Imagi*nation*: The Making of Kurdish National Identity in the Kurdish Journalistic Discourse (1898-1914)

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I certify that all material in this thesis which is not my own work has been identified and that no material has previously been submitted and approved for the award of a degree by this or any other University.

Signature:

Abstract

By utilizing Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) methodology, this study explores the ideological function of language in the Kurdish journalistic discourse of the pre-WWI period (1898-1914). Informed by the CDA approach, the present study perceives language as a social practice that produces meanings and presumes a dialectical relationship between language and ideology in the construction of social realities, beliefs and identities. Hence, this study is situated within the wider scope of discourse analysis that focuses on the link between identity, discourse, power and ideology. The study particularly utilizes, in an eclectic manner, the CDA conceptual frameworks developed by Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak in order to examine and explain the ideological function of the Kurdish journalistic discourse in the formation of Kurdish national identity from the prespective of a linguistically informed discursive study. To this end, from the perspective of CDA approach, the study methodically and analytically conducts an exhaustive close textual examination of numerous discourse samples taken from the corpora of three Kurdish journals of the late Ottoman period, i.e., Kurdistan (1898-1902), Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi (The Kurdish Gazette for Mutual Aid and Progress) (1908-1909) and Rojî Kurd (Kurdish Sun) (1913). Given that the historical circumstance have a tremendous effect on the formation of discourses, this study investigates discourse practices and language devices employed in the Kurdish journals by taking into consideration the distinctive sociocultural and political conditions in which each journal was published.

The study concludes that contrary to the common misperception in the literature, the Kurdish press of the late Ottoman period served as a platform on which Kurdish intellectuals negotiated, constructed and disseminated a distinctive form of Kurdish national identity and nationalism in their discourse despite –sometimes at the expense of- the hegemonic Ottoman and Pan-Islamic identities. However, although the Kurdish journalistic discourse managed to produce a Kurdish nationalist discourse among the Kurdish intellectuals and a small segment of Kurdish reading public, it failed to imitate the Andersonian notion of 'imagined communities' as the 'cultural products' of 'print-capitalism' that would immensely contributed to the formation of a unified field of communication around a national

print-language. As a result the Kurdish identity discourse remained inconsequential in terms of making an impact among a larger Kurdish public that would ultimately lead to the construction of a braoder imagined Kurdish national community. The present study attributes the limited power and influence of the Kurdish journals or the Kurdish printing-press on Kurdish masses to the unfavourable historical circumstances, including the novelty of the newspaper genre, the low literacy rate in Kurdistan, the state-imposed restrictions on the production and dissemination of the journals, the personal and familial concerns and interests of the Kurdish leadership of the period and the lingering effects of both parochial (tribal, linguistic, sectarian, regional) and meta-loyalties (Islamism, Ottomanism) among Kurds in the era of nationalism.

To my mother…

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List of abbreviations

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
CAMTA	Computer-Aided Methodology
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CL	Critical Linguistics
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
KTC	Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti (The Society for the Rise of Kurdistan)
KTTC	Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti (The Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress)
KTTG	Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi (The Kurdish Gazette for Mutual Aid and Progress)
KXK	Koma Xebatên Kurdolojiyê (Kurdology Study Group)
OCR	Optical Character Recognition
PKK	Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
SFL	Systemic Functional Linguistics
TIC	Teşkilat-i Içtimaiye Cemiyeti (The Society of Social Organization)

List of Images

The folio section of the Journal *Kurdistan*

Sultan Saladin Ayyubid

Shah Abd al Karim Khan Zand

Erzurum province

Bedir Khani Huseyin Kenan Pasha

Translation and Transliteration

The original languages of the primary sources for this study are Kurdish (Kurmanji and Sorani) and Ottoman Turkish. The excerpts taken from the primary sources are translated to English by the present author. In the translations, the present author has remain as loyal to the original texts as possible, sometimes at the expense of literary translation, to allow for a meticulous and accurate close analysis of the rhetorical devices of the original texts. For the convenience of the audience familiar with Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish the Latin transliteration of the original Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish texts are provided in footnotes. For the transliteration of the excerpts from their original Arabic script to Latin alphabet I have relied on M. Emin Bozarslan and KXK's (Koma Xebatên Kurdolojiyê or Kurdology Study Group) transliteration system.

So far as the spellings of the proper nouns are concerned, if they have their established Anglicized form, they will appear in the text as such, for instance 'Ahmad Khani' and 'Mosul.' However they may appear as 'Ehmedê Xanî' and 'Musul' when they are used in a transliterated Kurdish or Ottoman Turkish text taken from the primary sources of this study. Below is the pronunciation key for the Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish alphabets to make it easier for the readers to correctly pronounce the original Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish words.

Pronunciation key for the Kurdish Alphabet

The Kurmanji alphabet consists of 31 letters with 8 vowels and 23 consonants.

Vowels

A,a	as in *car*
E,e	as in *pen*
Ê,ê	as in *fake*
I,i	as in *dim*

Î,î	as in *seek*
O,o	as in *boat*
U,u	as in *wing*
Û,û	as in *cool*

Consonants

B,b	as in *book*
C,c	as in *jam*
Ç,ç	as in *cheap*
D,d	as in *door*
F,f	as in *far*
G,g	as in *bargain*
H,h	as in a *head*
J,j	as in *leisure*
K,k	as in *kettle*
L,l	as in *lock*
M,m	as in *morning*
N,n	as in *net*
P,p	as in *poll*

Q,q	like Arabic ق *(qaf)*
R,r	r as *room*
S,s	as in *sad*
Ş,ş	as in *shake*
T,t	as in *telephone*
V,v	as in *victory*
W,w	as in *wide*
X,x	like German *ch*
Y,y	as in *yes*
Z,z	as in *zebra*

Pronunciation Key for Ottoman Turkish letters that do not exist in Kurdish

Â, â as in in *kind*
Ö, ö as in *urge*
Ü, ü as in *nude*
I, ı as in (the second syllable of) *number*
Ğ, ğ, as in *Khan*

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

1.1.   Introductory Remarks

In the beginning of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, a small group of well-educated and nationally oriented Kurdish intellectuals, most of them members of noble families, engaged in publication activities including newspaper publication in the Ottoman territories and abroad. This intellectual elite[1] that had received European-style education and been exposed to the European ideas envisioned a new Kurdish society based on European concepts of national identity, political participation, constitution, citizenship, civil rights, self-determination and, ultimately, full-fledged nationalism.

The late Ottoman period (1789-1918) is one of the most crucial eras in the Ottoman history marking the decline of the Ottoman Empire and giving rise to the modern-style national identities among various Ottoman communities, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The rise of these new identities coupled with various other local and global factors culminated in the formation of nationalist discourses and national liberation movements that eventually led to the break-up of the Empire (Hanioğlu 2008). Similarly this formative era, particularly the historical period around WWI presented Kurdish intellectuals with the best opportunity to construct a Kurdish nationalist identity, claim the status of nationhood and perhaps set up their own nation-state in the ensuing years. As the material expression of this nationalist endeavour, starting from 1898 the Kurdish intellectuals of the period fully engaged in publication activities in an attempt to forge a Kurdish national identity discourse. Several such periodicals became a platform to construct, negotiate and disseminate a novel discourse on Kurdish identity.

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[1] The term 'elite' is understood as 'people with attributes that qualifies them to be ranked higher and accorded more prestige and respect than ordinary people. These attributes include being politically or administratively powerful, being rich or propertied, having a title or high official rank, being well-educated… and so forth' (Whitmeyer 2002: 322).

Given the potential role of the print and publication activities in the formation of nationalist sentiments, the present study is set up to explore the discursive construction of national identity in the Kurdish case through the investigation of discourse practices, strategies and linguistic devices utilized in the Kurdish journals of the late Ottoman Empire. To this end the study adopts the Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) approach for a close textual analysis of the Kurdish journals' nationalist discourses in the late Ottoman period.

1.2.   Previous Research on Early Kurdish Periodicals

In spite of the diversity of the theoretical accounts in historical commentary on the emergence of Kurdish nationalism little has been said about publication activities of the Kurdish intellectual elite of the late Ottoman period. For the most part an exhaustive content analysis of the Kurdish journals has been neglected or overlooked. With few exceptions, when the Kurdish press has been analysed in scholarly works, it has been considered as an element of Kurdish political associations or subsumed under the general narrative of Kurdish nationalism and thus has not received the attention it deserves. As a result, only a limited amount of scholarship has focused on the development of Kurdish nationalist discourse produced by Kurdish intellectuals in the Kurdish press. Therefore, we lack a sufficient body of knowledge about the Kurdish nationalist discourse during this nascent stage of Kurdish nationalism, which also provided a breeding ground for the Kurdish nationalist movements of the ensuing generations.

There are a few noteworthy studies that have focused on the discourse of Kurdish journals. The most comprehensive account is Janet Klein's unpublished MA thesis entitled *Claiming the Nation: The Origins and Nature of Kurdish Nationalist Discourse, A Study of the Kurdish Press in the Ottoman Empire* (1996). As the title suggests, the study provides a detailed and intricate discourse analysis of the first Kurdish journals in the late Ottoman period.[2] In that it examines the ways in which Kurdish intellectuals made use of Kurdish history,

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[2] Klein investigates mostly Turkish articles in the following journals: *Kurdistan* (1898-1902), *Rojî Kurd* (1913), *Hetawî Kurd* (1913-1914), *Jîn* (1918-1919) and *Kurdistan* (1919).

language and literature in the production and dissemination of a unique Kurdish identity. Relying mostly on articles that appeared in Ottoman Turkish and giving space to only a few Kurdish articles, Klein reproduces a number of texts taken from Kurdish journals and provides an in-depth analysis. The study asserts that the Kurdish traditional leadership viewed the idea of nationalism as an ideal tool to reclaim its former power. However due to the historical circumstances - particularly under the dominant notions of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism exacerbated by low illiteracy rate- Kurdish intellectuals failed to produce a coherent and widespread Kurdish nationalist discourse. Hence, the study concludes that the Kurdish journalistic discourse of the late Ottoman Empire represents the proto-nationalist stage in the Kurdish history as it could not go beyond producing forms of 'Kurdism' 'tinted with varying shades of meaning' in each journal. Martin Strohmeier's *Crucial Images in the Presentation of a Kurdish National Identity: heroes and patriots, traitors and foes* (2003) covers the late Ottoman period from 1700 to 1938 with a particular focus on the first Kurdish journals of the late Ottoman period[3] analysing the evolution of Kurdish identity and politics. Strohmeier, similar to Klein's study, provides passages from the corpora of the Kurdish journals and analyses them discursively. However, the author relies entirely on articles written in Ottoman Turkish, leaving out the Kurdish texts. As far as the his analysis of the Turkish articles from the first Kurdish journals in the pre-WWI are concerned, the author asserts that because their demands could not go beyond linguistic and cultural reforms within the Ottoman political framework 'it would be anachronistic to speak of Kurdish nationalism before World War I' (Strohmeier 2003: 54). From a different perspective the works of two Kurdish scholars stand out as particularly important. M. Emin Bozarslan, who gathered and republished the collections of the journals *Kurdistan*, *Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi* and *Jîn*[4], presents a thoroughly

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[3] Strohmeier examines Turkish articles in *Kurdistan* (1898-1902), *Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi* (1908-1909)*, Rojî Kurd* (1913), *Hetawî Kurd* (1913-1914), *Jîn* (1918-1919) and *Kurdistan* (1919).

[4] *Jîn* (1918-1919) was the publication organ of *Kurdistan Tealî Cemîyetî* or the *Society for the Rise of Kurdistan*.

researched account of Kurdish journals in the introductory sections of each collection, and supplies invaluable analyses of the journal's content in connection with social and political description of the period in which they were published. In addition, Malmîsanij (Mehmet Tayfun) has published a number of books on the intellectual activities of the Kurdish intellectuals of the late Ottoman period and the biographies of those involved. Although it is not informed by the same theoretical perspectives as the academic writers, Malmîsanij's descriptive and narrative works are wonderful resources to study Kurds of the late Ottoman period. The present study has extensively made use of his informative research on the publication activities of the Kurdish individuals and organizations of the period under consideration.[5] Furthermore, there are a couple of unpublished MA theses on the topic at hand, notably Djene R. Bajalan's *'Kurds for the Empire: The Young Kurds 1898-1914* (2009)[6] which explores the development of Kurdish identity in the pre-WWI period. Bajalan's argument primarily revolves around the question of whether the Kurdish intellectuals were Kurdish or Ottoman nationalists, which the author concludes in favour of the second option. Gülseren Duman's *'The Formation of the Kurdish Movements 1908-1914: Exploring the Footprints of Kurdish Nationalism*' (2010) is also concerned with the gradual evolution of Kurdish identity in the discourse of pre-WWI Kurdish journals. Duman in her analysis utilizes Hroch's three chronological stages in the formation of a nation. According to Duman, the discourse of pre-WWI Kurdish journals corresponds to a stage between phase A and B in the form of 'Kurdism,' rather than 'Kurdish nationalism.' Moreover, Hakan Özoğlu's *'Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State'* focuses on the late Ottoman period. Based on primary sources, including the Kurdish journals as well as Ottoman and British archives, he analyses the social, political and historical forces behind the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. However, Özoğlu, similar to Strohmeier and others, situates

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[5] See the bibliography section of the present study for the relevant books written by Malmîsanij.

[6] Bajalan's MA thesis was later on translated into Turkish and published by Avesta. *See*, Djene R. Bajalan *'Jön Kürtler: Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan Önce Kürt Hareketi (1898-1914)*' [Young Kurds: Kurdish Movement before World War I (1898-1914], Istanbul: Avesta Yayınları (2010).

the emergence of Kurdish nationalism in the post-WWI period arguing that the Kurdish societies and their publications could not go beyond cultural clubs as they stopped short of making political demands (Özoğlu 2004: 78-78). The aforementioned works have greatly contributed to our knowledge and understanding of the evolution of Kurdish identity in the late Ottoman period.

1.3. The Aims and Objectives of This Study

This thesis seeks to carve out a space from the existing scholarship by examining the discursive construction of Kurdish national identity in the pre-WWI Kurdish journals. The lack of close textual analysis from the perspective of corpus linguistics methodology as well as shortcomings in the theoretical concepts utilized to explain Kurdish nationalism have caused the general literature on the early Kurdish journals to remain inconclusive on several vital aspects. Furthermore, these shortcomings are exacerbated by the grave fault of excluding the Kurdish articles from the analysis of the early Kurdish journalistic discourse. All these factors have, in turn, led to the absence of crucial knowledge and thus misconceptions about the Kurdish national identity constructed in the Kurdish journalistic discourse. A major common assumption in the literature on the pre-WWI Kurdish intellectuals and their journalistic discourse is that they cannot be labeled nationalist because (1) they remained Ottomanist rather then Kurdish nationalists, and (2) they made no political demands. It is important to note that as the analytical chapters of this study will illustrate, Kurdish articles were more nationalist compared to articles written in Ottoman Turkish. Furthermore, the Kurdish journals under consideration translated some of the Kurdish articles to Turkish, however, with significant discrepancies between the Turkish translations and the original Kurdish articles in order to mitigate the nationalist tone of the latter. Then it is fair to argue that the scarcity or total exclusion of the Kurdish articles from some of the aforementioned and widely quoted scholarly works analyzing the discourse of early Kurdish journals, might be one of the sources of the misconceptions on this early stage of Kurdish nationalism.

Thus the key objective of this study is to shed light, from a new angle, on the historical origins of the ideological framework and national discourses constructed in the Kurdish journalistic discourse. It utilizes the tools of corpus linguistics methodology for a close textual analysis of both Turkish and Kurdish articles of the ealy Kurdish journals from the perspective of CDA. To this end, this thesis applies a range of theories and concepts from social studies as well as linguistic and cultural studies to conceptualize and investigate the discursive formation of Kurdish national identity in the Kurdish journals of late Ottoman period.

Given its theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework, it is hoped that this thesis is step towards addressing the issues pertaining to the origins and development of Kurdish national identity in its early stage from a critical discourse analysis perspective.

1.4. Research Questions

In light of its aims and objectives, this study will attempt to address the following research questions:

- How did the socio-political, cultural and historical circumstances of the period and those of the Kurdish intellectual elite contribute to and determine the model of national identity envisaged and devised in the discourse of the Kurdish press?
- Which discourse strategies, practices and language devices (both in Ottoman Turkish and Kurdish articles) did the Kurdish press employ in the construction of a politically imagined distinctive Kurdish community with a shared sense of belonging that dis-identified Kurds from the dominant ethnic and religious identities, particularly the hegemonic discourses of the Islamic ummah and Ottomanism that were perceived as central components of Kurdish identity?

- Did the journals manage the fragmented nature of the Kurdish community along linguistic, sectarian and tribal lines, in their construction of a unified and homogenous Kurdish national identity?
- How did the Kurdish leadership and the intellectual elite construct social identities and relations between themselves and the Kurdish commoners through the Kurdish journals?

This study seeks to offer answers to the questions raised in the research and justification for the approach used in this study.

1.5.   The Primary Sources of Data

The primary sources of data for this study are the Kurdish journals of the Late Ottoman period. Some of the journals published during this period include *Kurdistan*[7] (1898-1902), *Şark ve Kurdistan* (East and Kurdistan) (1908), *Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi* (The Kurdish Gazette for Mutual Aid and Progress) (1908-1909) (henceforth *KTTG*), *Yekbûn* (Unity) (1913), *Rojî Kurd* (Kurdish Sun) (1913), *Hetawî Kurd* (Kurdish Sun) (1913-1914), *Bangî Kurd* (Kurdish Voice or Kurdish Call) (1914) and *Jîn* (life) (1918-1919). However, in order to limit the data to a manageable body, the most prominent three Kurdish journals have been chosen as the primary sources for analysis in the present study. These are, in chronological order, the first *Kurdistan, KTTG,* and *Rojî Kurd.* [8] The importance of these journals lies in the fact that each journal corresponds to a distinctive

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[7] Throughout 1898-1919 the journal *Kurdistan* reappeared three times. It appeared for the first time between 1898-1902, which is analysed in this study. Then, it resumed its publication under the editorship of Sureyya Bedir Khan between 1908-1909 (McDowall 2004: 93). Ten years later, in 1919, it surfaced again, this time under the editorship of Muhammed Mîhrî Hilav (Malmîsanij 1986: 69-73). In addition, another journal also called *Kurdistan* was published by the German missionaries in the Kurdish city of Mahabad (in Iranian Kurdistan) during the period preceding the World War I (Elaeddin Seccadi, Mêjui Edebi Kurd 1952, cited in Celîl 2000: 94-95).

[8] *Kurdistan, Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi* and *Jîn* have been collected and published by M. Emin Bozarslan. It should be noted that the 10th, 12th, 17th, 18th and the 19th issues are missing from the Bozarslan's collection. Fortunately, I managed to find the 2010 edition of another collection by Kamal Fuad in which only the 19th issue of *Kurdistan* is missing. I also had access to four issues of *Rojî Kurd* that were collected and published by Koma Xebatên Kurdolojiyê (Kurdology Study Group- Henceforth KXK) in which the authors have transliterated the Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish texts from their original Arabic script into Latin.

historical period in Ottoman and Kurdish politics. In that while *Kurdistan* was the very first Kurdish journal to articulate the socio-cultural and political demands of the Kurds from a nationalist perspective under the authoritative regime of Sultan Abdulhamid and his Pan-Islamist ideology; *KTTG* was the first legally established Kurdish journal that came out in the immediate aftermath of the Young Turk revolution of July 1908 and its liberal atmosphere. It is noteworthy that *KTTG* was the mouthpiece of its parent organization *Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti* or Society for Mutual Aid and Progress (henceforth *KTTC),* the first legally established Kurdish organization that articulated and negotiated the terms of Kurdish nationalism with the Young Turks and the Committee of Union and Progress (Henceforth CUP) on the pages of *KTTG. Rojî Kurd*, a publication organ of the *Kurd Talebe-Hêvî Cemiyeti* or the *Kurdish Students-Hope Society*, the first legally established Kurdish student organization, on the other hand, came out after the Italo-Ottoman and the First Balkan Wars (1912-1913), which resulted in a humiliating defeat and great loss of territories on the part of the Ottomans leading to the radicalization of Turkish nationalism as a chauvinist and oppressive state ideology. Due to the new social, political and ideological circumstances, *Rojî Kurd* adopted a distinctive Kurdish nationalist discourse to articulate Kurdish nationalism that was different from those of *Kurdistan* and *KTTG*. In short, the nationalist discourse of each journal investigated in this study reflects different stages or distinct forms of Kurdish nationalism*s* and Kurdish national identity under varying historical circumstances in the pre-WWI period.

It is beyond the scope of this study to textually analyse each of the aforementioned corpus sequence by sequence in its entirety. Instead, the articles or parts of articles that most clearly demonstrate discursive elements and strategies and thus are the most significant for discourse analysis of Kurdish national identity have been chosen for a discourse analytical approach. These include articles with such themes as common political present and future, common history, common homeland, common language, literature and common culture that indicate a distinctive cultural and political Kurdish national identity.

1.6. Theoretical and Conceptual Overview

This thesis adopts a multidisciplinary, pragmatic and modular approach making use of divergent concepts and theoretical positions relevant for the social, political and contextual particularities of the case at hand. The convenience of adapting a multidisciplinary approach, instead of utilizing a single grand theory of nationalism, is to avoid limitations of a specific ready-made theoretical position that might overlook the peculiarities of the Kurdish case.

A major theoretical assumption of this study, in line with the constructivist/modernist paradigm, is based on the view that nations are relevantly recent phenomena concurrent with modernity with nationalism being the *prima causa* of the nation. Nevertheless, this study does not assume that national identities are entirely *'inventions'* or *'fabrications'* of modernity or social engineering out of thin air (Hobsbawm 1983). Rather, borrowing concepts from the ethno-symbolist approach, it suggests that although national identities are discursive social constructs, the utilization of selection and 'reinterpretation of pre-existing cultural motives' and traditions -real or conceived- greatly contribute to the construction of national identities (cf. Smith 2002, 2003; Sheyholislami 2011). Consequently, a view of nationalism that benefits from the insights of modernist as well as ethno-symbolist theories will allow for a more fruitful and effective analysis of the issue at hand.

The Andersonian notion of *'imagined communities'* (Anderson [1983] 2006) is particularly relevant to this study as it is instrumental in the investigation of the role of Kurdish journalistic discourse in the formation of an imagined Kurdish national identity. Furthermore, this study acknowledges the profound effect of linguistic and discursive elements in the construction of national identities. Thus drawing on the theories and concepts from Halliday, Foucault, Lacan and Billing, among others, the present study understands that national identity is a discursive formation that is always in flux and change in accordance with sociocultural and political circumstances.

Moreover, the study conceptualize the motivations behind the Kurdish intellctuals' endeavour to construct a distinctive Kurdish national identity from the perspectives of 'nationalism as an ideological instrument in the service of the elite political movements' a view developed by Breuilly (1996a, 1993) and Brass (1979).

1.7.   Methodological Overview

This study utilizes CDA, a cross-disciplinary analytical approach to the study of discourse that draws from several disciplines in social sciences and humanities. CDA, in the most basic sense, is an approach to the study of discourse which views text as a major source of evidence for grounding claims about social realities, structures and processes (Fairclough 1995a: 209). In recent years, the CDA approach has been increasingly instrumental in many scholarly works to investigate the relationship between the use of language and the exercise of power and in this way has given new insights into the ideological use of language in the discursive production, maintenance or challenging social and political domination as well as the construction of national identities. The objective of the use of the CDA approach in this study is to methodologically and analytically examine the ideological working of language by investigating the relationship between communicative events and national identity in the Kurdish case through the analysis of discourse samples taken from the corpora of Kurdish journals. To this end, the study adopts two major CDA approaches, namely Fairclough's three-dimensional analytical framework and Wodak and her colleagues Discourse-Historical Approach for a multi-faceted analysis of the identity discourse of the Kurdish journals under consideration. A detailed discussion of both approaches will follow in Chapter 3.

Using discourse analysis as a toolbox typology that may prove helpful in the analysis of the discursive construction of national identities in different social, cultural, economic and political settings, it is hoped that this study adds to the increasing number of works utilizing the discourse analytical approach in

examining the connection between language, discourse, media and identity formation.

1.8. Overview of Chapters

The second chapter of this study discusses the advent of nationalism in the Ottoman and Kurdish context. After discussing such theoretical concepts as nation, nationalism, identity, national identity and discourse, which are utilized to conceptualize the origins and formation of Kurdish national identity, the chapter explores the advent of nationalism in the Ottoman and Kurdish context. The third chapter explains the CDA approach particularly focusing on the conceptual framework developed by Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak *et al*, and its applicability to the Kurdish case. In chapters four, five and six the CDA conceptual framework is applied to the Kurdish journals through an exhaustive close textual analysis in an attempt to explain the ideological function of the Kurdish journals in the formation of Kurdish national identity. To set the scene, each analytical chapter starts with the outline of significant historical events as well as sociocultural and political context of the relevant period. This is followed by the discursive practices of journals through close textual analysis. The three analytical chapters correspond to the way Kurdish publication activities are divided into three historical periods as briefly mentioned above. These are (1) the period from 1898 to the 1908 Young Turk Revolution; (2) the period from 1908 Revolution to the early 1910s; and (3) from the early 1910s to the beginning of the World War I. This periodization is based on the distinctive social, political and cultural contexts of each period marked by significant events and general circumstances for both Kurds and the Ottomans. The significance of this periodization for the present study is that the Kurdish nationalist discourse within each of these historical periods seems to be steady, coherent and even homogenous, albeit to a certain extent. For instance the discourse of the journal *Kurdistan*, published during the first period under the despotic regime of Sultan Abdulhamid II, revolved around anti-Sultan and occasionally anti-Turkish sentiments, while that of *KTTG*, published during the second period under the initially liberal Young Turk regime, put emphasis on the hegemonic notion of

Ottomanism as an integral part of Kurdish identity. *Rojî Kurd*, which came out during the third period under the heavy-handed rule of the Young Turk's CUP, tried to do away with the notion of Ottomanism by constructing a distinctive non-Ottoman Kurdish national identity. Chapter seven focuses on the findings of the study and concluding remarks.

CHAPTER II: THE ADVENT OF NATIONALISM IN THE OTTOMAN AND KURDISH CONTEXT

This study utilizes a number of theories and concepts from social studies as well as linguistic and cultural studies to conceptualize the formation of Kurdish national identity in the Kurdish journalistic discourse. Thus, in what follows, first I discuss various relevant theories and concept from several fields including the concept of nation, nationalism, national identity, printing press and print-capitalism in general to conceptualize the Kurdish case.

After a general discussion of these theoretical concepts, the second section of the chapter explores the advent of nationalism in the context of the late Ottoman Empire in order to unearth and re-examine the historical circumstances that led to the rise of nationalism in the Empire and among its divergent communities with a particular focus on Kurds, who sought to redefine and seize control of their social, cultural, and political identity and establish themselves as a visible and unified national community.

2.1. THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

2.1.1. The Concepts of Nation and Nationalism

In the course of its development as an object of philosophical and scholarly inquiry many scholars have analysed the concepts *nation* and *nationalism*. Although the term *nation* is generally used to describe a community of people who share a *real* or *putative* common culture, history, destiny, language, territory and ancestry, nation as a concept is still one of the most problematic and tendentious political lexicons in academic scholarship that lacks a generally accepted definition (Smith 2003). Similarly the concept of *nationalism* is a matter of a great controversy as far as the issue with a fixed definition of that term is concerned. The lack of an agreed upon definition for the two concepts has engendered divergent and conflicting views of *nation* and *nationalism*. That is the sheer universality of these concepts, which stem from the bewildering wide range of cases of nationalism throughout the history, has made it difficult for the scholarship to agree upon one single basic approach for the two concepts and a

clearly defined theoretical framework that is applicable to all actual cases (cf. Breuilly 1996a: 137, 1993: 404; Hobsbawm 1992: 7-8).[9] For instance, while some scholars define *nation* in terms of the *objective* criteria such as common language, territory, religion or ethnic attributes, others put emphasis on more *subjective* criteria such as self-awareness, nationalistic sentiments, common political future and solidarity, which inevitably affect the definition of *nationalism*.

Although it is difficult to reify the concept of nation by perceiving nation as substantial and enduring collectivities (Brubaker 1996: 21) the present study suggests the following working definition that spans the 'objective-subjective' spectrum: a nation is an imagined political community of people formed on the basis of real or putative common culture, which may include common religion, language and customs, common homeland, common political past (history), shared beliefs and mutual commitment.

As far as the term nationalism is concerned, all conflicting theoretical accounts in the field of nationalism recognize that nationalism is a modern phenomena -in the form of a political doctrine, principle, an ideology or a movement- that emerged as a product of modernity in the late eighteenth century. Nevertheless, a major source of controversy lies in their perception of nation and the order of causality between the concepts of nation and nationalism as to which comes first (Hobsbawm 1983; Gellner 1983 [1994]; Vali 2003; Özkırımlı 2000; Smith 2001; Breuilly 1993; Anderson 2006 [1983]). That is what has inspired this scholarly debate is whether nations existed in the pre-modern period(s) predating the ideology of nationalism (Vali 2003; Hobsbawm 1992; Anderson 2006; Özkırımlı 2000; Gellner 1994; Gelvin 2005; Joseph 2004; Smith 2001).[10] This debate has

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[9] Furthermore, some of the approaches to the concept of nation might not necessarily originate from scholarly concerns but rather from political ones; As Calhoun (1993: 215) asserts: '[t]he notion of nation is so deeply imbricated in modern politics as to be 'essentially contested', because any definition will legitimate some claims and delegitimize others'.

[10] There is a third paradigm called 'Ethno-symbolism' which came about as a result of dissatisfaction with the ideas put forward by the two major paradigms, i.e., modernist and perannialist/primordialist. This paradigm has two fundamental tenets: (1) at least some nations have existed prior to the modern ideology of nationalism (Smith 2003: 60); and (2) although the

initially divided scholars into two major conflicting schools: the perennialists and modernist. Broadly speaking, adopting an evolutionary narrative of historical continuity, perennialists believe in the existence of nations in the pre-modern periods. They posit that nationalism is merely a specific political effect of an ideological tool and political movement produced by modernity as a medium for the realization of the historical rights of a nation (Vali 2003; Smith 2001, 2003; Joseph 2004; Gelvin 2005). Accordingly, although 'new' nations were deliberately created by the ideology of nationalism after the French revolution, at least some nations existed as historical antiquities that predate modernity (Smith 2003: 50; Seton-Watson 1977: 11).[11] For some, perennialism is nothing more than a moderated version of primordialism, which traces the history of nations to the first natural human communities.[12]

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ideology of nationalism and the formation of the majority of nations are recent phenomena as the products of modernity, the construction of these 'new' nations has pre-modern origins (Smith 1998; 2002; 2003; 2004; Armstrong 1982; Hutchinson 1994). However, scholars of the modernist school, particularly Breuilly (1996b: 150-151), consider ethno-symbolism as a moderate version of primordialism. Ironically, the exponents of ethno-symbolism have also harshly criticized one another's particular approaches. For instance, Smith (2003: 59) accuses Armstrong of leaning towards perennialism, while Hutchinson (1994: 7) feels both Armstrong and Smith are ethnicist.

[11] One of the main tenets of the perennialists is that 'modern nations are the lineal descendants of their medieval counterparts' (Smith 2002: 53). Therefore Seton-Watson (1977: 11) suggests that a distinction should be made between the 'old, continuous nations' and the 'new' nations that were deliberately created after the French Revolution. 'During the stages of their history in which the national identity and self-consciousness of these 'old' nations were formed, the concept of 'national consciousness' and the modern concept of 'nation' did not exist. The leaders had no idea that they were engaged in forming nations. This is the basic difference between the old nations and the post-1789 'new' nations: in the case of the latter, the leaders knew perfectly well what it was that they were trying to do' (Seton-Watson 1977: 11). For Seton-Watson France, England, Spain and Scotland constitute some of the old, continuous nations and the those formed after the French Revolution are 'new' nations.

[12] Smith (2002; 2003) uses the term *perennialism* to make a distinction between the primordialists and those who reject primordial ties but still believe in the existence of nations in the pre-modern periods. For primordialists, although the idea of nationalism is a recent phenomenon, nations have always existed since the 'first order of time … in the state of nature' (Smith 2002: 31; 2003: 51; 2004: 5). Accordingly, human beings are *naturally* divided into nations and hence they constitute the basic form of the earliest societies that coeval with humanity (Smith 2004: 4-5). It follows that nations as the first natural communities possess an 'essences' and 'organic qualities' manifested in blood, language, custom, religion and so forth (Smith 2001: 54) with a timeless and thus 'ahistorical fixity'. It should be noted that the primordialist paradigm does not form a monolithic category but rather it is a generic or umbrella term used for various positions taken within this paradigm (Özkırımlı 2000: Chapter 3; Smith 2002: 31-32; 2004: 5-8). Because it is associated with unexplainable essentialism, naturalism and intensive emotions that lack a

The proponents of the constructivist/modernist paradigm, which arose as a response to the primordialist/perannialist view, assert that both the concept of nation and the ideology of nationalism are relatively new phenomena as the products of modernity that came about in the wake of the French Revolution of 1789. Addressing the order of causality between nation and nationalism, modernists, in stark contrast to the perennialists, designate nationalism as the *prima causa* of the nation (Anderson 2006; Hobsbawm 1992; Gellner 1994; Breuilly 1993; Nairn 1977; Vali 2003; Özkırımlı 2000). In this sene, for modernists the nation and national identity are socially constructed phenomena produced or invented by the ideology of nationalism in the service of nationalist politics. In the words of Hobsbawm (1992: 10)[13] 'nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way around.' Thus the view that nation is a natural and inherent though long-delayed political destiny, is a myth (ibid.).

What is more, this modernist paradigm is not a monolithic category as it does not constitute a homogenous theory that draws on a single agreed set of terms and concepts. This heightened attention has generated a plethora of theories and applications within the constructivist/modernist school. While some modernist accounts put emphasis on *economic factors* as evident in the works of Nairn (1977) and Hechter (1975); others stress the *political factors* and the 'transformation in the nature of politics' to describe the origins of nation and nationalism as in the works of Breuilly (1993 [1982]), Brass (1991) and Hobsbawm (1990). Still others, such as Gellner (1983 [1994]), Anderson (2006)

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historically grounded theoretical frame, today the term 'primordialism' has acquired a pejorative connotation (Smith 2000: 53; 2004: 8). In any case, today no serious scholar endorses the primordialist view (Smith 2003: 50; Özkırımlı 2000: 64). Nevertheless, primordialism was and has remained as a popular approach particularly in nationalist rhetoric. This study will illustrate many such instances of the primordialist approach in the corpora of the early Kurdish journals in which Kurdish nationalist intellectuals tried to justify the political demands of the Kurds by presenting the Kurdish 'nation' as a historical antiquity.

[13] The same order is true of Kurdish nationalism. Even Amir Hassanpour, who adopts a perennialist view of Kurdish nationalism, argues, 'Kurdish nationalism emerged as an ideology long before the formation of the Kurds as a nation […]' (Hassanpour 1994: 3).

and Hroch (1985), consider the *social and cultural transformation* to be the dynamic force behind the advent of nation and nationalism. Nevertheless, suffice it to say that although various approaches within the modernist paradigm have led to divergent assumptions on the concepts of nation and nationalism, the common denominator or the 'defining feature' of all modernist accounts is their conviction in the modernity of both nation and nationalism with nationalism being the *prima cause* of the nation (Vali 2003; Özkırımlı 2000; Smith 2001).

In contemporary historical argument, scholarly works have presented diverse theoretical accounts in an attempt to explain the origins and the emergence of Kurdish nationalism. Some scholars, from a modernist perspective, subscribe to the view that Kurdish nationalism, as a modern phenomenon, emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which corresponded to the social, political and cultural developments of the late Ottoman period; Others, from a perennialist point of view, locate the origins of Kurdish nationalism in much earlier periods. While the former conception can be observed in the works of such scholars as Hamid Bozarslan, Abbas Vali, Martin Van Bruinessen, Celîlê Celîl, among others, the latter view is crystallized in the works of Amir Hassanpour, Ferhad Shakely and Jamal Nebez. Different conceptions of common national origins and, tied to this, various approaches to the emergence of Kurdish nationalism are possible and they all can be valid depending on their respective frameworks, definitions and perceptions of the notions of nation and nationalism.

The theoretical assumption of this study, in line with the constructivist/modernist paradigm, is based on the view that nations, including the Kurdish nation, are relevantly recent phenomena concurrent with modernity with nationalism being the *prima cause* of the nation. However, this study does not utilize a single grand theory in the investigation of Kurdish nationalism. Instead, it seeks and applies conceptual tools relevant for the social, political and cultural particularities of the Kurdish case (Wodak 2002b: 64). Hence, the broader theoretical framework of this study is not based on one single modernist approach, but rather, it is based

on a multifaceted, pragmatic and modular approach making use of divergent theoretical positions taken by various modernist scholarships. The convenience of adapting a modular approach will allow for a more fruitful and effective analysis of the Kurdish case avoiding limitations of a specific ready-made theoretical position that might overlook regional and historical variations and contexts.

As such, this study will argue that the formation of Kurdish nationalism began around the same time as the inception of the first nationally oriented Kurdish organizations and their publication activities in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In other words, the present study will illustrate that the emergence of Kurdish nationalism -as a concept and a political project- took place in the form of a national identity discourse produced in the Kurdish journals of the Late Ottoman period. Below I discuss some theories in the modernist paradigm to conceptualize my own argument about the inception and development of Kurdish nationalism.

2.1.2. Nations as *'Imagined Communities'*

Among the exponent of the modernist paradigm, Anderson's inspiring concept of *imagined communities* is of particular relevance to this study because, in line with Anderson's theory, this study presumes that nation is a type of narrative or a mental construct in the form of an *imagined political community,* which is different from the imagined communities of the previous ages. Anderson relates the origin of the nation and nationalism to the rise of what he calls print-capitalism that made the emergence of nations possible in the minds as novel forms of *imagined communities*. His point of departure is that both nation and nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind (Anderson 1983 [2006]: 4); nation is an *imagined* and *socially constructed political community* that is imagined as *limited* and *sovereign* through the medium of vernacularized print-languages (*ibid.*).[14]

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[14] Anderson's concept of imagination draws on Seton-Watson's definition of *nation*. Seton-Watson (1977: 5) asserted: 'All I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation, or behave as if they formed one' (Seton-Watson 1977: 5). Another scholar who probably influenced Anderson's theory is Hechter

Accordingly, nation is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never come into a face-to-face interaction or know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear about them, but still the image of their communion lives in the minds of each member of the community conceived as a Herderian cross-class, horizontal comradeship [15] regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that might prevail among them (Anderson 2006: 6-7).

The core of Anderson's theory is the cultural root of nationalism that came out of large cultural systems that preceded it (Anderson 2006: 12). Anderson identifies two such systems: the dynastic realm and the religious community that dominated much of Europe until the sixteenth century. However, the gradual decline of both systems in the seventeenth century set the scene for the social, political, historical and geographical space for the rise of nationalism (*ibid*.: 42). Accordingly, in the pre-modern world, imperial governments, unlike the nation-states of the modern period, were simply concerned with maintaining the order on their territory to make the collection of taxes and tributes possible from their subjects and expending their imperial territories to further increase their tax revenues. They were not concerned with the formation of a homogenous community by imposing a single language, religion, culture or ideology on their populations. [16] They were usually tolerant toward their constituencies who observed diverse religions and spoke different languages [17] (Anderson 2006: 42).

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who stated that 'industrialization causes structural differentiation. Face-to-face interactions are increasingly replaced by social relationships which are largely impersonal' (Hechter 1975: 8).

[15] The notion of 'horizontal comradeship' was one of the main tenets of Herder's concept of nationalism. According to Herder, 'there is only one class in the state, the Volk, (not the rabble), and the king belongs to this class as well as the peasant' (in Blanning 2002: 261). The same notion was presented in Abbé Emmanuel Joseph Sieyés' (1748-1836) pamphlet entitled *What is the Third Estate?* (1789), in which Sieyés rejects class privileges and asserts that the nation is the community of equal citizens (*ibid.*: 120-121). Explaining the formation of national identities, Nairn (1977: 327) take a similar position by stating that: '… This meant the conscious formation of a militant, *inter-class community* rendered strongly (if mythically) aware of its own separate identity vis-à-vis the outside forces of domination' (my emphasis).

[16] To be sure, the ruling classes had no interest in imposing shared cultural norms or promoting cultural homogeneity on their subject populations. On the contrary, they tried to exaggerate rather than downplay the inequality and the degree of separation between different classes (Gellner

Significant historical occurrences of the sixteenth century brought the decline of religious communities and dynastic realms first in Europe then elsewhere defining the modern world. Drawing on the example of reformation in Europe, Anderson argues that the new social and political setting played a significant role and provided necessary conditions for the break-up of vast imperial territories into smaller units of sovereign states as a move from communities of *faith* to communities of *fate*.[18] This, in turn, laid a foundation for the formation of a new kind of imagined political communities in the subsequent decades (Anderson 2006: 42; Gellner 1994: 40-41; Gelvin 2005: 47).[19] Another crucial reason for the decline of religiously imagined communities was the gradual demotion of sacred languages such as Latin and Arabic that were replaced by vernaculars which had no religious attachments (Anderson 2006: 16-18). It is noteworthy that these developments in the history of Europe have parallels in the Ottoman history. As this study illustrates the decline of the Ottoman dynastic realm, the decrease in

1994: 9-10). In other words, the ruling classes deliberately marked the class and cultural differences between themselves and the lower class, e.g., peasants and other commoners to emphasize their artistocratic and privileged character. Even if the ruling classes happened to share some common cultural elements such as language, they managed to differentiate themselves from commoners through dialectal or some other social, economic and cultural peculiarities.

[17] For instance, in Late Antiquity the Roman Empire adapted Greek as the state language and Orthodox Christianity as the state religion yet the empire embraced diverse people from varied backgrounds who spoke variety of vernaculars. The same is true of the Persian and the Ottoman Empires. In the former, the ruling class spoke Pahlavi while other ethnic groups spoke Kurdish, Arabic, Aramaic, Baluchi, in addition to various other languages. In the latter the situation was even more complex in that although the imperial language was the Ottoman Turkish the educated class mostly spoke Arabic and Persian. Furthermore, there were a number of vernaculars spoken by ethnic groups including Albanian, Aramaic, Kurdish, Armenian, Romanian and Hebrew, *inter alia*. Furthermore, the Ottoman imperial government was usually tolerant towards many confessional communities such as Christians and Jews. (Gelvin 2005: 16).

[18] One such event was the Protestant Reformation of 1517 the year Martin Luther nailed his Ninety-Five Theses on the door of All Saints' Church in public denunciation of church doctrine and practices. The Reformation ushered in many conflicts between Catholics and Protestants that lasted until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which brought an end to the possibility of a universal Christian Empire in Europe.

[19] See also Jose Casanova's (1994) argument on the process of secularization where he identifies three dimensions of this process as (1) the decline of religious beliefs and practices, (2) the privatization of religion, and (3) the separation of the secular spheres, i.e., state, economy and science.

the ideology of Ummahism or Pan-Islamism that defined the Muslim religious community as well as the waning power of Arabic as the sacred language of Muslims immensely contributed to the formation of new identities along linguistic and ethic lines in the Ottoman Empire. As a matter of fact, Ismâ'il Hakkı Bâbânzâde, a Kurdish nationalist and an Islamic modernist, presented an account similar to that of Anderson, in which Bâbânzâde discussed the decline of dynastic realm and sacred languages in the face of nationalist ideologies in Europe and how the same process had started in the Ottoman Empire.[20] More on Bâbânzâde's article will follow however it suffices to say that in his analysis Bâbânzâde offers a brief explanation, similar to that of Benedict Anderson, about the dynamics of the advent of nationalism in Europe, sevend decades before Anderson's own account.

Furthermore, Anderson states that it would be too simplistic to claim that nations or imagined communities just grew out of or replaced religious communities. For him, beneath the waning of these sacred communities a much more fundamental change was taking place in modes of apprehending the conception of time and space (*ibid*.: 22-24). In Anderson's formulation this profound transformation is illustrated through two forms of imagining that flourished in Europe in the 18th century: the genres of *novel* and *newspaper*. Accordingly, these fundamental novelties led to one of the earlier forms of capitalist enterprise: *print-capitalism* (*ibid*.: 38). For Anderson, in the West, publication activities started as a modern-style mass-produced industrial commodity for which an unsaturated market already existed. Once the elite and small Latin market was exhausted, entrepreneurs, motivated by the profit-making logic of capitalism, turned to the monoglot masses that spoke vernaculars. Book sellers, whose primary concern was profit-making, began to seek out works of interest and published as many copies of cheap editions as could be sold in these vernaculars (*ibid*.). Publishing, as a profitable industrial commodity, eventually brought about mass consumption

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[20] *See*, İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde, *'Müslümanlik ve Kürdlük'* [Muslimness and Kurdishness], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 137-139).

creating unified fields of mass consumption, communication and exchange in vernacularized languages. This in turn contributed to the formation of *standardized, mass civilizations*.[21] Thanks to print-capitalism the speakers of, e.g., 'French*es*, English*es* or Spanish*es'*, involved more strata of their respective communities who came to understand one another in the same written language. This process made the speakers of the same language to be aware of their fellow-readers with whom they had something in common –language- as well as aware of those who they did not share the same language.

In Anderson's theory, newspapers as cultural products are capable of playing the same role as books. A periodical provides an imagined linkage when the readers of the same language consume it simultaneous on a massive scale during a specific time as a mess ceremony (*ibid*.: 34-35).[22] 'The very existence and regularity of newspapers caused readers or the citizens-in-the-making, to imagine themselves residing in a common time and place, united by a print language with a league of anonymous equals' (Kemper 1991: 4).[23]

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[21] The process of vernacularization, according to Anderson, gained momentum by three factors: The first factor was the change in the character of Latin. Thanks to Humanists, who came to appreciate the sophisticated style of ancient literature, Latin acquired an esoteric quality that was different from the ecclesiastical Latin and confined to the small circle of the trans-European intelligentsia. The second factor was the effect of Reformation, which owed much of its success to the publication of the Bible in German elevating the German language to the same ontological level as Latin and diminishing the idea that only sacred script languages could represent the truth (Anderson 2006: 38-40). It's important to note that Meyrowitz (1997: 60) from the perspective of 'medium theory' suggests that the form of a message is as important as its content. 'A look only at the content of printing during its rapid spread through Europe in the sixteenth century would have suggested that this medium was going to strengthen religion and enhance the power of monarchs' because in addition to the Bible, most of other printed books were on religion and their contents were determined by the Church and the monarchs. However, on the contrary, printing undermined religion and the power of royalty by eventually promoting scientific revolution, creating new pattern of knowledge development and secularizing the society. The third factor was the spread of particular vernaculars as administrative languages that replaced Latin.

[22] This mass ceremony, Anderson asserts, is performed in privacy, 'in the lair of the skull'. Nevertheless, each reader or communicant, to use the Anderson's term, 'is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion' (*ibid*.: 35)

[23] It is noteworthy that McLuhan (1964) was the first to argue the profound effect of the Gutenberg Revolution, that is, the success of print-languages and mass communication in creating unified fields of communication (see McLuhan 1964).

Accordingly, mass consumption in the same print-language, in its turn and *inadvertently,* paved the way for the formation of unified fields of mass communication, which made possible the imagining of nations around vernaculars. Hence one can surmise that the role of print-languages in the process of imagining the nation was largely an *unselfconscious* activity that resulted from the interaction between the transformation of the religious and dynastic realms, print-capitalism, technology and linguistic diversity.[24]

It is important to note at the outset that this study does not claim that the historical conditions that contributed to the development of Kurdish nationalism were the same as those in Europe. Nonetheless, the aforementioned interplay between the rise of nationalism, the decline of dynasties and religious communities and the emergence of print languages are more or less true in the Kurdish case, albeit following a different pattern. For instance, with the advent of the Kurdish printing press, the Kurdish language as a vernacular 'came into self-conscious existence' on large scale,[25] which coincided with the decline of the Ottoman imperial state, the waning power of Arabic language and religion, e.g. Ummahism or Pan-Islamism, as the cement that held together the divergent ethnic communities, and the diffusion of nationalist ideas or movements in the Ottoman state. However, the process that led to print-capitalism in Europe was reverse in the Kurdish case in that the publishers of Kurdish journals, and later on books, could not have been motivated by the merits of print-capitalism, i.e., the profit-making aspect of publishing, because publishing was not a profitable business in the Ottoman Empire let alone Kurdistan due to the lack of necessary circumstances, most notably the absence of a mass reading public. Thus unlike

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[24] From a similar theoretical perspective Gellner (1994: 35) suggests that vernacularization was not a conscious effort to form nations but rather a result of the necessities of the industrial society.

[25] I use the term 'large scale' here because with journal publication the use of Kurdish was no longer confined to manuscripts only available to the small medrese circle of the Kurdish clergymen. With the advent of publication activities Kurdish became a print language forming a Kurdish public platform, albeit a relatively small one. For instance, *Kurdistan*, the very first Kurdish journal, printed at least 2,000 copies of each issue to be disseminated in Kurdistan only.

the European experience, in which the printing press was not only a self-sustaining but also a lucrative enterprise, Kurdish printing activities did not start as a lucrative industrial commodity or as an entrepreneurial activity of print capitalism that unintentionally would contribute to the formation of a nation. Rather, it seems that Kurdish intellectuals were motivated by the social and political consequences of publication activities in Europe. [26] That is newspaper publication was an 'artificial' process deliberately pursued by Kurdish nationalists because they probably had observed the effects of book and newspaper publishing on cultural standardization and homogenization in Europe, which ultimately led to the formation of nations. Put it differently, while in Europe publishing as a profitable business in the hands of 'capitalist entrepreneurs' *unintentionally* contributed to the formation of national identities, mass-publication in Kurdish language was an *intentional* and *a self-conscious* activity for Kurdish *political* and *ideological entrepreneurs* in their endeavour to form a Kurdish nation. [27] Therefore, since the transition to the print culture was motivated by such nationalist awareness, the Kurdish nationalists purposefully adapted this tool to achieve a sociocultural and political effect similar to those in Europe (Hassanpour 1992: 276; 1996:52). In short, what was the *result* in the

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[26] For instance, M. Salih Bedir Khan –with pen name M. S. Azîzî- wrote the following in the 2nd issue of *Rojî Kurd*:

> 'Today there is no nation [qewm] without at least fifteen or sixteen newspapers [cerîde]. Through these newspapers they make their situation known, present their troubles and make requests if they have any… A nation without a newspaper is like a mute person; he/she can neither express his/her troubles nor can he/she be aware of his/her situation' **(**M. S. Azîzî *'Hişyar Bin'* [Be Wakeful], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 154-155)).

[27] The fact that publishing in Kurdish language was pretty much a conscious discursive practice aiming at the formation of Kurdish ethno-nationalist consciousness is also evident from a number of articles published in Kurdish journals in which the authors underline the importantce of publication activities and explicitely argued the effective role of newspaper publishing in the formation of nations. For instance, *see 'Kılıçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword] by M. Salih Bedir Khan in *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, reproduced in KXK (2013: 174-176); *'Hişyar Bin'* [Be Wakeful] by M. S. Azîzî, in *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, reproduced in KXK (2013: 154-155)); and 'Edebiyyâtımız ve Üdebâmızdan Bir Ricâ' [A Request from our Literature and littérateur, by Baban 'Abdül'azîz, in *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1919, in KXK (2013: 212-213)).

European case, turned into the *cause* in the Kurdish case.[28] Another significant point that differentiates the Kurdish publication activities from those of the 18th century Europe is that, the Kurdish intelligentsia failed to achieve the same result as in Europe. This was due to the lack of circumstances that could lead to the formation of mass literacy and a reading public, which would have made mass-consumption of the journals possible and thus bring about the production of a Kurdish national conscious among the Kurds around Kurdish as a vernacularized print-language.[29] Thus the Kurdish journals managed to produce reading circles rather than a broader reading public limiting the potentional effect of the journals on Kurdish messes. A detailed discussion of this failure will follow in the conclusion chapter.

2.1.3. The Language of an *'Imagined Community'*

In Anderson's (2006) theory of nationalism, a discrete national language is *not* seen as an 'objective' criterion in imagining a national community because the significance of the language is merely being a medium through which nations are imagined. That is producing a nationalist discourse does not require a particular language because,

> [m]uch the most important thing about language is its capacity for generating imagined communities… If radical Mozambique speaks Portuguese, the significance of this is that Portuguese is the medium through which Mozambique is imagined… Print-language is what invents nationalism, not *a* particular language per se (Anderson 2006: 134, emphasis in original).

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[28] Nonetheless, aware of the impact of industrialization in the formation of nation, *Kurdistan* and *KTTG* often lamented the lack of industrialization and progress in Kurdistan and thus encouraged the Ottoman state to invest in Kurdistan. Other times they directly appealed to the Kurds to improve themselves so that the social and economic circumstances necessary for the formation of nation would come into existence in Kurdistan, which in turn would help the journals to realize their nationalist objectives.

[29] See Allison (2013) for a critique of Anderson's concepts of *'imagined communities'* and *'print-capitalism'* in the Kurdish context.

Here, Anderson makes two distinctions; (1) any language –as opposed to *a* particular 'national' language- can be employed to imagine a nation, as in the case of Mozambique; and (2) only print-languages have the power and capacity to generate imagined communities in the absence of a face-to-face communication.

Furthermore, Anderson (2006: 133-134) warns us against the nationalist ideologues' tendency to see languages as *emblems* of nation-ness on the same level as flags, costumes and folk-dances, and instead, he lays emphasis on the 'capacity of [any] language for creating imagined communities.' Then, it can be said that for Anderson *a* particular language is neither an exclusive cultural instrument nor an essential component of national identity. Accordingly, the *emblems* cited above (customs, folk-dances, values, etc.) should not be considered as components of national identity, either, for anyone can *learn* them. It seems that Anderson's first point might not be true of or applicable to each and every nation building cases because the use of *a particular language* with its symbolic value and function has been a powerful emblem of national identities from the inception of the idea of nationalism as evident in the cases of German, Italian, Kurdish, Jewish and Arab nationalisms, to name a few (Hobsbawm 1994: 179). [30] More contemporary cases in which language is the defining feature of national identity include the Catalan, Quebec, Welsh and Amazing nationalisms (Sheyholislami 2011).

From this perspective, the earliest account on the centrality of the language in a political sense for a nation might be traced back to the 18th century German romantics such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), Johann Georg Hamman (1730-1788), and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). Among them Herder was one of the first to develop a historicist (primordialist) concept of

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[30] Lewis (1998: 47-49) from a similar point of view, highlights the importance of a distinct language in identity construction and argues that language is one of the major markers of identity. Exemplifying the case of the Jews and the revival of Hebrew, he underlines the way language functions as a 'bond of unity' at a symbolic level among those who share it as well as a barrier against those who do not.

nation, in which he places language at the emotional and intellectual centre of modern nationalism's concern for authenticity (Bruilly 1993: 56; Fishman 1972: 46; Brennan 1990: 44). Herder proposed the concept of *Volk* or *national spirit* reflected in nations' language (Joseph 2004: 44 Fishman 1972: 46). According to the Herderian concept of nation, language is the primary identity marker because first, only language makes man human; second, a language is the property of the community that can only be learned in a community; third, language determines thought and hence it is synonymous with thought; fourth, languages are different from one another; and fifth, if language is thought that could only be learned in a community and if each community has a distinct language different from one another, then each language community has its unique mode of national thought, values and ideas or the *Volk* (Breuilly 1993: 56-57).

Fichte, another German romantic who joined Herder in the quest for authenticity**,** also felt that the native language was the national spirit of a nation and a major sign of the national identity. For him the sameness of language ensures the existence of communal bonds of solidarity because 'the speakers of the same language belong together and are by nature one and inseparable whole' (Miscevic 2008: 91). The focus of German romantics on language as well as German thought, cultural traditions, folklore, music, dance, literature and so forth, as the manifestations of the German *Volk*, was later on formed into a nationalist narrative that claimed not only a historical antiquity but also the supremacy of the German culture in Europe (Blanning 2002: 261). Consequently, these nationalist historians, ideologues or social philosophers engaged in social and historical exploration of their communities in order to 'prove' the naturalness and 'perennial existence' of their communities by 'rediscovering' their unique values and characteristics through myths, customs, language, literature and other ethno-symbolic sources (Özkırımlı 2000: 23; Gelvin 2005: 198). With the advent of the French Revolution of 1789 and particularly the contribution of the ideas of Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1712-1778) to the concept of nation, the German romantic notion of nation and nationalism not only gained a clearer framework as a

political doctrine but it also acquired an actual and physical form (Özkırımlı 2000: 19-22).

At this juncture it is noteworthy that most of the Kurdish intellectuals of the historical period under consideration were exposed to European education and ideas and they were probably familiar with views set forth by German and French philosophers and statesmen as well as the ideological ad political developments in Europe. This particular view of language has also had a profound influence on latter-day nationalisms. For instance, a Finnish slogan reads: 'without Finnish we are not Finns'; Catalonian nationalist assert, 'our language, the expression of our people, which can never be given up…is the spiritual foundation of our existence' (Catalonian Cultural Committee 1924, cited in Fishman 1972: 46); similarly, a very popular slogan in the contemporary Kurdish nationalist discourse goes 'our language is our existence!' transforming the language into an ontological matter.[31]

Furthermore, making a distinction between the communicative and symbolic functions of language, John Edwards (1985: 17) states that the simple difference is the use of language as a tool of communication versus language as an emblem of groupness as a rallying-point with its powerful symbolism. Similarly, Billig, in his 'Banal Nationalism' (1995) emphasizes the significance of a discrete national language in imagining a nation or nation building projects seeing a discrete language as a 'strong social psychological dimension' of national consciousness. Referring to Anderson's argument above, Billig states, 'national languages also have to be imagined, and this lies at the root of today's common-sense belief that discrete languages 'naturally' exist… (Billig 1995: 10).

Then it can be inferred that Anderson puts more emphasis on the communicative and technological aspects of language overlooking the significance of the symbolic use of a particular national language. Conversely, numerous cases of

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[31] *See,* Fihsman (1996) for the significance of language in the construction of national identities along with abundance of historical examples.

nationalism have shown that where the language of the *self* is distinct from that of the *other(s)*, the symbolic use of national language, at least in certain cases have turned into an element of self-identification as well as distinction from out-groups in the process of national identity formation.

As far as the Kurdish case is concerned, since the time of Ahmad Khani [Ehmedê Xanî] (1651-1707) [32] Kurdish language has been the most salient and an inseparable component of Kurdish national identity that marks Kurds off from their neighbours, who speak Turkish, Farsi, and Arabic (Hassanpour 1997: 924; van Bruinessen, 2000a: 1; Sheyholislami 2011: 160).[33] Moreover, as I discuss in the following analyitical chapters, although Kurdish journals came out in both Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish, they utilized Turkish merely for its communicative function, as it was the *lingua franca* of the period, while Kurdish was deliberately used in its full capacity as an element of national *self-identification*, *exclusion* and *othering*.

It is noteworthy that this study does not attempt to sketch out an essential link between language and nation. Rather, it argues that the universalization of the *lack of* relationship between *a* particular language and national identity is a misguided judgment as much as the universalization of the *existence* of such link

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[32] Ahmad Khani (1651-1707) wrote *Mem û Zîn*, a narrative poetic romance significantly in the Kurmanji variety of Kurdish, in 1695 (Chyet 1991; Hassanpour 1992, 1994; Bruinessen 1992b). As he explains in his *Mem û Zîn*, Khani deliberately penned his masterpiece in Kurdish instead of Persian, the *lingua franca* of literature, in order to mark Kurds off from the Persians, Arabs and Turks. Thus it is fair to say that what Herder is to the Germans, Khani is to the Kurds, given the fact that Khani situated the Kurdish language at the emotional and intellectual centre of Kurdish identity in his quest for Kurdihs ethnic authenticity. This constitutes one of the reasons for Hassanpour's (1994) argument in which he describes *Mem û Zîn* as the most important literary manifestation of Kurdish political awareness. More on Khani and his *Mem û Zîn* will follow.

[33] What makes the Kurdish language even more crucial particularly after the establishment of the non-Kurdish states in the aftermath of the WWI, is the fact that the hegemonic, authoritarian and assimilationist state-nations of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria either placed strict restriction on the use of Kurdish language or banned it altogether. Until recently, in the Turkish part of Kurdistan, where the use of the Kurdish language had been banned for decades and the use of Turkish imposed through both soft and phsycal violence, the very act of speaking Kurdish in the public was considered as a sign of Kurdish patriotism, a political statement and a discursive act promoting Kurdish national identity.

is. There are numerous cases in which the use of the particular language of the self has been crucially important in the national identity formation but the contrary has also been the case as the link between the language of the self has not been the primary concern of the nationalist discourse. Hence, in the words of Sheyholislami (2011: 101), 'depending on context and each specific case, language may or may not be central in defining [or constructing] national identities'. Nonetheless, as this study will show, language and identity are intimately related in the Kurdish case.

2.1.4. Nationalism as an Ideological Instrument in The Service of Political Movements

Breuilly (1996a: 138-139; 1993: 2) offers a different account of nationalism within the modernist paradigm. For him, even though the elite presents it as a political expression of the nation, nationalism is strictly modern and a purely political movements in the service of the elite pursuing or exercising state power and justifying such power through the rhetoric of 'national cause' (Breuilly 1996a: 138).

Similarly, Brass (1979: 40), from an instrumentalist point of view, suggests that national identities are the inventions of the elite for generating mass support in their search for political power. Thus the type of nationalism promoted depends upon the nature of power relations between the state and the non-dominant elites. As such, Brass sees nationalism as the outcome of interactions between the state and the elites from non-dominant ethnic groups, especially the elite of the peripheries (Brass, 1991).

The view presented by Breuilly and Brass is extremely relevant to this study as it is useful in conceptualizing the Kurdish nationalist elite's motivations for the promotion of Kurdish nationalism. As this study illustrates in the analytical chapters, after the Ottoman centralization policies during the *Tanzimat* period, the descendants of Kurdish nobility were excluded from the Ottoman power structure (Özoğlu 2004: Klein 2007). However, at the end of the 19th century

seeing the ideology of nationalism as an opportunity to reclaim their former political power, the Kurdish elite attempted to produce a sense of nationhood among Kurdish masses to regain their former power (Silopî 2007: 28; Klein 1996: 8-9; 2007: 149: Özoğlu 2001: 383). The utilization of nationalism as such is most obvious in the discourse of the journal *Kurdistan* and *KTTG*, as will be discussed in details later, because both journals reveal how the Kurdish elite constructed various forms of Kurdish nationalisms in accordance with their own conditions of existence, i.e., in accordance with their personal and/or familial concerns, the nature of their relations with the state and the commoners as well as the local and global balance of power. In other words, the political aspirations of the Kurdish elite and the political future they envisioned were conditioned by historical circumstances which in turn determined the form and expression of Kurdish nationalism in the Kurdish journals.

2.2. THE DEVELOPMET OF NATIONALISM DURING THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Starting in the 19th century, the nation-state became the 'gold standard' of political organization worldwide. This profound change came about as a result of the historical conjunction of a number of social, political and economic factors in a long process first in Europe and the Americas and then throughout the world. Thus the 'long 19th century'[34] distinguished itself by several unique events. First, the twin process of increased industrialization and urbanization gave rise to the modern state in Europe when it proved to be more efficient than the previously existing political units, e.g., the Habsburg, Romanov and Ottoman Empires (Gelvin 2005: 199). Urbanization, industrialization and commercial revolution along with a new mode of economic production and economic system of

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[34] Chronologically, or according to the Gregorian calendar, the 19th century began in 1800 (or 1801). However, many historians do not simply divide history into the calendric units. For instance, when dealing with the 19th century, many historians tend to use a periodization that places the beginning and the end of the 19th century between the French Revolution of 1789 and the beginning of the World War I (1914). Historians call this time unit the 'long 19th century' (Gelvin 2005: 300).

capitalism gradually spread from Europe to other parts of the globe making the communities of every continent parts of the new global economy and division of labour. Second, as a result of the European global dominance, such European ideas as progress, equality, secularism, citizenship, popular sovereignty and self-determination gained almost universal currency and came to symbolize the long 19th century. Third, the process of urbanization and industrialization gave birth to new classes and social strata –the bourgeoisie and the working class, as well as the nationally oriented historians, philosophers, the elite and political leaders who became the driving force for social, political, economic and cultural change in a new and modern direction. And fourth, the long 19th century ushered in the elaboration of the concepts of nationalism, national identity and state-nations as the new political units that would replace the empires (*ibid*.).

Under these circumstances of the 19th century the 'Holy' Ottoman Empire was still a feudal agrarian economy dominating over a vast imperial territory incorporating many people of diverse faiths and ethnic backgrounds in its *millet system* (Zürcher 2004a: 10; Gelvin 2005: 34; Zeine 1966: 31-32: McDowall 2004: 2).[35] In such social and political system the terms *nation* or *nationalism* in their European sense were unfamiliar concepts in the minds of the Ottoman masses. All ties and loyalties remained denominational or religious as the society was imagined and organized along these types of identities (Zeine 1966; Zürcher 2004a, 2004b; Gelvin 2005 Campos 2011). In this multi-ethnic and multi-religious imperial *millet system* [36] each confessional community, e.g., Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews, constituted a *millah* (religion or religious community)[37] that were granted a wide range of economic, cultural and civil autonomy since

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[35] The *millet system* signifies the way in which the relation between the Ottoman state and the religious communities (millets) of the empire is organized (Gelvin 2005: 34).

[36] It is important to note that although in the Qur'an the term *milla* referred to the confessional communities of the Empire, including Muslims (Firro 2009: 6), it usually denoted the non-Muslim communities in the Ottoman contexts.

[37] These confessional groups were also known as *Ahl al-Kitab* or *People of the Book* (recipients of revealed scripture).

the time of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror (1432–1481) (Zeine 1966: 31; Jabar 2006:286; Zürcher 2004a; 11: Firro 2009: 6-7). Then, it is safe to presume that given the characteristics of the Ottoman social system in the pre-modern period, religion was the primary identity marker and that the segregation of the Ottoman communities ran along religious lines rather than ethnic or racial lines, which started to change as a result of the European influences.

As discussed above, in the pre-modern period empires never tried to impose a homogenous culture upon their subjects but instead they were, for the most part, tolerant to the diversity and coexistence of various faiths and ethnic cultures. In return for this tolerance, each religious community, which held a certain degree of autonomy or self-administration, submitted to the supreme authority of their ruler whose main concern was keeping peace in order to extract taxes (Campos 2011). After the French Revolution, the new European mode of economic system, i.e., capitalism, along with its new social, political and cultural values, were spreading fast to the other parts of the world undermining old imperial powers. 'The spread of the modern economic and state systems throughout the world encouraged the spread of modern institutions of governance and market relations within every territory, principality, or empire with which those twinned systems had contact' (Gelvin 2005: 302). The fact that the Ottoman Empire was not immune to this process becomes clear as it took less than half a century for the Empire to come under the heavy influence of the European –particularly the French – economic, social and cultural dominance (Gelvin 2005: 199; Zürcher 2004b). Consequently, from the mid 19th century onwards such European concepts as liberalism, constitutionalism, political participation, civil rights, positivism, nationalism and secularism entered into the Ottoman discourse ushering in the rise of ethnic consciousness that led to separatist nationalist movements first among its non-Muslim and later on Muslim elements (Gelvin 2005; Zeine 1966; Zürcher 2004a, 2004b; Göçek 1996).

Moreover, the penetration of the Western modern discourse into the Ottoman Middle East in the 19th century introduced new references to such old terms as

qawm, millah and *ummah,* (Firro 2009: 67: Hudson 1977: 35, 37). For instance, in classical Arabic of the 13th century the word *qawm* denoted 'a group of people' or 'a group of men' (Firro 2009: 67). In several passages of the Qur'an there are references to '*qawm Nuh'* (people of Noah), '*qawm Musa'*, (the people of Moses) and '*qawm Ibrahim'* (the people of Abraham) (Zeine 1966: 153). In this sense, *qawm* had a similar usage to the Greek term *ethnos* or corresponded roughly to the German *volk* (Hudson 1977: 36-37). However, the term *qawm* went through a semantic shift in the second half of the 19th century and came to signify collective identities in the modern sense. Eventually modern Arabic coined the term *qawmiyya* from *qawm,* which was suggested as a possible Arabic equivalent for the French *nationalité*, (Zeine 1966: 153; Firro 2009: 6; Hudson 1977: 37). The term also entered into the Ottoman social and political discourse as early as 1870, a year after the *Ottoman Law of Nationality* was issued by the Porte (Zeine 1966: 153).

A similar semantic shift took place in the Arabic word *millet,* which is the plural form of *millah-* for which there is no equivalent in Western political terminology (Zeine: 31-32). Although the term once denoted the non-Muslim confessional communities in the Ottoman Empire (Hudson 1977: 35), during the *Tanzimat* period and especially in the writings of Namik Kemal in the 1860s, the term *millet* went through a semantic change acquiring a new meaning closer to the European notion of *nation* both in Ottoman Turkish and Arabic (Zürcher 2004a: 72), e.g. *al-milla al-fransawiyya* (the French people) (Firro 2009: 6-7). Later on the term came to unambiguously denote the notion of *nation* in the Late Ottoman period (McDowall (2004: 2). It is for this reason that in the Ottoman political discourse the terms *millet* and *qawm* were used interchangeably. Similarly, as will become evident in the analysis of the primary sources of this study, *Kurdistan* and the subsequent Kurdish journals picked up this new meaning of the terms and used them as such in their respective nationalist discourses. Nevertheless, the journal *Kurdistan* and *KTTG* used the terms *qawm* and *millet/milet* in a variety of ways with ambivalent meanings. This ambiguity stemmed from the fact that the journals labeled not only the entire multiethnic/multinational Ottoman

community but also each constituent of that community as 'nation' [qawm/milet]. The same confusion and ambiguity was true in the Arab political discourse of the same historical period (Firro 2009: ch. 2).

In addition to the *millet system*, there also existed the concept of *ummah* (community), the collective identity of the dominant Muslim component of the empire, which bound together its Muslim subjects regardless of their diverse ethnic, linguistic or social backgrounds (Firro 2009: ch 1; Hudson 1977: 35; Zürcher 2010: 215). In this sense, *Ummah* denoted one unified community or commonwealth of believers (*ummat al-mu'minin* or *ummat al Muslimin*) of the Ottoman Empire under the Sultan Caliph, who was not only the protector of the orthodox Islam but also that of the non-Muslims (Gelvin 2005; Zeine 1996; Campos 2011; Firro 2009). Similar to *qawm* and *millet*, he term *ummah* also went through a semantic shift, from signifying 'the community of Muslim believers', since the time of the Prophet Muhammad (570-632), to denoting 'nation' as in '*ummah al-arabiyya'* (Arab nation) (Hudson 1977: 37). As far as the Kurdish political discourse is concerned, a good case in point is the use of the term *'al-ummah al-Kurdiyya'* [Kurdish nation] that appears in a reader letter published in the 8th issue of the journal *Kurdistan*.[38]

Due to the social, economic and political changes that took place over the course of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire increasingly came to resemble a modern state. This inevitable integration precipitated the decline of the Empire to the extent that it began to threaten its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Kasaba 1988; Zürcher 2004b). Kasaba (1988: 49) identifies two manifestations of the new balance of power between European imperialism and the Ottoman state. The first manifestation pertains to the military campaigns staged by European powers and their effort to exacerbate the secessionist movements among the non-Muslim ethnic communities of the Ottoman Empire. The second manifestation concerns the social and economic reorganization of certain

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[38] *See*, Eli Kurê Huseynê Amedî *(Kurdistan* No. 8, December 1, 1898, reproduced in Bozarslan 1991, Vol. 1: 212).

developed regions of the Ottoman Empire, e.g., Greater Syria and Balkans that bypassed the Ottoman treasury by being directly linked to European economy. This new balance of power together with the capitulations[39] and the spread of the European idea of political nationalism primarily among the intelligentsia of the Christian communities (such as Greeks and Serbs) culminated in separatist movements (Göçek 1996) [40] and the gradual disintegration of the Empire. [41]

The culmination of all these factors in the break-up of the empire did not take place overnight. Nor did the structural changes in the empire over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries follow the same pattern or created the same impact as they did in the European experience, even though the European influence was the instigator of these changes (van Bruinessen 2003; Klein 1996; Göçek 1996). Rather, the changes in the social and political culture of the Ottoman Empire was a long process that took almost a century and started to bear fruit only towards the end of the 19th century.

Threatened by the interventionist policies of the superior European powers and the nationalist challenges, starting from the early 19th century onwards the Sultans along with European educated and reform oriented Ottoman statesmen became increasingly aware of the necessity to rejuvenate the decaying Ottoman

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[39] Capitulations were certain extraterritorial privileges given to the non-Muslim communities since the early centuries of the Ottoman Empire, which included giving the European powers the right to protect the Christian communities of the empire. However starting in the early 19th century capitulations went far beyond their original intent of protecting the Christians from the Ottoman law when the European powers started to abuse these privileges (Zürcher 2004b: 6-7; 2010: 67; Campos 2011: 110). The abuses posed serious political problems to the Ottoman dynasty in the course of the 19th century as it further diminished the political legitimacy of the Empire.

[40] These communities were in close social, economic and cultural contact with the European powers and made great social and economic advances. They eventually sought alternative ways of economic and political ascension for their respective bourgeoisie and intellectuals (Göçek 1996).

[41] For instance, soon after the Bulgarian nationalist movement, Rumanians and Macedonians followed suite. Greater Syria is another good case in point where a regional economy in close connection with Europe developed and turned Greater Syria into a semi-independent economic unit. The new economic relations in Greater Syria transformed the social, economic, and cultural space and eventually laid the foundation for regional loyalties that would later provide the basis for nationalist movements first among the Christian.

administrative system (Mardin 2000 [1962]: 60; Ahmed Emin 1914: 14). They introduced a series of reforms, ranging from military and economic spheres to the political and social structure, to establish a new state/society connection based on new forms of political legitimacy and loyalty (Jabar 2006; 286; Breuilly 1993: 245; Deringil 1993: 4; Campos 2011: 61; Shaw 1997: 20; Zürcher 2004a: 39; 2004b: 3). In this sense, the policies of Sultan Mahmud II (1785-1839) defined the course of the Westernization process (Zeine 1966: 82; Kendal 1980: 11; Kasaba 1980: 49-50). These reformation and modernization efforts resulted in the declaration of what is known as *Tanzimat Proclamation* (The Reorganization) or *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunû* (The Gülhane Imperial Decree) in 1839.[42] *Tanzimat* brought about significant changes in the realm of, amongst others, diplomacy, trade, finance, law, education and bureaucracy (Zürcher 2004a, 2004b; Campos 2011; Göçek 1996; Davison 1963; Özoğlu 2004: 143).

On the one hand, these reforms, aimed at integrating the Ottoman economy into the global market. On the other, it attempted to centralize the Ottoman administration through the creations of new institutions to govern over the new Ottoman constituencies redefining state/society relations; To this end, the *Imperial Edict of Gülhane* (1839) and *the Imperial Reform Edict* (1856) proclaimed that all Ottoman subjects, regardless of their ethnicity or religious affiliation, would have the security of life and honour as well as political and religious liberties and equality as *'Ottoman citizens'*. In this way, it introduced a new brand of *official nationalism;* a route had been taken by European states during the advent of nationalism in the early 19th century as '[a] means for combining naturalization with retention of dynastic power, in particular over the

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[42] During the *Tanzimat* reforms the Ottoman Empire issued two decrees that are considered to be the cornerstones of this historical period: the *Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane* or *the Imperial Edict of Gülhane* (1839) and the *Islahat Hatt-ı Hümayunû* or *the Imperial Reform Edict* (1856). It is important to note that, the Edict of 1856 was a compensation for the European support of the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean war (1853-1856) fought against Russia and resulted in the Treaty of Paris (1856) (cf. Akşin 2006: 31). The treaty stipulated that the Ottoman territorial integrity would be protected under the umbrella of European law which in a sense 'Europeanised' the Empire (*ibid.*).

huge polyglot domains accumulated since the Middle Ages, or […] for stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire' (Anderson 2006: 86). In a similar manner, *Ottoman official nationalism* or more specifically *Osmanlılık* (Ottomanism) attempted to foster a notion of political community made up of equal citizens bound together by their commitment to a common set of legal norms. *Osmanlılık* meant to integrate the non-Muslim groups systematically into the Ottoman citizenry by granting them civil right and equality which would in turn incorporate the Ottoman ethno-religious groups into a unified political community to inspire universal loyalty to the Imperial State (cf. Zürcher 2010: 215; Firro 2009: 28).

Nevertheless, the notion of *Osmanlılık* proved to have a very limited appeal and thus, contrary to the expectations, failed to realize its goals. A main reason for this failure was that the Ottoman state saw the reforms in purely practical terms. Because the main motive behind the reforms was not a transformation of the state or the society, but to keep the Empire from falling apart, the Imperial State implemented reforms in a piecemeal and pragmatic fashion (Zürcher 2004a: 39; Breuilly 1993: 260; Jabar 2006: 286). In any case, the reforms were based on superficial political rights of the new citizens, which did not respond to the expectations of various communities. On the contrary, the reforms may have further contributed to the social and political environment in which the culture of separatist nationalisms flourished along ethnic lines. In that although it was not particularly intended, the reforms led to the gradual transformation of the state and society in a direction that ultimately gave rise to the emergence of an Ottoman modern public sphere introducing the new European concepts of liberalism, egalitarianism, self-determination, positivism and secularism to the Muslim and non-Muslim constituency that further nurtured national sentiments in both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. These developments ultimately resulted in a new political space favourable for the rise of nationalist tendencies and movements.

Moreover, when an increase in the wealth and status of the Christians became more visible by the 1860s, the *Tanzimat* reforms created a resentment among Muslim political and social elite, who felt that the new situation imposed by the European powers was threatening the Muslim predominance in the Empire (Kedourie 1974: 140; Zeine 1966: 82; Zürcher 2010: 68).[43] The dissatisfaction of the Muslim social and political elite crystallized in the formation of the *Young Ottoman* movement (1865) led by middle-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals (cf. Akçam 2004: 79-80; Zürcher 2010: 68; Zeine 1966: 75-77). Despite considerable variation in their outlook on politics and society, the movement vehemently opposed the imitation and wholesale adoption of Western thoughts and values. Although they were sympathetic to Western political institutions, they felt that Islam was a rational religion and receptive to scientific innovation and thus they projected an Islamic, modernist synthesis. [44] Furthermore, the Young Ottomans sought a political contract between the subjects –Muslims and non-Muslims alike- and the ruler and to this end they advocated a constitutional parliamentary regime, which would create what they called *Ittihad-ı Anasır* (or Unity of the Elements) (cf. Zürcher 2010; Mardin 1962) to modernize the state while keeping the Imperial State intact. However, it is debatable how many Ottoman reformers of this and the subsequent period actually believed in the idea and ideals of *Osmanlılık* (Zürcher 2010: 215).[45] In any case, towards the end of the 19th century, *Osmanlılık* or *Ottoman reform*

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[43] Zeine (1966: 82) asserts that the *Islahat Fermanı* was dictated to the Ottoman government by Stratford Canning, the British ambassador to Istanbul. For a similar discussion see also, Kendal (1980:11).

[44] The most prominent figures of this movement included, Namik Kemal, Ali Suavi, and Ziya Paşa.

[45] The Christian population of the new empire were not satisfied with the reforms and therefore preferred to take the path of separation instead of remaining under a predominantly Muslim empire ruled by Muslims (Zürcher 2004a: 29; 2010 68; Akşin 2007:38). That is why it is ironic that the policy of promising equality to all inhabitants of the empire, regardless of religious affiliation, hardened communal boundaries and precipitated instances of inter-communal hostilities and violence (Zeine 1966: 82).

nationalism or *Ottoman official nationalism* transformed into a chauvinist form of Turkish ethnic nationalism when the reform process, which created breeding ground for ethnic nationalism among the Ottoman communities, threatened to destroy the basis of the status quo in which the Turks prevailed. Thus, starting in the 1910s the reforms gradually acquired a Turkish rather than an Ottoman colour and an autocratic rather than a liberal form. As a result, in the face of growing Turkish nationalism even those who were previously silent or even ardent supporters of the Ottoman reforms and the ideals of *Osmanlılık*, such as Arabs and Kurds, moved toward opposition against the rising Turkish nationalism (Breuilly 1993: 150).

2.2.1. A Brief History of Kurds and Kurdistan

Little is known about the Kurdish history before the Islamic conquest in the 7th century when most Kurds became Muslims. Nevertheless, the controversial origins of the Kurds has been traced by many scholars back to the Iranian-speaking tribes who migrated from Central Asia towards the western parts of the Iranian plateau, Eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia at the turn of the second and first millennia BCE (Blau 1996: 20; Jwaideh 1960: 37). It is believed, on the basis of geographical, linguistic and historical evidence, that Kurds are descendants of the Media tribes, who together with the Persians established the Medes Empire (728-550 BCE), which stretched from Asia Minor to Central Asia (Bruinessen 1992; Jwaideh 1960). Kurds, who number around 25 to 30 million today, constitute the world's largest nation without a nation state of their own (Kreyenbroke & Allison 1996; Halliday 2006).

2.2.2. Kurds under the Ottoman Empire

After the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514 the Kurdish land was divided between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires.[46] Taking advantage of the rivalries between the two Empires Kurds established a number of powerful state-like dynasties,

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[46] Although there has never been a state named *Kurdistan*, the term was used to denote parts of the Ottoman and the Safavid Empires where Kurds lived (Bruinessen 1992: 11).

emirates or principalities throughout the 10th and the 19th centuries on both sides of the borders (Jwaideh 1960: 37; Bruinessen 1992a: 74; Özoğlu 2004: 46-47). These dynasties include the Emirates of Baban, Soran, Hakkari, Ardalan, Botan and Bitlis (Bruinessen 1992a: 74).[47]

As a result of the stagnation, decline and regional politics at the turn of the 18th century the authority of the two imperial centres over their gigantic territories was minimal. Desperate to keep their imperial territories in tact the central administrations of these empires loosened their grips on regional, ethnic and/or confessional communities through decentralization policies. In this way, similar to the other premodern imperial polities the elites of the periphery in the two imperial states were generally left to rule over their regional population under the loose authority of the imperial centres (cf. Smith 2003: 69). For instance, on the Ottoman side, parts of the mountain lands of Albania and Kurdistan, as well as the desert of Arabia, though nominally under direct administration, were in very slight obedience. They retained their ancient tribal organization under hereditary chieftains who were invested with Ottoman titles in return for military service, and whose followers might or might not submit to taxation (Zeine 1966: 25). Moreover, in the 18th century, Kurdish emirates of the Ottoman Empire, like other provincial administration in Rumelia and Arabia, consolidated their power and began to function as semi-independent or *de facto* independent states that paid only lip service to the authority of the Ottoman Sublime Port (Jabar 2006: 286; Özoğlu 2004: 65). Nonetheless, these Kurdish dynasties never managed to join forces to unite in a bid to establish an independent Kurdish state mainly due to the fact that the Kurdish population of the late Ottoman period was highly fragmented along tribal, linguistic and religious lines, a point that brings us to the social structure of the Kurdish community of the Ottoman period.

