

TURKOMANS BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES:
THE ORIGINS OF THE QIZILBASH IDENTITY IN ANATOLIA
(1447-1514)

A Ph.D. Dissertation

by
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February 2008

To Sufis of Lāhijan

TURKOMANS BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES:
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(1447-1514)

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
of
Bilkent University

by

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THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
BILKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA

February 2008

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ABSTRACT

TURKOMANS BETWEEN TWO EMPIRES: THE ORIGINS OF THE QIZILBASH IDENTITY IN ANATOLIA (1447-1514)

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February 2008

This thesis aims to evaluate the emergence of the Qizilbash Movement and the Qizilbash Identity during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century within the struggle between the Ottoman and the Safavid power. The process of the making of the Qizilbash Identity, which was, in essence, the concurrent process of the Turkoman milieu's gradual divergence from the Ottoman axis and convergence to the Safavid affiliation, is reflected in available sources as if it were predominantly a religious issue. The present study argues, however, that the religious aspect of the developments was simply the 'surface' or 'outcome' of a rather inclusive process including anthropological, cultural, sociological, and political dimensions. It is argued that the Qizilbash Identity was a product of the intercession of two separate but interrelated lines of developments: on the one hand being the alienation of the 'nomadic-tribal Turkoman world' from the 'Ottoman imperial regime', while on the other hand being the synchronized rapprochement between the 'Turkoman milieu' of Anatolia and the Safavid Order. One of the prominent promises of the present thesis is that the most decisive factors governing the course of both lines of the

developments stemmed from the structural inconsistencies, or ‘unconscious structures’ of societies as Lévi-Strauss states, between two ‘ways of life’: one is sedentary life, which accomplished its socio-political organization as bureaucratic state, and the other is nomadic or semi-nomadic life organized around tribal axis.

Key words: Qizilbash, Safavids, Ottoman, Turkoman, tribe

ÖZET

İKİ İMPARATORLUK ARASINDA TÜRKMENLER: ANADOLU'DA KIZILBAŞ KİMLİĞİNİN KÖKENLERİ (1447-1514)

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Bu tez Osmanlı-Safevi mücadelesi çerçevesinde on beşinci yüzyılın sonları ve on altıncı yüzyılın başlarında Kızılbaş kimliğinin oluşumunu incelemektedir. Kızılbaş kimliğinin oluşumu esas itibariyle Türkmen kitlelerin bir yandan Osmanlı ekseninden uzaklaşırken diğer yandan Safevi şeyhlerine/şahlarına bağlanmalarına dayanan tarihsel sürecin bir ürünüdür. Çağdaş kaynaklarda bu mesele daha çok dinsel yönüyle ön plana çıkarılmaktadır. Ancak elinizdeki tez bunun antropolojik, kültürel, sosyolojik, ve siyasi unsurları da içinde barındıran çok kapsamlı ve karmaşık bir süreç olduğunu, kaynaklarda bolca tesadüf edilen dinsel argümanların meselenin sadece dış yüzü ya da bir sonucu olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu çalışma, süreçte asıl belirleyici olan faktörlerin Osmanlı gücünün büyümesine paralel olarak git gide bir birinden uzaklaşan iki hayat tarzı arasındaki yapısal uyumsuzluklar, ya da Lévi-Strauss'un deyimiyle toplumsal hayatın gidişatını belirleyen 'bilinçsiz yapılar'ın farklılaşmasında aramak gerektiğini savunmaktadır. Bu iki yapı, bir yanda Osmanlıların benimsediği yerleşik hayata yaslanan ve siyaseten bürokratik devlet

olarak örgütlenen hayat tarzı, diğeryanda da konar-göçer bir hayat süren ve aşiret yapısı içinde örgütlenen Türkmen hayat tarzı idi.

Anahtar kelimeler: Kızılbaş, Safeviler, Osmanlı, Türkmen, aşiret

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Before everything else, I would like to thank my dissertation committee for their inspiring guidance and consistent encouragement. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Halil İncılık, who generously shared his time, immense knowledge, and stimulating ideas and suggestions with me in several stages of this dissertation. His valuable suggestions, both in scope and content, contributed too much to the development of this dissertation.

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I would also like to express my gratitude to Prof. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak for his valuable help and encouragement. I owe too much to his inspiring suggestions and stimulating contributions. I especially thank him for his generosity in sharing his time and insightful ideas as well as his vast knowledge.

Finally, my wholehearted gratitude goes to my beloved wife B. Edanur Yildirim, whose endless encouragement and support became my primary source of motivation. Without her invaluable presence in all stages of my study, this dissertation could not have been completed.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- AA Eskandar Beg Monshi, *History of Shah 'Abbas the Great (Tārīk-e 'Ālamārā-ye 'Abbāsī)*, translated by Roger M. Savory, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.
- ALI Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, *Kitabu't-Tarih-i Künhü'l-Ahbar*, 2 vols., eds. A. Uğur, M. Çuhadar, A. Gül, and İ. H. Çuhadar, Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997.
- ANM1 *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, F. Giese Neşri, ed. Nihat Azamat, İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1992.
- ANM2 *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512)*, ed. Necdet Öztürk, İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2000.
- ANMB *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, 1481-1512*, the entire text is transliterated in Faruk Söylemez, *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Erciyes Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1995.
- ANMH Kreutel, Richard F., *Haniwaldanus Anonimi'ne Göre Sultan Bayezid-i Velî (1481-1512)*, çev., Necdet Öztürk, İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997.
- APZ Aşıkpaşa-zâde, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, in *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, ed. Nihal Atsız, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1949, pp. 91-294.
- APZa Aşıkpaşa-zâde, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, ed., 'Ali Bey, İstanbul, 1332.
- BRW Browne, Edward G., *A Literary History of Persia. Vol. IV. Modern Times (1500-1924)*, Maryland: Iranbooks, 1997. (Originally published in 1902)
- CLZ Celâl-zâde Mustafa, *Selim-nâme*, ed. Ahmet Uğur-Mustafa Çuhadar, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1997.
- FSH Fisher, Sydney Nettleton, *The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481-1512*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1948.

- HAM1 Hammer Purgstall, Joseph Von., *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. I, trs. Mehmet Ata, eds., Mümin Çevik-Erol Kılıç, İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1984.
- HAM2 Hammer Purgstall, Joseph Von., *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. II, trs. Mehmet Ata, eds., Mümin Çevik-Erol Kılıç, İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1984.
- HAM3 Hammer Purgstall, Joseph Von., *Büyük Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. III, trs. Mehmet Ata, eds., Mümin Çevik-Erol Kılıç, İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1984.
- HR Hasan-ı Rumlu, *Ahsenü't-Tevarih*, translated into Turkish and abridged by Cevat Cevan, Ankara: Ardiç Yayınları, 2004.
- HS Khwandamir (Mir Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Husayni), *Habibu's-siyar*, translated and edited by W. M. Thackston, Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures 24, Central Asian Sources I, Harvard University, 1994.
- HSE2 Hoca Sadettin Efendi, *Tacü't-Tevarih*, vol II, ed. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999.
- HSE3 Hoca Sadettin Efendi, *Tacü't-Tevarih*, vol III, ed. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999.
- HSE4 Hoca Sadettin Efendi, *Tacü't-Tevarih*, vol IV, ed. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999.
- HT Qādi Ahmed Qumī, *Hulāsat al-tavārīh*, edited and translated into German in Erika Glassen, *Die frühen Safawiden nach Qāzī Ahmad Qumī*, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970. (The section from Shaykh Safī to the advent of Shah Ismail in 1501)
- HYDR Divan Kâtibi Haydar Çelebi, *Haydar Çelebi Ruznâmesi*, ed. Yavuz Senemoğlu, Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser Serisi. (Transliterated and abridged version of the copy housed in Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, R 1955)
- IDRS İdrîs-i Bitlisî, *Selim Şah-nâme*, haz. Hicabi Kırılancıç, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001.
- KPZ10 Kemalpaşazâde, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, X. Defter*, ed., Şefaettin Severcan, Ankara: TTK, 1996.
- KPZ8a Kemalpaşazâde, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, VIII. Defter*, ed. Ahmet Uğur, Ankara: TTK, 1997.
- KPZ8b Kemalpaşazâde, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Defter VIII*, published by Ahmet Uğur in his *The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the*

- Selim-nâme Literature*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, pp. 28-64.
- KPZ9 Kemalpaşazâde, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Defter IX*, published by Ahmet Uğur in his *The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-nâme Literature*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, pp. 65-145.
- LTFP Lütü Paşa, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, ed. ‘Ali Bey, İstanbul, 1925.
- MNB Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede, *Sahaif-ül-Ahbar fî Vekayi-ül-a’sâr*, 2 vols., trs. İsmail Erünsal, Tercüman 1001 Eser Serisi.
- NIT *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries*, translated and edited by Charles Grey, London: Hakluyt Society, 1873.
- Ross Anonymous* Ross, Denison E., “The early years of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavi Dynasty”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXVIII (1896), 249-340.
- SKB Şükrî-i Bitlisî, *Selim-nâme*, ed. Mustafa Argunşah, Kayseri, 1997.
- SKR Şikâri, *Karamanoğulları Tarihi*, ed. Mes’ud Koman, Konya, Yeni Kitab Basımevi, 1946.
- SLZ1 Solakzâde Mehmed Hemdemî Çelebi, *Solakzâde Tarihi*, vol. I, ed. Vahit Çabuk, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989.
- SLZ2 Solakzâde Mehmed Hemdemî Çelebi, *Solakzâde Tarihi*, vol. II, ed. Vahit Çabuk, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989.
- TA Minorsky, V., *Persia in A.D. 1478-1490. An Abridged Translation of Fadlullah b. Rûzbihân Khunjî’s Târîkh-i ‘Âlam-ârâ-yi Amînî*, London, 1957.
- TM *Tadhkirat al-Mulûk*, translated and explained by V. Minorsky, E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, New Series, XVI, London, 1943.
- TNSB Tansel, Selâhattin, *Sultan II. Bâyezit’in Siyasi Hayatı*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1966.
- TNSS Tansel, Selâhattin, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969.
- TTP Josafa Barbaro and Ambrogio Contarini, *Travels to Tana and Persia*, Hakluyt Society, first series 49, translated by William Thomas and A.A. Roy and edited by Lord Stanley of Alderley, London, 1873.
- ULCY1 Uluçay, Çağatay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Pahişah Oldu?”, *İÜEF Tarih Dergisi*, VI/9 (1954), 53-90.

- ULCY2 Uluçay, Çağatay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Pahişah Oldu?”, *İÜEF Tarih Dergisi*, VII/10 (1954), 117-142.
- ULCY3 Uluçay, Çağatay, “Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Pahişah Oldu?”, *İÜEF Tarih Dergisi*, VIII/11-12 (1955), 185-200.
- UZC1 Uzunçarşılı, İsmail, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. I, Ankara: TTK, 2003. (First published in 1947)
- UZC2 Uzunçarşılı, İsmail, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. II, Ankara: TTK, 1998. (First published in 1943)
- YSF Çerkesler Kâtibi Yusuf, *Selim-nâme*. The entire text is transliterated in Mehmet Doğan, *Çerkesler Kâtibi Yusuf'un Selim-nâmesi'nin Mukayeseli Metin Tenkidi ve Değerlendirmesi*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1997.
- TSA Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi
- DIA Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi
- IA Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı İslâm Ansiklopedisi
- EI1 Encyclopedia of Islam, 1st edition.
- EI2 Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition.

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

Source materials quoted in the present dissertation are predominantly either in Ottoman Turkish or in a western language (English, French, German) translated from Persian. As for the second group I use the translated texts without any change or modification. For the texts in Ottoman Turkish I follow modern Turkish orthography with the diacritical marks listed below.

For “ayn” (ع) and “hamza” (ء), I use “ ‘ ” and “ ’ ” (‘avārız, re‘āya, tābi‘, kāri’)

For long “a, i, u” (ظو , بی, فا), I use “ – ” (qādi, ulemā, Bitlisī)

Arabic *izāfe* in Arabic and Persian texts is transcribed as “al-” like *āmir al-umerā*, while in Turkish texts it is transcribed as “u’l-” like *Saffatu’s-safa*. Persian *izāfe* in all texts is transcribed as “-i” like *mekteb-i kebīr*.

In the Ottoman Turkish texts, for the terms and names that are used in Turkish – without regarding the origin of the word -, modern Turkish orthography is used and diacritical marks are omitted except in the two cases explained above. In the meantime, words and proper nouns that have a generally recognized English form, such as “shaykh, shah, pasha, qādi, waqf, ulemā, Qizilbash, Bektashi,” etc., are anglicized. For place names and the names of historic personages outside the Ottoman realm, such as “Baghdad, Ardabil, Tabriz, Junayd” etc., the generally

accepted anglicized form without diacritical marks are used. In quotations from various works, as well as published documents and manuscripts, the ways they were transliterated by the authors and editors are not changed.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study is an attempt to delineate the emergence of the Qizilbash Identity within the context of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. It aims to unfold the anthropological-cultural roots and socio-political environment of the Qizilbash zeal. A zeal which made a group of nomadic-tribal people, namely the Turkomans, “go into battle without armour, being willing to die for their monarch [spiritual and temporal master], rushing on with naked breasts, crying ‘Shiac, Shiac [Shah]’”¹. A zeal which created an empire from a sufi order; which brought about a serious crystallization in the official ideology and religious stand of the Ottoman state; and which opened up a permanently growing crack in the socio-religious set up of Anatolia. The qizilbash zeal was experienced in the hearts of Anatolian Turkomans by the second half of the fifteenth century onward. But, of course, it was by no means independent from the religious and political environment that surrounded these nomadic-tribes. Among many other factors, two were primarily responsible for creating

¹ A Venetian merchant reports the qizilbash on his eye witness in 1510. See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 206.

and feeding the qizilbash sentiment: the resentment against the rising Ottoman imperial regime, which was identified with the antipathy against the Ottoman sultans, and the love for the Safavid shaykhs/shahs. Thus, the present study is a history of the Turkomans searching for a ‘paradise’ between two empires, i.e. the Ottoman and the Safavid empires: a history shaped by the struggle of two mutually irreconcilable political systems, which were accompanied by increasingly diverging religious and cultural grounds; and a history that created an ‘ethnic’ socio-religious entity from the synthesis of the Turkoman culture and the Safavid mysticism.

It is an established acceptance among scholars that the roots of the Qizilbash belief trace back to Central Asia, to the pre-Islamic religions of the Turks, and to some extent to Iran and Mesopotamia.² However, the formation of Qizilbash identity as a social entity and a system of beliefs is mostly a legacy of the late fifteenth and the sixteenth-century.³ Without a doubt, the fierce political and military rivalry between the Ottomans and Savafids had primary influence on shaping this identity. It is known from contemporary sources that by the beginning of the sixteenth-century a considerable portion of the Anatolian population supported the Safavid dynasty against Ottoman rule with an intense religious vigor. As soon as Shah Ismail promulgated his state, brutal revolts broke out against Ottomans in Anatolia. Among these rebels some managed to

² See, for example, Fuat Köprülü, *Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar*, Ankara, 1976; Irène Mélikoff, *Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, çev. Turan Alptekin, İstanbul, 1998; *Sur les traces du soufisme Turc, Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, İstanbul: ISIS, 1992; *De l’épopée au mythe, Itinéraire turcologique*, İstanbul: ISIS, 1995; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Bektaşî Menâkıbnâmelerinde İslam Öncesi İnanç Motifleri*, İstanbul, 1983; *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Marjinal Sufilik: Kalenderiler*, Ankara, 1992; *Türk Sufiliğine Bakışlar*, İstanbul, 1996; *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslam*, İstanbul, 2000.

³ Among a number of studies, consider especially Irène Mélikoff, “Le problème Kızılbaş”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme Turc, Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, İstanbul: ISIS, 1992, pp. 29-43; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Babailer İsyanından Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da İslam Heterodoxisinin Doğuş ve Gelişim Tarihine Kısa Bir Bakış”, *Belleten*, LXIV/239, 2000, 129-159.

defeat the well-equipped Ottoman armies, even those commanded by grand-viziers.⁴ Şahkulu, the leader of the earliest large-scale Qizilbash uprising, for example, as the *qādi* of Bursa reported⁵, managed to reach the walls of Bursa, after which there was nothing but Constantinople. A number of reports written by contemporary local governors shed light on the socio-political and religious dimensions of these anti-Ottoman and pro-Safavid social movements.⁶ These letters stress the rebels' evil-beliefs, banditry, relationship with the Safavid Dynasty and consistently draw the attention of central government to the fact that their numbers were increasing day by day.⁷ It is clearly seen from these archival reports housed in *Topkapı Sarayı Arşivi* (TSA) that the Qizilbash movement during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century substantially reduced the authority of the Ottoman Government in Anatolia. One may even go further arguing that it threatened the existence of the Ottoman regime in Anatolia.

⁴ For the geographical distribution of these Qizilbash upheavals and their connections with the Safavid Order see Hanna Sohrweide, "Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert", *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, pp. 95-221; for an inadequate narration of the Şahkulu revolt according to Ottoman archival reports, see Şinasi Tekindağ, "Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli İsyani", *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 3-4, İstanbul, 1959; for the revolt of Shah Celal see Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Études Turco-Safavides, III, Notes et documents sur la révolte de Şâh Veli b. Şeyh Celâl", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VII, 1982, pp. 5-69.

⁵ On April 21st 1511, the *qādi* of Bursa sent a letter to the Head (*Ağa*) of the Janissary corps reporting the recent situation of the Şahkulu revolt. He was alerted that they were, after defeating the chief commander of Prince Korkud, Hasan Ağa, coming to Bursa and devastating everything on their way. He warned the Ağa insistently that if a military support from Janissaries did not arrive in two days the whole land would be lost. The *qādi* persistently emphasized the fact that he, Şahkulu, was a serious and very dangerous enemy and any laxity would result in a real catastrophe. See Document E 5451 in Topkapı Palace Museum Archives (From now on TSA).

⁶ Most of these letters and reports are published by Çağatay Uluçay, Selâhattin Tansel and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont. See Çağatay Uluçay, "Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu", *Tarih Dergisi*, VIII, cilt 11-12, 1954, pp. 53-90, 117-142, 185-200; Selâhattin Tansel, *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, Ankara, 1969; *Sultan II. Bâyezid'in Siyasi Hayatı*, İstanbul, 1966; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, Les Safavides et leurs voisins*, İstanbul, 1987.

⁷ For example, the governor of Antalya informed, in his letter dated March 1511, Prince Korkud about the emergence of the revolt and depicted the leader of the revolt as had pretended to be a God. He reported from the mouth of one of his adherents that "his followers say: he is the God, he is the Messenger; and the day of recurrence will appear in front of him. One who does not believe in him would go to the other world without faith." See TSA, E 632. Prince Osman also wrote a letter to the central government on April 16th 1511, in which he described rebels as destroying *mescids* and *zāviyes*, setting fire to the copies of Kur'an and other books whenever they came across them, and deeming their leader as Mahdi, the divine rescuer. See TSA, E 2829.

Needless to say, the emergence, molding, and congealment of the Qizilbash identity were socio-religious processes that coincided with the politico-military struggle between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids. Nonetheless, it was long before the commencement of this confrontation that a discontent segment in Ottoman society, which would ultimately wear the red-caps of Shaykh Haydar (d. 1488) and launch fierce uprisings against Ottoman authority, had already appeared. They were discontent because the central bureaucratic administration of the Ottoman State forced them to leave their traditional mode of life, which was overwhelmingly nomadic; because there was a certain cultural discrepancy between their cultures and that of the Ottoman elite, who at the same time had a demeaning attitude towards them; because their understanding, interpretation and practice of Islam was regarded by the Ottoman religious scholars as heretic (*rāfizi*); and finally because they could no more find their idiom-leader prototype in the Ottoman sultans as it had been during the formative period of the state. Contemporary sources clearly reveal that in the second half of the fifteenth century, the discontent population of Anatolia, which overwhelmingly consisted of tribal-nomads, regarded the Ottoman rule as illegitimate and oppressive. For the Ottoman governors, on the other hand, they were a source of disobedience, anarchy, political resistance, and finally of heresy; in short, they were source of all sorts of trouble.

When studying the emergence of the Qizilbash identity towards the end of the fifteenth century, a careful inquiry soon unveils the fact that there was not a single cause for a considerable segment of society in Anatolia to detach itself from the Ottoman Empire. It was rather a combination of political discontent, religious controversy, and economic incompetence. The main grounds of alienation, furthermore, were not merely

the unwillingness of two sides to understand and empathize with each other. It can be rather argued that the roots of hostility were at a deeper level; stemming from the incompetence of social structures, political orientations, modes of life, mentalities, and from the difference in perception of the faith. On one side was the Ottoman elite and social segments attached to them, while on the other side the Turkomans, who were either tribal-nomads or still maintaining the habits of tribal-nomadic way of life. Thus, if regarded the *long dure*, the emergence and development of the Qizilbash identity, or the Qizilbash 'heresy' within the Ottoman perception, should be assessed as an output of the interaction between these two 'ways of life'.

Thus the present study evaluates the emergence of the Qizilbash identity within the framework of the contest between the increasing 'Ottoman bureaucratic-imperial regime' and the tribal-nomadic Turkoman milieu. The first chapter attempts to construct a theoretical framework by placing basic anthropological premises that would govern the underlying conceptualization throughout the thesis. In the first part, it clarifies some anthropological terms employed throughout the study. In other words, the fundamental differences between the bureaucratic state and tribal organization as means of polity, as well as the difference in socio-religious structures, will be delineated. The second part of the first chapter provides a brief outline of the fundamental features of the interaction between nomadic-tribes and bureaucratic states in the Middle East.

The second chapter examines the foundation and development process of the Ottoman state within the framework drawn in the first chapter. It is supposed that during its very early phase the Ottoman principality was an enterprise of Turkoman nomadic tribes expelled from the central heart-lands of the Seljukid bureaucratic state, which was to a certain extent 'Persianized' and 'Arabized', to the marches. Nevertheless, the

accumulation of power soon made the dynasty inclined to embrace the bureaucracy produced by Islamic scholars, or *ulemā*, at the cost of tribal founders. This inclination of the dynasty in the meantime marked the beginning of the alienation process between the tribal-nomadic Turkoman milieu and the rising state machinery. The alienation, however, was not limited to the diffusion of the tribal elements from the political scene but also accompanied cultural, economical, ideological, and religious detachments as well. During the mid-fifteenth century the estrangement between the two ‘realms’ reached such a degree that a reconciliation was no longer possible.

On the other hand, a similar, but completely opposite in direction, story was developing in the East: The Sufi Order of Safavids attained a vast amount of audience among statesmen and men of culture in Azerbaijan, Central Asia, Iran, Syria, and Anatolia, as well as enjoying great prestige and power in many palaces. During the mid-fifteenth century, however, the Safavid Order underwent a fundamental transformation: under Shayh Junayd, both the esoteric doctrine and disciple landscape of the order fundamentally changed. The Order of Shaykh Safī (d. 1334), which once had the image of a ‘high’, well-cultivated sufi Order within the sunni sect of Islam, as long as one can speak of ‘sect’ (*mezhep*) regarding Sufism, now pursued a militant-shi’ite character and political aspirations. In the meantime, closely linked to the doctrinal transformation, the order gained wide-spread audience among Turkoman tribes of Anatolia and Northern Syria, which had already been distanced from the Ottoman regime. The third chapter elucidates how the Safavid Order and Turkoman milieu of Anatolia encountered, both experiencing significant transformation.

Then comes the most crucial turning point in the story: the rise of Shah Ismail. When he died during a battle with the Akkoyunlu army in 1488, Shaykh Haydar left to

his one year-old son a desperate situation but a mass of fanatically devoted disciples with a significant capacity of organization and military power. The adoration and heroism of Haydar's disciples, now wrapped around child Ismail, created one of the most romantic stories of Middle Eastern History. The fourth chapter is devoted to the history of young Ismail and his devoted disciples: a story from a most desperate situation to the throne of Persia. A special emphasis should be made on that the majority of Ismail's disciples were from Ottoman Anatolia. Hence, Ismail's advent (*hurūj*) and rise to the power created a vast excitement among Anatolian qizilbash. This excitement and the Ottomans' counter measures will also be dealt within this chapter.

The fifth chapter analyzes the rebellion of Shahklu, one of the prominent Safavid khalifas in Anatolia. Accompanied to the weakening of the Ottoman central administration because of the illness and elder ages of Sultan Bayezid II, and consequently of civil war among the princes, the qizilbash protest against the Ottoman rule peaked during the years 1509 and 1513. Among the qizilbash uprisings during this period, the most successful and the one having the most crucial outcome was, without a doubt, the Şahkulu rebellion. On the one hand, the Şahkulu rebellion proved the military strength of the qizilbash, successively defeating several Ottoman armies. But yet on the other hand, it opened up the paths to the Ottoman throne to Prince Selim, who, having been recently defeated by an imperial army, could barely hope for this fortune.

The next chapter continues the analysis of the qizilbash factor within Ottoman domestic politics. It delineates how Prince Selim, who had the least chance of ascending the throne at the beginning of the struggle, masterfully gained the central institutions of the already established Ottoman imperial regime. Selim's policy was principally based on two promises: he would finish the 'qizilbash problem' and he would (re)bring the old

glories of the Ottoman army. Towards the end of his reign, Sultan Bayezid II and his statesmen were seriously favoring Prince Ahmed, who was once even officially invited to Istanbul to take over the throne. Ahmed's ambiguous attitude against the qizilbashs turned into a powerful tool of legitimization in Selim's hands and rapidly finished Ahmed's advantage for the throne.

The seventh chapter focuses on the climax of the struggle between the Ottomans and Qizilbashs. Upon capturing the throne in 1512, in a way unprecedented in the Ottoman history, Selim I immediately started preparing to fully fulfill his pledge. His ultimate aim was not only to extirpate the sympathizers of Shah Ismail in Anatolia but also to bring a complete solution to the problem by finishing the Shah himself. Nevertheless, launching war on a Muslim country was not easy according to the Islamic law or *shari'a*. They needed religiously legitimate grounds to declare such a thing. Selim's heavy pressure on the *ulemā* produced one of the most controversial ordinances (*fetvā*) of the Ottoman history. At this stage the contest between the Ottoman imperial regime and the Qizilbash Turkomans, which was political in essence, gained an overwhelmingly religious skin: the qizilbashs were declared as 'heretics' deviated from the true path of the religion. On his way to Çaldıran, Selim persecuted and executed a great number of his subjects claiming they had adhered to the qizilbash movement. Ultimately, the plane of Çaldıran witnessed the last duel of the bureaucratic state and tribal federacy in the Middle East. After Çaldıran the latter would never attain an enough power to contest the former, neither in the Ottoman Empire nor in Safavids, nor any other place in the Middle East.

On the other hand, the fierce political and military struggle between these two systems, now represented by the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid-Qizilbash state, was

accompanied in every stage with a religious discourse. Thus the Qizilbash identity emerged on two principal bases: politico-militant movement and religio-mystical interpretation of Islam. The last chapter aims to highlight the main lines of post-Çaldıran events. Following the defeat of Çaldıran, the Qizilbash identity followed different trajectories in the Safavid and Ottoman realms, though maintaining significant similarities. In the Safavid Empire, the same story as in the case of the early Ottomans occurred. Parallel to the consolidation of its power, the Safavid state evolved towards a bureaucratic empire, equally pushing the qizilbash tribal aristocracy out of the scene. Within the Ottoman borders, on the other hand, upon gradually losing its first component, i.e. political, in the aftermath of Çaldıran, the Qizilbash identity developed in its peculiar way within the framework of Islamic Sufism.

1.1. LITERATURE

The focus of this study, namely the history of the Anatolian qizilbashes, lays at the intersection point of Ottoman History and Safavid History. Therefore both Ottoman and Safavid historians occasionally touched upon several aspects of the qizilbash history. Nevertheless, none of them except for Sohrweide's long article focused on the adventure of the qizilbashes themselves, but are interested only indirectly in qizilbash affairs because of their interaction with either the Ottoman or the Safavid state.

The only monographic work on the qizilbash movement in Anatolia has been undertaken by Hanna Sohrweide.⁸ Sohrweide's article starts with the emergence of the Safavid Order under Shaykh Safi and ends with the situations of qizilbashes in Anatolia

⁸ Hanna Sohrweide, "Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert", *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, 95-221.

in the second half of the sixteenth century. In the first half of the study, Sohrweide deals with the history of early Safavids until the rise of Shah Ismail. In this first part, she underlines the fundamental change from sunni bases to *ghulat* shi'ism in the esoteric message of the order under Shaykh Junayd, as well as Junayd's – and his successors' – success in recruiting new disciples from among Turkomans of Anatolia. Then she continues with the echoes of the Safavid success under Shah Ismail among the Anatolian qizilbash. In this context, she briefly examines the Shahkulu Rebellion (1511), the Nur Ali Khalifa Uprising (1512), the Celālī Uprising (1519), the Kalender Çelebi Uprising (1524), and some other qizilbash uprisings in the first half of the sixteenth century. Sohrweide finishes her work by providing a brief description of the positions of the Anatolian qizilbashes within the Ottoman realm in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Although it became a classic in the field, a fame it deserves, Sohrweide's work does not cover all the aspects of the issue. First of all, she does not adequately consult the Ottoman sources, neither the rich archival materials in TSA nor the *Selim-nāme* literature.⁹ As a result many important aspects of the issue remained untouched in her article. Secondly, Sohrweide presents a descriptive history of events within three centuries, but does not attempt to provide a theoretical framework filling the socio-cultural and ideological background. True that she occasionally refers to the tribal affiliations of the Safavid disciples. Nonetheless, she by no means intends to analyze the development of the qizilbash movement within a systematically developed theoretical framework.

⁹ Although she consults some Ottoman chronicles, some very important first-hand sources such as *Defter VIII* (and its addendum) and *Defter IX* of Kemalpaşazāde and *Selim-nāme* of Şükri-i Bitlisī are absent in this article.

As mentioned above, Sohrweide's article is the only detailed study devoted to the history of the Anatolian qizilbash. In the meantime, some works on the Ottoman and Safavid history dealt with several aspects of the issue within their own context.

As they founded the Safavid state and held the military privileges for a long time, qizilbash occupy a significant place in studies on the Safavid history. The reader should be reminded, however, that since Safavid historians primarily use Safavid chronicles, which were almost exclusively the product of Persian literati, thus, have not a keen eye on Turkoman qizilbash, their focus of interest is always the Safavid palace and Safavid realm, but not the socio-cultural roots of qizilbash founders of the state. For example, although all sources stress the Anatolian roots of the early qizilbash around Shaykh Haydar and Shah Ismail, interestingly none of the Safavid historians pays enough attention to Anatolia.

Still there appeared valuable contribution by Safavid historians to the history of Anatolian qizilbash. Before all, Viladimir Minorsky's groundbreaking works must be mentioned. Among his many other works on the Safavid history, his translation of Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji's *Tarikh-i Alem-ārā-yi Amini*¹⁰ and *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk*¹¹, as well as his notes to both, and his article on the poetry of Shah Ismail¹² should be specifically cited. One should mention of Roger M. Savory's studies especially on the formation and fundamental institutions of the Safavid state,¹³ of Jean Aubin's articles on

¹⁰ Viladimir Minorsky, *Persia in A.D. 1478-1490. An abridged translation of Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji's Tarikh-i Alm-ara-yi Amini*, Royal Asiatic Society Monographs, XXVI, London, 1957.

¹¹ Viladimir Minorsky, trs., *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk. A manuel of Safavid Administration*, Gibb Memorial Series, XVI, London, 1943.

¹² Minorsky, Viladimir, "The Poetry of Shah Ismail I", *BSOS*, X, 1938-42, 1006a-1053a.

¹³ Among his number of publications the followings deserve a special reference: Roger M. Savory, "The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia", *Der Islam*, XLI, Berlin, 1965, 71-94; "The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Ismail I(907-930/ 1501-1524)", *BSOAS*, XXIII, 1960, 91-105;

the role of the Sufis of Lāhijan in the early Safavid history,¹⁴ the religious policy of the Safavids,¹⁵ and especially the comprehensive one on the rise of the Safavid power;¹⁶ of Michel Mazzaoui's famous book on the origins and early history of the Safavid Dynasty;¹⁷ of Hans Roemer's works, especially his article on the qizilbash within the Safavid history.¹⁸

Masashi Haneda's book on the military system of the Safavid state deserves special mention. In his study, Haneda clearly determines the absolute dominance of the qizilbash *oymaqs* in the Safavid army, as well as the consolidating of the principal arguments of the present thesis that the qizilbashes constituted this army were almost exclusively tribal nomads.¹⁹ As long as the qizilbash founders of the Safavid state are concerned, comment should also be made of Faruk Sümer's important work on the Turkoman origins of the prominent qizilbash *oymaqs*,²⁰ and of Oktay Efendiev's article.²¹ Regarding Shaykh Junayd, Walter Hinz's famous book is still the only

"The Office of Khālifāt Al-Khulafā under the Safawids", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 85, no. 4, 1965, 497-502; *Iran under the Safavids*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.

¹⁴ Jean Aubin, "Révolution chiite et conservatisme. Les soufis de Lāhejān, 1500-1514 (Études Safavides II)", *Moyen Orient & Océan Indien* 1, 1984, pp. 1-40.

¹⁵ Jean Aubin, "La politique religieuse des Safavides" in Colloque de Strasbourg, *Le Shi'isme imāmite*, Paris, 1970, 235-244.

¹⁶ Jean Aubin, "L'avènement des Safavides reconsidéré (Études Safavides III)", *Moyen Orient & Océan Indien*, 5, 1988, 1-130. Also consider his "La politique orientale de Selim Ier", *Les Orientales, [Itinéraire d'Orient (Hommage à Claude Cahen)]*, VI, 1994, 197-216.

¹⁷ Michel M. Mazzaoui, *The Origins of the Safawids: Shi'ism, Sufism, and the Ghulat*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1972.

¹⁸ Roemer, Hans R., "The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy", *Intellectual Studies in Islam*, eds., M. M. Mazzaoui-V. B. Moreen, Utah, 1990, 27-39. Also consider his article in *the Cambridge History of Iran*. (Hans R. Roemer, "The Safavid Period", *The Cambridge History of Iran*, 6, ed. Peter Jackson, 1993.)

¹⁹ Masashi Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâs. Le système militaire safavide*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987.

²⁰ Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devleti'nin Kuruluş ve Yükselişinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü*, Ankara, 1976.

²¹ Oktay Efendiev, "Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque dans la création de l'état Safavide", *Turcica*, VI, 1975, 24-33.

monographic work of value.²² As for the political history of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry, Adel Allouche's monograph²³ and Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont's works²⁴ should be referred to. Regarding the ideological dimension of this struggle Eberhard's study is the only monographic work.²⁵

In the Ottoman historiography, qizilbashs usually became the subject of those studies dealing with the last years of Bayezid II, and the succession of Selim I as well as his reign. Among modern scholars, Hüseyin Hüsamedin was the first who devoted a considerable number of pages to qizilbash affairs in Amasya during the opening years of the sixteenth century.²⁶ His account, however, includes serious deficiencies in terms of methodology and approach. First of all, as well-known, he barely refers to his sources. Furthermore, following the *Selim-nāme* tradition, he pursues a fanatical pro-Selim stand in dealing with the struggle between Prince Ahmed and Selim for the throne. Hüseyin Hüsameddin, following a nationalistic approach of the early twentieth century, mistakenly depicts Selim as the champion of the Turkish tradition and Ahmed as the patron of the Persian culture. Then he argues that the Persians supported by Prince Ahmed spread shi'ism and organized the qizilbash rebellions in the Province of Rum. As will be delineated in detail, these assertions are clearly contradictive to the historical facts.

²² Walter Hinz, *Irans Aufstieg zum Nationalstaat im fünf-zehnten Jahrhundert*, Berlin, Leipzig, 1936. (Turkish translation: *Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd, XV. Yüzyılda İran'ın Milli bir Devlet Haline Yükselişi*, çev. Tevfik Bıyıkoğlu, Ankara :TTK, 1992.)

²³ Allouche Adel, *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safawid Conflict*, W. Berlin, 1983.

²⁴ Among his number of publications, which can be found in the Bibliography of this study, the following must be cited here. Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, Istanbul, 1987.

²⁵ Elke Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jh. nach arabischen Handschriften*, Freiburg 1970.

²⁶ Hüseyin Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol. 3, İstanbul, 1927.

Çağatay Uluçay's three articles in *İÜEF Tarih Dergisi* deserve special mention here.²⁷ Although Uluçay's work lacks a strong analytical construction, his extensive usage of the Topkapi Palace Archives enhances the value of his articles. Indeed, Uluçay focuses on the struggle between the sons of Bayezid II for the throne; hence the qizilbash affairs are of only secondary interest in his study. Nonetheless, Uluçay published a number of documents pertaining to the Shahkulu rebellion and the Nur Ali Khalifa uprisings. He also partially deals with these qizilbash rebellions since they played a significant role in the Ottoman domestic politics of the era. Halil İnalcık's article in the *Encyclopedia of Islam* is one of the few scholarly studies on Selim I.²⁸ As for the qizilbash affairs during the last years of Bayezid II and during the reign of Selim I, Selahattin Tansel's two monographs must be regarded.²⁹ Tansel does not present a systematic analysis of the events, but rather provides a sequence of events. Furthermore, his approach is remarkably Ottoman-centric in general and Selim-centric in particular. (Similar bias is observable on Uluçay as well.) Sydney Fisher's book dealing with the foreign relations of the Ottoman Empire under Bayezid II also touches upon some issues regarding early years of Shah Ismail and his relations with the Ottomans.³⁰ One should also mention Beldiceanu-Steinherr's article dealing with the changes in the Ottoman politics caused by the qizilbash movement.³¹

²⁷ Çağatay Uluçay, "Yavuz Sultan Selim Nasıl Padişah Oldu", *İÜEF Tarih Dergisi*, VI/9,1954, 53-90; VI/10, 1954, 117-143; VIII/11-12, 1955, 185-200.

²⁸ Halil İnalcık, "Selim I", *EI2*.

²⁹ Selahattin Tansel, *Sultan II. Bayezid'in Siyasi Hayatı*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1966; *Yavuz Sultan Selim*, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1969.

³⁰ Sydney Nettleton Fisher, *The Foreign Relations of Turkey 1481-1512*, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1948.

³¹ Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l'empire ottoman", *Turcica*, VI, 1975, 34-48.

Although not directly dealing with the Qizilbash Movement, Rudi Paul Lindner's two works must be mentioned for they have significantly contributed to the theoretical background of the present study.³² Lindner, for the first time among Ottoman historians, attempted to use modern anthropological findings in understanding the Ottoman history. His efforts to bring new notions to the concept of tribe, thus to the nature of early Ottoman state and society, remarkably expanded the avenue of discussion. Some of Lindner's conceptualizations regarding the definition of tribe and the transformation from 'tribe' to 'state' during the formative period of the Ottoman state are partly utilized and further developed by the present author.

In the meantime, Lindner's approach and analyses have certain shortcomings. First of all, his unproductive insistence on the rejection of 'gazā' as an ideological tool and stimulating factor in mobilizing the contemporary society, especially fighting elements, limits the 'inclusiveness' of his approach. A more serious problem, from the point of view of a historian, is perhaps his improper – in many occasions even non – usage of existing sources. Lindner derives most of his information from the secondary literature. And lastly, his careless method of adopting the findings and concept of modern anthropology into the early Ottoman history seriously weakens some of his analyses.³³

³² Rudi Paul Lindner, "What was a Nomadic Tribe?", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1982, 689-711; *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983.

³³ This point is already criticized by Richard Tapper. See Richard Tapper, "Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East", in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, pp. 58-60.

Lastly, as for the main characteristics of the early Ottoman *beylik*, of the developing Ottoman state, and of the ideological bases of the state, Halil İnalçık's several studies³⁴ and Ahmet Yaşar Ocak's contributions³⁵ should also be cited.

1.2. SOURCES

1.2.1. Ottoman Sources

1.2.1.1. Archival-Official documents

It is not unknown to the students of Ottoman history that the proliferation of archival materials is witnessed only during the mid-sixteenth century. Before then, we have limited numbers of imperial degrees, *waqfiyyes*, *tahrir* registers, and some other individual documents. As long as the first and, especially, the second decade of the sixteenth century are concerned, however, there is a relative 'abundance' of archival documents almost all housed in TSA.³⁶ In particular, during the struggle between Prince Ahmed and Selim, and the qizilbash uprisings within this context, there seems to be a remarkable increase in the number of reports – sometimes by spies of a prince,

³⁴ See especially his following works: "The Question of The Emergence of The Ottoman State", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2, 1980, 71- 79; "The Emergence of Ottomans", *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol.I, eds., P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, 263- 291; "State and Ideology under Sultan Süleyman I", in *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society*, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993, 70-94; "The Ottoman Concept of State and the Class System", in his *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600*, London, 1973, 65-9; "Comments on 'Sultanism': Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity", *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies*, no. 1, 1992, 49-72; "Periods in Ottoman History, State, Society, Economy", in *Ottoman Civilization*, I, edited by Halil İnalçık and Günsel Renda, Ankara: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004, 31-239; "Şer'i'at ve Kanun, Din ve Devlet", in his *Osmanlı'da Devlet, Hukuk, Adâlet*, İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000, 39-46.

³⁵ Among his many publications, his *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, which evaluates the development of the 'officially approved sphere' and the boundaries of 'heresy' within the Ottoman realm, deserves special attention. See Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-16. Yüzyıllar)*, 3. baskı, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003.

³⁶ For a list of the documents in TSA related to the Qizilbash affairs, see Appendix B.

sometimes by local officials or *qādis* – and letters, which are preserved in TSA. In these documents, we find detailed descriptions of the adherents of both parties (parties of Selim and Ahmed), as well as many details of the contemporary developments.

Furthermore, as the Qizilbash Movement directly menaced the Ottoman rule as well as playing significant role in the Ottoman domestic politics, there are many reports of local governors and spies on qizilbashes and their acts. Especially the Şahkulu Rebellion and subsequent acts of qizilbashes in Anatolia are well-documented in TSA. Of course there is a heavy prejudice against qizilbashes in the accounts of these documents. Therefore one should be careful in using them. On many occasions, especially when describing the religious stand of qizilbashes, they rather reflect the picture that the Ottoman administration attempted to create regarding qizilbashes than their real situation. From this point of view, these documents are quite informative on the ‘official’ attitude of the Ottoman state. In the meantime, as being the documentation of official correspondence within the Ottoman state, they provide invaluable historical facts pertaining to details and dates of events.

Unfortunately the archival evidence proliferates only towards the year 1510. Before then, we have quite a few number of documents. The history of the Qizilbash Movement in Anatolia before the 1510s can only be traced through narratives, both Ottoman and Safavid. Luckily, however, there is an exception. A register including the copies of the decisions made by the Ottoman Imperial Council (*Dīvan*) between *evāhir-i Zilkāde* 906 and *evāhir-i Zilhicce* 906 (8-17 June 1501/ 8-17 July 1501) is preserved in Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), *Bāb-ı Asāfi Dīvān (Beylikçi) Kalemi*, BA, A.DVN,

no.790. The whole collection has been published by İlhan Şahin and Feridun Emecen.³⁷ Seven orders in this collection are directly linked to the prohibition of qizilbash's communication with Iran, which is usually called 'Yukarı Cānib' in these documents.

Apart from this archival evidence, we have copies of some religious treaties. Among them especially the *fetvā* of Hamza and the *fetvās* of Kemalpaşazāde and Ebussuud Efendi against qizilbashes and Safavids provide valuable knowledge concerning the religious and ideological stand of the Ottomans regarding the qizilbash issue.³⁸ Starting from the last quarter of the fifteenth century, we also have *tahrir defters* of some provinces densely inhabited by qizilbashes. However, since nomadic tribes were not regularly registered in these *defters*, it is hardly possible to obtain information on the development of the early Qizilbash Movement in these surveys. There are some records in the *defters* from the 1520s indicating that some *mezra'as* were deserted since their inhabitants had been qizilbashes and had gone to Iran.³⁹

³⁷ İlhan Şahin and Feridun Emecen, *Osmanlılarda Dīvān- Bürokrasi- Ahkām. II. Beyazid Dönemine Ait 906-1501 Tarihli Ahkām Defteri*, İstanbul, 1994.

³⁸ All of these *fetvās* have been studied by several scholars in different contexts. A detailed analysis of these religious treatises in my own context will be provided in Chapter IX.

³⁹ As will be delineated throughout this thesis, at least two waves of eastward qizilbash mass-flux in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries occurred: the first wave started under Shaykh Junayd, continued under Shaykh Haydar, and climaxed during the rise of Shah Ismail to power. The second wave took place during the period between the years 1510 and 1514, which experienced intense qizilbash rebellions and Selim I's harsh persecution and campaign on qizilbashes. Therefore, one would expect a population reduction during this period especially in the 'qizilbash zones'. However, it is not an easy job to determine such a drop in population since our primary - and the only - sources regarding the population, namely *tahrir defters*, are designed primarily to record the sedentary tax revenue sources. (As mentioned our qizilbash subjects were overwhelmingly nomadic-tribespeople during this period.) Yet some speculations on the available flue evidence can be made. The volume and the scope of the present thesis, however, do not permit conducting of such a study. I plan to discuss this issue in a separate article, thus have not consulted *tahrir* registers in the present study.

1.2.1.2. Narratives

Before embarking on the evaluation of the *Selim-nāme* literature, one should mention the last chapter of Aşıkpaşazāde's history (APZ, APZa),⁴⁰ which is the only source about Shaykh Junayd's journey in Anatolia. Furthermore, this short section is also the earliest available source elucidating the qizilbash issue on a religious ground and mentioning religiously condemnation of the Safavid adherents. It is obvious from the general outline that this part was not planned as a part of main body in *Tevārih*. As well-known, following the tradition, Aşıkpaşazāde constructed his book on a chronological basis. He hardly disturbs chronologically sequential order while narrating Ottoman history. Nevertheless, the situation is totally different for the section on Shaykh Junayd. This section is located after the narration of the Venetian siege of Midilli in 907/1501-2. The book follows a chronological order until this point. At the last section, Aşıkpaşazāde returns to the time of Murad II and explains the history of Shaykh Junayd and his son Haydar. This section (*bāb*) is also available in 'Ali's edition. However, Giese queried Aşıkpaşazāde's authorship of this section of the work, thus omitted it finishing his edition by the events of 1492.⁴¹ Nihal Atsız, who published a combined version of these two editions, did not include the events of Bayezid II's period. But his edition also includes the mentioned section at the end, just before the concise world history from Adam's time down to the time of Prophet Muhammed. Although this section apparently seems to be a later addendum to the main corpus of the work, Aşıkpaşazāde's authorship

⁴⁰ Aşıkpaşa-zāde, *Tevārih-i Al-i Osman*, ed., 'Ali Bey, İstanbul, 1332 (APZa); Aşıkpaşa-zāde, *Tevārih-i Al-i Osman*, in *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, ed. Nihal Atsız, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1949, pp. 91-294 (APZ).

⁴¹ See F. Giese, *Die altosmanische Chronik des 'Asiq pasazāde*, Leipzig, 1929.

of this last section is open to speculation.⁴² Indeed, the orientation of the book suggests that this section must be a later edition either by Aşıkpaşazâde himself or by someone else. Atsız argues that Aşıkpaşazâde died in 886/1481.⁴³ To him, all sections narrating events of Bayezid II's reign must be a later addition. Taeschner suggests the year 889/1484 for his date of death.⁴⁴ But according to İnalçık, who establishes his view on archival evidence as well as the textual analysis of the *Tevârih*, he must have died after 908/1502.⁴⁵ Indeed, before Inalcik this date had been already proposed by Köprülü.⁴⁶ Then it is highly possible that the author of the last sections was Aşıkpaşazâde himself, but as a later addendum.

The unlawful succession of Selim I, who for the first - and the only - time in the Ottoman history forced his father to abdicate and ascended to the throne, created a deep hallmark in the Ottoman historiography. A literature called *Selim-nâme*,⁴⁷ narrating deeds of Selim I but with a specific intention to legitimize Selim I's usurpation appeared. Thanks to Selim's uprising against his father, which ended in the dismissal of the legitimate sultan by his son, this era became one of the most documented periods of the Ottoman history, both in terms of archival documents and authored historical works. Dozens of narratives exclusively devoted to Selim's deeds have been written during the reign of Selim I himself and his son Süleyman I.

⁴² For a textual analysis see V.L. Ménage, *A Survey of the Early Ottoman Histories, with Studies on their Textual Problems and their Sources, II*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1961, pp. 440-83.

⁴³ See APZ, p. 80.

⁴⁴ See F. Taeschner, "Ashik-pasha-zâde", *EI2*.

⁴⁵ See Halil İnalçık, "How to Read Aşıkpaşazâde's History", *Essays in Ottoman History*, Istanbul, 1998, p. 34.

⁴⁶ See Köprülü, "Aşık Paşa-zâde", *İA*, p. 707.

⁴⁷ For the *Selim-nâme* literature and a brief description of prominent *Selim-nâmes*, see Ahmet Uğur, "Selim-nâmes", in his *The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-nâme Literature*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, pp. 28-64, pp. 7-27; Şehabeddin Tekindağ, "Selim-nâmeler", *Tarih Enstitüsü Dergisi*, I, 1970, 197-231.

As already mentioned, the primary purpose of *Selim-nāme* writers was to explain how Selim I was rightful in overthrowing his father and killing all the males of the royal line. In other words, their stimulus was to create and propagate a ground of legitimacy for the unlawful acts of Selim I rather than recording the contemporary events. In his fight against both his father and his brother Prince Ahmed, Selim's most powerful tool of legitimacy was, without doubt, the qizilbash issue. Skillfully treating the qizilbash menace pointed towards the Ottoman rule, Prince Selim masterfully developed a policy against his father, the living legitimate sultan, and his brother, then the heir in line to the throne. At the end, this policy brought him the Ottoman throne. Selim's employment of the qizilbash affairs as a tool of legitimacy in the Ottoman domestic - and later foreign - politics was further cultivated by *Selim-nāme* authors. Therefore the issue of qizilbash became the major subject of the *Selim-nāme* literature.

However, in this literature one can barely find the definition or depiction of qizilbashes as they were. Rather Shah Ismail and his followers were given the role of 'evil', which would devastate not only the Ottoman Empire but the whole Islamic world if the great savior Selim had not eliminated them. From this point of view, *Selim-nāme* writers might be regarded rather as ideology-makers than historians. Hence, in their works the historical facts, especially concerning qizilbashes, are severely overshadowed by ideological treatments. As J. R. Walsh has already discussed, our contemporary sources pertaining to the Ottoman-Safavid relations in the late fifteenth- and sixteenth century are much inflected with ideological discourses and usually provide little information on what actually happened. In these sources, both Ottoman and Safavid, the

struggle between two powers is reflected as a war of religion; its social, cultural, and economic bases are completely ignored or not noticed by contemporary authors.⁴⁸

Consequently, on the one hand, this feature makes *Selim-nāmes* ‘unreliable’ from the religious stand, socio-political incentives, sources of motivation in their protest against the Ottoman rule, and the true sentiments of the qizilbash. Yet, on the other hand, it is exactly this feature that makes them extremely valuable as a source for understanding the proliferating ‘Ottoman official ideology’, which had one of the most effective roles in the making of the ‘Qizilbash Identity’.

Among a number of *Selim-nāmes*, some deserve special mention for the purpose of the present study. Before all, *Defter VIII*, the Addendum of *Defter VIII*, and *Defter IX* of Kemalpaşazāde⁴⁹ must be delineated. Before discussing his works, it should be stated that Kemalpaşazāde’s own career, which started as a *müderris* in small-scale *medreses* and ended in the highest office of the scholarly-bureaucratic hierarchy – that is *şeyhülislamlık* – of the Ottoman Empire,⁵⁰ makes his narratives of special interest. Indeed, Kemalpaşazāde was among prominent actors creating or re-shaping the ‘Ottoman official ideology’ against the qizilbash menace and thus formulating the ‘Qizilbash heresy’ as well. Therefore his writings, to a great extent, reflect the Ottoman official stand. On the other hand, as he was an active figure taking part in most of the contemporary events, his accounts are based either on his own eye-witness or on a report

⁴⁸ See J. R. Walsh, “The Historiography of Ottoman-Safavid Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries”, in *Historians of the Middle East*, eds., Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, New York, Toronto, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, 197-210.

⁴⁹ *Defter VIII*, which deals with the reign of Bayezid II, can not be deemed a *selim-nāme*. The other two *defter*s, however, must be considered among outstanding examples of the *selim-nāme* literature.

⁵⁰ For the life and works of Şemseddin Ahmed bin Süleyman bin Kemal Paşa (Kemalpaşazāde), see Mecdî Mehmed Efendi, *Şakaik-ı Nu’maniye ve Zeylleri*, c. I, haz. Abdülkadir Özcan, İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1989, pp. 381-385; ALI, pp. 1209-1216; Franz Babinger, “Kemālpashazāde”, *EI2*, p. 912; İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, “Kemāl Paşa Zāde”, *IA*, p. 561; Hayri Bolay, Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu, eds., *Şeyhülislām İbn Kemāl Sempozyumu*, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989.

of a first-hand observer. Therefore, in many cases he provides valuable unique details of events, which is absent in other sources. So, keeping in mind the fact that he was part of the ‘Ottoman regime’, thus has a heavy bias and pejorative attitude towards qizilbashes, Kemalpaşazâde’s three works are probably the most informative and certainly among the most valuable primary sources for the subject of the present thesis.

Kemalpaşazâde finished the eighth volume of his *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*⁵¹ (KPZ8a), which comprises the reign of Bayezid II until the early months of the year 1511, during the last years of Bayezid II, most probably in 1511.⁵² Being finished before Selim I’s ascendance, *Defter VIII* of Kemalpaşazâde holds a peculiar position among the Ottoman chronicles, which had been written under Selim I or his son Süleyman I. Although Kemalpaşazâde’s usual pejorative-biased attitude regarding the qizilbash affairs are equally echoed in this chronicle as well, *Defter VIII*’s account on Prince Selim as the governor of Trabzon fundamentally differs from the retrospective treatments of other *Selim-nâme* authors – and from Kemalpaşazâde’s own later works as well. *Defter VIII* also provides valuable knowledge concerning the Ottoman response to the rise of Shah Ismail from the year 1500 on and the activities of qizilbashes in Anatolia before 1511.

Kemalpaşazâde completed *Defter VIII* with an addendum⁵³ written during the reign of Süleyman I⁵⁴ and comprising the events from the year 1508 to the accession of

⁵¹ Kemalpaşazâde’s *Defter VIII* is published by Ahmet Uğur. See Kemalpaşazâde, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman, VIII. Defter*, ed. Ahmet Uğur, Ankara: TTK, 1997.

⁵² See Ahmet Uğur, “Kemal Paşa-zâde ve Sekizinci Defter”, in Kemalpaşazâde, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman, VIII. Defter*, p. XXIX.

⁵³ This addendum is published by Ahmet Uğur. See Ahmet Uğur, *The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-nâme Literature*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, pp. 28-64.

⁵⁴ As Ahmet Uğur determines, Selim is mentioned in the text as *merhum* or deceased while Süleyman is mentioned as the sultan of our time. See Ahmet Uğur, “Selim-nâmes”, in his *The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-nâme Literature*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, p. 23.

Selim to the throne in April 24, 1512. This addendum (KPZ8b) is indeed devoted to the struggle of Selim for the throne and obviously written with the aim of legitimizing Selim's acts. This addendum truly bears the general characteristics of the *Selim-nāme* literature indicated above. Kemalpaşazāde wrote a separate volume to narrate the reign of Selim I. *Defter IX*⁵⁵ (KPZ9) is the history of the reign of Sultan Selim up to the year 920/1516.⁵⁶ In spite of all his prejudices regarding the qizilbash affairs, both of Kemalpaşazāde's histories include quite valuable details.

Another prominent actor of the contemporary events was Idris-i Bitlisī. Idris started his career as a scribe in the Akkoyunlu Palace. When Shah Ismail put an end to the Akkoyunlu rule in 1501, he joined Bayezid II's suit, where he wrote his magnum opus *Heşt Behişt*, the history of the first eight Ottoman sultans down to Bayezid II. Unfortunately, *Heşt Behişt* does not include the last years of Bayezid II's reign, when the qizilbash affairs became one of the most vital issues in the Ottoman politics. However, later on he wrote a separate history of the reign of Selim I, namely *Selimşah-nāme* (IDRS).⁵⁷ Idris took a very active part in the Ottoman-Safavid struggle. He was among the prominent advisors of Sultan Selim regarding his eastern policy. He was

⁵⁵ This Defter is published by Ahmet Uğur in his *The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-nāme Literature*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, pp. 65-128.

⁵⁶ In the end of the text, the date Zilkāde 922 / November-December 1516 is recorded. See Kemalpaşazāde, *Defter IX*, in Ahmet Uğur, *The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-nāme Literature*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, p. 128. A contemporary Italian source ratifies this fact. Giovan Maria Angiolello, who attended Selim's campaign of Egypt, writes, "The history of this last expedition of Selim against the Soldan and the Mamelukes was carefully written by a Cadi Lascher [*kadiasker*], who was with the army, to a Cadi [qādī] in Constantinople, and translated from the Turkish into Tuscan on the 22nd October, 1517." See Giovan Maria Angiolello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano", in *NIT*, p. 137. It is known that Kemalpaşazāde was *kadiasker* of Anatolia during this campaign, and most probably he got the post as a reward for his *Defter IX*, which had just been presented to the sultan. (See Franz Babinger, "Kemālpashazāde", *EI2*, p. 912; İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, "Kemāl Paşa Zāde", *IA*, p. 561.) Thus the history Giovan Maria Angiolello mentions must have been the *Defter IX* of Kemalpaşazāde.

⁵⁷ The Turkish translation of this work, which was written in Persian, is published by Hicabi Kırlandıç. See Idris-i Bitlisī, *Selim Şah-nāme*, translated and edited by Hicabi Kırlandıç, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001.

among the Ottoman forces sent to Tabriz by Selim I as avant-garde, immediately after the Çaldıran victory of the Ottomans. In the following years he was appointed as the governor-general of the eastern provinces commissioned to re-structure Kurdish tribes against the Safavids.⁵⁸ As a prominent actor of the contemporary developments, his accounts in *Selimşah-nâme* mostly rely on his own eye-witness. Furthermore, as an activist, Ottoman ideology-maker and governor, his writings, as was in the case of Kamalpaşazāde, directly reflect the Ottoman official stand. Nonetheless, *Selimşah-nâme* is not very informative on actual events. It is verbose but rather sparse as to content. Another problem with this source is that when he died on November 18, 1520, approximately two months after the death of Selim I, Idris-i Bitlisî had not finished his history, but left its drafts. These drafts were later compiled and completed by his son Ebu'l-Fazl. The problem here is that which parts is Ebu'l-Fazl contribution is not clear. According to Hicabi Kırlangıç, who published a Turkish translation of *Selimşah-nâme*, the contribution of Ebu'l-Fazl to the original work is rather limited.⁵⁹

The versified *Selim-nâme* (SKB)⁶⁰ of Şükri-i Bitlisî, who served as a military officer under Bayezid II and Selim I, is also among important sources. Putting aside his usual pro-Selim stand, Şükri's history provides unique details especially concerning Prince Selim's fight against qizilbashes in Trabzon and the early phases of the Çaldıran Campaign. Approximately one century later Şükri's *Selim-nâme* was edited and re-written in prose by Çerkeslerkâtibi Yusuf (YSF).⁶¹

⁵⁸ For Idris-i Bitlisî, see Hicabi Kırlangıç, "İdris-i Bitlisi", in *Ibid*, pp. 5-21.

⁵⁹ Hicabi Kırlangıç, "Selim Şah-nâme", in *Ibid*, p. 22.

⁶⁰ This work is published by Mustafa Argunşah. See Şükri-i Bitlisî, *Selim-nâme*, ed. Mustafa Argunşah, Kayseri, 1997.

⁶¹ The entire text of Yusuf's prose edition of this *Selim-nâme* is transliterated in Çerkesler Kâtibi Yusuf, *Selim-nâme*, the entire text is transliterated in Mehmet Doğan, *Çerkesler Kâtibi Yusuf'un Selim-*

Apart from these *Selim-nāmes*, Haydar Çelebi's *Ruznāme* (HYDR)⁶² is of primary importance among available sources. Haydar Çelebi participated in the Çaldıran Campaign as the scribe of the Imperial Council (Divan). As part of his job, he prepared a diary of the campaign. Although it is not very informative on ideological and political aspects of the contemporary developments, the *Ruznāme* provides a detailed trajectory of the campaign, as well as specific dates and some individual events that occurred during the campaign.

The historians writing in the second half of the sixteenth century mostly used the above-mentioned contemporary histories, especially the works of Idris-i Bitlisi and Kamalpaşazāde, for the events of the early sixteenth century. However, they seem to have additionally used some oral hearsay from first-hand eye-witnesses. Therefore, they are also of importance as sources for the era under scrutiny. Among them the *Selim-nāme* of Celalzāde Mustafa (CLZ)⁶³, the history of Hoca Saadeddin Efendi (HSE)⁶⁴ and the encyclopedic chronicle of 'Āli (ALI)⁶⁵ are of the special interest in the present study.

A peculiarity of 'Āli's *Künhü'l-Ahbar* should be delineated here. Unlike other historians, 'Āli does not follow a strict chronological order. Furthermore he usually makes mistakes in dates. The original and valuable aspect of his work is that he occasionally gives his own analysis and interpretations of events. From this point of

nāmesi'nin Mukayeseli Metin Tenkidi ve Değerlendirmesi, Unpublished MA Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, 1997.

⁶² An unscholarly transliterated and abridged text of *Ruznāme*'s copy housed in Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, R 1955 is published by Yavuz Senemoğlu. See Divan Kâtibi Haydar Çelebi, *Haydar Çelebi Ruznāmesi*, ed. Yavuz Senemoğlu, Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser Serisi. (Undated).

⁶³ Celâl-zāde Mustafa, *Selim-nāme*, haz. Ahmet Uğur-Mustafa Çuhadar, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1997.

⁶⁴ Hoca Sadettin Efendi, *Tacü't-Tevarih*, vols. II-III-IV, haz. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999.

⁶⁵ Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, *Kitabu't-Tarih-i Künhü'l-Ahbar*, 2 vols., eds. A. Uğur, M. Çuhadar, A. Gül, İ. H. Çuhadar, Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1997.

view he seems to stray from the traditional style of chronicle writing, which usually lacks interpretation and analysis. Another valuable side of Ali's history is that it includes biographies of contemporary viziers, statesmen, poets, scholars etc. Later chronicles written in the seventeenth century, such as the history of Solakzāde (SLZ)⁶⁶ and *Sahai fu'l-Ahbar* of Müneccimbaşı (MNB)⁶⁷ barely adds unknown bits of knowledge to the known corpus.

Lastly, a sixteenth-century anonymous chronicle (*Haniwaldanus Anonymous-ANMH*) deserves special attention. This anonymous history was translated from Turkish into Latin by a certain Murad Bey, who was encouraged by Philipp Haniwald von Eckersdorf, in 1584. The Latin text was translated into German and published by R. F. Kreutel.⁶⁸ The importance of this source, for the purpose of the present study, is not only because of its valuable information absent in other sources, but also because of its relatively 'objective' attitude regarding the qizilbash issues. Fundamentally differing from other Ottoman sources, it occasionally depicts Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, and Shah Ismail, and their disciples as 'good men'. On the other hand, regarding the deeds of Selim, *Haniwaldanus Anonymous* does not hesitate to criticize his unlawful acts. These features ensure a peculiar place to this anonymous history in the Ottoman historiography.

⁶⁶ Solakzāde Mehmed Hemdemî Çelebi, *Solakzāde Tarihi*, vols. I-II, ed. Vahit Çabuk, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1989.

⁶⁷ Müneccimbaşı Ahmed Dede, *Sahai fu'l-Ahbar fi Vekayi-ül-a'sâr*, 2 vols., trc. İsmail Erünsal, Tercüman 1001 Eser Serisi.

⁶⁸ R. F. Kreutel, *Der fromme Sultan Bayezid die Geschichte seiner Herrschaft (1481-1512) nach den altosmanischen Chroniken des Oruç und des Anonymus Haniwaldanus*, Vienna, 1978. The Turkish translation of this work is published by Necdet Öztürk. See Richard F. Kreutel, *Haniwaldanus Anonimi'ne Göre Sultan Bayezid-i Velî (1481-1512)*, trs., Necdet Öztürk, İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1997.

1.2.2. Safavid Sources

The Safavid historiography is principally based on some dozens of narratives. Except a few imperial decrees, mostly of Shah Ismail,⁶⁹ and individual archival documents,⁷⁰ which are mainly housed in the Ottoman archives, the official records of the Safavid state are almost all lost to modern scholarship. Consequently, the chronicles, mostly written by Safavid court historians, remained as the principal, and the only in most cases, sources of the Safavid history. The most important narrative sources of the Safavid history, which are consulted in the present study, are well-known to modern scholarship.⁷¹ However, for the purpose of the present study, some observations should be made.

As long as the history of the qizilbash is concerned, the Safavid chronicles pose serious problems. First of all, except for a few number of anonymous narratives, whose authorship is still to be clarified, these histories were produced by Persian bureaucrats and the *ulemā*. As will be partly evaluated in Chapter VIII, immediately following the foundation of the Safavid state in 1501, two fundamentally different and contesting groups appeared within the Safavid realm: on the one side there was the Turcoman (tribal) qizilbash military aristocracy, which founded the state and held military ranks. On the other side, the bureaucracy, chancery, fiscal affairs, and

⁶⁹ For an incomplete list of Shah Ismail's decrees in TSA, see Appendix B.

⁷⁰ For some examples of these documents, see Said Amir Arjomand, "Two Decrees of Shāh Tahmāsp Concerning Statecraft and the Authority of Shaykh 'Alī Al-Karakī", in *Authority and Political Culture in Shi'ism*, edited by Said Amir Arjomand, New York: State University of New York Press, 1988, 250-262; B. G. Martin, "Seven Safavid Documents from Azarbayjan", in *Documents from Islamic Chanceries*, First Series, ed., S. M. Stern, Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1965, 170-206. For the only comprehensive source explaining the structure of the Safavid administration, see Viladimir Minorsky, *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, A Manual of Safavid Administration*, London, 1943. (TM)

⁷¹ For a brief description of the narrative sources of the Safavid history, the reader might regard the following studies: Ghulam Sarwar, *History of Shah Ismail Safawi*, Aligarh, Muslim University, 1939, pp. 3-16; Masashi Haneda, *Le Chāh et les Qizilbās. Le système militaire safavide*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987, pp. 10-28 ; Muhammad Karim Youssef-Jamālī, *The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā'il I (1487-1524)*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1981, pp. XV-XLV.

scholarship were left in the hands of Persian notables. Holding the military power and governorships, qizilbashs regarded the latter as of secondary rank that were responsible simply to fulfill some scribal stuff under their rule. On the other hand, for the high cultured Persian ‘men of pen’, qizilbashs were just coarse, uncultured, and single-minded soldiers knowing nothing other than fighting. The latter’s despising attitude, however, was not only limited to the illiteracy or the vulgarity of qizilbashs, but was pointed towards their way of life as a whole. Consequently, the chronicles produced by Persian bureaucrats are by no means free of prejudice against Turkoman qizilbashs, even if they were written under the patronage of the Safavid shahs. A careful treatment immediately demonstrates that these narratives are strongly inclined to underestimate the contribution of the qizilbash military aristocracy, while overemphasizing the role of bureaucrats. Therefore, in the Safavid narratives, the student of the qizilbash (or Safavid) history can find neither the true accounts of the events, especially regarding the early phases of the Qizilbash Movement, nor the feelings and ideas of Shaykh Haydar’s and Shah Ismail’s devoted qizilbash disciples. In other words, one can hardly penetrate to the mentality, world-view, sentiments, and the nature of religious thought of qizilbashs through these chronicles.

The *Habibu’s-siyar* of Khwandamir (HS),⁷² Iskender Beg Munshi’s *History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great* (AA),⁷³ and Qādī Ahmed Qumī’s *Hulāsāt al-tavārīh* (HT)⁷⁴ are among the prominent Safavid chronicles that strongly bear the prejudice mentioned

⁷² Khwandamir (Mir Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Husayni), *Habibu’s-siyar*, translated and edited by W. M. Thackston, Sources of Oriental Languages and Literatures 24, Central Asian Sources I, Harvard University, 1994.

⁷³ Eskandar Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great (Tārīk-e ‘Ālamārā-ye ‘Abbāsī)*, translated by Roger M. Savory, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.

⁷⁴ Qādī Ahmed Qumī, *Hulāsāt al-tavārīh*, edited and translated into German in Erika Glassen, *Die frühen Safawiden nach Qāzī Ahmad Qumī*, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970. (The section from Sheikh Saḡī to the advent of Ismail in 1501).

above. More interesting is that the *Ahsenü't-Tevārih* of Hasan-ı Rumlu (HR),⁷⁵ who was a son of a qizilbash amir in the service of Shah Ismail and Shah Tahmasb, also follows the same tradition, that is looking at qizilbashes from the eyes of Persian cultured class.

Among a few number of exceptions, the anonymous histories known as *Ross Anonymous* and *Tarih-i Kızılbaşān* can be counted. The authorship of the former has been discussed by several historians. According to E. Denison Ross, who partly published the text with its English translation, the narrative had been written during the early sixteenth century by an unknown author.⁷⁶ However, Ghulam Sarwar argued that it was written between the years 1540 and 1548 by an author whose name starts with 'Bijan'.⁷⁷ Andrew H. Morton, on the other hand, identifies this work with *Jahāngushā-yi khākān* and suggests a 17th-century date of composition.⁷⁸ Whatever the name of the author and the date of compilation were, the distinguishing feature of this narrative comes from its content. As a close examination would immediately reveal, here the attitude of the anonymous author regarding qizilbashes fundamentally deviates from that of the Persian bureaucrat-historians. His approaches seemingly reflect the qizilbash mentality much more than the above-mentioned chronicles. From this point of view, *Ross Anonymous* might be regarded among the most 'qizilbash-like' products of the

⁷⁵ C. N. Seddon, (ed.), *A Chronicle of the Early Safawis, being the Ahsanu't- Tawarikh of Hasan-ı Rumlu*, Baroda, 1931. For Turkish translation, see Hasan-ı Rumlu, *Ahsenü't-Tevārih*, translated into Turkish and abridged by Cevat Cevan, Ankara: Ardıç Yayınları, 2004.

⁷⁶ E. Denison Ross, "The Early Years of Shāh Isma'īl, Founder of the Safavī Dynasty", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXVIII, 1896, p. 252.

⁷⁷ Sarwar, *History of Shah Isma'il Safawī*, pp. 9-10.

⁷⁸ See Morton, "The Date and Attribution of *Ross Anonymous*. Notes on a Persian History of Shah Isma'īl I", *History and Literature in Iran: Persian and Islamic Studies in Honour of P. W. Avery*, ed. Charles Melville, Chambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1990, pp. 179-212. Also consider his "The Early Years of Shah Isma'īl in the *Afzal al-tavārikh* and Elsewhere", in *Safavid Persia. The History and Politics of an Islamic Society*, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, pp. 27-28.

Safavid historiography. *Tarih-i Kızılbaşān*⁷⁹ can also be deemed as a product of the qizilbash milieu. Nevertheless, this anonymous source is rather sparse as to content. It is simply composed of a relatively comprehensive list of the qizilbash *oymaqs* and names of prominent *amirs* in each.

It must be because of the mentioned disdainful attitude of Persian historians that Safavid chronicles are almost silent about Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Haydar.⁸⁰ Apart from the narratives produced in the Safavid realm, our principal source for the deeds of Shaykh Haydar and his father is Fadlullah b. Rūzbihān Khunjī's *Tārīkh-i 'Ālam-ārā-yi Amīnī*,⁸¹ which was written under Akkoyunlu patronage. Khunjī's extreme prejudice against Shaykh Haydar and his disciples, as well as his father, has two major bases: first of all, he wrote his history in the palace of Yakub Beg Akkoyunlu,⁸² the formidable enemy of the Safavid dynasty. No less affective was Khunjī's fervent sunni fanaticism and shi'ī enmity. Stimulated by a combination of these two biases, his account on Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Haydar appears as an enthusiastic attempt to marginalize the Safavids shaykhs and their disciples into an extreme heresy for certain practical purposes, rather than a historical work. Therefore, *Tārīkh-i 'Ālam-ārā-yi Amīnī*'s account on qizilbashes, especially its description of qizilbash beliefs, should be treated with a fastidious criticism.

⁷⁹ This anonymous work is completed in 1013/1604-5. The original Persian text, with a short foreword, is published by Mir Hāšim Muhaddes. See *Tārīkh-i Kızılbaşān*, edited and published by Mir Hāšim Muhaddes, Tehran, 1361 (1982).

⁸⁰ It is to be shown throughout this study that the Safavid history from the shaykhdom of Junayd to Ismail's ascendance to the throne was marked by the exuberant qizilbash movement resting on extremist-shi'ism, Turkoman tribal culture and militarism, and a popular form of intense Sufism. By the development of the Safavid state with its institutions, however, the official religious stand gradually shifted towards the 'orthodox' Twelver Shi'ism, which by no means approved the Qizilbash Sufism.

⁸¹ An abridged English translation of this work is published by Vilademir Minorsky. See Minorsky, *Persia in A.D. 1478-1490. An Abridged Translation of Fadlullah b. Rūzbihān Khunjī's Tārīkh-i 'Ālam-ārā-yi Amīnī*, London, 1957.

⁸² Khunjī's work is, indeed, is designed as the history of Yakub Beg Akkoyunlu.

1.2.3. Italian Sources

When Shah Ismail rose up as a regional power in 1501, the Ottoman-Venetian War had just ended with territorial losses of the Venetians. The treaty, however, by no means ended the immediate Ottoman threat for the Venetians. Therefore, the emergence of a new and powerful enemy of the Ottoman Empire in the eastern front was warmly welcomed by the Venetians. Indeed, establishing alliances with the enemies of the Ottoman Empire in the East was not a new phenomenon for European states. Before the Safavids, Uzun Hasan had also received the fervent support of the Venetians against Mehmed II. In this case, however, the excitement in Europe was two-fold: the newly rising ruler of Iran was not only posing a political and military menace to the Ottoman Empire, but also an effective sectarian contest as well. The second feature of the new ally even made Venetian ambassadors to perceive - as reflected in their reports - Shah Ismail's religious path closer to Christianity than the Sunni Islam of the Ottomans.

As a result, the European - especially Venetian - statesmen and intellectuals had an increasing interest in and curiosity about Shah Ismail. The Venetians dispatched a number of envoys to maintain an alliance with Shah Ismail and to encourage him in his struggle against the Ottomans. The reports of these envoys include a detailed description of Shah Ismail, his palace, his followers etc. Among them, the English translation of the most important and the most informative six travel accounts, or reports of diplomatic mission, are published.⁸³ The peculiarities of each narrative will be delineated in the related part of the thesis.

⁸³ The narratives of Caterino Zeno, Giovan Maria Angiolello, An unknown Merchant, and Vincenzo d'Alessandri are translated into English and published by Charles Grey. See *A Narrative of Italian travels*

Since they are free from the biases of the Ottoman and Persian authors explained above, this third group of sources provides us extremely valuable information, especially about the relationship between Shah Ismail and his disciples, about the adoration of the latter to their shaykh, and about the nature of the qizilbash belief. Nonetheless, they have their own subjectivity on the matter. Because of the situation mentioned above, Italian writers had a recognizable tendency to exaggerate Ismail's deeds and his power over the qizilbash Sufis. A careful examination of their accounts reveals that they overtone 'non-sunni', which meant 'non-Islamic' for them, and extremist deeds of qizilbashes. In their attitude, one can easily recognize an intention to depict Shah Ismail and his followers as a separate 'religion' from Islam, which was more Christian-like.⁸⁴

in Persia in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, translated and edited by Charles Grey, *Hakluyt Society*, London, 1873 (NIT). Yet the English translations of the narratives of Josafa Barbaro and Ambrogio Contarini are published by Lord Stanley of Alderley. See Josafa Barbaro and Ambrogio Contarini, *Travels to Tana and Persia*, Hakluyt Society, first series 49, translated by William Thomas and A.A. Roy and edited by Lord Stanley of Alderley, London, 1873 (TTP).

⁸⁴ For a discussion of the Italian sources in terms of their attitude regarding Shah Ismail, see Palmira Brummett, "The Myth of Shah Ismail Safavi: Political Rhetoric and 'Divine' Kinship", in *Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam*, edited by John Victor Tolan, New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1996, 331-59.

CHAPTER II

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: A DISCUSSION ON THE NATURE OF TRIBE AND STATE

2.1. BUREAUCRATIC STATE VS. TRIBAL ORGANIZATION

This thesis aims to analyze the emergence of the Qizilbash Identity within the framework of the interaction between two ‘ways of life’: 1) the overwhelmingly settled and urban-oriented way of life, which realized its political organization as bureaucratic state, and 2) nomadic or semi-nomadic and rural-oriented way of life, which accomplished its socio-political organization on tribal basis. The peasantry remains in between these two ends of my model and may be closer to either according to conditions. Especially those villagers, who had already settled in certain spaces but maintained tribal bonds and nomadic habits in terms of culture, mentality, ways of thinking and perception etc., are to be classified in the second group. Another parameter not to be ignored is the degree of literacy. The first way of life might be regarded under the dominance of literacy. However, this does not necessarily mean that the majority of

people in the first group were literate. Rather the point here is that the cultural, ideological, intellectual, political, and religious premises in this way of life were mainly the product of literate minds. The other members of society, majority of which might well have been illiterate, were to be attached to the intellectual products of the literate elite. The same approach is valid for the other pole of my model. Here some literate people might also be found. However, the governing mechanism of thought and perception was based on illiteracy.

A detailed discussion of differences and similarities between these two ways of life is beyond the scope of the present work. Nonetheless, it would be useful for the upcoming analysis to provide a brief framework of especially the major differences where the influence on the religious, political, and social levels is clearly visible.

I would like to start with asking the question, ‘what was a nomadic tribe in the Ottoman case?’ The term comprises two words and two notions: ‘nomad’ and ‘tribe’, which are closely connected to each other. Nomadism is a mode of life based on specialized types of food-producing systems with relatively conservative technology and close harmony with the ecology and all shaped by constant move. Although there were some nomads engaged in seasonal agriculture, the major means of food production in a nomadic society is always pastoralism.⁸⁵ A tribe is, on the other hand, a model for social and political organization principally erected around a fabricated lineage axis. Virtually all nomadic societies are organized as tribes in one sort or another.⁸⁶ There are, however,

⁸⁵ The reader must be reminded that in the Ottoman case, which is the focus of the present study, ‘nomadism’ in its absolute meaning of transhumance, is hardly applicable. Rather one can speak of ‘residual nomads’ moving within a prescribed route, either long-range or short-range. So throughout the study the term ‘nomad’ will be used in this sense. For a brief outline of nomadism in Ottoman Anatolia, see Xavier de Planhol, “Geography, Politics and Nomadism in Anatolia”, *International Social Sciences Journal*, XI, 4, 525-31.

⁸⁶ Bates, Daniel and Plog, Fred, *Cultural Anthropology*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990, p. 156.

settled tribes in several parts of the world. Although tribal organization in the Middle East was generally associated with nomadic pastoralists, sedentary tribes, as Barfield notices, located in marginal mountain and desert regions, such as the Berbers, Kurds, and Pashtuns, probably constituted an equally large population⁸⁷. In the Ottoman Empire too we know of some settled tribes especially in the eighteenth and fourteenth century Eastern Anatolia. Nevertheless, the tribes that constitute this study's subject-matter were overwhelmingly nomads. Hence I will use the term 'nomadic tribe' throughout my analysis.

Yet before going into detailed analysis of tribal organization and the nomadic way of life, I would like to make further clarification on the type of tribe that I will examine. Before everything else, the notion of tribe that I will employ for the purpose of my subject in the context of the Middle East, as Aydın and Özel underline for some other purpose, is "fundamentally different from the classical understanding of the Anglo-Saxon concept of tribe, which generally derives from African, American or Oceanic anthropological research on hunter-gatherers, horticulturalists, and intensive agriculturalists."⁸⁸ The essential difference lies in the political content attributed to tribe.

On the other hand, from the political point of view, one could not analyze all Middle Eastern tribes in one category. Comparing the tribal cultures of the Middle East, Charles Lindholm indicates structural differences between hierarchical Turko-Mongolian tribes in Inner Asia and egalitarian cultural tradition of tribes indigenous to

⁸⁷ Thomas J. Barfield, "Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective", in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, p. 156.

⁸⁸ Suavi Aydın and Oktay Özel, "Power Relations between State and Tribe in Ottoman Eastern Anatolia", *Bulgarian Historical Review*, vol. 3-4, 2006, 51-67.

the Middle East.⁸⁹ Thomas Barfield also analyzes Middle Eastern tribes in a same manner: the egalitarian (Arabian) tribal model and inner Asian hierarchical (Turko-Mongolian) tribal model. In the Arabian tribes, though some lineages demonstrated a greater capacity than others to assume political leadership, each clan considered itself to be the equal of any other. Thus the leadership in the egalitarian tribal system displayed little hierarchy.⁹⁰ This sort of organization is called, in a broader sense, by anthropologists as the segmentary lineage system. The tribal chief in this system is no more than a mediator between the tribe and the outside world or in inner disputes. He has no real political power. For the historians of the steppe and, the Turkish tribes in Anatolia as well, the segmentary lineage system seems obviously inapplicable as a model.⁹¹

The inner Asian pattern of tribal organization was much more hierarchical than that of the egalitarian organizations. This difference was reflected in both its social structure and political organization.⁹² They were organized according to a canonical system, in which there existed a superior segment, the leader of which is superior to all tribesmen. Hence, there was a central hierarchical organization which provides a considerable political and military might to the tribe alongside the powerful position to the chief. Barfield observes,

Unlike in the Middle East, where tribal societies that were distributed in a mosaic fashion across the region shared close economic and cultural ties with neighboring sedentary states, in Inner Asia tribal societies were more isolated, inhabiting their own distinct territories in which they were completely dominant and separated by linear frontiers from neighbors whose societies and cultures

⁸⁹ Charles Lindholm, "Kinship Structure and Political Authority: The Middle East and Central Asia", *Journal of Comparative History and Society*, 28, 1986, 334-355.

⁹⁰ Barfield, "Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective", p. 161.

⁹¹ Lindner, "What was a Nomadic Tribe?", p. 694.

⁹² Barfield, p. 164.

were alien. These sedentary neighbors were far larger in population and more centralized than their tribal neighbors, often refusing to trade with them except under threat of force. To deal with these powerful sedentary states, tribal societies had to organize their own state structures of sufficient power to force their neighbors to treat them as equal.⁹³

Lapidus uses the term ‘warrior chieftaincy’ for these sorts of tribes. To him, “Among Turkish Inner Asian Peoples who accepted hierarchical rule and recognized dynastic rule, the most common form of leadership was the warrior chieftaincy supported by a lineage, clan, or *commitatis* –a band of warriors who in turn won the allegiance of other such warrior units and thereby dominated a subject population.”⁹⁴ As clearly stated by Barfield and Lapidus, the Inner Asian Turko-Mongolain tribal tradition had an intrinsic capacity to construct a state whenever suitable conditions appeared. One might call it as a quasi-state organization. It is the Torko-Mongolian tribal model, or in Lapidus’ words ‘warrior chieftaincy’, that I will employ throughout this study.

2.1.1. Means of Socio-political Organization

A tribe is, before all, a socio-political association whose members jointly helped to maintain order internally and defend the unit externally. As a political organization it is an alternative to the state.⁹⁵ As Luis Beck puts forward “it is often more appropriate to speak of tribal or tribally organized society than of tribe.”⁹⁶ A tribe is rather an idea, a cultural construct, which has political, social and symbolic manifestations.⁹⁷ It is a rural self-administration. But the means of tribal organization intrinsically deviate from that

⁹³ Barfield, p. 166.

⁹⁴ Lapidus, “Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History”, p. 29.

⁹⁵ Ernest Gellner, “The Tribal Society and Its Enemies”, *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, ed., Richard Tapper, New York, 1983, p.442.

⁹⁶ Luis Beck, “Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran”, in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, p. 189.

⁹⁷ Beck, “Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran”, p. 188.

of state organization. That is because of the nature of social ground and mode of life on which socio-political organization rises. In the lack of social stratification and division of labor⁹⁸, and of the necessary material and tools such as literacy, social, political, and religious functions were assigned according to non-professional basis, which usually appears as blood lineage.⁹⁹ As Thomas Barfield has put it, one significant difference of tribal polity is that

...in contrast to states, tribal political structures employed, in theory, a model of kinship to build groups that acted in concert to organize economic production, preserve internal political order, and defend the group against outsiders. Relationships among people and groups in such systems were mapped through social space rather than geographical territory. Political units and the territories they occupied existed primarily as products of social relations: rights to use land and exclude outsiders were based on tribal affiliation. Non-tribal groups were generally organized in a converse fashion, with social groups defining themselves in terms of a common residence, system of cultural beliefs, or political affiliation.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Closely related to their simplistic and specialized structure of economy, social structure of nomadic societies is purely stratified. Since the mode of subsistence is highly specialized and one-sided there is no need for division of labor. In such a society that almost all members professionalize in same productive means social differentiation could never reach a considerable level. One might argue that the only social stratification in a nomadic society takes place during the emergence of a ruling tribal aristocracy, which usually comprises kin, comrades, or slaves of the chief and of tribal militia. Never the less, in terms of culture and ideology it is hardly possible to distinguish considerable differentiation among nomads. One may add to this homogeneity and even one-sidedness of nomadic culture and ideology, the superficial and rudimentary nature as well. Putting aside the ruling clan, which specializes in politics and military arts, members of a nomadic society are more or less the same in terms of productive activities, art, cultural means, scientific abilities, religious professions, etc. Adam Smith long ago recognized that the differences between individuals mainly come from the division of labor. Individual differentiation is not due to innate nature of people but is a result of division of labor and the discipline that society imposes upon its members. "The difference of natural talents in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the very different genius which appears to distinguish men of different professions, when grown up to maturity, is not upon many occasions so much the cause, as the effect, of the division of labor. The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature, as from habit, custom, and education. When they came into the world, and for the first six or eight years of their existence, they were perhaps very much alike, and neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any remarkable difference." See Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Book I, chap. ii., London: Penguin Books, 1979. Also consider Robert E. Park, "Human Nature and Collective Behavior", *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 32, no. 5, (Mar., 1927), p. 736.

⁹⁹ One should remember that according to the "Ocak" or "Dedelik" system of the Qizilbash, the privileged religious class of the society responsible to fulfill certain religious functions and supervise ordinary members of the community rests on genealogical basis rather than education or training.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas J. Barfield, "Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective", pp. 155-6.

So, in Barfield's terminology, the dominance of social space instead of physical conditions in shaping the map of relations and structure of political organization leads to the creation of abstract ideas such as genealogy, which could glue tribal body.

The political structure in the tribal system is influenced, conditioned, and determined by internal, local factors and external, supra-local factors. Internal forms, inherent tendencies, and local system parameters such as tribal values, cognitive frameworks, cultural commitments, mode-means and relations of production, environment, adaptation, eco-system are important. On the other hand, external ties, foreign relations, extraneous pressures such as high religions, literary traditions, formalized cultural transmissions, state pressure, government preferences, inter-tribal alliances, rivalries and conflicts play a significant role in the construction of tribal policy. But none of them should be taken as priori.¹⁰¹

Being one of the major external factors that determined tribal polity, it would be useful to give the definition of state and to point out briefly the fundamental differences between them. For the purpose of my study, I am inclined to take the following definition of state among many others. The state is a political entity characterized by territorial frontiers (not necessarily secure and clearly defined), a central government and bureaucratic apparatus, a legitimately monopolized physical coercion, extraction of resources (usually in the form of tax), and a socio-economically stratified heterogeneous population.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Philip Carl Salzman, "Why Tribes have Chiefs: A Case from Baluchistan", *The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan*, ed., Richard Tapper, New York, 1983, p. 281.

¹⁰² Richard Tapper, "Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East", in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner (eds.), *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, p. 50; Beck, "Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran", p. 191.

The major difference of state from tribe comes from its much more developed division of labor. Under the state organization there existed full-time professional warriors, officials of several bureaucratic offices. It sustained by the labor of peasants, artisans, and traders.¹⁰³ The tribal mode barely has intermediary echelons in administrative machinery. It is socially homogeneous, egalitarian, and segmented; the state is heterogeneous, stratified, and hierarchical. Tribes give primacy to ties of kinship and patrilineal descent as basis for identity, political allegiance, and behavior. States, on the other hand, put personal relations of state to secondary significance and insist on loyalty of each person to a central authority. In the tribal organization personal and moral factors play primary role, whereas states stresses impersonal relations and recognizes contract, transaction, and achievement.¹⁰⁴

2.1.2. Chieftaincy and Lineage

The chief, his household, and his lineage, though being usually ex post facto speculation, constitute the skeleton of tribal polity. In the nomadic society, which casts the main body of tribes under scrutiny, the physical factors that combine the members of the community fluctuate. Thus symbolic and abstract factors and ideas such as genealogy gain preeminence as a uniting factor within society. The mobility of nomads and instability of pastoral economy impedes stable social organization. On the contrary, it gives rise to a fluid social organization which is capable of change and which has the requisite segmentary means with which to accomplish this. The most appropriate principle for this turns out to be descent for it conceptualizes the structure of social

¹⁰³ Gellner, "The Tribal Society and Its Enemies", p. 445.

¹⁰⁴ Tapper, "Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East", p. 68.

relations on kinship basis.¹⁰⁵ The lack of constant territorial settlement, in addition to the absence of bureaucracy as mentioned above, makes impossible for tribes to invent a physical or territorial administrative chart, instead they implement genealogical charts. As Luis Beck truly demarcates, “Genealogies were charters of organization and not maps of actual kinship ties.”¹⁰⁶ In tribal context, attachment to a genealogy or common ancestor implies political connotations.

Tribes use genealogy as a tool of organization and social solidarity. Genealogical principle is important for the nomadic society, as Khazanov notes, not only to form descent groups but also to govern the structure of society. “Genealogies can be consciously or unconsciously manipulated. They are capable of broadening and narrowing, and of splitting up and merging in accordance with practical necessities and a specific historic situation.”¹⁰⁷ Genealogy, kinship, and descent fulfill vital function in the social organization of nomads. But genealogy usually does not reflect actual descent lines; rather it is fabricated to create a common feeling in community. Actual kinship relations occur only in sub-tribal units, such as families, household, and local lineages.

Barth observes that “kinship, especially a patrilineal one, is of prominent importance in nomadic life in terms of internal networks and ties in a camp”¹⁰⁸. He adds, however, that they had, in reality, little knowledge of genealogy. Beck and Barfield also indicate that the function of lineage gets its real meaning only at the local level; as it comes to higher levels of incorporation it gains symbolic and political notion rather than

¹⁰⁵ Anatoly M. Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1994, pp.138-9.

¹⁰⁶ Beck, p. 194.

¹⁰⁷ Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, p. 143,

¹⁰⁸ Barth, p. 30.

actual kinship ties¹⁰⁹. As Barfield delineates it, “The closer we get to the bottom ranks of any tribal system, the more the system relies on actual descent and affinal ties; the higher we go in the same structure, the more political its relationships become.”¹¹⁰

As genealogy serves as the pillar of the theory of tribal polity, the chief occupies the focus of this theory. The person of the chief stays at the top of the pyramid. He has three main functions: 1) organizing intra-tribal economy such as allotting pastures, determining migration routes, coordinating migrations of the tribe, 2) settling disputes within the tribe, 3) representing the tribe and safeguarding its benefits in relations with other tribes or states.¹¹¹ These functions also constitute the factors that lead to the emergence of leadership in a nomadic society. Namely, the need to allocate key sources, the establishing and regularizing of routes of pastoral migration, the need of certain order, the need for defense, the struggle for the livestock, pastures, and arable lands, migrations and wars, the desire of certain groups of nomads to subdue others, particularities of relations and interactions with the outside sedentary world requisite the accumulation of power in one hand.¹¹² The sources that the chief derives his power from are closely related to the cohesive forces that holds tribesmen together. As is already mentioned, one of those cohesive forces is genealogy.

Lindner calls attention to another significant means of social solidarity in tribal organizations: common interest. As many other anthropologists, he regards genealogy as an “idiom or charters that nomads use to explain their history and politics”¹¹³, but never

¹⁰⁹ For a case study among Qashka’i Tribe in southwestern Iran see. Beck, “Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran”, p. 193.

¹¹⁰ Barfield, p. 157.

¹¹¹ See for the case of Basseri, for example, Barth, pp. 75-76.

¹¹² Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, p. 148-9.

¹¹³ Rudi Paul Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1982, p. 696.

a map of real blood bonds. He notifies that the existence of mid-level gaps in tribal descent lines allows expansion and contraction¹¹⁴ of the number of tribesmen through grafting on new members.¹¹⁵ Kinship, as idiom, reinforces tribal cohesion.¹¹⁶ But the real factor pulling the members of tribe is common interest.¹¹⁷ Common interest, in addition to the external factors, determines the strength, size, and the life of a tribe.¹¹⁸ Furthermore, it is a cohesive force providing an inclusive model, says Lindner, which can explain rapid growth of tribes such as the Mongols and the Ottomans. In the Mongol and Ottoman case it is supported by raids and predation.¹¹⁹ Hence, the chief draws his power mostly from his success in retaining the common interest of tribesmen in

¹¹⁴ This was recognized long ago by Ibn Khaldun. He writes in his monumental work, *The Mukaddimah*, as follows: "It is clear that a person of certain descent may become attached to people of another descent... Such a person comes to be known as having the same descent as those to whom he is attached and is counted as one of them... Family lines in this manner continually changed from one tribal group to another...". See Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History*, trs., Franz Rosenthal, abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. For an analysis of fluctuating nature, variability, and inclusiveness of lineage system and descent lines in nomadic societies see also Roger Gribb, *Nomads in Archeology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 53-54.

¹¹⁵ Khazanov puts it as follows: "At the same time genealogies ideologically enable many groups of nomads smoothly to incorporate and adopt outside groups into their own ranks, without making any essential structural change. It could be supposed that ideological amnesia, which has been recorded among many nomads, is partly to be explained by the fact that it facilitates genealogical assimilation". See Khazanov, p. 143.

¹¹⁶ Khazanov also indicates the use of genealogy in providing a bond for all the members of a given society in the notion of common descent. See. Khazanov, p. 140.

¹¹⁷ Lindner, p. 697.

¹¹⁸ If we look at a contemporary case, namely Basseri Tribe, Barth records, "camps, *oulads* and sections seek out the strong chief and submit to him; from him they obtain better protection and by him their interests are best safeguarded. A "tribe" among South Persian nomads is a political concept; its unity is not ethnic, but depends on its allegiance to a chief. The process whereby ethnic complexity persist in the tribes, and whereby rapid changes in their relative and absolute sizes take place, can now be better understood. Any imbalance between tribes in the effectiveness of centralized authority stimulates an extension of the stronger centre's claims to authority, and a voluntary flow of commoners from the weaker to the stronger centre." Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, p. 85. Luis Beck comes out with similar results for Qashka'i Tribe. He says, "Tribal organization involved dynamic processes and could be created and enhanced as well as weakened and abandoned. Tribal groups expanded and contracted. Small tribal groups joined larger ones when, for example, the state attempted to restrict access to resources or foreign power sent troops to attack them. Large tribal groups divided into small groups to be less visible to the state and escape its reach. Intertribal mobility was a common pattern and was part of the process of tribal formation and dissolution." See Luis Beck, "Tribes and the State in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Iran", in Philip S. Houry and Joseph Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, p. 191.

¹¹⁹ Lindner, p. 698.

providing vast pasturelands and organizing fruitful predations on the one hand and in mediating internal disputes and in acting as a fulcrum¹²⁰ between tribe and external powers, on the other.

Ira Lapidus additionally calls attention to religious charisma as an internal uniting factor, especially among segmentary Arabic tribes. But he carefully distinguishes the very nature of segmentary Arabian tribes and hierarchical Turko-Mongolian tribes, as do others, and points out the fact that religion came at a secondary stage in the history of the latter. “It helped consolidate the identity of khanates, hordes, and *oymaqs* but does not seem to have played critical role in their origin.”¹²¹ He also delineates the ex post facto legitimization function of genealogical lineages. For him, genealogical factors may have played critical roles in small participation kinship units, or in theoretical self image, but they were not significant in the actual organization of larger movements. The principal constituent governing the tribal organization in larger scales was the formation of predatory war bands. It was only after a series of successful lootings that the leader of the tribe could gain real power and the number of his fellow tribal warriors would rapidly increase.¹²²

Other factors which deeply influence both the power of the chief and the nature of tribal organization are external ones (such as the role of state and neighboring tribes; the proximity of frontiers, cities, and trade routes). Nomadic tribal society is not self-sufficient especially in cultural and economic terms. They need and are dependent on their sedentary neighbors. Tribal system combines political autonomy with cultural and

¹²⁰ Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 700.

¹²¹ Lapidus, p. 34; for another view attributing to religion secondary importance in Inner Asian tribal organizations see Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: Inner Asian Perspective”, p. 170.

¹²² Lapidus, p. 29.

economic dependence on non-tribal societies.¹²³ Thus, the effects of external changes are usually direct and deep in tribal societies. Tapper, for this reason, puts primary emphasis on external forces as main variables determining the emergence of central leadership in a tribe.¹²⁴ William Irons also, as many other anthropologists, underlines external relations as primary determining parameter in tribal polity. As he has put it, “Among pastoral nomadic societies hierarchical political institutions are generated only by external relations with state societies and never develop purely as a result of the internal dynamics of such societies.”¹²⁵ Thomas Barfield, furthermore, examines Inner Asian Turko-Mongolain tribal organizations and he also comes up with a similar conclusion.¹²⁶

To sum up, the response of tribal society to the internal and external needs appears on the basis of genealogy. As Lindner has already put it, “The ideology which bounded the tribesmen together in a communality of thought and emotion was, then, kinship. Binding them together for action was the chief, whose position evolved as a result of the shared interests of the tribesmen and the strength of the external pressure.”¹²⁷

¹²³ Gellner, “The Tribal Society and its Enemies”, p. 442.

¹²⁴ Tapper, “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East”, p. 66.

¹²⁵ William Irons, “Political Stratification among Pastoral Nomads”, in *Pastoral Production and Society*, Cambridge, 1979.

¹²⁶ “...such tribal societies (vast majority of whom engaged in pastoral nomadism in distant and large territories with low population density and relatively undifferentiated economy) could not support large-scale political structures with their own resources; nor was there any pressing need for much supratribal cooperation to organize the nomadic pastoral economy itself or to handle internal political affairs beyond what could be provided by segmentary opposition. When large-scale organization did emerge, it arose to deal with surrounding sedentary states.” See Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: Inner Asian Perspective”, p. 166.

¹²⁷ Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 700.

2.1.3. Bureaucracy vs. Face-to-face Relations

One of the most prominent institutes that differentiates states from tribal organization is bureaucracy. A tribal chief does not need a specialized class of scripts in order to regulate and govern the issues of his tribe. The government of tribe works mainly on oral and kinship basis. Barth gives one striking example from the Basseri Tribe. As he writes in his ethnological study on this tribe, which became one of the classics in the field, “communications from the chief are relied on word of mouth via messengers – a service to which any Basseri may be deputed.”¹²⁸ The function of professional script class however, is not confined into merely its organizational support, which makes it possible to govern vast areas and huge populations. It totally changes the nature of relations in public sphere and of the functioning state apparatus. Instead of the person of the chief, obedience is owed to the legally established impersonal order in a bureaucratized governmental system. Bureaucracy shifts relations from a personal to impersonal basis. In a tribe, not only the daily commitments of sub-tribal groups but also the very vital issues relating to the internal and external affairs of the whole tribe, such as the distribution of pasturelands, the decision on raiding when and where etc., are managed via personal relations and ties such as kinship, comradeship, and slavery. Incorporation of bureaucracy by a professional trained script class curbs, however, the influence of personal ties and augments the role of legal norms, abstract rules, and the law, which are by definition impersonal¹²⁹.

¹²⁸ Barth, p. 76.

¹²⁹ Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trs., A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, edited with an introduction by Talcott Parsons, New York, London: The Free Press, 1964, pp. 329-330.

Furthermore, the office, an impersonal source of obedience, emerges via abstract rules and laws. In such a system the person occupying an office could not exercise any power stemming from himself, but he exercises the power of his office. The web of offices and the rules regulating these offices requires, of course, a certain technical training and education, which creates, as a result, a specialized group. This bureaucratic administrative staff, though nominally being dependent to the ruler, to the sultan in the Ottoman case for example, de facto masters the functioning of the governmental apparatus. Among them what gains prominence is, as Max Weber has put,

...the dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality, '*Sine ira et studio*', without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm. The dominant norms are concepts of straightforward duty without regard to personal considerations. Everyone is subject to formal equality of treatment; that is, everyone in the same empirical situation.¹³⁰

What create fundamental differences between tribal administration and bureaucratic state administration, at the micro level, are, perhaps, the written documents. It is clear that the adoption of written modes of communication was intrinsic to the development of more wide-ranging, more depersonalized, and more abstract systems of government; at the same time, the shift from oral intercourse meant assigning less importance to face-to-face situations.¹³¹ In a tribal organization, which barely uses documents, the media through which orders are transmitted is aural, which is, by definition subjective, personal, and humanlike. One does not need any special training or education in order to use aural media. Another important feature of this media, which also has significant influence on the nature of tribal organization, pertains to its durability. The life of sound finishes as soon as it appears. What lasts after a sound's

¹³⁰ Weber, p. 340.

¹³¹ Jack Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 (first published 1977), p. 16.

emergence is nothing but its image in the memories of the people that heard it. Hence, rules and regulations have rarely a long life in tribal organizations. Rather it is a dynamic and flexible one, dissolving and restructuring successively.

Bureaucratic state organizations, on the other hand, attribute little functionality to oral transmission, where the main media of order transmission is written documents. Administrative acts, decisions, and rules are formulated and recorded in writing, even in cases where oral discussion is the rule or is even mandatory.¹³² Written documents, which are, by definition, formal, impersonal, and artificial, require a specific trained group who can write and understand them. Furthermore they provide ground for long-lasting rules, namely laws, and, consequently, long-lasting social organizations. That means stability, cementing the social structure as much as possible, determining and delimiting the position and status of every group or class in the society, and forcing them to stay in their predetermined place. It is obvious enough that such a realm could be attractive for peasants, who look for stability and security before all, but not for nomads, for their life completely based on the principle of mobility and freedom.

2.1.4. The ‘Compact Community’: Individuality vs. Community

Nomadic tribal organizations are mainly composed of close-knit communities. In his influential book *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, a work devoted to the study of aspects of detribalization in the ancient world and of retribalization in the modern world, Karl Popper uses, for such societies, the term ‘closed society’, which has a biological unity and does not function by way of abstract relations like ‘open society’¹³³. It is to be

¹³² Weber, p. 332.

¹³³ Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.

shown, for the purpose of the present study, that there exist three kinds of relationships of the individual, which must be of the primary concern in determining the structural basis of community. These are (a) interpersonal relations within a group, (b) the relationship between individual and group as a whole, (c) and the relations of individual with other groups or members of other groups, which appears to be relatively weak in traditional close-knit societies. The density, strength, and nature of these three kinds of relationships have been considered among those factors chiefly responsible to shape the group structure and identity.

If to consider society not just as a set of individuals but also as a network of values, norms, beliefs surrounding an individual and merging him/her into the social body, all the elements of the network between individuals constitute the bases of interpersonal relations. In other words, one might regard society as a plasmatic entity, whose constituents are not just particles (correspond to individuals in this analogy) but also mucus that holds particles together. It is by the strength of this interpersonal network that a group can attain a distinct being for the most part independent from the individuals and has a certain imperative power on its members. When the social norms, values, cultural premises, and religious dogmas, which are social by nature, gain prominence, then there would be little room for personal choices of behavior.¹³⁴ In this perspective, hence, it appears that the stronger the cohesive forces within group, the

¹³⁴ One striking result of this compact social structure appears in conversion to a new religion. Just like other issues individual can not decide to change his religion. Because, this is such an issue that must come up as a result of collective consensus. But, as a rule, it is usually the leader of a group who makes that sort of decision and is followed by other members. The crucial point here, however, is that since the conversion was a collective act, an individual could hardly internalize the dogmas and cannons of a new religion, but only superficially imitate. What he practiced would be nothing than his old beliefs under the polish of new faith. This point, however, needs further analysis, which will partly be done in the next chapters.

weaker individual freedom,¹³⁵ the social structure, the ‘social facts’ and the individual’s duty toward society are overemphasized and at the same time restrict personal wills and feelings. It has been known since the path-breaking works of Emile Durkheim that once a community emerges as a social body, then it has a certain power over its members.¹³⁶ “There is something different in this power: it goes beyond the power one individual may have over another; the channel of influence of one person over another can not account fully for the effect of various group members on each other. There is something in the group as an entity which in itself is a source of power.”¹³⁷ Though being available in all social groups, this power of community as a distinct entity over individuals reaches its climax in close-knit societies.

For the purpose of my analysis, hence, I will focus on the socialization, or reversely individualization process which takes places on the basis of interpersonal aura versus individual dichotomy.¹³⁸ The close-knit compact societies see the individual as an incomplete part of society, who could never survive without social environment, which is for the most part true in its own context. There appears a high-degree of communality

¹³⁵ One should not disregard the role of informal commitments in the enforcement of group solidarity. As Back put forward “conversation within the group will establish an unspoken base of understanding, a frame of reference, that is a source of strength for group members. For many attitudes, values, and beliefs that can not be checked objectively, group members are dependent on the agreement of those who are members of those intimate groups.” They have also been called ‘family resemblances’; something in common but hard to determine distinctively. See Kurt W. Back, “Small Groups”, in *Social Psychology, Sociological Perspectives*, edited by Morris Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner, New Brunswick, London: Transaction Publishers, 1990, p. 339. For further reading on ‘family resemblances’ see J. S. Bruner, *A Study of Thinking*, New York: Wiley, 1956.

¹³⁶ Durkheim sees society as a ‘fact’, which imposes itself on individual and constrains his/her behavior. See Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, p. 239. For further reading on a critical review of Durkheim’s fundamental propositions on social construction see Gene A. Fisher and Kyum Koo Chon, “Durkheim and the Social Construction of Emotions”, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, vol.52, no.1, Special Issue: Sentiments, Affect and Emotion, March, 1989, pp. 1-9.

¹³⁷ Back, p. 338. For a wider reading see also D. Cartwright and A. Zander, *Group Dynamics*, New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

¹³⁸ It should be noted, however, that ‘socialization’ is loaded with some special connotations in my context. I am employing this word to express the dissolving of individual into a social aura, or at least his/her attaching to the social body in a proper way.

in tribal or sub-tribal societies because of two major reasons that reinforce intra-tribal cohesion: one pertains to economic base and the other comes from the very nature of nomadic mode of life. In terms of economy, the fundamental productive base of nomadic society is formed by a pastoral mode of subsistence, in which the ownership relations are quite different from that of sedentary societies. The economic relations in nomadic societies are based on two important foundations: private ownership of livestock and corporate ownership of pastures.¹³⁹ So, above all, corporate ownership of pastures forces nomads to act and behave collectively.¹⁴⁰ Although every family has its own properties, such as herd, tent, several tools etc., it is not sufficient to stand alone. As Roger Cribb has made the point clear, though being autonomous in terms of decision making and disposal of some sources, “pastoral household can not stand alone.”¹⁴¹ It needs other households to fulfill the full economic cycle and migratory operations. Thus communal ties are more advanced with regard to sedentary societies. And these communal ties usually, if not always, are based on kinship and affinity.¹⁴²

In addition to economic constraints, the very nature of nomadic life also forces individuals to knit to one another - at the first stage between the members of family and

¹³⁹ Barth observed in the Basseri case that the pasturelands of each *tira* and *oulads*, that are intermediary sub-tribal units, are assigned by the chief. A member of *oulad* has by birth the right of grazing on the pastures of his *oulad* without any limitation. The movements of man is restricted by the limits of *oulad* or section with whom he shared inherited pasturelands. But in the limits of pastureland of *oulad* he is totally free to move from one camp to other. See Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, pp. 54-60. For a broader analysis of ownership relations in nomadic societies see Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, pp. 123-25.

¹⁴⁰ For an analysis of ‘collective behavior’ see Dennis Brissett, “Collective Behavior: The Sense of Rubric”, *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 74, no.1, 1968, pp. 70-78.

¹⁴¹ Roger Cribb, *Nomads in Archaeology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 39.

¹⁴² Furthermore, nomadic families are relatively small and that the workforce required by the household is not only insufficient for the labor, but is subject to seasonal variations as well. As a rule, Khazanov says, it is impossible, or at least very difficult, for one nomadic household of average prosperity to accomplish a complete productive cycle on its own. Thus cooperation within a group by families is necessary. Consequently, economic structure endorses, or arguably enforces, social solidarity and collective actions in nomadic communities. See Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, pp. 130-31.

then between families. The Nomadic mode of life is devoid of physical constraints, such as quarters and districts that would hold community together and organize it. Since the physical environment of nomads is not fixed, they had to invent abstract means to fulfill this function, which is usually nothing but kinship. As Barth put it for the Basseri, patrilineal and affinal ties function as prominent means of social solidarity and cooperation; and they appear to be the most effective in establishing political bonds between tents.¹⁴³ Khazanov calls them ‘primary kin groups’. He affirms that “alongside families there were always primary kin groups. Members of the agnatic core of the latter frequently called themselves ‘sons of one father’ although in reality more than just brothers were included in this core. In this instance the word ‘father’ was used in the sense of ‘a very close ancestor’.”¹⁴⁴ One other uniting factor, Barth adds, forming a herding unit with other tents that have common interest and harmony in thought and practice.¹⁴⁵

Consequently, individual existence and development, in terms of both societal and introspective means, is inhibited by strong interpersonal group relations. One might regard these societies, as pointed above, a plasma-like entity in which individuals, though come into sight in a certain identifiable degree, are merged into the social total. Hence, in a tribal-nomadic society the individual can barely act independently from the

¹⁴³ Barth, p. 32.

¹⁴⁴ Khazanov, *Nomads and the Outside World*, p. 129.

¹⁴⁵ Barth, p. 35. One may add the problem of security as an additional factor obliging nomads to live in a close-knit, compact structure. They have no opportunity to build citadels or rampart around their camps or tents. Being dispossessed of any physical protective barriers, they are continuously vulnerable to any attack, banditry, or robbery. This physical situation leads them to form compact and cohesive social entities. The primary bonds that supply this cohesive force come from primarily kinship ties and from collaboration, which is based on common interest. Barth, for example, stresses the important outcomes that originates from vulnerable situation of nomads to any attack and argues that the psychological and social outcomes of the security problem must be examined in rather a wider plane, frame, and context. He says, for example, the excessive fear of thieves among Basseri is reminiscent of witchcraft beliefs in many aspects. See Barth, p. 47.

community to whom he/she belongs. It is of primary importance to notice that this narrowness in the sphere of individual freedom is not limited merely to the economic or social aspects. One might well argue that individual has a very limited sphere of liberty in intellectual, mental, and the religious level in nomadic societies as well.¹⁴⁶

This is not just a lack of ‘freedom’, however, but a lack of psychic development that would lead to the introspective contemplation and the strengthening of individual consciousness as well. Of course it is due to first and foremost the external constraints surrounding individual. Before all, in such societies, social relations and the basis of social structure rest primarily on face-to-face interactions, through which not the words and meanings are shared, but the sentiments as well. Face-to-face relations stick individuals sentimentally together and tighten cohesive bonds. Due to the fact that in such a communication, fundamentally different from that of through literal media, shared emotions and sentiments soon become cohesive forces holding individuals together. As Daniel Goleman puts it succinctly, “emotions are contagious.”

Most emotional contagion is far more subtle, part of a tacit exchange that happens in every encounter. We transmit and catch moods from each other in what amounts to what amounts to a subterranean economy of the psyche in which some encounters are toxic, some nourishing. This emotional exchange is typically at a subtle, almost imperceptible level...We catch feelings from one another as though they were some kind of social virus. We send emotional signals in every encounter, and those signals affect those we are with...We unconsciously imitate the emotions we see displayed by someone else, through an out-of-awareness motor mimicry of their facial expression, gestures, tone of

¹⁴⁶ Barth also calls attention to the passive situation of individual in relations with other societies, such as other tribes or sedentary societies. He attributes the primary affect to the institution of centralized chieftainship, for it constitutes the only media of contact with others. According to him, “The institution of centralized chieftainship effectively insulates the tribesmen from contacts with their environment and establishes them as a centripetally oriented linguistic community, with a few contacts with neighboring friendly tribes.” Thus, they form a close society, with hardly interactions in terms of culture, belief, tradition etc. with other societies. See Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, p. 133.

voice, and other nonverbal markers of emotion. Through this imitation people re-create in themselves the mood of the other person.¹⁴⁷

It is of primary significance to realize that, the faith, in such compact societies, is regarded as a social issue rather than an individual experience. Or more moderately saying, the former component of the faith is far more dominant than the latter. Every individual experiences, of course, spiritual and mystic sentiments during religious rituals or prayers. But he/she has little change, even capacity, to choose, to determine, and to clarify in what he/she believes in and how. Rather these have been evaluated as socio-religious processes. Once a belief appears and becomes a social fact, in Durkheimian terminology, it encompasses the whole society and forces every individual to believe in. On the other hand it becomes one of the abstracts constraints in nomadic society which strengthens the solidarity.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Daniel Goleman, *Emotional Intelligence*, New York, Toronto, London, Sydney, Auckland: Bantam Books, 1995, p. 115. Moreover, emotions are, at least of their considerable part, social by nature, since they are originated in social relations. For further reading on social constructionist approach to emotion see, for example, Gene A. Fisher and Kyum Koo Chon, "Durkheim and the Social Construction of Emotions", *Social Psychology Quarterly*, vol.52, no.1, Special Issue: Sentiments, Affect and Emotion, March, 1989, p.1.

¹⁴⁸ The binding and imperative force of such a sentimental structure, in which individuals placed and could not get rid of, in a close-knit society, is, indeed, far beyond the perception of modern man. But a closer scrutiny would unveil how conscious and unconscious social structure surrounds an individual and heavily influences both emotional and intellectual activities of an individual. Very striking examples from African natives, which shows enormous power of social premises on individual in such societies, are presented by Walter B. Cannon. Cannon recites a number of deaths recorded among natives by European travelers and missionaries, all caused by sorcery and magic. Among them one example would be sufficient for my purpose. The occurrence was recorded by Merolla in his voyage to Congo in 1682. A young negro lodged in a friend's house at night. The friend had prepared for their breakfast a wild hen, a food strictly banned by a rule which must be inviolably observed by the immature. The young fellow demanded whether it was a wild hen. When the host said 'no', he ate of it heartily and proceeded on his way. A few years passed on and the two met again. The old friend asked the younger man if he would eat a wild hen. He answered it is strictly forbidden. Thereupon he began to laugh and told what he ate few years ago at the breakfast was a wild hen. On hearing this news the negro immediately began to tremble, so greatly was he possessed by fear, and in less than twenty-four hours was dead. See Walter B. Cannon, "'Voodoo' Death", *American Anthropologist*, vol.44, no.2, 1942, p. 170.

It is obvious from this example that, in such societies, in which the individual is tightly stitched and stucked into the social body, once the ties with social environment are torn apart so little is left, as little as not enough to sustain the life. In other words, dissolution of the social personality inevitably demolishes individual personality in such a degree that the psyche could not maintain internal harmony of both limbic and psychological body, for the social environment as support for moral is of vital priority. It might be

One other substantial basis subsidizing cohesive bonds rests on the means of communication, which are merely oral. Marshall McLuhan has pointed out that the social bonds holding such societies together as a whole are principally the product of speech, drum, and ear technologies¹⁴⁹. As Walter Ong expresses, orality fosters personality structures that are more communal and externalized, and less introspective than those common among literates. That is because of the fact that, writing and reading are solidarity activities that throw the psyche back on itself, while oral communication unites people in groups.¹⁵⁰ Among traditional societies, the only way of transmission of knowledge is face-to-face communication, which appears usually to be more than knowledge transmission, but sentimental interaction as well. When a speaker is addressing an audience, for example, the members of audience normally become a unity

useful to remind here that, Durkheim also sought the roots of suicide in modern societies in the collapse of social orientation of individual in the social construction. See Emile Durkheim, *Suicide: A Study in Sociology*, trs., J. A. Spaulding and G. Simpson, New York: Free Press, 1951. Charles Blondel, a physiological psychologist, writes, in the footprints of Durkheim, again on the members of modern societies, "The individual does not invent his religion, his morals, his aesthetics, his science, his language, the patterns of his everyday behavior...his manner...and finally his thought or his conduct. All these he receives ready-made, thanks to education, to instruction and language, from the society of which he is part. These include, to be sure, conscious activities; but they are mental states whose most essential characteristics are distinguishable from the purely individual states." Cited in Maurice Halbwachs, "Individual Consciousness and Collective Mind", *The American Journal of Sociology*, vol.44, no.6, 1939, pp. 814-815

Levi-Strauss, touches also upon this social backgrounds of sorcery, which is, indeed, the real source of power that determines the efficacy of magic, and points out three complementary aspects, which firmly constitute the belief in magic: the sorcerer's belief, victim's belief, and the group's belief. (See Levi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, p. 168.) Levi-Strauss underlines that the power of the sorcerer comes from the community's belief in his power, which is so deep-rooted and so wide-spread in whole society that nobody could be immune of it. (For broader analysis of Levi-Strauss' ideas on shamanism and sorcery see Jerome Neu, "Levi-Strauss on Shamanism", *Man*, New Series, vol.10, no.2, 1975, pp. 285-292.) At the cost of oversimplifying one can argue that magical thoughts are a category of collective thought. (See S. J. Tambiah, "The Magical Power of Words", *Man*, New Series, vol.3, no.2, 1968, p. 202.) It is this point that makes it possible to be effective the magic. Since same patterns of thought and structures of belief are deep-rooted in all individual minds, when a magician pretends to initiate superstitious powers than psychic states of all individuals become ready to accept any kind of affect. Furthermore, The inclination of all minds in same direction creates a synergy which fosters to take the introspective attitudes of individuals to perceive supernatural beings, or to pretend as if perceived.

¹⁴⁹ Marshall McLuhan, *The Gutenberg Galaxy. The Making of Typographic Man*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962, p. 8.

¹⁵⁰ Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy. The Technologizing of the Word*, Routledge: London, 1989, p. 69.

having in some way of another a common consciousness and common feeling. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group.¹⁵¹ As Ong has well put in a summary statement "the spoken word forms human being into close-knit groups."¹⁵² Actually, as will be evaluated in the next part, the very nature of cognitive and intellectual process and psycho-dynamics of orality compel sociality, while inhibiting introspective solitary activities and throwing the psyche back on itself.

2.2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM TRIBAL CHIEFTANCY TO BUREAUCRATIC EMPIRE

In the Middle East, Iran, and Anatolia, states were usually founded by nomads and governed by sedentary bureaucrats.¹⁵³ Ibn Khaldun classified civilizations as either desert (Bedouin) civilizations found in outlying regions and mountains, in hamlets (near) pastures in waste regions, and on the fringes of sandy deserts; or the sedentary civilization as found in cities, villages, towns, and small communities that were protected and fortified by walls.¹⁵⁴ The history of the Middle East seems to be the history of the interaction between these two types of civilizations. Today Ibn Khaldun's viewpoint is still valued and shared by many scholars. Ernest Gellner, for example,

¹⁵¹ E. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, New York, 1909, p. 23.

¹⁵² Ong, p. 74: Jack Goody also indicates the role of intimate face-to-face association and co-operation in fostering group feeling. See Jack Goody, *The Domestication of the Savage Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 (first published 1977), pp. 15-16.

¹⁵³ For an overview of the nature of the states and the role of tribes in constructing or destructing states in the Middle East see Philips S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State formation in the Middle East*, California University Press, London, I.B. Tauris, Berkeley, 1991.

¹⁵⁴ Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History*, trs., Franz Rosenthal, abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 141-42.

along with many other historians and anthropologists, repeats the same idea: “The history of the Islamic Middle East can, from its very beginnings, be written to a large extent in terms of the interaction between the nomads and the sedentary and urban population.”¹⁵⁵

The formation process of the state and its continuance might well be evaluated in context of this interaction. Following Ira Lapidus¹⁵⁶, in the Ottoman case, I am inclined to analyze the interaction between tribal nomads and sedentary elements within the context of the state formation process in three phases: 1) the organization of conquest movements leading to state formation in a stateless region or to the reorganization in regions that already have a weak state, 2) the transformation of conquest states into routinized states or imperial governments, and 3) the relation of routinized or institutionalized empires to the tribal population within or outside their boundaries.

In the first stage, the influx of tribal people into a state region erodes the established fiscal and administrative system.¹⁵⁷ Military incursions finally lead to the complete destruction of the existing state, and to the establishment of tribal confederacy.¹⁵⁸ The conquering rulers, however, sooner realized the necessity of

¹⁵⁵ Ernest Gellner, “Introduction: Approaches to Nomadism”, *The Desert and the Sown; Nomads in the Wider Society*, Cynthia Nelson, ed., Berkeley, 1973, p.1

¹⁵⁶ Ira M. Lapidus, “Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History”, in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, p. 28.

¹⁵⁷ For further reading on how nomadic tribes threaten established sedentary economy and social order see Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China*, Oxford, 1989; Patricia Crone, ‘Tribes and states in the Middle East’, *JRAS* 3, 1993, pp.353-76; Fredrik Barth, ‘A General Perspective on Nomad-Sedentary Relations in the Middle East’, *The Desert and the Sown*, 1973, 11-21; Bradburd, Daniel, ‘The Influence of Pastoral Nomad Populations on the Economy and Society of Post-Safavid Iran’, *Nomads in the Sedentary World*, Anatoly M. Khazanov and Andre Wink, eds., Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001.

¹⁵⁸ For an succinct analysis of the state formation process from tribal confederacies in Inner Asia and Iran see Thomas J. Barfield, ‘Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective’, in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, pp. 153-182. Also consider Ernest Gellner, ‘Tribalism and the State

bureaucracy in order to maintain political order, and the need to preserve settled subjects in order to secure and develop the economic basis of the state; thus they should protect sedentary civilization from the extortion of the nomads. For example, when the Seljuks first entered Khorasan and conquered Nishapur in 1038, their leader, Toghril, had difficulty in restraining his brothers from looting the city. He had to point out that as the conquerors and new rulers of the land, they were in fact now destroying their own property.¹⁵⁹

On the one hand, this second stage marks the beginning of the conquered civilization's conquest of the conquerors. On the other hand, it also marks the beginning of the alienation of the founder tribal elements to the governing elite, which was now heavily influenced by local sedentary elements, and to the newly emerging bureaucracy. Realizing the fact that 'tribal nomads can easily demolish the governmental apparatus of the state, but can never construct it', the new ruling dynasty, though itself was of tribal nomadic origin, does not hesitate to take stand in favor of sedentary institutions.

The following example is one of many in the history of Middle East, Inner Asia, and Iran. Forty years after conquering Iran, the Mongols were just beginning serious attempts at regular government during the reign of Ghazan Khan (1195-1204). His appeal to his fellow tribesmen underscores their serious inability to comprehend even the simplest principles of governing a sedentary state:

I am not on the side of the *Tazik ra'yyat* (Persian peasant). If there is any purpose in pillaging them all, there is no-one with more power to do this than I.

in the Middle East", in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, 109-126; Lawrence Krader, "The Origin of the State among the Nomads of Asia", *Pastoral Production and Society*, Cambridge, 1979, 231-4.

¹⁵⁹ C. E. Bosworth, "The Political and Dynastic History of the Iranian World (A.D. 1000-1217)", in J. A. Boyle, ed., *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 5, *The Seljuq and Mongol Period*, Cambridge, 1968, pp. 20-21.

Let us rob them together. But if you wish to be certain of collecting grain and food for your tables in the future, I must be harsh with you. You must be thought to reason. If you insult the *ra'yyat*, take their oxen and seed, and trample their corps into the ground, what will you do in the future?...The obedient *ra'yyat* must be distinguished from the *ra'yyat* who are our enemies. How should we not protect the obedient, allowing them to suffer distress and torment at our hands.¹⁶⁰

Thomas Barfield rightfully interprets these attempts by Mongol rulers as the beginning of the discrimination between the ruling elite and ordinary tribal basis of the conquest: “The concern for establishing a proper administration was only the first of many cleavages between Turko-Mongolian elites and ordinary tribal peoples in the Middle East.”¹⁶¹

This ongoing process replaces conquering tribal forces by a new governmental organization, which is essentially derived from the previous establishment and supplies administrative-scribal cadres to the governmental organization. The same process also routinely supplements the tribal army with newly recruited forces, expected to be more dependent on, and thus loyal to, the ruler. In short, tribal elements are continuously and routinely being curbed in the newly establishing order.¹⁶² As Lapidus observes, this was the case for the Umayyad-‘Abbasid, Fatimid, Almoravid, Almohad, Saljuq, Ottoman, and Safavid regimes.

Umayyad military policy aimed for almost a century at replacing the general *levée en masse* of the Arabs with selected client forces, whether Arab, Berber, Iranian, or Soghdian...The ‘Abbasids first depended on the Arab troops who had

¹⁶⁰ This speech is reproduced in I. P. Petrushevsky, “The Socio-economic Condition of Iran under the Ilkhans”, in J. A. Boyle, *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. 5, *The Seljuq and Mongol Period*, Cambridge, 1968, p. 495.

¹⁶¹ Thomas J. Barfield, “Tribe and State Relations: The Inner Asian Perspective”, in Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, eds., *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990, p. 174.

¹⁶² On the evaluation of Islamic polity, especially on creation of slave origin soldiers to protect the stability of the order and the power of ruling dynasty against conqueror tribal nomads see Patricia Crone, *Slaves on Horses: The Evolution of the Islamic Polity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980; John Masson Smith, Jr., ‘Turanian Nomadism and Iranian Policies’, *Iranian Studies*, 11, 1978, pp. 57-81.

brought them to power, then on Persian regiments from the Transoxanian principalities, and finally on Turkish slave forces... Similarly, the Umayyad and 'Abbasid caliphs displaced Arab shaykhs in favor of administrators drawn from the former Byzantine and Sasanian bureaucracies. The tax-collecting bureaus were used to strengthen the financial and political position of the caliphate at the expense of Arab tribal elites. Thus, the 'Abbasids replaced the Arab rule with a kind of coalition government in which Eastern Iranian, Iraqi, Nestorian, and Baghdadi Shi'i scribes shared power with Turkish military slaves.¹⁶³

At the end, conflicts arose between the founder nomadic tribal elements and the ruling elite about the basic concepts of state administration and fiscal measures such as levying taxes, restraining rights on, and the usage of land, imposing certain governmental duties, since tribal nomads were unfamiliar to such restrictions.¹⁶⁴ Putting their tribal colleagues to one side, the rulers adapted themselves to their economic and political environment, mastered sedentary administration, and adopted sedentary cultural values.¹⁶⁵ As the tribal confederacy transmute into a sedentary-bureaucratic state, most tribal nomads found themselves in opposition, attempting to maintain their autonomy either by inhabiting in frontier zones or by forming confederations in opposition to the existing state structure which surrounded them.¹⁶⁶

To sum up, it is reasonable to argue that the emergence, development, and destruction of Middle Eastern States were a process that intrinsically included the struggle between tribal-nomadic and sedentary-urbanized elements. The dilemma was that although military superiority of nomads led to the destruction of a malfunctioning state and a replacement was constructed in its place, the lack of social stratification,

¹⁶³ Lapidus, p. 35

¹⁶⁴ For the case of Shahsevan in Iran, see, for example, Richard Tapper, *Iran'ın Sınır Boylarında Göçebeler*, çev. F. Dilek Özdemir, İmge Yayınları: Ankara, 2004. See especially pp. 457-505 where Tapper discusses the resistance of tribal Shahsevans against the measures of Iranian government. For another case, again in Iran, see James J. Reid, "The Qajar Uymaq in the Safavid Period, 1500-1722", *Iranian Studies*, 11, 1978, 117-143; *Tribalism and Society in Islamic Iran, 1500-1629*, Malibu, California, 1983; Lois Beck, *The Qashka'i of Iran*, New Haven, 1986.

¹⁶⁵ Barfield, p. 171.

¹⁶⁶ For analysis of the cases in Turko-Mongolian occupations in Iran see Barfield, pp. 172-177.

bureaucracy, and sophisticated social organization prevented the nomads from governing the state. Once founded, the state immediately needed sedentary bureaucracy to maintain its existence. So, although being the founders of the new state, nomads have been always pushed out of the sphere of state authority.

CHAPTER III

TURKOMANS AND THE OTTOMANS: FROM SYMBIOSIS TO ALIENATION

The Dream of Osman Beg

Kendüleriün aralarında bir aziz şeyh [Shaykh Edebali] var idi. Hayli kerāmeti zāhir olmuş idi. Ve cemi' halkun mu'tekadıyidi. Adı reviş idi. Ve illa deroişlik bātınındayidi. Dünyesi ve ni'meti, davarı çok idi. Ve sāhib-i çerağ ve 'alem idi. Dāyim müsafirhānesi hāli olmaz idi. Ve Osman Gāzi dahī gāh gāh gelür idi. Bu azize konuk olur idi. Osman Gāzi kim uyudu, düşünde gördi kim bu azizin koynundan bir ay doğar, gelür Osman Gāzi'nin koynuna girer. Bu ay kim Osman Gāzi'nin koynuna girdüğü demde göbeğinden bir ağaç biter. Dahī gölgesi ālemi dutar. Gölgesinün altında dağlar var. Ve her dağın dibinden sular çıkar. Ve bu çıkan sulardan kimi içer ve kimi bağçalar suvarur ve kimi çeşmeler akıdur. Andan uyhudan uyandı. Sürdi, geldi. Şeyhe habar verdi. Şeyh eyidür: "Oğul, Osman! Sana muştuluk olsun kim Hak Ta'ālā sana ve neslüne padişahlık verdi. Mubārek olsun" der. Ve "benüm kızum Malhun senün helālün oldı" der.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁷ APZ, p. 95.

One may safely argue that the process outlined above is, for the most part, applicable to the Ottoman history as well. The people that founded the Ottoman Principality in north western Anatolia at the beginning of the fourteenth century were, without doubt, nomadic or semi-nomadic and organized on tribal basis.¹⁶⁸ Osman Beg and his father Ertuğrul Gazi were nothing but tribal chiefs.¹⁶⁹ Contemporary sources strongly suggest that Osman was illiterate.¹⁷⁰ The effective religious leaders of the masses were popular sufi shaykhs, rather than *ulemā*, as in the later periods.¹⁷¹ So, the *beylik* (principality) was founded on the basis of tribal organization by overwhelmingly illiterate semi-nomadic people. One should not disregard, however, that even during the very early years of the *beylik*, there were ‘small-scale’ educated men, who were called ‘fakı’ in contemporary sources, helping Osman and Orhan Beg in establishing and developing the

¹⁶⁸ The portraits of early periods in the early Ottoman chronicles clearly support this argument. Consider Neşri, *Kitab-ı Cihannûma*, eds. Faik Reşit Unat and Mehmed A. Köymen, Ankara, 1995; Aşıkpaşazâde, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, yay. Nihal Atsız, in his *Osmanlı Tarihleri*, İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1947 (From now on APZ); Oruç Beğ, *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, F. Babinger, Hannover, 1925; *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman* (Die altosmanische anonymen chroniken), nşr. F. Giese, Breslau, 1922; *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, Giese Neşri, haz. Nihat Azamat, İstanbul, 1992; *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512)*, haz. Necdet Öztürk, İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları, 2000. Among contemporary studies on the foundation of the Ottoman state see Fuat Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, trl. Gary Leiser, New York, 1992; Halil İnalcık, "The Question of The Emergence of The Ottoman State", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2, 1980, 71- 79; "The Emergence of Ottomans", *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol.I, eds., P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, 263- 291; Cemal Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1995. For the latest account see Heath W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, New York: State University of New York, 2003.

¹⁶⁹ Fuat Köprülü states that the early Ottoman sultans were simple Turkoman chieftains too ignorant to understand the subtler issues of the religion. See Köprülü, "Anadolu'da İslâmiyet", *Dârülfünûn Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmûası*, 5, 1338 (1922), pp. 403-404.

¹⁷⁰ In the famous passage of Aşıkpaşazâde, after hearing Edebalı's fortunate interpretation of his famous dream, Osman bequeaths some land to a dervish called Kumral Dede. Upon the dervish's demand for a piece of paper to document his rights, Osman replies; "Do I know writing so that you want paper? I have a sword left to me from my ancestors; let me give it you. And let me give you also my dipper. Let them be the sign of your rights to this land." See APZ, p. 95. For a recent authoritative study on Osman Beg, see Halil İnalcık, "Osman I", *DIA*, vol. 33, 443-53.

¹⁷¹ We know from contemporary sources that after the cruel repression of Babāi revolt by Anatolian Sejukid forces, Babāi dervishes, who were preaching a 'heterodox' folk Islam intermingled with intense mysticism, fled into the western frontiers, especially into Ottoman territories. (For the Babāi revolt see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Babāiler İsyanı*, İstanbul, 1996) Early chronicles mention number of them such as Edebalı, Abdal Musa, Kumral Abdal, Abdal Murad, Gayikli Baba.

very early forms of the Ottoman administrative apparatus.¹⁷² One might regard these *fakıs* ‘the early pioneers’ of high Islamic *ulemā*, who would accumulate in the Ottoman capitals as the state grew up.

As a matter of fact, soon after its establishment, during the reign of Orhan – or back to the time of Osman -, the Ottoman dynasty turned in favor of sedentary life.¹⁷³ The *madrassa*-educated *ulemā* began to accumulate in Bursa, the capital city of the Ottoman *Beylik*. By taking positions in newly established *madrassas* or filling the posts of *qādi*-ship (jurist), they not only propagated orthodox Islam but also took positions of responsibility in the emerging bureaucratic structure, which soon transformed tribal bases of Ottoman *beylik* into a traditional Islamic state with well-organized bureaucratic governmental apparatus and a centralized army.¹⁷⁴ However, this inevitable

¹⁷² See, for example, Halil İnalçık, “Osman I”, *DIA*, vol. 33, p. 446; “Orhan”, *DIA*, vol. 33, p. 383.

¹⁷³ Rudi Paul Lindner traces the first occurrence of the Ottoman tendency towards sedentary life back to the time of Osman. According to Lindner, pastoralism was no more profitable on the limited plateaus of Bithynia. Rather there were fertile soils to cultivate. Therefore, the Ottomans realized the advantage of sedentarization. They even established new towns such as Yenişehir. As the economy of the tribe shifted towards a sedentary base, so did the military technology. Orhan created an infantry corps. “With a settled economy and a growing infantry at the core of their army, the Ottomans now had to adapt themselves to the demands of administering a sedentary and sedentarizing society. In such circumstances the chief became a settled ruler, and the nomadic tribesmen had ultimately to settle or accept secondary position. The institutions of the tribe ultimately broke down before the complex task of bureaucratic record keeping and urban organization.” See “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1982, p. 709. In this article Lindner focuses on three aspects of the transformation from tribal-nomadic basis into sedentary-state organization: domestic economy, military resources and practices, and political organization. He shows that since the ecology was unsuitable the Ottomans took advantage of sedentarizing and agricultural economy. Consequently, the change of economic base also brought a change of military base and political structure. See Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Bloomington, 1983, pp. 29-34.

¹⁷⁴ The early Ottoman administrative apparatus was established by religious scholars. They were responsible both for religious issues and state bureaucracy. Among those scholars were the members of Çandarlı Family who had a great effect on the fate of the Ottoman state. The first known member of the family was Çandarlı Kara Halil, also known as Hayreddin who was appointed as *qādi* of Bilecik by Osman. During the time of Orhan he became the *qādi* of Iznik and Bursa. After the establishment of *kazaskerlik* post during the time of Murad I he was appointed as the first *kadiasker* of the Ottomans. Later he became the vizier of Murad I. From then Çandarlı Hayreddin’s offspring held power up until the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. After which Mehmed II changed the balance in favor of slave origin viziers. For a biography of this influential scholar family see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi*, Ankara: TTK, 1988. Following the conquest of Constantinople Mehmed II executed his grandvizier Candarlı Halil -since he advocated diplomacy rather than attacking the city- and thus ended the Çandarlı

transformation of the *beylik* from tribal organization to bureaucratic state brought serious problems in terms of the relationship between the state and the nomadic tribal elements.

The direction of the political development in the Ottoman center was to push the nomadic elements of the *beylik* out. This was not just a power-play of two opposing parties. Rather the conflict was deep-rooted in the socio-cultural structures and mental habits of two different irreconcilable social groups. Roughly speaking, the first party consisted of the ‘Ottoman Elite’ and its adherents: those educated literate people settled in the prominent cities, especially in capital cities such as, Bursa, Edirne, and Constantinople, and the illiterate residents of cities and villages who attached themselves to this elite. The other party, on the other hand, was the ‘Turkoman rural populace’, the tribal nomadic population alien to literacy and bureaucracy. A recognizable incompatibility, which continuously fed the differentiation process between these two segments of society, was actually imposed by the birth of the new state. This incompatibility was actually nothing but the inevitable fate of almost all Middle Eastern states.

In the famous dream of Osman, the six century long Ottoman Empire was represented as a tree sprouted from his navel, the shade of which compassed the world.¹⁷⁵ Later traditions identified this tree with a plane tree probably because of its greatness and long life-span. Lindner, after citing the dream that “...Beneath this shade (of tree) there were mountains, and streams which flowed forth from the foot of each mountain. Some people drank from these running waters, others watered gardens, while yet others caused fountains to flow” truthfully concludes: “The arboreal image with its

hegemony on the Ottoman bureaucracy. See Halil İnalcık, *Fatih Devri Üzerine Tetkikler*, Ankara: TTK, 1987, pp. 132-136.

¹⁷⁵ See APZ, p. 95.

firm roots and branches protecting fountains and gardens reflects the purpose of the Ottoman enterprise. The Ottomans represented peace and plenty for settled agriculture, a bucolic promise made explicit in the dream. The Ottoman dream was for farmers and merchants, not for nomads.”¹⁷⁶ Taking into consideration the fact that the dream was a retrospective fabrication and prospective vision of the fifteenth century Ottoman intelligentsia, Lindner’s conclusion seems accurate. Already alienated from the Turcoman milieu, which once founded the *beylik*, their attitude towards nomadic elements was not limited to despising but also they forced them to transform.

3.1. SOCIO-RELIGIOUS SET UP OF THE EARLY OTTOMAN SOCIETY

In his article analyzing the emergence of the Ottoman state, İnalçık stresses two factors that led the Ottoman success: 1) the westward exodus of Turkomans¹⁷⁷ and 2) the successful use of *gazā* ideology as a tool to attract Turkoman tribal warriors, as well as offering enough booty or *doyum*.¹⁷⁸ Indeed, these two factors were closely

¹⁷⁶ Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, pp. 37-38.

¹⁷⁷ The continuous Turkoman immigration into Anatolia took the form of an exodus first by the collapse of Byzantine defense after the battle of Manzikert in 1071 and second under the Mongol pressure from the East in the period 1221-60. The overwhelming majority of Turkish immigrants were pastoral nomads, whose social organization was simply based on tribal means. Following Anatolian Seljuks’ second defeat against Mongols in 1261, the Turkoman tribes in western Anatolia enjoyed large-extend autonomy, which gave rise to Turkoman principalities. See, for example, Halil İnalçık, “The Yürüks: Their Origins, Expansions and Economic Role”, in his *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire. Essays on Economy and Society*, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry of Culture Joint Series Volume 9, 1993, pp. 97-9; “Osmanlı Tarihine Toplu bir Bakış”, *Osmanlı*, ed. Güler Eren, Ankara, 1999, pp. 37-8. (The English translation of this long article is published as “Periods in Ottoman History, State, Society, Economy”, in *Ottoman Civilization*, I, edited by Halil İnalçık and Günsel Renda, Ankara: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004, 31-239); “Osman I”, *DIA*, p. 446. According to Speros Vryonis, the intensive Turkoman influx led to extensive nomadization of Anatolia during the period 1071-1300. See Speros Vryonis, *The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor*, Berkeley, 1971, p. 184.

¹⁷⁸ See Halil İnalçık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State", *International Journal of Turkish Studies*, 2, 1980, 71- 79. Also consider his "The Emergence of Ottomans", *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol.I, eds., P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, 263- 291; “Osmanlı Tarihine Toplu bir Bakış”, *Osmanlı*, ed. Güler Eren, Ankara, 1999, 37-116. The decisive role of westward Turkoman migration in the socio-political developments in the thirteenth-century Anatolia was

interconnected, for the tribal warriors in the *gāzi*-mercenary bands were recruited among immigrant pastoral nomads. İnalçık rightly underlines that the population pressure under Turkoman immigration fundamentally changed the social set up, and consequently political formations, on the Seljukid frontier.¹⁷⁹ The point of eminence for the purpose of the present study here is that the immigrant Turkish population, which constituted the social base of the Ottoman Principality, was overwhelmingly pastoral nomads. Hence, the structure of the early Ottoman society was predominantly tribal in character.¹⁸⁰

Indeed, Aşıkpaşazāde's famous classification of the immigrant population (*müsāfir*) in Rum, that is the Turkish inhabitants of Anatolia in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, succinctly reflects both the major components and the basic nature of the early Ottoman society, or in a broader sense, the Turkish society of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Western Anatolia, and Rumelia as well. As is well-known, he divides the contemporary society into four groups: the Holy Warriors (*Gāziyān-ı Rum*), the Craftsmen (*Ahiyān-ı Rum*)¹⁸¹, the Popular Mystics (*Abdalān-ı Rum*), and the Women

first scholarly discussed by Fuat Köprülü. See his *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, especially pp. 27-70.

¹⁷⁹ See İnalçık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State", p. 71. İnalçık also calls attention to the feudal structure of the early *beylik*, which is closely connected to the tribal character. See Halil İnalçık, "Osman I", *DIA*, p. 445.

¹⁸⁰ This was first thoroughly suggested by Fuat Köprülü in his famous work *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire* (New York, 1992) and then attained wide-spread acceptance among scholars. The tribal character of the early Ottoman society and state was recently re-evaluated by Rudi Paul Lindner, who additionally employed some anthropological findings on the nature and organization of 'tribe'. See his "What was a Nomadic Tribe?" and *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*. It was further refined by Cemal Kafadar in his *Between Two Worlds*.

¹⁸¹ The role of *akhis* in the foundation of the Ottoman *beylik*, with a quite exaggerated tone, was first put forward by Friedrich Giese. ("Das Problem der Entstehung des osmanischen Reiches", *Zeitschrift für Semitistik und verwandte Gebiete*, 2, Leipzig, 1924, 246-71.) Mélikoff argues without providing sufficient evidence that *akhis* co-operated with qizilbashes and hence became subjected to persecution during the reign of Selim I. She repeats in her several articles a verse of Hata'ī as the source of this argument.

Şahun evlādına ikrar edenler,

Ahiler, gāziler, abdallar oldi. (The whole poem is published in Tourkhan Gandjei, *Il Canzoniere di Sāh Ismā'īl Hata'ī*, p. 15) See, for example, her "Le Problème Kızılbaş", p. 33. Before Mélikoff, however, Fuat Köprülü made reference to this verse in order to prove the connection between abdals and Safavid movement. See Fuad Köprülü, "Abdal", *Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, çıkaran M. Fuad Köprülü,

(*Bacıyân-ı Rum*).¹⁸² There is no need for a detailed explanation of these four groups here, for it has already been analyzed by several scholars.¹⁸³ There are two points, however, to be made for the upcoming investigation: 1) the social roots of these four classes, as Aşıkpaşazâde clearly stated, rested upon the tribal nomadic Turkoman population that had recently immigrated to Rum, 2) although they worked hand in hand with the early Ottoman Begs in founding the state (indeed they were principal, or one may think of the only, ally of the dynasty in early periods), all these four groups gradually lost their eminence on the socio-political scene parallel to the rise of the bureaucratic state; and finally they faded away.¹⁸⁴ Meanwhile, the continuance of these

sayı:1, İstanbul, 1935, pp. 30, 36. Indeed, it is interesting to note that in this verse Hata'î calls three of the four groups that Aşıkpaşazâde classified in the fourteenth century Anatolian society. On the other hand, contemporary sources hardly make reference to akhîs among the foremost leaders of the Qizilbash movement in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. One of very few examples is an archival document, namely a letter of Murad Aqqoyunlu, the son of Ya'kub Beg, written shortly before the Battle of Çaldıran and reporting the situation in Iran. When reporting Shah Suleyman (Shah Ismail's brother)'s attack on Tabriz, in the winter of 1513-4, Murad Beg says that the city was defended by Helvacıoğlu and Tamgacı Ahî Ali oğlu Hâce Pir Ali. See TSA, document E 5591. This document is published in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Deux lettres de Murad Akkoyunlu (Etudes turco-safavides, VII)", *Journal Asiatique*, CCLXXIII, 1-2, 1985, pp. 174-5. In order to escape from this persecution many *akhis* took shelter in the Bektashi Order. During this time many rituals, especially the rite of initiation, and doctrinal premises of *akhis* infiltrated into Bektashism. See Irène Mélikoff, *Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, trs. Turan Alptekin, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999, pp. 151-7; "Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektaşis", in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l'Islam populaire en Anatolie*, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 124-5.

¹⁸² APZ, p. 237. For *Bacıyân-ı Rum*, see Mikâil Bayram, *Fatma Bacı ve Bacıyan-ı Rum*, Konya, 1994.

¹⁸³ See, for example, Fuad Köprülü, "Abdal", *Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, çıkaran M. Fuad Köprülü, sayı:1, İstanbul, 1935, 23-56; *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, pp. 82-108; Halil İnalçık, "Dervish and Sultan: An Analysis of the Otman Baba Vilâyetnâmesi", in his *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire*, Bloomington, 1993, 19-36; Irène Mélikoff, *Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, trs. Turan Alptekin, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999. (The original work is published in French: Irène Mélikoff, *Hadji Bektach, un mythe et ses avatars*, Leiden: Brill, 1998.); Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Les milieux soufis dans les territoires du Beylicat ottoman et le probleme des Abdalan-ı Rum", *The Ottoman Emirate (1300- 11389)*, Institute for Mediterranean Studies, ed.by Elisabeth Zachariadou Crete University Press, 1993, 14 5-158; *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Marjinal Sûfilik: Kalenderîler (XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllar)*, Ankara: TTK, 1999; *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-16. Yüzyıllar)*, 3. baskı, İstanbul: Tarih Waqfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003; Ahmet Karamustafa, *God's Unruly Friends. Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Period 1200-1550*, Salt Lake City, 1994.

¹⁸⁴ Parallel to the consolidation of the Ottoman regime many influential social and religious corporations of Anatolia disappeared gradually. Among them were *Akhis*, *Bacıyan-i Rum*, and *Abdals*. All these 'anarchic' and heterodox groups found asylum in the Bektashi Order, which proved the approval of the regime. Ottoman administration, on the other hand, regarded it useful to canalize this unstable social energy into the Bektashi Order so that they would pose less threat to the socio-political order of the

groups merged in time and turned into the opposing parties to the central government, which was structured and developed on the centralistic and bureaucratic basis, assimilating all independent or autonomous political entities under *sultanic* sovereignty. According to the changing conditions, these ‘heterodoxed’ groups either offered alliances to rival powers, to which they felt affiliation (which was the case in Anatolia) or became marginalized within well-defined boundaries (which occurred mainly in Thrace and Balkans).¹⁸⁵

We know that during the foundation period, Ottoman begs established a warm relationship, which was based on mutual benefits and support, with popular sufi milieu, hence accordingly with the Turkoman population. Following the stern repression of the Babāi revolt by Anatolian Seljuks (1240), the adherents of this socio-religious

Ottomans. See Fuat Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, translated and edited by Gary Leiser, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 107; Irène Mélikoff, “L’Origine sociale des premiers ottomans”, p. 133; “Recherche sur une Baciyan-i Rum: Kadincik Ana”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p.35.

¹⁸⁵ During the fourteenth century and after, there appeared two different currents: on one side a group of Turkomans progressively settled, adjusting to the sedentary life and city centers. On the other side, we see those who led nomadic or semi-nomadic way of life and remained in the Anatolian countryside. They were strongly attached to the ancient Turkish traditions and their ‘islamization’ was not accomplished yet. (See Irène Mélikoff, “L’Origine sociale des premiers ottomans”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, 128.) The first group drew together in *tekkes* and fused under the umbrella of Bektashi Order, while the second group constituted *qizilbashs*. (See Irène Mélikoff, “Recherches sur les composantes du syncrétisme Bektachi-Alevi”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 45 (This article first published in *Studia Turcologica Memoriae Alexii Bombaci Dicata*, Napoli, 1982, 379-95.); “L’Ordre Bektaşis et les groupes relevant de Hacı Bektaş: survol du problème”, pp. 8-9; “Bektashi/Kizilbash Historical Bipartition and Its Consequences”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 41; “Les Fondements de l’Alevisme”, pp. 14-15.) Fuat Köprülü called the latter, which was later called ‘Alevi’, ‘country Bektashis’ for their creed and practices were a rough form of that of the Bektashis. (Fuat Köprülü, “Les origines du Bektachisme. Essai sur les développement historique de l’hétérodoxie musulmane en Asie Mineure”, in *Actes du Congrès international d’histoire des religions*, Paris, 1925; *Influence du chamanisme turco-mongol sur les ordres mystiques musulmans*, Istanbul, 1929.) Mélikoff calls attention to another difference in the historical developments of the two groups, namely the different ethnic influences to which they have been submitted: “the Bektashis were influenced by the Balkans, the Alevis by the people of eastern Anatolia: Iranians, Kurds and still others.” See Irène Mélikoff, “Bektashi/Kizilbash Historical Bipartition and Its Consequences”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 44.

movement found shelter in the frontier zones¹⁸⁶, which was, on the one hand, relatively immune to the interference of the Seljuk authority, and on the other, devoid of well-established institutions of the ‘orthodox’ Islam.¹⁸⁷ Thus, most of those Babāi dervishes flocked to Ottoman territory.¹⁸⁸ The most famous representatives of this group, such as Shaykh Edebāli, Geyikli Baba, Abdal Musa, Kumral Abdal, and Seyyid Ali Sultan, had all grown up in the Ottoman territories within the Vefāi-Babāi tradition.¹⁸⁹

As intermediaries between society and the ruling elite, Vefāi-Babāi shaykhs might be regarded as chiefly responsible for enhancing the popularity of the Ottomans.

¹⁸⁶ See, for example, Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Kalenderī Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries”, *Manifestations of Sainthood in Islam*, ed. G. M. Smith and C. W. Ernst, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1994, p. 244; "Oppositions au soufisme dans l'Empire ottoman au quinzieme et sezieme siecles", *Islamic Mysticism Contested: Thirteen Centuries of Controversies and Polemics*, eds. F. de Jong, B. Radtke, Brill, Leiden 1999; "Quelques remarques sur le role des derviches kalenderis dans les mouvements populaires dans l'Empire Ottoman au XVe et XVIe siecles ", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, III, 1982, p. 70 ; “Aleviliğin Tarihsel, Sosyal Tabanı İle Teolojisi Arasındaki İlişki Problemine Dair”, *Tarihi ve Kültürel Boyutlarıyla Türkiye’de Aleviler, Bektaşiler, Nusayriler*, İstanbul: İSAV, Ensar Neşriyat, 1999, pp. 391-2; *Babailer İsyanı*, genişletilmiş ikinci baskı, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1996, p. 210; Irène Mélikoff, “Bektashi/Kizilbash Historical Bipartition and Its Consequences”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 43.

¹⁸⁷ See Fuat Köprülü, “Anadolu’da İslâmiyet”, in F. Babinger-F. Köprülü, *Anadolu’da İslâmiyet*, haz. Mehmet Kanar, İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1996, pp. 63-5 (This article is originally published with the same title in *Dârülfünûn Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, IV, 1922-3, 291-303.); Paul Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire, ...*; Halil İnalçık, “The Emergence of ..”; Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, *Turcica*, VI, 1975, pp. 35-42.

¹⁸⁸ Halil İnalçık, “Osmanlı Tarihi’ne Toplu Bir Bakış”, *Osmanlı*, ed. Güler Eren, Ankara, 1999, p. 38; “Orhan”, p. 384.

¹⁸⁹ For the adherence of these dervishes to Babāi movement see Fuat Köprülü, “Anadolu’da İslâmiyet”, pp. 63-4; İnalçık, “Osmanlı Tarihi’ne Toplu Bir Bakış”, pp. 41, 48-50; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Ahilik ve Şeyh Edebali: Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuruluş Tarihi Açısından Bir Sorgulama”, *İslâmi Araştırmalar*, 12/3-4, 1999, 225-230; “Kalenderī Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries”, p. 244; “Babailer İsyanından Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da İslâm Heterodoksisinin Doğuş ve Gelişim Tarihine Kısa bir Bakış”, *Belleten*, LXIV/239, 2000, pp. 138-9. These Vefāi-Babāi dervishes are usually called “Abdalān-i Rum”. This term is first used by Elvan Çelebi for the followers of Baba İlyas, but systematically put by the fifteenth century Ottoman historian Aşıkpaşazâde and then gained wide-currency among writers. (See Elvan Çelebi, *Menâkıbu’l-Kudsiyye Fî Menâsibi’l-Ünsiyye. Baba İlyas-ı Horasânî ve Sülâlesinin Menkabevî Tarihi*, haz. İsmail E. Erünsal-Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Ankara: TTK, 1995, 166; APZ, p. 237.) Köprülü regards *abdals* simply as a group of dervishes affiliated to Babāi movement and distinguished with their latitudinarian way of religious life. (See, for example, his “Abdal”, “Abdal”, *Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, İstanbul, 1935.) One of Köprülü’s students, Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, on the other hand, deems *abdals* as a separate and independent mystical order (*tariqa*). (See his *Yunus Emre ve Tasavvuf*, İstanbul, 1961, pp. 17-50.) However, at the end both arrive at the same conclusion that they constituted the origin of Bektashi Order.

On the other hand, reliable sources clearly show that early Ottoman rulers bequeathed quite a large amount of lands as *mülk* and *waqf* to these shaykhs in return for their service.¹⁹⁰ Fuat Köprülü explains this co-operation between these groups and the dynasty with cultural and mental resemblance.¹⁹¹ According to Mélikoff and Ocak, however, it was rather a result of the pragmatic policy of the early Ottoman begs, who aimed to channel the energy of these groups for the good of the state and thus, both saving the society from their disturbance and keeping them under control.¹⁹²

In any case, the religious atmosphere in the early Ottoman lands, and in other frontier principalities as well, was not fully affected by so called orthodox-sunni Islam or *madrassa* Islam; quite the contrary, it was largely dominated by a popular-sufi form of Islam.¹⁹³ The testimony of Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta, who visited most Anatolia

¹⁹⁰ For a systematic analysis of this mutual-benefit cooperation between state and sufi milieu, see Ömer Lütfi Barkan, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda bir İskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu olarak Vakıflar ve Temlikler; İstila Devirlerinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri ve Zaviyeler”, *Vakıflar Dergisi*, II, 1942, 279-304. For a case study on Seyyid Ali Sultan, who not only worked for extending the legitimacy of Ottoman rule but also personally fought in the conquest of Rumelia, see Rıza Yıldırım, *Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi*, Ankara: TTK, 2007.

¹⁹¹ Köprülü, “Anadolu’da İslâmiyet”, pp. 61-66.

¹⁹² Irène Mélikoff, “Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektâşis”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 115-8; “Le Problème Kızılbaş”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 32; “Le problème Bektâşi-Alevi: Quelques dernières considérations”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 74; Ocak, “Kalenderî Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries”, p. 246. Ocak supports his argument by the example of Orhan Beg’s continuous surveillance on Kalenderî groups. See, in addition to the mentioned article, his *Babailer İsyanı*, p. 211; *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Marjinal Süfîlik: Kalenderîler (XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllar)*, Ankara: TTK, 1999, p. 119.

¹⁹³ Compare Halil İnalçık, “The Emergence of Ottomans”, *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. I, eds., P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, p. 270. Two exemplary cases reflect how nomadic Turkomans perceived and practiced Islam. One is about Famous Geyikli Baba, who attended in the conquest of Bursa and some other places and received some waqfs from Orhan. It is recorded in the short hagiography of Geyikli Baba that once Orkhân Beg sent to Geyikli Bâbâ ‘two loads of *araki*’ and ‘two loads of wine’ since he thought “Bâbâ was a *mey-hor* or wine lover.” Upon receiving the sultan’s presents, Geyikli Baba displays a *keramet*, or extraordinary deed. He says, “The Sultan sent us honey and oil!”. Then he orders his disciples to prepare a meal with this ‘honey’ and ‘oil’. The original text reads, “...merhum Orhan Padişah ‘baba mey-hordur’ deyu iki yük araki ve iki yük şarap gönderüb Baba dahi yanındaki baba sultana cevab virüb padişah bize iki yük bal ve iki yük yağ göndermişler deyü. Bir kazan getirüb ateş yakdurub kaynatdırur ve içine pirinç koyub âlâ zerde olub getüren adam nazarında ve hem anın ile bu zereden padişaha gönderüb ve hem ateşte yanan ateşten biraz kor bir penbe içine

towns in the first half of the fourteenth century, reinforces this assumption. He reports, for example, in Balıkesir a mosque for Friday-prayer did not exist.¹⁹⁴ As Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr have already shown, the foundations of Orhan and Murad I, which are today known as the mosque of Orhan and of Murad, are not recorded in their *waqfiyyes* as a mosque but as a *zâviye*.¹⁹⁵ Indeed, Aşıkpaşazâde's account concerning deeds of early sultans clearly reflects the tendency in the Ottoman administrative, from a heterodox, Turco-nomadic principality to a classical Middle Eastern Islamic state affiliated to high Islamic culture or orthodox sunnism.¹⁹⁶ Ocak states, even the sufi orders affiliated to the high Islamic culture such as Mevleviyye, Rifa'iyya, or Halvatiyya would come to the region after the consolidation of the Ottoman power, i.e. towards the

koyub padişaha göndermiş. ...” See BOA, Ali Emiri classification, document no 1. The facsimile copy of this *menâkıb* is published in Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Marjinal Süfîlik: Kalendariler (XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllar)*, Ankara: TTK, 1999, pp. 248-51. Another example is from Karamanoğulları. After capturing Antalya castle, Karaman Beg (d. 1263) organized a drinking gathering (İyş ü işret), which is a strong custom in Turko-Mongolian and Persian tradition. Şikârî's description here is very pivotal. He says: “*Ezincânib, Karaman beylere destur virüb gendüsü tahsil-i mizaç için ... İyş ü işrete başladı.*” See Şikârî, *Şikârî'nin Karamanoğulları Tarihi*, edited by Mes'ud Koman, Konya: Yeni Kitab Basımevi, 1946, p. 32. As obviously seen in this expression, drinking gathering parties were regarded as an essential activity of the ruler through which he attains true nature. What is of primary interest here is that when the cupbearer (*sâki*) brings *araki*, the drink, to the banquet they first prayed (*dua eyledi*) before drinking. See Şikârî, p. 32.

¹⁹⁴ *İbn Batuta Seyahatnâmesi'nden Seçmeler*, haz. İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1999, p. 38.

¹⁹⁵ Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, *Recherches sur les actes des règnes des sultans Osman, Orkhan et Murad I*, Munich, 1967, pp. 127-30; “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l'empire ottoman”, *Turcica*, VI, 1975, p. 37.

¹⁹⁶ According to Aşıkpaşazâde, Osman Beg delivered foods and clothes to poor people monthly. Orhan Beg carried on his father's practice by institutionalizing it, i.e. establishing *imârets*. He also established *zâviyes* for dervishes. Murad I founded *imârets*, *zâviyes*, and also *medreses* and mosques. (We know, however, that the first *medrese* in the Ottoman principality was founded in Iznik under Orhan). Bayezid I established *imârets*, mosques and *mescids*, as well as a hospital (*dârü'-şifa*). Mehmed I founded a *medrese* and dispatched abounded gifts to the poor of Makka and Madina. Similarly, Murad II established *imârets* and medreses and dispatched gifts to the poor of Makka, Madina, Jerusalem. He also delivered money to descendants of the Prophet, *seyyids*. Mehmed II founded *imârets*, mosques, and *medreses*, and delivered abounded gifts to poor people, scholars, sufis, and other people in need. See APZ, pp. 230-3.

end of the fourteenth century or in the fifteenth century, although they had already appeared in western Anatolia, in the territories of Qaraman, Germiyan, Aydin etc.¹⁹⁷

Thus, during the formative period of the Ottoman principality the most dominant, if not only, religious group in the Ottoman territories were Vefāī-Babāī dervishes. Ocak observes two major reasons behind this: the geopolitical situation of the Ottoman principality and the socio-cultural structure of the population. First of all, the Ottoman Principality was geographically situated at the frontier and was in constant fight with Christian neighbors. Political mobility and continuous wars made this region unpleasant for above-mentioned classical high-Islamic sufi orders, which preferred tranquility and stabilization, as well as culturally high level circles. Secondly, the overwhelming majority of Ottoman population in the early period was composed of nomadic Turkomans, who were best audience of *abdals*, rather than cultured mystics or learned *ulemā*.¹⁹⁸ As Ocak has put it, “A cette époque, c’est-à-dire au XIVE siècle, l’idéologie religieuse du beylicat ottoman reposait tout naturellement, en tant qu’un beylicat turcoman frontalier, sur une conception d’un Islam très simple, populaire, pas encore dominé par l’Islam dogmatique des *medrese*.”¹⁹⁹ These dervishes not only preached

¹⁹⁷ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Les milieux soufis dans les territoires du Beylicat ottoman et le probleme des Abdalan-ı Rum", *The Ottoman Emirate(1300- 11389)*, Institute for Mediterranean Studies, ed.by Elisabeth Zachariadou Crete University Press,1993, pp. 149-50. Ocak also adds the role of Mongol pressure towards the end of the thirteenth century, which pushed Turkomans to the most distant regions. The earliest Mevlevī lodge in the Ottoman territories is known to have been opened during the reign of Murad II (1421-1451) in Edirne. See Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600*, London, 1973, p. 201.

¹⁹⁸ The origin of this approach traces back to Köprülü, who first underlined the surveillance of ancient Turkish traditions in the folk Islam of Thirteenth and fourteenth century Anatolia. Köprülü indicated that among the nomadic, semi-nomadic, or recently settled peasant Turkish population most of the pre-islamic beliefs and practices continued under the varnish of Islam. The leaders of popular religion, called “dede” or “baba”, for example, resembled very much the ancient *Kam-ozan*. See Fuad Köprülü, “Abdal”, *Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, çıkaran M. Fuad Köprülü, sayı:1, İstanbul, 1935, p. 37; *Influence du chamanisme turco-mongol sur les ordres mystiques musulmans*, İstanbul, 1929.

¹⁹⁹ Ocak, "Les milieux soufis dans les territoires du Beylicat ottoman et le probleme des Abdalan-ı Rum", p. 158.

mysticism among the early Ottoman population but also took part, with their disciples, in the ‘gazā’ against the infidels as well. We know from contemporary sources that Abdal Musa, Geyikli Baba, Kumral Abdal and many others fought against Byzantine troops during the conquest of Bursa and other cities.²⁰⁰

The sentiment and the attitude of the ‘heterodox’-sufi milieu is arguably best reflected in the hagiography (*velâyetnâme*) literature attributed to the leading figures of this milieu. Since these works are the products of collective memory rather than individual authors, one may easily recognize in their accounts the traits of shared sentiment and opinion of the whole community. In other words, the legends attributed to the religious figures in the *velâyetnâme* genre are simply the stories either created or evaluated in the folk memory; hence they strongly reflect the sentiments and concerns of those people who maintained this tradition. Although the anonymous characteristics of such sources and their abundant superstitious accounts led historians to underestimate the historical value of *velâyetnâme* genre,²⁰¹ for the purpose of my analysis, this is exactly the feature that enhances the credibility of these accounts, for they directly reflect the opinion and sentiment of a particular social segment,²⁰² which was heavily influenced by tribal-nomadic traditions and inclined, parallel to the centralistic tendency in the Ottoman administration, to set apart from the ‘accepted *re’āya* model’ of the state. It is reasonable then to argue that the heroic stereotypes and the stories in these

²⁰⁰ For Geyikli Baba see Hilmi Ziya (Ülken), “Anadolu’da Dinî Rûhiyat Müşahedeleri: Geyikli Baba”, *Mihrab Mecmuası*, 13-14, 1340.

²⁰¹ For an analysis of *velâyetnâme* genre as source for history see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Kültür Tarihi Kaynağı Olarak Menâkıbnâmeler, Metodolojik Bir Yaklaşım*, Ankara: TTK, 1997.

²⁰² As Ocak has already stated, most stories in these hagiographic accounts might be partly or fully fabricated. But it is exactly this fact that augments their historical value, because in this way the stories, patterns of narration, the portraits of sheikhs are all vehicles that convey the desires, sentiments, and idealized models to be imitated by the people. See Ocak, pp. 33-34.

hagiographies²⁰³ genuinely reflect the religious, political, and cultural stand of those people who produced these legendary accounts and then transmitted them through generations.

Modern anthropological studies showed that verbatim memorization, and thus verbatim transmission of knowledge, is inapplicable in the oral tradition. Rather, in the oral milieu, every utterance and performance is, to a certain extent, a re-creation of the story. During the utterance, the singer or folk-teller is inevitably constrained by the surrounding conditions; and as a natural result adds some new elements to the story while omitting some others. In other words, every utterance injects some new elements to the story from the preset social set up or ambiance. Fundamentally differing from the nature of written documents, all chains of transmission in the oral milieu, hence, to a certain extent, alters the previous version of the story. Once written down by a compiler, however, this alteration process stops and the story freezes.²⁰⁴ Likewise, when we look

²⁰³ It is intended here the so called Alevi-Bektashi *velâyetnâmes*. Other legendary accounts narrating mystic leaders of sunni spiritual orders are out of the scope of this study.

²⁰⁴ Among a number of studies see especially Thomas Butler (ed.), *Memory. History, Culture and Mind*, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989; M. T. Clanchy, *From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1300*, London, 1979; D. W. Cohen, "The Undefined of Oral Tradition", *Ethnohistory*, vol. 36, no. 1, *Ethnohistory and Africa*, 1989, 9-18; Paul Connerton, *How Societies Remember*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Susan A. Crane, "Writing the Individual Back into Collective Memory", *The American Historical Review*, vol. 102, no.5, (Dec., 1997), 1372-1385; James Fentress and Chris Wickham, *Social Memory*, Oxford, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992; R. Finnegan, *Literacy and Orality: Studies in the Technology of Communication*, Oxford, 1988; *Oral Poetry: Its Nature, Significance and Social Context*, Cambridge, 1977; Amos Funkenstein, "Collective Memory and Historical Consciousness", *History and Memory*, 1, 1989, 5-26; Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam, "Collective Memory-What is it?", *History and Memory*, 8, 1996, 30-50; Jack Goody, "Mémoire et apprentissage dans les sociétés avec et sans écriture : La transmission du Bagré", *L'Homme*, 17, 1977, 29-52; *The Domestication of the Savage Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 (first published 1977); *The Power of the Written Tradition*, Washington, London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2000; Jack Goody and I. P. Watt, "The Consequence of Literacy", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 5, 1963, 304-345; D. H. Green, "Orality and Reading: The State of Research in Medieval Studies", *Speculum*, vol.65, no.2, 1990, pp. 267-280; Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, edited, translated and with an Introduction by Lewis A. Coser, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. (Translated from *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris: Press Universitaires de France, 1952; and from *La topographie légendaire des évangiles en terre sainte: Etude de mémoire collective*, Paris: Press Universitaire de France, 1941.); Walter J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy, The Technologizing of the Word*, Routledge: London, 1989.

at a story of the *velâyetnâme* attributed to Hacı Bektaş, what we see is not the historical event that took place during the lifetime of Hacı Bektaş; rather these metaphoric stories convey to us the traits of thousands of utterances – traits of the sentiments, protests, concerns, ideological and religious stands, and desires of singers and their audience - which conducted them to the compiler.

Among a number of accounts suffice it to refer to three exemplary cases from this genre. As is known well, most of the prominent religious figures who enjoyed spiritual authority on the Turcoman society of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Anatolia were later adopted by Bektashi tradition. Moving away from this established acceptance, I shall have a closer look at the *velâyetnâmes* of three most exalted figures of the Bektashi tradition.

The first one is the *Velâyetnâme* of Hacı Bektaş Veli, the attributed eponymous founder of the Bektashi Order. Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı surmises from a textual criticism of the *velâyetnâme* that the available text must have been compiled by Firdevsi towards the end of the fifteenth century.²⁰⁵ If this assumption is true, then the stories in the *velâyetnâme* evolved in the collective memory over two centuries.

Even a cursory reading of the *Velâyetnâme* of Hacı Bektaş shows that the memory of the intrinsic liaison between the ‘heterodox’ milieu and the frontier culture - thus the early Ottomans - is strongly visible in the social memory of the late fifteenth-century ‘heterodox’ circles. The *velâyetnâme* depicts Hacı Bektaş Veli as a saint not only approving the political career of Osman but also favoring him among many other

²⁰⁵ Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, “Vilâyet-nâme ne vakit ve kimin tarafından yazılmıştır”, in *Vilâyet-nâme. Menâkib-ı Hüncâr Hacı Bektâş-ı Veli*, haz. Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1995, pp. XXVII-XXIX. (From now on *Vilâyet-nâme*). Later on, Gölpınarlı’s suggestion attained wide-spread acceptance among scholars.

Turkoman begs. On one occasion Osman comes to the presence (*huzūr*) of Hacı Bektaş, demanding his auspice and spiritual support. The latter, then, puts a cap, which was blessed by him, on the head of Osman and wrapped his own belt, which was again blessed, around Osman's waist. Following some further actions symbolizing the transmission of this spiritual support to Osman Beg, Hacı Bektaş uttered,

Seni din düşmanlarına havāle ettik. Senin başındaki tācımızı gören kāfirler kılıcına karşı duramasınlar, kılıçları seni kesmesin! Nereye varsan üst gel! Önünden sonun gür gelsin! Kimse senin soyunun sırtını yere getirmesin! Hünkār adımı sana bağışladım, senin soyunun adını bu adla ansınlar! Gün doğusundan gün batısına dek çerağın yansın! Rum erenleri bu makāmı birisine vermek istedi, her biri bir eri tuttu. Ben se yedi yıldır senin ve soyunun ruhlarını vilāyet kabzasında saklayıp durmadayım. İşte geldin, nasibini aldın.²⁰⁶

As clearly seen in the quoted passage, the *velāyetnâme* depicts Hacı Bektaş as the spiritual patron or protector of Osman's temporal power. Another important notion to be noted here is that Hacı Bektaş sanctions the political authority of Osman Begs so that the latter attains a claim of legitimacy in the eyes of Turkoman mass. Consequently he gathers the warriors of Turkoman tribes under his banner. As will be delineated below, the same notion is repeated in other *velāyetnâmes* as well.

²⁰⁶ *Vilāyet-nâme*, p. 74.

The second prominent figure in the Bektashi tradition is Abdal Musa.²⁰⁷ Although Abdal Musa spent his youth in the Ottoman territories and participated in ‘holy wars’ among *gāzis*, the *Velâyetnâme* of Abdal Musa does not mention his activities in the Ottoman lands. Yet there are quite valuable passages narrating his relationship with *gāzi*-frontier culture, thus reflecting the attitude of his followers on the issue. The *Velâyetnâme* states, “...Then Abdal Musa came to a shore. He said, ‘Some soldiers are coming here. They are hungry. Let us prepare them some food.’ After one hour, a ship appeared and the soldiers arrived. When the soldiers saw the dervishes, they said, ‘Oh! There are *abdals* here’”²⁰⁸ After the *abdals*’ explanation of their shaykh’s intention to serve them food, the *gāzis* realized that there was only one cauldron of food, which shocked them since they were many. But Abdal Musa held a ladle and served all of them enough food. After witnessing this obvious miracle, the leader of the *gāzis*, Umur Beg came forward and said, “From now on you are our lord, please do not withhold your blessing from us!”²⁰⁹ Abdal Musa put a red head-gear on the head of

²⁰⁷ Abdal Musa is accepted as one of the great saints in Bektashi tradition. He holds the eleventh of the twelve stages (*post*) in the order, the *ayakçı postu* (footservant stage). He is dubbed “*Anadolu’nun gözcüsü Abdal Musa Sultan*” (the guardian/watchman of Anatolia Abdal Musa Sultan) in Bektashi literature.²⁰⁷ (Bedri Noyan, “Abdal Musa Hakkında”, *Abdal Musa Sultan ve Velâyetnâmesi*, ed. Adil Ali Atalay, Istanbul, 1997, p. 35.) *Alevi* societies, which perform religious ceremonies (*cem*) on Friday nights in winters and immolate in the name of Abdal Musa, show great respect to Abdal Musa even today. In *Alevi-Bektashi* literature, there are many *nefes*es (poems) in which he is praised and mentioned as a great saint. The *Tekke* of Abdal Musa, which contains his tomb, is considered as one of the four greatest Bektashi *tekkes* and is visited by thousands of *Alevi-Bektashis* with religious aspirations. He is beyond doubt one of the most important shaykhs of the Bektashi Order and perhaps the one who first determined the fundamental pillars and principals of this spiritual path. Aşıkpaşazâde explains the connection between Abdal Musa and Hacı Bektaş as follows: “Hacı Bektaş accepted Hatun Ana as disciple and divulged his spiritual secrets to her. Then Abdal Musa came and became her disciple. He learnt the divine facts that are the spiritual secrets of Hacı Bektaş, from Hatun Ana. He then came to the Ottoman territory and participated in the holy wars (*gazâ*). The person who was responsible for spreading the fame of Hacı Bektaş among the Ottoman soldiers and folk was none other than Abdal Musa.” See APZ, p. 238. For more information about Abdal Musa see Fuat Köprülü, “Abdal Musa”, *Türk Kültürü*, XI, 124, 1973, 198-207.

²⁰⁸ Abdurrahman Güzel, *Abdal Musa Velâyetnâmesi*, Ankara: TTK, 1999, p. 149.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid*, p. 149

Umur and said, “From now on call him ‘Gāzi Umur Beg’. Let him be a *gāzi*. We hereby bestow him the rank of *gāzi*-ship.”²¹⁰

It is known that Umur Beg appeared as the champion of *gazā*, especially in the Aegean sea (*guzāt fi’l-bahr*), in the first half of the fourteenth century. It is to be delineated below that following the death of Umur Beg Ottomans became the champion of *gazā*. As clearly visible in the account of the *velâyetnâme*, both parties, i.e. *gāzis* and *abdals*, beared quite warm sentiments towards each other. Moreover, there appears a co-operation between two groups. The most interesting point to be made is, perhaps, that as was the case in the *Velâyetnâme of Hacı Bektaş*, here also the *gazā* activities and *gāzi*-ship of Umur Beg, who represents the temporal authority in the story, were sanctioned by Abdal Musa, who represents the spiritual power.

Furthermore, the support of Abdal Musa to *gāzis* is not limited to the spiritual and religious sanction. Following the request of Umur Beg, Abdal Musa assigned Kızıldeli (Seyyid Ali Sultan), one of his prominent disciples, to join Umur’s army – possibly commissioned him to lead and arrange the religious affairs of the *gāzis*. Abdal Musa gave him (Kızıldeli) a wooden sword and said, “Now, go nowhere but directly to the Boğaz Hisar. Attack it! You will conquer it. After conquering it I will give you Rumelia, let no one would stand in your way and impede you!”²¹¹

Seyyid Ali Sultan might be regarded the third important religious figure in the Bektashi tradition.²¹² He was not only a mystic dervish but also a *gazi*-warrior as well

²¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 149.

²¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 149

²¹² It is known from archival evidence that he, with his mystic companions, Seyyid Ali Sultan played a significant part in the Ottoman conquest of Thrace. He also played prominent role in the spread of Islam through Thrace and the Balkans. Nevertheless, it was not official *sunni* version of Islam, which would flourish especially in the sixteenth-century among Ottoman elite, that was preached by Seyyid Ali Sultan and his companions, but a latitudinarian, quite tolerant, and considerably rough mystic interpretation of

and was obviously involved in the conquest of Rumelia, which was materialized by ex-Karasid and Ottoman troops. The *velâyetnâme* attributed to Seyyid Ali Sultan vividly pictures the close co-operation and similar religious stands of ‘heterodox’ dervish milieu and the early Ottomans.

The hagiography, if to summarize briefly, narrates how the Thrace was conquered under the leadership of Seyyid Ali Sultan and his forty companions. While Orhan was deep in thought seeking a way to pass through the Dardanelles and conquer the Thrace, they moved from Khorasan in order to realize the Ottoman Sultan’s dream which he had received by an order of the Prophet in dream. After first visiting Hacı Bektaş and receiving his spiritual guidance, Seyyid Ali Sultan and his forty friends came to the Ottoman Sultan, who warmly welcomed them on his own right. They negotiated several plans and finally accepted the suggestion of Seyyid Rüstem Ghazi²¹³, the closest

Islam, which was wide-spread among laymen and vulnerable to non-Islamic influences. The religious propaganda successfully fulfilled by Seyyid Ali Sultan and his disciples paved way for the emergence of the Bektashi Order in the Balkans. Birge portrays the religious interpretation propagated by Seyyid Ali Sultan and other early mystics as the ‘Bektashi Way’. (See John K. Birge, *The Bektashi Order Of Dervishes*, London, 1937, p. 51.) For the purpose of this study, the primary concern is that these mystics were responsible for the shaping of religious understanding among laymen, especially among the Turkoman populace, by whom they were perceived as ideal religious personalities to imitate and followed enthusiastically.

Seyyid Ali Sultan is, indeed, one of the most famous figures in early Ottoman history. Especially the writers interested in the Balkan conquests and Early history of the Bektashi Order or so called ‘heterodox Islam’ in the Balkans, somehow mention him. But paradoxically he is a very little known man due to the scarcity of sources about his life. His prominent role in the early history of the Bektashi order was first discerned by Birge, who used the *velâyetnâme* and some oral traditions he had heard in Bektashi circles. After Birge, many scholars touched upon Seyid Ali sultan’s role in shaping the Bektashi way of spiritual life and in the conquest of Balkans. Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr wrote an article devoted to the deeds of Seyyid Ali Sultan. (Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Osmanlı Tahrir Defterlerinde Seyyid Ali Sultan: Heterodox İslam’ın Trakya’ya Yerleşmesi”, *Sol Kol, Osmanlı Egemenliğinde Via Egnatia (1380-1639)*, ed. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou, çev. Özden Arıkan, Ela Güntekin, Tülin Altınova, İstanbul: Tarih Waqfi Yurt Yayınları, 1999, 50-72.) Before this article Beldiceanu, actually, presented her first findings at a conference. But only the abstracts of the proceedings of this conference were published. (Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “La Vita de Seyyid ‘Ali Sultan et la conquête de la Thrace par les Turcs”, in *Proceedings of the 27th International Congress of Orientalists, 1967*, ed. D. Sinor, Wiesbaden, 1971, s. 275-6.) For the latest publication of the *Velâyetnâme of Seyyid Ali Sultan*, text and analysis, and discussions of the sources see Rıza Yıldırım, *Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007.

²¹³ Seyyid Rüstem Gazi is not mentioned in any other contemporary sources. Although a certain Karamanlı Rüstem, who resembles Seyyid Rüstem Gazi, can be seen in early chronicles, a close scrutiny

friend of Kızıldeli amongst the forty and is mentioned in the hagiography as much as Kızıldeli himself. From then on Kızıldeli and his ghazi-dervishes led, organized and achieved the Ottoman conquests in Thrace. When the campaign was completed they settled down in various places and founded their hospices (*tekkes*), where they spent the rest of their lives in mystical experiences and religious propaganda. The hospice of Kızıldeli still exists in Didymoteichon (Dimetoka) in contemporary Greece. The *velâyetnâme* depicts Seyyid Ali Sultan, along with his *gâzi*-dervish companions, and early Ottomans not only as close allies but also as having eminent familial resemblances in terms of religious and intellectual affairs. Furthermore, like Hacı Bektaş and Abdal Musa, he is also introduced as the spiritual protector of those *gâzis* conquered Rumelia, thus of early Ottoman begs and of their temporal power. Seyyid Ali Sultan was supposed to sanction Ottoman conquests and to attract the divine support for the sake of their rule.²¹⁴ Nevertheless, as will be returned to below, in this *velâyetnâme*, there are also

shows that they were definitely different people. (On this issue see Rıza Yıldırım, “Velâyetnâme’de Geçen Tarihi Sımlar”, in his *Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi*.) *Velâyetnâme* recounts that Seyyid Rüstem founded a hospice near the mount Megâiri. But the place of this hospice was not known by scholars for a long time. Even its existence was the subject of dispute, along with the existence of Seyyid Rüstem himself. But the remains of this hospice were recently discovered in the triangle between modern day Mecidiyeköy, Erikli, and Beyköy near Keşan in Turkey. The hospice buildings had already been demolished but some gravestones survived and from the inscriptions it can be deduced that it was the hospice of Rüstem Baba. Furthermore archival evidence and folk legends pertaining to Rüstem Baba, which are slightly different versions of those recounted in the *Velâyetnâme*, make it clear that it was the hospice of Seyyid Rüstem Gazi mentioned in the *Velâyetnâme*. For a brief summary of this archival and archeological evidence see Ratip Kazancıgil, “Mihnetkeşan ve Rüstem Baba Dergahı”, *Yöre*, sayı: 37-38, Nisan-Mayıs 2003, s. 23; Ayhan Tunca, “Rüstem Baba Dergahı’na bir Araştırma Gezisi”, *Yöre*, sayı: 37-38, Nisan-Mayıs 2003, s. 27-30; Rıza Yıldırım, *Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi*. Two gravestone inscriptions read: “*Hû. Rüstem Baba Sultan Tekkesi postnişini Ali Dede. Ruh-ı revanı şâd olsun. Sene 1193*”; “*Kutbu’l-arifin Rüstem Baba Tekkesi’nin muhibbanından merhum Seyyid Yakub’un ruhu için el-Fatiha. Sene 1216*.” I am grateful to Dursun Gümüşoğlu, who visited the site in July 2003, discovered these gravestones, read them and generously shared the preliminary results of his research with me.

²¹⁴ In the narration of the *velâyetnâme* there is a clear hierarchy: at the top was the spiritual being of the Prophet, who orders what to do through dreams. Then come Seyyid Ali Sultan and his forty companions, who received the ‘key’ of the conquest of Rumelia from the Prophet (of course through spiritual means). At the third stage there is temporal begs whose leader was the Ottoman sultan. A close examination of the text unveils the fact that the governing mentality behind the text, which even occasionally finds its expressions in the text, premises the dependency of the temporal success of Ottomans to the spiritual

indications of protest by dervish milieu towards the centralization tendency of the Ottoman administration.

To sum up, a close scrutiny of the hagiographic literature produced by ‘heterodox’ milieu shows that early Ottomans were perceived in this milieu as one of themselves and they provided every kind of support to erect the temporal power of Osman and his successors. The clear familial resemblance between the religious affairs of the early Ottomans and that of the ‘heterodox’²¹⁵ sufi milieu was indeed a natural result of the fact that they all rose upon the same socio-cultural ground, that is nomadic-tribal Turkoman tradition.

Right after the consolidation of its power in the region, however, Ottoman dynasty took favor of sedentary life and those heterodox elements that had worked in the foundation of the principality were gradually shifted to periphery. As Mélikoff puts it,

De façon générale, dans l’Anatolie du Moyen Age, la population urbaine qui avait subi l’influence de la culture iranienne et qui parlait persan, apprenait les fondements de la religion à la medrese. Mais il en était tout autrement de la population nomade ou semi-nomade qui se rattachait avec force à ses traditions et à ses croyances ancestrales. C’est pourquoi la population urbaine regardait les Turkmènes d’un mauvais œil. On disait en parlant d’eux : *Etrāk-i bî idrāk* et *Etrākin dini zayıf*.²¹⁶

Comment should also be made of the new injections to the creeds of heterodox milieu in the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth century. Mélikoff underlines that this

support of Seyyid Ali Sultan and other saintly personages. For a detailed analysis of the subject, see Rıza Yıldırım, *Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi*.

²¹⁵ In the context of the fourteenth-century Ottoman society, I am using the term in a retrospective sense. Following Kafadar, I am inclined to elucidate the religiosity of the early Ottoman society in terms of “‘metadoxy’, a state of being beyond doxies”, for, in the absence of a “state that was interested in rigorously defining and strictly enforcing” the religion, there was no established orthodoxy, and consequently no heterodoxy. (See Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, p. 76.) Nonetheless, despite all the deficiencies of the word, I will maintain the retrospective usage of ‘heterodoxy’ referring to the religious groups sooner shifted to the periphery.

²¹⁶ Irène Mélikoff, “Les Fondements de l’Alevisme”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 12.

creed was a syncretism composed of several distinguishable elements.²¹⁷ First of all the Islamized shamanism of ancient Turks and elements from some other Asian religions that Turks had already incorporated constituted the base of this creed. To give an example, the dogma of the three prohibitions - that is saving the hand, the tongue, and the sexual desires - is obviously a survival of Manichaeism.²¹⁸ In the fourteenth century craft corporations, or *ahilik* and *futuwwa*, exercised certain influence, especially by introducing shi'ite elements, upon this creed. Later in the fifteenth century the cabalistic and anthropomorphic doctrine of Hurufism, principally through the works and the propaganda of Seyyid Nesimi and Ala al-A'la, seriously influenced it. And finally in the sixteenth century the extremist shi'ite elements dominated through the intervention of the Safavids.²¹⁹ Local beliefs and customs were also absorbed to certain extent.²²⁰

The Safavid connection is the main subject of this study. Here a brief reference to the Hurufi influence should be made. After the execution of Fazlullah Esterābādī²²¹,

²¹⁷ Irène Mélikoff, "L'Ordre Bektaşis et les groupes relevant de Hacı Bektaş: survol du problème", in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l'Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 8.

²¹⁸ Irène Mélikoff, "Recherches sur les composantes du syncrétisme Bektachi-Alevi", in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l'Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 56-7; "Un Islam en merge de l'Islam : L'Alevisme", in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 17; "Universalisme et gnosticisme dans les hétérodoxies du proche et du moyen-orient", in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p.136.

²¹⁹ Irène Mélikoff, Irène Mélikoff, "Le Problème Kızılbaş", in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l'Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 42-3; "L'Ordre Bektaşis et les groupes relevant de Hacı Bektaş: survol du problème", pp. 6-7; "Recherches sur les composantes du syncrétisme Bektachi-Alevi", pp. 46-7, 56-9; "Les Fondements de l'Alevisme", in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 18-20; "La divinisation de l'Ali chez les Bektachis-Alevis", in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 100-118; "L'Origine sociale des premiers ottomans", in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l'Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 131-2; "Un Islam en merge de l'Islam : L'Alevisme", p. 17. Also consider her "Le problème Bektaş-Alevi: Quelques dernières considérations", in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 69-71, 78-9.

²²⁰ Mélikoff, "Le Problème Kızılbaş", pp. 42-3; "L'Ordre Bektaşis et les groupes relevant de Hacı Bektaş: survol du problème", p. 7.

²²¹ See Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı, "Fadl Allah Hurūfî", *EI2*.

the founder of Hurufism²²², in 1394, his disciples scattered to several Islamic countries. In Anatolia and Rumelia especially the propaganda of Mir Şerif and İmâmeddin Nesîmî²²³ (d. 1408) found a sizable audience.²²⁴ Another famous Hurufi Turk was the author of *Işk-nâme*²²⁵, Ferište-oğlu, who died in Tire in 1496.²²⁶ Indeed during the fifteenth century Tire became a Hurufi center.²²⁷ The Hurufi influence penetrated even into the palace: the young sultan Mehmed II was seduced by some Hurufi propagandists. But the reaction of the *ulemâ* to protect the sultan from such ‘detrimental’ currents became brutal: those Hurufi propagandists were burned alive in Edirne in 1444.²²⁸

By the fifteenth century, following the severe persecution in Azerbaijan and Iran, the center of gravity of Hurufism shifted to Ottoman Anatolia and the Balkans. Concomitantly the language of Hurufis switched from Persian to Turkish. In Anatolia and the Balkans, however, Hurufism did not emerge as a totally independent movement;

²²² See A. Bausani, “Hurûfiyya”, *EI2*.

²²³ See Franz Babinger, “Nesîmî”, *EI2*.

²²⁴ See Abdülhakî Gölpinarlı, *Hurûfilik Metinleri Kataloğu*, Ankara: TTK, 1989, p. 28; “Bektaşilik-Hurufilik ve Fadl Allâh’ın Öldürülmesine Düşülen Üç Tarih”, *Şarkiyat Mecmuası*, V, 1964, pp. 19-20. A. Bausani says Ali al-A’la, the foremost khalifa of Fazlullah, was primarily responsible for Hurufi propaganda in Anatolia, where he appears as early as 1400. (See his article “Hurûfiyya” in *EI2*.) Gölpinarlı rejects this idea saying no contemporary sources, except Hâce Ishâk (d. 1892-3), mention his visit in Anatolia. Hamid Algar, however, criticizes Gölpinarlı’s assessment putting stress the role of Ali al-A’la while questioning the contact of Nesimi with Turkish population of Anatolia and Balkans. See Hamid Algar, “The Hurufi influence on Bektashism”, *Bektachiyya: Etudes sur l’ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach*, ed. Alexandre Popovic-Giles Veinstein, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1996, pp. 44-48. Also consider Irène Mélikoff, “La divinisation de l’Ali chez les Bektachis-Alevi”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 104-9; “Fazlullah d’Astarabad et l’essor du Hurufisme en Azerbaydjan, en Anatolie et en Roumélie”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 170-72.

²²⁵ This work is partly abridged translation of Fadlullah’s *Javidan-nâme*, partly original. See Ömer Faruk Akün, “Firishte-oghlu”, *EI2*.

²²⁶ See above footnote.

²²⁷ See Irène Mélikoff, “Le problème Bektaşî-Alevî: Quelques dernières considérations”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, pp. 69-71.

²²⁸ Fahrüddin-i Acemî is reported to have been responsible for this execution. See Algar, “The Hurufi influence on Bektashism”, p. 45; Gölpinarlı, *Hurûfilik Metinleri Kataloğu*, pp. 28-9; Franz Babinger, *Mehmed the Conqueror and his Time*, trs. Ralph Manheim, Princeton, 1978, pp. 34-5.

rather it merged into the Bektashi Order. Most of the influential Bektashi poets of the sixteenth century, such as Muhyiddin Abdal and Hayretî (d. 1534) were Hurufî.²²⁹

But the contribution of Hurufism in the Turkish Sufism appeared not as a separate mystical or religious path but as doctrinal influence on the already existing popular sufi streams, especially on the Bektashi Order and Kalenderî circles.²³⁰ Its penetration into Bektashi doctrine appeared especially as embedding a deep-rooted pantheism and anthropomorphism. The origins of the belief in the manifestation of God in the form of man and divinization of man trace in most part, if not totally, to the Hurufî graft.²³¹ As Ocak rightfully points out, the revolutionary affect of Hurufî graft in the

²²⁹ See Algar, “The Hurufî influence on Bektashism”, p. 49; Gölpınarlı, *Hurûfîlik Metinleri Kataloğu*, pp. 25-30; Mélikoff, “La divinisation de l’Ali chez les Bektachis-Alevîs”, pp. 108-111. Gölpınarlı notes that in the Ottoman literature and documents Hurufîs were called ‘Işık’. Gölpınarlı also notes, however, that Hurufîs were not sincere Bektashis and did not venerate Hacı Bektaş by heart. Rather they simply pretended to be Bektashi in order to get shelter, while continuing to worship Fazlullah secretly. See *ibid*, pp. 32-3. According to Mélikoff, among the seven grand poets (*ozan*) of Alevi-Bektashis: Nesimî, Hatayî, Fuzulî, Pir Sultan Abdal, Kul Himmet, Yeminî, and Viranî, there were three Hurufîs, namely Nesimî, Yeminî, and Viranî. See Irène Mélikoff, “Fazlullah d’Astarabad et l’essor du Hurufisme en Azerbaydjan, en Anatolie et en Roumélie”, p. 172 ; “Les Fondements de l’Alevisme”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 19. Nevertheless, one should be careful about Hurufî affiliation of, at least Yeminî for his *Fazîlet-nâme*, almost the only available source on Yeminî himself, does not include any indication of Hurufism. See Derviş Muhammed Yeminî, *Fazîlet-nâme*, ed. Yusuf Tepeli, Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2002.

²³⁰ As Bausani says, “When it began however, it was not intended that Hurufism should be merely a secret or esoteric religion but that it should become also (a premature ambition at that time) a visible religious organization, with autonomous rites; it was hoped that it would gain some rulers as its adherents. It did not succeed in this, but its doctrines penetrated in to various quarters, not only into Bektâshism but also into certain aspects of Persian Sûfism...” A. Bausani, “Hurûfiyya” in *EI2*.

