintaining troops in Anatolia, it can only be because she intends to obtain by force all she claims to be her by right. This is quite inconsistent with ge-

nuine alliance; its inevitable end is complete isolation. ...To Italy it will mean the loss of all claim to further assistance or aid from those who were once proud to be her associates. To us such a consummation seems to be disastrous, but if Italian policy runs its course unchanged it seems also to be inevitable."

№ 131 copy of letter from the Secretary of the British Delegation Sir M.Hankey - to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference P.Dutasta "Appointment of a resident Commissioner in Armenia"

Paris, June 28, 1919

Paris, vol.VII, p.30

"My Dear Colleague:

The Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers to-day had before them the attached letter from Mr.H.Hoover to President W.Wilson suggesting the appointment of a single temporary resident Commissioner to Armenia, who should have the full authority of the United States of America, Great Britain, France and Italy in all their relations to the de facto Armenian Government as the joint representative of these Governments in Armenia.

Mr.H.Hoover's proposal was accepted and this afternoon it was agreed that the Council of Ten should be asked to concert the necessary arrangements to give effect to this decision.

I am directed to request that Your Excellency will lay the matter before the Council of Ten.

Believe me, Yours very sincerely."

№ 132 telegram № 2461 from the Acting Secretary of State W.Phillips - to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington, June 28, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/12:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 824

"Following message sent to the President through ordinary channels on June 22nd: "We believe that without regard to party or creed the American people are deeply interested in the welfare of the Armenian people and expect to see the restoration of the independence of Armenia... we had hoped that the Peace Conference would make it one of its first duties to take necessary steps to put a stop to the agony of Armenia and recognize her fidelity and services to our causes. We now believe that the pre-

vailing insecurity of life and intense want in the major portion of Armenia make immediate action an imperative and sacred duty. We, therefore, respectfully urge that as a first step in that direction and without waiting for the conclusion of peace either the Allies or America or both should at once send to Caucasus Armenia requisite food, munitions and supplies for 50.000 men and such other help as they may require to enable the Armenians to occupy the non-occupied parts of Armenia within the boundaries defined in the Memorandum of the Delegation of Integral Armenia. We trust that it may be possible to secure prompt and full justice for Armenia. (Signed) Charles Evans Hughes, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, John Sharp Williams, Alfred E. Smith, James W. Gerard, Frederic Courtland Penfield, Charles W. Eliot."

№ 133 letter from the Secretary of State R. Lansing -
to President W. Wilson

Paris, June 28, 1919

Paris, vol. XI, p. 597

"My Dear Mr. President: It occurs to me that after your departure it will probably be necessary for me on different occasions to refer to conversations which have taken place at the meetings of the Council of Four and *as no records of these meetings are at my disposal*, I take the liberty of bringing the matter to your attention for such action as you may consider appropriate.

I believe that Sir M. Hankey has the reports of these meetings and at your request will no doubt furnish me with a copy.

Faithfully yours."

№ 134 special warrant issued by Treasury of the
Republic of Armenia - given to the American Committee
for Relief in the Near East

Yerevan, June 30, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg. 1, file 304, f. 12

"The Republic of Armenia pledges to pay on the 30th of June, 1921, the American Committee for Relief, or on order from him,* the United States Treasury in Washington, District Columbia, the United States of America, an amount of 5,000,000 five million dollars in gold coins of the United States of current pattern, weight and design, with interest, estimated as 5 per cent per year, beginning from this date on; the per cent should be paid annually,

on June 30, 1920, and on the 30th of June of every subsequent year as long, until this account remains outstanding.

This warrant is given by the Republic of Armenia in payment for foodstuffs and other commodities, transferred by the American Relief Administration to the Republic of Armenia as assistance to the Armenian people, on terms of the special agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the American Relief Administration, dated April 8, 1919.

The Republic of Armenia acknowledges that this warrant should be considered as a collateral and offer a guarantee by all its property, which is rendered as a collateral for other commitments, together with advances for similar goals, paid by the Republic of Armenia to some of the Allied Powers, starting from November 11, 1919." ...

* I. e. to bearer of its financial request.

№ 135 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, July 1, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/100; Paris, vol.XI, p.256-262

"15. ...The Commissioners discussed the question of an American mandate over Armenia and Constantinople. Mr.H. Hoover expressed himself as being very adverse to the United States becoming the mandatory power in Armenia alone for the following reasons:

Armenia was the poorhouse of Europe. It was at present overrun with Turks and in order to repatriate the Armenians an equivalent number of Turks would have to be replaced. This would require an army, and an army of at least 50,000 to 100,000 men. ...Altogether, such an undertaking would cost the United States at least \$100,000,000 a year for many years.

In Mesopotamia, however, the situation was very different. This was the richest and most fertile country of Asia Minor and could easily be developed to support additional population of from 5,000,000 to 10,000,000 people. It would therefore be only fair to the power which took a mandate over Armenia to give it at the same time a mandate over Mesopotamia. The British had, however, spent a great deal of money and shed much blood in order to become the possessors of Mesopotamia, and it would therefore be very difficult to oust them from this country. Accor-

dingly, Mr.H.Hoover suggested that the British be told that the United States would be glad to take a mandate over Armenia provided they were able to have Mesopotamia at the same time. Or that, vice versa, that if Great Britain wished to maintain a mandate over Mesopotamia, they should at the same time assume the same obligation for Armenia. He was convinced that the British would rather bear the burden of Armenia that run the risk of losing Mesopotamia.

In regard to Constantinople, Mr.H.Hoover felt that it would be a terrific burden and a public act of charity for the United States to take a mandate over this city, or of the area in which the city would located. At the present time the city has a population of 2,000,000 people and is entirely without any economic resources or any hinterland. As a port, it serves no purpose except as the gateway to the Black Sea and a coaling station, and as a home for pilots. Modern conditions of traffic no longer made it necessary for ships even to stop in the port, and that it was inevitable, therefore, that the city should soon be reduced to about 200,000 inhabitants, or else that the 2,000,000 inhabitants should be supported as a matter of charity of some Great Power. Mr.H.Hoover thought France would be the logical power to receive a mandate over this City, because of her future associations which France would undoubtedly have with Russia."

№ 136 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, July 2, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/101; Paris, vol.XI, p.262-264

"7. ...H.Hoover: He had come again to discuss with the Commissioners the question of relief in Armenia. He understood that General J.Harbord was to be sent to Armenia to investigate conditions in that country and to report as to the total number of troops which would be required to repatriate the Armenian population and keep the country in order. To send General J.Harbord in this capacity would be very unwise, and, at the same time, to realize the difficulty of giving to General J.Harbord an administrative position without supplying him with a great number of troops. At the same time he felt that by sending General J.Harbord to Armenia, the American Commission would be doing an involuntary piece of propaganda, looking towards the acceptance by the

United States of a mandate over that country.

Then he described the work which had been done in Russian Armenia by the Commission of the Near East, to assist in relieving hunger and want. ...In his opinion, a single competent official should be sent to Armenia, to whom he could turn over all the foodstuffs now in that district for distribution and to whom the Commission of the Near East should be required to turn over its funds for relief purposes. Such a person, if invested with proper authority by the Supreme Council in Paris, could become a virtual dictator in that country and could develop a proper and competent administration.

Mr.H.Hoover read a memorandum which he had prepared in regard to the whole Armenian situation.

The Commissioners agreed that the substance of the memorandum should be embodied in any reply that was sent to the telegram which had been received by the Commissioners from a committee, of which Charles E.Hughes was the chairman,* and which had asked certain specific questions in regard to Armenia.

H.Hoover: He felt, however, that if this were done, there should be added to this memorandum a statement to the effect that no action should be taken by the United States in Armenia without a complete and very thorough investigation of the geographical boundaries which would be given to this country because of the tremendous economic importance of these boundaries.

The Commissioners decided that Mr.H.Hoover with Mr.H. Morgenthau and Mr.W.H.Buckler, should draft an appropriate reply to Mr.C.Hughes."

* American Committee for the Independence of Armenia.

№ 137 brief notes on a meeting of the Council of Ten

Paris, July 3, 1919, 14:30

Paris, vol.VII, p.17-19

"M.G.Clemenceau had called the meeting at the request of M.T.Tittoni.

T.Tittoni brought up the question in regard to the troops in Asia Minor. He proposed that the railway line running east and west should be controlled by the British, French and American authorities, and that it should constitute the boundary line between the Italian and Greek forces, but that both the Italians and Greeks should have the right to use it.

G.Clemenceau: The Italians had gone into Asia Minor without authority from the Conference. He also suggested that M.T.Tittoni should draft some formula regarding the proposition of the use of the railroad. ...[Besides,] the settlement of the question of Asia Minor should not be made a separate question, but it would be considered in connection with the settlement of the whole Turkish question.

T.Tittoni: Italy did not desire to obtain sovereignty over that portion of Asia Minor now controlled by her troops. Italy did, however, desire to secure certain concession to the coal mines at Heraclea and to the oil wells at Van.

R.Lansing: He was sympathetic to the Italian desire to secure coal mines at Heraclea. On the other hand he thought that Armenia was too poor to be deprived of all her resources and that the oil wells at Van should not be taken from her.

G.Clemenceau: The French had certain concessions at Heraclea, and the Italians were now proposing to surround the French concessions.

R.Lansing asked whether Italy had any coal mines? ...Under these circumstances Italy should also have [them.] ...

T.Tittoni asked Mr.R.Lansing whether the United States would accept the Treaty of London if his question were answered in affirmative."

№ 138 telegram № 2961 from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, R.Lansing, H.White, T.H.Bliss - to the Acting Secretary of State W.Phillips, for Charles E.Hughes Committee

Paris, July 3, 1919 (received July 4)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/13:Telegram, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"Your cable June 22 referred by President to this Commission for reply. Active relief work on a large scale is now in progress in the most distressed areas of Armenia but will require much enlarged support in view of the expiration of congressional appropriations and falling off of public charity. Competent observers report that immediate training and equipment of adequate Armenian forces is impracticable and that repatriation of refugees is feasible only under protection of British or American troops. British authorities inform us that they cannot spare troops for this purpose. The problem cannot be handled without authority and

adequate appropriation by Congress. We requested H.Hoover and H.Morgenthau who have organizations in [this] territory composed of economic, military and transportation experts, to prepare memorandum on the points raised by you. Memorandum begins:

"Information herewith is broad summary of the views of economic, military, political, and relief missions and agencies of the various Allied Governments with whom we are associated and to some extent based on our own experience. First it appears there are now approximately 2,000,000 surviving Armenians in Russia and Turkey of whom about 750,000 refugees from their homes in Turkish Armenia and these refugees are largely centred in Russian Armenia. Therefore the centre of greatest present suffering lies in Russian Armenia in the area of the de facto Armenian Republic and this suffering is largely due to the flooding of the native Armenians with refugees from Turkey who have not only been driven out but whose lands have now been settled by Turks or villages destroyed. Turkish forces and bandits of considerable strength still occupy the old Armenian districts and the frontier between Turkish and Russian Armenia. Starvation has been greatly ameliorated by the United States Food Administration, American Commission for the Relief in the Near East and British military authorities in the Caucasus. The limiting factor has been the quantity of foodstuffs that could be gotten over the Caucasus railway which mainly traverses the new Georgian Republic whose people are antagonistic to the Armenians. Except for the small British occupying force it would have been practically hopeless to secure any railway service at all. The funds and supplies available from all sources for the relief will be exhausted by the end of September and the problem is entirely beyond the reach of private charity so that government support will be necessary. Aside from sheer support to refugees it is necessary to repatriate them, to re-establish their ability to support themselves, and incident[al]ly to dispossess and repatriate the Turkish intruders. Until this is done the entire displaced population must depend on charity. All military advisers agree that the Armenian population itself even if furnished arms and supplies will be unable to overcome Turkish opposition and surrounding pressure from Georgians et cetera. The area proposed to be assigned to the new State of Armenia in order to include all Armenian settlements will contain a population of approximately 5,000,000 so that the large majority will consist of Turks, Kurds

and other non-Christian population. The State as outlined will in large part be a mountainous area and expensive for railway transportation and traffic in general with limited resources beyond primitive agriculture. It is agreed that an Armenian gendarmerie could be built up after some years with sufficient sprinkling of foreign instructors but it is not believed that it could be built up to sufficient strength to dominate the major and antagonistic population that will necessarily be included in the Armenian State and it is generally considered that it will not only require an initial force of at least 60,000 foreign troops to even secure repatriation but to a continued force of at least one half this number in occupation over a number of years to maintain order and support any government that may be created. The economic resources of the new State appear to us incapable of supporting such a force for some years and the mandatory that assumes the new State of Armenia must bear these charges for that period. To secure the establishment and protection and undertake the economic development of the State until it becomes self supporting such mandatory must provide not less than \$300,000,000. This would have to be looked upon largely as a sheer effort to ease humanity. Whoever undertakes it will be exposed to constant political difficulties with the surrounding States on account of the mixed populations and the racial antagonisms that go back over centuries. In [any] event exhaustive investigation should be undertaken by impartial experts on the ground as to the problems involved and measures to be taken before more than support to refugees is undertaken. Hoover, Morgenthau."

Mr.H.Hoover wishes to add on his sole responsibility that he considers that this is the only practicable method by which a government in this region could be made economically self supporting would be to embrace in some [same] mandate the area of Mesopotamia where there are very large possibilities of economic developments, where there would be an outlet for the commercial abilities of the Armenians, and with such an enlarged area it could be hoped in a few years to build up a State self supporting although the intervention of some dominant foreign race must be continued until the entire population could be educated to a different basis of moral relations and that consequently whatever State is assigned the mandate for Mesopotamia should at the same time take up the burden of Armenia." For American Mission,

Robert Lansing, Henry White, Tasker H.Bliss."

№ 139 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace

Paris, July 3, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/102; Paris, vol.XI, p.265-267

"2. Suggestions of Steering Committee.

C.A.Herter brought to the attention of the Commissioners four suggestions which the Steering Committee desired to have considered. ...

a) The American representatives are not attending some of the meetings of the Commissions on the subjects relating to the Treaties with Bulgaria and Turkey, the opinion of the Commissioners is desired as to whether our experts should not attend all such meetings and participate fully in the preparatory work for these treaties. If... they shall participate, ...we recommend that instructions be issued to that effect.

The Commissioners decided [just in this way] ...and desired that a circular to that effect be issued to all the members of the Commission who might be effected thereby.

b) The Steering Committee requested that a memorandum from Professors C.Day and A.C.Coolidge, asking certain questions in regard to the Near East, be referred to a Special Committee, as a membership for which the following individuals are suggested: Dr.[D.W.]Johnson, Professor A.C.Coolidge, Mr.W.H.Buckler, Mr. L.Dominian.

The Commissioners approved entirely of the formation of this Special committee, with the exception of Mr.L.Dominian, whom they felt it would be unnecessary to include." ...

№ 140 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five of the
Paris Peace Conference

Paris, July 5, 1919, 15:00

Paris, vol.VII, p.28

"3. High Commissioner for Armenia.

At Mr.R.Lansing's proposal, the following resolution was adopted: -

Colonel W.N.Haskell, USA, is appointed by this Council to act as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the United States, British, French and Italian Governments, it being un-

derstood that Colonel W.N.Haskell will be coincidentally appointed to take full charge at all relief measures in Armenia by the various relief organisations operating there. All representatives of the United States, British, French, and Italian Governments in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Constantinople are to be at once instructed to co-operate with and give support to Colonel W.Haskell."

№ 141 letter from the member of the special committee on Near East Affairs of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace W.H.Buckler - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing, all Commissioners

Paris, July 5, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/5839/Ann."B"; Paris, vol.VII, p.43-44

"1. The question of Armenian Relief is now being dealt with as follows:

a) Colonel William N.Haskell is to be the local Commissioner in charge of food distribution and relief;

b) General J.Harbord is to proceed to Armenia to report on repatriation and general military and economic problems.

2. A further question is the feasibility of repatriating a certain number of refugees before September 1, so that they may sow their fields. This might possibly be accomplished through British officers on the spot, and the repatriation of even a few thousand men would materially reduce starvation next year. There will be no time for General J.Harbord to arrange for this before the winter begins.

Having consulted Mr.R.Vansittart of the British Delegation, I therefore recommend:

That the British authorities be requested to consult General G.Milne as to the possibility of immediately repatriating a certain number of Armenian refugees. Their protection, until Armenia receives a mandatory would devolve upon the British forces, while their food would be supplied, as at present, by the American Relief Organisation."

№ 142 telegram № 2982 from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, H.Hoover, H.Morgenthau - to President W.Wilson, to the Acting Secretary of State W.Phillips, and for C.E.Hughes committee if you see fit

Paris, July 5, 1919 (received July 6)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/14:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 826-827

"After receiving General Harbord's views, and discussion with the Peace Mission, we have concluded that the temporary measures necessary to strengthen relief and administration in Armenia would be separated from the problems involved in repatriation and expulsion of present trespassers, and permanent pacification of the territory. We have therefore recommended the appointment of Colonel William N.Haskell, at present in charge of relief measures in Rumania, to be a temporary commissioner as proposed by us to you and accepted in principle by the heads of States, and we trust he will not be recalled by the War Department. The broader question of repatriation, etc., requires an examination as to the measures and force necessary successfully to cope with the problem and will require Congressional action to grant sufficient funds and forces. We therefore recommend that a mission should immediately be sent to Armenia headed by General J.Harbord who should choose his own assistants to investigate this question together with the general political and economic problems involved in setting up the new State of Armenia. Such investigation as a basis of determination of policy is, in our minds, necessary before even the repatriation of refugees can be begun. We believe General J.Harbord could be persuaded to undertake such a mission. H.Hoover. H.Morgenthau. We endorse the recommendations made in the above telegram." ...

№ 143 notes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Paris, July 5, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/104; Paris, vol.XI, p.269-270

"6. Armenian relief.

Mr.W.Buckler entered the meeting and offered a memorandum regarding the question of Armenian Relief.* The Commissioners approved the recommendation contained in the memorandum, that the British authorities be requested to consult General

G.Milne as to the possibility of immediately repatriating a certain number of Armenian refugees. Their protection, until Armenia receives a mandatory, would devolve upon the British forces, while their food would be supplied, as at present, by the American Relief organization."

* I.e. document № 141.

№ 144 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, July 7, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/5839; Paris, vol.VII, p.32-44

"1. Situation in Italy.

G.Clemenceau: ...The French Consul at Rhodes reported that, at the very time when the Peace Conference was asking M.T. Tittoni to withdraw Italian troops from Southern Asia Minor, 3,300 men had been sent two days ago to occupy a further point in Asia Minor. The French Ambassador in Rome, who had been most violently attacked, had been told by General A.Albricci that these attacks would cease if better news came from Paris. ...

9. Repatriation of certain Armenians.

R.Lansing: He had a proposal to make regarding of certain Armenians, in order that they should be able to sow the next crop.

A.Balfour: So far as he remembered, on the previous day a Commissioner had been appointed for Armenia.

R.Lansing: What was now proposed was different. It was necessary to bring exiled Armenian agriculturalists back to the country, and to dispossess the Turkish usurpers of their land. His proposal was that General G.Milne be consulted as to the possibility of doing this.

A.Balfour: He would certainly agree to consulting General G.F.Milne as to the possibility of repatriation a certain number of Armenian refugees. He did not think, however, that he could accept the responsibility laid down in the second sentence of the proposal, namely, that their protection should devolve upon the British forces.

R.Lansing: All he wished was that General G.F.Milne should report as to this also.

A.Balfour: he would agree if a slight modification of the text were made.

It was then agreed that the British Government consult General G.F.Milne as to the possibility of repatriating immediately

a certain number of Armenian refugees, and as to the possibility of ensuring their protection by British forces until Armenia received a mandatory. In the meantime their food would be supplied as at present by the American Relief Organization."

№ 145 telegram № 118 from the U.S. Commissioner at Constantinople G.B.Ravndal - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing
Constantinople, July 7, 1919 (received July 11)
US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/15; published in: "Journal d'Orient," Constantinople, 2.07.1919,* T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"In reference to the scheme of Doctor [C.D.]Ussher concerning Armenian repatriation, an interview with Ali Kemal Bey, who recently was forced out of the Turkish Cabinet, in the "Journal d'Orient" for July 2nd is of interest. The former Minister of Interior says, "There is in this country a question of emigrants which we have inherited from the unhappy deportations of which you know. In conformity with my policy of large tolerance, I tried as far as possible to settle amicably the contentions which sprang from this question. In order to do so, I availed myself both of suitable Entente officers and of my own subordinates. But in all this my essential aim was the supreme interest of Turkey. Dr.[C.]Ussher recently came here with the intention of adjusting without reference to race or religion the question of emigrants from Bitlis, Van and Erzerum. Dr.[C.]Ussher considers these regions as Turkish. Consequently in his scheme he would determine the fate of the emigrants uniformly: furnish them houses and agricultural implements and build roads et cetera and all that with money which the Americans would have advanced. As Dr.[C.]Ussher had to leave and the Council of Ministers had not had the time to study his project, I gave him a letter of recommendation to the Grand Vizier in Paris and it is evident that if the latter accepts Dr.[C.]Ussher's proposition the scheme will be carried out. I might mention also that the project involves the employment of native ottoman gendarmerie from Bitlis, Van and Erzerum under American officers. It is this plan which aroused the opposition of my colleagues. As for me, I considered it in principle worthy of examination."

In an interview given yesterday by Edhem Bey, acting Minister of Interior to a Turkish newspaper, he refers to Dr.[C.]Ussher's proposition as follows. "We called Ali Kemal before the Cabinet. The ex-Minister declared that he had not signed the pro-

ject of Dr.[C.]Ussher; he had only given the letter of recommendation to Ferid Pasha in Paris. Dr.[C.]Ussher's scheme consists in according to the province of Bitlis-Van and Erzerum, an administrative autonomy uniformly condominium of Turkey and America, not with the American Government but with an American softy, which would charge itself with the necessary expenses in order to introduce the required reforms and be reimbursed for its expenses with interest acquired by collecting the public taxes of the said provinces. It is thus they would proceed to extort the Turkish debt."

*Contents of this document is produced in the article: Makhmourian G., Management of the U.S. relief and the Republic of Armenia. "Вестник общественных наук" ("Herald of the Social Sciences"), Yerevan, 2008, № 1, p.102.

№ 146 notes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, July 8, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/107; Paris, vol.XI, p.273-288

"L.Harrison: Treaty with Turkey. As far as the Supreme Council is concerned, the consideration has been postponed until it is known whether the United States will accept a mandate.

R.Lansing: Yes, and of course that comes after the Treaty with Germany.

L.Harrison: The Economic Commission is considering the Turkish Treaty at the present time.

R.Lansing: the Economic - and I assume the Territorial too, - are you not? Has it been submitted at all to the territorial Commission, as to boundaries?

Major D.W.Johnson: The Commission had taken up that side of it. ...

R.Lansing: But that all depends, doesn't it, or depends in very large measure, on whether it goes under mandates or whether there is to be an independent Turkish State?

F.K.Nielsen: They proceed on the supposition that there was to be a certain Turkey, which has been called Turkey proper. ...

R.Lansing: I think we will have to drop that, except I think we ought to continue the study of it, and I think we ought to study the boundaries. We don't want a perfectly impoverished Armenia, for example. That is a perfectly useless proposition. You

might just as well make the Sahara a State as to do that.

Well has anybody any suggestions? Of course there is... the necessity, so far as possible, of cutting down our personnel, but we don't want to cut it down to where it is going to materially impair our work at all. ...

L.Harrison: There are still miscellaneous questions.

R.Lansing: What are they?

L.Harrison: Mandates. A special commission is considering them. ...Supply of armaments to New States."

№ 147 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, July 9, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/5839; Paris, vol.VII, p.58-85

"G.Clemenceau: ...The only Great power which had not been demobilised was Italy.

S.Crespi: M.G.Clemenceau had more that once declared that Italy had not demobilised. He wished to make a formal and official statement that Italy had demobilised as much as France, and had even demobilised one class more than France.

G.Clemenceau: ...Meanwhile, she was sending 40,000 troops across the Black Sea to Baku.

S.Crespi: The British Government had requested that the British troops in the Caucasus be relieved by the Italians. He was not aware that Italy had as yet decided to send even one man.

G.Clemenceau: he had nevertheless received official telegrams in support of what he said.

U.Cavallero: He had just given General W.Thwaites a statement in complete contradiction of the information mentioned by M.G.Clemenceau."

№ 148 telegram № 3076 from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, R.Lansing - to the Acting Secretary of State W.Phillips

Paris, July 11, 1919 (received July 11)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/16:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 827

"The following resolution had been passed by the Council of Five with my support and with the prior approval of the President and the other heads of States:

"Colonel W.N.Haskell, USA, is appointed by this council to act as High Commissioner in Armenia on behalf of the United

States, British, French and Italian Governments, it being understood that Colonel W.Haskell will be coincidentally appointed to take full charge of all relief measures in Armenia by the various relief organizations operating there. All representatives of the United States, British, French and Italian Governments in Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Constantinople are to be at once instructed to cooperate with and give support to Colonel W.Haskell."

Colonel W.Haskell will act as an agent of the State Department in this area and it is desirable that you should arrange with Secretary [N.D.]Baker for his prolonged assignment for this service. He is at present assigned to H.Hoover's staff but as all regular army officers, of which he is one, are called in and as the army authorities here state that the matter is now out of their hands, it is necessary that it should be arranged in Washington. He may also need some further officers assigned him in connection with his mission. The travel and incidental expenses of the mission are being provided for by relief funds."

№ 149 telegram from the Acting Secretary of State F.L.Polk -
to the member of the American Committee for the Independence
of Armenia C.E.Hughes

Washington, July 12, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/13, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

I beg to transmit to you a telegram from the Secretary of State R.Lansing of July 3, 1919:

"The Department has received through the American Peace Mission copy of a telegram which Messrs.[H.]Hoover and [H.]Morgenthau sent to the President, the substance of which, at the suggestion of the Mission, is transmitted below for the information of yourself and the above named members of your Committee [E.Root, H.C.Lodge, J.S.Williams, A.E.Smith, J.W.Penfield, C.W.Eliot]. Messrs.[H.]Hoover and [H.]Morgenthau state that after being acquainted with General [J.]Harbord's views and after they had discussed the matter with the Mission, they concluded that it was advisable to separate the temporary measures necessary to strengthen relief and administration in Armenia, from problems that are involved in the repatriation of Armenian refugees and the expulsion of the present trespassers, as well as the permanent pacification of the territory. Therefore Messrs.[H.]Hoover and [H.]Morgenthau have recommended that Colonel William N.Haskell,

now in charge of relief measures in Rumania, be appointed a temporary Commissioner, as they had proposed to the Commission and which proposal was, in principle, accepted by the heads of States, and they trusted that the Department of War would not recall the Colonel. They state that the broader question of repatriation, etc., requires an examination as regards the force and the measures which would be necessary in order to cope successfully with the problem, and will require congressional action granting sufficient forces as well as funds. Messrs.[H.]Hoover and [H.]Morgenthau therefore recommend that a Mission be at once sent to Armenia headed by General [J.]Harbord, the latter to choose his own assistants, to investigate this question as well as the general economic and political problems which are involved in setting up the new Armenian State. Messrs.[H.]Hoover and [H.]Morgenthau state that, in their own minds, such investigation is necessary as a basis of determination of policy even before the repatriation of refugees can be begun.

I shall be pleased to see that any reply you may desire to send, shall receive proper course." ...

№ 150 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, July 15, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/5955; Paris, vol.VII, p.129-153

"9. Letter from M.E.Venizelos concerning Asia Minor.

T.Tittoni: The Greeks must conform to a common plan, and must realize that they formed part of the forces of the Allied Powers. The Greeks must therefore first halt on their present positions.

A.Balfour suggested that M.E.Venizelos be asked to attend the Council in order to give a frank explanation of what was going on. He would like to ask the Military Experts what they thought of the allegation made in the letter read by M.G.Clemenceau that there were 300,000 well-armed Turkish troops in the field. The British Military Experts were of the opinion that this was far from the mark.

General E.Belin: He thought that these figures very much exaggerated. He agreed that there were perhaps some 60,000 men in all Anatolia."

№ 151 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, July 16, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/5955; Paris, vol.VII, p.154-170

"1. Statement by M.E.Venizelos regarding the situation in Anatolia.

E.Venizelos: On the 18th June he had sent a letter to the President of the Peace Conference calling attention to the concentration of Turkish troops in various places. ...What he must ask the Council to grant him was either a definite line or liberty of action for his troops. ...He would further suggest that in the space left between the Greek and Turkish advance posts small detachments ...of Allied troops be placed. ...There were five Greek divisions in the area. He wished to reduce them to two. ...He did not wish to extend Greek occupation. All that he wanted was to be safe in Smyrna and to maintain hold on certain places the population of which was entirely Greek. He was well aware that no conquest would influence the decisions of the Conference. ...

A.Balfour: [At present] there were three separate armies in the area; one Greek, one Italian and one Turkish. The last was of uncertain size, largely composed, presumably, of irregulars, formidable for attacks on lines of communication, but not for a settle battle. ...According to his information the Turks were undoubtedly actuated by fear in all that they had done. ...This seemed to them the prelude of a great advance; this might lead to massacres. If it were made clear to the Turks that there would be no advance beyond a definite line it might be possible to control them. ...It was clear that the machinery for the co-operation of the Greek Commander and the British Commodore had not worked smoothly. ...He would like to remind the Council that General E. Allenby was still technically in authority over the whole of Turkey in Asia on behalf of the Allied Powers. ...

T.Tittoni: He agreed in the main with Mr.A.Balfour. All advance should be stopped and the Turks should be convinced that there was no intention to declare war on them and that the Armistice continued. ...

G.Clemenceau: He was disposed to favor M.T.Tittoni's plan. If need be, he might even agree to the employment of General E.Allenby, should M.T.Tittoni and M.E.Venizelos fail to reach an agreement. Happily this seemed unlikely. As to the means of reassuring the Turks, he thought this could best be done by the

Conference directly. He hoped that on the following day M.T. Tittoni and M.E.Venizelos would be able to bring a definite agreement to the Council. It would then be possible to send the Turks a message telling them exactly what to expect and that the ultimate solution would not be prejudged by any military occupation. ...He did not quite agree with Mr.A.Balfour. General E. Allenby *commanded in Syria and Mesopotamia*, not, he thought, *in Anatolia*. When the Greeks had been sent to Smyrna, ...Admiral [S.Gough-]Calthorpe had been informed. ...Surely a direct message from the Council would have more effect on the Turkish Government than anything else, especially if it be made clear to the Turks that the Italians and Greeks would stop their advance.

A.Balfour: Perhaps the advancer would not be arrested for long.

T.Tittoni: If he and M.E.Venizelos made themselves personally responsible, he thought there would be no further advance of their respective forces.

H.White: ...He doubted, however, whether the authority of Sultan really controlled events in Anatolia.

G.Clemenceau: This was perhaps true as the rebellion of the Turks had been spontaneous and not controlled in Constantinople.

T.Tittoni: The General in command had nevertheless come from the capital.

E.Venizelos: ...Where Greek and Italian troops were neighbors, both could safely halt on the same line; where the Greeks faces the Turks, it might be necessary to occupy a few additional points.

T.Tittoni: He thought the whole front should halt, otherwise the Turks would not believe in the message sent to them.

It was decided that M.T.Tittoni and M.E.Venizelos should seek an agreement regarding the delimitation of the Italian and Greek zones of occupation in Asia Minor and that they should submit the result of their conversation to the Council as soon as possible.

In case an agreement were reached, a communication would be made in the name of the Council to the Turkish Government informing the latter of the decision taken and offering the assurances regarding the intentions of the Allied Governments."

№ 152 memorandum by the Director of American Relief
Administraion H.Hoover - for the Council of Five
"Situation in Russian Armenia"

Paris, July 16, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/5944/App."C" and US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/27/App.249; Paris, vol.VII, p.482-483

"The relief Administration, co-operating with the various Allied authorities, has been for month striving to meet the terrible situation of starvation in Russian Armenia. Some 50,000 tons of food have been provided and the only method to access to this area is over the railway from Batum, and this railway is in the territory of the so-called Georgian Government. The railway is operating partially under the direction of the British military authorities, who have given every co-operation in the endeavour to move the supplies. However, the Georgian authorities have constantly interfered with the movement, have repeatedly demanded that they should be given a portion of the foodstuffs, and have latterly stopped the movement of the traffic four or five days at a time, despite the protests of all of the local Allied officials.

It is impossible to depict the situation in Armenia, for until the last six days the population had been eating the dead. During the last two months the movement of relief supplies has been sufficient to somewhat stem the tide, but there never has been ten days' supplies ahead of actual starvation. There is no acute necessity for foodstuffs in Georgia, although in an endeavour to secure some co-operation from the Georgian Government we have allowed ourselves to be blackmailed from time to time in the matter. I will not repeat the correspondence of the question between our officials and the Georgian Government. It is sufficient to say that their attitude has been entirely that of brigandage, against a population dying in their door. The last advices which we have indicate that these authorities have stopped our transport for a week at a time.

I quite realize that the situation is one beyond the strength of the Allied military forces at present in occupation in the Caucasus, but I am well aware of the aspirations of the Georgian authorities for consideration before the Supreme Council. I believe it might do some good if the Council could dispatch a very strongly worded telegram to the Georgian authorities through their own representatives, and if the Georgian representatives in

Paris were given information to the same import. My suggestion is that the telegram should be phrased in somewhat the following manner:

"The Council has been made aware of the interference of the Georgian authorities with food supplies being sent into Armenia in an endeavour on the part of the Allied Governments to stem the tide of starvation and death amongst these unfortunate people. The Council cannot state in too strong terms that it will not tolerate such interference, and that the action taken hitherto by the Georgian authorities and the continuation of such action must entirely prejudice the case of the Georgian authorities, not only before this Council but before the court of public opinion of the world. The Council therefore expects that the authorities in Georgia shall not only give the privilege of transportation over the railway route which they at present control, but will devote themselves to assisting in the transmission of these supplies without more than the normal charge and remuneration for such service. The Council awaits the reply of the authorities in Georgia as to whether or not they are prepared to acquiesce in this arrangement." Herbert Hoover."

**№ 153 records of a meeting № 27 of the Supreme
Economic Council**

Paris, July 17, 1919, 14:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/27; Paris, vol.X, p.470-483

"268. Passage of foodstuffs to Armenia.

A Memorandum, prepared by the Director-General of Relief [H.Hoover on July 16, 1919,]* and submitted to the Council of Heads of Delegations, regarding the stoppage by the Georgian authorities of foodstuffs intended by the Allied and Associated Governments for the relief of Russian Armenia, was submitted for the information of the Council."

* See the previous document.

№ 154 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, July 18, 1919, 10:00

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/5955; Paris, vol.VII, p.191-202

"3. Telegram from President W.Wilson regarding policy in Turkey.

Mr.H.White informed the Council that he had received the

following telegram from President W.Wilson, and asked his colleagues what answer he should give on their behalf:

"Respecting the decision announced in your telegram of June 30th, to postpone further discussions of the Treaty with the Ottoman Government until the Government of the United States is in a position to say whether it will be able to undertake a mandate for a part of Turkish territory, I am afraid that the delay which this will involve will be very considerable and should like to know what attitude towards Turkey the Powers propose to take in the meantime."

G.Clemenceau: The only attitude the Powers could adopt as far as he knew was one of expectancy. He was for certain reasons not ready to talk about Asia Minor. He did not know what kind of declaration the President expected the Council to make.

H.White: He thought perhaps the President had the maintenance of order in his mind.

G.Clemenceau: On this subject the Council would take the necessary measures in concert. As to the future he could at present enter into no pledges. If the Greeks, Turks, and Italians were fighting it was not his fault.

H.White asked if M.G.Clemenceau's intention was to wait until the Government of the United States was in a position to say whether it would undertake a mandate.

G.Clemenceau: He would not undertake to wait indefinitely. For the time being he could make no statement. When other work had been done, the Council would do its best to settle the affairs of Turkey. All he could say in reply to the President's message was that the Council had taken note of it. President W.Wilson knew full well what the difficulties were. He wished to obtain a mandate in Armenia and an American Commissioner had been appointed. He asked for part of Cilicia, and was favorably disposed towards accepting a mandate for Constantinople. The question of Constantinople was one of the greatest importance for Europe. It had caused wars in the past, and required the closest study.

A.Balfour agreed that no definite answer could at present be given to President W.Wilson. The President was unfortunately prevented by the American Constitution from undertaking anything for the time being. Meanwhile the Council would try and maintain order in Turkey.

It was agreed that Mr.H.White should reply in the above sense to the President's telegram.

4. Agreement between M.T.Tittoni and M.E.Venizelos regarding Greek and Italian zones of occupation in Anatolia.

M.T.Tittoni read the following agreement between himself and M.E.Venizelos: - ..."The two Governments agree not to pass beyond the line above established. Moreover this occupation has only a provisional character corresponding to the actual state of affairs, the consideration of the definite regime for these regions being reserved to the Conference." ...

A.Balfour: ...Commodore M[aurice] Fitzmaurice considered that they had exceeded their orders. ...As to the Italians, ...the Council of Three had informed M. V.Orlando that there could be no possible conversations until the Italian troops had been entirely withdrawn. Then a change of Government had taken place in Italy, and there had been a friendly meeting with M. T.Tittoni. M. T.Tittoni had said that the Italian Government would be put into a very serious difficulty if the British and French Governments insisted on the total withdrawal of the Italian troops. No formal decision had been taken as a result of this declaration, but the French and British Governments had not insisted. ...The British Government had no interests in the region affected. [Hence,] he suggested that General E.Allenby be utilized as an agent of the Council. ...

S.Pichon: He thought that General G.Milne was directly in command.

A.Balfour: ...General G.Milne was under the superior authority of General E.Allenby.

G.Clemenceau: To speak his mind freely, ...he felt that, in Turkey, he acted as a British officer receiving orders from the British Government rather than as an Allied Commander-in-Chief. The effect of his activities was distinctly anti-French. This ambiguous situation was unsatisfactory. General E.Allenby commanded British troops as a British General. As an Allied Commander-in-Chief he refused to allow French troops to be relieved. He refused to allow them to enter Syria. He placed them in Cilicia, knowing that the mandate of Cilicia was likely to go to the Americans. All his agents were consistently against the French. On every occasion, he said that the unpopularity of the French troops rendered their relief or their stationing in Syria undesirable. ...As a result of

all this, a condition of confidence did not exist. ...

A.Balfour: ...Under no circumstances, would Great Britain accept a mandate in Syria. The British Government, therefore, had no motive for creating difficulties in the path of others. ...He thought, in fact, the officer in charge would be General G.Milne, acting under the directions of General E.Allenby. ...

H.White: He was inclined to approve of Mr.A.Balfour's proposal. An arrangement made only between the Italians and Greeks would not reassure the Turks. ...The Commander-in-Chief would be able to issue orders to Turks, Greeks and Italians, and thus the Conference would be put in charge of the situation.

T.Tittoni said that (as Mr.H.White observed), the proposal under discussion would amount to an official recognition of Italian presence in Asia Minor. He took note of this, as he thought that this ultimately must be done. Italian troops were there. They could not physically be there and officially not be there. He, personally, had not sent them there, but he was, nevertheless, in an equivocal position and he would like it regularized.

G.Clemenceau: ...He trusted that whatever arrangement made, M.T.Tittoni would not base any claim on this situation again. ...Furthermore, the local Commander-in-Chief be in control of all troops - Turkish, Greek and Italian. They would have to obey the orders of General G.Milne.

E.Venizelos: ...Action at the capital might not produce all the effect desired in Anatolia. The Committee of Union and Progress still had more power than appeared on the surface. ...He wished to leave a note with the Council, asking for the execution of two Clauses of the Armistice, namely the disarmament of Turkey and control of railways either by Allied troops or failing them by Greek troops and Allied Officers. ...

It was further decided to adopt the following Resolution proposed by Mr.A.Balfour: -

"1. Resolved, that the Conference shall communicate to the Turkish Government their intention of immediately marking out the limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops will be permitted to move, all rights secured to the Allies under the armistice being of course reserved. The Turkish Government is required to withdraw its troops to a position which will be determined by the Commander-in Chief. The Turkish Government shall be at the same time informed that the limiting lines above referred

to, have no relation to the ultimate territorial arrangements which will be imposed by the Peace Conference. ...

3. Any future movement of the Allied forces shall be under the supreme direction of the Commander-in-Chief who is responsible to the Conference for military operations in the Asiatic portion of the Turkish Empire."

№ 155 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, July 18, 1919, 16:00

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/5944; Paris, vol.VII, p.203-232

"Cognisance was taken of the following reservation made by M.T.Tittoni on behalf of Italy: -

"...The Italian Delegation is of the opinion that stipulations of the Covenant of the League of Nations are not applicable to territorial questions and to the arrangements connected therewith, which having been made the subjects of consideration by the Peace Conference have not yet been settled." ...

7. Communication from Mr.H.Hoover with regard to Russian Armenia.

H.Hoover made a short résumé of the memorandum contained in appendix.* He drew the attention of the Council, moreover, to the fact that the Georgian Authorities had only agreed to allow the supplies to pass through their territory on condition of a certain proportion being given to them. They now demanded one-half of the supplies. This demand was not from necessity, because they did not lack food, but was made simply for the purpose of speculation. For this reason, the Council was asked to send a menacing telegram to the Georgian Authorities, in order to facilitate the transport of supplies during two or three months. The future destiny of Georgia depended on the Conference, and there was every hope that they would yield to our wishes.

It was therefore decided that M.G.Clemenceau, as Chairman of the Peace Conference, should send the following telegram in the name of the Allied and Associated powers to the Government of Georgia:

"The Council had been made aware of the interference of the Georgian Authorities when food supplies were sent into Armenian in an endeavour on the part of the Allied Governments to stem the tide of starvation and death amongst these unfortunate people. The Council cannot state in too strong terms, that such in-

interference and that such action taken by the Georgian Authorities together with the continuation of such action must entirely prejudice their case. The Council therefore expects that the Authorities in Georgia shall not only give the privileges of transportation over the Railway routes at which they at present control, but will devote themselves to assisting in the transmission of these supplies at no more than normal charge and remuneration for such service. The Council awaits the reply of the Authorities in Georgia as to whether or not they are prepared to acquiesce in this arrangement."

* See document № 152.

№ 156 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, July 21, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/6050; Paris, vol.VII, p.233-253

"G.Clemenceau: The question [of Constantinople] was evidently one which the Council must solve. He was prepared to discuss it at once, but he was afraid that Mr.H.White would not be able, without consulting his Government, to reach a decision immediately.

H.White: This was so. ...He would send a second telegram that very evening to endeavor to obtain instructions by Thursday.

A.Balfour: He regretted the delay as he regarded the matter as very urgent. He would, however, as it was necessary, assent to a postponement until Thursday." ...

№ 157 Report presented by President of the Central Territorial Committee of the Paris Peace Conference A.Tardieu - for the Supreme Council On the boundaries of Bulgaria

Paris, July 22, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/6050/App."A;" Paris, vol.VII, p. 242-248

"IV. - Southern Boundary. ...

2. English, French and Japanese viewpoints.

(b) Bulgaria, from an ethnical point of view, is not justified in claiming Western Thrace, a territory in which the Bulgarian element ranks only third according to the latest Turkish statistics (1910). The three delegations consider that *the value of these statistics has not been at all changed by the fact that deportations or mass emigrations of the Greek population have taken place since*

the occupation of Bulgaria. To admit such a criterion would be *to put a premium on the persecution of foreigners and to establish a precedent which, in other cases, for example that of Armenia, would lead to very unjust results.*" ...

№ 158 urgent telegram № 3513 from the vice-consul at Tiflis H.O.Doolittle, chief of the military mission B.Moore, military observer in Turkey H.Shekerjian, chief of the ACRNE E.Yarrow, chief of the ARA Major J.Green - to the chief of American Mission in Paris F.Polk, Director of Military Intelligence Bureau Major R.Tyler, Secretary of State R.Lansing, H.Hoover, H.Morgenthau

Tiflis, July 23, 1919 (received August 5-7)

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/126/Encl.2, M820, Roll 230, vol. 204, NAA, MR № 2 and US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/32

"...Situation predicted in dispatches four months past from the Consulate and Military Attaché has materialized.

(A) Situation in Armenia, i.e. Armenian Republic is approaching crisis. Unless political and frontier questions are settled soundly and military and relief measures on large scale undertaken immediately Russian Armenian Republic which is now only a part of Armenians of the former Russian and Turkish Empires will succumb to starvation and aggressions of neighboring peoples and organization of Armenian State will become impossible.

(B) Armenia surrounded on the west by hostile Turks, on the south by hostile armed Tartar forces under Turkish direction, on the east by hostile Azerbaijan organization directing Tartar activities and cooperating with the Turks emulated north by the unfriendly Georgian Republic. Turks and Tartars becoming daily more aggressive, Turks openly violating terms of the armistice and covertly defying British. Massacres have taken place on several occasions in various localities during the last six weeks. Armed conflicts of importance are still occurring in Armenian districts of Karabagh and Zangezour placed officially under Azerbaijan Government by the British and also in Nakhichevan, Kaghzvan* and Sarikamish officially assigned by the British to Armenian administration but occupied by hostile Turks and Tartars although north of Turkish frontier. Railroad between Erivan and Nakhichevan cut. Road (omission) between Erivan and Kars cut.

(C) American Relief organizations prevented by the Turks and Tartars from carrying out relief work in several districts where

starvation of the Armenians continues. Relief work on necessary scale cannot be undertaken until order is assured.

(D) Georgian Republic not permitting transport of relief traffic to Armenia but still holding back normal commercial intercourse thus forcing Armenia without waiting for decision of the Peace Conference to enter into negotiations for the cession of disputed territory in exchange for railroad transit convention. Refusal of Armenia to join defensive alliance with Georgia and Azerbaijan against [A.]Denikin volunteer army or other powers attaching them has increased hostility of the latter republics. This is shown not only in overt acts of Azerbaijan but in increase of obstructive and coercive means by both countries.

(E) Armenian Government has been successfully attempting constructive work but all energies are now necessarily absorbed in the struggle for self preservation. British forces already withdrawn from Armenia except the above political officers and the Armenian Government and people feel that they have been deserted by the Allies. Rumored withdrawal of British forces from Caucasus encouraging Moslems in their plans to make the most of expected confusion. British forces now in Caucasus inadequate to maintain order even in those districts which they are with difficulty occupying.

(F) Lack of information in regards to intensions and decisions of Peace Conference is intensifying disorders and undesirable political activities throughout Caucasus. Situation particularly affected by the uncertainty concerning possible withdrawal of British and proposed arrival of Italians. Conditions in future approaching a state which may render aid to Armenia impossible. Complete uncertainty regarding opening of frontier between Turkish and Russian Armenia makes it impossible for Armenian Government and American Relief organizations to adopt any policy concerning repatriation and relief of refugees. Accumulation of refugees from all parts of Caucasus and Persia along frontier in expectation of its being opened is increasing daily the acuteness of the situation.

(G) Arrival of European forces in adequate numbers under a commander with full authority or complete control of Armenian army under Allied officers and supported by limited numbers of Allied troops is imperative and will materially clear up the situation. Situation in Armenia cannot be considered separately from

situation in Georgia and Azerbaijan for the present. In particular mail transportation from Batum and Baku to Armenia must be safeguarded.

(H) Official information requested of W.Haskell's appointment and power. Press dispatches stating W.Haskell named High Commissioner for Caucasus are circulating in the Caucasus causing confusion and embarrassment both to Allied representatives and local Governments owing to uncertainty, No official information available." ...

* Transcribed as Kagizman.

№ 159 copy of cablegram from the head of the ARA Mission at Tiflis Major J.Green - to the Director General of Relief H.Hoover
Tiflis, July 23, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/29/App.267; Paris, vol.X, p.532

"...Long conference with Armenian President today. See joint telegram to-day's date from chiefs American organizations and see dispatches sent by French and British. Situation growing worse. Turkish Army well prepared and Tartars advancing from three sides. If military protection is not in Armenia immediately disaster will be more terrible than massacres of 1915, and the Armenian nation will be crushed to everlasting shame of Allied Powers. Predict that relief work will become impossible in present situation unless order is restored. Cannot something be done to have British forces in Caucasus intervene to save Russia? Please acknowledge by telegraph. J.Green, M.Bristol."

№ 160 telegram № 3409 from the chief of the ARA Mission in the Caucasus Major J.Green - to the director of the ARA H.Hoover, for the U.S. Secretary of State R.Lansing

Tiflis, July 24, 1919 (received in Paris July 31*)
transmitted by the telegram № 3483 from H.Hoover - to R.Lansing
Paris, August 4, 1919 (received August 5)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/27, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

..."Turks and Tartars advancing. Believe the districts of Karabagh and Zangezour, they now occupy approximately reopened territory of Russian Armenia. Halil Bey, Turkish Colonel, now in command of Azerbaijan Tartars. Regular army depots and relief trains surrounded and probably seized. British State orders from above prevent their interfering. Armenian government and people

almost in despair. General mobilization ordered yesterday, taking away men just as harvest begins. We shall not be able to carry on relief work much longer unless British receive orders to clear Russian Armenia including Karabagh and Zangezur of Turk and Tartar forces."

Department's 2695 August 1, has been communicated to General [J.]Harbord who will shortly submit his suggestions regarding the proposed investigation." ...

* Distorted text in: Paris, vol.X, p.532 added, that M.Bristol had received this telegram in Constantinople on July 29, and transmitted it further.

№ 161 telegram from the U.S. vice-consul at Tiflis H.O.Doolittle - to American Mission in Paris, F.Polk

Tiflis, July 24, 1919

for the Secretary of State R.Lansing and director of the ARA

H.Hoover transmitted by telegram № 3521 from F.Polk - to R.Lansing

Paris, August 6, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/126/Encl.1 and RG 59, 860J.01/30, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"Vice Consul [J.]Randolph after visiting personally every part of Armenia reports:

"Need of mandatory or immediate action by Allied Powers most urgent. Railways disorganized from lack of engines, rolling stock and repair shops retained by Georgia and Azerbaijan and especially from lack of fuel for engines, oil being obtained only from Baku in Azerbaijan and now obtained by Armenia only occasionally and with great difficulty owing to warlike conditions existing between these two small countries. Owing to lack of seed and refusal of Turks and Tartars to sell them seed, Armenian people have this season almost no crops except very little self sown grain insufficient for more than a few months. This coming winter there will be no food any more than brought in from abroad. More than 200,000 refugees from Western Armenia (the most miserable hopeless people imaginable with absolutely no possessions except the new rags on their backs) are lined up at different points within southern boundary of Russian Armenia longing to return southward to their former homes but prevented by bands of Kurds and also by the well equipped military forces

of Turkey. Two attempts to force their way homeward have been in vain, resulting only in bloodshed and further massacres. Unless prevented the Turks apparently intend the total extinction of Armenian race. Turkish emissaries inspire the warlike attitude of Azerbaijan and are arousing the Tartars of Shusha and the districts south-east of Erivan along the Persian border where Tartar forces have been massing for sometime, the purpose being according to information received by Armenian Government to totally wipe out or drive away Christian population and by means of a broad Mohammedan belt to connect up Turkey and Azerbaijan. On July 22nd report reached Erivan that Nakhichevan and two other places south-east of Erivan were surrounded by these Tartars. According to the reports massacre had begun in one of these three places. No later news obtainable in Erivan for all telegraphic communication is out off near the scene of fighting. Armenian soldiers lack shoes, uniforms and even clothing as well as munitions and in opinion of Armenian officials and French, American and British officers in Erivan their successful opposition to the well equipped Tartars and Turks improbable without at least moral support or Allied troops whose presence would show Tartars and Turks that Armenia has not been abandoned by the Allies, an impression Turkish emissaries are spreading. American flour and relief workers have saved lives of thousands but owing to lack of crops and absolute inability of refugees to return to their homes relief work must be continued for another year otherwise the majority of the Armenians who have so far survived will die of starvation. Armenia needs food and also seed for the fields but the greatest needs of the situation to restore living conditions are:

First. Allied decision regarding settlement and

Second. Immediate presence in Armenia of sufficient mandatory or Allied military forces to prevent farther massacres and to force Tartars and Turks to permit these miserable refugees to return to their homes.

American storage depot of relief food and also fifteen cars American milk and flour en route to Nakhichevan, as well as American citizens, relief workers are in cut off district south-east of Erivan and their fate is unknown.

Note. This confirms absolutely reports reaching me from other sources and calls attention to the importance of at once taking actual military measures to remedy a pitiable situation and

show our ability and intention to rescue a friendly nation from extermination.

Please repeat to Secretary of State and to [H.]Hoover." ...

№ 162 report from the Director-General of Relief H.Hoover
"Regarding relief operations in Europe during June 1919"

Paris, July 25, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/29/App.251/Encl.; Paris, vol.X, p. 499-501

I. Total relief deliveries under the direction of the Director-General of Relief during the period June 1 to 30, 1919 (metric tons)

...Armenia - 6,856 tons of breadstuffs, 6,823 tons of wheat flour, 33 tons of cereal flour, 2,042 tons of beans, 3 tons of rice, 1,950 tons of milk, 319 tons miscellaneous. Total 11,170 tons.

[There were no relief deliveries to Russia and Turkey.]

II. Total relief deliveries under the direction of the Director-General of Relief during the period from December 1, 1918, to June 30, 1919 (metric tons)

...Armenia - 25,614 tons of breadstuffs, 2,661 tons of beans and peas, 3 tons of rice, 2,463 tons of milk, 319 tons of cocoa and sugar. Total - 31,060 tons.

Turkey	14.458 tons of breadstuffs
Russia	1.307 tons of breadstuffs
	13.770 tons miscellaneous
Total	15.077

Russian prisoners in Germany - 1.433 tons of breadstuffs, 1,050 tons meats and fats, 202 tons miscellaneous. Total - 2,685 tons."

№ 163 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, July 26, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/15; Paris, vol.VII, p.315-341

"The fifth condition of [the Allied and Associated Powers'] note to Admiral A.Kolchak runs as follows: - "If a solution of the relations between... the Caucasian and Transcaspian territories and Russia is not speedily reached by agreement the settlement will be made in consultation and co-operation with the League of Nations, and that until such settlement is made the Government of

Russia agrees to recognize these territories as autonomous, and to confirm the relations which may exist between their de facto Governments and the Allied and Associated Governments." ...

A.Balfour: He had some doubts concerning the Policy proposed. He did not see whom it would please but it would certainly displease the Russians who desired Russia to be restored to its old frontiers. It was unlikely even to please the new States. ...The first paragraph added to this extract from the telegram no doubt expressed a truth; but unfortunately the Allied and Associated Powers could not do all they desired to do. There was not much money to give. As to arms and munitions they were being given. If this declaration were made [aforementioned peoples] might be led to suppose that they were about to receive more; but this was impossible. The declaration therefore would either merely restate what was being done or raise false hopes. ...He hoped that Russia would reconstitute itself, but for the time being he saw no elements tending in that direction. Was it desirable to tell... the States that they must wait for the settlement of their fate until a very remote contingency had taken place? Such a statement could only discourage them. ...He would not advise the Council to accept it. ...

S.Pichon: [The specified countries] ...had always been told that their efforts [to obtain de facto recognition] were sympathetically regarded and help had been given them as de facto Governments in their struggle against Bolsheviks. They had always been told, however, that the Powers could go no further. The ultimate solution must depend on the outcome of the Russian situation." ...

№ 164 copy of cablegram from head of the ARA Mission at Caucasus Major J.Green - to the Director General of Relief H.Hoover

Tiflis, July 26, 1919 (received July 29)

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/29/App.267; Paris, vol.X, p.532-533

"H.Hoover, Paris. Following from J.Green, Tiflis. ...

Relief work in Russian Armenia cannot be safeguarded unless European troops are sent to that country. See accurate and conservative report on situation by B.B.Moore of the 24th July.

Your m[emorandum] and identical telegram from [G.]Clemenceau to French Mission arrived. Garbled, but sense suffi-

ciently clear. Note has been sent to Georgian Government* by French Mission. J.Green, M.Bristol."

* Regarding barriers to railways freight traffic.

№ 165 letter from special representative of the U.S. Government in Europe E.M.House - to President W.Wilson

London, July 30, 1919

Paris, vol.XI, p.620-623

"...Almost as soon as I arrived in England, I sensed an antagonism to the United States. The English are quite cordial and hospitable to the individual American as ever, but they dislike us collectively.

The war has left but two great powers in the world, where before there were seven. While Russia has collapsed internally, and Germany and Austria have fallen through defeat, France and Japan have gone from first to second rate powers because the United States and Great Britain have become so powerful. While the British Empire vastly exceeds the United States in area and population and while their aggregate wealth is perhaps greater than ours, yet our position is much more favourable. It is because of this that the relations between the two countries are beginning to assume the same character as that of England and Germany before the war. ...

Our war expenditures gave a spectacular exhibition of our wealth which has excited the envy of the world, and which if we are unwise, may lead to a great coalition against us. It looks now as if it would be necessary for us to supply coal to those who formerly looked to England for this commodity, and if we continue our merchant marine building on the present scale, we will be hitting at two of her most lucrative industries.

Labour in Europe is showing a strange disinclination for work, and English labour is lagging behind more and more. This accentuates the widening economic position between us. The advanced liberals are questioning the Government as to the reason for their big navy estimates for next year. The Government's answer is that when the war was ended Great Britain was going at top speed in naval construction and that it would be a great waste not to finish the ships now on the ways. It was brought out that there would be 84 ships of the larger class and some 35 destroyers. It was the Government's intention, so it was

said, to use the newer types to replace the older ones now in use. The truth is this new construction is because of us, and for no other reason.

R.B.Haldane, E.Grey and I dined together on Sunday.* ...E. Grey told R.Haldane that he would write him a memorandum which he could hand to the Government. This memorandum would outline his, E.Grey's, views which are as follows:

That in no circumstances would Great Britain build against the United States no matter how many keels we laid. However, England would hold herself free to build against any European power in any quantity that seemed to her best. ...

E.Grey told me... that the British Government's policy during the time he was in office was to disregard the naval program of the United States. In the first place they thought was between the two nations was inconceivable, and in the second, that in a rivalry it was admitted that the United States could outbuild Great Britain. In discussing this matter further with E. Grey he admitted that this was the liberal point of view and not the conservative or the one held in naval circles. ...

You will have noticed that the British have been very insistent upon reduction of standing armies but they never protest against naval armaments. ...

P.S. H.Hoover who has just left, is in one of his most pessimistic moods. He is simply revelling in gloom. He gives Europe but 30 day longer of orderly life - after that it is to be revolution, starvation and chaos. In his opinion the coal situation is the most menacing."

* I.e. July 27, 1919.

№ 166 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, July 31, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/6227; Paris, vol.VII, p.434-448

"G.Clemenceau: if the territory of the future State of Constantinople were increased [by the President W.Wilson] to this extent, its attribution to any mandatory power would become impossible. There might be agreement if only Constantinople and the Straits were in question, but he saw no chance, if large territories were added. ...

A.Tardieu: The future State of Constantinople could be easily imagined if it were restricted to the Straits, the Sea of Mar-

mora and the populations who made their living by the sea, but if large territories were added to it, ...the task would be impossible.

G.Clemenceau: A very clear and restricted programme must be made for Constantinople, otherwise no mandatory would be found. ...

F.Polk suggested that the discussion be adjourned." ...

№ 167 telegram from the second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey A.Adee - to American Mission in Paris, F.Polk*

Washington, July 31, 1919 (received August 1)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/20, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"President approves of H.Hoover H.Morgenthau recommendation that a Mission of Investigation headed by General J. Harbord be sent to Armenia."

* Next day R.Lansing repeated this text in the telegram № 2695 to his Ambassador in Great Britain J.W.Davis, see: US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/20:Telegram.

№ 168 records of a meeting № 29 of the Supreme Economic Council

London, August 1-2, 1919, 15:30 and 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/29; Paris, vol.X, p.489-558

"287. Situation in Armenia.

The Director General of Relief [H.Hoover] reported the receipt of three cables from Major J.Green,* Head of the American Mission at Tiflis, dealing with the serious situation existing in Armenia. It was agreed that a note should be addressed to the Supreme Council notifying them of the receipt of these cables and requesting instructions whether the information contained therein should be published."

* See telegrams from J.Green dated July 23 and 26, 1919.

№ 169 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, August 5, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/24; Paris, vol.VII, p.528-546

"G.Clemenceau: He wished to have a conversation with M.E. Venizelos about Thrace and Asia Minor. The troops of the Great Powers were being demobilized very rapidly. It would therefore be impossible for any of the Great Powers to undertake a new campaign. ...He must warn M.E.Venizelos that the French Government

had no intention of embarking those troops in a campaign. They were needed at home, and he wished to recall them as soon as possible. All the Powers were in the same case. ...Could the Greeks undertake to defend themselves on two fronts - in Thrace and in Asia Minor - without any assistance from the Allies?

E.Venizelos: ...As to M.G.Clemenceau question, whether Greece could undertake simultaneous action in Asia Minor and in Thrace, he was bound to answer *in the negative*, but he hoped that simultaneous action would not be required. ...He fully understood that the Great Powers could not undertake to enforce the Peace for him. He fully understood that Greece must help herself in this respect. ...He had understood M.G.Clemenceau to ask whether Greece could fight Bulgaria and Turkey at the same time. This Greece could not do, but she was not afraid of local risings in the population." ...

№ 170 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, August 7, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/26; Paris, vol.VII, p.603-619

"A.Tardieu: ...The figures of the 1914 census did not deserve any attention. The reduction of the Greek population had been obtained by wholesale massacre. *He could not admit that massacre created title.*

F.Polk: He had taken care to say that no title arose from massacre. What he had drawn attention to was the actual condition of the population.

A.Tardieu: Under a Greek or International Government, the Greeks would flock back to the country.

F.Polk: They would doubtless do so if [they are] allowed [to]. That was the point." ...

№ 171 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, August 8, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/27; Paris, vol.VII, p.620-645

"4. Sale of State property by the Ottoman Government. ...

P.Cheysson: ...The Council was faced with the alternative of the eventual bankruptcy of the Turkish State, or of partially consenting to the measures which the Ottoman Government were taking. ...He did not think that it would be proper to allow the Turks to proceed with the sale of State property without further

enquiry. He suggested that they should be asked why the sale of their credits and property was so urgent, and what form of realizable property they proposed to sell.

T.Tittoni: He agreed with M.P.Cheysson. ...The State domains ...was a most important guarantee of ultimate reparation. ...

F.Polk: As it would be a *long time before the final peace could be arrived at, with Turkey*, ...would it not be advantageous to draft [new,] a more complete [and conclusive] Armistice? ...

A.Balfour: He thought Mr.F.Polk's suggestion, if put into effect, would be a trifle high-handed. ...It might be best -

1. To refuse to recognize the sales of property now being carried out by the Turkish Government until the final signature of the Peace Treaty. Such a measure would put prospective purchasers on their guard, and

2. After receiving a full report on the financial position of the Ottoman Government, authorization might be given to proceed with sales of a certain class, in order that the Turkish Empire might be saved from bankruptcy.

It was therefore decided:

1. That a communication should be sent to the Ottoman Government... informing it that the Allied and Associated Governments refused and would refuse to recognize the validity of any sales, effected by such Government, between the signature of the Armistice and the ratification of the Peace Treaty.

2. That the Allied and Associated Governments should reserve to themselves the right to grant special licenses to the Ottoman Government for the sale of such property as the aforesaid Ottoman Government might desire to realize: the conditions of sale, and the property to be realized, being specified, in detail, beforehand, to the allied and associated Governments.

3. That the Financial Commission should... examine the question of the sale by that Government."

№ 172 telegram from the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army
General P.C.March - to the Commander-in-Chief of the
American Expeditionary Force in Europe General J.Pershing

Washington, August 8, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/39/Encl., T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR

№ 49

"...The President has approved mission of investigation

headed by General [J.]Harbord to be sent to Armenia. Issue orders to General [J.]Harbord to consult with the American Mission in Paris and permit him to choose such personnel as he may see fit provided they can be detailed from the American Expeditionary Force, with motor cars and office supplies. The size of the party to accompany General [J.]Harbord is understood to be about 14 officers and civilians, 16 chauffeurs, clerks and orderlies and 4 motor cars."

№ 173 telegram № 5792 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain J.W.Davis

Washington, August 9, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/37:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.
828

"Following message has been received from American Mission Paris as their № 3581 of August 8th.

"As the embarkation of British troops from Batum begins August 15th and their withdrawal will probably be followed by anarchy and massacres in Armenia, it is suggested that if you appealed through Ambassador J.Davis to G.Curzon or D.Lloyd George for postponement of this withdrawal for at least one month, such request might be granted. Prompt action is necessary since a telegram to Batum revoking order for embarkation, must be August 13 from London. Officials in British Delegation here, who regard withdrawal as a calamity, have confidentially intimated, that an American appeal for postponement is the only thing capable of altering the British decision to withdrawal on August 15th."

You are instructed to take this matter up with the Foreign Office informally and orally and make such representation as seem proper to you under the circumstances without however, pressing the matter in any way. The last sentence of the above is, of course only for your confidential information. Inform the Department and Mission as to the extent of the representations which you make to the Foreign Office and the reply which the Foreign Office makes."

№ 174 press report from the "The New York Herald" - Armenia is left without protection when great assault is preparing against her
Paris, August 9, 1919 (New York, August 8 and 11)

"The New York Herald." Paris ed. 9.08.1919 in: NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 35, f.187-191; NY ed., 8.08.1919, p.2; 11.08.1919, p.1-2; texts in English and French compared, lacunae are paraphrased
"Armenians Left to the Mercy of Turkish Armies.

Forces Gathering for Campaign of Slaughter When British Troops Withdraw

American Army Urged to Stop War in East

General Harbord's Departure for Caucasus Taken to Mean U.S. Will Accept Mandate. ...

President Wilson has accepted the recommendation of Herbert C.Hoover to send Major General James G.Harbord [on the 15th of August] with staff of military, financial, political and railroad experts to the Caucasus to make a complete report on the situation there. This step follows an appeal to the United States by General [G.]Bridges, commander of the British army in the Caucasus, to send a force of 80,000 men to police the area and protect the Armenians.

General [G.]Bridges arrived in Paris last night and to-day discussed the situation with allied officials. He said the seriousness of the situation in the Caucasus cannot be exaggerated and that a general conflagration will occur among the Turks, Persians, Georgians and Azerbaijan's the moment the British forces are withdrawn.

These nationalities, which comprise four differing republics, are planning to attack Armenia. The British government has held two divisions in this territory for the past eight months in an endeavor to maintain order there. It was announced by the British government they would withdraw these forces by June 1 last, but at Mr. Hoover's earnest request Great Britain agreed to keep them until August 15.

The British government now considers it the duty of the United States to step into the breach of the impending crisis in the Caucasus, since America is least exhausted from the war, and police the country.

The assumption that the United States will at least accept the mandate for Armenia probably prompts this attitude, but I was informed in official American circles in Paris that the United

States will never agree to send men to the Caucasus.

The British troops will be withdrawn from the Caucasus on August 15. There is no provision for keeping order there in the interim, the Italians having decided not to undertake the occupation of the Caucasus. Meantime the British are sure there will be trouble between the tribes mentioned that may lead to a general war in that region."

American Army Urged to Stop War in East.

Unless the British order is rescinded and enough soldiers left to protect the lines of communication the relief so effectively carried out by the American Commission must cease. Twenty-five thousand orphans supported by them will starve, their schools and factories will close, the millions already expended will have been spent in vain and the Armenian Question will be settled for all time by extermination of the race.

More than \$20,000,000 has been spent throughout the Turkish Empire in the Relief of survivors of the Armenian massacres in 1915. Hundreds of devoted men and women have been nursing and teaching the survivors the horrors of deportations or fled for their lives to Russian Armenia. While the peace conference in Paris devoted itself leisurely to a settlement of boundaries and spheres of influence, these Armenians, without political aim but with the sole Christian purpose of ministering to suffering humanity, have gone on with their work.

It would be unbelievable if the evidence were not certain that the British Cabinet, with full knowledge of the consequences, issued the astounding order. It is said the political leaders demand as a settled policy for the future that all British troops be withdrawn from Russia. Opinions may vary as to the right or wrong of such policy, but the honor of the empire is engaged for the maintenance of order in the Caucasus until the conference can decide its political future. ...

Order has been kept in Constantinople by large naval forces and troops of Italy, France and England. ...

[General J.Harbord] is regarded as one of the soundest thinkers in the United States Army and his findings, it is believed, will carry much weight with the administration, whose confidence he is thought to have. ...Colonel Haskell will co-operate with General Harbord whose report on the situation is expected about September 15. ...

[Armenian Prime Minister Demands Allies' Help.

News about imminent combined assault of Turks, Kurds and Tartars against Armenia had been cabled to Paris by A.Khatisian,* chairman of current Council of the Republic of Armenia. Enver Pasha is highly active. Karabekir Kiazim Bey is at the head of movement. The found documents prove that all the plot is Young Turks' affair.

Despite appeals of the government, allied troops have already left territory of the Republic of Armenia.]” ...

* This name had been usually inscribed as A.Khatissian.

№ 175 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, August 11, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/6401; Paris, vol.VII, p.646-669

“3. Situation in Armenia.

The Council had before it the following communication from Colonel W.Haskell... to President [of the Peace Conference] G. Clemenceau:

“Have received official notice from the British Command at Constantinople that all British troops at present time in the Caucasus have orders to commence complete evacuation on August 15th; an order from London can only prevent this movement.

The Italians officially declare that they will not send troops. This retreat will leave several million dollars worth of relief provisions deposited at Batum, Tiflis, Erivan, etc. without protection and will stop all measures of assistance now operating, without which thousands of Armenian refugees in Russian Armenia are exposed to death from famine. The Armenians are surrounded by enemies and have not enough arms, munitions or energy to protect themselves. Two million of lives are in danger after the retreat of the British troops; anarchy will reign in the Caucasus where all the lives and properties are menaced. The French High Command in the East declares that British troops in the Caucasus are not under his jurisdiction.

In the name of the future of these regions, I ask that the British Government be requested to revoke the evacuation order until the question of the method of occupation shall have been decided. This viewpoint receives the approbation of all the authorities here who understand the situation. William Haskell, Allied

High Commissioner to Armenia."

A.Balfour: The situation in Armenia was very serious and very disturbing. Historically what had led to the present position was, as far as he could remember, as follows. British troops had been sent into the country in 1918. In March and April of the current year it had been made clear to the Conference by Mr.D. Lloyd George that the British troops would be withdrawn. The date for withdrawal had first been the 15th July, but had since been postponed to the 15th August. It was probable that movements had already begun. It had therefore been known to the Conference for a long time that continuance of British occupation could not be expected. It had been understood that Italian troops would replace the British. Italy had accepted this exchange and the relief had been expected. From certain remarks made lately by M.T.Tittoni, he inferred that Italy regarded the enterprise as too great a burden. What resulted was that British troops were leaving the country, that Italian troops were not coming to replace them and that America was not sending any men.

T.Tittoni: The question in as far as it concerned Italy, related to Turkish Armenia and not to Russian Armenia, of which Mr.A. Balfour had spoken. Italy at one time had thought of sending troops to Georgia and Azerbaijan, not to Armenia proper. Georgia demanded complete independence and on this condition raised no objection to occupation by Italian troops. On the other hand, Admiral A.Kolchak was unwilling to grant the independence of Georgia, though he might be ready to grant autonomy. If Italy had accepted a mandate on the conditions demanded by Georgians, Italy would have taken upon herself responsibility for safeguarding the independence of Georgia. This, she could not do. In any case, the area to be guarded was a large one; the railway line from Baku to Batum was of very considerable length] some 40,000 men would be required and, in addition, shipping and supplies would have to be found. The last were to have been lent by Great Britain, though it appeared at the present time that British shipping would not be available. The initial expense would be, he was told, 75 million lire and the annual cost would be as much as 1 billion lire. Italy could not undertake so heavy a burden and the idea had therefore be given up. Nevertheless, he wished again to point out that the question of Georgia was quite distinct from that of Armenia.

G.Clemenceau asked whether the United States could do anything.

F.Polk: The United States could do nothing until Congress acted. Troops could not be sent into a country with which the United States were not at war. The question of a mandate for Armenia would be put before Congress by the President.

A.Balfour asked whether President W.Wilson was aware of the critical condition in Armenia.

F.Polk: He had sent him two strong personal messages on the subject already within the last few days.

G.Clemenceau: The conclusion was that France could do nothing; Italy could do nothing; Great Britain could do nothing, and, for the present, America could do nothing. It remained to be seen whether, as the result of this, any Armenians would remain.

As no Government was prepared to furnish troops for Armenia, the question raised by Colonel W.Haskell of August 15th, 1919, was left without solution."

№ 176 telegram № 5795 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain J.W.Davis

Washington, August 11, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/39a:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.
828

"In view of gravity of situation and necessity of immediate action you are instructed to urge British Government with all earnestness not to withdraw troops from Batum for time being."

№ 177 letter from the special representative of the U.S.
Government in Europe E.M.House - to the President W.Wilson

Withyham, Sussex, August 11, 1919

Paris, vol.XI, p.632-633

"...The atmosphere has cleared considerably and with E.Grey in Washington with you I have no doubt but that everything will come right.

It is my intention to sail for home around the middle of September. There is no need of remaining longer than that. *If mandate A is to be finished before the Turkish Treaty is formed as we desire*, there will be ample time to accomplish it before then."

№ 178 telegram № 3629 from the Commission to Negotiate Peace,
F.L.Polk - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Paris, undated (received August 12, 1919)

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/6130:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II,
p.829

"The Council of Five considered at its meeting this afternoon a telegram dated Constantinople, August 5th, to [G.]Clemenceau from Colonel W.N.Haskell, High Commissioner for Entente in Armenia. After pointing out that the British will commence complete evacuation on August 15th, that the Italians will not send troops, that the Armenians are unable to protect themselves and that two millions of [lives] will be [in danger] and anarchy will reign in the Caucasus after the withdrawal of the British troops, Colonel W.N.Haskell says:

"In the name of the future of these regions I ask that the British Government be requested to revoke the evacuation order until the question of the method of occupation shall have been decided. This viewpoint receives approbation of all the authorities here who understand the situation."

Mr.A.Balfour stated that the British intentions to evacuate had been [announced] last March and that at this late date the British plans could not be changed. Mr.T.Tittoni declared that the Italians had examined the question of occupying Georgia upon the withdrawal of the British and had decided that such occupation would not be within their power. Mr.F.Polk explained in the absence of authorization by Congress the United States Government was not at the present time in a position to send troops to replace the British. No action upon Colonel W.Haskell's telegram was taken by the Council." ...

№ 179 telegram № 2766 from the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain
J.W.Davis - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

London, August 12, 1919 (received August 12)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/40:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.
829-830

"Conferred with Curzon yesterday, August 11, first opportunity following instructions. I confined myself to inquiring whether order for withdrawal was definite and irrevocable and expressed fears which were entertained as to its consequences. Curzon professed himself fully alive to possibilities, said withdrawal had been

definitely decided upon, that men belonging to units [whose] period [of] enlistment had expired, that no forces were at hand for replacement, that Great Britain had given notice of her intention to withdraw and Allies had offered task to Italy, who declined it, that Great Britain would be highly gratified to see America take mandate for Armenia and assume duty of policing. I told him, in response to questions, that [regardless] of future decisions the instant despatch of American forces was in my judgement, a military and political impossibility. [If] matter went to Congress it was unsafe to rely on prompt action. Matter will go before British Cabinet today but he gave me no reason to expect reversal of its decision.

I also met General G.Bridges, who has just returned from scene of operations, and says revocation of order is important; transports are at Batum or *en route* and arrangement for concentration and embarkation of troops already completed. Present forces in Caucasus about 22,000 men, [concentration of which] will occupy a month or six week. He also says that by his advice, British Government has offered or will offer price of 35,000 pounds sterling on the head of Enver Pasha who is now in Asia Minor leader of the Young Turks and a growing pan-Islamic movement. He, as well as G.Curzon, anticipates disorder following withdrawal of British troops. He remarked casually that "The thing to do is for us to do the job and you to pay for it."

Have received today your 5795 August 11th, 5 p.m. Can add nothing as to gravity of situation of which the British Government is not already aware unless as to danger to American relief workers. Have presented at once, by informal note to Curzon, substance of your message adding this point. [As] result of cabinet deliberations desire of British for our acceptance of Armenian mandate is evident as well as their fear of pan-Islamic movement; latter may operate to restrict their departure. Would appreciate information, if possible, as to our probable policy in matter of Armenian mandate." ...

№ 180 letter from the President of the USA W.Wilson -
to the Senator J.S.Williams

Washington, White House, August 12, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 351, f.26

"My dear Senator,

Unfortunately, it is true that the British Government is proposing to withdraw its troops almost immediately from the region in which they can act as protectors of the Armenians, and I am making every effort to bring about a re-consideration of the matter on their part.

In the present situation of things out there, it does look as if the only effectual assistance would be assistance of an armed force to subdue those who are committing outrages more terrible, I believe, than history ever before witnessed, so heartbreaking indeed that I have found it impossible to hold my spirits steady enough to read the accounts of them. I wish with all my heart that Congress and the country could assent to our assuming the trustsheep for Armenia and going to help of those suffering people in an effective way.

Cordially and sincerely yours, Woodrow Wilson."

№ 181 letter from the Secretary of State R.Lansing - to the Chairman of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia J.Gerard

Washington, August 12, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 351, f.29-30

"On the 1st instant I had the honour to inform you that your telegram dated July 31st as well as the recommendations in your letter of the 28th ultimo concerning the Armenian situation, had been communicated to the American Mission in Paris. The Department has now received a message from the Mission, making among others, the following remarks with regard to your several suggestions. ...

The Mission believe that the present situation would not be relieved by the recognition of the Armenian Republic, and it is not deemed advisable to send supplies and munitions to the Armenian Army, for the reason that the railway passes through the territory of Georgia, and they would probably never reach the Armenians. And even should the supplies and munitions not be stolen while passing through Georgian territory, the likelihood of their reaching the Armenians would have the effect of inclining Turks and Tartars to attack more vigorously and more rapidly.

I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient servant, Robert Lansing."

№ 182 notes of a meeting of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, August 13, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/136; Paris, vol.XI, p.377-379

"1. General J.Harbord's Mission to Armenia.

General J.Harbord, who was accompanied by General F.R. McCoy, informed the Commissioners that it appeared that it would be impossible to obtain the Transport "De Kalb"* to convey them to Armenia. ...

General J.Harbord explained that the "De Kalb" was the only suitable ship available in European waters for the purpose. Mr.F.Polk thereupon dictated a telegram to the Secretary of State requesting that the matter be laid before the President and that the President be urged to direct the navy Department to place the "De Kalb" at the disposal of the Mission. General J.Harbord pointed out, that...[this] cruiser carried guns. ...

General J.Harbord stated that he was prepared to leave Friday and to set sail from Brest on Saturday, if the question of the ship were settled. He also submitted a list of personnel which was approved, and a draft letter of instructions which was slightly modified and approved.

General J.Harbord also requested that the president of the Conference should be informed of his Mission, and that the representatives of the Principal Allied Powers in Asia Minor and Constantinople be advised of his Mission. Drafts of communications to the Secretary General of the peace Conference in this regard were submitted by Mr.W.Buckler, who was requested to change them in certain particulars to meet the views of the Commissioners. ...[Then] Mr.F.Polk left the meeting."

* Inscribed as DeKalb.

№ 183 notes of a meeting of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace

Paris, August 13, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/137; Paris, vol.XI, p.379-384

"W.Buckler: You saw the telegram from Mr.J.Davis this morning?*

H.White: Telling about the Armenians - yes, I saw that. Meanwhile we have heard nothing more about massacres having

begun.

W.Buckler: There are three American Relief workers missing there, and nothing has been heard of them.

H.White: I think we have a very able mission; General J. Harbord and the men who are with him. Their presence should have a good moral effect. Have you any observations, Admiral?

Rear Admiral H.S.Knapp: I have got a telegram from [Rear] Admiral M.Brisitol requesting funds for himself and his mission; he is on the Smyrna Commission.** He was appointed by the President and I should like to know what answer to make to him.

H.White: He certainly has not a monopoly on that kind of request. I think we will have to put that up to the representative of the government."

* A telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State, dated August 12, 1919, its copy had been sent to the American Commission to negotiate Peace.

** It dealt with assaults of the Greek Army on the Turkish civilian population.

№ 184 telegram № 2801 from the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs G.N.Curzon - to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain J.W.Davis*

London, August 13, 1919 (received August 15)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/46:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 830-831

..."My Dear Ambassador: I have received your note of last evening urging the British Government with all earnestness not to withdraw our troops from Batoum for the time being in view of the evident gravity of the situation. As I explained to you in our conversation... evacuation has already commenced at the eastern end of the line. In any case, however, its duration must be sufficiently prolonged to relieve us from any immediate anxiety as to the position at Batoum. Should the present programme be carried out unaltered it will not be till the early part or middle of October that the question of leaving Batoum will assume a practical form and it may be possible at that date, should the conditions in the Caucasus require it, to make arrangements which will not let the place remain without any protection. In the meantime I am making inquiries as to whether, consistent with the broad policy which I have indicated, anything can be done to insure some degree of

local security and to prevent the terrible events of which your Government are apprehensive. Any arrangement for this purpose would be much easier were your Government in a position either themselves to put troops into the Caucasus or to assure us that the mandate for Armenia would ultimately be accepted by the United States. The circumstances that you described to me yesterday appear to render the satisfaction of these two conditions for the present out of the question and they greatly complicate an issue which is in itself sufficiently difficult. Pray believe me, however, that the situation is one which I am examining together with our military advisers from day to day and almost from hour to hour with the most intense anxiety to find a solution that will relieve us from the gravest fears. I am seriously considering whether it will be possible to leave political missions with sufficient escorts at the principal cities along the railway and whether effective political pressure cannot be put upon the governments of the local States to induce them to desist from actions which could only imperil their cause and might ruin their future."

* On August 15, 1919, this telegram was conveyed to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

№ 185 letter from the Chairman of the ACIA J.Gerard -
to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

New York, August 14, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 351, f.18-20

..."The Powers of the Entente and we turned a deaf ear to the repeated appeals of the Armenians for food, munitions and supplies. Since the last March, the Armenians told us that, if we did not lend them necessary means for self-protection, or if we did not take necessary steps to protect them, there would be in store for them exactly the danger that is now threatening their very existence. ...

We can now do one of three things; namely, (a) We can turn them over to the Turks and Tartars to be slaughtered; (b) We can turn them over to the Powers of the Entente to be exploited; (c) We can intervene at this late hour and save this situation. ...

If it is absolutely impossible for us now to supply the Armenians with food and munitions, then Great Britain can be asked to furnish them with those necessities through Northern Persia and the Caspian. We cannot agree with the view that the Turks would

be likely to be more tolerant with the Armenians if we were to leave them without any means of self-defence. The Armenians do not think so." ...

№ 186 notes of a meeting of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, August 14, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/138; Paris, vol.XI, p.385-386

"6. Notification to [Rear] Admiral M.Bristol regarding General J.Harbord's mission.

The Commissioners approved a draft telegram to be sent by [Rear] Admiral H.S.Knapp to [Rear] Admiral M.Bristol informing the latter of General J.Harbord's mission and requesting him to advise American Officials in Turkey and Armenia and to instruct them to assist him by all means in their power."

№ 187 strictly confidential telegram № 2849 from the Secretary
of State R.Lansing - to the Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington, August 16, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/6130:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II,
p.831-832

"...The President desires Turkish authorities to be warned that should they not take immediate and efficacious measures to prevent any massacres or other atrocities being perpetrated by Turks, Kurds or other Moslems against Armenians in the Caucasus or elsewhere, then all support concerning a secure sovereignty over the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire, under Article XII of his peace terms, will be withdrawn, and that such withdrawal might result in the absolute dissolution of the Turkish Empire and a complete alteration of the conditions of peace. Should Turks put forward the plea that they have no control over such occurrences, it should be pointed out that if they expect to exercise any sovereignty over any portion of the Empire they should demonstrate that they are not only willing but also able to prevent their conationals and coreligionists from the perpetration of atrocities. Therefore no excuse of inability to prevent atrocities against Armenians will be accepted from Turks. Communicate to Turkish authorities at your discretion through such diplomatic channels as in your judgement may be available, and in any case, repeat to Admiral [M.]Bristol for communication to Turkish

authorities."

№ 188 telegram № 5844 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain J.W.Davis

Washington, August 20, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 741.91/23:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.
700

"The Anglo-Persian agreement has caused a very unfavourable impression upon both the President and me and we are not disposed to ask our Minister at Teheran to assist the British Government or to ask him to preserve a friendly attitude toward this agreement. At Paris I asked of Mr.[A.]Balfour three times that the Persians have an opportunity to be heard before the Council of Foreign Ministers because of their claims and boundaries and because their territory had been a battle ground. Mr. [A.]Balfour was rather abrupt in refusing to permit them to have a hearing. It now appears that at the time I made these requests Great Britain was engaged in a secret negotiation to gain at least economic control of Persia. ...We cannot and will not do anything to encourage such secret negotiations or to assist in allaying the suspicion and dissatisfaction which we share as to an agreement negotiated in this manner.

You will respond to Lord [G.N.]Curzon's request in this general sense."

№ 189 telegram № 2840 from the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain
J.W.Davis - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

London, August 20, 1919 (received August 20)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/53:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.
832-833

"I have just received the following note:

"Foreign Office, Tuesday 19th August 1919.

My Dear Ambassador: You may remember that in our conversation yesterday afternoon about the Armenian question and the Caucasus I expressed some surprise that if American opinion was as deeply stirred as I was led to believe on the subject, no official representations had reached me from the American Government and I was left to gather American sentiment from the reports and appeals and protests of private individuals. I further said that anxious as we were to do everything in our power to

satisfy American opinion and to protect the Armenians, it was difficult to modify our announced and already inaugurated policy of evacuation unless we knew for certain for how long a period we were requested or expected to remain and what part the American Government were prepared to play at its close. Later in the evening Mr.[A.]Bonar Law speaking on the same subject in the House of Commons used the following words:

"I can assure my noble friends that if any sign of help were coming from America as suggested they would only too gladly welcome it. Indeed I think I might say: ...It is... an American problem rather than a British. They are in a better position to deal with it. They have interests as great as ours. I think greater. I can assure the House that if the President of the United States were officially to say to the British Government, "We wish you to hold the fort for a little until we can make arrangements" we would certainly do our best to meet him."

Mr.[A.]Bonar Law meant to add what I may here be permitted to add on behalf of His Majesty's Government that in the event of the American Government addressing us in the sense indicated it would seem only reasonable that the financial burden of retaining our forces in the Caucasus beyond the period already fixed by us should not be borne by Great Britain, but should be assumed by the State which expects to be or is likely to become the mandatory for the Armenian people. Our own financial responsibilities in those regions have already been so overwhelming that we should not feel justified in continuing them for a further period. May I suggest to Your Excellency that you should telegraph in this sense to your Government since the matter is one that calls for very early decision." ...

After statement above quoted [A.]Bonar Law in House of Commons added "But I can hold out no hope of keeping troops longer in that part of the country although I am glad to say that an Allied Commissioner has already been sent to Armenia and that we have commissioners of our own both in Baku and Batum."

May I suggest that any answer to this letter other than a definite refusal should be so worded as to avoid any possible charge of bad faith *if mandate is finally declined?*" ...

№ 190 telegram from the members of the ACIA J.W.Gerard, C.E.Hughes, E.Root, H.C.Lodge, J.S.Williams, Alfred E.Smith, F.C.Penfield, C.W.Eliot, C.H.Dodge - to the Major General J.Harbord, on the road to Armenia*

New York, August 20, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/60/Encl.1, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"The American Committee for the Independence of Armenia heartily congratulates you and the members of your Commission upon your designation by the President for a high and difficult mission in Armenia and buds you Godspeed. We earnestly trust that the investigations to be made by your Commission may result in the speedy solution of the Armenian Question and consequently the full realization of the well deserved aspirations of a long suffering and worthy people." ...

* In compliance with the Secretary of State R.Lansing's order, given from Washington on August 27, 1919, American mission in Paris transmitted this text to J.Harbord.

№ 191 statement by the Allied High Commissioner in Armenia Colonel W.Haskell - to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia A.Khatisian

Yerevan, August 21, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.2, file 37, f.1-3, and 7-8

"W.Haskell, the High Commissioner in Armenia, at his first meeting with the Prime Minister A.Khatisian communicated something like this:

The Congress at Paris instructed him to assume internal and external supply of the Armenian people, its foodstuff and safe repatriation.

At the current moment he is going to stay in Erivan only three days, during this period of time he'll acquaint in detail with a situation in the country and with our demands; then he'll return Tiflis and in a week he'll come back again from there to Erivan, with a group of attendant officers whom he left there so far.

He'll wire to the Paris Conference collected data and his conclusions; and on the whole, he hopes that till the solution of the mandate issue he'll successfully ensure physical existence of the Armenian people.

American General [J.]Harbord is to arrive into Erivan in approximately ten days, to investigate local conditions and to find out how many American servicemen are needed to occupy whole Armenia.

The peace treaty is now under discussion in America, after its ratification League of Nations will be the next issue, and then an Armenian mandate will be considered."

№ 192 translation of the telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople J.-A.Defrance -
to the President of the Peace Conference G.Clemenceau

Constantinople, August 23, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/38/App."E;" Paris, vol.VII, p.858-859

"[Rear] Admiral M.Bristol, recently appointed American High Commissioner to Constantinople, remitted a comminatory memorandum to the Grand Vizier on the 22nd instant without having advised the Allied High Commissioners.

The following is a résumé of the note:

"President W.Wilson notifies the Turkish Government that if immediate measures are not taken to prohibit all violences or massacres on the part of the Turks, Kurds, or other Mussulmans against the Armenians in the Caucasus or elsewhere, the President will withdraw Article 12 from the Peace Conditions (rules concerning the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty). This action would result in the complete dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. If the Turks desire to continue to exercise any sovereignty over any part of the Empire, they must show that they not only have the intention, but the authority to prohibit their nationals from engaging in these atrocities: no excuse [of] being powerless in the matter will be accepted from the Turks."

The Grand Vizier communicated this memorandum to the English and French High Commissioners. He is very uneasy and declares that he has not been authorised to control the necessary forces to maintain order or to obtain the financial resources indispensable for the payment of his soldiers and functionaries, under these conditions he is completely at bay. He could not help remarking that America, a country which has not been at war with Turkey and did not sign the Armistice, gave this imperative

notification separately and without participation on the part of the Allied Powers."

№ 193 telegram № 3856 from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, F.L.Polk - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Paris, August 23, 1919 (received August 23)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/58:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 833-834

"Before taking the steps you suggest I should be glad to know what reply you wish me to make in case the British or other Allied delegates inquire whether the United States would be willing to pay the expenses of any military assistance that might be sent to Armenia and what are the prospects of the United States accepting a mandate over that country."

№ 194 telegram № 5867 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing - to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain J.W.Davis

Washington, August 23, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/53:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 834

"I have discussed matter very fully with the President and find the situation difficult. We would like to appeal officially to the British Government to continue their military control assuring them that they would receive financial aid in maintaining their forces, but unfortunately there are no funds available for such a purpose and it would require an appropriation by Congress in order to obtain them. At the present time to attempt to secure an appropriation would be to complicate further the political situation which the treaty of peace has caused. The same is true in regard to saying to the British Government to hold on "until we can make arrangements." The Senate would bitterly resent the apparent assumption that the United States will later take over responsibility for order in those regions. The temper of certain Senators and their hostility to the President and everything which he advocates is so intense that such action would add fuel to the flames already raging.

In view of the situation there is only one thing possible and that is to appeal to the British Government on the ground of humanity to continue their protection over those wretched people

pointing out the undoubted feeling of the world in the event that the British forces just at this time while the future of the Ottoman Empire was being determined should be withdrawn and the country given over to massacre, rapine and lawlessness.

I hope that you can make this plain to Lord G. Curzon and urge him to do all that he can to continue the protection which Great Britain is so generously giving to a distracted and unhappy race. Please telegraph the result as soon as possible."

№ 195 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, August 25, 1919, 15:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/38; Paris, vol. VII, p.835-926

"5. Notification to the Ottoman Government by the United States High Commissioner regarding Armenian Massacres.

G. Clemenceau drew attention to a report stating that [Rear] Admiral M. Bristol, the American High Commissioner in Constantinople, had presented a threatening memorandum to the Grand Vizier, without previous consultation of the Allied High Commissioners.* He did not think that President W. Wilson would approve of this policy. He drew special attention to the 12th of [his] Fourteen Points:

"The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities ...should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of *autonomous development*, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees."

All the Allies had adhered to this and the policy could not now be changed. Last of all could one High Commissioner dictate terms to Turkey, with whom his State had not been at war, without consultation with the Associated Powers. *As to saving the Armenians, he did not know what could be done.* There were no American troops. British troops were employed elsewhere. The French were not allowed by the British to play any part in Asia Minor. The Italians, it was true, had gone to Asia Minor in spite of the British, but they declined to replace the British in the Caucasus. *As to the Turks, they were themselves powerless, as they could not control their own troops.* He did not see from what quarter the Armenians could expect any assistance.

T.Tittoni: *This was one of the inevitable consequences of delaying peace with Turkey.*

G.Clemenceau: *Even when Peace had been made, it was not likely that the Armenians would be better off.*

A.Balfour: *This situation was really the consequence of a lack of troops.* He understood that the United States were raising a volunteer army. If so, perhaps some of these troops could be employed in Armenia.

F.Polk: Recruiting for the volunteer army was beginning.

A.Balfour asked M.G.Clemenceau whether, but for British opposition, he would send French troops to prevent the massacres in Armenia.

G.Clemenceau: He would consider the matter.

A.Balfour: He took note of this declaration.

G.Clemenceau: He made no undertaking.** The French had very few troops in Cilicia, but he would enquire whether they could do anything to save Armenians. What he had meant to convey was that nothing could be expected from the Americans, who were hampered by their constitution, from the British, who were leaving the Caucasus, from the Italians, who would not go there, or from the French, who were not allowed a free hand. The Turks, not being masters in their own house, were equally impotent. The Armenians were therefore no-one's responsibility.

A.Balfour asked M.G.Clemenceau whether he thought it worth while to ask the French Military Authorities whether they could do anything.

G.Clemenceau: He had not come to the Meeting with this idea. As he was pushed, however, he would consent to be pushed. He would make enquiries. Possibly the French Army might be able to do something.

A.Balfour: He thought it would be well worth while to find out. It was agreed that the French Government should enquire into the possibility of sending military protection to the Armenians.

It was also agreed that no pressure should be brought on the Sultan by any of the Allied and Associated Powers, acting alone."

* See telegram from J.-A.DeFrance, dated August 23, 1919.

** G.Clemenceau's phrase "he made no undertaking" is ambivalent, as far as "an undertaking" means also a funeral parlour.

№ 196 confidential telegram № 5874 from the Secretary of State
R.Lansing - to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain J.W.Davis

Washington, August 26, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/53:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.
836-837

"Supplementing Department's 5867, August 23, 2 p.m., reiterating urgent appeal on humanitarian grounds to the British Government to continue the protection which it is giving to the Armenians, the following considerations may incidentally be brought to Lord G.Curzon's attention.

1. The United States Government was not a signatory to the Paris treaty of 1856, the Berlin treaty of 1878, or any of the conventions between the European powers regarding the Near Eastern affairs and which caused the continuation of the condition of the Christians under Turkish rule. Consequently American desire to help Eastern Christians is based mainly on humanitarian and altruistic grounds without the feeling that America is in any way responsible for their condition or that she is under obligation to pay them back a moral or any other debt.

2. Should the withdrawal of British troops be followed by further massacre of Armenians, it may result in anti-British feeling in American public opinion, which this Government will greatly regret and would earnestly desire to avoid. We need not refer to British public opinion, much better known to the British Government than to ourselves.

3. The deportations and massacres of Armenians in 1915 and 1916 were principally due to the desire of the Young Turks to create a homogeneous Turkey. The pan-Touranian and pan-Islamic aspirations of the Turks still exist and do not seem to be discouraged by Moslems outside of Turkey. The Armenians and the formation of an Armenian State are considered by Turks as serious obstacles in the way of the realization of those aspirations, especially the first. It, therefore, seems to be in the interest of Great Britain and the other Allies to help the Armenians and protect them from extermination.