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[47] The earlier dynasties and pricipalities included the Shaddadies, Marwanids, Hasanwayhids and Ayyubids, *inter alia* (Hassanpour 1992: 50; Kendal 1980: 17-18).

A Kurdish tribe is a socio-political and usually territorial unit based on real or imagined descent and kinship (Bruinessen 1992a: 51). Especially the non-urban Kurds remained as a tribal society and were politically and militarily dominated by nomadic or semi-nomadic tribesmen led by tribal chieftains (Bruinessen 1992b: Özoğlu 2004). Tribal loyalties often led to inter-tribal blood feuds and complex conflicts sometimes over scarce resources, including grazing land and cattle, other times over military and political dominance. Thus conflicts between various tribal and sectarian groups, *inter alia*, prevented the Kurds from taking a collective action towards forming a state (Bruinessen 1992b). Nevertheless, throughout their history Kurdish tribes organized themselves around tribal confederacies in a pact where the tribes bound together to form larger political unites such as emirates or principalities mentioned above.

As far as intra-tribe social structure and stratification is concerned the hereditary tribal chieftain dominated over landless settled peasants or serfs who were not tribally organized. The intra-tribe hierarchy, assigned by the degree of power of the tribal chieftain, played a significant role in the construction of certain norms which determined social distance, interaction and relationship between tribesmen and peasantry (Bruinessen 1992b: 32). So far as the ethnic perception of tribesmen is concerned, Bruinessen (2006: 26) has observed that ethnic or religious roots of the tribes or the peasantry were not significant in inter- or intra-tribal relations: While non-Kurdish or non-Muslim tribesmen were treated as equals, the non-tribal groups be it Muslim or Christian were referred to as *re'aya* (subjects), *Feleh* (for Christian peasants) and *Kurmanc/Kurmanj* (for Muslim peasants in Northern Kurdistan). Tribesmen referred to themselves as *aşiret* (tribe) or *Kurd* as opposed to Kurmanj (*ibid*.). From these naming practices it is clear that the Kurdish tribesmen considered themselves as the *'real'* Kurds while they labeled the cultivators or the non-tribal Kurdish peasantry with caste terms such as *Kurmanc* (*ibid*.). As will become clear in the analytical chapters of this study a semantic shift occurred in the term *Kurmanc* in the discourse of the early Kurdish journals when the journals used the term *Kurmanc* [Kurmanj] in

reference to all Kurds, regardless of their social status. Moreover, as a powerful discursive practice, these journals used the terms *Kurmanc* and *Kurd* interchangeably transforming the meaning of the word *Kurmanc* from mere peasantry to an ethno-national group that encompassed all strata of what they perceived as the Kurdish society.[48]

2.2.3. The Demise of Kurdish Emirates

Accommodating the modernization process and especially maintaining a modern army within the framework of the *Tanzimat* reforms increased the Ottoman state expenditure, which in turn required economic growth, centralization and a more effective tax system (Breuilly 1993: 260). Subsequently the Ottoman state during the reigns of Sultan Mahmut II (1808-1839) Sultan Abdulmecid I (1839–1861) and Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876) tightened up its central control in Kurdistan and elsewhere by taking away the privileges of the semi-autonomous principalities to increase its coercive capabilities and thus extract more taxes directly (Gelvin 2005: 302). Centralization and the search for new revenues included the gradual destruction of semi-autonomous principalities in various places of the Empire, including the Balkans, Arabia and Kurdistan. The centralization policies, in turn, created resentment among Kurdish principalities when the reforms took away the privileges they had been enjoying since the early 16th century. As far as Kurdistan is concerned, this bitterness culminated in a series of Kurdish revolts throughout the 19th century,[49] which were suppressed violently and resulted in the demise of the Kurdish principalities (Kendal 1993: 5; McDowall 2004: 41; Olson 1989: 7; Van Bruinessen 1992a: 175-176; Özoğlu

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[48] Similarly, explaining the advent of Arab nationalism, Gelvin (2005: 202) argues that "[b]efore the 19th century, the term *arab* did not have the same meaning among Arabic speakers the way it has today. Instead, the word was commonly used as a term of contempt by town-dwellers when referring to 'savage' Bedouins.'' Only in the 19th century did the Arab intellectuals begin using the term *arab* to refer to their distinctive linguistic and cultural community. The word *Turk*, in a similar way, acquired its current meaning only during the late Ottoman period. Because in earlier periods it denoted Anatolian peasants, calling an Istanbulian gentleman a Turk was considered as an insult (Zeine 1966: fn.1).

[49] The major Kurdish revolts during the late Ottoman period include the Baban Revolt (1806-1808), Mîr Mohammed Revolt (1833-1837), Bedir Khan Beg Revolt (1837-1847), Yezdan Sher Revolt (1855) and Sheikh Obeidullah Nehri's Revolt (1880-1882) (Kendal 1980; McDowall 2004).

2004: 60; Sasuni 1992: 73; Safrastian 1948:54-60). After the demise of the Ottoman and Safavid/Qajar Empires in the aftermath of the WWI the Kurds came under the rule of the newly established state-nations of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria.

It is noteworthy that even after the fall of the Kurdish principalities the aristocratic Kurdish stratum continued to play its leading role in the Kurdish society. In fact, it was the sons of these aristocratic families that became the pioneers of Kurdish nationalism as they spearheaded the first Kurdish nationalist organizations and publications explored in this study.

2.2.4. The Kurdish Language

Kurdish, which belongs to the Iranic branch of the Indo-European languages, does not constitute a unified standard language. Its speech varieties spoken by people self-identifying as Kurds can be classified into four major dialects namely *Kurmanji* (or Northern Kurmanji), *Sorani* (or Central Kurmanji), *Dimili* (or Zazaki) and *Hawrami* (or Gorani) (Meho & Maglaughlin 2001: 5; Hassanpour 1992: 19; Paul 2008). These major dialects, in their turn, are further divided into a number of substandards (Meho & Maglaughlin 2001: 5; Hassanpour 1992: 19). Although Dimili speakers lack a written tradition, Hawrami speakers, like those of Kurmanji and Sorani, have produced a rich literary tradition (Hassanpour 1992: 25). Since the speech varieties employed in Kurdish journals were limited to Kurmanji and Sorani, the focus of this study will be on these two major varieties of Kurdish.

As far as the geographic distribution of Kurdish speech varieties is concerned, Kurmanji is spoken by most Kurds within the political borders of modern Turkey (except for several million speakers of Dimili), Kurds of the Syria and the former Soviet Union as well as by a third of the Kurdish population in Iraq and a sizable Kurdish population in Iran. Sorani, on the other hand, is spoken by Kurds residing in the southern parts of Iraqi and Iranian parts of Kurdistan. Although reliable statistical information is lacking, approximately 75% of all Kurds speak the

Kurmanji dialect (Blau 1996).[50]

It is important to note that the Kurdish speech varieties are not necessarily mutually intelligible. The speakers of different dialects often times have difficulty with understanding one another in all contexts due to differences at the basic grammatical, structural as well as lexical levels.[51] Nevertheless, this difficulty might be mitigated if the speaker of one speech variety has been exposed to another variety through close contact over a considerable period of time (Hassanpour 1992: 24; Bruinessen 2006: 25). As a matter of fact, most Dimili speakers in the Turkish part of Kurdistan do speak Kurmanji as Kurmanji is the dominant variety spoken in that part of Kurdistan. Similarly, in Iraqi Kurdistan most Kurmanji speakers speak the dominant Sorani dialect.

2.2.5. The Printing Press in the Ottoman Empire

One significant innovation that contributed to the growth and the dissemination of new European ideas, values and practices in the Ottoman Empire was the introduction of the press in the 18th century and of the print-media in the mind-19th century (Mardin 2006; Göçek 1996; Watson 1968; Akşin 2006; Ahmed Emin 1914; Robinson 1993).[52] Thus it is safe to presume that the first waves of the

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[50] *See* also Michael Chyet's foreword to Hassanpour (1992).

[51] This observation is borne out by the experience of all-Kurdish organizations such as the Kurdish Students Society in Europe (KSSE), which had members from among the Kurds of Iraq, Turkey, Syria and Iran. One of the leaders of the Society noted that seventeen participants in the third annual congress of KSSE in August 1958 had to use other languages besides Kurdish to fully understand each other *(Rojî Nû,* Vol. 2, No.3, 1961:31, cited in Hassanpour 1992: 24-25). At this point it is important to note that 'linguists have emphasized that there is no simple criterion for determining mutual intelligibility. How much comprehension should count as intelligibility? Where on the continuum of comprehensibility is the boundary between understanding an non-understanding to be drawn?' (Billig 1995: 32). Furthermore, emphasizing the social-political versus linguistic influences on assigning language or dialect status, Trudgill (2000: 4) asserts that 'the criterion of mutual intelligibility and other purely linguistic criteria are … of less importance in the use of the term 'language' and 'dialect', than are political, social and cultural factors…'

[52] The press had been in use since the last decade of the 15th century by Sephardic Jews in Constantinople who had fled from Spain (Mardin 2006: 100; Watson 1968: 436; Davison 1963: 27; Robinson 1993: 233). Nevertheless, since the guilds of writers denounced the printing press as 'the devil's innovation,' Muslims of the Ottoman Empire did not use the printing press until 1726, the year Ibrahim Muteferrika, a Migyar captive who converted to Islam, convinced the

European modernity and the introduction of the notion of nationalism in the Ottoman discourse coincides with the emergence of the national print-languages or the vernacularization activities as the first newspapers and periodicals in the Ottoman Empire concurred with the *Tanzimat* reforms (Akşin 2006: 32). In this sense, it is not just a historical coincidence that the establishments of societies like the *Young Ottomans* during the *Tanzimat* period would take place around the same time as the emergence of the first Turko-Ottoman journals that significantly contributed to the formation of an Ottoman public opinion (Mardin 2006; Göçek 1996; Ahmed Emin 1914; Akşin 2006). To be sure, the Ottoman intellectuals who engaged in journalistic activities were among the most influential political figures of the period and the prominent members of the *Young Ottoman* movement (Akşin 2006: 32).

The first Ottoman newspaper was the state-run official gazette the *Takvim-i Vekayi* (Calendar of Events) (1831) followed by *Ceride-i Havadis* (Register of Events) (1840), a British-owned semi official paper. Independent journalism started with *Tercüman-ı Ahvâl* (Interpreter of Conditions) (1860) and *Tasvir-i Efkâr* (Representation of Opinion) (1862) (Akşin 2006: 31). These first independent Ottoman periodicals found an audience that was, for the most part, already familiar with and therefore not puzzled by news reports and other journalistic genres. Hence, these periodicals contributed not only to the development of the Ottoman public opinion that had been in the making since the publication of the previous journals (Göçek 1996; Ahmed Emin 1914) but they also added to the construction of new social groups and identities along religious and ethnic lines. In this context, the proliferation of newspapers among Ottoman minority groups in the subsequent decades was instrumental in the construction, negotiation and dissemination of each group's national identity discourse.

Sultan Ahmet III to grant permission for a printing press. Although the permission was granted, a *fetva* (an islamic legal pronouncement) by orthodox ulama limited the output to non-religious, scientific and historical works and dictionaries, since the ulema would not permit the use of such 'impure innovation' for the production of the Holy Qur'an and works on theology or sharia; *see* Watson (1968) and Robinson (1993) for more details on the advent of printing press in the Ottoman Empire.

2.2.6. The Kurdish Printing Press

Similar to the Young Ottomans, the succeeding nationalist movements of diverse ethnic groups of the Ottoman Empire engaged in newspaper publication activities in order to construct and disseminate their respective identity narratives. Like other Ottoman minorities, Kurdish intellectuals were also exposed to the new European ideas, which, as mentioned above, inspired a social vision based on notions of citizenship, political participation, constitution, civil rights, freedom, secularism, and ultimately ethno-national consciousness and autonomy. In this way, the ideologically, politically and socially favourable intellectual environment of the late 19th and early 20th centuries gave birth not only to the formation of a Kurdish nationalist movement among the Kurdish intellectuals, but concurrently, to the Kurdish journals as a means of fostering Kurdish national identity among a Kurdish reading circle. Unsurprisingly and similar to the other Ottoman minority groups, the emergence of Kurdish nationalist discourse roughly coincides with the onset of the first publication activities between 1898-1914.[53] Among them, *Kurdistan*, the very first Kurdish journal published between 1898 and1902, became a modern instrument in the hands of the Kurdish elite through which they articulated, negotiated and disseminated Kurdishness or Kurdish national identity before the emergence of the first Kurdish social and political associations.

In the subsequent years, the Kurdish intellectual elite that was exposed to European education and ideas formed a number of social and political associations in the Ottoman capital of Istanbul, with their branches in Kurdistan and abroad. Some of these groups began to publish the aforementioned periodicals, which in their distinctive ways articulated, negotiated and circulated the new Kurdish identity discourse in the framework of new social, political and

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[53] The Ottoman government set up the first printing presses in Kurdish towns in the late 1860s, including Bitlis (1865-66 or 1893), Diyarbakir (1868-69) and Van 1889-90). However, they all printed Turkish materials as they were established, owned and operated by the government (Hassanpour 1996: 52). All Kurdish books and periodicals were published outside of Kurdistan in such places as Istanbul, Baghdad, Cairo, and Geneva due to the Ottoman government's lack of interest in printing Kurdish materials, and later on due to the restrictions and censorship on Kurdish publication (ibid.). *See* Hassanpour (1992) and (1996) for a detail account of the development of the printing press in Kurdistan.

ideological concepts, noticeably nationalism. Then, it can be stated that, the formation of Kurdish organizations and the publication of the newspapers were among the most significant concurrent developments in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as far as Kurdish nationalism is concerned.

Nevertheless, as this study shows in the analytical chapters dealing with the Kurdish journalistic discourse, Kurds did not manage to form a coherent and linear nationalist discourse or movement through the printing press in this emergent stage of Kurdish nationalism. Rather the type, strength and the objectives of the Kurdish nationalism was shaped and reshaped by diverse political actors in different socio-cultural and political circumstances of various historical moments during the late Ottoman period.

CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, first, I shall explain the concepts of 'discourse,' and 'identity,' and their utilization in this study. Second, I shall provide an outline of the research methodology adopted for the study, which is based on a three-dimensional CDA framework developed by Norman Fairclough, the most prominent figure in the field of CDA, followed by the Discourse-Historical Approach developed by Ruth Wodak and her colleagues. Third, I shall justify why and how this study adopts this methodology for the discourse analysis of Kurdish printing press of the late Ottoman period.

3.1.   What is 'Discourse'?

The term *discourse*, as a linguistic concept, generally means written or spoken communication and a social interaction. However, in recent years it has accumulated a number of complex meanings as a result of various research conducted in social sciences. Therefore, it is important to specify at the outset which of these numerous meanings of the term is utilized in this study. Discourse, in recent language studies, e.g., critical linguistics and social semiotics, has often been defined as a network of social action and interaction in real social situations through the medium of language, including semiotic modalities, i.e., non-verbal sign-systems. In this network of social action both the written language as well as speech systems are regarded as text (Purvis and Hunt 1993: 485; Fairclough 1995b: 18; Wodak 2002b: 66; Bakhtin 1986: 103-104). Similarly, in this study, the term discourse is understood not merely as a tool of interpersonal written or spoken communication or interaction, but rather, in a post-structuralist sense, as a social practice that produces meaningful statements and constructs social realities and knowledge from a particular perspective (Foucault [1972] 2002; Hall 2002a; Bakhtin 1986; Fairclough 1995b; Wodak 2002b). To put it differently, discourse is the ideological use of language in the production of knowledge. As such it refers to 'an institutionalized system for the social construction of reality and knowledge in regulated language' (Bové 1992: 2).

The term most vividly acquired this particular meaning in the work of Michael Foucault as a result of the shift of attention in his work from 'language' to 'discourse' as a system of representation (Hall 2002a: 72). In the Foucauldian sense language is not just an instrument for uttering thoughts, but it is 'the source of thought in its own right' (Gutting 2005). Foucault (1972 [2002], 1980, 1998) suggests that our knowledge does not derive from direct access to the *real world* or the *authentic reality*; rather it is constructed through discourses by way of language. Then, a discourse determines what is 'sayable' or 'unsayable' as well as what is 'thinkable' or 'unthinkable' because discourse as a concept is more than a way of writing or speaking about a particular topic; it is a whole 'mental set' and ideology which encloses the whole society's way of thinking and codes of behaviour (cf. Barry 2002: 176; Billig 2002: 217).[54] Thus, the notion that 'nothing has any meaning outside of discourse' (Foucault, 2002) [55] is central to the Foucauldian concept of discourse because even extra-textual or extra-discursive physical objects or happenings only take on meaning and become object of knowledge within discourse (Hall 2002a: 72). [56] For Foucault the crucial

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[54] For instance, the verbal expression 'ladies first' has a significance in the construction of gender roles as long as it is capable of producing actual beliefs and behaviors among men and women that conform with this expression. Then, the power of the notion 'ladies first' is not its existence as a verbal expression in gender construction, but in its 'physical spatial codes' that is in its actual or physical form when it is materially realized in daily life and contributes to the gender roles. In other words, 'ladies first' becomes significant as a part of discourse, for instance, the discourse of 'the gallant man', of 'male power' or 'a non-gendered discourse of general politeness in society' (Baker 2006: 17).

[55] In a similar manner, Derrida (1976: 158,163) suggests that 'there is nothing outside the text.'

[56] Foucault does not claim that nothing exists outside of discourse but rather that 'nothing has any meaning outside of discourse' (Hall 2002a: 73). On the issue of dichotomy of discourse and discursive formation of reality, on the one hand, and non-discursive, external, material reality, on the other, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 108) suggest, '[t]he fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in term of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God,' depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. Then, what is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but rather different assertions that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence' (emphasis in original). Similarly Sless (1986, 156) suggests that 'I am not suggesting that the only things in the universe are signs or texts, or that without signs nothing could exist. However, I am arguing that without signs nothing is conceivable'

aspect of a discourse is its power to produce knowledge or objects of knowledge through language by imposing regulations, norms, and practices -not by mere physical force, but by manufacturing consent and legitimacy- that govern and shape a way of talking. This in turn entails meaningful statements and ultimately forms fields of knowledge or what Foucault calls *discursive formations,* which leads to the construction of 'meanings and meaningful practices' (Foucault 2002: 74, 129). It is important to note that the Foucauldian notion of discourse is closely associated with the Gramscian notion of *hegemony* (Gramsci 2005), in that, both concepts assume that power, in the form of hegemony or discourse, is mostly cognitive and commonsensical and accepted unconsciously. Therefore both philosophers underline the subtler, *'naturalized'* form of power or dominance that bases itself on *free-will* and *consent*.

3.2.   National Identity as a Discursive Construct

From the perspective of the language-oriented approach, identity is a socially constructed phenomenon as a product of language and dominant discourses that are closely tied up with 'social arrangements and practices' always in flux and change in accordance with historical circumstances (Hall 1990, 1996, 2002b; Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl & Liebhard 1999; Joseph 2004; Anderson 2006). Accordingly, both individual and collective identities are cultural constructs formed through a series of discursive exclusions and inclusions. Jacques Lacan (1989: 65), in his psychoanalytic account, posits that language creates identities - among other forms of social realities- and as such he situates the process of identity formation in the heart of discursive realm in which the *Real* is symbolized and represented through language and other semiotic systems. Accordingly, identity can be said to be a linguistic construct: we are constructed in language (cf. Bertens 2004: 162). [57]

National identity, as a particular category, is not immune to the socially constructed nature of identity in general. In his discussion of language and

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[57] See, Bertens (2004: 161-162) and Barry (2002: 108-120) for detailed accounts of the Lacanian notion of identity.

national identity formation, Joseph (2004: 5) argues that national identity is *brought* into being through language. He asserts that the idea of 'Italian' comes into being first as a signifier (a word) of a signified (the 'Italian nation'), which initially exists only as a desire. He adds that '[w]ith sufficient motivation, those who hold this desire can cause it to turn into a discourse and be shared by a critical mass within the putative nation. When that happens, the signified, the 'Italian nation', becomes a *real* (as real as any signified can be […]) (emphasis in original)' (*ibid*.). Similarly, Henri Tajfel (1981: 229), a co-developer of social identity theory, argues that a nation will exist only if a group of people conceives of themselves as members of an in-group in the form of a nation vis-à-vis its *others*.

Because it is based on the relationship and difference between the *self* and the *other,* identity is also a *relational* term (Lacan 1989: 1-7). [58] Referring to the relational aspect of identity Billig (2002: 61) argues, '[t]he general forms of nationalist thinking […] includes ways of conceiving of 'us, the nation', which is said to have a unique destiny (or identity); it also involves conceiving of 'them, the foreigners', from whom 'we' identify 'ourselves' as different'. Thus, national identity is based on binary pairs of the ingroup/us that is privileged and therefore considered to be the self, good, central and primary; and the outgroup/them that is deemed the *other*, often designated with derogatory terms such as dangerous, barbarian, or marginal, if not inferior all together.[59] Consequently, the concept of identity (1) is a linguistic and discursive construct, (2) is based on difference and relationality, and (3) is subject to constant change in accordance with evolving circumstances. As will be discussed in the analytical chapters of this study, Kurdish journals of the late Ottoman period made an extensive use of the relational aspect of identity in their discursive construction of Kurdish national

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[58] The relational aspect of identity draws on the Saussurian notion of *difference* and *relationality* in linguistic system, which later on was applied to other disciplines (Saussure 1959: 114; Kress 2002: 31).

[59] See also Van Dijk (1999: 22-23) for a similar discussion.

identity. In accordance with the changing historical circumstances they underlined the racial, national, cultural, linguistic differences, *inter alia*, between the *'Kurdish-self'* and the *'non-Kurdish others.'*

3.3.   Discourse, uninterrupted historical continuity and narrative identity

The theoretical position of Foucault regarding the dynamic and changing character of identity discourse is also useful for a better understanding of the nature of national identity and the formation of historical narratives as it sheds light on the notion of *uninterrupted historical continuity*. Foucault did not think that the *same* phenomenon would exist with the *same* meaning across different cultures and historical periods and hence refused to recognize the 'infinite continuity of discourse'. He felt that one must question the notions of development and evolution for they are responsible for the misconception that dispersed events are successive reoccurrences of the same phenomenon linked to one another within a 'principle of coherence' and unity (Foucault 2002: 23). [60]

For Foucault, in different historical moments, discourses produce objects of knowledge fundamentally different from one another with 'no necessary continuity between them'. In this way, he *historicizes* each discourse because in his view '[t]hings meant something and were true [...] only *within a specific historical context'* (Hall 2002a: 74) (my emphasis). By the same token, identity, as a product of discourse, should be treated not as an infinite continuity of the same phenomenon or the same object of knowledge that is talked about or referred to within different historical or cultural settings, but as an object of knowledge constituted and reconstituted in diverse ways by specific discursive formations of different historical and cultural circumstances without a necessary continuity. In this sense, the unity of discourses on a specific object is not about

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[60] Foucault (2002: 23) asserts, '… Take the notion of tradition: it is intended to give a special temporal status to a group of phenomena that are both successive and identical (or at least similar); it makes it possible to rethink the dispersion of history in the form of the same; it allows a reduction of the difference proper to every beginning, in order to pursue without discontinuity the endless search for the origin.'

the *permanence*, *uniqueness* or *uninterrupted continuity* of that object but it is about 'the interplay of the rules that define the transformations of these different objects, their non-identity through time, the break produced in them, the internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence […] [and ultimately] make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time' (Foucault 2002: 36). Then it is safe to suggest that all types of identities, including national identities are unfinished products of discourses, in the constant process of becoming rather than a state of being in a persistent sameness. [61]

As the present study will illustrate, within a time span as short as 16 years, Kurdish national identity was defined and redefined in the discourses of Kurdish journals under the influence of divergent socio-cultural and political circumstance. Each historical circumstance produced a form of Kurdish identity that was different from the identities constructed in the preceding and succeeding periods. Therefore, the Foucauldian notion of *historicization* is extremely helpful when we try to make sense of each of the divergent forms of Kurdish national identities constructed in different historical conditions and contexts.

Taking up the issue of *uninterrupted historical continuity* in his discussion of *narrative identity* or hermeneutics of the self, Ricoeur's (1992; 1988) states that the dialectical relation between sameness and selfhood is characterized by the intermediary function of *narrative identity*. In this view, individuals integrate their life experiences into an evolving coherent story of the self with a sense an uninterrupted continuity, unity and purpose. A character in a narrative is a figure that is reidentified as being the same by integrating the changeable and dynamic elements of identity into permanence in time. In other words, to form a coherent unity with permanence in time, the narrative identity brings together the heterogeneous elements, e.g., diversity, variability, contradiction, discontinuity

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[61] Similarly, Bertens (2004: 127), denoting this ever-changing nature of identity in Lacanian psychoanalysis, asserts that, 'since the social and personal configuration in which we find ourselves at a given point will inevitably change, identity is not something fixed or stable, it is a process that will never lead to completion'.

and so forth that are 'seemingly' contrary to one another in the domain of sameness-identity (Ricoeur 1992; 140-141; McAdams 2001). Then, narrative identity as an 'art of composition', which mediates between concordance and discordance, offers the possibility of combining often conflicting elements of constancy and transformation into a harmony and a coherent life story (Wodak *et al*. 1999: 15). Ricoeur (1988: 246) states that the same is true for the past events or history of people. He adds,

> A series of rectifications applied to previous narratives, just as the history of a people, or a collective, or an institution proceeds from the series of corrections that new historians bring to their predecessors' description and explanation' (ibid.).

This flexibility provides one with the option of constructing past events of a collective life in a number of different ways depending on the narrators needs. In a similar manner, Hobsbawm (1992: 12) argues that although nation is a novelty, nationalists, from a primordialist perspective, attempt to establish a connection between the present and past, which implies the rootedness of the current nation in history as well as an uninterrupted historical continuity of their nation across time, even though this continuity is largely 'fictitious'. Thus, Ricoeur's notion of 'reinterpretation' or 'narrative identity' in Hobsbawm's theory translates as 'invention', 'fabrication' or 'fiction'. Then, what nationalists really do is not the rediscovery of the distant past but rather it is the creation of common-sense assumptions through the selection, alteration and the manipulation of the ethnic culture for modern political purposes (Hobsbawm 1992: 12; Breuilly 1993: 406). Similarly, as this study will discuss, the narration of Kurds as a unified and homogenous community in an uninterrupted historical continuity was a recurring theme in the Kurdish journals' discursive construction of the Kurdish common political past or national history.

It is noteworthy that although this study acknowledges the profound effect of linguistic and discursive elements in the construction of national identities, it does

not assume that national identities are purely discursive social constructs entirely *'inventions'* or *'fabrications'* of modernity or social engineering out of thin air. Rather, it presumes that in addition to the discursive nature of national identities, the utilization of selection and 'reinterpretation of pre-existing cultural motives' and traditions -real or conceived- also contributes to the construction of national identities (Smith 2002, 2003; Sheyholislami 2011). In line with the discourse-based frameworks that classify identity as an unfinished, fragmentary and on-going product of discourse, the present study presumes that identity is a discursive construct formed by way of language and discourse. It is not inherent or genetic and therefor never indicates something fixed, static, permanent and unchanging.

3.4.   Hegemonic Discourse vs. Counter/Heretic Discourse

For Foucault 'when those usually spoken for and about by others begin to speak for themselves, they produce a 'counter discourse'' (in Moussa & Scapp 2006: 89). He feels that history is the sequence of rules and their seizers. Emphasizing the historical struggle between discourses, Foucault (1977: 151) suggests,

> Rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to any purposes. The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing the rules, to replace those who had used them […] to invert their meaning and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them; controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules.

Lending support to this argument, Moussa & Scapp (2006: 89) point out, 'when […] formerly voiceless begin to speak a language of their own making [a counter discourse] they have begun to resist the power which seeks to oppress them. In this sense, the very act of speaking is political.' Hall (2002a: 74), in a similar manner, sees the counter-discourse as an element of the discourse of resistance and asserts, 'a different discourse or *episteme* will arise at a later historical

moment, supplanting the existing one, opening up a new *discursive formation*, and producing, in its turn, new conceptions' (emphasis in original). Similarly, Wodak *et al.* (1999: 8) assert 'discursive practice may be effective in transforming, dismantling or even destroying the status quo', with status quo being the hegemonic discourse that is the target of the counter-discursive practices (cf. Billig 2002: 214; Wodak, *et al.* 1999: 8).

Similarly, the Kurdish intellectual elite, faced with the Pan-Islamic, Ottomanist and Turkish nationalist hegemonic discourses in the late Ottoman period, attempted to produce an alternative discourse through printing press and other available discursive and non-discursive resources. For instance, the printing press provided Kurdish intellectual elite with the means of constructing and disseminating their own national(ist) discourse in the form of a counter discourse or a 'heretic discourse' vis-à-vis the hegemonic discourses of Pan-Islamism, Ottomanism and Turkish nationalism in the pre-WWI period. Therefore, power-resistance relationship (Foucault [1979] 1998: 95; 1980: 142, 209) in the case of the Kurds, as a subaltern group, to use a term from the postcolonial theory, found its interpretation in the heretic, counter-identity discourse of Kurdish newspapers of the late Ottoman Empire.

3.5. Critical Discourse Analysis as a Cross-Disciplinary Approach to the Study of Discourse

CDA as a multidisciplinary branch of linguistics is a type of discourse analytical research that is mainly concerned with investigating the relationship between language, power and ideology in order to explain the ideological function of language in social power abuse, dominance, inequality and manipulations (Fairclough 1995a, 1995b, 1992, 1989; Wodak *et al*. 1999; van Dijk 1995, 1996, 2002a, 2002b, 2003). More specifically, by integrating linguistic analysis and social theory, it attempts 'to unmask ideologically permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance, as well as strategies of discriminatory inclusion and exclusion in language use' (Wodak *et al.* 1999: 8).

CDA has become one of the leading branches of discourse studies since the early 1990s, owing much of its success to the pioneering works of Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Teun Van Dijk, among others.[62] It should be noted at the outset that although CDA does not constitute a homogenous academic discipline,[63] the common denominator of all CDA approaches is that there is a reciprocal relationship between language and power. Over the years, the works of the aforementioned scholars, who come from various CDA varieties, have been so influential within the CDA methodology that their works are perceived as the 'core CDA' (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000: 454).

Moreover, in recent years CDA practitioners have raised the need that CDA should also investigate the ideologies of domination over other disadvantaged groups such as ethnic minorities and human rights movement and their construction of counter-discourses vis-à-vis hegemonic discourses (cf. Luke: 2002). In this study, seeing the Kurdish national identity discourse as a counter-discursive practice and analysing it as such provides unique insights into the contestation between the emerging discourse of Kurdish national identity and the hegemonic Pan-Islamist, Ottomanist and oppressive Turkish nationalist identity discourses in the late Ottoman period.

3.6. Two Theoretical Dimensions of Critical Discourse Analysis Approach

As discussed in the outset of this chapter, modern social theory has produced radical political analysis and vital insights into the way a discourse functions in a

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[62] CDA, as a paradigm, or as 'a network of scholars,' as Wodak calls it, emerged after a two-day long symposium sponsored by the University of Amsterdam and attended by Fairclough, Wodak, Van Dijk, Kress and Leeuwen, in January 1991 (Wodak & Meyer 2002). Fairclough used the term 'critical discourse analysis' for the first time 1992 as a form of critical language studies (CLS) without abbreviating it to CDA. Three years later he started to use the term Critical Discourse Analysis as a result of a decisive terminological shift in his approach (Billig 2007: 35).

[63] Wodak *et al*. (1999) classify the branches of the CDA as: the British variety, led by Fairclough, Kress and Leeuwen, among others; the Dutch Critical Discourse Analysis, represented by Van Dijk; German Discourse Analysis represented by Utz Maas, Siegfried Jager and Jürgen Link; and the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis, represented by Wodak and her colleagues. For an excellent comparative account of different approaches and analytical frameworks within CDA *see* Sheyholislami, J. (2001), *What is CDA?* Available at: *http://www.carleton.ca/~jsheyhol/cda.htm*

society. CDA, taking its starting point in contemporary social theory, attempts to incorporate the insights of social theory into the study of language (Blommaert & Bulcaen 2000). In this context, broadly speaking, CDA has two theoretical dimensions: linguistics and the social theory. While CDA's social theory line draws on the concepts of *discourse*, *power*, *domination* and *hegemony* formulated in the works of Foucault, Althusser, Gramsci and Habermas, [64] its linguistic line of development is most closely associated with Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)[65] (Van Dijk, 2002b: 301).

So far as the social theory dimension is concerned, CDA theorists and practitioners argue that the social theory put forward by the aforementioned philosophers is so abstract that it has little practical value as it is not properly applicable to the actual instances of language use and thus fails to provide guidelines for close textual analysis (Fairclough 1992, 1995b; Van Dijk 2002b).[66] This is because although social theorists are concerned with such concepts as language, text, discourse and power, they do not explicitly and systematically deal with structures of discourse and texts in the construction of realities and power relations (Van Dijk 2002b: 301). Thus to develop a form of discourse analysis that contributes to the socio-political and cultural analysis, the insights of social theory need to be incorporated into the insights of critical linguistics and social semiotics for a close analysis of text (Fairclough 1995b: 53-54). To render social practices linguistically analysable,

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[64] With its social theory dimension, CDA most commonly draws upon the Foucauldian notions of 'discourse,' 'orders of discourse' and 'power-knowledge'; Althusser's (1971 [2001]) theory of 'ideological state apparatuses' and the notion of 'interpellation'; Habermas' (1984) concept of 'communicative action'; as well as Gramsci's (1971[2005]) theory of 'hegemony'.

[65] Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) is a functional-semantic approach to language and discourse formulated by the British linguist Michael Alexander Kirkwood Halliday (1985a, 1985b). It examines the way in which language is structured as a meaning-making system in diverse contexts. The central theoretical principle of Halliday's SFL is that language is a social semiotic system in which any act of communication involves choices for meaning-making.

[66] Particularly the Foucauldian-inspired concept of discourse has been criticized for its political and practical 'toothlesness' (Fairclough 1992: 37).

> [t]hese theories and concepts are given a linguistic translation and projected onto discourse objects and communicative patterns in an attempt to account for the relationship between linguistic practice and social structure and to provide *linguistically grounded explanations* for changes in these relationships (Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000: 452) (my emphasis).

Consequently, drawing on Halliday's trinity of *metafunctions*, i.e., *ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions*,[67] Fairclough developed what he calls *multifunctional* view of the text in his CDA methodology. Fairclough's three-dimensional analytical framework is instrumental in revealing the systematic links connecting text's metafunctions that consist of:

- Textual analysis
- Discourse practices
- Socio-cultural practices

This multifunctional[68] view of the text, which consists of three complementary aspects of a communicative event, is instrumental in investigating and revealing the simultaneous constitution of systems of knowledge, ideologies, believes, social relations and identities in text's semantic complexity (Fairclough 1995b: 58). Because textual analysis alone is limited and cannot capture the ideological effect of text by itself, Fairclough combines *micro level* analysis of textual

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[67] Halliday's SFL in its turn draws on the Saussurian linguistics and the theory of semiotic system. For Saussure (1959: 67) in all semiotic systems once it is established, the relationship between form and meaning is *non-negotiable*, *finite* and *conventional*. Furthermore, in the Saussurian theory, language is an autonomous system that is not directly connected with the social. SFL, on the other hand, asserts that the relationship between the form and meaning is not finite nor non-negotiable but rather it is motivated because speakers makes choices through combination of different forms to convey different meanings. Second, in systemic linguistics, there is a direct link between the language and the social in which the social shapes the language and the meaning. That is, a particular social circumstance entails a particular meaning making process –more on the relationship between the social and language will follow.

[68] In Fairclough's schemata, Halliday's 'interpersonal function' is divided into 'relations' and 'identities' in which identity function concerns the construction of social and personal identities while relational function deals with the construction of a particular type of relationship between the participants of a communicative event.

properties (textual analysis) with *macro level* analysis of discourse practices and social structures (Fairclough 2003: 15).[69]

3.7. How to Do CDA?: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis of a Communicative Event

3.7.1. Text

For Fairclough (1995b: 57), the significance of the textual level is that 'meanings are necessarily realized in forms, and differences in meaning entail differences in form […] it is a sensible working assumption that where forms are different there will be some differences in meaning'.[70] Then a text can be best defined as a semantic unit; a unit not of grammar and form but of meaning in which lexical and grammatical resources produce meanings through 'complex sets of choices'. To put it differently, 'each choice in the system acquires meaning against the background of the other choices which could have been made' (Eggins 2004: 20). Because textual analysis is concerned with the instances of social interactions in linguistic forms, the textual level deals with the internal organization and the communicative nature of a text by analysing the concrete textual properties of the text lexicogrammatical choices and other linguistic devices including, syntax, punctuations, deictics, presuppositions, vagueness, (e.g. the use of the passive voice), metaphors, conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs (e.g. but, however, moreover, and, nevertheless, yet, although,

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[69] Accordingly, micro level analysis concerns the *descriptive* stage at the textual level and deals with formal properties of the text such as the lexicogrammatical choices as well as metaphorical structures and devices; the macro level analysis, on the other hand, concerns the *interpretation* and *explanation* stages. While the *interpretation* at the discourse practice level concerns the text production and consumption processes and the way power relations are enacted; the *explanation* stage at the sociocultural practice level concerns the relationship between discursive practice and sociocultural context. (Fairclough 2003: 16-17) *See* also Fairclough (1989: chapters 5 & 6).

[70] This view is also a response to the Saussurian linguistics; for Saussure (1959: 67) the relation between form and meaning was seen *arbitrary* and *conventional.* In SFL – and later on CL and CDA- however, the relationship between form and meaning is a *motivated* one. In the words of Halliday (1985a: 345): '[a] text is meaningful because it is an actualization of the potential that constitutes the linguistic system; it is for this reason that the study of discourse ('text linguistics') cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it.' For a detailed discussion see Kress (2002: 31-32).

alternatively, consequently) in the meaning-making process (Halliday 1985a; Fairclough 1995b).[71] Then it is fair to argue that there is a close relationship between the writer's/speaker's intentions and the concrete form of language he or she deliberately chooses from a plethora of lexical and grammatical choices (Halliday 1985a: xiii-xiv, xxvii; Kress 2002: 33).

3.7.1.1. Ideational Function

In CDA semiotic interpretation, text is viewed as a specific and unique realization of a discourse in that language use is a deliberate structuring practice to construct particular ideologies (Wodak 2002a). Therefore the ideational function of the text is concerned with the ways in which social practices are represented or recontextualized in line with particular purposes and ideologies (Fairclough 1995b: 5, 58). This is because text as a semiotic process does not merely 'reflect' the reality but rather construct particular versions of ideational realities through meaningful statements from a specific position in line with the interest of those who produce them (Foucault 2002; Hall 1977, 2002a; Fairclough 1989, 1995a; 1995b; Van Dijk 2002b; Wodak et al. 1999). Then meaning making through the use of language is a conscious and deliberate act that promotes a particular point of view regarding a happening, an event or an occurrence (Fairclough 1995b: chapter 6; 1989: chapter 5).[72] Therefore, an analyst should first engage in the deconstruction and a detailed examination of the formal properties of a text to investigate the possible ideological reasons behind the linguistic choices made. Such a critical awareness in the analysis of the discourse of a text is fascinating and intellectually empowering as it provides the analyst with a more *refined* pre-understanding or the suspension of his or her common sense, instead of taking a naïve position against the manipulative assumptions or taken for granted 'truths' that are imposed by texts.

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[71] This level of analysis also corresponds to the *descriptive* stage of Fairclough's CDA framework, in which textual features are described and explained.

[72] See also Van Dijk (2002b: 312).

3.7.1.2. Identities and Social Relations

This dimension of the multifunctional view of the text relates to the text's interactivity mainly between the writer and audience in the construction of identities and relations particularly in media discourse.[73] There are three major categories of participants in media discourse: *media personnel*, *audiences* and *other participants* (Fairclough 1995b). Analysing the types of identities and relations in media discourse is an essential part of critical discourse analysis because it reveals the way power relations and domination are enacted between the participants of a communicative event (Halliday 1985a; Fairclough 1995a, 1995b; Sheyholislami 2011; Heyvaert 2003; Kress 2002). It is noteworthy that in addition to the lexicogrammatical features mentioned above, there are many other sets of linguistic resources at work that contributes to the designation of identities and social relations. These include modalities and moods such as declarative, imperative, optative, interrogative, desiderative and subjunctive clauses and sentences (Fairclough 1995b: 128). [74]

The analysis of identities and social relations constructed in the Kurdish journals under consideration will help address such questions as what kind of social, political and personal identities and relations were constructed between the participants of a communicative event in the Kurdish journalistic discourse? How were each participant related to one another? Did the producer of a text position himself or herself as a member of the audience claiming common identity with

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[73] Although Fairclough, unlike Halliday, separates the issue of *identity* from the issue of *relations* for analytical purposes, he acknowledges that the two aspect of *interpersonal* dimension, to use Halliday's terminology, are practically inseparable because how a reporter's identity is constructed cannot be separated from how a reporter relates to an audience (Fairclough 1995b: 126). In other words, the type of relationship set up between any two individuals is a significant part of the construction of their identities. Moreover in the Faircloughian (1995b) schemata the category of *other participants* refers to participants from the public domain such as politicians, trade unionists, community leaders, scientists and other experts some of whom might be representatives of the audience or those who dominate the state, politics, economy, culture and society.

[74] For instance, an assertion made through a declarative sentence might sound authoritative and thus construct an unequal social status and relationship between the text producer and the reader, positioning the text producer as an authority and the reader as a layperson (Fairclough 1995b).

them in the form of social solidarity or did he/she take a position on the side of a dominant class and its discourse? Did the text producers use an authoritative tone that constructed an educator-student relationship between themselves and the audience or did they adopt a more requesting or humble tone of an 'ordinary person' like that of the audience? Did the type of relations and identities constructed in Kurdish journalistic discourse legitimize the existing power relations through reproducing them or did it challenge them? Whose values were promoted in Kurdish journals, those of the oppressed or those of the dominant élite?

3.7.2. Discourse Practice

The *discourse practice* dimension in Fairclough's CDA framework corresponds to the *interpretation* stage of critical discourse analysis. It is particularly concerned with the analysis of text production, consumption and distribution processes seeing the text as the product of the process of production, and as a resource in the process of interpretation (Fairclough 1989: 26). CDA assumes that there is a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive practice and a social structure (See table 1). In that discourse and discursive practice are socially constitutive and socially constituted because as a result of the interaction with the social structure they might contribute to the reproduction or maintenance of social status quo or they might contribute to challenging and transforming the social status quo (Wodak 2002b; Wodak *et al*. 1999; Fairclough, 1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b; Hodge & Kress 2002; van Dijk 2002).[75]

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[75] Wodak, *et al.* (1999: 8) identifies four ways in which discursive acts can be socially constitutive and socially constituted. First, discursive acts are responsible for the genesis, production and construction of social conditions. Second, they might contribute to the restoration, legitimization and relativization of social status quo. Third, discursive practices are used to maintain and reproduce the status quo. Fourth, discursive practices might take the form of a counter-discursive act and aim at transforming, dismantling or even destroying the existing status quo.

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
Table 1. A conceptual framework for critical discourse analysis developed by Fairclough (1995b: 75).

Then, the significance of the discursive practice dimension is that it mediates between *sociocultural practice* and *text* (the other two dimensions of the framework) because the two dimensions have an indirect connection through discourse practices as the social affects the form of a text and, in turn, a text affects (reproduces or challenges) the social.[76] Explaining this mediating function of discourse practice, Fairclough (1995b: 61) states that the properties of sociocultural practice shape texts, but by way of shaping the nature of the discourse practice, i.e. the way in which text are produced and consumed.[77] In

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[76] In Van Dijk's (2002b; 1999) formulization it is the social and cognitive process that mediates between the sociocultural practice and text; *see*, Sheyholislami (2000) for a detailed comparison of the approaches developed by Fairclough and van Dijk.

[77] This is a central point in social semiotics as well; Social semiotics, unlike mainstream semiotics, sees system of signs (e.g. languages) as dynamic structures where there is a constant change. Hodge and Kress (2002: 295) state, '[t]erms in a system have value by virtue of their place in that system. At the same time, a system is constantly being reproduced and reconstituted in texts. Otherwise it would cease to exist. Then texts are both the material realization of system of signs, and also the site where change continually takes place.' This dialectical relationship between terms and system or texts and system is maintained by discursive practices or what Hodge and Kress call 'semiotic act'. Then, a discursive practice 'is the site

this sense, discourse practices 'are more or less intentional plan of practices... adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim' (Reisigl and Wodak 2001: 44).[78] In a similar way, text might try to change the social through discursive practices. Given that a discursive practice is an *action* and not merely a representation of the social reality, the analysis of a text should focus on what ideological impact a discursive practice might be trying to make.

The mutual dependence between the text and the social is most evident in the 'changeable discursive practices' in unsettled societies where there is a constant battle between different political and ideological entities, e.g. classes, genders and ethnic groups (Fairclough 1995b). Consequently, Fairclough makes a distinction between the relatively homogenous 'conventional discourse practice' that is found in more fixed and stable sociocultural environment and the relatively heterogeneous 'creative discourse practice' found in the discursive practices of a more unstable and shifting sociocultural environment. This is a particularly crucial point for the present study given the constant discursive shifts taking place in the corpora of Kurdish journals in accordance with the changing sociocultural atmosphere in the chaotic late Ottoman period.

Furthermore, Fairclough distinguishes between two aspects of discourse practice: the *institutional process* (institutional routines such as editorial procedures in media text production) and the *discourse process* (the transformation of text in the process of production and consumption) (Fairclough 1995b: 58-59), both of which are discussed below.

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where social forms of organization engage with systems of signs in the production of texts, thus reproducing or changing the sets of meanings and values which make up a culture' (*ibid*.).

[78] In Wodak *at al.*'s methodology, the concept of 'macro-strategies', which will be discusses later, corresponds to Fairclough's 'discourse practice' level or strategies of discourse practices (See Wodak *at al*. 1999: 33-34, also Reisigl and Wodak (2001: 44).

3.7.2.1. Institutional Process

The institutional process is not particularly relevant in this study given that Kurdish journalism in its early stage was not truly institutionalized. Since it lacked many typical characteristics of professional or institutionalized journalism, Kurdish journalistic activities fit more into the concept of 'citizen journalism', practiced by part-time, non-professional journalists or political activists (cf. Bowman and Willis 2003). As such although Kurdish intellectuals used journalistic practices similar to professional journalism, they were motivated by different objectives and ideals.[79] Consequently, most of articles in the Kurdish journals under consideration were editorials or opinion pieces –as opposed to hard-news- critically examining the social and political developments in the Kurdish community and the Ottoman Empire.[80] As a matter of fact even hard-news items appeared in editorial format in that happenings were not 'reported' bur rather they were presented from a particular personal perspective.

What is more, a typical newspaper appears in a standard format in which the paper is divided into such sections as domestic/national news vs. international news, editorial and so on. However, due to the same lack of professionalism and the scarcity of resources involved in journalism, the Kurdish journals did not

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[79] However, this situation was not unique to the Kurds as the absence of specialization was a characteristic of the press in other developing societies (Sommerlad 1996, cited in Hassanpour 1992: 276). Naturally, the same is true in the case of the first Turko-Ottoman journals published in exile. The editor Ali Suavi, for instance, wrote all of the articles in the first Turko-Ottoman journal *Muhbir* published in London, in 1867.

[80] The institutional process is characterized by routine procedures in which media workers collect, select and produce media texts (Bell 1991; Fairclough 1995b; Preston 2009). In this dimension news production is viewed as a collective process that involves 'coordinated and patterned' work of numerous media workers, such as journalists, editorial and technical staff to produce the news 'within a specific coordination of time, space, norms, technologies and other resources' (Preston 2009: 8). In the news making process, individual workers do not work alone and thus do not have self-invented rules or norms that give a news item its final version. Explaining the complex nature of news making process, Bell (1991) asserts that up to eight people might contribute to the production of a news item even in a moderately-sized press newsroom. Therefore, a journalist's first draft can never make its way into the newspaper because the first draft goes through changes made by the chief reporter, the news editor, the editor, the chief sub-editor, and so forth, before it achieves a final version and appears in a newspaper.

come out in such standard newspaper format, which had implications beyond mere technicalities. For instance, the lack of the home/abroad division could have contributed to the construction of the national homeland vs. elsewhere (Billig 1995), a point that will be discussed in details in the analytical chapters.

3.7.2.2. Discourse Process

A further dimension of discourse practice level is *discourse process* that deals with the analysis of the text distribution and consumption. In what follows I shall first examine the distribution and consumption of text and then discuss two central components of discourse practice: intertextuality and presuppositions.

3.7.2.2.1. Distribution and Consumption of the Text

Different types of communicative events vary in their time-space parameters (Fairclough 1995b: 36). For instance, in a typical small village gathering communication takes place in the presence of all participants in a particular time and place. In modern or post-modern societies, however, mediated communication has overtaken the face-to-face communication by a wide margin as each media type has its characteristic temporal and spatial disjunction depending on the type of technologies it draws on.[81] For instance while radio uses the technologies of sound recording and broadcasting, television relies on technologies of both sound and image-recording and broadcasting. The printing press, on the other hand, uses visual channels based on printing of written language, photography and graphic design lacking audio and motion picture and thus requiring the audience to be literate in the language of the medium (Fairclough 1995b: 38). Therefore, although the printing press has fostered a new form of communication, illiteracy, *inter alia*, can and does limit the potential audience size and tied to this the power and influence of the medium (Fairclough

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[81] Meyrowitz (1997: 62) identifies three distinct forms of societies; traditional, modern and post-modern linking each of these societies to dominant modes of communication: 'traditional to oral communication, modern to literate communication, and post-modern to electronic communication.'

1995b: 40). In regards to the case at hand, because coding and decoding practices of the printings press heavily depend on literacy, Kurdish journals had a very limited readership among mostly illiterate Kurdish masses. Thus it is fair to presume that Kurdish journals were not published under circumstances ideal for a distribution and consumption of text. A more detailed discussion of this point will follow.

So far as the consumption of the text is concerned, the CDA methodology has been criticized by reception theorists, on the ground that it pays little attention to the consumption process, i.e., the way readers consume –recontextualize and interpret- the text. The proponents of reception research argue that since a text does not have a single meaning as different audience might interpret a text in different ways, a thorough analysis of the consumption process should include inputs, e.g., interviews, from the consumers. However, by attaching too much importance to the consumer's interpretation, reception research misses the ideological power and influence of text (Fairclough 1995b: 16). Fairclough suggests that strong *interdiscursive* or *intertextual* links indicate that a text producer and audience draw upon the same discourses when producing and interpreting a text. That is when the text producer produces a text he or she takes into consideration the readers' *background knowledge* or what Fairclough calls *members' resources*[82] that a reader brings into the reading when interpreting the text. Thus a text addresses a sort of *ideal interpreter* who is expected to bring into the reading his/her *members' resources* –views, beliefs, ideologies- to make sense of what is said in the text, a point already taken into consideration at the production level by the producer of the text. Then when a reader interprets the text, he or she is actually interpreting another interpretation because the text itself is the interpretation of another interpreter (1989: 80-81). Thus,

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[82] In Fairclough's approach, the term *'members' resources'* refers to *background knowledge.* Fairclough refuses to use the term *background knowledge* on the ground that common sense assumptions can be ideological as in manipulative presuppositions that makes *knowledge* a misleading term (*see* Fairclough 1989: 141-142).

> [a]lthough readings may vary, any reading is a product of an interface between the properties of the text and the interpretative resources and practices, which the interpreter brings to bear upon the text. The range of potential interpretation will be constrained and delimited according to the nature of the text (Fairclough1995b: 16).

Here Fairclough draws our attention to the *pre-understandings* or *members' resources,* which are expected to generate a *predominant* or *preferred reading* of the text (Fairclough 1995b; Hall 1977). Accordingly, the reader is no *tabula rasa* by the time he or she reads the text. That is the reader does not come to a text with a blank mind but rather he or she comes to the text with a certain culture a worldview or a conviction determined by his/her *pre-understandings* or ideologies that inevitably play a significant role in his or her interpretation of text. Furthermore, a text producer, aware of the power of text to delimit the range of potential interpretations, [83] produces a preferred reading by forcing *members' resources* upon the interpreter's reading as a form of manipulation. In this sense, 'a text's presuppositions are important in the way in which it positions the readers: how a text positions you is very much a matter of the common-sense assumptions it attributes to you' (1995b: 106-107). Since media outlets in general lack access to the simultaneous feedback from their audiences, they 'postulate and construct 'ideal' audience partly on the basis of predictions or guesses about audience response drawn from experience and various types of indirect evidence (Fairclough 1995b: 40). In any case, although the present study does not relay on reception research, it takes into consideration the readers' reception through a few readers' letters sent to the Kurdish journals.

3.7.2.2.2. Discourse Process and Intertextuality

Intertextuality as a crucial concept in the construction of discourses refers to the explicit and implicit relation that a text has with the prior, existing and potential

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[83] See also Barber (2007: chapter 5) for a discussion of the 'co-constitutive role of the audience in the meaning-making process.'

future texts (Bazerman 2004: 86). As a concept it was first expressed by the Russian literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin (1986; 1987) through his notion of *dialogism*, in which Bakhtin considers all utterances as essentially dialogical, for no utterance occurs in isolation but rather as a response to the preceding, contemporary and succeeding utterances in a dialogical interactions and conversational context (cf. Akmajian, *et al* 1995: Chapter 9; Zappen 2000: 3). [84]

Inspired by Bakhtinian *dialogism*, Julia Kristeva (1980: 66), who coined the term *intertextuality* in the late 60s, argues that 'any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another.' There is a connection across texts or discursive events in that the meaning of any text or discourse is influenced by what has come before it in anticipation of subsequent texts. Then all literary texts are interwoven with other literary texts, with no beginnings or ends (Eagleton 2003: 118).[85] Similarly, Billig (2002: 214), from a discursive psychological point, asserts that each utterance, although in itself novel, carries an ideological history (ibid: 217). [86] Consequently, the concept of intertextuality undermines the notion that a text is an original and self-sufficient hermetic body in its own right.[87]

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[84] Bakhtin (1986: 85) asserts that since 'words belong to nobody, and in themselves they evaluate nothing' the meaning of an utterance ultimately depends on 'particular actual reality and particular real conditions of speech communication.'

[85] It should be noted that intertextuality is not confined to text. It can also be observed in other non-verbal semiotic modalities such as images. Hall (2002b: 328) argues that the meaning of an image can be altered when it is 'read in the context of other images'.

[86] This view distinguishes the poststructuralist view of the text from that of the structuralist in that while the former brings in an intertextual reading of text the latter limits itself to the internal structure of text.

[87] Roland Barthes (1981: 39), who problematized the concept of author and proclaimed 'the death of the author' states, 'any text is a new tissue of past citations. Bits of code, formulae, rhythmic models, fragments of social languages, etc., pass into the text and are redistributed within it, for there is always language before and around the text… the intertext is a general field of anonymous formulae whose origin can scarcely ever be located; of *unconscious or automatic quotations, given without quotation marks'* (my emphasis).

CDA attaches a particular importance to the social and historical contexts of text since a text cannot be properly analysed when isolated from the other texts (Fairclough 1995a, 1995b, 1992; Wodak 2002, 1999). In CDA approach, intertextual analysis mediates between the text and discourse practice. In this sense, intertextuality is,

> [...] an analysis of texts from the perspective of discourse practice, and more specifically from the perspective of 'discourse process'- in terms of the ways in which genres and discourses available within the repertoires of orders of discourse are drawn upon and combined in producing and consuming texts, and the way in which texts transform and embed other texts which are in chain relationships with them (Fairclough, 1995b: 75).

As it will become clearer in the subsequent chapters, intertextual analysis are crucial in the deconstruction of the Kurdish journalistic discourse, as various forms of intertextuality ranging from religious intertextuality to the overt and concealed forms of Pan-Islamism, Ottomanism and nationalism are utilized in the construction of Kurdish national identity.

3.7.2.2.3. Presupposition as a Dimension of Intertextuality

A presupposition is a context-bound 'common sense' assumption or belief the truth of which is taken for granted. Any text integrates explicit meanings through what is actually 'said' in the text as well as implicit meaning or what is 'unsaid' but taken for granted or presupposed (Fairclough 1995b: 106-107). [88] Nevertheless, even when it transcends the text's internal structure, the meaning is still present in the text only not explicitly or not as a formal property of the text but rather as an embedded presupposition (ibid.). We can still decode them because we do not start reading a text with a blank mind, letting the text to tell us whatever it

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[88] Thus an analyst should not only investigate what is being said or challenged, but he or she should also, examines 'what is being left unchallengeable or what is being presented as if unchallengeable [...] common-sensically' (Billig 2002: 220).

pleases. Instead we bring in a certain culture, a particular ideology or a mind-set formed by our pre-understandings, our 'bridge assumptions' or accumulated knowledge to make sense of a text. Since the relevant context of a presupposition might be in the text's immediate physical or social environment or it might be extended to a mutually agreed general truth requiring an extra-textual context or culturally defined conditions, an analyst should be aware of the presuppositions, conventions or commonsensical truths that a text conveys in a rather implicit manner (Akmajian, *et al* 1995: 370, 383; Fagyal *et al*. 2006: 306; Keenan 1971: 49). In consequence, one has to establish a set of connections between 'what is in the text and what is already *in* the interpreter' (Fairclough 1989: 78, my emphasis). [89] Then it is fair to argue that the use of presuppositions is a powerful way of imposing ideological assumption upon readers. Persuasive discourse and propaganda often make use of such perlocutionary acts.[90] In the subsequent analytical chapters, this study attempts to reveal or demystify particularly manipulative ideological presuppositions in the Kurdish journalistic

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[89] Fairclough (1989: 154) makes a distinction between two types of presuppositions as 'sincere prepositions' and 'manipulative prepositions'. A 'sincere' presupposition that does not have a direct ideological function in the service of power relations might be found in the following sentences: 'According to my horoscope my fortune will change this summer'. In this sentence the presuppositions for both the speaker and the addressee are: (a) the position of the stars and planets at the time of a person's birth has some effect on that person's future, (b) a fortune-teller can forecast this effect and (c) the person has had a bad fortune. Alternatively, a presupposition might have an ideological function with a persuasive and manipulative intention when what it assumes is commonsensical in the service of power (Fairclough 1989: 154). Consider the following sentence taken from the newspaper *Kurdistan*: 'I hope, with God's help, the Kurds also wake up from this ages-old deep sleep with the help of this newspaper... [and] make more progress than the neighbouring nations' (*Kurdistan*, October 11, 1898, No. 6, p. 5, reprinted in Bozarslan (1991: Vol 1: 177)). There are five presuppositions in this excerpt; first it is presupposed that there exists a distinctive, homogenous and uniformed community of people called by its collective proper name: Kurd. Second, we live in the era of nation-states in which other nations have *already* woken up to national self-consciousness. Third, the owner of the newspaper is constructed as an authority that has taken upon himself the duty of waking up Kurds through his newspaper. Fourth, Kurds are *still* in a deep sleep lacking national self-consciousness; and fifth, Kurds, like *the neighbouring nations*, constitute a nation.[89] These 'facts' are not overtly stated in the text but they are presupposed and it is the reader's part to fill the gap or supply 'missing links' by bringing all these assumptions into the process of interpretation to make sense of the text, almost intuitively (cf. Riffaterre 1990: 56-57; Van Dijk 2002b: 301; Fairclough 1989: 83, 85, 1995b: 123).

[90] See Akmajian, *et al* (1995: 376-383) for a detailed account of the formation and function of presuppositions.

discourse as the journals made an extensive ideological use of presuppositions in their various discursive practices.

3.7.3. Sociocultural Practice

The third dimension in Fairclough's framework is discourse as sociocultural practice that is dealing with text at social, cultural, political and historical levels. As we saw, language use is a 'context-bound social practice' and therefore a complete analysis of language can be possible only when it is analysed within its social and cultural context (Benwell & Stokoe 2006: 449). Given that for CDA language is a *social act*, the meaning of an utterance does not only depend on the *lexicogrammatical choices* but also on particular non-linguistic circumstances or extra-textual contexts of the situation e.g., social and historical circumstances within which text occurs (Wodak 2002b: 65; Halliday 1985a: 19; Eggins 2004: 85; Sheyholislami 2011: 45-46). Then given the fact that the social conditions regulate the speakers/writers choices as well as the audiences' interpretation, an utterance is both the *result* and the *representative* of the social conditions or what Foucault (1977; 2002) calls 'historical context.' Therefore, '[u]nderstanding the meaning of the choices made is to understand the meaning of the social environment in which they were made' (Kress 2000: 34-35).

Consequently, an analyst, with socio-diagnostic critique, has to make an extensive use of his or her contextual knowledge on the historical background and the original historical sources to situate a text in a wider frame of social, economic and political circumstances for a more accurate analysis (cf. Wodak 2002b: 65; Wodak, et al 1999: 7).[91] Then what necessitates this type of analysis is that every text is conditioned by some noticeable aspects of cultural, social, political and historical circumstances which a text either tries to reproduce and

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[91] Halliday (1985b: 11) refers to the contextual aspect of meaning as 'context of situation', a term originally coined by Bronislaw Malinowski (1923). Malinowski posits that the meaning of an utterance is not its effective internal meaning but rather the meaning is acquired 'through a systematic relationship between the social environment on the one hand, and the functional organization of language on the other' (Halliday 1985b: 11). Also see Joseph (2004: 17-18).

maintain or challenge and destroy (Fairclough 1995b: 57; Sheyholislami 2011: 156; Wodak 2002b: 65 Wodak, *et al.*1999: 8). In this context, with its sociocultural dimension CDA goes beyond a purely textual analysis in that it does not only deduce context from text but it also predicts the meaning of the text from its historical context. [92] It is noteworthy that the consideration of these extra-linguistic dimensions minimizes the risk of being biased when interpreting a text (Wodak 2002b: 65).

Moreover, analysis at the sociocultural practice level corresponds to the CDA's *explanation stage*, the second dimension of macro analysis of texts. The main concern of the *explanation stage* is to read texts and discourses as elements of social, cultural, political and historical processes and the way the sociocultural structure or 'the social matrix of discourse' determines the process of text production and consumption (Fairclough 1989: 163; 1992: 237). Thus, this level of analysis is instrumental in understanding the prevailing relations of power that motivate or cause the 'emergence and continuity of a particular discourse type and its ideological effect' (Fairclough 1995b: 78).

When analysing the media discourse, two important aspects of the sociocultural and political contexts are particularly important: the economics and political conditions of the media, which have a profound effect on media's discursive practices or semiotic acts. The social context pertaining to the economics of media concerns patterns of ownership, i.e., who has access to media under what market model and so forth (Fairclough 1995b; Sheyholislami 2011). The political condition of media, on the other hand, deals with such issues as what type of political regime the media output is operating in, whose interests are being served in media, what kind of affiliations the media owners have vis-à-vis the state and the reading public, and so forth (Fairclough 1995b, 1992; Sheyholislami

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[92] The analysis of the sociocultural dimension, distinguishes CDA from purely linguistic, arid and formalist approaches that isolate a text from its spatio-temporal settings (Fairclough 1995b, 1992; Wodak 2002b; Wodak *et al*. 1999; Van Dijk 1990, 2003; Hall 2000a; Hodge & Kress 2002; Benwell & Stokoe 2006). In this sense, CDA is a reaction to the asocial or uncritical linguistic paradigms of the 1960s and 70s (van Dijk 1990).

2011). Then, media ownership and the political conditions of a media outlet are particularly operative in shaping the discourse of media because media discourse fits the interests of its owners who have a privileged access to media and have the power to influence the perceptions of others by either reproducing and maintaining or alternatively resisting, changing and destroying the existing social, cultural and political structure (Meyrowitz 1997: 60; Whitemeyer 2002: 324; Wodak, *et al.* 1999: 8).

Given the importance of the social matrix in a *discursive formations* or *epistemes* this study in the outset of each analytical chapter situates the relevant Kurdish journal in its sociocultural, political and historical circumstances to explores the specific conditions and reasons that might have motivated the Kurdish journalistic discourse to contribute to the prevailing status quo or the existing social relations of power and domination, albeit with some modification, or alternatively resist and challenges the status quo with an assertive attitude through counter-discursive acts.

3.8.   Discourse-Historical Approach

Discourse-Historical Approach, as a branch of CDA developed by Wodak and other members of the Viennese School of CDA, is an analytical tool to study 'a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical and cultural sources as well as the background of social and political fields in which discursive 'events' are embedded' (Wodak 2002b: 65). Their framework is based on the *principle of triangulation* that consists of three major interconnected aspects for the analysis of the discursive construction of national identities as well as the conceptualization of the diachronic changes that a particular discourse type undergoes during a specific period of time (Wodak 2002b; Wodak *et al*. 1999).

Wodak *at al.*'s three- dimensional discourse historical approach consists of:

- Thematic contents
- Strategies
- Means and forms of realization

As far as the 'thematic contents' dimension is concerned, Wodak and her colleagues (1999: 30) identify five semantic macro-areas for content analysis in their investigation of the construction of Austrian national identity. [93] These are:

- The linguistic construction of the homo Austriacus
- The narration and confabulation of a common political past[94]
- The linguistic construction of common culture
- The linguistic construction of common political present and future
- The linguistic construction of a 'national body'

Given that nationalism as a socio-political movemet entails an immersion in the language, history, culture, homeland and politics of nation, these semantic areas are instrumental in investigating the discursive construction of a nation through

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[93] Sheyholislami (2011: 22-23), adopts the same methodology and successfully applies it to the construction of Kurdish national identity in the Kurdish satellite TV's and the Internet.

[94] Wodak and her colleagues (1999) in their discussion of national identity construction make an extensive use of Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic self and concept of identity formation. In his influential book entitled *'Oneself as Another'* Paul Ricoeur (1992) precisely deals with this aspect of identity. First, he makes a distinction between two sub-components of identity: identity as *sameness* and identity as *selfhood*. Then, he identifies three semantic components of *sameness*: (1) sameness as *numerical (quantitative) identity*, which denotes oneness of two or more objects; (2) sameness as *idem* identity or *qualitative* identity, which denotes extreme resemblance or similarity between two or more entities (Ricoeur 1992: 116). However, both numerical and qualitative identities are not strong arguments *per se* and hence questionable given that they lack the principle of temporal permanence in that objects or individuals or groups of people cannot and do not stay the same, but rather they are subject to constant change over a long period of time. Hence 'in the case of temporal distance between a recollection from the remote past and a present perception' the third element of sameness that is *uninterrupted continuity* gains significance (Wodak et al. 1999: 12). In Ricoeur's theory, *uninterrupted continuity* creates the assumption for lack of variation or diversity because it transforms disorder and disruption into neat arrangement, systematic function, continuity and permanence in time (Ricoeur 1992: 117). Moreover, since idem-identity (qualitative identity) does not address the psychological aspect of identity, Ricoeur employs the notion of *selfhood* (ipse-identity), the second sub-component of his concept of identity. Selfhood refers to the identity of the individual *self,* which is different from the identity of *another* (*ibid*.). For instance, A is A because A is not B. Furthermore, *selfhood* may also denote the identity, which belongs to oneself *as* another. That is selfhood addresses the question 'Who am I?' as it is concerned with the way one remains oneself in spite of all the physical and psychological changes one goes through in time or in spite of *his* or *her* others? Hence oneself as another is not a mode of sameness but rather a mode of selfhood (ibid.). Contrary to sameness (idem-identity), selfhood (ipse-identity) does not depend on something permanent for its existence because having self over time does not necessitate having something the same. What is necessary for selfhood is self-constancy, which combines numerical and qualitative identity and provides *uninterrupted continuity* and permanence in time (*ibid*: 147-148).

the rediscovery of its history, the revitalization of its vernacular language, the cultivation of its national literature, demarcation of its homeland and the restoration of its vernacular arts and crafts and music, e.g. native dance and folksongs (cf. Smith 2003: 6-7). The present study employs a similar set of semantic content areas. Nevertheless, given the peculiarities of the discursive construction of Kurdish national identity vis-à-vis the Australian identity, this study treats the language element as a major theme in its own right since Kurdish language was the most crucial element of Kurdish national identity in the discourse of early Kurdish journals.[95] Furthermore, this study adds another semantic content area under the heading 'the discursive construction of identities and relations between the Kurdish elite and commoners,' to investigate the relations of power and dominance between the participants of the communicative event in the Kurdish journalistic discourse. This category is very similar to Faircloughs *interpersonal metafunction*. Hence for a more comprehensive examination of the Kurdish case the present study identifies the following set of semantic areas for content analysis of the Kurdish journals:

- Discursive Construction of Common Political Present and Future.
- Discursive construction of Common Language
- Discursive Construction of Common History and Political Past
- Discursive Construction of Common Culture
- Discursive Construction of Common Territory/Homeland
- Discursive Construction of Identities and Relations between The Kurdish Elite and Commoners

As it will become appearant in the analytical chapters of this study, this set of semantic areas does not only allow for a systematic content analysis of the journals but it also reveals the diachronic changes in the Kurdish journals' discursive practices, which are extremely helpful when analysing and

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[95] For the same reason Sheyholislami (2011: 23) treats the language factor as a major thematic element on its own.

conceptualizing the constant discursive shifts in the corpora of the early Kurdish journals. Therefore, each analytical chapter of this study has parallel sections consisting of the above-mentioned set of semantic areas for content analysis. It is noteworthy that there are no clear-cut boundaries between these semantic areas as they frequently overlap. The significance of each of these semantic areas for the construction of national identities is briefly discussed under their respective sections in the first analytical chapter (Chapter 4).

The second dimension of Discourse-Historical Approach pertains to discursive strategies. Wodak *et al* (1999) identify four macro strategies in the discursive formation of national identity. These are *constructive strategies, strategies of perpetuation, strategies of transformation*, and *dismantling or destructive strategies* (Wodak, at al. 1999: 33).[96] Although these strategies are analytically distinct from one another they might simultaneously occur in the same discursive act (ibid: 36-42).

Means and forms of realization, which constitutes the third and final dimension of Discourse-Historical Approach, is similar to Faircloughs 'textual analysis' dimension, in that it concerns the linguistic means such as lexical units and syntactic devices, i.e., personal, spatial and temporal references, which are used in the construction of national unification, sameness, differences, uniqueness,

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[96] *Constructive strategies* pertain to discursive strategies that attempt to construct a particular national identity through national unification, identification and solidarity as well as differentiation from the *others*. *Strategies of perpetuation* aim at maintaining, preserving, supporting or reproducing a national identity that is under threat. *Strategies of justification*, as a subgroup of this macro strategy, are used in the justification of major problematic actions or events in the past to 'restore, maintain and defend a common 'national self-perception' which has been 'tainted' in one way of another'. *Strategies of transformation* attempt 'to transform a relatively well-established national identity and its components into another identity. *Disentailing or destructive strategies* attempt to dismantle or criticize parts of an existing national identity without being able to suggest an alternative. In addition, there also exist a subgroup of strategies that serve the aforementioned macro-strategies. Two of these sub categories pertain to the presuppositions: While, the strategies of presuppositions of sameness (strategies of assimilation) attempt to discursively construct 'a temporal, interpersonal or spatial (territorial) similarity and homogeneity,' the strategies of presupposition of difference (strategies of dissimilation) attempt to construct 'a temporal, interpersonal or territorial difference and heterogeneity.' The strategies of presuppositions of sameness and differences may be constructive, destructive, perpetuating or justifying in accordance with their respective social macro functions (Wodak, *at al*. 1999: 36-42).

origin, continuity, gradual or abrupt change, autonomy, heteronomy and so forth (*ibid*.: 35). What is more this dimension also deals with rhetorical questions, modes of discourse representation, e.g., forms of reported speech, as well as vagueness or trivialization through the use of passive construction, depersonalization, abstraction, metonymisation and deictic words (*ibid*.: 35, 86).

3.9. Computer-Aided Methodology in Discourse Analysis

Corpus linguistics, which has its roots in discourse analysis, is the study of examples taken from large bodies of text, which applies both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to the interpretive text analysis (McEnery & Wilson: 1996: 1: Baker 2007: 1). To this end, corpus linguistics uses bodies of electronically encoded text stored on computers to carry out complex calculations, for instance, frequency occurrences of particular linguistic patterns and so forth (Baker 2007: 02).[97]

This study uses OCR (optical character recognition) software in order to convert original printed versions of the corpora of Kurdish journals into word-searchable digital texts. OCR allows for a computer-aided methodology (CAMTA) for text analysis because corpus linguistic analysis is also about the evaluation of some kind of frequency information, e.g., multiple occurrences, co-occurrences or collocations of words and other linguistic patterns, given the fact that in large bodies of text, such as the corpora of Kurdish journals under investigation, there is a greater chance that words, which have already been used, will be used again in all sorts of contexts (cf. Biber 1999: 53). In this study, the frequency of such key words as *Kurd*, *Kurdistan*, *homeland*, *Ottomanism* etc., as well as co-occurrence and collocations of certain words are detected through OCR, which have been incorporated into the textual analysis of the early Kurdish journals.

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[97] See Baker (2007: 2-3) for a brief history of corpus-based method.

3.10. The Significance of CDA for This Study

CDA has transformed the study of language into a cross-disciplinary analytical tool offering an opportunity to incorporate a historical and social perspective into the study of language and media text. As an alternative to the formal and uncritical linguistic paradigms, it puts emphasis on both the structure and the social context of media text.

The importance of the CDA's systemic view of text for this study is that its multidimensional nature has provided the present author with an ideal analytical tool to conduct a thorough analysis of the Kurdish journalistic discourse from a critical perspective which in turned has allowed to reveal discourse strategies, practices and language devices that the Kurdish intellectuals employed in the construction of Kurdish national identities.

CHAPTER IV: THE JOURNAL *KURDISTAN*

4.1. THE SOCIOCULTURAL PRACTICES OF *KURDISTAN*

After the demise of the Kurdish principalities as a result of the centralization policy of the Ottoman state in the first half of the 19th century, the Kurdish nobility lost its traditional power. Some of them were exiled to various imperial centres, notably to the capital Istanbul. However, at the turn of the century, the descendants of the Kurdish nobility i.e. the sons of the princely families, religious dignitaries, e.g. sheikhs, and tribal leaders, began to seek ways to reclaim their former power. The first such attempt came from Miqdad Midhat Bedir Khan (henceforth M.M. Bedir Khan) and Abdurrahman Bedir Khan who particularly appealed to the idea of nationalism as a possible way to regain their family's former political prestige and power. To this end they sought a place among the Ottoman dissident circles, notably the CUP, as the legitimate national leader of the Kurds, in the struggle against Sultan Abdulhamid II (or the Hamidian) Regime. This endeavour of the descendants of the Kurdish nobility found an expression for the first time in the journal *Kurdistan* published on April 22, 1898 by the aforementioned Bedir Khan Brothers the luminaries of Kurdish journalism. The privileged access to newspaper publication equipped the Bedir Khan Brothers with a powerful and persuasive ideological tool through which they articulated, negotiated and constructed a new discourse on Kurdish national identity.

In order to situate the discourse of the journal *Kurdistan* in a broad historical context, this section provides the historical circumstances under the Hamidian regime during whose reign *Kurdistan* started its publication. Then, the section presents a brief account of the journal's ownership patter followed by short biographies of its editors, M. M. Bedir Khan and Abdurrahman Bedir Khan Brothers, and their politics along with the social, political and economic conditions of their journalistic activities. The section concludes with statistical information on the journal *Kurdistan* and challenges pertaining to the production,

distribution and consumption processes of that journal. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to six semantic macro-areas for content analysis of the journal *Kurdistan*.

4.1.1. The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdulhamid II Administration

Muslim reaction to *Tanzimat* reforms organized itself in the form of the Young Ottoman movement in the 1860s. Young Ottomans were convinced that only a constitutional parliamentary rule could save the Empire from falling apart. The First Ottoman Constitutional Period (Birinci Meşrutiyet) started on 23 December 1876[98] when a group of leading members of the movement carried out a coup d'état, deposing Sultan Abdulaziz on 30 May 1876 and replacing him first with Sultan Murat V,[99] then with Sultan Abdulhamid II who accepted the Young Ottoman's condition to adopt the constitution that had been written by Midhad Paşa (Zürcher 2004a: 72-73). However, under the pretext of the rising nationalist movements across the Empire's territories, the 1877-78 Russo-Ottoman War, which ended with the defeat of the Ottomans,[100] and increasing influences of the European liberal currents, Sultan Abdulhamid suspended the constitution on 14 February 1878 and thereafter ruled the Empire as an absolute monarch (Zürcher 2004a: 76; Akşin: 2007: 41).[101] Seeing them as disruptive forces, the Sultan Abdulhamid was extremely against such ideas as liberalism, nationalism and

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[98] The constitution drafted by Midhat Paşa 'was based primarily on the Belgian constitution of 1831, but a number of its articles (or omissions) gave it a more authoritarian character and left the sultan important prerogatives, which he was later to use to the detriment of the constitutional government. The authoritarian traits of the constitution were modeled after the Prussian constitution of 1850' (Zürcher 2004a: 74).

[99] Due to his rapidly deteriorating mental state Sultan Murat V was replaced with Sultan Abdulhamid (Zürcher 2004a: 74).

[100] The political pressure from Austria and Britain on Russia led to Treaty of Berlin (1878), which resulted in the independence of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro and autonomous status for Bulgaria, in addition to places lost to Russia in Asia, including the port of Batum. What is more, Austria occupied Bosnia- Herzegovina while Britain occupied Cyprus as a compensation for their intervention (Zürcher 2004a: 80).

[101] Sultan Abdulhamid's tyrannical period lasted for 30 years until the promulgation of the Second Constitutional Period on 24 July 1908 (Zürcher 2004a: 76).

constitutionalism. This coupled with his growing fear of the Ottoman court politics and the events of 1876, i.e., the dethronement of Abdulaziz and Murat V, before his ascendancy to the throne, led him to the establishment of an extensive network of espionage and a reign of terror (cf. Zürcher 2004a: 80). Sultan Abdulhamid tried to counter the strong liberal and nationalist currents in the Empire by constructing a strong link between Islam and the Ottoman imperial identity that can be regarded as *Islamic Ottomanism,* a particular brand of *Pan-Islamism*, which replaced *secular Ottomanism* of the *Tanzimat* period.[102] In accordance with his Islamic Ottomanism policy, Sultan Abdulhamid, more than any previous Ottoman sultan, made an extensive use of his title as the Islamic Caliph to appeal to Muslim solidarity inside and outside the Empire's borders.[103] His government attempted to standardize Islamic belief, intermix state and religious institution, and associate loyalty to the state with loyalty to Islam, which had struck a chord in many Muslim communities of the Empire, including the Kurds (cf. Gelvin 2005: 136). Sultan's Pan-Islamist policy did in fact reflect the new reality on the ground now that the Empire was more Muslim both in terms of population and territory.[104] It is noteworthy that as this study will illustrate, Sultan's Pan-Islamist policy was perhaps one of the reasons as to why *Kurdistan* made an extensive use of religious intertextuality in its discourse in an attempt to counter Sultan's Islamist strategy in addition to its appeal to the religious Kurdish

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[102] As we saw, during the *Tanzimat* period the Ottoman state attempted to foster a notion of political community made up of equal citizens bound together by their commitment to a common set of legal norms. This form of Osmanlılık failed for a number of reasons as described earlier.

[103] Only Selim III had used the title of caliphate in a similar manner during the Russo-Ottoman war (cf. Gelvin 2005: 136)

[104] Two reasons –one theoretical and one practical- made the new interpretation of Ottomanism or Pan-Islamism feasible; first, the new interpretation would have been impossible had it not been for the intellectuals and political activists who had laid the foundation for it over the course of the nineteenth century; Sultan Abdulhamid revived the version of Ottomanism that had been developed by Young Ottomans as well as the ideas of Islamic modernists, such as Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi and Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani who asserted that Islam was not only a divine message but an expression of a culturally distinct civilization. Second, the steady retreat of the Ottoman Empire from Europe resulted in the changing religious composition of the empire; with the loss of territories and the migration of Muslims from Balkans and Russia into the Empire the proportion of Muslims to Christians within the empire increased decidedly (Jabar 2006: 289-292; Gelvin 2005; 134: Zürcher 2004a: 79).

constituency.

Furthermore, Abdulhamid continued to modernize the empire as a furtherance of some of Tanzimat reforms; for instance, he established a modern school system to provide the Empire's administration and the new institutions with necessary staff (Zürcher 3004a). Despite these efforts, the major weakness of the Hamidian administration remained to be its failure to instill loyalty in the new generations of bureaucrats, officers and the intelligentsia, which were produced by the Sultan's own educational institutions (Zürcher 2004a: 86). This new generation attracted by liberal ideas[105] and constitutionalism formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the first organized opposition group in the Military Medical School in 1889. It is noteworthy that ironically none of the founding members of the CUP was Turk; Ibrahim Temo was an Albanian, Abdullah Cevdet and Ishak Sukuti were Kurds and Mehmet Reşit was a Circassian (Hanioğlu 1995: 76; Zürcher 2004a: 86). Influenced by the Comptian positivism, the CUP saw order and progress as two means of reshaping the Ottoman society scientifically to ensure the Empires wellbeing (Seton-Watson 1918: 135-136). The term 'union' in CUP's name referred to the unity of the ethnic and religious elements of the empire, similar to the Young Ottoman notion of *Ittihad-ı Anasır* (or Unity of the Elements). Soon after its establishment, the organization grew as numerous members from various ethnic and religious backgrounds, including Turks, Arabs, Kurds, Albanians and Armenians, among others joined the ranks of the CUP in a bid to bring an end to the Sultan's absolute monarchy and reinstate the constitution. Thus CUP promoted a form of *secular Ottomanism* -vis-à-vis Abdulhamid's *Islamist Ottomanism*- that embraced all ethno-religious identities

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[105] The word liberal here should be used with caution because 'their background as members of the administrative elite and their adherence to positivism, with its fundamentally undemocratic attitudes and deep-rooted mistrust of the masses, led them to see themselves as an enlightened élite on a mission to educate their people. In their eyes, the constitution was an instrument and an emblem of modernity, but not a goal per se… they had given scarcely any thought to what their political programme would be once the constitutional-parliamentary system was reinstated' (Zürcher 2010: 214-15).

under the banner of Ottomanism.[106] Their seemingly liberal ideas of secular Ottomanism coupled with the socio-political realities of the period – in which secessionism seemed as an impossible option- provided the impetus for many ethnic groups to subscribe to the Ottomanist ideas and act accordingly because they saw the CUP movement as an opportunity to defend their own national individuality and advance their own respective nationalist agendas (Klein 1996: 17; Zeine 1966: 85-86). Sultan who strictly banned any discussion of political matters, especially issues related to liberalism, nationalism or constitutionalism, took sever measures in the face of the increasing opposition in open defiance of his administration (Zürcher 2004a: 78). His oppressive actions resulted in the arrest of some members of the CUP and the forced exile of others to such places as Paris,[107] Cairo, Geneva, Folkeston and Athens from where the CUP members attacked the sultan through pamphlets and periodicals. (Hanioğlu 1995: 78-84; Göçek 1996: 117; Tütengil 1969: 1; Celîl 2000: 14; Zeine 1966: 58). After a year-long preparations, the first CUP or the 'Young Turks Congress' too place in Paris, in 1902, in which all nationalities and confessional commuities of the empire including the Kurds were present. The Kurdish delegation included Hikmet Baban[108] (Malmîsanij 2009: 19) and Abdurrahman Bedir Khan.[109] It is important to note that although the Young Turks rationally supported Ottomanism, they were strongly attached to a romantic Pan-Turkish nationalism, which would be outwardly expressed in the 1910s (cf. Zürcher 2004a: 128).