²³¹ See Irène Mélikoff, “Les Fondements de l’Alevisme”, pp. 19, 23-4; *Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, trs. Turan Alptekin, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999, pp.160-72. The essence of Hurufî doctrine is the belief in the continual theophany of the inaccessible divine treasure in man. Especially in the Man par excellence, Fazlullah, the manifestation of deity took its perfect form. In the Hurufî faith the history of being is divided into three parts: the epoch of *Nubuwwa*, the epoch of *Imāma*, and the epoch of *Ulûhiyya*. The prophecy started with Adam and ended with Muhammad. Ali, son-in-law of Muhammad, inherited the secrets of Muhammad and initiated the epoch of *Walāya* or *Imāma*, which ended by the eleventh Imam Hasan al-Askerî. By the emergence of Fazlullah, who was the Mahdi and the manifestation of God, the third epoch started. All the prophets were witness and foretellers of Fazlullah. There is a heavy pantheist influence on Hurufî doctrine. God manifests himself in being. There is a cyclic creation of being and the creation takes its perfect form in man, thus God can be represented only in man. But among men there is a perfect Man, i.e. Fazlullah, who was a perfect emanation of God. Fazlullah constructed his system of belief on a sophisticated interpretation of letters. The revelation of being can be possible through sounds and the perfect form of the sound is word, which can be produced by man. The word is composed of letters. So the essence of sound and word, hence, the revelation of being is letter. Hurufî works devoted

Kalenderi-Bektashi theology should be sought in its pantheist approach to deity, which can easily be reconciled with *hulūl* (incarnation) and *Mahdism*, rather than its cabalistic techniques or interpretations.²³² Hamid Algar also lays stress on the point that the influence of Hurufism on Bektashism occurred primarily at the doctrinal level, while Bektashi rites stayed immune to any Hurufi influence; he calls attention to two intrinsic affinities between the two: the antinomian attitude towards religious duties and belief in incarnation.²³³

3.2. THE FORMATION OF THE STATE AND THE RISE OF THE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL REGIME

The foundation of the Ottoman Principality and its transformation to a state has been long discussed since Herbert Adams Gibbons. There is no need of repeating all the well-known debates here.²³⁴ I would rather call attention to some major parameters of the transition from tribal chieftaincy to bureaucratic state, which would provide a useful framework for my analysis on the making of the Qizilbash ‘heresy’ at the threshold of the sixteenth century.

hundreds of pages to cabalistic interpretation of Qur’anic verses and other religious texts such as *Javidan-nāme* of Fazlullah. For further reading on the doctrinal basis of Hurufism see Gölpınarlı, *Hurūfîlik Metinleri Kataloğu*, pp. 18-24; A. Bausani, “Hurūfîyya”, *EI2*; Irène Mélikoff, “Fazlullah d’Astarabad et l’essor du Hurufisme en Azerbaydjan, en Anatolie et en Roumélie”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 163-74.

²³² Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Babaîler İsyanından Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu’da İslâm Heterodoksisinin Doğuş ve Gelişim Tarihine Kısa bir Bakış”, *Belleten*, LXIV/239, 2000, pp. 142-4.

²³³ See Algar, “The Hurufi influence on Bektashism”, pp. 50-53.

²³⁴ For a revision of all the discussions regarding to the foundation of the Ottoman state it might be useful to see Kafadar’s *Between Two Worlds*. For a good collection of prominent articles dealing with the foundation of the Ottoman state, see Oktay Özel-Mehmet Öz, eds., *Söğüt’ten İstanbul’a Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuruluşu Üzerine Tartışmalar*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001. For some recent suggestions see Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*; Rudi Paul Lindner, *Explorations in Ottoman Prehistory*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2007.

One should note that in the late thirteenth- and fourteenth-century western Anatolia there was a complete political fragmentation. As is well known, after the collapse of the Seljukid authority by the Mongolians at Kösedağ in 1243²³⁵, many frontier governors of the Seljukid state or powerful tribal leaders established either autonomous or independent principalities in the west half of the Anatolian peninsula.²³⁶ The political fragmentation, however, was not limited to the semi- or fully-independent structure of these Turkoman principalities. The partition of political authority and military power prevailed within the internal structures of each principality as well, for the troops of these Turkoman begs were composed of tribal warrior groups who were loyal before all to their tribal leaders. One of the most eminent images of these Turkoman warriors was their red cap (*Kızıl-börg*), differentiating them from the immediate retinue of the beg, *nöker*, who wore a white-cap (*Ak-börg*), a symbol of nobility among Turco-Mongolian peoples.²³⁷

Osman Beg appeared, at the threshold of the fourteenth century in the Byzantine borders, as one of those Turkoman begs, at the beginning among less significant ones, and as the leader of his own tribe. The remarkable achievement of Osman and his successors, before all, lies in their gaining of the allegiance of other tribal warrior groups through successful employment of *gazā* ideology²³⁸ as the motivating factor and

²³⁵ See Osman Turan, *Selçuklular Zamanında Türkiye*, İstanbul: Ötüken Yayınları, 2004, pp. 451-7.

²³⁶ Halil İnalçık, "The Emergence of Ottomans", *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. I, eds., P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 263-4.

²³⁷ See Halil İnalçık, "The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium, and the Crusades", in his *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society*. Bloomington: Indiana University, 1993, p. 325; "The Yürüks", p. 100. I will return to this issue in the following pages.

²³⁸ For further reading on 'gazā' in the Ottoman context, see Fuat Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, translated and edited by Gary Leiser, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992; Paul Wittek, *The Rise of The Ottoman Empire*, London, 1965; Gyula Káldy-Nagy, "The Holy War (Jihad) in the First Centuries of the Ottoman Empire", *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 3/4, 1979-80, 467-73; Ronald C. Jennings, "Some Thoughts on the Gazi Thesis", *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 76,

legitimization tool on the one hand, and through the offering of generous booty to their tribal comrades on the other.²³⁹ Halil İnalçık evaluates the Turkish expansion towards Byzantine territories and the formation of Ottoman Principality in four stages:

1) it began with the seasonal movements of Turkoman nomadic groups in the Byzantine coastal plains; 2) it was intensified by the organization of small raiding groups under *ghazi* leaders, mostly of tribal origin, for booty raids or for employment as mercenaries; 3) it continued with the emergence of successful leaders capable of bringing together, under their clientship, local chiefs to conquer and then establish *beyliks* (principalities) in conquered lands on the model of the principalities founded in the old Seljukid frontier zone; and finally 4) with the involvement of these *ghazi-beyliks*, with their definite political and economic aims, in the regional struggle for supremacy in the Aegean and in the Balkans, the previously undirected thrusts of the war bands became focused on new goals.²⁴⁰

The emergence of Osman as a significant regional power, therefore, corresponds to the third stage in İnalçık's scheme. As indicated above, for Osman and Orhan, the capability of bringing together fragmented small tribal *gāzi*-warrior groups under his clientship lied in the successful usage of *gazā* ideology and fruitful raids, which offered ample booty to raiders.²⁴¹

1986, 151-161; Colin Imber, "What Does Ghazi Actually Mean", *The Balance of Truth; Essays in Honour of Professor Geoffrey Lewis*, eds., Çiğdem Balım-Harding and Colin Imber, Istanbul: ISIS, 2000, 165-178; Rudi Paul Lindner, "What Was a Nomadic Tribe?"; "Stimulus and Justification in Early Ottoman History", *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 27/2, 1987, 207-224; Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*.

²³⁹ Pachymeres states that upon Osman waged violent raids on Byzantine territory Turkoman fighters or *gāzis* started gathering under his banner. (Cited in İnalçık, "The Emergence of Ottomans", p. 267; "Osman I", *DIA*, p. 449.) We learn from Cantacuzenus that when a beg embarked on a *gazā* expedition the *gāzis* from neighboring principalities would join his troops; and the beg, on his own terms, would willingly accept these *gāzis* in his troops. (Cited in P. Lemerle, *L'émirat d'Aydın, Byzance et l'Occident. Recherches sur la geste d'Umur Pacha*, Paris, 1957, pp. 212-3.) After his victory against Byzantine imperial army in Baphaeon in 1301, Osman's fame even spread to distant Muslim countries, which augmented the influx of *gāzi*-warriors into Osman's territory. For the Battle of Bapheus and its consequences, see Halil İnalçık, "Osman Gazi's Siege of Nicea and the Battle of Bapheus", in *The Ottoman Empire (1300-1389)*, ed. Elizabeth Zachariadou, Rethymnon: Crete University Pres, 1993, 77-98. Also consider İnalçık, "Osman I", *DIA*, p. 446.

²⁴⁰ İnalçık, "The Question of the Emergence of the Ottoman State", pp. 74-5.

²⁴¹ For some recent assessments of the construction of the Ottoman state, see Kafadar, pp. 118-150; Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*.

Indeed, in the first half of the fourteenth century, the leadership of *gazā*, or raids to the infidel lands, was carried on by two principalities: Umur Gāzi at Aegean coasts and Ottomans in Bithynia. Likewise, Ibn Battuta, who visited courts of most of Turkoman begs in 1332, refers to *gazā* or raids of only Umur Beg and Orhan Beg, putting more emphasis on the *gāzi* affiliation of the former than that of the latter.²⁴² It has been already shown that Aydınoğlu Umur Beg was one of the most brilliant and successful Turkoman *gāzi*-leaders towards the middle of the fourteenth-century.²⁴³ His achievements especially in raids of the Aegean islands and Thrace made him so famous that he began to be known as the chief of *gāzis*, which attracted rootless, adventurous, and war-like Turkomans to gather under his banner. After the death of Umur in 1348, however, his successors no longer pursued the policy of *gazā*. Rather they preferred to take advantage of trade with westerners. By then Ottoman begs arose as the only champion of *gazā* raids, and consequently their entourage became the most attractive for warrior tribal elements of Turkomans, or *gāzis*.²⁴⁴

However, it has been shown that the cohesive force holding Turkoman warriors around Osman, and later on around his successors, was neither merely religio-

²⁴² Ibn Battuta met Umur Beg in Izmir (Smyrnia). He writes, "He was a generous and pious prince and constantly engaged in war with the Christians. He had galleys, with which he used to make raids on the environs of Constantinople the Great, taking prisoners and booty and after spending it all in largesse he would make another raid. Eventually the Greeks, under the pressure of his attacks, appealed to the Pope, who ordered the Christians of Genoa and France to make an attack on him. They did so, and the Pope sent an army from Rome, which captured the port and the city in a night attack. The *amir* 'Omar [Umur] went down from the citadel and fought them, but he died a martyr's death together with a number of his troops." See Ibn Battuta, *Travels in Asia and Africa*, translated and selected by H. A. R. Gibb, London: Darf Publishers, 1983 (First published in 1929), pp. 134-5. Shortly after his meeting with Umur Beg, Ibn Battuta visited the court of Orhan Beg in Bursa. He describes Orhan Beg as the greatest of Turkoman begs and richest in wealth, land, and military forces. He underlines Orhan's fight against Christian neighbors stating "He fights with the infidels and besieges them." See *Ibid*, p. 136.

²⁴³ For a further reading on Umur Gāzi and his *gazā* raids, see İnalçık, "The Rise of the Turcoman Maritime Principalities in Anatolia, Byzantium, and the Crusades"; Irène Mélikoff, *Le Destan d'Umur Pasha (Düsturname-i Enveri)*, Paris; Presses Universitaires de France, 1954; Tuncer Baykara, *Aydınoğlu Gāzi Umur Paşa (1309-1348)*, Ankara; Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990.

²⁴⁴ See İnalçık, "The Emergence of Ottomans", p. 271. For economic basis of the *gazā* and both temporal and spiritual motivations of *gāzis* at that time see Halil İnalçık, "The Question of the Emergence".

ideological discourse of *gazā* nor supreme lineage of the dynasty, as formulated by later historians. Rather, arguably the most effective factor was Osman's success in preserving the common interest of the tribal participants in his service. Rudi Paul Lindner, moving from the results of modern anthropological studies on 'tribe', concludes that shared concerns or shared interest played a much greater role in formation of medieval tribes than did kinship or other factors such as ideology. He also underscores the inclusive feature of 'common interest' which, contrary to the 'exclusive' nature of kinship, allows the entrance of 'foreigner' element into the tribal structure, thus explains the rapid growth of tribes. Common interest as a cohesive force holding a tribe together as a political and military entity was, in the Ottoman case at least, supported by raids and predation.²⁴⁵

As it clearly appeared then, during its early phases under Osman and Orhan, the Ottoman Principality was rather a tribal confederation gathered around the Ottoman dynasty on the basis of common interest, which was almost wholly rested on *gazā*-raids, as well as predation, and was cemented by the idea of holy war. On the one hand, the successful raids of Osman and his tribal comrade-in-arms reinforced the influx of

²⁴⁵ Lindner, "What was a Nomadic Tribe?", p. 698; *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Bloomington: Indiana University, 1983, p. 2. Lindner, however, totally rejects the role of *gazā* ideology in the forming early Ottoman war-bands. To him, *gazā* was simply later innovated and formulated by *ulemā* in order to depict early Ottoman success as a classical Islamic enterprise. Lindner establishes his argumentation on the inclusiveness of 'shared interest' against exclusiveness if *gazā* ideology in forming a tribe. He argues that there were a considerable amount of Greek elements in early Ottoman enterprise. If the *gazā* was principal stimulus, argues he, then how can one interpret exclusive nature of *gazā* together with the Greek allies of Osman? See Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, pp. 2-18. However, Lindner's argumentation is neither well-organized nor supported original materials. He seems to overtone exclusiveness of *gazā* while neglecting worldly content of the concept, which was as affective as its religious connotation. For some criticism of Lindner's attitude, see, for example, Halil Berktaş, "Osmanlı Devleti'nin Yükselişine Kadar Türkler'in İktisadî ve Toplumsal Tarihi", in *Türkiye Tarihi 1: Osmanlı Devleti'ne Kadar Türkler*, ed. Sina Akşin, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1995, pp. 79-80; Ümit Hassan, *Osmanlı. Örgüt-İnanç-Davranış'tan Hukuk-İdeoloji'ye*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, pp. 137-47. In a recent publication, Heat Lowry pursued a similar line of argument (with Lindner) regarding the meaning and function of *gazā* during the early periods of the Ottoman history. Lowry develops the term 'plundering confederacy' for the *gāzi* bands fulfilling early conquests in Anatolia and the Balkans. See Heat W. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, p. 46.

Turkoman warriors to Osman's entourage. On the other hand, the religious representatives of early Ottoman society, namely 'heterodox' dervishes, flourished the idea of holy war and augmented religious sentiment among *gāzi*-warriors,²⁴⁶ as well as legitimizing claims of the early Ottomans for the worldly power.²⁴⁷

The political and military dignitary of this confederation was intermingled and represented by a tribal aristocracy, who were at the same time the comrade-in-arms of Osman, who was simply the first among equals rather than enjoying a supreme authority over other begs or tribal leaders of *gazā* bands. During the foundation period of the principality, two closely intermingled classes, which would play a leading role in the development of the state both in terms of organization and ideology, were almost absent: the bureaucratic elite and high (religious) scholars or *ulemā*.²⁴⁸ Contrary to the Turko-Mongolian step tradition, these two classes were representatives of high Islamic tradition, which was heavily influenced by the Arabic and Persian culture. As will be returned to in the further stages of the analysis in this chapter, the emergence and consolidation of the bureaucratic elite and *ulemā* class in the Ottoman capital cities constituted one of the two principal bases of the Ottoman Imperial regime, the other being the centralized military system.

²⁴⁶ One should note that there are indications in contemporary sources of that these dervishes did not only propagate the idea of *gazā* but also actively took part in many fights such as the conquest of Bursa, the conquest of Rumelia etc. For the prominent role of Seyyid Ali Sultan, one of the dervishes of that kind, in the conquest of Rumelia, see Rıza Yıldırım, *Seyyid Ali Sultan (Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi*.

²⁴⁷ Indeed, as İnalcık rightfully delineates, "in the Ottoman frontier lands dervishes and *gāzis* often became identical." See Halil İnalcık, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography", in *Historians of the Middle East*, eds., Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, Oxford, 1962, p. 157.

²⁴⁸ Indeed, one could hardly differentiate these two classes in early Ottoman context since there was not a clear-cut border-line between them and the transition from one to other was wide-spread. Researches on the Ottoman history point to the fact that the bureaucracy of the Ottoman empire was predominantly – wholly during the formation period – emerged from the *ulemā* class.

The mode of life, on the other hand, was mainly attributed to nomadic dynamics and the economy of the principality rested upon pastoralism, predation, and booty from *gazā* raids. The religious affairs of the Turkoman subjects of the principality or *beylik* were looked after by sufi dervishes, who were primarily remnants of the Babāi revolt and propagated a popular-heterodox way of Islamic Sufism. To sum up, during the early periods, the Ottoman realm was under the complete dominance of tribal-nomadic Turkoman polity, culture, and way of religious life style. The bureaucratic elite, and hence the bureaucracy itself, educated representatives of high Islamic culture or *ulemā*, and detribalized- centralized army were yet to appear. This may be regarded as the correspondent of the first stage of Lapidus's scheme, which is the tribal nomads' organization of conquest movement leading to state formation in a stateless region or to the regions which already have a weak state, in the Ottoman case.

The history of the formation of the Ottoman state - or the 'imperial regime' one might prefer to say – was, at the same time, the history of the struggle between two parties: one was the coalition of Turkoman tribal fighters and 'heterodox' mystics, while the other being the coalition of newly arising *ulemā*-bureaucrats and military elite of the centralized army. The following analysis will show that in the course of time the latter party almost wholly displaced the former, at least within the governmental machinery, by the reign of Mehmed II, shifting them to a position of marginalized opposition.

The early symptoms of transition from the first stage to the second - that is the transformation of conqueror tribal confederacy into routinized states or imperial governments – appeared as early as the time of Osman's son Orhan. One might even think that the very early symptoms, especially of sedentarization, were already visible during Osman's last years. To Lindner, for example, by the time of Osman himself the

Ottomans took advantage of sedentary life, for pastoralism was no more profitable in the limited plateaus of Bithynia, which, on the other hand, has fertile soils to cultivate. They even established new towns such as Yenişehir.²⁴⁹ “The Ottomans now had to adapt themselves to the demands of administering a sedentary and sedentarizing society. In such circumstances the chief became a settled ruler, and the nomadic tribesmen had ultimately to settle or to accept secondary position. The institutions of the tribe ultimately broke down before the complex task of bureaucratic record keeping and urban organization.”²⁵⁰ No doubt, the sedentarization process – of especially ruling elite - gained impetus under Orhan and Murad I.

Closely linked to the sedentarization, the economic base of the tribe shifted from pastoralism and predation to agriculture. Furthermore, using the Marxian scheme, sedentarization fundamentally changed the ‘infra-structure’ of socio-economic set up so that subsequent changes in the ‘super-structure’, i.e. nature of polity, military organization, and religious mind, inevitably followed.²⁵¹

One of the foremost results of this process appeared as the alienation of Turkoman milieu to the ‘imperializing’ state. Nonetheless, the alienation process did not rest barely on ideological-religious basis, but it had a substantial economic and social ground as well. Parallel to evolving of the Ottoman principality towards a bureaucratic empire, an intrinsic tension developed within a certain branch of the Ottoman society and the state. As J. R. Walsh has put it succinctly,

When gradually the concept of empire evolves and an effort is made to assume the responsibilities which this implied, the independent and arrogant tribal aristocracy had to be replaced by one of the sultan’s own creation selected from

²⁴⁹ See Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 708.

²⁵⁰ Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, pp. 708-9.

²⁵¹ Compare Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, pp. 29-38.

among the subject peoples. Moreover, the organization and good order of this empire demanded the adoption of Islam at its most civilized expression, with all its heritage of law and administration, and so the dichotomy between Ottoman and tribal Turk revolves itself into a contest between the *medrese* and the *tekke*, a contest weighed heavily in favour of the former by the influence of the throne.²⁵²

Among the chief instruments of centralization must be deemed the invention of Janissary corps, *timar* regime on one hand, and accumulation of traditional Islamic *ulemā* which constituted the backbone of the Ottoman bureaucracy on the other. The process of bureaucratization and centralization developed at the cost of the traditional Turkoman way of nomadic-tribal life as well as the marginalization of tribal organization from the politics. The foremost instruments associated with and which enforced this process, namely the Janissary corps, *timar* regime, and gradually consolidating *ulemā* class were not only alien to the nomadic-tribal way of life but also mortally destructive to it. Therefore, when the Ottoman polity dismantled from Turko-Mongolian step tradition and evolved towards a classical Middle-Eastern Islamic empire, the struggle emerged between the representatives of these two political systems and ways of life.

3.2.1. The Formation of the Ottoman Army

Lindner already noted that as economic base of the principality became sedentary, so did the military technology. Already during the time of Orhan, the nomadic war bands of horsed archers began to lose their eminence in the Ottoman militia and gradually were replaced by the recruited standing infantry corps (Janissary) and centralized provincial cavalry troops (*sipāhis*). Orhan created an infantry corps called *yaya* which was not

²⁵² J. R. Walsh, "The Historiography of Ottoman-Safavid Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in *Historians of the Middle East*, eds., Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, New York, Toronto, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 208.

organized on tribal basis, but loyal directly to the sultan.²⁵³ No sooner was the *yaya* corps²⁵⁴ established it transformed into a standing army at that time totally composed of captives. As Lindner argues, “within a generation, the Ottomans became bent on the creation of a military force totally unlike the bands of nomadic archers not only in strategy, but in training, technique, and support: the Janissaries.”²⁵⁵

The most salient characteristic of the new corps, at least for the purpose of this study, was the essential change in the means of organization and the loyalty of the soldiers. The new infantry of the sultan was formed totally on military basis, seriously damaging tribal bonds and habits. The immediate consequence of the shift from tribal principals in the organization was the shift in the loyalty of the soldiers from clan leaders to the head of the administrative machinery, i. e. the sultan. The change of loyalty found its symbolic expression in the color of caps. If we follow Aşıkpaşazâde,

Orhan Gâzi'ye kardaşı Alâaddin Paşa eydür: “Hanum! Elhamdülillah kim seni padişah gördüm. İmdi senin dahı birlevük leşkerin yevmen feyevmen ziyâde olsa gerekdür. İmdi senün askerinde bir nişan ko kim gayri askerde olmasun!” didi. Orhan Gâzi eyidür: “Kardaş! Her ne kim sen eyidürsin, ben anı kabul ederin” dedi. Ol eyitdi: “İmdi etrafdağı beğlerün **börkleri kızıldur**, senin ağ olsun!” dedi. Orhan Gâzi emr etdi. Bilecük'de akbörk işlediler. Orhan Gâzi geydi. Ve cemi' tevâbii bile **akbörk** geydiler. Andan Orhan Gâzi leşkerin ziyâde etmek diledi kim ol vilâyetde ola. Kardaşı eyidür: “Anı kadılara danış!” der. Ve ol zamanda Çandarlu Karaca Halil Bilecük kadısı olmuş idi. Kadılığı ana Osman Gâzi vermiş idi. Ve Orhan Gâzi zamanında dahı İznik'e kadı oldu. Ve dahı İznik'den sonra Bursa'ya kadı oldu. Orhan oğlu Gâzi Hünkâr zamanında kadı-asker oldu. Ve hem vezir oldu. Ve beğlerbeği dahı oldu. Ve bâki tafsil aşığa bâblarda gele inşaallahu ta'âla. Ve hem Edebalı'nun dahı kavmiydi. Ona dahı danışdı. Eyidür: “Elden yaya çıkar!” dedi. Ol vakıt adamların çoğu kadıya rişvet iletđi kim beni yaya yazdurun deyü. Ve hem anlara da akbörk geydürdiler.²⁵⁶

²⁵³ See İnalçık, “Orhan”, pp. 383-4.

²⁵⁴ Colin Imber rejects the idea that Orhan first created *yaya* corps arguing the related passage in APZ, Anonyms, and Oruç was a later alteration. However, he does not provide enough evidence for his argument. See Colin Imber, “The Origin of the Janissaries”, *Journal of Turkish Studies (Türklük Bilgisi Araştırmaları)*, vol. 26/II, Harvard University, 2002, p. 17.

²⁵⁵ Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 708. Also consider his *Nomads and Ottomans*, pp. 30-35.

²⁵⁶ APZ, pp. 117-8. For similar accounts see also *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri*, pp.16-7; *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512)*, pp. 18-9. Oruç's account shows two noticeable differences: 1) he

Learning from this passage, Ottomans, at a certain stage, needed to differentiate their immediate retinue from the troops of other begs around, i.e. tribal bands.²⁵⁷ The symbol chosen for distinguishing the ‘special forces’ of the sultan from other warriors is a traditional one. As indicated already, according to Turco-Mongolian tradition ‘white’ symbolizes the immediate retinue of the khan and thus the nobility while ‘red’ or ‘black’ symbolizes ordinary mass; in other words, the former symbolizes the ruling elite while the latter symbolizes the ruled subjects.²⁵⁸ In the context of Anatolian Turkomans the tribal warriors are known to have worn red caps. In Aşıkpaşazâde’s account, Alâaddin Beg refers to this fact and suggests his brother that he create a new army loyal only to his personality.²⁵⁹ Then comes the problem of how and from which source to form this

specifies that the soldiers who bore ‘ak-börk’ were special retinues of Orhan while others bearing ‘kızıl-börk’ were ordinary, i.e. tribal, soldiers of the sultan, not the soldiers of other begs around, as one might understand from Aşıkpaşazâde’s account at first sight. (Indeed, a close scrutiny shows that by ‘kızıl-börk’ Aşıkpaşazâde must also have referred to the tribal forces of Orhan Beg. See J. A. B. Palmer, “Yeniçerilerin Kökeni”, translated by Mehmet Öz, in *Söğüt’ten İstanbul’a Osmanlı Devleti’nin Kuruluşu Üzerine Tartışmalar*, eds., Oktay Özel-Mehmet Öz, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001, pp. 484-5. (The article originally appeared as “The Origin of the Janissaries”, *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library*, 35/2, 1952-3, 448-81.) Another significant difference of Oruç appears as his connection of the origin of *yaya* corps to Hacı Bektaş. Besides its apparent anachronism, the pattern here – that is the sanction of a worldly innovation by spiritual representatives - is worth dwelling on. According to Palmer, this passage was nothing than a later Bektashi addition. (See Palmer, p. 486.) I will return to this point in the context of Janissary-Bektashi relations. Oruç’s account reads, “... *Ali Paşa dedi ki: ‘Ey Kardeş bütün askerinin kızıl börk giysin. Sen ak börk giy. Sana ait kullar da ak börk giysinler. Bu da âlemde bir nişan olsun.’ Orhan Gazi bu sözü kabul edip adam gönderdi. Amasya’daki Horasanlı Hacı Bektaş’tan izin alıp ak börk getirtti. Önce kendi giydi. Ondan sonra kendisine ait kullar ak börk giydiler. Ak börk giymek o zamandan kaldı.*” See Oruç Beğ, *Oruç Beğ Tarihi*, summarized and edited by Nihal Atsız, Tercüman 1001 Temel Eser, p. 34.

²⁵⁷ Halil İnalçık evaluates the creation of *yaya* corps, the immediate military retinue of the beg within the Turco-Mongolian tradition of comradeship or *nökerlik*. See İnalçık, “Osmanlı Tarihi’ne Toplu Bir Bakış”, pp. 51-5.

²⁵⁸ See Sencer Divitçioğlu, *Osmanlı Beyliği’nin Kuruluşu*, İstanbul: YKY, 1999, pp. 124-5. In a similar manner, Divitçioğlu regards, in the Ottoman case, ‘Ak-börk’ as the symbol of ruling class while ‘Kızıl-börk’ as the symbol of ruled subjects. See *Ibid.*, pp. 116-121. Although this sort of classification might be useful in the analysis of the socio-political set up, it does not adequately depict the whole picture. In the early Ottoman case, ‘Kızıl-börk’ rather symbolizes militant Turkoman elements than passive ruled subjects totally devoid of political and military capability against the ruling class. In the course of time, a considerable portion of the social group symbolized by ‘Kızıl-börk’ maintained their resistance against the hegemony of the Ottoman ruling elite, while some other transformed into ‘tamed’ subjects, or *re’āya*.

²⁵⁹ Palmer suggests that this must have occurred around 1340. See Palmer, p. 483.

army. Orhan learns the method from the newly arising *ulemā*: he was to recruit soldiers from among the people of the country. The point of eminence here, however, is that the soldiers would enter the infantry with their individual identity, leaving tribal bonds aside.

The creation of the *yaya* corps marked the beginning of the cleavage between the Ottoman center and Turkoman milieu. In other words, it marked the transition from first stage to the second, i.e. the transformation of tribal chieftaincy into routinized state. It is not a task of this study to examine the development of the Ottoman military system. Stress should be put, for the present purpose however, on the stimulating role of the central army in realizing centralization of the administration. The Ottoman central army evolved in two directions: a standing army at the center, and a provincial army organized under the firm control of the center. It is to be shown in the following paragraphs that the provincial military system called *timarlı sipāhi* was intermingled with administrative and fiscal mechanisms as well. The *timar* system²⁶⁰ as a whole functioned as an efficient apparatus of Ottoman state in centralizing the administrative, military, and fiscal system.

Yet the most powerful weapon in the hand of the sultan in establishing his absolute power within a patrimonial state was the standing army attending the court, namely the Janissary corps. A detailed analysis of the origin and development of the

²⁶⁰ One of the principal bases on which Ottoman central administration developed was the fiscal regime, namely the *timar* system. The earliest documentary references to the *timar* system dates back to the time of Orhan but the system developed gradually and took its classical form during the time of Murad II, when the first concise registers were drawn up and the system was fully developed in all its basic principles and features. In the *timar* system, all newly conquered lands belonged to the state and the state distributed the usufruct right of the land to individuals, demanding certain taxes in return. A *timar* holder was a state agent who did not receive any stipend from the state treasury but collected the tax of a defined piece of land and *re'ayā* as *timar*. Since all territories of the Empire were divided and assigned to certain *timar* holders, the subjects were strictly constrained by certain duties. See Halil İnalçık, "Tīmār", *EI2*; "Giriş" in his *Hicri 835 tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-ı Arvanid*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954, pp. XI-XXXVI; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Timar", *IA*, 12/1, 286-333.

Janissary corps is beyond the scope of this study.²⁶¹ However, since the Janissaries played a significant role in the development and ‘solution’ of the Qizilbash question, a brief outline of the history and some peculiarities of the corps would be useful. The conceptual base, or the idea, of Janissary corps, that is creating an immediate and loyal military retinue of the sultan, traces back to the creation of *yaya* corps. In terms of men power, however, Janissary corps fundamentally differs from *yaya* corps.

Early Ottoman chronicles, which are the only sources about the origin of Janissary corps, inform us that following the conquest of Edirne in 1361²⁶², decades after the creation of *yaya* corps, the number of slaves obtained from *gazā* expeditions increased noticeably. By the advice of a certain Kara Rüstem, a *danişmend* following a well-known Islamic principle, one fifth (*pençik*) of the booty, including slaves, was put aside for the state treasury. In a short span of time, however, the number of slaves belonging to the treasury became so numerous that the leading statesmen of the time - Çandarlı Kara Halil, Kara Rüstem etc. – suggested establishing a troop with these slaves or *kuls*. Before becoming soldiers, however, they were sent to Turkish families to learn

²⁶¹ The reader might consider İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı’s classical work on the Slave Corps (*Kapıkulu Ocakları*): İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapıkulu Ocakları, I: Acemi Ocağı ve Yeniçeri Ocağı*, Ankara: TTK, 1988, 3rd edition. (First published in 1943.)

²⁶² Halil İnalçık, “Edirne’nin Fethi, 1361”, *Edirne, Edirne’nin 600. Fethi Yıldönümü Armağan Kitabı*, Ankara: TTK, 1993 (first published in 1965), p. 159. For another suggestion for the date of the conquest of Adrianople, see Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “La conquête d’Andrinople par les Turcs”, 439-461. Beldiceanu-Steinherr not only suggests some later dates for the conquest but also argues that the conquest was not fulfilled by Ottoman forces. She says, “La conaquête d’Adrinople fut l’oeuvre de beys non attachés à la dynastie ottomane, elle eut lieu aux environs de 1369. Quant à Murad I, il était occupé, entre 1362 et le début de 1365, par sa lutte contre ses frères et la défense des frontières orientales, et entre août 1366 et 1373 il n’avait pas la possibilité de s’imposer en Thrace en raison de la coupure des routes par la prise de Gallipoli. C’est seulement après la reddition de cette ville que Murad I vint à Andrinople, soit en hiver 1376-1377, soit en été ou automne 1377.” (*Ibid.*, p. 458). For a parallel argument also consider Elisabeth Zachariadou, “The Conquest of Adrianople”, *Romania and the Turks (c. 1300- c. 1500)*, London: Variorum Reprints, 1985, 211-217.

the Turkish language and culture. Aşıkpaşazāde and Oruç state that these “yeni-çeri” or “new soldiers” dressed in white caps.²⁶³

The creation of slave-corps marked a substantial change in the socio-ethnic base of the sultan’s immediate military retinue or the soldiers of *Ak-börg*. Unlike *yaya* troops, which were formed by Turkish soldiers, the new soldiers were adopted from a totally different cultural environment. Evident is that the drastic change in the cultural environment made it easier to create an unquestionably obedient military, and later bureaucratic, class who were supposed to run most important offices of the state.

This was, indeed, not an Ottoman invention. Rather, using slaves in the army and bureaucracy was an old practice of Islamic states that traces back, at least, to the Abbasids.²⁶⁴ Ottomans evidently learned this practice from the Anatolian Seljuks, their predecessors in Anatolia.²⁶⁵ As was the case in earlier Islamic states, slave-troops and slave-bureaucrats functioned, first of all, as an eminent tool of centralization of the Ottoman administration. It is not surprising to see that the Janissary corps, or the army of the Porte (*kapı-kulu*) in a broader sense, was strengthened and gained significance in the state during the reign of Bayezid I, whose attempt to create a centralized empire will be mentioned.²⁶⁶

²⁶³ See APZ, p. 128; Oruç Beğ, pp. 41-2. Also see *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri*, p. 25; *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512)*, pp. 28-9. For an analysis of these passages, see Palmer, pp. 490-94. For a recent ‘daring’ speculation on the epistemology of the word, see Imber, “The Origin of the Janissaries”, pp. 18-9.

²⁶⁴ For slave-system (*gulām*) in the Islamic states, see Halil İnalçık, “Ghulām”, EI2; Paul Wittek, “Devshirme and Shari’a”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 17, 1955, 271-8; Speros Vryonis, “Isidora Glabas and the Turkish Devshirme”, *Speculum*, 31, 1956, 433-43.

²⁶⁵ For a broader discussion of similarities, dissimilarities, and connections between Ottoman Devshirme and Seljuk Ghulams, see Speros Vryonis, “Seljuk Ghulams and Ottoman Devshirme”, *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, 224-52.

²⁶⁶ See İnalçık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, *Studia Islamica*, 2, 1954, p. 105.

The Ottomans in time developed this practice a step further, starting to recruit boys from among Christian subjects to the corps, which might be the third and the final stage of the development of the Ottoman *Kapı-kulu* corps. Palmer provides persuasive Latin sources, in addition to known Ottoman narratives, showing that it was Murad II who initiated recruiting Christian boys. And the Ottoman *devshirme* as an institution was formed by the mid-fifteenth century, at the latest.²⁶⁷ It is interesting to note that a contemporary observer, Georgius of Hungary who spent some years as captive of Ottomans until 1458 and wrote his book *Tractatus de moribus, condicionibus et nequicia Turcorum* in the 1470s, makes a special remark of ‘ak-börg’ as a distinctive sign of the sultan’s special retinue, which was strictly forbidden for others.²⁶⁸

One peculiarity of this army made its loyalty to the sultan absolute. The soldiers in these corps were recruited from Christian lands in their childhood and underwent a special education and training before filling military offices, as well as posts in the civil bureaucracy. The special education, one might call this process rather ‘brain-washing’, produced a class of unquestioned defenders of the *devlet-i ebed-müddet*. Not only because of the education they vigorously worked for the prosperity of the state but they also had practical reasons to do so: their own prosperity was also closely linked to the prosperity of the state. Furthermore, their adoration of the state was reinforced by the special legal status of these slave origin statesmen. Contrary to the legal status of an ordinary subject, their lives stood between the lips of the sultan, whose decisions on their death were never questioned.

²⁶⁷ See Palmer, pp.495-550.

²⁶⁸ Cited and quoted in Palmer, pp. 496-8.

One should also note that the Janissary corps was the only standing army using firearms. Consequently, contrary to the piecemeal organization of provincial cavalry, the Janissary corps held a great accumulation of military power. Thus they always had eminent influence on the Palace, and thus on the Ottoman politics. One should mention the fact that in the course of time some Janissary garrisons were stationed in the fortress of provincial cities to strengthen the central control on the provincial administration.²⁶⁹

The liaison of Janissary corps with the Bektashis constitutes one of the most controversial topics of early Ottoman historiography. Earliest references to the connection between Janissary corps and Hacı Bektaş date back to the mid-fifteenth century. The *Divan* of the fifteenth-century Bektashi poet Sadık Abdal, who most probably died during the mid-fifteenth century²⁷⁰, is the earliest source indicating Hacı Bektaş's spiritual patronage on the corps. Sadık Abdal states that Hacı Bektaş turned his courageous auspices on Janissaries and because of that they had a great opportunity.²⁷¹ A poetic work on the legendary prophet Hızır, namely *Hızırnâme*, written in 1476 by a shaykh near Isparta, which had just become part of Ottoman territory, also indicates the association between Hacı Bektaş and the Ottomans. Alongside with many other shaykhs from several orders, the author mentions Hacı Bektaş as well, referring to him as the

²⁶⁹ See, for example, İnalçık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", p. 107.

²⁷⁰ Sadık Abdal was apparently a disciple of Seyyid Ali Sultan and grew up the latter's *tekke* in Dimetoka. His *dīvan* is the only source about Sadık Abdal. The unique available manuscript of this work is copied by certain Rüstem Abdal in 1155/1742-3 and preserved in Konya Bölge Yazmalar Kütüphanesi, Hacı Bektaş'tan gelen kitaplar, no. 255. In his *dīvan*, Sadık Abdal explains how he became a disciple of Seyyid Ali Sultan, by giving valuable details. Most of the verses in this work are devoted to phrase Hacı Bektaş Veli and Seyyid Ali Sultan, the former is referred to as *pir* while the latter as *mürşid*. The transliterated text of the *dīvan* is being prepared for publication by Dursun Gümüšoğlu. I thank him for sharing with me a copy of this manuscript.

²⁷¹ "Şecâ'atle nazar kılmuş Yeniçeri kullarına ol / Sezâ oldu ânunçün anlara ol fırsat-ı kübrâ", *Divan-ı Sâdık Abdal*, manuscript, fol. 4a.

person guarding the Ottoman lands.²⁷² The *Velâyetnâme of Otman Baba*, written in 1483, also indicates the connection between Hacı Bektaş and Janissary corps. In the legendary account of the *velâyetnâme* the headgear of Janissaries is reported as the investiture of Hacı Bektaş.²⁷³

Aşıkpaşazâde also touches upon the connection between the Janissaries and Bektashis, attempting to reject it.²⁷⁴ He first states Bektashis' argument that the hat of the Janissaries derived from Hacı Bektaş; and then explains how it was fabricated by the Bektashis. He says, during the time of Orhan Beg, Abdal Musa participated in several *gazās* among Janissaries. One day he took a worn-out hat from one of Janissaries. When he returned from the campaign people asked about the hat on his head. Being proud, he answered: "I have worn the cap of *gāzis*. ... This is called 'elif tāk'."²⁷⁵ Then finishes Aşıkpaşazâde: "This is the true origin of their [Bektashis'] hat (*tāk*)."²⁷⁶ He also underlines the point that Hacı Bektaş Veli did not meet any members of the Ottoman

²⁷² "Ol Hacı Bektaş-ı güzîn gözler bu Osman illerin / Öpdüm mübârek ellerin bir gine görsem yüzlerin." See *Divan-ı Muhyiddin Çelebi* or *Hızırnâme*, Manuscript, İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, Türkçe Yazmalar, no. 949, fol. 27b. For further reading on Muhyiddin Çelebi and *Hızırnâme*, see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Hızırnâme", *Türkiye Diyanet Waqfi İslâm Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 17, 417-9; Mehmet Saffet Sarıkaya, "Hızırname'nin Bektaşiliğe Dair Malumatı ve Hızırname Çerçevesinde Bektaşî Kültüründe Hızır İnanç", 2. *Uluslararası Türk Kültür Evreninde Alevilik ve Bektaşilik Bilgi Şöleni Bildiri Kitabı*, Filiz Kılıç and Tuncay Bülbül (eds.), Ankara, 2007, 1463-80.

²⁷³ Gö'çek Abdal, *Odman Baba Vilâyetnamesi, Vilâyetname-i Şāhî*, haz. Şevki Koca, İstanbul: Bektaşî Kültür Derneği, 2002, pp. 198-9.

²⁷⁴ Aşıkpaşazâde's account pertaining to Bektashis needs a careful reading and criticism. First of all, as Köprülü long ago called attention, he was an "enemy of Bektashis". (Köprülü, "Abdal Musa", nşr. Orhan Köprülü, *Türk Kültürü*, 124, Şubat 1973, p. 198.) Köprülü states that from Aşıkpaşazâde on the strict sunni ulemâ of Ottomans flourished such a negative and pejorative attitude with regard to the origin of Bektashims and Hacı Bektaş Veli, and criticizes modern scholars like G. Jakob for they followed sunni *ulemâ* on this account. Second, his principal aim in writing his history was to prove the primary role of his ancestors that are the descendants of Baba İlyas, in the foundation of the empire. Thus he attempts to tone down the contribution of other groups, including Bektashis. See Halil İnalçık, "How to Read Aşıkpaşazâde's History", in *Studies in Ottoman History in Honour of Professor V. L. Ménage*, edited by Colin Heywood and Colin Imber, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1994, 139-56. Republished in Halil İnalçık, *Essays in Ottoman History*, İstanbul, 1998, 31- 50.

²⁷⁵ "Abdal Musa seferden dönicek gerü vilâyetlerine varmış. Ol Yeniçeriden geydüği börg ile bile varmış. Eyitmiş kim: 'Üş de ben gaziler tacın geyüb geldüm' deyü haylı tefâhür dahi eylemiş. Ol halk buna sormuşlar kim: 'Bunun adı nedir? Buna ne derler?' demişler. Bu dahi anlara cevap böyle vermiş kim: 'Buna bükme elif tac derler' demiş." See APZ, p. 238.

²⁷⁶ APZ, p. 238.

dynasty.²⁷⁷ Aşıkpaşazāde's endeavour to reject any link between Hacı Bektaş and the Janissary corps, however, clearly shows that such ideas were already in circulation during the second half of the fifteenth century; thus his account intrinsically indicates some sort of connection between the two.

Among modern scholars Fuat Köprülü seems to follow Aşıkpaşazāde. According to him the liaison between the Janissary corps and Bektashis originates from the intense participation of Babāi dervishes, who later became Bektashi, in the early *gazās*.²⁷⁸ Thus, the connection between the two was an intrinsic one, which developed spontaneously in the course of events.²⁷⁹ Mélikoff also indicates the liaison between Janissary corps and the Bektashi Order, and regards this connection as a result of the warm relationship of early Bektashi missionaries with the Ottoman dynasty and a proof of the privileged position of Bektashis in the Ottoman Empire. A representative (*vekil*) of the order used to be present in the Janissary corps (*ocak*).²⁸⁰ She, on the authority of the fifteenth century Ottoman historian Oruç Beg, underlines the role of the brother of Orhan Beg Ali

²⁷⁷ “Bu Hacı Bektaş Âl-i Osman neslinden hiç kimse ile musahabet etmedi. ... Her kimse kim Hacı Bektaş Âl-i Osmandan kimse ile musâhabet etdi der ise yalandur, şöyle bilesiz.” See APZ, pp. 237, 238.

²⁷⁸ See Fuat Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, translated and edited by Gary Leiser, Albany : State University of New York Press, 1992, p. 108.

²⁷⁹ The intimate affiliation between Bektashism and the *gazā* milieu is reflected in the expansion of Bektashi influence in Anatolia. As Faroqhi determines from contemporary sources, the order almost was non-existent in the Eastern and South-Eastern Anatolia, while proliferating in central and western Anatolia. See Suraiya Faroqhi, *Anadolu'da Bektaşilik*, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barin, İstanbul: 2003, p. 192.

²⁸⁰ Mélikoff, “Le Problème Kızılbaş”, p. 32. Also see Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, “Açıklama”, in *Vilâyet-nâme. Menâkı-nı Hünkâr Hacı Bektaş-ı Velî*, İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, 1995, pp. 125-8. However, Suraiya Faroqhi calls attention to the fact that the connection between the Janissary corps and the Bektashi Order is poorly reflected in official documents. Her research on the socio-economic history of Bektashi *tekkes* in Anatolia showed that the relationship between Janissaries and the known Bektashi *tekkes* was almost ignorable. Yet she refers some archival evidence indicating the participation of newly recruited Janissaries (*acemi oğlanları*) to the annual festival of the Tekke of Seyyid Gâzi towards the end of the sixteenth century. See Suraiya Faroqhi, *Anadolu'da Bektaşilik*, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barin, İstanbul: 2003, pp. 138-9.

Pasha's affiliation to Bektashi circles in augmenting the prestige of Hacı Bektaş and in making him eventually the patron-saint of Janissaries.²⁸¹

²⁸¹ Irène Mélikoff, "Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektâşis", in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l'Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 120-5. According to Oruç, Ali Pasha denounced his claims on temporal sovereignty and chose a dervish-like life. When the first standing army of Ottomans created during the time of Orhan, Ali Pasha suggested his brother put this new army under the spiritual protection of Hacı Bektaş. Then Orhan obtained the *icâzet* of Hacı Bektaş and *akbörk*, the characteristic white cap of Janissaries, for this purpose. See Oruç, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, ed. Franz Babinger, Hannover, 1925, pp. 15-6; *Oruç Beg Tarihi*, ed. Nihal Atsız, İstanbul, 1972, p. 34. According to Mélikoff, the wide currency of Bektashi Order in the Ottoman lands was primarily due to the support of early Ottoman begs and due to its close connection with the core of the Ottoman army, i. e. Janissaries; the personality of Hacı Bektaş was only of the secondary importance on this development. (Irène Mélikoff, "L'Origine sociale des premiers ottomans", in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l'Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, pp. 133-4; *Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, trs. Turan Alptekin, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999, p. 196.) On the other hand, the Ottoman administration benefited from Bektashis in colonizing newly conquered lands, in educating and Islamizing both Turkoman-Muslims and non-Muslim population, in propagating Islamic culture, and especially in converting and religiously educating newly recruited Christian-origin soldiers, which constituted the Janissary corps. The lodges founded by these dervishes also included food and shelter for travelers. (See Fuat Köprülü, Köprülü, Fuat, "Anadoluda İslamiyet", *Dârülfünûn Edebiyat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, IV, 1922-3, 291-303; *Influence du chamanisme turco-mongol sur les ordres mystiques musulmans*, Istanbul, 1929. Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda bir İskan ve Kolonizasyon Metodu olarak Vakıflar ve Temlikler; İstila Devirlerinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri ve Zaviyeler", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, II, 1942, 279-304; Suraiya Faroqi, "Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival: The Bektashi Order and the Ottoman State (Sixteenth-seventeenth centuries)", *Bektachiyya: Etudes sur l'ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach*, ed. Alexandre Popovic-Giles Veinstein, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1996, p. 172.) As Mélikoff writes: "L'Ordre des Bektâşis a été, dans les premiers temps de l'Empire ottoman, un ordre qui jouissait de la faveur gouvernementale en raison des liens étroits qui existaient entre les premiers sultans et les derviches affiliés à l'Ordre. Le rôle des Bektâşis paraît avoir été un rôle de prosélytisme et propagation de la culture islamique à l'échelle populaire. Ce rôle d'éducateurs du peuple des campagnes ressort clairement du *Vilayetnâme*. Un plus de ce rôle d'éducateurs, Ömer Lütfi Barkan a établi, à la lumière de documents, la contribution de ces derviches à l'expansion de l'économie rurale dans les régions inhabitées et dans les pays nouvellement conquis. Ce rôle de colonisateurs et d'éducateurs explique sans doute la raison pour laquelle le Corps des Janissaires, composé d'éléments d'origine étrangère, a été placé sous la protection spirituelle d'un saint dont les adaptes étaient chargés de l'éducation de masses." (See Mélikoff, "Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektâşis", p. 123.)

In a short while, the Ottoman sultans assumed another role to the order: canalizing and organizing under the control of Ottoman administration those masses that was yet mal-Islamized or non-Islamized. All these roles inevitably shifted the Order outside of the approved-sunni sphere of Islam. The heterodox elements from those mal-Islamized groups, such as Kalenderi, Abdal, Hurufi, etc., fused in Bektashi pot proliferating within the Order. This argument was first made by Fuat Köprülü and then further developed by later scholars such as Mélikoff and Ocak. According to Köprülü in the early sixteenth century Abdals deeply revered Hacı Bektaş but they were not yet Bektashi yet. By the seventeenth century, however, continuous pressure of the Ottoman administration on heterodox groups forced them to take shelter under the umbrella of Bektashi Order. In the course of time they melted in Bektashim. (See Fuad Köprülü, "Abdal", *Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, çıkaran M. Fuad Köprülü, sayı: 1, İstanbul, 1935, pp. 31, 36.) Especially the infection of the Order by the qizilbash propaganda during the reign of Selim I seriously raised the suspect of the Ottoman administration on Bektashis. (Mélikoff, "Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektâşis", p. 124.) Mélikoff says, "Les Bektâşis ont été à l'origine un instrument du gouvernement ottoman, chargés par une initiative venue du Sultan, de ranger sous la bannière d'un Sunnisme libéral et tolérant [Compare her "L'Origine sociale des premiers ottomans", in her *Sur les traces*

3.2.2. The Rise of the Ottoman Elite

It is to be shown in the following chapters that the decomposition of ‘Ak-börg’ and ‘Kızıl-börg’, i.e. the creation of an infantry corps alongside tribal Turkoman fighters, would ultimately lead to a violent clash between the two in Anatolia, which would appear as a Qizilbash uprising. Indeed, the bipartition of ‘Ak-börg’ and ‘Kızıl-börg’ was part of a more comprehensive ongoing process: the formation of the routinized state at the cost of the tribal chieftancy. Another major part of this process was the emergence of the bureaucracy and judicial administrative system. The contemporary sources leave no doubt that both the creation of central army and the establishment of administrative-judicial bases of the state was fulfilled by continuously arriving *ulemā* class. As the tribal war-bands of mounted archers were gradually replaced by a regular army, so were the popular-sufi shaykhs by the *madrassa*-educated *ulemā*, who would transform the tribal chieftancy of Osman into a classical Middle Eastern Islamic state.²⁸² Aşıkpaşazāde’s account clearly points out the role of *ulemā* in this transformation. Upon deciding to establish a regular infantry, Orhan Beg was advised to ask *ulemā* how to form this army. Then he went to Çandarlı Karaca Halil (d. 1387), who was then the *qādi* of Bilecik, and acted according to his advice.

du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 135. Indeed such an attitude regarding to the early phase of Bektashism, and to Hacı Bektaş himself, was first put forward by Köprülü. He argued that heterodox tone of Bektashism, and that attributed to Hacı Bektaş, was mostly a production of later *ulemā* and sunni circles, starting with Aşıkpaşazāde. See Köprülü, “Abdal Musa”, p. 198.] ... au service des Sultans ottomans, ils deviennent des derviches colonisateurs, éducateurs et propagateurs populaires de la religion islamique et de la culture turque ; et enfin, victimes de ce rôle de colonisateurs et d’éducateurs, ils ont fini par devenir un ordre hétérodoxe, libéral, supra-confessionnel, non-conformiste et révolutionnaire.” (Mélikoff, “Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektaşis”, p. 125. Also consider her “L’Origine sociale des premiers ottomans”, pp. 136-7. Also see her “Ahmed Yesevi et la mystique populaire turque”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 149.)

²⁸² The *ulemā* immigration to the Ottoman lands gained impetus during under Orhan Beg. As will be returned later, the first Ottoman *madrassa* was opened during this time. Compare Lindner, Stimulus and Justification in Early Ottoman History”, pp. 213-6; Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, p. 16.

One should note that the existence of *fakıs*, somewhat representatives of sunni Islam, around Ottoman begs as advisors in administrative and legislative-judicial matters traces back to the time of Osman. Nevertheless, those religious figures during the early periods of the *beylik* should be rather deemed as the ‘precursor’ of the upcoming ‘high Islamic’ or ‘real’ *ulemā*. Yet no others but primarily these *fakıs* were responsible for the regulation of the social, administrative, and legal affairs of the early *beylik*. When conquered a new place Osman Beg consulted *fakıs* on how to establish the religious and legal basis of his administration in the region. As the only scholars of the (sunni) Islamic law, *fakıs* laid the legal and administrative foundations of the *beylik*. In the lower level, in towns and villages, they functioned as the ‘official’ religious leaders of the community as *imams*. As we learn from *tahrir* registers, many *waqfs* were stowed by Osman and Orhan to *fakıs*.²⁸³ In a couple of decades, however, *fakıs* left their places and roles, as advisors of the begs, to the classical *ulemā* class.

The role of the *ulemā* class, especially of the Çandarlı family, was indeed far beyond merely being advisors. Rather it stands to reason to argue that they were the real architects of the emerging state. It is to be shown that early sources of the Ottoman history present members of the Çandarlı family, who uninterruptedly held the most important posts of the state such as *kadıasker* and grand vizier through generations,²⁸⁴

²⁸³ See Halil İnalçık, “Osmanlı Tarihine Toplu bir Bakış”, p. 56; “Osman I”, p. 446; “Orhan”, p. 383.

²⁸⁴ For a biography of this utmost influential family in the Ottoman polity, especially until the conquest of Konstantinople, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Çandarlı Vezir Ailesi*, Ankara: TTK, 1988. (First published in 1974.) In his work, Uzunçarşılı provides persuasive evidence that it was indeed the Çandarlı family who created the administrative and judicial apparatus of the Ottoman state as well as directing internal and external policy of the state. In this perspective, one might regard them as real founders of the state. Nevertheless, taking advantage of the limitless charisma brought by the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II put an end to the absolute dominance of the Çandarlı family in state affairs, executing Çandarlı Halil Paşa, who was then the leader of the family and the grand vizier. For further reading on the execution of Çandarlı Halil Paşa and Mehmed II’s policy of favoring slave-origin statesmen against *ulemā*-origin statesmen, see Halil İnalçık, “İstanbul’un Fethinden Önce Fatih Sultan Mehmed”, in his *Fatih Devri Üzerine Tetkikler ve Vesikalar*, I, Ankara: TTK, 1995 (First published in 1954.), 69-136.

and other *danişmends* as immediate counselors of the sultans and as the personages who initiated all the institutions of the routinized state. It should also be mentioned that in the Ottoman realm, the first *madrasa*, perhaps one of the most important institutes of traditional Islamic civilization not only for producing science and knowledge but also providing grounds of legitimacy for Islamic states,²⁸⁵ was opened in İznik in 1331 by Orhan Beg.²⁸⁶ Needless to say, *madrasas*, and thus the scholars that graduated from these schools, proliferated literacy-based sunni Islam at the cost of ‘heterodox’ popular mysticism in the Ottoman realm.²⁸⁷

The accumulation of the *ulemā* class in the Ottoman realm did not only establish a classical Islamic state machinery but also created a culturally ‘Persianized’ and ‘Arabized’ intellectual elite, which concomitantly produced the ‘Ottoman high culture’, which was an extension of ‘the Middle Eastern cosmopolitan culture’ as called by İnalçık.²⁸⁸ Indeed, this was not an original story; before Ottomans, a differentiation between the Turkoman way of life and ‘high culture’, which was developed under the

²⁸⁵ The reader might consider that the history of *madrasa* institution traces back to the *Madrasa* of Nizamiyye founded by the famous statesmen and grand vizier of Great Seljuks. The institutionalization of education and scholarly activities under the madras system marked the Islamic *ulemā*’s loss of independency against the state. Taking their salary from the state budget, from then on *ulemā*’s role of legitimizing political power, which was actually developed to certain extent under Umayyad rule, gained stress. Hence, to a certain extent, *madrasas* served to transform religion into a tool of politics. The situation was equally valid in the Ottoman empire as well. According to Ocak, being a part of state machinery, the *ulemā* class left aside their fundamental function of producing knowledge and but engaged in producing bureaucrats to the administrative machinery and in legitimizing every action of the sultan. See Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, pp. 94, 110-11.

²⁸⁶ It should be noted, however, that one might regard the *ulemā* in the Ottoman principality at this time rather a transition generation. Dâvud-ı Kayserî, the first *mudarris* of the first *madrasa* was a genuine follower of Ibn Arabî, whose mystical teaching evolved around the theory of ‘oneness of the being’, ‘*vahdet-i vücūd*’ has always been suspected, even harshly criticized at times, among *ulemā* circles. On Dâvud-ı Kayserî, see Mehmet Süreyya, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, vol. 1, İstanbul, 1332, pp. 67-9; A. Turan Akbulut, “Dâvud-ı Kayserî”, *İslam Medeniyeti Mecmuası*, 4, 1980, 61-83; Mehmet Bayraktar, “Dâvud-ı Kayserî”, *DİA*, 9, 32-5. On the reception of Ibn Arabî’s teaching in the Ottoman world, see Michel Chodkiewicz, “İbn Arabî’nin Öğretisinin Osmanlı Dünyasında Karşılığı”, in *Osmanlı Toplumunda Tasavvuf ve Sufiler*, ed. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, Ankara: TTK, 2005, 89-111.

²⁸⁷ Compare Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, p. 82.

²⁸⁸ Halil İnalçık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, in *Ottoman Civilization*, I, edited by Halil İnalçık and Günsel Renda, Ankara: Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2004, p. 20.

patronage of sultans or begs and around palaces, had already been experienced under the Seljuks of Anatolia. As demonstrated by Ahmet Y. Ocak, the differentiation between the Turkoman mass and the Anatolian Seljukid elite, who always regarded the latter of secondary rank calling them ‘*Etrāk-i bī-idrāk*’ or ‘turks with low capacity of cognition’, soon turned into alienation, then into antagonism, and finally into a fierce clash. The Turkoman mass, now deeming Seljukid authority entirely oppressor, rose up, following messianic-millennialist teaching of Baba İlyas. It is interesting to note that it was the mystical followers of Baba İlyas and the same social segment fought under his banner that provided the foremost support to the early Ottoman begs. Nevertheless, concomitant to the consolidation of the Ottoman power, the same story repeated: the high Middle Eastern Islamic culture in the Anatolian Seljukid palace and cities now moved to the Ottoman capital. And closely linked to this process, the Turkoman elements were gradually diffused from the Ottoman official sphere.

It is not surprising to see that most of the *ulemā* and statesmen in the fourteenth-century Ottoman realm are described as either ‘coming from Persia (Acem)’ or ‘coming from Karaman’, one of the centers of Anatolian Seljukid civilization.²⁸⁹ This fact is succinctly reflected in a verse of Le’âlî:

Acem’in her biri kim Rûm’a gelir,

Ya vezâret ya sancak uma gelir.

Whoever of the Persians comes to the Ottoman land,

²⁸⁹ See, for example, APZ, pp. 154, 240. The geographic connotation of ‘Karaman’ includes both the town Lārende and the region ruled by Karaman dynasty before Ottoman annexation. After Mehmed II put an end to the Karamanid rule the whole region became an Ottoman province and called “Vilāyet-i Karaman” whose capital was Konya. See J. H. Kramers, “Karaman”, *IA*, vol. 6, pp. 309-311; “Karaman”, *IA*, 6, 309-311; Metin Tuncel, “Karaman”, *DIA*, 24, 444-447. While Aşıkpaşazâde was writing his history, this was already happened. So when his context above ‘Karaman’ must be taken as Konya and the high Islamic cultural basin around.

Comes either for a hope of a ministry or a governorship.²⁹⁰

In later periods, the prestige of Persia-Islamic culture attained such a level that writing in Turkish was perceived as insufficiency and shame. Furthermore, proving affiliation to this ‘high culture’, which in most cases meant proving to be Persian origin, automatically attracts the favor of sultan and ruling class. İnalçık notes that many Ottoman intellectuals went to Persia for further education and were welcomed as masters when they returned. An exemplary case cited by İnalçık strikingly shows the degree of Persian and Arabic dominance on the high Ottoman culture in the fifteenth century: “Lâlî, one of the scribes, stayed in Persia for a long time and when he returned, he introduced himself as Persian. He became a *musâhib* to the Conqueror and when the truth was revealed, his position of manager of the *zâviye* and his salary were taken away from him.”²⁹¹ The predicament of Turkish intellectuals and artists is perhaps best reflected in Mesîhî’s following verse:

Mesîhî gökden insen sana yer yok,

Yürü var gel Arab’dan ya Acemden.

Oh Mesîhî there is no place for you even if you descend from the Heavens

[For the only way of attaining esteem] Go and then come either from Arabia or from Persia.²⁹²

On the other hand, parallel to the consolidation of their supremacy, Ottoman sultans offered generous patronage to newly arriving intellectuals and artists, for having renowned scholars and artists in the realm was perceived as a sign of splendor. It is known that, in the fifteenth century, Ottoman sultans pursued a conscious policy to

²⁹⁰ Quoted in İnalçık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, p. 19.

²⁹¹ See İnalçık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, p. 21.

²⁹² Mesîhî, *Mesîhî Divanı*, ed. Mine Mengi, Ankara, 1995, p. 231.

attract talents from the East to the Ottoman palace. Sehi Bey states, for example, “The conqueror used to search and bring to his court people of talents in the lands of Arabia and Persia and showed to them an extraordinary esteem.”²⁹³ Indeed, the palace patronage as an institute had been already established in the Islamic world long before the Ottomans. As İnalçık indicates, in the absence of the printing press, which gave the opportunity for large masses to read and thus provided for authors a source of income as the scholars and artists were dependent on the support of rulers and ruling class. It is simply because of this fact that ‘high culture’ in most Islamic states existed basically as the palace culture.²⁹⁴ Another function of the patronage of culture in the Turkish-Mongol states appeared as “the process of adopting the indigenous civilization for the military class.”²⁹⁵

To conclude, the intellectual and cultured elite of the Ottoman state were formed by ‘immigrant’ or ‘imported’ *ulemā* and bureaucrats as well as artists and men of letters. While establishing the administrative machinery, they also imported high Islamic civilization, which had flourished in the hinterlands of Islam, to the Ottoman cities. Hence, imitating traditional style in the great Islamic states, a ‘palace culture’ of Ottomans was also growing under the initiative of ‘imported’ intellectuals and artists. Of course many indigenous scholars and artists educated in Ottoman *madrasas* and grown up in the palace banquets of either the sultans themselves or of other prominent

²⁹³ Sehi Bey, *Heşt Bihişt*, ed. G. Kut, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 97. For further discussion of the issue, see İnalçık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, pp. 18-23.

²⁹⁴ İnalçık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, p. 18. For further reading on the palace patronage of science and art in the Ottoman empire, and in the Islamic world in general, see Halil İnalçık, *Şair ve Patron: Patrimonyal Devlet ve Sanat Üzerinde Sosyolojik Bir İnceleme*. Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2003; “Klasik Edebiyat Menşei: İrani Gelenek, Saray İşret Meclisleri ve Musâhib Şâirler”, *Türk Edebiyatı Tarihi*, 1, ed. Talât Halman, İstanbul: TC Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2006, 221-82.

²⁹⁵ İnalçık, “The ‘Ottoman Civilization’ and Palace Patronage”, p. 18.

statesmen appeared in the course of time. Nonetheless the hegemony of Persian and Arabic culture in the Ottoman high circles continued.

From the fifteenth century on, the ‘Persianized’ and ‘Arabized’ elite began to recruit novices from a completely new source of men: the slaves or *kapı kulları*. In the middle of the fifteenth century the power of slave-origin statesmen reached such a level that the sultan used to use the balance of power between them and *ulemā*-origin statesmen to maintain his absolute authority. It has been shown that following the conquest of Constantinople, the Conqueror changed the balance within the Ottoman state machinery in favor of the former group.

A detailed analysis of the emergence of the Ottoman bureaucratic elite and *ulemā* class is far beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to state here that by end of the fifteenth century, an ‘Ottoman ruling elite’ with well-determined cultural, intellectual, ideological, and social boundaries had already emerged. Being eminently attached to the classical Middle Eastern Islamic cosmopolitan culture, they were totally alienated from the simple culture and ‘way of life’ of Turkomans.

3.2.3. The Development of the Ottoman Ideology or “Imperial Regime”

It should be mentioned that the arising ‘official ideology’ developed concomitantly with the growing of the elite class. The official ideology of Ottomans was indeed a work of these elite. The most dominant components of the ‘Ottoman official ideology’ might well be regarded as the notion of the exalted-eternal state (*devlet-i ebed-müddet*)²⁹⁶ as a

²⁹⁶ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak argues that in the Ottoman empire the sate is a subject of belief and regarded as a sacred being. See Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, p. 73. Ocak also underlines that, following the Islamic state tradition, Ottomans perceived ‘state’ and ‘religion’ (*din ü devlet*) as inseparable twins. See *ibid*, p. 83.

possession of the Sultan (patrimonial state)²⁹⁷ and the sunni-orthodox way of Islam as socio-religious system of the empire to maintain the order and harmony.²⁹⁸ Indeed, as Ocak indicates state and religion were so much intermingled that the border-line between the two was usually blurred.²⁹⁹ The first notion was chiefly developed by slave-origin statesmen whose existence and prosperity was eminently linked to the state, while the ‘approved way of socio-religious, and dependently judicial, life’ was proliferated by the *ulemā* class.³⁰⁰

In terms of polity, what the Ottoman regime premised was for the tribal Turkomans unacceptable by nature. The ideal society envisaged was composed of compartments with well-defined boundaries; and inter-compartment transition was strongly discouraged.³⁰¹ This political understanding was conceptualized as the “order of

²⁹⁷ Halil İnalçık analyzes the patrimonial nature of the Ottoman state, making special reference to Max Weber’s typification of the Ottoman polity. See Halil İnalçık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’: Max Weber’s Typification of the Ottoman Polity.” *Princeton Papers: In Near Eastern Studies* 1, 1992, 49-72.

²⁹⁸ Compare Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, pp. 104-5.

²⁹⁹ Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, p. 73. Also consider Halil İnalçık, “Islam in the Ottoman Empire”, *Cultura Turcica*, 5-7, 1968-1970, 19-29.

³⁰⁰ It should be noted that although there were some slave-origin scholars from the fifteenth century onwards, the members of the *ulemā* class were principally derived from the Muslim subjects of the empire. İnalçık points out this fact in a slightly different manner: “... with regard to the concept of state, while the *ulemā* laid emphasis on the Islamic notions, the bureaucrats (*küttâb*) insisted on the Turko-Iranian traditions.” See Halil İnalçık, “State, Sovereignty and Law during the Reign of Süleymân”, in his *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire*, Bloomington, 1993, p. 70. The twin-structure of the Ottoman state is clearly visible in the judicial system of the empire. As is well-known, Ottoman laws rose upon two different sources: the Shari’a and the Tradition or *Örf*. The affairs of the religious sphere and daily life of the *re’āya* were subject to the Islamic Law, while the state affairs were arranged by the Sultanic Laws, whose origin traces back to the Turko-Mongolian tradition of *örf* or *yasa*. İnalçık indicates that by the Turkish domination in the Islamic world, which started mainly by Great Seljuks in the tenth and eleventh centuries, Islamic scholars developed a political theory which emphasizes the necessity of a sultanic authority separated from the religious law. Thence, in the later Islamic states, the temporal rulers enjoyed the power to create a ‘secular’ sphere of jurisprudence side by side the Shari’a. See Halil İnalçık, “Şerî’at ve Kanun, Din ve Devlet”, in his *Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk, Adâlet*, İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000, 39-46.

³⁰¹ As İnalçık has pointed out, Ottomans inherited this type of conceptualization of state from the Persian tradition, which divides the society into four estates at the top of which, between the society and God indeed, stays the ruler: 1) clergy, 2) military, 3) scribes, 4) artisans, merchants, herders of cattle, peasants, etc. See İnalçık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’”, pp. 53-4. The letter of Tansar, a royal advice letter from Sasanian times, advises the ruler: “Assuredly there shall be no passing from one [estate] to another unless in the character of one of us outstanding capacity is found. ... The King of kings ... kept each man in his

the realm” or “*nizām-ı ālem*”. The protection of the order of the realm was more important than all affairs.³⁰² The protection of the order generally meant keeping every subject within their own social compartment. Hence Ottoman polity fervently favored social stability and strongly discouraged social mobility.³⁰³ Indeed, most of the stern reactions of the state against social upheavals, including Qizilbash rebellions, were simply because of the menace posed to the socio-political order of the Ottomans. Nevertheless, the harsh measures of the state were usually skinned by the religious formulation of heresy.³⁰⁴

The most evident discrimination in this ideal socio-political order was between the ruling class (*askerī*) and ruled subjects (*re'āya*).³⁰⁵ The foremost concern of the Ottoman regime had always been to absorb the political content of the *re'āya*, aiming to make politics an exclusive profession of the *askerī* class. In order to achieve this goal against tribal order, Ottoman policy focused on destructing two fundamental basis' of the tribal system: breaking down the hereditary transmission of power and prosperity

own station and forbade any to meddle with a calling other than that for which it had pleased God ... to create him. He laid commands moreover on the heads of the four estates. ... All were concerned with their means of livelihood and their own affairs, and did not constrain kings to this by evil devices and acts of rebellion. ... The commands given by the King of kings for occupying people with their own tasks and restraining them from those of others are for the stability of the world and the order of the affairs of men. ...” See The Letter of Tansar, trans. M. Boyce, Rome, 1968, pp. 33-6. Quoted and cited in İnalcık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’”, pp. 53-4.

³⁰² It is interesting to note that among the most popular disciplines in the Ottoman *madrasas* was *fikh*, the Islamic jurisprudence, which deals with the clarification, consolidation, and imposition of the rules of the Ottoman socio-religious order.

³⁰³ Compare Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, p. 84, Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, pp. 51-66.

³⁰⁴ The reader might remember the merged nature of state and religion in the Ottoman empire.

³⁰⁵ See, for example, İnalcık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’”, p. 49; “Quelques remarques sur la formation du capital dans l’empire ottoman”, *Histoire Economique du Monde Méditerranéen 1450-1650: Melanges en l’Honneur de Fernand Braudel*, 1973, p. 235. According to Kafadar, the stratification of society as *askerī* and *re'āya* traces back to the time of Murad I, who also appointed first *kādıasker* and frontier begs (*uç beyleri*). See Kafadar, pp. 142-3.

and dividing subjects into the smallest pieces so that they would be totally devoid of the capacity to develop socio-political organization.³⁰⁶

From this point of view, one may regard Ottoman *timar* system as a perfect embodiment of the Ottoman classical regime developed at the cost of the tribal system. As well-known *timar* holders were simply servants of the sultan without any social and lineage roots and were appointed directly by the central government.³⁰⁷ It is true that the Ottomans assigned *timars* to the local aristocracy of the region they conquered. However, they usually received a *timar* in region far away from their homeland.³⁰⁸ Furthermore, upon the death of a *timar* holder, his offspring could take over only a small portion of the prosperity of their father. So as *timar* regime progressed so did the function of heredity decrease in the administrative system.

³⁰⁶ Indeed, following the Persian tradition, Ottomans regarded the right of rule solely a possession of the Sultan. The *askerî* class was nothing but the tool of the Sultan in ruling *re'āya*. One should remember that in this context ruling means to preserve every member of society within their pre-described boundaries, or to preserve the 'order of the affairs of men'. In the letter of Tansar cited above, the first three estates obviously constitute the state, i.e. *askerî* class in the Ottoman context. As owner of the state, thus, the Sultan was to a certain extent, also owner of the people belonging to the *askerî* class. In the classical form of the Ottoman regime, *kuls* represented arguably the 'perfect *askerîs*', owing everything to the Sultan, but, in return, holding the most important posts of the state and exercising the power in the name of the Sultan. Although being deemed *askerî*, the *ulemā* had a different status. Nevertheless, the status, privileges, and any forms of power were delivered directly by the Sultan to all members of *askerî* class, either *kul*- or Turkish-origin. As the absolute owner of the whole state apparatus, thus, the Sultan enjoyed some sort of ownership on the people running the state. On the other hand, the *re'āya* was in a completely different status. They were, to certain extent, protected from the arbitrary interference of the Sultan by the Shari'a. In the meantime, they were 'subject' to the rule of *askerî* class with the full meaning of the word. The function of *re'āya* was strictly limited to the production of food and goods. (For a broader analysis of the Ottoman polity, see İnalcık, "Comments on 'Sultanism'", especially pp. 49-60.) There is no doubt that the Ottoman monarchy with a highly centralized administrative apparatus and an omnipotent ruler at the top took its classical form under Mehmed II. With the immense prestige provided by the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II first eliminated elements which could have resisted him. (His execution of Çandarlı Halil Pasha and dismissal of this family from effective posts in the bureaucracy is already referred.) The reader might remember that the first codes or general *kanun-nāmes* were promulgated by Mehmed II. See Halil İnalcık, "Mehmed II", *IA*, 7, 506-535; "Kānunnāme", *EI2*, electronic edition; "The Rise of the Ottoman Empire", *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. I, eds., P. M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and B. Lewis, Cambridge, 1970, pp. 300-308; "Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş, Örfî- Sultanî Hukuk ve Fatih'in Kanunları, Siyasi İlimler ve Hukuk", *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 13, 1958, 102-126.

³⁰⁷ For *timar* regime, see Halil İnalcık, "Tīmār", *EI2*; "Giriş" in his *Hicri 835 tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-ı Arvanid*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954, pp. XI-XXXVI; Ömer Lütfi Barkan, "Timar", *IA*, 12/1, 286-333.

³⁰⁸ See, for example, APZ, pp. 219-20.

As İnalçık formulized long ago, the *timar* regime of the Ottomans is based, first of all, on peasant family units (*çift-hane* system).³⁰⁹ A family unit, in this system, was simply an agricultural producer totally dismantled of political and military content. More important perhaps is that they were placed in a situation in which they could never come together to form a political or military unit. Rather the political and military functions in the rural area were wholly designed to be held by *sipāhis*, who were simply appointed servitors of the sultan. As a famous maxim frequented in the Ottoman law codes, “*re’āya ibn-i re’āya*”, suggests, even the doors for a peasant-subject to become a state servitor, or a member of the ruling class (*askerī*) are almost completely closed. In the Ottoman regime, the ideal *re’āya* was obedient to the ruling class (*ulū’l-emr*), totally apolitical, never regarding himself in a position to interfere in politics, was totally subjugated to the established socio-political order and never thinking of changing his status.³¹⁰ The class of ‘ideal subjects’, which constituted the principal producer class of the empire, were under cautious protection of the sultan himself.³¹¹ Comment should be made here of the frequent articles in the Ottoman law codes insistently ordering to protect the rights of subjects against usurpations of *askerīs*.³¹²

³⁰⁹ For *çift-hane* system, see Halil İnalçık, "Osmanlılar'da Raiyyet Rüsûmu", *Belleten*, 23, 1959, 575-610.

³¹⁰ See Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, p. 92.

³¹¹ The protection of small farmers, or peasants, had always been foremost concern of the Sultan since they constituted the principal producer class, thus, the principal source of revenue for the treasury. See, for example, İnalçık, “Comments on ‘Sultanism’”, pp. 62-3.

³¹² Ottoman sultans used to promulgate frequent firmans, which might also be regarded as law code, called *adâletnâme* to protect against the usurpation of ruling class, i. e. *askerīs*. In these imperial edicts the agents of the sultan in provincial offices were strictly banned any practice outside the *kānun*, or law, which was deemed as oppression (*zulm*). (For a detailed analysis of *adâletnâmes*, see Halil İnalçık, “Adâletnâmeler”, *Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, 11, 1965, 49-145. Also consider Halil İnalçık, “Şikâyet Hakkı: ‘Arz-i Hâl ve ‘Arz-i Mahzar’lar”, in his *Osmanlı’da Devlet, Hukuk, Adâlet*, İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000, 49-71.) This was stemmed from the notion of ‘*adâlet*, justice, a key principle constituted the kernel of pre-Islamic Persian or Middle Eastern political systems, which was later developed by Muslim bureaucrats as well. See Halil İnalçık, “State, Sovereignty and Law during the Reign of Süleymân”, pp. 70-78.

Needles to say, such a piecemeal organization could by no means conform with the nature of the tribal way of life, which was based intrinsically on their social organization around a lineage, either real or fictitious. Therefore, dividing a tribal unit into small pieces is impossible by definition. In other words, it means completely destroying the tribal mode of life. As a matter of fact, Ottoman *kanuns* set nomadic tribes apart from the ordinary subjects of the sultan. In the compilations of cadastres, they were registered by tribes or *cema'ats* not by individual or family with places of residence, as it was with ordinary *re'āya*. This was, indeed, inevitable: each tribe was a compact political entity, having its own social organization under a tribal chief, who was the intermediary between the tribesmen and the outside world. The Ottoman administrative system, therefore, had to identify tribes by their chiefs, but could not reach every single individual within the tribe, whose absolute loyalty was, before all, to his tribal chief.³¹³ It is also evident that the Ottoman model also desired sedentarizing nomads. Rudi Paul Lindner showed that Ottoman regulations aimed either to sedentarize nomads or “to circumscribe their migrations within a predictable, ‘settled’ routine.”³¹⁴ Ottoman administration evidently aimed to curb down two essential features of the nomadic-tribal mode of life, namely movement and independence, for these features

³¹³ Lindner detects, in cadastres from the early sixteenth century, some attempts of central government to reach down inside the structure of the tribe, bypassing the chiefs and aiming to weaken the political structure of tribes. See Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, p. 95.

³¹⁴ Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, p. 51. Lindner also determines as an outcome of sedentarization policy that in Axylon, for example, the pasturelands and average herds per household decreased from 1500 to 1500, while *mezraas* and revenues from Horse Drovers (Atçeken) nomads increased. See *ibid*, p. 87. Lindner's case study on Atçeken tribes in the first quarter of the sixteenth century shows that the Ottoman administration forced nomadic tribes to settle down by limiting the pastures on the one hand and by levying heavy taxes over herds on the other. As a result, nomads could not maintain minimal seize of herds to perpetuate nomadic life and inevitably settled down. See *ibid*, pp. 75-96. Some premises of Lindner are, however, criticized by Halil İnalçık, who accuses the former for misinterpreting the Ottoman taxation system of subjects, namely *çift-resmi* system. See İnalçık, “The Yürüks”, pp. 112-3. For a detailed study on Atçeken tribes, see Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “A propos des tribus Atçeken (XVe-XVIe siècles)”, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. XXX, 1987, 122-95.

made it difficult to govern them.³¹⁵ On the other hand, this two-fold demand of *timar* regime was basically intolerable for nomadic-tribes, for it threatened the very existence of their ‘way of life’.³¹⁶ At the end, as Lindner concludes, under the prescribed conditions “the poor nomad had the final choice of either settlement or revolt.”³¹⁷

One should also point the fiscal aspects of *timar* system, which was also incompatible with the nomadic mode of life. First of all, the *timar* regime rested upon a regular record keeping system. All the subjects of the heartlands, the lands on which *timar* regime was imposed, of the empire were recorded according to their tax incumbencies as family or half-family units in *mufassal tahrir* registers (*defter*). Then the sources of income were distributed *timar* holders, which was also registered as *icmāl defters*. Thus the system established a socio-economic structure which clearly determined the limits of freedom for the *re’āya*, and strictly forbade going outside the pre-described sphere. Remembering the fact that the nomadic mode of life is essentially rested on ‘mobility’³¹⁸, one would easily recognize how deep the contradiction between the ‘ideal social system’ of the Ottomans and the nomadic way of life.

³¹⁵ Lindner already discussed Ottoman regulations discouraging nomadic-tribal mode of life by levying heavy taxes and fines. In addition to fiscal pressures on nomadic mode of existence, they were also forced to fulfill demeaning duties in the military system of the state. See Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, p. 66.

³¹⁶ Compare, Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, pp. 54-5.

³¹⁷ Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, p. 66.

³¹⁸ The essence of nomadic mode of life, without doubt, is mobility or constant movement. Roger Cribb determines essential features of nomadic life as follows: 1) The presence of transhumance migrations of livestock accompanied by human communities- vertical or horizontal, long or short distance. 2) The possibility of fluidity in the formation of residential associations, including some turnover in group membership in both seasonal and long term changes in the size of co-resident communities. 3) A high degree of household autonomy at the operational level of herding logistics and camp group formation. 4) The maintenance of a flexible system of rights of axes to territory in accordance with frequent changes in residence and wholesale shifts in the pattern of migration tracks and demands on grazing land. See Roger Cribb, *Nomads in Archaeology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 20. For another definition of pastoral nomadism see Khazanov, p. 16-17. In his definition Khazanov makes clear distinctions in economic terms. He stresses two fundamental features of nomads, which are their engagement in extensive mobile pastoralism and in periodic migrations. Fredrick Barth records his observations on Basseri as follows: “The life of nomads is going on a constant move. They pitch and unstick tents continuously. Thus the question of whether to move on, or to stay camped, constitutes the

The constant movement, in fact, does not govern merely daily life of nomads but shapes the basis of all aspects of life. Their economy, material culture, social relations, moral values, mentality, religious interpretations must be all in competence with constant move. In sedentary life, contrary to nomadic one, the fundamental institutions of daily life and of society as a whole are based on fixed elements. They live in a immovable house; their farms and fields, which constitute the primary means of economy, are stationary; they live in a geographically well-delimited village or town during almost all of their lifetime; the web of social relations is stable, since they see more or less same faces in their routine; they master the environment creating well-protected houses, villages, and towns, shaping close environment as they wish since they live for longtime in same bounded territory. Hence, the position and ‘coordinates’ of every member in sedentary society are well determined. They can hardly surpass the spatial and social space pre-determined. The situation is completely opposite in nomadic societies. They do not recognize borders; they can not be confined in a spatial space. Being considerably free from territorial boundaries and spatial constraints, they would hardly accept structure and stability of any kind. The notion of independence can be arguably regarded as one of the most prominent traits of a nomad’s disposition. They successfully combine political autonomy with cultural and economic dependence. Besides being essentially reliant on their sedentary counterpart, independence

most crucial problem in daily life of nomads. These decisions are the very staff of a pastoral nomad existence; they spell the difference between growth and prosperity of the herds, or loss and poverty. Every household in a camp is autonomous. Hence every day the members of the camp should decide whether to move or to stay. The maintenance of a camp as a social unit thus requires the daily unanimous agreement by all members.”³¹⁸ See Fredrik Barth, *Nomads of South Persia, The Basseri Tribe of the Khamseh Confederacy*, Illinois: Waveland Press, 1961, p. 26.

paradoxically constitutes one of the fundamental characteristics of nomadic life.³¹⁹ Needless to say, therefore, nomadic tribes strongly resisted the expansion of *timar* system.

To summarize, it was indeed these two principal foundations of the Ottoman official ideology or imperial regime that was chiefly responsible for producing an antagonized social segment, which would appear with their red head-gear in Anatolia. It is to be shown that both the political-military and religious aspects of the Qizilbash movement evolved in response to the arising official ideology or regime of the Ottoman state. On one hand, the notion of the exalted state, which leaves no room for the political content of tribal organization, seriously disturbed the existing political habits of the militant Turkomans. On the other hand, the sunni-orthodox version of Islam imposed on the subjects by the state was neither practicable nor perceivable by nomadic Turkomans, who were too ignorant to understand the subtler details of the religion; thus the ‘approved’ way of religion was unacceptable for them. As a matter of fact, they refuted both imposition of the Ottoman regime and raised the banner of revolt, which would appear as if in the name of Safavid shaykhs.³²⁰

³¹⁹ For a broader evaluation of nomadic autonomy in context of cultural and economic dependence among Middle Eastern tribes see Gellner, “Tribal Society and Its Enemies”, p. 442.

³²⁰ One should be reminded, however, that not all the discontent Turkomans converted to the Qizilbashism; but a considerable portion somehow conformed within the Ottoman regime. The focus of the present study is those Turkomans who did not conform but raised strong resistance against the Ottoman imperialism.

3.3. OTTOMAN REGIME'S DISCONTENTS

3.3.1. Early Protests

The protest of the Turkoman milieu against the development of the administrative apparatus and the growing Ottoman high culture is vividly reflected in the Anonymous histories. As Fuat Köprülü put it, Anonyms were produced among lower strata of the society and were written to be read by laymen.³²¹ Therefore, they are much closer to folk sentiment and opinion than any other early chronicles. In the Anonyms there are clever criticisms against centralization policies and bureaucratization of the state. As a strategy, they never directly attacked the sultans but point their criticisms towards Çandarlı Kara Halil and other *danişmends* who were responsible for establishment of the scribal base of the state. They accused the newly emerging statesmen of innovating the 'register', where the tax revenues were written down, which was previously unknown to them.³²² Another severe criticism of Anonyms pointed towards the arising *ulemā* and bureaucratic elite was that these two groups were accumulating a large amount of money in the state treasury but not delivering it to the *gāzi*-fighters.³²³ This point appears to be very important in order to understand the tribal nomadic mentality regarding a state organization. These sources depict the piling up of money in the state treasury as a

³²¹ Köprülüze Mehmed Fuad, "Lütfi Paşa", *Türkiyat Mecmuası*, I, 1926, p. 148.

³²² Compare Halil İncik, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", *Studia Islamica*, 2, 1954, pp. 104-5.

³²³ According to the tradition, the innovation of one-fifth rule that is taking one-fifth of the booty for the treasury was first suggested by a *danişmend* came from 'Karaman vilāyeti', namely Kara Rüstem. Aşıkpaşazāde narrates the innovation of this practice, which naturally created a serious discontent among *gāzi* leaders, with a veiled criticizing manner. As will be delineated, the practice of one-fifth rule constituted the starting point of the invention of the Janissary corps. See APZ, p. 35; *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, Giese Neşri, p. 25; *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512)*, pp. 28-9.

useless, even harmful, act and regard this practice of bureaucrats as stinginess.³²⁴

Another point to be noticed is that they present such scholars, which were depicted *Acem* or *Karamânî* origin, as the source of all evil innovations, which was actually nothing more than the establishment of the early forms of the routinized state's administrative institutions.

...Heman kim Osman beğlerine Acem ve Karamânîler musâhib oldu, Osman beğleri dahi dürlü dürlü günahlarla mürtekeb oldılar. Kaçan kim Çandarlu Kara Halil ve Karamânî Rüstem bu ikisi ol zamanda ulular ve âlimler idi, heman kim bunlar Osman beğleri yanına geldiler, dürlü dürlü hileyile âlemi toldırdılar, andan ilerü hesab-defter bilmezlerdi, heman anlar Osman beyleri yanına geldiler, hesap defteri anlar te'lif itdiler. Akçayı yığıp hazine idinmek anlardan kaldı.³²⁵

The criticism, however, is not limited merely to the efforts of establishing a bureaucratic state. The emergence of 'palace life', which, following the tradition, centered on drinking gatherings (*bezm*), is also deemed among most evil innovations in the Ottoman realm. So the 'imported' intellectuals and artists, who were chiefly responsible for the development of this 'alien' style of living and administering, are bitterly criticized by Anonymous authors, and by Aşıkpaşazâde as well. These histories trace the practice of wine drinking in the Ottoman dynasty back to Bayezid I, who is known with his vigorous effort to create a centralized empire.³²⁶ It is claimed that early

³²⁴ “*Ol zamanda pâdişahlar tama'kâr değüllerdi. Her ne ellerine girürse yiğide yegile virürlerdi. Hazine nedür bilmezlerdi. Heman kim Hayreddin Paşa kapuya geldi, pâdişahlar ile tama'kâr dânişmendler musâhib olub takvâyı koyub fetvâyâ yürüdiler. 'Hazine dahi pâdişah olana gerekdür' didiler. Ol zamanda pâdişahları kendülere döndürdiler. Eydürler: 'Tama' ve zulm peydâ oldı, elbette tama' olduğu yerde zulm dahi olsa gerekdür, şimdiki halde dahi ziyâde oldı. Bu memleketlerde ne kadar zulm ve fesâd olsa dânişmendlerdendir, sebep anlardır. Eğer anlar ilm ile amel eyleseler ümmî halk dahi anlara tâbi olurlardı' dirler.*” See *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri*, p. 27; *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512)*, p. 31.

³²⁵ See *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri*, haz. Nihat Azamat, Istanbul, 1992, p. 33. Aşıkpaşazâde also criticizes *dânişmend*s for similar reasons. But his stress was rather on the 'immoral' and 'irreligious' acts of these men of pen surrounded the sultan rather than crucial innovations towards bureaucratic state.

³²⁶ Bayezid I is usually accepted as the first Ottoman sultan who attempted to create a centralized empire. İncalcık says, for example, “Bayezid was responsible for the development of the semi-feudal state of Osman Gâzi and Orhan Gâzi with its vassals and powerful uc-beyis (chiefs in the military frontier-zone), into a real Islamic Sultanate with traditional institutions.” See İncalcık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, p.

Ottoman begs, until Bayezid I, never drank wine and followed the words of sincere *ulemā*. The *Ulemā* in their time, on the other hand, prudently followed the orders of the religion, but looked not for posts in the state machinery, which naturally made them indifferent to the orders of the religion. By the time of Bayezid I, however, the new type of *ulemā* organized drinking parties with the sultan and engaged in all sorts of immoral acts. The Serbian wife of Bayezid I is also said responsible for making the sultan addicted to the wine. Aşıkpaşazāde writes,

Bayazıd Han sohbet esbābın Laz kızı elinden öğrendi. Ali Paşa mu'āvenetiylen şarap ve kebab meclisi kuruldı. ... Bunlar bir sādık soydur. Hiç bunlardan nāmeşru hareket vāki olmamış idi. Ulemā bir nesneye kim yazuk deye, Āl-i Osman andan kaçarlar idi. Orhan zamanında ve Gāzi Murad Han zamanında ulemā var idi. Ve illā müfsid değüller idi tā Candarlu Halil'e gelince. Kaçan kim Candarlu Halil geldi, Türk Rüstem geldi, Mevlāna Rüstem dediler, āleme hile karuşdurdılar. Halil'ün oğlu Ali Paşa kim vezir oldu danişmend dahı anın zamanında çoğ oldu. Bu Āl-i Osman bir sulb kavm idi, anlar kim geldiler fetvāyı hile etdiler, takvāyı götürdiler. Üşbu vilāyetde kim eski akçeye kimse satu bazar etmeye ve hem gayri vilāyete gitmeye, Ali Paşa zamanında oldu. Bu Ali Paşa zevvāk kişiydi. Müsāhibleri dahı zevvāk oldılar. ... Zira anun yanına hīle eder Acem danişmendleri çok gelürler idi.³²⁷

Both Aşıkpaşazāde and Anonymous history incline to see the reasons of Bayezid I's defeat against Timur in the aforementioned 'irreligious' innovations, which distanced the ruling elite from the subjects. A close examination would show that this account reflects the historical fact in a sense that the accelerated centralization process of the administration, which went hand in hand with the growth of 'Ottoman elite', created a vast discontent among Turkoman subjects, who still constituted the majority, as well as widening the socio-cultural distance between the two. Furthermore, Bayezid I attempted

105. Likewise, differing from his predecessors who referred themselves as 'gāzi', Bayezid I, for the first time, claimed the title Eşrefu's-Selātin, the most distinguished and honored of the Muslim rulers. See İnalçık, "The Rise of Ottoman Historiography", p. 166. Nonetheless, the heavy blow by Timur in 1401 postponed Bayezid's project half a century.

³²⁷ APZ, pp. 138-9. Also see *Anonim Tevārih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri*, pp. 31-4; *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512)*, p. 36.

to transform the state still bearing traits of confederacy into a strictly centralized empire, trying to grind Turkoman dynasties of Anatolia up. Nevertheless, the center had not yet achieved enough gravity to stick all political actors together that in the battle of Ankara most of the Turkoman fighters under their own leader left Bayezid I with his Christian soldiers.³²⁸ The words attributed to Timur summarize the mentality and attitude of the milieu discontent of the rising Ottoman regime and of its actors. When brought to his court, Timur asks Bayezid I in a mocking manner, “*Hay Bayazid Han! Kamı ol güvendüğün oğulların, ol sancağın beğleri, ya ol sarhoş vezirlerün? Ne gökçek yoldaşlık ettiler sana!*”³²⁹

As stated previously, the sentiments and opinion of heterodox sufi milieu is best reflected in anonymously authored hagiographies or *velâyetnâmes* as well. So the change in the attitude of popular mystics towards the changing Ottoman state might be observed in some *velâyetnâme* accounts. Among the several exemplary cases demonstrating the disaffection of these mystics, and thus Turkoman folk populace attached to them, to the rising ‘Ottoman regime’, I will examine an account in the *Velâyetnâme* of Seyyid Ali Sultan, also known as Kızıldeli.³³⁰ One peculiarity of this

³²⁸ Indeed, already before the Battle of Ankara, many Turkoman begs of Anatolia suffering from Bayezid I’s arrogant policies, such as Germiyanoğlu, Aydınoğlu, Menteşeoğlu, and İsfendiyaroğlu, went to the court of Timur provoking him to invade Anatolia. See APZ, p. 142.

³²⁹ APZ, p. 144. Anonymous history says, Turkoman begs and soldiers left Bayezid I in the battlefield and only his own retinue or standing army (*kapusu halkı*) remained loyal to him. See *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, p. 43.

³³⁰ The *Velâyetnâme* of Seyyid Ali Sultan was published in a non-scholarly manner by Bedri Noyan. (Bedri Noyan, *Seyyit Ali Sultan Velâyetnâmesi*, Ankara:Ayyıldız Yayınları, 1999.) Noyan states in the introductory part of his work that he used a copy given to him by his spiritual master. But it is apparently a copy of the manuscript preserved in the Ankara National Library, (Manuscript section no.1189) apart from that there are a couple of other copies in Turkey whose content does not differ from the National Library copy. John K. Birge states that another copy existed in the *Tekke* of Kaygusuz Abdal, in Cairo. But after the closing of the *tekke* by the socialists in the middle of the nineteenth century this copy was lost. Nevertheless, luckily, Birge had copied this manuscript and his (uncatalogued) copy is preserved in Hartford Seminary Library in Connecticut. For an analysis of this hagiography as a source for history and edited text of the hagiography see Rıza Yıldırım, *Seyyid Ali Sultan(Kızıldeli) ve Velâyetnâmesi*.

hagiography strikingly probes the focus of this study's thesis. A close examination makes it clear that the attitude of the hagiography regarding the relationship between the state authority and popular *sufi* milieu changes markedly after the settlement of the Dervishes. Until then, the relationship between the two sides seems to be developed on mutual profit and reflects a deep respect of both parties to one another. The Hagiography mirrors the opinion of the Dervishes, and in a broader sense, the opinion of laymen who still maintained the Turkish culture and tradition which was chiefly nomadic in character. Hence, it gives the primary rank to Seyyid Ali Sultan and the dervishes. Nonetheless, it also refers to Ottoman sultans and commanders such as Orhan Beg, Suleyman Pasha, and Gazi Evrenos with great respect.

After a series of conquests, Kızıldeli and his mystic companions refrain from the waging of war and each settles in different places. From then on, the hagiography recounts the story of Seyyid Rüstem, who after leaving Seyyid Ali Sultan, arrives at a place he loves very much. He writes to Bayezid I requesting that he bequeath this place to him. Bayezid I accepts his request and immediately sends a document indicating that this land was bestowed to Seyyid Rüstem. Then Seyyid Rüstem goes into seclusion in a poplar copse for seven years, which at the same time marks profound changes in Rüstem's relation with state agents. At the end of his seclusion, Rüstem decides to clear the land and begins to cut down the trees. However, conditions have changed. It can be clearly seen in the account of the *velâyetnâme* that the affirmative relationship between the *dervish* milieu and the state, at least the state agents, had seriously deteriorated. The *beg* of the region, upon hearing that a dervish is cutting down trees in his district, becomes angry and immediately mounts his horse and goes to admonish Rüstem. Asking him why and with which right does he settle in this area without permission and refuse

to obey the law, Rüstem, replies: “this is my place that I conquered with my sword” and he curses the *beg* angrily.³³¹

The *mise en scene* of narration profoundly changes after Rüstem’s seclusion, which in the framework of this study symbolizes the transition from the first to the second stage. First, there was no longer such a thing as a member of the ruling dynasty, but an agent of the state, possibly the *timar* holder of the region.³³² The personal relations on issues shifted to an impersonal basis, where rules gained prominence. It is important here to remember that Rüstem was a person whose opinions and suggestions had been immediately accepted by the Sultan, and this land was also bestowed through a personal communication with the Sultan. But now, a lower-rank representative of the Sultan, whose name is not mentioned in the hagiography, does not recognize his rights, and, furthermore, does not respect him. He uses the term ‘*torlak*’ for him with the connotation of being despicable. A close examination illustrates that in this setting, *dervishes* were not considered as favorably as they had been in the first stage, at least for the *begs*, the state agents.

The quarrel between the *dervish* and the *beg* also sheds light on the profound changes in the social and political structure. It might be read as a conflict between the

³³¹ Noyan, p. 71.

³³² One of the principal basis on which Ottoman central administration developed was the revenue-holding system based on the *timar* institution. The earliest documentary references to the *timar* system dates back to the time of Orhan but the system developed gradually and took its classical form during the time of Murad II, when the first concise registers were drawn up and the system was fully developed in all its basic principles and features. The *timar* system abolished private-land holdings – except in certain extraordinary cases such as pious foundations; all newly conquered lands belonged to the state but the state distributed the right of use of the land to individuals, demanding certain taxes in return. A *timar* holder was a state agent who did not receive any stipend from the state treasury but collected the tax of a defined piece of *timar*. Since all territories of the Empire were divided and assigned to certain *timar* holders, the subjects were strictly constrained by certain duties. See Halil İnalcık, “Tīmār”, *EI*, 2nd edition; “1431 Tarihli Timar Defterine Göre Fatih Devrinden Önce Timar Sistemi”, *IV. Türk Tarih Kongresi 1948*, Ankara, 1952, 132-9; *Hicri 835 tarihli Suret-i Defter-i Sancak-ı Arvanid*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1954.

wish of nomadic mentality for freedom of action and the demand of a sedentary state to constrain its subjects within well-determined limits. When the *beg* heard about Rüstem, his immediate response was to ask: “with which courage could this *torlak* create a field in my land and stray out of the sphere of obedience? How could he reside there without permission?”³³³ It is obvious from this conversation that in the intervening years a system had been developed to which subjects were expected to conform.

The final symptom of distinction between the two parties reflected in the second part of the hagiography refers to the religious interpretation. In the first part, there is a complete harmony in religious perceptions of the *dervishes* and the members of the dynasty. They dream the same thing at the same time; they do not utilize written Islamic rules, but rather learn what to do through dreams. In one instance, Orhan saw the Prophet in a dream, ordering him to take certain portion of the booty for the state treasury. Upon Orhan’s question of how much of the booty he should take, the Prophet replied “Seyyid Rüstem knows, ask him!” Seyyid Rüstem in turn, was informed to take one fifth of the booty again through dream.³³⁴ There are many other passages in the text reflecting the religious perception of those dervishes, which was mystical, tolerant, and relied on subjective spiritual experiences rather than the written laws of Islamic *Shari’a*. The crucial point is that the hagiography depicts first Ottoman Sultans and *begs* as not just respecting that sort of interpretation of Islam represented by *dervishes*, but as accepting, sympathizing, and sharing it. In the second part, however, the *beg* is certainly disdainful of the *dervish* and his way of religious life.

³³³ Noyan, p. 70.

³³⁴ Noyan, p. 86.

Most of the events mentioned in the hagiography occurred in the second half of the fourteenth century, particularly during the reign of Orhan (1326-1362) and Murad I (1362-1389). It seems from the text and archival evidence that Seyyid Ali Sultan, Seyyid Rüstem and other dervishes settled down during the reign of Bayezid I (1389-1402) and founded their hospices in several districts in Thrace.³³⁵ From contemporary sources it can be seen that a centralistic tendency gained impetus during the reign of Bayezid I especially under the initiative of the Çandarlı Family.³³⁶ But the bureaucratic Imperial dream of Bayezid I turned into a nightmare by Timur in the Çubuk Valley, which was followed by a civil war among the sons of Bayezid I. It was after some ten years that Çelebi Mehmet, the youngest prince managed to eliminate his brothers and reunify the Ottoman territories. From then on the centralistic tendency in the state organization continued. Towards the last years of Bayezid I and later, though not being an emperor like Mehmet the Conqueror and his successors, the Ottoman Sultans could be no more be regarded as tribal chiefs as Osman and Orhan had been.

The hagiography gives Seyyid Rüstem's date of death as 1421. This can be interpreted that the first part of the narration corresponds roughly to the time of Orhan and Murad I and perhaps to the early years of Bayezid I's reign, while the second part, after the seclusion, must correspond to the reigns of Mehmed I and Murad I, when the nomadic tribal basis of the Ottoman state had already seriously diminished.³³⁷ Hence, in this perspective, the sharp change in the attitude of the hagiography towards state representatives seems quite meaningful.

³³⁵ See Beldiceanu-Steinherr , "Osmanlı Tahrir Defterlerinde Seyyid Ali Sultan: Heterodox İslam'ın Trakya'ya Yerleşmesi", p. 62.

³³⁶ See, for example, Halil İnalçık, *The Ottoman Empire The Classical Age, 1300-1600*, London, 1973, p. 16; Feridun Emecen, "Kuruluşun Küçük Kaynarca'ya", in *Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi*, cil I, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, ed., İstanbul, 1999, p. 18.

³³⁷ The first registers of land surveys were drawn up during the reign of Murat II.

This change should not be read simply as the personal contest of Seyyid Rüstem but rather as the discontent of a certain social segment, which was fit into a legendary story attributed to a highly revered religious figure. It is important to remember that the stories in this hagiography evolved in the collective memory of the social group under scrutiny through the fifteenth-century, which experienced the transmuting of the Ottoman state into its classical form with all institutions and the solidifying of its ‘official ideology’, and written down towards the end of the same century.³³⁸ From this point of view, it becomes clear that the protest of Seyyid Rüstem should be read in a broader perspective and be regarded as a middle-stage symptom of an ongoing process of alienation outlined in this chapter. Towards the end of the century, when the alienation process reached its third and final stage, in which discontent would turn into antagonism, this segment of society would not hesitate to stand up against the Ottoman imperial regime.³³⁹

3.3.2. The Opposition against the Ottoman Imperialism

3.3.2.1. ‘Akıncı’ (Passive) Resistance in Balkans

As the centralization of the Ottoman administration grew so did the discontent of local-provincial lords and tribal leaders. In the Balkans and Thrace, the resistance was represented by powerful *akıncı*-families, while in Anatolia the opposing force was organized and led by local aristocracy, whose roots trace back to the pre-Ottoman

³³⁸ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Bektaşî Menâkıbnâmelerinde İslam Öncesi İnanç Motifleri*, İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1983p. 13.

³³⁹ See, for example, Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, *Turcica*, VI, 1975, pp. 47-8.

period, and tribal chiefs. However, as J. R. Walsh already underlined, the conditions of these two opposing groups in the Balkans and Anatolia were completely different. The *akıncı*-groups in the Balkans, whose autonomy was threatened by the centralizing polity of the Ottoman state, were still dependent on the support of the Ottomans, which could prevent Christians from destroying them piecemeal, for they were still little more than small, isolated groups in the hostile territory. In Anatolia, on the other hand, the situation was completely different. First of all, there was no such menace. Second, the social roots of the Turko-Mongolian tradition were still strong in Anatolian lands. As Walsh says,

Here the Turkish tribal elements could maintain their natural independence of each other and of the central power; though the petty emirates were gradually absorbed, that instinctive separatism which had formerly atomized the Seljuq state of Rūm into ineffectual *begliks* was too ingrained in these pastoral peoples ever to respond easily to coercion or argument, especially when to the East lay an assured and inviting haven.³⁴⁰

As a matter of fact, the centralistic tendencies in the Ottoman politics created a serious discontent among the *akıncı-gāzi* milieu in the frontier regions of Thrace and the Balkans. Contemporary sources strongly suggest that the early conquests of the Ottomans in Balkans are associated with the eponymous founders of *akıncı* dynasties such as Evrenos Bey, Köse Mihal, Turahan Bey etc. These comrades of Osman, Orhan, and Murad were acting autonomously in the frontiers.³⁴¹ Beldiceanu-Steinherr already

³⁴⁰ J. R. Walsh, "The Historiography of Ottoman-Safavid Relations in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", in *Historians of the Middle East*, eds., Bernard Lewis and P. M. Holt, New York, Toronto, London: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 202. One should note that Ottoman conquests in Anatolia could attain strongholds only towards the end of the fifteenth century, when the champion of tribal resistance against Ottoman regime, namely the Karamanid dynasty, was removed. Before, Ottoman conquests in Asia Minor usually appeared as a temporary military invasion. In most cases, the former order was re-established following the return of the Ottoman army. See, for example, APZ, p. 191. Compare Oktay Özel, "The Transformation of Provincial Administration in Anatolia: Observations on Amasya from 15th to 17th Centuries", *The Ottoman Empire. Myths, Realities and 'Black Holes'. Contributions in Honour of Colin Imber*, eds., Eugenia Kermeli and Oktay Özel, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2006, 51-73.

³⁴¹ In the beginning, frontier raider-leaders were acting independently as comrades of Osman and Orhan. Osman Beg, for example, used to give conquered lands as appanage or *yurtluk* to those begs who

indicated that during the conquest of Rumelia and Thrace there were influential military and religious leaders, such as Hacı İlbeyi and Seyyid Ali Sultan, semi-dependent or independent from the Ottoman dynasty. To Beldiceanu-Steinherr, indeed, they were the ones who first crossed Maritza River and conquered many towns in the region but later became subjected to the superior authority of Murad I.³⁴²

Later on the prerogative of leading the *akıncı* troops was left in the hands of their descendents. These families with a great deal of raider-warriors under their command constituted an alternative focus of power during the formative periods of the empire, when the state institutions were still to be clearly defined and regulated. They ruled the regions that they conquered like small principalities on the frontier, with an only nominal dependence to the Ottoman sultan.³⁴³ In the course of time, when Ottomans evolved towards a bureaucratic empire, they became the representatives of the resistance against centralistic policies.

The reign of Mehmed II marked a drastic change in the status of *akıncı* families. They lost their political and military autonomy and were incorporated in the institutions

conquered those places. This practice later continued in Rumelia. See Halil İnalçık, "Periods in Ottoman History. State, Society, Economy", in *Ottoman Civilization*, vol. I, eds., Halil İnalçık and Günsel Renda, Ankara: Ministry of Culture, 2003, p. 48. Also consider Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, pp. 45-54.

³⁴² Beldiceanu-Steinherr argues that even the conquest of Adrianople was the work of these *gâzi* groups under Hacı İlbeyi. The dominance of Murad I was not before the winter of 1376-7. See her "La conquête d'Andrinople par les turcs : la pénétration turque en Thrace et la valeur des chroniques ottomanes", *Travaux et Mémoires*, 1, Paris, 1965, 439-61; "Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l'empire ottoman", pp. 44-6.

³⁴³ See İnalçık, "The Emergence of the Ottomans", p. 284. After indicating a somewhat independent status of *akıncı*-begs, İnalçık makes the point that these begs were prevented from becoming feudal lords with truly private armies since the *timars* were given directly by the sultan, who also maintained a greater power of slave surpassing the military power of *akıncı* begs. See İnalçık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", pp. 121-2. Also see Mariya Kiprovska, *The Military Organization of the Akıncıs in Ottoman Rumelia*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Bilkent University, 2004, pp. 22-3. To give an example of the excessive power held by *akıncı* commanders, Konstantin the Philosopher, who was a clerk in the court of the Serbian ruler Stefan Lazarević, on his eyewitness account states that Musa Çelebi wanted to kill Mihaloğlu Mehmet Bey, who was an *akıncı* commander under his rule, since the latter gained too much glory and was suspected to have condoned the escape of George Branković. Recited in Kiprovska, p. 25.

of the empire; their loyal *akıncı* troops turned into a branch of imperial army effectively controlled by the sultan. The nearly independent frontier begs of the early periods now became almost fully subdued officers in the administrative system of the empire, namely *sanjakkbeyi*. Although they preserved their hereditary rights on the commandership of *akıncı* troops, this was now far from providing any means of independence from the sultan for the latter was fully integrated into the centralized Ottoman army.³⁴⁴ Towards the end of his reign, so much power accumulated in the hands of Mehmed II that he could confiscate the property of great *akıncı* families along with the properties of other noble families and dervish lodges. The *waqf* of Malkoçoğulları in the region of Hasköy and the *mülk* of Turahanoğulları in Thrace were turned into *timar*.³⁴⁵

Closely connected to the aforementioned structural and geo-political conditions, however, *akıncı* begs of Rumelia could not dare to take arms against the central authority. Rather they pursued a policy of passive protest such as supporting heterodox *sufis*, patronizing antinomian-critical literature against the orthodox establishment, recovering or adding new buildings to prominent shrines, which were centers of pilgrimage of the unorthodox population of the empire. One should also mention the fact that the protest in the Balkans was religiously proliferated by heterodox mystics known as Abdal, Kalenderî, Hurufî, and Bektashi.³⁴⁶

³⁴⁴ Mehmed II exercised his power on *akıncı* begs by appointing them as *sancakbey* to several *sancaks* for short periods of time. For some examples, see Kiprovska, pp. 32-4.

³⁴⁵ For a broader look at the issue, see M. Tayyip Gökbilgin, *XV-XVI. Asırlarda Edirne ve Paşa Livası. Vakıflar-Mülkler-Mukataalar*, İstanbul: Üçler Basımevi, 1952, pp. 276-341.

³⁴⁶ As has been already put by several scholars all these 'heterodox' for some reasons had merged in the Bektashi Order by the seventeenth century at the latest.

The *akıncı* families - and fighters under their banners – were, indeed, representatives of the frontier (*uç*) culture³⁴⁷, and thus had close links with heterodox dervish milieu, just like the early Ottomans during the foundation period. The ‘strongholds’ of these powerful families in the Balkans emerged as centers of unorthodox Sufism, which had intrinsic ties with the frontier culture and enjoyed the patronage of these families. To give an example, towards the end of the fifteenth century and during the sixteenth century Yenice-i Vardar under Evrenosoğlu patronage became one of the most important cultural centers of the empire, where a number of poets affiliated to heterodox sufi currents grew.³⁴⁸

One should remember that when he revolted against Mehmed I, Shaykh Bedreddin found his natural allies in the Balkans, that is *akıncı* milieu and influential frontier begs; and the revolt of Bedreddin appeared as a sufi-messianic movement, a usual characteristics of heterodox-mystic upheavals.³⁴⁹ Moreover, the benevolent grants

³⁴⁷ For frontier culture in the Ottoman context, see Köprülü, *The Emergence of the Ottoman State*; Paul Wittek, *The Rise of The Ottoman Empire*, London, 1965; İncelik, “Osmanlı Tarihi’ne Toplu Bir Bakış”, pp. 45-8.

³⁴⁸ Most of these poets are affiliated to Hurufism and to the Bektashi Order in some way or another. Among them Hayretî (d. 1535), Usûlî (d. 1538), and Hayâlî (d. 1557) must be mentioned here. Especially Hayâlî, whose Shi’ite and Hurûfî affiliation is clearly seen in his poems, can be deemed a spokesman of the protest of the periphery against centralizing state. His verse “*Ne Süleyman’a esirüz ne Selimün kuluyuz / Kimse bilmez bizi bir Şah-ı kerimün kuluyuz.*” is famous. See Hayretî, *Hayretî Divanı*, haz. Mehmed Çavuşoğlu-Ali Tanyeri, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1981, p. 219. For further reading on the culture and literature proliferated under *akıncı* patronage, see Michael Kiel, *Yenice-i Vardar (Vardar Yenicesi-Giannitsa). A Forgotten Turkish Cultural Centre in Macedonia of the 15th and 16th Century*, Leiden: Studia Byzantina et Neohellenica Neerlandica III, 1971; Hayâlî, *Hayâlî Bey Divanı*, haz. Ali Nihat Tarlan, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1945; Mehmet Çavuşoğlu, *Hayâlî Bey ve Divanı’ndan Örnekler*, Ankara: KTBY, 1987; Cemal Kurnaz, *Hayâlî Bey Divanı’nın Tahlili*, Ankara: KTBY, 1987; Mustafa İsen, haz., *Künhü’l-ahbâr’ın Tezkire Kısım*, Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Yayınları, 1994; “Akıncılığın Türk Kültür ve Edebiyatına Katkıları”, *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 49, 1998, 88-96; *Ötelerden Bir Ses*, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 1997; Filiz Kılıç, *Meşâi’rû’ş-Şu’arâ I-II*, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Gazi Üniversitesi, Ankara, 1994; Kınalı-zâde Hasan Çelebi, *Tezkiretü’ş-şuarâ*, 2 vols., haz. İbrahim Kutluk, Ankara: TTK, 1989; Latîfî, *Latîfî Tezkiresi*, haz., Mustafa İsen, Ankara: KBY, 1990; Usûlî, *Usûlî Divanı*, haz. Mustafa İsen, Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları, 1990; Mustafa Tatçı, *Hayretî’nin Dinî-Tasavvufî Dünyası*, İstanbul: Horasan Yayınları, 2006; Hiclâl Demir, *Çağlarını Eleştiren Dîvan Şairleri: Hayretî – Usûlî – Hayâlî*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Bilkent University, Ankara, 2001.

³⁴⁹ See, for example, “The Shakhulu Rebellion” in this study. For the revolt of Şeyh Bedreddin see Michel Balivet, *Islam mystique et révolution armée dans les Balkans Ottomans vie du Cheikh Bedreddin le*

of foremost *akıncı* dynasties like Malkoçoğlu, Mihaloğlu, and Evrenosoğlu to *zâviyes* of these dervishes, who later melted in the pot of the Bektashi Order, are well-known.³⁵⁰ Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay has suggested that the interest of Rumelian *akıncı* families in the two greatest shrines most celebrated by ‘heterodox’ dervish groups, namely Shrine of Hacı Bektaş and Seyyid Gâzi, and their financial support to recover and to extend buildings of these shrine complexes should be regarded as a symbolic act of protest against the centralistic-imperial tendency in the Ottoman polity. She interprets the palatial arrangement of the Hacı Bektaş complex, which is composed of three successive courtyards, as a symbol of contest posed by *akıncı* families, whose autonomy and splendor started to waste away under Mehmed II.³⁵¹

3.3.2.2. *Turkoman (Active) Resistance in Anatolia*

In Anatolia, the opposition was led by pre-Ottoman aristocracy, who were transformed into simple *timar* holders from hereditary feudal lords, and tribal leaders. It is not surprising that in the battle of Ankara, in 1402, all the troops from the *sanjaks* of Saruhan, Aydın, and Menteşe abandoned Bayezid I, holding their position in Timur’s army and leaving the Ottoman sultan only with Serbian troops and Janissaries.³⁵²

« *Hallâj des Turcs* » (1358/59-1416), Istanbul : ISIS Press, 1995 ; Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı (with a foreword by İsmet Sungurbey), *Simavna Kadısoğlu Şeyh Bedreddin*, İstanbul: Eti Yayınevi, 1966; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Zındıklar ve Mülhitler*, pp. 136-202; Müfid Yüksel, *Simavna Kadısoğlu Şeyh Bedreddin*, İstanbul: Bakış, 2002. In the latter work, however, one would realize the effort of the author to tune down the unorthodox aspects of the revolt and of Shaykh Bedreddin’s religious identity.

³⁵⁰ See, for example, Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, p. 41. For a recent study on the sponsorship of great *akıncı* families to the shrine of Hacı Bektaş and socio-political motives behind this sponsorship see E. Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay, *Legend and Architecture in the Ottoman Empire: The Shrines of Seyyid Gâzi and Hacı Bektaş*, Unpublished PhD. thesis, Harvard University, 2005, especially pp. 174-91.

³⁵¹ See Yürekli-Görkay, pp. 263-6.

³⁵² Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l’empire ottoman”, p. 42. Also consider Bacqué-Grammont, “Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527”, pp. 156-7.

The social milieu in which the seeds of protest grew was principally Turkoman groups who still continued their traditional tribal culture and habits. For a long time the Karamanoğlu dynasty became the champion of tribal polity against Ottoman imperialism. By the fall of Karaman, the tribal forces, which could not resist against Ottoman's great military power by themselves, had to rely on a new fulcrum. The ideology of this protest, on the other hand, was developed on the grounds of a 'mal-Islamized' mystical religion of Turkomans which later incorporated the Safavid Order. In contrast to the Rumelian protest, in Anatolia the resistance was quite active taking arms against the Ottoman's imperial army and engaging in bloody combats when necessary.³⁵³

It is delineated above that, starting in the time of Orhan, the Ottoman center gradually distanced itself from the Turkoman culture. In the works of the fifteenth century Ottoman historians, one may notice a clear differentiation between settled- 'Ottomanized' subjects and 'untamed' nomadic elements; the former group is usually referred to as 'Türk' while the latter as 'Türkmen'.³⁵⁴ İnalçık also notices that Ottoman

³⁵³ One may observe the footprints of different characteristics of these two movements of protest in Bektashims and Alevism, the former proliferating mainly in the Balkans while the latter being primarily a product of Anatolian qızilbashes.

³⁵⁴ See, for example, APZ, pp. 142, 143, 168, 169, 188, 224. Aşıkpaşazâde uses the term clearly for nomadic Turkish tribes (that is referred to throughout this study as 'Turkoman'). In one occasion, for example, he narrates how Yörgüç Pasha, the tutor (*lala*) of Murad II, punished a nomadic group called 'Kızılkoca Oğlanlarının Türkmanları' in Amasya-Tokat region, for the latter used to plunder the settled subjects. See APZ, pp. 168-9. The word 'Türkmen' is nothing but a derivation of 'Türk', in which the suffix "men" intensifies the meaning, which might be understood as 'hundred percent 'Türk'. (See V. Minorsky, "The Middle East in the 13th, 15th, and 17th Centuries", *JRCAS*, 27, 1940, p. 439.) The origin of the term might be traced back to the second half of the tenth century. For further reading on the origin and meaning of "Türkmen" see İbrahim Kafesoğlu, "A propos du nom Türkmen", *Oriens*, vol. 11, no.1/2, 1958, 146-50; "Türkmen adı, manası ve mahiyeti", *J. Deny Armağanı*, Ankara, 1958, 121-33. Kafesoğlu revises Köprülü's view, which says, principally basing on *Divan-i Lügat-i Türk*, that the branch of Oğuz tribes who converted to Islam were called Türkmen. (*Türk Edebiyatında İlk Mutasavvıflar*, İstanbul, 1919, p. 152). To him, the usage of this word goes further back, principally originating from "Kök-Türk". Kafesoğlu sees a semantic liaison between two words. The word "Türkmen" is composed of two parts: "Türk" and the suffix "men", which reinforces the meaning of the main word. Thus, "Türkmen" means pure, noble, and real Türk. As for the word "Kök-Türk", again we have two parts: an adjective "Kök"

historians employ the term ‘Türkmen’ for those nomadic Turkish tribes who did not recognize Ottoman suzerainty, and for those Turkish states in the form of tribal confederacy such as Akkoyunlu, Dulkadir etc. For their own ‘tamed’ nomads, which were transformed into a special type of subject with certain duties against the state especially in Balkans and Western Anatolia (in the areas west of the river Kızılırmak), the Ottomans rather used the term ‘Yörük’, literally meaning the men who walk.³⁵⁵

There is strong evidence showing that a clear-cut differentiation between these two social groups, i. e. ‘Türk’ and ‘Türkmen’, was already established towards the mid-fifteenth century. A guide-book for students, *Tarîku’l-Edeb*³⁵⁶, which was completed in 1453, for example, evidently reveals that Turks and Turkomans were perceived as different socio-‘ethnic’ groups. The author Ali bin Hüseyin el-Amasî³⁵⁷, a middle-rank *ulemā* of the era of Murad II and Mehmed II, divides the people (*tavā’if*) of the Ottoman Empire into seven groups, giving a short description of most prominent dispositions of each group. He says,

Evvelā **Arab** tā’ifesiñün tabī’atı bārid olur. Bunlardan ülfet ve muhāletat mülāhaza etme.

Acem tā’ifesi sāhib-i ‘akrab tabī’at ve tīz nefes olur. Bunlardan şefkāt ve merhamet ve muvāfakat umma.

Ve **Kürd** tā’ifesi deve gibi kindār ve hod-pesend tā’ife olur. Bunlardan ihtirāz eyle. Bunlarınla adāvet bağlayub muhāsemet ve mu’ānedet kılma.

defining the main word “Türk”. “Kök” means sky in Turkish. Yet it also has connotations noble, grand, and universal. On this subject also see Halil İnalçık, “The Yürüks: Their Origins, Expansions and Economic Role”, in his *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire. Essays on Economy and Society*, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry of Culture Joint Series Volume 9, 1993, pp. 97-103; Louis Basin, “Notes sur les mots ‘Oğuz’ et ‘Türk’”, *Oriens*, vol. 6, no. 2, 1953, 315-22.

³⁵⁵ See Halil İnalçık, “The Yürüks”, p. 102. For further reading on the word ‘Yörük’ or ‘Yürük’, see Faruk Sümer, “XI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve Irak’da Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumî Bir Bakış”, *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 11, İstanbul, 1949-50, pp. 518-22.

³⁵⁶ The book was obviously written in the aim of explaining how to behave on several occasions, mostly pertaining to educational circles, for students and teachers.

³⁵⁷ He is said to be the tutor of Hızır Beg, who was the son of famous Yörgüç Pasha and was the *sancakbey* of Amasya. See İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, I, 1972, p. 450.

Ve **Türkmen** tā'ifesi gürk (kurt) tab' olur. Bunlarınla muvāfakat idüb yola gitme kim kurt birbirinde kan görse birbirin yer yutar.

Tatar tā'ifesi anduk misāl olur. Bunların değmesi temiz olmaz. Zīrā anduk gāh olur ki otlar, gāh olur ki murdār yer. (Gāh cīfe yer, gāh olur ki ot otlar.) Pes bunlardan diyānet ve salāhiyet umma.

Ve **Köle** tā'ifesi katır gibi bed-huy ve mütemerrid olur. Zīrā ki katır ne denlü nāz-ı nā'imle besleseler isyānun ve haramzādeliğün komaz. Pes bunlardan toğruluk ve mürüvvet umma.

Ve **Türk** tā'ifesi sādık ve müşfik ve yavař tā'ife olurlar. Koyun gibi birbirine muvāfakatı ve ülfeti ve şefkati ve tā'ati vardur. Görmez misin kim mecmu'sı birbirine ittibā' ider ve hem cemi' hayvanatda koyundan menfe'atlüsü dahī yokdur ve koyundan yavařı dahī olmaz ve hem ganem ganimetdür dimişler.³⁵⁸

What is interesting here is that he deems Türkmen (Turkoman) and Türk (Turk) as different socio-‘ethnic’ groups like ‘Arab’ and ‘Turk’ or ‘Kurd’ and ‘Turk’ etc. His description of both is also quite interesting and informative indeed. To him Turkomans resemble wolves while Turks are like sheep. He warns his reader not to believe in the friendship of Turkomans, for they always betray when opportunity arises. On the other hand Turks were the best of all the seven groups. They were loyal, compassionate, and slow; they harmonize and obey each other like sheep. Ali bin Hüseyin el-Amasī deems their obedience to each other as their most valuable feature. One can obviously observe in this depiction that Ali bin Hüseyin el-Amasī calls nomadic Turkish elements as “Türkmen” while sedentary Turkish elements, or the ordinary *re'āya* of the Ottoman state, as “Türk”.³⁵⁹ Thus, this testimony puts forward that already during the mid-fifteenth century the Turkish people in the Ottoman realm were differentiated in terms of cultural, social, political, and even religious aspects: one was the sedentarized ‘peasants’

³⁵⁸ Ali b. Hüseyin el-Amāsī, *Tarīku'l-Edeb*, haz. Mehmet Şeker, Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2002, pp. 254-5.

³⁵⁹ For a similar usage of ‘Türkmen’ see Kemal, *Selātin-nāme (1299-1490)*, haz. Necdet Öztürk, Ankara: TTK, 2001, pp. 180-81. Modern scholars also appreciate the usage of ‘türk’ and ‘türkmen’ with such connotation. See, for example, Irène Mélikoff, “L’Islam hétérodoxe en Anatolie”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 63. Mélikoff puts stress on that ‘türk’ indicates the sedentary Turkish people who became ordinary Muslims and *Iranized* culturally while ‘türkmen’ denotes nomadic or semi-nomadic Turkish groups who were either mal-Islamized or not Islamized.

transformed into modest ‘re’āya’ of the Ottomans, while the other still insisted on the traditional nomadic-tribal habits and resisted against the Ottoman imperial regime.

The opposing Turkoman elements of central and southern Anatolia politically organized around the Karaman dynasty against the Ottomans. It stands to reason to argue that, especially in the fifteenth century the continuous clash between Karaman and Ottoman states was indeed the struggle between two modes of state organization: ‘bureaucratic-imperial sate’ and ‘Turko-Mongolian tribal confederation’.

Already before the Ottomans, by the mid-thirteenth century, the Karamanoğlu dynasty appeared as the leader of a powerful tribe or tribal confederacy, which usually rose up against Anatolian Seljuks and Mongol governors of Anatolia. Faruk Sümer finds plausible Yazıcıoğlu Ali’s suggestion regarding their ethnic origin that suggests they were from the Afşar tribe, one of the twenty four great Turkish clans, and among five great clans which produced the ruler dynasty³⁶⁰ (the others are Kayı, Eymür, Yazır, Beğdili).³⁶¹ After the suppression of Babāi revolt, in which they actively took part, Karamanids moved to the Mut-Ermenek region under the leadership of Nüre Sofi. Under Karaman Beg, Mehmed Beg, and Güneri Beg in the second half of the thirteenth century, the Karamanoğulları became the champion of the Turkoman struggle against Mongol-oriented Seljukid rulers and thus Mongol domination in Anatolia, at times by fighting with Sejukids or Mongol armies at times supporting the more Turkoman oriented candidate to the Seljukid throne.³⁶² There is evidence that Mongols regarded

³⁶⁰ Faruk Sümer, “Karāmān-oghulları”, *EI2*, IV, p. 619; “Karamanoğulları”, *DIA*, 24, p. 454.

³⁶¹ Faruk Sümer, “Avşar”, *DIA*, 4, p. 160.

³⁶² The reader might remember that Mehmed Beg of Karaman (d. 1277) declared, for the first time, Turkish as the only official language, forbidding the speaking any other language in “*divan, dergāh, bārgāh, meclis, meydān*”. Sümer puts special stress on two policies of Mehmed Beg’s: supporting the Turkish language and initiating the war of independence of Turkomans against the Mongols. See Sümer, “Karamanoğulları”, *DIA*, 24, p. 455; Şehabeddin Tekindağ, “Şemsüddin Mehmed Bey Devrinde

Karamanids as the main barrier to their domination of the whole of Anatolia. Referring to the role of Karamanoğulları in stopping Mongol expansion in Anatolia, Gazān Han is reported to have said: “I was seeking the enemy in the east and west, while he was hiding beneath my clothing. If it had not been for the Karāmānids, Turkmens and Kurds, the Mongol Horsemen would have reached the place where the sun sets.”³⁶³

It is indicated that the alienation between Turkoman milieu and Seljukid ruling elite - in terms of culture, religion, political orientation – had already been emerged in the first half of the thirteenth century. And this alienation finally led to the revolt of the formers, namely Babāi revolt. After losing de facto power by the defeat of Kösedağ in 1243, Seljukids became the satellite of Mongol khans by both representing ‘Persianized’ imperial political tradition and high Islamic culture against nomadic Turkomans. Karamanids, having taken part in the Babāi revolt as well, appeared as the champion of the Turkoman resistance against Anatolian Seljukid rule and Mongol imperialism. Many Turkoman tribes provided their alliances to Karamanids in this struggle. Sümer counts Turgutlu, Bayburtlu, Varsak, Oğuzhanlı, Hoca Yunuslu, Hocantılı, Bozkırlı, Bozdoğan, Bulgarlı, İğdir, Beğdili, Yapaoğulları, Şamlu, Adalıoğulları, and Yuvalılar among principal tribes over which Karamanids ruled.³⁶⁴ Among these tribes especially Turgutlu, Bayburtlu, and Varsak proved to be long-lasting allies of the Karamanids and constituted a significant portion of their tribal army. The posts of *beylerbey*, the chief-commander of the army, in the Karamanid state were usually held by the leaders of the

Karamanlılar”, *İÜFTD*, 19, 1964, 81-98. Also consider Faruk Sümer, “Anadolu’da Moğollar”, *Selçuklu Araştırmaları Dergisi*, I, 1969, 1-147.

³⁶³ Cited and quoted in Faruk Sümer, “Karāmān-oghulları”, *EI2*, IV, p. 621.

³⁶⁴ Sümer, “Karāmān-oghulları”, *EI2*, IV, p. 619; “Karamanoğulları”, *DIA*, 24, pp. 454-5.

Turgutlu tribe.³⁶⁵ As will be delineated below, Ottoman sources also frequently mention these tribes in the Karamanid army against the Ottomans.

A close examination of Şikârî's *Karaman-nâme*³⁶⁶, the only hitherto known narrative produced under the Karaman patronage, clearly pictures the tribal confederative nature of the Karamanid state. Since its beginning under Nüre Sofi, Şikârî describes Karamanid power as a political and military entity consisting of a coalition of (semi-nomadic) tribal leaders.³⁶⁷ And the confederative character of the state is continued throughout the narration. The army was composed of autonomous tribal forces, which could easily dissolve when difficulty arose. The state could not establish her centralized institutions with an efficient bureaucratic apparatus.³⁶⁸ The suzerainty of Karamanid begs over other tribal leaders, who always held the loyalty of their tribal soldiers, usually did not go beyond a symbolic dependency.³⁶⁹

In Şikârî's depiction, Karamanids had absolute superiority over other Turkoman tribes until the fifteenth century. He argues that Osman also received *tabl u alem*, drum and standard, which were regarded as signs of suzerainty, from Karamanids.³⁷⁰ He even describes Osman as a shepherd of the Seljukids.³⁷¹ However, the situation changed during the reign of Murad I, when the Ottoman state not only emerged as a significant

³⁶⁵ Sümer, "Karamanoğulları", *DIA*, 24, p. 454.

³⁶⁶ For a short assessment of Şikârî's work, see Rudi Paul Lindner, "Appendix Two: Şikari", in his *Nomads and Ottomans*, pp. 145-7.

³⁶⁷ See, for example, Şikârî, *Şikârî'nin Karamanoğulları Tarihi*, edited by Mes'ud Koman, Konya: Yeni Kitab Basımevi, 1946, pp. 10, 19, 20-21, 34.

³⁶⁸ Modern scholars agree upon the idea that the Karaman army was consisted of tribal forces inhabited central Anatolia, Tas-ili and Taurus region. See for example, İnalçık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", p. 118.

³⁶⁹ Şikârî summarizes this confederative system as follows: "Ol zamanda adet bu idi ki: etrafta olan beyler yılda bir kere üç gün gelüb Lârende'de sâkin olurlardı. Sultandan yeni hüccet alub gene diyârlarına giderlerdi. Yahud Sultan çıkub etraftı devr iderdi. Ellerine hücceti nev verirdi. Zira **azil ve nasb yokdu.**" See Şikârî, p. 149.

³⁷⁰ Şikârî, pp. 47, 78.

³⁷¹ Şikârî, pp. 78, 130.

regional power but also established early forms of her centralized institutions, curbing the power of feudal lords. The first Ottoman-Karaman confrontation occurred between Murad I and Alāaddin Beg (d. 1398), who married the daughter of the former, in 1386-7.³⁷² This battle marked the first victory of the centralized bureaucratic state of the Ottomans over the tribal confederacy of the Karamans.³⁷³ The rise of Ottoman imperialism at the cost of the power of tribal-hereditary dynasties is reflected in Şikārî's narration as follows: “[Karamanoğlu] *Osman'ı bir gedā iken şah eyledi. [Osman] Aslı cinsi yok bir yürükoğlu iken bey oldu. Beyzādeleri beğenmez oldu, ocak erlerin incidür oldu.*”³⁷⁴ As clearly seen, Şikārî points his criticism, which might be a common sentiment of Turkoman milieu, particularly towards the Ottoman policy of reducing the power of tribal leaders.

The Ottoman-Karaman struggle continued throughout the fifteenth century. As Şikārî himself also admits, however, Ibrahim Beg (d. 1464) had to admit Ottoman superiority.³⁷⁵ In 1475, Mehmed II finally finished the Karamanid rule. By the death of Kasım Beg, who ruled the region until 1483 as a vassal of the Ottoman sultan,³⁷⁶ the political existence of the Karamanid dynasty *de facto* diminished.³⁷⁷ An account of Şikārî is of primary interest for the purpose of the present study. Şikārî says following

³⁷² Sümer, “Karāmān-oghulları”, *EI2*, IV, p. 623; “Karamanoğulları”, *DIA*, 24, p. 457.

³⁷³ Şikârî often accuses Ottomans for being not of noble blood, disloyal, not keeping their words. See, for example, Şikârî, pp. 149, 161, 162. Suffice it to quote following expressions from Şikârî to show Turkoman perception of the Ottoman rule: “*İbn-i Osman'ın ne ahdi dürüstdür ne imanı!*” (Şikârî, p. 159.) “Bu âdem and içer tutmaz, ahd ider tutmaz. ... Osmanoğlu'nun ne dostluğu belli ne düşmanlığı belli!” (*Ibid*, p. 165.) I would like to remind the different nature of relationships in bureaucratic state and tribal organization already delineated in this study. In the tribal mode of socio-political organization keeping one's 'word' is of utmost importance since the relationships are constructed on face-to-face interactions. On the other hand, in the bureaucratic system, the system rests on a scribal base, thus personal relationships are always subordinated by impersonal rules. See “Theoretical Framework” in this study.

³⁷⁴ Şikârî, p. 141.

³⁷⁵ Şikârî, p. 191.

³⁷⁶ KPZ8, p. 40.

³⁷⁷ Sümer, “Karāmān-oghulları”, *EI2*, IV, p. 624; “Karamanoğulları”, *DIA*, 24, p. 459.

the death of Kasım Beg, his commander-in-chief (*çeribaşı*) Pır Bayram and some leading generals, among whom were certain Kökez-oğlu and Esed Çelebi, did not surrender to the Ottoman rule but wandered with their guerilla-band for seven years. Finally they joined the forces of Shah Ismail.³⁷⁸ The last unsuccessful attempt to revive the Karamanid rule in the region occurred in 1500.³⁷⁹

One might well regard the Ottoman-Karaman rivalry as a struggle between the Ottoman imperial regime and opposing tribal forces in Anatolia. In this struggle, special attention should be given to the eminent place of Taş-ili tribes,³⁸⁰ who spent summers in the high plateaus of Bulgar Mountain and during winters came down to the surrounding low plains, especially those of the Turgutlu and Varsak in the Karamanid ranks. Contemporary sources strongly suggest that in the second half of the fifteenth century, tribes of Taurus and Taş-ili region, taking advantage of mountainous topography, constituted the backbone of tribal resistance against Ottoman imperialism. A great number of Turkomans from the Taurus-Karaman area were forcibly deported to Rumelia in the period 1468-1474 under Mehmed II.³⁸¹

Kemalpaşazāde describes the region as “*gāyet-i menā’at ve nihāyet-i hasānetle ma’rūf u mevsūf diyārdur ... müfsidler yatağı ve fāsīd-nihād, bed-nijādlar durağıydı...*”³⁸² and the people of region as “*Ma’mūre-i mezbūrenün nevāhisinde olan kabāyil ki, itā’ata kābil değıller idi, ol zamana gelinceye dek bir sultana fermān-ber*

³⁷⁸ Şikârî, pp. 206-7. As will be delineated, Bayram Beg Qaramanlu was among famous seven great qizilbash sufis of Lahijān, who protected, educated, and trained young Ismail. Following the foundation of the qizilbash state of Ismail, he undertook high-ranking functions. See “The Rise of Shah Ismail” in this study.

³⁷⁹ For a detailed examination of this attempt see “The Qaraman Uprising, 1500” in this study.

³⁸⁰ On one occasion, Kemalpaşazāde recounts Yüregir, Kuşunlu, Varsak, Kara İsalu, Özerlü, Gündüzlü, and Kuş Temurlu among Tas-ili tribes. See KPZ8, p. 88.

³⁸¹ İnalçık, “The Yürüks”, p. 106.

³⁸² “This is a region very precipitous and difficult to access ... it was a den of mischief and the station of seditious-natures and bad-races.” KPZ8, pp. 40, 52.

olmamışlardı, hizmete kāyil değillerdi.”³⁸³ The frequent phrase Kemalpaşazāde employs to describe these tribes is “bāğī” and “tāğī”, which means the ferocious, rebellious people who do not recognize state authority.³⁸⁴ Remembering the ideal subject or *re’āya* that the Ottoman regime demanded within the *timar* system, the view of Kemalpaşazāde, who was intrinsically attached to the official ideology, becomes meaningful.

Both Şikārī and Ottoman sources frequently refer to the Turgutlu tribe as the most loyal and powerful ally of the Karamanids.³⁸⁵ Several suggestions have been made about the ethnic origin of this tribe. According to Hammer they were Tatar³⁸⁶, while Zeki V. Togan suggests they were Kıpçak.³⁸⁷ Faruk Sümer rejects both arguments and asserts that Turgutlu was a Turkoman tribe.³⁸⁸ Şikārī counts Turgut among six begs gathered around Nüre Sofi.³⁸⁹ From then on until the end of the Karamanid rule, the Turgutlu tribe had always been primary ally of the Karamanids, which was often reinforced by marriages. The leaders of Turgutlu tribe usually held the post of *beylerbey* in the Karamanid state.³⁹⁰

³⁸³ “The tribes of aforementioned region did not hitherto accept suzerainty and service of any sultan.” KPZ8, p. 87.

³⁸⁴ See, for example, KPZ8, pp. 88, 90, 103, 104.

³⁸⁵ Turgutlu tribe lived in Taşlık-Silifke region and in the area between Akşehir, Aksaray, and Karaman. See Faruk Sümer, “Turgut-eli”, *IA*, 12/2, p. 120.

³⁸⁶ Hammer, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, III, trs. M. Ata, İstanbul, 1330, p. 92.

³⁸⁷ Togan, *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş*, İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1981, pp. 318-9.

³⁸⁸ Faruk Sümer, “Turgutlular”, *IA*, 12/2, p. 120. Zeki Oral follows the same argument. See Zeki Oral, “Turgut oğulları”, *IV. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, Ankara: TTK, 1952, pp. 153-4. For the extended version of this article, see Zeki Oral, “Turgut Oğulları, Eserleri-Waqfiyeleri”, *Vakıflar Dergisi*, III, 1956, 31-64.

³⁸⁹ Şikārī, p. 10. Another begs were Bayburt, Kaya, Mirza, İmadeddin, and Hayreddin. Şikārī always mention Turgut Beg and Bayburt Beg as close men of Nüre Sofi and his son Karaman Beg. Later on the tribes of these two begs became known as Turgutlu and Bayburtlu. According to a legendary source, *Didiği Sultan Menâkıbnâmesi*, Turgut and Bayburt were brothers and sent by Didiği Sultan from Khorasan to Rûm. Another interesting point here is that according to the hagiography, Didiği Sultan was a cousin of Hacı Bektaş. See Zeki Oral, “Turgut oğulları”, p. 149. On the tekke of Didiği Sultan, see Ömür Bakırer-Surayya Faroqhi, “Didiği Dede ve Tekkeleri”, *Bellekten*, 39, 1975, 447-71.

³⁹⁰ Sümer, “Karamanoğulları”, p. 454 ; Oral, “Turgut oğulları”, p. 140; Gary Leiser, “Torghud”, *EI2*, X, p. 570.

Contemporary sources clearly indicate that Turgutlu had always been against the Ottoman rule.³⁹¹ In the first confrontation of the Karamanids with the Ottomans in 1386-7, they fought in the left wing of the Karamanid army.³⁹² Turgutoğlu Ali Beg's utterance in the battlefield, as reported by Şikârî, truly reflects the attitude of the Turgutlu tribe, as well as other Turkoman tribes of Anatolia, towards the Ottomans:

Turgutoğlu Ali Bey meydana girüb Murad Bey'i çağırdı. Didi ki: "Ey Murad Bey! Karamanoğlu değilmidir ki senin pederini Germiyanoğlu habsinden çıkardı. Tabl u alem ve nakkâre virdi. Şimdi nice cenk idersin ve Tekfur-ı Konstantin'den iki kâfir beyin neye neye yardımcı aldın, Müslüman üstüne geldin? Müslüman olan kâfir askerın yardımcı mı idinür?"³⁹³

In all of the later battles between the two powers, the Turgutlu always constituted a significant portion of the Karamanid army. Turgutlu's hostility against the Ottomans was equally reciprocated in the Ottoman side by the fact that when he dispatched an army to finish the Karamanid rule, Mehmed II ordered his commander Mahmud Pasha to extirpate Turgut forces.³⁹⁴

Ottoman historians always pursue a despising attitude against the Turgutlu tribe and describe them as stubborn, wild, arrogant, and 'uncivilized' people. Suffice it to refer to Aşıkpaşazâde's description of Turgutlu troops in the Ottoman army at the battle of Kosovo in 1444. Ibrahim Beg of Karaman dispatched an auxiliary force to Murad II

³⁹¹ Oral, "Turgut oğulları", p. 155.

³⁹² Sümer, "Turgutlular", p. 121. Also consider *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman, Giese Neşri*, p. 22; *Anonim Osmanlı Kroniği (1299-1512)*, pp. 25-6.

³⁹³ Şikârî, p. 158.

³⁹⁴ Although Mahmud Pasha pillaged Turgut-eli in 1463, most of Turgutlu fighters managed to flee to Tarsus with their leader. Aşıkpaşazâde writes, "*Padişah Mahmud Paşa'ya eydür: 'Durgutoğlunun kandalığın bil! Dahı üzerine var!' dedi. Durgutlu dahı Bulgar Dağı'na çıkmış idi. Mahmud Paşa dahı bunların kandalığın habarın aldı. Üzerlerine yürüdü. Bunlar dahı duydılar kaçdılar. Darsus tarafına aşdılar. Mahmud Paşa dahı koyub ardından yetüb alıbdüğün alıkdılar, alınmayanlar varub Darsus Eli'ne girdiler.*" See APZ, p. 216. Also consider Sümer, "Turgutlular", p. 121; Oral, "Turgut oğulları", p. 157.

in his battle against Christians. Aşıkpaşazāde narrates on his eye witness the inspection of the army in the battlefield,

Amma cemi' vilâyetinün askerini cem' etmiş idi. Ve Karamanoğlu'ndan ol seferde gazāya adem gelmiş idi. Tamam leşker cem' olduktan sonra cebelüsü arz olındı. Cemi'i leşkerinün cebelüsün gördi. Diledi kim Karamanoğlu'ndan gelenleri dahı göre. Andan gelen leşkerin beğine eyittiler kim: "Sen dahı getir adamlarını ve cebelülerini göster" dediler. Ol dahı cebelüsün arz etdi. Kaltak eyerlü ve yırtmaç kürklü, örmeç kuşaklu, kabalak dülbendlü, kayış üzengilü, ipden kılıcı bağı, şol Durgutlu'nun boğazından asılacak at uğrılarını devşirüb göndirmüş. Ak-Çayluoğlına Hünkār eyidür: "Benüm gerçü anın yardımına ihtiyacım yokdur Allah ināyetinde. Amma min vechin bunları göndürdüğü begāyet eyü varmış" der. "Benüm çerimün bir masharası eksük idi, anun için göndürmişdür" didi.³⁹⁵

Leaving aside the obvious scorn, Aşıkpaşazāde's description, evidently puts forward the differentiation between tribal forces and the professionalized regular army of the Ottomans, and also how the latter regarded the former.

Kemalpaşazāde also frequently refers to the 'stubborn' tribes of Taş-ili, especially to Turgutlu and Varsak. To him, when the Karamanid rule came to an end, under the Ottomans, peace and prosperity arrived in the region, which was a "den of mischief and the station of seditious-natures and bad-races".³⁹⁶ Kemalpaşazāde makes a special reference to the Turgutlu tribe, describing them as a "fireplace which spurt the fire of dissention out to the sky." He says they used to create dissention, disturbing the inhabitants, pillaging villages, and attacking tribes in the region. If an army marched on them, they fled to Bulgar Mountain.³⁹⁷

³⁹⁵ APZ, p. 186. Aşıkpaşazāde personally attended this battle. In the following page he says he killed an enemy during the battle and received a good horse from the sultan as a present.

³⁹⁶ KPZ8, p. 52.

³⁹⁷ "Çün Kasım Beg öldi ve nesl-i Karaman münkariz olub madde-i fesād münkatı' oldı. Ol diyār, günc-i bī-mār ve gül-i bī-bār olub, bilād-ābād-ı Yūnān emn ü emān toldı. Ol bucākda, ki müfsidler yatağı ve fāsīd-nihād, bed-nijādlar durağıydı, bir ocak dahī var idi andan da āfāka şerār-ı nār-ı fitne intişār bulurdu. İl dilinde Turğudlu adıyla iştiḥār bulmuşlardı. Hiç bir makānda Turğūdmalu ta'ife değildiler. Her zamānda ol bilādda fesādları āşikār olurdu. Fırsat bulıcak kişver-i Karamanun bir kenārına ilğār iderlerdi. Leşkere haber olıcak çıkarlar kaçarlar kühsār-ı Bulğāra giderlerdi. Ol havālinin ahālisini ta'ciz

As already delineated, Mehmed II finished Karamanid rule in 1475. However, when civil war broke out between his sons Bayezid I and Cem, following his death in 1481, Karamanoğlu Kasım Beg returned to İçel.³⁹⁸ Hearing Kasım Beg's arrival, Turgutlu Begs, alongside with Varsak and other tribes of the region, immediately presented their allegiance to the former with great pleasure.³⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Kasım Beg could never achieve independence, but governed the region for two years as a vassal of Bayezid II.⁴⁰⁰ Following his death in 1483, Turgutoğlu Mahmud Beg, who had Karamanid blood from his mother, became the governor of the Ottoman province of Karaman. However, since he supported the Mamluks against the Ottomans, he had to flee to Aleppo in 1487.⁴⁰¹ Turgutlu, Varsak, Ramazanoğlu and other ex-Karamanid tribes seem to have never accepted Ottoman suzerainty, or more properly stating, they never became a 'tamed' *re'āya* of the empire. During the Ottoman-Mamluk rivalry, they supported Mamluks and took arms against Ottomans when the opportunity appeared.⁴⁰² Turgutlu and Varsak tribal forces came up against the Ottoman imperial army, for the

itmişlerdi. Nice köyü issüz koyub, nice boyı tağıtmuşlardı." KPZ8, pp. 52-3. In the following page, Kemalpaşazâde narrates how Prince Şehinşah dispatch an army under the command of Karagöz Pasha on the Turgutlu and Varsak tribes, and how the latter were defeated by Karagöz Pasha. According to Kemalpaşazâde, these events occurred in 1483-4.

³⁹⁸ KPZ8, pp. 23-4.

³⁹⁹ Sümer, "Turgutlular", p. 121.

⁴⁰⁰ KPZ8, p. 40.

⁴⁰¹ See KPZ8, p. 89; Sümer, "Karāmān-oghulları", *EI2*, IV, p. 624; "Karamanoğulları", *DIA*, 24, p. 459; "Turgutlular", pp. 121-2.

⁴⁰² Kemalpaşazâde vividly describes the 'rebellious' and conceited nature of the tribal people of the region, and narrates consecutive Ottoman campaigns on these tribes in the last decades of the fifteenth century to subjugate them. See KPZ8, pp. 87-110. İnalçık and Lindner rightfully argue that the real reason behind the continuous enmity of Turgut, Varsak, and other Tas-ili tribes against Ottomans was their desire to avoid the Ottoman centralizing administration. Lindner says, "... so in some way must these nomads have learned that the Ottomans threatened the continuation of their ways. And in response to this storm, the nomads sought any port." See Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans*, p. 81. As a matter of fact, during the sixteenth century the tribal elite of the region were assimilated the *timar* system of the Ottomans and the tribal structure of the local society to a great extent dissolved. See İnalçık, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest", pp. 118-9.

last time, during the last Karamanid attempt to regain the control of Karaman-ili in 1500.⁴⁰³

Comment should also be made about the fact that when the civil war began within the Ottoman borders, Turgutlu always supported the candidates who diverged from traditional imperial policy of the state and were cast out by the central forces. In 1423, when Küçük Mustafa rose up against Murad II, who was engaged in executing his uncle *Düzmece* or Fake Mustafa in the Balkans, and marched on Bursa, Turgutlu tribal forces constituted a significant portion of his army.⁴⁰⁴ During the civil war between Bayezid II and Prince Cem, they, alongside with the Karamanid dynasty, maintained military support to Prince Cem.⁴⁰⁵ And lastly, during the struggle between Prince Selim and Prince Ahmed in the 1510's, Turgutlu tribal forces were one of the significant constituents of Ahmed's army against Selim.⁴⁰⁶

One may safely think of the exemplary cases of Turgut and Varsak for other Taş-ili and Taurus tribes such as Yumlu, Ramazanoğulları, Turkomans of Teke-ili, etc. Contemporary sources suggest that during the decline of Karamanid power towards the end of the fifteenth century, Turgutlu, Varsak, and other tribes looked for another powerful ally against the Ottoman imperialism. This power turned out to be the qizilbash state of Shah Ismail. Likewise, as clearly put by strong archival evidence, which will be examined in the next chapters of this study, Turgutoğlu Musa, the leader of the tribe then, acted in accordance with directives of Shah Ismail.

⁴⁰³ See KPZ8, pp. 210-212. A detailed evaluation of this attempt will come in the next chapters.

⁴⁰⁴ Sümer, "Turgutlular", p. 121.

⁴⁰⁵ See KPZ8, pp. 23-6.

⁴⁰⁶ Chapter VII will discuss this issue in detail.

3.4. CONCLUSION

By the second half of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans had captured Constantinople and rose as a world power, with a bureaucracy that had been fully created by traditional Islamic *ulemā* and slave-origin bureaucrats. On the other hand, a vast Turkoman population, still mainly nomadic, or at least sustaining nomadic habits, no longer considered the Ottoman power as their legitimate state authority. Furthermore, the centralistic policies of the Ottoman government, which accelerated under Mehmed II's reign, created a vast discontent among nomadic tribes of Anatolia.⁴⁰⁷ As has been pointed out by a modern scholar, "their tribal identity is never allowed to disappear into that of the state, and the interests of the tribe are the only paramount ideal which they are ever seen to serve."⁴⁰⁸ Nevertheless, the tribal structure of Anatolia did not have enough potency of resistance against the extension of the Ottoman imperialism. Consequently they started to wait for a savior who would stop the Ottoman oppression. Furthermore, the messianism, which had already dominated their belief system, augmented this expectation.⁴⁰⁹ From the poems of qizilbash *ozans* (poet and singer) of the sixteenth century, it can be understood that the Turkoman considered the Ottoman governmental

⁴⁰⁷ See Halil İnalcık, "Mehmed II", *IA*, vol. 7, 506-535; Oktay Özel, "Limits of the Almighty: Mehmed II's 'Land Reform' Revisited", *Journal of Social and Economic History of the Orient*, 42/2, 1999, 226-246; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527", *Studia Islamica*, LXII, Paris, 1985, pp. 156-7. Another reason aroused discontent of dervish milieu toward Ottoman administration was the confiscation of waqfs by Mehmed II in 1476, obviously for financial reasons. See Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l'empire ottoman", pp. 46-7; Oktay Özel, "Limits of the Almighty: Mehmed II's 'Land Reform' Revisited", *Journal of Social and Economic History of the Orient*, 42/2 (1999), 226-246.

Yet it is reported that right after the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmet II bestowed Akataleptos church in the Şehzadebaşı district to Kalenderîs, who rushed to the army's aid during the siege. See Oruç Beg, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, ed. F. Babinger, Hannover, 1925, p. 65; Mehmed Neşrî, *Kitâb-ı Cihannümâ*, II, ed. F. R. Unat-M. A. Köymen, Ankara: TTK, 1995, p. 691. O. Nuri Ergin argues, however, that this was not because of Mehmed II's approval of Kalenderîs' religious path, but because of the necessity to make them harmless for the society by settling in a certain place. See O. Nuri Ergin, *Türk Şehirlerinde İmaret Sistemi*, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1939, pp. 26-7.

⁴⁰⁸ Walsh, p. 203.

⁴⁰⁹ Ocak, "Babîler İsyanından Kızılbaşlığa", p. 148; Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l'empire ottoman", p. 43.

agencies as oppressors (*zalim*) who were forcing them to change their traditional life.⁴¹⁰ On the other hand, as will be evaluated in the following chapters, this unhappy population had already found their savior or *mahdi*, namely Safavid shaykhs and later on shahs, who would annihilate this oppressing power and take the oppressed into Heaven. As Lindner states, “The ‘pure nomad’ who suspected (rightly) Ottoman intensions after the founding of Yenişehir soon found a nomadic alternative in the tribes that supported the rise of the Safavids to power in Iran; the grandson of a fourteenth-century Osmanli could – and some did – become one of the fifteenth century Safavi Rumlu.”⁴¹¹

⁴¹⁰ Most of these poems have been published in the following anthologies: Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, *Pir Sultan Abdal, Hayatı, Sanatı, Şiirleri*, İstanbul, 1969; *Alevî Bektâşî Nefesleri*, İstanbul, 1992; Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı-Pertev Naili Boratav, *Pir Sultan Abdal*, İstanbul, 1991; Cahit Öztelli, *Pir Sultan Abdal, Bütün Şiirleri*, İstanbul, 1985; *Bektaşî Gülleri*, İstanbul, 1997; Sabahattin Eyuboğlu, *Pir Sultan Abdal*, İstanbul, 1997.

⁴¹¹ Lindner, “What was a Nomadic Tribe?”, p. 710.

CHAPTER IV

TURKOMANS AND THE SAFAVIDS: FUSION OF TURKOMAN CULTURE AND THE SAFAVID MYSTICISM

The Dream of Shaykh Safi

While still a lad he was favored with divine grace and spent his time performing religious acts. During that period of his life he had strange visions that made him hopeful of receiving even more divine and regal bounty. One night he saw in a vision that he was seated on the dome of the congregational mosque in Ardabil when suddenly there rose a sun that filled the whole world with light. When he looked closely he saw that the sun was his own blessed countenance rising above the horizon of felicity. Then he woke up and told his mother his dream, asking her for an interpretation. After contemplating the dream she replied, "My dear son, the dream indicates that the light of sainthood will so shine from you that the east and the west will be lighted by it." Of course he was delighted.⁴¹²

⁴¹² After citing Shakh Safi's dream Khwandamir adds his comment: "During the writing of this dream it occurred to the writer of these pages that apparently at that time in was indicated to the shaykh in the visionary world that there would soon rise from his loins a luminary, the final of whose reigning banner would shine like the sun over the expanse of the world, and truly those words have now come true." See HS, pp. 556-7.

It is also related that one night during the shaykh's youth he saw in a dream that he was seated on a high mountain, with a long, broad sword bound to his waist and a crown of sable on his head. Even in his dream he said to himself. "What is the son of Shaykh Aminuddin Jibrail doing with a sword and a crown?" He tried to loosen the sword from his waist but was unable. Then he took the crown off, and from his blessed head rose a sun that illuminated the whole world. When he put the crown back on his head, the light was covered. When he had taken the crown off and put it back on three times, he woke up from his dream.⁴¹³

4.1. THE SUFI ORDER OF SAFAVIDS

Although the order of Safaviyya was extremely influential on both the elite and the masses of Azerbaijanian, Iranian, Eastern Anatolian, Syrian and Iraqi societies up until the time of Ismail, a period covering two centuries, we do not have access to any religious or mystical works by Safavid sheiks during this period. After the death of Shaykh Safi in 1334, the *mürşid*-post of the order was filled by Sadreddin Musa (1334-1391), Hāce Alāaddin Ali (1391-1429), Shaykh Ibrahim (1429-1447), Shaykh Juneyd (1447-1460), and Shaykh Haydar (1460-1488), consecutively. With the exception of *Saffetu's-safa*, no work written by either the Shaykhs of the order or any other affiliated man has been discovered from this period. The scarcity of sources makes it difficult to

⁴¹³ Khwandamir writes his interpretation as follows: "This writer says that if an illuminated person contemplates the meaning of this dream he will realize that the sword was a metaphor for the appearance of the world-conquering sword of the victorious padishah and the crown and sun were metaphors for the *tāj* and *hāj* of His Majesty's [Shah Ismail] royal head." See HS, p. 557. Khwandamir, however, does not specify where the Shaykh saw this dream and to whom he asked for contemplation. Iskender Beg Munshī, who wrote his history nearly a century later than Khwandamir, recites the same dream. But in his account the interpretation of the dream is said to be made by Shaykh Gilānī. AA runs, "He related his vision to Shaikh Zāhed, and asked him what it meant. Shaikh Zāhed's interpretation was as follows: 'The sword and the sunlike radiance are the signs of the appearance and coming forth of a powerful king from your stock. The reflection of his sunlike felicity will shine upon the people of the earth, and the flashing blade of his sword will obliterate and utterly destroy the dark evil of innovators and those in error.'" See AA, p. 23.

write a satisfactory history of the order between Shaykh Safī and Ismail, especially in terms of the religious agenda of the order. From a historian's point of view, this period resembles a long, dark tunnel into which the order entered as a typical sunni mystical *tarīqa*, but emerged as a shi'ite, militant order featuring many *ghulat* elements. Since this passage through the 'tunnel' is not sufficiently documented, one can not properly determine the mechanism, dynamics, socio-cultural and theological grounds, nor the doctrinal basis of this transformation. Nonetheless, thanks to the great respect awarded to early Safavid Shaykhs and to their influence, we find some information in bits and pieces in contemporary Mongol, Timurid, and Sufi sources.

Even a cursory glance at the contemporary sources leaves no doubt that Shaykh Safīyuddīn Ishak (1252-1334)⁴¹⁴, who founded the Safaviyya order at the beginning of the fourteenth century in Ardabil⁴¹⁵, was an adherent of the sunni interpretation of Islam.⁴¹⁶ He is unanimously reported by contemporary sources as a sunni Shaykh who

⁴¹⁴ After a spiritual query under the auspices of several Shaykhs, the eponymous founder of the Safavid Order became the disciple of Shaykh Zāhid Gilāni, and married his daughter Bībī Fātīma. Following the death of Shaykh Zāhid in 1301, Safīyuddīn Ishak succeeded to the post of his master in accordance with the will of the latter. See HS, p. 557; AA, p. 23; HT, pp. 126-8; Ghulām Sarwar, *History of Shāh Ismā'īl Safawī*, Aligarh, 1939, p. 21; Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 6.

⁴¹⁵ For the geographical position of Ardabil and its effect on the growth of the order, which was not ignorable, see Michel M. Mazzaoui, *The Origins of the Safavids. Šī'ism, Sūfism, and the Gulāt*, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1972, pp. 43-46; Roger Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 1.

⁴¹⁶ See, for example, BRW, p. 43. A letter recorded in *Ahsanu't-tevārih*, from Uzbek Ubeyd Khan to Shah Tahmasb reads, "We have thus heard concerning your ancestor, His sainted Holiness Shaykh Safī, that he was a good man and an orthodox Sunnī, and we are greatly astonished that you neither follow the conduct of Murtaza Ali nor that of your ancestor." Quoted in BRW, p. 44. In *Saffetu's-safa*, "Shaykh Safī asked once: 'What is your *madhab*?' He replied that he believed in the *madhab* of the *imāms* (i.e. the four schools of Abū Hanīfa, Šāfi'ī, Mālik, and Ibn Hanbal) whom he loved, and that from among the (four) *medāhib* he chose those *hadīths* that had the strongest chain of authority (*asnad*) and are the best (*aḡwad*), and applied them. He added that he did not allow for himself or his *murīds* any license in these matters, but rather carried out the details that are expressed in the various *madāhib*." Quoted in Mazzaoui, p. 49. Ottoman sources, which were used to take a vigorously opposing stand to the Safavid movement, also unanimously depict Safīyuddīn and early Safavid Shaykhs up to Junayd as saintly and respected figures. These sources will be cited in the following pages. Even Fazlullah Ruzbihan Khunji, a rigorous sunni scholar who frequently expressed his hatred of Safavids in his writings, describes the early Safavid

pursued the orders of the shari'a and banned his disciples from indulging in unsanctioned practices such as drinking wine.⁴¹⁷ In fact, *Saffetu's-safa*, the principal source of information about Shaykh Safi, permits no suspicion on the issue.⁴¹⁸ Ibn Bazzaz, an adherent of the order, composed this encyclopedic book in 1356 by the order of Shaykh Sadruddin, the son, the chief disciple, and the deputy of Safiyuddin. *Saffetu's-*

Shaykhs in a quite positive manner. Like most Ottoman historians, he also argues that the saintly nature of this order was destroyed by Shaykh Junayd. See TA, pp. 62-3.

⁴¹⁷ Such an image of Shaykh Safi is unanimously accepted by modern scholars. Minorsky writes, for example, "The early shaykhs were strictly orthodox and their religious authority could not be called in question and opposed." V. Minorsky, "Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1/3, 1957, p. 439. Also see Hanna Sohrweide, "Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert", *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, p. 100; BRW, p. 43; Minorsky, *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk. A Manual of Safavid Administration*, London, 1943, p. 125; Zeki V. Togan, "Sur L'origine des Safavides", *Mélanges Massignon*, III, 1957, p. 356; Walther Hinz, *Uzun Hasan ve Şeyh Cüneyd. XV. Yüzyılda İran'ın Millî bir Devlet Haline Yükselişi*, çev. Tefvik Bıyıklıoğlu, Ankara: TTK, 1992, p. 15; Jean Aubin, "Etudes Safavides I, Sah Ismail et les notables de l'Iraq persan", *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, II/I, 1959, p. 9; Basil Nikitine, "Essai d'Analyse du Safwat as-Safa", *Journal Asiatique* 245, 1957, p. 388; Hans Robert Roemer, "The Safavid Period", *The Cambridge History of Iran*, 6, ed., Peter Jackson, Cambridge, 1993, p. 195.

⁴¹⁸ For a very brief summary of the content of this principle source regarding the early period of the order see BRW, pp. 38-39. Despite its eminence among sources of the history and especially the religious stand of early Safavids, a critical edition of this work is yet to be published. *Saffetu's-safa* is composed of an introduction, a conclusion, and twelve chapters (*bāb*). A German translation of the eighth chapter alongside its original text in Persian was published by Heidi Zirke. (*Ein hagiographisches Zeugnis zur persischen Geschichte aus der Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts, Das achte Kapitel des Safwat as-safa in kritischer Bearbeitung*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987.) In the introductory part of his study, Zirke briefly discusses the content of the whole work and the manuscript copies available in several libraries across the world. Zirke also provides a genealogical map of available manuscripts. See Zirke, pp. 1-32. The oldest copy of *Saffetu's-safa* is known as to be that in the Library of Leiden (Or. 465) dated 1485. (Mirza Abbaslı says he has a microfilm copy of the author copy, that was written by Ibn Bazzaz, dated 759/1357. But unfortunately he does not clarify where the original copy is. See Mirza Abbaslı, "Safevilerin Kökenine Dair", *Belleten*, XL, 1976, p. 289.) Two later copies are preserved in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul (Ayasofya 3099 and Ayasofya 2123), the former being dated 1491 and the latter, 1509. All the other copies were written during and after the reign of Shah Tahmasb. Interestingly, the fourth chapter (*bāb*) of *Saffetu's-safa* was translated into Turkish only one year later than it was written, in 760/1357. This copy is preserved in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, (Kemankeş 247). So, excluding Abbaslı's unknown copy, this is the oldest copy of *Saffetu's-safa*, even though it was partial and a translation of the original work. Another point to notice is that this Turkish translation of *Saffetu's-safa* seemingly gained wide currency among Ottoman learned circles, especially by the sixteenth century. There are numbers of copies of this Turkish translation in several libraries in cities such as Istanbul, Kastamanu, Konya, and Manisa. One should not disregard that these cities, except Istanbul, were prince *sanjaks* of the Ottoman Empire; thus, they were at the same time scholarly, literary and artistic centers. Furthermore there are respectful references to the sayings and deeds of Shaykh Safi in the works of some leading Ottoman sufis. For example, in his famous book *Müzekki'n-nüfûs*, which was written in 1448, Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, who is known as the second great *pîr* of the Kâdirî Order in Anatolia, counts Shaykh Safi among the greatest saints of Sufîsm and on six occasions refers to his words, an honor reserved for only few great sufis. See Eşrefoğlu Rûmî, *Müzekki'n-nüfûs*, yay. Nezihî Ferhun-Ali Ayağ, İstanbul, 1976. For an analysis of *Saffetu's-safa* see Basil Nikitine, "Essai d'Analyse du Safwat as-Safa", *Journal Asiatique* 245, 1957, 385-394.

Safa offers plentiful information about the religious stand and views of Shaykh Safi. Even a cursory sketch of *Saffetu's-Safa* makes it clear that Safiyuddin's ideas and mystic interpretations can hardly be evaluated as shi'ite.. Even though there might be some implicit implications to the contrary, these do not exceed the traditional shi'te core in all *tasavvuf* schools of Islam. After an analysis of *Saffetu's-safa*, Basil Nikitine, for example, arrives at the conclusion that the work depicts the Prophet as a sufi master who was carefully followed by Shaykh Safi; and thus, that the Shaykh did not deviate from the traditional way of the sunna and shari'a. "Leur orthodoxie est donc" says Nikitine, "indiscutable."⁴¹⁹ Sohrweide writes in a similar manner,

Die Einstellung der frühen Safāviya zur Šari'a reiht sie eher unter die Vertreter des gemäßigten Sufismus ein. Der Überlieferung nach hatte Scheich Zāhid Safi ad-Din strenge Befolgung der Šari'a empfohlen, die dieser Zeit seiner Lebens eingehalten und auch von seinen Jüngern gefordert haben soll. Mit besonderer Schärfe lehnte Safi das Weintrinken ab. Unter seinen Jüngern ahndete er streng jedes Vergehen gegen das Verbot; häufig war das Tod des Sünders die Folge, so erschien es jedenfalls den Jüngern. Ob dieser tatsächlich durch den Zorn des Scheichs verursacht wurde, ist hier unwesentlich; wichtig ist, daß man den Verstoß gegen das Weinverbot für eine Todsünde hielt.⁴²⁰

On the other hand, a closer look at *Saffetu's-safa* shows that Shaykh Safiyuddin was a highly educated man and that among his audience were figures from cultured classes of society as well as villagers and middle or low-class townspeople.⁴²¹ Shaykh

⁴¹⁹ Nikitine, p. 390.

⁴²⁰ Sohrweide, p. 100. Sohrweide also calls attention to the negative attitudes of both Shaykh Zāhid and Shaykh Safi toward antinomian Qalandar groups, whom they denounced as heretics. See Sohrweide, p. 103. Walther Hinz describes the daily activities of the *Tekke* of Ardabil: The day started with the early morning, before the sun rose. Then followed the prayer and zikr, which continues approximately one hour; the same zikr was repeated at the evening. In the mid-afternoon there was regular recitation of the Koran. The disciples of the hospice were fond of fasting. Especially during the last ten days of Ramadan and the first ten days of Zilhicce they lived in seclusion, totally devoting themselves to prayer and contemplation. See Hinz, p. 11. This description clearly indicates that during this time the *Tekke* of Ardabil was a great center of high Islamic Sufism, quite distanced from any forms of 'heterodoxy'.

⁴²¹ The fourth chapter of *Saffetu's-safa*, for example, is composed of the Shaykh's interpretation of Qur'anic verses, of some sayings of the Prophet, and of the special phrases produced by Islamic mystics. Even a cursory glance at its style and its evaluation of subjects makes clear that this work delves far beyond the perception level of illiterate people. Rather, its audience must have been learned mystics.

Safī and his spiritual master, Shaykh Zāhid Gilānī, were, indeed, representatives of high Sufism prudently respecting the rules of Islamic law (*ṣeriat*).⁴²²

Shaykh Safīyuddīn was highly influential, not only among ordinary people, but among the ruling elite as well. He gained the respect of Mongol rulers; and he saved many people from being harmed at their hands.⁴²³ Two letters of the great Minister Rashiduddīn Fadlullāh (d. 1318), one addressed to Shaykh Safī himself and the other to Mir Ahmad, the son of Rashiduddīn, reflect in an obvious manner the concern of the Minister for the welfare of the Shaykh and his desire to win the Shaykh's favor and intercession. In his first letter, Rashiduddīn offers to Shaykh Safī, for his convent, a yearly gift of corn, wine, oil, cattle, sugar, honey, and other food-stuffs for the proper entertainment of notables of Ardabil on the anniversary of the Prophet's birthday. In his second letter, the Minister enjoins his son, who was then the governor of Ardabil, to take care of the all inhabitants, and especially "to act in such wise manner that His Holiness the Pole of the Heaven of Truth, the Swimmer in the Oceans of the Law, the Pacer of the Hippodrome of the Path, the Shaykh of Islam and of the Muslims, the Proof of such as to attain the Goal, the Exemplar of the Bench of Purity, the Rose-tree of the Garden of Fidelity, Shaykh Safīyyu'l-Millat wa'd-Dīn (may God Most High perpetuate the

⁴²² As Sohrweide determines, both Shaykhs took positions against antinomian Qalandar groups, denouncing them as heretics. See Sohrweide, p. 103.

⁴²³ HT, p. 130. Also consider Mazzaoui, p. 46; Sohrweide, p. 110; Aubin, "Études Safavides I, Sah Ismail et les notables de l'Iraq persan", pp. 42-3; Roemer, "The Safavid Period", pp. 192-3. An interesting dialogue between the powerful Mongol *amīr* Amir Chūbān, who was a *murīd* of the Shaykh, and Shaykh Safī is recorded by Safavid sources. Asked by the *amīr* whether the soldiers of the king or his disciples were more numerous, Shaykh Sadruddīn is said to have answered that his disciples were twice as numerous. According to another version, he is said to have replied that in Iran alone for every soldier there were a hundred Sufis. To this the *amīr* is said to have replied: "You speak truly, for I have traveled from the Oxus to the frontiers of Egypt, and from the shores of Hurmuz to Bāb al-Abvāb [Darband], which are the furthest limits of this kingdom, and I have seen the disciples of the Shaykh embellished and adorned with the ornaments and the garb of the Shaykh, and they have spread the sound of *zīkr* to those parts." Recited in Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 10. The same occurrence is recorded in HT. See HT, p. 130.

blessings of His Holy Exhalations!) may be well pleased with and grateful to thee.”⁴²⁴

These two letters suffice to show the high repute which Shaykh Safī enjoyed amongst his contemporaries.⁴²⁵

The popularity of the Safavid order was so great during the time of its most illustrious founder that the number of those who came to visit the Shaykh along one road only – that from Maragha and Tabriz – in the course of three months amounted to some thirteen thousand.⁴²⁶ Khwandamir writes,

In *Safwatu’s-safā* it is recorded that Khwaja Muhyiddin, one of Shaykh Safī’s sons, said, “Once all the mosques and places of worship in Ardabil and surrounding areas were filled with a multitude of disciples gathered from Iraq, Azerbaijan, Anatolia, Diyarbakir, and Shirvan, and they were all in retreat under the shaykh’s guidance. It was my duty to take each of them a loaf of bread to break their fasts in the evening. During those days we had to prepare five thousand loaves every day in order to have enough.” It is also mentioned in *Safwatu’s-safā* that once in the village of Darwar in Pir-Muhammad Darwari’s hermitage nearly twenty thousand people repented before the shaykh and became his disciples. Mawlana Abdul-Latif, the shaykh’s prayer leader, said, “One night I heard the shaykh say, ‘Now I have two thousand perfected disciples, who have gone through the stages of fear and danger and arrived at the stage of fearlessness.’”⁴²⁷

⁴²⁴ Quoted in BRW, pp. 33-4.

⁴²⁵ Roemer underscores the political and commercial dimensions of Shaykh Safī’s leadership, as well as the spiritual one. He writes, “Shaikh Safī is portrayed as a paradoxical personality in which the miracle worker and man of God combined with a sober, practical politician and a cunning merchant.” Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, p. 191.

⁴²⁶ BRW, p. 44. According to Browne, many if not most of these disciples must have come from Asia Minor. Also see Hinz, p. 8. Khwandamir records a slightly different version: “It is related that Mawlana Abdul-Malik, son of Mawlana Shamsuddin Barniqi, once said, ‘I once counted the people who were going through Barniq to see the shaykh. Within three months there were thirteen thousand people, and God only knows how many came by other roads.’” HS, p. 559. It is true that the Safavid Order gained a wide-spread popularity even at the time of its founder. But one should not interpret this success merely as an achievement of Safavid shaykhs; the religious landscape of the Islamic world should also be taken into account. As Roemer rightfully asserts, with the destruction of the Caliphate by the Mongols, Islam was faced with a grave crisis, both political and religious. As a result, the official theology of Islam lost its political background and was deprived of much of its importance and influence. Instead, popular religiosity, which has been always chiefly represented by sufi brotherhoods, attained widespread popularity. This form of religiosity “included a marked willingness to believe in miracles, a cult of saints with the growth of much frequented places of pilgrimage, and even the veneration of ‘Ali.” See Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, p. 191.

⁴²⁷ HS, p. 559. HT recites similar passages from *Saffetu’s-safa*, saying many disciples of Shaykh Safī were coming from Iraq, Azerbaijan, Rum, Diyarbakr, and Shirwan in order to benefit the holy presence of the Shaykh. See HT, pp. 128-9.

The ethnic origin of the Safavid family is not clearly documented in contemporary sources. The family's claim of descendance from the Prophetic line has been already discussed by several scholars, and a consensus was established.⁴²⁸ To summarize, the origins of Safavid family had no relation to the family of the Prophet. The legend that family members descended from the seventh Imam Musa al-Kazim was a later invention, dating to the shaykhdom of either Hoca Ali or Junayd, closely connected to desires for the appearance of shi'ite tendency in the doctrine of the Order and aiming to provide legitimate ground for claims of worldly power.⁴²⁹

Some scholars argue that Firuzshah, the oldest confirmed ancestor of Shaykh Safī, was born to a Kurdish family.⁴³⁰ Nonetheless, the family has certain affinity to Turkish culture and language as well. An interesting entry in *Saffetu's-safa*, which was recited in some later Safavid chronicles as well, recounts that while searching for a mature spiritual guide Shaykh Safī went to the Province Fars, where he encountered a recommended Shaykh. After realizing the young age of Safī, the Shaykh calls him "Turkish Pīr" (*Pīr-i Türk*).⁴³¹ The same phrase is used several times to name Shaykh Safī in *Saffetu's-safa*. But, how should we understand this phrase? Basil Nikitine, after reciting these phrases in *Saffetu's-safa*, argues that during this period, Ardabil was not a

⁴²⁸ In the context of later Safavid assertion that they descended from the family of the Prophet, the origin of Safavid Dynasty, indeed, has been discussed at length by scholars and an agreement on the *seyyidship* of Safavids has already been reached. To repeat all those discussions here would be repetitive. For a brief summary, see Mazzaoui, pp. 46-52. According to Zeki Velidi Togan, the oldest well-known ancestor of Safavids, Firuzshah, was a Kurd. See Z. V. Togan, "Sur L'origine", p. 356.

⁴²⁹ An extremist form shi'ism was certainly implanted in the doctrine of the Order by the shaykhdom of Junayd. This topic will be further analyzed in the following pages.

⁴³⁰ See Zeki V. Togan, "Sur L'origine des Safavides", *Mélanges Massignon*, III, 1957, p. 356. Togan argues that the descendants of Shaykh Safī, who descended from a Kurdish family, were completely 'turkified' by the time of Shah Ismail. See *i.b.i.d.*, p. 353.

⁴³¹ Recited in Sohrweide, p. 99. AA recounts the same event. But in that account Safī is called "O Turkish youth!" See AA, p. 22.

“région turcophone”.⁴³² Despite being curious about Nikitine’s argument, Sohrweide also inclines to underestimate the connection of Safiyuddin with the Turkish cultural sphere. He states, the word ”Türk” is used here as a synonym of “beautiful”.⁴³³ To conclude, the origin of the Safavid dynasty was neither *seyyid*, nor shi’ite, nor of Turkoman blood.⁴³⁴

Indeed, the connection of the early Safavid Shaykhs to Turkish culture and language, as well as their ethnic origin, and the relationship of the order to the Turkish folk during the early years of its history are not clearly known. Modern scholars tend to identify the principal language spoken by the early Shaykhs as the Persian dialect of Gilan.⁴³⁵ Nonetheless, the translation of *Saffetu’s-safa*, albeit partially, into Turkish immediately after its appearance clearly shows that by at least the mid-fourteenth century the order had attained a wide-spread acceptance among Turkish speaking people. Likewise, by the Shaykhdom of Junaid, at the latest, the decisive majority of the order’s disciples hailed from Turkoman tribal peoples of Anatolia and Syria. Moreover, from this time onward until the fall of dynasty the native language of the Shaykh’s family members is known to have been Turkish.⁴³⁶

⁴³² Nikitine, p. 393, footnote 3. Nikitine’s view is, however, open to criticism. Sohrweide, for example, took a skeptic stance toward this view. See, Sohrweide, p. 99, footnote 26.

⁴³³ Sohrweide reminds that in the Persian poetry the phrase “schön Türke” is celebrated. Thus, this phrase in *Saffetu’s-safa* does not necessarily mean that Shaykh Safī was ethnically a Turk, but rather, that he was as beautiful as a Turk. See Sohrweide, p. 99, footnote 26.

⁴³⁴ Hans Roemer argues, however, that Ismail’s ethnic origin must be accepted Turkish or Turkoman; “At any rate,” he writes, “Ismail’s Turkish or Turkoman descent is beyond any question.” See Hans R. Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy”, *Intellectual Studies in Islam*, eds., M. M. Mazzaoui-V. B. Moreen, Utah, 1990, p. 29.

⁴³⁵ Sohrweide, p. 113. Brown states that Shaykh Safī produced poetry both in the dialect of Gilan and in ordinary Persian. See BRW, p. 43. However, Mazzaoui says that the Shaykh may possibly have produced some Turkish written works as well. See Mazzaoui, pp. 49-50, footnote 7.

⁴³⁶ Shah Ismail is said to have learned Persian during his concealment in Lahijan. (See Muhammad Karim Youssef-Jamālī, *The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā’il I (1487-1524)*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1981, p. 13.) And “more than a century after Isma’il’s death, when the capital had been transferred from the north of Persia to Isfahān, Turkish seems still to have been the language generally

After performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, Shaykh Safī died on September 12, 1334 at Ardabil.⁴³⁷ As Mazzaoui concludes, two significant facts exist about the Order of Ardabil during his lifetime; namely, “one: the high respect which the Order and Shaykh Safī enjoyed under the Mongols, and two: the curious fact that most of the inhabitants of Ardabil were of [the] Šāfi’ī school and were followers of Shaykh Safī ad-Dīn.”⁴³⁸ Furthermore, Shaykh Safī himself was a sincere and prudent follower of sunni Islam. However, the nature of contact between the Order and the Turkoman milieu, even its existence, is not clear in the available sources.

Towards the end of his life Shaykh Safī named his second son Shaykh Sadruddin Musa⁴³⁹ (1305-1391) as his successor.⁴⁴⁰ Shaykh Sadruddin held the position for 57 years. His Shaykhdom witnessed the further proliferation of disciples and the influence of his family on regional politics. The wealth of the *tekke* also increased considerably,⁴⁴¹ and his followers visited Ardabil in great numbers.⁴⁴² During his long term of office, many Ilkhanid *amīrs* and Mongol nobles became his disciples.⁴⁴³ As *Tārīkh-i ‘Ālam-ārā* writes, “[his glory] spread everywhere, the number of adepts increased and these brought him masses of valuables, and soon, as his father’s successor, he added to the

spoken at court.” BRW, p. 15. Attempting to prove the dominance of Turkish in the Safavid realm, Browne also calls attention to the fact that the war-cry of Safavid soldiers was not “Long live Persia!” or the like, but rather, in the Turkish language, “O my spiritual guide and master whose sacrifice I am!” Is this your translation or his? If it’s yours, change it to: “O my spiritual guide and master, for whom I sacrifice myself.” Also see Sümer, pp. 5-6. For several European travellers’ witness accounts see Fuat Köprülü, “Āzerī”, *JA*, pp. 120-21.

⁴³⁷ Sarwar, p. 21; Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 9;

⁴³⁸ Mazzaoui, p. 46.

⁴³⁹ Sadruddin Musa was born from the marriage of Shaykh Safī and Bibī Fatima, the daughter of Shaykh Zāhid Gilnānī. HS recounts Shaykh Zāhid’s miraculous foretelling of the birth of Sadruddin during the wedding ceremony of Shaykh Safī and Bibī Fatima. See HS, p. 559. AA repeats the same account. See AA, pp. 25-6.

⁴⁴⁰ HS, p. 559.

⁴⁴¹ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 9.

⁴⁴² Sarwar, p. 21.

⁴⁴³ AA, p. 26. However, Shaykh Sadruddin seems to have occasionally fallen into conflict with temporal rulers. The competition between him and Malik Ashraf is recorded in Safavid sources. See, for example, HS, p. 560; HT, pp. 137-48.

dignity of Aaron (Hārūn) the magnificence of Korah (Qārūn). His cellars (*hafīr*) became full of supplies, and the place of pilgrimage brimful with merchandise.”⁴⁴⁴

During the Shaykhdom of Sadruddin Musa the sacred enclosure of the Safavid Family at Ardabil was established under the direction of the Shaykh.⁴⁴⁵ The principle source regarding the early periods of the order, namely *Saffetu's-safa*, was compiled by Ibn Bazzaz. Indeed, the basic organization of the Safavid order had already been established by Shaykh Safī, who extended the Safavid propaganda network to eastern Anatolia and Syria. But, under his son Sadruddin, this network was consolidated and regular contact with proselytes was maintained.⁴⁴⁶

Shaykh Sadruddin died in 1391 and, like his father, buried in the Ardabil sanctuary.⁴⁴⁷ Shortly before his death, he performed the pilgrimage to Mecca⁴⁴⁸ and named his son Hoca Ali as his successor. Hoca Ali headed the order until his death in 1427. Some historians argue that the first discernible shi'ite tendency in the esoteric doctrine of the order appeared under Hoca Ali.⁴⁴⁹ However, some other scholars have

⁴⁴⁴ TA, p. 63.

⁴⁴⁵ HS, p. 559; AA, p. 26; Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, pp. 9-10; BRW, p. 44.

⁴⁴⁶ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 10. Savory also asserts that as a result of their propaganda in eastern Anatolia and Syria, the Safavids recruited many disciples from the pastoral Turcoman tribes inhabiting in these regions. But this assertion needs to be supported by historical evidence. Moreover, as indicated above, during this early period the message of the Safavid Shaykhs was not so attractive to illiterate pastoral nomads. It seems reasonable to conclude that the large-scale spread of the Safavid order among Anatolian and Syrian nomadic-tribal Turkomans must have occurred later.

⁴⁴⁷ Browne says both Sadruddin and his son Hoca Ali composed verses in Persian. See BRW, p. 44, 46.

⁴⁴⁸ BRW, p. 45; Sarwar, p. 22.

⁴⁴⁹ “In him strong Shi'a tendencies reveal themselves: instigated by the Ninth Imam Muhammad Taqī in a dream he converts the people of Dizful, by a miraculous stoppage of their river, to a belief in and recognition of the supreme holiness of Ali in Abī Tālib...” See BRW, p. 46. Browne also recites from *Nasab-nāme-i Silsilat as-Safaviyya* that on one occasion Hoca Ali exhorts Timur to “chastise, as they deserve, the Yazdī Kurds, the friends of Mu'āwiya, because of whom we wear the black garb of mourning for the Immaculate Imāms.”; and he considers this occasion as a strong proof of the Shaykh's shi'ite tendency. Also see Hinz, p. 15. Mazzaoui, p. 55; Hinz, p. 23; H. Roamer, “Die Safawiden”, *Speculum*, IV, 1953, p. 28; Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 13.

contested this idea, arguing that the esoteric doctrine of the order reflected shi'ism by the time of Shaykh Junayd, the grandson of Hoca Ali.⁴⁵⁰

Another controversial issue pertaining to the era of Hoca Ali is the story of his meeting with Timur.⁴⁵¹ Savory, following Iskender Beg Munshī⁴⁵², argues that these two men met three times, and that the last of these meetings occurred in 1404, shortly before Timur's death, when he was travelling back to Central Asia after his victory over the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I at the battle of Ankara in 1402. According to traditional Safavid account, Timur summoned Hoca Ali, and after the latter's display of *kerāmet*, or extra ordinary deeds, he became a disciple of the Shaykh. He then, upon the request of the Shaykh, handed over the prisoners taken in his campaign against the Ottomans. Hoca Ali set them free and settled in Ardabil. The grateful descendants of these freed captives, known as *Sūfiyān-ı Rūm*, became the most devoted adherents and supporters of the Safavid family.⁴⁵³ According to the *Anonymous history of Shah Ismail*, most of these

⁴⁵⁰ See, for example, *Minorsky, Tadhkirat al-Mulūk*, p. 189; Jean Aubin, "Notables", p. 9; Heribert Horst, *Tīmūr and Hōgā 'Alī, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Safawiden, in Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse Jahrgang*, Wiesbaden, 1958, p. 49; Sohrweide, p. 122.

⁴⁵¹ On the relation between Hoca Ali and Timur see Horst, *Tīmūr and Hōgā 'Alī*.

⁴⁵² According to AA, Hoca Ali met Timur on three occasions. The first occasion was when Timur was crossing the river Oxus on his way to invade Transoxania. At that time Hoca Ali appeared to Timur in dervish clothes and foretold him that he would re-appear in Dezdul and die in Jerusalem. The second occasion was while Timur was passing through the river Dezdul on his way from Baghdad to Kūzestān, again wearing dervish clothes. The third meeting occurred while Timur was returning from his campaign on Asia Minor. See AA, p. 27.

⁴⁵³ BRW, p. 46; Hinz, pp. 8-9; Mazzaoui, p. 54; Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 13; Oktay Efendiev, "Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque dans la création de l'état Safavide", *Turcica*, VI, 1975, p. 27. Iskender Beg Munshi narrates this event as follows: "Several years later, when Timur was returning from Asia Minor, bringing with him a large number of prisoners whom he had taken in that campaign, he stopped at Ardabil. The fame of Shaikh Safī al-Dīn and accounts of his high mystical station had reached Timur, and he made the pilgrimage to the Safavid mausoleum. Afterward, he asked some questions to dervishes sitting nearby, and they directed him to Kāja 'Alī. He went to the Shaikh's private quarters and found the Shaikh at prayer, offering praises to God. However much the servants importuned him, informing him of the arrival of the great conqueror, Kāja 'Alī paid no attention. When he had finished, he saw that Timur was seated in a proper manner, and then began to offer him words of counsel and admonition. [Then Hoca Ali shows a *karamat* revealing Timur's secret thoughts and the latter became the disciple of the Shaykh. Upon Timur's offer to fulfill any request of the former, whose "mind was completely free from any worldly considerations"] ... the Kāja, seeking always to please God, requested the release of the prisoners whom Emir Timur had taken in Asia Minor. Emir Timur honored the request,

prisoners, upon becoming Safavid disciples, were sent back to Anatolia with representatives (*khalifa*) appointed to accompany them.⁴⁵⁴ Minorsky, basing his argument on the Anonymous History of Shah Ismail, states,

Under his [Safī's] grandson Sultan Ali, we have more direct indications of the threads drawn from Ardabil to the far-away Anatolia. When after his campaign in Asia Minor, Timur was passing through Ardabil, he told Sultan Ali to crave a boon. The Shaykh begged for the liberation of the prisoners of Rum, and Timur freed them all (*majmū'*) and appointed them to the service of the family of Ardabil. He also issued an order (*raqam*) to the rulers (*salātīn*) and governors of Rum to the effect that the men whom he had freed "and who are the Sufis of the Safavid family," wherever they be, should not be oppressed (*dast-andāz*) or prevented from visiting (*āmad-u-shud*) their Murshid; they must be exempted from payments to their masters, as well as from government taxes. Out of his own lawful money Timur bought fields and villages in the neighborhood of Ardabil and allotted them as *vaqf* to the resting place (*mazār*) of Shaykh Safī, which he recognized as a *bast* (asylum). He also made over to the Safavid family the land taxes (*kharāj*) of the said *vilāyat*. To those of the prisoners who expressed the desire to return to Rum, permission was granted to do so. Shaykh Sultan Ali appointed his representatives (*khalifa va-pīra*) to all the tribes (*oymaq*) and said: 'let your comings and goings be not infrequent, for the advent (*khurūj*) of the righteous Duodeciman religion is nigh and you must be ready to sacrifice your lives.'⁴⁵⁵

and gave orders that all the captives should be released. In the town of Ardabil and its environs, Timur bought, out of his lawful money, villages and excellent pastures, and made them into *vaqf* in favor of the Safavid sanctuary, which he declared to be a *bast* (sanctuary) and place of refuge. Further, he allotted/transferred to the Safavid family the land taxes of that region. From that date, the descendants and posterity of those prisoners, who indeed owed their freedom to that saintly family, have been enrolled in the ranks of their disciples and Sufis." AA, pp. 27-8. After reciting the event, Iskender Munshi genuinely questions the authenticity of this account. He attributes this meeting with Timur to Shaykh Sadruddin Musa and expresses his disagreement, stating "a more accurate account is that Kāja 'Alī was the person involved." Then he admits that he could not find this account in any written sources, but learned of it through verbal reports. He says, "Although I have not found this tradition in the historical chronicles, or in any other accounts of the circumstances of the Safavid family, either in prose or poetry, nevertheless it is widely rumored and disseminated by a succession of verbal reports, and so I have written it down." AA, p. 28. Then he specifies the story of *vaqf* documents said to have issued by Timur. "The actual *vaqf* document, written in an antique hand and embellished with the Mongol seal and with the personal seal of Emir Timur, fell into Safavid hands during a campaign in the region of Balk, while Safavid forces were laying siege to Andekūd. It was brought to the notice of Shah Abbas I." AA, p. 28. Qādi Ahmed Qumī, who finished his work in 1591, 25 years before the appearance of Iskender Beg Munshi's first two volumes, recites the summary version of this occasion. But here, Shaykh Sadruddin Musa is said to have met with Timur. See HT, p. 149. It should be noted, however, that the earliest Safavid chronicle, HS, does not mention this meeting.

⁴⁵⁴ See the former footnote. Also consider Hinz, p. 9; Mazzaoui, p. 54.

⁴⁵⁵ See Minorsky, *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, A Manual of Safavid Administration*, London, 1943, pp. 189-190.

However, this account of Hoca Ali's meeting with Timur has been rejected by some prominent scholars. According to Roemer and Sohrweide, for example, this story must be a later invention of the Safavids, either during the time of Haydar or Ismail, simply to provide legitimacy for their temporal suzerainty by somehow establishing a connection with the former great ruler of the region. Sohrweide notes that none of the Mongol sources mention Timur's visit to Hoca Ali in Ardabil.⁴⁵⁶ Faruk Sümer follows the same line of argument. After mentioning the absence of any single reference in Mongol sources to this event, he concludes that this story must have been a distortion of qizilbash Turks' collective memory pertaining to their Rūmī origin.⁴⁵⁷ Likewise, Sohrweide argues that Shaykh Sadreddin and Shaykh Hoca Ali could hardly have had disciples among the Turkoman nomads of Anatolia.⁴⁵⁸

As a matter of fact, Timurid sources do not mention any meeting between Hoca Ali and Timur, or even any correspondence between the two. Nonetheless, we learn from *Zafernāme*, the biography of Timur written by Nizamuddin Şâmî in 1402, that while returning from his campaign in Asia Minor, Timur passed through Georgia, Armenia, Shirvan and Azerbaijan, conquering some fortresses in Georgia and Armenia. *Zafernāme* says that upon returning from Asia Minor, Timur decided to invade Georgia and laid siege to Berts, one of the most fortified fortresses of Georgia. After a nine-day

⁴⁵⁶ Roemer, "The Safavid Period", pp. 205-6; Sohrweide, p. 126.

⁴⁵⁷ Faruk Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü*, Ankara: TTK, 1999, pp. 6-7.

⁴⁵⁸ Sohrweide, p. 130. Babinger recites from the Ottoman historian Cenābī (d. 1590) that Shaykh Sadreddin had a great number of disciples in the Province of Teke and Hamid-ili, who joined Timur while he returning from his campaign. See Franz Babinger, "Schejh Bedr ed-Din, der Sohn des Richters von Simaw", *Der Islam*, 11, 1921, p. 85. Nonetheless, Sohrweide regards this record of Cenābī as "Tekelü-Version der Tīmūr-Legende". For a similar approach see Herbert Horst, *Tīmūr and Hōğū 'Alī, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Safawiden*, in *Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse Jahrgang*, Wiesbaden, 1958.

siege, Timur's forces managed to capture the fortress on August 12, 1403.⁴⁵⁹ Timur then advanced towards Armenian lands. Upon the Armenian ruler's acceptance of levy payments (*cizye*), however, he gave up the idea of invading Armenia and proceeded to Karabağ-ı Erran through Tiflis and Beylekan.⁴⁶⁰ Here Timur stayed for a while, enjoying the entertainment and the banquets of religious scholars and spiritual guides (*ulemā ve meşāyih*), who came from Iran and Turan and were Turk, *Tacik*, Arab, and *Acem*. *Zafernāme* specifies that all these parties were organized and sponsored by the governor of Shirvan, Shaykh Ibrahim.⁴⁶¹ After spending some time in Karabağ-ı Erran, Timur seems to have moved to Gilan, where he made generous bestowments to Seyyid Rıza Kīya⁴⁶², who was the governor of Gilan.⁴⁶³ *Zafernāme* also records that Timur helped a certain group living in Asia Minor, called the Karatatarlar, to emigrate to the East, providing safe conditions for travel. *Zafernāme* relates that the Karatatarlar, whose number included nearly 1000 families, emigrated with their properties, cattle, camels, and sheep.⁴⁶⁴

In light of these facts, namely that the returning trajectory of Timur evidently crossed the Ardabil region,⁴⁶⁵ and that he took with him a one thousand-family nomadic group from Anatolia, and that he evidently participated in the banquets of religious

⁴⁵⁹ Nizamudin Şâmî, *Zafernāme*, çev. Necati Lugal, Ankara: TTK, 1987, pp. 334-8.

⁴⁶⁰ Nizamudin Şâmî, pp. 339-41.

⁴⁶¹ Nizamudin Şâmî, pp. 346-7.

⁴⁶² He must be a member of the famous Kirkiyā family, who ruled the region of Gilan for centuries. One century later, one of his descendants, Ali Kirkiyā would offer asylum to unprotected Safavid princes against the Aqqyunlu rulers.

⁴⁶³ Nizamudin Şâmî, pp. 349-50. Indeed, *Zafernāme* does not state clearly where Timur met Seyyid Rıza Kīya. But the flow of narration strongly suggests that this meeting occurred in Gilan, on his way back to Central Asia.

⁴⁶⁴ Nizamuddin Şâmî, pp. 328-9. The description of this group here strongly suggests that they were pastoral nomads.