4. If public opinion in America should agree to an American mandate over Armenia, it will be due to the sympathy formed for the Armenians and the hope that through American help the Armenians may, during the mandatory period, learn to organize a

self supporting State. If through further massacres, the Armenians should be weakened to the extent of pan-Turkish hope [so] that they will be forever unfit to form a Christian State, then possibly a strong opposition may grow in this country against the assumption of any mandate by the United States."

№ 197 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, August 26, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/144; Paris, vol.XI, p.394-395

"4. Information for the J.Harbord Mission.

The Secretary read a communication received from General F.R.McCoy, Chief of Staff to General J.Harbord, dated on board the S.S. "Martha Washington," Brest, France, August 23, with which General F.R.McCoy submitted a draft telegram to be sent by the Mission to Dr.A.Khatisian, President of the Armenian Republic, requesting certain definite information for the information of the J.Harbord Mission.

The Commissioners approved the despatch of a telegram to the American Commissioner at Constantinople requesting him to compile as far as possible the information desired by General J. Harbord and to deliver the same to the General upon his arrival."

№ 198 telegram from the Allied High Commissioner in Armenia W.Haskell - to the President of the Peace Conference G.Clemenceau

Tiflis, s.d., August 27, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/42/App.A; Paris, vol.VIII, p.10

"I have personally investigated conditions in Armenia and find the horrible situation beyond description. Relief can and will reach the destitute in time to prevent starvation providing you support me with troops. Cavalry most suitable if available. The equivalent of an American reinforced infantry brigade will save situation in Russian Armenia. Tartars attacking on east and south, with Tartar uprisings increasing daily throughout interior. Arrival of even one regiment might decide fate of our Armenian allies who may be exterminated at any time unless troops are rushed. British now leaving Caucasus and have already refused even temporarily to use any of their troops in Armenian stating that orders from above forbid their stationing of any British troops in Arme-

nian territory. If British policy forbids protection of Armenians indicated by above conditions, this must be changed or other troops must be found and their arrival expedited. British troops now here are principally Indian. Please acknowledge receipt this telegram."

№ 199 report of the American section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey (of H.C.King and C.R.Crane)

Paris, August 28, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 181.9102/9; Paris, vol.XII, p.751-848

"Submitted by the Commissioners: Charles R.Crane,
Henry Churchill King.

Section I. The Report upon Syria

The Commission's conception of its mission was defined in the following statement which was given to the press wherever the Commission went:

"...The American people - having no political ambitions in Europe or the Near East, ...but nevertheless... recognize that they cannot altogether avoid responsibility for just settlements among the nations following the war, and under the League of Nations. In that spirit they approach the problems of the Near East." ...

The Commission had in their survey of Syria the assistance of Dr.Albert H.Lybyer, Dr.George R.Montgomery, and Captain William Yale, U.S.A., as Advisers; of Captain Donald M.Brodie, U.S.A., as Secretary and Treasurer; of Dr.Sami Haddad, Instructor in the School of Medicine of the Syrian Protestant College of Beirut, as Physician and Interpreter; of Mr.Laurence S.Moore as Business Manager; and of Sergeant Major Paul O.Toren as stenographer. The advisers had all been previously connected as experts with the Peace Conference in Paris, and had been students of the special problems of the Near East.

June 10 - Commission arrived in Jaffa; ...June 13 - to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem; June 17 - to Bethlehem, Hebron and Beersheba; June 19, 20 - Jerusalem. Interviews. June 21 - to Ramallah and Nablus; June 22 - to Janine and Nazareth; June 23 - to Haifa; June 24 - to Acre, [and return] to Nazareth; June 25-30 - to Damascus.

July 1 - [Commission went] to Amman and Deraa; July 2, 3 - Damascus; July 4, 5 - to Baalbek; July 6, 7, 8 - Beirut; July 9 - to Jebeil, Batrun, and Bkerke; July 10 - to Sidon and Tyre; July 11 -

to Ainab, Baabda, and Zahle; July 12 - to Tripoli; July 13 - to Alexandretta; July 14 - to Ladikiya and Tripoli; July 15 - to Homs; July 16, 17, 18, 19 - to Aleppo; July 20 - to Adana, by train. July 21 - to Mersin by train, via Tarson.* Commission left Mersin on U.S. Destroyer "Hazelwood" for Constantinople.

The British officials, from Major General Sir Arthur Money, who was in command of O.E.T.A. South, down to the youngest officer, were courteous, obliging, and helpful. Most of them had had Indian, Egyptian or Sudanese experience before the Great War. As a body, they gave an impression of ability, efficiency, and a serious effort to administer the country for the good of the people.

It should be noted here that General E.Allenby detailed to accompany the Commission as aide Lt. Col. J.K.Watson, who had served for years in a similar capacity with Lord H.Kitchener, and later with the Khedive of Egypt.** His thoughtfulness, kindness, and efficiency... were unflinching. ...

IV. Cilicia:

1. General -

(a) The Commission did not endeavour to give thorough hearings in this region, feeling that it is not seriously to be considered a part of Syria, and desiring not to open up as yet the question of the Turkish-speaking portion of the former Turkish Empire.

(b) The population statistics vary considerably but there can no be doubt of a marked Moslem majority in Cilicia before the war, now probably somewhat increased.

2. Wishes of the people -

(a) The Turks here, like most of those heard previously, wish to retain Turkish unity under the house of Osman, and leave the question of what shall be the Mandatory Power, if any, to the Turkish Government in Constantinople.

(b) The Arabs... ask for union with Syria under a French mandate.

(c) The Armenians... ask for the union of Cilicia with Armenia under an American mandate.

(d) The other Christians, a small minority, are mostly for France, particularly the Greeks, who are working in close relation with the French in the northern regions of Turkey. ...

6. The Recommendations.

(6) The objections to simply recommending at once a single American mandate for all Syria are: first of all, that it is not certain that the American people would be willing to take the mandate; that it is not certain that the British or French would be willing to withdraw, and would cordially welcome America's coming - a situation which might prove steadily harassing to an American administration; that the vague but large encouragement given to the Zionist aims might prove particularly embarrassing to America, on account of her large and influential Jewish population; and that, if America were to take but one mandate, it is probable that an Asia Minor Mandate would be more natural and important. ...The Commissioners believe, moreover, that no other Power could come into Asia Minor, with hands so free to give impartial justice to all the peoples concerned. ...

The Commissioners, therefore, recommend, as involved in the logic of the facts, that the United States of America be asked to undertake the single mandate for all Syria.

If, for any reason the mandate for Syria is not given to America, then the Commissioners recommend, in harmony with the express request of the majority of the Syrian people, that the mandate be given to Great Britain. ...On the contrary - ...more than 60 percent of all the petitions, presented to the Commission, directly and strongly protested against any French Mandate. ...

Charles R.Crane, Henry C.King. ...

Section III. The Report upon the non-Arabic-speaking portions of the former Ottoman Empire. ...

In the case of the proposed State of Armenia, the territory was not yet set off, nor its boundaries even approximately known; the Armenians were not largely present in any of the territory to be assigned; the wishes of the Armenians themselves as to mandate were already known; and the wishes of the rest of the population could not be taken primarily into account, since the establishment of the Armenian State would be in a sense penal for the Turkish people, and naturally to be accepted as a necessity. ...

III.

Considerations looking to a proper division of the Turkish Empire. ...

3) And the treatment of the other subject races has been still worse than that of the Turks. For them nothing has been secure -

whether property, lives, wives, or children. To all this have been added the horrible massacres of the Armenians, especially since Abdul-ul-Hamid's time, and somewhat similar deportations of the Greeks. Both races have proved themselves abler, more industrious, enterprising, and prosperous than the Turks, and so have made themselves feared and hated, doubtless not altogether without some provocation on their part in certain cases. And these massacres have been due to deliberate and direct government action, in which the Turkish people themselves have been too willing to share. They have not been crimes of the passion of the moment. And they have involved cruelties horrible beyond description.

For it must not be forgotten that this thing was not done in a corner. The evidence for few events in history has been more carefully gathered, sifted and ordered. The J.Bryce report upon "The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16,"*** leaves no room for doubt of the essential facts. It is idle to attempt to deny it, or appreciably to mitigate its force. ...

It is not pleasant to call these dark facts to mind, but unfortunately there is only the slightest evidence that the Turkish Government or people as a whole have recognized or repudiated the crime of the Armenian massacres, or done anything appreciable to set them right. ...

4) It might be asked whether the situation created by the massacres could be met only by the formation of a separate Armenia. For such a separation, it must be admitted, involves very difficult problems. Why, then, is it necessary to set off an Armenian State? ...

The only possible substitute for a separated Armenia is a general mandate by one of the Great Powers over all Asia Minor, which should ensure equal rights to all elements of the population, - to all races, and to all religions. If such a mandate were honestly carried out, we should certainly hope for a far better government on modern lines. But under the proposed mandatory system of the League of Nations, it is intended that the mandate shall be for a limited period. Even if that period were considerably prolonged, what would happen when the Mandatory withdrew? It is impossible to be sure, if the Turks still constituted the majority, that the State would not slump back into many of its old evils, including oppression of other races. The history of the

Turks, unfortunately, gives all too small reason to hope for more.

The reasons for a separate Armenia, then, may be said to be: because of the demonstrated unfitness of the Turks to rule over others, or even over themselves; because of the adoption of repeated massacres as a deliberate policy of State; because of almost complete lack of penitence for the massacres, or repudiation of the crime - they rather seek to excuse them; because practically nothing has been done by the Turks in the way of repatriation of Armenians or of reparations to them - a condition not naturally suggesting a repetition of the experiment of Turkish rule; because, on the contrary, there is evidence of intense feeling still existing against Armenians, and implicit threatening of massacre; because there has been sufficient proof... that it is better for both that they have separate States; because of complete failure of the strong clauses of the Treaty of 1878 to protect the Armenians; because the most elementary justice suggests that there must be at least some region in Turkey where Armenians can go and not have to live under Turkish rule; because nothing less than that could give to the Armenians any adequate guarantee of safety; ...because in this day of opportunity for small nations under the League of Nations, the Armenians have surely earned the right, by their sufferings, their endurance, their loyalty to principles, their unbroken spirit and ambition, and their demonstrated industry, ability and self-reliance; ...because such a separate State would probably make more certain decent treatment of Armenians in other parts of Turkey; and because there is no adequate substitute for such a State. In the interests of the Armenians, of the Turks, and of the peace of the world alike, the formation of a separate Armenian State is to be urged.

2. But the reasons for some righteous division of Turkey do not lie simply in that "historical mis-government," which justly challenges her rule over any other people; but also in her utter unfitness for the strategic world position in which she is placed.

...1) For Turkey is held, as L.Dominian has said, by "a people whose incompetence to convert nature's gifts into use or profit is historically patent."^{4*} But, striking as has been their economic failure, the failure of the Turks has been far more than merely external or material. She has acted rather as a kind of blight upon all the peoples she has conquered. As W.Ramsay - possibly too strongly - puts it: "The action of the Turks in every

department of life has simply been to ruin, never to rebuild... They destroyed the intellectual and moral institutions of a nation; they broke up and dissolved almost the entire social fabric; they undermined every educating and civilizing influence in the land, and they brought back a great part of the country to the primitive simplicity of nomadic life." "There is hardly a social institution in Asia Minor, showing any degree of social constructiveness, that is not an older Anatolian creation, Moslemized in outward form, and usually desecrated in the process."^{5*} ...

2) Turkey is before everything else a roadway - a bridge-land. ...The through roads converging into the Turkish territory are probably the oldest commercial routes of the world. ...

4) The problem of the control of Constantinople and the Straits [is of] a different spirit. The situation is so unique, the relations so complex and far-reaching, the responsibilities so heavy, and the possibilities so enthralling, that no one nation can be equal to the task, - least of all a nation with Turkey's superlatively bad record of misrule. No situation in the world demands so compellingly international rule, [as this one.] ...

This call for a Constantinopolitan State, directly and permanently vested in the League of Nations, but best managed probably through a single mandatary as trustee, steadily responsible to the League and removable by the League.

Such a solution, at first sight, will undoubtedly be unwelcome to most Turks. But Turkey is simply not conceivably equal to a great world responsibility; and the larger world interests must prevail. ...

IV. Resulting problems.

The considerations now dealt with looking to a righteous division of the Turkish portion of the former Ottoman Empire, clearly involve the setting off of an Armenian State, and of a Constantinopolitan State; but as clearly imply the continuance of a distinctly Turkish State, with guarantees of justice to all its constituent peoples. The resulting problem, now to be considered, therefore, naturally become: the problem of a separate Armenia; the problem of an international Constantinopolitan State; the problem of a continued Turkish State; the problem of the Greeks; and of other minority races.

1. The problem of a separate Armenia.

1) The reasons why it is necessary that a separate Armenian

State should be set up, have already been fully given. ...

2) It is not proposed in such a State to establish the rule of a minority of Armenians over a majority of other peoples. That would inevitably seem to the Turks to be very unjust, and would at once excite resentment and unremitting opposition. Moreover, such an arrangement would be unfair to the Armenians as well, for it would place them from the start in a false and untenable position. It would put them, too, under great temptation to abuse of power. And it would be no fair trial of a truly Armenian State. It would, of course, also make any mandate mean little or nothing, if not make it entirely impossible.

But such a separated State should furnish a definite area into which Armenians could go with the complete assurance, that there they would never be put under the rule of the Turks. It should be also a region in which Armenians could gradually concentrate, and from which the Turkish population might tend increasingly to withdraw; though no compulsion should be put on any people.

All this necessitates a strong Mandatory Power. The State could not even start without such help. This separated State should be therefore a State definitely under the rule of a Mandatory Government, organized on a modern lines to do justice to all elements of the population: and a State from which the Mandatory should not withdraw, until the Armenians constituted an actual majority of the entire population, or at least until the Turks were fewer than the Armenians. This would necessarily mean that full Armenian self-government would be long delayed. And that fact should be definitely faced as inevitable. The conditions are such that there is no defensible alternative.

3) The term of the mandate... cannot be a short-term. ...A true Armenian State cannot be established in a brief period of time. ...The Armenians cannot safely undertake the government independently, until they constitute an actual majority. There is also the added consideration of the natural need of considerable time for the amalgamation and consolidation of the Armenian people, as against some tendency to split up into fragments. The mandate must be long enough, too, to make the people thoroughly ready for both self-government and self-protection, through an increasing use of Armenians in the government even from the beginning.

4) An American mandate desired. It seems universally recognized that the Armenians themselves desire an American mandate. And this choice is apparently generally approved by America's Allies. The Turks, too, though not wishing any separate Armenian State, would probably favour an American Mandate for Armenia, if there must be an Armenia at all.

5) The conditions upon which America would be justified in taking the mandate for Armenia may be said to be: the genuine desire of the Armenians; the cordial moral support of the Allies in carrying out the mandate; willingness on the part of the Armenians to bear with a pretty long mandatory term, for the reasons already stated, and to give up all revolutionary committees; that Armenia should have territory enough to ensure a successful development; and that peculiarly difficult *mandate for Armenia should not be the only mandate given America in Turkey.* ...

6) The Extent and Boundaries of the Armenian State. The General Adviser, Dr.A.Lybyer, has expressed so exactly the convictions of the Commissioners concerning the extent and boundaries of the Armenian State, that his statement may well replace any other discussion of this question:

1. The Armenians should be provided with a definite territory, and organized as soon as practicable into a self-governing independent State. Otherwise the questions of their safety and of their ceasing to be a centre of world-disturbance cannot be answered.

2. This area should be taken from both Turkish and Russian territory. ...

3. The Armenians are entitled to an amount of Turkish territory which takes into account their losses by the massacres of 1894-1896, 1908-1909, and 1915-1916. These losses may be estimated at one million.

4. They should not be given an excessive amount of Turkish territory, if their State is to be practicable.

a) The Turks, Kurds, and other races should not be left with a just grievance, since that would solidify their traditional hostility, and embitter them against the League of Nations.

b) It has been questioned, even by many of themselves, whether the Armenians are ready for self-government at present; certainly an imperial rule by them over other peoples should not

be thought of for the present or the future. ...

d) If the Armenians are assigned too large an area, they will never be able to occupy and hold it.

e) The idea has been suggested that Armenia should be developed as a wall of separation or a buffer State between the two Moslem areas occupied by Turks and Arabs. This might be done by a compact, homogeneous State with considerable population and resources, but it is a burden which the Armenians cannot be expected to bear within a conceivable time.

5. The proposed large Armenia, to extend from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, is probably impossible of realization, and therefore should not be planned for. It encounters all the objections previously mentioned.

a) In 1914 and before 1894 the Armenians were in a small minority in such an area.⁶ If they should be given the control, the majority populations would be injured, in violation of all "Wilsonian principles" and war aims. With allowance for the estimated million who perished, and assuming that all these could have been gathered into the territory, the Armenians would still now number only about one-third of the total population. ...

b) The real Armenia, as maps and records show, was a highland country, which at one time reached the Caspian Sea, which came near to the Black Sea without reaching it, and which never came near the Mediterranean Sea.⁷ The Lesser Armenia of the Middle Ages in the Cilician region was the result of the expulsion and flight of Armenians from further east, - a process which scattered them over a large area, in which they have ever since been in a minority almost everywhere. The demand for both areas is therefore an imperialistic claim, based historically upon an over-strained interpretation of facts.

c) the Armenians are reduced, allowing for the return of survivors, to about ten per cent of the population in the large area proposed. Assuming an optimistic amount of migration of other Armenians into, and of Turks and Kurds out of the land, the Armenians would still constitute only about one-fourth of the population. ...The situation of a mandatory power would be extremely difficult in defending this minority, which would as future owners and rulers of the land, be much more obnoxious to the majority than at present.

d) No European power will undertake so difficult a task, and

it must therefore be left to the United States. ...The chances are considerable that the large Armenia would never become an Armenian State at all, but a mixed State, composed of minorities of Armenians, Turks, etc., which could not maintain internal order or security against external aggression without the support of a strong mandatory power. This would disappoint both the Armenians, who could never control the government, and the mandatory power, which could never leave the country.

6. On the contrary, an Armenia reduced to the Armenian highlands in both Turkey and Russia, with an outlet on the Black Sea, would have a good chance of establishment and continuance. The Turkish area which the Russian held in 1917 may be taken approximately as the Turkish portion of this "Small Armenia," and the present territory of Russian Armenia as the remainder. Engineers could overcome the physical obstacles to internal and external communication.

a) The Turks and Kurds could not rightfully complain of such an area, because it is the historical Armenia, and because if the million dead Armenians could be restored and brought into the land, the Armenians would have about one-half the population. ...Migration of Turks and Kurds from this area can be more easily accomplished than from the larger land, inasmuch as a considerable proportion of them fled before the Russians, and thus are in a dislocated condition.

b) The Armenians might become the majority of the actual population within a few years, and with that in view, and with the smaller area, they could be given a larger share in the administration from the start, and trained more rapidly to self-government.

c) The duration of the mandate would be materially shortened, with a solidier ethnical foundation and a more compact area. The Mandatory would need far fewer troops, and would be put to much less expense.

d) The doubt as to the possibility of erecting an Armenian State in the larger area, are reduced for the smaller land. The mandatory power could with a prospect of success, keep in mind the giving of control to the Armenians, since they would after a time not be a minority, causing trouble by incessant pushing for a special privileges of an economic and political nature, but a majority with a just right to a larger place.

e) This land, having secure frontiers, ...gives promise of self-

defensibility. ...

f) The economic opportunity of an Armenia on this basis would be ample. ...

I. In Turkish Armenia the Armenians were able to live and often to prosper, and yet they paid considerable taxes and were subject to frequent robbery.

II. In Russian Armenia the Armenians have thriven greatly, under only moderately favourable conditions.

III. This area is crossed by commercial routes of immemorial importance, notably through Erzinka⁸ and Erzerum between Anatolia and Persia and Trans-caucasia, and through Trebizond toward the Persian Gulf. This guarantees the importance of several towns at nodal points, such as Kars, Erivan, Erzerum, Mush, and Van, and suggests valuable possibilities in the direction of transportation, trade, and manufacture for exports. ...

7. [Armenians] are in genuine danger of grasping at too much and losing all.

If they establish themselves securely in the more restricted area, and if Anatolia fails to develop as a well knit and successful State, there is no reason why the question should not be resumed later of connecting Cilicia with Armenia.

Estimates of the Population of an Armenian State.

The appended tables are the result of an effort to compare the population of Armenian areas according to two plans. That which includes a "Larger Turkish Armenia" was worked out by the American Division of Western Asia at the Peace Conference, and can be examined more fully in the records of the Conference. It represents probably, subject to minor alterations, the best possible arrangement on the basis of giving an outlet on both the Black and Mediterranean Seas; the frontiers follow natural features, and the connection with Cilicia is made as narrow as practicable. The "Smaller Turkish Armenia" suggested in the text cuts off for Armenia in Turkey substantially that portion of the Armenian plateau which was held by Russia in her period of advance during the Great War. The phrase "Differential Area" was chosen to represent what is left after subtracting "Smaller Turkish Armenia" from "Larger Turkish Armenia," and extends from Mersin to Kharberd,⁹ and north to the Black Sea.

A) Before 1914. - ...The statistics prepared by Drs. [D.]Magie and [W.]Westermann. ...Dr.[D.]Magie's figures may under-esti-

mate the Armenians in some areas. Certainly will never be attained as to the numbers of the different elements in Turkey until a scientific ethnological survey has been made under disinterested control.

Larger Turkish Armenia

Moslems	3,073,000	or	71%
Armenians	933,000	or	21,5%
Greeks	289,000	or	6,5%
Others	34,000	or	1%
Total	4,329,000		

Differential Area

Moslems	1,697,000	or	73%
Armenians	461,000	or	20%
Greeks	136,000	or	6%
Others	18,000	or	1%
Total	2,312,000		

Smaller Turkish Armenia

Moslems	1,376,000	or	68%
Armenians	472,000	or	23,5%
Greeks	153,000	or	7,5%
Others	16,000	or	1%
Total	2,017,000		

B) In 1920. - It may be assumed that in 1920 order will be restored so that all survivors can return, of the Armenians, ...and of the Turks and Kurds. ...An estimate follows, that in the "Smaller Turkish Armenia" 50 per cent of the Armenians and Syriac Christians have perished, and 20 per cent of the Greeks and Moslems. The Armenians of the "Differential Area" had not the same opportunity to escape into Russia, and it is guessed that 75 per cent of these have perished.

Larger Turkish Armenia

Moslems	2,549,000	or	80%
Armenians	351,000	or	11%
Greeks	232,000	or	8%
Others	17,000	or	1%
Total	3,059,000		

Differential Area

Moslems	1,358,000	or	85%
Armenians	115,000	or	7%
Greeks	110,000	or	7%
Others	9,000	or	1%
Total	1,592,000		

Smaller Turkish Armenia

Moslems	1,101,000	or	75%
Armenians	236,000	or	16%
Greeks	122,000	or	8%
Others	8,000	or	1%
Total	1,467,000		

Estimated losses in whole area

Moslems	615,000
Armenians	582,000
Greeks	57,000
Others	17,000
Total	1,270,000

C) In order to give the Armenians the benefit of their entire losses in Turkey during the war, one million may be added to the numbers of Armenians according to each plan. This... displays the justice of assigning them the "Smaller Turkish Armenia."

Larger Turkish Armenia

Moslems	2,549,000	or	60%
Armenians	1,351,000	or	33,5%
Greeks	232,000	or	6%
Others	17,000	or	0,5%
Total	4,059,000		

Smaller Turkish Armenia

Moslems	1,101,000	or	45%
Armenians	1,236,000	or	50%
Greeks	122,000	or	5%
Others	8,000	or	-%
Total	2,467,000		

D) In 1925 - It may be assumed that on either plan, changes will take place between 1920 and 1925 in the following manner: 20 per cent of the Moslems will leave, and 300,000 Armenians will come from other parties of Turkey and of the world. No account is taken of natural increase but this would act against the percentage of the Armenians, because they lost men in far greater portion than women, and because they are less numerous than the Moslems, particularly when the larger area is considered. It appears that in normal times before the war Armenians increased more rapidly than Moslems, because of differences in social systems and military service; conditions will probably reduce these differences in the future.

Larger Armenia

Moslems	1,867,000	or	60,5%
Armenians	651,000	or	23%
Greeks	232,000	or	8%
Others	17,000	or	0,5%
Total	2,867,000		

Differential Area

Moslems	1,086,000
Armenians	115,000
Greeks	110,000
Others	9,000

Smaller Armenia

Moslems	881,000	or	57%
Armenians	536,000	or	35%
Greeks	122,000	or	8%
Others	8,000	or	0,5%
Total	1,547,000		

E) Complete Armenia in 1920. - It remains to add the Russian Armenia to the Turkish areas considered. The assumption has been made that Russian Armenia will contain in 1920, after the Turkish Armenians have gone home, a population of about one and one-half times as great as that estimated by Mr.H.Lynch. his actual figures, as of about 1890, for the Russian part of the

Armenian population, are: Armenians 519,238, Moslems 459,580, Greeks 47,763, others 69,129, total 1,095,710.¹⁰

Russian Armenia

Moslems	600,000	or	40%
Armenians	750,000	or	50%
Greeks	50,000	or	3%
Others	100,000	or	7%
Total	1,500,000		

Larger Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia

Moslems	3,059,000	or	67%
Armenians	1,101,000	or	24%
Greeks	282,000	or	6%
Others	117,000	or	3%
Total	4,559,000		

Smaller Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia

Moslems	1,701,000	or	57%
Armenians	986,000	or	33%
Greeks	172,000	or	6%
Others	108,000	or	4%
Total	2,967,000		

F) Complete Armenia in 1925. - Finally it may be assumed between 1920 and 1925, 250,000 Armenians will return from the remainder of Russia and from other parts of the world, and that a like number of Moslems will emigrate. Again no account is taken of natural increase, which might make a small addition to the Armenian percentage.

Russian Armenia

Moslems	350,000	or	23%
Armenians	1,000,000	or	67%
Greeks	50,000	or	3%
Others	100,000	or	7%
Total	1,500,000		

Larger Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia

Moslems	2,317,000	or	53%
Armenians	1,651,000	or	38%
Greeks	282,000	or	6,5%
Others	117,000	or	2,5%
Total	4,367,000		

Smaller Turkish Armenia with Russian Armenia

Moslems	1,231,000	or	40%
Armenians	1,536,000	or	50%
Greeks	172,000	or	6%
Others	108,000	or	4%
Total	3,047,000		

The whole calculation then shows a possibility... that by 1925 the Armenians can be in a small majority in an Armenia erected on the smaller basis. They would constitute about $\frac{2}{3}$ of the population in the Russian portion, and a little over $\frac{1}{3}$ in the Turkish portion.

In an Armenia on the larger basis they would not exceed 40 per cent for the whole area in 1925, and would then constitute about $\frac{2}{3}$ of the population in the Russian portion, and not over $\frac{1}{4}$ in the Turkish portion.

2. The problem of a separate Constantinopolitan State.

...It is proposed that the Constantinopolitan State... should be directly in charge of the League of Nations for the good of all the nations, ...[because] even "national interests are often promoted better by international cooperation than by international competition." ...The Constantinopolitan State could be administered by an International Commission; ...[but] the single Mandatory would seem to have some decided advantages. ...The need at least of some internationalization is manifest, when it is remembered that the Straits have been closed almost continuously since 1911.

...2) Reasons for a mandate for the Turkish State.

It seems to be generally recognized by the Turkish people themselves, that the surest and speediest road out of their present evil conditions is by way of a mandate under the League of Nations, and so shifting from an imperialistic State to a democra-

tic one. ...Indeed, it seems impossible to expect any satisfactory change in the government of Turkey by any other method. And if the Turks had not themselves suggested a mandatary, the Peace Conference might well have felt obliged to require one. ...

3) Turkey's desire for an American mandate. ...

It has been very difficult to get clearly decisive evidence of the desires of the people of Turkey upon the choice of mandate. But many indications tend to confirm the opinion that the great majority of thoughtful Turkish leaders sincerely desire an American mandate. ...

The National Congress, a body formed in Constantinople several months ago by the delegates of 53 different Turkish societies and organizations, is one of the chief supporters of the American Mandate. ...The national League, containing about 40 of the most respected citizens and Senators is also for the American Mandate. This means at the same time, the majority of the Senate. The "nationalist" Party in Anatolia in general are in favour of the American Mandate. The professors of different faculties of the university favour the American Mandate, So do most of the lawyers, teachers, technicians, and merchants. At present most of the papers with large circulations are taking the same view of things. This state of things is very surprising, because there is, on the one hand, a very active propaganda for the English mandate; on the other hand the Americans do not make any propaganda. ...

4) Territorial conditions in Anatolia.

...This is also furnished by the General Adviser.

I. After setting off definitely from the Turkish Empire as it was in 1914 all the Arabic-speaking areas, Armenia and the Constantinopolitan State, there remain a large mass of territory, in which the greatest single element of population is Turkish. ... Claims have been advanced towards setting off portions of this remaining area, by Kurds for "Kurdistan"; by Greeks for "Pontus", - an area along the Black Sea coast from Sinope to Batum; by Syrians for Cilicia; by Italians for Adalia and the whole southwest; and by Greeks for Smyrna, and the west. The only one of these portions that is advisable... actually to handle separately at present, is "Kurdistan." ...

II. Kurdistan. ...It seems best to limit them to the natural geographical area which lies between the proposed Armenia on the north and Mesopotamia on the south, with the divide between

the Euphrates and the Tigris at the western boundary, and the Persian frontier as the eastern boundary. A measure of autonomy can be allowed them under close mandatory rule, with the object of preparing them for ultimate independence or for federation with neighbouring areas in a larger self-governing union. It is possible to shift most of the comparatively small numbers of both Turks and Armenians out of this area by voluntary exchange of population and thus obtain a province containing about a million and a half people, nearly all Kurds. ...It would seem better, unless the population itself strongly prefers the other plan, to place it under the control of the power which cares for Mesopotamia, than to connect it with Armenia across the mountains at the north, or with Anatolia with which it would have only narrow contact at the west.

III. "Pontus." About one-half of the area asked for by the Greeks of "Pontus" should be included in the Armenian State, in order to give it access to the sea. The remainder is needed by Anatolia for the same reason. There were approximately 200,000 Greeks in each of these portions in 1914. This would seem to be too small a minority in both Armenia and Anatolia to be erected into an autonomous province. The rights of these Greeks can in each State be provided for fully by general laws, enforced in each case by the mandatory power until such time as the States are ready for self-government with adequate protection of minorities.

IV. Cilicia. Cilicia is claimed by both Armenians and Syrians, in each case by a minority which did not exceed 25 per cent in 1914.¹¹ ...It is very valuable to the areas both at the northeast and the north. It should not be separated economically from Anatolia at present, and if at any future time the Armenians should receive it, provisions would have to be made for the use of its ports by the interior regions of Anatolia from Caesarea^{12*} to Konia.

The region between Cilicia and Armenia, containing Albistan, Malatia and Kharberd, is claimed by the Armenians, but should also be left with Anatolia. It contained in 1914 a mixture of Turks, Kizilbash, Armenians, Sunnite Kurds and others, proportioned apparently in the order named. Strong mandatory control would be difficult because of the distance from the coast across rough mountainous country, but it would be necessary, lest the region become a hunting ground for Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian bands, each anxious to acquire the territory for its people.

V. Adalia^{13*} and the Southwest. Italy's claim to the southwest of Asia Minor rests upon nothing that is compatible with the principles of the Commission's instructions. There are no Italians native to the country, and no evidence exists that the population desires Italy as a mandatory over them. In this region Moslems are to the Greek Orthodox Christians as ten to one. None of this area should be separated from Anatolia.

VI. Smyrna and the West. The problem of the west coast is a difficult one, ...because of the persistency of the Greek Government in demanding an area there, and of the fact that a Greek army is in occupation. ...The Greek army and all authority of the Greek government ought to be withdrawn from an area where better order was kept by twelve British Officers that can be maintained by one hundred thousand Greek troops. There can be no settled peace *until either a Greek conquest has swept far to the interior, with great destruction of property and life, or until the Greek power is wholly removed.* In the later case the question would still remain: Should an area in Western Asia Minor be set off as a special Greek region and placed under a separate mandate? The answer is in the negative. ...

The maximum that would seem to be advisable at the present would be that *a strong mandatory power should be entrusted with a single mandate for Anatolia,* and should take special pains to protect Greeks and Turks alike and preserve order in the west, with the possibility of a limited locally autonomous Greek area. The question of future separated Greek area could then be left in abeyance, to be brought up again if circumstances justify.

VII. *A mandate for Anatolia.* While the instructions of this commission do not directly mention the assignment by the League of Nations of a mandatory nation to assist the Turks, *many of the Turks themselves have suggested such a plan,* and some have presented urgent requests for America as the mandatory power. *The need of supervision* over finance, public works, education, internal order, and all the processes of government is hardly less for the Turks, ...than for the Armenians, Syrians, and Mesopotamians. It is in fact *impossible to discern any other method of setting Western Asia in order.* The Turks if left to themselves in a condition of poverty, ignorance, and general exhaustion, with a feeling that they had been unjustly treated and then abandoned by all the

world, could not fail to be a source of trouble and disturbance *until another crisis, with perhaps another great war*, would necessitate some such solution as is now suggested, but under conditions less favourable to success.

VIII. The Desirability of a Single Mandatary for Armenia, Anatolia and Constantinople. *While it is desirable that Armenia, Anatolia and Constantinople should be placed under separate mandates, and governed by separated administrations*, it is also desirable that the three mandates should be held by one great power.

1) These areas have been held together for several centuries, and have a great number of close ties of all sorts, the delicate adjustment of which can be best accomplished under one power.

2) Unity of economic control, with similar commercial laws, coinage, weights, and measures, and language of business is advantageous to all concerned.

3) Problems of repatriation and exchange of populations, can be arranged more justly and promptly under one mandatary.

4) The adjustment of the public debt will be easier.

5) The building of railroads and the improvement of routes of travel can be better arranged.

6) Police control and repression of brigandage will be far simpler. On the contrary, the holding of the three areas by separate powers permits the taking refuge by bandits and criminals across the borders.

7) Unity is urged by *many well-informed foreigners*, looking from various points of view. *Many of these favour not merely a single mandatory power, but a single mandate*. Practically all the benefits can be obtained by the first plan that could be obtained by the second, and many serious difficulties can be avoided, such as arise from persecution of Armenians, interference with navigation, and complications of intrigue.

8) Friction which might arise between three mandataries, and which might conceivably lead to a great war, could be eliminated.

9) The transition would be more easily acceptable by the Turkish people, than if two or three powers should take control of the three areas. *The fact that the mandatary would probably establish a central control in Constantinople* would aid the transition still further. ...

4. The problem of the Greeks.

The general situation of the Greeks, too, in diminished numbers, *is much less desperate than that of the Armenians.* ...

V. Recommendations.

The Commissioners recommend:

1. The formation, under a Mandatary, of an Armenian State, completely separated from Turkey. ...It is consequently recommended that Cilicia should not be separated from Anatolia at present.

2. The similar formation, under a Mandatary, of an International Constantinopolitan State, completely separated from Turkey. ...

3. The appointment of a Mandatary for the continued Turkish State, in line with the apparent wishes of the majority of the Turkish people.

4. ...No independent territory be set off for the Greeks; though local autonomy be granted to that portion of the sanjak of Smyrna which has a decided majority of Greeks, but under the general mandate for Turkey.

5. That a commission or commissions on boundaries in Asia Minor be appointed. ...The definition of the boundaries of the Turkish State, ...with the clear understanding that the rights of the Syrians, Chaldean, and Nestorian Christian minorities in this whole region shall be carefully guarded.

6. A general single mandate for the whole of Asia Minor (not assigned to Mesopotamia or Syria) to include under it the mandate for Armenia, the mandate for the Constantinopolitan State, and the mandate for the continued Turkish State, each with a governor of its own to ensure full attention to its particular interests, besides a governor-general over the whole. ...

7. That the United States of America be asked to take this general single mandate together with its inclusive mandate for Armenian State, the Constantinopolitan State, and the continued Turkish State. This recommendation is made for the following reasons which need to be developed in full:

1) ...It seems to be generally desired that America should take the mandate for Armenia. In this, both the Armenians and the Allies seem agreed - and even the Turks, if there must be an Armenian State at all. Nevertheless, America cannot wisely take

this mandate without at the same time taking a mandate for the rest of Asia Minor as well.

For, in the first place, this Armenian Mandate would be in many respects the most difficult of all: because it would begin in relations of bitter hostility; because the State would have to be built from the bottom under most peculiar circumstances; and *because the mandate would have to be prolonged against the impatience of the Armenians.* ...

The problems of the different States in Asia Minor are too closely related to be wisely entrusted to entirely different Powers, with different ideals and methods. That situation would inevitably tend to produce friction, waste, and bad feeling. ...The American mandate for Armenia, thus, calls for a general mandate over all Asia Minor.

2) America is also the most natural Power to take the mandate for the International Constantinopolitan State, as well as for Armenia; for the simple reason that she is the only Great Power territorially and strategically disinterested. The Mandatary for this international State should be herself strong, *to discourage any further intrigue for control of the Straits*; disinterested, to command the confidence of all the nations concerned; and in unmistakably earnest sympathy with the aim of such a State, and with those international means by which this aim is to be achieved, - the League of Nations and its mandatory system. These needed qualifications are best met by America. ...

The mandate for the Constantinopolitan State also calls for a general mandate over all Asia Minor.

3) It is to be added that America is also the most natural Power for the mandate over the new Turkish State, because the Turkish people want her, and generally trust her. ...The desired American Mandate for the new Turkish State, then, calls also for a general mandate over all Asia Minor.

4) The best solution for mandates in Asia Minor would seem then to be, to combine all three mandates in a composite mandate, which would be put in the hands of America as the single Mandatary. ...

All the other Great Allies are already heavily loaded with colonial responsibilities, which of itself suggests a special obligation here for America. ...

5) Considerations on which America would be justified in

taking a composite general mandate for Asia Minor. Those conditions are: that she is really wanted by the Turkish people; that Turkey should give evidence that she is ready to do justice to the Armenians, not only by the allotment of the territory within her borders, recommended for the Armenian State, but also by encouraging the repatriation of Armenians, and by seeing that all possible just reparations is made to them as they return to their homes; that Turkey should also give evidence that she is ready to become a modern constitutional State, and to abolish military conscription; *that Russia should be ready to renounce all claims upon Russian Armenia*; that the Allies should cordially welcome America's help in the difficult situation in Turkey; and especially that all plans for cutting up Turkey, for the benefit of outside peoples, into spheres of influence and exploitation areas should be abandoned. These conditions are necessary to a successful solution of the Turkish problem. Unless they are fulfilled, America ought not to take the mandate for Asia Minor. And the Commissioners do not recommend that the mandate be given to America if these conditions cannot be essentially met.

Respectfully submitted, Charles R. Crane, Henry C. King."

* Inscribed as Tarsus.

** Abbas II Hilmi Pasha was the last Khedive of Egypt.

*** The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16. Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon by Viscount J. Bryce. Comp. by A.Toynbee. Lnd., HMSO, 1916.

4* Dominian L. Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe. NY, H.Holt and Co, 1917, p.236.

5* Ramsay W.M. Impressions of Turkey During Twelve Years' Wanderings. NY, G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1897, p.264-265.

6* Authors of the report used investigation, accomplished by their delegation. However, citing the latter's ratio of 21-23 per cent of Armenians in Western Armenia in 1914, H.King and C.Crane specified that this number may have been considerably diminished. They are quite right in this matter. Data, collected by Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople concerning 1912 (NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 557, vol.I, pt.3, f.192, 200, 429, 449-460), volume by Grigor (otherwise Krikor) Zohrap, published by his efforts in 1913 in Paris under the name Marcel Léart (see: La Question Arménienne a la lumière des documents. P., A.Challamel, 1913), Orange Book of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, printed in 1915;

Russian official statistics about 1916, note by the Armenian Delegation, directed to the Paris Conference on April 6, 1919 (NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 193, pt.5, f.335-338); as also materials required by the same Delegation for the London Conference, dated February 23, 1920 (file 557, f.360-366), and March 2, of the same year (file 557, f.191-192); letter by A.Aharonian and Boghos Nubar to W.Wilson of July 14, 1920 (file 557, f.426-429), and lots of other sources testify that rate of Armenians in Western Armenia formed 41,3 per cent. I had already approached this issue in: Новая история Армении в трудах современных зарубежных авторов. Под ред.Р.Г.Саакяна. Ер., НАН Армении, 1993, с.41. As it had been noted in the same book, on the page 125, Soviet Armenian historiography relied on data, collected by the Patriarchate of Constantinople about 39,3 per cent of indigenous Armenian population in their native land (file 557, f.192).

All referred documents were accepted at the Paris Peace Conference without objections or distrust; besides, if we advance statistics on certain Provinces according to H.King and C.Crane's classification, then we have the following pattern:

Larger Armenia, which had been perceived by Americans as a region in the Ottoman Empire between Black and Mediterranean Seas (file 193, f.338) - 1 million 274 thousand Armenians out of population equal to 3 million 75 thousands, it makes 41,4 per cent

Smaller Armenia, comprised of Provinces Van, Bitlis and Erzerum, with the Yerevan Republic (file 193, f.336-337) - Van had 240 thousand Armenians or 57,8 per cent; Bitlis 198 thousands or 49,5 per cent; Erzerum 220 thousands or 34,1 per cent; Republic of Armenia (file 557, f.426) has 1 million 294 thousand Armenians or 60 per cent

Differential area, i.e. Provinces Kharberd, Diarbekir, Sebastia and Cilicia (file 193, f.337) - Kharberd and Diarbekir had 115 thousand Armenians each, or 37,6 per cent; Sebastia 181 thousands or 35,3 per cent; Cilicia 205 thousands or 42 per cent.

⁷ The fact of Tigran II Artashesid's (Tigranes the Great Artaxiad) Empire, of his rule in 95-55 B.C., when his possessions reached the Mediterranean coast, had been ignored in the report of King-Crane Commission. This, aforesaid expansion took place too long ago, to be considered in the sphere of current political calculations. However, in domain of history it doesn't raise any doubts.

⁸ Inscribed as Erzingan.

⁹ Inscribed as Kharput.

¹⁰ Lynch H.F.B., Armenia, Travels and Studies. Lnd., Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901, vol.I, p.451.

¹¹ Let's repeat: there were 205 thousand Armenians in Cilicia in 1914, they comprised 42 per cent of total population, equal to 490 thousand dwellers (NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 193, f.338). Besides, if we evaluate whole area together with Province of Aleppo, then Patriarchate of Constantinople offers us number of 380 thousand Armenian inhabitants (file 557, f.200).

¹² Inscribed in the text as Kaisariyeh.

¹³ Nowadays: Antalya.

№ 200 Confidential appendix to the Report upon Syria - by H.King, C.Crane

for use of Americans only Paris, s.d., August 28, 1919
US NA, RG 256, 181.9102/10; Paris, vol.XII, p.848-863

...“In all Syria surprisingly few... declared for Britain as first choice - not nearly so many as for France. The fact is that Britain and America were classed together, with a distinct preference for America, but both were greatly preferred to France. ...

Practically all of the Moslems, who number about four-fifths of the population of Syria, are for America as their first choice. ... As for the Christians, while comparatively few declared directly for America as first choice - only a part of the Protestants and Syrian Orthodox and Armenians - they were bound by old ties and recent agreements to declare for Britain or France, but a large proportion mentioned America as second choice, and stated that they would welcome her, while there were abundant assurances that an American mandate would be satisfactory to practically all.

...Many British officials, not excepting General E.Allenby, think the best solution to be an American mandate over the whole of Syria. England might be very glad to get out of the difficulties of the situation in this way.”

№ 201 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, August 29, 1919, 11:00
US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/42; Paris, vol.VIII, p.1-11

“4. Situation in Armenia.

G.Clemenceau: He had received a disquieting telegram from

Colonel W.Haskell, the Allied High Commissioner in Armenia. [The telegram was read.]*] He had ordered a note to be circulated to his colleagues to the effect that he was ready to send 12,000 men to Cilicia. This force would be able to occupy the points mentioned by Colonel W.Haskell. It would be necessary to utilise the Baghdad railway as a means of supplying this force.**

F.Polk asked whether the army referred to by Colonel W. Haskell was not one that was accessible from the Black Sea.

P.Berthelot: It was also accessible from Cilicia, as the roads were good and suitable for motor lorries. It would be possible, he considered, to sent supplies into Armenia from Mersin and Alexandretta. An agreement for the use of the railway would, however, be necessary.

A.Balfour asked whether this had been studied by the French General Staff.

G.Clemenceau: The note was a result of a study by the Staff.

It was decided to postpone the consideration of the note regarding "Protection of the Armenians" till the following day."

* See telegram from W.Haskell, dated August 27, 1919.

** The note "Protection of the Armenians," presented in the next document, was read.

№ 202 note by the French Delegation "Protection of the Armenians" - for the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference

Paris, circulated August 29, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/42/App.B; Paris, vol.VIII, p.11

"In pursuance of the decision of the Conference of August 25, the possibility of sending a small expeditionary contingent for the protection of the Armenians has been examined by the French Government, and the following conclusions had been reached:

1) The French Government recognizes the possibility of constituting an expeditionary force of some 12,000 men of all arms, to be taken for the most part from the army of General L.F.Franchet d'Esperey, upon completion of the reconstitution of that army, that is, after September 10.

The operation would be carried out by taking as point of debarkation the ports of Cilicia, where two French bases would be created (at Mersin and Alexandretta).

In order to gain time, however, it would be necessary to re-

serve the maritime route for the transport of troops; materiel and horses would be transported by rail through Haidar-Pasha, Konia, Adana; an understanding to that effect would be concluded with the railway company for control of the transportation.

2) The occupying force would ensure its own food supply first by the railways from Mersin and Alexandretta, and beyond these by means of motor trucks for which the good state of the roads in Armenia permit a wide use.

The supply of the bases could be assured out of our own resources as for the French troops in the Levant, provided the English continue to assure us a supply of refrigerated meat.

3) To recapitulate, the operation contemplated is possible after September 10 without serious difficulties, on condition that an understanding be reached regarding transport and supply."

№ 203 telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia A.Khatisian, R.Ter-Minasian - to the Minister President of the RA H.Kajaznuni,* Chairman of the Parliament H.Arghoutian**

Tiflis, August 30, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 362, pt.1, f.26

"We arrived on Tuesday, in the morning,** E.Gegechkori welcomed us at a railway station. There were two lengthy meetings with W.Haskell. His attitude is quite favourable and term required are not in the least categorical. Hope for successful settlement of all contestable issues. ...Owing to W.Haskell's negotiations the Georgian Government has assented today to transport [arrived goods] into Armenia. ...General [J.]Harbord leaved via Diarbekir and Van to Erivan, will arrive in three weeks." ...

* H.Kajaznuni should be implied in this case. He had been acting abroad, and on August 10, 1919, A.Khatisian was confirmed as a head of Government. It is evident, that the latter could not dispatch letters, addressed just to himself.

** As far as Chairman of the Parliament A.Aharonian worked abroad, and its Vice-Chairman A.Sahakian transferred on August 10 to the Government, Speaker of the Parliament H.Arghoutian had been appointed to a position of its Acting Chairman.

*** I.e. on August 26.

№ 204 telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia A.Khatisian, R.Ter-Minasian - to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RA, Chairman of the Parliament H.Arghoutian*

Tiflis, August 30, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 362, pt.1, f.25

""Considering objections raised by Azerbaijan and complete agreement of W.Haskell with our proposals, W.Haskell compiled quite acceptable to us text of his final decree, composed in the name of Conference, to be fulfilled by contracting parties. ...I'll receive tomorrow all questions by General J.Harbord to prepare reports before his arrival at the end of September. We leave for Erivan on Sunday." ...

* See the second remark of the previous document.

№ 205 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, September 1, 1919, 11:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/44; Paris, vol.VIII, p.29-53

"A.Tardieu: Greece since the Armistice... had mobilised three more divisions than she had under arms during the war. Greece was the only Power which had increased her Army since the Armistice. ...

3. Situation in Armenia.

A.Balfour: He had sent M.G.Clemenceau's proposals to the British Government with a personal opinion in their favour, and was waiting to hear further as to representatives being sent out to confer regarding details.

It was agreed the question should be adjourned."

№ 206 confidential telegram № 3021 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing - to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, F.L.Polk

Washington, September 2, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/68:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 838-839

"...Department received following dated August 30th from Constantinople. "The Captain of the United States vessel *Olympia*

telegraphs as follows: from Batoum, "British evacuated Tiflis August 29th and will be entirely out of Transcaucasia, including Batoum, in two weeks. General [W.J.]Cooke Collis of opinion that evacuation will result in collision with Georgian and Turkish forces at Batoum and general close in of neutral Armenians by Tartars and Turks." [G.B.]Ravndal, American Commissioner."

№ 207 confidential telegram from the American Commissioner G.B.Ravndal and High Commissioner at Constantinople Rear-Admiral M.Bristol - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Constantinople, September 8, 1919

(received September 9)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/72, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"...I went to the Anatolian Railroad station yesterday morning to bid goodbye to General J.Harbord and his Mission who departed for Mardin from which place they will proceed by motor car to Diarbekir and Sivas and Erzerum and Kars and Erivan and Tiflis. They expect to be in Sivas September 24th. If the roads are very bad the party may go out via Samsun and take boat to Trebizond and then enter the interior again via Erzerum. At my suggestion Husein Bey [Hulusi], Professor of Turkish at Robert College, was taken along as interpreter. He will render valuable service in the interior. Major H.Shekerjian, an American officer of Armenian, also went along. He has travelled quite extensively in Transcaucasia within recent months. I have placed H.G.Keropian of my staff at the disposal of United States Trade Commissioner E. Mears who has been attached to the J.Harbord Commission, and will join the latter in Tiflis. G.B.Ravndal, M.Bristol."

№ 208 note by the chief of the American military mission in Caucasus B.Moore "Political Parties" - for the chief of the military mission to Armenia Major General J.G.Harbord

Tiflis, September 11, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/85/Encl.4, M820, vol.230, vol.204, NAA, cm № 2

..."Armenia:

A. Dashnaktzut[y]un. This is really a political society rather than a party. ...In 1918 it was largely responsible for Armenia's

valiant resistance to the Turks. ...It is highly organized, has agents everywhere and still plays a dominant part in Armenian national life.

The people feel great devotion to it on account of its patriotic work and the protection it has afforded them. In both the Ministry and Parliament it has a large majority.

It contains three clearly defined elements, all of which are strongly serviceable. a) The right wing, composed of comitadji. b) The centre comprising intellectuals who control both wings. c) The left wing which is almost Bolshevik. ...It is possible that the Dashnaktut[y]un still employs terroristic methods and undeniable that it is now a source of danger, owing to its liability to precipitate conflicts.

This organization is now all-powerful in Armenia. The strongest part of it is the so-called "Bureau," a secret political club of ultra socialists who wish to nationalize the land and who terrorize the more moderate elements of the Government.

It appears more and more certain that good government cannot be established until the Dashnaktut[y]un has been suppressed. It is reliably reported, that many of its members are opposed to the arrival of Americans in Armenia, on the ground that they will hinder graft and that with them there will return from abroad such Armenians, which likely to diminish the power of Dashnaktut[y]un.

B. The Peoples Party: ...This party is opposed to socialism and the Dashnaktut[y]un, of which it is the only serious rival. It is not however strong enough at present to overthrow the Dashnaktut[y]un and considers that all political agitation should be suspended in order to concentrate Armenian energies on the problems of national existence and in particular the repatriation of refugees. It does not expects majority at the next elections, but hopes to increase... its strength and trusts to Allied disapproval of violence to assist it to destroy the Dasnaktut[y]un.

The Peoples Party appears to be gaining in strength and popularity, is well represented in the Ministry and Parliament and in many ways represents the soundest elements in Armenian politics. ...

C. Social-Democrats. Are too weak to have any influence.

D. Social Revolutionarists. Also too weak to count." ...

№ 209 Aide-Mémoire by the British Prime Minister D.Lloyd George "In regard to the occupation of Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia, pending the decision in regard to mandates" - for the French Prime Minister G.Clemenceau

Paris, September 13, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/53/App.B; Paris, vol.VIII, p.216-217

"1. Steps will be taken immediately to prepare for the evacuation by the British Army of Syria and Cilicia including the Taurus tunnel.

2. Notice is given both to the French Government and to the Emir Feisal of our intentions to commence the evacuation of Syria and Cilicia on November 1, 1919. ...

4. ...The garrisons in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line and the garrisons in Cilicia will be replaced by a French force. ...

11. The French Government, having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate dispatch of French troops in Alexandretta and Mersin for this purpose."

№ 210 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, September 15, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/53; Paris, vol.VIII, p.200-217

"4. Future of the Conference.

D.Lloyd George: ...It was impossible for the Conference to continue in perpetuity governing Europe. ...There was one or two large questions which the Conference ought to clear up. After that, they would only have to deal with the Treaty with Turkey. He feared that this could not be settled finally for some months. At present the Conference was held up in the matter until President W.Wilson was able to declare the position of America in regard to Mandates. Until he did so, what useful purpose could be served by discussing the Treaty with Turkey? He did not know when we should be in a position to discuss it, but, in his view, it might not be until the end of November.

F.Polk: He thought the American position would be cleared up by the end of October. A Resolution had already been tabled in Congress in regard to the Armenian Mandate. ...

(a) Turkey.

D.Lloyd George: He thought that Mr.F.Polk was rather sanguine. President W.Wilson had hoped that he would be able to announce the American position on Mandates in August or September. He felt, therefore, that the Conference could not found its procedure on the assumption that the American position in regard to Turkish mandates would be cleared by October. In any case the Conference would have to be reconstituted in November or later for the consideration of the Turkish Treaty. He did not think the Conference could be kept in continuous session until then.

Secondly, what was now important was to make provisional arrangements as regards the garrisons to be maintained in Turkey.

...(b) Russia.

In addition, there was the question of Russia. ...In addition to the sum required for maintaining the Poles, A.Denikin had another 500,000 men. Would these also have to be paid for, and if so, by whom? ...

5. Syria and Cilicia.

As regards Turkey it was impossible at the present moment to discuss the question of mandates. All that could be discussed, usefully was the arrangement for the military occupation of the various spheres. He had discussed this matter with M.G.Clemenceau on... September 13th, and had handed to him an Aide Memoire, which he would now place before the Conference.* [It was handed around.] ...

D.Lloyd George referred first to the final paragraph, in which it is stated, that the French Government having accepted responsibility for the protection of the Armenian people, the British Government will consent to the immediate despatch of French troops via Alexandretta and Mersin, for this purpose. ...The withdrawal of British troops from Cilicia was to take place immediately. ...

G.Clemenceau: The pressing question today, on which he wished to take an answer from Mr.D.Lloyd George, was as to whether the occupation by French troops of Syria and Cilicia would be considered as... a definite acceptance of the [Sykes-Picot] agreement. It would not be possible for him to promise things he could not carry out. If Mr.D.Lloyd George was unable to come to France later to discuss the question, then he himself would be

prepared to go to London. Until this later discussion, he could accept no condition in the Aide Memoire, other than the occupation by French troops. As for the question of sending French troops to Armenia, this was a very serious and grave responsibility for France to take. He offered to send French troops to Armenia because the Armenians were threatened with massacre, in order to render a service to the Conference. This offer, however, could not constitute a provision of an agreement since France was not desirous of going to Armenia and it would involve an enormous burden. For the moment, he merely wished to put this question: "Does the sending of troops by France to Syria and Cilicia mean, that he accepted the whole agreement?" If it was so, he could not undertake to send troops.

D.Lloyd George: M.G.Clemenceau would not be committed to the whole agreement by sending troops. It was the intention of the British Government to withdraw their troops from Syria and Cilicia in any event. ...

G.Clemeceau: It was no advantage for France to go to Armenia, which would cost them a great deal of money.

D.Lloyd George: ...The mere presence of troops in the places now occupied, had a good effect in averting massacres in Armenia.

F.Polk: ...It was understood that the question would be debated hereafter as a whole.

G.Clemenceau: ...He would agree to replace the British troops in Syria and Cilicia by French troops, but as regards the rest of the Aide Memoire, he must reserve his opinion. ...He would always be ready to go to London.

D.Lloyd George: ...He wished to be perfectly clear that M.G. Clemenceau had accepted that France should occupy Syria and Cilicia. ...This was a purely provisional arrangement for the military occupation.

G.Clemenceau: ...The matter did not really affect the Conference.

D.Lloyd George: It did not prejudice the settlement of mandates or boundaries." ...

* See the previous Aide Memoire of September 13, 1919.

№ 211 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission
to Negotiate Peace

Paris, September 18, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/152; Paris, vol.XI, p.417-424

“W.Buckler: I have a feeling that we ought to be arranging about a financial expert familiar with all the intricacies of the Ottoman debt; we ought to be looking forward to having someone ready to serve in that capacity when the Turkish Treaty comes up for discussion. ...

F.Polk: I assume that we are not going to touch the Turkish Treaty. Every time they take up anything in regard to Turkey we make the reservation that it is altogether temporary. For instance, with regard to this arrangement that G.Clemenceau and D.Lloyd George were discussing, I made it clear several times in the procès verbal that it was in no way binding on the United States, that it was purely temporary, provisional.

W.Buckler: Might it not be well to call [to] the Department's attention that the particular thing is an extremely intricate one, and that it needs a certain amount of preparation?

H.White: Yes, we should.

F.Polk - to W.Buckler: If you will prepare a telegram along that line, I will send it.”

№ 212 strictly confidential telegram № 1410 from the special
representative of the U.S. Government in Europe E.M.House - for
the President W.Wilson; conveyed by the U.S. Ambassador in
France H.Wallace - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Paris, September 19, 1919 (received September 20)

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/6830:Telegram; Paris, vol.XI, p.
647-648

“...I have been going over the situation here with F.Polk and find that... there are five principal problems: ...

5th. The Turkish Treaty. I have talked with [D.Lloyd] George, who feels that nothing can be done with this until it is known whether the United States will take mandates. The others are of the same opinion. ...In our opinion it will not be necessary to keep more than one commissioner here to carry on negotiations, particularly since you have certain definite policies which can be laid down and there are few difficult boundary questions. ...Lord A.

Milner believes that no further action should be taken on mandates until the time of the Turkish treaty, which may not be until the turn of the year. ...

I am sailing between the 1st and 10th of October. I have shown this to F.Polk, who agrees. Edward House."

№ 213 strictly confidential telegram № 3193 from the Acting Secretary of State W.Phillips - to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, for F.L.Polk

Washington, September 20, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/85a:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 839

"Senator J.S.Williams introduced resolution proposing to authorize the President to use American military forces to protect Armenians. Resolution referred to subcommittee.* President is heartily in favour of this course provided it meets authorization of Congress. If French are sending sufficient number of troops, President is willing to defer to them, or if they will accept a joint military action he is willing to join the French. Under instructions from the President I today saw Senator J.Williams who does not hope that the dispatch of American troops can be realized because French are apparently willing to send troops and because the feeling in the Foreign Relations Committee is against sending American forces. He is therefore in favour of securing authorization to suspend restrictions against recruiting volunteers for foreign armies in the United States, at the same time securing authorization for the immediate dispatch of arms and ammunition to Armenia. The subcommittee will summon me in a few days to discuss the matter. I will therefore be glad to receive a reply to Department's 3060 of September 8, 7 p. m."

* See names index.

№ 214 telegram № 4312 from the Commission to Negotiate Peace, from F.L.Polk - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Paris, September 22, 1919 (received September 22)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/90:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p. 840-841

"...The French offer... to land troops at Alexandretta and Mersina meant that an expeditionary force of about 12,000 men of all arms would be moved into Cilicia and would occupy the points

in southern Armenia such as Marash, Malatia, and Urfa now occupied by British troops. In pursuance of this plan the British and French agreed on the 15th instant, that the British garrisons in Syria west of the Sykes-Picot line in Cilicia and southern Armenia will be replaced by a French force; that the garrisons at Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo will be replaced by an Arab force; and that after the withdrawal of the British forces neither the British Government nor the British commander-in-chief shall have any responsibility within the zones from which the army has retired.

This carries out the arrangements contemplated by the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, under which the Syrian littoral with Cilicia and southern Armenia was to be occupied and administered [by the] French. This plan will merely protect the relatively few Armenians now occupying southern Armenia. It is a practical impossibility for a French force to reach Russian [Armenia from] Malatia which is about 300 miles* from Erivan, and furthermore the French force intending to occupy the posts evacuated by the British in Cilicia and southern Armenia will be no more than sufficient for that purpose. *The above plan will be therefore do nothing to prevent the invasion or the massacring of Armenians in Russian Armenia.*

Joint military action by our troops with the French, as mentioned in your 3193, September 20th, does not seem feasible because [G.]Clemenceau has already declined to consider the sending of any French troops to Russian Armenia via Batum where the British withdrawal is proceeding and will be completed in about 10 days. The sending [of] ammunition, supplies, and volunteer recruits to the Armenian republic as proposed by Senator [J.S.]Williams can be assured only if the railway from Batum to Erivan be held by an American military force. In that event, the Armenian army, reenforced and equipped, probably would be able to successfully withstand the Turks and Tartars."

* Nearly 485 kilometers.

№ 215 memorandum by the President of the Anatolia College in Marsovan Dr. G.E.White - for the Colonel J.P.Jackson, from the J.Harbord mission

Marsovan, September 23, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 184.02/317/Encl.1, M820, Roll 232, NAA,
MR № 4

"There is coal within ten miles* of the town. The vein varies in thickness up to as much as 10 feet.** The character of the coal is about that of ordinary bituminous. No careful investigation of this coal has been made, so that amount available is not known. The superintendent of the mine is now away.

The superintendent, who is also the owner of the mine, is an Armenian, and by reason of the present disturbed conditions of the government, is unable to run the mine at full capacity and expects to close it down entirely, unless governmental conditions improve. This is a catastrophe of great importance, as the fuel of this mine is essential for house-warming during the coming winter. The transportation from Marsovan is by small wagons, having about a five-foot wheel base, and drawn by two or three horses; ox-teams with solid wheel carts of small capacity; donkey carrying about 150 lbs.** Load, and camels carrying about 500 lbs.^{4*} A normal wagon load is about 1000 lbs.^{5*} The transportation available is sufficient to handle the local needs and transport exportable material, even though this should be greatly increased. The exports are largely wheat, with some hides, tobacco, fruits, etc., and go to the port of Samsun.

The agricultural methods are primitive and do not utilize much of the good land available. The adoption of modern agricultural machinery would result in a two-fold advantage. ...the Armenians here are actually leaving the district by reason of their fear of further massacres. For instance, the cook in the President's house left this morning, and many others either have left or are preparing to leave. (We met a couple of families on the outskirts of the city this afternoon who were making their plans to go to Samsun at the earliest possible moment.)

The Armenians and the Greeks and the staff of the College, all believe that the new Independent Government Movement means the resumption of power of the Committee of Union and progress, largely under the leadership of the same man who committed the atrocities in 1914. The conditions as explained by the Doctor are practically the same as those which existed before the beginning of two former series of massacres. He himself considers that the conditions are very dangerous.

Up to last week this place was garrisoned by about 600^{6*} English soldiers. These have now been withdrawn, and with them

all feeling of safety. The British advised the Americans to close up their establishments and go off with them. The Armenian continually bring in reports that Turks tell them that they will shortly take measures against them, and that they had better at once become Moslems. Such of these threats cause much disturbance.

The population of this town was approximately 30,000 total, before the war, and it is 20,000 now. There were 14,000 Armenians before the war, and there are about 2,000 now. There are about 500 Greeks.

The College is carrying for 250 Armenian and Greek orphans in its school buildings. It has about 40 girls taken from Turkish homes, and has already placed in suitable situations some 357* others. About 500 women are working on lace and embroidery work; and there are about 80 to 100 in the Hospital. There is no likelihood of this work decreasing, but it is probable that it will increase. The workers named above are all in destitute circumstances and are given this opportunity to earn their livelihood.

The industry in the town is flour-milling in small crude mills, and weaving or knitting. The weaving and knitting is largely done in the homes, but here and there groups of dozen or so work together. The Doctor estimates that in his entire district at least the equivalent of 26,000 people require entire maintenance for the coming winter in clothing and food. He says that food is available in the country if properly distributed. There is also possibly enough clothing or yarn for the necessities of half of these people. Yarn or cotton thread should be furnished for the remainder from the outside.

The number of people total in the Sandjak is now about 200,000, before the war it was 250,000. Of these there were 40,000 Armenians before the war, and there are 10,000 now. There were and are about 10,000 Greeks.

The district covered by Dr.[G.]White^{8*} includes the West part of Sivas, the East part of Angora, the West part of Trebizond, and the East part of Kastamuni. In this district there are about 2,500,000 people. Dr.[G.]White states that a stable and permanent government which will maintain justice and peace, is absolutely essential to the prosperity of the country. He also insists that it must come quickly if serious consequences are not to follow. He of course hopes that America may take a mandate which will

accomplish these ends.

The basis of the difficulty seems to be religion. The politicians take advantage of religious fanaticism. The bigotry and hate of the Moslems for those not of their faith is always present as a source of danger. The Kurds, in the judgment of the Doctor, are not a large element in the population, nor an important influence. They Aryan by origin and are inclined to accept the religion and leadership which touches them most nearly.

Dr.J.K.Marden, director of the Hospital, emphasized the fact that the village Turk was in many ways as much in need of protection as the Armenians and Greeks. He said that under the tax and governmental system these villagers were practically the serfs of land-owners residing in the city, ...that there are no schools in the most of the villages; that there are no doctors available; frequently not even a midwife; disease is rife; and that as a matter of fact their condition is pitiable. ...

Dr.[J.]Marden and Dr.[G.]White both stated at the time of the massacres the business-men, doctors, and indeed all able-bodied Armenians were taken out to the south hills a few miles away, in groups of about 250 each to a total of about 1,100 and were murdered. After these massacres the deportations began and continued up to a total of about 12,000, leaving out of the total 14,000 about 1,000 who slipped through by accepting the Moslem religion or otherwise.

Dr.[G.]White considers that the "great bulk of the Turks" in his district are not, as a matter of fact, as much Turkish as Armenian and Greek. He also believes that if the pressure of Turkish combined with Moslem religious rule was abolished, the great bulk of these people would return to the type. He considers this true of the whole district claimed by the Armenians.

Doctor [G.]White is of the opinion that primary human justice demands that the civilized world make available a country to their use along more or less the line of the Armenian demands. He does not necessarily consider that those demands need be complied with in full. He further says that in his judgment any strong power that comes in to take charge, will find the present resistant attitude of the Turks is largely a bluff.

The method of taxing is as in other places, namely, the Government expects 10 per cent of the crops. This 10 per cent it sells to the highest bidder. The tax collector then collects the

percentage from the farmer and endeavors to make his profit by selling at a higher price than his bid. Doctor [G.]White said that this system resulted in the tax collector frequently gathering much more than the allotted proportion, and that the result of the whole system has been to kill initiative and impoverish the villagers of all nationalities."

* 16 kilometers, approximately.

** A little bit more than 3 meters.

*** Almost 70 kilograms.

4* About 225 kilograms.

5* Equal to 450 kilograms.

6* 800 is also probable, as far as the first figure is illegible and somewhat indistinct.

7* 55 and 65 are also probable, the figures are indistinct. In all similar cases we adopt the last admissible number.

8* See also the memorandum by J.P.Jackson of October 7, 1919, published below.

№ 216 minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, September 24, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/154; Paris, vol.XI, p.427-434

"W.Buckler: I would like to ask if there is any objection to the British commission having, to keep in their secret files as a secret document, a copy of the C.Crane-H.King report. They saw it and their interest in it was excited.

F.Polk: I think they had better trust to their memories. There will be probably a fight on that. They read it, and I don't doubt that they made very copious notes of it.

W.Buckler: No doubt they did. But they want a complete copy. They undoubtedly could have made extensive notes of it.

F.Polk: Yes, but they just tried, perhaps, to economize on stenographers.

F.K.Nielsen: I suppose we ought to keep them posted as to what is going on [in a telegram to the Secretary of State].

F.Polk: Yes."

№ 217 telegram № 3101 from the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia L.Evanghoulian - to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the RA A.Khatisian*

Tiflis, September [20-25], 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 175, pt.1, f.90

““General J.Harbord's aide-de-camp Captain [L.]Hill reached Tiflis with some members of his mission. They are seven officers and seven subalterns in number who depart for Erivan on Monday and will stay there several days. Don't worry about accommodation. Member of mission, legal expert J.Briton, who comes with [L.]Hill, requests to prepare before his arrival an outline of the State structure of our Republic, organization of its legislature, executive authority, and of local administration, particularly of zemstvos.”

* This document is compiled in Russian and translated into English.

№ 218 telegram № 3102 from the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia L.Evanghoulian - to the Minister of Public Instruction and Culture N.Aghbalian*

Tiflis, September [20-25], 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 175, pt.1, f.91

“Legal expert of the American commission J.Brinton requests to prepare by the day of his arrival [in] Erivan data concerning number of middle and primary schools, quantity of educators and pupils, teaching system, together with University project. J.Brinton leaves for Erivan on Sunday.**”

* This telegram was composed in Russian and translated into English for our collection.

** I.e. on September 28, 1919.

№ 219 telegram № 3116 from the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia L.Evanghoulian - to the Minister of Justice of the RA A.Gyulkhandanian*

Tiflis, September [20-25], 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 175, pt.1, f.94

“Legal expert of the American commission J.Brinton requests to prepare by the day of his arrival in Erivan an information about effective judicial system, present standing of courts,

current laws and penal system; specify changes, which took place, in comparison with Russian regulations. J.Brinton leaves for Erivan on Monday.**"

* Translated from Russian into English.

** I.e. on September 29, 1919.

№ 220 telegram № 3136 from the diplomatic deputy representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia M.Toumanian - to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the RA A.Khatisian*

Tiflis, September [20-25], 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 175, pt.1, f.95

...“Seven subaltern officers of the J.Harbord's mission will leave for Erivan at 9 o'clock in the morning of Monday;** they will stay in Erivan one day, till the night of Tuesday. I request to give orders that outlines on issues referred in telegram № 3101 be completed by Tuesday and handed over to J.Brinton.” ...

* This telegram had been translated from Russian.

** It is September 29, 1919.

№ 221 information by the Minister of Public Instruction and Culture of the Republic of Armenia N.Aghbalian “On foundation of University in Yerevan” - to the Prime Minister of the RA A.Khatisian, for J.Harbord mission*

Yerevan, September 26, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 498, f.67A-67B

“The Council of Minister at its session of May 16, 1919, had resolved to found a University in Erivan.

The University will have four faculties; they are

1. Faculty of Physics and Mathematics, with departments of Mathematics and Natural sciences

2. Faculty of Law, with School of Economics

3. Faculty of History and Linguistics, with the department of Oriental languages

4. Faculty of Medicine.

1. Faculty of Physics and Mathematics: a) after two years of activity, department of Mathematics will include division of Mechanics with following sections: a1) of Architecture and of Mechanics, with five-year education; a2) of General Subjects, a3) of Special Subjects.

b) Two years later, department of Natural sciences will have

chapter of Agriculture with four-year education; two years of this term are intended for General Subjects and two years for Special ones.

2. Course of lectures in the Faculty of Law will last four years, i.e. eight semesters; pay attention that the last three of them will be set aside for School of Economics.

3. Course of lectures in the faculty of History and Linguistics will last eight semesters (i.e. four years). The last four semesters will be devoted to Oriental languages.

4. Faculty of Medicine will have five-year course of education.

Yu.Ghambaryan, expert in orthodox science and Professor of Moscow University, together with chemist [D.K.]Zavriev, who is Professor of Tiflis University, are entrusted to organize the University.

300,000 roubles are allocated for initial expenses. Building of former Erivan Teachers' Seminary is transferred to the possession of University. There is an American hospital in it now. When outpatient clinic vacates this building we can get down to business in it. We propose to inaugurate this year Faculty of Law together with Faculty of History and Linguistics; and as we think, they will train something like 300-400 students.

First expenditures of the University are evaluated as follows:

Salary of Professors	1,207,000 roubles
Salary of Employees	12,000 roubles
Heating and Lightning	40,000 roubles
Miscellaneous	1,000,000 roubles

The University will have autonomy; Board of Professors will elaborate curriculum and its domestic rules."

* This document is translated from Russian.

№ 222 report by the Minister of Public Instruction and Culture of the Republic of Armenia N.Aghbalian "On secondary, junior high and primary schools in Armenia" - to the Prime Minister of the RA A.Khatisian, for J.Harbord mission*

Yerevan, September 27, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 498, f.69A-69B

"There were 7 public high schools, 1 private progymnasium, 11 junior high schools, 673 primary and 4 national high schools within the bounds of Armenia before 1918.

The number of schools had reduced in consequence of Turkish invasion in 1918 and evacuation of Kars and Alexandropol with their vicinities, in common with other districts, as also because of louse-borne typhus and starvation; thus there were only 5 high schools, 1 private progymnasium, 1 newly founded progymnasium, 3 junior high, 133 primary and 3 national high schools on the same territory in May of 1919.

Here are a list of these schools:

a) High and junior high schools: pupils, teachers, classes

1.	The Erivan men's Gymnasium	749	30	20
2.	-"- St.Hripsime women's Gymnasium	421	28	13
3.	-"- Alexander I women's Gymnasium	356	19	10
4.	-"- Theological Seminary	398	15	10
5.	-"- st.Gayane women's School	250	12	7
6.	Alexandropol Commercial Gymnasium for men	200	19	9
7.	-"- st.Olga women's Gymnasium	131	14	8
8.	-"- Arghoutian women's School	442	15	13
9.	Dilijan Forestry Gymnasium	92	11	5
10.	Erivan men's private Progymnasium owned by [N.G.]Scherbanina	98	14	8
11.	-"- Junior High School	51	6	4
12.	Ashtarak Junior High School	120	8	4
13.	Nor Bayazet** -"	137	5	5
	Total:	3,445	196	116

b) Primary schools: schools, pupils, teachers

1.	Public primary	78	6,200	153
2.	Theological	48	4,300	107
3.	Municipal primary	7	1,750	
	Total:	133	12,250	303

Educational process in academic year of 1918/1919 had been time and again interrupted.

Since October of 1918, studies were going on till December 5 of the same year, then they had been ceased again and resumed in March of 1919, being finally completed on June 1, 1919. So,

lessons lasted only five months in the course of all year. That was consequence of louse-borne typhus, starvation, etc.

High schools were in very hard plight, as far as their edifices were handed over to orphanages or transferred to troops. All high schools accommodated in two small school buildings, where lessons were managed in three shifts. Most of school premises are still occupied by different agencies, and that impedes the learning process.

Housing of men's Gymnasium, for example, is occupied by American orphanage and up to 800 pupils have to remain without teaching and wait until construction of their school is vacated. In spite of all unfortunate circumstances, the Ministry takes steps to resume regular study as soon as possible. In addition to schools that operate now, next schools will be inaugurated at the beginning of this year:

Kars non-classical secondary school and Kars women's Gymnasium; the Teachers Seminary and 2 junior high schools will be opened soon; 1 Armenian national school will be raised to Gymnasium. Gymnasiums will be established in 5 other uyezds^{***} also, exactly in Jalalogli,^{4*} Ijevan, Karaklis,^{5*} Etchmiadzin and Kamarlu.^{6*} We mean to constitute about 500 primary schools where 950 teachers will be employed. We have allocated next to 25,000,000 roubles for this purpose and nominated more than 400 teachers.

Large majority of schools will be opened about October 15. Currently, the Ministry clears up a question, in what manner technical, agricultural and handicraft know-how ought to be diffused in population; and we make some arrangements with this end.

...When we speak about matters of Armenia, you should bear in mind territory, composed of Kazakh, Pambak-Lori, Alexandropol, Kars, Etchmiadzin, Surmalu, Erivan, Sharur-Daralagyaz, Nakhichevan and Zangezur."

* Translated from Russian.

** It is Gavar at present.

*** Districts.

^{4*} Nowadays it is Stepanavan.

^{5*} Today it is Vanadzor.

^{6*} I.e. Artashat.

№ 223 list of documents, submitted by the Government of the Republic of Armenia - to the chief of the military mission to Armenia J.Harbord*

Yerevan, October 1, 1919

NAA, fund 206, reg.1, file 364, f.73-74

"General:

1) Booklet by the Armenian Delegation in Paris regarding historical and ethnic title of Armenia to disputed lands, unjustly contested by Georgia and Azerbaijan (accompanied with map of ethnic settlement of various nations in Transcaucasia and statistical data on their size.)

2) Letter by General G.Forestier-Walker of February 19, 1919, on need to abstain from acts of aggression in controversial matters, pending their settlement at the Peace Conference.

On Karabagh and Zangezur:

1) Last statistical values on size of Armenian population in Karabagh and Zangezur, including information on particular villages and towns.

2) Memorandum in regard to Karabagh, with historical and ethnic title of Armenia to this land, submitted by Association of Karabagh dwellers by parentage to Commander-in-Chief of the British military forces in Transcaucasia, attached to the letter by the aforementioned Association.

3) Formal order by the British Command, directed to the population of Karabagh, Zangezur, Jivanshir and Jebrail districts, dated April 3, 1919.

4) All protests, expressed by the Armenian Government and directed to the British Command on the subject of its decision to transfer Karabagh temporarily under the administration of Azerbaijan.

5) All letters on the same subject, presented to the British High Command by the National Council of Karabagh and by Association of Karabagh dwellers by origin.

6) Desires of political nature, submitted by the Armenian Government to General W.Thomson on March 28, 1919.

7) Letter by General G.Cory of June 1, № 13/12, which indicates his proposal to Azerbaijan that the latter ought to restrain from attempts to extend its authority over Zangezur.

8) Remonstrance by the Government of Armenia, dispatched

to the Chairman of the Peace Conference G.Clemenceau.

On Nakhichevan:

1) Clauses of truce, concluded by Colonel [F.]Laughton on January 21, 1919.

2) Letter by General K.M.Davie, dated April 24, 1919, on a decision, taken by the British Command, to transfer the Nakhichevan district to authority of the Government of Armenia.**

3) Letter by General G.Cory of May 31, 1919, on a decision, taken by the British Command to withdraw its troops from Nakhichevan, in view of certainty of the British Command that the Government of Armenia will fully secure peace in aforesaid district under its rule.

4) All appeals by the Government of Armenia to retain British military forces in the Nakhichevan district for some time, in view of alarm conditions in it.

On Kars:

1) An agreement of January 6, 1919, made by General G. Forestier-Walker and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia S. Tigranian.

2) An agreement of January 7, 1919, made by General G. Forestier-Walker and Shevki Pasha.

3) An offer, made by the British Command, to assume control of the Kars oblast*** and in what order the Armenian military forces had been brought into it.

4) Three written appeals by the Government of Armenia addressed to the British High Command with requests to cease removal of ammunition and cannons from Kars.

5) Replies by the British Command regarding the mentioned issues."

* Translated from Russian.

** See: NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 92, pt.4, f.233-234 rev.; file 212, pt.2-3, f.104-104 rev.; Նախիջևան-Շարուրը 1918-1921թթ., Փաստաթղթեր և նյութեր: Խմբ.Վ.Ն.Ղազարյան: Եր., ՀՀ Արխիվային գործի վարչություն, «Բանքեր Հայաստանի արխիվների», 1993, № 1-2, էջ 92-94 (subsequently: Նախիջևան-Շարուրը 1918-1921թթ.):

*** I.e. administrative region.

№ 224 brief remark by the Government of Armenia
on attached documents - for the chief of the military
mission to Armenia J.Harbord*

Yerevan, October 1, 1919

NAA, fund 206, reg.1, file 364, f.71

"...Acts of hostility by the [South-Western] Republic, aimed at the British Command, and total anarchy in the region forced the same British Command to detain on April 12, 1919, Government of Shura; then to propose on April 18 to the Government of Armenia to take its own control of the [Kars] Oblast and to bring the Armenian Army into this region." ...

* Translated from Russian.

№ 225 telegram № 4054 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Armenia A.Khatisian - to the diplomatic mission
of Armenia in Georgia, M.Toumanian*

Yerevan, October 2, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 175, f.471 and file 357, f.298

"...J.Harbord leaved in the morning by a motor car, he should reach Tiflis at night and will stay there one day; he is going to be in Baku on Saturday,** and ought to be in Batum on Sunday."

* Translated from Russian.

* On October 4, 1919.

№ 226 note from the British Delegation, by G.Milne
"Limitations of Greek and Italian troops in zones of occupation
in Western Asia Minor" - for the Council of Five
of the Paris Peace Conference

Constantinople, October 2, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/66/App.H; Paris, vol.VIII, p.531-533

"1. The Supreme Council decided on July 18th to direct the Commander-in-Chief of the forces belonging to the Allied and Associated Powers in Asiatic possession of Turkey to send officers, who... were to fix the military limiting lines beyond which neither Greek nor Italian troops should be permitted to move.

2. In pursuance of these directions General G.Milne has telegraphed the following report for communication to the

Supreme Council: -

"I have arrived at the following conclusions as a result of the report of the Commission who have been visiting the Turco-Greek front:

1. That a state of active warfare exists between the Greek and Turkish forces,

2. That the greater portion of the Turkish forces is composed of organized bands of brigands, reinforced by armed peasants driven from the villages by the Greeks and determined to prevent further advance of the Greeks. These armed forces which are secretly receiving reinforcements from the regular units are in considerable strength,

3. That the Turkish Government has no control over these forces, which are pledged to drive the Greeks out of Asia and hence cannot insist on their withdrawal from any stipulated line,

4. That generally speaking the civil administration is overruled by the military authorities, the latter being secretly in support of the national movement, which is gaining strength, and the Turkish Government are powerless to exercise any restraining influence,

5. That the Greek forces having advanced in many places to a purely Turkish area and an extremely difficult country, are from a tactical point of view badly placed but that any further advance to gain better positions will be resisted to the utmost and can succeed only after severe fighting,

6. That it is of little practical value to define a tactical defensive line, since it would be respected by neither one side nor the other, the Turks because they are determined to drive back the Greeks, the Greeks because no line will satisfy them until they obtain the line asked for by Mr.E.Venizelos,

7. To concede this line to the Greeks would be to give them territory which is purely Turkish and where a bitter resistance would be offered by the inhabitants. In addition it will precipitate an outbreak elsewhere in Asia Minor. ...

9. Guerilla warfare will continue so long as Greek troops remain [at the spot], and any further advance will tend to create greater difficulties.

10. For the present best solution is for Greeks *to remain* practically *in the present position*. ...

13. *An advance will be necessary* to secure a good and safe

position but this will be stoutly resisted by Turks. ...

14. It is hardly desirable that an early and clear decision from the Peace Conference on above points should be given. Such a decision will carry much weight and should do much to establish tranquility before the conclusion of harvest when unless some solution be found Turkish forces will be considerably increased." ...

№ 227 very confidential telegram № 3327 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing - to the head of American Commission to Negotiate Peace F.Polk

Washington, October 3, 1919 (received October 4)

US NA, RG 256, 811.001/360:Telegram; Paris, vol.XI, p.650

"...The President is very seriously ill and unable to attend to any business. You should not therefore for the present forward to him personal communications since they cannot be answered. R.Lansing."

№ 228 letter by Armenians, townspeople of Baku - to the chief of the military mission to Armenia Major General J.Harbord*

Baku, October 4, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 364, f.59-63A**

Referred by Armenians, engaged in enterprise in Baku.

"We, as representatives of different stratum of the Armenian population in Baku greet in Your person the Great American Democracy, which lent an unmercenary helping hand to the Armenian people in our cruel times. We deem it our duty to announce loudly and publicly that we, Armenians, regard High patronage of the Great Atlantic Republic as the most true and most reliable guarantee of our national revival, be it rebirth of Statehood and of culture. ...Representatives of the Armenian population of Baku give you today a solemn promise on behalf of the Armenian society of this city... to apply all our effort to constructive labour... in Armenia immediately, when the door is open and an ample opportunity presents itself; at the very moment, when the State system of Armenia is put into political shape. ...

[In the production sphere,] I.Mirzoyev, the Armenian, had been a pioneer of the petroleum industry in district of Baku, who set up the first derrick in 1869.

During the first big Auctions, organized in 1872 to give over

oilfields to exploitation, twenty big parcels of land had been yielded; eleven of these parcels fell to Armenians and nine to Russians. I.Mirzoyev, the Armenian, alone paid into the Treasury 1,087,000 Roubles out of all proceeds, equal to three millions.

Armenian firms, owned by I.Mirzoyev, G.Lianozov, as well as "Khalafi," "Associates," "Masis," "Tagiyev and Sarkisyan," and others, were first who proceeded to rational commercial activity concerning extraction of oil on the Apsheron peninsula. And the very first oil gusher which disgorged oil on the peninsula in 1873 from a depth of 126 feet*** belonged to an Armenian Company "Khalafi." One of the first kerosene factories, initially established in 1863, belonged to the Armenian D.Melikov. Soon after 1872, kerosene-industrial enterprise started to grow simultaneously with oil extraction; and a well-educated Armenian, by the name Tavrizov, merits reward for discovery of continuous oil distillation, as well as of extraction of kerosene and of fuel-oil residue.

With arrival of *L.E.Nobel* on Apsheron, petroleum industry, earlier almost the cottage craft, had shaped and grown into capitalist enterprise; taking American ones as an example, oil pipelines, tankers, many engineering works and drilling, big kerosene-lubricant plants, etc. came into being. Armenian little firms had immediately acquired these attributes, intrinsic to major oil companies; it enable them to produce and refine from 45 to 55 per cent of the extracted oil; they export their output by their own means and distribute a produce through their agencies both in Russia and abroad; construct their own oil and water pipelines, which serve their needs and wants of other companies as well; thus the whole entrepreneurs' strata of European formation, including engineers, experts, artisans and workers is creating; they make up to 40 per cent of all employed in petroleum industry. "Mantashev and Co" Society, "The Caspian Partnership" (Ghukasov^{4*} Brothers), "Mirzoyev Brothers" Partnership, "G.M.Lianozov Family," "Pitoev and Co," "G.M.Araphelov and Co, (it is known as BORN^{5*} at present), "A.Tsaturov," "Aramazd Company," "Aral-Caspian Company," "Astghik," "Syunik," "Ararat," "Masis," and many others were and are counted among such kind of enterprises. "Mantashev and Co" House exported its produced kerosene and lubricants both by loading its own tankers, and by filling canisters, sent to European, African and Asian ports as far as India. Now the very same business is managed by Ghukasov

Brothers and their "Caspian Partnership," they possess even ocean steamers. "Buniyatov Brothers" Society, who sailed their own tanker fleet on the Caspian Sea, was one of the first-rate export merchants in the Russian home market. ...

Annual output of oil in 1890 consisted 23,2 millions bbl^{6*}, 46 per cent of it had been extracted by Armenians, 47,3 per cent by Russians and Europeans, 6,7 per cent by other Caucasian nations. Out of 46,2 millions bbl, produced in 1907, 52,4 per cent had been procured by Armenians, 39,6 per cent by Russians and Europeans, 8,7 per cent by other Caucasian nations. Out of oil output equal to 36,9 million bbl in 1917, 53 per cent has been owned by Armenian Companies, including former ones.

There were 164 enterprises in 1907, 89 of them, i.e. 58 per cent were Armenian firms; in 1909 we possessed 99 out of 176 Companies, i.e. 56 per cent of the total number. There were also 39 oil and water pipelines in 1901, 25 of them, i.e. 64 per cent of the whole quantity had been constructed by Armenian Companies. ...

An Armenian from Vladikavkaz, Akhverdov by his family name, had become a pioneer... in Grozny oil area; ...he turned his business into big joint-stock company "Akhverdov and Co," with 33 per cent of total extraction in 1914; in 1901 that index amounted up to 40 per cent. He connected his oil fields with the Caspian Sea by means of 86 miles,^{7*} long pipeline, built the lengthwise of Grozny-Petrovsk line. During last 6-10 years... such Armenians as Tsaturov brothers, the Caspian Partnership, Mantashev and Co, Lianozovs, Mayilov Brothers and the others, had increased oil production in Grozny area ...up to 10,5-12,5 millions bbl^{8*} per year; they proceeded to laying-out of the second pipeline from Grozny till the Caspian Sea at Petrovsk, and they design at present to lay out with assistance of American firms one pipeline more, which should link Grozny oil area with the Black Sea. Participation of purely Armenian enterprises in petroleum production in the Grozny area now comes up to 60 per cent, and more. ...

Armenians drew special attention to metal working shops which provide a petroleum industry. ...Armenian enterprise "Shagidanov and Co" had been a pioneer in this business (in 1880s). First industrial water supply system, called the Caspian, is the biggest up to date; and it laid by Armenians. ...Figures tell us now that Armenians own 44 per cent or 65 plants out of total number,

that accounted 148 metal-working shops until event, which came over in the last year. Total number of skilled workers at all these plants amounts 3494, 1675 of them (i.e. 48 per cent) are Armenians. As to the enterprises, engaged in oil-wells drilling, the pattern is as follows:

Total number of enterprises, occupied with drilling, is 44; Armenians own 18 of them (i.e. 41 per cent). We should say the same about Trade Houses, which sell equipment for petroleum industry. ...There are 58 such firms in Baku, and 24 of them, i.e. 41 per cent, are Armenian. ...

There are only 430 diplomaed engineers who have graduated from the higher educational establishments, and 350 technicians employed in the industry of Baku, both in the petroleum sector, and in other its branches too; 220 diplomaed engineers of this total are Armenians. ...The ratio of Armenians with higher technical education amounts to 51 per cent. ...There are something like 160 Armenians, who are technicians by trade, that is 46 per cent of total strength.

Fishery, tobacco and wine-making, cotton growing, silkworm breeding, all this lines of business, which constitute at present basis of the economic might and wellbeing of the population in the noted areas, came into being in the Eastern Transcaucasia and in the rest of the Caspian seaside due to Armenians' initiative and vigour.

B.R.Arzoumanian, the Armenian, was a pioneer of cotton growing in the Caucasus. He started his business in 1890-1891, in Aghdash district, where American seeds of cotton had been reared. He constructed one after another gin houses in Aghdash, Aghstafa, Lyaki, Elizavetpol, Petropavlovka, in the Mugan region, six factories in all; 75 up to 80 per cent of aggregate raw cotton accumulated there; cotton sowing was encouraged and stimulated through subsidizing peasants. After B.Arzoumanian firms of [B.]Eghiazarov, of Avetisov brothers, of Kevorkovs', of Hakopov family and others gave a powerful incentive to cotton business in the Eastern Transcaucasia. ...Names of such initiators as Gyanjuntsev brothers, Nersesov, Arounyantz brothers, Mirzoyev brothers, Tarayantz and others... will always remain... in the history of this branch. ...Seeds had been ordered from Italy, Turkey and Japan, machinery was obtained in France and Italy; several enhanced factories, both silk-reeling and silk-throwing, had been created as

well. ...Silk from Nukhi was in particular demand in Marseilles, it was also taken to Moscow in the volume 245,7 up to 327,7 metric tons^{9*} annually. There were up to 100 plants in Nukhi before the disaster of last year; and the largest-scale ones belonged to Ter-Kevorkov brothers, to Shahbagov, Khachikov, Ter-Poghosov, Nasibov, Ter-Grigoryev brothers, to Osipov brothers, Buniyatov brothers, Mesropov brothers, and to others. Last decade Moslems followed Armenians' example and actively engaged in the activity of silk production, too. However, transportation of silk from this district was concentrated in Armenian hands almost exclusively.

Wine-making in the Republic of Azerbaijan is highly developed in Shamakhi^{10*} uezd, as also in Elizavetpol one. It is high in the product scale of the second uezd; and Armenians dominate almost overwhelmingly in the first area. Armenian first-rate undertakings operate in 1987 tons of output per year; Aghriyev brothers and Janumov brothers produce 993,3 tons^{11*} annually.

[Fish industry] owes its efficient organization and development to the first-rate Armenian Companies, that belong to Lianozov, Kamoyev, Pitoev, Vanetsov and Mayilov families. The latter proprietors upbuilt first advanced cold stores, equipped with state-of-the-art machinery.

The first-rate business firm in the segment of tobacco industry, owned by Mirzabekyantz brothers, has money turnover up to 30 million roubles a year; it holds sway over Azerbaijan tobacco market up to the present day.

Besides, we should testify the significance of Armenians in Turkestan and Trans-Caspian area regarding economic life of this region, although there are no more than 80 thousand of our nationals in it. Armenians had been the first who reared cotton in this district out of American seeds and brought up manufacture of cotton fibre at their own plants, which are 16 in number, up to 24,570 tons.^{12*} Armenian contribution in butter-making and soap boiling manufacture is also quite significant. ...

Several Armenian commercial firms contribute rather substantially to the trade with Persia (let us cite, for example, the Trade House of Toumaniantz brothers, they are Persian subjects by affiliation). ...

First private Banks in Baku, known as the Society of Mutual Credit and a Branch of the Tiflis Commercial Bank (later on - the Caucasian Bank) had been founded by Armenians. ...

First charitable institution, identified as the Armenian Philanthropic Society, had inaugurated in 1870s the very first Public Library in this city. And first Printing Houses were Armenian, too. Up to the last years, Armenian children formed a majority in municipal schools. ...

When You research as the case stands now in the Republic of Armenia, we beg Your Distinguished Excellency to keep in mind the Armenians of Baku, too. We personify those capitalists, workers and qualified specialists of all kinds, who are ready to join at the first summons of our native land and Your Government the ranks of professional community to construct our country, if it finds, under the high auspices of the United States, an opportunity of peaceful coexistence in the borders, eligible to the development of its productive forces.

Natural resources will provide with ample opportunity to apply Armenian effort and capital; thus we are sure: there will not be any shortage of intellectual experts and home terrain, fertilized by our constructive labour, will rise excellent sprouts for the benefit of our exhausted people.

We wait for the United States decision on the Armenian Question with trembling hearts; therefore, a day when Your nation takes unfortunate Armenia under its powerful protection will be our day of the great annunciation which will proclaim resurrection of our Fatherland and will summon all sons, who are spread over the whole world. ...We are aware that Armenians have constituted the Joint-Stock Company in the Trans-Caspian area and Turkestan with capital of 200 million Roubles, allotted for the development of business and industry in Armenia. Armenians of the Trans-Caspian area have elaborated a plan of gradual liquidation of their enterprises; they are ready to resettle in Armenia immediately, when the very first opportunity occurs, if the independence of Armenia is recognized by the Entente and it is finds its protector, represented by the United States of America."

* This letter was composed in Russian and translated into English for our volume.

** You can read Russian version of this document in extenso and with different archival identification in: Микаелян В.А., Мирзоян С.С. Участие армян в экономической жизни Восточного Закавказья (вторая половина XIX - первые десятилетия XX вв.).

"Вестник общественных наук," Ер., 1990, № 2, с.74-81; Հայերի կոտորածները Բարձի և Ելիզավետպոլի նահանգներում 1918-1920թթ.: Փաստ. և նյութերի ժողովածու: Եր., ՀՀ Պատմության արխիվ, 2003, էջ 408-414:

*** Noted in the text as 18 sazhenes, equal to 38,4 meters.

4* Ghukassow had been written on their tomb, they were frequently mentioned as Gukasov, too.

5* Baku Society of Russian Petroleum.

6* Inscribed as 226 millions of poods, one pood is equal to 16,38 kilograms. Next weights in the document are noted in poods, too.

7* Or 130 versts in the text, with one verst equal to 1,067 meters.

8* Evaluated in the text as 100-120 poods.

9* They are mentioned as 15,000-20,000 poods.

10* Inscribed as Shemakha.

11* Authors of this document noted 200,000 and 100,000 buckets correspondingly; one bucket is equal to twenty-one pints.

12* This figure is identified as 1,500,000 poods.