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[106] Some members of the CUP such as Ahmed Riza, an uncompromising positivist, went much further as to reject religion altogether (Zürcher 2004a: 87).

[107] The groups called itself *Jeunes Turcs* (Young Turks) from 1895 onwards (Zürcher 2004a: 87).

[108] In 1920 Hikmet Baban joined the *'Teşkilat-i Içtimaiye Cemiyeti'* (The Society for Social Organization), which due to its secessionist nationalism had split from *Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti* (Society for the Rise of Kurdistan) (Silopî 2007: 59; Özoğlu 2004: 84).

[109] See, *Kurdistan*, No. 31, April 14, 1902, in Bozarslan, Vol. 2, pp. 568-573.

4.1.2. Kurdistan During Abdulhamid II Administration

The semi-autonomous Kurdish emirates disappeared in the mid-19th century as a result of the *Tanzimat*'s centralization policies. The last such powerful Kurdish emirate that posed threat to the Ottoman domination in Kurdistan was Botan Emirate under Bedir Khan Bey, the father of M. M. Bedir Khan and Abdurrahman Bedir Khan Brothers, who only paid lip service to the Sublime Port. Bedir Khan Bey along with his family was sent into exile after his uprising collapsed in 1847.

In the absence of the previous powerful tribal confederacies in the form of emirates, the Kurdish tribes remained fragmented and dispersed. The Ottoman state neither allowed for the emergence of another strong Kurdish principality nor did it replace the previous emirates with an effective central control. This power vacuum led to a period of anarchy in Kurdistan and paved the way to the shift in the balance of power in favour of tribal chiefs and religious leaders, who used their authority to mediate inter-tribal conflicts (Zürcher 2004a: 30). For instance, Sheikh Ubeydullah, the father of Sayyid Abdulkadir,[110] who organized the first major revolt against the Ottoman and Qajar Empires in 1880 after the fall of the Kurdish emirates, was the product of this new power structure (Burinessen 1992a: 250). After the defeat of Sheikh Ubeydullah Revolt, Sultan Abdulhamid, aware of the strategic importance of Kurdistan, introduced a new military organization composed of smaller and hence 'less-threatening' military units called the *Hamidiye Hafif Süvari Alaylari* (Hamidian Light Cavalries) under the command of Zeki Pasha, who was in conflict with the Bedir Khans (Bruinessen 1992a: 187). These cavalries composed of Kurdish tribes were meant to bring an end to the tribal unrest, incorporate the Kurdish tribes into the Ottoman system and in this way strengthen the Empire's peripheries against the Armenian and Russian aggressions (cf. Klein 2002; 2011; Bozarslan 2008; Özoğlu 2004).

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[110] Sayyid Abdulkadir, was the president of *Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (The Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress). See chapter 5 for his short biography.

4.1.3. The Proprietors of *Kurdistan*: Ownership patterns and the Control of Media

The *economic* and *political* conditions of the media are two important dimension of the socio-political contexts in which the media operates. (Fairclough 1995b: Sheyholislami 2011). Given their profound effect, these two dimensions should be considered in the analysis of media discourse to find out who has access to mass communication; in what type of political regime the media operates; what type of affiliations the media owners have in relation to the state and the lay audience; what kind of relation the media tries to create between themselves the state and the audience; what motivates media to participate in this process; and more importantly, whose interests are being served? Does the discourse of a medium reproduce the existing power structure or does it challenge it? Does it constitute a substantive egalitarianism or does it primarily have a legitimizing role in respect to the existing power relations? (cf. Fairclough 1995b: 126). Media ownership is an crucial aspect of sociocultural level because the view, concerns and circumstance of the owner of the medium play a significant role in the discursive practices of media which ensured that particular political views become dominant in line with the interests of the owners and at the expense of other views. Similarly, the analysis of the journalistic discourse of *Kurdistan* should include not only the social and political conditions in which it was formed but also the analysis of the circumstances of individuals or groups involved along with their politics that shaped or reshaped that discourse.

In the new Ottoman political setting loyalty to his person became the overriding concern of Sultan Abdulhamid that led to a network of patronage system; the Sultan tried to win over Kurdish tribal leaders, and the former princely families of Kurdistan, such as the Bedir Khans, through expensive gifts, medals of honour and prestigious administrative and military posts to integrate them into the Ottoman bureaucracy (Klein 2007: 141; Olson 1989: 7-8; Gelvin: 2005: 54-55; Zürcher 2004a: 80; Özoğlu 2001: 384). Moreover he established boarding schools known as *Aşiret Mektebleri* (or Tribal Schools) in 1892 where the sons of leading Kurdish, Albanian and Arab tribal notables were educated. These

schools were meant to foster an allegiance to the Ottoman state and integrate these students into the Imperial centre through administrative positions and civil services (Olson 1989: 7-8; Klein 2011; Celîl 2000; Logan 1996; Uçarlar 2009). As members of Ottoman high bureaucracy the wellbeing of the Kurdish elite, including that of the sons of Bedir Khan Bey, depended on that of the Ottoman state. As a matter of fact many Bedir Khans 'bore the title of 'paşa' and served as public prosecutors, local administrators (outside Kurdistan), military officers, and judges. In other words, they were on the payroll of the Ottoman Empire' (Özoğlu 2004: 122).

4.1.3.1. The Social Background of Miqdad Midhat Bedir Khan and Abdurrahman Bedir Khan Brothers

M. M. Bedir Khan, the founder and the first editor of the journal *Kurdistan,* was born in Crete in 1857. He was one of the sons of Bedir Khan Bey, the last prince of the Botan Emirate. By the time he graduated from 'Mektebi Sultani' (Galatasaray Lycée), he spoke Kurdish, Turkish, Arabic, French and Farsi. He assumed various positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy, including the position of executive assistant to the attorney general in Ankara, Izmir and İsparta and attorney general in Kırşehir (Malmîsanij 2000: 187-190).

Together with his older brother Emin Ali Bedir Khan he was involved in an unsuccessful revolt in 1889.[111] Due to his anti-government activities in the ensuing years, he fled to Cairo (1898),[112] a place that had become one of the

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[111] *See* Malmîsanij (2000: 187-188).

[112] According to one of Abdurrahman Bedir Khan's open letters to the Sultan, his brother M. M. Bedir Khan had to leave Istanbul for Cairo to receive medical treatment upon his doctor's referral. However, since the Sultan did not grant him permission, he had to leave Istanbul secretly without imperial permission (*Kurdistan*, October 11, 1898, No. 6., reprinted in Bozarslan (1991) Vol. 1, p. 174-176). However, it seems more likely that Abdurrahman Bedir Khan tried to conceal the real reason for M. M. Bedir Khan's unauthorized stay in Cairo with the pretext of health problems. Hassanpour's (1992: 221) account also confirms the second possibility as he states that M. M. Bedir Khan escaped to Cairo for the sole reason to publish *Kurdistan*, because he could not publish it in Istanbul due to Sultan's oppressive policies. Celîl (2000: 20-21), relying on Russian Foreign Policy archives, states that upon Sultan's order the members of the Bedir Khan family were arrested in 1898 on the ground that the Bedir Khan family had called upon Kurds, in a letter,

safe heavens for many dissidents where the Sultan's power was less effective or non-existent (Hassanpour 1992: 221; Zürcher 2004a: 9; Van Bruinessen 2000a: 5).[113] While in Cairo, M. M. Bedir Khan started the journal *Kurdistan* on 22 April 1889 and published the first five issues there before he returned to Istanbul as a result of the pressure and extortions by the Abdulhamid's administration.[114] Upon his arrival in Istanbul the Hamidian regime appointed him as Sultan's second town clerk to keep a close eye on him. In 1906, M. M. Bedir Khan along with Abdurrahman and a number of his family members was sent into exile to Mecca after the assassination of Rıdvan Paşa, the mayor of Istanbul (Malmîsanij 2000 188; Özoğlu 2004: 95). M. M. Bedir Khan, like other dissident figures, returned to Istanbul after the July revolution of 1908. He became one of the founding members of *Kurd Neşr-î Maarif Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Society for the Diffusion of Education) in Istanbul (Malmîsanij 1999: 37; Jwaideh 2006: 298; Klein 1996: 27-29; Olson 1989: 115). Togheter with his brother Emin Ali, he participated in the Ottoman political system and supported *Hürriyet ve Itilâf Fırkası* (Freedomand Accord Party) (Özoğlu 2004: Malmîsanij 2000; Dersimi 1992). During the short-lived government of *Hürriyet ve Itilâf Fırkası* he was appointed as the governor of Dersim however it is not clear whether he actually

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to rise against Sultan's regime. In any case, as a consequence of Sultan Abdulhamid's repressive policies not only the Kurds but all anti-Hamidian opposition was driven either underground or abroad. Especially after the occupation of Egypt by Great Brittan, in 1882, Cairo became one of the destinations for many opponents of Abdulhamid II as many dissidents, constitutionalists and nationalists fled to Cairo and Alexandria in search of a more favourable environment for their political activities (Zeine 1966: 58; Gelvin 2005: 144, 203). Similarly, during the early stages of Arab nationalism, a number of nationally oriented Christian intellectuals moved from Beirut to Cairo to establish Arab journalism in which they criticized Sultan Abdulhamid's absolutism and promote the revival of Arab culture (Firro 2009: 29).

[113] Relying on G.R. Driver's account, Jwaideh (2006: 128) asserts that *Kurdistan* was published with British approval and support however he fails to present any conclusive evidence for such claim.

[114] *See*, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan's open letter to the Sultan entitled 'This is My Humble Petition to the Majestic and Magnificent, His Excellence Sultan Abdulhamid Khan the Second' [Sevketlu Azametlu Sultan Abdulhamid Han-i Sanî Hazretlerine Arzihal-i Abidanemdir] (*Kurdistan*, No. 6, October 11, 1898, in Bozarslan, vol. 1., p. 173-191). The letter goes to great length to explain how the Sultan's advisors are trying to punish the brothers of the editor of *Kurdistan* to intimidate and discourage the editor from publishing *Kurdistan*. As a matter of fact, the editor's brothers, including Emin Ali Bedir Khan, were harassed, beaten up or arrested.

assumed this position (Malmîsanij 2000; Dersimi 1992). M. M. Bedir Khan was also a member of the *Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti* (Society for the Rise of Kurdistan) established in 1918 (Özoğlu 2004: 103).

Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, the second editor of *Kurdistan* and the brother of M. M. Bedir Khan, was born in 1868. Like his brother, he was also admitted to Galatasaray Lycée in 1877. After studying political science he assumed the prestigious position of the Chief Secretary to High Schools Administration until 1898.[115] The same year he left for Geneva both to partake in the CUP's anti-Hamidian activities and to take over the journal *Kurdistan*. As the new editor of *Kurdistan*, he moved the journal from Cairo first to Geneva then to other places in Europe (Malmîsanij 2009: 13).

Abdurrahman Bedir Khan was in close contact with Dr. Abdullah Cevdet and Ishak Sukuti, two Kurdish founding members of the CUP (Jwaideh 1960: 290-301; Hanioğlu 1966: 41, 1995: 351, n. 251; Malmîsanij 2009: 119-120, 1986: 15; McDowall 2004: 90). Interestingly, in an article published by the Armenian journal *Nor Dar* (1900), Abdurrahman Bedir Khan is introduced as 'an active Young Turk leader' (cited in Celîl 2000: 45).[116] In his writings, he frequently referred to the CUP as 'our society'.[117] As stated above together with Hikmet Baban, he attended the first CUP Congress in 1902 as the Kurdish delegate. Abdurrahman Bedir Khan penned two articles –one in Turkish and one in Kurdish- about this congress and published them in his journal *Kurdistan*.[118] It is noteworthy that Abdurrahman Bedir Khan was closer to the Prince Sabahattin fraction of the CUP, which advocated *'ademi merkeziyetçilik'* or political decentralization, instead of the more Turkish nationalist and centralist fraction led by Ahmed Rıza

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[115] As we will see later many Kurdish intellectuals and notables occupied prestigious senior position in the Ottoman state machinery.

[116] *See* also Malmîsanij (2009) for Abdurrahman's activities as a CUP member.

[117] For instance, *see*, *Kurdistan*, No. 22, February 2, 1900, in Bozarslan, Vol. 2., p. 388.

[118] *See*, *Kurdistan*, No. 31, April 14, 1902, in Bozarslan, Vol. 2., p. 568-573.

(Celîl 2000: 30). *Kurdistan* did not represent or promote the views of any nationalist Kurdish political organization as it came into being as a result of the endeavour of the Bedir Khan Brothers.[119]

So far as the nationalism of the Bedir Khan Brothers is concerned, as briefly explained earlier, seeing nationalism as an interest-serving response to the conditions of modernity (Gellner 1994; 1997; Rogowski 1985), the Kurdish elite, through the Bedir Khans, was quick to react to the opportunities presented by this ideology (cf. Halliday 2006: 18; Brass 1979: 40; Breuilly 1996a: 139, 1993: 2). More specifically, as the present study demonstrate in the subsequent sections of this chapter, the Bedir Khan Brothers saw the idea of nationalism as an ideal concept and a project to recover and possibly expand the traditional power of their princely family once enjoyed before the destruction of their Kurdish emirate by the Ottoman state (Silopî 2007: 28; Klein 1996: 8-9, 2007: 148; Özoğlu 2001: 1).[120] To this end they adopted nationalism as an argument for regaining their former political power. After all, as Breuilly (1996a: 138) puts it, politics as power is what nationalism really about even though the nationalist narratives attempt to justify and legitimize the nationalist cause through the presentation of the political expression of the nation. Then nationalism, as an ideology that had a near-universal acceptance, is a tool through which the sub-elites, attempt to mobilize people and channel their energies to legitimate, regain or seize political power (cf. Smith 2003: 56). Put it differently, in the age of nationalism the quest for political power was concomitant with the rise of the notion of nationalism, a purely political movement pursuing or exercising state

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[119] In the 1st issue of the third *Kurdistan* (1919), Sureyya Bedir Khan states that the first *Kurdistan* was established as the official organ of a secret Kurdish society (in Malmîsanij 2009: 116) without specifying the name of that organization. However, as Celîl (2000: 25) confirms, *Kurdistan* did not have any affiliation with any Kurdish political party. For that matter, the *Kurdistan Azmi Kavi Cemiyeti*, which is said to be the first Kurdish political organization (Silopî 2007: 31), was founded in 1900, two years after *Kurdistan* started publishing (see also Bozarslan's introduction to the journal *Jîn*).

[120] The same is true of the Ottoman-Arab notables, who previously enjoyed a privileged position. A number of studies on the political power of the Arab notables have found that the loss of their privileged positions in the Ottoman state was a major motivation for the emergence of Arab nationalism in such places as Syria (Khoury, 1983: 96).

power and justifying this power with nationalist argument (cf. Breuelly 1993: 2). In this context, ideology is secondary to politics as political relations, power and aspirations determine the goals of nationalism (Breuilly 1996a). For instance, the process that led to the formation of Germany in 1871 had more to do with power politics than culture and Romanticism (*ibid*.) although this does not mean that the pioneers of nationalist movements were not genuine nationalist.

Similarly, the Bedir Khan Brothers' personal and familial concerns do not mean that they were not genuine nationalist or they did not sincerely believe in the national rights of the Kurds. On the contrary, they did have a strong sense of nationhood as they started to develop nationalist feelings at an early age under the tutelage of Haji Qadir Koyi, the second proponent of Kurdish nationalism after Khani as Hassanpour (1992: 57) puts it.[121] In any case, culture cannot be severed from politics (Smith 1993: 76). Therefore, in their quest for political power, the Bedir Khan Brothers usually implicitly but sometimes overtly presented themselves as the natural and historical leaders of the Kurds in the nationalist discourse of their journal *Kurdistan*. Their political relations determined what Kurdishness was and what it was not, 'they decided what their society's problems were, they proposed solutions and they announced that they were qualified to do the job' (Klein 1966: vii.). [122]

4.1.4. Challenges Pertaining to the Production, Distribution and Consumption Processes

As stated above, the Bedir Khan Brothers were in close contact with the key members of the CUP that supported their journal from the very beginning, but

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[121] It is believed that Koyi was employed by the Bedir Khan family to tutor their children (Bruinessen 2003: 48, 51). The fact that M. M. Bedir Khan had in his possession a manuscript of Khani with Koyi's handwriting in the back indicates that Koyi was indeed in close contact with the family in one way or antoher. See also Kurdo (2010) and Özoğlu (2004).

[122] Sheyholislami (2011: 46) analysing the discourse of Kurdish satellite TV channels in Iraqi Kurdistan, found that, 'in Kurdistan-Iraq, it is clear that only those organizations that have political power and also economic means have access to satellite television. They are the ones that set the agenda in Kurdistan for example regarding what Kurdishness is and what a Kurdish identity is believed to be or should be.'

especially after the journal *Kurdistan* was forced to move to Europe under the editorship of Abdurrahman Bedir Khan. A prove of such close relations is that *Kurdistan* was mostly printed at CUP affiliated printing houses in European cities where the CUP centres were also based (*See* Table 2).[123]

Issue Number	Year	Printing House	Place
1-3	1898	Al-Hilal	Cairo
4-5	1898	Kurdistan Gazetesi	Cairo
16-19	1898-1899	The Society for the Union and Wellbeing of Muslims[124]	Geneva
20-21	1899-1900	Not Specified	Cairo
22-23	1900	Hindiye	Cairo
24	1900	Not Specified[125]	London
25-27	1900-1901	Not Specified	Folkestone
28-31	1901-1902	Vengeance[126]	Geneva

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[123] For instance, such Ottoman journals as *Osmanlı, Selamet* and *Dolab were printed in Folkestone* around the same time as the publication of *Kurdistan* in the same city. Moreover, both Tütengil (1969: 87-93) and Hanioğlu (1995: 117, 170) claim that Abdurrahman Bedir Khan printed *Kurdistan* at Young Ottomans' printing houses where the journal *Osmanlı* [Ottoman], the publication organ of the CUP was printed.

[124] According to Malmîsanij (1986: 16) this was a CUP printing house. He asserts that Abdurrahman Bedir Khan translated *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin Matbaası* (The Printing House of the Committee of Union and Progress) into Kurdish as *Metbea Cem'îyeta Tefaq û Qencîya Musulmana* (The Printing House of the Society for the Union and Wellbeing of Muslims), which probably is true because Abdurrahman Bedir Khan printed the 6th-19th issues of *Kurdistan* at a printing house that belonged to the CUP, a point also confirmed by Tütengil (1969: 92).

[125] In an announcement on the cover page of the journal the editor states that he had to move the journal form Geneva to London. However, he does not specify where the journal was printed.

Table 2*. Publication dates and places of Kurdistan*

As *Table 2* illustrates the editor of *Kurdistan* had to constantly relocate the journal between multiple cities in Europe and Egypt. Although according to an article published in the 49th issue of *Osmanlı,* one of the CUP journals, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan moved the journal *Kurdistan* back to Cairo because he could not bear Geneva's harsh winter (Tütengil 1969: 92; Malmîsanij 2009: 120-121), it seems that issues related to Abdurrahman Bedir Khans economic problems, but particularly the Sultan's pressure on European countries to oppress the CUP and the other opposition activities played the central role in the constant relocation of the journal *Kurdistan* (Bozarslan 1991: Introduction to *Kurdistan*, Vol. 1: 13; Malmîsanij 2009: 121). For instance, while the spies of Sultan Abdulhamid intimidated the members of the CUP movement in Europe by chasing them, the Ottoman ambassadors to the European countries, where the members of the movement including Abdurrahman Bedir Khan operated, filed complaints in European courts against the CUP members to deter them or to have them handed over to the Hamidian regime. Moreover, as it was reported in the 55th issue of the journal *Osmanlı*, Sultan Abdulhamid's spies and Ottoman state ambassadors put pressure on the owners of the printing houses in Europe to get them deny contracts with the dissident Ottoman journals (cited in Tütengil 1969: 111). Consequently, since *Kurdistan* was mostly depended on the CUP printing houses, when the CUP centres or printing houses had to move so did *Kurdistan*.[127]

Moreover, the newspaper *Kurdistan* was meant to be published fortnightly; for instance on the cover pages of the issues 1st-23rd it was indicated that the paper

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[126] Or the '*İntikam Printing House'* which probably belonged to the *İntikamcı Yeni Osmanlılar Cemiyeti (The Committee for Avenging Young Ottomans*) an offshoot of the CUP established by Ali Fahri who was a key figure in the Egypt branch of the CUP. For more details *see* Hanioğlu (1995: 159-160).

[127] The technical problems faced by the CUP printing presses affected the publication of *Kurdistan* too. According to an article published in *Osmanlı* the long delay in the publication of the upcoming issue of *Kurdistan* was due to a technical problem at their printing house (cited in Malmisanij 2009: 121).

was 'a Kurdish Biweekly Journal' [15 günde bir neşolunur Kürdçe gazetedir]. Then, in the subsequent issues this notice is changed to 'Monthly Kurdish Newspaper' [Ayda bir neşrolunur Kürdçe gazetedir].[128] Still, due to the relocation issues and the fact that Abdurrahman Bedir Khan had to shoulder the whole burden of newspaper publishing,[129] *Kurdistan* could not appear with regularity after the 5th issue; it sometimes came out once a month or could not be published for as long as 4 or 5 months.

Although there is no statistical data on *Kurdistan*'s overall circulation, we know that the editors sent at least 2000 copies to Kurdistan as indicated on the folio section of the journal. It is also noteworthy that although the Ottoman state issued the law of 'Press Regulations' as early as 1864, the state imposed censorship was strictly enforced only under the Hamidian regime (Lewis 1968: 187-188). Therefore, *Kurdistan*, like the publications of the Young Turks, was circulated in the Empire clandestinely through Syria (Celîl 2000: 26). Moreover, *Kurdistan* and most of the CUP journals were small enough to fit into envelopes and in this way they were distributed through the Ottoman postal system (Mardin 2006: 106).[130] Still Sultan Abdulhamid paid particular attention to the journal *Kurdistan* and its circulation (Hanioğlu 1996: 211). For instance, on March 30th 1898, the Ministry of Interior enacted a government order banning the circulation of *Kurdistan* in the Ottoman territory even before the second issue of the paper came out. Moreover according to correspondences between the Ottoman officials, Kurds returning from pilgrimage to Mecca were subject to thorough search on their way back for they were suspected of smuggling in the copies of *Kurdistan* (Malmîsanij 2009: 128-130).

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[128] In issues 25th-31st this phrase changed to *'Monthly* [published] *Kurdish and Turkish Newspaper'* [Ayda bir neşrolunur Kurdçe ve Turkçe gazetedir].

[129] The same is true in the case of the first Turko-Ottoman journals published in exile. The editor Ali Suavi, for instance, had to tend to every task involved in newspaper publication including writing all the articles for the first Turko-Ottoman journal *Muhbir* that was published in London, in 1867 (Tütengil 1969: 56).

[130] The Ottoman state had around 1,700 postal stations (Mardin 2006: 106).

It should be noted that not only the publishers but also the readers were persecuted by the Ottoman state. A reader's letter from Diyarbekir reported the following:

> The newspaper *Kurdistan* is being circulated in our country for the last two-three months. However, government officials do not let us read it freely; they take it away from us, and when they find it in someone's possession they torture and imprison the person. (*Kurdistan*, April 2, 1899, No. 13, p. 3, reprinted in Bozarslan (1991) Vol. 1: 275).

In addition to the state restrictions, Kurdish journalism, from its inception, suffered from limited professionalism and specialization, as mentioned in the previous chapter. This is because newspaper publication was performed not by professional journalists but by Kurdish political activists who became part-time journal publishers. For instance, *Kurdistan* was the initiatives of the Bedir Khan brothers who without any assistance had to shoulder the duties involved in journal publication such as editorial responsibilities, corresponding, reporting, text writing, typesetting, printing, distribution and so forth. Therefore, Kurdish newspapers lacked many typical characteristics of professional newspapers publishing[131] due to the lack of the expertise, professionalism and financial constraints.

Still the greatest obstacle to the dissemination of the the journal *Kurdistan* was the high rate of illiteracy among Kurds, as the literacy rate in Kurdistan did not exceed %10 (Klein 1996: 124), although this restricted social base of literacy was alleviated through the reading circules in coffee houses, medreses (mosque schools) and guest-houses (diwanxane). These public places acted as the agents of the dissemination of nationalism, where newspapers were read out-

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[131] For instance, the partition of a typical newspaper into multiple sections such as domestic/national, international, finance, editorial, and so forth lacked in Kurdish journals. What is more, most of the texts -including some hard-news items- were in editorial format in which issues or happenings were not *reported* but *presented* from a particular perspective. What is more, in Europe printing press was a self-sustaining or even a lucrative business. By contrast, Kurdish journalism has its origins in the dynamics of Kurdish nationalistic activities and financially depended on individuals (Hassanpour 1996: 56).

loud to those present. The images such as picture published in the journals as well as the word of mouth were also effective in disseminating the journals' discourse (cf. Hassanpour 1992: 77-81, 1996: 51, 67; Klein 1996: 122-126; Karababa & Ger 2011). Consider the following reader's letter sent from Adana:

> I was astonished when I read this newspaper. I could not put it down. I called Kurds [Kurd û Kurmanca] and read it to them. They were delighted so much that they were speechless. In a few days they collected and handed to me enough money to buy twenty issues (*Kurdistan*, No. 5, 17 June 1898). [132]

The above-mentioned challenges, among others, prevented the journal from reaching a larger readership to create the effect of the Andersonian print-capitalism (Anderson 2006) or lead to the Habermas' (1989) concept of wide-ranging 'public sphere' that would facilitate the spread of ideas, such as nation and nationalism among broad segments of the Kurdish community. An in-depth analysis related to the distribution and consumption issues will follow.

4.2. THE DISCURSIVE PRACTICES AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE JOURNAL *KURDISTAN*

This section concerns the content and close textual analysis of *Kurdistan* in terms of its themes, discourse structures and lexico-grammatical features in the framework of the following overlapping semantic macro-areas: the discursive construction of common political present and future; the discursive construction of common language; the discursive construction of common history and common political past; the discursive construction of common culture; discursive

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[132] 'Wekî ew cerîde min xwend, ez derheqa dua û medhê te heyirî mam. Ez ji xwendina wê têr nebîm. Min gazî Kurd û Kurmanca kir, ji wan re xwend. Ew jî gelek şa bîn, belkî ji şabînê lal bîn. Li navbêna du-sê roja de heqê bîst cerîdeya dan hev û ji mi re anîn' (Seyid Tahirê Botî, *Ji bo Cerîdeya Kurdistanê* [To *Kurdistan* Newspaper], *Kurdistan*, No. 5, June 17, 1898 in Bozarslan (1991), Vol 1. p. 162).

construction of national body; and the discursive construction of identities and relations between the Kurdish elite and the commoners.

4.2.1. The Discursive Construction of Common Political Present and Future

This semantic macro-area explores such themes as the contemporary socio-political problems and their implications for the future political achievements, crises and dangers, future political objectives and so forth (cf. Wodak *et al*. 1999: 31). Some of the essential issues and problems identified by *Kurdistan* included the imminent 'foreign' threats on Ottoman Kurdistan, the idea of the *Ummahism* and *Ottomanism* among Kurds; the lack of unity and the inter-tribal rivalries, the lack of education, modernization and industrialization among Kurds; deteriorating relations with the Armenians, and so forth. Although *Kurdistan* problematized various other issues that were not exclusively Kurdish concerns but those of all Muslims and the Ottoman state, the journal distinguished itself by dealing with these issues from a nationally oriented Kurdish perspective (Klein 1996: 23). In this way, the editors of *Kurdistan*, seeing themselves as the custodians of Kurds, took upon themselves the responsibility to determine what constituted social, cultural or political problems by making references to the common worries, possible solutions and their implication for the future of the Kurdish community. Hence analysis at this level is the most revealing insofar as the politics of *Kurdistan* regarding the journal's assessment of the political situation and the course of action it envisaged for the present and future of the Kurds. Moreover, this section attempts to uncover the type of Kurdish national identity constructed by *Kurdistan* in connection with the strong notions of Ottomanism but particularly Ummahism.

It is important to emphasize at the outset that under the impetus of fast-changing social and political realities of the period the discursive practices of *Kurdistan* pertaining to the political present and future of the Kurds remained ambiguous for the most part as the politics of *Kurdistan* oscillated between *Ummahism* under the banner of the Ottoman Turks, on the one hand, and a secessionist Kurdish nationalism, on the other. That is, in an essentially pragmatic manner, *Kurdistan*

adopted different ideological characters and course of action corresponding to different sociocultural and political contexts.[133]

Given the hegemonic dominance of religion during this historical period, one such ideological character was the journal's intense use of religious allusion for novel needs.[134] In that almost everything *Kurdistan* stood for was justified through an Islamic religious intertextuality either by citing a relevant hadith or a Qur'anic verse as a part of the journal's *strategy of persuasion and manipulation* (cf. van Dijk 2002b: 302). In this context, education was presented as a religious virtue because hadiths and the Qur'anic verses said so; literacy was necessary for being able to say one's prayers; internal disputes were 'evil' because all Muslims were brothers; progress in science and technology was good because in this way Kurds could serve not only their own community but also the Islamic ummah in a better capacity and so forth.

In one article Abdurrahman Bedir Khan wrote:

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[133] It is important to note that *Kurdistan*, especially under the editorship of M. M. Bedir Khan, refrained from criticizing or opposing the Sultan directly. On the contrary, the editors usually tried to ally themselves with Sultan Abdulhamid II despite the fact that they acted with the CUP. In most of the open letters to the Sultan the editors of *Kurdistan* often praised and even defended Abdulhamid against criticisms and pinned the blame for administrative misconducts on Ottoman statesmen and officials. M. M. Bedir Khan went to the extent to suggest that he could change the content of his journal in accordance with Sultan's wish if the state removed the restrictions on the distribution of his journal in Kurdistan. This is expressed in the following two excerpts from the 4th and 5th issues.

'…esasen munderecatında muzır bir şey olmadığı gibi, tamamen hukumet-i seniyyenin tensib ve arzusuna tevfiki dahi mumkin olduğundan…' […in fact as there is nothing harmful in its content, it is possible to make its content more compatible with the noble government's views and desire…] (M. M. Bedir Khan 'Open Letter 'No.1. *Kurdistan* No. 4, June 3, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 147).

'…salifularz bir numrolu arzıhal-i abîdanemde arzolunduğu veçhile, gazetemi, hukumet-i seniyyenin tensib buyuracağı surette çıkarmak dahi mumkin olduğundan…'[… as was stated in my first humble petition submitted previously, since it is possible to publish my newspaper in a manner that your noble government would see fit…] (*Kurdistan* No. 5, June 17, 1898).

It is important to note that the paper adopts a more radical position later on under the editorship of Abdurrahman Bedir Khan.

[134] This does not mean that the pioneers of Kurdish nationalism were no genuine Muslims but rather they utilized religion as an instrument in the promotion of Kurdish nationalism and the modern needs of the Kurds.

O ulema of Kurds!... I feel sorry [that] I have come across Kurds [who] cannot even recite the verses of the Qur'an to say their prayers; this is a sin [guneh] for all of us (*Kurdistan*, No. 7, 5 November 1898).[135]

In this dense and 'manifest religious intertextuality', although the editor's major concern is the lack of literacy among Kurds, he painstakingly draws his audience's attention to the fact that they cannot even practice their religion without literacy, lack of which is significantly presented as a *sin* [guneh].[136] Whereas, in reality, one does not need schooling or even literacy to learn the Qur'anic verses to say their prayers as many illiterate Muslims just memorize them.

Similarly, M. M. Bedir Khan wrote:

O ulema and mîr and aghas of Kurds! [...] for God's sake [ji xêra Xwedê], take action, educate Kurds, teach your children sciences, literature, and arts. Muslim people should be educated, they should learn their religion [...] From now on, I expect from the ulama of Kurds to read this newspaper of mine to the mîrs and aghas and Kurds [Kurmanc], and explain to them what Almighty God and His Excellency the Prophet, may peace be upon him, have commanded (*Kurdistan* No. 1, 22 April, 1898).[137]

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[135] 'Gelî ulemayên Kurda!... Heyfa min têt, ez rastê hin Kurmanca hatime, ayetên nimêjê nizanin; ew guneh stûyê me hemîya ye' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Al Mu'minun Ekhwatun'* [All Believers Are Brothers], *Kurdistan,* No. 7, November 5,1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1., p. 200).

[136] A genre or discourse might be embedded in a text covertly in the details; they might be present in the forms of obvious quotations or sometimes through a single word that belongs to a certain discourse. In this excerpt the discourse of religion is reinforced through the use of the word *'guneh'* (sin).

[137] Gelî ulema û mîr û axayên Kurda… un jî ji xêra Xwedê re dest hilînin, Kurdan bidin xwendin, zarûyên xwe bielimînin ilm û edebê, bielimin sin'eta. Mirovên Musulman divê xwenda bin, divê bielimin dînê xwe […] Edî ji ulemayên Kurda hêvî dikim, vê cerîdeya min ji mîr û axa û Kurmanca ra bixwînin derheqa elimandina ilmê de Xwedê teala û Hezretê Pêxember, eleyhîsselam, çi emir kirîye, ewî bikin aqilê wan de (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Untitled' Kurdistan* No. 1, April 22, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 116).

Here again education and literacy are constructed as essential parts of religion as the editor urges Muslim Kurds to educate themselves *merely* 'for the sake of God' and his Prophet to become good Muslims. Furthermore, notice how the editor transforms the voice of *Kurdistan* to the voice of the religion in that the voice of the journal and that of the religion are intermingled. Moreover, conveying his message through the voice of God and the Prophet is meant to aggrandize and glorify his own voice. Abdurrahman Bedir Khan reinforced this point in the 9th issue where he wrote:

> All the things that I am writing in this newspaper are the things that have been commanded by God and the Prophet. The thing that is commanded by God and practiced by the Prophet, with no doubt, is for your benefit […] [138]

Again, the editor attempts to transform the sacred and authoritative voice of religion to the voice of their journal as if God and the Prophet are speaking through their journal or as if the journal itself is the voice of God and the Prophet. This impression, in turn, is meant to transform the message of *Kurdistan* into an authoritative divine text.

The Kurdish-Armenian hostile relation was another realm in which the journal made an extensive use of religious intertextuality. In one article Abdurrahman Bedir Khan asserted:

> Instead of going to the help of the oppressed Armenians, you kill them. This is a very *sinful* situation [Ew hal gelek *guneh* e] and it is a great disgrace. God and the Prophet do not approve of this situation. Almighty God has commanded in His book: 'We îzzî we celalî îlkh [ilaakhirihi]', which means 'I swear on my greatness and glory that I will revenge those who see an oppressed person but do not help him' (*Kurdistan*, No. 11, 10

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[138] 'Tiştê ez vê cerîdeyê de dinivîsim, hemi tiştên we ne ku Xwedê û Pêxember emir kirine. Ya Xwedê emir kirî û Pêxember emel kirî, mueyyen ji we re xêr e' […]' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Welat-Weten* [Homeland], *Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 228).

February 1899).[139]

In this 'manifest intertextuality'[140] (Fairclough 1992: 104) the religious texts –a hadith and a Qur'anic verse- are overtly present in the form of the words of the Prophet and God. The editor labels the Kurdish antagonism towards Armenians as *sinful* acts to render a more convincing argument.

As stated above, although it does not mean that they were not genuinely religious, it is important to note that neither of the editors was particularly devout Muslims.[141] Therefore, it is fair to say that the editors' constant use of the religious intertextuality was a part of their *strategy of persuasion and manipulation* to supplement and back up their various arguments through the Holy Scripture and the Hadith. In any case, in an Islamic society, political leaders and intellectuals have generally found it wise to profess and sponsor religion regardless of the depth of their own belief and commitment in order to justify and legitimize their authority (Razi 1990; Akhmajian, et al. 1995). What is more, if the journal *Kurdistan* were isolated from its nationalist nature, its corpus would look

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[139] Şûna un biçin îmdada Ermenîyên mezlûm, un diçin wan dikujin. Ew hal gelek guneh e û gelek fehêt e; Xwedê û Pêxember ji vî halî ne razî ne. Xwedê teala kitaba xwe de ferman kirîye: 'We îzzî we celalî îlx (ilaaxirihi).' Yanî 'ez bi îzzet û celala xwe qesem dikim ku, ewê mezlûmekî bibîne û neçe îmdada wî, ez ê heyfa xwe jê bistînim' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan*, No. 11, February 10, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1. p. 248).

[140] In analysing texts' intertextual relation, Fairclough (1992: 104;) distinguishes between two types of intertextuality: (i) manifest intertextuality, and (ii) constitutive intertextuality (cf. Sheyholislami 2000; Bazerman (2004). In the former, other texts are overtly present in the text through, for instance, citation marks. Whereas in the latter, other texts are so integrated into the text that no traces of them can be explicitly seen. I this sense, intertextuality is operative in each and every text regardless of how they might be interwoven. Similarly, explaining the interwoven character of texts, Eagleton (2003: 119) asserts, '[a]ll literary texts are woven out of other literary texts, not [merely] in the conventional sense that they bear the traces of 'influence' but in the more radical sense that every word, phrase or segment is a reworking of other writings which precede or surround the individual work'.

[141] For instance, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, a western-oriented intellectual similar to many other like-minded Ottomans, received a secular education in Istanbul and became an active member of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a positivist political movement. Furthermore, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan married Elisabeth-Eugénie van Muyden, a member of a Genevan aristocracy, who remained Christian even after their marriage. She converted to Islam in 1940 and changed her name to 'Emel' simply to be buried next to her husband (Malmîsanij 2009:105) as only Muslims are allowed to be buried in a Muslim cemetery.

like a collection of leaflets or a propaganda tool that promoted literacy and education for pure religious purposes. However, in intertextulity, 'it is not just a matter of which other texts you refer to, but how you use them, what you use them for, and ultimately how you position yourself as a writer to them to make your own statement' (Bazerman 2004: 94). Similarly, when *Kurdistan* made use of other texts, e.g. religious texts, the editors adopted a particular attitude in that they commented and evaluated the original text in a new contexts in the service of novel social, cultural and political ends: the progress of the Kurdish community as a nation in the age of nations (cf. Bazerman 2004: 90; Fariclough 1995b: 68, 114).

As far as the concept of Ottomanism is concerned, although the Ottomanist discourse of the Kurdish intellectuals found its true manifestation in the discourse of *KTTG*, as I argue in the following chapter, *Kurdistan* also blended the notion of Ottomanism into its discourse. For instance, one of the political issues of the day that was problematized more outstandingly by *Kurdistan* was the Russian threat on the eastern borders of the empire, i.e., Kurdistan. In the very first open letter to the Sultan,[142] M. M. Bedir Khan underscored the strategic location of Kurdistan as a vulnerable Ottoman territory in the east and urged the Sultan to improve the situation of Kurds so that they could defend the empire's eastern borders: [143]

> My Padishah,
>
> As your Excellency knows, Kurds are the most distinguished of all the people [akvam] that compose your Ottoman empire, which will live forever; and as Kurdistan is located on the borders of two neighbouring states, [Kurds] can prevent any attack on Anatolia and even have the ability to threaten the enemy from that direction; Although Kurds have occupied an important place in the [Ottoman] political realm and, for a long time, have been proud Ottomans, somehow the means and methods

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[142] *Kurdistan* published 6 open letters to the Sultan in the 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th and the 13th issues.

[143] The letters also warn the Sultan against Iran, though to a lesser extend.

that would enable Kurds to receive education and instructions had been neglected until you, the Padishah, ascended to the throne (*Kurdistan* No. 4, 3 June, 1898).[144]

It seems that although the Russian ambitions did in fact pose a threat to the Ottoman state's integrity, the primary objective of the letter is the consolidation and the empowerment of the Kurds by exploiting this real or putative threat.[145] Especially when read in connection with the entire corpus of the journal, the exploitation of the Russian threat as such becomes more evident given the fact that the construction of Russia as the 'other' was a discursive practice to convince the Sultan to improve Kurdistan and at the same time to persuade Muslim Kurds to improve themselves against such 'Christian threat'; after all the memories of the destructive Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 were still vivid in Kurdish minds.[146] In this context, it is also interesting to see that the subsequent

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[144] 'Padişahım, Malum-ı Şahaneleri buyurulduğu vech ile, Kürdler, devlet-i ebedmuddet-i Osmaniyelerini teşkil eden akvamın en guzîdelerinden ve Kurdistan dahi mevkian iki devlete hemhudud ve alelhusus Anadolu tarafından tecavuz-i a'dayı mani ve hatta o cihetten düşmanı tehdid edebilmek kabiliyetini haiz olduklarından, politika âleminde muhim bir mevki işgal ettikleri ve birçok zamandan beri Osmanlı tabiiyetiyle muftehir bulundukları halde, culûs-ı meyaminme'nûs-ı humayunlarına gelinceye kadar bunların talim ve tedrisleriyle esbab-ı terakkileri her nasılsa nazar-ı dikkate alınmamıştır.' (M. M. Bedir Khan Bedir Khan 'Open Letter No.1. *Kurdistan* No. 4, June 3, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 146).

[145] Since the 17th century the Ottoman Empire had been wary of the Russians and their intentions of Pan-Slavism in the Balkans, their search for access to the warm seas (the Mediterranian sea and the Indian Ocean) as well as their desire to have control over the Holy Land of Palestine. Bedir Khan brothers, aware of these concerns, reproduced this threat in the pages of *Kurdistan* to depict the Kurds as the only viable option to protect the eastern part of the empire from Russian agrassion and other threats. Abdurrahman Bedir Khan in another lengthy article explains the Russian intentions on Balkans and the Mediterranian, *see* (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Hamidian Cavalry Regiments'* [Hamidiye Suvari Alaylari] *Kurdistan* No. 28, September 14, 1901, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 503-509).

[146] Kurds had bitter memories of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, also known as '93 War' in Turkish. One of the bettlefields of this war was Northern (Turkish part of) Kurdistan where clashes caused destruction and great human losses (Akşin 2007: 41; Kendal 1980: 23). According to Kendal (1980: 23) the war led to the worst famine in centuries which was further aggravated when the Ottoman soldiers, whom the state could no longer pay, began terrorizing Kurds and pillaging their remaining resources. This eventually led to local revolts against the Ottoman state in such places as Dêrsim, Mardin, Hakkari and Bahdinan (*ibid*.). Abdurrahman Bedir Khan mentions the destructive results of this war in more details in the 28th issue of *Kurdistan*. Besides, the memories of the conflicts with Russia were vivid until recent times. On a personal note, I remember that when I was a kid, our mother, in order to convince us to get back home

Kurdish journals never expressed any particular concern about Russia even though Russia did remain as one of the major hostile states to the Ottoman Empire, particularly the Ottoman Kurdistan.

Moreover, it should not go unnoticed how M. M. Bedir Khan in his letter reassuringly presented Kurds as loyal Ottomans and Kurdistan as an extension of the Ottoman land in order to put the Sultan's mind at ease by leaving no room for any suspicions about Kurdish nationalist aspirations. In this particular representation of the Kurds and Kurdistan, the political present and future of the Kurds lie with those of the Ottoman state. M. M. Bedir Khan in a number of other articles tried to further consolidate his argument about the Ottoman identity of the Kurds and their loyalty to the state. For instance, appealing to the Sultan for the free circulation of the journal *Kurdistan*[147] he wrote:

> … if such journal [*Kurdistan*] existed ten years ago the *foreigners* [ecanibi] would not have been able to cause chaos in Kurdistan and it would have prevented the intervention and disturbance by the *foreigners*; it would have contributed to the achievement of a total progress and development (my emphasis) (*Kurdistan* No. 4, 3 June, 1898).[148]

Although the progress of Kurds is the central issue of this article, an important discourse practice in this extract is embedded in the noun *foreigner*s, which is meant to create or reinforce the assumption that Ottomans are *not foreigner*. On the contrary, this presupposition presents Ottoman identity as a part of the Kurdish-self.

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before dark, would tell us 'the Russian soldiers will come and get you' (Eskerên uris dê werin te bibin).

[147] The Hamidian regime had banned the circulation of *Kurdistan* in the Ottoman territories after the publication of its first issue (cf. Malmîsanij 2009: 128).

[148] '… eğer on sene mukaddem şu gazete gibi bir ceride mevcud olmuş olaydı, bunca mudahalât ve iz'acât-ı *ecanibi* mucib olan Kurdistan iğtişaşâtına meydan verilmemiş ve kulli bir terakki ve temeddün âsârı hasıl olmuş olurdu' (M. M. Bedir Khan 'Open Letter' No.1. *Kurdistan* No. 4, June 3, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 147).

Similarly, after warning the Kurds against possible attacks from Russia, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan explains the possible consequences of such attacks:

> Kurds will see that the land that has raised their children with love falling into the hands of *foreigners* [biyanî]' (my emphasis), (*Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16, 1898).[149]

Here too the Russians are clearly and explicitely portrayed as *foreigner*, while instinctively the Ottoman domination in Kurdistan is established as a non-foreign rule. The assumption that suggests that Ottomanism is a part of the Kurdish-self demonstrates the power of presuppositions in that what is not explicitly said but implied might be more effective than what is actually said.

A similar Ottomanist and pro-Sultan tendency is evident in the journal's treatment of the hostilities between the Armenians and Kurds. After presenting this conflict as an internal matter between the two Ottoman communities. M.M. Bedir Khan argued that

> For the last two-three years Armenians and Kurds have been entangled in quarrels. This is not a good situation. The state dose not approve of that (*Kurdistan* No. 3, 20 May, 1898).[150]

Here the author's conformism goes to such extent to claim that the state does not approve of the killings of the Armenians by Kurds. It does not seem possible that M.M. Bedir Khan, a well-educated and well-informed intellectual would sincerely believe in what he says above given the fact that the state was the actual perpetrator or the encourager of these hostile actions against the Armenians. After all, one of the major reasons behind the establishment of the *Hamidian Cavalries,* only nine years earlier, was the oppression of the Armenians (Klein

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[149] 'Kurd'ê bibînin ku ew axa zarûyên xwe hinde delalî mezin kirî, wê bikeve nav destê bîyanîya de' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Welat-Weten* [Homeland], *Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 227).

[150] 'Du-sê sal e Kurd û Ermenî têkilhev bîne. Ev halê ha ne qenc e. Dewlet ji vî halî ne razî ye' (M.M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan* No. 3, 20 May, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 134)

2011; Zürcher 2004a).[151] Then, here the author either assumed that the state's disapproval would be more convincing for the Kurds as not to target the Armenians or he just intended to curry favour with the Hamidian regime or both.[152] Still the significant aspect of this extract is that the journal recognizes and validates the Ottoman state as the legitimate political authority that should be obeyed by Kurds.

Nevertheless, despite this emphasis on *Ummahism* and the legitimacy of the Ottoman rule in Kurdistan, the journal never shied away from constructing Kurds and other Ottoman communities as distinct ethnic groups or nations, albeit within the Ottoman framework. Billig (1995: 83) asserts that 'nationalism inevitably involves a mixture of the particular and the universal: if 'our' nation is to be imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined as a nation amongst other nations.' In this sense, national identity takes on an inter-national context in that 'foreigners are not simply 'others', symbolizing the obvers of 'us': 'they' are also like 'us', part of the imagined universal code of nationhood' (ibid.).

In a similar fashion, *Kurdistan* portrayed, in a very subtle way, the non-Kurdish Ottoman communities, including the Turks, as *other* (nations). For instance M. M. Bedir Khan wrote:

> There are many nations [milet] that are not half as much as us; they all
> posses newspapers, books [and] schools. Kurds are stronger and more
> hardworking then other nations [qawm]; therefore the lack of book[s] and

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[151] Later on, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, M.M. Bedir Khan's brother, brings up the issue of the Hamidian Cavalries in the 28th issue and condemns the Ottoman government for encouraging the misconducts and unlawful acts of these cavalries (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Hamidian Cavalry Regiments'* [Alayên Siwarên Hemîdî] *Kurdistan* No. 28, 14 September, 1901, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 491.

[152] It is important to remember that the editor is not someone uninformed or naïve who does not know the true nature of Abdulhamid's manipulative policies. As a matter of fact, according to some sources, M. M. Bedir Khan, along with Emin Ali Bedir Khan, his older brother, organized an unsuccessful revolt against Abdulhamid, in 1889, ten years before the publication of *Kurdistan* (Malmîsanij 2000: 187-188). What is more, it is noteworthy that later on, *Kurdistan*, under the editorship of Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, would directly blame Sultan Abdulhamid in the harshest way for all the atrocities inflicted on the Armenians.

literacy bring shame on us (*Kurdistan* No. 4, 3 June, 1898).[153]

Here the editor presents the *others,* including various Ottoman communities, as *nations* in comparison with Kurds, which inevitably creates the assumption that Kurds *too* constitute a nation. Then, through the dichotomy of *us versus them* in the phrase *'all nations'* [hemî qewm] and *'us'* [me], all other nations are constructed outside of the realm of the Kurdish self as the non-Kurdish *others*. It is remarkable that M. M. Bedir Khan remains ambiguous in his construction of the *'others',* as he refrains from openly referring to any particular ethnic group as the *'other'*. However, M. M. Bedir Khan, in the continuation of his article clarifies this ambiguity through the clear and radical words of Ahmad Khani' (1650-1706) *Mem û Zîn (1695)*: [154]

> *Only if we had a unity*
> *If we obeyed each other*
>
> *The entire Turks, Arabs and Iranians*
> *They all would have become our servants*
>
> *We would have achieved perfection in religion and worldly affairs*

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[153] 'Gelek milet henin, ne nîvê me ne; hemî xweycerîde ne, xweykitêb in, xweymedrese ne. Kurd ji hemî qewman zêdetir xweyxîret û hîmmet in; loma bêkitêbî, bênivîsandin li ser me ar e, fêhêt e' (M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan* No. 4, June 3, 1898, reproduced in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 148).

[154] *Mem û Zîn* (Mem and Zîn) is a narrative poetic romance by Ahmad Khani who adopted it from *Memê Alan* (Mem of Alan), an orally composed and transmitted Kurdish folk ballad. The plot of the romance in *Mem û Zîn* revolves around the story of *Mem* and *Zîn*, who are in love with each other but whose union is prevented by Bekir, the villain. Although the epic is a classic love story, it is believed that the story is the allegory of the tragic fate of Kurds (Hassanpour 1992: 87; 2003: 123; M.M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan* No. 2, 6 May 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 126-127). Accordingly, *Mem* and *Zîn* represent the two parts of Kurdistan divided between the Safavid and the Ottoman Empire, while Bekir represents the discord and disunity among Kurdish rulers (Hassanpour 1992: 87; 2003: 123; O'Shea 2004: 146). Ahmad Khani's *Mem û Zîn*, as recognized by many scholars, is a clear expression of the pre-modern Kurdish ethnic awareness or even the first appearance of an embryonic national awareness among Kurds (Bruinessen 1997: Hassanpour 1992) if not an unequivocal national consciousness (Hassanpour 1992; 2003). Nationalist or not, Khani, in his epic, clearly promotes an unmistakable Kurdish patriotism and Kurdish ethinc consciousness (*ibid*.: 90).

We would have learned knowledge and wisdom[155]

Later on, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan also resorted to the same voice. First he raised the unjust treatment of the Kurds by the state officials and encouraged Kurds to appeal to the Sultan's authority through petitions:

> If the state officials did not listen to you… you should complain to the Sultan, write to the Sultan… The Sultan will remove them. If he did not, write to him again… Therefore stop waiting. Raise your voice; cry out, demand justice from the Sultan (*Kurdistan* No: 8, 1 December 1898)[156]

In these lines Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, from a seemingly Ottomanist perspective, urged the Kurds to appeal to the Sultan in the face of government official's unjust treatment an argument that contributed to the validation and legitimization of the Ottoman regime in Kurdistan. However, after the lines above the editor resorts, the way his borther had done, to the following verses of Khani as if he is pouring out his heart in Khani's verses:

If our fortune favoured us
If we could wake up from this sleep

If a protector could raise among us
That we could find a king
[…]
These Turks wouldn't dominate us
We would not fail at the hands of the owl

We would not be miserably oppressed
We would not be defeated and obedient to the Turks and Iranians[157]

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[155] 'Ger dê hebûwa me îttîfaqek / Vêkra bikira me inqiyadek // Rom û Ereb û Ecem temamî / Hemya ji me re dikir xulamî // Tekmîl dikir me dîn û dewlet / Tehsîl dikir me ilm û hîkmet' (M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan* No. 4, June 3, 1898, reproduced in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 148).

[156] 'Eger memûren hikûmetê guh nedan we… divê un nik Xunkar şikat bikin, ji Xunkar re binivîsin… Xunkar ê wan ezil bike. Heger nekir jê re disa binivîsin… Loma, bes bisekinin. Dengê xwe hilînin, hawar bikin, ji Xunkar edaletî bixwazin' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Untitled' Kurdistan* No. 8, December 1, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 209-210.

[157] 'bextê me ji bo me ra bibit yar / carek bibitin ji xwabê hişyar // rabit ji me jî cîhanpenahek /

Notice how the Bedir Khan Brothers are careful in their own writing as not to sound too radical or rebellious against the sacred authority of the state and the Sultan Caliph, the leader of the Muslim ummah and the *'Zil-Allah fil ard'* (shadow of God on earth). However, through an act of ventriloquism they remarkably allow the more radical words of a higher religious figure of authority, i.e., Khani, speak to the audience on their behalf. This radical voice, in stark contrast with the whole Ottomanist stand of the journal *Kurdistan*, communicates 'the actual' solution': that Kurds, who are under the 'yoke' of the Ottoman Turks, Arabs and Iranian, should overcome their internal enmities, unite and revolt under the leadership of a Kurdish king to establish a state of their own.[158] The voice of such a well-respected clergyman whose 'discourse on the Kurds was one of the state of politics and governance' (Hassanpour 2003: 129), was much needed for two reasons; First, the voice of a third party was instrumental for an indirect and subtle expression of such radical measures to overcome political problems face by Kurds because the Bedir Khan Brothers refrained from taking an open or radical position, at least in the early issues of *Kurdistan*; Second, the Bedir Khan brothers felt that they should supplement their tribal authority with a highly venerated religious voice to justify their argument. Hence they had to rely on Khani to legitimize their discourse in the eyes of Muslim Kurds, who were, to a certain extent, loyal to the Ottoman State and to the Sultan Caliph the leader and the protector of the Islamic ummah.[159] In addition, if such radical solution had directly come from the Bedir Khan Brothers, it might have alienated them from the Young Turks and the CUP, whom they needed for their publication activities.

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peyda bibitin me padîşahek […] xalib nedibû li ser me ev Rûm / nedibûne xirabeyê di dest bûm // mehkûmueleyhî-yû sealîk / mexlûb û mutîê Tirk û Tacîk' (in *Kurdistan* No. 8, December 1, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 217-219).

[158] See the discursive construction of common culture in this chapter for a detailed discussion about the 'nationalist' aspect of Khani's *Mem û Zîn*.

[159] Later on, for the same purpose M. Salih Bedir Khan would reproduce the same verses in one of his articles in *Rojî Kurd*.

4.2.1.1. Instances of A Discursive Shift from Sultanism/Ottomanism to full-fledged Kurdish Nationalism

In the later issues of *Kurdistan*, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan adopted a more radical political line by directly criticizing the Sultan himself and holding him responsible for the misconducts of the state officials, particularly in Kurdistan. Furthermore, he drew a clear line between the Kurds and Turks defying the Ottoman Turkish political dominion over the Kurds and Kurdistan. Correspondingly, the importance and objectives of education and modernization shifted from turning the Kurds into capable Muslims to the consolidation of the Kurdish national identity and the protection of the Kurdish homeland without any expectation from the state. Moreover, the editor kept problematizing the Russian threat but this time not as a part of his strategy to convince the state to empower the Kurdish component of Ottomanism against Russia but rather as a *strategy of delegitimization and discrediting* of the Sultan and the weakening Ottoman rule (cf. Wodak *et al*. 1999: 42). Evoking the fate of *Muslims* in Crete[160] at the hands of *Christian* Greeks, the editor asserts that the same situation will befall Kurds when Russia invades Kurdistan:[161]

> Then, O Kurds, you should come to your senses. Alas, if you are not cautious, if you do not wake up, this situation, before long, will befall you too… If Moscow sends its soldiers on you, the [Ottoman] state will not send its troops to your aid. The soldiers of Moscow outnumber you, you do not possess the cannons and rifles they do. Until you empty out one

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[160] After losing considerable territories during the late eighteen and the nineteenth centuries to the Russian Empire and the nationalist movements of the Balkans, i.e., Serbian and Greek, the Ottoman Empire, under the Hamidian regime, suffered yet another wave of territorial loss as a result of the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 which included the loss of Crete (Hanioğlu 1995: 64: Zürcher 2004b: 1). Furthermore, it should be noted that, in addition to *Kurdistan*, the CUP journals, for instance *Osmanlı Gazetesi* (Osmanlı Gazette), extensively criticized the Christians of Crete for allegedly oppressing Muslims. Not only that, these journals also harshly criticized Sultan Abdulhamid's failure to protect Muslims of Crete, (Oğuz 2007: 146-147).

[161] In support of his argument, in the 14th issue of *Kurdistan* the editor expressesed his concerns about the Italian intentions to annex Tripolitania. He concluded that the Sultan would once again abandon the Muslim subjects of Tripolitania to their fate.

rifle [magazine], Russian soldiers will empty out twenty.... I know Kurds are manlier[162] then Moscow. However, in the face of those cannons and rifles your manliness will not suffice (*Kurdistan* No. 7, 5 December, 1898).[163]

In this passage the editor kills two birds with one stone, so to speak; first, he condemns the Sultan's regime for being oblivious to the plight of his subjects (Kurds and other Ottoman communities, e.g. Muslims of Crete). Second, through the *strategy of negative-self presentation* he criticize the backward situation of the Kurds and encourages them to take the matters into their hands by educating and modernizing themselves in order to be able to confronted this imminent *Christian* threat on their own, without the assistance of the Ottoman state. IN this context, the most important implication of the passage is that the fate of Kurds no longer lies with that of the Ottomans, which invalidates one of the strongest ties between Kurds and the Ottoman Turks.

A similar discursive shift took place in the journal's treatment of the Armenian issue; the Sultan who was previously claimed to be against the killings of the Armenians was now the very entity responsible for such acts:

> you... are murdering innocent women and children of Armenians. The Prophet has said: 'Give the good news to the killer [that he too will be killed] [...] You obey Abdulhamid's orders [and] kill Armenians. Do you think Abdulhamid's order is greater than the Prophet's hadith [or] superior to the command of God? (*Kurdistan*, No. 27, 13 March 1901).[164]

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[162] *See,* Enloe (1990) for an evocative discussion on the close connection between masculinity and nationalism.

[163] 'De vêca Kurdno, aqilê xwe bînin serê xwe! Wah, heger we ha ji xwe nebit, heger un şarîya xwe nekin, gelek naçe, rojekê ev hal bê serê we jî! [...] Heger Mosqof esker rêkir ser we, dewlet esker rênake arî we! Eskerê Mosqof ji we gelektir e, top û tifingên destê wan heyî destê we nîne! Heta we tifingek vala kir, eskereke wî kare bîsta vala bike! De vêca heta we yek ji wan kuşt, ew'ê bîsta ji we bikuje! Ez zanim Kurd gelek ji Mosqof mêrtir in! Lê ber wan top û tifinga, mêranîya we'yê gelek kêm bimîne!' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, '*Girîd*' [Crete] *Kurdistan* No. 7, December 5, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 202-203).

[164] un... jin û zarûyên Ermenîyên masûm qetil dikin. Pêxember gotîye "beşşîrulqatîle bîlqetlî"...

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Notice how in this dense religious allusion the editor compares the orders of the Sultan with those of the Prophet and the Qur'an; obeying the Sultan's orders is equated with going against God's will. Moreover, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan not only condemns the Kurdish hostilities toward their Armenian neighbours in religious terms but he also defies Abdulhamid II who is openly blamed for ordering the killings of the Armenians. It is remarkable that not only in this passage but in the entire corpus of *Kurdistan* religious intertextuality is utilized as a major strategy in the critique of the Sultan's unjust regime.

Furthermore, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, in another article, explicitly and with great resentment equated the Ottoman state and the Sultan Caliph with Turkishness or Turkish identity, creating an explicit *other* in nationalist terms:

> Rom [Turks] establishes great schools in places inhabited by Turks. The government takes money from Kurds and spends it on Turks. Poor Kurds are captives/slaves [esîr] of that government… I want to come to my homeland and sacrifice myself for my nation [milet]. But the Turkish government does not allow [me], it does not want Kurds to become learned and strong. [165]

This is clearly a breaking point in the discourse of *Kurdistan* from an Ottomanist position to a more nationally oriented anti-Turkish one. The excerpt is a clear expression of the Kurdish ethno-national consciousness directed against the hegemony of the Turks since the *poor Kurds* are depicted as the *captives/slaves* [esîr] of the Turks, who dominated the state and who 'take it from the Kurds and spent it on Turks.' Notice how the Ottoman state is equated with the Turkish state. The author's word choice is also important in that he refers to the Turks as

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Un îtaetê emrê Ebdulhemîd dikin, Ermenîya dikujin. Ma emrê Ebdulhemîd ji hedîsa Pêxember mestir e, ji emrê Xwedê teala eqdemtir e? (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan *'Kurdçe Kısım'* [Kurdish Section], *Kurdistan*, No. 27, March 13, 1901, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 472).

[165] 'Rom, cîyê Tirk lê hebit mektebên mezin datîne. Hukumet pera ji Kurda distîne, ji Tirka re serf dike. Kurdên reben esîrên wê hukumetê ne… Min divê ez xwe bêm welatê xwe, xwe di rîya miletê xwe de fîda bikim. Lê hukumeta Tirkan nahêle, navê Kurd xweyfen, qewet bibin' (Abdurrhaman Bedir Khan, *'Untitled' Kurdistan* No. 6, October 11, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 179).

Rom; although the term *Rom* or *Roma Reş* [the Black Rom] used to refer to the Byzantine Empire, Kurds kept using the same term, with its derogatory connotation -perhaps because it used to refer to a hostile *non-Muslim* entity- to refer to the Turks[166] who 'replaced' the Byzantine Empire when they settled in western Anatolia.[167]

Nonetheless, the most radical manifestation of Kurdish nationalism was yet to appear in the 27th issue of *Kurdistan* when Abdurrahman Bedir Khan wrote:

> O Kurds! As you know, all nations are working toward their own welfare. It is very bad that Kurds have always served the *foreigners* [biyanî]. You have been serving the Turks for so many years, what benefit did you gain from it? When you receive a badge or a military rank in return for all the cruelty of the government, you forget all about the unjust treatments. Many Kurds have been killed in wars for the sake of this government; however, never, not even a [single] Kurd, until today, has made an effort for his own homeland; as if we have been created to serve the *foreigners*. Five hundred years ago there was not a single Turk in our country [welat]. All these Turks came to our country from Turan, and they dominate us in our own country. Their padişahs, who are bloodthirsty tyrants, call themselves caliph and in this way they carry out all types of cruelties that exist. However, the truth is, they are not caliphs, they are cruel padişahs who should be dethroned. You are not aware of this situation because you are ignorant; the government keeps you remain that way lest you become aware of the situation.
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> Turks and the Sultan might use whatever name and title they desire; however, God has not created Kurds for their service […]

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[166] The same is true of the Turkish language as Aburrahman Bedir Khan in another article refers to Turkish as 'Romî' (the language of the Rom, i.e., Turkish), *see* Abdurrhaman Bedir Khan *'Untitled' Kurdistan*, No. 6, 11 October 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1., p. 177).

[167] It is important to note that even today Kurds sometimes referred to the Turks as *'Rom'* or *'Roma Reş'*.

The time has come; we should work for our own and our children's salvation. It is a shame if Kurds, who are known for their bravery and generosity, keep being servants to a cruel government. A while back we also possessed a state, we had freedom. However, it is a shame that, that happiness slipped through our fingers; now we are in the hand of charlatans [sûtar]. Our disunity is the major reason for this situation. Because we Kurds are enemies of one another, Turks are taking advantage of this situation […] Among us there are good, kind-hearted and just rulers; let our leader be a Kurd. Why should we stay under the [rule of the] Turks.

I have written to some Kurdish aghas and begs to unite them so that they can find a cure for this disease. I am telling you through my newspaper too [that] you all should unite. Given their situation, the Armenians [are ready to] ally with you. Together you will formulate a good future [and] you will together liberate yourselves from the cruelty of the Turks […] God willing, one day, I myself will seize an opportunity [and] come to the border of Kurdistan from the Iranian side. Then, God willing I will liberate Kurds from the Rom [Turkish] servitude, and I will show the world that Kurds are not killers of the oppressed people, the way Abdulhamid claims…

May God give us success (*Kurdistan*, No. 27, 13 March 1901).[168]

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[168] 'Gelî Kurdno! Un dizanin ku çi qasî milet hene, hemî li qencîya xwe re dixebitin. Ev gelek xirab e ku Kurda, her xizmeta bîyanîya kirîye. Eve hev qasî sal e un xizmeta Tirka dikin, we çi qencî dît? Muqabilê hev qasî zulma hukumetê, wekî we nîşanek an rutbeyek stand, un mexdûrîyeta xwe ji bîr dikin. Rîya vê hukumetê de hinde Kurd serî de hatin kuştin; lakin heta nuho tu cara yek mirovek Kurd, wetenê xwe re tu xîret serf nekir. Goya ku em ser xizmeta bîyanîya xelq bîne. Berî pênc sed sala tu Tirkek li welatê me de nebî. Ev Tirk hemî ji Tûran hatin welatê me, û welatê me de hakimîyê li me dikin. Padîşahên wan, ku hemî xwînrêj mustebid in, unwanê "Xelîfe" li xwe datînin û bi vî halî, çi qasî new'ê zulm heye îcra dikin. Lakîn heqîqetê hal de ew ne xelîfe ne; ew, wacibulxel' padîşahên zalim in. Un vî halî nizanin. Zîra un cahil in; hukumetê her un cahil hişt, da un waqifê hal nebin.

Tirk û Xunkar çi nam û unwan bivên, bila bidin xwe; lakîn Xwedê Kurd ji xizmeta wan re xelq nekirîye […]

Êdî zeman e, divê em silameta xwe û zarûyên xwe re bixebitin. Şerm e ku Kurdên hinde bi mêranî û semahet meşhur in, xizmetkarîya hukumetek zalim bikin. Berî çend zemanekî em jî xweyhukumet bîn, sahiburre'y bîn. Lakîn heyf ku me ew seadet ji deste xwe revand, nuho em ketin destê sûtara de. Bêtefaqîya me jî gelek dibe sebeb ku em Kurd neyarê hevdû ne, Tirk jî ji vî

In the first line, the editor laments the fact that all nations work for their own welfare but Kurds, which presupposes that Kurds constitute a single, coherent and unified entity in the form of a nation [milet] just like other nations who *do* work for their *national* welfare. Then in the 2nd and 8th lines we observe a radical shift in not only the referent but also the meaning of the term *foreign* in that while the term 'foreign' used to denote the Russians as a non-Muslim *other* in a religious intertextuality, here the term unambiguously refer to the Turks and significantly designating them as *foreigners* with political connotation of and entity *nationally alien* to the Kurds. This connotation of the term 'foreigner' can be based on the fact that in the age of nationalism there remained only one clear, modern and acceptable definition of foreignness: *those* that do not have the same nationality/national identity as *'us'* (Billig 1995: 79; Kristeva 1991: 96). Next (lines 9-11) the editor portrays *'these Turks'*[169] as foreign invaders who occupied Kurdistan by force. He specially states that there was not a single Turks in Kurdistan five hundred years ago before they left their native land Turan for Kurdistan to dominate 'us' in 'our own country' (line 10-11). In this way he does not only construct Kurdistan as the Kurdish national homeland but he also he reinforces the foreignness of the Turks as the natives of Turan and the newcomers of Kurdistan.

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halê me îstîfade dikin […] Nav me de hakimên qenc, muhib, adil hene; bila reîsê me Kurd bit; çire em binê destê Tirka de bimînin!

Ev hal, ev cahilî êdî bes e; aqilê xwe bînin serê xwe. Min hin axa û beglera re nivîsîye, da îttîfaq bikin, dermanekî ji vî derdî re bibînin. Ez pê vê cerîda xwe jî ji we re dibêjim, divê un hemî tefaq bikin. Ermenî jî wî halî de we re îttîfaq dikin. Un hemî hev re îstîqbalek qenc tehyie bikin, hemî hev re xwe ji binê zulma Tirka xilas bikin. Ez xwe jî, înşaellah firset bibînim, rojekê bêm ser hudûdê Kurdistanê li nav Ecem. Bi îzna Xwedê, wê hingê ez'ê Kurda ji xulamîya Romê xilas bikim û ez'ê nîşanê alemê bikim ku Kurd, wek Ebdulhemîd îlan dike ne mirovên zebunkuş in.

Muweffeqiyet ji Xwedê'

(Abdurrahman Bedir Khan *'Kurdçe Kısım'* [Kurdish Section], *Kurdistan*, No. 27, March 13, 1901, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 471-474).

[169] The demonstrative adjective *'these'* that precedes the noun *Turk* in *'Ev Tirk'* [These Turks] is used in a demeaning way.

Another fundamental argument in the extract pertains to the title of the Islamic Caliph held by the Ottoman Turks. Through the *strategy of delegitimization and discrediting*, the editor labels all Ottoman sultans as 'bloodthirsty *Turkish* tyrants' who do not deserve the title of caliph (lines 10-12).[170] Using the strategy of *'devaluation/negative connotation of political continuation'* (Wodak et al. 1999: 41), the editor suggests that the Sultan Caliph should be dethroned and Kurds should cut all bonds with the Turks and free themselves form this slavery [xulamî] (lines 10-21). In this particular construction the Turks are deemed as an outgroup through derogatory terms such as barbarian and inferior (cf. Billig 2002: 61; Van Dijk 1999: 22-23). Another significant discursive practice here is that the editor assigns an ethnicity not only to the Ottoman state but also to the Caliph, a position that had always been perceived as a universal and supra ethnic. Hence, by passing the notion of *Ummahism*, the editor presents the entire Kurdo-Ottoman history as a relation of master-servant in which Kurds served their *foreign Turkish masters* and died for them in vain during many wars. By constructing the past and the present as such the editor burns all bridges and invalidates the so-called centuries old bond of brotherhood and common fate between the Muslim elements of the empire, e.g., Turks, Kurds and Arabs. Then, from the perspective of romantic nationalism the editor reminds the Kurds of their real or putative glorious past when they lived as freemen in their own country before they came under the Turko-Ottoman rule.

The metaphorical representation of disunity among Kurds as a disease (lines 28-29) is also significant as it is instrumental in presenting Kurds as a single entity. As Fairclough (1989: 120) asserts 'the ideological significance of disease metaphors is that they tend to take dominant interests to be the interests of

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[170] Around the same time as the journal *Kurdistan* there were dissident voices rising from the Arab world questioning the legitimacy of the Turkish monopoly over the office of the Caliphate. For instance, 'Abd al-Rahman al- Kawakibi (1849-1903), an Arab nationalist of Kurdish descent, represents the best such argument on the legitimacy of a Muslim umma leadership against Turkish despotism embodied in Sultan Abdulhamid (Firro 2009: 30). Kawakibi went to the extend to suggest the replacement of Abdulhamid with an Arab Caliphate (*ibid*: 32).

society as a whole.[171] As a way of getting rid of this disease the editor rejects the rule of the *'charlatans'*, i.e., the Turks and urges Kurds to work towards 'their own future' (lines 19-21) by uniting under the leadership of a Kurd, perhaps himself along with people from his princely family (line 26-27) to bring an end to the domination of the *Roms* [172] over Kurds. As a matter of fact, later on in lines 32-37 he explicitly designates himself as the leader of the Kurds, who, given his familial past, is qualified for the job. It is noteworthy that this is the very first manifestation of what might be called Kurdish *political nationalism* in the Kurdish journalistic discourse.

Another radical proposition on the part of the editor is placing the future of Kurds in an alliance with the Armenians [lines 30-32] despite the fact that suggesting a common front with the Armenians, a *Christian* community, against the Sultan Caliph, was for the most part unthinkable in the discourse of conservative Muslim Kurdish community.

Another significant aspect of the article above is it's use of deictic words. Deictic words as concrete textual properties of text are crucial in the meaning-making process. Although their semantic meanings are fixed, the denotational meaning of deictic words shift depending on the contextual information. Not only memorable grand words and phrases, but also small deictic words of banal nationalism such as 'we', 'you', 'this', 'here', 'there', 'them', 'us' and so on can be powerful, albeit 'barely conscious' reminders of nation and nationalism (Billig 1995: 93-94). As Billig (1995: 70) has observed there is a case for saying that nationalism is, above all, an ideology of the first person plural that is *'we'*, which is constructed through the binary opposition of '*us and them'* in the rhetoric of nationalism. In this sense nationalism is the ideology of both the first person plural as well as the third person plural; 'there can be no 'us' without 'them' (Billig

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[171] As the study will show, this is a popular analogy that is often used in the discourses of *KTTG* and *Rojî Kurd*.

[172] As we saw earlier, the term *Rom* with its negative connotations refers to the Turks.

1995: 78) because 'every presence is the presence of something to something or to somebody' (Frank 1997: 98). Then the use of such deictic words as personal pronouns, personal determiners and object pronouns, e.g., *'you/your; we/us/our; they/them/their'* should also be analysed for a complete close textual analysis.[173]

In the extract above, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan uses the pronoun *em* (we/us) and *me* (we/us/our) on sixteen instances registering solidarity and communality of experience among his readers who are constructed as a national audience (cf. Fairclough 1989: 180). For instance, he says: 'as if *we* have been created to serve the foreigners'; '*we* should work for *our own* and *our* children's salvation'; 'why should *we* stay under the [rule of the] Turks'; '*they* dominate *us* in *our own* country'. Then, in stark contrast to the deictic *we, our, us, own*, the author uses such deictic words as 'them', 'their', 'they', and so forth to refer to the Turks that are deemed the *other*, often accompanied by derogatory terms such as *cruel, barbarian* and *bloodthirsty*. For instance he says: *their* padişahs, who are all bloodthirsty tyrants, call *themselves* caliph and in this way [*they*] carry out all types of cruelties that exist'; 'however, God has not created Kurds for *their* service'. Through these binaries the author construct Turks as an out-group that is nationally different from *us* Kurds.

It is also noteworthy that the deictic *'we'* and its Kurdish variants are *'addressee inclusive'.* As such, they are expected to be read as a particular *we*, i.e., '*we* the Kurdish nation' (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 45; Billig 1995: 115). In this sense, the inclusive 'we' helps the editor, a member of the Kurdish aristocracy, to claim co-

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[173] Kurdish is a pro-drop language, that is a Kurdish sentence requires no expressed subject because the suffix (personal ending) attached to the verb signifies the subject in person and number. Since the conjugated verb forms have an implied subject, Kurds tend to drop the subject from the sentence. As a result, the number of subject pronouns in this text –and the other Kurdish texts for that matter- is not as high as it should be. For the sake of a more accurate close textual analysis I sometimes add the subject pronouns to the utterances where the pronoun is omitted. Furthermore, it is also important to know that Kurmanji-Kurdish has two sets of pronouns, i.e., the *nominative (simple) case* and the *oblique (possessive) case pronouns* both of which might be used as a subject pronoun. Therefore, for the pronoun 'you' (the second person plural pronoun) both *un* (you) as well as *we* (you/your) might be used, as it is the case in this particular text. The same is true for the first person plural pronoun *we,* which in Kurdish has two forms: *em* (we) and *me* (we/our/us) as well as the third person plural pronoun *they*, which in Kurdish corresponds to *ew* (they) and *wan* (they) (Ekici 2007; 2011).

membership with the audience as an ordinary person who has the right to talk on behalf of 'us' as one of us (cf. Fairclough 1989: 127-128; Benwell & Stokoe 2006: 115). In the remarkable words of Volmert: 'a speaker can unite himself and his audience into a single community sharing a common destiny' by letting fall into oblivion all differences in origins, confession, class and lifestyle with a simple 'we'…' (Volmert 1989: 123, cited in Wodak *et al*. 1999: 45). This discursive strategy also corresponds to Anderson's definition of nation, which implies a sense of cross-class, deep and horizontal comradeship in a community of 'equals' regardless of the members' various social, political or economic statuses.

Moreover, the use of the exclusive deixis *you* (hûn/we) that occurs on fourteen instances in the extract, is also significant in that it distinguishes the speakers from the addressee (cf. Fowler & Kress 1979: 204). Abdurrahman Bedir Khan makes an extensive use of the exclusive deixis *you* in the first paragraphs (nine occurrences) in order to exclude himself from the mistakes of the past. Consider the following sentences from the extract: '*you* have been serving the Turks for so many years, what benefit did *you* gain from it'; 'when *you* receive a badge or a military rank in return for all the cruelty of the government, *you* forget all about the unjust treatment'; '*you* are not aware of this situation because *you* are ignorant'. Notice how the editor creates a distance between himself and the audience through the exclusive *'you'* to save himself from criticism despite the fact that prior to his departure to Cairo, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan himself, had worked for the Ottoman Ministry of Education as the Chief Secretary for several years, in addition to his previous services to the Ottoman state.[174] Here exempting himself from the mistakes of the past consolidates his role as the saviour with a 'clean personal record' who could liberate Kurds from the Turkish domination (lines 30-33).

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[174] See *Kurdistan* No. 26, December 14, 1900, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 452.

Another noticeable discursive practice in this and the two previous extracts is that Abdurrahman Bedir Khan abandons the use of honorific titles before and after the Sultan's name. Although the editor used to refer to the Sultan by such honorific titles as *'your excellency; you, the Sultan; your excellency the Sultan; Sultan Caliph; His Excellency Sultan Abdulhamid Khan'* and so forth, starting from the 9th issue, he starts to refers to the Sultan by his given name only, i.e., Abdulhamid. Later on he refer to the Sultan with such insulting words as, *cruel* (zalim), *bandit* (şakî), *that man* (o adam), *hypocrite* (minafiq) and *thief* (diz).[175]

However this harsh criticism of the Ottoman Turks, the state and the Sultan Caliph should not be interpreted as the expression of a widespread and organized attempt on the part of the journal to break away from the Ottoman Empire toward the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. Even though in the extract above and elsewhere *Kurdistan,* the editor calls upon Kurds to take up arms against the Turks, the state and the Caliph, he does not clearly suggest a well-defined course of action such as an armed struggle that could lead to independence. It seems that his rage is directed to the increasing hegemonic power of the Turks over the state apparatus.

Kurdistan was a bilingual journal published in Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish. Thus it is important to note that when the corpus of *Kurdistan* is considered as a whole, articles written in Kurdish seem to be more radical compared to the more moderate Ottoman Turkish articles. The articles in the 27th issue of the journal constitute a good case in point in that compared to the article I just analysed - which was taken from the 27th issue- two Turkish articles that appeared in the same issue are much more moderate in their content and tone as the author, in line with the CUP discourse, adopted a more Ottomanist tone by limiting his criticism to the personality of Abdulhamid and his destruction of Kurdistan, without mentioning the Turkishness of the state or the Sultan. Furthermore, his criticism revolved around the manipulation of the Kurds against Armenians,

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[175] *Kurdistan*, No. 29 in Bozarlslan, Vol. 2 p.511-515; *Kurdistan*, No. 26, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 462.

another ethnic group vigorously involved in CUP activities. Given the fact that the CUP members, the Turks in particular, were the 'unaddressed recipients' of *Kurdistan*'s messages, the journal naturally tried to be on the good side of the CUP. As the present study will illustrate in the subsequent chapters, the difference between the nationalist tone of the Kurdish articles and the more Ottomanist Turkish articles can be observed in the succeeding Kurdish journals due to the same reason.

As stated earlier, far from representing the general voice of *Kurdistan*, the radical attitude in the above extract occured in a few instances that stand out in the entire corpus of the journal. Later, in a complete contrast to his previous radical tone, the editor Abdurrahman Bedir Khan goes back to his earlier moderate political line in which he promoted Kurdish identity as a part of the larger Islamic and Ottoman identity. Below are excerpts from different issues to illustrate the journal's more dominant Ottomanist stance through the content and deictic words:

> Last year *our* state and the Greeks fought. Thank God *our* state defeated the Greeks; the *soldiers of Islam* took six large cities and more than hundred villages from the Greeks in a month. Thereafter Moscow intervened and did not let *us* proceed; *we* made peace (my emphasis) (*Kurdistan*, No. 1, 22 April 1898).[176]

> *We* all know that in every sector of *our* government misery and disorder prevails (my emphasis) (*Kurdistan*, No. 17, 27 August 1899).[177]

> Kurdistan constitutes a very vast and important region for *our* state on the borders with Russia and Iran… It is obvious that Kurdistan will someday

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[176] 'Par dewleta me û Yunanîya şerî kir. Şikir ji Xwedê re, dewleta me karî Yunanîya; heyvekê de eskerê Îslamê şeş bajarên mezin û ji seda bêtir gundên Yunanîyan girtin. J'ew paşê Mosqof ket nêva halî de nehişt em zêdetir biçin; me sulh kir' (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Untitled'*, *Kurdistan*, No. 1, April 22, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 117.).