⁴⁶⁵ Ardabil is located on the road connecting Shirvan and Gilan.

scholars and mystical leaders⁴⁶⁶ in Shirvan, the account of Safavid sources seems possible, though not certain.

As stated, towards the end of his life Hoca Ali decided to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. His son Ibrahim, despite his father's desire to leave him in Ardabil as spiritual director and supervisor of the *tekke*, joined him on the journey. On the way back to Ardabil, the Shaykh made a visit to Jerusalem, where he died and was buried in 1427. In accordance with the will of the deceased Shaykh, his son Ibrahim, better known as Shaykh-Shah, succeeded to the post and served as the head of the order until his death in 1447.⁴⁶⁷ Safavid sources are almost silent on the period of Shaykh Ibrahim. Khwandamir, for example, mentions him only in one sentence: "After the death of his father, Shaykh Khwaja Ali, Shaykh Ibrahim traveled in great sorrow until he reached Ardabil, where he took up the prayer carpet of his fathers and forefathers in guiding dervishes and devotees of his house."⁴⁶⁸

Iskender Beg Munshī expands this account slightly, emphasizing the great number of the disciples under Shaykh Ibrahim's auspice as well as his bounty and generosity. It seems from Iskender Beg's account that Shaykh Ibrahim maintained and strengthened the network of adherents who were actively conducting the propaganda of the order in Anatolia and elsewhere. Likewise, according to Iskender Beg, Shaykh Ibrahim sent out khalifas to all regions wherever his disciples existed; as a result, in a short space of time, Ardabil became a meeting place for people from both near and

⁴⁶⁶ Timur is famous for his interest in and benevolence toward religious figures.

⁴⁶⁷ HS, p. 561; HT, p. 150; AA, p. 28. BRW, p. 47; Sarwar, pp. 22-23; Savory, p. 15;

⁴⁶⁸ HS, p. 561. HT also skips some details, mentioning brief examples with more or less the same meaning. See HT, p. 151.

far.⁴⁶⁹ During Shaykh Ibrahim's time, the glory and the wealth of the Order seemingly exceeded that during the times of his forefathers. We are told,

The throng of disciples circumambulating the Safavid sanctuary had become so great that not all of them could be admitted into the presence of the Shaykh Ibrahim. His authority increased daily, so that no one in the Province of Ardabil could oppose his orders, which had to be obeyed. ... His well-stocked kitchens were full of dishes and vessels of gold and silver, and his munificence exceeded even that of his forefathers. His manners and customs were positively regal.⁴⁷⁰

It can be concluded from these limited records that Ardabil became increasingly more frequented by the followers of the Safavids. But Ibrahim's shaykhdom does not include any considerable event in the flow of the history of the Order. As a modern scholar describes, "His period of leadership of the order, which lasted for some two decades, gives one the decided impression of having been the lull before the storm."⁴⁷¹

Mazzaoui correctly describes the establishment period of the order, the period from Shaykh Safī to Shaykh Ibrahim, as "The Sūfī Order" while describing the period from Shaykh Junayd to Shah Ismail as "The Safavid Movement."⁴⁷² During the establishment period, the four heads of the order were renowned as pious men of exemplary conduct and character, loved by their followers and respected by contemporary temporal rulers. Even such a tempestuous sunni author as Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunjī has admitted the virtue of these men, using only good words to describe Shaykh Safī: "a unique man of the world."⁴⁷³ Minorsky also paints a positive picture: "...the Lords of Ardabil, they are highly respected shaykhs leading a

⁴⁶⁹ AA, p. 29. For similar conclusions see also Savory, p. 16.

⁴⁷⁰ Savory, p. 16. Mazzaoui, however, sees the time of Ibrahim as the least significant period, when the activity of the Ardabil Order appears to have hit its lowest point in the history of the order. See Mazzaoui, p. 56.

⁴⁷¹ Michel M. Mazzaoui, "The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State", *Iqbāl Review*, XII/3, Karachi, 1971, p. 83.

⁴⁷² See Mazzaoui, pp. 52-82.

⁴⁷³ TA, p. 62.

contemplative life, spending their time in prayers and fasting, and credited with supernatural powers.”⁴⁷⁴ No palpable signs of Shi’ism, either in terms of high level of Twelver Shi’ism or at the folk level of the *ghulat*, were recognizable during this period of the Order.⁴⁷⁵ Although not clear enough in the sources, a special interest among nomadic Turkoman masses towards the Order was not detected during this period. On the contrary, this early Safavid Shaykh had great numbers of khalifas and disciples among the educated circles of towns and cities. And finally, no indications of inclination towards worldly power – i.e. assuming political authority – were seen in the first four heads of the Order. As will be discussed in the next section, during the Shaykhdom of Junayd three sudden, fundamental changes occur: one in esoteric doctrine, a second in the social background of the disciples, and the third – a natural result of the first two changes – being the transformation of the traditional quietist sufi order into an extremist-shi’ite mystic-political movement. Not only does Junayd’s creed display evident shi’ite elements, but his disciples were principally nomadic Turkomans of Anatolia and Syria; and finally, he displayed desire for the temporal as well as spiritual. The following section will evaluate how this deep-seated transformation of the order occurred was fulfilled under Shaykh Junayd.

⁴⁷⁴ Minorsky, *Tadhkirat al Mulūk*, p. 189.

⁴⁷⁵ Mazzaoui, p. 56.

4.2. SHAYKH JUNAYD (1447-1460): TURKOMAN DOMINATION AND THE SCHISM WITHIN THE ORDER

4.2.1. The Succession of Shaykh Junayd and his Removal from Ardabil

As the previous section of this paper described, the Safavid Order under its eponymous founder and his immediate successors was a peaceful and contemplative order, one that did not differ in any aspect from countless other sufi orders established in other parts of the Muslim world.⁴⁷⁶ Shaykh Junayd is generally accepted by the historical and modern scholars as the one who was responsible for transforming the theological frame of the order from sunnism to shi'ite militancy.⁴⁷⁷ However, whether or not elements of shi'ism within the order can be traced back to before Junayd's time is not clear. What is clear is that under the leadership of Junayd the transformation process, which will be discussed below, was more or less accomplished. Contemporary evidence reveals that one, Junayd

⁴⁷⁶ See Michel M. Mazzaoui, "The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State", *Iqbāl Review*, XII/3, Karachi, 1971, p. 82.

⁴⁷⁷ Minorsky states: "The early shaykhs were strictly orthodox and their religious authority could not be called in question and opposed. The turning point came in the years 1449-56, when a descendant of Shaykh Saḡī in the fourth generation, the young Shaykh Junayd, appeared ..." See V. Minorsky, "Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1/3, 1957, p. 439. Hanna Sohrweide follows the same line of argument: "Ġunaid ist der Verantwortliche für den radikalen Wandel im Orden, durch den dieser, das heißt der sunnitisch ausgerichtete, eher gemäßigte Orden Saḡī ad-Dīns, zu der militanten, extrem-schiitischen Qizilbaş-Safavīza wurde." See Sohrweide, p. 122. Also consider Aubin, "Les notables", pp. 45-46; Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Babiler İsyânından Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu'da İslâm Heterodoksisinin Doğuş ve Gelişim Tarihine Kısa bir Bakış", *Bellefen*, LXIV/239, 2000, p. 147. Among the foremost specialists on the Safavid history, Minorsky, Horst, Aubin, and Efendiev accept the turning point in the ideology of the order as the Shaykhdom of Junaid. Some other scholars, such as Browne, Hinz, Savory, and Roemer, however, argue that the first signs of shi'ism were already discernable during the time of Hoca Ali. See V. Minorsky, *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, A Manual of Safavid Administration*, London, 1943, p. 189; Jean Aubin, "Notables", p. 9; Heribert Horst, *Tīmūr and Hōğā 'Alī, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Safawiden, in Abhandlungen der Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftlichen Klasse Jahrgang*, Wiesbaden, 1958, p. 49; Efendiev, "Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque", p. 25; Browne, p. 19, 46; Hinz, p. 23; Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 13; Roemer, "Die Safawiden", *Speculum*, IV, 1953, p. 28; "The Safavid Period", pp. 193-6. Indeed, Roemer draws quite a vague picture regarding Safavid's adherence to shi'ism. Stressing the obscure line of separation between sunnism and shi'ism, especially at the folk level, during that period, he says one might trace the traits of shi'ism even back to the founder himself. Conversely, one might argue that the discernable shi'ite tinges in Junayd and Haydar should be regarded as a natural feature of folk Islam.

preached a ghulat-shi'ite form of Islamic mysticism, two, that he had obvious political ambition, and finally that during his shaykhdom, nomadic Turkoman disciples from Anatolia and Syria became the dynamic force within the Order. Likewise, all sources unanimously remark, albeit with distinct attitudes and in varying manners, that the Safavid order experienced a decisive change or transformation during the Shaykhdom of Junayd. Mazzaoui claims, for example, that Junayd transformed the "Safavid Sufi Order" into the "Safavid Movement". As a matter of fact, Junayd's Shaykhdom marked actual starting point of the Safavid Movement, which would create the qizilbash state of Shah Ismail in half a century.

4.2.2. Junayd's Shaykhdom: a 'Turning Point'

The Safavid sources do not provide enough information about Shaykh Junayd or the crucial transformation under his leadership.⁴⁷⁸ They routinely make brief mention of the Shaykh's exile from Ardabil, his arrival in Diyarbakir, his marriage to the sister of Uzun Hasan, and finally, his return to Ardabil and battle with Shirvanshah, during which he was killed. Yet, interestingly, these sources do not document the most important part of Shaykh Junayd's journey out of Ardabil, namely his visits in Anatolia.⁴⁷⁹ Another deficiency of the Safavid sources pertaining to Shaykh Junayd, and to Shaykh Haydar as well, is their negligence of the three fundamental changes which came into existence during this period. Ignoring these changes, they depict a linear history from Shaykh Safi

⁴⁷⁸ Compare Mazzaoui, p. 72. It should be stated here that although the general attitude prevailed in Safavid sources is alike, there are some little exceptions as well. AA makes the point, for example, that Shaykh Junayd had clear political aspirations. Another seventeenth century Safavid source, whose author is unknown, namely *'Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'īl*, attributes to Shaykh Junayd to change the secret teaching of the Order. These sources will be further referred in the following pages.

⁴⁷⁹ These visits will be discussed shortly later. Luckily, this part of Shaykh Junayd's history was recorded by the Ottoman historian Ashikpashazāde. A very brief indication with one sentence is also available in TA, p. 63.

to Shah Ismail and his descendants. Apart from the Safavid chronicles, a contemporary sunni author, Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunjī, the court historian of Aqqoyunlu Yakub Beg, provides valuable information about both Junayd and Haydar.⁴⁸⁰ Nevertheless, his bias against Safavids and qizilbashs is most passionate; thus, his account must be treated prudently.⁴⁸¹ Shaykh Junayd's raid on Trebizond was recorded in Byzantine sources as well.⁴⁸²

Interestingly, the most informative historical source on Junayd is not a Safavid, but an Ottoman one: the history of Aşıkpaşazāde. In a section at the end of his historical treatise, which appears to be an appendix, he gives valuable information about Shaykh Junayd, especially about his journey in Anatolia.⁴⁸³ What increases the historical value of this account is that Aşıkpaşazāde himself participated in some of the events of this narrative.⁴⁸⁴ This section was obviously added in order to provide a legitimacy and

⁴⁸⁰ See TA.

⁴⁸¹ Although Khunji's sunni bias is evident, it is interesting to note that his exaggerated accounts of Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, and their followers - such as his assertion that Shaykh Junayd's disciples idolized him as God - are used by modern historians without serious criticism. In the following lines this subject will be evaluated further.

⁴⁸² See Rustam Shukurov, "The Campaign of Shaykh DJunayd Safawī against Trebizond (1456 AD/860 H)", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, v. 17, 1993, 127-140.

⁴⁸³ It is interesting to note that all the Safavid sources are silent on Shaykh Junayd's journey in Anatolia, which, as will be explained, was the precursor to the future Safavid movement. Rather they narrate events as if Junayd had traveled directly to Diyarbakir after being exiled from Ardabil. Indeed, keeping in mind the fact that the earliest Safavid chronicle, which was Habibu's-siyār, was composed during the last years of Shah Ismail's reign by a learned Persian man, such an establishment in the Safavid historiography is apt to reflect the regard of Safavid shahs and their courts on their past. This, however, is another story. Maybe you should leave out this part, if it's another story! Seems unnecessary.

⁴⁸⁴ It is obvious from the general outline that this part was not planned as a part of main body in his *Tevārih*. As well-known, following the tradition, Ashikpashazāde constructed his book on a chronological basis. He rarely disturbs chronological, sequential order while narrating Ottoman history. However, the section on Shaykh Junayd is related otherwise. This section is located after the narration of the Venetian siege of Midilli in 907/1501-2. The book follows a chronological order until this point. During the last section, Ashikpashazāde returns to the time of Murad II and explains the history of Shaykh Junayd and his son Haydar. This construction is available in 'Ali's edition. However, Giese queried Ashikpashazāde's authorship of this section of the work and omitted it ending his edition with the events of 1492. See F. Giese, *Die altosmanische Chronik des 'Asiq pasazāde*, Leipzig, 1929. Nihal Atsız, who published a combined version of these two editions, did not include the events of Bayezid II's period. But his edition also includes the aforementioned section at the end, just before the concise world history from Adam's time down to the time of Prophet Muhammed. Although this last section seems to be a later addendum to

persuasive religious ground for the Ottoman mass deportation of qizilbashes in 1501-2.⁴⁸⁵ Attempting to explain the legitimacy of this deportation, Aşıkpaşazāde asserts that the religious scholars issued sanctions upon heretics; but then he asks a question which seems to reflect some doubt in the public mind: ‘They were sufis and disciples of Shaykh Safi, who followed the religion of Muhammed in their mystical path. If this was the reality, what became the reason for accusing them as unbelievers?’⁴⁸⁶ The whole section (*bāb*) 161 of his treatise is devoted to answering this question.

As can be understood from his question, Aşıkpaşazāde tacitly accepts the order’s revered past. But, he argues that under the Shaykhdom of Junayd the order underwent an essential transformation, which continued during his son Haydar’s reign and was culminated by his grand-son Ismail. The whole section (*161. Bāb* of his *Tevārih*) is

the main corpus of the work, no Ottoman historian other than Giese expressed serious doubt of Ashikpashazāde’s authorship. For a textual analysis see V.L. Ménage, *A Survey of the Early Ottoman Histories, with Studies on their Textual Problems and their Sources, II*, Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1961, pp. 440-83.

Indeed, the orientation of the book suggests that this section must be a later edition either by Ashikpashazāde himself or by someone else. Atsiz argues that Ashikpashazāde died in 886/1481. See APZ, p. 80. According to him, the whole sections narrating events of Bayezid II’s reign must be later additions. Taeschner argues 889/1484 for Ashikpashazāde’s date of death. See F. Taeschner, “Ashik-pasha-zāde”, *EI2*. But according to Inalcik, who bases his view on archival evidence as well as on the textual analysis of the *tevārih*, he must have died after 908/1502. See Halil İnalcık, “How to Read Ashikpashazāde’s History”, p. 34. Indeed, before Inalcik, this date had been already proposed by Köprülü. See Köprülü, “Aşık Paşa-zāde”, *İA*, p. 707. This date is correct, then it is possible that the author of last sections was Ashikpashazāde himself. But still, the original plot of his narrative logically must have ended with the narration of Venetian attack on Midilli, which was chronologically the last event.

⁴⁸⁵ This is the deportation of Qizilbashes from Teke and Hamid-ili region to Moton and Coron. We know that following the conquest of these port cities on the Morean coasts in 1500, the Ottoman government forced the Ardabil sympathizers of Teke and Hamid-ili region to emigrate to these newly conquered cities. (See, for example, MNB, p. 417.) It seems that this deportation created such a dispute in Istanbul that Ashikpashazāde felt obliged to explain the reasons in an appendix to his history. Indeed the dispute was not limited to the deportation of sufis. It was a part of greater danger arising from Ottoman suzerainty in Anatolia. The beginning of the sixteenth century marked the rise of a new power, which relied not only on political and military networks, but on religious beliefs as well. In 1500, Ismail managed to defeat the Akkoyunlu army and captured Tebriz, their capital city, where he promulgated the foundation of his theocratic state. Ismail’s capture of temporal power in addition to spiritual power stirred up Anatolian Ardabil sympathizers, who had been uneasy with the Ottoman administration for a while. Social unrest became discernable. The mass deportation of Teke and Hamid-ili sufis was, hence, only part of a series of measures to quell this unrest. For a detailed discussion of the issue, see Chapter IV of this study.

⁴⁸⁶ ‘Sual: Bunlar hod sofilar idi. Şeyh Safi müridlerinden idi. Tasavvufdan Şer-i Muhammedî sallallahu ‘aleyhi ve sellem üzerine olurlar idi. Bunları tekfir etmeğe sebep ne oldı?’ APZ, p. 249.

devoted to explaining how this transformation materialized, even though it is thinly disguised as the story of Junayd and Haydar.

Apart from Aşıkpaşazāde, there are references in many other Ottoman sources as well. All the Ottoman sources, except *Haniwaldanus Anonym*, which deploys the traditional pejorative attitude of Ottoman authors towards Shaykh Junayd and Haydar, depict the history of the Safavid Order in the same manner as Aşıkpaşazāde. To summarize, the early Shaykhs until Junayd were revered as saintly persons and rightly guided spiritual masters; by the time of Junayd, however, desire for worldly power had invaded the souls of the Safavid descendants, and they deviated from the true path of their ancestors.

İdris-i Bitlisī, a contemporary writer of the era, who first served at the Aqqoyunlu court and then moved to the Ottoman palace, writing *Heşt Behişt*, the famous history of the first eight Ottoman Sultans up to Bayezid II, repeats more or less the same account without mentioning any names. He says that the early Safavid Shaykhs set their feet on the path of *şeriat* and on the prayer rug (*seccade*) of *tarikāt*; and that thus, a great number of prominent religious men and people of truth in the Ottoman and Şam (Damascus) countries followed them. Nonetheless, he claims, their descendants did not continue the rightly guided tradition established by the early Shaykhs, but went astray, preferring the worldly throne to the spiritual one. They married daughters of Persian kings and established kinship with temporal rulers. Consequently, certain licentious disciples began to be excited by the ‘mania’ for temporal sovereignty. To ratify their legitimacy on temporal power, they eventually claimed descentance from the

family of the Prophet, a claim which had not been made during the time of their ancestors.⁴⁸⁷

These later Shaykhs, says Idris, even joined in the Ghulat Shi'ism. Sometimes they argued, like *Hulūlīs*⁴⁸⁸, that the imam, who was known as a descendant of the Family of the Prophet (*ehl-i beyt*), would appear among the members of Safavid family. Still, at other times they permitted their disciples to perform some actions prohibited by the Islamic law (*haram*). In doing so, they claimed to be following the words of some mystics such as Hallac-ı Mansur, but by omitting the fact that these words were uttered during ecstasy, (*cezbe-sekr*) could not anyhow be regarded as reference to the acts of ordinary people.⁴⁸⁹ However, despite all their fallacious deeds, Idris says, a great number of people in Anatolia, who were sincerely looking for a true way of salvation, adhered to Safavid shaykhs.⁴⁹⁰

Another contemporary Ottoman author Kemalpaşazāde, also deems the Shaykhdom of Junayd as the breaking point in the history of Safavid Order. He says, although he was a respected Shaykh during his early years, shortly after his succession, Junayd ignited the fire of discord (*fitne*) and waged wars against Georgia pretending to conduct holy war or *cihad*. Thus he lost the reverence of the people of truth. Following his death at the hands of Shirvanshah, his son Haydar, whose majesty was further

⁴⁸⁷ IDRS, p. 121.

⁴⁸⁸ A group in the Islamic society who argues that the soul of a person, especially that of important figures, may incarnate into another person. For a further reading on Hulūlī groups see Ebu Muhammed Hasan b. Musa en-Nevbahfī, *Şiī Firkalar*, çev. Hasan Onat, Sabri Hizmetli, Sönmez Kutlu, Ramazan Şimşek, Ankara: Ankara Okulu Yayınları, 2004; Abdülkahir el-Bağdadî, *Mezhepler Arasındaki Farklar*, çev. Ethem Ruhi Fığlalı, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2005; Buckley, R. B., "The Early Shiite Ghulah", *Journal of Semitic Studies*, Autumm 2: XLII (1997), 301-325.

⁴⁸⁹ IDRS, p. 121.

⁴⁹⁰ IDRS, p. 121.

reinforced by marrying with the daughter of Uzun Hasan, followed the same fallacious path.⁴⁹¹

Celalzāde follows a similar line of argument,

... Acemin silsile-i saltanatı düdmān-ı Ardabilden Şeyh Haydar oğlu Şah İsmail'e müyesser ü mukadder olub, ol vilāyetlere mutlak şah-ı cihan-penāh olıcak zātına sezāvar u elyāk bu idi ki saltanat-ı Aceme mālīk oldı ecdād-ı 'izāmı tarīkına sālīk olub şer'-i Mübīn-i Ahmedī üzerine sābit-kadem olub gündüden mukaddem olan selātin-i şeri'at-āyin yollarından çıkmayub, āsār-ı İslamı tebdīl ü tanvīl itmeyeydi. Serīr-i saltanata cülūs idicek, sürūr-ı şeyātın-i İblis-i menhūsula me'nūs olmuş, ba'zı etrāk-i bī-idrāk⁴⁹² ile üns ü ictimā' idüb tarīk-ı dalālete sülük eyledi. Sanāyi-ı rafz u ilhād ki pīşe-i erbāb-ı dalāl u fesāddur ol tarīka i'tikādla zulm u dalāl iklimlerini ma'mur u ābād eyledi. Cevāmi-i hidāyet-savāmi'i āhūr-ı devvāb kılub ashāb-ı güzīn-i Rasūle sebb ü la'n ile bir bātıl mezheb ihtirā' idüb Şi'a dimekle meşhur sebīl-i şenī'a şüyü' virdiler.⁴⁹³

Arguably the most figurative account reflecting the peculiarity of Junayd's period is recorded in *Şakāyık-ı Nūmāniye*. While writing the biography of Abdurrahman Erzincānī,⁴⁹⁴ one of the leading Safavid khalifas who had lived in Amasya in the fifteenth century, Taşköprüzāde writes,

Nakl olunur ki bir seher şeyh Hāmid hamīdesirin çehre-i bâ-behresinde keder, hüzün ve melâl ve semâ-yi necābet imāsında gubar gam ve hem işkār olub āyine-i safāsında jenk fütür meşāhid oldı. Şeyhin hıyār-ı ehıbbāsı istikşāf-hāl idüb bu bābdan feth-i kelām eyledüklerinde cevap virüb tāife-i Ardabilıyye şimdiye değın gāyetle vera' ve takva ve hüsn-i akīde üzere iken hālen şeytan-ı bed-gūman anların sudūrına duhül ve fāsıde gibi ervākına (ervāhına) hulul

⁴⁹¹ KPZ9, p. 86

⁴⁹² Nomadic or semi-nomadic Turkoman tribes must be meant by this term. As put forward by several scholars, and scrutinized throughout this study as well, Ottoman authors usually use these terms such as "etrāk", "Türkmen", in a pejorative manner and to indicate nomadic groups. For further reading on the connotation of these words in the Ottoman literature see, for example, Faruk Sümer, "XI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve Irak'da Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumî Bir Bakış", *İFM*, 11, 1952, 509-523; Yusuf Halaçoğlu, "Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Türk-Etrāk, Kürd-Ekrād Kelimeleri Üzerine Değerlendirme", *Belleten*, 60, no. 227, 1996, 139-146; İlhan Şahin, "Review of the Recent Studies on the Nomads (Yörüks) in the Ottoman Empire", in his *Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler*, İstanbul: Eren, 2006, 35-45.

⁴⁹³ CLZ, pp. 208-9.

⁴⁹⁴ "Şeyh Safiyeddin Ardabilî hazretlerinin hulefāsındandır. Vatan-ı aslisini terk idüb Diyār-ı Rum'a geldükde Amasya kurbunda tavattun eyledi." Mecdî, p. 78. In the Mecdî's Turkish translation of *Şakāyık*, which was completed in 1586, 30 years after the composition of the original work, Abdurrahman Erzincānī is counted among the *meşāyih* of Sultan Bayezid I' period. But the content of the passage quoted above obviously contradicts this assumption. He must rather have lived during the lifetime of Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Haydar. See also Sohrweide, p. 117.

idüb tarīka-i İslamdan ihrac ve idlāl eyledi diyu buyurdular. Fi'l-vāki' ve 'ahd-i ba'id mürür itmeden Şeyh Haydar'ın umūr-ı diniyede ve i'tikadiyâtda eslâf-ı eşrâfin i'tikâdatını tağyîr ve tebdîl ve adâb ve ahvallerini tahvîl itdüğü ve tarîk-i zığ ve dalâlete gitdüğü haberi istima' olındı.⁴⁹⁵

A similar account is seen in a letter of Shaykh Bālî Efendi⁴⁹⁶ addressed to Rüstem Pasha (d. 1561), the Ottoman grand vizier under Suleyman I.⁴⁹⁷ Shaykh Bālî Efendi dedicates most part of his letter to draw a brief sketch of the history of the Safavid family.⁴⁹⁸ Indeed his account is full of invention and historical error. However, it truly reflects the established picture of the Safavid family line among Ottoman intellectuals. Bālî Efendi begins with Shaykh Safî. After stating some doubts on the authenticity of his family line, which was alleged to trace back the seventh Imam Musa al-Kazim, he continues, "Sayyid or not, the faith of Islam should be respected. In any case, it is known that Shaykh Safî is a perfect *murshid* and one of God's men (*ehl Allah*)."⁴⁹⁹ Then he recites an attributed dream of Shaykh Safî, which is most probably a sunnî invention. Shaykh Safî is said to have witnessed in a visionary world that in his loins tiny puppies were yapping and calling to one another. He interprets this dream in such a manner that he imagined that from his descendants a tyrannous band would rise up and uproot the

⁴⁹⁵ Mecdî, p. 78.

⁴⁹⁶ He was learned and pious man and enjoyed the favor of Sultan Suleyman I whom he accompanied on several campaigns and recited prayers for his victories. He died in 1553 and was buried in Sofia. See Minorsky, "Shaykh Bālî-Efendi on the Safavids", p. 442.

⁴⁹⁷ He occupied the post twice, first from 1545 to 1553, and second from 1555 to 1561.

⁴⁹⁸ At least two copies of this letter are available. One is preserved in Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes in Paris (No. 103, f. 10r) and the other one is preserved in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi in Istanbul (Halet Efendi, 818, ff. 97a-98b). The English translation of the full text of the first copy, with a brief introductory note, is published by Minorsky in his article "Shaykh Bālî-Efendi on the Safavids". The content of the letter indicates that it was written after 1550.

⁴⁹⁹ Minorsky, "Shaykh Bālî-Efendi on the Safavids", pp. 444-5. "Şeyh Safî bu tâyifenin dedesidir. Meşâyih silsilesindendir. Ve biz gördüğümüz silsilelerde seyyiddür deyü kayd olunmamış. Bazı mürşidler seyyiddür deyü kayd itmişler. Bâ-seyyid evliya olmiya, itibar-ı din-i İslamdır. Beher-hal meşhur budur ki Şeyh Safî mürşid-i kâmindür ve ehlullahdandır." Manuscript, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Halet Efendi, 818, f. 97a.

Mohammedan law, oppressing learned and pious believers.⁵⁰⁰ The next words that Bālī Efendi recites from the mouth of Shaykh Safī are typical Ottoman jargon which prevailed in Selim I’s court.⁵⁰¹

Fearing such a future for his offspring, in his last days Shaykh Safī asked his khalifas to select a successor from among themselves (among khalifas); on the other hand, he advised not choosing his son to the post. Following the death of the Shaykh his rightly guided khalifas followed Safī’s words and selected one from among them as successor to the shaykh. Nevertheless, the son of the Shaykh also established himself in his father’s place. From then on the two separate lines of tradition appeared: those who were licentious promoted Shaykh Safī’s son to his father’s place; and those who were people of truth did not accept his decision and each of them betook himself to a country and being occupied with his own plight (*hāl*) acted in conformity with the *ṣeriat*. Among the ignorant and common the son of Shaykh Safī had a large number of followers, who were also heretics, while learned and pious men shunned his assembly. “Because of the multitude of the ignorant (in his assembly), the idea of a Holy War (*ghazā*) occurred to Muhammad-shah⁵⁰² and moved by this mania (*savdā*) he led expeditions towards Georgia several times.”⁵⁰³

⁵⁰⁰ In Bālī Efendi’s account, after interpreting his dream Shaykh Safī makes an analogy to the case of Mu’āwiya and his son Yazid: while the former being, according to Bālī Efendi’s account, a great man from his loins a hated man like Yazid was born. In the sunni literature on Safavid family the analogy to the famous story of Noah and his son: while the former being one of great Prophets, his son did not believe him and fell in idolatry. See, for example, TA, pp. 61-62; *Terceme-i Risāle-i fī-tekfīr-i Kızılbaş*, Manuscript, Milli Kütüphanesi, YzA 695, ff. 8a-8b.

⁵⁰¹ “*Hak teala anları ve anlara tabi olanları helak eylesün didi. İmdi benim oğlum bu duanın maktezası budur ki ... bu tayifenin sabibānından gayrısın ulusun ve kişisin erini ve avratını kılıç urub kahr ile helak etmek vacibdür. Çare yokdur bu tayife lütf ve ihsan ile ıslaha gelmek müyesser değildir.*” Manuscript, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Halet Efendi, 818, f. 97b.

⁵⁰² As was indicated, regarding to historical flow of events Shaykh Bālī-Efendi’s account is full of errors. Firstly, he makes an evident mistake regarding the son of Shaykh Safī, who was Shaykh Sadruddin Musa. Secondly, the crucial deviation of Shaykh Safī’s descendants certainly did not occur following the death of the Shaykh. Rather it occurred either during the Shaykhdom of Junayd or shortly before his succession.

Following the death of Muhammad-shah, his son Junayd succeeded him. Those who loved Muhammad-shah crowded together around Junayd, who too launched ‘holy war’ several times. As they were successful, many people good and bad joined him. In the end, they applied for permission from the king of Persia (the Aqqoyunlu ruler) to invade Georgia through Persia. Although the king of Persia⁵⁰⁴ was inclined to give permission, one of his viziers suspected something and suggested to investigate the situation. After a thorough investigation, the king realized that no man of virtue or good temper was in his retinue, but all were wicked and seditious. Consequently permission was not granted. Upon Junayd’s insistence to march on Georgia, the king sent a detachment of men on Junayd. After a great battle the army gone astray was put to flight and Junayd was beheaded.⁵⁰⁵ Then his son Haydar, who like his father pursued the way of gazā and gathered all the ignoramus, libertines and heretics around,⁵⁰⁶ succeeded him,

So when considering the known history of the order the best person identifiable with Muhammad-shah of Bālī Efendi seems to be Shaykh Junayd. But in the following part of his letter Bālī Efendi separately mentions Junayd as son of Muhammad-shah. Whatever the truth is, Bālī Efendi’s knowledge about the history was obviously not based on authentic sources but on the tradition circulating among Ottoman *ulemā*. The value of his account as a source, thus, not stems from his penetration into the true history of the dynasty but his capacity to reflect the established view of the Ottoman scholars.

⁵⁰³ Minorsky, “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, p. 446. The Istanbul copy runs, “Kaçankim Şeyh Safi mevte karib oldı cem oldı. Didi ki cümleiniz itaat iderek aranızdan birinizi ihtiyar idin. Makamda olsun. Benim oğlum yerime otursun. Benim yerime layık vekildür didi. Ve ahirete intikal itdi. Muhammed Şah dirler bir oğlu kaldı. Sofiler ana yolak(?) oldılar. Anlar ki ehl-i hevâdır alayıyla bu canibe oldılar Muhammed Şah yerine geçürdiler. Cüheladan ve avamdan çok kimse tabi oldılar. Ve bir bölük tayife ki ehl-i Hakdır kabul itmediler. Şeyhin emrine muhalifdür dediler. Her biri bir memlekete başların aldılar gütdiler. Gendü hallerine meşgul oldılar. Şeriatle âmil oldılar. Muhammed Şah babası makamında karar eyledi. Amma hali şöyle oldı ki vardıkça ehl-i hevâ oldı. Râfîzî tâyîfesi meclisinde kesretle cem olur oldılar. Ulema ve süleha meclisinden i’raz eyledi. Cehlinin bu vecihle cemiyyetinden Muhammed Şaha gaza hatırası düşdi. Bu sevdayla birkaç defa gaza eyledi.” Halet Efendi, 818, f. 97b.

⁵⁰⁴ Bālī Efendi again makes a mistake. Junayd had to pass through Shirvan in order to raid Georgia. Shirvanshah Khalil did not permit him to pass through his territories, thus broke out the war between two sides, which cost Junayd at his life.

⁵⁰⁵ “Muhammed Şah fevt oldı. Oğlu Cüneyd yerine geçdi. Muhammed Şahın muhibbi olanlar Cüneyd’in başına çökdüler. Cüneyd dahi gazā hevâsiyla birkaç defa eşdi yurttdı. Gazası rast gelmekle eyu ve yatlu katına kesretle cem’ oldı. Bir defa dahi cem’ oldılar, Acemden geçüp Gürciye gaza itmeğe destur dilediler. Padişah destur verdi vüzerâdan birisi razı olmadı. ‘Padişahım bu tâyifenin cemiyyeti eyu adla söylenmez. Ben kulun varub göreyin ne tayifedür.’ Padişah emrile vardı gördü ol tayife tamam dalâlet üzere. Geldi padişaha haber virdi. ‘Bu nice şeyhdür içlerinde ehl-i ilim yok ve sülehâ yok cümlesi ehl-i hevâ ve ehl-i fesaddur. Bu cemiyyeti dağıtmak vacibdür. Ansızın hücum idecek olursa def idince çok ziyân olur.’ didi.

A comprehensive *risāle* preserved in Milli Kütüphane in Ankara reflects a similar attitude.⁵⁰⁷ The *risāle* is composed of an introduction (*mukaddime*), three sections (*bāb*) and a conclusion (*hātime*) all dedicated to prove the idolatry of qizilbashes on religious grounds. The evaluation of the qizilbash issue in this *risāle* deserves to be the subject of an independent study. But the important point for the purpose of the present study is that the author of this *risāle*, Hüseyin bin Abdullah Şirvanî, starts the history of heresy in the Safavid family with Shaykh Junayd.⁵⁰⁸

Outside the Ottoman realm, Fadlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunjî's approach to the issue, which has already been referred to partly is not different. Indeed his main focus is Shaykh Haydar, who was in open clash with his master Yakub Beg of Aqqoyunlu. However, in explaining the heresy of Haydar he makes a brief flashback to his ancestors. "Indeed," says Khunjî, "Haydar belonged to the family of venerable shaykhs, for Ardabil was a refuge of sanctity and the place of circumambulation for the righteous. The first who raised the ensign of excellence in this family was the unique of the world (*wahîd-i āfāq*) Shaykh Safî al-dîn Ishâq ..."⁵⁰⁹ Then Khunjî recites a tale in order to explain why and how the descendants of Shaykh Safî deviated from the true path. When the Mongol ruler Uljaytû (1305-16) finished the rebuilding (*ta'mîr*) of Sultaniye (in 1305), he convened a thanksgiving meeting at which noblemen, religious scholars,

Eyle olsa Padişah emr eyledi icazet yokdur varsunlar yerlerine gitsünler didi. İnad eylediler padişahın buyruğın dutmadılar. Nice olursa olsun biz bu gazadan rücu' itmezüz didiler. Padişah cānibinden bir bölük halk gönderildi. Azîm kütal oldu. Şeyh Cüneydin başın kesdiler. Halk kırıldı. Cemaatleri dağıldı." Halet Efendi, 818, ff. 97b-98a.

⁵⁰⁶ Halet Efendi, 818, f. 98a; Minorsky, "Shaykh Bālî-Efendi on the Safavids", pp. 446-7.

⁵⁰⁷ See *Terceme-i Risāle-i fî-tekfîr-i Kızılbaş*, Manuscript, Milli Kütüphane, YzA 695. The *risāle* is a modified Turkish translation of certain Hüseyin bin Abdullah Şirvanî's *fetva* originally written in Arabic. The date of issue of neither the original *fetva* nor the translation is specified in the manuscript. But in the text the author refers to Bālî Efendi Sofyevî, whose letter is studied above, as his Shaykh's Shaykh. Thus the original *fetva* must have been issued during the second half of the sixteenth century.

⁵⁰⁸ *Terceme-i Risāle-i fî-tekfîr-i Kızılbaş*, f. 6b.

⁵⁰⁹ TA, p. 62.

mystics and saints appeared. Shaykh Safī was also invited, however, since “his rectitude was opposed to accepting food (*navāla*) from sultans”,⁵¹⁰ the Shaykh made a pretext of his age and sent his son Sadruddin. Being a young man “who had not yet plucked a rose from the gardens of asceticism”⁵¹¹ Sadruddin did not refuse to partake of the food.

According to Khunjī, it was this *navāla* of Uljaytu that passed through Sadruddin’s crew that deteriorated the pure mysticism in the line of this family and injected the seeds of desire for the worldly throne. He says, “As the author was writing the story a thought crossed his mind: what a pity that, while Safī al-dīn preserved his being from a doubtful repast, he did not restrain his children from the vanities of this world. As a result, his progeny forsook poverty and humility for the throne of a kingdom.”⁵¹² But the effect of this *navāla* would appear after three generations. After Shaykh Safī, his descendants Shaykh Sadruddin, Hoca Ali, and Shaykh-shah Ibrahim followed his footprints. “But when the boon (*navāla*) of succession reached Junayd, he altered the way of life of his ancestors: the bird of anxiety laid an egg of longing for power in the nest of his imagination. Every moment he strove to conquer a land or a region.”⁵¹³

A rare example in Safavid sources points to the change in the teaching and policy of the order, as well as its disciple-stereotype, during this period an anonymous history of Shah Ismail supposedly compiled in the first half of the seventeenth century, during the reign of Abbas I is available in *‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā’il*. Here Shaykh Junayd is described as a man responsible for changing the secret teaching of the order. However,

⁵¹⁰ TA, p. 62.

⁵¹¹ TA, p. 62.

⁵¹² TA, p. 63.

⁵¹³ TA, p. 63. Similar arguments are recorded in a letter of Sultan Yakub Aqqoyunlu to Bayezid II. See Feridun Bey, *Münşe’āt-ı Selātin*, I, İstanbul, 1274, pp. 300-301.

according to the anonymous writer, the change here was not from sunnism to shi'ism, which had already claimed to be done under Hoca Ali, but from an 'orthodox' shi'ite doctrine to an extreme one, which was, furthermore, saturated with political ambition. Perhaps as a contingent of this change, Junayd also transformed his disciples from quietist mystics to devoted militants.⁵¹⁴ Iskender Beg also makes clear references to the desire of Junayd for temporal power.⁵¹⁵

To sum up, the above-mentioned sources, most of which were contemporary to Junayd and Haydar while the rest being nearly contemporary, leave no doubt that by the succession of Shaykh Junayd the Sufi Order of Safavids had split into two branches. One was headed by Shaykh Ca'far the brother of former Shaykh Ibrahim and continued the traditional way of former Safavid Shaykhs. Some influential khalifas of early Shaykhs such as Shaykh Hamid b. Musa, also known as Somuncu Baba (d. 1412), the spiritual master of Hacı Bayram Veli and the disciple of Hoca Ali (d. 1429), and Abdurrahman Erzincānī were representatives of the early phase of the Safavid mysticism in Anatolia. The other branch headed by Junayd was decisively different from the traditional picture of the order, in terms of both the esoteric doctrine and the socio-cultural landscape of disciples. Under Shaykh Junayd's comparably short leadership (1447-1460), this branch of the Order experienced a fundamental transformation from a cultivated, tranquil, and ascetic Sufi Order, which was highly respected by the learned class and ruling elites as well as the public masses, to a densely mystical but uncultivated, militant, and gulat shi'ite movement, which identifiably pursued political aspirations and, perhaps mostly

⁵¹⁴ See Muhammad Karim Youssef-Jamālī, *The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā'īl I (1487-1524)*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1981, p. 18.

⁵¹⁵ AA, pp. 29-30.

because of that, was denounced by learned sunni scholars as ‘heretic’.⁵¹⁶ Sooner the second branch swallowed the whole of the Order, shifting the representatives of the traditional line to marginality, and in one or two generations to oblivion. This transformation, which started during the Shaykhdom of Junayd and was mostly completed under Shaykh Haydar, also laid the fundamentals of Ismail’s state. As a modern scholar states, “Following the death of Šaiḥ Ibrāhīm ... a sudden and tremendous change occurred in the Order of Ardabil and its leaders. With the succession of Šaiḥ Ğunaid the Order seemed to be transformed into a militant movement which, like a whirlwind, grew in intensity during the period of Ğunaid’s son Haydar, and during Haydar’s son Sultān ‘Ali Pādishāh, and which finally carried Haydar’s second son Ismā’īl and seated him on the throne of the Safawids at Tabriz.”⁵¹⁷

From this point of view, Junayd’s Shaykhdom, especially his journey to Anatolia and Syria was the period during which the seeds of Ismail’s throne were planted. The most crucial historical development of this period, for the future of the Safavid Order, was without a doubt the attachment of militant Turkomans of Anatolia to the Order. In Mazzaoui’s words, “the Anatolian ‘Turks’ who under Osman and Orhan were conducting *gazā* in the west against the Byzantium are now the ‘Turkmāns’ who were engaging in similar *gāzī* activities under Junayd and Haydar against Georgians.”⁵¹⁸ In

⁵¹⁶ As already mentioned Safavid sources undervalue this transformation, attempting to present a linear history of dynasty. Indeed, the *ghazā* activities of Junayd and Haydar are recorded, but present this new area of interest as if it were a normal sufi practice rather than loading some new connotations. (Yet the outstanding genuineness of Iskender Beg Munshi must be remarked here. He openly writes the political desires of Junayd.) The emergence of shi’ite ideas and the essential change in the socio-cultural bases of the disciples during this period is especially not mentioned. Nonetheless, even the epithets that they use for the members of the dynasty clearly reflect this transformation. The four heads of the order up until Shaykh Ibrahim, employ the epithet “Shaykh” while Junayd and Haydar are called “Sultan”, obviously connoting temporal power as well as the spiritual one. For a brief analysis of Safavid historian’s usage of the title ‘sultan’ for Junayd and Haydar and its connotations, see Mazzaoui, p. 72.

⁵¹⁷ Mazzaoui, pp. 71-2.

⁵¹⁸ Mazzaoui, p. 77.

the following pages I will analyze, mainly basing on Aşıkpaşazāde's account, how Junayd gained the unhappy masses of the Ottoman society, which inclined to break ties with the Ottoman administration because of both practical and religio-ideological reasons, and because of how successfully the newly maturing 'Safavid message' had been carved into their chests.⁵¹⁹

4.2.3. Leaving Ardabil: The Schism within the Order

Junayd was the sixth son of Shaykh Ibrahim, the fourth Shaykh of the order.⁵²⁰ Upon the death of Ibrahim in 1447 a quarrel took place between Ca'fer, the brother of Ibrahim, and Junayd. Sources are not clear whether the disagreement between Junayd and his uncle stemmed from the newly emerging shi'ite ideas of Junayd or from the ambition of Shaykh Ca'fer.⁵²¹ According to Jean Aubin, both are possible. As he states, "les deux mobiles sont d'ailleurs parfaitement conciliable."⁵²² Indeed, there are indications that Ca'fer assumed spiritual leadership and *tauliyat* of the Ardabil sanctuary, both of which used to pass down from father to son. On the other hand, attached to the traditional teachings of the former shaykhs⁵²³, Ca'fer vigorously denied such shi'ite orientations within the Order. Furthermore, by his assumption of the leadership, Junayd did not hesitate to give clear indications of his desire for temporal power.⁵²⁴ And last but not least, the indications of two identifiably different types of disciple images clearly

⁵¹⁹ The following chapters of this study delineate how these newly recruiting *murids* founded the Safavid state under the banner of young Ismail.

⁵²⁰ Walter Hinz, p. 15.

⁵²¹ Compare Roemer, "The Safavid Period", pp. 200-201, 205. Roemer reckons the religious controversy a possible reason for the quarrel but adds that this argument finds no adequate support in contemporary sources. To him, the real cause of the contest was the clashing irreconcilable political ambitions of two shaykhs.

⁵²² Aubin, "Les notables", p. 46.

⁵²³ See, for example, Aubin, "Les notables", p. 46.

⁵²⁴ Compare Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 16.

appeared. Consequently, the two Shaykhs fell into struggle for the leadership.⁵²⁵ More correct is, perhaps, that two already differentiated groups of disciples fell into struggle. The considerable portion of disciples, who were advocators of the traditional line and inhabiting at the *Tekke*, wanted Ca'fer as their head. But there still appeared another influential group, recruited mainly from the nomadic tribes of Anatolia and Syria, who zealously supported Junayd.

Seemingly more decisive on the advent of events was that Cihansah Qaraqoyunlu (1437-1468), who was ruling the region, was not pleased with Junayd's presence in Ardabil, most probably because of his political desires and of the military strength of his disciples.⁵²⁶ If relied on *'Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'īl*, Cihansah first wrote a letter to Shaykh Ca'fer advising him to block Junayd's action. Then he wrote a strong letter directly to Shaykh Junayd, ordering him to disperse his followers.⁵²⁷ Junayd, after a long discussion and consultation with and his prominent disciples, is said to have replied to Jihansah's letter:

It should not be hidden from the world-illuminating king of Iran that apparently your mind is ill and in trouble because of Shaikh Saft's children. You should banish this temptation from your mind and heart. Satan is deceiving you because I am in a corner of my ancestor's resting place and together with my devotees, I am praying to God. I have never had the desire to rebel or conquer. If your astronomers have frightened you because of a rebellion from Shaikh Saft's children, I am not such a rebel. Such a rebel may come from my children or grandchildren. And if the will of God is such that a rebellion should arise from

⁵²⁵ HT, p. 152. But Qādi Ahmed Qumī does not mention shi'ite ideas of Junayd but simply refers to the quarrel between Sultan Junayd and his uncle.

⁵²⁶ According to AA, on being informed of the growing strength of Sultan Junayd, the number of whose adherents in Ardabil was increasing day by day, Mirzā Cihansah "became suspicious of Joneyd's [Junayd] intensions, and apprehensive lest Junayd's rising power cause his own decline." See AA, p. 29. For a similar account also see HT, p. 152.

⁵²⁷ In his letter Cihansah wrote: "When my letter reaches you, you must remove people from yourself and your spiritual guidance and remain by yourself. I do not feel safe in regards to you and your Sūfis, since they may incite you to rebel and desire sovereignty. In my opinion, if a problem can be solved simply, why should it cost the shedding of the blood of innocent people, and the destroying of thousands of lives? If you do not accept my advice and do not do as you are told, I will certainly succeed in destroying you and your devotees." Quoted in Youssef-Jamālī, p. 19.

Shaikh Safī's children, the whole world will not be able to prevent it. So, be relaxed and sure. Leave us by ourselves, because I seek no enmity with you. Be sure of our honesty and afraid of God's punishment. Now, you know what is best.⁵²⁸

Upon receiving Junayd's answer, Cihanshah wrote a second letter, as reported in *'Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'il*, saying, "Make preparation, depart from my realm; otherwise I will come not only to destroy Ardabil, but also to perform a full-scale massacre."⁵²⁹ This strong letter persuaded Junayd that against the powerful coalition⁵³⁰ of Cihanshah and Shaykh Ca'fer, Junayd had no choice but to leave Ardabil.⁵³¹

A further point to note, as clearly seen above, is that when the Safavid Order split into two parties Cihanshah evidently took stand in favor of Shaykh Ca'fer.⁵³² At a first glance, when looked at from a religious point of view, his support of Shaykh Ca'fer, who advocated the traditional sunni line of the Order, seems somewhat controversial for he was not a fanatic sunni ruler – not as much as Uzun Hasan, for example –, even his shi'ite tendency is known.⁵³³ When considering the bigger picture, however, his

⁵²⁸ *'Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā'il*'s account is quoted in Youssef-Jamālī, p. 20.

⁵²⁹ Quoted in Youssef-Jamālī, p. 20. Also see Sarwar, p. 23.

⁵³⁰ This co-operation was further cemented by a marriage between two families: Seyyid Kāsim, one of Ca'fer's sons, married Cihansah's daughter. See Hasan-ı Rumlu, *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, çev. Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara: TTK, 2006 (Ninth volume of *Ahsenü't-tevārih*), pp. 393-4

⁵³¹ HS states that Junayd was expelled by Cihanshah from Ardabil since his great number of disciples was regarded as a threat to his throne. "Since he [Sultan Junayd] was such a perfect spiritual guide, a huge throng of all nations gathered at his threshold to become his disciples. Indeed, the crowd at his assembly was so great that Mirza Jahanshah, who was then the ruler of the two Iraqs and Azerbaijan, was afraid that he would lose his throne and ordered Sultan-Junayd to leave Ardabil accompanied by many of his disciples and headed for Diyarbakir." See HS, p. 561. HS does not mention the intervention of Shaykh Ca'fer in the affairs. AA follows HS. See AA, p. 29. According to Hasan-ı Rumlu, however, Cihansah ordered Shaykh Ca'fer to make Junayd leave the Ardabil. See Hasan-ı Rumlu, *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, p. 393. Khunji does not mention any reason but simply records that "when his father Khwāja Shaykh-shāh (Ibrahim) departed (d. A.D. 1447), Junayd for some reason or other had to leave the country and travel to various parts of Syria, the West (*maghrib*), and Rūm." See TA, p. 63.

⁵³² It is not out of possibility that Cihanshah himself might have played an effective role in the division of the order, either by promptly supporting Ca'fer or by provoking him to eliminate Junayd.

⁵³³ Indeed Cihanshah's religious views are difficult to define. His attitude rather resembles traditional pragmatism of Turkish rulers in this issue, not being tied down to any religious creed. Minorsky, after a substantive study of his poetry, concludes, "Only on close examination can one discover in the poems a tinge of shi'ite feeling and terminology." (See V. Minorsky, "Jihan-Shah Qara-Qoyunlu and His Poetry

behavior appears to be quite reasonable. As most of our sources underline, the main concern of Cihanshah was not the religious affiliation of Junayd, but his political aspirations and the characteristics of his disciples, whose number proliferated day by day. The militant characteristics, which stemmed from their nomadic-tribal nature, of Junayd's disciples obviously reinforced the Shaykh's desire for temporal power. So, Cihanshah's aim was to eliminate not a sufi Shaykh because of his deviant esoteric ideas, but a leader of a political and military movement mingled with mysticism that obviously threatened his temporal authority. After repelling Junayd from Ardabil, Cihanshah further underpinned the power of Shaykh Ca'fer in Ardabil by appointing him controller of the affairs of the shrine of Shaykh Safi.⁵³⁴ Under the patronage of Cihanshah, Shaykh Ca'fer enjoyed a prestigious and respectful life in Ardabil. But following the decease of the former at the hands of Uzun Hasan in 1467, the star of Shaykh Ca'fer, as well as the traditional line within the Ardabil Order was destined to disappear in a short while.

Thus, Junayd's departure from Ardabil marked one of the most crucial turning points in the History of the Safavid dynasty and Order, which would also fundamentally affect the history of the Middle East. The established reasoning of this deportation in the

(Turkmenica, 9)", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 16, No. 2, 1954, p. 281.) Minorsky, says in the same article, "the evidence is clear that they [Qaraqoyunlu] pretended to something more than domination based on sheer force and that, in trying to unify their adepts on a shi'a platform..." (*Ibid*, p. 274) The coins of Qaraqoyunlu usually bear the sunni formula mentioning the four caliphs. But two coins struck in Baghdad bear the names of Hasan and Husayn instead of four caliphs. Further on a coin of Cihanshah the names of four caliphs have been cut off. (See *Ibid*, p. 279.) On some of Cihanshah's coinage the shi'ite formula "Ali is the walī of Allah" appears alongside the names of four caliphs on the reverse of the coins. (For the coinage of Cihanshah see Richard Burn, "Coins of Jahān Shāh Kara Koyunlu and Some Contemporary Rulers", *The Numismatic Chronicle and Journal of the Roy. Numismatic Society*, 5th ser., No. 71, 1938, 173-197.) So, as Mazzaoui remarks, his religious views are vaguely depicted by sources: neither a perfect sunni nor a shi'ite. See Mazzaoui, pp. 65-6. Savory deems this shi'ism of Qaraqoyunlu as a reason for the clash between them and Safavids on ideological ground. (See Savory, *Iran under Safavids*, p. 17)

⁵³⁴ Sarwar, p. 24; Aubin, "Les Notables", p. 46.

literature, which is summarized above, tends to explain it within incompatible ideas of Junayd and Cafer. According to this hypothesis it was Junayd who departed from the traditional way of the order and the pursuing shi'ite ideas fell into a marginal path. The discrepancy stemmed from the minds of two Shaykhs. However, taking into account the later developments, it appears that such reasoning is unsatisfactory to explain the flow of history. First of all, the dynasty and the spiritual leadership of the order were continued by the offspring of Junayd, while Cafer's offspring soon after disappeared from the scene of history. Secondly during the Shaykhdom period, from Safiyuddin to Shah Ismail, the traditional pattern of succession was always from father to son. There was only one exception, which was a compulsory result of conditions: after the death of Haydar, his elder son Ali succeeded. But soon after, he was killed by Akkoyunlu forces, without having a chance to marry. Then his younger brother Ismail became the Shaykh of the sufis. Thus, putting aside this exception, the secret of the order was always passed down from father to son.

With the death of Ibrahim this tradition was somehow broken and Cafer became the Shaykh of the Tekke. From this point of view, it was not Junayd who broke the tradition but Cafer himself. Contemporary sources do not clarify whether Cafer's attempt to capture Shaykhdom stemmed from his personal ambition or whether he was forced by some influential disciples to pacify Junayd. What is certainly known is that a sharp incompatibility between the mystical views of the two Shaykhs appeared. One advocated the continuation of traditional teaching while the other advocated the grafting of some new ideas. It seems that in order to preserve tradition in terms of mystical knowledge Cafer was forced to interrupt the traditional pattern of succession.

The crucial point neglected by most historians is the stimulating factors that led Junayd to combine the mystical teaching of the order with shi'ism. Was it simply a result of his personal religious synthesis and spiritual experience? Or did he express and formulate the religious sentiment of a certain branch among disciples? In other words, was this fundamental change in the doctrine of the order a 'top-down' process or a 'bottom-up' one? Most historians followed the former type of explanation. However, as already pointed out, such an explanation fails to explain later developments. Thus, one should look at the issue from the other side.

4.2.4. Junayd's Journey to Anatolia: The Merging of Turkoman Culture with Safavid Sufism or the Seeds of the 'Safavid Movement'

4.2.4.1. Kurtbeli: The Dominance of Tribal Disciples

Aşıkpaşazāde states that Junayd left Ardabil because he was offended by his uncle. He came to Anatolia (Rum), which was under the rule of the Ottoman sultan Murad II. He sent an envoy to the sultan with gifts. His gifts were of symbolic connotation: a prayer rug, a Qur'an, and a *tesbih*. They obviously symbolized the dervish life, which can be regarded as complementary of Junayd's request from Murad II. He demanded the region of Kurtbeli, a highway passage between Sivas and Amasya, in order to settle down and establish a tekke. As Sohrweide has already mentioned, this place in the eastern borders of the Ottoman territories was apt to provide a quite favorable situation for Junayd for it was on one of the main trade routes; he could easily establish communication lines with

Ardabil and with his disciples in other regions as well.⁵³⁵ But the response of Murad II, who reached a decision after discussing the issue with his grand vizier Halil Pasha - a member of the well-known ulema family of Çandarlı- suggests that Junayd was not sincere in his words, which assured the Ottoman sultan that he simply was going to conduct mystical deeds there, but rather seems to have attempted to deceive Murad II. Relying on Aşıkpaşazāde's account, we see that Murad II recognized Junayd's real intention, which was much more political than religious, and refused his demand.

Another sixteenth century Ottoman chronicle, which differs from all the other Ottoman sources with its seemingly positive attitude towards Safavids in that it does not repeat the clichés of Ottoman historians on Safavid Shaykhs but depicts both Shaykh Junayd and Haydar as pious and respected men⁵³⁶, also mentions the Ottomans' annulment of annual gifts to the Tekke of Ardabil. Skipping Junayd's adventure in Anatolia, *Haniwaldanus Anonym* says he was living in Uzun Hasan's country. He was so famous and revered that all the princes and Turkish begs felt a spiritual dependence on him and sent gifts. Ottoman sultans also used to send annual gifts to him under the name 'çerağ akçesi'. It was reported, says *Haniwaldanus Anonym*, that Timur Han, the ruler of the *tatars*, wanted to visit him and presented 31 captives since he felt deep reverence.⁵³⁷ Mehmed II⁵³⁸ stopped sending traditional gifts to the Tekke of Ardabil.

⁵³⁵ Sohrweide, p. 118.

⁵³⁶ "Ardabil beğinin Allah'a olan sevgisi samimi idi ve bunu başkalarına da öğretiyordu. Onun asıl adı Haydar olub dini inancı gereği, ahlāk bakımından kusursuz bir hayat tarzı olduğundan halk tarafından ona *şeyh* denirdi. Babası Cüneyd aynı sebeplerden dolayı *şeyh* lākabını almıştı." ANMH, pp. 34-35.

⁵³⁷ ANMH usually makes mistakes in the details of events especially that took place outside the Ottoman land. Its accounts seem to be knowledge picked up here and there by listening rather than first hand report. But still it follows quite an appropriate track in essence of events. In this specific case the anonymous compiler again confuses: Actually Timur visited Junayd's grand-father while returning from his campaign on Bayezid I in Ardabil. It is reported that Timur presented 30000 captives that he deported from Anatolia to the Tekke. (Hinz, pp. 8-9). ANMH recites this visit but confuses Hoca Ali with Junayd.

⁵³⁸ ANMH makes a mistake here. In 1444 Murad II abdicated in favor of his son Mehmed II. But upon the intensifying external threats he re-accessed the throne two years later and remained as the Ottoman sultan

Upon not receiving Ottoman gifts in its traditionally established time, Junayd dispatched a messenger and asked the sultan why he had not sent their annual ‘çerağ akçesi’. Mehmed II’s answer is rather interesting: ‘The old man of the tekke is now dead!’⁵³⁹ This answer, of course, annoyed Junayd.

The answer of Mehmed II is actually quite meaningful. He must have referred to Junayd’s father Ibrahim by saying ‘the old man of the *tekke*’ (*tekkenin kocası*). Thus Mehmed II (Murad II) expressed his ideas to Junayd in a symbolic way, ‘you are no more a true Shaykh because of your political ambition. The last true Shaykh of your tekke was your father and he has already died. It is because of that I have stopped sending ‘çerağ akçesi’’. The desire of Junayd for temporal power, at the cost of contradicting the tradition in the Safavid historiography, is clearly stated by the historian of Shah Abbas the Great: “When Joneyd became established as leader and defender of the faith, he gave them spiritual guidance in a way that gave clear evidence of his desire for temporal power and kingship. His disciples flocked to Ardabil from all sides, and a cardinal point in his spiritual guidance was the incitement of his disciples to raid and carry on a holy war against the infidel.”⁵⁴⁰

It is well-known that Ottoman administration had always regarded sufi orders as their allies and had been generous in granting lands to those sort of fraternities. During the formative period especially, the close co-operation between the two sides is documented by several historians. Even the Order of Safaviyya, though being far away from Ottoman territories, benefited from the Ottoman’s benevolence. It is recorded by

until his death in 1451. On the other hand, Shaykh Junayd arrived in Anatolia after the death of his father, in 1447 or 1448. So the Ottoman sultan corresponding with Junayd must be obviously Murad II.

⁵³⁹ “Vallahi tekkenin kocası ölmüştür!” ANMH, pp. 35-36. Compare Hinz, p. 17.

⁵⁴⁰ AA, p. 29.

historians that the Ottomans dispatched regular gifts and money as a symbol of their reverence to Ardabil Tekkesi and its Shaykhs. So considering the traditional Ottoman policy towards mystical fraternities, the answer of Murad II then marks a recognizable deviation from the traditional Ottoman attitude towards Safavid order.⁵⁴¹ The reason behind such a deviation must be sought in the political intentions of Junayd skillfully kneaded by the mystical tradition of the order. When consulting Halil Pasha about Junayd's demand, Halil Pasha's answer makes it clear that the Ottoman administration was quite aware of the political content in the new orientation of the Safavid order under Junayd. He said: 'No two sultans can fit onto one throne!'⁵⁴²

Murad II's negative response, however, must presumably have been due to a much more intimate reason for the Ottoman state. As already indicated above, the Safavid Order achieved a wide-spread acceptance among the population of many cities and towns in Asia Minor, within the Ottoman realm. Up until Shaykh Junayd, since the order was a typical sufi order of Islam and since its disciples were barely spiritual followers, the Safavid message did not create any suspicion or reaction within the Ottoman administrative circles. On the contrary, Ottoman sultans were to dispatch annual gifts to the headquarters of the order in Ardabil.⁵⁴³ Sultan Murad II's refusal of Shaykh Junayd's request marked the turning point in the relationship between the Ottomans and the Safavids. The question to be asked at this point is, thus, what had happened with the succession of Junayd that the Ottoman policy against the order began to change? The answer to this question should be sought in the changing portrayal of

⁵⁴¹ One should keep in mind that this was not a cumulative change in the Ottoman policy towards sufi orders, but only towards the Safavid order.

⁵⁴² APZ, p. 249. Compare Hinz, p. 17.

⁵⁴³ Hinz, p. 7.

Safavid disciples in Anatolia. As the next stops of Junayd's journey in Anatolia will clearly show, the main body of Junayd's disciples (but not disciples of the Safavid order in general) was not composed of city dwellers any more, but nomadic-tribal people of Anatolia and northern Syria.

Indeed, further investigation is required as to clarify when the connection, between the order and Turkoman nomads of Asia Minor and Syria, was established significantly, and how the Safavid message spread among them. There is a vague record in *Tārīkh-i 'Ālam-ārā*. According to Khunjī, upon Shaykh Safī's return to Ardabil, where he began to direct his followers after ascending high levels in the path of devotion, "the *amirs* of Tālish turned his residence into their refuge and the great men (*kubarā*) of Rum honored him."⁵⁴⁴ Even if Khunjī's account, which was written nearly two centuries after the events, is true, it does not include any hint to clarify social position of "the *amirs* of Tālish" and "the great men (*kubarā*) of Rum", i.e. whether they were settled people representing high Islamic culture or tribal leaders. The argument tracing the origin of the establishment of close ties between the Order and the Anatolian Turkomans back to the time of Hoca Ali is already delineated. According to Faruk Sümer, the large-scale recruitments of these nomadic and tribal elements materialized under Shaykh Junayd.⁵⁴⁵ Sohrweide also draws attention to the considerable number of Safavid khalifas in Anatolia and Syria already under the early Shaykhs. According to her, by the end of the fourteenth century, the Safavid Order was wide-spread in the towns and cities of Eastern Anatolia. She stresses, however, that the main regions in which the Safavid khalifas appeared were on the trade routes. She puts special emphasis

⁵⁴⁴ TA, p. 62. Khunji mentions the adherence of the heads of Talish and the people of Rum to the Safavid Family once more while referring to Shaykh Sadruddin. See TA, p. 63.

⁵⁴⁵ See Sümer, p. 7, 10.

on Erzincan and Sivas; the latter, especially, lied on the crossroads of caravans. Sohrweide underscores the point that such places did not provide only for the people of different countries a suitable ground of communication and making contact, but also for the nomads and sedentary people as well.⁵⁴⁶ Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, she thinks it is not likely that Shaykh Sadruddin and Hoca Ali adopted large numbers of disciples from among nomadic Turkomans. Rather during this period the gravity of the Order in Anatolia was in cities among educated people.⁵⁴⁷

What is apparent in our knowledge is that by the arrival of Junayd in Anatolia the Safavid order had considerable adherents from among the nomadic Turkomans of the region⁵⁴⁸, as well as among the urban population; and the enthusiastic propaganda led by Junayd decisively gave impetus to the recruitment of new disciples from within the Ottoman realm, especially among tribal nomads.⁵⁴⁹ For instance, Irène Beldiceanue observes on the tahrir-registers of the province of Kirsehir that considerable numbers of names mark attachment to Ali and to his family, which might well have indicated attachment to the shaykh of Ardabil Hoca Ali as well. She counts some examples: ‘Şah Ali, Seydi Ali, Arslan, Şīrī, Sāfī, Şahverdi, Şahkulu.’⁵⁵⁰ It must be because of the

⁵⁴⁶ Sohrweide, pp. 115-6.

⁵⁴⁷ Some famous khalifas of the early Safavid Shaykhs, who preached the Safavid order among principally the townspeople of Anatolia, were Shaykh Hamid b. Musa (d. 1412), the spiritual master of Hacı Bayram Veli and the disciple of Hoca Ali (d. 1429), and Abdurrahman Erzincānī. Sohrweide, pp. 116-7.

⁵⁴⁸ As Roemer states, in explaining Junayd’s adventure in Azarbaijan, Anatolia, and northern Syria, “It was thus not fortuitous that Junayd visited precisely these areas on these raids. Here he could be certain of support and assistance.” See Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, p. 206.

⁵⁴⁹ See Roemer, p. 201; Sohrweide, p. 118. Sohrweide puts special emphasis on that Junayd’s main interest turned towards nomadic Turkomans, whose lifestyle and religious perception were under suspicion of urban population. She says, “Verstärkt wurde dieser Eindruck dadurch, daß er sich seine Anhängerschaft weitgehend unter Nomadenstämmen suchte, deren Lebensweise und Glaubensvorstellungen städtischen Kreisen stets mehr oder weniger verdächtig waren; außerdem nahm er anerkannt ketzerische Elemente, wie ehemalige Anhänger Scheich Bedr ed-Dīns, in seine Reichen auf.” See Sohrweide, pp. 119-120.

⁵⁵⁰ Irène Beldiceanue-Steinherr, “A propos d’un ouvrage sur la polémique Ottomane contre les Safawides”, *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXXIX-2, Paris, 1971, p. 398.

potency of the political and military competition posed by the tribal-nomadic adherents of Junayd that led the Ottoman administration to be curious about the young Shaykh. But Murad II welcomed Junayd's envoy and sent them back them with gifts.

4.2.4.2. Konya: Shi'ite Color

Seeing there was no refuge in the Ottoman territories for him, Junayd moved to the land of Karaman, which was the traditional rival of Ottoman power in Anatolia.⁵⁵¹ He lodged with the Zaviye of Sadreddin Konevi in Konya. The Shaykh of this zaviye, Shaykh Abdullatif, was a deputy (*halife*) of Zeyneddin Hāfi, who was the founder of the Zeyniyye Order.⁵⁵² Shaykh Abdullatif did not warmly welcome Junayd. Aşıkpaşazāde reports that he rejected on several occasions Junayd's demand for a meeting. The communication between the two Shaykhs took place through the mediation of Junayd's tutor Mevlāna Hayreddin.⁵⁵³ Aşıkpaşazāde's narration of the events that took place in Konya is quite unreliable. Abdullatif replies to the tutor of Junayd, upon his demand for a meeting with Junayd: 'the former row is former!'⁵⁵⁴ Then for a while the two Shaykhs did not meet, says Aşıkpaşazāde. During this time Junayd prayed behind a window in the mosque until the two Shaykhs came together after a mid-afternoon prayer. During the first meeting, the two Shaykhs talked for a while and departed from one another with the intention of meeting again in thirty days. During this time some scribes copied the books of Muhyiddin-i Arabī and Sadreddin Konevī, preserved in the zaviye, for Junayd. It was after copying of all the books that they met again. Aşıkpaşazāde needs to declare

⁵⁵¹ According to Hinz, Junayd arrived in Konya most probably in 1550. See Hinz, p. 18.

⁵⁵² Mükrimin H. Yinanç, "Cüneyd", *IA*, p. 243.

⁵⁵³ Hayreddin was a pupil of Hizir Beg. He later on became the tutors of Mehmed II. See Yinanç, p. 243; Tahsin Yazıcı, *DIA*, "Cüneyd-i Safevî", p. 124.

⁵⁵⁴ "es-saffü evvelü ülā", *APZ*, p. 243.

that the copied books were available at this second meeting, which took place in the mosque of the zaviye.

A close scrutiny suggests that this is a quite concise narration of events. Aşıkpaşazâde must have skipped important details, which he must have regarded unnecessary or he consciously concealed. As stated in the same paragraph, he participated in this meeting; thus his knowledge was derived from an eye-witness.⁵⁵⁵ So he had a chance to access all details. Nevertheless, as summarized above, both the behavior of Shaykh Abdullatif and the organization style of the meeting seem quite odd. These are some questions worth asking: why did Abdullatif hesitate to meet with Junayd that he postponed the meeting for as long as possible? What is the meaning of the phrase ‘the former row is former!’ that Aşıkpaşazâde quoted from Abdullatif? Why did Junayd pray behind the window until the meeting with Abdullatif took place? Why did they wait for the copying of the mentioned books before a discussion?

Before attempting to seek possible answers to these questions I would like to have a look at what happened in the meeting, which would shed light on the answers. Naturally, they must have discussed many issues during this meeting; but Aşıkpaşazâde

⁵⁵⁵ Ashikpashazâde states that he attended the meeting as a significant participant. His narration makes it clear that he took a position behind Shaykh Abdullatif, who was his Shaykh as well. (Köprülü, “Aşık Paşa-zâde”, p. 707) But there is confusion in the biographies of Ashikpashazâde about the time of his visit to Konya and participation in this dispute. Relying on his own account in *Tevârih* it is known that Ashikpashazâde left Ottoman territories for a pilgrimage in 840/1436-7 and visited Konya during this journey. It is mistakenly reported that he participated in the mentioned dispute during this visit. (Köprülü, “Aşık Paşa-zâde”, p. 707.) But as obviously seen it is impossible for Junayd to have left Ardabil after 1447. Thus, Junayd’s stay in Konya must have taken place most probably between 1448 and 1450. (Compare Hinz, p. 16.). One year later we see Ashikpashazâde in Uskub. He states that he returned from pilgrimage with Pasha Yigitoglu Ishak Beg and engaged in raids around this city. (APZ, p. 179; APZa, p. 2). Ashikpashazâde mentions himself again 9 years later. This time he fought in the Battle of Kossovo and even received some special gifts from Murad II after the victory in 852/1448. (APZ, p. 188; APZa, p. 2, Köprülü, “Aşık Paşa-zâde”, p. 707.) We know again from his history that Ashikpashazâde was present in the circumcision feast of prince Mustafa and Bayezid in 861/1457. (APZ, 198; APZa, p. 2 ; Köprülü, p. 707.) In narrating the events of nine years between 852 and 861 Ashikpashazâde does not mention himself anymore. So the only possible assumption is that he must have made a second visit to Konya after the Battle of Kossovo. Then the most probable date of this meeting appears to be 1449 or 1450. (See also Hinz, p. 18.).

mentions only one of them. In one of the hot instances of the conversation Junayd asked: ‘Who is superior for a father, his sons or his friends?’⁵⁵⁶ Abdullatif answered: “in the conditions you meant the friends are superior. For that reason, they are mentioned in the Holy Qur’an as “*muhācirīn ve ’l-ensār*” (the man who emigrates and the man who hosts). Furthermore the four true sects (*mezheb*) were derived from the friends but not from the sons.’ The response of Junayd to these words was quite frustrating for a sunni Shaykh: ‘Were you present when those verses (*āyets*) that you mentioned were descended?’ This question ended the already stirred up discussion. Abdullatif said: ‘Now you became an unbeliever with this faith (on the verses of Qoran) and those who follow you in this belief are unbelievers!’ and abandoned the meeting with Aşıkpaşazāde in his arm. Junayd also left the place with his tutor Hayreddin.

Aşıkpaşazāde summarizes this important debate in a brilliant and concise manner. Undoubtedly, the conversation between the two Shaykhs could not have consisted of a four-sentence dialogue. Keeping in mind that Aşıkpaşazāde began to write his history in 889/1484⁵⁵⁷, approximately 36 years after the meeting, he may even have not been able to remember details. What he remembered was the core theme of dispute, which obviously indicates that the quarrel focused on the different convictions of sunni and shi’ite sects. Junayd’s question clearly addresses the famous argument of the shi’ite sect that after the Prophet the caliphate was reserved to Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet, and to his offspring, because offspring were superior to friends. Abdullatif’s answer was a conventional *sunni* argument against the shi’ite attack especially on the first three caliphs. He put forth the Qur’an’s praising of friends (*ashāb*) and their being the source

⁵⁵⁶ “*Ataya eshāb mı evlādur, yohsa evlād mı evlādur?*”, APZ, p. 250.

⁵⁵⁷ Fuat Köprülü, “Aşık Paşa-zāde”, İA, p. 708.

of the four true sects, in which shi'ism was not included. The response of Junayd to especially the first part of this argument is quite interesting and pregnant to further knowledge about the nature of the shi'ism that Junayd upheld. He obviously propounded that the verses praising *ashābs* were not part of the original Qur'an but were later amendments by sunni scholars. It is known that such ideas proposing the alteration of the Qur'an was not accepted among shi'ite scholars as well, but had wide-spread currency among popular level and ghulat extensions of shi'ite society. On the contrary, shi'ites also accepted the available text as whole, unaltered, and the exact original text of the Holy Message on the literary level. Thus, we can conclude from this passage that the shi'ite ideas Junayd pursued were not affiliated with well-cultivated, 'orthodox' shi'ism, which was historically impossible, but resemble ghulat convictions, which have been attributed to shi'ism mainly by sunni scholars.

So it appears imperative to clarify the shi'ism of Junayd and his son Haydar and its historical background. As Sohrweide states, available sources do not clarify whether Junayd pursued Shi'ite ideals already present in Ardabil or whether he appropriated militant-shi'ism by the influence of nomadic disciples during his journey in Anatolia.⁵⁵⁸ Sümer regards the second case fairly possible.⁵⁵⁹ Jean Aubin also sees a strong connection between the appearance of extremist-shi'ism, alongside the claim of *seyyid*-ship, under Junayd and his disciples among Anatolian Turkomans.⁵⁶⁰ Indeed, the general set up of the events has certain suggestions. Studies on the issue point out that Junayd

⁵⁵⁸ Sohrweide, p. 122.

⁵⁵⁹ Sümer, p. 10.

⁵⁶⁰ "Peut-être deviennent-ils sayyids un peu avant le milieu du xv siècle. C'est Šayh Ğunayd, en tout cas, qui adhère au chiisme extrémiste, qu'il prêche dans les tribus turcophones d'Anatolie. Ces tribus vont porter au pouvoir, en 1501, son petit-fils Šah Ismā'īl, un garçon de quatorze ans, de sang princier Aq-qoyunlu par les femmes." See Jean Aubin, "La politique religieuse des Safavudes", *Le Shī'isme Imâmīte, Colloque de Strasbourg, 6-9 mai 1968*, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, p. 237.

must have been a young man when he embarked on a struggle with his uncle for the Shaykhdom.⁵⁶¹ His life before 1447 is not known. But one can safely suggest that he lived in Ardabil near his father. This being the case, then, one feels the right to ask from which sources and how did he derive these elements of the shi'ite faith? His training and education must have been performed under the careful auspice of his father and the foremost dervishes of the hospice, according to the one and a half century-long tradition of the order, which is known as bearing a sunni character. Considering such a career, how could Junayd personally have developed a sufi-shi'ite synthesis all by himself? Being one of the strongest candidates to the shaykhdom, his every ideas and practices must have been closely observed. It is almost impossible for a man in such a situation to depart from the traditional mystical way of the order and to pursue such a way that not only contradicted but also struggled with the former teachings through only his intellectual activities. Even his intellectual activities and cognitive development were severely conditioned by the intellectual environment of the hospice.

Thus the only logical explanation left is to seek the answer in a long socio-religious transformation process that took place from top to bottom,i.e. that started among the disciples and barely transformed the ideas of the shaykhs as a result. This point is generally ignored by modern historians, seeking the answers primarily in the personal decisions and the strategies of the shaykhs. Mazzaoui, for example, sees this transformation on the doctrinal level as very much connected to the newly arising political ambitions of the shaykhs. He says, "The religious change was simply a pretext for a political ends. The two are inextricably united in the persons of Ğunaid and

⁵⁶¹ Hinz, p. 15.

Haydar, and Shah Ismā'īl merely carried this to its natural conclusion.”⁵⁶² Mazzaoui truly pays much attention to the arising *gazā* motif with interest to zeal as a ‘state’ policy, instead of the introspective and contemplative Sufism of earlier shaykhs, and sees a close connection between the new doctrinal orientation, that is *ghulat shi’ism*, and the rise of *gazā*. As he rightly points out, “For all of a sudden now, the *murīds* of the Order became the *guzāt-i sūfiya*”⁵⁶³.

Nevertheless, as for the dynamics behind these inextricable changes on doctrinal and political grounds, Mazzaoui inclines to omit or underestimate the role of the decisive change in socio-cultural roots of the disciples; rather his focus in explaining this tremendous change in the Order seems to be on the persons of the shaykhs and on their personal intentions and decisions. The following paragraphs will attempt to show this was not the case, but in fact the opposite.

There must have been enough of a number of disciples aggregated by the death of Shaykh Ibrahim that had recognizably departed from the customary way of the order and were not in calm relations with the highly educated dervishes of the hospice. Junayd was the representative of this group while Cafer was somehow pushed to the leadership of the traditionally educated dervishes of the hospice. The trajectory of Junayd’s journey in Anatolia actually indicates the social roots of the former group.

Sohrweide has truly stated that a significant differentiation between the traditional, or early, disciples of the order and the new ‘type’ of disciples especially was wide-spread among the nomadic tribes of Anatolia and Syria.

Das spricht sehr dafür, daß im Ordenszentrum nicht alle Sūfis den Wandel im Orden gut heißen hatten und deswegen den Nachkommen Ğunaidis feindlich

⁵⁶² Mazzaoui, p. 73.

⁵⁶³ Mazzaoui, p. 74.

gegenüberstanden. Möglicherweise haben sie sich auch andern Orden angeschlossen, wie der verwandten Halvatīza. Man kann jedenfalls nicht voraussetzen, daß die Anhänger der frühen Safavīya ohne weiteres den Wechsel zur Qizilbaş-Safavīya mitmachten. ... Mit dem Wandel im Orden, angezogen durch die militanten Neigungen der Scheiche, trat auch eine andere Anhängerschaft in Erscheinung bzw. in den Vordergrund: Angehörige kriegerischer Türkmenenstämme, die eigentlichen Träger der Qizilbaş-Safavīya, nach deren von Haydar eingeführter roter Mütze sie ihren Namen „Qizilbaş“ trugen.⁵⁶⁴

As Sohrweide underlines, the Shaykhdom of Junayd was not a period of transformation of the whole order; but, by this time, the order experienced a schism. On the one hand, the original quietist sufism of Shaykh Safī al-Din was continued mainly by those followers settled at home in the neighborhood of Ardabil or by some leading khalifas of the early Shaykhs such as Shaykh Hamid b. Musa and Abdurrahman Erzincānī, in other towns and cities. On the otherhand, newly growing militant, extremist-shi'ite ideals were gaining popularity among rural and nomadic Turkoman elements. During the very early phase of this schism the first wing was led by Shaykh Ca'fer while the second faction was developed under the leadership of Junayd. In the course of time, however, the first wing would be destined to lose its affiliation with the Order after one or two generations of khalifas. As Abdūlbaki Gölpınarlı points out, apart from Junayd's offspring, another familial line stemming from Shaykh Ibrahim, namely Kevākibzāde family, continued to practice the traditional sunni way of the Order in the Ottoman territories without any pressure by the state. On the contrary, Ottomans recognized their claim to be descended from the Prophetic line and made them fill important posts either governmental or scholarly (*ulemā*) ranks.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶⁴ Sohrweide, p. 124.

⁵⁶⁵ See Abdūlbaki Gölpınarlı, *Kaygusuz Abdal – Hatayî – Kul Himmet*, İstanbul, 1953, p. 15.

However, the foot-prints of this doctrinal schism continued to be seen even between the descendants of Haydar at least during the first decade of the sixteenth century. Likewise, Andrew Morton pays attention to persuasive signs of doctrinal differentiation between the members of Safavid family. Basing his work on Fazli Isfahani's *Afzal al-tavārīkh*, a seventeenth-century Safavid chronicle, he questions the generally accepted view of the sixteenth century Savafid sources on the succession of Ismail to his elder brother Sultan Ali.⁵⁶⁶ Differing from other sources, *Afzal al-tavārīkh* argues that Sultan Ali, when understanding his destiny to be killed, divided the succession between Ibrahim and Ismail. The related passage runs, "He [Sultan Ali] made his younger brother Ibrahim his deputy for the chain of mystical guidance, commanded him to transmit guidance and occupied the prayer carpet, and transferred matters of military action and kingship over the whole world which, by the grace of God became adorned with his [presumably Ismail] noble existence, to Sultan Ismail Mirza, who was seven years old. ... With his [Sultan Ali] blessed hand he placed the twelve-gored Haydarian garment [the *tāj*] on the head of that fortunate brother [Ismail] and tied the thunderbolt-powered sword of Sultan Junayd at his waist ... and, making Sultan Ibrahim Mirza his heir in transmitting guidance and the ways of his noble-natured grandfather, which had come to him in regular succession, ordered the *khalifas* of the retreat, the *pīras*, *tarīqchīs*, sayers of *zikr* and his disciples to serve and obey his dervish-natured brother."⁵⁶⁷ After reciting this passage from *Afzal al-tavārīkh*, Morton reminds the above mentioned differentiation between Safavid followers by the succession of Junayd, and

⁵⁶⁶ Andrew H. Morton, "The Early Years of Shah Isma'il in the *Afzal al-tavārīkh* and Elsewhere", in *Safavid Persia. The History and Politics of an Islamic Society*, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, p. 35.

⁵⁶⁷ Quoted in Morton, "The Early Years", pp. 34-35.

than asks whether one can assume that Ibrahim represented the quietist faction while Ismail the militant. To him, explaining this separation by personal qualities of both brothers rather than on ideological ground is more plausible.⁵⁶⁸ On the other hand, Jean Aubin also brings under scrutiny the divergence between sons of Shaykh Haydar in his succinct and authoritative article on the advent of Shah Ismail. According to Aubin, however, the contest, which started with the death of Sultan Ali, was far beyond mere personal rivalry. Rather under both Ibrahim and his other step-brothers a resistance against the militant and extremist-shi'ite movement of Ismail appeared.⁵⁶⁹

At this point, one should not disregard the role of shaykh's young age in the transformation process of the order. The age of Junayd when he succeeded his father is not clarified in sources. But as Hinz has already emphasized, he must have been pretty young. His son and successor Haydar was yet to be born when Junayd died, and was killed when he was twenty-eight. For Haydar's successors, first Sultan Ali and then Ismail, the case was not different. Ismail was a one-year baby at his father's death. Thus by the time of Junayd, Safavid shaykhs were not educated and trained within the traditional ideological and mental habitat of the order according to the traditional way. One might even argue, the traditional atmosphere in Ardabil came into a rapid process of disintegration with Junayd's departure from Ardabil, or shortly before. This interruption in the chain of traditional teaching opened the doors of innovations and changes both in the esoteric doctrine of the Order and in the ideological orientation and interests of the young shaykhs, whose shaykhdom stemmed merely from familial claims but not from

⁵⁶⁸ This sort of interpretation is, however, not shared by the present author, who is rather inclined to attribute more affective role to the doctrinal differentiation.

⁵⁶⁹ See Aubin, "L'avènement des Safavides reconsideré (Etudes Sfavides III)", *Moyen Orient & Océan Indien*, 5, 1988, pp. 103-111.

mastership or merit in Sufism. Furthermore, with the departure of Junayd from Ardabil these young shaykhs were brought up in the Turkoman socio-cultural milieu. Indeed, except for Junayd, they received their education and training under the auspice of these Turkoman khalifas, who were principally of nomadic origin. Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to argue that since the cognitive process and mental development of the Safavid shaykhs of the ‘transformation period’, that is between Junayd and Ismail, was surrounded by the cultural and intellectual environment of Turkomans; and thus was conditioned by this environment. This leads us to the conclusion that the doctrinal and ideological synthesis came out under Junayd and his successors, which is said to be ghulat shi’ism, was not a personal choice or production of these shaykhs, but was a natural outcome of the marriage of the Safavid Order with the Turkoman culture and mentality. Both the ghulat shi’ism and the political aspiration that appeared during Junayd’s shaykhdom were the products of this marriage, and were brought to the Order not primarily by the shaykh but by the socio-cultural roots of the dominating ‘new type’ disciples, that is the nomadic Turkomans.

4.2.4.3. Varsak, Taurus, Aleppo: Consolidating Ties with Tribal and Heterodox Elements

After such a fierce dispute with an influential sunni Shaykh of the region, Junayd must have realized that he could no longer take shelter in Konya due to the fact that he left the city by the following morning. The third stop in his journey was the Varsak land (*vilāyet-i Varsak*)⁵⁷⁰. It is well-known that the Varsak were one of the few tribes that

⁵⁷⁰ APZ, p. 250. The nomadic tribal people of Varsak were living in the mountainous region around Taş-ili (İçel) of South Anatolia.

managed to preserve their traditional social structure and way of life – that was tribal nomad- against the Ottoman expansion. We always witness them as allies of the Karamans in their struggle against the Ottomans.⁵⁷¹ But for the purpose of my analysis the foremost characteristic of the Varsak was that they were still immune to the high Islamic culture culminating among the educated elites of the great cities. Rather they were under the heavy influence of the traditional Turkish way of life.⁵⁷²

Nonetheless, Junayd's stay in Varsak territories was not a long one. Shaykh Abdullatif wrote a letter to Ibrahim Bey, the ruler of Karaman, stipulating that the actual aim of Junayd was not mystical, but that he aimed to deteriorate the actual religion (sha'ria) and to be a temporal ruler as well. Upon receiving this letter from the most prestigious Shaykh of Konya, Ibrahim Bey ordered Varsak tribal chiefs to arrest Junayd. Being an ally and vassal of Karaman, Varsak Begs could not resist this order. But it is clear enough in the narration of Aşıkpaşazâde that they were quite reluctant to seize Junayd. Rather, Varsak leaders somehow allowed him to escape from their region. Aşıkpaşazâde indicates an important detail that must be taken note of here. Before leaving Varsak territory, Junayd had recruited many disciples from among them.⁵⁷³ However, one may well propose that he already had disciples from among the Varsak before visiting their lands. Anyhow, we have convincing reasons to think that by the time of Junayd's personally visiting the Varsak tribes, the Safavid Order already had a

⁵⁷¹ There are many references in Şikârî'a *Karamanoğulları Tarihi* as well as Ottoman chronicles such as Ashikpashazâde, *Ananim Tevârih*, Neşrî, Kemalpaşazâde, and others depicting Varsaks as an intrinsic ally of Karamanoğlu.

⁵⁷² For further reading on Varsak tribes see Ahmed Gökbel, *Anadolu Varsaklarında İnanç ve Adetler*, Ankara: Atatürk Kültür Merkezi Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1998; Ali Sinan Bilgili, *Osmanlı Döneminde Tarsus Sancağı ve Tarsus Türkmenleri: Sosyo-ekonomik Tarih*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001.

⁵⁷³ APZ, p. 250.

strong foot-hold among them. Warriors from the Varsak would be seen, among the ranks of Ismail's enthusiastic Qizilbash fighters, half a century later.⁵⁷⁴

Then Junayd went to Mount Ersuz near Aleppo. He requested a deserted fortress in this mountain from the ruler of the region in order to settle down. Having the permission of Bilal-oglu, who was ruling the region, he repaired the fortress and made there the center of his missionary activities. It is not recorded in sources how long Junayd stayed there. The progression of events suggests that it must not have been long. It seems that Junayd continued to spread his militant shi'ite ideas and recruit new disciples especially from among the Turkoman tribes of the region.⁵⁷⁵ He sent missionaries to the tribes of Antakya, Ayıntab, Maraş, and Amik ovası.⁵⁷⁶ The flow of events in later periods shows that the seeds that Junayd sew into the soils of the region leafed out in a great degree of success. One interesting group that Aşıkpaşazâde mentions among the hinterland of Junayd's propaganda was the adherents of Shaykh Bedreddin. He says many people from the adherents of Bedreddin and others coming from Rum-İli⁵⁷⁷ gathered around him.⁵⁷⁸

Not long had passed since Junayd had settled in Ersuz Mountain (*Cebel-i Arus*) that the political and shi'ite content of his mystical message was discerned by the sunni

⁵⁷⁴ See Sümer, *Safevî Devleti'nin Kuruluşu*, pp. 49-50.

⁵⁷⁵ For the nomadic Turkomans of the region see Faruk Sümer, "Anadolu'da Yaşayan Bazı Üçoklu Oğuz Boylarına Mensup Teşekküller", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, c. 11, no. 1-4, 1949-50, 437-508; "XVI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve Irak'ta Yaşayan Türk Aşiretlerine Umumî bir Bakış", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, c. 11, no. 1-4, 1949-50, 509-569; İlhan Şahin, "XVI. Asırda Halep Türkmenleri", in his *Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler. Nomads in the Ottoman Empire*, İstanbul: Eren, 2006, 129-154; "XVI. Yüzyılda Halep ve Yeniil Türkmenleri", in his *Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler. Nomads in the Ottoman Empire*, İstanbul: Eren, 2006, 155-164.

⁵⁷⁶ Yinanç, p. 243.

⁵⁷⁷ This phrase indicates Thrace and Balkans here.

⁵⁷⁸ APZ, p. 250. Also consider Sohrweide, p. 119. For Şeyh Bedreddin and his followers see Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, *Simavna Kadıoğlu Şeyh Bedreddin*, İstanbul: Eti Yayınevi, 1966; Michel Balivet, *Şeyh Bedreddin. Tasavvuf ve İsyan*, çev. Ela Güntekin, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000; Müfid Yüksel, *Şeyh Bedreddin*, İstanbul: Bakış Yayınları, 2002.

scholars and the Shaykhs of the region. Among the Shaykhs of Aleppo, Mevlāna Ahmed Bekrī and Abdulkirim Halife were the first to realize the danger of Junayd’s movement for the sunni establishment. They drew the attention of Memluk ruler Cakmak to the danger. Aşıkpaşazāde’s description here is again quite interesting. He reports that the two Shaykhs wrote letters to the ruler of Egypt saying that ‘the *Deccal* has appeared in your country!’⁵⁷⁹ In Islamic literature *Deccal* is known as the man who will appear just before the breaking of doomsday and will diminish the true religious system. He will have so much great power that no ruler will be able to resist his devastation, but for the Mehdi, the last savior of human being. What is worth recognizing in our context is that *Deccal* has two principal characteristics: one is religious and the other is political. He will annul the true religious system of God and establish the order of Satan. Meanwhile he will not achieve these devilish accomplishments only through the spreading of his religious ideas but also through a social revolution as well.⁵⁸⁰

Cakmak immediately dispatched an order to the governor of Aleppo to capture Junayd. The governor Kanbay al-Hamzavī⁵⁸¹ could not go personally since he was ill, but he sent one of his commanders. They attacked Junayd’s camp and killed about 70 adherents of Junayd, 25 of whom were disciples of Shaykh Bedreddin but Junayd managed to escape. He declared that ‘Those who want to meet me will find me in Canik.’⁵⁸² But Junayd was attacked on his way by Üzeyir-oğlu. He could get rid of this

⁵⁷⁹ APZ, p. 250.

⁵⁸⁰ For further information see A. J. Wensinck, “*Deccal*”, *IA*, pp. 504-505; Kürşat Demirci, “*Deccal*”, *DIA*, pp. 67-69.

⁵⁸¹ Yinanç, p. 243.

⁵⁸² APZ, p. 250.

danger only by leaving behind all his properties. Junayd must have left Syria in 1453, shortly before Cakmak's death.⁵⁸³

4.2.4.4. *Canik and Trebizond: Becoming "gāzi"*

Aşıkpaşazāde says he went to Mehmet Beg in Canik. But it is not clear who this Mehmet Beg was. Hinz refers to him as the governor of Canik⁵⁸⁴ while Yinanc argues that he was Tāceddin-oğlu Mehmet Beg.⁵⁸⁵ The truth was that Junayd stayed in Canik for a considerably long period between 1453 and 1456,⁵⁸⁶ and continued his propaganda and militaristic activities there as well. He gathered some thousands of armed men in a short while.⁵⁸⁷ The Greek source Chalkokondyles says the Shaykh's troops were collected from everywhere in the east and south and from Samion as well as from some other cities.⁵⁸⁸ Here the question arises of whether Junayd stayed in Canik, which was an Ottoman province at that time, for three years?⁵⁸⁹ Aşıkpaşazāde very briefly says he went to the court of Mehmet Beg in Canik (*Canikde Mehmed Beg katına vardı*);⁵⁹⁰ he does not specify whether Mehmed Beg offered him some sort of protection, thus he stayed in his (Mehmed Beg's) dominion or Junayd left the latter's court after a short while. Remembering Murad II's refusal of the Shaykh's request to stay in Kurtbeli,

⁵⁸³ Hinz, p. 19. Khunji says, in Syria he several times revolted against the governors. See TA, p. 63.

⁵⁸⁴ Hinz, p. 20.

⁵⁸⁵ Yinanc, p. 244.

⁵⁸⁶ Following paragraphs in this study.

⁵⁸⁷ APZ, p. 250. Most of these adherents of Junayd must have been from the Çepni tribe living in the region southwest of the Empire of Trebizond at least by the second half of the thirteenth century. See Fuat Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, trs. Gary Leiser, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992, pp. 49-50. Compare Sohrweide, p. 121.

⁵⁸⁸ The identification of this "Samion" is a controversial issue among historians. According to Hinz, it denotes the Pontic harbor Samsun. See Hinz, pp. 19-20. However, Shukurov challenges this argument asserting the Samion was nothing but the modification of oriental Sham (Damascus). To him Junayd's stay in the Ottoman territory for such a long term since the hostile attitude of the Ottoman administration towards the Shaykh is apparent from Ashikpashazāde's account. See Shukurov, p. 135.

⁵⁸⁹ According to Hinz, the answer is "yes". See Hinz, p. 20.

⁵⁹⁰ APZ, p. 250.

however, one feels the right to question the assumption that he stayed for three years under the protection of Mehmed Beg, who was either a dependent or a tributary of the powerful Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II.⁵⁹¹ Indeed, such a query is made by Rustam Shukurov. Thinking it was impossible for Junayd to survive in the Ottoman territories, he concludes that Junayd must have spent these three years in the vicinity of the borderlands, which one might regard as ‘no mans land’, between the Canik Province of the Ottomans and Pontus territories.⁵⁹²

However, Shukurov’s view needs further modification. We know that there were influential Turkoman tribes both in the Province of Canik and along the borders of the Pontus state. Especially Çepni tribe, which had been established in the region southwest of the Empire of Trebizond, had already proved itself in successful battles against Pontus troops.⁵⁹³ Faruk Sümer determines that already in 1277 there were numerous Çepni⁵⁹⁴ Turkomans living in the region of Sinop.⁵⁹⁵ Towards the end of the century they moved eastward and captured Ünye. Greek sources record that having established a strong foot-hold here Turks raided the whole of the coastal region up until Trebizond.⁵⁹⁶ In the first half of the fourteenth century Trebizond was attacked two times by Turks,

⁵⁹¹ For an entirely different argument regarding the identification of Mehmed Beg, see Shukurov, pp. 137-9.

⁵⁹² Shukurov, pp. 136-7.

⁵⁹³ Fuat Köprülü, *The Origins of the Ottoman Empire*, p. 50. In the second half of the thirteenth century Chepnis captured Sinop and towards the end of the century they headed towards east, Trebizond. See Faruk Sümer, *Oğuzlar*, 5th ed., İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1999, p. 323. For a further reading on Chepni tribe see Faruk Sümer, *Çepniler: Anadolu'daki Türk Yerleşmesinde Önemli Rol Oynayan bir Oğuz Boyu*, İstanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1992.

⁵⁹⁴ Chepnis are one of the famous 24 Oghuz clans. Çepni was one of the four sons (other three were Bayındır, Peçenek, and Çavuldur) of Gök Han, who was one of the six sons of Oğuz Han. The word ‘çepni’ means the man who immediately attacks his enemy whenever and wherever he sees. See Faruk Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, İstanbul, 1992, p. 35.

⁵⁹⁵ Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, p. 35.

⁵⁹⁶ Anthony Bryer, “Greeks and Turkmens: The Pontic Exception”, *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, XXIX, 1975, p. 143.

first in 1335 and second in 1348.⁵⁹⁷ In both attacks the Çepnis played an important part.⁵⁹⁸ In 1357, Hacı Emir Beg of Çepni raided Macka. In the following year he married Theodora, the daughter of ex-emperor Basil, so that Trebizond became safe from his raids.⁵⁹⁹ In 1396-7, his son and successor Ibrahim Beg conquered Giresun from Pontus state and in a short while the region around Giresun and Ordu became intensely inhabited by Turkoman tribes, especially by the Çepnis.⁶⁰⁰

During the reign of Murad II Samsun was conquered by the Ottomans and the province of Canik, which was composed of Bafra, Alaçam, and Çarşamba, was formed.⁶⁰¹ In 1461, Mehmed II first conquered Kastamonu and Sinop, ending the sovereignty of Candaroğulları, and then marched on Trebizond, which was surrendered without resistance. When the Ottomans came to the region the Görele, Tirebolu, and Giresun castles were under the control of Pontus Emperor while the vast area between Kürtün, Dereli, Giresun, Tirebolu, and Eynesil was controlled by Çepni begs.⁶⁰² During the reign of Bayezid II (1481-1512) Trebizond became a Prince province. In 1489-90

⁵⁹⁷ Bryer, p. 144.

⁵⁹⁸ Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, pp. 36-7.

⁵⁹⁹ Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, pp. 39-40.

⁶⁰⁰ Sümer, *Oğuzlar*, p. 326; *Tirebolu Tarihi*, p. 42. For the activities of Turkoman tribes in this region and their relation with Trebizond Empire see Anthony Bryer, "Greeks and Turkmens: The Pontic Exception", *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, XXIX, 1975, 113-148; İlhan Şahin, "Osmanlı Döneminde Giresun Bölgesinde Konar-Göçerlerin İzleri", in his *Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler. Nomads in the Ottoman Empire*, İstanbul: Eren, 2006, 218-224. On the other hand, an anonymous qizilbash history from the early sixteenth-century approves that the the Chepni oymaq in Ismail's ranks originally came from the region of Trebizond and Canik. See *Tarih-i Kızılbaşân*, edited and published by Mir Hâşim Muhaddes, Tehran, 1361 (1982), p. 24. (Hereafter *Tarih-i Kızılbaşân*.) This work is an anonymous history of Qizilbash oymaqs, reporting the geographical origins and great *amirs* of each qizilbash oymaq that participated in the Safavid Movement. The available copy of the work is dated 1013/1604-5. However, as Mir Hâşim Muhaddes states, some expressions in the text suggest an earlier date for the compilation of the work; it must have been written between 1598 and 1605. For the most part, the information provided by the Anonymous History of Qizilbashes shows a great deal of conformity with the known historical facts. Furthermore it provides some valuable information, even if it is not much. Especially its account on the geographical origins of qizilbash tribes is of great value in determining the socio-ethnic roots of the Safavid Movement.)

⁶⁰¹ Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, p. 44.

⁶⁰² Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, p. 48.

Selim I was appointed to the governorship of Trebizond and remained there until 1510.⁶⁰³

Sümer determines from the Tahrir registers of the region dated 1468 and 1515 that in the second half of the fifteenth century almost all the Çepnis settled down in villages. Following the conquest, the Ottomans applied the timar regime upon the region and allotted all timars to Çepni begs. In tahrir registers Giresun and its neighborhood is called ‘Çepni İli’. In the first tahrir, the majority of the Çepnis were recorded as müsellem, those who participate in campaigns with their own facilities but in return do not pay tax. In the second register, dated 1515, however, most of them are recorded as ordinary peasants or reāya and were deprived of tax exemption. But timar holders were still Çepni begs.⁶⁰⁴

On the other hand, Çepni Turkomans are known for their heterodox beliefs and ‘shi’ite’ tendencies. Upon arriving in Suluca Karahöyük, Hacı Bektaş Veli was welcomed to the house of Kadincik Ana and her spouse Idris in this village and recruited his first disciples from among the Çepnis who populated the village.⁶⁰⁵ Towards end of the fifteenth century a considerable part of çepni *oymaqs* joined Safavid ranks.⁶⁰⁶ Ottoman Geographer Mehmet Aşıkî (1555-1600) describes the Çepnis as having converted to qizilbashism and worshipping Shah Ismail.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰³ Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, p. 47.

⁶⁰⁴ Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, pp. 48-64.

⁶⁰⁵ See Irène Mélikoff, “Bektashi/Kızılbaş, Historical Bipartition and its consequences”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2001, p. 38; “Recherche sur une Bacıyan-i Rum: Kadincik Ana”, in her *Au banquet des quarante. Exploration au coeur du Bektachisme-Alevisme*, p. 34; Sümer, *Tirebolu Tarihi*, p. 35. Çepni *oymaqs* scattered several parts of Anatolia. In the sixteenth century, for example, some of them constituted Halep Türkmenleri, while some others joined Ulu Yörük living in Sivas-Tokat-Amasya region. On the other hand, a crowded branch of Çepni was still living in the region of Trabizond, Bayburt, Gümüşhane, Giresun, Ordu, and Samsun. See Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 50.

⁶⁰⁶ See Faruk Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, pp. 50, 66, 80, 82, 104, 194; Oğuzlar, pp. 322-330; Mélikoff, “Bektashi/Kızılbaş”, p. 38; “Recherche sur une Bacıyan-i Rum”, p. 34. However, one of his

So, putting these two facts together, it clearly appears that Shaykh Junayd's homage in the Province of Canik was provided by the Çepni and other Turkoman tribes that inhabited in the region, which provided gâzi-disciples for Junayd's troops as well. If Mehmed Beg was a dependent of the Ottoman Sultan as intrinsically suggested by Kemalpaşazâde, then Junayd's stay at his court must have been a short visit. Rather, he supposedly spent three years from 1453 to 1456 among the Turkoman tribes, engaging in the propaganda of his spiritual way and making new recruits. We do not know exactly how the response of the Canik governor and the Ottoman administration to his doings was. Although no military measure is recorded in contemporary sources, the Ottoman's, Karaman's, and Memluk's attitudes to the former actions of Junayd suggest that it was not calm.

On the other hand, failing to realize his political intentions within the three Islamic realms – namely the Ottoman, Karaman, and Mamluk –, Junayd turned towards a Christian country. He attacked the Trabzon Greek Empire. Junayd's goal was obvious: to construct a temporal power over the ruins of this infidel state in addition to the spiritual one. Shaykh Junayd's attack on Trebizond was also recorded in Greek sources.⁶⁰⁸ Taking advantage of the internal conflicts within the ruling family, Junayd achieved considerable success against the Greeks. He defeated the combined army and navy of the Greek emperor Yuannis Comminos IV near Kordile (Akca Kale) and

other works, where he studied Ottoman tahrir registers related to Chepnis Sümer says there were number of people bearing names like 'Osman', 'Bekir', 'Ömer' in Chepni villages thus they were sunnis. See his *Tirebolu Tarihi*, pp. 53-4.

⁶⁰⁷ Mehmed Aşıkî, *Menâzirü'l-evâlim*, manuscript, Nurosmaniye Kütüphanesi, no. 3426, fol. 299a.

⁶⁰⁸ For an assessment of Junayd's campaign on Trebizond mainly basing on Greek sources see Rustam Shukurov, "The Campaign of Shaykh Djunayd Safawî against Trebizond (1456 AD/860 H)", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, v. 17, 1993, 127-140.

besieged Trabzon.⁶⁰⁹ But some unexpected news forced Junayd to return without a decisive result.

After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 the Greek emperor of Trabzon accepted to be the tributary of Mehmed II.⁶¹⁰ One may think that Junayd's attack on his vassal state must have annoyed the sultan and made him decide to punish this unusual Shaykh. It stands to reason, however, to suggest that this was not the only reason for Mehmed II's decision. Being aware of Junayd's political intentions and religious divergence he must have realized the possible harmful outcomes of Junayd's maneuver for his empire. He commissioned the governor of Sivas, Hizir Beg, to eliminate this newly emerging but potentially hazardous power. Upon receiving an order from Mehmed II to march on Junayd, Hizir Beg dispatched a powerful army. Junayd had no choice but to desert the region for the forth time in his adventure in Anatolia.⁶¹¹ Although contemporary sources do not record the exact date, the development of events suggests that Junayd's assault on Trabzon must have occurred in 1455, or 1456 at the latest.⁶¹²

⁶⁰⁹ For further details see Shukurov, pp. 128-30; Hinz, pp. 20-21; Yinanç, p. 244.

⁶¹⁰ Yinanç, p. 244; Yazıcı, p. 124. Walther Hinz gives a slightly different account. To him Comminos became a tributary of Mehmed II after Hizir Beg's campaign. See Hinz, p. 22. Anyhow, Mehmed II's interference forced Junayd to raise the siege and leave the region. Accordingly the Pontus Empire of Trebizond came to an end in Mehmed II's hands when he conquered the city in 1461. See Michel M. Mazzaoui, "The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State", p. 85.

⁶¹¹ APZ, p. 250.

⁶¹² According to Hinz, Junayd's assault occurred in 1456. See Hinz, p. 20. A close study of Greek sources led Shukurov to the same conclusion. See Shukurov, p. 134. There are some other suggestions as well. But, taking into account the fact that Safavid sources say Junayd spent four years in Diyarbakir, and the fact that he was killed in 1460, 1456 reasonably seems to be right date.

4.2.4.5. *The Aqqoyunlu Palace: Legitimizing Worldly Power*

The next episode of Junayd's adventure would take place in the Palace of the Akkoyunlu ruler, Uzun Hasan. Following the unfruitful assault on Trabzon, Junayd realized that he could not find suitable conditions in Anatolia, though he had a number of disciples there. The last option left to him was to take refuge in the Palace of Uzun Hasan, who was in a state of war with Cihansah, the foremost enemy of Junayd. As Roemer notes, "he rightly saw that his opportunity lay in the rivalry between the Qaraqoyunlu and the Aqqoyunlu."⁶¹³ If we rely on Aşıkpaşazāde, however, he was not warmly welcomed. Just like other sunni rulers, Uzun Hasan was uneasy with Junayd's peculiar mystical ideas and militant disciples. He arrested the Shaykh.⁶¹⁴ Nonetheless, Safavid sources do not mention any skeptical behavior of Uzun Hasan regarding the Shaykh; rather he is said to have had him welcomed with pleasure.⁶¹⁵

However, the fruits of Junayd's adventurous journey had already begun to appear. The intense propaganda performed by him and his disciples in central, southern, and northern Anatolia created a vast social ground for the new mystical synthesis of Junayd. This social ground did not only produce new adherents to the brotherhood but armed fighters as well. As will be referred to, the three fundamental characteristics of Junayd's synthesis were mysticism, shi'ite tendency, and politico-militarism. Only the first component was the continuation of the traditional Safavid way. But even this

⁶¹³ Hans R. Roemer, "The Safavid Period", *The Cambridge History of Iran*, 6, ed. Peter Jackson, 1993, p. 201.

⁶¹⁴ APZ, p. 250.

⁶¹⁵ Khunji, a fervent opponent of Junayd and Haydar, for example does not mention such an arrest at all. To him, the latter received Junayd generously for he used to pay attention to hermits and dervishes, "hoping to catch from his shirt the aura of sanctity of his ancestors." Also see TA, p. 63. In this issue Safavids accounts are parallel to Khunji. See HS, p. 561; HT, p. 153; *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, pp. 394-5; AA, p. 30. Also consider John Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire*, Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1999, p. 83; Sarwar, p. 23; Youssef-Jamālī, p. 22.

component experienced an essential metamorphose under the influence of the two later added elements. Junayd's period also marked the shift of the order's center of gravity from traditional dervish groups, who were recruited from different social roots and geographical regions and educated according to the high sufi tradition stemming from Safiyuddin, to Turkoman tribal sufis, who were chiefly illiterate, culturally uncultivated, mostly still bearing old Turkish beliefs, and masters in fighting. It was nothing other than this new stem of the order that constituted the Qizilbashes of Haydar and Ismail.

It is safe to argue that Junayd was not as weak as he had been in Konya or Aleppo when came to Uzun Hasan's palace. Rather, he relied on a considerable number of armed disciples, which is reported as twenty thousand by Aşıkpaşazāde.⁶¹⁶ Being aware of his disciples' mastery in fight, Junayd proposed co-operation against Cihanşan. Uzun Hasan must have realized the efficacy of Junayd's power that he not only freed Junayd but also married his sister Hatice Begum⁶¹⁷ to Junayd as well.⁶¹⁸ Hasan Beg's aim in establishing a warm relationship with Shaykh Junayd, however, was not only to benefit from the military capability of his disciples but also to take the advantage of the Shaykh's authority and influence on the people in consolidating and perpetuating his own sovereignty.⁶¹⁹

This marriage became another milestone in the history of the Safavid dynasty, for being the intersection point of the two dynastic lines one holding spiritual power, while the other holding the temporal one. This marriage was an excellent opportunity for

⁶¹⁶ APZ, p. 250.

⁶¹⁷ From the marriage of Junayd and Hatice Begum was born Haydar, the successor of Junayd and the father of Ismail.

⁶¹⁸ "...Uzun Hasan'a gitti. Uzun Hasan Cüneyd'i dutdı. Cüneyd eyidür: 'Beni niçin dutarsın? Cihanşah gibi bir düşmanın var. Benim silahlı yiğirmi bin sofuya gücüm yeter. Ben de sana yardımcı olayın!' dedi. Uzun Hasan dahi yemin edüb Uzun Hasan'ın kız karındaşın aldı..." See APZ, p. 250. Also see HS, p. 561; HT, p. 153; *Ahsenü't-tevârih*, IX, p. 395; AA, p. 30.

⁶¹⁹ Compare, Youssef-Jamālî, p. 34.

Junayd to legitimize his already embarked on political project.⁶²⁰ From then on the Safavid dynasty would not be the master of only the spiritual world but the material world as well. A contemporary author marks the importance and echo of this marriage that “Junayd’s marriage became known even in the farthest corners of Rūm and Syria and, in view of this honor, the Khalifas of the earlier shaykhs wanted to wait on him.”⁶²¹

Gaining the favor of Uzun Hasan, Junayd continued his propaganda dispatching khalifas to nearby countries while staying in Diyarbakir, but in quite comfortable conditions for this time.⁶²² He must have considerably broadened the hinterland of the ‘new sufi message’ of Safavids during the Diyarbakir days under the protection of Uzun Hasan. On the other hand, his armed disciples, who were proliferating day by day, engaged in successful battles with the Akkoyunlu troops, naturally by the order of their Shaykh. *Haniwaldanus Anonym* says numerous people and considerable wealth from Ottoman territories flowed to Uzun Hasan’s country for the sake of Junayd.⁶²³ After spending 3 or 4 years in this manner Junayd decided that it was time to return home.⁶²⁴ He left Diyarbakir for Ardabil with his prominent disciples in 1459.⁶²⁵ Aşıkpaşazāde

⁶²⁰ Compare Savory, *Iran under Safavids*, p. 17.

⁶²¹ TA, p. 64.

⁶²² See Youssef-Jamālī, pp. 23-4.

⁶²³ ANMH, p. 36. According to ANMH especially the military support of Junayd’s disciples was so important for Uzun Hasan that upon Mehmed II’s decision he also got angry. ANMH deems this anger as one of the reasons that lead to war between Mehmed II and Uzun Hasan. ANMH insistently underscores the warm relation between Uzun Hasan and Safavid Shaykhs – first Junet then his son Haydar. Hasan-ı Rumlu says in Diyarbakir, 12.000 devoted and sincere sufis trod the right path under the auspice of Shaykh Junayd. See *Ahsenü’-t-tevārih*, IX, p. 395.

⁶²⁴ Hasan-ı Rumlu says he lived there for four years. See *Ahsenü’-t-tevārih*, IX, p. 395. According to *‘Ālam-ārā-yi Shāh Ismā’īl*, he stayed there for three years. See Youssef-Jamālī, p. 23. HS and HT say after living there for a while, having grown homesick, he set out for Ardabil. See HS, p. 561; HT, 153. See Also Savory, *Iran under Safavids*, p. 17. According to Savory he stayed in Diyarbakir for three years.

⁶²⁵ According to Khunji, Junayd’s deportation from Diyarbakir was because of his worldly desires. His account reads, “Junayd was not exempt from temerity and showed signs of vehement folly. Every moment some evil fancy took hold of him; for example his mind was perpetually haunted by the dream of conquering Sharvān. Consequently, after the new honor bestowed on him [establishing kinship with the royal family of Aqqoyunlu], he decided to return to Ardabil.” See TA, p. 64. Also consider Yinanç, p. 244; Yazıcı, p. 124.

records that his disciples were so crowded that they could not find enough place in Ardabil.⁶²⁶

4.2.4.6. Ardabil Again: Completing the Circle

Junayd's arrival excited Ca'fer and his supporters in the Tekke. Using his warm relations with Cihanshah of Karakoyunlu, Ca'fer managed to force Junayd to desert the city once more.⁶²⁷ On the other hand Cihanshah became uneasy by the arrival of Junayd, for, having established kinship with Uzun Hasan, his principal enemy, he posed further danger.⁶²⁸ However, Junayd was no more alone, but had a recognizable military power as well as a great number of sufi adherents. Yet his power was still not enough to oppose the coalition of Ca'fer and Cihanshah. Thus Junayd decided to leave Ardabil.

He dispatched orders for his adherents to congregate near Ardabil. In a short while ten thousand armed men assembled.⁶²⁹ Junayd promulgated holy-war (*gazā*) on Georgia in the same year.⁶³⁰ He passed through Shirvan which was ruled by Halil-Allah. Furthermore the territory that Junayd was about to invade was the tributary of Halil-Allah. Thus he strongly opposed Junayd's movements and warned Junayd not to invade his tributaries.⁶³¹ According to Hasan-ı Rumlu, Shirvanshah Halil first pursued a warm

⁶²⁶ APZ, p. 251.

⁶²⁷ HT, p. 153; *Ahsenü 't-tevārih*, IX, p. 395; Hinz, p. 34; Youssef-Jamālī, p. 24. HS again does not mention Shaykh Ca'fer blaming only Cihanshah for forcing Junayd to desert the city. See HS, p. 561. AA repeats the same account. See AA, p. 30.

⁶²⁸ HT, p. 153.

⁶²⁹ "Couriers were sent in all directions to gather disciples, and in a short while ten thousand fighting men had joined Sultan Junayd's train, determined to battle the enemies of sainthood." See HS, p. 561; AA, p. 30. See also HT, p. 154; *Ahsenü 't-tevārih*, IX, p. 395; Hinz, p. 34; Yinanç, p. 244. The latter gives the number of armed disciples twelve thousand.

⁶³⁰ Inskender Beg Munshi again sincerely indicates Junayd's worldly concerns in this decision: "... Then, in a bid of temporal power, he encouraged his men with promises of booty and the rewards of holy war, and ten thousand Sufi *gāzīs* marched toward Sirvān with the intension of attacking the Circassians." See AA, p. 30.

⁶³¹ HS, p. 561; APZ, p. 251; TA, p. 64; HT, p. 154.

manner against Shaykh Junayd, but his attitude changed with the intervention of Shaykh Ca'fer. To him, Ca'fer wrote a letter to Shirvanshah stating, "A group among the disciples of the family of sanctity (*hānedan-ı velāyet*) recognized Shaykh Junayd as murshid and followed him. Nonetheless, he was a liar in this matter. His succession to the saintly post and his spiritual guidance is truly false. The best thing to do is to repel him."⁶³²

Yet Junayd was not to change his plan; he spoiled Georgia and returned with immense booty. Halil-Allah dispatched an ambassador to express his displeasure. He, moreover, demanded Junayd to leave his country. Junayd again did not take these demands seriously. He not only decided to spend the winter in Shirvan but also killed the ambassador.⁶³³ As a last solution Halil-Allah decided to eliminate Junayd by force. Two armies confronted on May 3, 1460 near Tabarsaran.⁶³⁴ Junayd on the battlefield and his disciples dispersed.⁶³⁵ According to Aşıkpaşazāde his son and successor Haydar from Hatice Begum was due in a month.⁶³⁶ Although Junayd's elder son Hoca Mehmed survived, the disciples adhered to Haydar, a new-born baby in a cradle, as their Shaykh, possibly because of Junayd's last demand just before his death.⁶³⁷

⁶³² *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, p. 395. Also see Sarwar, p. 24.

⁶³³ APZ, p. 251; Hinz, p. 35.

⁶³⁴ *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, p. 395; Yinanç, p. 244. Yazıcı gives the date as March 4, 1460. HS specifies the place where the battle occurred, namely Tabarsaran. See HS, p. 561. Also see AA, p. 30. Ghulām Sarwar determines the number of Junayd's followers in this battle ten thousand, and the number of Shirvan soldiers thirty thousand. See Sarwar, p. 24. See also Savory, *Iran Under the Safavids*, p. 17.

⁶³⁵ HS, p. 561 ; TA, p. 65; *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, p. 395.

⁶³⁶ APZ, p. 251. Haydar was born in Amid one month later than the death of his father. See Hinz, pp. 35-36.

⁶³⁷ AA, p. 31. APZ reads, "Cüneyd öldüğünden bir ay sonra bir oğlu doğdı. Adını Haydar kodılar beşikdeyiken. Şeyh Cüneydün müridleri, beşikte yatur iken ana tābi oldılar. Cüneydün bir oğlu dahi var idi. Büyük Hoca Mehmed derler idi. Ona tābi olmadılar. Küçüğüne tābi oldılar." See APZ, p. 251. Also consider Yinanç, p. 245. Junayd's elder son Hoca Mehmed was not born into the his marriage with Hatice Begum. As Sümer remarks, it is not difficult to recognize Junayd's intention in this succession. By this way, Safavid Shaykhs would both secure the support of Aqqyunlu and claim dynastic legitimacy for the

Junayd left his son two very important legacies, which would fundamentally change the flow of not only Safavid history but also of the history of Anatolia and Iran as well. One was the transformed esoteric doctrine of the Order, which was no more fitted into the quietist traditional Islamic Sufism but was heavily influenced by ghulat shi'ite ideas, and was grafted with intense political aspiration. Another legacy of Shaykh Junayd to his son was the large-scale devoted and militant Turkoman disciples recruited among Anatolian and Syrian nomadic tribes.

As delineated in the previous chapter, the early signs of incompetence between the economic, political, cultural, and religious habits of these nomadic Turkomans and that of the newly arising 'Ottoman realm' had already appeared before Junayd's arrival in Anatolia. Junayd's energetic activities and his khalifas' enthusiastic propaganda among these nomads succeeded in adding most of them to 'the Safavid cause'. As a matter of fact, Junayd successfully sowed the seeds of 'the Safavid Movement' in the fertile socio-cultural and religious ground of Turkoman nomads. The first outcomes of these seeds would immediately sprout during the time of his son, Haydar. In this aspect, one may regard Haydar as a gardener who raised the newly emerged saplings. However, Haydar's live would not be long enough to see the fruits. It would rather be his son Ismail who gathered the fruits of seeds sown into soil by Shaykh Junayd. It is not a coincidence that the army, which would open for Ismail the gates of the sovereignty of whole Iran and Azarbaijan, was exclusively composed of Turkoman tribes stemming from the regions visited by Shaykh Junayd half a century earlier.⁶³⁸

temporal power. See Sümer, p. 11. HS and HT mistakenly say that Haydar was the older son of Sultan Junayd. See HS, p. 561, HT, p. 155.

⁶³⁸ To give a very brief summary, among foremost tribes of Safavid military aristocracy were the Rumlu and Ustaclu tribes. The former was most probably composed of the nomads of the Province of Rum. (An

4.3. SHAYKH HAYDAR (1460-1488): THE ZEAL OF ‘GAZĀ’

Haydar was yet to be born when his father was killed by Shirvanshah Halil.⁶³⁹ His leadership marked the intensification of political desire and military activities. As a modern scholar remarks, under Sultan Haydar the Safavid Movement’s “drive to achieve temporal power accelerated”.⁶⁴⁰ But the fulfillment of this achievement would have to wait his son and successor Ismail. The contemporary Safavid historian Khwandamir writes, “He always encouraged those who were engaged in holy war, . . . , he raised the banner of battle with the infidels.”⁶⁴¹ Indeed, in the hands of Junayd and Haydar *gazā* turned into the most influential instrument in transforming the contemplative sufi Order of Safavids into the Safavid State, the process which lasted half a century. During the transformation period, the benefit of *gazā* for Ardabil was two-fold. First and foremost, these expeditions on infidels further attracted Turkoman tribal elements, mostly living

interesting account in APZ hints that Junayd had recruited a considerable number of disciples in the Province of Rum. APZ states that when Haydar was four or five years old, a man very much resembling Shaykh Junayd appeared in Tokat. Junayd’s disciples said “he is our Shaykh Junayd” and adhered to him. The number of these disciples must have been recognizable that Sultan Mehmed II ordered the arrest this man and had him brought to his presence. Then he asked his tutor (hoca) Hayreddin, who was the ex-tutor of Junayd, whether or not this man was Junayd. When Hayreddin’s testimony revealed the truth he was released. See APZ, p. 251.) According to Sümer, the members of this tribe were from Sivas, Koyulhisar, Karahisar, Tokat, and Amasya. See Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 43. Ustaclu tribe was derived from members of a great nomadic group called Ulu Yörük, which inhabited more or less the same region. One should remember that this region was Shaykh Junayd’s first station in Anatolia, where he wished to establish a *tekke*. The second important location in Junayd’s trajectory was Konya and Taş-eli region. From these regions joined the tribes of Karaman, Turgutlu, and Varsak. One may also add the Tekelu tribe that was recruited during Junayd’s propaganda in this region as well. Junayd’s next station was Aleppo. We see among the ranks of the Safavid army Şamlu, which was one of the pillars, the Dulkadir, and Arapgırlu all from neighboring regions to Aleppo. We should note here that the connection with all these tribes was reinforced during Junayd’s stay in Diyarbakir as well. But before coming to Diyarbakir Junayd stayed for three years in Canik, which was inhabited by Çepni tribe. As will be delineated, following Ismail’s advent, Çepnis also filled the ranks of the young shah’s army. This subject will be evaluated in detail in the following chapter.

⁶³⁹ Haydar was born one month after the death of his father. APZ, p. 251.

⁶⁴⁰ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 18.

⁶⁴¹ HS, p. 561.

within the Ottoman borders.⁶⁴² Secondly, the raiding infidels provided somewhat of a legitimate ground for the political desires of the shaykhs, while accumulating further military power in their hands.

Like his father, Shaykh Haydar also does not occupy much space in later Safavid chronicles, starting by HS. Especially the extremist beliefs of his adherents regarding the shaykh himself are completely ignored by Safavid chroniclers. This is not, however, something astonishing. We know that all the Safavid historians,⁶⁴³ except Khwandamir, wrote their histories during or after the reign of Shah Tahmasb, when the ‘orthodox’ Twelver Shi’ism, which vehemently denies extremist assertions of ghulat shi’a, had already been established in the official sphere of the Safavid state.⁶⁴⁴ Khwandamir, for instance, was born into an old-rooted bureaucrat family of Persia and grew up in a highly educated milieu, which was alien and antagonist towards rough and simple beliefs of illiterate-nomadic Turkomans. It is evident in these chronicles that they aim to

⁶⁴² As already delineated, the intensification of the spirit of gazā within the order was chiefly caused by the influence of large-scale Turkoman disciples on Ardabil.

⁶⁴³ For a through description of Safavid sources see Sarwar, pp. 3-16; Youssef-Jamāli, pp. XV-XLV; Masashi Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâs. Le système militaire safavide*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987, pp. 10-28.

⁶⁴⁴ The venture of Safavid ideology from extremism to the orthodox shi’ism arguably began as early as 1508, when Shah Ismail dismissed Husayn Beg Lala, one of ‘the Seven Sufis of Lahijan’ and of the foremost representatives of late ‘Safavid Movement’, from the post of wakīl and in his place appointed a Persian, Amīr Najm al-Dīn Mas’ūd Gīlānī. (See Jean Aubin, ‘Revolution chiite et conservatisme. Les soufis de Lahejan, 1500-1514 (Etudes Safavides II)’, *Moyen Orient & Océan Indien* 1, 1984, pp. 9-15; Roger M. Savory, “The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Isma’l I (907-30/1501-24)”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXIII, London, 1960, p. 94.) But on the ideological plane the main transformation took place under Shah Tahmasb, when prominent Arab theologians of Twelver Shi’ism from Jabal ‘Āmil or somewhere else were imported to the Safavid capital. On the role of Amili Scholars in transforming the officially approved religious perception of the Safavids see Devin J. Stewart, “Notes on the Migration of Amili Scholars to Safavid Iran”, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. 55, no. 2, 1996, 81-103; “An Episode in the ‘Amili Migration to Safavid Iran: Husayn b. ‘Abd al-samad al-‘Amili’s Travel Account”, *Iranian Studies*, v. 39, no. 4, December 2006, 481-508; Said Amir Arjomand, “Shi’ism as the State Religion under the Safavids”, in his *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam*, Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 105-212; Albert Hourani, “From Jabal ‘Āmil to Persia”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 49, 1986, 133-40; Andrew Newman, “The Myth of Clerical Migration to Safavid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition to ‘Ali al-Karakī and Safavid Shiism”, *Die Welt des Islams*, 33, 1993, 66-112.

tune down the devoted extremism that prevailed during the shaykhdom of Junayd and Haydar – and, ironically, that provided the necessary excitement, energy, and enthusiasm necessary for the advent of Ismail, thus for the foundation of the Safavid state. Thus the ignorant attitude of Safavid historians regarding Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Haydar is quite understandable. This being the case, they could not totally overshadow the political aspirations and military deeds of Shaykh Haydar. Rather, these points are more toned by Safavid historians compared to the depiction of Shaykh Junayd.

On the other hand, Ottoman sources are not as informative as they are on Junayd. The most informative account on Shaykh Haydar is interestingly, like in the case of Shaykh Junayd, provided by a vehement Qizilbash enemy and a sunni zealot, namely Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunjī, the court historian of Aqqoyunlu Yakub Beg. One should, however, be very careful regarding his account for his bias is excessively exuberant and his effort to depict Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, and their followers as ‘heretics’ is evident. For this purpose he does not hesitate to exaggerate or even to fabricate especially when dealing with the faith of Ardabil sufis, their devotedness and reverence to their shaykhs. Yet we learn the most original and interesting details of deeds of Haydar from Khunjī.

4.3.1. Haydar in Ardabil

Haydar grew up in the Aqqoyunlu Palace under the protection and auspice of his uncle Uzun Hasan. It was on the return of his victorious campaign on Azarbaijan, which ended with the death of his foremost enemy, Cihanshah, and with the annexation of whole Azarbaijan, that Uzun Hasan permitted Haydar, who was a child of only seven years, to

stay in Ardabil.⁶⁴⁵ During Haydar's stay in Ardabil, his father's khalifas came from every direction, presenting their service and unquestioned obedience. Haydar was tutored by Shaykh Ca'fer in Ardabil. It seems, however, that as Haydar grew up, the old contest between his father and Shaykh Ca'fer re-emerged. According to Hasan-ı Rumlu, Ca'fer claimed lots from the gifts brought by the disciples of Haydar in Rum, Syria, and other places. Haydar, on the other hand, not only deprived Shaykh Ca'fer of these gifts but also forbade him to enter the *tekke*.⁶⁴⁶

Learning from Khunjī, the interest of the Young Shaykh in Ardabil was not really focused on the mystical teachings and exercise but rather on the art of war and war-craft. In the succinct expression of Khunjī:

Instead of exercising his pen on the sacred book, he exercised his sword on the dogs of Ardabil. In his house the only *chilla-gīr* was his bow, and in his close circle (*khalvat*) only the sword was engaged in exploits. In the morning, which venerable (*ābdār*) shaykhs greet with heart-burning and rending of breasts, he was sowing shields and sharpening arrows. In the evening, when ascetics thrust their heads forward (in religious zeal, *murāqabat*), he, with the sword of oppression, struck off people's heads.⁶⁴⁷

Haydar spent most of his time preparing swords and lances on one hand, and in physical exercises to improve his skill in the art of fighting on the other. As admitted even by Khunjī, his most energetic enemy among all historians, he was a brave man by nature and acquired great proficiency in archery and the use of the sword.⁶⁴⁸ Iskender Beg Munshī states that Haydar engaged in reviving the customary practice of his predecessors, “but his secret aspiration was to have dominion over territories and

⁶⁴⁵ TA, p. 66.

⁶⁴⁶ Hasan-ı Rumlu, *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, çev. Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara: TTK, 2006 (Ninth volume of *Ahsenü't-tevārih*), p. 579.

⁶⁴⁷ TA, pp. 66-7.

⁶⁴⁸ TA, p. 68.

subjects.”⁶⁴⁹ Khunjī goes further saying “Shaykh Haydar of Ardabil who wished to rear a sultanate by mere masquerade (*talbīs*), changing the (dervish) cap of poverty (*kulāh-i gedā’ī*) for a crown of worldly domination.”⁶⁵⁰ His desire for the temporal power was further reinforced by his marriage to Halime Begum Aga, known as Alemshah Begum, the daughter of Uzun Hasan, who wished to consolidate his connection with the Safavid family.⁶⁵¹ The mother of Alemshah Begum was the famous Pontus princess Despina Khatun, the daughter of the Emperor of Trebizond Calo Johannes.⁶⁵² This marriage obviously augmented the prestige and influence of Shaykh Haydar, whose affairs further prospered and whose court was further frequented by both the high and the low.⁶⁵³ John Woods calls attention to the point that later Safavid sources deliberately reflect the notion that the dynasty founded by Ismail “represented the union of the spiritual authority of the Safavid order and the worldly domination of the Aqquyunlu Empire”.⁶⁵⁴ Qazi Ahmad Qumī says, for example, “The eminence [Haydar] was the eldest son of

⁶⁴⁹ AA, p. 31. HS tacitly refers to Sultan Haydar’s political ambition by saying “Sultan Haydar ... was worthy of both a prayer carpet and throne.” See HS, p. 561.

⁶⁵⁰ TA, p. 61.

⁶⁵¹ HS records that this marriage happened after Uzun Hasan’s victory over Cihanshah of Qaraqoyunlu in 1467. See HS, p. 561. HT follows the same account. See HT, p. 156. Bālī Efendi’s letter includes a purely slander history about the marriage of Haidar, into which Ismail was born. Yet this story is valuable for it reflects the fanaticism of Ottoman *ulemā* against father and grandfather of Shah Ismail, as well as against Ismail himself. According to the legend, the Persian king (Uzun Hasan) took Haidar in Tebriz after his father was killed on the battlefield. Haidar was a refractory youth wandering drunk in the streets, strumming his *tanburā* etc. The contemporary sultan had a widowed sister who did not enjoy a good name or good manners. “By chance they fell in love, the pregnancy of the young woman became evident, and everybody knew that the cause of it was this young man. This was an undeserved shame for all the chiefs and nobles. Consequently they married (Haidar to the widow) and sent him with his wife to Ardabil. A short time passed and Ismā’īl was born prematurely. The heretics said it was a miracle, while the doctors of law gave a decision proclaiming Ismā’īl a bastard. This term acquired notoriety in those parts, and when Ismā’īl grew up this was reported to him. When he asked: ‘Who put out this talk about me?’, the answer was: ‘The doctors of the sunnis said so’. Ismā’īl said: ‘Should I find an occasion, I shall murder the doctors with various kinds of torture and then uproot the sunnis and, instead, I will spread the shi’a creed. I will avenge my father and grandfather’. See Minorsky, “Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids”, pp. 446-7.

⁶⁵² See, for example, BRW, p. 47.

⁶⁵³ HS, p. 561; AA, p. 31.

⁶⁵⁴ John Woods, *The Aqquyunlu. Clan, Confederation, Empire*, revised and expanded edition, Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 1999, p. 168.

Sultan Junayd and the nephew of Hasan Padishah; and because of these two considerations, the luster of sovereignty and guidance radiated from his august brow.”⁶⁵⁵

4.3.2. Becoming “Qizilbash”

The name “qizilbash” for the adherents of the Safavid Order, together with the introduction of the twelve-gored hat, undoubtedly goes back to the time of Haydar. The word is not used in *Kitāb-ı Diyārbakriyya*⁶⁵⁶ of Abū Bakr-i Tihirānī, completed in 1470, but used by Khunjī, who finished his work towards 1490. The invention of the red head-gear by Shaykh Haydar is explained by later Safavid sources through a genuine dream of Shaykh Haydar.⁶⁵⁷ According to the tradition, in a dream Haydar was visited by some messengers from the unseen world and was instructed to make his disciples wear a hat with twelve-gores, indicating the twelve immaculate Imams, as a sign of distinction for his followers.⁶⁵⁸ On awakening, he joyfully changed his ordinary Turkoman hat, which

⁶⁵⁵ Recited in Woods, *The Aqquyunlu*, p. 168.

⁶⁵⁶ This is the history of Uzun Hasan written by Tihirānī, a court historian of his. The Persian text is published by Necati Lugal and Faruk Sümer, while a Turkish translation of the work was published by Mürsel Öztürk. See Abū Bakr-i Tihirānī, *Kitāb-ı Diyārbakriyya*, I-II, yay., Necati Lugal-Faruk Sümer, Ankara: TTK, 1993; Ebu Bekr-i Tihirānī, *Kitab-ı Diyarbakriyye*, çev. Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001.

⁶⁵⁷ This tradition in the Safavid historiography is equally reflected in the famous *Histoire generale de la religion des Turcs* of Michel Baudier. According to his account, “Scheidar” for the first time put red head-gears on heads of his disciples so that by then they were called “Tête-rouge” or *kızılbaş*. Baudier also states that all their “Emirs” and “Sheriphes” were bearing this Turban. See Michel Baudier, *Histoire generale de la religion des Turcs*, Paris, 1625, p. 216. It should be noted that Baudier mistakenly tends to regard Shaykh Haydar and his followers as ordinary “Etnazery” shi’ism or Twelver schi’ism. As already put by several prominent modern scholars and evaluated throughout the present study one can hardly deem the religious stand of Haydar and of the early Qizilbas as ordinary Twelver schi’ism. Yet, a careful reading of his account may reveal some peculiar features of the Qizilbash sythesis. On explaining contrasts and similarities between the religion of “Perses” (of Safavids or Qizilbash) and Turks (sunni Islam), Baudier says regarding the belief in the Supreme Creator and the prophecy of Muhammad both parties are the same. However, immediately after Muhammad the “Sofians” add ‘Ali: “leurs inocations portent fouent ces mots, Halla, Mehemet, Haly, Dieu, Mahomet, Haly [‘Ali].” See Baudier, p. 217. When remembered that this expression “Allah-Muhammed-Ali” is known as the ‘motto’ of the Qizilbash way of Islam, still today, Baudier’s account becomes rather meaningful.

⁶⁵⁸ AA, p.31. *The Anonymous History of Shah Ismail*, better known as *Ross Anonymous*, gives a slightly different account. “One night the Prince of the throne of Guidance and Sanctity, that is to say the Commander of the Faithful (‘Alī), upon whom be the prayers of God, appeared in a vision to Sultan

was the customary gear in those days⁶⁵⁹, and wore the twelve-gored hat, which has been called since then the Haydarî hat or *Tāc-i Haydarî*⁶⁶⁰; likewise his adherents followed him.⁶⁶¹ Thus, the followers of the Safavid family distinguished themselves from other people and acquired the sobriquet ‘Qizilbash’ or ‘redheads’.⁶⁶²

4.3.3. ‘Gazā’ on Circassia

Iskender Beg clearly figures the temporal authority which accumulated at the hands of Haydar. To him the number of disciples that frequented Haydar’s court increased day by day. As a result “Haydar possessed both temporal and spiritual authority. Inwardly, following the example of shaykhs and men of God, he walked the path of spiritual guidance and defense of the faith; outwardly, he was a leader sitting on a throne in the manner of princes.”⁶⁶³ Iskender Beg also underscores the role of amity and concord

Haidar, and said to him: ‘Oh my son, the time is now at hand when my children from among your descendants shall arise and sweep Infidelity from off the face of the Earth. It now behoves you to fashion a cap for the Sūfīs and your disciples, and you must take it of scarlet cloth.’ Sa saying His Sanctity cut out of a cap with twelve points [tarlak].” See Denison E. Ross, “The early years of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavi Dynasty”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXVIII, 1896 (from now on Ross), pp. 254-5.

⁶⁵⁹ AA, p. 31. Also consider Youssef-Jamālī, p. 38.

⁶⁶⁰ “The basis of this crown was a hat made of red wool which was joined to a long red conical shape made of wool. This part of the hat, as a sign of the Twelve Imāms, had twelve folds or slits. Round the red hat, there was a white or green Turban made of wool or silk.” Youssef-Jamālī, p. 43.

⁶⁶¹ Savory argues that Haydar invented twelve-gored hat, by the instruction of Imam Ali in a dream, shortly before his last expedition in 1488. But he refuses the second part of the story, which is related to Uzun Hasan’s adoption of *Haydarî Tac*, since the latter died ten years earlier, in 1478. See Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 20.

⁶⁶² AA, p. 31; Ross, p. 255. According to *Ross Anonymous*, on hearing Haydar’s doings Hasan Padishah requested Haydar to send him one of those caps. Thereupon Sultan Haydar sent him a cap. Hasan Padishah was pleased when saw it, kissed it and placed it on his own head. The he bade each of his children to do likewise. But his son Yakub refused to do so. “In this manner” says the *Anonymous History*, “he bind round his soul the girdle of hostility towards Sultan Haidar.” See Ross, p. 255. This tradition must be a fabrication of later Safavid historians. Likewise, HS does not mention such a dream simply saying “On his head Sultan Haydar used to wear a scarlet red hat with twelve folds, and everyone who joined him as a disciple was given similar headgear. He always encouraged those who were engaged in holy war, and with those holy warriors and Sufīs, who because of the red hat became known as qizilbash (“redhead”), which name is still applied today to the adherents to the family...” See HS, p. 561.

⁶⁶³ AA, p. 31. Qādī Ahmad Qumī too makes clear reference to Shaykh Haydar’s combined authority of temporal (sultanat) and spiritual (hidāyat). See HT, p. 155. See also HS, p. 561, where the Shaykh’s enthusiasm for engaging in holy war against infidels and the strength of his army briefly indicated.

showed by Uzun Hasan, who never permitted any action that might disturb his nephew and son-in-law, in proliferation of Haydar's affairs.⁶⁶⁴

When Hasan Beg died in 1478, however, his successors did not maintain warm relations with the Shaykh. After a short reign of Halil, his brother Yakub usurped the throne and managed to stay there for about ten years. Yakub Beg was skeptical on Haydar and his *murids*.⁶⁶⁵ Besides, Haydar, "whose thoughts were dominated by the desire for the rewards of raids against the infidels"⁶⁶⁶, decided on an incursion in the direction of Dagistan and Circassia, whose inhabitants were infidels.⁶⁶⁷ After taking counsel with his sufi emirs he dispatched couriers to mobilize his disciples for the Holy War, or *gazā*. Accordingly, warriors for the faith, who were fully armed and equipped, assembled company upon company around his tent.⁶⁶⁸ According to Rumlu Hasan, this

⁶⁶⁴ AA, p. 31.

⁶⁶⁵ Ross Anonymous relates his hostility as follows: "On account of the hatred he had formerly cherished in his heart for Sultan Haidar he warned his subjects saying: 'Woe unto that man who places on his head the cap of Sultan Haidar.' He thus became an enemy to the children of Shaykh Safi; and he moreover issued a decree that the disciples of Shaykh Safi should no longer wear their caps. In thus changing his former righteous actions for evil and impious deeds, and in opposing this holy race, Sultan Ya'kub brought about the ruin of the dynasty of the White Sheep..." See Ross, p. 255. It is interesting to note here that Anonymous author sees the reason of the decline of Aqqoyunlu Dynasty in their changed attitude towards the sons of Shaykh Safi. That sort of interpretation, however, traces back to the beginning of Safavid historiography. Shah Ismail's historian Khwandamir writes, "... as long as the expansionist Aqqoyunlu padishahs maintained their devotion to the guiding Safavid house, their fortunes were ever on the increase, but when they exchanged their devotion and faith for treachery and enmity, in a short while the firm foundation of their rule crumbled and they were scattered to the winds." See HS, p. 562.

⁶⁶⁶ AA, p. 31.

⁶⁶⁷ According to AA, Haydar did not consider the conduct of Sultan Yakub while deciding to invade Circassia. Nevertheless, earlier sources have clear indications that he first requested the permission of Sultan Yakub and obtained the necessary permission as well as a degree addressed to Shirvanshah ordering him to provide a safe passage through Shirvan. TA says, for example, Haydar first wrote a letter to Yakub Beg demanding his permission for a *gazā* on Circassia. Although Sultan Yakub was aware of the fact that the Shaykh was using *gazā* simply as a pretext and that his main intention was to find a way of capturing temporal power, he gave the permission for it was inconvenient for "the king Defender of the Faith [Sultan Yakub] to impede" holy war. See TA, pp. 68-9.

⁶⁶⁸ AA, p. 32. Also consider HS, p. 562. Rumlu Hasan gives the numbers of sufi fighters as 6.000. See *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 579. TA, however, gives the number 10.000 and depicts them as "brutal men" who "from every side streamed into Ardabil and engaged in theft and murder." TA, p. 67. Faruk Sümer says that Haydar's disciples were mainly poor people of Anatolia. See Faruk Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 13. KPZ depicts the adherents of his son Ismail in the Teke regions in the same manner. See KPZ8b, p. 43.

was in 1484 and the Shaykh's real intention was to invade Shirvan but for some reasons he firstly directed his followers towards Circassia.⁶⁶⁹ On the way home, after pillaging Circassia, however, he wanted to materialize his intention regarding Shirvan. But some influential sufis in his court persuaded him not to do so, arguing sufis needed to have some rest and obtain further weaponry.⁶⁷⁰ So, having created great havoc in Circassia, Shaykh Haydar triumphantly returned to Ardabil with a great deal of captives and spoils, ordering to spend all the booty in order to reinforce the arsenal of the *Tekke*.⁶⁷¹

Sultan Haydar waged three more campaigns on Circassia and Dagistan. His first two expeditions in 1484 or 1486, and 1487 were not opposed by Shirvanshah Farruhyasar, who was the ruler of Shirvan, the territory through which Haydar had to cross in order to reach Circassia and Dagistan. After his first successful expedition in 1484 or 1486, Haydar organized a second incursion, which again ended victoriously with many slaves and booty.⁶⁷² These military successes waxed Shaykh Haydar's prestige while astonishing the rulers of outlying regions.⁶⁷³ Consequently Sultan Yakup called him to Tabriz in order to oblige the Shaykh to take an oath to leave the habits of kings and to forbid him intercourse with his supporters, especially his khalifas in

⁶⁶⁹ *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 579. Hinz, who used the ninth volume of *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, probably relying on Venetian sources, writes the date of Haydar's first expedition as 1483. See Hinz, p. 68. In TA this date is vaguely suggested as 1486. (Indeed Khunji does not specify the date of the first incursion. Nonetheless, after stating that Shaykh Haydar launched two expeditions in successive years, he records that he returned from his second raid in 1487.) See TA, pp. 69-70. Also consider Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 18.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 580. Also see Hinz, p. 69.

⁶⁷¹ *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 580.

⁶⁷² TA says Shaykh Haydar returned with 6.000 captives from his second raid. TA, p. 70. Learning from Josaphat Barbaro, to whom Vincenzo spoke of it, that Haydar's expedition reached far beyond Daghestan, may be to Darial and Kabarda. See "Haydar's Second Expedition Against the 'Cherkes'", in TA, p. 119. Also see *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 582; Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia*, edited and translated by Charles Grey, London: Hakluyt Society, 1873, p. 44; "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia*, edited and translated by Charles Grey, London: Hakluyt Society, 1873, p. 185.

⁶⁷³ TA, p. 69. Here there is a very interesting note in TA: Khunji says, "The Lord of Rum, despite all his army and dominions, was afraid of the turbulence (*bī-bākī*) of the subjects of the Shaykh." TA, p. 69.

Rum.⁶⁷⁴ At the court of Sultan Yakub, Shaykh Haydar was warned for his king-like doings and encouraged to deals with the proficiency of his ancestors.⁶⁷⁵

In the next year, however, Haydar managed to get permission from Sultan Yakub for a new expedition on Circassia.⁶⁷⁶ Then his followers began to summon in Ardabil in large numbers. In a short while, Haydar's troops reached the size of an army. When they reached the river Araxes, "it was an innumerable levy (*hashar*) of people of Tālish clad in blue, of the ill-starred lot of Siyāh-kūh and of benighted Shāmlu."⁶⁷⁷ Shaykh Haydar's last expedition with his fully mobilized zealots would, however, be on Shirvan rather than Circassia.⁶⁷⁸ Haydar first sacked the town Shamakhī, the capital of Shirvan. Farruhyasar b. Sultan Halil, realizing that his forces could not resist against the Safavid army, he dared not meet the *gāzis* of Haydar but fled to the lofty fortress of Gūlistan, from where he dispatched couriers to Sultan Yakub, who was his son-in-law, informing him that, although Haydar was ostensibly intent on conducting raids against 'infidels', his main concern was to conquer Shirvan.⁶⁷⁹ As Iskender Beg says,

At the moment," said Farruhyasar, "Haydar owns no territory, but he has mobilized a warlike army, and his ambitions will not be contained within the confines of the district of Ardabil. Nor, if he succeeds in acquiring a kingdom such as mine, will he for long be satisfied with such a meager empire. On the contrary, it will merely whet his appetite."⁶⁸⁰

⁶⁷⁴ TA, p. 70. Also consider Woods, *The Aqqoyunlu*, p. 142.

⁶⁷⁵ See Hinz, p. 70.

⁶⁷⁶ According to TA, Haydar sent his mother, the sister of Uzun Hasan, to obtain this permission. TA, p. 71. Also consider Hinz, p. 71.

⁶⁷⁷ TA, p. 71.

⁶⁷⁸ *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 583 ; John E. Woods, "Turco-Iranica I: An Ottoman Intelligence Report on Late Fifteenth/Ninth Century Iranian Foreign Relations", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. 38, no. 1, 1979, pp. 5-6.

⁶⁷⁹ TA, pp. 71-74.

⁶⁸⁰ AA, p. 32. For a slightly different version of this message see HS, p. 563; *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 583; HT, pp. 157-8.

Then Farruhyasar finished his letter by demanding military help against qizilbashes: “It would be better for you to send an army to assist me to keep the Qizilbash from entering this region and diminish their might in battle.”⁶⁸¹ Farruhyasar’s message excited Sultan Yakub, who had already adopted a hostile attitude toward Haydar. Indeed, the anxiety of Farrukhyasar had already been shared by Sultan Yakub, for he considered the military strength of Haydar as a great danger for his kingdom. Caterino Zeno, a contemporary observer, writes Yakub’s unease as follows: “The king, greatly disturbed by these designs of Secheaidare, entertained no slight suspicion of him, as it seemed to him that he, by the esteem in which he was held, and his numerous followers whom he enriched from the great booty he made, might make himself so great in time as to be able to overthrow the kingdom, and establish a dynasty of his own firm and safe against any attack.”⁶⁸² Consequently he dispatched an army of four thousand fighters under the command of Suleyman Bijan-ogli to the assistance of the Shirvanshah.⁶⁸³

Haydar and his gāzis entered Shirvan from the north and reached Darband, which was a lofty fortress of legendary strength⁶⁸⁴, by way of Sakki. The inhabitants of

⁶⁸¹ HS, p. 563. Also see TA, p. 74; *Ahsenu’-t-tevārih*, IX, p. 583.

⁶⁸² Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, p. 45.

⁶⁸³ TA, p. 77; HS, p. 563; AA, p. 32; HT, p. 158; *Ahsenu’-t-tevārih*, IX, pp. 583-4; Sarwar, p. 25. Muhyî-i Gülşenî reports the event as if Haydar revolted against Sultan Yakub. He says, when Shaykh Ibrahim Gülşenî was in Sultaniye with Qadi ‘Isā, one of the leading ulemā and statesmen in the court of Yakub, a message of Sultan Yakub reached, informing that Shaykh Haydar rose up (*hurūc itdi*) and ordering them to join his court. In the following paragraphs Shaykh Haydar’s action was clearly depicted as a dissention (*fitne vü fesād*). See Muhyî-i Gülşenî, *Manâkib-i İbrâhîm-i Gülşenî*, yay., Tahsin Yazıcı, Ankara: TTK, 1982, pp. 194-5. The revolt of Shaykh Haydar is also reported by an Ottoman envoy to the Aqqoyunlu capital Tabriz. See TSA, Document 5943. The facsimile of this document is first published by Tansel in TNSB, p. 98, doc. 12. After Tansel, John Woods also published a short article analyzing this document, as well as a facsimile of the document. See Woods, “Turco-Iranica I: An Ottoman Intelligence Report on Late Fifteenth/Ninth Century Iranian Foreign Relations”.

⁶⁸⁴ A contemporary Italian merchant describes this fortress as follows: “Darband is a large city, and, according to their chronicles and traditions, was built bay Alexander the Great; it is one mile wide and three in length, having on one side the Caspian Sea, and on the other a high mountain; no one can pass

Darband⁶⁸⁵ blocked the passage in order to prevent the passage of Haydar's troops.⁶⁸⁶ Then Haydar dispatched troops to capture the city.⁶⁸⁷ Although he had nearly successfully completed the objective the news brought by Qara Pīrī Qājār⁶⁸⁸, who was in charge of the rearguard, made Haydar withdraw from the siege. Qara Pīrī Qājār informed Haydar that Shirvanshah, reinforced with Turkoman troops sent by Yakub, had crossed the river seeking to battle the Safavid army.⁶⁸⁹

The two armies met near Tabarsaran.⁶⁹⁰ Sultan Haydar appointed Qara Pīrī Qājār to command the right wing, Husayn Beg Shāmlu to the left, while himself stayed at the centre.⁶⁹¹ Sultan Haydar personally engaged in combat. According to a story recited in Safavid sources, Haydar recognized Suleyman Bijan-ogli on the battle field and managed to unhorse him with his spear. Nonetheless, as Suleyman lay on the ground Haydar spared his life. Becoming bewildered, Haydar's companions inquired the reason of their master's behavior. Then Haydar said, "Suleyman's allotted life-span had not yet come to an end, whereas my life is in decline. I shall be killed in this battle. One can not

except through the gates of the city, as on the east is the sea, and on the west a mountain, so steep that not even a cat could climb it. ... and any one wishing to go into Circassia, must pass through the city which borders on that country, and the greater part of whose inhabitants speak Circassian, or rather Turkish." See "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia*, pp. 185-6. For description of the strength of Darband fortress also see Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", pp. 44-5.

⁶⁸⁵ This place is recorded in HS as Temür Qali and in HT as "Demir Qapi", meaning 'iron castle'. See HS, pp. 563-4; HT, p. 158. Caterino Zeno says the people of the country call it (the passage of Darband) "Amircapi [Demirkapı]" since the place is so strong and secure against attack. See Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", p. 45.

⁶⁸⁶ This must be because of that during his former expedition in the previous year Haydar pillaged this city and the surrounding area. See "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia*, p. 185; Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", p. 45.

⁶⁸⁷ *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 584; Hinz, p. 74.

⁶⁸⁸ Qara Pīrī Qājār was one of 'the Seven Sufis of Lahijan', or *ehl-i ihtisas*, the chosen companions, guards, and tutors of Ismail during his stay in Lahijan.

⁶⁸⁹ HS, p. 564; *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 584; AA, pp. 32-3. HT does not mention Qara Pīrī Qājār. See HT, p. 159. Also consider Hinz, pp. 74-5; Sarwar, p. 25; Woods, *The Aqquyunlu*, p. 143.

⁶⁹⁰ TA, pp. 78-9; HS, p. 564; HT, p. 159; *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 584; AA, p. 32.

⁶⁹¹ Sarwar, p. 25. AA records that Husayn Beg Lala attended this battle but does not specify that he commanded the left wing of the sufi army. See AA, p. 33.

avoid one's fate."⁶⁹² Likewise, in a short while Haydar was wounded mortally and tasted the death on July 9, 1488 at Tabarsaran, only a short distance from the place where his father had been killed.⁶⁹³ His death disheartened the gāzis, who soon after gave up the struggle.⁶⁹⁴ Haydar was buried in Tabarsaran by his devoted followers.⁶⁹⁵ Twenty-two years later his corpse was exhumed by Shah Ismail while he was on his second campaign on Shirvan and reinterred at Ardabil, alongside the tombs of his ancestors.⁶⁹⁶ Hasan Rumlu gives further detail. Haydar's head was cut off and sent to Sultan Yakub, who was in Tabriz. The latter ordered to hang the head of Haydar on the public square (*meydan*) of Tabriz. One person stole the head and hid it until the advent of Ismail. When he captured Tabriz this man brought the head of Shaykh Haydar to the Shah and obtained great benevolence.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹² AA, p. 32. The same story is recited in HS, p. 564; HT, p. 160; *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 584. An essentially different account of the clash between the two is recorded in TA. In this case Suleyman Beg and Shaykh Haydar met during the battle. Certain Hasan Aga Ustaclu of the Shamlu *amirs* (sic) recognized Suleyman Beg and pointed him out to the Shaykh, while Suleyman was looking for the Shaykh. Suleyman rushed forward alone, "undeterred by the sufis who were so numerous that their lances appeared as a forest. He clashed with the Shaykh and with his lance unhorsed him, after which, prancing on his charger and dealing blows right and left, he regained his centre..." TA, p. 80.

⁶⁹³ See AA, p. 33; HT, p. 161; Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 18. The sources unanimously underline that sufis fought bravely in this battle. The Italian merchant says, for example, 'everyone swore to fight valiantly' and they fought "like lions." See "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia*, p. 186. Also consider Giovan Maria Angiolello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano", *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia*, edited and translated by Charles Grey, London: Hakluyt Society, 1873, p. 101. Even the fervent sunni opponents of qizilbashs, Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji appreciates the bravery and valor of sufis and Haydar in this battle. He writes, "... but the sufis, too, fought bravely. Haydar performed prodigies of valour." See TA, p. 79.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 584. TA admirably narrates how sufis fought courageously like *fidā'īs* ('vowed to death') even after the death of their Shaykhs. TA, p. 81.

⁶⁹⁵ HS, p. 564; AA, p. 33.

⁶⁹⁶ AA, p. 33.

⁶⁹⁷ See *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 585. See Also Hinz, pp. 76-7; Sarwar, p. 26. Caterino Zeno gives the last part of this story differently. To him, the Aqqoyunlu Sultan commanded the head to be carried on a lance all through Tabriz and thrown to be eaten by dogs. See Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", p. 46. Reciting the same account the unknown Italian merchant adds an interesting note, "For this reason, the Suffaveans hate dogs, and kill all they came across." See "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia*, p. 186.

After the death of Shaykh Haydar, the sufis of Ardabil chose Sultan Ali Padishah⁶⁹⁸, the elder son of Haydar, as their shaykh, although he was very young.⁶⁹⁹ The khalifas and disciples of his forefathers frequented his court with gifts. However, Sultan Ali's activities in Ardabil were soon interrupted by the order of Sultan Yakub, who esteemed the sons of Shaykh Haydar as a potential threat for his sovereignty. By his decree, Sultan Ali, his two brothers Ibrahim and Ismail⁷⁰⁰, and his mother Alamshah Bagum were moved to Istahr and imprisoned there in March 1489.⁷⁰¹ They remained under custody for nearly four and a half years till the beginning of August 1493.⁷⁰²

4.3.4. The Disciples of Haydar: 'the People of Rum'

Khunjī constantly underscores the disciples of Haydar as mainly coming from Anatolia (Rūm)⁷⁰³. After narrating the first two triumphant campaigns of Shaykh Haydar and stating that all the kings of nearby countries were astonished by his success, Khunjī adds, for example, "The Lord of Rum, despite all his army and dominions, was afraid of the turbulence (*bī-bākī*) of the subjects of the Shaykh."⁷⁰⁴ On another occasion, when Sultan Yakub called the Shaykh to ban his king-like activities the first thing that his counselors advised was to obstruct his (Haydar) connection with his supporters, but

⁶⁹⁸ Sultan Ali is generally called as 'Padishah' by Safavid sources. As Savory underlines, his adoption of this title must be a clear evidence of the fact that the claim of Safavid family for the temporal power became even clearer. See Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 20.

⁶⁹⁹ Haydar left three sons begotten by his marriage with Alamshah Bagum: Sultan Ali, Mirza Ibrahim, and Mirza Ismail. See, for example, HT, p. 156. Two contemporary Italians, Caterino Zeno and an unknown merchant state this marriage also produced three girls. But they do not give the names of these girls. See Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", p. 43; "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", *A Narrative of Italian Travels in Persia*, p. 185.

⁷⁰⁰ Ismail was born on Tuesday, July 17, 1487, to Alamshah Bagum. HS, p. 562.

⁷⁰¹ *Ahsenu't-tevārih*, IX, p. 585; Sarwar, p. 26.

⁷⁰² Sarwar, p. 26.

⁷⁰³ Others being coming from Tālish and Siyāh-kuh (Qaraja-dagh). See TA, p. 67. He also mentions Shamlus elsewhere. See TA, p. 71.

⁷⁰⁴ TA, p. 69.

“especially [with] his lieutenants (*khalifā*) in Rum.”⁷⁰⁵ Yet in the third case, when the fighting flared up between the sufis and combined army of Shirvanshah and Suleyman Beg, Sultan Yakub’s commander, in Tabarsaran, it was again the sufis of Rum origin who constituted the backbone of Haydar’s army and fought through the most enthusiastic ways.⁷⁰⁶

Safavid sources also make frequent references to the Rum-originated adherents of Shaykh Haydar. Hasan Rumlu states, for example, that when Haydar settled in Ardabil in 1467, the disciples of Ardabil from Rum, alongside Syria and some other regions, frequented Haydar’s, court offering their various gifts.⁷⁰⁷ On the other hand, a contemporary Venetian observer Josaphat Barbaro, who learned from another contemporary Venetian Vincenzo, describes Haydar’s followers in the same fashion, i.e. principally originating from Anatolia. While narrating Haydar’s second expedition on Circassia, Barbaro reports,

... out of the territory of the Soldanes (Ottoman Sultan) there came forth a certain sect of Muhammadans (animated with) extreme fervour in their religion and shouting: “Death to the Christians!”⁷⁰⁸ And the farther they proceeded towards Persia, the more their numbers increased. These ribalds took the road towards the sea of Bachu (Baku) and came to Samachi (Shamāckhī), Derbenth (Darband), and Tumen (dominions of the Avars?), being in extremely great numbers, though partly without arms.⁷⁰⁹

Another Venetian merchant says, “ There are numbers of them [Shaykh Haydar’s disciples] in different parts of Persia, as in Natolia [Anatolia] and Caramania [Karaman],

⁷⁰⁵ TA, p. 70.

⁷⁰⁶ Khunji says, when the intensity of the fight peaked “The sufi unbelievers of Rūmī origin had planned that nobody should be bent but their bows, and nobody should fall on the ground but their arrows.” TA, p. 80.

⁷⁰⁷ See Ahsenu’t-tevārih, 9th volume, p. 579. Ottoman archival and narrative sources frequently mention such presents of Safavid adherents in Anatolia calling them ‘nezir’.

⁷⁰⁸ An unknown Italian merchant also stresses Haydar’s hatred against Christians, saying “... he also bore an intense hatred to the Christians.” See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 5. This is, of course, a misperception of the Shaykh’s fervor in gazā by Christian authors.

⁷⁰⁹ See “Haydar’s Second Expedition Against the ‘Cherkes’”, in TA, p. 118.

all of whom bore great respect to this Secaidar [Haydar], who was a native of this city of Ardouil [Ardabil], where he had converted many to the Suffavean doctrine.”⁷¹⁰ Suffices it to recite these quotations to show how a strong-hold Shaykh Haydar had in Anatolia.⁷¹¹

On the other hand, Khunjī, as a zealous sunni scholar, depicts Shaykh Haydar’s followers in quite a pejorative manner. Once he calls them “idolators of Rum”⁷¹², on another occasion “the fools of Rūm who are a crowd of error and a host of devilish imagination”⁷¹³, yet elsewhere he blames them with their excessive obedience and devotedness, as well as with their brutality.⁷¹⁴ When compared to the writings of the Ottoman ulemā, which will be studied in the following chapters, Khunjī’s attitude and depictions shows familial resemblances. In both approaches there appears to be the traditional demeaning attitude of learned sedentary towards illiterate and ignoramus nomads. Khunjī’s description of Shaykh Haydar’s disciples gathered for his first incursion on Circassia strongly resembles the classical view of Islamic ulemā on ignoramus nomads. He writes, they were “outwardly sufis and murids, but inwardly rebellious demons (*dīv-i marīd*), ... youths, robust (*jald*) and warlike, sword-slashers in clever fighting.”⁷¹⁵ Thus a careful study of Khunjī’s description of Haydar’s disciples leaves little doubt that they were not cultured inhabitants of cities and towns but

⁷¹⁰ “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, pp. 184-5.

⁷¹¹ Mélikoff notes Safavid shaykhs successfully gained the akhis, gazis, and abdals of Rum. See Irène Mélikoff, “Le Problème Kızılbaş”, in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l’Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, p. 33.

⁷¹² TA, p. 61.

⁷¹³ TA, p. 65.

⁷¹⁴ TA, pp. 66-7. Suffices it to quote Khunjī’s account on how sufis continued fighting after Haydar’s death on the battlefield to show the devotedness of Shaykh Haydar’s followers. TA reads, “On seeing that the shaykh was dead the sufis at once like *fidā’īs* (‘vowed to death’) returned to the battle and fought courageously. No mortal had ever seen an army fight thus after the loss of the commander.” TA, p. 81.

⁷¹⁵ TA, p. 68.

‘savage-like’ pastoral nomads and villagers to some extent, who were ignorant and unsophisticated in faith and brutal and war-like in the manner of life; the social class which is referred to by Ottoman writers as ‘Etrāk-i bī-idrāk’, or ‘the Turks without the ability of comprehension’.

More important for the purpose of this study is that Khunjī sees a concrete correlation between the deviation of Ardabil shaykhs from the right path and their links with the “men of Rūm”, which was reinforced under Haydar and his father.⁷¹⁶ A close scrutiny of Khunjī’s account shows that to him the intensification of the connection with the people of Rūm, whom he depicts as foolish, inclined to excessive beliefs, went hand in hand with the deviation of the doctrinal trajectory of the Order. One feels legitimate to propose that according to Khunjī it was these people of Rūm who were responsible for leading the shaykhs of Ardabil off of the true path of their ancestors.⁷¹⁷ Indeed, his introduction to the chapter dealing with the rise of Haydar and his ‘revolt’ clearly reveals Khunjī’s approach. While narrating Sultan Yakub’s deeds in 1488 he mentions Haydar’s third incursion on Circassia and his fight with Shirvanshah starting with the phrase “Among the events of this year was the revolt of ... Shaykh Haydar ... with the support of the idolators (literally ‘calf-worshippers’) of Rūm.”⁷¹⁸ After clarifying the point that Haydar went astray by pursuing the temporal power, he makes a flash back in order to better explain how he went astray. He writes, “As some of his actions were connected with the plans of his father, we must relate the story of the shaykhs of Ardabil and explain their links to the men of Rum and the increase of this connection under

⁷¹⁶ TA, p. 61.

⁷¹⁷ He says, for example, “The excessive obedience of the people of Rum moved the shaykh-zāda [Haydar] to acquire bad habits and manners.” See TA, p. 66.

⁷¹⁸ TA, p. 61.

Haydar and his father.”⁷¹⁹ So clear is thus that, to Khunjī, the transformation of the Safavid Order into the Safavid Movement very much depended on the ‘increase of the connection’ with Anatolian disciples.⁷²⁰

4.3.5. The Qizilbash Beliefs

The most controversial - and the most wide-circulated as well - account of Khunjī concerns the beliefs of Ardabil sufis who adhered to Junayd and Haydar. This is, in the meantime, almost the only historical account on the beliefs of early qizilbashes. Nevertheless the extreme points of their beliefs are evidently overvoiced by Khunjī for he was in an open attempt to position Haydar and his followers in heresy against the ‘legitimate’ authority of his patron Sultan Yakub. Accordingly, his negative and pejorative attitude peaks while narrating the religiosity of the path of Junayd and Haydar. Yet he provides valuable information pertaining to the nature of the Qizilbash faith before the establishment of shi’ite orthodoxy.

According to Khunjī, his adherents openly called Shaykh Junayd ‘God (*ilāh*)’ and his son ‘Son of God (*ibn-Allāh*)’. Even when they saw that Junayd’s corpse was covered with dust and blood, they did not denounce such a false faith but said: “He is the living One, there is no God but he.”⁷²¹ Their folly and ignorance was such that, says Khunjī, if someone says that any part of his body became missing or he is dead he was himself to taste the death. Elsewhere he says his *murids* considered Shaykh Haydar “as their god (*ma’būd*) and, neglecting the duties of *namāz* and public prayers (*ibādāt*),

⁷¹⁹ TA, p. 61.

⁷²⁰ One should keep in mind the Fazlullah b. Ruzbihan Khunji was both a contemporary and close observer of events for he finished his history in 1490 in the Aqqoyunlu Palace.

⁷²¹ TA, p. 66.

looked upon the shaykh as their *qibla* and the being to whom prostration⁷²² was due (*masjūd*). The Shaykh propagated among them the creed of *ibādat* and the religious law of Bābak’s Khurramites.”⁷²³

But the crucial point in his account is that his accusation is much more pointed towards the ‘foolish disciples’ than the shaykhs. “The fools of Rūm, who are a crowd of error and a host of devilish imagination,” says Khunjī, “struck the bell of the inane claim of Christians on the roof of the monastery of the world and, like that nation gone astray, exposed their (own) trinity (*thālith-i thalātha*) to exemplary punishment in the nethermost hell. They openly called Shaykh Junayd ‘God (*ilāh*) and his son ‘Son of God (*ibn-Allāh*)’.”⁷²⁴ Elsewhere he writes, when Uzun Hasan, after conquering Azarbaijan, let Haydar stay in Ardabil, the khalifas of his father, who came from every direction, foolishly announced ‘the glad tidings of his divinity (*ulūhiyat*)’; thus their⁷²⁵ excessive obedience caused Shaykh Haydar to acquire bad habits and manners.⁷²⁶

As already warned, Khunjī’s account must be read carefully by toning down his exaggerations especially regarding his assertion that their followers assumed deity in and worshipped Junayd and Haydar. Recognizing his exaggerations, Roemer reckons this assertion of Khunjī not to be accepted at its face value.⁷²⁷ This assertion rather seems to be the view of a learned sunni scholar with the zeal of orthodox sunnism, who was also directly or indirectly commissioned to blame this group for being heretics⁷²⁸, on the

⁷²² sic

⁷²³ TA, p. 68.

⁷²⁴ TA, pp. 65-6.

⁷²⁵ Khunji says here “the obedience of the people of Rum” See TA, p. 66.

⁷²⁶ TA, p. 66.

⁷²⁷ Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, p. 208.

⁷²⁸ This point appears clearly when Khunji explains how and why Sultan Yakub dispatched his 4.000 soldiers in order to fight with Shaykh Haydar. He attempts to secure the religious ground of Sultan Yakub’s decision arguing “In fact, according to the Sharī’at, the shaykh’s behaviour with regard to a

excessively emotional devotion of illiterate and ignorant sufis to their shaykhs. This ignorant and passionate devotion of sufis and its influence on their faith is best reported by the Venetian ambassador Caterino Zeno, who visited the court of Uzun Hasan, saying “So great was his success, that at this time he was considered by all a Saint, and a man almost divine.”⁷²⁹ He also gives interesting details denoting Haydar’s affiliation with shi’ism: “Secheaidare was a Saint or Master or Prophet, as we should call him, who by preaching a new Dogma in the Mohametan creed that Ali was superior to Omar, obtained many disciples and people who favoured his doctrine.”⁷³⁰

Likewise, other contemporary Italian observers, who were usually inclined to tune up the extremist and extraordinary practices, depict Haydar rather as a beloved shaykh than a divine being. The unknown merchant, for example, depicts Haydar as “a lord about the rank of a count, named Secaidar, of a religion or sect named Sophi, revered by his co-religionists as a saint, and obeyed as a chief. ... Indeed, he was like the abbot of a nation of monks.”⁷³¹ Similarly, another contemporary Italian observer writes that he was considered by his sufis a saint and followed him as their chief.⁷³² Vincentio D’Alessandri, the Venetian ambassador at the court of Shah Tahmasb, follows the same line of narration depicting Shaykh Haydar as “a man of great goodness and learning, and considered by his people a saint”.⁷³³

powerful ruler (*hākim-i qādir*) rendered it a duty to rebel his tyranny and oppression, for in his actions Shaykh Haydar was either a rebel (*yāghī*), or a highwayman and aggressor.” (TA, p. 74.) Blaming such rebellious groups for heresy has always become one of the powerful tools in the hands of sunni conformist ulema to facilitate their execution. As will be discussed in detail in the next chapters of this thesis the situation was essentially the same in writings of the Ottoman *ulemā*.

⁷²⁹ Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 43.

⁷³⁰ *I.b.i.d.*, p. 43.

⁷³¹ “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, pp. 184-5.

⁷³² See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, p. 100.

⁷³³ Vincentio D’Alessandri, “Narrative of the Most Noble Vincentio D’Alessandri”, in NIT, p. 211.

Despite all his sunni biases, his efforts to shift them into heresy, and his despising attitude, however, the three points regarding the faith of ‘the early qizilbashs’⁷³⁴ become apparent in Khunjī’s account, as well as in Venetian reports. Firstly, their adherence and devotedness to Junayd and Haydar was far beyond the limits of the liaison between shaykh and murid in the traditional Islamic Sufism. So excessive their sense of devotion was, that the line between the spiritual mastership and being of the nature of deity became obscure. One should not disregard here the role of the cultural milieu of the new type of disciples. The illiterate mind is, indeed, devoid of the ability to draw clear-cut lines between ideas.⁷³⁵ Secondly, the followers of Shaykh

⁷³⁴ My intention by this term is the new type sufis of Ardabil emerged under Junayd and were identifiably shaped under Haydar.

⁷³⁵ One might reasonably argue that one of the most revolutionary changes that writing brought the human mind is precision. (For an analysis on how the use of tables and writing shifted human perception towards more precision see Goody, *The Domestication of Savage Mind*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 (first published 1977), pp. 72-73.) Exteriorization, visualization, and storage of thought and knowledge give way to the dissection, organization, re-organization, analysis, and division into parts of the information. Classification exists in the oral mind as well, but is rare and ambiguous. Writing sharpens and clarifies the notion of classification in the human mind. (*I.b.i.d.*, p. 105) It was simply by the help of the organizational capacity of the writing that human the brain reached the ability to put clear and certain lines between several parts of the knowledge corpus. Number of modern anthropological studies among illiterate folks, sometimes called ‘primitive society’, showed that the oral mind does not recognize such sort of clear separating lines between several segments of human discourse. Though an illiterate man can differentiate and identify knowledge pertaining to different things or beliefs, they are not completely separated from each other; there is not a net borderline between them. As Goody stated, “the absence of writing means that it is difficult to isolate a segment of human discourse.” (*I.b.i.d.*, p. 13) One can regard oral mind as a cloud, which floats with continuous variation. Though being not homogenous and varying intensity in different parts, it is not possible to draw a clear-cut borderline between distinct bulks of a cloud; to determine a definite line which one side belongs to one bulk and other side belongs to other. Rather one can talk about a transition region, whose borderline is still flue.

Oral culture has a homeostatic economy, in which nothing is well-defined. Even the concept of definition is quite alien. The relationship between word, which is simply an evanescent vibration of particles in the air, and the meaning attached to it is a very dynamic and uneven one. It thereby changes, though one can speak of a certain perpetual core, according to situational context. Thus, even the meaning loaded to a word is not well-enshrined with a clear-cut boundary. It is rather like bulks in a cloud. The focus of meaning may easily move in the bulk pertaining to it, with regard to present conditions. What a word refers to is simply the bulk of meaning, which is obviously not clear. Thus, oral communication is heavily context-dependent. One can not attain the exact meaning of any word without participating to the whole context, which profoundly includes situational, emotional, historical, and cultural elements.

Writing, on the other hand, made possible what is called ‘context-free communication’, which was principally the result of precision that came with literacy. First of all, letters shifted the container of meaning from variable and evanescent aural media to more stable and fixable visual one. Now, with writing, it is possible not only to put the word outside the mind and treat it as a thing, but also to allocate

Junayd and Haydar evidently attributed to their shaykhs the authority to enact canons. In other words, they regarded decrees of their shaykhs rather more eminent than the well-defined orders of Islamic law. Again as in the first case, the role of illiteracy should be taken into account seriously when assessing this point. Lastly, early qizilbashs were quite ignorant on the officially ratified prayers of shari'at, neglecting duties of namaz, fasting in Ramazan etc.

Khunjī provides enough hints in his explanations on that these deviations from the true path of Islam were not simply the personal innovations of Junayd and Haydar; rather these two shaykhs were caused to acquire 'bad habits' because of the excessive obedience of their disciples.⁷³⁶ Thus, the roots of this newly emerging form of faith in the Safavid world must be sought in the socio-cultural roots of the new type of disciples, who were nomadic Turkoman tribes of Anatolia and Syria and who were described by a learned and fervent sunni scholar as "the fools of Rūm, who are a crowd of error and a host of devilish imagination"⁷³⁷.

Perhaps the most interesting point in Khunjī's account is that he does not anyhow mention the adoption of shi'ism⁷³⁸ by Haydar and his followers. As delineated before, Aşıkpaşazāde clearly states the fact that Shaykh Junayd propagated some shi'ite ideas in Anatolia. One would strongly expect that the same sort of shi'ism must have survived

certain limits to its meaning. Because sound has no definite confines but visual image has. As Goody and Watt have verified, "writing establishes a different kind of relationship between the word and its referent, a relationship that is more general and more abstract, and less closely connected with the particularities of person, place and time than obtains in oral communications." (See Jack Goody and Ian Watt, "The Consequence of Literacy", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 5, no. 3, 1963, p. 321.) Thus, literate mind has an ability to distinguish different segments of thought or knowledge, which is simply lacking, or very weak, in the oral mind.

⁷³⁶ I would like to note again the fact, which I think had a considerable part on the advent of events, that these two shaykhs, especially Haydar, were very young when they succeeded to the post; thus they were open to innovations, especially to those promising excitement, adventure, and outwardly outcomes.

⁷³⁷ TA, p. 65.

⁷³⁸ If we disregard his reference to Bābak's Khurramites.

during the Haydar's term as well. Since this form of creed did not much resemble the high shi'ism, however, Khunjī does not deem it attached to shi'ism but a separate heresy. So, regarding the religious orientation of Haydar's disciples one would conclude that they can be regarded neither sunni nor Shi'ite in the appropriate meanings of the terms.⁷³⁹

Indeed, the practical reasons do not permit us to suppose that Haydar adopted shi'ite theology. Haydar could not see his father even in the cradle and was brought up at the court of his uncle Uzun Hasan, in an intellectual and religious environment which did not show any bid of tendency towards shi'ite creeds, until the age of eight or nine. As Roemer states, during early years in Amid "he scarcely had any religious education at all, and certainly not a shi'ī one."⁷⁴⁰ When he moved to Ardabil towards the 1470's he certainly did not find a shi'ite atmosphere predominated under Shaykh Ca'fer. Thus one can not speak of a direct transmission of ideas between Junayd and Haydar.⁷⁴¹ Then we should seek another media through which the message of order was transmitted between generations. This media was nothing other than the Turkoman intellectual and cultural aura that influentially surrounded the Safavid Order during Junayd's journey in Anatolia. While transmitting the doctrinal and esoteric messages of the Order from one shaykh to another, who were devoid of direct contact, the media fundamentally influenced the nature of the message as well. It is because of that, as Roemer and Elke

⁷³⁹ Irène Beldiceanue-Steinherr, "A propos d'un ouvrage sur la polémique Ottomane contre les Safawides", *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXXIX-2, Paris, 1971, p. 398.

⁷⁴⁰ Roemer, "The Safavid Period", p. 208.

⁷⁴¹ Indeed, exactly the same situation was valid for Haydar's immediate successors. Haydar could not transmit any esoteric or doctrinal message to his successor Sultan Ali for the latter was a child at the time of his father's death. Haydar's sons spent the next seven years in the custody of the Aqqoyunlu, when they arguably could not find a convenient atmosphere for religious education.

Eberhard suggest, it seems more appropriate to use the term ‘folk Islam’⁷⁴² or ‘popular religion’⁷⁴³ for their religious orientation.⁷⁴⁴

4.3.6. ‘Gazā’ as a Tool of Legitimization and Propaganda

By reminding us of Wittek’s *gazā* thesis, Mazzaoui rightfully argues that the role of *gazā* in the foundation of the Safavid State is comparable to its role in the foundation of the Ottoman State under Osman and Orhan Begs.⁷⁴⁵ It is true that, in both cases *gazā* appeared as an immensely useful and influential ideological tool both in mobilizing the war-like Turkoman masses⁷⁴⁶ and in providing legitimate ground for their claims for sovereignty.⁷⁴⁷ However, Mazzaoui draws attention to three essential differences between the two cases. Firstly, the distance to the infidel territories was different. Ottomans were just at the frontier and could raid infidel territories without the permission of any Muslim rulers while Safavid had to first pass through the lands of Shirvanshah. Secondly, Safavid *gazis*, unlike the Ottomans, had no freedom of action for the regions they moved in were formally under other legitimate rulers. And lastly, the Ottoman begs and sultans had only temporal claims, i.e. they were only leaders of *gazis* on the battlefield. Safavid shaykhs, on the other hand, had the dual capacity combining

⁷⁴² Roemer, p. 196. Roemer, however, does not differentiate the crucial change both in theological phrased and disciple stereotype of the Order which appeared under Junayd. Rather he deems the religiosity of the Order from the time of Shaykh Safī to Ismail’s seizure of power in the framework of ‘folk Islam’, without ever having consciously or overtly going over to the Shi’a. To him some seemingly shi’ite indications in several Safavid shaykhs, including Haydar, do not necessarily constitute clear signs of shi’ite faith for they had always had a stronger or weaker presence in folk Islam.

⁷⁴³ Elke Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften*, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970, p. 26.

⁷⁴⁴ For a similar account also consider Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans”, p. 31.

⁷⁴⁵ Michel M. Mazzaoui, “The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State”, *Iqbāl Review*, ..., 79-90; Mazzaoui, p. 76.

⁷⁴⁶ For these Turkomans, as Mazzaoui says, “ghazāh was always an attractive pastime!” See Michel M. Mazzaoui, “The Ghāzī Backgrounds of the Safavid State”, p. 89.

⁷⁴⁷ Compare Roemer, “The Safavid Period”, pp. 203-4.

temporal and spiritual authority; they were both commanders of gazis and their spiritual masters. In the Safavid experience, this dual capacity both augmented the doctrinal strength and concentrated too much power in the hands of the Safavid shaykhs.⁷⁴⁸

Besides all the differences, however, one may safely argue that *gazā* was the chief instrument in the hands of Junayd and Haydar in forming the political and military ground for Ismail's state, as well as being closely linked to the new doctrine of the order, *ghulat* shi'a, which was to be pruned gradually after the foundation of the state. Accordingly a contemporary Italian observer insistently underscores that numbers of volunteers joined Haydar's ranks in hopes of plunder. He says Haydar's campaigns in Circassia increased his power "by being joined by such multitudes of volunteers for the sake of booty, by which means he would soon have become a great lord."⁷⁴⁹ It should be noted that when Ismail's hurūc occurred in 1500, he found a ready group of efficient sufi-gāzis, who were already the seasoned fighters experienced in several campaigns of Ismail's forefathers. It is thanks to their devotedness in faith and efficiency in fighting that Ismail managed to defeat the regional rulers one by one and seated himself on the throne of Persia in a short course of time.

4.4. CONCLUSION

The fundamental change in both the esoteric doctrine and disciple landscape of the Safavid Order, which was initiated by Shaykh Junayd and flourished by Shaykh Haydar,

⁷⁴⁸ According to Mazzaoui, in the meantime, this dual capacity paradoxically weakened the efficiency of gaza activities for it, "tending to the religious needs of their followers, no doubt detracted from the efficient execution of the gaza itself. And so it may be argued that assuming divine powers in order to rally their followers behind them ..., Junayd and Haydar may actually have been hindered rather than helped in the execution of their gāzī operations." See Mazzaoui, p. 77.

⁷⁴⁹ See "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", in NIT, p. 185. Also see Roemer, "The Qizilbash Turcomans", p. 32.

is perhaps best reflected in a relatively neutral account, namely the anonymous history of *Haniwaldanus*. While narrating Safavid affairs and Ismail's movement, *Haniwaldanus Anonym* strikingly always traces back to Junayd's time, but never mentions earlier shaykhs of the order. As indicated above, in a quite different manner to other Ottoman chronicles, *Haniwaldanus Anonym* never pursues a pejorative attitude neither on Junayd nor on Haydar. Rather he depicts them as highly revered saintly persons. Meanwhile, he does not neglect to indicate that these two Shaykhs established a 'new' religious way. While narrating Ismail's rise to the temporal power, for instance, *Haniwaldanus Anonym* stresses that Ismail's principal mainstay was the numerous Anatolian disciples, who adhered to the religious regulations established by Junayd and Haydar.⁷⁵⁰ Ismail developed his movement on the fundamental principles that were established by his ancestors (Junayd and Haydar). He started to summon people on these religious bases. One sentence recited from Ismail's mouth seems to be pregnant to further evidence. Ismail says to his man: 'if you want to be rescued from misery you must obey me and my decisions!'⁷⁵¹

It is worth dwelling on three points here: firstly, the anonymous compiler obviously indicates something 'new': a religious (mystical) path initiated by Junayd and advanced by Haydar. Secondly, he narrates as if the history of Safavid order started with Junayd; he never mentions former Shaykhs. We know, however, that Junayd inherited a well-established spiritual order and a great number of disciples. So why does the anonymous source depict it as if the spiritual path was initiated and established by Junayd? *Haniwaldanus Anonym*'s account, indeed, has truth value. What is described as

⁷⁵⁰ "dedesi Şeyh Cüneyd ve babası Haydar tarafından öğretilen dinî kurallar". See ANMH, p. 37.

⁷⁵¹ ANMH, p. 38.

‘new’ here is nothing other than the new synthesis generated under the leadership of Junayd. Thus, what starts with Shaykh Junayd was the ‘Safavid Movement’ but not the ‘Safavid Order’. Lastly, during and shortly before Ismail’s advent, his disciples are depicted in *Haniwaldanus Anonym* as being miserable,, and he depicts Ismail to be their savior:

[Ismail rose up, gathered approximately ten thousand men, and launched a campaign] Böylece o, İlähi kanuna ve dine sıkı sıkıya riâyet eden babası ve dedesinin geleneği ile hareket ederek yola koyuldu. Fakat ayrıca o, kazanılmış itibarını emniyete almak ve adamlarını itaatte tutmak için **yeni bir mezhep ve inanç şekli** buldu ve bunları kendi düşünce, niyet ve arzularına uydurdu. Bundan sonra kendisine hükümdar ünvanını takdı ve ‘şah’ dedirtti.⁷⁵²

Ismail therefore, followed the path established by his grand-father and father. But after promulgating himself as temporal ruler (*hükümdār*), it (this mystical path) was not enough to preserve his prestige and to keep his men obedient. Thus, in *Haniwaldanus Anonym*’s words, Ismail found a new sect and form of faith (*mezhep ve inanç şekli*). Here the anonymous author puts a clear line differentiation between the spiritual path, which was innovated by Junayd and developed under Haydar, and the sect promulgated by Ismail after becoming king. It is obvious that it vaguely indicates the religious basis of the transformation of ‘the Safavid Movement’ into ‘the Safavid State’. During this transformation, such innovations or metamorphosis of religious affairs was, indeed, inevitable, for the state needs literally based and well-organized religious system. The next chapter analyzes how Ismail inherited the ‘Safavid Movement’ and turned it into one of the most long-lasting states of Iran, principally focusing on the role of Anatolian disciples in this process and on the metamorphosis experienced in the political, social, and religious affairs of them.

⁷⁵² ANMH, p. 38.

CHAPTER V

THE RISE OF SHAH ISMAIL

AND

ITS ECHO IN THE OTTOMAN ANATOLIA

*Allah Allah din gâziler gâziler din Şah menem
Karşu gelün secde kılun gâziler din Şah menem
Uçmakğda tûti kuşuyam ağır leşker er başıyam
Men sûfiler yoldaşuyam gâziler din Şah menem
Ne yirde ekersen biterem hande çağırsan yiterem
Sûfiler elin dutaram gâziler din Şah menem
Mansur ile dârda idim Halil ile nârda idim
Musa ile Tur'da idim gâziler din Şah menem
İsradan beri gelün nevrüz idin Şah'a yetün
Hey gâziler secde kılun gâziler din Şah menem
Kırmızı taclu boz atlu ağır leşker heybetlü
Yusuf peygamber sıfatlu gâziler din Şah menem
Hatâyî'yem al atluyam, sözü şekerden tatluyam
Murtaza Ali zatluyam gâziler din Şah menem⁷⁵³*

⁷⁵³ Tourkhan Gandjei, *Il Canzoniere di Sâh Ismâ'îl Hata'î*, Napoli, 1959, p. 22.

5.1. THE CONCEALMENT PERIOD: PREPERATION FOR THE GREAT *HURŪJ*

5.1.1. Sultan Ali Padishah

“Nothing could appear more unpromising than the position of the three little sons of Shaykh Haydar, who were of the moment entirely at the mercy of their father’s enemies.”⁷⁵⁴, writes Edward Browne while explaining the imprisonment of three Safavid princes and their mother in the fortress of Istahr by Sultan Yakub’s men, just after the death of Shaykh Haydar. According to Khwandāmir, Sultan Yakub did so because of his fear that they would take revenge for Sultan Haydar’s death. He says, after Haydar’s death sufis gathered in Ardabil and chose Sultan Ali, the eldest son of Haydar, as his father’s successor. “In a short while many sufis assembled to offer their congratulations on Sultan Ali’s succession, and some of them were intent upon taking revenge for Sultan Haydar’s death.”⁷⁵⁵ Then Sultan Yakub dispatched one of his great commanders to capture the Safavid princes and their mother Halime Begum. When he saw Sultan Yakub’s soldiers in Ardabil Sultan Ali, seeing no alternative to submitting,

⁷⁵⁴ BRW, p. 49.

⁷⁵⁵ HS, p. 564. Also consider HT, p. 162; AA, p. 35.

did not attempt to oppose.⁷⁵⁶ A year later, they were moved to Shiraz and imprisoned in the castle of Istahr, where they would stay for four and a half years.⁷⁵⁷

A fierce civil war among Akkoyunlu princes followed the death of Sultan Yakub in 1490-1.⁷⁵⁸ After a short while Rüstem Beg, the son of Hasan Beg's son Maqsud Beg and the nephew of Halime Begum, who was also among the supporters of Masih Mirza, rose up with the assistance of powerful āmir Ayba Sultan. Rüstem Beg managed to capture Tabriz without serious opposition assuming the rule of Azerbaijan.⁷⁵⁹ On the other hand, Baysungur Mirza went to Shirvan⁷⁶⁰ with his prominent begs. Shirvanshah, the father-in-law of Baysungur Mirza, gave his allegiance to his son-in-law in his struggle against Rüstem Beg providing troops for his army and encouraging him to liberate his hereditary kingdom.⁷⁶¹

When Rüstem Beg heard this, he decided to gain the allegiance of the Safavid family and to use sufi-fighters against Baysungur Mirza and Shirvanshah, who had killed Sultan Haydar a couple of years ago. Therefore, when the news of Baysungur Mirza's move was received, Rüstem Beg ordered the release of the Safavid princes and

⁷⁵⁶ HS, p. 565.

⁷⁵⁷ HS, p. 565; HT, p. 162; AA, p. 35. AA specifies that Yakub's aim in incarnating the Safavid princes was to cut off the access of their followers, thus of their support, to the princes.

⁷⁵⁸ Following the death of Sultan Yakub and that of his brother Yusuf Mirza in the winter of 896 (1490-91), strife broke out between Yakub's son Mirza Baysungur, who was supported by Sufi-Khalil and Musullu and Purnak amirs, and Hasan (Uzun) Beg's son Masih Mirza, who was favored by Bayindir chieftains. (HS, p. 565; AA, p. 36. For the civil war between *Akkoyunlu* princes see Woods, *The Aqquyunlu*, pp. 163.) The battle in Qarabag ended with the victory of Sultan Baysungur, whose forces managed to kill Masih Mirza and most of the Bayindir amirs. Sultan Baysungur arrived in Tabriz in great splendor and ascended the throne, with Sufi-Halil, one of the most powerful generals, assuming all administrative and fiscal matters. (HS, p. 565; AA, p. 36.) But the civil war between Akkoyunlu princes did not end. First Mahmud Beg, the son of Amir Hasan Beg's son Ughurlu Muhammad, who had chosen to give his allegiance to Masih Mirza and escaped from the fray on the day his uncle Masih Mirza was killed, proclaimed himself king in Iraq and brought most of the two Iraqs under his control. Soon after, however, he was defeated and killed by Sultan Baysungur. (HS, p. 565.)

⁷⁵⁹ HT, p. 164.

⁷⁶⁰ The ruler of Shirvan was the father-in-law of Baysungur Mirza. See HS, p. 566.

⁷⁶¹ HS, p. 566; HT, p. 164; AA, p. 37.

in 1493, he welcomed them in Tabriz with robes of honor and much money.⁷⁶² Sultan Ali agreed upon giving his allegiance to Rüstem Beg and fighting against Baysungur Mirza. Taking revenge for the death of his father was the foremost, if not only, motive that led Sultan Ali to ally with the Akkoyunlu family.⁷⁶³ No sooner had this news spread than a great number of disciples and devotees of the Safavid house, who were mainly derived from Turkoman tribes of Anatolia and Northern Syria, gathered under Sultan Ali's banner.⁷⁶⁴

Sultan Ali engaged in two wars against Baysungur Mirza. In the first case, accompanied by Akkoyunlu forces under the command of Ayba Sultan, the most powerful general of Rüstem Beg, he marched on Baysungur Mirza. Upon reaching the Kur River they found that Baysungur's army camped on the other bank. After an arrow fight, however, two armies departed without further engagement, Baysungur turned back to Shirvan while Sultan Ali and Ayba Sultan headed back to Tabriz.⁷⁶⁵ Sultan Ali's second fight with Baysungur Mirza occurred after a short while, following the rebellion of the governor of Isfahan against Rüstem Beg in the name of Baysungur Mirza in August 1493.⁷⁶⁶ At the same time Baysungur Mirza left Shirvan. Targeting from two sides, Rüstem Beg dispatched Ayba Sultan and Sultan Ali on Baysungur Mirza and Qara

⁷⁶² HS, p. 566; AA, p. 37; HT, pp. 164-5; *Ross Anonymous*, p. 257; Hasan-ı Rumlu, *Ahsenü't-tevârih*, çev. Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara: TTK, 2006 (Ninth volume of *Ahsenü't-tevârih*), p. 600; BRW, pp. 49-50; Sarwar, p. 27. *Ross Anonymous* says that alarmed with the support of Shirvanshah offered to Baysungur Mirza, Rüstem beg held council with the Bayindirî chiefs as to how he might resist him. They advised him to release the Safavid Princes, underscoring the fact that the adherents of Safavid House were numerous in all parts of the world and when they heard of the release of the princes they would soon assemble in great numbers. See *Ross Anonymous*, p. 256. According to Woods, this event occurred in 1492. See Woods, *The Aqquyunlu*, p. 156.

⁷⁶³ Compare AA, p. 37.

⁷⁶⁴ Hasan-ı Rumlu says 12.000 devotees gathered round Sultan Ali Padishah in a short while. See *Ahsenü't-tevârih*, IX, p. 600. Also see HS, p. 566; HT, p. 165; AA, p. 37; Sarwar, p. 27;

⁷⁶⁵ HS, p. 566; *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 257-8; *Ahsenü't-tevârih*, IX, pp. 600-601; AA, p. 38.

⁷⁶⁶ AA, p. 38; Sarwar, p. 27. Hasan-ı Rumlu mistakenly recites this occasion among events of the year 897 / 1491-2. See *Ahsenü't-tevârih*, IX, p. 601.

Piri Tovachi⁷⁶⁷, one of the leading qizilbash *āmirs*, on the governor of Isfahan concomitantly.⁷⁶⁸ Sultan Ali's appointment in the battlefield clearly reveals the overwhelming tribal characteristics of his disciples. He appointed Husayn Beg Shamlu and Rüstem Beg Karamanlu on the right, and Dada Beg Talish – known as Abdāl 'Ali Beg⁷⁶⁹ - and Khadim Beg Khalifa on the left wing of his army, while he himself commanded the centre. Ayba Sultan commanded the skirmishing party.⁷⁷⁰ Both armies – of Sultan Ali and Qara Pīrī - returned victorious, killing Baysungur and Kusa Haji Bayindir the governor of Isfahan.⁷⁷¹

When Rüstem Beg relieved his enemies with the help of Safavid princes he gave them permission to depart to Ardabil to resume the religious guidance of sufis, which had been interrupted for nearly five years. Within a short span of time a huge number of devotees gathered in Ardabil to pay homage and serve the House.⁷⁷² Nevertheless, the intrinsic political and military capacity of Safavid tribal disciples always created unease in courts of temporal rulers. Likewise, hearing that vast throng of sufis gathered in Ardabil, Rüstem Beg's anxiety arose and he ordered the bringing of the three brothers to his camp, where they were kept under close watch preventing them any contact and communication with their adherents.⁷⁷³

Khwandāmir says, “While the three were in Rüstem Beg's camp, every day a large group of their disciples came to offer silver and gold coins, valuable goods and

⁷⁶⁷ *Ross Anonymous* gives the name as Qara Pīrī Qajar. See *Ross Anonymous*, p. 258.

