



IN THE LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES

QUEST FOR PEACE IN TURKEY

Cuma ÇIÇEK

English Translation: Justyna Szewczyk, Khaled El Jassem

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**DİYARBAKIR SİYASAL VE SOSYAL
ARAŞTIRMALAR ENSTİTÜSÜ**

**ENSTİTÜYA DİYARBEKİRÊ BO
LÊKOLİNEN SİYASÎ Û CİVAKÎ**

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Cuma Çiçek was born in 1980 in Diyarbakır. After completing primary, secondary and high school education in Diyarbakır, he graduated from Industrial Engineering Department of Istanbul Technical University in 2004. He completed the Urban and Regional Planning Graduate Program in the same university between 2005-2008. In his MA Thesis, he critically examined the governance process in Diyarbakır. Between 2009 and 2014, he completed his PhD in the Political Science/Political Sociology and Public Action in Sciences Po, Paris (*Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris*). He has published articles on the Kurdish issue, Kurdish Islamism, local governments, regional inequality, class and identity relations, conflict resolution and social peacebuilding in such periodicals as *Birikim*, *Praksis*, *İktisat Dergisi*, *Turkish Studies*, *Dialectical Anthropology*. He is currently working a researcher in the Paris Institute of Political Studies International Center for International Studies (Centre de Recherches Internationales - CERI).

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The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of DISA, Chrest Foundation and the Heinrich Böll Stiftung Association in Turkey.

with the contributions of



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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have been interested in the Kurdish issue for almost 20 years and since 2009, when I started my doctoral research, I have been trying to understand the issue from an academic perspective. Moreover, I have become interested in conflict resolution and peace building in 2015 through works of Peace Assembly of Turkey which later became the Peace Foundation. In particular, “The Peace Process from Dolmabahçe to Present-Day: Understanding Failure and Finding New Paths” report, which I wrote for the Peace Foundation in 2016 with professor Vahap Coşkun from Dicle University, allowed me a deeper insight into the matter. Also, the report for the Peace Foundation on “Non-Governmental Organizations in the 2013-2015 Resolution Process,” which was based on fieldwork, gave me the opportunity to focus on the relationship between the conflict resolution and the civil society actors. In this sense, both studies have significantly contributed to shaping the work in your hands.

Aside from the previous works, the book is a product of over a year’s work. My knowledge of similar cases occurring in different times and places and investigation of world experiences which started in September 2016, deepened and turned into a research project with the contribution of Diyarbakır Institute for Political and Social Research DISA, of which I am a member. After a nine-month study, the project was completed and turned into a research book. The book was shared with the public when it was published in Turkish in November 2017.

The book in your hand is not just a translation of the Turkish edition. The work was reviewed, updated and expanded with additional sections for the English edition. Unlike in the Turkish edition, in this one, there are two new chapters and an appendix. The first novelty in the English edition is the first chapter which quantitatively examines internal conflicts and peace agreements in the last two centuries. In this edition, not like in the previous study, intra-state conflicts and peace agreements are considered both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The fifth chapter titled “The Quest for Reconciliation in the Kurdish Conflict: A Short History” is the second innovation in the English edition. This chapter presents a brief summary of past attempts to resolve the Kurdish conflict from the first ceasefires of the early 1990s to the end of

the 2008-2011 Oslo Process. Together with the following chapter, which talks about the 2013-2015 Resolution Process, the 25-year-long pursuit of the resolution to the Kurdish conflict is presented.

Finally, the English edition contains an annex: the “Chronology of the Kurdish Conflict and Quest for Peace (1978-2017).” Despite the long duration of the conflicts in Turkey available information is unfortunately quite limited. This chronology gives a general overview of the last 40 years. It can be said that it fills an important gap in the archival work on the Kurdish conflict.

Like most research projects, this work has been realized with the contribution of many people. I would like to name a few here. This work would not have been possible without the encouragement and support of DİSA's veteran employee Murad Akıncılar. Dear Murad not only made important contributions to the drafting of the report but also read the entire report and offered important points. Members of DİSA, dear Necdet İpekyüz, and Şemsa Özar shared their precious views after having read the draft text. Beloved Ruşen Perinçek reviewed the whole report word by word, sentence by sentence. In addition, their critical notes drew my attention to matters I had overlooked. Atalay Göçer, DİSA's veteran employee, organized the whole process both for the English and Turkish edition. The translators, Justyna Szewczyk, and Khaled El Jassem made a great effort to make this Book reach you. I thank all of them for their contributions.

Finally, I am grateful to DİSA, Chrest Foundation and Heinrich Böll Stiftung Association in Turkey because of their institutional contribution that paved the way for this research report.

22 October 2018, Diyarbakır

Cuma Çiçek

ABBREVIATIONS

AKP/AK Party	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN	Association of Southeastern Asia Nations
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
Azadî	Kurdistan Islamic Movement for Rights Justice and Freedom
BDP	Peace and Democracy Party
BIFM/BIFF	Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters/Movement
CAB	Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro
CHP	Republican People's Party
CNRM	National Council of the Maubere Resistance
COHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
COW	The Correlates of War Project
CPP	Communist Party of Philippines
DBP	Democratic Regions Party
DEHAP	Democratic People's Party
DEP	Democracy Party
DSP	Democratic Left Party
DTP	Democratic Society Party
DYP	True Path Party
EU	European Union
FALINTIL	East Timor's National Liberation Armed Forces
FRETILIN	Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
FSA	Free Syrian Army

GAM	Free Aceh Movement
GNP	Gross National Product
HADEP	People's Democracy Party
HAK-PAR	Rights and Freedoms Party
HDP	People's Democratic Party
HEP	People's Labor Party
HPG	People's Defence Forces
HÜDA-PAR	Free Cause Party
İHD	Human Rights Association
İHH	The Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief
İYİ Party	Good Party
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
KADEK	Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress
KCK	Kurdistan Communities Union
Kongra-Gel	Kurdistan People's Congress
KRI	Kurdistan Region of Iraq
MGK	National Security Council
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MİT	National Intelligence Organization
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHAL	State of Emergency
OPM	Free Papua Movement

ÖSP	Freedom and Socialism Party
PAK	Kurdistan Freedom Party
PAKURD	Kurdistani Party (<i>Partiya Kurdistani</i>)
PDK	Kurdistan Democratic Party
PDK-Bakur	Kurdistan Democratic Party - North
PKI	Communist Party of Indonesia
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party
PKP	Communist Party of the Philippines
PSK	Socialist Party of Kurdistan
PYD	Democratic Union Party
RP	Welfare Party
SDF	Syrian Democratic Forces
TİHV	Human Rights Foundation Turkey
TSK	Turkish Armed Forces
UCDP	The Uppsala Conflict Data Programme
UDT	Timorese Democratic Union
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank
YNK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
YPG	People's Protection Units
YPJ	Women's Protection Units

INTRODUCTION

With over 500 thousand casualties, more than 10 million people displaced, of whom nearly half had to migrate to foreign countries, the Syrian civil war left seven years behind. After seven years of a bloody and devastating conflict, everyone agrees that there is no option other than a political resolution.

A similar situation exists in Iraq. For Iraq, which had entered major socio-political turbulence in 2003 with the intervention of the United States of America (USA), the Syrian civil war meant a new period of turmoil. Increased activity of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) both in Syria and Iraq resulted in a takeover of such major cities as Mosul, and thousands of deaths and nearly 3 million displaced people.

Civil wars in neighboring Turkey Syria and Iraq resulted in the burning and destruction of such historical cities like Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Baghdad. The victims of the war are scattered everywhere from Diyarbakir to Istanbul, from Paris to London. Domestic wars lost lives, and displaced people are not only present on the TV screens but have become a part of daily life in Turkey and other cities around the world.

The Kurdish conflict¹ has surpassed 34 years which means that nearly two generations have grown up in the conflict. Despite that, there are no signs of a solution and societal peace on the horizon. What is more, the failure of the quest for dialogue and compromise added a new color to the conflict as it has intensified to an extent not comparable to the past, and it has swept into cities, unlike the fights that first concentrated in the rural areas. In the skirmishes between the years 2015-2017, large-scale demolitions took place in many cities, including in historical Diyarbakır-Sur and Şırnak-Cizre. Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, and loss of the human life counts in thousands. In addition, the Kurdish conflict has gained a transborder character with the deepening civil war in Syria and Iraq. For that reason, today, mention of the Kurdish conflict evokes not only Diyarbakir, Şırnak, Hakkâri but also Kobanê, Raqqa, Mosul, and Afrîn.

¹ The term "Kurdish conflict" used throughout this study refers to fights between the Turkish state and the PKK rooted in the complexity of issues related to the death of about 40 thousand people, massive destructions, economic, political, social, cultural, administrative and psychological problems.

The effects of these human-made socio-political catastrophes had not yet been resolved when on 15 July 2016 Turkey suffered a military coup attempt. After 17 years long European Union (EU) accession process, all the discussions about ending military tutelage, Turkey faced another attempt of a military coup. Decades after three military coups between the years 1960-1980, a new coup attempt and the declaration of the State of Emergency (OHAL) in its aftermath struck a major blow to the accumulation of already limited democratic capital. Undoubtedly, prevention of the military coup due to the united opposition of the civilian population and political institutions is essential for the history of democracy in Turkey. This does not change the fact, however, that Turkey remains a country at risk of a military coup.

The fact that the coup attempt was prevented by a civilian administration with social support could have been an important start for democratization and social peacebuilding. There were also important opportunities with regard to this matter. However, the fact that the already exceeding twenty months OHAL, which was announced immediately after the coup became commonplace, the suspension of the law in the name of "struggle with putschists," the targeting of the entire opposition and the desire to have it silenced, the closure of hundreds of media outlets and civil society organizations and the expulsion of academics from universities point to a regression in terms of democracy in Turkey.

On the one hand, the internal conflicts in the neighboring countries, and on the other hand, the socio-political upheavals recently seen in the country, make the solution to the Kurdish conflict, which has continued with some interruptions since 1984, even more critical. While the upheavals are fueled by the Kurdish conflict, on the one hand, they also signify the formation of this clash. Today the end of the Kurdish conflict and the construction of social peace go beyond the political resolution of the Kurdish issue since the end of the Kurdish conflict will not only mean the re-establishment of the Kurdish socio-political and socio-economic sphere. Moreover, as much as the rebuilding of the political system and social life in Turkey, the reconstruction of the socio-political system in the region, starting with Iraq and Syria, will be shaped by the solution to the Kurdish issue which today is gaining a cross-border character and conflicts stemming from it.

In this study, Turkey's Kurdish conflict is discussed from a comprehensive historical and comparative perspective. In the light of world experiences, the past, present, and future of the Kurdish conflict are examined in a cross-border context. Focusing on conflict resolution and the construction of social peace, this research, in fact, discusses the possibilities of a return to negotiations in the Kurdish conflict. In this sense, this study hopes to fill an essential gap in the field.

The research consists of eight parts. The first four chapters are devoted to world experiences. In the first chapter, in order to show that the problem we are experiencing does not explicitly belong "to us," a quantitative picture of intra-state conflicts and quests for peace is presented from a global perspective. The second chapter discusses the basic parameters that determine the formation of such conflicts, in other words, the patterns of emergence, formation, and cessation. In this section, a conceptual framework of the fundamental dynamics that determine the formation of intra-state conflicts is developed. After the table presenting quantitatively and qualitatively intra-state conflicts on a global scale, the experiences of the Philippines/Bangsamoro and Indonesia/Aceh are examined in the third and fourth chapters, respectively.

Fifth and Sixth chapters look at the history of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. In this context, Chapter Five discusses the period from the ceasefires beginning in the first half of the 1990's to the Oslo Process of the 2008-2011, when the first quests to end the Kurdish issue through dialogue and negotiation emerged. In the Sixth chapter, the last dialogue process, the 2013-2015 Resolution Process, is scrutinized in depth.

The last two chapters cover the present and the future of the Kurdish conflict. In the seventh chapter, based on the conceptual framework developed in the second chapter, the Kurdish issue and its basic parameters are analyzed from a historical perspective. In this section, objective conditions of the Kurdish issue are presented in an analytical framework. In the final part of the study, taking as a starting point both the conceptual framework developed in the Second Chapter and the particular parameters of the Kurdish issue discussed in Chapter Seven, the possibilities and limitations of negotiations after failed dialogue initiatives are discussed.

1

INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS AND PEACE PROCESSES AROUND THE WORLD

In the political arena of Turkey, one of the most often heard phrase is Turkey's exceptional circumstances. When most problems come to light, this "unique", "specific conditions" are constantly reminded. Undoubtedly, during the period of the EU harmonization process, this discourse was most prevalent. Similarly, this phrase came to the forefront in the last crisis with the EU in the aftermath of the announcement of OHAL after the coup attempt on 16 July 2016. EU officials criticized this approach by saying that "There is no such thing as Turkish-style democracy. There is only democracy. The Turkish people have the right to enjoy the same freedoms as the Europeans."¹

Of course, the context in which each issue exists, or more specifically, time, space and actors involved are different. This contextual difference requires a more nuanced and sensitive approach to the problems and specific dynamics. However, in most cases, class, ethnic/national, gender-based, religious/sectarian problems in the world have similar characteristics. Both state and non-state actors of such issues display similar attitudes. The truth is that such commonalities are increasing in an environment where the interaction on the global scale is on the rise and the actors' learning capabilities are globalizing since everyone learns from one another at different levels and in different ways.

As in most cases, in the context of the Kurdish issue also, the unique conditions of Turkey when it comes to the problems, solutions, and rights are brought out. The Kurdish issue and resulting from it intra-state conflicts have their own dynamics. The fact that Kurds live under political sovereignty of four states is first particularity that comes to mind. However, contrary to what is believed, this issue shares the same qualities with many cases in the world.

In this section, we demonstrate that the Kurdish issue and conflict bear similarity with cases in almost every corner of the world. To this aim,

¹ Deutsche Well Türkçe, "AB Komiseri: AB rüyası şimdilik bitti," Deutsche Well Türkçe, 02.05.2017, <http://www.dw.com/tr/ab-komiseri-ab-rüyası-şimdilik-bitti/a-38663759>, Accessed: 30.05.2017.

we look at various intra-state conflicts and resolution processes around the globe in different periods of time to draw a general picture of these problems. Within this scope, firstly, two studies that collect regular data on conflicts in the world and digitize them into databases/sets are discussed. Secondly, using the data from these studies, the general data on the conflicts that have been going on since 1816 in the world are presented. Finally, the peace treaties that took place between 1975 and 2011 are considered quantitatively and common trends present in these treaties are summarized.

1. Intra-state conflicts in the world: Two projects

In order to examine conflicts in different times and places and to investigate both the common and differentiating points among them, there are a number of studies that collect data on these cases and present them to the public. Quantitative research, which constitutes a remarkable school in conflict resolution and social peacebuilding, utilizes these resources. Here, two prominent projects related to this matter are discussed. Using the data prepared within the scope of these projects, a general picture of the intra-state conflicts around the world and quests for peace is presented.

The Correlates of War Project (COW)² is the first of these studies. COW, founded in 1963 by J. David Singer, a political scientist at the University of Michigan, is a project aimed at collecting systematic and scientific data on war. The project, which was transferred to the Pennsylvania State University from Michigan University in 2001, continues to work under the direction of Zeev Maoz from the University of California with the contributions of academics from various universities.

Some of the data sets currently available within the COW project, which is expanding over time, include: COW War Codes (1816-2007), Militarized Interstate Disputes, Militarized Interstate Dispute Locations, National Material Capabilities (1816-2012), World Religion Data (since 1945), Formal Alliances (1816-2012), Territorial Change (1816-2014), Trade (1870-2014), and Diplomatic Exchange (1817-2005).

2 The Correlates of War Project's website: <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu>, Accessed: 01.06.2017.

Chart 1.1. The Correlates of War Project




The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is the second important study of conflicts in different periods and locations.³ The UCDP was established in 1980's in the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, under the name of Conflict Data Project. Since its establishment, data on armed conflicts are constantly being collected within the scope of the program. The program aims at systematic research on the roots of the conflicts, their dynamics and resolution processes. Along with the preparation of the global conflicts database, today, this data is available to anyone who wants to work on the issue.

Unlike COW, UCDP provides users with visual data i.e. maps and graphics. Simple visual presentation of worldwide conflicts and its interactive character is understandable for those who are not experts in the subject. The second important difference between UCDP and COW is that it focuses entirely on conflict data. It also includes the 1975-2011 Peace Treaty Data Set as well as the 1946-2015 conflict data.

3 Like COW, UCDP data is also accessible on the internet. See: Uppsala Universitet, *The Uppsala Conflict Data Program*, Uppsala Universitet, <http://ucdp.uu.se>, Accessed: 01.06.2017.

Chart 1.2. Uppsala Conflict Data Program



2. Intra-state conflicts from a global perspective

2.1. Types and regional distribution in intra-state conflicts


According to COW data, from the conflicts that took place between 1816-2007 in 121 countries, three types of intra-state conflict can be seen. According to the COW classification, intra-state conflicts involve conflicts within a state that has been internationally recognized. The first type of conflict that takes place in these countries is a regional conflict. These involve conflicts between a local or regional government (not the central government) and non-state actors in a region. The second type involves conflicts between the government and non-state actors to seize or retain control of the central government. The third type of intra-state conflict consists of conflicts between the government and non-state actors over a local or regional issue.⁴

In these 121 countries, there were 432 intra-state conflicts between 1816-2007, including recurring conflicts. Of the 422 cases known in detail, 250 (59.2%) of the conflicts were aimed at seizing control of the central government, 161 (38.2%) were conflicts between the government and non-state actors over a local or regional issue, finally, 11 (2.6%) were

4 Sarkees, Meredith R., *Codebook for the Intra-State Wars v.4.0. Definition and Variables*, The Correlates of War Project, pg. 2., <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war/intra-state-war-data-codebook>, Accessed: 27.01.2017.


regional conflicts between local or regional governments and non-state actors (see Chart 1.3). In addition, according to COW data, 168 of these 422 state-level crackers achieved an international dimension (39.8%).

Chart. 1.3. Types of Intra-state Conflicts in the World (1816-2007)



In terms of regional distribution of intra-state conflicts, 81 (19.2%) took place in the Western hemisphere (Canada, the USA, South America), 89 (21.1%) in Europe, 97 (23%) in Africa, 64 (15.2 %) in the Middle East and 91 (21.5%) in Asia (see Chart 1.4).


Chart 1.4. Intra-state conflicts by region (1816-2007)



Looking at the periodic distribution of conflicts, it is seen that 269 of 422 wars (63.7%) started after the First World War. Of these, 234 (55.5%) occurred after the Second World War. Post-WW II wars seem to be concentrated in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. In this period, 19 (8.2%) of intra-state conflicts took place in the Western Hemisphere, 19 (8.2%) in Europe, 97 (41.4%) in Africa, 39 (16.6%) in the Middle East, 60 (25.6%) in Asia (see Chart 1.5).

According to the records of the UCDP, between 1946 and 2015, conflicts between governments and non-state actors occurred in 66 countries. The number of conflicts in which at least 1,000 people lost their lives is 296. Of these conflicts, 63 (21.3%) had a third actor involved in the conflict and the case became international.

Chart 1.5. Post-WW II intra-state conflicts by region (1945-2015)



The UCDP classifies intra-state armed conflicts into two groups according to their aims: incompatibility concerning government and incompatibility concerning territory. According to this classification, a total of 296 conflicts (93%) are over territory, while the remaining 203 (68.6%) are conflicts concerning the government (see Chart 1.6). 28 countries in which conflicts concerning territory have taken place and in which at least 1,000 people have lost their lives are as follows: Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, Indonesia, Ethiopia, the Philippines, South Africa, Georgia, Croatia, India, Iraq, Israel, Mauritania, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Yemen.

In terms of regional distribution of these 296 territorial conflicts, there were 19 cases (6.4%) in the European region, 42 (14.2%) in the Middle East, 91 (30.7%) in Asia, 120 cases (40.5%) in Africa and 24 (8.1%) in Americas. As in COW data, UCDP data also indicate that conflicts were concentrated in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (see Chart 1.7).

Chart 1.6. Post-WW II intra-state conflicts by type of incompatibility






Chart 1.7. Post-WW II Conflicts (1945-2015) by region



2.2. The end result of the conflicts in the state: victory, reconciliation, impasse ...


According to the COW data, in 422 cases of inter-state conflict that occurred in the 1816-2007 period, in 218 (51.7%) states are victorious while in 101 cases (23.9%) the rebels. Only 43 (10.2%) cases have been concluded with a settlement. On the other hand, in 28 cases the conflicts turned into another type of conflict, in 2 cases conflicts have continued since 2007, in 16 cases the situation reached a deadlock, and finally, in 14 cases the intensity of conflicts went beyond intra-state conflict (see Chart 1.8).

Chart 1.8. Forms of Termination of Intra-State Conflicts (1816-2007)



In the period of 1945-2007, out of 234 conflicts, 97 (41.4%) have resulted in a government's victory, 52 (22.2%) in rebels' victory and in 41 (17.5%) a compromise had been reached. The number of cases that have turned into other types of conflict is 16, the number of conflicts in progress is 2, the number of cases that resulted in a deadlock is 13, and finally, the number of cases in which the intensity of conflict is decreasing is 13 (see Chart 1.9).

Chart 1.9. Post-WW II by Forms of Termination of Intra-State Conflicts (1945-2007)



The data above draws attention to three issues. Firstly, almost all of the conflicts that ended with a settlement (41 out of 43 cases) took place after 1945. It seems that the tendency towards reconciliation in the solution of the intra-state conflicts has developed after the Second World War. Secondly, there is a notable decline in the rate of cases the states have won. Finally, there the rate of conflicts resulting in rebels' victory is steady (22-24%).

2.3. Casualties

According to COW, which records the losses of states in 223 cases in 422 conflicts within the two-hundred-year-long period, the total loss of lives amounts to 2,743,790 and the average number of casualties is 12,304. The number of cases in which the losses of the rebels are registered is 195. From these cases, the total losses of the rebels amount to 3,303,663, lives and the average loss is 16,942. The number of cases in which the losses of both the state and the rebels were recorded was 167. In these cases, the death toll on behalf of states was 2,574,315 while on average 15,415 people lost their lives. On the other hand, the total casualties of the rebels are 3,278,022, while the average is 19,628. In general, a total of 5,852,338 people lost their lives and an average of 35,043 people died in each intra-state conflict (see Chart 1.10 and Chart 1.11).⁵

Chart 1.10. Fatalities in Intra-state conflicts (1816-2007)






Chart 1.11. Average number of fatalities in intra-state conflicts (1816-2007)



⁵ When evaluating the number of casualties, an assessment that will take into account the population of each country and the region in which each case has taken place will produce a healthier picture. Since there is no data on this subject in the mentioned data sets, the loss of life is considered in the context of general totals and average values.

The number of casualties in the post-WWII period has only been recorded in 87 cases out of 234. A total of 2,273,897 people lost their lives. The average loss of life in each conflict was 26.136, while the average number of deaths on the side of the state was 7,995, and on the side of the rebels 18,141.

Chart 1.12. Post-WWII average number of fatalities in intra-state conflicts (1945-2007)



Analysis of the data in the charts shows that after the Second World War, the number of casualties in intra-state conflicts has dropped from 35 to 26 thousand lives. This decline is mainly due to the decline in the losses of the state side of the conflicts. When we look at the cases recorded since 1816, the loss of lives of the states is reduced from approximately 15,000 to 8,000. This is probably due to the development of the state's capacities.

Both UCDP and COW data do not allow for separate calculations of deaths of state and non-state sides. In addition, only records of "battle-related deaths" are kept for the post-1989 period. Since year-based data are available in each case, revealing data for all countries requires extensive work. For this reason, only 20 countries where at least 1,000 people have lost their lives due to incompatibility concerning territory, as in the case of Turkey, were included. These data can be seen in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1. Fatalities in conflicts concerning territory (1989-2015)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Population (2015) (in millions)</i>	<i>Period</i>	<i>Battle-related deaths</i>		
			<i>Best estimate of deaths</i>	<i>Low estimate of deaths</i>	<i>High estimate of deaths</i>
Azerbaijan	9,8	1991-2015	5.141	4.612	9.735
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3,8	1992-1995	13.457	11.194	23.781
Indonesia	256,7	1992-2005	3.484	3.311	4.552
Ethiopia	99,4	1989-2015	47.223	46.906	67.772
Philippines	100,7	1989-2015	7.499	7.139	8.925
Georgia	4	1992-2008	2.959	2.959	4.827
Croatia	4,2	1992-1995	1.329	891	3.122
India	1.311,10	1989-2015	28.750	28.347	34.802
Iraq	36,4	1989-1996	2.035	2.035	3.467
Israel	8,1	1989-2014	7.365	7.095	8.426
Myanmar	53,9	1989-2015	10.268	9.744	17.636
Nigeria	182,2	2004-2015	2.044	2.041	3.155
Russia	143,5	1990-2015	21.120	20.575	38.549
Senegal	15,1	1990-2011	1.373	372	1.610
Serbia	8,9	1991-1999	5.773	4.789	9.677
Sri Lanka	20,7	1989-2009	60.785	60.635	74.153
Syria	18,5	2012-2015	13.342	13.188	14.083
Turkey	78,7	1989-2015	27.450	27.421	32.820
Ukraine	44,8	2014-2015	5.570	5.017	6.250
Yemen	26,8	1994-2015	1.735	1.529	3.504

See: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, <http://ucdp.uu.se>

Note: The numbers show the total loss of lives in the countries. In some countries, there have been conflicts in more than one region during the given period.

Source: Prepared using the Uppsala Conflict Data Program data. Population data were obtained from the United Nations Human Development Report (2015). The data is accessible on the internet.

3. Peace agreements in the world

The UCDP also holds records of peace treaties along with conflict data. The UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset prepared for the period 1975-2011 is an important resource to study conflict resolution and social peacebuilding. The following sub-section presents a general picture of the peace treaties signed in the world over the period in question.

3.1. Peace treaties signed in intra-state conflicts

According to the UCDP data, 196 peace agreements in different forms were signed between 1975-2011 in 44 countries from five continents. Table 1.2 shows the distribution of these countries according to the continents.

There are seven countries where the peace agreement was achieved in Europe: Yugoslavia, the United Kingdom, Moldova, Macedonia, Georgia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The only case in the Middle East where peace treaties were signed is the Israeli-Palestinian case. Peace treaties were signed in nine countries in Asia. These countries are: Tajikistan, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Nepal, Indonesia, India, Cambodia, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. Africa is the continent where the most peace treaties were signed. Peace agreements were signed in 23 countries: Zimbabwe, Uganda, Sudan, South Africa, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Senegal, Rwanda, Niger, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mali, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, DR Congo, Djibouti, Congo, Comoros, Chad, Central African Republic, Burundi and Angola. Finally, treaties were signed in five countries in the Americas: Mexico, Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador and Colombia.

As seen in Table 1.2, most of the internal conflicts that ended with a peace agreement were conflicts concerning governments. There are fewer peace treaties signed in conflicts over a given territory. All but one of the peace treaties signed in Europe were in territorial conflicts. It seems that there is a balance in Asia in terms of agreements reached in conflicts over the government and territory. The vast majority of the treaties in Africa have been made in intra-state conflicts over governments. Finally, all of the peace treaties in the Americas involve intra-state conflicts concerning governments.

Table 1.2. Peace Treaties by continents (1975-2011)

<i>Continent</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of Treaties</i>	<i>Years</i>
Europe	Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Kosovo)	2	1991, 1999
	United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	1	1998
	Moldova (Transnistria)	1	1997
	Macedonia (Government)	1	2001
	Georgia (Abkhazia)	1	1994
	Croatia (Serb)	1	1995
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	1994, 1995
Middle East	Israel (Palestine)	8	1993, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2007
Asia	Tajikistan (Government)	5	1995, 1996, 1997, 1997, 1997
	Philippines (Mindanao)	4	1976, 1987, 1996, 2001
	Philippines (Government)	1	1995
	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	3	1991, 1994, 2001
	Nepal (Government)	4	2006, 2006, 2006, 2006
	Indonesia	2	2002, 2005
	India (Tripura)	2	1988, 1993
	Cambodia (Government)	1	1991
	Bangladeshi (Chittagong)	1	1997
	Afghanistan (Government)	2	1993, 1996
Africa	Zimbabwe (Government)	2	1975, 1979
	Uganda (Government)	10	1985, 1988, 2002, 2007, 2007, 2008, 2008, 2008, 2008, 2008
	Sudan (Government)	13	1988, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2004, 2004, 2004, 2005, 2005, 2005, 2006, 2010, 2011
	South Africa (Namibia)	1	1978
	South Africa (Government)	5	1990, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993
	Somalia (Government)	5	1993, 1994, 1997, 2008, 2008
	Sierra Leone (Government)	3	1996, 1999, 2000
	Senegal (Casamance)	1	2004
	Ruanda (Government)	6	1991, 1992, 1993, 1993, 1993, 1993
	Niger (Government)	1	1993
	Niger (Air and Azawad)	2	1994, 1995
	Mozambique (Government)	6	1984, 1991, 1991, 1991, 1992, 1992
	Mauritania (Western Sahara)	1	1991
	Mali (Azawad)	2	1991, 1992
	Liberia (Government)	11	1990, 1990, 1990, 1991, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2003, 2003
	Ivory Coast	9	2003, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2007, 2007, 2007, 2008
	Guinea Bissau (Government)	1	1998
	DR Congo (Government)	6	1999, 2001, 2002, 2002, 2003, 2009
	Djibouti (Government)	3	1994, 2000, 2001
	Congo (Government)	1	1999
	Comoros (Anjouan)	3	2000, 2001, 2003
	Chad (Government)	14	1978, 1978, 1979, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2006
	Central African Republic (Government)	2	2007, 2008
	Burundi (Government)	8	2000, 2006, 2006, 2008, 2002, 2003, 2003, 2003
	Angola (Government)	4	1989, 1991, 1994, 2002
	Angola (Cabinda)	1	2006
	Americas	Mexico (Government)	1
Haiti (Government)		1	1993
Guatemala (Government)		16	1990, 1991, 1991, 1994, 1994, 1994, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1996, 1996, 1996, 1996, 1996, 1996
El Salvador (Government)		9	1990, 1991, 1991, 1992, 1992, 1990, 1990, 1999, 1991,
Colombia (Government)		4	1991, 1999, 2001, 2002

Looking at the peace treaties that have been made in intra-state conflicts over territory, it seems that these kinds of treaties have been made in the four continents except for the Americas. It is seen that peace treaties have been signed in 19 countries, 6 in Europe, 1 in the Middle East, 5 in Asia and 7 in Africa. The countries where peace has been achieved in Europe are: Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Kosovo), the UK (Northern Ireland), Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia), Croatia (Serbs) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croats and Serbs). The only case in the Middle East is the Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty. Peace treaties are signed across Asia in the Philippines (Mindanao), Papua New Guinea (Bougainville), Indonesia (Aceh), India (Tripura) and Bangladesh (Chittagong). Finally, the countries where peace treaties are signed in Africa are South Africa (Namibia), Senegal (Casamance), Niger (Air and Azawad), Mauritania (Western Sahara), Mali (Azawad), Comoros (Anjouan) and Angola (Cabinda) (see Table 1.3).

Table 1.3. Peace Treaties in Intra-state conflicts concerning territories

<i>Continent</i>	<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of Treaties</i>	<i>Years</i>
Europe	Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Kosovo)	2	1991, 1999
	United Kingdom (Northern Ireland)	1	1998
	Moldova (Transnistria)	1	1997
	Georgia (Abkhazia)	1	2001
	Croatia (Serb)	1	1994
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	1995
			2
Middle East	Israel (Palestine)	8	1993, 1994, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998, 2007
Asia	Philippines (Mindanao)	4	1976, 1987, 1996, 2001
	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	3	1991, 1994, 2001
	Indonesia	2	2002, 2005
	India (Tripura)	2	1988, 1993
	Bangladesh (Chittagong)	1	1997
Africa	South Africa (Namibia)	1	1978
	Senegal (Casamance)	1	2004
	Niger (Air and Azawad)	2	1994, 1995
	Mauritania (Western Sahara)	1	1991
	Mali (Azawad)	2	1991, 1992
	Comoros (Anjouan)	3	2000, 2001, 2003
	Angola (Cabinda)	1	2006

3.2. Third parties in peace treaties

According to UCDP data, out of the 196 peace treaties signed in 44 countries, in 29 countries and 164 agreements a third party was involved, while in the remaining 15 countries and 32 agreements, a third party was not involved. It means that in 83.7% of these treaties a third party was involved. In terms of countries, in two out of three countries involved in an internal conflict, a third party partakes in the peace agreement.

In terms of the results of the 196 peace treaties signed, the number of cases in which one of the parties withdrew or broke the agreement was 65 (33%) and the number of successful cases was 131 (67%). When the results of the peace treaties are analyzed according to the types of conflicts, it is seen that 156 of the 196 peace agreements were reached in conflicts over the government and 40 in conflicts over a territory. The success rate of peace treaties signed in conflicts concerning government is 65% (101 cases), whereas this rate is 75% (30 cases) in cases concerning territory.

When 164 peace treaties involving third parties are examined separately, the number of cases in which the treaty was broken was 59 (36%) and in 105 (64%) cases the treaties were successful. The number of cases that failed in the 32 peace treaties in which the third parties were not involved was 6 (19%). According to the UCDP data, in intra-state conflicts, the success rate is higher in agreements signed without third parties. This demonstrates that the fact that the presence of a third party in the peace treaty as a signatory does not guarantee success.

It is worth noting that there are different ways in which a third party can be involved in conflict resolution and peacebuilding and these different forms of involvement affect the peace process. For example, Nimet F. Beriker, in his study of foreign policy instruments in the context of conflict resolution and international relations theories, classifies these instruments into transformative and structural interventions. He distinguishes four types of transformative intervention and six types of structural intervention. Beriker also notes that the inclusion of these ten types of third parties' participation should be approached in conjunction with the roles of the actors who are directly involved in the conflicts. He describes the 14 different roles of the parties under the title of problem-solving diplomacy and traditional diplomacy. Beriker on the axis of "Relational/Strategic" and "Structural/Procedural" in the Foreign Policy

Circle model examines the sides of the conflict and third parties involved and classifies 24 different roles in eight main groups.⁶

In fact, some studies on internal conflicts suggest that there is no statistically significant relationship between the success of conflict resolution and reconciliation processes and the involvement of third parties, and underline the critical role of domestic institutions.⁷ In contrast, some studies have shown that multilateral and multidimensional third-party participation with comprehensive civil functions, including economic restructuring, institutional reforms, and election observation, has significantly increased the success of peacebuilding.⁸

3.3. Critical issues in peace treaties

UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset contains data pertaining to conflict resolution and social peacebuilding treaties, as well as arms/violence-related issues, administrative and territorial issues, transitional justice, provisions for the implementation of the agreements, the success of the processes and recurrence of conflicts.

Looking at the content of the peace treaties, it appears that 57 of the 196 treaties (29%) were full agreements covering all of the disputed issues. The number of partial agreements covering specific disputes is 100 (51%). Finally, 39 (20%) treaties involve initiating a process to end conflicts and solve problems.

6 Beriker, F. Nimet, "Uyuşmazlıkların Barışçıl Çözümü ve Liberal Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı: Dış Siyaset Araçlarına Bütüncül bir Yaklaşım," Nimet Beriker (ed.), *Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya: Kuramlar, Süreçler ve Uygulamalar*, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009: 1-31; Beriker, Nimet, "Conflict resolution. The missing link between liberal international relations theory and realistic practice," Dennis J. D. Sandole, Sean Byrne, Ingrid Sandole-Staroste and Jessica Senehi (Eds.), *Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution*, London: Routledge, 2009, pg. 256-271.


7 Dubey, Amitabh, "Domestic Institutions and the Duration of Civil War Settlement", *International Studies Association Annual Meetings*, 24-27 March, 2002, New Orleans.

8 Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *The American Political Science Review*, 94: 4 (2000), pg. 779-801; Fortna, Virginia A., "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly*, 48 (2004), pg. 269-292.

The issue of weapons/violence

Critical issues in the context of arms and violence are; a cease-fire, the involvement of rebels in the army, and disarmament. In the 196 peace agreements, the number of cases of ceasefire or cessation of hostilities was 114 (58%). On the other hand, there are no such provisions in 82 cases. In 68 peace treaties (35%), it is envisaged that a new national army would be created or the rebels would be integrated into the army. In the text of 80 (41%) treaties disarmament of rebels and integration were mentioned. The number of incidents involving various aspects of arms and violence, such as those mentioned above, is 140 (71%) (see Chart 1.13).


Chart 1.13. Weapons/violence related regulations in peace agreements (1975-2011)



Administrative / governmental issues

In the context of administrative or governmental affairs, 30 (15%) treaties contain rights for the rebel group to transform into a political party. In addition, while 32 (16%) agreements included provisions for the inclusion of the insurgent group into the government, 20 (10%) treaties stipulated integration of rebels into civil service. On the other hand, 68 (35%) treaties envisage elections or electoral reform, while 46 (23%) treaties provide for the integration of the rebel group in the interim government. Finally, 24 (12%) agreements stipulate extensive power-sharing. In brief, the number of peace treaties containing any of the above listed administrative issues is 115 (57%) (see Chart 1.14).


Chart 1.14. Government-related regulations in peace agreements (1975-2011)



Territorial issues

In terms of the regulation of territorial disputes, 18 (9%) of the 196 peace treaties grant autonomy to the disputed territory, 9 (5%) treaties provide for federal-state solution and 2 (1%) treaties guarantee the independence of the territory. Nine (5%) of the treaties envisage a referendum to determine the status of the disputed territory. On the other hand, 9 (5%) agreements grant power-sharing with the local government. The number of treaties that provided regional development to disputed regions was 15 (8%), while the number of treaties that provided cultural freedoms such as language, flags, and anthems in schools was 18 (9%). Finally, 30 (15%) of the agreements, through changes to municipal regulations, stipulate power within local government (limited autonomy). The number of treaties containing any of the territorial arrangements, such as the above regulations, is 60 (31%) (see Chart 1.15).

Chart 1.15. Territory-related regulations in peace agreements (1975-2011)




Considering the type of conflict and looking at the territorial arrangements, in 34 out of 40 resolved territorial conflicts, peace treaty contained one of the above-mentioned territorial regulations. On the other hand, among the 156 peace agreements terminating disputes concerning government, only 26 treaties provide territorial regulations. In other words, 85% of the peace agreements reached in territorial conflicts involve territorial regulations, and only 17% of the peace treaties in conflicts concerning government carry territorial stipulations.

Justice Issues

Issues addressed in the context of the justice issue are general amnesties, release of detainees and prisoners, national reconciliation and the return of refugees. The 196 peace treaties include general amnesty in 56 cases (29%), release of detainees and prisoners in 65 cases (33%), the concept of national reconciliation in 50 cases (26%) and, finally, return of refugees in 61 (31%) cases. The number of peace treaties in which any of the above four justice provisions are present is 126 (64%) (see Chart 1.16).


Chart 1.16. Justice-related regulations in peace agreements (1975-2011)



Provisions for the implementation of treaties

With regard to the implementation of the agreements, the first important issue is whether earlier agreements are reaffirmed or not. The number of such treaties is 53 (27%). 55 (28%) treaties outline a negotiation agenda which determines conflicts/incompatibilities to be addressed. On the other hand, 37 (19%) treaties include Peace-Keeping Operations. Finally, the number of cases requiring the establishment of a commission or committee to oversee the implementation of the peace treaty is 67 (34%) (see Chart 1.17).

Chart 1.17. Implementation-related regulations in peace agreements (1975-2011)



The question of success and return of violence

After weapons/violence related issues, administrative, territorial issues, justice and implementation matters, UCDP finally records the success rate of peace treaties. The basic criterion here is whether any of the parties returned to violence within 5 years since the agreement. Of the 195 peace treaties signed, in 78 (40%) cases violence resumed within 5 years, while in 117 (60%) cases permanent peace was achieved (see Chart 1.18).

Upon a closer examination of the cases in which violence was resumed, it is seen that it occurred in 66 internal conflicts concerning government and in 12 wars concerning territory. In other words, in the peace treaties provided in conflicts over the government, the rate of recurrence of violence within the next five years is 43%, while in case of territorial conflicts the rate is 30% (see Chart 1.19)

Chart 1.18. Permanent peace and return of violence in peace agreements (1975-2011)





Chart 1.19. Return of violence by the type of conflict (1975-2011) (%)



Conclusion

In this chapter, internal conflicts and peace processes from around the world were discussed. A general picture of the events on the global scale has been presented, showing that the Kurdish issue bears similarities with the conflicts in different times and places. With regard to many issues in Turkey, including the Kurdish issue and conflict, there is a belief in Turkish exceptionalism, its “specific conditions.” As this chapter demonstrates, conflicts concerning the government or a particular territory are not unique to us. For the last two centuries, especially after the Second World War, there have been and continue to be intra-state conflicts on almost five continents and in dozens of countries.

The number of intra-state conflicts and the quest for solutions are so large that it allows quantitative analysis of the subject. As a result, there are many projects that regularly collect data and share data sets with the public. Two prominent projects are COW and UCDP. Using the data from these two projects, a quantitative picture of both intra-state conflicts and quests for peace on a global scale was put forward. In order to present a general picture of the conflicts, mainly COW data was used, while UCDP data was used to create a picture of the search for peace.

As COW data reveals, intra-state conflicts take place in five parts of the world. In the period after WWII, such conflicts are concentrated in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. However, they are also present in Europe and America. Although a majority of the wars are socio-political disputes over the government, a considerable number of conflicts stem from disputes concerning territories within the country. Whereas the most common result of the conflicts is a military victory of the governments, the incidents that resulted in the military victory of the rebels, though not as numerous as the governments, exist. On the other hand, conciliation

based on negotiations has emerged as an important option, especially after World War II. From the point of view of fatalities, from 1816-2007, some six million people lost their lives in internal conflicts. After World War II, it is seen that the lives lost by the rebels are about twice the lives lost by the states. The average loss of the state is 8,000, while for the rebel forces it is 18,000. The average death toll in each case is over 26,000.

After the Second World War, with the increased number of peace treaties based on negotiations, peace agreements have been signed in many countries. According to the UCDP data, between 1975 and 2011, peace agreements were signed in conflicts over the government and in conflicts over territory in dozens of countries on all continents. The most important negotiation chapters that stand out in such peace treaties are:

- Third parties involved,
- Violence/weapon issue (disarmament of rebels and integration into the army, the establishment of a new army, cease-fire etc.),
- Administrative issues and issues related to the government (power-sharing, co-opting rebels into the government, referendum, electoral reform, etc.),
- Territorial issues (autonomy, federation, independence, strengthening local governments, cultural freedoms, etc.),
- The issue of justice (general amnesty, the release of detainees and prisoners, the return of refugees, national reconciliation, etc.)
- Implementation issues (including the creation of a negotiation agenda, the involvement of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of a committee to monitor implementation, etc.).

More than half of the peace treaties signed during the period were successful. On the other hand, success rates differ considerably according to the type of a conflict. In general, the peace treaties provided in conflicts over territory are more permanent than in the conflicts over governments.

In this chapter, a quantitative picture of the intra-state conflicts and the quest for peace has been put forward on a global scale. The next chapter discusses the main parameters that determine the formation of such conflicts.

2

INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: BASIC PARAMETERS

The conflict rooted in the Kurdish issue has been continuing since 1984, with some interruptions, despite the search for dialogue and reconciliation. Though more than thirty years have passed and it has led to a massive socioeconomic and spatial devastation, resulting in numerous casualties, the international knowledge and experience in the field of conflict resolution have not been fully exploited to this date. In the political sphere such efforts have increased considerably in recent years and some attempts have been made to share the experiences of political actors and non-governmental organizations.

In the academia, the picture is more barren. Although has faced for many years such serious problems as the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish conflict, there is a very limited body of research regarding different periods and places where fights have taken place. Parallel to the political field, in recent years, centers for conflict resolution have been established within a few universities, and studies on Kurdish conflict have been and are being conducted. However, a very limited number of publications in Turkish on conflict processes, conflict resolution and peace building show that the issue of political resolution and peace building in the Kurdish conflict is not adequately addressed in the light of world experiences.

In order to be able to examine the possibilities of a dialogue and reconciliation in the Kurdish conflict in the light of international experiences, the literature on conflict resolution in the context of "intra-state conflicts" is briefly discussed. The emergence of conflicts, the processes shaping it, negotiations and the main parameters that determine conflicts are discussed below. In this context, firstly, literature on the cases similar to the Kurdish conflict is examined and the definition and fundamental features of an intra-state conflict are analyzed. Secondly, the issue of terminating inter-state conflicts is debated. Thirdly, the structural dynamics of the cross-border and international dimensions that determine the conflict resolution are analyzed. Fourthly, the structural dynamics of the country which go beyond the actors' ability to change or cannot be changed in a short run are discussed. After having discusses structural dynamics in the national, cross-border/regional and international dimensions, finally, the variables connected to the actors are being examined.

1. Intra-state conflicts

Intra-state or internal armed conflicts are a 20th century phenomenon. There is a great deal of literature on the dynamics that determine the emergence, shaping, duration and termination forms of such conflicts. Before discussing these dynamics, it is necessary to describe intra-state conflict. In order to describe such processes, three concepts come to the fore in the literature of the subject: intra-state conflict/war¹², asymmetric conflicts/wars³, and civil war/conflict⁴.

In COW's first classification in 1982⁵, wars in the world were divided into two groups: international wars and civil wars. According to COW's war typology,

The classification of civil war was built on three dimensions: internality, types of participants, and the degree of effective resistance. In general, a civil war was defined as any armed conflict that involved; (1) military action internal to the metropole of the state system member; (2) the active participation of the national government; (3) effective resistance by both sides; and (4) a total of at least 1,000 battle-deaths during each year of the war.⁶

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- 1 In this study, the concept of intra-state conflict is used for three reasons. First, intra-state conflict is a broader concept involving the other two concepts. Secondly, the Kurdish conflict has the basic features of an intra-state conflict. Finally, The Correlates of War (COW) Project, which is the most comprehensive quantitative data on international intra-state conflicts, classifies the Kurdish conflict as such.
 - 2 Hartzell, Caroline A., "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43: 1 (1999), pg. 3-22.
 - 3 Mack, Andrew, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics*, 27:2 (1975), pg. 175-200; Arreguin-Toft, Ivan, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*, 26: 1 (2001), pg. 93-128.
 - 4 Pearson, Frederic S. vd., "Rethinking Models of Civil War Settlement," *International Interactions*, 32 (2006), pg. 109-128.
 - 5 Small, Melvin and Singer, J. David, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816-1980*, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage, 1982, pg. 205-206.
 - 6 Sarkees, Meredith R., *The COW Typology of War: Defining and Categorizing Wars ("Version 4 of the Data")*, The Correlates of War Project, pg. 5, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war/the-cow-typology-of-war-defining-and-categorizing-wars/view>, Accessed: 27.01.2017. For more details see: Sarkees, Meredith and Whelon, Frank, *Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, Intra-state, and Non-State Wars, 1816-2007*, Washington, DC, CQ_Press, 2010.

M. Small and JD Singer, COW academics, expanded their studies and have identified two criteria to define effective resistance: “(a) both sides had to be initially organized for violent conflict and prepared to resist the attacks of their antagonists, or (b) the weaker side, although initially unprepared, is able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five percent of the number of fatalities it sustains.”⁷

COW expanded the typology of wars between 1994 and 2000. Based on the status of the fighters, the COW identified nine types of war that can be organized into four categories: (1) inter-state wars, (2) extra-state wars, (3) non-state wars, and (4) intra-state wars. Inter-state wars, as the name suggests, include wars between internationally recognized states. Extra-state wars involve two types of war: colonial and imperial. A colonial war is a war with a colony while imperial war is a war between non-state actors against a state. Non-state wars take place between actors who are not members of the state system and go beyond the borders of a state, and there are two different types. The first includes conflicts that take place in a non-state territory or in the territories of an autonomous region. The second point is the cross-border conflicts that take place between non-state structures and that have occurred in the borders of two or more states.

Intra-state wars include conflicts taking place within a member state recognized by the state system and include four different types of wars. Firstly, there are regional civil wars. These include wars between a local or regional government (not the central government) and non-state entities in a region within a state. Secondly, there are inter-communal wars, which include combat between at least two communities. The third and fourth types of intra-state wars are classified as civil wars. The war between a government and non-state actors to capture or retain control of the central government is the first type of a civil war. Disputes between a government and non-state actors over a local or regional issue constitute the second type of civil war.⁸ Table 2.1. shows two modes of war typology according to COW.

7 Small and Singer, *Ibid.*, pg. 215.

8 Sarkees, Meredith R., *Codebook for the Intra-State Wars v.4.0. Definition and Variables*, The Correlates of War Project, pg. 2, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/datasets/COW-war/intra-state-war-data-codebook>, Accessed: 27.01.2017.

Table 2.1. War typology according to COW

<i>Classic war typology</i>	<i>Expanded war typology</i>
1. International wars	1. Inter-state wars (Type 1)
- Between states	
- Extra-systemic	2. Extra-state wars
- Colonial	- Colonial wars with a colony (Type 2)
- Imperial	- imperial war with non-state entities (Type 3)
	3. Non-state wars
	- Wars in a non-state territory (type 4)
	- Cross-border wars (Type 5)
2. Intra-state wars	4. Intra-state wars
	- Regional internal wars (Type 6)
	- Inter-communal wars (Type 7)
	- Civil wars
	- for control of central government (Type 8)
	- over regional/local issue (Type 9)

Source: Sarkees, Meredith R., Codebook for the Intra-State Wars v.4.0. Definition and Variables, The Correlates of War Project, pg. 2.

With the criteria that COW has identified for intra-state conflicts in mind, some scholars have suggested different categorization. Monica D. Toft underlines six criteria for defining intra-state conflicts. According to her, (1) what constitutes the basis of the war is control over which group would govern the political unit; (2) there must be at least two groups of organized combatants; (3) one of the combatants must be an internationally recognized state; (4) there are least 1,000 battle deaths per year on average; (5) the ratio of total deaths is at least 95 percent to 5 percent, and (6) the war must begin within the boundaries of an internationally recognized state.⁹

According to Roy Licklider, a frequently referred scholar on the issue of intra-state conflicts, for a conflict to be defined as intra-state, at least two other criteria, additional to COW's, must be met. First, there must

⁹ Toft, Monica D., "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?," *International Security*, 34:4 (2010), pg. 7-36.

be effective leadership who is sufficiently interested in la coexistence within the same political structure after the conflict. Secondly, “multiple-sovereignty,” as conceptualized by Charles Tilly, must be found.¹⁰ In other words, the people of a territory “pay taxes, provide men to its (rebel) armies, feed its functionaries, honor its symbols, give time to its service, or yield other resources despite the prohibitions of a still-existing government they formerly obeyed.”¹¹

2. Termination of intra-state wars

Many scholars working on civil wars state that such conflicts are more difficult to terminate than inter-state wars.¹² Unlike in the case of inter-state wars, parties in an intra-state conflict must coexist within the same political boundaries and co-operate in the common government after the conflict. In R. Licklider’s view “the consensus is particularly difficult, because the issue is the control of the new government, and thus, with the full meaning of the words, the control over the life and death of the fighters.”¹³ Indeed, the rate of intra-state conflicts that have ended with negotiations is very low in comparison with inter-state wars. In the 1991 study, Stephen J. Stedman shows that about 15% of the internal conflicts ended with negotiations.¹⁴

R. Licklider’s research of intra-state conflict between 1945 and 1993 shows that while only 14 (25%) of the 57 intra-state conflicts ended with negotiations, 43 terminated as a result of a military victory.¹⁵ M.D. Toft’s study of the conflicts between 1940 and 2002 reveals a similar picture.

10 Licklider, Roy, “The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993,” *The American Political Sciences Review*, 95:3 (1995), pg. 681-690.

11 Tilly, Charles, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, New York, Random House, 1978, pg. 192.

12 Bell, J. Bowyer, “Societal Patterns and Lessons: The Irish Case,” Robin Higham (Ed.), *Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century*, Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1972, pg. 218; Ikle, Fred C., *Every War Must End*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1971, pg. 95; Modelski George, “International Settlement of Internal Wars,” James N. Rosenau (Ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strive*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964, pg. 125-126; Pillar, Paul R., *Negotiation Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983, pg. 24-5; Zartman, I. William, “The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts,” Roy Licklider (Ed.), *Stopping the Killing*, New York, New York University Press, 1993; Zartman, I. William, *Elusive Peace: Negotiation an End to Civil Wars 1995-1996*, Washington, Brookings Institute, 1995.

13 Licklider, *Ibid.*, pg. 681.

14 Stedman, Stephen J., *Peacemaking in civil war: International mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*, Boulder, Colo, Lynne Rienner, 1990.

15 Licklider, *Ibid.*

According to Toft's findings, of 113 intra-state conflicts of that period, 22 (19%) ended with negotiations, 79 (70%) with a military victory and 12 (11%) resulted in a ceasefire/stalemate.¹⁶

In addition to the difficulties and scarcity of intra-state conflicts terminated by negotiations, there is also an important debate on the effectiveness of negotiation-based reconciliation/resolution. Some academics argue that intra-state conflicts, which result in a military victory of one side, are more effective than negotiation-based ones.¹⁷ According to this argument, the likelihood of recurrence of a conflict which ended with negotiations is higher than in the case of a military victory.¹⁸ It is due to the fact that negotiation-based solutions enable parties to protect their human and material resources and re-mobilize their organizational structures for a new intra-state conflict.¹⁹ In other words, "dual sovereignty" or "multiple sovereignty" conceptualized by Tilly as "revolutionary situation" continues to exist. In addition, negotiation-based solutions save lives and promote democratization for only a short term. However, in the long run, both peace and democratization end after the first or second post-conflict elections.²⁰ Notwithstanding, when internal conflicts result in a victory of one side, the capacity of the defeated side to resume conflict will either be very low or will be nonexistent altogether. It is necessary to "give war a chance" in order to increase the likelihood of lasting peace and successful reconstruction after the conflict.²¹ In this sense, in order to end the conflicts, interventions preventing ultimate victory and exhaustions should not be allowed.²²

On the other hand, academicians who focus on negotiation-based solution argue that it is important for former combatants to take part in post-conflict political, economic and social reconstruction processes. The provision of such a situation would reduce the likelihood of repetition of intra-state conflicts and increase the likelihood of creating and strengthening a democratic regime and political space while preserving

16 Toft, *Ibid.*

17 Luttwak, Edward, N., "Give War a Chance", *Foreign Affairs*, 78:4 (1999), pg. 36-44; Licklider, *Ibid.*

18 Toft, *Ibid.*

19 Wagner, R. Harrison, "The Causes of Peace", Roy Licklider (Ed.), *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*, New York, New York University Press, 1993, pg. 235-268.

20 Toft, *Ibid.*

21 Luttwak, *Ibid.*

22 Wagner, *Ibid.*; Luttwak, *Ibid.*; Licklider, *Ibid.*

peace.²³ J. Michael Quinn, T. David Mason and Mehmet Gurses quantitative research shows that negotiated solutions supported by international peacekeeping operations have provided a more lasting peace than solutions based on the military victory of governments.²⁴

In research based on quantitative methods, which has an important place in the literature on the termination of state conflicts, many factors are considered in the analysis of the termination of conflicts and the post-conflict peace sustainability. The model, developed by Quinn, Mason and Gurses, represents this approach quite well. According to this model,

any factor that (a) decreases the probability of victory [...], (b) decreases the payoffs from victory [...], (c) increases the rate at which the cost of conflict is absorbed, [...] (d) increases the duration of the war [...] or (e) increases the payoffs from maintaining the status quo should increase that actor's incentive to sustain peace rather than resume conflict. One difference between initial onset and recurrence of civil war is that the experience of the previous war enables protagonists in the post-civil war environment to estimate more realistically the expected costs and benefits of resuming armed conflict.²⁵

Despite the significant limits of “rational choice theory” on which this model is based, the above factors allow consider the cross-border/regional and international dynamics, the structural dynamics at the national scale, and the actor-based dynamics at the same time and in a relational perspective.

3. Cross-border and international structural dynamics

The literature on the emergence, shaping and termination of intra-state conflict draws, in general, attention to both structural and actor-based dynamics. In terms of basic structural dynamics on the cross-border and international level, the effects of the Cold War and the situation in the neighboring countries of a state in conflict are emphasized.

23 Hartzell, Caroline A. and Hoddie, Matthew, “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 40:3 (2003), pg. 303-320; Hartzell, Caroline A. and Hoddie, Matthew, *Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars*, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007; Toft, *Ibid.*

24 Quinn, J. Michale, Mason, T. David, and Gurses, Mehmet, “Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of Civil War Recurrence,” *International Interactions*, 33 (2007), pg. 167-193.

25 Quinn, Mason and Gurses, *Ibid.*, pg. 175-176.

Some empirical studies show that ethnic conflicts have increased considerably in the post-Cold War era. In these works, it is argued that the end of the Cold War provoked ethnic conflicts. However, Robert T. Gurr's data show that ethnic conflicts have increased since the 1960s, but have fallen noticeably since the mid-1990s.²⁶ Toft's findings based on a quantitative analysis of intra-state conflicts between 1940 and 2002 finds support Gurr's argument. Toft's study suggests that the end of the Cold War played a critical role in the formation of forms of cessation of conflicts. While the rate of intra-state conflicts that ended with negotiations until the 1990's was 41%, only a few of them were between 1940 and 1989. Two-thirds of the intra-state conflicts of the 1990's was concluded by negotiation. Similarly, while in 1990's rate of intra-state conflict resulting in a cease-fire/equilibrium was 20%, in the previous decade only a few cases can be mentioned.²⁷ Toft explains in two ways the increasing influence of the Cold War on negotiation-based solutions. Firstly, the international context in which the US and Soviet Union were two centers of power changed, and the motivation for providing weapons to the combatants of the superpowers' warfare was lost. Secondly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States remained the sole superpower and the pressure on moral responsibility in the ongoing conflicts in the world increased.²⁸

In her work on the relationship between intra-state conflicts and the duration of peace and the involvement of international actors in the process, Virginia A. Fortna reveals that the Cold War is a breaking point in the participation of the third parties in the peacekeeping process. The author shows that the roles of third parties have changed remarkably during the Cold War and in internal conflicts. She points out that the international community, which had previously been indifferent to peacekeeping in intra-state conflicts, intervened in many cases after the end of the Cold War and tried to preserve peace.²⁹ Indeed, since the 1990's there has been a remarkable increase in the number of intra-state conflicts that ended in negotiations and peace treaties.³⁰

26 Gurr, T. Robert, *People versus states*, Washington, DC, USIP, 2000.

27 Toft, *Ibid.*

28 Toft, *Ibid.*

29 Fortna, Virginia A., "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly*, 48 (2004), pg. 269-292.

30 Brandt *Ibid.*; Hartzell, Caroline A., "Structuring the Peace: Negotiated Settlements and the Construction of Conflict Management Institutions," T. David Mason and James D. Meernik

In addition to the end of the Cold War, some researchers suggest that the regional characteristics of the country in which the intra-state conflict takes place should be considered as a dynamic that determines the formation of conflicts. According to this approach, neighboring countries can play a critical role in the formation of conflicts. In their research, Peter Wallensteen and Margaret Sollenberg show that the 99 wars they have discussed bear considerable differences depending on their location in Europe, Americas, Africa, Middle East and Asia.³¹ Again Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis show in their work that in case of the conflicts supported by neighboring countries the peace building schemes cannot be successful.³² In addition, ethnic groups in neighboring countries may be part of the conflict in the country in question.

On the other hand, conflicts in neighboring countries may increase the vulnerability of the country in question to the civil war through “contamination” and/or “diffusion” effects.³³ N. Sambanis’s research also supports the arguments of a neighboring country’s influence on intra-state conflicts. He states that “countries that have land borders with countries at war (...) are significantly more likely to experience an ethnic war of their own.”³⁴ It is worth noting that at this point Sambanis’s research does not allow for a distinction between the contagion effect and the diffusion effect. In other words, it is not possible to distinguish “if ethnic war spreads physically across borders to other ethnic groups or if information effects influence patterns of mobilization and violent conflict in neighboring states.”³⁵ Although the research does not allow such a distinction, it clearly shows that the ongoing conflicts in the neighboring countries are remarkably influential in the formation of intra-state conflicts in the country.

(Eds.), *Conflict Prevention and Peace-building in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*, London, Routledge, 2006, pg. 31-52; Harbom, Lotta, Högbladh, Stina and Wallensteen, Peter, “Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 43:5 (2006), pg. 617-631.

31 Wallensteen, Peter and Sollenberg, Margareta, “Armed conflicts, conflict termination and peace agreements, 1989-1996,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 34:3 (1997), pg. 339-358.

32 Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid.*

33 Lake, David and Rothchild, Donald, “Containing fear: The origins and management of ethnic conflict,” *International Security*, 21:2 (1996), pg. 41-75.

34 Sambanis, Nicholas, “Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45:3 (2011), pg. 259-282.

35 Sambanis, *Ibid.* pg. 275.

4. Structural dynamics at a country level

The literature on state conflicts shows that cross-border/regional and international dynamics, as well as structural determinants within the country, are decisive in the onset, shaping and termination of conflicts. The main factors underlined as structural determinants at country level are: the level of socioeconomic development of the country, level of democracy, type of conflicts, ethnic/national configuration in the country and power relations between ethnic/national groups, geography and population of the warring territory.

First of all, many researchers note the negative relationship between the likelihood of an ethnic conflict and the **level of economic development**. In their study, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that the low level of economic development encourages actors to turn to violence by reducing the opportunity cost due to local shortcomings and by increasing the opportunities for private gain from violence.³⁶ Some of the scholars focusing on the relationship between economic underdevelopment and internal conflicts³⁷, suggest that promotion of economic development/growth is an effective way to cope with ethnic conflicts as well as in peacebuilding and peacekeeping.³⁸ In addition, many studies show that high economic dependence on easily accessible natural resources such as oil and diamonds leads to permanent conflicts.³⁹

Secondly, there is a debate on the relationship between the **level of democracy** of a country and internal conflicts. Virginia P. Fortna argues that there is no statistically significant relationship between the level of democracy and the sustainability of peace in her quantitative method-based study.⁴⁰ Similarly, James Fearon and David Laitin argue that the

36 Collier and Hoeffler, *Ibid*.

37 Quinn, Mason and Gurses, *Ibid*; Fearon, James and Laitin, David, "Weak states, rough terrain, and large-scale ethnic violence since 1945," *Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association*, Atlanta, 2-5 Sep. 1999.

38 Sambanis, *Ibid*; Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid*; Collier and Hoeffler, *Ibid*.; Fortna, 2004a.

39 Hensel, Paul R., "One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America, 1816-1986," *Journal of Peace Research*, 31:3 (1994), pg. 281- 297; Werner, Suzanne, "The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement and Renegotiating the Terms," *American Journal of Political Science*, 43:3 (1999), pg. 912-934; Fortna, Virginia P., *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2004b; Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke and Soderbom, Mans, "On the Duration of Civil War," *Policy Research Working Paper 2681*, Washington, DC, World Bank, 2001.

40 Fortna, 2004a.

intra-state conflicts are rooted in economic reasons, not political ones. According to this, there is no significant relationship between absence of democracy and conflicts.⁴¹

Against this economic model of intra-state conflicts, Havard Hegre and his colleagues developed a model in which political victims and opportunities for violence are key factors that cause conflicts. According to this model, there is a higher risk of conflicts emerging in countries that are in the middle of the autocracy-democracy continuum. Because these countries have neither political possibilities to suppress the uprising that autocratic countries have, nor political areas and mechanisms that prevent the heavy grievances that democratic countries have at their disposal.⁴² Toft's data, on the other hand, show that the average regime value of the countries in which internal conflicts take place is very low, and that such conflicts are more likely to emerge in authoritarian states.⁴³ Similarly, Matthew Krain and MARRISA E. MEYERS and ERROL A. HENDERSON and J. DAVID SINGER studies show that in democratic countries the likelihood of intra-state conflicts is lower than in others.⁴⁴ The theoretical and empirical analysis by N. Sambanis of ethnic and non-ethnic wars supports this argument. Sambanis examined 161 incidents for a 40-year period and he "identified significant differences between the determinants of identity and non-identity civil wars. Identity wars are predominantly caused by political grievance, and they are unlikely to occur in politically free (i.e. democratic) societies."⁴⁵

The difference between **identity-based conflicts** and non-identity socio-economic or political conflicts is the third structural determinant discussed in the formation of intra-state conflicts. In the empirical investigations of J. Fearon and D. Laitin; identity-based socio-political mobilizations based on the difference of culture or civilization, nationalism or cultural supremacy/essentialism have no explanatory power in the emergence of

41 Fearon and Laitin, *Ibid.*

42 Hegre, Havard, Ellingsen, Tanja, Gleditsch, Nils Petter and Gates, Scott, "Towards a democratic civil peace? Opportunity, grievance, and civil war, 1816-1992," *World Bank Workshop: Civil Conflicts, Crime, and Violence in Developing Countries*, February 1999, Washington, DC.

43 Toft, *Ibid.*, pg. 22.

44 Krain, Matthew and Meyers, MARRISA Edson, "Democracy and Civil War: A Note on the Democratic Peace Proposition," *International Interactions*, 23:1 (1997), pg. 109-118; Henderson, ERROL A. and Singer, J. David, "Civil War in the Post-Colonial World, 1946-92," *Journal of Peace Research*, 37:3 (2000), pg.275-299.

45 Sambanis, *Ibid.*, pg. 280.

intra-state conflicts. The authors suggest that civil conflict originate from economic reasons and that there is no significant relationship between conflict and ethnic disintegration.⁴⁶ Likewise, R. Licklider's quantitative study of five measures of intensity of intra-state conflicts (continuance, length, casualty patterns, recurrence, and genocide) shows that "identity civil wars are not clearly more intense than non-identity ones.[...] It is therefore not entirely a surprise that identity and political-economic civil wars are about equally likely to end in negotiated settlements."⁴⁷

On the other hand, many works on (ethnic-religious) identities-based conflicts underscore the differences in the number of non-identity based wars. N. Sambanis argues that politics is more decisive in ethnic wars than economics.⁴⁸ The theoretical and quantitative analysis of M.W. Doyle and N. Sambanis shows that the likelihood of peace building is lower in ethnic and religious conflicts.⁴⁹ Ethnic or religious identity conflicts, therefore, tend to last longer than non-identity based conflicts. Beyond that, the stability of peace in identity-based conflicts is less likely to be preserved than in others.⁵⁰

Fourthly, the **ethnic/national configuration of a country and the relationship between ethnic/national groups and intra-state conflicts** should be noted. Sambanis, in his research based on comparing ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts argues that there is a meaningful relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the onset of ethnic conflicts. Accordingly, ethnic heterogeneity increases the likelihood of onset of ethnic wars.⁵¹ In contrast, some scholars argue that there is no relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and the success of peace building.⁵² Some argue that the critical factor that increases the risk of intra-state conflict is not ethnic heterogeneity or homogeneity, but they point to the level of polarization. According to this approach, the capacity of ethnically polarized societies to live together in peace is low. These societies are more vulnerable to the risk of intra-state conflict than ethnically homogeneous or very

46 Fearon and Laitin, *Ibid.*

47 Licklider, *Ibid.*, pg. 686.

48 Sambanis, *Ibid.*

49 Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid.*

50 Fortna, 2004a.

51 Sambanis, *Ibid.*

52 Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid.*

heterogeneous societies.⁵³ On the other hand, Collier and Hoeffler argue that ethnically and religiously heterogeneous societies are safer than homogeneous societies, as long as they are away from seeking ethnic dominance. According to the findings of these authors, the risk of intra-state conflict is doubled in societies where there is ethnic dominance.⁵⁴

Fifth, some researchers see **geography** as a key factor that determines the onset of intra-state conflicts. Patrick T. Brandt and his colleagues emphasize that “secessionist movements typically arise among geographically concentrated ethnic groups, [where] the rebels have a greater ability to mobilize and sustain military operations longer than revolutionary rebel organizations because secessionists have a secure territorial homeland from which to operate.”⁵⁵ According to the findings of Barbara Walter’s quantitative analysis, when combatants have territorial claims the peace negotiations are 70% less likely to occur than in other type of wars.⁵⁶ The mediation and mediation success rate is lower in territorial civil conflicts than in other types of civil conflicts.⁵⁷

There is another reason why conflict geography is important. Many studies underline that the geographical features increase both the possibility of the onset of internal conflicts and the duration of conflicts. Some studies show that mountainous terrain provides rebels secure base, allowing them to sustain their military operations for a longer period of time, which in turn increases the duration of conflicts.⁵⁸ Other studies indicate that the proportion of forested areas and number of regions with common borders are critical geographical features that facilitate a rebellion.⁵⁹ In summary, there is a positive relationship between the fact that a country has geographical features that facilitate the rebellion and the onset and duration of internal conflicts.