[177] 'Em hemî dizanin ku li hemî şûbeyên hukumeta me da sefalet perîşanî gelek zêde ye' (Abdrurrahman Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan*, No. 17, August 27, 1899, in Kamal (2006), p. 75).

become a great battlefield [meqtelek mezin] between Russia and *us*…
Our soldiers do not have devices and equipment. *We* cannot defend
ourselves if a war breaks out today (my emphasis) (*Kurdistan*, No. 28, 14
September 1901).[178]

All Muslims should wish for the eternity of the Ottoman State (*Kurdistan*,
No. 16, 6 August 1899).[179]

Notice how the pro-state and ummahist content of these extracts are consolidated through the use of such deictic words as '*we,' 'us'* and '*our*,' all of which refer to '*us Ottomans'* or '*us Muslims*', '*our state'* and so on.

What is more, parallel to the dominant discourses of ummahism and Ottomanism, the Ottoman and Kurdish identities are so interwoven in the discourse of *Kurdistan* that it often obscures the meaning of an utterance. This deliberate *strategy of obscuration* is particularly obvious in the use of deixis where the referent of a deictic word is not clear. It is for this reason that Bozarslan in his collection of the journal *Kurdistan* often explains in the footnotes whether a word refers to the Kurds in particular or to the Ottomans in general. For instance, after reproducing an article penned by Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, Bozarslan explains, in a footnote, that the phrase *'[bizim] vatanımız'* (our homeland) [180] refers to the *Ottoman* vatan as opposed to the *Kurdish* vatan.[181]

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[178] 'Kurdistan ji dewleta me re ser hududa Rûs û Ecem de minteqek gelek fire û muhim teşkil dike… Ev aşikar e ku Kurdistan ê rojekê bibit meqtelek mezin mabeyna Rûs û me de… Destê eskerê me de tertîbat û techîzat nîne. Îro şerek biqewimit, em nikarin xwe mudafee bikin' (Abdurhaman Bedir Khan, *'Alayên Siwarên Hemîdî'* [Hamidian Cavalier Regiments], *Kurdistan*, No. 28, September 14, 1901, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1., p. 490-492).

[179] 'Heçî yê Musluman e, divê ku Dewleta Osmanî baqî bimîne' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan 'Untitled', *Kurdistan*, No. 16, August 6, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1., p. 310).

[180] Turkish, similar to Kurdish, is also a pro-drop language in that since the conjugated verb signifies the performer of the action the subject is often dropped from the sentence. Here too, for the sake of simplicity and a more accurate close textual analysis I have added the subject pronouns to the utterances where the pronoun is omitted.

[181] Similarly in the 30th issue, footnote 72, Bozarslan explains that in the phrase *our name/fame* the deictic *our* refers to the Kurds and not the Turks.

I would like to conclude my analysis of this section by examining a few very interesting remarks made by the Abdurrahman Bedir Khan on the Armenian issue. His treatment of the Armenian issue represents a perfect case in point that typifies his inconsistent manner of jumping from one extreme to another throughout the corpus of *Kurdistan*. As we saw, on several occasions the editor praised the Armenian struggle against the Ottomans and shamed the Kurds for not following suite or forming an alliance with the Armenians in a possible war against the Sultan Caliph and the Ottoman Empire. The excerpts below illustrate his inconsistency and sharp turn from being a zealous supporter of the Armenian struggle to its the condemnation:

> There is no one province [in the empire] that the Armenians could outnumber the other nations [milet] such as Kurds or Turks. Therefore, the ambition for Armenian independence is an impossible dream… Armenians should eventually seek their happiness with our [Ottoman] state… If our state survives so will the Armenians. If not, the Armenians will completely be destroyed. Our state can still survive on its own should the Armenians break away; we would only be left with sadness [for Armenians] (*Kurdistan*, No. 29, 14 October 1901).[182]

Notice how Abdurrahman Bedir Khan urges the Armenians to work toward the welfare of the Ottoman state, pursue their happiness with the Ottoman state framework and give up all hopes for independence, which is presented as *'an impossible dream.'* [183]

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[182] 'Tu wîlayet nînin ku Ermenî ji miletên dî yanî an ji Kurda an ji Tirka zêdetir bin. Loma, sewdayê îstîqlala Ermenîya xiyalek mustehîl e… Ermenî, nîhayet divê bi dewleta me re seadeta xwe teherrî bikin… Heger dewleta me baqî bimîne Ermenî jî baqî dimînin. Heger ne, Ermenî yekcar mehw dibin. Heger Ermenî ji dewleta me înfîkak bikin dewleta me dîsa bi serê xwe kare dewam bike; bes teessufek ji me re dimîne' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan *'Wezîyeta Hazir û Musteqbel a Kurdistanê'* [The Present and the Future Situation of Kurdistan], *Kurdistan*, No. 29, October 14, 1901, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 2., p. 514). It is important to note that this text was translated into Ottoman Turkish and was published side by side with its original Kurdish version.

[183] Armenians had two nationalist organizations called *Henchak* (the Bell) founded in 1887 and *Dashnakzoutiun* (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) founded in 1890, which sought Armenian independence (Zürcher 2004a: 83).

In the extract below the editor makes a similar suggestions to the Kurds:

> O noble and hard-working Kurds! I would not suggest you such a difficult
> task of fulfilling all the current requirements of the modern civilized world
> such as producing works of the civilization that you have not seen or you
> have not been shown. Everywhere [in the world] this is a task that should
> be done by governments.[184]

It is remarkable that the editor, who had previously condemned the Turkish racial
dominance and called upon the Kurds to take up arms agains thte Ottomans
under his very own leadership, would now expresse his doubt about Kurds' ability
to cope with the requirements of the modern age and suggest that Kurds should
seek their future with the Ottoman state.

As stated in the outset of this section, due to the rapid changes in the local and
global socio-political circumstances and shifts in the balance of power, the Bedir
Khan Brothers but especially Abdurrahman Bedir Khan did not manage to
maintain a coherent and consistent political discourse. Instead, in a very
pragmatic manner his Kurdish nationalist discourse tended to ebb and flow over
time in accordance with the requirements of the day and his personal feelings. As
a result the political present and future of the Kurds in the discourse of *Kurdistan*
fluctuated between two extremes of an Ummahist and Ottomanism, on the one
hand, and a pure separatist Kurdish nationalism, on the other.

4.2.2. The Discursive Construction of Common Language

As discussed in Chapter II, language has been perceived as the *national soul* or
Volk and hence the major marker of national identity since the mid-eighteenth
century when the idea of nationalism was for the first time elaborated by German

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[184] 'Ey asîl ve faal olan Kürdler! Size, kendi başınıza, medeniyet-i âlemin bugunku mucibâtını icra etmeyi ve bu maksadla hiç gormemediğiniz, yani size hiç gösterilmeyen âsâr-ı medeniyeyi husule getirmek gibi bir emr-i duşvarı tavsiye etmem. Bu iş, her yerde hukumetlere murettebdir' (Abdurrhamna Bedir Khan, *'Kudlere'* [To the Kurds], *Kurdistan*, No. 25, October 1, 1900, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 2., p. 441).

romantics. The significant role of language is even more crucial in the Kurdish case, since Kurds share many cultural traits with the neighbouring ethnic groups such as Turks, Persians and Arabs, leaving language to be the major exclusive marker of Kurdish national identity (Hassanpour 1992; Sheyholislami 2011, 2010; Olson 1991; van Bruinessen 1992a; 2003; Özoglu 2004). [185] Furthermore, the fragmented nature of Kurdish society along economic, tribal, sectarian and regional lines attributes a stronger role and a distinguishing factor to Kurdish language despite its speech varieties.

Consequently the editors of the journal *Kurdistan* aware of the role of Kurdish as a 'natural' divide between the Kurds and non-Kurds, transformed Kurdish language into a collective cultural element in a politico-linguistic framework as a crucial component of the Kurdish national identity. Through its vernacularization in the printing press, [186] texts in Kurdish language acquired a significant function as a tool of inclusion and exclusion regardless of their content. Hence, thanks to 'identitive integrating power' of Kurdish language, Kurds were imagined as a distinct entity both *in* and *around* Kurdish language, instead of Ottoman Turkish, the *lingua franca* of the Empire. [187] In the words fo Wodak 'language is not

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[185] It is noteworthy that there are four schools of Islamic law in Sunni Islam namely Hanafi, Shafi'ite, Maliki and Hanbali. Although Kurds, unlike the *Hanafi* Turks, belong to the *Shafi'ite* school of Islamic law, *Kurdistan* did not exploit this significant difference between the Kurds an the Turks. Kreyenbroek (1996: 93) speculates that when Sheikh Ubeydullah claimed that 'the Kurdish nation is a people apart. Their religion is different and their language… is distinct' he was referring to this sectarianism between the Shafi'ite Kurds and Hanafit Ottoman-Turks. Only a reader letter from Adana, a city outside of the historical Kurdish territories, published in the 5th issue of *Kurdistan* points out this aspect of Kurdish identity when the reader complains about the lack of mullas from the Shafi'ite School in Adana as well as the lack of Shafi'ite religious books. It should be noted that under the reign of Sultan Abulhamid the Ottoman state had began a systematic programme of forcible conversion to Sunni Hanefi orthodoxy particularly among the Shi'ites, the Nusayri and the Yezidi Kurds declaring Sunni Hanefi school as the official belief (mezheb-i resmiye) (Deringil 2003: 14-18). This policy was partially in response to the Christian missionary activities.

[186] Vernacularization is understood as 'the use of a vernacular language for new purposes of written literature and learning' (Leezenberg 2014).

[187] *Kurdistan,* in the 1st-3rd, 8-12th and the 15th issues came out exclusively in Kurdish. From the 4th issue on only a few articles, e.g., the letters addressed to the Sultan, appeared in Ottoman Turkish. Furthermore, from the 1st issue on it was indicated on the cover page of each issue that *Kurdistan* was a fortnightly Kurdish newspaper *in Kurdish language*. Although the articles in Ottoman Turkish started to appear in *Kurdistan* from the 4th issue on, only from the

powerful on its own- it gains power by the use powerful people make of it'
(Wodak 2002a: 10).

4.2.2.1. The Politico-Symbolic Function of Kurdish Language as a Tool of Inclusion and Exclusion

The use of Kurdish language 'as the sole basis for identity' (cf. Smith 2003: 64) was a major discursive practice in *Kurdistan.* Thus the use of Kurdish language as such presented *Kurdistan* with the opportunity to make an unmistakable distinction between Kurds and their linguistic 'others'.[188] That is the use of Kurdish language for *Kurdistan* was a *tactic of dissimilation* or *dis-identification* in the journal's strategies of *inclusion* and *exclusion* in the process of power struggle for themselves and for Kurdish people (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 38; Fishman 1972: 45). Then it can be argued that through this multifaceted strategy, *Kurdistan* illustrated how the use of *the language of the self* could be a powerful

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25th issue onwards a note indicated that *Kurdistan* was a Kurdish newspaper in Kurdish and Turkish languages.

[188] It is noteworthy that Khani wrote his masterpiece significantly in Kurdish due to the inferior status of Kurdish vis-à-vis the more prestigious Arabic, Persian, and Turkish languages. For Khani what made Kurdish inferior or less prestigious was the lack of written literature in this language. He expressed his feelings in the following lines of Mem û Zîn:

 'Whether out of stubbornness or injustice / He [Khani] made this innovation/heresy [bîd'et] against traditions […] Lest people say Kurds are / Without knowledge origins and basis

[…] All sort of people possess books / Only Kurds are without an account'

[Hasil, ji înad, eger ji bêdad / Ev bîd'ete kir xîlafê mu'tad […] Da xelq-i nebêjitin ku Ekrad / Bêmarîfet in, bê esl û binyad // Enwaê mîlel xwedankitêb in / Kurmanc-i tenê di bê hesêb in] (Reproduced in *Kurdistan* No. 9, 16 December 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 233-234).

As far as contemporary Kurdish writers are concerned, Mehmet Uzun and other Kurdish novelists had the similar concern in mind when producing their works in Kurdish; because the use of Kurdish was forbidden and criminalized by the Turkish state they deliberately produced their novels in Kurdish even though the majority of them were equally if not more fluent and comfortable in the dominant, hegemonic languages, i.e., Turkish, Arabic, Persian. This preference is made at the expense of having a much smaller readership as their language preference not only deprived them of the Persian, Turkish and Arabic speaking potential readers but many literate Kurds are more fluent in the dominant languages and prefer to read Kurdish novelists in those languages. It is for this reason that many Kurdish novels are translated into Turkish, Persian or Arabic right after they are published in their original Kurdish form.

boundary-maker and an instrument of *othering* in a linguistic nationalism framework. In this context, the present study suggests that the chief reason for the Bedir Khan brothers preference of Kurdish as the dominant medium of communication in *Kurdistan* was not the purely pragmatic communicative function of this language, neither was it the result of a theoretical or academic interest in this vernacular, rather it was the powerful politico-symbolic function of Kurdish as the most salient marker of Kurdish identity. [189]

In regards to the profound effect of tools of inclusion and exclusion in the nation making process, Meyrowitz (1997:62) asserts,

> Communities are defined by their boundaries. And with every change in boundaries comes a new form of inclusion and exclusion, a new pattern of sharing and lack of sharing of experience… Each evolution in communication form has involved a shift in social boundaries and hence a shift in the relationship between self and others.

In this sense, the journal *Kurdistan*'s use of Kurdish language as an exclusive Kurdish cultural property, engendered a new social interaction and an imaginary connection exclusively among Kurds as the readers of the same journal *in* and *around* their own language. That is *Kurdistan* offered something that only Kurds

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[189] Nevertheless, *Kurdistan* also employed Ottoman Turkish which suggests that more complex dynamics were at play than the notion of 'linguistic nationalism'; chief among them was that the editors tried to convey their politics to the non-Kurdish Ottomans, e.g., Turks, Armenians, Arabs and Europeans who spoke Turkish and to those Kurds who were illiterate in Kurdish (See *Kurdistan*, No. 13, 2 April 1899, In Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1. p. 268). For instance, upon readers' request the number of Ottoman Turkish articles in *Kurdistan* increase after the 18th issue. In a note appearing in the 18th issue of the journal the editor stated 'many people wrote to me [saying] that they cannot read Kurdish and therefore they asked for a Turkish section in my newspaper. On their request [and] God willing I will from now on publish half of my newspaper in Turkish' [Gelek mirova ji min ra nivîsîn ku nizanin kurmancî bixwînin lewma qismek Tirkî cerîda min da dixwazin. Ser taleba wan bi îzna Allah ezê paşê niho nîvê cerîda xwe Tirkî tab bikim' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Teblig'* [Notification], *Kurdistan* No. 18, October 3, 1899, in Fuad (2006), p. 79). In addition, Turkish was preferred particularly when the issue at hand was the concern of all Ottomans but dealt with from a Kurdish perspective. The bilingual format of the journal is also a good case in point that illustrates the way the Kurdish elite, who leads the nationalist project, could be influenced by the commoners in the formation of their nationalist discourse (cf. Smith 2003: 57).

had in common or something to which only Kurds had the privilege access, which in turn generated the feeling among the Kurds that they possessed something exclusive that they did not share with *other* Ottomans for the simplest reason: They did not speak *our Kurdish language*. Although the readers of *Kurdistan* had never seen each other or heard of each other, they all believed with great conviction that the ceremony of reading the same newspaper in Kurdish was being replicated simultaneously[190] elsewhere by their fellow Kurds whom they did not know in person but confident of their existence (cf. Anderson 2006: 34-35).

Nevertheless, the discursive practice of inclusion and exclusion was not limited to the mere use of Kurdish language but it was also produced in the content of the text.[191] For instance, the phrase below, which appeared in the folio section of the journal, read:

> Bi-weekly published Kurdish Newspaper [192]

Another note, this time in Ottoman Turkish and located right beneath the aforementioned phrase read:

> For now bi-weekly Kurdish newspaper for awakening and encouraging
> Kurds to education in arts and skills [193]

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[190] So far as the consumption of Kurdish journals is concerned, one should be cautions with the use of Anderson's concept of *simultaneity,* as I am here, given that Kurdish journals were not daily newspapers. Equally important is the fact that these journals could not appear with regularity even in their bi-weekly or monthly formats. Nevertheless, the present study prefers the word *simultaneous* given that the journal was still a periodical, as opposed to, say a book or a manuscript produced at medreses, and was to be consumed in a particular period of time or before the publication of the next issue.

[191] It is noteworthy that the significant of the content of the text in mass communication is a point that is missed in accounts by McLuhan and Anderson who only put emphasis on the vernacularized languages in the formation of national identities.

[192] 'Pazde roja carekê têt nivîsandin cerîdeya Kurdî ye.' This phrase appeared on issues 3rd-25th.

[193] 'Kürdleri îkaz ve tahsil-i sanayiye teşvik için şimdilik on beş gunde bir neşrolunur Kurdçe gazetedir'. It should be note that in some issues the editors made insignificant changes in the wordings of this phrase.

In both phrases the editor significantly and clearly *flagged* the fact that the paper was a Kurdish journal for Kurds only. [194]

Furthermore, in the 4th issue, M. M. Bedir Khan wrote:

> The line[s] above that I have written in *Turkish* is a letter for His Excellency Sultan Abdulhamid Khan. In this paper I [express my] hope that he gives permission for the free circulation of my newspaper in Kurdistan… Because *[they] don't speak Kurdish [Kurmancî]* [they] think I have written something [bad] about them (*Kurdistan* No: 4, 3 June 1898) (my emphasis).[195]

There are significant discursive practices at work in this extract. First, the author highlights the fact that the letter in question is in Turkish addressed to the Sultan Abdulhamid, which might, at first, seem as an insignificant if not redundant explanation. However, in this discursive act, the author implicitly associates the Sultan with Turkish language and hence Turkishness. Then, he adds the other state officials to the same category, i.e., *those who cannot speak Kurdish*, referring to them through the third plural pronoun *they* a significant term in the strategy of othering or the construction of 'out-groups.' In this way the editor M.M. Bedir Khan portrays the Sultan Caliph and his state officials not only as non-Kurds but also significantly as *Turks* who do not speak *'our Kurdish language'* a *'justification'* as to why the author had written the letter in *'their'* language. Here it is important to notice how Kurdish functions as a 'bond of unity' at a symbolic

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[194] However, from the 25th issue on the following phrase appeared on the first pages of each issue: Monthly Kurdish and Turkish Newspaper (Ayda bir neşrolunur Kürdçe ve Türkçe gazetedir).

[195] "Ev xetê min jor bi Tirkî nivîsî, kaxizek e ji Hezretê Sultan Ebdulhemîd Xan re ye. Li vî kaxizî de ez hêvî dikim ku îzna cerîdeya min bide, da ez rêkim Kurdistanê… Çiku Kurmancî nizanin dibêjin qey min derheqa wan de tiştek nivîsîye" (M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan* No. 4, June 3, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 145). As stated earlier, Kurdish is pro-drop language in which sentences require no expressed subject because the suffixes attached to the verb signify the subject in person and number. Since the subject pronound 'they' has been dropped in the original Kurdish texts, I have put the subject pronoun 'they' in square brackets in the English translations (*See* Ekici 2007: 2011).

level among those who share it as well as a barrier against those who do not.[196]

4.2.2.2. The Kurdish Intellectual Elite's Use of Kurdish Language as a Strategy of Co-membership and Class Solidarity

One aspect of the segregated nature of Kurdish community stemmed from the sociocultural alienation of the aristocratic stratum from the Kurdish masses.[197] Klein (1999: 107) argues that both history and literature promoted in the Kurdish journals were those of the elite, leaving Kurdish language as the only and the most crucial cultural element that the elite and the Kurdish masses had in common.[198] With the use of Kurdish language the Bedir Khan brothers attempted to establish a bond between the elite and the commoners through 'ethnification' and 'authentication' of both the Kurdish elite and the Kurdish masses around Kurdish language, a strong identity-constitutive element. Hence, the promotion of

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[196] Similar discursive practices can be observed in other issues of *Kurdistan*. For instance, in the 6th issue the editor Abdurrahman Bedir Khan wrote:

- 'In this [issue of] the newspaper I have written a *Turkish* [Romî] letter for Sultan Abdul Hamid Khan' (my emphasis) ['Min vê cerîdeyê de kazizek Romî ji Xunkar Ebdulhemîd Xan re rêkirdiwe'] (Abdurrhaman Bedir Khan *'Untitled' Kurdistan*, No. 6, 11 October 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1., p. 177).

Similarly, a reader letter, wrote:

- 'We Kurds hope that you write to the Sultan *in Turkish* and [publish it] in your paper, so that he would consider the situation of Kurds [Kurmanc]…' ['Em Kurd ji te hêvî dikin ku tu cerîdeya xwe de bi Tirkî ji Xunkar re binivîsî, da fekire halê Kurmanca…'] (Ş. M., A notable from Diyarbekir, *Kurdistan*, No. 13, April 2, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1., p. 259-260).

Notice how in both extracts the Sultan Abdulhamid and the Ottoman state are assigned an ethnic identity through Turkish language.

[197] As will be discussed in Chapter 6 the alienation of the Kurdish intellectual elite from the Kurdish commoners becomes a significant issue as it is widely discussed in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd*.

[198] The monopoly of the elite on Kurdish history is also evident in Sharaf al-Din [Sharaf Khan] of Bitlisi's (1543-1603) *Sharafname* (1596), the first written account of 'pan-Kurdish history'. As Hassanpour (2003: 111-112) indicates, *Sharafname* was written significantly as the history of the rulers of Kurdistan rather than the history of Kurdish people or tribes. The reason for this, according to Hassanpour, is that 'Sharaf Khan tried to demonstrate that the Kurds were a people with tradition of governing. Therefore he significantly called his work the 'story of the rulers [(hokkam) of Kurdistan]'' (*ibid.*).

Kurdish as a common cultural property 'is what made the Kurdish people (the masses) valuable in the eyes of the nationalists' and vice-versa (*ibid*.). In other words, the functional dependence of the Kurdish elite on Kurdish language reflected their need to communicate and activate predominantly illiterate masses through the use of Kurdish language.[199]This was, of course, not an exclusively Kurdish phenomenon as '[t]he new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be written in a language they understood (Nairn's 1977: 340).

4.2.2.3. The Translation of Qur'anic Verses into Kurdish and Its Politico-Symbolic Power

As we saw, one of the major consequences of the Protestant Reformation in Europe was the translation of the Bible first into German and then into other vernaculars which brought about the gradual demotion of Latin as the sacred script language because vernacularization diminished the idea that only a sacred language could represent the divine truth (Anderson 2006: Chapter II). Vernaculars, which had no religious attachments, eventually put an end to the politico-religious monopoly of the Latin over the Bible elevating German and other vernaculars as a prestigious language to the status of Latin (Anderson 2006: 40).

Similarly, after the arrival of Islam, Arabic became the medium of divine revelation and the sacred language of God while Persian remained as the language of literature. Ottoman Turkish, on the other hand, was the language of the state.[200] This situation rendered Kurdish, along with a few other peripheral languages, to be inferior and lower in rank and status (Hassanpour 1992: 84;

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[199] The issue of illiteracy and its consequences will be dealt with later.

[200] Even though Turkish did not enjoy the same prestige as Arabic and Persian. As well be discussed later Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı identifies this inaqulity between Kurdish on the one hand and Turkish and Arabic on the other in one of his articles published in the 3rd issue of *Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi* (See, (*Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi,* December 19, 1908, No. 3: reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 141-143).

2003: 121). *Kurdistan* became the first Kurdish journal that printed the Kurdish translations of Qur'anic verses.[201] However, this was not due to religious purposes to propagate religion[202] but rather a part of the journal's strategy of religious intertextuality, in the form of an Islamic Modernist synthesis, towards novel needs of modernization and nationalism.[203] That is the translation of the Qur'anic verses into Kurdish was a significant discursive act affirming the validity, prestige and credibility to the Kurdish language by reproducing the divine words of Allah in that language.[204] This type of religious invocation is a generic set piece, proving the literary credentials of Kurdish elevating it to an equal

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[201] The first printed complete-translation of Qur'an into Kurdish was made by Muhammad Koyi Galizadeh in 1968. Galizadeh's three volumes were published under the title *Tafsira Kurdî* (Kurdish Interpretation) in Baghdad (Binark & Eren 1986).

[202] Meyrowitz (1997: 60), from the perspective of 'medium theory' suggests that 'a look only at the content of printing during its rapid spread through Europe in the sixteenth century would have suggested that this medium was going to strengthen religion and enhance the power of monarchs' because in addition to the Bible, most of other printed books were on religion and their contents were determined by the Church and the monarchs. However, on the contrary, printing undermined religion and the power of royalty by promoting vernaculars at the expense of Latin, fostering scientific revolution, creating new pattern of knowledge development and secularizing the society (*ibid*.). Similarly the translation of the Qur'an did not necessarily consolidate the power of religion in the Kurdish community. But rather it was a pragmatic tool in the hands of the editors of *Kurdistan* that added further credibility and convincibility not only to the Kurdish language per se but also to their modernist/nationalist discourse.

[203] The analysis of the use of Qur'anic verses in *Kurdistan* will be discussed below in details under the title 'Intertextuality'. In this section I limit my discussion to the significance and the implications of the translation of Qur'anic verses into Kurdish.

[204] Since the introduction of Islam, Kurds, as well as other non-Arab Muslims, perceive Arabic to be the language chosen by Allah to disseminate the divine message through the Holy Qur'an. Thus to safeguard the divine character of the book, it was believed that the Qur'an could not be translated, imitated or reproduced in any form or manner because it is an inimitable miracle (i'jaz al-Qur'an) (Fatani 2006: 57; Zadeh 2012: 6, 214; Hassanpour 1992: 50; 1996: 48-49: Jwaideh 1960:37). In this context, since the *ayat*s (verses) of the Qur'an are considered to be miracles (Fatani 2006: 87) they cannot be translated. The inimitability of the verses is justified through the claim that the meaning (signified) is inseparable from the form (signifier) (Zadeh: 2012: 216). According to Zadeh (2012: 6), during the Crusades, the Eastern Christian set about refuting Islam by drawing on the translation of Qur'an in Greek and Syriac because evoking these translations discredited the miraculous status, which Muslims accorded to the Qur'an. It is for that reason that often Muslims prefer to use the term *'tefsir'* (interpretation) instead of *'translation'* for the versions of Qur'an in languages other than Arabic. As Zadeh (2012: 264) has put it '[I]t is in the field of interpretation that the translation of the Qur'an came to gain the greatest form of legitimization.'

ontological level with Arabic, the holy language of Allah. [205] In other words, the translation and the printing of sacred verses into Kurdish lent all the sanctity that religion has given to texts.

Then it is fair to say that the translation of Qur'an into Kurdish -and other vernaculars for that matter- was, in a sense, the manifestation of 'egalitarianism among languages' (cf. Anderson 2006: 71).[206] Moreover, with the translation of the Qur'an, *Kurdistan* took the first step towards the nationalization of the religion in the Kurdish case.

4.2.2.4. The Promotion of Linguistic Works in the Discourse of *Kurdistan*

The 19th century Europe was the golden age for the growth and reform of languages with the promotion of national literatures, monolingual/bilingual dictionaries, grammar books and so forth, which were indented to kindle the fire of national consciousness among masses (Seton-Watson 1977). Similarly, linguistic works became indispensable elements of the nascent Kurdish nationalism in the late Ottoman period as Kurdish intellectuals began promoting the Kurdish literature, dictionaries and grammar books.

To this end, *Kurdistan* proudly announced the publication of a Sheikh Yusuf Zîyaeddîn Pasha's Kurdish-Arabic dictionary entitled *El-Hediyye't'ul-Hamidiyye fi'l-Lugat'il-Kurdiyye* (A Gift to Hamid in Kurdish Language) with an introductory section on Kurdish grammar.[207] The publication of this dictionary was particularly

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[205] Later on Urdu also started to enjoy a similar prestige through the translation of the Qur'an and other works of Islamic literature in this language, nevertheless to a much further extent; *See* van der Veer (1994) for a comprehensive discussion on translation/interpretation of the Qur'an and religious nationalism.

[206] As Anderson (2006: 70-71) asserts, 'if all languages now shared a common (intra)-mundane status, then all were in principle equally worthy of study and admiration. But by whom? Logically, since now none belonged to God, by their new owners: each language's native speakers- and readers.'

[207] It is important to note that Khani's *Nubihara Biçukan* (The Spring of the Children) (1684) was also an Arabic-Kurdish lexicon promoting Kurdish langauge. 'Introducing a minor language such as Kurdish into an educational system, where Arabic was the medium of instruction, was considered as a serious bid'et [innovation/heresy], which Khani dared to commit… Anticipating opposition from conservatives, Khani had to justify this innovation by emphasizing that his

important given that Arabic was the most prestigious and sacred language in the Muslim world. Zîyaeddîn Pasha's dictionary, like the translation of the Qur'an, in a sense elevated Kurdish to the same ontological level as Arabic. Ironically, upon an order by Sultan Abdulhamid, to whom the dictionary had been dedicated, the Ottoman Ministry of Education banned Zîyaeddîn Pasha's dictionary and confiscated it from booksellers in June 1906 (Malmîsanij 2009: 87-90) [208] which indicates that the Sultan was concerned that the publication of such dictionary would bolster the Kurdish nationalist feelings.

Although the journal *Kurdistan* devoted a generous space to the importance of education through relevant lengthy articles in almost every issue, it sought neither vernacular literacy nor vernacular education in Kurdish. However strange this preference might seem for a journal promoting cultural and linguistic nationalism, it is still in line with *Kurdistan*'s overall stance on education; that is the editors of *Kurdistan* believed that without a certain degree of economic and industrial progress, which could be possible only through literacy and education in *any* language, Kurds would not be able to compete with the more advanced neighbouring ethnic groups, Turks in particular.

4.2.2.5. Rapprochement between Kurmanji and Sorani as The First Standardization Effort

Heinz Kloss (1967) distinguishes between what he calls *Abstandsprache* and *Ausbausprache* languages to draw a boundary-line between language and dialect. An *abstand* language, a 'language by distance', is a language that is different from other related varieties due to its intrinsic -linguistic and grammatical- distance; [209] while an *ausbau* language is 'a language by

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dictionary was not intended for 'the learned' people (Hassanpour 2003: 124). However, although *Kurdistan* makes no mention of Khani's *Nubihara Biçukan*, later on the magazine 'Jîn' does (*Jîn*, issue 19, in Bozarslan (1987), Vol. 4 p. 825).

[208] Sultan Abdulhamid had already banned the Albanian-language books and correspondences. (Albania: General Information 1984: 33).

[209] For instance, the Anglo-Saxon dialect spoken in England at the beginning of the Middle Ages was gradually separated from the rest of Germanic dialects spoken in Scandinavia and on the

development' that has been deliberately shaped or reshaped to become a tool of literary expressions (ibid: 29).[210] In other words, *ausbau* is the social construction of language through cultivation, by conscious effort of individual grammarians and intellectuals or deliberate innovational language planning which aims to construct a high formal language (ibid: 38).[211] Thus *'abstand language'* is primarily a linguistic term while *'ausbau language'* is primarily a socio-political one (ibid: 30).[212] *Ausbau*, as language cultivation, might target two different outcomes: it might try to widen the rift between two or more varieties to construct an *abstand* language,[213] the way French, English and German turned into full-fledged languages; or alternatively it might try to bring about a rapprochement between languages or dialects to make them more and more similar the way Riksmaal and Landsmaal languages were brought closer to each other to eventually construct two forms of one language (ibid: 33). This process might eventually lead to *Dachsprache* (roofing language), the third term in Kloss' framework, which might serve as a standard language for different dialects, like *fusha*, the modern standard Arabic (cf. Muljačić 1993).

As mentioned in the outset of this study, Kurdish language does not constitute a unified standard language (Hassanpour 1992). Instead, as a *polycentric language*, to use Stewart's (1968) term, it has a number of speech varieties with *Kurmanji* and *Sorani* being the two major -more or less standard- ones. Kurdish

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continent. At some point the grammatical differences were so great that English was considered to be a separate language on it's own.

[210] Kloss (1967: 33) emphasizes that 'the 'abstand' (distance) language concept is derived from spoken language, with a minimum distance between written standards, while the 'ausbau' concept is derived from the written standard.'

[211] For example, although the French spoken at the royal court was once just a French variety, between the 16th and early 19th century it was selected and codified by grammarians (Kloss 1967: 36).

[212] A conscious effort to reshape a language concentrate largely on its written form to construct a literary standard, which eventually should also transform the spoken language (Kloss 1967: 33).

[213] This does not mean all 'abstand' language are also 'ausbau'.

intellectuals, influenced by the nation-state premise of 'one nation, one language', were aware of the linguistic division of their society and the need for a linguistically homogenous unity.[214] Thus in the corpus of *Kurdistan* we see a discursive strategy that could be seen as the first practice of *ausbau* in a Kurdish journal to bring *Kurmanji* and *Sorani* varieties closer to each other.[215] There are many techniques of language-shaping in *ausbau*. One such technique utilized in the corpus of *Kurdistan* was the deliberate inclusion of some *Sorani* words in *Kurmanji* texts[216] as illustrated in the sample sentences below.[217]

- God *has not created* [nekirdiwe] anything better [çaktir] than reason (*Kurdistan* No: 6, 11 October 1898).[218]
- O Kurds! God and the Prophet and the imams and [other] notables *have shown* us [nîşa me kirdine] such useful advice and the right

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[214] Although it has been perceived as a unifying cultural component, Kurdish language has caused further division among Kurds rather than unifying them due to its significant dialectical diversity. The disunifying role of dialectical diversity has become more problematic particularly in recent decades as Kurds of different speech varieties have come to be exposed to other Kurdish dialects more often through the Internet and social media. See Sheyholislami (2009; 2010; 2011) for an extensive discussion of Kurdish varieties, their use in the Kurdish media and the way they have become an impediment to the construction of unified Kurdish national identity.

[215] Kloss in his work classifies Kurdish as a polycentric language based on near dialects.

[216] It is important to note that the content of these Kurmanji articles were in no way related to the issue of language. The author might have taken the idea of mixing the two speech varieties from Ahmedi Khani, who in his Kurmanji-Kurdish masterpiece *Mem û Zîn*, felt free to use Sorani words, e.g., *'Kurmanc im û kûh û kenarî / Van çend xeberêd-i Kurdewari'* (I am a Kurd from mountains and peripheries/These are a few words of mine on Kurdish land/territory) (*See*, Khani (1695 [2005]), Section VII, p. 192). The word '–war' in the word 'Kurdewari' is a suffix he borrowed the Sorani variety that denotes 'territory/land'.

[217] Today many Kurdish media outlets have adopted this strategy as they too mix Sorani words with Kurmanji texts and vice versa as a step in the unification of the two varieties. These media outlets includes the Voice of America (VOA) Kurdish Service. Dr. Michael Chyet, the former senior editor of the VOA Kurdish Service, deliberately mixed the two varieties to a certain extend, for the same purpose which indicates that this practice is endorsed not only by nationalists but also by linguists and academics (Personal Communication with Dr. Michael Chyet). Furthermore, mixing the two varieties has become a common practice today among Kurds both in Kurdistan and diaspora. This practice has come to be humorously called 'Sormanji', the combination of the first syllable of Sorani with the last two syllables of Kurmanji.

[218] 'Xwedê ji aqil **çaktir** tiştek xelq **nekirdiwe'** (Abdurrhaman Bedir Khan, '*Untitled*' *Kurdistan* No. 6, October 11, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 179)

path… (*Kurdistan* No: 7, November 1898).[219]

- Read Imam Ghazali's book; see what verses [and] what hadith he *has cited* [zikir kirdiwe] about ill-intentioned ulama (*Kurdistan* No: 13, 2 April 1899).[220]

The editor's word choice in these sentences and elsewhere is an obvious discursive strategy of rapprochement that perhaps aimed at bringing the two varieties closer to each other. What is more, it also hints at common origin of the two dialects, which would create or reinforce the impression that the two dialects are merely two mutually intelligible varieties of the same language. It is interesting to see that the editor Abdurrahman Bedir Khan has limited himself to a few words perhaps because he himself did not have a good grasp of *Sorani* or even if he did he might have felt that the *Kurmanji* speakers might not comprehend his message if he made a more extensive use of the *Sorani* vocabulary.

The publication of *Sorani* poetry side by side with the *Kurmanji* ones seems like another technique of *ausbau* utilized by the editors of *Kurdistan* to create a similar assumption among its readers. Furthermore, when introducing a poem by Haji Qadir Koyi,[221] M. M. Bedir Khan states,

> 'His language [ezman] is Sorani language. That is why not all Kurds know this language… [However] it is easily understood if read carefully' (*Kurdistan,* No. 3, 20 May, 1898)[222]

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[219] 'Gelî Kurdno! Xwedê û Pêxember û îmam û mirovên mezin hinde xeberên qenc, rîya rast *nîşa* me **kirdine'** (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Al Mu'minun Ekhwatun'* [All Believers Are Brothers], *Kurdistan,* No. 7, November 5, 1898, in Bozarslan vol (1991). 1., p. 200).

[220] 'Kitêba… Imamê Xezalî… bixwînin; fekirin ewî der heqa ulemaya sû' de çi ayet, çi hedîs **zikir kirdiwe'** *(*Abdurrahman Bedir Khan *'Ulemayên Kurda re Xîtabek'* [An Address to the Kurdish Ulama] *Kurdistan* No: 13, April 2, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1., p. 262).

[221] Haji Qadirê Koyi (1817-1897), 'the second apostle of Kurdish nationalism after Khani' according to Hassanpour (1992: 57), composed his poetry in his native Sorani variety. Following in the steps of Khani, he also attached a great importance to the vernacularization of Kurdish language. (Hassanpour 1994: 4; van Bruinessen 2003: 45-50).

[222] 'Ezmanê wî ezmanê Sora ye. Loma Kurd hemî vî ezmanî nizanin… Wekî bi dîqet bê xwendin, mana wan xweş têt famkirin' (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Untitled' Kurdistan* No. 3, May 20, 1898, in

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Notice how the editor presents *Sorani* as a mere variety of Kurdish and hence can be understood easily *'if read carefully'*. The author refers to *Sorani* as a *language* rather than a *dialect* perhaps due to the lack of a better term, such as, 'zarava', a neologism in Kurdish signifying *dialect* or *variety,* which probably had not been coined yet.[223] Nevertheless, the author tries to mitigate this difference between *Sorani* and *Kurmanji* by stating that 'not all Kurds speak this language' implying that *other* Kurds do speak it which suffices to see *Sorani* as *another* language/dialect used by Kurds. In this way, *Kurdistan* became the first Kurdish journal to take up the issues concerning the dialectical nature of Kurdish by downplaying the differences between the two varieties and attempting to bring them closer to each other through language cultivation (ausbau).[224]

The utilization of a limited number of language shaping techniques in *Kurdistan* was probably the result of the significant lexical but more importantly grammatical differences between the two dialects, which also undermines mutual-intelligibility in all contexts without a prior familiarity with the other dialect.[225] It is important to note that neither *Dimilî* nor *Hawramî* varieties of Kurdish were included in the use of *ausbau* as a discursive strategy.

4.2.3. The Discursive Construction of Common History and Political Past

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Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 135).

[223] In any case, 'dialect', 'speech variety' and 'national language' as terms and concepts belong to modernity.

[224] The speakers of two dialects might imagine themselves as the speakers of a common language and belong to a common nation as in the case of Albenian with its dialects of *Gheg* and *Tosk* (Billig 1995: 32).

[225] Hassanpour (2003:117) asserts that until 1918 dialectical differences were *not* seen as an impediment for Kurdish nationalists. He backs up his claim with the fact that the terms *Kurmancî* (Kurmanji), which today denotes a dialect of Kurdish, and *Kurdî* (Kurdish) were used interchangeably as in Ahmadi Khani's *Mem û Zîn*. In one of his article in *Kurdistan*, M. M. Bedir Khan repeats the same practice by using the term *Kurmanji* (in reference to *Kurdish* not the *Kurmanji* dialect) when referring to Haji Qadirê Koyî's Sorani poetry (M. M. Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan* No. 3, May 20, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1., p. 131). Similarly both *KTTG* and *Rojî Kurd*, used the same naming practice when referring to the Kurdish language and people as Kurmancî and Kurmancino respectfully. Hence, it is fair to say that this issue made itself felt as early as 1898.

This section discusses *Kurdistan*'s historiographic nationalism and its role in the forging of a Kurdish national identity. The flexible or open-ended character of narrative identity, as we saw in Chapter 2, becomes even more crucial when applied to the shared history of a nation as a major component of collective identity. In that revisiting the same events or occurrences in history and reinterpreting them in accordance with the needs of the present day is a common practice of nationalist historians and politicians. Thus, history as a glorious heritage and heroic past becomes one of the most effective resources available for cultivation among other pre-existing cultural attributes in the articulation and construction of a national identity. It is utilized to construct collective identities from real or invented basic cultural elements, including shared memories of great exploits and personage, myths of origin, genealogy, tradition, rituals and so forth that tend to be socially, culturally and politically binding. These elements characterize the persistent and recurrent elements of collective continuity and difference (Smith 2003: 19). Pointing to this crucial role of history, Renan ([1882] 1990: 19) observed that:

> 'More valuable by far than common customs posts and frontiers conforming to strategic ideas is the fact of sharing, in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets… or the fact of having suffered, enjoyed, and hoped together. These are the kinds of things that can be understood in spite of differences of race and language' (*ibid*.).

So far as the construction of the Kurdish history is concerned, the first time the journal *Kurdistan* made reference to the Kurdish history[226] was in the second issue where M. M. Bedir Khan made the following announcement:

> God willing, from now on, I will talk about the history of the Kurds too; what is their origin and their descent; the intelligent and famous peoples

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[226] As a matter of fact the word '*history*' occurs only 10 times in the entire corpus of *Kurdistan*, of which 3 occur in a contexts not directly linked to the Kurds and 1 occurrence refers to the Ottoman history. The search for the word '*ancestor*' and its variations (ecdad, cedde, bapîr, etc.) detected 29 words, of which only 15 were directly linked to the Kurds. Of these 15 words, 5 were used in the articles where the editor provided an account of his princely family. The search also detected 12 occurrences of the word 'Ezîz/Ezîzan', the name of the editor's princely family.

that has risen among them; I will write [about] them all (*Kurdistan* No. 2, 6

May, 1898)[227]

Although this extract seems to be a simple announcement about a future topic to be covered by the journal, it carries powerful implications or ideologies. In that the phrase 'history of Kurds' [tarîxa Kurda] along with such lexemes as 'origin' [esil] and 'descent' [nesil] presuppose or take for granted that Kurds as a distinctive community possess a 'national' history of their own without preponderance of the facts. Indeed, in such narratives the factual details do not matter; what matters is the general trajectory of the narrative. Hence the text imagines Kurds as a historical antiquity that has been moving through time in an uninterrupted continuity as an immemorial social and political entity.

Below is another typical example that illustrates a similar discursive practice:

O Kurds! For once look at your state of being and that of your neighbour Moscow. Kurds are the same today as they were a thousand years ago. But your neighbours have attained merits and skills, they posses states [of their own]. [Conversely] Kurds have remained weak and miserable (*Kurdistan* No: 7, 5 November 1898)[228]

On the surface the abstract is a lament about Kurds's lack of progress. However, there are three underlying messages conveyed subtly through assumptions: First, it is assumed that there exists a unified collective community that possesses a collective proper neme: Kurds. Second, Kurds as an ethnic group are rooted in the history whose past can be traced back to the antiquity -*or to 'a thousand years ago'*- that has remained unchanged in an uninterrupted historical

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[227] 'Bi îzna Xwedê teala, paş nuho ez'ê behsa tarixa Kurda jî bikim; esl û neslê wan ji ku ye, nêv wan de çi mirovên xwenda, xweynav û deng hatine, ezê hemi binivîsim' (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Bismillah al-Rahman al-Rahim'* [In the Name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful], *Kurdistan* No. 2, May 6, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 123).

[228] 'Gelî Kurdino! Carekê fekirin halên xwe û halê cîranên xwe Mosqof. Berî heza sala Kurd çawa bîn, îro dîsa we ne. Lê cîranên we xweymarîfet û sin'et bîne, xwedewlet bîne. Kurd jar û reben mane' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Laysa lil-insani illa masaa'* [Man Can Have Nothing But What He Strives For], *Kurdistan* No. 7, 5 November, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 198).

continuity.[229] This is a common strategy in the historicization of the nation for nationalists attempt to set the birth of their nation as early as possible to underscore the 'fact' that their nation is not a newly emerging 'invented' entity but rather a historical and inevitable 'natural reality' (Hobsbawm 1992). The third presupposition embedded in the extract is that Kurds not only constitute a nation but they also deserve a state of their own which has not been attained *yet*, a point *implied* through the fact that the 'neighbouring nations' have already attained statehood but Kurds are lagging behind simply due to their 'weakness and misery'

4.2.3.1. The Construction and Presentation of the Bedir Khan Family's Political Past as the Narrative of Kurds' Collective Political History

As we saw in Chapter 3, the pattern of media ownership is crucial in determining the formation of a media discourse in accordance with the interest of its owner(s) (Fairclough 1989, 1992, 1995a, 1995b). The Bedir Khan Brothers equipped with the privileged access to newspaper publication had the power to construct a particular version of Kurdish history in line with their own personal and familial interests.[230] To this end, they attempted to construct a particular version of Kurdish history as the history of their dynasty that had ruled the Botan Emirate in mid 19th century. Consequently, one of the most remarkable discourse practices of *Kurdistan* is its construction of Kurdish history as the familial history of the Azîz or Azîzan, the editors' princely family.

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[229] The author often uses this strategy. For instance, in the 28th issue he states: 'There is nothing [new] in Kurdistan today. It remains the same as it was a thousand years ago' [Kurdistan îro tiştek nîne. Berî hezar sala çawa bî, îro dîsa we ye] (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Hamidian Cavalry Regiments'* [Alayên Siwarên Hemîdî] *Kurdistan* No. 28, September 14, 1901, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 491).

[230] For instance, the editors on several occasion settled account with Sheikh Abul Huda, Sultan Abdulhamid's undersecretary who had personal issues with the Bedir Khan family. Abul Huda had a great influence on Sultan Abdulhamid (Islamoglu 1998: 108), and on many occasions he used his position to manipulate the Sultan to take drastic measures against the members of the Bedir Khan family. *See* the open letter to the Sultan by Abdurrahman Bedir Khan (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'My Petition to His Excellencey Sultan Abdulhamid Khan' Kurdistan* No. 6, November 5, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 174-176).

Therefore, it is fair to argue that in *Kurdistan* a particular version of Kurdish national history is forged through the process of selective memory by manipulating the *'collective act of remembering as well as the collective act of forgetting'* (cf. Renan 190: 11).[231] The following extract is a good case in point:

> I know that Kurds don't know anything about the history of Kurdistan. Therefore, in every [issue] of my newspaper, I will, very briefly, write about the history of Kurdistan and that of the ancestors of the Aziz [Azîzan] (*Kurdistan* No: 8, 1 December 1898)[232]

Here through collocation or the proximity of the phrases (Baker 2006) 'the history of Kurdistan' and 'the [history of] Azîzan' in the same sentence, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan equates or associates the Kurdish history with the political past of the Azîzan, the editor's princely family.

What is more, the editor Abdurrahman Bedir Khan started a Kurdish history series entitled *'Hukkamên Cezîretu ibni Umer' [The Rulers of the Jazirat ibn Omar]*[233] in the 8th-14th issues in which he introduces a total of twenty figures from his family lineage who ruled their Botan principality. In the first article of the history series he provides a brief account on the foundation of his family dynasty:

> The [full] name of Jazira is Jazira of ibn Omar [Jazira of Omar's Son]. This city was established two hundred years after the Prophet, may peace be upon him, under the auspicious of Abdulaziz bin Omar Al-

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[231] Such history writing practices have been observed in places like Jordan, were ethnographers have promoted their tribal history as the history of the whole Jordanian community. *See* Shryock (1996; 1997) for the Jordanian and other examples of contestation between tribes and their attempts to create official histories out of their respective tribal histories.

[232] 'Ez zanim Kurd ji tarîxa Kurdistanê tu tiştî nizanin. Loma ez ê her cerîda xwe de, kurt piçek tarîxa Kurdistanê û ya ecdadên Ezîzan binivîsim' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Untitled' Kurdistan* No. 8, December 1, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 213).

[233] Sharaf Khan's *Sharafname* (1596) was also written as the history of the rulers of Kurdistan rather than the history of Kurdish people. As we saw, according to Hassanpour (2003: 111-112), the reason for this is that 'Sharaf Khan tried to demonstrate that the Kurds were a people with tradition of governing. Perhaps the Bedir Khan brothers had a similar concern in their own history writing practice, however given their overall discursive practices their version of Kurdish history served to their claim to the former power and priviliges enjoyed by their princely family.

Barqamidi[234]. In 680[235] Prince Suleiman established his dynasty around Jazira. Prince Suleiman was a Kurd. This Prince Suleiman, may he rest in peace, is the ancestor of the Bedir Khan Beg and all emirs of Kurdistan.[236]

First, to attribute an antique value or a primordial quality to his family, the editor provides the date on which Jazeera was established. Second, he suggestively highlights that Prince Suleiman was a Kurd and not only the ancestor of the Bedir Khans but also the ancestor of all other princely families of Kurdistan, which by default designates all Kurdish rulers as the offspring of the Bedir Khan family. This particular representation implies that the history of Kurdistan is the same as the history of his family. More on this extract and its function in the justification of Bedir Khans' claim to the leadership position will follow.

Another significant aspect of this history series is that, the editor cites Sharaf al-Din [Sharaf Khan] of Bidlisi's (1543-1603) *Sharafname* (1596 [2005]),[237] the narrative of the Kurdish history, as his source, but interestingly he uses only the parts of the book pertaining to his own family even though Sharaf Khan recounts all Kurdish dynasties founded until his time (1596), including the Bitlis Principality which was ruled by Sharaf Khan himself.[238] Despite this, Abdurrahman Bedir

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[234] Bozarslan asserts that this is point inaccurate because according to *Sharafname* the founder of Jazir was Omar bin Abdulaziz of Omavis, *see* Bozarslan (1991), Introduction to *Kurdistan* (1991), Vol. 1., p. 213).

[235] 1281 according to the Gregorian calendar.

[236] 'Cizîr, navê wê "Cezîretu îbnî Umer" e. Ev bajar, du sed sal paş Pêxember eleyhîsselam pê hîmmeta Ebdulezîz bîn Umer El-Berqemîdî hat bînakirin. Sala şeş sed û heştêyan de Mîr Silêman dora Cizîrê de hukumeta xwe danî. Mîr Silêman Kurd bî. Ew Mîr Silêman, rehîmehullah, cedde Bedirxan Begê û hemî umerayên Kurdistanê ye' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Hukkamên Cezîretu îbnî* Umer' [The Rulers of the Jazirat ibn Omar] *Kurdistan* No. 8, December 1, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 213).

[237] *See*, Izady (2005) *The Sharafnama, or, The history of the Kurdish nation, 1597*, California: Mazda Publishers, Inc.

[238] There are minor discrepancies between the list of the names of the rulers in *Sharafname* and *Kurdistan*.

Khan remarkably introduces Sharaf Khan as a mere 'alim' (scholar). [239] What is more, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan disregards Sharaf Khan's claims that the Azîzan family used to be the adherent of Êzîdî religion.[240] As Halbwachs (1992: 49) asserts, history 'does not impose itself on us and we are free to evoke it whenever we wish. We are free to choose from the past the period into which we wish to immerse ourselves.' Abdurrahman Bedir Khan not only omits this piece of crucial information about the previous religion of his ancestors but he also alluringly highlights their Islamic heritage to present a more favourable image of the Azîzan, which brings us to another outstanding discursive practice of the journal *Kurdistan*. The Bedir Khan Brothers traced their family linage or genealogy back to Khalid ibn al-Walid, a companion of the Prophet, and an Arab Umayyad military general who conquered Kurdistan under the banner of Islam in the 7th century. M. M. Bedir Khan wrote:

> O ulema and mîr and aghas of Kurds! You all know my origin and descent. My ancestor is Khalid ibn al-Walid, may God be pleased with him, our tribe is Botan, we are known as the Azîzan (*Kurdistan*, No. 1, 22 April 1898).[241]

Similarly, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan claimed:

> There was a scholar of merit, his name was Sharaf bin Shemseddin… In his history of Kurdistan he wrote that Prince Suleiman is a descendent of

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[239]'Alimek xweyfedil, navê wî Şeref bîn Şemsedîn…' [(there was) a scholar of merit, his name was Sharaf bin Shemseddin...] (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Mîr Silêman bîn Xalid'* [Prince Suleiman bin Khalid] *Kurdistan* No. 8, December 1, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 213). However, when talking about Şah Elî Beg, one of his ancestors, the editor states that Şah Elî Beg along with Emîr Şeref of Bidlis accepted Sultan Selim's suzerainty. It seems like the editor is not aware that *Sharafname* was penned by Emîr Şeref of Bidlis.

[240] Ezîdî, which was initially established as an Islamic sect in the 12th century became a religion in its own right (Allison 2001, 199ab; Kreyenbroek, 1996; Şengül 2014)

[241] 'Gelî ulema û mîr û axayên Kurda! Un hemî esil û nesle min dizanin. Cedde min Hezretê Xalid îbnî Welîd e, redîyellahu teala enhu, eşîra me Botan in, şuhreta nesla me Ezîzan in' (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Untitled'*, *Kurdistan*, No. 1, April 22, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1., p. 116).

Khalid ibn al-Walid [and] he is from the Botan tribe.[242]

This claim to prophetic ancestry at first seems to contradict and undermine the Bedir Khan's claim to Kurdish national identity. However, as stated above, the factual details matter less than the general course of the narrative. Hence, when a historic situation acquires a mythical character, contradictions are forgotten or at least relativized. The same practice is true of the Iranian and Ottoman rulers who also used this religious allusion to legitimized their rules (Hassanpour 2003: 114: Özoğlu 2004: 28).[243] More on the editors appeal to their ancestral background will follow.

The more recent history of the Bedir Khan family was also in the centre of *Kurdistan's* production of the Kurdish history. Therefore, Bedir Khan Beg (1802-1870), the last prince in the genealogy of the Bedir Khan dynasty and the father of the editors of *Kurdistan*, received the utmost attention from the journal. Abdurrahman Bedir Khan narrates his father's rule (1821-1847) in two lengthy articles one in Kurdish and the other one in Turkish. Below is a passage from the article in Kurdish:

> Bedir Khan Beg became the Ruler of Kurdistan [Hakimê Kurdistanê] in 1250 (1835)… At that time the state officials were plundering Kurdistan… However, when Bedir Khan Beg took control, he rescued all tribes and clans from the cruelty of the officials… and ruled over his tribes with

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[242] 'Alimek xweyfedil, navê wî Şeref bîn Şemsedîn… tarîxa xwe ya Kurdistanê de nivîsîye ku Mîr Silêman ji sulala Xalid bin'il-Welîd e, ji eşîra Buxtana' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Mîr Silêman bîn Xalid'* [Prince Suleiman bin Khalid] *Kurdistan* No. 8, December 1, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 213).

[243] In *Sharafname* the lineage of many Kurdish princely families has been traced to the Arab-Islamic origins (cf. Hassanpour 2003: 114; Özoğlu 2004: 28). In the third issue of *KTTG*, the author V.H. claims that Sayyid Abdulkadir, the son of the legendary Shaikh Ubeydullah, was decendent of Porphet Muhammad (See, *Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi, No. 3* December 19, 1908, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 150). The practice of tracing ones roots to the Prophet was common among Kurdish commoners too. Moreover, the same practice is true of the Iranian and Ottoman rulers who also used this religious allusion to legitimized their rule (Hassanpour 2003: 114: Özoğlu 2004: 28).

justice… All Kurdistan, including the Hakkari region fell under his rule.[244]

The articles venerated Bedir Khan Beg and portrayed him as a heroic Kurdish leader and the saviour who protected the Kurds from the corrupt Ottoman governors. Then he asserts that his father as a protector ruled over all Kurdistan, a claim meant to attribute the role of a national leader to Bedir Khan Beg, whereas in reality he was dominating over a considerable territory of Kurdistan but not all of it. Moreover, it is important to note that although Bedir Khan Beg is presented as a Kurdish national leader, his and other Kurdish princes' major concern was to preserve their tribal authority and privileges and expend them when possible. They were not necessarily motivated by nationalist sentiments (Kendal 1980: 17).[245] However, the construction of history from a particular perspective or ideology is a characteristic of nation-builders. When crafting their histories, nations always manipulate their national histories, by eliminating or mitigating the inconvenient or burdensome aspects as well as by promoting certain aspect or even inventing them. After all, as Renan in his famous maxim summarizes: '[g]etting its history wrong is part of being a nation' (cited in Hobsbawm 1992: 12).[246] Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that accurate or not the

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[244] 'Bedirxan Beg sala 1250 de bî Hakimê Kurdistanê…. Wî zemanî Kurdistan nav destê me'mûrên hukumetê talan dibî… Lakîn weqta ku Bedirxan Beg cihê xwe rûnişt, çi qas qebail û eşairên binê destê wî hebîn, ji wê zulma me'mûra xilas kir…û bi edalet eşairên xwe îdare kir…Kurdistan hemî, heta di welatê Hekarya ket binê hukmê wî de' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Bedirxan Beg* [Bedir Khan Beg] *Kurdistan* No. 13, April 2, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 264).

[245] As several newly covered Ottoman documents indicate, Bedir Khan's revolt in 1846 was not motivated by nationalist concerns, but rather it was a reaction to the centralization policies of the Ottoman Empire which required the division and eventually the destruction of his semi-independent Kurdish emirate (Özoğlu 2004: 71; Kendal 1980: 17). Moreover, as Uçarlar (2009) suggests the nationalist character of the Bedir Khan uprising is disputable given the fact that the concept of political nation did not exist in Kurdistan during this period. One of the major reasons that led to the Bedir Khan uprising is that according to the newly introduced Ottoman administration system, Botan, the emirate's core territory, would remained in Diyarbakir province, while Cizre, a subdistrict, would be attached to Mosul, whose governor, Mehmed Paşa was already at odds with Bedirhan Beg' (Özoğlu 2004: 71).

[246] One of the contributions of Renan to the understanding of the nation is the notion of collective act of remembering and the collective act of forgetting. Renan exemplifies the Midi and the Saint Bartholomew massacres in the 13th and the 16th centuries respectively as two instances of collective forgetting in the French case that contributed to the unification of France. 'No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French

journal *Kurdistan* presented Kurdistan like a nation-state and Bedir Khan Beg as the national ruler.

Due to the limited space I am unable to produce and discuss the Turkish article in length but it suffices to say that the dominant tone in the Turkish article is much softer as it revolves around (1) the unjust practices of the state officials – not the state itself- in Kurdistan; (2) the Ottoman state's misconception of Bedir Khan's *alleged* defiant intentions; and (3) the general bitterness –not antagonism- of the Bedir Khan Beg, who was portrayed as a Kurdish leader loyal to the Ottoman state. The Kurdish article, on the other hand, goes beyond this soft tone portraying Bedir Khan Beg under a nationalist light as discussed above. Interestingly, only the Kurdish article concludes with the Armenian struggle against the corrupt Ottoman state officials urging Kurds to ally with the Armenians against the state a point that is completely missing in the Turkish article. Then, it can be argued that the Bedir Khan Brothers tried to sound softer in their nationalist discourse as not to upset their relations with the CUP a dominant concerned shared to different extends by the subsequent Kurdish journals. Nonetheless, a very interesting sentence in the Turkish article stands out.[247] After elaborating how the Bedir Khan administration was erroneously and unfairly perceived as a threat to the Ottoman state, the author wrote:

> Before setting out for Jazeera along with around 30 thousand forces of the regular army, 15 thousand militias and 40 cannons, the Sublime's decree, which included the reasons for the *War of Kurdistan,* was

citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew or the massacre that took place in the Midi' (Renan 1990; 11).

[247] Such discrepancies can be observed throughout the Kurdish journals under consideration. For example, in the 8th issue of *KTTG* one of Halil Hayali's articles was published in Kurdish with each paragraph followed by its Turkish translation. Similarlyb Salih Bedir Khan's article *Kılıçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword] in the 3rd issue of *Rojî Kurd* was translated into Turkish. It is fascinating to see how the nationalist tone of these Kurdish texts were mitigated in their Turkish translations (*see*, Halil Hayali*, 'Weten û Îttîfaqa Kurmanca'* [The Homeland and the Unity of the Kurds], *KTTG,* January 23, 1908, No. 8, in Bozarslan (1998: 391-395) and Salih Bedir Khan, *'Kılıçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK, 2013, p. 174-176)

announced…. (my emphasis).[248]

The author suggestively uses the phrase 'War of Kurdistan' because it presents the conflict as if it was a war between two states, i.e., the Ottoman state and Kurdistan state, which implicitly portrays Bedir Khan beg as a national leader who fought on behalf of the Kurdish nation-state.

4.2.3.2. The Discursive Construction of Kurds as a Primordial/Ancient 'Nation'

The construction of ancient history as a major constituent of identity can be found in all national identity narratives. Hence, it does not come as a surprise to see the primordialization of Kurds through the narration of an ancient past. Nevertheless *Kurdistan*'s treatment of the Kurdish ancient history had to wait until the 24th issue only after the editor was done with the construction of Kurdish history as the familial past of his princely family, i.e., the Bedir Khans. In an article that traces the history of the Kurds back to the antiquity, the author presents the main points of rather complex topics on the history of Kurds and Kurdistan in a condensed fashion, without going into factual details:

> Although the political borders [hudud-i sîyasîye] of Kurdistan are not clearly defined, today they dwell in Media and parts of the old Assyria. The region that includes Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Mosul… Ardalan region and Kermanshah territory, Lower Zab, Bitlis and Batman cities as well as the Lake Van vicinity are the ancient territory [cevelângâh] of this courageous nation [millet] […] Regrettably, we cannot come across any significant Kurdish source if we want to investigate the beginning of the settling of Kurds in these areas. [Thus] it is imperative that we resort to … the Assyrian and the Chaldean historical remnants. […] In their history, we come across one of the enemies of the Assyrians known as 'Kardu'; the ancient Iranian sources prove that these [Kardus] were the present

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[248] 'tecemmu' eden otuz bin kadar asakir-i nizamiye ve on beş bin nefîriam ve kırk pare kadar topları bilistishab Cezire'ye doğru azîmet etmezden mukaddem, Kurdistan muharebesinin esbab ve evamirini hâvî ferman-ı âlî okunup…' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Bedirxan Bey'* [Bedir Khan Beg] *Kurdistan* No. 14, April 20, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 282-285).

day Kurds. In ancient Iranian sources Kurds were known as Kardu and Kardyen. Kardu and Kardyen both in Zend and Sanskrit, which is the mother of Zend language, constitute the origin of the modern term 'Kurd'. Since these nouns mean 'hero' and 'courageous' they are the strongest evidence which prove that these are innate qualities of Kurds that they have inherited [from their ancestors]. [249]

First, the author discursively draws the map of Kurdistan by invoking its major cities, regions, rivers, and mountains. More on this point will follow in the section dealing with the discursive construction of the Kurdish common homeland. Second, he describes the location of Kurdistan through ancient references, i.e., Media and Assyria, which subtly implies that the history of the Kurds can be traced back to the time of ancient Medes (the Median Empire) and the Assyrians which serves as a myth of common origin or ancestory. References to the Assyrian and Chaldean sources as evidence for his claim, further consolidates his argument about the ancient roots of Kurds. Then, exploring the origins of the term 'Kurd' in ancient languages the author claims that the word 'Kurd' is derived from 'Kardu' and 'Kardyen,' which in Sanskrit language meant 'hero' and 'courageous'.[250] All these references add a primordial quality to the Kurds as an ancient entity showing that the Kurdish ethno-cultural legacy goes far back in

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[249] 'Kürdlerin hudud-ı siyasiyeleri lâyıkıyle tayin olunamamış ise de, bugün kadîm Asuristan ile Midya'nın bir kısmını işgal etmektedirler. Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Musul ve… Erdelan hıttasıyle Kermanşah arazisi, Zab-ı Esfel ile Bitlis ve Batman şehirleri havzasıyle Van Golu havalîsi, bu millet-i şecîa'nın cevelângâh-ı ezelîsidir […] Kürdlerin buralarda mebde-i iskânlarına irca-i nazar etmek istersek, vâesefa ki ellerinde, tahsil-i malumata kâfî bir eser-i muhimme tesaduf edemeyi. Bu mecburiyet îcabındandır ki… Asurîlerle Keldanîlerin metrûkât-ı tarihiyelerine muracaate mecburuz […] Tarihlerde, Asurîlerin duşmanları meyanında "Kardu" ismiyle bir millet tesaduf olunur ki, bunların bugunku Kürdler olduğu, Acem desatîr-i kadîmesiyle de isbat olunur. Acem desatîr-i kadîmesinde Kürdler, "Kardik" ve "Kardyen" namıyle müştehirdir. Gerek "Zend" lisanında ve gerek bu lisanın maderi bulunan "Sanskrit"te "Kardu" ve "Kardyen" kelimeleri, bugünkü "Kürd" lafzının aslıdır; "kahraman" ve "bahadır" manalarına delâletettiklerinden, bu milletin şecaat-ı fıtriyeleri miras-ı ezelî olduğuna, mezkûr kelimelerin vech-i tesmiyesi büyük bir delildir' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Kurdistan ve Kürdler* [Kurdistan and Kurds], *Kurdistan* No. 24, September 1, 1900, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. II, p. 425).

[250] The author, probably gathered this information from 'Encyclopedia Brittanica' because a similar account taken from and entry in that encyclopedia was published in the magazine *Jîn* in a piece-meal fashion. *For details, see* the 10th, 11th and the 12th issues of *Jîn in Bozarslan (1985) Vol. 2*.

time and it has been transmitted over many ages and generation in an uninterrupted historical continuity. What is more, the link between Kurdish, Sanskrit and Zend languages[251] might be read as a subtle reference to the pre-Islamic Indo-European roots of Kurds, which distinguishes and dis-identifies the Kurds from all Ottomans, perhaps particularly the Turks and Arabs.[252] In relation to the sources of his claims it is important to note that Abdurrahman Bedir Khan was in close contact with such orientalists as Martin Hartman and Hugo Makas (cf. Malmîsanij 2009: 20). The language preference of this article is also important in that it was written in Ottoman Turkish to make the article accessible not only to the Kurds but also significantly to the Turkish speaking Ottoman readers probably to prove the rootedness of the Kurds in history and thus justify their claim to nationhood.

4.2.3.3. The Discursive Construction of Pantheon of Kurdish Heroes

Kurdistan created what might be called 'the pantheon of Kurdish heroes' as a part of its nationalist narrative, which underlined the positive social, cultural and political continuity of Kurdish identity through ethnic ancestry and personage (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 37). Although the pantheon of *Kurdistan* consists of figures from different historical periods, the most dominant figures came, not surprisingly, from the Bedir Khans[253] in which the father of the two editors received the utmost attention.

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[251] The use of *Zend* as the name of a language or script is a misnomer because the term Zend means 'interpretation' and as such it refers to the language commentaries of the verbatim translation of the manuscripts of Avesta, the most ancient scriptures of Zoroastrianism, to Middle Persian (Opengin 2014: 19).

[252] The Kurdish ancient history was more dominant in the discourse of the subsequent journals, e.g., *Rojî Kurd* and *Jîn*.

[253] The complete list of the ancestors of the Bedir Khan in *Kurdistan* from the 8th issue through the 14th issue is as follows: Issue 8: Xalid bîn Welîd (Khalid ibn al-Walid); Mîr Silêman bîn Xalid; Mîr Ebdulezîz; Emîr Seyfedîn; Emîr Mecdudîn; Emîr Îsa; Emîr Bedredîn; Emîr Ebdal; Emîr Îzedîn; Issue 9: Emîr Ebdal; Emîr Îbrahîm; Emîr Şeref; Emîr Bedir; Emîr Kek Mihemed; Emîr Şeref bîn Emîr Bedredîn; Şah Elî Beg; Bedir Beg Bîn Şah Elî Beg; Issue 10: Mîr Mihemed bîn Bedir Beg; Issue 11: Mîr Mihemed bîn Mîr Mihemed; Emîr Ezîz bîn Emîr Kek Mihemed; Mîr Mihemed bîn Mîr Ebdal; Issue 12: Emîr Şîrvan Xan Abdalah; Issue 13: Bedirxan Beg (in a Kurdish article); Issue 14: Bedirhan Bey (in a Turkish article).

Another such important historical figure was Saladin, the Kurdish commander and the founder of the Ayyubid dynasty. An article entitled *'Selahedînê Eyûbî'* [Saladin Ayyubi] narrates the glory of the Ayyubid Sultanate of Egyp, Syria and Kurdistan under Saladin. The article concludes with Saladin's just administration his role as the protector of the honour of Muslims and his contribution to the Islamic civilization. In the following sections of the article the author stated:

> The founder of the Ayyubid state is Saladin Ayyubi. Himself was Kurdish from the Ruwadiye clan. His father and ancestors were from Dwin […] I pray to God that a few more people like this sultan rise among Kurds so that he [sic] can liberate Kurds and all Muslims from this danger (*Kurdistan* No: 15, 5 May 1899).[254]

Although the article promotes Saladin as a great Muslim warrior and a sultan within the context of Islam, still the significance of Saladin for the editor is his Kurdishness, which is reclaim in the immediate outset of the article wresting Saladin's Kurdish identity out of the Islamic history. Despite this nationalization practice, how much his Kurdish identity mattered to Saladin himself is debatable as Saladin was completely assimilated into the Arabo-Islamic culture in a milieu in which the dominant social identity marker was religion not ethnicity (Kreyenbroek 1996: 107; McDowall 2004: 23; Kendal 1996: 10).[255] Moreover, the article underlines an uninterrupted historical continuity of the Kurds when the author expresses his wish that Kurds could raise a like of Saladin.

Two other Kurdish rulers promoted in the pages of *Kurdistan* were Bad, the founder of the Marvanid dynasty and Ebu Said who later on also ruled the Marvanids:

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[254] 'Muessisê dewleta Eyûbîye Selahedînê Eyûbî ye. Ew xwe Kurd bî, ji qebîla 'Ruwadîyê' bî. Bab û bapîrê wî ji 'Dwîn'ê bî' […] Ez hêvî ji Xwedê dikim ku nav Kurda du-sê mirovê dî wek wî sultanî peyda bibin, da Kurda ji wê tehluka ew û hemi Musulman tê de ne, xilas bike' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, 'Selahedînê Eyûbî' [Saladin Ayyubid], *Kurdistan* No. 15, May 5, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 300-301).

[255] When the Mufti of Jerusalem was praising the 'Kurdish swords which defeated the Crusaders and liberated the Holy Land' Saladin in his reply emphasized his Islamic identity rather than his Kurdisness (Lyons and Jackson (1992) cited in Kendal 1996: 10).

The courageous commander Bad, who established The Marwanid or Humeydiye dynasty with Diyarbekir as its capital city, provided a great service to the Islamic civilization. Especially during the reign of Ebu Said,[256] this dynasty brought up many well-known scholars and people of merit. In fact, as if out of longing for its glamorous success of good old days, Amed that is Diyarbekir[257] city seems as though it has wrapped itself up in a black robe of mourning; while back then the centre of science and art, today it is just like the other Ottoman provinces; it is destroyed day by day under the cruelty of Abdulhamid's administration (*Kurdistan* No: 24, 1 September 1900).[258]

Here the author nostalgically celebrates the glorious days of Ebu Said administration and the Marwanids' contribution to the Islamic culture. It seems that the implicit yet the underlying message is about the prosperity of *Amed* under a Kurdish ruler –that is before the arrival of the Turks in the region. However, now that it is destroyed under Abdulhamid, a Turkish ruler, Amed is *'in grief as the outward expression of the loss of its Kurdish king.'* Then it can be argued that the editor's rhetoric revolves around the present humiliation and oppression as opposed to the favourable and glorious past that is expected to provide a prescription for the problems of the present in the pursuit of a brighter future.

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[256] Bozarslan claims that this must be Sultan Naruddevle Ebu Nasr. He was never known as Ebu Said although he had a son named Said.

[257] It should be noted that as Boazarslan indicates, although Amed was also under the rule of the Marwanids, the capital city of the Marwanids was not Amed but Farqîn (Silvan), *see*, *Kurdistan* No. 24, September 1, 1900, Vol. 2, p. 427, fn. 53). Bozarslan further states that the Marwanid dynasty was never known as Humeydiye dynasty the way it is claimed by Abdurrahman Bedir Khan.

[258] 'Payitahtları Diyarbekir olmak üzre, Emîr-i şuca' "Bad"ın teşkil etmiş olduğu Mervaniye yahud Humeydiye Hükümeti, medeniyet-i Islâmiyeye hayli hidemâta muvaffak olmuştur. Bahusus bu hanedandan Sultan Ebusaid'in devrinde pek çok meşahîr-i ulema ve fuzala yetişmiş ve hatta bugun, o zamanki şa'şaa-i ikbaline tahassurle libas-ı siyah-ı mateme burunmuş zannolunan "Amed" yani "Diyarbekir" şehri, o zamanlar merkez-i ulûm ve funûn olmuştu; bugun ise, sair vilâyât-ı şahane gibi, idarei Hamidiyenin zulmu altında gunden gune mahvolmaktadır.' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Kurdistan ve Kürdler'* [Kurdistan and Kurds], *Kurdistan* No. 24, September 1, 1900, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 427).

There is also a significant naming practice in the extract. Naming practices are important in that names become parts of the subject's nature in collective remembering (Halbwachs 1992: 72). Billig (1995: 73) asserts that if 'we' are to imagine 'ourselves' as unique, 'we' need a name to do so. Similarly, Tajfel's (1981) Social Identity Theory suggests that,

> 'we' must categorize 'ourselves' with a distinctive label, so that 'we' are 'French', or 'Belgian' or 'Turkish' or 'Breton', or 'Flemish' or 'Kurdish'. The category not only categorizes 'us', in our particularity –demarcating 'us' as an 'us'- but the category is to be categorized (or proclaimed) as a national label in its universality. There is, in short, a universal code for the naming of particulars.

Similarly, in the extract, *Amed* as the original Kurdish nomenclature is foregrounded while *Diyarbekir* is backgrounded as an act of semantic cleansing to promote the Kurdish identity of that city.[259]

4.2.4. The Discursive Construction of Common Culture

The editors of *Kurdistan* were also engaged in the cultivation of Kurdish literature to demonstrate the capacity of Kurdish as a language of literature and high culture, which in turn would instill the Kurds with a sense of national pride. However, the use of Kurdish classical literature remained limited in *Kurdistan* given that although Kurds possessed a rich body of oral literature (Allison 1996a) a considerable portion of this heritage was not written due to social, economic and political limitations (Hassanpour 1992: 70).[260] Therefore, only a few written works of literature existed and even fewer were accessible to reflect on, as most of these works were manuscripts in scattered private collections. As a result,

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[259] Even today, referring to this city by its Kurdish name Amed instead of Diyarbakir/Diyarbekir is one of the most obvious discursive practice that underlines and claims the Kurdish identity of the city.

[260] Some of the major poets whose works were possibly available to the editors of *Kurdistan* are Mela Pareşan, Elî Harîrî, Melayê Cizîrî, Feqîyê Teyran, Melayê Bateyî, Xanayi Qubadi, Abdurrahman Salim, Xidir Nalî and so forth. See Hassanpour (1992: 70-70) for an extensive list of Kurdish poets from the 14th to the early 20th centuries.

Kurdistan heavily drew upon Ahmad Khani's *Mem û Zîn* and the poetry of Haji Qadir Koyi.[261]

Aware of the nation-forming power of language and literature (Dominian 1917: 318; Brennan 1990: 52) the Bedir Khan Brothers took great national pride in *Mem û Zîn* and promoted it as such. From the 2nd issue on they began publishing *Mem û Zîn* in a piecemeal fashion turning it into a printed material and a monumental piece of Kurdish national literature.[262] It is important to emphasize that the publication of Kurdish literature for *Kurdistan* was not an end in itself neither was it for purely aesthetic concerns. Rather the journal saw these samples of Kurdish literature 'as the hallmark of a civilizsed and sovereign people' (Hassanpour 1996: 49). In this context, the discursive act of publishing *Mem û Zîn* became a sample of Kurdish vernacular literature that served *Kurdistan* at the level of ideological and intellectual program, while it served the Kurdish masses as an emotional link between language and national identity (cf. Fishman 1972). In his introduction of *Mem û Zîn* to the reader's of *Kurdistan*, M. M. Bedir Khan wrote:

> I have, from time to time, read this book to some Turkish and Arab ulema and translated it for them; they all said 'we have never seen anything of this sort that would be superior to this book.' (*Kurdistan* No: 2, 6 May 1898)[263]

Coming from Turkish and Arab ulama, such recognition of *Mem û Zîn* was perhaps particularly meaningful for the editor and the readership, given that

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[261] Another possible reason for the Bedir Khan Brothers' preference might be that Khani and Koyi, who are considered to be the two apostles of Kurdish nationalism (Hassanpour 1992: 57), were more nationally and politically oriented than others. One important work of literature that was indeed available to *Kurdistan* but was not used extensively was Sharaf al-Din [Sharaf Khan] of Bidlisi's (1543-1603) *Sharafname* (1596).

[262] Before *Kurdistan, Mem û Zîn*'s manuscripts were in the private possession of medrese educated Kurdish mullahs (*see*, the introduction to *Kurdistan*, in Bozarslan (1991: 22)).

[263] '[M]in ev kitêb carina hin ulemayên Tirk û Ereb re xwendiye û tercume kiriye, hemîya jî gotîye ku 've re de ji vê kitêbê çêtir me nedîye' (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Untitld' Kurdistan* No. 2, May 6, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 127).

Kurdish was, in a sense, competing with these two languages. Also notice how the word 'translation' reinforces the status of Kurdish as a unique language different from Turkish and Arabic.

It is important to note that the editor's of *Kurdistan* did not discriminate against the religious, e.g., the '*Dibace'* (Prologue) section, and the secular or patriotic sections of *Mem û Zîn,* e.g. the section entitled 'Derdê Me' [Our Troubles]. To be sure, the editors started with the very first verses of the *Dibace*, which were purely about religion, the glory of God, and Sufic love as it was the tradition of the *masnavi* genre in which *Mem û Zîn* was written.[264] Nevertheless, the present author believes that the editors of *Kurdistan* had no particular interest in the propagation of religion. In any case, the editors were determined to publish this epic story in its entirety.[265] Furthermore, the editors reproduced the religious verses to illustrate that the Kurdish language was also capable of producing a vibrant and colorful example of high literature. What is more, the editors also intended to show Khani's learning and the articulation of this wisdom in Kurdish. In any case, one of the major motivations for putting emphasis on language and literature is the revival of that past and turning its cultural products into elements of everyday reality and hence establish a link to greatness 'particularly for those whose current greatness was far from obvious' (Jaszi 1992, cited in Fishman 1972: 45).

However, the significance of the language of *Mem û Zîn* for *Kurdistan* does not mean that the journal did not show interest in its content. On the contrary, *Kurdistan* exploited *Mem û Zîn*'s content as much as its form. As we saw earlier,

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[264] As a literary genre 'a masnavi is divided into sections, which often receive decorative headings in the manuscripts; conventionally the poem opens with a section invoking the blessing of God and singing his praises; this is followed by a section that praises the prophet Muhammad; next the poets' patron, who commission the book, is eulogized, then, there is usually a section explaining the reason for the composition of the book' (Morrison 1981: 11)

[265] The Bedir Khan Brothers were working through *Mem û Zîn* to publish it in its entirety as M. M. Bedir Khan indicates in the 2nd issue: 'In each [issue of this] newspaper I will publish some of this book, until it is completed' (Her cerîdekê de ezê ji wê kitêbê hine binivîsim, heta xilas bibe) (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Untitled' Kurdistan* No. 2, May 6, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 127). However they did not get all the way through as the publication of *Kurdistan* ceased after the 31st issue.

the Bedir Khan Brothers did not hesitate to cite verses of Khani's *Mem û Zîn* to convey some of their explicitly nationalist messages. Furthermore, when announcing the publication of *Mem û Zîn*, M. M. Bedir Khan wrote:

> On the surface it is the story of two young lovers, but many *hidden meanings*, accounts and wisdom can be inferred from it. That is why one should read [it] carefully (*Kurdistan* No. 2, 6 May 1898).[266]

Presumably, the 'hidden meaning' of *Mem û Zîn* hinted at in this extract implies the view that the romance aspect of this epic, the impossible love between Mem and Zîn, is just an allegoric reflection of the Kurdish society of the period that was divided between the Ottoman and Savafid Empires (Chyet 1991: 33; Hassanpour 1992; 2003). However, instead of stating this allegory explicitly, the editor, probably due to unfavourable social and political circumstances of the period, e.g., their close relations with the CUP, contented himself with giving a *hint* only and let the reader to fill the gap that is to infer the true yet the 'hidden meaning' of the epic.

Such a 'nationalist' interpretation might be seen as a too much reading into the intended meaning of *Mem û Zîn* because after all Khani's remarks were a part of a prologue in a masnawi genre which might dilute the nationalist message one would like to see, not to mention the fact that in Khani's time, i.e. the late 17th century, the European notion of nationalism in its modern sense was an unfamiliar concept in the Ottoman Middle East. However, as we saw earlier, in *the Derdê Me (Our Trouble]* section of his work, Khani did indeed problematize the division of Kurdistan between the Ottoman and the Persian Empires and expressed the need for a Kurdish king who would unite Kurds and bring an end to the domination of the Turks, Arabs and Persians.

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[266] 'Eşkare hîkata eşqa du ciwana ye, batin, gelek meqsed û hîsse û hîkmet jê tên fehmkirin. Loma divê mirov bi dîqet bixwînitin' (M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan* No. 2, May 6, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, pp. 126-127).

Moreover, it is remarkable that a number of prominent Kurdish scholars have found the genealogy of Kurdish nationalism in Khani's *Mem û Zîn.* For instance, Haji Qadir Koyi in as early as the 1890s labeled *Mem û Zîn* as 'the book of our *nation*' (Bruinessen 2003: 50), which marks the advent of modernity along with the idea of nationalism in the Ottoman and Kurdish context. Then, it can be argued that the increasing influence of the notion of nationalism must have enabled Koyi to read *Mem û Zîn* in this particular way without feeling the necessity to pay much attention to the classic convention it was written in. A similar reading of *Mem û Zîn* was also dominant in the national identity discourse of *Rojî Kurd*, as that journal utilizes the patriotic verses of *Mem û Zîn* for the promotion of nationalist ideas and sentiments. Moreover, this nationalist reading of the book has been shared and expressed by contemporary scholars over the course of the 20th century, notably by Amir Hassanpour (1992).[267]

Going back to M. M. Bedir Khan's subtle voice about his interpretation of *Mem û Zîn*, first, the discourse of *Kurdistan* was not and could not be as radical as that of Khani's *Mem û Zîn* for many reasons: (1) Khani was a product of Kurdish medrese of an agrarian Kurdish society under the administration of autonomous semi-independent Kurdish principalities without the direct Ottoman rule, while the Bedir Khan brothers were the products of the Ottoman modern school system in the era of nationalism and published *Kurdistan* under the threat of the oppressive Hamidian regime; (2) *Mem û Zîn* and *Kurdistan* differed in form –the former was poetry, the latter was prose- targeting different audiences through two different genres within two different historical contexts.[268] Khani as a patriot and his work as an expression of his personal grief in the form of a poetry, was meant, with its few copies, for a small Kurdish elite circle of the 17th century medrese who were bestowed with the prestige of literacy (*See* Bozarslan, introduction to *Kurdistan*,

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[267] See a fascinating discussion between Hassanpour (2003) and Vali (2003) about whether Khani's *Mem û Zîn* was the first manifestation of Kurdish nationalism.