№ 229 telegram from the chief of the American military mission to Armenia General J.Harbord

on the board of "Martha Washington," October 5, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/305, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

..." Quote for Associated Paris, date September 30. Erivan few miles from Mount Ararat [J.]Harbord mission Auto Caravan attacked held prisoners for few hours Sunday night by mixed bands Kurds, Tartars,* Turks with Autos upshot various officers soldiers narrowly escaping death from dozens volleys riffles. Captain David Loring,** Oregon, received slight head wound also Auto Driver Abernathy, Florida, slight eye wound from splintered glass windshield. Attack came while caravan proceeding from Kars to Erivan through valley river Araxes. Fortunately cars [of] Generals [J.]Harbord and [G.]Moseley had reached unmolested lane leading to Erivan before attack, otherwise this conjured attempt being made hold them for ransom. Original reason for attack appears to be bands who warring with Armenians doubted nationality [of] Americans. After Chiefs [of] bands assured themselves [that] caravan [was] Americans, they released Autos [and] returned most [of] property. Declared they did desire peace as well as other peoples but that only some outside power using strong hand capable doing so, that otherwise they [and] many others die of

starvation this winter due unsettled conditions. What happened [to] mission caravan daily occurrence section with raiding bands constantly destroying prosperous villages both Armenian [and] Moslem. Right where correspondent six autos detained was village named Koghb,** until ten days ago was charming place [with] fine gardens pretty villas, good buildings, church, inhabited by Armenians, but which captured by Moslem bands, then wrecked with inhabitants outdriven or murdered with women held captives. Mission proceeding Tiflis, Baku, Batum, Constantinople, however [J.]Harbord stated he unexpected further attacks." ...Unquote above from [W.]Haskell Tiflis. - Biggest advisability holding foregoing for approval General [J.]Harbord."

* I. e. Azerbaijanis.

** Inscribed as Daniel Loring. We corrected his name, on the premise of the Official Register with the names of all members of the Mission in: US NA, RG 59, 184.02/99; M820, Roll 230, vol.204, NAA, MR № 2.

*** Inscribed as Kulp.

№ 230 telegram from the chief of the military mission to Armenia J.Harbord - to the chief of American mission in Paris F.Polk, transmitted by telegram № 4658 from the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople M.Bristol - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Tiflis, October 6, 1919

Constantinople, October 14, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 184.02/307, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4; and 860J.01/116, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"§ 1. Report arrival Batum after successful journey through Asia Minor, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan. Mission travelled Baghdad Railway Constantinople, Mardin, with two days Adana and vicinity. By motor-car Mardin, Diarbekir, Kharput, Malatia, Sivas, Erzerum, Kars, Erivan, Tiflis. By rail Tiflis to Baku and Batum. Also covered route parallel Turkish frontier Trebizond to Bayazed. Representative also visited scene hostilities between Azerbaijan and Armenia near Persian border. I have had long conferences [with] Ministers of Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and at Sivas had long conference [with] chiefs [of] Nationalist movement.

§ 2. Purpose [of] Nationalist movement [is] to try to preserve integrity [of] Ottoman Empire under mandatory of whole, preferably by American Government. They are under great fear [of] ter-

ritorial encroachments by great powers. We believe Turkish officials are carrying out terms of Armistice and army demobilized to skeleton. Find appalling loss of population in Turkey due to war and disease. Estimated not more than 20 per cent of men went to war have returned and absence men 20 to 35 years very noticeable. Found survivors Armenian deportations slowly returning, expressing no fear for their safety. Turkish officials state the Armenian refugees in Trans-Caucasus, who fled before war or with Russian retreat, would be permitted in Turkey now if properly documented to prevent entrance with them of Russian Armenians whom Turkey believes revolutionary. We saw nothing on whole journey to indicate purpose Turkey to cross frontier and massacre Armenians as anticipated in cablegrams from Trans-Caucasus prior to our departure from Paris and no such iniquities reported by Armenian authorities. Believe Turkey has neither disposition nor ability to carry out such purpose and that present officials appreciate fatal defect of policy [of] former Government.* ...

"Some unorganized border war are along southern frontier [of] Russian Armenia, apparently result [of]old animosity between Kurds and Tartars and Armenians, unrestrained by weak Governments. Undoubtedly some former Turkish officers and soldiers, out of employment account demobilization, have sought service with forces [of] Azerbaijan. Latter, at nominal peace with Armenia, is prosecuting border operations near Persian frontier in vicinity [of] Nakhichevan and Sharur, in which small salient with Armenian villages separates two groups [of] Tartar population and across which Azerbaijan hopes build an all-Moslem railroad into Turkey. These districts lie within temporary Armenian borders, as fixed by British and approved by [W.]Haskell. These minor operations in process temporary settlement through neutral zone proposed by [W.]Haskell, which I have supported in interviews with local Governments. Pending action [of] Peace Conference, do not believe Armenians, either in Turkey or Trans-Caucasus, are in danger except in these local affairs.

§ 3. Actual attitude [of] Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia towards each other very discouraging for future peace [in] region, except under strong hand. All are corrupt, all are existing on salvage from Russian collapse, all reflect bolshevist influence, especially Georgia. Principal cause [of] friction is disputed boundaries. Greatest obstacle to tranquility is uncertainty as to whether a

mandatory will be given for Trans-Caucasus and the fear that [A.] Denikin may come to the region.

§ 4. Great scarcity [of] food in Turkish as well as Russian Armenia, but conditions are improving. Russian Armenia can not become self-sustaining before Autumn [of] 1920. [W.]Haskell requires minimum 7,000 tons wheat flour or equivalent monthly for 10 months, to begin arriving Batum December 1st. Winter season will witness many deaths unless adequate food, medical supplies and clothing are received from outside sources. Railroads of Trans-Caucasus can not be consolidated for rehabilitation and operation without foreign control. Foreign credit badly needed for purchase [of] farming implements, clothing, medicines, manufactured articles. Caucasus Branch, Near East Relief, rapidly reorganizing, expanding and increasing activities to meet conditions to administer any quantity relief provided. Unquestionably administration of Colonel [W.]Haskell has greatly improved conditions throughout Trans-Caucasus.

§ 5. This problem is one which includes inseparably Turkey, Armenia and Trans-Caucasus because of inextricable mingling of races, religions and interests.** Whole this region is familiar with principles [of] self-determination and generally expresses faith in disinterested mandatory under League [of] Nations as only solution for desperate*** situation.

§ 6. Mission leaves Batum for Constantinople [on] October 7th, via Trebizond and Samsun, and will probably sail from there about October 15th.^{4*}

* The following was not transmitted by M.Bristol to Paris immediately. Instead, it was recounted in another document of October 14, 1919 (US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/117, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49), with fewer alterations. See document № 252 in this book.

** In the text of October 14, 1919, the problem includes all Armenia and Trans-Caucasus without Turkey. And the main telegram from Tiflis ascribed the mingling of races and religions not only to Armenia, but also attributed it to Turkey as a completely detached unit, which was familiar with principles of self-determination and expressed its willingness to comply with mandate of the League of Nations.

*** In a telegram from Constantinople, desperate situation was substituted for "designated situation."

^{4*} When we compare this telegram with its Constantinople version,

we do not detect in the latter neither Sharur and Nakhichevan, nor the J.Harbord's report that he approved the neutral zone.

№ 231 telegram from the chief of the military mission to Armenia J.Harbord - to the Prime Minister of Azerbaijan N.Usubbekov*

Tiflis, October 6, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/309, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4
...“Just prior to me departure for Paris Colonel [W.]Haskell informed me of your agreement to establishment of a neutral zone in Nakhichevan District. Congratulate you on such a wise decision, which will make very favorable impression.”

* This text mislinked the post of addressee to the name of the Minister for Foreign Affairs M.Yu.Jafarov.

№ 232 letter from the Tiflis townsman H.Vahanian - to the chief of the military mission to Armenia Major General J.Harbord

Tiflis, October 6, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/308, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4
“Sir, Having learned of your desire to visit the ruins of Ani, Capital of Bagratides and were unable to carry out the intention, permit me to offer as a souvenir of Armenia, an old collection of curios of Ani.

Ani will recall to you a glorious period of our Armenian people between the 9th and 11th Centuries when Armenia survived, although surrounded and parceled out by barbarians.

I hope that that will inspire within you the confidence that the same people will be capable of creating a new Ani, while in the meantime this sickly hour of despair will pass with the help and under the protection of a great civilized people. ...

H.Vahanian, rue Olginskaya № 49, Tiflis.”

№ 233 letter from the chief of the military mission to Armenia Major General J.Harbord - to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia A.Khatisian

Batum, on board U.S.S. “Martha Washington,”

October 7, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/311, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4; NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 364, f.75 and file 557, pt.2, f.302

“Dear Mr. Minister,

I cannot leave the Trans-Caucasus without again expressing to you my appreciation of the many courtesies shown me while a guest at your capital. We had a pleasant journey to Tiflis and in all Armenian towns were welcomed with enthusiasm.

I carry away with me nothing but kindly recollection of the Armenian people and very great sympathy for those who are refugees from their homes and are now being protected by your Government. Had a pleasure of meeting Madam [X.]Khatisian in Tiflis at a very charming reception given me by the Armenian people in that city." ...

№ 234 telegram from the chief of the military mission to Armenia
Major General J.Harbord - to the Prime Minister of Georgia
N.Zhordania

Batum, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"
October 7, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/312, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4
"...My visit to your city and Government leaves me with no regret except for your unfortunate illness which deprived me of the pleasure of meeting you.

I received your message at the hands of Mr. V.Gambashidze and beg to thank you for the sentiments therein expressed.

I very much enjoyed meeting the Georgian people socially on two occasions and my interview with your Ministers was most interesting and profitable from the standpoint of our mission. I trust that your health will soon permit you to resume your duties."
...

№ 235 telegram from the chief of the military mission
to Armenia Major General J.Harbord - to the Prime Minister
of Azerbaijan N.Usubbekov

Batum, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"
October 7, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/310, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4
"...I wish to add to my telegram already sent you, many felicitations on your Government having accepted, no doubt, through your initiative, the neutral zone proposed by Colonel W. Haskell. I am sure this can have only a salutary effect on public opinion in the Peace Conference.

I take this opportunity to thank you for the charming

hospitality enjoyed while at Baku and to express my appreciation of your courtesy during our official interview on governmental matters pertaining to Azerbaijan.

Both the officers of my mission and myself bring away a very favorable opinion of the capabilities of your country and people, provided that their progress is not interrupted by difficulties with your neighbors, thereby incurring the displeasure of the Great Powers." ...

№ 236 letter from the chief of the military mission to Armenia
Major General J.Harbord - to the U.S. High Commissioner at
Constantinople M.Bristol

Batum, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 7, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/313, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR

№ 4

"...You have a destroyer leaving here at noon today and I decided it would be quicker to send [this letter] by that [steamer]. ...I shall be able to arrange the matter of the two limousines to be left in Constantinople. ...One of them is somewhat battle scarred with four bullet holes, but will, I think, give you good service. ...I have been embarrassed by requests for passage to France for Colonel and Mrs. Haskell, which I have been obliged to deny. Of course, as turned over to me "Martha Washington" was intended [only] for the use of the Mission. ... [We] have taken on a number of refugees from here as far as Constantinople, ..[and] I have now asked Colonel [W.]Haskell to accompany us as far as Constantinople, but am very anxious that there be no first class passengers of any kind on board after we leave Constantinople and no second class of the gentler sex." ...

№ 237 memorandum report by the member of mission
Lieutenant Colonel J.P.Jackson - to the chief of the military
mission to Armenia Major General J.Harbord

Batum, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 7, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 184.02/317, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

"Upon leaving the main party under your orders on September 20, we passed through Tokat, Amasia and Marsovan to Samsun. After passing through the mountain regions towards Samsun

from Amasia, we entered a series of broad and apparently fertile plateaus extending clear through to Samsun. The valley is self-supporting as far as food supplies are concerned. The highway over this course is good and a railroad has been largely graded from Samsun to Marsovan by French company. I enclose a type-written copy of an interview with Doctor George E. White,* which gives a more or less general view of the conditions of the whole region.

We left Samsun by destroyer and arrived at Trebizond on the night of September 26. This town is very similar to Samsun. Both are unprotected anchorages, except for small artificial breakwaters. The towns both show the effect of European influence and contain the facilities necessary to handle present trade. We left Trebizond the following day, passing through Baberd,** Erzerum, Kars, Alexandropol and Erivan to Tiflis, where we joined your party upon its arrival from Baku.

The gorge we followed from Trebizond to Baberd contains an excellently constructed Russian war road, but it is narrow, deep and precipitous practically the whole way. Some farms run up the sides of the steep mountains, but the amount of available land for agricultural purposes is extremely small. We found a few forests with excellent timber, but so far as we could observe these were not extensive, and certainly only covered an extremely small fraction of the natural forest areas. We found no knowledge of mines or mine operations in this particular district, though beyond Baberd when we had reached the Erzerum district and plains, there was indication that coal oil and various minerals were available in material quantities.

Mr.[G.]White's statement about the feeling of the Armenians and Greeks with regard to the political situation was supported by the opinion of Captain Crawford, who represents the British at Samsun. From Trebizond on to the Armenian border we had the opportunity of meeting few but Greeks.

Mr.[G.]White states that there is sufficient food in the district between Samsun and Sivas, but that there is a shortage of clothing. We found, however, in a destroyed village to which a few Armenians had returned, that as near as we could discover, they were unable to get work or credit, and were in a state of abject destitution. This was in spite of the fact that there were all indications that a large harvest was being threshed."

* See memorandum by G.White of September 23, 1919, published above.

** Inscribed in the text as Baibert.

№ 238 memorandum by the member of mission Lieutenant Colonel J.Brinton - to the chief of the military mission to Armenia Major General J.Harbord

Batum, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 7, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/318, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

"As requested I received this evening in the name of the Mission the representatives of the Russian National Society of Batum - General Chermin, formerly a Russian division commander, an Mr.Kovanko, formerly an engineer of roads and highways. They called to present generally the Russian point of view towards Trans-Caucasia and particularly in relation to Batum, where they claim there is a Russian population of some 8,500 as against an equal number of Georgians and some 20,000 or more Mussulmans. They stated that in 1916 in the Batum province there were 122,000 Mussulmans, of whom today over 100,000 have strong Russian or Turkish leanings as perhaps some 22,000, who incline to Georgia; that the entire intellectual population of Batum is Russian, the commerce being in the hands of Armenians and Greeks but the Government offices, under the English direction, are almost entirely Russian, as also the most important schools and the administration of the courts.

These gentlemen... [told] that... in January, 1916, Russia had three army corps here (at that time roughly 100,000 men), with additional Russian population of over 300,000 out of a Trans-Caucasian population of 6,500,000; ...that Russia had constructed 2106 kilometers of railroad, 3500 kilometers of roads and 780 kilometers of pipe line; ...that during the period of Russian development in Trans-Caucasia Georgians were specially favored in Russia and incidentally composed the personal guard of the Emperor. They added that the Georgians were principally useful for parade and that both Georgians and Armenians were without value as soldiers, citing the instance of the surrender of Batum, which they stated was taken in six days by 2,000 Turks and 2,000 Mussulmans, with 3 canons and a few guns left behind by the Russians in their retreat, as against some 12,000 well armed Geor-

gians. ...They were very insistent on the point the Trans-Caucasia required a strong hand in control, without which it could not exist; that the interests of the Russia and Trans-Caucasia were inseparable; that since the establishment of Baku, and the Trans-Caucasian railroad, Russia could not exist commercially without Trans-Caucasia, nor could her southern boundary be protected, and insisted, that pending the return of Russia, the status quo of Batum should not be altered by any endeavor to subject her to Georgia. ...They made it plain that their immediate hope is of course that the situation will remain as it is until [A.]Denikin is able to occupy Batum. Apparently they had not given much thought to the subject of a mandate and were inclined to magnify the difficulties, saying, off-hand, it would require half a million men. They took occasion to express their friendly feeling towards the United States, and asked me more than once to extend to the General their appreciation of his courtesy in giving them an opportunity to fully present their case." ...

№ 239 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five
of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, October 7, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/66; Paris, vol.VIII, p.504-533

"9. Limitation of Greek and Italian zones of military occupation in Asia Minor.

E.Crowe... recalled that General G.Milne had been asked by the Supreme Council to fix a line which neither the Turks nor the Greeks should pass. The General... thought that the present line could not be held. It was necessary for the Greeks either to advance or retreat. If they advance, they could not avoid a conflict with the Turks. The Greeks were aware of this fact. General G.Milne thought that it would be possible to advance the line, but in this event, it would be necessary to take armed resistance into consideration. ...Before M.E.Venizelos had left Paris he had been sounded as to whether he was willing to accept a *withdrawal* of the Greek line. ...M.E.Venizelos appeared to be willing to agree, but upon condition that a withdrawal... should call for occupation of the territories evacuated by the Greeks by Interallied contingents. ...

U.Cavallero: There was in [General's] report to show that the actual line of demarcation should continue to form the

northern limit of the Italian occupation. ...The Italian soldier lived on good terms with the local population and [his] occupation could be made under the best conditions. ...

E.Crowe: He did not feel that the idea of replacing Greek troops by Italian troops would meet the situation. ...The proposal to which M.E.Venizelos had finally agreed looked to a Franco-British occupation. Such an occupation seemed possible of realization, but if the Greeks learned that they were to be replaced by Italians the situation would be worse than at present. ...

V.Scialoja: [It] was a line of demarcation between the Greeks and the Italians. If the Greeks were no longer there, it would be natural, to establish contact, for the lone to go further north. The Greeks would have no reason to complain.

F.Polk: What would be the result if the line were moved *further east?* ...

V.Scialoja: If the principle of Interallied occupation... were adopted, it would have to be understood that an Italian contingent would form part of the army of occupation.

S.Pichon: He saw no reason to object to this proposal.

E.Crowe ...asked whether any... resolution had been made requesting the Italians to go to Asia Minor. ...

F.Polk: The Council had never sanctioned Italian occupation. It had only been a question of avoiding conflict. ...

E.Crowe: His Government had undoubtedly never recognized Italian occupation. ...

S.Pichon asked whether it would be possible to send Italian troops as well to this zone.

F.Polk: He was ready to refer the matter to his military advisers, but he could not consent to this arrangement if it meant that the present position of the Italians in Asia Minor was to be recognized. The situation would then be quite different. The presence of Italian troops had never been recognized as resulting from a mandate given by the Conference. ...

S.Pichon: The question now was to decide if the Inter-Allied Army of occupation should contain Greek troops and no Italian troops, if the occupation should be truly Inter-Allied and if, at the side of the American, British and French troops, Italian and Greek troops would be represented.

E.Crowe: He thought that he should make his point of view more definite. The Greeks were in occupation. *They were being*

asked to retire for military reasons, to spot their advancing in order to avoid conflict with the Turks. M.E.Venizelos had said, that the Greek troops should be left where they were, but *should be joined by British and French units.* This would be sufficient to prevent the Turks from attacking. He asked just what the Council desired: whether it was to prevent the Turks from attack and nothing else. If the situation were complicated in allowing the Italians to enter the Inter-Allied Army, new difficulties would be created. The very fact of putting Italian and Greek troops in contact would place them on the verge of an incident. ...

General G.Milne had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies in Asia Minor by a decision of the supreme Council. It appeared, however, that the French authorities at Constantinople were unwilling to recognize the situation. They stated that they had received no instructions on the subject. It might be possible to inform them of the decisions of the Conference.

S.Pichon: There was no question but that General G.Milne was in command in Asia Minor. As to the question of the command at *Constantinople, that was another matter,* and had formed the subject of negotiations between the British and French Governments, and an agreement had been reached in regard to the matter in the month of December last.* ...

It was decided:

3) that the zone between the line established by the decision of the Supreme Council of the 18th July, [1919,] and the new line... should be occupied *by British, French and Greek troops.*"

* I. e. on December 2-3, 1918, at London.

№ 240 memorandum by the member of mission Lieutenant H.Khachadorian - to the chief of the military mission to Armenia Major General J.Harbord

Batum, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 8, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/321, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4
"Subject: Kars Ammunition.

1. The memo on the above subject that Dr.[A.]Khatisian promised to give me, has been handed to one of our Colonels on the evening of October 1st, by an Armenian official, according to information from Erivan. I have been unable so far to locate the said memo.

2. I remember the following statements made by Dr.[A] Khatisian near the wireless station at Erivan, October 1, 1919. (a) The British took away all the modern guns, about 80, from Kars military depot and forts. Forty of these guns fell into Tartar hands.

(b) The British took away about 2,000,000 rounds of ammunition from Kars. Georgia kept a considerable quantity and they furnished Azerbaijan with ammunition recently.

(c) Armenians protested vigorously and stopped the ammunition train but they were threatened by British General that unless the Armenians let the train go, no flour would be allowed to enter Armenia. The train went.

(d) The British claimed that the above military supply was being taken for the [A.]Denikin Army, but mostly it fell into the hands of Armenia's enemies."

№ 241 diary of overland party of the American military mission to Armenia

Batum, September 27 - October 8, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/323, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

"9-27-1919: Left camp at 7-45 A.M., and arrived at Sarikamish about 9-00 A.M., where reception was given to Mission and members there took special train to Kars. The cars were sent on ahead to Kars, arriving there shortly before noon. At Sarikamish there were several arches placed across the road bearing the words "You are welcome." At this city there were many well built buildings, constructed principally of stone. There was also a very fine Russian church.

Party arrived at Kars at 1-30 P.M., being met at the station by many local notables. Upon the station platform where General [J.]Harbord had to walk in order to reach the car were spread many beautiful rugs. About the platform were gathered many school children in costume and a guard of honor of mounted Armenian troops. As General [J.]Harbord descended the steps these children strewed small branches of shrubs and trees in his path and all shouted and cheered. The station and buildings surrounding it were well constructed of stone and had been recently painted. The town itself was mainly ruins and the condition of the inhabitants is well understood when it is considered that 28,000 of a population of a little over 30,000 are being fed by the American relief Committee.

From the train the party was conducted to the commander's house where a banquet was served which was a collation of fine viands greatly in contrast with the impoverished condition of the city. At the banquet many speeches were made and toasts proposed. Music was furnished by a local band and the principal pieces rendered were Russian.

After the banquet the party visited several of the orphanages and home for women refugees, and then started out on the road again, being conducted to the outskirts of the city by the local commander and staff.

Kars was the old Russian stronghold and has great natural defences as well as many forts on every side. There are ruins of an old fortress on a hill high above the city dating from the 9th century. During the visit of General [J.]Harbord several salutes were fired.

Mission left the city about 5-00 P.M. en route to Erivan. Not many miles out, a terrific thunderstorm which had been threatening for some hours, broke and the rain fell in torrents. The route was through the mountains and there were many curves which made driving dangerous. General [J.]Harbord's machine became disabled and had to be towed for many miles through the mountains to the camp for the night. During the run the lights of General [G.]Moseley's limousine gave out temporarily and a sudden stop was. This happened to be in the vicinity of a band of Kurds encamped by the roadside, who lost no time in firing four shots, evidently with the intent of frightening away any foes who might be lurking about their camp.

We arrived at Kaghzvan* at 11-00 P.M. and were conducted to the headquarters of the Armenian troops at that place which party was served light supper and accommodated for the night.

9-28-1919: Left Kaghzvan at 9-30 A.M. after the General's car had been repaired. One of the other touring car was stripped of all baggage and sent back on the road to locate the Ford which had not arrived from Kars up to this time. About four miles out the limousine again broke down and after being towed a distance of several miles, General [J.]Harbord decided to go forward in one of the other cars, leaving the disabled machine to be repaired and to rejoin the other cars later in the day. Subsequently, however, General [J.]Harbord joined General [G.]Moseley in the latter's limousine.

About 30 miles further out this car and one of the touring cars passed the truck plugging along and had not gotten far beyond it when shots were heard. Without warning someone had opened fire from the neighboring hillside upon the truck. After firing about fifteen shots, the firing ceased as suddenly as it had commenced. The driver, upon discerning he was the object of attack, immediately stopped his truck. None of the bullets hit the car so he made preparations to start off again. At this time General [J.]Harbord, who had come back to investigate, reached the truck, ascertained that no damage had been done, and ordered the driver to proceed. For the time being, the truck took the lead. Several miles beyond a point was reached where a large bridge was out, necessitating fording the river at this place. While attempting to do this, one of the cars became stuck and some time was lost before it was gotten through. In the meantime, some friendly Kurds offered to guide the party around this place by making a detour along the river bed to a more favorable crossing; and both the truck and the General's car took this route. General [G.] Moseley wrote a note and gave it to these men to be given to any of the other cars when they reached this point, stating in it that the Kurds were friendly and would guide all the party by the best route to make the crossing. Motor trouble soon caused the truck to fall behind the other machines, which went ahead without any interception until they reached the river forming the Azerbaijan-Armenian frontier. There was a large bridge across the river at this point but the wooden flooring had been burned so that to cross it was impossible. Accordingly, camp was made on its banks and the arrival of the rest of the party awaited.

In passing the town Koghb** about 20 miles back from the camping place it was necessary to climb quite a long grade. When about half-way up the grade several score Tartars suddenly appeared and blocked the truck's progress, forming a cordon around it and raising their hands in signal to stop. This was promptly done. The roadway was then blocked with timber and stones to prevent any further progress and a guard placed over it. Driver and other men on the truck got off to answer inquiries which were made as to their nationality and reasons for being in this particular locality. Corporal Kopp, Russian interpreter, conversed with the tribesmen and told them they were Americans. The tribesmen insisted, however, that they were Armenians attempting to masquerade as Ame-

ricans, and stated that this subterfuge had been practiced upon them before, and they were not to be tricked that way again. They finally decided they would do nothing until the arrival of their principal chief. The chief arrived in the course of an hour accompanied by his elders. During this period more and more of the Tartars had collected in the vicinity until several hundred could be counted. The chief lost no time in interrogating the men, and after conversing with them seemed satisfied that they were not Armenians, for whom he expressed bitter hatred. He finally said, however, that he would hold the truck until the General returned or sent someone to investigate, and in the meantime would have the truck carefully guarded and be responsible for the safety of its contents. The men, he said, would be treated with every courtesy and as his guests. Later he decided to permit the truck to proceed and instructed the driver to get ready to start. At this time, word was received that an attack was about to begin so the men were placed under guard and hurried away up the hillside. They had not gone far, however, before the lights of an automobile were seen. This was one of the touring cars which contained Major [H. W.]Clark, Professor Husein Bey [Hulusi], Mr.[W.B.]Poland and Mr.[W.]Hiatt who had come back to investigate matters. This party was immediately ordered to dismount and were made prisoners, though every courtesy was shown them. The Chief finally decided to send some of his men to parley with General [J.]Harbord and the touring car was sent back with Professor Husein Bey [Hulusi] as interpreter along with several of the Kurds. The others, the chief explained, would be held as hostages in the meantime.

The car containing Captain [J.E.]Boush and party who had gone in search of Ford finally located it at Kars where a broken spring had just been replaced. No time was lost in proceeding with it to Kaghzvan where the party had camped the night before. After stopping at this point long enough to get direction as to the route the other cars had taken, this party started off again about 10 or 12 miles out reached the General's car taking the lead. Before many miles, however, the rapid rate of speed of this car placed it in advance of the others which had to proceed slowly due to bad condition of Dodge truck which had two broken springs, about 10 miles separating the two parties. While paralleling the river a sharp turn was encountered. The General's driver slowed considerably here, and, as the roadway then ran straight

ahead from some little distance, started to increase his speed. Just then the light of a camp-fire was seen to the left, shouts were heard, and all thought the camping place for the night had been reached. Instantly, however, it became apparent that the voices spoke in a foreign tongue, so the chauffeur was instructed to drive on. The shouting suddenly became louder and several signal whistles were heard. This was thought at first to be a crowd of Armenians cheering the party on. Suddenly, however, a fusillade of shots rang out and Captain [D.]Loring who was riding in the car shouted to the driver to speed up. The latter did this amid the sharp cracking of many rifles. This continued for a good mile when the car apparently got beyond range and firing ceased. The car continued at a high rate of speed narrowly escaping disaster several times. Suddenly, when about four or five miles from where the firing had commenced, another party of Kurds opened fire. Again the gauntlet was run, but not without a narrow escape, for, dashing around a sharp curve at an excessive rate of speed, the car came to a point where ditch of considerable size crossed the roadway. There was nothing to do but to go on. The machine struck the ditch, lurched sickeningly, crashed into the bottom, throwing the occupants against the roof of the car, suddenly righted itself and then sped on. Several miles further after crossing another deep gully the engine suddenly stopped and all got out to see what the trouble was. The light of a camp fire could be seen about a mile away, the barking of dogs and whistling was heard in its vicinity and another attack was feared. The driver made frantic efforts to start his engine but without result. In a few minutes, voices were heard at intervals, each time seeming nearer and nearer. Finally, footfalls were heard and then the dim silhouettes of a number of men could be seen approaching the machine. Captain [G.]Villaret then cried out and was answered by the coming Kurds. He laid aside his rifle and advanced unarmed toward them shouting all the while "Americanish" and "Americansky." The men came up to him, rifles lowered, saw he was not Armenian and then approached the machine. Discovering all its occupants were not Armenians and were apparently Americans, one of them drew a folded paper from his garments and handed it to Captain [G.]Villaret. This proved to be General [G.]Moseley's note and the bearer explained by gestures that he would guide the party, but that they must first go back and then turn off the

main road. The engine was still stalled and the efforts of the chauffeur were apparently unavailing. At this time a chieftain appeared who seemed to doubt the nationality of the party and took pains to explain to them that if they did prove to be Armenians he would cut their throats. After much parleying and explaining on all sides he seemed satisfied and consented to let them go. Finally, after some anxious waiting engine started and with guides hanging all over the car it was brought around and made the detour in safety. During the melee it had been struck four times by bullets, but no one was injured. About eight miles further on the guides left the machine and it proceeded without further mishap until it was stopped at Koghb and took position along with the cars.

Captain J. Boush's car and the Lodge and Ford were making about 15 miles an hour while passing through a small village when the cries of many children were heard. Their cries could not be understood, and, not wishing to be delayed, the Captain ordered the chauffeur on the car in which he was riding to speed up. The car sped around a curve at about 25 miles an hour when another cry was heard. It was then perceived that the roadway was blocked. The car was stopped within 50 yards at a point not more than 15 feet from the blockade. No sooner did the car stop when about 15 shots were fired directly at it from close range from both sides and in front of the machine. Four bullets passed through the windshield, the chauffeur receiving a shower of glass particles of which entered one of his eyes. All the men immediately surrendered themselves and it was then founded that the party of bandits numbered between one and two hundreds, all armed with rifle, pistol, and knife, and ranging in ages from about twelve to forty five. Their intentions were to rob the party, take the automobiles and do way with the men, but fortunately their chieftain who had been about two miles away when the firing began, had heard it and hurried up to ascertain matters, would have none of it and finally beat some of his men over the head and shoulders before they finally consented not to molest the party. He was quite friendly and placed six of his men to act as guides on the cars and then let the party proceed. These men accompanied the party to a point within a mile of Koghb and then dropped back. The cars proceeded onward and at the point where the other machines were being held, they, too, fell into the hands of the Kurds.

By the time these last cars had come up, the touring car which had conveyed the party of Kurds on the General's camp, had returned and the Chief seemed satisfied to let the whole party go. At this point another group of Kurds appeared on the scene who were not of his tribe. His efforts to persuade them not to molest the party were unavailing, and he communicated to the party that his men had agreed not to molest anyone, but that he could not guarantee it was safe to proceed further during the night as these other elements would surely attack. It was finally decided to remain with the Kurds for the night and make an early start in the morning. Tea was made, the chief supplied a large quantity of roast lamb and the party made themselves as comfortable as they could for the night.

9-29-1919: party left camp of Tartars*** at 6-20 A.M. accompanied by escort of Tartars,*** including their Chief. About nine miles out from their camp these guards halted and told party to go ahead alone, at the same time the Chief requested a conference with General [J.]Harbord. Upon arrival at place where the General had spent the night, party halted while he went back to parley as requested, Colonel [H.]Beeuwkes accompanying him. The General returned about 10 o'clock and the entire party headed for Erivan. There were Armenian soldiers to be seen as along the route. In all the towns and villages passed there were troops who came to attention and saluted as the cars sped by. Practically every village was particularly in ruins and they were for the most part sparsely inhabited. The country was practically level and there were many vineyards and flourishing orchards. At one village there were cheers and at another several songs were sung. Mount Ararat, rising majestically to a height of 17,055 feet with snow-covered crest half-hidden by clouds, soon came into view, standing out as a sentinel over the country.

We arrived at Etchmiadzin, the home of Armenian Catholicos or Patriarch, about 11-45 A.M. Here there was a reception and members were guests of the Catholicos at a splendid luncheon. The usual crowd greeted the party and many Armenian soldiers rendered usual courtesy. The townspeople had hung all their fine rugs over their doorways and had made various other attempts at decoration. After short stay, the Mission proceeded to Erivan, 12 miles distant, where they were met at the outskirts of the city by officials and notables. Here an arch of welcome has

been erected and the floor of the bridge leading up to the city walls was covered with branches of trees. Inside the city the main street was lined with many troops and hundreds of orphans in costume. There was also a crowd of several thousand of the townspeople assembled to greet the visitors. Shortly after the arrival a banquet was tendered the party. Members of the Mission were accommodated at Colonel [W.]Haskell's local headquarters during their stay in the city.

9-30-1919: At Erivan. Many visits paid and received. State banquet at which all officials of the Armenian Republic were present, was given in the evening. General [J.]Harbord met all American Relief Workers in the city. General [G.]Moseley and Captain [G.]Villaret went on short side trip to Nakhichevan and will return tomorrow evening. Car set out to pick up General [F.]McCoy and Colonel [E.]Bowditch out returned late without these officers, having been unable to proceed further than a few miles owing to terrible condition of road. Professor Hussein Bey [Hulusi] and Captain [D.]Loring went on to Tiflis by train to make arrangements for the housing of the party while in Tiflis.

10-1-1919: - At Erivan. Conferences and meetings occupied the entire day. In afternoon General [J.]Harbord had tea with the Prime Minister [A.Khatisian]. General [F.]McCoy and Colonel [E.]Bowditch returned about midnight as also General [G.]Moseley and captain [G.]Villaret. Preparations made for early start for Tiflis in the morning, it being planned to make the trip in one day with the automobiles. Trucks and Ford were started out at 3-00 this afternoon. It is intended to meet the truck en route and gas up the tanks on the cars inadequate to carry gasoline for the entire distance, nearly 200 miles.

Erivan is the capital of the Armenian Republic and is well situated in a raised portion of a broad and fertile valley. Its streets are wide and apparently well kept. Many poplar and other trees line the main thoroughfares lending them an attractive appearance. There were numerous shops in the city and quite an extensive bazaar, but there was a noticeable lack of purchasers. The stocks for the most part were scant and meager. Though there were many evidences of poverty to be seen, yet the place bore evidences of care and cleanliness. The main street was sprinkled by hand both morning and evening. The present population of Erivan is about 110,000. Its pre-war population was about 33,000,

the enormous increase being due to the influx of refugees seeking shelter and sustenance there. The altitude is 3230 feet. The bulk of its population have always been Armenians, though there are also many Tartars.

10-2-1919: Party left Erivan at 6-50 A.M. and headed for Tiflis. Good time was made as surface of road was quite good although it was necessary to slow down frequently in order to pass many ox carts which were bearing products to nearby markets. About 30 miles out cars gassed up at track which had broken down the night before, and then General [J.]Harbord pushed on, driving on through to Tiflis without a mishap, arriving there about 7-00 P.M. where usual welcome was accorded. At the Armenian-Azerbaijani border troops of latter Republic held the party up for a few minutes, but later permitted them to continue. Scenery was interesting all the way. The shores of Lake Sevan,^{4*} situated in the mountains at an altitude of 6315 feet and having an area of some 500 sq. miles, were skirted for several miles, after which a long climb took us to the summit where a rapid descent covering nine miles was encountered. This lead into several valleys surrounded by well forested slopes. The leaves had began to turn their autumn colors and the scene presented was a striking one. Several villages were located in these valleys and at several welcome was received. At Dilijan there were several arches of honor of the party and a luncheon had been prepared, but owing to the long run to be made, there was no stop at any place at route. Leaving Dilijan the roadway led through several canyons along the bed of a river which it was necessary to ford in several places. In this section of the country, the houses were better constructed and many of the people passed were Russians. The lowlands and higher slopes even though steep were well cultivated. Here, too, were many acres planted to potatoes which were being harvested in several places. The last forty miles of the run, it was impossible to utilize the main road due to its bad condition. Instead a dirt road paralleling the other was used. Several crossings of the Kura River were made both by bridge and ford. Members accommodated in various hotels and homes in the city.

10-3-1919: Many courtesies received by members of Mission. Conferences held with local representative Americans as well as with members of Georgian Government. State banquet and lavish entertainment given in evening attended by many notables.

Tiflis was a welcome sight with its many fine buildings and European atmosphere after the trip through sparsely inhabited country. Here was evidence of prosperity on every hand, although that is generally attributable to the enormous plunder of goods taken after the Russian collapse. There were many well-paved streets and a number of street car lines. At the outskirts of the city was located a huge wireless tower said to have been erected by the Germans. On one side of the city were located extensive barracks where in former days the headquarters of two Army Corps of the Russian Army were located. The Kura River cuts the city in two and furnishes the water supply, the water, however, being but little used for drinking purposes. It is raised from the river which lies in a deep cut by means of many large wheels located along its banks. Large sections of the city are built upon the surrounding hillsides and here the streets are steep and narrow. There were many large stone buildings used for Governmental purposes and several handsome school buildings. The population which approximates 300,000, is of mixed character.

Late in afternoon both Cadillac touring cars which had been unable to make the run in one day, due to being directed on a different route than the one taken and then having to retrace the distance they had gone on their route, arrived.

At Tiflis. Conferences and visits occupied the day until about 4-00 when a party consisting of Generals [J.]Harbord, [F.]McCoy and [G.]Moseley and several staff officers and enlisted personnel left on special train for run to Baku, the seat of Azerbaijan Government.

Late in evening Colonel [J.]Jackson, Major [H.]Shekerjian and Major [L.]Martin arrived from Erivan.

10-4-1919: Party arrived at Baku about 11-30 A.M. Party consisting of officials of the Azerbaijan Government and high military commanders extended welcome at station which was decorated in honor of their visit. The platform bore a covering of splendid rugs over which the party passed. Luncheon was served at the home of one of the residents. General [J.]Harbord had an extensive interview with the Prime Minister of the Republic. Party left Baku en route to Batum about 8-00 P.M. on special train.

10-5-1919: Party arrived early in afternoon at Tiflis and after final conferences boarded the train shortly before eight o'clock. The Station was well decorated and a crowd of notables were

gathered there to bid farewell. A military band played the Georgian national anthem as the General crossed the platform. After inspecting the troops placed at the Station as a guard of honor, the General boarded his private car, said to have been one of the private cars of the late Czar and the train pulled out. Up to time of leaving the truck, Dodge, repair truck and one touring car had not reached Tiflis, and it was decided to wait at Batum.

10-6-1919: Arrived at Batum shortly before 8 o'clock in the morning. Party immediately boarded ship where breakfast was served. Shortly after, conference of members of Mission was held at which General [J.]Harbord outlined plans for the final report of the Mission and discussed other matters pertinent to the completion of the work of the Mission. In the evening telegram was received stating that other machines had arrived in Tiflis and would arrive in the morning.

10-7-1919: At 8 o'clock train arrived with balance of personnel of the Mission and all haste was then made to make an early start on the return journey. Colonel and Mrs. Haskell also arrived and will accompany the Mission as far as Constantinople. Several hundred Armenian and Russian refugees were also taken aboard and will be taken to Constantinople where they will disembark.

Anchor weighed at 10-30 A.M. and vessel headed along the coast for Trebizond which was reached at about 7 o'clock. Coast very picturesque there being heavy vegetation on the lower mountains at the waters edge and then as far back as one could see range after range of peaks, many of which bore traces of snow."

* In the text mentioned as Kagizman.

** Written as Kulp.

*** Both words were deleted and substituted for handwritten terms "Kurdish," and "Kurds."

4* Inscribed as Gokcha.

№ 242 memorandum by the member of American military mission to Armenia Lieutenant H.Khachadoorian "Armenians' Conditions in Turkish Armenia" - to the chief of the mission Major General J.Harbord

Batum, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 8, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/324, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

"1. In Malatia, September 18, no Armenian dared to talk to me while I was with the Turkish officials. The young Armenian who twice tried to see me without being observed was called by the chief of police in each case and cross examined why he should went to see me and what he was going to tell.

While in the market place, I talked to an Armenian (American citizen) employed by ACRNE. He informed me that the Armenians were openly threatened by the Malatia Turks who had been armed by the nationalistic Movement. When the Turkish officials heard American Mission coming, they suppressed the open threats.

2. In Andreas,* September 22, the Armenian representative, in presence of Turkish officials, told me that only in a few cases the Armenians received back their property. The process was very slow. All Armenian orphans and young girls were still kept in Turkish harems."

* Inscribed as Su Shehri; by 1914 there were 6,000 Armenian population in it.

№ 243 minutes of the meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, October 8, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/161; Paris, vol.XI, p.445-448

"6. Views of Hain Nahum, Grand Rabbi of Turkey.

Mr.H.White read certain extracts from a memorandum dated October 6th, submitted by Mr.W.H.Buckler regarding a conversation with Hain Nahum, Grand Rabbi of Turkey: "The Grand Rabbi, who has just arrived from Constantinople, emphasizes the importance of dealing immediately with the Turkish question and of not allowing it to be postponed for three or four months, as seems to be the present intention.

1. The dangers are (a) financial collapse of the Turkish Government and (b) increasing disorder in the interior of Asia Minor. The second of these is partly dependent on the first because the present poverty of the Turkish Government makes it impossible for them to keep an adequate gendarmerie.

The Government hitherto maintained itself by selling large stocks of tobacco, wool and other materials acquired during the war.* This source of ready money is coming to an end, and there

is practically no revenue owing to the fact that trade cannot revive and customs-duties depending on imports cannot be paid until peace is made. The comatose condition of the port of Smyrna and the impossibility of exporting the large surplus of this year's magnificent harvest are examples of the general financial paralysis.

Unless something is done, the result will be that thousands of government employees, police officers, army officers, etc. will go unpaid, they and their families will be starving, and complete disorganization with disorder is certain to follow. Constantinople is full of Bolshevik agents, and [notwithstanding the lethargy of the Turks,] the Rabbi believes that Bolshevik propaganda will take root among the thousands of starving government officials who will crowd Constantinople during the coming winter.

2. The Grand Rabbi regards international control of Turkey under the League of Nations for a considerable period as only feasible solution. A provisional arrangement, he thinks, could be made for Armenia, subject to the transferring of that province to the United States under a mandate, should the United States be willing to accept it.

The cutting up Turkish Empire by a series of "surgical operations" would have been possible at the time of the Armistice but it impossible now, and no peace can be expected unless Anatolia is evacuated by Greeks and Italians. The movement under Mustafa Kemal is not aimed at Greeks or Armenians within the Ottoman Empire, on the contrary it appeals for their support. But it is aimed at stopping amputations from the Empire. It has an army of 40,000 good fighters capable of being largely increased, and it knows that the Allies will not send British, French or Italian soldiers to reconquer Turkey.

3. As to Smyrna, the Grand Rabbi (who expects to visit and to warn E.Venizelos) regards permanent Greek occupation as impossible but believes that local autonomy for Smyrna and its district, under a Greek governor but within the limits of the Empire, would work well and would be accepted by the Turks.

A prompt solution of the Smyrna question is urgently needed because the blocking of Turkey's chief seaport is ruinous to the Nation's finances and because it stirs up revengeful bitterness even in the remotest corners of Anatolia.

4. If the Allied Powers will not discuss a permanent Turkish settlement until the American attitude on mandates is known, the

Grand Rabbi thinks that a provisional regime should be agreed upon, under which the Turks would receive advances of money enabling them to pay current salaries and expenses, subject to some joint foreign control.

Unless immediate steps of this kind are taken by the Supreme Council, the Grand Rabbi regards increasing disorder and chaos in Turkey as inevitable."

* Enormous part of this "acquirement" constituted property of Armenians, who were Ottoman subjects exposed to Genocide, and to the ravaged Western Armenia.

№ 244 telegram from the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople M.Bristol - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing
Constantinople, October 8, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/110, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"General [J.]Harbord reported arrival Tiflis after successful journey October 3^d. He plans to start for Constantinople about October 7th, possibly first visiting Baku.

Rumor from private sources Armenia that part of General [J.]Harbord's auto caravan was stopped for a few hours by Kurds and Turkish bands last week between Kars and Erivan are not affirmed by messages from the General." ...

№ 245 telegram № 4101 from the Minister President of the Republic of Armenia A.Khatisian - to the Armenian Delegation in Paris, for A.Aharonian*

Yerevan, October 9, 1919

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 355, f.225

"General [J.]Harbord departed from Erivan, on October 5 he embarked at Batum for Paris. Situation is relatively calm. Delegates [of] Boghos Nubar did not arrive yet." ...

* Translated from French.

№ 246 telegram from the chief of the military mission to Armenia Major General J.Harbord - to the representative of the Committee for the Defence of Turkey General M.Kemal (Sivas)

Samsun, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"
October 9, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/326, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4
and RG 256, 184.02102/5/Exhibit D

"...I acknowledged receipt at Samsun of your letter setting forth the aims of the party of which you are the Chief. I thank you for it. In our journey after leaving Sivas we were recipients of many courtesies from your people.

I have been informed by members of my Mission who have travelled through Malatia, Kaiseriya and Marsovan that the Armenian people in those regions are still very apprehensive of danger from the Nationalist movement, and that some are leaving their homes again in consequence of threats from their Turkish neighbors. I found similar uneasiness in other places. I again invite your attention to the keen interest America has in the safety and welfare of these people, as shown by President Wilson's cable to the Turkish Government, and suggest a wider circulation of the information that your organization is in no way inimical to the Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, as I understood from you is the case." ...

№ 247 urgent telegram from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople M.Bristol

Washington, October 9, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/110, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"Please telegraph at once any report you may have received from General [J.]Harbord regarding conditions in the Caucasus and Russian Armenia."

№ 248 list of Turkish, Armenian, American, Georgian and
Azerbaijani* officials, with whom members of mission met at their
route between Adana and Tiflis - among the documents of the
Mission of Major General J.Harbord

Constantinople, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 9, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/96, M820, Roll 230, vol.204, NAA,
MR № 2

..."Adana, September 10, 1919

Armenians: Dr.Vartabedian, Armenian National Council; Mr.
[Mihran] Damadian, Armenian National Council

Aleppo, September 12, 1919

Americans: Consul J[esse B.] Jackson

Armenians: His Holiness Catholicos Sahak II [Khapayan],
Archbishop [Mushegh] Seropian; Mr.S.Krajian

Mardin Station - September 13

Turks: Ali Riza,** Representative of the Commander of 5th
Division; Shukri Effendi, Commander of Gendarmerie; [Mehmet]
Kenan Bey, Commander of 5th Division ...

Americans: Miss A[gnes] Fenenga, Captain S.B.Dudley, Mr.
E.Miller, Miss Kirshner and Miss A.Truax; Mr. and Mrs.G.L.
Richards, Miss M.K.Dasey - came to Mardin on the same train;
[all from ACRNE]; Mr.C.V.Tarham

Mardin City, September 14

Turks and native Christian Representatives: Lieutenant-Colo-
nel [Mehmet] Kenan Bey, Commander of 5th Division; Mustafa
Nadir, Mutesarif;*** Husein Effendi, Mufti;^{4*} Hasan Fehmi, Kadi;^{5*}
representatives of Assyrians, Chaldeans, Catholic Priests,
representative of Protestants

Diarbekir, September 15

Americans: Mr.J.N.Smachler, Miss R[achel] B.North, Miss
[Johanna] L.Graf; Miss Emely Wade, Miss A.Dando

Turks and native Christian representatives: Faik Ali Bey,
Vali; [Ahmed] Jevdet Bey, Commander of 13th Army Corps; Bekir
Bey, Prominent Turk,

Chaldean Priest, Assyrian Priest

Arg[h]ana Maden, September 15

Turks: Shevki Bey, Governor-General; M.Nuri, Police officer
...Kharberd, September 17

Turks: Servet Bey, Vice Vali; Tahsin Bey, Defterdar; Colonel
Vehib Bey, Military Commander ...

Armenians: Mr.[Levon] Harpoutlian, Dr.Michael [Hakobian]

Americans: Mr.H[enry] H[arrison] Riggs in charge; Dr.M[ark
Hopkins] Ward & Mrs.[Anna R.]Ward, Mr.L[ee] Vrooman, Agri-
culture; Mr.G.C.Means, Industry; Mr. [Laurence] & Mrs.[Frances]
MacDaniels,^{6*} Dr.[Ruth Azniv] Parmelee, Miss A.Bliss, Miss I[sab-
bella] Harley, Miss M[argaret] H.Niles, Miss [Elsie] Tanner, Miss
[Anna] Jones, Miss [Mary W.]Riggs, Miss Fuller, Miss J.N.Nill,
Bacteriologist.

Malatia - September 18

Turks: Major Elias Bey, Tevfik Bey, Rifat Bey, Finance Minister; Nuri Bey, Justice; Tahsin Bey

Americans: Miss E.F.Greene, Miss A.Moore [of NER]

Sivas, September 20

Turks: Reshid Pacha, Vali; Colonel Salahaddin Bey, Commander of Troops; [Husein] Rauf Bey, ex-Minister of Marine (the real force in Nationalistic Movement); Bekir Sami Bey, Ex-Vali of Beirut; A[lfed] Rustem Bey, Ex-Ambassador at Washington; Abdullah Bey, Director of Census Bureau; ...Mustafa Kemal Pasha

...Americans: Miss M[ary] L[ouise] Graffam, Missionary; Mr. Ernest C.Partridge, Director of ACRNE; Dr.F[loyd O.]Smith; Miss Christian McLelan, Nurse; Miss M.Flinn, Nurse; Miss M.Knapp, Nurse; Miss A.N.Tipple in charge of Boys' Orphanage; Miss M. Spalding, in charge of Girls' Orphanage; Miss M.Hubbard, Women's Industry; Mr.R.M.Custer, Men's Industry; Mrs.L[ilian] M.Sewny, Refugees; Miss L.M.Thompson, Kindergarten; Miss M. Dickson, Orphans' Records; Miss B.Scribner, stenographer; Mr. W.Hawkes, Storage Depot; Mr.L.R.Larcombe, Transportation

Armenians: Dr.[Khosrov] Hekimian, Employed by ACRNE; Dr.[Levon] Sewney

Zara, September 22

Turks: Major Suleiman, Military Commander; Zia Bey, Kaimakam ...

Andreas,^{7*} September 23

Turks: Urfi Bey, Kaimakam; Lieutenant Osman, in charge of Military Depot

Greeks: Priest Anastas

Armenians: Mr.K.Surmayan, Mr.A.Julphayan

Erznka, September 23

Turks: Mutesarif; Lieutenant-Colonel Ismail; [Husein] Avni Bey, Health Officer; Nasib Bey, Justice; Avni Effendi, Civil Engineer; Khalil Ajha, Kurd Chieftain

Greeks: Priest

Armenians: Mr.Arshag, Mr.Avedis

Erzerum, September 25

Turks: Nejati Bey of Erzerum (delivered speech); Emin Bey of Van; Ahmed Rechid Pasha, Vali; Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, Commander of 15th Corps; Kiazim Bey [Dirik], Commandant of fortress; Mustafa Bey, Chief of Staff; I.Tali Bey,^{8*} Sanitary Inspector; Mehmed Faik, Chief Quartermaster; Ferid Bey, Chief of Gendarmes;

Suleiman Bey, representative of National Movement; Zaki Bey, Municipal Council; Izzet Bey, prominent Turk; Riza Bey, prominent Turk; Dr.Zia Bey, Red Crescent

Americans: Colonel Edmund L.Daley

Hasankale, September 26

Turks: Avni Bey, Kadi-Kaimakam; Major Nuri, Military Commander ...

Khorasan, September 26

Turks: Lieutenant Colonel Osman Nuri Bey, Commander of 12th Division; Lieutenant Colonel Salaadin Bey, Chief Quartermaster; Lieutenant Ismail Hakki, Chief of Gendarmes

Sarikamish, September 27

Armenians: General C[hristaphor] Araratian; [Stephan] Korganian (Governor of Kars); General Toumanian, Colonel Mirimanian^{9*}

Kars, September 27

Americans: Colonel Warren

Armenians: [Major] General [Daniel Bek] Pirumian, Military Commander; [Major General Harutyun] Hovsepian^{10*}

Kaghzvan, September 27

Armenians: Major R[ouben] Palian, Commandant

Etchmiadzin, [September 29]

Armenians: His Holiness Catholicos Gevorg V [Tphghisetsi Surenyants], Bishop Mesrop^{11*} [Ter-Movsesian]

Americans: Miss F.Witte

Erivan, [September 29]

Armenians: Dr.Alexander Khatisian Prime Minister; S[argis] Araratian, Finance Minister; A[vetik] Sahakian, Agriculture Minister; C[hristaphor] Araratian, (General), War Minister; A[braham] Giulkhandanian, Justice Minister; N[ikol] Aghbalian, Minister of Education,^{12*} [Commandant Arshavir] Shahkhatuni, Protocol; Rev. Khoren [Muradbekian], Bishop of Erivan; Rev. Bagrat, Bishop of Baku;^{13*} Mr.S[irakan] Tigranian, President of Parliament; General Dro [Kanayan]; Mr.[Vahan] Papazian; Mr. & Mrs.Afrikan^{14*}

Americans: Major [Dale F.]McDonald, Dr.[Hans] and Mrs. [Ada] Spoer, Dr.E.R.Mitchell; Miss H[elen] Wilson; Miss M.Draper; Miss B.Mills; Miss M.Kifer; Miss B.Knox; Mrs. E.Hauffman; Miss E.Berry; Miss L.Chamberlain, Mr.C.[S.]Ayer; Mr.Ed[ward] Perry; Mr. C[layton] C.Skinner, Miss R.Henry

English: Captain [George] Gracey
French: Captain A[ntoine] Poidebard
Tiflis, [October 2]

Georgians: General [A.]Gedevanov, Assistant War Minister; Mr.N[oy] Zhordania, Prime Minister; N[oy] Ramishvili, Minister of Interior; General [A.K.]Zakhariadze, Chief of Staff; General Cavtaradze, Adjutant General; Colonel [N.]Gedevanov, Chief Operations, General Staff; Prince [N.I.]Melikov; [Irakliy] Tsereteli; Prince Orbeliani; V.Gambashidze

Armenians: Prince [Michael] Toumanian, Mr.[Levon] Evangelian; Mr.E.Mailian; Mr.[H.]Vahanian

Baku, [October 4]

Tartars: N.Usubbekov, Prime Minister; Mr.[G.]Tagiev, the wealthy host; General [S. Bek] Mehmandarov, War Minister; Mr. [M.]Jafarov, Foreign Minister; [H.]Melik Aslanof, Minister of Railways; Dr.[Ahmed] Agaev, [Assistant] President of Parliament; A.Safikyurdski,¹⁵ minister of Justice; General [M.Bek] Sulkevich,¹⁶ Chief of Staff; Dr.[R.]Kaplan[ov], Minister of Education; General [S.]Agabekov, [Assistant Minister of Interior]."¹⁷

* Portrayed in the text as Tartar.

** Inscribed in the text as Ali Razi.

*** Mutesarif means ruler of Sanjak.

4* A judge who made decisions on the basis of religious Moslem law.

5* Moslem cleric, who carried out judicial commitments.

6* This name was inscribed in its older form of McDaniels.

7* Mentioned in the text as Sushehir.

8* The name was distorted as J.Tally.

9* This family name is noted in the text with error.

10* General H.Hovsepian is miscalled the chief of Militia and Colonel; and mayor Hamazasp Norhatian had missed the list.

11* He was defined as Archbishop.

12* N.Aghbalian was by mistake entitled Minister of Interior.

13* Noted in the text as Bagratouni.

14* Mayor of Yerevan Mkrtych Musinyantz had been omitted in the list.

15* Through an error inscribed as: Safakowski.

16* Written as Sulkevitch.

17* This person had been designated in the text as Minister of Police. In fact, Assistant Minister of Interior did administered

police; however he had never been its Minister.

№ 249 memorandum by the member of the military mission to Armenia Colonel J.Brinton - to the chief of the mission Major General J.Harbord

Constantinople, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 13, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/329, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

"Complying with request for a statement of pros and cons on the question as to whether America should assume the mandate. ...

Reasons I favor of the mandate.

1. This is the hour of crisis for Armenia. If she is to exist as a nation, preserving her institutions and developing her national existence, rather than to continue as a refugé and persecuted people, she must have the immediate support of a great power. On all sides she is surrounded by hostile neighbors, and is in the direct path-way of the Mohammedan. While officially friendly relations exist between herself and her sister republics, so-called Georgia and Azerbaijan, she is hardly less disliked by them than she is by her tyrant master Turkey. With all these she has been in recent and armed conflict. The Georgians today are persecuting her residents in Tiflis. The Azerbaijanis, who are essentially Turks, are openly if not even officially supporting military operations against her by Tartars and Kurds, and by Mohammedans, they are bitterly hostile to her and jealous of the assistance which she is receiving from the Christian world. As to the Turks, while there is no present danger of a massacre under the regime of the nationalist party, there is no reasonable hope whatever that the Armenians will be given the protection in Turkey necessary to ensure their return to their homes and their resumption of a normal peaceful life. Only the strong authority of an *outside power* can restore order or give the Armenians protection. Without that protection the forces which are practically united against her, will continue by every means in their power short of massacre, to crush and eliminate her. As a people Armenia will not disappear, but as a nation* she cannot possibly exist.

2. This [outside] *power* must be the United States. The colonial policies of Great Britain are in direct conflict with the national ambitions of Armenia. Her enormous Mohammedan

colonial population alone compels Great Britain to temporize with the Mohammedan population which practically surrounds Armenia, and her interests in Constantinople and her large political and financial commitments in the Caucasus lead in the same direction. She has shown no friendliness to Armenia throughout recent events and is distrusted by the people. Moreover the new responsibilities which she has assumed in Mesopotamia and Persia strongly militate against her ability to successfully handle any such problem as a mandate for the large additional territory of Turkey and Trans-Caucasia. There is no other State in position to undertake a mandate. The Italians are not trusted, the French have not the equipment, and Russia, the logical mandatory, is unfortunately not available.

3. The United States is providentially equipped for the responsibility. It requires above all power, prestige and disinterestedness to secure the confidence and support of the widely diverse elements which make up the problem. Much of the existing disturbed conditions of today is due not to a religious or political persecution but to a genuine fear on the part of mountaineers and other ignorant tribes that their territorial interests are being threatened by the Armenians. Among all these peoples as well as throughout the entire region covered by the proposed mandate America enjoys a prestige which is hard to exaggerate and which implies a responsibility to use it. She is credited with having won the European war after it had been lost by the Allies, and she is hailed everywhere as the leader and protector of small peoples. Her power has touched the popular imagination throughout the entire region. The existence of this prestige would enable her to carry through the mandate at a relatively slight cost in man-power, and a small fraction of that which would be required of any other nation. A comparatively small but well-organized exhibition of military power at the outset, coupled with a declaration and practical demonstration of her intention to treat all nations and all religions with absolute equality and fairness, would immediately secure popular support and confidence, and soon make the problem not a military but an educational one.

4. America is already committed to saving Armenia from starvation. This work is enormous. Half a million human beings will probably be dependent upon her aid throughout the winter, and the burden will continue for a long time to come. To continue

to give this aid without at the same time controlling the large territory through which it is to be administered and the unfriendly districts through which it must be first transported is like pouring water in to a sieve. It involves criminal waste and to a large extent the defeat of the very end in view. The work is throttled and will continue to be throttled by the hostile elements which go to make up the problem of Armenia. This would be removed and support take the place of opposition, on the assumption of a mandate.

5. The taking of a mandate by America will therefore not mean the starting of a new adventure. She is already in the field. Her relief work has already established an extensive organization throughout Turkey and the Caucasus where much of its possibilities are wasted, and the undignified and futile spectacle is presented of a large body of American officers placed in a position where they are at the mercy of the political corruption of a group of small peoples, all of whom are in need of guidance and control. America owes it to herself to correct this spectacle.

6. But America has not entered on the Armenian Question through her relief work. For more than half a century her educational institutions have been a power of enormous influence, and have been by words throughout the entire Near East. At the opening of the war a net work of American schools covered the Turkish Empire, and several great colleges for men and women made the entire territory familiar with the highest type of American collegiate education. The existence of these institutions whose graduates are found in every corner of the district, and which in pre-war times had an attendance of 20,000 students, is in itself a call to America to accept the present opportunity of simply completing a work of education, which stands today as one of the finest contributions of any civilized nation to the welfare of stranger peoples. Long before America's interest in Armenia or her avowed interest in small peoples, these institutions established before the peoples of the Near East the disinterestedness of America in their welfare and form an incalculable asset available for America in working out a problem on which the peace of the world largely depends.

7. The opportunities for commercial expansion which the taking of a mandate will afford are in themselves no reason for assuming the mandate. They will, however, open a large and con-

stantly increasing field for legitimate commercial enterprise which will inevitably be associated in many helpful ways with the work of political re-establishment of the Near East. It will be of very special value and significance in opening to America the markets of Russia, and of enabling her to take part in the reconstruction of a nation whose future is the greatest problem of modern Europe. This will enable America to play a large part in defeating the menace of Germany in Russia and of building Russia by economic and commercial ties to the Anglo-Saxon world.

8. In a word, then, America has already committed herself for the Armenian mandate and is alone competent to successfully administer it. To assume it is merely to accept an obligation which she owes to civilization and from which she cannot turn without being unfaithful not merely to her splendid record in the Near East but to the principles which brought the war to an end and whose faithful application by a disinterested power can alone hope to bring about that permanent political stability in the Near East which is absolutely necessary to ensure the future peace of the world.

Reasons against America assuming the mandate.

1. I am not aware of *any* convincing reason why America should not accept the mandate. This statement is of course based on the assumption already expressed that the mandate will be given to America upon those conditions as to unity and character of control, and as to territory to be included which she will demand and which will be essential to its success. If these conditions are not granted of course there would be many arguments against the mandate. Without absolute power of direction over the entire area from Constantinople to the Caucasus the success of the experiment would be more than doubtful, and the essential unity of a problem both as to territorial control will of course be one prime essential upon which America will have to first convince her people and then have to convince the powers. This unity will no doubt be bitterly resisted from many different directions, and the territorial ambitions of the powers as well as commercial and financial commitments which have already been made both in Caucasus and Turkey will prove serious obstacles. But it is hard to believe that if this essential is strongly presented, on the facts as we now have them, and as a clear cut absolute ultimatum, it will not, in the end, be accepted.

2. A reference, however, to possible reasons against the mandate will be submitted later."

* The author uses term of "nation" rather in its meaning of a State.

№ 250 memorandum by the member of the military mission to Armenia - to the chief of the mission Major General J.Harbord

Constantinople, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 13, 1919

US NA, RG 256, FW 184.021/329, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR

№ 4

"...1. The administration of the mandate for the entire territory of Turkey and Trans-Caucasia should be in the hands of a single supreme commissioner, with some such title as *the American High Commissioner on the Near Eastern Mandate*.

2. This official should be an army officer which will enable him to assume the civil office of commissioner, and at the same time exercise command over the troops who would be placed at his disposal for the restoring order through the territory. Any separation of these functions or civil and military authority would be highly unsatisfactory. In other words, the military power should not be subjected to a separate civil authority, nor should the civil rule be under the direction of the military. They should be united in the office as the case of the President.

3. The term Governor General, or in fact the term governor in any connection, should be avoided, as well as anything which might emphasize the impression of military occupation or government. The actual presence of the necessary troops would sufficiently impress the military power of the mandatory upon any disorderly tribes or functions, while, on the other hand, the use of a title associated with military rule would simply invite criticism against a program which as rapidly as possible must become one of education and the restoration of local self-government.

4. It might well prove desirable, or perhaps politically necessary, to have associated with the Commissioner in the capacity of a cabinet and under his direction, a small commission, thus preserving the commission form of government which, in American hands has become so well established, in public confidence not only in the United States, but through the world.

5. For administrative purposes the Territory in question should be divided into two principal divisions: a) Turkey.

b) Trans-Caucasia, including Armenia.

Each of these divisions should be centralized under a Commissioner General, who, if there is a commission established, should be a member of it.

6. The political unity of the territory, for the purpose of a mandate, should be insisted upon at every point, and the settlement of boundary disputes should be subordinated to the more immediate problem of restoring order through the territory and securing the confidence of the people in the intention of the Mandatory to treat all parties and all religions with equal consideration and working out a plan of bringing them together for the friendly discussion of matters of immediate commercial and political importance.

7. *The recognition of the independence of the so-called republics is, of course, inconsistent with the Mandate* and the creation of permanent national boundaries will not be called for. However, certain political *districts* will have to be defined and the political organization already established must be looked to as the basis of administering local government.

8. As to Georgia and Azerbaijan, no serious difficulty should be encountered in establishing a tentative line between these districts, it being understood that this line was merely for administrative convenience, and not in final determination of any future national rights.

9. As to the more difficult question of recognizing Armenia's demands for a separate political boundary, my conclusion is that a district should be created for administrative purposes to include the Republic of Armenia and approximately the *three* vilayets if Turkish Armenia, *Van, Bitlis* and *Erzerum* (with a question as to the city), together with an *outlet to the sea* at the eastern end of Pontus. This should be known as the District of Armenia and should be administered as one of the three temporary districts of Trans-Caucasia, under the direction of the Commissioner for Trans-Caucasia. This will not mean the setting up of an independent Armenia, any more than it will mean the setting up of an independent Georgia or Azerbaijan. The district will include probably not half of the territory claimed for Turkish Armenia, and would be so far from satisfying their exaggerated pretensions that it would not be likely to create any serious opposition on the part of her neighbors.

10. The establishment of these boundaries for the district, moreover, would be accomplished by a declaration that Turkish, and all other nationalities, would be as impartially protected in this district and be as much at liberty to settle there, as the Armenians would be protected in the remaining district of Turkey.

11. As reasons in support of this policy in tentatively defining an Armenian district, and for administrative purposes uniting Russian Armenia with Turkish Armenia, the following may be suggested: 1.) The persistent demand of the Armenians for some sort of a district assigned to themselves, under the name of Armenia, and which they might look to with reasonable hopes as their future national home, is so strong that any failure to give it recognition now would completely fail to solve the Armenian problem and would leave conditions in a state of total unrest and of uncertainty. Whatever their shortcoming or their responsibility for their present condition, the Armenians are at least entitled to this much. 2.) The setting apart of such a district under the name of Armenia would be the minimum demanded by public opinion in America, which has crystallized around the conception of the "independence of Armenia." 3.) Such an administrative division would probably be acceptable at heart to the Turks, a large majority of whom have not only become reconciled to the eventual loss of Armenia, but would be glad to get rid of the problem at a reasonable loss of territory. While not in accord with the avowed principles of the Nationalists, it is believed that if the problem was handled by America and it was made apparent that the intention of the Mandatory was not to dismember Turkey it would be accepted by them. The result of this would be that the Turkish portion of the territory would be administered from Constantinople, through the administration already established by the Turks, but that the boundary line would be changed so as to exclude the new Armenian district which would be administered in common with the district of the present Armenian Republic, from *Erivan* and Tiflis, under a system which would replace the old Turkish administration, which was naturally become more or less a name in the region so largely devastated and depopulated. It would throw Armenia's lot in with Caucasus and place her in a position to be gradually absorbed into some reconstructed, democratic Russian Confederation, in which direction her sympathies already strongly lay.

12. As to the district of Batum, now held by the British, and in which the Russian and Mohammedan influences outweigh the Georgian, it might be necessary to create a separate administrative district, under the Commissioner General for Trans-Caucasus. This would not mean that the future of Batum was in any way committed, or her eventual inclusion in the Georgia district precluded. It would merely mean that the status quo of Batum would be temporarily maintained, the American Mandatory being substituted for that of Great Britain and her future disposition being left to developments."

№ 251 memorandum by the member of the military mission to Armenia W.W.Cumberland "An American mandate in the Near East" - to the chief of the mission Major General J.Harbord

Constantinople, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 13, 1919

US NA, RG 256, FW 184.021/329, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR

№ 4

"Pros.

1. Turkey should be placed under the direction of a mandatory power. Her past and her present status are conclusive answers as against her claims to self-government. For Transcaucasia the case is not so clear. Were it not for the strategic importance of the region and the inevitability of foreign interference if the present republics should be permitted to attempt self-government, there are reasons for believing that the people of the Caucasus are capable of conducting their own administration, possibly with some pressure on the part of the Powers. But the republics would not be let alone by at least three nations, so a mandate becomes a necessity.

2. Only two powers can be seriously considered as mandatories - Great Britain and the United States. France does not possess the necessary strength, while Italy and Greece do not deserve to be trusted with the destinies of others, and in addition to being too weak to support the burden. Her record debars Germany as a possible trustee for the Near East. Great Britain's imperialism seems, if anything, to have been accentuated during the war, the result being that she is rapidly losing the confidence and good-will of her allies. Nor has Great Britain's mark as administrator in many backward countries been altogether disinter-

ted, and on all sides her entrance into Turkey or Transcaucasia would be regarded merely as a prelude to changing additional portions of the world's map to red. The United States is unhampered by any of the foregoing disabilities: her power is adequate, her record is clean, and her motives are above suspicion. She would be the only power that could enter the Near East with the possibility of approval both of the peoples to be governed and of the other nations, allied, enemy and neutral.

3. The mandate should be self-supporting, and even some financial profit might insure to America through the opportunities for the investment of capital and the expansion of our foreign trade. In particular the Caucasus might serve as a base for greatly extended trade with a reorganized Russia. These possibilities, however, will and should have little bearing on the ultimate decision in regard to American interference.

4. For many years the United States has enjoyed an enviable reputation in the Near East. She has not participated in political intrigues. She has not tried to secure special economic privileges. On the contrary, she has given to Turkey the best schools and hospitals that exist in the Empire. No other nation would have such an uneasy task in securing the confidence and co-operation of the native population.

5. Humanitarianism and idealism are more firmly entrenched in the United States than anywhere else in the world. As a nation we have not yet been disillusioned. There exists a fervor for service that is without parallel. As a nation we resemble a physical giant with the enthusiasm of youth, with a clean mind, with ample resources and with a pride in using them for the general welfare. The Near East presents an ideal setting for the activities of a nation thus motivated. Both the needs and the possibilities are unbounded.

6. The problem of the backward peoples is the most urgent and the most baffling that modern civilization has to solve. For centuries organized and mechanically equipped western civilization has had nothing to fear from the inchoate masses of Asia and Africa. The end of the era in which vast population masses may be rendered impotent is imminent. A combination of ignorance, poverty and oppression (or imagined oppression) with modern mechanical devices is pregnant with possibilities of disaster. Will the civilized nations neutralize dangers by a systematic and disinte-

rested effort to remove the causes? For this titanic task leadership and example must be found. The Near East is in the lime-light, and a spectacular success by the United States, in the region that has been the principal arena of international debauchery and the chief victim of exploitation by the so-called civilized powers, might be the inspiration and example that other nations need for attacking the problem of the backward peoples in their charge and might afford the light of hope that would save other backward peoples from actions of despair.

7. The United States could administer the Near East better than any other nation. The conditions of success are present, and the United States would not rest content until the possibilities should be realized. Great Britain has the reputation for being a successful administrator. The writer suggests that the success is larger from the point of view of British than of native interests. Our record in Cuba, in Puerto Rico, in Hawaii and in the Philippines defies comparison. America could and would do the best job in the Near East.

8. The Armenians are entitled to a better lot than has been theirs in the past. A sense of fair play demands that they be no longer subjected to promiscuous massacre, deportation, abduction and plunder. Though they may have some unattractive and some reprehensible qualities they have at least been loyal allies, and the mere chance for existence is certainly not an exorbitant demand. They feel, with much cause, that America is their best and their only reliable friend.

9. It has proved impossible to maintain the balance of power. Therefore, the political philosophy based upon such a system must be discarded. A League of Nations is not a fantastic concept, though even a novice in political affairs realizes that its practical realization is beset with difficulties. In short, no better theory than a League of Nations for securing permanent peace has been devised. Pragmatism is a necessity in the affairs of the everyday world, and the theory of League of Nations must be adopted and put to trial until it proves worse than other possible systems or until a better theory has been formulated. As the sponsor of the League of Nations the United States is under some obligation to prove the sincerity of her belief in the doctrine to which she has secured the adherence of her allies. ...Nowhere, if not in the Near East the United States demonstrate that she ac-

cepts her share of the obligations of the peace settlements and that she is convinced that the mandatory system is the correct principle for dealing with backward peoples. Refusal on the part of the United States to accept extra-territorial responsibility might throw suspicion on the purity of her motives and might be the sign for the formulation of pretentious designs by the great powers, to be realized at the expense of the defenceless.

10. The Near East should be taken out of international politics. An independent Turkey or Transcaucasia or a mandate for the region to Great Britain would be signal for the recrudescence of the former intense rivalry between Germany, Russia and Great Britain for control. The immediate peace of the world would unquestionably be furthered by American interference.

11. America is a land of immeasurable energy. There are increasing evidences that this energy is seeking, and must find an outlet. A man-sized job like regenerating the Near East is just the kind that would fire the American imagination. Instead of concentrating attention on domestic quarrels it would afford a common interest outside ourselves. ...

Cons.

1. Great Britain already has large interests in the Near East and the East, and the proper solution of the problem of Turkey and Transcaucasia is more to her advantage than that of any other nation. Let her, therefore, assume the liabilities, since the assets of political stability must inevitably accrue to her account. Great Britain's delicate position in the Mohammedan world would assure proper treatment of the Moslem population, but it might be at the expense of the Christian elements.

2. Great Britain's strategic frontier is the line of the Caucasus, the Black Sea and the Straits. Her activities in Persia and Mesopotamia make the establishment of this line urgently imperative from her point of view. An American wedge between Russia, Germany and herself which the establishment of an American mandate would accomplish, would unquestionably be an immense relief to Great Britain. It may be true that Great Britain is carrying more than her share of the white man's burden, but the burden has certainly been self-imposed. Nor does Great Britain seem backward in assuming additional "burdens" like Persia and Mesopotamia. Let's her renounce some profitable "burdens" as well as simulate inability to assume those that may be dangerous and

expensive.

3. Some sort of political or economic understanding between Germany and Russia is a foregone conclusion. As neither Germany nor Russia has forgotten her former power or repented of her former methods, is it to be supposed that the designs of each nation toward Constantinople and India are no longer a menace? Russia will never consent to see the oil fields of Baku under the political control of another power, for her industrial welfare is absolutely dependent on them. Unless the United States is prepared to return the Caucasus to Russia as soon as she regains her political equilibrium, danger is merely courted.

4. There is no prospect of disaccord between Great Britain and the United States, but the former's control of the sea would afford the power seriously to compromise an American administration.

5. International jealousies might be able to accomplish the partial or complete failure of an American administration. Moreover, there are evidences that in certain quarters failure would be looked upon with complacency. Various nations would not welcome a demonstration of the fact that a backward people can be quickly and completely put upon a solid financial and political foundation, when continued tutelage no longer becomes necessary.

6. The economic situation in the proposed region is not altogether reassuring. Turkey is already well mortgaged up and possible reparation payments may make her financial position untenable. Under any circumstances the United States would be hampered in putting her policies into effect due to the fact that an important proportion of the income of the region is pledged to foreign creditors and thus unavailable for rising the standard of living of the people or for obtaining the equipment that is prerequisite to modern economic life.

7. At present the United States is the acknowledged embodiment of international morality. Too much effort cannot be applied to maintaining that pre-eminence. Already there are hints that the United States is looking toward political interference in the Near East as a means for commercial and financial penetration. Her entrance would be the signal for the opening of a campaign of slander which might too seriously prejudice our position in other fields.

8. For the doing of a job which apparently belongs to others and for which we would get scant credit there is a question as to how far we should feel obligated to go in sending our soldiers into a country which would mean physical and moral disaster for many of them.

9. There would be no intention on the part of the United States to remain permanently in the Near East. What would be the political situation at the termination of the mandate? In other words, American occupation would merely be a temporary palliative for the Near Eastern malady and could not effect a permanent cure. The mandatory system looks to the eventual independence of the country in tutelage, but unless the political ambitions of Great Britain, Germany and Russia are completely renounced during the period of the mandate an independent Turkey or Transcaucasia is merely the fantasy of sentimentalists.

10. A plunge into European politics such as the acceptance of a mandate would involve, might be the spark to kindle imperialistic ambitions in the United States. Our power would become more and more obvious, and synchronously might develop a lust for further power. History has too many examples of slight expansion being followed by head-long designs of conquest to inspire assurance that our own nation, in spite of its present disinterestedness, might not fall a prey to the fascination of imperialism. The American temperament is certainly expansionist by nature.

11. America's world obligations lie in other directions. She is sponsor for the Monroe Doctrine and should be responsible for the political and economic development of Mexico, Central and South America. If European nations are not to exert pressure in the New World, the United States should accept the converse and recognize that her responsibilities do not extend to Europe. Moreover, Japan's record in the Far East is not one to inspire confidence. As yet few Americans are familiar with her perfidy, her brutality or her boundless ambitions. In the next quarter of a century, and possibly longer, it should be America's paramount international task to checkmate Japanese penetration. ...If the United States ensures the [fulfillment of this task,] she will rendering a hundred fold greater service to the world than would be accomplished by the regeneration of the Near East. Distraction of attention and dissipation of resources by accepting responsibilities in either Turkey or Transcaucasia might involve sacrificing

the prospects for establishing western civilization throughout the world. We cannot afford to take the chance."

№ 252 telegram from the chief of the military mission to Armenia J.Harbord - to the chief of American mission in Paris F.Polk, transmitted by telegram № 4659 from the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople M.Bristol - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Constantinople, October 14, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/117, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"1. ...Some unorganized border warfare along southern frontier Russian Armenia, apparently result old animosity between Kurds and Tartars* and Armenians unrestrained by weak Governments. Undoubtedly some former Turkish officers and soldiers, out of employment account demobilization, have sought service with forces [of] Azerbaijan. Latter at normal peace with Ottoman subjects in each small salient with Armenian village separating.

2. Beginning with Tartar population and across which Azerbaijan hopes build an all Moslem railroad into Turkey. These districts lie within temporary Armenian borders as fixed by British and approved by [W.]Haskell. These minor operations in proposed basis taking the place of settlement through neutral zone proposed by [W.]Haskell, which I have supported in interview with local Governments. Pending action Peace Conference, do not believe Armenians either in Turkey or Trans-Caucasus are in danger excepting in these local affairs.

3. Actual attitude toward Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia Towards each other very discordant for future peace this region except under strong hand. ...

4. Great scarcity food in Turkish as well as Russian Armenia, but conditions improving. ...

Railroads of Trans-Caucasia cannot be consolidated for rehabilitation and operation without foreign control. ...Unquestionably administration of Colonel [W.]Haskell has greatly improved conditions throughout Trans-Caucasia.

5. This problem is one which includes inseparably all Armenia and Trans-Caucasia, because of inextricable mingling of races, religions and interests. Whole this region is familiar with principles self-determination and generally expressed faith in disinterested mandatory under League of Nations as only solution for designated situation."*** ...

* I.e. Azerbaijanis.

** M.Bristol added, that he heartily approved this report.

№ 253 copy of the memorandum by the chief of the military mission to Armenia General J.Harbord - to the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople M.Bristol

Constantinople, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"

October 15, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/440/Encl.4, T1192, Roll 3, NAA, MR № 37

..."Attached here is a memorandum from my A.D.C., covering the particulars and arrangements from transportation of the American Military Mission from Constantinople to Mardin via the Baghdad Railway.

I request your interest in arranging with the proper British authorities for a reasonable bill covering this journey and based upon the military rates granted British and other Allied Forces. The bill rendered is extravagantly exorbitant and, for that part of the journey from Constantinople to Konia approximates to \$11,000 US currency.

In arranging for this trip my staff officers were unable to gain even an estimate from the railways authorities, but after talking it over with them, and considering the first-class rates for individuals and the car rate, it was estimated that the bill would probably be from \$3,500 to \$4,000, and an outside estimate of not more than \$5,000 for the entire trip. This mission is a strictly official one and it was impracticable for it to travel in any other way to carry out this mission, and is entitled to the best rates granted British and other forces occupying and operating in parts of Turkish Empire.

I urgently beg your continued protest until a reasonable bill is rendered, which I request you to forward to the Disbursing Officer of the US Commission to Negotiate Peace, Hotel Crillon, Paris."

№ 254 memorandum by the member of the military mission to Armenia Captain D.Loring - to the duty officer of the U.S.S. "Martha Washington"

Constantinople, on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington,"
October 15, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/336, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

"For your information, please be advised that the following members of our Mission discontinued accompanying us at Constantinople, this date:

Mr. W.W.Cumberland,
Mr. E.G.Mears,
Mr. W.S.Hiatt,
Major Haik Shekerjian,
Prof. Husein Bey [Hulusi],
Private Tigran* Serijanian,

Also, that Mr. H.G.Keropian** will accompany us to the United States on the "Martha Washington." ...

* Inscribed as Dickran.

** According to the muster roll of American mission (US NA, RG 59, 184.02/99, M820, Roll 230, vol.204, NAA, MR № 2), First Lieutenant Harootiun Khachadoorian, Corps of Engineers, Sergeant-Major Aram Kojassar (inscribed as A.Kojassar), Criminal Investigation Department, and Orderly-Interpreter, Sergeant Tigran (Dick) Ohanessian, Signal Corps and Orderly-Interpreter, also formed a part of it.

№ 255 telelgram from the chief of the military mission to Armenia J.Harbord - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington," October 16, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.02102/5; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.841-874 - first text is that of the signed original left with the Commission to Negotiate Peace at Paris.

US NA, RG 256, 860J.01/575 - second, an unsigned copy of the report was transmitted by J.Harbord at Washington to the Secretary of State R.Lansing, November 14, 1919.

"The undersigned submits herewith the Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia. The Mission organized under authority of the President, consisted of:

Major General James G.Harbord, U.S. Army; Brigadier General Frank R.McCoy, U.S. Army; Brigadier General George

Van Horn Moseley, U.S. Army; Colonel Henry Beeuwkes, Medical Corps, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel John Price Jackson, U.S. Engineers; Lieutenant Colonel Jasper Y.Brinton, Judge Advocate, U.S. Army; Lieutenant Colonel Edward Bowditch, Jr., Infantry, U.S. Army; Commander W.W.Bertholf, U.S. Navy; Major Lawrence Martin, General Staff, U.S. Army; Major Harold W.Clark, Infantry, U.S. Army; Captain Stanley K. Hornbeck, Ordnance Department, U.S. Army (Chief of Far Eastern Division, American Commission to Negotiate Peace); Mr.William B.Poland, Chief of the American Relief Commission for Belgium and Northern France; Prof.W.W. Cumberland, Economic Adviser to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; Mr.Eliot Grinnell Mears, Trade Commissioner, Department of Commerce; with other clerks, interpreters, etc., etc.

The instructions to the Mission were "to proceed without delay on a government vessel to Constantinople, Batum and such other places in Armenia, Russian Transcaucasia and Syria, as will enable you to carry out instructions already discussed with you. It is desired that you investigate and report on political, military, geographical, administrative, economic and other conditions involved in possible American interests and responsibilities in that region."

The Mission proceeded by ship to Constantinople. From there it travelled by the Baghdad Railway to Adana; ...the scene of the massacres of 1909, and the principal city of the rich province of Cilicia, where two days were spent visiting Tarsus, and the ports of Ayas and Mersin; thence continued by rail via Aleppo to Mardin; from there by motor car to Diarbekir and Kharberd,* Malatia, Sivas, Erznka,** Erzerum, Kars, Erivan and Tiflis; thence by rail to Baku and Batum. ...Members of the Mission also travelled by carriage from Ulakishli to Sivas; from Sivas to Sam-sun;** visiting Marsovan where there is much apprehension among the Armenian population at this time; from Trebizond to Erzerum; by horseback from Khorasan^{3*} to Bayazet; from Erivan to Nakhichevan. ...The Armenian Catholicos... Gevorg V was visited at Etchmiadzin. ...The mission traversed Asia Minor for its entire length and the Transcaucasus from north to south and east to west. All of the vilayets of Turkish Armenia were visited except Van and Bitlis which were inaccessible in the time available, but which have been well covered by Captain [E.H.]Niles, an army officer who inspected them on horseback in August, and whose

report corroborates our observations in the neighboring regions. ... The Turkish frontier was paralleled from the Black Sea to Persia. On the return voyage from Batum the Mission visited Samsun, the port of one of the world's great tobacco regions, and Trebizond. ...The Mission spent thirty days in Asia Minor and Transcaucasia and interviewed at length representatives of every government exercising sovereignty in that region, as well as individual Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Tartars, Georgians, Russians, Persians, Jews, Arabs, British and French, including Americans for some time domiciled in the country. It also gave consideration to the views of the various educational, religious, and charitable organizations supported by America. ...The mission before leaving Paris was in frequent conference with the various delegations to the Peace Conference from the region visited. It has had before it numerous reports of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, and Food Administration, and that of the Mission of Mr. Benjamin B. Moore sent by the Peace Conference to Transcaucasia, as well as the very complete library on the region, its geography, history and governments loaned by the Librarian of Congress, the American Mission to Negotiate Peace and others. It has listened to the personal experiences of many witnesses to the atrocities of 1915, and benefited by the views of many persons whose knowledge of the various peoples in the regions visited is that obtained by years spent among them.

The interest, the horror and sympathy of the civilized world are so centered on Armenia; and the purpose and work of this Mission so focus on that blood-soaked region and its tragic remnant of a Christian population that this report should seem to fall naturally under the following heads: (a) History and present situation of the Armenian people. (b) The political situation and suggestions for readjustment. (c) The considerations for and against the undertaking of a mandate.

The Report is accordingly so presented.

The History and Present Situation of Armenian People

The Armenians were known to history under that name in the 5th Century B.C., and since that period have lived in the region where their misfortunes find them today. Their country is the great rough tableland, from 3,000 to 8,000 feet^{4*} above the level of the sea, of which Mount Ararat is the dominant peak. In ancient times it touched the Mediterranean, Caspian and Black

Seas. In later days it has dwindled to about 140,000 square miles;^{5*} ...existing in 1914 in two parts, the eastern belonging to Russia which consisted of Kars and Erivan, and some portions of the present territory of Azerbaijan; the remainder being Turkish Armenia, comprised in the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Diarbekir, Kharberd^{6*} and Cilicia, though Armenians were scattered more or less throughout the whole of Transcaucasia and Asia Minor. Armenia was an organized nation a thousand years before there were one in Europe except Greece and Rome. For over twelve of the twenty-five centuries of its history Armenia enjoyed independence within borders that shifted with the events of the times. Its last King, Levon VI, an exile from his own land, spent his last years in the effort to bring about an understanding between France and England, ...and actually presided at a Peace Conference near Boulogne in 1386, which... led to the end of the [Hundred Years] War. Armenia was evangelized by Apostles... as early as 33 A.D., and as a nation adopted Christianity and founded a National Church in 301 A.D., which... is vital today. Armenia was the *first* nation to officially adopt Christianity, with all that act involved in a pagan world. The first two centuries following... the invention of an Armenian alphabet; the translation of the Bible into the vernacular.

By its geographical location on the great highway of invasion from East to West; the ambitions of Persia, the Saracens and the rising tide of Islam, and the Crusades found Armenia the extreme frontier of Christianity in the East. Persians, Parthians, Saracens, Tartars and Turks have exacted more martyrs from the Armenian church in proportion to its numbers than have been sacrificed by any other race. The last Armenian dynasty was overthrown by the Sultan of Egypt seventy-eight years before the fall of Constantinople to Mehmed II in 1453. From that time until today the story of their martyrdom is unbroken. In the Persian, the Roman, the Byzantine, the Armenian found Aryan kinsmen and tyranny was tempered with partial autonomy. Even with the Saracens reciprocal adjustment had been possible. The Turk to whom they now fall prey was a raiding nomad from the Central Asia. His mainsprings of action were plunder, murder and enslavement; his methods the scimitar and the bowstring. The Crusades were long ended; Europe busy with her own renaissance contented herself with standing on the defensive against the Moslem, and the

Eastern Christian was forgotten. For more than three centuries the Armenian people figure little in the history of the times, though at an earlier period sixteen Byzantine Emperors were of that race, and ruled the Eastern Empire with distinction. Many individuals, and even colonies, however, played a part in distant lands. Europe, India and Persia welcomed them. They were translators, bankers, scholars, artisans, artists, and traders, and even under their tyrannical masters filled posts which called for administrative ability, became ambassadors and ministers and more than once saved a tottering throne. They carried on trades, conducted commerce and designed and constructed palaces. Nevertheless, as a race they were forbidden military service taxed to poverty, their property confiscated at pleasure, and their women forced into the harems of the conqueror. Such slavery leaves some inevitable traces upon the character, but in the main the Armenians preserved his religion, his language and his racial purity, persecution bringing cohesion.

Time, temperament and talent eventually brought most of the industry, finance, commerce and much of the intellectual and administrative work of the Ottoman Empire into Armenian hands.

The progress of events in Europe brought about in the early 19th Century a revival of interest in the forgotten Near East. As early as 1774 the treaty of [Kuchuk] Kainardji had placed Imperial Russia in the role of a protector of the Christians of the Near East, ...[and] whatever its motives, the only genuine attempt by any European nation to afford such protection to helpless Armenia. A plebiscite in Russian Armenia, if fairly held, would probably vote a reconstituted Russia into a mandatory for that region.

With Armenian consciousness of their own capacity to trade, to administer, and to govern in the name of others, there came in the last quarter of the 19th Century the opportunity to throw their weight into the scale for the reform of Turkey from within, at a time when the dismemberment of Turkey was balanced in European politics against the possibility of her self-redemption. In 1876 a constitution for Turkey was drawn up by the Armenian Grigor Otyan, Secretary to Midhat Pasha, ...[it] was proclaimed and almost immediately revoked by Sultan Abdul Hamid.

The foregoing inadequately sketches the story of the wrongs of Armenia down to our own times. From 1876 it is a story of massacre and of broken and violated guarantees. ...The Treaty of

San Stefano, [signed in 1878,] ...through the British jealousy of Russia, [it] was torn up... and the futile Treaty of Berlin substituted, asking protection but without guarantees. Meantime there had been the Convention of Cyprus by which that island passed to Great Britain in return for a [its union with Turkey] against Russia. A collective note of the powers in 1880 was ignored by Turkey. Then followed the agreement of 1895, which has never carried out, and the restoration of the constitution of 1976 in 1908. A further agreement on 1914 was abrogated at the entrance of Turkey in the war, and... a secret treaty of 1916 between Great Britain, France and Russia, the existence and publication of which rests on Bolshevik authority, by which Armenia was to be divided between Russian and France. Meanwhile there have been organized official massacres of the Armenians ordered every few years since Abdul Hamid ascended the throne. In 1895 one hundred thousand perished. At Van in 1908 and at Adana and elsewhere in Cilicia in 1909, over thirty thousand were murdered. The last and greatest of these tragedies was in 1915. Conservative estimates place the number of Armenians in Asiatic Turkey in 1914, over 1,500,000, though some make it higher. Massacres and deportations were organized in the Spring of 1915 under definite system, the soldiers going from town to town. The official reports of the Turkish Government show 1,100,000, as having been deported. Young men were first summoned to the Government building in each village and then marched out and killed. The women, the old men and children were, after a few days, deported to what Talaat Pasha called "Agricultural Colonies," - from the high, cool, breeze-swept plateau of Armenia to the malarial flats of the Euphrates and the burning sands of Syria and Arabia. The dead from this wholesale attempt on the race are variously estimated from 500,000 to more than a million, the usual figure being about 800,000. Driven on foot under a fierce summer sun, robbed of their clothing and such petty articles as they carried, prodded by bayonet if they lagged; starvation, typhus and dysentery left thousands dead by the trail-side. The ration was a pound^{7*} of bread every alternate day, which many did not receive, and later a small daily sprinkling of meal on the palm of the outstretched hand was the only food. Many perished from thirst or were killed as they attempted to slake thirst at the crossing of running streams. Numbers were murdered by savage Kurds against whom

the Turkish soldiery afforded no protection. Little girls of nine or ten were sold to Kurdish brigands for a few piastres, and women were promiscuously violated. ...In the orphanage there maintained under American Relief auspices, there were one hundred and fifty "brides," being girls, many of them of tender age, who had been living as wives in Moslem homes, and had been rescued. Of the female refugees among some seventy-five thousand repatriated from Syria and Mesopotamia, we were informed at Aleppo that forty percent are infected with venereal disease from the lives to which they have been forced. The women of this race were free from such disease before the deportation. Mutilation, violation, torture and death have left their haunting memories in a hundred beautiful Armenian valleys; and the traveler in that region is seldom free from the evidence of this most colossal crime of all the ages. ...

Even before the war the Armenians were far from being in the majority in the region claimed as Turkish Armenia, excepting in a few places. Today we doubt if they would be in the majority in a single community even when the last survivors have returned to the soil, though the great losses of Turkish population, to some extent, offset the difference brought about by slaughter. We estimate that there are probably 270,000 Armenians today in Turkish Armenia. Some 75,000 have been repatriated from the Syrian and Mesopotamian side, other are slowly returning from other regions. ...There are in the Transcaucasus probably 300,000 refugees from Turkish Armenia. ...Reports from twenty stations in Turkey show 15,000 orphans receiving American aid, and... the number demanding care is double this, for many were seen cared for under the auspices of the Red Crescent. ...Twenty thousand are being cared for at the expense of the various relief agencies in the Transcaucasus. On the route travelled by the mission fully 50,000 orphans are today receiving government or other organized care. We estimate a total of perhaps half a million refugee Armenians as available to eventually begin life anew in a region about the size of New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio, to which would be added those, not refugees, who might return from other lands. The condition of the refugees in the Transcaucasus is pitiable to the last degree. They subsist on the charity of the American Relief organizations with some help, not great however, from their more prosperous kinsmen domiciled in that region. Gene-

rally they wear the rags they have worn for four years. Eighty percent of them suffer from malaria, ten percent from venereal troubles, and practically all from diseases that flourish on the frontiers of starvation. There are also the diseases that accompany filth; loathsome skin troubles and great numbers of sore eyes, the latter especially among the children. The hospitals are crowded with such cases. The refugees in Russian Armenia have hitherto drifted from place to place but an effort is now being made by the administration of Colonel W.Haskell to concentrate them in several refugee camps. The winter season will see many deaths, for the winters there are extremely severe, fuel is scarce, and shelter inadequate. Medicines are scarce and very dear. Quinine cost approximately thirty dollars a pound. On the Turkish side of the border where Armenians have returned they are gradually recovering their property, and in some cases have received rent for it, but generally they find things in ruins, and face winter... with only such desultory assistance as the Turkish government can afford. Things are little if better with the peasant Turks in the same region. They are practically serfs equally destitute, and equally defenseless against the winter. ...Not over twenty percent of the Turkish peasants who went to war have returned. ...Six hundred thousand Turkish soldiers died of typhus alone, it is states, and insufficient hospital service, and absolute poverty of supply greatly swelled the death lists.

In the region which witnessed the ebb and flow of the Russian and Turkish armies, ...no crops have been raised for several years and the land... has gone to weeds. Scarcely a village or city exists which is not largely in ruins. The country is practically treeless. ...In the territory untouched by war from which Armenians were deported, the ruined villages are undoubtedly due to Turkish devilry, but where Armenians advanced and retired with the Russians their retaliatory cruelties unquestionably rivaled the Turks in their inhumanity. The reconstruction of this country will be little short in difficulty of its original reclamation from virgin wilderness in days when the world was young.

Where the Russians went he built fine macadam highways, and even the main Turkish roads generally built during the war, over which our Mission travelled, were passable, and some quite good. All highways are rapidly going to ruin for lack of maintenance. A country once fairly equipped for motor traffic is sliding

back to dependence on the camel caravan, the diminutive pack donkey, and the rattly, ramshackly araba wagon. The ox is the principal draught animal. A good highway existed from Erzerum to Trebizond, ...the distance is about one hundred and fifty miles.^{8*} The freight rate is now between \$145 and \$150 per ton.^{9*}

In the portion of Turkey traversed, we heard of brigandage but experienced no inconvenience. Apparently the Turkish government, inefficient and wicked as it sometimes is, can control its people, and does govern. In the region once policed by Russia the relaxation from its iron hand has been great, and life and property are unsafe in many regions. Our Mission was fired upon by Kurds in Russian Armenia and several motor cars struck by bullets, and over half the party were kept prisoner one night by Moslems who claimed to have been driven from their villages by Armenians. In Azerbaijan we were also fired upon. Train wrecks for robbery are frequent on the Transcaucasian Railroad and the [Georgian] government took the precaution to run pilot engines ahead of our train for safety. The highways are unsafe even to the suburbs of the large towns. Practically every man in Georgia and Azerbaijan, outside the cities, carries a rifle. If he desires to stop traveler on the highway he motions or calls for him, and if unheeded fires at him.