⁷⁶⁸ *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, p. 601.

⁷⁶⁹ *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 258-9.

⁷⁷⁰ See *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 258-9; Sarwar, p. 27.

⁷⁷¹ HS, p. 566; AA, p. 38; *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, pp. 601-2; *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 259-60. As understood from *Ross Anonymous*'s account qizilbash amirs like Husayn Beg Lala and Dada Beg Talish played leading role in this victory.

⁷⁷² HS, p. 567; *Ross Anonymous*, p. 260; *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, p. 602; HT, p. 166; AA, p. 38;

⁷⁷³ HS, p. 567; *Ross Anonymous*, p. 261; *Ahsenü't-tevārih*, IX, p. 602; HT, p. 166; HR, p. 3; AA, p. 38; Sarwar, pp. 27-8.

other things, but since they were not allowed to remain in the camp, they returned home.”⁷⁷⁴ Without a doubt these disciples were mostly coming from Anatolia and Northern Syria. It is interesting to note that a few years before, Rüstem Beg’s predecessor Yakub Padishah had forbidden Shaykh Haydar to communicate with his disciples, especially with his khalifas in Rūm.⁷⁷⁵ All this evidence clearly puts the facts that 1) the disciples of the Safavid house were no more the quietest mystics but had formidable military potency as well, 2) the main stem providing the ‘new type of disciples’ to the ‘order’ was in Anatolia, and then in northern Syria. It is because of this fact that when Safavid shaykhs emerged as a threat for the temporal authority of Akkoyunlu rulers, the first measure they applied was to cut off the connection between the shaykh, the head, and Anatolian (as well as Syrian) disciples, the body.⁷⁷⁶

In the end, in the middle of 1494, Rüstem Beg grew quite fearful of an attack by qizilbashs; he decided to kill Safavid princes on his way from his winter quarters in Hoy to his summer pastures.⁷⁷⁷ Forewarned, Sultan Ali and his two brothers, accompanied by chief devotees like Husayn Beg Lala, Dada Beg Talish, Qara Pīrī Beg

⁷⁷⁴ HS, p. 567. *Ross Anonymous* writes similarly: “... he [Rüstem Beg] commissioned spies to see that the Prince [Sultan Ali] had no communication with the Sūfīs. Nevertheless, his faithful disciples contrived secretly to send him gifts of ready money and various stores, thus putting to the test the coin of their devotion.” See *Ross Anonymous*, p. 261. Also see HT, p. 166; AA, p. 38.

⁷⁷⁵ TA, p. 70.

⁷⁷⁶ One might feel legitimate to ask the question that ‘what was the policy of the Ottoman government against Safavid movement during this period?’ We know from the letter of Bayezid II to Akkoyunlu Yakub, as an answer to the letter of the former sent upon the death of Shaykh Haydar, that he was antagonist against Haydar and his followers. In this letter qizilbashs are depicted as ‘the people who went astray’ or *gürūh-ı dālle-i Haydariyye*. (See Feridun Bey, I, pp. 304-5.) But we do not know of any Ottoman measure to prevent Safavid shaykh’s communication with their disciples in the Ottoman territories. Furthermore, Ottoman chronicles, except APZ’s account on Shaykh Junayd, are totally silent on Safavid matters until 1500, when Ismail came to Arzinjan, the Ottoman border in the East. Thus available evidence suggest that the Ottoman government did not apply any effective preventive measure against the communication between Anatolian qizilbashs and their shaykhs until 1500. Faruk Sümer deems Bayezid II responsible for ignoring the arising danger in the East and for his soft policy against qizilbashs, which paved way to the flourishing of qizilbash movement within the Ottoman borders. See Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 13.

⁷⁷⁷ HS, p. 567; HT, p. 167; HR, p. 3; Sarwar, p. 28; Woods, *The Aqqyunlu*, p. 156.

Qajar, and İlyas Beg Ayghūr Oghli, escaped from the camp and rode straight to Ardabil.⁷⁷⁸ No sooner was Rüstem Beg apprised of their escape, he dispatched Husayn Beg ‘Alikhaniī and Ayba Sultan with 5000 men in pursuit of him. Realizing that he had no chance with three hundred sufis against Akkoyunlu forces, Sultan Ali summoned leading qizilbash khalifas in Shamasī, a village near Ardabil. He then took of his crown (*Haydarī Tāc*) and put on Ismail’s head, and bound his girdle on Ismail, declaring him his successor.⁷⁷⁹ After laying on Ismail the obligation of avenging his death, and that of his father and grand father, and speaking “into his ear those maxims which he had received as an inheritance from his noble ancestors”,⁷⁸⁰ Sultan Ali selected seven men from among the most prominent qizilbash *āmirs*, including Husayn Beg Lala, Qara Piri Beg Qajar, Abdi Beg Shamlu, and Dada Beg Talish (Abdal Beg Dede), Khadim Beg Khalife, Rüstem Beg Karamanlu, İlyas Beg Aykutoğlu, and ordered them to proceed to Ardabil and to protect Ismail in any circumstances.⁷⁸¹ Then Sultan Ali returned against

⁷⁷⁸ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 261. According to *Ross Anonymous*, upon being apprised about the conspiracy Sultan Ali summoned his chief qizilbash followers and took their advice on what to do. They answered as follows: “May we be thy sacrifice! [*Kurban olduğumuz!*] Arise and let us go to Ardabil, for there and in that neighborhood you have many disciples. If Rüstem Pādishāh should wish to pursue us, we will give him fight. If, however, he neglects to follow us, we shall remain unharmed.” Also consider HT, p. 167; AA, p. 38.

⁷⁷⁹ HS, p. 567; *Ross Anonymous*, p. 262; HT, p. 167; HR, p. 4; Sarwar, p. 28;

⁷⁸⁰ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 262. It is important to recognize here that the transmission of spiritual authority was symbolized by three elements: *Haydarī Tac*, girdle, and secret maxims of the order. On the other hand, I would like to remind that at that time Ismail was only seven years old. AA narrates the scene as follows: “Since Sultan Ali, by virtue of his saintly insight, had seen the fact of his own martyrdom written on the pages of the book of fate, he gathered together all the sufis and partisans of the Safavid family, and told them he would lose his life in the coming battle. He nominated his brother Ismail his heir and successor, and imparted to him the secret of those mysteries which constituted an integral part of the customs and the practices of the spiritual directors of the Safavid house, and which he had inherited from his father and his ancestors. Then he placed his own taj on Ismail’s head, and placed him in the charge of his trusted companions, and addressed him at length regarding his mission. Speaking with divine inspiration, he declared that the light of the house of Ali (the fourth caliph) would shine forth through Ismail, and that his speartips would be raised to the skies in triumph, and that the rays of his justice would illuminate the faces of mankind.” See AA, p. 39. Also see HT, p. 167.

⁷⁸¹ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 262; Sarwar, p. 28. ‘*Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail* describes this scene as follows: “... When Sultān ‘Ali Mirza looked over his shoulder, he saw a cloud of dust [the army of Ayba Sultan]. So he summoned Ismail Mirza and said: ‘I desire you to avenge me and your ancestors by shedding the blood of Hasan Padishah’s children. For the die of Heaven’s choice has been cast in your name, and before long

his enemies with 300 qizilbash devotees⁷⁸², who had joined him en route. Although the qizilbashes fought with utmost bravery⁷⁸³, the unequal fight ended with the absolute defeat of Sultan Ali, who fell in the battlefield.⁷⁸⁴ His body was brought to Ardabil and buried nearby his ancestors.⁷⁸⁵

5.1.2. Ismail in Concealment

Following Sultan Ali's death Ayba Sultan started a cruel investigation in Ardabil and the surrounding region to capture Ismail and Ibrahim.⁷⁸⁶ In spite of the heavy persecution some devotees of the Safavid house, the Dulkadir tribe and some other Turkoman tribes, hid Ismail in their houses for a while.⁷⁸⁷ After a short span of time, however, the heavy pressure by the Akkoyunlu governor of the city made it impossible for Ismail to hide in

you will come out of Gīlān with a world-conquering sword like a burning sun, and eliminate the color of Idolatry from the face of the world forever.' So he took Haydar's crown, placed it on Ismail Mirza's head and, fastening his own turban to his waist, whispered to him the advice inherited from his ancestors. Then he appointed seven of his best devotees and amirs called: Husayn Beg Lala, Qara Pīrī Qajar, Abdāl Beg, Dada Beg Talish, Khādīm Beg, Bayram Beg, and Sari Ghūra qūrchī-bashī, to take Ismail Mirza, Ibrahim Mirza and Suleyman Mirza to Ardabil and from there to Gīlān to stay there in the service of Padishah of Lāhijān until the time of the rising, while he himself stayed where he was to bar the road to Ayba's troops until he was killed." Quoted in Muhammad Karim Youssef-Jamālī, *The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā'īl I (1487-1524)*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1981, p. 79. 'Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail is an anonymous history of Shah Ismail, which occasionally does not refrain of pointing open criticism towards Shah Ismail. It has been edited by A. Montazer-Sāhib basing on a manuscript in his private possession (Tehran, 1349). The content of the work is similar to that published by Sir Denison Ross, which is known as *Ross Anonymous*. For further details see Youssef-Jamālī, pp. XXXV-XXXVI.

⁷⁸² AA says 700. See AA, p. 39.

⁷⁸³ As Browne determines, the valor and devotion of qizilbash-sufis is testified by contemporary European writers as forcibly as the Safavid historians. One frequently comes across the phrase "The Suffaveans fought like lions" in the pages of the Venetian travelers. See BRW, pp. 50-51.

⁷⁸⁴ *Ross Anonymous* and HR report the battle in a slightly different manner. To him, at the beginning of the fight Ayba Sultan drove some of his forces into the battlefield but he himself lay in ambush. In the first phase of the battle the qizilbashes proved victorious. But when they started to gather booty Ayba Sultan attacked them and defeated them. See *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 262-3; HR, p. 4.

⁷⁸⁵ HR, p. 5; *Ross Anonymous*, p. 263; AA, p. 39. Sarwar, pp. 28-9. According to HT, this event occurred in the end of 898 (August 1493).

⁷⁸⁶ During this time Ismail was only seven years old. He was born on July 17, 1487, one year before the death of his father on July 1, 1488. He was, with his brothers and mother, imprisoned by the orders of Yaqub Mirza in March 1489, and released by the orders of Rüstem Beg in August 1493. And in the summer of 1494, he was a fugitive wanted by Rüstem Beg. See Sarwar, p. 30.

⁷⁸⁷ *Ross Anonymous* and HR gives a detailed account of this persecution and how Ismail was protected. See *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 283-5; HR, pp. 5-7.

Ardabil anymore. Rüstem Beg Karamanlu, the uncle of Bayram Beg Karamanlu, who had managed to flee from the battle with eighty qizilbashes and take refuge in a mountain in the vicinity of Ardabil, took the princes (Ismail and Ibrahim) at night to Korgan, a village in the mountain 9 km. to the north east of Ardabil, and hid them.⁷⁸⁸ Taking counsel with Husayn Beg Lala, Khadim Beg, Dede Beg, and other prominent sufi āmirs⁷⁸⁹, Ismail decided to go to Gilan.⁷⁹⁰ On their way to Gilan, they first visited Rasht⁷⁹¹, where Ismail met with a goldsmith, named Āmir Najm. From then on Āmir Najm became a servant of Ismail and one of his eminent advisors and teachers.⁷⁹² They arrived in Lāhijan towards the end of 1494.⁷⁹³ Ismail, with his elder brother Ibrahim and two hundred devotees, was welcomed by the ruler of Lāhijan, Mirza Ali Karkiya, who was the most powerful ruler of Gilan and head of one of the most ancient families in the region.⁷⁹⁴

Khwandamir says after several months Ibrahim decided to return to Ardabil, “removing the twelve-fold Haydarī hat, the emblem of the Safavid house, and putting a felt cap on his head in the manner of the Akkoyunlu Turcomans.”⁷⁹⁵

⁷⁸⁸ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 285; HR, p. 7.

⁷⁸⁹ HR gives the list of these prominent qizilbash amirs as Kipchak Mansur Beg, Husayn Beg Lala, Kīrk (Kazak) Seydi Ali, Cholpan Beg, Khulafa Beg (Khadim Beg Khulafa), Kūk Ali. See HR, p.7. *Ross Anonymous* gives the same list but adds Dada Beg too. See *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 285-6. Also consider Youssef-Jamālī, p. 84.

⁷⁹⁰ HT, p. 168. According to HR, however, Ismail decided to go to Rasht. See HR, p. 7. Also consider AA, p. 40.

⁷⁹¹ According to *Ross Anonymous* and HR, at the beginning they decided to go to Rasht. See *Ross Anonymous*, p. 286; HR, p. 9. HR says that Ismail and his entourage stayed in a mosque although they were invited by the governor of the city to stay in his own house.

⁷⁹² See HR, p. 10; Sarwar, p. 31.

⁷⁹³ Sarwar, pp. 31-2.

⁷⁹⁴ HS, p. 567; *Ross Anonymous*, p. 287; HR, p. 10; AA, p. 40. It is already mentioned in the previous chapter that his ancestors were visited by Timur during his return from Anatolia in 1402 and benefited from the generous grants of the latter.

⁷⁹⁵ HS, p. 567. AA repeats the same account. See AA, p. 40. Also consider Youssef-Jamālī, p. 93.

Ismail stayed approximately four and a half years in Lāhijan under the protection of Mirza Ali Karkiya. Until his death in 1497, Rūstem Beg on several occasions demanded Sultan Ali Karkiya to surrender Ismail but received evasive replies. In addition to his protection of the young prince, Sultan Ali Karkiya dealt with the education and training of Ismail as well. He appointed Shams al-Dīn Lāhijī⁷⁹⁶ to instruct him in the Holy Qur'an and to teach him Persian and Arabic.⁷⁹⁷ Furthermore, Āmir Najm, the goldsmith of Rasht, who visited the young prince frequently, had certain influence on the education of Ismail.⁷⁹⁸

On the other hand, during this period the famous qizilbash *āmirs*, known as *Sūfiyān-i Lāhijān*, were always nearby their young shaykh, whose education and military training was mostly under their custody.⁷⁹⁹ These seven men, who were selected by Sultan Ali just before his death and whom Safavid sources used to call '*sūfiyān-i Lāhijān*' or '*ehl-i ihtisas*', were among the prominent generals of Shaykh Junayd and Haydar and fulfilled important military functions under them, as well as under Sultan Ali. With the death of Sultan Ali they became the protectors and tutors of young Ismail. Thus they played a very eminent role in maintaining the network between the disciples and the center of the order, in the education of Ismail, and in establishing the nucleus of

⁷⁹⁶ When Ismail ascended the throne in 1501, he became the first *sadr*, the head of Shi'ite-religious clergy and the highest responsible for religious affairs, of the Safavid state. But it seems that neither Ismail nor him were prepared for such a mission, the mission of transforming the country into shi'ism, that he could find only the book of Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hillī, *Qawā'id al-Islām*, among shi'ite literature to consult. See Jean Aubin, "Etudes safavides I. Šāh Ismā'il et les notables de l'Iraq Persan", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 2:1, 1959, p. 53; For further reading on the office of *sadārat* and early *sadrs* see Roger M. Savory, Savory, Roger M., "The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Ismā'il I (907-30/1501-24)", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXIII, London, 1960, pp. 103-105.

⁷⁹⁷ *Rooss Anonymous*, p. 288; HR, p. 11; AA, p. 41; Sarwar, p. 32.

⁷⁹⁸ See *Ross Anonymous*, p. 288; HR, pp. 11-12.

⁷⁹⁹ HT, p. 171.

the Safavid state during the period of concealment.⁸⁰⁰ Savory, an eminent historian of the Safavids, writes about the crucial role of the sufis of Lāhijān in leading the movement and establishing the state as follows:

It is often assumed that Ismāʿīl himself was solely responsible, by his charismatic leadership, for bringing the Safavid revolution to a successful conclusion. When one considers that Ismāʿīl was only seven years old when he took refuge in Gīlān; that he was only twelve when he emerged from Gīlān in 1499 to make his bid for power; and no more than fourteen when he was crowned Shāh at Tabrīz in 1501 as the first king of the Safavid dynasty, it is clear that this could not have been so. The responsibility of maintaining the momentum of the Safavid revolutionary movement lay primarily with the small band of seven close advisers known as *ahl-i ikhtisās*.⁸⁰¹

Although the formula ‘seven men’ is widely used by Safavid sources, there is no consensus on the names of these seven men. Later sources even increase the number. The plausible interpretation of the information provided by the Safavid sources appears to suppose that indeed there were more than seven qizilbash (may be around eighty as some sources indicate) around Ismail during his concealment in Lāhijan. Most of those qizilbashes were not permanently resident with Ismail but were coming from their tribe to present allegiance and obedience, as well as vows and gifts, and returning to their homes. Seven - or around seven – men called *ahl-i ihtisas*, however, were the masterminds behind the movement, organizing mystical affairs of the disciples,

⁸⁰⁰ For a detailed analysis of their role in the Safavid history see Jean Aubin, “Revolution chiite et conservatisme. Les sufis de Lāhejān, 1500-1514 (Etudes Safavides II)”, *Moyen Orient & Océan Indien* 1, 1984, pp. 1-40. Also see Roger M. Savory, “Safawids”, *EI2*, electronic edition.

⁸⁰¹ Roger Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 22. Also see his “The Safavid State and Polity”, in *Studies on Isfahan, Proceedings of the Isfahan Colloquium, 1974*, Part I, ed. R. Holod=*Iranian Studies*, VII, Chestnut Hill, Mass., 1974, p. 192. For a similar approach also see Hans R. Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy”, *Intellectual Studies in Islam*, eds., M. M. Mazzaoui-V. B. Moreen, Utah, 1990, p. 32.

maintaining the communication and network between sufis and the center, taking care of the young Shah, etc., and were permanent residents nearby Ismail.⁸⁰²

Tribal affiliation of these *āmirs* is also confusing in sources. Masashi Haneda, who studied the Safavid chronicles in a comparative manner, arrives at the following conclusion: Husayn Beg Lala was from the Shamlu tribe, Abdal Ali Beg Dede from Dulkadir tribe, Hadim Beg Khulafa from the Talish tribe, Rüstem and Bayram Beks from the Karaman tribe, İlyas Beg Aykutoğlu from the Hınıs tribe⁸⁰³, Qara Pīrī Beg from the Qajar tribe.⁸⁰⁴ So, five of these seven most prominent leaders of the qizilbash movement were of Anatolian (including one from northern Syria) origin.⁸⁰⁵

All the members of the *ahl-i ihtisas* occupied eminent posts of the Safavid state during her early period, especially until 1508.⁸⁰⁶ Especially Husayn Beg Lala, Abdal Ali Beg Dede, Hadim Beg Khalifa, Abdi Beg Shamlu, and Bayram Beg Karamanlu exercised excessive influence during the premier years of Ismail's reign. They were, indeed, to a certain extent, the founder of the state and the ones most responsible for shaping the Safavid mysticism during the transformation period from Junayd to Ismail. In Aubin's words,

Ce sont de vieux dévoués de la fraction chiite extrémiste qu'ont greffée sur l'ordre des soufis d'Ardabil Seyx Jonayd, le grand-père, et écrasé, ils ont maintenu, depuis leur refuge du Gilan, par leur émissaires clandestines, l'attentisme des fidèles. Et plus tard, des cinq, trois sinon quatre, tomberont au

⁸⁰² For an analysis of the sources in this issue see Aubin, "Sufis of Lāhejān", pp. 2-3; Masashi Haneda, *Le Chāh et les Qizilbās. Le système militaire safavide*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1987, pp. 68-78.

⁸⁰³ Also see Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 53.

⁸⁰⁴ See Haneda, pp. 72-78.

⁸⁰⁵ A brief account of Turkoman oymaqs that constituted the Safavid army will be provided below.

⁸⁰⁶ For example, following Ismail's ascendance to the throne in Tabriz in 1501, Husayn Beg Lala became *wākil*, the lieutenant of the Shah, and *emiru'l-ümera*, the head of the army; Abdal Ali Beg Dede became the head of the Special Forces (*kurçi başı*), Hadim Beg Khulafa became *halifetu'l-hulefa*, the head of the sufi organization of qizilbashes; Bayram Berg Qaramanlu became *amir-i divan*; and Abdi Beg became *tovacı-başı*. See Aubin, "Sufis of Lāhejān", pp. 4-5; Haneda, *Le Chāh et les Qizilbās*, pp. 72-77; Roger M. Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Ismā'il (907-30/1501-24)", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXIII, London, 1960, pp. 93-101.

combat. Comme leur titre l'indique, le dede, le xalife et le lele appartiennent aux grades initiatiques de l'organisation religieuse qizilbas. Les deux autres sont chefs des tribu, et ces deux chefs ont avec la vénérée famille d'Ardabil un lien mondain : 'Abdi Beg et Bayram Beg sont des gendres ; ils ont épousé des filles de Seyx Haydar.⁸⁰⁷

Ismail's concealment in Lāhijan no doubt constituted the nucleus of his future state. While taking care of young Ismail's education and training, the seven great qizilbahes around him maintained the connection and communication with disciples of the Order in several provinces of Anatolia, Syria, and Azarbaijan.⁸⁰⁸ *Ross Anonymous* and *Ahsenu't-tevārih* record that during Ismail's residence in Lāhijan, sufis from near and far, especially from *Diyār-ı Rūm* (Anatolia), Karacadağ, Tuman Meşkin, came to the court of the prince⁸⁰⁹ in Lāhijan, presenting their gifts and votive offerings (*adak*) and paying their homage. But they did not stay there for a long time simply because of security reasons, but rather returned to their home sooner.⁸¹⁰ A contemporary Italian testimony approves the Safavid chronicles:

During these five years [in concealment] these boys [Safavid princes] were incited by many of their father's friends, who came to visit them, to assemble troops to recover his possessions; having collected five hundred brave and faithful men, and the whole country being friendly disposed towards them, they elected Ismael their captain, as he was a fiery, brave, and courteous youth.⁸¹¹

⁸⁰⁷ Aubin, "Les souifs de Lāhejān", p. 4.

⁸⁰⁸ Caterino Zeno, a Venetian embassy at the court of Uzun Hasan, states that Ismail sent secret orders to his followers instructing them on what to do. See Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", in NIT, p. 48.

⁸⁰⁹ *Ross Anonymous* uses the term "Perfect Guide". See *Ross Anonymous*, p. 288. Also consider Roger M. Savory, "The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia", *Der Islam*, 41, Berlin, 1965, p. 85; *Iran under the Safavids*, pp. 22-23.

⁸¹⁰ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 288; HR, p. 11; HT, p. 171. AA writes similarly, "Ismail's place of residence was frequented by sufis, and devotees were never absent from his threshold." See AA, p. 41.

⁸¹¹ Giovan Maria Angiolello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano", in NIT, p. 103. Giovan Maria Angiolello fell captive to Mehmed II's army in 1470. He served Prince Mustafa and attended the Otlukbeli battle with Uzun Hasan in the Ottoman army. He then obtained his freedom and returned to Italy. Between 1499 and 1515 he stayed in Persia for business or a diplomatic mission on behalf of the Venetian Republic. See Tufan Gündüz (trs.), *Seyyahların Gözüyle Sultanlar ve Savaşlar. Giovanni Maria Angiolello – Venedikli Bir Tüccar ve Vincenzo D'Alessandri'nin Seyahatnâmeleri*, İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2007, p. 11

5.1.3. The Advent (*Hurūj*) of Ismail

The strife among Akkoyunlu princes continued during Ismail's concealment in Lāhijan. In the summer of 1497 Ahmed Mirza, the son of Hasan Beg's son Ugurlu Muhammad, killed Rūstem Beg and proclaimed himself as the ruler of Azarbaijan.⁸¹² Nonetheless, his rule lasted only six months. The powerful *āmir* Ayba Sultan defeated and killed him in Isfahan and read the *khutba* in the name of Sultan Murad, the son of Yakub Mirza.⁸¹³ But he could not expand his rule all over the Akkoyunlu dominion. The two sons of Hasan Beg's son Yusuf Beg, namely Alvand Mirza and Muhammadi Mirza, who were in Ahmad Mirza's entourage during the battle with Ayba Sultan, assumed suzerainty in Diyarbakir and Iraq. Although Sultan Murad managed to incarnate Muhammadi Mirza, Alvand Mirza proved successful in his struggle against the former. In the end, they decided to divide the country among themselves. The provinces of Diyarbakir, Arran, and Azarbaijan were ruled by Alvand Mirza while the regions of Iraq, Fars, and Kirman went to Sultan Murad, Qizil Azwan River being the line dividing their respective territories. Alvand Mirza returned to Tabriz and Sultan Murad to Kazwin.⁸¹⁴

Taking advantage of civil war among the Akkoyunlu princes, young Ismail decided that it was time to take action. Despite Sultan Ali Karkiya's opposition, thinking that the conditions did not mature to advent as well as the tender age of the Safavid prince, Ismail took council with prominent qizilbash *āmirs* and left Lāhijan for Ardabil in August 1499.⁸¹⁵

⁸¹² HS, pp. 567-8; *Ross Anonymous*, p. 298; HR, pp. 17-18; Woods, *The Aqqyunlu*, p. 158.

⁸¹³ HS, p. 568; *Ross Anonymous*, p. 300; HR, pp. 21-2; Woods, *The Aqqyunlu*, p. 158.

⁸¹⁴ HS, p. 569; *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 306-7; HR, pp. 27-32; Woods, *The Aqqyunlu*, pp. 159-161.

⁸¹⁵ HS, p. 570; *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 326-7; HR, pp. 33-4; AA, p. 42; Sarwar, p. 33; Jean Aubin, "L'avènement des Safavides reconsideré (Etudes Sfavides III)", *Moyen Orient & Océan Indien*, 5, 1988, p. 7.

He first visited Daylam and then proceeded to Tarum with seven devotees, namely Husayn Beg Lala, Dede Beg Talish (Abdal ‘Ali Beg Dede), Khadim Beg Khalifa, Rüstem Beg Qaramānī, Bayram Beg Qaramānī, İlyas Beg Ayghut-Oghli, and Qara Pīrī Beg Qājār.⁸¹⁶ The news of Ismail’s march to Ardabil immediately spread among disciples living in Anatolia, Syria, Azarbaijan, Iraq, and created great excitement. Hearing of his advent, says *Ahsenu’t-tevārih*, qizilbashes from Anatolia and Syria poured into his entourage at every stage of his journey reaching 1500 men by the time he encamped at Tarum.⁸¹⁷ Ismail then went to Ardabil by way of Khalhal and Kūrī, where he spent one month in the house of Melik Muzaffer known as Khulafa Beg, the standard bearer of Sultan Ali Padishah.⁸¹⁸ But Ardabil was not a place of safety for the young prince and his hundreds of sufis⁸¹⁹ accompanying him.⁸²⁰

According to Khwandamir, Ismail’s first intention was to wage *gazā* against Georgia. But since the number of *sufi-gāzis* present in his entourage was not enough, some leading āmirs such as Abdi Beg Tovachi, Husayn Beg Lala, Khulafa Beg, opposed this idea suggesting first to send heralds to all devotees ordering them to prepare for a holy war and to gather at a specific time in the royal camp, and then, with such reinforcement, to wage *gazā* on the infidels.⁸²¹ *Ross Anonymous* repeats the same

⁸¹⁶ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 332; Sarwar, p. 33.

⁸¹⁷ *Ross Anonymous*, pp. 332-3; Sarwar, p. 33. However, Khwandamir’s account, a contemporary of events, challenges this idea. He says that there were no more than three hundred warriors in the royal retinue when they arrived in Ardabil. See HS, p. 570. Whatever the number was, however, his move from Lahijan mobilized qizilbashes all over Anatolia, Syria, Azerbaijan and other regions.

⁸¹⁸ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 333; HR, p. 35.

⁸¹⁹ HS gives the number of qizilbash accompanying Ismail in Ardabil as three hundred. See HS, p. 570.

⁸²⁰ *Ross Anonymous* and HR say, the governor of Ardabil appointed by Alvand Beg sent a messenger to Ismail suggesting him either to leave the city or to prepare for an engagement. See *Ross Anonymous*, p. 333; HR, p. 35.

⁸²¹ HS, p. 570. HT follows HS’s account on this issue. Qumī, however, puts a special emphasis on the *oymaq* of Ustaclu. See HT, p. 175. Also consider Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, pp. 8-9. Aubin deduces from this scene that although Safavid chroniclers write as if young Ismail was the author of all

account; but mistakenly narrates as if this happened in the spring of 1500, when Ismail moved from Arjuwan.⁸²²

...[Not deeming it wise to remain in Ardabil] He [Ismail] discussed with the leading Sūfis what road he had better take. They being all of one mind, suggested that before he left his winter-quarters he should send orders by swift messengers to the sufis in Rūm and Shām, and then betake himself to the frontiers of Arjinjan by way of Gökcha Dengīs, for there he would be near his ‘supporters’, who on hearing of his arrival, would the more speedily assemble. Such was the most reasonable plan. Having collected an army he might then, with the help of Divine favour and the assistance of the Imāms, turn whither he would.⁸²³

Accepting this suggestion, Ismail sent swift messengers to the various provinces of Asia Minor and Syria carrying his message, which ordered the followers of the Safavid house to summon under the banner of the young shaykh in Arzinjan the next summer.⁸²⁴ Ismail himself spent the winter of 1499-1500 in Arjuwan, a village near Astārā on the Caspian Sea,⁸²⁵ allowing “those sufis, which he had retained in his army, to return to their homes, to rejoin him on the New Year’s Day [*Nevruz*].”⁸²⁶

decisions, at the beginning of the advent, and without a doubt during the following years, the decisions were made primarily by his tutors.

⁸²² Indeed HS is also not clear about the time of this meeting. Khwandamir is completely silent on Ismail’s almost one year stay in Arjuwan. Rather he narrates as if Ismail directly went to Gökçe Deniz from Ardabil, and then to Arzinjan. If we accept his account, then it means that Ismail stayed in Ardabil for one year, which is obviously impossible, even according to HS’s former expressions. Thus Khwandamir is evidently wrong in this matter. On the other hand, *Ross Anonymus*’s account doesn’t appear to be reasonable either. If Ismail dispatched heralds to their disciples in Anatolia and Syria in the spring of 1500, how could they gather in Arzinjan in a couple of months? This was impossible simply because of the technical reasons. So the best conclusion that can be deduced from these accounts appears as follows: Ismail sent swift messengers to all disciples in Anatolia, Northern Syria, and Azarbaijan in the summer of 1499, during his first visit to Ardabil. In the following spring he simply passed through Ardabil on his way to Arzinjan, which was determined as the gathering place the former summer. Iskender Beg Munshi, who had access to all these sources when he wrote his history a century later, also arrives at the same conclusion. See AA, p. 42. Also compare Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 17.

⁸²³ *Ross Anonymus*, pp. 339-40. One of those heralds was Kıcıoğlu Hamza Beg, who was sent to his own tribe Ustaclu. See Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 17.

⁸²⁴ In addition to the mentioned Safavid sources also see HSE3, p. 345; SLZ1, p. 428.

⁸²⁵ *Ross Anonymus*, p. 334; Sarwar, p. 34.

⁸²⁶ *Ross Anonymus*, p. 337.

5.1.4. The vision of Dede Muhammad: The Ideological Background of the Qizilbash Movement

Although it is fiction, an account in *Ross Anonymous*⁸²⁷ is of highest importance for it perfectly reflects the qizilbash mentality: how they perceived the Shi'a and how they believed in Ismail.⁸²⁸ Just before leaving Lāhijan, Ismail went hunting with some of his disciples. At a place not far away they arrived at the edge of a dense forest, where there was a river. Ismail crossed the river and said to his companions: "Not one of you is to follow me across this river, but you are to await my return on the other side."⁸²⁹ Ismail then entered the forest alone. No one knew what happened in the forest. But after a while Ismail returned as girt with a belt, bearing a sword suspended from a sword-belt, and with the other 'signs' which Sūfis witnessed.⁸³⁰

⁸²⁷ The same account with minor differences occurs in some other Safavid chronicles as well. See Youssef-Jamālī, p. 103.

⁸²⁸ The religious position of Shah Ismail in the eyes of the contemporary qizilbashes is one of the controversial issues of the Safavid History. The question of whether he was regarded as a God, as a Prophet, or as a Mahdi by the contemporary qizilbashes' is not clear enough in available sources. The most informative sources on the subject are reports of Venetian travelers or ambassadors, poems of Shah Ismail himself, and accounts of sunni enemies. Contemporary westerner observers used to depict him as adored by his followers as if a God. (See for example, "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", p. 206, where written that "This Sophy is loved and revered by his people as a god, especially by his soldiers..." Further examples will be presented in Chapter V.) On the other hand, his poetry led modern scholars to a similar conclusion. Minorsky concludes, after an analysis of his poetry, for example that Ismail regarded himself somehow having the nature of a deity. (See Minorsky, "The Poetry of Shah Ismail I", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 10, no. 4, 1942, 1006a-1053a.) Abdūlbāki Gölpınarlı, a twentieth century Turkish writer, takes the account of Khunjī by words and argues that his followers believed in Junayd as God, in his son as the 'son of God'. (See his article "Kızılbaş" in *IA*, 789-91.) Savory argues, according to Safavid propaganda Ismail was not only the representative of the Hidden Imam but the Hidden Imam himself; he was even apotheosized as a divine incarnation. See Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 23. For a similar approach also see Aubin, "L'avènement des Safavides", pp. 36-40. Roemer stresses Ismail's exaggerated assumptions regarding Ali. Roemer states, "he must have had a well-defined religious sensibility, as can be seen from his divan. Here he calls 'Alī a manifestation of God and proudly asserts that he himself is a descendant of 'Alī and Fātima who came into the world at 'Alī's behest. Of course such notions can not be reconciled with the Shī'a or the Shī'ī theology; but they originate in the world of the Shī'a rather than in that of Folk Islam." See Hans R. Roemer, "The Safavid Period", *The Cambridge History of Iran*, 6, ed. Peter Jackson, 1993, p. 209.

⁸²⁹ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 327.

⁸³⁰ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 327.

The anonymous author then recites the account of Dede Muhammed Rumlu, who was a sufi-dervish from Anatolia (*Urum-ili*) gifted with second sight, and in the year 907 (1501-2) “had the honor of kissing the ‘Perfect Guide’s’ feet in the market-place called Sāhib-ābād in Tabriz.”⁸³¹ Dede Muhammad was a dervish and a disciple of Hasan Khalifa Tekelu,⁸³² who attended the court of Shaykh Junayd and was among the prominent khalifas of Shaykh Haydar.⁸³³

In the following pages, the anonymous author of this chronicle narrates how Bābā Shakhulu, the son of Hasan Khalifa, sent Dede Muhammad, who was one of his most pious dervishes, to pilgrimage in 905 / 1499-1500. The adventure of Dede Muhammad, on its own, has a special value not because it merely reflects historical events but for the fact that it reflects the qizilbash mentality.

Following his death, his son Shakhulu succeeded Hasan Khalifa. During this time Dede Muhammad, who then became a disciple of Shakhulu, requested the permission of his spiritual guide for a pilgrimage to Mekka.

In the year 905⁸³⁴, Dede Muhammad, who was a disciple of Khalifa, desiring to make the pilgrimage to Mekka, asked the permission of Bābā Shāh Kulī, who said to him: “You have permission, go; but when you have completed your pilgrimage to Mekka you will visit the Holy Shrines (in Babylonia) and thence go to Tabrīz. On the first day of your arrival there the time will have come for one of the sons of purity and goodness, and he will have become pādishāh, having caused coins to be struck and the *khutba* read in his name; you will find

⁸³¹ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 327.

⁸³² The same story is recited in another chronic, which is studied by Erika Glassen, as well. The main difference in the account of the manuscript housed in India Office Library (pers. 1877) comes out in the identity of Dede Muhammad Rumlu. Differing from Ross Anonymous, he is depicted as a Bektashi Dervish – one of the followers of Haci Bektash Veli in Constantinople. The account of this manuscript is published by Glassen. See Erika Glassen, “Schah Ismā’īl, ein Mahdī der anatolischen Turkmenen?”, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, band 121, 1971, pp. 61-69.

⁸³³ Hasan Khalifa was the father of Shakhulu who initiated and led a large-scale revolt against the Ottoman state in Teke-ili and western Anatolia. For further information see “Shakhulu Rebellion” in this study.

⁸³⁴ 1499-1500.

him playing polo in the square [maidān] of Tabrīz. You will go to him and greet him from me and give him this *ablak* to fasten on his crown.⁸³⁵

Dede Muhammad visited the son of purity, but not in material world, rather in a miraculous dream. On performing the circuit of Mekka and visiting Medina, he turned towards Baghdād. Between Medina and Baghdād the dervish got separated from the caravan and fell asleep. On awakening he realized that the caravan had already departed. He wandered through deserts for three days. At the end he fell exhausted to the ground.

When the mid-day sun shone straight down upon him he perceived an Arab youth riding towards him, who coming up to him said: "Oh! Dervish, arise, for thou art not far from cultivated land." The dervish indicated by signs that he was too feeble to walk. The youth then took his hand, and no sooner was his hand in that of the youth than he felt all his strength return. So he arose and was led by the youth towards a hill; when they reached the summit of the hill he looked around and saw that as far (330) as the eye could reach the plains were covered with verdure and roses and tulips, and that gold-embroidered tents and silk canopies had been spread out. Turning to his companion he said: "Oh! Arab youth, no one ever saw such a place as this in the deserts of Mekka and Najaf-i Ashraf. What place is this? and who is the lords of these tents and places?" The young Arab replied, "You will know afterward?" he then walked by the young man's side, until they came to a place, whose cupola out-rivalled the sun and the moon. They then entered, and a delightful apartment met his view, the like of which he had never seen. Golden thrones were arranged side by side, and on one of the thrones a person was seated whose face was covered with a veil. Dede Muhammad, placing his hands on his breast, made a salutation, whereupon an answer to his salutation came from the veiled one, who having bidden him be seated, ordered food to be brought for him. The like of this food he had never seen in his life before. They also brought some cold water, which Dede Muhammad drank, nor had he ever tasted such refreshing water. As soon as he has finished his repast, he saw that a party of men had entered, bringing a boy of about fourteen years of age, with red (*surkh*) hair, a white face, and dark-grey eyes; on his head was a scarlet cap. Being entered he made a salutation and stood still; the veiled youth then said to him: "Oh! Isma'īl, the hour of your 'coming' (*hurūc*) has now arrived." The other replied: "It is for your Holiness to command." The prince then said: "Come forward." He came forward, and His Holiness taking his belt three times lifted it up and placed it on the ground again. He then, with his own blessed hands, fastened on the girdle, and taking (Isma'īl's) cap from his head, raised it and then replaced it. He wore a Kurdish belt-dagger; this His Holiness took from him and threw (331) to the dervish, saying: "Keep this, for it will stand you in stead." His Holiness then told his

⁸³⁵ Ross Anonymous, p. 329.

servants to bring his own sword, which, when brought, he fastened with his own hands to the girdle of the child. Then he said “You may now depart.” Having recited Fātiha he entrusted the child to the two or three persons who had brought him in. when they had taken the child away, he made a sign to the young Arab to lead the dervish back to his caravan; and having brought him to it, said: “This is the caravan from which you were separated.” When Dede Muhammad saw the caravan he said: “Oh! Youth, tell me, for God’s sake, who that prince was and who the child?” He replied: “Did you not know that the prince whom you saw was no other than the Lord of the Age [The twelfth Imam]?”⁸³⁶

Before analyzing the content I would like to call attention to the author and authorship of the source. According to Ross, some details in the narration suggest that the anonymous author of this history must have participated in most of the events he recounts. Ross also deduces that he (the anonymous author) must be closely connected with the Safavids.⁸³⁷ A close examination of the narration, indeed, reveals that the author was a sincere qizilbash. As for the time of completion, one might feel justified in supposing that it was completed soon after the accession of Tahmasp in 930 / 1524, for the work ends with a short account of the accession of Tahmasp.⁸³⁸ According to Sarwar, however, the work was composed between 1540 and 1548.⁸³⁹ Andrew H. Morton, on the other hand, identifies this work with *Jahāngushā-yi khākān* and suggests a 17th-century date of composition.⁸⁴⁰ Whatever the date was, it appears as a clear fact that the aforesaid account should be regarded as a retrospective re-production of the ideological frame of Ismail’s *huruj* by qizilbash authorship. Although the above story is,

⁸³⁶ Ross *Anonymous*, pp. 329-331.

⁸³⁷ E. Denison Ross, “The Early Years of Shāh Isma’īl, Founder of the Safavī Dynasty”, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, p. 252. The author’s full name is unknown, but Ghulām Sarwar determines from an incomplete marginal note that it starts with *Bijan*. See Sarwar, *History of Shah Isma’īl Safawī*, p. 9.

⁸³⁸ Ross, p. 250.

⁸³⁹ See Sarwar, p. 10.

⁸⁴⁰ See Morton, “The Date and Attribution of *Ross Anonymous*. Notes on a Persian History of Shah Isma’īl I”, *History and Literature in Iran: Persian and Islamic Studies in Honour of P. W. Avery*, ed. Charles Melville, Chambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1990, pp. 179-212. Also consider his “The Early Years of Shah Isma’īl in the *Afzal al-tavārikh* and Elsewhere”, in *Safavid Persia. The History and Politics of an Islamic Society*, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, pp. 27-28.

without doubt, fiction, simply because of this feature it has a value of utmost importance for it perfectly reflects the qizilbash mentality and approaches.⁸⁴¹

Returning to the content, the first point to be realized is the position of Ismail in the qizilbash cosmology. As Glassen notices, he is depicted neither as God, nor as Prophet, but as a contemporary representative and deputy of twelfth Imam.⁸⁴² His legitimacy and spiritual power rests on the blessing of the Hidden Imam, who commissioned Ismail to rise against the oppressors of the time, fastening, “with his own blessed hands”, Ismail’s girdle, taking his cap from his head and replacing it after he raised it, and putting his sword on his belt. Thus the ideological background of Ismail’s advent (*huruj*) rests on the assignment by the Hidden Imam; Ismail was appointed by the Hidden Imam as his deputy to fight against the enemy of the faith and to overcome the oppression all over the world. As Glassen puts, “Doch Schah Ismā’īl ist nur ein Glied in der Kette der Empörer gegen die unvollkommene muslimische Gessellschaft, die immer wieder ungerechten und glaubensschwachen Herrschern anheimfällt. Endgültiges Heil wird erst die Wiederkehr des verborgenen zwölften Imāms über die Welt bringen.”⁸⁴³

Here I should draw attention to the role of the Anatolian disciples, who were represented by Dede Mohammed in the dream. Dede Muhammad witnessed the blessing of Ismail by the Lord of the Age. He had a present (*imānat*) to give to Ismail, the entrusted one of the Hidden Imam on the world. And lastly, the Hidden Imam gave the dagger of Ismail to Dede Muhammad giving him (to Ismail) his own sword. Ismail

⁸⁴¹ One should remember that most of the Safavid chronicles, thus the history of qizilbashes, were written by Persian or ‘persianized’ bureaucrats rather than by qizilbashes themselves. Thus one can hardly penetrate to the mentality, world-view, sentiments, and the nature of religious thought of qizilbashes through these chronicles. All those Safavid chroniclers, starting with Khwandamir and even including Hasan Rumlu, who himself was son of a qizilbash, are apathetic with the cultural and ideological world of qizilbash Turkomans.

⁸⁴² Compare Glassen, p. 69.

⁸⁴³ See Glassen, p. 69.

would conquer all Iran and Azarbaijan with this sword while Anatolian Turkomans would rise up with this dagger against Ottoman authority for the cause of Ismail. As a matter of fact, upon hearing of Ismail's advent his Anatolian followers were excited so much, many of them pouring to his court in order to fight against 'oppressors'. As will be evaluated below, these newly arriving qizilbash fighters constituted the backbone of Ismail's army, with which he conquered the whole of Azarbaijan and Iran. In the vision of Dede Muhammad, these qizilbash troops joined him, especially in Arzinjan and later on, can be regarded as the sword that was fastened to the belt of Ismail by the Hidden Imam. On the other hand, the rest of the Safavid followers in Anatolia, who did not join Ismail's army but stayed at their homes, undertook fifth-column activities in favor of the Safavid movement in Asia Minor. They gathered money among themselves for the Shah, provided logistic supply for Ismail's forces whenever needed, eroded the Ottoman authority through several means, especially by means of insurrection. The rebellion of Shahkulu became the most greatest and most effective of those insurrections.⁸⁴⁴ In Dede Muhammad's vision all these fifth-column activities and pro-Safavid rebellions are symbolized by the dagger of Ismail, which was taken from him, replaced by a sword, and given to Dede Muhammad, the representative of the Anatolian disciples, by the Twelfth Imam.

In his analysis of the same vision, Rudi Paul Lindner rightly emphasizes on the nomadic and militant notions in the story, as well as the fifth-column role of the Anatolian followers. As he says,

⁸⁴⁴ Nonetheless, contemporary evidence does not clarify the exact nature of the connection between Shahkulu and Shah Ismail during the rebellion. Was this link merely limited to the ideological inspiration of Shahkulu as a Safavid khalif, and of the adherents of the rebellion of course, or was there a more concrete relation, such as taking orders from the Safavid center? The answer of this question needs further investigation to be elucidated. Compare Sohrweide, p. 148. For further details of this rebellion see "Shahkulu Rebellion" in the present study.

To the tribal following of the Safavi chief, Dede Muhammad's dream revealed the intimate connection between their sheykh and the messianic fulfillment of their expectations. The hidden imam, the scarlet surroundings, the expected 'coming' of a purging savior, the sanctification of swords and daggers, all these justify and urge on a militant audience. The head-dress distinguished them from an uninitiated enemy. These were men set apart by choice and a mission, ... Ismail's kızılbaş or 'red-headed league', among whom were the Rumlu and Tekeli tribes, were his earlier supporters, his army, forming a fifth column deep inside Ottoman Anatolia. In this dream the Lord of the Ages approves the head-dress, the ends, and the Anatolian means: he hands Ismail's dagger to Dede Muhammad. This act does not simply imply approval for the dervish's propaganda. It is a call to arms.⁸⁴⁵

If we return to Dede Muhammad's account, upon learning the identity of this Arab prince Dede Muhammad asks whether or not he could return and beg his blessings, kissing the feet of His Holiness. Nonetheless, being refused, he finds himself returned to the material world just behind the caravan that he missed. Putting aside Dede Muhammad's account, *Ross Anonymous* returns back to Ismail and the Sufis on the other side of the river. The Sufis were waiting, in obedience to Ismail's command, on the bank of the river near the forest. After two hours had passed in the midst of their anxiety, Ismail emerged from the forest "with dignity, with a sword attached to his girdle, but without his belt-dagger." On seeing this, on realizing those 'signs' attached to the 'Perfect Guide', so much overcome were they with awe that the Sufis prostrated themselves before Ismail. Having all gathered round Ismail, they decided that it would be better to go to Ardabil by way of Tarum.⁸⁴⁶

⁸⁴⁵ Rudi Paul Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983, p. 109.

⁸⁴⁶ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 332.

5.2. ISMAIL'S ASCENDANCE TO POWER, 1501

5.2.1. The Erzincan Congregation: a Turning Point

When Ismail rose up, the propaganda of Shaykh Junayd and Haidar had already created a vast social ground for the Safavid order in Anatolia. Thus his *huruj* from Lāhijan, and especially his coming to Erzincan created deep excitement among Anatolian disciples and sympathizers of the order. It must be because of this excitement of Anatolian population that Ottoman chroniclers, except Aşıkpaşazāde, first mention sufis of Ardabil in 1500, in the context of Ismail's visit to Erzincan. In these histories, the earlier development of the qizilbash movement is usually summarized retrospectively while explaining Ismail's *huruj*. But still they do not give a detailed account of events. Details of the struggle with Safavids usually emerge in Ottoman chronicles during the last years of Bayezid II, especially in reference to the famous Shahkulu rebellion. Before then they only refer tacitly to some events connected to the Safavid movement. Nonetheless, a careful reading of these chronicles reveals that at least by the advent of Shah Ismail in 1500, Ottomans were quite aware of the rising danger from the east and even levied serious measures.

Contemporary evidence confirms that even before 1500, the relationship between Ismail and his Anatolian disciples was intense. His deputies, called '*halife*', were fairly active especially in qizilbash zones of Anatolia.⁸⁴⁷ On the one hand, they preached evolving doctrine and rites of the order and gained further adherents. On the other hand, they provided an excellent communication web that closely connected the disciples to

⁸⁴⁷ "*İsmail adamlarını ülkenin değişik kesimlerine gönderdi ve kararlarını her yere bildirdi. Bu yüzden her gün gittikçe daha çok insan onun yanına akın etti. Sonuçta etafında kısa bir müddet zarfında yaklaşık 10.000 kişilik silahlı bir güç toplandı ve bu insanlarla bir sefer düzenledi.*" ANMH, p. 38.

each other and to the center. Contemporary sources commonly reports that the main body of Ismail's troops stemmed from the Turcoman tribes of Anatolia.⁸⁴⁸ Since the deputies (*halife*) of his ancestors were diffused in Anatolia, Hoca Saadeddin reports, Ismail's disciples and 'friends of 'Ali' proliferated very rapidly; their number was uncountable.⁸⁴⁹ Indeed, as Solakzāde points out, the overwhelming majority of Ardabil deputies were working in Anatolia⁸⁵⁰, for the main source of the 'new type disciple' existed there. He sent letters to these Anatolian disciples ordering them to gather under his banner. Many people warmly welcomed Ismail's invitation and flowed to his entourage.⁸⁵¹

Aşıkpaşazāde vividly describes the enthusiastic devotion of his disciples to Ismail.⁸⁵²

Sonra Haydar'un bir oğlu dahī zāhir oldu, İsmail adlu. Müridleri ana tābi oldılar. Şol kadar oldılar kim cemi' memleketde olan müridleri birine buluşacak 'selāmun alekkūm' deyecek yerde 'Şāh' derler idi. Hastalarını görmeğe varıcaq dua yerine 'Şāh' derler idi. Ve bu vilāyet-i Rūm'da olan müridlerine ehl-i sünnet eyidürler idi: 'Bunca zahmet çaküb Ardabil'e varacağına Mekketullah'a varsanuz, Hazret-i Resūl sallallāhu 'aleyhi ve sellemi ziyaret itsenüz yeğrekdür' derler idi. Bunlar cevab virürler idi ki 'Biz diriye varuruz ölüye varmazuz' derler. Ve dahī biri birinin ağzına lafzıyile söğüb yürüler idi. Latifeleri işbu vechileydi. Namaz dahī kılmazlar idi. Ve oruç dahī dutmazlar idi. Ve dahī rafza müte'allik kelimāti çok iderler idi. Velhāsıl rafzı aşıkāre eder oldılar. Memleket-i Rūm'da olan sofuların hülefāsını ve Ardabil'e varan sofuları Sultan Bayezid tahkīr idüb Rum Eli'ne sürdü. İsmail dahī asker çeküb Tebriz'e yürüdü. Tebriz'in

⁸⁴⁸ See, for example, HSE3, 345; SLZ1, p. 428; ANMH, p. 45. Hans R. Roemer, in addition to many other scholars, stresses the nomadic way of life of these tribes and argues that the "elements were tied together not only by ethnic origin and a common language, but much more so by their way of living, namely nomadic features peculiar to their vast majority. ... The Qizilbash are mostly descendants of Turcoman tribes who lived in smaller or bigger unions of federations, mainly as cattle-breeding nomads..." See Hans R. Roemer, "The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy", *Intellectual Studies in Islam*, eds., M. M. Mazzaoui-V. B. Moreen, Utah, 1990, p. 28.

⁸⁴⁹ HSE3, p. 345 ; SLZ1, p. 428.

⁸⁵⁰ SLZ1, p. 428.

⁸⁵¹ HSE3, p. 345; SLZ1, p. 428.

⁸⁵² Aşıkpaşazāde was the first Ottoman historian who attributed religious heresy (*rafaza*) to the adherents of Safavid order during the opening years of the sixteenth century. I would like to remind that the last chapter of Aşıkpaşazāde's history, which pertains to Junayd and later sufis of Ardabil, was finished in Safer 908 (August-September 1502), as recorded by Aşıkpaşazāde himself.

beği kaçdı. Tebriz’i yağma etdiler. Ehl-i sünnete hayli hakaretler eyledi. Müslümanların rızkını, malını ellerinden alub, biri birinin avradına tasarruf edüb helâldür derler idi.⁸⁵³

Haniwaldanus Anonym demonstrates the role of both his ancestors’ propaganda and Ismail’s charisma in collecting so numerous disciples.⁸⁵⁴ *Haniwaldanus Anonym* also sheds light on the nature of the relationship between Ismail and his disciples, as well as the socio-cultural set up of Safavid adherents in Anatolia. The Anonymous history states that Ismail’s disciples loved him so much that when they would swear for something they swore on the head of the Shah.⁸⁵⁵ If a law was issued in the name of Shah everybody - man, woman, children, and elderly – obeyed; and if something was ordered in the name of the Shah they fulfilled it with great pleasure whatever it was. When to wish good health for somebody they said nothing other than ‘Let the Shah give

⁸⁵³ APZ, p. 251. Following verses also clearly show that APZ regards Ismail and his disciples as heretics.

“Muradlar çokluğu gör şeyhi netdi
Kuşandı safayıçün cehle gitdi.
Kuşandı ihramı saraya gitmek,
Ki yumdı gözini ol küfre gitdi.
Husûsan bu şimdiki şeyh ü müridler,
Kamunun ‘ilel hep kile bir nice gitdi.
On iki terk deyüb geydi o şeyhler,
Müridleri kamu yok sevdaya gitdi.
‘Aşıkî sen ol beğle bölüğü,
Ko orduları rafza gitdi.” See APZ, p. 252; APZa, p. 269.

⁸⁵⁴ “[Ismail decided to move from Geylan]. Ülkesinin bütün halkı hem ibadette, hem de dedesi Şeyh Cüneyd ve babası Haydar tarafından öğretilen dini kurallara uyduklarından ve dinî hayatın müstesna kişileri olan meşhur bu iki kişiye olan derin hürmetlerini muhafaza ettiklerinden, bu işi rahatlıkla başaracağını anladı. Bu büyük iki adamın torunu ve oğlu olan İsmail’i onlar şayanı hayret bir sadakatle seviyor ve ona, ellerinden gelen hizmeti yapmaya her zaman için büyük bir zevkle hazır olduklarını gösteriyorlardı. Çünkü o, sadece babasının ve dedesinin şöhreti sayesinde itibar kazanmış değil, aynı zamanda kendi meziyeti sayesinde de üzerine aldığı bütün görevlerde, hatta övgüye değer bir takdirle, onları geçti. O kadar ki, delikanlılık yaşına rağmen, henüz çocukluk çağını atlatmış olmadığı halde, kendisine duyulan saygı ve hürmetten dolayı ona şeyh ünvanı verildi; zira her şeyden önce bu ünvan ona, dedesinin ve babasının izinden giderek onların düşündüklerine göre, insanlara gerçek ve doğru yolu, Allah yolunu gösteriyordu.” See ANMH, pp. 37-38.

⁸⁵⁵ “Bütün halk Şah İsmail’e karşı o kadar büyük bir sevgi besliyordu ki, herhangi bir şeyi yeminle doğrulamak istediklerinde Şah’ın başına yemin ederek bizzat doğruluğunu temin ederlerdi.” ANMH, p. 39.

you what you wish, let what he gives bestow you with what you desire in your heart!⁸⁵⁶ Shah Ismail rearranged the worship, in a contradicting manner to the application of the Prophet Muhammed. Iranian people, in accordance to his orders, did no more respect; rather they cursed them. It is inscribed on one side of his tokens that ‘*Lā ilāhe illāllāhu Muhammediün resulu’llāhi*’ and on the others side ‘*İsmailün halifetu’llāhi*’.⁸⁵⁷

The same source gives further details on the beliefs and religious practices of Ismail’s adherents. After narrating how numerous nomadic Turks (*yörüks*) of Anatolia, who are described as bandits, ran under the banner of Ismail our anonymous author talks about their religious stand. The new and latitudinarian religion established by Ismail was enthusiastically appropriated by these vagabond people. The freedom and indifference to the strict rules of the religion reached such a degree that - contradicting to the Islamic tradition - they even abandoned *namaz* and *oruç*.⁸⁵⁸ The following argument put forward by the anonymous author is quite interesting. He states, ‘put aside all the other factors, it is due to this reason [laxity in religious affairs] that numerous people from the Ottoman realm joined the ranks of Ismail.’⁸⁵⁹

At the beginning of the spring of 1500, having celebrated the festival of New Year’s Day (*Nevruz*) in Arjuwan⁸⁶⁰, Ismail left that place for Ardabil by the way of Gökçe Deniz.⁸⁶¹ After paying a short visit to Ardabil he proceeded to Erzincan. On his way, Ismail spent a few days in the house of Sultan Husayn Bārānī, one of the grandsons

⁸⁵⁶ “*Birine saadet temenni edilmek istendiğinde, ‘Şah arzunu yerine getirsin ve kalbindeki dileği ihsan etsin!’ sözünden başka bir şey söylemeye gerek yoktu.*” ANMH, p. 39.

⁸⁵⁷ ANMH, pp. 39-40.

⁸⁵⁸ ANMH, p. 45.

⁸⁵⁹ “*Her şeyden önce bu sebepten dolayı Osmanlı vilâyetlerinden çok sayıda insan Şah İsmail’in etrafında toplandı.*” ANMH, p. 45.

⁸⁶⁰ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 338.

⁸⁶¹ During the winter of 1499 / 1500, attempts by both Akkoyunlu rulers and Shirvanshah Farukhyasar to seize or kill Ismail were made, but without success. See Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 25.

of Jahanshah Karakoyunlu, in Gökçe Deniz. Suspecting of evil intentions of his host, he left with his 1500 men at night for Chukur Sa'd and then moved to Dokuz Alam.⁸⁶²

Khwandāmir reports that when the news of the young shaykh's emergence spread, devotees from all parts of the world poured to his camp to pay homage. Among them were a group from Afşar of Araslu and another group from Dulkadır, both of whom joined Ismail in the Gökçe Deniz region.⁸⁶³ After a short while Qaracha İlyas⁸⁶⁴, who had set out with a group of his followers from his homeland in Anatolia, appeared at the courtyard of Ismail.⁸⁶⁵ Having been plundered by a neighboring chief named Mentesh in Shoragil on his way, Qaracha İlyas joined the royal camp in Doquz Alam.⁸⁶⁶ The Karamanlu tribe had already met their leader Rüstem Beg and his nephew Bayram Beg, who were among sufis of Lāhijan, and joined Ismail's forces on the plain of Moghan at the beginning of the year.⁸⁶⁷ Being reinforced by newly arriving qizilbash fighters Ismail set out for Terjan on the Qaghizman road, and from there he proceeded to the summer-quarters of Sarukaya⁸⁶⁸, inhabited by the Ustaclu tribe. Ismail spent two months of the summer of 1500 in Sarukaya, a summer pasture (*yaylak*) at the south of Terjan.⁸⁶⁹ There he also spent a few days in the house (tent) of Oglan Ummat from the Ustaclu tribe. Here the Ustaclu tribe gathered around Ismail with their men and

⁸⁶² HS, p. 571; HT, pp. 177-81; HR, pp. 42-3; Sarwar, p. 34; Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 18.

⁸⁶³ Aubin, "L'avènement des Safavides", p. 9; Efendiev, "Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque", p. 26.

⁸⁶⁴ According to HT, he was from Bayburdlu tribe. See HT, p. 182.

⁸⁶⁵ HS, p. 571; HT, p. 182; Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 18.

⁸⁶⁶ HS, p. 571; HR, p. 44; Sarwar, p. 34; Aubin, "Les soufis de Lāhejān", p. 8.

⁸⁶⁷ Aubin, "Les soufis de Lāhejān", p. 8.; "L'avènement des Safavides", p. 9; Haneda, *Le Chāh et les Qizilbāš*, p. 76.

⁸⁶⁸ Some sources mention certain summer-quarter called Sangikul apart from Sarukaya. (HT, p. 182; Sarwar, p. 34.) But this place must be a sub-region in the pasture-land (*yaylak*) of Sarukaya.

⁸⁶⁹ HT, p. 182; Sarwar, p. 34; Aubin, "L'avènement des Safavides", p. 10; Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 18. A heroic deed of Ismail performed in this summer pasture is recited by Safavid chroniclers. According to the legendary report, in the vicinity there was a fierce bear attacking all passers-by and nobody could kill him. In spite of his young age Ismail proved his bravery by slaying this formidable bear. Then Ismail proceeded to Erzincan. See HS, p. 571; HT, pp. 183-4; HR, pp. 44-5.

women.⁸⁷⁰ Qādi Ahmed Qumī gives further details about this meeting: while staying at the camp of the Ustaclu tribe, the leaders of this tribe came to the court of Ismail and paid their homage. Their families and possessions were also with them at the camp. The conversation between the tribal leaders and the Shah ended with the decision that their families would not come with the army, for the security of the women, children, elders, and possessions would create additional problems during the combat and would be sent to the Ottoman territories in Anatolia. A request to the Ottoman authorities made for the transhumance of the Ustaclu women, elders, and children.⁸⁷¹ Upon receiving approval they inhabited in the region Sivas-Tokat-Amasya.⁸⁷²

This exemplary case, of Ustaclu tribe, must be valid similarly for the other tribes of Anatolia as well. The fighter human sources of these Turkoman nomadic tribes joined Ismail's army while the rest of the tribes - i.e women, elders, children, animals, and other properties – were left behind in the Ottoman territories. The former group constituted a tribal military aristocracy in the Safavid state after 1501. The military aristocracy of each tribe, under their own tribal leader, were running Safavid provinces (*ulkā*) bestowed upon them as prebend called “*tiyul*”.⁸⁷³ Thus the connection and

⁸⁷⁰ HS, p. 571; HR, pp. 44-5; Sarwar, p. 34; Savory, “The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia”, pp. 85-6.

⁸⁷¹ Aubin, “L'avènement des Safavides”, pp. 9-10, 29. HT says Ismail wrote a letter to Bayezid II for this. See HT, pp. 175-6. Sümer cites the same account from Gaffārī's *Tārih-i cihān-ārā* and Oktay Efendiev from Eli Zeynelabidin's *Tekmilatü'l-Ahbar*. See Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 18; Oktay Efendiyev, “Sultan II. Bayezid ve Şah İsmail”, *XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildirileri*, Ankara: TTK, 2002, p. 90.

⁸⁷² Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 54.

⁸⁷³ See Aubin, “L'avènement des Safavides”, pp. 29-31. As Roger Savory rightly points out, qizilbash amirs were governing provinces with a certain degree of autonomy, having their own provincial vizier, *sadr*, *wakil*, and other officials. Savory underscores that the provincial administration of the Safavid state was almost exclusively – the only exception was Qādi Muhammad Kāshānī who was appointed *sadr* in 909 / 1503-4 and later promoted to the governorship of Yazd, where he was put to death in 915 / 1509-10 because of his abuse of the extraordinary power in his hands – run by qizilbash amirs. Savory puts it as follows: “The government of the provinces of the Safavid empire during the early period was allotted to qizilbash amirs, who ruled as pretty princes in their provinces. These assignments were known by the

communication between fighting qizilbash troops in Azerbaijan, Iran, and Iraq, and their relatives in Anatolia became one of the vital issues for qizilbashes. As will be scrutinized below, especially by the year 1501, when Ismail captured the temporal power, the policy of the Ottoman government focused on cutting the connection between the two sides off.

Likewise, when heard that Ustaclu tribe had gathered at the court of the Shah, the other qizilbash *oymaqs*, especially from Rūm (Anatolia), Shām, Dulkadir, and Diyarbekir, poured to the courtyard of Ismail.⁸⁷⁴ In the depiction of a modern scholar, “The Safawid *murīds* responded to the call of their leader with enthusiasm, even fanaticism.”⁸⁷⁵ Two additional anecdotes, in addition to the case of Ustaclu, vividly illustrate the spirit and enthusiasm of early qizilbashes during the early years of Ismail. Qādī Ahmad Qumī on the authority of Shahkulu Khalifa Muhrdar says, the devotion of Ismail’s followers was in such a degree that one of them (said to have been from the Dulkadir tribe), who heard the news that Ismail had arrived in Erzincan during his wedding night, immediately left the bride in the tent, without touching her, and went to join the army of the Shah.⁸⁷⁶ The second anecdote is again related to the Dulkadir tribe. *Jawāhir al-Akhhbār*, again on the authority of Shahkulu Khalifa Muhrdar, states, “the fermān of the pādishāh (Ismā’īl) was brought to the Dulkadir tribe, stating that he needed their help and was marching against Alauddevle Dulkadir (913/1507); if they

general term *tiyūl*. The governor, and the troops which he was obliged to maintain and muster when required, consumed the greater part of the revenue; a part only, in the form of presents and certain dues, was given to the king. They (the governors) were able to sub-assign the area under them and had complete control.” See Roger M. Savory, “Some Notes on the Provincial Administration of the Early Safawid Empire”, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXVII, London, 1964, p. 115.

⁸⁷⁴ HT, p. 176. But HT mentions these events as if occurred before Ismail’s move to Gökçe Deniz.

⁸⁷⁵ Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, p. 85.

⁸⁷⁶ HT, p. 184. The same story is recorded in some other Safavid sources as well. See Youssef-Jamālī, *The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā’īl I*, p. 59.

wished to demonstrate the true devotion, let them heed the order (*hüküm*) the moment they received it. The order reached them in the late afternoon. By sunset, 5.000 men of this tribe had mounted.”⁸⁷⁷

In accordance to the decision taken in the previous summer, Safavid disciples gathered in Erzincan under Ismail’s banner. By the time followers from the Shamlu, Ustaclu, Rūmlu, Tekelu, Dulkadirli⁸⁷⁸, Afshar⁸⁷⁹, Qajar⁸⁸⁰, and Varsaq tribes, and sufis from Karacadağ⁸⁸¹ had joined him in this place, the size of the Safavid army had reached seven thousand men.⁸⁸² Among those new-comers were Muhammad Beg Ustaclu and

⁸⁷⁷ Quoted in Savory, “The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia”, p. 86.

⁸⁷⁸ Of course this was a group from the Dulkadir tribe, which was ruling in the region of Maraş, Elbistan, and Harput under Alāuddevle Beg. It seems from available evidence that Alāuddevle did not, or could not, apply any effective measure against a certain branch of his tribe’s adherence to the qizilbash movement. Following his death in 1515, the Dulkadir tribe is said to have divided into three parts: One went to Sultan Selim, the other to Shah Ismail, and the third group to Ubayd Khan Uzbek. See Muhammad Karim Youssef-Jamālī, *The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā’il I (1487-1524)*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, 1981, p. 58. For further reading on Dulkadirli tribe see Mükremin H. Yinanç, “Dulkadirli”, *IA*, vol. 3, 654-62; *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan*, edited and published by Mir Hāşim Muhaddes, Tehran, 1361 (1982), pp. 49-51.

⁸⁷⁹ For Afshar tribe see M. Fuad Köprülü, “Afshar”, *EI2*; “Afşar”, *IA*, vol. 2, 28-38; Faruk Sümer, “Afşarlar’a Dair”, *Fuad Köprülü Armağanı*, İstanbul, 1953, 453-78.

⁸⁸⁰ According to Faruk Sümer, Qajars came from the Boz-ok region (Yozgat) in Anatolia to Gence in northern Azerbaijan towards the end of the fifteenth century. Among the most prominent disciples and amirs of of Shaykh Haydar was Pīrī Beg Qajar. However during the same period another branch of the Qajar tribe served Akkoyunlu rulers. Later on, following Shah Ismail’s seizure of the power they fully joined Qizilbash troops. Nonetheless, their achievement of primary rank in the state affairs of the Safavids would occur under Shah Tahmasb. See Faruk Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türkmenlerinin Rolü*, Ankara: TTK, 1999, pp. 12, 53-4, 96-8. For further reading on Qajar tribe, see Faruk Sümer, “Kadjar”, *EI2*; M. Longworth-Dames and B. Darkot, “Kaçar (Kacar)”, *IA*, vol. 6, 33-9; James J. Reid, “The Qajar Uymaq in the Safavid Period, 1500-1722”, *Iranian Studies*, 11, 1978, 117-43; Robert D. McChesney, “Comments on the ‘The Qajar Uymaq in the Safavid Period, 1500-1722’”, *Iranian Studies*, 14, 1981, 87-105.

⁸⁸¹ See, for example, HT, p. 184. Karacadağ is a mountainous region in the north of Tabriz, between Tabriz and Aras River.

⁸⁸² This force constituted the essential core of the Safavid army, which would conquer the whole of Azerbaijan, Iran, as well as Iraq in ten years. Compare Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, pp. 10-11; Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 31. Almost all of the early Safavid sources agree on this number. Iskender Munshī, who frequently refers to those early sources such as HS and HR, however, interestingly gives the number as three of four thousand. He also says that those sufis came from “Syria, Diyarbakr, Sivas, Bayburd, and those regions.” See AA, p. 43.

Abdi Beg Shamlu with 200 and 300 fighters from their tribes respectively.⁸⁸³ An anonymous history of Shah Ismail recounts the agglomeration of qizilbash tribes in Erzincan as follows,

After Ismail's arrival to Erzincan, chiefs of the tribes, and leading sufis and khalifas of the family of the Imām from Syria, Anatolia, Karaman, and from the region around Erzincan came to the royal court. Day after day the number of gāzis augmented... After sufis from diverse regions arrived, the tribes assembled; and the tribes of the Shamlu, the Ustaclu, the Rūmlu, the Tekelu, the Dulkadir, the Afshar, the Varsaq, and the sufis from Karacadağ, as well as Muhammad Beg Ustaclu with 200 men from his clan and 'Abdi Beg Shamlu with 300 men from his clan, had the honor of kissing the noble feet. Among them the Seigneur of the fortunate conjunction chose 7.000 young sufis⁸⁸⁴ who had the same sentiment and the same objective.⁸⁸⁵

The point of eminence to be stressed here is that except the Shamlu, which was from northern Syria-eastern Anatolia, and the Qajar from Azerbaijan⁸⁸⁶, these tribes were all from Anatolia; and almost all were nomadic Turkomans.⁸⁸⁷ Among the seventeen prominent qizilbash āmirs marching on Shirvan, records Safavid sources, there were two Shamlu, two Ustaclu, two Karamanlu, one Bayburdlu, one Hınıslu, one Tekelu, one Çekirlu, one Qajar, one Dulkadirli, and five Afshar.⁸⁸⁸ During the campaign

⁸⁸³ HR, p. 51. Also consider Sarwar, p. 35. HS interestingly does not mention the reinforcement of Ismail's army by the sufi fighters from these prominent qizilbash tribes in Erzincan. He narrates as if Ismail headed towards Shirvan after spending two months in Sarukaya.

⁸⁸⁴ This phrase is very interesting. If we rely of this account, the number of qizilbash summoned in Erzincan pastureland was greater than 7000. But Ismail and his prominent amirs chose among them those who were most alike fighters. The anonymous history also underlines the focused sentiment and ideological alignment of these fighters.

⁸⁸⁵ Quoted in Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâš*, pp. 63-64. This is the anonym history housed in British Library, Or. 3248, and is used by Denison Ross (Denison E. Ross, "The early years of Shah Ismail, founder of the Safavi Dynasty", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXVIII, 1896, 249-340.). But Ross did not publish this part of the manuscript in his article.

⁸⁸⁶ See *Tarih-i Kizilbaşan*, pp. 56-7. Nonetheless, as indicated above their origin was central Anatolia, namely Boz-ok region.

⁸⁸⁷ As Roemer determines, "on the whole, the non-Turkish Qizilbash [including Persian men of pen such as Najm-i Sani and Najmu'd-din Gilāni] were not only in the minority, but were even rare exceptions." See Roemer, "The Qizilbash Turcomans", p. 29. For further reading on the origins of these tribes see Faruk Sümer, *Safevi Devletinin Kuruluşu*, especially pp. 43-56. Also compare Savory, "The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia", p. 92.

⁸⁸⁸ Aubin, "L'avènement des Safavides", p. 11. Efendiev recites the names of these amirs from *Futuhāt-ı Şāhī* as follows, Abidin Beg Shamlu, Husayn Beg Lala Shamlu, Muhammad Beg Ustaclu, Ahmed Beg

on Shirvan, Bayram Beg Karamanlu commanded the troops of the Tekelu and the Dulkadir tribes.⁸⁸⁹ During the war with Shirvanshah Farrukhyesar, the Shamlu tribe constituted the right wing and Ustaclu tribe constituted the left wing of the Safavid army,⁸⁹⁰ while the Tekelu, Rumlu, and Dulkadir tribes were avant-garde.⁸⁹¹ The qizilbash army which defeated Alvand Mirza in 1501 was almost exclusively composed of these qizilbash *oymaqs*.⁸⁹²

To sum up, it is not an exaggeration when Efendiev states that, “L’État safavide fut donc crée par l’aristocratie féodale des ces tribus kızılbaş de langue turque.”⁸⁹³ Masashi Haneda, who conducted a detailed study on the military of the early Safavid state, concludes that although there were certain religious figures and statesmen of Persian origin, the portion of Iranian element in the early Safavid army is almost negligible; he rather underlines the tribal and Turkoman character of this army. As he puts, “Il ne serait donc pas exagéré de dire que l’armée safavide se composa, en gros, de tribus turkmènes. En effet, l’existence de gens issus de tribus dans l’armée y apporte

Sufioğlu Ustaclu, Bayram Beg Qaramanlu, Kılığ Beg Qaramanlu, Qaraca İlyas Bayburdlu, İlyas Beg Himislu, Sultanshah Beg Afshar, Dana Beg Afshar, Halil Beg Muhurdâr Afshar, Husayn Beg Sofracı Afshar, Lala Muhammad Tekelu, Bekir Beg Çakırlu, Pîrî Beg Qajar, Pîrî Beg Pervâneci Afshar, Salman Beg Hâzin Dukadir. See Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 31.

⁸⁸⁹ Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, pp. 30-31.

⁸⁹⁰ Aubin, “L’avènement des Safavides”, p. 11 ; Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâş*, p. 66.

⁸⁹¹ Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 31 ; Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâş*, p. 31.

⁸⁹² For detailed analysis of Ismail’s army in the early battles, such as that against Shirvanshah, Alvand, Murad, Shaybānī Han, and Sultan Selim, see Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâş*, especially pp. 29-47.

⁸⁹³ Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 33. For a similar approach, which put primary stress on the role of Turkoman tribes in the forming of Safavid Military, thus in foundation of the, state see Hans R. Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy”, pp. 27-9. Roemer writes, “Obviously, the appearance and success of the Qizilbash are primarily to be related to the Turkomans. ... First of all, the Safavid state, founded by Shah Ismail, was a Turkoman achievement.” Also see Irène Mélikoff, *Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, trs. Turan Alptekin, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999, p. 174.

quelques caractéristiques typiquement tribales. Le système des deux ailes existe.⁸⁹⁴ Les troupes se composent des unités tribales.”⁸⁹⁵

If we look at the geographical origin of the prominent qizilbash tribes, the very eminent link between the movement and the Ottoman Anatolia appears. Among those tribes, the Ustaclu, which had already associated with the campaigns of Shaykh Haydar on Caucasus, and played an active role during the rise of Shah Ismail,⁸⁹⁶ was stemmed from Ulu Yörük, a great nomadic group living in the region of Sivas-Amasya-Tokat and Kırşehir. In the later Ottoman surveys, towards the end of the sixteenth century, we still come across the Ustaclu clan among the Ulu Yörük nomads. But their number was then quite reduced.⁸⁹⁷ As mentioned above, Ismail visited their summer pasture and stayed there for two months just before the Erzincan congregation. This *oymaq* produced a number of very influential war lords such as Muhammad Han Ustaclu, his brother Karahan, and Çayan Sultan.⁸⁹⁸

Another very important qizilbash tribe serving Shah Ismail, the Shamlu, was composed of nomadic Turkomans from Halep Türkmenleri, so called in the Ottoman official registers, which were grazing their herd in Uzun-Yayla, in the south of Sivas,

⁸⁹⁴ Following the Turko-Mongolian tradition, the Safavid army used to organize as two wings and a center in battlefields. If the shah was present, he stayed at the center with dignitaries such as religious representatives and statesmen. The right wing had always been dominated by the Shamlu tribe while the left wing had been dominated by Ustaclu. Apart from Shamlu, Rūmlu, Tekelu, and Turkmān tribes used to fight in the right wing, while Dulkadir, Afshar, and Qajar tribes used to fight in the left wing. For a detailed analysis of the organization of the Safavid army based on the Safavid chronicles see Haneda, *Le Chāh et les Qizilbāš*, p. 48-61.

⁸⁹⁵ Haneda, *Le Chāh et les Qizilbāš*, p. 47.

⁸⁹⁶ Aubin, “Les soufis de Lāhejān”, p. 9.

⁸⁹⁷ See Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 44. For Ulu Yörük see Erhan Afyoncu, “Ulu Yörük (1485-1574)”, *Anadolu'da ve Rumeli'de Yörükler ve Türkmenler Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, haz. Tufan Gündüz, Ankara, 2000, 1-7.

⁸⁹⁸ See *Tarih-i Kızılbaşān*, pp. 45-9.

and spending the winter-season in the vicinity of Antep and Halep.⁸⁹⁹ The earliest record about Shamlu Turkomans traces back to the late fourteenth century. *Bezm u Rezm*, the history of Kadı Burhaneddin, mentions them grazing their herds in the summer pastures (*yaylak*) near Sivas-Kösedağ.⁹⁰⁰ Their adherence to the order traces back to Shaykh Junayd's visit of the region half a century ago. And since then the Shamlu tribe had become one of the main pedestals of the Safavid order. Husayn Beg Lala, Abdi (Abidin) Beg, his son Durmuş Han were some of the influential *āmirs* of this tribe.

Among the qizilbash tribes in Ismail's retinue, the origin of Karamanlu oymaq is perhaps the vaguest one. According to Faruk Sümer, they had no connection with the Karaman-oğlu tribe of Anatolia, but did have one with an indigenous Turkoman tribe of the Errān region, in the north of Azerbaijan, since the time of Karakoyunlu. The name was seemingly derived from their eponymous leader Emir Karaman, who governed Gence and Berda' during the rule of Kara-Yusuf of Karakoyunlu (late fourteenth- and early fifteenth century, d. 1420). Before the rise of Safavids, this tribe served in the Karakoyunlu and Akkoyunlu armies.⁹⁰¹ *Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān* confirms Sümer's suggestion.⁹⁰² It counts Karamanlu among Akkoyunlu (ex-Karakoyunlu) *oymaqs* and describes Emir Karaman the greatest among emirs under Kara Yusuf. *Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān* also mentions Bayram Beg Karamanlu, saying he was the governor of Balkh during the

⁸⁹⁹ See *Tarīh-i Kızılbaşān*, p. 8-11; Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 44; "XVI. Asırda Anadolu, Suriye ve Irak'ta yaşayan Türk aşîretlerine umumî bir bakış", *İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, c. 11, no. 1-4, 1949-1950, pp. 511-513, 517; İlhan Şahin, "XVI. Asırda Halep Türkmenleri", in his *Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler*, İstanbul: Eren, 2006, pp. 131-133; "XVI. Yüzyılda Halep ve Yeniil Türkmenleri", in his *Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler*, İstanbul: Eren, 2006, pp. 156-8.

⁹⁰⁰ See Aziz b. Erdeşir-i Esterâbadî, *Bezm u Rezm*, translated into Turkish by Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara, 1990, p. 303. *Bezm u Rezm* is a Persian history of Kadı Burhaneddin, who ruled Sivas and the region around in the period between the years 1381 and 1398, and written in 1398. The author was the court historian of Kadı Burhaneddin and reported most of the events on his eye witness, which enhances the value of his history.

⁹⁰¹ See Faruk Sümer, *Kara Koyunlular*, I, Ankara, TTK, 1992, pp.26-7; *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, pp. 12, 54, 106-7.

⁹⁰² It should be noted that Faruk Sümer did not use this source.

reign of Shah Ismail, married the sister of the shah, and died in the battle of Gujduwan with Necm-i Sāni.⁹⁰³

However, a fifteenth century Anatolian source shows Bayram Beg and his *oymaq* as a branch of Karamanoğulları, which ruled central and southern Anatolia for nearly two centuries. We learn from Şikârî's *Karaman-nâme* that when Karamanoğlu Kasım Bey was killed and the Karaman rule in the central Anatolia had ended by the Ottomans in 1483,⁹⁰⁴ most of former Karaman begs entered into the service of the Ottoman dynasty. However, Kasım Bey's commander in-chief (*çeri-başı*) Pir Bayram and two other prominent Karaman generals, namely Kökezoğlu and Esed Çelebi, refused the Ottoman suzerainty. They, with a group of warriors, became brigands conducting banditry in several regions including Maraş, Halep, Amid, and Humus.⁹⁰⁵ On the other hand, says Şikârî, Shah Ismail rose up with claim of temporal power, also arguing the revenge of his father and grand-father. He gathered an army of 4.000 men from artisans and craftsmen. However, one of his wise counselors opposed him arguing that these men could not be soldiers and it was impossible to avenge for Shaykh Haydar with them. The soldier must be experienced in battle and cut off heads.⁹⁰⁶ Acknowledging his counselor

⁹⁰³ *Tarīh-i Kızılbāşān*, pp. 37-8.

⁹⁰⁴ Kasım Bey was the son of Qaramanoğlu İbrahim Bey. Following the death of İbrahim Bey in 1464, taking advantage of internal struggle between Qaraman princes, Ottoma troops invaded Qaraman territories, mortally demaging the Qaraman rule in the region. During the civil war between Prince Cem and Bayezid II, Kasım Bey fought in the ranks of Cem against Bayezid II's troops. Following Cem's defeat he made a deal with Bayezid II and governed İçel region as a vassal of Bayezid II. His death in 1483 marked the end of Qaraman rule in Anatolia. According to Şikârî, he, with his three sons, was poisoned by Bayezid II. See Şihâbeddin Tekindağ, "Qaramanlılar", *IA*, vol. 6, pp. 326-7. Also consider Faruk Sümer, "Karāmān-oghulları", *EI2*.

⁹⁰⁵ Şikârî, *Şikârî'nin Qaramanoğulları Tarihi*, haz. Mes'ud Koman, Konya: Yeni Kitab Basımevi, 1946, p. 206. A more carefully prepared edition of *Qaraman-nâme* was recently published by Metin Sözen and Necdet Sakaoğlu. However, the above cited part, which constituted the last paragraphs of *Qaraman-nâme*, does not exist in the manuscript they used. See Şikârî, *Qaramannâme*, [*Zamanın Kahramanı Qaramanîlerin Tarihi*], Metin Sözen-Necdet Sakaoğlu, eds., İstanbul, 2005.

⁹⁰⁶ "... Böyle asker ile Şayh Hayder'in kanın alamazsın. Asker cenk görmüş, baş kesmiş bahadır gerekdir". See Şikârî, p. 207.

to be right, Ismail decided to return to Gilan. At that moment one of his men informed Ismail about a war-lord, who refuted the Ottoman rule and had good profession in the art of war: “*Ol adem eyder: ‘Karaman Ođlu henüz vefat eyledi. Üç serdar ile bahadır bin erleri vardır. Muttasıl erbabı cenkdir [sic], Osman Ođluna tâbi olmadılar. Eđer gelirlerse dünyada anın gibi asker olmaz. Birisi kırk bine yetişir. Serdarlarına Pir Bayram dirler.*” Then Ismail sent a letter to Bayram Beg and Kökezođlu, who received it in Tekür Yaylađı. Şikârî’s account runs,

Mektup yazub Meges ile Karamanođlu askerine gönderdi, gelüb Tekür Yaylađında bulub, Pir Bayram’a ve Kökez’e mektubu virdi. Açub okudu, dimişki: “Senki Pir Bayram’sın! İştittim, şahınız vefat itmiş, kalmamış, Osman Ođluna tabî olmamışsınız. Lütf idüb gelüb bana asker olasız, size küllî riayet iderim.” Pir Bayram beylerle müşavere idüb Aceme gitmesin makul gördüler. Bin erle Kökez, altı bin erle Pir Bayram kalkub, Şahı Acem’e [sic] gelüb, Şah bunlara azim riayet idüb, varub Tebriz’i Şah’a alıvirdiler. Horasan cenginde Kökez’i ve Bayram’ı ahz idüb helak itdiler.⁹⁰⁷

Şikârî’s account evidently includes a number of historical errors, thus can not be used *mot à mot* as history; a careful criticism of this account is necessary.⁹⁰⁸ Besides all its deficiencies, however, the very strong point in his account is that it clearly reflects one of the fundamental changes in the political scene of Anatolia in the second half of the fifteenth century: the traditional Turko-Mongolian political system of tribal confederation, which clamped around the Karaman dynasty, failed and totally dissolved against the developing bureaucratic empire of the Ottomans. Still more valuable point of Şikârî’s account for the purpose of the present study is that following the dissolution of the tribal confederation as an effective political and military power, some actors of this

⁹⁰⁷ Şikârî, pp. 207-208. Bayram Beg Qaramanlu was killed during the battle against Uzbeks in Gujdavân, a city in Tranxoxiana, in 1512. See HS, p. 598. Şikârî interestingly does not mention Rüstem Beg Qaramanlu.

⁹⁰⁸ Whether the story recited here is true or not, it surely indicates some historical facts; as will be discussed in the next chapter, the connection between Shah Ismail and Qaramanlu tribes of Anatolia is envisaged by archival evidence.

traditional structure, who were not incorporated into the Ottoman system, resisted against Ottoman ‘imperialism’ and sought another powerful axis to save themselves from being swallowed by the Ottoman regime. The new synthesis of the Turkoman way of life and Islamic mysticism rising in the east, the Safavid movement, became exactly the fulcrum of these tribes against the increasing Ottoman power in Anatolia. In addition to the case of Bayram Beg Karamanlu, we see the same situation in the Turgut, Varsak, and other tribes of Tas-ili region as well.

Fadlullah b. Ruzbihāni says most of the adherents of Junayd and Haidar were coming from Rūm.⁹⁰⁹ No doubt Ruzbihāni means Anatolia by the word “Rum”. In the more specific connotation, however, the Ottoman Province of Rum was a major qizilbash zone as well. As a matter of fact, one of the greatest tribal groups in the Safavid ranks were the Rumlu, which was composed of sufis from the Province of Rum⁹¹⁰ - i.e Sivas, Şebinkarahisar, Tokat, Amasya, Canik, Çorum.⁹¹¹ Sohrweide has doubts on whether or not the people bearing this name all came from the Ottoman Province of Rum, even though considerable portion of them plausibly were.⁹¹² Nonetheless, *Tarih-i Kızılbaşān* clearly writes that this *oymaq* was composed of qizilbashes from Tokat, Sivas, Amasya, Karahisar, and Tercan.⁹¹³

⁹⁰⁹ TA, p. 61.

⁹¹⁰ For the borders of the Province of Rum within the administrative system of the Ottoman Empire see Tayyip Gökbilgin, “15 ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-i Rûm”, *Vakıflar Dergisi*, VI, 1965, 51-61.

⁹¹¹ Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 43.

⁹¹² Sohrweide, p. 137. Sohrweide underlines three peculiarities of this province: 1) it had been the center of gâzi milieu tracing down from Danişmend Turkomans, 2) it was the frontier province between Ottoman and Safavid states, and 3) it was on the main trade roads connecting the East to Constantinople. See Sohrweide, pp. 134-5.

⁹¹³ Indeed, *Tarih-i Kızılbaşān* mentions two *oymaqs*: Rumlu and Hınıslu *oymaqs*. According to *Tarih-i Kızılbaşān* the members of the former were from Tokat, Sivas, Amasya, and neighboring regions, which corresponds to the Province of Rum in the Ottoman administrative division, while the latter was composed of tribal people from Karahisar and Tercan. Nonetheless others must have regarded Hınıslu as a sub-clan in Rumlu *oymaq* that they refer to the great amirs like Div Ali, Nur Ali Sultan, whom *Tarih-i Kızılbaşān* mention with affiliation to Hınıslu, as Rumlu. An interesting point in the account of *Tarih-i Kızılbaşān*

As for the other tribes, members of the Tekelu came from the Teke region.⁹¹⁴ The Varsaq⁹¹⁵ tribe was living in the region of Adana-Tarsus, and the Turgud⁹¹⁶ were in the Karaman and Taş-eli region. Afshar was a great Turkoman tribe scattered in Anatolia (*Rūm*), Azerbaijan, Fars, Persian Iraq, Kirman, Khorasan, and Arabian Iraq.⁹¹⁷ To conclude, it obviously appears that an overwhelming majority of Ismail's followers were coming from the Ottoman territories.⁹¹⁸

There is a complete list of Ismail's army, possibly during the battle of Çaldıran⁹¹⁹, in *Şahnâme-i Âl-i Osman*⁹²⁰ housed in *Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi*. *Şahnâme* says when Shah Ismail rose up, a great number of people from several countries gathered around him. Then the Shah assigned a person as the leader of each

pertaining to Rumlu is that only for this oymaq it needs to bring an expression that some of this oymaq were nomads and some of them were sedentary. See *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan*, pp. 11, 25-6.

⁹¹⁴ *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan* gives the homeland of this oymaq as Menteşe İli, Aydın İli, Hamid İli, and Germiyan İli. See *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan*, p. 27. After 11 years, the qizilbashes of Teke would revolt against the Ottoman authority in the name of the Shah. This revolt will be evaluated in detail.

⁹¹⁵ It is said that several folk-singers at Shah Ismail's court used to sing Varsaqi songs in order to arouse the motivation of warriors. See Youssef-Jamali, *The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā'il I*, p. 60. Faruk Sümer states it is recorded with red ink in the Ottoman survey registers (*tahrir*) during the reign of Suleyman the Magnificent that many Varsaq from the region of Adana and Taurus became qizilbash and went to Iran. See Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, p. 50; *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan*, p. 40. For further reading on Varsaq see Faruk Sümer, "Çukur-Ova Tarihinde Dâir Araştırmalar", *Tarih Araştırmaları*, I, sayı. I, 70-98; Ali Sinan Bilgili, *Osmanlı döneminde Tarsus Sancağı ve Tarsus Türkmenleri: sosyo-ekonomik tarih*, Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 2001; idem, "Tarsus Türkmenleri (Varsaklar)", *Anadolu'da ve Rumeli'de Yörükler ve Türkmenler Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, haz. Tufan Gündüz, Ankara, 2000, 9-49; İlhan Şahin, "Kırşehir Bölgesinde Varsaklar", in his *Osmanlı Döneminde Konar-Göçerler*, İstanbul: Eren, 2006, 165-172.

⁹¹⁶ For further reading on Turgud see M. Zeki Oral, "Turgut oğulları, eserleri-vakfiyeleri", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, 3, 1956, 31-64; "Turgut oğulları", *IV. Türk Tarih Kongresi 1948*, Ankara, 1952, 140-158; Faruk Sümer, "Turgutlular", *IA*.

⁹¹⁷ Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, pp. 98-100; Youssef-Jamali, *The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā'il I*, p. 54. (Quotes from *Bustān al-Siyāha*); *Tarih-i Kızılbaşan*, pp. 51-6.

⁹¹⁸ For further discussion of geographical, cultural, and ethnical origins of those tribes constituting the backbone of Ismail's army see Sümer, *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu*, pp. 43-56; Youssef-Jamali, *The Life and Personality of Shāh Ismā'il I*, pp. 48-64.

⁹¹⁹ See footnotes below.

⁹²⁰ Mehmed b. Mehmed el-Fenārî eş-şehir bî Ta'likî-zâde, *Şahnâme-i Âl-i Osman*, manuscript, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, III. Ahmed Kitaplığı, 3592. *Şahnâme-i Âl-i Osman*, alias *Şemâlnâme-i Âl-i Osman* is a book devoted to explaining the virtues of the Ottoman Sultans until Murad III (1574-95). The author writes his name in fol. 9a as Mehmed b. Mehmed el-Fenārî eş-şehir bî Ta'likî-zâde. He says he was assigned as court historian (*şehnâmeçi*) by Murad III. Thus his work must have been completed in the period between 1574 and 1595. Ta'likî-zâde died in 1599-1600. See Fehmi Edhem Karatay, *Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Türkçe Yazmalar Kataloğu*, İstanbul, 1961, p. 371.

arriving group (tribe or *oymaq*) and the others were put under his command. By this way, the Shah founded his army.⁹²¹ According to *Şahnāme*, Ismail's army was composed of a total of seventeen *oymaqs*, each providing Kurçis⁹²² and ordinary soldiers to the army. The complete list is given in Table 5.1.⁹²³

Table 5.1. The List of Qizilbash *Oymaqs*

OYMAQ	NEFERAN	KURÇIYAN
Ustaclu	6100	400
Ekrad-ı Seyyid Mansur	845	150
Afşar	7400	400
Bayburtlu	375	400
Bayatlu	1500	
Tekelü	5000	300
Ereşlu ve Talişlu	6500	150
Türkman	6700	400
Çepni (neferan+kurçiyani)	1300	
Hacılar		1200

⁹²¹ *Şahnāme*, fol. 87a.

⁹²² For “Kurçi”, see following paragraph.

⁹²³ See *Şahnāme*, fols. 87a-87b.

Şamlu	5100	400
Dulkadirlü	6300	500
Arapkirlü	1000	
Garipler	350	
Kaçar	3300	300
Karadağlı (neferan+kurçıyan)	1000	
Varsak		500
TOTAL	52770	5100 ⁹²⁴

Şahnāme, without specifying time and space, says that Shah Ismail had in total 54.000 soldiers.⁹²⁵ His army was composed of two essentially different kinds of troops.⁹²⁶ One consisted of the Shah's immediate retinue (*kapıkulu*) receiving their salary directly from the Shah. They were called *Kurçi* or *Korucu*. The other part of the army was composed of the (tribal) retinues or *oymaq* soldiers of Qizilbash khans (tribal leaders). *Şahnāme* states that at the head of each *oymaqs* was a *han* and some three or four *sultans*. These khans were governing provinces and possessed tax revenues; and they had their fellow tribal troops under their command, which constituted the main

⁹²⁴ An archival document dated July 21, 1516 (TSA, document E 11996) says, "During the battle of Caldiran the shah had three thousand *kurçis*. Later the number of *kurçis* reduced to one thousand and seven hundred. Now [in June 1516] he there left one thousand *kurçis*." This document gives a list of the qizilbash army, indicating each amir with the number of soldiers they commanded. According to this document the overall total was approximately eighteen thousand soldiers. It is not clear in the document whether this was the inventory of the whole qizilbash army or of one bunch of it. When compared to other contemporary sources, however, it clearly appears that this must have been the inventory of only one bunch of the Safavid army.

⁹²⁵ According to the list above, the size of Safavid army appears 57870 soldiers in total. This number seems compatible with the other Ottoman sources describing the Safavid army during the Battle of Caldiran. However, it should be noted here that this was not the whole of Safavid army for "large qizilbash forces were tied down on the eastern marches of the the Safawid empire, where some of the leading qizilbash *amīrs* remained at their posts to guard against a sudden Uzbek incursion into Khurāsān: - these included Dīw Sultān at Balkh, Zaynal Khān Shāmlū at Harāt, and Amīr Sultan Mawsillū at Qāyin." See Roger Savory, "The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia", *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, p. 87.

⁹²⁶ As one would immediately note, the immediate retinue of the Shah, the *Kurçi*, was also composed of tribal soldiers. Furthermore, the *Kurçi* troops of each tribe were most probably had their own tribal commander directly responsible towards the Shah.

body of the Safavid army. Each *han* and sultan had soldiers according to their countries. From the central treasury only some barley for the horses of these soldiers and wheat for themselves as well as some money for their needs were provided. Apart from that neither the Shah gave anything to these tribal chiefs and provincial governors at the same time, nor did they give to the Shah. However, the *korucus* of each *oymaq* used to receive clothes from the shah according to their merit and skill.⁹²⁷ As obviously seen, qizilbash khans enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in political, military, and fiscal affairs, which was pretty compatible with the tribal mode of organization.⁹²⁸

What immediately comes to mind at this point is the question of what the response of the Ottoman government was when Ismail rose up, especially when he came to Erzincan. Ismail arrived in Erzincan in the summer of 1500, when Bayezid II was engaged in the conquest of Moton, Coron, and Navarin. Thus he could communicate with Anatolian disciples without serious obstacles. As already delineated, numerous qizilbash fighters from several Turkoman nomadic tribes living within the Ottoman borders joined Ismail's army there. Kemalpaşazâde calls attention, for example, to the fact that the eastern borders of the empire were not well protected since the army was occupied in war with Venice. Because of that Ismail could congeal a great number of fighters from Ottoman territories.⁹²⁹

⁹²⁷ See *Şahnâme*, fols. 87a-87b.

⁹²⁸ *Şahnâme*'s account reads, "Kızılbaş-mecusi me'âş cümle vaz'-ı evvelde elli dört bin leşkerdür. Bu dahi iki nev' üzeredür. Dergâhidür ki kapıkuludur Şahdan tonluğı vardır. Ya'ni ulûfeye mutasarrıfdur. Biri hanlar sultanlar nökeridür. Onlar ülkeye mutasarrıflardur. Ya'ni bir veche timar karyeleri vardır. Bu icmalin mufassalı ve bu kelamın mahsulü budur cümle kızılbaş on yedi oymağdur. Aslı budur ki Şah İsmail zuhur itdükde her diyardan adem gelüb cem' olan eşhasın birin baş eyleyüb säyirini âna tâbi' iderdi. ... Bu zikr olunan oymağların her birinin bir hanları üçer dörder beşer sultanları olub her hanın ve sultanın ülkesine göre neferâtı olub bu neferâtın atın arpa ve gendüye buğday virüb vemâ yehtâc için birer mikdar nesne virür. Ne Şah'dan bunlara bir akçe virilür ve ne bunların karyelerinden ve ülkelerinden Şah'a bir akçe gelür. Amma bu oymağânun yine kurçuları ki vardır anlar şahdan tonluk yirler, nev-rûzda liyâkatine göre hil'at giydirilüb şanına göre tümen hesabınca tonluk virülür." See *Şahnâme*, fols. 87a-87b.

⁹²⁹ KPZ, p. 277.

Similarly, Hoca Saadeddin also reports that Ismail came to Erzincan in order to recruit fighters from among his disciples, who were ‘uncountable’ in the Ottoman territories.⁹³⁰ Ottoman administration, however, carefully followed Ismail’s movement. In the case of possible qizilbash assaults Anatolian forces were alerted. Bayezid II ordered Yahya Pasha to move to Ankara with Anatolian troops (*sipāhis* of *Anadolu Beylerbeyliği*). Karaman and *Rumiye-i Suğra*⁹³¹ troops were also alerted.⁹³² But Ismail’s plan was not to fight with the Ottomans. Rather he aimed to gather qizilbash fighters from Ottoman territories. When convened some thousand qizilbashes he returned to clash with his enemies in the east, i.e. Shirvanshah and Akkoyunlu. Since the intention of the Shah appeared as just to recruit soldiers, Ottoman forces relaxed.⁹³³ Aşıkpaşazāde states that when he came to Erzincan Ismail realized that the Ottoman army was already on alert. Then he sent an ambassador to the sultan explaining his intention, which had nothing to do with the Ottoman territories. Aşıkpaşazāde says that Ismail’s ambassadors explained his aim as if to take the revenge of his ancestors, but not to seize temporal

⁹³⁰ HSE3, p. 345.

⁹³¹ For the Province of Rum in the Ottoman administrative division, see Ahmet Şimşirgil, “Osmanlı Taşra Teşkilatında Rûm Beylerbeyliği”, *Marmara Üniversitesi, Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 5, 1990, 289-99.

⁹³² HSE3, p. 345; SLZ1, p. 428. Also consider Hanna Sohrweide, “Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert”, *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, p. 141.

⁹³³ “Böylece bütün Haydâriye tâifelerini toplamakla nice azgın yaradılışlı ve raftzî mezhebinde olan dev yapılı türk yanına derilmiş bulunuyordu.... Atalarının halifeleri Rum diyarına yayılmış olmakla Ali dostları ile müridleri sayıya gelmez ve hesaba sığmaz ölçüye ulaşmıştı. Bu nedenle Rum ülkelerine mektuplar gönderip yanına çağırırdı. Bu haber üzerine Rum’dan pek çok kimse gidip ona ayak uydurup buyruğuna bağlandılar. Ama sürekli savaşlar sonunda bir çok adamları telef olduğundan yardımcıları azalınca yeniden adam derlemek için Rum ucundan girerek Erzincan’a geldi. Cennet mekan Padişah Sultan Bayezid ol kıyıcı kişinin bir mazarrat yapacağından kuşkuyla düşmekle Yahya Paşa’yı Anadolu askeriyle Ankara yöresine göndermişti. Qaraman askeri Aksaray’da toplanıp Rumiye-i Suğra cerisi de Sultan Ahmed Han yanında yer almışlardı. Azgınlığı yol edinen Şah ise Rum’dan nice bin sersemi toplayınca geri dönüp Bayındır’la döğüşmeye girişti. Rum ucuna gelmekten muradı tek asker toplamak idüğü belli olunca sefere hazırlanan kahraman orduya destur verildi.” HSE3, pp. 345-6.

power.⁹³⁴ By pretending so, Ismail reduced the wrath of the Ottoman sultan. Ottoman response and measures will be further delineated below.

Another important point to be noted here is that the Erzincan congregation initiated a process within the Safavid movement that would have a deep impact on the future of Ismail's state. It was the emergence of tribal military aristocracy against the selected elite of the order, namely sufis of Lāhijān. Masashi Haneda underlines the remarkable difference between these two groups in the early years of Ismail. One was composed of the personage who had served the Safavid dynasty during Junayd's and Haydar's time and continued their service under Ismail especially during the concealment in Lāhijān. As pointed out earlier, Safavid sources traditionally call this group 'sufis of Lāhijān'.⁹³⁵ The second group, which principally joined the royal camp in Erzincan in 1500, was constituted of tribal leaders and their fellow tribesmen coming from Anatolia, Syria, and Azerbaijan. Of course both groups were disciples of the Safavid shaykhs.

As Haneda indicates succinctly, there were remarkable contrasts between these two factions. One of the prominent differences comes out in the dominance of tribal character. Although the members of the first group also stemmed from certain tribes, the

⁹³⁴ “*Andan asker leşker cem' idüb Rūm'a teveccüh itdi. Öyle olsa Rūm padişahı dahi mütenebbih oldi. Anadolu beğlerbeğisine 'Engürü'ye var, asker cem' eyle, otur didi.' Ve dahī etrafını Acem beyleri ihāta eyledi. Kendüsi dahi Erzincan'a geldi. Ahır her taraftan ihāta eylediler. Aciz kaldı. Rūm sultanına tevāzu'lar ile, temelluklar ile, hediyeler ile bir halife göndürdi. 'Ben kandan sizin vilāyetinizde asker çekmek kandan? Bu Şark vilāyetine etdüğümüz ecdādımızın kanın taleb etmek içindir. Ve bizim muradımız yine dervişlikdür.'* dedi. Bunlar dahī kelimatlarına göre cevap verdiler. Elçilerini yine göndürdiler.” APZ, pp. 251-2. But APZ mistakenly narrates this event after the capture of Tebriz by Ismail. Ismail marched twice towards Ottoman territories: one was in the very early phase of his rising (hūrūc) and the other was to fight with Alauddevle. In the former he came to Erzincan in order to summon Anatolian disciples in the summer of 1500. His later entrance in Ottoman territories occurred just before his attack on Zulkadir in 1507. At the end of the chapter APZ states these events took place in Safer 908 (August-September 1502). So what he talks about must be obviously Ismail's former visit to Erzincan, which occurred before his capture of Tebriz.

⁹³⁵ For a detailed account of this group see Aubin, “Les soufis de Lāhejān”.

main factor governing their attitudes and behaviors was never their tribal connection. Rather, being the closest personage to the Shaykh, they constituted a kind of spiritual and administrative high cast, a sort of intermediary between the ‘Perfect Guide’ (*Mürşid-i Kâmil*) and the disciples. As Haneda puts, they formed the elite of the Safavid order.⁹³⁶ Accordingly, their function in the spiritual and administrative system of the order preceded their tribal affiliation. It must be because of this fact that they are always mentioned in sources with their titles such as *lala*, *dede*, and *khalifa*. One should notice that their tribal affiliations are also mentioned occasionally showing that they maintained their tribal connections. Nevertheless the overtly toned attribution to these sufis is always their function, i.e. *lala*, *dede*, or *khalifa*, rather than their tribal affiliation. This attitude of Safavid historians most probably reflects the fact that the tribal liaison of them became inferior to their office or function.⁹³⁷

The second group, on the other hand, took part in the movement with their tribal identity, putting over-toned stress on lineage. The leaders of these tribes became the Safavid *āmirs* and generals. It should be noted, however, that their role and function was almost exclusively confined into the sphere of military affairs. Furthermore, there was no transition between tribal units. Rather the tribes acted as a compact and autonomous socio-political and military entity. The tribal troops were always commanded by their own hereditary leaders. After the Erzincan congregation, the influence of tribal leaders

⁹³⁶ Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâš*, pp. 67-8.

⁹³⁷ Another indication of this fact might be that their tribal affiliations are usually confusing in the sources. Husayn Beg Lala, for example, is reported to be from the Shamlu tribe in some sources, while some others writing he was from Ustaclu tribe. The tribal affiliation of Abdal Beg Dede is also fluctuating in sources: he is mentioned as Dulkadirlu in some chronicles and as Talish in some others. As for Hadim Beg Khulafa, Talish and Rūmlu are proposed by several sources. (For a discussion of the tribal affiliation of these great qizilbash sufis and amirs see Haneda, pp. 68-75.) The tribal affiliations of second group amirs, on the other hand, are quite consistent in the sources. Muhammad Beg, for example, is always mentioned as ‘Ustaclu’.

such as Muhammad Han Ustaclu, Abdi Beg Shamlu, Div Ali Rumlu, Nur Ali Khalifa Rumlu gradually increased while the absolute superiority of the sufis of Lāhijan eroded. It suffices to indicate the augmenting eminence of tribal qizilbash leaders saying that Shah Ismail married his three sisters; these being the three most powerful qizilbash tribal leaders: Muhammad Han Ustaclu, Abdi Beg Shamlu, and Bayram Beg Karamanlu.⁹³⁸ Especially by 1508, when Husayn Beg Lala was dismissed from the post of *wākil*, and in the next year from the post of *āmīr al-umarā*,⁹³⁹ the influence of the ‘Sufis of Lāhijan’ reduced irreversibly in Safavid politics.⁹⁴⁰ Instead, two other groups captured the dominance in state affairs: the military was in the hands of tribal war-lords while the bureaucracy and religious clergy shifted under the control of the Persian elites.⁹⁴¹

In sum, during the concealment period and early years of Ismail’s reign, the sufis of Lāhijan were indisputably dominant in the decision making mechanism. As a natural result of this fact, they occupied principal offices of the new state. But their power and brilliant reputation did not last long; but they sooner lost their privileges. In Çaldıran, for

⁹³⁸ Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâš*, p. 93, 76. From the reign of Shah Ismail onwards, the kinship ties between these tribal aristocracies and the Safavid dynasty always became an important part of Safavid polity. For an exemplary study on the kinship ties between Tekelu tribe and the dynasty see, Maria Szuppe, “Kinship Ties between the Safavids and the Qizilbash Amirs in Late Sixteenth-Century Iran: a Case Study of the Political Career of Members of the Sharaf al-Din Oghli Tekelu Family”, in *Safavid Persia, The History and Politics of an Islamic Society*, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, 79-104.

⁹³⁹ In the same year Abdal Ali Beg Dada was also dismissed from his post. After the conquest of Khorasan in 1510, Husayn Beg Lala, Dad Beg, and Bayram Beg Qaramanlu were appointed governors of several cities in the region: Husayn Beg Lala to Herat, Deded Beg to Marv, Bayram Beg to Balh. Needless to say, this was a kind of exile for them. See Aubin, “Les soufis de Lâhejân”, pp. 15-19 ; Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâš*, pp. 72-84.

⁹⁴⁰ Aubin, “Les soufis de Lâhejân”, pp. 9-15 ; Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâš*, p. 84. Haneda follows their paternal and maternal lines through available sources and concludes that the descendants of the sufis of Lāhijan could never play primary role neither in the military nor in politics. They are even scarcely mentioned in the Safavid chronicles. As Haneda states, “Il est curieux, et il peut même sembler anormal, que des mentions des descendants des soufis des Lajigan, qui avait travaillé avec tel dévouement pour la fondation de l’Etat safavide, n’apparaissent ainsi peu dans les chroniques.” See *I.b.i.d.*, pp. 82-3.

⁹⁴¹ Aubin, “Les soufis de Lâhejân”, pp. 9-11 ; Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâš*, pp. 93-5. For the increasing influence of Persian notables in the Safavid statecraft see especially Jean Aubin, “Etudes safavides I. Šâh Ismâ’îl et les notables de l’Iraq Persan”, *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 2:1, 1959, 37-81.

example, we see Muhammad Han Ustaclu and Durmuş Han Shamlu, the son of Abdi Beg Shamlu, discussing the war strategy at the court of Shah Ismail. Nevertheless none of our sources mention any idea of Husayn Beg Lala at this meeting, although he attended.

How should we understand this sharp change? The analysis of Masashi Haneda deserves closer attention here.⁹⁴² According to Haneda, this change was a natural result of the transformation of the administrative structure of the order. Before 1500, the organization of the Safavid order was composed of two different elements: a) the core in Ardabil, spiritual supervisors and directors who had certain privileges, and b) the provincial disciples, which were principally members of several tribes. The first group constituted a kind of spiritual elite functioning as a link between the Perfect Guide and the corpus of disciples. It was exactly this function that provided them certain privileges and administrative power. After the great meeting of Erzincan, however, the situation was totally changed. The tribal disciples could directly get in touch with their *mürşid*, thus the function of intermediary became useless. Consequently, sufis of Lāhijan, who were selected elite of the first group, gradually lose their superiority. On the other hand, the leaders of tribes became more and more influential for they took the control over their fellow tribesmen, who constituted the backbone of the army.⁹⁴³ In other words, parallel to the Shah's meeting with his tribal disciples, tribal character dominated the newly emerging army and state; and consequently, tribal affiliation became more eminent and tribal leaders more powerful. It is interesting to note that since the first group held the position of spiritual guidance, which could be acquired only through

⁹⁴² Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâš*, pp. 97-100.

⁹⁴³ See, for example, Hans R. Roemer, "The Qizilbash Turcomans: Founders and Victims of the Safavid Theocracy", p. 27.

education and training, their privileges did not pass on to their descendants. As for the tribal war lords, however, the situation was totally different. In accordance to the hereditary principles of the tribal tradition their descendants, as leaders of their own clan, continued to fill the military posts of the Safavid state.

5.2.2. Ismail's First War: the Revenge of Shaykh Junayd and Shaykh Haydar

Upon forming a tribal army of some seven thousand men in two months, Ismail mounted and set out for Azerbaijan. After discussing with his advisers what direction they were to take, the final decision comes out that they were “to proceed first to Shirvan, and unsheathing” their “vengeful swords, deal with the Shirvanshāh.”⁹⁴⁴ In Yāsin on the way, Khulafa Beg was ordered to take a contingent and proceed directly to Georgia. Khulafa Beg returned triumphant and laden with booty, which was distributed by the shah amongst the gāzis.⁹⁴⁵ Around the same time İlyas Beg Aygutoglu was dispatched to reconquest Mantash's fortress. İlyas Beg was equally successful.⁹⁴⁶

Ismail then marched to Hasanabad, where Mantash came to his court and apologized for his previous conduct.⁹⁴⁷ On the way after Hasanabad Āmir Najmu'd-Dīn

⁹⁴⁴ HS, p. 572. Khwandamir attempts to give a holy 'hue' to this decision. He says, after hearing several suggestions of the prominent qizilbash chiefs, he decided to take an augury at night seeking the approval of the spirits of the Imams. The following morning all were summoned and the shah said: “Last night, by the assistance of the spirits of the Twelve Imams, it was vouchsafed that the best course of action is none other than to proceed first to Shirvan and, unsheathing our vengeful swords, deal with the Shirvanshah.” Hearing this, the amirs unanimously acquiesced. HR follows HS in this account. See HR, pp. 51-52. Savory sees two motives that influenced Ismail's decision to march on Shirvanshah rather than invading Akkoyunlu territories: “the practical desire to test his army against a less formidable enemy before risking a pitched battle with Aq Quyunlu; and a psychological motive, namely, the desire to avenge the deaths of his father and grandfather at the hands of the rulers of Shirvan.” See Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 25. Among Ottoman historians see, for example, HSE3, p. 345.

⁹⁴⁵ HS, p. 572 ; HR, p. 52; Sarwar, p. 3; Aubin, “L'avènement des Safavides”, p. 13.

⁹⁴⁶ HS, p. 572 ; HR, p. 52; Sarwar, p. 35

⁹⁴⁷ HR, p. 52.

Mas'ūd⁹⁴⁸, the goldsmith of Rasht, arrived at the camp and was taken into service.⁹⁴⁹ Ismail's army crossed the river Kur in December 1500⁹⁵⁰ and turned his reins to Shamakhi. On the way, he was reported that Shirvanshah Farrukhyesar was preparing for battle in Qibla⁹⁵¹, with 7.000 infantry and 20.000 cavalry.⁹⁵² After sending one of his court servants, Quli Beg, to Shirvan to announce the good news of amnesty to the inhabitants, Ismail arrived in Shamakhi, where he learned that Shirvanshah was camped in a forest that lay between the Gulistan fortress and the citadel of Bigharu.⁹⁵³

Both sides met at Jiyānī near Gulistan and arranged their armies in battle array. In the qizilbash army, the Shamlu took the right wing and the Ustaclu took the left wing while the Tekelu, the Rumlu and the Dulkadir constituted the skirmishing party. Ismail himself stayed at the centre.⁹⁵⁴ After a fierce battle, Shirvanshah was killed on the battlefield and his army dispersed. The large booty fell into the hands of the victors and was distributed amongst the *gāzis*.⁹⁵⁵ On the qizilbash side, Mirza Beg Ustaclu, the

⁹⁴⁸ From then on he became one of the most influential counselors of Ismail. Following the dismissal of Husayn Beg Lala in 1508 he succeeded the post of *wakil*, the highest position, after the shah of course, in the Safavid state apparatus. See Aubin, "Les soufis de Lāhijān", pp. 11-12.

⁹⁴⁹ Sarwar, p. 35.

⁹⁵⁰ Sarwar, p. 35. Safavid sources describe the shah's crossing of the river in a legendary manner. According to the tradition, already before arriving at the river Ismail dispatched Bayram Beg Qaramanlu with a contingent from the Tekelu (in HT Ustaclu) and Dulkadir tribes to cross the river and to discover the possibility of safe passage for the army. When Ismail arrived he found that some of Bayram Beg's contingents were gone to gather boats and ships while some others were preparing rafts and floaters. Realizing the insufficiency of these measures, Ismail "rode a short way upriver and then turned his reins and charged directly into the water, which the wise and experienced had thought impossible to cross without boats. He crossed like a breeze traversing the desert, and the army, following him, spurred their mounts into the water, and all crossed safely – and because of this event the soldiers' faith in the shah increased." HS, p. 572. Also see HR, pp. 52-3; HT, pp. 188-9.

⁹⁵¹ HS, p. 572; HR, p. 53; HT, p. 189.

⁹⁵² HS, p. 573 ; Sarwar, p. 35. According to HR, 6.000 infantry 20.000 cavalry. See HR, p. 53. HT says 6.000 infantry and 20.000 cavalry. See HT, p. 192.

⁹⁵³ HS, p. 573; HR, p. 53; HT, p. 190. Also compare Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", in NIT, pp. 49-50.

⁹⁵⁴ Sarwar, p. 36 ; Haneda, p. 31.

⁹⁵⁵ HR, pp. 54-5; AA, p. 43. A Venetian merchant, who spent three years between 1507 and 1510 in the region, puts a particular stress on Ismail's generosity when distributing booty. He says since Ismail was dividing all the booty among his men, keeping nothing for himself, he was joined by numerous fighters, even those who were not sincere sufis, flocking to his standard in hopes of receiving gifts. See "The

father of Muhammad Han Ustaclu, fell in the battlefield. Ismail is alleged, though less than fourteen years of age, to have fought in front ranks in this battle.⁹⁵⁶ Needless to say that Ismail's bravery and the qizilbash's devotion and heroic deeds were most responsible for such a victory, against an army of 27.000 soldiers with 7.000 tribal fighters, possible. This constituted the first circlet on the chain of the glorious victories of the qizilbash fighters under Ismail's banner.

After receiving the congratulations of his *āmirs* and distributing favors to them, Ismail returned to Shamakhi.⁹⁵⁷ On receiving the news that Shaykh Shah, the son of Farrukhyasar, who had escaped from the battlefield, was making preparations for the battle, he dispatched Khulafa Beg against Shaykh Shah. But since the latter escaped to Gilan no engagement occurred; Khulafa Beg was appointed governor of Shahrinaw. Ismail himself proceeded to Mahmudabad to spend the winter.⁹⁵⁸ Here Muhammad Zakariya, who worked as the prime-minister of Akkoyunlu for many years, came to the royal court and was taken into service.⁹⁵⁹

On the other hand, Ismail sent two prominent qizilbash chiefs, namely Muhammad Han Ustaclu and İlyas Beg Aygutoglu, to conquer the fortress of Baku.

Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in *NIT*, p. 188. Caterino Zeno follows a similar line of argument. See Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in *NIT*, p. 49.

⁹⁵⁶ HR, p. 54; HT, p. 193; Sarwar, p. 36. Indeed, Ismail's bravery and mastery in the art of fighting, in addition to his many other distinguished aptitudes, provided him with a great charisma and immense influence on the emotions of his followers. As Roemer writes, “He was the one who knew how to implant into his Turcoman warriors and to preserve in them enthusiasm for his cause, readiness for struggle, courage to face death, and unrestricted loyalty. The magnet which attracted masses of new adepts was the young God-king Isma'il.” See Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans”, p. 32.

⁹⁵⁷ HR, p. 55. A contemporary Italian observer writes “The fame of victories and generosity of Ismael spread throughout Persia and Natolia [Anatolia], so that everyone became a Suffavean [sufi] in hopes of advancement.” See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in *NIT*, p. 189. This merchant does not mention his name in his travel account. However he specifies that he was in Persia and Eastern Anatolia between 1507 and 1510. He spoke Persian, Turkish, and Arabic, and was well acquainted ohe regional culture. Thus his could deeply penetrate the contemporary events. Especially his account on the events of the years 1507-10 is quite accurate and authentic for it is mainly derived from eye-witness accounts.

⁹⁵⁸ HS, pp. 573-4 ; HR, p. 55; HT, pp. 195-6; Sarwar, p. 36.

⁹⁵⁹ HR, p. 64; HT, p. 197; Sarwar, p. 36.

However, the conquest of this strong fortress had to wait for the arrival of the shah in the following spring.⁹⁶⁰ After spending the winter in Mahmudabad, Ismail personally came and laid siege to the fortress. Fierce struggle took place between the two sides. In the end, the qizilbash captured the fortress. Khulafa Beg was ordered to go into the fortress in order to take the treasure of Shirvanshah, which was distributed among the soldiers by him. In the excess of zeal he also exhumed the bones of Shirvanshah Khalil⁹⁶¹, father of Farrukhyasar, who had killed Shaykh Junayd forty-five years ago, and burnt them to ashes.⁹⁶² His acts must have pleased Ismail so much that when he returned, as Khwandāmir states, he was promoted to the highest rank among all the *āmirs*.⁹⁶³

Ismail then set out for the fortress of Gūlistan, where many Shirvan soldiers were resident. Ismail first sent a messenger to the soldiers in the fortress offering amnesty if they would surrender without trouble. Trusting on the strength of the fortress, which was known as impregnable, they refused to submit or pay homage.⁹⁶⁴ Although qizilbash incursions started in a short while, the news brought to Ismail made him give up the siege. It was reported to him that Alvand Mirza of Akkoyunlu was at Nakhjuwān with 30.000 men and dispatched some of his generals to Shirvan, Karacadağ, and Ardabil to check the advance of the shah's army.⁹⁶⁵

⁹⁶⁰ HS, p. 574 ; HR, pp. 55-6; HT, p. 197; Sarwar, p. 37.

⁹⁶¹ Exhuming the bones of dead people as a sign of revenge or insult was a usual practice of Shah Ismail and the Qizilbash. As J-P Roux states; the origin of this practice traces back to ancient Turko-Mongolian traditions. See J-P Roux, "Un survivance des traditions turco-mongoles chez les Séfévides", *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, 183, 1973, 11-18.

⁹⁶² HS, p. 574; HT, pp. 202-203; HR, pp. 56-7 (HR does not mention Khulafa Beg in this context); Sarwar, p. 37; Youssef-Jamālī, pp. 125-6.

⁹⁶³ HS, p. 574.

⁹⁶⁴ HS, p. 574; HT, pp. 203-204.

⁹⁶⁵ HS, p. 575 ; HR, p. 69; AA, p. 44; Sarwar, p. 37. HR gives a rather superstitious reasoning for Ismail's ending of the siege. According to HR, during the siege Ismail saw one of the Twelve Immaculate Imams in his dream ordering him to end the siege and to proceed to Azerbaijan. In the morning he gathered prominent amirs like Husayn Beg Lala, Abdal Beg Dede, Muhammad Beg Ustaclu, Abdi Beg Shamlu, and Hadim Beg Khalife, and asked them whether they wanted the Gulistan fort or Azerbaijan. They

5.2.3. Ismail's Second War: the Turn of the Fortune

Paying close attention to Ismail's advance in Shirvan, Alvand Mirza sent Hasan Beg Şikaroğlu as a forward detachment to Shirvan. Upon learning of the approach of Akkoyunlu troops just after passing the river, Ismail dispatched Qara Pīrī Qajar to deal with Hasan Beg Şikaroğlu, who fled back to Nakhjuwān without engagement.⁹⁶⁶ Ismail then proceeded in the direction of Nakhjuwān, sending Qara Pīrī Qajar ahead with a contingent as a reconnaissance party. On the other hand, Alvand Mirza sent one of his commanders, called Osman, to oppose Qara Pīrī Qajar. But he was taken captive in a skirmish and sent to the court of the shah, where he was executed. Upon being appraised of this, Alvand Mirza moved from Nakhjuwān and camped in Sharur, a village by the side of the river Aras, arranging his army of 30.000 soldiers in battle array.⁹⁶⁷ Ismail followed him via Nakhjuwān and the two armies met at Sharur in the summer of 1501.⁹⁶⁸

The disposition of the Qizilbash army was as follows: the right and left wing were commanded by the chief qizilbash *āmirs*, namely Husayn Beg Lala, Abdal Ali Beg

answered that they wanted Azerbaijan. Then Ismail raised the siege and marched against Azerbaijan. HR, pp. 57-8. A very similar account is in HT, pp. 204-205.

⁹⁶⁶ HS, p. 575; HT, pp. 207-208; HR, p. 69. This event occurred in May 1501. See Sarwar, p. 37.

⁹⁶⁷ HS, p. 575 ; HT, p. 209; HR, pp. 70-71; AA, p. 44.

⁹⁶⁸ *Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail* contains a correspondence between Ismail and Alvand Mirza, which is not recorded in any other Safavid sources. According to this account, Alvand Mirza wrote to Ismail suggesting him to maintain the peace and warm relationship. In his answer Ismail said, although the descendants of Hasan Padishah disgraced the descendants of Shaykh Safī without any reason, he was not intending to avenge his ancestors' blood; and he did not aspire to the throne as well. His sole object was to propagate the religion of his ancestors, the immaculate imams. Ismail says in his letter, as recorded in *Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail*, "As long as I am alive, I will draw my sword for the sake of God and his Immaculate Imams and the true religion until justice will be confirmed in its right place. You [Alvand] should ask help from the pure spirits of the Immaculate Imams with sincere belief and you should repeat and profess: 'Ali is the friend of God' constantly in order to receive salvation in both worlds and become the most prosperous king among all others." (Quoted in Youssef-Jamālī, p. 131.) Ismail finishes his letter by declaring that if he (Alvand Mirza) would profess Shi'a then could regard him as his elder brother. Upon receiving the negative and arrogant answer of Alvand Mirza he marched towards Nakhjuwan. See Youssef-Jamālī, pp. 131-2.

Dede, Hadim Beg Khalifa, Muhammad Beg Ustaclu, Bayram Beg Karamanlu, Abdi Beg Shamlu, Qaraca İlyas Bayburdlu, Qara Pīrī Beg Qajar, İlyas Beg Helvacıoğlu (Bayburdlu), Saru Ali Beg Tekelu Mührdar, İlyas Beg Aykutoğlu, and Ali Beg Rumlu (also known as Div Sultan), while Ismail himself commanded the centre, fighting enthusiastically.⁹⁶⁹ Safavid sources narrate how young Ismail displayed his courage in the battlefield by fighting in the front rows, and personally putting many Akkoyunlu chiefs to the sword, while Alvand stood and watched from the top of a nearby hill.⁹⁷⁰ Thanks to the zeal and devotion of Ismail's disciples that at the end of the day 7.000 qizilbash defeated the Akkoyunlu army of 30.000 soldiers in the fall or summer of 1501.⁹⁷¹ A contemporary Italian testimony depicts the devotion and appearance of qizilbash warriors, which was, without a doubt, primarily responsible for these victories against four-five times greater (in number) armies, as follows:

This monarch is almost, so to speak, worshipped, more especially by his soldiers, many of whom fight without armor, being willing to die for their master. They go into battle with naked breasts, crying out 'Schiac, Schiac', which, in the Persian language, signifies 'God, God'. [This is evidently wrong] Others consider him a prophet; but it is certain that all are of opinion that he will never die.⁹⁷²

⁹⁶⁹ HR, p. 71. (The last two are not mentioned in HR). Also consider Haneda, pp. 32-3; Sarwar, p. 38.

⁹⁷⁰ Khwandamir writes, for example, "During the fray the shah, like a cloud shedding rain that settles the useless dust, or the sun banishing the forces of darkness, unsheathed his sword and charged the enemy lines, felling several men with his mighty arm and raising the banner of victory. The shah and his men continually made concentrated attacks on the enemy as they brandished their weapons." HS, p. 576. Also see HT, p. 211; Youssef-Jamālī, p. 133.

⁹⁷¹ HSE3, p. 345. Solakzāde's account is again similar. SLZ1, pp. 428-9. Also consider Aubin, "L'avènement des Safavides", p. 16; Woods, *The Akkoyunlu*, p. 163.

⁹⁷² After stating that "While I was in Tauris [Tabriz] I heard that the king was displeased with this adoration, and being called God.", Giovan Maria Angiolello's account continues with the depiction of appearance of qizilbash warriors: "...Their custom is to wear a red caftan, coming half a cubit over the head, which widens at the part which covers the head; it gets narrower towards the top, and is made of twelve fringes, a finger in thickness, symbolizing the twelve Sacraments [Imams] of their religion; neither do they ever shave their beards or moustachios. They have made no change in their dress; their armour consists of cuirasses of gilt plates made of the the finest steel of Syras [Shiraz]. Their horse-armour is of copper: not like ours, but in pieces like those of Soria [Syria]; they also have helmets or head-pieces of a great weight of metal. Everyone of them rides on horseback: some with a lance, sword, and shield; others with bow and arrows, and a mace." See Giovan Maria Angiolello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts

Alvand Mirza barely managed to flee from the battlefield and took refuge in Erzincan. A great deal of booty, “so many horses, camels, beasts of burden, valuable goods, and gold and silver vessels”⁹⁷³, was left in the hands of victorious qizilbashs.

Although Alvand could escape from the battlefield, he started to gather another army in Erzincan, and Murad was waiting undefeated in the south with a large army, the victory of Sharur was decisive. This victory brought Azerbaijan under Ismail’s rule, and opened the doors of the whole of Iran and the two Iraqs as well. In half a century, the Safavid movement, which had started with Shaykh Junayd in the mid-fifteenth century, eventually came to a successful end. By Ismail’s brilliant victory against Alvand Beg, the dream of Junayd turned into an accomplished fact.⁹⁷⁴

5.2.4. Ismail’s Ascendance to Power

Following his decisive victory against Alvand Mirza, Ismail set out for the Tabriz on the next day, to occupy the vacant throne of Azerbaijan.⁹⁷⁵ In the middle of 1501, he was

of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 115. For a similar account also see “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, pp. 206-207.

⁹⁷³ HS, p. 576. Also see HR, pp. 72-3; “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 190.

⁹⁷⁴ Savory, regarding the whole history of the order as oriented towards a political revolution, says, “Safavid revolution, after two centuries of preparation, was an accomplished fact.” See Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 26. The present thesis, however, follows a different line of argument. The first four Safavid shaykhs, though having a relationship with temporal rulers, seemingly did not have political ambition for the sake of their own temporal rule. If we should talk about a ‘Safavid revolution’ it started by the shaykhdom of Junayd and continued under his successors until his grandson Ismail, who culminated the revolution.

⁹⁷⁵ HR, p. 73. The contemporary Venetian merchant talks about the slaughter that Ismail conducted in Tabriz. “... [Ismail] then advanced on the city of Tauris [Tabriz], where they met with no resistance, but massacred many of the inhabitants. All the kinsmen of Jakob [Yakub] Sultan were put to the edge of the sword, and even pregnant women were slaughtered with their unborn offspring. The tomb of Jakob Sultan, and those of many lords who had been present at the battle of Derbant where Ismael’s father was killed, were opened, and their bones burnt. Three hundred public courtesans were then arranged in line, and their bodies divided in two. Then eight hundred avaricious Blasi who had been brought up under Alumut [Alvand] were beheaded. They even slaughtered all the dogs in Tauris, and committed many other atrocities. ... From the time of Nero to the present, I doubt whether so bloodthirsty a tyrant has ever existed.” See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, pp. 190-91. Giovan Maria Angioiello repeats

crowned king of Azerbaijan, for the time being, to be known henceforth as Shah Ismail.⁹⁷⁶

During its early years, Ismail's state equally bore the tribal characteristics of his disciples. The most important and efficacious offices of the new state were bestowed to the sufis of Lāhijān, who were in many aspects the main architect of this result. Husayn Beg Lala became *wākil*, the lieutenant of the Shah, and *emiru'l-ūmera*, the head of the army; Abdal Ali Beg Dede became the head of the Special Forces (*kurçi başı*), Hadim Beg Khulafa became *khalifatu'l-hulefā*, the head of the sufi organization of qizilbashes; Bayram Beg Karamanlu became *āmir-i divan*; and Abdi Beg became *tovacı-başı*.⁹⁷⁷ The bureaucratic affairs of the state and clerical issues, however, were entrusted to the Persian literati. Shamsu'd-Din Lāhijī, who was the tutor of young Ismail in Lāhijān, was made the *sadr*⁹⁷⁸ and the comptroller to take charge of all religious endowments.

more or less the same account adding, "... all the city wore his ensign, that is, the red caftan." See Giovan Maria Angiolello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano", in NIT, p. 105. For another very similar account see Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", in NIT, p. 52.

⁹⁷⁶ In explaining Ismail's coronation, Khwandamir refers to a famous prophetic saying that "God sends at the beginning of every century someone to renew the faith" and continues "the foundation of the Prophet's religion be reinforced by the Safavid shah's efforts, never, since the sun of his rule had risen, had victory turned its back on him – or would it ever. ...he mounted the throne and placed the crown of the caliphate and world conquest on his head." HS, p. 576. Also see Sarwar, p. 38.

⁹⁷⁷ See HS, p. 576; Aubin, "Sufis of Lāhejān", pp. 4-5; Haneda, *Le Châh et les Qizilbâs*, pp. 72-77; Roger M. Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Ismā'īl (907-30/1501-24)", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXIII, London, 1960, pp. 93-101.

⁹⁷⁸ The religious affairs in the Safavid state were organized as two separate systems: on one hand there were sufis, the disciples of the Safavid order, spread in several provinces of the Ottoman Anatolia, northern Syria, Azerbaijan and adjacent regions. This group constituted the man resource for the armies of Junayd, Haydar, Sultan Ali, and finally of Ismail; thus it is not an exaggeration to say that the state was founded on their enthusiasm, devotedness, zeal, and swords. These sufis were already organized clandestinely by the hierarchical system of *khalifa*. Each *khalifa* educated and trained at the court of the shaykh was dispatched to 'qizilbash zones' with the mission of organizing disciples there and conducting the propaganda of the order. At the top of this system was the *khalifatu'l-hulefā*. (For the office of *khalifatu'l-hulefā* see Roger M. Savory, "The Office of Khalifat al-Khulafā under the Safawids", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 85, no. 4, 1965, 497-502.) On the other hand, by the proclamation of Twelver Shi'ism as official sect, the ordinary, one might called 'orthodox', Twelver shi'ites of Iran also became a part of the system. At the beginning, in 1501, this group was very few in number and less powerful in state affairs. As time went on, however, they became the most affective ideology-makers of the Safavid state. (For this process see, for example, Devin J. Stewart, "Notes on the Migration of Amili Scholars to Safavid Iran", *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. 55, no. 2, 1996, 81-103; "An Episode in

Muhammad Zakariya, who had been the former prime minister of Aqquyunlu rulers and had been accepted to Ismail's service after the victory against Shirvanshah, was brought to the vizierate and the office of chief of divan.⁹⁷⁹

Among first deeds of Shah Ismail as a state founder was the proclamation of Twelver Shi'ism not only the approved and encouraged official sect but the only tolerated one.⁹⁸⁰ During the Friday prayer Ismail read the *khutba* in the name of the twelve Immaculate Imams. In Hasan-i Rumlu's words, the phrase "I witness that Ali is the Friend of God, come to the best of deeds", which was rubbed out in the Islamic realm by the coming of Sultan Tuğrul Seljuk to the power "five hundred and twenty eight years ago"⁹⁸¹, is again affixed to the prayer call.⁹⁸² Ismail ordered the cursing of the first three caliphs Abu Bakr, Omar, and Osman, in public areas; he also ordered the

the 'Amili Migration to Safavid Iran: Husayn b. 'Abd al-samad al-'Amili's Travel Account", *Iranian Studies*, v. 39, no. 4, December 2006, 481-508; Said Amir Arjomand, "Shi'ism as the State Religion under the Safavids", in his *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam*, Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1984, 105-212; "The Clerical Estate and the Emergence of a Shi'ite Hierocracy in Savafid Iran", *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 28, 1985, 169-219; Albert Hourani, "From Jabal 'Amil to Persia", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 49, 1986, 133-40; Andrew Newman, "The Myth of Clerical Migration to Safawid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition to 'Ali al-Karakī and Safawid Shiism", *Die Welt des Islams*, 33, 1993, 66-112; Kathryn Babayan, "The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi'ism", *Iranian Studies*, v. 27, no. 1-4, 1994, 135-61.) The office of *sadr* was the head of religious institution. As Savory puts, "The main function of the *sadr* under the early Safawids was to impose doctrinal unity by directing and accelerating the propagation of the Shi'ī faith. Upon the successful imposition of doctrinal uniformity depended the smooth operation of the temporal arm of the government and the ability of the state to survive hostile attacks by its Sunnī neighbors. As a corollary, the *sadr* was responsible for the rooting out of heresy." See Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safawid State during the Reign of Ismā'īl", p. 103. Nonetheless, under Shah Tahmasb I, the *sadr* rather assumed to consolidation of the newly establishing official faith, the Twelver Shi'ism, which was yet alien even to the founders of the state, that is to the Qizilbash. See Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safawid State during the Reign of Tahmāsp I (930-84/1524-76)", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXIV, 1961, p. 81.

⁹⁷⁹ HS, p. 576; HR, p. 64. (HR narrates as if the appointments of these two were occurred following the victory over Shirvanshah.)

⁹⁸⁰ Compare BRW, p. 53.

⁹⁸¹ HR, p. 74. Hasan-i Rumlu makes a mistake in this calculation. Tugrul Beg entered Baghdad in 447 / 1055 and finished the Shi'ite Buyids' domination on the Islamic Khalifate. (See, for example, David Morgan, *Medieval Persia 1040-1797*, London and New York: Longman, 1988, p. 27.) So when subtracted 447 from 907, it makes 460. For a similar, but not identical, calculation see BRW, p. 54, footnote, 2.

⁹⁸² HR, p. 74. Also see HT, p. 213.

decapitation of those who opposed doing this or who do not repeat the curse.⁹⁸³ The coins of the Shah were struck with the inscription “Ali wali-Allah”.⁹⁸⁴ The contemporary historian of Ismail writes the first acts of the Shah as follows,

And since the shah’s entire concern was the propagation of the Imami sect and strengthening of the Prophet’s law, at the beginning of his coronation a regal decree was issued that all preachers in the realm of Azerbaijan pronounce the *khutba* in the name of the Twelve Imams, that the leaders of prayer in all places abrogate all despicable, heretical practices and that the muezzins of all mosques and places of worship would add to the cry for prayer the words “And I profess that Ali is the Friend of God.” Furthermore, any soldiers or warriors who witnessed any action contrary to the White Nation would decapitate the perpetrator. Consequently the qualities of the Immaculate Imams and the prayer for the perpetual continuation of the shah’s reign were pronounced from the pulpit, and the coinage was graced with the names of the Imams and the titles of the Shah. Those who were attached to the sect of Ali and followed the rite of Ja’far now loosened their tongues against their opponents who could not mention the Imam’s names with veneration, and the sunnis who made a show of religiosity and fanatical Kharijites fled in all directions in fear of the vengeful swords of the great warriors, while the hopes of shah’s servants were fulfilled in the best possible manner.⁹⁸⁵

When Ismail imposed Shi’a doctrine on his subjects two-thirds of the people of Tabriz were sunnis.⁹⁸⁶ Because of that his counselors warned him that the introduction of distinctively Shi’i clause to the prayer and profession of the Faith, and especially the cursing of the first three caliphs might cause serious resistance to his sovereignty. Having excessive confidence in his charisma and in the military strength of his zealots, however, Ismail replied, “God and Immaculate Imams are with me, and I fear no one. By God’s help if the people utter one word of protest, I will draw the sword and leave

⁹⁸³ HR, p. 74; HT, p. 213; AA, p. 45. Those who hear the cursing of first three caliphs had to say “May it be more, not less!” Otherwise he/she would suffer death. See BRW, p. 22, 53-4. For a detailed analysis of this subject, see Rosemary Stanfield-Johnson, “The Tabarra’iyan and the Early Safavids”, *Iranian Studies*, vol. 37, no. 1, 2004, 47-71.

⁹⁸⁴ AA, p. 45 ; Sarwar, p. 3; Youssef-Jamālī, pp. 138-145.

⁹⁸⁵ HS, p. 576.

⁹⁸⁶ BRW, p. 22.

not one of them alive!”⁹⁸⁷ As Browne states, “he was as good as his word”⁹⁸⁸ that the religious demography of Iran would fundamentally change in a short course of time.

However, the Shi’a that Ismail and his qizilbash devotees professed was far away from the well-cultivated ‘orthodox’ Twelver Shi’ism.⁹⁸⁹ As Hasan-ı Rumlu records, when Ismail proclaimed Twelver Shi’ism as the only creed of his realm, there was a shortage of works on Shi’ite jurisprudence and shortage of Shi’ī ulemā; a book on the Shi’a creed and jurisprudence in Tabriz could not be found, except the *Qawā’idu’l-Islām* (Rules of Islam) of Shaykh Cemaleddin Mutahhar Hillī, found in the private library of a local qādi called Nasrullah Zeytūnī.⁹⁹⁰ The ideological trajectory of the Safavid state is not among primary concerns of this study. I would like to be content with only saying that by proclaiming Shi’ism as the official religion, Ismail differentiated his domain

⁹⁸⁷ Quoted in BRW, p. 22 and p. 53. ‘*Ālam-ārā-yi Shah Ismail* writes the sequence of events as follows: “Shah Ismail said: ‘By the help of God, I will ascend the pulpit next Friday to preach the Twelver way.’ But he himself was irritated because he knew that the amirs were right. As he fell asleep he dreamed of Hadrat-i Ali who told him: ‘O son, do not be disturbed in your mind; order all the Qizil-Bash to wear armour under their army uniforms and order that one of them should stand between every two people present at that ceremony. Then preach the sermon. If anyone moves while you are preaching the khutba, the Qizil-Bash should kill him. By this means you can perform the public sermon.’ Then Shah Ismail awoke and called his amirs and Husayn Beg Lala to him. He described his dream and the amirs accepted this idea and said: ‘It is true that without this instruction it can not be performed.’” Quoted in Youssef-Jamālī, pp. 135-6. For the same account also see Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 29.

⁹⁸⁸ BRW, p. 22.

⁹⁸⁹ See, for example, Roemer, “The Qizilbash Turcomans”, p. 30. However, the extremist Shi’ite creed of Ismail and his qizilbash followers, and the process of the dominance of ‘orthodox’ Twelver Shi’ism in the public sphere, especially during Shah Tahmasb’s reign, had been long discussed and is well-known among scholars. So I will not repeat here. For a ground reading see Jean Aubin, “La politique religieuse des Safavides” in Colloque de Strasbourg, *Le Shi’isme imāmite*, Paris, 1970, 235-244; “Etudes Safavides I, Sah Ismail et les notables de l’Iraq persan”, *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, III, 1959, 37-81; Said Amir Arjomand, *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi’ite Iran from Beginning to 1890*, Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 1984; “Two Decrees of Shāh Tahmāsp Concerning Statecraft and the Authority of Shaykh ‘Ali Al-Karakī”, in *Authority and Political Culture in Shi’ism*, edited by Said Amir Arjomand, New York: State University of New York Press, 1988, 250-262; Kathryn Babayan, “The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi’ism”; *Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs. Cultural Landscape of Early Modern Iran*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 2002; Andrew Newman, “The Myth of Clerical Migration to Safavid Iran: Arab Shiite Opposition to ‘Ali al-Karakī and Safavid Shiism”, *Die Welt des Islams*, 33, 1993, 66-112; Devin J. Stewart, “Notes on the Migration of Amili Scholars to Safavid Iran”, *Journal of Near Eastern Studies*, vol. 55, no. 2, 1996, 81-103; “An Episode in the ‘Amili Migration to Safavid Iran: Husayn b. ‘Abd al-samad al-‘Amili’s Travel Account”, *Iranian Studies*, v. 39, no. 4, December 2006, 481-508.

⁹⁹⁰ HR, p. 74.

from - and provided immunity against the interference of - the powerful sunni Ottoman empire. So the Safavid state could attain distinctive territorial, political, and ideological identity, creating a sense of unity among her subjects.⁹⁹¹

5.3. REPERCUSSION AMONG ANATOLIAN TURKOMANS AND THE OTTOMAN RESPONSE

5.3.1. Echoes in Anatolia and Ottoman Measures

The testimony of a contemporary Venetian merchant, who made business in Safavid lands between 1507 and 1510, even met Ismail himself, clearly shows how strong the connection between the Safavid power and Anatolian Turkomans was: “During my stay in Tauris [Tabriz]⁹⁹², men were continually flocking to his standard, from all parts of the country, but especially from Natolia [Anatolia], Turkey, and Caramania, Ismael presenting gifts to them all according to their rank and condition.”⁹⁹³ Needless to say, thus, Ismail’s success rose upon the swords of his warrior Turkoman disciples mostly coming from Ottoman territories. Moreover, these tribal disciples did not constitute simply the body of the conquering ‘war machine’ of Ismail, but they, - especially sufis of Lāhijan and some newly joined tribal leaders such as Muhammad Han Ustaclu and Abdi Beg Shamlu - were also at the head of the movement heavily influencing all the vital decisions of Ismail. As already indicated, the qizilbash army was commanded by

⁹⁹¹ A. K. S. Lambton, “Quis custodiet custodies”, *Studia Islamica*, VI, 1956, p. 126; Savory, “The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia”, p. 84; *Iran under the Safavids*, pp. 29-30.

⁹⁹² Our merchant was in Tabriz in 1509-10 and met Ismail in person. See “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 201, pp. 205-206.

⁹⁹³ “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 194. Throughout his travel book this unknown Venetian merchant repeatedly stresses Anatolia and Qaraman as regions from where Ismail and his forefathers derived their followers.

those great *āmirs* during both battles against Shirvanshah and Alvand Mirza. Although Safavid historians attempt to depict Ismail as responsible for all, the decisions were indeed made by significant contributions of the prominent qizilbash *āmirs*. Thus it is not an exaggeration to assert that the successful outcome of the Safavid movement started by Junayd was more than anything else the deed of tribal Turkoman adherents, of both ordinary *sufi-gāzis* and their tribal leaders. As Efendiev states, “L’État safavide fut donc créée par l’aristocratie féodale des ces tribus kızılbash de langue turque, mue par des intérêts de classe. Ce sont ces tribus qui, parvenues au pouvoir, s’emparèrent de toutes les ressources matérielles du pays et se partagèrent entre elles la plus grande partie du territoire.”⁹⁹⁴

Accordingly, every step of Ismail, especially those towards the west, created a vast wave and excitement among Anatolian adherents, thus deeply influencing the social tranquility of the Ottoman dominion. The social stirring that Ismail’s movement created among Ottoman subjects was so wide-spread that in early 1502 it was rumored in Istanbul that there were five hundred qizilbashes in the city. All gates were closed for five days to prevent their escape.⁹⁹⁵

Then the main question arises: what was the Ottoman response and what was the situation in Anatolia, the home of Ismail’s devoted *gāzis*? As referred to earlier, Bayezid II was skeptical, even antagonistic, against the Safavid movement already during the time of Haydar, whom and whose adherents he depicted as people who had gone astray in his letter to Yakub Akkoyunlu. Following Ismail’s ascendance to the throne in

⁹⁹⁴ Efendiev, “Le rôle des tribus de langue Turque”, p. 33.

⁹⁹⁵ FSH, p. 92. ANMG gives the number over than two hundred families and states that their houses were set on fire while they were in. ANMG, p. 179. But Ottoman sources do not mention any qizilbashes in Istanbul during this time.

Tabriz, Bayezid II sent another letter to Alvand with his special messenger Mahmud Aga advising him to finish the struggle between Akkoyunlu princes and to devote their energy to finish qizilbash peril. Furthermore, he promised to provide every kind of assistance whenever necessary.⁹⁹⁶ So the advent of Ismail was observed in Constantinople with anxiety, but without any effective attempt to stop it.

For the Ottomans, however, the problem was not limited to Ismail's conquests in Azerbaijan and Iran. The trouble was rather deep-rooted - so deep-rooted that could not be solved any more -. Qizilbashes of Anatolia were continuously either immigrating to the lands of Shah or providing every kind of logistic support they could. Kemalpaşazâde describes the situation vividly:

Teke diyârınınun dike burun bî-bâk fettakları ser-i hayl-i Ardabil Şah İsmail'ün a'vân u ensârı onlar idiler. Zaman-ı fetrette fırsat eline girüb, iki üç yüz kişi ile baş kaldırub, hurûc idicek yoldaşı ve yârı onlar idiler. Takaddümle tağarrüb bulub mukaddem-i hadem ü haşem olub ziyâde ra'bet tahsil itdiler. Yerlerinde ra'yyet idiler, onda vardılar devlete irdiler ve esbâb-ı şevketi tekâmîl itdiler. Ol tâ'ife'nün kalanı dahî terk-i diyar itmek istediler. Ölüsü dirisine yüklenüb cümlesi çıkub gitmek istediler.

Bey-i türki li-mü'ellifi:

Türkler terk idüb diyarların

Satdılar yok bahâya davarların⁹⁹⁷

.....
Şah İsmail-i gümrâh Büm-ı şüm gibi Gīlan vilâyetinde künc-i hümülde sinüb otururken Bayıdır beğlerinün fetreti zamanında fırsat bulub Erzincan'a ki geldi, Anadolu da olan hulefâ vü ehîbbâya âdem saldı. Tekelü etrâkinün dike burun fütâklerinden yanına varanlar takaddümle takarrüb bulub, Kızılbaş içinde merdânelik ve yoldaşlığ ile meşhûr oldılar. Ömründe timâr yimeyen, diyârında kendüyekimse âdem dimeyen bî-kârlar tümen beğleri olub hadden ziyâde itibar buldılar. İşinden çıkdı giti, mevhum yerden ötürü muhakkak yirin yurdun terk idüb, çiftin çubuğun dağıttı, evin ocağın yıkdı, yakdı harâb itdi. Anda varan beğler olurmış diyu zikr olan tâ'ife-i hâ'ife kalanları dahî kemân-ı intikam

⁹⁹⁶ See Oktay Efendiye, "Sultan II. Bayezid ve Şah İsmail", *XIII. Türk Tarih Kongresi Bildirileri*, Ankara: TTK, 2002, p. 90; BRW, p. 68. In this letter Ismail's followers are defined as 'rebellious hordes of qizilbashes' (*tâ'ife-i bâğiye-i kızılbaşîyye*). Nonetheless, we do not have clear evidence on his help to Akkoyunlu princes. As a matter of fact, it was not easy for Bayezid II for he was at war with Venice.

⁹⁹⁷ KPZ8a, p. 233.

kurmuşlardı. Zalâm-ı şâm-ı fitne büm-ı Rûmı kaçan tuta diyü eyyâm-ı fetrete ve hengâm-ı fırsata nâzır u muntazır turmuşlardı.⁹⁹⁸

Thus, cutting off the communication and connection between the Anatolian body of the Safavid order and its head in Iran⁹⁹⁹ emerged as an issue of primary importance for the Ottoman administration, which levied strict measures to impede Ismail's disciples passing through the borders. The governors of the frontier provinces were instructed to cut off the communication and mass transportation between Shah and his Anatolian disciples.¹⁰⁰⁰ *Haniwaldanus Anonym* states that Bayezid II sent orders to both governors (*sancak beyleri*) and *qâdis* of Anatolia to put watchmen on borders and to prevent passages of Ismail's disciples. He also ordered the killing of all the men who wanted to join Ismail. Local governors fulfilled the sultan's order and executed quite a great number of runaways. But the enthusiasm of Ismail's adherents was in such a degree that no punishment could prevent them from going to their shah.¹⁰⁰¹

⁹⁹⁸ KPZ8b, p. 43. As further examined elsewhere, KPZ's depiction of *qizilbashes murids* of Ismail in Anatolia suggests that they were overwhelmingly nomads. This is indeed a commonly agreed phenomenon among historians specialized in *qizilbash* and Safavid history. Jean Aubin says, for example, "... c'est bien dans les milieu turkmène d'Anatolie orientale, parmi ces nomades qui vont être connus sous les nomes de « Têtes-Rouges » (*qizilbaş*) du fait de leur coiffure rituelle, que prennent corps le mouvement safavide, l'idéologie safavide. Populations très frustes, sans contact avec les milieu urbain, ni même véritablement avec les milieu rural, et qui gardent encore vivaces coutumes ancestrales et pratiques chamaniques." See Jean Aubin, "La politique religieuse des Safavides", *Le Shi'isme Imâmite, Colloque de Strasbourg, 6-9 mai 1968*, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, p. 236.

⁹⁹⁹ This description was first used by Faruk Sümer. See his *Safevî Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerini Rolü*, Ankara: TTK, 1999, p. 12. "...tarikatın başı Azerbaycan'daki Ardabil şehrinde, gövdesi de Anadolu'da idi."

¹⁰⁰⁰ "...Uç beylerine gereği yapılması buyrulan emirlerde bundan sonra sufi adında bir kimseyi sınırlardan geçirmemeleri, yolları tutmaları ve kesmeleri bildirildi. Bunun sonunda o pis kalabalık Rum diyarında kapatılmış ve Ardabiloğlu kendisine taraf olanların gelmelerinden umudunu kesmişti." HSE3, p. 346. However, as we learn from imperial edicts, which will be analyzed in the following pages, HSE is not really right in his last opinion. Although the Ottoman administration applied strict preventive measures, it could not totally finish the communication and mass transportation between two sides. On this issue see also SLZ1, p. 429.

¹⁰⁰¹ ANMH, p. 45.

We can also follow from archival evidence, namely the records of the imperial council¹⁰⁰² (*dīvān*), how the Ottoman administration took the issue seriously and levied severe punishments. The collection includes copies of imperial decrees addressed to the governors of Sivas, Amasya, Kastamonu, and Konya. In these decrees Bayezid II ordered the governors of mentioned provinces, who were all princes except the governor of Sivas, to incarnate and execute those who endeavored to pass the borderlands for the sake of the Shah.

One of these decrees was addressed to the governor of Sivas and was issued in *evāhir-i Zilkāde* 906 (8-17 June, 1501). It refers to a former order already issued about the sufis of Ardabil. According to the former order, which does not currently exist but its content can be deduced from the text, the central government had strictly ordered the governor of Sivas that the sufis of Ardabil who were caught while going to the other side (Iran) would be executed (*siyāseten salb oluna*) and their possessions would be given to those who caught them. It is seen from the next sentence that one of the princes¹⁰⁰³ sent

¹⁰⁰² In the Ottoman archives there are not many documents concerning the acts of the imperial council before mid-sixteenth century. It was after then the collections of *Muḥimme Defterleri*, copies of the orders issued by the imperial council, came into view. For the first half of the sixteenth century and earlier periods we have limited sources in the archives. This is, however, not because the proceedings of the council were not recorded, but because of the fact that these registers were not preserved. There are only a few exceptions. One of these exceptions is a collection of orders issued by the imperial order, which is preserved in BOA, *Bāb-ı Asāfi Dīvān (Beylikçi) Kalemî*, BA, A.DVN, no.790. This collection includes copies of imperial orders issued in between *evāhir-i Zilkāde* 906 and *evāhir-i Zilhicce* 906 (8-17 June 1501/ 8-17 July 1501). The whole collection was published by İlhan Şahin and Feridun Emecen. İlhan Şahin and Feridun Emecen, *Osmanlılarda Dīvān- Bürokrasi- Ahkām. II. Beyazıd Dönemine Ait 906-1501 Tarihli Ahkām Defteri*, İstanbul, 1994. (From now on *Ahkām Defteri*) Seven orders in this collection are directly linked to the prohibition of qızilbash's communication with Iran, which is usually called 'Yukarı Cānib' in these documents. In a recently published article Gilles Veinstein discussed these documents in the historical context. See Gilles Veinstein, "Les premières mesures de Bâyezîd II contre les Kızılbaş", *Syncretismes et hérésies dans l'Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIV-XVIII siècle)*, *Actes du Colloque du Collège de France, octobre 2001*, Sous la direction de Gilles Veinstein, Paris, 2005, pp. 225-136.

¹⁰⁰³ It is not clear to which prince is referred to here. But it stands to reason to suppose that he must be Ahmed, then the governor of Amasya. Firstly, only Ahmed could dare to intervene in imperial orders for he was regarded as the apparent heir of the throne by leading statesmen and by Bayezid II as well. Secondly, later developments would show that he had relationship with sufis of Ardabils in one way or another.

a messenger to the governor of Sivas and declared that the death sentence of those sufis arrested during the passage to the other side could be turned into a fine. (*Anların gibi sufilerin siyāseti ta'zir bi'l-mal olmak vech görüldü*) This prince also determined the fine as four hundred *akçe* for sufis and two thousand *akçe* for khalifas. But the governor of Sivas had not put these instructions of the prince into the practice but sent a messenger to Istanbul to confirm whether or not such a re-arrangement was levied by the central government.

The existing order was actually the answer of the center to the governor. Bayezid II reaffirms his former order concerning sufis. He strictly bans any laxity in this issue. According to his order any sufis, who went to Ardabiloğlu and were detained either during arrival or during return must definitely be executed. The possession and clothes of detained sufis would be given to the one who had done the detaining. Bayezid II warns the governor that he must be careful. No one should excuse any detained sufis for the sake of money. The sultan repeats his ultimate aims that these sufis will be cut off from the other side. Lastly Bayezid II instructs the governor of Sivas to report how many sufis were detained, how they were detained and executed since receiving the present order. The governor was expected to send this report back via the centre's returning messenger.¹⁰⁰⁴

Approximately ten days later, the central government sent another decree to the governor of Sivas. As seen in this document, the governor of Sivas had sent spies to the east in order to scrutinize the state of affairs of Ismail, Murad Han of Akkoyunlu, Ebu'l-feth Mirza, and the son of Shirvanshah Gâzi Bey. The governor had sent the intelligence divulged by these spies to Istanbul. At the beginning of the decree it is stated that his

¹⁰⁰⁴ See *Ahkām Defteri*, p. 8, decree 27.

report on eastern affairs was received. Then the governor was ordered to continue inspecting the state of affairs of the ‘other side’ and to report to the Porte.¹⁰⁰⁵

Another decree issued in *evāhir-i Zilkāde* 906 (June 7-17, 1501) was addressed to Prince Mahmud, the governor of Kastamonu. At the beginning, the former prohibition is repeated:

Bundan evvel memālik-i mahrūsemde bazı sufiler yaraklarıyla Öte Taraf’da Ardabiloğluna varub ol tarafta şekavet idüb ol zümre-i tugāt ve tāife-i eşkıyānun enva’-ı şeneatleri zāhir olub ol tāifenün Yukaru gitmesi men’-ü def’ olunub nice defa men’le memnū’ olundukları ecilden mezbūr sufilerden ol tarafa giderken yolda ve izde, varışda ve gelişde dutulanun soygunu dutanun olub gendüler siyaseten salb oluna” diyü emr idüb ol babda ahkam-ı şerifeler irsal olunmuşdı.¹⁰⁰⁶

Here we see the real reason why the Ottomans wanted to cut off the communication and visits between the two sides. It is reported, says the decree, that some of my subjects had gone to the other side with their arms and conducted banditry there. It is because of that their going to the other side was prohibited. The decree obviously refers to the qizilbash tribes that joined the forces of Ismail, especially in Erzincan.¹⁰⁰⁷

Then Bayezid II warns his son: I have heard that my definite order on this mutinous group (*ol tāife-i eşirrā*) is not applied but they are set free by taking money in return. We have heard that my state agents, who are responsible to execute my orders, do not put to death the detained sufis but set them free by receiving money in return, four hundred *akçe* from sufis and two thousand *akçe* from khalifas. This laxity gives way to the continuation of their connection with the other side. It is said that they pay the mentioned fee, go to and come back from the other side. It continues:

¹⁰⁰⁵ See *Ahkām Defteri*, p. 92, decree 330.

¹⁰⁰⁶ See *Ahkām Defteri*, p. 21, decree 71.

¹⁰⁰⁷ See Veinstein, “Les premières mesures”, p. 232.

Eyle olsa ol taifenin hakikat-i hâli hod tamam mälumdur. Anların şirret ve fesâdları tamam zâhir olub her yirde nasıl hareket ve şene'ât itdükleri, pāye-i serir-i a'lāma arz olunub ef'āl-i kabīhleri ve şirret-ü fesâdları mümted olduğu merraren istima' olunmuşdur. Anların cüzi nesnelere iltifat idüb emrim mucebince siyaset olunmamak bir türüdür. İmdi emrüm kemākān ol bābda mukarrerdür. Buyurdum ki, ol tāifeden şunlar ki yukarı tarafa teveccüh ideler, bāb-ı sa'adet me'ābında olan hüddāma ve sipāhiye ısmarlayasız ki, yolları görüb gözedeler, onların gibi sufiyūn tāifesinden her kim benim hükmüme muhalefet idüb yukarı tarafa giderlerse dutub muhkem bend ideler. Soygunu ve esbabı dutanın olub sen dahi mecal virmeyüb dutulan sufileri siyaseten salb idesiz ve bu hükm-ü şerifim vasıl olduktan sonra ne denlü adem dutulub salb olunursa karşı bu tarafa i'lam idesiz. Amma bu bābda ademlerine ve sipāhilerine te'kiden ısmarlayasız ki bu kaziyeyi heman bir kizb-ü kār idinüb, ol sufilerin esbablarına ve mallarına tama' idüb dutulan sufileri salıvermeyeler. Ve illa istima' olunursa anlara i'tab-ı azīm olub siyāset olunur. Şöyle bilesiz.¹⁰⁰⁸

Ten days later another decree was dispatched to Mahmud.¹⁰⁰⁹ It again reiterates the sultan's former definite orders to put to death (*siyāseten salb*) detained sufis and not to desire greedily their money to free them. The decree states that it is still heard that some officials condone sufis' round trip to and from the other side in return for a certain fee, four hundred *akçe* for sufis and two thousand *akçe* for khalifas. Then Bayezid II underscores: 'It is not my order to receive money and I definitely do not approve of the taking of money! [instead of the death penalty]'¹⁰¹⁰ Bayezid II again warns Mahmud to make all state agents in his province apply sultanic orders without any negligence and tolerance. Those sufis who were detained on the way to the other side, on arrival, on return, or who were arrested in his house but whose arrival is in anyway proven, must be absolutely put on death without regarding whether he is sufi or khalifa. Any tolerance towards them in this affair is not tolerated.¹⁰¹¹

¹⁰⁰⁸ See *Ahkām Defteri*, p. 21, decree 71.

¹⁰⁰⁹ At the end of the document it is written that the same decree was sent to Ahmed, Alemshah, and Selimshah as well.

¹⁰¹⁰ 'Akça alınmak benim emrüm değıldür ve akça alınmağa kat'a rızam dahı yokdur'. See *Ahkām Defteri*, pp. 78-9, decree 281.

¹⁰¹¹ "Elbette elbette dutulan sufi siyāset için salb olup emrüm yerine varmak gerekdür. Bir kaç aydan sonra yarar ademler ve mütemed kimesneler gönderüb bu husussiyātü alā vechin bi'l-ihtimam teftiş

The central government seriously warned provincial governors to overlook any bribery or preferential treatment on this affair.¹⁰¹² Inspectors were commissioned to investigate the situation. The Porte insistently ordered local governors to report periodically how many sufis were detained and executed. In one decree issued in *evāhir-i Zilhicce* 906 (8-17 July 1501), Prince Şehinshah, the governor of Konya, was ordered to record and report to the Porte how many sufis had been detained and put to death since the former decree, which explained the definite order of the sultan to detain and execute sufis arriving to and returning from the upper side, had arrived. He was also ordered to report monthly how many sufis had been put to death.¹⁰¹³

This decree indicates another interesting point, which is absent in the others. It gives details on judicial aspects of these executions. It is explained that any claims of executed sufis' relatives would not be accepted by Ottoman trials. Thus, those officials in charge of executing sufis should not worry on that. No demands of executed sufis' relatives would be regarded as lawful.¹⁰¹⁴

itdürsem gerek. Şöyleki bunların siyāseti bābında ihmal olunmuş bulunacak olursa senün lalalarından olsun Hüdavenđigar-enarallahu burhanehu- ruhiyçun azille konmayub mu'ateb bi'l- mu'akab olurlar ve ger subaşılardan ve sipāhilerden ve senün bāb-ı sa'adet me'ābun halkından olsun ve sair halktan olsun ol halās itdükleri kimesne yirine gendüleri salb itdürsem gerekdür. Şöyle bileler. Ve sen dahi her üç ayda bir taht-ı hükümetünde vilayeti teftiş itdürüb kazıyye ne vechile olub ve kaç nefer-i sufi salb olunduđını malum idinüb dahi tefāsiliyle yazub dergāh-ı mu'allāma i'lām eylesiz. Ve subaşılardan ve sipāhilerden her kim benüm emrim yerine koyub ol sufileri siyaseten salb ide, anun bu hizmeti benüm 'izz-i huzürümde pasendāde vāki' olub enva'-ı ināyetümle mer'ī ve mahzüz olalar. Şöyle bilesiz, alamet-i şerife i'timad idesiz!" See *Ahkām Defteri*, pp. 78-9, decree 281.

¹⁰¹² See, for example, *Ahkām Defteri*, pp. 78-9, decree 281: "Bir kaç aydan sonra yarar ādemler ve mütemed kimesneler gönderüb bu husussıyyātı alā vechin bi'l-ihitimam teftiş itdürsem gerek."

¹⁰¹³ "Bundan evvel hükm-ü hümayun gönderüb "Yukaru tarafa varan Ardabil sufilerinden varışda ve gelişde bulunanun siyāset idesiz" diyu buyurmuşdum. Ol bābda hāliya şöyle buyurdum ki ihtimam-i tam üzere olub sabıka gönderilen hükm-i hümayunum mucebince amel idüb mezbür sufilerden ele girenün mecal virmeyüb siyāset itdüresiz. Ve ol bābda gönderilen hükm-ü hümayunum tarihinden şimdıyedek ne denlü sufi siyāset olunmuşdur defter idüb dergāh-ı mu'allāma gönderesiz. Ve bundan böyle ayda bir, iki ayda bir, ne denlü sufi siyāset olunursa defter idüb göndermek ardınca olasız. Fi'l-cümle ol bābda gönderilen hükm-ü hümayunı icra idüb emrümü ihmal itmeyüb yirine komak ardınca olasız!" See *Ahkām Defteri*, p. 126, decree 454.

¹⁰¹⁴ Veinstein regards this sentence as a part of judicial arrangements of Ottoman law regarding tribal affairs. "...La dimension tribale de l'affaire ressort une nouvelle fois ici: l'exécution des consignes du

Zamanla akrabası demin dava etmekte hazer eylemeyeler. Emr-i şerifim budur ki ol asıl sufilardan her kim siyāseten salb oluna hiç bir zamanda anun demi hususunda olan dava mesmû' olmaya. Şöyle ki atabe-i alem-penahımdan gelüb bir suretle teftişe hükm dahı alurlar ise, ol hükümle dahı amel olunmaya. Elbette elbette dutulan sufi siyaset için salb olup emrüm yerine varmak gerekdür.¹⁰¹⁵

Another edict dated *evāhir-i Zilhicce* 906 (July 7-17, 1501) was addressed to Prince Ahmed, the governor of Amasya. It includes three orders, two of which were directly linked to the qizilbash affairs. The first is related to a spy report on the affairs of Ismail and Akkoyunlu that had already been sent by Ahmed to Istanbul. Ahmed reported that Shah Ismail resided on the other side of the river Kur; there appeared epidemic in farms of Shirvan; Akkoyunlu resided on this side of the river and controlled gateways. The central government orders Ahmed to collect further information on these affairs and to report to the Porte.¹⁰¹⁶

The second decree is quite interesting. It is stated in the decree that they (central government) received a letter from the governor of Karahisar. The governor reported in his letter that certain Zinnūn Beg among the begs of the East sent a messenger to him explaining Zinnūn's request to take refuge in the Porte (*āsītāne-i saādet*). The central government states that Zinnūn's request would be refused since they had warm relations

sultan était entravée, au moins pour une part, par les règles en vigueur dans le milieu tribal." See Veinstein "Les premières mesures", p. 234. But his approach is open to criticism. It must be rather assessed within the framework of the Ottoman-Safavid political rivalry. As a matter of fact, we do not see such harsh measures against tribal groups in the other parts of the empire. In this case the judicial base of the Ottoman policy lays in the concept of rebel and heresy rather than tribal affairs.

¹⁰¹⁵ See *Ahkām Defteri*, pp. 78-9, decree 281.

¹⁰¹⁶ "Şimdiki hâlde dergâh-ı mu'allâma mektub ve âdem gönderüb Yuraru Şark diyârına gönderilen âdemden biri gelüb: "Sufi tâifesi Kür suyunun öte kenarında oturub Şirvan vilayetinin ekin yörür ovalarında taun hastalığı vâki' olub, Akkoyunlu bu canibde oturub memerrleri hıfz iderler" diyu bildürmüş, malum oldı. Eyle olsa gerekdür ki bundan böyle dahı dâim yarar âdemler gönderüb tecessüs itdürüb hakikat-ı hâl ne vechile zahir olursa yazub dergâh-ı âlem-penâhıma i'lâm idesiz!" See *Ahkām Defteri*, p. 125, decree 453.

with the Upper Eastern Side (*Yakaru Cānib*).¹⁰¹⁷ If they would accept Zinnūn's application this might damage their good relations.¹⁰¹⁸

It should be noted that according to these decrees it was not merely being a sufi of Ardabil that instigated the penalty but also communication with the other side, more precisely visiting the Shah there. Furthermore, these documents do not mention immigration. Rather they mention the effort of individual sufis to maintain their communication and connection with the other side, i.e. Safavids. The crime is always formulated as an arrival to and return from the other side (*öte tarafa-yukaru cānibe varub gelmek*). We observe that the sufis did not aim to immigrate to Iran, the land of the Shah, but provide support for their Shah from Ottoman territories. Of course there were numerous men, especially young fighters of tribes, who joined the Shah's army. But their relatives were still living in the Ottoman territories.

The central government obviously regarded the prevention of sufis visiting the other side as a matter of utmost importance. But local governors seemed to overlook it. That might be either to make money or because of their sympathy. But one point attracts attention. In spite of the strict ban of the Porte on turning the death penalty into fee, there emerged a standardized tariff. The first decree includes some clues about the origins of these abuses. Prince Ahmed and his retinue must be responsible for such laxities. And the role of Safavid sympathizers among *sipāhis* should not be overlooked as well. It seems that although nominally sultanic orders strictly premised death penalty for

¹⁰¹⁷ Ottoman documents and chronicles usually use this terms for the country of Shah Ismail.

¹⁰¹⁸ “*Ve Karahisar sancağı beyi mektub gönderüb Şark beylerinden Zinnūn Bey nām kimesne kendüye adem gönderüb Asitāne-i sa’ādete iltica itmek istediğini i’lām itmişiz. Eyle olsa Yukaru Şark tarafiyle, bu canibün aramızda dostluk ve muhāleset-i tāmme vardır. Şimdi ol taraftan bu tarafa ādem kaçub gelüb kabul olunursa aralıkda bürüdete ve küdûrete sebep olur. Mezbūr sancak beyine mektub gönderüb ismarlayasız ki, ol dahu haber göndere ki, mezbūr Zinnūn bu tarafa gelmek lazım değildir, gelmeye!”* See *Ahkām Defteri*, p. 125, decree 453.

communication with the other side, a *modus vivendi* was established between local governors and sufis.

But still the preventive measures of the Ottoman administration must have seriously reduced the mass flow from Anatolian tribes to the Shah's territory as Ismail sent a letter to Bayezid requesting the permission of his disciples to visit their shaykh. The sultan said in his answer that the motive of many of these pilgrims for going to the Tekke of Ardabil was not the desire to fulfill a pious duty, but to escape from the obligation of military service; many of them using pilgrimage to Ardabil and visiting 'the friends of God'¹⁰¹⁹ as a pretext to abandon the country. But he still expresses his warm sentiment for receiving Ismail's letter, which he (Bayezid II) deemed a sign of friendly relationship between the two states. Thus Bayezid refused Ismail's request in a polite and diplomatic manner.¹⁰²⁰ The dates of these letters are not specified in *Münşeāt*. However, they are placed just after the *fetih-nāme* (letter of conquest) of Moton and Coron. Since these cities were conquered in 1501, the correspondence under scrutiny must be dated in or after 1501.¹⁰²¹ Ottoman chronicles also report Bayezid II's refusal of Ismail's request. Hoca Saadeddin says, for example, after the deportation of Ardabil sufis in Teke region, the passage of qizilbashs through borders was strictly banned. Upon the prohibition of the sultan, Ismail wrote a letter bagging him to permit his disciples to visit himself.¹⁰²² The above mentioned deportation occurred in 1502. Thus,

¹⁰¹⁹ Bayezid II uses this term for Safavid shaykhs.

¹⁰²⁰ Feridun Bey, I, pp. 338-39. Also see BRW, p. 68; Efendiyev, "Sultan II. Bayezid ve Şah İsmail", p. 93; Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, Istanbul, 1987, pp. 19-20.

¹⁰²¹ It is well-known that Feridun Bey follows a chronological order in organizing his work.

¹⁰²² "...Bu maksatla kapıya nāme gönderip zavallılığını ortaya koydu. Atalarının dostları için Acem diyarına geçiş izni tanınması ricasında bulundu ise de sözüne değer verilip dileği yerine getirilmedi." HSE3, p. 346.

this correspondence must have taken place in the same year.¹⁰²³ Solakzāde also gives the same date, 908/1502.¹⁰²⁴ But some historians trace this date back.¹⁰²⁵

Some important points to be noted in these imperial decrees are that the terms ‘sufi’ and ‘khalifa’ are being used with quite a specific connotation in these edicts. Accordingly, it stands to reason to presume that these terms had already acquired their specific meaning within the order and social organization of qizilbash society so that Ottoman administration recognized their specific connotations.¹⁰²⁶ The orders were sent to the border provinces, which are known as parts of qizilbash zones. But surprisingly no order seems to have been sent to the governors of Teke or Taş-eli. Or, to be more precise, at least this collection does not contain such orders.¹⁰²⁷

In these decrees sufis were not clearly mentioned as nomads. But there are some clues. Some phrases such as “*zümre-i tugāt ve tāife-i eşkiyā*” invoke nomadic connotation.¹⁰²⁸ We know from other sources that the Ottoman government uses these

¹⁰²³ Also consider Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, p. 20, footnote, 27.

¹⁰²⁴ Solakzāde narrates it in the same manner: “*Hudud kumandanlarına hükümler tebliğ olundu. Bundan böyle sufi nāmı ile hiç kimsenin Anadolu’ya geçmemesine ve yolların zabt olunmasına dāir emirler verildi. Çünkü bu çirkin kalabalık Anadolu diyārında bu vechile mahbūs oldu. Şāh İsmail ashāblarının kendilerine ulaşmasından me’yūs olunca, bizzarure, 908 (1502) yılında Der-i Devlet’e ubūdiyet-nāmeler gönderdi. Miskinliğini arz iderek itāat yüzünü gösterdi. Babasının ahablarının Acem diyārına gitmelerine icāzet verilmesini rica eyledi. Amma onun bu ricalarına hiç bir sūretle iltifat olunmadı. Kabūle karin kulağı ile işidilmedi.*” SLZ1, p. 429.

¹⁰²⁵ According to Gaffārī, for example, it must be written in late 905 or early 906 / middle of 1500. (See Ahmed İbn Muhammed Gaffārī Qazvinī, *Tārīkh-i Cehān Ārā*, ed. M. Minuvī, Tehran, 1953, p. 265.) Allouche, basing on textual analysis of the letter, follows Gaffārī’s account. To him this letter must have been written just before embarking on the campaign over Shirvan. (Allouche, p. 89.)

¹⁰²⁶ Solakzāde states Ismail made his soldiers wear red-caps and his soldiers became famous as qizilbash. We know that this term is actually derived from Haydar. Then how should we read this passage in Solakzāde? “*Şāh İsmail Tebriz’de saltanat mülkünün tahtına oturdu. Kendisine de Şāh namını takdı. Askerlerine kırmızı çukalardan tāclar giydirdi. Kızılbaş nāmı ile şöhret ve şān kazanmalarına vesile oldu.*” SLZ1, p. 428. This passage obviously refers to the turning point of the Safavid Order from a mystic order into a state. SLZ mentions his disciples as qizilbash for the first time. In the former paragraphs he referred, as other sources, to them as ‘sufi’. In the Ottoman sources ‘qizilbash’ is used during 1510s in the context of rebellions and war with Ismail. And this term has clear politico-religious connotation.

¹⁰²⁷ Compare Veinstein, “Les premières mesures”, p. 229.

¹⁰²⁸ See Chapter III and Chapter VI in this study.

terms usually nomadic tribes because of their disobedience.¹⁰²⁹ *Haniwaldanus Anonym* clearly puts that the great number of people gathered under the banner of Ismail from several regions of Anatolia were nomadic Turkomans (*yörük*).¹⁰³⁰ Their description also strongly affirms this idea. The chronicle describes them as looters (*çapulcu*), which was one of the principal bases of the nomadic economy.

5.3.2. Excitement in Teke Region and Mass Deportation to Morea.

I have already delineated that Junayd's propaganda achieved brilliant success in the Taurus region of southern Anatolia. A number of disciples had already served in the court of Junayd, Haydar, and Sultan Ali during the pre-state period.¹⁰³¹ The rise of Ismail further excited the qizilbash population of the region, especially in Teke and Hamid-ili.

The Ottoman government took measures to preserve social tranquility in the region and to prevent the immigration of the qizilbashes to Iran. According to Kemalpaşazâde, Korkud was appointed as governor of Antalya in order to establish social tranquility and control the underground activities of Ismail's agents.¹⁰³² He says that when it obviously appeared that the mentioned region became the source of

¹⁰²⁹ Müneccimbaşı mentions the rebellious disciples of Ismail in Teke as 'Türkmen', which traditionally refers to the tribal-nomadic Turkish population in Ottoman chronics. KPZ describes them as 'menba'-ı buğât ve mecma'-ı tuğât'. KPZ8a, p. 233. APZ uses the adjectives 'baği' and 'taği' for Turgud and Varsak tribes. To sum up, in the Ottoman official language and in the language of writers who might be regarded as spokesmen of the official view these adjectives and the term 'Türkmen' are nearly identified with nomadic tribes.

¹⁰³⁰ ANMH, p. 45.

¹⁰³¹ One of them was Hasan Khalifa, the father of Shahkulu. See "Shahkulu Rebellion" in this study.

¹⁰³² "*Ma'mûre-i mezkûrenün menba'-ı buğât ve mecma'-ı tuğât idüğü âşikâr olıcak ol diyârün bed-kirdâr nâ-bekârları şî'âr-ı 'isyân u tuğyanla iştihâr bulıcak râyet-i zâhire vü siyâset-i kâhireyle ol vilâyeti himâyet mühimm oldı. İçinde bir nâsıb-ı râyet-i şevket, sâhib-i haşmet ü iktidar serdâr olmak lâzım oldı. Ol esnâda ittîfak şehzâde-i âsümân- 'azamet serv-i âzâde-i bostan, saray-ı cihân-ârâ-yı saltanat...Cihangîr Kotkud sipîhr-i kerem...Saruhan diyârından ferâgat gösterdi. Altalya'da olmağa râğbet gösterdi.*" KPZ8a, pp. 233-4.

insurgence and meeting place of rebels, to protect this province became of primary importance. To achieve that appointing a strong and skilful governor there to put issues in order turned out to be of utmost necessity. Prince Korkud, who was then the governor of Manisa, accepted this mission and was assigned to Antalya.¹⁰³³ According to Kemalpaşazāde, Korkud took severe measures against qizilbash activities and managed to take events under control.

Riyāset-i kāmilesinün siyāset-i şāmilesiyle ol diyār mazbūt olub etrāf u eknāfuna bāl-i ikbālī mebsūt olub āsār-ı envār-ı ‘adliyle deycūr-ı şerr ü şūr zāyil oldı. Ayağ üzerine gelen serkeşleri yürütmeyüb fi’l-hāl pāymāl eyledi. Kimseye boyun eğmeyen gerden-keşler tav’an ev revān emrine imtisal eyledi. Dādiyle bilād ü kurrāyī ābād eyleyüb, adliyle ehl-i fesād u gavgāyı korkutdı. Mülhid-i i’tikād(u) müfsid-nihādların kimi kırılıb, kimi ırılıb ol diyār (tohtüşdi) karār tutdı. Mukīm ü musāfir huzūr bulub, ragat oldı. Ol iklimün nāhiyeleri emn ü āmān toldı.¹⁰³⁴

Kemalpaşazāde does not give the exact date of these events. But we understand from the following paragraph that they must have occurred in 908/1502. Following the appointment of Korkud as governor of Antalya, Saruhan was allotted to ‘Alemshah, another son of Bayezid II. However, soon after his move to Saruhan, ‘Alemshah died. Kemalpaşazāde gives the date of ‘Alemshah’s death as 908.¹⁰³⁵ Furthermore, we know from archival sources that Korkud was appointed to Antalya in 908/1502.¹⁰³⁶

¹⁰³³ KPZ8a, pp. 233-4. KPZ narrates as if Korkud voluntarily accepted to leave Manisa. But we know from other sources that he was forced by his brother Ahmed, who was the most favorite prince to the throne, to do so. See ULCY1, p. 58; M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, “Korkut”, *IA*, p. 856; Feridun Emecen, “Korkut”, *DIA*, p. 205.

¹⁰³⁴ KPZ8a, p. 234.

¹⁰³⁵ MNB also gives the same date. See MNB, p. 442.

¹⁰³⁶ ULCY1, p. 58, footnote 6. Ulucay mentions the gravestone of Korkud’s mother, which is in Antalya and dated 908. He also quotes from a document preserved in TSA. According to this document, which is an imperial decree issued by Bayezid II, the Province of Hamid was additionally given to Korkud, who was then the governor of the Province of Antalya, in Zilka’de, 908 (May, 1503). The documents reads, “*Kabza-i tasarrufunda olan Antalya sancağından bedel Hamid vilayeti taleb itdüğü ecilden mumaileyh oğlum tulullahi ömrühu Mentеше vilayetinde olan tasarrufunda olan hasrlarunu geru ibka edub ve Antalyada olan 837090 akçalık haslardan bedel zikr olunan Hamid ili sancağın 841363 akçalık hass ile tevfiş kılınub...*” TSA, document E 6536. On this issue consider also Gökbilgin, “Korkut”, p. 856.

Kemalpaşazāde reports that some of rebels were killed and some others were deported in order to re-establish tranquility. But he does not clarify where these rebellious qizilbashs were exiled to. Later historians, however, specifies this point. Hoca Saadeddin, for example, explains how the number of Ismail's sympathizers in Anatolia, especially in Teke and Hamid-ili, had increased when Ismail rose up, captured Tabriz and consolidated his temporal power as well as his spiritual one. As already mentioned in the previous pages, the majority of his fighters were recruited from several region of Anatolia and the Ottoman Provinces of Teke and Hamid-ili were among the foremost regions where qizilbash activities were intensified.¹⁰³⁷ Ottoman administration tried to prevent qizilbash's passing over the borders.¹⁰³⁸ Nevertheless, the danger was not limited to some subjects' abandoning their home lands, but, according to Ottoman sources, the remaining qizilbashs were also disturbing the social order.¹⁰³⁹ The final solution, then, came out as a quite severe one. The famous qizilbashs of the region were exiled to the recently captured coastal cities of Morea, Modon, Coron, and Lepanto.¹⁰⁴⁰

Before Hoca Saadeddin, however, this deportation was reported by Aşıkpaşazāde, who was already an old man then. As indicated earlier, the last section (*bāb*) of his history is directly connected to the deportation of Safavid disciples from Anatolia to Moton and Koron. The subtitle and introductory sentences of this section

¹⁰³⁷ HSE3, p. 345.

¹⁰³⁸ See, for example, ANMH, p. 45.

¹⁰³⁹ KPZ8a, p. 233-4. Seventeenth century historians, such as Müneccimbaşı and Solakzāde, usually recite Saadeddin's account on this issue. Among them Müneccimbaşı explicitly states the risk of anarchy that the remaining sufis could possibly create as a reason of the deportation. "*Teke ve Hamid İli'nde bulunan Türkmenlerden çoğu Şah İsmail'in ordusuna katıldıklarından kalanların bir fitne çıkarmasından korkuldu. Bunlar Sultan'ın emriyle Modon ve Koron bölgesinde iskān edildiler. Serhad muhafızlarına da bunlardan memleketlerine dönmek isteyenlere mani olmaları emr edildi.*" See MNB, p. 417.

¹⁰⁴⁰ HSE3, pp. 345-6. Solakzāde repeats Saadeddin's account. See SLZ1, p. 429. Consider also TNSB, pp. 237-8 and HAM2, p. 369. The deportation of qizilbashs is recorded in contemporary Italian sources as well. See FSH, p. 92.

actually include indications on the issue. The section is entitled ‘This section explains the reasons why the sūfis of Ardabil were forced to emigrate to Rumelia.’¹⁰⁴¹ The first sentence explains the reason: ‘it was because of the fact that religious scholars (*ulemā*) declared them to be unbelievers. Thus, they fell victim to the sultan’s wrath. As a result they were forced to emigrate to Rumelia.’¹⁰⁴² Following this sentence Aşıkpaşazāde asks a question, which seems to reflect some of the question marks in the public mind: ‘They were sufis and disciples of Shaykh Safi, who followed the religion of Muhammed in their mystical path. While this being the reality what became the reason for accusing them of being unbelievers?’¹⁰⁴³ The whole section (*bāb*) 161 of his history is devoted to answering this question.

After establishing peace with Venice, the rise of Safavid power and the activities of their disciples in Anatolia became the foremost matter of the Ottoman government. It was not an easy task to punish these sufis since they were Muslim as well. Actually, Aşıkpaşazāde was the first to lay the issue on the table and establish a religious ground for the measures to be taken by the Ottoman administration. Soon after, foremost religious scholars such as Muftī Hamza, Kemalpaşazāde, and Ebussuūd would issue severe *fetvās* about these groups. During the first years of the sixteenth century, however, the issue was not sharpened yet, but still appeared as a crucial problem both in terms of politics and religion. We see from the question Aşıkpaşazāde asks in his chapter on the Safavids that especially among the lower and middle-classes, who were the audience of Aşıkpaşazāde’s history, there were a recognizable number of people who

¹⁰⁴¹ APZ, p. 249.

¹⁰⁴² ‘*Bu oldu kim ülemā küfürlerine hükm etdiler. Padişah anlara gazāb etdi. Rum eline sürdüler.*’ APZ, p. 249.

¹⁰⁴³ ‘*Sual: Bunlar hod sofilar idi. Şeyh Safi müridlerinden idi. Tasavvufdan Şer-i Muhammedî sallallahu ‘aleyhi ve sellem üzerine olurlar idi. Bunları tekfir etmeğe sebep ne oldı?*’ APZ, p. 249.

were confused about the disciples of Ardabil. The Safaviyya order had been known as one of the appreciated sufi orders within the boundaries of sharia for long time. We know from the wide-spread fame of Shaykh Safi among Anatolian mystics that the mystical path of Safi had been revered by the Ottoman population as well. So being the situation, the mass deportation of Safavid disciples must have raised question marks in public opinion. Among our known sources, Aşıkpaşazāde was the first to attempt to clarify this issue.

Another point to underscore here is that Aşıkpaşazāde declares sufis of the Safavid order as heretic. He says, “the scholars of religion decided that they are outside shari’a.” Historians generally accepted that Bayezid II pursued moderately a tolerant policy against sufis of Ardabil. Only after Selim’s ascendance to the throne did the Ottoman government take harsh measures. The earliest religious sanction, or *fetvās*, accusing Safavids of being heretic or unbelievers is known as the one issued by Hamza just before embarking on a campaign on Ismail. But this passage in Aşıkpaşazāde’s history shifts that sort of religious declaration by Ottoman *ulamā* back to the beginning of the century. If this section was not a later edition, then we have to accept that qizilbashs had already been recognized and declared as heretics one decade before Hamza’s *fetvā*, when Ismail founded his temporal empire.

There is enough reason to suppose that the mass deportation was not limited to the provinces of Teke and Hamid-ili. Aşıkpaşazāde does not mention, for example, any specific province when explaining the reasons why the sufis of Ardabil were deported. Rather he states the leaders of Ardabil sufis, and those who visited Ardabil among them,

were denigrated and exiled from the country of Rūm (*memleket-i Rūm*) to Rum Eli.¹⁰⁴⁴ Neither the province that sufis were deported from, nor the one they were exiled to is specified by Aşıkpaşazāde. Thus it is reasonable to think that the mass deportation from Teke and Hamid-ili to Moton and Coron was only an example among many others. But it must have been the greatest since historians needed to put special emphasis on this case. Aşıkpaşazāde recites the deportation just before his narration of Ismail's march on Tabriz.¹⁰⁴⁵ One can deduce, thus, from his account that Ismail captured Tabriz after the exile of many sufis from several parts of *memleket-i Rūm*. As delineated above, the deportation from Teke occurred after the appointment of Korkud in 1502, when Ismail had already entered Tabriz.¹⁰⁴⁶ Thus what Aşıkpaşazāde mentions must be not necessarily the well-known exile of Tekean sufis but some others that took place earlier than 1502.¹⁰⁴⁷

Haniwaldanus Anonym confirms such an assumption. It states, Bayezid II dispatched orders to his governors in eastern borders to arrest and execute those who wanted to join Ismail's forces. But such measures could not prevent the qizilbash flow to Iran. He, then, inspected sufis wearing red-caps (*kızıl tāk*) all over Anatolia. Upon his order the adherents of Ismail were executed. But those who were sympathizers but still hesitant were deported, with their children and spouses, to Morea. For this purpose many messengers were sent to Anatolia; so many people were executed and exiled that many

¹⁰⁴⁴ “*Memleket-i Rūm'da olan sofıların hülefāsını ve Ardabil'e varan sofuları Sultan Bayezid tahkır edüb Rum Eli'ne sürdi.*” APZ, p. 251.

¹⁰⁴⁵ APZ, p. 251.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Ismail captured Tebriz in the summer of 1501. See Allouche, p. 82.

¹⁰⁴⁷ For a similar approach consider Veinstein, “Les premières mesures”, pp. 230-32. Veinstein comes out with the same conclusion on the basis of a totally different source. He analyzes a decree of Bayezid issued in June, 1501, which is published in *AD*. The decree is addressed to the *qadi* of Ankara and orders to arrest certain Fethullah, who was deported to Moton but returned to Ankara without permission. The *qadi* was expected to capture and imprison him.

villages became devoid of people.¹⁰⁴⁸ As seen evidently, the anonymous author reports that people were arrested and deported from the whole of Anatolia and Rum-ili (meaning the Balkans and Thrace). Italian sources also agree upon that not only from the region of Teke but from the whole of Anatolia groups of ‘heretics’ were deported to Greece and Albania.¹⁰⁴⁹

One further point to be noticed in *Haniwaldanus Anonym*’s account is that the mass deportation is reported as the B-plan of the Ottoman administration. Bayezid first tried to prevent the flow of his subjects to Ismail’s entourage by levying severe punishments. But this measure failed to cut off the connection between the shah and his disciples. It was after then that Bayezid exiled sufis to recently captured Morea, which was the western frontier of the empire. Bayezid’s aim is obvious: he wanted to make them totally torn off from Ismail and other sufis of Anatolia. *Haniwaldanus Anonym* draws attention to one additional concern of the Ottoman administration: they would protect the borders against [Christian] enemies.¹⁰⁵⁰

Haniwaldanus Anonym also sheds light on some aspects of the deportation. It states that so many people were deported that villages and towns became for the most part devoid of people. A close scrutiny of other sources discloses that they also tacitly indicate that the deportation was comprehensive. It seems, for example, from the commentary of Aşıkpaşazāde that it created displeasure among a certain portion of

¹⁰⁴⁸ “Bunun üzerine [sınırlarda alınan önlemlerin sufilerin geçişine engel olamaması üzerine] Bayezid bu kötü duruma başka bir care buldu. O, Anadolu bölgesini inceden inceye arattırarak ele geçen kırmızı taçı herkesi yakalatıp idam ettirdi. Fakat henüz kararsız olan ve açıkça sufilerin mezhebini Kabul etmiş görünmeyenler, karıları, çocukları ve taraftarları ile birlikte Mora’ya sürülerek burada deniz kıyısında ikamete mecbur tutulacak; böylece düşmandan gelecek baskınlara her an maruz kalacak biçimde silah altında bulundurulacaklardı. Bu maksatla Anadolu ve Rumeli’ye ulaklar gönderildi ve yakalananların çoğu idam edildi; ayrıca çok kişi de sürgüne gönderildi. Bunun sonunda köyler ve kasabalar büyük ölçüde insandan arındırılmış bir hale getirildi.” ANMH, p. 45.

¹⁰⁴⁹ See FSH, p. 92.

¹⁰⁵⁰ ANMH, p. 45.

society; the attitude of the government was regarded as either as too harsh or entirely oppressing. Indeed, it must have been this discontent that forced Aşıkpaşazâde to add the last section of his history, which summarizes the deeds of Junayd. His question at the beginning of the section reveals the fact that a considerable number of people, possibly even among the high circles of Istanbul, were confused with the deportation of Safavid adherents, who seemed still to be well-regarded sufis. The answer of Aşıkpaşazâde aims exactly to resolve this question. He attempts to explain the essential change in the doctrinal basis of this mystic order in order to prove to his audience that the Order of Safaviyya was no more regarded as an ‘approved’ mystical path from the Islamic point of view.¹⁰⁵¹

5.4. THE KARAMAN UPRISING, 1500

A certain Mustafa¹⁰⁵², pretending to be a member of Karaman dynasty, rose up against the Ottoman authority while Bayezid II was occupied with the conquest of coastal strongholds in Morea such as Lepanto, Modon, and Coron. The tribes of the Taş-eli region such as Turgutlu and Varsak immediately gathered around him.¹⁰⁵³ Aşıkpaşazâde declares that the actual reason of the uprising was the increasing taxes imposed over the region. Ottoman government commissioned a bureaucrat to re-register the tax sources of the province of Karaman in 906 / 1500-1. The new register (*tahrir*) doubly increased the administrative and military responsibilities of the timar holders while their allotted

¹⁰⁵¹ APZ, p. 249.

¹⁰⁵² Idris and ‘Ali gives his name as İbrahim. “...vilâyet-i Qaraman’da İbrahim nâm bir meçhûlû’n-neseb-i mezmûmü’l-haseb nedir ki ‘Ben Qaraman-Oğlı İshak Beğ’in ferzend-i reşidiyem’ diyu zuhur eyledi.” See ALI, p. 900. Also consider TNSB, p. 123, footnote 43. Solakzâde says his name was Mustafa and he was the son of Hacı Hamza, who was the son of Qaramanoğlu İbrahim Bey. Münecimbaşı, however, argues that Hacı Hamza was the son of İbrahim Bey’s brother Mirzâ Bey. Both of them agree on the fact that Mustafa had fled to Iranian lands during his infancy and grew there. See SLZ1, p. 429; MNB, p. 412.

¹⁰⁵³ KPZ8a, pp. 210-11.

revenue sources remained the same. At that point Aşıkpaşazâde's account differs from later histories. To him the rebellion was initiated by those *timar* holders who were charged with heavy incumbency. They brought someone, who was pretending to be from Karaman dynasty, to the leadership of the rebellion. But Aşıkpaşazâde repeatedly argues that Mustafa was not a member of Karaman dynasty.¹⁰⁵⁴ Throughout his narration of several stages of the rebellion, he never mentions the Varsak and Turgut tribes. But at the end of the rebellion, when Mustafa fled, *timar* holders and Karaman begs, he says, came to Mesih Pasha; they expressed repentance and vowed not to betray any more.¹⁰⁵⁵ Later accounts, however, do not mention the role of *timar* holders in the rebellion. One feels legitimate within available evidence to take into account both groups, *timar* holders and local tribal leaders.