[268] It is noteworthy that Kurdish prose writing started with Kurdish journalistic activities (Blau 1996: 23).

p. 87; Bruinessen 2003: 42; Memduh Selimbegî, *Jîn*, issue 16, in Bozarslan p. 718); while *Kurdistan* in the era of nationalism was a prosaic *cerîde* (newspaper) produced on larger scale in a printing press with the largest audience attainable targeting the political and cultural elite and non-elite, including the Young Turks as well as the Ottoman state officials. Because, the social and political realities of the late Ottoman period that coupled with the personal and familial interests and concerns of the editors played a significant role in setting the tone of their journal, the Bedir Khan Brothers made an extensive use of Khani's radical political tone.

4.2.4.1.   The Discursive Construction of Historical Continuity of Identity through Literature

It goes without saying that the sections of *Mem û Zîn* on the pages of *Kurdistan* had implications other than giving authenticity, validity, prestige and credibility to the Kurdish language. Nationalists frequently appeal to literature in order to add the 'image of antiquity' or a primordial quality to their nation given the nationalist belief that a nation is as old as its language. In other words, if the language has always existed so has the nation. With a similar concern, the publication of *Mem û Zîn* helped to demonstrate the retrospective pattern of the Kurdish language. In that *Mem û Zîn* served the journal's *strategy of perpetuation* (Wodak et al. 1999:39) putting emphasis on the uninterrupted historical continuity or *'la longue durée,'* to use Smith's (2003) term, of Kurdish 'national' identity.

Introducing *Mem û Zîn* to the reader, M. M. Bedir Khan proudly said:

> In year 1105 (1695),[269] Ahmad Khani, in Jazeera, wrote a poetic book…
> This book was written two hundred and ten years ago (*Kurdistan* No. 2, 6 May, 1898)[270]

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[269] 1105 according to Hijri calendar, which corresponds to 1675 in Gregorian calendar.

[270] 'Sala hezar û sed û pêncê de Cizîrê Ehmedê Xanî kitêbek menzûm nivîsîye… Ew kitêb berî du sed û deh sala hatîye nivîsandin' (M. M. Bedir Khan, '*Untitled*', *Kurdistan* No. 2, May 6, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 127).

Having already provided the date, it was not a crucial piece of information to indicate how much time had passed since Khani wrote his *Mem û Zîn*, however it seems that the author added this 'redundant' but crucial piece of information purposefully with a particular goal in mind: to specify how old this monumental Kurdish book was. Hence the oldness of *Mem û Zîn* provided the editor with the opportunity to draw attention to the antiquity of this literary work and hence the historical uninterrupted continuity of Kurds as an identifiable 'national' community that possessed hight literature. Then it is fair to argue that *Kurdistan* constructed *Mem û Zîn* as a piece of Kurdish national literature transforming a literary tradition into a national property and a 'usable past' (cf. Fishman 1972: 8; Hobsbawm 1983: 5; Brennan 1990: 53). In this context, for *Kurdistan* Kurdish language and literature were not simply the 'highroad to history,' but they were the 'voice of years that were gone' (cf. Fishman 1972: 45).

It is important to note that *Kurdistan* presented a limited culturally based concept of national identity because the Kurdish language and a few examples of Kurdish literature remained as the two major elements of collective Kurdish culture. Nevertheless, *Kurdistan* attempted to enrich its repertoire of the Kurdish common culture by constructing a specific national character through what is claimed to be the common features of Kurdish mentality, behaviours, attitudes and Kurdish way of life (cf. Wodak *et al*. 1999:119). Discussing the rhetoric of identification, Billig (1995: 98) asserts that when addressing the imagined national audience national leaders identify themselves with the praised audience, which is described as the greatest on earth. 'They dress is in rhetoric finery, then, these speakers-as-outfitter hold a mirror so the nation can admire itself' (*ibid*.). Similarly, the editors of *Kurdistan* promoted Kurdish mentality and behaviours through *the strategy of positive self-representation* with the lexemes of bravery, wisdom, generosity and similar positive attributions, which distinguished the Kurds from other ethnic

communities of the Empire (cf. Wodak *et al*. 1999: 39).[271] Below are some relevant excerpts from *Kurdistan*:

> Kurds are more hard working and benevolent than all other nations [qewm].[272]

> Kurds are generous and talented by nature.[273]

> Although Kurds possess the most distinguished human characters such as intelligence, comprehension, courage, assiduousness, generosity, devotion and loving freedom idolatrously, one does not come across their name in world history…[274]

Knowing the importance of authenticity, purity and nobility of the beliefs, values and behaviours in ethno-cultural characterization, the editors of *Kurdistan*, in these and similar articles, portrayed Kurds as brave, intelligent, patriotic, strong, kind and generous people, in comparison to other nations (cf. Wodak et al. 1999:119). Even what seems to be a negative self-representation in the last extract, it is actually a part of the journal's *strategy of the shift of blame and responsibility*, which seeks the failure of the intelligent, generous, hard working

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[271] Khani in his *Mem û Zîn* also used the strategy of positive self-representation balancing it with the strategy of shift of blame holding the ill-fate of the Kurds responsible for their misery. Thus, *Kurdistan*, in a sense, imitated Khani's strategy. The following is the title of a section from *Mem û Zîn* published in the 8th issue of *Kurdistan*: 'A statement about the tributes of Kurdish tribes, such as bravery, and hard-workign, [and a statement] to show their misfortune and ill-fate in spite of their generosity and patriotism' [Îş'ara Medîheta Tewaîfêd Kurdan e bi Şeca'et û Xîretê Îzhara Bedbextî û Bêtaliîya Wan e Digel Hinde Semahet û Hemîyetê] (*Mem û Zin*, reproduced in *Kurdistan* No. 8, December 1, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991) , Vol. 2, p. 216).

[272] 'Kurd ji hemî qewma zêdetir xweyxîret û hîmmet in' (M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled,' *Kurdistan*, No. 4, June 3, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1, p. 148).

[273] 'Kurd bi xilqeta xwe mirovên camêr û jêhatî ne' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, '*Laysa lil-insani illa masaa'* [Man Can Have Nothing But What He Strives For], *Kurdistan* No. 7, November 5, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 198).

[274] 'Kürdler, zekâ ve dirayet, şecaat ve faaliyet, civanmerdlik ve istihkar-ı hayat, perestişkari-i hurriyet gibi hasail-i berguzide-i insaniyenin cumlesine malik olmalarına rağmen, tarih-i âlemde namlarına nadiren tesaduf olunduğu gibi…' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Kurdistan ve Kürdler* [Kurdistan and Kurds], *Kurdistan*, No. 24, September 1, 1900, in Bozarslan (1991) Vol. 1, p. 425).

and talented in their misfortune and ill-fate, a point that will be discussed in details when analysing the subsequent journals.

4.2.5. The Discursive Construction of National Body (Common Territory and Homeland)

One of the conditions of modernity was a fundamental shift in ideas about the significance of territory, which transformed the territory from a geographical expression of cultural identity into an essential basis for defining group identities in *national* terms (Penrose 2002: 283). In other words, since the social construction of one's national homeland as an object of primordial attachment renders emotional ties similar to that of kinship (Stern 2000), territory as *locus amoenus* became a primary factor in defining national identities (cf. Wodak *et al*. 1999: 150). Consequently, nations as products of modernity usually claim a recognized territory with which they are associated as *the homeland* beyond its physical and practical function (Smith 1981: 63; 2003: 31). It follows that, because 'a nation without its homeland is unthinkable' (Smith 1981: 63) every nation, as a great family, should have a home[land], the way a family should have a home. After all in the age of nationalism 'every inhabitant is expected to be tied to one national soil… or to be an outcast (Harris 1990: 257-258). Referring to Anderson's notion of 'imagined communities', Billig (1995: 74) asserts 'a nation is more than an imagined community of people, for a place –a homeland- also has to be imagined'. That is in national identity narrative the space is transformed into a place when it acquires a 'perceptual unity'; the space becomes a national territory or homeland when it is delimited in nationalist thought through strategies that connects society and space in a profoundly new way. Hence, nationalism carries a space to a new ontological level in a way it did not exist previously (Penrose 2002: 278-279).

During the Ottoman period the term 'Kurdistan' referred to a geographical area without any clearly defined boundaries (Bruinessen 1997), however, given the essential role of national territory in national imagination, the journal *Kurdistan,* in its discourse of *territorial nationalism*, presented Kurdistan as a well-defined

homogenous geoethinc territory and the historical homeland of the Kurds. To begin with, the name of the journal, i.e., *Kurdistan*, is significant in that the Kurdish national homeland was embedded in the very fabric of the journal's name and as such it was flagged discursively in bold-faced large fonts at the top of the front page of every issue. When analysed from the perspective of 'banal nationalism' it can be argued that it was an everday representation of the Kurdish nation as a constant affirmation reminding the Kurds of their national homeland.[275]

The folio section of the journal right beneath the journal's name also reproduced Kurdistan as a national territory. A notice on the right hand side of the folio section read:

> Each time I will send two thousand [copies of the] newspapers to Kurdistan to be distributed to people free of charge.[276]

On the left hand side another notice read:

> Yearly subscription fee for everywhere outside Kurdistan [Kurdistan haricinde] is 80 pennies; it is free of charge for special requests from within Kurdistan [Kurdistan dahilinde].[277]

In both of these 'homeland-making' notes, to use Billig's terms, the editors utilized the powerful dichotomy of *'particular homeland* versus *general elsewhere'* with clear-cut imaginary boundaries; in that Kurdistan is discursively constructed

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[275] Up to the 15th issue the word 'Kurdistan' appeared in the Arabic script only. However, from the 16th issue on it was also reproduced in the Latin alphabet script, though in smaller fonts right beneath the Arabic version. Producing the word 'Kurdistan' significantly in Latin scrpt itself was a major discursive practice in that while the Arabic script was associated with the Ottoman empire and Islamic community (ummah), the Roman alphabet was associated with the advanced West and its social, cultural and political values. With this discourse practice the editor perhaps intended to do away with and dis-identify from the Ottoman/Turkish or Islamic identity in favor of a pro- Western inclination. In this sense, it is also the reaffirmation of the Western civilization often promoted by the journal.

[276] 'Her car du hezar cerîdeya ez ê rêkim Kurdistanê da belaş bidin xelkê.'

[277] 'Kurdistan haricinde her yer için senelik abone bedeli 80 kuruştur; Kurdistan dahilinde hususî isteyenlere meccanen gonderilir.'

as a *particular territory* as the Kurdish homeland through the phrase *'within Kurdistan'*; then, this *particularity* is further consolidated with the construction of *'generalized elsewhere'* or 'the unspecified world of foreigners and others' through the phrase *'outside Kurdistan'* (cf. Meyrowitz 1997: 62; Billig 1995: 100). Although, in the Ottoman administrative system of the day Kurdistan had been divided into different provincial administrations under different names, this discursive act disregarded this division presenting Kurdistan as a unified geoethinc territory and a national homeland. [278]

In addition, although neither of the notes in the folio section mention the word Kurd explicitly, Kurds are ingrained in those notices through presuppositions; in the first notice the deictic word *'people'* refers to '*us Kurds'* or the people of Kurdistan, who would receive the paper free of charge, elevating the Kurds to a privileged position, while the second notice further reinforces this special and privileged status, by repeating that the paper waves subscription fee for *people from within Kurdistan*. As Hall and Held (1989) have observed, in modern politics '*the* people' is a discursive construction that is synonymous with *the* nation. Similarly in the folio section of Kurdistan, *the people* [xelk], i.e., the members of the Kurdish nation, have been granted the privilege of receiving the paper free of charge while foreigners or *others*, i.e., all non-Kurds have to pay the fee. Undoubtedly, neither everybody in Kurdistan was Kurdish nor the author makes such an explicit claim. Nevertheless, offering a Kurdish paper free of charge only for those within Kurdistan and not for those outside it creates the impression that all people residing in Kurdistan *are* Kurdish. In any case, the name *Kurd-istan* (the place/home of the Kurds) reinforces this automatically.

Another powerful discursive act in journal *Kurdistan* is the use of collocations, which are the phenomena of certain words frequently co-occurring next to or near each other (Baker 2006: 95-96). Collocates are extremely important to understand the meaning of words in relation to the surrounding words. As we

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[278] See Özoğlu (2004: 59-68) for a detailed account of the Ottoman administrative units and policies in Kurdistan.

saw, the first notice above reads: 'Each time I will send two thousand [copies of the] newspapers to Kurdistan to be distributed to people free of charge'. In the original text, i.e., *(Kurdistanê da belaş bidin xelkê),* the words *Kurdistan* and people are separated only by the preposition *da* [in order to], the adverb *belaş* [free] and the verb *bidin* [inflection of the verb 'to give']. Thus in this sentence the deictic word 'people' refers exclusively to the Kurds since it is juxtaposed with the word 'Kurdistan.' That is the meaning of the deictic word 'people' contextually determined by the word 'Kurdistan', here in the folio section and elsewhere. For instance M. M. Bedir Khan in an article wrote:

> …we should take care of [all] Kurdish [Kurmanc] children as if they are our own children. Therefore whoever among the people of Kurdistan wishes to send their child to Istanbul for education, they should send them to my brother…[279]

It is remarkable how the author equates the Kurds [Kurmancs] in the first sentence to *the people of Kurdistan* in the second sentence by implying through a taken-for-granted supposition that *Kurds* and the *people of Kurdistan* are one and the same. Moreover, using *Kurds* and *the people of Kurdistan* interchangeably surpasses the segregation of the Kurdish community along linguistic, sectarian, tribal and regional lines creating a new bond among them by turning the territory into homeland and a primary element of identification.

Furthermore, the word 'Kurdistan' appears six times in the folio section of each issue only. This high frequency further intensifies the familiar assumption amongst the readers that although the village, neighbourhood, town, city or the region they live in might be different, they are all a part of a larger [home]land that is called 'Kurdistan.'

As discussed in chapter 3, a typical newspaper is divided into multiple sections such as home/domestic/national, international/abroad, editorial, and so forth, in

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[279] '…divê em wek zarûyên xwe fekirin zarûyên Kurmanca. Lewre ji xelkê Kurdistanê kî vê zarûyên xwe rêket Istanbulê da bixwîne, rêkin cem birayên min…' (M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan*, No. 3, May 20, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1. p. 133).

which the sections dedicated to home and abroad habitually contribute to the construction of the homeland. The journal *Kurdistan* did not come out in such standard newspaper format, due to the lack of opportunities or professionalism. The lack of such sections, particularly the lack of home/domestic vs. abroad sections, as a form of 'banal nationalism' (Billig 1995), might have contributed to the reproduction of the notion of Ottomanism as most of the hard-news in the *Havadis* (Happenings) section pertained to the issues concerning all Ottomans, e.g., the news about the activities of the CUP members or the Ottoman palace. However, a discursive influence similar to home vs. abroad is achieved through the imbalance between news from or about Kurdistan and those about *other* places in favour of the former. Roughly, more than 60 percent of all texts in *Kurdistan* are exclusively about Kurds and Kurdistan while around 21 percent are about issues pertaining to all Ottoman communities including Kurds. Only 17 percent of the news pertained to issues that were not exclusively Kurdish concerns, although were still presented from a Kurdish perspective (*See* Table 3).

News concerning Kurds	News concerning Kurds & other Ottomans	News not directly concerning Kurds
60%	21%	17%

Table 3. Distribution of the content of the news in Kurdistan

Thus, reporting or writing predominantly on Kurdistan, in line with the 'homocentricism' of the press (cf. Fowler 1991: 16), was an effective discursive act that contributed to the construction Kurdistan as a Kurdish homeland.

Another important source of such discursive acts in the construction of the homeland can be found in the content of the texts in *Kurdistan*. For instance, in an open letter to the Sultan Abdulhamid the editor M. M. Bedir Khan requests the lifting of the ban on the circulation of his journal in Kurdistan:

> Believing in the sanctuary of the land on which you, the Padishah, to whom we turned for help, has set foot, I humbly request your orders for

[the journal *Kurdistan*] to be allowed in Kurdistan and other places where Kurds live.[280]

In the clause *'in Kurdistan and other places where Kurds live'* it is assumed that Kurdistan is an exclusive Kurdish homeland inhabited by Kurds as the are also those Kurds who do not live in their Kurdish homeland but 'elsewhere' outside of Kurdistan. Such discursive practices contribute to the perception of Kurdistan as the exclusive national homeland of the Kurds.

In an article that condemns the Sultan for his mistreatment of the Bedir Khans, the editor Abdurrahman Bedir Khan wrote:

> …Five of my brothers who wanted to leave Istanbul for Kurdistan, which is their *ancient* sanctuary and their *original* [aslî] homeland… (*Kurdistan*, No. 7, 5 November 1898).[281]

Notice how the editor constructs Kurdistan as the ancient and the *original* [aslî] homeland of Kurds as opposed to their, say, 'unoriginal/none-native' homeland, i.e., any other Ottoman territory outside of Kurdistan.[282]

In the above extracts the term 'Kurdistan' acquired a political connotation as a unified political entity in the discourse of this journal. Consider the following extract from an article by Abdurrahman Bedir Khan in which this political connotation is further reinforced:

> Now, Kurdistan is also under the Turks, under the control of Abdulhamid, like other countries. Abdulhamid sends the state officials that rule over

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[280] '[*Kurdistan* gazetesinin] Kurdistan'la Kürdlerin bulundukları mahâll-ı saireye duhulu hususuna ruhsat itasının Babıâlî'ye irade ve ferman buyurulmasını hâkipay-ı hacetreva-i Şahanelerine iltica ile istirham ederim' (M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Open Letter No. 1', *Kurdistan*, No. 4, June 3, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1, p. 147).

[281] '…İstanbul'u terk ile, me'va-i kadîmleri ve vatan-ı aslîleri bulunan Kurdistan'a gitmek isteyen beş biraderimi…' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, 'Open Letter No. 4', *Kurdistan*, No. 7, November 5, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1. p. 195).

[282] The same phrase (vatan-î aslî) is also used in *Rojî Kurds* (see, *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, (1913: 5)).

you. But the Kurds are the owners of Kurdistan. For instance, if an enemy attacks Kurdistan, Kurds will die for it [Kurdistan]. Kurds cultivate the soil of that place; Kurds plant the trees of that place... Kurdistan is yours.[283]

Here too Kurdistan is portrayed as a unified country exclusively inhabited and *owned* by Kurds. Furthermore, what makes Kurdistan a Kurdish homeland is the fact that Kurds cultivate its soil and plant its trees and would defend it to death if attached.[284] Notice how the extract appeals to the emotive power of the homeland to evoke patriotic feelings by exploiting the emotional attachments to the 'folk' and the agrarian life-style and customs of the peasantry (cf. Smith 2003: 31). Still, the most politically outstanding assentation is in the first three lines where Abdurrahman Bedir Khan portrays Kurdistan as a colonized homeland under the occupation of the another nation: the *Turks*, Abdulhamid and his officers who are not the real owners of Kurdistan and thus *foreigners*.

4.2.5.1. The Semantic Shift in the term *'Welat'* (Homeland)

At this juncture it is important to discuss the semantic shift the term 'welat' went through in the early Kurdish journalistic discourse. In the pre-modern periods the term 'welat/wilat' generally referred to the *residing area* of an individual or a group of people, e.g., *'native region/province.'* This is because 'welat' is derived from the Arabic word 'wilāyah', from which the Ottoman word 'vilayet' (province) comes.[285] In this sense, the term 'welat' approximately had the same connotation

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[283] 'Nuho Kurdistan jî weke welatên di binê Tirka, bine deste Ebdulhemîd de ye; me'mûrên serê we Ebdulhemîd rêdike. Lakin xweyîyê Kurdistanê Kurd in. Wekî neyarek hat ser Kurdistanê, Kurd ê xwe ser bidin kuştin. Erdê wê derê Kurd dikolin, darên wê derê Kurd diçînin… Loma, Kurdistan ya we ye' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Thabat Al-Mulk Bel 'Adl'* [Justice is the Foundation of the Authority], (*Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1, p. 229.)

[284] Discussing the rhetoric of soil and blood Chabod (1996: 125) argues that after the French Revolution the nation became the patria (homeland) and the goddess of the modern world, a new divinity and sacred; 'The *patria* as sacred; blood shed for it as sanctified'. In a similar manner, the journal *Kurdistan* evoked the sacrifices through the rhetoric of soil and blood and hence turned Kurdistan into a *patria*.

[285] According to Hans Wehr's (1994: 1301) Arabic-English dictionary 'wilāyah' signifies: sovereign power, sovereignthy, rule, government, or administrative district.

as 'wilāyah' (province or region) [286] as evident from three oral versions of Khani's *Mem û Zîn*.[287] Likewise, the frequent use of 'welat' as a 'native district, region or town' can be found in the Baban school of poetry for instance in the poems of Nalî, Salim and Kurdî the term "welat" refers to 'Sulemanî' a major Kurdish province.

It seem that the first significant semantic shift in the meaning of 'welat' from 'native province' to the native 'homeland' took place in the poetry of Haji Qadir Koyî (2007: 78-83), who used the term 'welat' to referred to the entire Kurdish land. For instance, in his famous qasida *'Xakî Cezîr û Botan'* (the Land of Jazira and Botan), warning his audience against the threat posed by the Armenian

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[286] While the Arabic 'wilāyah' is feminine, the Kurdish 'welat' is masculine.

[287] Version 1: *'Mem û Zînê'* in Eminê Evdal's 'Folklora Kyrmança' (1936: 261-292):
Gava kevotka xatûn Zîn radikirin Welat-welat ra derbaz dikirin
P'encera Memê ra xar kirin Nizam ev çi welat e, çi cî ye
Memê li Zînê nihêrî, axînek hatê, dilê xweda got:
dibe eva Zînê be, evê ji k'ê derê navê min zanibû,
gelo li welatê bavê min yeke mina vê t'une bû, wekî min bistenda,
Memê p'oşman bû ur girîa,
-Ax çawîşno, hûne minafiq,
Ez hatime ji welatê mifriq,
We çima bîr kir yê xuliq
Ezê welatê we xerîbîyê da bimirim bê xwey û bê xwedan
Qeret'ajdîn mîr ra got:
-Mîrê min, eva çend sal e li vî welatî k'esekî zor li me nekrîye.

Version 2: [From a c assette tape purchased in Van, in1988, by Michael Chyet]:
Memo bila tenê neketin serê rê û dirba-anê
Zimanê rûştê nav û welatê xerîb e bile nebêjî bêxwey û bêxudanê.

Version 3: [Dzhalilov, Ordikhane & Dzhalil Dzhalilov. "Memê û Zînê (şaxa 1)", *in* Zargotina K'urda (Kurdski Fol'klor) (Moskva : Nauka, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 45-65.]
Em Al-p'aşa, pîrejina wî û Memê delal va bihêlin şeherê Muxurzemînê da,
rîya çil rojî herîne welatê Cizîrê û bigihîjine Cizîra Bota.
Girtin û berdana welatê Cizîrê destê wan da bû,
k'îjan şerê wana berê xwe bidaye, bi altindarî û k'ubar vedigerîyan.
Memê go: "Qurba, eva cotê k'î welatîye?"
Cotk'arî go: "Xortê delal, cotê Cizîrêye".
Qeret'ajdîn û herd birava k'arê xwe kirin,
wekî herin xercê welatê Cizîrê hevt sala mabû,
berevkin bînin, pê k'oçk-serayê xwe çê kin.
Ew eskerê xweva çend roja man şeherê Cizîrê
û vegerîyan berbi walatê xwe.

nationalism, Koyi says:

> The land of Jazzier and Botan, that is the homeland of the Kurds,
>
> Thousands of shame that they become Armenia)[288]

Remarkably, in these verses Jazira and Botan, two separate 'welat*s*' are combined into one large Kurdish national 'welat' (homeland/motherland).

So far as the discourse of the journal *Kurdistan* is concerned, similar to Khani' use of the term, the editors of *Kurdistan* used *'welat'* to denote 'native region' or 'native district' on a few occasions. For instance, referring to Haji Qadir Koyi, M.M. Bedirkhan says:

> This person worked very hard in his lifetime; he wrote many Kurdish qasida
>
> and poems about studying sciences and [acquiring] skills [and] would send
>
> them to his hometown of [welatê] Sora.[289]

Here and elsewhere the author referred to the 'Sora district' as 'welat,' which indicates that there was still a certain ambiguity about the meaning of the term 'welat'[290] and that it was still being negotiated in the discourse of *Kurdistan*.

Nonetheless, on a number of occasions the editors of the journal *Kurdistan* used the term 'welat' to exclusively denote the entire Kurdish national homeland. Thus it is noteworthy that on its 118 occurrences (in addition to 36 occurrences of the

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[288]   Xakî Cezîr û Botan, Y'enî willatî Kurdan,
        Sed heyf û sed mexabin deyken be Ermenistan (Koyi 2004: 83-86).

[289] 'Ev mirov saxîya xwe de gelek xebitî; derheqa elimandina ilm û marifete de gelek beyt û eş'arên Kurmancî dinivîsî, rêdikir welatê xwe Sora' (M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan*, No. 3, May 20, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1., p. 135).

[290] This ambiguous meaning of the term *welat* has lingered into the present day too. On a personal note: When I was a kid in our neighborhood we had a family who raised cattle for a living. In summers they would go to the uplands of their native village to graze their animals. When I asked my mother their whereabouts she would say 'Ew çûne welatê xwe' (They have gone to their hometown/homeregion). This is true of the Sorani variety, especially in its Mukriyani variety. For example, in parts of the Iranian Kurdistan people use the term 'welat/wilat' to refer to a space, place, area or the interior of a room or house, e.g. 'wilatim xawen kirdewe' (I cleaned the house); 'hemu wilatyan pis kird (they made a mess here/there) (personal correspondence with Michael Chyet, Jaffar Sheyholislami and Ergin Opengin).

term 'weten' [homeland])[291], the term 'welat' predominantly signified the notion of political homeland for a unified ethnic or national community similar to the French term *la patrie* (cf. Gallagher 1963: 217-219).

One such instance can be observed in the following lines by Abdurrahman Bedir Khan:

> The homeland [welat] of the Kurds is weak like a wounded
> body.[292]

Here the term 'welat' clearly refers to one unified Kurdish national homeland in its singular form (i.e., welatê)[293]. Interestingly, in the title of an article, to which the above extract belongs, the author has used the Arabic word 'weten', right next to the Kurdish term *'welat,' i.e., Welat-Weten* –both of which denote 'national homeland', as if the author wants to ensure that the term 'welat' is understood 'correctly' as the 'homeland' with its ethnic and political connotation.

Similarly in the extract below the term *welat* clearly signifies the whole Kurdish homeland:

> Now, Kurdistan, like *other countries/homelands* [welatên din], is also under
> the Turks, under the control of Abdulhamid (my emphasis).[294]

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[291] Weten/watan is the Arabic word for 'homeland.' It is important to note that the Ottoman public discourse was familiar with the term 'watan' since the mid 19th century when Namik Kemal introduced this term with its modern connotation in his work *Vatan yahut Silistre* (Homeland or Silistra) in 1860 (Biçakçi 2007). See, Firro (2009: 26-27) and Hudson (1977: 36-37) for the evolution of the term 'weten/watan' in the context of Arab nationalism.

[291] 'Nuho Kurdistan jî weke welatên di binê Tirka, bine deste Ebdulhemîd de ye' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Thabat Al-Mulk Bel 'Adl'* [Justice is the Foundation of the Authority], *Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1, p. 229.)

[292] 'Welatê Kurdan wek cîsmek birîndar bêhal maye' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Welat-Weten* [Homeland], Kurdistan No. 9, December 16 , 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 227).

[293] The singular suffix –ê attached to 'welat' is one of ezafeh endings or noun connecters that are used when a singular head noun receives a modifier. In English they function like the possessive *'s* or 'of phrases' (*See*, Ekici 2007).

[294] 'Nuho Kurdistan jî weke welatên di binê Tirka, bine deste Ebdulhemîd de ye' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Thabat Al-Mulk Bel 'Adl'* [Justice is the Foundation of the Authority], *Kurdistan* No. 9,

Comparing Kurdistan to the 'other countries (welat) by default creates the assumption that Kurdistan is also a unified country/homeland (welat).

Another discursive practice the journal *Kurdistan* adopted in the construction of Kurdistan was through drawing discursive map of Kurdistan as we saw in some of the extracts analysed so far from the perspective of other thematic areas. One such article significantly entitled *'Kurdistan and Kurds'* appeared in the 24th issue of *Kurdistan* in which the editor Abdurrahman Bedir Khan presented a discursive map of Kurdistan:

> Although the political borders [hudud-i sîyasîye] of Kurdistan are not clearly defined, today they dwell in Media and parts of the old Assyria. The region that includes Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Mosul… Ardalan region and Kermanshah territory, Lower Zab, Bitlis and Batman cities as well as the Lake Van vicinity are the ancient territory [cevelângâh] of this courageous nation [millet]. [295]

Notice how the editor draws a discursive map of Kurdistan by identifying Kurdish, lakes and rivers as well as cities and regions inhabited by Kurds. The fact that this discursive map was constructed as a part of the journal's nationalist narrative in the age of nationalism means that the map had clear a symbolic function and political connotations. In any case, this symbolic and political aspect is explicitly expressed in the phrase *'although the political borders of Kurdistan'.* It is notewhorty that the author explicitely mentions *'the political borders of Kurdistan'.* Equally important is the use of the conjuction 'although' in the beginning which might refer not only to the 'lack of' but also 'the necessity of' demarcating such 'political borders'. Even though the author is not particularly concerned with

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December 16, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1, p. 229.)

[295] 'Kürdlerin hudud-ı siyasiyeleri lâyıkıyle tayin olunamamış ise de, bugun kadîm Asuristan ile Midya'nın bir kısmını işgal etmektedirler. Erzurum, Diyarbekir, Musul ve Acemistan'a aid olan Erdelan hıttasıyle Kermanşah arazisi, Zab-ı Esfel ile Bitlis ve Batman şehirleri havzasıyle Van golu havalîsi, bu millet-i şecîa'nın cevelângâh-ı ezelîsidir' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Kurdistan ve Kürdler* [Kurdistan and Kurds], *Kurdistan* No. 24, September 1, 1900, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 425).

drawing a visual cartographic map of Kurdistan with its precise borders, his discursive map still helps create an assumption that Kurdistan with its people, cities, rivers, lakes and regions forms a coherent geoethnic/territorial unit (cf. O'Shea 2004:143).[296] Finally, it is important to notice how the author includes both parts of Kurdistan divided between the Qajar and the Ottoman Empires, a discursive practice that would be repeated later on by İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde in the 4th issue of *KTTG*. This and similar discursive maps as an abstraction of the reality transcend the fragmented reality of the Kurds along tribal, regional, linguistic and sectarian lines enabling the readers to add a spatial perception to their national identity (cf. Robinson *et al*. 1984: 7).

Nonetheless, it should be noted that the discourse of *Kurdistan* on the construction of common homeland was obscured by the journal's Ottomanist discourse, in that the term *'homeland'* on a few occurrences referred to the Ottoman homeland making the referent of the term rather vague. For instance, in the following news item, which reports the loss of Bosnia and the situation of its Muslim population, the referent of *'homeland'* is not Kurdistan but the wider Ottoman homeland:

> We know that recently many villages and cities of the homeland [weten]
> have fallen into the hands of other states.[297]

Here the term homeland refers to the *'Ottoman homeland'* as Bosnia was not a part of Kurdistan but that of the Ottoman Empire.

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[296] It is important to note that the journal *Kurdistan* never produced a cartographic map of Kurdistan. Except for the map presented to the Paris Peace Conference, formal attempts to map Kurdistan appeared only in the 1930s. All previous cartographic maps of Kurdistan were drawn by non-Kurds (O'Shea 2004: 143).

[297] 'Em hemî dizanin ku eve eyamek e gelek gund û bajarên *wetenî* (*the* homeland) ketin destê dewletên dî de' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan *'Hewadis'* [News], *Kurdistan* No. 16, August 6, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 318).

4.2.5.2. Kurdish Women and the *Mother*land in the Discourse of *Kurdistan*

Although *Kurdistan* did not take a particular interest in gender relations, it included women issues in its nationalist discourse, where women were portrayed as innocent, pure and chaste mothers of the nation, which is a common feature of many incipient nationalisms (cf. Mojab 2001: 76; Najmabadi 2005: 97; 1997: 451; 1998: 49). Mojab (2001: 76) has observed that

> in the case of women… sexuality is inseparable from the project of nation-building. The purity of the nation, and its strength, is inseparable from the chastity… of its women. If the motherland should be cleared from foreign domination, the ideal woman, too, should be virgin and legally possessed (ibid.).

Similarly, *Kurdistan* made an extensive use of women's sexuality through the chastity of women as the 'women and wives of the nation' (Najmabadi 2005: 207). [298] This can be most clearly observed in articles concerning the enslavement of women, by Christian men, both in the context of Crete and in the incitement of fear over a possible invasion of Kurdistan by Russia.[299] In those articles, from a male gendered perspective, the Bedir Khan Brothers drew upon the discourses of family, women's honour, the discourse of sexuality and religious discourse as their argument revolved around the use of Muslim Kurdish women as sex-slaves, prostitutes or non-marital partners by Christian men. It is remarkable that a recurring theme is Muslim Kurdish women are forced to serve

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[298] We observe a discursive shift in the ensuing Kurdish journals about the role of women in the Kurdish society. For instance, *KTTG*, *Rojî Kurd* and *Jîn* emphasize the contribution of Kurdish women to the Kurdish society as the treasure and true guardians of the purity of Kurdish language; as warriors and as a part of the workforce in the public sphere.

[299] For relevant articles, *see*, M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Untitld' Kurdistan* No. 1, April 22, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 118; Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Girîd'* [Crete], *Kurdistan* No. 7, November 5, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 202; Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Welat-Weten* [Homeland], *Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 227; Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Untitled*, *Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 228; Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Hirka-i Saadet'* [The Cloak of the Prophet Muhammed], (*Kurdistan* No. 12, March 2, 1899, in Fuad (2006), p. 57.

'wine' to the Russian soldiers.[300] In this context, it is fair to argue that in the gendered discourse of *Kurdistan*, emancipation of the motherland is equated with the emancipation of the woman and her honour.

Education was another domain through which women entered the discourse of *Kurdistan*. Being aware of the improvement in the status of women in the West and their contribution to their societies, the editors of *Kurdistan* promoted the education of Kurdish girls along with boys. In this way, the European secular and democratic logic of the nationalist blueprint found its expression in the pages of *Kurdistan* through women's right to education. To mitigate their secular tone vis-à-vis the education of women, they frequently drew on the Islamic religious discourse in order to back their argument. This religious allusion would not only prevent possible reactions from conservatives but it would also add credibility and authority to the journal's argument. [301]

4.2.6. The Discursive Construction of Identities and Relations between the Kurdish Elite and the Commoners

This section is concerned with the *interpersonal metafunction* of the text, i.e. the construction of social identities and relations between the participants of a

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[300] There is a strong link between serving wine and eroticism. The theme of wine serving with its erotic or sexual connotation is taken from a common theme of the Persian classic literature. In this genre, the wine serving boys called 'shahed' (catamite) are enslaved good-looking young boys whose mustache has not grown yet. Shaheds are not only saqî (wine bearer) but they also angage in homosexual intercourse with men to whom they are serving wine. In the Persian classic literature they are traditionally the focus of erotic desire. The description of these boys in this literature matches the stature, face and physical features of Turkish boys who were sold as slaves (Shamisa 2002; Ehsan 1986). Similarly, in classic Kurdish literature wine serving is linked to eroticism. However, in Kurdish literature the saqî is not a boy but a beautiful woman. In the 20th issue of *Kurdistan*, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan explicitly uses the 'saqîyat' referring to Muslim women who are forced into serving wine to the soldiers of the 'enemy' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Maqaleê Mexsûse'* [The Special Article], *Kurdistan* No. 20, December 29, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 342).

[301] For example, see, M. M Bedir Khan, *'Kullukum Ra'in Wa Kullu Ra' in Mas'ulun 'An Ra'iyyatihi'* [All of You Are Guardians (in Trust of Something or Someone) And Are Accountable For Your Flock], *Kurdistan* No. 3, May 20, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 132; and Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Hel Yestewî'llezîne Ye'lemûne We'llezîne La Ye'lemûne* [Those Who Know Are Not The Same As Those Who Do Not Know], *Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 228).

communicative event (Fairclough 1995b). *Interpersonal metafunction* is an essential part of discourse analysis in the corpus of *Kurdistan* because it reveals the relations of power and dominance enacted between *the Kurdish elite*, *the Kurdish commoners* and *other participants* [302] (cf. Halliday 1985a; Fairclough 1995a, 1995b; Wodak *at al.* 1999; Heyvaert 2003; Kress 2002).

Wodak *et al.* (1999: 98) asserts that, politicians by definition are not only the custodians of the future of their nations but they are at the same time custodians of their own personal political career. Wodak *et all.* add,

> '[t]herefore, they constantly make reference to common worries and problems, common opponents and enemies as well as to common aims – in regard both to the present and to the future- in order to stimulate those forms of identification, solidarity and union among their listeners which seem more advantageous for their parties and themselves' (ibid.).

As discussed earlier, towards the end of the 19th century the sons of Kurdish nobility were excluded from the power structure as a result of the centralization policies of the Ottoman state that had its roots in the *Tanzimat* reforms (Klein 1996). However, the members of the Kurdish nobility felt that their former power was their due and thus they attempted to reclaim these lost power and privileges (Silopî 2007: 28; Klein 1996: 8-9; 2007: 149: Özoğlu 2001: 383). In accordance with the historical circumstances and the opportunities of the period, the Kurdish elite stratum saw the notion of nationalism as the most legitimate concept and ideal tool to recover, consolidate and expand its former power (Özoğlu 2001: 383). In this context, I shall now discuss how the Kurdish elite, in the person of the Bedir Khan Brothers, made the nationalist argument the basis of their claim to power on behalf of the Kurds.

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[302]In Fairclough schemata the category of *other participants* refers to participants from the public domain such as politicians, trade unionists, community leaders, scientists and other experts some of whom might be representatives of the audience or those who dominate the politics, economy, culture and society.

As discussed in Chapter 3, language produces three types of meanings simultaneously in its multifunctional feature or semantic complexity namely *ideational, textual* and *interpersonal metafunctions* (Halliday 1985a; Fairclough 1995a, 1995b). This section specifically deals with the latter metafunction in which the linguistic choices made in the text entail not only particular types of relations between the participants of a communicative event but they also enact social identities (Halliday 1985a; Fairclough 1995a: 133, 1995b: 5, 25; Wodak 2002b: 8; Heyvaert 2003; Kress 2002). For instance, as far as interpersonal metafunctions in a media outlet is concerned, a writer/speaker might adopt the position of a reporter who simply informs the audience by reporting the facts of a matter; similarly a writer/speaker might adopt an expert attitude by offering his or her opinion, or alternatively he or she might adopt an authoritative tone making suggestions, assertions and giving commands through lexicogrammatical choices, as well as various sets of linguistic features including such modalities and moods as declarative, imperative, interrogative, desiderative and subjunctive clauses and sentences (Fairclough 1995b: 128). [303] Each approach, in return, constructs quite different social relations and identities between the text producer (writer/speaker) and the audience (Kress 2002: 34).

So far as the editors of Kurdistan are concerned, the Bedir Khan Brothers constructed a specific relationship and assigned particular identities to themselves and their readers in that while they presented themselves as figures of authority, who knew and were capable of identifying problems and proposing the right solutions, the readers were presented as receptive, who were in need of guidance and thus waiting to be told, waiting to know (Fairclough 1995b: 4). This approach is evident in the mission statement of the journal published in its very first issue:

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[303] For instance, an assertion made through a declarative sentence might sound authoritative and thus construct an unequal social status and relationship between the text producer and the reader, positioning the text producer personal identity as an authority and the reader's identity as a layperson (Fairclough 1995b).

> In this newspaper I will discuss the merits of science and skills; I will show Kurds where one can receive education [and] where there are good schools and medreses; [also] I will tell you all about places where there are quarrels; what the great powers are doing; how they conduct a war; how business is done; I will narrate them all (*Kurdistan*, No. 1, 22 April 1898).[304]

Notice how M. M. Bedir Khan constructs himself as the 'educator' and 'modernizer' through a pedagogic and authoritative voice of an expert, while he presents the reader as the 'learner.' In a similar manner, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan did not shy away from reflecting the hierarchy between himself –through his dynastic family- and the reader:

> Leave the advising up to me; I leave the execution of it to you (*Kurdistan*,
> No. 6, 11 October 1898).[305]

The above sentence is the combination of two clauses: a) 'what I say goes', and b) 'yours is not to reason why, but it is to do.' This authoritative tone of the editor reproduces and strengthens the aforementioned hierarchy between himself and the reader that is constructed as a layperson who should follow the editor's 'advice'.[306]

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[304] 'Vê cerideye de ez'ê behsa qencîya ilm û marîfeta bikim; li ku derê mirov dielime, li ku derê medrese û mektebên qenc hene, ez'ê nişa Kurda bikim; li ku derê çi şer dibe, dewletên mezin çi dikin, çawa şer dikin, ticaret çawa dibe; ezê hemîya hîkat bikim' (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Bîsmîllahîrrehmanîrrehîm'* [In the Name of God; The Compassionate, The Merciful] *Kurdistan*, No. 1, April 22, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1. p. 112).

[305] 'Nesîhet ji min, guhdan ji we' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan*, No. 6, October 11, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1., p. 179)

[306] According to Van Bruinessen (1992a: 275-276) '[t]hese aristocrats shared the Ottomanist ideals of the Young Turk movement, but not its liberal ideas. Their attitude towards the common Kurdish people was extremely paternalistic. They had no serious contacts with Kurdistan'. One cannot disagree with van Bruinessen on the fact that the Kurdish aristocrats could not internalize strong liberal ideas, which would have led to a stronger relation and cooperation between the elite and the Kurdish commoners. Nevertheless, the extent to which their Turkish counterparts, i.e. the Young Turks, succeeded in internalizing liberal ideas and incorporating Turkish masses into their nationalist ideas is also questionable partly due to the fact that it was the state apparatus, not an independent bourgeoisie class or devout liberalists, or a grassroot movement, that spearheaded the social changes in the Empire (Göçek 1996). In fact, Bulgaristanlı Dogan, in a very interesting article published in the second issue of *Rojî Kurd*, warns the Kurdish intelligentsia and the

From the same authoritative point of view, the editors of *Kurdistan* felt that the Kurdish notables, i.e., people from their own social background, e.g., other mîrs, aghas, and ulema, were the only effective class that could educate and modernize Kurds. Thus the editors entrusted them with the protection and education of the 'weak' and 'ignorant' Kurdish masses. Consider the extracts below:

> O ulema, mîr and aghas of Kurds! As the Prophet has commanded: 'all of you are shepherds and all of you are responsible for your flock;'[307] on Judgment Day, God will hold the dignitary accountable for [the situation of] Kurds (*Kurdistan*, No. 6, 11 October 1898).[308]

> O mîrs and aghas! You are mîrs and aghas thanks to Kurds [Kurmancs]. Therefore you should be considerate of them, help them study [and] learn sciences and skills. Who would you rule over as mîrs and aghas if it were not for Kurds [Kurmanc]. The more Kurds [Kurmanc] become strong and rich, the more their mîrs and aghas become honourable and famous. Therefore, O dignitaries of Kurds! You should care for Kurds [Kurmanc]

Kurdish youth not to imitate the Ottoman Turkish elite because Dogan felt that the Ottoman Turkish intellectual elite was detached from the Turkish masses in that the Turkish intellectuals looked down on the commoners and in this way alienated themselves from the Turkish masses (Bulgaristanli Togan, *'Milletinize Karşu Vazifeniz'* [Your Duty Towards Your Nation] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 134-136)). Similarly, referring to the Turko-Ottoman intellectual strata that emerged after the Tanzimat, Ülken (1940: 762) states that these strata were dualists in that the Ottoman intellectuals had an Islamic and Eastern (oriental) spirit with a Western *appearance*. What is more, immediately after the July 1908 revolution, the CUP adopted a policy of oppression against not only the non-Turkish ethnic groups or nations, but also against the other Turkish opposition parties. All these demonstrate that the CUP's brand of liberalism was not a genuine one. The spirit or deeper meaning of liberalism was adapted only in form and therefore never prevailed. See, Göçek (1996: 3-19) for a detail account of the formation of the *dependent* Ottoman bourgeoise class and the role of the state as the agent of change in the transformation of the Ottoman Empire.

[307] 'Shepherd and flock' is a metaphor commonly used in the corpus of *Kurdistan*.

[308] 'Gelî ulema û mîr û axayên Kurda! Wek Pêxember ferman kirî: 'kullukum rain we kullukum mes'ulun an raiyyetihi', roja qiyametê Xwedê teala wê Kurmanca ji mezinê wan bipirse' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan*, No. 6, October 11, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1., p. 179).

as if they are your children (*Kurdistan* No. 4, 3 June, 1898).[309]

Here a reciprocal relationship and dependency between the Kurdish notables and the commoners is emphasized through a nationalist rhetoric of solidarity as well as religious intertextuality in which the notables are urged to accept and carry out their responsibility as the educators and leaders of the Kurds. The use of the model verb *'should'* [divê] affectively criticizes the nobles reminding them their obligations. It is also important to notice how the extract constructs Kurds as the children of the nobles through the metaphorical application of the paternalistic authoritative discourse of family.

Another point that should be highlighted in the construction of relations and identities concerns the way a text producer constructs his or her identity and then relates himself or herself to the 'other participants' e.g. experts, professionals, politicians, members of the dominant class, etc. For instance, M.M. Bedir Khan wrote:

> O ulema and mîr and aghas of Kurds! You all know my origin and descent. My ancestor is Khalid ibn al-Walid, may God be pleased with him, *our* tribe is Botan, *we* are known as the Eziz [Azîzan] (*Kurdistan*, No. 1, 22 April 1898) (my emphasis).[310]

Remarkably in this extract the issue of relation and identities is no longer between the other Kurdish dignitaries and the Kurds but between the dignitaries and the Bedir Khan family. Although the Bedir Khan Brothers delegated the Kurdish dignitary to protect, inform and educate Kurds -as evident in the

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[309] 'Gelî mîr û axano! Hun li saya Kurmanca mîr û axa nin. Loma divê hun qenc fekirin wan, ewan bidin xwendin, bielimînin ilm û hunera. Heki Kurmanc nebin, hun'ê mîr û axatî ji kî re bikin! Kurmancên we hingî xurt, dewlemend bin, mîr û axayên wan jî wê hew qas xweynav û deng bin. Loma, gelî mezinên Kurmanca, divê hun wek ewladên xwe fekirin Kurmanca!' (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'*Untitled', *Kurdistan* No. 4, June 3, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 149).

[310] 'Gelî ulema û mîr û axayên Kurda! Un hemî esil û nesle min dizanin. Cedde min Hezretê Xalid îbnî Welîd e, redîyellahu teala enhu, eşîra me Botan in, şuhreta nesla me Ezîzan in' (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Untitled'*, *Kurdistan*, No. 1, April 22, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1., p. 116).

proceding extract above -they still kept the 'actual' role of supreme leadership for themselves and their princely family presenting the other Kurdish dignitaries as their auxiliaries.

Moreover, in a predominantly Sunni Muslim Kurdish community of the late Ottoman period some sort of religious background or religious lineage or at least the expectation of piety in political leaders was vital for an individual or groups to acquire the leadership position. Thus as the extract above illustrates, starting from the very first issue of *Kurdistan*, the editor M. M. Bedir Khan declared his and his familial religious authority by evoking his ancestral background based on religion. Notice how in the second sentence the author foregrounds the religious (Islamic) aspect of his tribe by mentioning it in the first clause, while he mentions the Kurdish roots of his tribe in the second and the third clauses. Given that *Khalid ibn al-Walid* was an Arab military general, for the Bedir Khans tracing their genealogy back to an Arab commander may seem to contradict and undermine their claim to the leadership of a nation in the making. However, as sated earlier, in such narratives, the general trajectory of the narrative overshadows the factual details. The important thing here is that this divine descent legitimizes the Bedir Khans' authority and serves their political agenda (cf. Halbwachs 1992 [1941]: 47).[311] Needless to say, *Kurdistan* employed their ancestral background along with the pre-existing religious and popular traditions, not for religious purposes but rather for novel needs of the nationalist ideology.

This point was reinforced in the subsequent issues as the editors projected their ancestors and by default themselves as the only legitimate supreme leaders of all Kurds as evident in the following extracts although the first extract was analysed erlier from other thematic perspectives:

In 680[312] Prince Suleiman established his dynasty around Jazira. Prince

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[311] Later the same practice will appear in an anonymous article on the pages of *Roj Kurd* (1913) where the author in his eulogy for Hüseyin Pasha Bedir Khan traces the geneology of the Bedir Khans back to *Khalid ibn al-Walid.*

[312] 1281 according to the Gregorian calendar.

> Suleiman was a Kurd. This Prince Suleiman, may he rest in peace, *is the ancestor of the Bedir Khan Beg and all emirs of Kurdistan* (*Kurdistan* No. 8, 1 December, 1898) (My emphasis).[313]

> Since the time of *our* ancestors *we* have been the princes of Botan, we are the dignitaries of the Kurds. Therefore, it is our obligation to work for the well being of the Kurds [Kurmanc] (*Kurdistan*, No. 3, 20 may 1898) (My emphasis).[314]

After establishing prince Suleyman's Kurdish identity at the outset, the editor Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, in the last sentence of the first extract, presents Prince Suleiman not only the ancestor of the Bedir Khans but also that of all princes of Kurdistan, which inevitably designates and impose the Bedir Khans as the progenitor of all Kurdish rulers, lending further legitimacy to the family's aspiration to the supreme national leadership position. A similar discursive practice is at work in the second extract taken from one of M. M. Bedir Khan's articles, however one should particularly notice how in this extract the M. M Bedir Khan's use of the deictic word 'we' –along with its variants- is no longer the *addressee inclusive 'national we'* that was discussed earlier; rather it is an *addressee exclusive* 'we' that refers only to the *historically expending 'we'* of the editor as a member of the Bedir Khans, the former rulers of Kurdistan (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 45).[315]

Due to similar familial concerns Abdurrahman also wrote:

> You know that I am the son of that person who made great effort with his

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[313] 'Sala şeş sed û heştêyan de Mîr Silêman dora Cizîrê de hukumeta xwe danî. Mîr Silêman Kurd bî. Ew Mîr Silêman, rehîmehullah, cedde Bedirxan Begê u hemî umerayên Kurdistanê ye' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Hukkamên Cezîretu îbnî* Umer' [The Rulers of the Jazirat ibn Omar] *Kurdistan* No. 8, December 1, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 213).

[314] 'Em ji ecdad ve mîrên Botan in, mezinên Kurmanca ne. Loma ser me deyn e, divê em qencîya Kurmanca re bixebitin' (M. M. Bedir Khan, *'Untitled'*, *Kurdistan*, No. 3, May 20, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1. p. 133).

[315] It is important to note that in May 1920 the Bedir Khans established their own familia association; *see*, Malmîsanij (2000:15-43).

sword for your wellbeing. Today, as a requirement of this era, I am providing that [same] service with my pen (*Kurdistan*, No. 26, 14 December, 1900).[316]

In the first sentence by invoking the former leadership position of his aristocratic family, the editor aspires to the same position, rather in an implicit way through presumptions, in that the reader is supposed to know who the writer's father was –even though his name is not directly mentioned- and what he had done for Kurds. In any case, the editor presents his activities as an extension of his family's political legacy –through his pen- in an uninterrupted political continuity, in the second sentence of the extract.

To add further legitimacy to his authority Abdurrahman Bedir Khan in another article wrote:

> I abandoned Istanbul [and] came to foreign lands in order to publish this newspaper of mine, send it to the Kurds and warn them through this newspaper. Thus I am hoping that Kurds will lend an ear to this newspaper of mine. All the things that I am writing in this newspaper are the things that have been commanded by God and the Prophet. The thing that is commanded by God and practiced by the Prophet, with no doubt, is for your benefit […][317]

Here the editor basically tries to clothe his aspiration to leadership with religious intertextuality. Through this mixture of genres or what Fairclough (1995b: 78) calls reconfiguration of genres, the authoritative tone of the religion becomes the authoritative tone of the editor, as if the editor speaks to the reader through God and the Prophet or God and the Prophet speak through the editor, bestowing a

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[316] 'Un dizanin ku ez lawê wî mirovî me ku bi şîrê xwe, seadeta we re gelek xîret kir. E jî muqtezyê zeman, îro bi qelema xwe wê xizmetê îfa dikim' (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *'Kurda re'* [To the Kurds], *Kurdistan*, No. 26, December 14, 1900, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 2., p. 454).

[317] Min İstanbul terk kir, ez hatim welatê xerîba de, da vê cerîdeya xwe binivîsim, Kurda re rêkim, da pê vê cerîdeyê Kurda îqaz bikim. Vêca ez hêvî dikim Kurd jî guh bidin vê cerîdeya min. Tiştê ez vê cerîdeyê de dinivîsim, hemi tiştên we ne ku Xwedê û Pêxember emir kirine. Ya Xwedê emir kirî û Pêxember emel kirî, muyyen ji we re xêr e' […] (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Welat-Weten* [Homeland], *Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 227-228).

superior position that is above all other members of the Kurdish nobility including the Kurdish religious dignitaries.

As briefly mentioned above, one of the most characteristics of *Kurdistan* is its authoritative and paternalistic discourse. In an article Abdurrahman Bedir Khan wrote:

> Why Kurds, who are so brave and hard working, are becoming unworthy and dishonourable like a herd in the hands of cruel officials. Aren't you human beings? Are you lower than other people? […]
>
> Enough is enough; open your eyes, raise your hands, draw your swords… Go gather around your leaders; go gather around your ulema and unite. Rid yourselves of this cruelty of the officials. Shame on you [...] (*Kurdistan* No. 9 16 December, 1898).[318]

Here utilizing the authoritarian discourse of family discipline or the disciplinary discourse of 'scolding' in his criticism of the reader, the editor has positioned himself as a figure of authority that knows and hence has the right to teach, discipline and lead the reader, who is projected as submissive with the lack of self-esteem or as a 'naughty child' that needs to be disciplined (cf. Fairclough 1995b: 4, 95). Also notice how the commanding tone of the editor in the second part of the extract appears in the form of the imperative mood (cf. Fairclough 1995b: 72), i.e., 'open!', 'raise!', 'draw!', 'go!', 'gather!', 'unite!', etc. Then the editor further reinforces this authoritative tone with a phrase of scolding, i.e., 'shame on you', in line with the discourse of discipline or the authoritative discourse of feudalism in which the master commands or humiliates the serf or the peasant.

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[318] 'Kurd hinde ciwanmêr in, sahibxîret in, çire wek pezî nav destê me'mûrên zalim heqîr û rezîl dibin! Ma un ne mirov in? Ma un ji xelqên dî kêmtir in? […]

Êdî bes e; çavê xwe vekin, destê xwe hilînin, şîrên xwe bikişînin…. Herin dor mezinên xwe, herin dor ulemaya îttîfaq bikin; xwe ji binê vê zulma me'mûra hilînin; ji we re fehêt e! […] (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Welat-Weten* [Homeland], *Kurdistan* No. 9, December 16, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 227-228).

Another point in the construction of personal identities and relations may pertain to the use of the public discourse of science and technology or, on the contrary, the use of a semi-technical or non-technical private discourse of ordinary life (Fairclough 1995b: 9). In the former case an author may reproduce the elite dominance through the construction of a boundary based on the use of a scientific discourse; while in the latter case an author may try to eliminate such boundaries by discussing an elaborate topic through an experiential way using a conversational language and giving examples from daily life for an ordinary audience not necessarily expert on the topic. In such cases the degree of the conversationalization of the discourse is a tool at the disposal of a text producer to relate himself or herself to the ordinary audience by explaining things or concept through the 'world of common experience' instead of relying on a heavily theoretical or technical discourse.[319] The latter practice can be observed throughout the journal *Kurdistan*. For instance in the 11th issue the author illustrates state corruption over an example about how state officials unfairly extract money from Kurds:

> I will give you an example: Suppose there is a person in Kurdistan, [say] in Jazeera whose name is Mehmo. This Mehmo has five hundred cattle, a wife and children. The qaimaqam [district governor] finds out that Mehmo is a bit wealthy; he sends over gendarmerie to collect the tax for his cattle. Mehmo pays his taxes and in return gets a piece of paper from the gendarmerie conforming that this person has paid his taxes. But the paper is false and forged…[320]

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[319] Alternatively, a speaker might adapt a distant and authoritative tone through rather an abstract, theoretical or scientific discourse that is full of verbiage and technical terms and expressions. A text producer might prefer such tone, when/if he or she intents to claim a more superior identity as a member of a profession, a social class or as a person occupying an influential political position.

[320] Ez'ê mîsalekê ji we re bejim: Ferz bikin ku Kurdistanê, Cizîrê de mirovek heye Navê wî Mehmo ye. Ev Mehmo, pênc sed pezê wî, jin û zarûyên wî hene. Qaîmmeqam dibihîze ku Mehmo piçekê dewlemend e; zebtîyekî rêdike ser wî, xeraca dewarên wî Dixwaze. Mehmo xeracê dide. Zebtîye jî kaxizekî dide destê wî, ango ewî mirovî xeraca pez û dewarên xwe daye.

Notice how the author accommodates the way corruption operates to the laypersons' understanding to ensure clarity and comprehensibility of his argument. That is the author formulates his political argument as a 'lifeworld' or conversational discourse in the most basic terms. Nevertheless, this pedagogical accommodation does not take anything away from the author's level of intelligence vis-à-vis the lay readership. On the contrary, it reproduces a teacher-learner relation in which the teacher is speaking 'the language' of the learner to communicate his point. This is a popular strategy that pertains to the use of narratives as a considerable amount of media output consists of narratives because different representations are realized through narratives (Fairclough 1985b: 90-91). In that it is a common strategy to transform news items –including hard-news- into story-like events, especially for less educated audiences, in order to add entertainment value in the process of explanation because 'stories are for those who, because of their social status and education, are denied the power of exposition, while exposition is for those who have been given the right to participate in debates that may change the society' [van Leeuwen 1987: 199, in Fairclough 1995b: 91).

4.2.6.1. Addressivity and Convocation of a New Audience

In this section I discuss an innovative way in which the newspaper genre provides a new mode of addressing, which, in turn, convokes a new audience. As we saw in Chapter 3, for Bakhtin (1986; 1987) all utterances are essentially *dialogical* and they acquire their meaning as such. Then, a text needs audience in order to realize its potential to constitute meaning because a writer writes 'to' an imagined readership and expects them to play their 'co-constitutive' role in the realization of the meaning (Hanes 2000: 1; Barber 2007: 137). In his discussion of the Victorian novel, Henry James (1984) argues that, 'in every novel the work

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Lakîn ew kaxiz ne rast e, saxte ye… (Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan*, No. 11, February 10, 1899, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1., p. 242).

is divided between the writer and the reader; but the writer makes the reader very much as he makes his characters' (cited in Stewart1996: 6). Then, an author does not only constructs the reader as part of this fictional world but he/she also tells the reader how to participate in this fiction by 'offering a standpoint from which to secure uptake of the utterance' (Barber 2007: 138). In this context, the formation of genres takes place in the realm of addressivity that is constituted by the mutual orientation of the text to the audience and vice-versa. Thus new forms of address are the key to new genres because a new genre and a new type of address come into being in response to each other, which together construct a new audience (*ibid*.). Then it is fair to say that new genres take shape as the text writer convokes a new audience (*ibid*.). For instance, a study by Klancher (1987: 3) on the early 19th century English periodicals shows that after the ideological chaos caused by the French Revolution, the periodicals 'carved out new readerships and transformed old ones.' For Klancher 'the British periodical [is] a paradigm of audience-making," attempting 'to divide audiences and guide them to compete for position in social and cultural space' (*ibid*.: 4).

Insofar as media studies are concerned the audience is viewed from two perspectives: audience as potential consumer and audience as composed of 'citizens who must be reformed, educated [and] informed…' (Ang 1991: 28-29). *Kurdistan*, which introduced the newspaper genre to the Kurds, adopted the latter perspective constructing and convoking a new public or a new audience not only as an audience that needs to be informed, educated and reformed but also as an audience of a particular kind: a national audience whose members shared a common language, history, culture, ethnicity, political aspirations and so forth (cf. Anderson 2006: 30; Barber 2007: 139). In *Kurdistan*, in addition to other devices, the convocation of the new audience as a new collectivity is most obvious in the forms of particular types of addressivity. In this way, instead of an arid monological conception, the editors of *Kurdistan* formed a specific relational matrix through a dialogic exchange between themselves and their readers.

To this end, as a strategy of emphasis on intra-national sameness or national singularity (Wodak et al. 1999: 37), *Kurdistan*, often addressed its readers in nationalist terms. For example, the most frequently used such term was 'Gelî *Kurdino!'* (O Kurds!), which appears 34 times in the corpus of *Kurdistan* aiming at downplaying the tribal, linguistic, sectarian and regional differences among Kurds and persuading them to imagine themselves as a homogeneous, and horizontal national community (Anderson 2006; Brennan 1990).

Below I present a list of the forms of addressivity and their frequency along with brief analysis:

- O mîrs and aghas and Kurds [Kurmancno]!) (1 time)
- O Kurds, O mîrs and aghas! (1 time)
- O mîrs and aghas [and] Kurds! (2 times)
- O ulema of the Kurds! (13 times)
- O mîrs and aghas of Kurds! (2 times)
- O mîrs and aghas of Kurds [Kurmanca]!) (2 times)
- O ulema and mîrs and aghas of Kurds! (1 time)
- O ulema and mîrs and aghas of Kurds! [Kurmanca] (3 times)
- O ulema and pashas and mîr and aghas of Kurds! (1 time)
- O wealthy Kurds! (1 time)
- O Kurdish notables! (1 time) [321]

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[321] *Gelî mîr û axa û Kurmancno!*

Gelî Kurdno, gelî mîr û axa!

Gelî mîr û axano, Kurmancno!

Gelî ulemayên Kurda!

Gelî mîr û axayên Kurmanca!

Gelî mîr û axayên Kurda!

Gelî ulema û mîr û axayên Kurmanca!

In these various forms of addressivity the editors forges a new type of audience constructing them as the members of an ethno-national community. In the first form of address above *Kurdistan* uses the terms 'Kurd' and 'Kurmanc' interchangeably in a discursive act -the way Khani did in his *Mem û Zîn*- lifting the concept of *Kurmanc* from its parochial context, i.e., landless non-tribal peasants, to a broader context of a national group. Another discursive act is embedded in the editors attempt to bring different strata of the Kurdish society together in a new semantic context through the use of the possessive structures in possessive determiners mostly visible in such forms as 'ulamas *of* Kurds/Kurmancs; aghas *of* Kurds/Kurmancs'; 'mîrs *of* Kurds/Kurmancs', in which everybody is '*of*' Kurdish obscuring class differences between the elite and non-elite as well as other existing social stratifications such as occupational, gender, religious and linguistic. In other words, the semantic difference between the term *kurd* and *kurmanc* is once again blurred as both terms came to signify the same national phenomenon, creating a sense of belonging, interdependency and solidarity among these strata that glosses over class differences (Bruinessen 2006: 31; Brennan 1990: 45). Consequently, instead of the previously dominant narrow elitist view that did not consider the non-tribal Kurds or *kurmanjs* to be dignified enough to be called Kurd (Bruinessen 1992a: 120-121; 2003: 54-55), *Kurdistan* redefined Kurdishness through a semantic shift in the meaning of the term *kurmanc*. To sum up, through the discursive act of addressivity the journal *Kurdistan* forged a new national audience that was in need of education and modernization.

Gelî ulema û mîr û axayên Kurda!

Gelî ulema û paşa a û mîr û axayên Kurmanca!

Gelî dewlemendên Kurda!

Gelî mezinên Kurmanca!

4.3. CONCLUSION

Kurdistan was an irregularly published nationalist journal operating from exile, under the editorship of the Bedir Khan Brothers. It became a political platform through which the Bedir Khan Brothers, articulated, negotiated and disseminated a Kurdish national identity discourse within the context of modern ideas of nationalism. Moreover, the analysis of the journal *Kurdistan* informed by the CDA approach revealed that the sociocultural and political circumstances of the historical period in which the journal was published had a tremendous effect on the formation of the journal's Kurdish nationalist discourse.

In the first place, the hegemonic discourses of the period –consisted of ummahism and Ottomanism- was at the core of the Hamidian regime's unification strategy of uniting all Muslim components to keep the empire intact. The hegemonic power of these two meta-loyalties coupled with the religious nature of the Kurdish community caused the religious intertextuality to become a major discursive practice of the journal *Kurdistan*. Therefore instead of adopting an aggressive form of nationalism, they rendered the nationalist tone of the journal to remain subtle and thus more acceptable to the predominantly Sunni Muslim Kurds. In tandem with the hegemonic religious discourse of the period, the journal's solution to the national problems of the Kurds was presented in a dense religious intertextuality. In other words, the modernization and industrialization of the Kurdish society as a distinct nation was justified through religious allusion in which citing the hadiths and Qur'anic verses was a common practice. Second, the hegemonic notion of Ottomanism and the editors' close relations with the CUP and its cadres significantly affected the journal's political projection, which would become a major discursive act later on in the discourse of *KTTG*. Given that several meta-loyalties, i.e. ummahism and Ottomanism, on the one hand, and Kurdish nationalism, on the other, were at work in the discourse of *Kurdistan,* the journal's discourse, in a way, became a site of contestation between these meta-loyalties and identities. Subsequently, the editors' nationalist arguments fluctuated between the ideas of ummahism and

Ottomanism, on the one hand, and a strong notion of nationalism that nourished from anti-Abdulhamid and anti-Turkish resentment, on the other, which sometimes led the editors, particularly Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, to entertain ideas of secessionism towards setting up and independent Kurdish nation-state.[322] However this rebellious attitude toward the Ottoman state or more precisely towards the Sultan's misgovernment should not be interpreted as coherent and widespread discursive acts on the part of *Kurdistan.* Although there were instances in which Abdurrahman Bedir Khan did express ideas of Kurdish national independence under his family's leadership, he, for the most part, promoted a national solution within the Ottoman political framework. This is because first, the Kurdish society was still loyal to the Ottomans and the Caliphate with strong emotions; and second, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan was not blind to the ambitions and interests of the Great Powers in the Ottoman Empire fearing that the further weakening of the Empire might lead to the occupation of Kurdistan either directly by the Great Powers or by the Armenians backed by them.[323] It is noteworthy that the Armenian ambitions supported by European powers were one of the major reasons behind Sheikh Ubeydullah's Revolt in 1880 (Jwaideh 2006: 75-101). That is why, the major political demand of the journal, which can be deduced from the general trajectory of the paper, revolved around political, social, economic and administrative reforms in the empire, which would bring an end to the abuses, the corruption and the despotism of the Turkish regime in Kurdistan and lead to the formation of an autonomous status under the leadership of the Bedir Khans.

Despite not being overtly 'nationalist,' due to the reasons discussed so far, *Kurdistan* is remarkable as an early attempt to conceptualize Kurdishness under

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[322] *See*, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan *'Kurdçe Kısım'* [Kurdish Section], *Kurdistan*, No. 27, March 13, 1901, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 2, p. 471-474, where he refers to Ottoman sultans as *bloodthirsty Turkish tyrants* who do not deserve the title of Islamic Caliph. See also '*Untitled*' *Kurdistan* No. 6, October 11, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 179).

[323] In this connection, it is important to note that Western colonial expansion in Africa and Asia was in full tide between 1844-1900 (Zeine, p. 68-69).

the light of nationalist ideas. For instance, utilizing various discursive strategies and linguistic devices such as syntax, punctuations, deictics, presuppositions, vagueness, metaphors, conjunctions and conjunctive adverbs, they transformed Kurdish language, literature, history and homeland, *inter alia*, into collective cultural elements of the Kurdish national identity.

Given their nation-forming power, the cultivation of Kurdish literature and the predominant use of Kurdish as the journal's medium of communication functioned as a natural divide between Kurds and non-Kurds –particularly the Ottoman Turks. In addition, influenced by the nation-state principle of 'one nation, one language,' the Bedir Khan Brothers adopted several discourse strategies in an attempt to construct a unified and standardized formal language by bringing the Sorani and Kurmanji varieties of Kurdish closer to each other. One such noticeable discursive practice to this end was Abdurrahman Bedir Khan's deliberate use of Sorani words in his Kurmanji articles. Moreover, the Bedir Khan Brothers reproduced the sections of Khani's epic *Mem and Zîn*, for emotional, intellectual and ideological reasons in that this monumental Kurdish national literature was meant to instill Kurds with a sense of national pride and validated Kurdish as a vibrant and colorful language of high literature while at the same time it afforded the editors with a more radical 'nationalist' voice of a highly venerated scholar to represent and express the journal's 'true' Kurdish nationalist tendencies.

Furthermore, in their ethno-cultural characterization of Kurds, the Bedir Khan Brothers, highlighted the real on conceived unique Kurdish values, mentality, morale and codes of behaviour, which also meant to dis-identify Kurds from 'other' Ottomans. [324] Similarly, to primordialize the Kurdish identity they constructed a glorious heritage and a heroic Kurdish past to attribute uniqueness

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[324] For instance, see, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, *Kurdistan ve Kürdler* [Kurdistan and Kurds], *Kurdistan*, No. 24, September 1, 1900, in Bozarslan (1991) Vol. 1, p. 425; M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled,' *Kurdistan*, No. 4 June 3, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 1, p. 148; Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, '*Laisa lil-insani illa masaa*' [Man Can Have Nothing But What He Strives For], *Kurdistan* No. 7, November 5, 1898, in Bozarslan (1991), Vol. 1, p. 198.

and historical permanence to the Kurdish identity. Additionally, the Bedir Khan Brothers transformed the Kurdish territory to a political and a geoethinc homeland through various discourse strategies, practices and language devices, including presuppositions, metaphors, intertextuality as well as temporal and special references. Despite the fact that there still remained a certain amount of ambiguity around the meaning of the term 'welat' (homeland) -as it was still being negotiated in the discourse of *Kurdistan*- it gradually came to signify the national homeland. It is noteworthy that he questions of gender also played a role in the discourse of *Kurdistan*, in which women's honour and purity was closely connected with the national honour through both nationalist and religious intertextuality.

Seeing the readership as composed of 'citizens,' *Kurdistan* became a paradigm of audience-making that carved out a national audience whose members shared a common language, history, culture, ethnicity and national aspirations (cf. Anderson 2006: 30; Barber 2007: 139; Ang 1991: 28-29). One such noticeable discursive strategy that convoked a Kurdish national audience is observed in the journal's use of particular types of addressivity, in which the journal often addressed the reader in national terms, e.g., 'Gelî Kurdino!' (O Kurds!). In this way, the journal tried to soften or downplay the fragmented nature of the Kurdish society in order to persuade Kurds to imagine themselves as a homogeneous national community through a cross-class, horizontal ethno-national sentiment (cf. Anderson 2006; Brennan 1990).

Contrary to the general misperception which claims that the journal *Kurdistan* made no political demands (Özoğlu 2004; Bajalan 2009: Strohmeier 2003) this chapter argued that having lost their traditional power as a result of the Ottoman centralization policies, the Bedir Khan Brothers saw nationalism as an ideal tool to regain their former power and privileges. To this end they felt the need to construct the Kurds as a distinctive national group and themselves as the legitimate leaders of that community. Consequenlty, the journal demanded equal

political rights with the Turks along with a measure of political autonomy for the Kurds perhaps under the leadership of the Bedir Khan family.

So far as the interpersonal metafunction in the discourse of *Kurdistan* is concerned, the close textual analysis of the journal revealed the ways in which the Bedir Khan brothers constructed a particular relation of power and dominance between themselves and the Kurdish commoners. Adopting a paternalistic discourse through several discursive practices and strategies, e.g., the use of the exclusive deixis 'you', the imperative mood, particular modes of addressivity and so on, the Bedir Khan Brothers presented themselves as the leaders of the Kurds and thus the figures of authority that had the right and the capacity to identify problems and propose solutions, while the readers were constructed as receptive, ignorant masses in need of guidance. However, I discuss in the following two chapters that as Kurdish nationalism matured, this paternalistic tone of the Kurdish leadership in the Kurdish journalistic discourse evolved into a more humble and populist tone.

CHAPTER V: THE JOURNAL *KÜRD TEAVÜN VE TERAKKÎ GAZETESİ (KTTG)*

5.1. SOCIOCULTURAL PRACTICES OF *KTTG*

This chapter deals with the construction of the Kurdish nationalist narrative in the discourse of *KTTG*. To situate the journalistic activities of the *KTTG* in its historical circumstances, in what follows I shall offer an account of the sociocultural and political environment in which the *KTTG* and its parent organization *KTTC* operated. Then I shall present short biographies of the *KTTC* and *KTTG* members within the journal's ownership pattern followed by statistical information about the journal and its particular issues. The rest of the chapter deals with conducting a close textual analysis of the journal in accordance with the six semantic macro-areas for content analysis.

At the turn of the century Istanbul was bursting with European-inspired strong liberal and nationalist movements against Sultan Abdulhamid's authoritarian monarchy. In July 1908, the Young Turks under the leadership of the CUP were able to force the Sultan to restore the constitution and reconvene the parliament marking the Second Constitutional Era in the Ottoman history (cf. Zürcher 2010: 75). As a result many dissident Ottomans, including Kurdish intellectuals, returned to Istanbul from the exile. Once in power, the CUP restored the Ottoman parliament that had been suspended by Sultan Abdulhamid since 1878 and brought about large-scale reforms including liberties to the confessional and ethnic communities, notably the right to publish and teach in their own languages as well as parteking in state politics (Kendal 1980: 13). Naturally, the 1908 Young Turk Revolution caused a great joy among all Ottoman communities, e.g., Muslim, Jews, and Christians, who responded to the new situation with festivities, receptions and public meetings (Zeine 1966; Zeki 1977; Klein 2007). The Arabic literature of the time in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt was full of panegyrics by the best poets about restoring the Constitution and inaugurating an era of liberties, justice and equality (Zeine 1966: 79). In this burst of universal rejoicing

everyone was convinced that nothing would be the same as all Ottomans believed that the tyrannical Hamidian period was gone. As a result of this liberal climate the intellectuals of these ethnic and confessional communities engaged in social, cultural and political activities to find a niche for their respective communities in the new Ottoman political landscape. Nevertheless, although the revolution had promised equality to all Ottoman subjects irrespective of creed, language or race, these promises were never carried out, as the Ottoman reformers did not genuinely believe in the ideals of Ottomanism (Zeine 1966: 83, 86-87; Zürcher 2004a: 128-129, 2010: 215).

5.1.1. The Ideological Currents of The Second Constitutional Period (1908)

The Second Constitutional Period presented a range of intellectual and ideological currents notably Islamic Ottomanism (or Ummahism), Secular Ottomanism, and ethnic nationalism (cf. Akşin 2007: 82-88) as reflected in Yusuf Akçura's *'Üç Tarzi Siyaset'* or *Three Types of Policy* (1904),[325] published in a piece-meal fashion in the 23rd-34rh issues of *'Turk',* a Young Turk publication in Cairo. In his book, Akçura discussed the pros and cons of three possible policies the Ottoman state could adopt. These were: (1) Ottomanism: the formation of a state based on the notion of an Ottoman nation that would including the empire's non-Muslim elements similar to the *Tanzimat* version of Secular Ottomanism; (2) Islamism: the formation of an Islamic state that would include all non-Turkish Muslims, which corresponded to the Abdulhamid's policy of Islamic Ottomanism or Ummahism; and (3) Turkism or Turanism: the formation of a nation-state based on the dominance of the Turkish race. Among these Akçura found Turkism or Turanism as the only viable option (Akçura [1904] 1976). Although long before the Balkan Wars, Turkism had taken root among prominent Ottoman intellectuals

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[325] Yusuf Akçura was a Volga Tatar by birth who was deported to Tripolitania by the Hamidian regime for his involvement in the Young Turk activities. From there he fled to Paris where he studied political science. He wrote extensively for the opposition newspapers. Later on he became a driving force behind the Turkish Hearth movement. He was elected to the national assembly and remained as a member of the Turkish Parliament for 16 consecutive years from 1923 to 1939. He also served as the president of the Turkish Historical Society and professor of Turkish history at Istanbul University in the 1930s (Zürcher 2004a: 383; 2010: 215).

and the CUP leadership, first as a cultural concept, then as a political program (Hanioğlu 2006: 19), the CUP did not find it wise to adopt Turkism as the state ideology. This is because they felt that the unabated constraints imposed by the circumstances both at home and abroad would not allow for such strategy to succeed.[326] Thus for the time being they found it more beneficial to opt for *secular Ottomanism* to bind together what was left of the empire.[327]

After the July revolution, similar to the other non-Turkish Ottoman communities, the Kurdish intelligentsia in Istanbul felt that Ottomanism and the Ottoman identity were more appealing, hoping that under the banner of Ottomanism the social, cultural and political demands of the Kurds would be seriously taken into consideration and eventually met. They enthusiastically advocated the protection of the Constitutional revolution and the ideology of Ottomanism. To this end many *KTTG* authors attempted to provide the Kurdish masses with a full understanding of the new circumstances brought about by the revolution and create a great appreciation for the ideology of Ottomanism and constitutional monarchy. Moreover, for the same purpose, the *KTTG* constructed Ottomanism as an integral part of Kurdish collective identity and sought the future of the Kurds within the new Ottoman political framework. For instance, Ismail Hakkı Bâbânzâde in an article identified the 'levels' of Kurdish identity in the order of importance as Muslimness, Ottomanness and Kurdishness.[328] This seemingly

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[326] On the one hand, the CUP had to deal with the intra-Young Turk opposition but more importantly with the separatist inclinations among the non-Turkish or non-Muslim communities of the empire, while on the other, it had to deal with rival imperialist powers (Zürcher 2004a: 104; Akşin 2007: 67-81).

[327] *KTTC* also established *Kürd Neşr-i Maarif Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Society for the Diffusion of Education), a subordinate society, which opened up a school for Kurdish pupils in the Çemberlitaş district of Istanbul (Malmisajin 1999: 37; Klein 1996: 27-29; Olson 1989: 115; Jwaideh 2006: 298). The Society saw to the establishment of its branches in Kurdistan too (Kendal 1980: 35-36). According to Süreyya Bedir Khan, The Young Turks were wary of this society's activities and particularly disturbed by the word 'Kurd' in the header. However the Young Turks who did not dare to order the shutdown of the society directly, resorted to intimidation and harassment that eventually led to the breakup of the society (Süreyya Bedir Khan, *Vahdet-i Osmaniyeyi Kimler Parçaliyor?* [Who is Disrupting the Unity of the Ottomans?] *Kürdistan, No. 8, December 14, 1917,* cited in Malmîsanij 1999: 15).

[328] Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, *Kürdler ve Kurdistan* [Kurds and Kurdistan] *KTTG*, December 5, 1908, No. 1, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 44-46).

passionate attitude on the part of the *KTTG* towards the notion of Ottomanism has led academics to label the *KTTG/KTTC* members as genuine 'Ottoman nationalists' (Özoğlu 2004; Bajalan 2009), an overly simplistic account that stems from two inadequacies: the first is the lack a systematic and exhaustive investigation of the journal's identity discourse embedded in the actual intances of communication, i.e. the journal's texts. Second, the failure to situate the Kurdish intellectuals and their identity discourse in their historical circumstances and analyse them as such. Any historical account on this emergent stage of Kurdish nationalism and its nationalist discourse that lacks a thorough textual analysis of the journals of the period within its historical circumstances cannot do justice to the Kurdish intellectuals and the true nature of their activities as these inadequacies have led to an inaccurate reading of this important period; whereas a thorough exploration of the *KTTC* discourse based on a close textual investigation that is supplemented with extra-textual analysis reveals that the Kurdish leadership was not as naïve as it is depicted in the some of the relevant previous scholarship. As it will become obvious in this and the subsequent chapters, there were a number of causes behind the Kurdish leadership's fervent approach to the idea of Ottomanism. To begin with, Ottomanism was the prevailing and hegemoni discourses of the period. While some Kurdish intellectuals were perhaps convinced of the CUP's rhetoric of Ottomanism and therefore heavily incorporated it into their nationalist discourse; others, from a more pragmatic point of view utilized Ottomanism as a rhetorical tool to disguise their ethno-nationalist inclinations and give them a more subtle form, which would be more acceptable not only to the Young Turks but also to the Kurdish masses who were for the most part loyal to the Ottoman state and the Caliphate.[329] Second, thanks to its Ottomanist stand, the Kurdish leadership would remain on the good side of the Young Turks and have a chance to partake in Ottoman politics on behalf of the Kurds. Third, perhaps the Kurdish intellectuals felt that

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[329] See, Hanioğlu (2006: 3-19) where he argues that '… the non-Turkish communities of the empire inclined towards separatism; demand for cultural rights and recognition were mere pretexts for dangerous nationalist agenda…'

Kurds were not ready to go their separate way in the face of the threat posed by the Western colonial powers and thus they felt that they should stick to Ottomanism. That is, sharing the concerns of the Bedir Khan Brothers, the Kurdish intelligentsia organized around *KTTC/KTTG* was not blind to the ambitions and interests of the Great Powers [330] perceived to be encouraging the Armenians[331] to lay claim on the eastern provinces of the Empire where Kurds lived. Fourth, the *KTTG* used the concept of Ottomanism as an effective tool to curb and keep the growing Turkish nationalism in check and prevent it from turning into an oppressive official state ideology.[332] Although, it is hard to pin down one particular reason for Kurd's ostensible strong commitment to Ottomanism, the empirical evidence presented in this chapter points that it was conceivably the interplay of all the factors that caused the Kurds to adopt Ottomanism for *tactical* or *strategic* purposes. Moreover, Kurdish Ottomanism seemed more like loyalty to a territorial state, i.e., Ottoman state, in the form of *patriotism*, rather than nationalism, which is the love of an ethno-nation (cf. Connor 1994: 197).