The relief work consists of allotment made to the Transcaucasus from the unexpended balance of the hundred millions appropriated by Congress for relief in allied countries, and of the funds contributed through the American Committee for Relief in the Near East. ...The Relief Administration in the Transcaucasus seem to have been conducted with more than average energy. It has rescued the refugees there from starvation, and brought the name of America to a height of esteem. ...It extends now throughout the Near East, and is felt by the wild ragged Kurd, the plausible Georgian, the suspicious Azerbaijan[i], the able Armenian and the grave Turk with equal seriousness. With it or probably because of it there has come wide spread knowledge of the Fourteen Points submitted by the President, and "self determination" has been quoted to the Mission by wild Arabs from Shamar and Basra, by every government of Transcaucasia; by the mountaineers of Daghestan, the dignified and able chiefs of the Turkish Nationalist movement at Sivas and Erzerum, and the nomad Kurds who ten minutes before had fired at our party thin-

king us to be Armenians. Undoubtedly some charges of Corruption [on the part of native officials] connected with the Relief could be substantiated. Charges of partiality favoring Christians against Moslem [in equal distress] are not infrequent. Due to inexperience, to difficulties of communication and other causes there has been inefficiency on the part of American officials and employees. Enthusiastic young Americans out of touch with the sources of their funds, confronted with the horrors of famine in a refugee population, drew drafts on the good faith and generosity of their countrymen. ...[Their] work accomplished, has been very great and very creditable to America. ...Colonel W.Haskell has reorganized the work in Transcaucasus and getting better results. In some way funds must be found and this work must be continued and the people be sustained until they can harvest a crop. If seed is available for planting, a crop should be due in August 1920. Even this prospective amelioration only applies to those repossessed of their lands.

There is much to show that left to themselves the Turk and the Armenian when left without official instigation have hitherto been able to live together in peace. Their existence side by side on the same soil for five centuries unmistakably indicates their interdependence and mutual interest. ...Testimony is universal that the massacres have always been ordered from Constantinople. Some Turkish officials were pointed out to us by American missionaries as having refused to carry out the 1915 order for deportation. That order is universally attributed to the Committee of Union and Progress of which Enver Bey, Talaat Bey and Jemal Pasha were the leaders. A court has been sitting in the capital practically since the armistice and one man, an unimportant subordinate, has been hung. Talaat, Enver and Jemal are at large, and a group of men charged with various crimes against the laws of war are at Malta in custody of the British unpunished except as restrained from personal liberty. Various rumors place Enver Bey as scheming in the Transcaucasus, and a French officer is authority for the statement that he has been in Tiflis within two months conferring with government officials. This man is in Turkish eyes a heroic figure; risen from obscurity by his own effort; allied by marriage to the imperial House of Osman; credited with military ability; the possibilities of disturbance are very great should he appear in command of Moslem irregulars on the Azerbaijan-

Armenian frontier. ...

[Thus,] roads and lands almost back to the wild; starvation only kept off by American relief; villages and towns in ruins; brigandage rampant in the Transcaucasus; lack of medicines and warm clothing; winter coming on in a treeless land without coal. We saw nothing to indicate that Armenians who have returned to their homes in Turkey are in danger of their lives, but their natural apprehension has been greatly increased by unbalanced advice given by officers on the withdrawal of foreign troops from certain regions. The events at Smyrna have undoubtedly cheapened every Christian life in Turkey. ...Meantime the Armenian, unarmed at the time of the deportations and massacres, a brave soldier by thousands in the armies of Russia, France and America during the war, is still unarmed in a land where every man but himself carries a rifle.

The Political Situation and Suggestions for Readjustment

In seeking a remedy for political conditions which shriek of misery, ruin, starvation, and all the melancholy aftermath, not only of honorable warfare, but of bestial brutality unrestrained by God and man, but which nevertheless prevail under an existing empire with which the governments of Europe have long been willing to treat on terms of equality, one's first impulse is to inquire as to the possibility of reform from within. The machinery of government existing, can it be repaired and made a going concern, affording to its people the guarantees of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness which the modern world expects of its governments? The case for the Turkish Empire was duly presented to the Peace Conference in Paris on June 17th last by the Turkish Grand Vizier, Damad Ferid Pasha. ...He admitted for the Turkish Government of the unhappy region under consideration of "misdeeds which are such as to make the conscience of mankind shudder with horror forever" and that "Asia Minor is today nothing but a vast heap of ruins." In reply made by the Council of Ten of the Peace Conference to the plea of the Grand Vizier for the life of his Empire, the probability of that government being able to accomplish reforms from within which will... perhaps make amendments for past crimes, is well weighted in the following words:

"...There has been no case found either in Europe or in Asia or in Africa in which the establishment of Turkish rule in any

country has not been followed by a diminution of prosperity in that country. Neither is there any case to be found in which the withdrawal of Turkish rule has not been followed by material prosperity and a rise of culture. Never among the Christians in Europe, nor among the Moslems in Syria, Arabia or Africa has the Turk done other than destroy wherever he has conquered. Never has he shown that he is able to develop in peace what he has gained in war. Not in this direction do his talents lay."

It seems likely, therefore, that as far as the Armenians are concerned, the Turk has had his day and that further uncontrolled opportunity will be denied him.

With the break-up of Russia the Transcaucasus found itself adrift. ...Until today its small [Caucasian] area contains five great racial groups, divided into forty distinct races. Nine of these have arrived in comparatively recent times, but the remaining thirty-one are more or less indigenous. There are twenty-five purely Caucasian races. ...With the exception of the fairly compact group of Georgians, and one of the Tartars these peoples are inextricably commingled throughout the region. Their civilization varies from the mountain savage to individuals of the highest types. ...The most important groups are the Georgians, the Azerbaijanese Tartars and the Armenians. ...These republics [of Transcaucasia] have been recognized by none of the Powers except Turkey. The Armenian Republic seeks a union with the six vilayets (Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharberd, Sivas, Erzerum) and Cilicia, to be governed by a mandatory of the Great Powers during... a term of years in which... a Constituent Assembly be held to determine the form of the eventual permanent government. Georgia and Azerbaijan ask independence. ...

Both Georgia and Azerbaijan living on salvage from the wreck of Russia, have persuaded themselves that the civilization and governmental and business machinery they have taken over have been theirs from the beginning. The Georgians with a church of their own antedating that of Russia, and traditions of a Georgian dynasty of Armenian origin which reigned in Tiflis for a thousand years before Russia took over the country in 1802, are a very proud and plausible race. They have been much influenced by the proximity of Bolshevism, fly the red flag of revolution over their own, and have nationalized land, taking it from the original owners without compensation, to sell to peasants. This measure

has been unsatisfactory to both peasant and proprietor. [As to] the Azerbaijanese... the diversity of [their] products make them independent of outside help. Both Georgian and Azerbaijan government live in terror of the forces of A.Denikin. ...Georgia has her little army on her northern frontier, and Azerbaijan has a tacit agreement with General A.Denikin to refrain from hostilities against him in return for immunity from attack by his gunboats on the Caspian Sea.

The Russian Armenians... absorbed many Russian matters and customs, and the wealth and ability of the race gave them a predominant role in the Transcaucasus under Russia. Tiflis... has probably the largest Armenian population of any city in the world except New York and Constantinople. They are friendly to A. Denikin and a restituted Russia, and their refusal to join Georgia and Azerbaijan against A.Denikin caused the break-up of the Transcaucasian Confederation.^{10*}

The dominant civilization in Transcaucasia is Russian. Everything worth while in the country is due to the Russian money and Russian enterprise. ...Under Russia, the [rail]road was... under one management, with shops, rolling stock and policy in common. Georgia now controls the shops; Azerbaijan the oil fuel, and each of the three such rolling stock as it can get. No one of the three trusts the others; no through or continuous traffic is possible without an outside power guaranteeing the return of the rolling stock when it passes from one jurisdiction to another. Georgia does not hesitate to embargo freight against Armenia, and from her position of vantage simply censors the railroad traffic to that unfortunate country. Azerbaijan... combines with Georgia against Armenia, which alone of the three has nothing by which to exert leverage. The railroad can neither be consolidated, nor properly operated under native control. Roadbed and rolling stock are rapidly deteriorating. An example of the power of Georgia over Armenia is that the latter is not permitted to import either arms or ammunition, though under almost constant menace from its neighbors.

The three governments from an occidental standpoint are now thoroughly inefficient, without credit, and undoubtedly corrupt. Alone each faces inextricable financial difficulties. Religious differences, added to racial, threaten to embroil them unless brought under a common control. ...They have no present inter-

monetary, postal or custom union, ...no definite agreement for common control and use of the railroad; and are in continual squabbles over boundaries. Azerbaijan has no educated class capable of well administering a government; Georgia cannot protect itself against Bolshevism; Armenia in ruins and partial starvation. All our investigations bring conviction that the people in each would welcome a mandatory by a trustworthy outside power. Russian Armenia would today probably vote a mandate to Russia if that power were reconstituted. Georgia recalls its independence. ...Azerbaijan feels a tie to Turkey and distrusts the Christian, but the more intelligent people realize that outside control is inevitable and even necessary to their relations with Christian countries and that Turkey is beyond consideration. So closely are the countries related geographically, commercially and by the habit of generations that this Mission not only believes that a mandatory is necessary for them, but that it is imperative from every standpoint of peace, order, efficiency and economy that the same power shall exercise a mandate over them all, leaving for the present their interior boundaries unsettled. The ultimate form of government of these States, other than that they may look forward to autonomy but not necessarily independence, should in our opinion not now be announced. Their capacity for self-government and their ability to sustain amicable and workable relations among themselves remain to be tested... [for] a long period of tutelage for possible unappreciative and ungrateful pupils, much expense, probably diplomatic embarrassment from a reconstitution of Russia, and little reward except the consciousness of having contributed to the peace of the world and the rehabilitation of oppressed humanity. ...

The Covenant of the League of nations contemplates that "certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire" shall be subject to a Mandatory Power. ...This, in connection with [the arraignment of the Turkish Government in] the reply of the Peace Conference, ...may be construed to apply to any or all parts of the Turkish Empire. ...As between actual dismemberment and a receivership for his entire country the Turk would beyond doubt prefer a mandatory for the whole empire as it may stand after adjudication by the Peace Conference. ...There would seem to be no objection to action in [such] direction.

A Power which should undertake a mandatory for Armenia and Transcaucasia without control of the contiguous territory of Asia Minor-Anatolia-and of Constantinople with its hinterland of Rumelia would undertake it under most unfavorable and trying conditions, so difficult as to make the cost almost prohibitive; the maintenance of law and order and the security of life and property uncertain; and ultimate success extremely doubtful. With the Turkish Empire still freely controlling Constantinople, such a Power would be practically emasculated as far as power is concerned. For generations these peoples have looked to Constantinople as the seat of authority. The most intelligent and ambitious Armenians have sought the capital as a career. The Patriarch of the Armenian Church in Constantinople, although subordinate in matters of doctrine to the Catholicos at Etchmiadzin, is in reality the political head of the Armenian people by his location. ...The Armenians reaching before the war the number of 150,000 [at the capital,] with business connections ramifying to distant corners of the entire country. To no small degree the future business and industrial development of their native land will depend upon these men. ...There are well-informed business men who believe it is destined to become the third most important commercial city in the world. But, ...unless put under a mandatory, ...concession-hunting, financial intrigue, political exploitation and international rivalries will center there in the future as in the past. Concerted international action for control of Constantinople is impracticable. ...All concerts must have a leader. ...In any concert... there would still exist the temptation for single powers to play politics. ... There must be actual control, for responsibility without authority is worse than useless in a land of oriental viewpoints. ...

Without dependable centralized control of a Constantinople a Power exercising mandate in Armenia would be crippled in administration, restricted in trade development, ridden by concessionaires, dependent on Turkish discredited diplomacy for redress of local boundary grievances, and in extreme case practically cut off from communication with the Western World. It is believed that Allied sentiment is so crystallized in the opinion that Constantinople must be placed under a mandatory that it may safely be assumed in the report that this will be done.

Conceded that there shall be a mandate for Armenia and Transcaucasia, and one for Constantinople and Anatolia, there are

many considerations that indicate the desirability of having such mandates exercised by the same Power. If separate Powers exercised such mandate, the inevitable jealousies, hatreds, exaggerated separatist tendencies and economic difficulties would compel failure. With all its faults the Turkish Empire... has some rusty blood-stained political machinery which under control of a strong mandatory can be made to function. ...A single mandatory for the Turkish Empire and the Transcaucasus would be the most economical solution. No intelligent scheme for development of railroads for Transcaucasus, and Armenia can be worked out without extension into Anatolia. Natural highways through the high mountains of Armenia are few, and transportation development will... be costly and difficult. Without access into Anatolia it will be impossible. For many years the expenses of exploitation will not be met by equivalent receipts. This situation would be alleviated by control of both regions. With Constantinople, Anatolia and Armenia in different hands, the manufacturers and exporters of Armenia could not hope for an equal share in the commerce and trade of the Near East.

The Armenian Patriarch, the head of the Armenian Protestants and others at Constantinople, on our return from Armenia called and volunteered the belief that the Armenian question could not be settled within the boundaries of that country, and that they were prepared to pass under a single mandate which should include the other parts of the Turkish Empire. In a latter written statement,^{11*} however, they modified this, stating that while "Different nations of this empire may enjoy the help of the same mandatory power," they felt that to bring Armenia under the same system of administration as that of the Turks would defeat the object of the development of Armenian ideals, "because by assuring the individual rights of a people the national rights and ideals of the same people cannot necessarily be assured;" that "Giving a good government to the whole Turkish Empire will not induce the Armenians to gather to their native land. They will still be a scattered people, etc., etc."

A party of distinguished Turks, including a former cabinet minister of high standing, and a diplomat who for eight years represented his country at one of the European courts, stated that as between the independence of Turkey as it existed in 1914, and a mandate for the empire given to the United States they greatly

preferred the latter, and believed that they spoke for the educated classes of all Turkey. It has been very evident to this Mission that Turkey would not object to a single disinterested Power taking a mandate for her territory as outlined in the Armistice with the Allies, and that it could be accomplished with a minimum of foreign soldiery, where an attempt to carve out territory for any particular region would mean a strong foreign force in constant occupation for many years. The Aim of the Nationalist [adherents of M.Kemal]... is the preservation of the territorial integrity of the empire under a mandatory of a single disinterested Power, preferable America.

The Mission while in Sivas, had a conference with the chiefs of this party which held a congress at Erzerum in July and one at Sivas in September. ...The leader, Mustapha Kemal Pasha... appears to be a young man of force and keen intelligence. He is supposed to have resigned from the army to lead this movement. It sought... the overthrow of the Ferid Pasha Cabinet, which has since fallen, claiming, that it was entirely under the influence of one of the great powers which itself desires a mandate for the empire. While professing entire loyalty to the Sultan, [M.Kemal]... cut all official telegraph communications between the capital and the interior, pending the removal of the cabinet. The fall of the Damad Ferid Pasha ministry in October would seem to put the empire behind the movement, for the Turkish officials in the interior were already identified with it. In a statement given out on October 15th, Mustapha Kemal said [that he] "recognized the necessity of the aid of an impartial foreign country. It is his aim to secure the development of Turkey as she stood at the armistice. It is [his] conviction that Turkey... has become weakened through foreign interference and intrigues. After all [his] experience [he is] sure that America is the only country able to help. We guarantee no new Turkish violences against the Armenians will take place."

The events of the Greek occupation of Smyrna... have so stirred the Turkish people, ...that an announcement of intention to carve... a State of Armenia, unless preceded by a strong military occupation of the whole empire might be the signal for massacres of Christians in every part of the country. There is no wisdom in now incorporating Turkish territory in a separate Armenia, - no matter what the aspirations of the Armenians. Certainly it is unwise to invite trouble which may be avoided by the consolidation

of the mandate region under a single power. Under one mandatory they will be neighbors. Under two or more they will be rivals. ...Only under a single mandatory can the matter of ultimate boundaries be deferred; which is believed by this Mission to be important.

In the proposition to carve an independent Armenia from the Ottoman Empire, ...the Turk, ...even when all the refugees shall have returned to their homes, will be in the majority, - and [his people] were in the majority before the deportations took place, - even though due, as it may be, to gerrymandering of provincial boundaries and the partial extermination of a people. Notwithstanding his many estimable qualities, his culture, and his tenacity of race and religion, the Armenian generally does not endear himself to those or other races with whom he comes in contact. ...[There is a] saying current in the Near East: "The Armenian is never legally in the wrong; never morally in the right." Even the American Missionary who in so many instances has risked his life for his Armenian charges, does not as a rule personally like the Armenian as well as he does the more genial but indolent and pleasure-loving Turk. ...Racially allied to the wild Aryan Kurd he is cordially hated by the latter. Kurds appealed to this Mission with tears in their eyes to protect them from Armenians who had driven them from their villages. ...The Kurds claim that many of their people were massacred under the most cruel circumstances by Armenian irregulars accompanying the Russian bolshevists when the Russian army went to pieces after the collapse of the empire. ...From the standpoint of this Mission the capacity of the Armenian to govern himself is something to be tested under supervision. With that still in doubt the possibility of an Armenian minority being given authority over a Moslem majority against whom its hearts are filled with rancor for centuries of tyranny, may well justify apprehension. ...

There are very many who believe that the best elements of the Armenian race have perished. It is believed that with the reestablishment of order in their native country many of those who have emigrated to other countries will return. That, however, can only come with time, and even then it is doubted if many of the wealthy and influential Armenians long domiciled in happier land will return to their somewhat primitive ancient home, even though such absentees have raised their voices most loudly for an

autonomous Armenia. Certainly with arbitrary boundaries on the Anatolia side determined only by Armenian wishes, expediency, tradition, or even verified historical claims of former occupation, without regard to the present population, the mandatory powers for both Anatolia and Armenia should inaugurate government by placing a cordon of trustworthy foreign soldiers from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

With a single power in control of both peoples and boundaries unannounced except as they have hitherto existed, such difficulties would not arise. Against such combination of authority and postponement of delimitation of boundaries is to be weighed the unchangeable belief of many that the Turk at the end of his tutelage will still be the Turk, bloodthirsty, unregenerate and revengeful and that it is unthinkable that Armenia shall ever again form part of a country which may be governed by him; that the sufferings of centuries should now be terminated by definite and permanent separation of Armenia from Turkey; and that this plan seems to contemplate a tutelage of indefinite length. To this the reply is that the Armenian should have no fear to submit his case to the League of Nations, ...and that he must in the meantime prove his capacity not only to govern himself but others, and that as the behest of the Great Powers a plebiscite could be had and the mandatory at any time be terminated by detachment of his territory from Anatolia as well as now and with much greater safety to him and convenience to his benefactors.

The conclusion of the... Mission... is that the remedy for the existing conditions in Armenia and the Transcaucasus is a mandatory control to be exercised by a single great power. The Armenian question cannot be settled in Armenia. It cannot be finally settled without answering two questions: "What is to be done with Turkey?" [and] "What is Russia going to do?" Pending the ultimate settlement of these questions the Mission believes that... the power which takes a mandate for Armenia and Transcaucasia should also exercise a mandate for Anatolia, Rumelia and Constantinople; the boundaries of the Turkish vilayets of Armenia and Anatolia and the interior boundaries of Russian Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan to remain as they are for the present. The divisions of such mandate are... to be worked out by the mandatory power. ...There should [certainly] be some intermediate authority between the provinces and the capital. A natural subdivision of such a

mandate... would probably be: Rumelia; City of Constantinople (federal district); Anatolia; Armenia; District of Transcaucasia (less Russian Armenia). ...

A plebiscite fairly taken would in all probability ask for an American mandate throughout the Empire. Syria and Mesopotamia, ...actually occupied by France and Great Britain at this time, have been considered by us as excluded from our consideration, as is... Arabia. In its belief that the Armenian problem is only to be solved by a mandatory which should include also Constantinople, Anatolia, Turkish Armenia and the Transcaucasus, the Mission has the concurrence of many Americans whose views by reason of long residence in the Near East, are entitled to great weight. Such Americans are practically a unit in believing that the problems of Armenia, Transcaucasia, Anatolia and Constantinople must be considered as an inseparable whole. ...

The mandatory power [should be] prepared steadfastly to carry out a continuity of policy for at least a generation, and to send only its most gifted sons to leadership in the work without regard to political affiliation. No disinterested nation would undertake such a mandatory except from a strong sense of altruism and international duty to the peace of the world... and the unanimous wish of other parties to the Covenant of the League of Nations. No duty of modern times would be undertaken under so fierce a glare of publicity. Such nation would hold... the spotlight from every foreign office and from every church steeple in the world focuses upon it. No nation could afford to fail, or to withdraw. ...No nation incapable of united and non-partisan action for a long period should undertake it.

Conditions and Problems Involved in a Mandate for Turkey and Transcaucasia

...The problems for the United States would not be identical with those of any other nation which might undertake [a mandate.] ...An Old World, without pretensions to altruism or to much devotion to ideals, will expect of America in the Near East the same lofty standards shown in Cuba and the Philippines, - the development of peoples rather than of material resources and commerce. ...Our innocence from participation in the intrigues which have hitherto characterized intercourse with the Turk, our freedom from bias through the necessity of considering Moslem public opinion in other parts of the world, and the fact that we

have no financial interest in the great foreign debt of the Ottoman Empire give America... an advantage. A great part of the work of the Mission has been devoted to a consideration of the situation as it would affect our own country should it be invited to assume a mandate. The problem as a whole has been kept in mind while individual members of the Mission have made special inquiry into different matters:

A, - Political factors and Problems, by Captain Stanley K. Hornbeck, ...

B, - Government in Turkey and Transcaucasia, by Lt. Col. Jasper Y.Brinton, ...

C, - Public and Private Finance of Turkey and Transcaucasia, by Prof.W.W.Cumberland.

D, - Commerce and Industry in Turkey and Transcaucasia, by Trade Commissioner Eliot Grinnell Mears.

E, - Public Health and Sanitation, by Col. Henry Beeuwkes,
...F, - Population; Industrial and Other Qualities; Maintenance, by Lt. Col. John Price Jackson, ...

G, - Climate, Natural Resources, Animal Industry, and Agriculture, by Lt. Col. E.Bowditch

H, - Geography, Mining and Boundaries, by Major Lawrence Martin, ...

I, - The Press of Turkey and Transcaucasia, by Major Harold W.Clark

J, - the Military Problem of a mandatory, by Brig.-Gen. George Van Horn Moseley, ...

K, - Transport and Communications in Asia Minor and the Transcaucasus, by Wm.B.Poland, ...

L, - Bibliography

The Military Problem

...The heart of the nation is so sensitive to any enterprise which calls for its sons to serve as soldiers in distant lands. ...The immediate problems which would lay before the Army and navy of a mandatory power in Turkey and Transcaucasia are:

(a) The suppression of any disorder attendant upon withdrawal of occupying troops and the initiation of the government.

(b) The maintenance of order until a constabulary could be organized for the rural police of the mandatory region.

(c) To help organize and train a native constabulary.

(d) To constitute a reserve for moral effect; for possible

actual use in supplementing the local constabulary in case of emergency; and for the prestige of the mandatory government in a region which has been governed by force since the beginning of history.

The inauguration of a mandatory government would be followed at a very early date by the withdrawal of the foreign troops now occupying the region and by the dissolution as soon as practicable of the permanent military establishments now maintained by Turkey and Transcaucasia. ...No resistance to [the United States] troops would be anticipated. On the contrary, they would doubtless be welcomed. No problem of external defense of the country occupied would exist.

(a) The present occupying force of the region under consideration, Rumelia, Constantinople, Anatolia and Transcaucasia, excluding five Greek divisions occupying Smyrna, is the Army of the Black Sea and the troops in Cilicia, comprising about 50,000 of the British, French, Italian and Greek Governments. The regular troops of Turkey and Transcaucasia to be disbanded in the same region at the convenience of the mandatory government aggregate about 92,000 men. The gendarmerie of Turkey amounts to about 30,000 men. The loss of man power in Turkey has been appalling, and too many men are still absent from work and carrying rifles.

It is not thought that any serious disorder would attend this substitution of the troops of the mandatory power for the army of occupation, and for the native regular forces.

(b) During the formation of an efficient native constabulary, a period of six months to a year, small garrisons would have to be furnished along the railroads and in isolated towns, especially on the old frontiers, where feeling runs high between races. This would give security while the various nationals are being repatriated. ...The suppression of outlaw bands which already exist in some localities, and the formation of which invariably follows the disbandment of armies after a long war, would call for constant use of a certain number of United States troops. ...

(c) The first duty of a mandatory would be to guarantee the safety of life and property through the country, and to this end its earliest efforts should be directed to the establishment of a native rural police or constabulary. ...While decentralized in its administration and destined eventually to operate in small bodies, it

should be a Federal force, co-operating with but not serving under provincial officials. Its personnel should absorb the best elements of the present gendarmerie, and also provide suitable employment for deserving officers of the disbanded armies. For a considerable period its highest officers would necessarily be Americans but as fast as the quality of the native officers justifies, the force should become native. The strength of the constabulary should be such as to enable it to take over the whole task of maintaining order outside the towns and release American troops at the earliest practicable date. Coincident with the organization of the constabulary would be the creation of efficient municipal police.

(d) Considering... the traditional lawlessness of migratory Kurds and Arabs, and the isolation of certain regions where the temptation to reprisals for past wrongs will be strong for at least a generation, a certain force must be kept in hand to supplement the native constabulary when needed. ...Its mere existence will prevent organized disorder on a scale too large for a peace force to handle. Such a force would be stationed near the capital, trained for quick expeditionary work, and sent where needed. ...

For expeditionary purposes mariner or infantry with artillery would be best. For moral effect in the interior and during the period of constabulary organization cavalry would be preferable. A small efficient air service should be maintained. ...Its value for dealing with... half-wild tribes cannot be overestimated [in] the country [that] much resembles Mexico. ...An extra proportion of sanitary troops [of mandatory] would be necessary.

Estimates of the necessary number of mandatory troops vary greatly, - from twenty-five thousand to two hundred thousand; [and] conditions change so rapidly. ...Today... a force of two American divisions, with several hundred extra officers, are total force of fifty-nine thousand would be ample. Such force would be specially organized; one aeroplane squadron; a minimum of artillery; not to exceed one regiment of seventy-five's motorized; four times the usual number of sanitary troops; four regiments of cavalry. ... This force should be substantially reduced at the end of two years, and by fifty percent at the end of the third year. After that some further reduction could be slowly effected, but the irreducible minimum would be reached at about the strength of one division.

The annual cost for the force of the army above stated would be at the maximum; -

For the first year	\$88,500,000
At the end of two years perhaps	59,000,000
At the end of three years	44,250,000

with thereafter a continuing appropriation of that sum less such amount as the local revenues could afford, probably a very substantial fraction of the cost.

To offset our expenditures there would be available at least a part of the naval and military budget hitherto used for the support of the disbanded armies in the region. In Turkey before the war this totaled about \$61,000,000 annually for her army including \$5,000,000 for the navy.

The naval establishment should consist of a station ship for the capital, and probably one each for Smyrna, Mersin, Batum and Baku. ...A transport of light draft capable of carrying a complete regiment should be permanently on station at the capital. Four to six destroyers would be needed for communication and moral effect. Collier, repair and hospital service afloat should be in proportion. Old ships of obsolete type would probably answer for all except the station ship at the capital and the destroyers. Some ships of the Turkish Navy, of which there are over thirty, could doubtless be used with American crews soon to be replaced by natives.

The naval establishment might not entail any additional Federal appropriations. Ships and personnel could probably be drawn from existing establishment; the only additional expense would probably be the difference in cost of maintenance in Near Eastern and home waters.

It is very important that a proper military and naval setting be given the mandatory government at the beginning. In no part of the world is prestige so important, and in no region have people been so continuously governed by force. The mandatory could at the outset afford to take no unnecessary risks among such a population in densest ignorance as to our resources and our national traits.

Conclusions

This mission has had constantly in mind the moral effect to be exercised by its inquiry in the region visited. Very alarming reports had been received from Transcaucasia for several months before its departure from France, particularly as to organized attacks by the Turkish army impending along the old international

border between Turkey and Russia. ...We practically covered the frontier of Turkey from the Black Sea to Persia, and found nothing to justify the reports. The Turkish Army is not massed along the border; their organizations are reduced to skeletons; and the country shows an appalling lack of people, either military or civilian. ...The Armenian deportations, the massacres and the return of survivors were discussed on each occasion, ...intended to convince Turkish officials that their country is on trial before the world. The visit of the Mission has had a considerable moral effect in securing the safety of Christian lives and property pending action by the Peace Conference.

We would again point out that if America accepts a mandate for the region visited by this Mission, it will undoubtedly do so from a strong sense of international duty, and at the unanimous desire, so-expressed at least, of its colleagues in the League of Nations. ...In our opinion there should be specific pledges in terms of formal agreements with France and England, and definite approval from Germany and Russia. ...Of particular importance are the following:

Absolute control of the foreign relations of the Turkish Empire, no ambassador, envoy, minister, or diplomatic agent to be accredited to Turkey, and the latter to send none such abroad.

Concessions involving exclusive privileges to be subject to review if shown to be contrary to the best interests of the State.

Concessions undesirable from the standpoint of the mandatory upon which work has not been started to be cancelled. Compensation to be allowed to holders when necessary.

The system by which specified revenues are assigned for particular purposes to be discarded. All revenues to be controlled by the Treasury, and all creditors to look only to the Treasury as the source of payment.

Foreign control over Turkey's financial machinery to cease, meaning the dissolution of the Council of Administration of the Ottoman public debt, reserving the right to retain some individual members of the Council as advisors because of their familiarity with Ottoman finances.

All foreign obligations of the Empire to be unified and refunded.

Those countries receiving territory of the Turkish Empire, e. g. Syria and Mesopotamia, to assume their reasonable share of the

paper currency, of the foreign obligations, and of obligation for possible reparation payments.

Abrogation, on due notice, of existing commercial treaties with Turkey.

All foreign governments and troops to vacate territorial limits of mandate at dates to be fixed by the mandatory power.

Consent to many of these measures would not easily be obtained. Many nations now have some sort of financial control within the Ottoman Empire, and they would not see this control taken away without protest.

It needs no argument, however, to show that the United States could not submit to having her financial policies controlled from foreign capitals. The refunding of the debt, possibly with a reduction of the capital amount, would raise a storm of protest, but it should be insisted upon. Otherwise as American administration would be embarrassed and run the risk of being discredited.

The Mission has nor felt that it is expected to submit a recommendation as to the United States accepting a mandate in the Near East. It, therefore, simply submits the following summary of reasons for and against such action, based on all information obtainable during six weeks constant contact with the peoples of the region:

Reasons for	Reasons Against
1. As one of the contributors of the League of Nations, the United States is morally bound to accept the obligations and responsibilities of a mandatory power.	1. The United States has prior and nearer foreign obligations, and ample responsibilities with domestic problems growing out of the war.
2. The insurance of world peace at the world's cross-ways, the focus of war infection since the beginning of history.	2. This region has been a battle ground of militarism and imperialism for centuries. There is every likelihood that ambitious nations will still maneuver for its control. It would weaken our position relative to Monroe Doctrine and probably eventually involve us with a reconsti-

	<p>tuted Russia. The taking of a mandate in this region would bring the United States into the politics of the Old World, contrary to our traditional policy of keeping free of affairs in the Eastern Hemisphere.</p>
<p>3. The Near East presents the greatest humanitarian opportunity of the age, - a duty for which the United States is better fitted than any other, - as witness Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and our altruistic policy of developing peoples rather than material resources alone.</p>	<p>3. Humanitarianism should begin at home. There are a sufficient number of difficult situations which call for our action within the well recognized spheres of American influence.</p>
<p>4. America is practically the unanimous choice and fervent hope of all the peoples involved.</p>	<p>4. The United States has in no way contributed to and is not responsible for the conditions, political, social or economic, that prevail in this region. It will be entirely consistent to decline the invitation.</p>
<p>5. America is already spending millions to save starving peoples in Turkey and Transcaucasia and could do this with much more efficiency if in control. Whoever becomes mandatory for these regions we shall be still expected to finance their Relief, and will probably eventually furnish the capital for material development.</p>	<p>5. American philanthropy and charity are worldwide. Such policy would commit us to a policy of meddling or draw upon our philanthropy to the point of exhaustion.</p>
<p>6. America is the only hope of Americans. They consider but one other nation, Great Britain, which they fear would sacrifice their interests to Moslem public</p>	<p>6. Other powers, particularly Great Britain and Russia, have shown continued interest in the welfare of Armenia. Great Britain is fitted by experience and</p>

<p>opinion as long as she controls hundreds of millions of that faith. Others fear Britain's imperialistic policy and her habit of staying where she hoists her flag.</p> <p>For a mandatory America is not only the first choice of all the peoples of the Near East, but of each of the great powers, after itself.</p> <p>American power is adequate; its record clean; its motives above suspicion.</p>	<p>government, has great resources in money and trained personnel, and though she might not be as sympathetic to Armenian aspirations, her rule would guarantee security and justice.</p> <p>The United States is not capable of sustaining a continuity of foreign policy. One Congress cannot bind another. Even treaties can be nullified by cutting off appropriations. Non-partisanship is difficult to attain in our government.</p>
<p>7. The mandatory would be self-supporting after an initial period of not to exceed five years. The building of railroads would offer opportunities to our capital. There would be great trade advantages not only in the mandatory region, but in the proximity to Russia, Rumania, etc.</p> <p>America would clean this hotbed of disease and filth as she has on Cuba and Panama.</p>	<p>7. Our country would be put to great expense; involving probably an increase of the army and navy. Large numbers of Americans would serve in a country of loathsome and dangerous diseases. It is questionable if railroads could for many years pay interest on investments in their very difficult construction. Capital for railways would not go there except on government guarantee. The effort and money spent would get us more trade in nearer lands than we could hope for in Russia and Rumania. Proximity and competition would increase the possibility of our becoming involved in conflict with the policies and ambitions of States which now our friends would be made our rivals.</p>

<p>8. Intervention would be a liberal education for our people in world politics; give outlet to a vast amount of spirit and energy and would furnish a shining example.</p>	<p>8. Our spirit and energy can find scope in domestic enterprises, or in lands south and west of ours. Intervention in the Near East would rob us of the strategic advantage enjoyed through the Atlantic which rolls between us and probable foes. Our reputation for fair dealing might be impaired. Efficient supervision of a mandate at such distance would be difficult or impossible. We do not need or wish further education in world politics.</p>
<p>9. It would definitely stop further massacres of Armenians and other Christians, give justice to the Turks, Kurds, Greeks, and other peoples.</p>	<p>9. Peace and justice would be equally assured under any other of the great Powers.</p>
<p>10. It would increase the strength and prestige of the United States abroad and inspire interest at home in the regeneration of the Near East.</p>	<p>10. It would weaken and dissipate our strength which should be reserved for future responsibilities on the American continents and in our Far Eastern dependency. Our line of communication to Constantinople would be at the mercy of other naval powers, and especially of Great Britain, with Gibraltar and Malta, etc., on the route.</p>
<p>11. America has strong sentimental interests in the region: our missions and colleges.</p>	<p>11. These institutions have been respected even by the Turks throughout the war and massacres; and sympathy and respect would be shown by any other mandatory.</p>
<p>12. If the United States does not take responsibility in this region, it is likely that internatio-</p>	<p>12. The Peace Conference has definitely informed the Turkish Government that it may expect</p>

<p>nal jealousies will result in a continuance of the unspeakable misrule of the Turk.</p>	<p>to go under a mandate. It is not conceivable that the League of Nations would permit further uncontrolled rule by that thoroughly discredited government.</p>
<p>13. "And the Lord said unto Cain, Where is Abel, thy brother? And he said: "I know not; am I my brother's keeper?" Better millions for a mandate than billions for future wars.</p>	<p>13. The first duty of America is to its own people and its nearer neighbors. Our country would be involved in this adventure for at least a generation, and in counting the cost Congress must be prepared to advance some such sums, less such amount as the Turkish and Trans-Caucasian revenues could afford, for the five years, as follows:</p>

First Year	General government	\$100,000,000
	Communications, railroads, etc.	20,000,000
	Relief, <i>repatriation</i> , education, etc.	50,000,000
	Army and navy	88,500,000
	Sanitation, etc.	17,000,000
	Total	275,500,000
Second Year	General government	75,000,000
	Communications, railroads, etc.	20,000,000
	Relief, education, etc.	13,000,000
	Army and navy	59,000,000
	Sanitation, etc.	7,264,000
	Total	174,264,000
Third Year	General government	50,000,000
	Communications, railroads, etc.	20,000,000
	Relief, education, etc.	4,500,000
	Army and navy	44,250,000
	Sanitation, etc.	5,000,000
	Total	123,750,000
Fourth Year	General government	25,000,000
	Communications, railroads, etc.	20,000,000

	Relief, education, etc.	4,500,000
	Army and navy	44,250,000
	Sanitation, etc.	3,000,000
	Total	96,750,000
Fifth Year	General government	15,000,000
	Communications, railroads, etc.	20,000,000
	Relief, education, etc.	4,500,000
	Army and navy	44,250,000
	Sanitation, etc.	2,000,000
	Total	85,750,000
	Grand total	\$756,014,000

<p>14. Here is a man's job that the world says can be better done by America than by any other. America can afford the money; she has the men; no duty to her own people would suffer; her traditional policy of isolation did not keep her from successful participation in the Great War. Shall it be said that our country lacks the courage to take up new and difficult duties?</p>	
--	--

Without visiting the Near East it is not possible for an American to realize... the respect, faith and affection with which our country is regarded throughout that region. Whether it is... a tribute perhaps to the crusading spirit which carried us into the Great War, not untinged with hope that the same spirit may urge us into the solution of great problems growing out of that conflict, or whether due to unselfish and impartial missionary and educational influence exerted for a century, it is one faith which is held alike by Christian and Moslem, by Jew and Gentile, by prince and peasant in the Near East. ...Burdens that might be assumed on the appeal of such sentiment would have to be carried for not less than a generation. ...If we refuse to assume it, ...we shall be considered by many millions of people as having left unfinished the task for which we entered the war, and as having betrayed their

hopes.

Respectfully submitted, J.G.Harbord. ...

Note: the Mission is indebted for assistance to the American High Commissioner, Rear Admiral Mark L.Bristol, ...and to Consul General G.B.Ravndal at Constantinople, to American Consuls Jackson at Aleppo, and H.Doolittle at Tiflis, as well as to the Allied High Commissioner to Armenia, Colonel W.N.Haskell. ... Acknowledgments are also made to Dr. Mary Mills Patrick, President of the Woman's College of Constantinople; to the authorities of Robert College, particularly Professor Husein Bey [Hulusi]; and to Messrs. J.L.Barton, W.N.Chambers, T.D.Christie, H.Riggs, E. Partridge, Professor Robert P.Blake of National University, Mr. Benjamin Burgess Moore, Chief American Political-Intelligence Mission to the Transcaucasus, Tiflis, and Misses M.L.Graffam and A.Fenenga, as well as to various other representatives of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, and of the several missionary centers. All of these devoted missionaries have passed years of exile in this country, offering their lives for its betterment, and have the high respect of not only the people among whom they live, but of the various foreign representatives to whom they are known. American Missions and Schools have for a hundred years produced striking and far-reaching results in Asiatic Turkey, and are a credit to our country. The Mission is also under obligation to government officials in all the countries visited, from whom it has received nothing but courteous assistance in its work."

* Inscribed as Kharput.

** Mentioned as Erzinjan.

*** They talk about a township east of Erzerum.

⁴* I.e. at an altitude of 900, up to 2500 meters.

⁵* Equal to 362,600 square kilometers.

⁶* Sivas had been omitted in this enumeration, although American mission traveled through this Province.

⁷* Or 453,59 grams.

⁸* More than 240 km.

⁹* Fee equal to 1 cent per 10 kilograms a mile.

¹⁰* This particular fragment of the report provides an evidence of the U.S. interest in creation of the regional Confederation. Though, in practice, Transcaucasian Federation of 1918 fell to pieces, open to Turkish invasion, which had been launched in

January-May of the same year. Later, negotiations with this end were conducted in April of 1920 without effect, because Governments in Tiflis, Baku and Yerevan pursued different purposes.

¹¹ Dated October 15, 1919.

№ 256 Condensed memorandum concerning organization and points of view of the League for the defense of the rights of Anatolia and Rumelia*

Sivas, s.d.[September] 1919 r.

US NA, RG 256, 184.02102/5/Exhibit C; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.875-885

...“VI. We entertain no unfriendly dispositions toward the Armenian Republic of which Erivan is the center. For the present the League has no relations with this State and is not interested in it. Our knowledge concerning it derived from rumours and indirect information. We know, however, ...that the Armenians in the new State are carrying on operations in view of exterminating the Musulman element in obedience to orders from the Armenian corps commander. We have had copies of their orders. ...And this policy of [extermination against the Musulmans] had spread right up to our frontier, [it] is also established by the fact of presence within our borders of numerous Musulmans fleeing from death on the other side. The government of Erivan... practise of gunfire this side of the border. ...

The English encourage on the one hand the Armenians in the attitude adopted by them against the Musulmans or even stirred them up to it and, on the other hand, enumerating to us the outrages of the former and describing them as unbearable, they urged us to retaliate by attacking the neighboring State. But we, putting up with the Armenian provocations turned a deaf ear to the indignations of the English, feeling sure that the truth would make itself known soon enough. We thought we could detect in the attitude of the English trying to launch upon an attack against Armenia, the plan of creating a situation of which they would avail themselves to despatch their own troops into that country. All these maneuvers of the English were started by their officers and representatives after they saw themselves obliged to evacuate Caucasia.

We hear that conflicts are taking place between Azerbaijane and the Erivan Armenians. We presume that the reason for

this is the refusal of the Armenians to join the alliance concluded between the Azerbaijanese and the Georgians against England's protégé, A. Denikin, who is trying to push southward.

It is quite natural, that the Musulmans of Erzeroum and Van, and more particularly those among them living in the borders regions should have reached a high state of excitement as a result of the news reaching them daily of the massacres in Armenia and the sight of the unfortunate refugees having escaped death and whose condition is lamentable. ...But our organization has succeeded in appeasing them and all likelihood of violent reaction... has been averted.

VII. Refraining from going to the assistance of the unfortunate Musulman population in Armenia and from collaborating with the Musulmans of Azerbaijan, we consider it indispensable to confine... to the task of ensuring the future existence and welfare of the... Nation, within the borders already defined. We are... convinced that Turanianism is a mischievous conception. [We do not want to] pursuit chimeras a long distance from our frontiers, [thus] we will only weaken the strength we require for defending the seat of the Throne and Caliphate. ...

Quite recent events... have taught us to remain faithful to moderate conceptions. ...During the general war, which has not yet ended in peace, the man at the head of our government employed the Ottoman forces to attain... the conquest of Caucasia, the strengthening of the Azerbaijan government and the recovery of Egypt. As a result... the very source of life in our Fatherland, the population has diminished considerably. Many fertile and otherwise valuable lands have been wrested from us and even within the frontiers we have assigned to ourselves as our last future, our Capital, ...Smyrna, Adalia and Adana are under foreign military occupation. ...If we had wisely employed our forces with a view to defending our territory within its existing borders, ...our situation... would be different from what it is. In any case the spreading of the preposterous report that Turanianism forms part of our aims and action is but another instance of the calumnies in which the English indulge at our expense.

VIII. With a view to distorting the true, that is the purely national character of our movement, the English have also thrown into circulation reports to the effect that we have obtained money now from the Germans or bolshevists, now from the foreign

Musulmans or unionists, now again from Enver Pasha and we do not know who else. These reports suiting the Ferid Pasha cabinet, it is... strengthening them. In reality our League has no connection whatsoever with the sources just mentioned. ...Our object is purely national... and follows an open course. To accept money from any source whatsoever, it is necessary... to sacrifice the money thus received to the intentions of the donors. ...

Our League does not require as large sums of money as is imagined. ...Our treasury is the conscience of the nation which has learnt to appreciate the value of independence and patriotism. The sources of our revenues are the spontaneous donations of the nation.

IX. After the Armistice the European Powers fell into the mistake of imagining that in Turkey there was not a nation. ...The idea was entertained... of distributing [our lands] as presents right and left. ...These preposterous decisions, which were calculated to plunge humanity in new tragedies, have been deferred. ...The decisive resolutions concerning our fate have been made dependent on the deliberations and decisions of the American Congress. ...The American Nation brought about the end of the general war, which has soaked the soil of the globe with human blood and strewn it with human corpses. ...

We entertain an unshaken confidence that thanks to the humane decisions of the Americans the ground will be found for the establishment of an enduring and perfect peace. ...The American Nation and the American Congress... have been sufficiently enlightened in regard to our... people... and will adopt the most efficient, equitable and practical resolutions concerning its fate, leaving us, thus, overflowing with gratitude.

X. ...As for the Ottoman State, it dates from seven centuries and can boast a glorious past and history. ...Our men of war and merchantmen sailed the oceans and carried our flag as far as India. Our... power [we once wielded]... had become world-wide. But during the last century, the intrigues of the European Powers in our Capital and... their interferences with our independence, the restrictions with which they trammled our economic life, the seeds of discord they sowed between us and the non-Moslem elements with which we had been living on fraternal terms for centuries, and added to these circumstances the weakness and resulting misrule of our governments have acted as obstacles to

our advance in the paths of modern progress and prosperity. The painful condition which is ours today does not in the least imply any radical incapacity on our part or incompatibility with modern civilization. It is solely due to the persistence of the adverse causes enumerated above.

We can give the most positive assurances that our country, if freed from the incubus of foreign intrigue and intervention and if its affairs are managed by a capable government respectful of the National will and wishes, it will presently assume a condition, which will be a source of satisfaction to the whole world. We make a special point of adding that the assistance of a powerful and impartial foreign nation will be of great value to us in saving us from the iniquitous oppression of which we are the victims and in hastening our development.

We derive great hope from the Wilsonian Doctrine... and from the spirit of justice and humanitarianism displayed by the American nation in its action to ensure its triumph. M.Kemal."

* Attached to the telegram by J.Harbord of October 16, 1919.

№ 257 memorandum by the member of the military mission to Armenia Lieutenant Colonel J.P.Jackson - to the chief of the mission Major General J.Harbord

on board U.S.S. "Martha Washington," October 21, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/347, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

"...b) Information already submitted to you by report indicates that during the coming year not less than 50 millions of dollars will be required to prevent starvation and acute exposure and to repatriate the great bulk of the refugees.

c) It is believed that the greater part of the repatriation of the refugees should be accomplished by the end of the coming year and that production will have been brought to a more normal level. This will make unnecessary any great amount of general maintenance of the population. But continued support of the orphans will be essential if they are not turned over to the governments of the region.

It is believed that there are now approximately 50,000 orphans for which America has made herself responsible, and which must be maintained in orphanages or the equivalent. It is further believed that by the end of the first year this number will be reduced to 40,000 by reasons of their being of sufficient age for

self-support, or by having been placed where special relief is not needed from the outside. The maintenance of the orphans per month has been estimated by representatives of the American relief forces at \$6.00 per month. This, however, does not include clothing and general expenses. It is probable, therefore, that \$100.00 per year would not be an unreasonable minimum estimate for the annual cost of each one. If it is assumed that the relief funds must provide the facilities for the education of the orphans, another material item of expense arises. It is believed that 3 millions of dollars for teachers and a million dollars for providing or preparing buildings would cover this expense. It is assumed in this statement that the teachers will receive reasonable pay and will not be placed upon the missionary basis at present existing, and also that the bulk of the buildings required could be requisitioned from the present generous supply of military barracks to be found throughout the region, or from other sources. The total cost of the orphans then for the first year would amount to not less than 8 millions of dollars. To this it is believed that 5 millions should be added for other forms of relief, making a total of 13 millions.

d) From the end of the second year on, ...the average number of orphans will have dropped to 25,000 though some having reached the age of self-support and otherwise.* The provision of teachers, orphans and maintenance for these orphans may be estimated at about 4,5 million per year, or for the three years say 14 millions of dollars.

e) During the following five years it is not unlikely that the orphans will have dropped to an average of as low as 10,000, and that the expense would be less than one million of dollars.

The total amount for the 10 years would thus lie between 85 and 95 millions of dollars. ... [hand-written signature:] John Price Jackson."

* Otherwise meant not only children's mortality but also a possibility to find the lost kindred.

№ 258 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five
of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, November 1, 1919, 10:00

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/80; Paris, vol.VIII, p.845-872

"1. Powers of General G.Milne in Asia Minor.

The Council had before it a note from the British Delegation dated October 28, 1919.

E.Crowe: ...The Council had appointed , at some prior time, General G.Milne as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in Asia Minor: It seemed that neither the French nor the Italian authorities had been informed of the decision of the Council.

S.Pichon: ...The British Delegation had said that the *General Officer commanding* the British troops at Constantinople and in Asia Minor (Syria excepted) had been appointed *Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces* in those regions. This assertion was *correct, as far as Turkey in Asia was concerned*, but the question of the command at Constantinople was the object of negotiations between the British and French Governments.

E.Crowe agreed." ...

№ 259 telegram from the chief of American mission in Paris F.Polk - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Paris, November 3, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 184.021/355, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

"Major General [J.]Harbord and staff returning to the United States on board of the U.S.S. "Martha Washington," sailed from Brest, Saturday, November first. Would appreciate if Department would arrange for free entry for the General and staff, if consider it proper and advisable."

№ 260 letter from Chairman of the Armenian National Delegation Boghos Nubar - to its representative in London J.Malcolm

Paris, November 6, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/31/App.305/Encl./Subencl.; Paris, vol.X, p.659-660

""[For] James A.Malcolm: I had today a very important conversation with Colonel W.Haskell, who expects to return to the Caucasus after handing in his report to the Conference, so as to be there before the end of the month. He does not think there is any reason to fear an attack of the Turkish forces of Mustapha Kemal during the winter. But he asks for equipment to clothe 20,000-30,000 Armenian troops who are defending the frontiers.

These troops, which are ill clad, would not be able to endure the cold and would be compelled to abandon the frontier line and take refuge in the towns if they were not supplied with warm clothing.

Colonel W.Haskell also asks that the supply of 7,000 tons of flour which has been delivered each month thanks to H.Hoover's administration, and which is to come to an end owing to lack of funds, may be continued until the harvest next August. These 7,000 tons are at present supplying the 300,000 refugees from Turkey and a considerable part of the population. There are only sufficient supplies for one month, and if some means of continuing deliveries is not found, the result will inevitably be a famine and the extermination of 700,000 more Armenians. The matter is extremely urgent. He has telegraphed to America to give information of the gravity of the situation and to request the immediate steps may be taken. He also asked us to telegraph and A.Aharonian and I at once sent very urgent telegrams.

Colonel W.Haskell undertakes to receive all clothing and other articles purchased with the funds obtained from the Andranik [Ozarian] subscription, and to have them distributed to the refugees under his personal supervision. All packages must be addressed to him exactly thus: Colonel Haskell, Near East Relief, Batum.

This address is very important as everything addressed either to private persons in the Caucasus or to the Government of the Armenian Republic is held up at Batum by the Georgians and does not reach its destination. It would also be well to advise Major D.MacSweeney in advance of each new dispatch. Major D. MacSweeney is Colonel W.Haskell's agent at Batum."

№ 261 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, November 8, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/87; Paris, vol.IX, p.35-73

"E.Venizelos: Certainly the longer the question [of the complete pacification of Turkey] was dragged out the more financial difficulties would increase for a small country such as Greece. She had an army of 12 divisions of 325,000 men; an army stronger than it was at the time of the Armistice. He felt assured that if the Conference should charge Greece with the task of defeating

Turkey she would be able to do so.

G.Clemenceau: He had put the question the other way.

E.Venizelos: With 12 divisions he had nothing to fear. Mustapha Kemal only had 70,000 men. It was evident that if the present situation was unduly prolonged, but he hoped that would not be the case."

№ 262 letter from representative of the Armenian National Delegation in Lodon J.Malcolm - to Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain C.Hardinge

London, November 8, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/31/App.305/Encl.; Paris, vol.X, p. 659

"Sir, I have the honor to enclose herewith copy of letter I have received this morning from H.E. Nubar Pasha giving particulars of his interview with Colonel W.Haskell. Colonel W.Haskell's view are doubtless already known to you but they indicate such a serious prospect in Armenian that I venture to express the confident hope that His Majesty's Government will once more extend their generous assistance to avert the calamity with which such a vast number of Armenians are still threatened." ...

№ 263 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, November 10, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/88; Paris, vol.IX, p.74-93

"F.Polk asked if General G.Milne had not made it clear that this proposed advance would necessarily mean further fighting between the Greeks and Turks.

E.Crowe: Affirmative.

F.Polk: ...His Government had no troops to send, therefore although he could not unconditionally object to this solution, his Government did not wish to assent thereto and felt that it must decline all responsibility.

E.Crowe: It had been found impossible to find French or British troops to occupy this territory, but he hoped... that M.G. Clemenceau might once more examine the possibility of sending French troops.

G.Clemenceau: ...He felt that he would not be successful inasmuch as France had no troops to spare. He thought it was no use for the Council to shut its eyes to the fact that the Turks would continue to harass the Greeks. ...

F.Polk: His Government could do nothing to help the situation by sending troops. But he wished to put himself on record as insisting that any further difficulties or fighting in Asia Minor would certainly make the ultimate settlement of the Turkish question more difficult. ...He felt that any decision which would necessarily bring them into closer and further armed contact was bad." ...

№ 264 memorandum by the Executive Committee of Near East Relief A.J.Hemphill, H.Morgenthau, J.R.Mott, C.E.Beury, S.White, A.I.Elkus, C.V.Vickrey - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

New York, November 11, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 860J.48/8; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.821-823

"I. Memoranda

1. Our Committee, having recently received full detailed reports from our relief commissioners, who have personally visited and investigated conditions in practically every important centre in the Near East, are deeply impressed with the continued destitution among the subject races of the Near East, due in large measure to the delay in concluding the Treaty of Peace and consequent lack of stable government under which these people, after four years of exile, can return to their homes and resume self-support.

2. Colonel William N.Haskell, USA, as High Commissioner for Armenia, appointed by the President, reports in a recent cable:

"Estimate 800,000 Armenians destitute, most of whom will require assistance until the fall harvest next year. Estimate will need 7.000 tons wheat flour or equivalent monthly, beginning December 1st. In addition one cargo child-feeding supplies to arrive December 1st to supplement diet for 150,000 children for succeeding three month."

In a cable received November 10th from Colonel Haskell, he says in part:

"700,000 destitute kept alive by Hoover program; will perish from starvation unless program is continued with direct cargo each month at value of million and a quarter dollars each. No

foodstuffs available in Caucasus to replace this flour. Eleven million dollars flour, etc. furnished by Hoover since last April will have been furnished in vain unless program is immediately forthcoming - most vital requirement is continuation of Hoover's program from some source. Only dependable source at present is United States."

3. It is a matter of well-authenticated record that tens of thousands of these people died last spring of sheer starvation due to the failure of ourselves and other Allies to get sufficient food into the country. The article in the November number of the "National Geographic Magazine" entitled "The Land of Stalking Death" is but one of the many gruesome accounts of the ravages of famine last spring. One of our own commissioners, Dr. John H. T. Main, President of Grinnell College, reported from personal observation 192 bodies, victims of starvation, taken from the streets of one town in one day, which he had reason to believe was below the daily average of that town, and there were other towns where the famine was reported as even more severe.

4. With the resources of the people further depleted by the lapse of a year since the armistice, without established government and with the food supply known to be practically exhausted, there is every reason to fear and expect that during the winter months immediately ahead there will be an even more tragic and serious famine than the one of last year.

Colonel Haskell, as well as officers of the American Relief Administration, report that the present food supply cannot last much, if any, beyond December 1st. Captain Chadwick of the American Relief Administration, who was just returned from six months' service with the American Relief Administration in Armenia says he does not see how twenty-five per cent of the people can survive through the coming winter if help is not given from outside.

5. Near East Relief, now incorporated by special act of Congress (formerly known as "The American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief" and "The American Committee for Relief in the Near East") has administered for relief in this general area more than \$30,000,000 of volunteer contributions from the American public. The Committee has made a recent appropriation of \$1,500,000 to aid Colonel Haskell in the Caucasus, and other large disbursements that completely exhaust, in fact, temporarily

overdraw the Committee's treasury.

7. It is evident that the task of saving these people and sustaining them until their status can be determined by the Peace Conference, or until the harvest of 1920, when they can be restored to self-support, is too great for private philanthropy alone, although private philanthropy may help both to secure funds and maintain public interest. Moreover, there are now other than purely financial problems involved, such as additional rolling stock and the insuring to Colonel Haskell as Commissioner of the Allied Powers, a sufficient measure of control over the railroad from Batum to Erivan, through Tiflis to make relief work effective.

II. Requests

We, therefore, venture on purely humanitarian grounds, without any reference or commitment to any future political or international program, to suggest and request:

1. That the Department recommend to the President that he authorize the United States Grain Corporation to sell to the Armenian Republic, to the Armenian National Delegation, to Near East Relief, or to whatever other agency can most economically and effectively administer relief to the starving and meet the legal requirements, such grain or other foodstuffs as may be needed to prevent further famine, and that the Grain Corporation be authorized to accept in payment for such grain or foodstuffs the bonds or other obligation of the Armenian Republic and the Armenian National Delegation in the same manner as similar obligations were accepted prior to June 30th by the United States Treasury for grain and flour delivered through the American Relief Administration.

2. That the department recommend to the United States Congress the immediate passage, on humanitarian grounds, without commitment to any political or international program, such bill or resolution as will most effectively protect the Armenians from further unnecessary suffering or decimation, and that Congress by such bill or resolution make available sufficient funds to buy food, foodstuffs, clothing and other provisions, which, under the administration of Colonel Haskell, may help to keep these people alive until their political status is determined by the Peace Conference.

Near East Relief, incorporated by special act of Congress, August 1919, "To provide relief to the dependent people of the

Near East" and under its charter accountable to Congress for "A full and itemized accounting of all receipts and expenditures," has no interest in this matter other than a purely humanitarian desire to relieve suffering and prevent famine. The Board's one dominant desire is to save the people by whatever agency can do it most effectively.

The Board does, however, have at the present time over 500 American citizens, aside from organized native helpers, administering relief in the Near East, and the Board will continue to send to this relief work such funds as it may be able to secure from its regular contributors and friends throughout the United States and to a limited extent from other countries.

If Near East Relief can be of any assistance to the Department or Government in this distinctively humanitarian service to our less fortunate allies, the personnel and machinery of the organization will be at the service of the Government."

№ 265 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five
of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, November 12, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/90; Paris, vol.IX, p.121-140

"F.Polk called attention of the Council to a paragraph of the draft note authorizing the Greeks to advance. ...It should be remembered that any further advance meant fighting between the Greeks and Turks. ...He therefore wished to ask if the Council deemed it advisable to assume the responsibility for such further conflict.

E.Crowe: [But] that meant letting the Turks to occupy this region.

G.Clemenceau inquired if the Italians were far distant from the Greeks in this region.

G.de Martino: They were not; the Italian forces were within six hundred meters of the [Greek] line. ...

G.Clemenceau: The Greeks could be left [in their place], but they should not be allowed to advance.

F.Polk asked if General G.Milne himself had not said that a farther advance by the Greeks would inevitably result in serious trouble.

E.Crowe: ...General G.Milne had rather said that he *would be willing to authorize* a further *advance*, if the Council was pre-

pared for the fact that such an advance would mean encountering armed opposition. General G.Milne had favoured that advance on strategic grounds.

G.Clemenceau: ...He agreed with Mr.F.Polk that if the Council ordered a further advance it would be in a position of creating further trouble.

F.Polk: *He could not agree* to a letter authorizing the Greeks to advance in view of the fact that the authorities on the spot had said that trouble would certainly ensue. ...

E.Crowe: The only alternative was to let in the Turks who would then unquestionably start to massacre the Greeks.

F.Polk asked if Sir E.Crowe felt convinced of this?

E.Crowe: He did.

F.Polk: His personal view was that if this line of action were followed all Asia Minor would eventually have to be occupied.

G.Clemenceau suggested that the Greeks be left at [the spot] but that they be not authorized to advance further.

This was agreed to.

G.de Martino: ...According to a telegram which he had received, ...English troops were reported to be ready to advance [there]. ...

E.Crowe: The British arrangement had been made in contemplation of Inter-Allied occupation. As no French troops could be sent [there]he thought that the British troops would likewise not approach."

№ 266 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, November 15, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/93; Paris, vol.IX, p.175-186

"3. Extension to Georgia and Azerbaijan of the mission already entrusted to Colonel W.Haskell for Armenia.

Mr.F.Polk read the resolution adopted by the Supreme Council on July 5th on the subject of Colonel W.Haskell's mission. He proposed to add after the word "Armenia" the words, "Georgia and Azerbaijan." The Council had heard at the preceding meeting Colonel W.Haskell's declarations. He simply wished to submit this proposal to the Council without insisting that it should be adopted.

E.Crowe: He had submitted this question to his Government. He thought he could already say that they would not object to the

extension of Colonel W.Haskell's mission *for the organization of relief* in Georgia and Azerbaijan. He would, however, call to the attention of the Council the fact that in the resolution which had just been read Colonel W.Haskell was entitled High Commissioner. He wished to make his reservation on that title all the more so as he did not think that it corresponded with the functions with which Colonel W.Haskell had been entrusted.

F.Polk: As the British were already represented in those regions, he proposed that Sir Eyre Crowe be good enough to submit a draft resolution at a later meeting.

G.de Martino: The Italians also had officers in the Caucasus. He would therefore consult his military experts, but he could already say that he was in favour of the American proposition.

It was decided: "that Sir Eyre Crowe, after consultation with the competent experts, would put before the Council a draft resolution extending the powers already conferred upon Colonel W.Haskell for Armenia to include Georgia and Azerbaijan in matters concerning relief work."

№ 267 letter from the Foreign Office employee G.Spicer -
to the British Council Officer of Supreme Economic Council

London, Foreign Office, November 15, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/31/App.305; Paris, vol.X, p.658-660

"Sir: With reference to the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Economic Council in Rome on the 22nd instant, I am directed by Earl G.Curzon of Kedleston to transmit herewith copy of a letter from Mr. James Malcolm* with enclosures from Boghos Nubar Pasha,** relating to the situation of the Armenians in the Caucasus.

While Lord G.Curzon understands that the Relief Funds at the disposal of the Supreme Economic Council which could properly be applied to purposes of Armenian relief are exhausted, His Lordship considers it in the highest degree desirable that the urgent necessity of doing something to succor the Armenians in the Caucasus, of whom there are understood to be 30,000 refugees from Asia Minor alone in addition to the Armenian inhabitants, should be brought to the attention of the Supreme Economic Council.

Lord G. Curzon would point out that the *destitute condition of these unfortunate people is to a large extent the consequence of the regrettable though unavoidable delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey* which prevents the re-establishment of settled conditions throughout Anatolia, which on humanitarian ground, cannot be exaggerated, and the responsibility, for which must to some extent be borne by the Allies themselves." ...

* See the letter from J. Malcolm of November 8, 1919.

** See the letter from Boghos Nubar dated November 6, 1919.

№ 268 telegram № 3796 from the Secretary of State R. Lansing -
to the Commission to Negotiate Peace, for F. Polk, W. Haskell
Washington, November 17, 1919
US NA, RG 59, 860J.48/5b:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol. II, p.
824

"President authorized Julius H. Barnes, United States Wheat Director and President Grain Corporation to sell to the Armenian Government on credit or otherwise 35,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour. Haskell please inform Erivan."

№ 269 records of a meeting № 31 of the Supreme Economic Council at the Paris Peace Conference

Rome, November 21-23, 1919, 15:00; 10:00 and 15:00; 11:00
US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/31; Paris, vol. X, p. 623-624
"336. Situation in Armenia.

A letter with enclosures from the British Foreign Office stating the present deplorable situation of Armenian refugees in the Caucasus, was submitted to the Council by the British delegation.

After discussion, the following resolution, proposed by the British delegation, was agreed for transmission to the Supreme Council: "The Supreme Economic Council, having made careful note of the representations of Earl G. Curzon in regard to the present unhappy conditions prevailing among the Armenians, desires to place on record its sympathy with the Armenians and to express its regret that it has no resources from which the relief of Armenian necessities could be effected. The Supreme Economic Council is of the opinion that the relief of Armenian distress is as in the case of Austria a matter of concern not alone to the Powers represented on the Supreme Economic Council, but to all the

civilized peoples of the world." ...

№ 270 telegram № 3906 from the Secretary of State R.Lansing -
to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace

Washington, November 27, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/7808:Telegram; Paris, vol.XI, p.
672-673

"In view of the failure of the Senate to ratify the Treaty the President feels that you should withdraw immediately the American representatives on all Commissions growing out of or dependent on either the Peace Conference or the Treaty except those dealing with Reparations Commission which are being further considered by the President." ...

№ 271 telegram № 5468 from the head of American Commission
to Negotiate Peace F.Polk - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Paris, November 29, 1919

US NA, RG 59, 861.00/1175a:Telegram; Paris, vol.XI, p.675-
677

"...At D.Lloyd George's request had a long and very interesting conversation with him on Monday.* I repeated all my conversation to J.W.Davis and will report here in general points touched on by the Prime Minister. ...

2. Turkey. He and G.Curzon both told me that they are most anxious to have a settlement of the Turkish question at the earliest possible moment. They see a grave danger in letting the situation run any longer. He assumes that we will not take a mandate on any terms and expressed keen regret as he said that was the only real solution of the Turkish question. ...[He] is apparently not unwilling that the Italians should have a sphere of influence in southern Anatolia, but as to this I am not certain. He realizes, as we here do, that the French are anxious to keep Constantinople and Asia Minor intact and rather hope for a mandate for themselves. ...It is apparent that the English have not made up their minds in regard to Mesopotamia. It is an expense to keep a large army there and they fear complications with the Kurds and ultimately with Russia. I think they would be willing, if there was any objection on the part of other governments to their actually

taking Mesopotamia, merely to take a mandate for that territory. They wish to hold the Turkish conference immediately, but, as you know, the French are apparently unwilling for some reason to proceed. It has been suggested that the French wished to wait until after the senatorial elections in January. He asked who would negotiate for us and I told him that of course it dependent on the action of the Senate, but that I personally hoped we would have nothing to do with it. He said it would be a calamity if we did not participate. ...*As to Armenia, he does not see any necessity for a separate mandate.* ...

* On November 24, 1919.

№ 272 telegram from the Allied High Commissioner
in Armenia Colonel W.Haskell - to chairman of Paris Peace
Conference G.Clemenceau

Tiflis, December 1, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/113/App.C; Paris, vol.IX, p.606-607

"An agreement has been signed between the Armenians and Tartars* by Premiers A.Khatisian (Armenia) and N.Usubbekov (Azerbaijan).

The Agreement provides:

"(1) The Governments pledge themselves to stop the present hostilities and not to resort again to force arms.

(2) They agree to open roads into Zangezur to peaceful traffic.

(3) All controversies, including borders, are to be settled by peaceful agreement, or, failing this, are to be left to a neutral party as arbitrator, said party to be the High Commissioner.

(4) An International Conference was called to discuss all questions causing dispute or friction, the delegates being given full authority to settle same by agreement or arbitration.

(5) Agreement effective as of dates on which they are signed."

In view of above developments believe peace can be kept in the Caucasus if the menace of military operations against Transcaucasia by volunteer army is removed.

A.Denikin has recalled his Missions from both Georgia and Azerbaijan. The possibility of his attacking Azerbaijan through Daghestan virtually forces Azerbaijan to seek Turkish aid. As it

recommended, if it is believed advisable, after considering this matter from other standpoints, that the Peace Conference define the boundaries of A.Denikin's activities with reference to the Caucasus, at least until the final decision of the Caucasus question is reached. The limits recommended to such activities should follow those previously described by the British." ...

* This communication describes an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, signed on November 23, 1919. See: US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/180/Encl.7 and NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 282, f.35-36; published in: Нагорный Карабах в 1918-1923 гг. Сб.док.и мат., под ред.В.А.Микаеляна. Ереван, АН Армении, 1992, с.352-353; Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը 1918-1920թթ.: (Քաղաքական պատմություն): Խմբ.Գ.Գալոյան, Վ.Դազախեցյան: Փաստաթղթերի և նյութերի ժողովածու: Եր., Գիտություն, 2000, էջ 140-141 (subsequently: Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը, քաղաքական պատմություն):

№ 273 telegram № 101 from the U.S. High Commissioner M.Bristol - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Constantinople, December 4, 1919 (received December 6)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/158:Telegram; Papers 1919, vol.II, p.

889

"There have been no massacres in Caucasus since last June when about 600 Armenians were [massacred] near Shusha,* and July when estimated 5.000 Armenians massacred Nakhichevan.** Usually Armenians gave provocation. Shusha massacre was reprisal for attack by Armenians upon Tartar shepherds near Goris.*** Nakhichevan massacre was reprisal for expulsions of Tartars from district 40 miles back from railway. Zangezur district also very much aggravated by British policy first placing this district, February 1919, under Azerbaijan^{4*} and later, just about the time British began evacuation, her policy was changed and local Armenian council was permitted to govern Zangezur and final evacuation left this question unsettled.^{5*} It looks now as if attack on Armenia by Azerbaijan had for object forcing Armenia into agreement with Georgia and Azerbaijan against A.Denikin especially as this has been desired for a long time. This seems most probable from Colonel J.Rhea having requested Peace Conference to define boundary A.Denikin activities so as to protect Caucasus. This may be secret presented through State agreement in Caucasus. ...After personal conference here with W.Haskell we have

arranged close liaison for keeping each other fully informed thereby assisting each other as much as possible."

* In full view of the British troops, Azerbaijani Army, with the assistance of local gangs, had arranged on June 4-7, 1919, an on-slaught on Shushi and neighbouring villages Ghaibalishen (on June 5), Krkzhan, Pahloul and Jamilli. M.Bristol reiterates a record of investigation, compiled on the spot by the representative of the British Mission in Shushi Lieutenant Colonel C.Clutterbuck for the Foreign Office and the War Office. His account dealt with a number of murdered peasants, and it was ascertained that 600 persons had been killed in Ghaibalishen alone.

** The preposition "*in* Nakhichevan" is ambiguously omitted in this telegram. The very fact that Armenians were *targets* of mugging, is confirmed by the subordinate clause concerning the railway. This mode of presentation had been adopted by M.Bristol since his letter to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, dispatched to Paris on August 4, 1919 (US NA, RG 256, 867B.00/205; RG 59, 861.00/938). It is then, that chief of the U.S. Mission in Tiflis B.Moore had complained after conversations with the Rear Admiral in Constantinople, that his interlocutor, being at the same time a Commissioner, distorted B.Moore's reports and advanced only those statements which he liked. Such kind of selectivity covered prospects of creation of the consolidated Armenian State as well as the issue of Nakhichevan.

It should be observed that after withdrawal of Turkish forces from Nakhichevan in December of 1918, Azerbaijan asserted his claims up to Etchmiadzin and suburbs of Yerevan (US NA, RG 256, 861K.00/106 F.W.). The Government of Armenia reminded about 54,000 Armenians, along with 81,000 Tartars, Kurds and Sunni Turks, taken together, who lived in the Nakhichevan district in 1916 (US NA, RG 256, 867B.00/10). When the British Army arrived in 1919, it established on January 26 the Military Governorship of Nakhichevan. Later on, in comply with an order, issued by its War Office on February 15, 1919, General K.M.Davie cancelled this Governorship on April 3 of the same year. Afterwards, on May 3, he and D.Kanayan had signed an order For Nakhichevan county, which instructed to unite this region with Armenia (NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 212, f.194; its English translation in: US NA, RG 256, 184.021/15. On May 13 officials of the Republic led by the Governor G.Varshamian, reached Nakhichevan. Act of

reunification had been welcomed in the telegram by the Prime Minister of Persia Vosuq ed-Dowleh. In his turn, Envoy of Azerbaijan in the Republic of Armenia M. Khan Tekinskiy wrote that subject to external non-interference population of Nakhichevan would reconcile with the new state of things (US NA, RG 59, 861.00/6583).

When the British troops had withdrawn from Nachichevan on June 7, 1919, ammunition and money had been directed to this region from Baku and K.Karabekir assigned into the district Colonel Halil Bey, together with 30 Turkish officers. Their activity had been more than once depicted by the U.S. Vice Consul H. Doolittle in dispatches for the Department of State (US NA, RG 59, 861.00/4875; 860J.01/24; RG 84 Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 800, H.Doolittle to State Department, 17, 30, 31.07.1919; RG 256, 867B.00/173, 181, 192-193); as well as in reports by B.Moore addressed to Major R.Tyler, chief of Military Intelligence of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris. Extension and jeopardy of disaster "more terrible than massacres of 1915," had been recorded by chief of the American Relief Administration in the Caucasus Major J.Green, in his dispatch to H.Hoover (document № 159 of this collection).

The fights began on July 4-14, 1919, near Vedi; by July 18 mutiny covered all this region and after attacks, launched on July 22-25, the Armenian garrison together with refugees left the town of Nakhichevan. Diseased and the wounded, patients of local American hospital, with countryfolk of Yamkhana, Tumbulal, Yari-mja, Giultapa, Kiarim Bek, Kyulibek Diza, Alagyaz Mazra, Diduvar, Nazarabad villages felt into invaders' hands (US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/21, 28; RG 84 Tiflis Consulate, 1919, File 800, H.Doolittle to Ammission, 30.07.1919; RG 256, 867B.00/279). British staff of the military mission headed by F.Schwind and American employees of the NER had left the town on July 28. At the same time H.Doolittle, B.Moore, H.Shekerjian, J.Green and Director of the NER in the Caucasus E.Yarrow conveyed on July 23 their joint appeal to Paris and Washington. They had written that the Republic of Armenia was exposed to hunger and external aggression (US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/32). On August 7 A.Aharonian had sent a similar telegram to W.Wilson (NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 355, pt.1, f.15-16).

On September 17-26, 1919, officers of the NER C.Ussher and C.S.Ayer went on inspection tour for the town Nakhichevan-Julfa-Ordubad-Agulis. From the very beginning, during their first stop at the village Khanoukhtar they had revealed that only 2,400 persons out of 7,000 Armenians of this settlement survived. They were gathered in one of the eight places into custody of Turkish soldiers without permit to return home and farm. 10 to 20 souls perished each day from hunger, poverty, sexual abuse, malaria and dysentery. The Americans encountered humiliation inflicted by Colonel Halil in the village of Engija. The latter called W. Wilson an ass and threatened to arrange such a massacre "compared with which occurrences in Nakhichevan (45 villages destroyed and 10,000 massacred), would seem child's play." No Armenian would be admitted to live in Azerbaijan, added Kerbalay Ali Khan on September 19. When C.Ussher returned Yerevan, he inferred: "Under present circumstances it is impossible for either Tartar or Armenian to justly govern the other race" (RG 256, 184.021/285). See more detailed reference in: NAA, fund 199, reg. 1, file 12, f.87, 153; fund 200, reg.1, file 212, f.48 rev.; fund 200, reg.1, file 291, f. 341; fund 200, reg.1, file 357, f.40; fund 201, reg.1, file 171, f.29; Hovannisian R., The Republic of Armenia, vol.I, p.90-91; vol.II, p. 69, 71, 89, 91, 106-108; Նախիջևան-Շարուրը 1918-1921 թթ., էջ 67-68, 102-104, 181-182, 184-186; Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը, քաղաքական պատմություն, էջ 97-98; Զոհրաբյան Է.Ա., Նախիջևանյան հիմնահարցը եւ Հայաստանի «Դաշնակիցները» (1918թ. դեկտեմբեր - 1920թ. ապրիլ): Եր., Տիգրան Մեծ հրատ. տպարան, 2002, էջ 165-166, 172-176:

*** The city is lettered in the text as Gerusi.

^{4*} Less than 65 kilometres.

^{5*} Totally perverse presentation by M.Bristol reiterates a thesis from the telegram by H.Doolittle, B.Moore, H.Shekerjian, E.Yarrow and J.Green of July 23, 1919, addressed to the Secretary of State R.Lansing, to the head of American Mission in Paris F.Polk, H. Hoover and H.Morgenthau, already mentioned in the second comment. The thesis itself had been lettered as follows: "Armed conflicts of importance are still occurring in Armenian districts of Karabagh and Zangezour placed officially under Azerbaijan Government by the British" (US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/32 and RG 256, 184.021/126/Encl.2; see document № 158 of this collection). In fact, the British failed to subdue Zangezur to Baku authorities. This history began on January 15, 1919, when W.Thomson, who

was a Commander of troops in the Northern Persia with accommodation in Baku, had made an attempt to appoint a Governor General in Zangezur. Nevertheless, Government of the Republic of Armenia (on January 26) and Commander of the British forces in Transcaucasia G.Forestier-Walker (on February 19) had cancelled this order. On March 28 W.Thomson, already as a Commander of the 27th Division, had visited Yerevan and admitted there that he put an end to his claims to a territory of Zangezur (NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 244, f.4).

Afterwards, on May 9, 1919, Commander of the Imperial Garrison in Baku General D.Shuttleworth arrived with the same demands in Goris. He was accompanied by the Representative of the Republic of Armenia H.Arghoutian and came across with the Chairman of Zangezur Council S.Melik-Stephanian, members of Presidium A.Shirinian, A.Bakunts, Secretary M.Esayan, A.Shahmazian (see: US NA, RG 256, 184.021/23; RG 256, 184.01602/60). Armenians had not yielded to his blackmail and threats, what was more, they demanded from the General to sign a document that he fulfilled decisions of the Paris Conference, otherwise, that he executed Allied common policy, rather than his own (NAA, fund 200, reg.2, file 37, f.15). D.Shuttleworth had been compelled to wire S.Melik-Stephanian on May 14 that there would not be Azerbaijan administration in Zangezur (NAA, fund 275, reg.5, file 101, f.85 & f.87). At the turn of this month Commander-in-Chief of all British troops in Transcaucasia G.Cory summarized his visit to Yerevan including negotiations with the Council of Ministers; on May 31 he had written to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia H.Kajaznuni: "I am proceeding to Baku, and will speak to the Government of Azerbaijan to limit their zone of action in the disputed district, and to inform them that they should refrain from extending their authority to Zangezur" (NAA, fund 275, reg. 5, file 101, f.34). Later on, when British detachments had been withdrawn from Transcaucasia; and there had never been any British soldiers in Zangezur, the situation in general did not change.

See in detail: Нагорный Карабах в 1918-1923 гг., с.230; Махмурия Г.Г., Политика Великобритании в Армении и Закавказье в 1918-1920 гг. Бремя белого человека. Ереван, Лусакн, 2002, с.70-72; она же, Губернаторство Карабах-Зангезур и британская политика 1918-1919 гг. в Карабахе. В кн.: Շուշիի հայրը

քաղաքակրթության օրրան: Եր., Գիտություն, 2007, էջ 150-174.

^{6*} At a moment when British troops had been withdrawn from Transcaucasia, M.Khan Tekinskiy had as usual appealed on August 3 to his Government "to take advantage of the moment" and "to put an end to Zangezur" (NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 427, pt.1, f.210).

№ 274 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five
of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, December 6, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/108; Paris, vol.IX, p.504-516

"1. The Council had before it 5 resolutions passed at meetings of the Supreme Economic Council in Rome.

L.Loucheur: ...With regard to the situation of the Armenian refugees in the Caucasus, the Supreme Economic Council wished to bring the attention of the Supreme Council to the great importance of providing for the provisioning of those refugees and he understood that the Armenians had applied to the American Delegation direct. He wished to ask Mr. F.Polk what could be done in the matter.

Colonel J.A.Logan: A telegram from Mr. H.Hoover had been received to the effect that an arrangement had been entered into with the Grain Corporation to supply 35,000 tons of cereals on credit to Armenia, to be distributed under Colonel W.Haskell's supervision. Furthermore, the American red Cross had given 1,700,000 dollars for relief purposes."

№ 275 resolution of the Supreme Economic Council -
in the Council of Five

Paris, December 6, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/108/App.A; Paris, vol.IX, p.509

"The Supreme Economic Council having taken note of the affirmations of Lord G.Curzon relative to the critical situation actually existing in Armenia, [is] desirous to show its sympathy for the Armenians and to express its regret that it has no available resources to offer assistance to Armenia.* ...

* * *

The Supreme Economic Council deems it opportune to indicate to the presidency of the Conference in Paris the increasing danger to which the economic life all the Allied countries is exposed by the delay in the exchange of the Peace Treaty ratifications."

* Following is the text from the document № 269.

№ 276 secretary's notes of a meeting of the International Council of Allied Premiers

London, December 12, 1919, 11:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03801/2; Paris, vol.IX, p.841-852

"2. Russia.

D.Lloyd George: In the House of Commons he had ventured to say that at their next Conference the Allied and Associated Powers would consider the question of Russia. He felt that they ought to have a common policy. He had spoken to M. G.Clemenceau on the subject the previous day, and M. G.Clemenceau's views had been so much in accord with his own that he would ask him to recapitulate them.

G.Clemenceau: ...They agreed at almost every point. He thought that all were agreed that there could be no peace in Europe so long as Russia remained in her present state of anarchy, disorder, robbery, crime and revolt. This was a danger not only to Russia herself, but to the whole world, all were convinced of the truth of this. Intervention had been tried by every means - men, supplies and money - with the object of setting up a stable Government. Up to now no result had been achieved. The anti-Bolshevist elements had proved insufficient. ...it was certain that up to now Allied policy had not succeeded. ...A.Kolchak had retired, ...and his troops were in deplorable conditions. Then the Allies had believed in A.Denikin; and great efforts had been made in his support by Great Britain and, to some extent, also by France. A.Denikin, however, was now retiring. It therefore seemed useless to continue on this lines, and he would suggest making, as it were, a barber wire entanglement round Russia in order to prevent her from creating trouble outside, and in order to stop Germany from entering into relations with Russia, whether of a political or military character. This was not such a difficult policy to carry out. The stories which had been circulated of an enor-

mous army in Germany were, he believed, entirely fanciful. ... There was some evidence that Germany was in danger of a civil war. ...This might end in a revolution. ...He would give up all idea of further direct intervention in Russia. All efforts in this direction would prove wasteful. ...It merely led people to believe that we had an honest desire to resuscitate the ancient regime in Russia.

...D.Lloyd George: On the previous day he did expressed his full agreement with M. G.Clemencenau. Great Britain had spent about £100,000,000 in Russia, ...mainly in support of General A. Denikin. This sum included the last "packet" of J15,000,000 to £16,000,000, which would be delivered by the end of March. She had not got much in return for it. The last news was that General A.Denikin had been driven back. ...The situation in South Russia did not look at all satisfactory. So far as the British House of Commons was concerned, and, he believed, so far as France was concerned, these two countries were not prepared to go on helping in a material manner the anti-Bolshevist forces. He did not know how Italy and America regarded this question.

G.Imperiali: thought that Italy was of the same view.

J.W.Davis: ...He thought the United States were not willing to give further assistance.

D.Lloyd George: On the previous day a proposal had been discussed for a Federation of the anti-Bolshevist States. This was of no use unless the Allies were prepared to support the Federation, and such support meant money, guns and equipment. He and M. G.Clemenceau had come to the conclusion that this was not a very helpful expedient. ...He asked if Mr. J.W.Davis had anything to say.

J.W.Davis: ...He believed, that the United States Government would be in accord with what Mr. D.Lloyd George had said. He knew that from the first they had been opposed to military intervention in Russia, and had gone as far as they were willing to go in rendering financial assistance.

G.Curzon: Summed up M. G.Clemenceau's proposals as follows: -

(1) A barbed wire fence, as it were, round Russia, within which the allies should not interfere;

(2) To put an end to contributions of supplies and money for the purpose of upholding or reestablishing order in Russia;

(3) To build up Poland as a barrier against Russia and a check on Germany.

These were accepted by Mr. D.Lloyd George and Signor V. Scialoja, and, so far as he had authority to speak, by Mr. J.W. Davis. ...He hoped, however, that... we should not also withdraw our moral support and take our representatives away." ...

№ 277 secretary's notes of a meeting of the International Council of Premiers

London, December 13, 1919, 16:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03801/3; Paris, vol.IX, p.853-858

"D.Lloyd George: There were two questions which it was very desirable to discuss while M. G.Clemenceau was in London. The first was the Russian question and the second was what arrangements should be made as regards the future of the Peace Conference.

As regards Russia, the question to be decided was what was to be done in regard to giving moneys. ...Further, there was the question of the Caucasian States, and what was to be done if these were attacked by General A.Denikin. ...The fourth point was in connection with the assistance to be given to the border communities, and it was agreed that the allies should give them such assistance in defending their liberties as might be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arose." ...

№ 278 Resolution A "Policy in Russia " - discussed at a meeting of the International Council of Premiers

London, December 13, 1919, 16:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03801/3/Suppl.A; Paris, vol.IX, p.857-858

"1. The Russian policy agreed to at the Conference may be summed up as follows:

Not to enter into any further commitments beyond what have already been promised, ...as to furnish assistance to the anti-Bolshevist elements in Russia, whether in the form of troops, war material, or financial aid; ...each Power to have discretion to leave on the spot all political or other missions which may be attached to the anti-Bolshevist elements; ...and to leave Bolshevist Russia, as it were, within a ring fence. ...

4. As regards the Border Communities with non-Russian populations which have been struggling for freedom and self-government, the allies will give them such assistance in defending their liberties as may be found desirable in the circumstances of each case as it arises."

№ 279 Resolution B "Future of the Peace Conference" - discussed at a meeting of the International Council of Premiers

London, December 13, 1919, 16:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03801/3/Suppl.B; Paris, vol.IX, p.858

"It was agreed that: -

1. The present session of the peace Conference shall come to an end... at latest within a fortnight of the first procès-verbal of the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

2. After the termination of the present session of the peace Conference large questions of policy shall be dealt with by direct communication between the governments themselves, while questions of detail shall be dealt with by a Conference of Ambassadors in Paris.

3. The principles of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey shall be first discussed between the heads of Governments before the Conference meets to consider necessary treaties." ...

№ 280 telegram from the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia L.Evaghouljian - to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia A.Khatisian

Tiflis, December [16], 1919 (received in MFA December 17)

NAA, fund 200, rg.2, file 56, f.13-19

..." During conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia* regarding Mussulmans I referred several times to the General J.Harbord who had visited Armenia in summer. General J.Harbord offered his, or one of his officer's services to the Minister President in order that a basis of the talks with Turkey might be drawn up. ...England, France, Italy and now America too, they by no means treat Moslems with hostility. ...Even Russia is outwardly nice to Turkey nowadays."

* With Eugene Gegechkori.

№ 281 notes of the meeting of the Council of Five
of the Paris Peace Conference

Paris, December 18, 1919, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/113; Paris, vol.IX, p.593-608

"3. Line of Demarcation between the Governments of A. Denikin and the States of Caucasus.

The Council had before it a telegram from Colonel W. Haskell, dated December 1, 1919,* transmitted by the American Delegation.

J.Cambon: Asked whether the American Delegation supported Colonel W.Haskell's proposal.

H.Wallace: It *did not*, but was contented with transmitting it; Colonel W.Haskell, he would add, had acted in this matter as an Interallied representative.

E.Crowe: He feared that if Colonel W.Haskell's proposal were adopted, it would create serious difficulties. ...If the line [of the zone assigned to General A.Denikin] were changed, they would be raising a wasp's nest. ...They had no authority over General A.Denikin. How could they tell him that he must retire beyond a new line which would be fixed by them? If he refused to obey, how could the Council enforce its decisions? The whole problem of the Caucasus was involved, and... they exercised over it no. ...They should leave things as they were; though of course, he was quite ready to draw the attention of his Government to that proposal.

G.de Martino: The W.Haskell proposal had made an extremely favorable impression on him. It was calculated to protect from troubles and disorders of all kinds a region most important for them, economically speaking. They knew what guerilla warfare meant as practised in those countries, and what ruins it accumulated. It would be to the advantage of those territories to fix a limit to the advance of the Denikin Army. ...

E.Crowe: In his opinion the difficulties were greater than Mr. G.de Martino seemed to think. General A.Denikin actually occupied the territories in question; they would therefore have to drive him out. ...

J.Cambon: Said they would therefore adjourn the discussion until such time as they should have more complete information.

The discussion was then adjourned." ...

* See text of this telegram slightly above.

№ 282 telegram from the Allied High Commissioner at Constantinople, sent by J.-A. DeFrance - to the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference*

Constantinople, December 23, 1919

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/122/App.H/Encl.; Paris, vol.IX, p.800-802

"The High Commissioners are trying to assure the execution of Art.23 of the Armistice and to prevent, as much as possible, the resumption of enemy trade in Turkey.

For this purpose, they have taken measures, ...prohibiting the importation in Turkey of all goods loaded on a German ship or in a German port. But this prohibition is not sufficient. The Germans have promptly found means to evade it, by sending their goods from Allied or neutral ports and in Allied or neutral ships. Therefore it is necessary to take some other measures. ...

The High Commissioners propose (two) solutions.

(1) Impose on the German products, destined to Turkey, ... importation duties. ...

(2) Publish a notice that no goods of German origin shall be received in Turkey, whatever may be the nationality of their owner, the port of embarkation and the nationality of the transporting ship. This measure would be most efficacious, ...but its application would be difficult. ...It should be notified that... the agents of the navigation Companies... should declare, upon their arrival in a Turkish port, that they have no German goods, bound to Turkey. ...

Before adopting one of the above solutions, ...the High Commissioner decided... to ask [their Governments]... by this telegram to the Supreme Council for instructions."

* Examined on January 5, 1920, by the Council of Five at Paris.

№ 283 note from the French Peace Delegation "On the prohibition of enemy trade in Turkey" - for the Council of Five*

Paris, December 29, 1919

RG 256, 180.03501/122/App.H; Paris, vol.IX, p.800

"In a telegram, copy of which is enclosed,** the Allied high Commissioners at Constantinople, make to the Supreme Council two propositions, with a view to restrict trade with the enemy in Turkey. ...

However, it seems to be dangerous, from a political point of view, to authorize Turkey to resume her commercial relations with the Central Powers, before a treaty has been concluded with her; this would open the way to German influence in the East, before the allies established the economic status of the former Turkish Empire. ...The present provisions which prohibit direct importation in Turkey of goods loaded on a German ship, or in a German Port, ...seem to be sufficient to prevent any German political action... for propaganda purposes; in consequence, the aim of the Allies is realized.

On the other hand, any modification of the Armistice Convention of October 30, 1919, seems to be premature, as long as the Peace negotiations with Turkey are not ended. Therefore it is proposed that the existing measures destined to assure the execution of Art.23 of the armistice be maintained."

* Examined on January 5, 1920

** See telegram of the High Commissioners from Constantinople, dated December 23, 1919.

№ 284 Report of the Communication section -
for the Supreme Economic Council

Paris, January 1, 1920 (heard February 6-7)

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/32/App.322; Paris, vol.X, p.728-730

"Trans-Caucasus

18. The Railways in the Trans-Caucasus were controlled by a British Military Technical Mission under General A.Brough. In September 1919 this mission was withdrawn by the War Office and has not been replaced. The railways are in a lamentable condition, and there is no organization; there is no confidence between Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. A working agreement between these three which was on the point of being established fell through on the departure of the British Mission. If the task were undertaken it would be essential to provide considerable credit for spare parts and material for repairs to locomotives and rolling-stock; without such a credit of at least £100,000 a Mission would be useless."

№ 285 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, January 5, 1920, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/122; Paris, vol.IX, p.778-805

"6. Prohibition of enemy trade in Turkey.

E.Crowe: ...He would summarize in five points the proposal of the high Commissioners, such as he understood it:

1. No further license would be granted to German ships to enter Turkish ports.

2. Ships used for the repatriation of... prisoners would no longer be authorized to land goods in Turkey.

3. All goods embarked in a German or Bulgarian port, ... could no longer be landed in Turkey, and no goods could be shipped... in Turkey destined for a German or Bulgarian port.

4. No goods could be landed in Turkey by a German or Bulgarian ship; no goods could be shipped on a German or Bulgarian ship in Turkey.

5. All goods shipped in ports situated outside Germany and Bulgaria by any non-German or Bulgarian ship could be landed in Turkey, whatever their origin might be. ...

E.Crowe: He did not believe that the Reparations Commission was qualified to interfere in the present case.

G.Clemenceau: He also thought that the Reparations Commission was not competent, as there was no Treaty with Turkey.

E.Crowe: The question was to prevent the Germans from getting a footing commercially in Turkey, before peace with that Power was signed, and from devoting themselves to a propaganda which, as recent incidents proved, might be full of danger. It was that which they had to consider and not the whole of foreign trade in Turkey, a question bristling with difficulties.

G.de Martino: He would consult his Government on the subject but would point out that the Organization Committee of the Reparations Commission already dealt with questions referring to the preparation of Treaties which had not yet been signed.

The discussion was adjourned to a later date."

№ 286 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, January 10, 1920, 11:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/125; Paris, vol.IX, p.835-838

"3. Situation in the Caucasus.

D.Lloyd George: Told the Council that they had just received from the Caucasus very disturbing news. The Bolsheviks were advancing upon the Caspian; if, having entirely defeated A.Denikin's army, they should reach the sea, it was possible that the Turks might join with them, an event which would throw the States of the Caucasus into a desperate situation. It became incumbent, therefore, on the Council to find out whether it would be wise to support those States by sending them, for example, arms and ammunition to facilitate their resistance to the Bolshevist drive. He did not mean to express in that place an opinion upon so delicate a question, but suggested referring it to the military organization at Versailles, which without prejudicing the political solution might be able to give them the information of a purely military nature which they required in order to take a decision.

G.Clemenceau: It might be good if the British Delegation drafted a memorandum which the Council could submit to the military council at.

It was decided: to refer to the Versailles Military Council the question of the aid it might be necessary to give to the Caucasian States against the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik Delegation would prepare a memorandum upon the subject which would be submitted to the Versailles Military Council for immediate examination and report to the Supreme Council." ...

№ 287 notes of a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs

Paris, January 10, 1920

US NA, RG 256, 180.03701/1; Paris, vol.IX, p.955-967

"5. Situation in the Caucasus.

G.Curzon: Mr. D.Lloyd George had just raised the serious question of South Russia and the Caucasus. ...

There were three States in the Caucasus: Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The fate of Armenia would be decided by the Peace Conference when it made its decision upon the Turkish problem. There remained, then, Georgia and Azerbaijan whose independence for the past year and a half has been most precarious. These countries were exposed to a threefold danger: in the first place they lived in dread of the conquered army of A.Denikin which might perhaps come down upon them from the North, on the other hand, they were exposed to the Bolshevist peril, Bolshe-

vist troops advancing upon them from two-sides - along the Caspian and in pursuit of A.Denikin's armies; finally, on the West and the South, there was the Turkish danger - already in Azerbaijan Enver Pasha and his brother Nury were at work. The military authorities would take the steps required by the situation; but, on the other hand, there was a political step which the British Delegation was very anxious to see taken, and from which it anticipated happy results; he meant the recognition "de facto" Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan. British troops occupied those regions since the armistice and His Majesty's Government had thus had, more than any other, the opportunity of manifesting its sympathy with those States. Later, they had evacuated those regions except Batum; but they had consuls at Baku, Tiflis and elsewhere. The countries he mentioned had shown a firm desire to become real States. Their Governments were socialist but decidedly anti-Bolshevist. They were living in dread of a Bolshevik invasion, at once political and military. They turned, therefore towards Europe as suppliants. They asked the Allies to accord their support; to recognize their "de facto" Governments would be equivalent to according them support. That was how they acted towards the Baltic States.

F.Berthelot: He had already discussed this subject with Lord G.Curzon in London. He had given Mr. G.Clemenceau an account of that conversation and he knew, that he was willing to accord that "de facto" recognition subject to the reserve that the recognition of Georgia and Azerbaijan in no wise prejudiced the future frontiers of Armenia.

G.Curzon: He agreed with him on that point.

V.Scialoja: He was equally inclined to grant that "de facto" recognition on the same conditions as for the Baltic States.

K.Matsui: On a question of that nature he would have to ask for instructions from his Government.

H.Wallace: He was in the same situation.