Leaving aside the proportion of *timar* holders and tribal begs in the rebellion, what is known is that they rose up and to lead the uprising they invited Mustafa Bey, who was the grand-son of Mirza Beg, a brother of Kasim Beg, and at that moment was living in Iran. Mustafa Beg came to İçel and formed a government there.¹⁰⁵⁶ They pillaged Larende and surrounded the citadel of the city. Upon hearing these developments, Prince Ahmed who was the governor of Amasya, sent a messenger to Muhammed, the son of Prince Şehinşah and governor of Beyşehir, ordering him to march on rebels. Ahmed himself also moved towards Larende as well. Upon hearing that an Ottoman army was on the way towards him, Mustafa Beg returned to Taş-ili. Although Ahmed followed them for a while, since Mustafa Beg's forces took shelter in

¹⁰⁵⁴ Even the title of related section in Aşıkpaşazâde's history is "*Anı beyan ederkim düzme Qaramanoğlı ne suretde geldi neyledi*" See APZa, p. 260.

¹⁰⁵⁵ APZa, p. 261.

¹⁰⁵⁶ UZC2, p. 109. Also consider HSE3, p. 318;

the steep mountains of Taş-ili and the winter was about to begin, he had to return without a confrontation.¹⁰⁵⁷

In the following spring (Ramazan 906/May-April 1501) Bayezid II, who had already returned from Morea, commissioned Mesih Pasha to resolve the Karaman problem. Mesih Pasha surrounded rebellious forces in Bulgar Mountains. If we trust Hoca Saadeddin, some tribal leaders around Mustafa Beg regretted and began to communicate secretly with Mesih Pasha. They pleaded for forgiveness and pledged to obey.¹⁰⁵⁸ Thus, shortly after the arrival of the Ottoman army the tribal forces around Mustafa beg began to fall apart. Mustafa himself had to flee to Aleppo.¹⁰⁵⁹ But Aşıkpaşazāde and Kemalpaşazāde, two contemporaries of the events, do not mention such an implicit coalition between tribal comrades of Mustafa Beg and Mesih Pasha. Aşıkpaşazāde states that it was after the siege of rebellious troops by the Ottoman army in Taş-ili and the fleeing of Mustafa that tribal begs and *timar* holders begged forgiveness.¹⁰⁶⁰ Kemalpaşazāde gives a similar story: Mesih Pasha besieged Mustafa Beg's forces in Bulgar Mountains and killed a number of them, especially from the Varsak tribe. The rebellious troops could not resist and scattered soon. Mustafa Beg fled.¹⁰⁶¹ An imperial decree issued in *evāil-i Zilhicce* 906 (18-27 June 1501), and addressed to Mesih Pasha, confirms that Mustafa Beg escaped from Taş-ili and first went to Tarsus, then disappeared. He might either arrive in Damascus or go to Eastern

¹⁰⁵⁷ HSE3, pp. 319-320; MNB, p. 412.

¹⁰⁵⁸ HSE3, p. 320. 'Ali and Müneccinbaşı repeats the same idea. See ALI, p. 901 and MNB, p. 413.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Uzunçarşılı relies on Hoca's account. See UZC2, pp. 109-110.

¹⁰⁶⁰ APZa, p. 261.

¹⁰⁶¹ KPZ8a, pp. 211-212. An imperial decree issued in *evāil-i Zilhicce* 906 (18-27 June 1501)

Side (*Şark Cānibi*), i.e. Iran.¹⁰⁶² Later sources say, he was, upon request of Bayezid II, arrested and imprisoned by Memluk governor of Aleppo.¹⁰⁶³

The uprising of Mustafa Beg constituted the last confrontation of Karaman and Ottoman forces. The Karamanid dynasty, which resisted against Ottomans for two centuries, was totally diminished by the repression of this uprising and did not rise again.¹⁰⁶⁴ One accomplishment of Mesih Pasha was that after suppressing the rebellion he built a castle in Taş-ili and stationed a group of janissaries in it. The reason for this was the idea that these soldiers would intervene and prevent similar insubordinate activities in the region.¹⁰⁶⁵

In order to better assess the events of the year 1500, a short glimpse into the international power relations is necessary. In 1500, when Ismail rose up, the seven-year long struggle with Mamluks had already ended in 1491 and since then the Mamluks and the Ottomans had been relatively friendly. The newly rising power in the east further cemented warm relations between the two. Bayezid sent his daughter to the sultan of Egypt for marriage in 1501. In the next year, ambassadors discussed the affairs of Persia

¹⁰⁶² ‘*Şimdiki hâlde dergâh-ı mu’allâma mektub ve âdem gönderüb*

*Karamanoğlu adına olan müfsid Taşili’nden çıkub Tarsus cānibine gidüb akabince Ankara Sancağı beyin gönderüb mezbur Karamanoğlu adına olan mesfuri Kuştemiroğlu deniz kenarından geçürmiş, Şam tarafına veyahud Şark canibine gidüb veyahud ol yirde pinhan olduğu ma’lum olmadı diyü bildirmişsiz. Eyle olsa gerekdür ki, bu bâbda kemal-i ihtimâm ve hüsn-ü ikdâm zuhura getürüb ol müfsidün ne yire varub ve ne yire iltica itdüğün tamam tahkik idüb bilmeyince olmayasız ve hakikat-ı hâl tamam ma’lum olduktan sonra yazub dergâh-ı âlem-penâhıma i’lam idesiz!’ See *Ahkâm Defteri*, pp. 67-8, decree 240. Ten days before, another decree had been sent Şehinshah to inform the Port on affairs concerning Karamanoğlu. See *Ahkâm Defteri*, p. 32, decree 111.*

¹⁰⁶³ See for example SLZ1, p. 422. Fisher deduces from contemporary Italian sources that Ismail requested the Governor of Aleppo to free the Qaramanian leader. But the Mamluk sultan sided with Bayezid. He not only refused Ismail’s request but also sent three thousand mamluks to Aleppo to prevent his release and to guard frontier. See FSH, p. 92.

¹⁰⁶⁴ TNSB, p. 125.

¹⁰⁶⁵ “*Ve ol Taş-ili içinde bir kale yaptılar, kapıklarından içinde biraz kul kodular, artuk bir ânın gibi haramzâde haramilik idüb kaçub Taş-iline girmesün deyu*”. See APZa, p. 261. For a similar account also consider KPZ8a, p. 212.

and the Syrian frontier.¹⁰⁶⁶ On the other hand, the ruler of Egypt preferred to preserve the distance in his relations with Ismail. He refuted Ismail's request to free Mustafa of Karaman, who was arrested by the governor of Aleppo. He also did not accept Ismail's offer to make an alliance against the Ottomans,¹⁰⁶⁷ and rather pursued a pro-Ottoman policy against the Safavids. A letter of Hayr Beg, the Mamluk governor of Aleppo, addressed to the Ottoman sultan evidently indicates that Mamluks preferred to move together with the Ottomans against rising shi'ite danger. In his letter Hayr Beg states that he had received a letter from his sultan ordering to help Ottomans against qizilbash. He also explains that he had already ordered his generals to join Ottoman forces and he himself was ready to perform any mission that would be delivered by the Ottoman sultan.¹⁰⁶⁸

In the opposite camp, there was Venice and Ismail. There are reasons to suppose a connection between these two powers and the uprising of Mustafa. Indeed, Ottoman sources do not suggest any link between the Karaman uprising and the qizilbash movement, neither ideological affiliation nor concrete co-operation between the two. Furthermore, Safavid sources never talk about neither Mustafa Beg nor his uprising against the Ottoman authority. Meanwhile Sydney N. Fisher, relying on Italian sources, argues many of the tribes summoned under the banner of Mustafa were qizilbash.¹⁰⁶⁹ Adel Allouche follows the same approach. To him the concurrence of the Karaman uprising and Ismail's westward march in the summer of 1500 was not accidental. They appear to have acted in complete co-operation. Allouche develops his idea further and

¹⁰⁶⁶ FSH, p. 93.

¹⁰⁶⁷ FSH, p. 93.

¹⁰⁶⁸ TSA, document E 5483. This document is partly published by Selahattin Tansel. See TNSB, p. 232.

¹⁰⁶⁹ FSH, p. 91.

argues that the real reason of Ismail's visit to Erzincan was not solely to summon his Anatolian disciples, as widely accepted by historians, but to enter into the Ottoman territories from there and to join in the Karaman uprising. But since he could not summon as many fighters as he expected in Erzincan, he had to turn on a weaker enemy, which was the ruler of Shirvan.¹⁰⁷⁰

Allouche calls attention to Venice's effort to establish a coalition against the Ottomans on the eastern front. It seems from contemporary reports of Italian diplomats that diplomatic relations between Venice and Ismail had already been established in 1502.¹⁰⁷¹ Upon the request of Ismail, Venice sent Constantino Laschari from Cyprus to promise aid and artillery.¹⁰⁷² Furthermore, Laschari was commissioned to convey the message of Venice not only to 'Nuovo Profeto' (Ismail) but to Karaman and Persia as well.¹⁰⁷³ Thus, Allouche deduces, this letter must have been written before the summer of 1501 since Ismail became the ruler of Persia from then on. If it was written after this date then Venice should not address Ismail and Persia separately.¹⁰⁷⁴ Consequently, Venice, Ismail, and Mustafa acted in coordination against the Ottoman Empire in the summer of 1500. But this coalition did not survive long since Venice was defeated on Morean coasts on the one side and Ismail could not gather enough warriors from the Ottoman territories on the other. After signing a treaty with Venice in the following

¹⁰⁷⁰ Adel Allouche, *Osmanlı-Safevî İlişkileri. Kökenleri ve Gelişimi*, çev. Ahmed Emin Dağ, İstanbul: Anka Yayınları, 2001. (Originally published in English: *The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict (906-962 / 1500-1555)*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983.), p. 93. It should be noted, however, that the available evidence does not support Allouche's argument.

¹⁰⁷¹ Allouche, p. 90. The attempt of western powers to establish good relations with Shah Ismail against the Ottoman Empire is a well-known historical fact. In addition to Venice, Portugal also sought ways of co-operation with the new monarch of Iran. On the other hand, Ismail also pursued a policy to maintain warm relationship with Venice, Portugal and other western states. For the diplomacy between Shah Ismail and Portugal see Jean Aubin, "Les ambassades portugaises à la cour de Châh Isma'il", *Journal of Azerbaijani Studies*, 1, 1998, 20-29.

¹⁰⁷² FSH, p. 92.

¹⁰⁷³ Allouche, p. 91.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Allouche, p. 91.

summer, Bayezid dispatched an army on Mustafa and eliminated the Karaman threat. Ismail then had to abandon his territorial interests in Ottoman lands if he had any and turned towards Iran.¹⁰⁷⁵

Although Allouche's indication on the possible connection between these three concurrent events and on the corroboration between the three rivals of the Ottomans deserves attention, his argument on Ismail's territorial ambition within Ottoman borders is open to criticism. He argues that Ismail did not come to Erzincan for the purpose of gathering Anatolian disciples for he could have well done this in distance from the Ottoman border. And he gives an example: Certain Karaca İlyas, who came from Anatolia, joined with his man to the Shah in Chukur Sa'd.¹⁰⁷⁶ That sort of analysis fails to explain psychological dimension of the issue. The stirring effect of Ismail's rise among Anatolian disciples was augmented by his westward march towards Anatolia. He had, indeed, been expected by his followers as a savior from Ottoman oppression.¹⁰⁷⁷

Furthermore, keeping in mind the difficulties in transportation, the affect of geographical vicinity in collecting more men should not be underestimated. Indeed, Allouche himself recites that only 1500 men gathered around Ismail when he entered Ardabil towards the end of 1499 summer. In the next summer, when he arrived in Erzincan, his forces outstripped 7000 armed men¹⁰⁷⁸, which constituted the core of Ismail's army that would seize in a couple of years the entire Azerbaijan, Iran, and greater part of Iraq.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Allouche, pp. 85-92.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Allouche, p. 89.

¹⁰⁷⁷ For expressions of qizilbash sentiments in many occasions see "Shahkulu Rebellion" in this study.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Allouche, pp. 80-81.

Nonetheless, the connection between the two movements must not be underestimated. Allouche and Fisher actually proved this connection relying on Italian accounts. But the content and the nature of this relation between Ismail and Karaman uprising still needs further investigation. However the first point to emphasize is that the same tribal groups, such as the Varsak and Turgud, were close associates of both the Karamanoğlu dynasty and the Safavid order.¹⁰⁷⁹

5.5. THE DULKADIR CAMPAIGN, 1507

Ottoman sources are considerably silent on qizilbash issues until Ismail's campaign on the Dulkadir in 1507. The reason must be that during this period Shah Ismail was engaged in extensive conquests in Fars and Iraq; thus he was far away from the Ottoman borders. The seemingly friendly but suspicious relation between two states is reflected in the Ottoman chronicles as silence. A short passage in the history of Kemalpaşazāde sheds light on Ottoman attitudes towards Ismail and his state and on the Ottoman eastern policy as well. Kemalpaşazāde states that Bayezid II was well aware of the dangerous storm arising in the east in 911/1505; Ismail's power was growing day by day. It appears from his explanation that the Ottoman administration regarded Ismail as a serious enemy. But this was not just because of his fifth column activities in the Ottoman realm but because he was threatening the Ottoman borders with his growing army as well. Ottoman administrators took seriously the possibility of the Shah's attack on Ottoman territories into account. Because of that, as Kemalpaşazāde states, the Ottoman army in

¹⁰⁷⁹ Both Allouche and Fisher draw attention to this point but do not dwell on the important role of these tribes on the contemporary affairs. See FSH, p. 92; Allouche, p. 83.

eastern borders was reinforced and continuously stood ready for battle.¹⁰⁸⁰ After Ismail's capture of Bagdad, Bayezid II ordered the reinforcement of the fortress of Sivas.¹⁰⁸¹

Meanwhile, Ismail maintained warm relations with Bayezid II. He dispatched various ambassadors to the Porte during these five years in order to express his friendly attitude and regards. Bayezid II in his own part also preferred to avoid conflicts with his new rival neighbor in the east. In the meantime, as we learn from Ottoman sources, he was always suspicious of Ismail's acts. Kemalpaşazâde summarizes Bayezid's policy as follows: "*Gerçi ol tâc-dârun bâb-ı hilâfet-me'âba ilçisi gelür giderdi. Cenâb-ı kâim-yâb-ı sultân-ı cihâna izhâr-ı ihlâs u ihtisâs iderdi. Emmâ kavline i'timâd itmelü değil mekkârdı.hayl-i bād kirdârla leyl ü nehâr işi ilgârdı.*"¹⁰⁸²

Bayezid dispatched an ambassador, who was carrying his letter, to congratulate Ismail on the conquests of Fars and Iraq. In his letter, Sultan Bayezid, addressed Ismail as 'my son' and advised him to be a just ruler, not to persecute the sunni population of his country, not to desecrate mescids and tombs of sunni saints, and to maintain a warm relationship between the two states.¹⁰⁸³ They were dismissed with robes of honor and Ismail's friendly sentiments. It is reported, however, that his envoy was compelled to witness several executions, including that of leading sunni scholars¹⁰⁸⁴, and to eat pork.¹⁰⁸⁵ In the summer of 1505, Ismail dispatched an envoy to Istanbul. There were three issues on his agenda: to assure his peaceful intentions toward

¹⁰⁸⁰ "*Ser-i hayl-i Ardabil Şah İsmail'ün şevk-i şevketinün hiddeti ve şiddeti günden güne izdiyâdda idi. Ol 'adû-yı kinecüy nâgâh kadem-i şümle büm-ı Rüm'a hücum ve kudüm ide diye asker-i mansûra ... tefrika virmeyüb hâzır olmuşdı...*" KPZ8a, p. 243.

¹⁰⁸¹ KPZ8a, p. 278.

¹⁰⁸² KPZ8a, p. 243.

¹⁰⁸³ Efendiev, "Sultan II. Bayezid ve Şah İsmail", pp. 91-2.

¹⁰⁸⁴ BRW, p. 57.

¹⁰⁸⁵ FSH, p. 94.

the Ottoman Empire¹⁰⁸⁶, to protest the hostile activities of Prince Selim in Trabzon, and to guarantee that his soldiers would respect Ottoman lands during his upcoming campaign on the Dulkadir.¹⁰⁸⁷ Bayezid did not show an open disapproval, but remained suspicious. An interesting event reported in Italian sources shows how suspicious and distrustful the Ottoman administration was of Ismail. Ismail's ambassadors were guarded closely in Istanbul and prevented from communicating with the public. 'Even the money which he spent in Istanbul was afterwards collected and the holders of it were reimbursed, in order that the heresy inscribed upon it could not circulate in Turkey.'¹⁰⁸⁸

On the other hand, the close connection between Ismail and his disciples in Anatolia proved to be intense during this period as well. Hoca Saadeddin, while narrating Selim's reasoning of his campaign on Iran, places a special emphasis on the fifth column activities of Ismail's khalifas and disciples within the Ottoman realm. According to his testimony, the impercipient Turks (*Etrāk-i bī-idrāk*) of Anatolia somehow adhered to him (Ismail) without knowing his true character; they began to sacrifice their possessions and sons for the sake of the Shah. Those who had the opportunity used to visit him (Shah Ismail) carrying uncountable presents and vows (*adak*); those who did not have chance to visit him were sending their vows and presents via the Safavid khalifas working in Anatolia. To Hoca Saadeddin, the primary stimulus of the qizilbashes' such practices was that they regarded the Porte of the Shah as the door of need and wish (*hācet kapısı*) believing that the Shah would fulfill their wishes through spiritual or supernatural means; the nature of their belief in the Shah was

¹⁰⁸⁶ He was expressing in his letter: "Benüm Pādişah-ı ālem-penāh hazretlerinin memālik-i mahrūselerine kal'en dahl ü taarruzum yokdur". TSA, document E 325. Regard also TNSB, p. 240.

¹⁰⁸⁷ FSH, p. 94.

¹⁰⁸⁸ FSH, p. 94.

reflected in their practice that when hearing the name of the Shah they used to prostrate immediately.¹⁰⁸⁹ He seems to have been exaggerated, however, in asserting “they did not hesitate to offer their daughters or sisters to the naughty men of the Shah.”¹⁰⁹⁰

After conquering Fars and Iraq, in the summer of 1507 Ismail decided to march on Alauddevle, the ruler of the Dulkadir.¹⁰⁹¹ The reason of this campaign is reported differently in contemporary sources. Some say Murat Akkoyunlu fled to Dulkadir territories and was planning an attack on the Safavids with the help of Alauddevle, who was his father-in-law.¹⁰⁹² Others report that it was because of the fact that Ismail wanted to marry Alauddevle’s beautiful daughter; but his request was refuted.¹⁰⁹³ Yet some others argue that it was because of the bad treatment of Alauddevle towards Ismail’s ambassador.¹⁰⁹⁴ A contemporary Venetian observer presents a completely different reason: the men of the Dulkadir were in the habit of making frequent incursions into the province of Diyarbekir, which was under the rule of Muhammad Han Ustaclu, one of the prominent qizilbash khans. Muhammad Han Ustaclu attempted on several occasions to

¹⁰⁸⁹ HSE4, p. 171.

¹⁰⁹⁰ HSE4, p. 171.

¹⁰⁹¹ HSE mistakenly gives the date as Ramazan 913 / December 1508-January 1509. See HSE3, p. 350. SLZ, as usual, follows him. See SLZ1, p. 432.

¹⁰⁹² HS, p. 582; HR, p. 115; AA, p. 50; Sarwar, p. 52; TNSB, p. 241; Caterino Zeno, “Travels in Persia”, in NIT, p. 53.

¹⁰⁹³ HSE says Alauddevle first inclined to accept Ismail’s request. But he soon realized religious laxity of Ismail and decided to refuse his demand. HSE3, p. 350. Also consider ALI, p. 908; SLZ1, p. 432; ANMH, p. 40.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Alauddevle imprisoned Oğlan Ümmet Çavuşlu, the envoy of Shah Ismail. See Sarwar, p. 52. Kemalpashazâde writes, “*Mezkûr tâd-dârun mezbûr diyâra inmesine illet bu idi ki, Zü’lkadir Oğlı ‘Alâü’ d-devle Begle aralarına ‘adâvet düşmüşdi. Ol serdâr kendüye i’tibâr itmeyüb, il içinde ilçisine ta’zîr ü teşhir itdüği-çün nâr-ı ‘ârîla kâr u bâr-karârı dutuşmuşdi. Hayl-i cerrârîla seyl-vâr akmış gelmişdi ki, harmen-i düşmeni yile virüb, ilin günin yıka, yaka Zü’lkadirlü Türkmânınün hânümânın harâb u yebâb idiüb ol diyârun üstünden girüb altundan çıka.*” KPZ8a, p. 250. Also consider TNSB, p. 16; UZC2, p. 228.

capture some principal Dulkadir fortresses, but failed. Consequently Ismail was determined to march in person to destroy Dulkadirius.¹⁰⁹⁵

Ismail's trajectory in this campaign is also a topic of controversy.¹⁰⁹⁶ Instead of directly entering Dulkadir territory, which was shorter in distance, he first entered Ottoman territories, via the route of Erzincan, Sivas, and Kayseri, and attacked the Dulkadir.¹⁰⁹⁷ Ismail had already sent a letter to Bayezid II and informed him about his campaign and affirmed not to cause any damage to Ottoman subjects.¹⁰⁹⁸ During his movement within Ottoman borders Ismail carefully protected Ottoman subjects and their possessions from any usurpation.¹⁰⁹⁹ He arrived in Sivas and stayed there for a while.¹¹⁰⁰ His goal in visiting Sivas, as reported by Kemalpaşazâde, was to gather further fighters from his Anatolian disciples.¹¹⁰¹ But he could not find what he planned since the

¹⁰⁹⁵ NIT, p. 195. The unknown Venetian merchant also says Ismail moved with an army of 60.000 towards Erzincan. See NIT, p. 196. For a similar account also see Giovan Maria Angioiello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano", in NIT, p. 108.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Consider Sohrweide, p. 142.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", in NIT, p. 53.

¹⁰⁹⁸ HSE writes, "*Ancak Dulkadirli ülkesine gidebilmek için Osmanlıların bakımlı ülkelerinden geçmek gerekiyordu. Bunun için de Şah İsmail mutlu gölgelikler salan ulu otağa rica mektupları gönderip parlak hükümlerinin yürüdüğü korunmuş ülkelerden geçmek zorunda kaldığından özür diledi. Geçtiği topraklara da bir zarar dokunmasın diye adamlarının soyguncu ellerin tutup ağaçtan bir yaprak koparamı yokluk yollarına yolcu ederek durağı yüce padişahın memleketini dikkatle korudu. Sıkı yasağ ile, birlikte olan azgın fesatçılara nefes aldırmadı.*" HSE3, p. 350. Also see SLZ1, p. 432. The contemporary unknown Venetian merchant affirms Ottoman sources. He says, during his stay in Erzincan, on the way to Dulkadir, Ismail "sent two ambassadors, one named Culibec [Kulu Beg] to the Ottoman in Natolia (sic), and the other named Zachariabec [Zekeriya Beg] to the Soldan of Cairo, swearing solemn oaths to these monarchs, that he intended no harm to their dominions, but only wished to destroy his enemy Aliduli." See "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", in NIT, p. 196. The same account is repeated in Giovan Maria Angioiello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano", in NIT, p. 108.

¹⁰⁹⁹ HS, pp. 582-3; HR, p. 115; Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", in NIT, p. 54.

¹¹⁰⁰ KPZ8a, p. 251. According to ALI and SLZ, Ismail moved ahead till Kazābād near Tokat. ALI, p. 908; SLZ1, p. 432.

¹¹⁰¹ HSE does not mention such a goal of Ismail. To him Ismail followed this route since it was the only way to enter Dulkadir territories. See above footnote. HSE3, p. 350. SLZ follows this assertion. SLZ1, p. 432. Hoca's account is obviously deficient since he could have well entered Alauddevle's country from eastern fronts – through Diyarbekir for example – instead of wandering through northern borders, which was evidently longer in terms of territorial distance. KPZ's account stands seemingly more reasonable on this issue. İsmail H. Uzunçarşılı states, Ismail's aim in following this route might be to surprise Alauddevle and to take from him the opportunity to prepare for a battle. He also calls attention to the aim of exciting qizilbash society in Ottoman realm. See UZC2, p. 228, footnote 2. A contemporary Venetian

Ottoman administration had taken effective measures in preventing the movements of Ismail's adherents since the year 1500. Upon learning of Ismail's westward march, the Ottomans increased their preventive measures. Consequently Ismail could not recruit as many fighters as he planned from Anatolia during his stay in Sivas.

Diyārbekr içinden dahī gitse olurdu. Ol yoldan da varır maksuda vusūl bulurdu, ammā rindāne deprenüb, bir taşla iki kuş urmak istedi, bahāne ile gelüb serhadd-i Rūmda bir zaman turmak istedi. Ta ki Anadolu'nun Kızılbaş ve sāyir evbaşı ol şem'-ı bezm-ı fitnenün kenāra geldüğün duyub, her tatarftan yanına cem' ola. Süvār u piyāde bende vü azāde her kanda varsa ālet-i rezmle 'azm ide vara, kendünün haşmeti artub, ziyāde şevket bula. Emmā umduğın bulmadı, ol didüğü iş olmadı. İçinde kızılbaş olan vilāyetlerin ra'iyetleri boyunlanub birbirine merbut olmışdı. Mecāl-ı 'ubūr ve ihtimāl-i mürūr merfū u medfū' olmuş ve mesālik-i memālik mazbūt olmışdı. Sipāh-ı keşver-penāh ayağ üzerine gelüb, kişt ü bağ, deşt ü rağ, sahra vu tağ tolup turudı. Cüyüş-ı seylāb-cüş u sehāb-hurūsun mehābetinden kuş uçmaz ve kolan yürimez olup dururdu....Yarağla ayağ üzerinde buldukları Kızılbaşın arkasından kumaşın soymağla komazlar, başın alub fitne menba'ını soğuldurlar ve yaşın kurudurlardı. Mazanne-i fesād ve mienne-i 'inād olan bed-nihādları bend-i pulāda çeküb cānlarına a'zāb u 'ikāb iderler ve tenlerini zindān içinde çürüdürlerdi.¹¹⁰²

In fact never trusting in the words of Ismail, Bayezid mobilized his Anatolian army towards the eastern borders of the empire. Ahmed was ordered to protect the gateways between Tokat and Amasya while Karagöz Pasha, the beylerbey of Anatolia, moved to the Çubuk valley ready to battle.¹¹⁰³ Kemalpaşazāde argues that Ahmed's forces completely blocked the communication between the Shah and his disciples. They arrested those who traded with Ismail's men and tortured them. They detained anyone

observer, however, puts forward a more simple reason. He says, "It is only four days' march from Arsingan [Erzincan] to the country of Aliduli; but Ismael took another route, passing by the Turkish city of Cesaria [Kayseri] in order to obtain supplies which he intended to pay for honesty." NIT, p. 196. It is to be noted here that this Italian source does not mention Ismail's visit to Sivas.

¹¹⁰² KPZ8, pp. 251-252.

¹¹⁰³ KPZ8a, p. 253.

who was found on the way going to Ismail. They put those who were seized with arms to death.¹¹⁰⁴

It is not clear from available sources whether or not Ismail intended to attack the Ottomans. Some modern historians advocate that this was highly possible. Tansel marks out, for example, that trusting in his disciples living in Ottoman lands Ismail disregarded border-lines. According to Tansel, it is reasonable to think that if he could gather enough disciples from Anatolia he would invade Ottoman territories.¹¹⁰⁵ Fisher also argues that Ismail was planning to attack Ottomans if opportunity would arise.¹¹⁰⁶

Indeed, Ismail's policy against the Ottomans was quite difficult to assess. He always pursued respectful policy in his correspondence with Bayezid, repeatedly declaring his friendly sentiments regarding the Ottomans, avoiding any open clash with this power of the region.¹¹⁰⁷ Yet in practice he did not hesitate to show hostile-like behaviors on some occasions. Some of these practices were part of unavoidable conflicts between the two states. The major source of Ismail's man power, that is the qizilbash tribes, was in Ottoman territories. The relatives of soldiers fighting under the banner of the shah were living in this country. Overall, Ismail had to maintain relations with these tribes for they provided future fighters. The Ottoman government, on the other hand,

¹¹⁰⁴ “*Ol diyârda Türk ve Türkmânla satubazar itmeğe çıkan bed-kirdârları perçe-i pür-şikence-i ‘ikâbla ‘ukâb-vâr kaparlar, gelürler giderlerdi. Ol bed-râyleri göç üzerinde bulsalar alaylarınınun serpindisini yürütmezler, tutarlardı. Ordu kurup konmuş bulsalar, hayme vü hargâh arasından çıkan gümrâhları nâr-ı demârla üterlerdi. Şehzâde-i mezkûr yanındağı asker-i mansurla düşmen-i ye’cüc-ûca karşı Sedd-i İskender olub turdi.*” KPZ8a, p. 253.

¹¹⁰⁵ TNSB, pp. 242-3.

¹¹⁰⁶ FSH, p. 94.

¹¹⁰⁷ Hoca Saadettin explains, for example that Ismail sent a letter to the Ottoman Sultan (before attacking the Dulkadir) expressing his respect to the sultan's superiority. Hoca's account runs as follows: “*Öte yandan devlet kapısına gelen rica mektubunda kendisini bu kapıya bağlanmış, özünü padişahın buyruğuna sunmuş gibi gösteren nice sözler etmişti.* [But Bayezid did not trust on his words] *Böyle olmakla beraber iklimlere padişah olan sultan Bayezid sultanlara yakışır ihtiyat tedbirlerini almakta gecikmemiştir.*” HSE3, p. 350. Ismail's message, expressed his peaceful sentiments regarding the Ottomans and his intentions to punish Alauddevle, also see ANMH, p. 42.

could not accept such a situation because of the apparent reasons. Consequently, a fierce but unspoken struggle was going on along the borders: the Ottoman administration levied every possible measures, even the most severe ones, in order to cut off every sort of connection between the shah and his Anatolian disciples while qizilbashs resorted to every possible means to maintain communication with the 'other side'. It was because of this that Ismail's every westward movement was stirring both the qizilbash groups of Anatolia and the Ottoman administration. Meanwhile, the correspondence between the two rulers had been carried on in a peaceful and respectful frame. Some of Ismail's actions, however, seem to be deliberately intended to jeopardize some of his plans, which would displease Bayezid II. His treatment against Bayezid's ambassador, whom he forced to witness the execution of some leading sunni scholars and to eat pork, might be regarded in this perspective. His policy was, indeed, not a stable and straight forward; but he pursued quite a pragmatic strategy, fluctuating in accordance to the circumstances.

As for his intentions on the Ottoman territories, without a doubt he had ambitions on some Ottoman provinces, especially on the regions that his disciples intensely populated. But sources do not record any deliberate attacks by him. In fact, it was not logical for Ismail to attack such a great power in a period which he was still consolidating his power. A rather pragmatic strategy was to maintain peace on the one hand, and to carry on 'fifth column activities' among Ottoman subjects on the other. This was the exact policy that Ismail followed against the Ottomans. So it doesn't seem very probable that Ismail planned an invasion within Ottoman lands in 1507. Nonetheless, whether he planned to invade Ottoman provinces or not, what is certain from contemporary sources is that the Ottomans perceived such a threat. Comprehensive

military measures in eastern provinces evidently show that Ottoman administration considered this possibility seriously.¹¹⁰⁸ But Bayezid II, for some reasons, did not pursue a decisive policy against Ismail. Contemporary accounts clearly reveal that he had serious suspicion of Ismail's faith, actions, and intentions. Nevertheless, the Ottoman Sultan always avoided open confrontation with the young ruler of Persia, perhaps fearing the possible ideological influence of the shah on his own soldiers.¹¹⁰⁹

After staying one month in Sivas, Ismail realized that he could not meet Anatolian disciples. Kemalpaşazāde states that neither any cavalry nor any infantry joined Ismail's army.¹¹¹⁰ He returned disappointedly and marched on the Dulkadir territories. He first arrived in Kayseri, then entered Maraş and Elbistan.¹¹¹¹ Alauddevle did not have enough force to oppose Ismail and fled to Turna Dağı. It was almost impossible to capture the fortress on this mountain for it was very precipitous. Ismail surrounded the mountain. Although Alauddevle had enough provision, the winter was at the door and snow had already fallen on the mountain. If Ismail would have kept the siege long, Alauddevle's situation might have gotten worse. He appealed for help from both Bayezid and the sultan of Egypt. The Mamluk sultan did not respond to this appeal for he was afraid of Ismail's possible attacks on his own country.¹¹¹²

Thanks to Bayezid's decision to take more dissuasive measures against Ismail's rising power, Alauddevle escaped from the wrath of the Shah. Bayezid II replied to his

¹¹⁰⁸ Compare TNSB, pp. 242-3.

¹¹⁰⁹ As we learn from contemporary sources, the doctrinal influence of the shah was not ignorable especially among *akinci gāzis*. See "Çaldıran" in this study.

¹¹¹⁰ "*Muhāliften ve muvāfıktan süvār ü piyāde kimse varmaz gördi*" KPZ8a, p. 254.

¹¹¹¹ Ismail entered the country of Dulkadir on July 29, 1507. See NIT, p. 197.

¹¹¹² KPZ8a, p. 256.

father-in-law's¹¹¹³ request¹¹¹⁴; he moved Rumelian soldiers and 4000 janissaries¹¹¹⁵ toward the eastern frontiers under the command of vizier Yahya Pasha. We learn from Kemalpaşazāde that Bayezid's concern was not merely to rescue the Dulkadir country from Ismail's invasion but to crush the shah's rising power, which was causing damage to the Muslim countries of the region.¹¹¹⁶ As indicated above an army composed of Anatolian troops had already been located in the Çubuk Valley near Ankara. Bayezid did not order this force to help Alauddevle but dispatched a much stronger army composed of Rumelian troops and Janissaries. This was the first time that the Ottomans pursued an offensive policy against the Safavids; and it was the greatest military might that Bayezid had ever sent on Ismail, which was possibly the sole one that aimed to

¹¹¹³ Bayezid II married Alauddevle's daughter Ayshe while he was governor of Amasya and Selim I was born into this marriage.

¹¹¹⁴ Actually it is not clear enough whether Bayezid dispatched this military in order to respond to Alauddevle's request or to accomplish his own plan, which had been already determined. As will be delineated, according to some later Ottoman sources Yahya Pasha was sent to Anatolia when Ismail was still in the province of Rum. See ALI, p. 909; SLZ1, p.432. Although KPZ's account, which was contemporary of events, appears to be the most reliable one, it stands to reason to suppose that Bayezid's aim in this comprehensive military operation was not solely to help Alauddevle.

¹¹¹⁵ HSE records 5.000 Janissaries. HSE3, p. 350.

¹¹¹⁶ "...Emmā hazret-i pādīşāh-ı hilāfet-penāh ol mazlūmun girihānını ve mūkinūn dāmenini dūşmen-i bī-meyl ü amānun elinden kurtarmağa ikdām eyledi. Kızılbaş-ı berhāş-kārūn ki, yağlık ayağı üzerine turup, dār-ı İslām'a nār-ı gāret ü hasāreti urmuşdı. Zarar-ı āmin def' u ref'a ihtimām eyledi. Kasd itdi ki ol mutlaku'l- 'inānun kaydın göre. Dīvān-ı cihāndan nām ve nişān-ı defterin düre....hazret-i sāhipkırān-ı cihān zimām-ı ihtimāmi hayl-i bī-meyl ü amān-ı Kızılbaşı Türkmān üzerinden def' ve kenār-ı gülzār-ı memleketden ol hārī ref'a sarf itdi. Anatolının Rumilinin mevākib-i kevākib-şümārına Vezir-i sāyib-tedbir ve emīr-i sahib-i şemşir Yahya Paşa'yı sipahsālār idüb ol hizmete gönderdi, gitdi. Çün sultān-ı cihān ve Süleymān-ı zaman ol hurūc iden ve tād-dārlik mi'rācına 'urūc iden bed-kirdārūn tedmīri tedbirine ihtimām itdi. Rumili leşkerine ve uç beğlerine dān-ı āsitān-ı āsümān-nişāndan ahkām gitdi ve hass ü 'ämme Anatoliya sefer haberini i'lām itdi. Ümerā-yı rezm-ārāy, pūr-hazm ü rāy sāz u seleb-i āheng-i cengi bī-kusur u fütur mükemmel ve müretteb gönderdiler....Yahya Paşa buyrıldı. 'Asākir-i ferhunde-me'āsire baş oldı. Asitān-ı āsümān-nişāna lazım olan mevākib-i kevākib-şümārdan dört bin Yeniçeri koşıldı ve atlu bölüklerden dahi bir nice koşun yol-dāş oldı. Mezkūr düstūr dergāh-ı āsümān iştibāh-ı sultān-ı cihān-penāhdan mihr-sipihr gibi 'ālem-i 'ālem-gīri kaldırdı ve yürüdü.the army was so great and so numerous that Ak Deniz ve Kara Denizün boğazları henüz gāzilerün atlusu ve yayası-yla tolup dururdu. İstanbulun ve Gelibolunun iskeleleri hadem ü haşemün bakāyāsi-yle māl-ā-māl olup dururdu ki 'asker-i ye'cūc-hurūcun ucı vardı Kaysariyye'ye irdi...." KPZ8a, pp. 256-7. ANMH confirms KPZ's account. It states upon receiving Ismail's letter expressing his peaceful attitude towards Ottomans, Bayezid answered that Alauddevle was under his auspices, thus he (Ismail) should leave Dulkadir territories; otherwise his (Bayezid's) army was ready to battle. ANMH, p. 42.

confront Ismail's forces.¹¹¹⁷ Hoca Saadeddin, who wrote events more than half a century later, however, does not point out Bayezid's offensive objectives. To him, Yahya Pasha was ordered to interfere whence Ismail's forces engaged in 'inappropriate affairs' (*uygunsuz davranış*) such as the spilling of innocent blood and assaulting on probity (*ırz ve namus*) of the subjects. The Ottoman army would watch the borders and protect the country from any possible assault of Ismail's troops.¹¹¹⁸ Ali, on the other hand, confirms Bayezid's offensive intentions. He states that Bayezid commissioned Yahya Pasha to punish the commander of the seditious troops that entered his country without permission.¹¹¹⁹

Yahya Pasha arrived in Ankara where the Anatolian troops commanded by Karagöz Pasha had already garrisoned.¹¹²⁰ He sent one thousand cavalries from Rumeli soldiers to the Kayseri region in order to take captives (*dil almak*) and to derive intelligence.¹¹²¹ Basing his work on Italian sources Sydney Fisher writes that in Ankara there were about 70.000 men under Yahya Pasha. At the same time in Aksaray 10.000 men under Prince Şehinşah, in Kayseri 23.000 men under Karagöz Pasha, and in

¹¹¹⁷ As already delineated, the military moved to Ankara under the command of Yahya Pasha in 1500 and aimed to protect the frontiers in case of Ismail's attack on Ottoman territories and to block communication and transportation between the Shah and his Anatolian adherents.

¹¹¹⁸ HSE3, pp. 350-51.

¹¹¹⁹ But he confuses the chronology. He narrates as if Yahya Pasha moved while Ismail was in Ottoman territories. According to his account it was upon the advance of Yahya Pasha towards the eastern frontier that Ismail deserted Ottoman lands and entered the country of the Dulkadir. The related passage in *Kitabu't-Tarih-i Kühü'l-Ahbar* reads: "Fe-ammā bu kıssa [that Ismail's entrance into Ottoman land without permission] ki, ma'ruz-ı Şehriyāri oldı, Rūm-ili ve Anatoli leşkeri ve vezir-i kihter ve şecā'atle nām-ver ve büzürg-ter olan Yahya Paşa'yı sipeh-sālār nasb itdiler. 'İcāzetsiz memlekete duhül iden ser-dār-ı zümre-i Celāli'nin hakkından gelinmesi lâzımdır' diyu gönderdiler. Vaktā ki, bu ahbār mesmū'-ı Şāh-ı zü'l-iştihār oldı, 'Hodāvendigār-ı milk-i Rūm, benim vālid-i mācid-i büzürg-vārımdır ve anların that-ı tasarrufundaki merz u büm ne benim murād u matlūbum ve ne maksūd u muhtārımdır' diyü cevāb-nāme gönderdi ve gendüsü bilā-tevakkuf o nāhiyeden göçüb 'Alāu'd-Devle memleketine duhül eyledi.'" ALI, p. 909. SLZ repeats same mistake. See SLZ1, p.432.

¹¹²⁰ KPZ8a, p. 258; HSE3, p. 350.

¹¹²¹ KPZ8a, p. 258.

Amasya 12.000 men under Prince Ahmed were ready.¹¹²² Fisher argues, however, that they were ordered not to come to blows with Ismail's forces.¹¹²³ He also calls attention to the point that Bayezid was not desirous to engage in an open clash with the shah's army. It was not because Ismail's military power surpassed that of the Ottomans, but because of the fact that considerable numbers of soldiers in Ottoman troops were not willing to battle with the shah.

Bayezid greatly feared the *Sofi* because of the nearness of his army and even more because of the great number of Ottomans, both soldiers and civilians, who were deserting the Porte and joining the *Sofis*. In fact, one of Bayezid's sons wrote to Istanbul that it would be impossible to form an army against the Sofi if the sultan did not come in person.¹¹²⁴

Nevertheless, Ismail was not yet ready to encounter with powerful Ottomans. Hearing that a great Ottoman army was approaching, Ismail raised the siege and retreated back towards the river Fırat. Hoca Saadeddin records, Ismail thought that his actions created mistrust in the minds of the sultan of Rum. Upon the suggestion of Necm-i Geylāni, who was his vizier and counselor, he retired to Persia.¹¹²⁵ Alauddevle's forces followed Ismail until they crossed the river; but they could not continue further.¹¹²⁶

¹¹²² FSH, p. 95, footnote 41.

¹¹²³ FSH, p. 95.

¹¹²⁴ FSH, p. 95. Fisher recites this account from Deposition of Priamo Malipiero dated August 24, 1507. The he explains his comment, "It appears that, without the presence of the sultan, the power of Ismail's attraction in the way of Bektashi ideology, generosity, and common Turkish customs, was more than the Ottoman *timarjis*, janissaries, and Anatolian Turkish feudatories could withstand." His account, however, needs further revision for we do not know exactly the nature of relations between Bektashis and Ismail during that time.

¹¹²⁵ HSE3, p. 351. Also regard SLZ1, p. 432. An anonymous history of the period Bayezid II and Selim I (*Vakāyi-i Sultan Bāyezit ve Selim Han*, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, 1416) confirms this idea: "*Sultān-ı Rūm'un hatırına şüphe hutūr itmesün için veziri olan Şeyh Necm-i Geylāni'nin tedbiri ile taraf-ı āhardan Acem diyārına doğru çekilüb gitti.*" Re-cited in TNSB, pp. 245-45, footnote, 93. A Venetian travel account gives the date of the retreat of Ismail as the middle of November, 1507. See "The Travels of a Merchant in Persia", in NIT, p. 197. Caterino Zeno gives the same date stating Ismail remained there from the twenty-ninth of July to the middle of November. See Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", in NIT, p. 54.

¹¹²⁶ KPZ8a, p. 259.

The Ottomans, on the other hand, kept up the preparations to defend the empire against an invasion by Ismail in 1508. The fortification in frontier cities was reinforced.¹¹²⁷ As Fisher deduces from Italian sources,

Camps remained at Bursa and various places in Anatolia and all the *sanjakbeys* of Rumelia were ordered to be in readiness to cross to Asia if the need warranted it. Guards were posted along the southern and eastern frontiers to keep a vigilant eye on the movements of the Sofis and to report and punish any defection of the border tribes. Within the empire the heterodox Sofis were ferreted out and either executed or deported to Europe.¹¹²⁸

As observed in contemporary Ottoman and Italian sources, Ottoman cautions against Safavid danger reached its peak during and after the Dulkadir campaign of the shah. Although the Ottoman administration had always perceived Ismail's movement as a threat from its very beginning, until then their primary concern was rather isolating the qizilbash sympathizers of Anatolia from Persia. But in six years until 1507 Ismail gained brilliant victories in Persia and consolidated his power. Although he passed through both Ottoman and Mamluk territories during his invasion of the Dulkadir, neither the Ottomans nor Mamluks were decisive to wage war against Ismail. Rather they preferred to employ diplomacy to seek a peaceful solution. It is clearly seen that Ismail had already become a decisive power of the region in 1507. Thus, realizing this fact, Bayezid II saw that there was no choice for him other than to pursue more a vigilant and offensive policy against Ismail. The mobilization of a large-scale army and all the preparations were part of this changing policy. But, the great chance of Ismail was that Ottomans could not successfully carry on this policy since Bayezid II's health was

¹¹²⁷ KPZ records, for example, the fortress of Sivas was repaired and reinforced after the shah's capture of Bagdad in 1508. KPZ8a, pp. 278-9.

¹¹²⁸ FSH, p. 96.

getting worse and the struggle between princes for the throne was about to appear.¹¹²⁹ Ismail would have 5 golden years in which the Ottoman administration could not pursue a determinant policy against him.

The most concrete result of the Dulkadir Campaign was the annexation of Diyarbakir to the Safavid territories.¹¹³⁰ Muhammed Han Ustaclu was appointed to the governorship of this province as a reward for his outstanding services; he held the post until his death in the battle of Çaldıran.¹¹³¹ But after his retirement from the Dulkadir campaign, Ismail was not to plan any attack on the Ottomans for he had to engage in eliminating another threat rising from the east: Tatars invaded the eastern provinces of Ismail's country. After annexing the Arabian Iraq in the next year¹¹³² Shah Ismail turned east to meet Shaybāni Khan of the Uzbeks.¹¹³³ Because of the new enemy Ismail resorted to diplomacy on the western front. His ambassador arrived in Istanbul in 1508, at the same time when Shaybānī Han's envoy was also at the Port.¹¹³⁴ The objective of both envoys was the same: to gain the support of Bayezid II. The sultan honored both embassies but did not take stand in favor of any.¹¹³⁵ On the agenda of Ismail's ambassador, however, there were other issues as well. He complained about Selim's war-like actions in the borderlines of the two states. He stated that Ismail had always had peaceful and respectful attitudes toward the Ottomans; he had been fighting Alauddevle,

¹¹²⁹ Compare TNSB, p. 247.

¹¹³⁰ HS, p. 583; HR, p. 116 ; AA, pp. 51-2; Aubin, "L'avènement des safavides", p. 25.

¹¹³¹ HS, p. 583; HR, p. 116 ; Şerefhan, *Şerefname*, trs. From Arabic to Turkish M. Emin Bozarlan, İstanbul: Hasat Yayınları, 1990, p. 471; Aubin, "L'avènement des safavides", p. 25; Sarwar, p. 53; Roger Savory, "The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia", *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, p. 76. It is interesting to note that Ismail appointed to the governorship of Diyarbakir the beg of Ustaclu tribe, whose home was Sivas-Tokat-Amasya region, but not a beg from Shamlu tribe, whose zone of seasonal migration included Diyarbakir.

¹¹³² HS, p. 585; HR, pp. 127-8.

¹¹³³ HS, pp. 589-592; HR, pp. 137-50; FSH, p. 96.

¹¹³⁴ FSH, p. 96.

¹¹³⁵ FSH, p. 96.

not the Ottomans. This being the case, Selim attacked him and robbed him of artillery. The ambassador asked for the restitution of the stolen armaments. As Fisher puts, "...the request was tactfully ignored, but the ambassador was laden with gifts and departed with peace and friendship expressed between Ismail and Bayezid."¹¹³⁶ In the next few years the relation between the two was relatively quiet and seemingly friendly. It was primarily because of that Ismail engaged in the annexation of the rest of Iran and Iraq, and in war with the Tatars while Bayezid II was occupied with health problems and internal troubles.

On the other hand, Ismail wished to maintain an alliance with Venice against their common enemy, the Ottomans. His envoy arrived in Venice the following year.¹¹³⁷ His object was to secure artillery and to consolidate the cooperation against the Ottomans. But Venice was in no position to attract the anger of the sultan for she was occupied with the Italian wars.¹¹³⁸ Thus Ismail's ambassador could not obtain any concrete benefit but only a warm reception and a few valuable presents. Leonardo Loredano, the head of the government, sent a letter to Ismail. He expressed their gladness because of his hostile attitude towards the Ottomans. But he also stated that they were not in a relaxed state and could not break the peace with Bayezid II, at least for the time being.¹¹³⁹

¹¹³⁶ FSH, p. 96.

¹¹³⁷ FSH, p. 96; Allouche, p. 101. Tansel states, Ismail's envoy arrived in Venice in 1508.

¹¹³⁸ FSH, pp. 96-97.

¹¹³⁹ See *16. Asırda Yazılmış Grekçe Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, ed. Şerif Baştav, Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1973, p. 179; TNSB, pp. 245-46.

CHAPTER VI

ANATOLIAN QIZILBASHES IN ARMS: ŞAHKULU REBELLION,

1511

The most extensive, influential, and successful outcome of the Safavid propaganda among Anatolian population appeared as the rebellion lead by Şahkulu. The importance of this rebellion for the history of qizilbashes and the Ottoman empire was not limited to the fact that it for the first time, and to the largest scale ever recorded, not only mobilized and organized already excited qizilbash masses against the Ottoman rule in an armed resistance, but also became one of the most decisive factors in Ottoman domestic politics. Paradoxically, the qizilbash uprising in search of a better life in the Ottoman realm, made Prince Selim's accession to the Ottoman throne possible, which at the beginning of the civil war between the princes was quite unlikely. This chapter will examine the ideological background, social bases, Safavid connections, and consequences of the Şahkulu rebellion. And its decisive role in providing the legitimate

ground for the enthronement of Selim I, the most merciless and harsh Ottoman sultan against qizilbashs, will be evaluated in the following chapter.

The development of Şahkulu rebellion is well-documented in TSA. Çağatay Uluçay extensively used these documents in his series of articles on how Selim I became the sultan.¹¹⁴⁰ In the first of these three articles, Uluçay explained the phases of the rebellion from the beginning to the end. After Uluçay, Şahabettin Tekindağ published an article exclusively devoted to the rebellion.¹¹⁴¹ His article however hardly adds something new – neither in terms of archival evidence nor in terms of interpretation – to the article of Uluçay. Apart from them, Selāhattin Tansel devotes some pages to the rebellion in his book *Sultan II. Bāyezid'in Siyasī Hayatı*.¹¹⁴² Although the itinerary and military development of the rebellion is more or less delineated in these works, none of them pay enough attention to the ideological and socio-religious content of the rebellion. The scholar who briefly touched upon the ideological content of the rebellion was Hanna Sohrweide, who studied the repercussion of the rise of Safavids among Anatolian qizilbashs in the sixteenth century.¹¹⁴³ Although meriting to be deemed among classics in the field, Sohrweide's analysis on the Şahkulu rebellion is mainly based on the articles of Uluçay. Furthermore she pays much more attention to the political and military development of the rebellion than its ideological and social dimensions. Thus her discussions on the ideologico-religious content of the rebellion and its socio-cultural basis are rather limited.

¹¹⁴⁰ See ULCY1; ULCY2; ULCY3.

¹¹⁴¹ This article is published in two parts. See Şahabettin Tekindağ, “Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı”, *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 3-4, 1959, 34-39; 54-59.

¹¹⁴² See Selāhattin Tansel, *Sultan II. Bayezid'in Siyasī Hayatı*, İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1966, pp. 248-256.

¹¹⁴³ Hanna Sohrweide, “Der Sieg der Safaviden in Persien und seine Rückwirkungen auf die Schiiten Anatoliens im 16. Jahrhundert”, *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, 95-221. See especially pp. 145-156.

My intention here is to focus on the socio-religious aspects of the rebellion, on its connection with the Safavid movement in general and qizilbash insurrections in Anatolia in particular. Accordingly I will try to designate the movement of Şahkulu in the broader framework of qizilbash movements in Anatolia during the early sixteenth-century. Yet many unknown details of the political and military advent of the rebellion will also be discovered. My analysis will also explore the dominant tribal characteristics of the rebels.

6.1. PRELUDE TO THE REBELLION: THE ERA OF CORRUPTION AND CALAMITY

As İnalçık states, Ottomans created an administrative organization “to be totally devoted to the person of the Sultan.”¹¹⁴⁴ Thus being at the center of state organization and political perception, the personality of the sultan was decisively effective not only on state issues but on the whole social body as well.¹¹⁴⁵ As a matter of fact, in the Ottoman Empire during the early sixteenth century, all critical decisions were still between the lips (on the tip of the tongue) of the sultan even though there was a considerably developed bureaucratic governmental apparatus.¹¹⁴⁶ Thus any deficiency in physical being of the sultan directly resulted in drawback in functioning of the state machinery. Moreover, this dependency on the personality of the sultan was not just at the practical and operational level. Rather it had a philosophical base as well. The Sasanian political theory, which was one of the fundamental pillars of Ottoman polity, envisaged a

¹¹⁴⁴ Halil İnalçık, “Ottoman Methods of Conquest”, *Studia Islamica*, 2, 1954, p. 120.

¹¹⁴⁵ See Halil İnalçık, “Pâdişah”, *IA*; “Osmanlı Padişahı”, *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 13, 1958, 1-12; Franz Babinger, “Pâdishâh”, *EI2*.

¹¹⁴⁶ Halil İnalçık, “Decision Making in the Ottoman State”, in *Decision Making and Change in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Caesar E. Farah, Kirksville: The Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1993, 9-18.

stratified social structure on top of which sits the just ruler. The ruler was not only the leader of his subjects but also fulfilled the role as mediatory between God and people as well. Though using a corpus of scribes, priests, generals and traders to maintain social harmony, the ruler was always alone in making final decisions, which were also his responsibilities against God.¹¹⁴⁷

Towards the end of his reign in the early sixteenth century, Bayezid II was not only too old to lead the army and deal with state affairs, but also had serious health problems. It is commonly recorded by Ottoman historians that he left state issues to his viziers during his final years.¹¹⁴⁸ The most explicit information about the sultan's disease is found in Haniwaldanus's anonymous history. It is recorded here that Bayezid II's illness was *nikris*, which causes severe pains in the feet and legs. In 912/1506-7 the pain reached such a degree that he could not participate in campaigns.¹¹⁴⁹ In three years he became bed-ridden. He could not move his legs.¹¹⁵⁰

Selim-nāme authors usually tend to use this fact to create a legitimizing ground for Selim's seizure of the crown by force. It is not a coincidence that they establish an explicit correlation between the illness of Bayezid II and the corrupt practices of high officials. A closer examination of these contemporary accounts, however, suggests that they also presumed a certain –direct or indirect- link between the weakness in the

¹¹⁴⁷ See, for example, Halil İnalçık, "The Ottoman Concept of State and the Class System", in his *The Ottoman Empire. The Classical Age 1300-1600*, London, 1973, 65-9; "Comments on 'Sultanism': Max Weber's Typification of the Ottoman Polity", *Princeton Papers in Near Eastern Studies*, no. 1, 1992, 49-72; "State and Ideology under Sultan Süleyman I", in *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society*, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993, 70-94; "Turkish and Iranian Political Theories and Traditions in Kutadgu Bilig" In *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society*, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993, 1-18.

¹¹⁴⁸ See for example KPZ8b, p. 39; IDRS, p. 87; CLZ, p. 95;

¹¹⁴⁹ ANMH, p. 34. KPZ also mentions the sultan's disease as *nikris*. See KPZ8b, p. 39.

¹¹⁵⁰ '...Sultan Bayezid *nikris* hastalığından muzadarip olarak ve belden aşağı hiç bir uzvunu kullanamayıp bir kütük gibi yatağında yatıyordu, ve iyice zayıflamıştı.' See ANMH, p. 46.

personal decision making mechanism of the sultan –both psychological and physical- and calamities such as earthquake, famine, torrent, and wide-spread uprisings.

Between the spring of 1509 and 1510, when Korkud was in Egypt, the Ottoman authority in the province of Antalya declined seriously. The Porte was so much occupied with the problem of succession that other state affairs fell into secondary rank of importance. Taking advantage of weak central authority, local governors engaged in increasing their own profit, thus, in abuses. Contemporary Ottoman historians commonly point harsh criticisms towards the viziers and high officials who sold state posts via bribery, rather than delivering them according to merit. In short, the state apparatus was completely malfunctioning and just about to collapse. Being devoid of its governor, the province of Antalya was certainly among those regions of the empire that was bitterly experiencing such disorder and turmoil. Consequently, the qizilbash propaganda, which had been effective since the Shaykh Junayd's visit of the neighboring regions, accelerated in the Province of Antalya, especially in the mountainous Teke region. Kemalpaşazāde states that the symptoms of rebellion had already appeared while Korkud was in Egypt. Although local bureaucrats had well-discerned the danger and reported to the Porte, the viziers, who were much occupied with the effort to bring Ahmed to the throne, did not inform the sultan on the issue. Furthermore they dispatched orders to the local representatives to keep this information unknown. He says,

Dahi Sultan Korkud Mısırdā iken kara'ın-i hāricīye inzimāmi-le ol havāricün hurūca ikdām itmelerini ol cevānibün hükkāmı bilmişlerdi; zikr olan ma'nā-yı menhīye irtikābları vuku' bulmadan devlet-i ebed-peyvendün menhīleri vākıf olub, bāb-ı sa'ādet-me'ābda olan nevvāb-ı kām-yāba i'lām kılmışlardı. Emmā ihtilāf-ı ahvāl-i eyyāmī olmağın ol kazāya 'alā mā cerā Hüdāvendigāra 'arz olunmadı; Antalya hisāri dizdārına ve kādısına ādem gönderilüb, ol haberün sıdkı ve kizbi aslı ve faslı tahkīk kılınmadı.¹¹⁵¹

¹¹⁵¹ KPZ8b, p. 44.

According to the Ottoman court historians, the abuses of viziers and other officials, who got enough opportunity to do that by the deterioration of Bayezid's health, were responsible before all for creating so many Safavid adherents and sympathizers in the Ottoman realm. Their attempt to create a *devr-i sâbık*, an era of dissonance, in order to legitimize Selim's grasp of the throne via unusual means sometimes led them to exaggerate the deficiencies of the former administration. But still their accounts seem to have sizable credibility in the assessment of the social, religious, and political ground, which was quite fertile for the cause of Ismail and eventually produced strong religio-political qizilbash opposition.

On the other hand, one should not underestimate the stimulating role of natural catastrophes that occurred during this period, as well as the corruptions within the administrative body. As Sohrweide already pointed out, the first decade of the sixteenth century, that is the last decade of Bayezid II's reign, was a catastrophic era in the Ottoman realm not only in terms of abuses in governmental mechanism but also natural disasters as well.¹¹⁵² The health problems of Bayezid II, corruptions in the distribution of state offices and tax collections, and natural catastrophes created a pessimistic mood in public opinion. The influence of the first two factors in creating alternative expectations in public opinion is already well-treated by both contemporary and modern historians. The role of natural disasters in catalyzing these expectations, however, seems to have been underestimated. Taking into consideration the average man's mentality of the Middle Ages, which regarded concrete interactions between natural events and the

¹¹⁵² "Das letzte Jahrzehnt der Regierung Bāzezīds II. stand für die Bevölkerung des Reiches unter keinem glücklichen Stern. Vor allem Anatolien wurde von Naturkatastrophen, Hungersnot und Seuchen heimgesucht, die sich über Jahre hinzogen und zahllose Todesopfer unter der Bevölkerung forderten." See Sohrweide, p. 139.

activities of human being, the influence of torrents, famine, and earthquakes exceptionally followed one by another, in creating grounds for messianic expectations must be further evaluated.

‘Ali records a wide-spread plague in Recep, Şaban, and Ramazan (May, June, July) of 897/1491. It was fatal especially in Egypt, Damascus, Aleppo, and generally in the territories of *Rûm (memâlik-i Rum)*.¹¹⁵³ ‘Ali says that in territories of *Rûm* several thousand men died per day; in the capital city of *Rûm (pây-ı that-ı Rum)*, for example, one thousand men died in the first five days, then twenty thousand men in the following ten days, and thirty thousand men in the following seventeen days. In Cairo, on the other hand, the plague prolonged extremely strong for thirty three days and six hundred and twenty five thousand men died.¹¹⁵⁴ Solakzâde states that the plague continued for three years and the famine for six years without interval. The people of Bolu survived without bread eating whereby herbs for two months.¹¹⁵⁵ After the plague and famine, intense rain started in Anatolia. The Konya plain was completely covered by water. This extreme rain continued between the years 907 and 910.¹¹⁵⁶

The whole of Anatolia and the Balkans were trembled by a great earthquake on the night of Cemâzi I 26, 915 (September 11, 1509)¹¹⁵⁷. It continued for forty five days. The destruction of the earthquake was so great that contemporary sources call it ‘small

¹¹⁵³ The term ‘Rum’ was used for two regions in Ottoman sources: one was for the province comprising Tokat, Sivas, Amasya, and Çorum, the other being western parts of Thrace, which was specifically referred as ‘Rum-ili’. ‘Memâlik-i Rum’ here must be the former region. For a parallel interpretation see UZC2, p. 233. For the limits of the Province of Rum in the sixteenth century see Tayyib Gökbilgin, “15 ve 16. Asırlarda Eyâlet-I Rûm”, *Vakıflar Dergisi*, 6, 1965, 51-61.

¹¹⁵⁴ ALI, p. 868.

¹¹⁵⁵ SLZ1, p. 430.

¹¹⁵⁶ SLZ1, pp. 430-1.

¹¹⁵⁷ KPZ8b, p. 36. ALI gives the date as Rebî’ II 25, 915 (August 12, 1509).

doomsday'.¹¹⁵⁸ The people of Anatolia and the Balkans could not sleep in their beds for two months; they slept in gardens. Many constructions were demolished in Edirne. Two quarters of Çorum were completely sunk under the ground and all of the *mescids* and minarets in this city were pulled down.¹¹⁵⁹ But the most destructive results of the earthquake were seen in Constantinople. A number of mosques, minarets, castles, ramparts fell to the ground. One thousand and seventy houses collapsed and five thousand people passed away.¹¹⁶⁰ It created such awful air in Constantinople that Bayezid II decided to move to Edirne. But a second earthquake took place on 9 Receb 915/23 October 1509 in Edirne, which was as strong as the former one.¹¹⁶¹

A third earthquake appeared on 3 Şaban 915/16 November 1509, which was not much weaker than the former two. This earthquake was followed by intense rains and torrent started on 19 Şaban 915/2 December 1509. The river of Tunca overflowed; Yenişehir was sunk into the water. 'Ali records that not such a torrent had been seen around the region since the founding of Edirne.¹¹⁶²

The sources do not include clear indications of how people of the empire interpreted all these natural disasters. But there are some accounts on how Bayezid II himself interpreted them. An anonymous history records that after these earthquakes Bayezid II summoned known astronomers and specialists on natural sciences and asked them the possible hidden reasons of this wrath of the ground. He also demanded whether or not these catastrophes might include clues for the future. The present scholars said that there would be fierce wars all over the world and that much blood would pour on

¹¹⁵⁸ KPZ8b, pp. 36-39; ALI, p. 920.

¹¹⁵⁹ ALI, p. 920.

¹¹⁶⁰ Ottoman chronicles give details of destruction. See KPZ8a, pp. 279-280; ALI, pp. 920-21; ANMH, p. 43; SLZ1, pp. 435-6; ANMB, pp. 157-159. Consider also UZC2, pp. 233-4.

¹¹⁶¹ ALI, p. 921. See also TNSB, pp. 8-11.

¹¹⁶² ALI, p. 921.

the ground; further natural disasters and climate deterioration would appear and that all of these catastrophic events would take place in order to punish human beings.¹¹⁶³ The account of Solakzāde is more interesting. He summoned viziers and generals and spoke as follows: ‘It is the lament of the oppressed, which is a result of your oppression and corruption that reached God and ignited his wrath. This disaster is nothing other than the result of your oppression!’¹¹⁶⁴ While the Ottoman horizons were filled with dark clouds, the star of Ismail was rising day by day.¹¹⁶⁵

Indeed, for the rebels’ thoughts, attitudes, and sentiments, unfortunately there is a scarcity of sources. We can only get an idea through the writings of their opponent. For example, a short passage in the conversation between Ismail and the rebels¹¹⁶⁶, which was cited in Hoca Saadeddin’s history, gives an idea of their sentiments and incentives. When answering Ismail’s question about the reasons of their uprising, the leader of rebels is reported to have said,

Ol pādīshāh yaşlandığından vücudunun rahatsızlığı ülkenin kargaşasına yol açtı. Ülkeye düzen getirecek önlemleri almaktan el çekti. Vezirlerin ellerini uzatmalarıyla ortaya nice zulümler çıktı. Anların ettiklerine dayanamayıp bu yolu seçtik. Özellikle Şah hazretlerinin kapısına yüz sürmek ve güzel varlığını görmek de muradımız ve gönlümüzün tek dileği idi. Kapılarına kul olmayı hora geçer hizmet sanıp kalkıp geldik.¹¹⁶⁷

Before endeavoring interpretation of these words, one should keep in mind that this passage is a re-production of the memory and mind of Hoca Saadetin, who was a leading representative of Ottoman religious scholars in the sixteenth century and

¹¹⁶³ ANMH, p. 44.

¹¹⁶⁴ SLZ1, p. 437.

¹¹⁶⁵ Sohrweide, p. 140. In addition to all these natural disasters and administrative corruptions, there appeared corsairs pillaging coastal towns and villages. (SLZ1, p. 431.) One of these corsairs, Kara Turmuş, was captured and executed in 1504. But this execution could not reduce the number of corsairs. See HSE3, p. 348; MNB, pp. 418-9.

¹¹⁶⁶ As will be delineated below at the end of the rebellion rebellious qızilbashs went to Iran, to the court of Shah Ismail.

¹¹⁶⁷ HSE4, p. 67.

rigorously deem both Ismail and the rebels as heretics. Thus what we read is the version of an authentic event that could have passed through the intellectual filter of Hoca. Indeed, it is highly likely that the factual event was not only filtered but also underwent metamorphosis while being reformulated in Hoca's mind. Even so, two incentives of rebels clearly appear in this account. Hoca Saadeddin makes the leader of the rebels articulate firstly the oppression of the Ottoman regime, and secondly their enthusiastic devotion to the Shah.¹¹⁶⁸

No less decisive than the above-mentioned two reasons was that the incompatibility of Turkoman tribal organizations and the bureaucratic-state organization of the Ottoman Empire had already appeared. It is known that the Taurus region was densely populated by nomadic Turkoman tribes such as Turgutlu and Varsak. This region had long been the center of tribal resistance against Ottoman imperial expansion. Thus this socio-cultural discrepancy had already created alienation between Ottoman bureaucrats and the nomadic subjects populating the region.

¹¹⁶⁸ The sentiment of qizilbash population is better seen in the oral productions of this milieu. A poem of Pir Sultan Abdal, a qizilbash *ozan* (poet-singer) of the sixteenth century, is pregnant to the sentiment of qizilbashes against Ottomans. It reads,

*“Lānet olsun sana ey Yezid Pelid,
Kızılbaş mı dersin söyle bakalım!
Biz ol aşıklarız ezel gününden,
Rāfizi mi dersin söyle bakalım.
Ey Yezid geçersen Şah'ın eline,
Zülfikārın çalar senin beline.
Edeple girdik biz kırklar yoluna.
Kızılbaş mı dersin söyle bakalım.
Yufetti erenler ey münkir size,
İftira ettiniz sizler de bize,
Muhammed sizleri taş ile eze,
Rāfizi mi dersin söyle bakalım.
Pir Sultan'ım eder lānet Yezid'e,
Müfteri yalancı yezidler size,
İşte er meydanı çık meydan yüze,
Rāfizi mi dersin söyle bakalım.”*

See Cahit Öztelli, “Pir Sultan'ın Hayatı İle İlgili Yeni Şiirleri”, *Türk Dili Dergisi*, 34, 1954, p. 587. The whole text of this poem also recited in Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı”, p. 34.

Ottoman historians depict the disciples of Şahkulu as rebellious, people who stir up trouble, vagrant, vagabonds, good-for-nothing, and heretics. These are frequently phrases employed by Ottoman historians and reporters for the adherents of the rebellion: ‘*ehl-i tuğyan*’, ‘*müfsīd*’, ‘*bağī*’, ‘*evbāş*’.¹¹⁶⁹ An anonymous history from the sixteenth century best summarizes the Ottoman perception of Şahkulu rebels. It reads, “They deviated from the avenue of obedience and fixed their foot on the route of heresy; they wholly agreed on performing strife and sedition.”¹¹⁷⁰

The attitude of the Ottoman administration towards the nomadic Turkish population was quite pejorative. The common phrases often applied by the court historians, who were high officials and representatives of the high Ottoman bureaucracy and intelligentsia as well, for these groups are ‘*Etrāk-i bī-idrāk*’ (the Turks without capacity to perceive), ‘*Ertāk-i nā-pāk*’ (the dirty Turks), ‘*dike burun*’ (the man who does not obey), ‘*bī-bāk fettāk*’ (the man without fear and kills many people). Their description of these Turkomans especially in the context of the Şahkulu rebellion clearly reflects the view of the Ottoman bureaucrats regarding nomadic subjects. Kemalpaşazāde, for example, depicts the adherents of the rebellion, who defeated the Ottoman army under

¹¹⁶⁹ An anonymous history recounts the early phase of the revolt as follows: “...*Ol bed-ahterlerden bir nice evbāş-ı huffāş-ittikāş ki her biri ismen ve resmen mehcūl ve hilkat-ı pūr-nekbetleri habāsetle mehcūl idi. İhmāl ve eskāl in fi’alle ol bed-fe’ālun vücūdları kendu boyunlarında bār-i girān olmağın terīk-i fesād ve dalāletde cān u baş terkini tahfīf-i me’net bilürlerdi. ..Sene seb’a ‘aşere ve tis’ami’e Muharreminin evāyilinde zıkr olan ehl-i tuğyāndan birkaç müfsīdler yolda giderken şehzādenin hazāin ve emvāline ta’arruz idüb sūret-i bağı izhar eylediler...*” ANMB, p. 173.

¹¹⁷⁰ “*Cādde-i itā’atden çıkub tarīk-i dalāletde sābit-kadem olmağla mu’āhede eyleyüb cem’isi fitne vü fesāda el-bir itmışlerdi.*” ANMB, p. 174. It is interesting to note that HR, completely contrary to the Ottoman sources, depicts Şahkulu and his followers as “the people on the right path” while accusing Ottoman troops “those in favor of the darkness”. See HR, p. 154.

the command of Karagöz Pasha and spoiled their possession, as ‘the dirty Turks with wooden feet who never mounted a horse’.¹¹⁷¹

Celalzāde’s depiction suggests that nomadic Turkomans constituted the majority of the rebels. He says, the whole of the naughty, mischievous Turks, vagrants, and nimble-robbers living in cities, towns and villages, mountains, summer pastures (*yaylak*), and winter pastures (*oba*) of the region joined the ranks of Şahkulu.¹¹⁷² Hoca Saadeddin depicts them in the same fashion. He argues that the Turks living in this region were naughty by birth and disobedient by nature. The bad temperament was part of their disposition. Their hearts were full of dissension and desire for evil actions; outwardly they appeared human-like but their true nature was animal-like.¹¹⁷³ Hoca Saadeddin depicts Şahkulu with the phrase ‘*aşağılık herif*’, the man deprived of any respect and virtue.¹¹⁷⁴

Ottoman historians generally depict the Anatolian disciples of Ismail in the same manner: stressing their poor appearance and their disobedience as a disposition, their impercipience and insensitivity etc. Once, Hoca Saadeddin says for example, “*Başına tāt aldı çıktı ol pelīd / İtdi duygusuz Türkleri mürid.*”¹¹⁷⁵ Hoca Saadeddin insistently depicts the adherents of the rebellion as ‘heretic by birth’.¹¹⁷⁶ He also describes them as

¹¹⁷¹ “Ömrü piyādelikle geçmiş ağaç ayaklu etrāk-i nā-pāk” See KPZ8b, p. 45. ANMB employs the same phrase in the same context. See ANMB, p. 177. HSE’s account is similar: “...Zamane dünyasında yaya dolaşmakla ömrün geçiren bir nice çulsuz işsiz güçsüz, purlanta gibi atlara....biner oldular.” HSE4, p. 46.

¹¹⁷² “Şehirlerde ve kasabat u kurrāda, cibālde ve yaylaklarda ve obada ne denlū eşirra vū etrāk ve ne mikdār levend u nuhusted (nuhūset) ve çalāk varısa....” CLZ, p. 121.

¹¹⁷³ “Ama ol diyārda yaşayan Türklerin varlıkları doğuştan yaramaz olup, yaradılışlarından dik başlı olduklarından başka, huysuzluk da onların aşağılık yapılarında bir huy gibiydi. Ol insanlıktan eksik kişilerin nifākla dolu yüreklerinde bin bir türlü fesād gömülü olub her biri insan biçiminde laf anlamaz hayvana benzer kişilerdi.” HSE4, pp. 42-3.

¹¹⁷⁴ HSE4, p. 43.

¹¹⁷⁵ HSE4, p. 171.

¹¹⁷⁶ “...ol ‘yaradılıştan sapkın’ kişiler kendlerine boyun eğmeyenleri demir kılıçlarla tepeleyip ol yörede oturan Müslümanların ırzlarını berbat edip pis bulularla gelen fesat ve kargaşa cemrelerini sert ve yakıcı

enemies of the religion (*din düşmanları*). When narrating the death of Karagöz Pasha in the battle of Kütahya, Hoca Saadeddin deems his death in the hands of these ‘enemies of the religion’ as proof of his highly appreciated place in Heaven.¹¹⁷⁷ Somewhere else he describes rebels as tramps with naked feet and hatless heads, who took off the yoke of obedience from their necks.¹¹⁷⁸

After narrating how Ismail interrogated and punished the leaders of the rebellion, Hoca Saadeddin records that some people of the rebellious group were set free with their women and children.¹¹⁷⁹ This phrase suggests that there were women and children in the camp of the rebellious qizilbashs as well. In a similar vein, Ebu’l-Fadl Mehmed Efendi records that after defeating Karagöz Pasha’s commander Nokta on April 16, 1511, 20.000 *müfsids* entered Burdur with their families, properties and animals.¹¹⁸⁰ Tekindağ states on the authority of Kemalpashazāde that during the engagement between Ali Pasha and Şahkulu in Çubuk the families and children of qizilbashs also attended the battle.¹¹⁸¹

As a result, considerable portion of the rebels, if not all, left their homeland with their families, which obviously reflects the fact that their hope of a sustainable life in the

gurur rüzgârı ile tutuşturarmak için nice ‘kötü yaradılışlıları’ da kendilerine uydurmuşlardı...” HSE4, p. 44.

¹¹⁷⁷ “... ahiret yurdunda değeri ölçüsüne bu din düşmanları eliyle öldürülmesi kanıt oldu.” HSE4, p. 45.

¹¹⁷⁸ HSE re-phrases Ali Pasha’s words about qizilbash rebels. Upon learning the defeat of Karagoz, Pasha Ali Pasha, who was not willing to agree on the achievement of rebels, interpreted the defeat as a result of improvidence of local governors. He said, “Bütün bu olanlar beylerbeyilerin yüreksizliklerindedir. Birkaç Teke Türkü’nün nice hakkından gelemezler. Yohsa başı kabak, ayağı çıplak haylazların neleri var ki boyunlarındaki bağlılık tokunu çıkartub başkaldıralar ve bunca zarara cesaret ideler.” HSE4, p. 47.

¹¹⁷⁹ HSE4, p. 68.

¹¹⁸⁰ Ebu’l-Fadl Medmed Efendi, *Selimşâh-nâme*, Lâlâ İsmail Efendi Kütüphanesi, no. 348, f. 48a. Cited in Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı”, *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 4, 1959, p. 54.

¹¹⁸¹ “Bir düz yerde müdevver bir hendek-i amik edüb, harbgâh durmuşlar imiş. Paşa’nın erdüğün görüb âni ol hendeğin içine tir ü tüfenge mâyil tedbirin itmekiçün, olayı tamam bir nice bin deve çökördiler, dahî kamu mühmelât-ı evrât ve ebnâ vü benâtiyle içine girüb tahassun eylediler, gâfilâne cümle etfâl ve avrâtiyle ol develer ardından cenge hazır hazır oldılar...” İbn Kemal, *Selim-nâme*, Hazine Ktp., no. 1424, f. 25b. Cited and quoted in Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı”, *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 4, 1959, p. 58.

Ottoman realm had totally vanished; they left Ottoman land with no intention returning. Furthermore, this can also be regarded as a proof that the majority of rebels were tribal nomads, who could easily move their families and possession with themselves. Indeed, qizilbashs are reported to have come with their families in many campaigns, including Çaldıran.¹¹⁸²

Another point to be emphasized is that Ottoman sources insistently reports that the stimulating groups among rebels were adherents of the Safavid order. ‘Āli, for example, phrases the title of the related section of his history as follows: “The story of vagrants and adherents of Qizilbash who advent in the Province of Teke and killed Karagöz Pasha, the *beylerbey* of Anatolia.”¹¹⁸³

Furthermore, the depictions of rebels in archival documents and in histories of contemporary authors clearly put that the main body of rebels were from disgraced – by Ottoman officials of course - social classes. They are described in the report of one inspector, who was commissioned to look over the rebellion, for example, as follows, “His [Şahkulu’s] soldiers apart from *sipāhis* are quite poor...Their clothes are rather awful. If you crush his cavalries the rest can not further resist.”¹¹⁸⁴ CLZ reports, when learned of, qizilbashs fled from Kızılkaya Ali Pasha. His commanders said, “...*ardına düştüğümüz düşmene ne i’tibār, bir bölük murdar cimriler, Türkler, Kızılbaşlardır, kaçdılar. Hemān piyāde olan yeniçerilerden bir mikdarını atlandurub müfsidleri kaçurmayalım, deyu tedbir itdiler...*”¹¹⁸⁵

¹¹⁸² See Chapter VIII in this study.

¹¹⁸³ “*Teke eyāletinde zuhūr iden Anatolı beğlerbeğisi Karagöz Paşayı katl iden evbaşlar ve Surh-ser tāifesine mütāba’at gösteren kallaşlar kıssasıdır.*” ALI, p. 926. See also ANMB, p. 176.

¹¹⁸⁴ “...*Sipahi taifesinden gayri askeri gayet cimri şekildir.Giyecekleri hor ve hakīrdir. Atlasunda mukābil olursa ziyade dayanmaz...*” TSA, document E. 6187.

¹¹⁸⁵ CLZ, p. 132. Another sixteenth century historian ‘Āli describes early qizilbashs as follows: “Yini yaka oldukları zaman ve henüz zuhūr u hurūc itdükleri evān olmağın bir çift çahşırı iki kişi giymek ve bir

We learn from Kemalpaşazāde,¹¹⁸⁶ when Ismail rose in 1499, the Turkomans of Teke were among his foremost supporters. Kemalpaşazāde's description - such as disobedient-stubborn, fearless, and killers - suggests that they were overwhelmingly nomadic-tribes. We also learn from Kemalpaşazāde that they were not deemed as being respected (*kendüye kimse ādem demeyen*), but rather esteemed among lower classes of the society in their homeland. They were far away from state posts, but always had been simple subjects. In short, they were distanced from the Ottoman state organization in such a degree that they could not benefit from any favor of the state; rather regarded by the bureaucrats - the state agents – as second class subjects.

On the other hand, they found, as Kemalpaşazāde put forward, honor and respect in the court of Ismail. They became attached to the dignity of state and achieved high posts near Ismail while they were ignorable subjects in their homeland. Those who had never been acquainted with any state functionary in their life became the commanders and generals. Kemalpaşazāde also hits on an important point to be underscored: the Turkomans of Teke were among the firsts who joined Ismail's forces when he moved from Gīlan. Thus they acquired superiority among qızilbashes. They also acquired fame with their bravery and obedience (*merdānelik ve yoldaşlık*).¹¹⁸⁷

Kemalpaşazāde argues it was because of the respect and opportunities they found under the banner of Ismail which caused many Turkomans of the Teke region to leave their home and immigrate to Persia. They sold all of their possessions even at very low prices. One should not disregard, however, that this is not the whole picture; it was not

çift āstini iki yini yaka rüstāyi bölüşmek, ya'nī ki iki çahşını bir uğurdan temellüke kādir olmayanları birisi ile iktifā itmek ve beğleri ve bellü başluların ekseri ol tarīka gītmek şī'ār u disārları İslām ve imanları gibi şatr-ı vāhid ile kanā'at sūretini göstermek üzere idi." (ALI, p. 1086.)

¹¹⁸⁶ KPZ8b, p. 43.

¹¹⁸⁷ KPZ8b, p. 43.

only the temporal benefits offered by Ismail that attracted Turkomans. Rather they were tied to Ismail, just like to the former shaykhs of the Safavid order, with mystical and religious bonds for he was their spiritual guide. The temporal benefits must be regarded only as supplementary incentives for the sincere adherents of the order. They were, however, influential in gaining discontent population, which was not yet a sincere adherent of the spiritual reasons, and especially dismissed *sipāhis* against the revolt. Kemalpaşazāde states those who had not gone to Persia prepared for revenge. They began to wait for suitable conditions to appear. (*Zalām-ı şām-ı fitne büm-ı Rūmı kaçan tuta diyü eyyām-ı fetrete ve hengām-ı fırsata nāzır u muntazır turmuşlardı.*) The preparation was speeded up while Korkud was in Egypt. And the most suitable time was believed to have arrived when Korkud left the city in a hurry.

Another point emphasized both in archival documents and chronicles is that they were sackers; they plundered the properties of Muslims¹¹⁸⁸ and killed many of them throughout the rebellion.¹¹⁸⁹ If we trust Idris-i Bitlisī, 50.000 people were killed from both sides since the outbreak of the rebellion to the death of Ali Pasha on July 2, 1511, which marked the end of the rebellion.¹¹⁹⁰ Ottoman sources unanimously report the outbreak of the Şahkulu rebellion as great turmoil and disaster for the ‘Muslim’ population of the region. *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman* says, for example, when they rose up, they looted the properties and chastity (*ırz*) of Muslims who did not join them.¹¹⁹¹ They set the villages on fire. All the vagabonds of the region joined them.¹¹⁹²

¹¹⁸⁸ See, for example, SLZ1, p. 445; MNB, p. 428; ANMB, p. 49.

¹¹⁸⁹ See, for example, TSA, document E 2829. “...Elmalı’ya azimet düb anda dahī bir iki bin askerler cem olub dururmuş. Buluşub anları dahī sıyub mübalağa tayifesin şehid eyleyüb ve Elmalı’ya dahi kezālik vurub malın ve rızkın alub kendulara yaramayanı kırub Müslümanların ehl-ü ‘iyāllerine bir vech ile hakaret etmişdir ki demek olmaz...”

¹¹⁹⁰ IDRS, p. 89.

¹¹⁹¹ See TSA, document E 2829. Also consider HSE4, p. 44.

Their number increased significantly so that they even began to dream of a temporal suzerainty. They were pillaging villages and towns, killing all the people and spoiling their properties.¹¹⁹³ Some of the people living in this region were killed and some others could save their life only by fleeing over mountains.¹¹⁹⁴

One interesting point in the testimony of an arrested sufi dispatched by Korkud, draws attention. According to this testimony, after defeating Karagöz Pasha's army outside Kütahya and executing him, qizilbashes toasted three people.¹¹⁹⁵ The testimony does not specify, however, why they toasted these three people and what they did with toasted corpses.¹¹⁹⁶ Another extreme practice attributed to the rebels by Ottoman authors

¹¹⁹² HSE4, p. 44.

¹¹⁹³ HSE4, p. 44.

¹¹⁹⁴ ANMB, pp. 174-5. CLZ narrates events more or less in the same manner. But a couplet of him is worth to cite here. He says, “*Şarab u hamr içildi âşikâre / Harâmî başladı sayd u şikâre.*” See CLZ, p. 121. Also see HSE4, p. 44. A contemporary inspector reports the early phases of the rebellion as follows: “*Hurûc edeliden bu demedeğin gâlib budur ki ricalden ve etfalden ve avretiden on binden ziyade nefis katlolunmuşdur. Efvâh-ı ricalde hod ziyade mübalağa ederler. Hâsil-ı kelam bir gün önden memleketin ahvâline tadârik gerekdir. Gâyet gerekdir. Asıl Kızılbaş kendi gelse bu kadar âfet olmazdı. Kendudan eşeddir. Bu zalim uğradığı yerlerde ricalden ve avretiden ve etfalden ne bulursa kırar. Hatta kendu maslahatından ziyade koyun ve sığır olsa cümlesin kırar. Kediye kırar, tavuğu kırar. Kütahya’da talan etdüğü esbabı, mahbub kaliçalar ve sayir esbab her ne var ise cem edüb oda yakmuş. Hâsil şerh olunur zalim değildir. Ve bazı ahvâl ve kelimât vardır yazılmak edeb olduğu sebebden yazılmadı. Çavuş İskender bendeniz cümleye vakıfdır, mahfice teftiş oluna. Cengin evvelinden ahârına cemî’ ahvâla vâkıfdır. Takrir eyleye. Çok namus eksikliği oldu. Ve memleket halkı, hususa Kütahya şehirlisi rızıkların yağmalatmışlardır, kurtaramamışlardır. Müslümanların halleri gayet mükedder olmuşdur, hayf olmuşdur.*” See TSA, document E. 6187.

¹¹⁹⁵ TSA, document E 5035.

¹¹⁹⁶ Indeed, contemporary sources often refer to cannibalistic practices of qizilbashes, both in Anatolia and in Iran. For example, On May 13, 1504, Ismail captured Amir Husayn Kiyâ Chulawî, the Shi’ite ruler of Fîrûzkûh and Damâwand and confined him in an iron cage. On the return march, however, Amir Husayn Kiyâ managed to commit suicide. His corpse was burnt in *meydân* at Isfahân. (Sarwar, pp. 48-9) Furthermore, two of his officers, Murad Beg Jahânshânî and Sâylatmish beg were roasted alive. As a warning to others, Süfîs ate them as a *kebâb*. Roger Savory determines, Ismail was alleged to have given the order, “whoever is a convinced believer, let him eat a morsel of this *kebâb*.” (Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, p. 74.) As recorded in one Safavid chronicle, such was the zeal of the *gâzis* neither flesh nor bones remained. (Khwurshâh b. Qubâd al-Husaynî, *Târikh-i İlchî-yi Nizâmshâh*, Manuscript, British Museum, Add. 23, 513, fol. 451a, cited in Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, p. 74.) Jean Aubin also calls attention to some cannibalistic practices of qizilbashes. He reminds, for example, that Ismail made the skull of defeated Uzbek Sheybâni Han goblet and with it drunk wine. He also indicates that Shah Ismail invented new methods of torture such as coating captives with honey and posing to wasps, putting in a boiling caldron. See Jean Aubin, “La politique religieuse des Safavides”, *Le Shi’isme Imâmîte, Colloque de Strasbourg, 6-9 mai 1968*, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, p. 237. Still more unfortunate

is that they set fire to even *cāmis* and *zāviyes*; they trampled on the words of God and set it on fire.¹¹⁹⁷

The violent reaction of the rebel *qizilbash*es to the Ottoman regime, which was intermingled with the sunni-Hanefi interpretation the Islamic law (*şeriat*), was best manifested in their attitude towards *qādis*, foremost representatives of this regime. They treated *qādis* of the cities the most awfully and those that they captured they tortured to death. Prince Osman reports, for example, upon capturing Gölhisarı that the *qizilbash*es had detained the *qādi* of the city, killed him with severe torture, took his money and smashed his body into pieces. Prince Osman also reports that their wrath was not only against *qādis* but also against *subaşı*s and elites of cities and towns as well.¹¹⁹⁸

6.2. ON THE NATURE OF THE REBELLION

6.2.1. The Ideology of the Rebellion

As delineated above, the Şahkulu rebellion had not only religious character but also ideological and social dimensions as well. Sohrweide detects similarities in this rebellion

was Muhammad Karra, who rebelled and took possession of Yazd. He was confined in a cage and smeared with honey so that the wasps tormented him. Finally he was also burnt alive in the square (*meydān*) of Isfahan. (BRW, p. 56.)

Ottoman historians also occasionally mention cannibalism conducted by the Shah's soldiers. HSE says, for example, Shah Ismail ordered to make two grandsons of Alauddevle, who were captured during his campaign on Dulkadir, and his followers ate them. (HSE3, p. 351.) 'Âli recites their cannibalism in more exaggerated manner, "Dem olurdu ki, Şah-ı nev-sipāh bir şahsa gazāb eylerdi, karşusunda hazır bulunan hezeleye "Yen bunı!" diyū söylerdi. Fi'l-hāl ol behāyim sıfatlu etrāk ol dermendin ağzını burnını koparub çāk çāk iderlerdi. Lisān ve beynini kelle-i küsfend ve dili gibi tatlu tatlu hora geçürürlerdi. Ke-ennehū segān ve gürkān gibi merdum-hordeliği hisāl-i hamīdeden bilürlerdi. Kendüsi dahī bu yüzden icrā-yı fermāna mahzūz olurdu. Bu hāleti kuvvet-i kāhiresinden 'add idüb tefāhur kılurdu." (ALI, p. 1086.)

¹¹⁹⁷ "...Ve şehri dahi yer yer oda koyub mescidleri ve zāviyeleri bile yakmışdır. Ve haşā buldukları kalamullahı ve kitapları oda vurub tabanlayub mahvederlermiş..." TSA, document E 2829.

¹¹⁹⁸ "...Gölhisar üzerine düşüb gelgüğü gibi fil-hāl hisarı alub kadısın dutub ellibin akçesin aldıktan sonra enva'-i ceza ile katl edüb meyyitin der-pare eyleyüb dört köşede asub ve subaşısin bile öldürüb ekābirden ve āyandan mübalağa ādem kılıçdan geçürüb..." TSA, document E 2829.

with those of shi'ite rebellions within sunni realms since the early periods of Islam, especially with extremist shi'ite movements.¹¹⁹⁹ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak follows a similar line of argument. Ocak analyses the rebellions in the Ottoman Empire under two categories: in the first group, the rebels simply aimed to acquire their goals through armed struggle without basing it on any ideological framework; the second group rebellions, however, bear dominant ideological character, that is revolutionary messianic insurgency.¹²⁰⁰

Ocak determines the four fundamental features of messianic insurgences as follows: 1) a discontent or oppressed social segment, usually nomads or peasants following an heterodox form of religion, 2) a strong belief in a divinely commissioned savior (Mahdi) who would soon appear and save those oppressed people¹²⁰¹, 3) the belief that the savior would bring them not only the worldly welfare but the heavenly salvation as well, and 4) a myth, regarding the savior, produced by the collective mind of the group.¹²⁰²

He argues that most of the uprisings led by nomadic Turkomans including those qizilbash revolts in the sixteenth century were rested upon the ideology of revolutionary

¹¹⁹⁹ Sohrweide, p. 146. For a concise look at to the issue of 'heresy' or *rafada* contests in Islamic societies see, for example, Bernard Lewis, "Some Observations on the significance of Heresy in the History of Islam", *Studia Islamica*, I, 1953; Matti Moosa, *Extremist Shiites. The Ghulat Sects*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1988;

¹²⁰⁰ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Kutb ve İsyân: Osmanlı Mehdi (Mesihanik) Hareketlerinin İdeolojik Arkapları Üzerine Bazı Düşünceler", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 83, 1999-2000, p. 49.

¹²⁰¹ The claims pertaining to the identity of Mahdi usually appears vaguely and fluctuating. The leader may claim to be the representative of Mahdi or in another occasion to be Mahdi himself. As will be delineated contemporary Ottoman reports depict Şahkulu exactly in this manner: "...*Gâh mehdilik davasının eder gâh Şah öldü anın vilâyeti bana deđdi memleket benimdir der. Gâh birkaç günlük ömrüm vardır memleket benimdir deyu birbirine muhalif kelimat eder...*" TSA, document E. 6187. Shah Veli, the leader of another Qizilbash uprising in 1520, commonly known as Celâli uprising, is reported as first claimed himself to be the representative of Mahdi, then Mahdi himself. See HSE4, pp. 347-8.

¹²⁰² Ocak, *Babailer İsyanı*, p. 144; "Synchrétisme et esprit messianique : le concept de qotb et les chefs des mouvements messianiques aux époques seldjoukide et ottomane (XIIIe-XVIIe siècle)", in *Synchrétismes et hérésies dans l'Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIVe-XVIIIe) siècle. Actes du Colloque du Collège de France, octobre 2001*, ed., Gilles Veinstein, Paris, 2005, 2249-57.

messianism.¹²⁰³ It is not coincidence that most of the charismatic leaders of those sort of rebellions were affiliated with mysticism. These leaders usually lead an ascetic life secluded in a cave, which created great respect mingled with the fear among folk, before launching the insurrection.¹²⁰⁴ Şahkulu also, as well as Baba Ilyas 260 years ago, spent a couple of years in a cave just before raising the banner of revolt. As Ocak puts,

Aux époques dont nous parlons, il faut certainement qu'il y ait un idéologie religieuse se nourrissant des croyances traditionnelles des révoltés. Et c'est précisément sur ce point que le chef soufi du mouvement ou de la révolte joue son rôle fondamental. Ce chef suofi et souvent le stimulateur d'une idéologie messianique, mettant à profit sa personnalité charismatique de caractère mystique. Ce caractère mystique prend la forme du mahdî – une forme qui est très familières aux peuples musulmans médiévaux.¹²⁰⁵

On the other hand, the discourses used by the leaders of rebellions are nearly identical. As Ocak has already showed, Şahkulu carried on an astonishingly similar propaganda to that spread by Baba Ilyas two and a half centuries earlier. Furthermore, the socio-economic backgrounds of two revolts, as well as of other similar but smaller-scale revolts in the Ottoman realm, were also more or less the same. Like Baba Ilyas, the followers of Şahkulu were mainly nomadic or semi-nomadic Turkomans affiliated with a 'heterodox' form of Islam. The roots of rebellion, indeed, stemmed from the socio-economic conflict between nomadic groups and the Anatolian Seljukid regime rather

¹²⁰³ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "XVI. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Anadolu'sunda Mesiyani Hareketlerin Bir Tahlil Denemesi", *V. Milletlerarası Türkiye Sosyal ve İktisat Tarihi Kongresi (Tebliğler)*, İstanbul, 21-25 Ağustos 1989, Ankara, 1991, 817-25; "Babil İsyanından Kızılbaşlığa", p. 153; "The Wafā'ī tarīqa (Wafā'īyya) during and after the Period of the Seljuks of Turkey: a new Approach to the History of Popular Mysticism in Turkey", *Mésogaios*, 25-26, 2005, p. 243; "Tarihsel Süreç İçinde Türklerin İslâm Yorumu (Tarih Boyunca Türkler ve İslâm Problemine Genel Bir Bakış Denemesi)", in his *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslam. Yaklaşım, Yöntem ve Yorum Denemeleri*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000, p. 47; "Un aperçu général sur l'hétérodoxie Musulmane en Turquie: Réflexions sur les origines et les caractéristiques du Kizilbashisme (Alévisme) dans la perspective de l'histoire", *Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East*, eds. Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, Barbara Kellner-Heinkele, Anke Otter-Beaujean, Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 1997, pp. 202-3.

¹²⁰⁴ Ocak, *Babailer İsyanı*, pp. 157-8; "Kutb ve İsyân", p. 51.

¹²⁰⁵ Ocak, "Syncretisme et esprit messianique", p. 252.

than the religious contest between heterodox Islam and Sunni Islam.¹²⁰⁶ The main stimulus of this revolt was the hatred of Turkoman elements for the alienated (*Iranized*) state elite.¹²⁰⁷ But the ideology of the rebellion was constructed on a deep-rooted belief: millennialism.¹²⁰⁸ Ocak determines the three dominant characteristics of Babāi movement as messianic, syncretic, and mystic.¹²⁰⁹ As will be discussed below, contemporary sources clearly envisage the same characteristics in the case of the Şahkulu rebellion; especially the messianic and mystic character of Şahkulu's movement is evidently reflected in almost all sources.

Both Safavid and Ottoman sources depict the father of Şahkulu, Hasan Khalifa, as one of the foremost khalifas of Shaykh Haydar. He even attended the banquets of Shaykh Junayd. But his main spiritual training was developed under the auspice of Shaykh Haydar. On fulfilling his spiritual maturation, Shaykh Haydar sent him to the Teke region for the purpose of preaching the mystical message of the Safavid Order among the Turkoman population of the region. A contemporary Safavid source gives valuable information on Hasan Khalifa,

Hasan Khalifa, also a darwish (who dwelt between the Tike İlî [Teke-ili] and the Arūm İlî [i.e. Anatolia]), was a disciple of the Safavis. He had once waited on Sultan Junayd, and twice on Sultan Haydar, who had sent him with forty sufis to a *chilla-khāna*, where each had a jug of water and a loaf of bread as their sustenance during the period of fasting (*chilla*). When this period was over they came out of the *chilla-khāna*. All of them had consumed their provisions, excepting only Hasan Khalifa, who brought his untouched to 'His Holiness' (Sultan Haydar) who then sent him back to Teke İli,¹²¹⁰ having first given him a promise with regard to the appearance and coming of Isma'îl. When he returned

¹²⁰⁶ See Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Babailer İsyanı*, genişletilmiş ikinci baskı, İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 1996, pp. 147-52; Irène Mélikoff, *Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, trs. Turan Alptekin, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Kitapları, 1999, pp. 68-72.

¹²⁰⁷ Ocak, *Babailer İsyanı*, p. 142; Mélikoff, *Hacı Bektaş Efsaneden Gerçeğe*, p. 69.

¹²⁰⁸ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Babailer İsyanıdan Kızılbaşlığa: Anadolu'da İslâm Heterodoksisinin Doğuş ve Gelişim Tarihine Kısa bir Bakış", *Belleten*, LXIV/239, 2000, pp. 136-7.

¹²⁰⁹ Ocak, *Babailer İsyanı*, pp. 79-82.

¹²¹⁰ For the same account until that point also see HR, p. 157.

to the aforesaid *II* he performed many miracles and uttered prophecies, repeatedly announcing to pious sufis the coming of Ismaʿīl. On leaving this world he bequeathed his ‘throne’ to his son Bābā Shāh Kulī, who was also a revealer of mysteries and worker of wonders, and gave him an *ablak*¹²¹¹ saying: “In the year 907¹²¹² our Guide will mount the throne of Iran in Tabrīz. This is a present entrusted to me [*imānat*] for that prince – give it him with my salutations.” So Bābā Shāh Kulī awaited the appointed time.¹²¹³

The following paragraphs of *Ross Anonymous* deal with how Hasan Khalifa’s son, Şahkulu, approved of the pilgrimage of Dede Muhammad, who was among the purest and most religious dervishes of the Safavid khalifas in Teke region (i.e. of Hasan Khalifa first, and after the death of his successor Şahkulu). This account is already analyzed in the present study while evaluating the rise of Shah Ismail. What is important for the present purpose is that the activities of the qizilbash of Teke region are presented as an extension of Ismail’s *hurūj* in the vision of Dede Muhammad. As was already analyzed the fifth-column activities of Anatolian sufis, including armed uprising, are represented by the dagger of Ismail, which was taken off of him and given to Dede Muhammed by the Hidden Imam, while Ismail’s *hurūj* was represented by a sword girded again by the Hidden Imam.

One subsequent but important detail deduced from this account is that Şahkulu was already actively leading the qizilbash population of the Teke region before the advent of Ismail; and he had certain connections with the center of the Order. Hasan Rumlu records an interesting detail: when Hasan Khalifa, upon the directive of Shaykh Haydar, arrived in the Teke region, the sufis of Sultan Haydar were in a meeting. One of them, namely Pīre Sinan announced the arrival of Hasan Khalifa; but he added, “He

¹²¹¹ Denison Ross interprets this *ablak* as a precious stone of some sort, probably of changing colors. See *Ross Anonymous*, p. 328, footnote, 6.

¹²¹² 1501-2.

¹²¹³ *Ross Anonymous*, p. 328.

brought a burning fire to Teke-ili.”¹²¹⁴ Then, continues Hasan Rumlu, God bestowed Şahkulu Baba to Hasan Khalifa, who used to spend winter among the tribe of Teke Yahırlu and the summer among the tribe of Tekermeşlu. HR also adds that since he demonstrated *keramet* or supernatural deeds, many people of the region became his adherents.¹²¹⁵

Ottoman sources sometimes refer to him pejoratively as *Şeytankulu*, literally ‘the slave of Satan’, or Karabıyık-oğlu¹²¹⁶, and unanimously relate to him as the son of Hasan Khalife. Ottoman sources clearly put that Hasan Khalifa and his son Şahkulu were deputies and propagandists of Safavid shaykhs in the Teke regions. Hasan Khalifa was engaged in mystical life and asceticism in a cave in Kızılkaya, near the village of Yalınlu in the province of Teke. His ascetic experiences and mysterious life extended his fame, thus, the influence of Safavid order. Some sources record, Hasan Khalifa’s fame became so wide-spread that Bayezid II sent him 6000-7000 *akças* annually.¹²¹⁷ He was a close disciple and khalifa of Shaykh Haydar and was commissioned to preach the Safavid ideals in the region.¹²¹⁸ Upon his death, Şahkulu succeeded his father’s spiritual post. Şahkulu also pursued an ascetic life in the same cave.¹²¹⁹

¹²¹⁴ HR, p. 157.

¹²¹⁵ HR, p. 158.

¹²¹⁶ ALI, p. 927; SLZ1, p. 445.

¹²¹⁷ TNSB, p. 248. ANMH states, in addition to annual money, Bayezid constructed an hospice for Şahkulu. See ANMH, p. 48. But this must be confusion with the famous Tekke of Abdal Musa in Elmalı since none of the other sources mention such a *tekke*.

¹²¹⁸ TNSB, p. 248.

¹²¹⁹ KPZ, for example, depicts Şahkulu as follows: “Şahkulu dimeğle ma’rûf mülhid ü müfsîd, ki Şâh-ı gümrâhun dâ’ilerinden mezheb-i bî-asl-ı Şi’âyî şâyi’ itmeğe Rûma gelen sâ’ilerindendi, Teke Etrâkiniün dike burun fittâklerinden Gazâl-oğlu ve Çakır-oğlu ve Ulema ve Kara Mahmûd nâm müfsîdler, ki fesâd pınarlarının başlarıydı, mezkûr Şahkulu ile ittifâk ve ‘ahd ü misâk itmişlerdi. Cem’iyetle hurûc idüb Şaha gideler, önlerine gelen ehl-i İslamla cidâl ü kitâl ideler. Bu kazîye vâki’ olıcak, birbirine haber idüb, ‘azîm cem’iyyet itdiler; civarlarında olan re’âyanun mâl u menâlin ve ehl ü ‘iyâlin kendülere mübâh bilüb bildükleri fesâdı idüb ziyâde şene’ât itdiler.” See KPZ8b, pp. 43-44. CLZ describes Şahkulu in a more pejorative manner, “...meğer zikr olunan Teke vilâyetinde bir bed-baht-ı ser-nigün, bir dalâlet-şi’ar müfsîd-i fesâd-meşhûn var imiş. İsmine Şeytankulu dirlermiş. Bir mağarada sâkin, tarîk-i şerre sâlik, bir

According to Hasan-ı Rumlu, Şahkulu rose up with the aim of going to the shah's realm.¹²²⁰ Ottoman sources, on the other hand, present a different picture. They all agree that Şahkulu arose not only with spiritual assurance but also with claims of temporal power as well.¹²²¹ 'Āli states, Şahkulu rose up with the claim that "I am the deputy of Shah Ismail, who is the owner of advent (*hurūc*). From now on the state and the sovereignty are mine!"¹²²² Solakzāde replicates 'Āli's account pertaining to Şahkulu affairs. But a small addition in his work is of utmost importance in order to envisage the mentality of rebellious sufis. To him, Şahkulu said to his adherents, "It is inspired to me from saintly persons [to raise the banner of revolt]. I am the deputy of Shah Ismail!"¹²²³ 'Āli also describes Şahkulu as a 'qizilbash khalifa' and a 'great unbeliever (*mülhid*)'.¹²²⁴ Müneccimbaşı also deems him unbeliever (*zındık-mülhid*).¹²²⁵

'Āli's account runs,

Bināen 'alā zālik Teke sancağından Elmalu nām karyede sākin ser-keşler ve gümrāhlar içinde Karabıyık Oğlı diyū hīle-ver biri müte'ayyin, sūret-i salāhda Şeyh nāmına mezkūr, sorhlı ashāb-ı fesād u şürūr olan bed-baht, nedir ki, 'Ben sāhibzuhūr olan Şah İsmā'ıl bin Haydar'ın helifesiyyem' diyū hurūc eyledi.

kūh-sār-ı mezellet-medārda mutavattın, hazīne-i fesāda mālİK imiş..." CLZ, p. 120. ALI gives his name as Karabıyık Oğlı and states he was living in Elmalı, a village near Teke. ALI, p. 927. ALI, just like other Ottoman court historians, pursues quite negative attitude on Şahkulu. To him Şahkulu was a khalifa of Ismail and unbeliever: "*kızılbaş halifesi nāmındaki mülhid-i a'zām*"; and his followers were rebels: "*tāife-i bāğīye*". See ALI, p. 928. Also regard SLZ, p. 445; MNB, p. 427. MNB uses the word 'zındık', the man who divorced from the faith, for Şahkulu.

¹²²⁰ HR, p. 154.

¹²²¹ CLZ writes, for example, "...Şehzādelerin harekātı ve inkılaplarını işidüb, görür ki, memleket hāli hāris yok, meydān-ı saltanatta kimesne görünmez, fāris yoki tabi'atında şehriyārlık tama'ları gālib görünür. Tavakkuf itmeyüb, hemān havālisinde vāki' olan erbāb-ı fesādla kalkub hurūc eyledi. Rāyāt-ı şeytanı kadrub, a'lām-ı iblīs-i pür-telbīs-i āşikār eyledi..." CLZ, p. 120.

¹²²² "Ben sāhibzuhūr olan Şah İsmā'ıl bin Haydar'ın helifesiyyem. Min ba'd devlet ü saltanat benimdür." See ALI, p. 927.

¹²²³ "Bana erenlerden işaret olmuştur. Hālā ortaya çıkmış olan Şah İsmail'in halifesiyyim!". See SLZ1, p. 445.

¹²²⁴ ALI, p. 928. For similar depictions also consider SLZ1, p.446; Hadîdî, *Tevārih-i Āl-i Osman (1299-1523)*, haz. Necdet Öztürk, İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991, pp. 359-62.

¹²²⁵ MNB, p. 427, 428. For the meaning of these terms in the Ottoman context see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Türk Heterodoksi Tarihinde 'Zındık'-'Hāricî'-'Rāfızî'-'Mülhid' ve 'Ehl-i Bidat' Terimlerine dair Bazı Düşünceler", *TED*, XII, 1981-2, 507-20; *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-16. Yüzyıllar)*, 3. baskı, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003, pp. 6-15.

‘Ale’l-fevr niçe bin gümrāhı başına cem’ idüb, ‘Min ba’d devlet ü saltanat benimdür’ diyü söyledi.

Nazm:

Oldı ashāb-ı fesādāta imām
Didi ‘Hep birdurur helāl ü haram’
Gāret itdi her diyārı bī-hisāb
Köyleri kıldı harāb ender-harāb
Didi ‘cāhil kavlidir fi’l-i nikāh!’
Oldı her ‘avret rıza ile mübāh.’¹²²⁶

During the early phases of the rebellion an official inspector reported to the Porte that they (rebels) were spoiling the properties of Muslims, killing them without regarding whether those they kill are children or women, setting fire to villages and towns. The inspector also recorded, the rebels were preaching among people, “the Shah himself also will come by ‘the time of peach’¹²²⁷, from now on the country is our.”¹²²⁸ The unknown reporter calls special attention to the inconsistent attitudes of Şahkulu regarding his own status: ‘In one instance he claims to be the Mahdi himself, while in another instance he says ‘the Shah died and his country became mine, the country is mine’. Still on some other occasions he says ‘I will die in few days, the country is mine’.’¹²²⁹ Prince Osman, on the other hand, portrays him as pretending to be Mahdi, who claimed “from now on the country is our”.¹²³⁰

Haniwaldanus Anonym’s account is rather interesting in this respect. According to *Haniwaldanus Anonym*, One day Şahkulu gathered his disciples and uttered to them a

¹²²⁶ ALI, p. 927. SLZ repeats ALI’s account on this affair. See SLZ1, p. 445.

¹²²⁷ The time when peaches mature, which roughly corresponds to early summer. Remembering that the rebellion started in early April the rebels seem to have moved with the hope of meeting their shah at the end of their movement.

¹²²⁸ “...Cemi’ ‘alem halkına avāze yapmışlardır ki zerdalu vakdında Şah da gelse gerekdir. Memleket bizindür deyü mühmelat söylerler...” TSA, document E. 6187.

¹²²⁹ “...Gāh mehdilik davasın eder gāh Şah öldü ānın vilāyeti bana değdi memleket benimdir der. Gāh birkaç günlük ömrüm vardır memleket benimdir deyu birbirine muhalif kelimat eder...” TSA, document E. 6187.

¹²³⁰ “...Varub Teke’nin tamam kaydın gördükden sonra mezkūr bedbaht mehdilik davasın edüb bundan sonra memleket bizindür deyu da’va edüb andan göçüb Hamid sancağına duhül edüb...” TSA, document E 2829.

sermon. During his sermon the shaykh argued, the days of Ottomans that were granted to them by the fate were about to finish; they could not rule the people forever; a great revolution, at the end of which the sovereignty of the world would be given to him, was about to occur; a sword would be given to him from the heavens and he would secure the obedience of all people with this sword; and finally it was time for him to declare this good news (*müjde*). He also asserted that from then on the number of his adherents would not decrease but augment; they would present their obedience with their own will.¹²³¹

Haniwaldanus Anonym reports, after declaring these ‘crazy’ ideas his disciples further motivated Şahkulu by assuring him that all people would follow him with great pleasure. Then Şahkulu ordered his disciples to gather people in the following festival (*panayır*). His speech in this festival, as reported in *Haniwaldanus Anonym*, is of utmost importance for discovering the ideology of the rebellion and the socio-psychological orientation of the adherents, even if does not reflect historical reality. Şahkulu said,

I have invited you to this gathering because I wished you to hear from my mouth that the bliss (*saadet*) that was bestowed to Ottomans by the God had diminished. Now their fortune is finished, and we will sooner see great changes. Sultan Bayezid is lying like a trunk because of his illness and could not use his organs efficiently. His sons, as contrary to the traditional ‘love of brothers’ (*kardeş sevgisi*), are nourishing enmity one another. The power of the state is weakened because of strife and civil war. Their rule can no longer prolong. The God gave me a sword from the heavens in order to found a new state. Because of that come and follow me as your ruler! I will provide you wealth and peace and make you happy.¹²³²

Of course, this passage from *Haniwaldanus Anonym* does not give us the proper historical event. But the governing idea of the narration pertaining to the claims of Şahkulu must be regarded seriously. Şahkulu obviously presented himself as the

¹²³¹ ANMH, p. 48.

¹²³² ANMH, p. 49. (Translation is mine)

legitimate heir of the suzerainty predestined by God. His claims were not limited to temporal power, but he also claimed divine support. Thus his adherents attributed to him supernatural power, which was reinforced by successive victories over Ottoman armies, as well. The letter of the *qādi* of Antalya includes further extreme claims. The *qādi* mentions a disciple of Şahkulu called Salih Fakih who preached among people “he (Şahkulu) is God; he is Prophet; and the resurrection will occur in front of him; those who do not obey him will pass away without faith.”¹²³³

Indeed, even the descriptions of Ottoman reporters and historians occasionally reflect his spiritual influence over the folk. An inspector says, although his soldiers are rather poor and disregarded he managed to save himself from each assault of the Ottoman soldiers; we do not know whether he is acquainted with magic or ability to control *jinn*s.¹²³⁴ Kemalpaşazāde’s account on the end of Şahkulu during the battle with Ali Pasha also follows a similar manner: “...He disappeared in the battlefield; nobody knew whether the ground opened and he fell in or he ascended to the sky!”¹²³⁵

6.2.2. The Organization of the Rebellion

A close examination of the sources unveils that, in the 1510s, the qizilbash society of Anatolia was already remarkably organized and well-communicated with each other. The architects of this web of communication and socio-religious organization were khalifas

¹²³³ “...Subaşı Hasan bendenüz gönderilüb mezkur Şahkulu ele girmeyüb musahiblerinden yirmi nefer kimesne ele girüb tutulub habs olundu. Zikr olunan mahpuslardan Salih Fakih nām kimesne mezkur Şahkulu için halka telkin edüb haşa Allah budur ve Peygamber budur ve sūr-ı hesab bunun önünde olsa gerekdür. Buna itaat etmeyen imansız gider dedüğü bi-hasebişşer sābit olub salbolundu...” TSA, document E 632.

¹²³⁴ “...Amma bilmeyüz ki sihri mi vardur teshir-i cin mi bilür her ne defada ādem sıymış ise uğraş olmadan sıyub kaçmışdır...” TSA, document E. 6187.

¹²³⁵ “...Mezkūr paşa düşecek Şeytan Kulu didikleri müfsid-pelid cenk içinde nā-bedid oldu, yer delindi yere mi girdi, göğe mü çıktı, kimse bilmedi...” KPZ8b, p. 55.

of the Order. One feels legitimized in supposing that the success of the qizilbash resistance against severe Ottoman pressure came from the clandestine socio-religious organization of the society, whose religious institutions were, at least in terms of their principal basis, already structured.

A careful analysis of the sources makes it clear that this was not simply a social explosion resulting from discontent of a social segment. Rather it rested on a well-organized social body, which had both ideological principals and the ability to move coherently. Ottoman archival sources occasionally mention meetings of Şahkulu with his adherents shortly before the rebellion. He appeared, indeed, as the foremost representative of the Safavid Order in Anatolia and clandestinely organized the qizilbash opposition against the Ottoman government.¹²³⁶

Archival evidence clearly points out that the Safavid disciples of the region were organized under the leadership of Şahkulu, who was also the khalifa of the order. The *qādi* of Antalya¹²³⁷ underscores that Şahkulu did not behave like a mystical guide but like a political leader. He assembled a council (*divan*), which was among foremost indications of being a temporal leader, and attempted to grasp the suzerainty. His political ambitions, however, were not overlooked by state agents. The Subaşı, the person who was responsible for the public security, of Antalya attacked them, captured 20 adherents of the rebellion, but missed Şahkulu.

¹²³⁶ A letter from the *qādi* of Antalya to Prince Korkud, dated May 29, 1511, reads: "... Şimdiki hâlde bu diyarda olan Erdebil halifelerinden Hasan Halife nâm kimesnenin Şahkulu nâm bir oğlu zuhur bulunub Antalya'da Dervenbaşı(?) nâm menzilde temekkün edüb ve bu diyarda olan Erdebil halkı ona etba' edüb emirâne bir 'âli divanhâne ve evler ve matbah yapuverüb ittifakla memlekete hükmetmeğe kast eyleyecek Subaşı Hasan bendenüz gönderilüb mezkur Şahkulu ele girmeyüb musahiblerinden yirmi nefer kimesne ele girüb tutulub habs olundu." TSA, document E. 632.

¹²³⁷ See above-footnote.

Another document¹²³⁸, which is the interrogation report of a sufi captured and sent by Korkud, sheds light on the preparations of the rebellion and on social groups who supported it. The interrogated sufi testified that when Korkud left Antalya they said, “The country is now empty, let’s seize it!” and they summoned in Döşeme Dervendi near Kapulukaya. After staying there for three or four days they dispersed into the region in order to procure arms and food. According to the testimony of this sufi, the most close assistants of Şahkulu were certainly Dede Ali and Hızır. Upon the inspector’s question “since when do they know each other?”, the sufi replied while Sultan Korkud was in his province. This testimony clearly supports the fact that the leaders of the rebellion had already known each other and moved collectively before 1509, when Korkud left his province. Indeed, a careful reading of the contemporary sources suggests that the roots of this movement in some sense traces back to the second half of the fifteenth century.

Another document sheds further light on the clandestine organization of qizilbashes in the Ottoman realm. This is a report written by the *sancakbey* of Filibe to the Porte. The governor of Filibe snatched one of the spies dispatched by Şahkulu and reported the information provided by this spy, Pir Ahmed, to the Porte.¹²³⁹

¹²³⁸ “Sultan Korkud tãle bakãhudan gelen sofinun kable’l-örf ettiüğü ikrãrın beyanıdır ki zikr olunur. Memleket hãlidir fırsat bizimdir gelin cemi’ memleketi zabt idelim; yürüdüler. Kapulukaya’da Döşeme Dervendinde cem’ olub dört beş gün oturdular. Sonra etrafa dağılub yarağa ve azığa mukayyed oldular.... Yanında gãyet mukarribleri kimlerdir? diyecek, Dede Alisi ve Hızır nãm kimesnelerdir. Ne kadar zamandır bunlar tanışık ederler? diyecek dahi, Sultan Korkud tãle bakãhu sancağında iken.” TSA, document E. 5035. Another document, which was also a testimony of sufi spy, gives names of two other close men (*mukarrib-yarar âdem*) of Şahkulu as Sefer and İmamoğlu. “Ve Şahkulu Antalya kurbunda Yalunlu nãm karyenin yanında bir mağara olurdu. Ve mevlüdu de o karyede idi. Ve sen orada iken Şahkulunun yarar ademisi kimler idi diyecek, biri Sefer ve biri İmamoğlu nãm kimesnelerdir.” See TSA, document E. 6636. This report was the testimony of a spy snatched in Filibe.

¹²³⁹ The full text of the document reads, “Filibe Sancağı beyi Sofu Şahkulu’nun casusu Pir Ahmed nãmın etdüğü ikrarın beyanıdır ki zikr olunur: ...Ve sen Şahkulu’nun yanından ne vakit gittin deyu sual olıcak geçen yılın Safer ayında gittim. Kaç kişiydiniz deyu sual olıcak dört kişiydik dedi. Her birimize yirmişer kãğıt verdi. Ol kimesnelerin adları nedür diyecek: Biri Sefer ve biri İmamoğlu ve biri Taceddin ve biri dahî mezkur Pir Ahmed. Ve bunlar nereye vardı diyecek Hızır Serez’e vardı, İmamoğlu Selanik’e vardı, ve Taceddin Zağra Yenicesi’ne vardı. Mezkur Pir Ahmed Filibe’de İmaret mahallesinde Kara Habib nãm

We learn from this document that Şahkulu dispatched spies even to Rumelian provinces to organize Safavid sympathizers.¹²⁴⁰ There was a concrete communication and connection between qizilbash communities living in different parts of the empire. According to the testimony of the spy recorded in the aforementioned document, he visited Şahkulu in Safer 916 / May-June 1510, approximately one year before the outbreak of the rebellion in Teke.¹²⁴¹ And he was not alone in this visit, but there were three other spies as well. Pir Ahmed gives the names of his comrades: Sefer, İmamoğlu, and Taceddin. The statements of arrested spies, however, indicate that they were also commissioned with the same mission.

The whole testimony does not include any indication of rebellion, or preparation for a rebellion. Meanwhile, a close examination suggests that to prepare the society for an upcoming rebellion was at least part of their mission. Pir Ahmet admits that Şahkulu delivered twenty papers to each of the four spies addressed to the well-known – by Şahkulu - khalifas of the Safavid order.

A closer scrutiny of the whole testimony suggests that the principal mission of the spies was to deliver Şahkulu's 'papers' to the addressed khalifas.¹²⁴² Pir Ahmed's

halifeye kâğıt verdi. Mezkur Kara Habib imaret-i mezkûrede himem ve müstaidir. Ve Sofya'da Taceddin ve Şuca ve Şeyh Çelebi ve mezkûrun imamı Muhiddin halifelere kağıtlar verdüm. Ercanlı halifeye kâğıt verdüm. Ve esbâbım ve bazı kâğıtların Ercanlı Halifede emanet kodum. Ve Dice nahiyesinde Rasullü nam karyede alaybeyi Yusuf bin Mehmed ve ve Ethemî Mehmed nâm halifelere kâğıtlar verdüm. Ve Yalınacak nâm karyede timar eri İlyas Halifeye kâğıt verdüm. Ve Pörtlü (Pirenli?) nâm karyenin imamı Muhyiddin nâm halifeye kâğıt verdüm.” TSA, document E. 6636. The transcribed text of the document first published in ULCY1, pp. 62-63, footnote, 12; The facsimile copy of the document was later published by Şahabettin Tekindağ. See Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı”, *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 3, Aralık 1967, p. 36.

¹²⁴⁰ However, Rumelian disciples could not participate in the revolt or support it. As Uluçay put forward, the reason should have been Selim's existence in Rumelia during this time. See ULCY1, p. 63.

¹²⁴¹ The document is, indeed, undated. But the course of events mentioned in the document suggests that it must be sent to the Porte during the rebellion, i. e. in early 917 / March 1511. Moving from this supposition I felt legitimized in dating the visit of Pir Ahmed to Şahkulu as Safer of 916.

¹²⁴² Hızır went to Serez, İmamoğlu to Selânik, and Taceddin to Zağra Yenicesi in order to deliver the papers. Pir Ahmed gives further details pertaining to his own itinerary. He first visited Khalifa Kara Habib

testimony unveils a fact: Şahkulu was not simply one of the khalifas spread over all the empire but the one superior to other khalifas, at least to those khalifas in certain parts of the Ottoman Empire. One may surmise that the ‘papers’ he dispatched to several khalifas in Rumelia must have been pamphlets written in the aim of teaching pillars of the spiritual path and instructing what to do.

One might reasonably infer that Pir Ahmed was only one of many sufi spies circulating in the Ottoman realm. Accordingly his activities recorded in this document are simply a cross section of the clandestine qizilbash organization. It would not be wrong to assume that the agitation of Safavid khalifas in both Anatolia and Rumelia had already been wide-spread and intensified at the threshold of the sixteenth-century. As some sources - though being scarce – imply, this propaganda was not fruitless; rather it was met by a great audience. The Safavid propaganda achieved considerable success in Rumelia as well as in Anatolia. An account in *Haniwaldanus Anonym*, which is totally absent in other chronicles envisages that the khalifas had already created an organized - even armed - society, which was considerably immune to the interference of the Ottoman administration. It is written in *Haniwaldanus Anonym* that in Dobruca so many weapons were found that could arm whole people of the region in case of any rebellion. These weapons were sent by those men who called themselves ‘şeyh’¹²⁴³ in order to arm people when the arrival of Shah Ismail who would according to the propaganda of

(Ceyib) in the district of İmāret in Filibe and handed over ‘paper’ to him. He then proceeded to Sofya, where he visited Tāceddin Khalifa, Şuca Khalifa, Şeyh Çelebi Khalifa, and Muhyiddin Khalifa, delivering papers to them. He then gave papers to Ercanlı Khalifa, whose accommodation is not clear. Pir Ahmed put some of his clothes and papers in trust of Ercanlı Khalifa and moved to his next destinations: Alaybeyi Yusuf the son of Mehmed, and Ethemī Mehmed in the village of Resullu of the nāhiye of Dicle, İlyas Khalifa in the village of Yalınacak, and finally in the village of Pörtlü (Pirenli) Muhyiddin Khalifa, who was the *imam* of the village.

¹²⁴³ Evidently refers to khalifas of the Safavid Order.

khalifas, launch a campaign on Ottoman lands, was heard. By propagating such ideas they (*şeyhs*) won the crowd and prepared the weapons for a rebellion.¹²⁴⁴

The anonymous history does not specify the date. In the meantime, one might convincingly infer from the context that it must be sometime in the early years of the sixteenth century. The event is mentioned just after the qizilbash deportation in 1502-3, and before the appointment of Suleyman, son of Selim, to Kefe, in 1509. So, if relied on *Haniwaldanus Anonym*, Safavid khalifas, most of whom were working under the direction of Şahkulu as indicated above, had already started the preparation for an upcoming rebellion a couple of years before the famous Şahkulu revolt. As obviously put forward by our anonymous author, the propaganda of khalifas aimed to prepare the community to help Ismail when he marched on the Ottomans.

With the available evidence at hand, it is not possible to determine whether or not Ismail ever intended to invade Ottoman territories; but what is known is that he never attempted to engage such an adventure. Nonetheless, whatever his intention may have been, it is obvious from the above-mentioned evidence, and from some other sources, that his deputies (*halife*) were propagating among disciples in Anatolia and Rumelia that the Shah would arrive soon and deliver them from the oppressing Ottoman power; and they should have been ready to bear arms and stand up when the time came. Needless to say, this propaganda kept the motivation of the qizilbash mass alive. As all sources agreed on, when Şahkulu revolted in Teke, his supporters from several regions

¹²⁴⁴ “...Dobruca ...ovasında bir ayaklanmada çabucak bütün halkı silâhlendirilecek sayıda kılıç bulundu. Bunları, her yerde Osmanlı tebaasını, Şah İsmail’in varış haberini alır almaz ona yardım etmek üzere, silâhlendirmalı yolunda kendilerini şeyh diye adlandıran adamlar gönderdi; çünkü Şah İsmail yakınlarda bir sefer düzenleyerek Osmanlı ülkelerini hâkimiyetleri altına alacaktı. Böylece onlar vaadleri üzerine halkı kendi yanlarına aldılar ve silâhların her an hazır tuttuğu bir depo meydana getirdiler.” ANMH, p. 46.

of Anatolia, especially from western and southern Anatolia, outnumbered some tens of thousands.¹²⁴⁵

6.2.3. *Sipāhis* in the Rebellion

Contemporary sources leave no doubt that not only tribal people but also villagers, townspeople, some literati, and even some Ottoman officials took part in the qizilbash uprisings in the period between the years of 1510 and 1514. As a matter of fact, our sources describe the disciples of Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, and Shah Ismail (until his rise to power) almost exclusively as tribal people.¹²⁴⁶ However, as long as the uprisings of the Anatolian qizilbashes, which were closely interconnected with the power struggle within the Ottoman Empire, are concerned the sources frequently mention settled subjects and some members of the *askerī* class among qizilbash ranks.¹²⁴⁷ As will be delineated in the next chapter, the number of non-tribal people in the qizilbash movement considerably increases in the Province of Rum, which had been governed by Prince Ahmed. Although not totally rejecting the existence of sincere qizilbash adherents among villagers and townspeople, this thesis inclines to interpret the support provided by *askerīs* such as *sipāhi* and *qādi* to the qizilbash movement within

¹²⁴⁵ Idris-i Bitlisī gives the number of rebels 20.000. See IDRS, p. 87.

¹²⁴⁶ This issue is already discussed in detail in Chapter IV and Chapter V.

¹²⁴⁷ To give an example, the profession of the khalifas whom Pir Ahmed, the spy of Şahkulu, delivered ‘papers’ are as follows:

Kara Habīb in the district of Imāret (*Imāret mahallesī*) in Filibe: staff of the *imāret* in the mentioned district.

Muhyiddin Khalifa in Sofya: *imām*, the man who leads the public prayer in *cāmi*, and religious head of district or village.

Yusuf son of Mehmed in the village of Rasullu: *alaybeyi*, an officer in Ottoman military system.

Ilyas Khalifa in the village of Yanacak: *timar eri*,

Muhyiddin in the village of Pörtlü: *imām* of the village. TSA, document E. 6636.

the framework of the Ottoman domestic politics, rather than religious or ideological affiliation.

It has been shown that the corruption within the Ottoman administration towards the end of Bayezid II's reign is severely criticized by *Selimmāme*¹²⁴⁸ authors. The criticism, however, is usually pointed towards the viziers and other high bureaucrats, whom Bayezid II entrusted the state affairs because of his tiresome health condition.¹²⁴⁹ A contemporary source states, for example, that Bayezid, in his last years, pursued a religious life and entrusted the state to the viziers. Therefore, he was not aware of the state of affairs of his subjects.¹²⁵⁰ Then the unknown author points his condemnation

¹²⁴⁸ Selim's acquisition of the throne by force from his father was an unprecedented event in the Ottoman history and contradictory to the tradition. Thus, during his reign to justify and to legitimize his usurpation became foremost issue of the Ottoman ideology makers. It is because of that so many histories dedicated to the eight-year reign of Selim were written. This special genre within Ottoman historiography is generally called '*Selimmāme*'.

¹²⁴⁹ "*Hakān-ı sa'īd merhūm Sultan Bāyezid'ün müddet-i hizmeti, ki otuz iki yıldır, ihtimāma karīb oldı, vücūd-ı şerifini, ki merkez-i dā'ire-i hilm ü cüddür, cünūd-ı 'ilel her cānibden ortaya aldı, dest-i takdir pençe-i tedbirin burup, (ayak) zahmeti huzūrın uçurub nikris zahmeti, ki maraz-ı mevrüsiydi, hudūs bulmuş, mizācına tamam müstevli olmuşdı....Ol sebepten cihangirlik rikābından ayak çeküb, 'inān-ı 'ālem-sitāni elden komışdı, büm-ı Rūmda husūm-ı kudūmla nerd-i neberdi gāyibāne oynayub bis 'āt-ı pür-nesāti rezmün temāşāsından göz yummuş, el yumışdı. Ol sebepten sarsar-ı neket-eser-i sūr u şeş-cihāt-ı heft-kışver toldı; huffāş gibi müstetir olub, büm-ı şum gibi bir bucağa baş sokub, zalām-ı şām-ı fitne büm-ı Rūmı kaçan tutar diyu muntazır olub, cerād-vār etrāf-ı bilāda münteşir oldı...*" KPZ8b, pp. 38-9. Celalzāde follows the same line of argument. But a unique account of him is worth to state here. He argues Bayezid entrusted high state posts – without regarding whether or not they merited – to the bureaucrats who were his retinue while he was prince in Amasya. His account reads, "...merhūmun mizācında nev'-i fütür, i'tidāl-i tabī'atda kusur olmağın, ahvāl-i memlekete kasd ü şu'ūra iltifay itmeyüb, giderek āşstane-i sa'ādetde vezārete istihkāk mülāhazası metrük olub, Amassıyya'da şehzāde iken içeru hizmetlerinde olan ba'zı bendelerini tizcek mertebe-i bālāya irişdirüb, vezür, tāyife-i tavāşiden ba'zını dahī serir-i sadārete getürüb, müşir-i sahib-i tedbir eylediler. Sarayda perverde olmuş hālī zihnlere, merāsım-i saltanatda 'āmiller üslüb-ı hilāfetde kem-nāmiler, tedābir-i umūrda kāsru'l-'ukül kalīlu'l-fühüm, ārā-i intizām-ı mülkde za'ifü'l-kuüb ve nahifü'l-ulüm kimesneler, serir-i vezāretde hüküm-pezir ve kezā-te'sir oldılar..." CLZ, p. 95. On this issue also consider MNB, p. 428.

¹²⁵⁰ "*Çün Hazret-i Pādişāh-ı hilāfet-penāh 'inān-ı ihtiyārdan makām-ı vezāretde olan bir niçe bedgirdārların eline virub kendüler zühd ü salāhı kem-nişin idinüb serir-ı ferāgatde 'uzlet-güzin olmuşlardır. Vüzerā-i K.ejranın kemāl-i intikāmlarına hüsn-i i'tikādları ve i'timād-ı küllileri müte'allık oldığı ecilden kendüler re'iyet ahvālince bī-nefsihī mübāşir değillerdiler. 'Ale'l-husūs mübārel mizaçlarında vāki' olan ihtilāl sebebi infī'al olmağın memleket bunların sū-i tedbirleriyle halel-pezir olduğına nāzır olmazdı. Zikrolan vüzerā Sāmānilerun sebebi zevāl-i saltanat-ı kahiresinden, ki ünvan-ı müsibet-nāme-i rüzgārdır, bi'l-kālliyeye gāfillerdiler.*" ANMB, pp. 173-174. HSE repeats same claim. See HSE4, pp. 43-4.

towards high bureaucrats, especially towards viziers.¹²⁵¹ He argues, they were neither respecting nor protecting the rights of the subjects. So the distance between the ‘right’ (*hak*) and those who deserved it became as much as the distance between horizons. Those who had neither virtue nor merit lived a prosperous and comfortable life while the men of virtue and merit fell into poverty. To him, this was because of the fact that the viziers were devoid of virtue by nature. They were so greedy and overly fond of money that they even appropriated *waqf* properties, which was completely contrary to the religious law.¹²⁵²

Celalzāde, in his analysis on the reasons why so many Ottoman subjects adhered to the cause of Ismail, and to the Şahkulu rebellion, calls attention to the corruption within bureaucrats and in the allocation of *timars*.¹²⁵³ He underscores that those who merited *timar* could not attain the post (*dirlik*), but they were allocated according to the bribe offered.¹²⁵⁴ *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman* repeats the same: “It was out of possibility to receive a *timar* without offering enough bribes. *Sipâhis* got sick with this

¹²⁵¹ Another contemporary source runs as follows: “*Hüdâvendigâr hazretlerinin mizâc-ı latîfî’l-îmtizâçlarında nev’an tegayyür bulunub muhtâc-ı ilâç olmağın birkaç eyyâm taşra çıkmayub zabt-ı memâliki erkân-ı devlet uhdesine tevfiż buyurmuşlardı. Anlar dahî umûr-ı saltanatı kendü arzu vü nefisleri içün vaz’ olunmuş sanub cem’-i mâle düşüb tekayyüd-i ahvâli mülkiyyede ihmalleri olmağla reâya pâymâl ve memleket ehl-i perişan-hâl olmuşlardı...*” *Vekâyi-i Sultan Bâyezit ve Selim Han*, p. 40, cited in TNSB, p. 247, footnote 110.

¹²⁵² “*Hukûk-ı nâş ri’âyeti şanlarında yoğidi. Hakla müstehâk arasında tûl-i mesafe-i bu’du’l-meşrakayn vâki’ olmuşdı. Cemi’ erbâb-ı fazl ü kemâl dest-i vekâyile pây-mâl ve kamû iskât ve erzâl huzûr-ı kalble müreffetü’l-hâl idi. Cibilliyetlerinde rezâlet-i nefis ve denâet-i tab’ merkûz idi. Hutâm-ı dünya-yı denîyyeye cân u dilden rağiblerdi. İsticlâb-ı mâlî bir vechile hâl idinmişlerdi ki mâl ü mülk mevrûs-ı eytâmün elinde kendüler cânibinden emânet idi. Şer’ile vakfiyyeti sâbit olduğına ehl-i vukûfun nihâyeti olmayan yerleri temellük itmekte tevakkuf çekmezlerdi.*” ANMB, p. 174. For similar arguments see HSE4, p. 44.

¹²⁵³ “*...Adalet ü nısfet umûri matrûh, irtişâ vü nisbet ve ta’assup kapuları meftûh, tîğ ü tîr-i cevr ü ‘udvân ile re’fet ve şefkat escâmını merz ve mecrûh eylediler...*” CLZ, p. 96.

¹²⁵⁴ “*...Kadîmden âli mansıplar şeca’at-medâr, şehâmet-şi’âr olan yarar ve şîr-merd merd-i dilîr olanlara tevcih olunagelmîş iken, ol etvâr ve kâ’ide metrûk olub, her Türk sipâhi ve emîr, kanda bir bedbaht ve şakî ve gümrâh var ise, ehl-i kadr ve sâhib-i tedbîr oldı. Denîler her mahalleye kedhudâ küştenîler her vilâyete mutasarrıf ve râfi’ü’l-livâ oldılar.*” CLZ, pp. 96-97. Consider also MNB, p. 428.

disease and fell devoid of *timar*.”¹²⁵⁵ Celalzāde also puts a special emphasis on unjust favoritism toward *kuls* (slaves). He argues that the Porte allocated *timars* to *kuls* without regarding whether they merited it while ‘sons of people’ (*merdūm-zāde*) were deprived of *timars*.¹²⁵⁶

Celalzāde puts special emphasis on the fact that the rules of *timar* distribution in the provinces of Anatolia, Karaman, and Rum had been well-determined. According to these rules a vacant *timar* must have been allocated to other merited ones. And the merit to *timar* had been according to the merit to sword; bribery had never interfered in *timar* allocation system. In order to get a *timar* one had to show outstanding performance during battles. But during the last years of Bayezid, these good practices were all abandoned and corruption infected every state affair. In a similar vein, those who deserved *timars* with their achievements in battles were removed from posts while those who offered enough bribe attained good positions.¹²⁵⁷

According to Celalzāde, Ismail used the situation for his purpose and gained discontent, dismissed *timariots* to his cause. Upon his advent those dismissed *timariots*, who totally lost their hope to obtain posts within the Ottoman system, turned their attention towards Persia. Meanwhile, Ismail’s khalifas were constantly propagating how much of a just ruler he was and how he granted posts (*dirlik*) to those who deserved.

¹²⁵⁵ “Rüşvet virüb bezl-i māl itmeyince bir mansıb ehline düşmek muhal idi. Sipāhi tāifesi bu derdile bīmār olub timardan kalmışlardı.” ANMB, p. 174.

¹²⁵⁶ CLZ, pp. 101-102.

¹²⁵⁷ “...Ol devirde bu üslüb ve tarîk külliyyen ferāmüş olunub, timarlar bāzār-ı irtişāda mezāda çıkub bī’men yezîd olunur oldu. Tavîla tavîla esb ü esterler, katār katār mâyeler ve üstür-nerler virilmeyince timardan behre-ver olmazlardı. Timara müstehak ve yarar olan bahādır ve dilāverlerin yanlarında ismi havāric ve ecnebî olub timar virmezlerdi. Ol ecilden zikr olunan vilāyetlerde sipāh ahvāli mükedder olub, muhannesler hüsn-i iltifāt ile derecāt-ı ‘ulyāya su’ūd itdiler.” CLZ, pp. 97-8. As indicated several times one should be careful while reading Celalzāde and other *Selimnāme* authors on Bayezid’s period, for they were certainly inclined to exaggerate the corruption in the administrative system in order to prepare a legitimate base for Selim’s dismissal of his father. Even so, these accounts potentially reflect some truth as well.

Thus many members of the Ottoman military, who did not have the opportunity to get a post, tended to become attached somehow to the qizilbash movement, even if they were not qizilbash by heart.¹²⁵⁸

A parallel account of Kemalpaşazāde is already demarcated above. Hoca Saadeddin also calls attention to how unjust administration of the Porte shifted *sipāhis* to vagrancy.¹²⁵⁹ *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*'s account follows a similar line of argument. The discontent *sipāhis*, who were valuable for the military power of the empire, joined qizilbashes since they entirely lost their hope of achieving posts according to merit within the Ottoman system. They gathered under the leadership of Şahkulu. *Anonim Tevârih-i Al-i Osman* demarcates that with the support of discontent *sipāhis*, the turmoil overflowed.¹²⁶⁰

The testimony of the sufi sent by Korkud evidently reveals that some *sipāhis* were among the foremost supporters of the rebellion. When he was asked, "From *sipāhis*, who were attended by him at the beginning?", the sufi answered, "They were

¹²⁵⁸ Celalzāde writes, "... *Vilāyet-i Acemde Kızılbaş ta'ifesi zuhūr idüb, Akkoyunlunun re'âyaya sitem ve zulm idenleri cümle kırılıb, Anadolu cāniblerin ba'zı yerlerinden tā'ife-i Kızılbaşa varmış ādemler olub, bu memlekette vāki' olan mezālīm ve mehāyifi işidüb, akvām u akrabasına haber gönderüb 'ol tā'ife ra'iyete adl idüb ve dirliği yarar ve şir-merde virürler' deyu bildirmeğin Rum halkının ekseri ol cānibe meyl idüb yer yer 'Aceme mektublar ve kâğıtlar gönderüb fesāda mübāşeret etdüklerini...*" CLZ, p. 101. The corruption in administration and debility of the Porte against qizilbash peril became foremost tools of *Selinnāme* authors in order to legitimize Selim's usurpation. It would not be adequate, however, totally discredit their point in this issue. Selim seems to have successfully used the administrative deficiency to gain discontent military classes to his ranks. The issue is further evaluated in related chapter of this thesis.

¹²⁵⁹ "Ülkeyi derleyip toplama odaklarına el koymuş bulunanların soyguncu ellerini halkın mallarına uzatmaları, rüşvet kapılarını açmaları sonunda timar sahiplerinin çoğu timarsızlıkla dermansız kalmış ve boş umutlarla kapı aşındırmadan canlarından bezmiş, yaşamlarından bıkmışlardı. Bunlar karınlarını doyurabilmek için türlü türlü düzenler kurmaya zorlanmışlardı. Bu nedenlerle nicesi yol kesen yaramaz çetelere yoldaş olup onları güçlendirmişler, vardıkça baş gösteren fesādın genişlemesine destek olmuşlardı." HSE4, p. 44. Also regard MNB, p. 428.

¹²⁶⁰ "Tevâtür-i ālām-ı rüzgārla bir niçesi (of *sipāhis*) cihādan bızār olub varub ol müfşidlere mülhāk olmala madde-i fesād hadden ziyāde olmuşdı. İçlerinden Şahkulu dimekle müsemmā bir mec'ülī Kızılbaş-eybāş kendülere baş idinmişlerdi. Cādde-i itāatden çıkub tarīk-i dalālete sābit-kadem olmağla mu'āhede eyleyüb cem'isi fitne vü fesāda el-bir itmışlerdi." ANMB, p. 174.

Kızıloğlu, Köleoğlu, Mehmed Bey, and three individuals from Çakıroğlanları.”¹²⁶¹ The testimony of Pir Ahmed also underpins this argument. As mentioned above, one of the khalifes whom Pir Ahmed delivered the papers of Şahkulu was *alaybeyi*, the other being *timar-eri*. There is further archival evidence, which indicates some *sipāhis*’ participation in the rebellion, as well. An undated report written to the Porte by an inspector, who was commissioned to investigate the reasons and the progress of the rebellion, does not only ratify the argument but also uncovers the incentives of these *sipāhis* to participate in the rebellion.¹²⁶²

At the beginning of his report, the inspector explains why and how the rebellion achieved such a success.¹²⁶³ To him, Şahkulu managed to gather so many rebels not due to the fact that the necessary preventive measures had not been taken; in contrast, the measures had indeed been taken. But the reason behind the wide social support to the rebellion was further deep-rooted and complicated. The inspector reports, ‘The realm is devastated. The situation of the people (*re’āya*) is soiled. It is urgently required that the conditions here be remedied. The enemy’s numbers are growing day by day.’¹²⁶⁴ The inspector reports that there were many men from the *sipāhi* class in the adherents of Şahkulu. He further argues, the men who engaged in most troubles were these *sipāhis*. During the fight outside the Antalya fortress they caused many difficulties. It is also underlined that the *sipāhis* in the Ottoman side did not fight efficiently. The rest of the report clearly indicates why *sipāhis* revolted against the Ottoman authorities. Our inspector reports the conversation between the Ottoman authorities and rebellious

¹²⁶¹ “*Sipahiden ibtida tanışıkda kimler vardı diyecek, Çakıroğlanlarından üç nefer kimesne vardı. Biri dahi Kızıloğlu biri dahi Köleoğlu, biri dahi Mehmed Bey derler.*” TSA, document E. 5035.

¹²⁶² Compare Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı”, pp. 35-6.

¹²⁶³ TSA, document, E. 6187.

¹²⁶⁴ TSA, document, E. 6187.

sipāhis during the fight outside the fortress of Antalya. According to the report, rebellious *sipāhis* said,

... bir dahi timar satarlarmı? Timarlarımızı satın alı alı cemi' rızkımız tükendi. Timar almağa deve gerek mal gerekdir. Yoldaşa timar yokdur. Nerede maldar etrak taifesi varsa bezirganoğulları varsa kadioğulları, mütevellioğulları varsa cümlesi ehl-i timar oldular. Padişahın ne kadar āşinası, seyisi mehteri ve sâir hüddāmı varsa cümlesi ehl-i timar oldular, yoldaşa dirlik kalmadı. Görsünler imdi timarı nā-mahall verüb sipahi taifesini zulmetmekten ne fitneler zahir olsa gerektir deyu dürlü dürlü mühmelatlar söylemişlerdir. ... Ekseri fesadlara ikdam itdüren sipahilerdür ve müslümanlar askerinde olan sipahilerden yoldaşlık gelmedi. Dahi artuk dahi olsa fiillerinden yoldaşlık ümid olmazdı...¹²⁶⁵

A short account in *Haniwaldanus Anonym* is complementary to this report. The anonymous author states that there were *sipāhis* among people who joined the movement of Şahkulu. Among those *sipāhis* there was a man whose name was Uctacıoğlu and was a *subaşı* dismissed from his *timar* by Karagöz Pasha. His aim in joining the rebellion was to take revenge from the pasha.¹²⁶⁶

On the other hand, another report written by the *defterdār* of Antalya to Korkud gives further details of this fight outside the city walls. The *defterdār* says following the first advent of sufis that some Ottoman forces confronted them, but was defeated. Then the *defterdār* and *subaşı* of the city recruited an army of three thousand men from dwellers of Antalya and villages nearby. But when they confronted with rebels some *sipāhis* and villagers in the Ottoman army changed sides. It was especially by the crucial support of these betrayed *sipāhis* that the rebels defeated the Ottomans, who were forced to retreat into the fortress. These betrayed soldiers even surrounded the *subaşı*, who could barely flee to the fortress with a serious injury. The *defterdār* underscores in his

¹²⁶⁵ TSA, document, E. 6187.

¹²⁶⁶ ANMH, p. 49. ANMH describes this man as the second leader of the rebellion, who received a province from Ismail when they arrived in Tabriz. Other sources do not specify names of any other leaders than Şahkulu. It is highly possible that ANMH confuses the second leader of the rebellion with famous qizilbash leader Ustacıoğlu Muhammed Han, the governor of Amid.

report that Şahkulu's force was reinforced by the participation of deceived *sipāhis*; they spoiled tents, clothes, slaves and other properties of the Ottomans. The power balance was so changed in favor of the rebels that if aid would not arrive soon the fortress would inevitably fall.¹²⁶⁷

6.3. THE REBELLION

As already mentioned, Prince Korkud left the Province of Antalya in 915 / 1509. After an adventurous journey to Egypt, Korkud felt remorse for having left his government without permission and wrote letters to the Porte expressing his penitence. Eventually he was allowed to return to his province in 916 / 1510.¹²⁶⁸ Ottoman sources do not clarify whether or not a provisional governor was appointed to Antalya during his absence. Later events suggest, however, that Antalya was devoid of a firm government during this era.

After his return, Korkud did not stay long in Antalya. Without having the permission of the Porte, he left Antalya for Saruhan (Manisa) in the early months of 1511.¹²⁶⁹ According to Ottoman chronicles, he moved to Saruhan upon hearing that

¹²⁶⁷ TSA, document E. 6321. This document was first published by Uluçay and later reused by Tekindağ. See ULCY1, p. 65; Tekindağ, pp. 38-39.

¹²⁶⁸ ULCY1, p. 59.

¹²⁶⁹ According to Kemalpashazāde, Korkud felt uncomfortable with the 'dirty Turks' (*Etrāk-i nā-pāk*) of this province. Accordingly he decided to go to the province of Saruhan, where had been his former province. "*Sultan Korkud mahrūse-i Mısır'dan gelüb Antalya şehrinde bir mildar ikāmet itdükden sonra, ol vilāyetün Etrāk-i nā-pākinden, ki sūretā ādem ve ma'nāda bir nice hayvan-ı lā-yefhem idiler, tab'-ı şerifi ziyāde bī-huzūr u mükedder olduđu ecilden ol yörede ikāmet etmekden ferāgat idüb Saruhan vilāyetine, ki kadīmī taht-gāhıydı, gitmeđe niyet itdi.*" KPZ8b, p. 42. HSE follows same line of argument: "*Gerçi ol ilin halkı onun (Korkud) adāleti gölgesinde güven ve huzur içinde oldular. Ama ol diyārda yaşayan Türklerin varlıkları doğuştan yaramaz olup, yaradılışlarından dik başlı olduklarından başka, huysuzluk da onların aşağılık yapılarında bir huy gibiydi. Ol insanlıktan eksik kişilerin nişākla dolu yüreklerinde bin bir türlü fesād gömülü olup her biri insan biçiminde laf anlamaz hayvana benzer kişilerdi. Şehzādenin ince gönlü ol çirkin suratlılardan işrenmeğin eskiden sancağı olan Saruhan İli'ni arzulayıp kapusu halkından birkaç yiğidi hazinesini koyup taşımak için geride bırakarak bir gece ansızın Saruhan'a doğru yola çıktı.*" HSE4, pp. 42-3. For similar claims regard also ANMB, p. 172; MNB, p.

Selim crossed over to Rumelia.¹²⁷⁰ Kemalpaşazāde records that Korkud so hastened to move to Saruhan that he left Antalya at night, leaving his treasury and possessions to be brought later by his men. His hurry, on the other hand, made the people think that Bayezid II had died.¹²⁷¹ The qizilbash population of the region, who had been prepared for a rebellion for a while, decided to rise up under the leadership of Şahkulu.¹²⁷² Kemalpaşazāde says the sufis of the region communicated with each other and the revolt broke out. His account reads,

[Korkud] Saruhan vilāyetine ... gitmeğe niyet itdi; ahmāl-i eşkāl ve hazā'in ü emvāl üzerine kapısı halından bir mikdar ādem koyub, kendüsi ziyāde isti'calinden gice ile çıkdı gıtdi. Ol havālide olan evbāş-ı kallāş böyle acele ile gitmeden Hazreti Hüdāvendigār vefat itdi sanub, 'isyān izhār itdiler; Şehzādenün hazā'in ü emvāline taarruz kasd itdüklerinde ol hizmete mübāşir olanlar muharebeye ikdām idüb muhkem kārzār itdiler.¹²⁷³ ...Sultan Korkud gice ile Antalya'dan çıkub gıtdüğün görüb fırsatudur diyu hurūç itdiler. Kendülere muvafakat itmeyen müslümanların malların ve esbābların gāret kılub zirve-i 'isyāna 'urūc itdiler.¹²⁷⁴

427. Among modern writers, Tansel deems the same factor among the reasons that forced Korkud to leave Antalya. Tansel also calls attention to the fact that Korkud's primary concern was to get closer to the capital city in order to augment his change in a possible struggle between princes. See TNSB, p. 249.

¹²⁷⁰ ALI, p. 927; SLZ1, pp. 444-45. CLZ does not mention Selim in this context. To him, Korkud left Antalya because he heard that Ahmed left Amasya and arrived in Karaman. At the end, the Porte had to approve Korkud's usurpation. In one of his letters to the Porte, for example, he expresses dissatisfaction with the appointment of certain Isa Fakih to the *defterdār*ship of his province Saruhan. See ULCY1, p. 60, footnote 9. On the other hand, Prince Ahmed got angry with the rebellious movements of his brothers. As mentioned before, he decided to punish both Korkud and Selim; but the Porte prevented him from doing that. His later demands in this province leave no doubt about the main incentive of Korkud in moving from Antalya. He further requested some coastal cities on Aegean Sea in order to arrive easily at the capital city when opportunity appears. For his letters demanding Bergama see ULCY1, p. 61, footnote 10.

¹²⁷¹ KPZ8b, p. 42. CLZ recites events in a similar fashion: "...Etrāf u cevānibde olan şehzādelər harekāt ve inkılāb itmekle, ehāli-yi memleket ve vilāyet ayak üzere gelüb..." CLZ, p. 120. Also regard ANMB, p. 173. Later historians repeat this claim as well. HSE says, for example, "Şehzādenin olağandışı yola çıkıp gidişini görücek ay gibi tün yolculuğu etmesinden saltanat göğü güneşinin battığı kamsına vardılar ve başkaldırıp fesād doruğuna doğru çıktılar. Dokuy yüz on altı Muharreminin onuncu gününde (19 Nisan 1510). [This date is obviously mistaken. It must be 917 instead of 916. *Alevi töresine göre toplanarak Şahkulu sanıyla tanınan bir aşâğılık herifi kendilerine baş ve buğ ettiler.*" HSE4, p. 43. MNB replicates HSE but gives the year correctly as 917. Also regard ALI, p. 927; SLZ1, p. 445; MNB, p. 428. Among historians of the seventeenth-century, MNB follows HSE and SLZ follows ALI in regard to Şahkulu affairs.

¹²⁷² CLZ, p. 120.

¹²⁷³ KPZ8b, p. 42. KPZ records this event occurred in early months of 917 / 1511 (*evāil-i 917*)

¹²⁷⁴ KPZ8b, p. 43.

At the beginning, Şahkulu gathered 400-500 men and came to Yenice Derbendi. He attacked the caravan which was carrying the property and treasury of Korkud and his courtiers.¹²⁷⁵ Some of them were killed and some others were captured. Hoca Saadeddin claims that the revolt broke out on Muharrem 10, 916¹²⁷⁶, which is one of the foremost important days according to Shi'ite tradition for it is the memorandum of the martyrdom of Husayn, the son of Ali and grandson of Mohammad the Prophet. Hoca Saadeddin particularly indicates that they gathered according to the Alevī tradition.¹²⁷⁷

Upon gathering enough men, Şahkulu marched on Antalya. As we learn from a letter of the *defterdār* of Antalya to Korkud, the *subaşı* and *defterdār* put together 3.000

¹²⁷⁵ According to a detained sufi's testimony Şahkulu and Ottoman forces fought in Kapulukaya and Döşeme Dervendi. See TSA, document E. 5035. Also see SLZ1, p. 445.

¹²⁷⁶ The year in this date is apparently mistaken. It must be Muharrem 10, 917 (April 9, 1511). ANMB and MNB give the same date for the beginning of the revolt. See ANMB, p. 173; MNB, p. 428.

¹²⁷⁷ HSE4, p. 43. Nonetheless, archival evidence suggests an earlier date for the beginning of the revolt. A letter written by the *qādi* of Antalya to Korkud dated March 29, 1511 reports the very early phase of the revolt. (See TSA, document E. 632.) According to this letter, Şahkulu first attacked Prince Korkud's caravan and servants. (Also see HSE4, p. 43; MNB, p. 428.) His main goal was to capture the treasury of the prince, which was trusted to some of his close men by Korkud to be brought to Manisa. Following the attack of Şahkulu forces, the subashi of Antalya, Hasan Beg, marched on sufis with some fighters and slew a number of them. The *qādi* stresses that the fighters that Hasan Beg gathered were sunnī. He also lays stress on that the number of the sufis gathered in Yenice was increasing day by day and their ultimate goal was nothing but to grasp the country wholly: "...*Ammā mezkūr Şahkulu gaybet ettükden sonra Yenice Derbendi'ne varub gendunun etbā'ından dört-beş yüz nefer kimesne cem' edüb yola durub Çakırbaşı Nasuh bendenizin hātunu ve oğlancıkları ve halkımızdan ve şehirludan nice cem'-i kesir göçüb gider iken zikr olunan Erdebil halkı mezkūrları basub Mezkur Çakırbaşının kızcağızını ve Yazıcı Kemal kulunuzun iki oğlancığın ve yirmi neferden ziyade müslümanları envā'-ı ezālarla katl edüb malların alub Çakırbaşının hātunun ve Katip Kemalin kızı ve bazı hatunları ve kızları alub dağa çıkarub esir etmişlerdür. El'an kendulardadır.Ve sultanım hazretlerinin otağı göçüb Evdekiye'ye varıcak basub almak kasd edicek şehirden subaşı bendeniz nice müslümanlarla varub alub şehre getirüldü. Mezkur subaşı sünnī tayifesinden cem'-i kesir ile mezkūr Erdebil tayifesinden ve bunlardan nice kimesne maktul olub Erdebil halkından kesilmiş baş getirüb ve bir diri kimesne getürdüler, salbolundu. Mezkūr tayife Yenice'de durub yevmen fe yevmen mütezayiddir. Kasıtları memleketi bi'l külliye almaktır. Bunda nefir-i ām olmuşdur...."* (TSA, document E. 632.) Thus, if we take the starting point of the rebellion as leaving of Şahkulu from his cave in Yalınlu, the letter of *qādi* obviously contradicts HSE's claim. But HSE's claim is still credible if one takes the starting point as moving from Yenice.

After attacking Korkud's caravan and then being attacked by the forces of Hasan Beg, Şahkulu gathered his adherents in Yenice and prepared for upcoming attacks, which would be much stronger and victorious. Fisher recounts the very early phase of the rebellion in a similar fashion: "When Prince Korkud moved his seat from Antalya to Manisa, Shahkuli robbed him of many of his effects which may have given the heretics the means to commence their revolt. Once the movement was under the way, it grew in size and weight like a giant snowball." See FSH, p. 97. Therefore, it is reasonable to take 10 Muharrem as the beginning of the revolt when Şahkulu set into action in Yenice, after robbing Korkud's caravan.

men and confronted the rebels outside the city. But some *sipāhis* and fighters gathered from nearby villages betrayed and turned against Ottoman forces. In the end, the Ottoman forces had to draw back to the fortress.¹²⁷⁸ This letter is not dated. But if we accept the date offered by Hoca Saadeddin as the sufis day of moving from Yenice, this battle must have occurred soon after Muharrem 10, 917 / April 9, 1511. Another letter written by Karagöz Pasha pertaining to Şahkulu affairs suggests that another clash between Ottoman forces and Şahkulu took place in Yenice; the *defterdār* lost his head during this fight. Hasan Beg could barely flee to the fortress. Rebels also blocked the communication of Antalya with the outside world.¹²⁷⁹

Şahkulu surrounded the city for a short while and moved northward, towards Burdur, passing through Istanos, Elmalı, and Gölhisar. All the sufis of the region joined them while the sunni population fled to mountains.¹²⁸⁰ Before entering the city, Şahkulu crushed another Ottoman force of 2.500 soldiers commanded by Nokta, one of Karagöz Pasha's men.¹²⁸¹ The qizilbashs entered Burdur on Muharrem 17, 917 (April 16, 1511) or just before this day. Prince Osman reported the events to the Porte in his letter dated Muharrem 17.¹²⁸² Şahkulu did not aim simply to destroy the area; rather he believed in capturing the country and establishing his own rule. His practices in the early phases of

¹²⁷⁸ TSA, document E. 6321.

¹²⁷⁹ TSA, document E. 77. Published in ULCY1, pp.65-66, footnote 16. Tansel recites that qizilbashs attacked the market place of Antalya and spoiled properties of the city dwellers. During this attack 10.000 people were killed, among whom the *qādi* of Antalya was as well. See TNSB, p. 249, footnote 125.

¹²⁸⁰ TSA, document E. 5035.

¹²⁸¹ CLZ, p. 123. KPZ refers to this battle without mentioning Nokta. See KPZ8b, p. 44. ANMB follows the same manner. But ANMB's description of rebellious troops is quite interesting: "...*Ol gün hasmın kuvve-i tāli'i ziyāde idi. Gāzilere bu hālet müris-i za'f olub, mühnezim oldılar. Ol esrār-ı nākısu'l-efkārın ki kalb-i pür-illetleri nūr-ı imandan hālî ve mücevvef idi. Esbāb-ı gururları muza'af oldu. Her biri şahid-i maksūdların kenāre çekmek ümīdiyle baş ortaya koyub ölüm eri olmuşlardı. Aralarında kesret-i vifāk ve mezīd-i ittifak bir mertebede idi ki her birinin önünde ölmeği hayat-ı ebedî ve sa'adet-i sermedî bilmişlerdi...*" See ANMB, p. 176. See also MNB, p. 428.

¹²⁸² At the beginning of his letter Prince Osman refers his former letters reporting the outbreak of the rebellion. Then he reports current events which took place after the first letter. TSA, document E. 2829. This document is partly published in ULCY1, pp. 66-67.

the rebellion clearly reveal his ultimate goal. Prince Osman reported to the Porte that Şahkulu was behaving like a ruler; he appointed *beylerbeys* and *subaşı*s to ‘conquered’ towns. Prince Osman puts special emphasis on that most of the *sipāhis* of Teke adhered to the rebellion and they proliferated day by day.¹²⁸³ Ebu’l-Fadl Mehmed Efendi records that 20.000 *müfsids* with their families, properties and animals were present when they entered Burdur.¹²⁸⁴

On the other hand, Korkud also informed the Porte on the situation. Karagöz Pasha, the *beylerbey* of Anatolia, Prince Ahmed, the governor of Amasya, and Prince Mehmed, the governor of Niğde were assigned to suppress the rebellion.¹²⁸⁵ As mentioned above, Karagöz Pasha had already sent a small army on Şahkulu under the command of Nokta, which was destined to be routed. After defeating Nokta, Şahkulu captured Burdur but did not stay there. Hasan Rumlu notes that upon hearing the victories of Şahkulu the disciples of the Safavid House (*Hānedan*) armed themselves and joined Baba Şahkulu.¹²⁸⁶ He then proceeded toward Kütahya, where Karagöz Pasha had settled. Qizilbashs arrived in front of Kütahya on Muharrem 23 (April 22, 1511) and the two armies clashed.¹²⁸⁷ At the beginning of the fight Karagöz Pasha’s troops dispersed the rebels; Şahkulu had to retreat to the mountain. Thinking they had totally devastated the foe, Ottoman soldiers left the fight and started to loot properties of

¹²⁸³ “...ol tãife-i melãyinden sãdır olan hadisãt bunlar ki beyan olunur. Mesela mezkũr tãife ol tarihten beru yevmen fe- yevmen mũtezãyid olub vilayet-i Teke'nin ekseri sipahileri bile anlara mũtãbaat edũb zaman-ı kalĩlde bir iki bin melã'in cem' olub mezkũr bedbaht ki reisleri Şahkuludur, amirãne hareket edũb kimin beylerbeyi edinũb kimine yer yer subaşılık verũb bu üzere dimağları fesãda varub sancak kaldurub...” TSA, document E. 2829.

¹²⁸⁴ Ebu’l-Fadl Mehmed Efendi, *Selimşãh-nãme*, Lãlã İsmail Efendi Kũtũphanesi, 348, f. 48a. Cited in Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı”, p. 54.

¹²⁸⁵ ULCY1, p. 65.

¹²⁸⁶ HR, p. 154.

¹²⁸⁷ ULCY1, p. 68. CLZ points bitters criticism toward Karagöz Pasha accusing him for underestimating the power of rebels and not for making enough provision. See CLZ, p. 122.

retreated rebels, to whom the soldiers around the pasha joined as well. Taking advantage of the situation Şahkulu led an assault on Karagöz Pasha, who was totally defenseless, and incarcerated him. Upon losing their leader, the Ottoman troops scattered. After consulting the *sipāhis* of Teke¹²⁸⁸, Şahkulu executed Karagöz Pasha outside the city.¹²⁸⁹

Some words in the letter of the Ottoman spy Yusuf, who reported the defeat of Karagöz Pasha to the Porte, best explain the psychology of the folk in the region. He underscores, just like other reporters and spies, that the Porte should not underestimate the danger; each day numerous men of plunderer were gathering around him. The folk psychology was governed by the idea of revolution; thus the people of the region did not trust anyone. Yusuf warns the Porte that one should not compare them with other foes: “...mezkūr tāyifeyi zaif etmek olmaz ve durmayub her gün yanlarına eşirradan adem cem’ oluyor. Vilayetin halkı inkılab üzre olub kimesneye itimad değildir. Elhasıl bu mel’unları sair a’dāya kıyas etmelü değildir. ...”¹²⁹⁰

It seems from this expression that Şahkulu managed to convince not only his adherents but also a considerable portion of the non-qizilbash population of the region on his claims. As indicated above his intention was not simply to plunder the area but he believed in repelling the Ottoman rule from the country and in establishing his own rule in the name of Shah Ismail. So the revolt of Şahkulu was intended as a revolutionary movement aiming to change the regime.¹²⁹¹ As observed in Yusuf’s report, Şahkulu

¹²⁸⁸ See below footnote.

¹²⁸⁹ TSA, document E. 5035. Partly published in ULCY1, p. 62, footnote 11. Also consider TSA, document E. 5881; TNSB, p. 251. KPZ and ANMB narrates the events in the same manner. See KPZ8b, pp. 45-46; ANMB, p. 176-7. Also consider CLZ, p. 123; MNB, pp. 428-9.

¹²⁹⁰ TSA, document, E. 5881.

¹²⁹¹ After narrating the death of Karagöz Pasha in Kütahya ANMB states, “...Çün memleket-girlik secdası dimağları cevfen-i makarr idinmişdi. Müşāhade idikleri süret bi-hasbi’z-zāhir ol ma’nāyı kendü za’m-ı fāsıdlerince mukarrer idüb Anatoli Vilāyetini kabza-i tasarrufa getürdük deyu eşerinde bilürlerdi...” ANMB, p. 178.

successfully created a revolutionary atmosphere at least in the southern and western Anatolia; many people of the region fell into indecision on which side would win the struggle. He was appointing governors to captured towns and castles. Furthermore, as Uluçay points out, Şahkulu managed to gain some Ottoman administrators for his cause.¹²⁹²

Another report, that of Prince Osman, also depicts Şahkulu as behaving like a ruler, assigning governors, and confusing the minds of people. (...*amirane hareket idüb, kimin beylerbeyi idinüb, kimine yer yer subaşılık virüb...dimağları fesada varub sancak kaldurub...*)¹²⁹³ As also reported in the letter of the *qādi* of Antalya to Prince Korkud in Zilhicce, 916 (March, 1511), he secured the submission of Ardabil sufis living in the area and acted like a ruler, setting up *dīvan-hāne* and attempting to rule the country. The *qādi* warned Prince Korkud on that their ultimate goal was to seize the country wholly.¹²⁹⁴

The defeat of the Ottoman *beylerbey* of Anatolia was indeed a great success for the rebellious movement. But Şahkulu was determined to go further. He then turned towards Prince Korkud who was the governor of Saruhan. Korkud appointed Hasan Aga to the command of his troops, which was reinforced by auxiliary forces from nearby provinces. The two armies met on the plain of Alaşehir, where the Ottoman army tasted a bitter defeat. Hasan Aga's and some other *sancakbeys'* heads were left on the battlefield. Korkud could barely take refuge in the fortress of Manisa. These events took

¹²⁹² ULCY1, p. 69.

¹²⁹³ TSA, document E 2829.

¹²⁹⁴ See TSA, document E 632.

place just before May 3, 1511.¹²⁹⁵ İshak Çelebi records that after this victory Şahkulu said to his comrades, “We now took the suzerainty over the Province of Anatolia!”¹²⁹⁶

For some reasons Şahkulu did not attack Korkud in Manisa, but turned toward Bursa.¹²⁹⁷ On hearing the developments and the intention of the rebels, the *qādi* of Bursa sent an urgent message to the head of the Janissary corps on *Safer* 4, 917 (April 1511); he reported the recent developments and the intention of Şahkulu. In his letter the *qādi* was crying for help,

Sultan Korkud dahī kaçub Manisa kalesine varub, bi’l-fiil memleketi yıka yaka Bursa’ya geliyor. İki gündeğin yeniçeriden ve gayriden ve gayriden mu’în ve zâhîr ve mededci erişmezse memleket bi’t-tamam elden gitmişdir. Azîm adüvdür. Beylerbeyinin vesâyir sancak beylerinin hazînelerine ve cebecüşlarına ve silâhlarına mâlik olmuştur...¹²⁹⁸

This report of the *qādi* explains clearly the degree of the success that the Şahkulu movement achieved. Up to this point Şahkulu had defeated five Ottoman armies (he himself had never been defeated yet), one of them was commanded by the *beylerbey* of Anatolia, the highest military rank of Anatolia in the administrative system, and the other by a deputy of Prince Korkud. Actually in the Anatolian peninsula, there was no further Ottoman army, which was prepared and strong enough to stop Şahkulu, when he marched toward Bursa.¹²⁹⁹ Ahmed, the *qādi* of Bursa, underscores this fact in an effort

¹²⁹⁵ The battle was reported by Ahmed the qadi of Bursa to the Aga of Janissaries in his letter dated Safer 4, 917 (May 3, 1511). TSA, document, E. 5451. For the report and further details of events see ULCY1, pp. 69-70.

¹²⁹⁶ “*Anadolu Vilâyetini kabza-i tasarrufa getürdük.*” See İshak Çelebi, *Selim-nâme*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, no. 2614, f. 12b. Recited in Tekindağ, “Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı”, *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 4, 1959, p. 55.

¹²⁹⁷ See KPZ8b, p. 46. KPZ does not mention, however, Şahkulu’s march on Korkud and the battle took place in Alaşehir.

¹²⁹⁸ TSA, document, E. 5451.

¹²⁹⁹ One might argue, however, that Prince Ahmed had enough military power to avert Şahkulu. Although this idea seems to be true, Ahmed was devoid of the motivation to mobilize his army against Şahkulu since he was much occupied with the struggle for the throne. Şahkulu affair was only of secondary importance for Ahmed. Nonetheless, as will be analyzed below, his negligence in this affair would cause him to lose the throne.

to convince the head of the Janissary corps to dispatch military help as soon as possible – in two days at the latest -. What is important in his letter is that the *qādi* does not state ‘if a military assistance would not arrive, Bursa will surrender!’, but he consciously underlines, ‘the country will be wholly lost!’ He also calls attention to the fact that the rebels retained the weapons and treasury of *beylerbey* and some *sancakbeys*; thus his power acquired further strength.

These early successes of the rebellion, however, should not be regarded as solely the result of the deed of Şahkulu and his adherents. Although the Safavid propaganda created an ideologically oriented social ground for such uprisings, it is not sufficient to explain the whole story. The debility of the Ottoman administration must also be regarded in this aspect. First of all, as mentioned earlier, the system of the allocation of administrative and military posts, especially of *timars*, degenerated; those who deserved posts by their service could not get good positions while those who offered bribery or has favor of high bureaucrats received them. The deterioration of merit based allocation of state favor caused many discontent or dismissed government officials, especially *timar* holders, to join the rebellion or at least to support it by some means. On the other hand the central government was not functioning efficiently either. Selahattin Tansel argues, for example, that the sultan was not aware of the Şahkulu rebellion until Korkud’s letter, which was written after the defeat of his forces in Alaşehir, arrived. Upon learning the situation Bayezid reproved his viziers, especially grand vizier Ali Pasha, severely and commissioned the grand vizier to finish the problem.¹³⁰⁰

Perhaps more vital than the degeneration of provincial administration was the chaos that emerged at the Porte. The worsening health of Bayezid II inflamed the desire

¹³⁰⁰ TNSB, p. 252.

of the princes for the throne. The most important issue occupying the attention of all high statesmen, especially during the last two years of Bayezid II's reign, became the problem of determining the successor of Bayezid. Already before the outbreak of the Şahkulu revolt Selim left Trebizond for Kefe in 1510. As expressed above, Korkud also left his province Antalya on the eve of the rebellion. Strange enough is that although Şahkulu rose up almost simultaneously with Korkud's departure from Antalya, the prince did not return but continued on his way to Manisa, leaving the job of the suppression to his *subaşı* and *defterdār*. As clearly observed, the primary concern of his, and of the other two princes, was to get closer to the capital city. The revolt seems to have been nothing more than a secondary problem to be solved in the aftermath of ascendance to the throne. It must be due to this that Korkud did not deal with the rebellion.

Prince Ahmed, who was assigned to punish the rebels, did not strive to suppress the rebellion either. Rather he decided to punish his two brothers since they deserted their provinces for the sake of the throne.¹³⁰¹ With this incentive he also left Amasya and moved toward Ankara.¹³⁰² He sent an envoy to the Porte and explained his complaints

¹³⁰¹ CLZ bitterly criticizes Prince Ahmed for esteeming himself as the most fitting nominee for the throne and for not suppressing the rebellion: “*Sultan Ahmed saltanat ümidi ile bunca lāf u güzāf urub, ‘ale’l-husūs ayağı rikābda pādīşāhlık sevdasıyla şām u seher cüst ü cüdā ıztrābda idi. Henüz kendü memālik-i mevrūsesi içinde yanında bunca tevābi’ u hadem, bi’l-cümle ‘asker-i kevākib-şümār u encüm-haşem birle hāzır u müheyyā iken, birkaç etrāk-i bī-idrākin ‘isyān u tuğyānları oldı. İrişüb şimşir-i zafer-te’sir ile ol ateş-i pür-tāb-ı fitneye itfā veirmeğe kādır olmadı. Cümle ehl-i İslāmın ma’lūmı oldı ki Sultan Ahmedin kāmēti bī-dirāyetine hilkā-t-i saltanat elyak ve ahrā değıldir...*” CLZ, p. 125.

¹³⁰² “[Ahmed summoned his *dīvan* and reminded them Selim's and Korkud's movement. Then he said:] ‘*Babam mārız ü bī-mecāl olub, kendü hāline iştigalinden vilāyet ahvāli kemāl mertebede ihtilāl bulubdurur. Münāsib oldur ki mukaddemā varub Kurkud’u te’dīb eyleyem, andan Rumili’ne geçüb, karındaşım Selim’i çıkarub, babam yirine pādīşāh olam!*’ Hazır olanlar bu tedbiri beğenüb, tahrık ü tahsīn itdiler. *Ertesi hemān sefer tedārikin idüb, Ankara cānibine müteveccih oldı...*” KPZ8b, p. 48. For similar accounts consider ANMB, pp. 186-7; HSE4, p. 51. MNB states that Prince Ahmed and the grand vizier Ali Pasha were moving coordinally and Ahmed's leaving of his province was planned by the both. He also underscores that Ahmed's main concern was nothing than to capture the throne. See MNB, p. 430. ALI recites Ahmed's words as follows: “*Çünkü Korkud bilā-izn-i Pādīşāhī sancağını koyub, livā-i Saruhan’a*

against his two brothers. Ahmed demanded permission from his father to punish Selim and Korkud.¹³⁰³ The answer was not affirmative. Rather he was ordered to return to his province.¹³⁰⁴ In his answer, Bayezid underlined that one of his brother's (Korkud) disobedience caused such a great turmoil (*fesād*). He reminded Ahmed of how sensitive his province was to the matter for it was close to the country of Ismail and most of the people living there were qizilbash. Bayezid assured Ahmed to do what was necessary to stop his brothers and ordered him to return to Amasya in order to handle qizilbash affairs.¹³⁰⁵

Ahmed received his father's request, which was also indicative of Bayezid's stand in favor of him, in Ankara.¹³⁰⁶ When he learned of his father's fortunate intention regarding the throne, Ahmed accepted to abandon his agenda and informed his father

ta'aruz itdi ve Selim Hān oğlu bahānesiyle Keŧe ser-haddine varub, bilā-izn ü ruhsat Rūm-ili'ne geħdi. Evvelā Kurkud'un üstüne varub hakkından geleyin, sāniyen Rūm-ili'ne geħub Hān Selim'in vücūdını nā-būd kılayın" ALI, p. 938.

¹³⁰³ ANMB reformulates Ahmed's words to his father as follows: "...Karındaşım Sultan Korkud ki eski sancağın koyub bī-icāzet Saruhan Vilāyetine gelmişdir, ānun giru yerine varması lāzımdır. Hūdāvendigār Hazretlerinin ol bābda ħün kemāl-i rāfeti ve mezīd merhameti te'dīb olunmalarına mānidir. Bizim üzerimize vācip olmuştur ki ol hizmeti edā idüb varub gūşmāl idevüz. İmdi yümn-i himmetleriyle zikrolan maslahatun tedārikiħün ol cānibe teveccüh gösterdim. Gerekdir ki hüsn-i rızaların o yolda bize hem-rāh eyleyeler..." ANMB, p. 188. Also consider HSE4, p. 51.

¹³⁰⁴ "Kaħan bu haber Cenāb-ı Şehriyāri'ye vardı, Sultān Ahmed'in bu gūne hiħfetine āzorde hātır olub, 'itāb-āmiz emirler gönderdi. 'Zinhār makarr-ı devletinden hareket itmeyüb, yerinde turasın. Vezīr Ali Paşa'ya surh-serān ahvāli sipāriş olunmuştur, ānun müşāveresi ile amel idesin' cevābını inhā kıldı." ALI, p. 938.

¹³⁰⁵ KPZ re-formulates the words of Bayezid as follows: "Bir karındaşun bi-lā-takrīb yerinden kalkub hareket itmekle bu kadar fesād oldu. Senün memleketün hod Kızılbaşa karīn olub, ekser-i re'āyā ol mülhidün ehibbāsındandur, me-bādā ki, fitne-yi 'azīme bā'is olub vilāyet harāb ola. Biz senün karındaşlarını dām-ı ri'āyetle kayd-ı gaflete düşürmek tedbirindeyüz. İnşa'a'llah 'an karīb sühületle ol me'müle hayyiz-i husüle vusül bula." KPZ8b, 48. ANMB follows KPZ in this issue. Slightly differing from KPZ, however, Bayezid's promise to Ahmed for granting him the throne - but after he successfully suppressing the rebellion of course - is evidently indicated in ANMB. It reads, "...Biz ħice gündüz senin devletin mukaddemāti tertibin idüb karındaşlarını dām-ı ri'āyetle kayd-ı gaflete düşürmek tedbirindeyiz. Ol maslahat tamamolub ba'dehu Kızılbaş zümresi müfsidlerin ber-tarāf idüğümüzden sonra sen kendüni ber-murād göresin. cemī'-i matlūbuna suhületle vāsıl olmak mukarrerdür. Şimdi mahall-i tehettük deħildir. 'İzz u temkīnle dāmen-i ferāgati kendüne çeküb sabr idesin..." See ANMB, pp. 188-9. HSE is also clear in this issue. To him too, Bayezid did not only ordered Ahmed to return to his province, which was desely populated by qizilbashes, but also promised to secure the throne for him. See HSE4, p. 52.

¹³⁰⁶ HSE4, p. 52.

that he would march on the rebels.¹³⁰⁷ Upon learning of Ahmed's decision Bayezid felt rather comfortable and dispatched a second letter ordering Ahmed to meet Ali Pasha, who had been commissioned to repress the rebellion, and to move together with him against the qizilbashs.¹³⁰⁸ Ahmed did not return to Amasya but proceeded toward the province of Kütahya, where he would meet Ali Pasha. The advance of events would show, however, that his primary concern had always been securing the throne for himself.¹³⁰⁹

To sum up, on April 22, when Şahkulu defeated Karagöz Pasha, the *beylerbey* of Anatolia, none of the princes except for Şehinşah¹³¹⁰ were in their provinces; and they were not very interested in the rebellion. The Porte, on the other hand, was so occupied with the struggle of the princes for the throne that Şahkulu affairs were neither perceived nor dealt with adequately. But the defeat of Karagöz Pasha made the Porte realize the power of the peril. Upon the news reaching the Porte, Ali Pasha, the grand vizier, was assigned to suppress the rebellion. Orders were dispatched to *begs* of Anatolia to gather under Ali Pasha's banner in order to finish the rebellion.¹³¹¹ Ali Pasha moved from Edirne with an army composed of 4.000 janissaries and 4.000 *bölük* (*kapu*) halkı.¹³¹² But his attention was not concentrated on the rebellion a lot. Neither had he appreciated the power of Şahkulu. For him, they were no more than some thousands of looters; and the consecutive defeats of Ottoman troops were just because of the improvidence of local

¹³⁰⁷ KPZ8b, p. 49; ANMB, p. 189; HSE4, pp. 52-3.

¹³⁰⁸ KPZ8b, p. 49; ANMB, p. 189; HSE4, p. 53; ANMB, p. 50.

¹³⁰⁹ KPZ recounts Ahmed's intention as follows: "*Merhūm Sultan Ahmed kendüyi 'arūs-ı cülūs-ı mülk-i Rūma nāmzed i'tikād idüb, özüni dāmād bilmişdi. Kızılbaş tevecçühi maksüd bi'l-'arz idüb maksüdına vāsıl olmak istedi...*" KPZ8b, p. 53.

¹³¹⁰ Among the four sons of Bayezid, who were alive, only Şehinşah did not participate the struggle for the throne. But his position was more problematic for the Porte for he was obviously affiliated to the qizilbash ideas. This will be delineated below.

¹³¹¹ KPZ8b, p. 47; ANMB, p. 183.

¹³¹² KPZ8b, p. 47; CLZ, p. 128; ANMB, p. 184; HSE4, p. 49.

governors and of Karagöz Pasha, but not because of the rebels' power.¹³¹³ Ali pasha was renown with his pro-Ahmed stand. In this campaign his main intention was to use the rebellion as an intermediary-legitimizing step in order to save the throne for Prince Ahmed.¹³¹⁴ However, it was not only the intention of the grand vizier, but the intention of the sultan as well. If relied on contemporary Ottoman historians, Bayezid planned to use the prestige of suppressing Şahkulu rebellion to enthrone Ahmed.¹³¹⁵ Hoca Saadeddin records, for example, that when Şahkulu defeated the Ottoman army in Kütahya the sultan's health had already deteriorated seriously. Upon learning the defeat of Karagöz Pasha he became so sorrowful that he felt he could no longer carry on the *saltanat*. He summoned leading statesmen and explained his decision, which was to leave the throne to Prince Ahmed.¹³¹⁶ But, Hoca Saadeddin says, in order to achieve this plan the problem of Şahkulu had to be solved beforehand. He charged Ali Pasha first to extirpate qizilbashs and then to bring Ahmed to the capital city.¹³¹⁷ As Hoca Saadeddin clearly states, the real point of the Pasha was to meet Ahmed and to make necessary preparation for ascending him to the throne.¹³¹⁸

¹³¹³ KPZ records, for example, "[Upon learning the situation that the rebellion reached Bayezid II became so uncomfortable and angry. Ali Pasha, the grand vizier, said to the sultan] *Anatoluda âdem olmayub, beğler kötülüğündendir. Birkaç etrāk-i nā-pākün ne kadar iktidârı ola ki bu kadar fesâd eyleye, dahî haklarından gelinmiye!* Bilmedi ki düşmene hakâret nazarıyla nazar etmek 'ayn-ı sefahatdir.'" KPZ8b, p. 47. For similar a account also see ANMB, pp. 179-183; CLZ, pp. 127-8; HSE4, p. 47; MNB, p. 429.

¹³¹⁴ CLZ writes Ali Pasha's intention, which was shared by other 'corrupted' statesmen as well, as follows: "(Ali Paşa) Sâyirleri ile ittifâk eylediler ki, 'Asıl maksûdumuz Sultan Ahmed ahvâlidir, 'isyân ve tuğyân iden melâhide husûsı dahî murâdımıza muvâfık vâki' oldı. 'Atabe-i 'ulyâda olan 'asker-i zaferpeykerin yararlarını ve yeniçeri dilâverlerinden birkaç bin güzîde ve şîr-merdlerini alub, Anatoliya geçelüm, vâki' olan mühimmât-ı saltanatı görüb Sultan Ahmedî getürelim' deyü mu'âhede eylediler..." CLZ, pp. 127-8.

¹³¹⁵ According to ANMB, Bayezid secretly commissioned Ali Pasha to enthrone Prince Ahmed by using this revolt as excuse. According to the sultan's plan Ali Pasha would join Ahmed's army and provide the support of janissaries to Ahmed's succession. See ANMB, p. 50.

¹³¹⁶ HSE4, p. 48.

¹³¹⁷ HSE4, pp. 48-50. For a similar account regard MNB, p. 429.

¹³¹⁸ "Aslında Paşa'nın gerçek amacı Sultan Ahmed'le buluşarak onun saltanat tahtına oturmasıyla ilgili ilk hazırlıkları yapmak ve de yeni padişahı iş başına getirmekti." HSE4, p. 49.

Both Ali Pasha and Ahmed were ordered to move together in suppressing the rebellion.¹³¹⁹ An expression recorded by Kemalpaşazāde apparently shows how the Şahkulu affair was perceived and dealt with in the high echelons of the Ottoman administration. Kemalpaşazāde states that the *sancakbeys* of Rumelia were also called to the Porte. But since they realized the actual intention of the sultan and the grand vizier, these begs did not hasten to go to Istanbul but waited for the result of Ali Pasha's fight with qizilbashes.¹³²⁰ Taking into account Selim's chance to ascend the throne, the *sancakbeys* did not want to risk their fortune.¹³²¹ Hoca Saadeddin chronicles the same event but with more details. To him, Bayezid II called *beylerbeys* of Rumelia to Edirne for the sole purpose of protecting the city from a possible attack from Selim. Furthermore the sultan planned that when Ahmed would come with the grand vizier after suppressing the rebellion he would easily secure the obedience of these begs for the rule of Ahmed.¹³²²

It is, therefore, possible to argue that Ahmed was in the most advantageous position with regard to his brothers. He was just and could ascend the throne. The only step to be the next sultan was suppressing the rebellion.¹³²³ Ali Pasha, on the other hand,

¹³¹⁹ KPZ recites that when Ahmed's messenger informed him on Ahmed's intention to march on qizilbashes Bayezid felt so happy and wrote his son, " 'Ināyet-i Bāri yāri kulub, ol etrāk-i nā-pāki ortadan götüresin, bī-māni' ü dāfi' gelüb serir-i saltanata oturasın. Emmā gerekdür ki Ali Paşa ile dā'im müşāvere idüb birbirinüze mu'āvin ü zāhir olasız!' Ali Paşa'ya dahī hük mü şerif gönderilüb, vech-i meşrüh üzere sipāriş olındı." KPZ8b, p. 49. Regard also TNSB, p. 253; IDRs, p. 88; ANMB, p. 190;

¹³²⁰ "...Ba'dehu Rumilinde olan sancakbeylerine ulaklar gönderilüb, kapuya da'vet olundılar. Onlar dahī maslahat tefvīz-i saltanat idüğün bilüb, bir mikdar eğlendier, Ali Paşa ile Kızılbaş-ı evbāşun savaşı ne vechle suret bulur, bu serencāmi-ı kār ve ahvāl-ı rüzgār nice olur görelüm diye katlandılar." KPZ8b, p. 49. Also consider ANMB, p. 191;

¹³²¹ I would like to remind here that during this time Selim was in Kefe and would sooner cross to Rumelia. He was carrying on intense propaganda among Rumelia begs to win them for his cause.

¹³²² HSE4, pp. 54-55.

¹³²³ One should keep in mind that Şahkulu affair was before all a matter of internal politics in the struggle of princes for the throne. At that time, Seim also achieved a quite advantageous position. His press gave result and he managed to grasp a province in Rumelia. Furthermore he got permission to summon Rumelian troops for a 'gazā!' campaign on Hungary, which provided him the chance to control Rumelian

strongly believed in suppressing the rebellion without any serious resistance. But the main question, for him, was to enthrone Ahmed. Nevertheless, his underestimation of the power of the rebels would terminate not only his life but Ahmed's *saltanat* as well. Ali Pasha met with Prince Ahmed in Altıntaş near Kütahya.¹³²⁴

On the other hand, when learned that a strong army was dispatched under the command of the grand vizier, Şahkulu decided to retreat.¹³²⁵ According to Kemalpaşazāde Şahkulu retreated because he learned that Bayezid II was alive.¹³²⁶ But Şahkulu did not explain this fact (the fact that Bayezid II was alive) to his adherents; rather he said, 'Our immediate need is a fortress to take shelter in case of a possible attack. Then assault on Bursa is easy.'¹³²⁷ Qizilbashs then proceeded toward Alaşehir.¹³²⁸ The begs of Aydın, Saruhan, and Menteşe came together in order to repel Şahkulu. Nevertheless, they could not agree on the command of one of them, thus, could not move coherently. Consequently they could not put an effective resistance against

begs and to gain them for his cause. ANMB asserts that upon Selim appointed to the governorship of Semendire, some leading statesmen, who realized that the balance was sliding in favor of Selim, wrote a letter to Ahmed and reported him the situation. The way that these statesmen offer Ahmed in order to gain the *saltanat* clearly puts forward how Şahkulu affairs became an issue of internal politics. More clearly, it reflects how the rebellion was regarded by high bureaucrats and princes as a tool that would provide legitimate base for grasping the throne, rather than a problem of public security to be solved. ANMB runs, "İttifakla Sultan Ahmede mektup gönderdiler. Hazret-i Şehr-yār'un (Selim) tevcīh olunan sancağa teveccühün i'lām itdikden sonra didiler ki: Hazret-i Hüdāvendigār ve kapu halkı sığār u kibār emr-i ma'hūd üzere cümle mütefiklerdir ve Rum-ili beğlerbeğisine tekrar istimāletler olunub cem'isi yek-cihet olmuşlardır. Hemān maslahāt-ı şehzādenin kızılbaş savaşında mansūr u muzaffer olmasına mevkūfdur. Anatolida olan madde-i fesād munkatı' olmağla zikr olan ma'ni sūret-pezīr olduğında şāyibe-i şübhe yokdur. Hemān mütevākı' ol tāyifenin zevālidir. Şehzāde hazretlerinden me'mūr olunan oldur ki ol müfsīdlerin şerrini ehl-i İslām üzerinden götür, tā ki müslimanların nefāyis-i enfās-ı müteberrikesi sebebiyle gunçe-i maksūdları şükūfte va handān ola..." ANMB, p. 214. HSE repeats more or less the same account. See HSE4, pp. 30-31.

¹³²⁴ TNSB, p. 253.

¹³²⁵ ULCY1, p. 70.

¹³²⁶ Ottoman chronicles follows KPZ on this issue. See the following footnote.

¹³²⁷ KPZ8b, p. 46. ANMB, HSE, and MNB follow the same line of narration. See ANMB, p. 178, 219; HSE4, pp. 46-47; MNB, p. 429.

¹³²⁸ HSE4, p. 47.

Şahkulu. He moved as he wished in south-western Anatolia and looted the region,¹³²⁹ eventually ending up in Antalya. The dwellers of Antalya armed and levied resistance against qizilbashs once more. But they had to retreat into the fortress, which was besieged by qizilbashs.¹³³⁰ To Kemalpaşazāde, it was during this siege that Şahkulu learned that Ali Pasha was coming with a strong army. Consequently he stopped the siege and retired to the mountainous region of Kızılkaya, which was very difficult to access, thus, was appropriate to take shelter.¹³³¹

Ali Pasha met with Prince Ahmed in Altuntas near Kütahya and marched on Şahkulu toward Antalya.¹³³² They surrounded Şahkulu in Kızılkaya. The siege lasted around one month.¹³³³ Ottoman historians argue that during this time Ali Pasha discussed with Prince Ahmed the sultan's - and his - intention to enthrone him after the suppression. This excited Ahmed so much that he thought himself as the sultan of the empire¹³³⁴ and demanded the obedience of janissaries and other soldiers during the siege.¹³³⁵ Nonetheless, janissaries refuted this demand stating that 'we do not offer our obedience to anyone while our *padişah* is alive!'¹³³⁶ He was further disappointed by the

¹³²⁹ KPZ8b, p. 46; ANMB, p. 220.

¹³³⁰ ANMB, p. 220.

¹³³¹ KPZ8b, p. 46. ANMB repeats the same account. See ANMB, p. 221.

¹³³² ALI, p. 929.

¹³³³ ALI states that Ali Pasha besieged the rebels here for 38 days. See ALI, p. 929. (One should keep in mind, however, that ALI usually makes mistakes in dates.) If we rely on his account than it appears that the grand vizier and Prince Ahmed arrived Kızılkaya in early May of 1511, for Şahkulu fled from Kızılkaya on June 15.

¹³³⁴ "Şehzāde hazretleri ol gün ol kadar inşirāh u irtiyāh hāsıl olub sevindi ki kendüyi ol gün hemān memālik-i Rüm'a pādişāh oldı sandı..." KPZ8b, pp. 53-54. Also consider HSE4, p. 58.

¹³³⁵ ALI re-phrases Ahmed's utterance to janissaries and *sipāhis*: "Saltanat bana mukarrer olmuştur. Bir el öndin bey'at ü teba'iyet idenleri 'uluvv-i himmetim hāmi vü rā'īdir" ALI, p. 929. SLZ follows ALI's account. See SLZ1, p. 453. Also consider MNB, p. 430.

¹³³⁶ See, for example, *Vekāyi-i Sultan Bāyezit ve Selim Han*, p. 53, recited in TNSB, p. 254. Also consider ANMB, p. 223; ALI, p. 929; SLZ1, p. 453. ANMB's account slightly differs. According to ANMB, Ali Pasha attempted to bring Prince Ahmed to the commandership of the whole army. His aim was that, when Ahmed would gain the victory at the head of the army his way to the throne would totally open. Ali Pasha uttered janissaries that "From now on your commander is Prince Ahmed." But they opposed to this

arrival of a messenger from the Porte. The messenger reported that Prince Selim had arrived near Edirne and taken the Province of Semendire.¹³³⁷

On the other hand, while Ali Pasha and Prince Ahmed were discussing how to secure the throne, Şahkulu was in search of breaking the siege.¹³³⁸ As Kemalpaşazāde explains there were two passages from the mountainous region that the rebels took shelter in. One was secured by Ali Pasha while the other branch of the Ottoman army under Haydar Pasha's¹³³⁹ command was commissioned to blockade the other passage to the Province of Karaman.¹³⁴⁰ Şahkulu must have understood that he had little chance against the grand vizier so he assaulted Haydar Pasha's forces. After a pitch battle Haydar Pasha was defeated, he himself falling in the battlefield,¹³⁴¹ and the qizilbashes moved toward Konya on Rebī I 18, 917 (June 15, 1511).¹³⁴²

decision arguing that "Our sultan appointed Ali Pasha to our command. We would not accept any other sultan while Sultan Bayezid is alive!" See ANMB, pp. 50-1.

¹³³⁷ KPZ8b, p. 54; ANMB, p. 225; HSE4, pp. 59-60.

¹³³⁸ HSE bitterly criticizes Ali Pasha for leaving aside the fight with the rebels and so much occupied in preparations to ascend Ahmed to the throne. He says, "*Ayaklananlarla uğraşmayı bir yana koymuş toy gereklerini tedārike kendini vermişti.*" HSE4, pp. 56-7.

¹³³⁹ Haydar Pasha was the *lala* of Prince Sheinshah, who was the *beylerbey* of Karaman. See KPZ8b, p. 54; TNSB, p. 254.

¹³⁴⁰ KPZ8b, p. 54. Also regard TNSB, p. 254; ANMB, p. 226; MNB, pp. 430-1. SLZ states, Ali Pasha divided Ottoman army into three: one was commanded by Haydar Pasha, the other by Prince Ahmed, and the third branch by Ali Pasha himself. Each branch blockaded different sides of the mountain. See SLZ1, p. 453.

¹³⁴¹ ANMB, p. 227; HSE4, pp. 60-61; SLZ1, p. 453.