53 Collier and Hoeffler, *Ibid*; Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, *Ibid*; Elbadawi, Ibrahim and Sambanis, Nicholas, “How Much War Will We See? Estimating the Incidence and Amount of Civil War in 191 Countries,” *Working Paper*, Washington, DC, World Bank” DECRG”, 2000; Bates, Robert, H., “Ethnicity, Capital Formation, and Conflict,” *CID Working Paper no 27*, Cambridge, Harvard University, 1999.

54 Collier and Hoeffler, *Ibid*.

55 Brandt, Patrick T., Mason, T. David, Gurses, Mehmet and Radin, Dagmar, “When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars,” *Defence and Peace Economics*, 19:6 (2008), pg. 421;

56 Walter, *Ibid*.

57 Bercovitch and DeRouen, *Ibid*.

58 Fearon, *Ibid*.

59 Fearon and Laitin, *Ibid*; Collier and Hoeffler, *Ibid*; Quinn and Gurses, *Ibid*.

Finally, there is a noteworthy debate on the link between the **population** and formation and transformation of internal conflicts. Many studies suggest that there is a relationship between population size and the emergence of intra-state conflicts. According to this argument, as the population size increases, the human pool from which the rebels can mobilize militants grows.⁶⁰ However, Quinn, Mason and Gurses in their work argue that there is a negative relationship between population size and the onset of conflicts.⁶¹ On the other hand, unlike in previous studies, Jeffrey Herbst focuses largely on population density rather than population size. Accordingly, countries with a large population and high-density are at a higher risk of conflict than countries with large population and low density.⁶² Collier and Hoeffler also note the role of the **diaspora** in the relationship between population and intra-state conflicts. According to the findings of these authors, there is a positive correlation between the size of diaspora and the repeat conflicts.⁶³

5. Actor based dynamics

The previous two sub-sections addressed the structural dynamics on a country's level, as well as the cross-border/regional and international dynamics that determine intra-state conflicts. The determinants in this group are largely in conflicts where the actors are unable to intervene or processes and institutions cannot change in the short run. Nevertheless, the formation and transformation of intra-state conflict are strongly connected to the ideas, interests and institutions of the actors directly involved. In this sense, the perceptions, resources, preferences and strategies of actors as well as structural dynamics are important. In the literature, there are six often mentioned actor related determinants of an intra-state conflicts pertaining to the emergence, formation, transformation, and termination of intra-state conflicts. These are: cost of conflicts, duration of conflicts, capacity of the state (in particular military capacity), political agency, political and perceptual dynamics, the number of actors involved in the conflict, the political configuration of the state, political leadership, the involvement of third parties, and power-sharing. Research focusing on actor-driven dynamics in intra-state conflicts is

60 Fearon and Laitin, *Ibid.*; Sambanis, *Ibid.*

61 Quinn, Mason and Gurses, *Ibid.*

62 Herbst, Jeffrey, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2000.

63 Collier and Hoeffler, *Ibid.*

generally based on “rational choice theory”.⁶⁴ According to this theory, “war will recur if the expected utility of war is greater than the expected utility of peace.”⁶⁵

The first actor-driven determinant is the **cost of conflict**. Many academics call attention to the correlation between cost of conflict and the termination of conflicts. The quantitative analysis of Doyle and Sambanis and Fortna reveals that the chances of success of peace building are reduced by the high human cost of war (deaths and displacement).⁶⁶ Accordingly, it is much more difficult for people to reach an agreement with those responsible for the death of their loved ones. However, many academics argue against it: the high human cost increases the chances of peace since the cost of conflict is the strongest incentive to stop deaths and work together for a solution.⁶⁷

The **duration of the conflict** is the second actor-driven determinant. Doyle and Sambanis also point out in their research that there is a relationship between the duration of the conflicts and the success of peace construction. The authors show that there is a positive correlation between these two variables. Nevertheless, they advise to consider the duration of the conflict together with the cost of conflict since the duration of the conflict does not have a direct effect on the construction of peace. Rather than that, the duration of the conflict is a variable that increases the cost of conflict. On the other hand, T. David Mason and Patrick J. Fett underline the three main outcomes of the conflict that include the military victory of the rebels, the military victory of the government and the negotiated solution, and argue that the duration of the conflict is a strong indicator of the end of state conflicts.⁶⁸ T. D. Mason, Joseph P. Weingarten and P. J. Fett’s research reveals that the military victory of the government or rebels was mostly seen in the first five years of the conflict.⁶⁹ In contrast, conflicts that last for seven years often result

64 Azam, J. Paul, “How to Pay for Peace,” *Public Choice*, 83:1/2 (1995), pg. 173-184; Collier and Hoeffler *Ibid.*; Hirschleifer, Jack, “Conflict and Settlement,” John Eatwell, Murry Milgate and Peter Newman (Eds.), *New Palgrave, A Dictionary of Economics*, London, Macmillian, 1987, pg. 567-570.

65 Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid.* pg.780.

66 Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid.*; Fortna, 2004a.

67 Hensel, *Ibid.*; Werner, *Ibid.*; Fortna, 2004a.

68 Mason, T. David, and Fett, Patrick J., “How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40 (1996), pg. 546-568.

69 Mason, T. David, Weingarten, Joseph P., and Fett, Patrick J. “Win, Lose, or Draw: Prediction the Outcome of Civil Wars,” *Political Research Quarterly*, 52:2 (1999), pg. 239-268.

in “mutually hurting stalemate.”⁷⁰ Empirical studies of long-standing intra-state conflicts show a tendency come to end through negotiated settlement.⁷¹

The **state capacity** is the third variable that determines the formation of intra-state conflicts. Some academics argue that weak states are more vulnerable to internal conflicts. Their low capacity increases the opportunities for insurrection.⁷² According to Fearon and Laitin, “financially, organizationally and politically weak central governments can be more susceptible to a rebellion due to poor security services or counter-insurgency practices that are ineffective or corrupt.”⁷³ Many works on this subject in particular focus on the link between the size of the army and the termination of an intra-state conflict. Karl DeRouen and David Sobek suggest that the bigger the size of the army the shorter is the duration of intra-state conflicts.⁷⁴ However, it is necessary to dismiss the fact that large armies inevitably bring about the military victory of governments. Large armies can bring the rapid military victory of governments. On the other hand, indiscriminate counter-insurgency practices, violation of rights and oppression inflicted by the army make it easier to find militants and can also lead to the military victory of the rebels.⁷⁵

The fourth actor-related determinant must take into account is **political subjectivity** that refers to the actors’ perceptions, ideas, interests, institutions, resources and strategies at the same time. In this regard, some studies focus on the political and perceptual transformation

70 Zartman, I. William, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985.

71 Brandt et al., *Ibid.*; Mason and Fett, *Ibid.*; Mason, Weingarten and Fett, *Ibid.*; Fearon, *Ibid.*

72 Skocpol, Theda, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1979; Goodvin, Jeff, *Not Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001; Goldstone, Jack A., *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991.

73 Fearon and Laitin, *Ibid.*, pg. 75-76.

74 DeRouen, Karl and Sobek, David, “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 41:3 (2004), pg. 303-320.

75 DeRouen and Sobek, *Ibid.*; Mason, T. David and Krane, Dale A., “The Political Economy of Death Squads: Towards a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror”, *International Studies Quarterly*, 33:2 (1989), pg. 175-198.

of the parties and the interaction between them. Albert W. Harris⁷⁶ and Ivan Arreguin-Toft⁷⁷ emphasize the duration of the asymmetric conflicts, strategies of the parties during the negotiation process and the importance of strategic interactions. Branislav L. Slantchev examines the principles of convergence in conflict negotiations and reveals how the parties learn from each other both during the conflict period and during the negotiation process.⁷⁸

I. William Zartman, whose research on the termination of intra-state conflicts is frequently referred to, defines “ripeness” as a necessary condition for the solution of such conflicts. According to Zartman, the parties will negotiate when the conflict reaches the “mutually hurting stalemate”. Zartman describes the mutually hurting stalemate as a situation when parties understand that they cannot win and perceive the cost of the conflict as high.⁷⁹ The author advocates for the existence of the spokesperson for all the parties as an additional precondition for the negotiated solution.⁸⁰ Richard N. Haass, who further developed the concept of “ripeness”, defines “a shared perception of the desirability of a compromise” as the first condition of conflict ripeness.⁸¹ According to Zartman in a renewed study “ripeness is a necessary but not sufficient condition to start negotiations. It is not self-supporting or self-imposed. It must be obtained either by the parties or, if this is not possible, by convincing mediators”.⁸²

The “ripeness” concept, which has an important place in conflict resolution research, is also criticized remarkably. Daniel Lieberfeld criticizes ripeness approach for “sharing the tendency of political realism, seeing actors as a one/whole”⁸³. In this regard, A. Mack defines “political

76 Harris, Albert W., “Coming to Terms with Separatist Insurgencies,” *Negotiation Journal*, 26:3 (2010), pg. 327-356.

77 Arreguin-Toft, *Ibid*.

78 Slantchev, Branislav L., “The principle of convergence in wartime negotiations”, *American Political Science Review*, 97:4 (2003), pg. 621-632.

79 Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*.

80 Zartman, I. William, “The negotiation process in the Middle East,” S. Spiegel (Ed.), *The Arab-Israeli search for peace*, Boulder, Colo, Lynne Rienner, 1992.

81 Haass, Richard N., *Conflict unending: The United States and regional disputes*, New Have, Yale University Press, 1990.

82 Zartman, I. William, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1:1 (2001), pg. 8-18.

83 Lieberfeld, Daniel, “Conflict ‘Ripeness’ Revisited: The South African and Israeli/Palestinian Cases,” *Negotiation Journal*, 15:1 (1999), pg. 63-82.

will” and “political division” within the metropolitan power as the key determinants of asymmetric conflicts.⁸⁴ S. J. Stedman goes one step further and argues that the ripeness approach ignores the actors’ domestic politics. The internal politics of the actors, however, constitute one of the most important dynamics that determine the formation of conflicts and solutions. According to Stedman, the concept of ripeness must be redefined by “the development of more contextualized generalizations.”⁸⁵

In his work on South Africa and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Lieberfeld describes seven indicators that could be useful in understanding negotiating possibilities:

1. Acceptance of the stalemate/balance: It is possible to suggest that each side can reasonably negotiate from a strong position,
2. The discussions of the negotiated solution have a central place in the national political competition,
3. Change in the leadership of the side supporting the status quo,
4. The existence of unsuccessful attempts to allow the accumulation of alternative negotiating partners,
5. Informal contacts between politically powerful constituents or actors from both sides,
6. Declarations by the leadership of each side, including non-maximalist prerequisites for the negotiation,
7. Stable solutions negotiated to the conflicts.⁸⁶

Some researchers on political subjectivity have pointed out the relation between power concentration of the conflicting parties and the success of peacebuilding. Doyle and Sambanis argue that high number of conflicting parties in countries where the level of democracy is low makes it difficult

84 Mack, *Ibid.*

85 Stedman, Stephen J., *Peacemaking in civil war: International mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*, Boulder, Colo, Lynne Rienner, 1990, pg. 235.

86 Lieberfeld, *Ibid.*, pg. 78.

to construct peace.⁸⁷ However, Fortna's quantitative research shows that there is no meaningful relationship between the sustainability of peace and the number of conflicting parties.⁸⁸ Michel G. Findley distinguishes three interrelated phases of the settlement process of internal conflicts based on bargaining model which is one of the approaches to intra-state conflicts. In these stages "combatants: (1) decide to engage in formal negotiations with each other, (2) reach a peace agreement to end the civil war, conditional on negotiating with each other, and (3) successfully implement the terms of the agreement, conditional on negotiating and reach an agreement."⁸⁹ Findley's new examinations of bargains suggest that the number of warring conflict parties creates different effects at each stage of the conflict resolution and peace process.

The fifth actor-based variable is **power sharing**. Many studies have emphasized the importance of power sharing and recognition of rights of a community to prevent ethnic conflicts. According to Charles W. Maynes, if two or more communities are having trouble living together under a common state roof, then the options are ethnic cleansing, repression, division and power sharing. Despite political difficulties, the most humane approach to ethnic conflict is power sharing. Unlike Anglo-American democracy based on individual rights, "consociational democracy" based on community rights can be a suitable model for identity conflicts that shake the world.⁹⁰ C. Hartzell argues that peace agreements based on military, political, economic and territorial power sharing are more long lasting.⁹¹ In other research, conducted with a group of colleagues, Hartzell shows that sharing power does not only increase the likelihood of peace, but also provides more stability.⁹² Accordingly, institutions play a critical role in conflict management, the security dilemma faced by the parties can be lifted and social relationships based on peace and co-operation in society can be built and protected "only through the incorporation of institutionalized solutions".⁹³

87 Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid.*

88 Fortna, 2004a.

89 Findley, Michael, G., "Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Civil War Resolution," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 57:5 (2012), pg. 905-932.

90 Maynes, Charles, W. "Containing Ethnic Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, 90 (1993), pg. 3-21.

91 Hartzell, Caroline, "Explaining the Stability of Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 43 (1999), pg. 3-22.

92 Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Hartzell, Caroline, Hoddie, Matthew and Rothchild, Donald, "Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variable," *International Organization*, 55:1 (2001), pg. 183-208.

93 Hartzell, 1999, *Ibid.*

The sixth variable, in conflict resolution and discussions in the context of actor-based dynamics in peace, is a matter of **third-party involvement**. C. Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild argue that the participation of third parties significantly and substantially make peace more permanent.⁹⁴ Doyle and Sambanis in their quantitative analysis argue that there are only some forms of third parties' involvement that are conducive to success. Accordingly, multilateral and multidimensional third-party involvement, a mission based on comprehensive civil functions involving economic reconstruction, institutional reforms and election observation, considerably increases the chances of successful peacebuilding.⁹⁵ On the other hand, the findings of the quantitative research of Amitabh Dubey show that there is no meaningful relationship between the participation of third parties such as the UN and the duration of peace.⁹⁶ Fortna re-analyzes these controversial findings and segregates the different effects of various forms of intervention into: observer missions, traditional peacekeeping missions, traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement.⁹⁷ According to the author, "observer missions and multidimensional peacekeeping may reduce the likelihood of another war, but (...) traditional peacekeeping and enforcement missions do not."⁹⁸

Finally, some researchers note that **formal peace settlements** play a key role in conflict resolution⁹⁹ because "formal agreements entail a political commitment to peace that invokes audience costs, both internationally and domestically."¹⁰⁰ These authors underline the need for formal agreements to increase the success of peace building and ensure a lasting peace.

94 Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild, *Ibid*.

95 Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid*.

96 Dubey, Amitabh, "Domestic Institutions and the Duration of Civil War Settlement," *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*, March 24-27, New Orleans.

97 For classification of peacekeeping missions see: Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid*.

98 Fortna, 2004a, pg. 271

99 Fortna, 2004a; Hoddie, Matthew and Hartzell, Caroline, "Managing Domestic Anarchy: Liberal Institutionalism and the Resolution of Civil Wars," *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*, February 26 - March 1, Portland, Oregon.

100 Fortna, 2004a, pg. 273.

Conclusion

As a result, the experience and know-how gained in relation to intra-state conflicts in different times and places underline many dynamics that determine the formation of intra-state conflicts and the conflict resolution processes. In this study, these dynamics were classified at three levels: (1) Cross-border/regional and international dynamics, (2) structural variables within the country, and (3) actor-related determinants.

Within the framework of structural dynamics at the cross-border/regional and international level, the impact of the Cold War on intra-state conflict was first emphasized. At this point, position taken by powers on international level or a war by proxy, directly affect the conflict and the resolution. Secondly, the influence of cross-border/regional peculiarities, and in particular of neighboring countries, has been underlined. Accordingly, the existence of conflicts in the neighboring countries as well as conflicts involving the same ethnic group, or the stance of the neighboring countries in support of the conflict, determine both the formation of the conflicts and directly affect the conflict resolution.

In the context of the structural dynamics on the national level, the situations in which actors could not intervene or change in the short run were pointed out as main variables. In this context, as structural dynamics that play a role in the onset, formation and termination of internal conflicts, the following are emphasized: the level of economic development of the country, the level of democracy, whether the conflict is ethnically or religiously or socioeconomically and politically based, ethnic/national composition of the state and the power relations between ethnic/national groups, geographical features of the conflict area, the population and the diaspora.

Processes, entities and agencies in which the conflicting parties are involved are discussed as actor-based dynamics. In this framework, the costs of conflicts such as deaths and injuries, the duration of conflict, the capacity of the state, in particular the size of the army, the thoughts, interests, resources and strategies that shape the political subjectivity of the actors, power sharing, the involvement of third parties in conflict, whether or not formal peace treaties were examined as the main actor-based variables.

There are different approaches to the determinants summarized above and as to how they impact the onset, transformation and termination of the conflict. Some of the studies of these variables influencing the conflict overlap, some contradict and some complement each other. In this sense, the approaches outlined above do not present prescriptions that will be ready and definite to understand the formation, transformation, and termination of conflicts. However, they open considerable horizons to understand the processes of conflict, to protect against possible complications of conflicts, and to construct possible ways of negotiation and reconciliation.

3

THE QUEST FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES/BANGSAMORO

In the previous two chapters, a global picture of the conflict resolution and reconciliation quests has been put forward. In the first chapter, the intra-state conflicts and peace settlements on the world scale are presented as numerical data, the parameters determining the formation of such conflicts are discussed in detail in the second chapter.

In this and the next chapter, to better illustrate the global experience of conflict resolution and reconciliation processes two cases, of Indonesia and the Philippines, are examined in depth. There are a few reasons for preferring these two countries. Regarding the Kurdish issue in Turkey, despite many cases of internal conflicts in Europe and South America have been brought to the attention, the experiences from Asia are insufficiently addressed. Conflicts in the European region, especially in the cases of Spain (Basque) and the United Kingdom (Northern Ireland), are frequently mentioned. Columbia, though only partially, has been mentioned as an example of a domestic conflict from the region of South America. Nevertheless, the experiences in the Asian region, where conflicts have intensified, have not yet been fully examined.

There are four important reasons for preferring the Philippines in the Asian region. Firstly, in territorial conflicts such as the Philippines/Bangsamoro, Northern Ireland and South Africa, the Philippines experience is one of the most important examples of the quest for peace and resolution.¹ Secondly, despite the long quest for conflict resolution and reconciliation in this country, stable peace has not been achieved and the process of reconciliation continues. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, the Turkish state and an NGO participate as third-parties in conflict resolution and reconciliation process in the Philippines. In Turkey, the actors on both the governmental and civil society levels can examine their direct experience from the Philippines and they could contribute significantly to

¹ Democratic Progress Institute (DPI), "*Çatışma Çözümünde Filipinler Deneyimi*" Konulu Karşılaştırmalı Çalışma Ziyareti Raporu, London, Democratic Progress Institute, 2016, pg. 12.

the resolution of conflicts arising from the Kurdish issue. Finally, in the Philippines, as in Turkey, the disputes are not limited to a single issue of identity. There are regional disparities in socio-economic development or regional socioeconomic discrepancies as well as differences in identity between Mindanao region, where the territorial conflict takes place, and the rest of the country.²

The chapter outlines first the socioeconomic and socio-political structure of the Philippines. Secondly, in order to better understand the socio-political context of the country, the 50 years long internal conflict over the government between the Philippine state and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) is examined. Thirdly, the territorial conflicts in the Mindanao/Bangsamoro region, which constitute the main theme of this chapter, are summarized. Finally, to better understand the settlement of territorial conflict, the conflict resolution, and reconciliation process, especially since the 1970s, and the final treaty signed in 2014, are discussed.

1. Socio-economic and socio-political structure

Located in the western part of the Pacific Ocean in Southeast Asia, the Republic of the Philippines, gained its independence shortly after World War II, on July 4, 1946, after nearly four centuries of colonial experience. Until 1898, the Philippines remained under the Spanish colonial rule and since that date under the US administration. During the Second World War, it emerged as an independent state after a brief Japanese occupation.³

The Philippines, consisting of 7,645 small islands and islets, is composed of three main geographical regions: Luzon to the north, Visayas to the central region and Mindanao to the south (see Map 3.1).⁴ One of 18 administrative units in the three groups of islands is autonomous (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao- ARMM). Each region consists of provinces, municipalities and the smallest administrative unit, *barangays* (village, neighborhood, district).⁵ Eight of those 18 administrative units are in

2 DPI, *Ibid.*; Söylemez, Hatice, *Moro: Uzakdoğu'da Bir Bağımsızlık Mücadelesi*, İstanbul, İHH İnsani and Sosyal Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2016, pg. 3-4, 13-20, 58; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), *2012/2013 Philippine Human Development Report*, New York, UNDP, 2013, pg. 66-71, <http://www.hdr.org/ph/20122013-philippine-human-development-report/>, Accessed: 12.07.2017.

3 MacDonald, Graeme, *Güney Filipinler'de Barış İhtimali and Karşılaşılan Engeller*, Democratic Progress Institute, 2013, pg. 9.

4 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 10.

5 Philippine Statistics Authority, *Provincial Summary: Number of Provinces, Cities, Municipalities*

Luzon, four in Visayas and six in Mindanao. Manila, the capital of the Philippines, is also the center of the National Capital Region, comprised of Luzon island group with a population of 11.5 million. The National Capital Region also has Quezon City (QC), which is the most populous city of the country with a population of 2.7 million.⁶

Map 3.1. The Republic of the Philippines



The Philippines is governed by the US-type presidential system with the separation of powers between the executive, judiciary and two-chamber (the Senate and Parliament) legislative body. On the other hand, many studies describe the socio-political structure in the Philippines as “oligarchic democracy.”⁷ According to the International Democracy Index, which is based on 60 indicators, the democracy level of the Philippines on a 1-10 scale varies between 6.12-6.94 for the period of 2006-2016. According to the four categories of the Index (authoritarian regimes, hybrid regimes, flawed democracies, and full democracies), the Philippines a hybrid regime moving towards flawed democracy.⁸

and Barangays, by Region, Philippine Statistics Authority, 31.03.2017, <http://nap.psa.gov.ph/activestats/psgc/SUMWEBPROV-MAR2017-CODED-HUC-FINAL.pdf>, Accessed: 06.06.2017.

6 Philippine Statistics Authority, *Ibid*.

7 MacDonald, *Ibid*, pg. 9-10.

8 The Economist Intelligence Unit, *The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2016*, The Economist Intelligence Unit, <https://infographics.economist.com/2017/DemocracyIndex/>, Accessed: 09.06.2017.

According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 2018 Human Development Report, the urbanization rate in the Philippines is 46.7% with a total population of 104.9 million and a working population aged 15-64 years of 66.6 million. The Philippines with a Human Development Index of 0.699 ranks 113th among 189 countries and is among the middle-ranking developed countries in the four-level (low, medium, high, very high) development indicator. Gross National Product per capita (GNP) was \$ 3.962 in 1990, rising to 4.972 in 2000, 6.754 in 2010 and 9.154 in 2017.⁹ In terms of income inequality, the Philippines belongs to the third group out of the four-level classification of GINI Index. While “the Palma ratio,” which is the ratio of the richest 10% of the population’s share of gross national income (GNI) divided by the poorest 40%’s share is 1.9, the “quintile ratio” which is the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% of the population to the average income of the poorest 20% of the population, is 7.2.¹⁰ In brief, all three indicators show that the income inequality in the Philippines is quite high.

The Philippines is a multilingual and multi-ethnic country with nearly 200 languages and dialects spoken. For example, each of the 13 Muslim peoples in the island of Mindanao in the south of the country speaks a different language.¹¹ According to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 (Article 14, 6, 7, 8 and 9),¹² Filipino is the national language. Moreover, Filipino (*Tagalog*) and English are the official languages of communication and education. Regional languages are auxiliary language in the regions and are used as auxiliary tools in education. Spanish and Arabic are used on the basis of choice.

In practice, although multilingual education in the Philippines was in principle prescribed in 1948, Filipino and English bilingual educational policy was implemented in 1974.¹³ Since 2009, the Mother Tongue-Based

9 United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 -2018 Statistical Update. Briefing note for countries on the 2018 Statistical Update - Philippines*, United Nation Development Program, New York, 2018, http://www.hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PHL.pdf, Accessed: 02.10.2018.

10 United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Reports: Philippines*, United Nation Development Program, New York, 2018, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/PHL>, Accessed: 02.10.2018.

11 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 21.

12 Official Gazette, *The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines*, Official Gazette, <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/>, Accessed: 06.06.2017.

13 Burton, Lisa Ann, *Mother Tongue-Based Multilingual Education in the Philippines: Studying Top-*

Multi-Lingual Education (MTB-MLE) policy is in force. Under this policy, the Philippine Government Department of Education has decided to use 12 local/regional languages as means of instruction. Children are taught in their mother tongue from the beginning of the school to the third grade and the Filipino and English languages are introduced afterward. From that grade on, Filipino and English gradually become educational languages.¹⁴ The primary languages of instruction are: Tagalog, Kapampangan, Pangasinense, Iloko, Bikol, Cebuano, Hiligaynon, Waray, Tausug, Maguindanaoan, Maranao, and Chabacano. In 2013, the Philippine Government's Department of Education added seven languages to these 12 languages, raising the number of local languages used as teaching to 19. The following languages were added to the curriculum: Ivatan, Sambal, Akianon, Kinaray-a, Yakan, and Surigaonon.¹⁵

The majority of the population in the Philippines is Roman Catholic Christians, while the main minority group is Muslims located in the south of the country (mostly in the Mindanao region) and their presence dates back to the beginning of the 14th century. According to the National Statistics Office in 2010, approximately 90% of the population is Christian (81% are Roman Catholics and 9% are other Christians), 6% are Muslims and 4% either do not declare or do not follow a system of belief or are animists or followers of syncretic beliefs.¹⁶ In contrast, according to estimates made in 2012 by the National Commission of Muslim Filipinos affiliated with the Office of the Presidency, the proportion of Muslim population is about 11%.¹⁷

The Philippines has a secular state structure. The 1987 Constitution stipulates that no law can be enacted with respects a religious institution or prohibits a religious practice. Religious professions or religious rituals are said to be free from discrimination or support. Other chapters also

Down Policy Implementation from the Bottom Up, Unpublished Phd. thesis, University of Minnesota, 2013, pg. 15-16.

14 Burton, *Ibid.*, pg. 17-19.

15 GMA News Online, "DepEd adds 7 languages to mother tongue-based education for Kinder to Grade 3," *GMA News Online*, 13.07.2013, <http://www.gma-network.com/news/news/nation/317280/dep-ed-adds-7-languages-to-mother-tongue-based-education-for-kinder-to-grade-3/story/>, Accessed: 06.06.2017.

16 U.S. Department of State, *International Religious Freedom Report for 2015: Philippines*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=256135>, Accessed: 06.06.2017.

17 U.S. Department of State, *Ibid.*

stipulate the relation between the state and religion as there shall be no political or civil rights discrimination based on religion (Article 3, Chapter 5), in case the parents choose so, their children may learn their religion from the teachers appointed by the religious authorities affiliated with their religious schools (Article 14, Section 3).¹⁸ On the other hand, when we look at the social structure, Muslims and other minorities are subjected to discriminatory practices in economic, social and political sense.¹⁹ In fact, these will be discussed in detail in the next subsections as one of the most important sources of territorial conflicts in the country.

2. Conflicts over government: Communist Party of the Philippines

Established as an independent state after the four hundred years of colonial heritage, the Philippines has experienced three types of intra-state conflict since 1946: anti-government communist revolts, a series of military coups in the late 1980s, and finally separatist territorial movements of organizations of Muslims in the Mindanao region.²⁰

The communist uprisings began immediately after independence. The Hukbalahap Rebellion took place under the leadership of *Partido Komunista Pilipinas* - PKP in the first decade after independence due to the repression of the opposition and the poor land distribution.²¹ The young communists under the leadership of Jose Maria Sison inspired by successful uprisings in China, Cuba, and Vietnam funded the Communist Party of the Philippines - CPP in December 1968 and began the armed struggle in 1969.²² Defining the Philippines as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal society,²³ the CPP aimed at “the democratic revolution of the people” through a “long-term people’s war” based on the countryside, rooted in the peasants as in a Maoist perspective.²⁴

18 Official Gazette, *Ibid.*

19 MacDonald, *Ibid.*; U.S. Department of State, *Ibid.*; DPI, *Ibid.*, pg. 97-99.

20 Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), “Philippines,” <http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/840>, Accessed: 07.06.2017.

21 The Mapping Militants Project, *Mapping Militant Organizations: Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army*, Stanford University The Mapping Militants Project, 24.08.2015a, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/149>, Accessed: 13.06.2017.

22 International Crisis Group, *The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks*, Asia Report No. 202, 14.2.2011, pg. 3.

23 For a short history of the CPP see: The Mapping Militants Project, 2015a, *Ibid.*

24 Geurrero, Amado, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, Revolutionary School of Mao Tsetung

2.1. The Fighting

In 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law on the grounds of suppressing uprisings throughout the country and controlling social conflicts between Muslims (Moros) and Christians in Mindanao to the south of the country. As a result of the martial law, the CPP, which the 1970s had a number of armed militants ranging from 1,000 to 2,000 grew rapidly in the late 1970s and in the first half of the 1980s.²⁵ In 1986, when the widespread mass unrests led to the overthrow of Marcos, The New People's Army (NPA), the military wing of the CPP, had around 25,000 militants. With 26 guerilla fronts in 1980 increased to 58 in 1986, the NPA was active in 69 of the 80 provinces of the country.²⁶ In the mid-1980s the CPP began to control 20% of the *barangays* in the country and to increase its influence in the cities.²⁷ Only in the period of 1984-1986 more than 10 thousand people lost their lives.²⁸ Between 1987-1994, the militant power of the CPP was reduced to 6,000, losing considerable military power. However, during the period of 1994-2000, the CPP strengthened again, doubling the number of armed militants.²⁹

The outcome of a mass movement, also known as People Power Revolution, was the election in 1986 of Corazon Aquino, wife of Benigno Aquino Jr., the most serious opposition of the regime, who was assassinated in 1983. It forced Marcos to leave the country.³⁰ Aquino launched a new wave of reforms, which led to the release of all political prisoners, including CPP leader, Sison, and began peace talks with the CPP.³¹ Because of these negotiations, various groups formed within the army during Marcos rule have orchestrated six coup attempts in the years 1986-1990. Although these coup attempts were unsuccessful, until the mid-1990s

Thought, 1970. The text of the CPP leader, Jose Maria Sison was published under the name of Amado Guerrero. The book is available online: <http://www.geocities.ws/kabataangmakabayan64/psr.pdf>, Accessed: 06.06.2017.

25 Hernandez, Carolina, *Institutional Responses to Armed Conflict: The Armed Forces of the Philippines*, The Human Development Network Foundation, 2005, pg. 24, http://www.hdn.org.ph/wp-content/uploads/2005_PHDR/2005%20AFP_Assessment.pdf, Accessed: 06.06.2017.

26 International Crisis Group, *Ibid.*, pg. 4.

27 MacDonald, *Ibid.*, pg. 12.

28 Hernandez, *Ibid.*, pg. 25.

29 Abinales, Patricio N. and Amoroso, Donna J., *State and Society in the Philippines*, New York and Oxford, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005, pg. 267; Hernandez, *Ibid.*, pg. 24.

30 MacDonald, *Ibid.*, pg. 13; The Mapping Militants Project, 2015a, *Ibid.*

31 International Crisis Group, *Ibid.*, pg. 5; The Mapping Militants Project, 2015a, *Ibid.*

the Philippines was struggling with crises resulting from these attempts. Despite various peace talks between the Philippine government and the CPP in the 1990s and 2000s, the conflicts lasted until 2010s.³² In Charts 3.1 and 3.2, illustrate the number and geographical distribution of casualties in the conflict between the government forces and the CPP during the period of 1989-2016.

Chart 3.1. Casualties in the Fights Between the Government Forces and the CPP (1989-2016)




Chart 3.2. Casualties by location (1989-2016)



2.2. Negotiations

Negotiations between the CPP and the government were intermittent and inconclusive. According to the International Crisis Group, despite the fact that there were 12 agreements reached in 25 years from 1986 to 2011,

32 Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), “Government of Philippines – CPP,” <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/411>, Accessed: 07.06.2017.

the main issues were hardly mentioned at all.³³

The first negotiations began in December 1986 during the Aquino period after the overthrow of the Marcos regime. However, these negotiations ended in February 1987 without a treaty.³⁴ From that date, especially in the period of President Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), there were some attempts to find a solution to all the conflicts in the country, nevertheless, the conflict persisted. The “Hague Declaration”, signed by the parties in 1992, included a four-stage negotiations agenda. Human rights and international humanitarian law, socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms, and finally the ending of hostilities and the disbandment of the armed forces were going to be discussed in this process. The only concrete achievement resulting from the subsequent negotiations between 1992 and 1998 was the 1998 “Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law” (CARHRIHL), which was mutually signed and aimed at protecting civilians in the ongoing conflict.³⁵

At the beginning of 2000, various peace talks with the mediation of the Norwegian government took place, and official negotiations began in Oslo in 2004.³⁶ However, after three rounds of talks, the CPP withdrew from negotiations as they were placed on a renewed list of terrorists.³⁷ In 2004-2010 the conflict continued along with informal talks. After seven years of war and impasse, the parties came together in Norway for the second time on 15-21 February 2011³⁸ and they agreed to reach a settlement on socioeconomic, political and constitutional reforms within a time frame of 18 months.³⁹ Despite this agreement, conflicting parties came together again in December 2012. This was followed by a February 2013 meeting of the parties when “Common Declaration of the National Unity and Just Peace” was drafted. However, these negotiations were

33 International Crisis Group, *Ibid.*, pg. 26.

34 International Crisis Group, *Ibid.*, pg. 5.

35 International Crisis Group, *Ibid.*, pg. 26; The Mapping Militants Project, 2015a, *Ibid.*

36 International Crisis Group, *Ibid.*, pg. 26.

37 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), *Timeline of the Philippine Peace Process: Peace Process with the Communist Party of the Philippines / New People's Army / National Democratic Front (CPP/NPA/NDF)*, Office of the President of the Philippines, <https://peace.gov.ph/timeline/peace-process-cpp-npa-ndf/>, Accessed: 07.06.2017.

38 OPAPP, *Ibid.*

39 UCDD, *Ibid.*

also inconclusive. After nearly three years, the parties reunited in Oslo in August 2016, and by the end of the month, they declared a ceasefire and violence decreased significantly. Finally, during the meeting in Oslo in October 2016, the parties agreed on a framework that would form the basis for the peace treaty.⁴⁰

3. Territorial conflicts and negotiations: Mindanao/Bangsamoro

In the Philippines, while the conflict with the CPP concerning the government continued throughout the country, in the southern region of Mindanao there was a territorial conflict between the state and separatist movements. Map 3.2 shows the region of Mindanao and the region of Bangsamoro⁴¹ where its separatist movements are active from its southwest.⁴²

The Moro people⁴³, with their past rooted in the colonial period, led separatist Islam-referenced ideologies movements in the 1970s and 1980s with the idea of establishing an independent state of Moro nation/people (*Bangsa Moro*). Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM), Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),⁴⁴ Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF),⁴⁵ Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)⁴⁶ and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom

40 UCDP, *Ibid*.

41 Bangsamoro refers to Moro people/nation. The word “Bangsa” derived from Malay means “people/nation/race.” The Moro people use the term “Bangsamoro” to separate themselves from the Philippines identity. See Lingga, Abhoud Syed M., *Rethinking State Policies and Minority Rights: Getting the Mindanao Peace Process Moving*, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, No. 2, 2008, pg.2.

42 Democratic Progress Institute (DPI), *Filipinler Barış Sürecinin 2012-2015 Arası Dönemine İlişkin Güncelleme*, Democratic Progress Institute, London, 2015.

43 In the period when the Philippines was a Spanish colony, the Spaniards called the Muslims in the Mindanao region “Moros” like the Muslims in South Africa. This term, which has been left in use since that period, is now being used to describe multilingual Muslims in the Mindanao region.

44 For short history of MNLF see: The Mapping Militants Project, *The Mapping Militant Organizations: Moro National Liberation Front*, Stanford University the Mapping Militants Project, 14.8.2015b, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/379>, Accessed:13.6.2017.

45 For short history of MILF see: The Mapping Militants Project, *The Map-ping Militant Organizations: Moro Islamic Liberation Front*, Stanford University the Mapping Militants Project, 24.8.2015c, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/309>, Accessed:13.6.2017.

46 For short history of ASG see: The Mapping Militants Project, *The Mapping Militant Organizations: Abu Sayyaf Group*, Stanford University the Map-ping Militants Project, 20.7.2015d, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mapping-militants/cgi-bin/groups/view/152>, Accessed:13.6.2017.

Fighters/Movement (BIFM/BIFF)⁴⁷ are the most prominent groups in the Moro issue. As of 2017, negotiations with MILF, the most powerful group of Moro, were continuing while fights with ASG and BIFF, which had limited military capacity but could affect the negotiation process, continued.

Map 3.2. Mindanao and Bangsamoro Region



The history of territorial conflicts over the Mindanao region dates back to 1969 when MNLF was founded under the leadership of Nur Misuari. In 1968, a group of young militants from MIM established MNLF and its armed wing - Moro People's Army (Bangsa Moro Army - BMA) with the purpose of establishing an independent state in the Mindanao region and towards 1975 with the support from the Philippines and of many Muslims abroad it became an armed socio-political movement.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ For short history of BIFF see: The Mapping Militants Project, *The Mapping Militant Organizations: Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters*, Stanford University the Mapping Militants Project, 27.8.2015d, <http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/601>, Accessed: 13.6.2017e.

⁴⁸ Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP), "Philippines: Mindanao", <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/conflict/308>, Accessed: 07.06.2017.

According to some sources, in the violent clashes that took place during the mid-1990s, close to 120,000 people lost their lives⁴⁹ and more than one million people were displaced.⁵⁰ According to government sources, the total death toll is more than 240,000.⁵¹

The first negotiations between the Philippine Government and the MNLF began with the mediation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on 13-27 January 1975.⁵² The Treaty of Tripoli signed in 1976 stipulated an autonomous region with broad powers covering 13 of the 23 provinces/states in Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan.⁵³ However, President Marcos disregarded this treaty and unilaterally established two non-autonomous regional administrative units.⁵⁴

A group that left MNLF on the grounds that it had abandoned independence established the MILF in 1977 under the leadership of Hashim Salamat. Apart from the issue of independence, the second reason for separation was the MILF's emphasis on Islam. Unlike the MNLF, the MILF sees Islam as the crucial reference point in the struggle for independence.⁵⁵

The fights that began with the breakdown of the agreement due to divisions within the separatist movement continued at a low-intensity level until the first half of the 1980s.⁵⁶ After the fall of the Marcos regime, Aquino, who was elected president in 1986, created a new draft constitution and initiated peace talks with the MNLF as with the CPP. However, negotiations with the MNLF in 1987 also failed and the conflict resumed. In 1987, the law for the establishment of ARMM was accepted by the Congress. However, in public vote only four provinces/states (Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi) agreed to join the newly established autonomous region. In 1990, ARMM was formally

49 UCDP, *Ibid.*, DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 115.

50 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 3.

51 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 69.

52 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), *Timeline of the Philippine Peace Process: Peace Process with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)*, Office of the President of the Philippines, <https://peace.gov.ph/timeline/peace-process-mnlf/>, Accessed: 07.06.2017.

53 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 90-96

54 UCDP, *Ibid.*; The Mapping Militants Project, 2015b, *Ibid.*

55 MacDonald, *Ibid.*, pg. 20; Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 64; The Mapping Militants Project, 2015b, *Ibid.*, The Mapping Militants Project, 2015c, *Ibid.*

56 MacDonald, *Ibid.*, pg. 20.

established and Cotabato city became the capital of the autonomous region.⁵⁷ MNLF opposed the offer on the grounds that it was not included in the negotiation process and that the scope of autonomy was limited.⁵⁸

When President Ramos came to power in 1992, he established the “National Unification Commission” to terminate the conflicts in the Philippines and negotiated with the CPP, on the one hand, and with the MNLF on the other. The “Final Peace Agreement” was signed on 2 September 1996 in the capital Manila as a result of continued negotiations under the auspices of Indonesia, Libya and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. With this treaty, the 30-year conflict between the Philippine government and MNLF ended. Under the treaty, a transitional government was established in ARMM under the name of the South Philippine Peace and Development Council, and MNLF leader Nur Misuari became the President of the Council in order to expand the geographical area and political power of the autonomous region. Also, the agreement stipulated integration of MNLF’s armed forces into Philippine’s army and the national police force.⁵⁹ In the referendum held in 2001, out of 13 regions and 10 cities included in the Autonomous Region in the Tripoli Treaty, only 5 regions and 1 city voted to join the newly established autonomous region.⁶⁰

Although the MILF did not participate in the 1996 treaty, it did not interfere with the peace agreement, and the fights were considerably reduced.⁶¹ After the agreement with MNLF, the MILF remained the dominant group in Mindanao to fight the state.⁶² Moreover, with the participation of many MNLF members dissatisfied with the treaty MILF gained much more strength. During this period, the number of MILF’s armed militants reached 15,000.⁶³

57 MacDonald, *Ibid.*, pg. 21; Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 77, 96.

58 UCDP, *Ibid.*; Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 77.

59 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 78; Brown, Graham K., “The Long and Winding Road: The Peace Process in Mindanao, Philippines,” *IBIS Discussion Paper*, No. 6, Institute for British-Irish Studies, University College Dublin, 2011, pg. 13-14, http://www.ucd.ie/ibis/publications/discussionpapers/thepeaceprocessinmindanao/g_brown.pdf, Accessed: 12.07.2017.

60 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 97-100.

61 Lingga, Abhoud Syed M., “Negotiating Peace in Mindanao,” *Institute of Bangsamoro Studies*, No. 04, 2007, pg. 7; UCDP, *Ibid.*; Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 100-102.

62 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 62.

63 The Mapping Militants Project, 2015b, *Ibid.*

Although the political and military activities of the MILF intensified particularly during the late 1980s and early 1990s⁶⁴, the most violent fighting between the Philippine state and the MILF took place in 2000 (see Chart 3.6)⁶⁵ and nearly 2 million people were displaced in that period.⁶⁶ During the 1996-2000 period, negotiations between the state and the MILF continued, albeit at a low level. In 2000, however, clashes between the state and the MILF rose again, and due to the government's total war strategy, the number of casualties was very high and hundreds of thousands of people were forcefully displaced.⁶⁷

According to MILF sources, the number of displaced persons exceeded one million.⁶⁸ Moreover, on the grounds that the government had not fully implemented the treaty signed in 1996, Misuari with a group from MNLF resumed armed actions in November 2001 but was arrested in December 2001.⁶⁹ Between 2003 and 2006 negotiations with the MILF resumed and the conflict intensity fell sharply. Since 2007, when the negotiations failed, clashes between the MILF and the state have intensified. In this period, besides the MILF, the MNLF group led by Misuari on one hand, another group led by Habier Malik from MNLF, and the ASG established in 1991 increased intensity of violence.⁷⁰

In 2008, the Philippine government and the MILF reached an agreement. The Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domains (MOA-AD) signed by the parties was canceled on 4 August 2008 by the Supreme Court of the Philippines on the grounds that it was contrary to the Constitution.⁷¹ In July 2009, the MILF unilaterally declared a ceasefire so the clashes

64 The Mapping Militans Project, 2015c, *Ibid.*

65 UCDP, *Ibid.*

66 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 157-171; World Bank, *The Search for Durable Solutions: Armed Conflict and Forced Displacement in Mindanao, Philippines*, Washington, DC, World Bank, 2011, pg. 5.

67 MacDonald, *Ibid.*, pg. 23.

68 Iqbal, Mohagher, "Bir MILF Müzakerecinin Gözünden Barış Süreci", Ayşe Betül Çelik (Ed.), *Barış Süreçlerini Anlamak ve Canlandırmak*, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2017.

69 After the 1996 treaty divisions in MNLF grew. A group under the Misuari leadership, also known as MNLF-NM, continued its armed actions until 2013, even at low intensity. However, the core of the MNLF ended armed struggle with the 1996 treaty. Currently, MNLF is not directly involved in the ongoing peace process. However, it is also not against the process. See: DPI, 2015, *Ibid.*, pg. 11-12; Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 265-266.

70 UCDP, *Ibid.*

71 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), *Timeline of the Philippine Peace Process: Peace Process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)*, Office of the President of the Philippines, <https://peace.gov.ph/timeline/peace-process-milf/>, Accessed: 08.06.2017.

significantly declined. Following the 16 meetings between 2008 and 2012, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) was signed in October 2012.⁷² In the aftermath of this agreement, negotiations between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF continued, and on the 27th March 2014, the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) ended the conflict of 40 years.⁷³ According to the agreement, “Bangsamoro Autonomous Region” was going to be created instead of ARMM. In addition to four provinces/states of this “main geographical area”, a majority Christian Basilan region was added. Moreover, the Lanao del Norte and North Cotabato districts, where the majority of Christians who had decided to become autonomous in the 2001 elections, were to be included in the new autonomous administration. According to the treaty, other provinces/states could also join this region with a public vote.⁷⁴ Although the settlement was reached, the process is not over. According to the agreement of the parties, the treaty was going to be legislated and the implementation process was going to start. As of 2017, the draft of Bangsamoro Basic Law is waiting to be passed.

Despite the agreement with the MILF, BIFF, an offshoot group from MILF established in 2008, as well as ASG, continued the fights with the government forces, albeit at a low level. The military capacity of both warring groups is too small to compare with MNLF and MILF. However, they had the power to influence the masses throughout the Philippines and the capacity to sabotage the peace process.⁷⁵ The following charts (Charts 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9) present the number of casualties by place and years in the fights between the government forces and different groups in the period of 1989-2016.⁷⁶

72 Democratic Progress Institute (DPI), *Briefing: International Contact Group for the Southern Philippines Peace Process*, Democratic Progress Institute, 2014.

73 OPAPP, *Ibid.*

74 MacDonald, *Ibid.*, pg. 28, 31.

75 The Mapping Militants Project, 2015d, *Ibid.*; The Mapping Militants Project, 2015e, *Ibid.*

76 All charts come from UCDP. See: Uppsala Conflict Data Program, “Philippines: Mindanao”, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/conflict/308>, Accessed: 08.06.2017.

Chart 3.3. Total number of deaths in territorial conflict over Mindanao (1989-2016)




Chart 3.4. Total number of deaths by location in territorial conflict over Mindanao (1989-2016)



Chart 3.5. Total number of deaths in the conflict between the state of Philippines and the MNLF (1989-2016)




Chart 3.6. Total number of deaths in the conflict between the state of Philippines and the MILF (1989-2016)




Chart 3.7. Total number of deaths in the conflict between the state of Philippines and the MNLF-NM (Nur Mansuri) (1989-2016)




Chart 3.8. Total number of deaths in the conflict between the state of Philippines and the ASG (1989-2016)





Chart 3.9. Total number of deaths in the conflict between the state of Philippines and the BIFM (1989-2016)



4. Philippine state - MILF reconciliation process

Before examining in detail the peace treaty between the Philippine state and the MILF, it is important to note the basic provisions made since the signing of this treaty.

4.1. Steps taken during the Bangsamoro Peace Process

Detailed agreements and a series of provisions were made on a range of issues from the framework agreement (FAB) signed in 2012 to the comprehensive treaty (CAB) signed in 2014. Among these are the following:⁷⁷

- On December 17, 2012, the “Bangsamoro Transition Commission” was set up to draft the “Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL)” by the Presidential decree.
- On February 11, 2013, “the Sajahatra Bangsamoro” program was launched to develop areas affected by the conflict.
- On February 27, 2013, “Annex on Transitional Arrangements and Modalities” was signed.
- On July 13, 2013, “Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth-sharing” was signed.

⁷⁷ Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), *Timeline of the Philippine Peace Process: Peace Process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) ...*

- On 8 December 2013, “Annex on Power-Sharing” was signed.
- On January 25, 2014, “Annex on Normalization” and “Bangsamoro Waters and Zones of Joint Cooperation Addendum” were signed.
- On 22 March 2014, treaties were signed on “Terms of Reference for the Joint Normalization Committee,” “Terms of Reference for the Independent Decommissioning Body,” “Terms of Reference for the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)”.

Based on these regulations, CAB, signed on March 27, 2014 recognized broad authority in the administrative, political and economic spheres of the to be established Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.⁷⁸ The fundamental measures taken after the comprehensive agreement based on the peace process are as follows:⁷⁹

- On April 22, 2014, the “Bangsamoro Transition Commission” presented the draft of the BBL to the Presidential Office.
- On September 10, 2014, President Aquino sent the draft of the BBL to the Senate Speaker and the House of Representatives.
- In October 2014 the “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission” started to work.
- On November 5, 2014, the “Bangsamoro Development Plan” was announced.
- On June 16, 2015, 145 MILF militants gave up weapons in a symbolic disarmament event.
- On May 30, 2016, the parties in the Bangsamoro Peace Process declared that the partnership between the government and the MILF will continue with the “Continuity Declaration”.
- On July 18, 2016, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte approved the six-point peace and development agenda. The roadmap of the Bangsamoro peace process will be set within a federal system through wide transitional efforts throughout the country.

78 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 112-124.

79 OPAPP, *Ibid.*

- On 13-14 August 2016, the parties who came together in the Malaysian capital of Kuala Lumpur officially launched the implementation phase of the Bangsamoro Peace Process.

4.2. Key issues in the Bangsamoro Peace Process

The comprehensive agreement reached in Bangsamoro has just come into force and there are considerable uncertainties about the future of the process. However, the road-map to implementation is well-paced. There are at least seven critical issues that stand out when the conflict resolution and social peace-building process are examined in detail. First, the peace treaty was provided after a 17-year-long on-and-off dialogue and negotiation process. Considering the transition period of the implementation, it took 20 years. Fights began at the beginning of the 1970s and only entered the path of dialogue and negotiation in the mid-1990s meaning the reconciliation lasted as long as the fights. According to the information provided by M. Iqbal, who since 2003 was part of the MILF negotiating delegation and was the chief negotiator of the MILF in the last peace talks, six presidents and 12 governments changed during this period of 17 years. In addition, the MILF negotiating delegation changed four times.⁸⁰

Second, in the Bangsamoro peace process, both the Philippine government and the MILF confirm that the third parties played an important role.⁸¹ The most important issue to be stressed about the third party acting as a kind of a “trust bridge”⁸² is that there is a long experience of different countries involved in the conflict resolution process in the Philippines, and the first attempts to solve the issue date back to the 1970s. Based on these experiences, five critical mechanisms concerning third parties were set up in the last peace process.

The most important mechanism was the International Contact Groups (ICG) established in 2009. The ICG played an important role by mediating

80 Iqbal, *Ibid.*

81 Iqbal, *Ibid.*; Ferrer, Miriam Coronel, “Filipinli bir Müzakerecinin Gözünden Barış Süreci,” Ayşe Betül Çelik (Ed.), *Barış Süreçlerini Anlamak ve Canlandırmak*, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2017. Regarding the third parties role, for the experience of the IHH which is a Turkey-based NGO and directly took part in the Philippines peace process, see: Oruç, Hüseyin, “Moro Barış Süreci ve STK’ların Rolü: IHH’nın İnsani Diplomasi Tecrübesi,” Ayşe Betül Çelik (Ed.), *Barış Süreçlerini Anlamak ve Canlandırmak*, İstanbul, Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2017; DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 17-70, 195, 200, 201, 210, 211.

82 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 211.

between the parties, especially in times of crisis. ICG consists of four states: UK, Japan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey as well as of four international non-governmental institutions. These included: London-based Conciliation Resources, Geneva-based Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, Indonesian-based Muhammadiyah, and Washington-based Asian Foundation. The last institution left its seat to the Rome-based Community of Sant'Egidio.⁸³ The ICG is “a mixed mechanism in which state and non-state actors co-exist in an unprecedented fashion.”⁸⁴

The second important mechanism is the International Monitoring Team (IMT).⁸⁵ The main responsibility of IMT, headed by Malaysia and involving Brunei, Japan, Norway, and Indonesia, is to “monitor and observe the cease-fire.”⁸⁶ IMT is based on three premises: the concept of prevention of the onset of events, the conflict concept that aims at containing the conflict and preventing escalation, post-conflict reconstruction concept.⁸⁷ The IMT has set up a partnership between the Philippine Government and the MILF to fulfill these functions. To this end, the Joint Action Group works in coordination with different structures, such as the Coordination Committee for Ending Hostilities and the Local Observation Mission.⁸⁸

The third important mechanism is the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), established under the chairmanship of a Swiss representative, to carry out the work of confronting the past and providing justice. The task of the TJRC is to manage the period of transitional justice and to determine how this process can be operated.⁸⁹

The fourth crucial mechanism is Third-Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) which consist of mediators.⁹⁰ The TPMT, also including the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH) from Turkey, is tasked with monitoring and reporting on the compliance of the

83 DPI, 2014, *Ibid.*; Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 146-148.

84 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 20.

85 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 142-146.

86 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 216.

87 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 217.

88 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 216; Yokuş, Sevtap, *Filipinler'de Çatışma Çözümü ve Temel Yasa Tartışmaları*, Democratic Progress Institute, London, 2016, pg. 18.

89 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 41, 154.

90 Iqbal, *Ibid.*

measures undertaken by the signatories of the treaty with its provisions.⁹¹ The TPMT is chaired by an impartial international actor and consists of local and international NGOs proposed by the state and the MILF.⁹²

The fifth key mechanism is Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) headed by Turkey and composed of ambassadorial level envoys which is tasked with managing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR).⁹³ The Philippines prefer to call this process normalization, not DDR.⁹⁴

It should be noted that the Malaysian state plays a facilitating role in the Philippine peace process, as well as in all mechanisms related to the third parties. In fact, Malaysia is not only hosting the peace talks and secretarial services but also has an influence on the MILF.⁹⁵

Third, legality is important in the Moro peace process in addition to the long-running dialogue process and the role played by third parties. According to MILF chief negotiator M. Iqbal, over 100 documents and treaties were signed in the 17-year peace talks between the state and the MILF.⁹⁶ As noted in the related chapter regarding measures taken within the peace process, the reconciliation is based on two main treaties: FAB and CAB. Based on these two treaties, the BBL which outlines Bangsamoro's status, power, authority and responsibilities, and its relation to the national government, is the most important indicator of the legality of the Philippine peace process. Another important indicator of the central place of the legislative affairs in the process was that the 2008 treaty was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.⁹⁷ Today, the most critical phase of the process is the enactment of the BBL by the newly elected president and government.⁹⁸

91 Ferrer, *Ibid.*; Oruç, *Ibid.*; DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 40; Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 151-152.

92 Oruç, *Ibid.*; DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 40.

93 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 111.

94 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 43-44, 139, 121; Ferrer, *Ibid.*

95 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 38; Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 131-134.

96 Iqbal, *Ibid.* Some of these treaties are made available online by Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process. See <https://peace.gov.ph/signed-agreements/>

97 Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), *Timeline of the Philippine Peace Process: Peace Process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)...*

98 DPI, 2016, *Ibid.*, pg. 54-55.

Fourth, power-sharing in the Moro peace process is one of the most critical subjects for both conflict and peacemaking.⁹⁹ Forty years before the now-reached treaty, in 1976 President Marcos, broke a signed treaty which stipulated autonomy for 13 states of the 23 provinces of Muslim Mindanao region, and he unilaterally established two non-autonomous regional administrations.¹⁰⁰ The “Annex on Power-Sharing” signed during reconciliation process on December 8, 2013, a half century later, details power-sharing between the national government of the Philippines and the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region. The 12-page treaty consists of a five-page introduction and a total of 101 articles organized into four parts: “Intergovernmental Relations”, “governance structure”, “delineation of powers” and “other matters pertaining to power sharing.”¹⁰¹ Lastly, it is important to note that the newly elected President Duterte deals with the federal state-building and transition processes.

Fifth, as much as the identity issue, the socioeconomic development seems to have an important place in the peace process. In the Bangsamoro region, as well as religious identity-based conflicts, interregional socioeconomic inequalities and regional development needs form major problems. The identity and socio-economic issues are intertwined because despite its rich resources, the region is poorer than the rest of the country, and the policies of demographic change¹⁰² brought Christians from the North to settle in Mindanao.

As a matter of fact, apart from power-sharing outlining rights and responsibilities stipulated in the peace treaty, there is also “Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth-sharing” signed on July 13, 2013 and “Bangsamoro Waters and Zones of Joint Cooperation Addendum”, which delineates the authority over the territorial waters of the region.¹⁰³ In addition to the treaty, the Sajahatra Bangsamoro program, which was

99 DPI,2016, *Ibid.*, pg.105.

100 Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg.75.

101 The treaty can be accessed online. See: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), *Annex on Power Sharing*, Office of the President of the Philippines, <https://www.scribd.com/document/208285324/Annex-on-Power-Sharing>, Accessed: 09.06.2017.

102 MacDonald, *Ibid.*, pg.17-18; Yokuş, *Ibid.*, pg.4-5; DPI,2016, *Ibid.*, pg.199; Söylemez, *Ibid.*, pg. 157-171.

103 The treaty is available online. See: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), *Annex on Revenue Generation and Wealth Sharing*, Office of the President of the Philippines, <https://www.scribd.com/document/153840531/Annex-on-Revenue-Generation-and-Wealth-Sharing>, Accessed: 09.06.2017.

launched on February 11, 2013, for the development of areas affected by the conflict, and Bangsamoro Development Plan announced on 5 November 2014 show that elimination of socioeconomic inequalities and regional development have an important place in the Bangsamoro peace process.

Sixth, the “Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission” established in order to confront injustices and grievances created by the conflict, and to serve justice, has an important place in the peace process. In this regard, both the text of the signed treaty, the work to be done and mechanisms were defined and documented in addition to the establishment of a commission with international actors. The Commission’s (TJRC) Transitional Justice and Social Reconciliation Program, which was set up in October 2014, presented its reports at the Peace Panel. However, it should be noted that the work undertaken is in an initial stage and that the process of confronting the past have not begun.¹⁰⁴

Finally, it is necessary to note the issue of disarmament, which is one of the most critical problem areas in conflict resolution and social peace-building processes. In this regard, a gradual process of disarmament is planned in the Philippines. Symbolic disarmament took place on June 16, 2015, with the release of 145 MILF militants’ weapons. However, the actual disarmament, or “normalization” the term preferred in the Philippines, will start after the legislation of the BBL in the Congress and after the positive outcome of the referendum. According to the treaty, in the aftermath of the referendum 30% of the weapons will be decommissioned, followed 35%¹⁰⁵ when the Philippine army’s local security authorities are transferred to a police force that will be newly formed and responsible to both the Philippines and Bangsamoro governments, and the remaining 35% when the other phases of the process are completed.¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

In this chapter, the intra-state conflict in the Philippines over the territory is discussed. In order to better understand the context of the country, the conflict concerning government and negotiations between the state and

104 Yokuş, *Ibid.*, pg.11; Ferrer, *Ibid.*

105 MacDonald, *Ibid.*, pg.29; DPI, 2015, *Ibid.*, pg.8.

106 Yokuş, *Ibid.*, pg.12.

the CPP are briefly mentioned. Nonetheless, the territorial conflict and negotiation process that took place mainly in the Mindanao/Bangsamoro region constitute the main subject of this chapter. Considered along conflicts with different groups, the focus in this chapter in terms of conflict resolution and the construction of social peace was MILF, the most active and strongest group since 1997, and the peace process concluded in 2014 with a peace settlement.

If one were to summarize the results of the Philippine experience, firstly, it should be noted that the construction of the state in the country is an ongoing process. Established as an independent state in the middle of the 20th century after about four hundred years of colonial experience, the Philippines is actually in the process of building a new socio-political system after four or five centuries of problems. The conflict concerning government, conflict with different separatist movements over territory, and the quest for resolution can be read as the problems of building a post-colonial state and society.

Secondly, there is a long history of conflict in the Philippines. The state established after four hundred years of colonial rule nearly since its founding is at war. Most violence took place in the period of Marcos dictatorship but have lasted for almost 70 years even though there were periodical interruptions.

Third, it is necessary to note that there are multiple conflicts and multiple negotiation processes in the Philippines. As stated above, there are both socio-political intra-state conflicts concerning government and territorial conflicts based on identity. While the first conflict was spatially spread throughout the country, the second type of conflict was concentrated in the Mindanao/Bangsamoro region, in the South of the country. Both conflicts and negotiation processes affect each other and to a great extent run in parallel.

Fourth, it seems that the elections, changes in presidents and governments are important in conflict and reconciliation processes. In the experience of the Philippines, during the conflict and reconciliation process, the change of heads of state and governments was decisive. In this sense, it is necessary to note that elections and electoral processes are a critical period in conflict resolution and social reconciliation processes.

Fifth, changes among rebels as well as changes on the government front seem to be important. In the Philippine experience, it is seen that there is a continuous fragmentation within the separatist movements and that they are divided into groups during critical conflict or reconciliation periods. In most cases, the conflict with the departing faction remains, while dialogue and negotiations between the government and the main group continue. The most important point to be underlined in the Philippine experience is that both the government and the rebels continue their negotiation process despite fragmentation and ongoing fights.

Sixth, in the Philippine case, international actors play a critical role. As a unique experience, both states and non-state actors have played a critical role in the Moro peace process. In this sense, the Moro peace process offers an important experience for conflict resolution and social peacebuilding processes in different places.

Seventh, it should be noted that the peace treaty provided in the Philippines is both comprehensive and highly detailed. With the additional treaties signed with the framework treaty, both the scope of the reforms to be done and the main mechanisms by which the process is governed are described in detail.

Finally, it seems that the relations established by the Philippines with the USA in particular, and the international conjuncture in general, have directly affected the conflict and peace processes in the country. The Marcos dictatorship in the 1970s developed at the time with the support of the US administration. On the other hand, violent fights that have increased since 2000 and caused numerous casualties and forced displacement have developed in parallel to the doctrine of global “preventive war on terror” of the United States after the September 11, 2001 attacks. Finally, the post-2008 peace process coincided with the change of the US administration and the new period that started with Barack Obama. In sum, the conflict processes and peace-seeking in the Philippines should be seen in the international context.

The Philippine experience was discussed in detail in this chapter with regard to conflict resolution and social peacebuilding after a global picture was drawn up and the basic parameters determining the formation of such cases was addressed. The next chapter examines the Indonesian experience.

4

THE QUEST FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND RECONCILIATION: THE EXPERIENCE OF INDONESIA/ACEH

In this chapter, the Indonesian/Aceh experience is dealt with in depth as the second case after Philippines/Bangsamoro. The most important reason for selection of these cases from the Asian region, as underlined in the previous chapter, is that when it comes to Kurdish conflict and quest for solutions, even though the examples from Europe and South America are to a certain extent on the agenda, the cases in the Asian region are not adequately addressed.

There are two important reasons for Indonesia's preference as the second case-study from the Asian region. Firstly, both the majority of the country and the rebels, like in Turkey, are Muslim. Secondly, Indonesia is an example of a successful conflict resolution and reconciliation.

The chapter first outlines the socio-economic and socio-political structure of the Indonesian state. Secondly, other types of conflict in the country are briefly examined to better understand the context in which the case of Aceh, a territorial type of conflict, takes place. Finally, the main focus of this chapter is the conflict mechanisms in Aceh and the process of conflict resolution and reconciliation, which successfully concluded in the middle of the 2000s.


1. Socio-economic and socio-political structure

The Republic of Indonesia, located in the western part of the Pacific Ocean in Southeast Asia, emerged as an independent state on August 17, 1945, after the 70-year-long Dutch colonial rule, which had begun in the 19th century.¹ The colonialism in the region dates back to the beginning of the 16th century. The Southeast Asian region, including today's Indonesia, had been colonized by Spain, Britain and the Netherlands for nearly four centuries. The Indonesian territory remained a colony of the

¹ Worldwatch Institute, "Conflict and Peacemaking in Aceh: A Chronology," *Worldwatch Institute*, <http://www.worldwatch.org/node/3929>, Accessed: 16.06.2017.

Netherlands from the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th century. As a result of the anti-colonial struggles starting at the beginning of the 20th century, Indonesia declared its independence under the presidency of Ahmed Sukarno. During the Second World War, the anti-colonial struggle escalating in the Aceh area which was occupied by Japan from 1942 to 1945, played an important role in the founding of Indonesia.² The Netherlands recognized Indonesia's independence on December 27, 1949.³

Map 4.1. Administrative map of Indonesia



Source: <http://www.indonesiaamatters.com/images/indonesia-map.gif>

Consisting of more than seventeen thousand islands, Indonesia has seven major geographical regions/groups of islands: Java, Kalimantan, Lesser Sunda, Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua and Sumatra which Aceh is part of (see Map 4.1). Indonesia is made up of 33 administrative provinces. Ten of these 33 provinces are in Sumatra, six in Java, four in Kalimantan, three in Lesser Sunda, six in Sulawesi, two in Maluku and two in Papua. In every province, the second level of administrative units is organized into urban units (*Kota*) and semi-urban/semi-rural cities/regencies (*Kabupaten*) which have equal status.⁴ At the lower administrative level are districts (*Kecamatan*). The capital of Indonesia is Jakarta province in the Java region.

The Republic of Indonesia is a unitary state with a presidential system and two-house parliament (People's Representatives Council and

2 Worldwatch Institute, *Ibid*.

3 Worldwatch Institute, *Ibid*.

4 Some of the cities in Indonesia comprise both of urban and rural areas, out of the cities, and have been organized into a separate administrative unit.

Regional Representatives Council).⁵ With the constitutional amendment of 2004 (Article 18), autonomy was given to regional governments. The regional autonomy is secured by the local governance of provinces, cities, and regencies.⁶ According to the Constitution, the state recognizes and respects the provincial governments as determined by autonomy law. Both provincial governors, regency presidents, and city presidents are directly elected and have local parliaments.