F.Berthelot: That the Powers who were already disposed to recognize those "de facto" governments would take such step together.

It was decided: that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers should together recognize the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as "de facto" Governments,* subject to the reserve that the representatives of the United States and the represen-

tative of Japan would request instructions from their Governments on the question."

* As we see, Armenia had been absent in the resolution of January 10, contrary to the general course of negotiations.

№ 288 report of the Interallied Military Committee at Versailles, prepared by Marshal F.Foch, Generals C.Sackville-West and U.Cavallero - for the International Council of Premiers

Paris, January 12, 1920

US NA, RG 256, 180.03801/8/App.A; Paris, vol.IX, p.902-903

"The British Delegation has prepared a Memorandum on the situation created in the Caucasus by the defeat of General A.Denikin's armies and of the measures to be taken to enable the Caucasian Republics to offer a resistance to the junction of the Bolshevik and Mussulman Forces across their territories.

After a preliminary examination of the question the Allied Military Committee is of the following opinion:

If it has not been possible to overcome Bolshevism on its own soli, it should be possible to arrest it on certain dangerous routes such as that of the Caucasus. With this end, the organization of a military barrier on the line of the Caucasus could well be considered.

In view of the unstable condition of the local Governments and of the immature condition of their military forces, this barrier should first of all be organized by European troops, whose strength might be fixed at two* divisions. Eventually, these European troops could be relieved by local forces, as soon as the latter shall have been reconstituted, organized and provided with the necessary armament. Beyond financial and material provision, this organization of the defensive barrier of the Caucasus would require time (a minimum of three months should be allowed). It would be advisable, therefore, to undertake it without delay.

In the meantime the elements of General A.Denikin's armies of the East which, in spite of their reverses, constitute the only force in these regions which has any military value, might advantageously continue the struggle with a view to denying to the Bolsheviks the approaches to the Caucasus and of allowing the necessary time for organizing the defensive barrier. Consequently, without being able to foresee the period during which their resistance would be effective - probably not a long one - it

would certainly be advisable to continue to give them material assistance within the scope of possible action by them. The military barrier of the Caucasus should be strengthened and completed by the grouping under Allied command of as large a number of ships in the Caspian Sea as possible; thus ensuring the command of this Sea.

It is on these lines - according to the available information on the present situation - that the military conditions of defensive military action in the Caucasus should be drawn up.

If the Allied Governments consider it advisable to undertake such action, the question would remain of considering the possibilities of carrying it out and of examining the best means to that end." ...

* When this document was discussed at the Supreme Council on January 19, 1920, these two divisions had transformed into three.

№ 289 note by British Peace Delegation - for the International Council of Premiers

Paris, January 12, 1920

US NA, RG 256, 180.03801/8/App.A/Ann.A; Paris, vol.IX, p. 903-904

"Present situation caused by defeat of both A.Kolchak and A.Denikin.

Bolsheviks having failed to upset Europe have made agreement with Mussulmen to attack the East.

Owing to collapse of A.Denikin Trans-Caucasus becomes bridge which must be defended by Allies to prevent union of these two hordes. It, including the Caspian and especially Georgia, is the natural barrier separating these two forces, At present, in consequence of impending advance of Red Army towards the Caucasus the situation in Georgia becomes complicated. Without effective aid Georgia, which is passing through painful economic crisis, will be unable to resist attack from both North and South and crushing of Georgia will have serious consequences for Allies. If Allies will help Georgia will have sufficient courage and strength to defend her frontiers.

As a preliminary measure and before considering the larger aspect of preventing Bolshevik invasion of the East certain steps can and should be taken:

(1) Recognition by Allies of Georgia and Azerbaijan (this has now been done).

(2) Diversion of all stores, etc. now en route to A.Denikin, to these Republics and to Armenia.

(3) Additional help by Allies to Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

(1) Financial.

(2) Military stores especially cartridges and boots.

(3) Provisions, especially bread.

(4) Sufficient military assistance to secure Batum and Baku.

(5) Denying of the Caspian and the fleet to the Bolsheviks.

A.Denikin's fleet must either be voluntarily sunk or secured for our own use."

№ 290 notes of a meeting of the Supreme Council

Paris, January 16, 1920, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03801/5; Paris, vol.IX, p.863-871

"3. The question of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

J.Cambon: Mr. Philip Kerr, P.[Tomasi] Marquis della Torretta and himself had got in touch of the preceding day with the representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan.

He had informed those gentlemen that according to the decision of the members of the Council of Three, the Supreme Council of the Allied Governments had recognized the Governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan as "de facto" governments. They had then asked them whether they had any questions to put.

The representatives of Georgia were Messrs. I.Tsereteli and Z.Avalov; the representatives of Azerbaijan were Messrs. A.M.Topchibashev and M.Magaramov, who had spoken in turn. These gentlemen had first thanked them for the "de facto" recognition of their Governments, but they had gone further: they asked that nothing be placed in the way of the course they were following in order to be completely separated from Russia, and they asked for the assistance of the Powers on financial, military and political grounds so as to liquidate their original situation.

They had then put questions to the representatives of Georgian and Azerbaijan concerning their interior situation and the danger which might threaten them on the part of former Russia. They had appeared more generally preoccupied concerning A.Denikin's intentions than those of the Bolshevists; but the

actual condition of A.Denikin'd army re-assured them completely on their countries future for the time being.

P.Kerr had put questions to them on the military situation of both Republics and their answers had not been very definite. They had then pressed them further, and the representatives of Georgia had declared that they could put 50,000 men in the field, and those of the Azerbaijan approximately 100,000.

G.Clemenceau: Thought that extremely doubtful.

D.Lloyd George: They made very good fighting troops, as they were mostly Tartars.

J.Cambon: Their army was composed first, of a regular army with officers, and even ex-General officers of the Russian army, and second, of a national guard. I.Tsereteli had especially insisted on the fact that he considered that the troops they had then under arms were sufficient to defend both Georgia and Azerbaijan against a possible invasion, should an offensive come either from the former armies of A.Denikin, or the Bolshevists, but it would be impossible to arouse the military feeling of their population to make an offensive warfare, that is to say, a war which would not be solely in defence of the Caucasian territory.

The two Republics had sufficient men to put in the field, but what they lacked was arms and munitions, and they asked the Allies to supply them with such. ...

J.Cambon wished especially to point out the different point of view of the representatives from the two Republics: the representatives of Georgia, on account of their geographical position, were of opinion that the most important menace against their independence would come from the Russian or Bolshevist Armies, which would follow the shores of the Black Sea, and thought that they would have nothing to fear on the Caspian Sea. On the other hand, however, the representatives of the Azerbaijan which was bounded by the Caspian Sea, had declared that the danger lay in that direction: if the Bolshevists pursued the rest of the army of Volunteers' up to the town of Derbent, Baku would be in dire straits. Once in possession of that town, the situation in the Caspian would be extremely dangerous. ...

D.Lloyd George: ...Azerbaijan and Daghestan were Musulman territories, he thought; and Georgia and Armenia were Christian, although he was not quite sure to which confession they belonged.

G.Clemenceau: The representative of Armenia had told him that he was a Gregorian, but he had been unable to explain to him what that meant.

D.Lloyd George: It was evident that the recognition "de facto" of the Daghestan... might be as wise a step as that of Georgia and Azerbaijan, especially on account of its buffer position between the North and the latter Republics;** what they knew of the history of those countries showed the difficulties which had impeded the Russian armies in their march through the Caucasus. They were not asked for troops. That was a satisfactory point, and he thought that they might try to supply them with arms and munitions. ...They had four British battalions at Baku which might either remain there, if that proved to be useful, or be withdrawn. ...The Allies also had plenty of munitions which they might send. The difficulty lay in finding transport for arms and munitions to be sent into these republics.

G.Clemenceau: He thought most of it had gone to the Soviets through A.Denikin's army.

D.Lloyd George: They might at least send a lot of clothes, etc.

G.Clemenceau: It would be well to examine this question further.

The meeting then adjourned."

* A.Denikin's Army.

** Taking into consideration that Daghestan is allocated northward of Georgia and Azerbaijan, it could serve a buffer only for these two republics. In their turn, Georgia and Azerbaijan could turn into a buffer between Russia and Armenia alone. Existence of lengthy Armenian-Turkish border both at that time and now, eliminates another "buffer" interpretations.

№ 291 notes of a meeting of the Council of Five

Paris, January 19, 1920, 10:30

US NA, RG 256, 180.03801/8; Paris, vol.IX, p.889-890

"2. Situation in the Caucasus.

F.Foch: A question on this subject was put to the Interallied Military Committee at Versailles: the committee pronounced an opinion. ...

G.Clemenceau: You mean, I take it, the pronouncement of the 12th January.* ...

D.Lloyd George: The military advice, if I have understood it correctly, is that no barrier, consisting of less than three divisions would be effective against the Bolsheviks; and Lord D.Beatty could not send his sailors unless there were already assurance of such effective military measures. ...With the object of holding up the Bolsheviks, would it be any good to supply the Caucasian Republics of Azerbaijan, Daghestan and Georgia with guns and war materiel? ...

F.Foch: ...Only an officer on the spot would be in a position to say what effective force those countries can muster and whether therefore it is worth supplying them with anything whatsoever.

D.Lloyd George: ...We have already been asked to send material to those tribesmen. I want to know if that is military expedient.

F.Foch: I am entirely without information as to whether those populations are ready to receive materiel and to employ it to advantage or whether all that we might send would not simply fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

H.Wilson: In the meeting that took place the day before yesterday and at which we examined the defence of the Batum-Baku line, the conclusion was reached that unless the British Navy effectively held the Caspian, that line could not be effectively defended: and inversely, that unless there existed the means of defending that line, it was impossible to send naval forces into the Caspian. For that matter, unless the Caspian is occupied and held, Baku will certainly fall.

D.Lloyd George: I take it then to be Sir Henry Wilson's advice that we ought not to send war material to those peoples to help them to defend themselves against the Bolsheviks.

H.Wilson: That, Sir, is undoubtedly my opinion, ...I should send nothing.

W.Churchill: I entirely agree with Sir Henry's opinion on that point. ...All that we might send would almost immediately pass into the hands of the Bolsheviks.

G.Curzon: ...I have been speaking with the representatives of the Caucasian republics who are at this moment in the adjoining room. They have told me already that the Bolsheviks will attack them; they are anxious to defend themselves, provided we supply them with food, arms and munitions. So supplied, they believe

that the danger could be averted. Without supplies, their fall, they say, is inevitable. In any case I suggest that we take no decision upon the matter without first all hearing them. ...

The representatives of the Republic of Georgia Messrs. N.Chkheidze, I.Tsereteli and Z.Avalov, and of Azerbaijan, Messrs. A.M.Topchibashev and M.Magaramov were then introduced.

G.Clemenceau: The Conference has been discussing the urgency of sending to Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan food, arms and munitions. ...We want to know the present state of your countries and whether such aid would be effectively used against the Bolsheviks, or whether it is more likely to happen, as it did with A.Denikin, that the Bolsheviks would be strong enough simply to capture from you the materiel sent and thus to make the matters worse.

I.Tsereteli: I speak in the name of the Georgian Delegation as well as in that of the Delegation of Azerbaijan. We are equally likely to be attacked by the Bolsheviks but we do not know whether we shall be or not. Were we helped by the Entente, the Bolsheviks might hesitate to attack us. In any case, we need material assistance of the Great Powers if we are to defend ourselves.

G.Clemenceau: Am I to understand that you are asking us to send troops also?

I.Tsereteli: That would be better still; but the mere fact of being protected on the sea and receiving the arms, munitions and food we require, would be invaluable help. The state of mind of our people is such, that, should the Bolsheviks arrack, and if at the same time we received the material support of the Entente, we hope to defeat every attack. But such materiel aid is necessary immediately. ...The present situation in the Caucasus is dangerous from the point of view of the morale of the populations. When A.Denikin was in our land, our despairing peoples fought his troops by every means in their power, and a current of sympathy with the Bolsheviks appeared. Today our people see their independence recognized. ...We do not wish war: we are even ready to come to an agreement if that were possible, with the Bolsheviks, but only upon the condition that they also recognize our independence.

G.Clemenceau: You would really sign an agreement with the Bolsheviks?

I.Tsereteli: Yes, on condition, that they pledged themselves not to invade our country and that they did not try to introduce propaganda among our people. But I must repeat, if we were strong, and the Entente were to help us, the Bolsheviks would be obliged to recognize our independence and give up their attempt.

I should nevertheless like to point out that there are three Trans-Caucasian Republics - Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. We would like to know why Armenia has not received de facto recognition. That recognition would help us all and render easier resistance to any aggression whatsoever. But, in short, it is in immediate help that our hope of resistance lies.

D.Lloyd George: How many men can Azerbaijan put into the field?

M.Magaramov: A military law has been passed by our Parliament; assuming that we have the necessary arms and munitions, we shall be able to put into the field some 100,000 men.

D.Lloyd George: Have you the troops at the moment?

M.Magaramov: We have a little army, in the command of a native Azerbaijan General, about 50,000 strong, perhaps more, disciplined, but there are only from 10,000 to 12,000 of these men with arms.

D.Lloyd George: And in Georgia?

I.Tsereteli: We have about 16 battalions of regular troops, each 600 strong, and nearly 15,000 men of the National Guard. ... In a fortnight we could mobilize 50,000 men if we had the necessary arms and munitions. ...In a war for independence we could count upon support of our whole people, among whom national enthusiasm run very high. ...

G.Curzon: reports that I have received say that *a certain number of officers of Azerbaijan are Turkish officers*. Does the presence of these Turkish officers in the army leave us the guarantees necessary in a fight against the Bolsheviks?

M.Magaramov: After the conquest of Azerbaijan by Russia a great part of the population emigrated 25 years ago to Turkey. Later on, when the Turkish army invaded the Caucasus, a certain number of its officers were natives of our country and of Daghestan. Among these, some 50 preferred to remain in Azerbaijan but they are native Caucasians and we can be certain that they, like all our populations, will use their whole energy in fighting the Bolsheviks for the defence of our independence.

A.M.Topchibashev: We, the inhabitants of Azerbaijan, dread Bolsheviks even more than do our Georgian neighbors. We have had an experience of it. The Bolsheviks occupied our country for four months. I myself, head of a Trans-Caucasian committee, was a prisoner with them for two months and a half. The danger threatens us from two sides: from the north and from the Caspian. On the Caspian side we hope that the English, who have a naval base of Enzeli, will give us perhaps marines and, in any case, arms and munitions. As for the northern frontier, we believe that in order to protect the whole of Trans-Caucasia, and especially Azerbaijan, it is expedient to recognize the Republic of Highlanders, which would then be a buffer State against Bolshevik attacks. ...

D.Lloyd George: Why did A.Denikin attack Daghestan?

I.Tsereteli: A.Denikin looked upon Daghestan and all Trans-Caucasia as Russian provinces. He judged it easier to invade those territories than to fight the Bolsheviks; it was against the peoples of the Caucasus that he turned the arms which were supplied to him to maintain the fight against the army of the Soviets. ...

F.Nitti: If I have properly understood Mr. I.Tsereteli, the real objective of A.Denikin's army is the reconstitution of the old centralized Russia, rather than the defeat of the Bolsheviks, is Mr. I.Tsereteli quite sure about that?

I.Tsereteli: I am certain. ...Had he managed to defeat the Bolsheviks, he would immediately have turned all his efforts towards the reduction of those nations whose independence has been proclaimed. It is [conviction] of all those independent States of which I speak and which defend themselves against him. It is the conviction also of our Azerbaijan neighbors.

F.Nitti: Do you believe that the recognition of the Caucasian Republics, which exist already, or which will be recognized later could arouse the spirit of resistance in the country?

I.Tsereteli: I am convinced that that recognition will strengthen resistance to all aggression from whatever side the aggression comes. We entertain the hope that... the Supreme Council will go to the full length of recognition our Republics de jure. ... Our population will display all the morale zeal as they know that this de jure recognition will come about. As for A.Denikin's policy, he has declared officially several times that he did not recognize the right of our nations to self determination: in his eyes, we still constitute mere provinces of the old Tsarist Russia.

...D.Lloyd George: Could [the government of Azerbaijan] garrison Baku if you were given the arms? How many men could you find to defend that town? ...

M.Magaramov: ...Two months ago, there were 7,000 men in Baku, all natives of Azerbaijan, of which State Baku is the capital.

...The representatives of Georgia and Azerbaijan left the Conference.

W.Churchill: Could Marshal F.Foch tell us whether he looked upon the question of defence of the Caucasus as a problem standing by itself or as a part of the problem of the general defence against Bolshevism?

F.Foch: I have not considered the problem exclusively from the former point of view. To me *it seems obvious that that question is part of the general problem of the defence against Bolshevism.*

W.Churchill: On which side are the forces at present threatening the Caucasus most formidable, A.Denikin's or the Bolshevik?

F.Foch: I believe that A.Denikin's forces may be considered so far reduced that in a short time they will not exist. ...I have still less information about the Bolshevik army; but it is beyond question that Bolshevism is in the ascendant. ...We can therefore count upon seeing it still carried on by its own momentum, I would not say victorious, but at least penetrating various countries under different guises. In those circumstances, it is high time to establish, wherever we can, at least a barrier.

W.Churchill: ...And assuming that A.Denikin's forces disappear, ...in that case, when might the attack take place?

F.Foch: I do not know that Bolshevik concentrations or attacks are in preparation, but that is quite possible at some undefined future date. ...The forces that can be opposed to the Bolsheviks are those of scattered republics organized or unorganized. Passing from Azerbaijan by the Caucasus there are Georgia... - all new States might be placed in a very difficult situation if they were abandoned. If on the contrary they are taken in hand, it is possible to succeed in establishing a system of military forces powerful enough to hold Bolshevism in check.

D.Lloyd George: Do you propose a military entente between these different States with the object of attacking Soviet Russia, or, on the contrary, with the object of common defence in case

the Bolsheviks attack?

F.Foch: The first thing to be done is to stop the advancing Bolshevism and to consolidate the States which have just been founded. It is a matter of establishing a defensive organization, a safety belt to protect Central Europe against the advance of the Bolsheviks. This is the goal to be reached first of all. ...That [European, small Entente of] the Trans-Caucasian countries would join and Bolshevism would thus be surrounded. ...

D.Lloyd George: Do you know whether the Bolsheviks are preparing to attack those countries?

F.Foch: That one cannot know till after the event.

D.Lloyd George: Could you now mention a single one of those countries against which the Bolsheviks contemplate a military attack?

F.Foch: When the attack takes place, I shall be in a position to reply. I could not do so beforehand.

At this point the military experts left the Conference.

G.Curzon: I should like to explain why, when recognition was given to Georgia and Azerbaijan, it was not also given to Armenia. I myself was responsible for the original proposal that Georgia and Azerbaijan should be recognized. Why I did not propose at the same time to recognize Armenia was that the question of Armenia had still to be decided by the Treaty of Peace with Turkey. It was felt that to give recognition at that time would be to anticipate the work of the Peace Conference. Nevertheless, there are now strong reasons for giving recognition to Armenia. The present Armenian State forms part of the old Russian Empire with its capital Erivan, just as did Georgia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, the Armenian State is prepared to join in the defence of the Trans-Caucasian States against the Bolsheviks. Consequently, I think it would be just and wise to give it recognition on the clear understanding that that does not prejudice the ultimate delimitation of Armenia, the boundaries of which have still to be decided in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

G.Clemenceau: Are there any objections? As there are none, we therefore agree to recognize the Armenian republic on the condition just proposed by Lord G.Curzon.

W.Churchill: The decision we have just taken being of a diplomatic and political nature, does not solve the military problem. The present situation of the Armenian republic, like that

of the other Caucasian republics, remains precarious; attacked by Turks on the south and threatened on the north by the Bolsheviks, its complete extinction is a possibility to be reckoned with.

D.Lloyd George: I am informed that the United States Treasury has made a recommendation to Congress that the sum of 25,000,000 dollars should be allotted to Armenia. The recommendation has still to be considered by Congress and the Senate, but I understand, that it will probably be adopted. That will be a very material help.

H.Wallace: I believe that Mr. D.Lloyd George's statement is accurate.

D.Lloyd George: that is one very important matter settled. We have now to decide what support, if any, ought to be given to the Caucasian States. Marshal F.Foch had said that three divisions are necessary. The British Government cannot possibly spare these.

G.Clemenceau: Neither can we.

F.Nitti: Italy too cannot send any.

D.Lloyd George: We must then find out whether we can send arms and munitions. ...I do not see any harm can come of sending arms and supplies. Before the Bolsheviks can reach the Caucasus, they have to pass through the most productive provinces of Southern Russia; consequently they would have no need to capture any food we might send to the Caucasus. As for war materiel, the Reds already have so many rifles that the capture of 25,000 or 50,000 more would not make much difference. ...In those circumstances, the danger from supplying a certain number of guns and rifles to the Caucasian States is not very great. ...I am of the opinion to supply the Trans-Caucasian Republics with all the material aid asked for, on the express condition that the Caucasian States will resist Bolsheviks and garrison Baku with all their strength. ...

G.Clemenceau: ...That I think is the decision that ought to be communicated to the military experts by telling them we have decided to send war materiel to the Caucasus as quickly as possible; and they should be asked to deal with the question of quantity and the means of dispatch.

D.Lloyd George: I am in entire agreement.

F.Nitti: The Italian Government cannot undertake in this matter any engagement at all, either in men or arms, since to do

so would be contrary to a law which has been passed in the Italian Parliament by all parties. ...The gist of that law is that Italy can take no part in any intervention against *de facto* Governments, such as that of Russia. ...

G.Curzon: There is nevertheless a precedent for Italian intervention. ...My information is that much is hoped from Italian aid at Baku and in the Daghestan.

F.Nitti: I cannot do anything officially. There are some Italian interests in Georgia and I believe that Italian volunteers have gone there. Probably I will be able to help this move; it will be impossible, however, to send regular troops, or even to send any materiel officially. ...

D.Lloyd George: It does not matter very much whether the arms are sent officially or unofficially, so long as they reach the Caucasian States.

F.Nitti: ...I may say very confidentially that I could supply arms and war materiel if Great Britain or France will take the responsibility of sending them.

D.Lloyd George: We agree.

G.Clemenceau: We decide then to accept in principle the supply of war materiel and food to the republics of the Caucasus and to refer to the military experts for their solution on the problem just put. ...

It was decided:

1) that the Government of the Armenian State should be recognized as a *de facto* government on condition that this recognition in no way prejudices the question of the eventual frontiers of that State;

2) that the Allied Governments are not prepared to send to the Trans-Caucasian States the three divisions contemplated by the Interallied Military Council;

3) to accept the principle of sending to the Trans-Caucasian States arms, munitions, and, if possible, food;

4) that Marshal F.Foch and Field-Marshal H.Wilson are requested to consider of what these supplies should consist and the means of their dispatch.**

H.Wallace will refer the present resolution to Washington for instructions." ...

* See. report of the Interallied Military Committee at Versailles, dated January 12, 1920.

** Documents, which are kept at the British Foreign Office, slightly vary stylistically. To compare them, see: Махмуриян Г.Г., Политика Великобритании в Армении и Закавказье, с.179-180.

№ 292 draft telegram from the President of the Peace Conference
G.Clemenceau - to the French Ambassador in the USA
J.Jusserand, for transmission to the American Government

Paris, January 20, 1920

US NA, RG 256, 180.03801/9/App.A; Paris, vol.IX, p.924-926

"I beg you to submit to the American Government, on the part of the Peace Conference, the following telegram.

The overthrow of Admiral A.Kolchak and General A.Denikin has led the Allied Governments to again take up the Russian question as it is now evident that the attempt supported up to the present time by the Allies, to overthrow the Bolshevist regime by anti-Bolshevist forces has definitely failed. After attentive examination the Allies have decided upon the two following conclusions: ...

To permit the free exchange of the products necessary for the Russian peasants, to be obtained in Allied countries, on condition that grain, flax, skins, and other raw products to be found in Russia, be received in exchange. ...Last year's corn crop in southern Russia established a record and that enormous quantities of food stuffs and other raw products are available for exportation if the necessary transportation facilities can be obtained. ... These food stuffs are absolutely necessary in Europe in order to meet the acute food shortage which is the principal encouragement to Bolshevism in the West. ...

The projected exchange of products will not involve any negotiations between the Allied Governments and the Governments of the Soviets, nor the recognition of the Bolshevists, nor the authorization for Bolshevist representatives to enter the Allied countries. ...

The second conclusion reached by the Allied Governments is that they must declare themselves as having arrived at an agreement, in so far as the future is concerned, by which they will observe a policy of non-intervention in affairs within the boundaries of Russia, but that they have recognized the independence of the neighboring States, to the list of which has just been added

Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and that in the eventuality that the Bolsheviks would refuse to make peace with these States and would attempt to infringe on the independence of the said communities by force, the Allies would accord these States the fullest support in their power. The Allied Governments are very desirous of knowing whether the Government of the United States is disposed to concur in this policy."

№ 293 telegram № 358 from Allied High Commissioner at Armenia W.Haskell - to the Secretary of State R.Lansing

Tiflis, January 22, 1920 (received February 5)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/200, T1192, Roll 2, NAA, MR № 38

"Under date January 22 [W.]Haskell reported following: "Recent personal investigation of American officer and his interview with Tartars in vicinity convinced as follows: Concerning situation region South Goris,* he reports that clear evidence Tartars had looted two Armenian towns near Ordubad, previously Tartar villages, Voghji** Valley surrendered, Armenians from Zangezur without resistance escaping over snow covered mountains; later were fired on and many killed and wounded and died of exposure; reported fifteen hundred in all. Tartar village of Geghi** Valley attacked by Armenians. It resisted seven days then Armenians sent from Goris artillery and entrenched machine guns well served and drove Tartars from village to village, finally surrounding; survivors escaped to Ordubad and Nakhichevan where interviewed by American officer. Tartars claim Armenia object drive all Tartars from Zangezur capturing Ordubad and Julfa, thereby forcing evacuation Nakhichevan, Halil Bey, and Kerbalay*** Pasha in Julfa en route for Ordubad December 25.

December 31 three American officers verified report Armenian attack on Akers Tartar village within Armenia only twelve miles Northwest of Erivan; officers viewed bodies dead men and women; eight armed Armenian participants with loot arrested; these outrages becoming more frequent and of [all] kinds after Armenian Government disarmament of Tartars; am insisting prompt measures Armenian Government prevent recurrence; present government Armenia rapidly proving itself untrustworthy and incompetent apparently actuated by desire to increase territory and material for propaganda.

Georgia Government states that difficulty of transporting flour to Armenia will soon arise, same time request for assistance themselves believed forerunner of policy to blackmail American relief and hold us *up for* flour." [H.]Wallace."

* Inscribed as Gerusi.

** Lettered as Okhchi.

*** Has been written as Kighi.

4* Enrolled as Kalb Ali.

5* On February 4, 1920, the U.S. Ambassador H.Wallace had transmitted this text to Washington.

№ 294 telegram № 188 from the U.S. Acting Secretary of State F.Polk - to the U.S. Ambassador in France H.C.Wallace

Washington, January 24, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/192:Telegram; Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1920. In 3 vols, vol.III. Wash., US GPO, 1936, p.775-776 (following: Papers 1920)

"Your [telegram]... January 19. ...

As regards Armenia, this Government concurs in the decision taken by the Council to recognize the government of Armenian State as a de facto government on the condition that this recognition in no way prejudices the question of the eventual frontiers. The Secretary of State will so notify the Armenian representative in Washington.

While this Government appreciates the point of view of the Allied Governments in wishing to render material assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, it cannot but feel that the question of the recognition of these governments as de facto governments raises issues of great scope and importance. The possible reaction on the minds of the Russians hitherto friendly to the Allied and Associated governments of such a recognition, which may be advertised by the Moscow government as the beginning of an attempt to dismember Russia, demands the further and very serious consideration of the American Government."

№ 295 telegram № 200 from the U.S. Acting Secretary of State F.Polk - to the U.S. Ambassador in France H.C.Wallace

Washington, January 27, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/192b:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.776-777

"...Through an inadvertence the Department sent you telegram № 188 of January 24, before the President had sanctioned the decision to the question of the recognition of Armenia. № 197 of January 26 was accordingly sent to cancel instruction in № 188. Notices in the press seem to indicate, however, that you have already communicated to the Supreme Council at Paris the substance at Department's № 188. It is desired, therefore, that you will give your best endeavors to modify the strength of any statement you may have made before the Supreme Council on the basis of the Department's № 188. It is suggested in this connection that you could give emphasis to the fact that, in stating its concurrence in the decision of the Supreme Council, on which however the United States is not represented, this Government intended to indicate that it does not oppose that decision; but that the actual recognition of the alleged Government of Armenia as a de facto government is a step to which this Government is not in a position to pledge itself. There should be conveyed, in effect, the impression that the communication of the United States Government was merely an expression of sympathy for the Armenian people and does not in any matter affect the political relations of this Government with Armenia.

The text of the statement which you made before the Supreme Council should be communicated to the Department at once.

The American press has been given the following statement, which is appended for your guidance:

"Armenia Not Recognized"

"The United States has reached no definite conclusions as to the recognition of the Republic of Armenia, it was stated authoritatively in Washington last night. The relations of the United States toward the Armenian State to be created under the Turkish peace treaty have been under consideration by this Government, it was added, but never has a decision been made to accord recognition to the proposed State, at Paris dispatches quoted Hugh C. Wallace, United States Ambassador to France, as having announced to the Council of Ambassadors.

Recognition as a State the boundaries of which have not been defined finally would be unusual, it also was said." ...

№ 296 telegram from the U.S. Acting Secretary of State F.Polk -
to the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople M.L.Bristol

Washington, January 27, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/196a:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III,
p.777

"As United States not yet adhered to the decision of Supreme Council recognizing the independence of the Armenian Republic, or that of Georgia and Azerbaijan you are authorized to deny any report that this government has accorded such recognitions. Repeat to [W.]Haskell for similar action." ...

№ 297 telegram № 280 from the U.S. Ambassador in France

H.C.Wallace - to the Secretary of State B.Colby

Paris, January 28, 1920 (received January 28)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/193:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.
777

"...Formal notification to Armenian Delegation of action of Council granting de facto recognition was made yesterday by M. [A.]Millerand. ...

I have requested Foreign Office to inform Armenian Delegation immediately that there has been a misunderstanding and that American participation in action taken should be cancelled.

In view of what has occurred request Department's specific approval of this action and further instructions if any deemed necessary."

№ 298 telegram № 283 from the U.S. Ambassador in France

H.C.Wallace - to the Secretary of State B.Colby

Paris, January 28, 1920 (received January 28)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/195:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.
778

"...Referring to Department's № 200 of January 27. At Conference of Ambassadors on January 26, statement was made as follows:

"I am in receipt of instructions from my Government with regard to the decision taken by the Council of Heads of Governments to grant the de facto recognition to the Republic of Armenia. My Government concurs in the decision taken by the Council on the condition that this recognition in no way assured

her the question of the eventual frontiers. I may add the Armenian representative in Washington* is being notified accordingly.

"While my Government appreciates the point of view of the Allied Governments in wishing to render material assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, it cannot but feel that the question of the recognition of these Governments as de factos raises issues of great scope and importance. The possible reaction on the minds of the Russians, hitherto friendly to the Allied and Associated Governments, of such a recognition which may be emphasized by the Moscow Governments as the beginning of an attempt to dismember Russia, demands the further and very serious consideration of the American Government."

This afternoon I received a call from the President of the Armenian Delegation who came to inquire how the matter now stands. The information which the Foreign Office had already communicated to him was confirmed by this Embassy."

* Garegin Pasdermajian.

№ 299 note by the British Delegation regarding "Need of relief for Christians in Turkey" - for the Supreme Economic Council

Paris, January 28, 1920 (heard February 6-7)

US NA, RG 256, 180.03501/32/App.318; Paris, vol.X, p.706-707

"The situation of Armenian refugees in the Caucasus was discussed at the 31st meeting of the Supreme Economic Council in Rome, and a resolution was passed expressing the concern of the Council at the situation. The United States representative on the Reparation Commission subsequently stated that it had been arranged for the Grain Corporation to send grain, and for the American Red cross to send drugs for the relief of distress in Armenia. In addition, considerable sums have been raised in America for the relief of the Turkish provinces of Armenia and the Caucasus.

It should, however, in the opinion of the British Delegation, be pointed out that this assistance will not benefit the Christian population of Turkey, i.e. Greeks and Armenians, among whom very serious distress prevail.

Persecution by the Turks has caused many Christians to flee from the interior of Asia Minor to the coast. There are, however, no facilities in the coast districts for providing the necessary ac-

commodation and relief for these refugees. Even in Constantinople, the refugee camps are so over-crowded and so insanitary that typhus is spreading. Conditions in the provinces are still worse.

The resources of voluntary relief are nearly exhausted and are quite insufficient to provide for the Christian refugees, who number several hundreds of thousands. The Turkish Government could give no help, even if were willing. The only means of assisting these people, who rely entirely upon the Allies for help, is a scheme of relief undertaken by the Allied Governments."

№ 300 memorandum by an officer of the NER Robert

A.Lambert - for the Foreign Secretary of the NER C.W.Fowle

Aleppo, February 23, 1920 (received March 8)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.48/23/Encl.1, T1192, Roll 7, NAA, MR

№ 36

"...Reports received from [Lorin A.]Shepard and [John E.]Merrill [of ABCFM] regarding attack on Near East automobile February 1st and political conditions [in] Aintab indicate attack made by organized brigands directed by Turkish nationalist leaders. Purpose of organization is opposition to foreign military occupation and killing of Christians. Car attacked while stopped for water. [Frank S.]Johnson and [James E.]Perry [of YMCA] shot and killed instantly. Native driver and assistant also killed. No Near East personnel involved. 11 wagons taking supplies with Moslem drivers stopped by same brigands but nothing taken. 4 wagons with Armenian drivers following automobile looted drivers fled. Bodies F.S.Johnson and [J.E.]Perry taken Aintab February 4th by Turkish gendarmes buried American Cemetery [with] French military honors. Turkish and French authorities investigating affair. Americans [in] Aintab safe. Road between Tiflis and Aintab infested with brigands. French report sufficient troops to control situation after clearing roads which are impassable account snow. At least 10 days good weather necessary to open roads. Serious fighting [in] Marash about January 25th between French and large force Turks.* French report Turkish section [of] city partly destroyed and 2,000 Turks killed. French and Armenian casualties much smaller.** No letters from Marash since January 10th but French give assurance all Americans there safe. Situation [in]

Aintab [and] Marash improved since arrival aeroplanes.*** Communication with Urfa, Mardin, Diarbekir cut off since January 25th account damage railroad [on] both sides [of] Euphrates. Feel sure Americans in these places are safe. No trouble anticipated Mardin and Diarbekir which are outside zone [of] French military occupation. Personnel have been ordered to remain at stations until safety of travel is assured. There have been no disturbances in Aleppo." ...

* As it is known, 20,000 Armenians had returned Marash by the middle of January, 1920, where a 2,000 men strong French Garrison had been deployed. Since January 21 till February 11 Armenians in this city had been exposed to massacre and total extermination by means of overall arsons and shooting at houses and churches, which were their last cover and ultimate hope. The French forces had abandoned Marash during severe blizzard on February 11, without any warning. Remnants of population flung after them in hasty pursuit.

The Marash massacre of January and February months acquired extensive academic promulgation. See, for example: Mterne Muré R.P., *Le massacre de Marache (février 1920)*. Bruxelles, Flambeau, 1921, p.9-15, 18-20; du Véou P., *La passion de la Cilicie 1919-1922*. 2nde ed. Paris, Paul Geuthner, 1954, p.122, 137, 139; Kerr S., *The Lions of Marash. Personal Experiences with American Near East Relief 1919-1922*. Albany, State University of New York, 1973, p.122-124, 186-192, 196; *Allies and Turkey. Armenians' Peril in Cilicia*. "The Manchester Guardian," 26.02.1920; Marashlian L., *The Armenian Question from Sèvres to Lausanne. Economics and Morality in American and British Policies 1920-1923*. PhD dissertation. Los Angeles, UCLA, 1992, p.18; Ованнисян Р., *Международные отношения Республики Армения*. Ер., Тигран Мец, 2007, с.442-450. You may look through an overview of historiography in: Саакян Р.Г., *Франко-турецкие отношения и Киликия в 1918-1923 гг.* Ер., АН АрмССР, 1986, с.22-24.

** By February 14, when exhausted Armenians from Marash reached in pursuit of the French troops Islahie, out of 4,000-5,000 dwellers, who had managed to leave the city with soldiers, not more than 1,500 souls succeeded to survive. The rest had been killed by frost on their 120 kilometres long way, encompassed by whirling snowstorm. See: Brémond E., *La Cilicie en 1919-1920*. Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1921; "Revue des Études Arménien-

nes," P., 1921, vol.I, № 3, p.340; du Hays H., Les armées françaises au Levant, 1919-1939. Vol.II: Le temps des combats, 1920-1921. Vincennes, Lavauzelle, 1979, p.245; Elliot M.E., Beginning Again at Ararat. Lnd. & Edinburg, Fleming H.Revell, 1924, p. 115-131.

*** This improvement sustained until April 1, 1920, when the Kemalists launched their second onslaught on the city. Stubborn self-defense of Aintab lasted till February 8, 1921; however, the Angora Agreement was concluded by the French and Turks on October 20 of the same year, and Armenians had been forced to abandon their homeland in the sequence of it.

№ 301 letter from the Vice President of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia in Paris and Envoy of the Armenian Republic on special mission to the USA G.Pasdermajian - for the Acting Secretary of State F.Polk

New York, March 3, 1920 (received March 8)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.48/19; T1192, Roll 7, NAA, MR № 36

"The Department of State is well aware of the most urgent need of the Civil population of the present Armenian Republic, the meeting of such needs forming only a humanitarian question.

In November last the President most kindly authorized the Grain Corporation to sell to the Government of the Republic 35,000 tons of food stuff.

Besides food stuff that Government is most anxious to buy in this country clothing, shoes, medicine, agricultural implements and the like which are indispensable for the Civil population.

In order to raise the necessary funds, it is contemplated to issue through some New York Banks certain short term bonds of the Armenian Republic, in the aggregate sum of five million dollars, the proceeds to be used for such purchase. It is believed that such bonds would be very easily sold among Armenians in the United States.

The issuance of these bonds has been authorized by a recent act of the Armenian Parliament, and Mr.H.Kajaznuni has new credentials in relation to the same.

Some Banks in New York which have been approached in the premises, have replied that although in their opinion there is no legal provision preventing such issuance, yet, before arriving at a decision, they would desire to know whether, as a matter of Politics, the Department of State has any objections to it.

I beg to submit that a favorable reply from you will greatly contribute towards the reconstruction of our unfortunate but deserving country, and will be gratefully appreciated by all Armenians and their friend.

Trusting that you will find it convenient to favor me with a reply."

№ 302 translated note from the French Ambassador in the USA
J.Jusserand - for the U.S. Acting Secretary of State F.Polk

Washington, March 12, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/9608; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.748-750

"Mr. Secretary of State: I had the honor orally to inform Your Excellency on the 9th of this month that the work of framing the peace treaty with Turkey had in the conferences at London progressed far enough to make it possible to consider summoning the Turkish delegates at an early date. At the same time I told you that my Government would be happy to know as early as possible whether the Government of the United States, which is not taking part in the conferences in question, intends to desist from interest in Eastern affairs or whether on the contrary, as the President of the Council would prefer, it proposes by taking part in this work to claim its share of influence, action and responsibility in the definitive and general reestablishment of peace.

Acting upon an allusion of yours to the nature of the settlement contemplated, I telegraphed to my Government, which has put me in a position to inform you as follows: ...

2. - Frontiers of Turkey in Asia: On the North and the West, the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmora, the Mediterranean. On the east, the frontier of the Armenian State. On the South, the course of the Jahan* (Cilicia), then a line running North of Aintab, Birejik, Urfa, Mardin and Gzira.** ...

6. - The independence of Armenia, whose financial and military organization will be effected with the assistance of the League of Nations, will be recognized. Special rights over Lazistan will ensure her access to the sea."

* Inscribed as Jaihun Irmak.

** Mentioned as Jezireh-Ibn-Omar.

№ 303 note by the U.S. Secretary of State B.Colby -
to the French Ambassador in the USA J.Jusserand*

Washington, March 24, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/9608; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.750-753

"...Excellency: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of March twelfth, relative to the conferences regarding the Peace Treaty with Turkey and the present status of the negotiations between the principal Allied Powers, and in reply to inform you that the President does not deem it advisable in the present circumstances that the United States be represented by a Plenipotentiary at the conference. The President feels, however, that as this Government is vitally interested in the future peace of the world, it should frankly express its views on the proposed solutions of the difficult questions connected with the Turkish Treaty. ...

There can be no question as to the genuine interest of this Government in the plans for Armenia, and the Government of the United States is convinced that the civilized world demands and expects the most liberal treatment for that unfortunate country. Its boundaries should be drawn in such a way as to recognize all the legitimate claims of the Armenian people and particularly to give them easy and unencumbered access to the sea. While unaware of the considerations governing the decision reached by the Supreme Council, it is felt that special rights over Lazistan would hardly assure to Armenia that access to the sea indispensable to its existence. It is hoped that, taking into consideration the fact that Trebizond has always been the terminus of the trade route across Armenia and that Mr.[E.]Venizelos, on behalf of the Greeks of that region, has expressed their preference for connection with Armenia rather than Turkey, the Powers will be willing to grant Trebizond to Armenia. ...

Let me say in conclusion that it is the understanding of the Government of the United States that whatever territorial changes or arrangements may be made in the former Ottoman Empire, such changes or arrangements will in no way place American citizens or corporations, or the citizens or corporations of any other country in a less favourable situation than the citizens or corporations of any Power party to this Treaty."

· Proper and adequate translation of this document into Russian, dated March 31, 1920, is stocked in the NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 577, pt.3, f.241-242 rev.

№ 304 note from the U.S. Secretary of State B.Colby - to the Envoy of the Republic of Armenia in the USA G.Pasdermajian

Washington, April 23, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/242a; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.778

"Sir: Referring to communications heretofore received from you on the subject of the proposed recognition of your Government by the Government of the United States, I am pleased to inform you, and through you, your Government, that, by direction of the President, the Government of the United States recognizes, as of this date, the de facto Government of the Armenian Republic.

This action is taken, however, with the understanding, that this recognition in no way predeterminates the territorial frontier, which, it is understood, are matters for later determination."

№ 305 note by the Allied Supreme Council - for the U.S. Secretary of State B.Colby*

San Remo, April 26, 1920 (received April 27)

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/9747:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol. III, p.753-756

"...The Council notes that the United States Government do not propose to be a plenipotentiary at the conference charged with negotiating the Treaty of peace with Turkey, otherwise than in the capacity of an observer, from which it follows that the United States Government do not intend to become signatories to the treaty. ...

The Allied Governments have never concealed their wish to see the United States associated in the preparation and signature of the treaty which is to embody the resettlement of Turkey on just and lasting basis. In the hope and expectation of American participation they had delayed the negotiations with Turkey at the risk of gravely imperilling the prospect of any satisfactory settlement being effected without a fresh recourse to arms. They fully understand and appreciate to the reasons for which the United States Government have not, finally, seen their way to become

parties to the treaty.

The Allied Government now pass to the conditions of the specific points raised in Mr.[B.]Colby's note. ...

2. The southern frontier of Turkey has been drawn after due consideration not only of the ethnical but also of economic and geographical factors involved. The United States Government will readily recognize that, as in the case of the other treaties with enemy powers, it is impossible to isolate these factors. In the region of Cilicia, the problem is more than usually complicated by the intermingling of those racial elements whose interests it is the object of the Allied Governments to protect. ...

7. The Allies share to the full America's interest in the establishment of an independent Armenia. It has been their earnest desire to accord to Armenia the territory which she might reasonably claim for her present needs and the future expansion. The problem has proved to be the most difficult of the whole treaty and the obstacles with which the Allies have found themselves confronted have at times seemed almost insuperable. The matter is being fully and frankly dealt with in a separate communication to the United States. ...

11. Finally, the Allied Governments take this opportunity of assuring the United States Government that the Allied Governments have in no way sought by the territorial changes and arrangements provided for in the Turkish treaty to place corporations or citizens in a privileged position as compared with American citizens or corporations. They feel, however, that they would lacking in candour if they did not point out that as they are precluded from undertaking obligations on behalf of non-signatory powers, so also they are unable to stipulate conditions in their favour." ...

This answer to the note by the U.S. Secretary of State B.Colby of March 24, 1920, had been approved at the meeting of the Supreme Council convened on April 26, in the course of the San Remo Conference. The text had been agreed by the Prime Ministers of the Great Britain, France and Italy D.Lloyd George, A. Millerand and F.Nitti; according to their common decision this note was signed by F.Nitti and transmitted to the U.S. Ambassador in Italy Robert Underwood Johnson, so that he could forward it to Washington. By a decision of his Government, R.Johnson took part in the Conference as an observer. He had wired the telegram

on April 27; and the Department of State had received it on the same day.

№ 306 note by the Allied Supreme Council -
to the U.S. President W.Wilson*

San Remo, April 26, 1920 (received April 28)

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/9749:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol. III, p.779-783

"...The following are the views which it is the desire of the Supreme Council to submit for the consideration of that Government.

At an early stage in the discussions which have been proceeding with regard to the Turkish treaty, first in London and afterwards [in] Paris, an inquiry was addressed by the Allied conference to the Council of the League of Nations, who were known to be greatly interested in the future of Armenia, as to what might be the degree of assistance that they would be prepared to offer toward the realization of the independence and security of the prospective Armenian State.

It was not contemplated to invite the League of Nations itself to assume a mandate for Armenia for the sufficient reason that [that] body is neither a State nor has the army or the finances to enable it to discharge such a duty. The Council of the League of Nations in their reply, while indicating the fullest sympathy with the object of the Allied Powers, themselves pointed out that this could best be assured if either a member of the League or some other power could be found willing to accept the mandate for Armenia.

The Supreme Council is considering this reply were at once reminded of the conviction long entertained by them that the only great power which is qualified alike by its sympathies and its material resources to undertake this task on behalf of humanity is America. It has indeed been rightly described in Mr.[B.]Colby's note as "the demand and expectation of the civilized world." Never had the Supreme Council forgot[ten] that the inclusion of a liberated Armenia among the objects for which the Allied and Associated Powers fought and won the war nowhere received more eloquent expression than in the speeches of President [W.] Wilson.

Accordingly the Supreme Council now address a definite appeal to the United States Government to accept the mandate for Armenia. They do so, not from the smallest desire to evade any obligations which they might be expected to undertake, but because the responsibilities which they are already obliged to bear in connection with the disposition of the former Ottoman Empire will strain their own capacities to the uttermost and because they believe that the appearance on the scene of a power emancipated from the prepossessions of the Old World will inspire a wider confidence and afford a firmer guarantee for stability in the future than would the selection of any European power.

The United States Government might well enquire what is the scope of the obligations which they are invited to accept and this involves the boundaries of the new State. The question is one in which it is in the power of that Government itself to formulate a reply.

In the course of the discussions that have been proceeding there has been no problem more earnestly debated or more difficult of solution than the boundaries best consonant with the interests of the Armenian State. The President of the United States has consistently pleaded the cause of a larger Armenia; considerations with which the President is already familiar have inevitably compelled the partial curtailment of these aspirations; and the prospect of creating an Armenia which should include Cilicia and extend to the Mediterranean has for long been abandoned as impracticable.

There remained the questions what portions of the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, still in the possession of the Turkish authorities, could properly and safely be added to the existing Armenian State of Erivan and what means of access to the sea should be provided in order to ensure to the new Armenia a self sufficing national existence. In other words it remained to be settled what should be the exact boundaries on the west and south which should be inserted in the peace treaty with Turkey. The boundaries of Armenia on the northwest and north and northeast with the adjoining States of Georgia and Azerbaijan it is hoped to settle by a mutual agreement between these Republics. In any case these do not call for mention here.

Upon the above questions there was much to be said upon both sides which need not be quoted in this note. Suffice it is to

say that an appeal to the decision of an independent and absolutely impartial arbiter was recognized as the best available solution and hence it was decided to include in the appeal to the President of the United States a request to this effect. Whatever may be the answer of the United States Government on the larger subject of the mandate it is earnestly hoped that he will, in the interests both of Armenia and of the peace of the East, accept this honourable obligation. In this expectation it has been agreed:

(a) To make an appeal to President [W.]Wilson that the United States of America should accept a mandate for Armenia within the limits set forth in section 5 of the first print of the draft treaty of peace with Turkey;

(b) that whatever may be the answer of the United States Government on the subject of the mandate the President of the United States should be asked to arbitrate on the boundaries of Armenia as set forth in the draft article below;

(c) that an article in regard to Armenia should be inserted in the treaty of peace in the following sense:

Turkey and Armenia and the other High Contracting parties agree to refer to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis and to accept this decision thereupon as well as any stipulation he may prescribe as to access to the sea for the independent State of Armenia.

Pending the arbitration the boundaries of Turkey and Armenia shall remain as at present.

The boundaries of Armenia on the north and east, that is, between Armenia and Georgia, and between Armenia and Azerbaijan shall be laid down by the Supreme Council at the same time as those between Armenia and Turkey, failing a spontaneous agreement on this subject between the three Caucasian States.

Irrespective of the mandate and the frontiers, there remain certain additional considerations to which the Supreme Council feel impelled to call the sympathetic attention of the United States Government. In whatever hands the destinies of Armenia may be placed an interval must inevitably occur after the conclusion of the treaty with Turkey in which the security and even the existence of the new State will be in peril unless it can be assured of extraneous aid. Its immediate needs will be two in number, pro-

vision for the military forces required to defend it against external attack and provision for the financial means that will enable it to constitute an orderly administration and to develop its own economic resources. In the last resort both of these necessities may be summed up under the heading of financial operations. The question of military assistance is not thought to be so formidable as might at first sight appear to be the case. The forces at present possessed by the Armenian Republic of Erivan have hitherto been to a large extent diverted if not dissipated in the unfortunate disputes with its neighbours on the north and the east. When these are composed as may be hoped from an arrangement quite recently concluded between the three Caucasian Republics there will be nothing to prevent a reconstituted Armenia from devoting its undivided energies to the vindication and maintenance of such frontiers as may be allotted to it. The question has been anxiously examined of the extent to which the Allied Powers might themselves be able, by the movement of troops, to assure the prompt execution of the territorial clauses of the treaty in the region of Armenia. Arms and ammunition are already been provided,** but it would raise false hopes on the part both of the Armenians and of their friends in all parts of the world if it were generally believed that the Allied Powers could themselves spare troops for this purpose. The responsibilities entailed upon them in addition to the heavy obligations in Europe and elsewhere by the occupation or administration of territories that formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire and by the necessity of enforcing the treaty in those parts of Turkey which are more accessible to their arms will render impossible the assumption of military responsibilities additional to the tremendous burdens they have already assumed. Unless, therefore, Armenia can obtain immediate assistance from some other power she shall be forced to rely in the main so far as military defence is concerned upon the forces which she already possess, augmented by such instructor[s] and munitions as the Allies can supply. Were, however, a volunteer contingent or a volunteer corps to be raised for her defence in America or in any foreign country it would no doubt be welcome and invaluable incentive to her own patriotism, but the offer of trained and technical assistance and material aid on an organized scale by a great civilized State would be exclusively opportune and would enable her to employ her own manhood in her own defence in an effective way.

It would be of the greatest value to know if the American Government or the American people will be at all disposed to render her this service.

The provision of credits, however, is even more urgent. The Council of the League of Nations have had it in mind we believe to recommend [to] the Assembly of the League to favour a loan to Armenia from all countries who are members of the Leagues. The Supreme Council have of course no knowledge of the response that may be returned to such an appeal if it be made, but even assuming a favourable reply an interval must occur before effective aid could be given. In this manner it is uncertain whether the response would be adequate to the need and in any case the appeal cannot, for reasons which are known,** be addresses to the United States Government. In these circumstances help might fail to be forthcoming in the very quarter where sympathy for the future Armenian State is most sincere and active, where the burdens entailed by the war are believed to be less prodigious than in any of the other recently belligerent countries, and where the resources of a State and a community at once powerful and wealthy have been least impaired.

It is not for the Supreme Council to suggest to the United States Government by what means, whether by State action or by contributions public or private, the desired financial aid to the Armenian Republic could best be afforded. As American loan of a few millions sterling might be the means of setting Armenia at once upon her feet. On the other hand it is believed that there are many organizations and societies in America that would gladly contribute to so excellent a cause, nor should Armenians themselves be backward in coming forward in the hour of their country's need. They cannot expect and they do not desire to depend exclusively upon the mercy or charity of others. Wealthy Armenians will, it is felt sure, contribute largely to that resuscitation of their country for which they have waited so patiently and amid sufferings so cruel and prolonged. ...It is not desired to urge upon the United States Government any unreasonable haste in arriving at a decision upon the momentous questions that have been submitted to them but it will be obvious to them that so long as these matters are held in suspense the anxieties of Armenia will be extreme and the pacification of the Eastern World may be seriously and even disastrously postponed. It would accordingly

be an immense relief to all the parties concerned if the United States Government were in a position to give as early a reply as may be convenient to all or any of the questions which have been submitted to them nor can the Supreme Council conclude without expressing a most earnest hope that that reply may be affirmative in character." ...

· Compiled by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs G. Curzon, approved by the Prime Ministers of the Great Britain, France and Italy D.Lloyd George, A.Millerand and F.Nitti at the San Remo Conference. By their common decision this message was signed by F.Nitti and transmitted to the U.S. Ambassador in Italy R.U.Johnson, to be forwarded to Washington. The latter had wired this telegram on April 27; it was received in Washington next day.

· This assertion had been somewhat exaggerated if we specify as the case stood on April 27, 1920. The first vessel with arms had arrived at Poti on July 2.

· On March 19, 1920, the U.S. Senate had rejected the Charter of the League of Nations for the second time; it had disavowed any membership of its country in the aforesaid organization, as well as participation in a Peace Treaty with Turkey.

№ 307 J.Harbord's Report on Armenia

Tiflis, April 27, 1920

"The Near East News." Tiflis, № 110, 27.04.1920, p.1-2; stored in: NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 576, pt.5, f.255-255 rev.

..."A Washington message says that General [J.]Harbord's report on the United States mandate for Armenia was introduced in the Senate. A resume was added to the report, wherein all considerations for and against acceptance of the mandate are examined.

I. Considerations for acceptance of the mandate.

- (1) Insuring of peace to the whole world.
- (2) Assisting the cause of humanity.
- (3) Satisfying the wishes of the Near East nations, who prefer American administration to any other.
- (4) The fact that each Allied Great Power, since it does not receive itself the mandate for Armenia, prefers America to be the mandatory.

(5) The consideration that some time the revenue of the mandatory will cover its expenses, and thus [will help the] American capital to [make] profitable investment.

(6) The fact that if America takes the mandate, ...it will obtain no [objections]... under the recent Turkish regime.

II. Consideration[s] against taking of the mandate:

(1) Grave interior affairs of the United States.

(2) The fact that intervention of America in the affairs of the Old World diminishes the effect of the Monroe Doctrine.

(3) The fact that America in no way took part in the present grave situation of the Near East.

(4) The fact that Great Britain, Russia and other great powers are disappointed in the regions, England, however, has of course the experience and means for establishing a just and stable control over the country.

(5) The United States cannot pursue for a long time a uniform foreign policy for the present Congress cannot bind by obligations any future Congress.

(6) The necessity to advance big sums of money at first, while commercial revenues will be insignificant."

In connection with this report, [W.]Wilson addressed the following statement to General [J.]Harbord: "The United States has indeed undertaken the obligation to regulate several questions of foreign policy touching very strongly the interests of the United States, independently from domestic affairs of the utmost importance. But American intervention in Armenian affairs will demand from 100,000 to 200,000 soldiers. The United States can undertake such a burden only after preliminary agreement with Great Britain and France, and after definite approval by Russia and Germany, especially on questions concerning Turkey and Transcaucasia. The expenses of intervention for the first year are figured at 275,000,000 dollars."

№ 308 telegram from the U.S, Secretary of State B.Colby -
to the U.S. Ambassador in France H.C.Wallace

Paris, May 17, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 763.72119/9749:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol. III, p.783

"...The request of the Supreme Council has been considered by the President, and he desires that the Powers represented at

San Remo be informed through the proper channels of his willingness to undertake to act as arbitrator for the Armenian boundaries. He gladly accepts this opportunity to contribute to the welfare of the Armenian people, and you are requested to convey his acceptance to the Powers concerned." ...

№ 309 memorandum by the U.S. Secretary of War N.D.Baker -
for the U.S. Secretary of State B.Colby

Washington, June 2, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/280/Encl.; Papers 1920, vol.III, p. 784-785

"1. The report of General J.Harbord, Chief of the American Military Mission to Armenia, contemplated, that Trans-Caucasia and the whole of the former Turkish Empire, less Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia would be included in the terms of a single mandate. For this territory General J.Harbord proposed an initial American force of occupation of 59,000 men, to be reduced subsequently by about 50 per cent as a result of the organization of a native constabulary.

2. The area of the proposed State of Armenia is from 55,000 to 60,000 square miles, or about one-sixth of the area considered by General J.Harbord. Its population is estimated at approximately 3,000,000.

3. The War Department is of the opinion that pending the organization of a native constabulary, an American force of occupation of the following strength and composition, would be sufficient to insure domestic order in Armenia, and to protect its frontiers against the incursions of irregular or unorganized forces from adjacent territories, viz;

One Infantry Division, less 1 regiment, of 155 mm. howitzers,
plus a third brigade of infantry... 21,152 men

Attached troops: -

1. Railway Battalion	1,000
2. Aero squadron	400
Additional Sanitary Personnel	1,000
Service of Supply	2,500
Attached for duty with native constabulary	500
Total Attached Troops	5,400

Grand Total	26,552
Or in round numbers	27,000

4. As a result of the organization of native constabulary, it should be possible to reduce the above force substantially by the end of two years, and to about 10,000 men by the end of the third year.

5. As to organized external aggressions against Armenia, if the League of Nations functions in accordance with the terms of the Covenant, the protection of Armenia against such aggression will devolve upon all the member States of the League. In any event it may be said that it will be impracticable to maintain in Armenia American forces of occupation of such size as to insure the protection of that State against invasions in force. At present the greatest danger in this respect is that offered by the Bolsheviks. A Bolshevik force of from 65,000 to 75,000 men has been advancing southward through the Caucasus and has recently occupied Baku, and in newspaper dispatches of this date is reported to have ensured Russian Armenia." ...

№ 310 letter from the Envoy of the Republic of Armenia on special mission to the USA G.Pasdermajian - to the Secretary of State B.Colby

Washington, June 10, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/407, T1192, Roll 3, NAA, MR № 37

"Sir, Firmly believing that the President, as the recognized champion of the just cause of Armenia, will define such boundaries as to assure for her a real political and economic independence I now have the honour to invite your attention to the following:

The Great Powers do not appear to intend employing any of their forces to occupy Turkish Armenia, and thinking that the Armenians cannot occupy with their own forces the territories which they claim, they, the Powers have reduced the size of the proposed Armenia.

Since May, 1919 the representatives of our Government have repeatedly asked the Allied Powers for arms and munitions, but up to date we have not received a single rifle or cartridge from them.* Consequently, our small army of 25,000 men is ill equipped and ill clad, and therefore unable to protect the Republic against the Turko-Tartars and at the same time to occupy that part of

Turkish Armenia which the President will allot to us.

It is a matter of record that we had in the Russian Army over 160,000 Armenian officers and men. We have today within the boundaries of our Republic more than 70,000 trained soldiers and a corresponding number of officers. It is evident that if the necessary munitions and supplies were to be furnished us, we could easily put in the field an Armenian army that would meet the requirements of the situation.

Our present difficulties are aggravated by the unfortunate fact that the Turkish so-called nationalists appear to have been encouraged and that the importance and resources of their movement has been grossly exaggerated. On the other hand, the rejection of the mandate for Armenia at this juncture was a most unfortunate incident in our cause. But our people will not fail to be ever grateful to the President for his magnanimous efforts to translate into a definite policy his well known sympathy for Armenia.

The prevailing desperate conditions in Armenia render some immediate remedial action imperative, if Armenia is to be saved. In view of the extraordinary situation, I take the liberty to ask whether it would be possible for the United States Government to suggest to the Allied Powers to take certain steps in order to meet the most urgent needs of Armenia.

(a) That munitions and supplies for an Army of 50,000 men be furnished on a credit basis to the Armenian Government.

(b) That, as a means of avoiding unnecessary bloodshed, a small international force be sent to Armenia for a short period - two to four battalions from each participating State, - which force shall accompany the Armenian troops charged with the task of occupying the non-occupied parts of Armenia.

(c) That the Allied and Associated Powers create an international fund, say \$200,000,000 out of the indemnities which they shall receive from the Central Powers, to be used for the repatriation of the several hundred thousand refugees, for the reparation of the wanton destruction, for the general work of reconstruction, the purchase of agricultural implements, rolling stock, etc. I understand that the Turkish Treaty does not provide any indemnity for the damages caused in Armenia, notwithstanding the fact that Armenia in proportion to her population, has suffered greater human and material losses than any one of the belligerent nations.

In conclusion I beg to state, that even if the American mandate over Armenia, so much desired by us, should unfortunately not materialize for the present, we would still hope that the United States Government might extend to our Country a moral protection, lending us advisory aid during our formative period, and to use its influence with the Allied Powers to do their share in the above mentioned three points." ...

* Correct. As it was already mentioned a little bit above, the first ship with the British arms had arrived in Poti on July 2, 1920.

№ 311 memorandum by the heads of the Armenian United Delegation A.Aharonian and Boghos Nubar - for the President of the USA W.Wilson

Paris, July 14, 1920

NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 557, ч.2, f.409-441, 462-489

"Mr. President

We have the honour to hand you herewith two memoranda with their annexes, together with copies of five other documents presented at the Peace Conference, concerning the Armenian claims to the regions which, by the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey are to be, wholly or in part, included in the territories of the Armenian Republic, and the delimitation of which has been submitted to your arbitration. At the same time we beg respectfully to mention the main reasons which make it desirable that your decision should be pronounced as soon as possible. ...

Although a number of refugees have found shelter and work in Europe, and although many Armenians even enjoy a real prosperity which they are eager to place at the disposal of their country as soon as the situation makes it possible for them to do so; yet by far the large number, those belonging to the regions to be restored to Armenian refugees from Van, Bitlis, Erzerum, Trebizond etc., endure dire privations in the Armenian Republic where they found an affectionate welcome but not the means of satisfying all their material needs. Three hundred thousand of those refugees, who saw 200,000 of their companions perish from famine, and disease before the arrival of the American Relief Mission, await with feverish impatience the decision that will allow them to return to their homeland to till their soil again and rebuild their homes while wheat is scarce in the Armenian Republic, vast expanses of uncultivated land in the deserted regions

only await the coming of the labourers to afford subsistence to all the citizens of Armenia.

From Bulgaria, Egypt, Rumania, Mesopotamia and Soviet Russia pressing appeals reach us from our Countrymen anxious to return to their native land. Many of them in the belief that the Armenian Question was settled by the victory of the Allies, liquidated their businesses and property months ago, with the intention of settling in Armenia. Unable either to realize their project or to go back to their affairs, they are now living from hand to mouth in poverty and uncertainty.

A sad multitude of widows and orphans continue to wander hither and thither in Turkey, because the over[crowded] Armenian Republic is unable to find food and shelter for them. To their number must be added the thousands of Armenian women sequestered in Mussulman harems.

Moreover, the present state of uncertainty paralyses the Armenian Republic itself in its efforts towards the restoration and reorganisation of the country. Financially it has to face the impossibility of effecting loan or other operations to the country's development as well as to meet its immediate needs, so long as its boundaries remain undetermined.

It is certain that the delimitation by arbitration of the frontiers of Armenia will have an immediate and considerable moral effect. The Turks, accustomed to tergiversations and imprecisions of all sorts on which they have constantly founded the success of their European policy, are not yet resigned to the idea that the creation of an independent Armenia calls for territorial sacrifices on their part. This question left in abeyance, gives them the opportunity of intriguing at home and abroad with a view to rendering a solution as difficult as possible. The Young Turks, with Mustapha Kemal Pasha at their head, base their propaganda in the assertion that the Powers will be forced to waive the conditions of the Peace Treaty on account of the resistance of the nationalists. The arbitration award cannot fail to make an impression on the Young Turks and modify their state of mind. Knowing the Turks, we attach the utmost importance to this moral factor which, we are convinced, will hasten the return of peace. Oriental resignation will soon accept the necessities of the arbitration award, while the Armenian nation will feel well-deserved relief and comfort.

Mr. President, you will understand the anxious suspense with which the Armenian people (on the eve of its renaissance) awaits the arbitral sentence that will fix the boundaries of Armenia.

Respectfully confident in your sentiments of Equity, drawn [by] the ties of the sincerest gratitude towards the [eminent] and generous defender of the Armenian cause and convinced that your intervention as supreme arbitrate[tion] guarantees [to] Armenia the frontiers that are indispensable to her existence and development we leave it to your high sense of justice to appreciate the importance and urgency of the considerations set forth in the annexed documents.

We beg to remain, Mr. President, your most obedient servants.

Annex 1 "Note relative to the frontiers of Armenia.

Frontiers of Armenia. Geography"

"Determining the area within which the President of the United States of America will fix the frontiers of Armenia, the Turkish Peace Treaty designates the four provinces of Erzerum, Trebizond, Bitlis and Van.

Even if the President of the United States, while adhering to the letter of the Treaty, were to attribute [to Armenia] the whole of these four provinces, the resulting frontiers would have none of the characteristics of a geographical unity. ...

The Armenian Delegation ventures to insist on this point more particularly because, apart from administrative, stratigraphical and ethnic considerations it should not be forgotten that, from an economic point of view, as explained in the Armenian note handed to General J. Harbord on September 4, 1919, the no mineral riches the country can only be reached where seismic upheavals have broken the immense sheet of lava covering the Central Plateau. It is in the water-course depressions around the Plateau that mineral wealth is accessible. The mineralogical map of Armenia indicates nine minefields of different description in the depression of Kharpout alone.

The Armenian Delegation, although aware that the scope of the present arbitration is limited to the four provinces of Trebizond, Erzerum, Bitlis and Van, begs leave to submit to President W. Wilson's judgment the foregoing historical, economic and (particularly) geographical considerations relative to Kharpout, which is

not included in the four provinces mentioned in the Treaty. The Delegation trusts that these considerations in view of their great importance will be taken into account; more particularly as it has deemed desirable to abandon all claim to certain non-Armenian regions such as Aghbak* and the greater portion of the Vilayet of Trebizond, which, nevertheless, are comprised with the four provinces the attribution of which is submitted to arbitration.

The Armenian Delegation begs therefore to express the following hopes:

1. That the Western and Southern frontiers of Armenia will be drawn to correspond with the boundaries of the former province of Erzerum, as indicated on the map annexed herein. It should be particularly remarked that this province, represents the Ancient Armenia Major, and, scientifically the central Plateau of Armenia, one and rationally indivisible.

II. That the Northern frontier will be delimited so as to include the Black Sea coast - from Off-Surmene, to the former Russo-Turkish frontier on the mountains sloping, thus giving Armenia means of communications between the interior and the sea.

These conditions being observed, the frontier line desired by Armenia would start at a point West of Off, on the shores of the Black Sea, ascend towards the Pontic Chain, pass Westward along the crests of the latter, to the town of Gumushkhane in Armenian territory, and thence descend Southward, following the Western Administrative limits of Erzerum as far as the Euphrates, which would thence form the frontier to, as far as the great barrier of the Armenian Taurus stretching Eastward from Theleck to Bashkale, South-East of Van, to meet the Persian frontier.

"Note concerning the maritime debouch of Armenia"

...From the mouth of the Chorokh to Trebizond the only point offering a certain number of favourable hydrographical conditions is that of the Bay of Rize. ...The Bay of Rize is not a maritime port could not easily be transformed into one; it is, however, the only inlet breaking the escarpments of the Pontic chain... along the whole coast as far as Batum. ...

"Topographical particularities of Armenian land communications"

The whole stretch of the narrow land of territory between the mouth of Chorokh and that of the Iris** is occupied by the

Pontic Chain, which the well-known English geologist F.Oswald described as the coast-chain of the Armenian Plateau. ... Taking as a basis the map prepared by the Geographical Section of the British army and annexed to the Turkish Treaty, we may divide the Pontic Chain into four Zones of altitudes. ...

The only breach through which the future Armenian road to the sea can pass is the one extending from Rize to the valley of the Chorokh and giving access to Erzerum.

No attempt has ever been made by the Ottoman Government to build roads connecting the interior with the Coast, and taking advantage of the topographical features of the country. Of these that exist, only the Trebizond road is more or less fit for carriage traffic, the Rize, Off and Atine roads are mere mule tracks. ...For the present and for some time to come, the only practicable communications between the interior of Armenia and the Black Sea are the two valleys traversing the central and Eastern fractions of the Pontic Chain; on the West, the valley of Khorshat*** which is utilized by the Trebizond road from Ardassa,⁴ in the heart of Western Armenia; on the east, the valley of the Chorokh, the main artery of Eastern Armenia.

Armenia cannot be reconstituted and prosperous if these two main arteries be detached from her geographical unity.

The first, the Trebizond road, is suitable for carriage traffic, and is the only practicable route. From Trebizond to Ardassa it belongs to the region of Trebizond, but on leaving Ardassa, it enters the heart of the Armenian Plateau. The Erzinka⁵ carriage road joins it at Thekke. The Armenian Delegation respectfully begs President W.Wilson to consider the desirability of including this junction of Thekke in Armenian territory. In regard to the valley of the Chorokh it represents incontestably the whole Economic future of Armenia.

The Commission for the delimitation of the Russo-Turkish frontiers in 1878 was guided by purely military reasons, which explains why the admirable geographical frontiers constituted by the mouth of the Chorokh was rejected. The frontier was made to pass along the heights on the West in order to guard against Turkish incursions. These reasons no longer exist. ...

Trebizond being attributed to Turkey, Batum to Georgia, the only site meeting the requirements of a maritime debouche for the Armenian Plateau is the Bay of Rize. ...As indicted on the Topo-

graphical map (Annex I № 9) it is indispensable that, on the West, the mouth of the Surmene and the cross-roads of Thekke, and on the East the mouth of the Chorokh be comprised within the frontiers of Armenia. The Armenian Republic has unfortunately already experienced the bitter disadvantage and perils of a State encircled and deprived of an outlets to the sea. This lack of communication with the world is responsible for the death of 180,000 Armenians from famine. The reports presented by Colonel W.Haskell, the indefatigable American Commissioner, indicate the extraordinary difficulties encountered in the despatch of American wheat to Armenia.

The Armenian Delegation confidently trusts, therefore, that the President of the United States will attribute to Armenia a suitable outlet to the sea with adequate means of communications with the interior.

"Population of Armenia"

In the section entitled "Armenia" of the Turkish counter-propositions, the Ottoman Empire asserts that "if certain portions of the Eastern Vilayets of Turkey are annexed to Armenia the Mussulman element in the Republic will be equivalent to the double or triple of the Armenian population." That is an assertion for which there is no foundation whatever. In the Transcaucasian portion of the Armenian Republic, the number of inhabitants, according to the statistics compiled by the Russian Government in 1916, is distributed as follows:

Armenians	1,294,000
Mussulmans	670,000 (including 82,000 Kurds)
Russians, Georgians	123,000 (including Greeks, Nestorians)
various	73,000

...If we add to the above Table the statistics of Vital Cuiet,⁶ quoted by the Turkish Government, relative to the vilayets of Erzerum, Van (without the Sanjak of Aghbak*) and Bitlis (without Sgherd), it will be seen that... the Mussulmans are in a minority, the figures showing: ...

Armenians	1,595,000
Mussulmans	1,421,000

Now, it will be prudent to test the value of even Vital Cuinet's statistics. This author published in 1892 an interesting work on Turkey in Asia, in the form of a semi-official Turkish publication. But, with a scientific sincerity, he was careful to state that the figures he gave could not be taken as absolutely accurate, in view of the hindrances which the Turkish authorities deliberately placed in the way of his researches, and of the general difficulty of his task due to the distance of certain provinces. ...

After examining the figures quoted by the Turkish memorandum, the Armenian Delegation deems it its duty to set against them the figures resulting from the Census of the Armenian population in Turkey taken in 1912 by the Armenian Patriarchate. It may be mentioned that the means of the disposal of the Patriarchate were sufficient for the accomplishment of its purpose. ... We give below the figures thus obtained of the Armenian population in the regions in question, adding, for the territories of the Armenian Republic, the Russian official Statistics of 1916:

Armenians	1,874,000
Mussulmans	1,261,000

The Kizilbaches, Zazas, Yezidis, Tsiganes etc., cannot exceed half of the pre-war number. This diminution is explained by the effects of the war, army mobilizations, privations of all sorts, losses of the front, epidemics, famine, and the military occupation of this portion of Turkish Armenia, taken and retaken several times by the Russian armies, the result being the emigration of the Mussulman population en masse towards Asia Minor. At a sitting of the Turkish Senate on January 29, 1915⁷ the Director of the Emigrant Department, replying to a question by General Riza Pasha, Senator, confessed that the frightful mortality among the emigrants (20 per cent in the Turkish provinces) had been lowered to 5 per cent only during the month of January, 1915.⁸ ...

The Armenians, it is true, also suffered unspeakably from massacres and other calamities. But if Armenians of the western Provinces of Turkey were subjected to all the horrors of a regime of barbarity, those of the provinces of the east, nearer the frontier, were for the most part able to take refuge in Russian territory at the beginning of hostilities. Thus, the survivors of Erzerum, Van and Bitlis are much more numerous than those of the other pro-

vinces of the former Turkish empire. Directly the reunion of those regions with the Armenian State is accomplished, the Armenian refugees in the Caucasus, as well as those who have fled abroad, will return in large numbers to their own country - 800,000 probably in all. ...

It must not be forgotten, indeed, that on the one hand, that the area of land unfit for agriculture and cattle-breeding surpasses amounts to 40 per cent of the total superficies; while on the other hand the Armenians are known to be one of the most prolific peoples of the world. Where the existence of the Armenian peasant was assured, as, for instance, in Russia, the normal increase of the Armenian population of Transcaucasia was, according to the Russian Official Statistics, between 23,1 per thousand and 28,8 per thousand per annum. Such an annual increase of population insures an augmentation of 100 per cent in 30 years.

It may not be out of place here to recall that Bulgaria, which at the time... of its liberation, counted not more than 1,130,000 Bulgarians against 1,119,000 Mussulmans, entered upon its independence under much less favourable auspices than does Armenia. ...

The massacres of Armenia by the Turks... began long ago. The Armenians, oppressed in every way by the invader have been systematically prevented from developing their social and political capacities. ...Under the regime of the Sultan Abdul Hamid alone, that is to say during the last half of the 19th century, more than 300,000 Armenians were massacred in Armenia, and that or even greater number of Armenians emigrated to America, Europe, Egypt, etc.

The Turkish regime, indeed, has decimated the Armenian race. The disappearance of that regime, however, will automatically restore normal conditions thanks to which, within a comparatively short period, Armenians will be enabled to become masters in their own country, and with the superiority of numbers, play the role assigned to them by History. ...

Vilayets and Sanjaks	Armenians	Greeks, Nestorians, Jacobites, Chaldeans	Mussulmans	various
Erzerum	134,967	3,741	500,782	500,782

Sanjak Van	64,998	1,000	60,500	3,000
Bitlis				
Sanjak Bitlis	32,909	3,950	70,403	965
Sanjak Mush	55,365	372	66,752	970
Sanjak Genj	12,964		52,397	836
Total	301,203	9,063	750,834	11,983" ⁶

* Inscribed as Hakkiari.

** Mentioned as Yeshil Irmak.

*** In the text: Kershut.

⁴ At present: Torul.

⁵ Lettered as Erzinghian.

⁶ Cuinet V., *Le Turquie d'Asie. Géographie administrative, statistique descriptive et raisonnée de chaque province de l'Asie Mineure*. P., E.Leroux, 1892, tome I, p. 137; t.II, p.527, 690.

⁷ Mentioned in the text as March 13, 1333 of Hegira.

⁸ See: Official Journal, report of the sitting of March 13, 1333, p.567.

№ 312 note by the Director of the American Relief Administration H.Hoover - to the Secretary of State B.Colby

New York, July 26, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 123 H 271/4; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.785-787

"...On July 5th, 1919, in order to meet the desperate need of the Armenian population in Transcaucasia and the Armenian Republic, at my suggestion and in accordance with the wishes of the President, Colonel William N.Haskell was appointed High Commissioner to Armenia, representing the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy. His commission was signed by M. G.Clemenceau as President of the Peace Conference.

The authority centred in the High Commissioner as joint Representative of the several Allied Powers gave him the powerful support which he required to overcome those racial and political antagonisms, the natural outgrowth of the birth of the new States, which were threatening the total annihilation of the Armenian people. The work of this Mission was also to ascertain and provide requirements up to the point when the succeeding crops would

render general contributions of food stuffs from overseas unnecessary; to take over and extend the charitable work of the Near East Relief in caring for refugees, orphans and destitutes; to represent the American Relief Administration; to administer the charitable relief from all other countries; to assist in re-establishing stable conditions in the Republic of Armenia.

Colonel W.Haskell, supported by an efficient and devoted staff, has carried out his difficult duties in an admirable manner. Flour was the most urgent food requirement of this region. The 41,000 tons contributed through the United States Grain Corporation and the 51,000 tons of the American Relief Administration have been delivered. The amount is sufficient to supply essential needs until the next harvest, which it is estimated, will then carry the country for six to eight months. Refugees have been fed and clothed to a considerable extent restored to useful occupations. Agriculture has been re-established. Forty hospitals and seventeen orphanages have been opened or put in order and provisioned for one year ahead. Over fifty thousand children have been fed daily.

Under the direction of the American Relief Administration and including the period of the administration of the Allied High Commissioner, there was contributed from all sources for the aid of the Armenian people in this region one hundred and eight thousand tons of food and supplies. This was in the form of the Governmental credits or private donations the approximate values of which were as follows:

From Great Britain:

Besides a small amount of private charity of which we have no record, there was furnished on the part of the British Government in the form of freight credits a total of \$560,000.

From the United States:

1. The American Relief Administration covering allocation from the \$100,000,000 relief appropriation, March 1919, to date credits	\$8,075,000
2. Grain Corporation Credits	\$4,725,000
3. American Red Cross donations	\$2,100,000
4. Commonwealth Fund donations	\$750,000
5. Near East Relief donations	\$4,802,000
Total from the United States	\$20,452,000

Grand total	\$21,012,000
-------------	--------------

Aside from the work of reconstruction, the repatriation of the many thousands of refugees, and the benevolent activities which must for years be carried on by the American Government, for the present the most appealing work for any outside relief organization must be the care of hospitals, orphanages, schools and a certain number of destitute.

Colonel W.Haskell has successfully performed the task for which he was appointed. The orphanages, hospitals and other charities in the Armenian Republic and Transcaucasia have been turned over to the management of the Near East Relief. All the American Military Staff are to be withdrawn at once. He proposes, as of August first when the few remaining relief measures of the Government program are completed, to present his resignation to the Council of Ambassadors in Paris.

With Colonel [W.]Haskell's resignation my intervention in the management of this branch of European Relief will also come to an end.

I respectfully suggest, Mr. Secretary, that the State Department notify the Council of Ambassadors in Paris of the resignation of Colonel W.Haskell to be handed to them August 1st, 1920." ...

№ 313 note № 491 by the British Ambassador in the USA
A.Geddes - for the Secretary of State B.Colby

Washington, August 6, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/40; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.787

"Sir: I have the honor, on instructions from my Government, to enquire whether the President's decision as to the boundaries of Armenia, may be expected in the near future.

I understand that this question has become a matter of urgency owing to the imminent signature to the Peace Treaty with Turkey,* the execution of which in part, at least, depends on the President's decision." ...

* Arranged on August 10, 1920.

№ 314 note by the Secretary of State B.Colby - for the British Ambassador in the USA A.Geddes

Washington, August 13, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/40; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.787-788

"...I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Note ...of August 6th, inquiring whether the President's decision as to the boundaries of Armenia may be expected in the near future. The collection of pertinent data on this subject, and the examination and verification of various records, historical and cartographical, is a preliminary to the consideration of the main question which, as you are of course aware, requires ample time. This work is in progress.

Our impression has been that as Article 89, Section VI, of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey provides that "Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting parties, agree to submit to the arbitration of the president of the United States, the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia," the decision of the President would only follow the notification to him of the signed agreement of the interested parties." ...

№ 315 memorandum № 493 by the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople M.Bristol - for the Secretary of State B.Colby

Constantinople, September 18, 1920 (received September 19)

US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/23:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.788

"Section 2. ...No one could believe that the Turks would evacuate any territory cede to Armenia without being forced to make such evacuation. ...And it is most probable that they will have to be forced by the Allies, assisted by Greece, to recognize the treaty. The Turkish treaty gives to Armenia only such portions of the eastern vilayets as may be decided by the arbitration of the President. This would seem to impose upon him the responsibility for enforcing the evacuation of territory thus given to Armenia. Such regions are practically empty of Armenians to-day and repatriation from the Erivan Republic would result in disorder unless protection were assured." ...

№ 316 telegram from the U.S. Consul at Tiflis C.Moser -
to the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople M.Bristol*

Tiflis, October 4, 1920 (received October 12)

US NA, RG 59, 760J.67/-:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.
788-789

"Armenian Government informed me tonight that Armenia in a state of war against Turkey. A general mobilization is called for all males over age of 35 and the railroad turned over to military authorities. It is reported, that Georgia has agreed to assist Armenia and to compel the mobilization for service in Armenia of all men in Georgia according to their nationality. The Turks occupied Sarikamish which contains considerable stores of the Near East Relief and some anxiety is felt for the personnel of the Near East Relief especially at Kars. Tonight military patrol established at Tiflis to guard police station and government institutions from possible Bolshevik demonstration in support of Turk Nationalists."

* On October 10, 1920, this message had been wired to Washington as telegram № 520 for the Secretary of State B.Colby.

№ 317 note from the Secretary General of the Peace
Conference - for the U.S. Embassy in Paris*

Paris, October 18, 1920 (received October 18)

US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/47:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III,
p.789

"...The Secretariat General of the Peace Conference has the honour to forward herewith to the United States Embassy an authenticated copy of the treaty signed at Sèvres on August 10th, 1920 between the Allied Powers and Turkey.

The Secretariat General has the honour to draw the Embassy's attention to article 89 of this treaty which provides that the determination of the frontier line between Turkey and Armenia will be submitted to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America who will also prescribe all expedient stipulations in regard to Armenia's access to the sea and in regard to the demilitarization of the Ottoman territory adjacent to the said frontier. The Secretariat General of the Conference acting in accordance with the instructions of the Allied Powers begs the United States Embassy kindly to transmit to President W.Wilson the copy of the treaty which it has the honour to enclose."

* The U.S. Ambassador in France H.C.Wallace had transmitted

this note on same day to Washington, for the Secretary of State B. Colby.

№ 318 letter № 4818 from Diplomatic Representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia T.Bekzadian - to the U.S. Consul in Transcaucasia C.Moser*

Tiflis, November 11, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 860J.00/17/Encl.3, T1192, Roll 1, NAA, MR № 49

"Following my note of November 4, I have to report that according to last-minute information received from Erevan, the Turkish offensive on Alexandropol, which had taken place after the seizure of Kars, was provisionally suspended by our troops just near the Alexandropol. The Turks assault the railway station Kizil Chakhchakh, its seizure could decide the fate of Alexandropol. Three successive Turkish attacks were repulsed by our forces, the enemy had to retreat, although Turks from Aghbaba had rebelled during these operations. Under the direction of regular Turkish army detachments, they assault our rears. Thus, occupation of Alexandropol by Turkish troops turns inevitable.

Under the circumstances, there is nothing else left for our High Command to do but to accept Turkish proposal of Armistice and thus to obtain an opportunity to be permitted to save population from the imminent disaster; and therefore, to surrender fortress of Alexandropol and its railway station. ...My Government consented to take this step, dictated, however, by fatal inevitability.

Indescribable and unprecedented hardships in the country, suspension of railway traffic owing to absence of fuel, occupation by the enemy of our sole sources of coal and firewood (in Olty and Sarikamish), which are indispensable both to population and to the Army; everything taken together deprived our troops of hot meals and heated barracks; besides, total absence or disorganization of traffic management, disability to exploit cars, lorries and airplanes for lack of gasoline, and even to employ howitzers for want of their lubricants, total lack of drugs and quinine in particular in a country where epidemics of malaria embrace whole districts and field forces; total lack of garments and sheepskin coats, which would enable soldiers to endure [hard] frosts at Kars and Alexandropol - such are physical and material conditions in

which population of the Republic and its Army heroically fight two last years, consumed with a common impulse to conserve their liberty and independence of their State.

All available facilities, however, are limited by reality. Patience of martyred and moaning Armenian nation gives away. This people is compelled to sustain anew unspeakable sufferings; the nation is enforced to adopt the proposal of Armistice, which he would reject indignantly and with invincible firmness under other conditions and with at least slight support of Allies. Just that exact people had been enforced to consent to the occupation of Alexandropol by hostile troops, not including other demands which might be made of him.

The tragic case of Armenia, its folk and Government becomes even more evident if we take into account that 1) this new disaster befell Armenia after the de jure recognition of its Republic in the Treaty of Sevres by the Powers of Entente; 2) that after conclusion of this Treaty scores of refugees arrived from Russia, Europe and Constantinople; places, they had fled to escape from Turkish yataghan. These people hurried to return their native land; and now they should undergo here deathblows again; besides, we can't dismiss 3) a consideration that this disaster expands for six weeks, with the knowledge of Allies who did not wish to render Armenia any substantial assistance.

I think it to be my duty to notify Your Excellence all previously mentioned and I do hope You'll deign to bring it to Your Government's knowledge."

* Translated from French.

№ 319 telegram from Catholicos Gevorg V Tphghisetsi -
to President of the USA W.Wilson

Yerevan, November 12, 1920 (received December 2)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.4016P81/125, T1192, Roll 6, NAA, MR

№ 46

"At the moment when the Treaty of Sevres had consecrated the liberty of the Armenian people, ...it sees again its secular adversary invade its country. Exhausted, starving, suffering, the Armenian people is abandoned at the present hour to the enemy.

...In the name of the Saviour I appeal to the Christian humanity of your Excellency to save the remains of my people in Armenia, by according to it the necessary moral and physical aid

until it may be able to collect its scattered forces to be in a condition to defend itself." ...

№ 320 confidential letter from the President of the USA
W.Wilson - to the President of the Supreme Council
of the Allied Powers*

Washington, November 22, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/61/Encl.1, T1193, Roll 2, NAA,
MR № 35

"Mr. President:**

By action of the Supreme Council taken on April 26th of this year an invitation was tendered to me to arbitrate the question of the boundaries between Turkey and the new State of Armenia. Representatives of the powers signatory on August 10th of this year to the Treaty of Sèvres have acquiesced in conferring this honor upon me and have signified their intention of accepting the frontiers which are to be determined by my decision, as well as any stipulations which I may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea and any arrangements for the demilitarization of Turkish territory lying along the frontier thus established. According to the terms of the arbitral reference set forth in Part III, Section 6, Article 89, of the Treaty of Sèvres, the scope of the arbitral competence assigned to me is clearly limited to the determination of the frontiers of Turkey and Armenia in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis. With full consciousness of the responsibility placed upon me by your request, I have approached this difficult task with eagerness to serve the best interests of the Armenian people as well as the remaining inhabitants, of whatever race or religious belief they may be, in this stricken country, attempting to exercise also the strictest possible justice toward the populations, whether Turkish, Kurdish, Greek or Armenian, living in the adjacent areas.

In approaching this problem it was obvious that the existing ethnic and religious distribution of the populations in the four vilayets could not, as in other parts of the world, be regarded as the guiding element of the decision. The ethnic consideration, in the case of a population originally so complexly intermingled, is further beclouded by the terrible results of the massacres and deportations of Armenians and Greeks, and by the dreadful losses also suffered by the Moslem inhabitants through refugee move-

ments and the scourge of typhus and other diseases. The limitation of the arbitral assignment to the four vilayets named in Article 89 of the Treaty made it seem a duty and an obligation that as large an area within these vilayets be granted to the Armenian State as could be done, while meeting the basic requirements of an adequate natural frontier and of geographic and economic unity for the new State. It was essential to keep in mind that the new State of Armenia, including as it will a large section of the former Armenian provinces of Transcaucasian Russia, will at the outset have a population about equally divided between Moslem and Christian elements and of diverse racial and tribal relationship. The citizenship of the Armenian Republic will, by the tests of language and religion, be composed of Turks, Kurds, Greeks, Kizilbashis, Lazes and others, as well as Armenians. The conflicting territorial desires of Armenians, Turks, Kurds and Greeks along the boundaries assigned to my arbitral decision could not always be harmonized. In such cases it was my belief that consideration of a healthy economic life for the future State of Armenia should be decisive. Where, however the requirements of a correct geographic boundary permitted, all mountain and valley districts along the border which were predominantly Kurdish or Turkish have been left to Turkey rather than assigned to Armenia, unless trade relations with definite market towns threw them necessarily into the Armenian State. Wherever information upon tribal relations and seasonal migrations was possible, the attempt was made to respect the integrity of tribal groupings and nomad pastoral movements.

From the Persian border southwest of the town of Kotur the boundary line of Armenia is determined by a rugged natural barrier of great height, extending south of Lake Van and lying southwest of the Armenian cities of Bitlis and Mush. This boundary line leaves as a part of the Turkish State the entire Sandjak of Aghbak,** or about one-half of the Vilayet of Van, and almost the entire Sandjak of Sairt. The sound physiographic reason which seemed to justify this decision was further strengthened by the ethnographic consideration that Aghbak and Sairt are predominantly Kurdish in population and economic relations. It did not seem to the best interest of the Armenian State to include in it the upper valley of the Great Zab River, largely Kurdish and Nestorian Christian in population and an essential element of the great

Tigris river irrigation system of Turkish Kurdistan and Mesopotamia. The control of these headwaters should be kept, wherever possible, within the domain of the two interested States, Turkey and Mesopotamia. For these reasons the Armenian claim upon the upper valley of the Great Zab could not be satisfied.

The boundary upon the west from Bitlis and Mush northward to the vicinity of Erznka^{4*} lies well within Bitlis and Erzerum vilayets. It follows a natural geographic barrier, which furnishes Armenia with perfect security and leaves to the Turkish State an area which is strongly Kurdish. Armenian villages and village nuclei in this section, such as Kighi^{5*} and Temran, necessarily remain Turkish because of the strong commercial and church ties which connect them with Kharput rather with any Armenian market and religious centers which lie within Bitlis and Erzerum vilayets. This decision seemed an unavoidable consequence of the inclusion of the city and district of Kharput in the Turkish State as determined by Article 27 II (4) and Article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

From the northern border of the Dersim the nature and direction of the frontier decision was primarily dependent upon the vital question of supplying an adequate access to the sea for the State of Armenia. Upon the correct solution of this problem depends, in my judgment, the future economic well-being of the entire population, Turkish, Kurdish, Greek, Armenian, or Yezidi, in those portions of the Vilayets of Erzerum, Bitlis and Van which will lie within the State of Armenia. I was not unmindful of the desire of the Pontic Greeks, submitted to me in a memorandum similar, no doubt, in argument and content to that presented to the Supreme Council last March at its London Conference, that the unity of the coastal area of the Black Sea inhabited by them be preserved and that arrangements be made for an autonomous administration for the region stretching from Rize to a point west of Sinope. The arbitral jurisdiction assigned to me by Article 89 of the Treaty of Sèvres does not include the possibility of decision or recommendation by me upon the question of their desire for independence, or failing that, for autonomy. Nor does it include the right to deal with the littoral of the independent Sandjak of Janik^{6*} or of the Vilayet of Kastamuni into which extends the region of the unity and autonomy desired by the Pontic Greeks.

Three possible courses lay open to me: to so delimit the boundary that the whole of Trebizond Vilayet would lie within Turkey, to grant it in its entirety to Armenia, or to grant a part of it to Armenia and leave the remainder to Turkey. The majority of the population of Trebizond Vilayet is incontestably Moslem and the Armenian element, according to all pre-war estimates, was undeniably inferior numerically to the Greek portion of the Christian minority. Against a decision so clearly indicated on ethnographic grounds weighted heavily the future of Armenia. I could only regard the question in the light of the needs of a new political entity, Armenia, with mingled Moslem and Christian populations, rather than as a question of the future of the Armenians alone. It has been and is now increasingly my conviction that the arrangements providing for Armenia's access to the sea must be such as to offer every possibility for the development of this State as one capable of reassuming and maintaining that useful role in the commerce of the world which its geographic position, athwart a great historic trade route, assigned to it in the past. The civilization and the happiness of its mingled population will largely depend upon the building of railways and the increased accessibility of the hinterland of the three vilayets to European trade and cultural influences.

Eastward from the port of Trebizond along the coast of Lazistan no adequate harbor facilities are to be found and the rugged character of the Pontic range separating Lazistan Sandjak from the Vilayet of Erzerum is such as to isolate the hinterland from the coast so far as practicable railway construction is concerned. The existing caravan route from Persia across the plains of Bayazet^{7*} and Erzerum, which passes through the towns of Baberd^{8*} and Gumushkhane and debouches upon the Black Sea at Trebizond, has behind it a long record of persistent usefulness.

These were the considerations which have forced upon me to revert to my original conviction that the town and harbor of Trebizond must become an integral part of Armenia. Because of the still greater adaptability of the route of the Khorshat^{9*} valley, ending at the town of Tireboli, for successful railway construction and operation I have deemed it also essential to include this valley in Armenia, with enough territory lying west of it to insure its adequate protection. I am not unaware that the leaders of the Armenian delegation have expressed their willingness to renounce

claim upon that portion of Trebizond Vilayet lying west of Surmene. Commendable as is their desire to avoid the assumption of authority over a territory so predominantly Moslem, I am confident that, in acquiescing in their eagerness to do justice to the Turks and Greeks in Trebizond I should be doing an irreparable injury to the future of the land of Armenia and its entire population, of which they will be a part.

It was upon such a basis, Mr. President, that the boundaries were so drawn as to follow mountain ridges west of the city of Erznka to the Pontic range and thence to the Black Sea, in such a way as to include in Armenia the indentation called Zephyr Bay. The decision to leave to Turkey the harbor towns and hinterland of Kerasun(t) and Ordu in Trebizond Sandjak was dictated by the fact that the population of this region is strongly Moslem and Turkish and that these towns are the outlets for the easternmost sections of the Turkish vilayet of Sivas. The parts of Erzerum and Trebizond Vilayets which, by reason of this delimitation, remain Turkish rather than become Armenian comprise approximately 12,120 square kilometers.

In the matter of the demilitarization of Turkish territory adjacent to the Armenian border as it has been broadly described above, it seemed both impracticable and unnecessary to establish a demilitarized zone which would require elaborate prescriptions and complex agencies for their execution. Fortunately, Article 177 of the Treaty of Sèvres prescribes the disarming of all existing forts throughout Turkey. Articles 159 and 196-200 provide in addition agencies entirely adequate to meet all the dangers of disorder which may arise along the borders, the former by the requirement that a proportion of the officers of the gendarmerie shall be supplied by the various Allied or neutral Powers, the latter by the establishment of a Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organization. In these circumstances the only additional prescriptions which seemed necessary and advisable were that the Military Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organization should, in conformity with the powers bestowed upon it by Article 200 of the Treaty, select the superior officers of the gendarmerie to be stationed in the vilayets of Turkey lying contiguous to the frontier of Armenia solely from those officers who will be detailed by the Allied or neutral Powers in accordance with Article 159 of the Treaty; and that these officers, under the supervision of the

Military Inter-Allied Commission of Organization and Control, should be especially charged with the duty of preventing military preparations directed against the Armenian frontier.

It is my confident expectation that the Armenian refugees and their leaders, in the period of their return into the territory thus assigned to them, will by refraining from any and all form of reprisals give to the world an example of that high moral courage which must always be the foundation of national strength. The world expects of them that they give every encouragement and help within their power to those Turkish refugees who may desire to return to their former homes in the districts of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van and Bitlis, remembering that those peoples, too, have suffered greatly. It is my further expectation that they will offer such considerate treatment to the Laz and the Greek inhabitants of the coastal region of the Black Sea, surpassing in the liberality of their administrative arrangements, if necessary, even the ample provisions for non-Armenian racial and religious groups embodied in the Minorities Treaty signed by them upon August 10th of this year, that these peoples will gladly and willingly work in completest harmony with the Armenians in laying firmly the foundation of the new republic of Armenia.