It is noteworthy that ironically, the CUP was also exploiting the idea of Ottomanism against the raising ethno-nationalist inclinations among the non-Turkish constituencies to keep the empire intact (cf. Hanioğlu 1966: 209-215; Zürcher 2010: 215). As we saw, many key members of the CUP had already subscribed to Akçura's idea of Turkism but the unfavourable social and political circumstances of the empire compelled them to stick to the idea of Ottomanism

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[330] As stated above, it must be recalled, in this connection, that Western colonial expansion in Africa and Asia was in full tide between 1844-1900 (Zeine, p. 68-69).

[331] As we saw in the journal *Kurdistan*, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan was already concerned with the Armenian ambitions on the eastern provinces which were claimed by Kurds. *See* Abdurrahman Bedir Khan *'Wezîyeta Hazir û Musteqbel a Kurdistanê'* [The Present and the Future Situation of Kurdistan], *Kurdistan*, No. 29, October 14, 1901, in Bozarslan (1991), vol. 2., p. 514).

[332] Most of *KTTG*/KTTC activists were very much incorporated into the Ottoman state bureaucracty as some of them occupied influencial positions. For instance while Bâbânzâde İsmâ'îl Hakkı was an MP from Baghdad, Sayyid Abdulkadir was president of the Ottoman Senate. More on the biographies of the Kurdish intellectuals will follow.

for the time being (Akşin 2007; Zürcher 2004b; Zeine 1966). In any case, the Turkish understanding of Ottomanism was different from that of the other ethnic communities –even if we assume that other ethnic groups were genuine Ottomans- as the CUP equated Ottomanism with Turkism (Zeine 1966: 87: Zürcher 2004a: 129). Seeing themselves as the successors of the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks initially promoted the notion of the *'unity of elements'* (Ittihad-ı Anasır); however their real commitment lay with the Turks, the dominant or at least the *main element* (unsur-i aslî) –as they called it- of the Empire (Hanioğlu 1989: 626-644; Yeğen 2006: 121-124; Kayalı 1997: 113).

Then, aware of the Turkish dominance in the Ottoman state machinery, the Kurdish leadership had good reasons to be wary of the CUP and its attempts to transform *Turkism* into an oppressive form of chauvinist Turkish nationalism (Akşin 2007: 84-87; Zeine 1966: 93). Therefore, on the one hand, the Kurdish intellectuals pressed even harder to promote a more liberal and encompassing notion of Ottomanism that resembled a form of civic nationalism; while on the other, they negated Turkish nationalism through various discursive strategies because Turkism was the Sword of Damocles hanging over the ideals of Ottomanism as the only threatening form of nationalism that could suppress the Kurdish and other non-Turkish ethnonational identities. What is more, the Kurdish intellectuals at the same time and cleverly justified their own Kurdish ethno-nationalism by suggesting that for the Kurds the best way to serve the ideals of Ottomanism was through the formation of a strong Kurdish national community which would be possible only through modernization and education of the Kurds. In this context, the *KTTG*'s sociocultural practices in a way are the paper's response to the realities of the period.

5.1.2. The Proprietors of *KTTG*: Ownership Patterns and the Control of Media

Kurdish intellectuals and notables, many of whom came from Kurdish dynastic families that were excluded from the power structure after the demise of the Kurdish Emirates in the mid 19th century, made good use of this relatively liberal

climate and resumed their activities by establishing the first legal Kurdish nationalist organizations and periodicals mainly in the capital city of Istanbul. The first such organization was *Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti*[333] (KTTC) or Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress, in the Vezneciler[334] district of Istanbul, on September 19, 1908 (Malmîsanij, 1999; Tunaya 1952).

The *KTTC* leadership remained for the most part in the hands of the Kurdish feudal nobility dominated by the rival Kurdish families namely the Şemdinans and Bedir Khans (Hassanpour 1992: 58; Özoğlu 2004: 78-79). The founding members of this first legal organization included, Sayyid Abdulkadir, Emin Ali Bedir Khan, Halil Hayali, Ferik Şerif Paşa, Damat Ahmet Zülkif Paşa and Şükrü Mehmet Sekban (Malmîsanij 1999: 23-25). [335] The *KTTC* elected Sayyid Abdulkadir as its president for life and Ahmet Zülkif Paşa as the vice-president. Shortly after its foundation, the *KTTC* started publishing a weekly eponymous journal *Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi* [336](KTTG), whose first issue appeared on December 5, 1908 in its Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish bilingual form. The prominent authors of *KTTG* included, Halil Hayali, Ismail Hakkı Bâbânzâde, Molla Said-i Kurdi, Diyarbekirli Ahmed Cemil, Suleyman Nazif, Suleymaniyeli M. Tevfik (a.k.a. Pîremêrd) and Ercişli Seyyah Ahmet Şewqi.

As we saw, media ownership and its relations with the state and the readership are effective in shaping the discourse of media. Therefore it is important to look

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[333]Sometimes erroneously called *Kürd Terakki ve Teavün Cemiyeti* (The Kurdish Society for Progress and Mutual Aid).

[334] According to Zinar Silopî (2007: 23), the headquarters of the *KTTC* was in the Gedikpaşa district of Istanbul. However, on the third page of each issue of the journal it is indicated that the *KTTG*'s headquarter was *KTTC*'s central office in Vezneciler, which means that the journal *KTTG* shared the *KTTC*'s office in Vezneciler.

[335] Other members included Süleymaniyeli M. Tevfik (a.k.a. Pîremêrd), Salih Hulusi Pasha, Naim Baban, Bâbânzâde Zihni Paşa, Diyaberkirli Ahmet Cemil Bey and Liceli Ahmet Ramiz (Malmîsanij 1999: 23-25).

[336] Celîl (2000) erroneously calls this newspaper *Kurd* probably due to the fact that the word *Kurd* in the first line has a larger font size than the second line that reads *Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi*. Another possibility is that he might have referred to *Kurdistan*, a magazine published simultaneously by *KTTC* (Silopî: 2007).

into the background of the *KTTG/KTTC* members to understand fully the *KTTG* politics and identity discourse. It is noteworthy that most of these intellectuals had received education in the empire's institutions and became high-ranking Ottoman Officials. For instance, Sayyid Abdulkadir was and active CUP member and the president of the Ottoman Senate, Emin Ali Bedir Khan was a public prosecutor, Ismail Hakkı Bâbânzâde was a CUP deputy for Baghdad and served as the Minister of Education (1911), Şerif Pasha was a member of the Ottoman Parliament and served as an Ottoman diplomat in Europe, similarly Suleymaniyeli M. Tevfik was also a member of the Ottoman Parliament (Malmîsanij 1999: Özoğlu 2004: 122). Furthermore, many other members were integrated into the Ottoman state machinery on the state payroll and served as prosecutors, local administrator, civil servants, military officers and so forth (Özoğlu 2004: 122). [337]

5.1.3. THE SOCIAL BACKGROND OF *KTTC* MEMBERS AND *KTTG* WRITERS

5.1.3.1. Sayyid Abdulkadir (1851-1925)

Sayyid Abdulkadir, the second son of the legendary Sheikh Ubeydullah, the leader of the Naqşibendi Şemdinan Family, was born in 1851 in Şemdinan. He received education in the Naqşibendi tradition. He took part as a commander in the rebellion led by his father.[1] In 1896 he became an active member of the CUP who commissioned him, among others, for a visit to Kurdistan in order to secure the Kurdish support for the CUP program and the constitution (Klein 2007: 144; Hanioğlu 1989: 188). After the Young Turk revolution Sayyid Abdulkadir was appointed as the president of the Ottoman Senate and remained in this post until 1920 (Özoğlu 2004: 90). In 1919 he was elected as the president of *Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti* (KTC) or the *Society for the Rise of Kurdistan* (1918). Sayyid

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[337] For instance, Emin Ali Bedir Khan as a retired Ottoman civil servant was on the state payroll until 1923 (Bedir Khan 1997:32).

Abdulkadir derived his authority among the Kurds both from his religious background as well as his position in the Ottoman state (Klein 2007: 91). Although he remained as an autonomist vis-à-vis the seekers of Kurdish independence within the *KTC* ranks, the Turkish Republic sent Sayyid Abdulkadir to the gallows after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925.

5.1.3.2. Emin Ali Bedir Khan (1851-1926)

Emin Ali Bedir Khan, one of Bedir Khan Bey's sons, was born in Crete in 1851. Upon his graduation from law school, he became a public prosecutor and served in such places as Adana, Konya, Selanik and Ankara. He was actively involved in both Kurdish and Ottoman politics. He joined the decentralist *'Ahrar Fırkası'* (Party of Ottoman Liberals) and then the *'Hürriyet ve Itilaf Fırkası'* (Freedom and Accord Party), both of which were opposed to the CUP. In 1918 he was elected as the vice-president of the *KTC* (Özoğlu 95-100). Later on he became the president of *'Teşkilat-i Içtimaiye Cemiyeti'* (TIC) or *the Society of Social Organization* (1920) as a result of a split from the *KTC*, in which *TIC* adopted a secessionist line against Sayyid Abdulkadir's autonomist line (cf. Özoğlu 2004: 93). Before the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 Emin Ali Bedir Khan left Turkey for Egypt where he died in 1926.

5.1.3.3. Sulaymaniyeli M. Tevfik (a.k.a. Pîremêrd) (1867-1950)

Pîremêrd, the publisher and the director of *KTTG*, was born in Suleymaniye in 1867. He is one of the most important figures of modern Kurdish literature and journalism. Pîremêrd, who came from a less prestigious background vis-à-vis other *KTTC/KTTG* members, received his education at traditional Kurdish medreses. After working as a public servant for a number of years in Kurdistan he went to Istanbul along with Sheikh Said Barzanji in 1899. He wrote extensively for both Kurdish and Ottoman journals. Pîremêrd was appointed to the Ottoman Parliament on the order of Sultan Abdulhamid in 1899. Later on he studied law and worked as an attorney. He married a Turkish woman and served as a 'kaymakam' (district governor) for a number of years in such places as Hakkari, Beytüşşebap and Adapazarı before and after the Young Turk revolution.

Having been at odds with the CUP regime, he was imprisoned after the 31st March incident.[338] He settled in Suleymaniye in 1924 where he continued his intellectual activities until his death in 1950 (cf. Malmîsanij 1999: 67-102; Gunter 2011: 289)

5.1.3.4. Halil Hayali (1865-1946)

Hayali was born in the Mutki district of Bitlis in 1865 where he received education from an early age at Kurdish medreses. He spoke Zazaki, Kurmanji, Turkish, Arabic, Persian and French. As a person from a humble background, like Pîremêrd, Hayali was the most active member of the *KTTG*/*KTTC*. He became a civil servant in 1882 in Bitlis. He moved to Istanbul in 1890 and lived there until his death in 1940s (KXK 2013: 77). He actively took part in Kurdish cultural and political activities in Istanbul. In addition to *KTTG*, Hayali wrote extensively for such Kurdish journals as *Yekbûn, Rojî Kurd, Hetawî Kurd* and *Jîn*. The dominant themes of his writings were on language cultivation, Kurdish national literature and national history (Cemilpaşa 1989: 18-20). Hayali also prepared a grammar book and a dictionary with Ziya Efendi (Gökalp), however the latter burned them when he turned into a Turkish nationalist and a founding father of Turkish nationalism. Later on Hayali began to rewrite both works (Silopî 2007: 29-30).

5.1.3.5. Ismail Hakkı Bâbânzâde (1876-1913)

Ismail Hakkı Bâbânzâde, a son of Zihni Pasha from the aristocratic Baban family, was born in Baghdad in 1876. After studying law, he began teaching at Mektebi Mülkiye (School of Political Science) in Istanbul in 1909. As an active member of

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[338] 31st March incident was an attempted counter-revolution against the CUP. Since the July revolution two types of oppositions had challenged the Young Turks regime. One was that of the 'Ahrar Fırkası' (the Party of Ottoman Liberals) established by former Ottoman intellectuals that were dissatisfied by the CUP's authoritarianism, and the other one was the conservative religious circles who were against the secularist policies of the CUP wishing to restore Islam and şaria law. However, the real instigator of the incident was the latter group who had established 'Ittihad-i Muhammedi' (the Muhammedan Union) under the leadership of Derviş Vahdetin. Those who had earned a living or enjoyed a privileged status in the Sultan's network of patronage, including the member of the Hamidian Cavalries, also joined the Ittihad-i Muhammedi. The CUP eventually managed to suppress the rebellion by declaring a marshal law and eventually executing Derviş Vahdettin and many others rebels. The CUP also dethroned Sultan Abdulhamid replacing him with his brother Mehmet Reşit (Sultan Mehmet V) (cf. Zürcher 2004a: 95-99, 382).

CUP, Bâbânzâde became a deputy for Divaniye (Baghdad) on the CUP ticket. In 1911 he served as the Minister of Education under Kamil Pasha government. Bâbânzâde wrote a few articles for *KTTG* as well as *Rojî Kurd* in which he tried to convince the Ottoman state to strengthen the Kurdish community that constituted an 'important pillar of Ottomanism'. He also advocated for Kurdish to become the language of instruction in schools for Kurdish students. Although Bâbânzâde adopted a strong Ottomanist stance in *KTTG*, his views evolved over the years as he came to lean towards Kurdish nationalism evident in his articles in *Rojî Kurd*. He is the author of 'Letters from Iraq', 'The Political Life of Bismarck' and the co-author of 'The Dreyfus Incident'. He died of brain hemorrhage in 1913 (KXK 2013: 73).

5.1.3.6. Molla Said Kurdi (1876–1960)

Molla Said Kurdi also known as Molla Said Nursî or *Bediuzzaman* (Marvel of the Time) was a Kurdish theologian who was born in the Nurs district of Bitlis province in 1876. As a poor cleric of a non-aristocratic background he received traditional religious education at Kurdish medreses of the Nakşibendi *derviş* order. He went to Istanbul in 1896 where he was involved in the activities of the Kurdish intellectual circles and wrote Kurdish and Turkish articles for *KTTG*. In his articles he promoted the importance of education and the Kurdish identity within the political framework of Ottomanism and Islam. He was imprisoned for his involvement in the 'Muhammedian Union' during the 31st March incident. During WWI he served in the Teşkilat-i Mahsusa (the Special Organization) that functioned as the CUP's intelligence organization involved in the Armenian genocide. Since he was at odds with the new Republic and Mustafa Kemal's policies Kurdi was arrested and tried many times for his political use of religion. His writings are collectively known as Risale-i Nur (Message of Light), a body of Qur'anic commentary, which acquired a large following that later on turned into a movement called *Nurculuk* or *Enlightenment*. After his death his body was buried at an unknown location so that his tomb would not become a symbol of veneration (Zürcher 2004a: 401-402; Kutlay 2002: 140)

5.1.3.7. Diyarbekirli Ahmed Cemil (1872-1941)

Ahmed Cemil, the editor-in-chief of *KTTG*, was born in Diyarbakir in 1872. He studied at Aşiret Mektebi (Tribal School) then at the Schools of Political Science. He was a relative and close friend of Ziya Efendi (Gökalp) and one of the first members of CUP branch in Diyarbakir. He was involved in the establishment of the *Kurd Neşr-i Maarif Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Society for the Diffusion of Education). Ahmed Cemil served as kaymakam (district governor) in such towns as Siverek, Midyat, Cizre, Nusaybin and Dersim, then as the deputy mayor of Diyarbakir. He broke away from the Kurdish movement after the establishement of the Turkish Republic.

5.1.4. A Brief Introduction to the *KTTG*

On the cover page of each issue it is indicated that the owner and the chief director of this first legally circulated Kurdish newspaper was Suleymaniyeli M. Tevfik and the editor-in-chief was Diyarbekirli Ahmed Cemil. It seems that unlike *Kurdistan*, which was mostly printed at Young Turk printing presses, *KTTG* had its own printing press in Istanbul (Silopî 2007: 48; Malmîsanij 1999: 105). If this is true, then it is interesting that the *KTTG* would name its printing press 'Selanik' (Salonica),[339] where the first two issues of the journal was printed. To date, only 9 issues of *KTTG* have been located. The issue numbers and the publication dates are as follows:

Issue Number	Publication Date	Printing House	Place
1st	December 5, 1908	Selanik Printing House	Istanbul
2nd	December 12, 1908	Selanik Printing House	Istanbul

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[339] Selonica was the headquarters of the CUP and had a special place in the CUP history.

3rd	December 19, 1908	Merkez Printing House	Istanbul
4th	December 26, 1908	Merkez Printing House	Istanbul
5th	January 2, 1909	Merkez Printing House	Istanbul
6th	January 9, 1909	Merkez Printing House	Istanbul
7th	January 16, 1909	Merkez Printing House	Istanbul
8th	January 23, 1909	Merkez Printing House	Istanbul
9th	January 30, 1909	Merkez Printing House	Istanbul

Table 4 Publication dates and places of the journal *KTTG*

Since the *KTTG*, unlike *Kurdistan*, was published and circulated legally and since its parent organization *KTTC* had several branches in Kurdistan, e.g. Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Erzurum, Muş, Mosul and Baghdad, the paper probably reached to a larger readership in remote parts of Kurdistan. Although the first 9 issues of the *KTTG* are available, it is not clear whether there are more issues of that journal waiting to be discovered. In any case, scholars contemplate that after it dropped the ideal of Ottomanism and started to pursue a Turkish nationalist policy, the CUP shut down the *KTTG* and *KTTC* based on the article 3 of 'Cemiyetler Kanunu' (Associations Law) which provided a legal base for the closure of all ethnic associations after the 31 March incident (Bayir 2013; Minassian & Avagyan 2005). [340]

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[340] The second *Kurdistan was also shut down* with its publisher Sureyya Bedir Khan being imprisoned (cf. Malmîsanij 1999: 64-65; 2000: 108-109; Silopî 2007: 23).

5.1.5. *KTTG* as The Monopolistic Voice of The Kurdish Elite in Istanbul

The news of the Young Turk revolution and the restoration of the constitution resulted not only in the expression of joy but also in widespread anger and unrest among the conservative circles of ulama and sheikhs as well as tribal leaders in the periphery -notably in the Asiatic provinces- who had been benefiting from the Hamidian patronage network (Zürcher 2004a: 94; Özoğlu 2004: 12-13). Similarly, the Kurdish chieftains and particularly the Kurdish tribes under the Hamidian Cavalries[341] had lost their power and privileges as a result of the new Young Turk regime's reforms and centralization policies.[342] Soon after the state crackdown some of these tribal leaders came together under the banner of *KTTC* branches established in Kurdistan, while others, like Ibrahim Milî and Sheikh Said Barzanji, the father of legendary Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji, resorted to revolts against the Young Turk regime (Jwaideh 2006: 308-310; Klein 2002: 210-212)

The *KTTG*'s reaction to the Barzanji revolt is particularly important as it epitomizes an important aspect of the sociocultural practices of the journal. The *KTTG*'s reaction reveals: (1) the nature of relations of power between the *KTTG* and the Young Turk regime as well as th power relations between the *KTTG* and traditional Kurdish leadership in Kurdistan; (2) the way *KTTG* tried to accommodate relations between the Kurdish leadership in Kurdistan and the Ottoman state in accordance with the interests of the Kurdish elite in Istanbul. As the analysis of the Barzanji incident will show, the uprising had a pro-Sultan and anti-Young Turk character perhaps due to the Sheikh's desire to recover his former power he had enjoyed during the Hamidian period.

Upon a telegram received from the Mosul branch of *KTTC* regarding the uprising, *KTTG* published an article in which the paper reconstructs the incident and

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[341] Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji, the sheikh of a Qadiriyah Sufi family, led several revolts against the British Mandate of Iraq (Jwaideh 2006: 108; McDowall 2004: 140; Olson 1989: 61).

[342] Although the Young Turk regime initially attempted to disband the Hamidian Cavalries, it preferred the reorganization of these forces as *Hafif Aşiret Alayları* (Light Tribal Regiments) under the strict control of the central government (Klein 2002: 214).

expresses its reaction. On the surface, it seems that the *KTTG* is trying to mediate between the Sheikh's supporters and the state, while in reality the paper is clearly siding with the state under the control of the CUP and Young Turks. By adopting such attitude, the paper recognized and legitimized the existing power relations instead of challenging them. This, in line with the paper's none-secessionist approach, was perhaps meant to help the *KTTC/KTTG* win the Young Turks favour and carve out a bigger niche for itself in Ottoman politics. Then it is fair to say that the Kurdish leadership in Istanbul was instrumental in pacifying or silencing a more radical or even separatist movements by monopolizing the Kurdish politics and marginalizing alternative Kurdish voices. As Klein (1996: 119) insightfully asserts:

> For the most part, there is no record of what the underclass, or subaltern groups, thought of their situations, or of the changes taking place around them, or to what extent they participated because their voices do not appear in the historical record, which was monopolized by the literate elite. The nationalist elite, in speaking for the nation, in this way silenced other voices. They claimed the leadership roles and the tasks that went with them for themselves. In short, they claimed the nation for themselves. Through their discourse, they indicated directly and indirectly that should there ever exist an independent Kurdish identity, then the leadership would be in their hands.

In short, the elite's privileged access to media gave *KTTG* the power not only to by-pass dissident voices and oppress them but it also enabled the KTTG to portray a rosy picture in which Kurds for the most part were in favour of the CUP and constitutional monarchy through –and under the leadership of- the *KTTC*.

5.2. DISCOURSE PRACTICES AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE JOURNAL *KTTG*

5.2.1. The Discursive Construction of Common Political Present and Future

The construction of a common political present and future in *KTTG* is significantly different from that of *Kurdistan*. In that *Kurdistan*'s discourse practices remained ambiguous as it oscillated between ummahism, along with a reformist strategy of

perpetuation of the Ottoman regime -with certain modifications in favour of Kurds- and the more revolutionary strategy of transformation, including secession from the Ottoman Turks, with the predominance of the former standpoint; while *KTTG*'s construction of a common political present and future revolved around a dense Ottomanist policy.

The Ottoman political landscape had changed significantly after the July 1908 revolution as the Young Turk government started promoting a more secular form of Ottomanism (Zürcher 2010: 215),[343] i.e., a particular brand of *Ottoman nationalism* along with constitutional monarchy in order to appeal to the non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities. As we saw, the intellectuals of the Ottoman ethnic groups, including the Kurds, received the new regime with great enthusiasm. Thus at this level of analysis the major concern will revolve around the construction and the problematization of political circumstances in the discourse of the *KTTG,* including social and political crises, common worries and their future consequences for Ottomans in general and Kurds in particular. This will unveil the politics of the *KTTG* as to how they perceived and tackled certain contemporary issue from a Kurdish viewpoint and how they envisaged an ethno-national future for themselves and the Kurdish masses.

Some of the major themes in the corpus of *KTTG* pertain to the protection of the constitution and strengthening the idea of Ottomanism among Kurds; reformation and decentralization of the administrative system; inter-tribal rivalries in Kurdistan and the need for the unification of the Kurds, perhaps under the *KTTG* leadership in Istanbul; the lack of education and modernization among Kurds; relations with the Armenians, and so forth. Problematizing these issues and presenting them as common worries shared by all Kurds aimed at the production of strong ties among the readership with a sense of a common political present, future and a common fate. Nevertheless, this particular construction in *KTTG* corpus was

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[343] Under Sultan Abdulhamid the Ottoman state had abandoned the more secular form of Ottomanism that had been formulated during *Tanzimat* (reformation) period and instead promoted a religious one, which corresponded to the notion of *ummah* (the unified community of all Muslims). However, the CUP revived the more inclusive form *Tanzimat* Ottomanism.

heavily affected by the conjuncture of global politics and the fluctuating power structure within the Empire because global and local socio-political circumstances had a determinative effect on the types of problems and solution identified by the journal, which in turn, shaped the *KTTG* authors' political aspirations and demands for themselves and the Kurdish people they represented.

Thus the nationalism developed in *KTTG* discourse is of a complex type; whilst it promoted Kurds as a separate ethnic group that deserved a certain amount of administrative autonomy, it had to ensure that its nationalist discourse remained in line with the dominant Ottomanist and religious discourses in the process of power struggle. This position was articulated in the founding declaration[344] of the *KTTC* published in the inaugural issue of the *KTTG* on December 5, 1908: [345]

> As it has been declared and explicated in its bylaws, the purpose of founding the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress is based on finding out the ways and means of progress and happiness of the noble Kurdish people in accordance with modern principles and teachings and to ensure the reconciliation and friendly relations with other [Ottoman] citizens, particularly the Armenians by **protecting the rules of the constitution [Kânûn-i Esasi].**
>
> **The Protection of the constitution from any infringement and the territorial unity of the Ottoman state** are tied to such an important matter as the permanent consolidation of such values as national and religious willpower with integrity. Moreover the transformation of these associations into political parties after the opening of the parliament [Meclis-i Meb'usan] **should not violate the legal rights of the office of**

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[344] The founding declaration was published in Ottoman Turkish; however a summary of the major points made in the declaration was also published in the Sorani variety in the same issue of the journal by Süleymaniyeli Tewfik a.k.a Pîremêrd.

[345] Since the *KTTG* was the publication organ of the *KTTC*, it naturally reflected the politics of the organization and its members. Beneath the name of the newspaper it reads: 'The Publication Organ of the Society' in which the word 'society' refers to the *Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress*.

the Great Caliph of Islam, and the Great Ottoman throne as determined in the constitution. **Based on [the principle of] not privileging one community over another, and bestowing provinces with broader power,** the state should make changes in accordance with the constitution when considered necessary by the parliament. **Since the society [*KTTC*] accepts and supports all ideas and initiatives that entails the advancement and glory of the Ottoman state […] it subscribes to the provisions of the CUP's political program** that takes upon itself the well-being and progress of the homeland; **the stance of the society regarding other issues is based on the provisions [of CUP's political program]** in question (*Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti,* December 5, 1908, No. 1: 6, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 40-41)).[346]

The declaration is the manifestation of the political program of the *KTTC* regarding the present and the future of the Kurds. The first paragraph explicitly specifies that the *KTTC* is a Kurdish association working for the rights of 'noble Kurdish people' through modernization within the framework of Ottomanism and Islamic modernism. It also suggests the reconsolidation of friendly relations with

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[346] 'Kürd Teavün ve Terakkî Cem'iyeti"nin maksad-ı taşkili, nizamname-i dahilîsinde beyan ve tasrih olunduğu üzre, berat-i selâmet-i mülk-ü millet olan ve ahkâm-ı şeriata müstenid bulunan Kanun-ı Esasînin muhafaza-ı ahkâmıyla, o sayede Kürd kavm-i necibinin ihtiyacât-ı asriyece ve tahsîs-i maarifçe esbab-ı terakkî ve saadet-i halini istikmal ve diğer vatandaşlarıyla ve siyyema Ermenilerle tezayüd-i i'tilâfât-ı medeniye ve hüsn-ı muaşeret-i kavmiyelerini istihsal hususlarına ve Kanun-ı Esasînin her gûna tatarruk-ı halelden vikayesi ve tamamiyet-i mülkiye-i Devlet-i Osmaniye'nin muhafazası uğrunda îsar-ı nakdîne-i hayata olan azm-ü cezm-i millî ve dinînin bir nokta-ı sabite-i Itttihadda te'yîd-i te'bîdi kaziyye-i mühimmesine ma'tûf olduğu gibi, Meclis-i Meb'usan'ın küşadıyla, bu gibi cem'iyetlerin devam-ı mevcudiyetleri halinde veyahud fırak-ı siyasiyeye inkılabında ta'kîb olunacak meslek-i siyasî dahi makam-ı celîl-i Hilâfet-i İslâmiye ve saltanat-ı muazzama-ı Osmaniye'nin kanun-ı mezkûrde muayyen hukuk-ı meşruasına îras-ı nakîse etmeyecek ve lâaletta'yîn bir kavmin diğer bir kavm üzerine bir gûna imtiyazı haiz olmaması ve vilâyâta tevsî-i me'zuniyet i'tası kaidelerine müsteniden, mülk-i Devletin ihtiyacât-ı medeniyece daha muvafık idaresini te'mîn eyleyecek surette Meclis-i Meb'usan'ın Kanun-ı Esasîce lüzum göreceği her gûna ta'dilât ve tekemmül.tı ve Devlet-i Osmaniye'nin tealî ve şevketini müstelzim kâffe-i tasavvurât ve teşebbüs.tı esasen tervîc ve iltizam etmekten ve Osmanlı İttihad ve Terakkî Cem'iyeti'inin neşreylediği siyasî programın mevadd-ı muhteveyesi vatanın selâmet ve terakkîsini kâfil bulunmasıyla, hususât-ı sairede mevadd-ı mezkûreye istinad edilmekten ibaret bulunmuştur. (Cem'iyet'in Beyannamesi [The Founding Declaration of the Association], *KTTG*, No. 1, December 5, 1908, In Bozarslan (1998), p. 40-41)

other Ottoman societies, by upholding the rule of law (the constitution)[347] with a particular emphasis on the relations with the Armenians.

The second paragraph again foregrounds the constitution law, which stipulates the equality of all Ottoman ethnic and religious constituents. Then the paragraph reiterates the importance of Ottomanism by underlying the territorial integrity of the empire and loyalty on the part of potential new political parties to the Sultanate and the Caliphate. This strong emphasis on the territorial integrity of the Empire and loyalty to the Sultan Caliph indicates that the society was not in favour of secessionism. Moreover, given that the Kurdish intelligentsia had been active in the CUP from the very beginning[348], it does not come as a surprise to see how in the subsequent lines the KTTC embraces the CUP program by promising to promote the constitutional monarchy and educate the Kurdish masses about the importance of the constitution through various means including its journal *KTTG*.

It is remarkably important that the *KTTC* explicitly argued that no one community should be favoured over another, a point specifically made to express the Kurdish intelligentsia's concerns vis-à-vis the Turkish racial dominance. Equally important is the KTTC's demand for giving broader power to the provinces, which subtly advocates a form of Kurdish autonomy.[349] In the last paragraph of the

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[347] As we saw in the previous chapter, the Kurdish-Armenian relations was one of the major themes of the journal *Kurdistan*, in which the authors constantly referred to the historical friendship between the two communities and tried to persuade Kurds to restore these friendly relations that were harmed by the policies of the Hamidian regime. In a similar way, *KTTG* also published articles that promoted friendly relations between the two communities. For instance, Hüseyin Paşazade Süleyman's article in issue 9 is illustrative of the *KTTG* policy towards the Armenians in which, through the use of the strategy of *then and now*, the author blames the previous tyrannical Hamidian period for the enmities between the two communities and asserts that with the new constitutional regime Kurds and Armenians will be able to normalize their relations. (See, Hüseyin Paşazade Süleyman, *'Kürdler ve Ermeniler'* [Kurds and Armenians]. *KTTG* No. 9, January 30, 1909, in Bozarslan, p. 431-434).

[348] Some of the Kurdish intellectuals were among the founding members of that organization, *see*, Hanioğlu (1966).

[349] As we will see later, Kurdish leadership will develop a better articulated and more openly expressed autonomist view in *Rojî Kurd*.

declaration, the society explicitly expresses its commitment to Ottomanism and the CUP's political program, ensuring its loyalty to the CUP and thus to the state albeit within the framework of the Ottomanist principles. It is also noteworthy that the founding declaration mentions the possibility of associations, especially their own, turning into political parties. Clearly, if the *Young* Turks had not shut down the *KTTC*, the Kurdish leadership had every intention to transform this association into a Kurdish political party.

Some of the views above are also echoed in the first article of the *KTTC*'s constitution, which stipulated:

> A beneficial association by the name of *KTTC* has been established **to enlighten those Kurds who are not aware of the virtuous principles of the constitution [Kânûn-i Esasi]** which are in accordance with great provisions of Islam, and guarantee the well-being of the homeland and the happiness of the people; **to consolidate the strong Kurdish ties with the office of the high esteemed Caliph and the great Sultan as long as the system of constitution [meşrutiyet] and consultation [meşveret] is protected;** to consolidate the relations between Kurds and other Ottoman people such as the Armenians and the Nasturis;[350] **to solve the conflicts and hatred between [Kurdish] tribes and to find out the means and methods to unite them around a legitimate body**;
> to promote education, industry, commerce and agriculture.' (in Malmîsanij 1999: 19).[351]

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[350] Nestorians are members of a Christian sect originating in Asia Minor and Syria. They are represented by the Church of the East, or Persian Church, commonly known as the Nestorian Church. Today most members of this sect, numbering about 170,000, live in Iraq and Turkey (cf. Hill 1988; Atiya 1968).

[351] 'Islam ulu hükümlerine uygun ve milletin mutluluğu ile vatanın selamtine kefalet eden Kanûn-î Esasî'nin güzel kurallarını bu gerçekleri bilmeyen bir takım Kürdlere anlatmak; Osmanlılığın yüce vasıflarını daima korumakla beraber din ve devletin ilerleme ve yaşamasının biricik aracı olan meşrutiyet ve meşveret düzeni korunup sürdürüldükçe Kürdlerin büyük halifelik makamı ve yüce sultanlığa olan güçlü baglılıklarını sağlamlaştırmak; vatandaşları olan Ermeni, Nesturi ve diger Osmanlı kavimleri ile iyi geçinip uyuşmalarını ve bir kat daha güçlendirmek ve arttırmak; kabileler ve aşiretler arasındaki bazı anlaşmazlıkları ve nefreti gidermek ile tümünün bir meşru merkez birliğinde ilerlemek için el ele vermelerinin araçlarını sağlamak; maârif, sanayi, ticaret ve tarımı yayıp geliştirmek temel maksatları üzerine Kürd Teavun ve Terakki Cemiyeti adıyla bir hayır

Here too the protection of the constitution is foregrounded as it is meant to regulate the relations between the Ottoman state and the Kurds. But more strikingly, the text conditions the *KTTC*'s support fort he Ottoman State an even the Caliphate in that the Kurds would remain loyal to the state and the Caliph *'as long as'* [sürdürüldükçe] the constitution, which ensures equality between different Ottoman ethnic communities, is protected. This had also been implied in the second paragraphs of the *KTTC*'s founding declaration above (see the first sentence of the secinde paragraph), which subtly suggested that Kurds might break away from Ottomanism and look for other solution should there be a breach of the Ottoman constitution or should the constitution be abolished altogether.

Moreover, the text mentions the inter-tribal rivalries as the *KTTC* attaches great importance to the unification of the competing Kurdish tribes. The text offers a particular solution: the unification and mobilization of the tribes around a 'legitimate body' (in line 11). Needless to say, this body was none other than the *KTTC* itself, which in this way would gain more legitimacy and political leverage in Istanbul as the representatives of an allegedly unified ethnic community.

Suleymaniyeli Seyfullah taking up the issue of political autonomy restated the need to strengthen local governance capacities:

> Since every Ottoman region did not have the same capacity -given that they all displayed differences in accordance with their ethnicity and character -and since the light of education did not reach every corner [of the empire] equally and also since the administration of one region differed from those of other regions, the application of a centralized decision-making mechanism was not favourable.[352]

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cemiyeti kurulmuştur' (See, Malmîsanij, 1999: 19-20). The text has been translated from Ottoman Turkish into plain and simple modern Turkish by Malmîsanij)

[352] Memalik-i Osmaniye'nin her ciheti aynı seviye-i kabiliyette olmadığından, gerek ihtilaf-ı mizac-ü anâsırla ve gerek envar-ı maarifin her tarafa seyyanen intişar edememesiyle bir tarafın idaresi diğer tarafın idaresine bezemediğinden, merkezin alel'ıtlak bir karar ve tedbiri tatbikatça tevlîd-i mehazîr etmekten hâlî kalmamakta bulunmuş… idi (Süleymaniyeli Seyfullah, *Telhîs-î Sîyasî* [A

Here through the *strategy of rationalization* and emphasis on the difference between regional subgroups, the author advocates stronger regional bodies or governance.[353] Needless to say, although the author's suggestion is for the entire Ottoman territory, his primary concern is the administration of the Kurdish provinces.

The aforementioned extracts from the corpus of *KTTG*, contain enough evidence to refute claims in the relevant literature that tend to portray the *KTTC* as a truly Ottomanist *'cultural club'* and *KTTG* as a *'cultural publication'* that did not make any nationalist or political demands (Özoğlu 2004; Bajalan 2009: Strohmeier 2003). It goes without saying that *KTTG*, albeit in a very implicit manner, due to the reasons stated above, often problematized and expressed its concerns about the Turkish racial dominance in the Ottoman politics. However as I argued above, a major reason, *inter alia*, for the KTTC/KTTG's support of Ottomanism was that they saw Ottomanism as the most effective tool to cover up their nationalist agenda, while at the same time it helped them keep the rising Turkish nationalism in check and prevent it from turning into the state ideology. Then, as it will become more obvious, thanks to a meticulous close textual investigation of *KTTG* corpus, far from being a mere *cultural club or a cultural publication, the KTTC* and *KTTG* were political centres for Kurdish intellectuals where the Kurdish intellectuals formulate their nationalist political agenda. [354]

Nonetheless, as mentioned above, for pragmatic reasons the *KTTG* adopted a very dense Ottomanist tone in its discourse of Kurdish national identity. In what follows I investigate actual instances of language use in the corpus of *KTTG* in

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Summary of the Political Situation], *KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 187).

[353] Decentralization was a defining character of Arab political demands after the 1908 revolution. Arab leadership established a number of political parties during this period one of which was *The Ottoman Administrative Decentralization Party* (Hizb al-Lamarkaziyyah al-Idariyyah al-'Uthmani) (Zeine 1966: 94).

[354] The same was true for the associations established by other ethnic groups, such as the Albanians (Sönmez 2007) and Arabs (Firro 2009).

which Ottomanism and Kurdish ethno-nationalism were interwoven. The extract below from an article by Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı is typical:[355]

> The Kurdish people, to whom I am proud to belong, are also showing signs of revival and restoration […] This pure and virtuous community, which constitutes the most fertile and eternal branch of the river of Islam as well as the strongest and most durable bastion and fortress of the great Ottoman masses [kitle-i muazzama], is first of all Muslim. Then, a Kurd, without any dishonesty or hidden intent and within the framework of the constitutional monarchy, which is the source of life for nations [millet], is a true Ottoman. And thirdly a Kurd is a Kurd […][356]

Here the author, a deputy in the Ottoman parliament, employs various discursive strategies to articulate the Ottomanness of the Kurds. First, through the strategy of positive self-representation along with the lexemes of 'purity' and 'virtuousness' he creates a sense of national pride in being Kurdish as distinct Ottomans community. Second, through the strategy of cohesivation, he emphasizes the unifying common history of the Kurds as a Muslim Ottoman community and their will to stay as such in solidarity with other Ottomans. The most striking part of the author's Ottomanist argument is in lines 4-7 where he significantly expresses the multi-leveled nature of Kurdish identities in degree of importance, in which Islam (religion) [357] and Ottomanism are the first two primary

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[355] This article was also published in the 3rd issue of *Hetawî Kurd*.

[356] 'Mensubiyetiyle müftehir olduğum Kürd kavmi de bugün bir eser-i teceddüd ve heyat göstermeye başladı. Nehr-i cûşan-ü bereketnişan-ı İslâmiyetin en abdar ve en cavidanî bir ayağını, kitle-i muazzama-ı Osmaniye'nin en müstahkem ve en rasîn bir burc-ü istihkâmını teşkil eden bu kavm-i pâk-ü nezîh, her şeyden evvel İslâmdır. Andan sonra, sebeb-i hayat-ı ümem ve bâdî-yi saadet-i âlem olan usûl-ı meşrutiyet dairesinde hâlis ve bîğıll-ü ğışş bir Osmanlıdır; ve derece-i salisede de Kürddür […]' (Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, *Kürdler ve Kürdistan* [Kurds and Kurdistan], *KTTG*, No. 1, December 5, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998), p. 44-46).

[357] The force of Islam was still much greater than that of politico-secular nationalism not only for the Kurds but also for other Muslim Ottoman communities (Zeine 1966: 142). However, as we will see later, the ideology of Ottomanism diminished in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd* in which Kurdishness consisted of the Islamic and Kurdish national identities leaving out the Ottoman component. Bâbânzâde himself was among the authors of *Rojî Kurd* who for the most part dismissed the idea of Ottomanism. In addition, a more radical discursive shift would take place in the discourses of *Rojî Kurd* and particularly that of *Jîn* in which the notion of Ottomanism

and indispensable components of Kurdish identity, with the Kurdish ethnic identity coming in the third and last place. However, in reality although religion was in fact a primary identity marker for Kurds, it was not followed by the Ottoman identity but rather by parochial loyalties such as tribal, denominational, linguistic, and regional identities.[358] Thus, it is clear that the levels of Kurdish identity designated by the author is a deliberate discursive practice aiming at the consolidation of the journal's overall Ottomanist rhetoric to assure the Young Turks of the Kurdish loyalty to the idea of Ottomanism. However, later in his article the author balances his argument in favour of the ethnic component of Kurdish national identity:

> A Kurd is still a Kurd; he has not even slightly changed [neither] his nationality [milliyet], [nor] his appearance or his material and moral identity.[359]

Here from a primordialist point of view he refers to the 'inherent' moral, racial and physical features of the Kurds as shared characteristics of a national community, which differentiates them from the *other* Ottoman communities. Notice how the author attributes an uninterrupted historical continuity and coherence to the Kurdish national identity through the *strategy of singularization*.

The author adds:

> Yet, the Kurd has been loyal to the Ottomanism with a strong tie [...] Ottomanism has encompassed Kurdishness and Kurdishness in return has encompassed Ottomanism […] God forbid, if Ottomanism is destroyed, Kurdishness will be reduced to a shadow of its former self;

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disappears altogether. Thus Kurdishness gradually came to be the dominant component of Kurdish identity discourse superseding Ottomanism, or even Islam on a few occasions .

[358] As Hobsbawm (1992: 10) once said, 'ideologies and identities are attributed to the commoners by the state or the elite and thus they do not reflect the true ideas or feelings of the people they supposedly represent.'

[359] 'Kürd hâlâ Kürddür; milliyetini, şekl-ü manzara-ı hariciyesini, hüviyet-i maddiye ve ma'neviyesini zerre kadar değiştirmemiştir' (Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, *Kürdler ve Kürdistan* [Kurds and Kurdistan], *KTTG*, No. 1, December 5, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 44-46).

God forbid, if Kurdishness is destroyed and loses its name and fame, [then], Ottomanism will become weak and miserable.

Nevertheless, the tyrannical period, which should be left in the frightening darkness of the past that we do not want to remember, has also crushed this strong component [Kurds] and maltreated it even more cruelly compared to the other components [of the Empire] [...]

Nonetheless, let's forget all these bitter memories; let us pass the sponge over the embarrassing and face-blushing crimes of the previous government and let's work hard and say, 'the future is ours'. (, December 5, 1908, No. 1: 3, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 44-46)).[360]

In the first paragraph, through the *strategy of unification* and the rhetoric of *we are in the same boat* (cf. Wodak *et al.* 1999: 100) the author envisages a common political future and destiny for the Kurds and other Ottomans, Turks in particular. We observe the same rhetoric in lines 11-13 where the author constructs a common fate for the Kurds and Ottoman state. However, he emphasizes it is the Ottoman state that is in need of the Kurdish support rather than the other way around.

Parallel to the papers Ottomanist stance, in the second paragraph the author makes a distinction between the Hamidian regime and the new Young Turks government by utilizing the rhetoric of *then and now*.[361] First, he expresses his

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[360] 'Bununla beraber, Osmanlılığa da bir hal-ı metîn-i ittihad ile murtabıt kalmıştır […] Osmanlılık Kürdlük ve Kürdlük de bilmukabele Osmanlılığı cem'etmiş […] Osmanlılık maazallah mahvolursa, Kürdlük bînişan kalır; Kürdlük Huda nekerde muzmahil ve kemnam olursa, Osmanlılık zayıf ve perişan olur.

Bununla beraber, artık mâzînin mahûf zalamına, bir daha anmak istemediğimiz saha-ı nisyana atılması vacib olan devr-i sabık-ı istibdad, Osmanlılığın bir direğini teşkil eden bu unsur-ı kuvveti de ezmiş, diğer anâsıra nazaran daha elîm bir surette hırpalamış idi […]

Ma'mâfîh, şimdi artık bu elîm hatıratı bırakalım. Hük.met-i sabıka için bâdî-i hicab-ü hacalet olan hatîât üzerinden bir sünger geçirelim ve artık istikbal bizimdir" diyerek dört el ile damen-i sa'y-ü gayrete sarılalım' (Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, *Kürdler ve Kurdistan* [Kurds and Kurdistan] *KTTG*, December 5, 1908, No. 1, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 44-46)).

[361] *Then and now* is a rhetorical device in the *strategy of discontinuation/dissimilation* to emphasize the differences between the pre-revolution and post-revolution periods. To this end, *KTTG* often compared the old administration to the new one through this strategy, resenting the

resentment of the past tyrannical Hamidian period that had crushed the Kurdish component saving the new government. Then, in the last paragraph he suggests through a metaphor that the Kurds should pass the sponge over all the atrocities inflicted by the 'former' regime that Kurds should seek a common future with other Ottoman communities within an Ottomanist political framework. [362]

Halil Hayali wrote a similar piece entitled *'The Homeland and the Unity of the Kurds [Kurmanc]'* in the Kurmanji variety of Kurdish:

> With the benevolence of the CUP and the assistance of the army the Constitution [Kanun-î Esasi] was declared [hence] the troublesome cruelty was vanished. The honorable deputies gathered and [now] the [Ottoman] Parliament will discuss the situation of the homeland. May God give them all success…
>
> Kurd [Kurmanc] is a significant element in the Ottoman nation [qewm]; [he] is religious, brave and capable. *(KTTG, January 23, 1908, No. 8: 8, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 391-395).[363]*

Praising the CUP and the constitution, Hayali designates the CUP and the Ottoman army as the liberators of the Kurds and the other Ottamans. In the second paragraph, through the strategy of self-positive representation he does not only single out the Kurds from other Ottomans but he also glorifies them as a major Ottoman element that has protected the homeland, the religion and the honour of the [Ottoman] people.

Another common tactic used in *KTTG* to promote the journal's Ottomanist policy was the *strategy of shift of blame* through *scapegoating* (cf. Wodak *et al.* 1999: 36). Interestingly, while the journal *Kurdistan* employed this strategy to discredit Sultan Abdulhamid, *KTTG* used it to *defend* him. Accordingly, the *KTTG* put the blame on the *devr-i sabık-ı istibdad* (the former tyrannical period) but holding its officials, particularly Sultan's 'evil' advisers, responsible for all malicious deeds committed against Kurds without bypassing Sultan Caliph's responsibility.[364] Although he was in total control of the state before the 1908 revolution, the Sultan remained as an *'innocent perpetrator'* (cf. Wodak at al. 1999: 87).[365] Moreover, the rhetoric of *then and now* and the *strategy of shift of blame* provided the *KTTG* with the perfect opportunity to express its frustration with the Ottoman state policies without attracting the wrath of the CUP.[366]

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[364] The same strategy was being used by the CUP who portrayed Abdulhamid as a well-intentioned sovereign who had been mislead by evil advisors (Akşin 2007: 54). Although the CUP members distrusted him, they felt unable to remove Abdulhamid because many Ottomans saw the Sultan as the hero of the July Revolution who restorred the constitution (Zürcher 2004a: 94).

[365] The journal used such phrase as *devr-i istibdad* (tyrannical period), *devr-i sabık-ı istibdad* (the former tyrannical period), *maziye-i istibdad*, (the history/past of tyranny) etc., to blame unspecified state officials who had 'misguided' the Sultan. Nevertheless, this does not come as a surprise because glorification of the Sultan Caliph was a part of the whole Ottomanist narrative. After all, the office of the Caliph was the embodiment of the idea of Ottomanism and the Caliphate. Later on I will show how *KTTG* glorified Sultan Abdulhamid in both in the articles and by publishing one of his portrait on the cover of the 4th issue in addition to an image of his chamber on the cover of the 5th issue to display Kurds' commitment to the Ottoman ideals.

[366]This is so because criticizing the previous regime kept the Kurdish leadership closer to the Young Turks and the CUP government who were responsible for the overthrow of the previous regime in the first place. It is noteworthy that in the first year of their government, the Young Turks approved the establishment of 200 new newspapers in Istanbul, which raised the number of newspapers in Istanbul to 353 (Firro 2009: 45). This is because the Young Turk regime felt that newspaper publication was an ideal tool to justify the 1908 Revolution by disseminating the state

5.2.1.1. Modernization and Education

KTTG authors were aware that the progress of a society was judged by the educational level of its members and felt that a certain degree of modern education was a necessity for the Kurds to be taken considered as a national community.[367] In other words, the success of the national models in Europe had profound social, cultural and political implications both in and outside Europe. In that, the nationalist leaders of other communities found education and modernization, including industrialisation, as the major compontents of *national* progress and a blueprint for the construction of the nationhood (cf. Smith 2003: 116). Thus, similar to *Kurdistan*, modernization and education of the Kurds became indispensable themes in *KTTG* discourse for the intellectual progress as well as industrial, commercial and agricultural growth in Kurdistan would entail a national formation.

The crucial importance of education was expressed from the very beginning in both the constitution and the founding declaration of the *KTTC*. In the subsequent issues Saîd-î Kurdî, Halîl Hayalî, Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı and Suleymaniyeli Tevfik were the most prominent figures that advocated schooling and education as a way to emerge from the state of backwardness. While *Kurdistan* promoted modernization and education using the rhetoric of the protection of the Empire's eastern frontiers against Russian aggression, *KTTG* put greater emphasize on the rhetoric of producing better Ottomans out of Kurds. Moreover, as I will discuss later in details, while *Kurdistan* made no demands for the use of Kurdish as the language of instruction, *KTTG* did demand education in

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reforms among Ottomans in Istanbul as well as in the provinces and hence politicize the Ottoman society in accordance with CUP's ideals. In a sense, *KTTG* complied with this expectation. However, soon after the revolution the Young Turks felt that a free press was also harming its centralist policies (ibid.).

[367] They were right in their judgment because although there were many educated Kurds in the Young Turk movement, 'the general stereotype that 'the Kurds' were backward, ignorant group that needed to be controlled and civilized was widespread. Kurdish intellectuals wanted to dispel these notions, and worked hard to do so in their journals.' (Klein 2007: 144).

Kurdish language. Also, while *Kurdistan* promoted education through a discourse heavily affected by religious intertextuality, *KTTG* discourse on education relied for the most part on a secular and positivist view.[368] For instance, Malatyalı Bedri wrote:

> Today the major deficiency and the fault of the Kurds is ignorance and lack of education and schooling even though they remain courageous […] Nations acquire great status and glorious ranks, within their civilizational circle, [only] after they incorporate their superior moral merits, that they possess from birth, with [skills] acquired through science and arts.[369]

Bedri's primary concern was modern education without recourse to religious intertextuality.[370] He felt that secular and modern education would help Kurds achieve all the attributes of a fully formed modern nation, assuming significance that would lead to their recognition as such. Thus the most outstanding aspect of his text is in its last sentence where he asserts that a certain degree of modern education -emphasized with the lexeme of *ilim* [science]- a prerequisite for the national progress.

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[368] An exception to this was Halil Hayali who said: 'O Friends, open up schools, educate your children, do not see ignorance as something suitable for your children; because the command 'you should seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave' is a religious duty' [Geli Hevalan! Mekteban vekin, ewlade xwe bidin xwendin, arê nezaniye li ewlade xwe layiq mebinin. Cunki emrê 'utlubul'ilme minelmendi ilellehd' li me ferz e] (Halil Hayali, *Weten û Îttîfaqa* Kurmanca [The Homeland and the Unity of the Kurds], *KTTG,* January 23, 1908, No. 8: 8, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 391-394). Remarkably the author invites Kurds to the realm of modern education through the divine voice of a hadith from the Prophet.

[369] 'Bugün yine evvelki vaz'iyet ve şecatlarıyla bakıy kalan Kürdlerin en büyük noksanı, en azîm hatası ma'rifetsizlik, maarifsizliktir […]

Milletler, daima, mutahallık oldukları meziyet-i fıtriyenin ilim ve hüner ma'rifetiyle edeceği imtizacdan sonra bulundukları daire-i medeniyette büyük büyük mevkiler, şanlı dereceler kazanır' (Malatyalı Bedri, *Makale-i Mahsuse: Kürdler ve Şecaat-i Akvam* [Special Article: Kurds and Heroism of Nations, *KTTG*, No. 6, January 9, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 287-289)).

[370] Secular Ottomanism was a product of positivism, *inter alia*, that emerged as the underpinning current of the 1908 Revolution (Hanioğlu 1995: 200-212). In line with the CUP discourse *KTTG* promoted education through a Comptian positivism in a scientific discourse.

Saîd-î Kurdî was among those who underlined the importance of education. In one article he asserted that education and unity would liberate the Kurds from their 'miserable' situation: [371]

> Then we have three enemies that destroy us. One of them is poverty, as 40 thousand Kurdish porters in Istanbul prove it. The second one is ignorance and lack of education [bêxwendinî], which is proved by the fact that not even one out of a thousand of us can read a newspaper. The third is hostilities and conflicts among us, which weakens us […] (*KTTG*, December 5, 1908, No. 1: 4, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 54-55)).[372]

Although the journal propagated the education of the Ottomans as a whole, Saîd-î Kurdî, like Bedrî, promoted education for a particular Ottoman element, i.e. Kurds, through the use of such deictic words as the pronouns *em/me* [we/us] whose referents were *'we Kurds'*.

At this point, I would like to discuss briefly the role of deixis in the *KTTG*'s identity discourse. As we saw in the previous chapter, although its semantic meaning is fixed, the denotational meaning of a deictic word depends on the contextual information. Therefore, when the author says *'we have three enemies that destroy us'* we know from the global context of the text that it is *we Kurds* who have three enemies that destroy *us Kurds*. The frequent use of deictic pronouns in the text, and in the whole corpus of the *KTTG* for that matter, greatly contributes to the formation of Kurdish collective identity in the form of a taken-for-granted assumption. Hence, when the readers see a *'we'* or *'us'* they *habitually* assumed that it is *'we/us Kurds'* that renders the imagination of the Kurds as an *in-group* of a single and unified community surpassing intra-Kurdish tribal, denominational, linguistic, and regional differences. Predictably, this also

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[371] This article was also translated into Ottoman Turkish and published in the 2nd issue of *KTTG*.

[372] 'Piştê wê, sê dujminê me hene, me xirab dikin. Yek feqîrtî ye, çil hezar hemalê Istanbulê delîlê wê ye. Ê diduwan cehalet û bêxwendinî, ku hezar ji me da yek "qazete" nikarin bixwînin, delîla wê ye. Ê sisîyan dujminî û îxtîlaf e, ku ev edawet qeweta me winda dike […]' (Kürdçe Lisanimiz: Bediüzzaman Molla Said-i Kurdînin Nasayihi [Our Kurdish Language: Advice by Bediüzzaman Molla Said-i Kurdî] *KTTG*, December 5, 1908, No. 1: 4, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 54-55)).

evoked the notion of *'them,'* *'the out-group'* or *the 'non-Kurds'*, on the other side of the dichotomy, even if *'them'* does not physically exist in the text.

Nonetheless, deictic words were also utilized in the construction of the Kurdish Ottomanism as illustrated in the following examples:

> The German economic power which is getting bigger and stronger thanks to the permission they acquired under heavy circumstances for the on-going construction of Baghdad railroad, was wounding the heart of *our* empire and hampering and shaking *our* life-giving resources… Because the advantages acquired by the Germans in *our* country are withheld from them, *we* have not only lost the friendship of the English and French completely… [373]
>
> The disagreement between *us* and Austria is solved.[374]

Here, in line with the journals Ottomanist rhetoric all deictic words, i.e. *our, we* and *us,* refer either to the Ottoman state or the Ottoman society as a whole including all its constituencies, e.g., Kurds, Turks, Arabs, Armenians and so forth. The content of the above extracts are also significant in that they demonstrate how Kurdish intelligentsia presented itself as integral part of the Ottoman political system and criticized the state it from within circumventing any notions of *'othering'*.

Nonetheless, not all deictic words have a clear contextual environment from which the meaning could be deduced. That is, sometimes it is hard to tell the denotational meaning of a deixis as to whether it refers to the 'us' of the Kurds, the 'us' of Ottomans or the 'us' of Muslims. [375] It seems that *KTTG*, like *Kurdistan*,

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[373] 'Şerait-i fahişe tahtinde imtiyazı istihsal edilen Bagdad hatt-ı kebîri ile bir kat daha kesb-i vüsat ve kuvvet eden Alman nüfûz-ı iktisadîsi, memalikimizi kalbgâhından cerîhadar ve bütün kuva-yı hayatiye-i menabiimizi haleldar etmekte idi… Almanya'nın memleketimizde bissühûle nail olduğu istifadeyi kendilerinden diriğ etmek yüzünden İngiliz ve Fransız dostluğunu son senelerde büsbütün gaybetmiş olduğumuz gibi…' (Süleymaniyeli Seyfullah, *Telhîs-î Sîyasî* [A Summary of the Political Situation], *KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 144-145).

[374] *'Avusturya ile olan ihtilâfımız, bir suret-i tesviyeye iktiran etmiştir'* (M. Tevfik, *Icmal-i Siyasi* [Political Recovery], *KTTG, No. 8, January 23, 1909, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 367-368)).

[375] Some instances of this ambiguity can be observed, for instance, in Ahmed Cemil's article in the 3rd issue; see Bozarslan's footnote 33, in which Bozarslan feels the need to clarify that the

particularly preferred to remain ambiguous, which can also be observed with the use of such terms as 'homeland', 'citizen', 'nation', 'national', and so forth in that sometimes they refer to Kurds and Kurdistan other times to the Ottomans and the Ottoman land. Consider the following two extracts:

> No force, no shackle can destroy your rope of unity. Then your homeland will be free of all fears. [But] if you carry on with this disunity you better forget about Kurdistan.[376]

> Just until six months ago our homeland was the matter of partition in negotiations with the Europeans [frenga]. [377]

Notice that in the second sentence of the first extract the author uses the term 'homeland' without any determiner or a modifying word but in the subsequent sentence he specifies the referent of the term by using the word 'Kurdistan'. Whereas in the second extract, although the homeland remains rather vague the 'negotiations with the Europeans' indicates that the term 'homeland' in this context refers to the Ottoman homeland. Bozarslan, who was aware of the ambiguities here and elsewhere in the corpus of the *KTTG*, felt the necessity to use footnotes in order to clarify the referent of these terms. For instance, one such footnotes is attached to the second extract above stating that the term *'homeland'* refers to the Ottoman homeland as opposed to the Kurdish homeland.

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phrase 'our national life' [hayati kavmiyemiz] refers to 'our *Ottoman* national life' as opposed to 'our *Kurdish* national life'. Similarly, there is a similar ambiguity in the extract from Süleymaniyeli Hüseyin Paşazade's speech in the 6th issue. Therefore, in footnote 91 Bozarslan indicates that the deictic pronoun *'our'* [bizim] refers to all the Muslims rather than to the Ottomans or the Kurds only.

[376] Tu zor, tu zincîr, ewî tayê we yê îttîfaqê nikare biqetîne. Wî wextî welatê we ji hemû tirsî xilas dibe. Eger bê îttîfaqîya we dewam bike, hun destê xwe ji Kurdistanê bişon. (Seyyah Ahmed Şewqî 'Gelî Welatiya' [O [My] Fellow Countrymen], *KTTG*, No. 3. December 19, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 157-158)).

[377] 'Şeş meh nebûye ke welatê me di binê muzakera teqsîma Frenga bî' (Diyarbekir'den Telgrafçi Mehmet Tahir Cezeri, *Kürdçe Lisanimiz: Gelî Birakên Ezîz û Gelî Kurmanca* [Our Kurdish Language: O Dear Brothers and Kurds], *KTTG*, No. 7, January 16, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 344-345)).

For *KTTG*, one of the vehicles for education was *the Light Hamidian Cavalries* because some saw these regiments as a major educational institution for Kurds, where they could receive both religious but more importantly scientific education.[378] The cavalries were also seen as an ideal mechanism for upward social mobilization towards employment and high positions in the Ottoman administration for Kurds who could, then, elaborate and pursue Kurdish social, economic and political goals in the Ottoman politics and the administrative system. For instance, discussing the Hamidian Cavalries and their significance for the Kurds, Saîd-î Kurdî states that he has been reflecting for 15 years on the needs of the Kurds to build up Kurdistan's future. He wrote:

> The first one [need] is the national unity and the second is disseminating modern science that is essential besides religious science; Tribal Regiments can provide the basis for this serving as an institution. By the virtue of this secret I fearlessly say: We should make those who are not already Tribal [Regiments] soldiers into national soldiers as well until the military, which resembles the beams of electricity, generates an organic relationship between the neighbouring tribes; so that it reconciles their [differing] thoughts and wishes; brings out their essence and true values; produces the light of education and schooling and brings out Kurds' potentials. [379]

Kurdî felt that the regiments had introduced to the Kurds a disciplined military force and modern technologies through modern secular education. [380]

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[378] *KTTG* promoted the Hamidian Cavalries although it 'was one institution that had long been regarded as exemplifying the worst kinds of abuses committed the Hamidian regime' (Klein 2007: 141).

[379] 'Birincisi ittihad-ı millî, ikincisi ulûm-ı diniye ile beraber fünûn-ı lâzime-i medeniyeyi ta'mîm etmektir, ki esası ve medresesi Aşiret Alaylarıdır. Bu sırra istinaden bilâperva diyorum: Aşayirde asker olmayanları da onlar gibi asakir-i milliye yapmalı; tâ ki şua-ı elektrikiye gibi olan askerlik, o aşayir-i muhtelife-i mütecavire miyanında bir münasebet-i kimyeviye gibi peyda ederek, imtizac-ı efkâr ve irsal ile, anların cevherlerini ve kıymet-i hakikiyelerini izhar etsin, ziya-yı maarif ve Kürdlerin hararetli kuvvetlerini tevlîd edebilsin' (Said-i Kurdi, *Kürdler Neye Muhtac?* [What do the Kurds Need?], *KTTG*, No. 2, Decembe 12, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 92-93)).

[380] The Military remained the most favorable institution that provided its members with access to modern science, technologies through power and access to the state resources. This situation continued until the early years of the republic to the extent that even the very first Turkish painters were military personnel who had the opportunity to go abroad for education.

Furthermore, he observed that the army's unifying function had brought together Kurds from different, perhaps feuding, tribes replacing feudal affiliations or titles, such as tribal leader, agha, etc., with modern military ranks.[381] It seems that Kurdî was right to identify a broader connection between national progress along with cultural homogenization and mass conscription because, like education, conscription into mass armies of the modern age had a unifying and homogenizing effect (cf. Gellner 1994: 24-29; Conversi 2007: 372; Breuilly 1996a: 142). Thus the author considered the army (the Hamidian Regiments) as a key feature in the historical development of the Kurds as a unified nation. Moreover, with the adverb 'fearlessly' [bilaperva] the author perhaps wanted to convey that he was aware of the atrocities that the regiments had inflicted upon the none-Hamidian Kurdish tribes. [382]

5.2.1.2. More Royalist than the King

A more radical form of Kurdish Ottomanism, which I call *extreme Ottomanism,* was another major rhetoric of the *KTTG* in its construction of common political present and future, which distinguishes this journal from *Kurdistan*. The anonymous article below is a good case in point:

> O Brothers!
> The name of our nation [millet] is Kurd [Kurmanc]. Kurds [Kurmanc] are
> all one [...] Our country [memleket] is subject/belongs to the government

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[381] Sayyid Abdulkadir, Shaikh Ubeydullah's son and the life-time president of the *KTTG* and Süleymaniyeli Fethi joined the voice of Kurdî in their articles that were published in the first and second issues respectively. They both oppose the Young Turks' plans to dissolve the Hamidian Regiments arguing that the regiments consolidate ties between Kurds and the state, among other benefits. This attitude of the authors, which presented the journal's line, immensely contributed to the reproduction of the Kurdish leadership's policy of seeking a solution within the Ottoman framework.

[382] In a similar manner, Sayyid Abdulkadir in an article feels that the Hamidia Regiments should be *rehabilitated* [islahat], probably due to their unjust practices towards non-Hamidian elements including Kurdish and Armenian groups and individuals; see, Sayyid Abdulkadir Ubeydullah Efendi, *Cem'iyetimizin Reis-i Fezail'enîsî Sayyid Abdülkadir Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Nümûne-i Fikr-ü Irfani* [An Example from the Thoughts and Wisdom of Sayyid Abdulkadir Ubeydullah Efendi, the Honorable President of Our Association], *KTTG* No. 1, December 5, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 51-52).

of the Sublime Ottoman state. We too are subject/belong to the Ottoman [state]. All the people living on the Ottoman lands, be it Turk, Kurd, Christian, Yezidi and Nestorian, are together as one [body] with no differences. Our name and our nation's [millet] name is Ottoman and our homeland is the Ottoman homeland.

We are proud of the name of Ottoman. We have felt that way since the time of our ancestors. (*KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908).[383]

This is a perfect example that informs the constructive nature of national identities and how the production of national identities are heavily influenced by the political and ideological concerns of the period in which they were produced.[384] Clearly, the author of the extract above is at pains to 'prove' the Ottomanism of the Kurds and Kurdistan by designating Kurds as true Ottomans and Kurdistan as an extension of the Ottoman land.

However, here and elsewhere,[385] Ottomanism is *propagated* through rhetorical devices to persuade the readership, particularly the Young Turks of the Kurdish

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[383] 'Gelû bira!

Navê mileta me Kurmanc e. Kurmanc hemû yek in. Bajarê me muqeddes e. Memleketa me tabiê Hukumet û Dewletê Elîyyeê Osmaniye ye. Em jî tabiê Osmanlı ne. Tirk, Kurmanc, File, Yehudî, Ezîdî, Nesturi, ji wan xeyrê, yekûnê mileta ke milkê Osmanli de rûdine, giş em bi hev ra beramber in, yek in; mabeyna me da ferq tunîne. Navê me û navê mileta xeyr tu car Osmanli ye û memleketa me memleketê Osmanli ye.

Em bi sifetê namê celîlê Osmanî ra îftîxar dikîn. Ji bav û kala, me bi wî çavî mêze kirine' (Anonymous, *Kürdçe Lisanımız* [Our Kurdish Language], *KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 200-2001)).

[384] Earlier we saw how İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde expressed the multi-leveled nature of Kurdish identities in degree of importance, in which Islam and Ottomanism were designated as two primary and indispensable components of Kurdish identity, with the Kurdish ethnic identity coming in the third. However, as we will see later the same İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde drops this Ottomanist rhetoric and excludes Ottomanism from Kurdish identity. This discursive shift once again proves that Ottomanism was not a genuine part of Kurdish identity but it was rather a rhetorical device in the hands of the Kurdish intelligentsia to carve a niche for itself in the Ottoman political landscape.

[385] A number of articles construct Kurdish Ottomanism through the same radical approach, e.g. *see* Bediuzzaman's article (*KTTG*, No. 6, January 9, 1909, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 283-285).

dedication to Ottomanism. Yet, it is remarkable that the Kurdish ethno-nationalist undertone of this extract is stronger than its explicit Ottomanism in that while here and in similar texts Ottomanism is overtly present in the form of an explicit *persuasive discourse* through rhetorical devices and propaganda, the presence of Kurds as a unified ethno-national community comes in the form of an *ideology*, an *assumption* or a *taken-for-granted presupposition*, which is much stronger than the linguistic devices of a persuasive discourse.[386] For instance, in lines 1, 2 and 4 the word *Kurd* refers to a suppositional, unified and homogenous ethno-national group overlooking the fragmented nature of the Kurdish society. That is, although Kurds are designated as a part of the larger Ottoman body, they are Ottomans not as individuals but as a cohesive ethno-national entity called *Kurds*. Then, it can be argued that the overall discourse of the paper, even when it ostensibly propagates Ottomanism, contributes to the discursive construction of Kurds as a distinct, unified and recognizable national community.[387]

Finally, also notice how the argument of *being Turk vs. being an Ottoman* is made in lines 4-6, where the author designates the Turks as a *mere* component of Ottomanism just like the Kurds, Arabs or any other ethnic or religious Ottoman group. Designating the Turks as a mere component of Ottomanism is another major discourse practice throughout the *KTTG* corpus that persistently makes a distinction between *being Turk vs. being an Ottoman* to refute the Young Turks discourse in which Ottomanism was equated with Turkish identity or Turkism (Hanioğlu, 1966: 212-213; 2006: 3-19; Akşin 2007: 84-87). More on this will follow.

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[386] Fairclough (1995b: 45) and Billig (2002: 220) make a distinction between the ideological and persuasive aspects of discourse. While a persuasive discourse uses explicit rhetorical devices from a particular point of view to persuade the audience, i.e. Ottomanism in this extract, ideologies, by contrast, are not usually 'adopted' but taken for granted common assumptions without recourse to rhetorical devices, as in the presentation of the Kurds as a unified ethno-national community.

[387] This is the case throughout the *KTTG* corpus every time the word *Kurd* is employed to refer to the people of this region.

5.2.1.3. Multimodality: The Use of Photographic Images and the Consolidation of Ottomanism

For Fairclough (1989: 27) it is artificial to conceive of discourse in exclusively verbal terms because they are interwoven with visuals, in that 'very often visuals and 'verbals' operate in a mutually reinforcing way' in the meaning-making process. Such multimodal texts, as a particular form of intertextuality (Hall 2002b: 328), include visual/photographic images, which function as complementary meaning sources for 'verbals' because different semiotic modes have different meaning potentials in communicative actions. Therefore, since each semiotic mode has its own 'grammar' we need a multimodal discourse analysis for a more systematic exploration (van Leeuwen 2005; Kress and van Leeuwen 2001).[388] Leeuwen identifies two types of relations between different modes: *elaborative* and *extensive* (Leeuwen 2005: 77; Sheyholislami 2011; 135-136). [389] The relationship between the modes is *elaborative* when the content of one mode is repeated through another mode in order to provide the reader with further explanation, an example or a summary; this relation is *extensive* when one mode contains an element of extension that would add a new but still related content to the content of another mode (Leeuwen 2005: 77).

KTTG corpus does not consist of monomodal verbal texts but rather multimodal texts in which we come across 12 images, of which only two can be regarded as examples of *elaboration*. One of them is a magnificent portrait of the Sultan Abdulhamid on the front page of the 3rd issue right above a quote taken from his inaugural address during the opening ceremony of the Ottoman Parliament.[390] Similarly we see a panoramic image of Crete surrounded by an article that

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[388] Multimodality is also another dimension of intertextuality because in multimodal texts the meaning of one mode depends on its relation with other modes (Hall 2002b: 328; Leeuwen 2005: 77).

[389] Leeuwen, draws on Halliday's (1985a 202-227) concepts of 'elaboration', 'extension' and 'enhancement', the three transitional devices in SFL.

[390] *KTTG*, No. 3, December 19, 1908, reproduced in Bozarslan (1998: 181).

defends this islet against the Greek claims and aggression.[391] Both images serve to reinforce the Ottomanist stance of the paper. All other images can be regarded as examples of *extension* because they are not directly related to the immediate surrounding texts but rather they are 'fragments of the more general syntagma' of the paper, i.e., the paper's overall Ottomanist discourse. These images included the interior of the Ottoman Senate (Meclis-i Ayan)[392], the parliament building[393], Sultan's private chamber,[394] and an image of the MPs,[395] which together reproduce and consolidate the paper's Ottomanist position through the use of this semiotic modality.[396]

Leeuwen (2005: 81-82) argues that the *reading path* is another dimension of multimodality because particular textual elements can capture the readers' attention over others through a range of various visual features such as their position, framing, font size, tonal construct, colour, and so forth. Similarly, in the folio section of the *KTTG* (Image 1) the words *Kürd* [Kurd] in the name of *'Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Gazetesi'* is in large and bold typography at the middle-top of the page with its own line encoding a differential salience between the remaining parts of the journal's name. This differential salience affects the reader's attention in favour of this element marked with the bold typography, which reinforces a particular reading path and hence foregrounds the ethnocentric or Kurdish nationalist colour of the journal.

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[391] *KTTG*, No. 6, January 9, 1909, reproduced in Bozarslan (1998: 280).

[392] *KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908, reproduced in Bozarslan (1998: 205).

[393] *KTTG*, No. 8, January 23, 1909, reproduced in Bozarslan (1998: 364).

[394] *KTTG*, No. 5, January 2, 1909, reproduced in Bozarslan (1998: 228).

[395] *KTTG*, No. 9, January 30, 1909, reproduced in Bozarslan (1998: 430).

[396] The journal also published images with sceneries of Istanbul, the capital city of the Ottoman state; an image of *Kizkulesi* (Maiden's Tower), also known as *Leander's Tower* located on a small islet in the Bosporus strait off the coast of Üsküdar district in Istanbul; an image that shows the Golden Horn in Istanbul; and one that show Mektebi Sultani (now known as Galatasaray Lycée) also in Istanbul.

Image 1

5.2.1.4. The Telegrams Sent from Provincial *KTTC* Centres

KTTG often dedicated space to the telegrams sent from the local *KTTG* branches some celebrating the Young Turk revolution and expressing their happiness with the new constitutional regime; others informing the headquarters of the current political situation and happenings in Kurdistan, including the inter-tribal rivalries and their complaints about the officials of the new regime. The publication of these telegrams had multiple functions. In the first place, they contributed to the role of the *KTTG* as a platform and a unified field of communication for the Kurdish leadership. Second, they created an impression that Kurdish leadership was united around a single organization, i.e., the *KTTC*. Third, the telegrams acknowledged the *KTTC* head branch as the representative of the Kurds in the capital city of Istanbul. Fourth, most of these telegrams expressed the Kurds' dedication to the protection of the constitutional monarchy and the ideology of Ottomanism, which also strengthened the position of the *KTTC* in Istanbul. More on the telegrams will follow.

5.2.2. The Discursive Construction of Common Language

Kurdish language remained the most significant marker of Kurdish national identity in the discourse of the *KTTG*. Nevertheless, the journal's approach to the utilization of the Kurdish differed from that of the journal *Kurdistan*. In that, unlike *Kurdistan, KTTG* adopted Ottoman Turkish as its primary medium of

communication because for the *KTTG*, the use of Ottoman Turkish had both a powerful politico-symbolic as well as a pragmatic communicative function.

So far as the politico-symbolic power is concerned, Turkish had been the language of the vast imperial bureaucracy and the administration for centuries and was still the common language of the new *Ottoman man* that had been in the making since the *Tanzimat* period. Thus, the predominance of Turkish was an element of Ottomanism and its use a major discursive practice to display Kurds' loyalty to Ottomanist ideals. In this context, this language preference rendered a two-way *strategy of inclusion*: In the first place, the journal included the Turks in the *KTTG* discourse. That is in pragmatic terms, the Kurdish intellectuals of the period attempted to make the content of their journal accessible to the non-Kurds, e.g. the Armenians, Arabs but more importantly to the Turks, to convey their strong commitment to Ottomanism and display their friendly intentions towards other Ottoman constituencies. [397] To this end, the *KTTG* also translated some Kurdish articles and poems into Turkish.[398] However, the translation of Kurdish articles can also be seen as a subtle discourse practice as a part of the *strategy of dissimilation* because translation is made for 'foreigners' who do not speak *'our language'*. [399] Furthermore, translation valorised Kurdish texts elevating Kurdish language to the level of the more prestigious Ottoman Turkish.

Second, the use of Turkish strengthened the Kurds in the Ottoman socio-political setting positioning them as an integral part of the greater Ottoman family. What is more, preferring Turkish language perhaps helped the *KTTG* to circumvent

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[397] Given the animosities between Kurds and Armenians, another ostensible Ottoman community, the *KTTG* made use of Turkish to communicate their friendly and peaceful intentions to the Armenian intellectuals and leadership.

[398] For instance, articles by Khalil Hayali and Bediuzzaman Said-i Kurdî were translated to Turkish.

[399] As we saw in the discourse of *Kurdistan*, the editors made an extensive use of Kurdish language as the strongest Kurdish exclusivity that differentiated the Kurds from the Sultan and state officials who did not understand this language. For instance, M. M. Bedir Khan wrote: 'Because they don't speak Kurdish [Kurmancî] they think I have written something bad about them (M. M. Bedir Khan, 'Untitled', *Kurdistan* No. 4, June 3, 1898, in Bozarslan, Vol. 1, p. 145).

Young Turk antagonism and accusation of being nationalist at the cost of the Ottoman ideals.

Furthermore, Kurdish is not a unified standard language. Rather it consists of multiple varieties that are not necessarily mutually intelligible. This disadvantage, probably caused communication problems among the members of the leadership as well as among the leadership and the audience that spoke different varieties of Kurdish. Thus Turkish functioned as the *lingua franca* (Bruinessen 2006: 25) among the participants of the communicative events in the pages of the *KTTG*.[400] It is also possible that Kurdish intellectuals refrained from publishing in multiple Kurdish dialects as this might have highlighted the differences between Kurdish dialectical communities, causing further fragmentation and undermining the notion of Kurdish unity.[401]

However, despite this linguistic choice, one can surmise that *KTTG*, like *Kurdistan,* perceived Kurdish language as the most vital resource available to mark the Kurds off from other Ottomans, particularly the Turks in that it promoted Kurdish in an innovative way that had not been seen in the discourse of *Kurdistan*: KTTG demanded the use of Kurdish as the language of instruction in public schools where Kurds lived.[402] One of the figures that championed the use of Kurdish as the language of instruction in public schools was surprisingly Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, a modern Islamist and seemingly a zealous supporter of Ottomanism. He perceived Kurdish language as a central component of the collective Kurdish identity and referred to it as the 'national honour' [namus-i milliye] of the Kurds. The extracts from two articles by Bâbânzâde epitomize his - and *KTTG*'s dominant-stance on the language issue:

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[400] Although Ottoman Turkish was the *lingua franca* of the Empire it is noteworthy that it was not a standardized language at the same level as modern Turkish.

[401] See Sheyholislami (2011) for an excellent discussion on how the uses of multiple Kurdish dialects and alphabets on the Kurdish Internet have contributed to the further fragmentation of the Kurds along these lines.

[402] This demand perhaps was a reaction to the declaration of the official status of Turkish, which was made compulsory at schools by Sultan Abdülhamid (cf. Sadoğlu 2003: 89-90)

The previous government while the enemy of [free] thought, when it came to the Kurds it was the enemy of both thought and language […]

Kurds were about to lose not only their nationality [milliyet] but also their religious denomination [mezhep] due to their 'languagelessness' [lisansızlık]. A great ignorance was widespread in many places [and] many Kurds almost lost their humanity. Due to the lack of a civilizational progress and ignorance [coupled with] the lack of religious principles, not only the life of the miserable Kurds but also their dignity and honour, their national honour [namus-i milliye], which is the dearest to them, was face to face with being sullied (KTTG, December 5, 1908, No. 1: 3, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 44-46)).

The author Bâbânzâde constructs a unique Kurdish identity through the Kurdish language by placing the language at the emotional, spiritual and intellectual heart of that identity because as a result of their 'languagelessness', 'Kurds were about to lose their nationality, national honour, dignity and religion. In this context, Bâbânzâde does not only transform Kurdish language from an everyday thing to an essential national value, but he also elevates it to the level of *national honour* in line with the German romantics' view of nation and the concept of *'volk'* (national spirit), which revolved around national language.

Moreover, the religious intertextuality in the extract should not go unnoticed. First, the hegemonic power of religion over the notion of identity provides the author with a perfect reason to defend Kurdish language: Kurds should be able to keep their native language for the sake of religion because if there is no language, there is no religion. Furthermore, the wording of the sentence pertaining to religion in the second paragraph is also noteworthy in that the author prefers the word '*mezhep*' (religious denomination) to '*din' or 'diyanet'* (religion). That is, he could have said 'Kurds were about to lose their *religion'* instead of *'their denomination'.* With this word choice, the author might have wanted to emphasize the fact that Kurds, *unlike* the *Hanafi* Turks or the *Hanbali* Arabs, adhere to the *Shafi'i* school of Sunni Islam in a discursive attempt to

reinforce the 'uniqueness' of the Kurds by evoking yet another cultural difference between the Kurds and the other Ottomans. [403]

The importance of progress and modernization of the empire to catch up with the Western powers had been a state-sponsored dominant discourse since the *Tanzimat* period. The discourse on progress became an ideal instrument for the intellectuals of divergent non-Turkish or non-Muslim Ottoman groups to advocate such progress for their own respective communities without going against the ideals of Ottomanism. Adopting the same strategy, the Kurdish intellectuals promoted education among Kurds arguing that through education Kurds would attain the same level of progress as the other Ottoman groups that are more advanced in science and technology. In this way the Kurds would be able to serve the Ottoman state in a better capacity. This rhetoric helped the *KTTG* authors to disguise or at least mitigate their nationalist attitudes.[404] For instance, Bâbânzâde in an article drew attention to the repressive Ottoman policies against the use of Kurdish language and then elaborates on his view regarding the necessity for the use of Kurdish as the language of instruction:

> Among the Ottoman peoples, the Turks are more advanced in science
> and technology than the Kurds, Albanians, Lazs, and Circassians, given
> the fact that Turkish is the official language, and that they possess
> schools and [other] state apparatuses... If a Circassian, a Laz, a Kurd [or]
> an Albanian intends to get education in science and technology, he has to
> speak Turkish or Arabic, to say nothing of foreign languages…

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[403] I was curious about whether or not the journal used the word 'mezhep' (religious denomination) and 'din' (religion) interchangeably. However, I did not come across such practice anywhere else in the corpus of the *KTTG*. It is important to remember that this denominational difference between the Kurds and Turks had been exploited almost three decades ago by Sheikh Ubeydullah (Kreyenbroek 1996: 93).

[404] As Klein (1996: 96) has observed: 'education was increasingly viewed as an institution to serve nationalist goals. Thus, it could, if institutionalized in a body run by the nationalists themselves, serve to teach their people, not only about technology and modern arts and science, but about their own Kurdishness' and Kurdish as the language of instruction would have further consolidated such outcome.

A people that lack a written language and rich written products would also be bereaved of the ability to speak properly and express their ideas… Because their tongue has been cut off, Kurds, as one of the Ottoman communities, are devoid of progress in proportion to its languagelessness. Kurds do not have grammar books, Kurds do not possess a printing press or published books, Kurds are bereaved of literature, science and modern technologies… if the speech functions in the brain cells of this important Ottoman component become rusty as a result of the cruel oppression, then it goes without saying how much Ottomanism would be affected and damaged… Power and authority are embedded in education and education is tied to language. If the Kurds, who constitute the most important pillar of Ottomanism, remain in such a rusty and decayed condition, then, the Ottomanism that relies upon Kurds will, God forbid, collapse…

Although it might occur to one the possibility of the Turkification or Arabization of the Kurds, Lazs and the Albanians, such a cruel and shocking method that would wipe out the language of a people have not been discovered; [in any case] such an attempt will not produce any benefit other than striving for something meaningless and absurd.