On the other hand, according to the International Democracy Index, which is based on 60 indicators, in 2006-2016 Indonesia's democracy varied between 6.34 and 7.03 on the 0-10 scale. According to the four categories of the Index (authoritarian regimes, hybrid regimes, flawed democracies, and full democracies), Indonesia is an flawed democracy.⁷ Despite some problems, such as violations of press freedom, "there are free and fair elections in these countries, and basic civil rights are respected. However, there are considerable weaknesses in other dimensions of democracy, such as problems in governance, underdeveloped political culture, and low-level political participation."⁸

Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world, with 264 million inhabitants.⁹ Urbanization rate is 54.7% and there are 177.7 million working population aged 15-64.¹⁰ Since 2018 Indonesia with a Human Development Index of 0.694 ranks 116th among 189 countries and is among the middle-ranking developed countries in the four-level (low, medium, high, very high) development indicator.¹¹ The per capita Gross National Product (GNP) was \$ 4,293 in 1990, compared to 5,430 in 2000,

5 The first article of the Indonesian Constitution stipulates a unitary state structure, articles 2 and 3 the assemblies, 3-16 the powers and responsibilities of the executive i.e. the presidency. The 1945 Constitution of Indonesia was amended four times. The last changes took place in 2002. For the 1945 Constitution and the new constitution based on the amendments see: Indrayana, Denny, *Indonesian Constitutional Reform 1999-2002: An Evaluation of Constitution-Making in Transition*, Jakarta, Kompas Book Publishing, 2008, pg. 333-356.

6 Indrayana, *Ibid.*

7 The Economist Intelligence Unit, *The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2016*, The Economist Intelligence Unit, <https://infographics.economist.com/2017/DemocracyIndex/>, Accessed: 16.06.2017.

8 The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2016*, London, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2017, pg. 54.

9 UNDP, *Human Development Reports: Indonesia*, United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), New York, 2018, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/IDN>, Accessed: 04.10.2018.

10 UNDP, *Ibid.*

11 UNDP, *Ibid.*

8.210 in 2010 and increased to 10.846 in 2017.¹² Income injustice is one of the most important problems in Indonesia. Based on the GINI-coefficient, Indonesia is ranked third among the countries with income inequality in the four-rank classification. While “the Palma ratio,” which is the ratio of the richest 10% of the population’s share of gross national income (GNI) divided by the poorest 40%’s share is 1.8, the “quintile ratio” which is the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% of the population to the average income of the poorest 20% of the population, is 6.6.¹³

Indonesia is a multilingual and multi-ethnic country. According to Ethnological data, there are 707 living languages in the country, 18 of which are institutional.¹⁴ On the other hand, according to the Indonesian Constitution, the official language of the country is Bahasa Indonesia, the Indonesian language. Nevertheless, the state respects and develops the regional tongues that are part of the national cultural heritage.¹⁵ Looking at the praxis, it can be said that it takes considerable time for a local language to become a “national language.”¹⁶ For centuries Bahasa Indonesia was a *lingua franca* but in 1945, when independence was declared only 5% of the population spoke this version of the Malay language which has now become the first or second language of the vast majority of the country.¹⁷ In addition to the national language, the most spoken languages in the country are: Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, Batak, Minangkabau, Balinese and Buginese.¹⁸ Today, languages spoken by millions of people in the west, such as Javanese and Bali, are preserved and institutionalized at a remarkable level. On the other hand, the vast majority of small tongues in the eastern part of the country are at risk of

12 UNDP, *Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update. Briefing note for countries on the 2018 Statistical Update - Indonesia*, United Nation Development Programme (UNDP), New York, 2018, http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/IDN.pdf, Accessed: 04.10.2018.

13 UNDP, *Human Development Reports: Indonesia...*

14 Ethnologue, “Indonesia”, Ethnologue: Languages of World, <https://www.ethnologue.com/country/ID>, Accessed: 17.06.2017.

15 Indrayana, *Ibid.*

16 Bukhari, Daud, “Bahasa Indonesia: The Struggle for a National Language,” *University of Melbourne Working Papers in Linguistics* 16, 1996, pg. 17-28.

17 Paauw, Scott, “One land, one nation, one language: An analysis of Indonesia’s national language policy,” H. Lehnert-LeHouillier and A. B. Fine (Eds.), *University of Roshester Working Papers in the Language Sciences*, 5:1 (2009), pg. 2-16.

18 Rini, Julia Eka, “English in Indonesia: Its Position Among Other Languages in Indonesia,” *Journal Beyond Words*, 2:2 (2014), pg. 19-40, Surabaya, Widya Mandala Catholic University.

disappearing.¹⁹ In order to protect and improve endangered languages, “multilingual education based on mother tongue” has been developed in the Papua region since 2015.²⁰

Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country in the world. According to the 2010 census, approximately 87% of the country is Muslim, 10% are Christian (7% are Protestant and 3% are Roman Catholic), 1.5% are Hindu and 1.3% Buddhist or traditional believers who do not disclose their religious beliefs.²¹ The Muslim population is predominantly Sunni. On the other hand, it is estimated that there are between one and three million Shiites in the country. According to the Indonesian Constitution, the Indonesian nation is based on the belief that “the only judge is God”, and everyone is guaranteed the right to live according to their own faith and worship. On the other hand, the Ministry of Religious Affairs recognizes only six religious and religious sects in the country. These religions and sects are: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism.²² Those belonging to indigenous religions other than these are also under the protection of the Constitution and are guaranteed the right to live according to their own faith and worship. While this is the status of religion in the eyes of the law, on the other hand, considerable human rights violations are reported against non-Sunni-Muslim groups.²³

2. Conflicts and negotiations in Indonesia

It can be said that there is a long history of conflict in Indonesia. According to the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University, since 1945, when independence was proclaimed, there have been many different types of conflicts in the country, including interstate conflicts.²⁴

19 ACDP Indonesia, “Mother Tongue Based Multilingual Education,” *Working Paper*, November 2014, <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/176282/into-mother-tongue-multilingual-education.pdf>, Accessed: 18.06.2017.

20 ACDP Indonesia, *Ibid.*

21 U.S. Department of State, *International Religious Freedom Report for 2015: Indonesia*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=256135#wrap_per, Accessed: 19.06.2017.

22 U.S. Department of State, *Ibid.*

23 U.S. Department of State, *Ibid.*

24 UCDP, “Indonesia,” *Uppsala Universitet Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP)*, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#country/850>, Accessed: 19.06.2017.

During the years when independence was declared, debates continued over the borders of the country. On the one hand, there were regions/territories in a quest for independence that denied Indonesian claims to sovereignty, and on the other hand, there were wars with the Dutch and neighboring states, the colonial forces in the region. In 1962, a war broke out between Indonesia and the Netherlands over alleged sovereignty over the western region of the New Guinea Island. Another inter-state war was with Malaysia in 1963-66.²⁵ In addition to wars between states, there have also been intra-state conflicts. Between 1953 and 1958-61, both Islamic movements and factions of the army tried to seize control of the governments.²⁶

Although it does not fall into an intra-state conflict, during the years 1965-66, the massacre against the members of the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI) should be noted. An anti-PKI campaign was launched nationwide on the grounds that it was related to the failed coup attempt that took place on 30 September - 1 October 1965. Under the leadership of General Suharto, who took control of the army, it is estimated that at least 500,000 communists were killed as a result of anti-communist propaganda and actions throughout the country.²⁷ In the 1960s, the PKI, was the largest communist party in the world after the Soviet Union and China, there were approximately two million members who accounted for 3.8% of the population of working age.²⁸

Although the exterminatory slaughter of the PKI had a very important place in the political history, the main events that fall into the category of an intra-state conflict took place in Papua Barat in the east of the country, in East Timor in the south and in Aceh in the west (see Map 4.2).

25 UCDP, 2017, *Ibid.*

26 UCDP, 2017, *Ibid.*

27 Gellately, Robert and Kiernan, Ben, *The Specter of Genocide: Mass Murder in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pg. 290- 291; Cribb, Robert and Kahin, Audrey, *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2004, pg. 264.

28 Benjamin, Roger W. and Kautsky, John H., "Communism and Economic Development", *The American Political Science Review*, 62:1 (1968), pg. 110-123.

Map 4.2. Territorial conflicts in Indonesia: Aceh, East Timor and West Papua



Source: McCulloch, Lesley, *Aceh: Then and Now*, London: Minority Rights Group International, 2005, pg. 3.

2.1. Papua Barat

West Papua, the Dutch colony, with the support of the United States after one year of the United Nations (UN) administration, on condition of an Act of Free Choice, was included in Indonesia in 1963.²⁹ Instead of the UN referendum, West Papua remained part of Indonesia as a result of 1969 election with the participation of only 1.025 community leaders who were forced to vote in favor of Indonesia.³⁰

This led to separatist movements in Western Papua, where the majority of the population is Christian.³¹ The Free Papua Movement (OPM), founded in 1965, declared the Republic of West Papua on July 1, 1971. The small but effective OPM, increased armed mobilization in particular in the 1970s

29 Bell, Ian, Feith, Herb and Hatley, "Ron, The West Papuan Challenge to Indonesian Authority in Irian Jaya," *Asian Survey*, 26:5 (1986), pg. 539-556; Trajano, Julius Cesar I., "Ethnic Nationalism and Separatism in West Papua, Indonesia," *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, No. 16, 2010, pg. 12-35.

30 Trajano, *Ibid.*; United Nations (UN), *Report of the Secretary-General Regarding the Act of Self-Determination in West Irian*, UN Document A/7723, General Assembly, 1969; Human Rights Watch, *Protest and Punishment: Political Prisoners in Papua*, Human Rights Watch, Cilt 19, No. 4(C), February 2007, pg. 9-10, <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/papua0207webwcover.pdf>, Accessed: 19.06.2017.

31 Bell, Feiht and Hatley, *Ibid.*

and continued until the mid-1980s.³² There was also a considerable mass of support.³³ According to the US Ambassador of that time, “most probably 85-90% of the population sympathized with the cause of Free Papua”.³⁴ The “New Order” regime of “powerful”, “central” and “unitary” state was built with the military support under the leadership of Suharto. The “New Order” regime’s economic exploitation, oppression, marginalization, and large-scale internal migration practices in West Papua aimed at changing the demographic structure of the region were effective in strengthening separatist movements and Papua nationalism.³⁵ During the Suharto period, the Western Papua remained a “Military Operations Region” and according to reports of international NGOs, not only armed groups, but civilian opposition groups were targeted. There are no official data on the fatalities. Unofficial numbers range from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands. However, the figure that is often given for loss of lives is 100,000.³⁶

Since the mid-1980s OPM has largely lost its influence. Nevertheless, especially in urban areas, a cultural nationalism centered on the Papuan identity developed.³⁷ After the overthrow of Suharto in 1998, there was a revival in independence movements³⁸ and in 2001, the autonomy of the region was legally expanded due to the impact of the referendum on independence in East Timor.³⁹ In this period, non-violent political movements for independence emerged in addition to the OPM.⁴⁰

32 Trajano, *Ibid.*

33 Bell, Feiht and Hatley, *Ibid.*; Osborne, Robin, *Indonesia's Secret War - The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1985, pg. XIV.

34 The National Security Archive, “Indonesia’s 1969 Takeover of West Papua Not by “Free Co-hoice”, *The National Security Archive*, <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB128/index.htm>, Accessed: 19.06.2017.

35 Trajano, *Ibid.*; Webster, David, “Already Sovereign as a People: A Foundational Moment in West Papuan Nationalism,” *Pacific Affairs*, 74:4 (2001-2002), pg. 507-528; Chauvel, Richard, *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation*, Washington, East-West Center Washington, Policy Studies 14, 2005, pg. 1-4.

36 The Politics of Papua Project, *Assessment Report on the Conflict in the West Papua Region of Indonesia*, The University of Warwick Department of Politics and International Studies, The Politics of Papua Project, Coventry, 2016, pg. 19., https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/researchcentres/iERG/westpapua/assessment_report_international_version_final_pdf.pdf, Accessed: 19.06.2017.

37 Webster, *Ibid.*

38 Chauvel, *Ibid.*, pg. 10.

39 Webster, *Ibid.*

40 King, Peter, *West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy or Chaos?*, Sydney,

Meanwhile, OPM's armed actions continue, though rarely and at a low intensity.⁴¹

The dilemma between autonomy and independence continues to be the question today among the Papua Barat nationalists.⁴² The annual independence rally used to be held in December every year. In the last 2016 rally, more than 500 people were arrested.⁴³ Some see Papua nationalism today to be stronger than the 1960s. Indeed, the idea of the independent West Papua that was popular among the urban elites in the 1960s, has spread throughout the region to the rural parts. The nationalist movement has raised today's elites which have better political experience and capacity and are now both quantitatively and qualitatively in a better situation than in the 1960s.⁴⁴

2.2. Timor-Leste

The second territorial conflict in Indonesia took place in Timor-Leste (East Timor). Immediately after the former Portuguese colony, East Timor declared its independence in 1975, the Indonesian occupation and force-based integration initiated a 24-year territorial conflict. The resistance was initiated by a Marxist organization, Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN - *Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste independence*). As a result, Indonesia withdrew from the region in 1999 and East Timor became an independent state in 2002.⁴⁵

After the revolution in 1974, there was a rapid political change in Portugal and Portugal withdrew from colonies. Immediately after the Portuguese withdrawal from East Timor a power-struggle⁴⁶ emerged between a

University of New South Wales Press, 2004; Human Right Watch, *Ibid.*, pg. 11.

41 UCDP, 2017, *Ibid.*; Human Right Watch, *Ibid.*, pg. 10-11.

42 Chauvel, *Ibid.*, pg. 5.

43 Green Left Weekly, "West Papua: More than 500 arrested marching for independence," *Green Left Weekly*, No. 1122, 21.12.2016, <https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/west-papua-more-500-arrested-marching-independence>, Accessed: 19.06.2017.

44 Chauvel, *Ibid.*, pg. 1-4.

45 UCDP, "Indonesia: East Timor," *Uppsala Universitet Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP)*, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/conflict/330>, Accessed: 19.06.2017.

46 Fukuda, Chisako M., "Peace through Nonviolent Action: The East Timorese Resistance Movement's Strategy for Engagement," *Pacifica Review*, 12:1 (2000), pg. 17-31; Kiernan, Ban, "War, Genocide, and Resistance in East Timor, 1975-99: Comparative Reflections on Cambodia," Mark Selden and Alvin Y. So (Ed.), In: *War and State Terrorism: The United States, Japan and the*

right-wing party, Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), and the ruling Timorese Social Democrat Association - ASDT, which was a leftist party and later transformed into FRETILIN. In the fighting that lasted between May and September, nearly 3,000 people lost their lives and nearly 200,000 people were forced to leave their houses.⁴⁷ Indonesia, which already had territorial claims to the region, on the pretext of internal conflicts, launched comprehensive military operation on December 7, 1975. As a result of the operations, Indonesia annexed the region with two-thirds of the population animist and the remaining third Catholic.⁴⁸ According to some sources, about 2,000 people lost their lives only in the first days of occupation.⁴⁹ In July 1976 East Timor officially became the 27th province of Indonesia.⁵⁰ This deepened the social disparity in East Timor. While a segment of society supported Indonesian forces, a significant number supported FRETILIN and was on the side of the armed wing, East Timor's National Liberation Armed Forces (FALINTIL - *Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste*).⁵¹

Conflicts in East Timor increased in particular in the period 1976-79. In these years, the widespread and extensive military operations of the Indonesian state dispersed the FRETILIN, and the conflict intensity fell considerably. By 1979, only three out of 55 members of the Central Committee survived.⁵² According to the information presented to the national conference held in March 1981, 79% of the members of the High Command of FALINTIL, 80% of the armed militants, 90% all of the active social base and communication channels perished.⁵³ According to

Asia-Pacific in the Long Twentieth Century, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004, pg. 199-233.

47 Ofstad, Olav, "Reconciliation and Conflict Resolution in East Timor," University of Oxford, Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, *Working Paper*, April 2012, <http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/reconciliation%20and%20conflict%20resolution%20in%20east%20timor%20apr%202012.pdf>, Accessed: 20.6.2017. Some sources estimate the number of enforced displacements to be around 10.000. See Durand, Frédéric, "Three centuries of violence and struggle in East Timor (1726-2008)," *Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence*, 14 October, 2011, <http://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/three-centuries-violence-and-struggle-east-timor-1726-2008>, ISSN 1961-9898, Accessed: 20.06.2017.

48 Fukuda, *Ibid.*

49 Durand, *Ibid.*

50 UCDP, "Indonesia: East Timor", ...

51 Ofstad, *Ibid.*

52 Kiernan, *Ibid.*

53 Budiardjo, Carmel, vd., *The War against East Timor*, London, Zed, 1984, pg. 67-70.

the Indonesian army's description, in December 1978, 372,000 (60% of the total population) Timorese were in 150 camps. The extreme famine of 1981-82, 1984 and 198, caused massive casualties mostly among the Timorese imprisoned in the camps.⁵⁴

The practice of targeting civilians in the region by the Indonesian military administration enabled to revitalize the independence movement with a massive popular support in the 1980s.⁵⁵ FALINTIL has been organized again since the beginning of the 1980's. The armed groups were formed into smaller units and turned into a well-organized guerilla movement. In the first 10 months of 1985, FALINTIL carried out 50 attacks. The Indonesian military authorities stated that it would take years to deal with such a well-organized guerrilla movement.⁵⁶ In 1988, FALINTIL leader José Xanana Gusmao established an umbrella organization under the name "National Council of the Maubere Resistance" (CNRM). At the same time, FALINTIL ceased to be an armed wing of FRETILIN and turned into a common armed force above the party.⁵⁷ In addition to the Indonesian regime's oppression, the new organization strengthened, particularly in the political arena, the independence movement in East Timor.⁵⁸ In the 1990s, despite lowered armed mobilization capacity and many high-rank leaders arrested, including leader Gusmao, FALINTIL could maintain its existence. According to Indonesian authorities' estimates, this new organization had around six thousand armed militants. However, only 163 out of the 442 villages in East Timor were secured. Nevertheless, the spread of city-based non-violent political activities was the main developing dynamic of East Timor's struggle for independence.⁵⁹

While Indonesia had the support of the US, Portugal supported independence movements in East Timor. Since the UN did not recognize the sovereignty of Indonesia over East Timor, for the international community the region belonged to Portugal. From 1983 onward, the dialogue on the East Timor issue between Indonesia and Portugal began under the auspices of the UN. As a result of intensive lobbying activities

54 Durand, *Ibid.*

55 Durand, *Ibid.*; Fukuda, *Ibid.*

56 Durand, *Ibid.*

57 Durand, *Ibid.* CNRM in 1998 became the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT). The separation between FRETILIN and CNRT is visible until today. See: Ofstad, *Ibid.*

58 Fukuda, *Ibid.*; Kierman, *Ibid.*

59 Kierman, *Ibid.*; Fukuda, *Ibid.*

of Portugal and the Timorese in exile, the UN General Assembly in 1983 gave the Secretary-General a mission to find a solution to the conflict.

On the other hand, the efforts of the UN only came to fruition after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. With the UN as the mediator, negotiations between Indonesia and Portugal concluded with a settlement. In the UN-monitored referendum held in August 1999, 78.6% of the Timorese voted for independence. In the aftermath of the referendum, the anti-independence Timor-Leste militias and the Indonesian army violently targeted civilians. During the fights it is claimed that about 80% of houses were destroyed and about 300,000 Timorese, one-third of the population, had to emigrate to Western Timor.⁶⁰ The deployment of the UN International Peacekeeping Force to East Timor, led by Australia, on September 20, 1999, brought an end to the violence.⁶¹ East Timor which between 1999 and 2002 was under the control of the UN Transitional Administration, was transformed into an independent state on May 20, 2002, under the name of Timor-Leste Democratic Republic. The president of CNRT (National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction), Gusmao, was elected the first president of the country. After its first mission in 1999, the UN sent four different missions. The fifth mission, the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT), left the country on 31 December 2012.⁶²

According to East Timor sources, more than 250,000 people, in other words, one-third of the region's population, lost their lives in a 24-year conflict.⁶³ According to official Indonesian sources, 80,000 of them lost their lives in military operations and 70,000 of them died of famine, in total 150 thousand people died.⁶⁴ Governor Abilio Osorio Soares, who was appointed to East Timor by the Indonesian government between 1992-1999, reported in 1999 that there were around 200,000 casualties.⁶⁵ On the other hand, according to the data of the Timorese Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) established in 1981, the

60 Kiernan, *Ibid.*

61 Durand, *Ibid.*

62 UN, "United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste," *United Nations*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmit/>, Accessed: 20.06.2017.

63 Government of Timor-Leste, "History," *Government of Timor-Leste*, <http://timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=29&lang=en>, Accessed: 20.06.2017.

64 Durand, Frédéric, *Timor Lorosaé, Pays au carrefour de l'Asie et du Pacifique, un atlas géo-historique*, Marne-la-Vallée/Bangkok, Presses universitaires de Marne-la-Vallée/IRASEC, 2002, pg. 88.

65 Durand, 2011, *Ibid.*

number of casualties due to violence during the period 1974-1999 was 102,800 (+/- 12,000),⁶⁶ the number of persons killed in extrajudicial executions or who were disappeared was 18,600⁶⁷ and the total number of casualties was 183,000. Independent sources report that there were around 250,000 deaths.⁶⁸ In this period as well, nearly 60,000 houses were burned and 300,000 people were forcibly displaced.⁶⁹ According to CAVR data, the majority of displacements took place in 1975 (61.400 +/- 13.300), 1980 (59,800 +/- 7,200) and in 1999 (28,100 +/- 5,600).⁷⁰ Although East Timor is an independent state today, the deep social divisions that caused the fights and massive losses of lives continue to exist.⁷¹

3. Territorial conflict and peace process in Aceh

The third of the territory-based conflicts in Indonesia took place in the Aceh region. In the 1970s, there were already conflicts between the Indonesian state and the separatist movements in the East Timor and Western Papua regions, when the conflict began in the Aceh region in the north of Sumatra, one of the seven main geographical regions of the country. The armed struggle that began with the goal of independence under the leadership of *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*⁷² (GAM / Free Aceh Movement) ended in 2005 with the contribution of international mediators and agreement was reached with the signed treaty.

3.1. Aceh

Ace has been an important trade center in the region since the 16th century. An average of 50,000 vessels pass through the Malacca Strait in the region. Aceh, which is located on international trade routes, has

66 CAVR - Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste, *Chega! The Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation Timor-Leste: Executive Summary*, Timor-Leste, 2005, <https://www.etan.org/etanpdf/2006/CAVR/Chega!-Report-Executive-Summary.pdf>, pg. 44., Accessed: 20.06.2017; Durand, 2011, *Ibid*.

67 CAVR, *Ibid.*, pg. 54.

68 Defert, Gabriel, *Timor-Est, le génocide oublié, droit d'un peuple et raison d'Etats*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 1992; Taylor, John G., *Indonesia's Forgotten War. The Hidden History of East Timor*, London, Zek Books, 1991.

69 Ofstad, *Ibid*.

70 CAVR, *Ibid.*, pg. 45.

71 Ofstad, *Ibid*.

72 For a comprehensive study of GAM see: Schulze, Kirsten E., *The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization*, Policy Studies No. 3, Washington, D.C., East-West Center, 2004.

been shaped by the influences of Arabs, Europeans, Chinese and Indians. The region accounts for about 2% of the Indonesian population and has a population of 4.5 million according to the 2010 census. According to estimations made on the basis of 2010 population census, the population of Aceh was 5 million as of 2015.⁷³ 6.67% of the population did not go to school, 19.05% could not complete primary school, 26.85% are primary school graduates, 19,58% are middle school graduates and 20,42% are high school graduates. The ratio of higher education graduates is 6.33%.⁷⁴

Almost all of the population (98%) is Muslim, and Aceh is a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic region. The Acehnese, Gayonese, Alas, and Tamiang, are the four main ethnic groups, but there are many others as well. Each of these groups has its own language or dialect. However, the Acehnese constitute about the majority (90%) of the population and inhabit along the coastal strip.⁷⁵

Having rich natural resources, Aceh's economy is based on agriculture, forestry, and fishery. However, the gold, tin, pepper, sandalwood, spice and coffee trade are important parts of the economy. With the discovery of natural gas in the 1970's, the gas industry has also developed in the region.

However, the vast majority of workers in this sector are either Indonesians from the outside of the region or foreigners. The share of Aceh in natural gas revenues until the peace treaty was limited to 5%.⁷⁶ Despite its rich natural resources, Aceh was the poorest in the Sumatra region and the second poorest region in Indonesia. However, the income from natural sources in the poor Aceh region accounted for 11% of Indonesia's annual total income.⁷⁷

73 UNDP, *Indonesia: Province Infographic*, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, 2014, pg. 19.

74 UNDP, *Ibid.*, pg. 19.

75 McCulloch, Lesley, *Aceh: Then and Now*, London: Minority Rights Group International, 2005, pg. 10-11.

76 McCulloch, *Ibid.*, pg. 7.

77 Sukma, Rizal, *Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences and Lessons*, Policy Studies No. 3, Washington, D.C., East-West Center, 2004, pg. 3, 30.

3.2 .Territorial conflicts in Aceh, 1976-2005

History of conflicts in Aceh dates back to the late 19th century when it became a Dutch colony. After about five hundred years of the independent sultanate, Aceh became the Dutch colony in 1873. The Acehnese fought a long anti-colonial war between 1883-1903. This anti-colonial war turned Aceh into a center of resistance and created a strong Islamic tradition.⁷⁸ During the Second World War, Aceh was under Japanese occupation between 1942-45. After the important role it played in the Indonesian struggle for independence against the Netherlands in 1945, Aceh was granted a comprehensive autonomy.⁷⁹ However, with the construction of Indonesia as a centralized and unitary state, the special status was abolished in 1951 and Aceh was incorporated into the northern Sumatra province.⁸⁰ Having a strong regional identity, a tradition of resistance and an Islamic heritage, Aceh was challenged due to President Sukarno's "secular" Indonesian nation-building project (1945-67) and his successor, President Suharto's, ultra-centralist, developmental ideology and practices (1965-98).⁸¹

President Sukarno's termination of autonomy as well as the secular nature of the newly established state created disturbance in Aceh and the Darul Islamic Uprising of 1953-1962, which aimed at establishing an Islamic state across Indonesia, began.⁸² Based on the agreement reached in 1959 with president Sukarno, Aceh became an autonomous province again with increased control over religion and local administration.⁸³ However, this autonomy was once again abolished in the mid-1960s under the "New Order" regime, when General Suharto became the president.

The abolition of autonomy through excessive centralization policies aimed at creating a single Indonesian nation within the "New Order," the widespread human rights violations and impunity of the military administration, and the deprivation of the region's rich economic

78 Robinson, Geoffrey, "Rawan is as Rawas Does: The Origins of Disorder in New Order Aceh," *Indonesia*, V. 66 (1998), pg. 127-157.

79 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. vii.

80 Worldwatch Institute, *Ibid.*

81 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 1.

82 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 1.

83 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 1-2; Aspinall, Edward and Crouch, Harold, *The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed?*, Policy Studies No. 1, Washington, D.C., East-West Center, 2003, pg. 5.

resources while exploiting them, constituted the basic dynamics of the second uprising that occurred in 1970s in Aceh.⁸⁴ Unlike the Darul Islamic Uprising, the second uprising was led by a separatist movement.⁸⁵ The Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* - GAM) was established under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro,⁸⁶ the grandson of the anti-colonialist hero Teungku Cik di Tiro who fought against the Netherlands. The ideological and political discourse of GAM with some changes oscillated around nationalism, Islam, anti-capitalism, anti-imperialism, anti-Westernism, human rights and democracy.⁸⁷ On 4 December 1976, GAM unilaterally declared Aceh's independence. The Indonesian government responded with military pressure and economic programs. By 1979, the vast majority of members of the GAM, consisting of a well-educated small elite group, had either been arrested, or had to go to exile, or were killed. Among the GAM leaders who went to exile during this period was the founding leader Hasan di Tiro.⁸⁸

The GAM used the period of the 1980s to reorganize with the support of Libya and in 1989 underwent military and political training with hundreds of militants in Libya and started armed actions in Aceh. The government responded by announcing Aceh the "Military Operations Region" (*Daerah Operasi Militar* - DOM) and launched comprehensive operations against both GAM and the civilian population. As a result of what Amnesty International called "shock therapy," the second uprising of GAM was also suppressed in 1992.⁸⁹ When the GAM military capacity was to a large extent destroyed in 1992, the Indonesian security forces continued rigorous counter-insurgency operations until the end of Suharto regime in 1998.⁹⁰ It is estimated that in the period between 1989 and 1998, during the military rule, between 9.000-12.000 people lost their lives.⁹¹

84 McCulloch, *Ibid.*, pg. 20; Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 3-6; Schulze, *Ibid.*, vii.

85 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 1; Shculze, *Ibid.*, pg. 2; Robinson, *Ibid.*

86 Shculze, *Ibid.*, pg. 4.

87 Shculze, *Ibid.*, pg. 6-10.

88 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 1-2.

89 Amnesty International, "*Shock Therapy*" *Restoring Order in Aceh, 1989-1993*, Amnesty International, August 1993; Kell, Tim, *The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992*, Ithaca, Cornell University, 1995, pg. 74-76; Shculze, *Ibid.*, pg. 4.

90 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 3-11; Huber, Konrad, *The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation*, Policy Studies No. 9, Washington, D.C., East-West Center, 2005, pg. 13.

91 Worldwatch Institute, *Ibid.*

With the end of the 30-year-long Suharto dictatorship in 1998, the independence movements in Aceh strengthened again, due to the widespread rights violations by the DOM, especially in the 1990s. In this period, the armed struggle led by GAM, unlike the previous 1976-1979 and 1989-1992 uprisings, gained mass support.⁹² The political uncertainties that followed the overthrow of the Suharto regime in Indonesia, in general, turned the army and especially the police, into the decisive actors. Their indiscriminate use of counter-insurgency strategies significantly contributed to the GAM's increased popular support.⁹³ Moreover, the failure to implement the autonomy adopted in 2002, and the evaluation of GAM's long-term peace talks during 2000-2003 as "organizational restructuring and enlargement" and "internationalization" enabled the organization to turn into an armed political movement with social support.⁹⁴ It is important to emphasize the importance in this transformation of the referendum held in 1999 which resulted in the independence of East Timor.⁹⁵ In fact, at the beginning of the 1990s, GAM, which controlled only small areas, began to form alternative local administrative entities⁹⁶ in some regions of Aceh and to collect "Aceh tax" from different layers of the broader community.⁹⁷ Throughout the conflict the Aceh government in exile in Sweden under the leadership of Hasan di Tiro, continued to direct GAM and its political movement.⁹⁸

In the years of 2000, peace negotiations were being held on one side and clashes continued on the other. Following the failure of the peace talks in 2003, a martial law was declared in Aceh and the "Integrated Operation" (*Operasi Terpadu*) was launched involving deployment of approximately 50,000 soldiers and police in order to eradicate GAM. For the Indonesian army, this was the biggest engagement after 1975 East Timor operation. Moreover, all the political parties in the Indonesian Parliament and the majority of non-Acehnese Indonesians supported the operation in question.⁹⁹ The Integrated Operation consisted of four components. First,

92 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 2; Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 5; Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 6-8.

93 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 15.

94 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 2-3; Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 4.

95 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 41-44.

96 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 10-19.

97 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 24-27.

98 UCDP, *Ibid.*; Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 2-3.

99 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 22-25.

extensive military operations against GAM members were conducted. Second, strict surveillance was implemented by soldiers who were deployed to civilian villages, road controls, and home searches - all in order to undermine GAM's logistical support lines. Third, an ideological campaign was orchestrated involving mass demonstrations aimed at showing support for the Indonesian state and opposing the GAM. Finally, civilian militias were formed, tasked with providing intelligence on GAM's movements, protecting the villagers at night, and participating in counter-insurgency operations of the army.¹⁰⁰

At the beginning of the 1990s, GAM had few hundreds armed militants, while in April 2003 its men-power was estimated to be 5,500.¹⁰¹ There were violent clashes within the next 12 months when Aceh was largely cut off from the world, the media was under control, journalists, NGOs, and foreign diplomats were banned from entering the region. According to government sources, GAM members lost 2,000 lives, 2,100 were arrested and 1,300 were forced to surrender. During this period, hundreds of civilians lost their lives. It is estimated that the number of forcibly displaced Acehnese, in 2003 alone, reached 100,000.¹⁰² On the other hand, local sources suggest that the majority of those said to be GAM members were actually civilians.¹⁰³ According to human rights activists, the number of casualties and injuries experienced at this time is well above these figures. Although the numbers are controversial, it is clear that GAM suffered a major blow, losing many senior commanders. Despite all this, GAM managed to maintain its presence. On the other hand, it could not be said that the Indonesian army was trying to win the "hearts and minds" as they claimed.¹⁰⁴ Exactly a year later, on May 19, 2004, martial law was abolished and the state of emergency replaced it. However, the fights and repression in the region continued.¹⁰⁵

There are different figures about the cost of the conflicts that took place between 1976 and 2005 in Aceh. According to UCDP sources, 3,377 people lost their lives between 1989 and 2005, with a majority in the 2000s.

100 Aspinall, Edward, *The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?*, Policy Studies No. 20, Washington, D.C., East-West Center, 2005, pg. 7-8.

101 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 30.

102 Huber, *Ibid.*, pg. 2.

103 Aspinall, *Ibid.*, pg. 8.

104 Aspinall, *Ibid.*, pg. 8-12.

105 McCulloch, *Ibid.*, pg. 9.

According to COW data, a total of 5,380 people, including 480 security forces and 4,900 GAM members, lost their lives only between 1999 and 2003.¹⁰⁶ According to the Minority Rights Group International, between 1976 and 2005, approximately 15,000 people lost their lives.¹⁰⁷ According to *Tapol*, a civil society organization working in the field of human rights, peace and democracy in Indonesia, between 10.000 and 30.000 people, mostly civilians, lost their lives because of conflicts.¹⁰⁸

It is estimated that tens of thousands of people have been forcibly displaced as well as lost their lives. As mentioned above, in 2003 alone, the number of people forced out of their homes was around 100,000. Numerous losses and infringements of rights such as the death of civilians, disappearances, torture, rape, damage to personal property were recorded by neither the official state institutions nor the local or international civil society organizations.

3.3. Aceh peace and reconciliation process

The main quest for peace in Aceh became possible with the overthrow of the Suharto regime and period of reforms (*reformasi*) that followed. Under the leadership of the second President, B. J. Habibie, the transition to democracy in Indonesia begun. Extensive programs have been launched to decentralize and to limit the influence of the army on the political scene throughout the country. In August 1998, the status of the Military Operation Region in Aceh was abolished. During this period, the country also experienced a revival in the field of civil society. The power struggle within the state intensified during this period when the power of the army was tried to be reduced and the relations of power were reestablished. The Army tried to delay the withdrawal of its excess forces in the Aceh region and to legitimize its existence through increased violence. In this period, GAM considered the emerging situation as an opportunity and intensified both the mobilization of the armed forces and the political activities.

106 The Correlates of War Project (COW), *COW War Data, 1816-2007 (v4.0)*, The Correlates of War Project, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war>, Accessed: 23.06.2017.

107 The Correlates of War Project (COW), *COW War Data, 1816-2007 (v4.0)*, The Correlates of War Project, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war>, Accessed: 23.06.2017.

108 Tapol, "Justice, Truth and Reparations for Victims of the Aceh Conflict, Ten Years On," *Tapol*, 13.08.2015, <http://www.tapol.org/press-statements/justice-truth-and-reparations-victims-aceh-conflict-ten-years>, Accessed: 24.06.2017.

The first search for peace and reconciliation between Indonesia and GAM began at the beginning of the 2000s during the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, leader of Nahdatul Ulama, a traditional Islamic institution. A Swiss-based non-governmental organization called Henri Dunant Center, also known as the Center for Human Dialogue initiated talks in Aceh and with GAM leadership that was mainly abroad. As a result, on May 12, 2000 “Joint Understanding on a Humanitarian Pause for Aceh” agreement was signed in Geneva. Despite some disputes, the agreement continued until the beginning of 2001.¹⁰⁹ There was, however, an important segment of the army and the police that was uncomfortable with the treaty. High-ranking officials of the Indonesian army did not even refrain from publicly expressing their discontent with the dialogue process.¹¹⁰ The talks, which were held until April, ended due to ongoing clashes despite the treaty, as well as the ongoing presidential crisis in the capital Jakarta.¹¹¹ Violence resumed in July with the suspension of the work of the “Joint Committee on Security Modalities” created by president Wahid and the arrest of the GAM negotiating delegation.¹¹²

On the other hand, in July 2001, the Wahid administration was overthrown and the government was taken over by the Megawati Sukarnoputri government with the support of the army and police. In his first speech as president on 16 August 2001, Megawati presented his “profound apologies to Western Papua and his brothers in Aceh, who suffered for a long time from inadequate national politics.”¹¹³ Megawati, while continuing military operations on the one hand, also, on August 9, 2001, in order to gain social support in Aceh, passed the autonomy law that was prepared by Habibie administration and approved by the parliament during Wahid regime. Legal amendments expanded powers of Aceh Autonomous Region in financial, administrative and legislative areas, and unlike in other regions, the way to implement Sharia laws was opened.¹¹⁴

Strengthening its position with military operations and autonomy regulations, the government resumed peace talks with February 2002.

109 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 19; Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 44.

110 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 19.

111 Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 20-21.

112 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 44; Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg.2 2-23.

113 McCulloch, *Ibid.*, pg. 22.

114 Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 25.

In the talks were included the “wise men,”¹¹⁵ a group created by the international non-governmental organization Henri Dunant Center, and with the clear support of the EU, the United States, the World Bank after several rounds of negotiations, on December 9, 2002, the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), a kind of framework agreement between the parties, was signed.¹¹⁶ Unlike the previous treaty, mechanisms for the implementation and monitoring of the treaty were described in more detail. The treaty included the creation of “peace zones,” the establishment of a “Common Security Committee” under the leadership of the Philippines and Thailand, the decommissioning of GAM’s weapons into the hands of a third actor, the redeployment of Indonesian security forces and the reorganization of their roles. The Joint Council was set up by the Indonesian Government, GAM and a senior official at the Henri Dunant Center, the mediator party, to conduct all the work.¹¹⁷ In the Treaty period, 38 countries attended the “Peace and Reconstruction Preparatory Meeting in Aceh” during which they committed to providing support for the reconstruction of the war-affected areas.¹¹⁸ Seven peace zones were formed within the scope of the first stage of the Treaty. Along with the treaty, number of fatalities considerably decreased in comparison with 100 per month prior to December 2002.¹¹⁹

However, the peace process became meaningless due to the deadlock over the collecting of GAM’s weapons in the hands of the third actor and the redeployment of the Indonesian army and Aceh’s territorial sovereignty. While disarmament of GAM and rearrangement of the Indonesian army should happen simultaneously, the Indonesian army refused to reorganize its forces without GAM decommissioning their weapons first. On the other hand, while the Indonesian government excluded the unity of the country from the negotiations, the GAM talked explicitly about the option of independence and commented that the “autonomy law is a starting point for further debate.”¹²⁰ In the face of this situation, the

115 Retired US Navy General, Anthony Zinni, former foreign minister of Thailand, Surin Pitsuwan, former ambassador of Yugoslavia to Indonesia, Budimir Loncar, a former Swedish diplomat Bengt Doerberg and Lord Avebury from the UK were a part of the Wise Men. See: Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 44; Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 27.

116 McCulloch, *Ibid.*, pg. 32; Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 20. For a detailed analysis of this treaty See Huber, *Ibid.*

117 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 44-45; Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 32-34.

118 Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 31-32

119 Sukma, *Ibid.*, pg. 20; Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 34.

120 Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 34-42.

already considerably failing treaty, was breached entirely due to increased violence and when March and April 2003 army-trained and financed militias attacked the COHA's office.¹²¹ The negotiations in Tokyo in May 2003 which were to save the peace process were inconclusive as the Aceh delegation members were arrested before going to Tokyo.¹²² Above all, the real reason for the process to collapse were the preconditions that the Indonesian government had proposed for negotiations, but which GAM rejected. GAM was supposed to abandon the demand for independence accepting the existing autonomy and disarm.¹²³

According to the analyzes made by the *East-West Center Washington* institute, which has done significant work on the territorial conflicts in Aceh, the dynamics that led to the failure of the peace negotiations during the period of 2000-2003 are grouped into four categories. First, there was a problem with the structure of the process. In the processes formulated in the shape of firstly the ceasefire, then a disarmament, and finally a political resolution, fundamental critical issues like the political status of Aceh, which is at the core of the conflict, could not have been addressed at any time. Secondly, the actors on both sides who breached the process were strong. Third, the actors and mechanisms that would provide the implementation and monitoring of the peace treaty were weak. Finally, the political steps taken by the government like the 2001 Autonomy Act had no effect on the fighting. In this regard, the way the reforms are carried out is as important as their content. Unilateral regulations which excluded field actors – especially GAM – did not fit the reality on the ground.

One day after the peace talks had failed, martial law was declared in Aceh on May 19, 2003, and a comprehensive “Integrated Operation” (*Operasi Terpadu*) was launched to completely eradicate the GAM. The Integrated Operation lasted a full year and on May 19, 2004, the martial law was replaced with the state of emergency. However, the clashes and repressions in the region continued. In October 2004, the former general and Security Minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected president in the general elections. During the fighting, an 8.9 magnitude earthquake in the Indian Ocean caused a tsunami that hit on December 26, 2004, and an estimated 250,000 Acehnese died.¹²⁴

121 Schulze, *Ibid.*, pg. 45-46; Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 40-42.

122 McCulloch, *Ibid.*, pg. 22.

123 Aspinall and Crouch, *Ibid.*, pg. 1-2,43.

124 McCulloch, *Ibid.*, pg. 3.

The peace treaty was reached in 2005 mainly as the aftermath of the tsunami disaster, though there were prior contacts.¹²⁵ A day after the natural disaster, both the GAM and the Indonesian government declared a unilateral cease-fire. On the other hand, a ceasefire was violated on the first day of 2005 and 175 people lost their lives in fights during the first three months of the year. However, increased international community's pressure on both sides resulted in the resumption of peace talks in order to rebuild and heal wounds inflicted by the disaster. As a result of the five rounds of negotiations, under the leadership of former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, and an international non-governmental organization, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), the parties agreed on 15 August 2005 to form a "Memorandum of Understanding" in Helsinki and concluded 30-year conflict with the settlement known as the "Helsinki Treaty."¹²⁶

There were four critical issues on the negotiating table. The first was the disarmament of GAM and the re-definition of the role and numbers of security forces in Aceh. The second issue was the monitoring and implementation mechanisms to be established in the peace process. The third important issue was the general amnesty for the GAM members and the economic measures to be implemented for their social integration. The last and perhaps most important issue was Aceh's political status. Unlike previous open-ended negotiation processes, all negotiations were based on Ahtisaari's creative principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed." According to Ahtisaari, this approach has kept the negotiation process alive, alleviating the irreconcilable differences between the positions of the parties.¹²⁷

According to the treaty, GAM's 3,000 armed militants will be demobilized, disbanded and re-integrated into civilian life. The disarmed militants were given the right to be hired or right to the arable land. In addition, the presence of the army in Aceh was restricted (14,700 soldiers and 9,100 police officers). In addition to the issue of disarmament, the territorial status of Aceh was also identified in the treaty. Accordingly, foreign affairs, foreign defense, national security, monetary and fiscal issues, justice, freedom of religion and conscience will remain under the power of the central authority. Apart from these, all public services will be provided

125 Aspinal, *Ibid.*, pg. 14-19.

126 For the text of the treaty See Aspinal, *Ibid.*, pg. 75-84.

127 Aspinal, *Ibid.*, pg. 22-23.

by the Autonomous Aceh Administration. Under the Treaty, a general amnesty was also announced and the GAM member political prisoners and detainees were to be released. In the context of confrontation with the past and justice, a non-international human rights court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission were to be established. In addition, the citizens who suffered damages during the conflict period will be compensated in agricultural land, employment or social security. Finally, the “Aceh Monitoring Mission”¹²⁸ will be established to monitor the implementation of the peace treaty, with members from the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹²⁹

In practice, on August 30, 2005, a general amnesty for GAM members was issued in accordance with the treaty and 1,300 people were released. On September 15, the Aceh Monitoring Mission, led by the EU, started to work. During September-December 2005 period, while the GAM members were disarming, on the one hand, the government’s “non-essential” forces were withdrawn from Aceh. In March 2006, the Indonesian Parliament adopted Aceh Management Law, which granted extensive autonomy to Aceh and control over its natural resources. According to the law, it was possible to establish political parties at the provincial level. The elections held on December 11, 2006, were won by GAM-supported candidates.¹³⁰

More than 10 years have passed since the peace treaty was signed in Aceh. Even if the termination of violence and political compromise were provided, there is still a long way to go in term of confrontation with the past and the establishment of justice. Amnesty International says in their 2013 Aceh report that people still do not know the whereabouts of their relatives and the culture of impunity persists. Some steps were taken by the authorities in this regard and the National Human Rights Commission was established (*Komnas HAM*). Despite in a limited fashion, the Commission carried out some work.¹³¹ On the other hand, although the Helsinki Agreement foresees the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, not later than one year after the adoption of the Act on the Autonomy of Aceh, the commission was established at the

128 Aspinall, *Ibid.*, pg. 44-46.

129 Member states are: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

130 Worldwatch Institute, *Ibid.*

131 Amnesty International, *Time to Face The Past: Justice for Past Abuse in Indonesia's Ache Province - Executive Summary*, Amnesty International, 2013.

beginning of 2016. By law, the commission will have completed its work by 2021.¹³²

3.4. Special features of the Aceh peace process

When the process of conflict resolution and social cohesion provided in Aceh is closely examined, at least seven points can be underlined. First, the peace process was possible after the demise of the Suharto regime, which lasted for about 30 years, in the political atmosphere of democratic transition throughout the country. Dialogue and negotiations started and began to be successful from 2005 on when relations of power were restored, civilian politics restructured, civil society and media strengthened, military and police involvement in both politics and economy weakened.

Secondly, it can be said that the most important variable that made the peace process possible was the tsunami disaster. The natural disaster that caused much more casualties and destruction than the nearly 30-year-old conflict created “an external shock effect,” creating favorable conditions for the peace process.

Thirdly, it seems that the most fundamental subject of dispute in Aceh was the issue of territorial sovereignty. The region’s rich natural resources, discovered after 1970, have made the territorial sovereignty issue much more complicated. While the negotiations at the beginning of the 2000s could not progress, the real determinant that enabled the Helsinki Treaty to be reached, apart from conflict fatigue, was the fact that GAM managed to be persuaded by the self-government solution to be regarded as a kind of “functional independence” and to give up its independence.

Fourth, the reconstruction of the political, economic and legal spheres took an important place in the peace process in Aceh. In the political sense, by allowing local/regional parties to be established, it was possible to open up the politicization of GAM and enable the political autonomy of Aceh. Economically, the sharing of regional resources remained on the table as one of the most important negotiating subjects. Legally, the legislative power was shared between the central and local governments,

¹³² Amnesty International, “Indonesia: Truth, justice and reparation vital for victims and families of *Jambo Keupok*,” *Amnesty International Public Statement*, 17.05.2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/.../ASA2140562016ENGLISH.pdf>, Accessed: 24.006.2017.

and Aceh was granted the authority to set the norms and make laws on the regional scale, provided that they are not contrary to the national law.

Fifth, the issue of disarming GAM in Aceh was addressed as part of the reorganization of the security. On the one hand, both the army and the police force were restructured both quantitatively and qualitatively while ensuring the disarmament of the GAM members. The number of security forces has been considerably reduced, while the roles and structure of these forces have been revised.

Sixth, the peace treaty also dealt with the destruction experienced during the conflict period. General amnesty, the integration of disarmed GAM members into the social life and economic support provided for this purpose should be noted. In addition, the treaty included the establishment of commissions of truth and reconciliation in the context of confronting human rights abuses and deaths suffered during the conflict period. Nevertheless, despite the successes achieved in previous issues, there has been very limited progress in confronting the past, healing the wounds of the conflict period, and building justice.

Finally, third parties have played a critical role in conflict resolution and peacemaking. It is important to note that more than one mechanism works in this area. The mediation of an international non-governmental organization established under the leadership of a former head of state supported by the EU and the UN is the first thing to be underlined. On the other hand, the support of the global powers and international institutions such as the EU, USA, Japan and the World Bank is the second important matter to be emphasized. Thirdly, disarming GAM was possible due to the Common Security Committee established under the leadership of the Philippines and Thailand. Finally, regarding the third parties, the monitoring commission for the implementation of the peace treaty was established under the supervision of two major transnational regional organizations, EU and ASEAN, both politically and economically powerful.

Conclusions

This chapter deals with identity-based intra-state territorial conflict in Indonesia/Aceh region. In order to better understand the context in which the conflict has come to fruition, other major conflicts in the country are briefly mentioned. The territorial conflicts of Western Papua and East Timor, in particular, were studied in this regard. Finally, the conflict and negotiation processes in Aceh were discussed in detail.

If we were to summarize the results of the Indonesian experience, first of all, the construction of the state and society continues in Indonesia as it does in the Philippines. Conflicts and the peace treaties that have been mentioned above point to the problem of a post-colonial state and society building. After four centuries of colonial experience, Indonesia declared its independence. However, after 30 years of dictatorship, in the 2000s the country was experiencing birthing pains of transition into democracy. Although a remarkable progress has been made in this regard, the process of social and political transformation carries on. The issue of Aceh is only a part of this process.

Secondly, there are multiple and long-lasting conflicts and negotiation processes in Indonesia as in the case of the Philippines. The Darul Islam uprising which started immediately after the establishment of the country lasted for about 10 years. From the 1970s to the early 2000s, there were territorial conflicts based on identity both in the west and east and south of the country. East Timor and Aceh wars ended. On the other hand, the conflict in Papua continues at a very low level of intensity, and a political resolution to the problem has not been found.

Third, international actors seem to play an important role in solving the problem. In fact, gaining an “international” character made it possible for the conflict in Aceh to find a compromise and to come to an end. Especially after the experience of East Timor, while the government avoided it during the negotiation process, GAM has consistently invested efforts in bringing the conflict to an international level. A peace treaty was provided after a process in which the global players such as the EU, the US, and ASEAN played an active role. The main point to be underlined at this point is that after the negotiation process GAM abandoned the demand for independence and accepted an expanded autonomy within the unitarian state. While the government was reluctant to include international actors, this process strengthened the position of the

government and provided a peace treaty excluding separatist demands, as the government wanted.

Finally, the peace treaty includes both a comprehensive and detailed solution. In fact, the treaty, in which the sharing of territorial sovereignty was formulated, described the detailed arrangements in the political, economic and legal areas. In addition to the details of the political resolution provided in the treaty, mechanisms to clarify issues such as how the process will proceed, how it will be monitored, and who will participate were also described in detail. In a nutshell, the questions “what” and “how” were answered.

This chapter which addressed the Indonesian experience, and the previous three chapters, were basically intended to establish an external frame of reference for conflict resolution and social peacebuilding of the Kurdish issue and a solution to the related fights. In this context, while providing a numerical illustration of conflict processes and a global picture of peacebuilding, the basic parameters that determine such processes have been discussed. Later, two cases were dealt with in depth to complete this picture. In the next four chapters, the Kurdish conflict and search for solutions are examined in detail. In the next, fifth chapter, the period from the early 1990s till peace process in Oslo in 2008-11 is discussed.

5

QUEST FOR RECONCILIATION IN THE KURDISH CONFLICT: A SHORT HISTORY

Kurdish conflict in Turkey has lasted intermittently for 34 years. The ending of fights and the pursuit of peaceful and democratic ways and methods of the solution began in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Though in the first decade of the clashes the search for political resolutions already begun, and there were important initiatives in this regard, to this day it has not been possible to prevent deaths. However, considering that the first ceasefire was declared in 1993, the quest for dialogue and political resolution in Turkey has continued for 25 years.

Taking into account intra-state conflicts in different places and periods, it is seen that in the first 5-7 years either the military victory of the state or the rebels took place, in conflicts longer than 7-10 years, the conflict resulted in either with mutually destructive balance or negotiated settlement. In this regard, it is highly unlikely for the Kurdish conflict in Turkey to be solved by violence and most probably it will be solved through negotiations. Nevertheless, despite the 25-year long search, the fights still continue, rendering the coming to terms with the past an important part of future solution and consensus. So far there has been no proper accountability in Turkey. Even worse, there is no significant archive of the last 25 years of the pursuit of dialogue and compromise.

In this chapter, a short history of seeking compromise in the Kurdish conflict is presented. For this purpose, the pursuit of dialogue and reconciliation which since the 1990s until now left behind 16 governments, and political leaders such as Turgut Özal, Süleyman Demirel, Tansu Çiller, Mesut Yılmaz, Necmettin Erbakan, Bülent Ecevit and Abdullah Gül is examined. In this context, in the first section, the transformation in the early 1990s of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* - PKK) – which constitutes the basis for the solution and consensus – from separatism to “internal resolution politics” is discussed. In the second section, the first ceasefires in the 1990s are examined. The third section examines one of the most important opportunities for the termination of the Kurdish conflict, the İmralı Process of 1999-2004. In the last section, known to the public as the Oslo Process (2008-2011), direct negotiations between the state, Qandil, and Öcalan are discussed.

1. From separatism to “internal resolution” politics

The PKK has emerged as a socialist organization with a Marxist / Leninist worldview in the 1970s.¹ Like many movements that emerged in the 1970s, many Kurdish organizations, as well as the PKK, also had a discourse of “national liberation”. Dr. Şivan’ (Sait Kirmızıtoprak) argument that “Kurdistan is a colony”² became the main thesis of most Kurdish organizations including the PKK in the second half of the 1970s. The PKK in the first years declared to establish “independent, unified and democratic Kurdistan” with pan-Kurdish perspective covering Kurdish regions in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria through “national democratic revolution” with a “revolutionary force.”³ Thus, after a “national democratic revolution”, a socialist system would be built in Kurdistan.⁴ The PKK aimed to achieve “national democratic revolution” through political violence. The PKK, influenced by the war in Vietnam, envisaged building a “unified Kurdistan” by carrying out a “national democratic revolution” with the strategy of a rural guerilla “three-stage popular war.”⁵

The early years of the 1990s are a turning point in terms of the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish conflict. In these years, the PKK has faced an existential crisis in three main areas and has attempted to produce responses to these crises: (1) Marxist/Leninist socialist worldview, (2) national liberation discourse, and (3) strategy based on political violence. The envisaged political and military objectives were not achieved and it was faced with a deep ideological and political discourse crisis. Due to many dynamics, the PKK has had to change its ideological orientation, political goals, and strategy these years. Indeed, it is worth noting that search for answers in these three areas, varied and bumpy, continues till now.

1 Jongerden, Joosta and Akkaya, Ahmet H., *PKK Üzerine Yazılar*, İstanbul, Vate Yayınları, 2012; Akkaya, Ahmet H. and Jongerden, Joost, “Reassembling the Political: The PKK and the Project of Radical Democracy,” *European Journal of Turkish Studies (Online)*, no. 14 (2012), <http://ejts.revues.org/4615>; Barkey, Henria and Fuller, Graham E., *Turkey's Kurdish Question*, New York, Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, 1998; Gunes, Cengiz, “Explaining the PKK’s Mobilization of the Kurds in Turkey: Hegemony, Myth and Violence,” *Ethnopolitics*, 12:3 (2013), pg. 247-267; Gunter, Michael, *The Historical Dictionary of the Kurds*, Oxford, The Scarecrow Press, 2004; Özcan, A. Kemal, *Turkey's Kurds: A Theoretical Analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan*, Londra, Routledge, 2006.

2 Bozarslan, Hamit, “Between Integration, Autonomization and Radicalization. Hamit Bozarslan on the Kurdish Movement and the Turkish Left,” *European Journal of Turkish Studies (Online)* no. 14 (2012). <http://ejts.revues.org/4663>.

3 Öcalan, Abdullah, *Kürdistan Devriminin Yolu*, Köln, Weşanên Serxwebûn, 1993.

4 Öcalan, *Ibid.*

5 Öcalan, *Ibid.*

First, with the collapse of the Socialist Block in 1991, the PKK faced an ideological crisis. In the 1990s, the Marxist/Leninist socialist worldview took a revisionist turn. This change came about in January 1995 at the Vth PKK Congress, with a symbolic replacement of the hammer and sickle with a torch on the flag. The ideological change first manifested itself as the disappearance of the emphasis on the Marxist/Leninist discourse. This new trend, also referred to as “democratic socialism,” essentially expressed a tendency to refer to the left-populist rhetoric and to emphasize the collective rights of the Kurds, rather than the class issue and class struggle.

The search for ideological revision secondly manifested itself in the “issue of religion.”⁶ Until 1990, the PKK had an orthodox secular stance on religion. Accordingly, religion was an issue related to roughness, anachronism and backwardness and a counter-revolutionary tool used by the state. This counter-revolutionary dynamic would gradually disappear from social life in the process of modernization. In the 1990s, this orthodox secular approach to religion began to change. In these years, Öcalan under the name of “revolutionary approach to the problem of religion” proclaimed Islam as a religion of justice in the face of oppression and persecution.⁷ This trend with regard to religion was not limited to Islam, as the PKK was trying to expand the field of socio-political mobilization around the national cause and opened towards Muslim religious Kurds as well as Kurds belonging to other faiths. In these years, the organization approached socio-cultural and socio-political organizations aimed at the Alevi and the Ezidi Kurds,⁸ while at the same time establishing Kurdish and Islamic organizations.⁹

Another visible area of ideological revision pursuit was the question of women’s freedom and gender equality. Women’s freedom and gender equality began to appear as one of the main elements of the ideological and political orientation. The Kurdish women’s movement has been developing since the 1990s and it is a fundamental feature of today’s

6 Barkeya and Fuller, *Ibid.*; Çiçek, Cuma, “The pro-Islamist Challenge for the Kurdish Movement,” *Dialectical Anthropology*, 37, no. 1 (2013): 159-163.

7 Fırat, Ali, *Din Sorununa Deurimci Yaklaşım*, İstanbul, Melsa Yayınları, 1991.

8 Ozsoy, Hisyar, *Between Gift and Taboo: Death and the Negotiation of National Identity and Sovereignty in the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey*, Unpublished PhD Thesis, The University of Texas, 2010.

9 İmset, İsmet G., *PKK: Ayrılkıç Şiddetin 20 Yılı (1973-1992)*, 7. baskı, Ankara, Turkish Daily News Yayınları, 1993.

leading Kurdish politics on the level of ideas, interests, and institutions. In these years, women's freedom and gender equality are related to organization's mobilization strategies and came to the fore¹⁰ as "women and family" issue.¹¹

Secondly, the PKK started as a separatist movement with the goal of establishing "Independent United Democratic Kurdistan"¹² but has largely departed from initial goals and no longer aims at independence, but at "internal political resolution" within existing political limits of Turkey.¹³ In the June 16, 1988 interview with Mehmet Ali Birand, published by the Milliyet newspaper, Öcalan stated that they were ready for a political resolution.¹⁴ This internal political resolution debate held by both the PKK and the Turkish state in the 1990s focused mainly around the federation and Basque models.

Finally, parallel to the search for "internal political resolution," the pursuit of democratic politics started instead of political violence. Öcalan, who frequently emphasized the political resolution in the 1990s, declared the first cease-fire on March 17, 1993, after talks with President Turgut Özal. This ceasefire was followed by the ceasefires of 1995, 1998 and 1999. With regard to internal solution and pursuit of democratic politics instead of political violence, in addition to ceasefires, another important development was the establishment of legal political parties under the political influence of the PKK. The first leading Kurdish party, the People's Labor Party (HEP), was established on 7 June 1990. Legal Kurdish parties were constantly subjected to state violence in the 1990s and were closed many times. Nevertheless, these parties have played a critical role in the formation of the Kurdish issue, becoming an important area in the political socialization and mobilization of the masses.

10 Çağlayan, Handan, *Analar, Yoldaşlar, Tanrıçalar: Kürt Hareketinde Kadınlar ve Kadın Kimliğinin Oluşumu*, 3. baskı, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2010.

11 For primary sources on the subject see: Öcalan, Abdullah, *Kürdistan'da Kadın ve Aile Sorunu*, Köln, Serxwebûn Yayınları, 1993; Erdem, Selahattin (der.), *Kadın ve Aile Sorunu*, İstanbul, Melsa Yayınları, 1992.

12 Öcalan, 1993, *Ibid*.

13 Çandar, Cengiz, "Leaving the Mountain": *How May the PKK Lay down Arms? Freeing the Kurdish Question from Violence*, İstanbul, TESEV, 2012; Tan, Altan, *Kürt Sorunu*, İstanbul, Timaş Yayınları, 2011.

14 Birand, Mehmet Ali, "Tarihi Bir Dönemece Geldik," *Milliyet*, 16.06.1988.

Another important development that needs to be underlined about the quest for democratic politics is the institutionalization of the political party as well as the media and civil society. The foundation for today's leading Kurdish movement's cross-border media network, which has numerous TV and radio channels, several news agencies, newspapers and magazines and hundreds of websites, was laid in the 1990s. Despite having a limited scope, the field of civil society has been institutionalized. Particularly, it appears that as a result of the fights various non-governmental organizations working in areas such as human rights violations, forced migration, solidarity with families of political detainees and prisoners were established in this period.¹⁵

2. First ceasefires

The ongoing quest for conflict resolution and reconciliation in Turkey since the 1990s was made possible in the new context created by the changes outlined above. In the 1990s, the first ceasefires were declared. All of these ceasefires were unilateral and were attempts to initiate a dialogue between the state and the PKK. However, all failed. In this sense, it would be more correct to define these ceasefires not as a process of settlement or reconciliation or the peace process, but rather as a search for dialogue.

2.1. 1993 ceasefire

The pursuit of reconciliation in the Kurdish conflict is based on the unilateral ceasefire declared by the PKK in 1993. Upon the request of the President Turgut Özal through the Chairman of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (*Yekitiya Nashtimanî Kurdistan - YNK*), Jalal Talabani, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan declared a one-sided ceasefire on March 16, 1993.¹⁶ During a press conference held in the village of Bar Elias in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, Öcalan indicated that a ceasefire declared between 20 March and 15 April was a sign that they were ready for a political resolution.¹⁷

15 The topics discussed in this section are covered in a much broader and more detailed study. For a detailed discussion of the transformation of the PKK and its influence in the era of mass socio-political mobilizations from its foundation until 2015 See: Çiçek, Cuma, "Demokratik Ulusçuluk ve Radikal Demokrasi", Evren Haspolat and Deniz Yıldırım (der.), *Türkiye'de Yeni Siyasi Akımlar (1980 Sonrası)* Ankara, Siyasal Kitap, 2016, pg. 351-403.

16 Çandar, Cengiz, *Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu*, 3. baskı, İstanbul, İletişim, 2014, pg. 15-32.

17 Çandar, *Ibid.*, pg. 15-32.

The month passed without the state taking any steps. Beyond that, official statements made were negative. The Prime Minister of that period, Süleyman Demirel, expressed his opinion that “the state does not bargain with those who shed blood. It is not the state that sheds the blood. They should come and surrender. Surrender to the law and justice.”¹⁸ On the other hand, the dominant tendency in the army was against ceasefires that would take the Kurdish issue and the PKK problem to the political arena.¹⁹ Necati Özgen, the Commander of the Public Order Corp’s who spoke to the journalist Saygı Öztürk in the following years expressed his attitudes regarding the ceasefire as “The PKK terrorist organization has declared a ceasefire, and according to us, there is no such thing as a ceasefire. No one gave me a ceasefire order, and I did not order anybody to cease fire.”²⁰ At the same time, due to Özal’s initiatives and Talabani’s mediation the PKK extended the ceasefire indefinitely and unconditionally.²¹ At the second press conference in Lebanon on 17 April 1993, in addition to Öcalan and Celal Talabani, there were also leaders of various Kurdish parties such as President of HEP, Ahmet Turk, and Kemal Burkay, the Chairman of the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (*Partiya Sosyalist a Kurdistanê* - PSK).

One day after the declaration of the extension of the ceasefire, President Turgut Özal lost his life. Although Özal died as a result of a heart attack, there are various speculations to this day, mainly by Öcalan, that his death was related to his attempts to solve the Kurdish issue. However, the main event that ended the truce was the killing of 33 soldiers by the PKK in Bingöl. Özal planned to prepare an amnesty that would allow militants who did not take part in actions to be directly reintegrated into political life, and the leaders, if they had not committed any crimes, would be granted same rights after five years.²² It was ordained 40 days after Özal’s death, on May 24, 1993, at the meeting of National Security Council (MGK). The written statement of the MGK General Secretariat issued after the meeting was as follows:²³

18 İrmak, Selma, “Çıplak yüz, karşısındakini de soyar,” Necmiye Alpaya and Hakan Tahmaz (Eds.), *Barış Açısını Savunmak: Çözüm Süreci’nde Ne Oldu?* Ankara, Metis, 2015, pg. 118.

19 Çandar, 2014, *Ibid.*, pg. 21-22.

20 Öztürk, Saygı, *33 Kurşun*, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2015, pg. 63.

21 Çandar, 2014, *Ibid.*, pg. 15-32.

22 Çandar, 2014, *Ibid.*, pg. 15-32.

23 T24, “MIT, 33 asker katilamını hiç incelemedi mi?,” *T24 Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi*, 23.12.2009, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/mit-33-asker-katliamini-hic-incelemedi-mi,64933>, Accessed: 25.05.2017.

At this meeting, the National Security Council established that peace and trust in the Southeast Anatolia and other corners of our country were preserved. In addition to the security measures taken, in order to ensure the sustainability of internal peace and stability in Southeast Anatolia, in compliance with societal acceptance, it is necessary to ensure that if persons who have joined the terrorist organization, especially in the region of the State of Emergency, and who have not been involved in bloodshed, come and surrender, they will not be prosecuted. Within this understanding, with regard to the situation of other members of the terrorist organization, it has been decided to inform the Government to make the necessary arrangements.

At the day of the meeting, when the MGK was about to announce its decision to the government, the killing of 33 unarmed soldiers captured by PKK militants in Bingöl ended the first serious attempt to end the conflict via a political resolution.

With the end of the ceasefire, the area of politics was narrowed, and on the other hand, fights became widespread and intensified. HEP was closed on 14 July 1993 with the unanimity of 11 members of the Constitutional Court. On March 3, 1994, the parliamentary immunity of the MPs who passed from closed HEP to the Democratic Party (DEP) was lifted and the members of parliament, Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan, and Selim Sadak were arrested. The deputies were sentenced to heavy imprisonment of 15 years due to “separatist activities in line with the instructions of the PKK.” DEP, like HEP, was closed down by the Constitutional Court on 16 June 1994. In this period, the fights increased to an unprecedented extent in comparison with previous years. Many settlements were emptied as a result of intensified and widespread fights. According to the Human Rights Association (IHD) data, in 1994 alone, 5,000 people lost their lives in the conflict, 1,500 settlements were burned-down/evacuated and 123 associations, trade unions or publishing organs were closed.²⁴

2.2. 1995 ceasefire

After nearly a year and a half of violent clashes, the PKK declared a second unilateral ceasefire. Announced on 15 December 1995, ten days before the general elections, the ceasefire was based on the initiative of

²⁴ İnsan Hakları Derneği, “1994 Yılı İnsan Hakları İhlalleri Bilançosu,” *İnsan Hakları Derneği*, Ankara, http://www.ihd.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/ads/2007/11/1994_yili_%20insan_haklari_ihlalleri_bilancosu.pdf, Accessed: 23.05.2017.

the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller, according to the PKK's allegation.²⁵ In the December 24, 1995 general elections, with 21,37% of the vote and 158 parliamentary seats, the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi* - RP), under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, became the first party. After the short-lived coalition government established between the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi* - DYP) and the Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi* - ANAP), the REFAH-YOL government was established and Erbakan became prime minister on June 28, 1996. However, with the post-modern coup that took place on February 28, 1997, the REFAH-YOL government was forced to resign and Erbakan resigned from his position as prime minister on June 18.