I have the honor to submit herewith the text of my decision.

Accept, Mr. President, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration, Woodrow Wilson." ...

* The cited letter is accompanied with the decision of President of the USA "Respecting the frontier between Turkey and Armenia, access for Armenia to the sea, and the demilitarization of Turkish territory adjacent to the Armenian frontier" (US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/61/Ecnl.2). The Russian version of it had been made public as a component of the article: Махмурия Г.Г., Пограничные проблемы Республики Армения и британская политика. Диалог исследователей. "Вестник общественных наук," Ер., 2007, № 3, с.238-244. Certain extracts from this document were offered to the reader in: Ованнисян Р., Международные отношения Республики Армения, с.719-720. Both variations, although they have slight stylistic distinctions, adequately reproduce contents of the document and each of them is apt for usage.

** At this moment the Supreme Council transformed into the Council of Ambassadors under the guidance of J.Cambon.

*** Inscribed as Hakkari.

- 4* Lettered as Erzingan.
- 5* The main form of transliteration: Kghi.
- 6* Mentioned as Djanik.
- 7* Defined as Bayazid
- 8* Inscribed as Baiburt.
- 9* Written as Karshut.

№ 321 telegram from the President of the USA W.Wilson - to the President of the Council of the League of Nations P.Hymans*

Washington, November 30, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 760J.67/39a:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p. 804-805

"...You offer to the United States... [to render] its good offices to end the present tragedy, being enacted in Armenia, and you assure me that your proposal involves no repetition of the invitation to accept a mandate for Armenia.

While the invitation to accept a mandate for Armenia has been rejected by the Senate of the United States, this country has repeatedly declared its solicitude for the fate and welfare of the Armenian people, in a manner and to an extent that justifies you in saying that the fate of Armenia has always been of special interest to the American people.

I am without authorization to offer or employ military forces of the United States in any project for the relief of Armenia, and any material contributions would require the authorization of the Congress which is not now in session and whose action I could not forecast. I am willing, however, upon assurances of the moral and diplomatic support of the principal powers, and in a spirit of sympathetic response to the request of the Council of the League of Nations, to use my good offices and to proffer my personal mediation through a representative whom I may designate, to end the hostilities now being waged against the Armenian people and to bring peace and accord to the contending parties, relying upon the Council of the League of Nations to suggest to me the avenues through which my proffer should be conveyed and the parties to whom it should be addressed." ...

* This is a reply to the telegram from the Council of the League, dated November 25, 1920. As far as correspondence between P. Hymans and W.Wilson is concerned, you may see: Махмурян Г.Г., Лига Наций, Армянский вопрос и Республика Армения.

Ep., Aprarepc, 1999, c.127.

№ 322 telegram № 609 from the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople M.Bristol - to the Secretary of State B.Colby
Constantinople, November 30, 1920 (received December 1)
US NA, RG 59, 760J.67/39:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p. 805

"Reliable information received from Armenia by one just returning from Erivan. It is reported that Armenia is finished. The Armenian troops at Kars and Alexandropol were superior in forces, however, they were defeated and in many cases ran away. The Turks have captured Igdirdir and are only a few miles from Karaklis. General Dro [Kanayan] is now in command of the Armenians and appears to be holding his lines. A second armistice is in effect and a treaty of peace is being negotiated. The Americans are reported all safe within the Turkish lines. The Bolsheviks and Nationalist Turks are in accord. There is no foundation in reports that Alexandropol and Kars have been retaken by the Armenians and there is no likelihood of their being retaken."

№ 323 telegram from the President of the Council of the League of Nations P.Hymans - to the President of the USA W.Wilson
Geneva, December 2, 1920
US NA, RG 59, 760J.67/42½:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.805-806

"In the name of the Council of the League of Nations I thank you for your telegram of November 30th, in which you agree to act as mediator between the Armenians and the Kemalists. ... The Council asks me to inform you that the Spanish Government declares itself ready to participate in any action of a moral and diplomatic character in support of Armenia and that the Brazilian Government announces that it is ready to take part alone or with other powers in putting an end to the present situation in Armenia. The Council is therefore requesting those two Governments to communicate directly with you. ...Negotiations can be opened immediately with the Armenian Government at Erivan. As regards the Kemalists the Council is taking steps to find out the most effective method of getting into touch with them and will inform you further on this point as soon as possible."

№ 324 telegram № 99 from the U.S. at Tiflis C.Moser -
to the Acting Secretary of State N.Davis

Tiflis, December 4, 1920 (received December 11)

US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/367:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.
806-807

"It is officially announced at Erivan, December 2nd, that Armenia is declared Soviet republic. The new government will consist of five Bolshevik commissaries and two members of the Dashnak party, General Dro [Kanayan] and H.Terterian, former appointed military dictator in the field with O.Silin probably Russian Commissary for Military Affairs. Soviet Russian Ambassador has announced Russia's recognition of the new Soviet republic.

Overthrow of the Armenian Cabinet,* formed a week ago, followed occupation by Russian troops from Baku of the Armenian frontier towns Ijevan** and Dilijan, on November 29th.*** Russian action taken at the request of Armenian Bolshevik Committee at Baku and met with no opposition. During the peace conference between Turkey and Armenia local government at Alexandropol turned Bolshevik. Control of the district to pass to them upon Turkish Army evacuation according to the peace treaty of December 2nd.^{4*}

Finding it will be impossible to proceed with the work or to receive assurance of safety under the Bolshevik regime, Director General E.Yarrow has secured Turkish military protection and is removing entire Near East personnel and stores to trains going to Kars. Thus he is forced to abandon orphans and American relief work of five years. Relief work in Armenia proper no longer possible^{5*} but E.Yarrow hopes under the protection of Turks to continue relief of Armenians in Turkey and to obtain communications and supplies through Erzerum and Trebizond."

* It had been supervised by Simon Vratsian.

** A name of the city is distorted in the telegram.

*** Author of the text had mistakenly noted November 30. Besides, early in the morning of November 29 Armenian Separate Regiment had entered Ijevan together with Russian detachments. Quantity of inexactitudes in this document testifies that Consul C. Moser had quite limited sources of exact information so that he could receive it in prevailing difficult conditions.

^{4*} Compiler of the document had roughly noted December 5.

^{5*} E.Yarrow had stayed in Kars from October 5 to December 20, 1920; thereupon he remained at the head of the NER in Yerevan up to July, 1924. After his departure American charity in Armenia continued till the end of 1920s. Furthermore, main displeasure had been showed not by the staff itself but rather by local Soviet authorities. As to the Western Armenia, the NER had been functioning there until 1922; afterwards it abandoned provinces in view of intolerance and obstructions, created by the Kemalist officials. See, for example: Մախանուրյան Գ.Գ., Փաստաթղթեր Խարբերողի նստանիստի մասին (1919-1922թթ.): «Բաների Հայաստանի արխիվների», Եր., 2008, № 2, էջ 75-86:

№ 325 telegram № 1695 from the Acting Secretary of State
N.Davis - to the U.S. Ambassador in France H.C.Wallace

Washington, December 13, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/66:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III,
p.807

"Department has decided that on Friday December 17 the President's boundary decision will be given out for publication by the press on the following day. You may so inform the Foreign Office."

№ 326 telegram from the Acting Secretary of State N.Davis - to
the President of the Council of the League of Nations P.Hymans

Washington, December 15, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 760J.67/47a:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.
807

"The President has directed me to advise you that he has designated to the Honorable Henry Morgenthau as his personal representative who is prepared to proceed as soon as practicable to carry out his proffer of good offices and personal mediation in the matter of Armenia. The President, however, is still awaiting advices from the Council of the League as to the avenues through which his proffer should be conveyed and the parties with whom his representatives should get in contact, as well as assurances that he may count upon the diplomatic and moral support of the principal powers represented on the Council of the League."

№ 327 telegram № 2015 from the U.S. Ambassador in France
H.C.Walace - to the Acting Secretary of State N.Davis

Paris, December 16, 1920 (received December 16)

US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/70:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III,
p.807-808

"Referring to Department's 1695 of December 13. I have received from the Foreign Office a pressing request that you be asked to delay making public the President's decision on the Armenian boundary until they have been afforded opportunity to submit certain considerations which are to be immediately communicated to you through me."

№ 328 telegram № 1707 from the Acting Secretary of State
N.Davis - to the U.S. Ambassador in France H.C.Wallace

Washington, December 17, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/70:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III,
p.808

"...Complying with Foreign Office request, Department will not for the present make public the President's decision."

№ 329 telegram № 2029 from the U.S. Ambassador in France
H.C.Wallace - to the Acting Secretary of State N.Davis

Paris, December 20, 1920 (received December 21)

US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/72:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III,
p.808

"...I have received from Mr. G.Leygues... a note stating in part as follows:

"Inasmuch as the chiefs of the Governments of the principal Allied Powers have not to this day had the opportunity of considering together President W.Wilson's decision I have the honour to beg Your Excellency kindly to request the Department of State to examine whether in its opinion it would not be advisable to defer the publication of the decision until the meeting of the Heads of Governments which in fact will take place shortly."

I have made informal inquiry as to when the meeting of the Supreme Council will be held but date apparently is as yet undetermined."

№ 330 telegram from the President of the Council of the League of Nations P.Hymans - to the President of the USA W.Wilson

Geneva, December 26, 1920

US NA, RG 59, 760J.67/56½:Telegram; Papers 1920, vol.III, p.809

"...Following from Mr. D.Lloyd George: Your telegram of December 2nd after consulting British representatives at Constantinople and Tiflis best course would appear to be that President [W.]Wilson should telegraph his instruction direct to American High Commissioner at Constantinople, who would concert with his colleagues in the matter. It has now been reported that a treaty of peace has been concluded between the Armenian Government * and the Council are no doubt aware that Armenia is at present reported to be under the control of Soviet Russia and the advanced Dashnak party. G.Curzon." P.Hymans."

* Two contracts had been signed on December 2 of this year: one was an agreement between the Republic of Armenia and Soviet Russia, the second was a Treaty of Alexandropol between the Republic of Armenia and Kemalist Turkey. Judging by context of this telegram, its omitted fragment is related to the first arrangement.

*

And this is the end of story which archival documens tell. Adduced historical records were dispatched from the U.S. Department of State and assembled in repositories of the National Archives of Armenia. They disclose a great deal to concerned reader, so that I have only to add: thank you for consideration and, please, consult our reference tools.

Names Index

Abbas II Hilmi Pasha - the last Khedive of Egypt, ruled in 1892-1914

Abdul Hamid II - Sultan of Turkey in 1876-1909. During his rule this Empire had lost Cyprus, Egypt, Tunisia, Kars, Ardahan, Batum. Wreaked his insolvency by obliteration of 300,000 Armenians in massacres of 1894-1896

Abdullah Bey - director of Census Bureau, managed by Nationalists in Turkey; welcomed J.Harbord Mission in Sivas on September 20, 1919

Abernathy, Grady - Sergeant of the U.S. Army, car driver at Headquarters of its Commander-in-Chief, as well as one of the drivers of J.Harbord Mission

Adee, Alvey A. - American diplomat, the second Assistant Secretary of State

Afrikian - this kin is from Bayazet by birth; its members settled down on the shores of Sevan and gave a title of Nor Bayazet to their hamlet. Dyer Abraham Karapet and his wife Khanum had had 11 children there; in 1909 their two grandsons Arakel Gaspar and Tigran Mkrtich had opened "The Trading House of A. and T.Afrikians" at Moscow with affiliated branches in Tiflis and Yerevan. The family was engaged in cotton growing in Erivan Governorate and was master of gin house in the Capital, where merchant of the 2nd guild Arakel, Tigran and cognac distiller Karapet had built the water pipeline in 1910-1912. Tigran, Ervand, Karapet and Haroutiun Afrikian had also a rented apartment house in this city, on Malyarskaya Street (nowadays it is Teryan Street 11-13). In order that he could qualify as viticulturist, Karapet studied gardening in the environs of Vienna and in South Tyrol. His Cognac Distillery had been founded in Yerevan in 1893, then sold and bought back by his master in 1904. Next year the famous painter M.Saryan had created portrait of M.Afrikian. Karapet had also been elected deputy of the metropolitan Duma. In his turn, Vahan Afrikian had become a Mayor of Nor Bayazet in 1919-1920, as well as a member of the Revenue Commission of the Union of Armenian Cities. Another member of the family, Khachatour Afrkian, lived in Tiflis. He was a fellow-fighter of H.Arghoutian in Armenian National Bureau, participated in raising of Volunteer Squads for the Caucasus Front.

Representatives of this clan continued their enterprise in the 21st Century (Business Firm "Daroynk"); they scored a success in Science (Academician E.G. Afrikian) and in other public activities. See: Հայ ժողովրդի պատմություն, 8 հատորով: Հ.6 Հայաստանը 1870-1917թթ.: Եր., ՀՍՍՀ ԳԱ, 1981, էջ 443; NAA, fund 199, reg.1, file 159, f.244; Վրացյան Ս., Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն, էջ 379, 594

Aftab Ahmad - one of the Indian Representatives at the Paris Peace Conference

Agha Khan - one of the Indian representatives at the Paris Peace Conference

Aghabekov, Sadykh Bek - Major General of Russian Army, deputy minister of interior in Azerbaijan who changed three minister one after another from October 23, 1918, up to December 22, 1919

Aghaev, Ahmed - since 1905 propagated a single political centre for all Turkic peoples of Russia; since 1909 resided in Constantinople and actively collaborated there with the Young Turks; urged since 1911 on monoethnic States for Turkic peoples in Russia. In 1915 he entered the Committee for Defence of Rights of Turkic-Tartar Muslim peoples of Russia, which had been founded in the Ottoman capital; and a member of the League of indigenous peoples of Russia since May of 1916, this organisation had appealed to W.Wilson with a plea for protection of its interests. In June of 1918 he had returned to Azerbaijan in a capacity of adviser of the Turkish Army and was elected to the Deputy Chairman of Parliament, occupying this position in 1919, too. Then he appeared in 1920 in Turkey again, was arrested there by the British and exiled to Malta. In 1921 served as a head of the Directorate General of Press of the Angora Government and a member of Kemalists Parliament. However, he criticized Cabinet of I.Inonu in 1930s and had deceased in 1939

Aghbalian, Nikol - alumnus of Nersisyan School at Tiflis and Gevorgian Gymnasium in Etchmiadzin; studied in Moscow, Lausanne and Sorbonne Universities. Tutored in Kaghzvan, Agoulis and Shushi. In 1914 entered the leading body of the Armenian Volunteer movement. The main author of Appeal to the Armenian People in 1918 and Member of the Armenian Council; Minister of Public Education and Culture from August 10, 1919 till May 5, 1920

Aghriyan (Aghriyev), Samson with his brothers - noted clan of wine-makers in Elizavetpol Governorate, from Matrassa village in the vicinity of Shamakhi. Owners of vineyard and orchard in Kyurdamir, as well as of strong drinks stores in Baku, Purveyors to Imperial Court in the Caucasus and Transcaucasia. See also: Հայերի կոտորածները Բարսիլի և Ելիզավետպոլի նահանգներում, էջ 252, 392

Aharonian, Avetis Arakel - chairman of Delegation of the Republic of Armenia at the Paris Peace Conference since February 4, 1919. Chairman of the Armenian National Council from October 13, 1917, till July 20, 1918. On May 30, 1918 (NAA, fund 222, reg. 1, file 141, f.239 rev.), this body had proclaimed itself the supreme sovereignty of the Armenian part of Transcaucasia. Chairman of the Armenian Parliament in 1919. Participant of Constantinople (1918), Paris (1919-1920) and London (since November 14, 1919, of 1920 and of 1921) conferences. On January 1, 1920, met D.Loyd George and on January 8 - with W.Churchill. Signed the Treaty of Sevres. In 1922-1923, with no State credentials, took part in the Lausanne Conference

Albricci, Count Alberico - Lieutenant General, Commander of the 2nd Italian Army Corps in France; Minister of War in 1919-1920. In compliance with an Act of the U.S. Congress of July 9, 1918, W.Wilson had decorated him with the supreme American non-combatant award, with the "Army Distinguished Service" medal

Alexander I Holstein-Gottorp-Romanov - ruled over the Russian Empire in 1801-1825

Ali Bey, Faik - a Governor of Diarbekir province in 1919

Ali Kemal Bey - Turkish Liberal, journalist and Minister of Interior in the Ottoman Cabinet of 1919. Adversary of the Young Turks and Kemalists, he had been deported under Abdul Hamid II; in 1909 charged Dr.Nazim with aspiration to kill him. In June of 1919 served as one of the Ottoman delegates at the Paris Peace Conference, advocated British protectorate over Turkey. On June 25 of the same year had incriminated Enver and Talaat with restoration of their power and resigned on July 3. Had been condemning the massacre of Armenians and demanded to try the masterminds of Genocide. He had been kidnapped from the Tokatlian Hotel in Constantinople on November 4, 1922, and on November 6 was stoned to death by a crowd. Organizer of the assault had

informed afterwards Riza Nur and I.Inonu, who departed Lausanne, that an inscription with concocted name of "Artin Kemal" had been pinned on the corpse.

After the death of M.Kemal one of the sons of Ali Kemal had received personal approval of the President I.Inonu and entered diplomatic service. He had been Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, an Ambassador in London and Madrid where his car was fared upon in 1978 and his wife was murdered.

Ali Riza Bey - is known as a Mutesarif of Urfa and mastermind of Turkish resistance to the French troops in Cilicia

Allenby, Edmund Henry Hynman - 1st Viscount, Field Marshal of the British Army, High Commissioner in Egypt

Anastas - Greek priest in Andreas in 1919

Andranik (Ozanian, Andranik Toros) - national hero. Participated in the liberation movement since 1890s; fought in squads of Abro, Gourgen and Aghbyur Serob, companion-in-arms with Hrayr, Nikol Duman, Medzn Murad. Since 1899 led Haiduk forces of Vaspurakan and Sasun, waged effective war against Turkish regular troops. Commander of the 1st Armenian Volunteer Detachment in 1914-1918; his unit had distinguished himself in seizure of Van and Mush, in the Battle of Dilman made in April of 1915. Major General in January of 1918 and Commander of Division in the framework of the Armenian Army Corps; since April of the same 1918 till April of 1919 had been in charge of the Special Striking Detachment. Later on departed to France, England and to the USA, where he continued to arrange military and material aid for his Nation

Araphelian (Araphelov), Grigor Martin - Karabakh dweller, who had founded oil producing enterprise "G.M.Araphelov and Co" in Baku in 1887; he possessed banking office in this city, and was a ship-owner as well. His brother Nikoghayos Martin had been a trustee of the Parish Council in 1910-1911. The family hold textile mill in Baku and a cotton mill in Moscow

Araratian, Christaphor Gerasim - Major General of the Artillery, graduated from Tiflis Cadet Corps, Michael Artillery School in Petersburg, and the Officer School at Tsarskoe Selo; as well as from the high command postgraduate training courses under Frunze Military Academy. Made war on the Caucasus Front, as a Commander of Brigade participated in the battle of Sardarapat in 1918. Minister of Military Affairs of the Republic of

Armenia from March 27, 1919, to May 5, 1920. On October 30, 1920, when a fortress of Kars had been yielded up to Turks, he had taken prisoner and driven away to Sarikamish and Karin. Released after an intercession of the Soviet Government, he had returned Soviet Armenia in the turn of the same 1921 where he was in command of the Armenian Rifle Division in 1923-1925. Placed under arrest on September 2, 1937, and shot in the same year. Rehabilitated posthumously

Araratian, Sargis - Vice Chairman of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia from August 5, 1919; Minister of Provisions from August 10 till January of 1920; Minister of Finance from the same August 10 of 1919 until May 5, 1920; then Minister of Welfare and Reconstruction up to November 24, 1920

Arghoutian, Hovsep - Prince, disciple of the Nersesian School at Tiflis, then a teacher. From 1889 on, in common with Arabo, Nikol Duman and Vardan he had been fidayee in the Western Armenia, arranged output of weapons in Tabriz. Served exile in Kishinev and Vologda. Assistant Commander of detachment in Khanasor Expedition of July 25, 1897; had been arranging the self-defence during the Armenian-Tartar skirmishes in 1903; Commander of the 7th Volunteer Detachment on the Caucasus Front, of the 7th Volunteer Squad and of the 8th Armenian Rifle regiment. Thereupon he had been Delegate, Acting Chairman of the National Council of the Republic of Armenia, its Diplomatic Representative in Persia. From 1922 on lived and died in France

Argishti I - king of the State Urartu, reigned in 786-764 BC

Argutinsky-Dolgoruky - of an ancient Prince stock. Archbishop Hovsep Arghoutian (1743-1801) - head of the Armenian Church in Russia who promoted consolidation of Russian interests in Transcaucasia. In 1783 he had worked out a draft of the Armenian-Russian agreement, which contained restoration of the Armenian State under Russian Protectorate, permanent deployment of Russian forces and everlasting bilateral union. In 1790 he had transferred to Catherine II memorandum "On Armenian Authoritative Princes, or Meliks of Karabakh, by Their Names, and on Their Possessions," together with a "Note on Inducements of Embassy to Russia by Karabakh Authoritative Princes, Referred To as Meliks." In these documents he had described history of the noted relations since 1701. In the summer of 1800 he had been elected Catholicos, but died before consecration

Arounyantz, Hambartsum, Nerses and D.G. - businessman brothers from Shushi uezd; in 1899 they had set up there "Silk-throwing and Silk-reeling Joint-Stock Company of D.G.Arounyantz." Hambartsum and Nerses were in possession of silk-throwing mills with 150 and 120 workers employed

Arzoumanian B.R. - owner of the gin house in Aghdash village in Elizavetpol Governorate, built in 1890-1891

Avalov (Avalishvili), Zurab David - legal councillor of the Georgian Delegation at the European parleys in 1919-1920; author of books on History of Georgian Republic

Avetisov A.I., K.I. - Armenian merchants, brothers from Khachmaz village of Shushi uezd, from the end of XIX century they credited and produced cotton in Elizavetpol Governorate and Trans-Caspia

Avni Bey - a judge of Muslim religious law and a district chief in 1919 in Hasankale

Avni Bey, Hussein - in 1915 dwelt in Trebizond as an Officer of Medical Service; afterwards served in the troops of Nationalists in Erzinka in 1919

Avni Effendi - in 1919 worked as civil engineer in Erzinka

Ayer, Carlton S. - worked with his wife in 1919 on the staff of NER in Yerevan

Ayyub Bey, Charles - oil industry businessman from Jerusalem

Bagratids, Bagratuni - Armenian Royal dynasty, 885-1045 AD

Bahadur, Sir Ganga Singh, the Maharajah of Bikaner - member of the Indian deputation at the Paris Peace Conference

Baker, Newton Diehl Jr. - the U.S. Secretary of War in 1916-1921, vigorously promoted W.Wilson as presidential candidate for the election campaign of 1912. A lawyer by training, he had been appointed in 1928 to Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague

Bakunts, Arsen - member of Presidium at Regional Council of Zangezur-Karabakh in 1919, managed communication issues

Balfour, Arthur James - British Prime Minister in 1902-1905, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from December 7, 1916 to October 29, 1919

Barclay, Colville A. de R. - Counselor of the British Embassy at Washington in 1918-1919

Barnes, Julius H. - President of the U.S. Grain Corporation

Barton, James Levy (1855-1936) - Dr., missionary for life service and foreign secretary of the ABCFM. On the order of the Department of State he had written on September 14, 1915, to C. Dodge and expressed the need for constitution the Armenian Relief Committee; straight away, on September 16 he became co-founder of this organization. From the month of November ARC had been reorganized as an American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief, then in 1918 transformed into the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, and by Congressional Act of August 6, 1919, into the Near East Relief. Since 1930 it carries on its mission as the Near East Foundation.

After the war J.Barton had been a member of General Committee of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia. He served at Kharberd; in April of 1919 arrived in Constantinople from a journey to Adana, Tarson, Mersin, Aleppo, Aintab, Marash and Urfa. In the month of June he made a trip to Mardin, Diarbekir, Kharberd, Malatia, Caesarea, Sivas and Marzvan; thereupon he consulted the King-Crane Commission at the Ottoman capital. By August 23 completed extensive Caucasian tour and wrote off to New York, that 70 Americans of relief staff took care of 20,000 orphans and 300,000 refugees in this region. As he specified, Armenia needed an American reinforced Brigade and 10,000 rifles with 100 machine guns. Published two books in New York: a "Story of Near East Relief (1915-1930)" and "The Near East Relief, 1915-1930," in 1930 and 1943, accordingly

Baruch, Bernard Mannes - a broker on the New York Stock Exchange, was notable for his business conduct in accordance with originating demand. Financier, arms-producer. He had assigned \$50,000 for W.Wilson election campaign in 1912; as a reward was appointed to Department of War. During the War his personal capital grew from \$1 million up to \$200 millions. In 1917, when the British purchased American produce, B.Baruch closely related with W.Churchill. In 1918 became the Chairman of the U.S. War Industries Board in 1918, he entrusted coordination of arms-production and its export to Samuel P.Bush, grandfather and great grandfather of the U.S. Presidents to come.

Economic and reparations clauses advisor for the American Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference and Chairman of the Interallied Purchasing Commission in 1919. Representative of his country in the Allied Supreme Economic Council. Personal

informal economic adviser to W.Wilson, afterwards, adviser to Presidents W.Harding, H.Hoover, F.D.Roosevelt, H.Truman and J.F.Kennedy.

During the II World War Nazis entered him in a list of persons, condemned to death. The U.S. representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in 1946-1947, he proposed to set up a League to Enforce Peace. It included total ban on nuclear weapons coupled with control of research and compulsory measures, unbound by the UN Security Council veto. This "Baruch Plan" had not been accepted. He was the first who applied on April 16, 1947, a term of "Cold War" to label a clash between USSR and USA.

Beatty, David Richard - Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet of Great Britain in 1916-1919, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty in 1919-1927

Beeuwkes, Henry - Colonel of Medical Corps from J.Harbord Mission. Had composed a report on public health and sanitation in the region for final account of the Mission

Bekir Bey - resident of Diarbekir in 1919, on September 15 met with J.Harbord Mission there

Bekir Sami Bey, Kunduh - former governor of Beirut, deputy at the Sivas Congress; on September 20, 1919, welcomed J.Harbord Mission at this city. Later on, first foreign minister of Kemalists from May 3, 1920, to May 8, 1921

Bekzadian, Tigran Artem - before 1918, worked for C.I.Khatisian as his assistant in oil business. Diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Azerbaijan in 1920; from the month of March mastered a similar Mission in Georgia

Belin, Emile Eugène - Major General, Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of French troops in wartime; from April, 1918, till October, 1919, representative of France in the interallied Supreme War Council at Paris

Benson, William Shepherd - Admiral, Chief of Naval Operations and chief aid to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy in 1915-1919. From November 1918 on, Naval adviser of the American Peace Commission. Retired from the Navy in September 1919; Chairman of the U.S. Shipping Board in 1920-1928

Bernstorff, Johann Heinrich Graft von - German Ambassador to the USA and Mexico; mastermind of sabotage mission in order to obstruct military supplies for the Allies. Ambassador in

Constantinople from August 1917 till the turn of 1918; chief of the Peace Treaties drafting department at the Foreign ministry in 1919; member of Reichstag in 1920. He was born in London, in the family of Ambassador, and died in Geneva

Berry E. - employee of the ARCNE in Yerevan

Berthelot, Philippe Joseph Louis - managed political department at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1919; General Secretary of this institution in 1920

Bertholf, Wallace W. - Commander of Navy, member of the J.Harbord Mission

Beury, Charles Ezra - legal trustee and member of the Executive Committee of ACRNE in 1919

Blake, Robert P. - Professor of National University in Constantinople

Bliss A. - employee of the NER in Kharberd

Bliss, Howard Sweetser - Doctor of Divinity, American missionary, President of Syrian Protestant College in Beirut

Bliss, Tasker Howard - General, from November 1917 on, the U.S. representative at the Interallied Supreme War Council, one of the five chief members of the American peace delegation

Bonar Law, Andrew - Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1916 - January 1919; then Lord Privy Seal (Minister without portfolio) in 1919-1921. Leader of the Conservative Party and of the House of Commons in 1916-1923. Prime Minister of the Great Britain in 1922-1923. Two elder sons fell in the war

Borden, Robert Laird - Lord, Prime Minister of Canada

Botha, Louis - General, Prime Minister and representative of the Union of South Africa at the Paris Peace Conference

Boush J.E. - Captain of the U.S. Army from J.Harbord Mission to Armenia

Bowditch, Edward Jr. - Lieutenant Colonel of Infantry from the J.Harbord Mission. Wrote a report on regional climate, national resources, livestock sector and agriculture for its final account

Bowman, Isaiah - executive officer of the division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; chief specialist and head of the expert group, dealing with the territorial questions and issues related to special areas

Bridges, George Tom Molesworth - Lieutenant General, chief of the British Mission in 1919; head of British Mission to

Allied Armies of Orient, quartered in Constantinople

Brinton, Jasper Y. - Colonel and Judge Advocate of the U.S. Army, i.e. legal counselor and prosecutor in court-martial. Legal expert of J.Harbord Mission in 1919, he composed for it a report on government in Turkey and Transcaucasia

Bristol, Mark Lambert - Rear Admiral, the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople from March, 1919, to October 22, 1923. In June of 1919 he met with Armenian Prime Minister A. Khatisian in Tiflis; after this interview he assessed the Republic of Armenia as an unviable political phenomenon. He had been under the impression that Prime Minister insisted upon repatriation of Western Armenians pursuing political considerations and striving not to lose control of Western Armenia. At the same time, dander which would threaten refugees, had been actually ignored.

M.Bristol called Republics of Transcaucasia "a perfect farce," in which members of Cabinets were "hands of secret societies" who used their office "for what they could get out of it." He urged the U.S. to "drop all petty questions, such as the formation of an Armenia, the running of the Turks out of Europe, the maintaining of the Sultan on account of the Mohammedan religion," or the rights of the Christians races in Turkey, who were mighty few at the moment.

Rear Admiral didn't reject that "the Turk was a devilish brute and he had not changed his spots," nevertheless, he proposed to create policy aimed at this twenty millions, and not at two million victimized people. See: Hovannisian R., Op.cit., vol.I, p.299, 329-330; vol.II, p.91, 392.

Brockdorff-Rantzau, Graf Ulrich von - in the capacity of Ambassador in Denmark assisted Lenin and Bolsheviks in their coming back to Russia in April of 1917, in order to produce revolution there, combined with destruction of Russian-German battlefront. From December 1918 on State Secretary, and from February 13 till June 26, 1919, Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs. Chairman of German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference since April 29, 1919; resigned his ministerial position, refused to sign the Treaty of Versailles, although he attended procedure of its conclusion

Brodie, Donald M. - Captain of the U.S. Army, secretary and treasurer of King-Crane Commission

Brough, Alan - temporary Brigadier General, chief transport officer of British 27th Division. From March 14, 1919, until July 1920, was a chairman of the Transcaucasian Commission on Railways, established by the Allies

Bryce, James - Viscount, Member of Parliament in 1880-1907 and Ambassador of Great Britain to the USA in 1907-1913; then President of the British Academy (for the humanities) during 4 years. His Government had published the Blue Book in 1916; it was a compilation of documents "The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16," prepared in partnership with A. Toynbee and unmasked criminal policy of the Young Turks. In February and on March 11, 1920, he spoke in the House of Lords and condemned the Kemalists for expatriation of Cilician Armenians

Buchanan, George William - British Ambassador in Russia in 1910-1918; had been set free on January 3, 1918, to return his homeland in exchange for G.V.Chicherin, who had been taken into custody in England

Buckler, William Hepburn - career diplomat, specialist on Ottoman Empire, Armenia and the Caucasus. Special assistant at the U.S. Embassy in London in January 1919; from June till October had been on the staff at Russian Division of the American commission to negotiate peace in Paris and served on the Special committee on the questions of the Near East of the said Commission. In the beginning of July, coupled with W.L.Westermann, they advised H.Hoover on the issue if there should be an American permanent Commissioner with credentials of temporary representative of the Allied Powers in Armenia instead of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East. Such an assignment would impart political tint to the ACRNE activity, carried out on purely humanitarian basis. As an adviser he had been recommended by R.Lansing and his stepbrother H.White. See: Gidney J.B., A Mandate for Armenia. Oberlin, Ohio; The Kent State University, 1967, p.139; Hovannisian R., The Republic of Armenia. Vol.II, From Versailles to London, 1919-1920. Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1982, p.50, 54, 58

Buniatyan, Michael and Hambartsum (Buniatov, Mikhail and Ambartsum) - brother, owners of oil tankers "Bernardaki," "Buniat" and "Nickolay Buniatov" in Baku; had founded storehouses and workshops in the environs of Astrakhan. Were busy

with silk manufacture in Nukhi

Cambon, Jules Martin - French Ambassador to Washington, Madrid, Berlin. Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry from October 1915, member of the National delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, who signed the Treaty of Versailles

Cardashian, Vahan - advocate, native of Caesarea, alumnus of Yale University. In 1911-1915 he represented Ottoman Embassy and its Consulate in New York; quitted this work in October of 1915. Director of Armenian Press Bureau in 1918, he created in 1919 the American Committee for Independence of Armenia with its residence at New York city. In disagreement with supporters of mandate, he persisted in a thesis of the U.S. direct assistance to politically independent republic

Cavallero, Ugo - General, Count, Italian representative on the Supreme War Council of Allies, chief of Italian Military Intelligence. During the Fascists regime, he had been in 1937-1942 Commander-in-Chief of the troops in Eastern Africa, Chief of General Staff and Marshal. When Mussolini had been overthrow, U.Cavallero found himself under arrest in 1943 and wrote a letter, exposing and unmasking his boss. In September Rome had been occupied by German forces, General was taken into their headquarters as far as they schemed to entrust him the guidance over remains of Italian Army. However, they discovered displeasing writing and on September 13 he shot himself

Cecil, Edgar Algernon Robert Gascoyne, Viscount of Chelwood, 3rd son of Marquess Salisbury - one of private secretaries to his father, Prime Minister R.Salisbury in 1886-1888. Member of British Parliament from 1906. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from May, 1915, till January, 1919; at the same time Minister of Blockade in 1916 - July 1918, then assistant to the head of Foreign Office A.Balfour. On November 16, 1915, when an issue of Armenian Massacre was considered in the House of Commons, R.Cecil in capacity of Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had stated: "The massacres were premeditated with the intention o the part of their instigators, the Committee of Union and Progress, not to punish the insurrectionists, but to exterminate the Armenian race." In 1919 he served as a co-President of the Supreme Economic Council at the Paris Conference, where he had been one of the key figures in elaboration of a Charter for the League of Nations. On March 11, 1920, delivered next exten-

sive speech on the necessity to defend Armenians of Cilicia and Western Armenia against military assaults.

Returned to the Cabinet in 1923-1927; Nobel peace prize winner in 1937. See: "The New York Times," 17.11.1915, p.2; The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Official Report, House of Commons, 5th Series, cited speech in: vol.75, 16.11.1915, col.1770-1776; vol.126, 11.03.1920, col.394-409; "Times," Lnd., 12.03.1920, p.19 in NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 427, f.104; as well as his autobiography "All the Way," published by himself in 1949

Chadwick - captain of the U.S. Army, who had been employed by the American Relief Administration in Armenia between April and October of 1919

Chaikovski, Nickolas Vasiliy - aristocrat, the socialist revolutionary (Eser) and free mason. From August 1918 on, president of the Provisional government of the Northern Russia, member of the Russian Political Conference in 1919. The latter was created by followers of A.Denikin in November of 1918 at Paris. In May of 1920 emigrated to London

Chamberlain, William and L. - employees of ACRNE at Yerevan in 1919

Chambers, William Nesbitt - missionary of the ABCFM in 1879-1925. Preached at Erzerum; served in Adana from January 1910 until October 1915, as well as from May 14 to November 21, 1919. As a Director of ACRNE in Adana welcomed the King-Crane Commission at the spot in June, then met J.Harbord at the same locality in September. Gave evidence concerning horrors of Genocide and advocated inclusion of Cilicia into projected new Armenian State

Chermin - General, Commander of Division, in 1919 participated in activities of the Russian National Society at Batum

Cheysson, Pierre Eugene Marie - financial expert to the French Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference who was involved in problems of the Ottoman Empire's bankruptcy, as well as in issues of its foreign debt. In February-November 1920 he was a member, then a President of the international Commission on reparations. Son of Jean-Jacques Emile Cheysson, who worked as director of the maps and plans department in the Ministry for Public Works. Statistical methods of J.-J.Cheysson were put into practice in Turkey of 1895. And Pierre, in his turn, gave birth to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs Claude Cheysson, who

held his post in 1981-1984

Chicherin, George Vasiliy - belonged to an old aristocratic kin who came to Moscow as an escort for Zoya Paleolog. From 1898 worked at a Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and took part in writing of the history of that institution. He had also studied there biography of A.M.Gorchakov, who was Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1856-1879 and a supporter of "half-peace" in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. What concerns G. Chicherin, he moved to England in 1908 and lived there until 1917 as a Menshevik and secretary of the Russian delegate's commission for facilitation to repatriation of emigrants, which functioned in London. Arrested in August, he had been exchanged for G.Buchanan on January 3, 1918. On January 29 had been appointed the Soviet Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs and on February 24 was assigned a head of the Soviet delegation at parleys in Brest-Litovsk. Signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918. On March 13 replaced L.Trotsky, then between May 30, 1918, and July 21, 1930, was People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR

Chilton, Henry G. - Secretary of British Embassy in Washington

Chkheidze, Nicholas Simeon - head of Georgian Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

Chkhenkeli, Akakiy Ivan - Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Transcaucasian Federative Republic in May 1918

Christie, Thomas Davidson - employee of ABCFM in 1877-1920. In common with his wife Sarah Carmelite served at Tarson; from 1893 on hold a post of President at the St.Paul Institute there. Witness of massacres implemented in 1895, 1909, and of Genocide, committed in 1915. On September 11, 1919 played host to J.Harbord and G.Moseley in this city

Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer - British Secretary of State for War, afterwards Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Clark, Harold Wentworth - Major of Infantry from J.Harbord Mission; prepared a survey of periodical press for concluding report

Clemenceau, Georges - Prime Minister of France and its Minister for War from November 16, 1917, to January 20, 1920

Clutterbuck, Cecil Hulton - Lieutenant Colonel, representative of the British Mission at Shushi in 1919

Colby, Bainbridge - the U.S. Secretary of State from February 25, 1920, until March 4, 1921

Cole H.C. - employee of the Standard Oil of New York

Cooke-Collis, William James Norman - Acting Brigadier General of the British Army; Commander of the Allied troops in Batum since December 24, 1918, till July 9, 1920

Coolidge, Archibald Cary - Professor at Harvard University, chief political cartographer under W.Wilson, part of the Special committee on the questions of the Near East in the frame of American Delegation at Paris

Cory, George Norton - Major General and Chief of Staff, British Salonika Army, under command of G.Milne. In the beginning of November 1918 reached with his master Constantinople to assume a post of the Chief of Staff at the Army of Black Sea in this city. From May 10 until September 6, 1919, replaced General W.Thomson as Commander of the 27th Division, as well as of all British forces in Transcaucasia up to their withdrawal.

Crane, Charles Richard - businessman, an Arabist and philanthrope, good friend of W.Wilson, main sponsor of his election campaign in 1912. Stockholder of "Westinghouse Co" Plant in St. Petersburg and President on the Board of Trustees at the Constantinople Woman's College. From September 16, 1915, acted as a co-founder of the Armenian Relief Committee. One of two administrators who guided the Inter-Allied Commission on mandates in Turkey (King-Crane Commission) in June - August 1919; and his elder son Richard was private secretary to R.Lansing.

In 1930 Charles Crane granted to the Harvard University as a keepsake 17 bells from the Moscow Danilov Monastery, recently returned to their native place.

Crawford - Captain of British Intelligence, in 1919 he represented occupation troops at Samsun

Crespi, Silvio Benigno - Ambassador and Member of Parliament, member of the Italian peace delegation. Italian plenipotentiary to the Paris Peace Conference from June 23, 1919, who superseded T.Tittoni. Signed the Treaty of Versailles and Saint Germain Treaty

Crosby, Oscar T. - assistant secretary of the Treasury of the USA, president of the Inter-Allied Council on war purchases and

finance

Crowe, Sir Eyre Alexander Barby Witchard - British assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from January 1912 until 1919; Permanent Under-Secretary of State from November 1920 till 1925. Married niece of the Chief of German Naval Staff. From 1907 on, stood for Anglo-Russian alliance without rapprochement with Germany; in March 1914 required not to implicate England in Armenian business. At the Paris Peace Conference formed a part of the Committee to Supervise the Execution of Versailles Treaty; head of British Delegation from September 18, 1919. Afterwards participated in Lausanne Conference

Cuinet, Vital - French geographer and statistician, author of two volumes on "Asiatic Turkey," published in 1892 and generally appreciated as a reliable storage of statistical data on Ottoman Empire. See: Cuinet V., *Le Turquie d'Asie. Géographie administrative, statistique descriptive et raisonnée de chaque province de l'Asie Mineure, en 2 tomes.* P., E.Leroux, 1892

Cumberland, William Wilson - Professor, economic adviser to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace in Paris, member of J.Harbord Mission. Prepared a report on financial situation in the region for financial account of his team

Curzon, George Nathaniel, Marquess Kedleston - British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; then head of the Foreign Office from October 29, 1919. On December 6, 1919, set an aide mémoire to the Supreme Economic Council of the Paris Peace Conference. As stated this politician: "The destitute conditions of these unfortunate people is to a large extent the consequence of the... delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey." The responsibility for this situation "must to some extent be borne by the Allies themselves." See: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Ed.by E.L.Woodward, R.Butler. 1st Series, in 27 vols. Lnd., HMSO, 1948, vol.2, p.499

Custer, Raymond M. - master of industry shops for men and superintendent of the NER branch at Sebastia in 1919-1921. On January 7, 1921, had been imprisoned for resisting authorities and exiled ("The New York Times," NY, 20.02.1921)

Daley, Edmund Leo - Colonel at the Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army; coordinator of relief in Nakhijevan from October 16 to December 12, 1919. Then until May 19, 1920, was employed by the NER in Tiflis, as its chief of staff. Major General in the World

War II

Damad Mehmed Adil Ferid Pasha - Ottoman diplomat in Berlin, Paris, St.Petersburg and London, son-in-law of Sultan Abdul Mejid. Grand Vizier from March 4 until October 1, 1919, and from April 5 till October 18, 1920. Had signed the Treaty of Sevres on August 10, 1920

Damadian, Mihran - native of Constantinople, who had graduated from Moorat-Raphaelian School in Venice, afterwards tutored in Constantinople, Adana and Mush. Participant in a manifestation at Kumkapi, Constantinople, on July 15, 1890. In 1912, as a plenipotentiary representative of Cilicia, he entered the National Delegation lead by Boghos Nubar. In 1919-1920 strove to establish autonomous State of Cilicia under the French tutelage; and on M. Damadian's initiative on August 4, 1920, the Supreme National Council of Adana had proclaimed Cilicia an independent State under patronage of France. However, French authorities had preferred to approach Turkey, therefore, they dissolved new administration. And M.Damadian had deceased in Egypt. More detailed account in: Տեփոյսն Պ., Միհրան Տամասյան (1863-1945): Գտնիք, «Արեւ»ի թերթօնը, 1956, էջ 28, 34-36, 40, 42, 53-54, 121, 200, 211, 219-221, 250-255

Dando A. - employee of NER at Diarbekir in 1919

Dasey M.K. - employee of the ACRNE at Mardin in 1919

Davie, Keith Maitland - Brigadier General, Commander of the 82th Infantry Brigade. From January 19, 1919 on, he led British detachments in the Tiflis sector. By April 4 until June 14 he served as British military representative in Yerevan and Commander-in-Chief of the 27th Division, Southern Command. The Yerevan Sector, subordinated to General, embraced the Neutral Zone of Borchalu uezd, Nakhijevan and Kars Oblast. It was made his duty to convey until April 30 Nakhijevan and Kars Oblast to Armenia's administration, to decide the fate of Borchalu uezd; to ensure repatriation of refugees within the borders of 1914; to detain Turkish agents; then to withdraw British troops and to retain behind them an Imperial Mission

Davis, John William - in 1911-1913 member of the U.S. House of Representatives from West Virginia, Solicitor General of the United States in 1913-1918, Ambassador in London from 1918 to 1921, a trustee of the Rockefeller Foundation in 1922-1939, Democratic party nominee at the presidential elections of 1924

Davis, Norman Hezekiah - Assistant Secretary of the Treasury of the USA in 1919-1920; member of the American Delegation in Paris. Undersecretary of State in 1920-1921

Day, Clive - member of the American commission to negotiate peace at Paris, collaborated with its Special committee on the questions of the Near East, member of the Interallied Commission on Greek Territorial Claims with borders, which encompassed the Western Armenia, too

Defrance, Jules-Albert - Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul General in Egypt in 1910-1918; French High Commissioner in Constantinople from January 30, 1919, to December, 1920. In December of 1919 he called for territorial unity of Anatolian region with the whole Empire, in which he also included Cilicia, provided "the specific status" of France and protection of its "Armenian wards." See: Ованнисян Р., Ук.соч., с.311

Denikin, Anton Ivan - Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer White Guard Army from April 13, 1918, to April 4, 1920

Dickson M. - employee of the NER at Sivas, who registered orphans in 1919

Dirik, Kiazim Bey - Colonel, Commandant of Erzerum fortress in 1919; Acting Commander of the 15th Army Corps of Turkish Nationalists in 1920

Disraeli, Benjamin, 1st Earl of Beaconsfield - Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1868 and in 1874-1880, proponent of integrity of the Ottoman Empire. In 1878 he had opposed the Treaty of San Stefano and signed the Cyprus Convention; the latter specified that England engaged to counteract every effort, applied by Russia in Western Armenia. He sharply disputed at the Congress of Berlin, especially deprecating liberation of Alashkert valley

Dodge, Cleveland Hoadley - undertaker and philanthropist from a copper tycoons family, good friend and sponsor of W. Wilson's election campaign, his money-man. Held a position in the headquarters of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions; President of the Board of Trustees at Robert College in Constantinople. From September 16, 1915, in response to a letter by J.Barton, he had established and mastered the Armenian Relief Committee. In 1919-1920 he was Treasurer of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East and member of the Executive Committee at the powerful American Committee for the Independence of Armenia. His son had been President of the

American University in Beirut, set up by their own family, and his daughter lectured at the Robert College

Dominian, Leon (13.04.1880-25.07.1935) - employee of the Department of State, technical expert of the American Delegation in Paris. Graduated from Robert College in Constantinople; in 1915 he has published an article in a "Bulletin of the American Geographical Society" which was entitled "The Peoples of Northern and Central Asiatic Turkey" (NY, 1915, vol.47, № 11). In 1917 authored monograph "The Frontier of Language and Nationality in Europe" (NY, H.Holt and Co., 1917, 375 p.). Served as Consul at Rome in 1924-1926 and as Consul General at Stuttgart in 1931-1932

Doolittle, Hooker Austin - the U.S. Vice-Consul at Tiflis in 1917-1921

Draper M. - employee of ACRNE in Yerevan

Dudley S.B. - Captain of the U.S. Army, doctor of the ACRNE at Mardin in 1919

Dunsterville, Lionel Charles - Major General, on January 14, 1918, had received an order to mount an Allied Expedition for Tiflis. Had been designated to reorganize Transcaucasian forces so that they could defend this region against Turkish invasion; the Allied troops were instructed to occupy Baku. He had wintered in Hamadan; it was only August 5, 1918, when he appeared at a destination with a detachment of 1,200 men. As soon as September 14 leaved this city for the benefit of Turkish troops, who were 14,000 in number. See: "Times," Lnd., 30.04.1920; Dugdale B.E.C., Op.cit., vol.2, p.197, 199-200, 202-204. On departure of L.Dunsterville's force refer: Suny R., The Baku Commune 1917-1918. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1972, p.335.; on its strength: NAA fund k.1021, reg.2, file 978, f.1-3

Durian, Archbishop Eghishe - Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople in 1909-1910 and Patriarch of the See of Jerusalem in 1921-1930. Partaker in international diplomatic talks from 1912 on, when Armenian National Assembly in Constantinople had elected him a member of the Security Commission. Had been part of the National Delegation in 1919-1920

Dutasta, Paul Eugène - Secretary General of the Paris Peace Conference; simultaneously, French Envoy Extraordinary at Berne in 1918-1920

ed-Dowleh, Vosuq - Prime Minister of Persia in 1916-1918

Edhem Bey - Turkish acting Minister of Interior in July, 1919

Eghiazarian, Barsegh S. - Armenian merchant, in common with his brother Grigor conducted business in Erivan and its Governorate, where he was engaged in cotton production. Landowner in Sardarapat, a banker and a chairman on the administrative board of the tobacco processing plant in Tiflis. His Yerevan house (in Abovian st., 6) served as hospital, and his brother's neighboring house was given to the 2nd charity orphanage of the ACRNE. For additional data, see: Հայ ժողովրդի պատմություն, 8 հատորով, հ.6, էջ 308, 346, 443

Elias Bey - Major of Turkish Army at Malatia in 1919

Eliot, Charles William - up to 1909, he was elected President of Harvard University with forty years of unbroken record of such service. Member of the Board of Trustees at the Rockefeller Foundation in 1914-1917, as well as of the Executive Committee at the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia and trustee of the NER in 1919-1920

El Housseini, Ismail Hakki Bey - businessman and an oilman from Jerusalem

Elkus Abram Isaac - the U.S. Ambassador at Constantinople in 1916-1917, worked till his country entered the war; legal trustee and member of the Executive Committee at ACRNE in 1919

Emin Bey - actively participated in the Nationalist movement in Van Province

Enver Pasha, Ismail - Minister for War and Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Army in 1914-1918; prime mover of the Turkish entry into the World War; Commander of the 3rd Army on the Caucasus Front in 1914-1915. Fled to Germany after the Mudros Armistice; in 1919 entered into communication with K.Radek there and moved into Soviet Russia. Later on, entering a struggle against this new Power killed him in 1922.

Esayan Melikset - secretary at Regional Council of Zangezur-Karabakh in 1919

Evanghoulian Levon George - son of Tiflis Mayor, son-in-law of Mantashian, diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia between April 1919 and 30 March, 1920. Died on September 9, 1920, in Tiflis

Faik, Mehmed - in 1919 he was the Chief quartermaster of Turkish Nationalist forces, stationed at Erzerum

Faisal I, ibn Hussein - Emir, guiding hand at the Arab Legion, allotted to the British Expeditionary Corps under the command of E.Allenby, which combated Turks in 1917-1918; afterwards party to the Paris Peace Conference. Leader of Syrian resistance to French mandate, as well as of drive for independence. King of Syria in 1920, head of Iraq kingdom in 1921-1933

Fehmi, Hasan - a judge of Islamic law at Mardin in 1919

Fenenga, Agnes - missionary of the ABCFM in 1901-1945; until 1915 served in Mardin, where she was arrested the very same year. In 1919 returned this city as a director of the local branch of the ACRNE. On September 13, 1919, conversed on the spot with J.Harbord; she disclosed to her interlocutor that after the carefully prepared massacre not a single Armenian survived

Ferid Bey - commander of gendarmes at Erzerum in 1919

Fitzmaurice, Maurice Swynfen - Commodore, commanding British Aegean Squadron in 1919-1920. In 1920 and 1926 had been promoted, accordingly to the ranks of Rear, and Vice-Admiral

Flinn M. - in 1919 she served as a nurse at Sebastia

Foch, Ferdinand - Marshal of France; Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies on the Western and Italian fronts from April 3, 1918, on; head of the Supreme War Council at the Paris Peace Conference

Forestier-Walker, George Townshend - Major General of the British Army, who commanded the 27th Division from December 25, 1918, up to March 10, 1919. His forces were deployed all across the Caucasus, with a headquarters in Tiflis. He executed an ousting of Turkish troops out of Armenia

Fowle, Charles W. - foreign secretary of the NER in 1920

Franchet d'Espérey, Louis Félix - General, Commander in Chief of the Allied Armies at the Bosphorus from July, 1918; High Commissioner of France in Constantinople from November, 1918 till January, 1919

Francis, David Rowland - Governor and Secretary of the Interior; the U.S. Ambassador to Russia in April, 1916 - November, 1918. His archives is stored at the Truman State University, Missouri

Fuller - she was employed by the NER at Kharberd in 1919

Gambashidze, Vahtang - Dr., ended up his life as White-Guard émigré

Gates, Caleb Frank - Doctor of Divinity, American missionary, President of Robert College at Constantinople in 1903-1932. Before this post he lived since 1881 in Mardin and was the fourth president of Euphrates College at Kharberd in 1894-1902

Geddes, Sir Auckland - British Minister of Reconstruction and President of the Board of Trade in 1919, Ambassador to the USA in 1920-1924

Gedevanov, Alexander Constantine - General, Deputy Minister of War at the Republic of Georgia

Gedevanov Nickolas Constantine - Colonel of the General Staff, chief of the operation department at the Ministry of War, Republic of Georgia

Gegechkori, Eugene Peter - a Chairman of the Transcaucasian Commissariat from November 28, 1917, up to April 22, 1918; at the same time, served till February 23 as a Commissar for issues of the Ministry of Labour and of Foreign Affairs; Minister of War from February 23 until April 22. However, the Transcaucasian Cabinet was inactive from April 8 on, though its resignation was accepted on April 22. Afterward Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Georgian Republic from June 24, 1918, up to 1921, he had simultaneously served as a Vice Minister (i.e. Vice-Premier) and Minister of Justice from March 12, 1919

George V Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, Frederick Earnest Albert - a grandson of Queen Victoria, King of the United Kingdom and British Dominions, Emperor of India, who reigned from May 6, 1910, till his death on January 20, 1936

Georges-Picot, Charles Marie François - French Consul General in Beirut, co-author of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, signed in 1916. French High Commissioner at Syria and Cilicia in 1919 with headquarters at the same city. In the beginning of December made a journey to Sivas with a purpose to achieve a separate agreement with M.Kemal

Gerard, James Watson III - generously financed W.Wilson's electoral campaign in 1912; served as the U.S. Ambassador to Germany in 1913-1917; chairman of the ACIA in 1919-1920

Gevorg V Tphghisetsi Surenyants - Catholicos of all Armenians in 1911-1930

Ghambarian Yuri Stephan (1850-1926) - Professor of jurisprudence at Moscow University. Proponent of civil liberties, secular and democratic education. Studied in Gottingen, lectured in

Brussels, Paris and Petersburg, staffed at the editorial board of encyclopaedia "Granat." He had become one of the founders and the first rector of the Yerevan University, who hold this post from July 1919 till December 1920. The University was initially inaugurated on January 31, 1920, in Alexandropol; where he started to operate at the School of Commerce

Ghukasian, Poghos, Arshak, Hakob and Abraham, sons of Hovsep - businessmen-brothers from Shushi, founders of the "Caspian Partnership" in 1888. This enterprise had been the forth by its capacity in Baku; along with another one, operated at Maykop. In 1890-1917 Poghos and Arshak were chairmen of the Council of Convention of the Baku oil producers; from 1897 on Poghos went into trade, selling machine tools, engines and power stations. In 1902 Poghos Ghukasian in partnership with A.Mantashian had set up a Company in England and assigned his brother Abraham to manage its office at London. Afterwards this member of the family went into shipbuilding. In 1906-1912 Poghos had been elected member of the State Council. Hakob established a monopoly in sale of mineral waters at Pyatigorsk; in 1917-1918 he served as Chairman of the Armenian National Council at Baku. Later on, Poghos and Abraham emigrated into Paris.

As active members of Armenian Philanthropic Society, run at Baku, brothers raised a High School in Shushi and named it "Mariam Ghukasian;" Arshak bequeathed whole his fortune, equal to eight million roubles, for educational purposes. See: Բալազյան Լ., Ալեքսանդր Մանթաշյանց: (Ազգային բարերարը և գեղարվեստի մեկենասը:) Եր., Հայաստան, 1991, էջ 42, 65, 162, 194-195; Дадаян Х.З., Армяне и Баку (1850-е гг. - 1920 г.). Ер., Норавапк, 2007, с.65, 162, 194-195

Gladstone, William Ewart - British Prime Minister in 1868-1874, 1880-1885, 1886 and 1892-1894. Mouthpiece of sympathy with small nations and originator of pro-Armenian public opinion in his country. In 1876 had been opposed to the policy of unconditional support, given by B.Disraeli to the Sultan. On July 2 and September 11, 1880, he composed two collective notes by Powers, who addressed to Porte with request to comply with the Treaty of Berlin, signed only two years earlier, and to implement reforms in the Western Armenia. He had been initiator of the Anglo-Armenian Association in 1882. In 1895 generally, and especially at a meeting held on August 6 at Chester, he had sharply condemned

bloody massacre of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and demanded one-sided actions by the British. At a meeting, held on September 24, 1896, had labeled Abdul Hamid II "the crowned assassin," whose crimes "constitute the most terrible, most monstrous series of proceedings that have ever been recorded in the dismal... history of human crime."

Glazebrook, Otis Allan - the U.S. Consul at Jerusalem un February 1914 - April 1917 and in December 1918 - December 1920

Goodrick - Lieutenant of British Army, officer at the Administration of the Occupied Enemy Territories, allocated at Jerusalem

Gough-Calthorpe, Somerset Arthur - Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean Fleet from August 1917. In 1895-1896 his Fleet had been forwarded to the coasts of Africa; then a naval attaché in Russia, Norway and Sweden in 1902-1905. On January 20, 1918, he performed a sortie into Aegean Sea, as a result of it "Goeben" obtained heavy damage and "Breslau" sank. Signed the Mudros Armistice on October 30 of the same year and brought the Allied Fleet into Constantinople on November 12, where he had been nominated as a High Commissioner. In this capacity he was engaged till August 5, 1919, in problems of Russian Civil, as well as in troubles connected with collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Admiral of the Fleet from 1925 on

Gracey, George Frederick Handel - Captain of British Intelligence in Armenia, representative of the Great Britain in Yerevan in September 1919 - October 15, 1920

Graf, Johanna L. - missionary of the ABCFM at Mardin in 1894-1920, met J.Harbord Mission in Diarbekir on September 15, 1919

Graffam, Mary Louise - missionary, employed in 1900 - August 1921; the principal of the girls' high school at Sivas. Along with people under her wardship, went on July 7, 1915, in a convoy of proscription as far as Malatia. Described the horrors of deportation in a letter addressed to H.Morgenthau on August 7, which had been forwarded to Secretary of State R.Lansing. Did not abandon the city even in wartime. In 1919 cared for 1,500 orphans in Sivas, where this ardent protagonist of Armenian independence had finally deceased. See: Sahagian H. Graffam, Partridge and the Armenians of Sivas in a collection Armenian Sebastia/Sivas and

Lesser Armenia. Ed.by R.Hovannisian. Costa Meza, Ca., Mazda, 2004, p.376-378

Green, Joseph Coy - Major of the U.S. Army, in 1918-1919 he was Director of the American Relief Administration in Rumania and in the Near East; then head of ARA in the Caucasus, resided at Tiflis from April till September 30, 1919. On his departure home took away a letter by A.Khatisian for W.Wilson, written on September 14 and delivered to the USA on November 18. In 1920 he had become chairman of election committee assisting H.Hoover's run for the U.S. President in the State of Ohio

Greene, Esther F. - employee of NER at Malatia in 1919

Gregory (Grigor) the Parthian, Illuminator (c.257 - c.331) - first Armenian Catholicos, who converted Armenia to Christianity, adopted as its official religion in 301. He held office of the first official head of Armenian Apostolic Church in 302-325

Grey of Fallodon, Sir Edward - Viscount, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1905-1916; past master in secret diplomacy. Architect of Anglo-Russian agreement signed in 1907 as a component of Entente. Champion of such approachment pointed against Germany and Austria-Hungary; however, it should not contain joint actions directed at Turkey. In 1912 he proposed to turn Bosphorus and Dardanelles into neutral area. In 1913-1914 took an active part in negotiations on Turkish reforms; in the end of July 1913 confirmed to S.D.Sazonov, that Russia could operate single-handedly in the Ottoman Empire. However, this approach had not been extended to its Asian portion, where success probability was the most high. At this moment of 1913 he accepted an alliance with Russia and Germany; though Russia did preferred France as their third partner.

Being in charge of special relationship with Washington, E. Grey had appealed on August 10, 1915, to W.Wilson and launched an initiative to establish the League of Nations. On February 14, 1916, he concluded "will-o'-the-wisp" House-Grey agreement; it provided for American entry into the war and divided Europe and Turkey between two contracting parties. Afterwards this statesman crossed the ocean in September - December of 1919 as an Ambassador and chief of special diplomatic mission. To acquire datum on E.Grey you may refer, for example: Howard H.N., The Partition of Turkey, a Diplomatic History of 1913-1923. Norman, Ok., University of Oklahoma, 1931; Dugdale B.E.C., Arthur James

Balfour, in 2 vols. NY, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1937, vol.2, 1906-1930, p.164; Corp E.T. Sir William Tyrrell: The Eminence Grise of the British Foreign Office, 1912-1915. "The Historical Journal," Cambridge and NY, 1982, vol.25, № 3, p.697, 705-706; Игнатъев А.В., Русско-английские отношения накануне первой мировой войны (1908-1914 гг). М., Соцэкгиз, 1962, с.131-142, 150-153, 171; Гершов З.М., Вудро Вильсон. М., Мысль, 1983, с.271; Уткин А.И., Вудро Вильсон. М., Международные отношения, 1989, с. 43, 82, 84, 97-98; Козенко Б.Д., Посредничество без кавычек. Миротворчество США в 1914-1916 гг. (характер и цели). In a book: Первая мировая война: дискуссионные проблемы истории. М., 1994, с.81-82; Романов В.В., Полковник Эдвард Хауз. "Вопросы истории," М., 2005, № 7, с.45-68, с.53, 67

Gyanjuntzian (Gyanjuntsev, Kyanjuntsev), Hayk Grigor and M.G. - brothers, proprietors of engineering plant in Baku, engaged in oil and cotton, held on lease the silk-winding mill in Nukhi. Hayk Grigor was an alumnus of Petersburg Technological Institute, board member at Baku Oil Society, established in 1874. In cooperation with C.I.Khatisian he had founded in 1902 Engineering, Oil Industry and Trade Company of Baku. Administered the Moscow-Caucasus Oil Industry Partnership

Gyulkhandanian, Abraham - since August 10, 1919, until May 5, 1920, Minister of Interior and Justice of the Republic of Armenia; on December 2, 1920, in common with A.Khatisian and S.Korganian had concluded the Alexandropol Treaty

Haddad, Sami - instructor of the School of Medicine of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut; physician and interpreter at the King-Crane Commission in 1919

Haidar, Rustem - representative of Hejaz delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

Hain, Nahum - Grand Rabbi of Turkey

Hakhverdian, Alexander Hovhannes (Akhverdov, Alexander Ivan) - a nobleman. In 1896 he had founded an enterprise "A.I. Akhverdov and Co;" thus he grew into a leader of petroleum industry in Grozny, extracting something about 50 per cent of all local oil

Hakki, Ismail - this Lieutenant of the Turkish General Staff had secretly crossed the border in February, 1913, and arrived to Tiflis for subversive activities. Later chief of Gendarmerie at Khorasan, Erzerum province, in 1919

Hakobian (Hakopov), Bagdasar Hovannes - representative of Hakopov family, its brothers were engaged in cotton business, wine-making and from 1890 on, were occupied with extraction of oil at Baku. In 1911 Bagdasar was a member of Armenian Philanthropic Society in this city

Hakobian, Michael - Assistant Director at Kharberd Branch of the NER

Haldane, Richard Burdon Sanderson - Viscount, Secretary of State for War in 1905-1912, stood up for implementation of combat operations on the continent, established British Expeditionary Army and Imperial General Staff. In February, 1912, went with diplomatic mission to Berlin, to discuss problems of Baghdad Railway in common with building of German Navy. These two issues urged Great Britain to begin preparations for big war. Lord High Chancellor in 1912-1915; then, in consequence of pro-German inclinations, he did not obtain State position up to 1924

Halil Bey - Colonel of the Turkish Army, operated in Nakhichevan in 1919-1920

Hankey, Sir Maurice - Captain of Marine Artillery, engineering manager of the British peace delegation and chief secretary of the Paris Peace Conference. He knew everything; he could put his hand on anything; he knew everybody; he said nothing; he gained the confidence of all. He became the sole recorder for the decisive six weeks of the conversations between W.Wilson, G.Clemenceau and D.Lloyd George in January-February, 1919. Secretary to all British Cabinets during twenty years of their work

Harbord, James Guthrie - Major General, Chief of Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe in 1919; from August 25 till October 23, headed the American military Mission to Armenia

Hardinge, Sir Charles - Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain in 1906-1910, as well as from 1916 till November of 1920; Viceroy of India in 1912-1916. Acting head of the Foreign Office in January of 1920; afterwards Ambassador to France up to 1922

Harley, Isabella - missionary of ABCFM at Kharberd in 1911-1916, witness of Armenian Genocide, 1915. She had leaved for the U.S. in 1917; then signed a contract with NER after the war and returned to Kharberd in 1919-1922. In a common with R.Parmelee she was driven away from this city on January 21, 1922, by local

authorities; therefore until 1933 worked at Girls School in Scutary, Constantinople. Afterwards, up to 1939, I.Harley continued charitable assistance in Greece. More detailed in: Հայկ Վստէ, Նշվ.աշխ., էջ 369

Harmsworth - Lieutenant of the British Army, assigned to its national delegation in Paris

Harpoutlian, Levon - Assistant Director of the Kharberd unit of NER in 1919

Harrison, Leland - counsellor of the U.S. Embassy in France in 1918. Secretary of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace (this is the official appellation of the Peace Delegation) at the Paris Peace Conference

Haskell, William Nafew - Colonel of the U.S. Army; Allied High Commissioner in Armenia and head of the NER from July 5, 1919, until August 17, 1920

Hauffman E. - employee of ACRNE in Yerevan

Hawkes W. - in 1919 he was in charge of Storage Depot, managed by NER at Sivas

Heck, Lewis - the U.S. High Commissioner on Bosphorus

Heinz, Howard Covode - employee of the American Food Administration; in the capacity of AFA director in Constantinople concerned himself with welfare aid in the Balkans and Turkey. Collaborated with charitable American Committee for Relief in the Near East; in April, 1919, he travelled all over the region, comprising Armenia and Caucasus

Hekimian, Khosrov - general practitioner, employed by ACRNE at Sebastia in 1919

Hemphill, Alexander J. - legal trustee and member of the Executive Committee of ACRNE in 1919

Henry R. - officer of the ACRNE in Yerevan

Herter, Christian Archibald - secretary of the Paris Peace Conference on behalf of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace; afterwards a Governor and Secretary of State

Hiatt, Walter Sanders - American pressman who worked for Associated Press and was a member of J.Harbord mission to Armenia. In October of 1919, when wayfarers returned home, he remained at Constantinople

Hill, Lovering - Captain of the U.S. Army, aide-de-camp of General J.Harbord

Hoover, Herbert Clark - Major, director of the American Food Administration in 1917-1918; Director General of Relief from December 1, 1918, till August 2, 1919; and head of the American Relief Administration in 1919-1923. Head of the Interallied board to coordinate relief work (that is of Relief Section at SEC), as well as of the Food Section of the Allied Supreme Economic Council. Chairman of the Commission for Relief in Belgium in 1915; and CRB had its flag, navy, factories, mills, railroads in common with eleven million dollars a month budget. After the U.S. entered the war, as administrator of national food supplies, he dealt with provision of foodstuffs needed for the war and with deliveries to the Allies. He put to use meatless Mondays, wheatless Wednesdays, and a slogan "when in doubt, eat potatoes." On August 17, of the same 1917, in the network of the U.S. Food Administration had been organised new agency, called Grain Corporation, charged with purchases and sales of breadstuff and having transaction of seven billion dollars. It was also managed by the director of the greater structure personally. By an Act of Congress of February 24, 1919, AFA was transformed into ARA with the budget of \$100 millions. Private donations had augmented another \$100 millions. In 1921-1923 giving help to Soviet Russia, he put slogan "whatever their politics, they shall be fed."

On the eve of ferocious crisis, in 1912, he and his wife published a book "De re metallica," written by Georgius Agricola in 1555 and translated by them from Latin. Besides, when at work in China before the war, they studied in a team-work Chinese language which used at the White House, after the election of H.Hoover as President of the USA

Hope, George Price Webley - early in 1918 he had been British Rear Admiral, Deputy First Sea Lord and director of the Operations Division on the War Staff at the Admiralty

Hornbeck, Stanley Kuhl - Captain of Ordnance Department, chief of Far Eastern Division of the American commission to negotiate Peace in Paris; member of J.Harbord Mission. Presented a paper on political problems in the area for its final statement. By his judgment, creating of the Armenian State ought to subordinate to that of safeguarding its population. See: Ованнисян Р. Ук.соч., с.256

House, Edward Mandell - special representative of the U.S. Government in Europe

Hovannisian, Richard Gable - Historian, specialized in Armenian Studies, who works at the University of California Los Angeles, expert on history of the Republic of Armenia, 1918-1920

Hovsepian, Harutyun - Major General, commander of the 2nd Infantry Regiment in 1919, who commanded forces of Alexandropol detachment, as well

Hubbard, Mary - missionary and member of ABCFM in 2nd generation, she had been born in 1890 in Sebastia as the seventh child in a family of Presbyterian preachers. Here, in the very same Sebastia her father died in 1899 and was buried in Armenian cemetery. In 1919 the daughter managed women's workshops in this city. In greater length: Martin E.W., The Hubbards of Sivas: a Chronicle of Love and Faith. Santa Barbara, Ca., Fithian Press, 1991

Hughes, Charles Evans - Chief Justice of the USA; in 1916 he had been nominated by the Republican Party for Presidential elections, but lost his race to W.Wilson. Afterwards operated as a member of the American Committee for Independence of Armenia and trustee at the Near East Relief. Later on, he was appointed Secretary of State

Hughes William Morris - Prime Minister of Australia

Hulusi, Husein Bey (Pektash) - Professor, taught Turkish in the Robert College at Constantinople, interpreter of J.Harbord Mission

Hurley, Edward Nash - chairman of the United States Shipping Board; advisor of American commission to negotiate Peace at the Paris Peace Conference on the issues of labour and shipping

Husein Effendi in 1919 he had been a judge of Moslem law at Mardin

Hymans, Paul Louis Adrien Henry - Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1918-1920, Minister of State; on November 15, 1920 at the first Assembly of the League of Nations had been elected President of its Council

Imperiali di Francavilla, Guglielmo - Ambassador of Italy in London

Ismail - Colonel in the Army of Turkish Nationalists, mutasarrif of Erzrnka in 1919

Izzet Bey, Hasan - there was certain Turkish Consul General at Kars in 1912 and Commander of the 3rd Ottoman Army near Sarikamish in 1914. Commander of Kurdish irregular bands on the

frontier of the Kars Oblast

Jackson, Jesse Benjamin - the U.S. Consul in Aleppo, on September 12, 1919, he had imparted to J.Harbord Mission that out of one million Armenians, who were deported southwards, only 100,000 souls survived. See: ОВАННИСЯН Р., Ук.соч., с.227

Jackson, John Price - Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers of the U.S. Army, member of J.Harbord Mission. Supported American mandate and daring intrusion of the USA into the region of their investigation. Prepared a report on population and productive forces in the examined area

Jafarov, Mohammed Yusuf - Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan

James, Arthur Curtiss - businessman, Director of the Paris bureau of the American Food Administration in the Near East, Chairman of the national organization of the American Committee for Relief in the Near East

Janumyantz (Janumov), Arakel and his brothers - Armenian entrepreneurs, wine-makers in Elizavetpol uezd. They came from Matrassa village near Shamakhi; 30 families of wine-growers Janumyantz clan lived there. Owned stores in Baku and Samarkand

Jemal Pasha, Ahmed - a member of the Young Turk triumvirate, Minister of Public Work in 1913, Minister of the Navy in 1914, Commander of the 4th Turkish Army in 1914-1918. One of three main masterminds and cut-through accomplice of the Armenian Genocide, 1915. Drowned in blood the self-defense of Urfa city, lasted from September 29 until the middle of November of the very same 1915. On July 5, 1919, he was sentenced to death in absentia by the Extraordinary Court Martial at Constantinople and shot on July 25, 1922, in Tiflis by Petros Ter-Poghosian, Artashes Gevorgian and Stephan Tsaghikian

Jevdet Bey, Ahmed - Colonel, Commander of the Turkish 13th Army Corps at Diarbekir in 1919

Johnson, Douglas Wilson - Major, Professor, Doctor of Geology, Geographer, specialist on boundary geography at the division of Territorial, economic and political Intelligence of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace. Member of Central Territorial Committee of the Paris Peace Conference, of the Special committee on the questions of the Near East within the frame of the American Delegation, as well as of its Steering Committee

Johnson, Frank S. - worked for the Young Men's Christian Association in 1920, when he went to Aintab with the relief supplies. See: The Two YMCA Men Victims of Turks. "The New York Times," NY, 8.02.1920

Johnson, Robert Underwood - editor and poet, from February 1920 till May 1921 had been the U.S. Ambassador in Italy

Jones, Anna B. - missionary of ABCFM in 1890-1931, in 1919 she had been an employee of the NER at Kharberd

Jones, Russell C. - employee at the office of the Assistant Secretary of State

Julphayan A. - town dweller of Andreas in 1919

Jusserand, Jean Andrien Antoine Jules - Ambassador of France in the USA

Kajaznuni, Hovhannes - Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia from June 7, 1918, till August 7, 1919, though from April 16, 1919 on, A.Khatisian had been operating as Acting Premier Minister. H.Kajaznuni leaved Paris for New York on October 1 (NAA, fund 370, reg.1, file 63, f.2-2B) in the capacity of a chief of special economic and political Mission to the USA. He returned home in September 1920, and on November 4 had been elected Chairman of the Parliament

Kaledin, Alexis Maxim - Commander in Chief of the 8th Cavalry Army, Ataman of the Don Cossack. Proponent of war to the victory, he did not obeyed orders from Provisional Government and composed on November 26, 1917, a triumvirate with Generals M.V.Alekseev and L.G.Kornilov to struggle against Bolsheviks. Don Cossacks, however, did not desire to wage war on Bolsheviks and the Volunteer Army into Kuban. In consequence of these proceedings, A.Kaledin waived on January 29, 1918, his Ataman authorities and committed suicide by shooting at his heart

Kamoyev - Armenian businessmen engaged in fish industry at Baku

Kanayan, Drastamat (Dro) - studied at a Military School in Pyatigorsk. From 1908 on, managed transportation of weapons into Western Armenia. During the World War I commanded the 2nd Armenian volunteer detachment on the Caucasus Front. Commissar of the Armenian Corps in 1917. Was in command of covering force at the Battle of Bash Aparan in 1918. Minister of War in November 1920. In accordance with Agreement, concluded with the RSFSR on December 2 of the same year, he had been included

into the staff of temporary Revolutionary Committee of Armenia. Participated in anti-Soviet mutiny in February 1921; afterwards émigré in Rumania and Lebanon. In the years of World War II generated an Armenian Legion for the Nazi Germany, recruited out of prisoners of war of the Soviet Army. Died in Boston. See: Армянский вопрос. Энциклопедия, с.168

Kaplanov, Rashid Khan - Minister of Education and Religious Affairs in Azerbaijan from April 14 to December 22, 1919; Minister of Finance in 1920

Karabekir, Kiazim Musa - Lieutenant General of Ottoman Army; stood of guard over the Straits in 1915; Commander of the 2nd Caucasian Corps in 1916. Arrived to Erzerum in March 1919 and immediately resorted to sabotage of disarmament. In the beginning of April, when the 9th Army had been renamed into the 15th Corps, he took command over it and vigorously backed M. Kemal. Zone of his responsibility stretched from Trebizond to Van. When this Corps had been turned into the Eastern Army, led it and waged the Turkish-Armenian war in 1920. He concluded Alexandropol and Kars Treaties; on March 16, 1921, accomplished temporary annexation of Batum, thus helping Turkey to ensure control over Ardvin and Ardahan. See: Dadrian V.N., Op.cit., p.362-369; Rawlinson A., Adventures in the Near East, 1918-1922. Lnd.-NY, Dodd, 1924, p.173

Karakhan (Karakhanian), Levon Michael - member of RSDLP from 1904, Menshevik. Switched to Bolshevik since May 1917; member of Petrograd Revolutionary Military Committee in October of the same year. From November 1917 up to March 1918 was a member and a secretary of Soviet peace delegation at Brest-Litovsk; on March 3 signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. People's Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR from March 1918 till 1921; Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy in 1925-1927; People's Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1927-1934. Ambassador to Turkey in 1934-1937, he was summoned to Moscow on May 3, taken into custody and shot on September 20, 1937. Was exonerated a posthumous

Kavtaradze - there was certain Nickolas Alexis Kavtaradze, alumnus of the Page Corps, Colonel of the Semenovskiy Regiment and Major General of Russian Army from 1916, on

Kemal, Mustafa - made war at the Dardanelles Front in 1915; holding a rank of General and called Pasha by his title,

commanded a Corps and then an Army in 1916-1917 at the Caucasian Front. Led the movement of Nationalists in 1919, and in their pursuit to lessen losses in the East exploited military and Genocidal methods, implemented earlier by Young Turks. Placed himself at the head of Nationalists' Representative committee and on April 23, 1920, entered a claim for Kars, Batum, Ardahan and Mosul. After effective war against the Republic of Armenia, combined with victory at the Greco-Turkish war of 1919-1922, was elected first President of Turkey

Kenan Bey, Mehmet (Dalbashar) - Lieutenant Colonel, Commander of Turkish 5th Division at Mardin in 1919

Kerbalay, Ali Khan of Nakhichevan - staff captain in the Russian Army, conducted Tartar mutinies at Nakhijevan in the Spring of 1919

Kerensky, Alexander Fyodor - advocate, socialist revolutionary and freemason; Prime Minister of the Provisional Government from July 7 until October 25, 1917. In 1912 he defended at St.Petersburg accused Armenians, members of Dashnak Party. Had been elected Secretary General to the Supreme Council of Masonic lodge The Grand East of the Nations of Russia in 1916-1917. In June of 1918 fled to London and Paris via North of Russia. His son was an architect who supervised construction of the bridge over Bosphorus.

Keropian Hagop Gabriel (b.1889 Constantinople) - performed his job there, at the U.S. High Commissariat, under command of M.Bristol. Afterwards participated in J.Harbord Mission and served as employee, attached to the U.S. Trade Commissioner E. Mears. On November 11, on board of "Martha Washington" arrived at New York, to join his sister who lived there

Kerr, Philip Henry, Marquess Lothian - private secretary to British Prime Minister D.Lloyd George. Was occupied with the Armenian Question from 1895 on, negotiated with A.Lobanov-Rostovsky, who did not wish England's active interference for the benefit of Armenians. As a partaker at the Paris Peace Conference, he had already been in May 1919 of opinion that Britain could not stay in the Caucasus any longer, as far as it was beyond her power. In August he objected Italian military presence in Southern Anatolia. In September penned together with the U.S. Ambassador in France H.Wallace a letter of credence for personal friend of G. Clemenceau J.Loris-Melikov, who went Caucasus to improve A.

Denikin's relations with Transcaucasian Republics. His policy run counter to intentions of Foreign Office and displeased G.Curzon.

On January 8, 1920, P.Kerr received A.Aharonian and heard his assessment of the French positions in Cilicia; as well as appreciation of Karabakh's importance for the defence of the Republic of Armenia, and appraisal of the Allies' concern in increase of the Armenian Army. The British had answered that the U.S. resignation virtually leaved Cilicia for France, that his Empire permanently meant to create united Armenia and promised to speak to the Prime Minister about military aid to Armenians.

Kevorkov (Gevorkiantz) Aghabek Bagdasar and sons of Christian: Sargis, Bagrat, Christian, Hovannes - Armenian merchants, brothers, engaged in cotton and silk production. They credited peasants, owned houses, factories, offices and stores in Moscow, Yerevan, Gandzak, Nukhi, Ashkhabad and Merv. As soon as 1893 they already exhibited wines from Erivan Governorate at the International Trade Exposition in Chicago

Khachadoorian, Harootiun Hovhannes - native of Aintab, he had got education at Moorat-Raphaelian School in Venice and at the University of Vermont. First Lieutenant, Corps of Engineers, on the active list of the U.S. Military Intelligence during wartime. Later on, was assigned to American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference and dismissed on July 28, 1919. Then was included in J.Harbord mission. Additional information in: US NA, RG 256, 184.00101/124

Khachikov - Armenian entrepreneur occupied with silk production in Nukhi

Khalil Ajha - Kurd chieftain at Erznka in 1919

Kharlamov, Vasiliy - chairman of South-Eastern Federation in Ekaterinodar

Khatisian, Alexandre Ivan - Mayor of Tiflis in 1909-1917, Minister President of the Republic of Armenia from August 10, 1919, till May 5, 1920, and its Minister of Foreign Affairs from May 22, 1919, until April 2, 1920. Signed the treaties of Batum and Alexandropol

Khatisian, Xenia - spouse of A.I.Khatisian

Khoren I Muradbekian - Catholicos of all Armenians in 1932-1938; Bishop in 1910, chairman of the Yerevan National Council from 1917 up to August 1, 1918, who handed over his powers to H.Kajaznuni. In 1919-1920 had been sent with diplomatic

missions to Paris, London and the USA. See: Վավերագրեր հայ եկեղեցու պատմության: Գիրք Բ Խորեն Ա Մուրադբեկյան կաթողիկոս ամենայն հայոց (հոգևոր գործունեությունը 1901-1938թթ.): Կազմ.Ս.Բեհբուդյան: Եր., ՀՀ Արխիվային գործի վարչություն, 1996, էջ 3-8, 118, 291

Kifer M. - employee of the ACRNE in Yerevan

King, Henry Churchill - theologian, President of Oberlin college, Ohio; co-leader of the Inter-Allied Commission on mandates in Turkey (King-Crane Commission) in June-August 1919

Kirshner - employee of the ACRNE at Mardin in 1919

Kitchener, Horatio Herbert - Secretary of State for War, United Kingdom, in 1914-1916

Knapp, Grace Higley - missionary of ABCFM; in 1893-1915 she worked in her birthplace, in Bitlis, as well as in American schools of Erzerum and Van. In June-July 1915 collaborated in hospital of Van with Countess Alexandra Tolstoy, daughter of Lev Tolstoy. On August 3-13 she left this city in common with members of Russian Red Cross and returned home, where she penned the situation with Armenians and the necessity of outside aid

Knapp, Harry Shepard - Vice Admiral from February 1920, the U.S. representative in Supreme War Council of the Paris Peace Conference, who dealt with Navy issues; Naval Attaché at London in 1918-1919 and Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces operating in European waters in 1920. M.Bristol reported him directly

Knapp M. - nurse of the NER at Sebastia in 1919

Knox B. - employee of the ACRNE in Yerevan

Kojasar, Aram - Sergeant-Major at the Department of Criminal Investigation and orderly-interpreter for J.Harbord Mission

Kolchak, Alexander Vasily - Admiral, polar explorer; Supreme Governor of Russian State and Commander-in-Chief of White forces at Omsk from November 18, 1918, to January 4, 1920; executed by shooting on the night of February 7, 1920.

In June 1916 was appointed Commander of the Black Sea Fleet and got an order to prepare the Bosphorus action by spring of the next year. Widely applied mining at the Straits and in common with Army had successfully taken Trebizond. On July 22, by efforts of "Empress Maria" made good progress in his war on "Breslau" near Bosphorus; however, on October 20 his dreadnought suffered a subversive explosion or some ill luck in the inner roads of Sevastopol and perished.

After February 1917 A.Kolchak was the first in the fleet of Black Sea who swore to Provisional Government; nevertheless, in August he was summoned by A.Kerensky to Petrograd, compelled to resign; and on invitation by American Mission of E.Root he went to the USA as semiofficial observer who would deliver his knowledge regarding Bosphorus. Coming back, he asked for joining British war service, preferably in Mesopotamia; he got counteroffer though, to lead strife against Bolsheviks, and went to Omsk

Kopp - Corporal, interpreter from Russian in J.Harbord Mission

Korganian, Stephan Alexander - Governor General of Kars Oblast from April 20, 1919, until October 30, 1920. Earlier, he had been assistant chief of Surmalu uezd in 1885-1888; then up to 1895 served as assistant chief of Nakhijevan uezd; chief of Novo-Bayazet uezd till 1910; and chief of Kutais uezd until 1915. Signed the Treaty of Alexandropol on December 2, 1920

Kovanko - engineer of roads and highways, an offspring of well-known family of military aeronauts; member of the Russian National Society at Batum in 1919

Krajian S. - member into the Armenian National Council of Adana; on September 12, 1919, welcomed J.Harbord Mission there

Kuchuk Khan - Persian tribal chieftain for Jangali Kurds

Lambert, Robert A. - director of the NER in Syria in 1919-1920

Lansing, Robert - the U.S. Secretary of State from June 23, 1915, to February 12, 1920; son-in law and uncle by marriage of Secretaries of State. On October 4, 1915, he directed an instruction to his Ambassador in Constantinople H.Morgenthau to inform the Ottoman authorities that American nation was interested in the Armenian straits and insisted on protection and humane treatment of Armenian people. This instruction had not been an official remonstrance of the U.S. Government; however, it charged the Ambassador to alert Porte, that "the atrocities inflicted upon the Armenian Christians had aroused strong sentiment among the American people, and that a continuation of these atrocities would tend to jeopardize the good feeling of the people of the United States toward the people of Turkey." The State Department had asked Ambassador of Germany in Washington J.von Bernstorff to bring the issue to the attention of his Foreign Ministry. See: US

NA RG 59, 701.6711/103½, 104½; "The New York Times," NY, 5. 10.1915, p.3; Уткин А.И., Ук.соч., с.69

At the turn of 1918 he opposed W.Wilson's trip to Paris, since he desired to lead the delegation himself and thus to pave the way for his nomination at presidential elections of 1920. National chief executive did understand the matter; and though R.Lansing nominally was the head of delegation at the Peace conference, President seldom asked his advice. On October 11, 1919, J.S. Williams had introduced to the Secretary of State special diplomatic mission of the Republic of Armenia, which sought recognition de facto for their State. In a reply to R.Lansing's request, he had been provided on October 29 with a memorandum on the subject, composed by Armenian Mission

Larcombe L.R. - officer of the NER in charge of transportation at Sebastia in 1919

Laughlin, Irwin Boyle - chargé d'affaires of the U.S. in Germany; secretary and counselor of the Embassy in London from 1912 to 1919. Secretary of the special envoy to the Sultan of Turkey in 1910. Secretary to Senator H.C.Lodge at the Naval diplomatic conference in 1921-1922; envoy extraordinary to Greece in 1924-1926; was appointed by President H.Hoover an Ambassador to Spain and served there in 1929-1933

Laughton, Frederick Eastland - Captain of British Army, Acting Colonel; Military Governor of Sharur-Nakhijevan between January 26 and March 23, 1919, with headquarter at Nakhijevan. On January 21/February 3 signed corresponding agreement with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia S.Tigranian. See: NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 209, pt.1, f.2-2 rev., 16-18, 37; fund 201, reg.1, file 45, pt.I, f.78; Ավետիսյան Մ.Ն. Նախիջևանի պատմության վավերագրեր (1889-1920թթ.): «Լրագրեր հասարակական գիտությունների», Եր., 1996, № 3, էջ 192; Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը 1918-1920թթ., քաղաքական պատմություն, էջ 87; Նախիջևան Շարուրը 1918-1920թթ., էջ 80

Lenin, Vladimir Ilya - Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the RSFSR

Levon VI Lusignan (1374-1375) - the last Armenian King, ruled over Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia

Leygues, Georges - Prime Minister of France and Minister for Foreign Affairs from September 23, 1920 till January 16, 1921

Lianosian, Gevorg Martin (Lianozov) - merchant of the Moscow's 1st guild, owner of the "Society of Russian Oil Industry" at Baku. In 1900 he obtained from the Tsarist Government 25-years-long lease of the Caspian coastal waters for fishery. His brother Stephan as well as his sons Martin, Stephan and Levon were engaged in oil and fishery, too. It included a lease from the Shah Cabinet of all Persian rivers' outfalls in Caspian basin

Lloyd George, David - British Prime Minister in 1916-1922

Lodge, Henry Cabot - a Republican, the U.S. Senate Majority leader and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Member of the ACIA

Logan James A., Jr. - Colonel, advisor of the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Member of the ARA in summer of 1919 and the U.S. representative at the Relief Section of the Supreme Economic Council

Loring, David Jr. - Captain of the U.S. Army, native to Oregon, member of the American military mission to Armenia and aide to its head, Major General J.Harbord

Loucheur, Louis Albert Joseph - tycoon, Minister of Munitions during the War; Minister of Industrial Re-construction in France between November 26, 1918, and January 20, 1920; French representative at the Reparations Commission and principal economic adviser to G.Clemenceau at the Paris Peace Conference

Lybyer, Albert Howe - Professor of History, studied at Princeton and Harvard; in 1901-1907 he taught at Robert College in Constantinople; then lectured at Oberlin College in 1910-1913, where H.C.King had been in office. In the same 1913 A.Lybyer had published a book on the Ottoman system of administration in the sixteenth century. Expert of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace on matters of the Near East, partaker and General Adviser of the King-Crane Commission, including issues of formation and extent of Armenian borders. Proponent of independent Armenian State, composed of Western and Eastern Armenias. In his judgment, the Western Armenian region had to be massed around a zone of Russian military occupation, constituted in 1917. He considered that the Ottoman Empire ought to lose this share of its space as a penalty for its arrangement of slaughter, which annihilated one million of human lives, according to his estimate. See: US NA, RG 256, 181.9102/9 in: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference,

vol.XII, p.821-822, 831

Lynch, Henry Finnis Blossie - Irish geographer and traveller, a scholar in Armenian Studies. Travelled through Armenia in 1893-1894 and 1898. In 1901 he had published two-volume "Armenia, Travels and Studies," composed of books on "The Russian Provinces" and "The Turkish Provinces" (in 1910 this work was published in Russian at Tiflis, its concise Armenian translation was made public in 1913-1914). A member of British Parliament in 1906-1910, he criticized E.Grey's policy towards the Armenian Question, which had been opposed to reforms. Before his death, had published an "Open Letter" in the English press, and devoted it to the said problem

MacDaniels, Frances Cochran (1891-1986) and Laurence Howland (1888-1986) - spouses, from May 1919 till April 12, 1920, they worked at the Kharberd branch of NER and were responsible for its records management

MacSweeney, Denis - Major of the U.S. Army, representative of the American Relief Administration at Batumi in 1919

Magaramov (Mageramov), Mahmed - member of Azerbaijani delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

Magie, David - Professor of Ancient History at Princeton University; in the capacity of technical employee for King-Crane Commission he prepared statistic data on Syria, Lebanon, Armenia, Kurds, Assyrians

Mailian, Daniel and Eghia Ghazar (Mayilov, Daniel and Ilya Lazar) - Armenian businessmen brothers, petroleum producers in Grozny and Baku, who were occupied with fishery, too. On February 28, 1911, they inaugurated an edifice of the Opera and ballet theatre in Baku, which had been a pioneer construction of this kind in Muslim world. The opera "Leblebiji" by T.Choukhajian had been played on its stage in 1912 as a first performance of the noted spectacle in Transcaucasia. In February of 1919 brothers had assigned two million roubles for specific research; so that Government of the Republic of Armenia began to explore minerals and to examine its production potential. In September of the same year Eghia Ghazar had donated 50,000 roubles to refugees from Sharur and Nakhijevan; in his turn, A.Khatisian thanked him officially for this deed. See: Дадаян Х.З., Ук.соч., с.54-55; Hovannisian R., Op.cit., vol.I, p.145; NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 357, pt.3, file 209

Main, John Hanson Thomas - Doctor, missionary of ABCFM, Commissioner of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief who worked in the Caucasus. Acted in Constantinople, between March 1 and May 17, 1919, was a special Commissioner of ACRNE in the Republic of Armenia; afterwards, until month of July, operated as a director of NER in Transcaucasia.