Let's assume that there is a Kurdish child. In his village no language is spoken other than his mother tongue. If we open a Turkish school in that village and then educate this child step by step in Turkish, he will still grow up to be a responsible member of the society and will have a great carrier too if he is astute. However, he would have to lose quite a few precious years of his life for the sake of learning a new language, which is the instrument that provides access to sciences. If this Kurd goes to a Kurdish school and obtains books on sciences in his own language he will, without any doubt, learn thoroughly and much faster and will become a more valuable member of the Ottoman family.

Therefore, first and foremost, I strongly recommend that my fellow Kurdish countrymen possess an advanced [Kurdish] language. First, there should be a grammar book and a dictionary. Then, the Kurdish

history should be written down. And finally, all scattered and unwritten poems and other works of literature should be collected and written down. Once the foundation of language is laid down in this way, the bird of development and progress will open up its benevolent wings for us with a great enthusiasm (*KTTG*, No. 3, December 13, 1908, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 141-143)).[405]

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[405] 'Diğer akvam-ı Osmaniye'den Türkler, lisan-ı resmiye ve makâtibe ve sair kuva-yı hükümete malik olduklarından, bittabi' ulûm ve fün.ndaKürdlere veya Arnavudlara ve Lâzlara ve Çerkeslerem nazaran hayli terakkî etmişlerdir… Bir Çerkeş, bir Laz, bir Kürd, bir Arnavud ulûm ve fün.n-ı mütenevvia tahsil hevesinde bulunursa, -ecnebi lisanlarından sarf-ı nazar- ya Arabça ya Türk.e bilmek ve hadîka-ı vesâ-ı ma'rifete mutlaka bu iki kapudan girmek mecburiyetindedir.

Lisan-ı tahrirî âsâr-ü müellefât-i müdevvenesi olmayan bir kavm, nâtikadan mahrum bir ebkemdir… Maktûullisan, lisansizligi nisbetinde mahrum-i terakkî olan akvam-i Osmaniye'den biri ise Kürdler idi. Kürdlerin safr ve nahvi yok, Kürdlerin matbaası, âsâr-i matbûası yok, Kürdler edbiyattan, ulûm-ü fünûndan ve bunlara tebean âsâri ilmiye ve sanaiyeden mahrum… Böyle bir mühim kitle-i Osmaniye'nin hüceyre-i dimağıyesindeki hassa-i nutkiye kör bir zulmün tazyîkiyle paslanirsa, Osmanlılığın bundan ne kadar müteessir ve mutazarrir olacağını beyana hacet var mı?... Kuvvet ve satvet ma'rifettedir. Ma'rifet ise lisan ile kaimdir. Osmanlılığın en mühim bir direğini teşkil eden Kürd kavmi böyle paslı, çürük kalırsa, üzerine ittikâ eden Osmanlılık da maazallah münhedim olur.

Kürdleri, Lâzlari, Arnavudları Türkleştirmek veya Arablaştırmak gibi bir lüzum ve mütalâa vârıd-ı hâtır olabilirse de, cihan cihan olalı bir kavmin böyle lisanını kökünden istîsal edecek henüz hiç bir usul –ne kadar zalimane ve kahharane olursa olsun- keşfedilmemis olduğundan böyle bir teşebbüs, abesle iştigalden başka bir şey-i müfîd olamaz [...]

Şimdi faraza bir Kürd çocuğunu ele alalım. Bu adamın köyünde lisan-ı maderzadından başka bir şey konuşulmuyor. O köyde bir Türk mektebi küşad eder ve sonra çocuğu derece derece hep Türkçe tahsîl ile ileriye götürsek, vâkıa o çocuk sonradan yine adam olur, zekâsı varsa mertebe-i kemali dahi bulur. Fakat herhalde sinîn-i kıymetdar-i ömründen birkaçını, vasita-ı vusul-ı ulûm olan tahsîl-i lisan uğrunda izaa etmiş olur. Bu Kürd kendi lisanında ulûm-ü fünûn-i mutenevviaya dair eserler bulsa, Kürdçe icra-yı tedrisât edilir bir mektebe devam etse, şübhe yoktur ki daha çabuk, yetişir, tahsîli daha tamam olur ve aile-i Osmaniye'nin daha kıymetdar bir cüz'ü olur.

Onun için, Kürd vatandaşlarıma, her şeyden evvel muntazam bir lisan sahibi olmalarını kemal-i ehemmiyetle tavsiye eylerim, Evvelâ bu lisanin, bir sarf-ü nahvi, bir lugatı yapılsın. Ondan sonra Kürd kavminin bir tarihi kaleme alınsın. Daha sonra, ne kadar müteferrik ve gayr-i mektub eş'ar ve âsâr-i edebiye var ise cümlesi zabt-ü tedvîn olunsun. Lisanın temeli bu suretle vaz'olunduktan sonra, şehbal-ı terakkî ve teali bize kemal-i tehalükle cenah-ı âtıfetini küşad kılar' (İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde, *Kürdçeye Dair* [On Kurdish] *KTTG*, No. 3, December 13, 1908, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 141-143))

First, the author describes the dominant position of the two more privileged and advanced languages, i.e., Turkish, the official language of the empire and Arabic, the divine language of Muslim Ottomans.[406]

In lines 7-15 the author evokes the German romantic view of the native/national language, as he did elsewhere, arguing that the oppression of Kurdish language has resulted in the lack of progress, self-expression and social decay among Kurds. Although we do not come across a history of a systematic linguistic oppression in the late 19th century Ottoman Empire, it seems that the Ottoman state under the CUP had started a systematic language policy that promoted Turkish language.

Furthermore, as stated above, the *KTTG* authors took precaution not to be accused of ethno-nationalism and therefore they often felt the need to mitigate their nationalist tone. To avoid such potential accusation, the author, in lines 18-20, in a carefully worded and well-balanced rhetoric reminds the readers, especially the Young Turks, of his concerns about Kurds' inability to use their full potentials to serve the Ottoman Empire due to the lack of education in Kurdish language.[407] In lines 24-32 the author consolidates this point through an example. He argues that if Turkish remains as the only language of instruction, then a Kurdish child would be disadvantaged because he would have to sacrifice *'a few precious years of his life'* to learn a 'new' language. The author is explicitly against the education of the Kurds in Turkish language however he moderates his argument through the *strategy of rationalization*. This rationalization is further

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[406] Furthermore, the author states that due to the dominant position of these languages one has to speak at least one of them or a 'foreign language' to receive a proper education. The use of the phrase 'foreign language' (line 6) is very interesting on its own in that this subtle but very powerful discursive practice in the form of a presupposition designates Turkish and Arabic as 'non-foreign' languages reproducing and contributing the idea of Ottomanism.

[407] As we will see later in an article published in *Rojî Kurd*, Bâbânzâde completely dismisses this Ottomanist rhetoric and replaces it with Islam. That is Kurds should receive education –in their mother tongue- in order to become better Muslims and in this way serve Islam –not Ottomanism- in their full capacity.

reinforced with his argument that Kurdish children will become more valuable members of the Ottoman family through education in Kurdish language.

As we saw, the publication of grammar books, dictionaries and works of literature became indispensable elements of national identity discourses in the age of nations.[408] Similarly, in the text above the author encourages Kurds to possess printing presses and advance Kurdish language to produce grammar books, dictionaries, books on Kurdish history, and vernacularization of the oral literature.[409] In this way Kurdish 'national' literature' is presented as a unifying common Kurdish commodity.

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[408] Since the time of the German romantics, all nationally oriented intellectuals engaged in the cultivation of their respective communities' collective culture by laying claim to their language and literature. Thus the printing press and the relatively wide availability of printed materials had further undermined the importance of the oral communities (Meyrowitz 1997: 63) in favor of print-communities.

[409] The *KTTG* corpus in general encouraged and promoted intellectual works on Kurdish language, e.g. in the 6th issue the journal announces three such works in progress:

> 'We sincerely thank you for this good news about the works of Aktepeli Abdurrhaman Efendi, one of the most virtuous Kurdish notables, on history in Kurdish language; honorable Ziya Efendi's [Gokalp] research manuscript on Kurdish proverbs, grammar and dictionary which have been in the making for the past 10 years and will be published soon; and also the works of Hanili Salih Bey, one of the honorable figures of the region' [Ekmelîn-i sadât ve ezkiya-yı Kürdiyeden Aktepeli Şeyh Abdurraman Efendi'nin lisan-ı Kürdî ile bir tarih yazmakta olduğuna ve edîb-i muhterem Ziya Efendinin de -on senelik mahsûl-ı tetebbuât-ı olmak üzre- tesvîd ettiği Kürdçe durûb-ı emsal ile sarf ve nahvini ve bir kamûs-ı Kürdiyi yakında neşredeceğine ve fuzalâ-ı mahalliyeden Hanili Salih Bey'in dahi bu babdaki mesaî-i masrûfesine taalluk eden tebşîrâtınıza cidden teşekkür ve bu âlî himmetler bilhassa tebrik olunur] (Open Correspondence, *KTTG*, January 9, 1909, No. 6, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 303).

Evidently, *KTTG*, like *Kurdistan*, took great pride in Kurdish language and literature because scientific and literary works in or about Kurdish language proved the capacity of that language in literature to the Kurds and the Turks alike. For the Kurdish intellectuals an advanced language and literature bestowed recognition and respect onto Kurds as the speakers of that capable language which in turn would pave the way for the acknowledgment of the Kurdish as a noteworthy 'nation'.

Furthermore, the author was obviously aware of the gradual imposition of Turkish language onto the non-Turkish constituencies (lines 22-24).[410] However, instead of an overt accusation, the author very cleverly uses the ironic device of *paralipsis* to suggest the Young Turk policy of Turkification by denying its existence. This is done through the use of a hedge[411] obtained via the conjunction *although* in *'although it might occur to one the possibility of the Turkification...'* Notice how the author distances himself from this 'unfair' accusation by ostensibly dismissing but simultaneously highlighting it. To put it differently, whilst apparently defending the government, he subtly problematizes those 'misinterpretations' through the strategy of *confirmation through negation*. He reinforces this strategy in lines 21-23 when he implies that even if what is claimed were true, such a 'meaningless and absurd' attempt would be doomed to fail.[412]

If the author's primary concern were the lack of education among Kurds, he might have suggested that the Kurds master Ottoman and/or Arabic in order to gain access to education. It would have taken less time for a pupil to learn these languages in which textbooks were already available than wait for the publication of textbooks in Kurdish.[413] Although it never became the language of instruction

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[410] Indeed, the Young Turks appeared to be pursuing the policy of Turkification to transform *Turkism* into an oppressive form of chauvinist Turkish nationalism. For CUP policies to transform Turkism in to an oppressive nationalism see Akşin (2007: 84-87) and Zeine (1966: 98-99).

[411] *Hedges* are linguistic devices used to tone down or lessen the impact of an utterance. An *hedge* could be an adverb, an adjective, a conjunction or clause (Fairclough 1995b: 82).

[412] Although the author also brings up the possibility of Arabization attempts, it seems that he mentions this just to mitigate his tone not to put the Turks on the spot. To be sure, due to the process of Turkification, which had started during the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid, Arabic itself was struggling with the dominance of Turkish language in education and administration. Therefore, the use of Arabic in education and state institutions was among the primary demands of the Arab leadership in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries (Zeine 1966: 98-99; Firro 2009: 37).

[413] As a matter of fact, Erzincanlı Hamdi Süleyman in the 8th issue of the *KTTG* challenges Bâbânzâde's point by asserting that Kurdish children should be educated in Turkish because (1) the language of the bureaucracy and military is Turkish; (2) there are no teaching materials in Kurdish; and (3) the language of the Ottomans is Turkish and therefore all Ottoman communities should continue to speak Turkish. *See*, Erzincanli Hamdi Süleyman, *'Kurdistan'da Maarifin Tarz-i*

in schools, foregrounding Kurdish led to the transformation of this language from an everyday thing to a national symbol in the service of Kurdish national identity.

Moreover, the author never touches upon the fragmented nature of Kurdish language when he promotes it as the language of instruction. Through the *strategy of avoidance* (Wodak *et al*. 1999: 39) he minimizes or backgrounds the linguistic difference among Kurds, presenting Kurdish as a standardized and unified language. This is relevant because what is left unsaid, unthematized or backgrounded in itself is a discursive strategy that might attempt to avoid possible contradictions with what is actually said. [414]

Furthermore, *KTTG* became the first journal to publish texts in the two major Kurdish varieties, namely Sorani and Kurmanji (though not in Dimili (Kirmancki) or Hawrami).[415] Thus the speakers of the two varieties were now being exposed to each other through this journal although it was a small circulation paper. Interestingly, 5 out of 14 Kurdish texts in the entire corpus were published under the Turkish rubric of *Kurdçe Lisanimiz* (Our Kurdish Language). This practice probably meant for two discoursal achievements: (1) it attempted to underline this strongest Kurdish exclusivity, i.e., '*our* Kurdish language' distinguishing *us* from the rest of *you*; (2) since this Turkish phrase is used in the titles of both Sorani and Kurmanji texts, [416] perhaps it was meant to create the impression that

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Tensik ve Ihyasi' [Regulation and Revitalization of Education in Kurdistan] *KTTG*, January 23, 1908, No. 8, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 370-373).

[414] Needless to say, Bâbânzâde was not alone in his endeavor to promote education and literacy in Kurdish as there were other *KTTG* authors who also touched upon these issues. For instance, in an article published in the 3rd issue, S. E. Şewqî expressed his feelings about the importance of literacy in one's native tongue.

[415] The journal *Kurdistan* mixed the dialects at vocabulary but not the textual level.

[416] Only one Sorani article by Pîremêrd is entitled as *'Baban Kürdçesi'* (The Kurdish of Baban [tribe/region]), which still refrained from any reference to dialectical differences between the two varieties. See, *KTTG*, December 5, 1908, No. 1, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 57)).

'our Kurdish language' is one unified language avoiding any reference to the multi-dialectal nature of Kurdish. [417]

In conclusion, as far as its policy of common language is concerned, the *KTTG* took a more radical path in that although it did not utilize Kurdish as its medium of communication, it strove to convince the state to make Kurdish the language of education in Kurdish school. This is because the Kurdish leadership was aware that Kurdish as the language of instruction would tremendously contribute to the development of Kurdish national identity (Klein 1996: 96).[418]

5.2.3. The Discursive Construction of Common Political Past

For *KTTG*, national history writing was a novelty that linked the past with the present. This was, in turn, meant to instill a sense of shared history and common political past in Kurds who would come to imagine themselves as a historical community that has been moving through time in an uninterrupted continuity. An underlying discursive practice of the KTTG was the use of presuppositions or taken-for-granted assumptions in the construction of Kurdish national identity,

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[417] As we saw, ausbau was a major discursive strategy in the journal *Kurdistan* through which the authors utilized Sorani lexemes in their Kurmanji articles to bring the two varieties closer to each other and to create the impression that they were *'not-so-different forms'* of the same language. I came across only one instance of this strategy in the *KTTG* corpus in which the author calls upon the Kurdish notables to guide Kurdish masses in the right direction:

> 'Act as a guide. This guidance is for the benefit of the homeland and for the progress of the people; it *is not [nîye]* for your personal benefit. [Delalet bikin. Ev delaleta we ji bo nef'a weteni, ji bo tereqqiya mileti ye, ji bo nefsa we *nîye]* (Motike Asiretinden Halil Hayali, '*Kurdçe Lisanimiz: Weten u Ittifaqa Kurmanca'* [Our Kurdish Language: The Homeland and the Union of Us Kurmanjs] *KTTG*, No. 8, January 23, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 394)).

In the italicized part of this Kurmanji sentence the author uses the Sorani form of the negative copula [*nîye*] instead of the Kurmanji [*ne…ye* or *nîne*] in an attempt to bring the two varieties closer to each other.

[418] Since Kurds lacked educational institution at their disposal, Kurdish intellectuals set up the *Kürd Neşr-i Maarif Cemiyeti* (Kurdish Society for the Diffusion of Education), a subsidiary organization under KTTC, which establihed *Meşrutiyet Okulu* [Constitutional School] for Kurdish children in the Çemberlitaş district of Istanbul (Silopî 2007: 15; Klein 1996: 27-29; Olson 1989: 115). We do not know whether the language of instruction was Kurdish in this school. The school was shut down by the CUP in 1909 (Jwaideh 2006: 298).

which were also at work in the construction of a Kurdish political past. Consider the following short extracts from various *KTTG* texts:

> The great value of the history of Kurdistan for the Ottomans but particularly for all Kurds does not need to be explained.[419]

> The headquarters of Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress in Istanbul… has decided to prepare an excellent history of Kurds and Kurdistan [and also] to compile and publish [Kurdish] national literature.[420]

> Therefore, first and foremost, I urge my fellow Kurds to have a proper language as a matter of the utmost importance… then let a history of Kurdish nation [kavim] be written.[421]

> The Kurdish history, which has not been compiled and written so far, is transmitted in Kurdistan like many proverbs that are passed down from father to the son by word of mouth and from heart to heart.[422]

The common denominator of these extracts is their assumption that there exist such things as *Kurdish history,* which consists of a series of linear and recurrent themes or coherent and meaningful events pertaining to all Kurds. In other words, their discourse assumed that Kurds have moved through the past as a

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[419] 'Kürdistan tarihinin Osmanlılar ve hususuyla umum Kürdlerce ne derece kıymeti olacağını îzaha hacet yok' (Erzincanli Hamdi Süleyman, *Kurdistan'da Maarifin Tarz-i Tensik ve Ihyasi* [Regulation and Revitalization of Education in Kurdistan], *KTTG*, January 23, 1908, No. 8, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 370-373)).

[420] 'Kürd Teavün ve Terakkî Cemiyeti İstanbul Merkez-i Umumîsi […] Kürdlerin, Kürdistan'ın mükemmel bir tarihini tertîb etmeye, edebiyat-ı milliyelerıni de cem'-ü neşre karar vermiştir' Announcement, *KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 204-205)).

[421] 'Onun için, Kürd vatandaşlarıma, her şeyden evvel muntazam bir lisan sahibi olmalarını kemal-i ehemmiyetle tavsiye eylerim… Ondan sonra Kürd kavminin bir tarihi kaleme alınsın' (İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde, *Kürdçeye Dair* [On Kurdish] *KTTG*, December 13, 1908, No. 3, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 141-143)).

[422] 'Şimdiye kadar Kürdlerin zabt edilemeyen tarihleri, bugün Kürdistan'da babadan oğula intikal eden birçok durûbül'emsal gibi ağızdan ağza, lisandan lisana, kalbden kalbe giriyor, deveran ediyor' (Bedri, *Kürdler ve Şecaat-i Akvam* [Kurds and Heroism of Nations], *KTTG*, No. 2, December 12, 1908, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 90)).

unified community in a historical continuity. This discursive construct is expected to foster a collective identification with the past among the Kurds and produce what Halbwachs (1992) calls 'collective memory.'

Moreover, *KTTG* made references to the ancient Kurdish history in its discourse. For instance, using the *strategy of unification and cohesivation* as well as through the *strategy of perpetuation* Hüseyin Paşazade Suleyman designated the Kurds as the decedents of the Medes:

> If there really was a discord and animosity between the Kurds and Armenians, one of these two communities, who have lived in Kurdistan in a perfect harmony and friendship since 2600 BCE, that is as far as one could go back in history, would have probably annihilated the other over such a long period of time.

> … because as the Armenians are the ancient inhabitants of that piece of territory, so too are the Kurds, who are the descendants of the Medes and the ancient and primary/native inhabitants of that piece of territory as proven by historical evidence.[423]

Although the theme of the article revolves around the betterment of the Kurdish-Armenian relations, it is clear that through temporal and special references the author tried to historicize Kurds as an ancient community whose past can be traced back to antiquity or to the time immemorial, i.e., 'as far as one could go back in history'. That is, similar to some of the practices in the discourse of *Kurdistan*, the author attempted to set the birth of the Kurds as early as possible,

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[423] 'Milâd-ı İsa'dan 2600 sene evvelinden beri yani tarih nazarının erebildiği devirden bu âna kadar Kürdistan'da kemal-i ittihad ve mahabbetle yaşamış olan Kürdler ile Ermeniler arasında iddia olunan nifak-ü husumet esasen mevcûd bulunmuş olsa idi, birinin diğerini bu kadar medîd bir zaman içinde herhalde imha eylemesi lâzım gelirdi'

Çünkü Ermeniler o kıtanın sekene-i kadîmesi olduğu gibi, bugün tarihen sabittir ki Medyalılann ahlâfı olan Kürdler de o kıtanın sekene-i kadîme-ı asliyesindendir' (Hüseyin Paşazade Süleyman, *'Kürdler ve Ermeniler'* [Kurds and Armenians]. *KTTG* No. 9, January 30, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 431-434)).

i.e., to the time of the 'ancient Medes' or '2600 BCE' [424] to prove how Kurds as a *bona fide* nation are rooted in an uninterrupted historical continuity as an unchanged, coherent and unified 'national' community.

Nevertheless given the audience profile of the *KTTG*, this message is also meant for the Young Turk and the Armenian eyes. While it tells the Turks, implicitly, that the Kurds have been the inhabitants of the territory for the past three and half millennia way before the Turkish influx into the land, it contest the Armenians claims to the same territory by designating the Kurds as the *primary* inhabitants of that territory.[425]

Another effective strategy in the construction of a common political past is through the discourse of unifying shared sorrows and worries (Wodak *at. al* 1999: 38). To this end *KTTG* made frequent references to the situation of the Kurds under the previous Hamidian regime under which they, as a *community of victims* were collectively oppressed. To demonstrate this theme and its realization in the

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[424] In a similar way, Said-i Kurdi makes reference to the Medes as the ancestors of the Kurds. In an article he wrote:

> […] In such a situation if you demonstrate the consultative governance that is known as the limited monarchy and the Constitution under the name of Sha'ria… what would you lose by connecting the Turan, the Arian and the Semites?… [On the contrary] you will gain many benefits ['Binaenaleyh, meşrutiyet ve Kanun-ı Esasi denilen adalet ve meşveret, bu unvan ile beraber… Turan ve Aryan'ı ve Sam'i… ol seriat-ı garra unvanıyla gösterseniz… acaba ne gibi şeyi gaib edeceksiniz?' (Molla Said-i Kurdi, 'Bediuzzaman Said-i Kurdi'nin Milletvekillerine Seslenisi' (Bediuzzaman Said-i Kurdi's Call on the Members of the Parliament], *KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998:193-196)].

The general topic of Kurdi's article, entitled 'Bediuzzaman Said-i Kurdi's Call on MPs' revolves around the unity and progress of the Islamic ummah to catch up with European powers. One of the requirements for such unity and progress is the unity of such Muslim elements as Turks, Kurds and Arabs. However, the author evokes these groups based on their races, i.e. Turk (Turan), Kurd (Arian) and Arab (Semite). In this way, he roots the Kurds, in addition to Turks and Arabs, in the depth of history by connecting them to their ancient ancestors. Another significance of this invocation for Kurds is that, although Ottomanism and the notion of *umma* were the dominant discourses, Kurdi does not shy away from distinguishes Kurds from other Ottomans by designating them as a separate race based on their pre-Ottoman/pre-Islamic past.

[425] I will analyze this aspect later on in my discussion of the discursive construction of national homeland.

text below I reproduce sections from two texts – one by Halil Hayali and another one by Bâbânzâde:

> Oh those tyrants, first prevented us Kurds [Kurmanc] from education, then from trade and agriculture… *(, January 23, 1908, No. 8: 8, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 391-395)).*[426]

> Nevertheless, the tyrannical period, which should be left in the frightening darkness of the past that we do not want to remember, has also crushed this strong component [Kurds] and maltreated it even more cruelly compared to the other components [of the Empire]… (, December 5, 1908, No. 1: 3, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 44-46)).[427]

Here the authors present the oppressive policies of the Hamidian period from a particular Kurdish perspective constructing Kurds as an ethnic group that was collectively oppressed by the state.

However, as discussed earlier, what is left unsaid is as significant as what is actually said in the meaning-making process. Many Kurdish tribes, particularly the Hamidian Tribal Cavalry regiments, and their constituencies were actually better off under the Hamidian regime since they enjoyed extensive privileges that were later taken away by the CUP. However, the authors of *KTTG* dismiss these privileges by including all Kurds into their discourse of shared sorrows to create a sense of collective memory and *common sorrow.* This strategy is also in line with the journal's *then and now policy* in which all evil deeds were attributed to the previous Hamidian regime to glorify the new CUP government.

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[426] Ah, wan zalima ewil me Kurmancan ji xwendinê, paşê ji ticaret û zîraetê mehrûm hîştin… (Halil Hayali*, Weten û Îttîfaqa* Kurmanca [The Homeland and the Unity of the Kurds], *KTTG, January 23, 1908, No. 8: 8, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 391-395).*

[427] 'Bununla beraber, artık mâzînin mahûf zalamına, bir daha anmak istemediğimiz saha-ı nisyana atılması vacib olan devr-i sabık-ı istibdad, Osmanlılığın bir direğini teşkil eden bu unsur-ı kuvveti de ezmiş, diğer anâsıra nazaran daha elîm bir surette hırpalamış idi' (Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, *Kürdler ve Kurdistan* [Kurds and Kurdistan] *KTTG*, December 5, 1908, No. 1, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 44-46)).

Furthermore, there were instance in which the *KTTG* authors constructed a glorious past and the need for its restoration. For example, Suleymaniyeli Tevfik wrote the following lines in the very first issue of *KTTG*:

> For years we have not been able to find a solution due to our painful sightlessness, flopping in a state of being strangulated. Kurdistan, which in the past brought up geniuses in the fields of science and technology, today, leaves its children the inheritance of a book of religious sciences that has been brought from India, duplicated and used in every class.[428]

Notice how the author nostalgically celebrates the glorious 'good old days' of Kurds. Then he invites the reader to a *'collective act of remembering,'* taking pride in such a splendid common past and urges them to revive it. Also notice that through the metaphor of personification, Kurdistan is humanized as an entity *'that'* has raised genius Kurds in the past. As we saw, such metaphors favour the identification of the addressees with that of the personified collective subjects such as the homeland (cf. Wodak *et. al* 1999: 44).

Not surprisingly, the construction of the Kurdish common political past too was permeated with the notion of Ottomanism. An article by Suleymaniyeli A. Hilmi is illustrative:

> Just think a little bit; those who established a gigantic state out of a tribe of a handful, yes, those who passed the Dardanelles with [just] 40 people, and shook the whole Europe thanks to the success bestowed upon them by almighty God and the sword of valour, those who succeeded in putting the flag of pride on three great continents of the globe were our ancestors [ecdad], just as those ancestors of us who went all the way to the gates of

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[428] 'Biz bunca sene göz kapalılığının remedleriyle, açılarıyla nîmbesmel bir halde çırpına çırpına bir tarîk-i tevessül bulamıyoruz. Vaktiyle ulûm ve fünûn dâhiyelerini yetiştiren Kürdistan, bugün Hindistan'dan getirtebildiği bir ulûm-ı diniye kitabını, her derste not gibi birkaç satırını istinsah ederek evlâdına mîras bırakıyor.' (Tevfik, '*Untitled,'* *KTTG*, No. 1, December 5, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 40)).

Vienna by standing to the bullets of the enemy. They trusted us with that dear homeland which they founded with their swords and their blood…[429]

In this extreme case of Ottomanism, the author tries hard, notably through the term *ecdad,*[430] to reinforce the idea that Kurds are true Ottomans by an absurd implication that the Kurds are the descendants of *the house of Othman*, an Oguz Turk who founded the Ottoman Empire.

In a similar way, celebrating the second constitutional period, Ahmed Cemil, the editor-in-chief of the journal, wrote:

There have been many successive events and innovations until this 7th century of our existence, but it is impossible to come across such a bright and joyous national festival throughout our long national life.[431]

By '*our* long national life' the author refers to the national life of the Ottoman state in which the inclusive historical deixis 'our' encompasses Kurds too. This claim has been strengthen in the phrase 'this 7th century of *our* existence' in which the *'7th century'* refers to the establishment of the Ottoman Empire 7 centuries earlier (1299 CE) while the deictic word 'our' implies that the Kurds have existed as a part of the Ottoman state since its very foundation. This anachronism misplaces the Ottoman-Kurdish relations in time as the incorporation of Kurdistan

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[429] 'Az çok mülâhaza buyurulsun; bir avuç aşiretten bir koca hükümeti teşkil eden, evet Çanakkale boğazını kırk kişi ile geçerek, bitevfîkillâhi teâlâ ellerindeki seyf-i celâdetleri sayesinde bütün Avrupa'yı titreten, liva-yı mahmideti küre-i arzın üç büyük kıtasında rekze muvaffak olan ecdad-ı izamımız olduğu gibi, ta Viyana kapılarına kadar düşman kurşunlarına göğüs gere gere giden yine bizim ecdad-ı kiramımızdır. Onlar, kılıçlarıyla, kanlarıyla kazandıkları o muazzez vatanı bize emanet verdiler.'(Süleymaniyeli A. Hilmi, *'Kürd Vatandaslarıma Hitaben Birkaç Söz'* [Addressing my Fellow Kurdish Citizens in a Few Words], *KTTG*, No. 9, January 30, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 451-453))

[430] The Arabic term *ced/ecdad* refers to *grandfather, ancestor* or *forefather*; *see* Doniach's The Oxford English-Arabic Dictionary. The term has the same meaning in Ottoman as well as Modern Turkish, see, Kanar's *Osmanlı Türkçesi Sözlügü* (Ottoman Turkish Dictionary) and *Türkçe Sözlük* (Turkish Dictionary) by Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Association).

[431] 'Hayat-ı kavmiyemizin şu yedinci asr-ı medîd-i mevcudiyetine kadar teselsül eden vakayı' ve inkılâbât-ı gûna gûnunda, bu sûr-ı pürsürûr-ı millîmizin şa'şaa-ı emsaline kat'iyyen tesadüf olunamaz' (Ahmed Cemil, *'Milletin Id-i Ekber-i Hurriyeti'* [People's Grand Festival of Freedom] *KTTG*, No. 3, December 19, 1908, in Bozarslan, p. 139-140).

into the Ottoman Empire did not take place until 1517. [432] However, such historicization of the Ottoman-Kurdish relations should be seen as a part of the Kurdish intellectuals' *propaganda* to feed and comply with the hegemonic discourse of Ottomanism, a situation that is best described by Eriksen (1993: 98) who has observed that 'history is not a product of the past, but a response to requirements of the present'. [433]

As far as the construction of the pantheon of heroes is concerned, *KTTG* did not make frequent references to the historical Kurdish personage, the way *Kurdistan* did. Only in the 9th issue Ahmed mentions *Sharaf Khan of Bitlis* and *Saladin Ayyubi*. In order to instill Kurds with a sense of nation pride he reminds the readership of the glorious Kurdish past and great historical figures that rose among Kurds.

5.2.4. The Discursive Construction of Common Culture

Apart from the emphasis put on Kurdish common language and history, *KTTG*'s nationalist discourse on the construction of common culture revolved around the concept of an ideal –sometimes superior- Kurdish 'national character' vis-à-vis other Ottoman communities. As discussed in the previous chapter, the journal *Kurdistan* attributed distinctive behavioural dispositions to its imagined national audience, i.e. Kurds, describing them as the greatest on earth. In a similar way, *KTTG* discourse functioned as a mirror through which the Kurds could admire themselves based on their allegedly inherent and superior qualities of mind and character, which were presented as integral or stereotypical parts of Kurdish

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[432] In any case, the relations between the two were not as rosy as implied in the text even after the incorporation of Kurdistan into the Ottoman Empire. The amicable relations between the Ottomans and the Kurds deteriorated soon after the Safavid Empire ceased to pose a threat to the Ottomans. Kurds and Ottomans were in constant battle for power from 1650 until the demise of the Kurdish dynasties in the mid-19th century (Jwaideh 2006: 17).

[433] For the historicization of the relations between Ottomans and Kurds also *see* the following articles: Ahmed Cemil in issue 3; Bâbânzâde in issue 4, Erzincanli Hamdi Süleyman in the 8th issue.

national identity. This imagined national character is constructed through 'stereotypical phantasmagoria, which has no real counterpart outside of the minds of those who believe in it' (Wodak *at. al* 1999: 29). For instance, Malatyali Bedri promotes the superior moral merits of the Kurds and warns other Muslims against a potential moral degeneration caused by corrupt moral principles of the West:

> However this has not changed their [Kurds'] moral merits and habits, which are blended with bravery and strength; and no force is capable of changing them. Today, while they [Kurds] preserve these qualities along with their bravery, the major shortcoming and fault of Kurds is ignorance and lack of education. [However] the lack of these shortcomings have no negative influence on essential moral merits and nature, [on the contrary] their presence provide tremendous benefits for human life and prosperity.

> Since we Kurds have never been possessed by perverted absurdities neither at intellectual nor practical levels, we [Kurds] keep away from that stain. This distance stems not from ideas but our nature. Today, our moral values have not been corrupted, since we were born as Muslims and live in mountains [and] countryside or rather in valleys that have not been contaminated by corrupt principles; we are born with weapons, walk with our weapons and die with them in order to live a peaceful life. These are our essential characters.[434]

In line 1, the author constructs Kurds as a unified and coherent national

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[434] 'Fakat şecaat ve kudretle mümtezic bulunan ahlak ve i'tiyadlarım değiştirmemiş ve hiç bir kuvvet dahi değiştirmemiştir. Bir gün yine evvelki vaz'iyet ve şecatlarıyla bakıy kalan Kürdlerin en büyük noksanı, en azîm hatası ma'rifetsizlik, maarifsizliktir. Bunun ahlak-ı aslî ve hilkat üzerine sû-i te'sîri olmamakla beraber, maişet ve refah-ı beşer üzerine faidesi büyük ve hem pek büyüktür.

Biz Kürdler, bugün o kadar gavamızât-ı dallanın fikren ve fiilen zebûnu olmadığımız için, o şaibe-i dûr'endîşaneden baîdiz. Bu aramızdaki ib'ad fikren değil, hilkatendir. Bugün Müslüman doğmuş, dağların, sahraların, daha doğru, ahkâm-ı fesadiyenin telvîs edemediği vâdîlerin mütemekkinleri bulunduğumuz için, ahlakımızı bozmamış, oldukça asude yaşamak için silâh ile doğar, silâh ile yürür, silâh ile ölürüz. Bunlar bizim ahlak-ı asliyemizdir' (Malatyalı Bedri, *Makale-i Mahsuse: Kürdler ve Şecaat-i Akvam* [Special Article: Kurds and Heroism of Nations, *KTTG*, No. 6, January 9, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 287-289)).

community that has remained unchanged through centuries. Then, rather from a primordialist/essentialist view, he attributes superior *moral merits*, such as bravery, integrity and natural combat skills, as inherent characteristics shared by all Kurds as elements of their common culture. Notice how these attributes contribute to the construction of a Kurdish *national* moral code through the discourse of moral purity protected by the inaccessible rugged nature of Kurdistan's geography, i.e. mountains and valleys. Although he recognizes the lack of education among Kurds, he claims that this shortage takes nothing away from their innate abilities and their stereotypical moral merits.

Saîd-î Kurdî, who spared no effort to emphasize and promote his Kurdish identity,[435] was arrested and put in a mental hospital when he dared to petition the Sublime Porte for the establishment of a university in Kurdistan. He tells the following to the doctor at the mental hospital:

> First of all, I grew up in Kurdistan. You should measure my rough nature with a Kurdish scale not with an Istanbulian one. If you do not [...] you will have to lock up most of the Kurds in mental hospitals because the greatest moral merits in Kurdistan are bravery, honour, loyalty to religion and honesty. What is called 'politeness' by the 'civilized' is 'flattery' to them [Kurds]…

> My strange appearance and 'unsuitable' clothes show that I do not have earthly needs… it shows my genuineness as a natural human being and exalts my love for my nation…

> An untamed [and] free Kurd, who does not know Turkish well, can express himself only this much [in Turkish language].[436]

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[435] For instance, he refused to give up his traditional Kurdish outfits even in rather formal settings of the capital Istanbul because he saw his outfits as an expression of his Kurdish culture even though he was aware that others found his outfits 'unfashionable' or 'inappropriate'.

[436] 'Birincisi: Ben Kürdistan dağlarında büyümüşüm. Kaba olan ahvalimi Kürdistan kapanıyla tartmalı, hassas olan medenî İstanbul mîzanıyla tartmamalısınız. Öyle yaparsanız, ma'den-i saadetimiz olan Dersaadet'ten önümüze sed çekmiş oluısunuz. Hem de ekser-i Kürdleri tımarhaneye sevk etmek lâzım gelir. Zîra Kürdistan'da en revaclı olan ahlak cesaret, izzet-i nefs, salabet-i diniye, muvafakat-ı kalb-ü lisandır. Medeniyette nezaket denilen emir, anlarca müdahenedir…

Apparently, in Istanbul, Kurds were known by their 'untamed' and 'rough' character and unsophisticated appearance as mountain people.[437] The author plays on this popular urban view of Kurds by romanticizing these characteristics; he turns what appears to be 'inadequacy' into positive essential peculiarities of Kurdish culture that make them distinct from and superior to other Ottomans. In this construction of common Kurdish culture he exalts such Kurdish personal characters as being untamed, free, honest, rough, brave, honorable highlanders vis-à-vis the 'ingenious', 'pretentious' urbanite Turkish culture of Istanbul in which he equates the urbanite politeness with hypocrisy and flattery.[438] Also notice how he reconstructs Turkish as a foreign language (lines 8-9) that is not necessarily known or mastered by Kurds, including himself although Kurdî had a perfect command of Turkish. Here too he turns something that might be perceived as a shortcoming (not knowing 'proper' Turkish) into a merit with lexemes of freedom. Finally, in lines 6-8, he turns his 'unsuitable clothes' into a Kurdish cultural symbol and a source of Kurdish national pride.

Then the author reproduces a dialogue that took place between himself and the Minister of Security:

[…] The minister became upset.

[Then], I said: I have lived [as a] free [man]; I have grown up on the mountains of Kurdistan, which are the sites of boundless freedom. [Your]

Şekl-i garibim, bu muhalif olan libasımla makasıd-ı dünyeviyeden istiğnamı… tabiîlik insaniyetimi ve milliyetimin mahabbetini i'lâ etmek için…

Vahşî, yani hür, Türkçe iyi bilmez bir Kürd bu kadar ifade-i meram edebilir vesselam!' (Bediüzzaman-i Kurdî, *'Molla Said-i Kurdîn'nin Tımarhane Hatırâtı'*, [Molla Said-i Kurdi's Memoires of the Mental Hospital], *KTTG*, No. 5, January 2, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 236-241).

[437] In this regard Kurdî echoes what Khani had said earlier in his *Mem û Zîn*: *'Kurmanc im û kûh û kenarî / Van çend xeberêd-i Kurdewari'* (I am a Kurd from mountains and peripheries/These are a few words of mine on Kurdish land/territory) (*See*, Khani (1695 [2005]), Section VII, p. 192).

[438] A number of other articles by various authors also referred to similar cultural dispositions and attitudes, e.g., bravery, honesty, honor, loyalty and so forth, which believed to be shared collectively by all Kurds.

rage is useless. You are exhausting yourself to no avail... [439]

In his conversation with the minister, the author again puts emphasis on the free nature of the Kurdish culture that is closely associated with the mountainous geography of Kurdistan. In any case, the theme of Kurds as the free, unfettered inhabitants of the rugged mountains has been a significant element of Kurdish culture in Kurdish identity discourse up to the present time.[440]

Moreover, *KTTG* promoted a few works of Kurdish literature on its pages. For instance, the paper published poems by Suleymaniyeli Tevfik in the 1st, 2nd and 3rd issues. In addition, *KTTG* encouraged and promoted intellectual works on Kurdish language, e.g. in the 6th issue the journal announced three such works in progress:

> We sincerely thank you for the good news about the works of Aktepeli Abdurrhaman Efendi, one of the most virtuous Kurdish notables, on history in Kurdish language; honorable Ziya Efendi's [Gökalp] research manuscript on Kurdish proverbs, grammar and dictionary which have been in the making for the past 10 years and will be published soon, and also for the good news about the similar works by Hanili Salih Bey, one of the honorable figures of the region; we congratulate them all' (Open Correspondence, *KTTG*, January 9, 1909, No. 6, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 326).[441]

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[439] '[…] Nazır hiddet etti.
Ben dedim: Hür yaşamışım, hürriyet-i mutlakanın meydanı olan Kürdistan dağlarında büyümüşüm. Bana hiddet faide vermez. Nafile yorulmayınız…' (Bediüzzaman-i Molla Said El-Kurdî, *'Devr-i Istibdadda Timarhaneden Sonra Tevkifhanede iken Zaptiye Nâziri Şefik Paşa ile Muhaveremdir'* [My Quarrel with the Minister of Security Şefik Paşa, during the Tyrannical Period when I was in Prison after the Mental Hospital *KTTG*, No. 5, January 2, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 241-242)).

[440] Nontheless, Khani was the first to construct the rugged and mountainous nature of Kurdistan's geography as an essential part of Kurdish culture.

[441] 'Ekmelîn-i sadât ve ezkiya-yı Kürdiyeden Aktepeli Şeyh Abdurraman Efendi'nin lisan-ı Kürdî ile bir tarih yazmakta olduğuna ve edîb-i muhterem Ziya Efendinin de -on senelik mahsûl-ı tetebbuât-ı olmak üzre- tesvîd ettiği Kürdçe durûb-ı emsal ile sarf ve nahvini ve bir kamûs-ı Kürdiyi yakında neşredeceğine ve fuzalâ-ı mahalliyeden Hanili Salih Bey'in dahi bu babdaki mesaî-i masrûfesine taalluk eden tebşîrâtınıza cidden teşekkür ve bu âlî himmetler bilhassa tebrik olunur' (Open Correspondence, *KTTG*, No. 6, January 9, 1909, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 326).

Evidently, *KTTG*, like *Kurdistan*, took great pride in Kurdish language and literature because scientific and literary works in Kurdish language proved, to the Kurds and the non-Kurds alike, the capacity of that language. Such prestige bestowed recognition and respect onto Kurds as the speakers of that capable language which in turn could pave the way for the acknowledgment of the Kurdish as a noteworthy 'nation.'

Although gender relations were far from being among the major themes or concerns of the *KTTG*, there were instances in which KTTG authors referred to the role of Kurdish women in the Kurdish society. Consider the following abstract:

> […] one of the marvels of the Kurds, among the well-known fine qualities of all Ottomans, such as bravery, heroism and noble moral, is that we find Kurdish woman facing dangerous situations that do not [generally] fit into a typical womanhood; [Kurdish woman] has never shown any sign of weakness, she has died and killed, she has taken part in wars and endured great difficulties side by side by with her husband. We strongly feel that we should show how every single one of [these examples] is the proof and embodiment of the Kurdish nation's endless [moments of] heroisms [and] their national moral and traditions that have not change for centuries. [442]

Through the strategy of dissimilation, the author foregrounds Kurdish women's 'manly' abilities and extraordinary qualities as a component of Kurdish national culture, which differentiates Kurds from other Ottoman communities. It is noteworthy that in this cultural engineering, in order to fit his argument into the journal's overall Ottomanist policy the author is careful as not to fail to present this distinguishing and superior aspect of Kurdish culture as an aspect of the

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[442] […] Osmanlıların, umum Osmanlıların evsaf-ı cemilesinden olan merdlik, kahramanlık -ahlak-ı asliye- arasında işitilen harikalarından biri de, Kürdlerin, Kürd kadınlarının, kar-zarda kadınlıkla hiç de münasib olamayan mehalike göğüs germiş, fütur etmemiş, ölmüş, öldürmüş, kocasıyla beraber harblere girmiş, sadamata uğramış bulacağız. Bunların her biri, Kürd kavminin payanı bulunmaz şecaatına, asırdan beri tebeddül etmemiş ahlak-ü adat-ı milliyelerinin birer şahid-i zihayatı şeklinde göstermeğe kalbimizde büyük bir his duyarız! (Bedri, *'Kürdler ve Şecaat-ı Akvam'* [Kurds and Heroism of Nations], *KTTG*, No. 2, December 12, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 90).

greater Ottoman family in the continuation of his article.

Moreover, although the non-Muslim Kurds did not constitute a major theme in the discourse of the *KTTG*, Sayyid Abdulkadir, the president of *KTTC*, in an article raises the issue of Kurdistan's non-Muslim communities:

> […] Their [Kurds'] innate abilities and their capacity for development and enlightenment is recognized and admitted by all men of reason. The previous regime, motivated by who knows what irrational policy, had sown [very cold] discord and created an abyss among their various tribes and their [Kurds'] non-Muslims'; and Kurdistan had been harmed in the most destructive way by fracturing the ties of unity and mutual affection. [443]

This very first mention of non-Muslim Kurds indicates that the Kurdish leadership included the non-Muslims into the repertoire of elements that constitute the Kurdish identity. Clearly, the incorporation of the Kurdish speaking non-Muslim inhabitants of Kurdistan, perhaps the Yezidis, Jews, Nestorians and so forth, into the Kurdish national identity was still being negotiated in the discourse of *KTTG*.

Similarly an anonymous article stated:

> O Brothers!
>
> […] [We] the people living on the Ottoman lands, be it Turks, Kurds, Christians, Yezidis and Nestorians, are together as one [body] with no differences between us.[444]

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[443] 'İsti'dad-ı maderzedleri ve kabiliyet-i tekâmül ve tenevvürleri de teslimkerde-i ülil'elbabdır. İdare-i sabıka, kim bilir ne gibi bir politikanın ilca-yı sahîfi ile, bunların kabail-i mütenevviaları ve gayr-i Müslim unsurları arasına pek soğuk nifaklar, vâsi' uçurumlar ilka etmiş ve Kürdistan, inkıta-ı rüşte-i ittihad-ü muvalât ile en dehşetli bir surette zedelenmiş idi' (Sayyid Abdulkadir Ubeydullah Efendi, *Cem'iyetimizin Reis-i Fezail'enîsî Sayyid Abdülkadir Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Nümûne-i Fikr-ü Irfani* [An Example from the Thoughts and Wisdom of Sayyid Abdulkadir Ubeydullah Efendi, the Honorable President of Our Association], *KTTG* No. 1, December 5 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 51-52)).

[444] 'Gelû bira! Tirk, Kurmanc, File, Yehudî, Ezîdî, Nesturi, ji wan xeyrê, yekûnê mileta ke milkê Osmanli de rûdine, giş em bi hev ra beramber in, yek in; mabeyna me da ferq tunîne' (Anonymous, *Kürdçe Lisanımız* [Our Kurdish Language], *KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 200-2001)).

In his endeavour to promote a common Ottoman identity, the author cites both Kurds [Kurmancs] and the Yazidis in his list, as if Yazidis belong to a separate *ethnie*, even though most of them spoke Kurdish (Allison 1996b). Given the importance of religion as an identity marker and the association of Sunni Islam with Kurdish identity during this historical period, the Kurdish speaking non-Muslims, e.g. Yazidis, were not truly incorporated in Kurdish identity discourse. The vagueness here illustrates how the intellectuals had just started to think in terms of ethnicity rather than religion. Hence, the inclusion of the Kurdish speaking non-Muslims into the Kurdish identity was a new idea, a discursive novelty or a discursive quest for a new national identity in a changing society.

In short, national identity implies 'a complex of similar conceptions and perceptual schemata, of similar emotional dispositions and attitudes and of similar behavioural conventions, which bearers of this 'national identity' share collectively' (Wodak *et al.* 1999: 4). *KTTG*, in its discourse of Kurdish national identity strove to construct a sense of collective culture based on such collective features as common Kurdish language, literature, mentality, behaviour and way of life among Kurds who in reality were fragmented along tribal, linguistic, sectarian and regional lines.

5.2.5. The Discursive Construction of National Body (Common Territory and Homeland)

As we saw the idea of nationhood rests on the claim to a specific territorial area (Wodak *et al*. 1999: 150) that is believed to be the exclusive historical and ancestral homeland of that particular nation. Thus every nationalist discourse engaged in the construction of the national homeland by exploiting its historical, cultural, symbolic, political or economic dimension simultaneously. In this section I explore the ways in which the *KTTG* authors engaged in the construction of Kurdistan as the Kurdish homeland.

First of all, the process of the semantic shift in the meaning of the term 'welat' from the 'native region/province' to 'native homeland' continued. For instance, Seyyah Ahmed Shewqî wrote:

> If you forgive the past misdeeds, your *homeland* [welat] will prosper day
> by day. Our objective is the welfare of *Kurdistan*.[445]

In this extract the term *'welat'* clearly refers to the entire Kurdistan rather than to a particular Kurdish city, province or region.

Second, similar to the extract above, Kurdistan is constructed as an exclusive land of the Kurds through many instances of presuppositions. Consider the following extracts:

> First of all, I grew up in Kurdistan. You should measure my rough nature with
> a Kurdish scale not with an Istanbulian one.'[446]

> The paramount ideal of this association of us Kurds in Istanbul is the
> protection of the religion and the development of Kurdistan.[447]

> Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress, taking this point into
> consideration, has decided to prepare an excellent history of Kurds [and]
> Kurdistan [and also] compile and publish [Kurdish] national literature.[448]

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[445] 'Eger hun xirabîya berê ji bîr bikin, roj bi roj welatê we'yê ava be. Meqseda me, jibo silameta Kurdistanê ye.' (Seyyah Ehmed Şewqî, *Geli Welatiya*! [O Fellow Countrymen!], *KTTG*, No: 2, December 12 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 99)).

[446] 'Birincisi: Ben Kürdistan dağlarında büyümüşüm. Kaba olan ahvalımı Kürdistan kapanıyla tartmalı, hassas olan medeni İstanbul mizanıyla tartmamalısınız' (Bediüzzaman Molla Said El-Kürdi, *'Molla Said-i Kurdin'nin Tımarhane Hatıratı'*, [Molla Said-i Kurdi's Memoires of the Mental Hospital], *KTTG*, No. 5, January 2, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 236-242)).

[447] 'Ew cem'îyeta me Kurda li İstanbul**ê**, fikra wan a mezin xweykirina dîn, tereqqîya Kurdistan**ê** ye' (M. Tevfik, *'Geli Welatiya!'* [O Citizens!], *KTTG*, No. 3, December 19, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 157)).

[448] Kürd Teavün ve Terakkî Cemiyeti İstanbul Merkez-i Umumîsi, bu ciheti dahi nazar-ı dikkate alarak, Kürdlerin, Kürdistan'ın mükemmel bir tarihini tertîb etmeye, edebiyat-ı milliyelerıni de cem'-ü neşre karar vermiştir. Anonymous, *'Makale-i Hikemiye'* [An Article on Philosophy], *KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 204-205)).

Notice how in all three instances Kurdistan is presented as the Kurdish national homeland as an implicit assumption the reality of which is taken for granted. Such presuppositions are widely used throughout the *KTTG* corpus.

What is more, the cartographic demarcating of territory is an indispensable *modus operandi* for the construction of a national homeland (Wodak at. al, 1999). Although, the map of Kurdistan in *KTTG* never took a cartographic form, *KTTG* authors did not shy away from drawing such maps discursively through spatial references. [449]

For instance, Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, in an article titled *The Geopolitical Position of the Kurds*, defines the borders of Kurdistan roughly based on its inhabitants,

> [I]n this article I am not going to discuss the geography of Kurdistan, its mountains and rivers, its cities and towns […]
>
> As is known, the eastern parts of the Ottoman Empire and the western parts of the Iranian Empire [and] from the north to the south, nearly from the Mount Ararat to the Persian Gulf, is inhabited by the Kurds. Although there are Armenians [living] in the Ottoman part [of Kurdistan] and Turks and Persians [Acem] in the Iranian part, there is no doubt that the population of the Kurds is much larger than the number of the all other components [unsur] combined in the semicircle running through Erzurum, Tabriz, Shiraz, and Mosul. While, particularly, the Loristan region of Iran is inhabited by Kurds in its entirety, Orumieh and its suburbs are predominantly inhabited by this people (*KTTG*, December 26, 1908, No. 4: 2, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 183-185)).[450]

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[449] In this period the term 'Kurdistan' still referred to a geographical area with no clearly defined borders or a political connotation (Bruinessen 1997). However, *KTTG* regularly presented this land as a well-defined virtually homogenous *geoethnic* Kurdish territory whose borders were demarcated by territories inhabited by non-Kurdish 'others'. As far as the political aspect of these discursive maps is concerned, *KTTG* constructed Kurdistan for a particular reason: to legitimize its political demands on behalf of the Kurds.

[450] 'Bu makalede Kürdistan'ın coğrafyasından, cibal ve enharından, bilâd ve kasabâtından bahsedecek değilim.

First, the author outstandingly establishes Kurdistan as an identifiable ethnic territory and a national homeland through an assumption embedded in the phrase 'the geography of Kurdistan'. Second, he draws a discursive map of Kurdistan by identifying certain regions, cities mountains and seas that allegedly either constitute or demarcate the Kurdish homeland. Third, he mentions Kurdistan's constituencies (lines 5-9): in the first clause even though the author recognizes the existence of non-Kurds in Kurdistan,[451] he reduces the effect of what he just said through the use of *'although'* [ise de], a sentence-linking contrastive conjunction, and then he adds that the Kurdish population in Kurdistan is much greater than the total number of all non-Kurds combined. Hence, what makes Kurdistan a Kurdish national homeland is the vast majority of its Kurdish inhabitant vis-à-vis the 'insignificant' number of the 'others'. This *'strategy of avoidance'* (Wodak at al. 1999) is a common tactic in nationalist discourses in which nationalists tend to dismiss or downplay the existence of ethnic groups other than their own on the national territory. It is noteworthy that the author makes reference to the both parts of Kurdistan to highlight the fact that the Kurdish homeland is partitioned between the Ottoman and Qajar Empires.

Mâ'lûm olduğu üzre, memalik-i Osmaniye'nin aksam-ı şarkiyesi ve İraniyenin cihet-i garbiyesi, şimalden cenuba, heman heman Ararat'tan Basra körfezine kadar Kürdlerle meskûndür. Vâkıa, cihet-i Osmaniye'de Ermeniler ve kısm-ı İranî'de Türkler Acemler var ise de, herhalde Erzurum, Tebriz, Şiraz, Musul ve tekrar Erzurum arasında klan şübh-i münharif dairesini Kürd unsurunun diğer anâsırın mecmûuna galib geldiği muhakkaktır. Hele Iran'in Loristan kısmı kâmilen Kürd olduğu gibi, Urmiye havalisi de hep bu kavm ile meskûndür' (İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde, *'Kürdlerin Mevki-i Coğrafi ve Siyasîsi'*, [The Geopolitical Posizion of the Kurds], *KTTG*, No. 4, December 26, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 183-185)).

[451] Drawing on Halliday's (1985a 202-227) concepts of 'elaboration', 'extension' and 'enhancement', Fairclough (1995b: 121) identifies three main types of local coherence relations between clauses, clause complexes or sentences: *elaboration, extension,* and *enhancement.* Accordingly 'in elaboration, one clause elaborates on another by describing it or making it more specific –by rewording it, exemplifying it, or clarifying it. In extension, one clause extends the meaning of another by adding something new to it… (marked with *and*, *moreover*, etc.), adversative or contrastive (marked with *but, yet, however*, *[although]*, etc.), or variations (marked with *or*, *alternatively*, etc.). In enhancement, one clause enhances the meaning of another by qualifying it, in terms of time (e.g. A then B, A after B, A while B – where A and B are clauses or sentences), place (e.g. A where B), cause (e.g. A because B, A so B) or condition (e.g. if A then B)' (Fairclough 1995b: 121).

Furthermore, the eastern part of the Empire was a disputed area between the Armenians and Kurds. For the Kurdish leadership, the Armenian claim to the territory was a significant threat as much as the threat posed by the Ottoman Turks.[452] Therefore, the *KTTG* invoked the ancient history of the region and constructed the Kurds as one of its oldest inhabitants to justify the present claims. As it is a perfect case in point I reproduce the extract from Hüseyin Paşazade Suleyman's article, which was analysed above under the Discursive Construction of Common Political Past. Tracing the history of the Kurds back to 2600 BCE, Hüseyin Paşazade Suleyman stated:

> If there really was a discord and animosity between the Kurds and Armenians, one of these two communities, who have lived in Kurdistan in a perfect harmony and friendship since 2600 BCE, that is as far as one could go back in history, would have probably annihilated the other over such a long period of time.

> … because as the Armenians are the ancient inhabitants of that piece of territory, so too are the Kurds, who are the descendants of the Medes and the ancient and the **primary** [aslî] native inhabitants of that piece of territory as proven by historical evidence.[453]

In order to add further legitimacy to the Kurdish claim to the territory, the author traces the existence of Kurds in Kurdistan to the ancient history, i.e., 2600 BCE. Although he admits the ancient existence of the Armenians on the same land, he presents them as the inhabitants of 'ancient *Kurdistan'* not of 'ancient

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[452] As a matter of fact, the Armenian ambitions backed by European powers were one of the major reasons behind Sheikh Ubeydullah's Revolt in 1880 (Jwaideh 2006: 75-101).

[453] 'Milâd-ı İsa'dan 2600 sene evvelinden beri yani tarih nazarının erebildiği devirden bu âna kadar Kürdistan'da kemal-i ittihad ve mahabbetle yaşamış olan Kürdler ile Ermeniler arasında iddia olunan nifak-ü husumet esasen mevcûd bulunmuş olsa idi, birinin diğerini bu kadar medîd bir zaman içinde herhalde imha eylemesi lâzım gelirdi'

Çünkü Ermeniler o kıtanın sekene-i kadîmesi olduğu gibi, bugün tarihen sabittir ki Medyalılann ahlâfı olan Kürdler de o kıtanın sekene-i kadîme-ı asliyesindendir' (Hüseyin Paşazade Süleyman, *'Kürdler ve Ermeniler'* [Kurds and Armenians]. *KTTG* No. 9, January 30, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 431-434)).

Armenia'.[454] This discursive practice has been further reinforced with the use of the adjective *primary* [aslî] (in line 7), which qualifies Kurds as the *'primary'* inhabitants, implying that Armenians were *'secondary'*. Also, while substantiating his argument by evoking the *Medes*, an ancient empire, whom Kurds see as their ancestors (Bruinessen 2006: 24), he does not make any reference to the ancient history of the Armenians. This approach fits into the general ideology of nationalism in which only one ethnic group possesses intrinsic rights to a particular piece of land while these rights are denied to others that might also inhabit the same land.

Furthermore, ethno-national identity drives much of its appeal from the combination of social and cultural identity with territorial identity. It links the past experiences, customs, heritage, as well as collective sufferings with the homeland. Thus *KTTG* authors, like those of *Kurdistan*, often appealed to the emotive power of the homeland in their discourse of common Kurdish identity. In the 8th issue Halil Hayali wrote:

> O homeland! How dear you are, how lovely you are! Your tulip gardens are from the blood of the martyrs. Your hyacinths and sweet basils are from the beauty of the eyes of your heroes. Once, you were prosperous, every corner of yours was a meeting place of horsemen, your trees and woods were the destination for the youth; embellished were your lowlands with farmers, your plateaus with tents, your valleys with flocks of cattle, your pastures with herds of horses [and] your hillsides and plains with milkmaids; every corner of you was like a manmade heaven…. Suddenly, the storm of cruelty and tyranny pestered you, it killed your children, ruined every corner of you without leaving any trace of joy and fortune…
>
> O Kurds [Kurmanc]! Love your homeland! Because love of one's homeland is part of the faith [îman].[455]

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[454] For that matter, not even once is the name 'Armenia' used in the discourse of *KTTG*.

[455] 'Weten, tu çi qa ezîzî,tu çi qa letîf î! Lalezarê te ji xwna şehîdan e.Sinbil û rîhanê te ji rindîya çavê egîtan e. Wextekî her terefê te ava bû, her goşeê te mecmeê siwaran bû, dar û berê te

In this article, the author makes an extensive use of the symbolic significance of the body metaphor by conceptualizing the homeland as an attachment figure parallel to family, and specifically, to parents. This anthropomorphism is evident in the use of the vocative expression in which the author addresses/speaks to the homeland, i.e. *O homeland!* [Weten!] lending a human quality to a non-human object in order to endear the homeland to the reader and increase the level of relativity between the two. Such metaphors of personification, as we saw, favour identification of the addressees with that of the personified collective subjects, e.g. the homeland (Wodak *et. al* 1999: 44).

Then a strong link is established between the land and its inhabitant (in lines 1-3) who shed their blood for it as implied through the metaphor of the tulips that have taken their colour from the blood of the martyrs. Furthermore, the use of religious intertextuality through the use of *martyr* [şehîd] is a discursive practice on its own right showing how nationalism demands a strong religious piety from its 'believers'. In this glorification of death sacrifice and the promise of immortality to national martyrs, *KTTG* manipulates perennial human concern about body, death and mortality in much the same way religion does. Consequently, with the rhetoric of soil and blood it presents the homeland as something to die for.[456] This religious intertextuality is reinforced through another metaphysical term: *heaven* [cennet]. What made Kurdistan a *heaven* were its nurturing fertility, landscape,[457] rich plethora, beauty [458] and a prosperous agrarian life-style (in

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menzilê xortan û lawan bû; deştê te bi cotyaran, zozanêd te bi konan, newalêd te bi kerîyê pezan, mergêd te bi refê hespan, guher û mexelêd te bi bêrîvanan xemilîbû; her alîyê te wekî cenneta derewî bû.... Nagah tofana zulm û îstîbdadê muselletê te bû, ewladê te kuşt, her terefê te xira kir, tê da eserê şahî û bextyarîyê nehişt…

Gelî Kurmancan! Wetenê xwe hez bikin. Çunkî mehebbeta wetenî ji îmanê ye' (Halil Hayali*, Weten û Îttîfaqa* Kurmanca [The Homeland and the Unity of the Kurds], *KTTG, January 23, 1908, No. 8: 8, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 391-395).*

[456] It is also important to notice how the meaning of death sacrifice for one's native land is translated as a sacrifice for one's homeland in a modern and nationalist sense.

[457] The mountainous terrain of Kurdistan was also utilized in the construction of the common Kurdish homeland. As we saw earlier in the Construction of Common Culture section, Said-i Kurdi used mountains as a symbol of national landscape. Similarly, Ahmed Cemil, commemorating Ishak Sukûtî evoks the mountains of Kurdistan and associates them with the

lines 3-7). In this rhetoric, material resources, e.g., fertility, rich plethora, etc., are important only when they are used to strengthen what are fundamentally emotional bonds and claims to space.[459] [460] This bond is further reinforced again from a religious point of view in the last two lines where the author evokes a hadith from the Prophet.

What is more, in accordance with the journal's Ottomanist line, *KTTG* authors stretched their use of the term *homeland* [vatan/weten/welat]. In this broader meaning the term encompassed the whole Ottoman territory. Consequently, the existence of two referents, i.e. Kurdistan and the entire Ottoman territory, made *'vatan/weten/welat'* rather an elusive term. For instance, Erzincanlı Hamdi Süleyman wrote:

> … I would also like to point that we appeal earnestly to those that are capable of translating this valuable history [of Kurdistan]… into Turkish so

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notion of freedom, (*see*, *KTTG*, No. 5, January 2, 1909, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 232). Today, mountains in Kurdistan have become a popular reference as a symbol of Kurdish national landscape in the contemporary Kurdish political discourse.

[458] When praising the beauty of the homeland, nationalist discouse usually does not mention any particular place or beauty but rather remains general and vague. Billlig (1995: 75) asserts 'in these hymns of praise the beauty is not localized: America is not beautiful because it offers a stunning waterfall near Buffalo or a canyon a couple of thousand miles away in Arizona. The country as a totality is praised as special, as 'the beautiful''.

[459] Similar practices can be observed in many other articles. For instance Seyyah Ahmed Şewqî in one of his articles says: 'Our purpose is the well-being of Kurdistan. Kurdistan's soil deserves to be coated with gold. The earth and sand of Kurdistan is more valuable than gold. Homeland Kurdistan is better than the government's mint' (Meqseda me, ji bo silameta Kurdistane ye. Kurdistan layiq e ku mirov erde Kurdistane bi zer siwax bike. Ax u xweliya Kurdistane, ji zer biqimettir e. Welate Kurdistane ji derbxana devlete çetir e. (Seyyah Ehmed Şewqî, *Geli Welatiya*!, *KTTG*, No: 2, December 12 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 99).

[460] *KTTG* also made use of the term *welatî* [fellow countrymen] in its discourse of national homeland; *see*, the text by Seyyah Ahmed Şewqî, *Ey Geli Kurdan!* [O Kurdish People], *KTTG*, No. 1, December 5, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 55-57); and the one by Diyarbekir'den telgrafci Mehmed Tahir Cezeri, *Kurdce Lisanimiz* [Our Kurdish Langugae], *KTTG*, No. 6, January 9, 1909, in Bozarslan, (1998: 295). The fact that these were the only two authors to utilize the term 'welatî,' is not surprising given the novelty of this nationalist discourse and its neologisms.

that our other citizens [vatandaş] can also benefit and have an opinion about Kurdistan, which constitutes an important part of their homeland [vatan].[461]

Notice how cleverly the author creates a presumption in which he presents Kurdistan as a part of the homeland of the Empire's other citizens.

Additionally the *KTTG* often concerned itself with attacks on the Ottoman sovereignty, e.g. lamenting the independence moveimnts in the Balkans and elsewhere. Protesting the Crete's union with Greece, Hüseyin Paşazade Suleyman said:

If we talk statistically about the souls we have lost for that cause, only the total loss of us Kurds, who are the furthest from Crete Island and hence the least affected, is a few times bigger than the current population of the island… One cannot imagine a single Kurd, not even in the most remote and rugged part of Kurdistan, who would not sacrifice his life to save Crete, which is an inseparable part of the homeland...[462]

Both extracts use the term *homeland* in its broader sense in which Kurdistan is a mere extension of the larger Ottoman homeland. [463]

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[461] 'Şurasını da arzedeyim ki ihzarını arzu ettiğimiz bu tarih-i kıymetdardan diğer vatandaşlarımızın dahi istifade edebilmesi ve vatanlarının bir kısm-ı mühimmi olan Kürdistan hakkında bir fikir hâsıl eyleyebilmeleri için, erbab-ı iktidardan Türkçeye tercümesini dahi taleb ve istirham eyleriz' (Erzincanli Hamdi Süleyman, *Kurdistan'da Maarifin Tarz-i Tensik ve Ihyasi* [Regulation and Revitalization of Education in Kurdistan] *KTTG*, January 23, 1908, No. 8, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 370-373).

[462] 'Girid ceziresine en baîd olmak i'tibarıyla en az musab olan biz Kürdler bile o uğurda telef olmuş olan canlarımızın bir istatistikini tanzîm edecek olursak, yekûn-ı adedi herhalde bugün cezîrede sakin ahalînin ad'af-ı mudaafma baliğ olur… vatanın bir cüz'-i gayr-i müfarıkı olan Girid'in devletimizle beka-yı irtibatı uğrunda feda-yı canı cana minnet bilmeyen bir Kürdün - Kürdistan'ın en hücra ve sengistan bir yerinde bile- vücudu tasavvuf olunmamalıdır' (Hüseyin Paşazade Süleyman, Makale-i Mahsuse [Special Article] *KTTG*, No. 6, January 9, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 281-282)).

[463] For a similar political stand on the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the construction of the Ottoman territory as the common homeland for all Ottoman communities also see, articles by, E.A. '*Siyasîyât'* [Politics], *KTTG*, No. 1, December 5, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 41-43); Süleymaniyeli A. Hilmi, *'Kürd Vatandaşlarıma Hitaben Birkaç Söz'* [A few Words to My Kurdish Countrymen], *KTTG*, No. 9, January 30, 1909, (1998: 451-453)); and Seyyah Ahmed Şewqî, *Geli Welatiya* [O Countrymen!], *KTTG*, No. 3, December 19, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 157).

Another discursive practice that incorporated Kurdistan into the greater Ottoman homeland can be observed in the folio section of the paper, which reads:

> Annual subscription fee for *taşra* [province] is… [464]

In the Ottoman discourse all Ottoman territories in Anatolia were referred to as *taşra* [province/periphery] vis-à-vis the capital centre of Istanbul (Marufoğlu 2011). Adapting this convention, the folio section of the journal implied that Kurdistan was a taşra as a part of the Ottoman homeland.

Furthermore, *KTTG* was a better structured and well organized journal compared to *Kurdistan*. For instance *KTTG* published the hard-news separately under the title *Havadis* (News) section in which it distinguished domestic news from international news or home news from abroad. The interesting thing about this practice is that the domestic news *(Dahili)* included news from all over the Ottoman land, rather than from Kurdistan only.[465] Hence, presenting news from outside of Kurdistan -but within the Ottoman domain- as domestic constitutes another powerful discursive strategy that consolidated the idea of greater Ottoman homeland.

5.2.6. The Discursive Construction of Identities and Relations between the Kurdish Elite and Commoners

Similar to the corresponding section in the previous chapter, the analysis here focuses on the lexicogrammatical choices, in addition to various sets of linguistic features including the modalities and moods such as declarative, imperative, optative, interrogative, desiderative and subjunctive clauses and sentences in the construction of interpersonal relations and identities between the Kurdish elite and Kurdish commoners (cf. Fairclough 1995b: 128).

As we saw, in the discourse of *Kurdistan*, the Bedir Khan Brothers constructed themselves and their princely family as the traditional and historical leaders of the

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[464] 'Taşra icin seneligi…'

[465] The *Dahili* section in the 2nd issue is illustrative in this matter (*KTTG*, Dahili, No. 2, December 12, 1908, in Bozarslan, (1998:107)).

Kurds and as such they reclaimed their former status and power. In the discourse of *KTTG*, however, not a particular dynastic family but rather the Kurdish aristocratic elite as a whole was constructed as the leaders of the Kurds under the banner of *KTTC*.[466] As such they were presented as figures of authority that were capable of identifying the problems concerning the Kurds and the ways to tackle them, while the readership –the Kurdish commoners- was constructed as ignorant, unaware, uninformed and backward in need of education, modernization and guidance.

Suleymaniyeli Tevfik, the executive director of the journal, wrote the following in the inaugural issue of the *KTTG*:

> […] Thus 'Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress' found the Kurdish nation [kavim], to whom it belongs to, in an awful darkness and a bitter muteness, […] it has promised to undertake the task of the progress and improvement of its Kurdish brothers -who constitute a valuable organ of Ottomanism and who were the first to enter into a covenant to be honoured by the name of Ottomanism- in terms of education, trade and industry; in short, [it has promised to work] for their happiness in proportion to the honorable title of Ottomanism. This journal of ours is the [sign of] an exciting divine melody of our determination and intention for our Kurdistan.[467]

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[466] The familial background of certain *KTTC* members were invoked to stimulate pre-modern loyalties as in the case of Sheikh Abdulkadir, the president of the *KTTC* and the son of Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri as well as that of Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, from Baban principality and a *CUP* deputy for Baghdad. For instance, Sheikh Abdulkadir wrote an article in the first issue of the *KTTG* and signed it as *Merhum Şeyh Ubeydullah Efendizade Abdülkadir* (Abdulkadir, the son of the late Sheikh Ubeydullah) (*see, Cem'iytimizin Reis-i Fezail'enisi Seyyid Abdulkadir Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Numune-i Fikr-ü Irfani* [A Sample from the Thought and Knowledge of Sayyid Abdulkadir Ubeydullah Efendi the Virtuous President of our Association] *KTTG*, No.1, December 5, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 51-52). It is clear that both the journal as well as Sayyid Abdulkadir himself preferred to highlight his familial background to stimulate the traditional loyalty of the Kurdish messes. Moreover, a hard-news item that announces the appointment of Sheikh Abdulkadir to the Ottoman Senate, presented him as a descendant of the Prophet (see, *Heyet-i Ayan ve Seyyid Abdulkadir Efendi Hazretleri* [Assembly of Notables and His Highness Sayyid Abdulkadir Efendi] *KTTG*, No. 3, December 19, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 150).

[467] 'İşte mensub olduğu kavmi bu müdhiş karanlıkta, bu acıklı ebkemiyette gören 'Kürd Teavün ve Terakkî Cem'iyeti'…Osmanlılığın bir uzv-ıkıymetdarı, Osmanlılık şerefinin ilk peymankârı olan Kürd kardeşlerinin her gûna terakkisi, tealîsi, maarifi, ticareti, sanayii, velhâsıl Osmanlılık nam-ı

Here the *KTTC* members are presented as self-appointed educators and modernizers of the Kurds. This is accomplished through a pedagogic voice of experts –represented by the author- who knows the solution to the 'awful darkness' that has pestered the Kurds who are in need of modern education and guidance under the tutelage of the *KTTG* and *KTTC*. Furthermore, the author constructs the Kurdish masses as the *brothers* [kardeş] of the Kurdish intellectual elite which has multiple purposes and functions: first, as a term used in more populist rhetoric[468] it mitigate the patronizing voice of the author –and thus that of the journal- by adding to it a more humble tone of an ordinary person approximating a relationship between equals (cf. Fairclough 1995b); second it implies a kinship –brotherhood- between the Kurdish elite and the commoners through a sense of solidarity claiming co-membership in the same national group; and third, it constructs Kurds as unified body of equal members in an Andersonian sense of cross-class 'horizontal comradeship'.[469]Surely, this was a mid-shift in the Kurdish journalistic discourse. To be sure, we also observe that the same Kurdish leadership takes an extremely paternalistic attitude towards the Kurdish commoners (cf. Bruinessen 1992a: 275-276). Below I demonstrate an instance of such extreme realization of this paternalism in an article by Seyyah Ahmed Şewqî:

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bülendi nisbetinde iktisab-ı saadeti için büyük bir azm ile ahd-ü mîsak altına girmiştir. Şu azm-ü niyetimizin Kürdistan'ımıza sala-yı pürzemzemesi, gülbang-i müheyyici şu gazetemizdir' (Tevfik, '*Untitled,' KTTG*, No. 1, December 5, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 40)).

[468] As in the motto of French Revolution: '*liberté, égalité, fraternité'*.

[469] As we saw, the *KTTC*'s founding declaration published in the inaugural issue of the *KTTG*, in a similar way pointed out that it had taken up the duty of educating Kurds in a superior and authoritative tone:

> the purpose of founding the Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress is based on finding out the ways and means of progress and happiness of the noble Kurdish people in accordance with modern principles and education and to ensure the reconciliation and friendly relations with other [Ottoman] citizens, particularly Armenians, in a civilized way as two national groups…(Cem'iyet'in Beyannamesi [The Founding Declaration of the Association], *KTTG*, No. 1, December 5, 1908, In Bozarslan (1998: 40-41)).

Hundred [of] thousand [of] Alexanders[470] rose from among Kurds; they have fallen martyr for the land of Kurdistan; [but] not even one of them is remembered [today]. What a shame for those lions that you are their children. If you still exist today, it is thanks to the fame of those ancestors. Aren't you men? Yes you are men and noble; [but] unfortunately you do not get along with each other.[471]

First, the author refers to an unspecified pantheon of Kurdish heroes in the past through the strategy of positive self-presentation. Through the metaphor of Alexander the Great, he reminds the Kurdish commoners of the valour of their ancestors, who were martyred for the land of Kurdistan. As discussed earlier, all past sacrifices, particularly death sacrifices, were conceptualized and presented as sacrifices in their more secular and nationalist sense that were made for the homeland Kurdistan. Also notice the secular tone of the text embedded in Alexander the Great, in place of a Muslim figure -say Saladin the Great-. Then, adapting a paternalistic authoritarian discourse of family discipline, the author 'scolds' the reader claiming that they are not worthy of being the children of those 'lions' to whom they owe their very existence today. This is followed by the most striking words of his paternalistic disciplinary discourse as he questions the 'manhood' of the reader (in line 4). Then as a self-appointed representative of the Kurdish elite, the author positions himself as a father figure who knows the best for his 'ill-behaved naughty children', so to speak, who cannot get along with their other 'brothers.'

The *KTTG* leadership, like the journal *Kurdistan*, delegated the role of education, unification and protection of the Kurds to the local Kurdish dignitary such as the

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[470] The author refers to Alexander the Great through allegory to convey that Kurds have raised many capable men like him.

[471] 'Ji Kurda sed hezar Eskender rabûne, ji bo erdê Kurdistanê şehîd bûne; navê yekê li meydanê tune. Heyfa wan şêra ku hun ewladê wan in. Eger heta nuha jî hun dom dikin, dîsa bi saya navê wan bav û kalan e. Ma hun bi xwe mêr nînin? Belê, mêr in, camêr in; çi faîde bi hev nakin' (Seyyah Ahmed Şewqî, *Geli Welatiya* [O Countrymen!], *KTTG*, No. 3, December 19, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 157-158)).

ulama and other influential leaders, who we could consider as *'other participants'* in the discourse of *KTTG*. Halil Hayali in the 8th issue of the *KTTG* wrote:

> O distinguished ulema, o powerful sheikhs, o influential Kurdish leaders of the Kurds [Kurmanc]! You should know well that the future of our nation [qewm], the salvation of our homeland depends on your unity and hard work. Abandon the past habits, unite the Kurds, and teach them the right from wrong because you are the learned and they are ignorant. Guide them! This guidance is for the common interest of the homeland [weten], for the improvement of the people, not for your personal ambitions. Remember the doomsday! In this mortal world achieve an immortal fame through kindness! Keep in mind the provision that says: 'be kind the way God has been kind to you!' *(KTTG, January 23, 1908, No. 8, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 391-395).* [472]

Clearly, the author creates a bond of solidarity between the two strata by enacting a common identity in which the local dignitaries belong to the same national community [qawm] as the Kurdish commoners. But equally interesting is that the text also relates the *KTTC/KTTG* to the local dignitaries in which dignitaries are designated as *auxiliaries* to the *KTTC/KTTG*, the embodiment of the *'real'* leaders of a much wider Kurdish community. This is achieved by (1) the fact that the text is a call upon the dignitaries by a member of the elite who represents the *KTTC/KTTG*; (2) the authoritative tone of the text that is manifested in the assertions pertaining to the past, present and future of the Kurds but more importantly by the imperative mood of several sentences and clause, e.g. *know that!, abandon!, unite!, tell!, guide!, keep in mind!, remember!*;

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[472] 'Ey ulemayê navdar, ey meşayixê xwedan'îqtîdar, ey ruesayê sahibnufûz ê Kurmancan! Hun qenc bizanin ku heyata qewmê me, selameta wetenê me di îttîfaq û xîreta we da ye. Adetê berê terk bikin, Kurmanca bi hev bixin, ji wan ra ji qencîyê û xirabîyê bêjin. Çunkî hun zana ne, ew nezan in. Delalet bikin. Ew delaleta we ji bo nef'a wetenî, jibo tereqqîya miletî ye, jibo nefsa we nî ye. Roja heşrê bîra xwe bînin. Dinyayê fanî da navê xwe bi qencî baqî bikin, hukmê "Ehsîn kema ehsenellahu îleyke" ji aqilê xwe dermexin' (Halil Hayali, *'Weten û Îttîfaqa Kurmanca'* [The Homeland and the Unity of the Kurds], *KTTG,* January 23, 1908, No. 8, in Bozarslan (1998: 391-395).

(3) the text positions the *KTTC/KTTG* as an authority even above the *ulama* (religious scholars), as it *'reminds'* them their religious duties and dares to give them *'advice.'*

It is noteworthy that although, Hayali's article was published in its original Kurdish format, each paragraph is followed by its Turkish translation. However, the fascinating thing about this practice is in the discrepancies between the two texts. The most interesting discrepancy is in his addressees line: while the original Kurdish form reads: 'O distinguished ulema, O powerful sheikhs, O influential Kurdish leaders of the Kurds,' the Turkish translation reads 'O distinguished *Ottoman* ulama, O powerful sheikhs, O influential Kurdish leaders'. Notice how the word *Ottoman* is *added* to the Turkish translation. It seems that the author himself or the paper found it necessary to add the word *Ottoman* to the Turkish translation in order to lessen the Kurdish ethno-nationalist tone of the author and give space to the general Ottomanist stance of the paper. In this way, the paper constructs a relationship between itself and the non-Kurdish Ottoman ulama, between the Kurdish and Ottoman ulama as well as between the Ottoman ulama and the Kurdish messes in which both Ottoman and Kurdish parochial leaders are responsible for the wellbeing of the Kurdish commoners.

Morevoer, it seems that these calls upon the Kurdish dignitaries were effective as they played a great role in mitigating the tension between the rival tribes evident from the telegrams sent to the *KTTC*, which brings us to the role of such telegrams in the consolidation of the *KTTG*'s leadership. Below is one such telegram sent from the Siirt Sanjak [district] signed by several tribal leaders:

> … We abandoned the enmity and hostilities of the past tyrannical period, then, we kissed each other in the presence of the mutasarrıf [the governor] and took an oath on the Qur'an. We kindly wish to inform you that we all the tribes will sacrifice our lives for the sake of our just constitutional government, the constitution and our sacred homeland. We appeal to your authority.

[Signatories:] Abdullah, one of the leaders of the Pinçinar Tribes; Hasan, the leader of the Alikan Tribe; Bişarê Çeto, a leader of the aforementioned tribes; Mehmed Bişar, one of the leaders of the Pinçinar Tribes; Mehmed Yunus, one of the leaders of the Batun [Tribe]; Derviş, one of the leaders of the Pinçinar Tribe. (*KTTG*, January 9, 1909, No. 6: 5, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 302)).[473]

The *KTTG* proudly published such telegrams because they 'illustrated' or 'proved' how effective *KTTG* was on Kurdish local leadership.

Moreover, in some of their telegrams the tribal leaders participated in the Hamidian Cavalries expressed their frustration with the unjust practices of the corrupt local state officials. The extract below taken from a telegram sent to the *KTTG* by Halil, the leader of the Karakeçi tribe, epitomizes such telegrams:

In 320 (in 1904 according to the Gregorian calendar), 5000 houses in 120 villages belonging to our tribe were completely destroyed and our tribe members were left homeless on their own land… Nonetheless, in this era of restoration and progress, we were officially commissioned by the government to chase and capture Milli Ibrahim -who had revolted against the Sublime Porte- and [in the process] we sacrificed many young souls. Although we were expecting to be rewarded, on the contrary, without any warrant of arrest from a military or civil court and in violation of the constitution and military regulations that is reminiscent of the despotic period, I have been put in a civilian prison along with my brother by the governor

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[473]'… Devri-i zulm-i sabikadaki adavetten, husumetten sarf-i nazarla, der'akab huzur-i Mutasarrifta kardaşça opusup Kelâm-i Kadîm üzerine ahd-ü misak ettik. Hükümet-i adile-i meşrutanin, Kânûn-i Esasinin, mukaddes vatanimizin uğrunda umum aşayirle feda-i can edeceğimizi minnetdarane arzeyleriz. Ferman.

Pinçinar Rüesasından Abdullah; Alikan Aşireti Reisi Hasan; Aşayir-i Mezkûre Rüesasından Bişarê Çeto; Pininar Aşayiri Rüesasından Mehmed Bişar; Batun Rüesasından Mehmed Yunus; Pinçinar Rüesasndan Derviş.' (Telgrafat-i Hususiye [Special Telegram], *KTTG*, January 9, 1909, No. 6, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 302)).