Before Erbakan became prime minister, the truce ended in the period of the DYP-ANAP coalition government. On January 15, 1996, 11 villagers were gunned down and burned in a minibus in Şirnak, Güçlükonak district. Immediately after the incident, the journalists were taken to Güçlükonak in a private jet by the Department of Chief of Staff and in the statement on behalf of the Department, it was announced that the incident was carried out by the PKK and the one-sided ceasefire was broken.²⁶ In a statement made one day later, the PKK denied involvement in the incident. Thirteen years later, State Minister responsible for Human Rights, Adnan Ekmen, asserted that 11 villagers were killed by JİTEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counter-Terrorism).²⁷ Meanwhile, the Güçlükonak massacre, which took place a month after the ceasefire, had a similar effect to the murder of the 33 soldiers. Moreover, an attempt to assassinate Öcalan was made on 6 May 1996 in Damascus, the capital of Syria. Öcalan was rescued without any injuries from the attack with a bomb-laden vehicle near a training area of the organization in Damascus.²⁸ Finally, on June 14, 1996, a cross-border operation against the PKK militants in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) was carried out.²⁹ The second ceasefire was terminated after these developments.

25 Oğur, Yıldırım, "Devletten Apo'ya mektuplar," *Taraf*, 29.09.2010-02.10.2010.

26 Başlangıç, Celal, "Türkiye'nin yakasındaki katliam," *Radikal*, 06.20.2003, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/turkiyenin-yakasindaki-katliam-685699/>, Accessed: 25.05.2017.

27 Keskin, Adnan, "11 köylüyü JİTEM yaktı," *Taraf*, 07.02.2009.

28 Hürriyet, "Yeşil'in elinden iki kez kurtuldu," *Hürriyet*, 06.10.1998, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yesilin-elinden-iki-kez-kurtuldu-39041520>, Accessed: 25.05.2017. For details and evaluation of the attempt on Öcalan's life see: Pekmezci, Necdet, *Memlekete Hoş Geldin Öcalan*, Ankara, Tanyeri Kitap, 2014.

29 Hürriyet, "Geçmişten günümüze Irak'ın kuzeyine tüm harekâtlar," *Hürriyet*, 12.07.2010, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gecmisten-gunumuze-irakin-kuzeyine-tum-harekatlar-15292244>, Accessed: 25.05.2017.

Fights continued in 1996 and 1997. According to the IHD data, 2,859 people lost their lives in the conflict in 1996, 68 villages and hamlets were burned-down and evacuated and 132 associations, trade unions and publishing organs were closed.³⁰ In 1997 the situation was similar. 2,514 people lost their lives in the fights, 23 villages and hamlets were burned and evacuated and 152 associations, trade unions and publishing organs were closed.³¹ Carried out in May 1997 and lasting for about 2,5 months, the Hammer Operation, was one of the largest cross-border operations organized by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) since 1983 and involved some 200,000 soldiers and guards.

2.3. 1998 ceasefire

After two years of violent clashes, the third unilateral truce began in 1998 at World Peace Day on September 1st. On August 28, 1998, Öcalan appeared via phone on a panel-talk format program broadcasted from Europe by Med TV with the participation of representatives of Turkish mainstream media. He declared a ceasefire effective September 1, the World Peace Day, in response to requests of different national and international circles. Öcalan stated that he made this step in order to give the Kurdish issue a chance for a political resolution and democratization.³²

Like the case of previous two ceasefires, this truce was also announced as the result of contacts with state authorities. Regardless, without the approval of the Turkish state, it would not be possible for mainstream media representatives to appear on Med TV press conference format program where Öcalan was the only speaker. According to some allegations,³³ especially after the postmodern coup of February 28, 1997, military and civilian administration tried to convince Öcalan and the PKK of their willingness to solve the Kurdish issue through Yalçın Küçük on the other hand, via some political actors who were the members of People's Democracy Party (HADEP), which replaced DEP, on the other. As a continuation of these initiatives, according to some allegations, in August 1998 a letter signed by the General Staff and the National Intelligence

30 İnsan Hakları Derneği, "1996 Türkiye İnsan Hakları İhlalleri Bilançosu," *İnsan Hakları Derneği*, <http://www.ihd.org.tr/1996-yili-insan-haklari-ihlalleri-bilancosu/>, Accessed: 25.05.2017.

31 İnsan Hakları Derneği, "1997 Türkiye İnsan Hakları İhlalleri Bilançosu," *İnsan Hakları Derneği*, <http://www.ihd.org.tr/1997-yili-insan-haklari-ihlalleri-bilancosu/>, Accessed: 25.05.2017.

32 This program is available online. See: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ko8pFBAOYII>, Accessed: 25.05.2017.

33 Oğur, *Ibid.*

Organization (*Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı* - MİT), approved by the state's highest officials, was sent to Öcalan. The state passed a message to Öcalan that "anything but the integrity of the state and rights of sovereignty can be discussed" and the ceasefire was declared based on that.

The third truce remained inconclusive, as did the previous ceasefires. However, unlike in the previous ones, Öcalan was forced to leave Syria and captured and brought to Turkey on 15 February 1999. Two weeks after the beginning of the ceasefire, on 15 September, then the Commander of the Land Forces Gen. Atilla Ateş, during a control visit of a border squad near Reyhanlı county in Hatay, in a battle uniform, addressed the Syrian administration with the following words:³⁴

Turkey has good relations with its neighbors. Syria, which protects bandit Apo abuses our good intentions. I say clearly that now the Turkish nation has come to the limits of its good intentions. Our patience is about to finish. We do not eye anyone's soil. We will not allow any country to have claims to our territory. Our neighbor, Syria, must understand it well.

Two weeks after the words of the Commander of the Land Forces, President Süleyman Demirel in his opening speech of the parliament accused Syrian administration of a hostile attitude and expressed Turkish right to reciprocity:³⁵

In fact, Syria has pursued a policy of open hostility against Turkey. It continues to provide active support to the PKK terrorist organization. I declare to the world once again that our patience is about to finish, that we reserve the right of reciprocity against Syria, which does not give up its hostile attitude despite all our warnings and peaceful steps.

Once Turkey took this stance, Öcalan fled Syria on October 9th, and after four months in between Russia, Italy, and Greece, he was captured and brought to Turkey.³⁶ Many demonstrations were held in various parts of the world, including Europe and Turkey, to protest Öcalan's arrest and

34 Yetkin, Murat, "137 Fırtınalı Gün...(1)," *Radikal*, 9.8.2004, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/137-firtinali-gun-1-719013/>, Accessed: 25.04.2017.

35 Murat, *Ibid.*

36 For details see: Yetkin, Murat, *Kürt Kapanı: Şam'dan İmralıya Öcalan*, İstanbul, Remzi Kitapevi, 2004. For the narrative of a eye-witness to the process, a Greek agent appointed by the Greek Chief of Staff See: Kalenderidis, Savas, *Öcalan'ın Teslimi: Gerçeğin Zamanı - Tarihi Tanıklık*, İstanbul, Pencere Yayınları, 2012.

eviction from Syria described as an “international conspiracy.”³⁷ According to data of Human Rights Foundation Turkey (TIHV), in 1999 28 people committed self-immolation to protest Öcalan’s capture and death sentence.³⁸ Only between 16 and 24 February 3,369 people were detained according to IHD.³⁹ During 21 March 1999 Newroz demonstrations held across Turkey 8,174 was taken into custody. Only the number of persons detained in Diyarbakır was around 4,000, while in Istanbul, 2,459 people were taken into custody.⁴⁰

3. The İmralı Process (1999-2004)

3.1. Öcalan’s calls for peace and dialogue

Demonstrations concentrated in metropolises and pushing Turkey to face the risk of a civil war decreased significantly towards the end of March due to messages passed by Öcalan through his lawyers.⁴¹ During the first query, with the knowledge of the state, Öcalan established contact with the PKK and adopted a position in favor of dialogue and peace. He demanded they uphold an active defense-based ceasefire until the state clarifies its stance. The related part of the letter sent on 18 March 1999:⁴²

I have suggested a broad state-assured cultural autonomy combined with Kurds being essential elements of the state. I did not find a development of a model wrong in principle. I discussed the possibility of a democratic local government, election and political party law to contribute greatly to a political resolution. I mentioned that if legal security, employment, and similar matters come together on the agenda, there shall remain no point in continuing the armed war and the process will develop towards political peaceful. Until we at least clarify the attitude of the state, I find a ceasefire based on active defense, training, and building outposts to be a right attitude.

37 Öcalan, Abdullah, *Uluslararası Kompl - Atina Davası*, İstanbul, Amara Yayıncılık, 2016.

38 Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı, *1999 Türkiye İnsan Hakları Raporu*, Ankara, Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı Yayınları, 2002, pg. 27.

39 Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı, *Ibid.*, pg. 26

40 Kapmaz, Cengiz, *Öcalan’ın İmralı Günleri*, İstanbul, İthaki Yayınları, 2011, pg. 39-40.

41 Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 36-7.

42 Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 39.

In the same period, Öcalan addressed the public through his lawyers and declared that the ceasefire declared on 1 September 1998 should be continued. In his statement, Öcalan called for a permanent termination of the armed conflict. To that end, he called on the state to announce an amnesty and, related to that, on the PKK to legalize itself within a democratic system. Öcalan also invited all circles and international institutions working on human rights and peace to contribute to the process.⁴³ In a statement on May 6, the PKK Presidential Council positively responded to Öcalan's calls in which he addressed the public via letters or lawyers and announced the organization's loyalty to Öcalan and the new strategy.⁴⁴

During the judicial process from May 31, 1999, to June 29, 1999, Öcalan proposed a "Democratic Republic" project. In summary, Öcalan in the project, put forward that the PKK since 1993 has given up on the idea of independence; it does not find the notion of a nation-state right; it respects the structure of the National Pact of Turkey; is against an option of a federation or autonomy and that the PKK would promptly come down from mountains in the event of recognition of cultural rights under democracy and enactment of a social participation law.⁴⁵

3.2. Critical step initiating the process: withdrawal abroad

Öcalan took one more step right after the trial, calling on the PKK to declare an end to its armed struggle and to withdraw its forces abroad. On the one hand, after talks with state officials and the PKK through his lawyers, Öcalan took the most critical step of the İmralı Process on 2 August, which created a great opportunity for the settlement of the Kurdish issue, the end of the fights and the building of social peace and called on the PKK to end the armed struggle, and he urged the forces to withdraw abroad.⁴⁶

Conflict and violence in Turkey pose an obstacle to human rights and democratic development. Violence coming mainly from the Kurdish issue plays an essential role in this. To overcome the deadlock and to solve the problems require termination of violence. For this reason, I urge the

43 Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 40.

44 Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 43.

45 Öcalan, Abdullah, *Özgür İnsan Savunması*, İstanbul, Çetin Yayınları, 2003.

46 Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 96.

PKK to cease the armed struggle starting from September 1, 1999, and for peace, within the unilateral PKK ceasefire process, which has been attempted to be maintained since 1 September 1998, to withdraw its forces from the borders. In this way, I declare my belief that a new phase of dialogue and reconciliation will develop on the path to a democratic solution. I urge all relevant institutions and authorities of the state and society to be sensitive and supportive for the success of this peace and fraternity process, and I call on national and international governments and institutions to have a positive contribution.

The PKK announced three days later that it would comply with the call, and as of August 25, it began withdrawing its armed militants from the country. However, the expectation of the state was not the PKK's withdrawal abroad, but the descent from the mountain. Öcalan put forward two conditions for the PKK's withdrawal from the mountains on 12 August 1999: democratic law reform and general amnesty.⁴⁷ However, the law promulgated on 26 August, which stipulates effective remorse, failed to meet Öcalan's and the organization's expectations. According to the law numbered 4450, members of an organization, who did not participate in the commission of crimes by the organization would not be punished on a condition that they surrender their weapons and provide information that leads to prevention of crimes. The founders of the organization, the militants participating in the actions, and the top-level leaders would not benefit from the law.⁴⁸ As a result of these developments, though the final descent from the mountain was not achieved, there was a significant withdrawal abroad. The organization moved 85-90% of its forces from all areas to KRI, except for the very small groups they had left behind.

Another important step taken during this period was "Peace Groups." Öcalan called on two groups, one from Europe and one from the mountains, to come to Turkey as a show of good faith. The group from the mountains came down on October 1, and the group from Europe arrived in Turkey on October 29, the anniversary of the founding of the Republic. However, all members of the Peace Groups were arrested for membership in the organization, and most of them were imprisoned for more than five years.⁴⁹

47 Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 101-3.

48 Official Gazette, "Bazı Suç Failleri Hakkında Uygulanacak Hükümlere Dair Kanunda Değişiklik Yapılmasına İlişkin Kanun," *Resmî Gazete*, Tarih: 29.08.1999, Sayı, 23801, Kanun No: 4450.

49 Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 106-117.

On 25 November 1999, the Court of Cassation unanimously approved the death sentence given to Öcalan. Five days after this decision, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) assessed Öcalan's situation and asked that no punishment be executed until the trial was concluded. In Turkey, after weeks of discussions about the execution, on 12 January 2000, the coalition government formed by the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) decided to comply with the ECHR's ruling. In a statement after the summit, they informed that if the PKK and its circles used this against the best interests of Turkey, the legal process would be stopped and the execution carried out.⁵⁰

3.3. US intervention in Iraq and crisis period in the İmralı Process

The İmralı Process, which started after Öcalan's capture, lasted around five years without violence. During this period, negotiations with Öcalan in İmralı intermittently continued. That time, the government passed reforms under the EU accession process, particularly the 3rd reform package of August 9, 2002, which abolished the death penalty except for war and war-like situations. Regarding the reform package, it also included permission for TRT-3 to broadcast in the Kurdish language for two hours a week but not more than 45 minutes a day, and to open private Kurdish language courses.⁵¹ OHAL (State of Emergency), in place since 1987, was ended in November 2002. Finally, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) government announced to the public the "The Win Back to Society" draft bill in June 2003. This bill, which was later enacted, included an arrangement similar to the previous effective remorse law.

Starting in November 2002, when the AK Party came to power, the İmralı Process entered a crisis. On the one hand, the AK Party looked suspiciously at traditional state elites, and it came from one of the main Islamic background political movements of the National Vision tradition. On the other hand, in March 2003, the United States intervened in Iraq in cooperation with the Kurds. During this period, the government prevented Öcalan's meeting with his lawyers. During American intervention in Iraq, between November 27, 2002, and March 12, 2003, Öcalan was not able to meet with lawyers.

50 Milliyet, "İdam protokolü," *Milliyet*, 14.01.2000.

51 Commission of The European Communities, 2002 *Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Toward Accession*, Brüksel, 9.10.2002, SEC (2002) 1412.

These steps and reforms undertaken by the government and the state were not sufficient for the organization. Since the summer of 2003, the crisis in the İmralı Process has begun to deepen. Öcalan presented a 10-point solution proposal through his lawyers on 2 July 2003. The proposal included issues such as democratic and cultural reforms, the disbanding of village guards and para-military structures, strengthening of local administrations, confrontation with the past and the investigation of truth, regional socio-economic development and general amnesty. Öcalan also demanded the creation of two mechanisms, the “Investigation Committee for Truth” and the “Peace and Democratic Solution Committee”, which would mediate between the government and the organization.

In response to this proposal by Öcalan, the PKK disbanded itself leaving its place to Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (*Kongreya Azadî û Demokrasiya Kurdistanê* - KADEK) and offering a three-stage roadmap. Accordingly, in one year (September 1, 2003 - 1 September 2004) on the one hand, the democratization and constitutional solution to the Kurdish issue would be provided, on the other hand, KADEK, including its leaders and all the armed forces, would return to Turkey and disarm.⁵²

These appeals of Öcalan and KADEK were left with no response from the government and the state. Since the summer of 2003, the organization send back to Turkish borders large numbers of armed militants and began responding to the operations. After nearly a year of crisis, the İmralı Process ended with the organization’s a decision on June 1, 2004, to “move from passive defense toward legitimate active defense.”⁵³

3.4. Dynamics rendering failure of the process

Considering the nearly two-centuries-long history of the Kurdish issue and 15 years of the conflict, the İmralı Process was the most important opportunity that had been seized up to that date in terms of peaceful and democratic solutions. However, this opportunity was not benefited from. Although the reasons for the failure of the İmralı Process require a comprehensive investigation, some of the key matters are highlighted here.

⁵² Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 229-235.

⁵³ Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 284-285.

First, in this period, PKK under the leadership and initiative of Öcalan underwent important changes, within the frame of “Democratic Republic” thesis, in terms of ideology, political discourse, strategic goals, and institutional structure.⁵⁴ However, despite the tendency towards politicization and legalization, armed forces were not disbanded, but reorganized. This indicated that the decision to end the armed struggle was not a strategic decision, but that it was conditional, and depending on the circumstances, weapons could again be resorted to. As a matter of fact, it was confirmed by the organization’s decision of June 1, 2004, to re-engage in armed actions.

In addition, the organization faced major crises during this transformation process and suffered significant losses both in organizational structure and in mass support. On the one hand, new discourses, new goals, and new institutional arrangements triggered internal conflicts and fights, while on the other, they were met with considerable reaction. In this period, while most militants left the organization, there were significant contractions in mass support. Large numbers of both imprisoned and mountain militants left. Among these losses were Nizamettin Taş and Abdullah Öcalan’s brother, Osman Öcalan, as well as members of the KADEK Presidential Council. After a congress that took place between October 27th and November 6th, 2003, at which KADEK was dissolved and replaced by the Kurdistan People’s Congress (*Kongreya Gelê Kurdistanê - Kongra-Gel*), the split within the senior leadership deepened and Osman Öcalan, Nizamettin Taş, and Kani Yılmaz as a group left the organization in 2004.⁵⁵

Second, Turkey’s politics experienced a major turmoil in this period. As a result of the deep economic crisis of 2001, Turkey went through a radical transformation in politics and most of the political actors changed. At February 19, 2002, National Security Council meeting, the crisis created by a constitutional dispute between Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit and President Ahmet Necdet left Turkey to face a major economic depression. In the general elections held on November 2, 2002, DSP, MHP and ANAP, which were partners in the previous coalition government, received 1.22%, 8.36%, and 5.13% respectively. Prime Minister Ecevit’s party was the ninth, ANAP was seventh, MHP was the fourth. With DYP receiving

54 For detailed analysis of the transformation see Jongerdena and Akkaya, *Ibid*. For the opposite view see Pir, M. Hayri, *Bir Yanılsamanın Sonu: Uluslararası Karşı-Deurim Hareketi, Teslimiyet ve Tasfiyecilik*, Ankara, Komal Yayınları, 2001.

55 Kapmaz, *Ibid.*, pg. 262-287.

9,52% of the votes, only two parties passed the 10% threshold: the AK Party (34.42% of the votes and 365 MPs) and the CHP (19.42% of the votes and 177 MPs).⁵⁶ In the environment where traditional political actors were marginalized and new political actors emerged, both the state and the government avoided taking radical steps to solve serious problems such as the Kurdish issue. The suspension of the death penalty given to Öcalan was an important step in getting ahead of the wave of violence. However, apart from recognition of individual cultural rights as a part of the EU accession process and Effective Remorse Law, no significant reforms to provide a political resolution to the Kurdish issue were achieved.

Thirdly, while the governments have traditionally been under the “state” custody, a remarkable crisis in the relation between the government and the state emerged after the 2002 elections, when the AK Party came to power alone. The AK Party, which formed the government alone, was a party established by leaders of Islamically leaning Welfare Party ousted from the government in the post-modern coup of 28 February 1997. Chief of General Staff of that time said that “it would take a thousand years,”⁵⁷ but only five years passed since February 28 when political actors rooted in National Vision movement established the AK Party, which 1.5 years after the establishment became the first party in the first elections it joined, able to form a majoritarian single-party government. In the environment of radically changed political actors, the coming of new actors, relationships between political institutions, traditional civil and military bureaucracy were entering a troubled period.

Fourth, during this period there was a significant break in the geopolitical equation with regard to the Kurdish issue and Turkey entered into a regional uncertainty. The Multinational Coalition Force, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, intervened in Iraq on March 20, 2003, and on 15 April, Iraq came under the control of the Coalition Forces. This alliance, which resulted in the fall of the Saddam administration, played an important role in the Kurdish alliance with the United States, and the Kurds held a central place in the new socio-political and administrative structure of Iraq.

56 Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, “2002 Genel Seçimleri: Gümrük Oyları Dahil Türkiye Geneli Seçim Sonuçları,” *Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*, <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/docs/2002MilletvekiliSecimi/gumrukdahil/gumrukdahil.pdf>, Accessed: 26.05.2017.

57 Kılıç, Abdullah, “Gizli belgeleriyle 28 Şubat,” *Haber Türk*, 22-26.02.2012.

While Kurds and the United States formed a strategic alliance in Iraq, Turkey-US relations suffered a blow after the March 1 bill. The US and UK demanded that Turkey opens its borders to tens of thousands of foreign troops and allows to temporarily deploy air forces to the neighboring regions and to open airports, especially İncirlik, for Coalition Forces. The government agreed in a draft bill on the condition that deployed forces would not exceed 62,000 troops, 255 aircraft, and 65 helicopters. The bill presented by the Prime Minister to the parliament was not passed on March 1, 2003.⁵⁸ This event was a breaking point in Turkish-American relations. The arrest of 11 Turkish soldiers in Sulaymaniyah city, located in the KRI, hooded blindfolding and then the transfer to Baghdad to be interrogated showed the extent of the breakdown.

While there was a major crisis in US-Turkey relations, the Kurds were laying foundations of a federal state in their geography with the cooperation with the US, on the other hand, they started to play critical roles in Iraq's administrative and political institutions.⁵⁹ For example, in this period, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader, Jalal Talabani, became the first president of post-Saddam Iraq. Turkey perceived the establishment of KRI in this period as a threat and this perception remained unchanged until 2007.⁶⁰

Finally, it is necessary to underline the effect of attacks on Twin Towers in the United States on September 11, 2001. In this period, the new approach of the United States, especially on the subject of "terror" and "security," facilitated a tendency to centralize the "security" policies of governments on a global scale. The United States and the EU, which had not considered the PKK as a terrorist organization for many years during the conflict, placed both the PKK and KADEK, which replaced it, on the terrorist organizations' list. This change on a global scale in that period and the new approach of the US and the EU were interpreted in Turkey as an opportunity to shape security policies, with the PKK being a major problem for the country.

58 *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, Dönem: 22, Cilt: 6, Yasama Yılı: 1, 39. Birleşim, 01.03.2003.

59 Galbraith, Peter, *Irak'ın Sonu*, çev. Mehmet Murat İnceyan, İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2007, pg. 149-151.

60 Öğür, Berkan, Baykal, Zana and Balcı, Ali, *Kuzey Irak - Türkiye İlişkileri: PKK, Güvenlik ve İşbirliği*, Sakarya, Ortadoğu Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları (ORMER), 2014, pg. 39-48.

Despite the negative dynamics above, what were the factors that allowed the conflict-free environment to remain until 1 June 2004? Three matters can be underlined in this regard. First, the PKK, whose leader was captured, was facing a major crisis and needed time to overcome it. As a matter of fact, the PKK used this period largely to overcome its own internal problems and to re-organize itself. Second, the leading Kurdish movement achieved local political power. The local administration experience of leading legal Kurdish parties began with the acquisition of 37 municipalities, one of which was a metropolitan municipality and five provincial municipalities in the local elections of April 18, 1999.⁶¹ After a lengthy period of conflict, legal Kurdish parties began to govern the cities for the first time. This situation opened up new horizons for the Kurdish issue and has considerably expanded the sphere of politics. Finally, obtaining the status of a candidate country in December 1999, Turkey's full EU membership process gained a significant momentum. Regardless of all the limitations, Turkey's EU accession process extracted the Kurdish issue from violence and shifted it to the political ground and democratization, in other words, it offered important opportunities for the "Democratic Republic."

Despite the EU accession process and the five-year ceasefire period, the parties failed to agree on conflict resolution and reconciliation. In addition, apart from the state and PKK, the five-year violence-free environment could not be appreciated by other actors. In this period, neither political parties nor civil society organizations nor other social actors made a significant effort to end the conflict and build social peace. The İmralı Process ended after a five-year period of violence-free environment when the organization made the decision to "move from passive defense toward legitimate active defense" on June 1, 2004. A historic opportunity to sideline violence in the Kurdish issue was not taken, and the society entered a period of violence in Turkey.

3.5. Erdoğan's Diyarbakır speech and 2005-2006 decisions to abstain from armed actions

Upon the resumption of the fights, on June 15, 2005, 150 intellectuals published a call urging the PKK to "immediately and unconditionally terminate the armed actions" and the government "to make the necessary legal arrangements for the provision of lasting peace and for

61 Yüksek Seçim Kurulu, "18 Nisan 1999 Mahalli İdareler Genel Seçimi," *Yüksek Seçim Kurulu*, 11.06.2016, www.ysk.gov.tr, Accessed: 30.05.2017.

everyone to be able to participate in a democratic social life.”⁶² A month and a half after this call, a delegation composed of 12 intellectuals met with Prime Minister R. Tayyip Erdoğan on 10 August 2005. Two days after this meeting, on August 12, 2005, Erdoğan gave a speech in Diyarbakır that contained unprecedented political messages regarding the Kurdish issue.⁶³

In the past in every country mistakes were made. Great states should not ignore mistakes made in the past. A great state, a strong nation confront themselves, they put their mistakes and good deeds on the table. They are a state and a nation that walks with confidence towards the future. I stand in front of you as the prime minister of a team that believes in my nation, the self-confidence of my state, the awareness of history and geography. To be great nation means to walk towards the future while confronting the past, as it is possible to not burden the future with the past matters. Because the future is full of bright tomorrows. [...] For this reason, it is my and my friends’ love, passion and a dream that everyone is a first class citizen wherever our flag is waving, freedom is the full ruler of our country, the rule of law is not a guest but is the landlord and our children look with hope to the future. [...] if you insist that we should name it, the Kurdish problem is not only the problem of one part of my nation, it is a problem of every one of us, including myself [...] To those who ask “What will happen to the Kurdish problem” I say: as the Prime Minister of this country, this problem is, above all, my problem. Likewise, if you ask me about another concern of this country, I would also tell it is, above all, my concern. We are a big state and we are solving and will solve each problem with more democracy, more citizenship law and more welfare within the principles of the people who left this country to us, the principle of the republic and the concept of a constitutional order.

A week after this statement, on 19 August, the PKK made a decision to abstain from armed actions for a month. Then, a month later, the organization extended the period. Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s statement has not followed through. According to journalist Cengiz Çandar’s claim, who later spoke to Erdoğan, the Prime Minister told him that he made a mistake using the expression “Kurdish problem” and that it caused

62 Kaplan, Sefa, “Silahlı eyleme derhal son ver,” *Hürriyet*, 15.06.2005, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/silahli-eyleme-derhal-son-ver-327480>, Accessed: 26.05.2017.

63 Seven, Erhan, “Kürt sorunu benim sorunumdur,” *Yeni Şafak*, 13.08.2005, <http://www.yenisafak.com/arsiv/2005/agustos/13/p01.html>, Accessed: 26.05.2017.

uneasiness, and said it would have been better if he had said “something like the social and economic problems of our Kurdish origin citizens.”⁶⁴ The fights began again shortly afterward.

In a year of violence, Öcalan urged the organization to declare a ceasefire in response to outside appeals of PUK leader Jalal Talabani, Democratic Party of Kurdistan (*Partî Demokratî Kurdistan* - PDK) leader Massoud Barzani and the United States, and calls of the democratic mass organizations made from within the country. On October 1, 2006, Kurdistan Communities Union (*Koma Civakên Kurdistanê* - KCK), which replaced the PKK after six years of transformation, announced the decision to abstain from armed actions.⁶⁵ This decision lasted until the general elections on July 22, 2007. However, on October 17, 2007, The Prime Minister’s Bill authorizing cross-border military operations, was accepted by AK Party in partnership with CHP and MHP.⁶⁶ Afterwards, Erdoğan met with the US President Bush on November 5, 2007. As a result, while the military operations started within the borders, three cross-border operations involving thousands of soldiers were carried out, two in December 2007 and one in February 2008. These cross-border operations were followed by cross-border air operations conducted in December 2007 and January and February 2008.⁶⁷ After about ten months of fighting, a dialogue process, known to the public as the Oslo Process, began.

4. The Oslo Process (2008-2011)

The Oslo Process, which started after the İmralı Process, in September 2008, was the second major initiative for the negotiation-based settlement of the Kurdish conflict. However, the Oslo Process can be noted as the first official process, unlike any previous search for dialogue. For the first time in closed and secret talks for the public, a direct dialogue was established between the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the KCK in order to end the Kurdish conflict and find a political resolution to the Kurdish issue. Another important feature of the talks, which Erdogan confirmed in his statements to the public in 2012,⁶⁸ was the participation

64 Çandar, *Ibid.*, pg. 29-30.

65 Dicle, Amed, “PKK’nin Barış Diyalektiği,” *Demokratik Modernite*, Sayı 6, 2013, pg. 150-156

66 Bianet, “Tezkere Geçti: 507 Kabul, 19 Ret,” *Bianet*, 17.10.2007, <http://bianet.org/bianet/siya-set/102357-tezkere-gecti-507-kabul-19-ret>, Accessed: 26.05.2017.

67 Al Jazeera, “TSK’nın sınır ötesi operasyonları,” *Al Jazeera*, 2011, <http://www.al-jazeera.com.tr/haber/tsknin-sinir-otesi-operasyonlari>, Accessed: 26.05.2017.

68 Derviş, Görkem, “Başbakan Erdoğan’dan ‘Oslo görüşmeleri’ açıklaması,” *Milliyet*, 26.09.2012,

of an international organization in the negotiations. The Oslo Process, which officially started with a unilateral ceasefire announced by KCK on April 13, 2009, ended on July 14, 2011, after a bumpy path.

4.1. Oslo Talks

According to KCK, the first contacts of the Oslo Process started in September 2008 through an international organization.⁶⁹ These talks, held in Oslo, the capital of Norway, were participated by Hakan Fidan, Deputy Undersecretary of the Prime Minister, Deputy Undersecretary of the MIT and his team, together with the organization's top-level figures, Nuriye Kespîr, Adem Uzun, Zübeyir Aydar, Remzi Kartal, Sabri Ok, and Mustafa Karasu.⁷⁰ Some parts of the voice recordings of one of these talks were also leaked on Internet during that period. The state delegation while meeting directly with the organization, on the other hand, held meetings with Öcalan in İmralı. The state also provided direct communication between Öcalan and the organization. These talks continued until the summer of 2011 when the process was over. According to Karasu, who was one of the top executives and participated in some of these talks, as a result of nonstop negotiations between September 2008 and June 2011 Öcalan prepared three protocols under the titles of the constitutional solution, pursuit of peace and truth. However, the state did not sign these protocols and the process ended after the general elections on 12 June 2011.⁷¹

As a result of the talks, an unannounced mutual ceasefire was held until the 29 March 2009 local elections.⁷² The first state-run channel which broadcasts 24 hours in Kurdish, TRT-6, began test broadcasting on 25 December 2008 and began its regular broadcast on 1 January 2009. President Abdullah Gül on the way to Tehran on March 10, 2009, in the statement made to journalists on the plane, gave the first signal to the public about the Oslo Process by saying that "in the coming days there will be good things"⁷³ happening about the Kurdish issue.

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/basbakan-erdogan-dan-oslo-gorusemleri-aciklamasi-siyaset-1602761/>, Accessed: 29.05.2017.

69 Çimen, Ahmet and İnce, Nalin, "Karasu: AKP çözüm yaklaşımını geliştirmeli," *ANF News*, 24.04.2013, <https://firatnews.com/guncel/karasu-akp-cozum-yaklasimini-gelistirmeli-18640>, Accessed: 24.05.2017.

70 Çimen and İnce, *Ibid.*

71 Çimen and İnce, *Ibid.*

72 Çimen and İnce, *Ibid.*

73 T24, "Gül: Kürt sorununda iyi şeyler olacak," *T24 Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi*, 10.03.2009, <http://>

4.2. Announcing the process to the public

After the local elections, on April 13, 2009, KCK announced its decision to abstain from armed actions. One day after this announcement, 52 members of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), which was established in place of the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP), were arrested. These arrests continued in the following months. Approximately 8,000 political activists, including mayors, DTP executives, and employees, civil society leaders, lawyers, and journalists, were arrested in the next two years as a result of investigations and lawsuits that were reported as "KCK Operations." However, despite the KCK Operations, negotiations continued in Oslo.

Minister of Internal Affairs, Beşir Atalay, in a press conference on 29 July 2009 announced to the public that the government had started the "democratic opening" process. The most critical part of Atalay's statement was:⁷⁴

We believe that the issue of what is referred to as the Kurdish issue can be solved by expanding and consolidating the democratic rights of our citizens and by ensuring that every citizen can feel as an equal and free individual in the eyes of the state regardless of where they live. For this reason, democratization is the direction of the resolution process. This is an indication of what we have done before and what we will do next regarding this subject. We want to take the steps of democratization together with all sections of the society. This issue is not just about our party or government but about the whole society. Therefore, in this process everyone should be constructive rather than destructive, should have a contributive attitude to the solution and that is what we expect. We are and we will make efforts to include everyone in this process. We are committed and determined to conduct this as a state policy. [...] From here, I would like to call all our political parties, intelligentsia, authors, NGOs, trade unions, media, and, briefly, all the social and political actors who ponder about the issue - come and join this process. I say, let's solve this problem, which costs our nation a hefty price, takes away food from our table and weighs heavy on our future.

t24.com.tr/haber/gul-kurt-sorununda-iyi-seyler-olacak,33742, Accessed: 26.05.2017.

74 Haber Türk, "Demokratik Açılım Süreci Başlıyor: Türkiye Kürt Meselesinde Tarihi bir Döneme Giriyor," *Haber Türk*, 30.07.2009, <http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/161741-demokratik-acilim-sureci-basliyor>, Accessed: 27.05.2017.

4.3. Crises

The most critical step of the Oslo Process, which the government later called the “Kurdish Opening” or “National Unity and Cooperation Project”, was undoubtedly the Habur events. As a result of the talks and upon Öcalan’s call, two groups of 34 people in total from Qandil and Mahmur refugee camps entered Turkey through Habur Border crossing on 19 October 2009. These groups were released after being officially processed at the border.⁷⁵ They were greeted by large crowds along the way from Habur to Diyarbakir. In fact, when crowds joined these “peace celebrations,” they turned into political rallies, with the groups’ members wearing clothes symbolizing the organization which caused a wave of Turkish nationalism across the country. The Habur crossing, which was expected to contribute to the dialogue process and to open the way for disarmament, but turned into a big crisis. Prime Minister Erdoğan interpreted the mass welcoming as a “political show.”⁷⁶ B. Atalay, the Minister of the Interior who coordinated the process, accused the DTP of being irresponsible. In his view what happened was a show and provocation.⁷⁷

The second major crisis after Habur was the Reşadiye attack and the closure of the DTP, which took place within a week. After Habur, while KCK militants were expected to lay down weapons, on December 7, 2009, seven soldiers were killed and three were wounded in a KCK attack during a patrol in Reşadiye district of Tokat.⁷⁸ The armed wing of the People’s Defense Forces (*Hêzên Parastina Gel* - HPG) announced that a unit in Dersim carried out this action on its own initiative. In the statement, despite the suspension of actions, the ongoing operations and Öcalan’s

75 Those who came through Habur Border were charged with membership in a terrorist organization and terrorist organization’s propaganda. Eight months later, 13 members of the group were arrested after a trial. See: T24, “Habur’dan giren 13 kişi 8 ay sonra tutuklu,” *T24 Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi*, 18.06.2010, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/haburdan-giren-13-kisi-8-ay-sonra-tutuklu,80817>, Accessed: 05.08.2017.

76 Radikal, “Habur’dan giriş yapan PKK’lıların serbest bırakılması Ankara’yı hareketlendirdi,” *Radikal*, 21.10.2009, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/haburdan-giris-yapan-pkkililarin-serbest-birakilmasi-ankarayi-hareketlendirdi-960336/>, Accessed: 27.05.2017.

77 Sabah, “İçişleri Bakanı’ndan önemli açıklamalar,” *Sabah*, 23.10.2009, http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2009/10/23/icisleri_bakanindan_onemli_aciklamalar, Accessed: 27.05.2017.

78 Sabah, “Tokat’ta jandarmaya pusu: 7 şehit,” *Sabah*, 07.12.2009, http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2009/12/07/tokatta_catisma, Accessed: 27.05.2017.

prison conditions were cited as reasons.⁷⁹ On December 11, four days after the Reşadiye attack, the Constitutional Court ruled unanimously to close the DTP “because it became a focal point of the activities against the country’s and nation’s integrity.” In the same decision, 37 persons of the top executive of the party were banned from any political activity for 5 years and co-chairpersons, Ahmet Türk, and Aysel Tuğluk, were stripped of their parliamentary seats.⁸⁰ After Habur, the Reşadiye attack and the closure of the DTP, which both took place four days apart, were the second major crisis during the Oslo Process.

The third crisis took place on June 1, 2010, when the KCK declared ending of the 13 April 2009 suspension of actions. Öcalan withdrew from the talks on May 31, 2010 on the grounds that the government did not take any steps. KCK announced that they had ended unilateral declaration of suspension of their actions and adopted “active defense position” due to unanswered calls for peace and democracy. The decision was followed by 2.5 months fighting.

With the approaching 12 September Constitutional Referendum, talks with Öcalan were resumed and the organization announced it would suspend actions, except for defense, between August 13 and September 20. In the same statement, in order to make the process permanent and turn into a peace and resolution process, four conditions have been put forward: (1) to stop military and political operations and to provide a bilateral ceasefire; (2) to release about 1,700 Kurdish politicians arrested under the KCK operations; (3) the initiation of a negotiation process on the basis of the three-point solution framework proposed by Öcalan and “creation of conditions for active participation in the peace process” and finally (4) the reduction of the 10% electoral threshold.

The final crisis, which ended the Oslo Process, came from negotiations on the protocols. After the Constitutional Referendum, upon Öcalan’s call, the decision of suspension of actions was extended until after the elections of 12 June 2011. Öcalan announced through his lawyers that the talks with the state delegation came to the “point of practical suggestions” and that the year 2011 might be the year of the solution. In the same statement,

79 Bianet, “PKK Reşadiye Saldırısını Üstlendi,” *Bianet*, 10.12.2009, <http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/118770-pkk-resadiye-saldirisini-ustlendi>, Accessed: 27.05.2017.

80 Hürriyet, “DTP kapatıldı,” *Hürriyet*, 11.12.2009, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dtp-kapatildi-13176916>, Accessed: 27.05.2017.

he said that in case there was no solution in the first six months of 2011, there would be no postponement or extension of the situation and the process would end.⁸¹

During this period the state continued to meet with Öcalan in İmralı and the Qandil delegation in Oslo. The outcome of the negotiations were three protocols prepared by Öcalan for the state and the organization. According to Mustafa Karasu, who participated in the negotiations on behalf of Qandil, these protocols were presented to the organization in April 2011 and were accepted with one or two minor changes. However, the last pre-election meeting with the state delegation did not take place and the mediating institution reported that the state would not officially sign the protocols.⁸²

After the elections, on 24 June at a meeting with his lawyers, Öcalan said that everything had been discussed with the state delegation and that if no steps were taken, the process would end and the “revolutionary people’s war” would begin.⁸³

The interviews we make here are important and serious. They came to a certain stage. Now we have finished talking and discussing. There is nothing left to discuss. Those who met with me spoke on behalf of the state. If the government does not take practical steps regarding the democratic constitutional solution of the Kurdish problem, a crisis will arise. It turns out that the negotiations that have been held so far are intended to be a distraction. They will meet me again until July 15th. If at that meeting they declare that they cannot move on to the practical steps, then the revolutionary people’s war will come into play.

Öcalan, in a statement made on July 6, 2011, explained that there was a wrong perception of the protocols on the level of the public and stated that the protocols are more than a mutually signed text, it is “a text reached on mutual agreement on the solution.” He said that “protocols open the way, develop the solution and are solution texts that have been settled with the state which we will be committed to. The protocols are

81 Çayan, Serhat, “İmralı sürecinde Abdullah Öcalan ve barış girişimleri,” *ANF News*, 05.01.2013, <https://anfturkce.net/guncel/umraly-surecinde-abdullah-oca-lan-ve-baryth-girithimleri-13284>, Accessed: 27.05.2017.

82 Çimen and İnce, *Ibid.*

83 Çayan, *Ibid.*

tied to concrete and practical steps to be taken in the coming period.”⁸⁴ In the same meeting, Öcalan explained that earlier declaration of withdrawal from the talks if the government did not take steps until July 15 is meaningless as it had been agreed with the state to form a “Peace Council.” According to Öcalan, the Peace Council foreseen in the protocols “will be neither an official state body nor a civilian body. The Peace Council will work on peace efforts, peace implementation and solution. The Peace Council should be established in less than a month or a month.”⁸⁵

4.4. “Oslo Consensus”

A document which allegedly was the text of a settlement reached after the talks shared with the public by the CHP a year after the end of the Oslo Process. During Oslo negotiations, Omer Altıparmak, Chief of Police Intelligence, asserted that the Oslo documents disclosed by CHP and MHP were real and that he personally presented these documents to Prime Minister of that time, Erdoğan.⁸⁶ On 26 September 2012 Erdoğan confirmed the existence of such a text in the İskele Sancak program broadcasted on Kanal 7. However, he stated that this text prepared by the organization and submitted to the government cannot be considered as a document since it was not signed by the state or government authorities.⁸⁷

In the three-paragraph and nine-point text, especially the third, fourth and ninth parts confirmed the process:⁸⁸

3. The Parties, until the first week of June at the latest shall present opinions and suggestions regarding the drafts presented by Mr. Öcalan in negotiations on İmralı on 10 May 2011, and known as “Democratic Solution Principles Draft of Basic Societal Problems in Turkey”, “Draft of

84 Çayan, *Ibid.*

85 Radikal, “Öcalan: Türk yetkililerle Barış Konseyi konusunda anlaştık,” *Radikal*, 08.07.2011, <http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ocalan-turk-yetkililerle-baris-konseyi-konusunda-anlastik-1055599/>, Accessed: 30.05.2017.

86 Öztürk, Saygı, “PKK ile görüşmenin belgelerini Erdoğan’a bizzat ben sundum,” *Sözcü*, 31.10.2015, <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2015/gundem/pkk-ile-gorusmenin-belgelerini-erdogana-bizzat-ben-sundum-973567/>, Accessed: 29.05.2017.

87 This program is available online. See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HQZVCSPumsQ_, Accessed: 29.05.2017.

88 Gazete Vatan, “Oslo belgeleri açıklandı,” *Gazete Vatan*, 19.09.2012, <http://www.gazetevatan.com/oslo-belgeleri-aciklandi-481714-siyaset/>, Accessed: 28.05.2017.

Just Peace Principles of State and Society Relations in Turkey” and “Draft Action Plan for the Democratic Solution to Kurdish Problem and Fair Peace”. The Kurdish side welcomes the discussed drafts and accepts them in principle and as principal.

4. The Parties shall, at the same time, negotiate over the names of the Constitutional Council, Peace Council, Truth and Justice Commission referred to in the above-mentioned drafts, and present their proposed names.

9. The parties have agreed to meet in the second half of June 2011 in preparation to deepen the negotiations.

4.5. Silvan attack and autonomy declaration

Eight days after Öcalan’s statement of July 6, two events that ended the process took place on July 14, 2011: the Silvan attack and the “democratic autonomy declaration” of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK). The Silvan Commando Battalion squad that was searching the rural area of the Silvan district of Diyarbakir to rescue two soldiers and a medic kidnapped on July 9, was ambushed. 13 soldiers and 7 militants lost their lives and 7 soldiers were wounded in the fights.⁸⁹

A day after the fighting, DTK, an umbrella organization for the leading Kurdish movement gathered and unilaterally declared “democratic autonomy.” After the extraordinary meeting, DTK Co-Chairperson Aysel Tuğluk read a statement in which she said that the AK Party and the state do not get closer to the solution of the Kurdish issue and the deadlock (will) not only bring(s) the collapse and ruin to the Kurds, but also to Turkey. Tuğluk said “in the light of international conventions on human rights, respect for the territorial integrity of a common land and the prospect of a democratic nation, we, the Kurdish people, pledge our Democratic Autonomy, as well as national commitment to unity of the peoples of Turkey,” calling on the international community, recognize “democratic autonomy declared by the Kurdish people, which is a right in the international law.” Silvan-like incidents had happened before. In this sense, it can be argued that it is not a decisive factor in ending of the Oslo Process. However, the unilateral declaration of “democratic autonomy” and the call for recognition by the international community went beyond

89 Balıkçı, Faruka and Altıntaş, Canan, “Silvan’da 13 Şehit,” *Hürriyet*, 15.07.2011, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/silvan-da-13-sehit-18258459>, Accessed: 27.05.2017.

and pushed the limits of the state and AK Party's completed reforms regarding individual cultural rights of the Kurds.

As a matter of fact, the Oslo Process, which had lasted for nearly three years and involved direct talks between the state and the KCK and its leader, Öcalan, through the mediation of an international institution, ended after the Silvan attack and the declaration of "democratic autonomy." The meetings with KCK already did not continue after the June 12th elections. According to Öcalan, the state delegation once again met with him after these events. However, negotiations with Öcalan were terminated. In the last meeting with his lawyers on July 27, Öcalan criticized both the state and the KCK for using him as a subcontractor and announced his withdrawal from the process saying: "I end being used by both sides as a subcontractor. As of today, I end this. My work is over. After that, for me to continue my role there has to be a healthy, secure and free movement. From now on, I'll do nothing without these."⁹⁰ In the aftermath, although intermittent, but the ongoing meetings with lawyers since Öcalan's capture in 1999, were stopped.

Approximately one and a half years had to pass before the next initiative started to solve the Kurdish issue, end the fighting and build social peace. In this period, the KCK, which adopted the "revolutionary people's war" strategy, increased the intensity of the fighting. As a matter of fact, a number close to a thousand lost their lives in the 17-month conflict. According to İHD data, in 2011 the conflict costed the lives of 338 people (154 security personnel and 184 militants),⁹¹ in 2012 507 people (199 security personnel, 307 armed militants and 1 civilian), in total, 845.⁹²

Conclusion

In this chapter, in order to set the historical background for the Resolution Process, the quest for dialogue and reconciliation ongoing since the 1990s, political resolution to the Kurdish issue, the end of fighting and building

90 Emir, Cem, "Öcalan: Kandil beni taşeron olarak kullanıyor," *Milliyet*, 29.07.2011, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/ocalan--kandil-beni-taseron-olarak-kullaniyor-gundem-1420348/>, Accessed: 30.05.2017.

91 İnsan Hakları Derneği, "2011 Türkiye İnsan Hakları İhlalleri Bilançosu," *İnsan Hakları Derneği*, <http://www.ihd.org.tr/images/pdf/2012/2011bilanco.pdf>, Accessed: 28.05.2017.

92 İnsan Hakları Derneği, "2012 Türkiye İnsan Hakları İhlalleri Bilançosu," *İnsan Hakları Derneği*, <http://www.ihd.org.tr/images/pdf/2012/2012bilanco.pdf>, Accessed: 28.05.2017.

of social peace were addressed. In this context, after a brief analysis of the process leading to the PKK's search for internal solutions instead of separatist politics at the beginning of the 1990s, the first ceasefires in the 1990s, the İmralı Process of 1999-2004 and the 2008-2011 Oslo Process were discussed.

In the 1990s, the PKK faced a crisis of both the Marxist/Leninist socialist worldview and the strategy based on national liberation rhetoric and political violence. On the one hand, the PKK was trying to overcome the ideological crisis, on the other hand, it turned away from the national liberation rhetoric towards the search for a domestic political resolution around the federation model, and away from political violence towards a search for democratic politics. The quest for dialogue and reconciliation that began with the 1993 ceasefire, was based on search for the ways to overcome the three crises the organization faced at the beginning of the 1990s.

In general, it can be said that the quests of the 1990s were not peace or a resolution process, but in fact weak initiatives aimed at starting a dialogue between the state and the PKK. In those years, other than unilateral ceasefires which lasted a few months, there were no meaningful sources that would enable political resolution to the Kurdish issue, end the fighting and build social peace. High intensity of violence, casualties and displacements in that period are a confirmation of the situation.

It can be said that actually the quest for dialogue and reconciliation on the Kurdish issue started with İmralı Process of 1999-2004. In this period, there were important resources for conflict resolution and social peacebuilding. First, the state had the opportunity to engage in a direct dialogue with the imprisoned leader of the organization. Second, the PKK declaring its loyalty to the leader pulled their forces outside the borders of Turkey and a five-year period without fighting begun in order to solve the issue through political means. Third, the PKK notably transformed in an institutional sense, not only by not disbanding its armed forces, but also by major changes to both ideological and political lines, strategic goals and struggle. Finally, there was a remarkable level of contextual change, in terms of both the state and the organization, especially between 1999 and 2003. This contextual change on the governmental front gained momentum in 1999 with the EU membership process. In terms of organization, it was the local administration experience of the leading Kurdish parties that started with the 1999 local elections as well as the EU accession process. This local power opportunity provided significant chances for solution.

Despite all these positive resources, the PKK's reorganization of its armed forces for a possible conflict period with simultaneous withdrawal from the border; Öcalan's capture and the crises, conflicts and division within the organization resulting from the institutional transformations he proposed; the turmoil in Turkish politics after the 2001 economic crisis, the US intervention in Iraq in March 2003 and the rupture of the Kurdish issue after the creation of the KRI prevented the parties from building a negotiation process that would enable a social peace and end the fighting and which would go beyond the dialogue achieved in İmralı process.

In comparison with the İmralı Process, the 2008-2011 Oslo Process for a number of reasons had the potential to produce solutions in the Kurdish issue. First, the Oslo Process was a much more institutionalized process. The state was in direct contact with Qandil and Öcalan. Secondly, for the first time, an international institution was mediating between the parties. This, on the one hand, ensured the institutionalization of the process, while on the other, it created an "audience cost" and forced both the state and the KCK to fulfill commitments. Beyond that, this process of mediation meant that all stages were documented by a third actor. Thirdly, even if only a part of the process, but it was known to the public. For the first time, the government announced to the public that it was starting a project for a political resolution. It could be claimed that the Kurdish issue and the history of the Kurdish conflict in this situation became a new point of reference in the history of Turkish state. Lastly, the fact that negotiations could continue for about three years despite major crises provided an important institutional accumulation. The result of this institutional accumulation is discussing almost all issues and reaching the phase of preparing protocols/texts which covered practical applications. Even though these protocols/texts were not mutually signed, the importance of the achieved accumulation - especially for subsequent initiatives - should be noted.

Regarding the dynamics that contributed to the failure of the Oslo Process, there are three important points worth attention. First, the difference in political agenda between the state and the KCK should be underlined. The state limited the political resolution to the matter of cultural rights and actually aimed at the disarmament of the organization. On the other hand, the KCK since 2007 has aimed at achieving a political status formulated as "democratic autonomy" and has linked it to disarmament. Secondly, the two-centered power structure of the organization, Qandil, and İmralı, made it difficult to manage the process. Regardless of how much the

state met with both actors and provided the communication between them, Öcalan's imprisonment made it difficult for the organization to form a common will and decision mechanism. Thirdly, the exclusion of the DTP and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) which replaced it, created institutional obstacles for the debate in political and societal dimension of the issue and reduced it to a conflict between the conflicting parties. Like the İmralı Process, the Oslo Process remained largely a dialogue process between the state and the KCK and could not be turned into a reconciliation process to build social peace and negotiations.

In addition to the analyzes made separately for each of the three processes, finally, a common problem must be underlined: elections. It is seen that in all dialogue initiatives, the elections play a critical role as the negotiations mostly follow election calendar and in most cases, the processes are shaped according to the election results. This situation, known in the literature as "security dilemma", i.e. the concern of the parties about dissipation of assets/power in the post-conflict period seems to be quite effective in the dialogue process in Turkey. In the post-conflict period, the concern about maintaining its existence is generally related to organizations. However, the political concerns of the governments involved in the dialogue and negotiation processes seem to be a critical dynamic that determines the course of the ongoing process.

After this chapter, which deals with the quest for dialogue and reconciliation of the Kurdish issue, the last initiative of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, the Resolution Process, which took place between 2013 and 2015 is examined.

6

RESOLUTION PROCESS (2013-2015) AND AFTER

Kurdish conflict in Turkey has left behind the third decade. Fighting resumed after 2013-2015 Resolution Process, which created great public hope for a political solution and reconciliation but failed. However, after four interrelated basic dynamics which emerged in the new period of conflict, conflict resolution and reconciliation are not only to settle the Kurdish issue in Turkey through a political resolution but also to protect the existing democratic heritage and a political domain, albeit limited. These dynamics are: the new nature of the conflicts since July 2015, the military coup attempt that took place on July 15, 2016, the State of Emergency declared after the coup attempt and practices that take place in this context, and finally, the ongoing civil war in Iraq and Syria and the new geopolitical dynamics of the Kurdish issue which have ramifications for Turkey's domestic and foreign policy.

The resolution of intra-state conflicts that take place in different times and places, as outlined in the second chapter, is more difficult than the solution of inter-state conflicts.¹ Unlike inter-state conflicts, parties in intra-state conflicts must live together within the same borders after the conflict. In this sense, after the conflict, the real challenge is who will control the new government or the socio-political system. In other words, who will control the lives and death of the conflicting parties.² According to studies about intra-state conflicts, negotiation-based resolutions seem to be very limited.³

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- 1 Bell, J. Bowyer, "Societal Patterns and Lessons: The Irish Case," Robin Higham (der.), *Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century*, Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1972, pg. 218; Ikle, Fred C., *Every War Must End*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1971, pg. 95; Modelski, George, "International Settlement of Internal Wars," James N. Rosenau (der.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1964, pg. 125-126; Pillar, Paul R., *Negotiation Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1983, pg. 24-5; Zartman, I. William, "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts," Roy Licklider (der.), *Stopping the Killing*, New York, New York University Press, 1993; Zartman, I. William, *Elusive Peace: Negotiation an End to Civil Wars 1995-1996*, Washington, Brookings Institute, 1995.
 - 2 Licklider, Roy, "The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993," *The American Political Sciences Review*, 95:3 (1995), pg. 681-690.
 - 3 Stedman, Stephen J., *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980*, Boulder, Reinner, 1991, pg. 9; Toft, Monica D., "Ending Civil Wars: A Case for Rebel Victory?," *International Security*, 34:4 (2010), pg. 7-36; Licklider, *Ibid*.

If we remember that the initiatives towards dialogue and negotiation-based solution to the Kurdish issue go back to the early 1990s, one can say that efforts to build conflict resolution and reconciliation in Turkey faced considerable challenges. Following the failure of the Resolution Process which started after a period of 30 years of an intermittent conflict, the fighting moved from rural areas into urban areas and caused deaths and destruction on a scale unmatched by the past. It shows not only the difficulty of a negotiation-based solution but also that the failure of initiatives fuels more violent clashes.

This section examines the latest conflict resolution and reconciliation initiative between 2013 and 2015, considering dialogue and negotiation initiatives to end the Kurdish conflict since the 1990s. The reasons for the failure of the Resolution Process are analyzed in depth to understand the dynamics that will enable a new conflict resolution and reconciliation process. In this context, firstly, the basic ruptures leading to the Resolution Process and the peculiarities of the process are discussed. Secondly, the four areas of contention among the parties in the Resolution Process are summarized. Thirdly, the factors that caused the failure are hypothetically discussed. Finally, after the failure of the Resolution Process, the resurgent fighting and their consequences are analyzed.

1. Pre-Resolution Process ruptures and its peculiarity

In the nearly 17-month conflict period after failure of the Oslo Process, until January 2013, when the Resolution Process started, about 1,000 people lost their lives. It can be argued that along with structural factors, there are three mainstream developments that encouraged the Resolution Process.⁴ The first one is a dramatic increase of fighting in the summer of 2012, incomparable to the past. KCK declared “revolutionary people’s war” and starting from Hakkâri (Şemdinli) region with the strategy of “area control” begun to create “supervised regions.” Selahattin Demirtaş, the BDP Co-Chairperson at that time, claimed that the 400-kilometer had come under the control of the PKK.⁵

4 Çiçek, Cuma, “Çözüm Sürecinde Kırılmalar: Çatışmalar, Müzakereler ve Sınırlar,” Necmiye Alpay and Hakan Tahmaz (der.) *Barış Açısını Savunmak. Çözüm Sürecinde Neler Oldu?*, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 2015: 220-244.

5 Kaplan, Nizamettin, “Demirtaş: 400 Kilometre PKK'nin Denetiminde,” *NTV*, 28.08.2012, <http://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/demirtas-400-kilometre-pkknin-denetiminde,olAvQpPPSUanJUg-qcPoGA>, Accessed: 15.02.2015.

Secondly, there was a second great break in the geopolitical equation of the Kurdish issue. In 2003, the establishment of the KRI greatly changed the geopolitical equation of the Kurdish issue, which is a trans-border and international problem. While state authorities and governments in Turkey would not even approach to negotiate the right to education in Kurdish, the Kurds on the other side of the border built a federal state. The Syrian civil war created a second rupture in the geopolitical equation of the Kurdish issue. Today, one the most important dynamic determining Turkey's internal and external policies is the *de facto* military and socio-political administration in Kurdish Syrian region (Rojava) for which grounds were laid in July 2012.⁶ During this period, the Kurds started to take over the administration of the areas where they lived and attempted to build three cantons centered in Efrîn (Afrin), Kobanê, and Cizîr.⁷

Finally, a hunger strike that began in September 2012 among Kurdish political detainees and spread to all prisons within a short time. Soon after these protests turned into death fasts and triggered considerable socio-political mobilization on the scale of Turkey. Shortly before the beginning of the Resolution Process, the death fasts were terminated after the partial acceptance of protesters' demands and a call from Abdullah Öcalan in November 2012.⁸ On the one hand, the dialogue that had begun between the state and Öcalan ended the death fasts, and on the other hand, the relationships built during the protests created an environment for the Resolution Process.

The Resolution Process, which began after these three developments in January 2013, bears peculiarities worth noting. First, unlike the Oslo Process, the Resolution Process was not conducted in secrecy.⁹ The process that started with the meeting of Öcalan with a delegation of Kurdish politicians, continued, even if only partially, with the public's knowledge. The 2013 Newroz Declaration, which officially launched the process, can be noted as the most important indicator of the public

6 Özgür Gündem, "Kürt Kentleri Bir Bir Özgürleşiyor," *Özgür Gündem*, 21.07.2012, http://www.ozgur Gundem.com/?haberID=45209&haberBaslik=K%C3%BCrt%20kentleri%20bir%20bir%20%C3%B6zg%C3%BCrle%C5%9Fiyor&action=haber_detay&module=nuce Accessed: 15.02.2015.

7 BBC Türkçe, "Rojava: Suriye'nin Kuzeyinde 'Özerk Kanton'," *BBC Türkçe*, 21.01.2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2014/01/140121_cizire_ozerklik_ilan Accessed: 15.02.2015.

8 Radikal, "TUHAD FED: Açlık Grevleri Sona Erdi," *Radikal*, 18.11.2012, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/tuhadfed_aclik_grevleri_sona_erdii-1108310 Accessed: 15.02.2015.

9 Bayramoğlu, Ali, *Çözüm Süreci: Siyasetten Silaha*, Democratic Progress Institute, 2015, pg. 50.

openness. The letter in which Öcalan declared that it was time to end the armed struggle was publicly shared during Diyarbakır Newroz celebrations. The message was shared with the public in a symbolic city and on a symbolic day attended by around a million people. More importantly, the letter was shared by most of the mainstream media outlets announcing it to entire Turkey.

Second, the ceasefire was bilateral for the first time, although it was not officially announced. The five-year ceasefire which begun in 1999 with Öcalan's capture was unilateral. When KCK pulled its armed forces out of the borders, it lost about 500 members due to the unilateral ceasefire. Although there was no official bilateral ceasefire in the Resolution Process, it was seen that the two sides abstained from actions. Special attention was paid in order to avoid the losses experienced during the 1999-2004 period.

Thirdly, the process gained partial societal recognition through the Wise Persons Delegation.¹⁰ Within the scope of the Resolution Process, the Wise Persons Delegation was established based on seven geographical regions. In the meetings held in the seven regions of the country, people were informed about the process as well as voiced their requests and suggestions. Wise Persons Delegation has reported their work and presented opinions, requests, and suggestions of the street to the relevant actors.

Finally, the process gained a legal framework with a law adopted by parliament. The Government's "Draft Law on the Termination of Terror and Strengthening of Social Integration" was accepted on July 10, 2014, and entered into force by publication in the Official Gazette No. 29062 dated 16 July 2014 as Law No. 6551. The Government also issued a Decision of the Council of Ministers on October 1, 2014, for the "Establishment of the Resolution Process Board and Interagency Monitoring and Coordination Commission." In the first clause of the law, the purpose of the law was described as "regulating the procedures and principles of the resolution process carried out for the ending of terror and for the strengthening of social cohesion". Although the law contained many considerable problems, starting with its name, the process of legalization was an important step for both public openness and the institutionalization of the process as well as for its continuation.¹¹

10 Coşkun, Vahap, *Çözüm Süreci: Kazanımlar ve Tehditler*, London, Democratic Progress Institute, 2015, pg. 13-16.

11 Kanunun kısa ve öz bir analizi için bkz. Coşkun, *Ibid.*, pg. 24-28.

2. Four basic disagreements

Despite the positive aspects outlined above, the parties were unable to agree on the main issues and the process failed. When a detailed examination of the chronologies¹² on the Resolution Process is made, it can be seen that the parties could not agree on the four main issues. First, the parties disagreed about which mechanisms should be established for conflict resolution and reconciliation, and which actors would be involved in these mechanisms. Even with regard to the mechanisms and actors of the pre-negotiation dialogue process, there had been many crises.¹³

Second, the framework of the negotiation agenda and reforms could not be determined after the two-year period. Although at the press conference at Dolmabahçe, the last meeting of the Resolution Process, the delegation of the government and the İmralı Delegation stood before cameras, two different statements were made. While the government voiced a general democratization perspective, the İmralı Delegation read Öcalan's 10-point proposal, which provided a broad but vague framework ranging from gender equality, ecology, to the democratization of politics and socio-economic development, without a road-map for concrete implementation. Most importantly, apart from a general democratization perspective, there was no common framework.¹⁴

Third, the withdrawal of the KCK armed militants from the border constituted one of the most important crisis headlines. The date of the withdrawal, how long it would take, legal grounding, phasing, and steps to be taken in reciprocity by the government were subject to constant

12 For more detailed studies of "chronology" see Çiçek, Cuma and Coşkun, Vahap, "Dolmabahçe'den Günümüze Çözüm Süreci: Başarısızlığı Anlamak ve Yeni Bir Yol Bulmak", *Barış Vakfı Politika Raporu*, İstanbul, Barış Vakfı Yayınları, 2016; Aktan, İrfan, "Neler Olmuştu", *Heinrich Böll Stiftung Derneği*, 13.11.2014, <http://tr.boell.org/tr/2014/11/13/neler-olmustu>, Accessed: 14.02.2015; SETA, "Kürt Meselesi: Zaman Çizelgesi", *Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı (SETA)*, <http://setav.org/tr/kurt-meselesi/zaman-cizelgesi/5631>, Accessed: 14.02.2015; Alpay, Necmiye and Tahmaz, Hakan (der.), *Barış Açısını Savunmak. Çözüm Sürecinde Neler Oldu?*, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 2015.

13 Sabah, "Davutoğlu: Yurtdışındaki Kürtler de Kardeşimizdir," *Sabah*, 19.10.2014, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gundem/2014/10/19/basbakan-da-vutoglu-konusuyor#> Accessed: 14.02.2015; IMC TV, "Bayık: Türkiye'ye ABD'nin Arabuluculuğunu Önerdik", *IMC TV*, 22.12.2014, <http://www.imctv.com.tr/2014/12/22/58953/bayik-turkiyeye-abdnin-arabuluculugunuonerdik>, Accessed: 14.02.2015.

14 Çiçek and Coşkun, *Ibid*; Bayramoğlu, *Ibid.*, pg. 64.

debates.¹⁵ As a matter of fact, the withdrawal of the armed militants which the KCK began on May 8, 2013, upon Öcalan's call, was stopped on September 9, 2013, on the grounds that the government did not take necessary steps. It can be said that this crisis is the most important cause of the failure of the Resolution Process.

Finally, the parties have not reached a consensus on the cross-border dimension of the Kurdish conflict, especially on Rojava, the Syrian Kurdish Region. Rojava had been the most important discord between the parties since the beginning of the Resolution Process. The leading Kurdish movement claiming the "third way" between the Assad regime and the Syrian Arab opposition headed for construction of a *de facto* autonomous region. Ankara had repeatedly declared since the beginning of the Resolution Process that it would not allow a *de facto* Kurdish government under the leadership of PKK's sister organization, the Democratic Union Party (*Partiya Yekitiya Demokratîk* - PYD).¹⁶ However, Öcalan, describing "Turkey's Rojava policy as a war against Kurds" urged Kurds to organize their lives in accordance with a high-intensity war.¹⁷

3. Factors leading to failure

The four main areas of dispute show that the Resolution Process had a rather fragile ground. The basic question to be asked at this point is: Why was the ground for the Resolution Process so fragile? There are nine dynamics that undermined the process and caused it to fail:

1. Cross-border and international dynamics and the new geopolitical equation
2. Security dilemma and the crisis of existence
3. Problematic institutional structure of the Resolution Process

15 Al Jazeera Turk Dergi, "Çözüm Süreci Hangi Aşamada?," *Al Jazeera Turk Dergi*, 15.10.2014, <http://dergi.aljazeera.com.tr/2014/10/15/cozum-sureci-hangi- asamada/> Accessed: 15.2.2015; SETA, *Ibid*

16 Beki, Akif, "Erdoğan: 'Kuzey Suriye' İstemeyiz," *Hürriyet*, 27.01.2015, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/28056851.asp>, Accessed: 14.02.2015.

17 Kaplan, Çağdaş, "Öcalan: Türkiye'nin Rojava Siyaseti Kürde Karşı Savaş Siyasetidir," *Evensel*, 23.09.2014, <http://www.evrensel.net/haber/92546/ocalan-turkiyenin-rojava-siyaseti-kurde-karsi-savas-siyasetidir>, Accessed 10.02.2015.

4. The role of third parties
5. The deep gap between political agendas
6. The influence of the Turkish nationalist opposition
7. AK Party's limitations: Resolution Process *Alla Turca*
8. The limitations of the leading Kurdish movement
9. Transformation problems of Kurdish politics

3.1. Cross-border and international dynamics and the new geopolitical equation

It can be argued that the Resolution Process failed due to new international and regional dynamics that provided new military, economic and political possibilities, opportunities and options for the parties. Studies of internal conflicts show that both international and cross-border/regional contexts are potent in the emergence, shaping and ending of such cases. Most of the research in the international context focuses on the impact of the end of the Cold War and discusses how the power balance between global forces and the proxy-wars on the ground affect the course of intra-state conflicts.¹⁸ Studies of the cross-border/regional context, emphasize the nature of the region in which an intra-state conflict takes place, and, in particular, the influence of neighboring countries.¹⁹ Studies of such conflicts show significant regional differences

18 Gurr, T. Robert, *People Versus States*, Washington, DC: USIP, 2000; Hartzell, Caroline A., "Structuring the Peace: Negotiated Settlements and the Construction of Conflict Management Institutions," T. David Mason and James D. Meernik (ed.), *Conflict Prevention and Peace-building in Post-War Societies: Sustaining the Peace*, London: Routledge, 2006, 31-52; Harbom, Lotta, Högbladh, Stina and Wallensteen, Peter, "Armed Conflict and Peace Agreements," *Journal of Peace Research*, 43(5): 617-631; Brandt, Patrick T., Mason, T. David, Gurses, Mehmet and Radin, Dagmar, "When and How the Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil Wars," *Defence and Peace Economics*, 19:6 (2008), pg. 415-434; Fortna, Virginia A., "Does Peace-keeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly*, 48 (2004), pg. 269-292.