¹³⁴² Another reason for setting up towards Konya might well be Şahkulu's friendship with Prince Şehinşah, the governor of Karaman. Although we do not have clear evidence on the correspondence between the two, it is evident from archival documents that Şehinşah somehow sympathetic towards the qizilbash movement. Perhaps it was because of this fact that among the four living princes only he did not join the struggle for the throne. Nonetheless his position was less appreciated because of his qizilbash tendency. Haydar Pasha, when was the *lala* of the prince, first tried to persuade Şehinşah to abandon his sympathetic attitudes toward qizilbashes. When he realized that the prince was convinced with qizilbash ideas, he reported the situation to the Porte. According to his report, two qizilbash khalifas, called Fenāi and Dellak, influenced the prince and caused him to appropriate qizilbahs ideals. Haydar Pasha states further that the prince and qizilbashes, most possibly Şahkulu and his adherents, agreed on that sooner either the prince or the qizilbashes would join the other. Haydar Pasha stressed the urgency of the issue and warned the sultan not to regard this affair in parallel with others problems, but as the first priority; in order to solve the problem the sultan should come in person and do whatever needed without any delay. Otherwise the province of Karaman would be lost. The whole text of original letter runs, "*Sultanım Hazretlerinin hāk-i pāye-i ... arz-ı bende budur ki,*

According to ‘Āli, the qizilbashes moved toward the province of Rūm because they wanted to go to the realm of the Shah.¹³⁴³ Şahkulu arrived in Beyşehir on June 17.¹³⁴⁴ Then he proceeded to Kayseri.¹³⁴⁵ Ali Pasha could learn only after two days that Şahkulu had fled from Kızılkaya.¹³⁴⁶ He was so enthusiastic to finish the rebellion as soon as possible and underestimated the power of Şahkulu that he left most of his

Fenāyi ve Dellāk İbrahim demekle ma'rūf mezhepsiz mülhidler ve müfsidler ve kafirün-ı eşeddler şehzāde hazretlerini bilkülliye idlāl edüb tarikden ve tabiatden çıkardılar. Hatta bir derecedir ki ankaribüz-zaman mahzulin ve mel'uneyn kızılbaş cemaatının hazelehumullahı taalā ve şehzadenin ittifakları bunun üzerine olmuşdur ki şehzāde anlara yahud anlar şehzadeye mülakat olalar. Zamir-i münir-i cihān-āranuza mestūr olmayub bir dürlü dahi mülāhaza buyurulmiya öyle olsa sultanım hazretlerine vācib ve lāzımdır ki bu maslahatı sāyir mühim mesāliha kıyas etmeyüb cemi' mesālihden akdem ve ehemmiyilüm ta'cil ale'ta'cil devlet-ü saadetle bu canibe gelüb her ne tarik def-ü ref mümkin ise def etmeğe ikdām oluna. Billahil azim memleket-i Karaman heman elden çıkmışdur. Bir an ve bir lahza tevakkuf cā'iz değildir. Şöylece mülāhaza buyurula: bāki garāyibin ve fesadın nihāyeti yokdur. İnşaallah anlar dahī hāk-i pāy-ı şerefinize mahft olmiya. Bāki sultanım hazretlerin hāk-i pāy-ı şeriflerine il'ām hācet değildir. Ömrü devlet bāki ba'd.

Abdükiim el-muhlīs Haydar el-fakir.” (TSA, document E. 5590. The back side of this document reads ‘*Haydar Paşa'dan gelen mektup*’, the letter came from Haydar Pasha. Most part of the document is published in ULCY1, p. 69.)

On the other hand, the grand vizier Ali Pasha also wrote a letter reporting the situation of the prince when he was on the way to suppress the Şahkulu rebellion. Ali Pasha writes, the prince is yet in our side. But it seems that he feels discomfort because of Ahmed’s arrival in Eskisehir. It must be because of that, he called all of his *kapı kulu* soldiers, who was then with Haydar Pasha, and all of the Karaman troops to his retinue. Ali Pasha refers to the letter of Haydar Pasha quoted above and repeats the ‘evil-intentions’ of the prince. He also points out that the prince freed two captives, who were captured from the qizilbash army and sent o him. At the end of his letter, Ali Pasha informs the sultan that he sent Haydar Pasha to Konya in order to inspect the situation of the prince more closely and he asks to the sultan how to behave regarding Şehinşah. (TSA, document, 6352. The facsimile copy of this document is published in TNSB, p. 228.)

Indeed, Şehinşah’s link with the qizilbash movement was already established before the Şahkulu rebellion. Three letters from the Mamluk governor of Aleppo, Hayır Bey, clearly reveals his cooperation with Shah Ismail. In his letters Hayır Bey informs the Porte on the correspondence of the prince with Ismail and Ustaçloğlu Muhammed, one of the leading generals of Ismail and the governor of Diyarbakır. Learning from his letters, in 1510, Mamay Bey, the governor of Divriği, detained three messengers, one carrying a letter of Sahah Ismail, second carrying a letter of Ustaçloğlu Muhammed, and third carrying a letter of Prince Şehinşah. These three messengers were sent to Hayır Bey with their letters. Hayır Bey dispatched the messenger of the prince and three letters to the Porte through Prince Ahmed. (TSA, document E 5594. The facsimile copies of these letters are published in TNSB, p 240. See also TNSB, p. 239.) But Şehinşah left the political arena soon after. He died on July 2, 1511, in the same day that Ali Pasha was killed. See ULCY2, p. 123; KPZ8b, p. 55; ANMB, pp. 230-31; HSE4, p. 69; SLZ, p. 457.

¹³⁴³ “...Karaman cānibine dođrı inmişler ve çekilüb ‘Āsitān-ı Şāh-ı kerem’ diyü diyār-ı Rūm’a vusül bulmuşlar.” ALI, p. 929.

¹³⁴⁴ TSA, document E. 2667, partly published in ULCY1, pp. 71-2, footnote 24. According to Uluçay’s interpretation of this document, which is a letter of Ahmed, Ali Pasha arrived Kızılkaya on Rebī 18, 917. This interpretation seems, however, not reasonable for two days later Şahkulu was in Alaşehir.

¹³⁴⁵ MNB, p. 431.

¹³⁴⁶ HSE4, p. 61; TNSB, p. 255; MNB, p. 431.

soldiers behind;¹³⁴⁷ he chose 500 janissaries¹³⁴⁸ and mounted them on horses. In addition, some cavalymen from Karaman and Rum soldiers also joined him. Ali Pasha left Ahmed behind¹³⁴⁹ and followed Şahkulu with these few soldiers.¹³⁵⁰

Şahkulu moved westward. But Ali Pasha managed to catch the rebels in Çubuk near Sivas.¹³⁵¹ Kemalpaşazâde states that the rebels were exhausted and were not inclined to fight with Ali Pasha. But realizing that the soldiers of Ali Pasha were fewer than the half of them they decided to fight.¹³⁵² Furthermore, Ali Pasha did not wait to summon whole of his soldiers, but immediately assaulted Şahkulu on Rebî II 5, 917 (July 2, 1511).¹³⁵³ This improvidence, however, would cost him his life.¹³⁵⁴ The battle

¹³⁴⁷ His words as reformulated in Celalzâde's Selimnâme shows how he underestimated and despised qizilbashs: "...Kendü emsâli mukârin ve musâhipleri ile ittifâk itdiler ki ardına düşdüğüümüz düşmene ne i'tibâr, bir bölük murdâr cimriler, Türkler, Kızılbaşlardur, kaçdılar. Hemân piyâde olan yeniçerilerden bir mikdârını atlandurup müfsîdleri kaçurmıyalum, deyü tedbir itdiler..." CLZ, p. 132. KPZ's account sheds light to the psychology of Ali Pasha: "*Haber geldi ki ol gümrâhlar Karaman cânibine hücum idüb Haydar Paşa ile olan askerle mukâbil olub, ol iki bin kişi târumâr olub, Haydar Paşa şehâdet mertebesin bulur. Ali Paşa bu haberi işidicek şikârın aldırmuş şahîn gibi serm-sâr düşer, fi'l-hâl kapu halkından ve Yeniçeri tâifesinden ve sâir erbâb-ı timardan ilgara iktidarı olanı cem' ider, mezkûrların 'akablarınca kovub...*" See KPZ8b, p. 54.

¹³⁴⁸ According to ALI 1.000 janissaries.

¹³⁴⁹ TSA, document E. 2667. Partly published in ULCY1, pp. 71-2, footnote, 24. According to a letter of Ahmed, he killed the rest of qizilbashs who took shelter on the mountains: "...*badehu bu muhibleri Hisardağı demekle puhte ki suubetle meşhurdur ol bi-dinin bazı feceresi ana sığınmışlar imiş ve andan gayrı bir nice puhtelerin fethine birkaç gün tevakkuf edüb bi-inayetillahi teala hüdavendigar devletinde feth olunub cümle puhteler ve perakende dağlarda tutulan üç bin mikdârı kızılbaş melayin kılıçdan geçdikden sonra...*" TSA, document E. 3062. ALI says, Ahmed returned to his province since he was disappointed with the disobedience of *kuls* (*kapu halkı*). See ALI, p. 929.

¹³⁵⁰ Prince Ahmed killed some qizilbashs left on Hisardağı and moved to Afyon with the rest of army. ULCY1, p. 72; TNSB, p. 255.

¹³⁵¹ ULCY1, p. 72. KPZ mentions this place as Sarmısaklı while Idris-i Bitlisi, HSE, and MNB recount as Gökçay, and ALI as Sarmaşlık. See KPZ8b, p. 54; IDR, p. 88; HSE4, p. 61; ALI, p. 929; MNB, p.431. SLZ recites as Gökhan. See SLZ1, p. 453.

¹³⁵² KPZ8b, p. 54.

¹³⁵³ ULCY1, p. 72. Consider also CLZ, pp. 133-4.

¹³⁵⁴ "...*Milk-i Rûma düstür-ı vakûr iken nâ-dânlıkla birkaç meşhûr cimrinin elinde helâk, eyvân-ı felek-âşiyân-ı Osmânîde Asaf-mekân iken, bilmezlikle birkaç bî-din ü bî-insâfların destinde pâymâl-ı kabza-i hâk oldi...*" CLZ, p. 136. HSE depicts the death of Ali Pasha in hands of qizilbashs in quite an ironic manner:

"*Yer yer Paşamız düşman ile idüb cengi,
Gör şehid oldı en sonunda Ali gibi.
Ali'nin dostlarıyız dirken ol lânetlikler,
Ali'yi öldürmeye bunca çaba itdiler.
Sevgiden dostluktan ururken bunca lafi,*

ended with no victor. But the rebels managed to kill the highest bureaucrat of the Ottoman state.¹³⁵⁵ The fate of Şahkulu is not clear. His death in the battlefield was rumored.¹³⁵⁶ According to some hearsay, however, he was heavily wounded but not killed.¹³⁵⁷ Kemalpaşazāde summarizes the situation: “*Mezkūr paşa düşecek Şeytan Kulu didikleri müfsīd-pelīd cenk içinde nā-bedīd oldu, yer delindi yere mi girdi, göğe mü çıktı, kimse bilmedi.*”¹³⁵⁸

Most probably to shadow his passive participation in the suppression of the rebellion¹³⁵⁹, Ahmed accuses, in his report to the Porte, Anatolian and Karaman *sipāhis* for the defeat.¹³⁶⁰ Even so, his report includes a certain degree of truth regarding the Anatolian and Karaman soldiers. In his letter, Ahmed says that the end of Şahkulu was not clear: whether he was killed or had fled to the east. Then he asks the Porte: ‘Even if

Ali'ye çektiler kanlı kızıl nacağı.

Ali de küskün ol kötülük eyleyenden,

Soylu olan kaçır hilekārın övgüsünden” HSE4, pp. 62-3. Also see HR, p. 154.

¹³⁵⁵ TSA, document E. 3062. Also see ULCY1, p. 72; KPZ8b, p. 54;

¹³⁵⁶ According to HR, ALI and SLZ, he was killed in the battlefield. See HR, p. 155; ALI, p. 930; SLZ1, p. 454. Also regard, Tekindağ, “Şah Kulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı”, *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 4, 1959, p. 58.

¹³⁵⁷ Certain Hacı Mustafa wrote after the battle, “...*Amma aralarında reisleri olan Şahkulu halife dedikleri mühlide cenkde tüfenk dokundu öldü deyu mesāvi dahī varmış. Şimdiki hinde Erzincan'a can attı gitti derler...*” TSA, document E. 6664.

¹³⁵⁸ KPZ8b, p. 55. CLZ, HSE, and MNB repeat the same account. See CLZ, p. 137; HSE4, p. 63; MNB, p. 431. Prince Ahmed's letter is not clear on Şahkulu as well: “...*imdi eğer ol Şeytankulu dedikleri lain düştüğü vaki ise hüvel matlub-ı ila cehennem ve bi's' el-mesir ve eğer düşmeyüb zir-u inhizam üzre şark tarafına çıkub gitdi, dahi gitmediği takdirce beher hal onun def'i ne ile olur...*” TSA, document E. 3062.

¹³⁵⁹ For example, one of the contemporary sources depicts Ahmed's position in a pejorative manner as follows: In this side, while Ali Pasha was fighting with qızilbashes, Prince Ahmed was waiting with the rest of army. His dream was that Ali Pasha would return victorious and they would prepare for taking over the throne. But his dreams bitterly collapsed when he heard that Ali Pasha deceased. See ANMB, pp. 229-30.

¹³⁶⁰ Fisher, relying on the Italian sources, argues that many of Karamanian leaders participated in the rebellion from the beginning. Their incentives were more political, however, than religious beliefs. See FSH, p. 97. Nevertheless one should take this assertion with caution for none of Ottoman sources mention Karamanian leaders participation in the rebellion in any stages of it.

he was not killed and did not go to the East (Persia), with which soldiers would he be punished?’ Ahmed stresses that the soldiers of Anatolia were seriously deficient.¹³⁶¹

Idris also states that some Karaman soldiers fought reluctantly.¹³⁶² Uzunçarşılı argues that Karaman soldiers had secretly reached agreement on leaving Ali Pasha already before the battle. During the fight they retreated.¹³⁶³ ‘Ali’s account goes further. He argues that the rebels and Karaman soldiers in the Ottoman army had secretly communicated before the fight and agreed on not to fight each other. During the battle qizilbashs shouted: “Oh Karaman soldiers! What happened to our agreement with you?” Then they gave up the fight and left Ali Pasha face to face with qizilbash rebels.¹³⁶⁴

The rebels, choosing Halife Baba as their leader,¹³⁶⁵ retreated to the fortress of Hafik, but followed by some Ottoman forces composed of janissaries and other armed

¹³⁶¹ “...Şeytankulu dedikleri lâ’in düştüğü vâki ise hüvel matlûb-ı ilâ cehennem ve bi’s’ el-mesîr ve eğer düşmeyüb zir u inhiżâm üzre şark tarafına çıkub gitti, dahi gitmediği takdirce beher hal onun def’i ne ile olur? Anadolu askerinin hod hâli ne derece muhtel olduğu malumları olmuştur. Zira ki Anadolunun kadîmleri vesâyir yararları gitti yerlerine müselleme ve yaya reaya ve gayrı bî-hamiyyet kimesneler nasbolumub Anadolu askeri askerlikden gitmiştir deyu istima’ olunurdu, içlerine girmekle hakikat-ı hâlleri müşâhade edildi...” TSA, document E. 3062. In his another letter to the Porte, Ahmed further accuses the Anatolian troops: “İnhâ olunur ki bu hâyinler zulümleri ile ibâdullahı pâyimal ettikten sonra izzet-i saltanatı bi’l-küllîye ref’ eylediler. Hemân hasma mukâbil oldukları gibi yirmi otuz âdem düşmeden bunlar firar olmuş. Kangırı’dan ve Engürü’den bir ahada yara yetişmemişdir. Tamam malum oldu. Ve Rumdan bir kimseye ok düşmemiş. Heman Ali Paşa merhum ol kadar cenk etmiş ki bi had müddet-i medide cenkde üzerine dönüp varmamış. Eğer Ali Paşa üzerine beş yüz adem dönmüş olaydı hasmı aldıydı derler. Ve Sultan Alaeddinin cengin acep söylerler melâhide sancağı yıkmış ve bunun atına seğırtmişler ve yine at çekmişler. Ahar görmüşler ki alurlar kaçurmuşlar. Melâhide şehzade idiğünü sonra bilmişler. Ardınca haylı kovmuşlar. Elhamdülillah halas olmuş. Şunları koyub kaçmak Hüdavendigâr’ı koyub kaçmak değil midir? Bu ne rüsvaylıktır, nedir? Gayret-i din ve gayret-i saltanat yere depildi gitti. Yerler ve gökler inlediler. İbadullahın dâdları arşdan geçdi. Bu melunlar neleri varsa vardılar ol melunlara verdiler, geldiler. Halkın her nesin bulurlarsa alıyorlar. İş elden gitti, dahi ne vakta değin uyurlar. Uyanası olmadı. Şu işleri eden türkdür ve birkaç beylerbeyi elinden ciğerleri hun olmuş kimselerdir.” See TSA, document E. 6352, recited in ULCY1, pp. 72-73, footnote, 26. Tansel published another document from TSA with the same number, but of totally different content. See TNSB, p. 228. I could not see the original document in TSA. But it is not unusual in this archive to classify two or more documents under same number.

¹³⁶² IDRS, p. 88.

¹³⁶³ UZC2, p. 231.

¹³⁶⁴ ALI, p. 930.

¹³⁶⁵ HR, p. 155.

men recruited from among the local population.¹³⁶⁶ Although arrow skirmish occurred occasionally, neither side dared to attack the other. The qizilbashes then moved to Erzincan.¹³⁶⁷ A letter of Prince Ahmed's to the Porte shows that Şahkulu forces had been moving in coordination with the qizilbashes of the *eyālet-i Rum*. Perhaps it was because of this co-operation that they moved toward Sivas from Kızılkaya. As Ahmed reported to the Porte, already before his confrontation with Ali Pasha, Şahkulu met with some qizilbashes led by Kürd Halid, Zeynel, and Şah Ali, who were among the leading Safavid khalifas active in *eyālet-i Rum*, and came to Suşehri. They attacked the surrounding villages. In the meantime some other qizilbashes gathered in Geldigelen of Amasya, who immediately moved to join Şahkulu. But when they arrived in Suşehri, Şahkulu had already set off to Erzincan. Kürd Halid then returned to his hometown, while Zeynel stayed in Erzincan and Şah Ali went to Kelkit.¹³⁶⁸

The ultimate destination of qizilbash rebels was the realm of the shah. On their way they attacked a caravan coming from Persia and killed many people.¹³⁶⁹ Among them was a famous religious scholar Ibrahim Shebisterī, who was the author of *Enbiyā-nāme*, and his son.¹³⁷⁰ At the end they arrived in Tabriz. Ismail was in Iraq when he heard that the rebels were coming to his country.¹³⁷¹ He immediately set out for Tabriz

¹³⁶⁶ TSA, document E. 6664.

¹³⁶⁷ HR, p. 155; ULCY1, p. 73.

¹³⁶⁸ TSA, document E. 3062.

¹³⁶⁹ HR, p. 155.

¹³⁷⁰ IDRS, p. 88. HSE recites this event in most dramatic manner. He says, on realizing that the looters would kill his son, Shaykh Ibrahim Şebisteri requested from robbers to kill him before his son. But the 'heartless' robbers killed his son in front of the shaykh, and then 'martyred' the shaykh. See HSE4, p. 65. Also consider SLZ1, p. 455; MNB, p. 431.

¹³⁷¹ IDRS, p. 88. HR says, however, that during that time Shah Ismail had returned from Khorasan, from the campaign on Shaybānī Khan, and stationed in Şehriyar, a town close to Ray.

and arrived there before the Anatolian qizilbashes.¹³⁷² He dispersed new comers to several troops, and then summoned the leaders of the rebellion.¹³⁷³

After a cruel interrogation surprisingly the shah executed some leaders of the rebellion.¹³⁷⁴ Hoca Saadeddin gives details of the interrogation of the Shah and his execution of the leaders of the rebellion. He states that the Shah first dispersed the Anatolian qizilbashes to different troops of his army, and then ordered to prepare for a feast. Two great caldrons were filled with water and placed on a fire. The guests thought they were boiling water to cook a meal, but did not know that these caldrons would become the hell of the leader of the rebels and his assistant.¹³⁷⁵

Ismail's attitude towards the rebels, as reported by Hoca Saadeddin, was quite unexpected and is not easy to interpret. Especially the punishment superimposed on these Safavid disciples was not something anticipated by the rebels. If we rely on Hoca Saadeddin, Ismail called the leader of the rebellious group and his assistants (*vezirs*) to his presence; his first question was that "Under the protection of my father Sultan Bayezid, you were living with your families and children in peace. So what was the reason why you became disobedient and revolted?"¹³⁷⁶ They replied, "Since he got older, the disease of his body has caused the disorder of the country. He relinquished from measures that would restore the order, and left state issues to his viziers. Consequently oppression spread. We could no more stand their unjust practices and rose

¹³⁷² SLZ states that when Ismail learned in Iraq that such a crowded group was coming to his country his troops were dispersed. Because of that he feared for they could cause turmoil in his country. He hurried to gather soldiers and arrive in Tabriz before new-coming qizilbashes. See SLZ1, p. 454.

¹³⁷³ IDRS, p. 88.

¹³⁷⁴ HR, p. 155.

¹³⁷⁵ HSE4, p. 66. Also regard SLZ1, p. 455.

¹³⁷⁶ "*Babam Sultan Bayezid Han hazretlerinin koruyucu gölgesinde bunca zamandan berü çoluk ve çocuğunuzla ferahlık içinde yaşarken neden gerekdi ki boynunu bağluluk lālesinden çıkarub ayaklanma doruğuna tırmandın?*" HSE4, pp. 66-7.

up. On the other hand, it was our sincere desire to put our faces on the Porte of the Shah and see his beautiful presence. We thought that it would be an appreciated service to be a slave at the Porte of the Shah. Thus we left our country and came.” Then the Shah said, “Why was it necessary to put the country in the fire?” The leader of the rebels answered this question as follows: “We dared to loot and plunder because we wanted to get revenge of the oppressions to which we had been exposed and to add more men to the rebellion.” The Shah said, “This answer is not acceptable. You say you love us! While you know that the relationship between Sultan Bayezid and I is just like the relationship of a father and a son, did you not realize that your movement would damage our relationship with the Ottoman Sultan? How did you especially dare to plunder our caravan? Plundering caravans is the job of robbers. What you did is not compatible with what you say, and falsifies your words.” Then he could not find anything to say. Ismail continued, “And with which sultan’s permission did you put this hat on your head?” He replied, “It is the sign of *gazā*!” The Shah said, “It is up to the permission of sultans to put on such hats. Moreover, when did you become *gāzi*? Is it *gazā* to spill the blood of Muslims?” On concluding the conversation with this severe reproof, by a sign of the Shah the leader of the rebels and his vizier were put into the boiling caldrons. Other begs of rebellious group were also put to death.¹³⁷⁷

Hoca Saadeddin mentions an interesting event in this context. On disapproving of the leader of rebel’s vestry, *gāzi* hat (*otaga*) Ismail turned toward one of his leading commanders Dev Sultan and said, ‘You can take this *otaga* if you like!’ Dev Sultan put

¹³⁷⁷ HSE, pp. 66-8. The conversation between the Shah and leaders of the rebels is cited also by SLZ. But his account is nothing but a replication of HSE’s account. See pp. 455-7.

the *otaga* on and prostrated ‘according to their falsified rite.’¹³⁷⁸ Then the Shah checked over the rest of the group. He selected those whom he found useful and let the rest free, confiscating their properties and horses. Hoca Saadeddin points out with pleasure that they ended up in the streets with their women and children and became beggars. In this way they found the sentence of their evil action.¹³⁷⁹

Hoca Saadeddin’s account¹³⁸⁰ on the end of rebels is not easy to interpret. Especially Shah Ismail’s attitude towards the rebellious qizilbashes of the Teke region seems to be odd for many devoted qizilbash fighters in his army were from the same region.¹³⁸¹ Hasan Rumlu explains this ‘unexpected’ action of the shah as a punishment for killing the tradesmen.¹³⁸² According to Hammer, two concerns led Ismail to punish the leaders of rebellion. First of all, he wanted to consolidate his absolute suzerainty over his subjects by showing cruelty against disobedience. Secondly, he wanted to show Bayezid II that he desired to maintain warm relations with him.¹³⁸³ However, Hammer’s reasoning seems neither satisfactory nor consistent. Before all, he contradicts himself. He writes that Ismail dispatched an envoy just after punishing the rebels and presented his good wishes; however, the same envoy presented itself to Bayezid, the head of Shaybānī Khan. Indeed, Hammer, as he often does, makes mistake in dating the events. As Fisher determines, Ismail’s envoy arrived at the Porte on May 30, 1511,¹³⁸⁴ more

¹³⁷⁸ HSE4, p. 67. The same scene is cited by SLZ. See SLZ1, 457.

¹³⁷⁹ For the whole of the conversation in Turkish see HSE4, pp. 66-8. I omitted to quote the original version of the conversation since it would occupy much space.

¹³⁸⁰ Thought not giving details Hasan Rumlu verifies the tragic end of the leaders of this rebellion. See HR, p. 155.

¹³⁸¹ They are referred in contemporary sources as Tekelü, literally means the man comes from the region of Teke. Tekelü was a tribal entity within the qizilbash army of Shah Ismail and played effective role in power-play during the early years of Tahmasb, who was a child then.

¹³⁸² HR, p. 155.

¹³⁸³ HAM2, pp. 383-4.

¹³⁸⁴ FSH, p. 99.

than one month earlier than the rebels arrived in Tābriz. Thus it is not possible as Hammer argues, that this envoy, which carried Shaybānī Khan's head, could possibly inform Bayezid on Ismail's punishment of the rebels for it had not taken place yet. Furthermore, putting aside this chronological mistake, his argumentation lacks internal consistency. Because, as Hammer points out, what Ismail did was nothing more than challenge the Ottoman Sultan for Shaybānī Khan was a sunni ruler.¹³⁸⁵ 'Āli clearly explains this point. He records that Ismail sent the head of Shaybānī Khan with the message that 'the present from the mature son to the blissful father'.¹³⁸⁶ 'Āli interprets Ismail's message as the intention of the enmity of opposition by invoking the chain of love.¹³⁸⁷

Fisher also comes out with similar reasoning. He puts forward two possible reasons: Ismail condemned and executed the rebels because 1) they robbed his caravan¹³⁸⁸, 2) he (Ismail) wanted to show that he had not directly sponsored the rebellion and to avoid any complicity or doubt in the matter.¹³⁸⁹ Fisher's account, however, is no less ambiguous. Although he presents the second reason as more probable than the first, just in the following sentence he says, "Evidence for the latter assumption is not wanting."¹³⁹⁰ Then he recounts the envoy of the Shah, which brought the head of Shaybānī Khan to the Porte.

¹³⁸⁵ HAM2, p. 384.

¹³⁸⁶ ALI, p. 935.

¹³⁸⁷ "...Şeybek Hānla savařub bařın kesdi. 'Veled-i reřidin vālid-i sa'īde armaęanıdır' diyū Sultan Bayezid cenābına (cānibine?) gönderdi. Ya'ni silsile-i muhabbeti tahrīk sūretinde simā'-ı 'udvān-ı muhālefeti ziyāde kasdın eyledi..." ALI, p. 935.

¹³⁸⁸ This argument was recently re-echoed by Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, who underlined that the prosperity of Safavid empire was intimately depended on the international trade; thus Shah Ismail was eager to guarantee the safety of trade roads. See Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les ottomans les safavides et leurs voisins*, Istanbul, 1987, p. 27.

¹³⁸⁹ FSH, p. 99.

¹³⁹⁰ FSH, p. 99.

As for the first one, one may attribute certain credibility to such an explanation. But it needs to be further clarified. The most reasonable explanation of Ismail's reaction turns out to be the punishment of disobedience. But the question is still to be clarified: whose and what sort of disobedience did Ismail punish? And why did he need to turn this punishment into a show?

It is certain from archival evidence and contemporary sources, as evaluated above, that Şahkulu started his movement as a khalifa of Ismail and in communication with him.¹³⁹¹ To give an example, an official inspector, while reporting his observations on early movement of rebels, wrote to the Porte that the rebels were propagating among people that the Shah himself would come in early summer (*zerdalu vaktinde*), the country is ours.¹³⁹² As is already determined the rebellion started in early April. So it seems likely that during the early days of the rebellion, Şahkulu preached among his adherents the idea that the Shah would also come to the country of Rum and meet them.

İshak Çeşebi records that after defeating Korkud's army in Alaşehir on May 3, 1511 Şahkulu said to his comrades, "We now grasped the suzerainty over the Province of Anatolia!"¹³⁹³ As already delineated he assigned governors to captured cities. Ottoman historians congruently underline that Şahkulu behaved like a ruler. According to Tekindağ, the ultimate aim of Şahkulu was to establish a state in the name of the Shah in Anatolia.¹³⁹⁴

¹³⁹¹ As careful reader would immediately grasp, in terms of archival evidence the certitude of second assertion is far less than the first. In the meantime, it is natural consequence of the first argument.

¹³⁹² TSA, document E. 6187.

¹³⁹³ "*Anadolu Vilâyetini kabza-i tasarrufa getürdük.*" See İshak Çelebi, *Selim-nâme*, İstanbul Üniversitesi Kütüphanesi, no. 2614, f. 12b. Recited in Tekindağ, "Şahkulu Baba Tekeli İsyanı", *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi*, 4, 1959, p. 55.

¹³⁹⁴ Tekindağ, p. 54.

Even so, it is of no less a probability that in later stages of rebellion he might have seized the dream of independent suzerainty, or at least he moved independently from the shah. One feels legitimate in asking the following questions: what was the ultimate aim of Şahkulu? Was it well-determined from the beginning, or changed according to the course of events? A close study of contemporary sources leads us to pursue a second way of perception. Before all, the itinerary of Şahkulu and Ismail's treatment of the rebels include clues about changing goals and incentives of Şahkulu. It seems likely that he initiated the rebellion in the name of the Shah with purely religious incentives. But parallel to the accumulation of *sipāhis* and gaining successive victories, he began to think his own suzerainty. As already delineated the military campaigns of Şahkulu were mainly led by dismissed *sipāhis*, who were less affiliated to, if not totally uninterested in, the qizilbash cause, but among the foremost advisers – especially in military and political affairs - of him.

If his aim would be to support the Shah, Şahkulu must have proceeded eastward or toward the qizilbash regions, at least after the battle of Kütahya. But he moved toward the center of the empire. He turned toward the qizilbash zones and Persia only when he totally lost his hope to capture the country. According to 'Āli, when Ali Pasha besieged them in Kızılkaya, qizilbashes fled from the Karaman side and moved toward the province of Rūm because they wanted to pass the realm of the Shah.¹³⁹⁵ It seems that Şahkulu fell under the influence of the *sipāhis* in his ranks soon after the outbreak of the rebellion. Under their influence, he tended to pursue the idea of suzerainty on his own turn and behaved independently from the Shah. The victory over Karagöz Pasha outside

¹³⁹⁵ "...Karaman cānibine doğru inmişler ve çekilüb 'Āsitān-ı Şāh-ı kerem' diyū diyār-ı Rūm'a vusūl bulmuşlar." ALI, p. 929.

Kütahya seems to be the turning point in the political aspirations of Şahkulu. As referred to in this study already, Ottoman reporters and historians need to indicate that after capturing Karagöz Pasha, Şahkulu decided to execute him according to the suggestions of the *sipāhis* of Teke.¹³⁹⁶ Defeating the Anatolian *beylerbey* of the Ottoman Empire, Şahkulu strongly believed in gaining the control of the whole of western Anatolia for himself. Indeed, immediately after this victory his attack on Prince Korkud's province and then his march on Bursa reflect Şahkulu's big aspiration. Thus, it must have been exactly this independent movement (from the Shah) that Ismail severely punished.¹³⁹⁷

6.4. CONCLUSION

Idris-i Bitlisī records that from the emergence of the rebellion to Ali Pasha's death 50.000 people were killed from both sides, thousands of houses were plundered and many people were enslaved.¹³⁹⁸ The rebellious qizilbashs successively defeated a number of Ottoman armies, one of which was commanded by the *beylerbey* of Anatolia and the other by the grand vizier. The Şahkulu rebellion deeply weakened the authority of the Ottoman government in Anatolia. It also caused serious mass deportation. Apart from the killed people, those who managed to flee from the sword of rebels took shelter in the mountainous regions; they abandoned their fields, vineyards, gardens, and even their homes. Accordingly agricultural production lessened seriously. As a result, the rebellion severely damaged the economy of the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁹⁹

¹³⁹⁶ See, for example, TSA, document E 5035.

¹³⁹⁷ In the meantime, one should not disregard that the reliability of HSE's account is at stake. It would not be wrong to suppose that he exaggerated the treatment of Ismail against the rebels, because of well-known reasons. Even so, Ismail's discontent attitude toward the adherents of Şahkulu rebellion can not be denied.

¹³⁹⁸ IDRS, p. 89.

¹³⁹⁹ Compare ULCY1, pp. 73-74.

Arguably more significant than its damage on economy, the Şahkulu rebellion created deep cracks in the social structure of the empire. I have already evaluated that, starting with the activities of Shaykh Junayd in the mid-fifteenth century, a large group of Safavid followers, principally from nomadic tribes, emerged in Anatolia. In the course of time, we can observe a two-fold process regarding this social segment of Ottoman Anatolia: on one hand their number increased through gaining new recruits, and on the other hand, the religious doctrine and practices that they followed was developed further. By the first decade of the sixteenth century, the new synthesis of the Safavid Order, which can be called ‘qizilbash way of Islamic mysticism’, for its most essential parts, had already appeared. Thus the adherents of this ‘path’, or the original word in Turkish ‘yol’, already formed an identifiable religio-social entity. The socio-cultural background of this group was constituted mostly by Turkoman nomadic tribal element, who had already been alienated from the Ottoman regime. By the Şahkulu revolt, however, the qizilbash society of Anatolia, which was still congealing its religious-political identity, was not only alienated from the Ottoman state agents but also from the sunni population of Anatolia as well.

The outcomes of this rebellion in both domestic and international politics were decisive. In the domestic affairs, before all, Ahmed lost his most valuable and influential supporter: the grand vizier Ali Pasha. This rebellion’s consequence in the domestic politics was quite paradoxical. It would not be an exaggeration to assert that the Şahkulu rebellion facilitated greatly Selim’s capture of the throne. A passage in *Künhü’l-Ahbār*, even if it was later fabrication, reveals how Selim used Ahmed’s passive stand against Şahkulu to legitimize his dynastic claims. ‘Āli states that Selim defeated his brother Ahmed and captured him. Ahmed beseeched Selim, “Oh my sultan! Do not kill me!

Show me a small corner of hospice so that I will live there.” Selim’s answer clearly reflects how Şahkulu’s defeat diminished the prestige of Ahmed and ended his chance for the throne: “You were a respected prince with uncountable soldiers in your retinue. Some unbelievers rose up nearby your province. They executed the *beylerbey* of your father. If your eye of fortune was open you would have handled this problem; you would have punished them without needing the troops from the side of your father.¹⁴⁰⁰ Otherwise, I would not feel any reluctance because of your useless body!”¹⁴⁰¹

Consequently, it is not an exaggeration to argue that the great upheaval of qizilbashes paradoxically presented the throne to Selim, who established his policy on qizilbash enmity¹⁴⁰², on a silver tray. His passive attitude during the rebellion made Prince Ahmed completely lose the military elite, especially Janissaries.¹⁴⁰³ As will be delineated, Selim owes his *saltanat* mainly to Janissaries. It is known that janissaries had always been inclined to Selim’s favor for he was more dynamic and warlike. But in the absence of such an excuse – the defeat against the qizilbashes – one might think that they would hardly dare to repel Ahmed, who was invited by the legitimate sultan,

¹⁴⁰⁰ This sort of narration was evidently part of the legitimization efforts of Ottoman scholars. I would like to remind that Selim was in quarrel with his father, even fought with his army, while Ali Pasha was handling with the rebellion. Therefore, Selim’s accusation of Ahmed, even if it occurred, was not convincing.

¹⁴⁰¹ ALI, p. 931. Elsewhere ALI reports Selim’s reply to the request of Ahmed as follows: “... [Your punishment’s] *bā’isi budur ki, sen taht-ı Yunan’da [Rum] sâkin şehzâde ve asâkir-i bî-girânla her ân alât-ı har u rezme hâzır ve amâde iken Şeytan Kulu nâm Hâricî gelüb karîbinden geçe ve memâlik-i mahrûsedan Kütahiyye’ye girüb padişah-ı ‘asrın bir beğlerbeğisini katl ide ve niçe müslümanları nehb ü gâret ve katlile hasâret idüb sâlimin ü gânimin Kızılbaş’a toğrı çekile gide, sen âna karşı varmayasın ve havza-i hükümeti ol makûle Hârici zararından kurtarmayasın, mücerred ‘iş u nûşinde olub, alem haraba varduğundan iğmaz-ı ‘ayn idesin. Pes ne vechile şehzâde-i sezâ ve husûsâ serîr-i saltanata revâ olabilür misin? Pençe-i siyâsetden rehâ buldığın takdirce bunca nüfus-ı bî-günâh zâyi’ olmağla begne’n-nâs bizi dahî hicâba düşürürsin. İmdi evlâ olan budur ki, hakkından geline ve safha-i rûzgârdan vücûdın pençesi hakk oluna!” Ali says he heard this story from Celal-zâde Mustafa. But Celal-zâde does not include this passage in his own history. See ALI, pp. 1069-70.*

¹⁴⁰² As the next chapter will delineate, Selim not only represented the absolute qizilbash enmity, but, perhaps more importantly, also gained support of the institutions of the Ottoman imperial regime against Ahmed’s tribal allies.

¹⁴⁰³ Compare ULCY1, p. 74.

Bayezid II to openly to work in favor of Selim, even at the cost of opposing their legitimate *padişah*. The next chapter will further expand this issue.

CHAPTER VII

THE QIZILBASH FACTOR IN THE OTTOMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS: STRUGGLE FOR THE THRONE AND THE TOOLS OF LEGITIMACY

7.1. QIZILBASH ENMITY AND *GAZĀ*: THE CAREER OF PRINCE SELIM UNTIL ASCENDING THE THRONE

During the last years of Bayezid II only four of his eight sons¹⁴⁰⁴, namely Şehinşah, Ahmed, Korkud, and Selim were alive.¹⁴⁰⁵ Selim, who was the youngest of all, was born in 875 / 1470-1 in Amasya from Prince Bayezid and Ayshe, the daughter of the Dulkadir ruler Alauddevle.¹⁴⁰⁶ He was appointed to the governorship of Trabzon in either 1482 or 1487.¹⁴⁰⁷ By 1509, when Bayezid II got so ill and old that he could neither lead the army

¹⁴⁰⁴ These were Abdullah, Şehinşah, Alemşah, Ahmed, Korkud, Selim, Mehmed, and Mahmud. See UZC2, p. 234.

¹⁴⁰⁵ ULCY1, p. 57. Stanford Shaw, however, argues that Alemshah was also alive and died in 1512. See Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume I: Empire of the Gāzis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808*, Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 79.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Halil İnalçık, "Selim I", *EI2*; Şinasi Altundağ, "Selim I", *IA*, p. 423.

¹⁴⁰⁷ ULCY1, p. 74.

nor govern the empire efficiently, fierce struggles among the princes for the throne broke out. As İnalçık points out, although respected as an intellectual, versed in Islamic law and the fine arts, Korkud, the governor of Saruhan, was thought to be less apt for the throne.¹⁴⁰⁸ The strongest candidate was evidently Prince Ahmed, who was governing the Province of Amasya at that time and is described in Ottoman sources as generous and just but also easy-going, fond of having fun, and lacking any sense of monarchical responsibility. Ahmed's succession was supported by many major statesmen, including the grand vizier Ali Pasha, and *ulemā*.¹⁴⁰⁹ For some reasons, Prince Şehinşah, who was the governor of Karaman and would die without witnessing the end of this struggle, did not take part in this conflict. As the youngest of four princes, Selim, at the beginning he was not only the least favored by men of state but also geographically in the most unfavorable situation for he was the governor of Trabzon, the most distant province to the capital city among those governed by princes. Nevertheless, his well-designed, coherent, and determined policy led him to the throne. Ottoman court historians agree that he embodied all the qualities of an ideal ruler: justice, generosity, self-determination, war-like valor, broad wisdom, and zealous devotion to Islam.¹⁴¹⁰ At the end, he not only disqualified his opponent brothers but also forced his father to abdicate for the first and only time in Ottoman history.

¹⁴⁰⁸ İnalçık, "Selim I"; ULCY1, pp. 57-58.

¹⁴⁰⁹ See İnalçık, "Selim I"; Altundağ, "Selim I", p. 423; ULCY1, p. 57.

¹⁴¹⁰ For an analysis of CLZ's description of Selim, for example, see Celia J. Kerslake, "The Selim-name of Celal-zāde Mustafa Çelebi as a Historical Source", *Turcica*, IX/2-X, Paris, 1970, pp. 45-6. As Kerslake indicates, CLZ regard Selim as the only prince embodied all qualities of the ideal ruler and as predestined by God to restore the rule of the true religion in the Empire. The itinerary which Selim followed from Trabzon to Istanbul was, according to CLZ, a Divinely-ordained path which would lead him to the *saltanat*. ALI also deems him as supported by God (*müeyyed min 'indallāh*). See ALI, p. 1052. Ottoman historians describe Selim as a courageous, awe-inspiring, and wrathful man who liked '*ilm* and '*ālim*. He had a special interest and talent in poetry (in both Persian and Turkish) and history. For the character and appearance of Selim, see ALI, p. 1057; SLZ2, p. 1; MNB, p. 451.

Although one might partially attribute this success to the disposition and personal skills of Selim, real basis of this astonishing success must be sought in the strategy constructed and - without any deviation - successfully applied by Selim and his close men. His policy was constructed on two principal pillars, which would not only leave its mark on the whole of his reign, but also adjust the ideological stand of the Empire forever. First of all, Selim declared himself as the champion of the fight against religious ‘heresy’ led by Shah Ismail. Secondly, he pursued quite an aggressive policy and presented himself as the patron of *gāzis* and fighters. As will be delineated in the rest of this section, this twofold but closely related policy provided Selim the support of fighting elements in the Empire, which was most decisive on the advance of events.

7.1.1. Early Years in Trabzon

Ottoman chronicles congruently underscore a distinctive feature of Prince Selim differing from his brothers in a way that he played a part in *gazā* against infidels and heretics in the Province of Trabzon.¹⁴¹¹ Kemalpaşazāde, for example, records that upon the emergence (*mi’rāc-i ‘urūca hurūc*) of Ismail in 905/1499 in Iranian lands the strongest and the most effective reaction came from Prince Selim. His court became the shelter of former Akkoyunlu begs who hardly escaped from the qizilbash army of Ismail.

Mezkūr şehriyār-ı kām-kār (Selim) ki, ... serhadd-ı Gürcistan’da sedd-i İslam olub dururdu, asār-ı mehābetiyle o diyar tolupdururdu. Dergāh-ı āsūmān iştibāhı kızılbaş elinden kaçub halās bulan Türkmān serdarlarına penāh oldı. ... ol diyārın serdarları asitān-ı āsumān-mekānında baş urdılar. Ol kişverün serverleri hizmet kemerin bağlanub kapusunda turdılar. Bayındır beylerinden Feraşād Beg ve Mansūr Beg, dahi onların nazīri bir nice emirler rikāb-ı kām-yābında mülāzim olub yürürlerdi. Ol

¹⁴¹¹ ANMB, p. 160.

māh gibi felek-i rif'atda iken nāgāh cāh-ı feleke düşen a'yān dergāh-ı āsümān-iştibāhında gene 'izzet-ü cāh bulup tururlardı. Bāb-ı sa'ādet-me'ābı merci'-i erbāb-ı tabl u 'alem oldı. Dīvān-ı keyvān-mekānı mecma'-ı eshāb-ı tīg u kalem oldı. Ordu-yı hümāyūnına, ki serçeşme-i cūy-ı zaferdi, her boydan şehirden ve köyden hayl ü haşem seyl gibi akdı. Kahr-ı ateşiyile dehr serkeşlerini yakdı ve kulub-ı a'dā-yı bed-rāye bīm ü be's ve havf ü hirās bırakdı. Seylāb-ı tūfān-bārān-ı hadengi kūhistān-ı Gürcistan'ı garka virdi. Havā-yı gazāyı pür-tāb iden bārika-i bark-ı tīg-ı mīg-rengi şarka irdi.¹⁴¹²

Kemalpaşazāde states that all these events occurred in the same year that Mihaloğlu Ali Beg died, which is recorded by him as 905/1499. Thus, if we rely on Kemalpaşazāde, Selim closely observed the developments in Iran and responded effectively just after or concurrently to Ismail's coming to the power.¹⁴¹³ Some archival evidence confirms this fact. In *evāhir-i Zilkāde* 906 (8-17 June 1501) an imperial decree was sent to Selim. In this decree, after appreciating his endeavor for informing the central government on the developments pertaining to sufis of Ardabil and Shirvan, Selim was ordered to assign skilful spies in order to collect further true and trusty information regarding to the activities of sufis; and he was ordered to report all the news to the central government.¹⁴¹⁴

What Selim did was not only protecting former Akkoyunlu begs but also pursuing an offensive policy as well. With the help of newly joined begs he attacked former Akkoyunlu lands which was then under Ismail's rule. Kemalpaşazāde states that he seized some of these fortresses adjacent to Ottoman Province of Trabzon through

¹⁴¹² KPZ8a, pp. 232-3.

¹⁴¹³ KPZ8a, p. 233. We know that KPZ was, like other contemporary Ottoman historians, took pro-Selim stand and designed his *Selimnāme* mostly to legitimize Selim's unusual practices. Thus he does not hesitate to disguise and distort historical facts. Even so, it is safer to use his above-mentioned account for he wrote eight defter of his *Tevārih* during the reign of Bayezid II. See KPZ8a, p. XXIX; KPZ10, p. XXIII.

¹⁴¹⁴ See document 4 in Appendix I.

diplomacy and some other with coercion. Selim annexed İspiri, Kükezi, Bayburd, and Kemâh.

Şâh İsmâ'îl hurûc idüb taht-gâh-ı Azerbaycan'ı alıcak hânümân-ı evlâd-ı Hasan Hân nâr-ı kahr ü bî-dâdı salıcak, leşker-i cerrârla Trabuzan'dan çıkub civarında olan kişver-i Türkmân'ı zabt itdi. Hisarlarınun ba'zın sulhla ve ba'zın harble alub ol diyârı kendü mülkine rabt itdi. İspiri ve Kükezi (ki) ol kenarlarda ma'ruf ve hasânet ü menâ'atle mevsûf kal'alardur aldı. İçlerine hisar erleri koydı. Sonra Bayburdı ve Kemâhı dahî teshîr itdi. Ol diyarda kadîmü'z-zamandan yurd ıssı olan 'azîmü's-şân emirler bir bir geldi uydı. Nûr-ı 'adl ü dâdla mezkûr bilâd-ı ma'mûreden zulmet-i deycûr-ı şerr ü şûrrı ref' itdi.¹⁴¹⁵

7.1.2. First Confrontation with Ismail: Assault on Erzincan, 1503

After capturing Tabriz, Ismail dispatched an army to Erzincan and seized the city.¹⁴¹⁶ Although Erzincan was not within the borders of Ottoman Empire, such an attempt of the young shah attracted the anger of Prince Selim. According to Kemalpaşazâde, Selim waged several campaigns on Erzincan in order to repel Ismail's forces from the region.¹⁴¹⁷ The available sources determine at least two of his campaigns. How Selim first decided to attack Erzincan is vividly described in Yusuf's *Selimnâme*.¹⁴¹⁸ Yusuf recounts, once upon a time when Selim was eating and drinking with his viziers and generals¹⁴¹⁹ he called their attention and said:

Ey hayr-u hâh lalalarım ve hevâdâr kullarım! İş bu şehr-i Erzincan musîbeti yâdıma gelüb ve az müddette kaç kaç kimesne tasarrufuna girdi, ona taaccüb iderim. Evvelâ ol şehri mazlum ceddîm Yıldırım Hân merhum zamanında dâhil-i Rûm olup ba'dehû Zu'l-kadr diyârına mersum oldu. Ve şimdi diyâr-ı Acem'in vâli-i şumu'l-hâli olan İsmail-i pür-tadlilin meredd-i mülâhadesi tasarrufunda mahkûm olduğuna taaccüb edip, ceddîm şehri elden ele gezdiğine tahassür

¹⁴¹⁵ KPZ8a, p. 232.

¹⁴¹⁶ KPZ8a, p. 259.

¹⁴¹⁷ KPZ8b, p. 29.

¹⁴¹⁸ This is the prose version of the *Selimnâme* of Şükri-i Bitlisî, who was contemporary of the events. As indicated at the beginning of the manuscript, Şükri's work was re-written in prose form by Çerkesler Kâtibi Yusuf in 1030/1620-1. See YSF, pp. 22-23.

¹⁴¹⁹ "Bir karde-i şehinşâhi esbâb-ı meclis araya gelüb şerap, kebâb, saz-söz ve ni'mât-ı dîlfulûz hengâmı arayı dutdı." YSF, p. 25.

çekerim. İmdi ma'lûmunuz ola ki ol diyârı mağsûb ve şehr-i mazlûmu düşman elinden istihlâs etmeğe azimet ettim.¹⁴²⁰

From that day on, Selim started the preparation of an army to rescue Erzincan. In five to ten days an army was composed and moved immediately. They suddenly attacked Erzincan. Since this attack was not expected by qizilbash troops guarding the city, Selim's forces easily captured the city.¹⁴²¹ Kemalpaşazâde reports that Selim defeated qizilbash forces in front of the city and freed Erzincan from qizilbash trouble for the time being.¹⁴²² He assigned one of his men as the governor of the city and returned to Trabzon.¹⁴²³ Our sources do not give the date of this assault, but the flow of events suggests that it must have occurred between 1502 and 1505.¹⁴²⁴ We know that Ismail's ambassador, who arrived at the Porte in the summer of 1505, protested against warlike actions of Selim on the frontier of Trabzon.¹⁴²⁵ What the ambassador complained about during this visit must have been Selim's first assault on Erzincan and his raids around.

¹⁴²⁰ YSF, p. 25.

¹⁴²¹ YSF, p. 25.

¹⁴²² “*Mezkûr hasm-ı meksûr (İsmail) diyâr-ı Azerbâyçana irdükden sonra, başın gözün dirdükden ve dâru'l-mülk-i Tebrîze girdükden sonra zimâm-ı ihtimâmı Erzincan tarafına döndürdi. Ümerâ-yı bed-râyinün birini ol cânibe gönderdi. Hademi ve haşemi ile geldi ol arada oturdu, emn ü emânı şehirden ve yüresindeki karadan götürdi. Ol diyârın tağı ve taşı Kızılbaşla lâlezâr oldu. Şehzâde-i kişver-penâh Sultan Selim Şâh haber-dâr oldu. Peleng-i âteş-aheng-i hüsm-kân gibi dürüldü ve büküldü, haşem-i pür hüsm ü kâni derya gibi cüş idüb taşdı döküldü... Seylâb-ı pür-şitâb ve sehâb-ı âteş-tâb gibi hayl-i cerrârla darü'l-mülk-i Trabzundan çıkub, şemşîr-i cihân-gîrle bark-vâr geldi ol diyâra girdi....[after a fierce fight] (qizilbashes) tahammül eylemeyüb nücum gibi târumâr olub gittiler. Ol tünd-huyların yolları üzerinde köpri vardı, anı geçe tururken hayl-i seyl-püyla 'âdü-yı kine-cüy ardlarından irdi, boğazların dirdi, ördek ve kaz sürüsüne şehbâz-ı tîz-pervâz girür gibi girdi, mevc-i tîğ-i mîğ-günle zavrak-ı vücûdların garka virdi. İrden sebük-bâr olub kaçabilen kaçdı kurtuldu. Bâki bed-kirdârlarun kimi ele girib tutuldu, kimi öldü. Şehzâde-i kâmkâr ol diyârı hâr u hâsâkdan tekrâr pâk idüb, gamâm-ı intikâmdan yağın kan bârâni-yle sahn-i hâki nem-nâk idüb, sâlim ü gânim döndü gitdi, gelüp makamına ârâm itdi.* KPZ8a, pp. 259-60. See also HSE4, p. 6.

¹⁴²³ YSF, p. 25. Also consider TNSB, p. 265.

¹⁴²⁴ Following Selim's invasion of Erzincan, KPZ narrates the death of Prince Mahmud.

KPZ, pp. 260-61.

¹⁴²⁵ FSH, p. 94.

7.1.3. Second Confrontation: Assault on Erzincan, 1507-8

Upon hearing the capture of Erzincan by Selim, Ismail's anger was stirred up. He immediately summoned an army of 12.000 men whose command was assigned to one of his chief disciples. Yusuf's assessment regarding the assignment of a disciple to the command of this army is worthy to underscore. He says, 'Ismail assigned one of his disciples to the command of his army, for it was a tradition of the Qizilbash.'¹⁴²⁶ Fisher, relying on Italian sources, also briefly mentions Ismail's campaign. He says that after Selim had taken the region of Erzincan, Ismail gathered an army. But Bayezid II intervened in affairs to settle the disagreement. He sent an envoy to Persia with valuable presents and the difficulty was settled.¹⁴²⁷ According to Fisher, all these happened in 1510. As will be discussed in the following paragraphs, however, this date does not seem right. On the other hand, as Ottoman sources indicate, the disagreement between Ismail and Selim was not settled, and indeed would never be settled.

Tansel argues on the authority of Gelibolulu 'Ali that Ismail aimed to pillage around Trabzon with this army.¹⁴²⁸ According to 'Ali, Ismail sent 3.000 men to pillage the province of Trabzon, which was being governed by Selim. Upon hearing Ismail's approaching forces, Selim alarmed his army. At the end of the battle, Selim's soldiers

¹⁴²⁶ "İş bu dehşetlü haber Ardabiloğlu Şah İsmail'e vardıkda gazaba gelüb ve fevren şark arkerin derüb içinden oniki bin er seçüb, surh-i ser resmi üzere ol askere bir müridin başbuğ idüb Erzincan'a gönderdi." YSF, p. 25.

¹⁴²⁷ FSH, p. 97.

¹⁴²⁸ TNSB, p. 246. Though not being clear enough, Celalzāde also mentions such intentions of Ismail. See CLZ, p. 86. Solakzāde repeats the same idea by reciting from 'Ali. But some details in his account are noteworthy. He states that Ismail composed an army of 3.000 men in order to pillage the Province of Trabzon. His brother Ibrahim was also in this army. According to SLZ, Selim was ready to meet qizilbashes; he defeated them near Erzincan and captured the city. Ibrahim was snatched in the battle. He states that it is said that Ibrahim was imprisoned in Trabzon but this hearsay is not verified. SLZ1, pp. 438-9.

killed all of the qizilbash fighters, but arrested the brother of the shah¹⁴²⁹, who was imprisoned in Trabzon. ‘Ali also adds that they informed the Porte on developments.¹⁴³⁰ In this specific case, however, the accounts of two contemporary sources, Kemalpaşazāde and Yusuf, seem to be more reliable. Although Ismail’s response to Selim’s assaults in form of attacking the Province of Trabzon was not out of possibility, the conditions must have discouraged Ismail from such offensive policies, for he was recently forced to retreat from Dulkadir by the Ottomans. In addition, ‘Ali mistakenly gives the date of this occurrence as 916/1511.¹⁴³¹ As will be delineated in the following paragraphs, this confrontation must have occurred before 1508.

Though not explained explicitly in the text of *Selimnāme*, it can be deduced from the narration that Ismail’s army easily re-captured Erzincan. Selim, on the other hand, immediately started preparation of an army to re-march on Erzincan. Selim’s only son, Süleyman also attended this army.¹⁴³² When Selim’s troops appeared in front of the city, qizilbashes had already taken the position of war;¹⁴³³ two armies soon clashed each other. If relied on Yusuf’s account, the second round too turned out in favor of Selim.¹⁴³⁴ He quite vividly describes how Selim’s soldiers and Selim personally chased qizilbash fighters on rocky slopes of mountains near Erzincan.

Kızılbaş askeri akbehu’l-ahvāl üzere sınıb kaçtılar. Ve kimi at yerağın terk idüb baş kurtarmağa dağa çıkdı. Sipāh-i Rüm ardların alub ve Şehzāde bizzat piyāde

¹⁴²⁹ Hammer states that this brother was Ibrahim. See HAM2, p. 370. As indicated above, first SLZ mentions Ibrahim in this context.

¹⁴³⁰ ALI, pp. 925-6. CLZ also vaguely indicates that Ismail’s intention to attack some fortress of the province of Trabzon. See CLZ, pp. 85-6.

¹⁴³¹ ALI, p. 925.

¹⁴³² YSF, p. 26.

¹⁴³³ YSF, p. 26.

¹⁴³⁴ KPZ confirms this argument. “*Erzincan nāhiyetinden dahī bir nice def’a ceyš-i bed-kīş-i Kızılbaş savaşla def’ itdi. Ol havālide olan vilāyetlerün ahalisi hümā-yı himāyetinde refāhīyet üzerine rahat olub āsūde-bāl u hoş-hāl oldi. Ol hümā-himmetün sāye-i ri’āyetinde Erzenü’r-Rūma varınca merzbūm husūm-ı şūm-kademün hücum-ı kudūmandan me’mun ve mahsūn oldi.*” KPZ8a, pp. 232-3.

olub ol senkîn kayalardan çıkub, vahşi canavarlar gibi haylı kızılbaş kırdılar. Andan dönüp sahrâlarda kalan tazı, atlar, katır ve develerin nüker hıyâm, garâyib esbâb ve yarakların cem' idüb şehir-i Erzincan'a döndü. Anda birkaç gün ârâm idüb seyr u şikâr ide(rek) cevânibin gezdi. Pes zabt-ı memleket için bir yarar kulun tâyin idüb cānib-i Trabzon'a ric'at eyledi.¹⁴³⁵

Kemalpaşazâde records an interesting event worth mentioning here. During his march on Alauddevle, Ismail learnt that Alauddevle would not confront but had retreated to Elbistan.¹⁴³⁶ In order to catch Dulkadir troops, he had to leave heavy provisions in Erzincan, as well as the artillery. Kemalpaşazâde states that there was also valuable Chinese faience in Ismail's camp. They situated faiences into artillery and hid under the ground.¹⁴³⁷ But because of the approaching Ottoman army, Ismail had to leave Dulkadir country without finishing his plan. Furthermore, Ottomans forced Ismail to retreat immediately so that he could not return through Erzincan, but marched directly to Tabriz.¹⁴³⁸ Thus his artillery and faience were left in Erzincan. After a while Selim somehow learned the situation and immediately moved to Erzincan. Kemalpaşazâde says nobody could prevent Selim; but he did as he wished. He found the treasure and the artillery and took them to Trabzon. Before returning, he assigned one of his commanders as governor of Erzincan.¹⁴³⁹

As understood from Kemalpaşazâde's account, when Selim came to Erzincan, the city was under the control of qizilbash forces.¹⁴⁴⁰ What's more, after finishing his business, Selim assigned one of his men to govern the city. One may safely deduce from this phrase that before Selim's arrival, the city had not been ruled by Selim's

¹⁴³⁵ YSF, p. 27. Also consider CLZ, p. 87.

¹⁴³⁶ See "Dulkadir Campaign, 1507" in this study.

¹⁴³⁷ KPZ8b, p. 30.

¹⁴³⁸ KPZ8b, p. 30.

¹⁴³⁹ KPZ8b, p. 30.

¹⁴⁴⁰ He states that "nobody could prevent Prince Selim capturing the city." One may infer from this expression that the city was under the control of some other forces, which attempted to defend the city but failed.

dependents. When all these details are compared to Yusuf's account of Selim's second incursion to Erzincan, it evidently appears that what Kemalpaşazāde narrates by emphasizing a specific incident is identical with the second attack of Selim explained in Yusuf's *Selimnāme*. Yusuf, as usual, does not specify the date. Meanwhile, Kemalpaşazāde's explanation obviously puts that Selim assaulted Erzincan for the second time during or shortly after Ismail's campaign on Dulkadir in 1507.¹⁴⁴¹

Kemalpaşazāde states that when Ismail learned that his artillery and valuable faiences were grasped by Selim, he sent ambassadors to demand them. But his demand was refused.¹⁴⁴² Kemalpaşazāde does not specify to whom Ismail sent an ambassador; whether it was to Selim or to Bayezid. But we can clarify this point from other sources. It is recorded in Italian sources that Ismail dispatched an envoy to Istanbul in 1508. One of Ismail's requests delivered to Bayezid by this envoy was the restitution of the armaments stolen by Selim. Ismail's ambassador underscored friendly sentiments and peaceful intentions of the shah regarding to the Ottoman Empire; and he complained about hostile attitude of Prince Selim. He expressed that they had been fighting with Alauddevle not with Ottomans; but as this had been the case, Selim had stolen their artillery.¹⁴⁴³ Though the ambassador was treated with respect, his requests were tactfully ignored. But it seems that Ismail's diplomacy was not totally fruitless. Selim soon received warning from the Porte. He was ordered not to engage attacks on qizilbash territories and on Georgia. This case will be further examined below.

¹⁴⁴¹ Compare Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les ottomans les safavides et leurs voisins*, Istanbul, 1987, p. 24.

¹⁴⁴² KPZ8b, p. 30.

¹⁴⁴³ FSH, p; 96. TNSB, p. 246; HAM2, p. 370

Another aspect of Selim-Ismail struggle was that Selim not only pillaged and occasionally captured territories of Ismail but also seriously damaged the connection between the shah and his Anatolian disciples. Since he either controlled or threatened the principal region through which the communication and transportation between the shah and his disciples performed, his activities created great annoyance in the court of Ismail. An anonymous Ottoman historian points out this dimension of Selim's activities in Persian frontiers:

Zikr olan tāife-i tāğiye Şehriyār-ı kāmkarun vufūr-ı şecā'atinden şol derece mergüb olub leşker-i zafer-peykerinden öyle mağlūb düşmüşdi ki; diyār-ı Rūm'un ekser Etrāki bā-vücūd ol firka-i ehl-i ilhād ve işrākile mesūb iken baş kaldurub ol cānibe nigāh itmek kat'a mümkün değül idi. Zīrā defa'atle dest-i tīg-hūn āsāminden şerbet-i intikām içmişlerdi. Ve nice kerre ol erbāb-ı dalāliyle har ü kıtal olub meydān-ı ma'reke seyl-i hūnile Ceyhūn misal bir vechile seylān eylemişdi ki hubāb-ı hūn o firkanun ferekinde külāh-ı mezellet cāy-gāhlarından fark olmazdı. Hazret-i Şehriyār-ı nām-dārun ol eşrār-ı bed-girdārile vesāyir melel ü küffāriyle bunca eyyām harb ü kıtal üzere olduğundan şimşir-i mihr-i tenviri eş'ası mecmū' āfāka ziyā-bahş olub āyine-i tīg-i cihāngirde sūret-i feth ü zafer dāyimā cilveger idi.¹⁴⁴⁴

7.1.4. *Gazā on Georgia*

Selim's campaigns, however, were not limited to qizilbash territories; he launched raids on Georgia for several times as well.¹⁴⁴⁵ The exact number and the date of these raids are not clear in the sources. Şükrī records in his *Selīm-nāme* that Prince Selim invaded Georgia three times and each time returned with countless booty.¹⁴⁴⁶ He does not specify, however, the dates of these raids. Kemalpaşazāde, on the other hand, mentions Selim's two raids on Georgia. In the first place he refers to these raids only in one sentence while explaining how Selim turned Trabzon into the shelter of warrior-*gāzis*

¹⁴⁴⁴ ANMB, pp. 161-2.

¹⁴⁴⁵ HSE4, p. 5.

¹⁴⁴⁶ SKB, p. 65; YSF, p. 24.

and old Akkoyunlu begs. The events recorded in this chapter of Kemalpaşazāde's history all took place, as Kemalpaşazāde indicates in the same paragraph, in 905 / 1499-1500.¹⁴⁴⁷ It becomes clear, then, that Selim embarked *gazās* on Georgia at least by 1499. On the other hand, Kemalpaşazāde mentions elsewhere another invasion of Selim on Georgia. He states that in the early months of 914 / middle of 1508, Prince Selim moved from Trabzon with a big army by the intention of *gazā*.¹⁴⁴⁸ Any other incursion of Selim on Georgia after 1508 seems not to be possible since from then on, the struggle between princes for the throne was intensified. Just like his brothers, Selim was occupied with this struggle too much. Indeed, as will be discussed, the polemic between Prince Selim and the Porte started soon after his return from Georgia with abundant captives and spoils.

Consequently, based on Şükrī's explanation, Prince Selim conducted three incursions in Georgia, the first being in 905 / 1499-1500 and the last in 914 / 1508-9. Regarding the other chronicles, however, this number might be increased. Kemalpaşazāde and Şükrī congruently underlines that Selim returned from the last raid with plenty of booty and slaves. According to Kemalpaşazāde, *gāzis* returned with more than 10.000 slaves and the booty flowed into Trabzon like a river.¹⁴⁴⁹ Selim dispatched many valuable presents from this booty to Bayezid with a letter explaining his victory (*fetih-nāme*).¹⁴⁵⁰ Kemalpaşazāde states that after Selim's envoy arrived at the Porte, his son Süleyman

¹⁴⁴⁷ KPZ8a, p. 233.

¹⁴⁴⁸ KPZ8b, pp. 30-31. This information reinforces my argument on the date of Selim's second attack on Erzincan. If Selim marched on Georgia in the summer of 1508, then he must have attacked Erzincan in previous summer.

¹⁴⁴⁹ KPZ8b, pp. 32-33. For similar accounts, also see SKB, p. 65; YSF, p. 24.

¹⁴⁵⁰ KPZ8b, p. 33; SKB, p. 65; YSF, p. 24.

was appointed as governor of Kefe.¹⁴⁵¹ Şükrî, on the other hand, argues that Selim's request for a province for his son was presented to the Sultan by his former envoy. Upon returning from second Erzincan campaign to his province, Selim dispatched an envoy with valuable presents to the Porte. His objective was to request a province for his son Süleyman. His request was accepted and a citadel separated from the province of Ahmed was allocated to Süleyman.¹⁴⁵² When the two contemporary accounts are combined, one can conclude that the first time Selim requested a province for his son was in 1507, following his victory over qizilbash forces.¹⁴⁵³ Although his request was accepted by the Porte and Şebinkarahisar was allocated to Süleyman, as will be delineated, Ahmed forced the Porte to change this decision.

¹⁴⁵¹ KPZ obviously skips some details here. Süleyman was not directly appointed to Kefe. But this issue will be discussed later.

¹⁴⁵² SKB, pp. 70-71; See YSF, p. 27.

¹⁴⁵³ KPZ records that when Selim demanded a province (*sancak*) for his son, Sehinshah's son Sultan Muhammed was the governor of Niğde, Ahmed's sons Alaaddin, Süleyman, and Osman were governors of Bolu, Çorum, and Osmancık; Mahmud's son was the governor of Kastamonu; and Alemşah's son was the governor of Kangırı. See KPZ8b, p. 33.

7.1.5. Appointment of Süleyman to Kefe and Selim's Revolt against his Father

After a long debate among Prince Selim, the Porte, and Prince Ahmed,¹⁴⁵⁴ Prince Süleyman was appointed to the province of Kefe on August 6, 1509.¹⁴⁵⁵ In order to assess the importance of Süleyman's appointment to Kefe in the future developments, it is necessary to take a look at the rivalry between princes for the throne. During the last years of Bayezid II, when internal struggle between princes augmented, Ahmed was the governor of Amasya, the nearest province to Istanbul while Korkud was the governor of Antalya and Selim that of Trabzon, the farthest of all.

According to the Turco-Mongolian tradition, the sovereignty was exclusively granted by God; thus, no arrangement for succession to the throne was established in the Ottoman Empire. The ruler among princes would emerge only through struggle, which

¹⁴⁵⁴ A letter of Selim reveals that at first Giresun, Körtun, and Şiryan were to be given to Süleyman. But Selim vehemently opposed this appointment, for the climate of mentioned cities was bad and their income was low. (This letter presents one of the earliest criticisms of Selim towards the Porte. He says, in his letter, that such an allocation to a prince is, indeed, oppressing (*zulm*). If the Sultan took this decision, then it shows that *ekân-ı devlet* did not truly inform him about these cities. Thus they obviously did not perform their job properly. If it was the result of *erkân-ı devlet*'s decision, then they clearly engaged in oppression. See TSA, document E. 5970. The facsimile copy of the entire document is published in TNSB, p. 260.) Selim's severe resistance changed the decision of the Porte. Instead of these cities, Sebinkarahisar, which had been within the province of Ahmed at that time, was allocated to Süleyman. Prince Ahmed, however, opposed this appointment since Sebinkarahisar was too close to his province. Ahmed wrote to the Porte, "...Zira ki Karahisar'ın ana verilmesi caiz görüldüğünde şöyle fehmolunur ki varduğundan içmaz-ı ayn ettikleri muradları Karahisar eyaleti bu suretle ana verilmek imiş. Bu hod mümteniatdandır. Vallahil azim billahil kadim mademki kayd-ı hayatdayım eyalet-i mezkure değil andan bir taş verilmek mümkün değildir. Bundan evvel hod merraren bu ma'na arz olunmuşdur..." (See TSA, document E 2667. Also consider HSE4, p. 7.) Then Süleyman was appointed to Bolu. Ahmed again opposed and forced the central government to change Süleyman's province. His objective was that, since Bolu is between Amasya and Istanbul, in case of an emergency Süleyman could prevent him from reaching the capital city. (See HSE4, pp. 7-8.) The appointment processes of Süleyman congealed the enmity between Selim and Ahmed. 'Ali states that once Selim even decided to march on Ahmed. He says, "...Fursat buldukça birbirlerinin âdemlerine dest urub öldürdiler. Babaları hayatında bu güne nâ-sezâ evzâ'a başladılar. Hattâ bir defa Selim Hân âdemlerini fermân-berân eyledi. Leşker çeküb Sultan Ahmed üstüne varmağı mukarrer idi. Bi'l-âhere ikisine dahî emirler gönderilüb, nasihat olındı." ALI, p. 933.

¹⁴⁵⁵ ULCY1, p. 77; İnalçık, "Selim I". Indeed, Selim had already demanded Karahisar or Kefe in his former letter: "Mezbur Süleyman Şâh'a dahi civarımızda olub aklen ve insâfen bize münâsib olan Karahisar sancağı himmet olunub ol olmaz ise Kefe sancağı inâyet olunmak mümkün ise..." TSA, document E. 5970, published in TNSB, p. 260. By this appointment Ahmed possibly thought he won the first round against Selim. But the advance of events would show in a couple of years that this so-called victory of Ahmed opened the way for Selim to the throne.

was at the same time regarded as the selection mechanism of the God for the best candidate.¹⁴⁵⁶ For princes, it was, indeed, the matter of death or life, since the winner would inevitably put all other princes and their offspring to death, which was exactly done by Selim immediately after capturing the power.

As İnalçık points out, when the throne became vacant, the most decisive factor was to be the first to reach to the capital city and take control of the treasury. Consequently, staying in the nearest province to Istanbul was the primary objective of all princes.¹⁴⁵⁷ Looking from this perspective, Selim had obviously the least chance to capture the treasury in case of an emergency while Ahmed was in the most favorable situation. In 1509, when the rivalry stirred up, Selim realized his desperate position in Trabzon and developed alternative strategies. His first success was to secure the governorship of Kefe for his son Süleyman. His ultimate demand from the Porte was, however, a province in Rumelia, which was immediately denied since it was contradictory to the tradition (*kanun-ı kadīm*) to allocate governorship to princes in Rumelia. In addition to the governorship of Kefe, Fisher points out another valuable appointment that Selim managed to obtain; his relative, Iskender Bey, who had been *bostancı-başı* (chief gardener), became *sancakbey* of Gallipoli and *kapudan* (commander-in-chief) of the fleet.¹⁴⁵⁸ Fisher also argues that Selim, against his father's wishes, married Prince Mahmud's widow who was the daughter of a Tatar Khan of Crimea.¹⁴⁵⁹ His concern was obviously to gain the alliance of Tatars against his father

¹⁴⁵⁶ İnalçık, "Selim I". For further analysis of the Ottoman succession system see Halil İnalçık, "The Ottoman Succession and Its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty", in his *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire, Essays on Economy and Society*, Bloomington, 1993, pp. 37-69.

¹⁴⁵⁷ Halil İnalçık, "Selim I", EI2

¹⁴⁵⁸ FSH, p. 106.

¹⁴⁵⁹ FSH, 107. Also consider Altundağ, "Selim I", p. 424. According to ANMB, Prince Süleyman married the daughter of Tatar Khan. See ANMB, p. 47.

and brothers. As a matter of fact, as will be indicated, there was a considerable number of Tatar soldiers in his army when Selim landed on Kili shores.¹⁴⁶⁰ Nevertheless, Ottoman historians do not provide clear indication to this marriage.

Ottoman sources unanimously record that despite the very successful achievements of Prince Selim in the Province of Trabzon, Bayezid II did not appreciate his efforts. The reason stemmed from domestic politics. Towards the end of the first decade of the sixteenth-century, Bayezid's health deteriorated so much that he totally left the state affairs to his viziers.¹⁴⁶¹ The most important issue discussed in the Porte was the determination of the successor of Bayezid. As all sources agreed, Bayezid and leading statesmen were openly in favor of Ahmed, the governor of Amasya.¹⁴⁶² Idrīs-i Bitlisī records, for example, that in the last years of his reign, Bayezid's health seriously deteriorated. Consequently, complete disarray in the state affairs became inevitable. At the end, leading statesmen were summoned and they decided to enthrone Ahmed during the lifetime of Bayezid. According to Idrīs, they preferred Ahmed because they had good relations with him. In this way they could save their posts in the post-Bayezid period.¹⁴⁶³

It must have been because of this fact that Selim's success was disregarded in Istanbul. Contemporary sources record that the central administration was favoring

¹⁴⁶⁰ See, for example, FSH, p. 107. The archival evidence regarding Selim's movement will be delineated in the following pages.

¹⁴⁶¹ See, for example, IDRS, p. 87; KPZ8b, p. 39; ANMB, pp. 181-2.

¹⁴⁶² KPZ's account on the issue, for example, runs, "...*Ol zamanda Tavāsī Ali Paşa vezir-i a'zam olub, rü'ūs-i hadem arasında sadr idi, ve Mustafa Paşa vezir-i sāni olub sāhib-i sā'ib-tedbīr, müşīr-i celīlū'l-kadr idi. Ve sā'ir erkān u a'yānün ekseri kendü hevalarına teka'üd ve inzivalarına mülā'im oldığı ecilden merhūm Sultan Ahmede intisāb idüb, atası yirine pādīşāh oldığın isterlerdi...*" KPZ8b, p. 39. HSE writes in the same manner, "[*Bayezid II*] gönlünü Sultan Ahmed'den yana kaydırmiş bulunması, padişahlık otağından lütuf yellerini onun emel bahçelerine doğru estirdikten başka, Ahmed'i veliahd edinmesi niyeti de kesinleşmiş gibi bulunuyordu." HSE4, p. 11. 'Ali, on the other hand, records an important detail: 'the viziers were favoring Ahmed but begs of Rumelia and the Janissaries were favoring Selim.' ALI, p. 934.

¹⁴⁶³ IDRS, p. 87.

Ahmed in such a degree that Ahmed's men were never absent at the Porte and they continuously reported the developments at the Porte to Amasya.¹⁴⁶⁴ The Porte's open favoritism toward Prince Ahmed naturally annoyed other two princes. The first reaction to pro-Ahmed attitude of the central administration came from Korkud. He had already been forced to leave the Province of Saruhan by the influence of Ahmed on the viziers.¹⁴⁶⁵ In 1509, when Bayezid openly indicated Ahmed as heir-apparent, Korkud responded quite emotionally. He decided to leave the country and went to Cairo in May 1509 claiming he would perform a pilgrimage.¹⁴⁶⁶ However, for some reason, he returned the next year.¹⁴⁶⁷ But he continued to violate the orders of the Porte. He no longer stayed in Antalya, but moved to Saruhan in 1511 despite the disapproval of the Porte.¹⁴⁶⁸

Accordingly, as a result of Ahmed's influence on the central administration, Selim's raids against Qizilbash and Georgia not only became unappreciated but also they were banned by the Porte. His aggressive policy in the eastern frontier of the Empire was also considered as a violation of the Porte's policy regarding the East, and

¹⁴⁶⁴ “Hüdāvendigār Hazretleri'nin tâbe-serāh der-i devletinde olan o bî-basiret ve kütāh-nazarlar kendülere Sultān Ahmed cānibinden vāki' olan hüsn-i iltifātla mağrūr olub zikr olan şehzādeye intisāb-ı küllī itmişlerdi. Ol münāsebetle cemi' umūr-ı divāniyye zamīr-i münūrine ma'lūm olmakda bu'de-i mekān-hācet olmazdı. Her zamanda 'atabe-i 'ulyāda kapūsı bendelerinden ādem eksük deġül idi. Her biri bir nice gün turdukdan sonra sonra cemī' murādātın görüb, tedbir-i memlekete müte'allık haber-i meserret eseri kendüye bedreka-i rāh idinüb kemāl-i ri'āyetle merdiyyi'l-hāl 'avdet eylerdi. Andan gelen kimesnelere bu vechile mezīd-i ri'āyeti sair şehzādelere mücib-i ihānet olub bu kusur-rāyi ve süy-i tedbirle memleket halel-pezīr olmuşdı. Sultan Korkud'un Mısır'a gitmesine dahī sebab-i küllī oldı.” ANMB, p. 162. For parallel accounts also regard KPZ8b, p. 40; HSE4, p. 11. HSE adds that since many begs, eben sipāhis were benefitting his grants, they wished to see Ahmed as their sultan by heart.

¹⁴⁶⁵ ULCY1, p. 58.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Contemporary Ottoman historians congruently give the reason of Korkud's movement as the pro-Ahmed orientation of the Porte. See, for example, KPZ8b, pp. 34-5; HSE4, p. 1; ANMB, p. 162.

¹⁴⁶⁷ KPZ8b, p. 36; HSE4, pp. 2-3; ULCY1, p. 59.

¹⁴⁶⁸ ULCY1, p. 60.

thus considered as insubordination.¹⁴⁶⁹ Celalzāde records that Selim's assault on Erzincan and his continuous fight with Ismail annoyed Bayezid II. He repeatedly sent orders to Selim to stop the bickering with the shah. Consequently Selim stopped his attacks on qizilbash regions.¹⁴⁷⁰

The response of the Porte to his victories against the enemies of the empire, naturally, broke Selim's heart.¹⁴⁷¹ His sentiment can be seen in one of his letters to his father:

[Bayezid'in] rızasına ri'āyet için bir harābe köşenin ri'yasetinden değil tamam dünyanın saltanatından kemāl-i ihlās ve ubūdiyetim ve Allah te'alanın tevfi-k-i diyāneti ile ferāgat idem. Ve eğer vilāyet-i şarkdan kal'a ve il almağa devletlü Hüdāvendigār'ın emri ve rızası yoğiken bir nice kal'a ve yirler alub zabtedüb ve Sufi'ye virmede tereddüd eylemek bu davaya muhālifdür deyü buyrulursa anı dahī memleketim ve hāsılım çoğ olsun deyu nefsim hevāsına tābi' olub itmedüm, belki sedd-i İslām'ın siyāneti için itdüm. Ve bu hizmete adl ü insāf üzere nazar olunsa makābelede mücerred devletlü Hüdāvendigār'dan ve in'am değil ālişān emrelerimizden ve erkān-ı devletden ve her mü'min-i muvahhiden envā-i imdād iānet lāzım iken hizmetimiz küstahlığa bel ekābir ü a'yān i'tikādınca Sufi'nin evvel hurucunda Sufi'ye nisbet ve mütābeat mülāhaza itdükleri gibi nezübillah şimdi isyana hamlolunursa ol gayreti biz terk itdük. Şimdiden giru ol hizmeti oturdukları yirden hüsn-i tedbir ile erkān-ı devlet def' ideler.¹⁴⁷²

As clearly stated in this paragraph, and in all other Ottoman sources as well, the main problem of Selim was with the statesmen at the Porte, who were said to be preventing the communication between Selim and his father. Selim was said to believe

¹⁴⁶⁹ İnalçık, "Selim I". 'Ali records, "*Vaktā ki Hodāvendigār'a bu ahvāl ma'rūz oldı, 'yerine varasın' diyü bi'l-ittifāk emirler gönderüb, mukayyed olmyacak 'Bizimle saltanata yoksa müşterek misin?' diyü 'itāb-āimiz nāmeler yazıldı.*" See ALI, p. 926. Solakzāde repeats similar accounts. See SLZ1, p. 440. Also regard MNB, p. 422.

¹⁴⁷⁰ CLZ, p. 87. KPZ narrates in the same manner. His account runs, "*Sultan Selim defa'atle ahkām-ı şerife irsāl olunub, 'etrāf-ı vilāyetde olan a'dā ile, eğer Kızılbaş ve eğer Gürcüdür, musālaha vü müdürā üzerine ol, teksir-i a'dāya rızāmuz yokdur' dinilecek merhūm Sultan Selim bī-huzūr olub, endişe bahrine talmişdi.*" KPZ8b, p. 40. For similar accounts, see ANMB, p. 162; HSE4, p. 13.

¹⁴⁷¹ ANMB, p. 162. An undated letter written by Prince Selim to his father best expresses his distress. The letter reads: "*...ekābir ve erkān-ı devlet, devletlü Hüdāvendigār'ın eyyām-ı devletinde emremi (Ahmed) devletlü Hüdāvendigār'ın serir-ı saltanatına geçirmek kasd idüb bāki oğulların sergerdān ve derbeder ve belki helāk etmek niyyeti mukarrer olub bilāhire bu iş bu mertebeye yetiştı. Çünkü helāk mukarrerdir, bāri devletlü Hüdāvendigār ben bendesin gendü eliyle helāk etsün, ayağı toprağına onun için gelinmiştir.*" This letter is published in ULCY1, p.78.

¹⁴⁷² TSA, document E. 5970.

that his valuable activities were not mediated to his father as they were, but presented as insubordination.¹⁴⁷³ One year later after Korkud's open violation of the subordination, Selim moved from Trabzon, once more disregarding insistent orders of the Porte. Ottoman court historians usually tend to conceal Selim's real intentions. They depict as if Selim moved from Trabzon in order to kiss his father's hands.¹⁴⁷⁴ Some more realist historians mention his demands for another province in Rumelia, but presenting as if the reason was the low income of Trabzon.¹⁴⁷⁵ A close examination of his movement from Trabzon to his ascendance to the throne, however, leaves no doubt that Selim's only goal since the very beginning of his movement was to capture the throne. But, of course, he always declared different reasons or pretexts. His strategy was cunningly planned and gradual.¹⁴⁷⁶

¹⁴⁷³ Ottoman court historians congruently argue that the statesmen in Istanbul created an obstacle between Selim and this father. They constantly depicted Selim's victories against heretics and Christians as insubordination to the Sultan's authority for they favored Ahmed for the throne. Thus Selim lost his hope to express his true intentions and sentiments through mediation of these statesmen and decided to visit his father personally. TNSB, p. 270. Müneccimbaşı writes, for example: "*Vüzerā ve vükelānın ve devlet ileri gelenlerinin çoğu güzel huylu ve mülāyim mizaçlı olduğundan Sultan Ahmed'in tarafını tutuyorlar, kötü huylu, öfkeli ve sert bir mizāca sahip olan Sultan Selim'den çekiniyorlardı. Bir fırsat ve münāsebet düştükçe huür-ı hümayunda Sultan Ahmed'in iyi taraflarını, Sultan Selim'in de kötü taraflarını söyleyip, Bayezid Han'ın Sultan Ahmed'e karşı muhabbetini artırıp Sultan Selim'den soğutmaya çalışıyorlardı. Hatta, Sultan Selim'in Sultan'a itāat üzere olmayıp dāvā-yı istiklāl ettiğini iddia ediyorlardı. İddialarını isbat için de, Sultan Selim'in devlet-i aliyye ile sulh hālinde bulunan kızılbaşlarla savaşmasını ve izinsiz olarak Gürcülerin memleketlerini yağmalamasını delil olarak gösteriyorlardı. Sultan Selim'in ağızından vüzerāyı tehdid eden bir de mektup uydurmuşlardı.*" See MNB, p. 422.

¹⁴⁷⁴ HSE4, p. 13. HSE says Selim sent to his father three successive letters demanding permission to visit him. But his demands were rejected.

¹⁴⁷⁵ This was, indeed, one of the first pretexts of Selim for departing from Trabzon. When decided to cross Rumelia, he first attempted to prepare ground to leave Trabzon. For this purpose he wrote letters to his father explaining his discontent with the province of Trabzon. (For one of these letters see ULCY1, pp. 75-76.) According to KPZ, Selim decided to visit his son in Kefe in order to relax himself. He wrote a letter to Bayezid for permission. His request however was denied. Upon his second demand was also denied Selim moved from Trabzon without permission. (See KPZ8b, p. 40.) Another contemporary source narrates otherwise: he wished to visit his father and sent letters to the Porte. His three successive demands were all rejected. (ANMB, p. 162.) Instead, the Porte ordered him to stay in his province and protect it. This answer, however, did not satisfy Selim and he decided to depart from Trabzon in 1510. See ULCY1, p. 78; ANMB, p. 162.

¹⁴⁷⁶ The real incentive of Selim to rebel his father is best indicated in Şükrī's *Selim-nāme*. It is written in this versified history that one day Selim summoned his entourage and discussed the deteriorated situation of the empire. He reminded his men of the defeat of the Ottoman army against Mamluks, inability of the

Presenting his pretext either to kiss his father's hand or to visit his son, Selim arrived in Kefe in 1510. The correspondence between the prince and the Porte was intensified; while the Porte was insistently writing him to return to Trabzon, Selim offered several excuses to the Porte. Selim was strictly determined not to return to Trabzon. His letters obviously indicate this ultimate determination. In his letter which he wrote upon hearing that Mevlāna Nureddin Sarıgürüz was dispatched as a intermediary, he definitely expressed that there was no possibility for him to return.¹⁴⁷⁷ His response to Mevlāna Nureddin Sarıgürüz shows his utmost determined attitude. After explaining that his violation of the Sultan's wish was because of his interests in the well-being of the state, Selim declared,

...Ve rızadan garaz Trabzon'a varmak gökten Cebrâil inüb ve Peygamber dilek ederse kabul eylemezsin. Ve sen anda varub âdemün gelüb cevap getirünceye değin bunda ancak tahammül ederin. Ve beni şöyle sanmasunlar ki, Korkud Emrem gibi bir yere varub yine rucū' eyemek ihtimālî ola. Ben bu hususta baş vermeye rāzı olub fikrimden dönmek ihtimālî yokdur.¹⁴⁷⁸

Selim was now demanding a province in the Rumelia, which was obviously against the Ottoman law.¹⁴⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the Porte ardently refused this demand. It

Porte against conspiracies of Alauddevle, and the passive policy of the empire against Shah Ismail. Then he declared he could not stay without doing anything while the country was falling in havoc. Consequently Selim moved to Kefe. See SKB, pp. 73-75; YSF, pp. 28-29. ANMH also clearly states the real reason of why Selim left Trabzon: 'Selim learned that his father would leave the throne to Ahmed. He got angry for he was not accounted in this affair. Then he built ships to cross to Kefe.' ANMH, p. 47.

¹⁴⁷⁷ KPZ8b, p. 41; ULCY1, p. 80, footnote, 35. Also consider TNSB, pp. 271-2; MNB, p. 423.

¹⁴⁷⁸ TSA, document E. 6322. This document is published in ULCY1, p. 81.

¹⁴⁷⁹ But the Porte repeatedly declared him that it was unfeasible since it contradicted the traditional law (*kānun-u kadīm*). According to KPZ, Selim first demanded a province in Rumelia while he was in Kefe; he had left Trabzon in order to rest in Kefe. KPZ states that upon Selim's demand, the leading statesmen were summoned and they discussed the issue. The conclusion was as follows: "It is contrary to the *kanūn-u kadīm* to give a province in Rumelia; and it will cause quarrel among princes. When other princes hear such a decision they would also wish to pass to Rumelia. Then how can we prevent such turmoil? The best choice is to force the prince to return to his province. If he would refuse, then taking the advantage of this pretext we would bring Ahmed to the throne." (See KPZ8b, p. 41. For parallel accounts see HSE4, p. 15; SLZ1, p. 441.) Selim, on the other hand, insisted on his demand arguing that this would not be the first time that they would violate *kānun-u kadīm*. Learning from Sarugurz's report on this meeting with Selim, however, he left the door open for another choice. Sarıgürüz reported to the Porte that Selim would accept another province in Anatolia, but not a piaster less than that of Ahmed. (See TSA, document E. 5490. Also

should be remembered that Ahmed was also closely following Selim's movements and continuously writing letters to the Porte demanding them to reject Selim's rebellious requests.¹⁴⁸⁰ Selim, on the other hand, was not to return without taking what he wanted. He left Kefe and landed on Kili shores in April-May, 1511.¹⁴⁸¹ In Kili, second offer of the Porte reached Selim. He was offered the province of Kefe and some additional income from Kili and Akkirman. Selim again rejected this offer and declared his 'new red line'. He swore not to cross back the Danube.¹⁴⁸² On the other hand, he constantly assured his father on that his intention was neither to rebel nor to grasp the throne.¹⁴⁸³

consider HSE4, p. 17.) Later developments would show, however, that this was not what Selim sincerely wanted, it was just an intermediary step of more comprehensive bargain. Likewise, Selim did not accept the Province of Menteşe, which was offered later. He declared in one of his letters sent from Kefe that it was impossible for him to return to Anatolia. Rather, he demanded the Province of Silistre in Rumelia. (ULCY1, p. 82; TNSB, p. 274.) Another objective often repeated in his letters was to meet the Sultan personally and to express his ideas directly to him. As indicated before, Ottoman historians tend to conceal Selim's real intention simply to legitimize his openly unlawful acts. If relied on KPZ, for example, Selim never wished a province in Anatolia, whether it would be greater than that of Ahmed. KPZ states, on the subject of so-called offer of a province in Anatolia, that Selim responded that his desire was to kiss his father's hands and to talk directly to him. His account runs, "*Babam hazretlerinin mübârek cemâlin görüb ellerin öpmek be-gâyet muradımdur, bi-nefsih huzûr-u şeriflerine 'arz idecek kazâyâ vardır. Ol maslahat nihâyet bulduktan sonra, emr-i şerifleri teveccühle sudûr u zuhûr bulur ise imtisâl oluna.*" KPZ8b, p. 42. Hoca Saadeddin admits Selim's insistence on a province in Rumelia, but offers a much more legitimate reason: he argues that Selim's intention was to raise the banner of *gazâ* against infidels in Rumelia. But the statesmen around Bayezid did their best to damage the relationship between the prince and his father. HSE4, p. 15.

¹⁴⁸⁰ For one of these letters see ULCY1, p. 82. KPZ states that Ahmed got so angry with Selim's movement that he decided to pass Rumelia and punish his brother. But after his intention was prevented by the Porte, he could not realize this plan. KPZ8b, p. 48.

¹⁴⁸¹ Selim stitched his tent near Kamçısuyu on Rebî I 4, 917 (June 1, 1511). See ULCY1, p. 83. KPZ records the date as first months of the year 917. See KPZ8b, p. 49. Şükrî records an interesting dialogue between Selim and the ruler of Crimea, who was said to be father-in-law of Selim in some sources. When he decided to leave from Kefe for Rumelia, the Khan of Tatar offered some soldiers to reinforce Selim's forces. Selim's response was that 'do not think that I am going with bad ideas and I have the desire of the throne in my heart. Why should I need abundant soldiers; I just wish to see the face of my father!' SKB, pp. 77-78; YSF, p. 29.

¹⁴⁸² ULCY1, 84. Selim expressed his definite decision in a letter to the Porte. See TSA, document E. 5443.

¹⁴⁸³ Şükrî-i Bitlisî puts special emphasis on Selim's concern to improve the deteriorated situation of the empire. He says, for example, that Selim wrote to the Porte when he was in Kili and explained his concerns. Selim says, "*Ey erkân-ı din-i devlet! Hâtrâ bu hutûr etmeye kim benim bu cânibe kudûmum kasd-ı tâc u taht rûsûmu ola. Pâdişah rub'u meskûne kulları şark ve garp düşmenları zebûn idegelmişken şimdi bu mertebe sükûn tutmağa bâ'is ne oldı? Kim memâlik-i Osmâniyede nice eşkiyâ peydâ ve sipâh u râbeti kahr u zillete hüveydâ oldı...*" Sukrî's account continues with mentioning of the weakness in the administration against Alauddevle and Shah Ismail. See YSF, p. 31. For original versified version see SKB, p. 85.

Upon realizing Selim's resolution, Bayezid ordered the *beylerbey* of Rumelia to come to Edirne. By the suggestions of viziers, Bayezid began to regard Selim's movement as complete rebellion and decided to punish him. Upon receiving the news, Selim persistently wrote to his father that his aim was not to rebel but to kiss the Sultan's hands and explain his concerns personally.¹⁴⁸⁴

'Ali records that absolute orders were dispatched to Selim not to come to Edirne. Even religious scholars issued religious ordinance declaring that "from the point of religious law, his blood was permitted." A copy of this ordinance was sent to Selim. But it also could not stop the rally of this grim prince.¹⁴⁸⁵ Nonetheless, Selim advanced until Tunca River, near Edirne. Bayezid, on the other hand, moved from Edirne and stationed his army in Cukur-çayır. The tension reached its peak.¹⁴⁸⁶ A war between father and son was about to ignite. As a last hope, Bayezid again sent Mevlāna Nureddin Sarıgürüz to settle an agreement. At the end of the negotiations, Selim got almost everything that he had demanded. In addition to the governorship of Semendire, a practice never seen before in the Ottoman history, he obtained permission to wage *gazā* campaigns on Hungary. Furthermore, Bayezid promised not to determine any heir-apparent during his lifetime.¹⁴⁸⁷ Selim was ordered to go to his new province as soon as possible.

While Selim was struggling with the Porte in Rumelia, Anatolia was in complete turmoil. Şahkulu rebellion was expanding in western Anatolia. At the end, the Grand

¹⁴⁸⁴ IDRS, p. 90; TNSB, p. 276. One of his letters, for example, after complaining about Ahmed's favorite position in the eyes of the Sultan, says, "...*bu zaif dahī iş baştan aşub gayret ve hamiyet ile helāk olmak mukarrer olduđu(nu) müşāhade edüb bizzat devlet eşiğine yüz sürüp ayağı toprağına hālim arzedüb devletlu Hüdāvendigārın çun ben bendesine gazābı olub helāk ve zayı' eylemek murādıdır, bāri varayın hāk-i pāyine yüz süreyin her ne fermānı var ise yerine kosun deyu bu cānibe gelindi.*" See TSA, document E. 6815.

¹⁴⁸⁵ ALI, pp. 931-2.

¹⁴⁸⁶ KPZ8b, p. 50; SKB, p. 81.

¹⁴⁸⁷ For detailed explanation of negotiations see ULCY1, 86; KPZ8b, pp. 51-52; TNSB, pp. 276-9; IDRS, pp. 91-92; HSE4, pp. 19-29; ANMB, pp. 212-3.

Vizier Ali Pasha was assigned to suppress the rebellion with the aid of some Janissaries. Ali Pasha was obviously declaring his pro-Ahmed orientation. His plan was, as explained in contemporary sources, to suppress the rebellion with Ahmed and then grant him the throne.¹⁴⁸⁸ Selim must have been aware of Ali Pasha's plan because when he heard the Sultan's decision to go to Istanbul, he rigorously opposed. He did not go to Semendire but stayed in Eski Zağra,¹⁴⁸⁹ where he summoned Rumelian troops as if they would march on Hungary.¹⁴⁹⁰ Fisher, quoting from the letter of Andrea Foscolo, a contemporary Italian observer, dated June 24, 1511, writes: "Selim was afraid that should Ali Pasha and Prince Ahmed be victorious, they might then be united and cross to Europe against him. With this in mind, Selim camped near Edirne, continually increasing the strength of his army at the expense of his father, by offering double pay."¹⁴⁹¹ Foscolo calls attention to an important point, "Bayezid could find no pasha to attack and drive Selim to his new province, because no officer, feeling that Selim would be the next sultan, could dare to incur his wrath."¹⁴⁹²

¹⁴⁸⁸ KPZ8b, p. 53. ANMB states that after the Province of Semendire was allocated to Selim, some leading statesmen wrote a letter to Ahmed. They reported him the the latest events. According to these statesmen, if he (Ahmed) would solve the qizilbash problem, then his way to the throne would be opened. But Selim somehow knew about this letter and decided not to go to Semendire. See ANMB, p. 214.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Selim was unwilling to go to Semendire, because he thought that Bayezid decided to enthrone Ahmed in Istanbul. One of his undated letters to Bayezid reads, "...Devletlu Hüdāvendigār hazretleri Rumeli livālarından Semendire livāsını bu bendesine sadaka edüb akın etmek için icāzet buyruldukda ba'zı akıncılardan kimesneler cem' etmek sadedinde iken ba'zı subaşılar ve sipahiler cem' olunub Zara Eskisi'nde sākin olub tedārikde iken nāgāh Anadolu tarafından kızılbaş üzerine Ali Paşa ile gönderilen asker münhezim olub ve Ali Paşa'nın dahī alındığı haberi muhakkak alındukda devletlu Hüdāvendigār yümn-i ikbālle İstanbul'a müteveccih oldı, şol kasde ki Emrem Sultan Ahmed'i getürdüb memleketi ana ismarlayub kendüler ferāgat ideler deyu istima' olındı..." KPZ states that the succession of Ahmed was planned in Edirne, where Bayezid had granted the obedience of Rumelia begs to Ahmed. See KPZ8b, p. 56. Also regard SKB, p. 87; ALI, p. 942.

¹⁴⁹⁰ According to Idrīs, one of the most pro-Selim contemporary historians, Selim would sincerely wage *gazā* on Hungary if Bayezid had not decided to enthrone Ahmed. See IDRS, p. 91. In reality, Selim's aim was nothing than to secure the obedience of Rumelian troops.

¹⁴⁹¹ FSH, p. 107. Regard also ANMH, pp. 54-55. ANMH states that Selim behaved like an independent ruler in Rumelia. He gathered an army of 20.000 men. In order to pay the expense of this huge army, he confiscated all gold and silver mines; he also collected all the taxes and tariffs of Rumelia for himself.

¹⁴⁹² FSH, p. 108.

Kemalpaşazāde records that following Ali Pasha's and Prince Şehinşah's death on July 2, 1511, most of the leading statesmen inclined to invite Prince Ahmed to the throne. Kemalpaşazāde also underscores that after the death of Ali Pasha, Ahmed pretended to be an independent ruler; he wanted to rule the country as he wished and was not willing to accept any other solution.¹⁴⁹³ Consequently Bayezid II decided to leave the throne to Ahmed. He ordered high officials to do what was necessary to enthrone him.¹⁴⁹⁴ And he moved from Edirne to Istanbul in July 1511.¹⁴⁹⁵ Bayezid II also demanded the obedience of Rumelian begs for Ahmed's *saltanat*. Though some of them offered their submission and joined the imperial army on the way towards Istanbul, some others preferred to take position on Selim's side.¹⁴⁹⁶

Learning that Bayezid had moved from Edirne¹⁴⁹⁷, Selim immediately set off with 40.000 soldiers and caught his father near Çorlu.¹⁴⁹⁸ This time, a clash was inevitable.¹⁴⁹⁹ Selim was defeated and fled to Ahyolu, where his ships were waiting, on

¹⁴⁹³ KPZ8b, pp. 55-6.

¹⁴⁹⁴ KPZ cites his words, "Oğlum Sultan Ahmed'i götürmeğe tarîk-i sevâb u vech-i ma'kul neyse ana meşgul olun, min ba'd padişahınız oldur." KPZ8b, p. 56.

¹⁴⁹⁵ KPZ8b, p. 56.

¹⁴⁹⁶ KPZ8b, p. 56.

¹⁴⁹⁷ According to KPZ, Bayezid moved from Edirne to Istanbul in order to enthrone Ahmed. The plan was to send Selim to Semendire and to enthrone Ahmed in Istanbul. See KPZ8b, p. 56. Idrīs repeats the same account. He records that Bayezid moved in the last days of *Rebī II* 917 (the last days of July 1511). IDRS, p. 92. For similar accounts see HSE4, p. 34 (Hoca also gives the date as the last days of *Rebī II*); ALI, pp. 942-3; MNB, pp. 425-6. Italian sources, however, suggest another reason for Bayezid's departure from Edirne to Istanbul. As Fisher summarizes, according to reports of Italian observers, Bayezid heard a rumor that Selim was planning to go around Edirne and go to Istanbul to seize the imperial treasury. It was because of this rumor that Bayezid moved from Edirne to Istanbul. See FSH, p. 108. ANMB recounts a similar account; Bayezid departed from Edirne because he heard that Selim was coming to Edirne with a strong army. Since the Sultan had not enough military force to resist Selim for the time being, as he sent most of the Janissaries with Ali Pasha, Bayezid fled from Edirne to Istanbul. See ANMH, p. 56.

¹⁴⁹⁸ ULCY1, p. 87. KPZ and TNS give the number of soldiers as 30.000. See KPZ8b, p. 52; TNSB, p. 281. ALI says that he moved with forty or fifty thousand soldiers. See ALI, p. 943.

¹⁴⁹⁹ Idrīs' account regarding this battle is quite outlandish. To him, Selim did not want to make war on his father; when he decided to return, the soldiers of the Sultan attacked his forces. See IDRS, p. 93. This must be regarded, however, as Idrīs' attempt to recover the bad-fame of Selim. It should be remembered that Idrīs wrote his *Selimnāme* during the reign of Selim. KPZ and CLZ pursue similar attitude putting the blame on the shoulders of Bayezid's high officials. See KPZ8b, pp. 57-8. For an analysis of CLZ's account see Celia J. Kerslake, "The Selim-name of Celal-zāde Mustafa Çelebi as a Historical Source",

August 3, 1511 (Cemāzī I 8, 911).¹⁵⁰⁰ He moved to Kefe and began to observe the events there.¹⁵⁰¹ Bayezid entered Istanbul on Cemāzī II 17, 917 (September 11, 1511).¹⁵⁰²

7.1.6. An Evaluation of Prince Selim's Policy for the Throne

The system of the Ottoman state apparatus and economy were established on the basis of territorial expansion. Any stagnation in territorial expansion, thus, created serious internal crisis.¹⁵⁰³ The later episodes of Bayezid II's reign bitterly experienced one such crisis. Especially military classes were eager to maintain continuous warfare. This was the result of not only military heroism but also economic interests. Most of promotions and assignments of new *timars*, as well as extra payments to *kuls*, could be realized after military victories and territorial expansions. Thus, especially military wing of the Ottoman state apparatus was constantly demanding warfare.¹⁵⁰⁴ Selim, with his militant and warlike character, was promising to re-stimulate Ottoman war machine, which was in numbness for a while. Thus his war-like fame won him the favor of the members of military classes. More specifically, as İnalcık states, the Janissaries, *timar* holders, and *akıncıs* wanted Selim's succession for "it was the military campaigns that gave

Turcica, IX/2-X, Paris, 1970, pp. 44-47. ALI follows IDR's account on this issue. See ALI, pp. 944-5. On the other hand, ANMH recounts Selim's behavior in a different manner which seems to be closer to the truth. To ANMH, Selim pursued quite an offensive policy; he followed his father and assaulted him when he reached him. Bayezid always tried to avoid a confrontation with his son. But Selim carried the situation into a point at which a clash became inevitable. See ANMH, pp. 56-7.

¹⁵⁰⁰ ULCY1, p. 88; TNSB, pp. 281-2; ALI, p. 947. ALI gives this date as the day on which the battle occurred. KPZ notes that the Janissaries and kapı kulu soldiers became so sorrow when Selim was defeated in this battle. See KPZ8b, p.58.

¹⁵⁰¹ For detailed narration of the battle and Selim's flight see KPZ8b, pp. 56-58. Also see SKB, pp. 89-90; YSF, p.33; HSE4, pp. 37-41; ALI, pp. 943-7.

¹⁵⁰² ALI, p. 947.

¹⁵⁰³ Compare Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 27-27.

¹⁵⁰⁴ ULCY1, p. 77.

opportunity to these military classes to get promotion, more valuable *timars* or booty.”¹⁵⁰⁵

In their attempt to legitimize Selim’s usurpation of the *saltanat* from his father, Ottoman historians of the sixteenth century always emphasize Selim’s promise to (re)mobilize the ‘central institutions’ of the Ottoman empire.¹⁵⁰⁶ Celalzāde Mustafa, for example, while bitterly criticizing corrupt practices of the viziers and begs during the last years of Bayezid II, underlines that the *timars* and state posts were not allocated on the basis of merit. Those who offered enough bribe got the posts instead of those who deserved *timars* according to their service. Celalzāde emphasizes that Selim took stand in favor of warrior-*gāzis*. He did not take even one fifth of the booty, which had been the tradition, but delivered all the booty to the *gāzis*.¹⁵⁰⁷ Selim’s aim was to attract the warriors (*yarar ādem*) who were disappointed by wrongdoings of the Porte.¹⁵⁰⁸ According to the Celalzāde’s reconstruction of Selim’s early days in Trabzon, Prince Selim summoned the leaders of these discontent classes in Trabzon and told them that he did not appreciate this policy of the Porte. As re-formulated by Celalzāde, Selim launched a campaign on Georgia in order to provide booty for these discontent and neglected groups and to show that his favor was on these groups. According to Celalzāde, Selim evidently uttered to the leaders of these discontent groups that if he could be the sultan, his favor would be over them rather than the class of slaves.

Not difficult to recognize, Selim’s *ghazas* against Gerogian Christians, which were resulted in satisfactory spoils, attracted idle young population of Anatolia who was

¹⁵⁰⁵ İnalçık, “Selim I”.

¹⁵⁰⁶ KPZ8a, pp. 232-3; ANMB, pp. 160-61; HSE4, pp.5-6.

¹⁵⁰⁷ CLZ, p. 103.

¹⁵⁰⁸ CLZ, pp. 103-4.

not yet attached to Qizilbash movement to Trabzon. Selim declared himself as the leader of *gāzis*. Celalzāde vividly describes how Selim made Trabzon the gathering center of *gāzi*-warriors. He says that Selim dispatched messengers to the provinces of Anatolia, Rūm, and Karaman in order to preach his intention of *gazā* on Christian Georgia. These messengers explained to the unembroidered young fighters that Prince Selim would launch a *gazā* campaign on Georgia and those who desire some spoil and booty shall come and join his army. By this way, Selim gathered *yarar ādems* of the cities, towns, villages, and of the nomadic tribes, who were in search of adventure, from above-mentioned provinces.¹⁵⁰⁹ He spoiled the Georgian territories with these recruited forces several times. At the end of each campaign the warriors received booty, which inflamed their desire for further *gazās*.¹⁵¹⁰ These fighters not only reinforced the army of Selim, but also expanded his fame as the patron of *gāzis* and warriors throughout the empire. When they returned to their home, these men narrated what they saw and heard during the raid on Georgia. Especially the booty and Selim's promises to the non-slave origin warriors (*merdūm-zāde*) must have echoed among discontent population. Celalzāde says that Selim's policy created such an excitement among the folk that they sang songs whose lines reads: "*Yürü Sultan Selim meydān senindür!*"¹⁵¹¹ They also trusted, Celalzāde argues, in the promise of Selim and disregarded qizilbash side.¹⁵¹²

¹⁵⁰⁹ "...Memālik-i mahmiyede vāki' olan şehirlerden ve kasabātdan ve kurādan ve konar göçer erbāb-ı ahbiyeden cihād ve gazādan safulu olan merdān-ı kār ve hizebrān-ı kār-zār Trabzon'a sefer idüb, bu bahāne ile hayli hayli dilāverler, gazā-perverler, cihād-ziverler anda varub cem' olmuşlar..." CLZ, p. 102.

¹⁵¹⁰ CLZ, p. 102.

¹⁵¹¹ CLZ, p. 105.

¹⁵¹² CLZ, p. 105.

Selim obviously appeared as the symbol of aggressive policy.¹⁵¹³ In 1507, during his invasion of the Dulkadir principality, Ismail passed over the Ottoman lands and enrolled Turkomans who were Ottoman subjects in his army. Although it was an open violation of Ottoman sovereignty, Bayezid avoided any open conflict with the shah. Meanwhile, Selim, in his own turn, pursued a rather aggressive policy. As explained above, he raided Erzincan in 1507. He did not hesitate to criticize Bayezid's passive policy especially against Shah Ismail.¹⁵¹⁴ As İnalçık puts it succinctly,

While, by his submissive attitude, Prince Ahmed was favored by the Sultan and the Grand Vizier, Selim became the symbol of an aggressive policy. Selim, however, declared that his concern was not to secure the throne but to save the empire from the havoc in which it had fallen. Openly criticizing his father's inactivity, he showed himself as a champion of the warfare against heretics as well as Christians. Already from Trabzon he had organized raids into the neighboring Georgia. His *ghazā* activities, used as political propaganda, won him the favor of the Janissaries, the timariot Sipāhīs and *Akindjis* in Rumelia. It was the military campaigns that gave opportunity to these military classes to get promotion, more valuable *tīmārs* or booty.¹⁵¹⁵

One would easily realize that this offensive policy made military classes whose income and wealth was depended on warship become inclined to Selim. On the other hand, as reported by Celalzāde, viziers and high bureaucrats were favoring Ahmed's candidacy. *Selīm-nāme* authors unanimously argue that these statesmen were in favor of Ahmed since Ahmed was relaxed and soft in disposition. They thought that if Ahmed

¹⁵¹³ ULCY says that Selim first realized the vitality of the qizilbash threat and wrote several letters to the Porte in order to call attention to this rising danger. But he never received a satisfactory answer. Then he waged campaigns on the Qizilbash with warriors gathered from the provinces of Rum and Karaman. He became the leader of sunnism against shi'ism. ULCY1, p. 76. ULCY follows, however, the footprints of Ottoman court historians, not only in this specific case but also throughout his article, and takes a pro-Selim stand. As explained in the former sections, the Porte was actually quite aware of the qizilbash threat and took severe preventive measures.

¹⁵¹⁴ When their pro-Ahmed orientation became apparent Selim pointed his bitter criticism especially against viziers and high officials at the Porte. His undated letter, possibly written in Kefe during his rebellious movement, clearly shows how he accused *erkān-ı devlet*: "*Memleket ahvālinin tedārik olunması hususunda daima iğmaz-ı ayn vāki' olub memleketin ahvāli bābında sū-i tedbirinizden gayri nesne zāhir olmaz. Mā-hāsal-ı kelām bu kadar fitne ve fesāda sizing adem-i ikdamınız vāki olmuştur...*" See ULCY1, p. 79.

¹⁵¹⁵ İnalçık, "Selim I"

would be the next sultan, their established order would continue. On the other hand Selim was dynamic, rigorous, enterprising, and warlike. They knew that during the reign of Selim they would either lose their position or have to work harder.¹⁵¹⁶

A passage in the *Selimnāme* of Idrīs-i Bitlisī succinctly explains the two pillars of Selim's strategy in his struggle with his father and brothers. Idrīs says that when Selim approached to Edirne demanding to meet with his father, Bayezid declined his request and ordered him to return. But Selim insisted on his demand. According to Idrīs' reformulation, Selim based his claim for the throne on two pillars: first, the Porte had given up rigorous *gazā* policy, which had always been the core of the traditional policy from their ancestors.¹⁵¹⁷ The Sultan had to stimulate *gāzis* and launch *cihād* campaigns in order to enlarge the realm of Islam. This the tradition of the Prophet (*sünnet*), was the strict order of the God on certain portion of Muslims (*farz-ı kifāye*)¹⁵¹⁸. On the other hand, the warrior-*gāzis* began to lose their enthusiasm and skill since they never engaged war; especially the young soldiers who never participated in a *gazā* were neither tasting the heroism and the religious enthusiasm of a holy war nor progressing their skills and abilities to fight. Selim accused the Porte, as reported by Idrīs, for they renounced traditional policy of the dynasty.¹⁵¹⁹

Selim's second criticism pointed toward the viziers, if not toward the Sultan, was regarding their passive attitude in qizilbash affairs. Selim carefully constructed his line of argument in such a manner that, on one hand, he called the attention of the statesmen (*erkān-ı devlet*) to the rising power of Ismail and his deadly enmity regarding the

¹⁵¹⁶ See, for example, CLZ, pp. 105-106.

¹⁵¹⁷ Consider also HSE4, p. 11.

¹⁵¹⁸ That is the strict order of God on Muslims, but not on every individual. If some portion of Muslims fulfils this order, then the others will not be responsible. If no one would fulfill, then the whole Muslim society would be punished for it.

¹⁵¹⁹ IDRS, pp. 90-91. Also regard HSE4, pp. 11-12.

Ottoman Empire; and on the other hand, he openly accused them of not taking necessary measures against this serious and rising peril.¹⁵²⁰ He argued that if this problem was not to handle adequately, its hazards on the Ottoman state and society could not be recovered; thus, the problem had to be urgently treated. In the meantime, his father was not able to handle such a great trouble because of his old age and deteriorating health.¹⁵²¹ Therefore, one of the princes had to take over the rule of the country. As a matter of fact, the Sultan was also aware of his lack of sufficient qualities in order to rule the empire adequately during this critical period; it was known that he wished to leave the throne to Prince Ahmed.¹⁵²² Idrīs does not directly say on behalf of Selim that the true candidate was Selim himself.¹⁵²³ Nevertheless, his expression means exactly the same thing. Idrīs reports Selim’s last words to the Porte as follows: “It is certain that the viziers agree on Ahmed’s *saltanat*; but their primary concern in choosing Ahmed is not for the good of the state but for their own profit.¹⁵²⁴ Nevertheless, in spite of viziers and statesmen, holy warriors (*mücāhit*) and strong-fighters (*yiğit*) are just in opposite opinion.”¹⁵²⁵

‘Ali reports that during 1510’s, Ismail’s majesty was in its climax while the Ottoman realm was experiencing its most disastrous period. On one hand, the number of soldiers in his army increased day by day; but on the other hand, the security and peace in the ‘country of welfare’ (*memālik-i ma’mūre*), i.e. the Ottoman realm, diminished hour by hour accordingly. The Sultan could do nothing because of his tiresome health

¹⁵²⁰ For a similar account see HSE4, p. 12.

¹⁵²¹ For a similar reasoning for succession of Selim regard HSE4, p. 12.

¹⁵²² IDRS, p. 91.

¹⁵²³ Ottoman historians who composed their histories during the reign of Selim or his son Süleyman always describe Selim as the best candidate to handle the great troubles to which the empire was exposed during the last years of Bayezid II. See, for example, HSE4, p. 17.

¹⁵²⁴ For a similar account, see ANMB, pp. 193-4.

¹⁵²⁵ IDRS, p. 91.

and old age while his subjects fell into miserable life conditions and poverty. He states that “the power and splendor of Shah Ismail reached such a degree that the populations of Anatolia were in expectation with great fear that the Shah shall come to Rūm either today or tomorrow!”¹⁵²⁶

Selim successfully used this pessimistic atmosphere for his purpose. The following verse of Celalzāde evidently shows ideological construction of pro-Selim camp: “*Vücūdi olmasa Sultan Selim’in / Sa’ādet menba’ı şāh-ı kerīmin / Alurdu milketi (memleketi) düşman ser-ā-ser / Fütūh u nasr olmazdı müyesser.*”¹⁵²⁷ ‘Ali follows the traditional line of *Selimmāme* authors which profoundly appropriates pro-Selim stand, in depicting princes and their attitudes regarding to the appalling situation of the country. He portrays Prince Ahmed, who was then the foremost candidate to the throne, as a man of laxity of pleasure. To him, Ahmed was not interested in the deteriorating conditions of the country, and those of the subjects, but his only concern was to secure the throne for himself and have a more enjoyable life in the palace.¹⁵²⁸ In a similar vein, Prince Ahmed was indifferent to the rising qizilbash threat as well. ‘Ali follows the traditional line in arguing that the most suitable candidate to the throne was Selim, even if he was the youngest prince. Because he had the qualifications needed for a good ruler of which the other princes were lacking. In that aspect Selim was the greatest among all

¹⁵²⁶ ALI’s account runs, “*Bu tarikle rüz be rüz askerini ziyāde itmekde ve saat be-saat memālik-i ma’mūre halkının huzūr u āsāyişi zāil olub gitmekde idi. Hodāvendigār ise, za’f-ı kuvāsına bināen izhār-ı sekīne vü vakār ile ser-gerdān ve vüzerā vü ümerā ol cānibde tagallūbe hayrān, re’āyā ise bu ortalıkda perişān-hāl ü ser-gerdān olub, Şah İsmail’in sīt u savleti bir dereceye vardı ki, ‘Acabā vilāyet-i Rūm’a bu gün mü gelür ki veyāhud teveccūhi yarına veya obir güne mi kalur ki?’ diyü havfile tereddüd iderdi. ‘Ve bu ru’b u hirās sonı niye varsa gerekdür?’ diyü birbirlerine söylerlerdi. Hattā vilāyet-i Rūm’a mahsūs emti’adan ba’zı nesne ister oldı. Sūret-i ‘arz-ı muhabbetde ādemleri gelüb, ahvāl-i vilāyeti ve kendüden olan havf u huşū’i tamāmen fehm eyledüği muhakkak buldı.*” See ALI, pp. 935-6.

¹⁵²⁷ CLZ, p. 131.

¹⁵²⁸ ALI, p. 936.

princes.¹⁵²⁹ Since Selim had a nature of a good ruler, he deeply recognized the danger of qizilbashes for the empire before his brothers and even before his father did. He was uncomfortable with the advance of Shah Ismail in Persia and frontier regions, even before the outbreak of struggles for the throne. Already during his governorship in Trabzon, Selim truly realized the poisonous menace of Ismail for the Ottoman Empire; and he thought on how to eliminate this rising enemy. He felt so sad and regretful because of not being the sultan of the empire during this vital period in which his father and the viziers could not truly comprehend the qizilbah jeopardy. In these sentences, ‘Ali does not hesitate to explain Selim’s real incentive and goal in departing from Trabzon: Selim tried to find ways to overcome the qizilbash problem. Eventually he decided to grasp the throne for himself and then to solve the problem.¹⁵³⁰ It was for this purpose that he first procured Prince Süleyman’s appointment to the governorship of Kefe and then moved from Trabzon pretending to visit his son. However, his genuine objective was to cross to Rumelia and to grasp the throne when opportunity appeared.¹⁵³¹

To sum up, we can determine at least three very important elements in the movement of Prince Selim up to his ascendance: Firstly, he departed from Trabzon with the absolute goal of acquiring the throne and never hesitated or thought to return to

¹⁵²⁹ “...amma Sultan Selim-i vakūr gāyetde ‘ālī-himmet ü gayūr olmağla sāir şehzādelerden kihter ve sinnen asgar iken himmeten ve gayreten her birinden ekber u mihter olmağın...” ALI, p. 936.

¹⁵³⁰ Indeed, ALI does not directly state the ultimate goal of Selim. A careful reading of the whole paragraph, however, leaves no suspicion on this assumption.

¹⁵³¹ “...Şah İsmail’in hareketine ve surh-serān ve Ibn-i Ardabil’in cür’et ü cesāretine rencide vü bī-huzūr olurdu. Dem be-dem teessüf ü nedāmet ve mālīk-i taht u saltanat olmaduğına ‘arz-ı peşimāni vü mihnet kılurdu. Belki gāh gāh hāriçden kimse agāh olmaduğı demlerde göz yaşları katarātını dökerdi. Gūya ki, nihāni cünūd-ı gaybī ile akınlar salub, dūd-ı āh-ı alev-nākden zerrīn ‘alemler ve bayraklar çekerdi. Āhīr-i kār, ‘Kızılbaş tāifesinin dest-i te’addīleri itālesini Āl-i Osman’ın mīlk-i mevrūsının izālesine müstevcibdir’ diyū hüsn-i tedbīr idüb, kurret-i ‘aynı olan noyīn-i nev-āyīni, ya’ni ki şehzāde-i selimü’t-tab’-ı Süleyman-temkīni Kefe sancağına vāli basb itdi. Anları taht-ı eyāletine ulaştırmak bahanesiyle Rum-ili’ne geçmeğe himmetini ‘ālī kıldı...” ALI, p. 936.

Istanbul throughout his journey. As delineated above, a careful scrutiny of his movement clearly unveils this fact. All other demands of Selim which were constantly furthered throughout his journey were simply a pretext to secure the peace with the Porte and to gain time. Two distinguished features of his personality and disposition marked not only his early movement which led him to ascend to the throne but also his whole reign as well. These features are that he was harsh and grim in temperament; and that he used to discuss things in depth before making a decision, and once decided he applied it with ultimate determination.

Secondly, one of the principal constituents of Selim's political propaganda was the stress on the warship and *gazā*. In this, he gained the favor of military classes, which would be decisive in his struggle with his father and brother Ahmed. As will be evaluated in the next sections, it was the Janissaries who opposed the Sultan Bayezid's legitimate decision to enthrone Prince Ahmed, who prevented him from materializing this intention, and who repelled Prince Ahmed while he was arriving in Üsküdar in order to ascend to the throne.

Last but not the least, alongside with the *gazā*, Prince Selim consciously constructed his policy on the qizilbash enmity since the early days of his governorship in Trabzon.¹⁵³² As will be further discussed elsewhere, his strictly anti-qizilbash stand was chiefly effective in gaining the favor of the influential groups, among which the Janissaries came first, in Istanbul. Selim's antagonistic attitude against qizilbashes must have also won him the favor of the sunni population who suffered especially during the rebellion of Şahkulu. Although this popular support was not effective in his capturing

¹⁵³² Sohrweide calls attention to the role of Selim's tutor and favorite entourage Halimī, who was a member of Zeyniyye Order. See Sohrweide, pp. 143-4. As already delineated another prominent sheikhs of this order had caused Sheikh Junayd to be driven away from Konya after a theological discussion.

the sovereignty, it prepared a public ground and legitimacy for his later harsh measures against qizilbash population. The following chapters evaluate how this happened.

7.2. QIZILBASHES IN THE OTTOMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS: THE CIVIL WAR AND THE TRIUMPH OF FANATICISM

7.2.1. Selim's Ascendance to the Throne, 1512

In the Mid-August of 1511, there was a complete chaos in the Ottoman realm. After Ali Pasha suppressed Şahkulu rebellion with difficulty at a cost of his life, Prince Selim attacked his father but was defeated. He had to flee to Kefe on August 8. In the meantime, Prince Ahmed was following the developments with great anxiety. He insistently demanded permission from the Porte to cross Rumelia and punish Selim. But his demand was again refused. Nevertheless, Selim's daring attack on his father convinced the Porte and the Sultan that it was time to leave the throne to Ahmed.¹⁵³³ Although his performance in suppressing Şahkulu rebellion seriously eroded the image of Ahmed as a candidate to be the next Ottoman sultan, Selim's situation was no more advantageous than Ahmed's because he was seen as *the defeated rebellious prince*.

Haniwaldanus Anonym records that after this battle with his son, Bayezid did not permit begs, *sancakbeys*, and *beylerbeys* of Rumelia to go to their provinces but ordered them to spend the winter in Istanbul.¹⁵³⁴ His aim was to secure the ascendance of Ahmed to the throne. *Haniwaldanus Anonym* argues further that Bayezid took the obedience of Rumelian governors for Ahmed's suzerainty; he made them to swear for that. They took

¹⁵³³ For details of events and archival evidence see ULCY2, pp. 117-8.

¹⁵³⁴ For a parallel account see also KPZ8b, p. 59.

an oath that they would accept the rule of Ahmed and would do what is necessary to protect him.¹⁵³⁵ Fisher gives a similar account. To him, Bayezid decided to abdicate in favor of Ahmed and demanded the obedience of generals to Ahmed's rule. In Fisher's account, however, the response of the soldiers differs from what was stated in *Haniwaldanus Anonym*. Although Bayezid offered many gifts and increases in pay on the account that they would accept Ahmed as their sultan, he could not win them over to the idea. The military commanders and the governors of Rumelia preferred Selim because they believed that it was he who could lead them in victorious wars.¹⁵³⁶ 'Ali also follows the same line of argument. To him, Bayezid was inclined to leave the throne to Prince Ahmed but the begs of Rumelia and the Janissaries were in favor of Prince Selim.¹⁵³⁷

Kemalpaşazāde provides a similar account. According to him, on arriving Istanbul the imperial council gathered and discussed the necessary measures. They agreed upon a solution that an open clash with Prince Selim was to be avoided since in such a case the inclination of soldiers and population to Selim's side was highly possible.¹⁵³⁸ They would offer Selim and Ahmed to return to their provinces. When this

¹⁵³⁵ ANMH, p. 57. ANMB confirms this idea. The Sultan initially guaranteed the obedience of Rumelian begs to Ahmed: "... Öyle tedbir itdiler ki: zikrolan beğleri Hüdāvendigārın 'izz-i huzuruna getürüb, her birine 'alā haddihi yemin itdüreler, kendü rızalarını padişahın dest-i ihtiyārına virüb, kat'a emr-i vācibü'l-inkiyāda muhalefet eylemeyeler. Lā-cerem ümeraya emr oldı. Meclis-i himāyuna hāzır oldılar. Mā-hüve'l-maksüd ma'lum olıcak cümlesi kendü sadakat ü ihlāsını eyman-ı gülāzü şeddād ile müşeyyed kılub canımız başımız Hazret-i Hüdāvendigarun yolına fedā didiler. ..." See ANMB, pp. 232-3. Upon his arrival in Istanbul, after the battle with Selim, Bayezid did not permit Rumellian to quit Istanbul: "... Tāc u hilāfeti Sultan Ahmed'e tefviz eylemek tedārikinde olub Rum-ili askerine icāzet virmedi. ..." See ANMB, p. 251; also see pp. 252-3.

¹⁵³⁶ FSH, pp. 108-109.

¹⁵³⁷ "Vüzerāsının meyl-i tāmı ve Hodāvendigār'ın ihtimāmı tāt u taht Sultan Ahmed'e olmak üzere idi. Ancak Rum-ili beğleri, zümre-i yeniçeri Sultan Selim Hān cānibine meyl itmişler idi..." ALI, p. 934. ALI repeats similar ideas in p. 937. ALI states in elsewhere that on entering Istanbul after the battle of Corlu, Bayezid declared his decision to abdicate in favor of Ahmed; but nobody agreed upon this idea. See ALI, p. 947.

¹⁵³⁸ KPZ8b, pp. 58-9.

was over and the tranquility was procured, then bringing Ahmed to the throne was easy.¹⁵³⁹ Nevertheless, Ahmed did not agree on this plan.¹⁵⁴⁰ On realizing that nothing but the throne would calm his son, Bayezid II decided to abdicate in favor of Prince Ahmed,¹⁵⁴¹ who was then called to Istanbul.¹⁵⁴²

Ahmed moved with his army possibly from Eskişehir to Istanbul. Taking advantage of the Şahkulu rebellion, Ahmed had already gathered Anatolian soldiers under his command. But his most trusted troops consisted of post-Karamanid tribal forces of Taş-ili region such as Turgut and Varsak tribes.¹⁵⁴³ Upon invitation to Istanbul, Ahmed dispatched edicts to leaders of these tribes to join him with their forces. In one of these edicts, for example, he informs Musa Beg and Ahmed Beg, who were the leaders of Turgut-oğlu tribe, that he would rally to Istanbul and orders them to join his forces with their warrior-men.¹⁵⁴⁴

¹⁵³⁹ KPZ8b, p. 59. CLZ recites a similar account. See CLZ, pp. 140-1. For parallel accounts also see HSE4, p. 70; ANMB, p. 231; MNB, pp. 432-3.

¹⁵⁴⁰ HSE describes Ahmed's refusal of this plan because of his insufficiency in politics. See HSE4, pp. 74-75. Also see ANMB, p. 232.

¹⁵⁴¹ See IDRS, pp. 93-4. *Vakayi-i Sultan Bāyezid ve Selim Han* records, "... be'delyevm seccāde-i ibadet üzere tesbih ve zikre meşgul olmak tedārikinde oldum. Bi-hamdillah evlād-ı emcādımın üçü bile sezāvār-ı serir-i serveri ve lāyık-ı mesned-i kayzeridir. Lākin Ahmed Han'ımın kesret-i evlādı olub ve sinn ü sāl ciheti ile cümleden mukaddem olmağın imdi iktiza hasebiyle anı izhar tedārikinde olası ki şimdiden girü padişahınız oldur. Bu hususta ihmal itmeyesiz. ..." Cited and quoted in TNSB, p. 287, footnote 168. Also consider ANMB, pp. 232-3; HSE4, pp. 72-73.

¹⁵⁴² According to CLZ, Bayezid II said that "*Rıza ve muradım maksūd ise benim padişahlık itmeğe mecālīm kalmadı. İhtiyarımla saltanatı oğlum Ahmed'e virdim. Min ba'd padişahınız oldur tedārikün eylen!*". See CLZ, p. 141. In one of his letters dated early Cemāzi I, 917 (early August, 1511) Ahmed orders the leader of Turgutlu tribe to join him since he will go to Istanbul. ULCY2, p. 119. Also consider ANMB, pp. 251-2; MNB, p. 433.

¹⁵⁴³ See, for example, TSA, document E 2667.

¹⁵⁴⁴ "...El-hāletü hāzihī emr-i āli ile Āsitāne-i saadete teveccüh edüb sizin gelmeniz lābūd ve lāzım olmağın...karındaşınız oğullarıyla ve akvām ve etba' ve size müte'allik yarar ādemleriniz ile te'hir ve tevakkuf etmeyüb isti'cal gelüb ordı-yı hümāyunuma mülāki olasız..." Quoted in ULCY2, p. 119. Uluçay says that he quoted this passage from the document E 2667 of TSA. In addition, throughout his work, Uluçay refers to and recites passages from this document in some other contexts as well. Nonetheless, the content of the aforementioned passage is clearly different from Uluçay's quotations. It seems that during his study in TSA, a number of documents were catalogued under the same number, which is not an unusual practice in this archive, but later they were given different numbers. For the time being, however, the document catalogued as E 2667 is a report of Mir-ālem Mustafa, obviously a spy of Prince Selim, on the situation and military strength of Prince Ahmed. The situation depicted in the document strongly

But the most effective branch of Ottoman army, namely Janissary corps¹⁵⁴⁵, was not favoring Ahmed; indeed, as the forthcoming events would show, they were enthusiastically disfavoring him. According to Kemalpaşazāde, the principal reason for the Janissaries' disfavor was Ahmed's insufficient courage and enthusiasm in war. Some Janissaries had been already participated in wars with Şahkulu forces and witnessed insufficiency of Ahmed as a commander. Kemalpaşazāde writes,

Yeniçeri taifesi bu ittifakı işidüb, Hüdāvendigār Sultan Selim'le itdüğü ahd ü misākī nakz itdüğüne bī-huzr̄ oldılar. Bir yere gelüb tedbir itdiler. Bunların nısfı Ali Paşa ile Anadolu'da bile olub, Sultan Ahmed'i görmüşlerdi. Cür'et ü şecā'at ü sahāvetine ve sār ahvāline tamām vākıf olmuşlardı. Eyirdiler ki, 'Kendü re'āyāmuz olan bir niçe Etrāk-i nā-pāk hurūc u zuhūr idüb, bunca fesād eyledi. Ali Paşa bu mikdar asākir ile varub mülāki oldı, yine sū'-i tedbir ile ihmāl ü müsāhale[den] gayrı nesnesi zāhir olmadı. Âl-i Osman'un gayretin yirde hasır koyub anların haklarından gelemeyen riyāset-i 'āmme, ki Hak te'ālādan kullarına nübüvvete mu'ādil bir sa'adetdür, ānun hakkından gelinmek munteni' hāletdür.'... Kapu halkı ve Yeniçeri taifesi kendüden teneffür ü i'rāz eylemelerine sebeb-i küllī umūr-ı saltanatda līnet ü mülāyemet üzerine olub şiddet ü salābet üzerine olmaduğın...¹⁵⁴⁶

Şükri follows the same line of argument. He states that the Janissaries and Rumelian troops strictly objected to the possible rule of Ahmed. Their special hatred was pointed towards Ahmed's vizier and *lala*, Yular-kısdı Sinan Pasha, whom they accused of retreating without fighting bravely in the battle with Mamluks in Adana, and of fleeing from Şahkulu forces by leaving Ali Pasha defenseless. Thus, as Şükri cited

suggests that it was written towards the end of the summer of 1512. This document which includes quite valuable information will be further referred.

¹⁵⁴⁵ IDRS deems Janissary corps as the most sincere (*ihlaslı*) branch of the Ottoman army. His reasoning does not need explanation. See IDRS, p. 94.

¹⁵⁴⁶ KPZ8b, pp. 59-60. *Vakayi-i Sultan Bāyezid ve Selim Han* gives a similar reasoning for the Janissaries' attitude toward Ahmed: "... Şeytan-kulu uğraşında Sultan Ahmed Ali Paşa'ya imdada cüret itmeyüb hayfından eyāletine çekilüb gide ve ırz-ı saltanati kayırmak kaydında olmayub terk-i nāmus ide, bā-husus ol tāife-i ehl-i fesād kendü sancağına karib bulunmuş iken min ba'd andan bir merdāne hareket sādır ve dilrāne cümbüş zāhir olmaya. Bu makule tenperver olan makam-ı hilafete neden istihkak bulur ve padişahlığa ne hüner isbatı ile lāyık olur. Serir-i saltanata sezāvār Sultan Selim-i nāmdārdır, biz andan gayrisini kabul itmezüz..." Cited and quoted in TNSB, p. 290, footnote 188. For a similar account see also ANMB, p. 255.

directly from the Janissaries' words, a prince who makes such a man his vizier and advisor could not be suitable for the ruler-ship.¹⁵⁴⁷

Hoca Saadeddin also emphasizes Ahmed's weak and unsuccessful governance during the qizilbash revolt of Şahkulu in explaining the Janissaries' discontent. According to him, they said that "although there was a strong imperial army under his command, Ahmed could not handle some barefooted Anatolian Turks. He did not protect the honor of the *saltanat* but fled from a number of poor sackers. Being so, how could he regard himself merited to the post of *saltanat*, which is a gift of God and requires strong and vigorous personality? Those who are fond of relaxed and joyful life cannot bear this heavy burden. Thus, leaving the Ottoman throne to Ahmed would lead to the downfall of the empire. We do not agree upon the *saltanat* of any other prince but Selim, who has already proved that he has the noble potency of the sultan-ship!"¹⁵⁴⁸

So, the Janissaries were fairly displeased when they learned about Ahmed's approach to Istanbul in order to take over the throne. The discontent of the Janissaries was in such a degree that they wrote threatening letters to the members of the imperial council (*divan*) to make them change from their decision.¹⁵⁴⁹

Ahmed sent a letter to the grand vizier Hersek-zāde Ahmed Pasha on his way ordering to make necessary preparations for his enthronement. He must have been aware of the disfavor of the Janissaries and other *kuls* because in his letter Ahmed specially asks about their attitudes.¹⁵⁵⁰ Upon learning that Ahmed arrived in Maltepe and the members of the divan were making necessary preparations to welcome the next

¹⁵⁴⁷ SKB, pp. 91-92; YSF, pp. 32-3. Also see MNB, p. 434.

¹⁵⁴⁸ HSE4, pp. 77-78. For similar ideas also see ANMH, p. 58.

¹⁵⁴⁹ ULCY2, p. 119.

¹⁵⁵⁰ ULCY2, p. 119.

sultan¹⁵⁵¹, the Janissaries' discontent turned into revolt on Cemaz̄ II 27, 917 (September 21, 1511). They filled the streets cheering "for the sake of Selim's fortune and for his enemies' misfortune!"¹⁵⁵² They plundered houses of the second vizier Mustafa Pasha, Kadiasker Müeyyed-zāde Abdurrahim, Hasan Pasha the beylerbey of Rumelia, and Nişancı Cafer Çelebi.¹⁵⁵³ Fortunately these statesmen were not in their houses. Otherwise they would lose their heads as well.¹⁵⁵⁴ Celalzāde describes the Janissary *coup d'etat* vividly,

Sultan Ahmed ki yarın İstanbul'a gelür geçer didiler. Ol gice, ibtidā-i şebden vakt-i 'işāya varınca Yeniçeri odalarında olan dilirler velāyet-tesirler, a'dā-teshirler, şīr-nazīrlar, aristo-tedbirler ictima' idüb, a'yān-ı devletin ve ümerānın Sultan Ahmed cāniblerine tevessül ve intisābları mahzā hatā savābdandur. Anı serīr felek-nazīr-i Osmana geçürüb padişah eylemek ulu günah ve zehb-i medīd olduğunu fikr idüb, Selim Han gibi ādil padişah āsitāneden merdud u dūr, Sultan Ahmed gibi muhannes serīr-i mülke geçüb şād-ı mesrūr olmak düdmānımızda olan gayret ü hamiyete sezāvār olmaz. Ocağımız Hak penāhı, yatak ve turağımız şeri'at dest-gāhıdır deyū mülāhaza ile ittifak ve ittihad eylediler ki kalkub Sultan Ahmed'i getürmek isteyen paşaların evlerünü basub yağma ve talan eylediler. ... yarak ve yasakları ile müretteb ve mükemmel oldılar. Gürüh-i enbūh ve cünūd-ı saadet-şükūh, Allah Allah āvāzesiyle İstanbul'ın derūnını pür-sādā-yı sa'adet-penāh eylediler. Bölük bölük olub, berk-i hātif gibi irişüb, içerüsün ve taşrasın nehb ü hasāret itdiler.¹⁵⁵⁵

¹⁵⁵¹ For the preparations and happiness of leading statesmen for Ahmed's arrival see, for example, HSE, pp. 75-76.

¹⁵⁵² TSA, document E 3197. This document was first partly published in ULCY2, p. 121; the facsimile copy of the full text is published in TNSB, p. 292.

¹⁵⁵³ IDRS mentions that the grand vizier Hersek-zāde Ahmed Pasha was also among the statesmen who were attacked. See IDRS, p. 94. For further details see TNSB, pp. 289-291; HSE4, p. 78-9; ANMH, pp. 58-9; ALI, p. 948; SLZ1, p. 459; MNB, p. 434.

¹⁵⁵⁴ ULCY published a contemporary account explaining details of the event, namely the letter of Nihālī Çelebi, which was written to Hālimī Çelebi, the tutor of Prince Selim. Nihālī Çelebi states the sources of the Janissaries' anger and their psychologies as follows: "...Yeniçeriye dahī aziz yaran bu haberi nakl idicek yine kağıdlar yazub der-i bī-saadetlerine asdılar. Kim, şöyle istima' olundu ki, bize mültefit olmayub Sultan Ahmed'i getüresiz, bizimçün it ağızından üstühan tutar diyesiz; bilin kim biz kelp değil şīr-i neriz; bize gıda kelle geredür. Vallahi'l-azīm cümlelizün başın kesrüz bilmiş olasız deyu her birine āhar ekābir bu mekātibe itimad itmeyüb ehıbbāsı mekātibidür deyu getürmeğe mukarrer idüb gemiler tezyin edicek Cemāziyelāhırın yirmi yedinci gecesı cemi' Yeniçeri 'Allah Allah Sultan Selim'in devletine düşmanlarının körlüğüne deyu gülbank vāziyla müsellāh olub.....Hāliyan Yeniçeri Hünkār'a ağalarıyla mektub verdiler, elbet Müeyyedoğlu ve Mustafa Paşa ve Hasan Paşa ve Nişancı ve Mirim ve Ahi Çelebi şehirden gitmek gerekdir ve Sultan Ahmed dahī kandan geldiyse andan gitmek gerekdir. Ve illā fesadı min ba'd görürsüz dediler. Hünkār rāzı olub iltizam eyledi...." TSA, document E 3197, in ULCY2, p. 121. Also see KPZ8b, p. 60.

¹⁵⁵⁵ CLZ, p. 149. For a similar account see HSE4, pp. 77-78; SLZ1, p. 459.

The Janissaries soon secured their control on the capital city. Neither the Porte nor the Sultan could do anything. Idrīs states that Bayezid II tried to calm the Janissaries. But his intention was to secure Ahmed’s entrance to the city. On the other hand, the Janissaries were not to accept Ahmed’s entrance to Istanbul in any condition.¹⁵⁵⁶ Yular-kısdı Sinan Pasha, the *lala* of Ahmed, hardly saved his own life. The Janissaries followed him until the port but could not catch him. The Janissaries shouted to Sinan Pasha, “Tell him [Prince Ahmed] to go back to where he came from. Otherwise we cross to the other side and, for the sake of Sultan Selim, tear him into pieces.”¹⁵⁵⁷ Learning the situation from Sinan Pasha, Ahmed had no other choice than to depart from Üsküdar and head to Anatolia.¹⁵⁵⁸ His plan was first to control the Anatolian provinces and then return to Istanbul.¹⁵⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵⁶ IDRS, p. 94.

¹⁵⁵⁷ TSA, document E 3197. The facsimile copy of entire document is published in TNSB, p. 288. According to CLZ, the Janissaries, indeed, detained Yular-kısdı Sinan Pasha. But they freed him to carry their message to Prince Ahmed, who was ultimately arrogant. CLZ re-phrases their words, “... *Ol efendin diyen bî-gayret ü nāmusa iriş. Rum tahtına padişahlık güzāf, serîr-i Osman’a uruc mahza laf deġildir. Bunca zamandan beru Amasiyya taht-gāhında şah olub atası devletinde padişah idi. Biz anı ādem sanub dāyima devleti āsitānesine yüz sürüb, arz-ı niyāz iderdik. Memleket-i İslamiyede bir tāyife-i bî-din – mezheb gürüh-ı zālīmîn ve hāsîrîn ve bî-edeb hurûc itdiler. Bunca kanlar dökülüb hānumanlar harab iidiler. Rikāb-ı saltanata hakaretler düşürdüler. Anatoli beġlerbeġisi ve atabe-i ālem-penāhda vezîr-i āzām olan Ali Paşa’yu katl u kahr eylediler. Kendünün üzerinde bî-nihaya asker-i zafer-rehber var iken İslam ve din düşmenlarını kahr u kama kâdir olmadı. Lekelek ihtiyar idüb gayret ve hamiyetsiz iken şimdi saltanat mı ister? Bî-ar u gayret ne yüziyle geldi. Devlet āsitānesini hāli mi zan eyledi? Bu ocak erenler meydānı, pehlevānlar hanedānıdır. Bunda olan gāziler din-i mübîn-i Ahmedînin kulları çākerleridir. Biz anı saltanata kabul itmek ihtimali yokdur. Var haber eyle başını alub kande giderse gitsin!” See CLZ, p. 150.*

¹⁵⁵⁸ IDRS, pp. 94-5; TNSB, p. 292. SLZ states, “... *Daha sonra yeniçeriler İstanbul iskelelerini bir yolunu bularak zabt eylediler. Üsküdar yakasınan gemi deġil kuş bile uçurmadılar. ...*” See SLZ1, p. 460. For a similar account also see MNB, p. 435.

¹⁵⁵⁹ “... *gerü Karaman vilāyetine azimet itdi. Hatırında bu mānayı mukarrer eyledi ki vilāyet-i Karaman’a varub mukaddema Karaman vilāyeti hakimi olub vefat iden karındaşı Sultan Cihanşāh’ın oġlu Sultan Muhammed’i kendüye yār idinüb, mukaddema Anadolu ve Karaman ve Rum diyārlarını zabt u feth idüb müstakil padişah ola. ...*” CLZ, p. 151. Also see KPZ8b, p. 60; ANMB, pp. 258-9; SLZ1, p. 460.

Ahmed began to behave as if he had been the ruler of Anatolia during the lifetime of Bayezid II.¹⁵⁶⁰ The Sultan warned him several times but Ahmet didn't heed his words.¹⁵⁶¹ As indicated above, Ahmed mainly rested on tribal forces which had long been, indeed, the chief opponents to the Ottoman rule in Anatolia under the banner of Karamanid dynasty until Mehmed II annexed Karaman. After the Karaman rule, nomadic Turkoman tribes of the Taurus region such as Turgut and Varsak continued their opposition whenever an opportunity emerged.¹⁵⁶² Ahmed was playing a dangerous game; his allies were principal opponents of the Ottoman regime by nature. As Uluçay already presented a number of examples, Ahmed deemed these tribal forces the most trusted troops of his army¹⁵⁶³ and allocated provinces to these tribal leaders in his own name.¹⁵⁶⁴

On the other hand, the Janissaries' *coup d'état* succeeded in Istanbul. Pro-Ahmed statesmen were either disqualified or pacified. On Şevval 16, 917 (January 6, 1512), the second vizier Mustafa Pasha became the grand vizier in place of Hersek-zāde Ahmed Pasha, Sinan Pasha became vizier, Yunus Pasha the beylerbey of Rumelia, and Dukakinoğlu Ahmed Pasha the *beylerbey* of Anatolia. Hasan Pasha, the former *beylerbey* of Rumelia, was assigned to the governorship of Semendire but he refused this

¹⁵⁶⁰ For example, as ULCY indicated, Ahmed assigned a certain Ali Beg to the governorship of Niğde in late December 1511. See ULCY2, p. 121, footnote 8. Also consider IDRS, p. 95.

¹⁵⁶¹ KPZ8b, p. 60.

¹⁵⁶² For example, when a certain Mustafa, pretending to be the member of Karaman dynasty, rose up in 1500, these tribal forces did not hesitate to join him. For further analysis of the issue, see Chapter III and Chapter V in the present study.

¹⁵⁶³ In a Şaban 11, 917 (November 3, 1511) dated edict of Ahmed, which was written in Yenişehir addressing Tugutoğlu Musa Beg, Turgudoğlu Musa Beg is ordered to come to join the army of Ahmed since he is needed. Ahmed assures Musa Beg on granting him a satisfactory reward: "...İnşaallahü'l-aziz her birinizü ulûfeden ve dirlikden gereği gibi mahzuz ve behremend kılub hoşnud ve razı eyleyem. Vallahu'l-azîm bu ahd ü peymanu muhalefet etmeyem..." TSA, document E 2667, published in ULCY2, pp. 121-2.

¹⁵⁶⁴ See ULCY2, pp. 121-2. Also see HSE4, 80.

position.¹⁵⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the new administration was still under the suspicion of the principal supporters of Prince Selim in Istanbul, namely the Janissaries and *kapu halkı*. A report of one of Selim's spies in Istanbul reflects the balance of power in the capital city. His spy Hacı reported the pro-Selim and anti-Selim parties in Istanbul to his master as follows:

...Ve āyine-i gayb-ı gaaye mahfi olmya ki, a'da-yı devletinden herkes ağalardan vesair ehl-i divandan kapu halkına pişe edinüb her gün vahşet-engiz ve nefter-āimiz kelimāt idüb, işte geldi, bunca bin tatar getirdi, bizden intikama gelmiştir deyu nice bunun gibi emsālī öz lā-dine lāyık hezeyān iderler. Amma yeniçeri vesair kapu halkı cemi' muhiblerün devletlü vücudundan ricaları bu ki, devletle gelüb Silistre nahiyesinde temekkün idüb Hüdāvendigār'a tenezzül tazarru' tariki üzere elçi gönderüb sancak taleb olunub....Erkānda adem-i icabet olamaz. Dahī muannidinun kelle-i devletlerini ol sahip devletün dü ayağına galtan ederüz derler. Tatar gelmesün denildikde, bilinüz gelmiye, itimadımız yokdur. Ta'zir edüb ale'l-gafle üzerine asker çekesüz deyu sual edicek her birisi yemin edüb varmazuz da, varayın deyene de mani' de olub hakkından gelürüz derler. İ'timad, adem-i i'timad re'y-i cihan-ārāya menuttur.¹⁵⁶⁶

At the same time Prince Ahmed, who was in Akşehir, demanded the province of Karaman, which was then governed by Sultan Mehmed, the son of Prince Şehinşah¹⁵⁶⁷. But his demand was refused.¹⁵⁶⁸ Ahmed's obvious aim was to make this previous Karamanid capital the center of his government in Anatolia. His preference of Konya

¹⁵⁶⁵ ULCY2, p. 122. Also see TNSB, p. 291. According to ALI, Molla Halil became the *kazasker* of Anatolia and Ibrahim Paşa-oğlu was assigned to the post of *nişancı*. ALI gives, however, the date of this event as September 23, 1512. See p. 948.

¹⁵⁶⁶ TSA, document E. 6186, published in ULCY2, pp. 122-3. After a couple of months, however, Selim's another spy in Istanbul, named Yusuf, reported the grand vizier Mustafa Pasha, vizier Sinan Pasha, and Yunus Pasha along with the head of the Janissary corps among the leading figures of the pro-Selim party in Istanbul. The report reads, "...ve Mustafa Paşa hod bī-riya sultanıma kul olmuştur. Ve Sinan Paşa on evvel gelür ve hatta Sultanum ile bile olmasına haylı iştiyakları vardır. Ve Yunus Paşa ve Yeniçeri Ağası hālīs münis bendenizdür..." TSA, document E 7072, published in ULCY2, p. 125. At the end of his report, Yusuf says that he had registered the names of those who stood against Selim and sent this register as well.

¹⁵⁶⁷ Prince Shehinshah died as the governor of Konya on Rebī II, 917 (July 2, 1511). See ULCY2, p. 123.

¹⁵⁶⁸ ULCY2, p. 122. Regard especially the footnote 11. A spy of Selim reports the events in the capital city to the prince: "[after reciting new appointments to the high official posts] *Sultan Ahmed çaşnigir-başı gelüb giru tālib-i Karaman suretin tutub 'elbet ya verin; ya hücum ederim, müslimanların huni dökülür, günahı uhdenizedür; bir sefih oğlana bī-vech Karaman gibi memleketi vermek nedir?'...Ve kendüsü Akşehir'de amma hakikat-ı hal bu ki, devletle beruya teveccühünüz istima' idüb tecessüse gelmiştir...*" TSA, document E 6187. See also TNSB, p. 292; HSE4, p. 83.

instead of Amasya can be accounted for the principal force, namely ex-Karamanid tribal forces, on that he relied against the *Kapı kulu* and Janissaries.¹⁵⁶⁹ Upon receiving the repudiation of the Porte, Ahmed besieged the city. Sultan Mehmed could not resist long and Konya fell to Ahmed's control.¹⁵⁷⁰ What Ahmed did was an open violation of the subordination to his father.¹⁵⁷¹

The Janissaries and *Kapı kulu* took advantage of this situation and rose up again in Istanbul.¹⁵⁷² According to the letter of one of Ahmed's sympathizers, upon learning the fall of Konya, the Janissaries sent a letter to Prince Selim informing him that Ahmed captured the province of Karaman and most of Anatolia. Selim gathered a great number of soldiers among which were some *akıncı* begs such as Mihallu, Evrenuslu, and Yahya Paşalu.¹⁵⁷³ Janissaries feared that Ahmed would capture the whole country and then execute them.¹⁵⁷⁴

The archival evidence clearly reveals that the Janissary corps and the other branches of slave troops were ultimately determined to enthrone Selim. They even dared the insubordination to the royal authority of the legitimate sultan for this purpose.¹⁵⁷⁵ They forced Bayezid II to leave the throne to Selim through most disrespectful and brutal means. Bayezid could no longer resist cruel pressure of his rebellious soldiers and

¹⁵⁶⁹ ALI states that he gathered soldiers among the vagrants of Karaman region and prepared to oppose the sultan of the time. See ALI, p. 1059.

¹⁵⁷⁰ KPZ8b, p. 61; ANMB, p. 263; ALI, p. 948. TNSB, p. 293.

¹⁵⁷¹ See ." KPZ8b, p. 61; HSE4, pp. 83-84; ALI, p. 949; SLZ1, p. 461.

¹⁵⁷² "Konya şehrini ... muhasara itdügüne kapu halkı ve Yeniçeri cemaati ziyāde bī-huzur oldılar. 'Fermān-ı āli-şanla tasarruf olunan sancağın tasarrufuna māni' olmak isyan u tuğyandır' diyü müctemi'an divana geldiler." KPZ8b, p. 61. ALI gives a similar account: "... bu husūs için leşker Sultan Ahmed'den yüz döndürmeğe sebep oldı. 'Padişah-ı cihān vali nasb eylediği Şehzādeyi bilā-emr u cürm muhāsara itmek mahzā isyandır' diyü her kişi kendüden el çekti. ..." ALI, p. 946.

¹⁵⁷³ TSA, document E 2667, published in ULCY2, p. 24.

¹⁵⁷⁴ See ULCY2, p. 24.

¹⁵⁷⁵ CLZ states that Bayezid II was still searching ways to bring Ahmed to Istanbul. But the head of the Janissary corps (Yeniçeri ağası) warned the Sultan on that it was impossible to persuade Janissaries for the *saltanat* of Ahmed. If he [Bayezid II] would not accept their demand, then they would conduct further banditry. See CLZ, p. 154.

had to call Prince Selim to Istanbul in order to command the imperial army in a campaign on Prince Ahmed.¹⁵⁷⁶ On Muharrem 9, 918 (March 27, 1512) Selim was invited to the capital city.¹⁵⁷⁷ Indeed, Selim was following all the events in Istanbul through incessant reports of his spies. One of them, a certain Yusuf, wrote concurrently the situation in the capital city. Yusuf assures Prince Selim in his report that after Ahmed's assault on Konya, the balance had quickly shifted in his favor. He states that the leading members of the new government such as the grand vizier, the viziers, and the *beylerbey* of Rumelia, were waiting for Selim enthusiastically. Furthermore, he reports that the Sultan invited himself [Yusuf] and told him that "I have assigned my son to the command of my army; all the soldiers and weapon are in his service."¹⁵⁷⁸

Convincing himself on that the situation was fairly suitable, Selim departed from Kefe.¹⁵⁷⁹ He entered Istanbul with the cheering of the Janissaries.¹⁵⁸⁰ Bayezid II invited Selim in order to command his imperial army against Ahmed.¹⁵⁸¹ Selim's intention was,

¹⁵⁷⁶ KPZ argues that Bayezid was quite disappointed with the activities of Ahmed. He says, "... *Hazret-i Hüdvendigâr dahi anların [Janissaries] inkisarından ziyâde inkisarı vardı, be-gâyet incinüb hatırı Sultan Ahmed'den i'raz itdi. Vüzeraya 'Maslahat neyse tedârik idün!' didi. Ahir-i kâr şöyle tedbir olundu ki, Sultan Selim'i getürüb ser-asker ideler. Sultan Ahmed ebsem olmaz ise üzerine varub def"-i zarar ideler...*" KPZ8b, p. 62. For further details see TNSB, pp. 293-6; HSE4, pp. 84-85; ANMB, pp. 265-6.

¹⁵⁷⁷ ULCY2, p. 125. ULCY published a part of the imperial edict that orders Selim to come and take the command of the army against Ahmed. It reads, "...*Karındaşın, oğlum Ahmed'in men'i hususunda kapum halkı ve yeniçeri kullarımı sana koşam. Sen dahi teveccüh idüb gelesin deyu emr eyleyüb mefâhirü'l-emâcid yeniçerilerim kethüdâsı İlyas ile hükm-i şerif irsal etmiş idim...İmdi evvel emrim ki, sâdır olub mezkûr yeniçerilerim kethüdâsı ile sana hükm-i şerif irsâl olunmuşdur. Ol emrim mukarrerdir....Şimdiki hâlde Rumeli'de vâki' olan sancak beglerine ahkâm-ı şerife irsâl idüb emreyledim ki senün cânibindnen mektub ve âdem varub niyet ettiğün gibi her ne mahalle davet eder isen sancaklarına müteallik subaşılar ile ve çeribaşıları ile ve cem'i sipâhiler ile cebelisü ile müretteb ve mükemmel yarakları ile varub vasıl olalar...*" TSA, document E 6187, published in ULCY2, p. 126. Also see ANMB, p. 266. ALI mistakenly states that Bayezid invited Selim in order to command the imperial army during the campaign on Shah Ismail, not on Prince Ahmed. See ALI, p. 950.

¹⁵⁷⁸ TSA, document E 7072, published in ULCY2, p. 125.

¹⁵⁷⁹ For his journey from Kefe to Istanbul see KPZ8b, pp. 62-3.

¹⁵⁸⁰ KPZ vividly describes the happiness of the Janissaries while Selim was entering the city. See KPZ8b, pp. 63-4. Also see HSE4, p. 94.

¹⁵⁸¹ "... *vüzerâ ve a'yân kemâ kân ittîfak-ı sâbıkları üzere esnâ-yı musâhabetde gerü Sultan Bayezid ile meşveret ve ittihad itmişler ki Hazret-i Padişah behişt-âşiyâna [Selim] ser-askerlik ihsan olunub def' eyleyeler. ...*" CLZ, p. 159. Fisher states that Bayezid designated three conditions to Selim before

however, different. After Selim provided the full support of the Janissary corps and *Kapı kulu* soldiers, he refused to command the army without the title of sultan.¹⁵⁸² Bayezid tried to persuade his son but was not successful. After fierce quarrels,¹⁵⁸³ he had to abdicate the throne in favor of his son Prince Selim on Safer 7, 918 (April 24, 1512).¹⁵⁸⁴ Bayezid II wished to spend his last days in Dimetoka, but died on his way.¹⁵⁸⁵

The disrespectful threats of the Janissaries were chiefly to persuade Bayezid to leave his throne. Idrīs narrates how Janissaries persuaded Bayezid to leave the throne in favor of Selim. Their argumentation was quite compatible with the policy of Prince Selim. Janissaries told the Sultan, as Idrīs rephrases, that the realm was in complete turmoil and chaos because of the ongoing civil war between the princes. The enemies of the empire, especially the oppressor *qizilbash*es, used the weakness in the administration of the state to interfere in the Ottoman internal affairs, even to attack the Ottoman lands. Prince Ahmed proved his inefficacy to overcome this problem. On the other hand,

bestowing the army upon him: “Bayezid was to die as sultan and Selim was to succeed him; and Selim was lenient with Ahmed.” See FSH, p. 110.

¹⁵⁸² Even CLZ, one of the most pro-Selim Ottoman historians of the sixteenth century, admits that Selim forced his father to retire resting on the unquestionable support of the Janissaries. He says that when some statesmen came to Selim and conveyed him the sultan’s decision, Selim turned towards the soldiers and asked the situation. The soldiers, however, proclaimed that they would not accept him solely as their commander (*ser-asker*) but as their sultan. They shouted, “*Hayır padişahım [Selim], kulların ser-asker olduğunuza rıza virmezler. Serir-i saltanat himmet olunursa fermân-berüz, ne hizmet olursa bende-i kemterlerüz!*” Then Selim turned to the statesmen and told them to inform the Sultan about the answer of the Janissaries. When they reported the attitude of Selim and the army, however, Bayezid II got angry and proclaimed that he would not leave the throne to anyone else while he was alive. Nevertheless his viziers persuaded the sultan explaining the ultimate determination of the army on the saltanat of Selim. See CLZ, p. 160. Also see FSH, p. 111; ALI, p. 951.

¹⁵⁸³ ANMH vividly describes Bayezid’s hopeless resistance against Janissaries to save his own position. See ANMH, pp. 64-7.

¹⁵⁸⁴ ULCY2, p. 127; ALI, p. 1049; MNB, p. 439. KPZ narrates the events in a slightly different manner. To him, when the Sultan learned the desire of the Janissary and *Kapı Halkı* to enthrone Selim, he accepted it willingly. See KPZ8b, p. 64. According to KPZ, Selim ascended to the throne on *Safer* 8, Thursday. See KPZ9, p. 66. Also consider IDRS, p. 99; HSE4, pp. 97-98. For further reading on Selim’s ascendance to the throne by force see SKB, pp. 93-108; TNSB, pp. 296-304.

¹⁵⁸⁵ CLZ, p. 163; HSE4, pp. 98-106; ALI, pp. 952-3; KPZ9, pp. 67-8. KPZ depicts Selim as if he felt sad when he heard his father’s death. But some other sources imply that Selim might have ordered to execute his father. See, for example, FSH, p. 111; MNB, p. 440. On the death of Bāyezid II see M. Şahabettin Tekindağ, “II. Bayezid’in Ölümü Meselesi”, *Tarih Dergisi*, 24, 1970, 1-14; TNSB, pp. 307-310.

Bayezid was so old and ill that he could not lead the army against the great perils of the empire. So he had to leave the throne in order to save the future of the empire. There were three candidates for this heavy mission. His failures against qizilbash movements clearly showed that Ahmed was insufficient in strength of sword and capacity to govern the empire.¹⁵⁸⁶ Korkud's candidacy could not be considered seriously since he had no son. Thus, as rephrased by Idrīs from the words of the Janissaries, the only merited candidate was Selim and the Jannisarries would not accept any other princes as their sultan.¹⁵⁸⁷

7.2.2. Prince Ahmed, the Ruler of Anatolia

Kemalpaşazāde records that all begs of Anatolia and Rumelia subdued to the new sultan except his brother Ahmed. As indicated above, Ahmed had already begun to move as an independent ruler in Anatolia during the last days of his father.¹⁵⁸⁸ Thus, he did not recognize the suzerainty of Selim and continued to rule Anatolia. As Kemalpaşazāde notes, the main portion of his military power came from Turkoman tribes of the post-Karaman region, such as Karaman-oğlu, Ramazan-oğlu, Turgut-oğlu and Varsak, which

¹⁵⁸⁶ See ANMH, p. 63.

¹⁵⁸⁷ IDRS, pp. 97-98. *Vakayi-i Sultan Bāyezid ve Selim Han* also vividly describe how the Janissaries surrounded the palace and forced Bāyezid to abdicate in favor of his son Selim. Some of their words during the conversation with the legitimate sultan were, "... ittiler ki padişahımız alilü'l-mīzaç olub Devlet-i Aliyye bir şehriyār-ı cedīde muhtaç idüğü azhar mine'ş-şemsdir. Lā-cerem şehzādelerden birine teslim-i saltanat tahmin ve mukaddema tāyin olunmuş idi. İmdi biz Sultan Selim'den gayrisini kabul itmezüz bu güne bu maslahat görülmeyince buradan dönüp gitmezüz. ..." Quoted in TNSB, p. 304, footnote 268. For similar lines of argumentation of the Janissaries also see ANMH, pp. 60-61; SLZ1, pp. 466-7.

¹⁵⁸⁸ ULCY partly published some degrees of Ahmed in which he was described as the sultan of the time. One of them, issued in Bursa in early June 1512 to the *alaybey* of Biga, reads, "... Sultan-ı selātin-i zaman Ahmed Han ezallahu teāla hazretleri avātif-ı hüsrevānelerinden bu kullarına Anadolu beglerbegliğini sadaka ve ihsan buyurdular ..." TSA, document E 5876, published in ULCY2, p. 132. ULCY mentions some other similar degrees of Ahmed as well.

were the champions of the opposition to the Ottoman regime from the very beginning.

Kemalpaşazāde reads,

Kurūm-ı Rumdan bir kimse kalmadı ki itā'at kılmadı, illā birader-i mihteri Sultan Ahmed, ki ol zamanda daru'l-mülk-i Amasya'da vāli-yi 'āli-şandı, inkıyād itmedi. Karaman'a gelüb Varsak-ı pür-nifakun ve Turgud-ı 'ānudun¹⁵⁸⁹ cünūd ü rünūdın cem' eylemeğe meşgul olub, zimām-ı ihtimāmını ol taraflarun teshīrine dönderdi.¹⁵⁹⁰

The contemporary reports and the advance of events clearly demonstrate that Ahmed was not skilful in politics. At the beginning of the struggle, most of the powerful institutions in the state machinery of the Ottoman Empire were in favor of Ahmed and against Selim and Korkud. But he could not keep the alliance of these forces. Especially his passiveness during the revolt of Şahkulu marked the turn of the rally between him and his younger brother Selim. During this campaign, he totally lost the most effective branch of the Ottoman army, namely the Janissary corps and *Kapıkulu* soldiers. Since then, Ahmed began to deviate from the center of gravity of the state machinery and to shift towards periphery while Selim started to approach to the center. Ahmed's utilization of tribal forces against the central army of the empire might be regarded as a pragmatic policy. Whatever it was, his relying on such tribal forces which were the enemy of the 'Ottoman regime' by nature¹⁵⁹¹, must have provoked statesmen, bureaucrats, and religious scholars who were closely adhered to the traditional line of the regime to incline towards Selim's side. Indeed, Ahmed was in a complete paradox: on one hand, the only effective military force that he can employ against Selim was post-Karamanian tribal forces of the Taş-ili region, as mentioned in Ottoman sources.

¹⁵⁸⁹ It is very interesting to note that KPZ always uses the adjective "anūd" which literally means stubborn, for Turgud tribes. Against whom or what were they stubborn? KPZ obviously refers to their resistance against establishment of Ottoman rule in southern Anatolia where these tribal forces resisted stubbornly.

¹⁵⁹⁰ KPZ9, p. 69-70.

¹⁵⁹¹ See Chapter III in this study.

On the other hand, these tribes appeared as the intrinsic enemies of the Ottoman imperial regime throughout the history, and were still chief opponents of this regime, for it was directly threatening the traditional way of life of all these tribal groups. Therefore, although their allegiance provided Prince Ahmed a military power against powerful Janissary corps¹⁵⁹², it caused Ahmed to lose the support of the central actors in the traditional state machinery. In other words, his allegiance with the periphery eroded the legitimate ground of his claim for the *saltanat*.

The land forces of the Ottoman army during this period were composed of three main branches: the slave-origin standing army or *kapı-kulu*, provincial army of *timarlı sipāhi*, and *akıncı* troops.¹⁵⁹³ Among these three branches, only the Janissaries clearly took position at the beginning of the civil war. The other two branches of the army remained reluctant to offer open support to either princes, but preferred to wait for the result. As a matter of fact, during the early phases of the struggle, there were *sipāhis* on both sides. When the balance of power changed in favor of Prince Selim, however, Ahmed's *sipāhis* sooner left him and sought ways of Selim's forgiveness.¹⁵⁹⁴ Like the

¹⁵⁹² As well-known, the Ottoman army during this period was composed of three main branches: the slave-origin standing army or *kapı-kulu*, provincial army of *timarlı sipāhi*, and *akıncı* troops. Among these three branches, only the Janissaries clearly took position at the beginning of the civil war. The other two branches of the army remained reluctant to offer open support either princes, but preferred to wait the result. As a matter of fact, during the early phases of the struggle, there were *sipāhis* on both sides. When the balance of power changed in favor of Prince Selim, however, Ahmed's *sipāhis* sooner left him and sought ways of Selim's forgiveness. Like the Janissaries, there was another military power clearly defined their position during the very early phases of the struggle and remained loyal until they totally lose the hope. This power was, however, not a part of the Ottoman militia, but rather was the traditional enemy of the Ottoman centralization process, thus of its institutional tools. It was the tribal fighters of Karaman, Turgut, Varsak, etc.

¹⁵⁹³ For a general reading on the Ottoman military system, see İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilâtından Kapıkulu Ocakları*, I, II, Ankara: TTK, 1988 (first published in 1943); Halil İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire The Classical Age 1300-1600*, London, 1973, especially pp. 89-118; Abdülkadir Özcan, "Osmanlı Askerî Teşkilâtı", in *Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi*, cilt I, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, İstanbul, 1999, pp. 337-370.

¹⁵⁹⁴ There are a number of letters of Ottoman officials to the court of Selim explaining how the conditions compelled them to move with Ahmed and requesting the forgiveness of the former. See, for example, document E 5877, which is the letter of a certain Yusuf written to explain the reasons of some of his

Janissaries, there was another military power clearly defined their position during the very early phases of the struggle and remained loyal until they totally lose the hope. This power was, however, not a part of the Ottoman militia, but rather was the traditional enemy of the Ottoman centralization process, thus of its institutional tools. It was the tribal fighters of Karaman, Turgut, Varsak, etc.

More important for the purpose of the present study was the relationship between these tribes and Shah Ismail. As will be delineated, the allegiance of Ahmed and Turkoman tribes lacked the ideological basis. Nomadic tribal milieu of Anatolia became the principal ground for leafing out the qizilbash way of religious perception, and for the flourishing Safavid Order. There are archival evidence showing the correspondence and the cooperation of these tribes with Shah Ismail. Thus the ideology of the military group on which Ahmed rested his strategy was somehow interrelated with the qizilbash movement. In this perspective, Ahmed was digging his own pit. He had no chance against the central powers of the state with these forces.

Ahmed sent his son Alaeddin to Bursa. Alaeddin's army was consisting of some Anatolian *sipāhis* under the command of Mustafa Pasha, the *beylerbey* of Anatolia, and

seemingly disobedient (to Selim) actions and to prove his loyalty to Prince Selim. Another document vividly depicts how the troops of Ahmed coming from the Ottoman military system began to switch sides when the fortune turned towards Selim. One of Selim's spies among Ahmed's soldiers, namely Mir-âlem Mustafa, reported towards the end of the summer of 1512 that at the beginning some Janissary *oğlans* had willingly joined to Ahmed's ranks. But then they were regretful and seeking ways of running away from Ahmed's army. Even a higher officer of Ahmed (*çavuşbaşı*) was regretful because of supporting Ahmed; he revealed his penitence to Selim's spy and wrote a letter to the prince begging his pardon. The related part of Mir-âlem Mustafa's letter reads, "...*Sultan Ahmed çavuşbaşısı Bālī bendenizü bu cānibde olan acemi yeniçeri cem' itmek gözedüb ve avārız düşürmeğe gönderilecek biz bendenizi bile mu'āvin olub bile yürüye deyu bir hüküm gelüb biz bendenüz dahī çavuşbaşı ile bile Bursa'ya ve İnegöl'e ve Sultanönü'ne varub iki yüz mikdāri oğlan cem' olunub gönderildi. Zıkr olan oğlanlar evvel rızaları ile alınmış idi. Şimdi yine pişman olub kaçayu derler. Amma çavuşbaşı Bālī bendenüz biz fakir bendenüz ile müşavere idüb ben Sultan Muhammed kullarından idim bir tarik ile gelmiş idim yine benim halımı sen (?) i'lām idiver diyicek çavuşbaşı bendenizün hali kendinin bir mektubu var anda malumdur. Kavlinde ve fi'linde sadık kulunuzdur. ...*"

the tribal forces from Dulkadir-ođlu, Ramazan-ođlu, Turgut-ođlu¹⁵⁹⁵, and Yumlu tribe.¹⁵⁹⁶ It is interesting to note that in a contemporary report, all these tribal forces in Alaeddin's army are called 'Karamanī'.¹⁵⁹⁷ At first Alaeddin took the control of the city. But heavy taxes levied by him and the plunder of his tribal soldiers soon turned the public opinion against Alaeddin.¹⁵⁹⁸

Another contemporary report of a spy called Mir-ālem Mustafa clearly puts forward the fact that Ahmed's most trusted forces were from ex-Karaman tribes. The same report also proves the assertion that in case of difficulty, these forces would easily abandon Ahmed since they were alien to the Ottoman regime. The report, after stating that Ahmed was wandering in the Marmara region, runs,

Sultan Ahmed ahvālinden istifsār olunursa cümle bin beşyüz mikdārı ādemi vardır. Ve ođlu ile beğlerbeğisi yanında dahī beş yüz mikdārı ādem kalub ulūfeci tāifesinden ekseri ulūfe verilmedüğü sebebden dağılmışdır. Ve beğlerden Karaođlu Ahmed Beg ve Ramazanođlu ve Şehsüvarođlu ve Turgutođlu vardır. Şimdiki halde beş bin ādemle Kütahya'ya gelmek kâbildür, beş bin ādeme cevap vermek kudreti yokdur. Şöyle ma'lum olına. Taş İli beğlerine ve Karaman beğlerine defaatle ulaklar varub ta'cil gelesiz deyu ikdam olundukda Osmanlunun bir ādeti vardır, sefer adın ile on gün bir yerde ve on beş gün bir yerde oturur, ādem eskidür, bizim ana kudretimiz yetişmez. İnşallah düşman üzerine gelicek varalum deyu def'-i vakt iderler, bi'l-külliye gelmezler deyu Çavuşbaşı kulunuz cevab virüb inandurdu.¹⁵⁹⁹

Upon learning that Selim moved from Istanbul towards Anatolia, Ahmed attempted to gather further soldiers. Again, his principal source of manpower was tribes of Taş-ili. In mid-July 1512, he sent a decree to Turgutođlu Musa Beg, who was assigned to the governorship of Turgud-ili by Ahmed, ordering to join the forces of

¹⁵⁹⁵ ULCY2, p. 132.

¹⁵⁹⁶ "... *Ve Sultan Ali ahvālinden sorarsanız Bursa'ya avārız akçesine varub bazı Yumlu tāyifesi şenā'at idüb şehir halkı dahī el bir idüb iki yüz mikdārı ādemilerini helāk kovdular. ...*" See TSA, document E 2667. Also consider TNSS, p. 4.

¹⁵⁹⁷ TSA, document E 6333.

¹⁵⁹⁸ See TSA, document E 5452. Also see KPZ9, pp. 71-2; TNSS, pp. 4-5; ALI, p. 1059.

¹⁵⁹⁹ TSA, document E 2667.

Taceddin Beg, who was the Karaman Beylerbey of Ahmed and commissioned to gather soldiers around Eskişehir. This document was designed according to the imperial style, depicting Ahmed as the Ottoman sultan and Musa Beg Turgutoğlu as one of his commander-governors.¹⁶⁰⁰

To conclude, archival evidence clearly shows that Turgutoğlu Musa Beg was one of the most trusted allies of Prince Ahmed. As already mentioned, Ahmed wrote at least three letters to Musa Beg ordering him as one of his governor-general to join his army. Turgutoğlu tribe was one of the principal sources of soldiers to which Ahmed resorted during critical moments of his movement, such as rallying to Istanbul in order to ascend to the throne, mobilizing his forces against Selim's army. His first letter dates back to early August 1511, when he was invited to Istanbul to ascend to the throne. Since the prince did not trust the Janissaries and *kapıkulu* soldiers, he took his most trusted allies with him in this journey.¹⁶⁰¹ Likewise, the Janissaries repelled him from the capital city. Ahmed's second letter to Musa Beg is dated November 3, 1511, which was just after he returned from Istanbul. Losing all his hopes in the capital city, Ahmed decided to

¹⁶⁰⁰ The entire text of the document E 3057 in TSA runs,

“(Tuğra of Ahmed)

Fahrü'l-ümerā ve'l-ekābir müstahmim el-me'ālī ve'l-mefāhir 'aziz el-vücūd-ı şerif... el-mahsūs be-ināyetü'l- Turgut ili sancağı beği Musa dāme izzuhu tevki-i ref'-i hümāyun vāsıl olıcak ma'lum ola ki şimdiki hālde emirü'l-ümerā ve'l-ekābir hāviyyü'l-meālī ve'l-mefāhirü'l- mahsūs be-'ināyetullahi'l- mu 'in Karaman beğlerbeğisi Taceddin Beğ dāme ikbaluhuyu ādem koşub ilgar tarikiyle gönderdüm. Eyle olsa sen dahi yarar ādemler ile gelüb Eskişehir önünde ılgayub mūmaileyhe yetişesin. Fi'l-cümle bu bābda kat'a te'hir ve terāhir cāyiz değıldir. Gayret demidir yetişmek ardınca olasın. olasın şöyle bilesin 'alāmet-i şerife i'timād kılasın. Tahriren fī evāhir-i āhir-i Rebī lī-sene semān aşer ve tis'a mie (Mid-July 1512) Be-mahall-i

Çayır-ı Karahisar-ı Sahib.”

¹⁶⁰¹ “... El-hālet-i hāzihi emr-i 'ālī ile āsitāne-i sa'ādete teveccüh idüb sizin gelmenüz lābüd ve lāzım olmağın ... karındaşınız oğullarıyla ve akvām ve etbā' ve size müte'allik yarar ādemleriniz ile te'hir ve tevakkuf etmeyüb isti'cal gelüb ordu-yı hümāyunuma mülāki olasız! ...” See ULCY2, p. 119, footnote 5. ULCY refers to the document E 2667 of TSA as the source of this phrase. Nevertheless, E 2667 has a completely different content. As already discussed before, this must be because of the change of the catalogue numbers of some documents after ULCY's study.

establish his own government in Anatolia and gathered his most trusted begs and commanders in Yenişehir, where he allocated governorships to each of them. In his second letter, sent from Yenişehir, Ahmed calls Musa Beg to his presence and explains that he would grant official post and source of income (*dirlik*) to the beg of Turgut-oğlu tribe.¹⁶⁰² And his last letter was just mentioned in the former paragraph.

What is of primary interest for the purpose of this study is that the same Musa Beg was also among the prominent allies of Shah Ismail in Anatolia. It has already been delineated that in the advent (*hurūc*) of Gilan in the summer of 1500, Ismail's principal source of warrior was Anatolian qizilbashs most of whom pursued a nomadic-tribal way of life. Since the social roots of his disciples were chiefly in Anatolia, Ismail could not be uninterested in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman state; and he did not. Archival evidence shows that he aimed to organize discontent tribal population of Anatolia, primarily but not necessarily the qizilbash society, especially against Selim's ascendance to the throne. In the establishment of the allegiance between Prince Ahmed and the tribal forces of central and southern Anatolia, Ismail's interference must have played a considerable role. His letter to Turgutoğlu Musa Beg, dated May 23, 1512, just one month later than Selim's ascendance to the Ottoman throne, clearly shows how he oriented these tribal forces of Anatolia. The complete text of the letter runs,

Bismillahirrahmanirrahim

Ya Ali

El hükmü lillah Ebu'l-muzaffer İsmail Bahadır sözüümüz

(on iki imamın ismi bulunan mühür)

Emir-i a'zām-ı ekrem Musa Durgutoğlu'na ināyet ve şefkatimize ümidvar olandan sonra şöyle bilesün kim iftiharü'l-e'azim ve'l-āyān Ahmad Ağa Karamanlu ol tarafa gönderdük ve ol her ne ki ihtiyar gelesi gendüye şefkat etmek gerekkim müşarü'n-ileyh sözünden maslahatından çıkmasun ve mutābaat

¹⁶⁰² ULCY2, pp. 121-2. Most probably because of the confusion referred in the former footnote, ULCY again refers to the document E 2667 as the source of this letter.

ve yardım ona kılsun kim inşaallahu teala her ne kim anın muradı isteği olsa hasıldur. Günden güne her iş vaki bula (bulsu) Ahmed Ağa in'āmı (ittifakı) ile dergah-ı mu'allamıza bildürsünler kim her nev' buyruğumuz olsa amel itsün gönlünü hoş dutub merhametimize imrār (isdār) olasun.

Tahriren fi 7 Rebiü'l-evvel
sene 918 (23 Mayıs 1512)¹⁶⁰³

In this letter, the first point that immediately draws attention is that Ismail addresses Turgutoğlu Musa Beg as if he was his subject and gives him orders as if he was the ruler of Musa Beg. The order itself is also of importance. Ismail states that he appointed a certain Ahmed Aga Karamanlu as responsible to organize – and govern – these sides (*ol taraflar*), thus he [Musa Beg] should act in accordance with the directives of Ahmed Aga Karamanlu. Ismail also indicates that Ahmed Aga was among his respected men whose requests were to be accepted in the royal court. Thus if he [Musa Beg] had any request from the Shah then he would conduct it through the mediation of Ahmed Aga. Ismail's letter openly orders Musa Beg to act in accordance with the royal decree of the Shah. It is obviously seen in this edict of Ismail that he was in an attempt to create an administrative system to govern the tribal population in Ottoman Anatolia.

Perhaps the most appealing message in this decree is in the words placed just at the beginning of the text. Ismail starts his message by stating that 'after being hopeful' (*ümitvār olandan sonra*). This hope is noticeably refers to the hope for the shah's arrival in a short while, more clearly the shah's conquest of Ottoman country. As demarcated in the context of the Şahkulu rebellion as well, there was a strong expectation among Anatolian population for Ismail's march on Anatolia until the battle of Çaldıran in 1514.

¹⁶⁰³ TSA, document E 5460. The facsimile copy of this document is published by Selahattin Tansel. See TNSS, Appendix: *Vesikalar*. The transliterated text of the document is republished by Faruk Sümer in his *Safevî Devleti'nin Kuruluşu ve Gelişmesinde Anadolu Türklerinin Rolü*, Ankara: TTK, 1999, p. 51, footnote 100.

This expression in Ismail's letter was seemingly written in order to reinforce this hope.¹⁶⁰⁴

Indeed we do not have enough evidence about the religious stand of Turgutoğlu tribe. To what extent they adhered to the religious and mystical ideas of the Safavid Order is not clear. What is clear within the available evidence, however, is that they had always been against the expansion of the Ottoman rule in Anatolia. Though the primary reasons of their fierce opposition were political, one should not also underestimate the role of socio-cultural discrepancy between the settled and controlled society provisioned by the Ottoman state and the nomadic-tribal societies of the Turkoman heritage.¹⁶⁰⁵ Consequently, it would not be wrong to assume that there was a certain affinity between qizilbash way of religion and socio-cultural structure of Turgutoğlu tribe. In a similar vein, one could suggest a similar affinity between the religio-mystic interpretation of Safavid sheikhs and other Turkoman tribal populations such as Karaman, Varsak, Ramazanoğlu, Afşar etc. Indeed we have enough historical sources to assume that these tribal groups were the main milieu in which the qizilbash message was rooted deeply and was growing.

¹⁶⁰⁴Indeed, Ismail's attack on Ottoman land was not impossible before 1514. But we do not have clear evidence pointing out his preparation for such a campaign on Anatolia. Nevertheless, Ismail skillfully kept the hope of Anatolian disciples alive for such a campaign. Accordingly the Safavid administration successfully kept public excitement among Anatolian Turkomans which weakened the suzerainty of the Ottomans.

¹⁶⁰⁵For further reading on Turgutoğlu tribe see Zeki Oral, "Turgut oğulları", *IV. Türk Tarih Kongresi 1948*, Ankara, 1952, 140-158; "Turgut oğulları, eserleri-vakfiyeleri", *Vakıflar Dergisi*, 3, 1956, 31-64; Faruk Sümer, "Turgutlular", *IA*.

7.2.3. Prince Murad, Nur Ali Khalifa, and Qizilbash Insurgences in the Province of Rum

The available evidence does not permit us to accurately determine Ahmed's attitude towards the qizilbash movement and his relation with qizilbashes. What the contemporary sources clearly show is that he attempted to use the discontent qizilbash mass for his cause. But the ideological dimension and the degree of this relationship, as reflected in the sources, are highly ambiguous. On one hand, his principal military confidants, both sedentary people of the Province of Rum and the tribes of especially Taş-ili region, as well as some in the Province of Rum, were at the same time the principal audience of the qizilbash message. On the other hand, some of his acts clearly reflect that Ahmed was a sympathizer of neither qizilbashes nor their ideals. On one occasion, he dispatched considerable portion of his army to repress the uprising of Nur Ali Khalifa, while in the other, when he was in search of a suitable asylum, he refused to take refuge in the realm of the shah. It seems that he certainly established a kind of problematic relationship with qizilbashes of Anatolia. One can surmise that his interest in the qizilbash-affiliated groups was mainly derived from pragmatic reasons, namely to get the support of discontent qizilbashes whose military capability was known, against the powerful army of Selim. In terms of ideology and socio-cultural perception, on the other hand, one can hardly observe, within available documentation, any affinity between Ahmed and the qizilbash movement.

Perhaps the most concrete result of Ahmed's vague attitude against qizilbashes was that Ahmed's 'soft' policy against the Qizilbash Movement created a somewhat 'legitimate' ground for qizilbashims in towns and high cultural echelons. Hüseyin Hüsameddin provides several examples of the fact that the number of statesmen and

ulemā at the court of Ahmed felt uncomfortable with this situation. Upon realizing that their warnings would have no result in Ahmed's palace, most of them joined the suit of Selim, who had already declared himself as the champion of anti-qizilbash fight.¹⁶⁰⁶

His son's, Murad's¹⁶⁰⁷ position was, however, completely different. Archival evidence and contemporary sources leave no doubt on his adherence to the qizilbash movement. Two contemporaries of the events present some explanation of both Ahmed's and Murad's connection with the qizilbash movement.

To begin with, Kemalpaşazāde explains this relationship in a quite conspiratorial way. To him, Murad's joining the qizilbash community was a political tactic designated at the court of Ahmed. Disturbed by his brother's accession, Ahmed sought to attain the support of Anatolian forces, both within and without the Ottoman military. His plan was first to establish a government in Anatolia and then march on Selim. On the other hand, the Şahkulu revolt, alongside with some other developments, had clearly shown that

¹⁶⁰⁶ See Hüseyin Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol. 3, Istanbul, 1927, pp. 247-8, 254, 257-8. According to Hüseyin Hüsameddin, Ahmed's interest in the Qizilbash Movement was far beyond pragmatic causes. He argues that Ahmed obviously supported Persian (Acem) scholars and literati against their Turkish colleagues; thus he favored Persian culture at the cost of Turkish culture. To Hüseyin Hüsameddin, these Persian-cultured men propagated the 'love of the house of Muhammed' (*Hubb-i Āl-i Aba*), which was a sign of Shi'ism and supporting Shah Ismail in Amasya and the region around. Therefore, Ahmed directly supported the spread of Shi'ism in the Province of Rum. See Hüseyin Hüsameddin, pp. 242-9. Nonetheless, Hüseyin Hüsameddin's arguments include serious errors. In many aspects, he simply reflects the mentality of *Selim-nāme* authors, adding new mistakes to the *Selim-nāme* literature in some other aspects. First of all, his nationalist approach clearly distorts the historical framework. He attempts to depict the struggle between Selim and Ahmed as a struggle of the Turkish culture and tradition against Persian culture and tradition. In this picture, Selim was the champion of Turkish tradition against Ahmed's patronage of Persian culture. This sort of classification obviously contradicts the historical realities. Furthermore, Hüseyin Hüsameddin identifies sunnism with Turkish culture - and with Selim's party - and shi'ism with Persian culture, which was, to him, supported by Ahmed. This is a clear mistake stemming from the retrospective approach of Hüseyin Hüsameddin. It has been already shown in Chapter V of the present study that the Shi'i domination in Persia was an enterprise of Shah Ismail and his qizilbash disciple-comrades. Thus the Persian literati in Ahmed's palace in Amasya, if existed as Hüseyin Hüsameddin argues, could barely have been shi'ite.

¹⁶⁰⁷ Prince Murad was the oldest son of Prince Ahmed. He was the governor of Çorum while Ahmed was governing the province of Amasya. When Ahmed departed from Amasya, he governed Amasya as well. See ULCY, p. 127.

qizilbashes of Anatolia had considerable military power. Ahmed aimed to gain this military force for his cause against his brother. Kemalpaşazāde states,

Again his confidants suggested to him that it would be a clever move if he allowed the impression to be spread abroad that one of his sons revolted against him. He could then gather about himself the discontent and unruly elements, and thus two groups could be acting against Sultan Selim at the same time. Ahmed agreed to this and informed his son Murad, who was his deputy in Amasya, to pretend that he was in revolt; and when Murad did so, within a few days several thousand Kızılbaş rallied to his side.¹⁶⁰⁸

Celalzāde follows a similar line of narration. To him, upon realizing that the soldiers and *sipāhis* of this region (*ol cānib*) were compulsorily inclined to obey their sultan (*pādişāh*) (Selim must be referred to here by the word *pādişāh*), Ahmed's confidants suggested him to gain the support of qizilbashes, who were outnumbered in this region. According to the plan advised to Ahmed, one of his sons was to convert to qizilbashism and to wear the *tāc* of the Shah so that he would gather an army from them against Selim. For this purpose Ahmed had his son Murad profess adherence to the qizilbashes, wear red head-dress, and abandon the ritual of Islam.¹⁶⁰⁹ Celalzāde emphasizes that they [qizilbashes] had already prepared their weapons and other necessary tools of war before this incident. On learning Murad's conversion to

¹⁶⁰⁸ *Selim-nāme*, Topkapı Sarayı, Hazine, 1424. Quoted in Ahmet Uğur, *The Reign of Sultan Selim I in the Light of the Selim-nāme Literature*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985, p. 209. Indeed it is not certain that this work was written by Kemal Paşa-zāde. Ahmet Uğur notices that although the name of the author is not mentioned, the work is identical with the *Selim-nāme* of Sa'dī, preserved in Topkapı Sarayı, Revan, 1277. Uğur says that certain minor differences between the two works make it unlikely that Kemal Paşa-zāde could be the author of this work. (Sa'dī b. Abdülmüte'āl wrote his *Selim-nāme* during the reign of Süleyman the Magnificent. His work was translated as a doctoral dissertation in the University of Basel by Marie Therese Speiser (Zürich, 1946)). Kerlake argues that *Selim-nāme* of Hazine 1424 does not belong to Kemal Paşa-zāde. Nevertheless, as Ahmet Uğur calls attention, the content of Sa'dī's work is derived from Defters viii and ix of Kemal Paşa-zāde. (See Uğur, p. 15) Thus it seems to be safe to deem that this information is originally derived from KPZ.

¹⁶⁰⁹ Fisher deduces from Italian sources that Ahmed had not only his son Murad profess adherence to qizilbashes but also marry one of his daughters to Shah Ismail. See FSH, p. 110. Nonetheless, Ottoman sources do not confirm this assertion.

qizilbashism, the Safavid disciples of the region felt so pleased that in a couple of days more than twenty thousand qizilbash fighters gathered about him.

Anatoli cānibinde Sultan Ahmedin muktezā-yı idrāk-i dūni ve müsted'āyı 'akl-ı zebūnı üzre gördü ki, serīr-i sa'ādet-pezīr-i hākānī vücūd-ı mevdūd-ı sultānī birle ārāste oldı. Lā-büdd yanında olan dūnler tedbir ve tedārik eylediler ki, ol cevānibde olan asker ve sipāhi zarūrī der-i padişahlarına mūti' ve münkād olurlar. Bu vilāyetlerde kızılbaş tāyifesine nihayet yok, oğullarından birisini kızılbaş idelüm, tēc-ı Şāhī giysün, az zamanda üzerine vāfir kızılbaş cem' olur. Hazır sipāh u cünūddur. Anlar ile Sultan Selim'e mukabil oluruz deyū tedārik idüb ana binā'en evlād-ı kirāmından büyük oğlu Sultan Murad'ı bu husus için kaskile kızılbaş tāyifesine mütāba'at ve inkıyād itdürüb, başına tēc-ı surh giyüb āyin-i İslamı terk itdürdüler. Ol tāyife hürrem-i şād olub evvelden 'ale'l-hufye ālāt ü esbāb ve kārzārları hāzır idi, hemān hurūc idüb Sultan Murad üzerine ictimā' eylediler. Birkaç gün içinde üzerine yigirmi binden ziyāde müsellaḥ āhen-pūş ve div-huruş evbaşlar cem' oldı.¹⁶¹⁰

However, not everything went according to the will and the plan of Ahmed. The qizilbashes gathered around Murad committed so many injustices and outrages against the people that there appeared to be the danger of Ahmed losing the popular support against Selim. Then, he ordered Murad to rid himself of these qizilbashes. But Murad was no longer a sincere follower of his father.¹⁶¹¹ Rather he consulted with a certain Kara Iskender, one of the leading qizilbash khalifas in the region, who was in his suit. Kara Iskender expressed the view that the people would follow those leaders who held power of which Sultan Ahmed no longer had any hope. Therefore, it was only Ismail that the people could turn for refuge.¹⁶¹²

Within this unexpected situation, Ahmed was not sure about what to do. But qizilbashes continued to tyrannize and plunder the local people in the Province of Rum, especially Sunni population, who demanded help from Ahmed.

¹⁶¹⁰ CLZ, p. 166.

¹⁶¹¹ *Selim-nāme*, p. 210.

¹⁶¹² *Selim-nāme*, p. 210.

Sultan Ahmed sent troops against this now unwelcome body of supporters, and in a battle between the two sides Kara Iskender was slain. On hearing this Murad Çelebi did not go to join his father, but moved instead towards Tokat. Shortly before this, Şāh Ismāʿīl had sent troops into Anatolia under the command of “Nār Ali” and Tokat was placed under siege; the people of the region were terrorized and made to recognize Şāh Ismāʿīl as their ruler. When Murād arrived he joined up with these Kızılbaş troops at Kazova, and together they went to the Şāh. Ismāʿīl, however, fearing that the troops were rendering obedience to Murād rather than himself, had him killed.¹⁶¹³

Celalzāde’s account seems alike but contains some differences. He does not mention the qizilbash outrages. To him, when Murad asked them to offer his father help, the leaders of qizilbash army said that they offered their allegiance since he [Murad] put on *tāc-i Şāhī* and chose the qizilbash path; thus, they could move only by the permission of the shah. The qizilbash leaders offered Murad first to go to the shah and take his authorization; if the shah would approve, then they were to provide every kind of support to him and his father. Accordingly, they set off for Iran. When they arrived, however, Murad was murdered and another person was substituted for him. In the meantime, Ahmed was to wait for the possible help from the qizilbash side.¹⁶¹⁴ Celalzāde does not mention Nur Ali Khalifa and his military actions.

Another contemporary of the events, namely Idrīs-i Bitlisī, describes Nur Ali Khalifa as an agent of Shah Ismail¹⁶¹⁵, who was commissioned to organize the qizilbashes of the Province of Rum and set up an insurrection. Müneccimbaşı broadens this argument. He states that Shah Ismail sent Nureddin [obviously referring to Nur Ali

¹⁶¹³ *Selim-nāme*, p. 210. It is explained in the following paragraph that at this time Selim was waiting for the arrival of his son from Kefe. When Süleyman arrived, he left him in Istanbul as his deputy, and immediately set out for Ankara.

¹⁶¹⁴ CLZ, p. 167.

¹⁶¹⁵ Contemporary Ottoman and Safavid sources leave no doubt that Nur Ali Khalifa was a direct agent of Shah Ismail. Realizing this point, Sohrweide truly argues that the military operation of Nur Ali Khalifa in the Ottoman Province of Rum was the first direct intervention of Shah Ismail in the Ottoman domestic affairs that we definitely know. See Sohrweide, p. 159.