By August 16, 1919, he returned to Iowa, where he was charged with the duty of a President at Grinnell College. When at home, he wrote to the head of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia J.Gerard, that Armenia needed a mandate, five to ten thousand American soldiers for police purposes, and a recognition by the USA. He disliked inactivity of lawmakers in Washington. On August 19, J.Gerard posted his letter to R. Lansing. During the hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, J.Main addressed the Senators on October 10, 1919, and urged them to help Armenia. See: US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/61, and 61/Encl.1; NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 431, f.50-54; Ованнисян Р., Ук.соч., с.278-279; Makhmourian G. Management of the U.S. Relief, p.106

Makino, Nobuaki - Baron, member of Japanese peace delegation in Paris

Malcolm, James A. - significant figure in shaping of Balfour declaration in 1917; in 1919-1920 acted as representative of the Armenian National Delegation in London. However, he had criticized the ARFD and on May 12, 1920, A.Aharonian had designated H.Khan Massehian as plenipotentiary of the Republic of Armenia in Great Britain, who was placed at the head of Malcolm's operations. See: Ованнисян Р., Ук.соч., с.637

Mantashian, Alexander Hovhannes (1842-1911) - merchant of the Tiflis city's 1st guild; traded in textiles at Tabriz. Banker, in 1899-1909 he owned the first-rate business firm in Russian petroleum industry with capital of 22 million roubles, which was known as "A.I.Mantashev and Co." Its board of management was located in Tiflis, and property was situated in Baku, Batum, Odessa, Smyrna, Salonika, Constantinople, Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said, Marseille, London, Bombay and Shanghai. The owner was a champion of Russian leadership in the world petroleum market; he rivaled Nobels, Rothschilds and the Standard Oil; exported kerosene into England. See: Բալազյան Լ., Ալեքսանդր Մանթաշյանց: Եր., Հայաստան, 1991; Дадаян Х.З., Ук.соч., с.24-25

March, Peyton Conway - Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army in 1918-1921

Marden, Jesse Krekore - the second generation missionary, born in Aintab. In 1910 he was assigned by ABCFM to Marzvan, where he worked as medical practitioner and a director of hospital

Martin, Lawrence - Major of General Staff, Professor from J. Harbord Mission; composed a report on geography, mining and regional frontiers for its closing report. He adhered to an opinion that Armenia could grow into a viable State, and so he offered two options of its borders, depending on factor of external surveillance

Martino, Giacomo de - Secretary General of Foreign Ministry in 1912-1919 and secretary of Italian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference

Massey, William Ferguson - Prime Minister of New Zealand in 1912-1925

Matsui, Keishiro - Japanese Ambassador to France, member of national delegation at the Paris Peace Conference; Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1924

McCormick, Vance Criswell - Presidential campaign manager in 1912; chairman of Democratic National Committee and of the U.S. War Trade Board in 1916-1919; member and adviser of the American Commission to negotiate Peace in Paris on economic and commercial questions. By the Congress Act of August 6, 1919, was charged with membership on the board of trustees, personally responsible for activities of NER

McCoy, Frank Ross - Major General, in 1902 and 1906 he was junior aide, then a senior adjutant to President T.Roosevelt. In 1903-1904 obtained experience of colonial governance in the Philippines under guidance of the U.S. next President W.Taft. Generals V.H.Moseley and J.Harbord, other members of future military mission to Armenia, served in the Philippines together with F. McCoy, and did it even longer. During the World War I served at the General Staff of the American Expeditionary forces in France; commanded a Shock Regiment, afterwards - a Brigade. Chief of Staff of the noted J.Harbord Mission in 1919

McDonald, Dale F. - Major of the U.S. Army, purchasing officer attached to the NER committee in Yerevan. From September 1919 until May 4, 1920, represented W.Haskell in Armenian Capital

McFadden, George - the United States War Trade Board representative and adviser of the American commission to negotiate Peace at Paris

McLelan, Christian - nurse of NER at Sebastia in 1919

Means, Gardiner Coit - expert of NER on the industry issues at Kharberd in 1919-1920; later on, the noted economist

Mears, Eliot Grinnell - the U.S. Trade Commissioner, member of J.Harbord mission who prepared conclusive report on prospects of commerce and trade in the region; opponent to American mandate over Armenia. He tended to consider the Turkish Empire as an integrated political and economic field with the Caucasus

Mehmandarov, Samed Bek - General, Minister of War in Azerbaijan

Mehmed II Fatih - Turkish Sultan in 1444-1446 and in 1451-1481; he conquered Constantinople on May 29, 1453

Mehmed V Reshad - Turkish Sultan, who ruled during World War I from April 27, 1909, until July 3, 1918

Mehmed VI Vahideddin - the last Ottoman Sultan who reigned from July 3, 1918, until November 1, 1922

Melik Aslanov, Khudadat Bey Agha - Minister of Transportation at Azerbaijan in 1919-1920

Melikian (Melikov), Derenik - businessman who had built one of the first kerosene plants at Baku in 1863

Melikov N.I. - Prince, Lieutenant General, Commander of Cavalry Corps during the World War I. Close friend of P.N. Wrangel, he had constituted in 1920 a Committee for assistance to Mountaineers and Tersk Cossacks in their liberation from Bolsheviks, with a headquarter of this organization at Tiflis

Melik-Stephanian, Smbat - deputy chairman at Armenian Regional Council of Zangezur-Karabakh in 1919

Merrill, John E. - missionary of ABCFM at Aintab in 1897-1937; he had constituted family there in 1905, and afterwards worked at Aleppo

Mesropov - Armenian entrepreneurs, brothers, concerned with silk manufacture in Nukhi

Midhat Pasha, Ahmed Shefik - head of the constitutional movement of "New (Young) Ottomans;" one of prime movers in murder of Sultan Abdul Aziz together with enthronement of Abdul Hamid II. For this operation, he had been appointed Grand Vizier of the Empire in 1876-1878; originated its first Constitution and

took the lead in convocation of its first Parliament. In 1881 was convicted by Abdul Hamid of his predecessor's murder; the death penalty was replaced by an exile in Arabia, where all banished criminals spent two years and then died the very same day

Mikaelian, Vardges Alexan - Historian and Scholar, specialist in problems of Armenian-Russian relations, in history of Armenian settlements in the Crimea, in contemporary history of Mountainous Karabakh, had published documents of the German Foreign Ministry on Armenian Genocide

Miller, David Hunter - special assistant to the Secretary of State in summer of 1918, afterwards technical advisor of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace on International Law and legal adviser to President W.Wilson at Paris. Published 21 volumes of his diaries, which were compiled in Paris, together with description of procedures, pertinent to the shaping of Covenant of the League of Nations. See: Miller D.H., *The Drafting of the Covenant*. 2 vols. NY, G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1928; --. *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, in 21 vols. NY., Appeal Printing Co., 1928

Miller, Earnest Edgar (1893-1975) - employee of the NER at Mardin in 1919-1920; than Mennonite missionary in India

Millerand, Alexandre Étienne - Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of France between January 20 and September 24, 1920; afterwards its President until 1924

Mills, Blanche - teacher and employee of NER in Yerevan

Milne, Sir George Francis - Lieutenant General, Commander in Chief of the British Army of the Black Sea with the headquarters at Constantinople from November 1918 till November 1920. He ensured the ousting of Turkish troops from Transcaucasia. Paid an official visit to Armenia on April 28-30, 1919; where he assisted at transfer of Kars under the control of the Republican Army by British detachments

Milner, Lord Alfred - British Secretary of State for War from April 19, 1918, to January 10, 1919; Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1919-1921

Mirbach-Harff, Wilhelm Count von - participant of parley at Brest-Litovsk, who arrived on April 26, 1918, in the capacity of German Ambassador to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. He was murdered on July 6 by decision of the Central Committee of the Left Socialist Revolutionary Party (also called

Ezers), who fulfilled instructions, given by All-Russian Congress of their Party, to ruin the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. This killing did not yield anticipated results; however, it provoked a two-days mutiny, implemented by Left Esers in Moscow. Prosh Proshian, son of the famous writer Perch Proshian, actively participated in this insurrection

Mirimanian A.I. - Colonel, commander of the 4th regiment in the Army of the Republic of Armenia, commandant of Sarikamish in 1919-1920

Mirzabekyantz, Gevorg and Mirzajan, sons of Rostom (Yegor and Mirzajan, sons of Roman) - native of Nor Shen village at Shamakhi uezd; brothers who owned "Br.Y and M.Mirzabekyantz" tobacco processing plant, which had been built in 1873 at Baku. In 1908, this enterprise employed 400 persons, who produced 183 million cigarettes out of raw stuff, brought from Turkey, Crimea, Tashkent, Tiflis Governorate. Their firm had its branch in Tiflis, warehouses in Astrakhan, Ashkhabad, Derbend, Samarkand, Krasnovodsk and Shamakhi. See: Дадаян Х.З., Ук.соч., с.48-49

Mirzoyan, Grigor and Melkon Hovhannes (Mirzoyev, Grigor and Melkon Ivan) - temporary merchants of Moscow 1st guild, noblemen. Post mortem their father, in common with their mother Daria and sister, Princess Maria Argutinsky-Dolgoruky, they had established in 1886 and operated until 1918 an oil-industrial and commercial Partnership. It was named "Mirzoyev Brothers and Co" and was provided with stock of capital equal to 2,1 million roubles. This firm had oil fields, industrial premises, oil-pipeline in Balakhany, kerosene and lubricants producing factory in Baku, workshops and chemical lab, wharf, four sailing vessels, plant spaces in Batum, storehouses in Moscow, Tsaritsyn and Nizhniy Novgorod

Mirzoyan, Sonya Souren - Historian and Archivist, deputy director at the National Archives of Armenia, expert in sources, dated to the beginning of 20th century

Mitchell, Elsie Reed - doctor of ACRNE in Yerevan

Money, sir Arthur Wigram - Major General of British Army, waged war on Mesopotamian Front in 1915-1918; chief of the Occupied Enemy Territories Administration, with headquarters at Jerusalem, in 1918-1919

Monroe, James - the U.S. President in 1816-1824. On December 2, 1823, he advanced in his address to Congress a thesis

of non-proliferation of European systems of administration on the American continent. In return, the USA promised not to interfere into internal affairs of European countries and to maintain neutrality regarding anti-colonial struggle waged by Latin America against Spain

Montagu, Edward Samuel - British Financial Secretary to the Treasury in 1914-1916; Minister of Munitions in 1916; Secretary of State for India in 1917-1922

Montgomery, George Redington (1870-1945) - missionary of ABCFM, born at Marash in a family of missionaries. Expert of the American commission to negotiate Peace on non-Arab regions of the Ottoman Empire; an adviser of the King-Crane Commission in 1919. He was a Director of Armenia-America Society in 1920-1922; his organization upheld American mandate in 1920

Moore, Alice - employee of NER at Malatia in 1919

Moore, Benjamin Burges - chief of American political and intelligence mission in Tiflis between March 17 and October 20, 1919, who advocated Armenian Zangezur and Artsakh. In the month of June he compiled a report on "American political and intelligence mission in Transcaucasia" for R.Tyler, as well as for American Delegation in Paris (NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 304, f.32, file 317, f.20-23A and file 319, f.7). B.Moore had visited Yerevan on July 28 - August 1, 1919; and he wired R.Lansing that Armenian forces needed arms in common with external military assistance, which was necessary for Republic (NAA, fund 220, reg. 1, file 317, f.20-23A; file 357, f.177-177A; US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/ 41). In reports, compiled for M.Bristol in August and dispatched to Constantinople, chief of mission observed that "the Tartar attacks had not been provoked by the Armenian Government, since in its wildest mood it could not think of adopting so suicidal a policy. The only place where the Armenians appear to have carried on a deliberate anti-Tartar agitation is in the Karabagh-Zangezur district, where - for reasons well known to you - they can hardly be blamed for doing so." At the same time civil administration of the Republic had been assessed as inefficient, and D.Kanayan's activity was called void of flexibility. See: Hovannisian R., Op.cit., vol. II, p.91; --. Scholarship and Politics. "Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies," Boston, 1985-1986, № 2, p.179-180

Moore, Laurence S. - business manager of King-Crane Commission

Morgenthau, Henry (1856-1946) - close friend of W.Wilson and one of money-men in his election campaign in 1912. American Ambassador to Turkey in 1913-1916. On September 3, 1915, he had wired R.Lansing and described him the annihilation of Armenian people. Ottoman Minister of War promised to let Armenians go to the USA if the Ambassador would vouch for them solidly. H.Morgentau asked C.Dodge, C.Crane, J.Mott and S.Wise to collect money. Hence, the Department of State had issued an instruction for J.Barton, and foundation of the Armenian Relief Committee followed this telegram.

H.Morgenthau was legal trustee and member of the Executive Committee of ACRNE in 1919. See: Армянский вопрос. Энциклопедия, с.230; Miglio S., America's Sacred Duty: Near East Relief and the Armenian Crisis, 1915-1930. Notre Dame, Indiana; Department of History, University of Notre Dame, 2009, p.19

Morris, Ira Nelson - the U.S. Minister to Sweden in 1914-1923

Morteza Gholi Khan (1863-1923) - Sardar of Maku in 1895-1923, ruler of this rank in fourth generation, owner of second wealth in his country who had been imprisoned by order of Shah in 1923 and died after a short-time confinement in Tabriz

Moseley, George Van Horn - Brigadier General of the U.S. Army, accomplished military deliveries and provided for J.Harbord Mission. In its framework he was escorted on September 30 - October 1, 1919, by Captain G.Villaret to Sharur-Nakhijevan, to exert his restrictive impact on Kerbalay Ali Khan of Nakhichevan, who was a ringleader of Tartar mutinies in the region

Moser, Charles Krath - the U.S. Consul at Tiflis from January, 1920; then from June 24 on, continued his service in Batum

Mott, John R. - General Secretary of the International Committee of Young Men's Christian Association in 1917; legal trustee for ACRNE and member of its Executive Committee in 1919

Musinyantz, Mkrtych Tatevos - mayor of Yerevan from January 9, 1919, till November 27, 1920; an outstanding distiller of cognac

Mustafa Bey - Captain of General Staff, Chief of Staff which gave orders to the Turkish troops, quartered at Erzerum in 1919

Nadir, Mustafa - ruler of Mardin Sanjak in 1919

Nasib Bey - Turkish judge at Erzinka in 1919

Nasibian, Ashot Abraham - owner of silk mill in Nukhi. The Armenian National Council of Baku had assigned him in March, 1919, to a mission to ascertain conditions of the refugees' existence in Tersk and Kuban Oblasts. See: ՀԱՅԵՐԻ ԿՈՍՏՐԱԾՆԵՐՐ, էջ 271

Nassif, Suleiman Bey - an Armenian, businessman from Jerusalem, engaged in petroleum industry

Nazarbekian, Tovmas Hovhannes - Lieutenant General, who participated in Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, waged war on the Caucasus Front in 1914-1918, commanded the 2nd Caucasian Rifle Corps. He had been Commander of detached Armenian Corps in 1917; afterwards served as a Commander-in-Chief of the republican Army

Nejati Bey - mastermind of assaults on Armenians in 1915 at Angora; joined Turkish nationalists in 1919

Nersisyan (Nersesov), Alexander - Armenian entrepreneur, occupied with cotton production

Nicholas II Romanov - emperor and autocrat of all Russia, reigned from November 1, 1896, until an abdication on March 15, 1917. His coronation had taken place on May 26, 1896, and was darkened by a human stampede of May 30 on Khodynka Field in Moscow during the festives following first ceremony, when 1389 persons were killed.

Nicolson, Harold Lord Carnock - assistant to the British representative E.Crowe, on the Commission on Greek affairs at the Paris Peace Conference. Author of books on G.Curzon and on peace negotiations in 1919. See: H.Nicolson, Curzon: the Last Phase 1919-1925. A Study in Post-War Diplomacy. Lnd., Constable, 1934, 416 p.; --. Peacemaking, 1919, Being Reminiscent of the Paris Peace Conference. NY., Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939, 378 p. and its translation into Russian: НИКОЛЬСОН Г., Как делался мир в 1919 г. М., ОГИЗ, 1945

Nielsen, Frederick Kenelm - employee of the Department of State; on June 23, 1920, was assigned by W.Wilson a legal adviser and a Solicitor of this agency. Major of the U.S. Army in 1918; technical advisor in the economic section of the American Commission to negotiate peace in 1919, who represented his country in a commission re-examining Belgian obligations

Niles, Emory H. - Captain of the U.S. Army who had visited Van and Bitlis provinces in August of 1919; he reached Bayazet and then submitted a current report to J.Harbord Mission

Niles, Margaret H. - nurse of the NER at Kharberd in 1919
Nill J.N. - skilled Bacteriologist on the staff of NER at Kharberd in 1919

Nitti, Francesco Saverio - Italian Minister of the Treasury in 1917 - June 23, 1919; Prime Minister and Minister of Interior from June 23, 1919, to June 15, 1920. Simultaneously, Minister for Foreign Affairs in June-September, 1919

Nobel, brothers Ludvig, Robert and Alfred - a family of entrepreneurs and innovators, inventors of contact mine, dynamite and refrigerator, gas burner and of the electric chair, of cisterns and oil tanks. Founders of the famous Nobel Prize. Monopolists of lamp oil in Russia. In 1879 they had established in Baku "Partnership of the Petroleum Production of Nobel Brothers," nationalized by Bolsheviks in 1920

Norhatian, Hamazasp - mayor of Kars in 1919-1920

North, Rachel B. - missionary of the ABCFM in Western Armenia in 1911-1921, nurse at Mardin Hospital, afterwards worked in Diarbekir orphanage

Nubar Pasha, Boghos - Chairman of the Armenian National Delegation

Nuri - officer of Turkish police at Arghana-Maden in 1919

Nuri - Major, in 1919 he had been the military commander of detachment at Hasankale; his troops took orders from Turkish Nationalists

Nuri Bey - Minister of Justice in the Cabinet of Turkish Nationalists; on September 18, 1919, welcomed J.Harbord Mission in Malatia

Nuri Bey, Osman - Lieutenant Colonel, Commander of 12th Division in 1919; its forces were stationed in Khorasan, Erzerum province

Nuri Pasha, Killigil - General of the Ottoman Army, commanded Army of Islam; brother to Minister of War Enver. On September 15, 1918, Nuri occupied by its forces Baku and organized a slaughter there. In January, 1920, continued to act in Azerbaijan, initiating military assaults on Nakhijevan and campaign against Karabakh; he had been one of the masterminds, who burnt Shushi to the ground on March 23-26, 1920

Ohanessian, Tigran (Dick) - Sergeant, signalman from the 34th maintenance company and Orderly-Interpreter at J.Harbord Mission; which he leaved to continue subsequent service as an

employee of NER in the Caucasus. See: Ованнисян Р., Ук.соч., с.240

Orbeliani - it was possible to identify in this princely family the one-time Commander of Caucasus Cavalry Brigade, Lieutenant General Georgy Ilya Orbeliani (1853-1924)

Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele - Italian Prime Minister from 1917 to June 23, 1919, who had resigned because during bitter controversy with W.Wilson he did not succeed at his attempts to append the city of Fiume (known as Rijeka now) to the Italian State

Osipov - Armenian businessmen, brothers, who concerned themselves with silk production in Nukhi. Merchant of the 2nd guild B.P.Osipov cooperated with Russo-English Bank and traded in textiles at St.Petersburg

Osman I Gazi - since 1281 he had been the first Sultan, founder of the Ottoman Empire in 1299

Osman - Lieutenant of Turkish Army, who was in charge of military depots at Andreas in 1919

Oswald, Felix - Doctor of Geology, in 1898 made a journey through Armenia together with H.Lynch, following a route Trebizond-Erzerum-Khnus-Dutagh-Sipan-Khlat-Nemrut-Erzerum.

His bulky "Treatise on the Geology of Armenia" had been published by the London University in 1906

Otyan, Grigor (1834-1887) - Liberal, idea man of the movement which insisted on necessity to adopt a Constitution for the Ottoman Empire. Participated in making of Armenian National Constitution in 1860; the latter was sanctioned by the Sublime Porte in 1863; afterwards he was a partner in drawing up the Ottoman Constitution in 1876. Being a proponent of Armenian servicemen in the Ottoman Army, he had, nevertheless, opposed such a move, carried out by Sublime Porte during the Russo-Turkish war. On the eve of the Berlin Congress, convened in 1878, G.Otyan had been charged by Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople with important mission. In compliance with received instructions, Armenian public leader had elaborated "Program of Organizational Statute for Ottoman Armenia." This document provided autonomy for Western Armenia, which ought to be subordinated to Armenian Governor. The writer assessed initiative of a Congress in Berlin very dangerous when European diplomats had replaced autonomy with international surveillance over reforms. All the

worse, they entrusted innovations to Sultan, who was expected to fulfill them for benefit of Western Armenians. In 1880 G.Otyan emigrated to France. He had never returned from asylum

Page, Walter Hines - the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain from March of 1913 to August, 1918

Palian, Rouben - Major in the Army of the Republic of Armenia, commandant of Kaghzvan in 1919

Papazian Vahan - in 1906-1907 guided weapon deliveries out of the Caucasus to Van, where he was elected into the Ottoman Parliament in 1908. Member of a Fedayee squad under Rouben Ter-Minasian in 1914-1918. Representative of the Armenian National Delegation at Paris in 1919-1920

Parmelee, Ruth Azniv - born in Trebizond, where parents gave their daughter an Armenian name Azniv and it had to become the second part of her proper name. When 11 years old, Ruth returned to the USA. She had got medical education at the University of Illinois, served as missionary of ABCFM at Kharberd in 1914-1917 and got across the ocean to America when her country entered the war. However, the young lady had been back at Kharberd in 1919, where she was employed by NER. Turkish authorities made an attempt to expel her from the city in June of 1921; they were displeased that 200 Armenian girls broke out of harems and were admitted to the orphanage by this well-known American functionary. After repeated instruction, issued by local officials on January 21, 1922, our Relief worker had got to quit her post in Autumn of the same year. In 1923-1941 she continued operation in Greece. See more details in: Հայկ Վահէ, Խարբերդ եւ անոր Ոսկեդէն դաշտը: Յուշամատենան պատմական, մշակութային եւ սոցալագրական: Նիւ Եորք, 1959, էջ 370-371

Partridge, Ernest Crocker - missionary of ABCFM in 1900-1933, principal of the Sivas Normal School, later transformed into a Teachers' College; afterwards Director of ACRNE. In June, 1919, met with King-Crane Commission at Constantinople; on September 20 of the same year played host to J.Harbord in Sebastia. It was precisely an orphanage on the spot where the General faced 150 recently rescued "bride"-girls, referred to in his report. Sahagian H., Op.cit., p.395, 397

Pasdermajian, Garegin (Armen Garo) - Doctor of Natural Sciences and Chemistry, he had been educated at Sanasarian College in Erzerum and at the University of Geneva. In 1895 got

involved in liberation movement at Western Armenia, and took part in capture of the Ottoman Bank on August 14, 1896, at Constantinople. Member of Turkish Parliament and energetic convener of volunteer movement on the Caucasus. Special envoy in the USA of the Armenian Catholicos Gevorg V in 1918, he arranged relief for compatriots, victims of World War I. In 1919 acted as a member of economic section and vice-chairman of the Armenian National Delegation at Paris; from October 9 of the same year operated as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Armenia. See: Հայկական հարց, էջ 66

Patrick, Mary Mills - missionary of ABCFM in 1871-1913 and 1919-1924 with permanent residence in Erzerum and Constantinople, where she served as a President of American College for Girls. Supported consolidation of Turkish-American relations and opposed creation of enlarged independent Armenia under American guardianship. In June of 1919, she told it to King and Crane Commissioners in the Ottoman capital. During a spadework she was also questioned by J.Harbord Mission in August of 1919 at Paris; M.M.Patrick had submitted her own 14 Points for the benefit of American mandate over all Turkish Empire and proposed M.Bristol as a Governor of such unit

Penfield, Frederic Courtland - General Consul at Cairo in 1893-1897, Ambassador to Austria-Hungary in 1913-1917. Member of the Executive Committee at the American Committee for Independence of Armenia in 1919-1920

Perry, Edward T. - employee of ACRNE, who worked in Armenia in 1919. On August 21, 1920, "The New York Times" had published his article with four arguments which contested disinclination of the U.S. National Committee of the Republican Party to adopt Armenian mandate. See: Edward T.Perry, Armenia As An Issue. Worker In That Unhappy Land Answers. "The New York Times," NY, 21.08.1920

Perry, James E. (1888-1920) - general secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association International, worked in the Ottoman capital from the early 1919. See: Two YMCA Men Victims of Turks, "The New York Times," NY, 8.02.1920; Kerr S., The Lions of Marsh. Personal Experience with American Near East Relief, 1919-1922. Albany, State University of New York Press, 1973, p.203

Pershing, John Joseph - General of the U.S. Army, Commander in Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe in 1918-1919

Phillips, William C. - began his career in the capacity of personal secretary to American Ambassador in London, Assistant Secretary of State of the United States in 1917-1920; Under Secretary in 1922-1924

Pichon, Stéphen Jean Marie - French Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1906-1911, 1913, and from November 16, 1917, till January 20, 1920

Picot - see: Gorges-Picot

Pirumian, Daniek Bek Abisoghom (1861-1921) - Colonel of Russian Army, Major General at the Army of the Republic of Armenia. Native of Nakhijevanik village in Varanda, Karabakh, commanded a battalion on the Caucasus Front and the Sardarapat detachment in the battle of May 21-28, 1918. Commandant of the Kars Fortress in 1919, he was captured there on October 30, 1920, at a moment of its surrender; and was driven away to Sarikamish on the night of November 20/21

Pitoev, Yesai (Isay Egor) - Armenian businessman of the noble family, his father supplied provisions for the Army and he himself owned "I.E.Pitoev and Co" oil industry enterprise in Baku, with its board of management in Tiflis. The family was engaged in fishery and possessed steamships "Van," "Mush," "Ani," "Sevan," "Masis," "Zangu." Boss of the clan had constructed an edifice for Armenian Artistic Society; later on, Shota Rustaveli State Academic Theatre accommodated within its walls. Daughter, younger brother and nephew of this kin formed a famous dramatic dynasty of Pitoev; with Georges Pitoev (1884-1939) to become one of the main promoters of the contemporary French theatre.

Poidebard, Antoine - Captain, military representative of France in Yerevan

Poland, William B. - chief of the American Relief Commission for Belgium and Northern France, member of J.Harbord Mission. He had prepared an account on transport and communications in Asia Minor and the Transcaucasia for its final report

Polk, Frank Lyon - Counselor for the U.S. Department of State in 1915-1919. Operated in Paris as Acting Secretary of State, although he enjoyed this status less than a month, in February - March of 1920. Head of the American Delegation from July 1 to

December 9, 1919; Undersecretary of State until June 15, 1920

Poole, DeWitt C., Jr. - the U.S. Consul at Moscow in 1918

Ramishvili, Noy Vissarion - Prime Minister of Georgia between May 26 and July 24, 1918; its Minister of Interior, he was killed at Paris in 1930

Ramsay, Sir William Mitchell - an archaeologist and scholar of Oriental Studies, specialist in Christianity within Ottoman Empire, and exactly in history of Asia Minor. In 1919-1920 served as expert of Foreign Office for Turkey

Randolph, John - the U.S. Consul at Tiflis in 1919-1921

Rathbone, Arthur - Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury

Rauf Bey, Husein Orbay - former Minister of Marine, who had signed the Mudros Armistice; driving force of the Nationalist movement. Delegate at Congress of Erzerum and deputy chairman at Congress of Sivas

Ravndal, Gabriel Bie - the U.S. Consul General in Constantinople in 1910-1917 and 1919-1924, from November, 1918, to January, 1919 the U.S. High Commissioner in that city

Reading, Rufus Daniel Isaacs - Marquis, the British Ambassador on Special Mission to the USA

Reshid Pasha - Governor of Sivas, one of the founder of the Nationalist movement

Reshid Pasha, Ahmed - Governor of Erzerum in 1919

Rhea, James C. - Colonel of the U.S. Army, Chief of Staff at NER in Tiflis from September 22 till December 13, 1919; operated as Acting High Commissioner between October 7 and December 5 of the same year, while his supervisor W.Haskell went on a voyage to H.Hoover and then to the 1st Congress of NER in New York

Richards, George L. - together with his spouse had been employed by the ACRNE at Mardin in 1919

Rifat Bey - Minister of Finance in the Government of Turkish Nationalists who met with J.Harbord Mission in Malatia on September 18, 1919

Riggs, Henry Harrison (1875 Sebastia - 1943 Jerusalem) - missionary of ABCFM at Kharberd and Beirut in 1902-1943. President of the Euphrates College at Kharberd in 1903-1910 and 1912-1917. Here he had reconstituted family in 1907 and then buried his wife and daughter in 1915. Director of Kharberd unit of the NER in 1919, who took care of 4,000 orphaned children and 1,000 refugees. On September 17, 1919, conversed with J.Harbord

there. The missionary asserted that without active American intervention all prospects for Armenians were quite bleak; proposals to form independent Armenia straight away became impracticable and exposed to mortal danger all those, who managed to survive. You may read about H.Riggs in: Հայկ Վստէ, Նշվ.աշխ., էջ 366-367

Riggs, Mary W. - daughter of Henry Riggs, in common with her brother Ernest W.Riggs proceeded with her family business in Kharberd. In 1919-1920 her brother was a member of the American Committee for Independence of Armenia; and his sister served at Marzvan in 1902; then she operated at Kharberd in 1910-1914. After the World War I she signed a contract with NER and came back to continue welfare in the same city. See: Հայկ Վստէ, Նշվ.աշխ., էջ 367

Riza Bey - Turkish senator, member of the Young Turks Central committee; General, Pasha and Grand Vizier of 1919-1920; and a certain Captain bore this name; the latter directed the Caucasus Section at Administrative Committee at the Special Organization, created for cut-through perpetration of the Armenian Genocide in 1915.

Rodd, Baron James Rennell - Ambassador from the United Kingdom to Rome in 1908-1919

Root, Elihu - former Secretary of War and Secretary of State, Senator; who balloted as one of the Republican candidates for the U.S. Presidency in 1916. However, his party chief nominee yielded to W.Wilson and lost the elections. Then E.Root went as a head (Ambassador) of the special diplomatic mission to Russia in 1917. Afterwards member of the Executive Committee at the American Committee for Independence of Armenia and of the board of trustees at NER as well; he proposed to establish permanent International Tribunal of the League of Nations

Rustem Bey, Alfred de Bilinski, Ahmet - former Ottoman Ambassador to Washington, who was dismissed in 1915 at President Wilson's insistence. "Without resources and principles, he has become an adventurer, seeking for spoils from any faction." See: US NA, RG 256, 184.021/331, M820, Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4

Sackville-West, Sir Charles John - Major General, British military representative on the Supreme War Council at the Paris Peace Conference

Safikyrudski, Aslan Bek - Minister of Justice and Labour in Azerbaijan between April 14 and December 22, 1919

Sahak II (Khapayan) - Catholicos of Cilicia Armenians; in March, 1915, he induced 30,000 dwellers of monoethnic Zeitun to obey orders of deportation. On September 12, 1919, met with members of J.Harbord Mission in Aleppo. After the massacre in Marash he travelled in March of 1919 to Europe and met with the Prime Minister of France A.Millerand

Sahakian, Avetik - Vice Chairman of the Armenian National Council, who had been elected Chairman of Council of the Republic of Armenia on August 1, 1918; then he was elected Vice Chairman of Armenian Parliament on August 5, 1919. However, between August 10 and October 27 of the same year he received two government posts and became a Minister of Public Assistance and Labour, plus a Minister of Agricultural Administration. He had been elected Vice Chairman of the Parliament for the second time on October 28.

Sahakian, Ruben Garegin - Historian and Scholar of Oriental Studies, an expert on Franco-Turkish relations at Cilicia in 1918-1923.

Salaadin Bey - Lieutenant Colonel, Chief Quartermaster of the 12th Turkish Division at Khorasan, Erzerum province, in 1919

Salahaddin Bey - Colonel, Commander of the 12th Turkish Army Corps at Sivas in 1919

Sarkisyan, Baghdasar and Poghos - oilmen, who operated in Baku, hold oil fields from 1872 on, and collaborated with G. Tagiev. In 1882 they earned a bronze medal for high quality kerosene at the All-Russian Industrial and Art Exhibit in Moscow. Poghos was a member of Baku municipal Duma and possessed "Grigor Artsruni" steamer. The later was transferred in 1921 to "Azneft," the State-owned Company

Scherbanina N.G. - proprietor of men's private Progimnasium, it functioned in Yerevan from 1906, on

Schwind F.L. - Lieutenant of the British Army, Acting Captain, military representative of the Great Britain in Nakhijevan between May 15 and July 28, 1919. In consequence of heavy fights, broken out in this district, leaved for Tabriz

Scialoja, Vittorio - took part in Paris, London (1920) and Lausanne Conferences. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy from November 22, 1919, till June 14, 1920

Scott, James Brown - technical advisor of the American Commission to negotiate peace at Paris on International Law

Scribner B. - stenographer of NER at Sivas in 1919

Serijanian, Tigran (Dickran) - Private of the Headquarters battalion, Orderly-Interpreter of the American commission to negotiate Peace in Paris, member of J.Harbord Mission. On September 25, 1919, together with General F.McCoy and Colonel E.Bowditch was assigned to verify information on concentration of Turkish troops near Bayazet. When his Mission returned home, separated from it and remained in Constantinople

Seropian, Mushegh Archbishop - Primate of Arabkir and Adana Armenians, in 1919 he had no doubts about French colonial aspirations in Cilicia; on September 12 of the same year welcomed J.Harbord Mission in Adana

Servet Bey - Vice Governor of Kharberd province in 1919

Sewny - noted family of general practitioners at Sivas. Levon G.Sewny had been educated in American University of Beirut and in London. He had married an American lady Lillian F.Cole, who accepted the family name L.C.Sewny. In 1914 Levon took part in organization of the Red Cross Hospital at Erzerum, yet he died the same winter. His father, the surgeon Garegin Sewny, had received professional training in the USA

Sewny, Lillian Cole - the American nurse, responsible for provision of facilities for refugees at the Sivas branch of NER in 1919

Shahbagov - Armenian businessman engaged in silk production at Nukhi

Shahgedanian (Shagidanov), Musael and his son N.Shagedanian - natives of Shushi, merchants and metallurgists; they produced oil equipment at Baku in a plant of "Shagidov and Co." In 1864 Musael was among pioneers, who promoted the Armenian Philanthropic Society in this city

Shahkhatuni, Arshavir Vagharshak - in 1914 served as aide-de-camp to General P.I.Oganovsky, Commander of the 4th Russian Corps; then Commandant of Yerevan in February 1918 - 1920

Shahmazian, Arsen - Lieutenant Colonel, in 1919 he operated as Commissioner of the Republic of Armenia and member of Presidium at Regional Council of Zangezur-Karabakh

Sharp, William Graves - the U.S. Ambassador in France in 1914-1919

Shekerjian, Hayk (13.06.1886-22.01.1966) - Major, the U.S. military observer in Turkey headquartered in Tiflis; then partici-

pated in J.Harbord Mission. Afterwards, in 1942, had been promoted to Brigadier General. In 1906 started his education in America where he entered the Colgate University. In 1907-1911 got a military training at West Point as a Cadet, graduated Second Lieutenant of Infantry. In 1916-1917 he participated in punitive expedition under General J.Pershing to Mexico. In 1914-1918 served as Assistant Military Attaché to Greece, then was assigned to Allied Armies of the Orient in the Near East. From 1923 on, transferred to the Chemical Warfare Service; furthermore, in 1935-1945 he commanded Chemical forces of the 1st Army, run a Chemical Warfare Replacement Training Center, and managed a Camp in Alabama. After that got an appointment to the Near East and went into retirement in 1946

Shepard, Lorin A. (1890-1984) - missionary of ABCFM in 1917-1957, who served at Aintab in 1919-1926. He worked there with his wife Virginia, in the hospital of his famous father Frederick Douglas Shepard. His sister Alice married an offspring of another mighty missionary clan, Ernest W.Riggs. In 1909 the spouses relocated to Kharberd. In 1920 Alice C.Riggs had published a book "Shepard of Aintab" and told about 33-years long activities of their parent, which continued until December 1915

Shevki Bey - Governor General of Arghana-Maden in 1919

Shevki Pasha, Yakub - Major General, commander of the Ottoman 9th Army which was reorganized in April, 1918, as an assault force, named "Kars." On May 15 on the same year he occupied Alexandropol in defiance of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty; and on May 21-28 led his troops in the battle of Sardarapat. When the Mudros Armistice was signed, he instructed on November 26 not to yield all area to the British. Even after a directive, sent from Constantinople, he did not surrendered his positions to the winners. Vice versa, Turkish General had set up sham authorities in Kars and distributed among local Moslems great amount of weapons, stored in the fortress. On February 18, 1919, G.Milne prescribed to recall the General from Erzerum, who returned to the capital in the month of April. Later on, Shevki was detained and exiled to Malta. However, he came back in 1921, just in time to wage war in August - September, 1922. See: Zürcher Eric Jan, *The Unionist factor: the rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926*. Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1984, p.98-99; Hovannisian R., *Op.cit.*, vol.I, p.207

Shirinian, Arshak Karapet - deputy of Armenian Parliament, chairman at Regional Council of Zangezur-Karabakh. In 1919 this body functioned within frontiers of Zangezur uezd

Shore, Offley Bohum Stovin Fairless - head of the British military mission in the Caucasus in 1917-1918

Shukri Effendi - chief of Turkish Gendarmerie at Mardin in 1919

Shuttleworth, Digby Inglis - Brigadier General of the British Army, Commander of the British garrison at Baku in 1919. Fiercely strived for subjection of Karabakh to Azerbaijan

Silin, Otto Andrei - from June 29, 1920, operated as Soviet first deputy Minister Plenipotentiary in Yerevan B.V.Legran; from December 2 served as a Military Commissar of Soviet Russia, assigned to the Military Command of still independent, but already socialist Armenia

Simon, Henry - French Minister of Colonies

Skinner, Clayton C. - employee of the NER in Yerevan and Kars

Slocum, Stephen L'Homedieu - Major of U.S. Cavalry, Military Attaché at London in 1899-1900, 1911-1912 and 1917-1918

Smachler J.N. - in 1919 had been employed by ACRNE at Diarbekir

Smith, Alfred Emanuel Jr. - Governor of New York in 1918-1920 and 1922-1928; member of the Executive Committee of the ACIA in 1919-1920. Had been defeated by H.Hoover during the presidential campaign of 1928

Smith, Felix Willoughby - the U.S. Consul at Batum in 1916, afterwards Consul at Tiflis from February, 1917, to May 20, 1919

Smith, Floyd Olin (1.12.1885-6.08.1961) - general practitioner and missionary of ABCFM at Diarbekir in 1913-1920

Sonnino, Giorgio Sidney - Baron, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs from October, 1914, to June 23, 1919; longtime supporter of a union with Great Britain. During his rule Italy discontinued its neutrality and entered the War on May, 1915, as a member of Entente. Earlier he was a Prime Minister in 1906, as well as in 1909-1910

Spalding M. - in 1919-1920 she run Girls' Orphanage, established by NER in Sebastia

Spicer, Gerald Sidney - Acting Under-Secretary of State superintending the Russian Department of the Foreign Office in

1919; former permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain

Spoer, Ada (1857-1931) - an English author, born Goodrich Freer, fellow of the British Society for Psychical Research, who wrote books on mystical plots in folklore of Scottish highlanders, as well as in traditions and beliefs of different Oriental regions. Two books, "The Strange Story of Ada Goodrich Freer" in common with "Strange Things," had been devoted to her and published in 1980 and 2006

Spoer, Hans Henry (1873-1951) - an American who was born in Germany, educated in the New York University and in American School of Oriental Studies at Jerusalem. In 1905 he married an Englishwoman Ada Goodrich Freer, completed a studies course at Lichfield Theological College in England; and was ordained as a dean of Anglican Church in 1910. He was a chaplain at Cairo, instructed English and German at Jerusalem in 1915-1917. Spouses were deported from this city when the U.S. entered the World War I. In 1919-1921 they worked for ACRNE, including Yerevan. In 1921-1922 H.Spoer lectured at Istanbul; from 1923 he chaired a diocese in Michigan and had never leaved the United States afterwards

Suleiman - Major of Turkish detachment at Zara in 1919

Suleiman Bey - member of the Representative Committee, summoned by Turkish Nationalists in Erzerum

Sulkevich, Mamed Bek - General, Chief of Staff at the Ministry of War in Azerbaijan. In January of 1920 waged war in Karabakh; in the beginning of May was arrested by Bolsheviks, in July he had been executed by shooting in Baku

Summers, Maddin - the U.S. Consul General at Moscow in 1917

Surmayan K. - town dweller of Andreas in 1919

Svaslian (Sevasly), Mihran - acted as co-editor of "Hayastan" newspaper in October 1888-1892. This periodical had been published in Armenian and French languages at London. In 1917-1919 edited "The Armenian Herald," a journal, which had been issued in English language at Boston. At the very same time he performed a chairmanship of the Armenian National Union of America. On September 27, 1919, M.Svaslian failed to impress the audience when he made a poor statement before the Subcommittee on foreign relations of the U.S. Senate. However, his

speech had been amplified with relevant memorandum, it provided lots of necessary geographic and statistical data. ANUA did not collaborate with diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in the United States

Sykes, Mark - Member of British Parliament with manifest Turkish bigotry, who joined Conservative party and co-authored Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. He had been very much helpful as a connecting link between War Office, Foreign Office and the War Cabinet, respecting matters of the Near East

Tagiev, Gadji Zeinalabdin - oil industrialist, owner of kerosene plant, fisheries, textile mills in Baku and Tiflis, millionaire. From 1907 on, Actual Counselor of State, partner with B. and P. Sarkisyan brothers. Financed erection of Baku Drama Theatre in 1883; initiated public horse-drawn tram and building of water piping in 1889; translation of the Koran from Arabic; inaugurated Girls School with European mode of training in 1901, the very first of this sample in a Moslem world. Transferred the ownership of his five-storey structure, to convert it from a mill into a prison

Tahsin Bey - chief secretary under the Governor of Kharberd in 1919

Talaat Pasha, Mehmed - Ottoman Minister of Interior in 1909-1912 and 1913-1918, Minister of Post and Telegraph in 1912; Grand Vizier from April 4, 1917, till October 9, 1918. One of the leaders of the Young Turks; instigator of policy aimed at forced turkification of non-Turkish nations mastermind and ardent protagonist of Pan-Islamism. Member of triumvirate, assembled by masterminds of the Armenian Genocide, 1915. In 1919 Extraordinary Court Martial held its hearings at Constantinople and sentenced him to death in absentia for war crimes, "massacre and destruction of the Armenians" in Empire (Takvimi Vekayi № 3540, p.6, more details in: Dadrian V.N., Op.cit., p.321-328). Had been shot by Soghomon Tehlirian in Berlin on March 15, 1921, in realization of operation "Nemesis"

Tali Bey, Ibrahim Ongerer - Colonel of Ottoman Army, medical inspector of the 3rd Army amenable to Nationalist and headquartered at Sivas in 1919; represented M.Kemal at the I Congress of Peoples of the East at Baku in September, 1920

Tanner, Elsie - employee of NER at Arabkir in 1919-1920. She returned home with foster daughter

Tapping - any kind of information had not been revealed

Tarayantz N.J. and I.S. - run production of silk in the Eastern Transcaucasia; owned wholesale and retail sale tobacco-
nists' shop in Baku, called "Mir." Дадаян Х.З., Уж.соч., с.48

Tardieu, André - Minister of Liberated Regions and assistant to G.Clemenceau during the Paris Peace Conference; deputy of the French Parliament. Later on, three times Prime Minister of his country in 1929-1930, 1930 and 1932

Tarham C.V. - an American who welcomed J.Harbord Mission at Mardin on September 13, 1919

Tavrizian (Tavrizov) A.A. - an Armenian engineer, one of the first proprietors of kerosene plant in Baku. In 1874 he developed new petroleum technology by analogy with alcohol distillation process and constructed innovative oil refining machine. At the very beginning, he was not allowed to exploit oil distiller, because State regulations of the time did not envisage implementation of continuous processes. In 1875 he held a post of Director at the Society of Mutual Lending

Tekinskiy, Magomed Khan - from March 14, 1919 on, served as diplomatic representative of Azerbaijan in the Republic of Armenia

Ter-Grigorian (Ter-Grigoryev), Sarkis and Misak - businessmen brothers engaged in production of silk at Nukhi, as well as in tobacco manufacture at the Baku Governorate

Ter-Hagopian Abraham - Professor at Robert College, Constantinople. On April 4, 1919, he had been elected at the I National Congress of Armenians, held in Paris, to the second composition of Armenian National Delegation. The latter represented Western Armenians at the Peace Conference. See: Balakian G., The Armenian Golgotha. A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918. Transl. P.Balakian, A.Sevag. NY, Alfred A.Knopf Inc., 2009, p.432

Ter-Kevorkov - Armenian entrepreneurs who run silk manufactures in Nukhi, where Gerasim Ter-Keworkov also managed the Caucasian Bank. See: Հայերի կոտորածները, էջ 312

Ter-Minasian, Ruben - Fedayee. Studied at the Etchmiadzin Gevorgian seminary, at Lazarev institute (seminary) of Oriental languages in Moscow, as well as at the University of Geneva. Entered into squads, which were guided by Nikol Duman and Gevorg Chavoush; participated in the last battle, fought by Chavoush a Sulukh on May 27, 1907. R.Ter-Minasian conducted

self-defence at Sasun in 1915 and managed withdrawal of many defenders to Manazkert. In 1917-1918 he was engaged in rendering assistance to Western Armenian refugees in the Caucasus. Was a Minister of Interior and the War Minister of the Republic of Armenia from May 5, 1920, on. Later, staying in Kapan he had set on December 21 the problem to discharge its imprisoned leaders at any costs, up to armed rising; thus he had laid a base of the anti-Bolshevik mutiny raised on February 18, 1921, and suppressed on April 22 of the same year. Therefore, he had emigrated and prepared seven volumes of "Memoirs by Armenian Revolutionary," published in 1951-1952.

Ter-Movsesian, Mesrop Bishop - Honorary President of Armenian Central National Bureau in 1916; in 1919 he served at Etchmiadzin. See: Арутюнян А.О., Кавказский фронт 1914-1917 гг. Ереван, Айастан, 1971, с.237

Ter-Poghosian, Hovannes (Ter-Poghosov, Avanes) - possessor of silk-winding plant in Nukhi

Terterian, Hambartsum - member of Parliament at the Republic of Armenia, socialist, native of Rostov/Nor Nakhijevan and classmate to A.Myasnikian. At the turn of April, 1920, Government of the Republic of Armenia prescribed him to join a delegation, which had been charged to conduct negotiations with Soviet Russia. On May 20, 1920, their group arrived at Moscow

Tevfik Bey - representative of Turkish Nationalists at Malatia in 1919

Thompson L.M. - employee of NER, she run a kindergarten an Sebastia in 1919

Thomson, William Montgomery - Acting Major General of British Army; till September, 1918, Commander of the 14th Division, allotted to Mesopotamian expeditionary forces. Between November 17, 1918, and March 10, 1919, commanded 39th Division of 82nd Brigade, which had occupied Baku and set up his Governorship General. Then, until May 12, he had been transferred into Tiflis, where he was placed at the head of all British troops in Transcaucasia

Thwaites, William - Major General, Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office, chief of the Military section of the British peace delegation at Paris in 1919. On March 19 he wrote to the Foreign Office that Armenian forces totaling some 12,500 men "should be sufficient to police" the area, including part of the

Western Armenia, if the Armenian Army really intends to keep peace and order in it. He contested possible deployment of Italian contingents in the Caucasus instead of British troops. In July of the same year the General objected to partial return of 650,000 Western Armenians home into their native lands, since there were no troops available to assist in repatriation. In December, 1919, W.Thwaites was of opinion that the proposal to form a Caucasus buffer against Bolshevism was ill advised, if implemented, it would destroy British influence in Transcaucasia. He also urged to remain A.Denikin armies the focal point of British efforts, receiving support to the utmost of their ability. See: Hovannisian R., Op.cit., vol.I, p.305; vol.II, p.59, 486

Tigran II Artashesid (Artaxias) - king of Great Armenia in 95-55 BC.

Tigranian, Sirakan - Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Republic of Armenia from November 4, 1918, till May 22, 1919; then on September 16 he had been elected Vice Chairman of the republican Parliament

Tipple A.N. - employee of NER, she run the Boys' orphanage at Sebastia in 1919

Tittoni, Tommaso - Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs in June, 1919; then President of the Senate. Supported military and political union with Austria and Germany. Interim Prime Minister of his country in 1905; head of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1903-1905 and 1906-1909

Tomasi, Pietro Marquis della Torretta - member of Italian peace delegation at the Paris conference; Ambassador in Vienna from August 20, 1919, until July, 1921. Afterwards Minister of Foreign Affairs 1921-1922

Topchibashev, Ali Mardan - chairman of Azerbaijani delegation, that came to take part in the Paris Peace Conference

Toren, Paul O. - Sergeant-Major, U.S. Army, stenographer of King-Crane Commission

Toumanian, Michael George - Prince, counsellor to diplomatic mission of the Republic of Armenia in Tiflis. Managed the same mission in Georgia between March 8 and the middle of April, 1919 (NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 35, f.47-48). On March 16, 1920, when L.Evanghouljian had gone into sickness retirement, Ministry of Foreign Affairs charged M.Toumanian with guidance of mission; and he affixed his signature to documents as

diplomatic deputy representative

Toumaniantz T.S. - merchant of the 1st guild, President of Baku petroleum Firm "Arshaluys," as well as board member of Trans-Caspian trade and industrial Society. In common with his brother dealt in cotton and grocery in Baku. They were both members of Armenian Philanthropic Society in this city and Persian subjects. See: Տեղեկագիր եւ հաշիւ Բազուի Հայոց մարդասիրական ընկերութեան 1911թ. գործունեութեան: Եօպու, "Եօպու," 1911, էջ 16-17

Toumanov - most similar, according to available information, was Prince Constantine Alexander Toumanov, Lieutenant General from January, 1917, Commander of Cavalry Corps from the month of April. He was referred as a close friend with P.N.Wrangel, who chaired the staff of the Committee for Assistance to Mountaineers and Cossacks of Tersk in their liberation from Bolsheviks. This organization was set up at Tiflis in 1920. However, direct link with Sarikamish or evidence of a General, who would bear the name of Toumanian and serve in the Army of the Republic of Armenia, were not chased

Trotsky (Bronstein), Lev David - adopted as allonym and made so famous the last name of a person who served as a warder in the prison of Odessa. War correspondent on the Balkan peninsula in 1912-1913. Bolshevik from August, 1917; Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs from October 26, 1917 until March 13, 1918; carried on parleys in Brest-Litovsk. People's Commissar for War and Navy from March 13, 1918, theorist and practitioner of Red Terror. Chairman of the Revolutionary Military Committee from September, 1918. Member of Political Bureau of the Central Committee of RCP(b)

Truax, Ana - in 1919 she run industrial department of the ACRNE at Mardin and provided work for 800 women

Tsaturian, Arakel - native of Shushi, together with G.M.Ara-kelian he had been among joint owners of the petroleum industry company "A.Tsaturov and others" in Baku. The first-rate shareholder at the trade firm "Shikhovo"

Tsereteli, Irakli George - member of the Georgian delegation at the negotiations in Paris and London, pursued from March, 1919, until June, 1920

Tyler, Royall - Major of the U.S. Army, chief of Military Intelligence of the American commission to negotiate Peace in

Paris

Tyrrell, Sir William - private secretary to the British Foreign Secretary E.Grey in 1907-1915; Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1918-1925. Starting from Anglo-Russian agreement, signed in 1907, he resisted approachment of these two countries and strived for Anglo-American-German collaboration

Urfi Bey - by 1919 he operated as Kaimakam, or chief of district, which had been organized around city Andreas at province of Sebastia, in Turkey

Ussher, Clarence Douglas - a physician and a missionary, in 1898-1915 he had been employed in the frame of ABCFM at Van, where he married in 1900, was down with typhus and buried his wife in summer of 1915. Since 1904 was on friendly terms with spouses M. and E.Yarrow, who were assigned to Van, too. After that he had departed for Constantinople and published in 1917 together with Grace H.Knapp a book "An American Physician in Turkey." Chief of the medical service, ACNER in January - August of 1919; visited Bitlis, Van and Erzerum in May. Thereupon left for Constantinople and on June 2-6 contacted the King-Crane commission there. Afterwards made for Paris to meet with Damad Ferid and on July 25 - August 1 returned to Tiflis, delivering a letter by Boghos Nubar for Gevorg V Catholicos. He had imparted in Tiflis to Major J.Green, head of ARA in the Caucasus, that H.Hoover had approved his design to repatriate Armenians. Consul B.Moore and E.Yarrow had written to F.Polk, who stayed at Paris, that in common with Armenian Government, they are all against such a scheme, as far as returning refugees, left without protection and military escort, would be obliterated. In October of 1919 C.Ussher worked in Yerevan, he was a District Commander of the NER and representative of the ABCFM in Metropolis From May 5 to June 14, 1920

Usubbekov (Yusufbayli), Nasib Bek - Prime Minister of Azerbaijan

Vahanian H. - Tiflis city dweller

Vanetsyan (Vanetsov), Grigory Peter and L.P. - business owners, occupied with fish and oil industry in Baku. By 1914, brothers had been board members of Company, established by the paper and carton factories at Surazh, as well as board members of fishing Company "Rybak" and of steamship Company "Khiva." Later on emigrated to Hamburg

Vansittart, Robert Gilbert - secretary at the Foreign Office on Eastern affairs; member, afterwards head of political section of the British Peace Delegation at Paris

Varshamian, Gevorg Petros - Governor of Nakhijevan area from April 3 till July 25, 1919, executed his duty on the spot from May 13 of the same year

Vartabedian - Dr., on September 10, 1919, met with J.Harbord in Adana

Vartazariantz, Bishop Bagrat - head of diocese for Shamakhi and Baku Armenians, honorary president of the Armenian National Council of Baku

Vehib Bey - General Vehib from February 1916, Commander of the 3rd Turkish Army Corps, he had been charged with area of Kharberd, where he hold an inquiry into 1915 extermination of Armenians. Several sessions of court martial together with executions followed this detection. Being of Colonel rank, he met in the same Kharberd with J.Harbord Mission on September 17, 1919. See: Dadrian V.N., The History of the Armenian Genocide. Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Providence RI & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1995, p.325

Venzelos, Eleftherios Kyriakou - Greek Prime Minister from 1910 to November 14, 1920

Vickrey, Charles Vernon (1876-1966) - on September 16, 1915, he had been one of the founders of the Armenian Relief Committee and participant of gathering, which made a decision to collect first \$100,000. When ARC had been transformed into Near East Relief, he had become its General Secretary and chartered member of the Board of Trustees. In the U.S. Congressional Act of August 6, 1919, C.Vickrey had been mentioned among those who were instructed to administer new agency and to control its funds. He had also been included into the personnel of legal trustees, as well as of the Executive Committee of NER

Villaret, Gustave - Captain from J.Harbord military mission to Armenia. As a member of its staff, accompanied General G.Van Horn Moseley on September 30 - October 1, 1919, to Sharur-Nakhijevan, to exert deterrent influence at the spot over Tartar ringleaders

Vratsian, Simon (Grouzian, Shmavon Ghazaros) - Minister of Labour from February 1 to November 24, 1920; Minister of Agriculture from May 5 of the same year; simultaneously Minister of

State Property; from November 24 till December 2, 1920, Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

Vrooman, Lee - expert in agriculture at the Kharberd Branch of NER in 1919

Wade, Emely - in 1919 had been employed in American relief agencies at Diarbekir

Wallace, Hugh Campbell - the U.S. Ambassador to France in 1907-1909; chairman of the social service dealt with military camps in 1917-1918. He had been appointed member of the American Commission to negotiate Peace in November, 1918; from December 16, 1919, sat in the Council of Five as the head of his delegation. At the same time, on February 27, 1919, he had been reappointed the U.S. Ambassador in Paris

Ward, Anna R. - missioner of the ABCFM, who served in 1915-1924 in Aintab and Kharberd, where on September 17, 1919, reported the situation in common with her husband to General J. Harbord

Ward, Mark Hopkins - Doctor and missionary, served in Red Cross and relief establishments at Constantinople 1915-1916. Captain in the medical corps of the U.S. Army at France in 1917. Then entered into a contract with the NER and from 1919 until March of 1922 worked as a Doctor in hospitals of Mezire and Kharberd. On orders from Turkish authorities he left the country and together with Director of Kharberd Unit of the NER, Major F.D. Yowell, had addressed on May 2, 1922, to the Secretary of State C.E.Hughes official confidential report on Kemalists' activities. In June of the same year he laid his diary before the Secretary of State, who was also the U.S. member to the Allied Commission for investigation of Turkish atrocities in Asia Minor

Warren - Colonel of the U.S. Army; representative of NER at Kars in 1919; on December 24 of the same year had been recalled to Tiflis. See: NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 92, pt.6, f.444

Washington Martha - spouse of the U.S. first President George Washington

Watson James Kiero - Lieutenant Colonel, official of the British High Commissariat in Egypt; aide to King-Crane Commission in 1919

Webb, Richard - British Admiral, Rear Admiral in 1918-1924, temporary deputy and mainly Assistant High Commissioner at Constantinople. Acting High Commissioner in April - May,

1920, when his executive Vice Admiral J. de Robeck had been absent

Westermann, William Linn - specialist on Western Asia at the Division of Territorial, Economic and Political Intelligence of the American commission to negotiate peace in Paris. Member of the Interallied Commission on Greek Territorial Claims with borders, which temporarily encompassed the Western Armenia, too. Compiled statistics on number of Armenians and other nationalities in the Western Armenia, the Minor Armenia, in the borders of contemplated Armenian State and in the vast area of the Ottoman Empire, as they were in 1914. This information had been constituent part of the summary report, submitted by the King-Crane Commission on August 28, 1919. See: US NA, RG 256, 181.9102/9 or Paris, vol.XI, p.825

White, George Edward - missionary of ABCFM in Marzvan from 1890 on; President of local Anatolia College in 1913-1921, which had been accommodated in 40 edifices. However, 8 Professors of his College were killed by axes in wholesale massacre; and thereupon, he was expelled from Turkey in 1916. On February 16, 1919, this person led a charitable expedition of 250 relief workers, who brought goods for Tarson, Marzvan, Adana, Marash, Aintab, Aleppo, Sebastia, Erzerum, Trebizond, Deir ez-Zor, Jerusalem, Baghdad, Mosul, Urmia, Tabriz, Yerevan, Tiflis, Batum, Bitlis, Kharberd, Mardin, Urfa and Van, worth a total of \$3,5 million. In the beginning of August, 1919 G.White testified to King-Crane Commission and urged, that American policy would consist in prompt independence for Western Armenian districts; in external and close watch of the rest of Anatolia together with the Straits area. Our hero welcomed one of the members of J.Harbord Mission, Lieutenant Colonel J.P.Jackson in his city on September 23. Later on, in 1940 he had published a book: White G.E., Adventuring with Anatolia College. Grinnell, Iowa; Herald-Register Publishing Co, 1940

White, Henry - the U.S. Ambassador in England, France and Italy; one of five principal members of the American Commission to negotiate Peace from November 19, 1918, until December 9, 1919. Set his hand on the Treaty of Versailles; then mastered his delegates in Paris for five months. He was a Republican. Had been buried in Washington National Cathedral, near the tomb of W.Wilson

White, Stanley - member of National Committee of the Armenia-America Society, legal trustee and member of the Executive Committee at ACRNE in 1919

Wilhelm II Hohenzollern Friedrich Wilhelm Viktor Albrecht - a grandson of the British Queen Victoria; the last emperor or Kaiser of Germany and king of Prussia, who ruled from June 15, 1888, till his abdication on November 9, 1918

Williams, John Sharp - elected as a Democrat to the U.S. Senate, close friend of President W.Wilson; member of Executive Committee of the ACIA. On September 9, 1919, Senator G.Hitchcock had submitted to the Senate their joint resolution for the maintenance of peace in Armenia. This document urged to use military and naval force of the USA, until the Peace Treaty would be concluded; to permit American Armenians to join as volunteers the colours of the Republic of Armenia; and to appropriate any moneys to this effect. W.Harding, the U.S. President to be, had opposed this move. On October 10 H.Kajaznuni had appeared in the Senatorial Subcommittee on Foreign Relations and spoke in this context. See: United States of America, Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session. Wash., US GPO, 1919, vol. LVIII, pt.5, p.5067 и Maintenance of Peace in Armenia. Hearings before a Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 66th Congress, 1st Session, on Senate Joint Resolution № 106 A Joint Resolution for the Maintenance of Peace in Armenia. Wash., US GPO, 1919, p.109-124. Complete text of the resolution in: Ованнисян Р., Международные отношения Республики Армения, с.269-270, as well as с.280-281

Wilson, Helen - worked at the ACRNE in Yerevan

Wilson, Sir Henry Hughes - Field Marshal, from November, 1917, he represented Great Britain at the Supreme Military Council, quartered in Versailles. From February, 1918, served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Military adviser to his Government at Paris, he had been in charge for information on Allied Powers

Wilson, Thomas Woodrow - President of the United States in 1913-1921

Witte, Frances - nurse of ACRNE in Etchmiadzin

Wright, Joshua Butler - the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Great Britain; later on served as Assistant Secretary of State for C.E. Hughes and the U.S. Ambassador

Yale, William - Captain, an Arabist; from 1913 on, represented the Standard Oil of New York in Constantinople. Special representative of the State Department at Cairo in 1917. American military observer at the Armed Forces under command of General E.Allenby, in Palestine next year. Expert of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace and counsellor to King-Crane Commission in 1919

Yarrow, Ernest Albert - Doctor of Divinity, missionary of ABCFM in 1904-1924. In common with his wife Martha J. worked in Van and Alexandropol. On April 7 - May 6, 1915, he watched the Self-defense of Van out of a window of his station. The preacher maintained strict neutrality and hid orphans in a Mission. In the months of June and July he worked at the Van Hospital and was down with typhus. Afterward he departed to Tiflis with a team of Russian Red Cross. Then went home to the USA in October, 1915; but returned to Yerevan in 1917. On May 2-11 of the same year he had represented ACRNE at the I Congress of Western Armenians, convened in the Armenian Capital. E.Yarrow joined A. Manoukian and K.Sasuni at this convention and entered its commission for reconstruction. In 1919 he was promoted to Director General of ACRNE at Tiflis. Then succeeded W.Haskell and on August 1, 1920, took over a post of the High Commissioner in charge of Relief. On August 23 new executive moved his headquarters into Alexandropol. And until July, 1924, E.Yarrow went on with his work as a Director of Relief in Yerevan; his Committee took care of 25,000 orphaned children, sheltered here

Yusuf Ali - representative of India at the Paris peace Conference

Zakariadze, Alexander Karaman - General, Chief of Staff of the Georgian Army

Zaki Bey - member of municipal council at Erzerum in 1919

Zavriev, David Christophor - Professor of Chemistry at the University in Tiflis; he had been graduated from St.Petersburg University and was the pupil of D.I.Mendeleev. One of initiators of the Yerevan University in 1919; its Dean in 1921

Zhordania, Noy Nickolas - Prime Minister of the Georgian Republic between July 24, 1918, and February 25, 1921

Zia Bey - physician, employee of the Red Crescent at Erzerum in 1919

Zia Bey - chief of the district at Zara in 1919

Zohrap, Grigor - barrister and Professor of law at Constantinople; in 1895-1896 he made the defense of politically charged Armenians and saved life of many clients. Deputy of Armenian National Assemble and member of Ottoman Parliament from 1908, on. In 1912-1914 he negotiated with Embassies of Great Powers on the Armenian Question; and published a volume with the same name in 1913 in French, under the pen name of Marcel Léart. G.Zohrap had written novels, narratives and short stories. On May 20, 1915, he had been arrested and then brutally murdered on his track into exile

Bibliography

Primary Sources. Official Documents

- Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը 1918-1920թթ.: (Քաղաքական պատմություն): Փաստաթղթերի և նյութերի ժողովածու: Խմբ.Գ.Գալոյան, Վ.Ղազախեցյան: Եր., Գիտություն, 2000:
- Հայերի կոտորածները Բաքվի և Ելիզավետպոլի նահանգներում 1918-1920թթ.: Փաստաթղթերի և նյութերի ժողովածու: Եր., ՀՀ Պատմության արխիվ, 2003:
- Նախիջևան-Շարուրը 1918-1921թթ.: Փաստաթղթեր և նյութեր: Խմբ. Վ.Ն.Ղազախեցյան: Եր., ՀՀ Արխիվային գործի վարչություն, «Բանբեր Հայաստանի արխիվների», 1993, № 1-2:
- Վավերագրեր հայ եկեղեցու պատմության: Գիրք Բ Խորեն Ա Մուրադբեկյան կաթողիկոս ամենայն հայոց (հոգևոր գործունեությունը 1901-1938թթ.): Կազմ.Ս.Բեհբուդյան: Եր., ՀՀ Արխիվային գործի վարչություն, 1996:
- Cuinet V. Le Turquie d'Asie. Géographie administrative, statistique descriptive et raisonnée de chaque province de l'Asie Mineure, en 2 tomes. P., E.Leroux, 1892.
- Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Ed.by E.L.Woodward, R.Butler. 1st Series, in 27 vols, vol.2. Lnd., HMSO, 1948.
- Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session, USA. Wash., US GPO, 1919, vol.LVIII, pt.5.
- Léart M. [Zohrap G.], La Question Arménienne à la lumière des documents. P., A.Challamel, 1913.
- Maintenance of Peace in Armenia. Hearings Before a Subcommittee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 66th Congress, 1st Session, on Senate Joint Resolution № 106 A Joint Resolution for the Maintenance of Peace in Armenia. Wash., US GPO, 1919, p.109-124.
- Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Russia. In 3 vols. Vol.I. Wash., US GPO, 1931, 754 p. Vol.II. Wash., US GPO, 1932, 887 p.
- Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1918 Supplement 1 The World War. In 2 vols. Vol.I. Wash., US GPO, 1933, 914 p.

- Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919. In 2 vols. Vol.II. Wash., US GPO, 1934, 889 p.
- Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1919. The Paris Peace Conference. In 12 vols. Vol.I, Wash., US GPO, 1942, 575 p.
 Vol.II, Wash., US GPO, 1942, 812 p.
 Vol.III, Wash., US GPO, 1944, 1061 p.
 Vol.V, Wash., US GPO, 1946, 949 p.
 Vol.VI, Wash., US GPO, 1946, 1021 p.
 Vol.VII, Wash., US GPO, 1946, 985 p.
 Vol.VIII, Wash., US GPO, 1946, 986 p.
 Vol.IX, Wash., US GPO, 1946, 1053 p.
 Vol.X, Wash., US GPO, 1947, 807 p.
 Vol.XI. Wash., US GPO, 1945, 736 p.
 Vol.XII. Wash., US GPO, 1947, 881 p.
- Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. 1920. In 3 vols., vol.III. Wash., US GPO, 1936, 823 p.
- The Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Great Britain. Official Report, House of Commons, 5th Series, vol.126, Lnd., HMSO, 1920.
- Parliamentary Papers, Great Britain. LI Command Papers, 4th series 1915-1958, Cmd.671, Miscellaneous № 7. Lnd., HMSO, 1920.
- The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, 1915-16. Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Fallodon by Viscount J.Bryce. Comp.by A.Toynbee. Lnd., HMSO, 1916.

- Великая Октябрьская социалистическая революция и победа Советской власти в Армении. Сборник документов. Сост. А.Н.Мнацаканян. Ер., Айпетрат, 1957.
- Нагорный Карабах в 1918-1923 гг. Сборник документов и материалов. Под ред.В.А.Микаеляна. Ереван, АН Армении, 1992.
- Сборник дипломатических документов. Реформы в Армении, 26 ноября 1912 г. - 10 мая 1914 г. (Оранжевая книга). Птт., МИД России, 1915.

Internet Resources

Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopaedia <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki>

Archival Sources

National Archives of Armenia (NAA)

fund 199 (Council of Ministers of the Republic of Armenia) reg.1,
files 12, 159

fund 200 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Armenia), reg.1, files 35, 92, 193, 209, 212, 244, 282, 291, 303-304,
317, 351, 355, 357, 364, 427, 431, 557

reg.2, file 37

fund 201 (Ministry of Internal Affairs of the first Republic of
Armenia) reg.1, files 45, 171

fund 275 (Diplomatic missions of the first Republic of
Armenia), reg.5, file 101

fund 370 (A.T.Ozanian, 1865-1920), reg.1, file 63

fund k.1021 (Institute of History of the Party, attached to the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia), reg.2, file
978

General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace,
1918-1931, American Delegation, Field Mission of the American
Delegation, Harbord Military Mission to Armenia. Microfilm
publications, Wash., the National Archives, NA and
Records Service, General Services Administration, 1970;
collection of microfilm rolls M820,

Roll 230, vol.204, NAA, MR № 2

Roll 232, NAA, MR № 4.

Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of
Armenia, 1910-1929. Microfilm publications, Wash., the National
Archives, NA and Records Service, General Services
Administration, 1975; collection of microfilm rolls T1192,
Roll 1, National Archives of Armenia, MR № 49

Roll 2, NAA, MR № 38

Roll 3, NAA, MR № 37

Roll 6, NAA, MR № 46

Roll 7, NAA, MR № 36.

Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations
Between Armenia and Other States, 1910-1929. Microfilm
publications, Wash., the National Archives, NA and Records
Service, General Services Administration, 1975; collection of
microfilm rolls T1193, Roll 2, NAA, MR № 35.

Periodical Press

- "Bulletin of the American Geographical Society," NY, 1915, vol.47, № 11.
- "Current History," NY, 1920, vol.XI, pt.II.
- "Daily Mail," Lnd., 31.01.1919.
- "The Manchester Guardian," Manchester, 26.02.1920.
- "The New York Herald," NY, 9.08.1919.
- "The New York Times," NY, 5.10.1915; 17.11.1915; 8.02.1920; 29.02.1920; 7.03.1920; 21.08.1920.
- "Revue des Études Arméniennes." P., 1921, vol.I, № 3.
- "Times," Lnd., 12.03.1920; 30.04.1920.
- "Известия," М., 3.09.1918.

Published Books and Articles

- Ավետիսյան Մ.Ն. Նախիջևանի պատմության վավերագրեր (1889-1920թթ.): «Լրաբեր հասարակական գիտությունների», Եր., 1996, № 3, էջ 186-196:
- Բալազյան Լ. Ալեքսանդր Մանթաշյանց: (Ազգային բարերարը և գեղարվեստի մեկեմասը): Եր., Հայաստան, 1991:
- Զոհրաբյան Է.Ա. Նախիջևանյան հիմնահարցը եւ Հայաստանի «Գաշնակիցները» (1918թ. դեկտեմբեր - 1920թ. ապրիլ): Եր., Տիգրան Մեծ հրատ. տպարան, 2002:
- Հայ ժողովրդի պատմություն, 8 հատորով: Հ.6 Հայաստանը 1870-1917 թթ.: Եր., ՀՍՍՀ ԳԱ, 1981:
- Հայկ Վահե: Խարբերդ եւ անոր Ոսկեղեն դաշտը: Յուշամատեան պատմական, մշակութային եւ ազգագրական: Նյի Եորք, 1959:
- Մախմուրյան Գ.Գ. Փաստաթղթեր Խարբերդի նահանգի մասին (1919-1922թթ.): «Բանբեր Հայաստանի արխիվների», Եր., 2008, № 2, էջ 75-86:
- Վրացյան Ս. Հայաստանի Հանրապետություն: Եր., Հայաստան, 1993:
- Տեղեկագիր եւ հաշիւ Բագովի Հայոց մարդասիրական ընկերութեան 1911թ. գործունեութեան: Баку, электропечатня газ. "Баку," 1911:
- Տեփոյան Պ. Միհրան Տամատյան (1863-1945): Գահիրե, «Արեւ»ի թերթօնը, 1956:

- Balakian G. *The Armenian Golgotha. A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1918.* Transl. P.Balakian, A.Sevag. NY, Alfred A.Knopf, 2009.
- Barton J.L. *Story of Near East Relief (1915-1930).* NY, Macmillan, 1930.
- Brémond E. *La Cilicie en 1919-1920.* P., Imprimerie Nationale, 1921.
- Corp E.T. *Sir William Tyrrell: The Eminence Grise of the British Foreign Office, 1912-1915.* "The Historical Journal," Cambridge and NY, 1982, vol.25, № 3.
- Dadrian V.N. *The History of the Armenian Genocide. Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus.* Providence RI & Oxford, Berghahn Books, 1995.
- Dominian L. *Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe.* NY, H.Holt and Co., 1917.
- . *The Peoples of Northern and Central Asiatic Turkey.* "Bulletin of the American Geographical Society," NY, 1915, vol.47, № 11.
- Dugdale B.E.C. *Arthur James Balfour, in 2 vols, vol.2.* NY, G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1937.
- du Hays H. *Les armées françaises au Levant, 1919-1939. Vol. II: Le temps des combats, 1920-1921.* Vincennes, Lavauzelle, 1979.
- du Véou P. *La passion de la Cilicie 1919-1922.* 2nde ed. P., Paul Geuthner, 1954.
- Elliot M.E. *Beginning Again at Ararat.* Lnd. & Edinburg, Fleming H.Revell, 1924.
- Gidney J.B. *A Mandate for Armenia.* Oberlin, Ohio; The Kent State University, 1967.
- Hovannisian R. *The Republic of Armenia, in 4 vols.* Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1971-1996.
- . *Scholarship and Politics.* "The Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies," Boston, 1985-1986, № 2, p.169-186.
- Howard H.N. *The Partition of Turkey, a Diplomatic History of 1913-1923.* Norman, Ok; University of Oklahoma, 1931.
- Kerr S. *The Lions of Marash. Personal Experiences with American Near East Relief 1919-1922.* Albany, State University of New York, 1973.
- Lynch H.F.B. *Armenia, Travels and Studies, vol.I.* Lnd., Longmans, Green, and Co., 1901.

- Makhmourian G. Management of the U.S. Relief and the Republic of Armenia. "Вестник общественных наук" ("Herald of the Social Sciences") Yerevan, 2008, № 1, p.96-113.
- Marashlian L. The Armenian Question from Sèvres to Lausanne. Economics and Morality in American and British Policies 1920-1923. PhD dissertation. LA, UCLA, 1992.
- Martin E.W. The Hubbards of Sivas: a Chronicle of Love and Faith. Santa Barbara, Ca, Fithian Press, 1991.
- Materne Muré R.P. Le massacre de Marache (février 1920). Bruxelles, Flambeau, 1921.
- Miglio S. America's Sacred Duty: Near East Relief and the Armenian Crisis, 1915-1930. Notre Dame, Indiana; Department of History, University of Notre Dame, 2009.
- Miller D.H. The Drafting of the Covenant. 2 vols. NY, G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1928.
- . My Diary at the Conference of Paris, in 21 vols. NY., Appeal Printing Co., 1928.
- Nicolson H. Curzon: the Last Phase 1919-1925. A Study in Post-War Diplomacy. Lnd., Constable, 1934.
- . Peacemaking, 1919, Being Reminiscent of the Paris Peace Conference. NY., Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1939.
- Ramsay W.M. Impressions of Turkey During Twelve Years' Wanderings. NY, G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1897.
- Rawlinson A. Adventures in the Near East, 1918-1922. Lnd.-NY, Dodd, 1924.
- Sahagian H. Graffam, Partridge and the Armenians of Sivas. In: Armenian Sebastia/Sivas and Lesser Armenia. Ed.by R.Hovannisian. Costa Meza, Ca., Mazda, 2004, p.373-398.
- Severance G. & D. Against the Gates of Hell. The Life and Times of Henry Perry, a Christian Missionary in a Moslem World. NY, University Press of America, 2003.
- Suny R. The Baku Commune 1917-1918. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Trask R.R. The United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1914-1939. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1971.
- White G.E. Adventuring with Anatolia College. Grinnell, Iowa; Herald-Register Publishing Co, 1940.
- Zürcher E.J. The Unionist factor: the rôle of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement,

1905-1926. Leiden, E.J.Brill, 1984.

- Армянский вопрос. Энциклопедия. Ер., Армянская энциклопедия, 1991.
- Арутюнян А.О. Кавказский фронт 1914-1917 гг. Ер., Айастан, 1971.
- Гершов З.М. Вудро Вильсон. М., Мысль, 1983.
- Дадаян Х.З. Армяне и Баку (1850-е гг. - 1920 г.). Ер., Норавапк, 2007.
- Игнатъев А.В. Русско-английские отношения накануне первой мировой войны (1908-1914 гг). М., Соцэкгиз, 1962.
- Козенко Б.Д. Посредничество без кавычек. Миротворчество США в 1914-1916 гг. (характер и цели). В кн.: Первая мировая война: дискуссионные проблемы истории. М., Наука, 1994, с.72-83.
- Махмуриян Г.Г. Губернаторство Карабах-Зангезур и британская политика 1918-1919 гг. в Карабахе. В кн.: Շուրիկի հայրը թրքաշրջադրմանը օրրիմ: Ер., Չիտրերյուն, 2007, էջ 150-174.
- . Лига Наций, Армянский вопрос и Республика Армения. Ер., Артагерс, 1999.
- . Пограничные проблемы Республики Армения и британская политика. Диалог исследователей. "Вестник общественных наук," Ер., 2007, № 3, с.230-245
- . Политика Великобритании в Армении и Закавказье в 1918-1920 гг. Бремя белого человека. Ереван, Лусакн, 2002.
- Микаелян В.А., Мирзоян С.С. Участие армян в экономической жизни Восточного Закавказья (вторая половина XIX - первые десятилетия XX вв.). "Вестник общественных наук," Ер., 1990, № 2, с.74-81.
- Никольсон Г. Как делался мир в 1919 г. М., ОГИЗ, 1945.
- Новая история Армении в трудах современных зарубежных авторов. Под ред.Р.Г.Саакяна. Ер., НАН Армении, 1993.
- Ованнисян Р. Международные отношения Республики Армения. Ер., Тигран Мец, 2007.
- Романов В.В. Полковник Эдвард Хауз. "Вопросы истории," М., 2005, № 7, с.45-68.
- Саакян Р.Г. Франко-турецкие отношения и Киликия в 1918-1923 гг. Ер., АН АрмССР, 1986.
- Уткин А.И. Вудро Вильсон. М., Международные отношения, 1989.

Names Index Per Page

- Abbas II Hilmi Pasha
200, 221, 303, 428
Abdul Aziz 470
Abdul Hamid II 202, 304, 408,
428, 430, 450-451, 470-471,
478
Abdul Mejid I 444
Abdullah Bey 282, 428
Abernathy G. 254, 428
Abovian Kh.A. 447
Abro (Sahakian Mkrtych) 431
Adee A.A. 174, 428
Afrikian 283, 428
Aftab Ahmad 109, 429
Agha Khan 107, 429
Aghabekov S. 284, 429
Aghaev A. 284, 429
Aghbalian N. 239-241, 283-
284, 429
Aghbyur Serob (Vardanian)
431
Aghriyan (Aghriyev) S. and
others 252, 430
Aglyan V.R. 7
Aharonian A. 6-7, 30, 83, 85,
129, 222, 225, 279, 338, 351,
400, 430, 462, 468
Ahmad Shah Qajar 474
Albricci A. 150, 430
Alekseev M.V. 459
Alexander I Holstein-Got-
torp-Romanov 242, 430
Ali Bey F. 281, 430
Ali Kemal Bey 151, 430-431
Ali Riza Bey 281, 284, 431
Allenby E. 78, 121-122, 156-
157, 161-162, 200, 223, 431,
448, 498
Anastas Fr. 282, 431
Andranik (Ozanian) 338, 431
Arabo (Arakel, Mkhitarian
Stephanos) 432
Arakelian G.M. 492
Araphelian (Araphelov) G. &
N. 249, 431
Araratian C. 283, 431
Araratian S. 283, 432
Arghoutian H. 225-226, 353,
428, 432
Argishti I 31, 432
Argutinsky-Dolgoruky 242,
432, 472
Arounyantz H., N. & D.G.
251, 433
Artsruni G. 483
Arzoumanian B.R. 251, 433
Avalov Z. 367, 370, 433
Avetisov A.I., K.I. 251, 433
Avni Bey 283, 433
Avni Bey H. 282, 433
Avni Effendi 282, 433
Ayer C.S. 283, 351, 433
Ayyub Bey C. 74-75, 433
Bagrat Bishop Vartazariantz
283-284, 494
Bagratids, Bagratuni 258, 284,
433
Bahadur G. 110, 433
Baker N.D. 154, 397, 433
Bakunts Arsen 353, 433
Balakian G. 489
Balakian P. 489
Balfour A.J. 18, 23, 43-44, 48-
49, 59, 66-67, 77, 79, 91, 102,
105-106, 131, 137, 150, 155-
157, 160-162, 164, 171, 176,
181-183, 190, 196, 224, 226,
433, 439, 452, 468
Barclay C. 36, 433
Barnes J.H. 346, 433

Barton J.L. 22, 36, 71-73, 86,
 124-125, 331, 434, 445, 474
 Baruch B.M. 65, 434-435
 Beatty D.R. 369, 435
 Beeuwkes H. 272, 301, 320,
 435
 Bekir Bey 281, 435
 Bekir Sami Bey K. 282, 435
 Bekzadian T.A. 413, 435
 Belin E.E. 155, 435
 Benson W.S. 90, 435
 Bernstorff J.H.G. von 435, 464
 Berry E. 283, 436
 Berthelot P. 224, 364, 436
 Bertholf W.W. 301, 436
 Beury C.E. 340, 436
 Blake R.P. 331, 436
 Bliss A. 281, 436
 Bliss H.S. 65-66, 436
 Bliss T.H. 35, 39, 94, 98, 144,
 147, 436
 Bonar Law A. 191, 436
 Borden R.L. 49, 56, 436
 Botha L. 56, 436
 Boush J.E. 269, 271, 436
 Bowditch E. 273, 301, 320,
 436, 483-484
 Bowman I. 70, 73, 436
 Brémond E. 385
 Bridges G.T.M. 178, 184, 436
 Brinton J.Y. 239-241, 262,
 285, 301, 320, 437
 Bristol M.L. 42, 69, 167-168,
 172, 187, 189, 193, 195, 227,
 255, 257, 260, 279-280, 298-
 299, 331, 349-350, 352, 381,
 412, 422, 437, 461, 463, 473,
 479
 Brockdorff-Rantzau U.G. von
 119, 437
 Brodie D.M. 199, 437
 Brough A. 85, 125-126, 361,
 438
 Bryce J. 202, 221, 438
 Buchanan G.W. 18, 438, 441
 Buckler W.H. 143, 147, 149,
 186-187, 231-232, 238, 277,
 438
 Buniatyan (Buniyatov) H., M.
 & N. 249, 251, 438
 Bush S.P. 434
 Butler R. 443
 Cambon J.M. 359, 367-368,
 421, 439
 Cardashian V. 129, 439
 Catherine II Anhalt-Zerbst
 432
 Cavallero U. 153, 264, 364,
 439
 Cecil E.A.R. 18, 65, 439
 Chadwick 341, 440
 Chaikovsli N.V. 96, 440
 Chamberlain L. & W. 283,
 440
 Chambers W.N. 331, 440
 Chermin 262, 440
 Cheysson C., J.-J.E. & P.E.M.
 175-176, 440
 Chicherin G.V. 32, 438, 441
 Chilton H.G. 36, 441
 Chkheidze N.S. 370, 441
 Chkhenkeli A.I. 28, 441
 Choukhajian T. 467
 Christie S.C. & T.D. 331, 441
 Churchill W. 67-68, 370, 373-
 375, 430, 434, 441
 Clark H.W. 269, 301, 320, 441
 Clemenceau G. 18, 41-43, 47-
 48, 50-51, 57, 59-61, 63-64,
 76-78, 80, 87-100, 102-104,
 106-107, 111, 113, 115, 117-
 119, 121, 127, 130-134, 137-
 138, 143-144, 150, 153, 155-
 157, 160-164, 171, 173-175,

180, 182-183, 193, 195-196,
 198, 223-224, 226, 228, 230-
 232, 234, 244, 339-340, 343-
 344, 348, 355-357, 362-364,
 367, 369-371, 375-377, 409,
 441, 454, 461, 466, 489
 Clutterbuck C.H. 350, 442
 Colby B. 382, 387-391, 397,
 399, 409, 411-413, 422, 442
 Cole H.C. 74, 442
 Cole L.F. 484
 Cooke-Collis W. 226, 442
 Coolidge A.C. 147, 442
 Corp E.T. 453
 Cory G.N. 244-245, 353, 442
 Crane C.R. & R. 81-83, 87,
 118, 199, 201, 221-223, 238,
 434, 437, 440, 442, 453, 463,
 466-467, 473-474, 478-479,
 491, 493, 495-496, 498
 Crawford 262, 442
 Crespi S.B. 153, 442
 Crosby O.T. 16, 442
 Crowe E.A.B.W. 263-265, 337,
 339, 343-345, 359, 361-362,
 443, 475
 Cuinet V. 406, 408, 443
 Cumberland W.W. 292, 300-
 301, 320, 443
 Curzon G.N. 116, 122, 177,
 183-184, 187, 190, 195, 197,
 345-347, 354, 356, 363-364,
 370, 372, 375-376, 395, 426,
 443, 462, 475
 Custer R.M. 282, 443
 Dadayan K.Z. 450, 467-468,
 472, 489
 Dadrian V.N. 460, 488, 494
 Daley E.L. 283, 443
 Damad M.A. Ferid 127, 151-
 152, 193, 195, 310, 316, 334,
 444, 493
 Damadian M. 281, 444
 Dando A. 281, 444
 Dasey M.K. 281, 444
 Davie K.M. 244, 350, 444
 Davis J.W. 39, 122, 174, 177,
 182-183, 186-187, 190, 194,
 197, 347, 356, 444
 Davis N.H. 37, 65, 423-426,
 445
 Day C. 147, 445
 Defrance J.-A. 193, 196, 359,
 445
 Denikin A.I. 93, 166, 230,
 256, 263, 266, 312, 333, 348-
 349, 355-359, 362-363, 365-
 371, 373-374, 378, 440, 445,
 461-462, 491
 de Robeck J.M. 496
 Dickson M. 282, 445
 Dirik, Kiazim 282, 445
 Disraeli B. 124, 445, 450
 Dodge C.H. 71-72, 192, 434,
 445, 474
 Dominican L. 70, 73, 83, 147,
 203, 221, 446
 Doolittle H.A. 17, 22-23, 165,
 168, 331, 351-352, 446
 Draper M. 283, 446
 Dudley S.B. 281, 446
 Dugdale B.E.C. 446, 452
 du Hays H. 385
 Dunsterville L.C. 23, 446
 Dutasta P.E. 139, 446
 du Véou P. 385
 ed-Dowleh Vosuq 351, 446
 Edhem Bey 151, 447
 Eghiazarian B.S. & G.S. 251,
 447
 Eghishe Archbishop Durian
 38, 446
 El Housseini I.H. 74, 123, 447
 Elias Bey 282, 447

Eliot C.W. 140, 154, 192, 447
 Elkus A.I. 340, 447
 Elliot M.E. 385
 Emin Bey 282, 447
 Enver Pasha I. 180, 184, 309, 334, 363, 430, 447, 476
 Esayan M. 353, 447
 Evanghoulian L.G. 238-239, 284, 358, 447, 491
 Faik M. 283, 447
 Faisal I ibn Hussein 229, 448
 Fehmi H. 281, 448
 Fenenga A. 281, 331, 448
 Ferid Bey 283, 448
 Fitzmaurice M.S. 161, 448
 Flinn M. 282, 448
 Foch F. 92, 364, 369-370, 373-377, 448
 Forestier-Walker G.T. 244-245, 353, 448
 Fowle C.W. 384, 448
 Franchet d'Espérey L. 35, 224, 448
 Francis D.R. 11, 20, 448
 Frunze M.V. 431
 Fuller 281, 448
 Gambashidze V. 259, 284, 448
 Gates C.F. 34, 36, 86, 449
 Geddes A. 411, 449
 Gedevanov A.C. 284, 449
 Gedevanov N.C. 284, 449
 Gegechkori E.P. 16, 21, 23, 28, 30, 225, 358, 449
 George V Saxe-Coburg and Gotha 18, 110, 449
 Georges-Picot C. 69, 75, 79, 229-230, 233-234, 449, 480, 488
 Georgius Agricola 456
 Gerard J.W. 140, 185, 188, 192, 449, 468
 Germanus V Patriarch Kobakopulos 88
 Gershov Z.M. 453
 Gevorg IV Catholicos 429, 489
 Gevorg V Catholicos 23, 272, 283, 301, 415, 449, 479, 493
 Gevorg Chavoush 489
 Gevorgian A. 458
 Ghambarian Yu.S. 241, 449
 Ghukasian Ab., Ar. & H., M., P. 249, 253, 450
 Gidney J.B. 438
 Gladstone W. 124, 450
 Glazebrook O.A. 73, 451
 Goeben A.K. von 451
 Goodrick 74, 451
 Gorchakov A.M. 441
 Gough-Calthorpe S.A. 97, 157, 451
 Gourgen (Malyan Baghdasar) 431
 Gracey G.F.H. 284, 451
 Graf J.L. 281, 451
 Graffam M.L. 282, 331, 451
 Green J.C. 129, 165, 167, 171-172, 174, 351-352, 452, 493
 Greene E.F. 282, 452
 Gregory (Grigor) the Illuminator Catholicos 368, 452
 Grey E. 173, 182, 221, 452, 467, 493
 Gyanjuntzian (Gyanjuntsev, Kyanjuntsev) H. & M. 251, 453
 Gyulkhandanian A. 239, 283, 453
 Haddad Sami 199, 453
 Haidar R. 68, 453
 Hain N. 277-279, 453
 Hakhverdian (Akhverdov) A.H. 250, 453

Hakki Ismail 283, 453
 Hakobian B.H. 251, 454
 Hakobian M. 281, 454
 Haldane R.B.S. 173, 454
 Halil Bey 167, 351-352, 379, 454
 Hankey M. 77, 97, 137, 139-140, 454
 Harbord J.G. 5-6, 8, 136, 142-143, 148-149, 154-155, 168, 174, 177-179, 186-187, 189, 192-193, 198, 225-227, 234, 238, 240-241, 243, 245-246, 248, 254-255, 257-260, 262, 265-269, 272-277, 279-280, 285, 289, 292, 298-301, 331, 335, 337, 358, 396-398, 403, 428, 435-437, 440-441, 443, 448, 451, 454-458, 461-464, 466, 469-470, 474-476, 478-481, 483-485, 489, 494-496
 Harding W.G. 435, 497
 Hardinge C. 339, 454
 Harley I. 281, 454-455
 Harmsworth 90, 455
 Harpoutlian L. 281, 455
 Harrison L. 152-153, 455
 Harutyunian A.H. 490
 Haskell W.N. 148-149, 153-154, 167, 179-180, 182-183, 192, 198, 223-226, 255-260, 273, 276, 298, 307, 309, 331, 337-342, 344-346, 348-349, 354, 358-359, 378-379, 381, 405, 409-411, 455, 469, 481, 498
 Hauffman E. 283, 455
 Hawkes W. 282, 455
 Heck L. 38, 41, 86, 455
 Heinz H. 71-72, 85, 455
 Hekimian K. 282, 455
 Hemphill A.J. 340, 455
 Henry R. 284, 455
 Herter C.A. 82, 147, 455
 Hiatt W.S. 269, 300, 455
 Hill L. 238-239, 455
 Hitchcock G. 497
 Hoover H.C. 6-7, 33, 37, 65, 69-72, 83-85, 88, 105, 126-127, 135-136, 139, 141-143, 145-146, 149, 154-155, 158-159, 163, 165, 167-168, 170-171, 173-174, 178, 338, 340-341, 351-352, 354, 409, 435, 438, 452, 456, 465, 481, 486, 493
 Hope G.P.W. 96, 456
 Hornbeck S.K. 301, 320, 456
 House E.M. 14-15, 172, 182, 232, 452-453, 456
 Hovannisian R.G. 6, 352, 385, 421, 437-438, 445, 452, 456-458, 467-468, 473, 477, 485, 491, 497
 Hovhannes Patriarch Arsharouni 221-223, 406
 Hovsepian H. 283-284, 457
 Howard H.N. 452
 Hubbard M. 282, 457
 Hughes C.E. 139, 143-144, 149, 154, 192, 457, 495, 497
 Hughes W.M. 45, 53, 56, 457
 Hulusi H. (Pektash) 227, 269, 273, 300, 331, 457
 Hurley E.N. 65, 457
 Husein Effendi 281, 457
 Hrayr Dzhoghk (Ghazarian Armenak) 431
 Hymans P.L.A.H. 421, 422-423, 425-426, 457
 Ignatyev A.V. 453
 Imperiali G. 90, 356, 457
 Inonu I. 429, 431
 Ismail 282, 457
 Izzet Bey 283, 457

Jackson J.B. 281, 331, 458
 Jackson J.P. 234, 238, 260,
 275, 301, 320, 335-336, 458,
 496
 Jafarov M.Yu. 258, 284, 458
 James A.C. 70, 72, 458
 Janumyantz (Janumov) A. &
 br. 252, 458
 Jemal Pasha A. 309, 458
 Jevdet Bey A. 281, 458
 Johnson D.W. 147, 152, 458
 Johnson F.S. 384, 459
 Johnson R.U. 390, 395, 459
 Jones A.B. 281, 459
 Jones R.C. 36, 459
 Julphayan A. 282, 459
 Jusserand J.A.A.J. 377, 386-
 387, 459
 Kajaznuni H. 85, 225, 353,
 386, 459, 462, 497
 Kaledin A.M. 15, 459
 Kamoyev 252, 459
 Kanayan D. (Dro) 283, 350,
 422-423, 459, 473
 Kaplanov R. 284, 460
 Karabekir K. 180, 282, 351,
 460
 Karakhan (Karakhanian) L.M.
 21, 460
 Kavtaradze N.A. 284, 460
 Kemal M. 278, 280, 282, 316,
 335, 338-339, 385, 402, 431,
 449, 460, 488
 Kenan Bey M. 281, 461
 Kennedy J.F. 435
 Kerbalay A. 352, 379, 461,
 474
 Kerensky A.F. 112, 461, 464
 Keropian H.G. 227, 300, 461
 Kerr P.H. 119, 367, 461-462
 Kerr S. 385, 479
 Kevorkov (Gevorkiantz) A.,
 B., C., H., S. 251, 462
 Khachadorian H.H. 123,
 265, 276, 300, 462
 Khachikov 251, 462
 Khalil Ajha 282, 462
 Kharlamov V. 16, 462
 Khatisian A.I. 180, 192, 198,
 225-226, 238, 240-241, 246,
 258, 265-266, 273, 279, 283,
 348, 358, 437, 452-453, 459,
 462, 467
 Khatisian C.I. 435, 453
 Khatisian X. 259, 462
 Khoren I Catholicos 283, 462
 Kifer M. 283, 463
 King H.C. 81-83, 87, 118,
 199, 201, 221-223, 238, 434,
 437, 440, 442, 453, 463, 466-
 467, 473-474, 478-479, 491,
 493, 495-496, 498
 Kirshner 281, 463
 Kitchener H.H. 200, 463
 Knapp G.H. 463, 493
 Knapp H.S. 187, 189, 463
 Knapp M. 282, 463
 Knox B. 283, 463
 Kojasar A. 300, 463
 Kolchak A.V. 112, 170, 181,
 355, 366, 378, 463-464
 Kopp 269, 464
 Korganian S.A. 283, 453, 464
 Kornilov L.G. 459
 Kovanko 262, 464
 Kozenko B.D. 453
 Krajian S. 281, 464
 Kuchuk Khan 23, 28, 464
 Lambert R.A. 384, 464
 Lansing R. 6, 9, 11, 13-18, 20-
 29, 31-33, 35, 37, 69, 73, 82,
 134, 140, 144, 147-148, 150-
 154, 165, 167-168, 174, 177,
 182-183, 185, 188-190, 192,

194, 197, 226-227, 232-233,
 248, 255, 279-280, 298, 300,
 337, 340, 346-347, 349, 352,
 378, 438, 442, 451, 464-465,
 468, 473-474
 Larcombe L.R. 282, 465
 Laughlin I.B. 33-34, 465
 Laughton F.E. 244, 465
 Lazarian I.L. & H.L. 489
 Legran B.V. 486
 Lenin V.I. 21, 437, 465
 Levon VI Lusignan 303, 465
 Leygues G. 426, 465
 Lianosian (Lianozov) G., L.,
 M., S. 248-250, 252, 466
 Lloyd George D. 34, 39-40,
 42-51, 53-62, 64, 76-80, 87-
 104, 106-107, 110-113, 115-
 119, 121-122, 124, 129-135,
 137-138, 177, 180, 228-232,
 347, 355-357, 362-363, 367-
 370, 372-377, 390, 395, 426,
 430, 454, 461, 466
 Lobanov-Rostovsky A.B. 461
 Lodge H.C. 140, 154, 192,
 465-466
 Logan J.A. 354, 466
 Loring D. 254-255, 270, 273,
 300, 466
 Loris-Melikov J. 461
 Loucheur L.A.J. 354, 466
 Lybyer A.H. 87, 199, 206, 466
 Lynch H.F.B. 212, 223, 467,
 477
 MacDaniels F.C. & L.H. 281,
 284, 467
 MacSweeney D. 338, 467
 Magaramov M. 367, 370, 372-
 373, 467
 Magie D. 209, 467
 Mailian (Mayilov) D. & E.
 250, 252, 284, 467
 Main J.H.T. 89, 341, 468
 Makhmourian G.G. 152, 353,
 377, 421-422, 424, 468
 Makino N. 51, 56, 468
 Malcolm J.A. 337, 339, 345-
 346, 468
 Manoukian A. 498
 Mantashian A.H. 249-250,
 447, 450, 468
 Marashlian L. 385
 March P.C. 34, 176, 469
 Marden J.K. 237, 469
 Martin E.W. 457
 Martin L. 275, 301, 320, 469
 Martino G. de 343-345, 349,
 362, 469
 Massehian H. Khan 468
 Massey W.F. 47, 56, 469
 Materne Muré R.P. 385
 Matsui K. 364, 469
 McCormick V.C. 65, 469
 McCoy F.R. 186, 198, 273,
 275, 301, 469, 484
 McDonald D.F. 283, 469
 McFadden G. 32, 470
 McLelan C. 282, 470
 Means G.C. 281, 470
 Mears E.G. 227, 300-301, 320,
 461, 470
 Medzn Murad (Poyatchian
 Hambartsum) 431
 Mehmandarov S. 284, 470
 Mehmed II Fatih 303, 470
 Mehmed V Reshad 465, 470
 Mehmed VI Vahideddin 103,
 105-106, 108-111, 113, 115,
 118-119, 131, 175, 196, 316,
 436-437, 470
 Melik Aslanov K. 284, 470
 Melikian (Melikov) D. 249,
 470
 Melikov N.I. 284, 470