19 Wallensteen, Peter and Sollenberg, Margareta, "Armed Conflicts, Conflict Termination and Peace Agreements, 1989-1996," *Journal of Peace Research*, 34:3 (1997), pg. 339-358; Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas, "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis," *The American Political Science Review*, 94:4 (2000), pg. 779-801; Lake, David and Rothchild, Donald, "Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict," *International Security*, 21:2 (1996), pg. 41-75; Sambanis, Nicholas, "Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45:3 (2011), pg. 259-282.

in Europe, Americas, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The dynamics of an internal conflict in a state are directly affected by conflicts in neighboring countries, the physical and intellectual spread of conflicts, especially if the neighboring countries support such conflicts.

It can be said that the above-mentioned international and trans-border/regional context is rather potent in the Kurdish conflict.²⁰ Today there is a widespread acceptance that the ongoing civil wars in Iraq and Syria are proxy-wars for global and regional powers. International Coalition forces, led by the United States with the participation of some EU countries, have been directly involved in both Iraq and Syria, especially in the war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). Russia openly supports the Assad regime in Syria by directly participating in the ongoing war, both militarily and politically. The two regional powers, Turkey and Iran, interfere militarily and politically in the ongoing wars both in Syria and in Iraq. Moreover, it is also worth noting that such regional powers as Qatar and Saudi Arabia have participated in the war in Syria. In a nutshell, it can be said that international and regional dynamics do not provide a supportive context for resolution and reconciliation in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.

It can be argued that along with changes in the regional and international equation, changes in Iraq and Syria brought ruptures in the geopolitical equation of the Kurdish issue which had decisive effects on the failure of the Resolution Process. Kurds live under the political domination of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Despite the political division, Kurds inhabit a trans-border, integrated and consistent geographic area. Moreover, the socio-political status of each Kurdish region influences each other at the level of both states and Kurdish political actors. In 2003, Kurds attempted to build political and administrative systems in Iraq and succeeded in the construction of the KRI, a kind of semi-state.²¹ Today, the political leadership of KRI is in pursuit of an independent Kurdish state.

20 Coşkun, *Ibid*, pg. 48; Bayramoğlu, pg. 50-22; 77-85; Yeğen, Mesut, "The Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey: Genesis, Evolution and Prospects," *Global Turkey in Europe*, Working Paper 11, May 2015; Ozkahrman, Cemal, "Failure of Peace Talks between Turkey and the PKK: Victim of Traditional Turkish Policy or of Geopolitical Shifts in the Middle East?," *Contemporary Review of the Middle East*, 4:1(2017), pg. 1-17.

21 Ozdemir Kiran, Merve, *Construire Un Etat, Briser Des Tabous: Les Hommes D'affaires de Turquie Entre La Construction Étatique Du Gouvernement Régional Du Kurdistan (GRK) et La Politique Étranger de la Turquie*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Paris, Institut d'Etudes Politique de Paris (Sciences Po.), 2013.

Since 2012, Syrian Kurds have been building socio-political, administrative, socio-economic and military administrations in their regions. Unlike in KRI, PYD and People's Protection Units (*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel* - YPG) which assumed the political and military leadership of the Kurdish region of Syria are KCK's sister organizations.²² Moreover, Syrian Kurds speak the Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish which is spoken by the majority of Turkey's Kurds. Finally, it is worth noting that despite political borders, geographical conditions significantly facilitate social and economic relations between Kurds in Syria and Turkey.

The *de facto* autonomy announced in 2012 in three small settlements like Cizîr, Kobanê, and Efrîn, spread to a wide geographical area throughout the Resolution Process. After the geographical unification of the cantons of Kobanê and Cizîr in June 2015, today the Syrian Kurds are seeking to unite the Efrîn canton with the cantons of Kobanê and Cizîr and to build a federal region. Throughout the Resolution Process, Turkey was faced with "the risk" of the emergence of even if not politically, but geographically united "Kurdistan" extending from the Iranian border to Hatay, possibly the Mediterranean. The construction of such a geographical area would interrupt a millennium-long Arab and Islamic geography of Turkey. The AK Party, which had consistently declared that it would not allow in Northern Syria under KCK's administration to build a "state" like KRI, in August 2016 directly intervened in the Syrian war. It was a joined intervention with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in the Jerablus region between Efrîn and Kobanê cantons aimed at establishing the safe-haven region. It is worth noting that being on the opposite sides of Syrian politics, the likelihood of a military conflict between Turkey and PYD/YPG was not insignificant. It can be argued that the ruptures in the geopolitical equation of the Kurdish due to changes that took place in Iraq and Syria in recent years had a decisive influence on the Resolution Process.

One can argue that both the AK Party government and the leading Kurdish movement pursued politics on a transnational scale and treated the Resolution Process as a part of their regional politics. Hence the dialogue process was shaped by regional developments for both sides. The constant change of regional dynamics and the domination of an ambiguity, in general, pushed the process into uncertainty. As a matter of

22 International Crisis Group, *The PKK's Fateful Choice in Northern Syria*, Middle East Report No. 176, 04.05.2017; International Crisis Group, *Syria's Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle*, Middle East Report No. 136, 22.01.2013; International Crisis Group, *Flight of Icarus? The PYD's Precarious Rise in Syria*, Middle East Report No. 151, 08.05.2014.

fact, what was going on through the process was “process management” based on “crisis management,” the main strategy of the government. On the other hand, the leading Kurdish movement largely focused on Rojava and run “process management” similar to that of the AK Party government.

3.2. Security dilemma and the crisis of existence

Secondly, the security dilemma of the parties and the crisis of survival they faced - together with mutual mistrust - were not overcome during the Resolution Process. The studies show that the security dilemma has an important place in the conflict resolution and reconciliation processes.²³ The provision of guarantees to ensure the security of the parties during the post-conflict peace period and creating institutional arrangements to render it possible play a critical role in the peace process. In this respect, it can be said that power-sharing plays a key role in transcending the security dilemma.²⁴ The work of C. Hartzell and his colleagues shows that peace treaties based on military, political, economic and territorial power-sharing are both more possible and more permanent.²⁵ Accordingly, institutions play a critical role in conflict resolution, and with “only building institutionalized solutions” the security dilemma faced by the parties can be overcome and peaceful and cooperative relations can be built in society.²⁶

In the Resolution Process, no power-sharing mechanism could be built on the KCK side to overcome the security dilemma. In this case, the parties could establish a normative framework that would guide the future process. What is worse, the assassination in Paris of Fidan Doğan and activist Leyla Şaylemez, the representatives of the Kurdistan National Congress (*Kongreya Neteweyî ya Kurdistanê*- KNK) a week before the start of the Resolution Process and the murder of Sakine Cansız, one of the senior executives of the KCK created a major security crisis.

23 Hartzell, 1999, *Ibid*

24 Maynes, Charles, W. “Containing Ethnic Conflict,” *Foreign Policy*, 90 (1993), pg. 3-21.

25 Hartzell, 1999, *Ibid.*; Hartzell, Caroline A. and Hoddie, Matthew, “Civil War Settlements and the Implementation of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements,” *Journal of Peace Research*, 40:3 (2003), pg. 303-320; Hartzell, Caroline, Hoddie, Matthew and Rothchild, Donald, “Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variable,” *International Organization*, 55:1 (2001), pg. 183-208.

26 Hartzell, 1999, *Ibid*.

On the other hand, there was a significant security and existential crisis in the AK Party government. The AK Party government faced three major challenges in the Resolution Process. Of these, the first one undoubtedly was the Gezi protests that took place during May-June 2013 period. In an unprecedented manner in Turkey's history, economic, social, cultural and political discontent with the AK Party government spilled onto streets in almost all cities and lasted for a month. According to the Ministry of Interior, 2.5 million people participated in the Gezi protests in 79 provinces, 4,900 people were taken into custody, nearly 4,000 people were injured.²⁷ The AK Party saw the Gezi protests as a total attack on itself, even as a coup attempt.

Secondly, it is necessary to talk about the dissociation and conflict with the Gülenist Organization, one of the strongest coalition partners of the AK Party. With the direction of the Gülenist Organization, MİT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan was summoned to testify²⁸ and the corruption operations of 17-25 December 2013 against the government were carried. In response, the government initiated a major operation against the Organization, which it described as a "parallel state structure." As a matter of fact, the July 15, 2016 coup attempt and the following OHAL appeared in large scale as the results of this conflict.

Thirdly, it is necessary to mention the Kobanê protests on October 6-8, 2014. As a result of protests in almost all of the Kurdish cities where protesters occupied the streets, 46 people died and the government lost control in many cities.²⁹ Kobanê demonstrations, a much rougher version of the Gezi protests, took place on a regional scale, and the events only ended upon Öcalan's call. In a nutshell, the Resolution Process coincided with the restructuring of the politics and the state,³⁰ and the increasing

27 Radikal, "Gezi Eylemlerinin Bilançosu Açıklandı," *Radikal*, 23.06.2013, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/gezi_eylemlerinin_bilancosu_aciklandi-1138770 Accessed: 15.02.2015.

28 Al Jazeera Türk, "MİT'e İfade Daveti," *Al Jazeera Türk*, 08.02.2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/mite-ifade-daveti>, Accessed: 11.07.2015.

29 For a detailed report on events related to Kobane resistance and solidarity see İnsan Hakları Derneği, "Kobane Direnişi ile Dayanışma Kapsamında Yapılan Eylem ve Etkinliklere Müdahale Sonucu Meydana Gelen Hak İhlalleri Raporu (2-12 Ekim 2014)," *İnsan Hakları Derneği*, <http://ihd.org.tr/index.php/raporlar-mainmenu-86/el-raporlar-mainmenu-90/2888-kobane-direnisi-ile-dayanisma-kapsaminda-yapilan-eylem-ve-etkinliklere-mudahale-sonucu-meydana-gelen-hak-ihlalleri-raporu-2-12-ekim-2014.html>, Accessed: 15.02.2015.

30 Radikal, "Kandil: Hükümet Algı Yönetimiyle Zaman Harcıyor," *Radikal*, 15.02.2015, http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/hdpden_kandil_aciklamasi-1293905, Accessed: 15.02.2015.

power struggles within the state and the government's worry to stay in power which made the basis of the process very fragile.

Finally, in the context of the security dilemma, the effect of the elections must be underlined. It is seen that the elections in the Resolution Process had a decisive impact on the beginning and the end of the dialogue period, as in the ceasefires in the 1990s, the İmralı and Oslo Processes.³¹ The crisis which ended the process and happened after the Dolmabahçe meeting should be viewed together with the 7 June 2015 elections. Both sides of the Resolution Process, the AK Party, and HDP faced a tough competitive discourse during the election period. As a matter of fact, HDP built its campaign around the saying "We will not make you president (Erdogan)" in the elections, received a vote of 13,02% and entered the parliament with 80 MPs. At the same time, the AK Party under Erdogan's leadership who in the period running up to the elections expressed dislike for such words as Dolmabahçe meeting, "negotiations," "agreement," "table," "third party" lost a considerable number of votes. The "presidential system" that formed the center of Erdoğan's election campaign did not find a positive response in the society. As a result of the HDP's surpassing the 10% threshold, the AK Party under Erdoğan's leadership did not gain the qualified majority in the parliament that would enable the "presidential system," on the other hand, after 13 years of single-party government experience, it could not achieve even the majority that would allow forming a government.

3.3. Problematic institutional structure of the Resolution Process

Third, the institutional structure of the Resolution Process was quite problematic. Resolution Process lacked clarity and accountability that would allow for public scrutiny and democratic control. This closed institutional structure in terms of parties reduced "audience costs"³² on the international and domestic scale. There were no mechanisms to allow the participation of social actors such as opposition parties, social movements, non-governmental organizations outside the AK Party government and the leading Kurdish movement.³³

31 Coşkun, *Ibid*, pg. 39-42; Bayramoğlu, *Ibid*, pg. 72-76; Yeğen, *Ibid*.

32 Fortna, *Ibid*.

33 Çiçek, Cuma, *15 Temmuz Sonrası Kürt Meselesi ve Sivil Toplum: Diyalog ve Uzlaşım İmkânları*, Mart 2017, İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi, http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CumaCicek_15TemmuzSonrasiSivilToplum.pdf, Accessed: 11.04.2017.

These initiatives were limited to the work of the Wise Persons Delegation, which held a limited number of meetings in seven regions of the country. There was no mechanism that would put pressure neither on the AK Party nor on the leading Kurdish movement or would force parties to sit by the negotiation table and follow commitments. The Resolution Process has largely been a dialogue and negotiation process between a limited number of high-level representatives of the AK Party government and of the leading Kurdish movement. Finally, three structural mistakes must be underlined: the ineffective use of time, extreme ambiguity and the non-fulfillment of commitments.³⁴

3.4. The role of third parties

Fourth, there was no domestic or international, non-state or third-state based actor in the Resolution Process which could play the role of a facilitator, mediator, controller, or pressure maker in order to increase the “audience costs.” Some studies show that a statistically significant relationship cannot be established between the successful outcome of conflict resolution and reconciliation processes and the involvement of third parties, and they underline the critical role of domestic institutions.³⁵ However, some studies show that multilateral and multidimensional third-party participation³⁶ has significantly increased the success of peacebuilding.³⁷ In fact, a third-party participation was one of the most important discussion topics among the parties in the Resolution Process.³⁸ One of the most important headlines, the “Observation Delegation” crisis that came to the agenda in the context of a third-party issue, caused flipping the table after the Dolmabahçe press conference, which was the last meeting of the process. In March 21, 2015, Newroz statement Öcalan conditioned the organization of a disarmament congress on the establishment of the Observation Delegation (and Truth

34 Çiçek and Coşkun, *Ibid*.

35 Dubey, Amitabh, “Domestic Institutions and the Duration of Civil War Settlement,” *Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association*, 24-27 Mart, 2002, New Orleans.

36 For details on differences of conflicting parties' roles of the third parties and roles that could be played by the third parties in conflict resolution see Beriker, Nimet, “Uyuşmazlıkların Barışçıl Çözümü ve Liberal Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı: Dış Siyaset Araçlarına Bütüncül bir Yaklaşım,” Nimet Beriker (ed.), *Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya: Kuramlar, Süreçler ve Uygulamalar*, İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009: 1-31.

37 Doyle and Sambanis, *Ibid*; Fortna, *Ibid*.

38 IMC, 22.12.2014, *Ibid*; SETA, *Ibid*.; Coşkun, *Ibid*, pg. 34-39.

and Accountability Commission),³⁹ but President Erdoğan explained that he had no knowledge of the Observation Delegation and did not view it positively.⁴⁰

At this point, it should be noted that the third-party issue should not be reduced only to the third actors who will participate in the negotiations. Another critical issue, at least as important, was the lack of mechanisms to make public control and pressure possible, as mentioned above. The distance of the leading media in Turkey from a critical and independent attitude, the ability to make the process familiar to the public, the absence of a strong peace movement able to exert pressure on the parties and negative attitude of the main opposition party to the process are elements related to the third-party issues.

3.5. The deep gap between political agendas

Fifth, it is necessary to underline the profound gap between the parties' political agendas.⁴¹ In the Resolution Process, the leading Kurdish movement demanded a local and pluralistic democracy based on autonomous regions or localities. The pluralist (ethnic/national, linguistic, religious/sectarian) identity politics, multi-dimensional power-sharing and the decentralization of state power were the three main pillars of the political agenda of the leading Kurdish movement. On the other hand, the AK Party's solution proposal was based mainly on non-political limited administrative decentralization and recognition of individual cultural rights.

In general, the Turkish right, and in particular the AK Party's limits as to the management of the Kurdish issue, constituted a considerable obstacle to the Resolution Process. At this point, it is necessary to underline the three basic characteristics of the Turkish right-wing politics: (1) the exclusionist and homogenous identity politics, (2) the monopoly of power, and (3) the re-centralization of state power. It can be argued that in addition to these three critical qualities of the Turkish right-wing politics, the AK Party's own limitations, which have emerged from the inside of the Turkish right-wing politics, and both culturally and politically socialized within it,

39 T24, "İşte Öcalan'ın Tarihi Newroz Mektubunun Türkçe Tam Metni," *T24 Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi*, 21.03.2015.

40 Hürriyet, "Erdoğan'dan İzleme Heyeti Açıklaması," *Hürriyet*, 20.03.2015.

41 Coşkun, *Ibid*, pg. 45; Bayramoğlu, *Ibid*, pg. 50-52; 59-62; 77-78; Yeğen, *Ibid*.

were obstacles to creating a comprehensive and inclusive solution to the Kurdish issue. In this respect, we must underline three basic limitations: (1) ideological, (2) intellectual, and (3) administrative limitations. The ideological boundaries largely refer to the relation between Islamism and Turkish nationalism and the limitations of managing ethnic/national pluralism as in the Kurdish issue. Intellectual limitations, in fact, point to the limitations of the AK Party intelligentsia with regard to the concept of the ethnic/national issue, in particular, dimensions of the Kurdish issue. Finally, administrative limitations highlight the weakness of the AK Party government's ability to manage the economic, social, cultural, political, administrative and military dimensions of the Kurdish conflict.

3.6. The influence of the Turkish nationalist opposition

Sixth, the opposition which relies on Turkish nationalism that in Turkey shelters different political groups, was quite influential in the failure of the process. Even if the AK Party took up Turkish nationalism, throughout the Process, Gülenist Organization, ultra-nationalists, the MHP and the CHP main factions followed an anti-process politics with a nationalist rhetoric. This situation constituted the Resolution Process an obstacle impossible to ignore.

The AK Party during Resolution Process, while in search of a compromise with the leading Kurdish movement, was in a serious conflict with the Gülenist Organization. The conflict between the parties started with the cram schools (*dershane*) crisis, the 17-25 December anti-corruption operations, and the summoning of MIT Undersecretary Hakan Fidan to testify within the scope of KCK operations. The conflict continued until the coup attempt that took place on 15 July 2016. The great majority of the military personnel, including the 2nd Army Commander Adem Hududi, who led the operations in the cities which intensified after the failure of the Resolution Process, is now on trial for participating in the 15 July coup attempt. There is widespread conviction that these clashes contributed to bringing again the army to the fore and establishing a suitable ground for the coup in the country.⁴²

As much as the Gülenist Organization, the MHP systematically voiced a very strong opposition to the Resolution Process. For example, the MHP Chair in reference to the Dolmabahçe meeting described the Resolution

42 Çiçek, 2017, *Ibid.*

Process as a “betrayal process” by comparing it to the Treaty of Sèvres:⁴³

They also called the Treaty of Sèvres peace and everybody knew that it would bring a hell to the Turkish nation. [...] 10-point betrayal text; is a declaration of denial of its [the Turkish Republic] existence, it's a document of the collapse of the Turkish Republic. This is not a statement of intention, but a manifestation of ignorance of the blessings. The betrayal accord announced on February 28, 2015, is the same as the conditions of the 25 articles of Armistice signed on October 30, 1918, in Mudros.

Like the MHP, the CHP also opposed the Resolution Process. However, CHP, which defined the Resolution Process as a “bargaining process” between the government and Öcalan, unlike the MHP, took up the demands for “social peace.” As an alternative to the “bargaining process” between the government and Öcalan, the Parliament was proposed as a mechanism in which all the parties would participate. CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu at a press conference explained their attitude towards of the Kurdish issue and why they did not support the Resolution Process as follows:⁴⁴

Since the AKP is in bargain that our people will not accept, it excluded the Grand National Assembly and, is in cooperation with Öcalan/Qandil, it runs the process unilaterally and afar from political responsibility. It is not possible for the CHP to be a partner in such a bargain without the knowledge and will of our people.

The CHP addressed the Parliament regarding the method by proposing for the solution of the Kurdish issue, the recognition of individual cultural rights such as the learning of the mother tongue and general democratization.

Ultra-nationalists, who are another important frontline of Turkish nationalism and have a considerable power in both the CHP and the MHP, also held a stern opposition to the Resolution Process. On the most radical fringes of this front and one of the symbolic figures, Doğu Perinçek, the Chair of the Patriotic Party, considered the Resolution

43 İnternet Haber, “Devlet Bahçeli’den çok sert çözüm süreci açıklaması,” *İnternet Haber*, 03.03.2015, <http://www.internethaber.com/devlet-bahceliden-cok-sert-cozum-sureci-aciklamasi-76994oh.htm>, Accessed: 18.08.2017.

44 T24, “Kılıçdaroğlu’ndan çözüm sürecine destek vermemelerinin 4 nedeni,” *T24 Bağımsız İnternet Gazetesi*, 10.05.2017, <http://t24.com.tr/haber/kilicdaroglundan-cozum-sureci-aciklamasi,229601>, Accessed: 18.08.2017.

Process as part of the “Kurdistan Plan of the United States”: “The US’s so-called ‘Kurdistan’ plan required the legalization of the PKK, its inclusion in the Parliament, the declaration of ‘autonomy’, the abolition of the municipalities in the Southeast and the removal of the Turkish nation from the constitution.”⁴⁵ According to Perinçek who believed that the PKK could only be suppressed with the state’s weapons: “Resolution (process) didn’t work, couldn’t have worked. No power, even if in power, couldn’t conduct a policy to divide Turkey. AK Party’s power abandoned the ‘resolution’ policy and toed the line.”⁴⁶

To sum up, Turkish nationalism that united different Turkey’s political movements built a potent opposition against the Resolution Process. Nationalism is part not only of political groups in Turkey but is also accepted by the majority of the Turkish society and considerably determines political preferences to the extent that it created an important pressure on the AK Party with regard to the Resolution Process. Together with the AK Party’s own limitations and the relationship it established with Turkish nationalism, this pressure was effective and played an important role in the failure of the process.

3.7. AK Party’s limitations: Resolution Process Alla Turca

Seventh, the limited resolution proposal presented by the AK Party had a significant effect on the failure of the Resolution Process. The basic qualities of the Turkish right pointed out above, and the limitations of the AK Party which has matured within it, have led the government to the construction of a “national” and “domestic” resolution process. It can be argued that the government had two main objectives of a “national” and “domestic” resolution process. First, with such a resolution process, the government tried to purge the negotiation process and its mechanisms from international actors. The transnational and international character of the Kurdish issue became visible to the extent incomparable with the past after the trans-national domination established by ISIL in the Syrian and Iraqi lands, and especially after the attack on Kobanê and Erbil. The scale of the problem in great measure went beyond the nation-states. In addition, with the resistance shown in Kobanê against ISIL, the Rojava Kurds, the PYD, its military wing YPG and the Women’s Defense Units (*Yekîneyên Parastina Jin* - YPJ) gained international attention. In this

45 Perinçek, Doğu, “AKP, CHP ve Vatan Partisi’nin PKK siyasetleri,” *Aydınlık*, 10.09.2016, <https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/akp-chp-ve-vatan-partisinin-pkk-siyasetleri>, Accessed: 18.08.2017.

46 Perinçek, *Ibid*.

period the direct relationship established by the organization with the governments of the USA, Russia, and France and strongly voiced demands and suggestions of the US mediation, increased AK Party's concerns and pushed it to seek "national" and "domestic" solution.

Secondly, through such a resolution process the AK Party government aimed at clearing the negotiation agenda from international norms, thus developing a "national" and "domestic" negotiation agenda and a unique solution model. The AK Party government planned to exclude norms and assumptions that had emerged from peace and reconciliation processes in different times and places and were internationally known. With a minimalist approach, it tried to narrow the negotiation agenda. Taking into account the conflict areas discussed in the previous sections, it can be argued that the government intended to keep out of this negotiation agenda the model of solutions based on status as power-sharing in an administrative and political sense and autonomy with collective cultural/linguistic rights.

3.8. The limitations of the leading Kurdish movement

Eighth, as much as the limitations of the AK Party government, the limitations of the leading Kurdish movement have led to the failure of the Resolution Process. In general, it can be argued that the leading Kurdish movement has failed to manage the Resolution Process. The AK Party government has built a coordinated, compatible, complete, and consistent discourse and institutional structure of the Resolution Process. The centralized nature of the AK Party tradition and the strong unrivaled political leadership of Erdoğan played an important role in this issue. On the other hand, the leading Kurdish movement remained divided, at times inconsistent and incomplete. At this point, apart from the leader of the movement, Öcalan, imprisoned on the İmralı island, there were at least three main power centers comprising of multiple networks of legal Kurdish politics in Turkey, Europe, and Qandil that were instrumental in shaping this problematic position. Even just the concerns voiced by some of the People's Democratic Party (HDP) MPs that the HDP is a postman between İmralı and Qandil,⁴⁷ were enough to show that the leading Kurdish movement cannot build a balanced and healthy negotiation mechanism between different power centers. Especially in terms of

47 Haberler.com, "Altan Tan, Partisini Eleştirdi: Postacı Olmamalıydık," *Haberler.com*, 29.01.2015, <http://www.haberler.com/altan-tan-partisini-elestirdi-postaci-6915565-haber/> Accessed: 20.02.2017.

the leading Kurdish movement and social groups it is based on, the Resolution Process became so fragile that it had an effect on the actors running the process so that they could not build a healthy mechanism. As a matter of fact, this troubled position played a remarkable role in the failure of the process and in the gradually decreasing belief in peace among the Kurdish public.

In addition, the problem with not internalizing the process by the public stemmed from the elitist and exclusionary institutional structure of the process, which was present in the Kurdish sphere as much as in the Turkish.⁴⁸ The leading Kurdish movement could not transform the Resolution Process into a process that would build consensus and would make the Kurdish issue be discussed by the street and different social groups.⁴⁹ However, the Resolution Process offered tremendous opportunities for the solution to the problem in the Kurdish area, for disseminating the conditions of peace and reconciliation, and for building a consensus among different Kurdish political groups.

3.9. Transformation problems of Kurdish politics

At this point, lastly, it can be argued that the Kurdish politics in Turkey, including the leading Kurdish movement, experienced remarkable transformation problems. The leading Kurdish movement could not reconstruct itself in accordance with the post-conflict turnaround. Drawing on the center-periphery theory in political science, it can be claimed that the leading Kurdish movement with Öcalan-KCK was the center and legal Kurdish politics were in the periphery. While the “referential actor,” as conceptualized by Hamit Bozarslan,⁵⁰ determined basic strategies and the ideological and political tendency of the movement, the legal Kurdish politics occupying the periphery, became the “representative actor” which bore socio-political framework determined mainly by the center.⁵¹

48 The concepts of “Kurdish space” (*espace kurde*) or “Kurdish sphere” (*sphere kurde*) developed by Jean-François Pérouse are used in this work. These concepts draw attention to changing and flowing geographical, cultural, economic and political limitations of the Kurdish mobilization. Pérouse, Jean-François, “Reposer la ‘question kurde,’” Semih Vaner (der.), *La Turquie*, Paris, Fayard, 2005, pg. 357-387.

49 Çiçek, 2017, *Ibid*.

50 Casier, Marlies and Grojean, Olivier, “Between Integration, Autonomization and Radicalization. Hamit Bozarslan on the Kurdish Movement and the Turkish Left,” *European Journal of Turkish Studies (Online)* No. 14 (2012). <http://ejts.revues.org/4663>

51 For a detailed discussion of the matter see. Çiçek, Cuma, *Ulus, Din, Sınıf: Türkiye’de Kürt Muta-*

The Kurdish opposition based on a massive sociopolitical mobilization has undergone three major transformations since the beginning of the local administration experience of the leading legal Kurdish parties in 1999: it became greatly (1) urbanized (2) legalized and (3) institutionalized. Nevertheless, the power relations within the leading Kurdish movement did not undergo an appropriate transformation in accordance with this new situation and remained within the center-periphery relation determined by the conflict period. The electoral successes that HDP had shown since 2014, especially the election success of June 7, 2015, offered significant opportunities to the leading Kurdish movement to reorganize itself. The leading Kurdish movement could have changed roles within itself by moving peripheral legal Kurdish politics to the center and central actors to the periphery, and could have completely sidelined them in the post-conflict period and, maybe, have incorporated them into legal Kurdish politics. However, neither the leading Kurdish movement nor the AK Party government took this opportunity.

The problems of the transformation of Kurdish politics are not limited to the leading Kurdish movement. At this point, it should be noted that there is a problem of public space in which an opposition and critical thinking can develop within Kurdish politics. It is difficult to talk about a significant opposition party or a political group that could exert democratic pressure on the Kurdish movement in Turkey. Although there are six political movements that see the political resolution of the Kurdish issue in a federal solution, the vast majority of these structures lack a social base, are fragmented within themselves, and have a limited capacity to cooperate. In addition, the vast majority of non-governmental organizations are either politically tied to the leading Kurdish movement or to the ruling party. Kurdish media, like non-governmental organizations, have similar political engagement. In Kurdish public opinion, as in general in Turkey, it is difficult to speak of a powerful media that would be independent, critical and focused on the public interest. Finally, it is necessary to note the weakness of critical debate in the public sphere. The Kurdish sphere is devoid of critical academy and intelligentsia. In brief, despite the considerable changes in the social base, problems in opposition parties, civil society, the media, and academia/intelligentsia remain important obstacles to the transformation of Kurdish politics.

bakatinın İnşası, İstanbul, İletişim, 2015.

4. From the Resolution Process until today: New conflict process

The factors discussed above led to the failure of the Resolution Process, which had created great hopes for the settlement of the Kurdish issue through political means and the construction of social consensus after a period of 30 years of conflict. In July 2015 violent clashes renewed and, on the one hand, caused many deaths, socio-economic and spatial destruction due to increasing violence, on the other hand, they gave rise to socio-political consequences that profoundly affect the future of Turkey's Kurdish issue.

The new fighting caused significant loss of lives incomparable to the past. Unlike in the previous combats, between 24 July 2015 and 23 May 2016 as a result of the intensifying clashes in the urban areas, according to official figures, 4,949 KCK members and 483 security forces lost their lives.⁵² According to the report of TİHV, between 16 August 2015 and 16 August 2016 "11 confirmed non-stop day-long curfews were imposed in a total of 9 provinces, and in at least 35 districts."⁵³ According to the 2014 census, approximately 1.7 million people living in the areas in question were affected by these curfews. 79 children, 71 women and 30 people over 60 years old, at least 321 civilian lives were lost in the clashes. In addition, there were large-scale urban destructions in 11 districts affected by the violence. Health Minister M. Mezzinoglu said on 27 February 2016 that 355 thousand citizens were displaced due to urban violence. Taking into account the results of the conflicts in Şırnak, Mardin-Nusaybin and Hakkâri-Yüksekova that started after the statement of the Minister, it is estimated that around 500 thousand citizens were displaced as a result of fights in urban conflicts. In addition, major cities such as Ankara, Istanbul, Kayseri, and Diyarbakir suffered from incomparable with the past large-scale bomb attacks.

All that happened did not just terminate the Resolution Process, but also undermined the socio-political conditions that had arisen since 1999 which offered great opportunities for the political resolution of the Kurdish issue and was a blow to the institutional accumulation that had

52 Doğan Haber Ajansı, "24 Temmuz 2015 Tarihinden İtibaren 7078 PKK'lı Terörist Etkisiz Hale Getirildi," *Doğan Haber Ajansı*, 23.5.2016, http://www.dha.com.tr/24-temmuz-2015-tarihinden-itikbaren-7078-pkkli-terorist-etkisiz-hale-getirildi_1235053.html, Accessed: 06.03.2017.

53 Tekin, Edip, "355 Bin Kişi Terörden Göç Etti," *Hürriyet*, 27.02.2016, <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/355-bin-kisi-terorden-goc-etti-40061270>, Accessed: 06.03.2017.

taken place. Firstly, people's hope and belief in the solution of the Kurdish issue through peaceful democratic means took a great toll. Secondly, as the dialogue and negotiating possibilities between different social and political groups was strengthened in the Resolution Process, resuming conflicts deepened these divisions. Thirdly, the political and civic sphere, which would play a key role in the development of democratic peaceful settlement and an opportunity for the eradication of conflict base in the Kurdish issue, were hit hard. As demonstrated by the success of the HDP in the post-2014 elections, the political and social sphere, which had expanded considerably in the Resolution Process, narrowed considerably. Fourthly, the contraction in these two spheres removed the "gray areas," which had important functions in the conflict resolution. The actors involved in these areas and having the capacity to talk with both parties were silenced and forced to take a side. Fifth, the blow to the political sphere, civil society, and gray areas, caused the silence of the street. This situation reduced citizens' confidence in politicians and political institution's solution making function. Finally, the direct involvement of a great deal of youth in the combat and the direct impact of fighting on nearly two million citizens significantly increased social militarization. In brief, the intensifying resumed fighting made achieving the Kurdish peace, the political resolution of the Kurdish issue and the social consensus more difficult than before the Resolution Process.⁵⁴

The military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, caused a second socio-political earthquake after the conflicts intensified in urban areas. The coup attempt, which created a deep security crisis in both the society and the state, and OHAL declared in its aftermath, created serious damage in the democratic accumulation of the country. With the closure of hundreds of media outlets and civil society organizations and the expulsion of thousands of academics from the public institutions, freedom of association, freedom of thought and expression, already limited, ceased to exist.⁵⁵ In this period, the legal leading Kurdish politics faced the institutional risk of being eliminated due to lifting of the immunity of the MPs and the arrests of the HDP parliamentarians, among them, two co-chairs; the arrest of nearly all of the mayors of the Democratic Regions Party (DBP) and the appointment of trustees in their places; arrests

54 For more detailed discussion of this matter see Çiçek and Coşkun, *Ibid.*

55 Commissioner For Human Rights, "Memorandum on Freedom of Expression and Media Freedom in Turkey," Council of Europe, CommDH (2017) 5, 15.02.2017, <https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=2961658&SecMode=1&DocId=2397056&Usage=2>, Accessed: 16.02.2017.

counted in thousands; closure of media outlets and non-governmental organizations.

There is a mutually determining relation between the shift of the Kurdish issue in Turkey towards violence, the coup attempt and practices of OHAL. Beyond that, considering world experiences, the collapse of the area of legal politics and the public sphere increases the risk of strengthening the tendencies towards a mutual radicalization of the Kurdish issue. As a result of the ongoing civil wars in Iraq and Syria, unlike in the past, the radicalizing violence that gained urban character bears a potential for growth.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter discusses the Resolution Process, taking into account the common tendencies of intra-state conflicts happening in different times and places, and argues that the structural dynamics as well as the ruptures that existed in three areas laid the groundwork for the Resolution Process: (1) fighting intensified after the KCK's new strategy that aimed at creating "liberated regions" through "revolutionary people's war," (2) the death fasts that started in prisons, and the remarkable socio-political mobilizations they brought to the streets, and (3) second major change in the geopolitical equation of the Kurdish issue after the Syrian Civil War.

The Resolution process which publicly begun in January 2013 by the triggering of these three ruptures, had significant differences comparing with the previous dialogue initiatives. First of all, the process was carried out at a certain level of public disclosure. Secondly, even though it was not officially declared, the ceasefire was actually observed bilaterally. Thirdly, though to a limited extent, the Wise Persons Delegation made the process known to the public. Finally, the laws adopted by the parliament provided a legal framework for the process. Despite all the problematic aspects of the promulgated law, the establishment of a legal framework was important for both public openness and institutionalization of the process and continuity of the process.

Despite these positive aspects, the parties could not build a consensus on the main issues. Four problem areas came to the forefront in the Resolution Process: (1) the mechanisms and actors of the negotiation

process, (2) the scope of the negotiation agenda and reforms, (3) the withdrawal of the KCK's armed forces and finally (4) the cross-border dimension of the Kurdish conflict, the Syrian Kurdish region in particular. The government and the leading Kurdish movement had not reached a consensus on these four issues and the process failed.

There are nine dynamics that undermined the process and caused it to fail: (1) cross-border and international dynamics and the new geopolitical equation, (2) security dilemma and the crisis of existence, (3) problematic institutional structure of the Resolution Process ,(4) the role of third parties, (5) the deep gap between political agendas, (6) the influence of the Turkish nationalist opposition, (7) AK Party's limitations: Resolution Process *Alla Turca* , (8) the limitations of the leading Kurdish movement, and (9) transformation problems of Kurdish politics.

The international experiences detailed in the second chapter propose to look at three levels of factors in conflict resolution and social reconciliation: (1) cross-border/regional and international equations, (2) structural dynamics at the country level and (3) actor-based dynamics. Taking these dynamics into account, the next two chapters deal with basic determinants of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, and the possibilities and limits of a return to negotiations.

7

TURKEY'S KURDISH ISSUE AND THE KURDISH CONFLICT: BASIC PARAMETERS

The Resolution Process, which is the most important initiative in terms of termination of the Kurdish conflict and the construction of peace, has failed. Clashes intensified in the urban areas since July 2015, the July 15 coup attempt and the subsequent implementation of the OHAL made the conflict resolution and building a compromise on the Kurdish issue more difficult than before. Before moving onto a discussion of the termination of the conflict in Turkey and the possibilities and limitations of a return to a new negotiation process that will make peacebuilding possible, main characteristics of the Kurdish conflict need to be examined.

In the second chapter, which deals with international experience, the dynamics that determine the process of reconciliation and consensus building were classified at three levels: (1) cross-border/regional and international dynamics, (2) structural dynamics at the country level and (3) actor-based dynamics. In the context of the first group of dynamics, the international forces involved in the conflict, the socio-political situation of the region in which the conflict occurred, and the influence of the neighboring countries were highlighted. Within the scope of the second group of dynamics, the level of socioeconomic development of the country, the level of democracy, whether the conflict is ethnic or religious-identity based, ethnic composition of the state and the power relations between ethnic groups, geographical features of the conflict area, the population and the diaspora were discussed. Finally, the third group of dynamics which consists of the actor-dependent variables such as the third-party involvement, cost of conflicts, the duration of conflicts, state capacity, political subjectivity, power-sharing is examined.

In this chapter, the main features of the Kurdish conflict are presented, taking into account the three levels of the main parameters the international experience reveals about conflict resolution and consensus building. In this context, firstly, the cross-border and international context of the Kurdish issue and conflict is addressed. Secondly, the structural characteristics at the country level in which the actors cannot

intervene or change in the short run are examined. Finally, the dynamics of the Kurdish conflict related to the actors are analyzed.

1. The Kurdish issue: Cross-border/regional and international parameters

The Kurdish issue is both an international and cross-border/regional problem. The socio-political situation of the Kurds living under the political sovereignty of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria was determined mostly after the WWI through a direct intervention by the global actors of that period. The lands inhabited by the Kurds for centuries served as a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Safavid states.¹ The Kurdish emirates maintained their existence² as semi-independent socio-political territories, despite all attempts by the Ottomans to establish a direct rule.³ In the 19th century, the Kurdish emirates were dismantled as a result of centralization policies developed in the Ottoman modernization process.⁴ The Ottoman centralization policies were largely completed with the abolition of the Botan Emirate, the last Kurdish emirate ruled by Bedr Khan Bey, in 1847.⁵ These territorial centralization policies further hardened with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey as a nation-state in 1923 on the remains of the Ottoman Empire.

In the studies on the Kurdish issue, this process is often referred to as the starting point. Mesut Yeğen, whose academic studies on the subject have become an important frame of reference, defines the Kurdish issue as a problem that emerges from the post-empire nation-state building

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- 1 Özoğlu, Hakan, *Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries*, New York, State University of New York Press, 2004, pg. 67; van Bruinessen, Martin, *Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan*, Londra, Zed Books, 1992, pg. 135; O'Shea, Maria Theresa, *Trapped Between the Map and Reality: Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan*, Florida, Routledge, 2004, pg. 9, 15.
 - 2 Hassanpour, Amir, *Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918-1985*, New York, Mellen Research University Press, 1992.
 - 3 Bozarslan, Hamit, *Confliit kurde: Le brasier oublié du Moyen-Orient*, Paris, Éditions La Découverte, 2009, pg. 25-35.
 - 4 Kutlay, Naci, *Kürt Kimliğinin Oluşum Süreci*, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 1997; Kutlay, Naci, *21. Yüzyıla Girenken Kürtler*, İstanbul, Pêri Yayınları, 2002; Vali, Abbas, "Genealogies of the Kurds: Constructions of Nation and National Identity in Kurdish Historical Writing," Abbas Vali (ed.), *Essays on the Origins of Kurdish Nationalism*, Costa Mesa, Mazda Publishers, 2003: 58- 105; van Bruinessen, *Ibid.*, pg. 175-188.
 - 5 Kutlay, 1997, *Ibid.*, pg. 26; Kutlay, 2002, *Ibid.*, pg. 44; Özoğlu, *Ibid.*, pg. 60; van Bruinessen, *Ibid.*, pg. 177-180.

process.⁶ However, another important scholar of the Kurdish issue, İsmail Beşikçi, argues that the Kurdish territories and the population are divided between the four states and that the matter is, therefore, an inter-state affair. Secondly, he states that the international inter-state system prefers such a socio-political status of the Kurds and this situation has been protected by these actors for decades. Therefore, he argues that the “inter-state” nature of the issue does not arise solely from the fact that the Kurdish territory and population are under the political sovereignty of the four states, but at the same time at the international level, influential states actively support this situation.⁷

Today, the socio-political status of Kurds living under the political sovereignty of the four countries is based on an international treaty, the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923.⁸ The Kurdish lands entered the political sovereignty of the two great empires with the Treaty of Zuhab (Qasr-e Shirin) signed between the Ottoman and Safavid empires in 1639. The Kurdish lands within the Safavid Empire are now largely under the political sovereignty of Iran. The Kurds today have an important place in Iran in the context of both geographic and demographic dynamics. According to Mehrdad R. Izady, between 1910-1990 the Kurdish population in the region along the border between Turkey and Iraq equaled to 11.5 % -13% of the population of Iran.⁹ According to data from Minority Rights Group International Kurds constitute 7% of Iran’s population.¹⁰ Considering these figures, as of 2015, out of a total of 79.1 million people in Iran, 5.5 to 10.2 million are Kurds.

On the other hand, Kurdish lands that were parts of the Ottoman Empire, after the Treaty of Lausanne and the establishment of the three nation-states in Turkey, Syria, Iraq, they became fragmented among these three socio-political structures. Turkey-Syria-Iraq borders were delineated after WWI by a peace treaty signed by representatives of Turkish Grand National Assembly, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, Serb-

6 Yeğen, Mesut, *Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2006, pg. 18-19.

7 Beşikçi, İsmail, *Devletlerarası Sömürge Kürdistan*, İstanbul, Yurt Kitap-Yayın, 1992.

8 For Turkish translation of the Treaty see http://sam.baskent.edu.tr/belge/Lozan_TR.pdf

9 Izady, Mehrdad R., *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook*, Londra and New York, Routledge, 2015, pg. 325-350.

10 Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Iran-Kurds,” *Minority Rights Group International*, <http://minorityrights.org/minorities/kurds-4/>, Accessed: 08.08.2017.

Croat-Slovene States. When we look at the discourse of the Kurdish actors related to the issue, we see that the notion of “Kurdistan divided into four-part” has a central place in the processes of socio-political mobilization regardless of the actors’ different ideas, conflicting interests and institutions.¹¹

Syria, which had been separated from the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, remained under the French rule between 1920-1946.¹² Syria, under the mandate regime established by France, joined the UN in 1946 as an independent state under the name of the Syrian Arab Republic. According to M. R. Izady, the population of Kurds varied from 8.6% to 12.9% of the total population of Syria between 1910 and 1990.¹³ According to the Minority Rights Group International, today 2-2,5 million Kurds live in Syria and they constitute 10-15% of the total population.¹⁴ Iraq, like Syria, also left the Ottoman Empire in the same period and after a decade-long British mandate administration, in 1932, the Iraqi kingdom became an independent state and joined the League of Nations. According to M. R. Izady, the population of Kurds varied from 22,5 to 28% of the total population of Iraq between 1910 and 1990.¹⁵ According to the Minority Rights Group International, today 5,5 - 7 million Kurds live in Iraq and they constitute 15-20% of the total population. The Syrian and Iraqi states were recognized by the UN and in 1970 and 1976, respectively, became members of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), which is now the Islamic Cooperation Organization (IIT). In sum, France and Britain, which were the global powers of the time, were directly involved in the construction of the political regimes in Syria and Iraq. These states were also recognized by trans-border and international organizations such as the OIC.

In Turkey like in Iraq and Syria, regional and international actors had a significant impact on the construction of the political regime. As stated above, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey is based on the Treaty

11 Çiçek, Cuma, *Ulus, Din, Sınıf: Türkiye’de Kürt Mutabakatının İnşası*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2015.

12 Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Syria,” *Minority Rights Group International*, <http://minority-rights.org/country/syria/>, Accessed: 14.04.2017.

13 Izady, *Ibid.*, pg. 325-350.

14 Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples,” *Minority Rights Group International*, <http://minorityrights.org/minorities/kurds-3/>, Accessed: 20.4.2017.

15 Izady, *Ibid.*, pg. 325-350.

of Lausanne. Turkey's borders with Iraq and Syria were delineated in the treaty. On the other hand, the determining powers in the construction of Turkey's political space are the relations that Turkey established with cross-border and international organizations. These relations have an influence on the building and protection of the country's political arena. After the WWII, Turkey's first institutional ties with Europe was joining the Council of Europe (CE). The CE was established by ten countries in 1949 and three months later invited Turkey and accepted it as a "founding member." In addition to CE, Turkey joined an international military alliance in 1952, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). EC and NATO membership as well as the relationship between the EU and Turkey must also be underlined. Turkey-EU relations are based on 1964 Ankara Agreement between Turkey and the EU's predecessor, the European Economic Community. The agreement reads: "the aim of this Agreement is to promote the continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations between the Parties." In 1999, when Turkey gained EU candidate state status, Turkey-EU relations significantly improved and in the 2000s became one of the most prominent determinants in the socio-political and economic transformation in Turkey. The economic, political and military relations Turkey established with the Western world do not only shape the Kurdish issue but also have a decisive influence on the domestic politics and institutional structure as well as foreign affairs.

The international and trans-border character of the Kurdish issue makes the geopolitics of Kurdish territory important. As stated earlier, Kurds live under the political sovereignty of four countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. If Iran is left out, international actors play an important role in the formation of political regimes in the other three countries. Besides, Kurds in each country have an important place both geographically and as a population. This situation has two important consequences in terms of geopolitics. Firstly, the Kurds have a considerable influence on the internal and external politics of these countries. From the past until today, the Kurdish issue continues to be one of the main dynamics in the relations between these countries.¹⁶ The Kurdish issue occupies a central place in Turkish intervention in the KRI's bid for independence, and in the Syrian civil war ongoing since 2011.

Relations between Kurdish political movements in the four countries

¹⁶ Bozarslan, *Ibid.*; Henri J. Barkey, "Turkey and Iraq: The Making of a Partnership," *Turkish Studies* 12, no. 4 (2011): 663-674.

are the second important factor in the geopolitics of the Kurdish issue. The changes in the socio-political status of the Kurds in each country directly affect the Kurdish communities and political movements in other countries. The establishment in 2003 of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and Rojava's formation in Syria since 2012, not only affected Kurdish population in Turkey, but also profoundly affected Kurdish political movements with their different ideologies and political orientations, conflicting interests, and institutions. The changes occurring in the geopolitical equation significantly changed different Kurdish political movements in terms of their ideas, interests and institutional structures in Turkey.¹⁷


2. Turkey's socio-economic and socio-political parameters

Regarding the structural dynamics of the country that determine the conflict, the basic parameters to be examined when looking at the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish conflict are as follows: the level of socioeconomic development, the level of democracy, whether the conflict is ethnic or religious-identity based, ethnic composition of the state and the power relations between ethnic groups, geographical features of the conflict area, the population, and the diaspora.

2.1. Socioeconomic inequality and level of development

Since 1960 Turkey is one of the largest economies in the world. In 1960, according to WB data, Turkey was the 12th largest economy in the world. Towards the 1980s Turkey ranked 21st. Between the years of 1980-2000, the country experienced economic tides and growing, since the beginning of the 2000s, became the 17th biggest economy. Chart 7.1. shows Turkey's rank in the world economy for the period 1960-2013.

Chart 7.1. Turkey's rank in the world economy




17 Çiçek, *Ibid.*

Although Turkey occupies an important place in the global economy due to the size of its economy, in terms of socio-economic development level, it is among the developing countries. One of the concepts that have emerged in recent years in measuring the socio-economic development level of countries is the “Human Development Index.” The concept of “human development”, which is a multidimensional concept that includes education, health and good living standards as well as income as prosperity indicators, was first created by Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq in 1990. The Human Development Index, which shows some numerical changes over the years, has been calculated and published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on a country-by-country basis since 1993.

According to the UNDP 2018 Human Development Report, Turkey ranks 64 among 189 countries.¹⁸ Chart 7.2 shows human development trends in Turkey between the years 1990-2015.¹⁹ In 1990 on a 0-1 scale Turkey’s HDI value was 0.576. This value increased to 0,653 in 2000 and to 0,737 in 2010. Between 2010 and 2015, the upward trend continued to be 0,767 as of 2015.

Chart 7.2. Turkey’s HDI (1990-2015)




In terms of socio-economic development level, Turkey is among developing countries. However, income inequality in Turkey constitutes

¹⁸ UNDP, “Human Development Reports: Turkey,” *United Nations Development Programme - UNDP*, New York, 2018, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TUR>, Accessed: 08.10.2018

¹⁹ UNDP, “Human Development Index,” *UNDP Human Development Reports*, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/137506>, Accessed: 25.04.2017.

one of the most important issues. One of the most important indicators for measuring income inequality in a country is the “Gini” coefficient.²⁰ Chart 7.3 shows Turkey’s Gini Index variation between years 1987–2016 according to the WB.²¹ Turkey’s Gini coefficient is 43.5 in 1987, 41.3 in 1994, 41.4 in 2002, 38.4 in 2007, became 41.9 as of 2016. In other words, there has been a deterioration in terms of income inequality. Especially in the period 2005–2007, there was a remarkable decrease in income inequality, but then it increased again after 2007.

Chart 7.3. Income inequality in Turkey (Gini Index) 1987–2016



According to UNDP data for 2015 income inequality Turkey is placed among the third-degree countries. Map 7.1. Shows categorization of countries into four groups based on the Gini coefficient. According to these data, Turkey ranks in the third group of the income inequality.²² Among 35 member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Turkey is the third country with the most income inequality (see Chart 7.4).²³

20 Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality and value of 100 maximal inequality.

21 The World Bank, “GINI Index (World Bank estimate),” *The World Bank Data*, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2016&locations=TR&start=1987&view=chart>, Accessed: 09.10.2018


22 UNDP, “Income inequality, Gini coefficient,” *UNDP Human Development Reports*, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/67106>, Accessed: 25.04.2017.

23 OECD, “Income inequality,” *Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development - OECD*

Map 7.1. Gini Index in the World, 2015



Chart 7.4. OECD countries income inequality (Gini Index), 2015 (0-1 scale)



The “Palma ratio” and the “quintile ratio” are used to measure countries’ income inequality. “The Palma ratio” is the ratio of the richest 10% of the population’s share of gross national income (GNI) divided by the poorest 40%’s share. The “quintile ratio” is the ratio of the average income of the richest 20% of the population to the average income of the poorest 20% of the population. According to the UNDP 2018 Human Development Report “Palma ratio” of Turkey is 2.1, while “quintile ratio” is 8.5. Maps 7.2²⁴ and 7.3,²⁵ show Turkey’s Palma and Quintile ratio respectively in comparison with the world in 2015.

Data, <https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-inequality.htm>, Accessed: 09.10.2018.

24 UNDP, “Income inequality, Palma ratio,” *UNDP Human Development Reports*, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/135206>, Accessed: 25.04.2017.

25 UNDP, “Income inequality, quintile ratio,” *UNDP Human Development Reports*, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/135106>, Accessed: 25.04.2017.

Map 7.2. Palma ratio by country, 2015



Map 7.3. Quintile ratio by country, 2015



Socioeconomic inequalities in Turkey are seen not only between individuals but also between provinces and regions. Actually, Turkey's socio-economic disparities between provinces and regions constitute a chronic problem unsolvable for decades. Since 1963 in the national development plans the difference between socio-economic development between provinces and regions is identified as one of the most important problems. Studies conducted by state institutions in 1982,²⁶ 1996,²⁷ 2004²⁸ and 2013²⁹ show that the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian regions, where are the majority of the Kurds, are the poorest and most deprived regions of the country and that the gap between regional development is an ongoing chronic problem.

26 Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Türkiye'de Yerleşme Merkezlerinin Kademelenmesi*, Ankara, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1982.


27 Dinçer, Bülent, Özaslan Metin ve Satılmış, Erdoğan, *İllerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyoekonomik Sınıflandırması Araştırması - 1996*, Ankara, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1996.

28 Dinçer, Bülent, Özaslan, Metin and Kvasoğlu, Taneroğlu, *İllerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyoekonomik Sınıflandırması Araştırması - 2003*, Ankara, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2004.

29 Kalkınma Bakanlığı, *İllerin ve Bölgelerin Sosyoekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması (SEGE-2011)*, Ankara, Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2013.

In the New Incentive System announced in 2012 by the Ministry of Development Turkey was divided into six regions. Map 7.4 shows incentive regions of Turkey. Regions ranked 1 are the most advanced while number 6 are the most deprived and poorest areas that need the most incentives. All of the 15 provinces of Turkey the most in need of stimulation are majority Kurdish regions. Apart from these 15 provinces, Erzurum, Tunceli (Dersim), Adiyaman, Kilis, are included in the fifth category, Malatya and Elazığ in fourth, and Gaziantep is included in the third.³⁰

Map 7.4. New Incentive System, and six regions of incentive, 2012



The results of “Income and Living Conditions Survey”³¹ conducted by Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) also show considerable size of the disparity between regions in Turkey. According to the survey, in Turkey annual “equalized household disposable income” for the year 2017 is 21.577 TL. Based on the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) classification Istanbul (TR10), Ankara (TR51), and Tekirdağ, Edirne, and Kırklareli Region (TR21) are the regions with the highest income with 30.895, 26.679 and 26.213 TL respectively. On the other hand, the average annual income per capita in TRC3 region consisting of Mardin, Batman, Şırnak and Siirt, TRC2 region consisting of Şanlıurfa and Diyarbakir, TRB2

30 Ministry of Economy, *Investment Incentives Program*, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy, January 2018, <https://eb.ticaret.gov.tr>, Accessed: 09.10.2018.

31 Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, “Gelir ve Yaşam Koşulları Araştırması Bölgesel Sonuçları, 2017,” *Haber Bülteni*, Sayı: 27824, 24.09.2018, <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=27824>, Accessed: 09.10.2018.

region consisting of Van, Muş, Bitlis and Hakkari provinces were recorded as 9.872, 10.030 and 10.878 TL respectively (see Map 7.5).

Map 7.5. Average annual equalized household disposable income per capita, NUTS, 2. Level, 2017



The overlapping between Turkey's socio-economic and socio-political maps is quite remarkable. In the provinces, the 15 that make up the 6th region and Dersim which is in the 5th region, there is a high political mobilization around the Kurdish issue and the highest social support for the leading Kurdish political parties. For example, in the general elections held on November 1, 2015, the People's Democracy Party (HDP) was the first party in 12 provinces, the second party in three, and the third in one of these 16 provinces.³² In the Constitutional Referendum on 16 April 2017, 10 out of 16 provinces voted for the "No" option supported by HDP against the "Yes" option supported by the AK Party. In the remaining 6 provinces the ratio of the "No" votes changed between 25-49% (See Map 7.6).³³

32 Çiçek, Cuma, "1 Kasım 2015 Seçimleri ve HDP: Kayıplar, Kazançlar ve Sonuçlar," *Birikim*, 02.11.2015b, <http://www.birikimdergisi.com/guncel-yazilar/7301/1-kasim-2015-secimleri-ve-hdp-kayiplar-kazanclar-ve-sonuclar>, Accessed: 25.04.2017.

33 For the 16 Nisan 2016 referendum results see: www.referandum.ntv.com.tr, Accessed: 25.04.2017.

Map 7.6. The results of the referendum on the constitutional amendment, 17 April 2017



Source: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-approves-presidential-system-in-tight-referendum--112061>, Accessed: 09.10.2018.


2.2. Democracy level

The second structural dynamic within a state, which determines the formation of internal conflicts, is the democracy level of the country. There are various organizations that measure the level of democracy in countries according to different indicators. The Austrian-Vienna-based Democracy Ranking Association has been publishing since 2007 at different times the Global Democracy Ranking. In the Global Democracy Ranking, variables are examined in six dimensions: the political dimension, economic dimension, environmental dimension, socioeconomic and educational equality between men and women, health and information dimension.

In the Global Democracy Rank for 2010-2011, published in the year 2012, Turkey ranks 65th among 104 countries. Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Denmark are in the top five, with scores of 87.3, 87.3, 85.8, 84.5 and 83.8 out of 100, respectively. Turkey's score, which is between Paraguay, Nicaragua, South Africa, and Namibia, is 53.4. Turkey dropped three ranks as compared to the 2007-2008 rankings. In the study repeated in 2013, Turkey was ranked 61st among 115 countries with 54.9 points. In 2014 ranking of 112 countries Turkey ranked 64 receiving 53.6 points. In the recent report, published in 2016, Turkey, with 50.6 points, dropped to the 75th position among 112 countries. According to Global Democracy Ranking's five-scale classification, Turkey is among the third category of medium democracies in 2015 (Map 7.7).³⁴

³⁴ Full Global Democracy Ranking data is accessible online.

Map 7.7. Global Democracy Ranking, 2016



The Democracy Index, set by the British-based the Economist Intelligence Unit, is another important global index quantifying the democracy level of countries. First published in 2006, the index is updated annually since 2010. Democracy Index in order to measure the democracy level of countries takes into account election processes and pluralism, government functioning, political participation, political culture, and civil liberties. In total it measures 60 indicators grouped into five categories.

The index classifies countries into four categories: full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and authoritarian regimes. In the Democracy Index these categories are defined as:³⁵

Full democracies: Countries in which not only basic political freedoms and civil liberties are respected, but which also tend to be underpinned by a political culture conducive to the flourishing of democracy. The

See: www.democracyranking.org, Accessed: 09.10.2018.

35 The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2016*, Londra, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, 2017, pg. 54.

functioning of government is satisfactory. Media are independent and diverse. There is an effective system of checks and balances. The judiciary is independent and judicial decisions are enforced. There are only limited problems in the functioning of democracies.


Flawed democracies: These countries also have free and fair elections and, even if there are problems (such as infringements on media freedom), basic civil liberties are respected. However, there are significant weaknesses in other aspects of democracy, including problems in governance, an underdeveloped political culture and low levels of political participation.

Hybrid regimes: Elections have substantial irregularities that often prevent them from being both free and fair. Government pressure on opposition parties and candidates may be common. Serious weaknesses are more prevalent than in flawed democracies—in political culture, functioning of government and political participation. Corruption tends to be widespread and the rule of law is weak. Civil society is weak. Typically, there is harassment of and pressure on journalists, and the judiciary is not independent.

Authoritarian regimes: In these states, state political pluralism is absent or heavily circumscribed. Many countries in this category are outright dictatorships. Some formal institutions of democracy may exist, but these have little substance. Elections, if they do occur, are not free and fair. There is disregard for abuses and infringements of civil liberties. Media are typically state-owned or controlled by groups connected to the ruling regime. There is repression of criticism of the government and pervasive censorship. There is no independent judiciary.

According to the Democracy Index on a 0-10 scale of democracy, Turkey ranged from 5.04 to 5.76 between the years 2006-2016. The value of 5.70 in 2006, rose to the highest value of 5.76 in 2012. Starting from that year, it decreased to 5.43, then to 5.12, to 5.04 as of 2016. According to the Democracy Index, Turkish democracy is a hybrid, between democracy and authoritarian regime (see. Map 7.8).

Map 7.8. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index: Turkey, 2016



Level of democracy, like socio-economic development level, also shows remarkable differences in rates among provinces and regions in Turkey. Many indicators that determine the level of democracy are lower in the Kurdish region where the fighting concentrated. Leaving aside uprisings and repression operations that took place during the last period of the Ottoman Empire, in the Kurdish area rights and freedoms were mostly suspended since the establishment of the Republic due to the state of emergency. The Kurdish region was governed by General Inspectorates,³⁶ a kind of military administration between 1927-1952. In 1960, 1970 and 1980, there were three military coups. Before the effects of the last military coup were over, in 1987 the OHAL Regional Governorate³⁷ was created and lasted until 2002. From this perspective, it is seen that from the foundation of the Republic until the year 2000, the Kurdish region was almost continuously ruled by OHAL.

Even if OHAL administration was over in 2002, as a result of the Kurdish conflict, compared to the rest of the country, in the Kurdish region,

36 Koçak, Cemil, *Umûmî Müfettişlikler (1927-1952)*, 2. Edition, İstanbul, İletişim, 2010.

37 For a debate on the human rights violations in Kurdish areas during the State of Emergency Regional Governorate see Tanrıku, Sezgin and Yavuz, Serdar, "İnsan Hakları Açısından Olağanüstü Hal'in Bilançosu," *Sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Dergisi*, no. 6 (2005): 493-521.

there has always been more human rights violations and limitations, starting with the right to life, as confirmed by the reports of the Human Rights organizations.³⁸ However, the reforms implemented during the EU accession process provided a notable progress towards the democratization of Turkey. Especially the years 2002-2010 should be noted as years of normalization and democratization in Turkey. Dialogue processes between the AK Party government and the KCK in order to resolve the Kurdish issue peacefully and democratically, the Oslo Process (2008-2011) and the Resolution Process (2013-2015), provided important contributions to the normalization of everyday life in the Kurdish region. Despite the adverse developments such as the arrest of close to 8,000 political activists, including mayors, politicians and NGO activists as part of the KCK Operations during the Oslo Process, and intensified fighting between 2011 and 2013, these years have been a period of partial normalization and a decline in rights violations and limitations.

After the Resolution Process ended in July 2015, the Kurdish conflict gained a different dimension. Unlike in previous years, recent fighting concentrated in urban areas and caused massive loss of lives and massive socioeconomic and material destruction. In this period, as has been elaborated on in the previous section, there have been unprecedentedly significant human rights violations in many areas, including the right to life.

2.3. Ethnic and religious groups and dominance relations in Turkey

The third structural determinant at the national level is the dominance relations between ethnic and religious groups. Turkey was built on multi-ethnic and multi-religious remains of the Ottoman Empire. However, there are great differences between Turkey the Ottoman Empire in administrative, political and cultural terms as well as in demographic composition.

Christian Greeks and Armenians

The Republic of Turkey which was constructed as a nation-state is based on Turkishness. The Turkishness, with the exception of Jews, is closed to non-Muslim communities. The non-Muslim peoples, especially Armenians and Greeks, who occupied very important places in the social, cultural and economic life of the Ottoman Empire, had to abandon the

³⁸ See reports of the Human Rights Association and Human Rights Foundation Turkey. Both organizations prepare annual human rights reports since the 1990s. In this topic especially post-2002 EU Progress Reports can be viewed.

country, suffered from pogroms or islamization with the establishment of the Republic. The material and symbolic assets of these peoples were to a large extent eradicated.

According to the industrial census of 1912-1915, 50% of the industry was owned by Greeks, 20% by Armenians, 5% by Jews and 10% by foreigners. Muslim groups had a share of only 15%.³⁹ Today's population and conditions clearly demonstrate the violence of the pogroms of Greeks and Armenians who once owned 70% of the industry.

According to the official data from 1914 about the population of the Ottoman Empire, 15,044,846 (81,24%) of the total population were Muslim, 1,729,738 (9,34%) were Greek and 1,229,006 (6,64%) were Armenian, 187,073 (1,01%) were Jews, 87,116 (0,47%) were Syriacs, Nestorian and Chaldean and 14,907 (0,08%) were Bulgarians out of the total population of 18,520,016.⁴⁰

With the great catastrophe that followed the deportation of the Christian Armenians in 1915, the material and symbolic existence of this people was largely destroyed. In this period, around a million Armenians lost their lives. On the other hand, in accordance with the population exchange treaty signed between the Republic and Greece, the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians were forced to leave the country, whereas in the Balkans Muslims who spoke not Turkish were accepted.⁴¹ After the January 30, 1923 "Convention Concerning the Turkish and Greek Populations" 1 million 700 thousand people were exchanged.⁴²

According to data of Minority Rights Group International as of the year 2017, there were 16,100 Greek Orthodox, 60,000 Orthodox and 2,000 Catholics, in total 62,000 Armenians in Turkey.⁴³ According to data of

39 Çandar, Tevfik, "Türkiye Ekonomisinin Elli Yılı Semineri," *Cumhuriyet Devaleri Başlarken Türkiye Ekonomisi* içinde, Bursa, Bursa İktisadi Ticari İlimler Akademisi, 1973, pg. 163; Başkaya, Fikret, *Paradigmanın İflası Resmi İdeolojinin Eleştirisine Giriş*, Ankara Özgür Üniversite Kitaplığı, 2004, pg. 140.

40 Dündar, Fuat, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi: İttihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Mühendisliği (1913-1918)*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2008, pg. 446-447.

41 Yeğen, *Ibid.*, pg. 109.

42 Dündar, Fuat, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2002, pg. 67.

43 Minority Rights Group International, "World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Turkey," *Minority Rights Group International*, <http://minorityrights.org/country/turkey/>, Accessed: 26.04.2017.

Turkey Statistical Institute as of 2016, with the total population of about 80 million, and Armenians and Greeks counted in thousands, it is clear that Turkey was rebuilt on Sunni-Muslim identity purged of non-Muslim collective identity and space.

Alevi

Today, Alevi are the most important group in Turkey in the context of religious minorities. Alevi represent a considerable proportion of Turkish, Kurdish as well as Arab communities, and constitute the largest religious minority transcending national/ethnic boundaries. Discussions whether Alevism is an original religion or a sect of Islam are continuing both within and outside the Alevi community. On the other hand, according to the dominant Sunni-Islamist view, Alevism is not a different religion, but it is a sect which has drifted away from Islam and is "out of Islam."⁴⁴ The most important factor in shaping the socio-political construction of the Alevi identity is the domination of Sunni-Islam based authorities over the communities in question. For centuries, the Alevi, members of a deprived and excluded religion (or sect), were subjected to neglect, denial and assimilation policies.⁴⁵

This religious group was subjected to assaults as severe as physical pogroms in the Ottoman and Republican periods.⁴⁶ The most important organized violence against the Alevi during the Republican period were the military operations between 1932 and 1937 in Dersim, the symbolic center of the Alevi Kurds, which resulted in the death of one third of the population and the forced migration of another third⁴⁷ and the events since the 1970s in Corum, Maras, Sivas and Istanbul Gazi Mahallesi that resulted in the deaths of dozens of Alevi citizens.⁴⁸

Due to the historical discrimination, marginalization and organized

44 Deniz, Dılşa, *Yol/Rê: Dersim İnanç Sembolizmi - Antropolojik Bir Yaklaşım*, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2012, pg. 17-18; Massicard, Elise, "Alevist Movements at Home and Abroad: Mobilization Spaces and Disjunction," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, No. 28-29 (2003): 163-187.