Khalifa]¹⁶¹⁶, one of his khalifas, to the realm of Rum in order to gather soldiers among the Turkomans of Varsak, Avşarlu, Karamanlu, Turgudlu, Bozoklu, Tekelü, Hamidlü tribes, who were inclined to the qizilbash way of religion and blasphemy.¹⁶¹⁷ Taking advantage of the civil war within the Ottoman realm, Nur Ali Khalifa proceeded towards Anatolia with twenty thousand men.¹⁶¹⁸ These qizilbashes plundered all the cities on the way from Karahisar and Niksar to Amasya.¹⁶¹⁹ Their aim was to capture Amasya.¹⁶²⁰ Ahmed sent his vizier Sinan Pasha on the rebellious qizilbashes with an army. But the pasha was destined to be defeated. He could hardly save his life¹⁶²¹ while qizilbashes arrived in Tokat.¹⁶²² Idrīs underscores that the majority of the population in this region was the adherents of Safavid order,¹⁶²³ therefore, a great number of indigenous people accompanied with the rebels, which worsened the *fitne*.¹⁶²⁴ But Idrīs neither indicates any direct connection between Ahmed and the qizilbash movements in his province nor mentions Murad in this context.

¹⁶¹⁶ Hüseyin Hüsameddin traces the origin of Nur Ali Khalifa – or Nureddin Ali Khalifa as he writes to Mardin. He argues, without providing sources, that in 1495-6 Nureddin Ali Khalifa came from Egypt to Amasya and propagated Shi'ism in the name of Shah Ismail until he left the city in April-May 1497. See Hüseyin Hüsameddin, p. 240. Elsewhere, he says that Nureddin Ali Khalifa arrived at Amasya in 1507-8 as the ambassador of Shah Ismail. See Hüseyin Hüsameddin, p. 255.

¹⁶¹⁷ MNB, p. 435.

¹⁶¹⁸ MNB says that Nureddin gathered thirty thousand men among these Turkoman tribes. See MNB, p. 435.

¹⁶¹⁹ MNB says that they plundered the towns and villages around Amasya, Tokat, and Sivas. See MNB, p. 435.

¹⁶²⁰ IDRS, p. 95. Also see HSE4, p. 84.

¹⁶²¹ MNB, p. 436.

¹⁶²² IDRS, p. 95; HSE4, p. 84. Uzunçarşılı, without citing his sources, states that Nur Ali Khalifa gathered some thousands of *Alevî* (qizilbash) cavalries in Koyulhisar and defeated a small-scale Ottoman army commanded by Faik Beg. Then Nur Ali Khalifa captured Tokat, where he read *hutbe* in the name of Shah Ismail. It was after the capture of Tokat that Sinan Pasha marched on qizilbashes and was defeated. See UZC2, p. 229.

¹⁶²³ IDRS uses the word 'sufti', which then commonly referred to the disciples of Safavid Order. HSE, whose account is almost entirely derived from IDRS, says for example, "Çün ol taraflın türkü Kızılbaş'a tutkun idi." HSE4, p. 84. MNB repeats the same idiom but uses a religiously more technical and elaborate word, 'rāfizi', to describe this group. See MNB, pp. 435-6.

¹⁶²⁴ IDRS, p. 95. See also HSE4, p. 84; SLZ, pp. 461-462. The latter two obviously repeat IDRS in this matter. For the revolt of Nur Ali Khalifa see also TNSB, pp. 256-257.

According to Idrīs, and some other Ottoman historians following him, it was after the defeat of Ahmed's forces against Nur Ali Khalifa that the prominent commanders of the Janissary corps and *sipāhi* troops, alongside with the wise statesmen in Istanbul, decided to call Prince Selim from Kefe to Istanbul.¹⁶²⁵ Hoca Saadeddin follows similar line of argument. To him, the defeat of Sinan Pasha strengthened the opposition of the Janissaries and Kapıkulu soldiers against the *saltanat* of Ahmed on one hand and their support to the *saltanat* of Selim on the other. Putting forward the worsening circumstances in every part of the empire, because of the civil war, they raised their voices to bring Selim from Kefe to Istanbul in order to govern the country.¹⁶²⁶ So, if we rely on the account of Idrīs, the battle between Nur Ali Khalifa and Sinan Pasha took place before the accession of Selim on April 24, 1512.

Here, we observe two distinctive lines of narration regarding the qizilbash movements in the Province of Rum and Ahmed's relation with these movements. One is originating from Kemalpaşazāde and expanded by Celalzāde by omitting certain details, while the other traces back to Idrīs, which was followed by Hoca Saadeddin, Solakzāde, and Müneccimbaşı.

The first line regards Ahmed's relationship with qizilbashes and Murad's conversion to qizilbashism purely as a political maneuver to gain the military support of qizilbash fighters who were already proved to be efficient during the Şahkulu rebellion and in some other events. According to Kemalpaşazāde and Celalzāde, Sultan Murad never converted to qizilbashism sincerely, but pretended to be a qizilbash just for the sake of his father's political strategy. Nevertheless, archival evidence which will be

¹⁶²⁵ IDRS, pp. 95-6.

¹⁶²⁶ HSE4, pp. 84-5. For a similar account also consider MNB, p. 436.

evaluated below makes us to think otherwise. A close examination of the contemporary reports of Selim's spies in Anatolia give the impression that Murad's connection with the qizilbash movement was far beyond solely pragmatic-political purpose; rather, he seems to have sincerely attached himself to the qizilbash cause to a certain extent as well. Likewise, when his father called Murad to his suite when preparing an army against Selim, he didn't accept Ahmed's invitation arguing that he had his own works in the Province of Rum.

Although Kemalpaşazāde and Celalzāde seem reasonable in explaining the beginning of Ahmed and Murad's correspondence with the qizilbashes, they are obviously inclined to overlook the fact that after a while Murad became absorbed in qizilbash ideals to such an extent that he even broke off his father's struggle. The reason for this sort of attitude of two prominent bureaucrats and *ulemās* of Ottoman realm is not difficult to realize. Their concern was obviously to conceal the adherence of an Ottoman prince to the qizilbashism, a religio-mystical path which was officially delineated and proclaimed as 'heresy'. Rather, they present his liaison just as a political tactic produced by the incompetent retinues of Ahmed. In doing so, they were in search of exonerating the members of royal line from religiously and ideological 'heresy'. It is not surprising from this point of view that Prince Şehinşah's adherence to qizilbashism, which is clearly presented in archival reports, is also never mentioned in Ottoman chronicles.

Indeed, they could not free them from intrinsically admitting Murad's ideological adherence to qizilbash movement. According to Kemalpaşazāde, for example, when Ahmed wanted Murad to rid himself of the qizilbashes since they caused to erode the popular support for Ahmed with their outrages, Murad did not obey his father but consulted a certain Kara Iskender, one of qizilbash khalifas, who suggested going to the

Shah. Celalzāde says, on the other hand, when Murad, in accordance with the plan designated in Ahmed's court, offered qizilbashes to help his father, they rejected to do so without taking the permission of the Shah. Then Murad went to Iran with qizilbashes but did not return to his father. As for the end of Murad, two accounts again come together. Murad was killed by Shah Ismail upon arriving Persia. Celalzāde interestingly ignores the Nur Ali Khalifa rebellion completely.

The other line of narration, however, focuses on Nur Ali Khalifa rebellion but completely ignores Ahmed and Murad's relationship with the qizilbash movements in the region. Similarly with Kemalpaşazāde, Idrīs and his followers also describe Nur Ali Khalifa, who managed to capture Tokat in the name of the Shah, as an agent of Shah Ismail commissioned to organize a rebellion in Anatolia. But they diverge from the first group with regard to Ahmed's respond to Nur Ali's activities and its consequence. Idrīs states that Ahmed sent his troops after Nur Ali under the command of Sinan Pasha, who was defeated. It was this defeat that finished the support for Ahmed's candidacy in Istanbul.

Indeed, the qizilbash movements in the Province of Rum in the year 918 (1512-3) and Murad's adherence to this movement are documented to a certain degree in archival reports housed in TSA. A careful study of these documents suggests that the qizilbash movement advanced as at least two correlated arms: One was led by Nur Ali Khalifa Rumlu,¹⁶²⁷ a Safavid khalifa directly charged by the Shah with organizing the qizilbash population especially living in the Province of Rum for an uprising, and the other being led by indigenous khalifas and Sultan Murad.

¹⁶²⁷ HR claims that Nur Ali Khalifa was coming from Rum. See HR, p. 164.

Archival evidence clearly reveals that, whether sincerely or as a political maneuver, Prince Murad put the qizilbash *tāc* on. Furthermore he was among the leading figures who organized the qizilbash movement in Çorum, Amasya, and Tokat region.¹⁶²⁸ A contemporary report points out his central role in organizing qizilbashes of the region for an uprising against Selim. In this report, it is written to the Porte that Murad wore qizilbash *tāc* and became qizilbash. A certain Kara Iskender, one of the leading qizilbash khalifas in the region, was responsible for converting the prince into a qizilbash. After becoming qizilbash, Murad gathered more than 10.000 qizilbashes as his soldiers and rebelled.¹⁶²⁹

An undated report of Yusuf, one of Selim's prominent spies in Anatolia, gives details on the co-operation of Sultan Murad with the qizilbash khalifas. According to Yusuf's report, in late mid-April, 1512, he was informed that Murad sent messengers to the cities around and gathered the qizilbash fighters around him. In 5 or 6 days, more than ten thousand men were summoned in Geldigelen, south of Amasya. Yusuf mentions a certain İsa Halife-oğlu who seems to have been among the prominent qizilbash khalifas. He was imprisoned by Murad in Çorum when Ahmed left Amasya but then he was freed, as one of the two leaders of the qizilbash group.¹⁶³⁰ The same information is recorded in another contemporary report. It is recorded here that Murad was suggested during a banquet of drink (*hamr-i sohbet*) to free İsa Halife-oğlu, who could gather thousands of sufis per day; by this Murad could collect a great number of soldiers without any expense. Murad accepted the offer, freed İsa Halife-oğlu, and

¹⁶²⁸ Yusuf, one of the leading spies of Selim in Anatolia, says in one of his letters that although he had not accepted to inspect the situation of Sultan Murad and his relations with qizilbashes at that time, he would accept this mission. See TSA, document 5877.

¹⁶²⁹ "...Haliyen bu diyarda sofular başkaldırub huruç etdiler. Kara İskender nam şahsın idlaliyle Sultan Murad taç geyüb sürhseri gendüye asker etdi. On binden ziyade oldular..." TSA, document E 6522.

¹⁶³⁰ TSA, document E 7292.

included him in his suit. Then they dispatched sufi messengers to the khalifas explaining the situation, which excited qizilbashes of the region.¹⁶³¹

According to Yusuf's report, the other leader of the insurgent was Davud Halife-ođlu. Yusuf states that all the Sufis around Iskilip either joined them or were on their way. All the male members of families joined. He also mentions a certain Aslıhan Ađa, who seems to have been among respected *āyāns*. One of his sons had already joined qizilbash rebels. He too received a *tāc* (*tāc* of the Shah indicating adherence to the Safavid religious path) and was to go with his other son. Their number was said to be around thirty thousands. They looted the villages on their way, robbed the qadi of Çorum who was returning from Amasya and cut one of his arms.¹⁶³² These qizilbash vagabonds also attacked and looted Zünnun Beg, one of Turkoman begs, and Barak Beg on their way.¹⁶³³

The other contemporary report confirms Yusuf's account.

Haliyen bu diyarda sofular başkaldırub huruç etdiler. Kara İskender nām şahsın idlāliyle Sultan Murad tāç geyüb sürhseri (kızılbaş) gendüye asker etdi. On binden ziyade oldular. Yevmen fe yevmen Sofu İsa halife ođlu nam mülhidin üzerine cem olurlar. Ve Seydi Ali Halife dahi kendüye nûger olub Geldigelen'e yıđıldılar ki fesād-ı azim edeler. Nice köyler talan etdiler ve nice ademleri katl edüb atların ve esbabların yağmaladılar. Bu diyarda emn kalmadı Alaüdevle'ye varuruz derler. Sultan Murad her tarafa ademler gönderüb her halifeyi tenbihleyüb asker cem' eder.¹⁶³⁴

Yusuf points out in his report that Sultan Murad does not join them yet; but he is said to arrive soon, to wear the *tāc* and prostrate to the Shah. According to another

¹⁶³¹ "... Bir havadis dahi budur ki Çorum'da İsa Halife ođlunu Sultan Murad habsden çıkarır her gün ana bin sofı cem' eder. Ulufesiz haraçsız her ne muradın var ise idesiz. Ol dahi hamr-i sohbetinde dedikleri gibi edüb mezkûru habisten çıkarub kendüya nöker edüb etraf u cevānibe sofular gönderüb her halifeye macerayı ilam edüb anlar dahi eski mezheplerin izhar edüb dāl ve mudill olub sebb-i sahabe ve katl-i nefis ve nehb-i emval ettiler..." TSA, document E 6522.

¹⁶³² In document E 6522, the qadi of Corum is reported to be killed by sufis.

¹⁶³³ TSA, document E 7292.

¹⁶³⁴ TSA, document E 6522. This document is partly published in ULCY2, pp. 128-9.

contemporary report, twenty sufis gathered around Murad in Amasya. They entered the city by repelling religious scholars (*hocalar*) and commanders (*paşalar*); and they conducted outrages there as well. After killing lots of people (most probably from among sunni population), they moved with Sultan Murad to Geldigelen.¹⁶³⁵

Yusuf also reports that after recognizing the real goals and nature of qizilbashs, Murad regretted because of his adherence to the qizilbash movement. He arrived at such a decision in consultation with Kara Iskender and Mihmanoğlu, one of his captains. His commanders were in fear and looking for a suitable opportunity to flee. Yusuf also records a hearsay that the secret intention of the Sufi was to execute Murad's commander and tutor. Yusuf says that "they are still gathering. Their intention after gathering in full numbers is said to go to Dulkadir country. ... The son of Ahmed Çelebi [Murad] arrived in Amasya and sent a *tāc* to the *qādi* of Amasya ordering him to put on. On receiving, the *qādi* wore it by saying 'it is the sultanic order!'" The Turkish text of Yusuf's report runs,

Eğer bu diyarın ahvālinden istifsar buyurulursa, şimdiki halde harabe müteveccih oldu. **Sultan Murad etraf-ı aleme ulak salup kande kızılbaş var ise yanına cem eyledi.** (Muharrem ayının aharında) haber olundu, beş altı güne değin Geldigelen ovasına on bin vardır derler cem oldu. Meğer ki İsa Halife oğlu derlerdi Çorumda bir oğlan var idi. Sultan Ahmed bu diyardan gitdüğü vakit Sultan Murad habs etmişdi. Anı koyuverdi. Başlarının biri ol ve biri dahi Davud Halife oğlu derler İskilip diyarında ne mikdar sofı varsa kimi gitdi, dahi gidiyor. Bir evde ne mikdar erkek adem var ise hepsi gitdi. Aslıhan Ağa'nın da bir oğlu gitdi. Ve kenduya dahi taç geldi. Bir oğluyla dahi kendu gitmek sadedindedir. Askeri yirmi otuz binden fark etmez derler. Cem oldukları yerde olan köyleri soydular. Çorum kadısı Amasya'dan gelürmüş, bir bölük sofuya uğramış. Dutup soymuşlar nesi var ise alduktan sonra bir elin kesmişler. Türkman beglerinden Zünnun Beg derler imiş üzerine adem seçmişler. Kendusu duyub kaçmış. Taalukatını kırub rızkını ve esbābını almışlar. Barak Beg oğlunun dahi evini yağmalamışlar deyu haber geldi. Yağluca dahi etrafında olan köyleri

¹⁶³⁵ "... Amasya'da yirmi bin sofı cem' olub nice müslümanları ehl-i ilimden ve halveti olan kimesnelerden katl etdiler. Sultan Murad'ı alub Geldigelen'e götürdüler. Anda dahi fesād-ı azim etdiler. Hocaların ve paşaların kaçırub şehre girdiler..." TSA, document E 6522.

yağmaladıkları mukarrer. Sultan Murad dahi içlerine gelub girmedir. Amma bu gün yarın gelür, taç örter (urunur), Şah'a secde eder derler. Sürhserin bu asıl hareketini görüp cemiyetlerine nazar edicek etdiği (ne) sonra peşiman olmuşdur derler. Meğer ki bu fikri bu tedbiri bir kendu ve bir Kara İskender derler ve biri dahi kendu çavuşlarından Mihmanoğlu derlermiş, bu üçünün fikriyle ve tedbiriyle olmuş. Paşaları havf edüb bu gün yarın fırsat bulurlarsa kaçarlardı. Ve hem sofunun kasdı varımış ki paşalarını ve hocasını katletmeğe. Şimdiki halde dahi cem olunmak üzerindedir. Tamam olduktan sonra Alaüddevle üzerine gider derler. Hak teala kemal-i lütfundan bu zalemei def edemezse ehl-i İslamın hali bu diyarda gayet mükedderdir. Amma es-seyf ve amma el-küfr deyub dururlar. Ahmed Çelebi oğlu Amasya'da olageldi kendusu Amasya kadısına taç gönderdi, örtün (urunsun) deyu. Ol dahi almış, emr-i padişahidir örtelüm (urundum) demiş. Bu babda şol ki beyan vaki dir arz olundu. Baki emr hazretinize mufavvazdır.

Veddua

kema yelik Yusuf¹⁶³⁶

Murad assigned Kara Iskender to the governorship of Iskilip. Then the dwellers of the city were terrorized; some of them fled to mountains and some others took shelter in the fortress of the city. They sent message to Ahmed requesting help. On learning the situation Ahmed dispatched an army of ten thousand soldiers under the command of Davud Pasha and Kızıl Ahmed-oğlu. The report from which this information is derived was written when this army was on the way. In the meantime, the army of sufis arrived in Sivas by setting the region on their way on fire and sent a messenger to the Shah.¹⁶³⁷

The proceeding of Ahmed's troops under the command of Davud Pasha and Kızıl Ahmed-oğlu is not recorded in this document, and unfortunately not in any other documents known to us. But Kemalpaşazâde's account seems to complete the story. As delineated above, Kemalpaşazâde states that when the plunders and outrages of qizilbashs heavily burdened the local population, Ahmed sent troops against these

¹⁶³⁶ TSA, document E 7292. Almost all text is also published in ULCY2, pp. 129-30.

¹⁶³⁷ "...Ve İskilib'i Kara İskender'e verdi. İl ve şehir ürküb kimi dağa ve kimi kaleye girdiler. Sultan Ahmed'e ulaklar gitdi. Feryat etdiler. Ol dahi on bin ademle Davud Paşa oğluyla ve Kızıl Ahmed oğluyla asker gönderdi. Yolda gelür derler. Nebi Halife bu vechile haber getürdü. Ve sofu askeri şimdi yıka yıka Sivas'a çıkub Şah'a elçi gönderdiler. Bu diyarın ahvali bir dürlü dahi oldu. Ehl-i İslam muhatarada ve tehlikede kaldı..." TSA, document E 6522.

qizilbashes led by Kara Iskender, which were defeated by Ahmed's troops. Kemalpaşazāde further says that on hearing this, Murad did not go to join his father, but moved towards Tokat. A contemporary spy report confirms this. It records that although Sultan Ahmed dispatched several orders to Prince Murad to come and join his forces, Murad did not comply with this order by stating that "I have a number of enemies here."¹⁶³⁸ Thus, putting two accounts together, it appears that after assigning Kara Iskender to the governorship of Iskilip, Murad set off with other qizilbashes for Sivas. Remembering that Tokat was on the way between Iskilip and Sivas, Kemalpaşazāde's account seems to be quite compatible with the archival evidence. On the other hand, the people living in and around Iskilip demanded help from Ahmed against Kara Iskender. Ahmed sent ten thousand soldiers to free Iskilip from Kara Iskender's assault. This was the first middle-scale army sent by Ahmed against the qizilbash rebels. Although Kemalpaşazāde says that Kara Iskender was slain during this battle, it is probably not true since we see him in the following events. But it is highly possible that qizilbashes were defeated.

According to Kemalpaşazāde, shortly before this event, Shah Ismail had sent troops into Anatolia under the command of Nur Ali, who seized Tokat in the name of the Shah. Murad and Nur Ali met in Kazova near Tokat and they together went to the Shah. It is also recorded, though vaguely, in a letter written to Selim by a certain Hacı Kemal, that Sultan Murad met with Nur Ali Khalifa and inclined towards the East [i.e. the country of the Shah]. Hacı Kemal reports this event as he learned from the letter of the

¹⁶³⁸ It is recorded in the report of Mir-ālem Mustafa, one of Selim's spies in Anatolia, that "... *Ve Sultan Murad ahvālinden sorarsanız defaatle gelesin deyü ulaklar varub, benim bu yana düşmanlarum vardur demiş. ...*" See TSA, document E 2667.

governor of Sivas.¹⁶³⁹ So Kemalpaşazāde’s account is fairly compatible with archival evidence except for the last assertion. As will be evaluated below, Nur Ali Khalifa would not return to Iran with Sultan Murad. As for Sultan Murad, however, it is highly possible that he went to Iran through Sivas for he is not mentioned in the context of later events. Likewise, as Uluçay indicates, Murad wrote a letter to his father from Sivas suggesting he go to the Shah together.¹⁶⁴⁰ We know from contemporary sources that Murad went to Iran during his father’s struggle with Selim and died there after a couple of years.¹⁶⁴¹

Safavid chronicles also mention Murad’s relation with the Shah and Nur Ali Khalifa. For instance, Hasan-ı Rumlu states that Murad – with ten thousands qizilbashes with him – met Nur Ali Khalifa in Kaz Çayırı after the latter captured Tokat and read *hutbe* in the name of the Shah. Then they together turned back to Tokat. But this time the townspeople showed signs of resistance. Then the qizilbashes set the city on fire and went to Niksar. Hasan-ı Rumlu says that in Niksar Murad left Nur Ali and went to the realm of the Shah.¹⁶⁴² He must have followed the way through Sivas. But before arriving Sivas, in Artuğak a serious disagreement rose up within qizilbashes among Murad’s company. Yahya Pehlivan and Dev Ali suggested going to the Shah while Kara İskender advocated going to Dulkadiroğlu Alauddevle Beg. The two groups clashed with each

¹⁶³⁹ “...Şimdiki hâlde Sivas sancağı beginden âdem ve mektub gelüb tastîr olan cevab budur ki, bundan evvel Sultan Murad Nur Halife ile Kızılbaş elçisi ile şark tarafına müteveccih olub...” The letter of Hacı Kemal, a possible spy of Selim. At the end of the letter Kemal wants Selim to pass Anatolia as soon as possible. Therefore, it must have been written before Selim move to Anatolia on July 29, 1512. See TSA, document E 2667, published in ULCY2, p. 130.

¹⁶⁴⁰ ULCY2, p. 131.

¹⁶⁴¹ In addition to KPZ and CLZ see IDRS, p. 115; HSE4, pp. 165-6; ALI, pp. 1068-9; SLZ2, p. 13; MNB, p. 456. The latter four sources points out that Murad fled to Shah Ismail and died in Persia after three or four years.

¹⁶⁴² HR, p. 165.

other. It was rumored that after this fight, Yahya Pehlivan and Dev Ali died.¹⁶⁴³ The rest of qizilbashes moved eastward. In his report dated May 17, 1512, Sultan Musa, the son of Prince Mahmud, the governor of Kastamonu, reported this event to Selim as follows,

... Murad Beg ki ol eşirrayı cem' idüb Artuğak (ارتوغاق) nām mevzie varmışlar idi. İttifak Murad Beg cānibinden Kara İskender Beg Alāüddevle üzerine Pehlivan Yahya ve Dev Ali bunlara muhalefet idüb biz Şah İsmail'e giderüz deyü ayru baş çeküb iki taraf birbirlerine girüb şaha gideriz diyenler tarafından haylı sofı kırılıb ve Yahya ve Dev Ali'nin başı kesilüb bāki varan eşirra dahī gelüb Kara İskender cānibine tābi olmuşlar ve andan sonra Alāüddevle Beg'in güveyisi Murad Han bir bir cānibden buluşub bir mikdar sofı kırımış fi'l-cümle bu ahvāl ma'lumumuz olduđu üzere i'lām olundu. ...¹⁶⁴⁴

As clearly seen in this document, Kara Iskender had not been slain by troops of Ahmed. After killing Pehlevan Yahya and Dev Ali, Kara Iskender subdued the other qizilbash group as well. But what happened to the qizilbashes under the leadership of Kara Iskender and Murad after this disagreement is not clear in the document. According to Sutan Musa, although Kara Iskender was in favor of going to Dulkadir territories, Murad Han, the son-in-law of Alāüddevle Beg, attacked the qizilbash group and killed a number of them just after their internal fight. Thus it would not be wrong to assume that they, with Prince Murad, consequently set off for Iran.

Independent from Kara Iskender and Murad, there were other local qizilbash uprisings as well. For example, Kürd Halid Beg¹⁶⁴⁵ rose up in the name of the shah and plundered some of the towns of Karahisar, such as Suşehri, Akşehir, and Şaphāne. In the

¹⁶⁴³ ULCY2, p. 130.

¹⁶⁴⁴ TSA, document E 2667, published in ULCY2, p. 132.

¹⁶⁴⁵ Kürd Halid was one of the Kürd begs who adhered to the qizilbash movement. An archival document accounts him among qizilbash begs, along with Lala Beg, Bayram Beg, Hacı Rüstem etc., moving under the direction of Shah Ismail. (See TSA, document E 7620. The full transcribed text and facsimile copy of this document are published in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Deux rapports sur Şah İsmail et les Özbeks (Études Turco-Safavides, X)", *Quand le crible était dans la paille :hommage à Pertev Naili Boratav*, Paris, 1978, pp. 68-73.) He had been active in the Province of Rum during the Shahkulu rebellion as well. After Ismail's defeat in Çaldıran, however, he wanted to change sides demanding refugee from Selim. Nevertheless, he was put to death with his one hundred and fifty men. See "The Battle of Çaldıran" in this study.

meantime, two Safavid khalifs, Şah Ali and Şahkulu attacked Şiran and Alucra, killing the subaşı. Apart from them, a certain Memiş and Menteş wore the qizilbash t̄ac in Kürtün and had the population of the region profess adherence to qizilbashism. After a while, all these small qizilbash groups came together and intended to capture Trabzon in the name of the Shah. Nonetheless, they were dispersed by an Ottoman force and forced to retire to Yukarı Kelkid, where they continued banditry.¹⁶⁴⁶

Turning back to the adventure of Nur Ali Khalifa, all the contemporary sources agree on that he was among leading khalifas of Shah Ismail and was commissioned by the Shah directly to organize the qizilbashes of Rum against the Ottomans. HR states that “when the Khāqān-i Iskandar-sha’n (Isma’īl) heard of the (state of) revolt in the land of Rūm, he sent Nur Ali Khalifa Rūmlū to those regions for the purpose of gathering the devoted Sūfīs together. When Khalifa reached Qarā Hisār, some three or four thousands horsemen among the Sūfīs of Rūm and the murīds of that region joined him with their families.”¹⁶⁴⁷ Taking courage from this support, Nur Ali marched toward Malatya. On hearing this, Faik Beg, who was the Ottoman governor of Malatya¹⁶⁴⁸, prepared a small-scale army of three thousand cavalries against qizilbashes. Two armies met in Tokat. After routing Ottoman cavalries, Nur Ali entered Tokat and read *hutbe* in the name of Shah Ismail. Some of the townspeople visited Khalifa and were received honor.¹⁶⁴⁹ Then he went to Kazova, where Murad joined him.

¹⁶⁴⁶ TSA, document E 6672. The facsimile copy of this document is published in TNSS, appendix, document 16. For a summary of the document also see p. 68 in the same work.

¹⁶⁴⁷ Savory, “The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia”, *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, pp. 82-3, recited from *A Chronicle of the Early Safawīs, being the Ahsanu’-t-Tawārikh of Hasan-i Rūmlū*, vol. I (Persian Text), ed. C. N. Seddon, Baroda, 1931, p. 134-5. Also see HR, p. 164.

¹⁶⁴⁸ sic

¹⁶⁴⁹ HR, pp. 164-5.

In Niksar, Nur Ali Khalifa left the other qizilbash group, which was led by Sultan Murad, Kara Iskender and some other local khalifas. After pillaging some towns he set off for Erzincan. But on the way, in Eyu-yazı (ایویازی), he heard that an Ottoman army of fifteen thousand men under the command of Sinan Pasha was approaching. He then organized qizilbash troops for the battle. After a bloody fight which continued from the afternoon prayer until sunset, Ottomans were routed and Sinan Pasha fled. HR says that Sinan Pasha was killed while he was fleeing.¹⁶⁵⁰ Nevertheless, this is not true as evidently seen in archival evidence.

Ottoman archival documents also indicate some details of this battle. As we learn from the letter of Hacı Kemal, Ahmed sent troops with his vizier Sinan Pasha to Amasya where the pasha gathered further soldiers among local people. Sinan Pasha first aimed to march on Sultan Musa, whose allegiance to Selim was already delineated.¹⁶⁵¹ Nonetheless he later changed his mind and turned against Nur Ali Khalifa since he was deemed vulnerable by the pasha. Sinan Pasha's army met the qizilbashes under the command of Nur Ali in Koyulhisar, in the north of Sivas. During the battle, the Karaman troops in the Ottoman ranks withdrew. At the end Ottomans were defeated. Sinan Pasha could hardly save his head by fleeing from the battlefield. Nur Ali sent one hundred qizilbashes to catch him. Nonetheless, this small qizilbash group was surrounded in Çithanı, near Sivas, by the troops of the governor of Sivas and were slain. On hearing this, Nur Ali set off for Sivas in order to capture and plunder the city.

Şimdiki hâlde Sivas sancağı beginiden âdem ve mektub gelüb tastîr olan cevab budur ki, bundan evvel Sultan Murad Nur Halife ile Kızılbaş elçisi ile şark tarafına müteveccih olub Sultan Ahmed Beg tarafından Sinan Paşa'ya bir nice âdem koşulub gelüb Amasya'da ol yerün atlasundan ve yeyağından birkaç bin

¹⁶⁵⁰ HR, pp. 165-6. Also consider AA, p. 68.

¹⁶⁵¹ See his letter to Selim above.

ādem cem' idüb Sultan Musa üzerine hücum etmek kasdında iken yine avdet edüb Nur Ali Halife zebundur deyub ardından ılgar idüb varub Koyulhisar'da ardından yetüb ikinci vaktında beraber olunub hayli cenk olub sağ koldan hain Karamanlu kaçub bu sebebden Sinan Paşa münhezim olub iki bin mikdarı piyāde kılıçdan geçüb ardınca Sinan Paşa'nın yüz mikdar kızılbaş gönderüb Sivas'tan yukarı Çithanı'na gelicek Sivas Begi'nin anda bir mikdar askeri hazır bulunub yüz kızılbaş araya alub kırmışlar. Nur Ali'ye bu haber varıcak Sivas'ı talan ve gasbetmeğe kasedüb bi'l-fiil Sivas üzerine gelmek üzeredür. ... ve dahī Sinan Paşa'yı münhezim iden Yapoğlu Şah Beg'dir ki evel āhar hiyānetlik ile meşhurdur.¹⁶⁵²

Whether or not Nur Ali attacked on Sivas is not clear from available sources. If we rely on Hasan-ı Rumlu, after his victory over Sinan Pasha, Nur Ali Khalifa went to Erzincan, which had been allotted to him, dispatching the heads of the Rūmīs, together with large quantities of booty, to Ismail's court.¹⁶⁵³ Two years later, Hasan-ı Rumlu mentions him among the influential qizilbash leaders in the battlefield of Çaldıran.¹⁶⁵⁴ Three years later, however, he was certainly in Erzincan. In the letter written to Selim by a certain Mehmed¹⁶⁵⁵, it is reported that after the return of imperial army from Kemah, Nur Ali Khalifa came from Harput, crossed Murad River, and was on his way towards Ovacık. Mehmed, who was also the commander of Ottoman troops, adds that some tribal Turkoman leaders such as Ulaş, Yaraş, Aygutlu, Yusuf Varsak, alongside with a certain Saru Şeyh, also attended the army of Nur Ali. Furthermore, in this qizilbash army, there was also a number of *korucus*¹⁶⁵⁶, who came from Iran (*Yukaru Cānib*).

... ol menbā-ı fitne vü fesad mecma'-ı ehl-i tuğyan u ilhād ser defter-i mütemerridin Nur Ali Halife-i bi-din bazı kendu emsali melāin ile Ulaş ve Yaraş

¹⁶⁵² TSA, document E 2667, partly published in ULCY2, p. 130.

¹⁶⁵³ HR, p. 166.

¹⁶⁵⁴ HR, p. 178.

¹⁶⁵⁵ According to ULCY, this man was most probably Mirahur Bıyıklı Mehmed Aga. See ULCY2, p. 130. HR affirms this idea. But it mentions him as Bıyıklı Çavuş Mustafa, Selim's governor of Trabzon. See HR, p. 190.

¹⁶⁵⁶ The name of the special soldiers in the army of Shah Ismail. These troops were directly bound to the Shah and their primary duty was to protect the Shah.

ve Aygutlu ve Yusuf Varsak ve Saru Şeyh lāinin divan begi ve bazı askeriyle ve yukarıdan gelmiş bir nice korucusuyla Harput'dan gelüb Murad suyun geçüb...¹⁶⁵⁷

We learn from the rest of Mehmed's letter that Ottoman troops and qizilbash fighters under the command of Nur Ali confronted in Göksu on June 21, 1515.¹⁶⁵⁸ HR follows a similar line of narration. To him, on learning Mustafa Pasha's [Mehmed] approach to Erzincan, Nur Ali Khalifa, with Aygutoğlu Muhammed Beg, mobilized his troops against the Ottomans. Two armies met near Çemişkezek. After a bloody battle, Nur Ali Khalifa was killed with many qizilbashes and the rest dispersed, among which was Aygutoğlu as well.¹⁶⁵⁹ According to Mehmed's report, however, the battle took place in Göksu.¹⁶⁶⁰

¹⁶⁵⁷ This document is the letter of certain Mehmed to Selim. In the rest of the letter he also says that Aygutoğlu and Yusuf Varsak escaped. See TSA, document E 6316, published in ULCY2, pp. 130-1.

¹⁶⁵⁸ Mehmed says in his report that they moved from Rum Saray on Rebī I, Thursday. But he does not specify the year. According to the report the battle took place eight days later on Friday. ULCY takes the year as 918. Rebi I 1, 918 corresponds July 15, 1512, Thursday. Nevertheless, the events mentioned in the document obviously took place in the summer of 1515, when Selim captured the fortress of Kemah. Furthermore, in July, 1512 Selim was not in a position to send any army to eastern Anatolia for he was to cross Anatolia on July 29 and Ahmed was in control of central and eastern Anatolian provinces. Thus, the year must be taken as 921. However, Rebī I 1, 921 was not Thursday but Wednesday. Indeed, Mehmed says *gurre-i Rebī I*. The word 'gurre' is normally used for the first day and the night of months in Arabic calendar. (Ferit Develioğlu, *Osmanlıca-Türkçe Ansiklopedik Lügat*, Ankara: Aydın Kitabevi, 2006, p. 295) In this case, Mehmed seems to have used the same term for the second day of the month as well. In addition, HR also mentions this battle among the events of the year 921. His account is quite compatible with the report of Mehmed. See AT, p. 190.

¹⁶⁵⁹ See HR, p. 190.

¹⁶⁶⁰ "... Ordu-yı hümayun yümn-ü ikballe Kemah'dan müracaat etdükte ol menba-ı fitne vü fesad mecma'-ı ehl-i tuğyan u ilhad ser defter-i mütemerridin Nur Ali Halife-i bi-din bazı kendu emsali melain ile Ulaş ve Yaraş ve Aygutlu ve Yusuf Varsak ve Saru Şeyh lāinin divan begi ve bazı askeriyle ve yukarıdan gelmiş bir nice korucusuyla Harput'dan gelüb Murad suyun geçüb beş yüzden ziyade melahid-i melain gümrahla Pir Hasan Beg'in haberin alub anın kasdın ovacuğa azmedüb fitne-i fesada ... itdüğü istima' olıcak...hazır bulunan dilir-i dilāverleri istimāletleyüb himen ve ināyet-i şāhāneyi ümidvār idüb mübārek şehri-i Cemaziyelevvelin gurre-i Penşembih günü te'hir ve tefakkuf etmeyüb Rum Saray'dan ol tafe-i evbaş kasdına Kırucan yolundan ılgar edüb akeblerin girizgahların alub Düşenbih günü begne's-salâtin vaktinde Göksu kenarındaki şeşenbih günü ale's-sabah sudan geçüb yemin ve yesar ve kalb ve cenahı tertib edüb sağ kolda Guraba Ağası Hüseyin bendeniz ihtiyarlarıyla yoldaşlığa kalan kapu halkın koşub üç yüz mikdarı erle tarh koyub sol kola dahi karındaşım Hızır bendenüzle Nur Ali Beg orçulu(?) Karahisar sancağının bazı güzide erleri ve Yapaoğlu İskender bendenüz ki gelen Karamanluya ve bazı ihtiyarlarıyla ve yoldaşlığa gelen subaşı ve erbab-ı timar ve gönüllüyü yüz mikdar dilāverlerle tarh koyub Canik sancakbegi Baltaoğlu kalbde sağ tarafda Asitane-i saadetden himmet ve inayetle gelen ümera-i ekrad Kaasım Beg ve Pir Hasan Beg sancaklarıyla ve haliyen gelen Atak begi Ahmed Beg ile Sultan Ahmed Beg'i kalbde sol canibe ve bu bendeye mahsus yarar adem ve bendelerünüz kalbde sancak önünde tayin olunub Serdarları olan lāin Nur Ali-i bi-din hayli cenk edüb āhar zahm-ı sehimmākle mecrüh ve

Mehmed's letter clarifies two crucial points which are important in assessing this movement correctly: the first point is that the assertion repeated in chronicles that Nur Ali was an agent of Shah Ismail and was sent to Anatolia with the aim of organizing qizilbash against the Ottoman authority. The attendance of Ismail's special force in the army of Nur Ali clearly proves this argument. The second point is perhaps more important for the purpose of this study. This document evidently shows that when Ismail sent one of his khalifas to Anatolia to initiate an insurgence, his prominent supporters were appeared as the tribal Turkoman fighters. As indicated several times before, these social classes in central and eastern Anatolia were the natural allies to the qizilbash movement in Anatolia. Irène Beldiceanue-Steinherr, while questioning the reasons behind the widely acceptance of Safavid propaganda in central and eastern Anatolia rather than other parts of the Ottoman lands, also comes out with the same conclusion. She studies the survey registers of several regions and truly observes that the reason must be sought in the socio-political structure of these regions which were densely populated by tribal people. She says,

Les documents conservés aux Archives du Palais de Topkapi ne laissent donc subsister aucun doute sur le fait que les Safawides essayèrent de miner l'État ottoman par l'intérieur. Mais pourquoi exerçaient-ils une telle emprise sur l'Anatolie centrale et orientale ? On comprend mieux la situation lorsqu'on feuillette les registres de cadastre que la Porte établissait à des intervalles plus ou moins réguliers. Ceux-ci montrent que la structure sociale en Anatolie centrale et orientale n'était pas le même que dans les reste de l'État ottoman. Tandis que les recensements en Roumélie et en Anatolie occidentale étaient dressés par villes et villages, les recensements de l'Anatolie orientale étaient faits par tribus. Pour la Qaramanie le recensement était mixte. Nous avons d'une part le recensement des centres urbains et des villages qui en dépendaient et d'autre part les recensement des tribus et des clans. Ceci montre que le sentiment d'appartenir à telle ou telle tribu l'emportait sur toute autre notion et que, pour

giriştār gelicek diri durmağa kabil olmaduğu sebepten kelle-i bi-devletleri alınub ve nice dahi korucu ve yararları dahi cenkde düşüb bāki binden ziyāde melāin-i gümrah tu'me-i şemşir-i gaaziyan-ı din penāh olub..." TSA, document E 6316.

entraîner la masse, suffisait de s'assurer de la sympathie d'un chef de tribu ou clan mécontent de la vie.¹⁶⁶¹

As pointed out before, Sultan Murad had already arrived in Iran before the battle between Nur Ali and Ottoman troops. As already indicated, the Ottoman Chronicles provides two distinctive line of narration regarding the end of Murad: Kemalpaşazāde and Celalzāde argue that he was killed by the Shah on his arrival while Idrīs argues that he died in Iran after three of four years. Nevertheless, Idrīs does not mention Murad's activities in the country of Ismail. Two letters written by contemporary officials prove Idrīs's account. Furthermore, they give quite valuable details regarding the actions of Murad under the auspice of the Shah.

The first letter was written by Şadi Beg to Selim when he was in Bursa. Although the date of the letter is not specified, the context of the events suggests that it was most probably written between December of 1512 and January of 1513.¹⁶⁶² In his letter, Şadi Beg reports the developments in 'the other side' (*yukaru cānib*), which was derived from the spies dispatched before. Learning from this report, Shah Ismail, after dispatching some of his troops to Khorasan,¹⁶⁶³ sent Dev Ali and Sultan Murad towards Ottoman territories in order to capture the country of Rum while he turned towards Isfahan to spend the winter. But, on hearing the defeat of his troops in Khorasan against Özbeks, he proceeded toward this territory.¹⁶⁶⁴

¹⁶⁶¹ Irène Beldiceanue-Steinherr, "A propos d'un ouvrage sur la polémique Ottomane contre les Safawides", *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXXIX-2, Paris, 1971, pp. 399-340. I would like to remind here, for the purpose of this chapter, that they were also one of the main sources of Ahmed's troops expected to be fought against Selim's Janissaries, *Kapıkulu* soldiers, and later on sipāhis.

¹⁶⁶² See Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, Istanbul, 1987, p. 31.

¹⁶⁶³ In November 1512, a Safavid army under the command of *vākil* Yar Ahmed Huzānī, who was killed in the battlefield, was defeated by Özbeks in Gac-Davān. Ismail then sent supplementary troops to secure his eastern borders. For further reading see Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, p. 30.

¹⁶⁶⁴ TSA, document E 6478/2.

Şadi Beg says that Ismail warned Dev Ali on that if he would hear about the advent of Selim then he would not enter Anatolia but wait for him [Ismail]. Otherwise Dev Ali and Murad were to go down to Anatolia and to conquer the lands in the name of the Shah. Shah Ismail had already allocated the provinces of Anatolia to his confidants, all of whom were included in the qizilbash army under the command of Dev Ali. In this distribution of the Shah, Sultan Murad was appointed as the *beylerbey* of Anatolia. Ismail also wrote a letter to Prince Ahmed advising him to go to Rum, to wait for his help, which would soon arrive. However, for the time being, Ismail said to Ahmed, his troops under the command of Dev Ali were ready to provide any support when he [Ahmed] needed. When Ahmed went down to Rum [from Darendé], he sent a messenger to Dev Ali to demand military aid by reminding Ismail's promise. The answer of Dev Ali, however, was not affirmative. He said that it was the strict order of their Shah that they were not to enter Rum while Selim was in Anatolia. At the same time, Dev Ali sent the messenger of Ahmed with his letter to the Shah and requested the majestic instructions.¹⁶⁶⁵

Safavid chronicles also affirm Ismail's intention to employ Murad in order to strengthen his power in Anatolia. After the execution of Ahmed, Murad continued to contest the succession with Selim on the support of the Shah. According to *Tārīkh-i Īlchī-yi Nizāmshāh*, Ismail's plan was to use Murad to provoke a rebellion against Selim. For this purpose, qizilbash troops under Div Sultan and Muhammed Han Ustaclu escorted Murad to Sivas. Nonetheless, since no support for him was materialized, this

¹⁶⁶⁵ TSA, document E 6478/2.

plan was abandoned. Before the end of 1512, Murad gave up the struggle against Selim and returned to Iran, where he was granted asylum by Ismail.¹⁶⁶⁶

Another contemporary report, namely the letter of Mamay¹⁶⁶⁷, narrates the events in the same way. What Mamay adds, however, is that Ismail's decision to send troops toward Anatolia was mostly due to Sultan Murad's advice; he said that that side of Rum would join their side. Another detail recorded in Mamay's letter, which is absent in the other, is that when Dev Ali and Murad arrived in Said Çuhuru with one thousand men, they learnt that Selim crossed to Anatolia with imperial army. Then they decided not to go to Rum but wrote a letter describing the situation to the Shah, who ordered them to stay where they were.

... hāliyen bu tarafda mütecella olan haber budur ki bu bende-i kemine Şah İsmaille ademler irsal etmişdi elçi suretinde bir iki atla şimdiki halde avdet edüb gelüb böyle haber verdiler ki Şah İsmaille Gök Kavak mevziinde vasıl olub bir ay mikdarı bile geçüb İsfahan kurbına bile varub andan avdet etdiler ol haletde Dev Aliyi Sultan Muradla bu tarafa tayin etdiler Sultan Murad söziyle ki Rumun berü geçesi bize dönse gerekdür deyü vakti ki Said Çuhurına vusul buldı bin mikdarı Ademle istima etdiler ki rikabı rikab-ı hümāyunları devlet-i kamrani ve saadeti cavidani birle berü geçede nuzul-ü iclal buyurdu. Ol rey tehir olundu. Anda Şah İsmail ile arz etdiler. Andan cevab böyle geldi ki yerinde otursun Said Çuhurundan hareket etmesin deyu ve Keçebaş¹⁶⁶⁸ leşkeri galib olub Şah İsmail üzerinde iki bin adem mikdarı kalmadı olan askerın Horasan tarafına gönderdi...¹⁶⁶⁹

Consequently, the qizilbashes of Erzincan and Bayburd¹⁶⁷⁰ maintained their position and watch over Selim's movement. Meanwhile, they sent letters and messengers to the qizilbashes living in the Ottoman side promising them to come in the

¹⁶⁶⁶ Cited in Roger Savory, Roger Savory, "The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia", *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, p. 82.

¹⁶⁶⁷ Mamluk governor of Malatya-Divriği region. See ULCY2, p. 123; Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, p. 39.

¹⁶⁶⁸ Refers to Ozbeks, which were also called as 'Yeşilbaş'. For further explanation see Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, p. 42, footnote, 71.

¹⁶⁶⁹ TSA, document E 8758. The whole text of the document is published by Bacqué-Grammont. See his *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, pp. 40-41.

¹⁶⁷⁰ Then, these cities were included in Safavid territories

next spring. The qizilbash propagandists were spreading the news that even the Shah was in preparation to march toward Anatolia and warning them to take necessary precautions for a great advent. Şadi Beg says that they sent a messenger to Çepni tribe living in the Province of Trabzon as well. The qizilbashes of this region even intended to capture Trabzon by way of banditry. Şadi Beg also describes the difficult situation of Torul fortress, near Trabzon.¹⁶⁷¹ He says that although they stocked some provision in the fortress some time ago, since transportation was cut off by qizilbashes, they could not provide additional supply; thus, the food in the fortress was about to finish. Ottoman soldiers could not go out of the fortress as well.

In the last part of his letter, Şadi Beg points out the weakness of the Shah's situation. He reports that although the voice of the Shah was seemingly loud, there was no need to fear. Because his troops were divided into several fronts: some were in Khorasan, some in Bagdad, some in Diyarbekir, and some in the border on Rum under Dev Ali's command. None of these troops could leave their places and help the other since they were exposed to enemies in each front. The Shah himself was wandering between fronts with his special forces.¹⁶⁷² Here Şadi Beg puts forward his own idea that if the news of the advent of the sultan [Selim] would be heard, then all the enemies would disperse. As a last note, Şadi Beg adds that some of Murad's confidants fled from his suit and reached Trabzon through Georgia.¹⁶⁷³

¹⁶⁷¹ Document E 6672 in TSA also indicates qizilbash activities in Torul. According to this document, the son of the ex-governor of Torul and his father's tutor Yahya, who also had a timar in Torul, managed to convert most of the population into the qizilbash movement.

¹⁶⁷² For the situation of Persia and Ismail's policy in the winter of 1512-1523 see Bacqué-Grammont, *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, pp. 29-31.

¹⁶⁷³ TSA, document E 6478/2. The whole text of the document with its facsimile copy is published by Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont in his *Les Ottomans, les Safavides et leurs voisins*, Istanbul, 1987, pp. 32-35.

7.2.4. The End of the Struggle: Selim Executes Males of the Royal Line

When Selim crossed to Anatolia with a strong army on July 29, 1512¹⁶⁷⁴, Ahmed was not optimistic about his fortune. Upon learning Selim's march on him, Ahmed first intended to retire toward Çukurova¹⁶⁷⁵, which was controlled by Karaman, Bulgar, and Taş-ili begs. But the serious obstacle on this way was Hemdem Pasha, who was newly appointed as the beylerbey of Karaman by Selim. Meanwhile, Yular-kısdı Sinan Pasha was still in Amasya with the properties of Ahmed. In his letter to Selim, Karaca Pasha reported that Prince Ahmed had moved toward Ankara and would be there on July 27. Among begs of Taş-ili, Umur Beyoğlu and his brother, Yuvaoglu Mehmed Beg, Kebelioğlu, and Şit were moving with Prince Ahmed and pillaging several cities in central Anatolia. At the same time, Sinan Pasha sent a messenger (*ulak*) to Ahmed informing him on that he had gathered the soldiers of Rum and had the intention to arrive Ankara with 15.000 men; but if he could not arrive, then the prince had to come to the Province of Rum and meet him there.¹⁶⁷⁶ Consequently, Ahmed moved toward Amasya from Ankara.¹⁶⁷⁷

Considerable portion of Ahmed's army was squandered during the battle with Nur Ali Khalifa. Ahmed was well-aware of the fact that the rest of his army was not enough to confront Selim's forces. Because of that, he began to search best place to flee. Some options were discussed in his court: some of his begs advocated to take shelter in the country of Shah Ismail.¹⁶⁷⁸ Some other begs suggested going to the country of

¹⁶⁷⁴ See, for example, HSE4, p. 149. According to some sources, however, Selim passed to Anatolia on July 18. See TNSS, p. 7.

¹⁶⁷⁵ TNSS, p. 8.

¹⁶⁷⁶ TSA, document E 2667, partly published in ULCY2, p. 137.

¹⁶⁷⁷ ULCY2, pp. 136-7. HSE says that he went from Karaman region (*diyār*) to Amasya upon learning Selim's march. See HSE4, p. 150; ALI, p. 1060.

¹⁶⁷⁸ ULCY2, p. 137; IDRS, 111.

Dulkadir.¹⁶⁷⁹ Of course Taş-ili, the region from where Ahmed gathered most of his fighters, was also on the table as an alternative. As we learn from the report of Karaca Pasha to his patron Selim, he was invited to Taş-ili by Turkoman tribal leaders of the region. According to this report, Ramazanoğlu sent a letter and suggested he come to Taş-ili, but by leaving his properties (*ağırılık*) behind. If he (Ahmed) would come, according to the plan of Ramazanoğlu, they would ally with Bulgar begs and kill those Karaman begs who betrayed, gaining the obedience of the rest (of Karaman begs). Karaca Pasha also informs Selim on that they sent a letter to the governors of Damascus and Aleppo, demanding their allegiance. Their aim in searching the allegiance of Mamluk governors was that if they could not resist in Taş-ili then they would flee towards Damascus.¹⁶⁸⁰

Hoca Saadeddin states that during the flight of Prince Ahmed most of the governors and begs deserted the prince and sought ways to find acceptance at the court of Selim, while some others still remained with Ahmed.¹⁶⁸¹ ‘Āli recites a similar account,

Hizmetinde dāmen der-meyān ve da’vā-yı hulūsla can-feşān olan ümerā-i rū-şināsān dahī iki kısım olub, bir bölüği hātime-i kār ne sūretle bedīdār olacağını bildiler. Envā’-ı inābetle rū-gerdān olub, rikāb-ı hümāyūn-ı şehriyārī takallübine ‘azīmet-kunān oldılar ve me’müllerinden ziyāde ri’āyetler ile şād-kām oldılar. Ammā bir kısmı ‘inādına musırr olub, ‘Ya taht ola, ya baht, ya tığ-ı saht ve ten-i baht ber-taht’ diyüb Sultan Ahmed’den ayrılmadılar.¹⁶⁸²

¹⁶⁷⁹ TNSS, p. 9.

¹⁶⁸⁰ “... Ramazanoğlu haber gönderüb eğer Bulgar canibine gelürseniz cemi’ ağırluğunuz birağub tenha gelmek gerekdir ki Bulgar begleriyle muavenet edüb Karaman beglerinin hiyanet edenlerin kılıçdan geçirüb mā-bākisin itaat itdürüb arka yardım alalım demişler. Dahi Şam ve Halep melik-i ümerāsına ādem gönderilmiş ki, muavenet taleb ideler. Amma ol cānibe ādem göndermekden garaz, Taş’da karar idemeyecek olursa Şam cānibini penāh tutuna. ...” TSA, document E 6399. At the court of Ahmed, fleeing to Egypt was also discussed; even this idea gained the sympathy of the prince who sent a letter to Kansu Gavri, the Mamluk ruler of Egypt. Nevertheless Gavri kindly turned down this request. See TNSS, p. 9; İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, “Memlūk Sultanlarının Yanına İltica Etmiş Olan Osmanlı Hanedanına Mensup Şehzādeler”, *Belleten*, cilt 17, sayı 68, p. 531.

¹⁶⁸¹ HSE4, p. 150.

¹⁶⁸² ALI, pp. 1060-61.

Those governors and begs who abandoned Ahmed when they realized that the balance of power turned for the sake of Selim, must arguably have been the *timar* holders and other governors who were closely connected to the traditional state machinery of the Ottoman Empire and owed their position to the established order. Their concern was just to be at the right side in this struggle. Those begs who provided their support until the end, however, were tribal leaders who had difficulty in incorporation to the Ottoman system. Their concern was not simply to take position at the right side. Rather ideological orientation was more responsible for their support to Prince Ahmed. Because, as already evaluated, Selim appeared as promising to re-establish the Ottoman traditional regime, which was weakened during last years of Bayezid II. Using this image successfully, Selim managed to gain the support of the most influential power of Ottoman state machinery and to shift Ahmed from center to periphery in the ideological plane. Thus, the real ground of the tribal support for the candidacy of Ahmed should be searched in his opposing position to the traditional central powers of the state.

At the end, Ahmed moved eastward and arrived Divriği, which was at the border between Ottoman Empire and Dulkadir Principality.¹⁶⁸³ Here again different views arose about where to go. Karaman begs insisted on fleeing to the Shah's country while Turgutoğlu, Reyhanoğlu, and Mıdikoğlu begs advocated to take shelter in Egypt.¹⁶⁸⁴ His son Murad was enthusiastically favoring to ally with Shah Ismail. He sent letters to his father one after another advising him the alliance of the shah. But he vigorously refused

¹⁶⁸³ KPZ9, p. 73.

¹⁶⁸⁴ CLZ states that Ahmed thought that he had three choices: fleeing to Egypt, becoming qizilbash, or trying his chances against Selim. Ahmed chose the last alternative. See CLZ, p. 169.

this idea and tore the letter from his son. Şükrullah who was in the retinue of Ahmed until Divriği reported the situation as follows,

Bu fakir bendeniz Sultan Ahmed'le Divriği beraberî Kazık Beli'ne deĝin cemaatımla ve ehl-i begtümla bile vardım. Hâliyen Karaman'dan evvelki beglerden gayri Turgud-oğulları, Reyhan-oğulları ve Mıdık-oğulları gelüb tamam Mısır cānibine teveccüh etmiş iken zıkr olan Karamanlı gelicek elbette Kızılbaş canibine gidelim, derman bize ol canibden olur, Mısır'a varıcak heman hab olursun deyu idlāl eylediler. Hatta oĝlu Sultan Murad'dan Sivas altında iken mektub gelüb Şah, Dev Ali ile bize yirmi bin kadar asker koşdu. Erzincan'da gelüb katılasın. Emir budur ki Üsküdar'a deĝin varıla deyu. Sultan Ahmed dahi gelen mektubu pareleyüb ve ol canibe idlal eyleyene iltifat etmeyüb ol tarafa meylelemedi. Sultan Selim Rum canibine çıkdığı gibi Alaüddeve Bege varub müşavere edüb Kayseri yanından Karaman'a varalum, ne olursak at üzerinde olalum deyu idlal eylediler. Alaüddeve Beg'e elçi dahi gönderdiler. Henüz elçileri gelmedi. Sonra padişah devletle Engürü'de karar eylediği işidecek giru zıkr olunan kimselerin fikri böyle oldu ki gel imdi Haleb'e varalum, ordan Çukurova'ya çikalım, Karaman Taşını arka edinelüm, ne kadar adam isterseniz biz bulalım deyu mütekellif oldılar. Varub hab olmakdan ise ölürsek at üzerinde ölelüm deyu çaşnigir başıyla Karamanlı idlāl eylediler. Bu tedbir üzerinde kaldılar...¹⁶⁸⁵

Ahmed proceeded to Darende and from there sent a letter to his brother Selim, who was then in Ankara, proposing to divide the country between himself and Selim. Selim did not accept this proposal.¹⁶⁸⁶ Taking the approaching winter into account, Selim retired to Bursa from Ankara on November 23, 1512.¹⁶⁸⁷ Then Ahmed attacked Amasya, which was being governed by Mustafa Beg, the son of Davud Pasha, and took the control of the city.¹⁶⁸⁸ As a precaution, Selim spent the winter in Bursa, where he executed Musa, Orhan, Emir (sons of Prince Mahmud), Osman, the son of Alemşah and the governor of Çankırı, and Mehmet Beg, the son of Şehinşah and the governor of

¹⁶⁸⁵ TSA, document E 7052.

¹⁶⁸⁶ For the letters of both princes see ULCY2, pp. 140-1. Also consider TNSS, pp. 9-10.

¹⁶⁸⁷ ULCY2, p. 142; TNSS, p. 11. KPZ records that after 63 days Selim returned from Ankara to Bursa on November 19, 1512. See KPZ9, p. 73. Also see ALI, p. 1061.

¹⁶⁸⁸ ALI, p. 1061; MNB, p. 452; TNSS, p. 12; HAM2, p. 403.

Konya.¹⁶⁸⁹ He also executed his brother Prince Korkud and ordered to burry him in Bursa on March 17, 1513.¹⁶⁹⁰

In the meantime, Ahmed spent the winter in Amasya, from where he moved on January 29, 1513, leaving his son, Sultan Osman, as his deputy.¹⁶⁹¹ He first went towards Tosya which was governed by Bıyıklı Mehmed Pasha. After some small-scale fights with the troops of Mehmed Pasha, he proceeded to Ankara. Selim also marched on Ahmed from Bursa. Two armies confronted in Yenişehir on April 15, 1513.¹⁶⁹² After a bloody battle Ahmed was defeated and detained on the way while fleeing towards İzmit and executed immediately.¹⁶⁹³ On May 14, 1513, Sultan Osman, the son of Ahmed, and Sultan Mustafa, the son of Sultan Murad were executed in Amasya.¹⁶⁹⁴ So, in the end Selim extirpated all the males of royal line except Prince Murad, who had fled to the Shah's country where he would cease in a couple of years.¹⁶⁹⁵ He returned to Istanbul leaving his son Süleyman as the only living male member of the dynasty.¹⁶⁹⁶

¹⁶⁸⁹ ULCY2, p. 142. KPZ recites this execution as follows: "... *Sene-i mezbûre Şevvalinün yiğirmi yedinci gicesi [January 5, 1513] Sultan Şehinşah oğlu Muhammed, ki Niğde diyârının serdarydı, ve Sultan Alemşah oğlu Sultan Osman, ki Kangırı sancağının sipeh-salarydı, ve Sultan Mahmud oğulları Sultan Orhan, Sultan Musa ve Sultan Emirhan, ki sancak yerlerdi, ahşam vaktinde saraya davet olunub kapucılar odasına getirildi. Eğerçi bunların ikisi dahî nâ-reşide tıfl idi, emmâ cihan-dâide pirlere tedbiriyle amel olunub ... ol leyl-i pür-veylde beşinün dahî maslahatları görüldi.*" KPZ9, p. 74. From Italian sources Hammer recites the hopeless resistance of the young princes to the executioners. See HAM2, p. 404. Also consider IDRS, p. 112; CLZ, p. 178; SKB, p. 118; YSF, p. 39; HSE4, 154; ALI, p. 1062 and p. 1071; MNB, p. 453.

¹⁶⁹⁰ ULCY3, p. 191. For further reading see KPZ9, pp. 75-77; HSE4, pp. 155-160; ALI, pp. 1062-5; ULCY3, pp. 185-91; TNSS, pp. 13-16.

¹⁶⁹¹ ULCY3, p. 192; TNSS, p. 17.

¹⁶⁹² KPZ9, p. 80; HSE4, pp. 162-4; TNSS, p. 18. Hammer, relying on Italian sources, gives the date as April 24. See HAM2, p. 406.

¹⁶⁹³ ULCY3, p. 197; KPZ9, p. 81; CLZ, pp. 176-7; TNSS, p. 19; HAM2, p. 407; SKB, pp. 129-132; YSF, p. 42; ALI, p. 1067; MNB, p. 456.

¹⁶⁹⁴ ULCY3, p. 199.

¹⁶⁹⁵ IDRS, p. 115. Ahmed's son Alaeddin and his brother were sent to Egypt before Ahmed's death. But they died there because of plague. See IDRS, p. 115. Also see HSE4, pp. 165-6 and ALI, pp. 1068-9; SLZ2, p. 13; MNB, p. 456. The latter four also specify that Murad fled to Shah Ismail and died in Persia after three or four years.

¹⁶⁹⁶ KPZ9, p. 81.

CHAPTER VIII

ÇALDIRAN, 1514:

THE APEX OF THE QIZILBASH ZEAL

8.1. PRELUDE TO THE CAMPAIGN

Gelibolulu ‘Ali deems Selim as the second greatest among the Ottoman sultans. According to him, Selim was a great sultan not only because of his personal skills and abilities but also because of the divine support behind him. He interprets the victories of Selim against the Safavids and Mamluks as a strong proof of the divine approval of his *saltanat*.¹⁶⁹⁷ He believes that what Selim successfully accomplished during his reign could only be fulfilled by any other ruler in many more years with serious difficulties

¹⁶⁹⁷ “*Selātin-i Āl-i Osman’daki padişahlar da müşārün ileyhin ecdād-ı ‘izāmından Ebu’l-Feth Sultan Muhammed Gāzi cümleden mevsūfdir. Bu delil ile ki İstanbul fethine müte’allik olan hadis-i şerifinde ‘izām-ı şān-ı ‘Ni’me’l-emūr’le ma’rūfdir. Ammā anlardan sonra gelen padişahlardan sāhib-kıranlık nāmı Sultan Selim Han’a mahsūsdur. Nitekim ‘Müeyyed min ‘indillāh’ olmaları fütühāt u āsārlarıyla mansūsdur. ...*” ALI, pp. 1051-2.

and hazards.¹⁶⁹⁸ ‘Āli argues that two accomplishments of Selim were of special value for the Muslim society (ümme-i Muhammed):

Evvelâ: Vâlid-i büzürgvârı Sultan Bâyezid Han’ın hilkat-i şeriflerindeki sebât ve sükûn-ı ‘anâsırın cüz’-i gâlibini hâke makrûn itmekle hareketden kaldığı ve gün günden Şah İsmail-i Erdebilî Ehl-i Sünnet ve Cemâ’at memâlikine müstevli olub kılıç çaldığı, dahî tursa rûy-ı zeminin teshîrine cüll-i himmet kıldığı ve Sultan Selim Han gibi sâhib-kırân-ı ‘asr elinden tabanca yemesi memâlik-i etrâf padişahlarının hânumanlarına sular koyduğu hususın def’idir.

İkinci: Ol makûle sahib-i hurûc ki, da’vâ-yı şeref-i siyâdet ide ve ırk ve nesebi mâderi tarafından Emir Hasan-ı Tavîl ve âna ferzend ü halef-i cemîl Sultan Ya’kub-ı Celîl hânedânına nisbet hem şahlık ve hem mürşid-i gümrâhlık semtinden hezâr hezâr evbaşâ hüsn virüb idlâl ve baş baş müfsidlerî sâye-i râyetinde ‘ibâdı pâ-mâl idinüb serkeşlik üzre iken bî-havf u tereddüd üstüne varub zarar ve şurûrına ahâli-i İslamdan men’-i pür-def’idir ki, ol makûle hasm-ı kavînin def’i kırk yıl kâmil tedârik isterdi ve ol zümre mâ-beyninde kibâr u sığâr ve kâffe-i a’yân-ı büzürgvâr – ‘iyâzen billâh – ne cefâlar çekdi. Kanı dökülmeyüb sağ kurtulanlar dahî bîmâr u zerâne kanlar yutaydı ve askerine gâh sa’âdetle ve gâh kerâmetle ve gâh velâyetle i’tikâd viren Hâricî’nin hânedân-ı devleti ateşgede-i gebrân gibi gitdikçe kuvvet ve işti’âl bulub söyündürmesi niçe rûzgâr harb u kîtâl ve iştiğâl icâb iderdi.¹⁶⁹⁹

Celalzâde’s view was not different. In his *Selim-nâme* Celalzâde says that “during the reign of Bayezid II, the viziers were not acquainted with necessary vision and knowledge in order to govern the country successfully. Moreover, they were defective in terms of religious purity and because of this, the conditions of the country worsened day by day. If Sultan Selim did not ascend to the throne, the country of Rûm (*mülk-i Rûm*) would have been (inevitably) lost. (*Merhûm Sultan Selim Han padişah olmasa mülk-i Rum elden gitmiş idi.*)¹⁷⁰⁰

In the years until Selim executed Ahmed in 1513 and finished the civil war, Anatolian population and the provincial administrators were in a complete turmoil and confusion. On one side, for the state officials and local authorities it was hard to openly

¹⁶⁹⁸ ALI, p. 1071.

¹⁶⁹⁹ ALI, pp. 1053-4.

¹⁷⁰⁰ CLZ, p. 253.

disclaim their tendency since the other prince could punish them. There are a number of letters in TSA archives reflecting this situation. Many local governors and *qādis* sent letters to Prince Selim presenting their obedience but at the same time expressing their excuse for cooperating with Ahmed. They informed the new sultan about the situation they were in. If they had not followed Ahmed's orders, he would have realized their real intention and punished them. Within these conditions, they had no other choice but to pretend as if they had been adherents of Ahmed.¹⁷⁰¹

The civil war seriously distorted the running of the governmental mechanism. No official could take himself from playing a part in the struggle of princes for this would be the most vital decision to determine their future within the Ottoman state machinery. Thus, the primary concern of the state agents was to take position on the right side. But being on the right side was depended on the efforts of the adherents as well. Consequently, once they chose a side, that is, a prince, they had to work with utmost enthusiasm for the future of their candidate. The natural consequence of this was, of course, intensified partisanship among the bureaucrats, soldiers, scholars, and other state agents and representatives.

The most devastating results of such chaos and confusion among the members of the *askerī* class or the ruling class arguably appeared on the wellbeing of the *re'āya*, the tax-paying subjects. The malfunction of the governmental apparatus paved way to corruption in the official spheres. Thus, the condition of the subjects worsened further. How this corruption contributed to the creation of a fertile ground to produce qizilbash rebellions has already been demarcated. Idrīs, for example, calls attention to the point

¹⁷⁰¹ See, for example, the letter of Sultan Musa, the governor of Kastamonu. TSA, document E 2667. Also consider TSA, documents E 6376, E 6205.

that there were a great number of Safavid disciples, who liked to amuse their *nefs* (or to fulfill even the immoral desires of their soul) and were inclined to attack defenseless (*miskin*) people in several regions of Anatolia. Idrīs indicates a very interesting point here that because of the qizilbash groups in Anatolia, serious discords (*fitne*) appeared within the imperial army.¹⁷⁰² Unfortunately he gives no further detail about this discord. However, his account makes the point clear that there were certain qizilbash sympathizers in the Ottoman army, most probably among the *sipāhis*.¹⁷⁰³

Furthermore, the plunder and banditry of the qizilbashes also created a serious discontent especially among the Sunni subjects of the empire. Thus, the Sunni population in Anatolia was in great expectation from Sultan Selim when he returned to Istanbul as the ninth Ottoman sultan. I have already discussed how he won the public opinion of the Sunni population by his successfully applied policy since his movement from Trabzon. When he returned to Topkapı Palace, there was a public expectation from him to resolve two principal problems: the corruption within the *askerī* classes, which increased the burden on the shoulders of *re'āya*, and the qizilbash trouble. Indeed, the second problem was not easy to settle in a short time if one would desire a permanent solution. However, Sultan Selim believed in a short-cut 'solution', which was indeed by no means a solution for the benefit of the society but would leave an inheritance of irreversible socio-religious cleavage within Anatolian population. He preferred to use the sword to deal with this complicated knot instead of untying it; namely he attempted to extirpate the society who caused 'problem' with cruel and harsh methods. Indeed, what he did to his Muslim subjects was questionable for a Muslim ruler. It must be the

¹⁷⁰² IDRS, p. 122.

¹⁷⁰³ The leading role of the provincial *timar*-holding *sipāhis* in Şahkulu Revolt is already delineated.

strong public expectations indicated above that provided the psychological ground which was fed by general suffering and pain because of disorder and banditry of the qizilbashs, and that enabled Selim to practice such a harsh policy against his own subjects.

A report presented to Selim by a middle-ranking religious scholar, namely Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife, mirrors the collective sentiment of the Sunni population. The report is preserved in TSA and published by Selahattin Tansel.¹⁷⁰⁴ In his long report, Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife both explains the lapses within and outside the state machinery and offers solutions. More importantly, he repeatedly expresses his strong expectation from Sultan Selim to put an end to such oppressions, which, one might assume, to have certain degree of social basis.

Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife begins with the religious scholars who were supposed to be exemplary for ordinary people. He argues that most of the *qādis*, *nāibs*, *muderriss*, and *muftīs* were indulged in every sort of immorality. The bribery, sexual perversion, alcohol consumption, etc. were wide-spread among them. He underlines that Bayezid II and his viziers did not pay attention to such needs of religious scholars and urgent needs of the *re'āya* who were living in provinces outside of Edirne and Istanbul. Another subject of complaint was the heavy taxes. Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife describes some taxes, such as *bennāk resmi* and *gerdek akçesi*, and incumbencies on *re'āya*, such as providing provisions for *ulaks*, as oppression from religious point of view and requests from the sultan to abolish such practices for they turned life for the subjects unbearable.

¹⁷⁰⁴ Tansel summarizes the content of this considerably long report in his book and gives its facsimile copy in the appendix. See TNSS, pp. 20-30.

Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife's attitude towards the qizilbashes is, on the other hand, quite fanatical. He recites a fabricated statement attributed to the Prophet that 'At the end of time, Persia will be full of *fitne* and become infidel.'¹⁷⁰⁵ According to Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife, the Safavids were those infidels filled Persia with *fitne* as foresaid by the Prophet. Consequently, he deems the qizilbashes of Anatolia, who adhered to Safavid Order, as infidels too. After referring to their insults to Kur'an by stomping on it and hanging it on the necks of dogs, he renounces the 'soft' policy of the government and provokes the sultan to extirpate the qizilbashes. He says,

... üşde bir zaman geldi ki Rum memleketinin halkının çoğu Erdevil [sic] olub kâfir oldu. ... Erdevil gelürse hep uyarız, tâbi oluruz didiler, nice fâsid fikirlere meşgul oldılar. ... ah kanı gayret-i İslam? Bu mel'unlar 'Şah, Şah!' dirler, niçin mü'minler 'Allah, Allah!' dimezler? Ve bunlara kılıç çalmazlar? ... Ey güzel Sultan Selim! Heman gayret-i İslam sizde kalmışdır. Bu kâfirleri hep kırmak gerekdir. Zira bular [bunlar] münkir-i kelimullahdır, câhid-i dinullahdır, hâdim-i şer'ullahdır. ...¹⁷⁰⁶

Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife's apparent hatred of the qizilbashes reaches such a degree that he even declares the color of *kızıl* (red) as a symbol of infidelity. He compares this color with blue and yellow which were attributed to Christians and Jews, and argues to ban the clothes and hats bearing red colors for Muslims. He goes further asserting that according to some books of religious law and sanction, the testimony of those men who wear red and yellow clothes is not acceptable. These colors are, to him, the ornament of Satan.

... Zîrâ bir zâlim kâfir-i bî-din zâhir olub kızıl şapka giyüb ehl-i ilme ve ehl-i tevhide ve ehl-i İslam ve sünnilere adüvv olub, darb urub azîm cidâl kıtâl idüb bed fi'l itdi. Adımı kızıl şapkanın tâc kodı, hâşâ ki tâc ola! ... bize dâ'vâ-yı fâsid etti, cihan halkını dalâlete bıraktı. Hidâyet-i ehl-i imanı inkar-ı küllî eylediler. Öyle olsa kızıl renkden gâyet hazer ihtirâz itmek gerekdir. Nitekim gök renkle

¹⁷⁰⁵ TSA, document 3192, cited in TNSS, p. 28.

¹⁷⁰⁶ Quoted in TNSS, p. 28.

saru renkden ihtirāz olundığı gibi, gökle sarunun Nasārā ile Yahūdiye mahsus olmuştur. ...¹⁷⁰⁷

Apart from the qizilbashs, Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife also calls attention to *ışıks* who lived communally in their lodges and wandered. He deems this group inferior to infidels from a religious point of view. According to him, these *ışıks* said that ‘our pray (*namaz*) was already performed (thus there is no need for us to perform pray)’, and they prostrated one another, used alcohol and hashish in their food, and were really merciless and mischievous. Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife advises Sultan Selim to confiscate their lodges in order to turn into *mescids* and even to kill them.¹⁷⁰⁸

Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife’s report clearly shows that a segment of Ottoman society was in expectation of effective measures both against corruptions within the governmental mechanism and against ‘religious divergent’ groups. This expectation made it possible for Selim to undertake a truly ruthless policy against his own subjects.

Giovan Maria Angiolello, who was an eye-witness of events, says that the Kurdish local rulers governing the borderline region between two empires provoked Sultan Selim to invade the Safavid Empire.¹⁷⁰⁹ Şerefhan Bitlisî confirms the invocation of Kurdish leaders. He states that when Emir Şeref lost Bitlis to the qizilbashs, he pinned his hopes on the Ottoman sultan who was rumored to have an intention to invade Iran. Emir Şeref, in collaboration with Idris-i Bitlisî and Muhammad Aga Kelhokî, who were also among the prominent notables of the region, persuaded 20 Kurdish feudal lords to support Sultan Selim. Then, they wrote a letter, presenting their loyalty to the

¹⁷⁰⁷ Quoted in TNSS, p. 28.

¹⁷⁰⁸ Quoted in TNSS, p. 29.

¹⁷⁰⁹ See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, pp. 118-9.

sultan; and Idris-i Bitlisî and Muhammad Aga Kelhokî brought the letter to Istanbul.¹⁷¹⁰

Although written after the battle of Çaldıran, some other letters of Şerefhan Bitlisî preserved in Tokapı Palace Museum further envisage the co-operation of the local Kurd lords with the Ottoman Empire before and after the battle.¹⁷¹¹

After executing Prince Ahmed, Selim returned to Istanbul in May 1513. However, he did not stay there for long and soon moved to Edirne, where he immediately started the preparations for a wide-ranging campaign on Shah Ismail. He first demanded Sultan Murad from the Shah. But his demand was turned down.¹⁷¹² Indeed, knowing his attitude towards the qizilbashs since his governorship in Trabzon, Ismail always maintained a negative attitude towards Selim. He, for example, did not congratulate Selim when he ascended to the Ottoman throne. It has already been delineated that Ismail's plan was to capture the eastern provinces of Ottoman Anatolia by using the prestige of Sultan Murad, as well as his mystical authority on the qizilbashs of this region.

Selim's situation, however, was not an easy one. On one hand, a considerable portion of his subjects were openly adhered to Ismail and rising the banner of revolt when an opportunity emerged. On the other hand, both these troublesome subjects and the shah using them as a sixth column within the Ottoman realm were Muslims, though being affiliated to a different sect, namely Shi'ism. According to the Islamic law, it was not easy to issue a religious sanction legitimizing war against any other Muslim state or

¹⁷¹⁰ Şerefhan, *Şerefnâme*, trs. From Arabic to Turkish M. Emin Bozarslan, İstanbul: Hasat Yayınları, 1990, pp. 479-80.

¹⁷¹¹ These letters are E 10739, E 9647, E 5818, and E 8308, dated 1516, 1518, 1519, and 1520 respectively. For a discussion of the relationship between Şerefhan Bitlisî and Selim I, primarily based on these letters, see Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Quatre lettres de Şeref Beg de Bitlis (1516-1520) (Études turco-safavides, XI)", *Der Islam*, Band 63, Heft 1, 1986, 90-118.

¹⁷¹² TNSS, p. 32.

group. Indeed, the Ottoman sultans waged wars against their Muslim neighbors during the earlier centuries obtaining the approval of the religious scholars for their actions. In these *fetvās*, the permission of waging war against Muslim states, or more correctly principalities, were derived from the idea that fighting against those who prevent the holy war against the enemy of the religion was itself a holy war. All the Ottoman campaigns against Karasi, Germiyan, and Karaman Principalities were religiously legitimized by the same idea.¹⁷¹³

The conditions were, however, completely different in the case of the qizilbashs. The problem they caused was not preventing Ottomans from the holy war against Christians. None of the religious sanctions issued against the qizilbashs touched upon this formulation of the Ottoman *ulemā*'s traditional legitimizing methods. Rather, the problem then was something internal within Islam. Two Islamic states affiliated with two different Islamic sects were in confrontation. And politically there was no way of reconciliation for the conflicting interests of the states involved. From political point of view, the clash was inevitable.

Nonetheless, in order to wage a campaign, any Muslim state had to secure the approval of religious scholars, which signifies the approval of religious Islamic law, that is, of God. This was exactly the focal point of confusion for all sides of the conflict. Because in order to promulgate such a *fetvā*, one had to prove that the opposite side was out of the 'true path' of the religion, i.e. they were heretics. Only after proving this, a religious scholar could authorize a campaign against Muslims. On the other hand, such a sanction was not easy for a religious man for a well-known saying of the Prophet reads

¹⁷¹³ See, for example, Feridun Emecen, "Ottoman Policy of Conquest of the Turkoman Principalities of Western Anatolia with Special Reference to Sarukhan Beyliği", in Elizabeth Zachariadou (ed.), *The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389)*, Rethymnon: Crete University Press, 1993, 35-40.

“If one promulgates another as an unbeliever, one of them becomes an unbeliever. If the statement of the speaker is true then the other man is really and unbeliever, but if he is mistaken, then he himself becomes an unbeliever.”¹⁷¹⁴ Thus, blaming a Muslim with atheism (*küfr*) is quite a risky action for a religious Muslim.

However, when the *fetvās* issued against the qizilbashes and the descriptions by Ottoman historians and religious scholars are scrutinized, it can be concluded that they were completely free of such a religious concern. Both contemporary chroniclers and the authors of *fetvās* seem to have been quite sure and clear in their thoughts regarding the qizilbash problem. These texts contain sharp discriminations, clear descriptions, strict judgments, and offer severe punishments for the qizilbashes. Even so, a careful study of these texts in the context of the political atmosphere in the contemporary Ottoman palace raises some questions on this clarity in terms of religious thought. First of all, one should keep in mind that these *fetvās* and chronicles, commonly called as *Selim-nāme*, were written either under the rule of Selim or his son Süleyman. Second, they were, except for the *fetvā* of Hamza and perhaps of Kemalpaşazāde, written after the events somehow arrived at the final phase, after the Ottomans and *Sunni* interpretation of Islam gained victory against Shiite Ismail. Approaching the whole matter retrospectively influenced the Ottoman perception of the qizilbash phenomenon directly. One can hardly argue, for example, that in the autumn of 1513 Kemalpaşazāde’s mind was as clear as it was while he was writing his Defter IX in December 1516.

¹⁷¹⁴ *Riyâzü’s-Sâlihîn ve Tercemesi*, vol. 3, ed. Muhyiddîn-i Nevevî, translated into Turkish by Hasan Hüsni Erdem, Ankara: Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1991, pp. 145-6.

Selim-nāme authors unanimously narrates the early phase of Selim’s preparation for Persian campaign as if there was a complete agreement among the statesmen and scholars on the legitimacy of this campaign.¹⁷¹⁵ A closer scrutiny of some accounts, however, casts doubt on this supposition. As will be discussed below, when the *Selim-nāme* literature is carefully analyzed, taking the enthusiastic endeavor of the authors to legitimize Selim’s all actions into account, one gets the impression that the main stimulating force behind such religious stand of scholars was Selim’s resolute insistence and political aspirations. In other words, although the discussion seems to have been carried out on religious grounds, it was under the heavy influence of the political polarization. Thus, it is hard to assess these texts from a fully religious perspective. Rather, their political content or the governing political orientation behind these religious sanctions, should be examined carefully in order to understand the nature of the upcoming developments adequately.

8.2. ASSEMBLY OF EDİRNE: THE DECLARATION OF WAR

In Edirne, Sultan Selim summoned the members of the *divan*, statesmen, and the religious scholars to discuss the religious, political, military and provisional aspects of the coming campaign.¹⁷¹⁶ Şükrî vividly narrates this assembly. According to him, Selim

¹⁷¹⁵ IDRS says, for example, that all *ulemā* agreed that it was necessary, before all, to rid of the qizilbash evil, even to neutralize them was compulsory by religion (*vācip*) on Muslims. IDRS, p. 117.

¹⁷¹⁶ Şehabeddin Tekindağ, “Yeni Kaynak ve Vesikalrın Işığında Yavuz Sultan Selim’in İran Seferi”, *Tarih Dergisi*, sayı: 22, 1968, p. 57; TNSS, p. 33. HSE’s history includes subtle indications to this assembly (*divan*) in Edirne. See HSE4, p. 169. KPZ, who wrote his history only two years later (in 1516) and possibly was in Edirne in the winter of 1513-1514, interestingly does not mention this meeting. See Ahmet Uğur, *Kemalpaşa-zade İbn-Kemal*, Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1996, p. 13. For further reading on the life and works of Şemseddin Ahmed bin Süleyman bin Kemal Paşa (KPZ) see Mecdî Mehmed Efendi, *Şakaik-ı Nu’maniye ve Zeylleri*, c. I, haz. Abdülkadir Özcan, İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1989, pp. 381-385; ALI, pp. 1209-1216; Franz Babinger, “Kemālpashazāde”, *EI2*, p. 912; İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, “Kemāl Paşa Zāde”, *IA*, p. 561; Hayri Bolay, Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu, eds., *Şeyhülislām İbn Kemāl Sempozyumu*, Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989.

Selim, as reflected in Şükrî's account, not only underscores the religious heresy of Ismail and his followers but also depicts them as oppressors killing true Muslims, pillaging their properties, devastating Islamic monuments, and assaulting the great symbols of (*Sunni*) Islam.¹⁷¹⁹ He pictures Ismail as a great source of astray who pursued the path of evil and abandoned the order of Muhammad on Earth¹⁷²⁰; indeed, he was a

See SKB, pp. 137-8. Also consider YSF, who rephrases Selim's utterance in this *divan* as follows: "... İmdi bu peyâmdan netice-i meram budur ki şark diyârın serâser kabza-i tasarrufa alan Erdebilöğlü dedikleri habîs-i lebîs nesl-i vilâyet iddiasın ide. Evbaş kesîre baş olub, yevmen fe-yevm bağı savaşın eyleye. Şahlık tahtına lihak ve selâtin tahtına otak bağlamış, anın hûz u hurûf ve mürekkebât-ı tâ'tıl-ı şer' u tahlil-i muharremât üzere mebnî olduğundan gayri mensûbe-i şeytaniyye ile nice şahı mat idüb nısf-ı kâinata ahkâm yürütmüş. ... Ulemâ-i din ve fukahâ-i müsliminden anın hâli istihyâr ve ef'ali istifsâr olundukda nakilleri muvâfık, sözleri mutâbık **ol tâğî-i bâğinin zulm ü inâd ve küfre irtidâdın hükm idüb, demi helâl ve kutâli efdâl-i â'mal olduğuna fetvâ verdiler. İmdi ol zâlimin cevr-i kahırdan def' etmeye azm eyledim. Asker çeküb üzerine varmak isterim. Görek sizin dahi re'yiniz nedir? ...**" See YSF, pp. 135-9. HSE and SLZ follow similar line of narration. See HSE4, p. 170; SLZ2, pp. 14-15. Lütfi Paşa, the famous grand vizier of Süleyman I, re-phrases Sultan Selim's utterance as follows: "*Andan Sultan Selim devlet erkânlarını cem' idüb didi kim: "Ey benim can ve gönülden müridlerim! Sizlere bu (sic) nice sözüm vardur, gözünüzü ve kulağınızı benden yana tutun. Bir sözüm budur ki cibilletimde konulan şeca'at berk urub cenk arzusun ider ve düşmana yeryüzünü tenk (تنگ) eylemek diler. Ve bir sözüm dahi budur ki bu kadar mal ve menâl ve bu kadar esbâb ve bu kadar asker hayfâ kim bunlar şöylece hâli tura!* Böyle leşker, böyle haşmet kimde var Böyle meleket böyle kut kimde var
Hayf kim geçmiş Feridun yohsa ben Gösterürdüm âna bezm u encümen
Ve bir sözüm dahî budur ki çünki bize zullu'l-İlah ve sultan-ı ehl-i İslam diyü lakab komuşlardur niçun ehl-i İslam'a mu'în ve hevâdâr olmayavuz. Ve bir sözüm dahî budur ki Şah İsmail kanlumuzdur ki Sultan Ahmed oğlu Sultan Murad yanına varub sığındığı için katl eyledi. Ve'l-hâsil murad budur kim serdar-ı Acem Şeyh Haydar oğlu Şah İsmail rıfz mezhebin ihtiyâr idüb sünniler katlini gendüye ve gendü etbâ'î şeyâtin-rehberlerine helal görüb mescidleri ve medreseleri oda urub küfrün gayet revâcın virüb ve din-i İslamı gayet zelil idüb...Andan sonra Selim vüzerâsına emr idüb "Ceddümüz Sultan Muhammed zamanında (208) Hasan dırâz üzerine ne mikdâr yarak ile vardı ise siz bir nice ol kadar eylen!" diyü emr itdi." See Lütfi Paşa, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, haz. 'Âli, İstanbul, 1341, pp. 207-8. Also consider HSE4, pp. 169-170; TNSS, p. 33.

¹⁷¹⁹ Such Ottoman accusations of Shah Ismail are repeated by the Venetian sources, but of course in a praising manner in this case. A report from 1502 reads, for example, "Aming [Ismail's] notable acts, to show his contempt for the Muslim faith he brought horses into the Turkish mosques in [in Erzincan] and tied up dogs inside, and then he destroyed the mosques down to their foundations. He ordered the restoration of a Christian church, half ruined previously by the Turks, and adorned it in all solemnity. ... He ordered all the Muslim books to be burned, persuading the people that they must abandon the vain and false Muslim tenets and adore the living God. ..." Sanuto, I Diarii, 4: 485-9, quoted in Palmira Brummett, "The Myth of Shah Ismail Safavi: Political Rhetoric and 'Divine' Kinship", in *Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam*, edited by John Victor Tolan, New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1996, p. 342. Ludovico d'Varthema, another Venetian source writes, "[Ismail] was going through the country putting everywhere to fire and flame; and especially killed all those who believed in Bubachar [Abu Bakr] and Othman [Uthman] and Aumur [Umar]." Quoted in Brummett, p.343.

¹⁷²⁰ Similarly in his letter (*fetih-nâme*), which was written after the battle of Çaldıran, to Süleyman, Selim narrates the prelude of the battle as follows: "Before embarking the battle, I have sent my messengers to Ismail who declared him his fallacious faith. They also affirmed that the rightly guided religious scholars agreed on his blasphemy and issued sanctions for the execution of him and his followers. I have informed him on that because of above-mentioned reasons, cleaning his dirty presence from the surface of earth

supporter of *küfr* and made the symbol of *küfr* the *tāc* (hat) on his head.¹⁷²¹ To sum up, Selim describes Ismail and his movement as a great fire of *fitne* within the world of Islam; and underlines that it was compulsory duty (*farz-ı ‘ayn*) on the Muslim rulers to extinguish this fire.¹⁷²² It is rather meaningful that Selim compares Ismail and his followers with Ye’cüc while presents himself as Alexander.¹⁷²³ Selim argues, as Şükrî rephrases, that the Muslims living in the territories under Ismail’s rule were suffering from oppression and demanding to take them into his realm of justice. Thus, Selim presents his campaign on the qizilbashs as a revenge of Muslims who suffered from Ismail’s oppression (*zulm*). In doing so, his aim was obviously to present his battle against Ismail as a religious duty for the sake of the whole Islamic world.¹⁷²⁴

became inevitable for me [for I am the sultan of Muslims.] But before using my sword I offer him the religion of Islam once more. If he would repent of his malicious actions, convert to Sunni Islam, and recognize all the land that my horse trampled until now as Ottoman land then he will see nothing but help and kindness from my state.” See Feridun Bey, pp. 358-9. (I have not translated whole the text *mot à mot* but summarized it.) As clearly reflected in this official document, Ottoman state did not regard Safavids within the borders of Islam. The same attitude is quite apparent in other *fetih-nāmes* of Çaldıran as well.

¹⁷²¹ For a similar description of Shah Ismail and his followers see Hadîdî, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman (1299-1523)*, haz. Necdet Öztürk, İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1991, pp. 385-6.

¹⁷²² Indeed, Ottoman historians unanimously depict the qizilbashs as oppressors tyrannizing the Muslim population. See, for example, IDRS, p. 120. Interestingly, more or less the same depiction was made by the qizilbashs of Anatolia about the Ottomans, who forced them to change their traditional way of life. Idris-i Bitlisî states that the brilliant temporal success of Ismail excited his enthusiastic disciples to such an extent that they began to deem Ismail as a divine being. See IDRS, p. 122.

¹⁷²³ SKB’s account truly reflects the perception of the Ottoman intelligentsia of the matter. Meanwhile, one feels legitimate in questioning whether or not this account could reflect true attitude and thought of Selim for it might well be the fabrication of SKB to a certain extent. Although Şükrî-i Bitlisî was in the Ottoman Palace by the last years of Bayezid II (See İsmail Hami Danişmed, *İzahlı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, c. 2, İstanbul, 1971, p. 22.) and participated in many events he narrated in his *Selim-nāme*, his contribution may not be disregarded. But still, considering the actions of Selim from his governorship of Trebizond to the Mamluk campaign carefully, it would be recognized that Selim was the real architecture who made the Islamic scholars to construct such a perception of Ottomans – and Safavids of course. For Şükrî’s life and works see Mustafa Argunşah, “Giriş: Şükrî-i Bitlisî’nin Hayatı ve Şahsiyeti”, in Şükrî-i Bitlisî, *Selim-nāme*, haz. Mustafa Argunşah, Kayseri, 1997, pp. 3-36.

¹⁷²⁴ For a similar but concise account see ALI, p. 1073. Another contemporary author, Mahremî reports the situation in a similar manner. See Hatice Aynur, “Tavalalı Mahremî’s Shehnâme and the Kızılbaş”, in *Syncretismes et hérésies dans l’Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIVe-XVIIIe) siècle. Actes du Colloque du Collège de France, octobre 2001*, ed., Gilles Veinstein, Paris, 2005, 237-48. Beldiceanu-Steinherr argues, however, that the persecution of Selim I was not primarily because he declared himself the guardian of sunnism but because he had to keep the integrity of the empire, which was under serious threat by

Idrīs also emphasizes this point and states that since there was no other Islamic power to stop Ismail's tyranny on Muslim societies, the Ottoman Empire was the only sunni state able to stop this torrent of heresy. Thus, Idrīs suggests, that it was the only way for Selim to wage campaign on the qizilbashs for the sake of not only the Ottoman Empire but also the whole Islamic world.¹⁷²⁵ With such a strategy, Selim would kill two birds with one stone: one was to secure the legitimacy of his campaign's religious ground. Likewise, he says, in Şükri's account, that because of Ismail's and his followers' wrongdoings and perversity, the *ulemā* issued sanctions authorizing Muslims to murder them.¹⁷²⁶ Selim's other concern pertained to the developments in the aftermath of the campaign. He declared himself as the savior of Sunni Islamic world for he would finish a heretic power within Islam. As will be delineated, the first letter of Selim to Ismail was exactly constructed on this ideological background and was an excellent manifesto of Selim's self-image he desired to establish.

There is evidence proving Selim's success in this attempt. A fervent Sunni scholar, Fazlullah Ruzbihan b. Khunjī's two entreaties to Sultan Selim may potentially reflect the sultan's image in the Sunni Muslim world outside the Ottoman realm. Fazlullah was the court historian of Yakub Beg Akkoyunlu until the latter's death in 1490. Being an ardent enemy of shi'ite Safavids, he observed the rise of Ismail with great anxiety. Following the intense civil war between Akkoyunlu princes, he left Azerbaijan in 1490. After spending ten years in Kâşân, he went to Khorasan finding homage at the court of Muhammed Shaybanī Khan. He spent rest of his life in Khorasan

numerous fragmented heterodox groups. See Beldiceanu-Steinherr, "Le règne de Selim Ier: tournant dans la vie politique et religieuse de l'empire ottoman", p. 42.

¹⁷²⁵ IDRS, p. 122.

¹⁷²⁶ This aspect of the issue will be further evaluated below.

under Shaybanī patronage and died in Buhara in 1521.¹⁷²⁷ His works in a variety of fields shows that Khunjī regarded Safavids a great peril against Sunni world and fervently provoked Sunni rulers to get rid of this peril. His depiction of Ismail's ancestors, which no doubt steered Yakub Beg, is already examined. Nonetheless, the Akkoyunlu dynasty was destined to vanish under the hooves of the qizilbash horses. When emerged as a great military power in Azerbaijan and Iran in the first decade of the sixteenth century, Ismail faced two great Sunni enemies: Ottomans in the west and Uzbeks in the East. After Azerbaijan and Iran fell under shi'ite rule, Khunjī first went to the Uzbek court. Nevertheless, Shah Ismail managed to defeat Uzbeks in 1510. This defeat must have seriously eroded Khunjī's dreams pertaining to Uzbeks Khans.

On the other hand, Selim's victory made Khunji so happy that after four years he wrote two poems - one in Persian and the other in Turkish - praising Sultan Selim.¹⁷²⁸ Khunji openly addresses Selim as the only protector of the Muslim world and the deputy (*halife*) of Allah and Muhammed.¹⁷²⁹ He repeatedly describes Selim as Zülkarneyn of Islam and the savior of Muslims (*Mehdi-yi Sahib-zaman*).¹⁷³⁰ In his poems (one may regard these works as letters of petition or entreaties), Khunjī not only praises Selim and his great victory against the 'enemy of true religion', but also incites him to re-march on Ismail in order to eliminate the problem and to conquer whole Persia and Khorasan. He

¹⁷²⁷ For the life, deeds, and work of Fazlullah Ruzbihan b. Khunjī, see Derya Örs, *Fazlullah b. Ruzbihān-i Huncī ve Tārih-i 'Ālem-ārāy-i Emīnīsi*, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara Üniversitesi, 1999, pp. 23-40; Gülşen Seyhan Alışık, "Fazlullah b. Rūzbihān-i Huncī'nin Yaşamı ve Yavuz Sultan Selim Han'a Yazdığı Türkçe Manzum Yakarışı", *Modern Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, cilt 2, sayı 4, Aralık 2005, 70-87.

¹⁷²⁸ These letters are recorded by Feridun Beg and Idris-i Bitlisī. See Feridun Beg, pp. 367-369; IDRS, pp. 125-30.

¹⁷²⁹ Feridun Beg, p. 368; IDRS, p. 126.

¹⁷³⁰ Feridun Beg, p. 368-9; IDRS, p. 126-29.

advises Sultan Selim that the ‘red-cap’ is like a poisonous snake - if you would not crush its head you could not get the result.¹⁷³¹

Clear enough in Khunji’s entreaties, hence, that he regarded Sultan Selim as the only hope against the rising qizilbash threat to the Sunni world. One might feel legitimized to extend this exemplary case to many other Muslim scholars outside the Ottoman country. Accordingly, after defeating Ismail in 1514, he gained such a great prestige in the eyes of the Sunni world that nobody within the *ulemā* circles could show resistance against his campaign on Sunni Mamluks, at the end of which he carried the symbolic leadership of the whole Islamic world to Istanbul.¹⁷³²

At the end of his speech, Selim clearly put forward his idea that it was urgently necessary to wage war on the Shah and to extirpate this mortal evil forever. Then he demanded the opinions of the present statesmen and scholars, expecting his ideas to be approved. Nevertheless, they were not as sure as Selim was. Although Selim repeated his question twice, no response came. It was only the third time that a law-ranking Janissary soldier stepped forward and said,

Hakk Celle ve ‘Alā pādişāhımızın ömrünü dırāz ve lütf u ihsānını ‘ibādına hātır-sāz ve iltifāt-ı bī-girānını çāker-efrāz eylesin, ki pādişāhımız ruh-ı revāndır. Anlardan ayrı düşen leşker māned-i cism-i bī-candır. Zāt-ı şerifleri gibi yegāne pādişāhı āllahdan isterdük. Bu kadar bir nev-civān ve pir-tedbir ferzāne

¹⁷³¹ Feridun Beg, p. 367; IDRS, p. 125.

¹⁷³² Edward Browne has truly pointed out Selim’s intention of becoming the supreme head of Islamic world in his combat against ‘heretic’ Shah Ismail, “For Sultan Selim was what is now called a Pan-Islamist, and his ambition was to be not merely the Sovereign of the greatest and most powerful Muhammadan State, but the supreme head of the whole Muslim world. His conquest of Egypt and the Holy Cities of Mecca and Madina in 1517, and his assumption of the title of caliph, which, whether by threats or promises, or a combination of the two, he induced the last titular Abbāsīd Caliph to surrender to him, might well have given him this position but for Shah Isma’īl and the barrier of heterodox which he had erected between the Turks, Egyptians and other Sunnis to the West and their fellow-believers to the East in Transoxiana, Afghānistān, Balūchistān and India. The Persians not only refused to recognize Sultan Selim as Caliph, but also repudiated the whole theory of Caliphate.” BRW, p. 24. For claims of Sultan Selim to universal legitimacy also see Karen M. Kern, *The Prohibition of Sunni-Shi’i Marriages in the Ottoman Empire: A Study of Ideologies*, Unpublished PhD. dissertation, Columbia University, 1999, pp. 54-58.

pādişāhımız ola, nat'-ı zeminde Şāh evine at sürsek dir idik, li'llāhi'l-hamd duāmız kabul oldu ve nāvek-i recāmız pūte-i icābete vusūl buldu. Fermān Hūdāvendigārındur, şimdi buyursun şimdi gidelim, her ne zamanda teveccüh kılursa emrine ita'at idelim.¹⁷³³

'Ali records that upon hearing these words from a low-ranking janissary who earned only nine *akçe ulūfe*, the Sultan generously granted him the governorship of the *Sancak* of Selānik.¹⁷³⁴ According to 'Ali, why the statesmen and generals remained silent when Selim asked their opinions, was because of fear caused by the disposition of Selim. This sort of interpretation should be regarded, however, as an attempt of a later Ottoman court historian to clarify and to glorify the fame of Selim. In a similar vein, 'Ali mistakenly narrates as if this event occurred in Istanbul when Bayezid II was alive in Dimetoka.¹⁷³⁵

A similar account is recorded in Şükrī. On demanding their opinion, the statesmen did not present their answer immediately; rather they negotiated the issue among themselves. At the end they decided to consult the law of former sultans (*kanūn-ı selef*).¹⁷³⁶ Upon hearing their answer, Sultan Selim became rather annoyed and said that the former law was neither the word of God nor the deed of the Prophet (*sünnet*). Then he gave the unquestioned obedience of the qizilbashs to the Shah as an example stating that whatever the shah initiated, his adherents perceived it as law without doubt. Finally

¹⁷³³ ALI, p. . TNSS argues that this conversation takes place just after Selim's ascendance to the throne in the spring of 1512. See TNSS, p. 31. Nevertheless, as Hammer realizes, the context of events suggests that it must be during the *divan* of Edirne. See HAM2, p. 420.

¹⁷³⁴ ALI, p. 1074.

¹⁷³⁵ ALI, p. 1073.

¹⁷³⁶ The best way of interpreting this phrase seems to take it as the traditional law of Ottomans, which is called *örf*. As Halil İnalcık determines in his various works, Ottoman law was composed of two main branches: the religious law (*şeriat*) and the traditional or *sultanic* law which principally encompasses state affairs. See, for example, Halil İnalcık, "Şer'at ve Kanun, Din ve Devlet", in his *Osmanlı'da Devlet, Hukuk, Adâlet*, İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 2000, 39-46; "Osmanlı Hukukuna Giriş, Örfi- Sultanî Hukuk ve Fatih'in Kanunları, Siyasi İlimler ve Hukuk", *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 13, 1958, 102-126; "Adâletnâmeler", *Türk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi*, 11, 1965, 49-145.

he blamed the statesmen and the scholars for being enslaved by the law and ordered them to start the necessary preparations for the campaign ahead. Şükri's account reads,

Çün ekābir şah fermanın tamam / Dinledi 'arz itdi k'iy pür-ihtişām
Ceddünüz kânunun icrâ idelüm / Anların üslûbu üzre gidelüm
İş bu sözden hışm-nāk oldı ferid / Kakıdı a'yāna tünd ol ehl-i dīd
Kim bu kanūn u kavā'id ü sūbül / Gökten inmiş Hak kelāmı hod değül
Ne Resül'ün sünnetidür bī-hilāf / Ni bu güft u gūda vardur ihtilāf
Kendu devrinde ne ihdās itse Şah / Ol anun kânunudur bī-iştibāh
Devr anundur, emr anun, kanūn anun / Bahr anundur, berr anun, hāmūn anun
Her zaman bir sūret ile iktiza / Nef' virmez böyle demde mā-mezā
Uş bu kanūn-ı kavā'id bi't-tamām / Kim verüpdür nazm-ı eşyaya nizām
Âdemī-zād ihtirā'idür bu hep / Her tarīka bir farīk olmuş sebep
Siz hemān kanūn dip olmuşsuz esir / Kendü zātında habīr olsa vezir
.....
Bunda şart olan ferāsetdür hemin / Yok suver yā reng yā dība-yı Çin
İmdi sizde maslahat bābın açun / Defter-i tumār elkābın açun
İttifāk idün bu yolda bī-nifāk / Kim bozar tedbiri gayr-ı ittifāk¹⁷³⁷

These are only two accounts that leaked out through thick pro-Selim filters of the *Selim-nāme* authors. Nevertheless, even these leakages are enough to observe the reluctance of the leading statesmen to wage an all-out campaign on Shah Ismail. One can easily discern in these accounts that Selim's enthusiasm and resolution to handle the qizilbash problem with severe measures including violence was not shared by the members of the *divan* and the high ranking religious scholars. On the contrary, when the fact that these narrations are seriously manipulated versions of events in favor of Selim in which the 'unpleasant' elements were gravely tuned down is taken into account, it stands to reason to propose that there was a considerable resistance against Selim's radical policy.

However, after viziers realized Selim's firmly determinant attitude and became exposed to his wrath, the viziers and pashas had to approve of Selim's plans.¹⁷³⁸ Then,

¹⁷³⁷ SKB, p. 139.

¹⁷³⁸ SKB re-phrases their answer as follows:

orders were dispatched to local *qādis* and governors to start necessary preparations for a large-scale campaign.¹⁷³⁹ On March 20, 1514, Selim moved from Edirne to Istanbul.¹⁷⁴⁰ Hammer says that this divan was summoned three days before Selim’s departure from Edirne.¹⁷⁴¹

8.3. ASSEMBLY OF ISTANBUL: THE LEGITIMIZATION OF THE WAR

One can trace the change in the Ottoman attitude towards the *qizilbash* issue in the first decade of the fifteenth century through the phrases employed by scribes and historians. The word ‘*qizilbash*’ is used neither in imperial edicts nor in chapters of the Ottoman chronicles narrating the events of the year 1500. Rather they employed the word ‘*sufi*’ in order to refer to the disciples of Safavid order.¹⁷⁴² Kemalpaşazāde, for example, uses ‘*qizilbash*’ for the first time while narrating events of 911/1505 pertaining to the Ottoman-Safavid relations. He describes Ismail’ movement as fire of anarchy (*nār-ı fitne*) that extended to southern Iran (*vilāyet-i Fars*) and Iraq; and the majesty of the Shah augmented day by day. But he still does not employ any religious terminology.¹⁷⁴³ He also uses the same word while reciting Ismail’s campaign on Dulkadir in 913/1507. Here

“Söylediler şaha a’yân k’iy ferîd Bahtun eżzün ola ömrün ber-mezîd
Päs-bân-ı der-gehün bulsun mihir Sāye-i çetr-i felek-sāyun sipîhr
Seyr idüb döndükçe çarh-ı āsumân Ömrün olsun iy şeh-i sāhib-karân
Zāt-ı pākün hās u ‘ām için müdām Devlet ü baht ile tursun ber-devām
Padişahā emr ü ferman sendedür Biz kamu cismüz hemân can sendedür.” See SKB, pp. 139-40.

¹⁷³⁹ SKB, pp. 141-43; YSF, p. 44; ALI, p. 1075.

¹⁷⁴⁰ KPZ9, p. 95. According to IDRS, SKB, YSF, Lütü Paşa, HSE, and ALI, he moved on March 19. See IDRS, p. 145; SKB, p. 143; YSF, p. 44; Lütü Paşa, *Tevārih-i Āl-i Osman*, p. 208; HSE4, p. 174; ALI, p. 1076. HYDR claims, however, that Selim departed from Edirne on Tuesday, March 21, 1513. Regarding the starting day of the campaign HYDR recites an interesting anecdote. He says that “it was recited from Shah Ismail that according to sayings of Imams to begin a campaign on Tuesday is not appreciated. Sultan Selim ordered, on the other hand, to begin the campaign on Tuesday.” See HYDR, p. 59.

¹⁷⁴¹ See HAM2, p. 420. Hammer takes March 19 as the date of departure.

¹⁷⁴² In the imperial edicts delineated in Chapter V, the Safavid disciples are insistently referred as ‘*sufi*’; the word ‘*qizilbash*’ is not employed.

¹⁷⁴³ KPZ8a, p. 243.

also appears another word which would be frequently seen in later descriptions of the qizilbash by Ottoman writers: ‘*evbaş*’ which literally means vagrant.¹⁷⁴⁴ Kemalpaşazāde’s description of Ismail and his disciples further develops and gets closer to the official formulation of later Ottoman *ulemā*, which evolved in its final form during the reign of Selim I, in his narration of Ismail’s capture of Bagdad in 1508.¹⁷⁴⁵ He uses, for the first time, the words ‘*kızılbaş*’, ‘*gümrāh*’, and ‘*evbaş*’ together.¹⁷⁴⁶ This words would evolve into formulaic expression of the Ottoman religious scholars in a few years. Perhaps what is more significant is that Kemalpaşazāde firstly attributes ‘*rafaza*’¹⁷⁴⁷ to Ismail and his followers. He says that when Bagdad fell in the hands of Ismail only those who were supposed to pursue shi’ite faith avoided his wrath. He massacred Sunni population of the city.¹⁷⁴⁸ This is the last connotation attributed to the qizilbash identity in the eighth *defter* of Kemalpaşazāde’s *Tevārih*.

¹⁷⁴⁴ KPZ8a, p. 251.

¹⁷⁴⁵ The conquest of Baghdād and the occupation of ‘Iraq-i ‘Arab marked the final stage in the conquest by the Safavids of the former Aqqoyunlu territories. See Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safawid Power in Persia”, *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, p. 77.

¹⁷⁴⁶ KPZ8a, p. 277.

¹⁷⁴⁷ The connotation of this word is quite comprehensive and variable in Ottoman context. But still some consistent elements of meaning can be detected in almost all usages. First of all ‘*rafaza*’ associates with shi’ite connotations such as disregarding first three true chalips – especially first two – and Aisha, the wife of the Prophet, and exalting Ali and his offspring. In connection to the shi’ite content in its meaning ‘*rafada*’ also refers to religious heresy in Ottoman context.

¹⁷⁴⁸ “...geldi Bağdad’ı aldı. Ol sevād ābāda dahī nehr-i kahr ü bī-dādı saldı. Rafzla müttehem olanlar ehl-i bid’atdan hāli mübhem olanlar kurtuldular. Onlar ki, *eshāb-ı sünnet ü cem’atdılar gark-āb-ı ‘azābda boğuldılar. Māhi-yi āsār-ı bid’at olanların harmenini yile virüb, hāmī-i şī’ār-ı şeri’at olanları ol havālıden ayırub, Medinetü’s-selām Bağdad’ı ālām-ı İslām’dan hāli kıldı. Nūr-ı hidāyetün menba’ını zulmet-i dalāletle mālī kıldı. Ceyş-i bed-kāşī Bağdad’a bir iş itdi ki, şerha kâbil değil. Ol bī-dādların fesādların fesādların beyāna lisān mütehammil değil. ...*

Dil niçe şerh eylesün düşmenlerün bī-dādını

Yıkdılar dārü’s-selām u sulhun bünyādını

Niçe akmasun gözümün kanlu yaşı Dicle-vār

Leşker-i gam geldi yıkdı gönün Bağdādını.” See KPZ8a, p. 278.

In the very early years of the sixteenth century, the sufis were killed for political reasons, not on a religious ground.¹⁷⁴⁹ Differing from the term ‘qizilbash’, which connoted political disobedience and religious heresy together, ‘sufi’ was used to refer to anarchic adherents of Ismail. Here the reason for the punishment was the anarchy they caused but not their religious stand.¹⁷⁵⁰ The formulaic phrase repeated in all decrees is ‘*siyāseten salb itmek*’, executing by *raison d’Etat*. The description of sufis in these decrees and the judicial ground of punishment shed light on the stage of the qizilbash problem in the Ottoman Empire in summer of 1501. It is obvious from this archival evidence that the Ottoman approach to the problem was yet political. No religious heresies of these groups are addressed, but they are described as groups causing disorder and anarchy (*zümre-i tugāt ve tāife-i eşkıyā*).¹⁷⁵¹ As Gilles Veinstein put forward,

On ne saurait donc sous-estimer la conscience que, dès les tout débuts de Sâh Ismâ’îl, avant même l’intronisation de ce dernier, le sultan a au du péril qu’il faisait courir à l’ordre régional, déjà bien compromis, et au territoire même de l’Etat ottoman. Néanmoins, ce péril n’a pas encore acquis toute sa dimension politico-idéologique mais relève encore plutôt de l’anarchie tribale. Les choses, il est vrai, ne vont plus tarder à changer de sens.¹⁷⁵²

¹⁷⁴⁹ As mentioned earlier, the Ottoman law was divided into two main branches: the religious law (*şer’î hukuk*) and the sultan law (*örfî hukuk*). The status of the Safavid disciples was yet in the sphere of the sultan law.

¹⁷⁵⁰ For another assessment regard Veinstein, “Les premières mesures”, p. 231 and p. 233.

¹⁷⁵¹ Aşıkpaşazâde’s account which deviates from the general picture put forward by other sources should be mentioned here. Aşıkpaşazâde is the only Ottoman historian who evaluated early Safavid affairs not only in religious context but also in political one. As will be explored below, for the first time he mentions religious ordinances issued by religious scholars on the sufis of Ardabil. Indeed, Aşıkpaşazâde argues that the scholars of religion (*ulemā*) had already concluded that the adherents of this sufi order fell out of the true religious sphere, namely they became infidels. (See APZ, p. 249.) Kemalpaşazâde, for example, does not yet mention any religious heresy; he gives the reason of mass deportation as the banditry and disobedience of these sufis. (Solakzâde, however, follows APZ’s line. To him the reason was their heretic beliefs. “[Ismail’in] Yanına toplanmış bulunan mühlidlerin ekserisi Teke ve Hamid vilâyetinden olmakla, o memleketlerde, mutlaka râfizilik kokusuna bulaşmış olmaları ve mezhepsiz sayılmaları dolayısıyla Rumeli yakasına sürüldüler.” SLZ1, p. 429.) Aşıkpaşazâde’s account on the infidelity of Ardabil sufis during the early years of the sixteenth century is rather peculiar. No other Ottoman chronicles evaluate this problem in terms of religious discourse until Selim launched war on Safavids in 1514. The first *fetvâ* disclaiming the qizilbashes as unbelievers is known to be issued by a certain Hamza shortly before the Campaign of Çaldıran.

¹⁷⁵² Gilles Veinstein, “Les premières mesures”, p. 236.

Solakzāde states that Ismail made his soldiers wear red-caps after his ascendance to the throne in Tabriz. And thence his soldiers became famous for the epithet ‘qizilbash’.¹⁷⁵³ Solakzāde does not use this word in the former chapters of his history. We see similar explanations in other sources as well. A sixteenth-century anonymous history, for example, cites almost the same story. After capturing Tabriz, Ismail soon became one of the most majestic rulers of the era. He ordered all his men - his retinues, his bureaucrats, warriors, adherents of his father and grandfather – and all his subjects whether they were Muslim or Christian to wear red-caps (*kırmızı çuhadan taçlar*). Eventually, his followers and subjects were called ‘kızılbaş’. Ismail’s goal in doing so was to differentiate his men from the Ottomans.¹⁷⁵⁴ We know that the word “kızılbaş” was not initiated by Ismail, but by his father Shaykh Haydar. Then how should we interpret this false account repeated in relatively independent Ottoman sources? The answer must somehow be related to the ‘political’ connotation of the word ‘kızılbaş’ in the Ottoman context. Before appearing as a temporal power, Safavids and their disciples were simply ‘sufis’ in the eyes of the Ottoman officials. When they turned into a political rival, the term ‘sufi’ was replaced by ‘kızılbaş’.

It is understood from Ottoman sources that the epithet of ‘qizilbash’ achieved wide acceptance among Ottomans only after Ismail’s achievement of significant temporal power. Because of that, this term not only conveyed mystical connotations such as being spiritual devotees of the Safavid order for which the term ‘sufi’ had been

¹⁷⁵³ See SLZ1, pp. 428-9.

¹⁷⁵⁴ See ANMH, p. 39. This anonymous historical document was written in the sixteenth century, approximately one century before Solakzāde. On the other hand, a careful examination reveals that it evidently has a different stand from other ottoman chronicles. Thus, though still bearing discernible familial resemblances with Solakzāde and with other Ottoman chronicles, there are reasons to deem its account considerably independent than that of the established clichés in the Ottoman historiography of the sixteenth-century.

used until the temporal power of Ismail became a threat for the Ottoman rule but also included, at least as much as its mystical content, political and military connotations in the Ottoman context. Furthermore, the Ottoman historians and bureaucrats used to attach adjectives to the word: the most frequently used formulas are *kızılbaş-ı evbaş*, vagrant qizilbash, *kızılbaş-ı bed-ma'aş*, qizilbash living a bad way, *kızılbaş-ı bī-din*, qizilbash without a religion, *kızılbaş-ı melā'in*, damned qizilbash, qizilbash in *bid'at u dalāl*, *kızılbaş revāfiz-i bī-iman*, qizilbash who went astray and without faith. One would immediately realize the two prevailing themes in these adjectives: one is socio-political and the other is religious. First of all they are described as disobedient-vagrants, not recognizing the 'legitimate' authority of the Ottoman state and the damned people living in a bad way of life. A close analysis of the works of Ottoman *ulemā* such as Kemalpaşazāde and Celalzāde Mustafa shows that these descriptions actually reflect the attitude of the Ottoman elites towards the nomadic subjects of the empire. Secondly, there are still some other adjectives depicting the qizilbashes as heretics deviated from the true path of Islam, qizilbashes who went astray, and in some occasions as people without faith. Indeed, it was the combination of these two themes that constituted the 'Qizilbash Heresy' in the Ottoman context: the excellent marriage of the politico-militarism and the ghulat-shi'ite mysticism; in other words, the metamorphosis of the Safavid gnosis (*irfan*) in the Turkish tribal milieu.

Turning back to Sultan Selim's campaign, he arrived in Istanbul in ten days and pitched his tent on Filçayırı near the famous quarter of Eyüp.¹⁷⁵⁵ Here Selim again summoned an assembly of especially the high ranking *ulemā* this time. He demanded

¹⁷⁵⁵ IDRS, p. 145. Lütfi Paşa says that Sultan Selim stayed in this place for twenty two days. See Lütfi Paşa, *Tevārih-i Āl-i Osman*, p. 208.

their opinion about the legitimacy of his campaign from a religious point of view. To put it more directly, he demanded religious sanction for this campaign. Again, as reflected in almost all *Selim-nāmes*, Selim describes Ismail and his followers as in astray and underscores that he [Ismail] had been damaging the true path of Islam. His argumentation in demanding religious authorization for the execution of the qizilbashs was completely established on religious ground. If we rely on contemporary Ottoman historians, in this assembly he did not even mention the political threat posed by Ismail.¹⁷⁵⁶

As will be discussed later, within purely religious context, the qizilbashs' deeds seem to have not been enough to promulgate them in astray; thus to wage war against them – further, to kill a great number of the empire's own subjects - would not be approved easily, at least when compared to the treatment of the Ottoman administration to similar 'religiously divergent' groups devoid of political menace. The decision was obviously taken on a political ground, even though the issue was evaluated fully within the religious terminology.

¹⁷⁵⁶ SKB narrates the events in verse:

“... <i>Kondı Filçayıru üzre şehriyār</i>	<i>İtti yiğirmi iki gün anda karar</i>
<i>Bunda cem' itdi mevāli fırkasın</i>	<i>Rum ahālisin ü sāhib-kırkasın</i>
<i>Kādı vü müfti müderris bi't-tamam</i>	<i>Geldi dirildi efāzil hep be-nām</i>
<i>Uş bu āli zümreden itdi sual</i>	<i>Hüsrev-i gāzi şāh-ı ferhunde –fāl</i>
<i>K'iy mevāli şarka men azm itdüm uş</i>	<i>Hayr dip bir niyyet-i cezm itdüm uş</i>
<i>Şah İsmail tā itdi hurūc</i>	<i>Fıska feshat virdi isyana urūc</i>
<i>Bid'ati ām itdi vü İslamı ketm</i>	<i>Zulmü itmām itdi vü bī-dādı hatm</i>
<i>Her fesāda mazhar oldu ol farīk</i>	<i>Koydular zulm ü dalālet-çün tarīk</i>
<i>İlm ü şer' ü fi'l ü har ü sarf ü nahv</i>	<i>Bunların devrinde yek-ser oldu mahv</i>
<i>Sünnet ü icmā ü Kur'an u kıyās</i>	<i>Sürhā-serden giydi gün-a-gün libās</i>
<i>Hill ü hürmet farkı ma'düm oldu hep</i>	<i>Küfr ile eşyayı yakdı bu Leheb</i>
<i>Katl-i nefis ü sebb-i sühān-ı vebāl</i>	<i>Küfr ü kin āsarı ya'ni tēc-ı āl</i>
<i>Uş buna mānend evsāf-ıla Şah</i>	<i>Muttasıfđur şah u hem Şāmi-sipāh</i>
<i>İmdi katl ü mālna fetvā virün</i>	<i>İzn-i şer' birle istiftā virün</i>
<i>Ger gazādur izn ü ruhsat hükm idün</i>	<i>Mal u esbābın ganīmet hükm idün</i>
<i>V'er hatā ise irādet virünüz</i>	<i>Bir heves itdüm icāzet virünüz ...”</i>

YSF, pp. 44-45.

It is clear that Selim had already started the preparations for the campaign when he summoned religious scholars and demanded the religious sanction. This assembly could not have any influence on the intension of Selim for he had already taken his decision firmly. This assembly of Istanbul was simply a tool for providing a legitimate religious ground and preparing the public opinion for the upcoming campaign and for the persecution of the Anatolian qizilbash. As I have already indicated, Selim had well clarified his mind regarding the qizilbash affair even before the assembly in Edirne.

It should be pointed out that the two assemblies in Edirne and Istanbul seem to have been different in content. Although some sources state that Selim summoned all prominent statesmen and religious scholars in Edirne assembly, the way the issue was discussed and the demand of Selim at the end, suggest that this assembly focused on political facet of the issue. Indeed, Selim's utterances in this meeting were quite alike with what he said to *ulemā* in Istanbul assembly. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that they discussed the religious ground of the affairs. As it is well-known, religion and politics were so much intermingled in the Middle Ages that one could hardly deduce the dominant incentive only from the utterance; rather in order to penetrate into the true nature and content of any utterance, one should regard the broader framework and the context as well. In the assembly of Edirne, after declaring the heretic stand of Ismail, Selim explained his decision and demanded their opinion on the matter. (*Asker çeküp üzerine varmak isterim. Görek sizing dahī re'yiniz nedür?*).¹⁷⁵⁷ The answer leaves no doubt that his primary audience was statesmen and the issue was being evaluated on political ground.¹⁷⁵⁸ Indeed, Şükri does not mention the religious scholars but only refers

¹⁷⁵⁷ YSF, p. 43.

¹⁷⁵⁸ As I have delineated above, they offered to consult to the traditional law (*örf*).

to the statesmen as participants of this assembly.¹⁷⁵⁹ Idrīs also mentions two distinct assemblies before the campaign: first he summoned statesmen and generals to discuss the political and military aspects, and then the religious scholars.¹⁷⁶⁰

After ‘persuading’ his viziers and pashas to wage a campaign against Shah Ismail, Selim needed to get the approval of the religious law. It must have been because of that that he summoned a second assembly in Istanbul only thirteen days after the first one to discuss the campaign on Iran. Idrīs states clearly that upon securing the approval of begs and soldiers, Selim summoned a second assembly which was attended by the prominent religious scholars of the time.¹⁷⁶¹ Thus, the focus in this second assembly was, as contemporary sources unanimously agreed on, to clarify the religious ground of such an operation within the realm of Islam. Likewise, after referring to Ismail’s deeds as contrary to the Islamic law and Sunni doctrine, Selim directly demanded religious sanction from the present *ulemā*.¹⁷⁶²

Contemporary authors unanimously reports that, dissimilarly with the former assembly, Selim’s demand was immediately accepted and performed quite willingly by the scholars. Kemalpaşazāde, who was one of the participants in most of the events that he recorded in his history journal completed in 1516, narrates the assembly of scholars in Filçayırı as follows,

... Ol makam-ı rahat-encāmda [Filçayırı] birkaç gün ārām olundukdan sonra āli divan olub, ol ‘asrda cādde-i şeri’atde sābit-kadem ve ehl-i sūnnet ü cemā’at

¹⁷⁵⁹ “*Edrene tahtında Şāh-ı ser-firāz Paşalar gelsün didi dergāhuma*

İtti rūşen-rāy ifşā-yı rāz

Bir sözüm var hassā devlet-hāhuma” SKB, p. 135. SKB records that when Selim called the viziers and pashas to the assembly, the grand vizier Hersek-oğlu Mustafa was ill and lying in bed. But the sultan insisted on his participation since the issue was very crucial.

¹⁷⁶⁰ IDRS, p. 123. IDRS does not specifies, however, that the first assembly was summoned in Edirne while the second in Istanbul.

¹⁷⁶¹ IDRS, p. 123. Also consider TNSS, p. 39.

¹⁷⁶² His audience, thus, was evidently the prominent *ulemā* of the empire rather than the statesmen.

arasında kalem-i fetvā ile ve ‘ālem-i takvā ile müsellemler ve mukaddem olan mevālī divana da’vet olundu. Kızılbaş-ı evbāş ta’ifesinin muhārebesi hususī söyleşilüb, muktazā-yı şeri’at nidüğü istiftā kılınub, bu maslahat müşāvere olındı. Anlar dahī rāy-ı sevāb icmā’ idüb bu cevābı müstetābı tahrīr itdiler ki: “Her kim, ol dāll ü mudille intisāb ide, ve ruhsat virdüğü ef’āle irtikāb ide, mübāhı mübahu’d-demdür. Cem’in tefrīk ve eşyā’ını temiz itmek gerek, sā’ir harbī kāfirlerden anlarunla muhārebe ehemm ü akdemdür. A’vān u ensārı sā’ī-yi fesāddur. Her ne diyārda ve bilādda var ise emān virmeyüb helāk itmek gerek. Ayet ü hadīs hükmiyle āmil olub vech-i arzı ol habīslerün levs ü revs-i ilhādından pāk itmek gerek.” ... Sultān-ı İslām ol mālīk-i ezimme-i ahkām olan ulemā-yı a’lāmun fetvāları muktezāsınca ‘amel idüb, ol ‘azīm-i kadīmle ‘azm-i rezmi tesmīm eyledi. ...¹⁷⁶³

If we rely on Kemalpaşazāde, and other contemporary *Selim-nāme* authors, Selim did not meet any opposition in the second assembly from the *ulemā*. On the contrary, they (the *ulemā*) not only issued the religious sanction legitimizing war against Ismail and his adherents but also encouraged him to extirpate these malicious people from the face of the earth.¹⁷⁶⁴ Idrīs deems, for example, the proliferation of the qizilbashs as the greatest discord (*fitne*) in the world.¹⁷⁶⁵ If we rely on Idrīs, the *ulemā* of the time unanimously claimed that for the ruler of Muslims, scattering the qizilbashs was more urgent than fighting with unbelievers.¹⁷⁶⁶ To sum up, according to the Ottoman chroniclers, all religious scholars agreed on the necessity of waging a war on

¹⁷⁶³ KPZ9, pp. 96-97.

¹⁷⁶⁴ For example, SKB follows the same line of argument with KPZ and writes,

“Yek-ser ehl-i ilm virdiler cevab	K’iy emirü’l-mü’mīn devlet-me’āb
Bunda yokdur zann u yā reyb ü güman	Müttefikdür cümle ilm ehli ‘ayān
Ger cihād-ı a’zam ister təcüdār	Uş ganimet uş gazā olsun süvār
Çün cevab aldı mevāliden Selim	Ber-murād oldu ahāliden Selim
Geldi dirildi tamam ālāt-ı ceng	Cübbe cevşen gürz-ile top u tüfeng.”

See SKB, p. 144.

¹⁷⁶⁵ See IDRS, p. 116.

¹⁷⁶⁶ IDRS, p. 123. IDRS gives an example from Ebu Bekir, a companion of the Prophet, while reasoning this argument. He says that it was already decided to conquer Damascus and to wage *cihad* against unbelievers shortly before the death of the Prophet. However, upon the revolt of Museyleme el-Kezzāb with prophetic claims, Ebu Bekir, in consultation with Umar and Ali, changed the priority marching on Museyleme. Thus, handling the *fitne* within the realm of Islam is always prior to performing *cihad* against external enemies. For similar arguments see CLZ, p. 209. In one of his *fetvās*, Ebussuud Efendi also refers to the same decision of Ebu Bekir in explaining the priority of handling the qizilbash problem. See Manuscript, *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi*, Esad Efendi, no. 3542, fols. 46a-47a. Also see Eberhard, pp. 166-7; Ertuğrul Düzdağ, *Şeyhülislām Ebussuud Efendi’nin Fetvalarına Göre Kanunî Devrinde Osmanlı Hayatı*, İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2006, pp. 134-6, *fetvā* 481.

the qizilbashs and dispersing them in order to save Muslims from a great oppression.¹⁷⁶⁷

Considering the report of Ali bin Abdülkerim Halife, it is clear that some members within the *ulemā* class who were vigorously advocating the suppression of this ‘heretic’ movement by all means possible had already emerged. But still one feels legitimate in feeling doubtful about the picture of the attitudes of the contemporary *ulemā* by *Selim-nāme* authors. As indicated earlier, their writing retrospectively should be discerned in this picturing as well as their writing under the patronage of Selim, who had then already accomplished the victor, or of his son Süleyman. Of course, within available sources, it is not possible to determine whether or not any opposition to the sanction came out from among the *ulemā* class, and if so to what extent. What we can be sure of is, however, that they felt the heavy pressure of Selim’s despotic, ruthless, and determined personality on all the decisions both *ulemā* and statesmen took. When writing the events years later, the influence of this pressure which was rather augmented was profoundly reinforced by the psychology of adherence to one party in a fierce and sharp religio-political confrontation. Consequently, one should be careful in assessing the attitude of the Ottoman religious circles toward the qizilbash problem and read these accounts by tuning down the religious sharpness or intolerance to a certain extent, realizing the political stimulus behind this seemingly religious approach.

According to Kemalpaşazāde, Selim first demanded religious sanction from *ulemā* in Istanbul assembly, 13 days later than the start of the campaign. In the

¹⁷⁶⁷ Tekindağ, differently from the author of the present study, refutes KPZ’s record which states that Selim obtained the religious approval from the *ulemā* in Istanbul, and argues that the religious sanctions were issued before the assembly of Istanbul. See Tekindağ, “Yavuz Sultan Selim’in İran Seferi”, p. 57, footnote 33.

meantime, Şükrî says, some *ulemā* had already issued religious sanction for the execution of the qizilbashes before Selim summoned the first assembly in Edirne.¹⁷⁶⁸ During the declaration of his decision to his viziers and pashas in Edirne, Selim referred, as Şükrî narrates, to certain *fetvā(s)* which were authorizing the persecution (*katl*) Ismail and his followers. Şükrî's account runs, “*Katline fetvā veribdür ehl-i din.*”¹⁷⁶⁹ Regarding his long descriptions even in a detail of events throughout his history, Şükrî's reference to the religious sanction only with one short sentence suggests that he was not inclined to stress the religious facet of the issue, at least in Edirne assembly. Moreover, he does not clarify when and by whom this *fetvā* was issued. Whether he expressed the shared

¹⁷⁶⁸ Although not specifying a date, HSE seems to have pursued similar view. He mentions the religious sanction issued by the doctors of the religious law just before narrating Selim's first assembly in Edirne. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that HSE wrote his history more than half a century later than the events, it is not of little probability that he might have mistakes in chronological order of the events. Furthermore, as already pointed out, *Selim-nāme* authors had been proved to show zealous enthusiasm to create a legitimate ground for Selim's unruly and daring practices. One of the best examples of such efforts is recorded in *Tacut'-tevārih*. HSE says that “once at the presence of Sultan Süleyman, İbrahim Paşa, one of Sultan Suleyman's grand viziers, asked me, ‘Our sultan has objections to some practices of his father; could you explain the reasons of his controversial practices?’ Then the sultan himself said, ‘We are not in a position to oppose the decisions of the majesty (Sultan Selim); but you should express your doubt!’” After mentioning three controversial practices of Sultan Selim in order to answer the question asked by İbrahim Paşa - killing and imprisoning the qizilbash envoys, marrying Ismail's wife to another man, and appropriating goods of merchants - HSE brings explanations for each practice clearly attempting to advocate Selim. (See HSE4, pp. 212-25.) From this point of view, one might regard his reference to the *fetvā* just before the assembly of Edirne as a part of legitimizing efforts. By doing so, HSE as well as some other Ottoman historians aimed without a doubt to stress that the campaign of Çaldıran and the large-scale persecution of Muslim subjects during this campaign were not because of Selim's political ambition but chiefly because of the religious incumbency put on his soldiers by the *ulemā*. Likewise, HSE does not mention the *fetvā* in other parts of his history. See HSE4, p. 169.

¹⁷⁶⁹ SKB, p. 138. Also regard YSF, p. 43. It reads, “...*Ulemā-i din ve fukahā-i müsliminden anın hāli istihyār ve ef'ālī istiḫsār olundukda nakilleri muvāfık, sözleri mutābık ol tāği-i bāğinin zulm ü inād ve küfre irtidādın hükm idüb, demi helāl ve kitāli efdāl-i ā'mal olduğuna fetvā verdiler.* ...” Here a peculiarity of *Selim-nāme* literature that I insistently underscore appears evidently. YSF's history was the re-edited version of SKB's text in prose. In the text of SKB's *Selim-nāme* only the sentence “*Katline fetvā veribdür ehl-i din*” is recorded pertaining to the religious sanction. SKB's expression is quite vague and not sharpened. However, as clearly seen, YSF expands this one sentence and adds supplementary expressions, which creates an impression that Selim consulted the prominent religious scholars of the time and received full authority to kill the qizilbashes. This provides a good example to the argument, which I follow, that as time went on, the minds of Ottoman scholars got clearer and parallel to the advent of events and their judgments gained sharpness (regarding the qizilbash affairs). What we read for the most part are, unfortunately, the products of the clarified and sharpened minds, which were written down after the battle of Çaldıran. Consequently, it is very difficult to penetrate into the true attitudes of the Ottoman religious scholars during the eve of the great clash.

sentiments among the Ottoman elite or referred to a written *fetvā* is not clear in his narration. Nevertheless when the whole chapter is taken into account, one feels that he simply explains a general tendency rather than a signed *fetvā* text. He might even have fabricated this information later, when writing his history.

Celalzāde states that upon Selim's declaration of his intention to wage war against Ismail, the attended statesmen and begs unanimously agreed upon this idea by stating that they (the qizilbashs) were worse than unbelievers for the realm of Islam and Ottomans. Then they decided to ask the religious dimension of the issue to the religious scholars. For this purpose the 'ālim who was the *müfti'l-müslimin* at the time was asked the legitimacy of such a war from the point of religion. In his answer, the *müfti'l-müslimin* sanctioned this war.¹⁷⁷⁰ Unfortunately, Celalzāde does not clearly indicate who the *müfti'l-müslimin* was.¹⁷⁷¹

Indeed, since the reign of Selim, a considerable literature of heresiography disclaiming the faithlessness of the qizilbashs down to the nineteenth century appeared. Almost all the *fetvās* and treatises dealing with the qizilbash issue, however, trace back two *fetvās*/treatises issued in the first quarters of the sixteenth century: one is the famous *fatva* of a certain Hamza and the other being the treatise (*risāle*) of Kemalpaşazāde. Both texts are dedicated to prove the fallaciousness of the qizilbash path of religion, to justify

¹⁷⁷⁰ “... mādām ki ol tāyifenin bu sebīle sülükleri olub, tārīk-ı dalāletden tevbe ve inābetleri olmiya, her vechile küffār-ı hāksārdan eşedd ve eşerr, min cemī'i'l-vücūh füccār-ı nār-kārdan edall ve ebterlerdir' deyü tafsīl-i kelām idicek sāmī'ine mecāl kalmayub cümlesi ol cānibe 'azīmet ma'kul ve makbuldür didiler. Ba'zı erbāb-ı savāb bu rāyı müstahsen görüb işareleri ana münceci oldı ki, bu husus a'lemü'l-'ulemādan sual, müfti-i din-i mübīnden fetvā olına. Ana binaen bu suret-i ahvāl tesdīd olunub ol tarihte müfti'l-müslimin olan 'ālimden istiftā idiler. Selātin-i şer'-āyinin teveccüh-i müveccehleri ol tāyife üzerine olamak meşru' idüğüün cevāb virdiler. ...” CLZ, pp. 209-210.

¹⁷⁷¹ One further point to be noted here is that although CLZ's arrangement of events, namely first taking the political decision and then providing religious sanction, is congenial to the accounts of SKB and KPZ, when writing his history half a century later than events, he was, most likely to make a mistake regarding the timing and the location of the second event, i.e. providing the religious sanction. As already delineated, Selim assembled religious scholars in Istanbul, when the campaign had already started. Yet CLZ narrates as if both events had taken place in Edirne, before the beginning of the campaign.

waging war against them and to kill them individually. Later treatises and *fetvās*, among which are those of famous Ebussuud Efendi, followed these two *fetvās*, especially the treatise of Kemalpaşazāde, in essence.

Unfortunately neither the *fetvā* of Hamza nor the treatise of Kemalpaşazāde is dated. Their content and style suggest, however, that Hamza's *fetvā*¹⁷⁷² must have been the first text of the Ottoman heresiography literature pertaining to the qizilbash.¹⁷⁷³ According to Şahabeddin Tekindağ, this *fetvā* was most probably issued in 1511 or 1512. His conclusion derives from the impression he got from an additional note attached to the main text of *fetvā*. To him, the inscription at the end of E 6401 suggests that the *fetvā* was presented to Yahya Pasha, who was the *beylerbey* of Anatolia in 1508, and includes implication to the Şahkulu rebellion.¹⁷⁷⁴ Nevertheless, his argument needs further clarification and correction. Firstly, Yahya Pasha's name is followed with the phrase 'rahimallahu te'āla', which is generally, though not exclusively, used for dead people. Secondly, according to this note, the *fetvā* was issued after Yahya Pasha's campaign on the qizilbash (*ba'de hiyni's-sefer ile'l-Erdebiliyyin el-malā'in*)¹⁷⁷⁵; but it does not indicate how much later. Lastly, this note is seemingly a later addition to the original document for i) the inscription is clearly different from that of the main text, ii)

¹⁷⁷² There are several copies of this *fetvā*. Three copies are housed in TSA with document numbers E. 6401, E 5960, and E 12077. The first one was published by Tekindağ in 1968 and all three were republished by Tansel one year later. See Tekindağ, "Yavuz'un İran Seferi", pp. 54-55 and appendix; TNSS, pp. 35-36 and appendix. At the end of all three texts, the name 'Hamza' is inscribed. But at the end of E. 6401 it reads, 'el-Müfti ez'afu'l-ibād Hamza el-fakir eş-şehir bi-Sarıgürz (Sarugörez)'.

¹⁷⁷³ Apart from the *fetvās* of Ebussuud, a number of *fetvās* and treatises proclaiming the qizilbashes as in astray appeared since the middle of the sixteenth century. For example, for four treatises dealing with this issue in the second half of the sixteenth century, namely those of al-Nahjuvānī, al-Sirvānī, Mirza Mahdūm, and Mutahhar, see Elke Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften*, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970, pp. 53-61.

¹⁷⁷⁴ Tekindağ, "Yavuz'un İran Seferi", p. 55.

¹⁷⁷⁵ As already delineated, Yahya Pasha was dispatched with Rumelian troops and 4000 Janissaries to protect the eastern borders of the Empire against Shah Ismail during the latter's campaign on Dulkadir in 1507.

it repeats the name of the author, although it is separately written by the original pen. At the end of the original text, it reads, “*harrarahū az’āfu’l-‘ibād Hamza el-fakīr*”. On the other hand, the additional note begins with the phrase, “*ve’l-müftī az’āfu’l-‘ibād Hamza el-fakīr eş-şehir bī-Sarıgürz*”.

On the other hand, a close study of the text of the *fetvā* suggests that it was written in order to justify the war against Shah Ismail as *cihād*. During the Şahkulu rebellion there was no need for such a religious sanction since qizilbashs were perceived as rebels; therefore, persecuting them was obviously not problematic from the religious point of view. Hamza’s *fetvā* declares that scattering their community is both ‘*farz*’ and ‘*vācib*’ for Muslims; whoever dies on the Muslim side is a martyr and will go to paradise while their deaths will be in depths of the hell. Hamza also proclaims that the Sultan of Islam should kill their men while dividing their women, children, and property among Muslim soldiers as booty.¹⁷⁷⁶ From these expressions, it is clear enough that Hamza’s sanction was to prepare a religious ground for the upcoming campaign of Selim against Shah Ismail. Consequently, it must be issued after the summer of 1513, when Selim secured his throne eliminating and executing Ahmed and the other males of the royal line. According to Selāhattin Tansel, Hamza authored this *fetvā* upon Selim’s demand from the *ulemā* in Edirne.¹⁷⁷⁷ If we accept this assumption Şükrī’s one sentence reference to a religious sanction may be interpreted as the *fetvā* of Hamza. Nonetheless, I have already delineated that Selim’s first assembly of war in Edirne was concerned

¹⁷⁷⁶ TSA, document E 6401.

¹⁷⁷⁷ TNSS, pp. 34-6. As I have already put forward, on the authority of mainly KPZ and SKB, however, the assembly of Edirne was summoned in order to discuss the political aspects of the campaign and the preparations rather than the religious aspects. Contemporary sources do not indicate Selim’s demand of the religious sanction in this assembly. On the other hand, Tansel also claims that this *fetvā* provided the legal ground for the execution of many qizilbash – Ottoman sources roughly say 40.000 - within Ottoman Empire before the campaign. See TNSS, p. 38. As will be evaluated in the following pages, Tansel’s argument stands to reason.

with the political dimension of the issue rather than the religious one. None of our sources mention Selim's any demand for a religious sanction in this assembly. Then again, the second assembly in Istanbul was summoned directly with the aim of discussing religious aspects of the campaign. Contemporary sources unanimously report that with the prominent Ottoman *ulemā* Selim obtained the religious sanction providing religious basis of the campaign in this assembly. Thus, if it had not been issued before, we can safely take early April of 1514 as *terminus post quem* for the date of Hamza's *fetvā*.

The identification of the author of the *fetvā* is another problem and would likely to shed light on the issue if clarified. I have already delineated that at the end of E 6401, the author writes his name as simply "Hamza el-fakīr"; but a note, which is evidently a later addition, adds further epithets to the name of the author. It reads '*el-Müfti ez'afu'l-ibād Hamza el Fakir eṣ-ṣehīr be-Sarugürz*'. Tekindağ claims that his full name was Müfti Nureddin Hamza Sarı Görez (d. 927/1521) and was one of the most distinguished *ulemā* of the time. He adds, on the authority of Bursalı Mehmet Tahir¹⁷⁷⁸, that his family was from Balıkesir and he was buried near Yayla-Camii in Istanbul.¹⁷⁷⁹ Tansel repeats the same idea that one may possibly identify Hamza with the *kazasker* Nureddin Efendi, but he is not as sure as Tekindağ.¹⁷⁸⁰ R. C. Repp, on the other hand, seems to feel certain

¹⁷⁷⁸ Mehmet Tahir's account runs:

"*Sarıgürz Nureddin Efendi 'Balıkesirī'*

Nātuk bi'l-Hak fakīh muhaddis bir zat olub Karasī'dendür. Bursalı Hoca-zāde ile Sinan Paşa'dan telemmüz eyledi. Sultan Selim ol zamanda kadı-askerlik rütbesine nāil olmuş idi. ... Vefātu 927'de kabri İstanbul'da Fatih civarında Yayla Camii kurbundaki mektep haziresindedir. ... Haleb kadısı iken 990'da vefāt iden hafīdi Mehmed Efendi de fuzaladan bir zattur. Sarı tüylü, kısa boylu ve mülhem olduğu-çün zamanında 'Sarı-gürz (صاري كرز)' şöhretiyle be-nām olmuşdur." See Bursalı Mehmet Tahir, *Osmanlı Müellifleri*, vol. I, Ankara: 2000, p. 341. Mehmet Tahir mentions some works of Nureddin Efendi, among which the *fetvā* of the war against the qızilbash is not mentioned at all.

¹⁷⁷⁹ See Tekindağ, "Yavuz'un İran Seferi", p. 53.

¹⁷⁸⁰ TNSS, p. 34.

about the identity of Hamza. He claims that he was Molla Nūr al-Dīn b. Yūsuf al-Karasīwī known as ‘Sarı Görez’, an established scholar who had already been one of the Sahn müderrises, served as a mufti pending Ali Cemâlî’s return from the pilgrimage, held the *qādilik* of Istanbul during the period July 1511-September 1513 and May 1518-September 1521 and also held both *kazaskerlik*.¹⁷⁸¹ Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr also follows the same line of argument in identifying the author of the *fetvā*, arguing that he was no other than Nureddin Efendi, first the *qādi* of Istanbul and later the *kazasker*.¹⁷⁸² The principal source of these scholars, except Repp who additionally consults *Şakāyık*, is again *Osmanlı Müellifleri* of Mehmed Tahir. However, because of three reasons to be discussed below, according to Mehmed Tahir’s account, it is very problematic to identify our Hamza with Sarıgürz Nureddin Efendi.

Although Tekindağ does not mention it, the one whom Mehmed Tahir refers to is obviously well-known *kazasker* of Selim, who was sent by Bayezid to Selim as an intermediary while Selim had been in rebellion. Furthermore, in Mehmed Tahir’s account, the name ‘Hamza’ is not recorded. And lastly, while counting the works of Nureddin Efendi, Mehmet Tahir does not anyhow point to the *fetvā* pertaining to the qizilbashes among them. The only connection left between the two religious scholars is the epithet ‘Sarıgürz’. Nonetheless, even this epithet was not possibly common for two authors, the author of our *fetvā* and Müfti Nureddin, who was the *kazasker* of Selim. It is highly possible that the writer of this additional note confused the author of the *fetvā* with famous *kazasker* Müfti Nureddin Hamza Sarı Görez.

¹⁷⁸¹ R. C. Repp, *The Mufti of Istanbul, A Study in the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy*, London, 1986, pp. 217-20.

¹⁷⁸² Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “A propos d’un ouvrage sur la polémique Ottomane contre les Safawides”, *Revue des Études Islamiques*, XXXIX-2, Paris, 1971, p. 397.

Adel Allouche follows Repp and, on the authority of Taşköprizāde, says that he was from an indigenous family of Karasu, a town in northern Anatolia, and recorded in biography books as Nureddin el-Karasuvī (d. 1512).¹⁷⁸³ Although Allouche's consultation to *Şakāik-ı Nūmāniye*, which is totally ignored by the first three scholars, must be appreciated, he still seems to be wrong in identifying our Hamza with Nureddin el-Karasuvī for he seemingly dwelled on the wrong entry in the *Şakāik-ı Nūmāniye*.

A three and a half pages section in Mecdi's translation of Taşköprizāde's monumental work, whose summary is also recorded by 'Ali,¹⁷⁸⁴ leads us towards a completely different direction and leaves little doubt on the life and deeds of our Hamza. Taşköprizāde and 'Ali mention a religious scholar, namely Mevlāna Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza, who became famous in Antakya with his skill in reciting Kur'an (*ilm-i kira'at*), his sermons, and religious sanctions (*fetvā*). He visited Cairo and obtained compliance in *hadis* and *fıkıh* there. He was the author of two books written in these fields, namely *Tezhībū 'ş-Şemāil* and *Nihāye*. Then, he came to Istanbul during the reign of Bayezid II and attended in the conquest of Moton. He was also in the court of Selim during the campaign of Çaldıran. 'Ali indicates that he wrote a delicious book for the two Ottoman sultans. He was with Süleyman I during the campaign on Hungary. He died in 938 / 1531.¹⁷⁸⁵

Taşköprizāde's account is rather long and detailed. He says that Mevlāna Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza became famous with the nickname 'Mevlā vā'iz-i Arab'

¹⁷⁸³ Adel Allouche, *Osmanlı-Safevi İlişkileri. Kökenleri ve Gelişimi*, translated from English to Turkish by Ahmed Emin Dağ, İstanbul, 2001, pp. 122-3.

¹⁷⁸⁴ Interestingly, none of the scholars consults ALI's *Kühü'l-Ahbār*.

¹⁷⁸⁵ ALI, p. 1224. ALI also records, "*Ālim-i Rabbānī ve kāşif-i esrār-ı Kur'ānī bir aziz idi.*"

or ‘Mevlāna Arab’.¹⁷⁸⁶ His family was from Māveraü’n-nehir from among the disciples of famous Taftazānī but settled (*tavattun itdi*) in Antakya. After delivering sermons (*va’az*) in some cities of the Middle East, including Tabriz, Amid, and Hasankeyf, he went to Cairo, where he received the compliment of the Mamluk ruler of Egypt, Kayıtbay until the death of the latter in 903 (1497-8). Leaving Cairo, he first went to Bursa and then to Istanbul. After returning from the conquest of Moton, he delivered sermons in Istanbul during which he condemned the fallacious (*zenādeka ve mülhidin*) and sufis who did not avoid dancing.¹⁷⁸⁷

Taşköprizāde says that after some time he moved to Aleppo where he engaged in the patronage of Hayırbey, the Mamluk governor of the city, and continued his sermons for three years. Then he returned to Rum. Taşköprizāde does not specify why he went to Aleppo leaving the Ottoman capital city. One might speculate that he might have left Istanbul because of his strife with some prominent figures of religious circles. Taking into account his leaving not only Istanbul but also the Ottoman realm, a more possible line of thought is that he must have gone to Mamluk territory in order to refrain from any possible harmful outcomes of the civil war among the Ottoman princes. Although he

¹⁷⁸⁶ One should not confuse Muhammed b. Omer b. Hamza with Molla Alāaddin Alī el-Arabī, known as Molla Arab, who died in 1496 as the Mufti of Istanbul. For Molla Alāaddin Alī el-Arabī, see Repp, pp. 174-87.

¹⁷⁸⁷ “... *Meclis-i vaazda zenādeka ve mülhidin ve raks iden sūfiyye-i menā’lehin hakkında kādh-amiz ve dahl-engiz kelimāt ider idi. ...*” Mecdī, p. 413. *Menākīb-i İbrāhīm-i Gülşenī* recites an interesting occasion regarding to the opposition of Vā’iz-i Arab. On one occasion when he was delivering a sermon in Ayasofya Mosque, Vā’iz-i Arab, who was an unbeliever in the sainthood (*meşāyih-i ‘izāma ve evliyā-yı kirāma hemīşe inkar üzere olduğu mukarrer olmağın*), began to denounce *sema*’ as atheism. Then a certain Dīvāne Şüca’, who was among *mecāzib-i meşāyih*, stood up and started dancing. During his dance in ecstasy the shaykh proved certain supernatural deeds which made the present audience to disbelieve in the words of Vā’iz-i Arab. When the negative attitude of the author of the *menākīb* regarding Vā’iz-i Arab is considered, one immediately realizes that he did not have a good fame among sufis. See Muhyī-i Gülşenī, *Manākīb-i İbrāhīm-i Gülşenī*, yay., Tahsin Yazıcı, Ankara: TTK, 1982, pp. 224-5. ‘Raks’ was one of the most controversial issues between ulemā and sufis in the early sixteenth-century. Many prominent religious scholars, including KPZ, were opposing ‘raks’ during the religious rituals of sufis. For KPZ’s attitude towards Sufism and ‘raks’ see, for example, Hayrani Altıntaş, “İbn Kemal ve Tasavvuf”, in *Şeyhülislām İbn Kemāl*, hazırlayanlar S. Hayri Bolay, Bahaeddin Yediylıdız, Mustafa Sait Yazıcıoğlu, Ankara: Türkiye Diyānet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989, 194-203.

does not give any proper date, Taşköprizâde's narration suggests that Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza left Istanbul during the last two or three years of Bayezid's reign. After delivering sermons which were usually dedicated to condemn the qizilbash and to proclaim them as unbelievers for three years, Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza returned from Aleppo to Rum. According to Taşköprizâde, his return to the Ottoman realm was directly connected to the qizilbash campaign of Selim. *Terceme-i Şakâik* continues:

Mahrûse-i Haleb'de üç yıl mikdârı vaaz ve hadis ve tefsir ile eğlenüb revâfız ve melâhideyi, husûsan tâife-i Erdebiliyyeyi kadh ve zem idüb bu iki gürûh-ı mekrûh ve tâife-i gayr-ı hâifenin nihâd-ı nâ-pâk ve cibillet-i bâ-cibilletlerinde nihâde olan sū'-i ahvâl-i demîme-i zemîmeyi ve kabîh-ef'âl-i nâkîse-i şenâ'-i nâ-hemvârı halk-ı âleme tebliğ itmekde mübâlağalar ider idi. ... Tâife-i reddiye-i Erdebiliyye fâzıl-ı mezkûre buğz ü adâvet idüb mesâcid ve me'âbedede haşa ashab-ı kirâm zevi'l-ihtirâmıdan sonra ana dahî la'net iderlerdi. Ba'dehu diyâr-ı Rûm'a gelüb merhum Sultan Selim Han Gâzi hazretlerini Kızılbaş-evbaşa cihad itmeğe tahrîz ve tahrîs idüb emr-i gazânın fezâiline ve ve ahvâline müte'allik bir kitab-ı **bedî'u'l-üslûb** ibdâ' ve ihtirâ' eyledi. Pâdişâh-ı Selimu't-tab' yekrân 'azm-i sâdıkla hem-inân olub asâkir-i zafer-rehber ile Kızılbaş seferine giderken fâzıl-ı mûma-ileyh râh-ı gazâda 'izzât ve kemâte mesûbât-ı cihâdı beyân ve müberrât-ı gazâyı tibyân eyledi. Zaman-ı mukâbele ve evân-ı mukâtelede nârgâr-zâr ve âteş-i muhârebe-i kerem olub "ve kad belağatu'l-kulûbu el-hanâcîre" ma'nâları zâhir oldukda ol tâife-i tâğîyye-yi bâğîyye-i div-surat ve kul-sîretin zarar u gezendini müslümanlardan def' için dua idüb cümle-i mücâhidîn ve Pâdişâh-ı sa'âdet-âyin 'amin' didiler. ... Dua hedef-i icâbet ve ve nişân-ı isticâbete musâdif olub evmâc-ı maksûda vâsıl olmağın tâife-i Kızılbaş-ı evbâş münhezim u mün'adim oldılar. ... Bu kazîyye-i marziyyenin vuku'undan sonra Rum illerine revâne olub mecâlis ü mehâfilde va'az ve pend itmeğın halk-ı âlem anın enfâs-ı müessire-i müsmiresi berekâtında o evâmir-i ilâhiyyeye inkıyâd ve menhiyât-ı münkirât-ı memnu'dan imtina' eyledi. ...¹⁷⁸⁸

As clearly reflected in the above-passage, Mevlâna Arab was fanatically against the the qizilbash movement to such a degree that even a sixteenth-century Ottoman religious scholar, Taşköprizâde himself, had to admit that he exaggerated in condemning and disdaining disciples of the Safavid Order. If we rely on Taşköprizâde, Mevlâna Arab assumed that the proclamation of the qizilbash as 'heretics' or 'infidels' was a religious

¹⁷⁸⁸ Mecdî, p. 413.

mission for himself. Taşköprizāde stresses his exaggeration and fanaticism in a striking way. He indicates that the adherents of Ismail hated him so much that they included his name to the first three khalifas to be cursed in mosques and shrines during or after the pray.¹⁷⁸⁹

It seems from Taşköprizāde's account that Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza was not content with simply proclaiming the heresy of the qizilbash through religious sermons but wished to do more in order to uphold the faith of Muslims keeping them away from the destructive effects of qizilbashism. It must be because of this incentive that following the ascendance of Selim, he immediately returned to the Ottoman Empire. Taşköprizāde states that he encouraged Sultan Selim to wage a war against the qizilbashes, arguing that it would be a *cihād*. Furthermore, he authored a book in a new style on the virtue and conditions of *gazā*, which was completely original and had never been seen before, (*emr-i gazānın fezāiline ve ahvāline müte'allik bir kitab bedī'u'l-üslūb ibdā' ve ihtirā' eyledi*). This description is worth considering. Taşköprizāde does not use the verbs 'te'lif etmek' (to author) or 'yazmak' (to write) but the verbs 'ibdā'' and 'ihtirā'' both of which mean to initiate or create something have never been seen before. If we take his *fetvā* on the qizilbashes as the first one, Taşköprizāde's description of his work becomes quite meaningful. Likewise, the problem – to describe the religious position of the qizilbashes and to determine the attitude towards them – was for the most part original for Islamic scholars of religious law and needed a new interpretation.¹⁷⁹⁰

¹⁷⁸⁹ I have not come across any record in Safavid or Ottoman sources indicating such a name included among the people to be cursed. But, even if this is a fabrication of Taşköprizāde, still it is apt to reflect the degree of the fanaticism of Mevlāna Arab, his hatred against the qizilbashes, and the hatred of the qizilbashes towards him.

¹⁷⁹⁰ For the Sunni ulemā of the sixteenth century, the originality of the problem is best reflected in one Ebussuud's *fetvās*. He says that he has never come across such a group neither in shi'ism nor in sunnism. This group is not even one of the 72 fallacious groups explained in the famous saying of the Prophet.

Taşköprizāde states that when Mevlāna Arab personally joined the campaign on the qizilbash; he declared and clarified the virtue of *gazā* and *cihād* on the way. (*Kızılbaş seferine giderken fāzıl-ı mūma-ileyh rāh-ı gazāda ... cihādı beyān ve müberrāt-ı gazāyı tibyān eyledi.*) Remembering that the campaign started in Edirne on March 19 (or 20) and the religious sanction was provided through the assembly with *ulemā* in Filçayı, which was summoned on the tenth day of the campaign, Taşköprizāde's explanation leaves no doubt that the first *fetvā* for this campaign was issued by Muhammed b. Ömer b. Hamza during the campaign, i.e. during or shortly after the assembly of Istanbul. Possibly because of this *fetvā*, he seems to have obtained Selim's special benevolence; during or shortly before the battle he prayed for God to bestow Ottomans the victory while the sultan and soldiers followed him. Taşköprizāde says that his pray was accepted by God.

After Mevlāna Arab returned from Çaldıran, he settled in Bursa and delivered sermons during the rest of his life. He died on Muharrem 4, 938 (August 18, 1531) in Bursa.¹⁷⁹¹ As reflected in *Terceme-i Şakāik*, his profile resembles a middle-ranking religious scholar whose career built up mainly on the religious sermons (*va'az*) and religious sanctions (*fetvā*). Because of that, the epithet 'müfti' is inscribed before his name in the document E 6401. During his first visit to the Ottoman Empire, he doesn't seem to have achieved a satisfactory position within the Ottoman society of *ulemā*. His

Rather they took the worst elements of each of these fallacious groups and created a new synthesis of heresy. See Manuscript, *Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi*, Esad Efendi, no. 3542, fol. 46a-47a. Also see Eberhard, pp. 166-7; Düzdağ, pp. 134-6, *fetvā* 481. Eberhard suggests that Ebussud's *fetvā* should have been issued during his long *şeyhülislamlık* between 1545-1574, most possibly before Sultan Süleyman's second and third campaigns on Persia in 1548 and 1553. He was already a famous *qādi* in 1532, first in Bursa and then in Istanbul. In 1537, he became the *kadiasker* of Anatolia and seven years later the *şeyhülislam*. See Eberhard, p. 50.

¹⁷⁹¹ Mecdī, p. 414.

fanatic anti-qizilbash stand was like a shining star for him during Selim's campaign on Iran, when he managed to include himself into the close circles of the sultan.

The *fetvā* of Hamza¹⁷⁹² is already discussed by several scholars and its text is published twice.¹⁷⁹³ Even a glance reveals that the ultimate aim of the text is to sanction the war against Shah Ismail and the persecution of the qizilbashes, either at war or peace. According to Hamza, executing the qizilbashes and dispelling their community wherever they were seen is not only approved but ordered by the religious law, for simply they fell apart the sphere of the faith or became disbelievers (*kāfir ve mülhid*).

Hamza lists the following acts and practices of Ismail and his followers as reason for denouncing them disbeliever: despising the Qur'an, Shari'a, and Islam, approving the acts prohibited by God, killing (sunni) *ulemā*, prostrating before their chief as if he is God, cursing Abu Bakr and Omar and denying their caliphate, defaming and cursing Āysha, and (consequently) endeavoring to nullify the Shari'a of Muhammad.¹⁷⁹⁴

¹⁷⁹² As Repp suggests, neither Hamza's nor Kemalpashazāde's statement should be taken as a *fetvā* since they are not cast in the traditional impersonal form but directly aimed Shah Ismail and his followers. See Repp, p. 220. Rather, they might be regarded as a manifesto of *ulemā* securing the religious ground of Selim's campaign. Another function of these treatises was, without doubt, as Parmaksızoğlu suggests, to prepare public opinion against Safavids and for the upcoming severe persecutions. See Parmaksızoğlu, "Kemal Paşa-zāde", *IA*, VI, p. 563. Nevertheless, since Hamza's statement is widely known as *fetvā* of Hamza, I will refer to it as 'fetvā'.

¹⁷⁹³ The complete text of the *fetvā* with facsimile copies of the original documents in TSA (E 6401, E 5960, E 12077) is published in Tekindağ, "Yavuz Sultan Selim'in İran Seferi", pp. 54-5; TNSS, pp. 35-36, footnote, 61. In the appendixes of their works, Tekindağ provides a facsimile copy of E 6401, while Tansel puts all three documents. For discussions of the *fetvā*, see, in addition to these three works, Repp, pp. 218-20; Allouche, pp. 122-4; İsmail Safa Üstün, *Heresy and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth Century*, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, University of Manchester, 1991, pp. 35-49.

¹⁷⁹⁴ "... Müslimanlar bilün ve agah olun şol taife-i kızılbaş ki reisleri Erdebilöğlü İsmaildür, peygamberimizün aleyhi's-salât ve's-selâm şeriatini ve sünnetini ve din-i İslam ve ilm-i dini ve Kur'an-ı Mübin'i istihfaf etdikleri ve dahi Allah-u Teala haram kıldığı günahlara helaldür dedükleri ve istihfafları ve Kur'an-ı Azim'i ve Mushafları ve kütüb-ü şeriatı tahkir edüb oda yakdukları ve dahi ulemaya ve sülahaya ihanet edüb kırub mescidleri yıkdukları ve dahi reisleri laini mabud yerine koyub secde itdükleri ve dahi Hazret-i Ebi Bekr'e radyallahu anhu ve Hazreti Ömere radyallahu anhu söğüb hilafetlerine inkar itdükleri ve dahi peygamberimizin hatunu Ayişe anamıza (radyallahu anha iftira etdüb – added in the later copy, E 5960) söğdükleri ve dahi peygamberimizün aleyhi's-salat ve's-selam şer'ini ve din-i İslam'ı götürmek kasdın itdükleri ve bu zikir olunan ve dahi bunların emsal-i şer'e muhalif kavilleri ve fiilleri bu fakir katında ve baki ulema-i din-i İslam katlarında (tevatürle) malum ve zahir oldığı sebebeden

Hamza's foundation in accusing qizilbashes with disbelief (*küfr*), however, seems to have been heavily manipulated by the political conditions of the period. First of all, some of his accusations appears to be at least over-toned. For example, despising Qur'an, Shari'a, and Islam must be carefully regarded. Furthermore, as delineated elsewhere in this study, permitting the acts banned by God and prostrating before Shah Ismail should be appraised within the unorthodox, extremist-shi'ite, and militant Sufism of the qizilbashes. That sort of Sufism was not a new phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire. Rather, it always co-existed with the Ottoman orthodox version of Islam.¹⁷⁹⁵ In the meantime, other accusations pertaining to the first two caliphs and Ā'ysha are supported by Safavid sources, not in the form of accusation as expected but as a natural result of Shi'ism.

Another question is the ratio between the 'guilt' and the punishment in this *fetvā*. Leaving the theoretical framework of the theological discussions aside, which appears to have been quite controversial in the history of Islam,¹⁷⁹⁶ on the level of practice, Hamza's judgment seems quite harsh and unprecedented in the Ottoman context. Hamza concludes that killing them and scattering their community is obligatory for all true Muslims; their dead are in hell while 'Muslims' who would die during fight against them are martyrs; whatever they slaughter is impure, their marriage is invalid, and they could not benefit from inheritance; in short, they are worse than infidels.¹⁷⁹⁷ I have

biz dahi şeriatün hümi ve kitaplarımızın nakli ile fetvā virdük ki ol zikr olunan taife kafirler ve mühlidlerdür. ..." See TSA, document E 6401.

¹⁷⁹⁵ This is already discussed in length in the second chapter of the present study.

¹⁷⁹⁶ For a summary of discussion among Islamic scholars, see Eberhard, pp. 5-44. Also consider Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar ve Mülhidler (15.-16. Yüzyıllar)*, 3. baskı, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2003, pp. 1-70.

¹⁷⁹⁷ "...Bunları kırub cemaatlerin dağıtmak cemi' müslümanlara vacib ve farzdur. Müslümanlardan ölen sa'id ve şehid cennet-i aladadır ve anlardan ölen hor ve hakir cehennemün dibindedür. Bunların hali kafirler halinden eşedd ve ekbahdur, zira bunların bugazladukları ve dahi saydları gerekse doğanla ve

already discussed the despising attitude of the Ottoman *ulemā* towards the nomadic tribes and their religion. Nevertheless, despite all their denigration, they never sanctioned killing these religiously fallacious people for the sake of God, unless they posed political threat against the government, which was the case in the revolt of Shaykh Bedreddin.

Indeed, some expressions in the text partly reveal the stimulus that made Hamza to pursue such a stern attitude and to give a *fetvā* with a political background. According to Hamza, not only the qizilbash were disbelievers but those people whoever inclined to them, agreed upon their beliefs, and helped them were also disbelievers. (*Ve dahi her kimesne ki anlara meyl idüb ol batıl dinlerine razı ve muavin olalar anlar dahi kafirler ve mülhidlerdür.*) Perhaps a more interesting expression is the following. He says,

(Ve bir nāhiye ehli ki bunlardan ola) Sultan-ı İslam e'ezze'l-lahu ensārehu için vardur ki bunların (ricāllerin katl idüb) mallarını ve nisālarını ve evlādlarını guzāt-ı İslam arasında kısmet ide ve bunların ba'de'l-ahz tevbelere ve nedāmetlerine iltifat ve itibar olunmayub katl oluna ve dahī bir kimse ki bu vilāyetde olub anlardan idügi biline ve yahud anlara giderken dudula katl oluna! Ve bilcümle bu tā'ife hem kāfirler ve mülhidlerdür ve hem ehl-i fesāddur, iki cihetden katlleri vacibdür.¹⁷⁹⁸

It is obvious that this statement is not related to the actual war involving the qizilbash warriors. Rather, it clearly refers to the villagers or rural population of the empire, i.e. the qizilbashes living in the Ottoman country. If people of a village would become qizilbash then the *Sultan-ı İslam* should execute their men and distribute their women, children, and property among *gāzis* of Islam as booty. Hamza further advises that even if the qizilbashes express regret upon their capture, the sultan should not accept their repentance but execute them all. Whoever in the Ottoman territories is known as

gerekse ok ile ve gerekse kelb ile olsun murdardur ve ve dahi nikahları gerekse kendülerden ve gerekse gayrden olsunlar batıldur ve dahi bunlar kimseden miras yemek yokdur. ..." See TSA, document E 6401.¹⁷⁹⁸ TSA, document E 6401. The phrases in parenthesis are added from the other copies of the *fetvā*.

qizilbash (*onlardan*) or captured on his way to join them must also be executed. It is not the exaggeration to surmise from Hamza's *fetvā* that whoever had any connection with Shah Ismail or the Qizilbash movement, no matter how and to what extent, had no other choice but die under the Ottoman sword. The harsh judgment of Hamza which leaves no room for error but brings all ways to execution resembles Selim's political determination rather than the theological indictment of the orthodox *ulemā* for the sake of the religion. In other words, it resembles a 'custom-made' work rather than a scholarly theological treatise.¹⁷⁹⁹ Likewise, as the political threat of the qizilbashes calmed down, so did the severity of the *fetvās* of the Ottoman *ulemā*. Contrary to Hamza and Kemalpaşazāde, for example, Ebussuūd, who held the post of *şeyhülislamlık* between 1545 and 1574,¹⁸⁰⁰ forbade the enslavement of the qizilbash children.¹⁸⁰¹

One feels legitimate to question the promulgation of such a critical religious sanction by a middle-ranking *ulemā* rather than the Mufti of Istanbul (*şeyhülislam*) or some other high-ranking *ulemā*.¹⁸⁰² The point rightfully raises suspicion on the mechanism that produced the first *fetvā*, as well as on the person behind it. According to Tansel, Hamza might have been induced to give the *fetvā* by threats, money or his own fanaticism.¹⁸⁰³ R. C. Repp, on the other hand, rejects this approach claiming that the *fetvā* represented a view commonly held among the *ulemā*. According to him, a number

¹⁷⁹⁹ Hamza's judgments seem exaggerated according to the Islamic jurisprudence. For a discussion of the *fetvā* from the view of Islamic jurisprudence and its references, see Üstün, pp. 42-8.

¹⁸⁰⁰ See Repp, pp. 272-96.

¹⁸⁰¹ Cited in Ertuğrul Düzdağ, *Şeyhu'l-İslam Ebu's Suud Efendinin Fetvālarına Göre Kanunî Devrinde Osmanlı Hayatı*, İstanbul: Yitik Hazine Yayınları, 2006, p. 136. For similar *fetvās* of Ebussuūd, see TSA, document E 7285.

¹⁸⁰² Indeed, in his *fetvā* after counting sins of the qizilbashes, Hamza says that he and other scholars decided on their disbelief: "... bunların emsālî şer'e muhālîf kavilleri ve fi'illeri bu fakir katında ve bâkî ulemâ-i din-i İslam katlarında mâlum ve zâhir olduğu sebebeden biz dahî şeri'atün hükmî ve kitaplarımızın nakli ile fetvâ virdük ki ol zikr olunan tâyîfe kâfirler ve mülhidlerdür..." See TSA, document E 6401. However, available sources do not suggest the existence of other prominent scholars issued concomitantly with or before Hamza's *fetvā*.

¹⁸⁰³ TNSS, p. 34.

of *ulemā* must have written *fetvās* independently as the result of separate initiatives but only one of them, perhaps the best, survived.¹⁸⁰⁴ One should note that Repp believes that the author of the *fetvā* was Molla Nūreddin b. Yūsuf al-Karasīwī known as ‘Sarı Görez’, a high-ranking scholar. Thus, he seems to be consistent in his argumentation. Nevertheless, a close examination of sources, as delineated, shows that the author of this *fetvā* could not be Molla Nūreddin. Furthermore, as Repp also admits, Ali Cemâlî, who was the *şeyhülislam*, the head of *ulemā* class at the time, seems to have been silent,¹⁸⁰⁵ and thus one might surmise hesitant, on the issue.¹⁸⁰⁶ As it is well-known, the *şeyhülislam* was the head of the *fetvā* institution in the Ottoman Empire. We have numerous *fetvās* of *şeyhülislams* pertaining to even seemingly unimportant, individual affairs. It is reasonable, therefore, to interpret the silence of *şeyhülislam* on such a vital issue of utmost importance for the state as a sign of hesitation among high-ranking *ulemā*. Following the enterprise of Hamza, however, Selim sooner gained further

¹⁸⁰⁴ See Repp, p. 219.

¹⁸⁰⁵ Ali Cemâlî Efendi held the post during from 1503 to 1525-6, and was succeeded by Kemalpashazāde. See Repp, pp. 197-224.

¹⁸⁰⁶ There are some vague indications in *Şahnāme-i Āl-i Osman*, a history of the virtues of the Ottoman sultans written in the late sixteenth century, to the attitude of Ali Cemâlî Efendi. In one occasion, *Şahnāme* narrates one of Sultan Selim I’s virtues as follows: Sultan Selim I decided to wage a campaign and asked the opinions of notables. At the end they decided to ask *şeyhülislam* (*müftî’l-enām*) Ali Cemâlî Efendi. Ali Cemâlî Efendi, however, did not approve Selim’s decision but offered to consult religious meditation. (In the text it is written as ‘*istihāre*’, which is a practice of consulting dreams with certain set of prayers and rites.) Being displeased with *şeyhülislam*’s answer, Selim declined his offer, saying “it is not appropriate to consult dreams in such vital issues!” Then Molla Sarıgürz, the *kadıasker* of Anatolia, celebrates Selim’s decision arguing that it is suited to the religious law. Nevertheless, there are confusions in *Şahnāme*’s account. First of all, this event is recorded as if happened on the eve of Semend Campaign, which is unknown for the students of the Ottoman history. We know two campaign of Selim I, one over Safavids and the other over Mamluks. Therefore, one may surmise that the above-mentioned campaign must be one of these two. Ta’likizāde, the author of *Şahnāme*, makes another mistake. In the following page, he reports the discussion between Selim I and Molla Sarıgürz. According to him, Selim first intended to wage campaign on Mamluks, but Molla Sarıgürz convinced him to march on Shah Ismail first. As already delineated above, this argument obviously contradicts the historical facts. Leaving aside his confusions, however, Ta’likizāde’s account, which was written approximately one century later, affirms that *şeyhülislam* Ali Cemâlî Efendi was reluctant to sanction Selim’s war, most probably on Safavids. On the other hand, *Şahnāme*’s depiction of the position of Molla Sarıgürz should be read carefully. Molla Sarıgürz might well have been among those *ulemā* who inclined to support Selim’s harsh policy against qizilbashes. However, this still does not prove his authorship of the first *fetvā*. It should be also noted that Ta’likizāde does not mention any *fetvā*. See *Şahnāme-i Āl-i Osman*, fols. 22b-23b.

support of high-ranking *ulemā* as well, either through genuine persuasion or through threats to use force.

The second *fetvā*/treatise declaring the faithlessness (*küfr*) of the qizilbashs was issued by Kemalpaşazāde. Indeed, there are at least two *fetvās* issued by Kemalpaşazāde, one in Arabic and the other in Turkish. His Turkish *fetvā* is in a classical question-answer form. Kemalpaşazāde answers the questions on whether it is authorized by the religion to kill the qizilbashs and to declare *gazā* against them; and whether those who were killed in this war are *şehits*. His answers are: “Yes it is a great *gazā*” and “yes, they are absolutely *şehits*.”¹⁸⁰⁷ The other *fetvā*/treatise of Kemalpaşazāde, which is written in Arabic, is not in the classical question-answer format. It is rather a memorandum proclaiming the heresy of the qizilbashs and the legitimization war against them. From this perspective, it would be rather appropriate to name this text as a ‘treatise’ (*risāle*) rather than a ‘*fetvā*’.¹⁸⁰⁸ There are several copies of this treatise. The one included in *Mecmūa-i Resā’l* is published by Şehabeddin Tekindağ.¹⁸⁰⁹ Another copy is published by Elke Eberhard.¹⁸¹⁰

None of these copies are dated. Elke Eberhard predicts that the first *fetvā* of Kemalpaşazāde, the Arabic one, must have been written in between 1513-14, while his second *fetvā* must have been issued between 1525 and 1535.¹⁸¹¹ One should remember

¹⁸⁰⁷ See the manuscript housed in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi, 3542, fol. 45b. For a brief summary and analysis of this *fetvā* see Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden*, p. 165.

¹⁸⁰⁸ Compare, Ménage, “Kemāl Pasha-zāde”, *EI2*.

¹⁸⁰⁹ This copy of treatise with the title ‘Risaletü’l- Mevla eş-şehir bā-İbn-i Kemal el-Vezir’ is located in between fols. 31a and 31b of *Mecmūa-i Resā’l*, which is housed in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Pertev Paşa Ktp., no. 621. Tekindağ published the full text in his article “Yavuz’un İran Seferi” in appendix.

¹⁸¹⁰ Eberhard used the copy located in fols. 45a-45b of a manuscript housed in Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi, 3542. See Eberhard, pp. 164-5.

¹⁸¹¹ Eberhard mistakenly accepts the date of death of KPZ as 1535. Elke Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16. Jahrhundert nach arabischen Handschriften*, Freiburg: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1970, p. 51.

that Süleyman I waged a campaign on Persia in 1534-5 and that Kemalpaşazāde died on April 16, 1534.¹⁸¹² Thus, Eberhard regards this *fetvā* as a psychological maneuver before the campaign of Süleyman.

Tekindağ, Ménage, and Parmaksızoğlu agree that the Arabic *risāle* of Kemalpaşazāde must be issued before the Persian campaign in 1514.¹⁸¹³ Even a cursory reading of the text which openly addresses Shah Ismail and his adherents makes it clear that the *risāle* was definitely written during the lifetime of Ismail by the aim of providing a religious ground for the war against the qizilbashs (against both the Safavid state and Ismail's disciples in Anatolia). From this point of view, the best assumption seems to be the year of 1514 or a little earlier as the date of the *risāle*. It is known that Kemalpaşazāde was appointed as the müderris of *Halebiye Medresesi* in 918 (1512 / 1513), then the müderris of *Üç Şerefeli Medrese* in Edirne, *Sahn-ı Saman Medresesi* in İstanbul, and *Sultan Bayezid Medresesi* in Edirne consecutively.¹⁸¹⁴ Unfortunately, the contemporary sources do not specify the time interval when Kemalpaşazāde was in Edirne. One might likely suppose that he may quite possibly have arrived before Selim's departure from there, thus attending the first assembly of Selim. Nevertheless, he does not mention the assembly of Edirne, even with a single word, in his *Tevārih*, while narrating the assembly of İstanbul in some details. His narration suggests that when Selim moved from Edirne, Kemalpaşazāde was in İstanbul, where he participated in the second assembly summoned in Filçayı.

¹⁸¹² See Parmaksızoğlu, "Kemāl Paşa-zāde", IA; Ménage, "Kemāl Pasha-zāde", EI2. I also want to remind that KPZ appointed as the kadiasker of Anatolia in 1516 and the şeyhü'l-islam in 932 (1525/6). (See Mecdī, p. 382)

¹⁸¹³ Tekindağ, p. 55; Ménage, "Kemāl Pasha-zāde", EI2, electronic edition; See Parmaksızoğlu, "Kemāl Paşa-zāde", p. 563.

¹⁸¹⁴ See Parmaksızoğlu, p. 563; Repp, pp. 229-231.

Kemalpaşazāde points out that in this meeting, the *ulemā* attended the assembly unanimously agreed on the legitimacy - even on the necessity – of a war against qizilbashs. They declared that those who adhered to him (Ismail) was surely in astray and those who performed the actions permitted by him were to be killed; the war against them was more important and necessary than the other wars (the *gazā* against the infidels); Ismail’s adherents and friends were all assumed as fallacious in their faith; they were to be executed when caught and they were to be extirpated from face of the earth.¹⁸¹⁵ Although the above-mentioned passage summarizes the *risāle* of Kemalpaşazāde, his narration does not include any hints implying that he issued a *risāle* or *fetvā* regarding the matter neither in the related part nor in any other part of his historical accounts. If we interpret this as a sort of modesty, then it would appear as the most reasonable way to admit that Kemalpaşazāde issued his *risāle* before the campaign either before or during the assembly of Istanbul. He did not participate in the campaign. But thanks to his *risāle*, he was appointed the qādi of Edirne on August 20, 1515, shortly after Selim’s return from the Çaldıran campaign, and on September 12, 1516, while Selim was staying in Aleppo after the battle of Merci-dābık, he was promoted to the qādi-*asker* of Anatolia.¹⁸¹⁶

The *risāle* of Kemalpaşazāde repeats Hamza’s *fetvā* in essence but is much more developed and better-organized in a scholarly manner. Kemalpaşazāde’s treatise became a model for the later heresiography literature of Ottoman *ulemā* on qizilbashs. At the beginning of the treatise, Kemalpaşazāde directly expresses the aim of his work: “This is a statement pertaining to the disbelieving (*küfr*) of Shah Ismail’s followers, who are

¹⁸¹⁵ KPZ9, pp. 96-7.

¹⁸¹⁶ Ménage, “Kemāl Pasha-zāde”, EI2, electronic edition; Parmaksızoğlu, p. 563; Repp, p. 231.

damned until doomsday.”¹⁸¹⁷ Then he states that a group (*tā'ifa*) of Shi'ite conquered most of the sunni lands and spread their fallacious path or *madhab*; they cursed the first three caliphs¹⁸¹⁸ and denied their caliphate as well as despising the Shari'a. According to Kemalpaşazāde, this group believes that path of Shari'a is difficult but the path of Shah Ismail is rather easy to follow and to perceive. In the same way, they believe in what Shah Ismail makes 'permitted' (*helāl*) as permitted, what he banned (*harām*) as banned. For example Shah Ismail made wine permitted, which is forbidden by the Islamic law, as well as rendering numerous act of disbeliever and the qizilbashs followed him. Kemalpaşazāde adds that whoever wears the red-cap, which is their distinguished dress, is bearing a clear sign of *küfr*.

So, concludes Kemalpaşazāde, “we have no doubt that they apostatized and became disbeliever; they must be subjected to the law of apostasy. Therefore, their country turned into the ‘realm of the war’ (*daru'l-harb*); their marriages became invalid and their children are to be considered bastard (*veled-i zīna*); the animals that they slaughtered are impure.” Like Hamza, Kemalpaşazāde repeats the idea that when captured their cities, which are parts of *daru'l-harb*, their men should be executed and their properties, women, and children are *helal* to Muslims. Differing from Hamza, however, Kemalpaşazāde secures their life whenever they return to the true faith. He agrees upon Hamza's judgment on the incumbency of *cihād* on all Muslims against qizilbashs.¹⁸¹⁹

¹⁸¹⁷ “Risāle”, in *Mecmūa-i Resā'īl*, Manuscript, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Pertev Paşa Ktp., no. 621. I thank Ahmet Simin for translating the text from Arabic into Turkish.

¹⁸¹⁸ Hamza mentions only first two caliphs.

¹⁸¹⁹ It can be clearly seen that Kemalpaşazāde's judgment is no less harsh than Hamza's. Indeed, their references are more or less the same. For a brief discussion of Kemalpaşazāde's references and religious stand, see Üstün, pp. 49-59.

Kemalpaşazāde states separately that whoever leaves *daru'l-islam* and joins them choosing their fallacious faith must be sentenced to death by *qādis*, their property must be distributed among his heirs and their wives must be married to someone else. As was the case in Hamza's *fetvā*, this statement is clearly addressed to the qizilbashs living within the Ottoman borders rather than the subjects or soldiers of Shah Ismail.

To sum up, Selim managed to attain two religious sanctions, chronologically the first from a middle-ranking *ulemā* of Arabic origin and the second from a high-ranking *ulemā* of Turkish origin. Although it differs in detail and style, the essence of the two *fetvās* is more or less the same. Both *fetvās* were designed to justify and legitimize two upcoming 'extraordinary' acts of Selim: first, waging war on a Muslim ruler, and second, 'extirpating' a certain portion of his own subjects, namely the qizilbashs in the Ottoman country who adhered to Shah Ismail and his fallacious path.¹⁸²⁰ As a matter of fact, Selim did not waste time putting his plan into action by starting with 'cleaning his own home.'

8.4. THE PERSECUTION OF ANATOLIAN QIZILBASHES

According to a Venetian report dated back to April 8, 1514, the total number of the shi'ites (i.e. qizilbash) in Asia Minor is estimated to be the four-fifth of the whole

¹⁸²⁰ One should notice that although both *fetvās* frequently refer to their targets as Shi'ite, by the term they obviously meant a specific group, namely the qizilbashs within and outside the Ottoman territories, but not the followers of Shi'a in general. Later *ulemās* such as Ebussuūd, did not regard the qizilbashs as ordinary Shi'ite. To him, they were even not among the 71 fallacious groups (*firka*) of 72 *firka* of Islam mentioned in the famous saying of the Prophet: "...Şi'a'dan değil ... bu tāife ol yetmiş üç firkanın hālis birinden değildir. Her birinden bir mikdar şer ve fesad alıp, kendiler hevālarınca ihtiyār ettikleri küfr ü bid'atlere ilhāk edip, bir mezheb-i küfr ü dalālet ihtirā' eylemişlerdir." See Düzdağ, pp. 134-5. This formulation (regarding the qizilbashs outside the 72 *firka*) later attained wide-spread acceptance among the Ottoman *ulemā*. See, for example, see *Terceme-i Risāle-i fī-Tekfir-i Kızılbaş*, Manuscript, Milli Kütüphane, YzA 695.

population.¹⁸²¹ Although this ratio seems to be an exaggeration, it still indicates the fact that before Yavuz Selim's campaign on Shah Ismail, much, if not most, of the Anatolian rural population were either adherents or sympathizers to the qizilbash movement. As I have already delineated, the qizilbash existence in Ottoman Anatolia could not be reduced barely to their sizable population, but they also had a very effective part in politics and the military affairs. By Selim's harsh policy, however, both the number and the influence of the qizilbashes in the political and military sphere reduced to a controllable level. Before he started the war against the Shah, Sultan Selim had already initiated a 'purging operation' within the Ottoman borders. It is traditionally reported by the Ottoman chroniclers that forty thousand qizilbashes were reported to the court and then executed by Ottoman officials.¹⁸²²

Idrīs states that while Sultan Selim was staying in Edirne in the winter of 1513-1514, he dispatched decrees for the local governors ordering to register the names of all the disciples and sympathizers of Ismail be it young or old up to their third ancestors.¹⁸²³ According to Idrīs, the local governors were ordered to register the ancestors of the qizilbashes back to the third generation because of the fact that among the Safavid shaykhs only Ismail's grand father, father, and himself (three generations) were enthusiastically engaged in politics and deviated from the 'true path' of Islam. Thus, the

¹⁸²¹ Minorsky, "Shaykh Bālī-Efendi on the Safavids", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vol. 20, no. 1/3, 1957, p. 438.

¹⁸²² For a different approach to the qizilbash massacre by the Ottomans see Benjamin Lellouch, "Puissance et justice retenue du sultan ottoman. Les massacres sur les fronts iranien et égyptien (1514-1517)", *Le Massacre, objet d'histoire*, sous la direction de David El Kenz, Gallimard, 2005, 171-182. This article attempts to bring a general conceptual approach to the massacre of the qizilbashes and Mamluks by Sultan Selim. To the author, Ottomans, and medieval Middle Eastern rulers in general, perceived the massacre of captives, even of the population of the conquered lands, as an act of sovereign power and justice. Thus it had ideological, judicial, and philosophical basis, as well as political reasons.

¹⁸²³ IDRS, p. 130. SLZ says, however, that Selim ordered the registration of the names of the qizilbashes when he was in Anatolia. See SLZ, p. 16.

offspring of those who adhered to the Safavid Order by the time of Junayd were under suspicion and were to be listed.¹⁸²⁴ ‘Āli reports it in a parallel fashion. After explaining Selim’s crossing to Üsküdar with the imperial army he says,

Ve mukaddemā Anatolı vilāyetlerindeki hukkāma bāhiru’l-ahkām gönderilüb Kızılbaş-ı evbāş meredesinden olan riyāz-ı din-i İslām’ı pejmürdelerden teftiṣ u tefahhuṣ itdirilüb, sinn-i heft-sāleden feftād-sāleye varınca kırkbin mikdarı nüfūs-ı menhūs ele girüb rafz u ŷenā’ati ve ef’āl-i ŷenī’a ile ol kallaṣlara ŷi’a ve Ravāfız ve ilhād serini ki, tu’me-i tīğ-ı ‘ālem-gīr ve lokma-i ŷīr-i ŷimṣīr idüb defterin göndermişler idi...¹⁸²⁵

‘Āli’s account makes it clear that the *defters* of the qizilbashs arrived at the tent of Selim immediately after he had crossed to Üsküdar.¹⁸²⁶ Münecimbaşı further specifies the place saying that the *defters* were presented to the sultan when he arrived in Maltepe, and Hasan Bey, the *beylerbey* of Rumelia, had just crossed from Gallipoli to Anatolia.¹⁸²⁷ According to the imperial decree, the local authorities were expected to prepare the list of names of all the qizilbashs within the boundaries of Rum with the the names of the places where they live; and these registers (*defter*) were to be conveyed to the Porte.¹⁸²⁸ Idrīs argues that they had already deserved to be extirpated for being deviated from the true religious path. Likewise, many of these registered qizilbashs were killed.¹⁸²⁹

Ebu’l-Fazl Mehmed Efendi, the son of Idris-i Bitlisī, follows similar line of narration but adds that the number of the qizilbashs recorded in these registers (*defter*) reached 40.000; then these *defters* were sent to the local governors to give an account of

¹⁸²⁴ IDRS, p. 130.

¹⁸²⁵ ALI, pp. 1076-77. Also see SLZ2, p. 16.

¹⁸²⁶ SLZ follows the same account. See SLZ2, p. 16.

¹⁸²⁷ MNB, p. 457.

¹⁸²⁸ IDRS, p. 130. Also see HSE4, p. 176. Both IDRS and HSE clearly state that those qizilbashs who were living in the territory of Rum (*diyār-ı Rūm*) were registered and then killed.

¹⁸²⁹ IDRS, p. 130. As Edward Browne rightly noted long ago, curiously little or nothing is said by the Safavid historians about this massacre of the qizilbashs in Ottoman Anatolia. See BRW, p. 72.

the people to be killed. The number of executed qizilbashs by this way exceeded 40.000.¹⁸³⁰ According to Hoca Saadeddin, however, some of the registered qizilbashs were killed while some others were imprisoned.¹⁸³¹ Other historians such as Solakzāde and Müneccimbaşı agree upon the number.¹⁸³²

Indeed, Selim's practice of registering the men in the opposite camp was not limited to the qizilbashs. One of Selim's prominent spies, Yusuf's report which informed Selim of the political situation in Istanbul while he was in Kefe in the autumn of 1511, clearly indicates that before his ascendance Selim had already ordered his spies to write down the list of opponents – mainly those who were pursuing pro-Ahmed stand. After reporting the tendencies of the leading statesmen and generals, Yusuf states that “I have registered the names of those who yelled against my Sultan [Selim] in detail; the list will arrive soon.”¹⁸³³

Learning from the contemporary historians cited above and from some further archival evidence, after his ascendance to the throne, Selim accelerated the journalistic activities of his spies – and from then on of the local official authorities as well - in Anatolia in order to determine the names, places, and positions of both Ahmed's supporters and the qizilbashs. His aim was obviously ‘to clear the house’ before marching on Ismail.

¹⁸³⁰ Ebu'l-Fazl Mehmed Efendi, *Selimşāh-nāme*, recited from Tekindağ, “Yavuz'un İran Seferi”, p. 56. The same account of Ebu'l-Fazl Mehmed Efendi is also recited in HAM2, p. 583. For the number of the registered qizilbashs also see HSE4, p. 176; TNSS, p. 38. This frequently repeated number pertaining to the executed qizilbashs, however, should be regarded as a conventional figure merely indicating a large number. For a similar approach see Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les ottomans les safavides et leurs voisins*, Istanbul, 1987, p. 53 ; Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 40.

¹⁸³¹ HSE4, p. 176.

¹⁸³² See SLZ2, p. 16; MNB, p. 457. MNB says, for example, that “... 920 Saferinin yirmi dördünde (April 20, 1514), Perşembe günü Üsküdar tarafına geçip Rum İli beylerbeyi ve askeriyle Gelibolu boğazından geçmişti. Önceden eyālet valilerinden tesbit edilebilen kırkbin kızılbaşın isimlerini muhtevî defter geldi. Selim Han hepsinin öldürülmesini emir buyurdu. ...”

¹⁸³³ “... Ve şol kimesneler ki sultanum hakkında na'ralar atmışlardur, mufassal defter etmişem. İnşallah dergāh-ı ālem-penāha arzoluna! ...” TSA, document E 7072.

Until now, historians had to rely on the contemporary chroniclers' accounts on the registration and persecution of 40.000 Anatolian qizilbashs before the Çaldıran campaign. Thus, some are inclined to deny this assumption arguing that this is just an invention of sixteenth century Ottoman court historians. Nevertheless, two unpublished documents in TSA leave no doubt that the qizilbashs of Anatolia, as well as the supporters of Ahmed, were registered to be executed by the order of Selim.

The title of one of these documents, D 10149¹⁸³⁴, reads “This is the copy of a register (*defter*) that expresses (*beyān ider*) some people in the the Province of Rum.” Then it writes the people's names with short notes indicating whether or not they supported Ahmed or Murad, or they somehow had any connection with the qizilbash movement. A short paragraph was attached at the end of the document explaining the reason of preparing this register and the way in which it was prepared. According to this paragraph, it had been ordered by Sultan (Selim) to register the names of all men who participated in the political or military actions in the Province of Rum, who had supported Prince Ahmed and who had not. It had been especially ordered to specify those who joined Ahmed's forces and those who did not. Then, these registers were to be sent to the Porte. The scribe states that these men were all registered according to the style instructed by the sublime order; some of the registers were sent directly (with the requests of local governors) and some others were sent with the certificates of *timars* (*timar tezkeresi*). The paragraph ends by informing that when the Sultan read this

¹⁸³⁴ In his book, *Les ottomans les safavides et leurs voisins* (p. 53, footnote 88) Bacqué-Grammont says that he published this documents in *Suspects*, without specifying volume and number of the journal. But unfortunately, I could not get the opportunity to read his article.

register, he would be aware of the state of affairs of these people who were not capable of doing anything against the government of the Sultan.¹⁸³⁵

Table 8.1: The List of Ahmed’s Supporters and Some Qizilbashes in the Province of Rum¹⁸³⁶

NAME	NAHİYE	ADHERED TO	NOTE
..... Beğ karındaşı	Tokat	Selim	Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyye’ye geldi varmayub Sivas’a varub kat’a Sultan Ahmed’e mutabık olmamışdur. Ve asla Kızılbaş olmak ihtimali dahi yokdur.
Mustafa Beğ oğulları	Tokat	Selim	Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyye’ye geldi varmayub Sivas’a varub kat’a Sultan Ahmed’e mutabık olmamışlardur. Ve asla Kızılbaş olmak ihtimali dahi yokdur.
Şah Beğ veled-i Şeyh Hasan Beğ	Tokat	Selim	Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyye’ye geldi varmayub Sivas’a varub kat’a Sultan Ahmed’e mutabık olmamışdur. Ve asla Kızılbaş olmak ihtimali dahi yokdur.
Yıldızoğlu İmirza	Tokat	Ahmed	
Yıldızoğlu Abdullah	Tokat	Ahmed	

¹⁸³⁵ “Südde-i saadetden hükm-ü cihan mûta’ varid olub mazmûn-ı şerifinde şöyle emr olunmuş ki Vilâyet-i Rum’da Sultan Ahmed’e varan ve varmayan tâ’ifenin ki ellerinden hayr u şer gelür ânın gibi kimesneleri ‘arzınla irsal idesin deyu. Ve varanı varmayanı ellerine virdüğün ‘arzda i’lâm idesin. Eyle olsa bermüceb-i emr-i Padişahî ellerinden hayır ve şer gelen kimesneleri esâmileriyle ve haller ve evsaflarıyla defter olunub irsal olundu. Eyle olsa her biri ‘arzla veya timarların tezkeresi birle irsal olanda varan deftere dahî nazar olunub ahvalleri ma’lum oluna. Bâ-husûs bu tâ’ifenin mecalleri olmayub cümle bir yerden varmağa kâbiliyet olmadığı ecilden sâniyla irsâl olunur. Şöyle ma’lum oluna!” See TSA, document D 10149. Hüseyin Hüsameddin says that following the execution of Prince Ahmed, some officials were charged to investigate the events that took place in Amasya and to report to the Porte: “Amasya’ya gelen kâdi, mufti, mütevelli Amasya’da cereyan iden ahvâl ve fecâya’yı tahkîke me’mur olmuşlardı. Bu hey’et günlerce tahkîkât icrâ itdiler. Yapdıkları tahkîkât evrâkını bir kitâb şeklinde doğrudan Sultan Selim’e gönderdiler.” Hüseyin Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol. 3, İstanbul, 1927, p. 272. Unfortunately, as his usual habit, Hüseyin Hüsameddin provides no sources for this information. Nevertheless, there is reason to think that the document D 10149 was, at least, a part of this ‘kitâb’ that Hüseyin Hüsameddin mentions.

¹⁸³⁶ The information in the table is taken from the document D 10149 in TSA.