Melik-Stephanian S. 353, 470
 Mendeleev D.I. 498
 Merrill J.E. 384, 470
 Mesrop Bishop Ter-Movse-
 sian 283, 490
 Mesropov 251, 470
 Midhat Pasha A.S. 304, 470
 Miglio S. 474
 Mikaelian V.A. 253, 349, 471
 Miller D.H. 37, 110, 471
 Miller E.E. 281, 471
 Millerand A.É. 382, 390, 395,
 471, 483
 Mills B. 283, 471
 Milne G.F. 148, 150, 161-162,
 246, 263, 265, 337, 339, 343-
 344, 442, 471, 485
 Milner A. 18, 63-64, 66, 77,
 115-116, 232, 471
 Mirbach-Harff W.C. von 27,
 471
 Mirimanian A.I. 283, 472
 Mirzabekyantz G. & M. 252,
 472
 Mirzoyan (Mirzoyev) D., G.,
 H. & M. 248-249, 251, 472-
 473
 Mirzoyan S.S. 253, 472
 Mitchell E.R. 283, 472
 Mnatsakanian A.N. 17
 Money A.W. 74, 200, 472
 Monroe J. 297, 325, 396, 472
 Montagu E.S. 107-108, 110,
 473
 Montgomery G.R. 199, 473
 Moorat Aga Samuel
 Megrđich 444, 462
 Moore A. 282, 473
 Moore B.B. 123, 165, 171,
 227, 302, 331, 350-352, 473,
 493
 Moore L.S. 199, 473
 Morgenthau H. 135, 143, 145-
 146, 149, 154-155, 165, 174,
 340, 352, 425, 451, 464, 474
 Morris I.N. 21, 474
 Morteza Gholi Khan Sardar
 of Maku 21, 474
 Moseley G. 254, 267-268, 271,
 273, 275, 301, 320, 441, 469,
 474, 494
 Moser C.K. 412-413, 423-424,
 474
 Mott J.R. 340, 474
 Mushegh Archbishop Sero-
 pian 281, 484
 Musinyantz M.T. 284, 474
 Mussolini B. 439
 Mustafa Bey 283, 474
 Myasnikyan A.T. 490
 Nadir M. 281, 474
 Nasib Bey 282, 474
 Nasibian A.A. 251, 475
 Nassif S. 74, 123, 475
 Nazarbekian T. 28-29, 475
 Nazim Bey Selanikli 430
 Nejati Bey 282, 475
 Nerses II Patriarch Varzha-
 petian 477
 Nerses V Ashtaraketsi Catho-
 licos 429, 432
 Nersisyan (Nersesov) A. 251,
 475
 Nicholas II Romanov 20, 475
 Nicolson H. 100-101, 103-104,
 475
 Nielsen F.K. 152, 238, 475
 Nikol Duman (Ter-Hovhanni-
 syan Nikoghayos) 431-432,
 489
 Niles E.H. 302, 475
 Niles M.H. 281, 476
 Nill J.N. 281, 476
 Nitti F.S. 373, 376-377, 390,

395, 476
 Nobel A., L. & R. 89, 249, 440, 468, 476
 Norhatian H. 284, 476
 North R.B. 281, 476
 Nubar Pasha Boghos 7, 83, 85, 129, 222, 279, 337, 339, 345-346, 400, 444, 476, 493
 Nuri (Arghana-Maden) 281, 476
 Nuri (Hasankale) 283, 476
 Nuri Bey (Malatia) 282, 476
 Nuri Bey O. 283, 476
 Nuri Pasha K. 363, 476
 Oganovsky P.I. 484
 Ohanessian T. (D.) 300, 476
 Orbeliani G.I. 284, 477
 Orlando V.E. 47, 49, 56-57, 63, 80, 89, 106, 110, 122, 124, 161, 477
 Osipov B.P. 251, 477
 Osman I Gazi 200, 310, 477
 Osman 282, 477
 Oswald F. 404, 477
 Otyan G. 304, 477-478
 Page W.H. 16, 18, 22, 478
 Palian R. 283, 478
 Papazian V. 283, 478
 Parmelee R.A. 281, 454, 478
 Partridge E.C. 282, 331, 451, 478
 Pasdermajian G. (Armen Garo) 24, 382-383, 386, 388, 399, 478
 Patrick M.M. 331, 479
 Penfield F.C. 140, 154, 192, 479
 Perry E.T. 283-284, 479
 Perry J.E. 384, 479
 Pershing J.J. 136, 176, 480, 485
 Phillips W.C. 36, 139, 144, 149, 153, 233, 480
 Pichon S.J.M. 18, 40, 47, 65, 75, 77, 115, 161, 171, 264-265, 337, 480
 Pirumian D.A. 283, 480
 Pitoev G., Y. 249, 252, 480
 Poidebard A. 284, 480
 Poland W.B. 269, 301, 320, 480
 Polk F.L. 34, 37, 39, 41, 65, 74, 124, 129, 134, 154, 165, 168, 174-176, 182-183, 186, 194, 196, 224, 226, 229, 231-233, 238, 248, 255, 264, 298, 337, 339-340, 343-347, 352, 354, 380-381, 386, 480, 493
 Poole DeWitt C. 25-27, 32, 481
 Proshian P. 472
 Queen Victoria (Alexandrina Victoria) Hanover 449, 497
 Radek K. 447
 Ramishvili N.V. 28, 284, 481
 Ramsay W.M. 203, 221, 481
 Randolph J. 168, 481
 Raphael Edward 444, 462
 Rathbone A. 37, 481
 Rauf Bey H.O. 282, 481
 Ravndal G.B. 124, 151, 227, 331, 481
 Rawlinson A. 460
 Reading R.D.I. 24, 481
 Reshid Pasha 282, 481
 Reshid Pasha A. 282, 481
 Rhea J.C. 349, 481
 Richards G.L. 281, 481
 Rifat Bey 282, 481
 Riggs A.C., E.W, H. & M. 281, 331, 481-482, 485
 Riza Bey 283, 407, 482
 Riza Nur 431
 Rockefeller 444, 447

Rodd J.R. 35, 482
 Romanov M.F., M.P. 431, 463
 Romanov V.V. 453
 Roosevelt F.D. 435
 Roosevelt T. 469
 Root E. 9, 12, 140, 154, 192, 464, 482
 Rothschild 468
 Rustaveli Shota 480
 Rustem Bey A. De Bilinski 282, 482
 Sackville-West C.D. 364, 482
 Safikyurdski A. 284, 482
 Sahagian H. 451, 478
 Sahak II Catholicos 281, 483
 Sahakian A. 225, 283, 483
 Sahakian R.G. 222, 385, 483
 Salaadin Bey 283, 483
 Salahaddin Bey 282, 483
 Salisbury R. 439
 Sanasarian M.S. 478
 Sarian M. 428
 Sarkisyan B. & P. 248, 483, 488
 Sasuni K. 498
 Sazonov S.D. 452
 Scherbanina N.G. 242, 483
 Schwind F.L. 351, 483
 Scialoja V. 264, 356, 364, 483
 Scott J.B. 37, 483
 Scribner B. 282, 484
 Serijanlian T. (D.) 300, 484
 Servet Bey 281, 484
 Sevag A. 489
 Sewny G., L. & L.C. 282, 484
 Shahbagov 251, 484
 Shahgedanian (Shagidanov) M. & N. 250, 484
 Shakhhatuni A. 283, 484
 Shahmazian A. 353, 484
 Sharp W.G. 14, 23, 32-33, 38, 65, 484
 Shekerjian H. 165, 227, 275, 300, 351-352, 484
 Shepart A., F.D., L.A. & V. 384, 485
 Shevki Bey 281, 485
 Shevki Pasha Yakub 245, 485
 Shirinian A.K. 353, 486
 Shore O.B.S.F. 16, 486
 Shukri Effendi 281, 486
 Shuttleworth D.I. 353, 486
 Silin O.A. 423, 486
 Simon H. 48-49, 486
 Skinner C.C. 284, 486
 Slocum S.L. 34, 486
 Smachler J.N. 281, 486
 Smith A.E. 140, 154, 192, 486
 Smith F.O. 282, 486
 Smith F.W. 11, 13-17, 20, 22-23, 26-29, 31, 486
 Sonnino S.G. 41, 43-44, 68, 88, 130, 486
 Spalding M. 282, 486
 Spicer G.S. 345, 486
 Spoer (Goodrich Freer) A. 283, 487
 Spoer H.H. 283, 487
 Suleiman 282, 487
 Suleiman Bey 283, 487
 Sulkevich M. 284, 487
 Summers M. 24-25, 487
 Suny R. 446
 Surmayan K. 282, 487
 Svaslian (Sevasly) M. 129, 487
 Sykes M. 69, 75, 79, 229-230, 233-234, 449, 488
 Taft W. 469
 Tagiev G.Z. 248, 284, 483, 488
 Tahsin Bey 281-282, 488
 Talaat Pasha M. 305, 309, 430, 488

Tali Bey I.O. 283-284, 488
 Tanner E. 281, 488
 Tapping 23, 488
 Tarayantz N.J. & I.S. 251, 489
 Tardieu A. 115, 164, 173, 175, 226, 489
 Tarham C.V. 281, 489
 Tavrizian (Tavrizov) A.A. 249, 489
 Tehlirian S. 487
 Tekinskiy M. 351, 354, 489
 Ter-Grigorian (Ter-Grigoryev) S. & M. 251, 489
 Ter-Hagopian A. 38, 489
 Ter-Kevorkov G. 251, 489
 Ter-Minasian R. 225-226, 478, 489
 Ter-Poghosian H. (Ter-Poghosov) 251, 489
 Ter-Poghosian P. 458
 Terterian H. 423, 490
 Teryan V. 428
 Tevfik Bey 282, 490
 Thompson L.M. 282, 490
 Thomson W.M. 244, 352-353, 442, 490
 Thwaites W. 153, 490-491
 Tigran II Artashesid 222, 491
 Tigranian S. 245, 283, 465, 491
 Tipple A.N. 282, 491
 Tittoni T. 133-134, 143-144, 150, 155-157, 161-163, 176, 181, 183, 196, 442, 491
 Tokatlian M. 430
 Tolstoy A.L. & L.N. 463
 Tomasi P. della Torretta 367, 491
 Topchibashev A.M. 367, 370, 372, 491
 Toren P.O. 199, 491
 Toumanian M.G. 240, 246, 284, 491
 Toumanianz T.S. 252, 492
 Toumanov 283, 492
 Toynbee A. 221, 438
 Trask R.R. 72
 Trotsky (Bronstein) L.D. 21, 441, 492
 Truax A. 281, 492
 Truman H.S. 435, 448
 Tsaghikian S. 458
 Tsuraturian A. 249-250, 492
 Tsereteli I.G. 284, 367-368, 370-373, 492
 Tyler R. 73, 123, 165, 351, 473, 492
 Tyrrell W. 122, 453, 493
 Urfi Bey 282, 493
 Ussher C.D. 151-152, 351-352, 493
 Usubbekov (Yusufbayli) N. 258-259, 284, 348, 493
 Utkin A.I. 453, 465
 Vahanian H. 258, 284, 493
 Vanetsyan (Vanetsov) G.P. & L.P. 252, 493
 Vansittart R.G. 148, 494
 Vardan (Meghrabian Sargis) 432
 Varshamian G.P. 350, 494
 Vartabedian 281, 494
 Vehib Bey 281, 494
 Venizelos E. 61-63, 90, 97, 155-157, 161-162, 174-175, 247, 263-265, 278, 280, 338-339, 388, 494
 Vickrey C.V. 71-72, 340, 494
 Villaret G. 270-271, 273, 474, 494
 Vratsian S. 424, 494
 Vrooman L. 281, 495
 Wade E. 281, 495
 Wallace H.C. 232, 359, 364,

375, 377, 379-382, 397, 413,
424-426, 461, 495
Ward A.R. & M.H. 281, 495
Warren 283, 495
Washington G. & M. 198,
254, 258-260, 262, 265, 277,
280, 289, 292, 299-300, 335,
337, 461, 495
Watson J.K. 200, 495
Webb R. 34, 495
Westermann W.L. 69, 87,
209, 438, 496
White G.E. 234, 236-237, 261-
262, 496
White H. 81, 144, 147, 157,
159-162, 164, 186-187, 232,
277, 438, 496
White S. 340, 497
Wilhelm II Hohenzollern 19,
497
Williams J.S. 140, 154, 184,
192, 233-234, 465, 497
Wilson H. 283, 497
Wilson Henry H. 92-94, 96-
97, 115, 370, 377, 497
Wilson W. 6, 39-51, 54-62,
64-65, 67-68, 77-80, 88-104,
106, 110-112, 114-120, 123-
124, 129-136, 138-140, 149,
159-160, 172-173, 178, 182,
184-185, 191, 193, 195, 207,
222, 229, 232-233, 280, 300,
308, 335, 342, 347, 351-352,
380, 386, 388, 390-393, 397,
399-400, 402-403, 405, 411,
413, 415, 419-426, 429-430,
433-435, 442, 445, 449, 452-
454, 457, 465, 471, 474-475,
477, 482, 496-497
Wise S. 474
Witte F. 283, 497
Woodward E.L. 443
Wrangel P.N. 470, 492
Wright J.B. 122, 497
Yale W. 199, 498
Yarrow E.A. & M.J. 22, 165,
351-352, 424, 493, 498
Yowell F.D. 495
Yusuf Ali 109, 498
Zakariadze A.K. 284, 498
Zaki Bey 283, 498
Zaven I Patriarch Ter-Yeghia-
yan 315
Zavriev D.C. 241, 498
Zhordania N.N. 259, 284, 498
Zia Bey (Erzerum) 283, 498
Zia Bey (Zara) 282, 498
Zohrap G. (Léart M.) 221, 499
Zoya Paleolog 441
Zürcher E.J. 485

Place Names Index

Acre 199
Adalia (Antalya) 53, 91, 215,
217, 223, 333
Adana 6, 62, 86, 200, 225,
255, 280-281, 301, 304, 333,
434, 440, 444, 464, 484, 494,
496
Aegean Sea 448, 451
Afghanistan 31
Africa 52, 110, 293, 311, 439,
451
Aghbaba 413
Aghbak (Hekkiari) 403, 406,
408, 417, 421
Aghdash 251, 433
Aghstafa 251

Agoulis 352, 429
 Ainab 199
 Aintab 86, 384-385, 387, 434, 459, 462, 469-470, 485, 495-496
 Aivali 104
 Akers 379
 Akhalkalak 26
 Alabama 485
 Alagyaz Mazra 351
 Alashkert 445
 Albistan 216
 Aleppo 77, 86, 128, 200, 223, 233, 281, 301, 306, 331, 384, 434, 458, 470, 483, 496
 Alexandretta 102, 200, 224-225, 29-230, 233
 Alexandria 468
 Alexandropol (Gyumri) 26, 28-29, 241-243, 261, 413-414, 422-423, 426, 450, 453, 457, 460, 462, 464, 485, 498
 Amasia 261
 America 9-11, 34, 47, 54, 70-71, 80, 95, 98, 112, 114, 116, 138, 140, 152, 178, 181-182, 184, 191, 193, 197, 201, 206, 217, 219-221, 223, 229, 236, 253, 285-288, 291, 293-295, 297, 302, 308-310, 316, 319-320, 324, 326-330, 336, 338, 358, 383, 389, 391, 394-396, 408, 473, 475, 478, 485, 497
 Amman 201
 Anatolia 34-35, 53, 63, 79, 87, 92, 95, 98-100, 102-106, 111, 113-119, 124, 133, 138-139, 155-157, 161-162, 209, 215-219, 227, 234, 278-279, 314-315, 318-319, 321, 332, 346-347, 461, 494, 496
 Andreas (Sushehir), town 277, 282, 284, 431, 459, 477, 487, 493
 Angora (Ankara) 236, 385, 429, 475
 Ani 258, 480
 Aparan (Bash Aparan) 459
 Apsheron peninsula 248-249
 Arabia 18, 30, 51, 81, 109, 119, 128, 305, 311, 319, 471
 Arabkir 484, 488
 Aragats (Alagyaz) 31
 Aral Sea 249
 Ararat, m. (Masis), valley 31, 62, 248-249, 254, 272, 303, 385, 480
 Araxes 254
 Ardahan 21, 24-25, 428, 460-461
 Ardassa (Torul) 405, 408
 Ardvin 460
 Arghana-Maden 281, 476, 485
 Armavir 31
 Armenia 5-8, 15, 18, 20, 23, 33-35, 37-38, 44, 50-51, 58, 62-63, 65-66, 69-73, 77-81, 83-86, 88, 92-93, 99-101, 103-105, 108, 112-116, 118-119, 124-128, 130, 135-137, 139-155, 158-160, 163, 165-171, 174, 177-186, 188-189, 191-194, 196-198, 200-216, 218-228, 230-231, 233-234, 238-241, 243-246, 248, 252-260, 262, 265-266, 273, 277-280, 285-287, 289-292, 298-308, 312-319, 326, 331-333, 335, 338, 340-342, 344-346, 348-354, 358, 361, 363-364, 366, 368-369, 371, 375, 378-383, 386-389, 391-409, 411-427, 430-432, 434-440, 444-445, 447-448, 450-455, 457, 459-462,

465-473, 476-480, 482-484,
 486-492, 494-497
 Armenian Upland 209, 305,
 403-405
 Artashat (Kamarlu) 243
 Ashkhabad 462, 472
 Ashtarak 242
 Asia 20, 59, 128, 132-134, 156,
 209, 217, 247, 293, 311, 337,
 387, 406, 408, 443, 496
 Asia Minor 18, 33-35, 38, 43,
 65, 70, 72-73, 81, 87, 91, 100,
 106-107, 109-113, 116-118,
 128, 130, 133-134, 137-138,
 141, 143-144, 150, 155, 157,
 160, 162, 174-175, 184, 186,
 195, 201-202, 204, 217, 219-
 221, 246-247, 255, 263-265,
 278, 301-303, 310, 314, 320,
 337, 340, 344-345, 347, 383,
 407-408, 443, 480-481, 495
 Astrakhan 25, 31, 438, 472
 Athens 36
 Atine 404
 Atlantic o. 33, 248, 328
 Australia 49, 53, 457
 Austria 62, 78, 131, 172, 346,
 491
 Austria-Hungary 10, 73, 137,
 452, 479
 Ayas 301
 Aydin 133
 Azerbaijan 28, 89, 91, 119,
 148, 154, 165-169, 181, 226,
 244, 252, 255-256, 258-260,
 266, 275, 285, 290, 298, 303,
 308, 311-313, 318, 333, 344-
 345, 348-353, 361, 363-364,
 366-375, 378, 380-382, 392-
 393, 429, 435, 458, 460, 467,
 470, 476, 482, 486-487, 489,
 493
 Baabda 199
 Baalbek 199
 Baberd 261-262, 419, 421
 Baghdad 15, 18-19, 117, 224,
 255, 299, 301, 454, 496
 Baku 21, 23-25, 27-29, 31-32,
 58, 88, 153, 167-168, 181, 191,
 246, 248, 251-253, 255, 260-
 261, 263, 275-276, 279, 283-
 284, 296, 301, 323, 332, 351-
 353, 364, 366, 368, 370, 373,
 376, 399, 423, 430-431, 438,
 446, 450, 453-454, 458, 466-
 468, 470, 472, 475-476, 480,
 483-484, 486-490, 492-494
 Balakhany 472
 Balkans 96, 455, 494
 Baltic 364
 Bashkale (Adamakert) 404
 Basra 308
 Batrun 199
 Batum 21, 24-31, 158, 167,
 177, 180, 182, 184, 187, 191,
 215, 226-227, 234, 246, 255,
 257-260, 262-263, 265-266,
 276-277, 279, 292, 301-302,
 323, 338, 342, 364, 366, 370,
 404-405, 428, 440, 442, 460-
 462, 464, 467-468, 474, 486,
 496
 Bayazet 255, 301, 419, 421,
 428, 475, 484
 Beaconsfield 124, 445
 Beersheba 199
 Beirut 40, 65, 199, 282, 435-
 436, 446, 449, 453, 481, 484
 Belgium 301, 456, 475, 480
 Berlin 18, 21, 27, 30-31, 37,
 46, 197, 304, 439, 444-445,
 450, 454, 477, 488
 Berne 446
 Bethlehem 199

Bikaner 110, 433
 Birejik 387
 Bitlis 151-152, 222, 290, 301, 303, 311, 392-393, 401, 403, 406-408, 416-418, 420, 463, 475, 493, 496
 Bkerke 199
 Black Sea 12, 23-25, 30, 65, 85, 90, 102, 119, 125, 128, 142, 153, 207, 209, 215, 222, 224, 250, 295, 302-303, 318, 321, 324, 368, 387, 404-405, 418-420, 442, 463-464, 471
 Bombay 468
 Borchalu 444
 Bosphorus 104, 118, 124, 448, 452, 455, 461, 463-464
 Boston 460, 487
 Boulogne 303
 Brest, France 90, 186, 198, 337
 Brest-Litovsk 21, 25, 28, 30, 37, 91, 441, 460, 471-472, 485, 492
 British Empire 30, 48, 55, 63-64, 77-79, 93, 107, 110, 172, 461
 Brussa (Bursa) 106-107, 113, 118
 Brussels 450
 Bulgaria 10, 65, 93, 147, 164-165, 175, 362, 401, 408
 Byzantine 68, 303-304
 Caesarea (Kayseri) 124, 216, 223, 280, 434, 439
 Cairo 468, 479, 487, 498
 California 457
 Canada 436
 Carpathians 105
 Caspian Sea 21, 23, 31-32, 85, 125, 188, 207, 249-253, 303, 312, 362-363, 365-366, 368, 370, 372, 450, 466
 Castellorizo 104
 Caucasus 11-14, 17, 19-20, 22, 24-25, 27, 32, 43, 50, 58-59, 64, 70, 76-77, 79, 85, 89, 92-94, 108, 112, 114, 119, 123, 128, 134, 140, 145, 153, 158, 166-167, 171, 178-180, 183-184, 187-191, 193, 195-196, 198, 227, 251-252, 257, 280, 286-289, 292-293, 295-296, 332-333, 337-338, 341, 345-346, 348-349, 351, 354, 358-359, 362-363, 365-366, 368-370, 372-374, 376-377, 383, 399, 407, 428, 430-432, 438, 447-448, 452-453, 455, 459, 461, 468, 470, 475, 477-480, 482, 486, 490-491, 493-494
 Central Asia 303
 Chelwood v. 439
 Chester 450
 Chicago 462
 China 19, 456
 Chorokh r. 404-405
 Cilicia 62, 76-77, 80-81, 86, 102, 116, 119, 121, 129, 160-161, 196, 200, 207, 209, 215-216, 219, 222-224, 229-231, 233-234, 301, 303-304, 311, 321, 385, 387, 389, 392, 431, 440, 444-445, 449, 462, 465, 483-484
 Columbia, dist. 140
 Constantinople 17, 19, 30, 33-34, 36, 38, 40-42, 54, 68-72, 75, 85-89, 92-94, 96-97, 99, 101, 103-107, 109-110, 113-116, 118, 124, 128, 130-133, 141-142, 148, 151, 154, 157, 160, 164, 168, 173-174, 179-180, 183, 186, 193, 195, 198,

200, 204, 214-215, 218-223,
 226-227, 246, 255, 257, 260,
 265, 276-280, 285-286, 288-
 289, 291-292, 296, 298-301,
 303, 309, 312, 314-315, 318-
 319, 321, 328, 331, 337, 347,
 349-350, 359-361, 381, 383,
 412, 414, 422, 426, 429-430,
 434, 436-437, 442, 444-449,
 451, 455, 457-458, 464, 466,
 468, 470-471, 473, 477-479,
 481, 484-485, 487-489, 493,
 495, 498-499
 Constantsa 31
 Crimea 25, 28, 471-472
 Cuba 294, 319, 326-327
 Cyprus 100, 304, 428, 445
 Daghestan 44, 309, 348, 368-
 370, 372-373, 376
 Dalmatia 100
 Damascus 77, 199, 233
 Daralagyaz 26, 243
 Dardanelles 33, 40, 96, 104,
 118, 124, 195, 452, 460
 Deir ez-Zor 496
 De Kalb 186
 Denmark 437
 Deraa 201
 Derbent 368, 472
 Dersim 417
 Diarbekir 6, 124, 128, 222,
 225, 227, 255, 281, 301, 303,
 311, 384, 430, 434-435, 444,
 451, 458, 476, 486, 495
 Diduvar v. 351
 Dilijan 31, 242, 274, 423
 Dilman 431
 Dodecanese isl. 104
 Don 12, 85, 459
 Donetsk 25, 85
 Dutagh 477
 Egypt 38, 122, 200, 221, 303,
 333, 401, 408, 428, 431, 444-
 445, 495
 Ekaterinodar 16, 462
 Elizavetpol 251-252, 430, 433,
 458
 Engija v. 352
 England 6, 15, 19, 34, 42, 57,
 116, 126-127, 172-173, 179,
 223, 303, 324, 333, 358, 396,
 431, 438, 441, 443, 445, 450,
 461, 468, 487, 496
 Enzeli 28, 372
 Erzerum (Karin) 6, 20, 24,
 151-152, 209, 222, 227, 255,
 261, 282, 290, 301, 303, 308-
 309, 311, 316, 331, 392-393,
 401, 403-404, 406-408, 416-
 420, 424, 432, 440, 445, 447-
 448, 453, 460, 463, 474, 476-
 479, 481, 483-485, 487, 493,
 496, 498
 Erzinka (Erzinjan) 20-21, 209,
 222, 282, 301, 331, 405, 408,
 417, 419, 421, 433, 457, 462,
 474
 Estonia 44
 Etchmiadzin 26, 31, 243, 272,
 283, 301, 314, 350, 429, 490,
 497
 Euphrates 215, 305, 384, 404,
 449, 481
 Europe 15, 42, 45, 55, 59-60,
 85, 95, 104-105, 110, 120, 131-
 133, 142, 160, 170, 172, 176,
 182, 199, 221, 229, 232, 288,
 297, 303-304, 310-311, 355,
 364, 366, 374, 378, 394, 401,
 408, 414, 435-437, 446, 452,
 454, 456, 480, 483
 Far East 71, 86, 297, 301, 328,
 456
 Fiume (Rijeka) 90, 124, 134,

477
 Florida 254
 France 6, 14-15, 19, 23, 32-34, 38, 46-49, 57, 63, 65, 75-78, 80-81, 83, 85, 90, 99, 102-103, 105-106, 108-109, 111-112, 114-119, 124, 126-127, 129, 133-139, 142, 153, 172, 179, 182, 198, 200, 223, 230-232, 251, 260, 292, 301, 303-304, 310, 319, 324, 340, 355, 358, 375, 380-382, 390, 395, 397, 409, 413, 424-426, 430-432, 435, 441, 444-445, 448, 452, 454-455, 459, 461-462, 465-466, 469, 471, 478, 480, 483-484, 495-496
 Gandzak 462
 Geghi r. 379
 Genj 408
 Geneva 423, 426, 436, 478, 489
 Georgia 26, 28-30, 37, 44, 73, 93, 145, 148, 154, 158-159, 163-164, 166-168, 181 183, 185, 238-240, 244, 246, 255-256, 259, 262-263, 266, 285, 290, 292, 298, 308, 311-313, 318, 344-345, 348-349, 358, 361, 363-364, 366-376, 378-382, 392-393, 405, 412-413, 435, 447, 449, 481, 491
 Germany 9-10, 15, 18-19, 21, 25, 29-32, 42, 46-47, 49, 51, 73, 91-92, 117, 133, 136, 152, 170, 172, 288, 292, 295-297, 324, 355-356, 358, 362, 397, 443, 447, 449, 452, 464-465, 487, 491, 497
 Ghaibalishen v. 350
 Gibraltar 328
 Giultapa v. 351
 Gottingen 449
 Goris 349, 352-353, 379
 Great Britain 16, 18, 22, 33-34, 37, 39, 45-48, 50, 53-54, 57, 66-67, 75-78, 80-81, 83, 85, 90, 94, 106, 109, 113-119, 122, 124, 126, 129, 133, 135-139, 142, 162, 172-174, 177, 181-184, 187-188, 190-191, 194-195, 197, 201, 223, 286, 292-297, 304, 319, 326-328, 339, 355-356, 377, 390, 395-397, 409-410, 438, 441, 445, 449, 451, 454, 463, 468, 478, 482-483, 486-487, 497
 Great Zab, r. 417
 Greece 63, 85, 87, 99-100, 103-104, 109, 175, 226, 292, 303, 338-339, 412, 455, 465, 478, 485
 Grinnell 341, 468, 496
 Grozny 21, 28, 250, 453, 467
 Gumushkhane 404, 419
 Gzira 387
 Hague 433
 Haidar Pasha 225
 Haifa 199
 Hama 77, 233
 Hamadan 446
 Hamburg 493
 Harvard 442, 447, 466
 Hasankale 283, 433, 476
 Hawaiian isl. 294, 326
 Hebron 199
 Hejaz 37, 453
 Heraclea 144
 Homs 77, 200, 233
 Igdirdir 422
 Ijevan 243, 423-424
 Illinois 478
 India 21, 31, 77, 107, 109-110, 113, 249, 296, 304, 334, 449,

454, 471, 473, 498
 Iowa 468, 496
 Iraq 492
 Iris (Yeshil Irmak) 404, 408
 Islahie 385
 Italy 15, 33-35, 47, 56, 63, 76,
 79, 81, 85, 88, 90-91, 94-95,
 98, 100, 103-106, 108-109,
 114, 117, 123, 126-127, 129,
 135-136, 138-139, 144, 150,
 153, 161, 163, 179, 181-182,
 184, 217, 251, 292, 356, 358,
 376, 390, 395, 409, 457, 459,
 483, 486, 496
 Jaffa 199
 Jahan (Jeihan, Píramos) r.
 387
 Jalalogli (Stepanavan) 243
 Jamilli v. 350
 Janik 418, 421
 Janine 199
 Japan 32, 49, 81, 129, 172,
 251, 297, 364
 Jebeil 199
 Jebraíl 244
 Jerusalem 74, 199, 433, 446-
 447, 451, 472, 475, 481, 487,
 496
 Jivanshir 244
 Julfa 28, 351, 379
 Kaghzvan 165, 167, 267, 269,
 276, 283, 429, 478
 Kapan 490
 Karabakh (Artsakh) 7, 165,
 167-168, 244, 349, 352-353,
 431-433, 462, 470-471, 473,
 476, 480, 484, 486-487
 Karaklis (Karakilisa, Vana-
 dzor) 243, 422
 Kars 6, 21, 24, 28, 30, 165,
 209, 227, 241, 243, 245, 254-
 255, 261, 265-267, 269, 279,
 283, 301, 303, 412-414, 422,
 424, 428, 432, 444, 447, 457-
 458, 460-461, 464, 471, 476,
 480, 485-486, 495
 Kastamuni 236, 418
 Kazakh 243
 Kedleston 443
 Kerasunt 419
 Kghi (Kighi) 417, 421
 Khachmaz v. 433
 Khanasor, valley 432
 Khanukhlar v. 352
 Kharberd 6, 124, 209, 216,
 222-223, 255, 281, 301, 303,
 311, 331, 403, 417, 434, 436,
 448-449, 454-455, 459, 467,
 470, 476, 478, 481-482, 484-
 485, 488, 494-496
 Kharkov 25
 Khiva 493
 Khlat 477
 Khnus 477
 Khorasan 283, 301, 453, 476,
 483
 Khorshat (Karshut) 405, 408,
 419, 421
 Kiarim Bek v. 351
 Kishinev 432
 Kizil Chakhchakh v., st. 413
 Koghb 254-255, 268, 271-272,
 276
 Konya (Konia) 76, 86, 91,
 103, 106, 216, 225, 299
 Kotur 417
 Krasnovodsk 31, 472
 Krasnodar 32
 Krkzhan v. 350
 Kuban 12, 70, 72, 459, 475
 Kuchuk Kainarji v. 304
 Kura r. 274-275
 Kurdistan 215, 417
 Kushka 31

Kutaisi 25, 464
 Kyulibek Diza v. 351
 Kyurdamir v. 430
 Latakia (Ladikiya) 200
 Lausanne 385, 429-431, 443, 483
 Lazistan 387-388, 418-419
 Lebanon 58, 65, 460, 467
 Lichfield 485
 London 16, 18, 22-23, 29, 34-35, 47-49, 67, 69, 76, 90-91, 114-117, 122, 124, 134, 137-138, 144, 172, 174, 177, 180, 183, 187, 190, 222, 230-231, 265, 337, 339, 345, 355, 357-358, 364, 387, 390, 418, 430-431, 436, 438, 440-441, 444, 450, 457, 461, 463, 465, 468, 477, 480, 483-484, 486-487, 492
 Lori 243
 Los Angeles 457
 Lyaki v. 251
 Macedonia 108
 Madrid 431, 439
 Makri 104
 Maku 21, 474
 Malatia 124, 216, 233-234, 255, 277, 280, 282, 301, 434, 447, 451-452, 473, 476, 481, 490
 Malta 309, 328, 429, 485
 Manazkert 490
 Manchester 385
 Marash 86, 125, 233, 384-385, 434, 473, 479, 483, 496
 Mardin 6, 124, 227, 255, 281, 299, 301, 384, 387, 434, 444, 446, 448-449, 451, 457, 461, 463, 471, 474, 476, 481, 486, 489, 492, 496
 Marmaris 91
 Marmora Sea 68, 104, 119, 173, 387
 Marseille 251, 468
 Marzvan (Marsovan) 124, 234-235, 260-261, 280, 301, 434, 469, 482, 496
 Matrasa v. 430, 458
 Maykop 450
 Mediterranean Sea 48, 77, 97, 104, 119, 128, 207, 209, 222, 225, 303, 318, 385, 387, 392, 451
 Mersin 86, 200, 209, 224-225, 229-230, 233, 301, 323, 434
 Merv 462
 Mesopotamia 18, 30, 34, 45-46, 51, 54, 59, 65, 76, 78-79, 81, 98, 109-110, 113, 116-117, 119, 121, 130, 141-142, 146-147, 157, 215-216, 219, 228, 286, 295-296, 306, 319, 325, 347, 397, 401, 417, 464, 472, 490
 Mexico 297, 322, 435, 485
 Mezire 495
 Michigan 487
 Mineralnye Vody 24
 Missouri 448
 Moscow 13, 24-29, 31-32, 241, 251, 380, 382, 428-429, 431 441-442, 449, 453, 460, 462, 466, 472, 475, 481, 483, 487, 489
 Mosul 31, 76-77, 79-80, 115-117, 128, 461, 496
 Mount Vernon 120
 Mudros 447, 451, 481, 485
 Mughan Plain 251
 Mush 209, 408, 417, 431, 444, 480
 Nablus 199
 Nakhichevan (Nakhichevan) 7,

26, 165, 169, 243-245, 256-258, 273, 301, 349-352, 379, 443-444, 454, 461, 464-465, 467, 474, 476, 483, 494
 Nakhijevanik v. 480
 Nazarabad 351
 Nazareth 199
 Near East 31, 34, 69-70, 72-73, 80, 82, 87, 119, 124, 136, 140, 143, 145, 147-148, 199, 257, 287-288, 292-298, 302, 304, 308, 315, 317, 319, 323, 325-328, 330-331, 338, 340-343, 384-385, 396, 409-410, 412, 424, 434, 438, 442-445, 452, 455, 457-458, 460, 466, 474, 479, 485, 488, 494
 Nemrut 477
 New York 36, 40, 71-72, 74, 84, 178, 188, 192, 306, 312, 340, 386, 409, 434, 439-440, 442-443, 459, 461, 465, 479, 481, 486-487, 498
 New Zealand 469
 Nice 134
 Nizhniy Novgorod 472
 Nor Bayazet (Gavar) 31, 242-243, 428, 464
 Nor Nakhijevan 490
 Nor Shen v. 472
 Norway 451
 Novochoerkassk 15
 Nukhi 251, 439, 453, 462, 470, 475, 477, 484, 489-490
 Oberlin 81, 438, 463, 466
 Odessa 59, 468, 492
 Off 404
 Ohio 306, 438, 452, 463
 Olty 414
 Omsk 119, 463-464
 Ordu 419
 Ordubad 26, 352, 379
 Oregon 254, 466
 Ottoman (& Turkish) Empire 18, 33, 43, 46, 51-53, 55, 57, 60, 62-65, 78-81, 106-107, 109, 112, 118, 125, 127, 135, 137, 163, 165, 179, 189, 193, 195, 200-202, 204, 215, 221-222, 255, 278-280, 287, 293, 299, 304, 310, 313-315, 317, 319-320, 324-325, 360, 388, 391, 394, 397, 406, 438, 440, 443, 445, 451-452, 466, 470, 473, 477, 479, 481, 488, 496
 Pacific Ocean 35, 52
 Pahloul 350
 Palestine 18, 30, 34-35, 37-38, 43, 51, 63, 65, 74, 77-78, 80-81, 109, 115-116, 119, 228, 397, 498
 Pambak 243
 Panama 326-327
 Panjdeh 124
 Paris 5-9, 15, 17-18, 23, 32, 35, 37-42, 44, 46-47, 51, 53-54, 56, 60-61, 63, 65, 67-72, 75-76, 80-83, 85, 87-89, 91-92, 94, 96-98, 101, 103-107, 110, 112-113, 115, 118-119, 121-123, 125-127, 129, 131, 133-137, 139-144, 147-153, 155-156, 158-159, 163-165, 167-168, 170-171, 173-175, 177-180, 182-183, 185-186, 189-190, 192-195, 197-199, 221-224, 226, 228-229, 231-233, 238, 243, 246, 248, 254-258, 263, 277, 279, 298-300, 302, 310, 337-339, 343-348, 350-355, 357-364, 366-367, 369, 377, 380-383, 386, 390, 397, 400, 410-412, 426, 429-430, 433-446, 448, 450, 453-459,

461-463, 465-471, 473, 475,
 478-484, 489, 491-498
 Pennsylvania 306
 Pensacola 40
 Persia 19, 23-24, 31, 34, 59,
 166, 188, 190, 209, 216, 252,
 286, 295-296, 302-304, 324,
 351-352, 419, 432, 446
 Persian Gulf 209
 Petropavlovka 251
 Petrovsk 250
 Philippines 294, 319, 326, 469
 Poland 59, 356
 Pontic range (Pontus) 216,
 290, 404-405, 419
 Port Said 468
 Poti 31, 396, 400
 Princes isls. 44, 68
 Princeton 446, 466-467
 Prinkipo isl. 67-68
 Prussia 497
 Puerto Rico 294, 326
 Pyatigorsk 450, 459
 Ramallah 199
 Resht 28
 Rhodes 150
 Rize 404-405, 418
 Rome 35, 89, 150, 303, 345-
 346, 354, 383, 439, 446, 482
 Rostov-on-Don 25, 28, 490
 Rumania 15, 59, 149, 155,
 327, 401, 452, 460
 Rumelia 314, 318-319, 321,
 327, 332
 Russia 5-6, 9-22, 24-29, 31-32,
 37, 39, 44, 47, 59, 67-68, 77,
 88, 91, 96, 98, 105, 108, 112,
 114, 119, 124, 133, 137, 142,
 145, 165, 167, 170-171, 179,
 208-209, 221, 230, 249, 262-
 263, 286, 288, 293, 295-297,
 303-304, 308, 310-313, 318,
 324, 326-327, 355-358, 363,
 367, 369, 372-376, 378, 380,
 382, 388, 396-397, 401, 407,
 414, 416, 423, 426, 429-430,
 432, 437-438, 440-441, 445,
 447-448, 451-452, 456, 459-
 461, 465, 471, 475-476, 486,
 490
 Sahara 153
 Saint-Germain-en-Laye 442
 Saint Petersburg (Petrograd)
 13-14, 18, 20-21, 29, 431, 442,
 444, 450, 453, 460-461, 464,
 477, 498
 Salonika 96, 442, 468
 Samarkand 458, 472
 Samsun 227, 235, 257, 260-
 261, 280, 301-302, 442
 San Remo 389-390, 395, 397
 San Stefano 304, 445
 Sardarapat 431, 447, 480, 485
 Sarikamish 165, 266, 283, 412,
 414, 432, 457, 472, 480, 492
 Sasun 431, 490
 Sebastia (Sivaz, Sivas) 6, 124,
 222, 227, 236, 255, 261, 280,
 282, 301, 309, 311, 316, 332,
 419, 428, 434-435, 443, 445,
 448-449, 451, 455, 457, 463,
 465, 470, 478, 481, 483-484,
 486, 488, 490-491, 493, 496
 Sevan 31, 274, 428, 480
 Sevastopol 463
 Sevres 385, 413-415, 417-418,
 420, 430, 444
 Sgherd 406, 417
 Shamakhi 252, 254, 430, 458,
 472, 494
 Sammar 308
 Shanghai 468
 Sharur 26, 243, 256-257, 465,
 467, 474, 494

Shikhovo v. 492
 Shushi 169, 349-350, 429, 433, 442, 450, 476, 484, 492
 Siberia 19, 96
 Sidon 199
 Silesia 122
 Simferopol 28
 Sinop 215, 418
 Sipan mt. 477
 Smyrna 53, 87, 89-90, 92, 95-97, 100, 104, 113, 133, 157, 187, 215, 217, 219, 278-279, 310, 316, 321, 323, 333, 468
 Spain 74, 465, 473
 Stockholm 21
 Stuttgart 446
 Sukhum 30
 Sulukh v. 489
 Surazh 493
 Surmalu 26, 243, 464
 Surmene 404-405, 419
 Sussex 182
 Sweden 21, 451, 474
 Syria 18, 34, 38, 43, 46, 50-51, 58-59, 63, 65, 70, 73, 75-78, 80-82, 87, 92, 109, 113-119, 121-122, 130, 157, 161-162, 199-201, 219, 223, 228-231, 233, 301, 305-306, 311, 319, 325, 337, 397, 448-449, 464, 467
 Syunik 249
 Tabriz 31, 432, 468, 474, 483, 496
 Tarson (Tarsus) 86, 200, 221, 301, 434, 441, 496
 Tashkent 472
 Taurus mts. 229, 404
 Teheran 22-23, 190
 Tel Aviv 199
 Temran 417
 Terek 12, 22, 470, 475, 492
 Thekke 405
 Theleck 404
 Thrace 35, 107, 109, 128, 164, 174-175
 Tiflis (Tbilisi) 11, 13-17, 20, 22-31, 165, 167-168, 171, 174, 180, 192, 198, 225-227, 238-241, 246, 252, 255, 257-259, 261, 273-276, 279-280, 284-285, 291, 301, 309, 311-312, 331-332, 342, 348, 350-351, 358, 364, 378, 384, 396, 412-413, 423, 426, 428-429, 431-432, 437, 443-444, 446-449, 452-453, 458, 462, 467-468, 470, 472-474, 480-481, 484, 486, 488, 490-493, 495-496, 498
 Tigris 215, 417
 Tireboli 419
 Tokat 260
 Trans-Caspia 252-253, 433, 492
 Transcaucasia 14-15, 24, 26-31, 60, 63-64, 85, 125, 209, 226-227, 244, 251, 256-258, 262-263, 286, 289-290, 292-293, 295, 297-298, 301-303, 306, 308-312, 314-315, 318-321, 323, 326, 331, 348, 353-354, 361, 366, 371-374, 397, 407, 409-410, 413, 430, 432, 437, 442, 449, 462, 467-468, 471, 473, 480, 489-491
 Trebizond 17, 20, 62, 209, 227, 236, 255, 257, 261, 276, 301-302, 308, 388, 392-393, 401, 403-405, 416, 418-419, 424, 433, 460, 463, 477-478, 496
 Tripoli 199-200
 Tripolitania 35

Tsaritsyn 25, 472
 Tsarskoe Selo (Pushkin) 431
 Tumbulal v. 351
 Tunisia 428
 Turkestan 25, 28, 252-253
 Turkey 10, 18, 21, 23-26, 30-31, 34-38, 40-41, 51, 54, 56-58, 61-62, 65, 69-70, 75-82, 85-87, 90-92, 94-101, 103-110, 113-114, 116-119, 121, 127-133, 135-138, 145, 147, 151-152, 156, 159-161, 165, 169-170, 175-176, 189, 193, 195-197, 199-200, 203-204, 206, 208-212, 215, 219, 221, 229-230 232, 246, 251, 255-257, 277-280, 285-287, 289-293, 295-298, 304, 306, 308, 310-311, 313, 316, 318-321, 323-326, 334, 337-339, 346-347, 358, 360-362, 372, 375, 383, 385, 387-389, 392-394, 396-397, 401, 405-408, 411-413, 416-421, 423-424, 426, 428-430, 437, 440, 442-444, 446, 452-453, 455, 460-461, 463-465, 472, 474, 481, 484, 493, 496
 Tyre 199
 Tyrol 428
 Ukraine 12, 19, 25, 37, 85
 Ulakishli 301
 Union of South Africa 436
 Urartu (Kingdom of Van) 432
 Urfa 86, 233, 384, 387, 431, 434, 458, 496
 Urmia 496
 USA 5-8, 11, 13-29, 31-36, 38-41, 47, 49, 57-59, 63-65, 68-72, 78, 80-81, 83-87, 89-90, 92-95, 97-99, 101, 103-104, 107, 109-110, 114-119, 121-124, 126-127, 129-130, 134-137, 139-145, 148, 151-154, 160, 167-168, 172-173, 176-179, 182-184, 187-188, 190-191, 194-201 207, 219, 226-227, 232-233, 253, 255, 260, 263, 278-280, 286, 292-301, 316, 319, 321, 325-329, 331, 340-342, 346, 349-352, 356, 364, 375, 377, 380-383, 386-397, 399-400, 403, 409-413, 415, 421-428, 430-431, 433-440, 442-449, 451-459, 461-470, 472-475, 478-482, 484, 486-488, 492, 494-498
 USSR 435, 460
 Van (lake, city) 17, 20, 24, 144, 151-152, 209, 222, 225, 282, 290, 301, 303-304, 311, 333, 392-393, 401, 403-404, 406-408, 416-418, 420, 431, 447, 460, 463, 475, 478, 480, 493, 496, 498
 Varanda 480
 Vaspurakan 431
 Vedi 351
 Venice 444, 462
 Vermont 462
 Versailles 60-61, 63, 90, 119, 136, 363-364, 369, 377, 437-439, 442-443, 496-497
 Vienna 47, 428, 491
 Vladikavkaz 21, 250
 Volga 25
 Vologda 432
 Vorontsovka 28
 Voghji r. 379
 Washington 5, 7-9, 14, 22-24, 26, 33, 35-36, 39, 41, 125, 139-140, 154, 174, 176-177, 182, 184-185, 189-190, 192, 194, 197, 226, 233, 248, 280,

282, 300, 346-347, 351, 377,
379-382, 386-388, 390, 395-
397, 399, 411-413, 415, 421,
424-425, 433, 439, 441, 452,
464, 468, 482, 496
West Virginia 444
Withyham 182
Wroclaw (Breslau) 451, 463
Yerevan (Erivan) 5-7, 26, 31,
85, 128, 140, 152, 165, 169,
180, 192-193, 209, 222, 225-
227, 234, 238-243, 245-246,
254-255, 261, 266-267, 272-
275, 279, 283, 291, 301, 303,
332-333, 342, 346, 350, 352-
353, 375, 379, 392-393, 412-
413, 415, 422-423, 428, 433,
436, 440, 444, 446-447, 450-
451, 455, 462-463, 469, 471-
474, 480, 483-484, 486-487,
493, 496-498
Yugoslavia 124
Yamkhana v. 351
Yarimja v. 351
Zahle 199
Zangezur 7, 165, 167-168,
243-244, 348-349, 352-354,
379, 433, 447, 470, 473, 484,
486
Zangu r. 480
Zara 282, 487, 498
Zeitun 483
Zephyr Bay 419

List of Documents

1. Supplementary report of special diplomatic mission to Russia for Secretary of State, August 1917, on necessity to explain in Russia how it was important to pursue the war..... 9
2. Despatch from U.S. Consul at Tiflis to Ambassador in Russia, 19.10.1917, on external menace for Transcaucasia and necessity to strengthen the Caucasus Front..... 11
3. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis to Secretary of State, 9.11.1917, on financial support of the Caucasus Front..... 13
4. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis to Secretary of State, 23.11.1917, on financial strengthening of Transcaucasian defense against Turks..... 13
5. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis to Secretary of State, 25.11.1917, on origination of Transcaucasian Commissariat and its defensive needs..... 14
6. Telegram from Secretary of State to U.S. Consul at Tiflis, 26.11.1917, on trends of disintegration in Russia..... 14
7. Telegram from special representative of U.S. Government in Europe to Secretary of State, 2.12.1917, on assigning of Anglo-French military mission to Tiflis..... 15
8. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis to Secretary of State, 4.12.1917, on determination of policy towards..... 15
9. Telegram from delegate of U.S. Treasury to Inter-Allied Council on War Purchases and Finance to U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 18.12.1917, on funding of Transcaucasian defense against Turks by the British..... 16
10. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis to Secretary of State, 18.12.1917, on financial aid to Armenian and Georgian troops and granting money funds for Armenian Relief Committee..... 16
11. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis to Secretary of State, 19.12.1917, on Truce concluded in Erzinka and disorganization of the Front..... 17
12. Memorandum by the U.S. Inquiry, 22.12.1917, on American War aims in the Near East, including autonomy for Armenians in the Ottoman Empire..... 17
13. Telegram from U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain to Secretary of State, 29.12. 1917, on attitude of Entente towards Bolsheviks, to secession of Transcaucasia, and towards Allied participation in the defense of this border region..... 18

14. Telegram from U.S. Ambassador in Russia to Secretary of State, 2.02.1918, about III Congress of All-Russian Workmen-Soldiers-Peasants' Soviets and its thesis of free self-determination for Armenia..... 20
15. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis to Secretary of State, 12.02.1918, on conditions at the Caucasus Front and positions kept by Armenian troops..... 20
16. Telegram from U.S. Minister in Sweden to Secretary of State, 4.03.1918, on conclusion and peace terms of the Brest Treaty..... 21
17. Telegram from Secretary of State to U.S. Consul at Tiflis, 30.03.1918, on the U.S. abstention from financing of the Caucasus Front..... 22
18. Telegram from Secretary of State to U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 3.04. 1918, on catastrophe in Transcaucasia, limited military resources at disposal of Armenians and on real danger of their extermination by Turks..... 22
19. Memorandum by British Ambassador in USA to Secretary of State, 16.04.1918, on resistance to Turkish invasion..... 24
20. Telegram from U.S. Consul General at Moscow to Secretary of State, 18.04. 1918, on grave social and political crisis in the Caucasus and defense requirements of Armenian detachments..... 24
21. Telegram from U.S. Consul General at Moscow to Secretary of State, 22.04. 1918, on German-Turkish advance and its backing from Caucasian Moslem elements..... 25
22. Telegram from U.S. Consul General at Moscow to Secretary of State, 27.04. 1918, on capture of Batum, Ardahan and aims of the Turkish Army..... 25
23. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Moscow to Secretary of State, 9.05.1918, on parleys between Transcaucasian and Turkish sides in Batum..... 25
24. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Moscow to Secretary of State, 17.05.1918, with assessment of the Batum Conference..... 26
25. Telegram from Secretary of State to U.S. Consul at Moscow, 28.05.1918, on intention to learn plans for defense of Transcaucasia..... 26
26. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Moscow to Secretary of State, 2.06.1918, on fragmentation of Transcaucasian Federation and Turkish territorial demands of Armenians..... 26
27. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Moscow to Secretary of State, 7.06.1918, on further resistance to the Turkish Army and

- fights in Baku..... 27
28. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Moscow to Secretary of State, 8.06.1918, on German support to independent Governments in Transcaucasia..... 27
29. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis, temporarily in Moscow, to Secretary of State, 16.06.1918, on Turkish advance and degree of alert in Armenian troops..... 28
30. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis, temporarily in Moscow, to Secretary of State, 18.06.1918, on desirability of the U.S. and Allied intervention on the Caucasus Front..... 29
31. Statement issued by Georgian Information bureau, 26.06.1918, containing appraisal of military and political menace to Armenia and Georgia; as well as an assessment of Armenian and Georgian common parleys with a delegation of the Central Powers in Constantinople..... 29
32. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Tiflis, temporarily in Moscow, to Secretary of State, 15.07.1918, on Armenian detachments in Baku and borders of the Republic of Armenia, shaped in Batum..... 31
33. Telegram from U.S. Consul at Moscow to Secretary of State, 5.09.1918, on a report by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR with its thesis that Turkey and Germany violate the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk..... 32
34. Telegram from U.S. Ambassador in France to Secretary of State, 9.11.1918, on trade competition between the U.S. and Allied Powers..... 32
35. Telegram from Secretary of State to U.S. Chargé in Great Britain, 20.11.1918, on operations of the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief..... 33
36. Telegram from U.S. military attaché at London for Chief of Staff, War Department, 27.11.1918, on British policy regarding Armenia and Ottoman Empire..... 34
37. Telegram from U.S. Chargé in Great Britain to Acting Secretary of State, 5.12.1918, on assistance to operations conducted by American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief..... 34
38. Copy of telegram from Foreign Office to British Ambassador in Italy, 13.12.1918, on non-compliance by Turkey with terms of the Mudros Armistice..... 35
39. Letter from Secretary of State to U.S. representative in the inter-Allied Supreme War Council, 16.12.1918, on protectorate over Armenia and Anglo- American relations..... 35

40. Note by the Counsellor of the British Embassy to the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, 19.12.1918, on need to haste with relief for Armenia..... 36
41. Letter from U.S. Assistant Secretary of State to Counsellor of the British Embassy, 23.12.1918, on dispatch of relief for Armenia..... 36
42. Memorandum by technical advisers to American Commission to Negotiate Peace for the Secretary of State, 30.12.1918, on independence for Turkish Armenia and representation of new States on the Paris Conference..... 37
43. Telegram from member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to Acting Secretary of State, 3.01.1919, on creation of Inter-Allied Board for furnishing relief..... 37
44. Telegram from American Commissioner at Constantinople to Ambassador in France, 4.01.1919, on independence for Western Armenia and punishment of officials for recent slaughter of Armenians..... 38
45. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten at the Paris Peace Conference, 12.01.1919, on attitude towards Bolshevism and Russian prisoners of war..... 39
46. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 12.01.1919, on non-recognition of Russia's title to plenipotentiary representation at the Paris Conference..... 39
47. Letter from the U.S. Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador in Great Britain, 16.01.1919, on delivery of weights sent by American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief..... 39
48. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 17.01.1919, on central issues at the Peace Conference and penal consequences for instigators of war..... 40
49. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 17.01.1919, on penal consequences for authors of the war and punishment for crimes committed within its time frame..... 40
50. Telegram from U.S. Acting Secretary of State to American Commissioner at Constantinople, 21.01.1919, on his functions..... 41
51. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 23.01.1919, on breaches of Laws of War, on Eastern policy and Ottoman debt..... 42
52. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 27.01.1919, on independent Republic of Armenia and mandates..... 44
53. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 27.01.1919, on the League of Nations and nature of mandates in Turkish

Empire.....	44
54. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 28.01.1919, on British attitude towards mandates and secret arrangements.....	46
55. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 28.01.1919, on French, Italian, British attitude towards mandate, and British occupation forces in Armenia and the Caucasus.....	47
56. Draft Resolutions in Reference to Mandatories, by D.Lloyd George, 29.01.1919, on complete severance of Armenia from the Turkish Empire.....	51
57. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 30.01.1919, contents a discussion of D.Lloyd Geotрге's Resolution on application of the mandatory system in Ottoman Empire.....	53
58. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 31.01.1919, on Anglo-American discussion of mandates, assignment of troops for Armenia and on surveillance in the Ottoman Empire.....	56
59. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 1.02.1919, on goals and mission of the Allied troops in Turkish territory and Transcaucasia.....	60
60. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 4.02.1919, on severance of Armenian and all nationalities, suppressed by Turkey.....	61
61. Minutes of the meeting of the Supreme War Council, 10.02.1919, on occupation of regions in Turkish Empire and Transcaucasia by Allies.....	63
62. Telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in France to the Assistant Secretary of State, 13.02.1919, on abolition of trade restrictions with Turkey and with ports of the Black Sea.....	65
63. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, 13.02.1919, on sending of Inter-Allied Commission to the Near East and Armenia.....	65
64. Minutes of the session of the Supreme War Council of Allies, 14.02.1919, on goals and aims of further ensuring of the Civil War in Russia.....	67
65. Minutes of the Plenary session of the preliminary Peace Conference, 14.02.1919, on the League of Nations and secret agreements.....	68
66. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 18.02.1919, on the U.S. attitude in regard to Sykes-Picot Agreement.....	69

67. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 21.02.1919, on functions of the U.S. Representative in Constantinople..... 69
68. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 26.02.1919, on delivery of cargoes with relief for Armenia..... 69
69. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 6.03.1919, on sending a field mission to Turkey and the Caucasus..... 70
70. Letter from the director of the American Food Administration to the Paris-resident director of the AFA in the Near East, 7.03.1919, on delivery of seed corn to Armenia..... 70
71. Telegram from the director of the American Food Administration to the director of the AFA in Constantinople, 10.03.1919, on delivery of loads with relief and on payment for them by Armenian Government..... 71
72. Telegram from the director of the American Food Administration to the director of the AFA in Constantinople, 10.03.1919, on delivery of clothes and payment for cargoes with relief for the Republic of Armenia..... 72
73. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 13.03.1919, on significance of sending a Mission to the Near East and on Armenian-Georgian borders..... 72
74. Letter from employee of the Standard Oil C^o of New York to the Acting Secretary of State, 15.03.1919, on conflicting Anglo-American oil interests in Jerusalem and an Armenian owner of petroleum bearing properties..... 73
75. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 18.03.1919, on shaping of the U.S. field mission to Turkey..... 75
76. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four of the Paris Peace Conference, 20.03.1919, on Sykes-Picot Agreement, the distribution of troops in Cilicia and the Caucasus, on Armenian mandate and sending of a commission to Syria and Armenia..... 75
77. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 20.03.1919, on a composition and budget for a fact finding mission to Turkey..... 80
78. Instructions from the Peace Conference for Commissioners of the International commission on mandates in Turkey, 25.03.1919, on permanent separation of Armenia and Cilicia from Turkish Empire..... 80

79. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 27.03.1919, on H.King and C.Crane as the U.S. delegates for a voyage arranging by Inter-Allied Commission on mandates in Turkey..... 81
80. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 31.03.1919, on H.King and C.Crane as the U.S. delegates to go with an Inter-Allied mission into the Near East..... 82
81. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 3.04.1919, on budget and personnel assigned to H.King and C.Crane, on goals of a mission to regions, permanently separated from Turkey, and on a candidacy of L.Dominian as its possible member..... 82
82. Agreement between director of the American Relief Administration and chairman of the Armenian National Delegation and representative of Government of the Republic of Armenia, 8.04.1919, on foodstuff deliveries to the Republic of Armenia and payment for them..... 83
83. Report of the Supreme Economic Council of Allies, 7 and 9.04.1919, on sending a technical mission to the Caucasus to organize and control efficient service of railways..... 85
84. Report from the Director General of Relief for the Supreme Economic Council, 10.04.1919, on total amount of foodstuff relief deliveries for Armenia..... 85
85. Report from the President of Robert College in Constantinople for the U.S. High Commissioner in the same city, 10.04.1919, on political situation in Cilicia and a single mandate..... 86
86. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 18.04.1919, on undesirability of sending a purely American mission into the Near East..... 87
87. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 21.04.1919, on Armenian mandate and unwelcome role of Italy as probable mandatory..... 87
88. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 22.04.1919, on sending shipments from Baku into Soviet Russia..... 88
89. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 30.04.1919, on situation in Armenia according to the report by American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief regarding the Caucasus..... 89
90. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 2.05.1919, on representation of Transcaucasian republics at the Paris Con-

- ference, secret agreements and Italian demands..... 89
91. Article in regard to Russia in the Treaty of Peace with Germany, 2.05.1919, on annulment of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk..... 91
92. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 5.05.1919, on withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus, non-admission of Italian Army there and on allotment of American detachments for Armenia..... 91
93. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 6.05.1919, on the U.S. denial to send troops to the Ottoman Empire, single American mandate and non-admission of Italians into Anatolia..... 94
94. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 7.05.1919, on future political system in Russia..... 96
95. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 7.05.1919, on size of Turkish Army and landing of Greek forces in Smyrna.....96
96. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 9.05.1919, on rapid reduction of the U.S. Expeditionary forces in Europe..... 97
97. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 13.05.1919, on the U.S. wardship over Armenia, on possibility of a single mandate and Anglo-American controversy regarding allocation of mandates in Anatolia..... 98
98. Minutes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 14.05.1919, on the U.S. mandate over Armenian, on Cilicia and partition of Anatolia..... 101
99. First resolution by H.Nicolson for the Council of Four, 14.05.1919, on the U.S. mandate over Armenia and Constantinople..... 103
100. Second resolution by H.Nicolson for the Council of Four, 14.05.1919, on Armenian borders and European mandates in Turkey..... 104
101. Report from the Director General of Relief for the Supreme Economic Council, 15.05.1919, on starvation in Armenia and obstacles encountered during foodstuff delivery into it.....105
102. Memorandum by A.Balfour, 16.05.1919, on severance of Western Armenia from new and free of mandates Turkish State..... 105
103. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 17.05.1919, on a memorandum by A.Balfour dated 16.05.1919 and on future of Anatolia..... 106

104. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 17.05.1919, on significance of British Army, mandates and on keeping the Caliphate at Constantinople..... 106
105. Stenographic notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 17.05.1919, on retention of independent Turkey in Constantinople and Asia Minor, on unified policy towards integral Armenia and the Caucasus..... 107
106. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 19.05.1919, on Italian claims in Anatolia, plight of Armenians there and American mandate over Armenia..... 110
107. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 19.05.1919, on supply of arms to counter Bolshevik forces in Russia..... 112
108. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 21.05.1919, on military significance of India, the U.S. mandate over Western Armenia and the Caucasus, on Franco-Italian claims in Anatolia..... 112
109. Memorandum of 21.05.1919, submitted by D.Lloyd George to the Council of Four, on the U.S. mandate over Western Armenia and Cilicia, as well as on provisional mandate over the Republic of Armenia and the whole Transcaucasia..... 118
110. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 23.05.1919, on non-recognition of the Omsk Government lead by A. Kolchak..... 119
111. Observations of the German Delegation on the conditions of Peace to the President of the Peace Conference, 29.05.1919, on the right of national self-determination in Allied politics..... 119
112. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 31.05.1919, on European refusal to send a commission to the Ottoman Empire and on dispatch of French troops to Cilicia..... 121
113. Draft telegram from the British Prime Minister to its High Commissioner in Egypt, 31.05.1919, on American composition of the Commission envisaged for a trip to the Ottoman Mediterranean..... 122
114. Note from the British Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Chargé d'affaires in Great Britain, 3.06.1919, on business interests of the Standard Oil Company in Jerusalem..... 122
115. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 5.06.1919, on attack and robbery of members on American military mission to the Caucasus..... 123

116. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 6.06.1919, on the future of Russia and Constantinople..... 123
117. Letter from the U.S. Commissioner at Constantinople to the Acting Secretary of State, 13.06.1919, on situation of Armenians and necessity of urgent independence for Western Armenia..... 124
118. Report of Communications Section of the Supreme Economic Council for its governing Council, 19.06.1919, on railways in Transcaucasian and import of relief into the Republic of Armenia..... 125
119. Analysis of contributions of the Allied countries in relief programs for the Supreme Economic Council, sine data, from batch of 19.06.1919, on magnitude and value of the U.S. foodstuff deliveries into Armenia..... 126
120. Letter from the Director General of Relief for the Supreme Economic Council, 22.06.1919, on relief supplies of foodstuff into Armenia..... 127
121. Note-memorandum from the Turkish Delegation, 23.06.1919, on reorganization of the Ottoman Empire, borders of integral Armenia and repatriation of Armenian subjects into it..... 127
122. Telegram from employee of the ARA to the U.S. Acting Secretary of State, 24.06.1919, on situation in Cilicia and contradictions between two Armenian delegations..... 129
123. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 25.06.1919, regarding frontiers of new Turkey, on cutting off Armenia and Constantinople from it..... 129
124. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 26.06.1919, on treatment of Turkish delegation, its memorandum dated 23.06.1919 and on Italian intrusion into Asia Minor..... 131
125. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 27.06.1919, on further work of Paris Conference and suspension of talks concerning the Treaty with..... 134
126. Letter from the Supreme Economic Council to President of the USA, 27.06.1919, on authorities and candidacy to Allied Commissioner into Western and Eastern Armenia..... 135
127. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 28.06.1919, on appointment of an Allied Commissioner to Armenia..... 136
128. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 28.06.1919, on submission of an issue regarding Allied Commissioner for Armenia to the Council of Ten..... 136
129. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Four, 28.06.1919, on opposition to Italian policy in Asia Minor..... 137

130. Redraft of the Allied Statement to the Italian Delegation, 28.06.1919, on secret agreements, freedom for nations oppressed in the Turkish Empire and withdrawal of Italian troops from Anatolia..... 137
131. Copy of letter from the Secretary of the British delegation to the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference, 28.06.1919, on appointment of an Allied Commissioner to Armenia.....139
132. Telegram from the U.S. Acting Secretary of State to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 28.06.1919, on military and food assistance together with restoration of independence of enlarged Armenia..... 139
133. Letter from the Secretary of State to the U.S. President, 28.06.1919, on necessity of access to minutes of the Council of Four..... 140
134. Special warrant issued by Treasury of the Republic of Armenia to the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, 30.06.1919, on official payment for aid commodities, transferred by the Committee..... 140
135. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1.07.1919, on American mandate over Armenia and Constantinople..... 141
136. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 2.07.1919, on relief in Armenia and functions of J.Harbord..... 142
137. Brief notes on a meeting of the Council of Ten, 3.07.1919, on interest shown by Italy in Van and her troops in Asia Minor..... 143
138. Telegram from the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Acting Secretary of State, 3.07.1919, on needs of Armenian Army, repatriation of refugees and actions by Congress aimed at arrangement of military and food assistance..... 144
139. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 3.07.1919, on participation of American delegates in preparatory work for a Peace Treaty with Turkey..... 147
140. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five of the Paris Peace Conference, 5.07. 1919, on the Allied High Commissioner for Armenia..... 147
141. Letter from the member of the special committee on Near East Affairs of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the U.S. Secretary of State and all Commissioners,

- 5.07.1919, on authorities of W.Haskell and J.Harbord, on obstacles in repatriating Armenian refugees..... 148
142. Telegram from the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the U.S. President, 5.07.1919, on separation of matters related to Armenian relief from issues of Politics..... 149
143. Notes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 5.07.1919, on memorandum concerned with impediments to repatriation of Armenian refugees..... 149
144. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 7.07.1919, on Italian troops in Asia Minor and bringing Armenian refugees back into Western Armenia..... 150
145. Telegram from American Commissioner at Constantinople to the U.S. Secretary of State, 7.07.1919, on American participation in repatriating Armenian refugees into Western Armenia..... 151
146. Notes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 8.07.1919, on the U.S. acceptance a mandate over Armenia and borders of Turkey..... 152
147. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 9.07.1919, on sending Italian forces to the Caucasus..... 153
148. Telegram from American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the U.S. Acting Secretary of State, 11.07.1919, on resolution containing appointment an Allied High Commissioner in Armenia..... 153
149. Telegram from the U.S. Acting Secretary of State to the member of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, 12.07.1919, on recommendation to separate matters of relief from political issues..... 154
150. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 15.07.1919, on Greek and Turkish Armies in Asia Minor..... 155
151. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 16.07.1919, on military and political situation in Anatolia, Italian and Greek zones of its occupation..... 156
152. Memorandum by the Director of American Relief Administration for the Council of Five, 16.07.1919, on appalling starvation in Russian Armenia and obstruction the traffic through Georgia..... 158
153. Records of a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council, 17.07.1919, on passage of foodstuffs trough Georgia to Armenia..... 159
154. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 18.07.1919, on delay in American decision regarding mandate, disarmament

- of Turkey and European policy in Anatolia and Cilicia.....159
155. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 18.07.1919, on notification of Georgia regarding its inadmissible high traffic duties on foodstuff deliveries for Armenia..... 163
156. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 21.07.1919, on the future of Constantinople..... 164
157. Report by President of the Central Territorial Committee of the Paris Peace Conference for the Supreme Council, 22.07.1919, on impermissibility to extend enemy borders for his expulsion of native Armenian population..... 164
158. Urgent telegram from the U.S. vice-consul, chief of American military mission and the U.S. military observer in Turkey, chiefs of the ACRNE and ARA in Tiflis to the chief of American Mission in Paris, 23.07.1919, on menace of disastrous starvation and Turkish-Azerbaijani aggression into Republic of Armenia, fights in Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhijevan, Kaghzvan, Sarikamish, factors of Georgia and of Volunteer Army lead by A.Denikin..... 165
159. Copy of cablegram from the head of the ARA Mission at Tiflis to the Director General of Relief, 23.07.1919, on meeting Minister President of the Republic of Armenia and Turkish-Azerbaijani menace..... 167
160. Telegram from the chief of the ARA Mission in the Caucasus to the director of the ARA, 24.07.1919, on Turkish-Azerbaijani assault on Karabakh and Zangezur..... 167
161. Telegram from the U.S. vice-consul at Tiflis to American Mission in Paris, 24.07.1919, on danger of starvation to death in Republic of Armenia, problems of its Army, refugees, on massacre in Nakhijevan and subversive activities by Turks..... 168
162. Report from the Director-General of Relief, 25.07.1919, on food relief for Armenia during June of 1919..... 170
163. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 26.07.1919, on relations between Russia and autonomous Caucasus..... 170
164. Copy of cablegram from head of the ARA Mission at Caucasus to the Director General of Relief, 26.07.1919, on want of European troops to protect Russian Armenia..... 171
165. Letter from special representative of the U.S. Government in Europe to President of the USA, 30.07.1919, on complexities of Anglo-American relations and their Naval armament race..... 172

166. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 31.07.1919, on the future State of Constantinople..... 173
167. Telegram from the U.S. second Assistant Secretary of State to American Mission in Paris, 31.07.1919, on decision to send J.Harbord Mission to Armenia..... 174
168. Records of a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council, 1-2.08.1919, on grave situation in Republic of Armenia..... 174
169. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 5.08.1919, on Greek troops in Asia Minor..... 174
170. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 7.08.1919, on regulation that no title arise from massacre, and on hindrance to repatriation..... 175
171. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 8.08.1919, on prohibition to sale a State property by Turkish Government..... 175
172. Telegram from the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army to the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Force in Europe, 8.08.1919, on approval and personnel of J. Harbord Mission..... 176
173. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 9.08.1919, on postponement of evacuation of British forces from Batum and imminent danger poised over republic of Armenia..... 177
174. Press report in "The New York Herald," 9.08.1919, on preparing assault on Armenia and the U.S. refusal to send its Army into Republic of Armenia..... 178
175. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 11.08.1919, on withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus and grave danger for remained all alone population of the Republic of Armenia..... 180
176. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 11.08.1919, on a danger of withdrawal of British forces from Batum..... 182
177. Letter the special representative of the U.S. Government in Europe to President of the USA, 11.08.1919, on elaboration of mandate system and Turkish Treaty..... 182
178. Telegram from American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the U.S. Secretary of State, undated, received 12.08.1919, on postponement of withdrawal of British troops from the Caucasus for further protection of the Republic of Armenia against Turks..... 183

179. Telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State, 12.08.1919, on Anglo-American negotiations concerning schedule time and consequences of British Army evacuation from the Caucasus..... 183
180. Letter from President of the USA to the Senator J.S.Williams, 12.08.1919, on necessity to protect Armenia and Congress' participation in sending American troops there..... 184
181. Letter from the U.S. Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia, 12.08.1919, on not advisability to recognize Republic of Armenia or to send munitions for its Army..... 185
182. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 13.08.1919, on sending J.Harbord Mission to Armenia..... 186
183. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 13.08.1919, on danger for Armenia and good moral impact by J.Harbord Mission..... 186
184. Telegram from the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 13.08.1919, on prolongation of duration envisaged for evacuation of British forces from Batum and vague situation regarding American mandate..... 187
185. Letter from the Chairman of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia to the U.S. Secretary of State, 14.08.1919, on need of food and munitions for the Republic of Armenia 188
186. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 14.08.1919, on arrangement of a voyage for J.Harbord Mission..... 189
187. Strictly confidential telegram from the U.S. Secretary of State to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 16.08.1919, on transfer to Turkish authorities a request to prevent countrywide onslaughts on Armenians..... 189
188. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 20.08.1919, on Anglo-Persian agreement and secret pacts..... 190
189. Telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State, 20.08.1919, on negotiations regarding Armenian Question, the Caucasus and the U.S. regional politics..... 190
190. Telegram from the members of the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia to the J. Harbord Mis-

- sion, 20.08.1919, on its significance for future Armenian State..... 192
191. Statement by the Allied High Commissioner in Armenia to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 21.08.1919, on their first meeting, his plans and the U.S. policy in the Armenian Question..... 192
192. Translation of the telegram from the French High Commissioner at Constantinople to the President of the Peace Conference, 23.08.1919, on the U.S. President requirement of Turkish Government to prohibit countrywide attacks on Armenians..... 193
193. Telegram from the head of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State, 23.08. 1919, on possibility of the U.S. payment for maintenance of Allied troops in Armenia and prospects of American mandate..... 194
194. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 23.08.1919, on absence of funds to pay for maintenance of Allied forces in Armenia and on inexpediency to appeal to the Congress..... 194
195. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 25.08.1919, on undesirability of the U.S. single-handed notification to Turkish authorities with a demand to cancel countrywide assaults on Armenians and on dispatch of French forces to Cilicia..... 195
196. Confidential telegram from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in Great Britain, 26.08.1919, on British protection of the Republic of Armenia, aims of the Young Turks when they deported and massacred Armenians, on correlation between American mandate and Armenian independence..... 197
197. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 26.08.1919, on telegram by J.Harbord Mission to Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia..... 198
198. Telegram from the Allied High Commissioner in Armenia to the President of the Piece Conference, sine data, 27.08.1919, on plight of nation in Armenia, dispatch of American troops, Azerbaijani attacks and mutinies in internal districts of Armenia..... 198
199. Report of the American section of the International Commission on Mandates in Turkey, 28.08.1919, on the U.S. politics in Cilicia, complete severance of Armenian State and Constantinople from Turkey, on a single mandate for Asia

- Minor..... 199
200. Confidential appendix to the Report upon Syria by H.King and C.Crane, sine data, 28.08.1919, on possibility of American mandate..... 223
201. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 29.08.1919, on situation in the Republic of Armenia and dispatch of French troops to Cilicia..... 223
202. Note by the French Delegation for the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, 29.08.1919, on sending French Army into the Republic of Armenia via Cilicia..... 224
203. Telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to Minister-President and to Chairman of Parliament of the Republic, 30.08.1919, on negotiations with Allied Commissioner in Tiflis and J.Harbord Mission..... 225
204. Telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to Chairman of Parliament of the Republic, 30.08.1919, on talks with Allied High Commissioner to Armenia and preparation for arrival of J.Harbord Mission..... 226
205. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 1.09.1919, on strength of Greek forces and situation in Armenia..... 226
206. Confidential telegram from the Secretary of State to the head of American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 2.09.1919, on evacuation of British Army from the Transcaucasia and menace of general close in of the Republic of Armenia..... 226
207. Confidential telegram from American Commissioners in Constantinople to the Secretary of State, 8.09.1919, on composition and route of J.Harbord Mission..... 227
208. Note by the chief of American military mission in the Caucasus for the chief of the military mission to Armenia, 11.09.1919, on political parties in the Republic of Armenia..... 227
209. Aide-Mémoire by the British Prime Minister for the French Prime Minister, 13.09.1919, on replacement of British forces in Cilicia by French detachments..... 229
210. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 15.09.1919, on terms for elaboration of Peace Treaty with Turkey, on American mandate, Russia and French troops in Cilicia..... 229
211. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 18.09.1919, on abstention from preparation of a Peace Treaty with Turkey..... 232
212. Strictly confidential telegram from the special representative of the U.S. Government in Europe to President of the USA,

- 19.09.1919, on reduction of the Pease delegation in Paris and possibility of American mandate..... 232
213. Strictly confidential telegram from the Acting Secretary of State to the head of American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 20.09.1919, on hearings in the U.S. Senate related to dispatch of American soldiers to Armenia..... 233
214. Telegram from the head of American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State, 22.09.1919, on replacement of British troops in Cilicia and in southern part of Western Armenia by French detachments and on abandonment of the Republic of Armenia without protection..... 233
215. Memorandum by the President of the Anatolia College in Marzvan for the member of J.Harbord Mission, 23.09.1919, on economic activity in the city and minerals in its environments, danger and plight of its Greek and Armenian population..... 234
216. Minutes of a meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 24.09.1919, on transfer of a copy of the secret report by H.King-C.Crane Commission to the British Delegation..... 238
217. Telegram from the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia to his Minister for Foreign Affairs, 20-25.09.1919, on document preparation and reception of J. Harbord Mission..... 239
218. Telegram from the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia to Armenian Minister of Public Instruction and Culture, 20-25.09.1919, on data for J.Harbord Mission concerning schooling..... 239
219. Telegram from the diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia to Armenian Minister of Justice, 20-25.09.1919, on data for J.Harbord Mission regarding laws and courts in the Republic..... 239
220. Telegram from the diplomatic deputy representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia to his Minister for Foreign Affairs, 20-25.09.1919, on document preparation for J.Harbord Mission..... 240
221. Information by the Minister of Public Instruction and Culture of the Republic of Armenia to his Prime Minister, 26.09.1919, on transfer of information to J.Harbord Mission concerning foundation of University in Yerevan..... 240
222. Report by the Minister of Public Instruction and Culture of the Republic of Armenia to Armenian Prime Minister,

- 27.09.1919, on schools in Armenia..... 241
223. List of documents, submitted by the Government of the Republic of Armenia to the chief of military mission to Armenia, 1.10.1919, on Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhijevan, Kars and Armeno-Azerbaijani relations..... 244
224. Brief remark by the Government of the Republic of Armenia on attached documents for the chief of military mission to Armenia, 1.10.1919, on Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhijevan, Sharur, Kars and Koghb..... 246
225. Telegram from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia to his diplomatic mission in Georgia, 2.10.1919, on movement of J.Harbord Mission in Transcaucasia..... 246
226. Note from the British Delegation for the Council of Five, 2.10.1919, on Greek and Italian troops in Asian part of Ottoman Empire and reinforcement of Turkish Nationalists..... 246
227. Very confidential telegram from the Secretary of State to the head of American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 3.10.1919, on illness of the U.S. President and his abstention from political activities..... 248
228. Letter by Armenians townspeople of Baku to the chief of military mission to Armenia, 4.10.1919, on economic role of Armenians in a life of Baku and whole Azerbaijan..... 248
229. Telegram from the chief of American military mission to Armenia, 5.10.1919, on attack by a band of Kurds, Turks and Azerbaijanis on J.Harbord Mission near Koghb..... 254
230. Telegram from the chief of military mission to Armenia to the chief of American mission in Paris, 6.10.1919, on covered route, approval of American mandate by Turks, their contribution to warfare in Sharur and Nakhijevan, together with domestic situation in the Republic of Armenia..... 255
231. Telegram from the chief of military mission to Armenia to Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, 6.10.1919, on consent to establish a neutral zone at Nakhijevan given by authorities in Baku..... 258
232. Letter from the Tiflis townsman to the chief of military mission to Armenia, 6.10.1919, on his donation of a collection composed of antique items from Ani..... 258
233. Letter from the chief of military mission to Armenia to Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, 7.10.1919, on sympathy for Armenian people and gratitude for reception..... 258

234. Telegram from the chief of military mission to Armenia to Prime Minister of Georgia, 7.10.1919, on sympathy for Georgian people and gratitude for reception..... 259
235. Telegram from the chief of military mission to Armenia to Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, 7.10.1919, on establishment of a neutral zone in Nakhijevan and gratitude for reception..... 259
236. Letter from the chief of military mission to Armenia to the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople, 7.10.1919, on arrangement for Mission's departure from Batum..... 260
237. Memorandum report by the member of military mission to Armenia to its chief, 7.10.1919, on a trip to Amasia, Marzvan, Samsun, Trebizond, and via Baberd to Erzerum, Kars, Yerevan and Baku..... 260
238. Memorandum by the member of military mission to Armenia to its chief, 7.10.1919, on meeting representatives of Russian National Society of Batum..... 262
239. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 7.10.1919, on Greek and Italian zones of military occupation in Asia Minor..... 263
240. Memorandum by the member of military mission to Armenia to its chief, 8.10.1919, on transfer of information by Minister President of the Republic of Armenia regarding munitions in Kars..... 265
241. Diary of overland party of the American military mission to Armenia, 27.09.-8.10.1919, on Sarikamish, Kaghzvan, Koghb, Kars, Etchmiadzin, Yerevan and reception accorded Mission in the Republic of Armenia, on Tiflis and Baku..... 266
242. Memorandum by the member of American military mission to Armenia for its chief, 8.10.1919, on plight of Armenians in Malatia and Andreas..... 276
243. Minutes of the meeting of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 8.10.1919, on domestic situation in Ottoman Empire, movement of Kemalists, Armenian mandate by the USA and danger to postpone Peace Treaty revealed in conversation with Grand Rabbi of Turkey..... 277
244. Telegram from the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople to the Secretary of State, 8.10.1919, on movement, agenda and attack on J.Harbord Mission on their road to Yerevan..... 279
245. Telegram from Minister President of the Republic of Armenia to the Armenian Delegation in Paris, 9.10.1919, on departure

- of J.Harbord Mission from Yerevan and Batum..... 279
246. Telegram from chief of the military mission to Armenia to representative of the Committee for the Defense of Turkey, 9.10.1919, on a receipt of a letter by M.Kemal regarding the danger from Nationalist movement for Western Armenians and the U.S. concern about their destiny..... 279
247. Urgent telegram from the Secretary of State to the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople, 9.10.1919, on importance of J.Harbord's reports relative to the Caucasus and Republic of Armenia..... 280
248. List of Turkish, Armenian, American, Georgian and Azerbaijani officials with whom members of mission met with at their route, 9.10.1919, on all persons with whom members of mission met with at their route between Adana and Tiflis, day after day..... 280
249. Memorandum by the member of military mission to Armenia for its chief, 13.10.1919, on pros and cons of adoption a mandate over Armenia by the USA..... 285
250. Memorandum by the member of military mission to Armenia for the chief of mission, 13.10.1919, on a single U.S. mandate over total territory of Turkey and Transcaucasia, non-recognition of its Republics and creation of Armenian administrative unit comprised of the Republic of Armenia, Van, Bitlis and Erzerum..... 289
251. Memorandum by the member of military mission to Armenia for the chief of mission, 13.10.1919, on pros and cons of different mandates for Turkey and Transcaucasia, Eastern politics of European Powers and threat to existence of Armenians..... 292
252. Telegram from the chief of military mission to Armenia to the chief of American mission in Paris, 14.10.1919, on warfare with Kurds and Azerbaijani troops assisted by the Turkish military, along borders of the Republic of Armenia, animosity within Transcaucasia and domestic situation in Armenia..... 298
253. Copy of memorandum by the chief of military mission to Armenia to the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople, 15.10.1919, on transportation of the Mission from Constantinople to Mardin..... 299
254. Memorandum by the member of military mission to Armenia to the duty officer of the U.S.S. "Martha Washington," 15.10.1919, on persons who left the Mission in Constanti-

- nople..... 300
255. Telegram from the chief of military mission to Armenia to the U.S. Secretary of State, 16.10.1919, on the work performed by Mission History of Armenians and of the Armenian Question, situation in Western Armenia and Transcaucasia, advantages and disadvantages of American mandate, extent of military aid and financial expenses..... 300
256. Condensed memorandum by League for the defense of the rights of Anatolia and Rumelia, s.d., September 1919, on its organization, military aims of Young Turks in Transcaucasia and attitude towards the Republic of Armenia..... 332
257. Memorandum by the member of military mission to Armenia for the chief of mission, 21.10.1919, on costs of war against starvation, work with refugees and orphans..... 335
258. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 1.11.1919, on British military Command in Constantinople and Asia Minor..... 336
259. Telegram from the chief of American Peace delegation to the U.S. Secretary of State, 3.11.1919, on return of J.Harbord Mission..... 337
260. Letter from Chairman of the Armenian National Delegation to its representative in London, 6.11.1919, on Kemalist troops, weapons and food deliveries for the Republic of Armenia..... 337
261. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 8.11.1919, on Greek Army, Kemalists and Peace Treaty with Turkey..... 338
262. Letter from representative of the Armenian National Delegation in London to Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, 8.11.1919, on desirability of British aid to the Republic of Armenia..... 339
263. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 10.11.1919, on military confrontation between Greeks and Turks in Asia Minor..... 339
264. Memorandum by the Executive Committee of Near East Relief to the U.S. Secretary of State, 11.11.1919, on plight of the Republic of Armenia and dimensions of the needed relief..... 340
265. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 12.11.1919, on Greek and Italian troops in Asia Minor..... 343
266. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 15.11.1919, on possibility to extent duties of Allied High Commissioner in Armenia to the whole Transcaucasia..... 344

267. Letter from the Foreign Office employee to the British Council Officer of Supreme Economic Council, 15.11.1919, on position of Armenians in the Caucasus and relief for them, on detriment inflicted by prolonged elaboration of the Peace Treaty with Turkey..... 345
268. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 17.11.1919, on a sale to the Armenian Government of a consignment of wheat..... 346
269. Records of a meeting of the Supreme Economic Council, 21-23.11.1919, on absence of funds at a disposal of Supreme Economic Council and its inability to earmark money for assistance to Armenian refugees in the Caucasus..... 346
270. Telegram from the U.S. Secretary of State to his Commission to Negotiate Peace, 27. 11.1919, on non ratification of the Treaty of Versailles by Senate and withdrawal of Americans on commissions of Peace Conference..... 347
271. Telegram from the head of American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State, 29.11.1919, on British approaches to the Turkish Question, ousting Italians from the southern Anatolia and Armenian mandate..... 347
272. Telegram from Allied High Commissioner in Armenia to chairman of Paris Peace Conference, 1.12.1919, on Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan not to resort to arms in solution of the disputes, to cease a blockade of Zangezur and on politics of A.Denikin in the Caucasus..... 348
273. Telegram from the U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople to the Secretary of State, 4.12.1919, on Armeno-Azerbaijani clashes in Zangezur, massacre in Nakhijevan and Shushi, politics of A.Denikin in Transcaucasia..... 349
274. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 6.12.1919, on relief to Armenian refugees in the Caucasus and sale of cereals to Cabinet of the Republic of Armenia by the Grain Corporation..... 354
275. Resolutions of the Supreme Economic Council in the Council of Five, 6.12.1919, on plight of the Republic of Armenia, absence of British funds for providing relief and harm caused by delay with Peace Treaty..... 354
276. Notes of a meeting of the International Council of Allied Premier Ministers, 12.12.1919, on Civil War in Russia and armament for anti-Bolshevik forces, furnished by the Entente..... 355

277. Notes of a meeting of the International Council of Premier Ministers, 13.12. 1919, on suspension of funding anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia and assistance of independent Republics along its borders..... 357
278. Resolution A of a meeting of the International Council of Premier Ministers, 13.12.1919, on restraint of military aid to anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia and to Republics along its borders..... 357
279. Resolution B of a meeting of the International Council of Premier Ministers, 13.12.1919, on completion of Paris Peace Conference and elaboration of Treaty with Turkey by heads of States..... 358
280. Telegram from diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia to Armenian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 16.12.1919, on possibility of face-to-face negotiations between Armenians and Turks..... 358
281. Notes of meetings of the Council of Five, 18.12.1919, on line of demarcation between the Army of A.Denikin and the States of Caucasus..... 359
282. Telegram from the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople to the Supreme Council of Peace Conference, 23.12.-1919, on resumption of Turkish-German trade..... 360
283. Note from the French Peace Delegation for the Council of Five, 29.12.1919, on prohibition of trade, conducted by the Central Powers in Turkey..... 360
284. Report of the Communication section for Supreme Economic Council, 1.01.1920, on financial requirements for repair of Transcaucasian railways..... 361
285. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 5.01.1919, on German-Turkish and Bulgarian-Turkish trade..... 362
286. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Five, 10.01.1920, on a rout of A.Denikin's Army, possibility of Bolshevik-Turkish alliance and armament of the Caucasian States..... 362
287. Notes of a meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 10.01.1920, on domestic position, recognition de facto and armament of Transcaucasian Republics..... 363
288. Report of the Interallied Military Committee at Versailles for the International Council of Premier Ministers, 12.01.1920, on a rout of A.Denikin's Army and armament of the Caucasian Republics..... 365
289. Note by British Peace Delegation for the International Council of Premier Ministers, 12.01.1920, on a defeat of A.

- Denikin's Army, significance of Transcaucasia and reinforcement of its Republics..... 366
290. Notes of a meeting of the Supreme Council, 16.01.1920, on negotiations, recognition de facto, abilities of Daghestan and strength of Georgian and Azerbaijani Armies..... 367
291. Notes of a meeting of the Supreme Council, 19.01.1920, on barrier against Bolshevism in the Caucasus, supplying this region with weapons and recognition of the Republic of Armenia de facto..... 369
292. Draft telegram from the President of the Peace Conference for the U.S. Government, 20.01.1920, on victory gained by Bolsheviks in Russia, establishment of trade ties with them and arms supply to Republics of Transcaucasia..... 378
293. Telegram from Allied High Commissioner in Armenia to the U.S. Secretary of State, 22.01.1920, on Armeno-Azerbaijani warfare in Zangezur and Nakhijevan..... 379
294. Telegram from Acting Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in France, 24.01.1920, on recognition of the Republic of Armenia de facto by the USA..... 380
295. Telegram from Acting Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in France, 27.01.1920, on absence of American recognition of the Republic of Armenia de facto..... 380
296. Telegram from Acting Secretary of State to the U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople, 27.01.1920, on absence of American recognition of Transcaucasian Republics de facto..... 382
297. Telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 28.01.1920, on recognition of the Republic of Armenia de facto by European Allies and absence of American recognition..... 382
298. Telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in France to the Secretary of State, 28.01.1920, on reconsideration of American recognition of the Republic of Armenia de facto..... 382
299. Note by the British Delegation for the Supreme Economic Council, 28.01.1920, on relief for Greek and Armenian refugees on the coast of Asia Minor and in Constantinople..... 383
300. Memorandum by an employee of Near East Relief for its Foreign Secretary, 23.02.1920, on murder of NER employees in Aintab and fights in Marash..... 384
301. Letter from Vice President of Delegation of the Republic of Armenia in Paris and Envoy of this Republic on special

- mission to the USA for Acting Secretary of State, 3.03.1920, on acquisition of goods in the USA and issuing there bonds of the Republic of Armenia..... 386
302. Note from French Ambassador in the USA for Acting Secretary of State, 12.03.1920, on elaboration of the Peace Treaty with Turkey, its frontiers, independence of the Republic of Armenia and the U.S. participation in negotiations..... 387
303. Note by the Secretary of State to French Ambassador in the USA, 24.03.1920, on American requirements concerning Peace Treaty with Turkey, boundaries of Armenia and equal access to regional markets..... 388
304. Note from the Secretary of State to Envoy of the Republic of Armenia in the USA, 23.04.1920, on recognition of Armenian Government de facto by the USA..... 389
305. Note by Allied Supreme Council for the U.S. Secretary of State, 26.04.1920, on abstention of the USA from negotiating the Peace Treaty with Turkey, its frontiers and establishment of an independent Armenia..... 389
306. Note by Allied Supreme Council for the U.S. President, 26.04.1920, on America as a mandatory and financier of Armenia, Presidential arbitration of Armenian-Turkish boundaries and establishment of Armenian borders in Transcaucasia by the Entente 391
307. Report by J.Harbord to the U.S. Senate, 27.04.1920, on feasibility, requirements and hardships of a mandate for Armenia..... 396
308. Telegram from the Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in France, 17.05. 1920, on President's consent to act as arbitrator for Armenian boundaries..... 397
309. Memorandum by the U.S. Secretary of War for Secretary of State, 2.06.1920, on a single mandate for Transcaucasia and Turkey, defense requirements of Armenian mandate and advance of Bolsheviks..... 398
310. Letter from Envoy of Armenia on special mission to the USA for Secretary of State, 10.06.1920, on absence of Allied troops, military and financial needs of the Republic of Armenia, its inability to occupy Western Armenian provinces and reinforcement of Kemalists aid..... 399
311. Memorandum by heads of Armenian united delegation for President of the USA, 14.07.1920, on conditions in the Republic of Armenia and in Western Armenian provinces

- allotted by the Allies, their borders, population, repatriation of Armenian and militancy of Kemalists..... 401
312. Note by Director of the American Relief Administration to the Secretary of State, 26.07.1920, on dimensions of the U.S. relief rendered to Armenians in the Republic of Armenia and Transcaucasia..... 409
313. Note by British Ambassador in the USA for the Secretary of State, 6.08.1920, on acceleration of Presidential decision concerning bounds of Armenia..... 411
314. Note by the Secretary of State for British Ambassador in the USA, 13.08.1920, on making public Presidential decision regarding frontiers of Armenia after conclusion of the Peace Treaty with Turkey..... 412
315. Memorandum by the U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople for the Secretary of State, 18.09.1920, on necessity to enforce the compliance of Turkey with provisions of the Peace Treaty in its part relative to Armenia..... 412
316. Telegram from the U.S. Consul in Tiflis to his High Commissioner in Constantinople, 4.10.1920, on general mobilization, and Turkish-Armenian war..... 413
317. Note from the Secretariat General of the Peace Conference for the U.S. Embassy in France, 18.10.1920, on forwarding to the U.S. Government a copy of the Treaty of Sevres..... 413
318. Letter from Diplomatic Representative of the Republic of Armenia in Georgia to the U.S. Consul in Tiflis, 11.11.1920, on Turkish offensive on Alexandropol, extreme hardships in solitary Armenia, remained all alone, and acceptance of the Armistice..... 414
319. Telegram from Catholicos Gevorg V to President of the USA, 12.11.1920, on acute need of moral and physical aid to Armenia..... 415
320. Confidential letter from the U.S. President to the President of Supreme Council of Allied Powers, 22.11.1920, on Presidential arbitration award in relation to Armenian frontiers..... 416
321. Telegram from President of the USA to the President of Council of the League of Nations, 30.11.1920, on inability of American military and financial aid to the Republic of Armenia and willingness of the President to act as mediator in Armenian-Turkish parleys..... 422
322. Telegram from the U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople to Secretary of State, 30.11.1920, on Turkish military advance and expiration of Armenian independence..... 423

323. Telegram from President of Council of the League of Nations to President of the USA, 2.12.1920, on League's participation in American moral and diplomatic support of the Republic of Armenia..... 423
324. Telegram from the U.S. Consul in Tiflis to the Acting Secretary of State, 4.12.1920, on proclamation of Soviet rule in the Republic of Armenia..... 424
325. Telegram from Acting Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in France, 13.12.1920, on decision to publish Presidential arbitration reward relative to Armenian borders..... 425
326. Telegram from Acting Secretary of State to the President of Council of the League of Nations, 15.12.1920, on designation of personal representative of the U.S. President as a mediator in Armenian-Turkish parleys..... 425
327. Telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State, 16.12.1920, on possibility to postpone making public the President's decision relative to Armenian frontier..... 426
328. Telegram from Acting Secretary of State to the U.S. Ambassador in France, 17.12.1920, on delay with publication of Presidential decision concerning Armenian bounds..... 426
329. Telegram from the U.S. Ambassador in France to the Acting Secretary of State, 20.12.1920, on further defer of publication of Presidential decision relative to Armenian borders..... 426
330. Telegram from President of Council of the League of Nations to the U.S. President, 26.12.1920, on impossibility of American mediation in Armenian-Turkish parleys and establishment of Soviet rule in Armenia..... 427

Contents

Introduction.....	5
Documents.....	9
Names Index.....	428
Bibliography.....	500
Names Index Per Page.....	507
Place Names Index.....	518
List of Documents.....	531

ARMENIA IN DOCUMENTS OF THE
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
1917-1920

Compiled and translated by
Gayane George Makhmourian

ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԸ
ԱՄՆ ՊԵՏԱԿԱՆ ԳԵՊԱՐՏԱՍԵՆՏԻ
1917-1920 թթ. ՓԱՍՏԱԹՂԹԵՐՈՒՄ

Ժողովածուի կազմող և թարգմանիչ
Գայանե Գեորգիի Մախմուրյան

АРМЕНИЯ В ДОКУМЕНТАХ
ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОГО ДЕПАРТАМЕНТА США
1917-1920 гг.

Составитель сборника и переводчик
Гаянэ Георгиевна Махмуриян

The author's e-mail: ggmakhm@hotmail.com &
history@sci.am
<http://gmakhmourian.research.sci.am>

Cover designer

Margarita Simonyan

Հանձնվել է տպագրության 06. 04. 2020թ.: Չափսը 60X84¹/₁₆:
Թուղթը՝ օֆսեթ № 1: Ծավալը 35 մամուլ: Տպաքանակը՝ 1500 օրինակ:
Գինը՝ պայմանագրային:

ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԻ ԳԻՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԱԿԱԳԵՍԻԱ
ՊԱՏՄՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏ

ՀՀ, 0019, Երևան, Մարշալ Բաղրամյանի պող. 24 Գ