45 Çem, Munzur, *Dersim Merkezli Kürt Aleviliği: Etnisite, Dinî İnanç, Kültür ve Direniş*, 2 Edition, İstanbul, Vate Yayınevi, 2011, pg. 17.

46 van Bruinessen, *Ibid.*, pg.142; Aygün, Hüseyin, *Dersim 1938 ve Zorunlu İskan: Telgraflar, Dilekçeler, Mektuplar, Fotoğraflar*, 6 Edition, Ankara, DİPnot Yayınları, 2011, pg. 57-68.

47 Çem, *Ibid.*, pg. 417-494; Aygün, *Ibid.*

48 van Bruinessen, Martin, *Kürtlük, Türklük, Alevilik: Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlik Mücadeleleri*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011, pg. 125-129; Fırat, Gülsün, "Dersim'de Etnik Kimlik," Şükrü Aslan (Ed.), *Herkesin Bildiği Sır: Dersim içinde*, 2 Edition, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2010, pg. 150.

violence the Alevi community was subjected to, the opposition to Sunni-Islam based policies and administration is the main constituent component of the Alevi identity. In other words, the historical “other” for the Alevism are the Sunni-Islam based socio-political structures. Indeed, for most of the Alevis today, secularism is a safeguard and protection shield against the Sunni-Muslim majority and the Islamic-based governments.⁴⁹

The Alevis today possess an unignorable socio-political mobilizing power within the Kurdish opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) as well as the socialist left. There is no common ground as to the numbers and size of the Alevi community in Turkey. According to the Minority Rights Group International, the rate of the Alevi population varies between 10% and 40%.⁵⁰ Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak in their study for the Economic and Social Studies Foundation of Turkey (TESEV) in 2006 established after detailed and cross-questions that the rate of Alevis in Turkey is 11.4%. According to the report prepared in 2012 by Hasan Akkiraz for the CHP, based on the 2011 data of densely Alevi populated areas, 12,521,752 Alevis live in Turkey.⁵¹ Accordingly, the Alevis constitute 16,76% of Turkey’s total population of 74,724,269. When these figures are taken as the basis, then with a population close to 80 million since 2016 between 9 and 13.4 million Alevis live in Turkey.⁵²

Laz People and Peoples of the Caucasus in Turkey

The main ethnic/national groups other than Turkish in Turkey, peoples of the Caucasus, Laz people, Arabs and Kurds. During the foundation of the Republic, these Muslim Turkish non-speaking groups were seen as possible to be assimilated into Turkishness.⁵³ The Caucasus peoples and the Laz were largely assimilated into Turkishness. Although the Arabs did not object to this project politically, to a great extent they retained their cultural identity and language. Although the Kurds are largely

49 Çiçek, Cuma, 2015a, *Ibid.*

50 Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Turkey-Alevis,” *Minority Rights Group International*, <http://minorityrights.org/minorities/alevis/>, Accessed: 26.04.2017.

51 The full report, known in media as the Alevi Report, is available online. See <http://alevienstitusu.blogspot.com.tr/2012/12/sabahat-akkirazn-hazrlattg-alevi-raporu.html>, Accessed: 28.04.2017.

52 Çarkoğlu, Ali and Toprak, Binnaz, *Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset*, İstanbul, TESEV Yayınları, 2006, pg. 37-38.

53 Yeğen, *Ibid.*

culturally assimilated, they still have a living language and culture. More importantly, the most significant political objection to the Turkishness project of the Republic came from the Kurds. This objection, which constitutes grounds for notable revolts throughout the history of the Republic, has been a source of an intermittently ongoing intra-state conflict since 1984 in large areas.

Abkhazians, Chechens, Circassians, Dagestanis, Ossetians and various Turkic groups do not constitute a single ethnic/national group. All of these groups speak different languages. However, all the Caucasus peoples in Turkey are Muslim and Circassians constitute 90% of them, while the majority of the remaining 10% are Abkhazians. According to the Federation of Caucasus Associations, about 3 million people from the Caucasus live in Turkey.⁵⁴ Geographically dispersed peoples of the Caucasus are by and large culturally assimilated into Turkishness, and do not display political demands based on ethnic/national identity.

The Laz people are also of a Caucasian descent. There are two basic groups of Laz in Turkey: The first in the Eastern Black Sea region of Rize and Artvin, while the second group is found in the Western Black Sea Region and Eastern Marmara, in Adapazarı, Sapanca, Yalova and Bursa. In the 1965 census, 250,000 people identified themselves as Laz. Based on this figure it can be estimated that today in Turkey live from 750 thousand to 1.5 million Laz. The Laz people, originally Orthodox Christians, have been Muslim since the 15th century.⁵⁵ The Laz who speak Lazuri are to a great degree culturally assimilated. Laz people, like the peoples of the Caucasus, today do not have any political demands.

Arabs

The Arabs constitute the third non-Turkish ethnic/national Muslim group. The Arab population is concentrated in provinces such as Adana, Antakya, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Mardin and Siirt located in the south-eastern border of Turkey as well as in big metropolises. 1.2% of Turkey's population in 1965 census stated that Arabic was their mother tongue. In the same

54 Minority Rights Group International, "World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Turkey-Caucasians," *Minority Rights Group International*, <http://minorityrights.org/minorities/caucasians/>, Accessed: 26.04.2017.

55 Minority Rights Group International, "World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples: Turkey-Laz," *Minority Rights Group International*, <http://minorityrights.org/minorities/laz/>, Accessed: 26.04.2017.

census, for 0.53% of the population, Arabic is the second language. These two groups comprise 1.7% in total.⁵⁶ According to the December 2008 data of the United States Center for World Mission (USCWM), which is an American-based organization studying ethnic origins, language and religion worldwide, 1 million 839 thousand (3.48%) Arabs live in Turkey and 52.8 million Turks.⁵⁷ According to KONDA's 2010 data, in Turkey, the proportion of citizens who define themselves as Arab and speak Arabic as a mother tongue is 1.2%. On the other hand, in KONDA's 2006 study, this rate was 1.5%.⁵⁸ From the above figures, it can be estimated that the ratio of the Arab population is between 1,5%- 3,5% which amounts to about 1.2 - 2.8 million Arabs living in the region based on 2016 census.

The Arab population in Turkey increased dramatically after the Syrian civil war forced people to flee to Turkey. According to the Interior Ministry records the number of registered Syrians in Turkey is over 3.5 million.⁵⁹ Including unregistered people, the number is much higher. Considering the fact that the vast majority of the population has lived in Turkey for several years, the continuing civil war in Syria and the immensity of the destruction, it is likely that they will remain in Turkey. Today, including people from Syria they are 4.4 - 6 million Arabs living in Turkey.

Socially and politically largely integrated into Turkey, Arabs so far have been able to protect their cultural identity. There are no political demands or any kind of a socio-political mobilization of the Arab population in Turkey. However, the Arab community has a living language and a culture of everyday life. The dramatic changes taking place in recent years in the Arab population will likely have an effect on this community's cultural and political situation as well as on the relations between ethnic/national groups in Turkey.

56 Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, *1965 Genel Nüfus Sayımı: Nüfusun Sosyal ve Ekonomik Nitelikleri* 24.10.1965, Ankara, T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1965, pg. 166-167.

57 Tafolar, Meriç, "Amerikan vakfından etnik köken araştırması," *Milliyet*, 02.01.2009, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/amerikan-vakfından-etnik-köken-arastirmasi-gundem-1041916/>, Accessed: 03.05.2017.

58 KONDA, *Biz Kimiz'io: Kürt Meselesi'nde Algı ve Beklentiler Araştırması*, Konda Araştırma, 2011, pg. 13-14. <http://konda.com.tr/tr/rapor/kurt-meselesinde- algı-ve-beklentiler/>, Accessed: 03.05.2017.

59 Milliyet, "Bakan Soylu: Türkiye'de 3 milyon 551 bin 78 mülteci var," *Milliyet*, 15.02.2017, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/bakan-soylu-turkiye-de-3-milyon-siyaset-2396690/>, Accessed: 28.06.2017.

Kurds

Kurds make up the largest group of Muslim minorities in Turkey. In their 1992 study, M. Izady, who studies Kurdish demographics from geographical and historical perspectives, puts forward that Kurds made up 18.9% - 24.1% of the population in Turkey between 1900-1990.⁶⁰ On the other hand, according to İsmet Koç, who using the 1935 and 1965 censuses and, and results of Turkey Demographic and Health Survey conducted by the Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies conducted in 1998 and 2003 concluded that in the period 1935-2003 the population of Kurds ranged from 7.6% to 14.4%.⁶¹ The rate of 9.2% in the 1935 census is established as 7.6% in the 1965 census. Gradually increasing the proportion of the population in the following years is documented by 2003 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey which gives the rate of 14.4%.⁶² In the 2011 study *Who are we'io: Perceptions and expectations of the Kurdish Issue* carried out by KONDA, 13,5% of the respondents described themselves as Kurdish, 1,2% as Zaza.⁶³ In 2006, these rates were 11.9% and 1.0%, respectively. In the study, in response to the question, "Which is your mother tongue, i.e. which language did you learn from your mother?" 12.7% answered Kurdish and 1.4% Zazaki. Taking into account these ratios, according to KONDA's research, 14.1% - 14.7% of the population of Turkey is Kurdish. Considering that the total population is approximately 79.9 million as of the 2016 data, there are from 11.27 to 11.75 million Kurds in Turkey. On the other hand, an increase to 12.9% in 2006 could be interpreted as citizens' inability to express their ethnic/national identity and their mother tongue freely and the actual rates may be higher.


60 Izady, *Ibid.*, pg. 342.

61 Koç, İsmet, "Türkiye'de Türkçe ve Kürtçe Anadil Nüfuslarının Demografik Farklılaşma ve Bütünleşme Düzeyleri," *21. Yüzyıl Dergisi*, Ocak-Şubat-Mart 2007, pg. 181-186, <http://www.21yuzyildergisi.com/assets/uploads/files/35.pdf>, Accessed: 08.05.2017.

62 Koç, *Ibid.*

63 KONDA, *Ibid.*, pg. 13-14.

Map 7.9. Kurdish Population Distribution by 12 Regions, 2011




Ortadoğu Anadolu: Central-Eastern Anatolia Region
 Güneydoğu Anadolu: Southeastern Anatolia Region
 Kuzeydoğu Anadolu: Northeastern Anatolia Region
 Batı Karadeniz: Western Black Sea Region
 Doğu Karadeniz: East Black Sea Region
 Orta Anadolu: Central Anatolia Region

Batı Anadolu: Western Anatolia Region
 Akdeniz: Mediterranean Region
 Ege: Aegean Region
 Doğu Marmara: Eastern Marmara
 Batı Marmara: Western Marmara
 İstanbul: İstanbul Region

In the KONDA survey, Kurdish total population distribution among 12 Second Level NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Unites for Statistics) Regions is as follows: 26.7% live in the Southeastern Anatolia Region, 29.3% in the Central-Eastern Anatolia, 10% in Northeastern Anatolia, 17.5% in İstanbul and 16.6% live in eight other regions (see Map 7.9).⁶⁴ Population distribution in each of these 12 Regions is as follows: 64.1% in Southeastern Anatolia, 79.1% in the Central-Eastern Anatolia region, 32% in Northeast Anatolia and 14.8% in İstanbul. The Kurds, who can be overlooked in the Western Black Sea, East Black Sea, West Marmara, and Central Anatolia regions, make up 4.9% of the population in Eastern Marmara, 6.1% in the Aegean, 7.7% in Western Anatolia and 4.9% in the Mediterranean (see Map 7.10).

64 KONDA, *Ibid.*, pg. 15.

Map 7.10. Kurdish Population Ratio in 12 Regions, 2011



Ortadoğu Anadolu: Central-Eastern Anatolia Region
Güneydoğu Anadolu: Southeastern Anatolia Region
Kuzeydoğu Anadolu: Northeastern Anatolia Region
Batı Karadeniz: Western Black Sea Region
Doğu Karadeniz: East Black Sea Region
Orta Anadolu: Central Anatolia Region

Batı Anadolu: Western Anatolia Region
Akdeniz: Mediterranean Region
Ege: Aegean Region
Doğu Marmara: Eastern Marmara
Batı Marmara: Western Marmara
İstanbul: Istanbul Region

The size of the Kurdish population in Turkey makes it the largest ethnic/national minority. Among the Kurds, the Ezidis and Alevi are two main religious minority groups. However, the majority of Kurds are Sunni-Muslim. In this sense, the Kurds are not only the largest ethnic/national minority but also the largest Muslim minority. In addition to population size, the Kurds constitute the majority in the Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country. They have an important population in metropolitan cities such as İstanbul, İzmir, Antalya, and Mersin. Moreover, despite decades of assimilation policies, today there is a lively Kurdish language and culture. Finally, the Kurds have political demands that go beyond cultural demands, and these demands are today the most important dynamics of the Kurdish conflict.

It can be argued that the “ethno-nationalist project of time and space integration”⁶⁵ based on Turkish identity has directed the process of the

65 Öktem, Kerem, “Incorporating the Time and Space of the Ethnic ‘Other’: Nationalism and Space in Southwest Turkey in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” *Nations and Nationalism* 10, no. 4 (2004): 559-578; Gündoğan, Azat Zana, “1960'larda Tunceli/Dersim Kent Mekânında Siyasal Eylemlilik: Doğu Mitingleri,” Şükrü Aslan (Ed.), *Herkesin Bildiği Sır: Dersim* içinde, 2. Edition, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2010, pg. 481-506.

dissolution and re-building of the relations between ethnic/national groups since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Within this project, the Turkish identity served as a founding element and was built as a dominant identity over other ethnic/national identities. This dominance was built not only in the political sphere but also in both cultural and socioeconomic life. M. Yeğen underlines, during this period, Turkishness was built as a closed identity to non-Muslims such as Armenians, Greeks, and Syriacs/Assyrians, and open to Muslims like Kurds, Arabs, the Caucasus peoples, and Laz people. In this building process, non-Muslim groups were subjected to discriminatory policies and Muslim ethnic/national minorities were considered “Turkify-able” and subjected to assimilation policies.⁶⁶

According to Yeğen, who analyzes the relationship between Judaism and Turkishness, which is an exception among non-Muslims, and the relationship between Kurdishness resisting assimilation and Turkishness, “there has always been a superior principle, a super-principle that determined inclusion in Turkishness: Loyalty.”⁶⁷ The fact that some of them resisted the assimilation on the one hand, and, the construction of the KRI on the other hand, caused the Turkish nationalism to question Kurds’ Turkishness and loyalty.⁶⁸ In this sense, it can be argued that the relationship between Kurdishness and Turkishness cannot be explained by the assimilation policy on its own and that it has been re-established on a fragile ground that includes discrimination, exclusion, conflict, recognition, and integration.

2.4. Types of intra-state conflicts in Turkey

One of the most important dynamics that determine the formation of intra-state conflicts is the type of these conflicts. Academic studies on such conflicts occurring at different times and places indicate that the question is whether conflicts are ethnic/national or religious-based or sociopolitical-based aiming at the change of government at the national level.

From this perspective, it is clear that the conflict in Turkey ongoing since 1984 is based on ethnic/national identity conflict. The leading Kurdish

66 Yeğen, *Ibid.*, pg. 111-116.

67 Yeğen, *Ibid.*, pg. 112-113.

68 Yeğen, *Ibid.*, pg. 115.

movement in Turkey which is represented by the HDP, undoubtedly cannot be reduced to an ethnic/national movement. This political movement focused on ethnic/national issues of Kurds as well as on the socio-economic and socio-political issues of Turkey. With regard to this topic, it is clear that the movement galvanized social mobilization.⁶⁹ When looking into the historical formation of the KCK, which is the core of the leading Kurdish movement, it is seen that the claim of socio-political transformation holds an important place. This social transformation issue, formulated around the socialist thought in the 1980s, today is based on four main axes: gender freedom, social/communal economics, ecology, and libertarian identity politics. Confederately organized communities based on assemblies and bottom-up social organizing are the basis for these four axes.⁷⁰ When analyzing the actions and discourse of the HDP, which is at the peripheries of the leading Kurdish movement and represents and carries out the will of the center to the masses, it is seen that the problem of socio-political and socio-economic transformation is central to the political movement in question. The HDP Party Program⁷¹ and June 7, 2015, November 1, 2015 election declarations⁷² as well as different ethnic/national identity, feminist, religious minority, socialist, liberal and Muslim profiles of its candidates in the said elections in Turkey, show that the HDP cannot be reduced to a political party focusing on the Kurdish ethnic/national question.

However, the socio-economic, cultural and political demands of the Kurds are the basis of the social mobilization of the leading Kurdish movement. This applies to both the KCK and the HDP. At the level of discourse, the statements, basic texts and demands of the two actors in question confirm this situation. On the other hand, although at the institutional/organizational level a limited number of non-Kurdish individuals takes part in the KCK and HDP, almost all of the human resources of these actors in the sense of social base are Kurds. The fact that the HDP won 11-13% of the votes across Turkey, usually less than 10% in the western metropolises, up to 85-90% in Kurdish densely populated cities, and over

69 For more details see Çiçek, 2015a, *Ibid.*

70 Çiçek, Cuma, "Demokratik Ulusçuluk ve Radikal Demokrasi," E. Haspolat and D. Yıldırım (Der.), *Türkiye'de Yeni Siyasi Akımlar (1980 Sonrası)*, Ankara, Siyasal Kitapevi, 2016, pg. 351-403.

71 Halkların Demokratik Partisi, *Halkların Demokratik Partisi Programı*, Ankara, Halkların Demokratik Partisi, <http://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/parti/parti-programi/8>, Accessed: 08.05.2017.

72 Halkların Demokratik Partisi, *HDP 2015 Seçim Bildirgesi*, Ankara, Halkların Demokratik Partisi, <http://www.hdp.org.tr/tr/materyaller/genel-secim-7-haziran/6010>, Accessed: 08.05.2017.

50% of the votes in 10-12 provinces confirm this situation. Indeed, the most comprehensive digital database on world conflict, the COW, coded the conflict in Turkey as an intra-state identity-based conflict.⁷³

2.5. Geography of the conflict

As much as the type of the intra-state conflict, the geography of the conflict is important in terms of conflict resolution and social peacebuilding. Three issues emerge in the context of conflict geography: the regional distribution of violence, the geographical characteristics of the conflict zone and the number of border regions. It is seen that the conflicts in a certain region within the country take longer than the conflicts spread across the country, and in such cases, the negotiated solution is more difficult to achieve. Both regional and identity-based conflicts take much longer in this sense. When this matter is analyzed in Turkey's context, even if there had been bomb attacks in big cities, in fact, violence was concentrated in the Kurdish region. The Iran and Iraq border regions are areas of most intensified fighting. The chart 7.5 prepared by the Uppsala University Peace and Conflict Studies Department shows the geographic distribution of fatalities caused by fighting between the Turkish state and the PKK/KCK in the years 1989-2017.⁷⁴ As the map shows, a vast majority of the casualties is concentrated in the Kurdish areas in Southeastern region. In this sense, it is clear that the conflict in Turkey is a territorial conflict.

73 For more details see <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu>, Accessed: 09.05.2017.

74 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, "Government of Turkey – PKK," *Uppsala Universitet Department of Peace and Conflict Research*, 2018, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/conflict/354>, Accessed: 09.10.2018.

Chart 7.5. The geographic distribution of fatalities caused by fighting between the Turkish state-PKK/KCK, 1989-2017



The physical characteristics of the conflict area are the second important issue in the geography of conflicts. In fact, the knowledge of intra-state conflicts in different times and places shows that the concentration of mountainous and forested areas directly affects the formation of conflicts. As seen in the Map 7.11, the Kurdish regions of Turkey are the most mountainous.⁷⁵ When the Chart 7.5 which shows the spatial distribution of casualties in the conflict, and Map 7.11, which shows the mountainous areas are analyzed together, it is seen that fighting is concentrated in the mountainous areas in the west, south, and east of the Van Lake.


⁷⁵ For the map see <http://www.hgk.msb.gov.tr/images/urun/90cc7defe415eb3.tif>, Accessed: 10.05.2017.

Map 7.11. Physical Map of Turkey



In the highly mountainous Kurdish areas, the forested areas are quite limited compared to other regions. Except for Şırnak and Siirt on the Iraq border, and Bingöl, which is located in the middle region, it is seen that forested areas cover less than 30% of the remaining provinces.⁷⁶ Map 7.12 shows the forested areas in Turkey by province.⁷⁷

Map 7.12. Forested areas in Turkey



76 Orman Genel Müdürlüğü, *Orman Atlası*, T.C. Orman ve Su İşleri Bakanlığı Orman Genel Müdürlüğü, pg. 9.

77 Orman Genel Müdürlüğü, *Ibid.*, pg.15.

Finally, in terms of border regions, when we look at the violence in Turkey, one can see that fighting increases in the region bordering five countries. The border in the northeast of Turkey with Georgia is 276 kilometers long, with Armenia 328 kilometers, to the east with Iran 560 kilometers, to the South, with Iraq and Syria, the borders are 384 and 911 kilometers long, respectively. To date, limited fighting has occurred in the border regions of Georgia and Armenia. On the other hand, the Iran, Iraq and Syria border lines are the main regions where the conflicts are concentrated.

Until the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the attention was mostly on the Iran and Iraq borders. Politically and militarily organized KCK, in Iraq, Iran as well as in Turkey, has a cross-border military mobilization capability along the borders with both countries. These borderlines are mountainous which facilitates cross-border armed mobilization. The fact that most of the military headquarters of the Organization are mostly beyond the borders of Turkey, along Iran-Iraq borderline, makes the issue of borders particularly important for the Kurdish question. The cross-border military operations against Organization's military headquarters in Iraq carried out first in 1983 and intensified especially in the 1990s, show the importance of the border issue in the Kurdish conflict. With the outbreak of the civil war, the Syrian border became at least as important as the Iraqi and Iranian borders. The *de facto* autonomous region established with the support of Russia and the USA under the leadership of the PYD, a KCK's sister organization concentrated along Turkish-Syrian border, is today one of the most important determinants of the Kurdish issue in Turkey.⁷⁸

2.6. Population and diaspora


In the context of structural dynamics that determine the formation of intra-state conflicts, it is necessary to finally look at the population and diaspora. Chart 7.6. Illustrates changes in Turkey's population between the years 1960-2015.⁷⁹ According to the WB data, in 1960 the population of Turkey was 27.5 million, in 1990 it was 54 million, 63.2 million in 2000, and in 2015 reached 78.7 million. UN Population Division of the Department

78 Çiçek, Cuma, *15 Temmuz Sonrası Kürt Meselesi ve Sivil Toplum: Diyalog ve Uzlaşma Olanakları*, Sabancı Üniversitesi İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi, İstanbul, March 2017, İstanbul, http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CumaCicek_15TemmuzSonrasiSivilToplum.pdf, Accessed: 10.05.2017.

79 The World Bank, "Population, total: Turkey," *The World Bank*, 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POPTOTL?locations=TR>, Accessed: 10.05.2017.

of Economic and Social Affairs in 1950 ranked Turkey's population 20th with regard to the size. As of 2015 Turkey ranks 18th and comes after Germany and Iran. In 2050, according to UN estimates, Turkey will rank 19th with 96 million inhabitants.⁸⁰

Chart 7.6. The population of Turkey, 1960-2015



According to the 2018 UN Human Development Report, average age in Turkey is 29.9 years, for every 100 working-age persons aged 15-64, there are 49.5 dependent children and the elderly. The working-age population (15-64) is 54.0 million. Finally, 74.6% of the population lives in urban areas.⁸¹

Turkey, which has a large population also has a relatively large diaspora. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, approximately 5.5 million citizens live abroad. Of these, 4.6 million live in Western Europe, mainly in Germany, France and the Netherlands. The rest live in North America, Asia, and Australia.⁸² According to the Ministry of Development, however, 6 million Turkish citizens live abroad. Out of these, 5 million live in Europe, with approximately 3 million living in Germany alone.⁸³ Number

80 United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision: Key Findings and Advance Tables*, New York, United Nations, 2015, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/Key_Findings_WPP_2015.pdf, Accessed: 10.05.2017.

81 UNDP, "Human Development Indicators: Turkey," *United Nation Development Programme - UNDP*, New York, 2018, <http://www.hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TUR>, Accessed: 09.10.2018.

82 Dışişleri Bakanlığı, "Yurtdışında yaşayan Türk vatandaşları," *Dışişleri Bakanlığı*, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/yurtdisinda-yasayan-turkler_.tr.mfa, Accessed: 10.05.2017.

83 Kalkınma Bakanlığı, *Onuncu Kalkınma Planı (2014-2018) Göç Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu*, An-

of voters registered abroad in April 16, 2017 constitutional referendum was 2.957.870.⁸⁴ Considering about 80 million inhabitants and 55.37 million voters in Turkey, and around 3 million voters abroad, it can be said that there are about 4.3 million citizens living in the diaspora. This data shows that the diaspora is the size of about 5% of Turkey's population.

Another important issue to be addressed with regard to the diaspora is the Kurdish diaspora. Not only from Turkey but also a significant number of Kurds from Syria, Iraq, and Iran living outside their homeland. There is no official study on the size of the Kurdish diaspora. According to the estimates of the Kurdish Institute of Paris, 60 thousand live in Turkmenistan, 150 thousand in Azerbaijan, 45 thousand in Armenia, 50 thousand in Georgia, 200 thousand in Afghanistan and 150 thousand Kurds live in Lebanon. On the other hand, between 1.5 and 1.7 million Kurds live in European countries, most of them in Germany, France and the Netherlands.⁸⁵ It is difficult to estimate the proportion of the Kurds in the diaspora with regard to the four countries they come from. However, considering that Turkey has the largest Kurdish population, it can be estimated that at least half of the Kurds in the diaspora have roots in Turkey.

In this sub-section, basic parameters of Turkey in terms of socioeconomic development, level of democracy, dominance relations between ethnic/national groups, types of conflict, geography, population and diaspora which constitute structural determinants inhibiting short-term change or intervention of actors on a national level were examined. In order to complete the analysis, the following sub-section examines the actor-based dynamics.

3. Actor-based parameters

In the Second Chapter, which focuses on the studies of intra-state conflicts, factors such as the cost of conflicts, duration of conflicts, state capacity, political subjectivity, power-sharing and participation of third parties were highlighted in the context of actor-based dynamics.

kara, T.C. Kalkınma Bakanlığı, 2014.

84 For the number of voters abroad see <https://secim.haberler.com/2017/referandum-yurtdisi-sonuclari/>, Accessed: 10.05.2017.

85 Institut kurde de Paris, "Diaspora Kurde," *Institut kurde de Paris*, 30.06.2016, <http://www.institutkurde.org/info/diaspora-kurde-1232550920>, Accessed: 10.05.2017.


3.1. Conflict duration

The conflict in Turkey began in 1984 with the attacks in Siirt's Eruh district and Hakkari's Şemdinli district carried out by the PKK. However, the fighting increased considerably with the beginning of the 1990s. Although there have been various ceasefire attempts since the 1990s and intermissions, the conflict has continued for 34 years. In 1993, 1995, 1998 and 1999 the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire. In particular, it is important to note the fact that after the arrest of the leader of the PKK, Öcalan, in 1999, upon his call the armed militants were withdrawn and the actual five-year ceasefire, which lasted until 2004, was maintained. As a result of the failure of the dialogue initiatives between the state and the Organization, the violence started again in June 2004. Between 2008 and 2011, there was a new dialogue process known as the Oslo Process. However, this initiative was also inconclusive, and in 2011, the conflict resumed with intensified force. After about one and a half years of violent clashes, the Resolution Process started in 2013 and there was a strong and effective cease-fire until June 2015. However, the last dialogue process failed and since July 2015, fighting has been continuing. Loss of life and socioeconomic and spatial demolitions, especially in urban areas where the conflict intensified, are incomparably higher than in the past.

Chart 7.7 prepared by the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at Uppsala University, shows the number of deaths caused by the conflict in the 1989-2017 period by year.⁸⁶ Different sources provide different figures for the number of fatalities. However, as seen in Chart 7.7, the conflict intensified especially in the 1990s, and there was a relative stability between 2000-2004. On the other hand, the conflicts that started again in the middle of 2004, intensified especially after the failures of the 2008-2011 Oslo Process and the 2013-2015 Resolution Process.

86 Department of Peace and Conflict Research, "Uppsala Conflict Data Program," *Uppsala Universitet Department of Peace and Conflict Research*, 2016, <http://ucdp.uu.se/#/conflict/354>, Accessed: 11.05.2017.

Chart 7.7. Number of Deaths in the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, 1989-2017



3.2. The cost of conflict

The most important issue in the context of the cost of conflicts is the loss of lives and forced displacement. According to the data compiled by the UCDP, which follows the major conflicts of the world, in clashes between the state and the PKK in Turkey between the years 1989-2016, 28,524 people lost their lives, 1,267 civilians died as a result of unilateral acts of violence by the PKK. According to this, the total number of deaths between 1989 and 2016 is 29,791. Based on the COW data, which also follows major conflicts in the world, the Turkish state lost 1,500 and the PKK lost 9,000 people during the clashes between 1984-1986. Between 1991 and 1999, 3,500 and 13,000 people lost their lives respectively. According to this, a total of 27,000 people, including 5,000 state security forces and 22,000 organization's militants lost their lives in the clashes between the Turkish state and the PKK between 1984-1999.⁸⁷ When we consider different time intervals of the data of both international organizations, the current figures for the 1984 - 2016 period show that at least 40,000 people lost their lives.

The most important source of information in Turkey about conflict-related casualties is the 2013 "Right to Life Violations Under Terror and Violence Investigation Report" prepared by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey Human Rights Inquiry Committee. According to this report, as of 30.12.2011, a total of 2,375 members of land, sea and air force personnel of the Turkish Armed Forces lost their lives in combat. Since February 2013, when the report was written, a total of 5,543 ministerial employees, including 5,216 members of the Ministry of Interior Affairs (security officers, gendarmerie and village guards) personnel died. Accordingly, the total number of civil servants who lost their lives in the clashes was

87 The Correlates of War Project, "COW War Data, 1816-2007 (v4.0)," *The Correlates of War Project*, <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war>, Accessed: 11.05.2017.

7.918. In the same report, the number of organization members who lost their lives between 1984 and 2012 is established to be 22.849. The total number of civilian casualties caused by conflict is 5,557. Based on this data, at least 36.324 people lost their lives due to clashes between the years of 1984 and 2013.⁸⁸ Considering the rather overlooked cases of violence in the 2013-2015 Resolution Process and considerably higher intensity of violence after July 2015, according to the 2017 official figures more than 47,000 people lost their lives. The official news agency of the state, Anadolu Agency, reported that 823 security officers and 343 civilians lost their lives in the domestic and international operations from July 2015 to January 2017, while around 10,000 members of the organization lost their lives or were seriously injured.⁸⁹

The second most important indicator of the cost of the conflict is the forced displacement of citizens. There is no official data on the displaced citizens during the conflict. However, the Inquiry Commission established under the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) reported in 1998 that in the OHAL region, 820 villages and 2,345 hamlets, a total of 3,165 settlements were depopulated, and 378,335 citizens were forcedly displaced.⁹⁰ According to the same report, 85 villages and 178 hamlets more were depopulated in the OHAL region and adjacent areas. In total 3.428 settlements were depopulated and more than 400,000 citizens were displaced in that period. "Migration and Internally Displaced Population Survey in Turkey" results released in 2006 by the Institute of Population Studies at Hacettepe University reveal that between 954,000 and 1.2 million people were displaced due to security reasons in 1986-2005.⁹¹ According to the data of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, 419,348 people filed a suit based on the Compensation Law since the end of March 2017.⁹²

88 İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, *Terör ve Şiddet Olayları Kapsamında Yaşam Hakkı İhlalleri İnceleme Raporu*, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, Ankara, 13.02.2017.

89 Okur, Yunus, "Törör örgütü PKK'ya 557 günde ağır darbe," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 31.01.2017, <http://aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/teror-orgutu-pkky-557-gunde-agir-darbe/738313>, Accessed: 11.05.2017.

90 Meclis Araştırma Komisyonu, *Doğu ve Güneydoğu'da Boşaltılan Yerleşim Birimleri Nedeniyle Göç Eden Yurttaşlarımızın Sorunlarının Araştırılarak Alınması Gereken Tedbirlerin Tespit Edilmesi Amacıyla Kurulan Meclis Araştırma Komisyon Raporu (10/25)*, Ankara, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 1998, pg. 13- 14, <https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/sirasayi/donem20/yil01/ss532.pdf>, Accessed:11.05.2017.

91 Hacettepe Üniversitesi Nüfus Etütleri Enstitüsü, *Türkiye Göç ve Yerinden Olmuş Nüfus Araştırması*, Ankara, Hacettepe Üniversitesi, 2006.

92 İller İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, "5233 sayılı Kanun Uygulanması İstatistikleri," *T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı İller İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü*, 31 Mart 2017, <http://www.illeridaresi.gov.tr/5233-sayili-kanun-uygulanmasi-istatistikleri>, Accessed: 11.05.2017.

On the other hand, according to the estimates of human rights and non-governmental organizations working in the field of forced migration, the number of displaced people is around 3 million. The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB) reported that between the years 1990-1999, “more than 3 million people from 3,700 residential areas were forced to leave their settlements against their will and without their control.”⁹³

After the wave of forced migration in the 1990s, the second major wave of forced migration occurred after the failure of the Resolution Process and after the conflicts in the urban areas intensified. Eleven central districts of Diyarbakır, Mardin, Şırnak, Hakkâri and Muş provinces, witnessed thousands of casualties and large-scale socioeconomic and spatial demolitions. Around 500 thousand citizens were forced to leave their homes due to fighting.⁹⁴ Including the last clashes, the number of citizens who were forcedly displaced due to conflicts in Turkey is between 1.5 million and 3.5 million.

3.3. State capacity

Another actor-based dynamic that determines the formation of intra-state conflicts is the capacity of the state. The most important point underlined in this regard is the number of security personnel such as the army and the police and the ratio to the population. Although there are different approaches, there is a general acceptance that there is a relationship between the state’s security capacity and the military solution of conflicts.

According to the military strength index prepared by the Global Firepower (GFP) in 2018, Turkey ranks 9th among 127 countries following the US, Russia, China, India, France, the United Kingdom, South Korea, and Japan. Turkey is followed by Germany, Italy, Egypt, and Iran. This index prepared by GFP is based not only on the number of soldiers but on a total of 55 indicators such as manpower, infantry, air force, maritime power, resources, logistics, finance, geography and regional power, including the number of soldiers. Turkey having a total population of 80. million, according to data GFP’s, has 35 million manpower eligible

93 TMMOB, “TMMOB İnsan Hakları Komisyonu Zorunlu Göç Raporu,” TMMOB, *TMMOB 2002-2004 Dönem Çalışma Raporu Ek 9*, Ankara, Türkiye Mimar ve Mühendisler Odalar Birliği, 2004, pg. 568.

94 United Nations, 2017, *Ibid.*

for military service. While the total number of personnel already in the military service is 350,000, there are 360,565 people waiting to serve.⁹⁵

According to official data, as of February 2017, there is 362,284 military personnel including 201 generals and admirals in the Turkish Armed Forces. Adding civil servants and employees of the force commanders, General Staff and the Ministry of National Defense, the TSK has 401,199 personnel.⁹⁶ In Turkey apart from the army, there is a considerable in size police force. According to the data of the Ministry of Interior, the number of personnel of the General Directorate of Security is 273,846 starting from 2017. 95% of the total personnel is directly involved in providing security services, including 3,882 police chief superintendents, 12,881 superintendents, chief inspectors, inspectors and deputy-inspectors and 233.227 police officers. 91% of the security personnel is university or college graduate, 7% high school and 2% graduated from secondary school. Also, within the organization, there are 4,701 officers with M.A. degree and 99 with a PhD degree.⁹⁷ The data clearly demonstrates that the number of security personnel and its qualifications make for a strong state capacity in Turkey.

3.4. Political subjectivity

Political subjectivity is the fourth actor-based dynamic. Political subjectivity refers to the thoughts, perceptions, interests, resources, and strategies of the actors. Political subjectivity proposes to look at the main players in the play-field, in other words, at subjects influential in conflict formation. In this sense, looking at the current situation in Turkey, the parties directly involved in the conflict are the AK Party government and the state on the one side and, on the other, the leading Kurdish movement in which the HDP and DBP are the peripheries and the KCK is the center. In addition to these two main actors, the main opposition party CHP, the small opposition parties MHP and İYİ Party (Good Party) non-parliamentary opposition parties, the army, non-governmental organizations and the media are the main institutional determinants

95 Global Firepower, "Countries Ranked by Military Strength (2017)," *Global Firepower*, 2018, <http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp>, Accessed: 09.10.2018.

96 Özer, Sarp, "TSK'nın personel mevcudu açıklandı," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 01.02.2017, <http://aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/tsknin-personel-mevcudu-aciklandi/739166>, Accessed: 17.05.2017.

97 Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, *T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü 2017 Yılı Performans Programı*, Ankara: Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü, 2017, <https://www.egm.gov.tr/Documents/2017Performans.pdf>, Accessed: 17.05.2017.

in the formation of the conflict. On the other hand, there are external actors such as the USA, EU, Russia, Iran and KRI who have the power to influence the political subjectivity of these actors. Analyzing the positions on the Kurdish issue, the termination of the conflict and the construction of social peace of each of these actors exceeds the limits of this chapter. However, for this topic, it is useful to highlight important characteristics of the actors.

AK Party

On the one hand, during the AK Party government rule the most important steps were taken in terms of both the cultural and political aspects of the solution to the Kurdish issue, on the other hand, the biggest destruction occurred also in this period. In the cultural sense, a partial recognition of the Kurdish language and culture and the relative opening of public space for cultural reproduction happened during the AK Party rule. TRT-Kurdî, the opening of undergraduate and graduate programs in the field of Kurdish language and culture in universities, the teaching of Kurdish as an elective course in public schools are the most important steps that must be underlined in the cultural field. On the other hand, Erdoğan's statements as the prime minister in 2005, recognizing the problem and accepting the mistakes of the state, as well as the 2008-2011 Oslo Process and the 2013-2015 Resolution Process constitute the AK Party's most important political steps towards the solution of the problem. Considering the century-old story of the Kurdish issue, it is clear that the steps taken in the cultural and political spheres express a very important break. However, during the AK Party period, there were also great setbacks. After the failure of the Resolution Process, the urban clashes which costed thousands of lost lives, the forced migration of about half a million citizens, the large-scale destruction that requires rebuilding of 11 districts, including Diyarbakır-Sur and Şırnak-Cizre cities, and socioeconomic impact of the clashes on the region took place during the AK Party period.

Both the big steps and the big devastations experienced in the same period show that the AK Party is an actor open to all options with regard to the Kurdish issue. The AK Party, which has been in power for over 16 years, is a party that gets 40-50% of the votes. What makes the AK Party the most important actor in the Kurdish issue, is the fact that the AK Party is the only party, that could receive as many Kurdish votes as its country general average and also as many as the HDP.

Öcalan and Qandil

On the leading Kurdish movement front, Öcalan, Qandil, and HDP are the second group of actors to determine the future of the Kurdish issue. Among these, Öcalan has been able to preserve his power and influence on both the masses, Qandil, and the HDP. Despite being imprisoned since 1999, Öcalan has managed to remain the most influential actor in the Kurdish movement. On the other hand, Qandil, regardless a major military and political defeat in the urban clashes, is the most important power center in the leading Kurdish politics, especially after the military and political achievements in Syria. Qandil's military and political presence not only in Turkey but also in Syria, Iraq, and Iran, as well as significant levels of social support and its institutionalization within the Kurdish diaspora, make it stronger.

Leading legal Kurdish politics and the HDP

Historically, the leading legal Kurdish politics could not make its presence felt alongside Öcalan and Qandil, however nowadays the HDP, which represents it today, is one of the most important actors who have grown strong in the field since 2014. While leading legal Kurdish parties used to win 4-7% of the votes between 1991 and 2011, the HDP rose to 10-13% after the 2014 Presidential elections, indicating that legal Kurdish politics will be much stronger in the future. Although the HDP could not take an active and strong position in the urban clashes to protect the social peace, it did maintain its strength and kept the masses stand by their side with 10-13% of the support in the 2017 Constitution Referendum, which all makes the HDP a critical actor in legal Kurdish politics, conflict resolution, and social peacebuilding.

The main opposition party CHP

The main opposition party, the CHP, is the third important actor in the Kurdish issue with a broad social base and the political segments it represents. Although the political tradition represented by the CHP in the 1990s somewhat looked for a political resolution to the Kurdish issue, today it does not constitute an alternative to the AK Party in critical issues such as collective linguistic-cultural rights, decentralization, cross-border dimension of the Kurdish issue, disarmament, etc. They have either the same position with the AK Party or more traditional state-oriented reflexes. On the other hand, the evolution towards a two-block political structure after the 2017 Constitutional Referendum in which the CHP has a social base of around 30%, might push the CHP into new alliances and

new positions on the Kurdish issue if it considers new dynamics of the Kurdish issue and the HDP's rise.

MHP

The MHP, a small opposition party, is another important actor to consider in the Kurdish issue. First of all, the MHP should be taken into consideration in the context of its status quo stance on the Kurdish issue and its potential to hinder the solution. However, the MHP, the fourth biggest party in parliament, became one of Turkey's most influential political actors due to the position it took in presidential system debates and especially after the July 15, 2016 coup attempt. During the referendum process, in coalition with the AK Party, the MHP was the actor who defined the content and the limits of the proposal that changed the executive system in the country. As the debates on autonomy during the referendum show, one of the most important topics that set the limits and content of the package was the Kurdish issue. This shows that the MHP is an actor who cannot be ignored in the formation of the Kurdish issue and conflict.

İYİ Party

The İYİ Party formed on 25 October 2017 by a breakaway group from the MHP under the leadership of a veteran politician, Meral Akşener, is another important actor to consider in the context of the Kurdish issue. The İYİ Party won 9.96% of the votes in the June 24, 2018 elections, while Akşener, who was running for the Presidency, won 7.29% of the vote. In other words, in a short time the İYİ Party succeeded in getting a vote close to the votes of MHP from which it had broken away. The most important issue that makes the İYİ Party a paramount actor in the Kurdish issue is the power of defining the opposition block against the AK Party and the MHP block. As a matter of fact, in the June 24 elections, the İYİ Party was the determining factor in the formation of the Nation Alliance running against the People's Alliance consisting of the AK Party and MHP. While it was not possible to achieve a vote of over 50% against the People's Alliance without HDP, the Nation Alliance remained limited to the CHP, İYİ Party and Felicity Party. While the MHP was influential on the AK Party with its nationalist rhetoric regarding the Kurdish issue, the İYİ Party had a similar effect on the opposition, particularly the CHP. In the current situation, as the MHP, the İYİ Party is a playmaker in the Kurdish issue.

Army

The army was traditionally the strongest actor in the Kurdish issue. In the early years of the AK Party, important steps were taken towards breaking the military tutelage, especially during the EU accession process. There is a common belief in the society that the end of military tutelage over politics was the most important step towards democratization in Turkey. However, a group within the military attempted a coup on July 15, 2016 which shows the need to re-read the relationship between the military and politics in Turkey. Although the purges and restructuring in the army after the coup attempt continued, the Kurdish issue shifted back to the battlefield after 2015, and the army has taken an active role in the trans-border operations and within the borders. All these make the army one of the most important actors regarding the Kurdish issue.

Extra-parliamentary opposition

In addition to the above actors, it is necessary to talk about the extra-parliamentary opposition. When we look at the actors that may be effective in the Kurdish issue within a rather heterogeneous extra-parliamentary opposition, there is no political movement or party with a meaningful social support in Turkey. For example, in the June 28, 2018, elections no party got more than 1.5% of the votes except for the AK Party, CHP, HDP, MHP, and İYİ Party. Felicity Party (SP), the highest rated party, remained at 1.34%.

On the other hand, even if in the Kurdish region the parties other than the HDP have a low social representation in terms of numbers, in comparison to other parties they occupy a different position in Turkey due to their character. While there are four parties effective on a national scale (AK Party, CHP, MHP and İYİ Party), in the Kurdish region there is only one, the HDP, and its regional component the DBP. In this sense, other Kurdish parties, even if they are small, form a center of critique of the HDP and the KCK in the Kurdish region. Today, the Kurdish parties outside the HDP and the DBP are: Free Cause Party (HÜDA-PAR), Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR), Socialist Party of Kurdistan (*Partiya Sosyalîst a Kurdistanê*, PSK), Freedom and Socialism Party (ÖSP), Kurdistan Freedom Party (*Partiya Azadiya Kurdistanê*, PAK), Kurdistan Democratic Party - North (*Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê - Bakur*, PDK-Bakur) and Kurdistan Party (*Partiya Kurdistanî*, PAKURD). Apart from these parties, there is also the Kurdistan Islamic Movement for Justice and Freedom (Azadî) which continues a debate whether to become a party.

Civil society

There is no effective civil society sphere in Turkey. Although NGOs are counted in thousands, it is seen that effective NGOs are quite limited in terms of their functions. Most of these institutions are associations that focus on building mosques or sports clubs or they are hometown community associations. Most of the rest is tied to political institutions and political parties. One of the most important reasons which creates this situation is the fact that political movements have an instrumental approach to civil society. The very limited impact of civil society on politics in Turkey confirms this situation.⁹⁸

In terms of conflict resolution and social peacebuilding, civil society's work is limited.⁹⁹ The issue of political engagement limits these institutions much more in conflict resolution and peace-building, and in most cases, forces them to get in line with the policies of the political party or movement they are linked to. The fact that the civil society actors were almost ineffective in the Kurdish issue, especially after the July 2015 urban clashes, and unable to intervene is a good indication of the decisive influence of the political institutions on civil society.¹⁰⁰

Studies on the role of civil society in conflict resolution and civil peacebuilding underline seven critical functions of civil society: (1) the protection, (2) monitoring, (3) advocacy and public communication, (4) in-group socialization, (5) social cohesion, (6) intermediation and facilitation, and (7) service delivery.¹⁰¹ From the perspective of these functions with regard to the Kurdish conflict, NGOs, even if in a limited scope, are still able to provide protection of citizens, monitoring and

98 For more details on the weakness of the civil society in Turkey see Çelik, A. Betül, "Turkey: The Kurdish Question and the Coercive State," Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Concepts, Cases, Lessons*, Boulder, Lynne Reiner, 2009, pg. 153-179.

99 For more details regarding the NGOs working on conflict resolution and social peacebuilding in Turkey see Anadolu Kültür, *Sivil Toplumun Kürt Sorununun Çözümüne Etkin Katılımı İçin Kapasite Geliştirme: STK Görüşmeleri Raporu*, İstanbul, Anadolu Kültür, 05.12.2010, <http://yeni.hafiza-merkezi.org/kay-nak/sivil-toplumun-kurt-sorununun-cozumune-etkin-katilimi-icin-kapasite-gelistirme-projesi-stk-gorusmeleri-raporu/>, Accessed: 19.05.2017.

100 For more details on the role of the NGOs in the conflict resolutions and peacebuilding, the Resolution Process in particular see, Çiçek, Cuma, *NGOs at the 2013-2015 Resolution Process*, İstanbul, Peace Foundation, 2018.

101 Thania Paffenholz (ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Concepts, Cases, Lessons*, Boulder, Lynne Reiner, 2009; Paffenholz, Thania and Spurk, Christoph, "Civil Society, Civic Engagement, and Peacebuilding," *Social Development Papers: Conflict Prevention ve Reconstruction*, Paper No. 36, World Bank, October 2006.

accountability, and the service delivery. However, they seem to be unable to perform nearly none of the remaining four functions.¹⁰² One of the most important needs for the termination of the Kurdish conflict is to build a peace movement capable of effective advocacy and public communication, in-group socialization and the construction of a culture of peace, mediation and facilitation.

Media

The media is the last actor at the local-national level, which has a role in ending the Kurdish conflict and building social peace. Until now, the mainstream media has taken a statist attitude in the Kurdish conflict and remained within the limits set by the state. Ragıp Duran coined a phrase “epaulet media” referring to the role of the mainstream media in the Kurdish issue.¹⁰³ In addition to the political culture which is dominated in Turkey by nationalism and statism, mainstream media outlets belong to large capital groups and again the relations between the capital and politics are the most conducive to this situation.

Apart from the mainstream media, there have been significant developments in the opposition media, especially in the field of television. For example, IMC TV, which adopted a broadcasting policy in favor of social peace, was an important experience. However, almost all of the alternative media outlets were shut down due to the OHAL announced after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016. Today, it is not possible to talk about a mainstream media outlet that can reach large sections of the society with a message about the end of the conflict and social peacebuilding.

Cross-border and international actors

It is not only the local-national actors that determine the formation of the Kurdish issue and the conflict. In addition, the US, the EU, Russia, Iran, and the KRI are key actors determining the course of affairs. Turkey’s EU accession process was the main dynamic framing the Kurdish issue between the years 1999-2005. However, with the 2003 US intervention in Iraq and establishment of the IKR, which in 2005 began to attain relative stability, geopolitics became the main dynamic framing the Kurdish issue. A radical rupture in the geopolitical equation of the Kurdish issue

¹⁰² Çelik, *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Duran, Ragıp, *Apoletli Medya*, İstanbul, Belge Yayınları, 2000.

caused by the KRI was followed in 2012 by the *de facto* Kurdish region (Rojava) established in Syria. In the aftermath of the Syrian civil war and the establishment of Rojava, which created a kind of second geopolitical breaking point, the United States, Russia, Iran, and KRI have become more and more decisive actors. Today, the US plays a direct role in the construction of the political and administrative structure in both KRI and Rojava. On the other hand, Russia, in Syria as much as the US in Rojava, are influential actors and directly cooperate with the Kurds. Iran is involved in military and political processes in both Iraq and Syria. Finally, KRI's quest for independence will clearly have an immediate impact on the Kurdish issue in both Syria and Turkey.

3.5. Third parties

Another actor-based dynamic that determines the formation of intra-state conflicts is the issue of third parties. The matter of a third-party is an important problem area in the Kurdish conflict. KCK demands the mediation of international actors such as the United States. They openly stated their demands both during and after the Resolution Process. On the other hand, the AK Party government does not find it appropriate to involve international actors in the process. For example, emphasizing the "national," "domestic," "unique" nature of the Resolution Process it openly opposed the involvement of international actors. This was one of the most important areas of dispute that had an impact on the failure of the last settlement process. Likewise, the most important problem that caused the collapse of the process after the Dolmabahçe meeting was the Monitoring Delegation crisis.

3.6. Power-sharing

The final actor-based dynamic is power sharing. With regard to this matter, there are significant obstacles emerging in relation to the Kurdish conflict. Turkey's administrative and political structure is a highly centralized one, rooted in state tradition. The Ottoman centralization policies, which began in the 19th century, became even stiffer with the construction of the Republic as a centralized unitary nation-state. Concerns about "unitary state structure" and "indivisible unity of the country and the nation" raised by the Kurdish question and efforts to protect these structures fostered a tradition of centralization of administrative and political power in Turkey. Within this structure, local administrations were very weak against the center and the double (appointed - elected) administrative system was built. In the case of local governments, which

are already weak in the face of the center, the appointed-elected balance (governorships and municipalities) is dominated by those who are appointed.

Along with the EU accession process, while there were discussions and reform efforts aimed at strengthening local governments against the center,¹⁰⁴ highly centralized unitary state structures were largely preserved. To sum up, there is a local government system that is weak against the center, does not have a political identity and is under administrative and financial tutelage. With the constitutional amendments approved by the referendum on 16 April 2017, a kind of presidential system *alla Turca* was adopted, based on executive against the legislative and judiciary, weak balance and control mechanisms and very weak local administrations against the center.

Conclusion

This chapter examined main parameters determining the Kurdish issue and conflict in Turkey taking into account the main dynamics informing intra-state conflicts formation. In this context, firstly, cross-border and international dynamics are examined which show that the Kurdish issue is a cross-border and international problem. It has been suggested that the geopolitical dynamics of the Kurdish issue have become important especially in recent years due to the cross-border/regional and international nature of the problem.

Second, the structural dynamics at the national level that the actors could not get involved in or can only change in the long-term, in other words, Turkey's socio-economic and socio-political parameters are discussed. To this end, socio-economic development level, Turkey's economy's place in the world, income inequality, regional socioeconomic inequalities, the level of democracy, the regional differentiation in the levels of development of democracy in Turkey, the principal ethnic and religious groups and power relations between them, types of intra-state conflicts, geography of conflicts, population and the diaspora are examined in a historical and comparative perspective.

¹⁰⁴ For more details about local democracy, problems and changes in recent times see Semerci, Pınar Uyan (Eds.), *Yerel Demokrasi Sorunsalı: Büyükşehir Belediye Meclisleri Yapısı ve İşleyişi*, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2015.

Finally, the actor-based parameters are examined. In this context, the duration of the conflict in Turkey, cost of the conflict i.e. the number of casualties and displaced persons, government capacity, including the quantitative and qualitative status of security forces, the political subjectivity of the main actors influencing the conflict, third-party issues and power-sharing are among the fundamental dynamics discussed here.

The next chapter discusses the possibilities and limits of a new reconciliation process that will enable termination of the Kurdish conflict and a political resolution to the Kurdish issue, by taking into consideration world experiences, previous dialogue processes and quests for reconciliation since the 1990s, the failed Resolution Process and the main parameters of the Kurdish conflict.

8

RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS IN THE KURDISH CONFLICT: POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS

Kurdish conflict in Turkey has lasted over three decades. Clashes resumed after the 2013-2015 failed Resolution Process, which had created a great hope among the public for a political resolution and reconciliation. Nevertheless, the dynamics that emerged during the new conflict apply not only to the political resolution to the Kurdish issue but also make it a necessity to protect Turkish democratic heritage and political domain, even if they are limited. Is there any possibility of a return to dialogue and negotiation in the Kurdish conflict after the urban clashes that led to major demolitions, the subsequent military coup attempt and the state of emergency that caused a major blow to the democratic accumulation of the country? What dynamics can make such a turn possible? This chapter is essentially an attempt to answer these questions.

In the Second Chapter which discusses the basic parameters that determine the formation of intra-state conflicts occurring at different times and places, it was underlined that we should look at three levels of dynamics in order to answer these questions; (1) international and cross-border/regional dynamics; (2) structural dynamics at a country level; and (3) dynamics related to actors. The first group of dynamics refers to the position of international actors in the war and the situation of neighboring countries. The second group dictates the structural limits of the playground and the rules of the game. The dynamics in the last group point to the actors' perceptions, ideas, interests, institutions, resources, and strategies.

Given the dynamics of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey, one could hypothetically argue: (1) the fate of the Kurdish conflict depends on the disappearance of uncertainty in Syria and Iraq, where international and cross-border/regional actors are involved. (2) The structural dynamics at the country level show that the possibility of a military solution to the Kurdish conflict is very low and the possibility of negotiated settlement is high. (3) Finally, in the actor-based dynamics, the cost of conflicts, the duration of the conflict and the dynamics of the state capacity show that

the possibility of a military solution in the Kurdish conflict is very low and the possibility of a negotiated settlement is high. On the other hand, actor-based dynamics such as political subjectivities, power-sharing, third-parties participation, and official treaties do not in current situation support a negotiated settlement. However, if international and regional conditions change, the position of political subjects who do not support a negotiated settlement may change. Table 8.1 shows the basic parameters and hypotheses which are classified into three groups.

Table 8.1. Basic parameters determining the formation of intra-state conflicts

<i>Dynamic</i>	<i>Impact of conflict resolution</i>
<hr/>	
Cross-border/regional and international dynamics	
International dynamics	Negative
Cross-border or regional dynamics	Negative
<hr/>	
Structural dynamics at the country level	
Socio-economic development level	Positive
Democracy level	Positive
Conflict type (identity-based, socioeconomic-based?)	Positive
Ethnic/national dominance	Positive
Conflict area (region based)	Positive
Conflict area (characteristics of the conflict geography)	Positive
Conflict area (number of shared boundaries)	Positive
Population size	Positive
Diaspora	Positive
<hr/>	
Actor-based dynamics	
Cost of conflicts	Positive
Duration of clashes	Positive
State capacity	Positive
Political subjectivities	Negative
Power-sharing	Negative
Participation of third parties	Negative
Official treaties	Negative
<hr/>	

In addition to the dynamics of the table, there is a direct relationship between the Kurdish conflict and the recently emerging state crisis which largely continues until today. The Kurdish issue is directly affected by the state crisis while at the same time it is deepening the state crisis. This is because the Kurdish issue is instrumentalized in the power struggle between the hegemonic powers in Ankara. In this chapter, it is suggested that the course of Kurdish conflict will be shaped as much by the course of the state crisis, as by the dynamics classified into three groups above.

In the light of these arguments, in the first subsection, the cross-border/regional and international parameters are examined in the context of the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish conflict. In the second subsection, structural variables on the national scale are discussed. The actor-based dynamics are discussed in detail in the third subsection. Finally, the relationship between the state crisis and the Kurdish issue in Turkey and the impact of the crisis on the course of the Kurdish conflict are examined.

1. Cross-border/regional and international dynamics and possibilities for a return to the negotiation

When we look at the Kurdish conflict in the context of cross-border/regional and international dynamics, it can be said that the possibilities for a return to negotiations will be shaped largely by the ongoing uncertainty in Syria and Iraq. Political developments in Syria and Iraq will determine the cross-border/regional and international dynamics of Turkey's Kurdish issue. Such global powers as the US and Russia are actors that are directly involved in both countries. On the other hand, both Syria and Iraq directly determine the formation of the cross-border and regional context of the Kurdish issue in Turkey due to their status as Turkish neighbors and their own Kurdish issues. Furthermore, there are multidirectional and multidimensional interactions between the Kurdish issues in all three countries, both at the level of states and non-state actors.

1.1. Syria


The civil war in Syria continues since 2011 with the involvement of such global powers as the US and Russia, and regional actors such as Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel. The actors mentioned above are directly or indirectly involved in the political dialogue to solve the problem.

The key matter that renders Syria's importance in the context of Turkey's Kurdish conflict is the fact that the Syrian Kurds under the leadership of PYD, a sister organization of PKK, became an important actor geographically, politically and militarily in the Syrian problem. The Kurds, one of the most influential actors in the anti-ISIS war in Syria, are almost the only local actors who can speak directly with the three critical actors in the field - the US, Russia, and Assad. On the other hand, despite the direct relationship between the AK Party government and the PYD, including several meetings in Ankara with its former leader, Salih Müslim, during the Resolution Process, the dominant political elites in Turkey see the Kurdish organization under the PYD leadership as an "existential issue."¹ In August 2016 Turkey in cooperation with the FSA created in northern Syria, in the *de facto* Kurdish region (Rojava) a buffer zone in Jerablus, located between the two cantons of Efrîn and Kobanê, effectively preventing the geographical unification of the three Kurdish cantons. On January 20, 2018, the Turkish troops and the FSA groups initiated a military operation towards Efrîn and took control of the area on March 18, 2018. Today, Turkey maintains its military presence in the region and constitutes one of the most important regional actors in the Syrian issue.

Syria is currently divided into six regions (see Map 8.1). (1) The Assad administration, with the support of Russia and Iran, controls the region from Aleppo in the north to Daraa in the south along with the eastern part of the country, and the central part. (2) The territory of Rojava/North and East Syria, which stretches from the Iraqi border to Aleppo in the north, along the border with Turkey and along the Euphrates river and in the south to Deir Ez-Zor, is under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under PYD leadership. The US supports the military and political entities in Rojava/North and East Syria. (3) The Jerablus and Efrîn regions of Northern Syria is under the control of Turkish and FSA forces. (4) In the Idlib province, just off Hatay, there are many Islamic groups supported by the US, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. The most influential group in this region is Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham HTS (ex Al-Nusra), which was the Syrian branch of al-Qaeda. (5) ISIL controls the eastern and southern parts of the Deir Ez-Zor region on the Syrian-Iraqi border. (6) Finally, in the southwestern part of Syria, Israel controls the Golan Heights.

¹ International Crisis Group, *Syria's Kurds: A Struggle Within a Struggle*, Middle East Report N 136, 22.01.2013.

Map 8.1. Civil War in Syria and the existing socio-political and military regions



- 1 Government & pro-government forces: Assad, Russia, Iran
- 2 Kurds: YPG, Syrian Democratic Forces
- 3 FSA, moderate rebels (many groups: Ahrar Al Sham, Jaish al Islam etc), more radical groups like Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham HTS (ex Al-Nusra)
- 4 FSA groups and Turkish troops
- 5 Islamic State
- 6 Golan Heights- controlled by Israel

Source: <https://syria.liveuamap.com/en/>, Accessed: 10.10.2018.

Since 2012 there have been multiple initiatives with the participation of many partners to end the civil war in Syria. These attempts, however, have failed to produce a result that would end the civil war in the country. In the current situation, there are two processes to end the civil war: Geneva Talks and Astana Talks. In both processes, PYD-led Kurds and Salafi jihadist groups and ISIL are not involved. The last time when the Syrian government and Syrian opposition groups came together with UN mediation in Geneva took place in July 2017. So far the Geneva Talks have not provided any tangible progress.

On the other hand, the first Astana Talks² led by Russia, Turkey, and Iran took place in January 2017. During the fourth round of talks held in May 2017 in Astana Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed on the creation of “de-escalation zones.” The designated “de-escalation zones” include the Idlib Province and some areas in the neighboring provinces of Aleppo, Latakia and Hama, an area north of Homs, the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta, and a couple of provinces in southern Syria - Daraa and Al-Quneitra.³ In October 2017, an operation was launched to protect the ceasefire in Idlib province. According to the reached agreement, Russia was to provide security around Idlib, and Turkey in the center of the city.⁴ TSK established the first surveillance post on October 13, 2017 and the second one on 27 October.⁵ TSK completed the establishment of 12 posts within the city in May 2018.⁶

In 2018, Assad regime took under control of the three non-conflict zones outside Idlib, with the support of Russia and Iran. Within the framework of the agreements reached, armed groups from different organizations in the three regions were allowed to move to Idlib region. The military operations of the Assad regime with the support of Russia and Iran to take control of Idlib were temporarily stopped by Turkey’s mediation as of September 2018.⁷ On the other hand, direct talks between the Syrian Democratic Forces and the Damascus administration took place first on July 27, 2018. To this day there has been no tangible conclusion of the talks.

The ongoing civil war in Syria brought high economic, social and security costs for Turkey. Trade relations with the longest border neighbor of

2 Arslan, Rengin, “İklere Sahne Olan Astana Görüşmeleri Başladı,” *BBC Türkçe*, 23.01.2017, <http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-38714279>, Accessed: 16.02.2017.

3 TASS - Russian News Agency, “Russia, Turkey and Iran continue cooperation on de-escalation zones in Syria,” TASS - Russian News Agency, 23.06.2017, <http://tass.com/world/953004>, Accessed:28.06.2017.

4 Sputnik Türkiye, “Türkiye’nin İdlib operasyonu,” *Sputnik Türkiye*, 08.10.2017, <https://tr.sputniknews.com/trend/turkiye-idlib-suriye-oso-tsk-isis/>, Accessed: 18.11.2017.

5 NTV, “İdlib’de 2’nci gözlem noktası oluşturuldu,” *NTV*, 27.10.2017, https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/idlibde-2nci-gozlem-noktasi-olusturuldu,y2qtHpk_Eo-BswE4PIQew, Accessed: 18.11.2017.

6 Asan, Yasemi, “Türkiye İdlib’e 8 üs kuracak,” *Yeni Şafak*, 21.10.2017, <http://www.yenisafak.com/dunya/turkiye-idlibe-8-us-kuracak-2804073>, Accessed: 18.11.2017.

7 Press TV, “Russia, Turkey agree on borders of buffer zone in Syria’s idlib province,” *Press TV*, 22.09.2018, <https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/09/22/574829/Syria-Idlib-Russia-Turkey-buffer-zone-terrorists-Sochi>, Accessed: 10.10.2018.

Turkey came to a halt. On the other hand, the number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey is over 3.5 million,⁸ causing social and economic problems. However, for the dominant military and political elite, in addition to the economic and social costs, “the Syrian issue is a critical security issue for Turkey.”⁹ According to this approach, the deterioration of relations with Turkey’s eastern and northern neighbors and its allies stemming from the civil war in Syria, on the other hand, “the problem of terrorism due to the power vacuum created by the failed state system,” create a major security problem for Turkey.¹⁰

Today in Turkey, the AK Party government sees the PYD-led Kurdish region and its relations with the USA as an important safety issue. Government officials say they will not allow a Kurdish entity in northern Syria. For example, President R. T. Erdoğan expressed this policy of the state on June 23, 2017: “the PYD/YPG are after something. No matter who is behind you or with you, you should know that the Republic of Turkey with its the armed forces, with all its means will never permit the establishment of a state in northern Syria.”¹¹

In August 2016 Turkey directly intervened in the Syrian war launching in Jerablus a joint military operation with the FSA, the “Euphrates Shield,” to prevent the possibility of the unification of three Kurdish cantons between the Iraqi border and Hatay under PYD leadership.¹² As part of Astana Talks Turkey also wanted to expand the safe-zone in Idlib to Efrîn to completely eliminate the possibility of the PYD-corridor in the southern border going to the Mediterranean Sea. On October 24, 2017, in his speech at the party group meeting gave the message that Turkey at any moment can enter Efrîn: “The operation in Idlib is largely completed. Now it’s time for Efrîn. They all are a threat to us. As I have

8 Göç İdaresi, “Geçici Koruma,” T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, 05.10.2018, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/gecici-koruma_363_378_4713_icerik, Accessed: 10.10.2018.

9 Yalçın, Hasan Basri and Duran, Burhanettin, “Giriş: Suriye’de İç Savaş, Vekâlet ve Yıpratma,” Hasan Basri Yalçın and Burhanettin Duran (Ed.), *Küresel ve Bölgesel Aktörlerin Suriye Stratejileri* içinde, İstanbul, SETA Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı Kitapları, 2016, pg. 7-21.

10 Yalçın and Duran, *Ibid.*, pg. 11.

11 Sabah, “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Kuzey Suriye’de bir devlet kurulmasına asla müsaade etmeyeceğiz,” *Sabah*, 23.06.2017, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/gun-dem/2017/06/24/cumhurbaşkanı-erdogan-konusuyor-1498236378>, Accessed: 28.07.2017.

12 Acun, Can and Keskin, Bünyamin, *PKK’nin Kuzey Suriye Örgütlenmesi PYD- YPG*, Revised 2 Edition, İstanbul, SETA Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2017, pg. 9.

said before, 'We can enter at any moment, we can hit at any moment.'¹³ In fact, Turkey initiated a military operation towards Efrîn with the support of the FSA groups, and took the control of the area after a three-months-long fighting. According to the Turkish Armed Forces, 54 Turkish soldiers lost their lives and 233 soldiers were injured, while the SDF lost 4,448 troops during the fighting.¹⁴ On the other hand, the SDF stated that they lost 820 members, while 500 civilians lost their lives and over 1,030 were injured.¹⁵

On the other hand, since the Euphrates Shield operation, the development of cooperation between the US with the SDF, of which YPG and YPJ are backbone, was the most important reason behind the escalation of the crisis between Turkey and the US. Turkey-US relations faced a serious crisis, especially during the operation against Raqqa, the ISIL's main headquarters. Against Turkey's protest and proposal of direct intervention in Raqqa, the US chose to cooperate with the US-armed SDF to intervene in Raqqa. The cooperation between the United States and the SDF continued with an operation against the city of Deir Ez-Zor.