Yıldızoğlu Kasım	Tokat	Selim	Sultan Ahmed'e tabi olmayub Sivas'a varmışlardır
Yıldızoğlu Şah Veli ¹⁸³⁷	Tokat	Selim	Sultan Ahmed'e tabi olmayub Sivas'a varmışlardır
Horosoğlu Mustafa Beğ	Tokat	Ahmed	
Horosoğlu Mustafa Beğ'in kardaşı	Tokat	Ahmed	
Tokuzoğlu Cüneyd Beğ	Tokat	Ahmed	
Mehmed Çelebi evlad-ı Töz	Tokat	Ahmed	
Hasan Celebi evlad-ı Töz	Tokat	Ahmed	
Tozanluoğlu Kılıç Beğ	Tokat	Ahmed	
Tozanlu'dan Halil Beğ	Tokat	Ahmed	
Tozanlu'dan Üveys Beğ	Tokat	Selim	Amma mezkur Sultan Ahmed'e gelmeyüb Kızılbaşla mücavere ve muharebe itmekte kusur komamışdır.
Meşalımlu(مشالمو)'dan Dede Beğ	Tokat	Ahmed	Sultan Ahmed bu defa Ruma geldükde mezkura Tokat Çeribaşılığı vermiş.
Aşçı Ali Beğ	Tokat	Ahmed	
Barak Beğ oğlu Ali Çelebi (Aşçı Ali Bey'in güyagsu)	Tokat	Ahmed	
Veli Çelebi veled-I Bazarluoğlu Mustafa Beğ	Tokat	Ahmed	

¹⁸³⁷ According to Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, he was Shah Veli b. Celal who led a large-scale qızilbash uprising in 1520. Bacqué-Grammont believes that these four people, namely Yıldızoğlu İmirza, Yıldızoğlu Abdullah, Yıldızoğlu Kasım, and Yıldızoğlu Şah Veli were brothers. During the civil war, contrary to his two brothers Shah Veli did not join Prince Ahmed's forces and went to Sivas with his third brother Kasım. See Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Seyyid Taman, un agitateur hétérodoxe a Sivas (1516-1518)", *IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi'nden Ayrışım*, Ankara: TTK, 1988, p. 868. For the uprising of Shah Veli b. Celal see Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Etudes Turco-Safavides, III. Notes et documents sur la révolte de Sah Veli b. Seyh Celal", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VII, 1982, 5-69.

Lütfi Çelebi veled-i Bazarluoğlu Mustafa Beğ	Tokat	Ahmed	
Hızır Beğ veled-i Bayad Beğ	Tokat	Ahmed	
Hızır Beğ veled-i Bayad Beğ'in kardeşi	Tokat	Kızılbaş	Tozanlu'dan kızılbaş'a gitmişdir
Ahmed Çelebi veled-i Denli Sinan	Niksar	Ahmed	
Mehmed Çelebi veled-i Taceddin Beğ	Gedegra (Mecitözü)	Selim	Sultan Ahmed Amasiyyeye geldükde kaçub Kastamonuya Karacapaşaya varmışdur
Elvend Çelebi veled-i Taceddin Beğ	Gedegra (Mecitözü)	Selim	Sultan Ahmed Amasiyyeye geldükde kaçub Kastamonuya Karacapaşaya varmışdur
Ahmed Çelebi veled-i Taceddin Beğ	Gedegra (Mecitözü)	Selim	Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyyeye geldükde beğlerbeğiyle bile bulunub dutulub sonradan bir suretle kaçub Kastamonuya varmışdur.
Hasan Celebi veled-i Taceddin Beğ	Gedegra (Mecitözü)	Selim	Merhum Sultan Ahmed Amasiyyeye geldükde beğlerbeğiyle bile bulunub dutulub sonradan bir suretle kaçub Kastamonuya varmışdur
Şah Beğ biraderi İşan Sultan	Gedegra (Mecitözü)	Ahmed	Sultan Ahmed'in Sipahi oğlanlar ağası idi
Tursun Beğ veled-i Ali Beğ	Gedegra (Mecitözü)	Murad	Sultan Murad'a tabi olub Kızılbaş olub Sultan Murad gidicek mezkur yine yolunda kalmışdur
İbrahim Beğ	Gedegra (Mecitözü)	Kızılbaş	
İbrahim Beğ Oğlu	Gedegra (Mecitözü)	Kızılbaş	
Kavak Çeribaşısı Ali Çelebi	Kavak	Murad-Kızılbaş	
Kavak Çeribaşısı Ali Çelebi'nin karındaşı İsa	Kavak	Murad-Kızılbaş	
Kavak Çeribaşısı Ali Çelebi'nin karındaşları oğlu Mehmed Çelebi	Kavak	Murad-Kızılbaş	

Bafra Çeribaşısı Musa Beğ Balısı	Bafra	Ahmed	
Ali Çelebi veled-i Kaya Çelebi	Sonisa (Uluköy)	Selim	Sultan Ahmed'e tabi olmayub Yenişehir kalasına varmışdur
Mahmud Çelebi veled-i Kaya Çelebi	Sonisa (Uluköy)	Ahmed	
Mehmed Çelebi veled-i Kaya Çelebi	Sonisa (Uluköy)	Ahmed	
Sonisa çeribaşısı	Sonisa (Uluköy)	Ahmed	
Eski çeribaşoğlu Mahmud Çelebi	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Çiftlüoğlu Hazar Beğ	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Amasiyye Çeribaşısı karındaşı Yakup Çelebi	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Mahmud veled-i Turan	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Mahmud veled-i Turan'ın oğulları	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Kara Çelebi veled-i Derviş Ağa	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Kara Çelebi veled-i Derviş Ağa'nın bir oğlu	Amasiyye	Murad	Sultan Murad'la bile gitmiş
Kara Çelebi veled-i Derviş Ağa'nın biraderi Bayezid	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Ali Çelebi veled-i Hacı Nevruz	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Beğler Ağa veled-i Mehmed Çelebi	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Hamza Beğ veled-i Ata Beğ	Amasiyye	Ahmed	Mezkurun kızılbaşta bir kimesne tealliki vardır
Hamza Beğ veled-i Ata Beğ'in bir yakını (tealliki)	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş (gitmiş)	
Bali Beğ veled-i Bekir Beğ	Amasiyye	Ahmed	

Dlbendbastı Ali	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
..... Ođlu Ali elebi	Amasiyye	Ahmed	
Hasan veled-i Bardakçı	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
İlyas Beđ Ođlu	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Şah Beđ Ođlu	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Bali elebi veled-i Naib Abdullah	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Kapıcı Mustafa'nın bir ođlu	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Kapıcı Mustafa'nın diđer ođlu	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Kasım Beđ veled-i Abdrrezzak	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
orlu'dan Uzun Beđ Ođlu	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Uđurlu veled-i Karamanlı	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Ali elebi veled-i Yaraş	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Minnet Ađa Ođlu	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Selman veled-i Şeyh Hasan Beđ	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Ađa Beđ Ođlu	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Eski Nişancıbaşı Ođlu Haydar	Amasiyye	Kızılbaş	
Sultan Ali defterdarı Acem Sinan Ođlu Sinan elebi	orum	Ahmed	
Tatar ođlanlarından Gnlsz	orum	Ahmed	

Tatar oğlanlarından Gönülsüz'ün karındaşı	Çorum	Ahmed	
Tatar oğlanlarından Şehsüvar nam kimesne	Çorum	Ahmed	
Sadulmelik Oğlu	Çorum	Ahmed	
İnallu'dan Hasan Beğ Oğlu	Çorum	Murad	Sultan Murad'ladur
Seyyid Nureddin	Ladik	Murad-Kızılbaş	Sultan Murad'a tabi olub kızılbaş olub cemiyet dahi itmişdür
Salimin (Meşalim) Oğlu Bali Beğ	Salimin(?) Kara Hisar	Ahmed	
Salimin (Meşalim) Oğlu Bali Beğ'in küçük oğlu	Salimin(?) Kara Hisar	Ahmed	
Salimin (Meşalim) Oğlu Bali Beğ'in büyük oğlu	Salimin(?) Kara Hisar	Ahmed	Sultan Ahmed'in ulufecisibaşıdır
Meşalimlu'dan Yinal Mensur	Salimin(?) Kara Hisar	Kızılbaş	Kızılbaş olup hayli fesad itmişdür

As it can be immediately recognized, this register includes not only the supporters of Ahmed and Murad or the qizilbashes but also some notables who had been indeed among Selim's supporters but were under the suspicion of pursuing pro-Ahmed stand or of the qizilbash affinity during the struggle. It seems like a general survey aiming primarily, but not exclusively, to determine the prominent notables of the *Vilāyet-i Rum* who either sympathized or actively joined Ahmed's troops during the struggle between Selim and Ahmed. Their affinity for the qizilbash movement, as well as their adherence to Sultan Murad if any existed, were also under investigation. In this journalistic report, people are attributed to one or two of the four stands: those who joined Ahmed's forces, those who adhered to Murad, those who took part in the

qizilbash movements, and those who were not anyhow connected to one of these three parties. The last group was evidently not among the primary targets of the survey and did not include all the notables pursuing a pro-Selim stand. Among them were only those who somehow fell under suspicion of one of the former three attributes. The reporter seems to have included their names in the register simply to clear out any doubt on their names. The *defter* simply reports the stands of people; it does not indicate what happened to them. Nonetheless, it is not hard to deduce from the narrations of the chronicles and from one other archival document, to be analyzed below, that those men whose connections with one or more of the former three parties were destined to be executed.

The first and foremost fact put forward by this document is that either before or immediately after the execution of his brother (Ahmed), Sultan Selim ordered to inspect all the dignitaries of the Province of Rum¹⁸³⁸ in order to determine their previous (and at the time being as well) political and ideological tendencies; Selim's order also included to register those dignitaries who had somehow been linked to Ahmed's political party or to the qizilbash movements in separate *defters*. We do not have enough evidence to verify whether the same sort of inspection was carried out in other provinces. Even if it

¹⁸³⁸ These men who were registered in D10343 were seemingly not ordinary people but the dignitaries of the region; in more proper words, they were mostly *mālikāne* holders. For a comparison with leading families of the District (*kaza*) of Amasya with *mālikāne* hold in c. 1480 and in 1520 see Appendix III in Oktay Özel, *Changes and Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in Rural Anatolia: A Case Study of Amasya (1576-1642)*, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Manchester, 1993, pp. 241-255. In his table Özel provides a complete list of revenue holders of Amasya around 1480, 1520, and 1576 basing on the *tahrir* registers of the region. The events under scrutiny here occurred in 1512-1514, between the first and the second *tahrir* registers used by Özel. The same names in my list are not supposed to appear in *tahrir* registers of 1480 compiled more than thirty years earlier, a time interval enough for a generation change. On the other hand, although there was a period of time of less than ten years to the second register which was created in 1520, since they were somehow erased by Selim's state, the names of this study are not expected to appear in this register too. Thus it is neither feasible nor fruitful to compare exact names in my list with those determined by Özel. Nonetheless, a comparison of their family attributions is still possible and provides enough evidence to affirm my suggestion above.

was not carried out, it is not difficult to recognize Selim's distrust in the people of the Province of Rum, since Ahmed's opposition, Murad's activities and the major qizilbash uprisings all emerged from within this region. Thus, it is obviously reflected in this document along with other sources that before embarking his decisive campaign against Shah Ismail, Selim desired to extirpate social roots of any potential opposition in this province. As my next document clearly shows, he did not refrain to employ the most brutal measures for this purpose.

The second document at our disposal is directly related to the registration and execution of the qizilbashes by the Ottoman authorities.¹⁸³⁹ To be more specific, it is a list prepared and sent by a local governor reporting those qizilbashes executed and the reasons why they were put to death. See Table 8.2.

Table 8.2: The List of Some Executed Qizilbashes in the Province of Rum¹⁸⁴⁰

NAME	KARYE / SEHR	REASON TO EXECUTE	RESULT
Divane Yakub	Karye-i Tacüddevele (?)	Kadurga seferine ve Torul (Hurhul / Turhal) cengine ve Erzincan'a varduğundan	Katl
Osman veled-i Adilhan	Karye-i Yassıviran (Merzifon-Amasya)	Kadurga seferine ve Mihmanselam cengine varduğu malum olduğundan	Katl
Ali	Karye-i Yassıviran (Merzifon-Amasya)	Kadurga seferine ve Torul cengine ve Erzincan'a varub kızılbaşoğlu kızılbaşdur şehadet eyledükleri ecilden	Katl
Halid veled-i Halil	Karye-i Hallar ? (Osmançık-Çorumlu)	Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine ve ehl-i müfsid olduğu malum olduğundan	Katl
Mehmed veled-i Ali	Karye-i Hallar	Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine varduğu malum olduğundan	Katl

¹⁸³⁹ TSA, document D 5720.

¹⁸⁴⁰ The information in the table is derived from document D 5720 in TSA.

Kasım (?)	Karye-i Hallar	Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine varduğu külli malum olundukdan	Katl
Yahya veled-i Yusuf	Karye-i Hallar	Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine ve ehl-i fesad olduğu malum olundukdan	Katl
Hızır Veli veled-i Yusuf	Karye-i Afşar (Argoma, Yavaş-Amasya, Gelmûgad-Sivas-Tokat, Suşehri-Karahisar-ı Şarki)	Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine ve Erzincan'a varduğu malum olundukdan	Katl
Mehmed veled-i Musa	Karye-i Afşar	Torul cengine ve Erzincan'a ve ehl-i fesad olduğu malum olundukdan	Katl
Mustafa veled-i Ahmed	Karye-i Afşar	Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine ve Mihmanselam cengine varduğu malum olundukdan	Katl
İsmail veled-i Süleyman (Selman)	Karye-i Afşar	Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine vediğer uğrısuz (?) ehl-i fesad olduğu malum olundukdan	Katl
Mehmed veled-i Hasan	Karye-i Afşar	Torul cengine ve Kagurga seferine ve Osmancuk cengine varduğu malum ulundukdan	Katl
Ahmed veled-i Mehmed	Karye-i Afşar	Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine ve Torul cenginden ... bile olub ...düştüğü malum olundukdan	Katl
Divane İbrahim	Karye-i Ağören (Akviran adıyla Osmancık-Çorumlu)	Torul cengine ve Kadurga seferine ve bu diyardan ehl-i müfsid olduğu malum olundukdan	Katl
Receb	Karye-i Zogu (Argoma-Amasya)	Kızılbaş canibinden taç giyüb Şehr-i Merzifon tamgasın üzerine oturub, zabt idüb, kitabet idüb ve il garet idüb ve mecmu' cenklerde bile olduğu malum olundukdan	Katl
Mustafa	Şehr-i Zeytun (Çorumlu)	Taç giyüb, il garet idüb ve Torul cengine varduğu malum olundukdan	Katl
Rıza (?)	Şehr-i Zeytun	Taç giyüb Kadurga seferine ve Torul cengine varduğu malum olundukdan	Katl
Sofu Ali Oğlu	Şehr-i Zeytun	Acemü'l-cemal (?) olub üzerine hayli adem cem idüb memleket garet idüb ve fesada kadir idüğü malum olundukdan	Katl

Considering the geographic distribution of the executions, it immediately becomes apparent that the qizilbashes registered in this report were all from a specific region which includes the *nāhiyes* or *kazas* of Merzifon, Argoma, Osmancık, and Zeytun. According to the administrative division in 1530, the first two *kazas* were within the border of Amasya Sancak while the latter two belonging to the Sancak of Çorumlu.¹⁸⁴¹ Considering the fact that during the political struggle between Prince Ahmed and Prince Selim this region almost fell under the control of the rebellious qizilbashes led by Prince Murad and Kara Iskender, this is quite meaningful.¹⁸⁴² Nevertheless, one can hardly assure that this is the whole of the reports prepared by local officials, which indicates all the executed qizilbashes rather it simply appears to be an example survived while many others disappeared or have not been found in the archives yet. It would not be wrong to suppose, especially when the accounts of contemporary Ottoman historians are taken into consideration, that there were many reports of this kind listing the people somehow affiliated to the qizilbash movement in other provinces such as Karaman and Teke.

D 5720 clearly demonstrates that some certain actions require execution as premised by the *fetvās* of Hamza and Kemalpaşazāde. This document specifies these actions as follows: participating in the campaign (*sefer*) of Kadurga, in the fights (*cenk*) of Torul and Mihmanselam, and arriving in Erzincan. For one case, participating in the fight of Osmancuk is also mentioned. Here, “arriving in Erzincan” obviously means

¹⁸⁴¹ See 387 *Numaralı Muhāsabe-i Vilâyet-i Karaman ve Rûm Defteri (937/1530)*, published by T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet Arşivleri Genel Müdürlüğü Osmanlı Arşivi Daire Başkanlığı, Yayın no: 36, Ankara, 1997, pp. 222-223.

¹⁸⁴² See Chapter VII in this study.

joining Shah Ismail's suite during his Erzincan congregation in the summer of 1500. "The fight of Osmancuk" refers to the fight occurred during the qizilbash uprisings in 1512. But I could not determine which events are meant by "the campaign of Kadurga" and "the fight of Torul and Mihmanselam." Most probably, these fights also have occurred in the Province of Rum during the qizilbash uprisings in the years 1511-1512.

Apart from these, some other acts and deeds of the qizilbashes also caused them to be executed. Among them are wearing the qizilbash *tāc*, tyrannizing the lands (*il gāret itmek*), and causing dissension. Most of the qizilbashes registered in the list were included in both the fights cited above and other activities. Only one of the 19 listed qizilbashes was not participated in any of these fights but linked to Iran, and the plundering of land by summoning vagabonds around.

What this document evidently reveals is that the Ottoman government under Selim I did not show any tolerance against those subjects whose connection with the qizilbash movement was proved. One should not disregard, however, the fact that the events used by Ottoman officials in reasoning the execution of the qizilbashes did not necessarily take place during the struggle of the princes which started approximately by 1509 but by the advent of Ismail in 1500. As already delineated, the meeting of Erzincan became one of the most crucial milestones, perhaps the most crucial one, in the march of young Ismail to the throne of Persia. About 7000 qizilbashes gathered in Erzincan defeated the Akkoyunlu ruler Alvand Mirza's army of 30.000 soldiers in Sharur in the summer of 1501 and thus opened the way to suzerainty of Azarbayjan and Persia for Ismail.¹⁸⁴³ Ottoman authorities seem to have been aware of this crucial role of Erzincan

¹⁸⁴³ See Roger Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 26.

meeting in the growth of the new formidable ‘evil’ that they deemed the participation in this meeting as a reason for execution.

8.5. THE CAMPAIGN

After eradicating the possibility of a qizilbash uprising within the empire, Selim could embark on his campaign on Shah Ismail. Anatolian and Rumelian troops met in Yenişehir.¹⁸⁴⁴ Towards the end of March, Selim sent a letter to Abid Han, the Ozbek ruler, informing the Han about his campaign on ‘heretic’ Ismail and demanded his help from the eastern flank.¹⁸⁴⁵ The answer of this letter was written in the last days of July. In his letter, Ubeyd Han mentions their war with the Qizilbash and expresses his pleasure of hearing sultan’s decision. He also promises to assault the eastern provinces of Safavid state concurrently with the sultan’s attack.¹⁸⁴⁶ Selim also sent letters to some local begs and small-scale rulers demanding provisional and logistic help.¹⁸⁴⁷ Among the rulers of the region, Dulkadiroğlu Alaaddin refused to support Selim’s campaign; he refused to dispatch Dulkadirli fighters against the qizilbashes and to provide provisional help to the Ottoman army while it was passing through and near his territories.¹⁸⁴⁸

On April 28, 1514, when the army was in Izmit, Selim sent the first letter which was authored by Tācizāde Cafer Chelebi, to the Shah with one of Ismail’s incarnated spies called Kılıç.¹⁸⁴⁹ For the students of the Ottoman-Safavid history, the importance of this letter is derived not only from the fact that it was the official declaration of the war

¹⁸⁴⁴ KPZ9, p. 98.

¹⁸⁴⁵ For the full text of this letter see Feridun Bey, *Münşeat*, pp. 346-349.

¹⁸⁴⁶ Feridun Bey, pp. 349-351. Nonetheless, for some reasons he did not do so.

¹⁸⁴⁷ See, for example, HYDR, pp. 42-3.

¹⁸⁴⁸ See Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un İran Seferi”, p. 59.

¹⁸⁴⁹ HYDR, p. 61, 136. According to IDRS, this letter was written on April 23. See IDRS, p. 142. Also consider ALI, p. 1077.

but also from its content reflecting the self-image, either achieved or desired, of the Ottoman state in the Islamic world and the new tendency in the official ideology encompassing both domestic and international affairs of the empire.

Here I will give a brief summary of the letter. The letter begins with verses from the Koran. But, without doubt, the verses were selected carefully. At the beginning of the letter, the phrase “the true religion with God is Islam”¹⁸⁵⁰ is recited from the Koran, Then it continues with another verse: “Inevitably those who lose faith after having had faith and then indulge in their loss of faith – their repentance shall not be accepted; those who are the ones who stray...”¹⁸⁵¹ Then comes another verse: “Whosoever receives an admonition from his Lord and gives over, he shall have his past gains, and his affair is committed to God; but whosoever reverts – those are the inhabitants of the Fire, therein dwelling forever.”¹⁸⁵² After reciting these verses from the Koran, a pray follows: “My Lord, register us among those who point out and follow the right path, but not among those who fall into astray!”¹⁸⁵³

In the following paragraph that this letter is written from Sultan Selim to Shah Ismail is mentioned. Here the epithets employed with the name of Selim call attention. Selim is described as the slayer of the wicked and infidel who crushes the enemies of the religion, the guardian of the noble and pious, the defender of the Faith, the head of *gāzis* and *mücāhids*, haloed in victory, triumphant like Ferīdūn¹⁸⁵⁴, Alexander of eminence, and standard-bearer of justice and righteousness. On the other hand, Ismail is described

¹⁸⁵⁰ Koran, III/19.

¹⁸⁵¹ Koran, III/85.

¹⁸⁵² Koran, II/275.

¹⁸⁵³ IDRS, p. 139; CLZ, p. 562, Feridun Bey, p. 351; Lütfi Paşa, p. 208; HSE4, p. 177; ALI, p. 1082.

¹⁸⁵⁴ An ancient celebrated king of Persia, who began to reign about 750 B.C.E.

as the *āmir* and the great commander of Acem, the usurping Darius¹⁸⁵⁵ of the time, and the malevolent Dahhāk¹⁸⁵⁶ of the age. The whole paragraph runs,

[After the doxology] But to proceed. This excellent address hath been issued on our part, we who are the Refuge of the Caliphate, the slayer of the infidels and polytheists, the extirpator of the foes of the Faith, the humbler of the Pharaohs' pride, the tarnisher of the Khākān's crowns, the King of those who fight and strive for Religion, whose pomp is as that of Feridun, whose Court is as that of Alexander, whose justice and equity is as that of Keyhusrev, that Dārā of noble descent, Sultan Selim Shah, son of Sultan Bāyezid, son of Sultan Muhammad Khan, to thee, who art the ruler of the Persians, the most mighty general and puissant leader, the Dahhāk of the time, the Dārāb of the combat, the Afrāsiyāb of the age, the famous Amīr Ismail.¹⁸⁵⁷

After this paragraph, further reference to the Qor'anic verses, which declares the status of human being as the deputy of God on the earth, is made. Then Selim affirms that in order to fulfill this divine mission it is compulsory to follow the path of the Prophet Mohammad, which provides the peace and salvation in both worlds. If this is so, it is required for all Muslims in general but especially for the just sultans to obey the following divine order: "O believers, be you God's helpers!"¹⁸⁵⁸, and to work faithfully to diminish the harms of whosoever does not obey the rules of God and tears the drape of the religion.

The letter of Selim describes Ismail's position with an analogy that when the forest is devoid of lion, jackal enters the forest as if it was a hero. He then recounts Ismail's wickedness driving him to war: he opened the doors of torture and oppression

¹⁸⁵⁵ Probably Darius III (ca. 336-330 B.C.E.), who was defeated three times by Alexander the Great. Selim is obviously alluding to current Ottoman-Safavid confrontation. See also William H. McNeill and Marilyn Robinson Waldman (eds.), *The Islamic World*, New York, London, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 339. An English translation of Selim's first letter is published in this book. (See *Ibid*, pp. 338-342.) Nonetheless, the source is not specified. Furthermore, the text published here shows remarkable differences from those copies recorded in Feridun Beg, IDRS, CLZ, and other cited Ottoman sources.

¹⁸⁵⁶ A mythological king of Iran, notorious for his blood-thirstiness. Here again there is an allusion to 'tyranny' and 'blood-thirstiness' of Shah Ismail against the 'just rule' of Selim.

¹⁸⁵⁷ Here I preferred the translation of Edward G. Browne. See BRW, pp. 13-14.

¹⁸⁵⁸ Kur'an, LXI/13.

to the faces of Muslims, fused the heresy and apostasy, spread discord and dissention, attempted to nullify the rules of the religion (*ṣeri'at*) according to his personal desires, sanctioned unlawful sexual course (*zīna*) which is strictly forbidden by the religious law, poured bloods of innocent Muslims, devastated the mosques, put tombs and graves in fire, despised great scholars, put the copies of Koran into dirty places, and ordered to curse two great khalifs of the Prophet, Abu Bekr and Omar. As a consequence of all these malicious deeds, says Selim, “The *ulemā* agreed on your disbelief and on the necessity of killing you and your followers.”¹⁸⁵⁹ It was because of that, stated in the letter, that Selim wore armor and caftan instead of silk in order to strengthen the religion, to help those weak people who were under oppression, to obey the divine order, and to fulfill the honor of being a ruler. After threatening Ismail by some arrogantly said words, Selim explains the reason of writing the present letter as follows: “This ornate letter is written to invite you to the true religion, Islam, for it is a rule according to the way of Mohammad to invite to Islam before unsheathing the sword.”¹⁸⁶⁰

The final section makes reference to a Qor’anic verse, “... who, they commit an indecency or wrong themselves, remember God, and pray forgiveness for their sins...”¹⁸⁶¹ Then it is told to Ismail that if he would repent for his sins and evil deeds, and would recognize the sovereignty of Selim over certain parts of his country, which was formerly trampled by the Ottoman horses, he would see nothing but friendly treatment

¹⁸⁵⁹ IDRS, p. 141; CLZ, p. 563; Feridun Bey, p. 352; Lütü Paṣa, p. 210; HSE4, p. 179; ALI, p. 1084.

¹⁸⁶⁰ IDRS, p. p. 141; CLZ, p. 564 ; Feridun Bey, p. 352; Lütü Paṣa, p. 211; HSE4, p. 179; ALI, p. 1084.

¹⁸⁶¹ Koran, III/135.

from the Ottomans; otherwise, a brutal confrontation was inevitable. The letter finishes with a pray that “God’s compassion be upon whoever on the right path!”¹⁸⁶²

Shortly after dispatching this letter, Selim set off to Konya. On the way he visited the sanctuary of Seyyid Gāzi where he donated money to the poor of the hospice (May 12, 1514).¹⁸⁶³ This act of Selim is quite interesting because Abdals (or Kalenders) of Seyyid Gāzi were known with their ‘heterodox’ beliefs/practices and with the familial resemblances of their religious perception to that of the qizilbashs. Remembering Selim’s extremely harsh policy against ‘the qizilbash heresy’, his benevolence to another religiously ‘divergent’ group, which was indeed fairly similar - from a religious point of view - to qizilbashs, is worth to be dwelt on.

The relationship between the Kalenderī groups and the Qizilbashs during the early sixteenth century is still to be clarified for the most part. From the contemporary sources we learn of an unsuccessful attempt of a Hayderī dervish who claimed to be Mahdi to assassinate Bayezid II during the course of Albanian campaign in 1492.¹⁸⁶⁴ Ahmet Y. Ocak appears to be reasonable in arguing that this attempt could be interpreted as a protest under the disguise of Mahdist claims against the existing regime.¹⁸⁶⁵ According to Ocak, after this attempt, Bayezid II ordered to deport all Kalenderīs of

¹⁸⁶² IDRS, p. 142; CLZ, p. 565; Feridun Bey, p. 353; Lütfi Paşa, p. 212; HSE4, p. 180; ALI, p. 1085. For a brief Turkish summary of this letter also see HYDR, pp. 43-44.

¹⁸⁶³ HYDR, p. 62; IDRS, p. 143; CLZ, p. 223 ; HSE4, p. 181. (IDRS gives the date as May 1 while HSE gives as May 2)

¹⁸⁶⁴ This event is recorded in almost all the accounts of the time. Anonymous Ottoman history reads, for example, “... *Ol gün fedâyi nemed-pûş kulağı mengüşlü, boyını toklu Hayderî şeklinde pâdişaha kadt itmek istedi. Hemandem ‘Mehdi benüm’ diüyü nemedi eğnüden atub yalın kılıç elinde pâdişaha yürüdi. Birkaç gayretsiz çavuşlar var idi. Önünden gidüvirüb pâdişaha yakın gelicek vaktin İskender Paşa hazır bulundu. Hemandem karşudan bozdağan ile atup urdu, tepesi üstüne yıkıldı. Andan kılıcıyla pare pare eylediler.*” See F. Giese (ed.), *Anonim Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, haz. Nihat Azamat, İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Basımevi, 1992, p. 130.

¹⁸⁶⁵ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Kalenderī Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries”, *Manifestations of Sainthood in Islam*, ed. G. M. Smith and C. W. Ernst, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1994, p. 249; “Quelques remarques sur le rôle des derviches kalenderis dans les mouvements populaires dans l’Empire Ottoman au XVe et XVIe siècles”, *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, III, 1982, pp. 74-5.

Rumelia to Anatolia where they cooperated with the Safavid propagandists.¹⁸⁶⁶ Ocak calls attention to the coincidence of the change in the Ottoman policy towards Kalenderi groups and the acceleration of Safavid propaganda in Anatolia, and he comes up with the argument that a connection between them and Safavid followers was established by the beginning of the sixteenth century.¹⁸⁶⁷ He also puts emphasis on the emergence of Shi'ite elements in the works of the sixteenth-century Hurufi poets like Hayali, Yetimi, and Hayreti.¹⁸⁶⁸ To him, after Kalenders realized that the governing circles of the Ottoman state turned against them, they sought a new political support. Furthermore their latitudinarian way of religious life formed an appropriate soil for the Shi'ite-Safavid propaganda.¹⁸⁶⁹

Nevertheless, Ocak does not provide any direct evidence for such a co-operation, at least during the early sixteenth century.¹⁸⁷⁰ On the contrary, above-mentioned act of Sultan Selim enables us to suggest another interpretation. It seems reasonable, within the available evidence, to propose that although there was a remarkable familial resemblance in terms of religious understanding and practice, the two groups did not establish a serious organizational connection. Selim was surely aware of the doctrinal and practical likeness between the the religious beliefs of the qizilbashs and *abdals*. It was most probably because of that, that Selim needed to visit the most celebrated center

¹⁸⁶⁶ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Marjinal Süfîlik: Kalenderiler (XIV-XVII. Yüzyıllar)*, Ankara: TTK, 1999, pp. 122-3.

¹⁸⁶⁷ Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, "Quelques remarques sur le rôle des derviches kalenderis dans les mouvements populaires dans l'Empire Ottoman au XVe et XVIe siècles ", *Osmanlı Araştırmaları*, III, 1982, pp. 78-9. Ocak Fuat Köprülü already indicated the connection between Abdals and Safavid movement before. See Fuad Köprülü, "Abdal", *Türk Halk Edebiyatı Ansiklopedisi*, çıkaran M. Fuad Köprülü, sayı:1, İstanbul, 1935, pp. 30, 36.

¹⁸⁶⁸ Ocak, "Kalenderi Dervishes and Ottoman Administration", p. 251.

¹⁸⁶⁹ Ocak, "Kalenderi Dervishes and Ottoman Administration from the Fourteenth to the Sixteenth Centuries", p. 250.

¹⁸⁷⁰ I should add that I have not come across any indication to such a cooperation between the Qizilbashs and Kalenderi groups in the contemporary sources, at least until the battle of Çaldıran.

of *abdals* and showed his generosity to them: simply to keep *abdals* out of the scene during his fight with the *qizilbashes*. In other words, he aimed to isolate Kalenderīs from the Qizilbash movement.

On June 1, Selim arrived in Konya where he visited the tomb of famous Sadreddin Konevī as well as the tombs of some other saintly people and delivered food and money to poor people.¹⁸⁷¹ He also ordered to give some promotion to his soldiers.¹⁸⁷²

On July 1, the Ottoman army arrived in Sivas¹⁸⁷³ where a general inspection of the army was carried out. Idrīs records that the army was composed of 140.000 soldiers.¹⁸⁷⁴ Those *sipāhis* whose *timars* were lower than 3.000 *akçe* as well as the elderly, sick, and under-aged soldiers¹⁸⁷⁵ were separated under the command of Iskender Paşa oğlu Mustafa Beğ to protect the rear.¹⁸⁷⁶ Furthermore the registers of the treasury and other affairs as well as some other logistics were also left in the citadel of Sivas.¹⁸⁷⁷ Kemalpaşazāde draws attention to the turbulence of Kızılırmak, the reasons being his division of the army and his leaving some logistics behind.¹⁸⁷⁸ According to Idrīs,

¹⁸⁷¹ As the ‘protector of sunni Muslims’ this practice of Selim needs no explanation.

¹⁸⁷² KPZ9, pp. 98-99; IDRS, p. 143; HYDR, p. 65, 137; CLZ, p. 224.

¹⁸⁷³ HYDR, p. 67; IDRS, p. 143.

¹⁸⁷⁴ IDRS, p. 147. HR records the size of the Ottoman army in Çaldıran as 200.000. See HR, p. 177. This number seems, however, quite exaggerated. Another Safavid historian who was contemporary of the events exaggerates further: Khwandamir argues in his *Habibu’s-siyar*, which was completed in 1524, that only the cavalry of the Ottoman army were more than two hundred thousand. Additionally twelve thousand matchlockmen, whom Selim always had with him, were stationed in front of the lines. (One would add foot soldiers, mainly the Janissaries, whom Khwandamir does not mention!) See HS, p. 605.

¹⁸⁷⁵ HYDR, IDRS, CLZ, ALI, and MNB say the number of these soldiers reached 40.000. See HYDR, p. 67; IDRS, p. 147, CLZ, pp. 225-6; ALI, p. 1090. Also see HSE4, p. 183; MNB, p. 458.

¹⁸⁷⁶ KPZ9, p. 100; CLZ, p. 226; HSE4, p. 183; ALI, p. 1090.

¹⁸⁷⁷ KPZ9, p. 100.

¹⁸⁷⁸ KPZ9, p. 100.

however, provisional anxieties were chiefly responsible for doing so. He says that the qizilbashs already pillaged and put the region all the way up to Erzincan in fire.¹⁸⁷⁹

Although three months had passed since the beginning of the campaign and the army already had entered Safavid territories, no signs of the qizilbash army appeared. On the other hand, the shortage of food and water was just to begin. Thus, some grumbling arose especially among the Janissaries, who began to openly pronounce the option of returning without a fight.¹⁸⁸⁰ Nonetheless, none of the pashas dared to convey the Janissaries' sentiments to the sultan. At the end, they persuaded the *beylerbey* of Karaman Hemdem Pasha, who was one of the most trusted statesmen of Selim during the civil war. However, the pasha paid this mistake with his own life. On hearing the Janissaries' complaints, Selim got so angry that he immediately executed Hemdem Pasha on July 24, shortly after they arrived in Erzincan.¹⁸⁸¹

Then the army set off for Erzincan. Kemalpaşazāde says that in the plain of Erzincan, Selim sent two successive letters to Ismail inviting him to battle. Ismail received these letters in Ucan Yaylağı, in the highlands of Azarbaijan.¹⁸⁸² We know that before the battle Selim sent four letters to Ismail, the first two being in Persian and the third and fourth being in Turkish, while Ismail only sent one. Three of Selim's four letters were written before the arrival of Ismail's answer. As already delineated, the first letter was sent on April 28, 1514 from Izmit and its whole text is recorded by Idrīs, Celalzāde, Feridun Bey, Haydar, and some later historians. The place where the second letter was written and when it was written are not clearly delineated in the sources. What

¹⁸⁷⁹ IDRS, p. 147, 162. Also see HSE4, p. 183 and ALI, p. 1090; MNB, p. 458.

¹⁸⁸⁰ SKB, pp. 151-2; HSE4, p. 187; ALI, p. 1094; MNB, p. 459.

¹⁸⁸¹ HYDR, p. 70, 140; IDRS, p. 149, 153; SKB, pp. 152-3; CLZ, p. 232; ALI, p. 1094; MNB, 459. According to HSE, this event occurred on July 23. See HSE4, pp. 188-9.

¹⁸⁸² KPZ9, p. 102.

is certain from the available sources is that it was written by Mevlāna Mürşid-i ‘Acem somewhere between Izmit and Erzincan. Its full text is available in the *Münşeāt* of Feridun Bey and *Ruznāme* of Haydar Çelebi.¹⁸⁸³ It repeats the content of the first letter authored by Tāci-zāde Cafer. The third letter of Selim was written in Erzincan in mid-August 1514 (*Evāhir-i Cemāzi II*, 920) shortly before the arrival of Ismail’s answer to his first two letters.¹⁸⁸⁴

Selim’s last two letters which were written in Turkish were recognizably different from the first two ones in terms of style and content. These two letters were far beyond the diplomatic language and the international rules of diplomacy. On the contrary, they were written in a somewhat arrogant, despising, and insulting style. Selim’s aim by these letters was evidently to provoke Ismail to battle as soon as possible.¹⁸⁸⁵ The apparently despising attitude of Selim comes out immediately in the introduction of the third letter. He totally abandons the customary way of diplomacia by not using any epithet before the name of Ismail; rather addresses Ismail by simply his name that “Ismail Bahadır”. Then comes a wish, or demand from the God (*dua*), which was as despising as the addressing was: “Eslahallahu şāneh” meaning “shall God improve his fame”.¹⁸⁸⁶ Then the letter starts by reminding the heretical status of Ismail according to the Sunni religious scholars who also unanimously sanctioned the execution of all the qizilbashs for the sake of Islam. Then Selim affirms that according to the already reached decision of *ulemā* he waged war and that he is resolute to finish this affair. He reminds his former letters in an insulting manner that “I have explained

¹⁸⁸³ See Feridun Bey, pp. 354-5; *Ruznāme*, Manuscript in *Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi*, R. 1955.

¹⁸⁸⁴ Feridun Bey, p. 356; HYDR, p. 46.

¹⁸⁸⁵ As delineated above, Janissaries had already begun to speak loudly about the fruitlessness of such a march without enemy.

¹⁸⁸⁶ IDRS, p. 151; CLZ, p. 227; Feridun Bey, p. 355; Lütü Paşa, p. 213; HYDR, pp. 44.

my intentions in the beginning of my campaign so that you would not say that you could not find enough time to prepare for a just war!”¹⁸⁸⁷ Selim continues despising, “although I have already informed you on my campaign and although I have been in your country since tens of days, no sign of your presence appeared yet. There seems no difference between your existence and absence!” His following words are pretty heavy for a ruler to be addressed:

Kılıç da’vasın idenlerin siper gibi belälara göğüs germek dāyım pīşesi, serverlik sevdāsında olanların zahm-i tīğ u teberden sırtartmamak her nefes endīşesi olmak gerek. ... Hazer selāmetde perde nişinlik ihtiyār idenlere erlik adı hata, ölümden korkan kimesnelere ata binmek ve kılıç kuşanmak nā-sezādır. Hāliya bu mesābede ihtifā ve bu derecede zāviye-i hamūlede inzivā ki sebep ağleb-i ihtimal kesret-i leşker-i bī-kıyasdan istīlā-yı ru’b u hirāsdır, imdi bu ma’nānın izālesi için asker-i zafer-rehberden kırk bin mikdārı er ifrāz olunub Kayseriyye ile Sivas mābeyninde ikāmet emrolunmuşdur. Hasma irhā-yı ‘inān, tevsi’-i dāyire-i meydān bu denlü olur, bundan artuk olmaz.¹⁸⁸⁸ Eđer zātında fi’l-cümle gayret ü hamıyyetden şemme vü eser var ise gelüb asākır-i nusret-me’āsire mukābil olasın. Ezel-i āzālde mukadder olan her ne ise ma’raz-ı bürüzda cilve-gir ola.¹⁸⁸⁹

Not long after the dispatch of this letter, the envoy of Ismail carrying his letter arrived in the Ottoman camp in Yassıçemen.¹⁸⁹⁰ With this envoy Ismail sent not only the answer to Selim’s former letters but also two mocking symbols as well: a pot (*hokka*) and a paste (*macun*).¹⁸⁹¹ Ismail’s answer evidently aimed to calm the tension down.

¹⁸⁸⁷ IDRS, p. 151; CLZ, p. 227; Feridun Bey, p. 356; Lütfi Paşa, p. 214; HYDR, p. 46.

¹⁸⁸⁸ Of course this was not the real reason; rather Selim was ridiculing in order to provoke Ismail’s pride. As already delineated, Selim’s concern in dividing his army was two-fold: on one hand, serious provisional risks appeared since Ustaclu Muhammed Han already pillaged the region from Sivas to Erzincan; on the other hand, those ‘weak’ soldiers were commissioned to protect any qizilbash attack from the rear. For a similar approach see TNSS, p. 43.

¹⁸⁸⁹ IDRS, pp. 151-2; CLZ, pp. 227-228; Feridun Bey, pp. 355-6; HYDR, pp. 44-46; Lütfi Paşa, pp. 215-6; HSE4, pp. 186-7. A summary version of this letter is included also in SLZ2, pp. 18-9.

¹⁸⁹⁰ On June 17. See HSE4, p. 185; ALI, p. 1091. In *Tacu’t-tevārih* Selim’s first Turkish letter is mentioned after the narration of the arrival of Ismail’s envoy with his letter in reply. However, in Ismail’s letter there are discernable references to this letter (the third letter of Selim). Selim’s last letter, on the other hand, clearly refers to Ismail’s answer. Thus, Ismail’s answer must have arrived to the Ottoman camp between the two Turkish letters of Selim.

¹⁸⁹¹ IDRS, p. 152; CLZ, p. 229; SKB, pp. 149-50; ALI, p. 1091; MNB, p. 458. These presents were certainly a part of an arrogant and aggressive diplomacy between the two monarchs. Before the arrival of the Shah’s presents, as ALI says, Sultan Selim had already sent women and dervish clothes to Ismail insulting the masculinity of the Shah on one hand and reminding his humble dervish origin on the other.

First he give the reason of entering into Ottoman territories in 1507. His aim had not been to violate Ottoman borders but to punish the insolent beg of Dulkadir, Alauddevle. Then he explains how his ancestors, including himself, have borne positive sentiments against the Ottoman dynasty. At the same time, Ismail tacitly threatens Selim by reminding the victory of Timur over Ottomans. Then Ismail criticizes the style of Selim's letter for they were quite arrogant and they violated the diplomatic courtesy. Ismail says that "there is no need for such inappropriate words. Indeed such a diplomatic style does not befit a ruler. I guess it must be the work of scribes who were most likely in ecstasy because of overtaking hashish! For them, I am also sending a pot of hashish with this letter!" At the end of the letter, Ismail states that he had written this letter which would be sent with friendly sentiments during a hunt in Isfahan. He declares at the same time that he started the preparations for a war which was not much desired by him. Ismail finishes his words by stating that if the sultan of Rum thought of nothing but the war then the confrontation should not be delayed; however, he is suggested to think the end very carefully for the descendants of Ali has not been defeated yet.¹⁸⁹²

ALI's account runs, "... [Selim] *ta'n u tevbîhi vâfir ve serzîşi mütekâsir nâmeler ile gâh nezkeb ü gâh çenber gönderirlerdi. 'Senin gibi nâ-merde destâr u miğfer yerine bunlar lâyıkdır' diyû muhannesliğini tasrîh kılurlardı ve gâh 'Sen bir sofu-zâdesin, taht-gâh-ı saltanata lâyıkdır bir fîrû-mâye üftâdesin. Sana münâsib olan bulnardur' diyû hurka, 'abâ ve şal ve misvâk ve 'asâ gönderüb, 'Sana zâviye-nişîn olmak münâsibdir' diyû bildürürlerdi.*" See ALI, p. 1091. Also consider HSE4, p. 190.

¹⁸⁹² For the full text of this letter see Feridun Bey, pp. 356-7; HYDR, p. 47. A versified and, to a certain extent, altered version of Ismail's answer is recorded also in KPZ9, pp. 102-103; YSF, pp. 49-50. All of the KPZ's account except one couplet exists in YSF. As for Safavid chroniclers, none of them gives the text of this letter. HS summarizes it with two sentences while HR mentions only with one sentence. According to the both chronicles, Ismail received Selim's letter (it must be his first letter) in Hamadan. He honored Selim's emissary with royal robe and gave him permission to withdraw. See HS, pp. 604-5; HR, pp. 177-8. HS states that after giving Selim's emissary permission to withdraw, Ismail set out for the battlefield. See also AA, p. 67.

Ismail's letter annoyed Selim so much that he immediately ordered to execute the qizilbash messenger¹⁸⁹³ and to write a fourth letter full of affront.¹⁸⁹⁴ The style of this letter was more insulting than that of the third one. It starts with the same despising *hitāp*.¹⁸⁹⁵ The starting paragraph states that his (Ismail's) letter and that substance which augments the courage (hashish) were received. You have stated, says Selim, that you sent this letter in order to free me from expectation or waiting. Then Selim begins insulting in an ultimately arrogant manner stating that with the courage embodied in his disposition he had already moved with his army and entered into the country of Ismail. Then Selim's letter continues,

Âyin-i selâtin-i ulu'l-emr ve mezheb-i kavâkin-i zevi'l-kadrde padişahların taht-ı tasarruflarında olan memleket menkûhası mesabesindedir. Rücûliyetden hissesi, fütüvvetden bahresi, belki derûnunda fi'l-cümle zehresi olan kimesne kendüden gayri bir ferd ana ta'arruz itdüğüne tahammül itmek ihtimali yokdur. Öyle olsa bunca gündür 'asâkir-i nusret-meâsir memleketüne dâhil olub kāmuranlık iderler, henüz senden ne nām u nişān peydā ve vücūdundan eser hüveydādır. Hayatın ve memātın 'ale's-sevādır. 'Arīzī cüret kesbetmeğe hācet kimde var idüğüne zāhir hāl tamam şāhiddür. Vāki'-i hāl kazıyye budur ki şimdiye değin senden bir fiil vücūda gelmemişdir ki andan celādet ve merdānelik fehmoluna. Sürete gelen amel dahī ser-ā-ser semere-i mekr ü hiyeldür. ... [After accusing Ismail of needing extra substance (such as hashish) to raise courage and reminding him that he had already left considerable portion of his army to raise his (Ismail's) courage] ... Eđer min ba'd dahī ber-karar-ı vaz'-ı sâbık günc-i zāviye-i ra'b u hirâsda münzevî olasın, erlik adı harāmdır. Miğfer yerine mi'cer, zırh yerine çadır ihtiyār eyleyüb serdarlık ve şahlık sevdāsından ferāğat eyliyesin!¹⁸⁹⁶

On the other hand, Sultan Selim dispatched some pioneer troops under the command of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beg in order to gather information and capture some

¹⁸⁹³ IDRS, p. 152; CLZ, p. 230. Indeed, during this campaign Selim executed all the qizilbash envoys who carried Ismail's messages as well as the qizilbash captives nabbed on the way. See, for example, HYDR, p. 65, 69, 71-2.

¹⁸⁹⁴ This letter was written only days after the third one. Feridun Bey and HYDR record the dates of both letters as *Evāhir-i Cemāzi II*, which means the last ten days of *Cemāzi II*. This corresponds to the period between August 12 and August 21, 1514. See Feridun Bey, p. 358; HYDR, p. 49.

¹⁸⁹⁵ "İsmail Bahadır, Eslahallahu şāneh!" See IDRS, p. 152; CLZ, p. 230, Feridun Bey, p. 557; HYDR, p. 47.

¹⁸⁹⁶ CLZ, pp. 230-31; IDRS, pp. 152-3; Feridun Bey, pp. 357-8; HYDR, pp. 47-9; Lütfi Paşa, pp. 217-8; HSE4, pp. 190-1; ALI, pp. 1087-8.

captives (*dil almak*).¹⁸⁹⁷ For similar purposes, one of Ferruḥşah Beg's men, Şeyh Ahmed, also moved to Tabriz. It seems from the contemporary sources that Şeyh Ahmed, who reached the Shah in Ucan Yaylağı, accomplished a very successful espionage. He managed to make Ismail to believe that he was sent by Rumelian begs and Turkoman leaders in Selim's army. He also persuaded the Shah on that most of the Rumelian and Turkoman begs were adherents of the shah by heart and they were requesting the order of the Shah on what to do and he told Ismail that they had promised to change sides during the battle. When he arrived in Hoy, Ismail who was utterly tricked by and believed in Şeyh Ahmed's senario sent him to the Ottoman army ordering to continue pretending as an Ottoman soldier.

[Şeyh Ahmed] eyitdi ki “Beni Rumili Beğleri ve Türkmân serverleri gönderdiler. Cümlesi kadimden muhibb-i Âl-i ‘Aba ve hevâdâr-ı evlâd-ı Murtaza olub Şahun hizmetine tâlipler, cân u dilden bende-i fermân olmağa râğiblerdür. ... Cümlesi kemer-bend-i vifâkı miyân-ı ittifâke şuşanub şöyle ahd-u misak eylemişlerdür ki miyân-ı meydana ki iki asker-i kine-ver mukâbil olıcak bād-i âsüb esüb gavga-yı vağa ile sahra-yı masâff tolıcak ol emr-i mahfîyi izhâr ideler. Rum askerini koyub Acem leşkerine gelüb gideler. Şahun uğrına can u baş oynayub dostuna dost düşmenine düşmen olalar.” Mezkûr mağrur bu efsâneye i'timâd idüb aldı. Mezkûr beğler cinayet-i hiyânete, ki cümle hiyânetten eşeddür, ikdâm ideler sandı. Cāsusa vâfir in'âm idüb Hoy nâm kasabaya dek bile getürdü. “Yine sen mukaddemâ var istimâlât eyle, ben dahî Çaldıran'da yetişirim!” didi.¹⁸⁹⁸

25 days after the execution of Hemdem Pasha, the Janissaries began to raise their voices again. Their complaint was the same: although they were in this foreign country which had been systematically devastated by Safavids¹⁸⁹⁹ for a long time, no sign of the enemy appeared yet; if they continued in that way they would all die of

¹⁸⁹⁷ KPZ9, p. 103; YSF, p. 50;

¹⁸⁹⁸ KPZ9, pp. 103-104. HYDR's and HSE's accounts pertaining to Şeyh Ahmed are more or less the same. See HYDR, pp. 73-74, 141; HSE4, pp. 195-6. For a slightly different version of this story see SKB, pp. 159-60; YSF, pp. 51-52. Also consider MNB, p. 461.

¹⁸⁹⁹ Ustacalu Muhammed Beg had already pillaged and put in fire all the region before Ottomans' arrival. See IDRS, pp. 162-3; HSE4, p. 183.

hunger and thirst!¹⁹⁰⁰ The situation was quite difficult for Selim, who thought no other alternative but to crush Ismail as soon as possible.¹⁹⁰¹ Thanks to the messengers of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beg and to Şeyh Ahmed who saved the position by the good news that Ismail would meet the Ottoman army in Çaldıran.¹⁹⁰² Upon returning to Selim's camp, Şeyh Ahmed informed the sultan about Ismail's plan to meet Ottomans in Çaldıran plains. In return for his services, he is shown the generosity of the sultan. At the same time, some of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beg's men arrived in the court and reported similar news.¹⁹⁰³

After receiving this good news, a solar eclipse was witnessed, which was interpreted by astrologers as the victory of the sultan of the western countries over the sultan of the eastern countries, on Cemāzi II 29, 920 (August 21, 1514).¹⁹⁰⁴ On the next day the advance guard of the qızilbash army was seen. At first, the Ottoman army alarmed for a sudden clash. But upon realizing that the distance between the two armies could not be covered in one day, Selim ordered his army to camp but to be ready for the battle. The night was spent with great caution and preparation for the battle.¹⁹⁰⁵ Kemalpaşazāde's portraying of Ottoman soldiers who were waiting for the upcoming battle is worth mentioning. He depicts Ottoman soldiers as *gāzis* fighting for the sake of

¹⁹⁰⁰ CLZ, pp. 234-5; HSE4, p. 192; ALI, pp. 1095-6.

¹⁹⁰¹ According to HSE and ALI, upon hearing the complaints of the Janissaries, in order to demonstrate his resolution, Selim came among them and gave an effective speech, which reaffirmed their absolute obedience to the Sultan. See HSE4, pp. 192-3; ALI, p. 1096. MNB follows their figure. See MNB, p. 460. See also TNSS, p. 49; Tekindağ, "Yavuz'un İran Seferi", pp. 63-4. This event occurred in Eleşkird.

¹⁹⁰² HYDR, p. 141; CLZ, pp. 237-8; HSE4, p. 196.

¹⁹⁰³ KPZ9, p. 104; HYDR, p. 74; SLZ2, p. 22; MNB, p. 461.

¹⁹⁰⁴ KPZ writes, "... *erbāb-ı tencim (ve) ashāb-ı takvim zikr olan kūsūfun ahkāmında 'Mağrib vilāyetiniün şehriyāri maşrık memleketine müstevlī olub hutbeyi vü sikkeyi tağyir ide!' (diyu) takrir itmişlerdi. 'Maşrık padişahına 'azīm neket ü zillet vardur' diyu takvimlerinde tahrir itmişlerdi. Vāki 'a eğlenmeyüb zikr olan kūsūfun akabince tahrir itdükleri ahkāmın eseri vulu' buldu, didüklerinden ziyāde makhūr u menküb ve meksūr u mağlūb oldı.*" KPZ9, pp. 104-105. According to HYDR, IDRS, CLZ, and HSE solar aclipse occurred on August 20. See HYDR, p. 74; IDRS, p. 154; CLZ, p. 233; HSE4, p. 197.

¹⁹⁰⁵ KPZ9, p. 105; HYDR, p. 142.

the true religion and this battle as a holy war or *cihād*, which is supposed to be fulfilled against the enemies of Islam. Kemalpaşazāde also attempts to load a religious tone on the intentions and acts of Ottomans. To him, the Ottomans prepared themselves for the battle psychologically and morally by praying throughout the night for the victory of the army of Muslims.¹⁹⁰⁶

An important note for the purpose of this study, which was totally ignored by the contemporary historians, was recorded by a seventeenth century Ottoman chronicler, namely Hüseyn b. Ca'fer. When the Ottoman army camped on August 22 in the Çaldıran valley, the war assembly was immediately gathered in the evening. Since the soldiers were tired and suffering from hunger and thirst after a 1500 km march, the majority of the viziers and grand generals suggested resting the army for one day. Only *Defterdār* Pīrī Mehmed Çelebi's¹⁹⁰⁷ idea was different. He proposed to attack the enemy as soon as possible for there were a considerable number of Safavid sympathizers especially among *akıncıs* and it was not impossible that these *akıncıs* could communicate with the Shah and change their side. When the Sultan asked his idea, Hüseyn b. Ca'fer cites, Pīrī Mehmed Çelebi said,

Heman durmayub göz açdurmayub duruşulmak ve adū'nun gözü öğrenüb alışmadın heman uruşulmak gerekdür. Zīrā ki askerden Mihallı tā'ifesi ve sāyire, Kızılbaşa muhibb olub anların mezhebinde olanlar bu gice Şah'ın casusları iğvāsiyle cāyiz ki öteye gitmek ihtimāli ola veyahut cenge el ucıyla yapışalar, can ve gönülden cenk itmeyeler, dahī askere fütur gele. Ve andan sonra adūnun üzerine “Allah Allah” deyüb, yürüyüb, göz açdurmayub, tokunmakda çok hal vardur.¹⁹⁰⁸

¹⁹⁰⁶ “*Subha dek ol gıceyi gāzılđ diri tutub Hālık-ı bī-niyāza tazarru'lar idüb Cenab-ı müfettihi'l-ebvābdan istimdād idiler. 'Eyyām-ı şerif mübārek' diyü birbiriyle musāfaha kalub, isti'dād-ı esbāb-ı cihād idiler.*” KPZ9, p. 105.

¹⁹⁰⁷ At that time Pīrī Paşa was the *defterdār* of Rumeli. See CLZ, p. 236.

¹⁹⁰⁸ Hezarfen Hüseyn b. Ca'fer, *Tenkīhu't-tevārih*, manuscript, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Fatih, 4301, fol. 114a. The reader might note that one of the major discontent groups with the growing Ottoman centralization was *akıncıs* of Rumelia. Hezarfen Hüseyn interestingly does not mention the Janissaries as potential sympathizers of the Shah, whom one might well expect because of the familial resemblances

Then Sultan Selim favored this suggestion saying that “here is the only man with a reasonable idea. It is a pity that he did not become a vizier.”¹⁹⁰⁹ Hüseyin b. Ca’fer says that because of this idea Sultan Selim promoted Pīrī Mehmed Çelebi to the vizierate after the battle.¹⁹¹⁰ So the preparations were made to confront the enemy by the early morning.¹⁹¹¹

It clearly appears in the contemporary sources that the Ottoman army at Çaldıran was much larger than the Safavid army. Perhaps as effective as the relative sizes of two armies was the nature of their composition. Safavid force essentially consisted of traditional Turko-Mongolian type cavalry archers, exclusively derived from *qizilbash oymaqs*. As already mentioned in Chapter IV, the prominent *oymaqs* constituted Shah Ismail’s army were as follows: Ustaclu, Şamlu, Tekelü, Afşar, Çepni, Dulkadirlü, Kaçar, Varsak, Çepni, Bayatlu, Talişlu, etc.¹⁹¹²

In the Ottoman army, on the other hand, as well as cavalry, there were infantry Janissaries armed with guns and field artillery, which the Safavid side totally lacked on this occasion.¹⁹¹³ Selim divided his army into three branches: at the center were the Janissary troops under the command of Selim himself while the Rumelian troops were on the left under the command of Hasan Pasha (the *beylerbey* of Rumelia) and the Anatolian troops being on the right under the command of Sinan Pasha (the *beylerbey* of

between the religious understanding and the practice of Bektashi Order, which is alleged to have been the official spiritual order of the Janissary corps, and Qizilbashism. Rather, he indicates *akıncıs* as potential sympathizers of Ismail. As delineated above, the same line of narration also occurred in the report of Spy Ahmed.

¹⁹⁰⁹ Hüseyin b. Ca’fer, fol. 114a; HAM2, p. 427.

¹⁹¹⁰ Hüseyin b. Ca’fer, fol. 114a. HYDR records that Piri Paşa became a vizier instead of Mustafa Paşa on October 15, 1514. See HYDR, p. 147.

¹⁹¹¹ See also HAM2, p. 427; UZC2, p. 266; TNSS, pp. 52-53.

¹⁹¹² See Mehmed b. Mehmed el-Fenārī eş-şehir bī Ta’līkī-zāde, *Şahnāme-i Āl-i Osman*, manuscript, Topkapı Sarayı Kütüphanesi, III. Ahmed Kitaplığı, 3592, fols. 87a-87b.

¹⁹¹³ See, for example, David Morgan, *Medieval Persia 1040-1797*, London, New York: Longman, 1988, pp. 116-7.

Anatolia).¹⁹¹⁴ On the other hand, Ismail organized his army under two wings: on the right wing were the 20.000 qizilbashs under the command of Ismail¹⁹¹⁵, while the left wing of Safavid army composed of 15.000 fighters who were commanded by Ustacaluoğlu Muhammed Beg¹⁹¹⁶ and his brother Karahan. Ismail also separated some 10.000 men under the command of his grand vizier Seyyid Abdülbâki and his *kadıasker* Seyyid Şerif to protect his standard.¹⁹¹⁷

On the arrival of the Ottoman army to the plain of Çaldıran, two different views appeared at the court of Ismail. Muhammed Han Ustaclu and Nur Ali Khalifa, who had been already acquainted with the Ottoman methods of warfare, advised to attack at once,

¹⁹¹⁴ See HYDR, p. 76. Also see CLZ, pp. 239-40; ALI, pp. 1097-8. According to the tradition, during the wars in Europe, Rumelian troops fight on the right while Anatolian troops on the left; during the campaigns in the east, on the other hand, Anatolian troops take place on the right while Rumelian troops form their ranks on the left. See IDRS, p. 148; HSE4, p. 199; SLZ2, p. 23; MNB, p. 462. Ottoman historians depict the majesty of the Ottoman army in detail. See, for example, Lütfi Paşa, pp. 221-228.

¹⁹¹⁵ KPZ depicts these qizilbashs as very good fighters dealing with at least ten enemies in a battle. He says that “*meymenesi tarafından kendü hulâsa-i cevşiyle, ki yiğirmi bin mikdarı var idi, emmâ her biri savaştta on merd-i neberde berâber idi, içi kara dışı kızıl, gören musavver mevt-i ahmer sanurdu, sol kola Rumîlinün üzerine azimet itdi. Salâbet ü şevketle meydan-ı muharebeye gelüb mizmâr-ı muharebeye bir mehâbet bıraktı ki kulüb-i ins ü cini korkutdı.*” KPZ9, pp. 107-108. IDRS gives the number of soldiers under Ismail’s command as 40.000. See IDRS, p. 172.

¹⁹¹⁶ Muhammed Han Ustaclu was the governor of Diyarbekir since the capture of this city by Safavids in 1507. He was famous for his bravery and skill in the art of war. HR says that his success in fights with local governors around Diyarbekir made him so conceited and self-esteemed that he began to write letters to the Ottoman sultan (Selim) provoking him to war. See HR, p. 177.

¹⁹¹⁷ KPZ9, pp. 106-107; ALI, p. 1098. Apart from KPZ, ALI, who had most possibly derived his knowledge from KPZ, and Lütfi Paşa, another Ottoman historian do not mention the third wing of Safavid army commanded by Seyyid Abdülbâki. Rather, they narrate that Ismail divided his army into two branches: one was commanded by him and the other was commanded by Ustaclu Muhammed Han. See Lütfi Paşa, p. 220, p. 229; HYDR, p. 143; YSF, p. 58; CLZ, pp. 240-41. On the other hand, Safavid chronicles confirm KPZ’s account. HR depicts, for example, the organization of Safavid army in a similar fashion to KPZ. According to HR, Ismail divided his army into two main branches: on the right were Durmuş Han Şamlu, Halil Sultan Dulkadirlu, Lala Hüseyin Beg, and Hulefa Beg; the left wing of the army was commanded by Muhammed Han Ustaclu and Çayan Sultan Ustaclu (HS says, however, that Muhammed Han Ustaclu was dubbed “Çayan”, literally means “scorpion”. See HS, p. 604); the forces at the center were given under the command of Persian-origin notables, namely Emir Abdülbâki, Seyyid Muhammed Kemüne, and Emir Seyyid Şerif. Additionally, Korucubaşı Sarı Pîre was sent to the frontal line with some *gâzis*. İsmail himself, with a group of *korucu*, was to watch over the progress of the battle and to help the weakened wing if any. See HR, pp. 179-80. HS describes Safavid organization of the army in a similar fashion. See HS, p. 605. AA chiefly follows the figure of these early Safavid historians. Differing from them, however, he says that “Esmâ’il himself was in command of the Safavid center.” See AA, p. 69. Selahattin Tansel, a contemporary historian who wrote the history of the reign of Selim I, follows KPZ and Safavid chronicles’ view. See TNSS, pp. 54-55. For a similar view also see Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un İran Seferi”, p.67.

before the Ottomans had time to complete their defensive laager. They also counseled against a frontal attack, thinking that the strong artillery of Ottomans would easily disperse the Safavid cavalries. Nonetheless, their seemingly reasonable advice was rejected both by a senior qizilbash commander, Durmuş Han Şamlu, who had the privilege of being the son of one of the *ehl-i ihtisas*¹⁹¹⁸ and the Shah's sister, and by the Shah himself.¹⁹¹⁹ Instead, Ismail made his forces wait until the Ottomans had completed their dispositions, saying that "I am not a caravan thief, whatever is decreed by God, will occur."¹⁹²⁰ As a result, two armies clashed on the next day, on August 23, 1514.¹⁹²¹

On the left wing of the Safavid army, Ustacaluoğlu Muhammed Beg was defeated by Sinan Pasha, the former being killed in the battlefield.¹⁹²² On the other side, Ismail first attacked the Janissary troops guarding Selim at the center. Thanks to the firearms used only by Ottoman soldiers, the effective defense of the Janissaries forced

¹⁹¹⁸ A special group of Ismail's companions during his concealment in Gilan.

¹⁹¹⁹ HR, pp. 178-9; AA, p. 68.

¹⁹²⁰ Eskandar Beg Monshi says that "On the Safavid side, Khan Mohammad Ostājīlū, who had just arrived from Dīār Bakr with his seasoned troops, counseled against a frontal attack because of the strength of the Ottoman artillery. 'We must,' he said, 'give battle to them when they are on the move.' Dürmīš Khan, however, with arrogant pride in his own bravery, did not accept this advice, and the Shah said: 'I am not a caravan-thief. Whatever is decreed by God, will occur.' And Khan Mohammad fell silent." See AA, p. 68. Also consider, Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 41.

¹⁹²¹ See Selim's letter (*fetih-nāme*) to his son Suleyman in HYDR, pp. 50-52. The same letter is also included in Feridun Bey, *Münşeat*, pp. 308-309. Also see IDRS, p. 154; CLZ, p. 239. CLZ frequently stresses that most of the qizilbash begs and soldiers were drunk before and during the battle. See CLZ, pp. 237-8, 243-44. Lütfi Paşa puts forward the same idea. But his reasoning seems to be fabrication. To him, on realizing the astonishing greatness of the Ottoman army, Ismail thought that no one could dare to fight with such a gigantic army; thus, the best way of encouraging the qizilbash fighters was to make them drunk. Then, argues Lütfi Paşa, the Shah ordered his soldiers to drink wine. See Lütfi Paşa, p. 228. Shah Tahmasb also admits that most of the Safavid *amīrs* were drunk on the day of the battle. See Şah Tahmasb-ı Safevî, *Tezkire*, translated from Persian into Turkish by Hicabi Kırilangıç, İstanbul, 2001, p. 40. Also consider Savory, "The Consolidation", p. 88, reciting from Khwushshāh b. Qubād al-Husaynī, *Tārikh-i İlchī-yi Nizāmshāh*, Manuscript, British Museum, Add. 23, 513, fol. 473a. There is an interesting note in AA, which says that "according to the *Jahān-ārā* (most probably the work of Gaffārī), and this is confirmed by general report, Shah Esmā'il, while his troops were taking up their stations for battle, went off to hunt quail, and returned to the battlefield after the fighting had started." See AA, p. 69.

¹⁹²² CLZ, p. 242; ALI, p. 1100; SLZ2, p. 24. HR says that at the beginning stages of the battle Muhammed Han routed the right wing of the Ottoman army, which turned back to the center. But upon his death during artillery fire, the qizilbashes dispersed and retreated towards the center. See HR, p. 181. AA says that "Khan Mohammad Ostājīlū, who was in the forefront of the Safavid army, was struck by a cannonball and killed, along with a considerable number of the Ostājīlū contingent." See AA, p. 70.

Ismail to retreat. Then he turned towards the left wing of the Ottoman army which was commanded by Hasan Pasha.¹⁹²³ Here, the qizilbash fighters commanded by Ismail managed to defeat the Rumelian troops, killing many prominent begs among which were Hasan Pasha, famous brothers Malkoçoğlu Ali Beg¹⁹²⁴ and Tur Ali Beg.¹⁹²⁵ When informed about the situation in the left wing, Selim ordered to send a portion of the Janissary troops, which were using rifle, to help Rumelian troops. When the Janissaries joined the battle with their firearms, the fate of the war was changed and it brought the victory to Sultan Selim.¹⁹²⁶ As David Morgan puts succinctly, “Çaldıran is seen above all else as the victory of modern military technology over the outdated steppe ways of warfare.”¹⁹²⁷ Kemalpaşazāde’s following words clearly put forth how the qizilbashes were vulnerable to the fire-armed warfare:

Lā-cerem, fermān-ı kazā-cereyān şöyle sādır buldu ki Yeniçeri askerinin tüfenk-
endāz serbāzlarından bir koşun asker Rumili leşkerine imdād u incād kaskine
yüzlerin ol cānibe döndürdüler. Tüfeng-i tārek-şiken havādan tolı gibi yağub,
‘adū-yı kīne-cūyun yüzün binin bir uğurdan Cehenneme gönderdiler. Terk ü

¹⁹²³ KPZ9, p. 108. Roger Savory argues, however, that Ismail first attacked Rumelian troops of the Ottomans then turned towards the center. See Savory, “The Consolidation”, p. 89.

¹⁹²⁴ According to HS, HR, and AA he was killed by Ismail himself. See HS, p. 606; HR, p. 180; AA, p. 69. Especially AA vividly describes the duello between Ismail and Malkoçoğlu. These sources specially praise Ismail’s courage and bravery underlining that he personally fought even in frontal lines of the battle and grounded a great number of Rūmīs into the dust of annihilation. HS says, for example, that on seeing most of his highest rank *Hans* were killed and his troops were routed “The Shah’s wrath was kindled and, unsheathing his sword, he charged without reinforcement into the midst of the enemy lines and killed a number of foes. Without fear of exaggeration it can be said that in that battle he displayed such a valor that Draco was vary of his serpentine arrows and Leo quivered in his lair from the heat of his fire-dripping sword.” HS, p. 606. AA recounts similarly that “Shah Esma’il entered that frightful field in person, supervising the course of the battle and performing deeds of valor surpassing those of Sām and Esfandiār. It is a matter of record among the Ottomans that the Shah several times forced his horse right up to the gun carriages and the barricade, and with blows of his sword severed the chains linking the gun carriages. ...” See AA, pp. 69-70. On the other hand, HSE, a sixteenth century court historian of the Ottomans, recites from his grand-father Hafız Mehmed who attended the battle among Safavid ranks that during the battle the Shah personally committed seven assaults into Ottoman ranks, changing his horse in each case. See HSE4, p. 211. Also see MNB, p. 463.

¹⁹²⁵ KPZ9, pp. 108-111; CLZ, p. 245. KPZ says that during the battle the qizilbashes shouted “Şah! Şah!” while Muslim soldiers shouted “Allah! Allah!” See KPZ9, p. 110. ALI repeats the same account. See ALI, pp. 1085-6. Also see IDRS, pp. 173-5.

¹⁹²⁶ IDRS, pp. 176-8; SKB, pp. 173-6; HSE4, pp. 201-202; ALI, pp. 1100-1101. See also the letter of Selim (*fetih-nāme*) to his son Suleyman in HYDR, pp. 51-52.

¹⁹²⁷ Morgan, p. 117.

miğfer ve cevşen ü siper māni' ü dāfi' olmayub, şahsār-ı vucūd-i bī-sūdlarında berg ü bār komadı kırdı. Kūh-şükūh güruhların tūde-i berg-i gāh gibi tārūmār idüb, hirmen-i hayāt-ı bī-sebātların havā-yı fenāya virdi.¹⁹²⁸

Contemporary European observers affirm that the Ottomans owed their victory to their firepower.¹⁹²⁹ Caterino Zeno, Venetian ambassador to the court of Uzun Hasan, writes,

The monarch [Selim], seeing the slaughter, began to retreat, and to turn about, and was about to fly, when Sinan, coming to the rescue at the time of need, caused the artillery to be brought up and fired on both the janissaries and the Persians. The Persian horses hearing the thunder of those infernal machines, scattered and divided themselves over the plain, not obeying their riders' bit or spur any more, from the terror they were in. Sinan, seeing this, made up one squadron of cavalry from all that which had made been routed by the Persians, and began to cut them into pieces everywhere, so that, by his activity, Selim, even when he thought all lost, came off the victory. It is certainly said, that if it had not been for the artillery, which terrified in the manner related the Persian horses which had never before heard such a din, all his forces would have been routed and put to the edge of the sword; and if the Turk had been beaten, the power of Ismail would have become greater than that of Tamerlane, as by the fame alone of such a victory he would have made himself absolute lord of the East.¹⁹³⁰

¹⁹²⁸ KPZ9, p. 111. HS and HR also underscore the decisive affect of firearms in this battle. See HS, p. 606; HR, p. 182.

¹⁹²⁹ In the battle of Çaldıran, the Safavid army was completely devoid of firepower. Why was Ismail's army not equipped with firearms? According to Savory, it was not because of their lack of acquaintance with necessary technology but because of their conscious choice. He argues that at the time of Ismail I, Safavids thought the use of firearms unmanly and cowardly. See Roger Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 43; "The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia", pp. 88-89; "The Sherley Myth", *Iran, Journal of the British Institute of Persian Studies*, V, 1967, 73-81. Also see Rudi Matthee, "Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid Iran", in *Safavid Persia, The History and Politics of an Islamic Society*, ed., Charles Melville, London, New York, 1996, 389-416.

¹⁹³⁰ Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", in NIT, p. 61. For a very similar account see Giovan Maria Angioiello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano", in NIT, p. 120. D. Ayalon also underscores the crucial role of firearms in the decisive victory of the Ottomans in Çaldıran. He writes, "Had the Ottomans not employed firearms on such a large scale in the battle of Chāldirān and in the battles which followed it, it is reasonably certain that their victory – even if they had been able to win – would have been far less decisive. In other words, the Ottomans would have acquired far less Safavid territory in that event and a much stronger Safavid army would have been left intact to prepare for a war of revenge." See D. Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamlūk Kingdom*, London, 1956, pp. 109-10. ANMG also puts stress on the decisive role of firearms and the Janissaries in the battle. See ANMG, p. 180. For detailed description of the battle see, in addition to the already cited Ottoman sources, HR, pp. 177-84; HS, pp. 605-606; TNSS, pp. 55-61.

Shah Ismail hardly saved his life only by sacrificing a qizilbash for his own life instead.¹⁹³¹ The qizilbash army dispersed, some were killed in the battlefield while some others were taken prisoner.¹⁹³² With only a small force which managed to follow him, Ismail first retreated to Tabriz, then to Sultaniye.¹⁹³³ Selim, perhaps thinking that his withdrawal was a ruse, did not pursue him.¹⁹³⁴ Ismail's wife, Taclu Hanım¹⁹³⁵, who was the daughter of Hulefa Beg, the governor of Bagdad, was among the captives. She was

¹⁹³¹ IDRS, p. 179; YSF, p. 62; HYDR, pp. 76-77; CLZ, p. 245; HR, p. 183; HSE4, p. 208. During the fight Shah Ismail fell down from his horse remaining vulnerable among the Ottoman soldiers. At this critical moment, one of Ismail's disciples, called "Hızır", who resembled a shaykh in appearance stepped forward and shouted "I am the Shah! I am the Shah!" After he convinced the Ottoman soldiers that he had been the Shah, Hızır succeeded to attract the attention and helped Ismail to escape on the spot. Some time later Ismail built a tomb over the grave of Hızır. See HSE4, p. 208. AA's account is very similar but differs in detail: "... At the pressing insistence and urgent entreaty of his loyal companions, the Shah was forced to abandon the field. As he did so, he and his companions clashed with the troop of Ottomans which had shattered the Safavid center and was returning to his own lines. The Shah broke through their ranks and continued on his way. En route, his horse sank into a bog, whereupon Kezr Aqa Ostājlı brought up his own horse and mounted the Shah on it. He then extracted the Shah's horse from the bog and followed on behind, later to be received by the Shah at Darjozīn." See AA, p. 70. AA does not mention what happened to Hızır Aga then. SLZ, a seventeenth-century Ottoman historian, recites a slightly different version of this story. See SLZ2, pp. 27-8.

¹⁹³² Giovan Maria Angiolello recites an interesting story: "... one of them [captivated qizilbashes] named Carbec, before he died, was taken before the Turk, who said to him: 'O, dog, who art thou, who hast had the courage to oppose our majesty; knowest thou not that my father and I are vicars of the prophet Mohamet, and that God is with us?' The captain Carbec replied: 'If God had been with you, you would not have come to fight against my master the Sophi; but I believe that God has taken away his hand from you.' Then Selim said: 'Kill this dog;' and the captain replied: 'I know it is my hour now, but you, Selim, prepare yourself for another occasion, when my master will slay you as you now are slaying me;' upon which he was immediately put to death." See Giovan Maria Angiolello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano", in NIT, pp. 120-21. Caterino Zeno also recites exactly the same story giving the name as Aurbec Samper. See Caterino Zeno, "Travels in Persia", in NIT, pp. 61-2. Tufan Gündüz, who translated Zeno's work into Turkish, translates this name as Saru Pire. See Tufan Gündüz (trs.), *Uzun Hasan – Fâtiḥ Mücadelesi Döneminde Doğu'da Venedik Elçileri. Caterino Zeno ve Ambrogio Contarini'nin Seyâhatnâmeleri*, İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınları, 2006, p. 64.

¹⁹³³ KPZ9, p. 112.

¹⁹³⁴ HS, p. 606; HR, p. 183. Also consider Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 42.

¹⁹³⁵ CLZ, p. 246; HSE4, p. 212; ALI, p. 1102. Giovan Maria Angiolello also records this event without mentioning any names. See Giovan Maria Angiolello, "A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano", in NIT, p. 120.

made to marry Tāc-zāde Cafer Chelebi by the order of the Sultan.¹⁹³⁶ On the next day after the battle, all the captives were slain by the order of Sultan Selim.¹⁹³⁷

On the third day of the battle, Selim moved with his army towards Tabriz. Kemalpaşazāde states that the Ottomans executed all the qizilbashes on their way.¹⁹³⁸ In Yediçeşme, Kürd Halid was executed with his 150 men; Hacı Rüstem and his men were also killed.¹⁹³⁹ On Wednesday (September 6, 1514) the Ottoman army camped in Surhab, near Tabriz.¹⁹⁴⁰ Selim accepted congratulations of the representatives of the dwellers of Tabriz. On Friday,¹⁹⁴¹ Selim entered the city with a great ceremony and went to Uzun Hasan Mosque, which had been used as an arsenal by Ismail but was re-prepared in a couple of days for the Friday prayer.¹⁹⁴²

As Kemalpaşazāde underscores, what Selim first ordered to do in Tabriz was to clean out the reminders of Shi'a and to re-establish Sunni practices. Those who fall under the suspicion of adherence to Shi'ism were immediately put to death.

Şehriyār-ı kāmkar āyin-i metin-i Ahmedī ile kavānin-i şer'-i mübīn-i Muhammedī'yi ol diyarda izhar idüb şī'ār-ı ahkām-ı İslam'ı āşikār itdi. Fısk u

¹⁹³⁶ KPZ9, p. 113; YSF, p. 63; HYDR, pp. 77-78; CLZ, p. 247; HSE4, p. 212; ALI, p. 1102. It is interesting to note that there were great numbers of women in the Safavid army. At the end of the battle these women became slaves of Ottomans. HYDR says, however, that they were freed on August 25 in order to avoid a possible shame that they could cause in the Ottoman army. See HYDR, p. 78.

¹⁹³⁷ KPZ9, p. 115; IDRS, p. 180, 189. KPZ recounts an interesting event. While Ottoman executioners (*cellat*) were slaying the qizilbashes, there were some religious scholars among them as well. Among these scholars, Kadızāde Erdebilī Mevlāna won the favor of Mevlāna Idris-i Bitlisī. The latter requested pardon for him from the Sultan saying that Kadızāde Erdebilī was one of his pupils (*şakird*). In the end, Sultan Selim forgave Kadızāde Erdebilī. See KPZ9, p. 115. IDRS does not mention Kadızāde but tacitly indicates the event. He says, only children, women, and those men of virtue and artisans who pretended to be adhered to the shah because of nothing but the fear could escape from the sword. See IDRS, p. 189. HYDR records that the captivated qizilbashes were massacred in front of the imperial tent. See HYDR, p. 144. It is interesting to note that Lütü Paşa, one of the grand viziers of Suleyman I, calls Çaldıran as "Sufikıran": "... Çaldıran ovasına gelüb ki şimdi ol yire 'Sufikıran' dırler..." See Lütü Paşa, p. 219.

¹⁹³⁸ KPZ9, p. 117.

¹⁹³⁹ HYDR, p. 80, 145; SKB, p. 182; YSF, p. 64; HSE4, p. 220; ALI, p. 1107; MNB, p. 466.

¹⁹⁴⁰ KPZ9, p. 117; HYDR, p. 80; YSF, p. 64; CLZ, p. 249.

¹⁹⁴¹ On September 8, 1514. See HYDR, p. 146.

¹⁹⁴² KPZ9, p. 119; MNB, p. 466. YSF follows a similar line of narration but gives the name of the mosque as Sultan Yakub Mosque. See YSF, p. 65. HR records the name of this mosque as "Hasan Padişah Cāmii". See HR, p. 184.

fücür, ki menba'-ı şerr ü şürdur, ve zındıka vü ilhād, ki ol bed-i'tikādlar arasında şāyi'ydi, kimde sezdiyse siyāset idüb cihanı başına tar itdi. Sünnet ü cema'at mezhebine reyāc virüb, tüccār-ı füccārun bazār-ı kāsıd ve sük-ı füsükı fāsıd oldı. Meşāhid-i esrār olan ma'āhid ahyār-ı ebrāra ma'ābid oldı. ... [During the Friday prayer] Adet-i ma'hūd üzerine hoş elhān u şirin zebān cārī kārīler Kelām-ı Bārī'den bir mikdar tilāvet itdükden sonra hatīb-i fasīhu'l-beyān minbere şu'ūd ve hurūc itdi. Çār-yār-ı ahyārı ehl-i sünnet ü cema'at mezhebi üzerine 'alet't-tertīb yād idüb her birinün mukābelesinde 'Radıyallahu anhū' sadāsı cāmi'i dutdı. Bunca müddet mütemādī olmışdı ki ol diyārın ahālisi hutbede Hulefā-i Rāşidin esāmisin işitmemişlerdi, āh u nāle ve feryād u 'ulāle eyleyüb ol cāmi'-i kebirün figān u zārıla içi toldı.¹⁹⁴³

Selim's intention was to spent the winter in Tabriz and resume his cosnquest of Persia in the next spring.¹⁹⁴⁴ However, the strong resistance of the Janissaries forced him to return to Anatolia.¹⁹⁴⁵ During Selim's short stay in Tabriz,¹⁹⁴⁶ Ismail stationed in Dargazin. On Selim's deportation, he immediately proceeded to his capital city.¹⁹⁴⁷

¹⁹⁴³ KPZ9, pp. 118-120. Compare HYDR, p. 80, 146; CLZ, pp. 249-50; HSE4, pp. 220-21; ALI, p. 1103.

¹⁹⁴⁴ SLZ2, p. 30; MNB, p. 467; TNSS, p. 69.

¹⁹⁴⁵ MNB, p. 467; TNSS, p. 69.

¹⁹⁴⁶ Selim entered Tebriz on September 8 and left the city on September 15. This makes eight days. See HYDR, pp. 80-81. HS also reports Selim's stay in Tebriz as eight days. See HS, p. 606. Also consider AA, p. 71. According to AA, Selim quitted Tebriz in a short time because of his fear about the qizilbash fighters, whose fighting qualities, along with the impetuosity and personal bravery of the Shah, were already experienced by the Sultan.

¹⁹⁴⁷ HS and HR say, Ismail entered Tebriz in *Şaban* (September / October). See HS, p. 606; HR, p. 184.

CHAPTER IX

THE AFTERMATH:

THE WANING OF THE QIZILBASH POWER

9.1. THE DECLINE OF TRIBAL DOMINANCE IN SAFAVID IRAN

Immediately after the establishment of the routinized Safavid state, more or less the same process that once occurred in the Ottoman case started in Iran: the inevitable contest between the sedentary bureaucracy and nomadic military appeared; and in time, parallel to the development of the bureaucratic governmental machine, the tribal founders of the state had been gradually diffused from the 'center', shifting to the periphery as an opposition party to the arising 'imperial regime'. In the Safavid case, the lines of differentiation between the two contesting parties were even more clear-cut. In addition to the anthropological, religious, and political inconformity, the ethnic foundations of the two parties were also recognizably different: on one side, there was the tribal qizilbash (overwhelmingly Turcoman) military aristocracy constituting and controlling the army and holding the posts of provincial governorships; on the other side

was the Persian bureaucracy running the administrative and fiscal affairs of the state. The latter was usually called ‘Tācīk’ by the formers in a despising manner, while the word ‘Qizilbash’ connoted ‘single-minded, uneducated and uncultured rough men’ among the bureaucratic elite. As it had been in the Ottoman case, the tribal mode of the polity here also lost the struggle against the bureaucratic imperial state. The sixteenth-century Safavid history, in essence, was indeed nothing other than the history of the tragic decline of the tribal politics, as well as the religious mentality and the way of practice accompanied, against the rising literacy based on the bureaucratic organization and religious proliferation.¹⁹⁴⁸

The Safavid historians seem to agree upon the idea that until 1508, when Husayn Beg Lala was dismissed from the posts of *vekālat* and *āmir al-umerā*, the absolute qizilbash domination in the Safavid politics continued. From then on, the balance of power began to shift towards the Persian bureaucracy. However, the main turning point, in many aspects, was arguably the defeat of Çaldıran, which resulted in a sequence of fundamental changes in both international and domestic affairs of the Safavid State. As Savory states, “as a result of their defeat at Chāldirān, the Safavids were thrown on to the defensive in their long-drawn-out struggle with the Ottomans, and did not regain the initiative for the three-quarters of a century, until the reign of Shah ‘Abbās the Great.”¹⁹⁴⁹ The consequences of battle of Çaldıran for the Safavid state, however, were to be far beyond the military defeat or territorial loss. Although it marked a turning point in the rivalry of the two powers for the leadership in the Islamic world, perhaps a more

¹⁹⁴⁸ The analysis of the tribe-bureaucracy contest in the Safavid state is far beyond the scope of the present study. For a recent study of several aspects of the issue, see Kathryn Babayan, *Mystics, Monarchs, and Messiahs. Cultural Landscapes of Early Modern Iran*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 2002.

¹⁹⁴⁹ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 45.

important consequence was that it brought profound changes in the political and ideological trajectory of the Safavid state because of two consequent developments: 1) the collapse of Ismail's mythical image as a divinely guided invincible leader¹⁹⁵⁰, and 2) the death of most of the leading qizilbash khans on the battlefield.

The subsequent effects of the defeat on the psychology of Ismail himself and on his relations with the qizilbash disciples had already been coined by several scholars. Indeed, before the battle of Çaldıran, both Ismail and his qizilbash disciples had reasons to develop such a mythical image. As Nasr Allah Falsafî underlines, having always been victorious until then, Ismail considered no adversary his equal and assumed that he had been invincible. Thus, the defeat of Çaldıran profoundly affected his character and behavior; his egoism and arrogance were changed to despair and dejection. From then on, he went into mourning and began to wear black robes and black turban. His pessimism was best reflected by the fact that during the remaining ten years of his reign, Ismail never led his troops into action in person.¹⁹⁵¹ “Nor did he devote his attention to the state affairs”, says Savory and goes on saying that “on the contrary, he seems to have

¹⁹⁵⁰ I would like to quote from the testimony of a contemporary western observer: “This monarch is almost, so to speak, worshipped, more especially by his soldiers, many of whom fight without armor, being willing to die for their master. They go into battle with naked breasts, crying out ‘Schiac, Schiac’, which, in the Persian language, signifies ‘God, God’. [This is evidently wrong] Others consider him a prophet; but it is certain that all are of opinion that he will never die.” See Giovan Maria Angiolello, “A Short Narrative of the Life and Acts of the King Ussun Cassano”, in NIT, p. 115. For a similar account also see “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, pp. 206-207. Another Venetian source writes that “they [Ismail’s army] fight neither for gold nor for the state but for their religion and they believe that if they die they will go straight to paradise and thus they fight most valiantly.” See Theodora Spandugino, *La Vita di Sach Ismael et Tamas Re di Persia Chiamati Soffi*, in Sansovino, *Historia Universale dell’Origine et Imperio de Turchi*, 98-100 (This source was compiled after Ismail’s death), quoted in Palmira Brummett, “The Myth of Shah Ismail Safavi: Political Rhetoric and ‘Divine’ Kinship”, in *Medieval Christian Perceptions of Islam*, edited by John Victor Tolan, New York, London: Garland Publishing, 1996, p. 337.

¹⁹⁵¹ Nasr Allah Falsafî, “Jang-i Châldıran”, in *Majalla-yi Dānīshkada-yi Adabiyāt-i Tihirān*, I, 1953-4, p. 121.

tried to drown his sorrows by drunken debauches.”¹⁹⁵² A Safavid chronicle describes his years after this defeat as follows: “He spent most of his time in hunting, or in the company of rosy-cheeked youths, quaffing goblets of purple wine, and listening to the strains of music and song.”¹⁹⁵³ A Venetian merchant records witnessing that in 1520, “on his second arrival in Tauris [Tabriz], Ismael committed a most disgraceful act, as he caused twelve of the most beautiful youths in the town to be taken to his place of Astibisti [Hešt Behišt] for him to work his wicked will upon them, and he gave them away one by one to his lords for the same purpose; a short time previously he had caused ten children of respectable men to be seized in like manner.”¹⁹⁵⁴

On the other hand, this defeat equally damaged the relationship between the Shah and his disciples, and consequently influenced the ground of the Safavids’ claims of legitimacy for the power. The autocratic power of the Safavid Shahs is alleged to have three foundations: the first was derived from the ancient Persian theory of suzerainty which attributed divine rights to the king regarding him as a ‘shadow of God upon earth’. The second foundation stemmed from the Shi’ite belief of Mahdi; the Safavid shahs, by the help of the newly migrated shi’ite scholars (especially from Jabal ‘Amil), declared themselves as the representatives of the Hidden Imam, Mahdi. And last but not least, they were the ‘perfect guide’, *mürşid-i kāmīl*, of the qizilbash disciples.¹⁹⁵⁵ During the preparation and formation period of the state, the most influential and functional instrument among these three foundations was, without doubt, the last one. Until the

¹⁹⁵² Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, pp. 46-7.

¹⁹⁵³ Khwursāh b. Qubād al-Husaynī, *Tārikh-i Īlchī-yi Nizāmshāh*, Manuscript, British Museum, Add. 23, 513, fol. 445a, recited in Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia”, *Der Islam*, 41, 1965, p. 93.

¹⁹⁵⁴ “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 207.

¹⁹⁵⁵ See Roger M. Savory, “The Safavid State and Polity”, in *Studies on Isfahan, Proceedings of the Isfahan Colloquium, 1974*, Part I, ed. R. Holod=*Iranian Studies*, VII, Chestnut Hill, Mass., 1974, p. 184.

defeat of Çaldıran, the qizilbashes deeply believed in the infallibility of their Perfect Guide, which was again ‘approved’ by the uninterrupted ascendance of Ismail. On the other hand, the first two foundations were not really at work during the formation period because until then the Turkoman qizilbashes had been familiar with neither the ancient Persian theory of kingship nor the Twelver Shi’ism in its orthodox or written way.

The artillery and firearms of Selim I, however, seriously damaged the qizilbash belief in the infallible and invincible nature of their Perfect Guide. Likewise, in the following episodes of the Safavid history, the role and effectivity of the title “*mürşid-i kāmīl*” attributed to the Safavid shahs would decline, even if they stayed as the spiritual guide of the qizilbash until they disappeared from the scene of history. The other two fundamentals, on the other hand, gained eminence concomitantly to the decline of the latter. Therefore, the battle of Çaldıran marked this major change in the philosophical fundamentals of the Safavid polity. The following paragraphs will briefly indicate that this crucial change was not limited to the political philosophy; rather, it extended to all the aspects of life in the Safavid realm.

As can be recalled, the qizilbash Turkomans of Anatolia and Syria considered Ismail as an omnipotent leader of both religious and political nature. First of all, he was *mürşid-i kāmīl*, the infallible spiritual guide, of all the qizilbash *mürids*. In addition, he was also recognized as the head of the community in terms of temporal power. Until Çaldıran, Ismail successfully merged these two natures in his personality in such a way that his image appeared as a semi-divine being. Shortly before 1510, a Venetian merchant depicts his image in the eyes of the qizilbashes as follows:

This Sophy is loved and revered by his people as a God, and especially by his soldiers, many of whom enter into battle without armour, expecting their master Ismael to watch over them in the fight. There are also others to go into battle

without armour, being willing to die for their monarch, rushing on with naked breasts, crying “Shiac, Shiac”. The name of God is forgotten throughout Persia and only that of Ismael remembered; if any one fall when riding or dismounted he appeals to no other God but Shiac, using the name in two ways: first as God Shiac, secondly as prophet; as the Mussulmans say “laylla, laylla Mahamet resurala,” the Persians say “Laylla ylla Ismael veliala”; besides this everyone, and particularly his soldiers, consider him immortal, but I have heard that Ismael is not pleased with being called a god or a prophet.¹⁹⁵⁶

Another Venetian source reads: “He is adored as a prophet and the rug on which he knelt for Easter was torn to pieces to be used by his followers as Christian relics. ... It is said that Ismail was sent by God to announce that his sect was the only true sect whose members would be admitted to paradise...”¹⁹⁵⁷ Zuan Moresini, a contemporary Venetian observer, further reports in 1507 that “[T]hese, in their way, adore the Sufi, and he is called not king or prince but holy or prophet. ... He is the holy of holies, full of divinatory power, for he takes council from no one, nor did he as a child, and because of this all believe that the Shi’ī in his every act is divinely inspired.”¹⁹⁵⁸ Yet in another occasion, Moresini says that “since Xerxes and Darius there has never been a king of Persia, neither so adored, nor so loved by his people, nor so bellicose, nor with such a great army, nor so graced fortune.”¹⁹⁵⁹

¹⁹⁵⁶ “The Travels of a Merchant in Persia”, in NIT, p. 206. It should be noted that the Venetian Merchant writes these words in the context of a description of sports and feasts prepared for the arrival of Shah Ismail in Tauris (sic) before 1520, most probably in 1518.

¹⁹⁵⁷ Theodora Spandugino, *La Vita di Sach Ismael et Tamas Re di Persia Chiamati Soffi*, quoted in Palmira Brummett, “The Myth of Shah Ismail Safavi: Political Rhetoric and ‘Divine’ Kinship”, p. 337. However, one should read Venetian (in general western) accounts on Ismail very carefully for they exaggerated Ismail’s divineness and holiness. For a critical evaluation of Venetian accounts on Shah Ismail, and an analysis of psychological and political background of the Venetian reporters see Palmira Brummett’s abovementioned article. Brummett successfully shows that contemporary Venetian observers either consciously or unconsciously amplified extremist attributes to Ismail partly for they wished to see him outside the Islamic sphere as much as possible, partly for they wished a powerful ruler, who was at the same time non-Islamic and Christian-like or at least friends of Christians, against their formidable enemy, Ottomans.

¹⁹⁵⁸ Quoted in Brummett, p. 338, from Sanuto’s *Diarii*.

¹⁹⁵⁹ Quoted in Brummett, p. 340.

These contemporary accounts clearly reflect the extremist beliefs of the qizilbashes about their *mürşid-i kāmīl* and shah. Nonetheless, the zeal of the qizilbashes was seemingly tuned down by the first defeat of Ismail; especially the religious and spiritual attributes to his image were seriously eroded. The mystical bond linking *mürşid* with *mürīd* had been damaged and would never be fixed again, while the belief in the Shah as a divine or semi-divine and invincible figure was shattered.¹⁹⁶⁰ In Savory's words, "Although the qizilbashes continued to accord their leader with the title of *mürşid*, the title had become meaningless except for ritualistic purposes. Similarly, although the traces of the original Sūfī organization persisted in a fossilized form, they rapidly ceased to have any organic function within the Safavid body of politics."¹⁹⁶¹ Elsewhere, Savory also rightfully makes the point that "as the qizilbash dissociated themselves from the *mürīd-mürşid* relationship with the shah, they reverted to their former and primary loyalty towards their tribe and their tribal chief."¹⁹⁶²

On the other hand, this attitude of the qizilbash was anticipated by the developing Safavid administration which was gradually affected by the 'literate' Twelver Shi'ism. Indeed, following the establishment of the state, the Safavid propaganda machine gradually abandoned the doctrine of Qizilbash-Sufism because the *ghulāt* represented by it was beyond the pale of orthodox Islam, and of orthodox Shi'ism as well; and also because the state needed a written and well-cultivated religion with a developed judicial system. As Savory puts it, in the Safavid domain, the propaganda of

¹⁹⁶⁰ Compare Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, *Les ottomans les safavides et leurs voisins*, Istanbul, 1987, pp. 73-4.

¹⁹⁶¹ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 46.

¹⁹⁶² Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Ismā'īl I", p. 92.

the Qizilbash-Sufism natural waned after the defeat of Shah Ismail in Çaldıran.¹⁹⁶³ When narrating the event nearly a century later, Eskandar Beg Munshi, the historian of Shah Abbas the Great, says that “without doubt God, in his most excellent wisdom, had decreed that Shāh Isma’īl should suffer a reverse at the battle of Chāldirān, for had he been victorious in this battle too, there would have been a danger that the belief and faith of the *unsophisticated* (italics are mine) *qizilbāsh* in the authority of the Shāh would have reached such heights that their feet might have strayed from the straight path of religious faith and belief, and they might have fallen into serious error.”¹⁹⁶⁴

Although they were rare, the protests against the temporal authority of the shah were seen even in Ismail’s lifetime. Only two years after Çaldıran, the qizilbash governor-general of Horasan made a powerful challenge to Ismail’s authority, and “within a year of Ismail’s death, civil war broke out between the qizilbash tribes fighting for the control of the state with little or no regard for the sacrosanct nature of not only the Shah’s character but also his authority, in both its spiritual and temporal aspects.”¹⁹⁶⁵ It is interesting to note that two decades later, one of the leading qizilbash chiefs, Ulāma Beg Tekelu, not only simply challenged the authority of Shah Tahmasb, but also offered his services to the Ottoman army and fought against the Shah in Sultan Süleyman’s ranks upon realizing that he could not seize a high office within the Safavid state machinery. This evidence clearly shows that “the extent to which the qizilbash had

¹⁹⁶³ Savory, “The Safavid State and Polity”, p. 200.

¹⁹⁶⁴ Eskandar Beg Monshi, *History of Shah ‘Abbas the Great*, vol. I, trs. Roger M. Savory, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978, pp. 71-2.

¹⁹⁶⁵ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 46. Also consider his “The Consolidation”, pp. 93-94.

abandoned in practice their unquestioning obedience to the Shah as their *mürşid-i kâmil*, whatever lip-service they might continue to pay to it in theory.”¹⁹⁶⁶

The second consequence of Çaldıran, which seems to have been fundamentally changed the development of the ideological and political stand of the Safavid state, was that in the battlefield of Çaldıran most of the leading qizilbash begs who were chiefly responsible for the success of Ismail’s early advent (*hurûc*) died. Among them the most prominent were Ismail’s vicegerent, *vekillü’s-saltanat* or grand vizier, Seyyid Abdülbâki; his *kadıasker* Seyyid Sadr Şerif; the governor of Bağdad, Hulâfa Beg; the governor of Herat and Horasan, Lala Beg; the governor of Diyarbakır, Ustacaluoğlu Muhammed Beg; the governor of Hamedân, Tekelü Kâhi Beg; (*Kemnân u Damğân sahibi*) Sultan Ali Beg; the governor of Irak-ı Acem, Pir Budak Beg; the governor of Fars and Şiraz, Köse Hamza Beg; the governor of İsfahan, Tursun Beg; korucu-başı Saru Piri; the governor of Gence, Serdar Beg; the governor of Damğân and Sa’îd Çukuru, Ağzıdar Beg; the governor of Kazvin and Sultaniye, Kara Sinan; and Seyyid Muhammed Kemâne¹⁹⁶⁷, who was the official-responsible (*nâkib*) of the sanctuary in Meşhed and known as descending from the Family of the Prophet.¹⁹⁶⁸

What is of utmost importance to be noted here is that the overwhelming majority of the grand leaders of the millenarist qizilbash movement deceased in this battle. Without doubt, the absence of these *khans* who were famous for their extremist beliefs,

¹⁹⁶⁶ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 61.

¹⁹⁶⁷ On October 21, 1508, when Ismail entered Baghdād, he visited the Shi’î shrines at Karbalā and Najaf, where Seyyid Muhammed Kemâne was invested with drum and banner and was made *mütevellî* of Najaf as well as governor of certain towns in ‘Iraq-i ‘Arab. See Sarwar, pp. 53-5; Roger Savory, “The Consolidation of Safavid Power in Persia”, p. 77.

¹⁹⁶⁸ KPZ9, p. 113; HYDR, p. 143; CLZ, p. 242; Lütüfî Paşa, p. 230; HR, p. 183; HS, p. 606; AA, p. 70. Also consider Savory, “The Consolidation”, p. 90; TNSS, p. 61; Tekindağ, “Yavuz’un İran Seferi”, pp. 68-9. h

were extremely influential on the military and political affairs of the state, and vitally affected the balance of power at Ismail's court.

First of all, in terms of ideology, the absence of these great qizilbash warlords facilitated the establishment of the "orthodox" version of Twelver Shi'a in the Safavid realm. As already determined by several scholars, the shi'ism implemented by Ismail and by early qizilbashes was not much acceptable by the religious scholars of Twelver Shi'ism. The shi'ism of early qizilbashes who founded the state was composed of simple elements. As Aubin points out, "D'une part, culte des imams, attente messianique du Mahdi, adoration du souverain; d'autre part, vindicte à l'égard du sunnisme, malédiction publique des trois premiers califes, profanation de ce que les sunnites célèbres, l'utilisation sacrilège de mosquées sunnites obstinés, ou, plus d'une fois, ceux que des vengeances personnelles feront passer pour tels."¹⁹⁶⁹

Soon after the establishment of the new state, however, the need for a well-established religious sect with a well-defined judicial basis emerged. At the beginning, on religious affairs Ismail conferred to Persian *ulemā* who were indeed not much acquainted with the well-developed theology and jurisdiction of Twelver Shi'ism. At the time of Shah Tahmasb, however, this role was fulfilled by Arab doctors of religion immigrated from Jabal al-Āmil and Bahrayn.¹⁹⁷⁰ Under the direction of the newly imported scholars, 'orthodox' Twelver Shi'ism was soon established while the extremist beliefs of the founders were marginalized. Despite the contest posed by the qizilbash tribes, "the dogmas of the Imami theologians along with a growing abstraction and

¹⁹⁶⁹ Jean Aubin, "La politique religieuse des Safavides", *Le Shi'isme Imâmite, Colloque de Strasbourg, 6-9 mai 1968*, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1970, p. 238.

¹⁹⁷⁰ Jean Aubin, "La politique religieuse des Safavides", p. 239.

depersonalization of political authority”¹⁹⁷¹ gradually established Safavid ideological and religious sphere, which might be called ‘Safavid Shi’ism’. Without doubt, the lack of influential qizilbash *khans* accelerated this process.

The second consequence arose in the administrative system of the Safavid state. It is an established fact in scholarship that the administrative structure of the state was divided along ethnic lines between Turkomans and Persian, the former constituting the military aristocracy (men of sword) while the latter filling the ranks of the civil and religious bureaucracy (men of pen).¹⁹⁷² There was an intrinsic friction between these two elements for, as Minorsky has put it, “like oil and water, the Turkomans and Persians did not mix freely, and the dual character of the population profoundly affected both the military and civil administration of Persia.”¹⁹⁷³ Both sides had a clear idea of what the function of the other and had pejorative attitude. Persians regarded the qizilbashes as vulgar men which were simply for fighting and devoid of any capacity to participate in the ‘civilized’ circles and in the bureaucratic affairs. For the qizilbashes, on the other hand, Persians, or Tājiks, were only fit for “looking after the accounts and divan business”¹⁹⁷⁴, but had no right in military affairs and could not command the troops on the field.

The death of the most prominent Qizilbash āmirs on the battlefield of Çaldıran deeply affected the advance of the struggle between the qizilbash tribal-military elements and the Persian bureaucracy; the balance considerably shifted towards the supremacy of the Persian bureaucracy. As Savory truly underlines, it was during the

¹⁹⁷¹ Woods, p. 172.

¹⁹⁷² See, for example, Roger M. Savory, “The Qizilbāsh, Education and the Arts”, *Turcica*, VI, 1975, p. 168.

¹⁹⁷³ TM, p. 188.

¹⁹⁷⁴ Roger M. Savory, “The Significance of the Political Murder of Mirzā Salmān”, *Islamic Studies, Journal of the Central Institute of Islamic Research*, vol. III, no. 2, Karachi, 1964, p. 184.

temporary eclipse of the qizilbash power because of the death of many highest-ranking qizilbash officers in Çaldıran that the office of *vakīl*, the vicegerent of the Shah, and *vazīr*, the head of bureaucracy gained gravity in state affairs.¹⁹⁷⁵ Together with the conscious withdrawal of the Shah from state affairs, the absence of powerful qizilbash *khans* granted considerable freedom in political and religious affairs to Persian bureaucrats on one hand and to newly consolidating Twelver Shi'ite clerics on the other. Khwandāmir reports,

During the winter [following the battle of Çaldıran], when the shah was in the capital of Azerbaijan, he decided to turn over the administration of the realm to someone who was capable of dealing capably with the office, and after much deliberation to office was given to Mirza Shah-Husayn Isfahani, a former deputy of Ramish [Durmuş] Khan's¹⁹⁷⁶, and an order was issued for him to run the administration independently and autonomously. All viziers and high officeholders were to be subject to him, and no action, great or small, was to be taken without his prior knowledge and approval. Thereafter Mirza Shah-Husayn's threshold became a resort for the great and powerful, and his magnificence and grandeur increased as the shah's favor shone upon him.¹⁹⁷⁷

Taking advantage of Ismail's withdrawal from the day-to-day managements of affairs, Mirza Shah Husayn enhanced his own power.¹⁹⁷⁸ Parallel to the increase of its influence on state affairs, the character of *vekālat* also experienced a radical change. As the use of 'vakīl' or sometimes 'vakīl-i saltana' instead of its original form 'vakil-i nafs-i nafs-i humāyūn' reflects, the *vakīl* was no more the alter ego of the shah; the *vakīl*'s loyalty is now primarily to the state not to the shah. According to Savory, "this

¹⁹⁷⁵ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 47.

¹⁹⁷⁶ When Durmuş Han was appointed as the governor of Isfahan in 1503, he remained at the court and delegated one of his retainers, Mirza Shah Husayn, to act as his deputy there and to look after the administration for him. After Çaldıran, however, the rank of the former servitor preceded that of his master. In April 1523, Mirza Shah Husayn was assassinated by a group of qizilbash, obviously because of the perception of the latter to be in service of a Persian as despising. Thus when opportunity appeared, they did not hesitate to kill the *vākīl*, and as in Savor's words, added "his name to the list of those who had become victims of the struggle between Turk and Iranian in the early Safavid state." See Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 48.

¹⁹⁷⁷ HS, p. 606.

¹⁹⁷⁸ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 47; "The Consolidation", p. 111.

development marked a decisive step away from the original theocratic concept of the state, and toward a greater separation of religious and secular powers within the state.¹⁹⁷⁹

On the other hand, the accumulation of Persian elements in the highest offices of the state was not limited to the office of *vekālat*. As we learn from Khwandāmir, “around the same time the shah assigned the office of comptroller to Sayyid Āmir Shihabuddin Abdullah, son of Sayyid Nizamuddin Lala, one of the great *seyyids* of Azerbaijan; but since he was incapable of discharging the office competently, the office was transferred to the great and learned *naqīb* and *seyyid*, Āmir Jalaluddin Muhammad al-Husayni al-Shirangi.”¹⁹⁸⁰

The decline of the qizilbash dominance on the Safavid affairs in the course of the sixteenth century is perhaps best reflected in the history of two offices: *khalīfat al-khulafā* and *āmir al-umarā*. It has already been evaluated in detail in the present study that the establishment of the Safavid state was a process principally rested upon the qizilbash movement which was initiated by Ismail’s grandfather Junayd. In its early phases until transforming into the ‘routinized state’ under the auspice of shi’ite ulame, the qizilbash movement had two aspects: politico-military and millenarian-sufistic.¹⁹⁸¹ The first aspect was represented by the *āmirs* or khans of the qizilbash oymaqs while the second was represented by the khalifas who fulfilled religious functions and the propaganda of the Order in each clan. According to Nasr Allah Falsafī, the leader of the

¹⁹⁷⁹ Savory, *Iran under the Safavids*, p. 47.

¹⁹⁸⁰ HS, pp. 606-7. Also see HR, p. 185,

¹⁹⁸¹ Concomitant to this dual structure of the movement, Shah Ismail and his successors embedded two institutions in their personality, which had hitherto been represented in Islamic states by two separate personalities: the holder of temporal power, the shah, and the perfect spiritual guide, the *mūrshid-i kāmīl*.

Sufis in each tribe was called khalifa.¹⁹⁸² Indeed, it has not been clarified yet whether the military chieftom and the spiritual leadership of the clans were unified in one person or represented by two different people. Kathryn Babayan suggests, without providing historical evidence, that during the classical age of the Safavid rule (1501-90), these two offices in each *oymaqs* were filled by two different delegates appointed by the court, a khan, sultan, or beg, and a khalifa.¹⁹⁸³ In any case, however, the organization of these two branches followed different lines. The tribal leaders who were the commanders of troops recruited from their own clan were organized under the supreme commandship of the *āmir al-umarā*, the head of the Safavid army. The Sufis or khalifas, on the other hand, were organized under the leadership of *khalīfat al-khulafā*¹⁹⁸⁴ who was regarded as the *nāyib* or deputy of the *mūrşid-i kāmīl*. Beginning from the reign of Shah Tahmasb I, both offices gradually lost their eminence in Safavid politico-religious sphere, one contested by the *ulemā* of Twelver Shi'ism while the other was eroded by the Persian bureaucracy and the *ghulām*.

During the formation period, the khalifas were extremely influential in propagating the Safavid message among Turkoman tribes and other affiliated social groups, organizing religious affairs of communities already converted to qizilbashism, recruiting fighters among disciples, organizing upheavals against the Ottoman administration, and consolidating the spiritual influence and the legitimacy of the Safavid shaykhs etc. It is not surprising that when this office was established officially by the foundation of the state, it was granted to a qizilbash Turkoman Hadim Beg

¹⁹⁸² Cited in Savory, "The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids", p. 497.

¹⁹⁸³ Kathryn Babayan, "The Safavid Synthesis: From Qizilbash Islam to Imamite Shi'ism", *Iranian Studies*, v. 27, no. 1-4, 1994, p. 138.

¹⁹⁸⁴ Minorsky truly called the office of *khalīfat al-khulafā* the 'special secretariat for Sufi affairs'. See TM, p. 125.

Khalifā, just like the office of *āmīr al-umarā*, which was appointed to Lala Husayn Shamlu.

As indicated above, the founders of the state, namely the qizilbashes, were gradually excluded from the officially approved ideological sphere. Shaykh Ali Karaki, the influential shi'ite mujtahid or jurisconsult at the court of Shah Tahmasb I, brought the dominance of the shi'te *shari'a* into the religio-ideological sphere of the state for the first time. He issued a fatwa (injunction) allowing the cursing of Abu Muslim, one of the most admired heroes of the qizilbashes, and wrote one of the earliest polemics against *ghulāt*-Sufism.¹⁹⁸⁵ Towards the end of the sixteenth century, especially during the reign of Shah Abbas I, even the term “sufi”, once the foremost honorable epithet of Safavi adherents, fell into disrepute.¹⁹⁸⁶ Since the office of *khalīfat al-khulafā* intimately linked to the Turkoman-qizilbash subjects of the Safavid State, one can observe the decreasing favor of the shahs with the qizilbashes on the declining prestige of this office. As Savory puts, “the prestige of the *khalīfat al-khulafā*, since this office was an integral part of the Sufi organization of the Safawiyya movement in its early stages, naturally declined *pari passu* with the general decline in the status of the sufi organization as a whole.”¹⁹⁸⁷ During the reign of Shah Abbas I (1588-1629), the office was totally discredited. “The Shah gave to the Sufis ever baser types of employment. From being in attendance on the Shah, and acting as his guards, they degenerated to being sweepers of the palace buildings, gate-keepers, and jailers. ... The *khalīfat al-khulafā* himself, under Shah Abbas I, was reduced to the position of a tame religious official at the court.”¹⁹⁸⁸ After

¹⁹⁸⁵ Babayan, p. 144.

¹⁹⁸⁶ Savory, “The Principle Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Ismā'il I”, p. 92.

¹⁹⁸⁷ Savory, “The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids”, p. 498.

¹⁹⁸⁸ Savory, “The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids”, p. 501.

Shah Abbas I, the status of the Sufis and that of the *khalīfat al-khulafā* further waned. As Savory concludes, "...in 1700, after almost two hundred years that Sūfī fervor had brought the Safawids to power, it was possible for a *mujtahid* to denounce Sūfism as 'this foul and hellish growth'."¹⁹⁸⁹

In the same vein, the importance of the office of *āmīr al-umarā* began to decline during the reign of Shah Tahmasb I, especially when he succeeded in establishing his absolute authority after the civil war over the qizilbash tribes. Savory notes that the office is not recorded among the appointments made by Shah Abbas I on his accession.¹⁹⁹⁰ Among others, arguably one of the most affective factors contributed to the decline of the office was the introduction of Caucasian elements into the Safavid state under Shah Tahmasb I.¹⁹⁹¹ From then on, the influence of Caucasians in state affairs, especially in the army, continuously increased, reaching its apex under Shah Abbas I. It is suffice to indicate the extent to which Georgian elements infiltrated into the important positions even before the reign of Shah Abbas I and to remind the fact that in 1585-6, a Georgian, Keyhusrev Beg, was appointed as *lala* of Tahmasb Mirza b.

¹⁹⁸⁹ Savory, "The Office of Khalīfat al-Khulafā under the Safavids", p. 502.

¹⁹⁹⁰ Roger M. Savory, "The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Tahmāsp I (930-84/1524-76)", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, XXIV, 1961, p. 84.

¹⁹⁹¹ Indeed, Shah Tahmasb's first attempt to curb excessive power of the qizilbash amirs and to break down their tribal loyalty came before the introduction of the Caucasian elements. As we learn from the author of the *Şerefnāme*, the sons of the noblest *āmīrs* were taken to the royal court and given a special education under the direct supervision of the Shah. Şerefhan Bitlisī says that "they were entrusted to the care of tutors of experienced piety and morals. As they grew up, they were thought all kinds of military exercises, including polo. Even painting was a part of their syllabus." (Quoted in TM, p. 133.) As a result, they grew up as better educated and more cultured which at the same time loosened their tribal bonds while reinforcing their devotion to the royal house both in terms of practical means and ideology. As Savory has already indicated, another consequence of this practice appeared as the blurring of the formerly clearly-defined lines between 'Turk' and 'Tājīk', for the qizilbash princes who underwent this education turned out at the end "to be more 'Tājīk' than 'Turk' in their background and outlook." See Savory, "The Qizilbāsh, Education and the Arts", pp. 174.

Muhammad Hudabende; the post of *lala* to the Safavid princes had hitherto been considered a qizilbash prerogative.¹⁹⁹²

The introduction of the Caucasian elements into the Safavid state apparatus as a ‘third force’¹⁹⁹³ goes back to the four expeditions of Shah Tahmasb I between 1540-41 and 1553-54, after which he brought a large number of captives, mostly women and children, back to Iran.¹⁹⁹⁴ The offspring of these slaves would constitute the third element of the Safavid polity which turned into an officially recognized institution under the name *ghulāmān-i khāssa-yi sharīfah*, slaves of the royal household, under Shah Abbas I.¹⁹⁹⁵ These Georgian and Circassian boys were given a special education and training, on completion of which they were either enrolled in the newly established *ghulām* troops, or assigned to special services in the royal household or employed in some other branch of the *khāssa* administration. The initiation and development of this third force was indeed an intended project of the shahs who felt uncomfortable with the excessive power and the tribal loyalty of the Qizilbash. The principal feature of the *ghulām* force was its unquestioned loyalty to the shah. It was because of two reasons: first, they were devoid of social roots and second, they were subjected to a special education, which surely was not simply aiming to teach necessary knowledge but including some sort of ‘brain washing’ as well.¹⁹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁹² See Savory, “The Principal Offices of the Safavid State during the Reign of Tahmāsp I”, p. 84.

¹⁹⁹³ Roger M. Savory, “The Safavid State and Polity”, in *Studies on Isfahan, Proceedings of the Isfahan Colloquium, 1974*, Part I, ed. R. Holod=*Iranian Studies*, VII, Chestnut Hill, Mass., 1974, p. 195.

¹⁹⁹⁴ From the last of these alone, 30,000 captives were brought back to Iran. See Roger M. Savory, “A Curious Episode of Safavid History”, *Iran and Islam, in Memory of the Vladimir Minorsky*, ed. C. E. Bosworth, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1971, p. 461.

¹⁹⁹⁵ Savory, “The Safavid State and Polity”, p. 196.

¹⁹⁹⁶ Although having certain differences, the Safavid *ghulām* system is surely comparable with the Ottoman *kapi-kulu* system, especially in their function of providing a core military force with absolute loyalty to the monarch.

As Babayan indicates, the entire tribal structure of the qizilbash was seriously affected by Shah Abbas I's centralizing reforms. Especially when the centralization process gained impetus by transferring the capital to Isfahan (1590), the qizilbash āmirs lost their privilege to receive appanages along with *lala*-ships, a key element in their bid for their active participation in Safavid politics.¹⁹⁹⁷ For many qizilbashes who were used to being regarded with special honor and respect; however, being dishonored was not only that they no longer enjoyed political and economic privileges, but many of *oymaqs* were now governed by *ghulāms* who had no blood ties but were directly appointed by the palace. The historian of Shah Abbas I, Iskender Beg, writes, "Since some of the *oymāqs* did not possess qualified candidates to take on high posts once their Qizilbash āmirs and governors had done, a *ghulām* was appointed, due to his justice, skill, bravery, and self-sacrifice, to the rank of *āmir* of that clan (*īl*), army (*qushūn va lashkar*) and to the governorship (*hukūmat*) of that region (*ulkā*)."¹⁹⁹⁸

9.2. THE WANING OF QIZILBASH FERVOR AND ESTABLISHING A *MODUS VIVENDI* IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The waning of the qizilbash dominance – and concomitantly the zeal - in the Safavid realm equally reciprocated among the 'Ottoman qizilbashes', i.e. the qizilbashes living within the Ottoman borders. Although the close connection between 'Ottoman qizilbashes' and the Safavid center continued after Çaldıran, their adoration to the Shah and zeal for the Safavid cause certainly started to calm down. It is true that in the following decades, a number of qizilbash uprisings some of which brought considerable

¹⁹⁹⁷ Babayan, p. 142.

¹⁹⁹⁸ AA, p. 1088.

success emerged. Nonetheless, none of these uprisings had big aspirations such as Shahkulu and Nur Ali Khalifa.

Indeed, after Çaldıran, Ismail completely lost his hope to gain a military success against the Ottoman army and so did the Anatolian qizilbashs. As a matter of fact, Ismail never intended to confront with the Ottomans again on the battlefield. However, he did not totally abandon his offensive policy; he continued to agitate the qizilbashs living on the Ottoman territories.¹⁹⁹⁹ Archival evidence clearly shows, for example, that the uprising of Şah Veli b. Celal, known as Celālī uprising, was fulfilled under the direction and auspice of Shah Ismail.²⁰⁰⁰

A contemporary archival report provides fairly detailed information on the Celālī uprising.²⁰⁰¹ The report is undated but its content clearly reveals that it was written shortly before the break up of Shah Veli b. Celal's uprising in 1520. The anonymous reporter, who was evidently a spy or a local officer, states that after interrogating a certain Dervish Zaifiye from the village of Eymir of Zile, it is learned that a man called Shaykh Celal founded a *tekke* in the village of Sızir²⁰⁰² in the the *sanjak* of Veys Beg²⁰⁰³, son of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Beg of Dulkadir. After Shaykh Celal's death, his son Shah Veli succeeded his father's post, i.e. the shaykdom of the *tekke*. While Sultan Selim was in Egypt (1516-7), Shah Veli paid homage to Shah Ismail. Upon his return from Iran, he

¹⁹⁹⁹ See Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Etudes Turco-Safavides, III. Notes et documents sur la revolte de Şah Veli b. Şeyh Celal", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VII, 1982, p. 25.

²⁰⁰⁰ See TSA, document E 2044.

²⁰⁰¹ The document is housed in TSA, document E 2044; its full transcribed text and facsimile copy, as well as their French translations are published in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Etudes Turco-Safavides, III. Notes et documents sur la revolte de Sah Veli b. Seyh Celal", *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VII, 1982, pp. 17-22.

²⁰⁰² A village within the boundaries of contemporary Sivas.

²⁰⁰³ This was the province of Bozok.

dispatched messengers to Erzincan, Kara Keçili²⁰⁰⁴, Rūm, Malatya, and some other places (obviously to prepare the qizilbashs of these regions for the upcoming uprising). Shah Veli maintained the communication with the shah by sending a *baba* called Koca as messenger. It had been six months since he had dispatched Koca Baba for the last time and the latter returned one month prior, carrying the following message: “The shah said with his best wishes that ‘you Shah Veli, son of Celal, on the fifteenth of Safer (February 5, 1520) you with the khalifas and disciples in the region rise up as perfectly armed and put the country in havoc; sooner we also will arrive with a sizable army!’” On receiving this order Shah Veli immediately re-sent Koca Baba in order to inform the shah of his advent, and dispatched messengers to the khalifas around. In a short while the khalifas and the qizilbashs gathered in the *tekke* and rose up under the leadership of Shah Veli. On this day, Shah Veli sent Gököğlü Veli to Shah Ismail. The anonymous report gives the details of the invited qizilbash groups and their locations: the tribe of Selmanlu²⁰⁰⁵ in Malatya, the tribe of Kurisa near Misis, some people (*bazı kimesneler*) in Canik, some people in Osmancık near Arkud River, and the qizilbashs along the river toward Iskilip.²⁰⁰⁶

Another occasion was recorded in Sivas. According to the document E 6188 in TSA²⁰⁰⁷, which is a report of a certain Shah Veli pertaining to the occasion of Seyyid

²⁰⁰⁴ A clan of Ulu Yörük living in Sivas, Amasya, Tokat, Kirsehir, and Ankara. See Faruk Sümer, *Oğuzlar*, pp. 201, 241. One should remember that one of the most influential qizilbash *oymaqs*, namely Ustaclu, was stemmed from Ulu Yörük Turkomans. Furthermore, another prominent *oymaq*, Rumlu, was also originated from the same region.

²⁰⁰⁵ In the Ottoman *tahrir defters*, there are tribes registered with the name ‘Selmanlu’ in several entries such as Maraş, Bozok, Ankara, Kütahya, Çorumlu, and Kayseriyye. See Orhan Sakin, *Anadolu’da Türkmenler ve Yörükler*, İstanbul, 2006, p. 294.

²⁰⁰⁶ TSA, document E 2044.

²⁰⁰⁷ The full text of this document is published in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Seyyid Taman, un agitateur hétérodoxe a Sivas (1516-1518)”, IX. Türk Tarih Kongresi’nden Ayırbaşım, Ankara: TTK, 1988, 865-74.

Temam, when Sultan Selim proceeded to Egypt from Damascus (after the victory of Mercidābık on August 24, 1516), Seyyid Temam came to Sivas and gained the friendship of Hızır, the *subaşı* of the governor of Sivas (*Sivas Sancağı beği Fāik Beğ*), and some *sipāhis* of Sivas. He wrapped belts around some of their waists and girded some others with swords.²⁰⁰⁸ Seyyid Temam called aforementioned *subaşı* as Çayan Beg, a *sipāhi* named İlyas as Kara Han, and a man known as Yiğitbaşı in Sivas as Div Ali.²⁰⁰⁹ They continuously gathered and engaged in eating and drinking. Their vagrant acts were in such a degree that because of their fear the commander of Sivas fortress reinforced the door of the fortress. Although they became silent when they heard of the conquest of Egypt, soon they resumed unlawful activities, pitching tents around the *tekke* in which Seyyid Temam was lodging. The aforementioned *subaşı* and *sipāhis* respected Seyyid Temam as a beg and the latter held meetings like a ruler (*dīvan eder idi*). At the end, the *seyyids* and notables of Sivas requested from *qādi* and *dizdār* (fortress commander) of the city to arrest Seyyid Temam and to inform the Porte on the issue. But the aforementioned *subaşı* (Hızır) prevented them to do so. Furthermore, the *qādi* also opposed the idea arguing that if they informed the Porte, then seventy to eighty men would die. Instead, he suggested to let him go out of the city. Consequently, Seyyid Temam left Sivas. Although he returned to a close vicinity of Sivas for a short time when the Sultan arrived in Halep from Damascus, following the sultan's arrival in Kayseri he disappeared. One might also add some other minor *qizilbash* attempts in the first half of the sixteenth century aiming to disturb the Ottoman order.

²⁰⁰⁸ "... *kimisine kuşak ve ba'zısına kılıç kuşadub...*"

²⁰⁰⁹ "... *mezbūr subaşıya Çayan Beg ve İlyas nām sipāhiye Kara Han ve Sivas'ta Yiğitbaşı nām kimesneye Div Ali deyu ad verüb ...*" One would immediately notice that these three figures were among the most prestigious and powerful *qizilbash amirs* after the battle of Çaldıran.

It should also be mentioned that the qizilbash movement among the Anatolian masses had its own momentum as well. Although it gradually calmed down, seemingly disappeared towards the end of the sixteenth century, the qizilbashes left within the Ottoman borders preserved a revolutionary spirit and organization capacity at least until the fourth decade of the sixteenth century. As Bacqué-Grammont has suggested, for example, the uprising of Kalender Celebi in 1526-7 could hardly be inspired by Safavids. When he rose up, Ismail already died two years before and Shah Tahmasb was fully occupied with a fierce civil war within his empire, thus was not in a position to organize a socio-military movement outside the borders of his empire. Consequently, one might safely agree with Bacqué-Grammont's suggestion that "Il convient donc de souligner que, bien que menées par d'anciens *dâ'î* et *halîfe* de Şâh Isma'îl, ces révoltes présentent un aspect « indigène » et spontané..."²⁰¹⁰

The present thesis deemed the qizilbash movement in its emergence, development, and consolidation periods up until the battle of Çaldıran as predominantly a tribal-nomadic enterprise. As a matter of fact, when speaking of Shaykh Junayd's immediate adherents, of the first 'Kızıl-baş', red-heads, under Shaykh Haydar, and of the sufi-warriors founded the Safavid state under the banner of Shah Ismail, our sources always mention tribal disciples of the order but barely refers to villagers or townspeople. As indicated above, one of the most crucial changes Caldıran brought to the qizilbash identity was that thenceforth the nomadic-tribal basis of this identity gradually dissolved. In the course of the sixteenth century, the socio-political basis of the qizilbash

²⁰¹⁰ Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, "Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527", *Studia Islamica*, LXII, Paris, 1985, p. 160. A report of Mahmud Pasha, the *beylerbey* of Karaman then, which most probably addressed the grand vizier Ibrahim Pasha who was charged by the sultan to suppress the rebellion, which is dated as the end of April 1527, two months earlier than the repression of the rebellion, describes the development of the rebellion without mentioning Kalender Çelebi. See TSA, document E 6369, published in Bacqué-Grammont, "Un rapport inédit sur la révolte anatolienne de 1527", pp. 164-7.

community within the Ottoman Empire significantly shifted from tribal-nomads to sedentary villagers.

Nevertheless, although being the overwhelming color, this is not the whole picture. It would not be true to argue that the dissemination of the qizilbash message among sedentary people was a phenomenon of the post-Çaldıran period. Contemporary sources make frequent references to villagers and townspeople somehow adhered to the qizilbash movement at least by the year 1510 and onwards especially in the province of Rum, in the context of the intense qizilbash uprisings. Even some discontent Ottoman officials such as the *timar* holders and *qādīs* supported these uprisings.²⁰¹¹ Especially in the Province of Rum, the number of non-tribal ‘qizilbashes’ increased dramatically. One may assume two possible reasons for this: first of all, in the first decade of the sixteenth century, the Province of Rum was ruled, nearly independently, by Prince Ahmed, whose vague policy regarding to the qizilbash issue is already delineated.

The analysis in chapter VI showed that one should not totally ignore the claim put forward by the Ottoman historians that Ahmed established good relations with the qizilbashes simply to gain their military support in his struggle with Prince Selim. On the other hand, it seems that the official interest in the military potency of the qizilbashes somehow facilitated the legitimacy of qizilbashism within the public sphere.²⁰¹²

²⁰¹¹ A detailed analysis of the role of *timar* holders in the Shahkulu rebellion and their incentives is already made in chapter VI. There are some occasional indications in the contemporary sources to the ‘somehow’ affiliation of state officials to the qizilbash movement. The *qādi* of Bolu, for example, lost his life because of his connection with the Safavids. As recited by Haydar Çelebi in Feridun Beg’s *Munşe’āt* (*Münşe’ātü’s-selātin*, I, Istanbul, 1274/1858, p. 497): “...*Yiğirminci günde (20 Rebī II, 924/May 1, 1518) Bolu kadısı Mevlāna İsa’nun Erdebil cānibiyle mu’āmelesi olmağın salb olunmak emr olunub Hüseyin ve İskender nām kapucular gönderildi. Anlar dahī mezkūrı Merzifon’da bulub ‘ale-mele’i’n-nās salb eylediler.*” Cited and quoted in Jean-Louis Bacqué-Grammont, “Etudes Turco-Safavides, III. Notes et documents sur la revolte de Sah Veli b. Seyh Celal”, *Archivum Ottomanicum*, VII, 1982, p. 24.

²⁰¹² For an exaggerated account of how qizilbashism attained popularity and ‘official’ acceptance in the Province of Rum under Prince Ahmed, see Amasyalı Abdizāde Hüseyin Hüsameddin, *Amasya Tarihi*, vol. III, İstanbul, 1927, pp. 240-272.

Consequently, many officials either pretended to be or really adhered to the qizilbash movement. Within the framework of this political struggle between the Ottoman princes, even Ahmed's son Murad became a qizilbash. Once the prince, who was then de facto ruler of the region, declared his qizilbash affiliation, many officials followed him simply to secure their position. Secondly, as Oktay Özel has already indicated, the geography of the Province of Rum was more suitable to agriculture than pastoral nomadism.²⁰¹³ Thus, there were not many nomads in the region at all. Rather, the province and its neighborhood were densely populated by villagers. As a matter of fact, *Bezm u Rezm*, a late fourteenth century source,²⁰¹⁴ clearly demonstrates that during the second half of the fourteenth century, nomadic tribes had already lost their eminence on the political scene in the region. Instead, the political and military power was scattered among the fortresses controlling strategic passages and important cities.²⁰¹⁵ When these two factors are combined, the reason why the tribal character of the qizilbash movement was loosened in this region can be inferred.

Apart from the tribal-nomadic contest, another peculiarity of this region should be mentioned: even before the Turkish invasion of the Anatolia, the region appeared as the niche of 'heterodox' beliefs. Under the Turkish rule, the same characteristic continued. It is well-known that the first large-scale uprising of the 'heterodox' Turcomans against the 'orthodox' Anatolian Seljukid rule was recorded in the same

²⁰¹³ Oktay Özel, *Changes and Settlement Patterns, Population and Society in Rural Anatolia: A Case Study of Amasya (1576-1642)*, Unpublished PhD. Dissertation, Department of Middle Eastern Studies, University of Manchester, 1993.

²⁰¹⁴ See Aziz b. Erdeşir-i Esterâbadî, *Bezm u Rezm*, translated into Turkish by Mürsel Öztürk, Ankara, 1990.

²⁰¹⁵ *Bezm u Rezm* is full of stories narrating how Kadı Burhaneddin subjugated local lords of these fortresses, which usually followed the revolt of the latter when opportunity appeared.

region.²⁰¹⁶ Thenceforth, ‘unorthodox’ beliefs and practices have always found deep-roots in the Ottoman Province of Rum. Therefore, especially in Amasya, Tokat, Çorum, Sivas, and in the vicinity of these cities, the sedentary bases of the qizilbash movement traced back to the early sixteenth century, or perhaps to the late fifteenth century.

Nonetheless, this does not seriously damage the thesis of the present study. Still it is highly plausible to argue that during its active phase until the defeat of Çaldıran, the locomotives of the movement were tribal devotees. The sincere sedentary qizilbashes, excluding those who pretended to be qizilbash within the framework of the balances in the Ottoman domestic politics, could be deemed only auxiliary supporters when they are compared to the role of nomadic tribes. Following the defeat of Çaldıran, however, the tribal characteristics of the qizilbash identity in the Ottoman Empire continuously faded away.

It should be noted that the gradual fading of politico-military content of the qizilbash identity was a process intimately connected to the change in the social basis of the community; that is, the dissolution of the tribal organization and nomadic mode of life. Contrary to the exclusive tribal nature of qizilbash *oymaqs* gathered around Junayd, Haydar, and finally young Ismail, the copies of the Imperial Council (*Divan*) decisions, namely *Mühimme Defterleri*, the Register of Important Affairs, from the second half of the sixteenth century barely mention tribal affiliations of the qizilbashes subjected to persecution. Rather, the recorded occasions are mostly pertaining to the villagers or townspeople.

²⁰¹⁶ The Babaī Revolt and the Qizilbash Movement have similarities in many aspects. For a brief discussion of these similarities, see chapter VI in the present study.

Two reasons might be suggested in interpreting this situation. First of all, as it is delineated in chapter IV and chapter V, the effective militant tribes had already left the Ottoman lands to join the Shah's suite either during his advent or in the course of uprisings during the interregnum in the Ottoman administration in the period between the years 1510 and 1513. Furthermore, many qizilbashs also must have left Anatolia in order to escape Selim I's persecution on the eve of the Çaldıran campaign. At the turn of the second quarter of the sixteenth century, the tribal, thus political and militant, content of the qizilbash identity in Anatolia was recognizably siphoned off.

Secondly, the remaining tribal-nomadic qizilbashs were subjected to a systematic sedentarization policy of the Ottoman administration.²⁰¹⁷ Now being devoid of their military power which had already gone to carry Ismail to the throne of Persia, these tribal units could no longer resist against the pressure of the Ottoman imperial regime, and dissolved gradually. Towards the end of the sixteenth century, the qizilbash identity in the Ottoman Anatolia lost its tribal characteristics to a greater extent and transformed into a religion of villagers.

Records in the *Mühimme Defterleri* clearly show that the Ottoman persecution of the qizilbashs continued throughout the sixteenth century.²⁰¹⁸ Nevertheless, parallel to

²⁰¹⁷ It should be noted here that the Ottoman policy of sedentarizing nomadic-tribes was not restricted to the qizilbash tribes. It was a rather comprehensive policy which derived from mainly economic, fiscal, and administrative concerns of the Ottoman government. For a thorough evaluation of the issue in the seventeenth century Ottoman Empire, see Cengiz Orhonlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Aşiretlerin İskanı*, İstanbul, 1987.

²⁰¹⁸ Some of the related records in the *Mühimme* registers spanning from the mid-sixteenth century to the early seventeenth century, were first published by Ahmed Refik. See Ahmed Refik, *On Altıncı Asırda Rafizilik ve Bektaşilik*, İstanbul: Ahmed Halit Kitaphanesi, 1932. Later on, two scholars published two articles dealing with the qizilbash persecution in the sixteenth century based on *Mühimme* records. See Colin H. Imber, "The Persecution of Ottoman Shi'ites according to the *Mühimme Defterleri*, 1565-1585", *Der Islam*, 56, 1979, 245-73; Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Qizilbash 'Heresy' and Rebellion in Ottoman Anatolia during the Sixteenth Century", *Anatolia Moderna*, fall, 1997, 1-14. Recently Saim Savaş published a more inclusive list of these records including whole texts. See Saim Savaş, *XVI. Asırda Anadolu'da Alevilik*, Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 2002. A selection of documents from *Mühimme* registers

the fading of the political and militant content of the qizilbash identity, the policy of the Ottoman administration was relatively softened. Because of the above-mentioned changes in the Safavid polity, the Safavid call gradually became less excitant for the Anatolian qizilbash population, especially in terms of politics. And arguably it became nominal towards the end of the sixteenth century, when Safavid state turned into a full-fledged bureaucratic empire, to a great extent diffusing tribal-qizilbash elements from the state machinery. In the mean time, as a closely connected and parallel process, the persecution of the Anatolian qizilbashes died down, even though Ottoman-Iranian wars went on intermittently down to the mid seventeenth century.²⁰¹⁹

On the other hand, the Ottoman policy regarding the remaining qizilbash elements was not limited to sedentarizing the qizilbash tribes, the government seems to have attempted to employ the Bektashi Order to neutralize the Qizilbash residue in Anatolia as a political force as well. The assimilation of the qizilbashes among Bektashis obviously aimed, on the one hand, to isolate the leaders from their political constituency and to eliminate all connections with Iran as much as possible,²⁰²⁰ and on the other hand,

pertaining to Alevi-Bektashi affairs are also published by Cemal Şener and Ahmet Hezarfen. See Cemal Şener (ed.), *Osmanlı Belgelerinde Aleviler-Bektaşiler*, İstanbul: Karacaahmet Sultan Derneği Yayınları, 2002; Cemal Şener-Ahmet Hezarfen (eds.), *Osmanlı Arşivi'nde (Mühimme ve İrâde Defterlerinde) Aleviler-Bektaşiler*, İstanbul: Karacaahmet Sultan Derneği Yayınları, 2002. Although this publication is far beyond academic standards, the original facsimile copies of the documents are included.

²⁰¹⁹ Compare Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Bektashis, A Report on Current Research", *Bektachiyya: Etudes sur l'ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach*, eds., Alexandre Popovic and Gilles Veinstein, İstanbul: ISIS, 1995, p. 17. For a parallel interpretation, see Krysztina Kehl-Bodrogi, *Die Kızılbaş/Aleviten, Untersuchungen über eine esoterische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Anatolien*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1988. According to Faroqhi, a supplementary reason might have been that "by the 1590's, more militant Kızılbaş tribes had either been eliminated or were forced to migrate to Iran." See Suraiya Faroqhi, "Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival: The Bektashi Order and the Ottoman State (Sixteenth-seventeenth centuries)", *Bektachiyya: Etudes sur l'ordre mystique des Bektachis et les groupes relevant de Hadji Bektach*, ed. Alexandre Popovic-Giles Veinstein, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1996, p. 175.

²⁰²⁰ Compare Faroqhi, "Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival", p. 177; Irène Mélikoff, "Un Ordre de derviches colonisateurs: les Bektaşis", in her *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l'Islam populaire en Anatolie*, İstanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, 115-125; "L'origine sociale des premiers Ottomans", in *The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389)*, ed., Elizabeth Zachariadou, Rethymnon: Crete

to evacuate the milleniarist-mystical and militant-shi'ite content of the qizilbash 'way of religion'.

It has been suggested that after their hopes in Safavids had been in vain, the qizilbashes themselves too shifted their allegiance to the Bektashi Order. The event of pseudo Shah Ismail in 1570 shows that this allegiance was already consolidated in the second half of the sixteenth century. This man appeared in Malatya district pretending to be Shah Ismail and visited the central *tekke* of the Bektashis, where he was offered a sacrifice. The reaction of Bektashi *babas* and dervishes is, however, not clarified in the contemporary sources.²⁰²¹

Indeed, the history of the Bektashi order, especially its early phases before the sixteenth century, and its relations with the Ottoman administration are still to be explored by modern scholars. Faroqhi deduces from a vague account in the *Velâyetnâme*²⁰²² and from an inscription over the present *meydanevi* that the *tekke* of Hacı Bektaş probably existed in the period of Murad I, who either built the mausoleum or restored an older structure.²⁰²³ Faroqhi also tends to rely on the *Velâyetnâme*'s account, arguing that Sultan Bayezid II had a great respect for Hacı Bektaş, so he extended his vakıfs and visited his *türbe* in person having its cupola covered with

University Press, 1993, 135-44. (Republished in Mélikoff, Irène, *Sur les traces du soufisme turc. Recherches sur l'Islam populaire en Anatolie*, Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1992, 127-37.)

²⁰²¹ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Anadolu'da Bektaşilik*, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barın, İstanbul: 2003, p. 187; "The Bektashis, A Report on Current Research", p. 17; "Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival", pp. 175-6.

²⁰²² Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, ed., *Vilâyet-nâme. Menâkıb-ı Hünekâr Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli*, İstanbul: İnkılâp Kitabevi, 1995, p. 89.

²⁰²³ Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş: Social Position and Economic Activities", *Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1976, pp. 183-4, 206. According to Yürekli-Görkay, the name in this inscription must be read as "Emirci Dede" instead of "Ahi Muad". The inscription reads "Emirci Dede [or Ahi Murad], the king of shaykhs, the descendant of saints, made this building (*imâra*) flourish [i.e. restored this *imâra*], and he ordered this on the last day of the month of Ramadan in the year 769 [1368]."

lead.²⁰²⁴ The *vakıf* of the *tekke* was well established in the second half of the fifteenth century, having possessions in the Kırşehir province, especially around Hacı Bektaş and in the area known as Sülaymanlı. From the period of Mehmed II onward, if not earlier, it also possessed *vakıf* in the Aksaray area. Faroqhi determines from archival sources that “while the *dergâh* received donations from different Sultans down to the period of Bayezid II, we have no further record of such gifts until the eighteenth century.”²⁰²⁵ Furthermore, although the *vakıfs* of the *tekke* were recorded in the *defters* compiled under Mehmed II and Bayezid II, they are absent in the *defters* up until the *defters* from the late sixteenth century.²⁰²⁶

The relationship between Bektashis and the Ottoman administration is also one of the most controversial issues of the Ottoman history. On one hand, the established acceptance by the current scholarship suggests a connection between Bektashi order and the Janissary corps.²⁰²⁷ On the other hand, because of their unorthodox way of Islamic mysticism, Bektashis had always remained suspicious in the view of the Ottoman official ideology.²⁰²⁸ For example, the central *tekke* in Kırşehir, if we rely upon the

See E. Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay, *Legend and Architecture in the Ottoman Empire: The Shrines of Seyyid Gâzi and Hacı Bektaş*, Unpublished PhD. thesis, Harvard University, 2005, p. 121.

²⁰²⁴ Faroqhi, “The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş”, p. 184. For the original account see, *Vilâyet-nâme*, p. 90.

²⁰²⁵ Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş”, p. 206.

²⁰²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 206. Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay determines stagnation in the architectural development of the shrine complex during the first half of the sixteenth century. The process of reviving and monumentalizing the buildings in the complex was started towards the end of the fifteenth century and completed during the mid-sixteenth century. However, until the 1550s there was a visible interruption, which might be a sign of the closure of the *tekke* as related in Bektashi tradition. See E. Zeynep Yürekli-Görkay, *Legend and Architecture in the Ottoman Empire: The Shrines of Seyyid Gâzi and Hacı Bektaş*, Unpublished PhD. thesis, Harvard University, 2005, p. 174.

²⁰²⁷ I have discussed this issue briefly in Chapter III.

²⁰²⁸ What is more controversial is that, as this thesis clearly puts it, the Janissary corps played the leading role in bringing Selim I, who had already established his program mainly on the qizilbash enmity during the period from his governorship in Trabzon, to the throne.

Bektashi tradition, was closed by Selim I, and not opened until 1551.²⁰²⁹ During the first half of the sixteenth century, however, the *tekke* benefited from the donations of Dulkadirli family, especially of Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey,²⁰³⁰ and during the mid-sixteenth century, of *akıncı* families like Malkoçoğlu and Mihaloğlu.²⁰³¹

It appears, however, that the Bektashi order (re)gained the support of the Ottoman administration by the second half of the sixteenth century. This must have been a natural result of the new Ottoman policy pertaining to the qizilbashs, which might well be called a policy of ‘taming’, rather than a Bektashi success. So when Ottoman policy of ‘taming’ qizilbashs under the supervision of Bektashi babas was accepted, the idea was first put forward by Köprülü and then flourished by Mélikoff and Ocak in that “by the late sixteenth century on several ‘un-approved heterodox’ groups took shelter in the Bektashi Order” gains further phase. “Not only did these people try to avoid persecution by joining the order”, as Faroqhi suggests, but also “the Ottoman

²⁰²⁹ Suraiya Faroqhi, who made an extensive research on the history of the *tekke*, says that “it has not been possible to prove the Bektashi tradition that the *tekke* was closed by Selim I. But since certain *waqf* villages show up in the *defters* compiled under Mehmed Fatih and Bayezid II, and then again in the late sixteenth century, while they are absent from the records of Süleyman Kanunî, there is some reason to assume that the dervish community at least suffered temporary losses”. See Suraiya Faroqhi, “The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş: Social Position and Economic Activities”, *Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 7, no. 2, 1976, p. 206. Also see *Ibid*, p. 185; Remzi Gürses, *Hacıbektaş Rehberi*, Ankara, non-dated, p. 44. Faroqhi also notes that although zaviyes like Seyyid Gazi in central Anatolia and Sari Baba in Denizli were in serious difficulties, *Mühimme* registers of the period 1560 and 1585 provide no record on the persecution directed at the shaykhs and dervishes living in the well-known Bektashi centers like Hacı Bektaş, Abdal Musa, Koyun Baba. See Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 174.

²⁰³⁰ In the complex of the shrine of Hacı Bektaş, there are two inscriptions written in the name Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey: one is located over the entrance to the mausoleum of Balım Sultan, dated 925/1519, and the other is situated over the door of the Friday mosque in the village, outside the shrine, dated 925/1524. See Faroqhi, “The Tekke of Hacı Bektaş”, p. 185. During the early decades of the sixteenth century the position of Kırşehir and the region around, which includes Hacı Bektaş as well, was ambiguous between the Ottoman Empire and Dulkadir dynasty ruling in Elbistan and Maraş as a buffer state between Ottomans and Mamluks. See Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr, “Les district de Kırşehir et le Tekke de Hacı Bektaş entre le pouvoir ottoman et les émirs de zulkadir”, in *Syncretismes et hérésies dans l’Orient seldjoukide et ottoman (XIVe-XVIIIe) siècle. Actes du Colloque du Collège de France, octobre 2001*, ed., Gilles Veinstein, Paris, 2005, 259-82.

²⁰³¹ Yürekli-Görkay, pp. 178-91.

administration tolerated and even encouraged this move.”²⁰³² Likewise Faroqhi surmises from archival evidence a connection between the tuning down of anti-Qizilbash persecution in the late sixteenth century and the official grant of privileges to the shaykhs of Hacı Bektaş.²⁰³³ When Bektashis’ role of reintegrating the qizilbash into the Ottoman polity is accepted, then it makes sense for the administration to be comparatively generous towards those *tekkes* formerly accused of heterodoxy or heresy.²⁰³⁴

By the mid-seventeenth century, the shaykhs of the *tekke* in Hacı Bektaş attained a certain degree of control over almost all the *tekkes* of ‘heterodox’ groups, who gradually affiliated to Bektashism.²⁰³⁵ They had significant power in determining the shaykhs of these *tekkes*. Although the power of the shaykhs of Hacı Bektaş in this matter was limited for the reason that these *tekkes* were usually run by hereditary families, usually there were more than one heir to choose from and this provided the opportunity for the assumed descendants of Hacı Bektaş to interfere with the domestic affairs of the provincial *tekkes*.²⁰³⁶ In any case, in the sixteenth century, the shaykhs of *Pir-evi* attained, on one hand, a recognizable control over other *tekkes* all over Anatolia, and on

²⁰³² Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 177.

²⁰³³ Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 179.

²⁰³⁴ For some exemplary cases see Ahmet Refik, *On Altıncı Asırda Rafizilik ve Bektaşilik*, pp. 32-3; Suraiya Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, pp. 180-1; “Seyyid Gazi revisited. The foundations as seen through sixteenth- and seventeenth-century documents”, *Turcica*, XIII, 1981, 90-122.

²⁰³⁵ In spite of the introduction of many heterodox elements into the order, Evliya Chelebi, who visited most of Bektashi *tekkes* in the middle of the seventeenth century, repeatedly assert that all the Bektashi dervishes he encountered were impeccable (*ehl-i sünnet ve'l-cemaat*). Nevertheless, as Faroqhi has already noted, not too much credit should be attached to his assertion. See Suraiya Faroqhi, *Anadolu'da Bektaşilik*, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barın, İstanbul: 2003, p. 84; “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, p. 174.

²⁰³⁶ Faroqhi, “Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival”, pp. 178-8. For some exemplary cases see Suraiya Faroqhi, *Anadolu'da Bektaşilik*, translated from German to Turkish by Nasuh Barın, İstanbul: 2003, pp. 141-4.

the other hand, a relative religious, economic, and administrative autonomy against the interference of the Ottoman officials at least by the mid-seventeenth century.

To the contrary of the Ottoman Administration's will, however, this autonomy which granted a certain capacity of resistance to the absorbed heterodox elements resulted in the survival of Anatolian heresy under (relative) Bektashi protection. Following Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher's analysis on the society of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Damascus²⁰³⁷, Faroqhi attempts to explain this autonomy and immunity of dervishes against the government with the phenomenon of 'sufi estate'. The sufi groups, or *tarikats*, in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire were bodies with a definite membership and a well-defined internal structure. Thus it was not so easy to violate the autonomous sphere of a sufi organization and to remove one or more people from this 'estate' to the status of ordinary *re'āya*.²⁰³⁸

As far as the qizilbashs are concerned, however, one should further this analysis. Although it seems plausible to assume that the qizilbashs of Anatolia shifted their allegiance to Bektashi Order from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, one may hardly claim that they became Bektashi. Rather, their affiliation to – or connection with – the order developed in a peculiar way. Most probably stemming from its dominant tribal character during the formation, or more accurately speaking 'synthesis' period, the boundaries of the qizilbash identity in the Ottoman Anatolia were formed not only by the religious discourse but also by a vague ethnicity. As elucidated throughout the present study, during the formative period under Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, and Shah Ismail, the qizilbash community mainly appeared as tribal, close-knit

²⁰³⁷ Linda Schatkowski-Schilcher, *Families in Politics. Damascus Factions and States of the 18th and 19th Centuries*, Stuttgart: Berliner Islamstudien, 2, 1985.

²⁰³⁸ Faroqhi, "Conflict, Accommodation, and Long-Term Survival", p. 182.

social units maintaining a low degree of religious and cultural interaction with neighboring – especially sedentary – communities. This characteristics survived even after the disintegration of the tribal structure. The qizilbashes usually, though not exclusively, formed uniform villages and maintained their beliefs and rituals among isolated, close social groups within the Ottoman realm.

This was perhaps the aim of the Ottoman administration with its two-fold policy indicated above. By confining the qizilbashes whose political threat had already been neutralized into a pre-determined social and spatial sphere, Ottoman bureaucrats reduced the qizilbash ‘heresy’, which once posed the most formidable threat to the very existence of the Ottoman imperial regime, to a manageable ‘religious heterodoxy’. From the seventeenth century on, the Ottoman government seems to have totally raised the persecution on the qizilbashes, even though the *ulemā* still proclaimed that they were heretic. The once overemphasized ‘religious heresy’ of the qizilbashes was now dealt with the policy of ‘do not talk so that there is not a problem!’

To sum up, the present study argued that the ‘qizilbash heresy’ in the Ottoman context consisted, for the most part, of the politico-military aspects of the rising Qizilbash identity. Nevertheless, both sides employed an intense religious discourse in expressing their political concerns. As far as the political aspect of the issue is concerned, Çaldıran might be regarded as the last duel of the bureaucratic state and tribal organization on the basis of equal conditions and power. From then on, tribal efforts against bureaucratic organization would be no more than hopeless, ‘rebellious’ attempts. Consequently, following the defeat of Çaldıran, the politico-military character of the

Qizilbash identity in the Ottoman Empire rapidly faded.²⁰³⁹ On the other hand, the other essential constituent of the Qizilbash identity, namely the mystical or religious dimension, survived under a peculiar form.

²⁰³⁹ However, we see in later qizilbash texts, especially *Buyruk* texts, that some reminiscent of the politico-military character survived in especially rhetoric and ritual of the qizilbash society.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

In the broadest framework, the Qizilbash Identity might be regarded as a product of two separate but interrelated currents. To explain these two currents, I will make use of Marxian scheme of ‘infrastructure’ and ‘superstructure’ with some specific adaptations to my own framework. I am inclined to call the first one the ‘deep current’ which corresponds to the ‘infrastructure’ in the Marxian terminology and is constituted by the anthropological, social and cultural norms, forms, and structures on – or within - which the social entity sustains. The other current is the ideological and political developments which rise on the ‘deep current’ but have a two-prong interaction with it. Therefore, I would like to utilize the term ‘surface current’.

The ‘deep current’ traces back to the pre-Islamic periods of the Turkish history. After converting to Islam, Turkish masses, especially at the public level, did not totally abandon their old habits, traditions, and beliefs. On the contrary, many pre-Islamic Turkish beliefs and practices some of which contradicted the Islamic principles, survived under a vague varnish of Islam. Without doubt, the more the urbanization

increased, the more the ‘non-Islamic’ elements decreased. One might deem this process in urban centers as the ‘assimilation’ of the Turkish culture within the rising Islamic civilization. On the other hand, the vast rural Turkish masses were, to a great extent, immune to ‘Islamization’ in its literal forms. Among these echelons of Turkish societies, who were overwhelmingly nomadic-tribespeople, a peculiar form of ‘Islamization’ was experienced. The notion of Islam spread chiefly in the form of Sufism among the Turkish tribal nomads referred as ‘Turkoman’. The merging of the Islamic Sufism – of a rough and popular form -, with the social-anthropological-cultural bases of the Turkish tradition, as well as with some pre-Islamic mystic traditions of the Mesopotamia and Asia, created an original form of public Islam among the lower strata of Turkish societies. When Turkoman masses invaded Anatolia and conquered the whole peninsula in a short span of time, they brought such a public Islam to Anatolia. Throughout the following centuries, this public religion further developed, now being nourished additionally by the rich cultural-religious atmosphere of Anatolia. The second chapter already delineated that the early Ottoman *beylik* was an enterprise of the people who were attached to this public Islam in terms of religion. The development of the Turkish folk Islam has been studied by several prominent scholars such as Fuat Köprülü, Abdülbâki Gölpınarlı, Irène Mélikoff, and Ahmet Yaşar Ocak.

It has been shown that although the Ottoman dynasty, the ruling elite around it, and the urban population accompanied sooner dismantled from this level of religious and cultural perception, shifting towards the classical high Islamic culture, a considerable portion of the Ottoman society remained attached to this folk Islam. Parallel to the rise of the Ottoman power, however, the sphere of the ‘high Islamic culture’ expanded at the expense of the Turkoman milieu of folk culture and religion. It

is obvious that the expansion of the Ottoman high culture was a demanding one on the Turkoman way of life, not only forcing some structural changes but also threatening the very existence of it.

A careful reader would immediately realize that the present thesis has primarily focused on the ‘surface current’ that refers to the political and ideological aspects of the historical process that produced the Qizilbash Identity. Although making occasional references to the cultural and religious background, the ‘deep current’ is of secondary rank of interest. Consequently, the religious aspects of ‘the making of the Qizilbash Identity’, which are without doubt as important as at least its political aspects, by and large remained untouched. This is, however, not the intention of the present author but a constraint posed by the present literature on the issue and the available sources. In order to discuss the religious, anthropological, and cultural aspects of the Qizilbash Identity, which might be labeled as the ‘invisible dimensions’ of history, or in Lévi-Strauss’s term “unconscious structure”²⁰⁴⁰ of societies governing the development of events, one should first establish the ‘visible dimensions’; that is, the historical data on the events. This thesis has already demonstrated that in the available literature, most of the historical data regarding the advent of events had been waiting to be explored. It is because of this fact that, the present study, although opening the discussion with providing an intense theoretical framework, inevitably gained a narrative character in the following chapters. Nevertheless, a careful reader would not miss that the narrative text is structured according to the theoretical framework presented at the first chapter. Accordingly, the theoretical approach, which is indeed derived from the analyses

²⁰⁴⁰ Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, New York: Basic Books, 1963, p. 21.

regarding the ‘deep current’ and which for the most part focused on the anthropological fundamentals of the political formations, governed the whole thesis.

It is only by now, having determined the ‘visible picture’ as far as the available sources allow, that the fundamentals of the Qizilbash Identity which are rooted in the ‘deep current’, especially its religious and anthropological fundamentals, could be speculated on a comparatively safe ground of historical knowledge. Yet it should be stated that the present monograph of the emergence of the Qizilbash Identity will remain incomplete until a comprehensive evaluation of the religious and anthropological dimensions of this identity is carried out. We have copies of the religious-sacred texts of the qizilbashes, namely *Buyruk*, dating from the early seventeenth century. The *Buyruk* texts not only explain the pillars of the qizilbash belief and rules of the practice or rituals, but also include valuable information on the social organization, the socio-religious hierarchy, and the religious-legal principles governing the community. Once the course of the events was established, which was what the present thesis attempted to do, then the accounts of *Buyruk* texts became meaningful and gain historical value even if the earliest text was from after a century later than the congealment of the Qizilbash Identity.²⁰⁴¹ As a matter of fact, a sufficient study of the religious aspects of the Qizilbash Identity, which is mainly based on the *Buyruk* texts and which consults with some archival documents – especially the *Mühimme* registers of the Ottoman state - and with the other known sources, would complete the present monograph.

As well as the ‘surface current’ is concerned, the attentive reader might have already recognized that ‘the making of the Qizilbash Identity’ was a phenomenon

²⁰⁴¹ The earliest known manuscript of *Buyruk* texts was copied in 1612-3 in Manisa. The transliterated text of this copy, alongside with the facsimile of the original manuscript, is published by Ahmet Taşğın. See Bisâtî, *Şeyh Sâfi Buyruğu (Menâkıbu'l-Esrâr Behcetü'l-Ahrâr)*, ed. Ahmet Taşğın, Ankara, 2003.

synthesized at the cross-section of two separate lines of story: it was the interference of the ‘dream of Osman Beg and that of Shaykh Safī, one started in Söğüt and the other in Ardabil at the beginning of the fourteenth century. After following two separate - but increasingly interrelative – trajectories for one and a half century, two lines of story intersected in the Anatolian peninsula. And this intersection created one of the most unique religio-social – and also political and military during the formative period – identity of the Islamic world. Apart from the foremost actors of the two lines, the Ottomans and the Safavids, the common actors of both lines, on whom the present study focused, were Turkomans.

Turkomans were composed of the nomadic-tribal units, each constituting a ‘compact community’ separate from each other and from the sedentary societies. Chapter I delineated that the most differentiating feature of the compact communities lays in its high degree of communality and low degree of individuality. As a social entity, a nomadic tribe is more like a biological unit rather than a set of individuals. Individual, as long as one can speak of the concept of ‘individual’ in such communities, is simply an incomplete part of the community and can not sustain separately. When abstract concepts such as faith, ideology, and polity are taken into account, the boundaries between individuals and the community as a whole further diminish. Thus, this is why in a compact community the faith is a social issue rather than an individual experience. Similarly, polity is also a social entity but not a collective initiative of individuals; therefore, the tribe constitutes an ‘indivisible’ – but greater and more influential - political unit.

It has been one of the major arguments of this thesis that the nomadic-tribes as compact communities and indivisible political units posed an uncompromising problem

within the Ottoman imperial regime, which rose upon a political philosophy that premises the accumulation of the political power in the hands of one person and his agents. Consequently, as the Ottoman state evolved from the tribal chieftaincy to the bureaucratic empire, the tension between the Turkoman subjects of the Ottomans and the central administration triggered. Although the alienation between the nomadic-tribal elements – in addition to some recently settled peasants who maintained nomadic and tribal habits – and the Ottoman regime was a gradual and comprehensive process, including differentiation in culture, religious understanding and practice, mentality, and mode of life, the main reason behind the harsh measures of the Ottoman administration against Turkomans was, without doubt, their political and military ability to resist the expansion of the Ottoman regime. As a result, in every stage of the formation process of the Qizilbash Identity, the dominance of the political considerations is clearly visible.

Towards the mid-fifteenth century, the tension between the Turkomans of Anatolia and the Ottoman administration turned into antagonism. Interestingly, during the same period, the Sufi Order of Safavids underwent an essential transformation in its esoteric doctrine. While a quietist, contemplative Sunni – as long as one can speak of sects regarding Sufism – order until then, the order pursued an extremist-shi'ite teaching and militant-popular form of Sufism. What is more noteworthy is that Shaykh Junayd was exiled from Ardabil, most probably by the traditional disciples of the order headed by Shaykh Ja'far, and carried out a long journey in Anatolia. This journey marked one of the most significant turning points of the qizilbash history. The places Shaykh Junayd visited were by no means accidental for these regions were densely populated by the Turkoman tribespeople. Likewise, the regions that Shaykh Junayd visited soon appeared

as major ‘qizilbash zones’ and provided the main body of the qizilbash tribal fighters which constituted the backbone of Shah Ismail’s conqueror army.

Obviously, Turkoman’s divergence from the Ottoman state and Shaykh Junayd’s recruitment of disciples among Anatolian Turkomans were closely interrelated developments. In the same vein, the doctrinal change in the Safavid order from the high Islamic Sufism to the militant-popular Sufism under Shaykh Junayd was not coincidental; rather, it was closely linked to a fundamental shift of the gravity in the disciple fundamentals of the order from the relatively cultured townspeople to the Turkoman tribespeople. The second half of the fifteenth century experienced the marriage of the Turkoman tradition, which had already been distanced from the Ottoman official sphere, and the Safavid mysticism.

This marriage brought considerable innovations to both parties. As mentioned above, the Safavid order experienced an essential transformation. On the other hand, under the spiritual and temporal leadership of the Safavid shaykhs, the Turkoman tribes attained a capacity of organization, of coming together and forming a supra-tribal entity cemented by intense mysticism. It was these inter-tribal bonds provided by the spiritual mastership of the Safavid shaykhs that made the harmonious collective deeds of the qizilbash *oymaqs* possible and made them capable of shaking the Ottoman suzerainty in Anatolia.

Moreover, the Safavid spiritual mastership shaped the Turkoman religious corpus evolved through centuries. The pillars of the faith and the fundamental rules of the practice (ritual) of the qizilbash understanding of religion are designed in the course of this period. Today, still many elements of belief and rules of ritual among qizilbashes bear clear seals of the Safavid mastership, especially of Shah Hatā’ī, i.e. Shah Ismail. If

we regard the ‘deep current’ as a dough kneaded in the course of centuries, this dough congealed during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century taking its shape in the hands of the Safavid shaykhs and shahs, especially of Shaykh Junayd, Shaykh Haydar, Shah Ismail, and Shah Tahmasb.

Under Shah Ismail, the qizilbashs reached the apex of their enthusiasm and power. However the heyday of the qizilbash zeal did not last long. After a fierce struggle against the Ottomans, the battle of Çaldıran marked the turn of the fortune for the qizilbashs, both in the Ottoman Anatolia and in the Safavid realm. Upon establishing their rule in Iran, Azerbaijan and the parts of Iraq and Central Asia, the Safavid Shahs also immediately realized the necessity of the bureaucracy to sustain their state. Consequently, more or less the same story in the Ottoman case, which is a general phenomenon in the Middle East as explained in the Chapter I, was carried throughout the sixteenth century. As were the cases in the previous experience, the nomadic-tribes were destined to lose against the sedentary bureaucracy, now the Turkoman Qizilbashs against the Persian men of pen. One century after the rise of Shah Ismail on the fervent qizilbash power, when the Safavid state attained its matured bureaucratic form under Shah Abbas the Great, the tribal qizilbashs were not only dispelled from the administrative circles but also regarded as an astray religious group.

In the Ottoman realm, the conditions for the qizilbashs had already become much worse on the eve of the Çaldıran campaign and turned out to be more dreadful following the battle. Already before Selim’s victorious return from Iran, they had been proclaimed heretics and subjected to harsh persecution. Yet the Ottoman victory of Çaldıran marked a profound change in the situation of the Anatolian qizilbashs. Since this bitter defeat terminated the offensive policy of Shah Ismail on the Ottoman

territories, from then on the qizilbashes of Anatolia fell enclosed within the Ottoman borders, progressively losing their connection with and especially their hopes in the Shah. The rest of the sixteenth century witnessed the downfall of the political and military content of the qizilbash groups, as well as the severance of their connection with the Safavids. For this purpose, the Ottoman administration employed a variety of means of persecution, which is partly reflected in the *Mühimme* registers.

As a result, the qizilbash population across Anatolia turned into a marginalized closed community towards the early seventeenth century. The tribal-nomadic social units with a strong political, military, and mystic content now transformed into marginalized socio-religious entities, isolated and surrounded by the Ottoman Sunni society. It constitutes one of the most interesting and original phenomenon of the Turkish history that the long experience of the qizilbashes in the Ottoman Anatolia produced an 'ethnic', socio-religious group, whose membership was based on the blood ties, from the Sufi-path. This social, religious, and anthropological process still remains totally untouched by the modern scholarship.²⁰⁴² It is interesting to note that they attained a permanent existence in Anatolia while disappearing in Iran, where they once ruled as victorious war-lords.

²⁰⁴² The only suggestion for this transformation from the sufi-order fundamentals to ethnic basis was made by Martin B. Dickson, who argues that by the time of Shah Ismail, individual conversion to the qizilbashism was no more possible, but "an individual became a qizilbash only by being born into one of the *uymaq* associated with the Safavid House." See Martin B. Dickson, *Shah Tahmasb and the Uzbeks (The Duel for Khurasan with 'Ubayd Khan: 930-940/1524-1540)*, Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Princeton University, 1958, p. 8. Nevertheless, Dickson provides no evidence for his assertion. As long as the Anatolian qizilbashes concerned, one feels legitimate to suspect this assertion. True that the transition between the qizilbash groups and Sunni society must have decreased by the early decades of the sixteenth century. However, the total cut off of this transition, which transformed the qizilbashes into an ethnic-like society, must have occurred in a rather *long dure*.

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APPENDIX A: CHRONOLOGY

1326		The death of Osman Beg, the founder of the Ottoman <i>Beylik</i>
1331		The first <i>madrassa</i> is opened in the Ottoman <i>Beylik</i> in Iznik
1334	September, 12	The death of Shaykh Safi
1362		The death of Orhan Beg
1386		First serious Ottoman-Karaman confrontation, ends with the victory of the Ottomans
1389		The death of Murad I
1391		The death of Sadreddin Musa
1402		The death of Bayezid I
1427		The death of Hāce Ali
1444		Hurufi propagandists are burnt in Edirne
1447		The death of Shaykh Ibrahim
1448		Shaykh Junayd leaves Ardabil and goes to Kurtbeli
1449		Shaykh Junayd visits Konya
1453		Shaykh Junayd leaves Syria for Canik
1456		Shaykh Junayd leaves Canik for Diyarbekir
1456		Shaykh Junayd attacks Trabzon
1459		Shaykh Junayd leaves Diyarbekir for Ardabil
1460	May, 3	Shaykh Junayd is killed in Tabersaran during a battle with Shirvanshah Halil-allah
1460		Ibrahim Beg of Karaman accepts the superiority of the Ottomans
1461		Mehmed II annexes Trabzon
1475		Mehmed II ends the Karaman rule
1483		Kasim Beg of Karaman, who ruled the Karaman region as Ottoman vassal since 1475, dies and the political existence of the Karaman Dynasty diminishes.
1484		Shaykh Haydar's first incursion on Circassia and Dagistan

1486		Shaykh Haydar's second incursion on Circassia and Dagistan
1487		Shaykh Haydar's third incursion on Circassia and Dagistan
1488	July, 9	Shaykh Haydar is killed in Tabersaran during a battle with Shirvanshah Farrukhyasar
1489	March,	Sultan Ali, Ibrahim, Ismail, and their mother Alamshah Bagum imprisoned in the fortress of Istahr
1489		Selim I appointed to Trabzon
1490		The death of Sultan Yakub Akkoyunlu
1493	August,	Sultan Ali, Ibrahim, Ismail, and their mother Alamshah Bagum released from the fortress of Istahr
1494		Ismail arrives in Lahijan with great qizilbash amirs
1497	Summer	Rustem Beg Akkoyunlu is killed by Ahmed Mirza
1499	August,	Ismail sets off from Lahijan to Ardabil
1500	December,	Ismail defeats Shirvanshah Farrukhyesar in Jiyani near Gulistan
1500	August	Ismail in Erzincan
1500	August, 10	The conquest of Moton
1500	August, 17	The conquest of Coron
1500	November-mid	Bayezid II returns to Edirne, then to Istanbul soon after.
1500	Spring	Ismail proceeds from Arjuwan to Erzincan
1500	summer	The qizilbash <i>oymaqs</i> from several parts of Anatolia gather around Ismail in Erzincan
1500	summer	Mustafa Beg Karaman rises up against the Ottoman rule in Karaman region
1500		First incursion of Selim on Gerogia
1501	Summer	Ismail defeats Alvand Mirza Akkoyunlu in Sharur and ascends to the throne in Tabriz
1501	summer	The Ottoman administration takes measures to prevent the communication of Anatolian qizilbashes with the Shah
1501		Ismail's writes a letter requesting the opening of the borders for his disciples
1502	December, 11	Treaty with Venice. Signed in August 1503.
1502		Death of Alemshah. Just after his appointment to Manisa
1502		Qizilbashes of Teke region are deported to Moton and Coron
1503		Selim's first assault on Erzincan

1505		Ismail's ambassador in Istanbul
1505		Bayezid II's ambassador in Ismail's court
1507	Summer	Ismail enters Ottoman land for Alauddevle and arrives in Sivas. Leaves here towards the winter.
1507	Summer	Ismail invades Dulkadir territories
1507		Selim's second assault on Erzincan
1508		Ismail's envoy in Istanbul. Campaign on Tatars, complaints of Selim's assaults.(coincided with Tatar envoy)
1508		Selim's third incursion on Georgia
1509	August	Suleyman appointed to Kefe
1509		Ismail's envoy in Venice. Secures artillery and obtains alliance against the Ottomans. (failed)
1509		Korkud leaves Antalya and goes to Cairo
1510	Summer	Selim departs from Trebizond for Kefe
1511	March	Korkud leaves Antalya for Saruhan
1511	March, 29	Şahkulu attacks Korkud's caravan
1511	April, 09 (Muharrem 10)	Şahkulu moves from Yenice
1511	April, 16	Şahkulu defeats Nokta and captures Burdur
1511	April, 22	Şahkulu defeats Karagöz Pasha and captures Kütahya
1511	April, 22	Selim stops in Eski-zagra to await the results of advents in Anatolia
1511	April, May	Selim lands on Kili shores
1511	May, 03	Şahkulu defeats Korkud's army, commanded by Hasan Aga, in Alasehir. Korkud flees to Manisa.
1511	May, 8	Ali Pasha besieges Şahkulu in Kizilkaya
1511	June, 01	Selim stays near Kamcisuyu
1511	June, 10-15	Selim takes Semendire after a quarrel with his father near Edirne
1511	June, 15	Şahkulu flees from Kizilkaya killing Haydar Pasha
1511	June, 17	Şahkulu arrives in Beyşehir
1511	June, 24	Selim in Zagra, awaiting the result of Ali Pasha's campaign.
1511	July	Bayezid II moves from Edirne to Istanbul. (Rebi II, 917)

1511	July, 02	Ali Pasha and Şahkulu battle in Çubuk, both die.
1511	July, last days	Bayezid moves from Edirne to Istanbul in order to enthrone Ahmed.
1511	August 03	Selim shipped from Ahyolu, after being defeated by his father near Corlu.
1511	August, 0-5	Ahmed moves from Eskişehir to Istanbul
1511	August, 8	Selilm flees to Kefe
1511	September, 11	Bayezid enters Istanbul.
1511	September, 21	Upon learning that Ahmed had arrived in Maltepe, Janissaries revolt against Ahmed's <i>saltanat</i> .
1512	January, 6	The cabinet changed by the pressure of Janissaries. Pro-Ahmed statesmen are eliminated.
1512	March, 27	Selim is invited to Istanbul to command the imperial army against Ahmed.
1512	April, 24	Selim ascends to the throne
1512	Mayis, 17	Qizilbashes fall into conflict about where to go and battle in Artuğak, where Murad's man Kara Iskender achieves victory and goes to Dulkadir
1512	Mayis, 23	Ismail's letter to Turgutoglu Musa, ordering him to move in accordance to the directives of Karamanlu Ahmed Aga.
1512	July, 29	Selim crosses to Anatolia to march on Ahmed.
1512	November	Selim returns to Bursa from Ankara.
1512	Spring	Nur Ali Khalifa captures Tokat and reads the <i>khutba</i> in the name of Shah Ismail
1513	January, 29	Ahmed moves from Amasya and marches on Selim, who was in Bursa.
1513	March, 17	Selim executes the princes and Korkud in Bursa.
1513	April, 15	Ahmed and Selim confront in Yenişehir. Ahmed is defeated and executed.
1513	May,	Sultan Selim returns to Istanbul and then moves to Edirne
1513	May, 14	Ahmed's son Osman and Murad's son Mustafa are executed in Amasya.
1514	March, 20	Selim moves from Edirne for the Çaldıran Campaign
1514	April, 28	Selim writes his first letter to Shah Ismail in Izmit
1514	April, 3	Selim summons the <i>ulemā</i> in Istanbul to issue the <i>fetva</i> for the campaign
1514	August, 23	The Battle of Çaldıran

APPENDIX B: A SELECT LIST OF DOCUMENTS IN TSA

<i>Arşiv no</i>	<i>Konusu</i>	<i>Tarihi</i>
<u>D 10149</u>	Sultan Ahmed ve Sultan Murad taraftarları ve kızılbaşların listesi ve ne iş yaptıkları	1513-4
D 5720	İdam olunan kızılbaşlar	1513-4
<u>D 9864</u>	Kilidbahir kalesinde habs olan Kızılbaş elçisinin eşyası	1516
E 10160/37	Naib Davud imzasıyla Kargı nahiyesi Çaykışla Köyünde Küçük Abdal adında birisinin bir tekke yaptığı hakkında	15.asır sonları
E 10198	İran Şahı'nın Yavuz'un vefatından dolayı Kanuniye taziye mektubu(farsça)	1520
E 10213	Seyyid Hüseyin'in İran naiblerinden birinin yardıma muhtaç olduğuna dair mektubu(farsça)	16.asır
E 10270	Şah İsmail'in fermanı(harap-farsça)	1503-14
E 11606	İranda bulunan memurlara yardım edilmesine dair(farsça)	1486
<u>E 11996</u>	Mehmet Başbüyük tarafından yazılan Şah'ın ordusunu hangi beyin emrinde kaç nefer bulunduğunu rapor eden belge	20 Cemaziyelahir 922 / 21 Temmuz 1516
<u>E 12077</u>	Kızılbaşlar hakkında Müftü Hamza'nın fetvası	
E 12077	Kızılbaşlar hakkında fetva ile ilgili bir vesika(Hamza'nın fetvasından ayrı)	
<u>E 2044</u>	Şah İsmail'in Şah Veli ile birlikte ayaklanabileceğine dair anonim rapor	16. asır
<u>E 2667</u>	Sultan Ahmed'in babasına Şahkulu ile buluşdukları ve onu takip ettikleri hakkında mektubu	1511
<u>E 2667</u>	Sultan Ahmed ahvalinden bahseden Mir-alem Mustafa'nın raporu	1513
<u>E 2829</u>	Şehzade Osmanın 17 Muharrem 917 tarihli Şahkulu isyanı ve mezkurun faaliyetleri hakkında arızası	h.917
<u>E 3057</u>	Ahmed'den Musa Turgut'a Taceddin Bey'e katılması için gönderilen hüküm	Temmuz ortası 1512

<u>E 3062</u>	Sultan Ahmed'in Ali Paşa'nın Sivas yakınlarında Çubuk nam mahalde katl edildiğine ve ordunun durumunun iyi olmadığına dair mektubu	1511
E 3192	Ali b. Abdülkerim Halife'nin memleket işlerine dair bir raporu	1514
<u>E 3295</u>	Karaman Beylerbeyi Hüsrev Paşa'nın kızılbaşların yenildiklerini bildiren mektubu	1510-20
E 4467	Eşkiyanın Zile ve civarında halkı soyduklarını herşeylerini kaybeden halkın vergilerini ödeyemeyeceklerini bildir vesika	1510-20
E 4796	Hızır Bey oğlu Ahmed'in padişahı İran'a yürümeye teşvik eden bir yazısı	1510-20
<u>E 5035</u>	Sultan Korkuddan gelen sufinin ifadesi	1510-11
<u>E 5293</u>	Bayat'ta isyan eden Şah veli adındaki mülhid ile Anadolu Beylerbeyi Sadi Bey'in çarpışmasına dair Sadi Paşa'nın bir raporu	1517
<u>E 543</u>	Şehzade Selim'in Trabzon havalisinin verimsiz olduğu ve kendisine başka bir yer verilmesini istediğine dair arzı	1509-10
E 5446	Kemah beyi İskender Bey tarafından şam ahvalini tecessüs ederek bilgi edinmek üzere Bitlis'den Tebriz'e gönderilen ve dönen casusun İstanbul'a gönderildiğine dair	16. asır başları
E 5452	Bursa kadısı Eflatunzade'nin Alaeddin'in şehre girip yağmaladığı şehir halkı tarafından geri püskürtüldüğü yardım gönderilmesine dair arızası	19 Haziran 1512
<u>E 5451</u>	Bursa kadısı Ahmed'in Yeniçeri ağasına Tekedeki İsyan hakkında mektubu	
E 5460	Şah İsmail'in Musa Durgutoğlu'na gönderdiği mektup: Şah değerli adamlarından Ahmed Karamanlu'yı o tarafa gönderdiğini ona tabi olunması ve birlikte hareket edilmesini emr ediyor.	7 Rebi I 918 / 23 Mayıs 1512
E 5465	Erzincandan Tebriz'e kadar olan konaklar	1514
<u>E 5469/2</u>	Muhtemelen Diyarbakır Beylerbeyi Mahmud Paşa imzasıyla arz: Bağdad yakınlarında Kızılbaş esirlerin ifadesine göre Mısırın fethinden sonra Bağdada kaçan Canberd Gazzalının Bağdad hakimi Şah Ali Obaş ve Erdebiloğlu ile ittifak ettiği hakkında	1518

E 5483	Halep Melikü'l-ümerası Hayırbay'ın kendi hükümdarından(memluk) kızılbaşlara karşı Osmanlı ile ittifak edilmesine dair emir aldığı ve sınırdeki memluk kumandanlarına Osmanlı askerine katılmaları için emir verdiğini bildiren mektubu	1513-5
E 5570	Şah İsmail'in Ali Kulu Bey'e namesi(farsça)	16. asır başları
E 5572	Seyyid Hüseyinden Şah İsmail'e mektub(farsça)	16.asır başları
E 5578	Şah İsmail'in fermanı(harap-verilmiyor)	1503-14
<u>E 5590</u>	Haydar Paşa tarafından rikab-ı hümayuna arz: Fenayi ve Dellak demekle maruf mezhepsizlerin ve bu gibilerin şehzadeyi (Şehinşah) yoldan çıkardıkları yakında kızılbaşla katılacağına dair rapor	1511
E 5594	Halep Melikü'l-ümerasının(Hayırbay) Şehinşah'ın Safeviler'le mektuplaştığını bildirir mektubu	1511
E 5594-b	Hayırbay'ın gönderdiği bir mektup	1511-20
E 5594-c	Hayırbay'ın gönderdiği bir mektup	1511-20
<u>E 5599</u>	Diyarbakır valisi Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa'nın, Şah İsmail'in hareketi ve İran işlerine dair padişaha gönderdiği mektup	1515-6
<u>E 5674</u>	Şah İsmail ile İran ahvali, Alaüddeve ve Şehzade Murad hakkında bilgi veren Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa'nın Sultan Selim'e arzı	Ağustos ortası, 1515
E 5685	Şah İsmail'in Dulkadiroğlu Kemaleddin Mustafa'ya Sultan Cihanşah'ın kendisine muhib olduğu ve O'na itaat etmesi hususunda yazdığı mektup	1 Safer 916 / 10 Mayıs 1510
E 5839	Şah İsmail'in ahvali hakkında Selim'e bilgi	1510-16
E 5842	Karahisarda zaviyadar Şeyh Musa'nın takriri: Kanber Bey'in Esterabad yakınlarında otururken Erdebiloğlunun Hata Irmağı yanına geldiği sonra Kanber üzerine yürüdüğü, Kanber müdafa ederken Erdebiloğlunu bozguna uğrattığı, Mardin Beyi'nin Ustacalunun kardeşinin başını kestiği hakkında	1515
E 5843	Şah İsmail'in fetva makamında bulunan zata Sultan Cihanşah'ın şillisi kabul ettiğine dair namesi	1 Safer 916 / 10 Mayıs 1510
E 5845	Seyyid Şah Ali Sehrani'den Dulkadiroğlu Ali Bey'e İsmail'in ordusunun ahvali hakkında mektup (farsça)	16.asır başları

E 5851	Kasım bin Abdüssamed imza ve mührüyle Rikab-ı Hümayun'a arıza: Yaralı olan Şah'ın durumunu öğrenmek üzere Adilcevaz ve Erciyeş tarafına adam gönderdiği, Şah hakkında bilgisi olan Ali Bey'i bulduğu ve İstanbul'a gönderdiği hakkında	13 Cemaziyelahir 927 / 19 Mayıs 1520
<u>E 5877</u>	Yusuf imzasıyla gönderilen Sultan Murad'ın kızılbaşlığına dair arz	1512-3
<u>E 5881</u>	Abdühü'l-fakir Yusuf el-hakir imzalı Şahkulu isyanı hakkında arıza	1511
E 5943	Haydar(şeyh) Yakub padişahın Mısırlılarla ittifakına itiraz vesairenden bahseden Mehmed'in mektubu	15. asır sonları
<u>E 5960</u>	Kızılbaşlar hakkında Hamza'nın fetvası	1514
E 5970	Şehzade Selim'in oğlu Süleyman'a tahsis olunan sancağı beğenmediği ve kızılbaşlara ait keleleri neden işgal ettiği	1509-10
<u>E 618</u>	Şehzade Selim'in memleket ahvalinin iyi olmadığından şikayet ettiği, Sadrazam'a yazdığı mektubu	1509-10
<u>E 6185</u>	Şehzade Selim'in işlerin kötüye gidişinden merkezi sorumlu tuttuğuna dair mektubu	1509-10
<u>E 6187</u>	Şahkulunun her tarafı tahrif ve katliam eylediğine dair teftişle görevli memura ait imzasız rapor	1511
E 6188	Şah Veli adında bir şahsın takriri: Yavuz Mısır seferine hareket ettiği zaman Seyyid Temam adında bir zatın zuhur ettiği hakkında	1517
<u>E 6316</u>	Mehmed imzalı Nur Ali Halife ile yapılan savaşı ve mezkurun katedildiğini bildirir arıza	1515
<u>E 6320</u>	İran ahvali hakkında bilgi veren ve bilhassa bir Osmanlı topunu numune alarak top imaline başladığına dair bir mektup	Mayıs-Haziran 1516
<u>E 6321</u>	Defterdarının Korkud'a gönderdiği Şahkulu ahvaline ve acele yardım gelmezse şehrin elden çıkacağına dair mektubu	1511
<u>E 6352</u>	Şahkulu isyanının sonuçları ve Ali Paşa'nın cengine dair imza yerinde M. Olan tarihsiz mektup	1511
<u>E 6352</u>	Sadrazam Hadım Ali Paşa'nın Şehzade Şehinşah'ın kızılbaşlarla münasebeti bulunduğu dair mektubu	1511
<u>E 6369</u>	Karaman Beylerbeyi Mahmud Paşa'nın Kalender Çelebi ayaklanmasının nasıl başladığını ve gelişimini anlatan raporu.	Nisan 1527

<u>E 6384</u>	Sadi Paşa'nın isyancıların reisinin ne şekilde yakalandığını bildiren mektubu	16. asır başları
<u>E 6401</u>	Kızılbaşlar hakkında Hamza'nın fetvası	1514
<u>E 6478-2</u>	Şadi Bey'in Dev Ali ve Sultan Murad'ın Anadolu'ya saldırı planı içinde olduğunu anlatan raporu.	1512-3 kışı
<u>E 6522</u>	Sultan Murad'ın kızılbaş olduğu, onlarla birlikte hareket ettiği ve Çorum Amasya sivas taraflarında kızılbaşların faaliyetlerine dair rapor	1513
<u>E 6535</u>	Şah Veli bin Selçuktan Kızılbaşlar isyanına dair yeniçeri ağasına gelen mektub	1510-20
<u>E 6536</u>	II. Bayezid'in Evvel-i Şehr-i Zilkade 908 (Mayıs 1503) tarihli Antalya sancakbeyi Şehzade Korkud'a ilave olarak Hamid sancağı verildiğine dair berat	1503
<u>E 6556</u>	Sivas Beylerbeyi Hacı Mustafa imzasıyla mektup: Tebriz'den bir Seyyid gelerek Şah'ın vefat ettiğinden Akkoyunlu ailesinden Yakub Bey'in oğlu Sultan Murad'ı boş kalan Diyarbakıra davet ettiği vesaire hakkında	16. asır başları
<u>E 6636</u>	Filibey sancağı beyinin Şahkulu'nun yakalanan Pir Ahmed nam casusunun ifadesi hakkında gönderdiği mektup	1511
<u>E 6664</u>	Hacı Mustafa'nın Şahkulu kuvvetlerini takip ettikleri Sivas yakınlarında Yenice karyesinde ok savaşı yaptıkları, Şahkuluna tüfenk dokunduğu, Erzincan taraflarına kaçtıklarına dair mektubu	1511
<u>E 6666</u>	Şah'ın ordusunun ahvaline dair vesika	16. asır başları
<u>E 6668</u>	Kudsine Beyi İbşir'den babasına gelen mektubun sureti: Şeybe Han oğlu Timur Han'ın Kızılbaşla yaptığı ve galip geldiği savaş hakkında	II. Bayezid dönemi
<u>E 2667</u>	Ali Paşa'nın yenildiği ve Nur Ali Halife'nin Sivas üzerine yürüdüğüne dair rapor(Arşiv kataloğunda alakasız bir belge olarak görünüyor)	1512
<u>E 6672</u>	Kürd beylerinden Halid ile kızılbaşların bazı şehir ve kasabaları yağma ve tahrib ettiklerine dair bir vesika	1512-3
<u>E 6942</u>	Zulkadiroğlu Ali Bey'in Şah Veli'nin katline dair raporu	1520
<u>E 7052</u>	Bitlisi'nin oğlu Şükrulla'nın Sultan Ahmed'in ahvali hakkında Selim'e arızası	1512
<u>E 7055</u>	Hemdem Paşa'nın Şehzade Ahmed ve müfsidler hakkındaki mektubu	1513

E 7118	Şah Tahmasb mührüyle Kanuni Sultan Süleyman'a mektup: Hicaz ve Irak'ta bulunan evkaf ve imaretlerin masraflarını tanzim ve tedkikine mülazım olarak bir veya iki oğlunun kabul edilmesine müsade buyrulması hakkında	1520
E 7285	Ebussuud Fetvaları: Diyar-ı Acem'de mütemekkin olanlara dair 6 fetva var	16. asır
<u>E 7292</u>	Sultan Murad ve sair kızılbaşların yaptıklarına dair rapor	1512-3
<u>E 7296</u>	Kızılbaşlar hakkında Anadolu Beylerbeyi Sadi Paşanın arzı:Şahın beylerinden Gurgurunun 3 bin kızılbaş ile Gürcistanda olduğu ve sınıra yakın bulunduğu hakkında	1517
<u>E 7620</u>	Şah İsmail ve Özbek Şeybani Han arasında 1510 yılında cereyan eden savaşın neticesi ve Şah'ın ahvali hakkında Hasan adında birinin raporu	1510
<u>E 77</u>	Anadolu valisi Karagöz Paşa'nın Şahkulu hakkındaki mektubu	1511
<u>E 8304</u>	Rumeli Beylerbeyi Hasan Paşa'nın Selim'e Korkud'un durumu hakkında mektubu	1513
E 8316	Emir Bey veled-i Gülabi mührü ile Div Ali Sultan'a farsça mektup: Şah Ali Bey ve arkadaşlarının perişan ve yardıma muhtaç oldukları hakkında (18.5-42.5 cm. Şikeste ta'lik)	16.asır başları
E 8325	Div Ali mührü ile Abdülbaki Han'a mektup: O tarafa gönderilen Kemal Ahi adlı zata elden geldiğince İzzet İkrâm gösterilmesi hakkında.	16.asır başları
E 8328	Şah İsmailin fermanı: Hoca Beğoğluna, Ebulmuzaffer Sultan Cihanşah'ın kendi muhibbi olduğu ve bütün işlerinde kendisine itaatte bulunması hakkında(farsça)	Gurre-i Safer 916 / 10 Mayıs 1510
E 8336	Mehmed Ali mührü ile Emir Abdülbaki'ye farsça mektup: Ankara'ya gönderdiği adamdan aldığı mektuba göre amcazade ile oraya giden Kasım Halife ve kardeşinin Kayseri'de öldürüldükleri, Varsak ümerasından Yahya Bey tavassutu ile amcazadesinin kurtulduğu hakkında.	20 Nisan 1514 / 24 Safer 920
E 8349	Div Sultan tarafından Şah İsmail'e farsça arıza: Semerkant'ın Kazaklar tarafından zabt edildiği, Abid Han'ın vefat haberinin asılsız olduğu, Cani Bey'in Belh'den firar ettiği, Özbeklerin yerlerinde oturdukları, Süleyman Kurci'nin Belh valiliğine tayin edildiği ve kendisine verilen emre göre Horasan'da bulunduğu.	16.asır başları

E 8350	Emir Ca.. Bey tarafından Yavuz Selim'e farsça arıza: Kendisine tabi bil elçinin bir İranlıyı da beraber getirdiği 16 Şaban'da Div Ali Sultan emri ile Azarbaycan, Geylan ve Karabağ askerlerinin Kağızman'dan Erzincan'a hareket ettikleri, Diyarbakır ve civarı askerlerinin de onlara katıldıkları hakkında.	16.asır başları
E 8505	Şah İsmail'in ümeradan Zuhurettin İbrahim Bey'e farsça mektubu: Muhaliflere karşı Ebulmuzaffer Sultan Cihanşah'la teşrik-i mesayi edilmesi hakkında. (18.5-43 cm, şikeste ta'lik)	10 Mayıs 1510 / Gurre-i Safer 916
<u>E 8758</u>	Şah İsmailin hareketi ve Dev Ali ile Sultan Murad'ın Anadolu tarafına gönderildiğine dair padişaha gelen Malatya'nın Memluk valisi Mamay'ın mektubu	1512-3 kışı
E 8922	Karacahan tarafından başvekil Abdülbaki'ye mektup: Hasan-ı Keyf'den istenilen paranın bu mıntıkanın harap olması ve halktan birçoğunun Erzincan'a hicret etmesi yüzünden tahsili mümkün olmadığından affı ricası.	16.asır başları
E 8923	Şah İsmail tarafından İran ümerasına hüküm: Ebulmuzaffer Gıyaseddin Sultan Cihanşah'ın emrine tabi olunması hakkında	10 Mayıs 1510 / Gurre-i Safer 916
E 8932	Şah İsmail tarafından Kemaleddin Seydi Bey'e mektup: Ebulmuzaffer Sultan Cihanşah'a itaat ve hürmet edilmesi tavsiyesini havi.	10 Mayıs 1510 / Gurre-i Safer 916
E 8933	Şah İsmailin namesi: Şah İsmail'in Şeyhullahoğlu Zeynel Ali Bey'e, Safeviye Hanedanına ve saltanatına bağlı bulunan Gıyaseddin Ebulmuzaffer Cihanşah'a itaat etmesi tavsiyesini havi	1509-17
E 8968	Yavuz Selim ile İran Şahı arasında sulh yapılmasına dair teati edilen nameler	1520
E 8974	Cihanşah Abdülmelik imzasıyla başvezir Abdülbaki'ye farsça mektup: Hükümet merkezine gidip arz-ı ihtiramda bulunacak olan Emir Nizamettin'e iltifat ve teveccüh ibrazı hakkında.	16.asır başları
E 936	İran Şahı Tahmasb'ın biraderi olub Şirvan Valiliğinde bulunmakta iken Kırım'a kaçıp oradan İstanbul'a gelen Elkan Mirza hakkında Şah'ın Sultan Süleyman'a gönderdiği name (farsça)	1520
E 9670	Şah İsmail'in namesi: Dulkadirli Şehabettin Ömer Bey'e, Sultan Selim'in Dulkadirli Alaaeddin Bey'i katli ve yerine Şehsuvaroğlu Ali Bey'i ikame ettiğinden Yavuz Selim'den intikam alması tavsiyesini havi	1515-6
E 9671	Şah İsmailin namesi: Dulkadirli Celaleddin Abdüllatif'e, evvelce gönderdiği mektubun üzerine Yavuz Selim'e vaki ilticası sebebi ile habs edildiğinden halas temini ile...	1515-6

E 5835/2	Alemşah Zeynel Han'dan İran vükelasına: Belh civarında vaki Sergan ve havalisi idaresine memur edilen Nuri Bey'in idaresinden halkın memnun olduğuna dair(farsça)	16. asır başları
E 10739	Şerefhan Bitlisi'nin Selim'e Mektubu (farsça)	30 Haziran 1516
E 9647	Şerefhan Bitlisi'nin Selim'e Mektubu (farsça)	1518
E 5818	Şerefhan Bitlisi'nin Selim'e Mektubu (farsça)	1519
E 8308	Şerefhan Bitlisi'nin Selim'e Mektubu (farsça)	1520
E 5591	Akkoyunlu Murad Bey'in Sultan Selim'e İran ahvaline dair mektubu: Horasan'da Ubeyd Han ile Temur Han'ın Kızılbaş'ı zebun ettiği, Kızılbaş Horasan'da iken kardeşi Şah Süleyman'ın asi olup Tebriz üzerine yürüdüğü ancak burada katledildiği, ve Ustacalu Muhammed Bey'in Eğil kalesine doğru gittiğini anlatıyor.	1514 başları
E 9684	Akkoyunlu Murad Bey'in büyük ihtimalle vezir-i azama yazdığı mektup: geçende dergah-ı muallayı ziyaretinde Sultan Selim'in muavenet vaadinde bulunduğunu hatırlatıp kendisine yardım etmesi için astane-i saadete arz yazılmasını talep ediyor.	1513