While Turkey considers the formation of a PYD-led Kurdish corridor in the North of Syria as an existential problem, the PYD continues to strengthen its presence and the capability of being almost the only local actor who can cooperate with the three key actors in the Syrian crisis. PYD has still relations with Russia, despite Russia's support to Turkey in the Efrîn war, and continues a dialogue with Assad administration in many areas, especially in Cizîr. On the other hand, the PYD works with the US in the regions of Kobanê, Cizîr, Raqqa, and Deir Ez-Zor. Today, the SDF is the most important force of the US-led International Coalition's anti-ISIL war in Syria. SDF is estimated to have 72,000 troops, 60,000 of which are YPG-YPJ.¹⁶

13 Euronews, "Erdoğan: İdlib neticelendi, sıra Afrin'de," Euronews, 24.10.2017, <http://tr.euronews.com/2017/10/24/erdogan-idlib-neticelendi-sira-afrinde>, Accessed: 11.18.2017.

14 Mynet, TSK, Afrin'deki Zeytin Dalı Harekatı'nın bilançosunu açıkladı," Mynet, 11.05.2018, <https://www.mynet.com/tsk-afrin-deki-zeytin-dali-harekati-nin-bilancosunu-acikladi-110104114040>, Accessed: 10.10.2018.

15 Artı Gerçek, "Afrin Özerk Yönetimi: Güçlerimiz Afrin'in her yerindedir," Artı Gerçek, 18.03.2018, <https://www.artigercek.com/haberler/afrin-ozerk-yonetimi-guclerimiz-afrin-in-her-yerindedir>, Accessed: 10.10.2018.

16 Syrian Civil War Map, "Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)," *Syrian Civil War Map*, <http://syriancivilwarmap.com/syrian-democratic-forces/>, Accessed: 28.06.2017. On the other hand, according to some sources YPG-YPJ has 30,000 troops. See: Acun ve Keskin, *Ibid.*, pg. 27.

In addition to military power, a significant progress has been made in the political sphere. The socio-political movement led by the PYD, which has ruled Rojava since 2012, declared on 17 March 2016 the Northern Syrian Federation consisting of three cantons.¹⁷ Moreover, in the local elections held on 22 September 2017, 3,732 representatives of villages, districts, and sub-districts were elected.¹⁸ On September 07, 2018, Syrian Democratic Council, the political wing of the Syrian Democratic Forces, announced that they formed a general administration “to coordinate the autonomous administrations in the region, to fill the void in administration and security and to act in accordance with the administrative system formed previously in Eastern and Northern Syria.”¹⁹ Even though the Federation is not officially recognized at the international arena, it has relations with many countries, particularly the US, Russia, and France, in many areas from the socio-economic spheres to the cultural, administrative and the political has been highly institutionalized.²⁰

The most concrete proposal reflected in the public opinion about post-war socio-political reconstruction in Syria came from Russia. Critical issues that come to the fore in the Draft Constitution that Russia presented to the parties in Astana Talks²¹ are as follows: first of all, a culturally and religiously pluralist Syria is proposed. On the one hand, while emphasizing the “national unity” and “territorial integrity of Syria,” on the other hand, the “protection of cultural diversity” which is understood as a national heritage is guaranteed. According to this, “The only source of sovereignty is the multicultural and multi-faith Syrian people.” Secondly, a secular Syria is envisaged. In this context, while religious freedoms are secured, on the other hand, the equality of religions before the law is ensured. “The State shall respect all religions and religious organizations, and ensure

17 BBC Türkçe, “Suriyeli Kürtler federasyon ilan etti, Şam ‘tanııyoruz’ dedi,” *BBC Türkçe*, 17.03.2016, http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2016/03/160317_suriye_federasyon, Accessed: 28.06.2017.

18 Deutsche Welle Türkçe, “Suriyeli Kürtler federal sistem için sandığı gitti,” *Deutsche Welle Türkçe*, 22.09.2017, <http://www.dw.com/tr/suriyeli-kürtler-federal-sistem-için-sandığa-gitti/a-40646592>, Accessed: 16.10.2017.

19 ANF News, “Northern and Eastern Syria Autonomous Administration formed,” ANF News, 06.09.2018, <https://anfenglishmobile.com/news/northern-and-eastern-syria-autonomous-administration-formed-29464>, Accessed: 10.10.2018.

20 Taştekin, Fehim, *Rojava: Kürtlerin Zamanı*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2016; Duman, Yasin, *Rojava: Bir Demokratik Özerklik Deneyimi*, İstanbul, İletişim, 2016.

21 Sputnik Türkiye, “Suriye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası'nın Tam Metni,” *Sputnik Türkiye*, 02.02.2017, <https://tr.sputniknews.com/ortadogu/201702021027032657-suriye-cumhuriyeti-anayasasi/> Accessed: 16.02.2017.

the freedom to perform all the rituals that do not prejudice public order. Religious organizations shall be equal before the law.” Thirdly, Syria will have a unitary state structure. Finally, the political regime is based on a bicameral assembly and a presidential system.

Considering the Draft Constitution in the context of the Kurdish issue, the following come to the fore: firstly, the name “Syrian Republic” is proposed instead of the current “Syrian Arab Republic.” Secondly, cultural autonomy for the Kurds is recognized. Article 15 of the Draft Constitution states that “The law shall state the status of the Kurdish Cultural Autonomy.” Thirdly, according to the draft, the Kurdish Cultural Autonomy with its governing institutions and organizations will use Arabic and Kurdish equally. In addition, “Each region shall have the right to use another language in addition to the official language as is regulated by the law, if such use was approved by a locally held referendum.” Finally, the right to education in the native language is guaranteed in both public and private schools.

It is almost impossible to foresee how and when the stalemate in the Syrian civil war will be overcome. However, it can be said that the political resolution to end the civil war in Syria is a stronger option than in the previous years, especially after the Astana talks in January 2017. The decline of ISIL, the loss of Aleppo and Daraa by fundamentalist Islamist Arab opposition and their isolation within Idlib province, the strengthening of the Assad regime and the consolidation of the Kurds in the north strengthened the political resolutions. With the progress towards a political resolution and the end of proxy wars, regional uncertainty will decrease and it can be foreseen that the sides of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey will be forced to take a new position.

In case of the establishment of a federal solution in Syria and creation of a Kurdish federal region, the existential concerns of Turkey will probably rise. On the other hand, a decentralized solution based on regional autonomy or local autonomy not based on ethnic/national identity can contribute to a similar decentralization and a solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The Draft Constitution presented by Russia to the parties in Astana negotiations strengthens the possibility of decentralization in Syria. On the other hand, the political and military accomplishments of the Kurds, especially after seizing control of the cities of Raqqa and Deir Ez-Zor, strengthen the possibility of a federative solution.

1.2. Iraq

KRI, a federated state in Iraq, has been openly seeking independence for the last few years. After several unsuccessful attempts and lengthy discussions, the political actors of the IKR decided to go to the referendum on independence. On June 6, 2017, following a parliamentary meeting headed by the president of the IKR, Massoud Barzani, with political parties, government officials and the Supreme Electoral Council, a referendum on independence was announced to be held on September 25, 2017. In addition to the provinces of Erbil, Duhok and Sulaymaniyah already in the KRI, disputed regions such as Kirkuk, which are outside the region, were included in the referendum.²²

Iraq's central government, Turkey and Iran responded against the referendum. The Iraqi government spokesperson, Saad al-Hadithi, said that "no party independently of the other parties can unilaterally decide on the future of Iraq." On the other hand, a written statement issued by Turkey's Foreign Affairs Ministry stated that against the advice and warnings given by Turkey to the KRI administration, the independence decision was a grave mistake.²³ Iran stated that "the Islamic Republic of Iran's stance in support of Iraq' unity and integrity is clear and simple. Iraqi Kurdistan Region is a part of the Republic of Iraq."²⁴ According to Iran, "an integrated, stable and democratic Iraq guarantees the interests of people of every ethnic origin and religion."²⁵

In addition to the neighboring countries, global powers such as the US, the EU, and Russia did not support the referendum decision. US State Department spokesperson Heather Nauert stated that their priorities in Iraq are fighting ISIL and expressed their support for "a united, stable, democratic and federal Iraq."²⁶ On the other hand, the joint statement of the EU Foreign Ministers meeting reads "the Iraqi parties shall avoid

22 Rûdaw, "Kürdistan 25 Eylül'de referanduma gidiyor!," *Rûdaw*, 07.06.2017, <http://www.rudaw.net/turkish/kurdistan/070620173>, Accessed: 03.07.2017.

23 Deutsche Welle Türkçe, "Ankara ve Bağdat'tan İKBY referandumuna tepki," *Deutsche Welle Türkçe*, 09.06.2017, <http://www.dw.com/tr/ankara-ve-bagdat-tan-ikby-referandumuna-tepki/a-39176559>, Accessed: 03.07.2017.

24 Gazete Duvar, "İran'dan Kürdistan tepkisi," *Gazete Duvar*, 10.06.2017, <http://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/dunya/2017/06/10/irandan-kurdistan-tepkisi/>, Accessed: 03.07.2017.

25 Gazete Duvar, *Ibid*.

26 Evrensel, "ABD'den Federal Kürdistan referandumunu değerlendirmesi," *Evrensel*, 09.06.2017, <https://www.evrensel.net/haber/322809/abdden-federal-kurdistan-referandumu-degerlendirmesi>, Accessed: 03.07.2017.

taking unilateral steps and solve their issues based on dialogue and the constitution.”²⁷ Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that the problems between Iraq and the KRI should be solved through dialogue and that they are in favor of the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.²⁸

The only support for the KRI’s referendum on independence came from Israel. In a speech to a delegation of the Republican members of the US Congress, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the Kurds are brave pro-Western people who share their values and expressed support for the establishment of an independent Kurdistan in the *de facto* sovereign KRI.²⁹

Despite the lack of support for the referendum decision from neighboring countries and global powers except for Israel, the President of the KRI, Barzani, said in an interview with France 24 that the referendum decision would not be revoked. Barzani, in response to criticism of the timing, said that it was not too early for a referendum decision, but the opposite, it was too late: “If we wait for all of Iraq’s problems to be solved, this will never happen. Because since the fall of the Baath regime in 2003, problems have increased day by day, the solution could not be developed. We have always postponed the referendum for 14 years, but now we will not postpone it. We can’t wait anymore.”³⁰

A week before the referendum, especially Turkey, Iran and Iraq’s central government and regional states, such global actors as the US, EU and Russia demanded postponement and cancellation of the referendum. Political, economic and military threats, as well as some economic sanctions, such as closing border gates and airspace of neighboring countries, intensified. However, despite all this opposition, the Kurdistan Independence Referendum was held on September 25, 2017. In a peacefully

27 Rûdaw, “AB’den referandum açıklaması,” *Rûdaw*, 19.06.2017, <http://www.rudaw.net/turkish/world/19062017/>, Accessed: 03.07.2017.

28 Russian News Agency, “Russian diplomat says issues between Baghdad and Kurds should be solved through talks,” *Russian News Agency*, 08.06.2017, <http://tass.com/politics/950577>, Accessed: 03.07.2017.

29 JPost Editorial, “An Independent Kurdistan,” *The Jerusalem Post*, 16.08.2017, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/An-independent-Kurdistan-502625>, Accessed: 18.07.2017.

30 Rûdaw, “Başkan Barzani: Kanlı bir savaş çıkar,” *Rûdaw*, 21.06.2017, http://www.rudaw.net/mobile/turkish/kurdistan/21062017?ctlo0_phMainContainer_phMain_ControlComments1_gvCommentsChangePage=1_5, Accessed: 03.07.2017.

held referendum, 72% of the 4.6 million eligible voters cast their ballots and 92.73% of the voters voted for the independence of Kurdistan.³¹

The KRI officials announced that they would not declare independence immediately after the referendum. Rather, they offered to initiate a new negotiation process with the Baghdad administration, based on the results of the referendum on independence. On the other hand, the Iraqi administration conditioned the negotiations on the annulment of the referendum results. The Iraqi government requested Turkey and Iran to close border crossings and military exercises took place in the border regions of both countries. In addition, Bagdat closed the KRI's airspace and canceled all international flights.

As the parties were still exchanging statements, three weeks after the referendum, on October 16, 2017, the Iraqi army and Hashd al-Shaabi entered Kirkuk. Within a few days, the Iraqi army and the Hashd al-Shaabi forces took control of all the disputed regions without any significant fighting. In other words, the KRI had to retreat from 40% of the lands it controlled before the referendum. The presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for November 1, 2017, in the KRI were postponed for an eight-month period. Also, on 1 November, when his term expired, Massoud Barzani, the president of the KRG, sent a letter to the parliament, saying that he did not wish to extend his term and stepped down from office. In a parliamentary vote, Barzani's duties were handed over to the parliamentary presidency, the government and the Supreme Council of Justice. Barzani sent a message to the parliament that he would continue the struggle as a peshmerga:³²

On October 24, 2017, the parliament of Kurdistan extended the term of the Regional government and its parliament for two terms.

I refuse to continue the position of president of the Region after November 1, 2017, and the presidential law of the Region should not be amended, nor should the term of the Regional Presidency be extended. You should, therefore, meet at your earliest convenience to ensure there is no legal vacuum in the execution of the duties and powers of the president of the Region and resolve this subject.

31 Rûdaw, "Resmi Sonuç - Yüzde 92.73 Evet!," *Rûdaw*, 27.09.2017, <http://www.rudaw.net/turkish/kurdistan/270920177>, Accessed: 16.10.2017.

32 Rûdaw, "Başkan Barzani: Bir peşmerge olarak mücadeleye devam edeceğim," *Rûdaw*, 29.10.2017, <http://www.rudaw.net/turkish/kurdistan/291020179>, Accessed: 19.11.2017.

Moreover, I, as Massoud Barzani the Peshmerga, will continue with our nation and beloved Peshmerga in endeavors to achieve the just rights of our nation and protect the achievements of our nation.

After the referendum, the takeover without significant resistance of the disputed regions by the Iraqi army with the support of Hashd al-Shaabi, and the fact that the international actors, especially the US, left the KRG alone, raised important debates among the Kurdish actors on three issues. First, the historical cracks between the KDP and the YNK surfaced. The unending “betrayal” debates and accusations are the most important symptoms of this. The ongoing political rivalry between the KDP-YNK has prevented the building of common institutional structures in many areas, especially in such military areas as peshmerga, security, and intelligence, bringing criticism for the continuation of historical divisions. Secondly, the long-standing alliance of the Kurds with the US and the reliance on this alliance for the sociopolitical structures began to be critically questioned. Moreover, these criticisms and discussions extended to include the existing cooperation between the PYD and the US in Syria. Finally, foreign dependency in many areas, starting with military, political, economic and diplomatic fields, especially in socio-political areas as well as insufficiently ensured independent institutionalization started to be widely discussed in the public sphere.

Despite all these political, economic and military crises, the Kurdistan Independence Referendum opened a new era, not only in Iraq but also in the whole region, with many options for the Kurdish issue. After the referendum, the Kurds’ separation from Iraq and the establishment of an independent state seem to be deferred for now. The KRI administration continues to make conciliatory statements addressed to both the Iraqi central government and neighboring countries. On the other hand, a consensus has not been reached between the Baghdad administration and the IKR administration. Moreover, Massoud Barzani’s emphasis on remaining a “peshmerga” when he left the office and his continuing leadership of the KDP could be interpreted as keeping the option of independence on the agenda. Most importantly, it can be said that the three most powerful parties in the KRI experienced a serious leadership crisis which brought about a remarkable vacuum in the political sphere creating an environment open to new options. While Massoud Barzani was forced to give up his presidency, the opposition’s two largest parties, the YNK and the Goran Movement, recently lost their charismatic leaders, Jalal Talabani and Nashirwan Mustafa respectively. There is a remarkable leadership vacuum in both parties.

Continuing political uncertainty both in Iraq and Syria constitutes one of the most important obstacles to the solution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey and to ending the conflict-induced problems. In the current stage, it is almost impossible to solve the Kurdish issue in Turkey separately from the situations in Iraq and Syria. Multiple interactions, both at the level of state and non-state actors and at the level of the Kurds in these countries, require a cross-border/regional approach to the problem. The Kurdish issue and the Kurdish conflict in Turkey will follow a course of that regional equation.

Depending on the attitude towards the Kurdish question of the parties in Turkey one can see two different courses. First, like with the Resolution Process, the Turkish state and the leading Kurdish movement without waiting for the end of the uncertainty can move towards a political resolution with a cross-border/regional perspective in mind and manage the uncertainty. For this to happen, the parties, especially Turkey, must build a common and holistic framework for a resolution to the Kurdish issue in Syria. Secondly, the parties can wait for the disappearance of uncertainty to take a step towards a political resolution. In this case, the parties will probably take a stance that will strengthen their position, focusing on the weakening of the counter-parties. Considering that the uncertainty in Iraq and Syria will not disappear in the short term, such a trend will cause the Kurdish conflict to continue in the coming years.

2. Structural dynamics at the country level and the impossibility of a military victory

Cross-border/regional and international dynamics do not provide a clear picture of the termination of the Kurdish conflict. On the other hand, when the structural dynamics of the country are analyzed, it is seen that the probability of a military solution is quite low. The world experiences demonstrate that a military victory is rather unlikely in a country characterized by low socioeconomic development level, underdeveloped or limited democracy, deepening identity-based polarization between ethnic/national groups, ethnic/national dominance, concentration of fighting in a specific geographical region, ongoing fighting in mountainous, forested or border regions, large population and significant diaspora.

First of all, socioeconomic inequalities and regional disparities are one of the important dynamics that feed conflicts. As discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, chronic deprivation and poverty in Kurdish regions

of Turkey and disparities between regions constitute one of the major obstacles to the termination of the conflict. The generations which grew up under conditions of inequality are a remarkable pool of human resources for the KCK, as the intensified clashes in urban areas between 2015-2017 show. This makes it easier to maintain fighting in terms of the organization, rendering the military victory impossible for the state. In this sense, socioeconomic underdevelopment and inter-regional inequality have the potential to increase violence, while at the same time they reinforce the option of a negotiated solution by making military victory impossible.

Secondly, it can be said that the situation of the level of socioeconomic development similarly applies to the level of democracy. Studies show that in countries with low levels of democracy, and in hybrid regimes, which is a type of a regime between authoritarian and democratic regimes, there is a high risk of conflict onset and continuation. In this sense, it can be argued that especially in an environment after 15 July 2016 when the limited democracy legacy eroded and democratic opposition opportunities shrank, the termination of violence and building social peace became ever more difficult. Moreover, in the Kurdish region as a result of urban clashes a year prior to the military coup attempt, the rule of law was nearly suspended and the political sphere collapsed.

However, it can be said that the current situation has created a ground for a negotiated solution by making the military victory impossible. In spite of all military “successes,” the organization’s potential for new militant gains and continuation of fighting is increasing. The military “successes” in an environment of eroded democracy and shrinking political sphere instead of weakening this potential, they strengthen it. The most important indicator of this is the military presence of the KCK in Syria. While between the years 2013-2015 the disarmament of estimated 5,000 - 7,000 armed militants was debated, today only in Syria the organization has over 60,000 troops, a remarkable part of them Kurds from Turkey.

Thirdly, identity-based conflicts tend to last longer compared to non-identity-based conflicts, and in such cases, peacebuilding and peacekeeping are more difficult. In fact, as conceptualized by Charles Tilly, one of the prominent scholars of social movements, the construction of “dual/multi sovereignty” is easier in such cases. Dual/multi sovereignty makes the military victory of the parties more difficult, causing conflicts to last longer. It is evident that the conflict in Turkey is identity-based.

Despite some interruptions, the conflict lasted for 34 years, revealing the difficulty of ending the fighting and building peace. On the other hand, this also shows that the negotiated solution is a more likely option.

Fourth, in Turkey, in a situation of a deepened ethnic/national polarization and of the dominance relations between ethnic/national groups the possibility of the onset and continuity of a conflict is much higher. As discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, the main political project of “ethno-nationalist unification of space and time” shaped socio-political, cultural and socio-economic life in Turkey and instilled the supremacy of Turkishness in all spheres. It can be argued that the real source of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is this policy. Despite all the reforms made by AK Party since 2002, the supremacy of Turkishness has been carefully preserved. In this sense, the core dynamic of the Kurdish conflict until today remains in place. Moreover, with the rise of Kurdish identity-based socio-political mobilization in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, the careful protection of the hegemony of Turkishness has become more visible. In sum, even if military progress in Turkey is noted, the current situation provides the organization with the possibilities of recruiting new militants and continuation of the fighting. It is important to note that as of today these opportunities have reached a cross-border level.

Fifth, it can be said that the geographic characteristics of the Kurdish area make military victory impossible. Research on intra-state conflicts in different times and places shows that military victory is more difficult in territorial conflicts concentrated in a certain region of the country. Because, in such cases, the rebels have a higher capacity to mobilize and maintain their armed activities than in the other cases. It is seen that the Kurdish conflict is a territorial conflict and concentrated in the Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country with some bomb attacks in Western metropolises. Another reason that makes the geography of the conflict important is the physical conditions of the region in question. Geographic features such as mountainous, forested and border regions that provide opportunities for uprising increase both the likelihood of intra-state conflicts and the duration of the conflict. The terrain of the Kurdish conflict is mostly mountainous and has borders with more than one country. The fact that there are Kurdish regions on the Iran, Iraq and Syria’s side of the border regions facilitates armed mobilization of the KCK. Despite numerous anti-KCK cross-border operations carried out during almost 30 years, today, the KCK continues to exist as a regional organization beyond the borders of Turkey. In sum, the physical

conditions of the Kurdish terrain have largely eliminated for the state the possibility of a military victory.

Finally, many studies underline the positive relationship between population and diaspora size and the capacity of rebels to resume fighting. The size of the Kurdish population in Turkey and especially the diaspora in Europe is another dynamic that weakens the state's prospects in terms of a military victory. There is a significant Kurdish population in Turkey. As the election results show, an important segment within this population is socio-politically different from Ankara. A party which on a national scale gets 10-13% of the votes, is capable in many cities of the Kurdish region to get the support of 50-90%. On the other hand, there is an important Kurdish diaspora that has entered the orbit of the socio-political movement in many regions, especially in Europe. The Kurdish diaspora is a human, material and institutional reservoir for the organization. The Kurdish population and its diaspora, which can be counted in millions, provide an important resource for the organization to continue the Kurdish conflict today.

In summary, almost all socioeconomic indicators clearly show that the Kurdish region is the poorest and most deprived region in the country. The country's already limited democratic accumulation took a major blow after the OHAL. Socio-political mobilization based on Kurdish identity is the most important fundament of the leading Kurdish Movement. As visible in the election results, the political agenda of the Kurdish area, political actors and priorities are largely dissociated from the general environment of Turkey. The supremacy of the Turkish identity over other ethnic/national identities continues. The conflict is largely concentrated in the Eastern part of the country. In addition, clashes take place in a terrain where mountainous areas are quite common and share borders with three countries. Beyond that, in Europe, there is a significantly politically mobilized Kurdish diaspora of considerable numbers expressed in millions. All these data render it almost impossible for the state to terminate the conflict through a military victory. On the other hand, the military victory of the organization is not a question. In this sense, the structural dynamics of Turkey by eliminating the option of a military victory, create the ground for a negotiated settlement.

The critical point here is that both the conflicting parties and the public reach a common understanding of the impossibility of a military solution and that it would cause a massive destruction due to above-mentioned

dynamics. The literature on the subject says that unless there is a shared perception of a mutually hurting stalemate, a negotiated settlement is not possible. At this point, it is necessary to look at the actor-based dynamics, alongside the cross-border/regional and international dynamics and the structural dynamics at the country scale.

3. Actor-based dynamics and the limits of a return to the negotiations

When we look at the actor-based dynamics, there is a dual picture. While such dynamics as the cost and the duration of the conflict, the state capacity support a negotiated solution; dynamics such as power-sharing, the role of third parties, formal treaties and political subjectivity create significant barriers to the termination of conflicts and social peacebuilding. In other words, while the dynamics related to actors that form over time at some point become structural features in favor of a negotiated solution, the dynamics related to the current position of the actors, work against such a solution.

3.1. Dynamics that facilitate the return to negotiations

First of all, it can be stated that as the losses caused by conflicts increase, the military solution becomes more difficult. Since these losses by increasing the polarization in a society, facilitate the formation of a dual or multi sovereignty. This allows the parties to reproduce the “combat capacity.” On the other hand, stopping the growing destruction and preventing the loss of lives is one of the most important motivating sources of a negotiated solution. It can be argued that the military solution is impossible when taking into account the loss of lives and forced displacement in the Kurdish conflict.

At this point, it is critical to note that in Turkey Kurdish identity goes beyond cultural identity, it is a political identity and it can be argued that it is built on “cost.”³³ The political Kurdish identity built on grave-mountain-dungeon-exile is being reproduced as fighting persists and the cost of conflict increases. In fact, as in most intra-state conflicts, in the

33 I use “cost” for the concept of “bedel” in Turkish. The “bedel” refers basically to a person’s perception and understanding that give a meaning or a reason for his/her loss. Therefore, they do not just lose their beloved ones, health, time or money, but rather, they pay a “bedel” for the sacred or honourable objectives.

Kurdish conflict, the first in the line of most of the groups involved in socio-political and armed mobilization processes are the people whose relatives are the actors in or victims of the conflict. Family-centered group identities and socialization processes are among the most important factors determining the dynamics of individual and group participation in collective action. In other words, the more the state tries to solve the problem by military means, the further it follows this path, the more it reinforces the Kurdish political identity and the socio-political and armed movement that centers around this identity. When the state achieves a military “success”, it is going to be nothing but re-producing of “the mountain-grave-dungeon-exile cycle.” Those who lost their lives end up in the grave, those captured end up in the dungeon, the angry ones go to the mountain, the prosecuted ones go into exile. The political Kurdish identity built on the “cost” of the grave, dungeon, mountain, and exile and the socio-political mobilization based on this identity are reproduced in a continuous cycle.

Secondly, the studies reveal a relationship between the “duration of conflict” and the “format of the termination” of the conflict. As discussed in detail in the Second Chapter, some studies show that the military victory of the rebels in the intra-state conflicts is possible in the first 5 years and the military victory of the state in the first 5-7 years. On the other hand, the possibility of a military victory in the conflict lasting longer than 7-10 years is very low and in such cases, negotiations based solutions come to the fore. When taking into consideration the fact that the Kurdish conflict in Turkey has continued, albeit intermittently since 1984, and compared to other cases, caused a high level of losses, it can be argued that the military victory is impossible at this point.

Thirdly, the government’s capacity in Turkey, especially in terms of the capacity of the security forces makes the “military victory” impossible for the organization. On the other hand, it is argued in the literature that in an asymmetric conflict it is possible for the rebels to win politically even if not militarily. Accordingly, intra-state conflicts can provide political triumph for the rebels by eroding the existing government and creating competition and a split in the political center. When looking at the situation in Turkey, as a military victory is not within KCK’s reach, political victory is not achievable by fueling conflicts/crises in Ankara. Because, in the context of the Kurdish issue, it can be argued that there is no structural difference between mainstream parties. Currently, neither the MHP and İYİ Party, nor the CHP has a political project that goes beyond

the AK Party's in the context of the Kurdish issue. Therefore, it is not possible for a conflict to focus on the differences between these parties and to create a crisis pertaining to the issue. In summary, both the military and the political capacity of the state make military or political victory impossible for the organization.

3.2. Obstacles to negotiations

Unlike the cost of conflicts, the duration of conflicts and the state capacity, the actor-based dynamics such as political subjectivity, power sharing, the role of third parties, and formal treaties constitute the most important obstacles to a new dialogue and negotiation process.

Political subjectivities

The biggest obstacle to the negotiation is the political subjectivity of the parties, including their perceptions, ideas, interests, institutions, resources, and strategies. Because, in the current situation, the conflicting parties do not favor starting a new process. Moreover, the third parties other than the AK Party government and the KCK are far from the point where they can force or push the parties to the negotiating table.

In the Second Chapter, on the subject of the formation of intra-state conflicts, the works of I. W. Zartman and D. Lieberfeld were highlighted with regard to "political subjectivity." According to Zartman's ripeness theory, the necessary but insufficient condition for the parties to sit at the negotiating table is reaching a "mutually hurting stalemate."³⁴ According to Lieberfeld, who works on South Africa and Israel/Palestine conflicts, in order to begin the negotiation process there must be an acceptance of the stalemate/balance, the discussions of the negotiated solution has to have a central place in the national political competition, there must be a change in the leadership of the side supporting the status quo and unsuccessful attempts must exist to allow the accumulation of alternative negotiating partners, there must also be declarations by the leadership of each side, including non-maximalist prerequisites for the negotiation, stable solutions negotiated to the conflicts and informal contacts must continue.³⁵

34 Zartman, I. William, "The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments," *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics*, 1:1 (2001), pg. 8-18.

35 Lieberfeld, Daniel, "Conflict 'Ripeness' Revisited: The South African and Israeli/Palestinian Cases," *Negotiation Journal*, 15:1 (1999), pg. 63-82.

When the issue of political subjectivity in the Kurdish conflict is examined from the framework outlined above, it cannot be said that a mutually harmful stalemate has been reached. Indeed, from the perspective of Turkish state and governments, it can be argued that the current conflict can be “sustainable.” In addition to the sustainability of the conflict, it can also be said that the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish conflict are and used to be to a certain degree useful instruments in the power struggle in Ankara.³⁶ It can be interpreted that one of the clearest indicators of this is the strengthening of the army’s political and military power during the intense city clashes prior to the July 15, 2016, military coup attempt. In fact, the majority of the military personnel who led the operations during the city clashes, especially Adem Huduti, who was then the Commander of the 2nd Army, are today being tried for a coup attempt.

Looking at the side of the KCK, especially in urban clashes, the organization lost considerable power both militarily and politically. Nevertheless, the organization continues its political and military presence, especially with the political and military gains it has achieved in Syria. There is no significant indication that the political and military presence of the organization will weaken in the short and mid-term. In summary, despite broad social consensus regarding the impossibility of the resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey by other means than a political resolution, the conflict is at a “sustainable” point for both sides.

In the framework of Lieberfeld, it can be said that the parties are aware that militarily they cannot make a remarkable progress. The experience of 34 years of conflict offers enough information with regard to this matter. On the other hand, the Kurdish issue and the Kurdish conflict are not central to political competition in Ankara since except for the AK Party there is no second party in the Kurdish region, which gets a considerable number of votes. Furthermore, neither the CHP nor the MHP and the İYİ Party have a political resolution plan beyond the one of the AK Party.

It can be said that there will not be any change of leaders with regard to the Kurdish issue. Both Öcalan and Erdoğan maintain their positions. In this respect, HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş can be noted as a newly emerging charismatic leader capable of mobilizing the masses. Demirtaş,

36 Çiçek, Cuma, *15 Temmuz Sonrası Kürt Meselesi ve Sivil Toplum: Diyalog ve Uzlaşım İmkânları*, Mart 2017, İstanbul Politikalar Merkezi, http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/CumaCicek_15TemmuzSonrasiSivilToplum.pdf, Accessed: 05.07.2017.

as a leader with the capacity to create change in the Kurdish socio-political field, has the potential to gain power. However, like Öcalan, Demirtaş is in prison and has a very limited space to participate in the politics.

The attempts of unsuccessful solutions to the Kurdish conflict are not few. The İmralı Process of 1999-2004, the 2008-2011 Oslo Process and the 2013-2015 Resolution Process can be noted as at least three major failed initiatives. However, it is debatable whether these initiatives brought to the fore alternative negotiating partners since apart from Erdoğan and Öcalan, there is a very limited number of people who have considerable influence on the society.

With regard to the preconditions, the KCK said in August 2016 that they would return to the negotiation table if AK Party government demonstrated the will towards a resolution and Öcalan was permitted to meet with different political and social actors.³⁷ On the other hand, in order to resume negotiations, the AK Party government demands “unconditional disarmament” which may seem like a maximalist demand.

President Erdoğan who had stated earlier that he would not accept “silencing the weapons” but that they should be “buried in concrete,”³⁸ in his last speech on April 1, 2017 in Diyarbakır, he put forward the requirement to lay down arms in order to talk: “We are ready to talk, meet, walk together with anyone who has something to say, has a project, a grievance. We have one condition. Nobody will carry a weapon in their hand, no one will try to divide this country, to tear this nation apart.”³⁹

It can be said that a remarkable progress has been taken in terms of negotiated stable solution proposals. In the Resolution Process, it was seen that the parties shared a general perspective of democratization. At the Dolmabahçe press conference, which was the last meeting of the process,

37 Birgün, “KCK’den müzakere açıklaması,” *Birgün*, 20.08.2017, <http://www.bir-gun.net/haber-de-tay/kck-den-muzakere-aciklamasi-124998.html>, Accessed: 04.07.2017.

38 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, “Silahların Bırakılarak Betona Gömülmesi Lazım,” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı, 22.09.2015, <https://www.tccb.gov.tr/haberler/410/35412/cumhurbaşkanı-erdogan-kanal-7-ulke-tv-ortak-yayinina-katildi.html>, Accessed: 04.07.2017.

39 Sözcü, “Erdoğan: Birlikte yol yürümeye hazırız ama tek bir şartımız var...,” *Sözcü*, 01.04.2017, <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2017/gundem/erdogan-diyarbakirda-konusuyor-2-1769269/>, Accessed: 04.07.2017.

both parties presented a general framework of democratization.⁴⁰ On the other hand, even if a consensus regarding main issues was not achieved, those issues were as follows: negotiation mechanisms and actors, the agenda of the negotiations and the scope of the reforms, disarming of the KCK militants, the cross-border dimension of the Kurdish issue starting with Rojava. In addition, although the details are not known to the public, it is known that in order to reach a political resolution the parties negotiated the issue of decentralization and democratization and prepared draft laws pertaining to this matter. İdris Baluken, former HDP MP, who was a member of the İmralı Delegation, announced that during the Resolution Process they have prepared draft laws with the AK Party on expanding the powers of local governments and expanding the civil society sphere:⁴¹

In the process of assigning trustees to municipalities, they should answer where they hid the legal regulations, achieved with the Ministry of Interior in the last stage of the Resolution Process, which transferred many powers from the center to the local administration. Likewise, at a time when the whole society is under pressure, it is necessary to explain why the civil society law we prepared together in the final phase of the process is hidden. They can explain to the public what the law of local governments and the civil society law we have prepared together contain.

Finally, it is not possible to say anything clear about informal contacts. It is known from world experiences that even during the most severe periods of conflict, contacts between the parties continue. There are also favorable conditions for the state and the AK Party authorities to contact Öcalan at İmralı Prison, even if they are not in contact with the KCK. Furthermore, at the official level, it can be said that the daily contacts between the MPs of the HDP and the AK Party are continuous.

Power-sharing

Within actor-based dynamics, power-sharing is the second dynamic which constitutes an obstacle to negotiations. Many studies emphasize the importance of power-sharing and recognition of community rights

40 Çiçek, Cuma and Coşkun Vahap, *Dolmabahçe'den Günümüze Çözüm Süreci: Başarısızlığı Anlamak ve Yeni Bir Yol Bulmak*, İstanbul: Barış Vakfı Yayınları, 2016.

41 Oda TV, "AKP ile birlikte yerel yönetim yasası hazırladı," *Oda TV*, 14.09.2016, <http://odatv.com/akp-ile-birlikte-yerel-yonetim-yasasi-hazirladik-1409161200.html>, Accessed: 04.07.2017.

in the resolution of intra-state territorial conflicts based identities. However, despite the longstanding reform debate in Turkey, the estate structure remains highly centralized. Moreover, with the Presidential System adopted on April 16, 2017 through a referendum, power became more centralized and concentrated around the executive.

In addition to the power concentration experienced in many areas throughout the country, the Emergency Decree Law (KHK) No. 674 published in the Official Gazette on 1 September 2016 within the scope of the OHAL paved the way for the appointment of trustees to the municipalities.⁴² In almost all of the municipalities run by the DBP, a component of the HDP, trustees were appointed upon publication of the KHK. According to the data of the *Human Rights Watch*, after the publication of the Decree, as of March 20, 2017, 82 of the 103 municipalities under DBP management have been appointed trustees.⁴³ The direct control was taken of municipalities in 11 provinces, including Diyarbakır, Mardin and Van Metropolitan Municipalities.

While the most important step that will lead to the political resolution of the Kurdish issue is to expand the powers and responsibilities of local governments and to increase their resources, these most important resources that could lead to conflict resolution and social peace-building were largely eliminated by appointing trustees. As long as direct control of the trustees is maintained, it will be difficult to make progress in the Kurdish conflict.

Third parties

The third-party issue is the third actor-based dynamic that hampers the return to negotiations. Like most states and governments in the intra-state conflicts, Turkey and the AK Party government do not want third parties to be involved. The involvement of the third parties, in particular, international actors, is often perceived by the state as the violation of sovereignty and the legitimizing the rebels at the international arena. The truth is that these two points also apply to Turkey. In Turkey, the third-party issue is perceived as a breach of sovereignty, and neither

42 Resmî Gazete, "Kanun Hükmünde Kararname," *Resmî Gazete*, 01.09.2016, KHK/674, No. 29818.

43 Human Right Watch, "Turkey: Crackdown on Kurdish Opposition," *Human Right Watch*, 20.03.2017, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/20/turkey-crack-down-kurdish-opposition>, Accessed: 04.07.2017

the government nor the main opposition parties look favorably on international actors in particular.

On the other hand, like most organizations, also the KCK demands a third party to be involved in the negotiation process. In the last dialogue and negotiation process, the parties negotiated an Observation Committee composed of local actors. Moreover, the KCK has often demanded that international entities, such as the US, be involved as mediators. As discussed in detail in Chapter Seven, the parties could not reach an agreement on this subject and the third-party/observation issue played an important role in the failure of the process.

Official Treaties

Finally, in the context of actor-based dynamics, it is necessary to underline the formal treaties. Some research suggests that official agreements have contributed to the termination of conflicts and peace-building. According to this, the official treaties by creating “audience costs” force the parties to remain committed to the peace treaty or otherwise to bear the political costs that arise. This increases the chances of a success in peacebuilding.

Regarding the Kurdish conflict in Turkey and formal treaties, the situation cannot be described in positive terms. Despite different quests for dialogue since the 1990s till today and dialogue processes since the 2000s till today, there has been no treaty signed so far by the Turkish Republic and its governments with the KCK or any component of the leading Kurdish movement. In other words, none of the previous dialogue and negotiation processes reached a formal settlement. Even the ceasefires were in most cases *de facto* upheld as a result of the dialogues. Moreover, Turkey systematically shied away from signing such a formal treaty. For example, one of the most important crises in the Resolution Process was not signing by the State Delegation the three protocols written by Öcalan.

Pertaining to this matter, probably the only source available is the Dolmabahçe meeting. For the first time, the state delegation represented at the level of deputy prime minister and the İmralı Delegation stood side by side in front of the cameras to hold a joint press conference. On the other hand, there have been debates between the parties on the naming of this meeting and the “Dolmabahçe Consensus,” a name proposed by the HDP and the İmralı Delegation, was rejected by President Erdoğan and the government.

3.3. Existing opportunities to overcome obstacles

In spite of the obstacles outlined above, there are also remarkable change potentials in three areas, other than the “formal treaties.”

Political subjectivity

In the context of political subjectivities, the pragmatist qualities of both the AK Party and the leading Kurdish movement increase the ability of the parties to take a new position if conditions change. The civil war in Syria evolves towards a political resolution in parallel with the new political system in Turkey in force after the Constitutional Referendum, which may produce new risks or new possibilities. Second, the US new administration’s Syria policy may be extracted from the dispute the relationship between Ankara and the *de facto* Kurdish administration in Syria as well as with the KCK in Turkey.⁴⁴ Finally, the violent clashes and destructions ongoing since July 2015 may accelerate the transformation of Kurdish politics in Turkey. The Kurdish public distanced itself from violent solutions which was one of the most important consequences of the fighting. This situation can trigger the restructuring of Kurdish politics in particular.

Regarding political subjectivity, the civil society along with the conflicting parties can play an important role.⁴⁵ Studies on disputes and social reconciliation processes point to the fact that the issue cannot be reduced to the negotiation between the conflicting parties (high-level leaders). The role of respected leaders, religious/ethnic leaders, academics, intellectuals, civil society leaders (mid-level leadership), local leaders, local NGO heads, community leaders, local public servants (community leadership) is at least as important as the role of the high-level leadership in the solution of the economic, political, socio-cultural, relational problems that emerge in the post-conflict period.⁴⁶ The social peacebuilding, which means the elimination of fears and threats of the conflict period, the transformation of the perceptions of different social

44 Stein, Aaron, “Reconciling U.S. - Turkish Interest in Northern Syria,” *Discussion Paper*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, Şubat 2017.

45 Daşlı Güneş, Alıcı, Nisan and Flader, Ulrike, *Kadınların Barış Mücadelesinde Dünya Deneyimleri: Sırbistan, Kosova, Sri Lanka ve Suriye*, Ankara: DEMOS Demokrasi Barış ve Alternatif Politikalar Merkezi Derneği Yayını, 2017; Çelik, A. Betül, “Etnik Çatışmaların Çözümünde Siyaset Bilimi ve Uyuşmazlık Çözümü Yaklaşımları,” F. Nimet Beriker (Der.), *Çatışmadan Uzlaşmaya: Kuramlar, Süreçler ve Uygulamalar* içinde, İstanbul, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2010, pg. 163-188.

46 Çelik, *Ibid.*

groups to eradicate social polarization, depends on internalizing the conflict resolution and reconciliation process by the society⁴⁷ as well as building social consensus.⁴⁸

At this point, it is necessary to underline the roles of civil society organizations in peace building and social reconciliation. Each of these organizations has functions such as protection of the citizens, monitoring and accountability, advocacy and public communication, in-group socialization, social cohesion, mediation and facilitation, and service delivery which are more prominent and differentiated in different periods of conflict and offer a significant contribution to the peacebuilding.⁴⁹ The studies done on civil society show that especially women's socio-political mobilization may open the way to peacebuilding. The research concerning gender roles and matters pivotal to women shows that they facilitate the contact, dialogue, and negotiations in the conflict resolution and social consensus construction.⁵⁰ Moreover, when taking into account that men and women are differently affected by the conflict, it is important for the conflict resolution and reconciliation to adopt the approach that women are active founders of social peace, not just the victims of the conflict.⁵¹

There is a significant accumulation of the civil society capital both generally in Turkey and in the Kurdish region. There is a substantial accumulation in the field of gender. However, it is clear that there is a need for a progress in the field of civil society. Considering the contraction in the civil area, especially after the OHAL, it can be foreseen that the progress in the construction of a new negotiation ground in the Kurdish conflict will depend upon the revival of the civilian sphere.

47 Çelik, A. Betül and Mutluer, Nil, "Toplumsal Barış ve Barış Süreci'nin Toplumsallaşması," Necmiye Alpay and Hakan Tahmaz (Der.), *Barış Açısını Savunmak. Çözüm Sürecinde Neler Oldu?*, İstanbul, Metis Yayınları, 2015, pg. 59-75.

48 Çelik, A. Betül, "Kürt Meselesini Dönüştürmede Toplumsal Mutabakat İhtiyacı: Neden, Nasıl, Kimle?," Murat Akbaş (Der.), *Çatışma Çözümleri ve Barış* içinde, İstanbul, İletişim, 2014, pg. 131-152.

49 Çelik, A. Betül, "Turkey: The Kurdish Question and the Coersive State," Thania Paffenholz (Ed.), *Civil Society and Peacebuilding: A Critical Assessment*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010, pg. 153-179.

50 Daşlı, Alıcı and Ulrike, *Ibid.*

51 Daşlı, Alıcı and Ulrike, *Ibid.*; Çelik and Mutluer, *Ibid.*

Power-sharing

There are also important opportunities in terms of power-sharing. First, despite the opposition of a half of the society (48,6%), the adoption of a new political system in the April 16, 2017 referendum shows that there is a need for a new social contract in Turkey. The resulting situation is likely, on the one hand, to bring to the agenda the long-discussed topic of a new constitution, on the other hand, it will expose the need to reform power-sharing and build checks-and-balances mechanisms in the existing system.

Second, there exists an important accumulation of intellectual and institutional capital with regard to decentralization and regionalization of Turkey. First of all, there has been a decades-long debate on decentralization and regionalization reform in Turkey. The state system based on eight regions proposed by Kenan Evren after September 12, 1980, the widely debated public administration law reform that emerged in the 2000's, followed by fragmentary legal changes (municipal law, metropolitan municipality law, etc.) preceded leading Kurdish political movement's proposal of administrative and political decentralization which brought about discussions regarding autonomy.

In addition to these debates, there is also a significant accumulation in terms of institutional tradition. Many public institutions and organizations in Turkey have been organized at the regional level for many years. Furthermore, in the context of the EU harmonization process, regions were organized into three grades for the purpose of socio-economic planning in Turkey. In this context, each of the 81 provinces was transformed into third-grade regions, neighboring provinces were brought together to form 26 second-grade regions, and the 26 regions were combined to form 12 first-grade regions. For example, the Southeast Anatolia Region, which consists of a total of nine provinces, is one of 12 first-grade regions. There are three second-grade regions under this region: Gaziantep sub-region, which consists of Gaziantep, Kilis and Adiyaman, Şanlıurfa sub-region consisting of Şanlıurfa and Diyarbakır and Mardin sub-region consisting of Mardin, Siirt, Şırnak and Batman.⁵² Development agencies were established for each of the 26 second-grade regions.⁵³ Finally, in

52 Resmi Gazete, "İstatistikî Bölge Sınıflandırması," *Resmî Gazete*, Tarih: 22.09.2002, Sayı: 24884, Karar Sayısı: 2002/4720.

53 Resmi Gazete, "Kalkınma Ajanslarının Kuruluşu, Koordinasyonu ve Görevleri Hakkında Kanun," *Resmî Gazete*, Tarih: 08.02.2006, Sayı: 26074, Kanun Numarası: 5449.

the context of institutional accumulation, 30 metropolitan cities can be mentioned. With the law enacted in 2014, 14 cities were converted into more metropolitan cities and the total number of metropolitan areas was increased to 30. In these cities, special provincial administrations were abolished and municipalities' powers were increased and their areas of responsibility were extended to from the city centers to the provincial borders.

Third, the population and regional socioeconomic inequality need to be discussed. About 70% of Turkey's population live in 30 metropolitan cities. The country's economic activities and value production are mostly concentrated in these cities. In addition, these cities bear a remarkable diversity and peculiarity. Each city has its own economic, social and cultural texture. These population and socioeconomic dynamics make city administrations much more important. On the other hand, inequalities between these cities and their regions are a major obstacle to a balanced socioeconomic development at the country level. A more balanced, egalitarian and widespread socioeconomic development calls for a more accurate identification of the problems and determination of the right solutions, as well as the city administrations that will enable a more efficient mobilization of human, material and knowledge-based local resources. In 2017, the Sabancı University Istanbul Policy Center in cooperation with the Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation (Türkonfed) carried out a study titled *City-Region: New Dynamics in Local Development. From the cities of Turkey to Turkey of cities* in which they put forward that Turkey urgently and definitely needs a reform of the centrally organized local administration.⁵⁴

Fourth, along with the Presidential System, the issue of decentralization goes beyond the Kurdish issue, as the mechanism of checks and balances against the centralized power is more important. Without such a mechanism it will not be possible to advance and protect the legacy of democracy in Turkey, even if it is limited. In this regard, the AK Party government can take steps towards decentralization. AK Party, which went through a "security crisis" since the 2013 Gezi protests, considerably consolidated its power after the constitutional referendum. In this sense, the AK Party's overcome the "security dilemma," renders it not impossible that to take steps towards "democratization" of the "presidential system"

54 Keyman, E. Fuat et al., *Kent-Bölge: Yerel Kalkınmada Yeni Dinamikler. Türkiye'nin Kentlerinden Kentlerin Türkiyesi'ne*, İstanbul, Türkonfed, 2017.

by making changes in some laws such as the election law or the law on parties. These steps may be accompanied by a decentralizing reform package.

Finally, the fact that during the Resolution Process the parties conducted negotiations in order to expand the powers of the local authorities and that a draft law was prepared is an important point of reference. The institutional and intellectual experience gathered in terms of decentralization and regionalization at the reference frame which the Resolution Process is, show that a considerable intellectual progress has been made in terms of power-sharing in Turkey.

Third parties

It can be argued that there are important opportunities in the third-party issue, as in the fields of political subjectivity and power-sharing. First of all, despite the all the perceptions of the sovereignty violation, it is known that an international actor was involved in the negotiations during the Oslo Process. Therefore, the third-party issue is not an insurmountable threshold. Secondly, Turkey is no stranger to the issue of third-party countries since as reviewed in detail in Chapter Three, Turkey was one of the most important architects of the Philippines/Bangsamoro Peace Process.⁵⁵ Moreover, Turkey was involved not only at the state level but also at the civil society level. Finally, the KCK had already given up the insistence on the international third-party engagement and was convinced about "Observation Committee" composed of local actors. All these data show that there are no critical thresholds in the third-party issue, and that the third-party issue can be solved in a new dialogue and negotiation process.

The dynamics that will determine the course of Turkey's Kurdish conflict are summarized above. Given the picture painted above, what can be said about Turkey's Kurdish issue and the direction of the conflict resulting from it? To answer this question, in addition to the three groups of dynamics outlined above, one has to consider a relatively new and distinctive issue in Turkey: the matter of a state crisis.

55 Geyik, Kurbanı, "Türkiye Filipinler'de Barış Sürecinin Mimarı," *Anadolu Ajansı*, 17.11.2014, <http://aa.com.tr/tr/dunya/turkiye-filipinlerde-baris-surecinin-mimari/1006663> Accessed: 17.02.2017.

4. The state crisis and the Kurdish conflict

The state crisis which erupted with a coup in Turkey, had, however, begun much earlier. The course of the Kurdish issue which gained cross-border and regional character will be shaped according to the course of this state crisis, but on the other hand, it will determine how the state crisis will be solved.

The state crisis in Turkey is based on three main conflicts/crises. The first of these disputes takes place between the Islamic-conservative nationalist right hegemonic bloc which is represented by the AK Party together with some segments of the MHP and the secular-conservative nationalist right hegemonic bloc represented by the CHP. As a result of the Islamic-conservative bloc's surmounting of the critical state governance threshold and eliminating of the cliché state-government division after the 2010 Constitutional Referendum, the opposition relationship between the two blocs transformed into a deep polarization and conflict.

The second conflict arose between the two big wings of the Islamist-conservative bloc. When the Islamic-conservative block crossed the critical threshold in state administration, the coalition of the main Islamic movements in Turkey, that rendered this hegemony possible, begun to crack. The National Vision Movement and the Gülenist Movement/Organization, which could not come together since the 1970s, came together with the establishment of the AK Party in 2002 and this unity made the AK Party's success possible. The first one was directly organizing in the political sphere, the second was organizing more in the economic, social and cultural spheres and became a significant power in the civil and military bureaucracy. The conflict which started in 2012 with the cram schools crisis, followed by summoning MIT undersecretary Hakan Fidan to testify regarding KCK operations, the 17-25 December anti-corruption operations against the government, continued until 15th July 2016 coup attempt.

Finally, while these two conflicts continued in Ankara, the third dynamic of conflict emerged which deeply affected both the positions of all the actors of the two conflicts and was instrumentalized by these actors: the "Kurdistan crisis." "Rojava" which emerged in the north of Syria in the aftermath of the civil war outbreak transformed Turkey's "domestic Kurdish issue" into a "cross-border Kurdistan issue." One of the most important moments of this new crisis was especially when the YPG took the control of the Tel Abyad region and announced a possibility

of uniting Efrîn with already merged regions of Kobanê and Cizîr.⁵⁶ Turkey was about to face if not politically, then a geographically united “Kurdistan” stretching along its borders with Iran to Hatay, possibly to the Mediterranean Sea.

The July 15, 2016 military coup attempt and the Presidential System adopted in 16 April 2017 Constitutional Referendum can be read as breaks in the efforts to overcome the state crisis. The coup attempt, details of which remain unknown today, shows that some actors within the state preferred to solve this crisis by a military coup. On the other hand, the Presidential System, which was prepared by the AK Party and MHP and was approved in a referendum, brought in radical changes to the structure of the state and is expected to overcome the current state crisis through concentration of power.

On the other hand, despite all these attempts, it can be put forth that the state crisis continues for at least three reasons. First, the disputes between the Islamist-conservative bloc and the secular-conservative bloc continue. A 49% of the strong “No” votes in the Constitutional Referendum created opportunities for the secular-conservative bloc to continue the conflict. If the “Yes” votes had had a more dominant majority, the resistance in the opposite bloc would have been considerably broken. However, the strong “No” result created a new point of resistance for the secular-conservative bloc.

Secondly, the Islamist-conservative bloc took a big hit with the coup attempt. One of the two wings of this bloc in a very short time dissipated a great deal of 50 years of human and institutional accumulation of the other wing. Taking into account that the Islamic-conservative bloc in Turkey started to emerge at least since the 1950s after a multi-actor and multi-faceted process and obtained considerable political gains, the recent dissipation of the human and institutional capital of one of the two wings of the bloc means weakening of the Islamic-conservative bloc. Opposite to what one would think, it will take many years for this bloc to recover and to restore the human and institutional accumulation that has been disintegrated. Moreover, in the current situation, the Islamic-conservative bloc is undergoing a comprehensive restructuring process which involves impossible to ignore re-establishment of power relations at the micro and macro scale and power struggles.

56 Bayramoğlu, Ali, *Çözüm Süreci: Siyasetten Silaha*, Democratic Progress Institute, 2015, pg. 79-83.

Finally, the “Kurdistan crisis” deepens as it continues. As detailed above, federated KRI is in the process of pursuing independence and in the current situation the *de facto* autonomous Rojava region is in pursuit of a federated state under the name of “Northern and Eastern Syrian Federation.” For all that, Ankara is an actor who has lost its influence both in Iraq and Syria and has to leave the field to the US, Russia, and Iran.

There is a direct relationship between the continuing state crisis embodied by the three conflicts/crises and the future of the Kurdish conflict. While on the one hand, the Kurdish issue is an important problem that deepens the state crisis, on the other hand, it is a problem that has been to a certain degree instrumentalized in the power struggle among hegemonic blocs in Ankara. In this sense, alongside the cross-border/regional and international dynamics, the structural dynamics on a national scale and the actor-based dynamics, the course of the state crisis will determine the course of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey.

Conclusion

Urban clashes that after the failure of the Resolution Process spread across cities causing massive destructions, the coup attempt and the subsequent OHAL have damaged restoration of the democratic capital of Turkey. The dialogue and negotiation-based solution to the Kurdish conflict is more difficult to achieve today than it was before the Resolution Process.

International experiences propose to look at the three levels of conflict resolution and social consensus building: (1) Cross-border/regional and international dynamics, (2) structural dynamics at the country level, and (3) actor-based dynamics. In terms of the first group of dynamics, the future of the Kurdish conflict depends largely on the Syrian civil war and, in part, on the quest for independence of the KRI. In other words, the ongoing changes in the geopolitical dynamics of the Kurdish issue are the most important dynamics determining the Kurdish conflict transformation in Turkey. Considering the intensified search for a solution to the Syrian civil war and strengthening of the possibilities for solutions, it can be said that the dialogue and negotiation in the Kurdish conflict is not a far-fetched possibility.

In the context of the second group of dynamics, it is seen that the structural dynamics in the country which determine the Kurdish conflict make the

military solution quite difficult for the parties and a negotiated solution is the most likely option. On the other hand, for the development of a negotiation-based solution, the parties must have a common sense of structural dynamics and a desire for dialogue. This makes the actor-based dynamics as important as the structural dynamics of the country.

The main problem in the Kurdish conflict is the actor-based dynamics. Having a common perception of both the cross-border and international context as well as the structural dynamics in the country constitutes for the actors the most important test to end the Kurdish conflict. The work of advocates of dialogue and negotiations within the conflicting parties paves the way. However, considering the power relations within the conflicting parties and the current reluctance of the dominant tendencies to terminate the Kurdish conflict through dialogue and negotiation, the future endeavors of the third-party actors are important. Mid-level leaders and community leaders, non-governmental organizations especially civil organizations working in the field of gender equality and women's freedom can usher building of social consensus. Finally, state-based or non-state civilian actors can facilitate the contact, dialogue, and negotiation between the parties.

Alongside these three groups of dynamics, the course of the state crisis will have a decisive influence on the next shape of the Kurdish conflict. On the other hand, even if it is not connected to the Kurdish issue alone, the course of the state crisis will be shaped according to the progress of the problem in the cross-border context.

CONCLUSION AND EVALUATION

In this study, intermittent conflict resolution and reconciliation processes in Turkey are examined in the light of the world experiences. In this context, the possibilities of a return to negotiations in the Kurdish conflict are discussed in depth.

As the study shows, intra-state conflicts are a 20th-century phenomenon. Such conflicts are not unique to Turkey. For a long time, there have been similar cases in dozens of countries on every continent of the world. On a global scale, there are databanks/sets containing quantitative data of the basic parameters of such cases. Quantitative analysis based on these data sets has created an influential school of thought for conflict resolution and reconciliation processes.

In addition to the intra-state conflicts, there is also a remarkable body of research on conflict resolution and reconciliation on the global scale. Just as there are data sets regarding conflicts, there are also sets pertaining to peace treaties. There has been a remarkable increase in the number of negotiated settlements, especially after the Second World War. The main points of the peace treaties in the intra-state conflict are the third-party issue, the issue of arms/violence, administrative/governmental issues, territorial issues, the issue of justice and issues related to implementation.

The dynamics that determine the formation of intra-state conflicts are classified into three main groups in this study: (1) Cross-border/regional and international dynamics, (2) structural dynamics on the country scale, and (3) actor-based dynamics. The first group of dynamics refers to the position of the global powers regarding the conflict and the neighbors of the state in which the conflict takes place. The level of democracy in neighboring countries, the presence of conflict in these countries and the presence of the same ethnic/national group in neighboring countries affect the formation of intra-state conflicts. The structural dynamics on a country scale, refer to the factors that determine the playing field and rules of the game. The second group of dynamics refers to the structural conditions under which the actors are not involved, cannot change in a short time, and/or have formed in a historical process and includes the level of socioeconomic development, the level of democracy, type of conflicts (based on identity, socioeconomic basis), geography of conflicts, population and the diaspora. Finally, the third group of dynamics includes

factors such as the cost of conflicts, duration of conflicts, state capacity, political subjectivities, the participation of third parties, power-sharing and the signing of formal treaties.

As the experiences of the Philippines/Bangsamoro and Indonesia/Aceh show, international conjuncture in the termination of intra-state conflicts and reconciliation, the participation of international actors as third parties, the continuation of the state and community building processes in these countries, the experience of democratization and reform processes on a country scale going beyond the conflict region, the change of political leaders and the increasing cost of conflicts are among potent dynamics. The termination of identity-based territorial conflicts and reconciliation in both countries was made possible by the power-sharing resulting from many years of negotiations.

In the light of these experiences, the main results obtained in the study of the Kurdish conflict are the following: opposite to what is believed, the Kurdish conflict is not “unique to us” and bears similarities with most intra-state conflicts. The fact that international actors are influential in the formation of conflicts and that the situation in neighboring countries directly affects conflicts shows that cross-border/regional and international dynamics are potent in the Kurdish conflict. On the other hand, persistent inequalities between regions and socio-economic injustice in Turkey, the weakness of democratic standards, the identity-based conflicts concentrated in certain areas show that the Kurdish conflict shares features with other conflicts. As in most intra-state identity-based territorial conflicts, in the Kurdish conflict the length and the high cost of the conflict, the high military and political capacity of the state, the crises related to the participation of third parties, the central role of the power-sharing in the conflict, and the determinative role of political subjectivities are also valid.

The quest for dialogue and reconciliation in the Kurdish conflict dates back to the early 1990s. The PKK, which emerged as a Marxist-Leninist separatist movement and aimed at achieving its goals through political violence, faced existential crises in the early 1990s in the areas of ideological and political orientation, strategic goals and the method of struggle. In these years, the organization abandoned its goal of an independent state and turned to “internal resolution politics” and sought political resolutions. The attempts of reconciliation and dialogue in the Kurdish conflict have largely emerged as an extension of the “internal resolution politics.”

In the 1990s, though there were various attempts for dialogue, did not go beyond failed unilateral ceasefire attempts. Although the search for reconciliation and dialogue started in the early 1990s, it would be more appropriate to call the initiatives in those years not as dialogue processes but rather as “weak quests for dialogue” aimed at terminating the Kurdish conflict.

The main dialogue processes in the Kurdish conflict began in the 2000s. The Imralı Process of 1999-2004, the Oslo Process of 2008-2011 and finally the 2013-2015 Resolution Process can be defined as the main dialogue processes in the Kurdish conflict. All three processes failed. The Imralı Process was the most critical missed opportunity to end the Kurdish conflict. There was a five-year-long suspension of hostilities during this process, and the organization largely withdrew its armed militants abroad. However, this process could not be benefited from by the parties. The Oslo Process, on the other hand, was the most institutionalized process among the three dialogue processes. In this period, while the state was negotiating with the leader of the organization, on the other hand, it spoke directly with high-level representatives of the organization from Europe and Qandil. Moreover, the negotiations were held with the participation of a group of international mediators.

The Resolution Process, which started with the first two unsuccessful attempts, was a dialogue process the most open to the public. This process was carried out with the relative knowledge of the public, unlike the previous attempts. However, as the parties could not agree on four main issues, this process also failed. The parties could not agree on the following: negotiation mechanisms and actors, the scope of the negotiation agenda and reforms, disarmament and the cross-border dimension of the Kurdish issue, particularly in Rojava.

The failure of the parties to reach an agreement on these issues is analyzed through nine factors: (1) cross-border and international dynamics and the new geopolitical equation of the Kurdish issue, (2) security dilemma and the crisis of existence of the conflicting parties, (3) problematic institutional structure of the Resolution Process, (4) the incompatibility regarding the role of third parties, (5) the deep gap between political agendas of the parties, (6) the negative influence of the Turkish nationalist opposition, (7) AK Party's and its Resolution Process *Alla Turca* limitations, (8) the limitations of the leading Kurdish movement and finally, (9) transformation problems of Kurdish politics going beyond the leading Kurdish movement in Turkey.

Turkey's Kurdish issue and the basic parameters of the Kurdish conflict reveal a complex picture of the possibilities for a return to negotiations. The course of the Kurdish issue which is the cross-border and international problem has become mostly dependent on geopolitical dynamics. The civil war in Syria and Iraq, KRI's quest for independence, the PYD-led quest for federation in *de facto* autonomous Kurdish region in Syria directly shape the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Without considering the course of the Kurdish problem in both of these countries, it is not possible to analyze the path the Kurdish conflict in Turkey will follow. The Kurdish issue in Turkey and attitudes of the parties related to it, will either "depend" on the developments in Iraq and Syria or will determine the course of the Kurdish issue in both countries. Provided the parties demonstrate the determination to find a solution and reach a consensus, the second scenario will occur. Otherwise, the solution to the Kurdish issue in Turkey will become dependent on the uncertainty in Syria and Iraq which will start a new era in the Kurdish conflict.

In addition to cross-border/regional and international dynamics, structural dynamics at the national level show that military victory is almost impossible in the Kurdish conflict. As in the Kurdish conflict, the possibility of a military victory is rather unlikely in conflicts characterized by deep socioeconomic inequalities, the weakness of democratic standards, high state capacity, especially the military capacity, identity-based nature, concentration in a particular area, which includes mountains and border regions, and large population and diaspora. Such conflicts usually end with a negotiated consensus.

The actor-based dynamics are the main problem in the Kurdish conflict. The parties directly involved in the conflict do not have a common understanding of a current mutually hurting stalemate and that due to cross-border/regional and international dynamics of the Kurdish issue and the structural dynamics at the national level there are no other options available except a negotiated settlement. Moreover, in no small extent the parties "are able to sustain" the ongoing fighting. In this sense, the support of the actors involved in the conflict who are in favor of reconciliation can bring about the return to the negotiations. However, as long as the third-party actors do not work towards "social peacebuilding," the prospects of termination of the conflict and reconciliation are quite low. Also, the return to negotiations in the Kurdish conflict requires facilitating actors and efforts to initiate dialogue and negotiations between the parties as much as it requires work towards social peacebuilding. In

this sense, the role of state-based or non-state actors as mediators is essential.

The return to negotiations in the Kurdish conflict is more connected to the state crisis which is another dynamic and is as important as the dynamics classified into three groups above. Turkey has been experiencing since 2010 a day-by-day deepening state crisis. This state crisis has three central conflict axes. The first conflict was deepened by the 2010 Constitutional Referendum and takes place between “the secular-conservative nationalist right hegemonic bloc” represented by the CHP and “the Islamic-conservative nationalist right hegemonic bloc” represented by the AK Party, which also relatively includes the MHP. The second conflict took place between the two wings of the Islamic-conservative nationalist right-wing: the National Vision Tradition and the Gülenist Organization, which were represented in the AK Party. The third area of conflict is the “Kurdistan crisis” that emerged with the Syrian civil war. The July 15, 2016 coup attempt and the adoption of the Presidential System on April 16, 2017, Constitutional Referendum can be interpreted as reflections of the state crisis.

The state crisis has not been overcome. Conflicts and crises in all three areas to a large extent continue today. The conflict between secular-conservative and Islamic-conservative bloc entered a new phase with the Constitutional Referendum of 16 April 2017. On the other hand, although the Gülenist Organization has been largely purged, the fifty-year human and institutional accumulation of a wing of the Islamic-conservative bloc, which has been built since the 1950s, has been eliminated in a very short period, meaning that the bloc is weakening. It will take many years to replace the dissipated human and institutional resources. Moreover, the reconstruction process of the Islamic-conservative bloc after the Gülenist Organization involves new power-sharing and power struggles on both micro and macro scales. Finally, Syria-based “Kurdistan crisis” deepens as it continues.

The Kurdish conflict is dependent on the state crisis in Turkey and as well as the cross-border/regional and international dynamics, structural dynamics at the national level, and actor-based dynamics. The course of the Kurdish conflict will be primarily determined by how the state crisis will be solved. On the other hand, the Kurdish issue is not a passive entity to which the state crisis is reflected. On the contrary, it is a constitutive dynamic that determines the course of this crisis. In this sense, the course

of the Kurdish issue which mostly turned into a cross-border problem will shape the solution of the state crisis and the character of the new political system and social structure in Turkey.

APPENDIX

Chronology of the Kurdish conflict and quest for peace (1978-2017)¹

The emergence and development of the PKK

1978, November 27, The Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* - PKK) was founded under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan.

1980, September 12, A military coup took place in Turkey. Political parties were closed, and many political activists, including hundreds of PKK militants, were arrested.

1982, August 25, The PKK, which settled in Syria-Lebanon and Iraq after the coup, decided to return to the country and start "the armed struggle."

1983, May 25, TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) crossed the border for the first time and carried out an operation against the PKK. In operation, about 5,000 soldiers moved five kilometers beyond the border.

1984, August 15, PKK carried out the first large-scale armed actions in Eruh and Şemdinli.

1985, March 21, The political wing of the PKK was formed under the name of Kurdistan People's Liberation Front (*Eniya Rizgariya Neteweya Kurdistan* - ERNK).

¹ In preparation of the chronology online open resources were used. For the Resolution Process, chronologies of Hafıza Merkezi, Heinrich Böll Stiftung Turkey Representation, and Al-Jazeera Türk were used. See Hafıza Merkezi, "Barış Süreci Kronolojisi," *Hakikat, Adalet ve Hafıza Merkezi*, 19.07.2015, <http://hakikatadalethafiza.org/baris-sureci-kronolojisi/>, Accessed: 19.11.2017; Aktan, İrfan, "Neler olmuştu," *Heinrich Böll Stiftung Derneği Türkiye Temsilciliği*, 13.11.2014, <https://tr.boell.org/tr/2014/11/13/neler-olmustu>, Accessed: 19.11.2017; Aljazeera Türk, "Kronoloji: 2013 Nevruz'undan bugüne," *Aljazeera Türk*, 19.03.2017, <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/kronoloji/kronoloji-2013-nevruzundan-bugune>, Accessed: 19.11.2017.

1986, August 15, TSK's warplanes crossed the Iraqi border and carried out aerial operations against the PKK.

1986, October 30, At its third congress, the PKK decided to reorganize its armed militants under the name of Kurdistan Liberation Forces (*Hêzên Rizgariya Kurdistan* - HRK) into Kurdistan People's Liberation Army (*Artêşa Rizgariya Gelê Kurdistanê* - ARGK).

1987, March 4, The TSK's warplanes bombed the PKK's camps in cross-border aerial operations.

1987, July 19, The State of Emergency Rule (OHAL), which would last until November 2002, was declared.

1988, June 16, Öcalan, in an interview with Mehmet Ali Birand from Milliyet newspaper, stated that they are ready for an internal political resolution.

1990, June 7, The People's Labor Party (HEP) was founded under the leadership of MPs excluded from the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP) on the grounds that they participated in a conference on "Kurdish National Identity and Human Rights" held in Paris.

1991, March 21, 31 people died in nation-wide Newroz demonstrations after the security forces opened fire.

1991, July 10, HEP Diyarbakır Provincial Chairman Vedat Aydın was taken from his home by persons who introduced themselves as police at night on July 5th. Two days after Vedat Aydın was allegedly not taken into custody, his mutilated body was found near the Maden district of Elazığ. The crowd gathered at the funeral ceremony held on July 10th in Diyarbakır was the largest gathering since 12 September 1980. Hundreds of people were wounded and three people lost their lives as a result of fire opened from the top of the Diyarbakır Walls on the people who attended the funeral. The murder of Vedat Aydın was the beginning of the murders committed by "unknown perpetrators."

1991, October 25, A cross-border operation against PKK camps within the Iraqi borders was carried out after the PKK's attacks on three gendarmerie stations in Hakkâri's Çukurca district and the death of 17 soldiers.

1991, October 20, HEP, in an electoral alliance established with the SHP, succeeded in sending 21 members to the parliament.

1992, March 21, In the Newroz demonstrations held throughout the country 94 civilians lost their lives when the security forces opened fire. Three security officers and a journalist, Izzet Keser, also lost their lives.

1992, April 18, Istanbul Kurdish Institute (*Enstîtuya Kurdî ya Stenbolê*) was founded by such intellectuals as Musa Anter, Feqî Huseyin Sağnıç, İsmail Beşikçi, Yaşar Kaya to work in the field of Kurdish language, literature and culture. Institute's signboard was taken down on an opening day and it was closed down on 15 November 1992.

1992, August 18, All the houses in the city of Şırnak were searched by the security forces during the operation initiated on the grounds that the PKK had entered the city. In the three days and three nights of the operations 54 civilians were killed.

1992, September 2, The TSK launched an aerial and land operation against the PKK camps within the Iraqi borders.

1992, September 20, Kurdish intellectual Musa Anter, who wrote in *Özgür Gündem* and *Yeni Ülke* newspapers, died in Diyarbakir at the age of 72 as a result of an attack.

1992, October 7, The TSK warplanes organized operations against Hakurk and Durjî camps in Iraq.

1992 October 31, The operation against PKK camps in Iraq was organized. In operations, the TSK captured Haftanîn, one of the most important trans-border camps of the PKK.

First Ceasefires

1993, March 17, The PKK declared a ceasefire for the first time.

1993, March 21, Unlike in previous years, the Newroz celebrations were quiet.

1993, April 16, The PKK extended one-month ceasefire for an indefinite period.

1993, April 17, President Turgut Özal lost his life after a heart attack.

1993, May 24, The National Security Council presented the government with an advice to release without prosecution PKK militants who did not participate in operations and who disarmed.

1993, May 24, In Bingöl, PKK militants killed 33 unarmed soldiers captured by them and *de facto* ended a truce.

1993, July 14, The Constitutional Court decided to close the HEP with unanimous consent.

1993, September 4, DEP Mardin Deputy Mehmet Sincar lost his life as a result of an armed attack in Batman.

1993, October 10, A cross-border operation against PKK camps in Iraq was organized.

1993, November 30, TSK's 16 warplanes bombed nine PKK camps in Iraq.

1993 December 18 to 20, The TSK organized aerial and ground operations against the PKK camps in Iraq.

1994, January 28, An aerial operation against the PKK Zeli camp in Iraq was organized.

1994, March 3, The immunity of members of the Democracy Party (DEP), which was established in place of the HEP, was lifted and six DEP MPs were detained on March 17.

1994, March 21, DEP celebrated Newroz festivals in closed lounges in various places. There were no casualties throughout the country.

1994, May 18, The PKK's Zeli camp in Iraq was bombed for the second time in four months.

1994, June 16, Constitutional Court decided to close DEP.

1994, August 3, TSK has conducted a cross-border operation against the PKK camps in Iraq.

1994, December 3, *Özgür Ülke* newspaper in İstanbul Kadırga suffered from a night bomb attack. One transportation officer, Ersin Yıldız, lost his life, and 23 journalists were injured.

1995, March 21, While there was no celebration in the region, HADEP held celebratory meetings in Mersin, İstanbul, and Ankara. A group of 500 people that lit bonfires in İstanbul Fatih Park was dispersed by the police and 23 people were arrested.

1995, March 21, TSK's most comprehensive cross-border operation called "Steel Operation" began. About 35 thousand troops participated in the operation. The operations, which lasted about four months, ended on the 9th of July.

1995, December 15, The PKK declared a ceasefire for the second time.

1996, Jan. 15, 11 villagers were gunned down and burned in a minivan in Şırnak province. This event led to the *de facto* termination of the second truce.

1996, March 21, Official "Nevruz" celebrations were held in many places in the country. President Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz also attended. General Chief of Staff İsmail Karadayı sent a message to all military troops of Turkish Armed Forces celebrating the Nevruz feast. Despite police bans, celebrations were held in many places such as Diyarbakır, Malatya, Mersin, Batman, Adana, İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Balıkesir, and Edirne. Hundreds of people were taken into custody.

1996, May 6, There was an assassination attempt on the life of the PKK leader Öcalan. Öcalan survived the attack without getting wounded.

1996, June 14, A cross-border operation was conducted against PKK militants in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).

1996 July 21-25, Aerial operations against many PKK camps in Iraq were held.

1996, October 8, A cross-border operation against PKK camps in Iraq was organized.

1996 December 30, A cross-border operation against PKK camps in the Sinath district of Iraq was organized.

1997, February 28, After the post-modern coup, the Refah-Yol government was forced to resign and on June 18, 1997, Refah Party Chairman, Necmettin Erbakan, resigned from his position as prime minister.

1997, March 21, The official “Nevruz” celebrations were held throughout the country while closed hall meetings led by HADEP were not allowed. Despite this, many festivities were organized. Police intervened in Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır. Outdoor celebrations in İstanbul were allowed.

1997, May 14, The “Hammer Action” which started upon the request of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) lasted for about a month. Approximately 200 thousand soldiers and village guards participated in the operations. The TSK claimed that around 2,000 PKK militants lost their lives during the operations.

1997, September 25, The “Dawn Operation” was launched against the PKK camps in Iraq. Allegedly nearly 1,000 PKK members lost their lives until October 15.

1997 December 5, “Sweeping Operation” was launched against PKK camps in Iraq.

1998, March 21, On the one hand, the official “Nevruz” celebrations attended by the protocol were held, while on the other hand, the celebrations requested throughout the country were not allowed. Police intervened in demonstrations held in Diyarbakır. The only festivities allowed were in the Kazlıçeşme, İstanbul.

1998, April 13, Important names from the PKK’s military wing, Şemdin Sakık and his brother Arif Sakık, were captured and brought to Turkey.

1998, April 29, The TSK launched “Operation Murat” against PKK camps in Iraq with 40 thousand soldiers.

1998, September 1, The PKK declared a ceasefire for the third time.

1998, October 9, As a result of Turkish pressure, Öcalan left Syria and went to Europe.

İmralı Process (1999-2004)

1999, February 15th, Öcalan was captured and brought to Turkey.

1999, March 21, Newroz celebrations across the country were banned. There were many incidents. According to the Human Rights Association, 8,174 people were detained in the demonstrations.

1999, April 18, The People's Democracy Party (HADEP), established in place of DEP, won elections in 36 municipalities, including the cities of Diyarbakır, Mardin, Batman, Ağrı, Van, and Hakkari. The local governance experience of the leading Kurdish movement began with these elections.

1999, 31 May, Öcalan's trial began. Öcalan called on the state, PKK and a public for a political resolution to the Kurdish issue within Turkey's borders, as in his "Democratic Republic" thesis.

1999 June 29, Öcalan was sentenced to death.

1999, August 2, Öcalan urged the PKK to withdraw its armed militants out of the country to give a chance for a political resolution to the Kurdish issue.

1999, August 25, Responding positively to Öcalan's call, the PKK began to pull out its militants.

1999, August 26, Effective Remorse Law was adopted. However, the organization found it insufficient.

1999, October 1, "Peace Group," a group of PKK members in the mountains, came to Turkey and handed over their weapons as a sign of good faith.

1999 October 29, A group of PKK members in Europe, the "Second Peace Group," came to Turkey and surrendered to judicial authorities.

1999, November 25, Öcalan's death sentence was approved by the Court of Cassation.

1999, November 30, The European Court of Human Rights demanded that Öcalan's death sentence is not executed before the end of the trial.

1999, December 10-11, During the Summit of Heads of Government of the European Union (EU) in Helsinki, Turkey's EU candidacy was approved and Accession Partnership Document was decided to be prepared.

2000, January 12, Leaders of the coalition government partners, Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) announced that they would comply with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights.

2000, March 21, Banned for many years, Newroz celebrations were allowed. Open-air festivities were held in Diyarbakır, Batman, Van, Hakkâri, and Siirt.

2001, March 8, The first Accession Partnership Document for Turkey was approved by the European Commission. The Accession Partnership Document was re-audited by the EU in 2003, 2005, 2006 and 2008.

2001, March 19, The government approved National Program for implementation of Accession Partnership Document's priorities. The National Program was updated in 2003, 2005 and 2008.

2001, March 21 Newroz celebrations were held throughout the country. More than 500 thousand people attended the celebration in Diyarbakır.

2002, 19 February, The First Reform Package, which was prepared in the EU accession process, entered into force. Amendments were made to the Turkish Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Law, the Law on the Establishment and Trial of the State Security Courts, and the Code of Criminal Procedure to expand freedom of expression, reduce detention times, strengthen the protection of prisoners 'and convicts' rights.

2002, March 21, Newroz celebrations were held throughout the country. Hundreds of thousands of people attended Sezen Aksu's concert during Diyarbakır Newroz celebrations. On the other hand, groups of demonstrators were dispersed by the police in İstanbul where Newroz celebrations were not allowed to be organized.

2002, April 9, With Second Reform Package coming into force changes were made to The Law on the Establishment, Duties and Authorities of the Gendarmerie and the Law on the Provincial Administration, the Law on the Establishment and Procedure of the State Security Courts, as

well as on the Law on Press, the Political Parties Law, Associations Law, Meetings and Demonstrations Law, Law on Civil Servants.

2002, April 4, The PKK disbanded and left its place to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK).

2002, May 2, The EU included the PKK on its list of terrorist organizations.

2002, August 9, Within the EU membership process, the Third Reform Package was accepted. With the package, the death penalty was lifted except for war and war-like situations, the TRT-3 was free to broadcast 2,5 hours per week in the Kurdish broadcasting, but not more than 45 minutes per day. It was also allowed to open private Kurdish language courses. Freedom of expression and association was expanded, and legal arrangements were made regarding the immovable property of non-Muslim community foundations.

2002, November 3, The Justice and Development Party won 34.42% of the votes in the elections, gaining 365 seats, the majority of the 550 members in parliament, which allowed the members to form a government alone.

2002, November 30, OHAL, which had been in force since 1987, was lifted by the AK Party government.

2003, January 11, The Fourth Reform Package, which was prepared within the EU membership process, entered into force. Freedom to establish associations was expanded through legal regulations, and major changes were made towards strengthening the protection of the rights of detainees and prisoners, as well as the prevention of torture and ill-treatment.

2003, February 4, As the Fifth Reform Package entered into force, changes were made to the regulations on freedom of association.

2003, March 13, HADEP was closed in a unanimous vote of the Constitutional Court on the grounds of aiding and abetting the PKK. 46 party members were banned from political life for five years.

2003, March 20, The Multi-national Force, led by the United States and the United Kingdom, intervened in Iraq.

2003, March 21, Newroz celebrations were held throughout the country. The biggest festivities took place in Diyarbakır and went without incidents. More than 500 people participated in the celebrations.

2003, July 2, Through his lawyers, Öcalan presented a 10-point solution proposal that included democratic and cultural reforms, the disbandment of village guards and para-military structures, the strengthening of local governments, the confrontation with the past and the investigation of truth, regional socio-economic development, and general amnesty.

2003, July 19, Within the scope of the EU accession process, the Sixth Reform Package entered into force. In this context, the amendments made in the Law on the Establishment and Broadcasts of Radio and Televisions Enterprises have brought legal guarantee both for public and private radio and television to broadcast in different languages and dialects that are traditionally used by Turkish citizens in daily life. In this package, significant changes were made to the Anti-Terror Law regarding constituents of the crime of terror i.e. violence and force. Article 8, which limited freedom of thought and expression was abolished.

2003, August 7, The Seventh Reform Package, which expanded the freedom of thought and expression, came into force.

2003, November 11, KADEK announced that it had dissolved and left the floor to the Kurdistan People's Congress (Kongra-Gel).

2004, March 21, Many people attended Newroz celebrations throughout the country with no record of any incidents.

2004, March 28, DEHAP, which made an electoral alliance with the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP), won municipal elections for Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality as well as in Mardin, Batman, Şırnak and Hakkari.

2004, June 1, Kongra-Gel has announced that it moves "from passive defense toward legitimate active defense." The Imralı Process, which started with the capture of Öcalan and brought a five-year truce, ended.

2004, July 14, The Eighth Reform Package, part of the EU accession process, adopted by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, abolished the death penalty in all circumstances, including war.

2004, December 17, At the Brussels Summit it was announced that Turkey adequately meets political criteria and the decision was made to start EU membership talks 3 October 2005.

2005, March 21, Kongra-Gel announced the establishment of the KKK (*Koma Komelên Kurdistanê* - Kurdistan Communities Union). In the new structure, the KKK became the umbrella organization, while the Kongra-Gel became a parliament, a kind of legislative body.

2005, March 21, As a result of flag-burning provocation during the Newroz celebrations in Mersin, nationwide lynching campaigns started. The event brought into question Newroz celebrations.

2005, August 12, In his speech in Diyarbakır, Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan admitted that the state made mistakes in the past and stated that Kurdish issue would be solved by democracy, citizenship law, and prosperity.

2005, August 19, Kongra-Gel in a statement announced its decision to abstain from actions for a month.

2005, October 3, During Intergovernmental Conference in Luxembourg official EU accession negotiations with Turkey begun. Negotiating Framework for Turkey was published on the same day.

2006, March 21, The Newroz celebrations across the country passed without incidents. Hundreds of thousands of people attended the celebration in Diyarbakır.

2006, March 28-31, The unrest that started at the funeral ceremony in Diyarbakır for PKK militants lasted four days. 14 people, 6 of them children, died, 563 people were taken into custody, and 236 people were arrested.

2006, October 1, Kongra-Gel extended the decision of suspension of action indefinitely.

2007, May 16-22, Kongra-Gel changed its name to KCK (*Koma Cîvokên Kurdistanê* - Kurdistan Communities Union), which was established on March 21, 2005, during the fifth general meeting held in Qandil. Since then, KCK's name has come to the forefront in reference to the top structure instead of PKK and Kongra-Gel.

2007, July 22, As a result of the general elections, the AK Party won 46.47% of the votes and gained the majority in the parliament alone. The leading Kurdish party sent 24 MPs as independent candidates.

2007, October 17, The Prime Minister's Bill authorizing cross-border military operations, was accepted by AK Party in partnership with CHP and MHP.

2007, December 1, Operations against PKK groups in Iraq begun.

2007, December 16, Aerial operations against the PKK's camps in Iraq were carried out.

2007, December 22, The TSK warplanes bombed the PKK's camps in Zap, Cemcho, Metina, Hakurk, and Haftan in Iraq.

2008, January 15, Aerial operations against the PKK's Zap-Shîvî, Avaşîn-Basyan and Hakurk camps in Iraq were carried out

2008, February 21, Land and aerial cross-border "Solar Operation" targeting KCK camps in Iraq was launched.

2008, March 21, Newroz celebrations were held throughout the country. Around a million people attended the celebration in Diyarbakır.

Oslo Process (2008-2011)

2008, September, Oslo talks started between the KCK and the National Intelligence Organization.

2008, December 25, TRT-6 (*TRT Kurdî*), the first Kurdish state channel, started its test broadcast and on 1 January 2009 began a regular broadcast.

2009, March 11, President Abdullah Gül stated that very good things with regard to the Kurdish issue are about to happen in the coming days.

2009, March 21, Newroz celebrations were held throughout the country. During the celebrations in Diyarbakır, Öcalan's Newroz comments from the 1990s were watched by hundreds of thousands of people through a video projection.

2009, April 13, The KCK announced that it had taken a decision to suspend actions.

2009, April 14, 52 members of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), among them popular names of the Kurdish political movement, were arrested. These arrests continued under so-called KCK Operations, and about 8,000 political activists were arrested in the next two years.

2009, July 29, At a press conference, Interior Minister, Beşir Atalay, announced that the government had started the “democratic opening process.”

2009, August 5, Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan met with Ahmet Türk, leader of the DTP, to discuss “Kurdish Opening.”

2009, September 11, Higher Education Council (YÖK) decided to open Institute of Living Languages in Turkey at Mardin Artuklu University, that could have programs in Kurdish, Syriac, Arabic, and Farsi.

2009, October 19, Upon Öcalan’s call 34 members of the KCK came to Turkey through Habur Border Crossing. Released KCK members headed for Diyarbakır. The “Habur event” was welcomed with peace celebrations throughout the region and has caused a surge of nationalism in Turkey. The Habur Events was one of the most important crisis moments of the Oslo Process.

2009, December 7, KCK militants attacked soldiers patrolling the town of Reşadiye in Tokat. Seven soldiers lost their lives, three were wounded.

2009, December 11, The Constitutional Court unanimously decided to close the DTP. General Presidents Ahmet Türk and Aysel Tuğluk were stripped of their parliamentary seats.

2009, May 31, Öcalan announced his withdrawal from the talks.

2010, March 21, Newroz celebrations were organized in many cities. Hundreds of thousands of people participated in the festivities in Diyarbakır, which was the biggest celebration.

2010, June 1, KCK ended the decision to suspend actions declared on April 13, 2009, claiming that the government did not take a step towards a political resolution.

2010, August 12, KCK announced that it would not take any action from August 13th to September 20th, in the period before constitutional referendum which was to be held on September 12, 2010

2010, September 10, Öcalan announced through his lawyers that the talks with the state delegation came to the “point of practical suggestions” and that the year 2011 might be the year of the solution. Also, the suspension of actions was to be extended until after the general elections of 12 June 2011.

2010, September 12, A constitutional amendments package regarding 26 articles, including particularly controversial regulations on the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), was put to a referendum. Amendments were accepted by 57.88% of the voters.

2011, January 26, YÖK decided to accept the request of Mardin Artuklu University to open the Department of Kurdish Language and Literature with a four-year undergraduate program.

2011, March 21, Newroz celebrations were held in many cities. The celebrations made throughout the country were peaceful.

2011, April, Öcalan presented three protocols for negotiations to the state and the KCK.

2011, June 12, General elections were held. The AK Party with 49,95% of the votes gained parliamentary majority sufficient to form the government. Running as independent candidates, the leading legal Kurdish party won 34 seats.

2011, June 24, Öcalan said that everything had been discussed with the state delegation and that if no steps were taken, the process would end and the “revolutionary people’s war” would begin.

2011, July 6, Öcalan explained that the earlier statement to withdraw from the process in case the government takes no action until July 15, was no longer valid as they had agreed with the state on the establishment of a “Peace Council.”

2011, July 14, The Silvan Commando Battalion squad that searched the rural area of the Silvan district of Diyarbakir was ambushed and 13

soldiers and 7 militants lost their lives in the fighting, 7 soldiers were wounded.

2011, July 14, Democratic Society Congress (DTK), the umbrella platform for legal leading Kurdish Movement, unilaterally declared “democratic autonomy.” This event *de facto* ended the “Oslo Process.”

2011, July 27, Öcalan criticized both the state and the KCK for using him as a subcontractor and announced his withdrawal from the process. With this statement, the “Oslo Process” came to an end.

2011, August 17, TSK warplanes carried out an aerial attack on the PKK camps in the Qandil and Kato Mountains in Iraq.

2011, October 11, Upon permission from YÖK, Kurdish Language and Literature Department opened at Mardin Artuklu University offering a four-year undergraduate program. In the first year, 21 students were enrolled.

2011, December 28, Smugglers, with nearly 50 mules, from Roboski village were bombed by TSK while crossing Iraqi border. From 38 people of the group, 34 people died, 19 of them were children and most belonged to one family.

2012, February 2, The undersecretary of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and a senior official, Hakan Fidan, and two MIT employees, were summoned by the special prosecutor as “suspects” upon Gülenist Organization’s inspiration. This incident was one of the main breaks between the AK Party and the Gülenist Organization.

2012, March 21, Newroz celebrations to be held in many cities including Diyarbakir, Batman and İstanbul were banned. Despite the bans, many local celebrations were held.

2012, June 12, Prime Minister R. T. Erdogan explained that if a sufficient number of students demand, Kurdish will be an elective course in primary school. The implementation phase started in the 2012-2013 education year.

2012, July 19, The Kurds took over the administration in the cities of Kobanê, Efrîn, and Derik under the leadership of PYD (Democratic

Union Party - *Partiya Yekîtiya Demokratîk*). From this date on, under the PYD leadership the cantons of Cizîr, Kobanê, Efrîn and then the Rojava Democratic Autonomous Region were *de facto* created. The area of Rojava, initially covering areas where the Kurds concentrated, later expanded to include the Arab cities like Raqqa and Deyr ez-Zor under the name of Northern Syria Region.

Resolution Process (2013-2015)

2012, December 29, Prime Minister R.T.Erdoğan in a live TRT broadcast revealed talks with Öcalan imprisoned on İmralı island.

2012, January 3, Chairman of the Democratic Society Congress (DTK) and independent Mardin MP Ahmet Türk and Batman MP Ayla Akat met on İmralı island with PKK leader, Öcalan.

2013, January 5, The the right to defense in courts in the mother tongue was granted.

2013, January 9, Founding member of the PKK, Sakine Cansız and two members, Fidan Doğan and Leyla Şeylemez, were assassinated in Paris.

2013, February 24, The PKK announced the establishment of the YDG-H (Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement), a militant youth organization in the cities.

2013, March 21, Öcalan's letter in which he explains that the end of an era of the "armed struggle" was read to hundreds of thousands of people participating in the Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır. The letter was shared with the whole country through mainstream TV stations.

2013, April 4, Consisting of 63 members from 7 regions of Turkey, the Wise Persons Delegation was formed and began to work in Turkey.

2013, April 25, Murat Karayılan announced at the press conference held in Qandil that the KCK's armed militants will be withdrawn unconditionally from 8 May.

2013, May 8, The first meeting of the Parliamentary Resolution Process Commission, established to investigate the social peace options and to evaluate the settlement process, was held. CHP and MHP did not send delegates to the commission.

2013, May 29, The Gezi protest started. Demonstrations that started in Istanbul shortly spread to 79 provinces and proceeded for approximately one month.

2013, June 8, PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan announced that he saluted the Gezi resistance and added: “However, no one should allow themselves to be used by nationalist circles, or circles favoring a military coup.” BDP MP Sırrı Süreyya Önder, who became a symbolic figure of the Gezi resistance, was excluded from the delegation to travel to İmralı.

2013, June 26, A meeting of Wise Persons Delegation and R. T. Erdoğan was held in Dolmabahçe. Regional Delegations presented reports.

2013, July 10, YDG-H started forming “security units” in cities. Images from the founding ceremony circulated the media.

2013, July 10, PYD co-chairman Salih Müslim met with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the MiT.

2013, July 31, KCK Co-Chairperson Cemil Bayık explained to the BBC Turkish that if the government does not take any steps, he would stop the 1 September withdrawal.

2013, August 12, PYD Co-President Salih Muslim came to Turkey for the second time after a two-week break.

2013, September 9, KCK explained that they had stopped the withdrawal because the government did not take any measures.

2013, September 30, The government announced the “Democratization Package.” The package allowed education in Kurdish in high schools and removed the oath. The BDP and DTK criticized the package due to its very limited content.

2013, October 27, The People’s Democratic Party (HDP) was established.

2013, October 29, KCK Co-Chairperson Cemil Bayık requested, for the first time, the participation of a “third party” in the negotiations.

2013, November 16, Prime Minister Erdoğan’s attended a rally in Diyarbakir together with the President of the KRI, Massoud Barzani, and the well-known bard, Şivan Perwer, who lived in exile for many years.

2013, December 2, The Resolution Commission of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) presented its report to parliament. Commission Chairperson Naci Bostancı said, “it has been determined that the Resolution Process has established a negative peace and that something needs to be done to orient it towards a positive peace.”

2013, December 3, KCK Co-Chairperson Cemil Bayık stated that they had given the government time until spring, and if no steps were taken, clashes could resume.

2013, December 17-25, With the direction of the Gülenist Organization, corruption operations against the government were initiated. Within the scope of the operations, 89 people were detained, among them Barış Güler, the son of the Minister of Interior, Muammer Güler, Salih Kaan Çağlayan, the son of Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan, Abdullah Oğuz Bayraktar, the son of Minister of Environment and Urbanism Erdoğan Bayraktar, Süleyman Aslan, Halkbank General Manager and businessman Rıza Sarraf. Twenty-six people, including the two minister’s sons, were arrested. Also, within the scope of the operations, Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan’s son Bilal Erdogan was called to the prosecutor’s office as a suspect. However, the order of the prosecutor’s office was not fulfilled by the police. Following the inquiries, voice recordings allegedly belonging to government officials, bureaucrats, and businessmen, including Erdoğan and some ministers, were leaked on the internet.

2014, January 14, Öcalan described the corruption operations of 17-25 December as a “coup attempt” and announced that he stands against it.

2014, January 21, The PYD declared democratic autonomy in Syria’s Kurdish region of Rojava.

2014, March 15, KCK declared that it was no longer the addressee of the AK Party government’s democratization move.

2014, March 17, Murat Karayılan announced that the PKK would not disarm as long as Öcalan was in prison. He said that if steps were not taken one or two weeks after the local elections that were to be held at the end of March, the process would end.

2014, March 21, Öcalan’s letter was read during Diyarbakır Newroz celebrations. In the letter, Öcalan re-stated his peace-oriented position.

2014, March 30, Local elections were held. Despite the allegations that the AK Party lost support after 17/25 December corruption operations, the AK Party retained its power by winning 45% of the vote.

2014, April 26, The MiT law was amended to add that “MiT members, in carrying out their duties, may communicate and may order meetings with detainees and convicts in penal institutions on condition that they provide advance notice, and may as part of the requirements of their duty, contact all structures threatening national security, including terror organizations.”

2014, April 28, BDP MPs transferred to the HDP. The BDP later changed its name to the Democratic Regions Party (DBP), transforming itself into a regional party focused on the Kurdish area.

2014, July 10, “Draft Law on the Termination of Terror and Strengthening of Social Integration” was passed through parliament. This law laid legal grounds for the Resolution Process.

2014, July 11, The last two detainees in the Main KCK Trial were released in Diyarbakir.

2014, August 5, Öcalan said in a meeting with the HDP delegation that “the 30-year-old war reached a point at which it will end with major democratic negotiations.”

2014, August 10, R. T. Erdoğan won the presidential election in the first round with 53% of the votes.

2014, August 27, Ahmet Davutoğlu became AK Party Chairman and Prime Minister.

2014, September 15, The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) besieged Kobanê. KCK accused Turkey of supporting ISIL.

2014, September 30, Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç announced that a Resolution Process Council would be formed for the process to succeed.

2014, October 2, Parliament passed the Syrian bill. The bill gave the military the authority to conduct cross-border operations in Syria.

2014, October 3, KCK militants attacked the police station in Turkey's Pülümür district of Dersim on the grounds that Turkey supports ISIL.

2014, October 4, PYD Co-Chairperson Salih Müslim came for the third time to Turkey and met with Prime Minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu and HDP Co-Chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş.

2014, October 6-8, The HDP, accusing the AK Party government of supporting ISIL and ISIL siege of Kobanê called people to the streets. In the protests spreading to many cities 46 people lost their lives. The demonstrations were ended by the call from Öcalan.

2014, October 11, Co-chairperson of the KCK, Cemil Bayık blamed the AK Party government for the incidents in Turkey and Kobanê. He said that the resolution that the parliament had passed authorizing the military to conduct cross-border operations was a declaration of war and that therefore they had sent back all the units they had withdrawn from Turkey.

2014, October 20, The US provided the YPG in Kobanê from the air with weapons and ammunition.

2014, October 21, Öcalan stated in a meeting with the HDP delegation that "on 15 October a new stage had been reached and concrete steps would be taken."

2014, October 29, KRI's Peshmerga forces marched through Turkey to support YPG forces against ISIL in Kobanê.

2014, October 29, Van MP from the HDP, Aysel Tuğluk, in an article she published on an internet site, stated that the AK Party was no longer a partner in the Resolution Process and called out "secular forces."

2014, November 17, Talks, suspended due to Kobanê events, were resumed. The HDP delegation consisting of Pervin Buldan, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, and İdris Baluken came together with the Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan and discussed the creation of the Observation Committee.

2014, November 21, HDP Group Deputy Chairperson and İmralı Delegation member, Pervin Buldan, stated that from now Öcalan would be visited by a delegation of five persons, and a total of 25-30 persons

would work on the process including the Observation Committee, an expanded negotiations delegation, and a secretariat.

2014, December 1, Sırrı Süreyya Önder shared with the public the details of Abdullah Öcalan's "Draft of Peace and Democratic Negotiations Process."

2014, December 4, Prime Minister Davutoğlu stated that there was a new environment in the Resolution Process and that they wanted to reach the conclusion by the general elections in June 2015.

2014, December 12, The claim that the negotiations draft prepared by Öcalan included a heading on "autonomy" caused a dispute between the government and the HDP.

2014, December 20, KCK Co-Chairperson Cemil Bayık with regard to the claims published by the press that "the PKK would disarm until 15 March" said that there will be no disarmament without solving the Kurdish issue.

2014, December 27, YDG-H and HÜDA-PAR members clashed in Cizre district of Şırnak. The incidents raised societal concerns that the events would bring about a new PKK-Hezbollah conflict.

2015, January 26, YPG took control over Kobanê, which was under ISIL attack since September 15, 2014.

2015 February 15, In the Operation Shah Euphrates, launched by TSK, the tomb of Suleiman Shah, which was under the attack of ISIL, was moved to the village of Eşme under PYD control.

2015 February 28, A joint press conference with the İmralı Delegation and the government delegation was held at the Prime Ministry Office in Dolmabahçe. At the meeting, Öcalan's 10-point frame text he had prepared for the Resolution Process was read. The call on KCK was also made take a decision at the Congress to disarm in May. On behalf of the government, Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan said that the Kurdish issue will be resolved within a democratic framework.

2015 February 28, The HDP leader, Selahattin Demirtaş, in his assessment of the Dolmabahçe meeting, criticized the government's Internal Security Package initiative and said that "the government with its policies doesn't give shreds of hope, doesn't come closer to peace."

2015 February 28, KCK executive, Mustafa Karasu, stated that as long as the Kurdish issue had not been solved and measures had been taken within Öcalan's 10-point frame plan, it was not possible to lay down weapons.

2015, March 1, KCK described Öcalan's call to lay down weapons as a historic step and vowed to fulfill their responsibilities when the state holds its end of the bargain.

2015, March 1, The US State Department welcomed the call by Öcalan to lay weapons.

2015, March 11, President Erdoğan said that Öcalan's call to lay down arms is important for the establishment of confidence, peace, and stability, and stated that they are expecting their promises to be put into practice.

2015, March 11, Speaking to IMC TV, KCK Co-Presidents Cemil Bayık and Besê Hozat stated that "Declarations that the PKK will disarm are election propaganda" and that "the decision to lay down weapons can be only made at a congress attended by Öcalan himself. In other words, the PKK will not make such a statement without Öcalan's release."

2015, March 17, HDP leader Demirtaş said in a statement made at the parliamentary group meeting, hinting at Erdogan, that "we will not make you a president." This rhetoric was one of the most important elements of the HDP's electoral campaign.

2015, March 18, Names of alleged members of the Observation Committee showed in the media.

2015, March 20, President Erdoğan announced that he had not heard of the Observation Committee and did not have a positive view of it.

2015, March 21, In a letter read during Diyarbakir Newroz celebrations, Öcalan called on the PKK to organize disarmament congress. In the same call, he conditioned the organization of such a congress on the establishment of the Truth and Accountability Commission.

2015, March 22, President Erdoğan announced that he did not approve of the Dolmabahçe meeting.

2015, April 3, Internal Security Package, known as the “Law on Amending the Police Powers and Duties Law, the Law on the Gendarmerie’s Organization, Duties and Authorities, and Some [Other] Law” was ratified by the President.

2015, April 11, Four soldiers were wounded and 5 PKK militants killed in a clash between the army and the PKK in Ağrı Diyadin.

2015, May 5, KCK co-chairperson, Besê Hozat, stated that disarmament congress is off the agenda. Hozat, arguing that the state has not taken any steps towards resolution, explained that the PKK would not make a call for such a congress.

2015, May 16, HDP Co-chairperson, Selahattin Demirtaş, stated that the Resolution Process was frozen and no meeting with Öcalan had been held in more than two months.

2015, May 19, Prime Minister Davutoğlu said that the Resolution Process could not proceed without a progress on disarmament, and that visits to İmralı were not meaningful either.

2015, May 31, Prime Minister Davutoğlu said that after the elections, the side to the Resolution Process will be revised.

2015, June 5, In a bomb attack on the HDP Diyarbakır rally, four people lost their lives, nearly 400 people were injured.

2015, June 7, In the general election, HDP surpassed the election threshold with 13% of the votes and succeeded in entering parliament with 80 seats. The AK Party, which made an electoral propaganda campaign about the presidential system, for the first time in 13 years, with 41% of the votes could not achieve the majority that would allow forming a government.

2015, June 12, KCK declared that the decision to lay down weapons was neither up to Öcalan nor to the HDP, but their own.

2015, June 15, YPG took control of the Tel Abyad (Girê Sipi) region merging Cizîr and Kobanê cantons.

2015, June 26, President Erdogan stated: “I call out to the whole world. No matter what the cost, we will never allow the establishment of a state to the South of Turkey, to the North of Syria.”

2015, July 1, KCK stated that the government did not take any steps, the military continued to build fortified outposts and dams, and that the arrests continued, suggesting that the truce was abused. The organization announced that it would target dams and vehicles used in dam construction.

2015, July 14, KCK Executive Council Member Murat Karayılan stated that the Resolution Process and the ceasefire were in an interim period and that a stance would be taken once a new government was established.

2015, July 15, KCK Co-Chairperson Besê Hozat wrote an article titled “The New Process: Revolutionary People’s War” and published by *Özgür Gündem* newspaper.

2015, July 20, A suicide bomb attack was carried out by ISIL in Şanlıurfa’s Suruç district while the youth members of the Socialist Revolutionary Youth Movement who gathered to go to Kobanê were giving a statement. 32 people lost their lives in the attack, 103 people were injured.

2015, July 22, Two police officers were executed in their houses in Ceylanpınar district of Şanlıurfa. The armed wing of the organization, the HPG (*Hêzên Parastina Gel* - People’s Defense Forces), announced that the action was taken by its members in retaliation for the attack in Suruç.

2015, July 24, Turkey and the US reached a settlement concerning the opening of Incirlik military base to the use of coalition forces aerial operations against ISIL.

2015, July 24, F-16 planes belonging to the Turkish Air Force bombed the PKK’s camps in Zap, Garê, Haftanîn, Metîna, and Avaşîn in the KRI. The Resolution Process, which entered a crisis before the election, ended with this event.

Clashes in the Cities (2015-2016)

2015, July 30, It was announced that 190 people were killed and 300 were wounded in the two major operations organized by the Turkish Armed Forces in the KRI and against the KCK in Turkey.

2015, August 2, Representatives of 640 non-governmental organizations from the East and South East that came together in Diyarbakır and

called on the government and the PKK to end the conflict and declare a ceasefire.

2015, August 10, In a statement made in the name of “People’s Assembly” in Şirnak, “self-rule” (*özyönetim* in Turkish) was declared.

2015, August 11, President Erdoğan said that the Resolution Process is “in the refrigerator,” saying, “We will continue our fight until there is not a single terrorist left within our borders until concrete is cast on weapons.”

2015, August 12, KCK stated that “people of Kurdistan have no other choice but self-rule.”

2015, August 13, In Hakkâri Yüksekova, the declaration made in the name of the “Gever Democratic Society Assembly” declared self-rule in the district.

2015, August 16, In the town of Varto in Muş, as a result of clashes with the HPG the first curfew was imposed. It lasted 20 hours.

2015, August 17, Co-Chairperson of the Executive Council of the KCK, Cemil Bayık, urged the US to mediate.

2015, August 19, Trenches were dug and barricades erected on the streets of Cizre.

2015, August 20, The number of centers that declared self-rule increased to 16.

2015, September 3, The Turkish Armed Forces was given the authority to conduct cross-border operations in Syria and Iraq.

2015, September 6, 16 soldiers lost their lives in the HPG attack in Dağlıca.

2015, September 7. Curfew was declared in Cizre.

2015, September 8, 13 police officers lost their lives in the HPG attack in Iğdır.

2015, September 12, In Cizre, a curfew which lasted non-stop for 8 days was lifted. 22 people lost their lives in the clashes.

2015, September 24, Russia joined the civil war in Syria with fighter planes.

2015, October 10, In order to hold the November 1 elections in a conflict-free environment, the KCK announced that it had taken a decision to suspend actions starting from October 15.

2015, October 10, A double suicide bomb attack was carried out by ISIL at the “Resist War, Peace Now, Labor, Peace, Democracy” rally organized in Ankara by KESK, DİSK, TMMOB, and TTB. 102 people lost their lives, more than 400 people were injured.

2015, November 1, Following the June 7 general elections, the parties could not form a government, and the general elections were held again. The AK Party won 49.48% of the votes achieving majority required to form a government. HDP entered the parliament with 59 members and 10.75% of the vote.

2015, November 3, In Silvan district of Diyarbakır a 12-day curfew was imposed.

2015, November 5, KCK ended the suspension of actions.

2015, November 23, HDP Co-Chairperson Demirtaş filed a criminal complaint regarding an attempt of his life.

2015, November 25, In Mardin, Derik district center, ten-day curfew was imposed.

2015, November 28, Diyarbakır Bar Association President Tahir Elçi was murdered in Sur, Diyarbakır district.

2015, November 28, A 102 day-long curfew was imposed on Sur district of Diyarbakır. Dozens of people lost their lives in the clashes and Sur district was significantly demolished.

2015, December 11, An 18 day-long non-stop curfew was imposed on Dargeçit district of Mardin.

2015, December 14, A 79 day-long non-stop curfew was imposed on Cizre central district of Şırnak. Hundreds of people lost their lives in clashes, and Cizre was largely destroyed.

2015, December 14, A 37 day-long non-stop curfew was imposed on Silopi district of Şırnak. There was a large-scale destruction of the city center.

2015, December 18, HDP, HDK, DBP and DTK co-presidents at a joint press conference in Diyarbakır declared that they “adopt with all institutions the demands of self-rule and the struggle of the people.”

2015, December 26, The HDP claimed that the government made the Undersecretariat of Public Order and Security prepare a “simulation of war” under the name of the “Subversion Plan.”

2015, December 27, 14-point “declaration of democratic autonomous regions” was published after the extraordinary DTK meeting attended by HDP, HDK and DBP.

2015, December 27, The PKK/KCK begun to establish new armed formation under the name Civil Protection Units (*Yekineyên Parastina Sîvîl* - YPS) in the provinces where fighting and curfews took place.

2016, January 11, 1,128 academics issued a statement calling on the government to return to the peace and negotiating table, criticizing curfews and operations.

2016, January 14, Six people were killed and 43 people were injured when the PKK attacked Diyarbakır Çınar District Police Headquarters with a car bomb.

2016, January 15, Academicians who signed the statement “We will not be partners in this crime” began to be subjected to detention, house and workplace searches, criminal and administrative investigations.

2016, February 5, Prime Minister Davutoğlu announced the Action Plan to Combat Terrorism in Mardin.

2016, February 8, The government spokesman Numan Kurtulmuş announced that through diplomatic means they prevented PYD from joining the Geneva Talks under the UN auspices.

2016, February 14, Turkey hit with artillery fire YPG positions around Azez, Syria and Menneğ Air Base which shortly before went under YPG control.

2016, February 16, A 44 day-long non-stop curfew was imposed on İdil district of Şırnak.

2016, February 16, 28 people died in a bomb attack on a military service vehicle in Ankara. While the action was claimed by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (*Teyrêbazên Azadiya Kurdistanê* - TAK), the government claimed that the YPG had done it.

2016, February 22, The number of those who lost their lives in the basements of buildings in Cizre during curfew and clashes reached 167.

2016, February 26, IMC TV, which broadcasted on TURKSAT, was blacked out on the grounds that it had “made propaganda for a terrorist organization.”

2016, March 2, The curfew in Cizre was partially lifted after 79 days.

2016, March 9, In Diyarbakir district of Sur where the curfew was ongoing since November 28, 2015, the operations ended after 103 days.

2016, March 11, After the end of operations in Sur, Cizre, and İdil, Interior Minister, Efkan Ala, announced that there would be operations in Yüksekova, Nusaybin, and Şırnak.

2016, March 13, 37 people lost their lives in a bomb attack carried out by TAK in Ankara Güven Park. 125 people were injured.

2016, March 13, A 79 day-long non-stop curfew was imposed on Yüksekova district of Hakkari. Many people lost their lives in the clashes in the city center.

2016, March 13, Curfew in Sur district of Diyarbakir was partially lifted.

2016, March 14, A 134 day-long non-stop curfew was imposed on Nusaybin, district of Mardin. A large-scale destruction took place of the city center of Nusaybin.

2016, March 14, An 8-month long, until November 14, 2016, non-stop curfew was imposed on Şırnak. Hundreds of people lost their lives in the fighting. The center of Şırnak was largely destroyed.

2016, March 15, After the district of Sur in Diyarbakır, curfew was imposed on Bağlar Kaynaratepe district.

2016, March 16, Assoc. Dr. Esra Mungan, Asst. Assoc. Dr. Muzaffer Kaya and Assoc. Dr. Kıvanç Ersoy, who signed “We will not be partners in this crime” petition of Academicians for Peace were arrested for “making propaganda for a terrorist organization.”

2016, March 21, Many Newroz celebrations were held throughout the country. Thousands of people participated in the celebrations held in an environment of fighting, though less than in previous years. Speaking at the Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır, HDP Co-Chairperson Selahattin Demirtaş called on the KCK and the AK Party for a political resolution saying, “as HDP we urge to return to the negotiation table, to end this animosity without targeting our peoples.”

2016, April 2, Seven police officers lost their lives in a car bomb attack carried near Diyarbakır Bus Station. 13 police officers and 27 people were injured. The HPG claimed the attack.

2016, April 5, A 19 day-long non-stop curfew was imposed on the center of Silopi district of Şırnak.

2016, April 7, US Ambassador to Ankara, John Bass, urged the PKK to end the violence, to lay down its weapons and to accept legitimate negotiations.

2016, April 8, The KCK invited the United States to mediate an end of the fighting and a political resolution of the Kurdish issue.

2016, April 10, After 44 days, curfew in İdil district of Şırnak was lifted.

2016, April 11, In Yüksekova, Hakkâri the curfew continuing for 79 days, was partially lifted.

2016, April 22, The academicians who were arrested for signing the declaration “We will not be partners in this crime” were released in the first hearing.

2016, April 27, A suicide bomb attack was carried out near the Bursa Ulu Mosque. The attack in which 13 people were injured was claimed by TAK.

2016, May 10, A bomb attack against the police service vehicle was organized in Bağlar district of Diyarbakır. 12 police officers and 45 people were injured in the attack claimed by the HPG.

2016, May 12, An HPG truck loaded with explosives exploded in Dürümlü village of Sur district Diyarbakır. In the explosion, four villagers lost their lives and 23 people were injured.

2016, May 12, In İstanbul Sancaktepe, a car bomb attack was carried out against a vehicle carrying TSK personnel. Eight people were injured in the attack claimed by the HPG.

2016, June 7, 12 people lost their lives and 35 people were injured in a car bomb attack carried out by TAK against armored police vehicles in İstanbul Vezneciler.

2016, June 8, In Midyat, Mardin province, a police officer and two civilians were killed in a car bomb attack carried out by the HPG against the Police Department. More than 30 people were injured.

15 July Military Coup Attempt and OHAL (2016-2017)

2016, July 15, A group of soldiers in the Turkish Armed Forces under the leadership of the Gülenist Organization attempted a military coup. For the first time in history of Turkey, a military coup was hampered by civilian politics and resistance of the citizens. According to the Ministry of Interior, 246 citizens lost their lives and 2,185 people were injured in demonstrations against the coup attempt.

2016, July 16, The four parties in the parliament declared in a joint statement published after the military coup attempt that “we have different opinions but we are all with the national will.”

2016, July 20, After the meeting of the Council of Ministers, President R. T. Erdoğan declared the State of Emergency for 90 days.

2016, July 23, Thousands of dormitories and educational institutions, as well as 35 health institutions, 19 trade unions, and 15 higher education

institutions, were closed, 9.103 police officers were removed from duty, and the length of detention was increased to 30 days by the first Emergency Decree Law (KHK) No. 667, adopted by the Council of Ministers.

2016, July 25, Curfew that had been in place since March 14, 2016, was partially lifted in Nusaybin district of Mardin.

2016, July 26, HDP Co-Chair, Selahattin Demirtaş, said at the party's group meeting that Turkey had changed following July 15, and called on both the government and the KCK for a new assessment of the situation.

2016, July 27, With the KHK No. 668, 87 generals, 726 officers, 256 petty officers were dismissed from the Land Forces Command, from the Air Force Command 30 generals, 314 officers, 117 petty officers, from the Naval Forces Command 32 admirals, 59 officers and 63 non-commissioned officers. The Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard were linked to the Interior Ministry. 45 newspapers, 18 television channels, 3 news agencies, and 23 radio stations were shut down.

2016, July 31, 193 people from the TSK and 1,196 from the Gendarmerie Command were dismissed. Military Academies, military schools were closed. National Defense University was established. Military hospitals, especially GATA, were transferred to the Ministry of Health.

2016, August 10, In Kızıltepe, Mardin a police officer and three people were killed, and 20 people were injured, 15 of them civilians in a car bomb attack carried out by the HPG.

2016, August 13, Syrian Democratic Forces which formed with YPG as their backbone took over Manbij from ISIL control.

2016, August 15, Two civilians, one of them a child, and five police officers were killed and 24 people were injured in a car bomb attack by HPG in the vicinity of Şükürlü village of Diyarbakır.

2016, August 17, 2,692 public officials were dismissed by the KHK No. 670, approved by the Council of Ministers. It was decided to transfer the assets of private institutions and foundations, which were closed, to the treasury. The same day, the Department of Telecommunications and Communication was closed down by the KHK No. 671.

2016, August 18, Three police officers lost their lives and 217 were injured in a car bomb attack on Elazığ Police Department. HPG claimed responsibility for the attack.

2016, August 24, Turkey, together with the Free Syrian Army entered Jerablus creating a buffer zone between Efrîn and Kobanê regions under the YPG control.

2016, August 26, In Cizre, Şırnak province, 11 police officers lost their lives and three civilians were injured when a truck loaded with explosives went off in front of a police department. HPG claimed responsibility for the attack.

2016, September 1, With the KHK No. 672 more than 42,000 employees were dismissed from many public institutions and organizations, mainly the Ministry of Education and Health. The KHK No. 674 allowed to appoint trustees in municipalities in place of mayors removed from the post due to links with a terrorist organization.

2016, September 11, Öcalan, who had not been able to meet anyone since July 2015, when the Resolution Process ended, and who allegedly had been killed in the July 15 coup attempt, met with his brother Mehmet Öcalan. Öcalan said through his brother that if the state is ready, the Kurdish issue can be solved in six months.

2016, September 11, Trustees were appointed as in municipalities headed by the DBP, one of the components of the HDP. Trustees were appointed in Ağrı-Diyadin, Batman-Center, Batman-İkiköprü, Batman-Beşiri, Batman-Gercüş, Diyarbakır-Sur, Diyarbakır-Silvan, Erzurum-Hınıs, Hakkâri-Center, Iğdır-Tuzluca, Iğdır-Hoşhaber, Mardin-Nusaybin, Mardin-Derik, Mardin-Dargeçit, Mardin-Mazıdağı, Muş-Bulanık, Siirt-Eruh, Şırnak-Silopi, Şırnak-Cizre, Urfa-Suruç, Van-Özalp, Van-Erciş, Van-İpekyolu and Van-Edremit municipalities.

2016, September 12, In a car bomb attack on AK Party provincial headquarters in Van 53 people were injured. HPG claimed responsibility for the attack.

2016, September 29, With the KHK No. 668 twelve television stations and eleven radio channel were closed down, among them were Hayatın Sesi, IMC TV and Kurdish child channel Zarok TV.

2016, October 3, The AK Party government extended the OHAL for three months.

2016, October 6, 10 people were injured in a bomb attack on the police headquarters in Yenibosna, İstanbul. TAK claimed responsibility for the attack.

2016, October 9, In Şemdinli, Hakkari a gendarmerie station was attacked with a truck loaded with explosives. 15 people, including 10 soldiers were killed and 26 people, including 13 soldiers were injured.

2016, October 29, 10,131 public officials were dismissed by the KHK No. 675. 10 newspapers, 2 news agencies and 3 journals, including *Özgür Gündem* and Dicle News Agency were closed.

2016, October 31, Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Co-Presidents Gültan Kışanak and Fırat Anlı were arrested. A day later, a trustee was assigned to the metropolitan municipality.

2016, November 4, 10 civilians and 2 police officers were killed and nearly 100 civilians were injured in a bomb-loaded vehicle attack on the security building in Diyarbakır Bağlar district. Both ISIL and TAK claimed responsibility for the attack.

2016, November 5, A trustee was appointed to Şırnak Municipality.

2016, November 5, 12 HDP deputies were detained. Nine deputies, including co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, were arrested.

2016, November 11, In a bomb attack on Mardin Derik district governor building, governor Mohammed Safitürk lost his life. YPS claimed responsibility for the attack.

2016, November 14, A curfew ongoing non-stop for 10 months in the center of Şırnak was lifted for the daytime hours.

2016, November 17, Trustees were appointed to Mardin and Van metropolitan municipalities and municipalities of Siirt and Dersim provinces.

2016, November 18, Van Metropolitan Municipality President Bekir Kaya was arrested.

2016, November 22, With the KHK No. 677, more than 15 thousand public employees were dismissed. A total of 375 associations, most of them sensitive to the Kurdish issue and of which 47 were from Diyarbakir, were closed down. 7 newspapers, 1 magazine and 1 radio channel were shut down.

2016, November 24, Mardin Metropolitan Mayor Ahmet Türk was arrested.

2016, November 24, Two people died and 33 people were injured when a car bomb went off in the parking lot of Adana Governorate building. TAK claimed responsibility for the attack.

2016, November 27, A trustee was appointed to the Municipality of Bitlis.

2016, December 10, In İstanbul, near the Beşiktaş Vodafone Arena Stadium, in a double-bomb attack on the anti-riot police force, 45 people, including 37 police officers lost their lives and 155 people were injured. TAK claimed responsibility for the attack.

2016, December 17, In Kayseri, in a car bomb attack carried out by TAK near the campus of Erciyes University, 14 soldiers were killed and 56 people were injured.

2017, January 4, The AK Party government extended the OHAL for the second time for three months.

2017, January 6, With the KHK No. 679, 2.687 police officers and 631 academics were expelled from the profession and 83 associations were closed.

2017, February 1, HDP Spokesperson Ayhan Bilgen was arrested.

2017, February 3, Removed from the post and arrested Mardin Metropolitan Municipality Co-President, Ahmet Turk, was conditionally released due to health problems.

2017, February 7, With the KHK No. 686, 330 academicians and 4404 people from various public institutions were dismissed.

2017, February 23, TSK and FSA took from ISIL the city of El Bab located in the south of Jerablus. The buffer zone between Kobanê and Efrîn expanded to the south.

2017, March 21, Newroz celebrations have been banned in many provinces. On the other hand, in many provinces, such as Diyarbakır and Van celebrations were held. Speaking at the celebrations in Diyarbakır, HDP Spokesperson Osman Baydemir made a reference to the 2013 Newroz and called for a political resolution.

2017, April 11, Three people, including one police officer, died in a bomb attack on a tunnel being dug near the police department in Diyarbakır district of Bağlar.

2017, April 16, In the referendum on the presidential system, proposed by the AK Party and the MHP, 51,4 % of the votes were in favor of the system.

2017, April 17, The AK Party government extended the OHAL for the third time for three months.

2017, April 29, With the KHK No. 689, 3.974 public employees were dismissed. 14 associations, 1 newspaper, 1 magazine, 18 foundations, and 13 health institutions were closed down.

2017, April 29, TSK-based warplanes carried out aerial operations against YPG camps located in the vicinity of Karaçok in the Rojava region in Syria and against HPG camps in the Sincar region on the Syrian-Iraq border.

2017, June 6, Despite Turkey's objections, the US launched an operation to take over Raqqa in cooperation with the Syrian Democratic Forces of which YPG is the backbone.

2017, June 15, The leader of the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and the party members started the March for Justice from Ankara Güven-Park to İstanbul. The March for Justice, which took place with the participation of thousands of people in 25 days, ended with a rally in İstanbul on July 9th.

2017, July 14, With the KHK No. 692, 7,348 people were dismissed from public offices.

2017, July 15, Dismissed and detained Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality Co-Chair Fırat Anlı was released.

2017, July 17, The AK Party government extended the OHAL for the fourth time for a period of three months.

2017, September 8, The HDP Spokesperson Ayhan Bilgen was released.

2017, September 20, TSK warplane held an aerial campaign against the KCK camps in the areas of Avaşın and Basyan in the KRI.

2017, September 25, A referendum on independence was held in the KRI. In the referendum, with 72% turnout, 93% of the votes were the “Yes”.

2017, October 13, Based on the decision made during Astana talks about establishing safe zones, Operation Idlib was launched. TSK-affiliated troops entered Idlib to provide internal control.

2017, October 16, The Iraqi army and Hashd al-Shaabi forces entered Kirkuk. As a result of three days of operations, the KRI withdrew from disputed territories.

2017, October 16, The AK Party government extended the OHAL for the fifth time for the period of three months.

2017, October 17, Raqqa, the headquarters of ISIL, went under the control of the US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces.

2017, October 19, The TSK’s fighter planes carried out an aerial campaign against the Zap camps of the KCK in the KRI.

2017, October 24, Speaking at the AK Party group meeting, President R. T. Erdoğan said that the operation in Idlib was to a large extent completed and that Efrîn was next.

2017, November 3, Deir ez-Zor, a city with Syria’s richest oil and natural gas reserves, was taken from ISIL by the Syrian Army and Syrian Democratic Forces. The Syrian Army took control of the city south of the

Euphrates river which runs through the city. The region to the north of the Euphrates and west of Khabur went under control of the Syrian Democratic Forces.

2017, November 3, Murat Karayılan, member of the KCK Executive Committee stated that after taking Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor from ISIL, Idlib would be next.

2017, November 8, Speaking in Aleppo, Ali Akbar Velayati, a senior adviser to Iran's religious leader Ali Khamenei, suggested that a "resistance fence" was established from Tehran to Beirut, suggesting that the eastern part of Syria and Idlib would be taken back soon.

2017, November 9, The Ministry of Interior announced that 2,304 KCK members had lost their lives in operations since January 10, 2017.

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The Diyarbakir Institute for Political and Social Research (DİSA) was founded in Diyarbakir on 8 March 2010, as a pluralist institute independent of politics. Our institute's work is centered on three research programs. Among the areas encompassed in its research programs, DİSA aims to function as a centre for researchers, and to contribute to the creation of the policies of the future through a first hand, objective and fieldwork-oriented knowledge base, by conducting research that will pave the way for the community's social and political development,

DİSA brings these issues to people's attention by publishing research, with the aim of increasing egalitarian social awareness and developing dialogue, which makes possible the peaceful coexistence of difference. It contributes to the sharing of information through conferences, symposiums, panels, workshops, studios and reports.

The Mother Tongue and Pedagogy Research Program. By conducting research that, with the politics of language and education, takes up the problems resulting from the lack of use of mother tongues in education, this project develops model suggestions relating to mother-tongue based multilingual education. Our institute draws out the results of the hierarchy between languages in the eyes of children who cannot develop through the mother tongue socialization phase or formal training, and researches the pedagogical possibilities of multilingual life.

The strands of this research project are: a mother tongue's intergenerational variance; the social perception of linguistic restrictions, and its relationship with exclusion; multilingual and multicultural education models; educational training subjects; turning children's oral literature materials and games into educational resources; and encouraging the cultural creative potential of children who have experienced social trauma.

The Justice and Peacebuilding Research Program encompasses the information and data production that has been analyzed in light of the regional reality of the world conflicts that are defined as "conflict resolution". It organizes comparative analyses, discussions


and research that reveal a legal coordination of justice, and the difference between a long kind of peacebuilding that has ups and downs and the reduction of public order for the sake of bargaining.

It encompasses things such as armistice and disarmament; paramilitaries and parallel structures; the protection of civilians; post-conflict, community-based justice; confronting the past and bringing the truth to light; transitions that have happened in other countries; negotiation and peacebuilding processes; the effects of regional conflicts' dynamics on local processes; mediation and monitoring processes; sub-research such as analysis of interrupted processes; and other activities in areas of debate.

The Sustainable Life and Space for Diyarbakir Research Program is a program focusing on the possibilities of a politics of space that is sensitive to nature and a given cultural fabric, and of a local, human-centered, decentralist and solidarist economy. It has been designed with the aim of conducting research on the basis of the reality of centrist/burocratic-driven investment that deals with the disconnect from the social consequences of economic growth in the region and the increase in the human development problems of urbanization politics, as well as the aim of debating the results.

The research subtopics of this program, specific to Diyarbakir and its surroundings, are: participation in the politics of the city and shelter, the peace economy, autonomy and centralized resource distribution, examples of the participatory regional economy and green urbanization, cooperative social solidarity network economies, local agriculture, the stability of the place-people-nature relationship and the politics of the fight against poverty.

DISA Research Books on Mother Tongue and Pedagogy




The book, *Scar of Tongue*, is the outcome of a qualitative research conducted through the assessment of a wide range of sampling. Rather than simply seeing the use of mother tongue in education as a human right, the study seeks to explore how Kurds and Kurdish children in particular, have been affected by the state policies regarding language and education in Turkey in the absence of this basic human right and necessity. In other words, it is an attempt to better understand the linguistic, educational, psychological, social and political destructions of banning Kurdish language as a mother tongue in education in Turkey and to contribute to precautions aimed at eliminating those destructions.

In this respect, “Scar of Tongue” consists of three major parts: firstly, it focuses on Turkey’s problematic political inheritance since the establishment of the nation-state, and the problems still posed by this inheritance; secondly it contextualizes this inheritance through findings of the fieldwork together with the theoretical analyses; lastly it compares and contrasts the historical-political context of Turkey with the language policy implementations in three different countries, Corsican in France, Basque in Spain and Uyghur in China with possible policy suggestions and precautions for Turkey.

“Scar of Tongue” aims to contribute to deepening of the current debates on mother tongue-based education and to development of an understanding of multilingual education - involving the use of Kurdish in education- in Turkey.

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


Handan Çağlayan started in Diyarbekir and investigated how language is used by different Kurdish families in everyday life. Her study *Same Home Different Languages* based on field research does more than just show us under what circumstances Kurdish was passed from one generation to another; it also depicts how this process was interrupted.

In many ways this study contributes significantly to the current political debates and the academic literature in this field. *Same Home Different Languages* contributes to the literature on the subject in the sense that it presents the issue of native language in the context of Turkey and specifically in regards to the Kurdish language. The study approaches this subject not only from the perspective of education, but also using a broader framework incorporating relations with the other spheres of everyday life; it does not focus only on the consequences of the ban on mother tongue, but also presents which social, psychological and political effects have occurred as a result of the interruption in the intergenerational transmission of language.

Handan Çağlayan, by discussing how the long term struggle of the Kurdish movement has been reflected in the sphere of language and what it has gained for Kurdish, brings the discussion on mother tongue to the fair context which politically and historically discerns the truth. Along with this debate, she presents the political developments that have occurred during field research. They are important from the perspective of presenting the setting in which the debates on native language have taken place.


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A society, which can freely use language and culture of its land in education, raises conscious individuals who are at peace with themselves. However, the same so-ciety, if under pressure and oppression of the hegemon does not refer to its own values, but values of the oppressor, becomes alienated from its own land, history, culture and language and raises individuals lacking self-confidence. Kurds, who possess rich language, culture, history and land, have been constantly prevented from growth by oppressive and colonialist states. Therefore, language and cultural values of Kurdish nation could be passed on new generations in written form only in a limited scope. Kurds managed to protect and preserve to this day their values in oral form through efforts of dengbêjs, storytellers and singers and that is how they created considerable repertoire of oral culture.

This study is based on fieldwork. In the course of the research five regions of Northern Kurdistan were visited in seventy eight days. 854 people were inter-viewed in fourteen counties and thirty two districts, two towns and seventy six villages. This study, conducted between late June and mid-September 2014, also aimed at recording and archiving Kurdish folklore in Northern Kurdistan. The overall objective of this broad research is to adopt collected folkloric products for the use in pre-school education.

DISA Research Books on Justice and Peacebuilding




This report aims to analyze the village guard system in a historical and social context, as one of the tools of the Turkish state for polarizing the society as “pro-state” and “enemy of the state” by arming civilian citizens. This research sheds light on the continuity between the Hamidiye Cavalry Regiments, the Late Ottoman paramilitary organization, and the “modern” village guard system that has been in practice since 1985. For approximately 30 years, the common denominator of various political powers was to consider the village guard system as an infection that needs to be eradicated, and also viewed it as an armed force that should persist after these political groups came to power. We follow the traces of the motive behind this dual attitude in the part of our research where meeting minutes of the Assembly and the news of the press organs were examined.

In this research, you will see that the village guard system is not only a tool of power, an instrument to polarize the Kurdish society or a world of armed crime, but also a social problem and an experience of human devastation. This field research was conducted on such a large scale for the first time and was based on the interviews done with the village guards, their spouses and children in their own villages. The research demonstrates the vast existence of different point of views regarding the village guard system, the state, PKK, Kurdish identity and their roles in this system among villagers who became the village guards willingly, by force or due to reasons beyond their will.

The research does not consider the village guard system as an institution that can be reformed or dissolved, but rather as an instrument that needs to be finalized by the mechanisms of seeking justice and social security while passing through a process without weapons and clashes. For this reason, a chapter was also included in the report regarding by which legal, political and social precautions the paramilitary organizations in other countries were abolished.

DISA Research Books on Justice and Peacebuilding



This is one of the studies of “coming to terms with the past”, which tries to give ear to the feelings, thoughts, demands of the victims, who were addressed by crimes against humanity, who were exposed to the violence of states; and to convey these feelings, thoughts and demands to the states at stake and to those who remained silent when tahose crimes were committed.

We bring together the narratives of those victims of state violence in Kurdistan in the 90s with the narratives of those who suffer similar pains in other parts of the world as well as with the political and philosophical narratives produced for similar situations concerning justice, mourning, forgiveness, resentment and political friendship. We bear testimony that those who were colonized, impoverished, silenced, displaced and whose relatives were “wiped out” give a gift – composed of values, words, and politics they produced in struggle and persistently keep alive – to those people, lives and sciences that did not experience and hear of oppression. A gift to enable the latter to “come to terms with the past”.

This testimony cannot be afforded without acknowledging that the pain cannot be told and it will never fade away. This kind of acknowledge also requires us to take into consideration that the victims have personal and social needs and expectations as well as fundamental human and citizenship rights, and to reason about the restora-tive justice mechanisms that will move and complement legal processes, the basis of retributive justice

approach, which some do not find sufficient or important and most people cannot reach yet. Moreover, even if we assume that retributive justice mechanisms will perfectly operate one day, it will always be necessary for building political friendship or renewing the contract of fraternity to give a possibility to witnesses, who have the responsibility of being silent to all those injustices and who are not eligible to sit in the dock, to participate in the restorative justice process.

For the very reason, we strived to give ear to interviewees' quest for justice reflected in their expectations from the state; their demands for the prosecution and punishment of perpetrators and the responsible ones; their objections to impunity, material reparation and plea-bargain; their views on disclosure and acknowledgment of truths, public apology, and finally their state of "demandlessness". We made an effort to understand their opinions with regard to the possibility of their confrontation with perpetrators and the responsible ones, the possibility for them to forgive and give their blessings, their expectations from Turks in terms of the likelihood of a new contract of fraternity/political friendship and the struggle for dignity they give. Now we try to convey them to you.

"Coming to terms with the past" is not a necessity, for neither Turks nor Kurds; it is at best a chance, one more chance for the possibility of living together.

Internal conflicts in Turkey's neighboring Iraq and Syria on the one hand, and socio-political turmoil of the recent years on the other hand make the solution to the Kurdish conflict intermittently ongoing since 1984 more crucial than ever. This turmoil is both fueled by and directly determines the formation of the Kurdish conflict.

The termination of the Kurdish conflict and social peacebuilding today go beyond a political solution to the Kurdish issue since the end of the conflict will not only pave the way for the socio-political and socio-economic reconstruction of the Kurdish space. At the same time, the Kurdish issue will have a decisive effect on the reconstruction of the political system and social life in Turkey. Moreover, the re-establishment of the socio-political system at the regional scale and the overcoming of the political crises in Iraq and Syria will be shaped by the solution of the Kurdish issue, which has gained a far more cross-border character than in the past.

In this study, Turkey's Kurdish conflict and the quest for peace is discussed from a comprehensive historical and comparative perspective. In the light of cross-country experiences, the past, present, and future of the Kurdish conflict are examined in a cross-border context and the possibilities for a return to negotiations are discussed. Due to these qualities, this research claims to fill an important gap in the field.