[mutasarrif] of Siverek, who is a servant of Izzet, the traitor. Thus the tribe has been agitated…[474]

In this telegram, Halil, the leader of the Karakeçi tribe from Siverek, calls upon the *KTTC/KTTG* to draw state's attention to the plight of his tribe anticipating the Society to *arbitrate* between his 'agitated' tribe and the state.

Another telegraph, this time from a local branch of the *KTTC,* read:

> From Muş, January 25, 1909
>
> Upon effective suggestions which grew out of the unifying ideals [of *KTTC*] about giving our Kurdish brothers, who have somehow been deprived of friendly relations, the benefits of the constitution, all of the tribes under the jurisdiction of the [provincial] governorate have come, clan by clan, to the [*KTTC*] branch and have become members of the Society by shaking hands with one another.
>
> Muş Branch of Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress. [475]

Evidently, through these correspondences, the *KTTG* did not only create a field of communication in which Kurds had a chance to gather around a single political body but it also designated itself and its parent organization *KTTC* as the sole legitimate voice and the representatives of the Kurds. This and similar

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[474] 'Üç yüz yiğirmide (Milâdî 1904) aşiretimizin yüz yiğirmi karyesi, beş bin hanesi kamilen mahvedilmiş, efrad-ı aşiretimiz toprakları üstünde kalmıştı… Bununla beraber, şu devr-i teceddüd ve terakkide Hükümet-i Seniyyeye karşı isyan eden Milî İbrahim'in ta'kîb-ü derdestine Hükümetin emr-i resmîsiyle memur edilmiş ve bu uğurda hayli civan-ü can telef edip bunun muntazar mükâfatı bulunmuş iken, bilakis ne bir divan-ı harbden ve ne de bir mahkemei nizamiyeden tarafıma tevkîfi mutazammın bir emir tebliğ olunmaksızın, bu kerre hain İzzet'in bendegânından bulunan Siverek Mutasarrıfı tarafından Kanun-ı Esasî ve nizamât-ı askeriyeye muğayir, istibdadî bir muamele olmak üzre biraderimle beraber mülkiye habshanesinde habsedilmişiz. Aşiret ise bundan heyecana gelmiştir' *KTTG*, No, 2, December 12, 1908, in Bozarslan (1998: 104-105)).

[475] 'Her nasılsa mahrûm-ı ünsiyet kalan Kürd kandaşlarımızın da Kanun-ı Esasînin füyûzâtından hisseyâb olmaları yolundaki efkâr-ı ittihadcûyanelerinden iktibasen vuku' bulan vasayâ-yı müessire üzerine, merkeze marbût bütün aşayir bugün kabile kabile şu'beye vürûd ve birbiriyle musafaha ederek Cem'iyete duhûl eyledikleri maatteşekkür ma'rûzdur.
Kürd Teavün ve Terakki Cem'iyeti'nin Muş Şu'besi' (*KTTG*, No. 9, January 30, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 460)).

practices, [476] in turn, did not only reinforce the image of the *KTTG*/*KTTC* members as the legitimate leaders of the Kurds in the eyes of both the Kurds and the CUP government but it also provided them with political leverage in the capital Istanbul as the representative of a supposedly unified ethnic group.

5.2.6.1. The Murder of Sheikh Said Barzanji

One of these telegrams was particularly significant as it reveals the KTTC/KTTG's stance vis-à-vis the relations between the Kurdish messes and the state. The telegram broke the news of Sheikh Said Barzanji's uprising against the new regime and his murder by the Ottoman Turkish forces:

> From Simil, 31 December 324 (13 January 1909):
>
> To Istanbul Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress:
>
> 16 cavalrymen were killed during a heated argument between the (local) people, joined by the local soldiers, and the soldiers of a cavalry [state troops] coming from Kirkuk. The next day it was decided to collaborate in a war against the Kurds [cihad-i Ekrad] and they attacked the residence of the Sheikh. The Sheikh who was holding the glorious Qur'an in his hands to disperse them, begged the soldiers to no avail; the holy Qur'an was torn into pieces under the feet and [the Sheikh] was killed in front of the government…
>
> Kurdish Society for Mutual Aid and Progress, Mosul Branch [477]

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[476] For instance, as we saw in its founding declaration, the *KTTC* implied that it might transform itself into a political party, which would work for the interests of the Kurds within the Ottoman framework. This once again reveals the strategies and practices through which the Society's members strove to establish themselves as the leaders of the Kurds.

[477] 'An Simbil, 31 Kânunıevvel 324 (Milâdî 13 Ocak 1909):
Dersaadet Kürd Teavün ve Terakkî Cem'iyetine
Kerkük'ten gelen estersüvar müfreze efradıyla ahalî arasında vuku' bulan münazaa-ı lisaniyede yerli asker ahalî ile bil'iştirak, estersüvardan on altı nefer telef, irtesi günü bil'ittifak cihad-ı Ekrada karar verilip külliyetli izdiham Şeyh'in ikametgâhına hücum ettiler. Dağılmaları için Şeyh'in elinde Kur'an-ı azîmüşşan bulunduğu halde yalvarması te'sîr etmeyerek, Kur'an-ı şerif ayaklar altında parça parça edildi ve Hükümet karşısında katlolundu

Musul Kürd Teavün ve Terakkî Cem'iyeti Şu'besi' (*KTTG*, No. 7, January 16, 1909, in Bozarslan

It is important to notice that the telegram states that the local (probably Kurdish) soldiers sided with the local Kurds against the government forces. More importantly it presents the quarrel as an *anti-Kurdish holy war* [cihad-i Ekrad]*,* which indicates that the local *KTTG* branch adopted a more radical discourse compared to that of the *KTTG*'s headquarter in Istanbul as we will see shortly.[478] What is more it is curious that the state troops called the clashes as a cihad (holy war) perhaps given the fact that the Ottoman soldiers perceived themselves as the representatives of the Sultan Caliph.

Nevertheless, perhaps to mitigate its tone, the passage uses a deliberately ambiguous passive voice to avoid mentioning the agent (the Ottoman state) responsible for this 'anti-Kurdish war'. Moreover, the use of religious allusion is also significant as evident from the 'disrespectful' attitude of *'the agent(s)'* towards a *holy personality* like the Sheikh, who was killed, and the *Qur'an* that was *'torn into pieces under the feet'*. Similarly, this disrespectful action towards the Sheikh and the holy Qur'an is attributed to unspecified agents through the use of passive voice. Nonetheless, the sensational event itself is meant to generate a sense of alarm and build up a negative view of the government.

What makes this uprising more interesting in the discourse of the *KTTG* is the attitude of the journal reflected in the hard-news piece regarding this incident:

> Terrible Incident in Mosul
>
> Upon the bitter news about the martyrdom of Sheikh Said Efendi, the grandson of Ahmed Efendi from the house of Barzanji Sayyids, may he rests in peace, we immediately appealed to His Excellency Paşa, the interior minister, to investigate the matter and seek justice; it is clear that aware of

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(1998: 339).

[478] Klein (2007: 142) asserts that the *KTTG* centres in Kurdistan 'should not be seen simply as branches of the Istanbul club' as they came from different social and political background and pursued different agendas (Klein 2007: 142), See also Klein (1996, 2002, 2007, 2011) for a detail discussion about the *KTTC* branches in Kurdistan and the nature of their relations with the society's headquarter in Istanbul.

the gravity of the situation, His Excellency minister attaches great importance to this tragedy as he has given orders to the authorities and promised to find out the perpetrators along with the possible instigators and severely punish them.

Accordingly, thanks to the justice system it is obvious that the perpetrators of this sad incidence will be captured and the rights of individuals will be restored by the just government; our association has advised the concerned parties [the Kurds] not to arouse excitement, to stay away from any form of provocation and also to strictly prevent any situation and behaviour that might disturb the public order and instead wait for the solution and the justice of the government…[479]

This telegraph is a good case in point that demonstrates how media operates in power struggle.[480] As Hodge and Kress (2002: 295) assert, 'both text and message signify the specific social relations at the moment of their production or reproduction.' Hence, analysis of the contexts within which a text occurred helps

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[479] 'Sâdât-ı Berzenciye'den merhum ve mağfurunleh Kak Ahmed Efendi hafîdi Şeyh Said Efendi'nin heber-i elîm-i şehadeti üzerine, cem'iyetimiz tarafından istiknah-ı hakikat ve istid'a-yı ma'delet zımnında derhal Dahiliye Nâzırı Paşa hazretlerine müracaat olundukta, Nâzır-ı müşarü'nileyh hazretlerinin vak'aya derece-i vahametiyle bihakkın mütenasib bir ehemmiyet atıf buyurdukları ve îcab edenlere vâkıfane gayet kat'î, şiddetli emirler i'ta eyledikleri anlaşılmış ve faillerin ve müşevvikleri var ise anların bieyyi hal zahire ihracıyla ceza-yı şedide çarptırılmaları esbabını istikmal edeceklerini kaviyyen va'd buyurmuşlardır.

Şu hale nazaran, saye-i adalette bu vak'a-ı elîme faillerinin az zamanda ele geçirilecekleri derkâr ve efradın ihkak-ı hakkı kaziyyesi esasen Hükümetin yed-i adaletine mevdu' bir keyfiyet olduğu aşikâr olmakla, Hükümetin siyaset ve adaletine intizaren beyhude tehyîcât ve tahrikattan tevakki eylemeleri ve huzur-ü âsâyiş-i mahallîyi ihlâl edebilecek edna bir hal-ü harekete kat'iyyen meydan bırakmamaları lüzumu cem'iyetimiz tarafından îcab edenlere tavsiye ve ihtar olunmuş… *'Musul Hâdise-i Fecîasi'* [Terrible Indicent in Mosul] *KTTG*, No. 7, January 16, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 339)).

[480] The position of media outlet regarding the existing power relations might vary in that it might either reconcile the conflicting voices, if there are any, it might promote the dominant voices by reproducing and legitimizing the existing power relations or it might side with the disadvantaged. For instance, when reproducing the existing power relations, a media discourse might explicitly side with the voice of the dominant. When 'reconciling' the conflicting voices it might still side with the dominant, nonetheless in a more subtle way by representing the current power relations and identities as *natural* social realities which ultimately contributes to the legitimacy and maintenance of the existing state of affairs. Alternatively a media outlet might challenge the power relations unequivocally by siding with the less advantaged creating a counter or heretic discourse vis-à-vis the dominant hegemonic discourse (cf. Wodak, *et al.* 1999: 8).

us to understand the social, economic, and political conditions as well as purposes, values or motivations that might have been behind a particular way of producing a text and in this way constructing a particular 'reality' (Fairclough 1995b: 57; Sheyholislami 2011: 45-46; Wodak 2002b: 65).

The truth of matter was that this 'incident' was a Kurdish uprising organized by the Hamavand tribe under Sheikh Said Barzanji's leadership against the Young Turk regime that was keeping a tight grip on Kurdish notables who had enjoyed an extensive autonomy in the pre-revolution period (Jwaideh 2006: 108). Yet the paper presents this politically motivated uprising without its social, political and historical contexts constructing it as a mere legal, criminal or personal matter between the Sheikh and the responsible agents. The paper significantly labels the uprising as a mere 'incident' [hadise]. What is more, the paper appeals to the interior minister asking him to bring the perpetrators to justice on the basis of the protection of 'individual' rights. Such word choices as *investigation, government's justice, punishment, responsible agents, individuals, sad incident* and *public order*, further consolidate the reconstruction of the event as a legal or criminal matter. The noun 'martyrdom' that describes the Sheikh's death remains too weak to add any substantial meaning to the construction of the event in favour of the rebellion except it might have helped to mitigate the paper's pro-government attitude in the eyes of the Kurds. Furthermore, through the *strategy of calming down* (cf. Wodak *at al*. 1999: 40), the text warns the Kurds *not to arouse excitement* among the locals and to strictly *stay away from any provocation* but instead to wait for government's justice.[481] It might seem that the *KTTG* was trying to play the role of a mediator between the concerned parties, i.e., the local Kurds and the Ottoman state, however, in reality it is leaning more toward the

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[481] This same point has been repeated in a Kurdish article by Ercişli Seyyah Ehmed Şewqî where he states 'the government is investigating the real reason behind the Sheikhs death. And [the investigation] will bring justice. It is necessary that the Kurds do not take any action' [Hukumet ji bo sebeba wefata Şex Seid Efendi izhara heqiqete dike. We heqiye icra ji bike. Kurd lazim e xwe tev nedit.] (Ercisli Seyyah Ehmed Şewqî, *'Geli Kurda!'* [O Kurds!], No: 7, January 16, 1909, in Bozarslan (1998: 347)).

government side.[482] It is not an unusual practice for a media discourse to create the allusion of siding with the disadvantaged by giving space to the dissident voices in a very mediated and controlled way but making sure that this would not pose any serious challenge to the dominant power structure (cf. Fairclough 1995b).

Moreover, an anonymous article went to the extent to blame the Sheikh implying that the Sheikh, his family and his associates 'provoked' this massacre.[483] In this way the article lent a degree of legitimacy to the action of the state. One might wonder whether the attitude of the journal would have been any different had an influential member of the Barzanjis partaken in the *KTTG/KTTC*.

Given its attitude toward an anti-government Kurdish uprising, it is fair to presume that the policies of the Kurdish intelligentsia in Istanbul went to the extent to prevent the development of a more radical and perhaps secessionist Kurdish nationalism. To put it differently, given media's pacification function, the *KTTG* might have inadvertently pacified the emergence of a more radical Kurdish nationalism by insisting on seeking the future of the Kurds within an Ottoman

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[482] It seems that not the Kurdish nationalist in Istanbul but the autonomous Kurdish nobility in Kurdistan was the real threat to the new Young Turk regime (Klein 2007: 145) because the news of the new regime was not well-received by the Kurds as well as by other provinces in Asia and the Arabian peninsula who previously benefited from the Hamidian patronage system in which they had a great amount of power over their respective territories (Kedourie 1974: 140; Zeine 1966: 82; Zürcher 2010: 68). The killings of Sheikh Said Barzanji and Ibrahim Paşa Milli by the regime were the first outcomes of the Kurdish resentment towards the regime within the first year of the Young Turk regime (Bajalan 2009: 87; Klein 2002: 210-212).

[483] 'We cannot think of anything that could go against the rightful defense of the person in question [the Sheikh] by his Excellency Sayyid Abdulkadir Efendi, the president of our association. However as a result of the weak and abusive administration in the region, the associates and the relatives of the Sheikh have lately been spoiled; we find the bothersome behaviors and actions of the Sheikh's brother and son worth complaining, and in this regard we acknowledge the truth of this matter [Cem'iyetimizin Reisi Seyyid Abdülkadir Efendi hazretlerinin merhum müşarün'ileyhe müteailik müdafaat-ı hakperestanesini ta'lil edebilecek hiç bir kuvvet tasavvur edemeyiz. Ancak son zamanlarda oraca, Hükümetin hakikîzu'fundan,su-i idaresinden dolayı, şamaran taallukat ve akrabasının, hatta biraderinin, oğlunun ef'al ve harekâtını şâyân-ı muahaze görür ve bu hususta teslim-i hak ve hakikat ederiz] (Anonymous '*Şüûnat: Teessüf-i azim'* [Happenings: Great Sorrow] *KTTG*, No. 6, January 9, 1909, In Bozarslan (1998: 282-283).

framework in which Kurds would be given some sort of political autonomy under the leadership of Kurdish intellectuals in Istanbul. [484]

5.2.6.2. Addressivity and Convocation of A New Audience

In the previous chapter, I discussed in details the formation of a new public through the convocation of a novel audience as a new collectivity in the discourse of *Kurdistan*. *KTTG*, in a similar way, convoked a new audience as the recipient of its nationalist discourse. In this regard, one of the effective ways utilized by the *KTTG* was the use of a particular type of addressivity. Below are the forms of addressivity in the discourse of *KTTG* that aimed at constructing an ethno-national audience:

O Kurds! (10 times)

O the countrymen! (3 times)

O Brothers! (1 time)

O Dear Brothers (2 times)

O Comrades! (1 time)

My Brothers! (2 times)

O Kurdish masses! (1 time)

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[484] As Klein (2007: 144) mentions, the CUP commissioned some leading Kurdish figures, who were members of the *KTTG* headquarters in Istanbul, to strengthen the authority of the state in Kurdish provinces through campaigns of persuasion. To this end, Sheikh Abdulkadir was sent to Kurdistan as an emissary. Klein feels that the *KTTG* offices in Kurdish provinces were not mere branches of the Istanbul *KTTG* for they had their differences, e.g., their views of the new regime; while Istanbul *KTTG* was a keen supporter of the new Young Turk regime and the constitutional monarchy, *KTTG* branches in Kurdistan had mixed feelings towards the new regime. This was perhaps the case as nothing against the new regime managed to find its way on the pages of *KTTG*. On the contrary, the *KTTG* portrayed a rosy picture about the Kurdish attitudes toward the new regime as if all *KTTC* centres were in favour of the regime. Given that a significant number of Kurdish leaders in Kurdistan were not happy about the new regime then most probably the paper either censored articles/letters with such content or refused to publish them all together. This is another instance that demonstrates how the privileged access to the media provides the elite with the power to oppress dissident voices. The differences between the presentation of the Sheikh Said Barzanji's uprising by the *KTTG* branch in Mosul and the *KTTG* head branch in Istanbul demonstrate their different political stands.

To my fellow Kurdish citizens (1 time)

O distinguished ulema!, O powerful sheikhs!, O powerful Kurdish leaders!
(2 times) [485]

Notice that while the addressivity in *Kurdistan* was a mixture of calls upon the Kurdish masses and the Kurdish local notables, e.g. the ulema, sheikhs and aghas, *KTTG*, frequently called upon Kurdish commoners. Addressing the Kurdish commoners rather than the Kurdish dignitaries was perhaps an indicator of the beginning of a discursive shift from a feudal view towards a more liberal one in line with the spirit of the July 1908 revolution and the maturing Kurdish nationalist discourse. Therefore, these dominant forms of addressivity might have aimed at changing the feudal social order towards the promotion of more liberal ideas and freedom in the liberal atmosphere of the post-1908 revolution. Hence not notables but rather Kurdish masses were deemed more important and worthy of being addressed.

Moreover, *KTTG*'s forms of addressivity were often author-inclusive, claiming co-membership with the lay audience in the same national identity, e.g. 'O Brothers!, O Countrymen!, My Brothers!', etc. This inclusive and more humble tone of an ordinary person perhaps served to balance the paper's extremely authoritative, paternalistic and patronizing tone that we saw earlier. Nevertheless, with such author-exclusive forms as 'O Kurds!' the journal still managed to create a distance between itself and the lay audience, which again reaffirmed the position of the text producers as figures of authority equipped with knowledge and the privilege to address Kurdish commoners.

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[485] Ey Kürdler; O Kurmancino; Geli Kurmancan; O Kurdino!; Geli Kurda (Kurmanc and Kurd were used interchangeably); Gelî Welatiya; Gelî Biran; Gelî Birakên Ezîz; Gelî Hevalan; Gelî Bira; Ya ma'serel Ekrad; Kürd Vatandaşlarıma.

5.3. CONCLUSION

By the time *KTTG* came out, the Ottoman political scenery had changed significantly as a result of the July Revolution of 1908. The revolution had ushered in the Second Constitutional Period bringing an end to the despotic regime of Sultan Abdulhamid and his Islamist Ottomanism, replacing them with a constitutional regime dominated by the CUP and the ideology of secular Ottomanism. The new regime promised to embrace, all 'citizens' of the empire as equal partners, regardless of their ethnic or confessional background by granting them certain political and civil rights and liberties. In this new and relatively liberal environment the Kurdish elite, now composed of both aristocratic and non-aristocratic self-appointed Kurdish leaders, seized the opportunity to set up the first legal Kurdish association (*KTTC*) and an eponymous newspaper (*KTTG*) at the turn of the century in the capital city of Istanbul.

Given the hegemonic dominance of the discourse of secular Ottomanism in the Second Constitutional Period, *KTTG* authors felt compelled to situate the Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish national identity in a wider Ottoman identity. To this end they developed complex types of discursive strategies that would fit their seemingly Ottomanist attitude. In this way the *KTTG* distinguished itself from the journal *Kurdistan* by adopting an unprecedented Ottomanist policy. The discursive manifestation of this extreme form of Ottomanist attitude was observed in (1) the journal's predominant use of Turkish language, the *lingua franca* of the Empire, rather than Kurdish to prove Kurd's loyalty to Ottomanism and (2) the journal's desire to communicate its ideas with other Ottomans who did not speak Kurdish; (3) the construction of the Kurdish history as an extension of Ottoman history by tracing the origins of the Kurds to the Ottomans at the expense of anachronisms; (4) the construction of Kurdish culture as a part of the Ottoman culture; and the Kurdish homeland as an extension of the Ottoman homeland; (5) the abundance articles that dealt with issues which were not directly the concern of the Kurds but all Ottomans, and so forth.

However, as discussed earlier, this more royalists than the king policy of *KTTG* had more pragmatic basis than idealistic principles, in that first, Ottomanism was the dominant identity of the Second Constitutional Period and as such it was instrumental for *KTTG* to disguise or soften its Kurdish nationalist objectives by adopting a dense Ottomanist stand. At any rate, the CUP was wary of any nationalist tendencies, openly labeled them as treacherous acts and oppressed them through legal as well as illegal channels (cf. Hanioğlu 1966: 209). Then, it can be said that *KTTG* cleverly responded to the CUP's policy through the CUP's own secular Ottomanist rhetoric to curve out a niche for itself and the Kurdish nation in the Ottoman political scenery. Second, but more importantly, the *KTTG* emphasized the Ottomanist notion in its discourse of Kurdish identity to keep the rising Turkish nationalist tendencies in check and prevent it from turning into an oppressive state ideology, a point that will be discussed at length later on in the conclusion chapter. Thus it is safe to argue that although several meta-loyalties, i.e. ummahism, Ottomanism and Kurdish nationalism, were at work in the discourse of *KTTG*, the first two loyalties were highlighted to facilitate the formation of the third one: Kurdish nationalist discourse.

Nevertheless, despite this strong Ottomanism, *KTTG* produced a more refined Kurdish nationalist discourse with clearer political demands vis-à-vis the discourse of the journal *Kurdistan*. For instance, *KTTG* authors highlighted the need to empower local administrations by granting them greater autonomy. In an article Suleymaniyeli Fethi advocated state's decentralization in favour of stronger regional bodies or governance, notably in Kurdistan. Similarly the *KTTC* constitution conditioned, albeit subtly, its support for the *CUP* regime in that *KTTC/KTTG* would continue to uphold the regime as long as the principles of constitution, particularly the principle of equality between various Ottoman communities, were realized, a condition that aimed at the prevention of the Turkish dominance in the empire.

The *KTTG* authors justified and rationalized their Kurdish nationalist ambitions by arguing that Kurds were an indispensable component of Ottomanism and thus

empowering Kurds through education, modernization, industrialization and other means would transform Kurds into better Ottomans. In their construction of the Kurds as a national community, the editorial board of *KTTG*, like the editors of *Kurdistan*, focused on the cultivation of a common language, literature, culture, political past and a common homeland to prove, especially to the CUP regime, that the Kurds met all qualities of a *bona fide* nation and deserve to be treated as such. Through a dense Ottomanist and religious intertextuality, the authors of the *KTTG,* notably Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, consistently propagated the production of books on Kurdish literature and language as well as the use of Kurdish language in education and schooling arguing that Kurdish pupils educated in their mother tongue would serve the ideals of Ottomanism in a better capacity. Through this language policy the *KTTG* did not only aim at reviving the Kurdish language but it also tried to prevent the *Turkification* policies of the *CUP*.[486]

In addition, *KTTG* authors attempted to construct a sense of common political past through temporal and spatial references to the glorious ancient history of the Kurds, which significantly predated the Ottoman and Islamic histories and refuted the Armenian claims to the same territories. What is more, several authors, including Malatyalı Bedri and Saîd-î Kurdî, wrote on the ethno-cultural characterization of Kurds such as their allegedly superior moral merits that distinguished them as a nation from other Ottoman and Muslim communities. The relatively advantageous status of the women, in terms of their liberal outfits, their capacity to fight side by side with their husband and their ability to be a part of the workforce in the Kurdish society, was another theme the journal exploited to differentiate the allegedly more liberal Kurdish culture from the cultures of other 'conservative' Ottoman and Muslim communities.

As discussed earlier, every nationalist discourse occupy themselves with the construction of the national homeland by exploiting historical, cultural, symbolic, political or economic dimensions of what they perceive as their national territory.

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[486] See my analysis of Bâbânzâde's article in Chapter 5.

Similarly, the *KTTG* authors engaged in the construction of Kurdistan as the exclusive historical and ancestral homeland of the Kurds through many discursive practices and strategies, including presuppositions, discursive maps and references to the ancient time, which presented the Kurds as the primordial and the original inhabitants of the land. Moreover, the chapter showed that the semantic change in the meaning of the term *'welat'* (homeland) continued to evolve in the discourse of *KTTG* from signifying the 'native region/province' to the notion of the 'native' or 'national homeland' in a more nationalist sense.

Given the crucial importance of interpersonal metafunction in the discursive construction of national identities, the chapter also explored the *KTTG*'s construction of identities and relations between the Kurdish intellectual elite and the Kurdish commoners through the analysis of various sets of linguistic features including the word choices, modes of addressivity, modalities and moods. Although, the journal for the most part adopted a paternalistic discourse, similar to the journal *Kurdistan*, one can observe a shift from this authoritative paternalistic discourse towards a more populist rhetoric has taken place to approximate a relationship of equals between the upper and lower classes of the Kurdish community similar to the Andersonian notion of 'horizontal comradeship.' Moreover given the origins of the intellectuals involved in *KTTG* and *KTTC*, e.g., Saîd-î Kurdî, Halil Hayali, Ahmed Cemil, among others, we observe the beginning of a gradual transformation in the nature of the Kurdish leadership in Istanbul from a traditional, dynastic type to a well-educated, non-aristocratic elite. This shift paved the way for a more populist leadership and discourse in the ensuing years as evident in the class composition of the members of the *Hêvî Society* and its publication organ *Rojî Kurd*, which is the topic of the next chapter.

CHAPTER VI: THE JOURNAL *ROJÎ KURD*

6.1. SOCIOCULTURAL PRACTICES OF *ROJI KURD*

In order to conceptualize and investigate the discursive formation of the Kurdish national identity and nationalism in the discourse of the journal *Rojî Kurd*, this section starts by providing a brief account of the historical conditions in which that journal appeared. Then it explores the short biographies and the social backgrounds of the *Roji Kurd*'s editorial board and the members of *Kurdish Students-Hope Society,* the journals parent organization along with statistical information about the journal. The rest of the chapter analzyzes Rojî Kurd's discourse in terms of its treatment and construction of the Kurdish national identity.

As we saw, the Young Turks or the CUP came to power through a military coup that marked the July 1908 constitutional revolution. The new regime had aroused great enthusiasm among the Ottoman communities of various ethnic and confessional communities in the form of a great celebration of Ottomanist ideals. However, the euphoria of the revolution was short-lived as it soon became evident that due to the false promises of CUP's Ottomanism not only the non-Muslim Greeks, Macedonians and the Bulgarians but even Muslim Albanians drew apart from those ideals and begun to ponder how they might turn the new political landscape to their own advantage. These communities tried to take the first opportunity to complete their own national unity and independence at the expense of the Ottoman establishment. Others such as the Arabs, Kurds as well as the Armenians and the Greeks of Constantinople and Anatolia recognized that secession was impossible; nonetheless they also took measures to defend their own national individuality and gain political leverage.

After the non-Muslim separatist movements, the first Muslim reaction in the form of a revolt to the centralization policies of the CUP came from Albania in May 1910 demanding independence (Akçam 2004: 129; Zürcher 2010: 84-85, 127),

while the second major such revolt took place in Yemen (Zürcher 2004a: 105). Consequently, the CUP came to realize that the Turks were the only element in the Empire that was not opposed to centralization policies and had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State ideals. Therefore the CUP fell back upon its Turkish nationality, and came to think of Turkism and Turkification as the natural means of achieving its ends. In any case, the Young Turks were already in the grip of Turkish nationalism even before the July Revolution as their interpretation of Ottomanism was based on the Turkification of the non-Turkish elements, which did not go unnoticed and tremendously harmed the credibility of the ideal of Ottomanism in the eyes of the non-Turkish and non-Muslim communities (Akçam 2004: 83; Zürcher 2004a: 129; Zeine 1966: 85-86: Kendal 1980: 13).

A. Geary, the British Acting Consul in Manastir wrote on August 28, 1910 to Sir G. Lowther, the British Ambassador in Constantinople about Talat Pasha's speech delivered to the local CUP members in Salonica during a secret conclave. Accordingly, Talat Pasha, the CUP minister of interior affairs, said:

> You are aware that by the terms of the Constitution, the equality of Mussulman [Muslims] and Ghiaur [infidel] was affirmed but you, one and all, know and feel that this is an unrealizable ideal. The Sharia, our whole past history and the sentiments of hundreds of thousands of Mussulmans and even the sentiments of the Ghiaurs [infidels] themselves, who stubbornly resist every attempt to Ottomanize them, present an impenetrable barriers to the establishment of real equality. We have made unsuccessful attempts to convert the Ghiaur into loyal Osmanlı [Ottoman] and all such efforts must inevitably fail, as long as the small independent states in the Balkan Peninsula remain in a position to propagate ideas of separatism among the inhabitants of Macedonia. There can therefore be no question of equality, until we have succeeded in our task of Ottomanizing the Empire -a long and laborious task, in which I venture to predict that we shall, at length, succeed after we have at last put an end to the agitation and propaganda of the Balkan States.

The letter also mentions another speech, this time made by Cavid Bey,[487] which that followed the same train of thought, to the CUP members assembled in secret in Manastir, (Gooch and Temperley, vol. IX, Part I (No. 38) Confidential, enclosure in F.O. 371/1014, pp. 208-209 cited in Zeine 1966: 86-87).

On September 6, 1910, sir G. Lowther wrote to Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary:

> The Committee has given up any idea of Ottomanizing all the non-Turkish elements by sympathetic and constitutional ways has long been manifest.
> To them 'Ottoman' evidently means 'Turk' and their present policy of 'Ottomanization' is one of pounding the non-Turkish elements in a Turkish mortar (*ibid*.).

It seems that from 1909 onwards the CUP had reached the conclusion that they could do away with Ottomanism because the Macedonians, Bulgarians and Armenians sought national independence at the expense of the constitutional revolution and Ottoman ideals. Similarly the CUP was convinced that Pan-Islamism was not an option as the Albanians and Arabs were also leaning towards separatism in favour of their respective national identities (Zürcher 2010: 216-217; Zeine 1966; 90).

Moreover, the internal opposition that had been pacified after the 31st March incident in 1909 gradually resurfaced. Starting from 1909 a number of opposition parties were established, some by the former CUP members who favoured a more liberal and decentralized system, others by more conservative circles. Towards the end of November 1911 almost all opposition parties, including ethnically based parties and organization that had been shut down as a result of the 'Law of Associations, coalesced under *Hürriyet ve Itilaf Fırkası* (The Freedom and Accord Party a.k.a *Liberal Union*) against the authoritarian CUP regime. The second general elections in February 1912, also known as *sopalı seçim* (election of clubs) resulted in the landslide victory of the CUP thanks to the electoral fraud,

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[487] Cavit Bey was an Ottoman Sabbatean and a prominent member of the CUP.

intimidation and violence. Since the new CUP government lacked any legitimacy, the growing opposition culminated in an armed intervention by the *Halaskar Zabitan* (Savior Officers) action that demanded the resignation of the CUP government. The CUP agreed to a non-partisan government under Grand Vizier Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Paşa also know as Grand Cabinet, which marked the end of CUP supervisory government and the beginning of a more liberal environment (Kevorkian: 2011: 134; Akşin 2004: 71; Zürcher 2004a: 102-103).

Meanwhile taking advantage of this chaotic situation, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece formed an alliance brokered by Russia and Britain, which led to the first Balkan Wars (1912-1913). The alliance demanded the whole of Empire's Balkan dominion and all of the Aegean Islands. During the ensuing war The Ottoman Empire suffered many defeats. The battle of Manastir on 18 November 1912 was particularly important as it sealed the fate of the Ottoman Balkans in favour of the alliance. The Balkan Wars were a disaster as the Ottoman Empire lost nearly all its territories in Europe. Moreover, in September, Italy occupied Tripolitania the last Ottoman territory in North Africa as a result of the Italo-Ottoman War. In this dire situation the inner circle of the CUP led by Enver and Talat launched another coup known as *Babi Ali Baskını* (Raid on the Sublime Porte) on 23 January 1913, when a group of CUP officers stormed into the room where the cabinet was in session killing Nazım Paşa, the war minister and forcing Kamil Pasha to resign at gun point (Kevorkian 2011: 141; Akşin 2004: 74-80; Zürcher 2004a: 102-109).

Now unopposed and in full control of the state, the CUP had no regard for any political opposition as it started to govern with an iron fist. As the myth of Ottomanism had been shattered after the first Balkan Wars, the Committee made the Turkish nationalist ideal and the Turkish racial superiority the basis of the state. In other words, the CUP came to openly promote the idea of Turkism proposed 9 years earlier by Yusuf Akçura. In any case, starting in 1908, nationalist Turkish intellectuals and students had already organized around Pan-Turkist cultural association, such as *Turk Derneği* (Turkish Society) (1909), *Turk*

Yurdu Cemiyeti (Turkish Homeland Society) (1911) and *Turk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearts (1912), which were closely linked to the CUP (Kevorkian 2011: 131; Zürcher 2010: 120, 216; Üstel 1997: 15, 70-75; Akşin 2007: 84-87). It is noteworthy that Akçura himself was among the founding members of the first organization. These Pan-Turkist associations published journals such as *Türk Dili Dergisi* (Turkish Language Magazine) and *Turk Derneği Dergisi* (Turkish Association Magazine). The ideas of Mehmet Ziya (Gökalp), for whom 'society' meant 'nation' which in turn meant 'Pan-Turkism,' were also very influential on Young Turks. Although in line with the CUP rhetoric these associations and their publication continued to advocate the idea of Ottomanism, their real aim was the cultural and political reorganization and unification of the Turkish race turning non-Turkish elements into subject nations (cf. Kevorkian 2011: 195; Akşin 2007: 86; Üstel 1997: 15, 263-268; Zürcher 2010: 216).[488] Remarkably, the emblem of *Türk Ocakları* was a grey wolf head.[489]

Consequently, the CUP's dominant policy was the Turkification of the administration and the imposition of Turkish as the language of education in all provinces of the Empire. The practice of changing the names of geographical places to Turkish also started during this period (Silopî 2007: 15; Firro 2009: 64; Zeine 1966: 98). Naturally, this nationalist undertone of the CUP policies further stimulated nationalist feelings this time particularly among the Muslim components of the Empire in Anatolia and Arabia and contributed to an intensive

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[488] For instance Nuri Dersimi in his memoire states that the CUP's Turkism after the Balkan War stimulated Kurdish national feelings among those who previously had no particular interest in Kurdish nationalism. He claims that during the intervals they would see slogans on the blackboard written by Turkish nationalist that read 'How happy is the one who says 'I am Turkish.'' In response Kurdish students would write 'How happy is the one who says 'I am Kurdish'' (Dersimi 1992: 31).

[489] According to the Turkic grey wolf mythology Turks consider themselves as the descendants of a she-wolf called Asena, *see* Turk Ocaklari Tüzügü (Turkish Hearts Bylaw) available at: http://www.turkocagi.org.tr/kitaplar/Tuzuk.pdf

social polarization and radicalization of Ottoman communities along ethnic lines (Zeine 1966: 93). Although it is believed that Balkan nationalism and their separatist movement sparked Turkish nationalism (Zürcher 2004b: 1), which in turn triggered Kurdish and Arab nationalisms, it is difficult to discern in this chaotic situation whose nationalism triggered the nationalism of the other(s). Nevertheless it seems that the rising Balkan nationalism and particularly the first Balkan Wars greatly contributed to the radicalization of Turkish nationalism, which in turn nurtured Kurdish and Arab nationalisms (Üstel 1997; Özoğlu 2004; Zeine 1966). Under these sociocultural and political circumstances the Kurdish intellectuals and students founded the *Kurd Talebe-Hêvî Cemiyeti* or the *Kurdish Students-Hope Society,* which published the journal *Rojî Kurd.*

6.1.1. The Proprietors of *Rojî Kurd*: Ownership patterns and the Control of Media

Hêvî Society, the owner of the journal *Rojî Kurd*, was founded, as the first legal Kurdish student organization, on August 9, 1912 in Istanbul by a group of students at Agricultural College of Halkalı. The founding members of the organization included, Kadri Cemilpaşa (Zinar Silopî), Omer Cemilpaşa, Fuad Temo and Diyarbekirli Cerrahzade Zeki (Silopî 2007: 27). Other members included Kerküklü Necmeddin, Ekrem Cemilpaşa, Memduh Selim, Ihsan Nuri, Kemal Fevzi, Nuri Dersimi, Asaf Bedir Khan, Müküslü Hamza, Şefik Arvasi, Mehmet Mihri [Hilav], and Abdurrahim Rahmi.[490] Moreover, Halil Hayali, Şükrü Mehmet Sekban and Abdullah Cevdet, among others, provided the *Hêvî Society* with material as well as ideological and intellectual support (Malmîsanij 2002: 86-87). The secretary general of the society was Omer Cemilpaşa, who was later succeeded by Memduh Selim (Silopî 2007: 37). As the *Hêvî Society* attracted Kurdish students from other colleges, the number of its members reached 200

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[490] *See*, Silopî (2007: 27-30, 35, 164) for the complete list of members.

soon after its foundation (Cemilpaşa 1989: 20). Its headquarter was located in Erzurum Office Blocks in Sirkeci district.[491]

In 1913 Kadri Cemilpaşa, along with his cousin Ekrem Cemilpaşa established the European branch of the *Hêvî Society* in Lausanne/Switzerland where the Cemilpaşas as well as Bâbânzâde Recai Nuzhet and Dersimli Selim Sabit were studying (Özoğlu 2004: 106; Malmîsanij 1999: 133; 2002: 134). The *Hêvî Society* published three journals namely *Rojî Kurd* (Kurdish Day/Sun), *Hetawî Kurd* (Kurdish Sun) and *Yekbûn* (Unity) (Malmîsanij & Lewendî 1992). As stated in the outset, although the present author has studied all three journals, due to the limited space, the present study will analyse the corpus of *Rojî Kurd* only.

6.1.2. The social Background of the *Hêvî Society* Members and *Rojî Kurd* Writers

6.1.2.1. The Cemilpaşa Family

As their last name suggest, the family is descendant from Ahmed Cemil Paşa (1837-1902), a son of Hafiz Mustafa Efendi, a powerful and affluent religious authority from Diyarbakir. Ahmed Cemil Paşa inherited a large estate in Diyarbakir, where he also served as the Governor. Thus the family belonged to the urban landed notable class and produced some of the most active members of the Kurdish nationalist movement (cf. Malmîsanij 2004: 11-27: Özoğlu 2004: 103-104). Among the Cemilpaşas, Kadri Cemilpaşa (a.k.a. Zinar Silopî) was born in 1891 in Diyarbakir; he was a son of Fuat Bey and a grandson of Ahmed Cemil Paşa. He enrolled in Agricultural College of Halkali in Istanbul and two years later went to Lausanne for his studies. He was a founding member of both *Hêvî Society* branches in Istanbul and Lausanne. Like other *Hêvî Society* members he was exposed to western ideas of nationalism while in Istanbul and later in Lausanne. He was also an active member of *KTC* and *TIC*. He left Turkey in

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[491] Due to space limitation the headquarter was first moved to an office across from Meserret Hotel on Bab-i Ali Slope (*Rojî Kurd* No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK 2013, p. 166; Dersimi 1992: 32) then to another office above Resimli Kitap Printing House on Bab-i Ali Street (*Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK 2013, p. 198).

1929 for Syria where he joined the Kurdish nationalists organized around Khoybun (Xoybûn)[492] in opposition to the new Turkish regime. He died in Damascus in 1973. It is noteworthy that Kadri Cemilpaşa was not actually an Ottoman 'paşa' by profession but rather it was u part of his family name (Malmîsanij 2004: 345-354; Özoğlu 2004: 106-107).

Ekrem Cemilpaşa (1891-1974), another grandson of Ahmed Cemil Paşa, received a well education in Istanbul and Europe, like Kadri Cemilpaşa and other members of the family. He studied engineering in Lausanne where he joined Kadri Cemilpaşa to establish a branch of the *Hêvî Society*. He was a founder of *TIC* and a member of *Khoybun* (cf. Malmîsanij 2004: 237-245; Özoğlu 2004: 104-106; KXK 2013).

6.1.2.2. Abdullah Cevdet (1869-1932)

Cevdet was born in Arapgir in 1869 where he received his primary education from his uncle an imam (prayer leader) and his father who was an assistant clerk at the Ottoman army first battalion. After attending Mameratülaziz provincial military school he went to Istanbul and enrolled in Military Medical School where he participated in a growing liberal and reformist Ottoman movement. In 1889 along with his three other non-Turkish colleagues he formed a secret political society, which after a succession of name changes would become the CUP. Like other CUP members oppressed by the Hamidian regime he fled to Europe where he joined the political and cultural activities of the Young Turks and published the Ottoman journals *Osmanlı* and *Ictihad*. Two important collections of his essays are *Science and Philosophy* (1906) and *An Examination of the World of Islam from a Historical and Philosophical Viewpoint* (1922). He also translated Shakespeare's plays. Cevdet returned to Istanbul after the July Revolution and resumed his journalistic activities this time in opposition to the CUP, which had deviated from its original liberal aims. Cevdet became a member of *Kurdish*

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[492] For Khoybun, *see* Jwaideh (2006: 145).

Society for the Diffusion of Education and contributed to the publication of *Rojî Kurd, Hetawî Kurd* and *Jîn.* He broke away with the Kurdish movement after the establishment of the Turkish Republic (cf. Hanioğlu 1989, 1966; KXK: 2013; Malmîsanij 1986).

6.1.2.3.   Beni Erdelanî Ehmed Muhsin (Mehmed Mîhrî Hîlav) (1889-1957)

He was originally from Sinê (Sanandaj) in Iranian Kurdistan. After studying at Kurdish medreses he went to Istanbul where he participated in the *Hêvî Society* activities. Like many other *Hêvî Society* members he joined *KTC* and became the editor-in-chief of the journal *Kurdistan*, one of KTC's publication organs. Later on he also published a book on Kurdish grammar (KXK 2012: 70).

6.1.2.4.   Mehmed Salih Bedir Khan (1874-1915)

He was born in Latakia in 1874. He started the middle school in Istanbul but finished it in Damascus. After dropping out of Damascus Military High School he published the journal *Ümid* (Hope) in Cairo in 1900 against the Hamidian regime. He was exiled and imprisoned several times by the Hamidian regime due to his political activities. He returned to Istanbul after the July revolution and wrote for the second *Kurdistan* published by Süreyya Bedir Khan. He was one of the most productive writers of *Rojî Kurd* where he sometimes used the pen name M. S. Azîzî. Because of his articles published in *Rojî Kurd* he was tried at a martial court and imprisoned by the CUP. He died in Kayseri in 1915 (KXK 2013: 75).

6.1.2.5.   Süleymaniyeli Abdulkerim (1880-1929)

Abdulkerim was the publisher of *Rojî Kurd*, where he wrote seven articles in the Sorani variety of Kurdish. He received his preliminary education from a medrese in Suleimania. After graduating from Suleimania Military High School he went to Istanbul in 1908 where he studied law. He worked at the Dept Collection Agency in Suleimania in 1914. He served as a judge in Kirkuk and Suleimania between 1922-27 (KXK 2013: 71). In some of his articles he used either 'Silêmanî 'Ebdulkerîm' or 'Kurdî' as pen names.

6.1.2.6. Fuad Temo

He was the son of Tevfik Bey, the deputy for Van. He was a founding member of the *Hêvî Society*. He is the author of the first modern Kurdish short story entitled *'Çîrok'* published in the first and second issues of *Rojî Kurd*.

6.1.2.7. Halil Hayali (1865-1946)

Hayali also used M.X., Xelîl Xeyalî, Modanî X as pen names. See chapter 5 for his short biography.

6.1.2.8. Ismail Hakkı Bâbânzâde (1876-1913)

See chapter 5 for his short biography.

6.1.2.9. Lütfi Fikri (?-1934)

Fikri was born in Istanbul. Upon his graduation from the School of Political Science in 1890 he left for Paris to study law. Soon after his return to Istanbul in 1894 he was sent into exile due to his connection with the opposition movement against Sultan Abdulhamid. He returned to Istanbul after the July Revolution and became the deputy for Dersim in the Ottoman parliament. Although he wrote extensively for many Kurdish journals of the era he was never actively involved in the Kurdish nationalist movements. He became the head of Istanbul Bar Association after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Fikri died in 1934 in Paris where he was receiving medical treatment.

Due to space limitation as well as scarcity of information this study is unable to provide biographies of all members/writers of the *Hêvî Society* and *Rojî Kurd*. However it suffices to state that the structural character of the *Hêvî Society* and *Rojî Kurd* was dominated by the new generation of the Kurdish youth of the non-aristocratic background, which made possible a wider discursive participation in the construction of Kurdish nationalism in *Rojî Kurd*. Malmîsanij (2002: 73-74) identifies 31 members of the *Hêvî Society* along with their social backgrounds:

Bedir Khan Family	1
Bâbânzâde Family	2
Cemilpaşazade Family	6
Sheikly or other religious background	4
Bureaucrats	1
Civil servants	1
Working class	1
Petty Urban notables	4

Table 5 *The social background of the 'Hêvî Society' members*

It is clear that most members of the Society came from an elite but not a dynastic or an aristocratic background. A number of its members received education in Europe, spoke European languages and were exposed to the European movements of thought (Malmîsanij 2002: Özoğlu 2004; KXK 2013). Although they were born into the Ottoman state system and educated in Ottoman schools as the children of the Kurdish urban elite, the majority of *Hêvî Society* members and *Rojî Kurd* writers were not incorporated into the Ottoman state bureaucracy or became a part of the power structure as much as the members of *KTTC/KTTG*. This coupled with CUP's policies of Turkish racial superiority led to the waning of the emotional attachment to the idea of Ottomanism among this new Kurdish generation and to the rise of Kurdish ethnic nationalism. Thus in an increasingly Turkist political environment they were concerned more about the future of the Kurds rather than that of the Ottoman Empire. This transformation become evident in the analysis of the journal as this study demonstrates the discursive discontinuities in regards to the idea of Ottomanism among the Rojî Kurd writers and its replacement with Kurdish nationalism. However as we will see, due to the constraints, particularly the state pressure, intimidation and violence through legal and illegal channels directed to the writers of *Rojî Kurd,*

the writers could not openly speak their minds and instead they adopted a very subtle discursive strategy in their construction of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish national identity.

Rojî Kurd as the first monthly publication of the *Hêvî Society* could publish only 4 issues before it was shut down. Each issue was composed of 32 pages. The issue numbers and the publication dates are as follows:

Issue Number	Publication Date	Printing House	Place
1st	June 19, 1913	Hukûk Priting House	Istanbul
2nd	July 19, 1913	Hukûk Priting House	Istanbul
3rd	August 14, 1913	Hukûk Priting House	Istanbul
4th	September 12, 1913	Hukûk Priting House	Istanbul

Table 6 *Publication dates and places of the journal 'Rojî Kurd.'*

The *Rojî Kurd*'s management shared the same office with *Hêvî Society*.[493] Although it received some financial support from Kurds in Istanbul, *Rojî Kurd* was published with very limited budget and it mostly relied heavily on subscription fees. For instance, at the end of an article that appears in the 4th issue the management reminds the readers of the subscription fees.[494] The same reminder

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[493] In the first issue of the paper it is indicated that the paper's management office was the same as Hukuk Publishing House on Ebu Suud Street (*Rojî Kurd*, No.1, June 9, 1913, in KXK, 2013, p. 130). However starting from the second issue the paper shared the same office with Hêvî Society's headquarter first on Bab-i Ali Slope across from Meserret Hotel (*Rojî Kurd* 2, July 1913, in KXK 2013, p. 166) then on Bab-i Ali Street (*Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK 2013, p. 198; Silopî 2007: 27-28).

[494] *'Yükselmek İçün Himmet Lâzımdır'* [Progress Requires Hard work], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1919, in KXK (2013: 214-215).

can also be seen in the announcements section in the same issue.[495] As mentioned above the CUP did not hesitate to intimidate opponents, including journalists through assassinations, arrests and shutting down newspapers (Hanioğlu 1966: 292).[496] The *Hêvî Society* and *Rojî Kurd* were not immune to these practices as some of their members/writers were intimidated through not only legally channelled actions but also harassment by the police (Silopî 2007: 43).[497] It was probably due to this intimidation that the paper had to change its name to *Hetawî Kurd* (Kurdish Sun) after the 4th issue. *Hêvî Society* ceased its activities with the outbreak of the WWI[498] as most of its members were conscripted into the Ottoman army and fought on various fronts during the war (Malmîsanij 2002: 161; van Bruinessen 1992a: 276).

It is important to note that the most prominent writers of *Rojî Kurd* included Halil Hayali, Kerküklü Necmeddin, Abdullah Cevdet, Silêmanî Ebdilkerim (Süleymaniyeli Abdulkerim), Ismail Hakkı Bâbânzâde, Beni Erdelanî Ehmed Muhsîn (Mehmet Miri Hilav), Mehmet Salih Bedir Khan, Bulgaristanlı Dogan, Lütfi Fikri and Harputlu H.B.[499]

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[495] *'Ihtar-i Mahsus'* [Special Notice] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1919, in KXK 2013, p. 232).

[496] *See* Akşin (2007: 69) for a list of journalists and other opponents assassinated by the CUP.

[497] Memduh Selim, the secretary general of the *Hêvî Society*, also mentions the intimidation and harassment of many *Hêvî Society* members by the police (see, Memduh Selim, *'Iki Eser-i Mebrur: Kürd Kadinlari Teali Cemiyeti, Kürd Talebe Hêvî Cemiyeti'* [Two Auspicious Works: The Society for the Advancement of Kurdish Women and Kurdish Students-Hope Society], *Jîn*, No. 20, June 4, 1919, In Bozarslan 1985, pp. 853-857).

[498] The society resumed its activities in 1919 at the end of the WWI however it was shut down by the state in 1922 (Malmîsanij 2002: 185).

[499] *See*, KXK (2013: 69-79) and Malmîsanij (2002: 141-142) for the full list of *Rojî Kurd* writers.

6.2. DISCOURSE PRACTICES AND TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE JOURNAL *ROJÎ KURD*

6.2.1. The Discursive Construction of Common Political Present and Future

As the study showed, the discourse of *Kurdistan* fluctuated between Ottomanism and Kurdish separatist nationalism, while that of the KTTG revolved around an ostensibly strong notion of Ottomanism. In both journals, the Kurdish intelligentsia explored Kurdish salvation within an Ottoman political framework.

The discursive construction of common political present and future kept evolving in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd* parallel to the shifting political landscape at home and abroad. One such development concerned the gradual demise of the Ottoman state and the rising nationalist movements that led to the failure of the Ottomanist ideals among Kurdish intelligentsia. Accordingly, one of the major discursive shifts that occurred in *Rojî Kurd* pertained to the replacement of the notion of Ottomanism with Islamism and a much stronger emphasis on Kurds as a distinct and unique ethno-national community. These developments eventually led to debates over political decentralization of the state in favour of the Kurds. In what follows I will chart these discursive shifts through the texts of *Rojî Kurd*, reflecting significant alterations in the construction of current political crises and dangers as well as the construction of a common future for Kurds.

Similar to the previous two journals the major themes in *Rojî Kurd* concerned the crucial need for the education of the Kurds; an alphabet reform; modernization, industrialization, commercial and agricultural progress of Kurdistan; political reforms and decentralization; disunity among Kurdish leaders, and so on. Nevertheless, *Rojî Kurd* differentiated itself not only by bringing in new themes but also adapting a new approach to the previous ones.

To begin with, some of the goals of the *Hêvî Society*, the owner of *Rojî Kurd*, were stipulated in its founding declaration:

In any case, our righteous religion commands that Muslims learn sciences and arts and work hard for progress and happiness… If we want to obey the will of the glorious God we should understand well that hard work is the only way to acquire sciences, arts and progress.

[…]

Today every Kurd, be it young or old, wealthy or poor, should realize their dept to their religion and nation and carry out their duty. Working individually is not rewarding. The best and the most beneficial way to do this is through a collective work. All other newly awakening nations first started with establishing associations and as a result they advanced their nations and attained their desire… We the Kurdish youths, who have gathered at medreses and schools in Istanbul to acquire sciences and skills, have legally established the Kurdish Students-Hope Society to fulfill our duty to our nation and religion. The purpose of our society is as follows:

1. To introduce Kurdish students to one another
2. To generate a collective work for Kurds
3. To cultivate Kurdish language and literature
4. To open medreses and schools and build mosques
5. To educate poor Kurdish children in medreses

[…] In short to work toward the prosperity and happiness of the Kurds.

[…] The ultimate purpose of our society is to aid the Kurds, who are an important pillar of Muslimness [Müslümanlık], and in this way to serve the religion and the state.

Today, the Kurdish ulama and nobles have no greater duty than their national and religious duty. The destiny of a great component of Islam is in your hands.

> … And then, once we comprehend the saying that 'the sheep is not for the shepherd, but the shepherd is for the sheep's service'[500], we will have, for the most part, paved the way for the prosperity of Muslimness [Müslümanlık] and Kurdishness [Kürdlük].[501]

As evident in the Society's founding declaration, education and progress remained as two major themes in *Rojî Kurd,* which were clustered tightly around a dense religious allusion even in articles by Abdullah Cevdet, an ardent positivist and secularist Kurdish intellectual who due to his materialist views was was 'accused' of being atheist (Hanioğlu 1966: 21).[502] The extract above

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[500] This is a quote from Islamic scholar Sheikh Sadi Shirazî (1193-1292). See, http://www.tasavvufdunyasi.net/tasavvuf-buyukleri/seyh-sdi-srz-kimdir/

[501] 'Zaten dîn-i mübînimiz, Müslümânlara ilim ve san'at öğrenmeyi terakki ve sâadet için çalismağı emrediyor. Biz Allahü teâlânın irâde-i sübhâniyyesine itâat etmek istiyorsak ilim için, san'at için, terakki için çalışmaktan başka yol olmadığını iyice anlamalıyız.

Bugün büyük, küçük, zengin ve fakîr her Kürd dîn ve millet olan borcunu anlayarak îfâsina koşmalıdır. Ayrı Ayrı çalışmak hiçbir fâide vefmez. En iyi ve en fâideli yol birleşerek çalışmaktır. Yeni uyanmaga baslayan umûm milletler en evvel 'cemiyetler' yaparak ise basladilar, netîcede de milletlerini terakki etdirerek murâdlarina erdiler… Istanbul'da medrese ve mekteblerde tahsil-i ilim ve ma'rifet için toplanan biz Kürd gencleri milletimize ve dînimize olan vazîfelerimizi îfâ etmek için Kürd Talebe-Hêvî Cemiyeti nâmiyla ve ruhsat-i resmiyye ile bir cemiyet teşkil etdik… Cemiyetimizin maksadi bervech-i âtîdir:

1. Kürd talebesini biribirine tanitarak Kürdler için müştereken ve müttehiden çalıştırmak.
2. Kürd lisân ve edebiyâtını meydâna çikarmak.
3. Kürdistan'da medreseler ve mektebler açmak, câmiler yapmak.
4. Fakîr Kürd çocularını mekteblerde okutmak, onlara ma'rifet, san'at ögretmek; fakîr olanlara yardım etmek.
5. Hulâsa Kürdlerin refâh ve sâadetine çalışmak.

[…] Cemiyetimizin hulâsa-i makasidi, Müslümanlığın bir rükn-i rasîni olan Kürdlere ve dolayisiyle dîn ve devlete hizmet etmektir.

[…] Kürd ulemâ' ve ümerâsinin bugünkü vazîfeleri kadar ağır dînî ve millî hiçbîr vazive yoktur. Koca bir unsur-i Islâmin mukadderâtı sizin elinizde.

[…] Daha sonra 'Gûsfend ez berayê çûban nîst/Belkê çûban berayê xidmetê û'st' kelâminin mazmûnunu da kendimize rehber edersek Müslümânlık ve Kürdlüğün esbâb-i sâadetini ekseriyyetle hâzirlamış oluruz.'(*The Founding Declaration of Kurdish Students-Hope Society* [Kürt Telebe-Hêvî Cemiyeti'nin Beyannamesidir], *Hetawî Kurd*, No: 4-5, May 10, 1914, p. 1-4, reproduced in Malmîsanij (2002: 257-261)). The text has been translated from Ottoman Turkish into plain and simple modern Turkish by Malmîsanij)

[502] It is important to note that in the discourse of *KTTG* the authors had promoted education primarily within the context of Ottomanism, the use of religious allusion was a secondary discursive strategy.

particularly stresses education in sciences and arts first and foremost as God's command and hence as a national and religious duty. In this way, religion is utilized for nationalist purposes. Moreover, the text prioritizes collective work suggesting that education is not the remedy for individual salvation, but rather it is for the collective progress and happiness of the Kurds as an ostensibly unified nation. Furthermore, the word 'duty' (vazîfe) in this nationalist context strongly denotes common rights and duties of the members of the imagined Kurdish national community.

It is important to note that, in stark contrast with the heavily Ottomanist stance of *KTTC/KTTG*, the *Hêvî Society* and *Rojî Kurd* for the most part dropped the Ottomanist rhetoric. Thus nowhere in the declaration of the *Hêvî Society* is there mention of Ottomanism. On the contrary, the text, from an Islamic modernists perspective, designates the Kurds as an important pillar of Islam (line 22), as opposed to that of Ottomanism. Similarly, the last two paragraphs promote hard work for the prosperity of Kurds and Muslims but significantly neither paragraph mentions Ottomanism, although only the word 'state' insignificantly appears in passing.[503] Also notice that in line 12 where the duty of the Kurdish society is specified, the word 'nation', i.e. *Kurdish nation*, precedes the word religion, giving priority to the Kurdish national identity vis-à-vis religion.[504] *Rojî Kurd* paid only lip services to the notion of Ottomanism when it was mentioned on a few occasions as Ottomanism was replaced with a more refined Kurdish ethno-national identity accompanied by a broader notion of Islamism. Then it is fair to argue that with the publication of *Rojî Kurd* Ottomanism ceased to exist as a visible part of the Kurdish identity in the Kurdish journalistic discourse.

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[503] Nevertheless, the phrase 'legally established' in line 11 indicates that the journal sought a solution within the Ottoman political framework albeit in a very loose system.

[504] A similar discursive practice can be observed in one of Halil Hayali's articles where he says: 'O brothers! My request from you is that you do not ignore the service to Kurdishness and Muslimness' [Gelî biran ji we hêvîya mi ew e ku xizmeta kurdîtî û misilmanî natîne pist guy[ê] xu] (Halil Hayali, *'Ziman'* [Language] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 186-187). Notice here how the word Kurdisness precedes Muslimness.

This brings us to the journal's promotion of the Kurdish service to Islam and not to the Ottoman state as in the first issue of *Rojî Kurd* Kerküklü Necmeddin wrote:

> In short, in the columns of *Rojî Kurd* we are going to write Kurds' loyalty and service [to Islam], which are proven by historical evidence, during the reign of the four Caliphs, [such as] Othman and Ali, [during the reign of] the Umayyad, Abbasids and Ottomans. [505]

Notice that there is not any specific reference to the Kurdo-Ottoman relations. Rather the author emphasizes the Kurdish service to the Islamic empires throughout the history that inevitably includes the era in which the Ottomans possessed the title of the Caliph.[506] Therefore, the Ottoman era is presented as a mere stage of the long Kurdo-Islamic history.

One figure that had persistently championed the idea of Ottomanism in the corpus of the *KTTG* was Ismail Hakkı Bâbânzâde. In Bâbânzâde's arrangements of the layers of Kurdish identity, Islam and Ottomanism were the first two primary and indispensable components that preceded the ethnic identity of the Kurds. [507] Furthermore, as we saw Bâbânzâde and other *KTTG* authors promoted education and modernization of the Kurds for the sake of one specific outcome: to produce better Ottomans and in this way serve the Ottoman state in a better capacity.[508]

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[505] 'Hülâsa hulefâ-i râşidînden 'Osman ile 'Alî, Emevî ve 'Abbasî ve 'Osmanlı hükûmâtının devre-i hükûmetlerinde vukû' bulan ve hakâyık-ı târîhiyye ile derece-i sübûta varan sadâkat ve hıdmetlerini Rojî Kurd nüsahının sütûnlarına derc ideceğiz' (Kerküklü Necmeddin, *'Kurd Talebe Cemiyyeti ve Kürdlerin Makam-i Hîlafete Hidmetleri'* [Kurdish Hope Society and the Kurdish Service to the Office of Caliphate], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 100-102).
[506] The Ottomans gained the title of caliph from the Mamluks when Sultan Selim I conquered Egypt in 1517.

[507] Bâbânzâde had written the following in *KTTG*: 'This pure and virtuous community [Kurds]… is first of all Muslim. Then, a Kurd, without any dishonesty or hidden intent and within the framework of the constitutional monarchy… is a true Ottoman. And thirdly a Kurd is a Kurd […]' (Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, *Kürdler ve Kurdistan* [Kurds and Kurdistan] *KTTG*, December 5, 1908, No. 1, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 44-46)

[508] '… If this Kurd goes to a Kurdish school and obtains books on sciences in his own language he will, without any doubt, learn thoroughly and much faster and will become a more valuable

In an article significantly entitled *Muslimness and Kurdishness*, the same Bâbânzâde wrote the following lines:

> As evident from the history as well as the present situation, one of the most robust and the most important members of the vast Islamic family is the Kurdish nation [kavim]. The place of such a deeply rooted and noble nation, who has brought up many renowned rulers, amirs, scholars and poets for Islam during the 1300 years-long Islamic civilization is not less important than other Muslim nations…

> For the defence of Islam, which is the sacred property and inheritance of the entire Islamic communiy, there is a need for a new weapon. This weapon is to equip everywhere, even the villages, with schools in order to give a bright life to the nations, that is, to elevate the scientific level of the nations…

> The only way and the only rule of salvation and safety for the Islamic nations: First Muslimness, then Arab[ness], Turkish[ness], Kurdish[ness] and Persian[ness]…

> In that case, Kurds, like other Islamic nations, should set their agenda as follows: First Islam, then Kurdish[ness]. [509]

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member of the Ottoman family' (Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, *Kürdler ve Kurdistan* [Kurds and Kurdistan] *KTTG*, No. 1., December 5, 1908, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 44-46)

[509] 'Â'ile-i vâsi'a-i İslâmiyyenin en mühim rükünlerinden birini Kürd kavmi teşkil itmekde olduğu gerek mâzînin ve gerek hâlin şahâdetiyle sâbitdir. İslâmiyyete pek nâmdâr hükümdârân, ümerâ, 'ulemâ ve şu'arâ yetişdiren bir kavm-i asîlin bin üç yüz senelik bir devr-i medeniyyetindeki mevki'i kendisiyle dâ'imî temas ve münâsebetde bulunan diğer akvâm-ı İslâmiyyeden dûn değildir.

Bütün cemâ'at-ı İslâmiyyenin mülk-i mukaddes ve mevrûsu olan İslâmiyyenin muhafaza ve i'lâsı için şimdi yeni silâhlar lâzımdır. Bu silâh ise akvâma nûr ve hayât bahş itmek ya'nî akvâmın seviyye-i 'irfânlarını yükseltmek, akvâm-ı İslâmiyyenin köylerine varıncaya kadar her tarafa mekteb sokmaktır…

Akvâm-ı İslâmiyye için yegâne düstûr yegâne rehber-i necat ve felah şudur: evvelâ Müslüman, sonra 'Arab, Türk, Kürd veya 'Acem…

Şu hâlde Kürdler için -sâ'ire-i akvâm-ı İslâmiyyede olduğu vechile- program şudur: Evvelâ İslâm sonra Kürd...' (Bâbânzâde Ismail Hakkı, *'Müslümanlik ve Kürdlük'* [Muslimness and Kurdishness], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 137-139).

While Bâbânzâde, an Islamic modernist, in his articles in the corpus of *KTTG* constructed the Kurds as the most important pillar of Ottomanism and as a nation in the service of Ottomanist ideal, here [in the first paragraph] the author bypasses this Ottomanist rhetoric altogether and instead presents Kurds as 'the most robust and important member 'of the Islamic family for the past 1300 years of great services' with no mention of Ottomanism whatsoever.[510] This temporal reference here is also significant in that the author not only promotes the Kurdo-Islamic ties but he also historicizes the Kurds as an ancient Islamic 'nation' whose history goes far beyond the Kurdo-Ottoman history. This discursive *strategy of dissimilation* (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 38) and dis-identification with the Ottomans is similar to the discursive practice in Kerküklü Necmeddin's article above.[511]

Then in the second paragraph the author promotes education and progress in sciences as the only way for Islamic nations' development, which will ultimately serve to the defence of Islam. That is, nations (here the author's primary, if not the only, concern is the Kurdish nation) could better serve Islam –not Ottomanism- if they improved themselves first. In this context, it is clear that Kurdish identity was no longer subordinated to the Ottoman identity.

Still, as far as the identity issue is concerned, the author's punch line lies in the last paragraph where he rearranges the layers of Kurdish identity he had previously proposed in *KTTG*. While Ottomanism, along with Islam used to constitute two primary components of the Kurdish identity, now, it is only

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[510] Historicization of the Kurdo-Islamic ties and the Kurdish service to Islam is one of the dominant themes in the entire corpus of *Rojî Kurd*. For instance see, Kerküklü Necmeddin, *'Kurd Talebe Cemiyyeti ve Kürdlerin Makam-i Hîlafete Hidmetleri'* [Kurdish Hope Society and the Kurdish Service to the Office of Caliphate], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 100-102); Salih Bedir Khan, 'Kılıçtan Evvel Kalem' [Pen before the Sword], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 174-176); H… *'Dertlerimiz/Nîfakimiz'* [Our Troubles/Our Disunity] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 180-181); M.X. *'Bextreşî û Mehrûmiya Kurdan'* [The Misfortune and Destitution of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 194-196)).

[511] Later on we will see a more radical dissimilation practice through other cultural traits such as clothing, traditions and language.

Kurdishness and Islam, infrequently accompanied by a very weak notion of Ottomanism. Equally important is that the author does not impose Islam as component of Kurdish identity, the way he did in his *KTTG* articles, but rather he presents Islam as a religious ideology that should be protected by all Muslims which leaves Kurdishness as the most salient component of the Kurdish national identity.

Similarly, in the 3rd issue of *Rojî Kurd* Bâbânzâde wrote:

> If Kurds, like some other nations [akvam], manage to start a campaign for education and establish a committee whose only endeavour would be the primary education without getting involved in politics or politicians, then they would be doing a great service *not only* to Kurdishness *but also* to Muslimness and Ottomanness [Osmanlılık]. [512]

Here again, through a correlative conjunction '*not only… but also*' [yalnız … da][513] the author foregrounds the service to Kurdishness backgrounding not only Ottomanism but even Islam.[514]

A comparison between Bâbânzâde's views in *Rojî Kurd* and those he had expressed in the *KTTG* demonstrates the extent of the discursive shift from Ottomanism to Kurdish ethnic nationalism both in the person of Bâbânzâde as well as in the overall discourse of *Rojî Kurd*.[515]

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[512] Kürdler diğer ba'z[ı] akvamın yaptığı gibi… bir ittifâk-ı ma'ârif-cûyâne vücûda getirirler. Siyâsiyyât ve siyâsiyyânatemas iden sâ'ir meşâgil ile 'alâkadar olmamak üzere münhasıran ma'ârif ve ma'ârif-i ibtidâ'iyye ile iştigâl idecek bir hey'et te'sisine muvaffak olurlarsa yalnız Kürdlüğe değil Müslümanlık ve 'Osmanlılığa da en mühim bir hıdmetde bulunmuş olacaklardır' (İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde *'Kürdelerin Te'âlîsi* [The Rise of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 282-284)).

[513] In Turkish it is what follows the phrase 'but also' that has the greater emphasis.

[514] His suggesting about not getting involved in politics will be discussed below along with my analysis of an article by M. Salih Bedir Khan.

[515] The same observation is true of Halil Hayali, another seemingly ardent supporter of Ottomanism in *KTTG* discourse. In all 7 articles he wrote for *Rojî Kurd*, he dropped the notion of Ottomanism all together and replaced it with a clearly defined Kurdish national identity and the notion of Islam. In addition, Hayali, similar to a number of other writers of *KTTG*, had concerned

Furthermore, despite their use of a dense religious intertextuality, *Rojî Kurd* writers did not shy away from questioning the *'one-sided'* Kurdish services to the Islamic ummah. M. Salih Bedir Khan in an article said:

> Since the advent of Islam until today, Kurdish mîrs have always been active in wars and shone on the front lines; they have always been unselfish for the sake of religion and the state and sacrificed their lives. But unfortunately and with great regret they have never benefited from all that effort. **Those that are not from us** [ji xeyrî me] have always benefited from **our** sacrifices.
>
> […] Therefore, **we** have always been and remain **slaves** [xulam] in the service of **those people that are not from us** [wan mirovînî ne ji me].
>
> **We Kurds** [me Kurda] have always been this way…
>
> If **we Kurds** do not comply with that command of God…[516] we will never make progress. We will always remain behind. We will be slaves to **others** [kes û nakes]…[517]

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himself with the problems pertaining to the Ottoman state. This was one of the discursive devices that they used to communicate their Ottomanism to the Young Turks. In *Rojî Kurd*, however, Hayali and other Kurdish intellectuals are concerned with only two issues; the present and future of the Kurds and Islam. For instance, *see* two articles by Halil Hayali: M.X. *'Tefsîrê Şerîf'* [Interpretation of the Holy Text], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 183-186) and Halil Hayali, *'Ziman'* [Language] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 186-187).

[516] The author refers to education.

[517] 'Ji roja islamiyet zuhûr bê heta îro, her mîrê kurda li nav şera lerizînê, pêşde çûne û tu cara xwe nedane pêş û her li rêya dînê û dewletê xwe de fedakarı kirine û rûhê xwe dane. Lê heyf û hezar heyf e jî tu cara wan ji wê himmeta tu xêr û menfe'et nediye û nexwariye. Her semeren rûhdana me ye ji xeyrî me re maye!

Bi loma her em bîne û mane xulam. Ji xidmeta wan mirovînî ne ji me.

Me kurda jî her we kiriye,

Heke em kurd jî bi wê qanûna Xudê ya heyatê qenc nekirînê, em tu car pêş de naçinê. Em ê her paş ve bin. Hetta mirinê xulamîyê ji kes û nakes re bikin'
 (M. Salih Bedir Khan *'Berî Şîrê Qelem'* [Pen before the Sword] *Rojî Kurd*, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 189-194)).

The author questions the entire Kurdo-Islamic history and the Kurds' *'unreciprocated'* service to Islamic ummah. Then deconstructing the Islamic ummah into its ethno-national components, the author claims that *those that are not from us,* i.e. all non-Kurdish Muslims, perhaps particularly the Arabs and the Turks, have been the beneficiaries of the sacrifices *'we Kurds'* have made. His argument coupled with his use of powerful discursive devices such as deictic pronounces, e.g., (*us/we [Kurds], them [all Muslims]*, etc., reinforces the presentation of the Kurdish identity at a unique and exclusive ontological level beyond religious ties, i.e., ummahism, with other Muslims.[518]

The author's use of the term *'slave'* might be too strong a word to use in this context given that it only refers to ostensibly unrecognized Kurdish contribution to the Islamic civilization.[519] Nevertheless, perceiving this situation as such indicates the extent of the author's national feelings and the degree of his disappointment and regret about the 'exploitation' of Kurds as 'slaves' by non-Kurdish Muslims.[520] Despite these criticisms the Kurdish intellectuals did not

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[518] *See* also M.X. *'Bextreşî û Mehrûmiya Kurdan'* [The Misfortune and Destitution of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 194-196), where the author laments the unrecognized and unappreciated Kurdish service to Islam saying that 'the situation is that all these services [of the Kurds]… have been lost [on Muslims]… Their names [Kurdish leaders in Islamic history] have been ignored. The ones that are recognized are claimed by Arabs and Persian'.

[519] The author laments that Kurdish men of literature have written their works in languages other than Kurdish, i.e. Arabic, Persian, and Turkish. He also laments the lack of a historical consciousness claiming that Kurds do not take the ownership of Kurdish historical personage such as Saladin the Great. For similar discussions on the unrecognized Kurdish contribution to the Islam and the Islamic community also see, (Benî Erdelanî Ehmed Muhsin,*'Le Tarîkî bo Ronakî'* [From Darkness to Enlightenment], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK, 2013, pp. 220-221; (M.X. *'Bextreşî û Mehrûmiya Kurdan'* [The Misfortune and Destitution of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK, 2013, p. 194-196); (H… *'Dertlerimiz/Nîfakimiz'* [Our Troubles/Our Disunity] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 180-181). The common denominator of all these articles is that they regret that despite their great service, Kurds have remained as the auxiliaries of other Muslim ethnicities, such as Turks, Arabs, and Persians. For instance, H. in his article cited above says: 'In reality, Kurdishness [Kürtlük] is a great and monumental power. This power has always produced great and magnificent works [of art] in accordance with its glory; however, others have used this power for their own benefits [Kürdlük, hadd-ı zâtında, 'azîm ve mühîb bir kuvvetdir... Bu kuvvet başkaları kullanmak ve başkaları hakkında kullanılmak şartıyla, hemân dâ'imâ, 'azamet ve mehabetine lâyık me'âsir-i 'âliyye ibraz itmişdir.] It is clear that the 'other' is none other than the Islamic empires including the Ottomans.

[520] Dis-identification with Ottomanism went to the extent to side with the Christian Armenians. In and article published in the journal *Hetawî Kurd* Mevlanazade Rifat claimed that Armenians and

present the notion of the Islamic ummah as an impediment for the development of Kurdish national identity and national goals. On the contrary, they argued, as I discus shortly, for the compatibility of Islam with the notion of nationalism as a force that could empower the Islamic world and its constituencies. Moreover, they created what could be called a 'micro ummah' within the Kurdish community in which all Kurds are bond to each other through the feeling of a religious fraternity. In this way, the concept of ummah was utilized to enforce national sentiments among Kurds through religious nationalism (cf. van der Veer 1994).

Another important point about M. Salih Bedir Khan's article is that it was published in both Turkish and Kurdish in the same issue of the journal with noteworthy discrepancies between the two versions. While the Kurdish version was much more radical in term of its nationalist tone the Turkish version remained comparatively more moderate perhaps to avoid possible state retribution.[521]

It is noteworthy that state retaliation was not a baseless concern but a reality of the period. As we saw, the CUP was extremely intolerant of any form of opposition even from their fellow Turks, let alone the Kurds. To be sure, below is

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Kurds belonged to the same race and thus they should collaborate (Mevlanazade Rifat, *'Muhterem Hetawi Kurd Gazetesi Muessislerine'* [To the Honorable Founders of Hetawi Kurd Journal], Hetawi Kurd No. 2, 3 December 1913 pp. 2-3.) In a similar way, Abdullah Cevdet also praises the Armenians for their modernism.

[521] For instance, the last paragraph of the extract above is significantly different form its Turkish version, which reads:

> 'Unfortunately, in spite of this, [Kurds] have never been able to escape the misfortune of being forgotten and abandoned' [fakat ma' a't-te'essüf bütün buna rağmen hîç bir vakit mensî ve mehcûr kalmak bahtsızlığından tahlîs-i nefs idememişdir] (Salih Bedir Khan, *'Kılıçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK, 2013, p. 174-176)

Clearly the Kurdish version is much more radical and nationalist in terms of both the content and its realization in the text. Moreover, a patriotic poem by Khani is missing in the Turkish version. It seems that both the use of less radical language as well as the exclusion of Khani's patriotic poem in the Turkish version stems from the fear of a Young Turk retaliation. Similarly, a part of the text where the author claims Kurdistan for Kurds against the 'unjust' Armenian claims and refutes the Kurdish antagonism toward the Armenians does not appear in the Turkish version perhaps to avoid Armenian reaction.

an extract from an article by M.S. Bedir Khan: [522]

> Today there is no nation [qewm] without at least fifteen or sixteen newspapers [cerîde]. Through these newspapers they make their situation known, present their troubles and make requests if they have any… A nation without a newspaper is like a mute person; he/she can neither express his troubles nor can he/she be aware of his/her situation. Here, the youths of the Kurds [Kurmanc] have gathered and established a Kurdish association [Hêvî]... And now they have begun publishing a newspaper. **This newspaper talks [only] about science and skills. It cannot talk about anything else because a clause in the state's law stipulates that 'those who wish to publish a political newspaper should deposit 500 gold.' It is we Kurds who lack the ability to provide that money. Therefore, for now, they [Hêvî] have contented themselves with this newspaper [*Rojî Kurd*].**[523]

First the author describes the crucial role of newspapers for a nation; for him a newspaper is not a mere 'cultural artefact' but a pragmatic tool that deals with nations' social and political problems and their solutions. Then, he explains the state law that requires depositing 500 gold in state treasure for a journal to be able to discuss political issues. However since this was beyond its financial reach, *Rojî Kurd* refrained from overtly discussing political issues pertaining to the Kurds. It is obvious that by political issues it is meant Kurdish political demands.[524] Then, it is hardly surprising to see *Rojî Kurd*, for the most part, stay

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[522] M. Salih Bedir Khan used a few different pen names in *Rojî Kurd*. The signature under this particular article is M. S. Azîzî. Azîzî is the name of the Bedir Khan's tribe.

[523] 'Iro tu qewm nemaye ke her yek ne xuyî pazde bi[s]t cerîda be. Bi van cerîda halê xwe beyan dikin, derdê xwe teşrih dikin, metlabek wan hebe, duxazin… Heç[î] qewmî bê ceride ye ew mirovek lal e, ne dikare derde xwe bêje û ne jî seh dike hal û mewqi'[ê] xwe çi ye. Eve li hêre xortên kurmanca xwe dan hev û cem'iyetek kurda çêkirin… niho jî bi dest ceride kirine, ev cerîda ha ji 'ilm û me'rifetê behs dike. Ji tiştek di nikare behs bike. Çûnke qanûna dewletê de maddek heye, dibêje heçî ku cerideye siyasî derxe, dibê pêncsed zêra emanet dayne. Heçî ku kurd in: 'aciz in ji tedarika van pera. Ji vê yekê re niho bi vê cerideye' [*Rojî Kurd*] iktifa kirine... **(**M. S. Azîzî *'Hişyar Bin'* [Be Wakeful], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 154-155)).

[524] As we saw earlier, Bâbânzâde too suggested that Kurds do not get involved in politics.

relatively away from overt political discussions. [525] Still M.S Bedir Khan, the author of the extract above, was tried at a martial court and imprisoned due to the content of his articles in *Rojî Kurd*.[526] This further proves my previous point about the inability of Kurds getting overtly engaged in politics via Kurdish journals due to the bans and other measures. In fact, the CUP did not hesitate to intimidate opponents, including journalists, through legal channels as well as assassinations, arrests and forcing journals to shut down (Hanioğlu 1966: 292). The *Hêvî Society* members were not immune to these practices as some of its members were intimidated through not only legally channelled actions but also harassment by the police (Silopî 2007: 43).

The inability of the Kurds to discuss Kurdish politics openly has led to the view, among some academics and commentators, that *Rojî Kurd* too, like its predecessors, could not go beyond being the publication of a 'cultural club' since it did not make any overt or radical political demands. This common view in the relevant literature is particularly dominant in the analysis of Özoğlu (2004) and Bajalan (2009). One study describes the Kurdish intellectuals of the period as 'Ottoman nationalists with Kurdish colours' and labels them as 'Young Kurds' as an allusion to the name *'Young Turks'* (Turkish: Jön Türkler or from French: Les Jeunes Turcs) (Bajalan 2009: 6). However as I have been arguing, a meticulous close textual analysis of the Kurdish journals that situations the Kurdish journalistic activities in its sociocultural and political circumstances suggest otherwise.

Despite this ban and the threats, Kurdish intelligentsia did dare to problematize the social and political situation of the Kurds and thus challenged the status quo, albeit in a very subtle way. M. S. Bedirkhan in the same article wrote:

> Our Kurdish brothers need to be awakened. If, from now on, we do not

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[525] Bâbânzâde's concern about Kurdish youth's involvement in politics, as we saw earlier, perhaps stemmed from the same reason.

[526] Tercüman-i Hakikat, No. 11687, 9 October 1913, p. 3, in KXK (2013: 67).

open our eyes and do not wake up from this heavy sleep they will leave nothing of our Kurdisheness [Kurdanî] and they will annihilate us… Friends are weeping and the enemy is cheerful. I said 'friends' but do not think we [truly] have friends other than ourselves… From now on we all… our learned as well as our ignorant, [we] should open our eyes and hold one another's hands and work hard for the salvation [silamet] of Kurds and liberate the homeland [welat]… Today there are six million Kurds; there is no one [nation] as courageous as Kurds… But it is a great pity that Kurdishness [Kurdanî] is not known among the [community of] nations. [527]

First, using the notion of 'national reawakening' (lines 1-2), one of the central doctrines of nationalism, the author calls upon his Kurdish *brethren* to wake up from the state of dormancy (cf. Gellner 1994).[528] Then utilizing a *unificatory warning* against the loss of Kurdish national identity (cf. Wodak at al. 1999: 38) he alerts the Kurds about the extinction of the Kurdish identity. Notice how the third person plural pronoun has afforded the author to go without specifying the source of the *threat* in lines 2 & 3 where he claims that an unspecified agent would annihilate the Kurds. Still, Kurdish has afforded the author with event a better linguistic device which has given the author the opportunity to avoid the use of the subject all together through the pro-drop feature of Kurdish, which is a 'pronoun-dropping' phenomenon where a sentence requires no expressed subject because the subject is pragmatically inferable in that the conjugated verb forms have an implied subject. Although the author found it necessary to utilize the strategy of avoidance (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 36) to avoid expressing the

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[527] Biray[ê] me kurda re hişyarbûn divê, heke ji paş niho jî em çavê[n] xwe venekin û ji vê xewa giran hişyar nebin ji me re kurdaniya me nahêlin û ên me ji nav halê bavêjin… Dost çav bi girî ye û dişmin rûbiken. Li vir min got dost, nebêjin qey me ji me xwe pê ve dost heye… 'Edî divê em hemî... zanay[ê] me û nezanay[ê] me hemî cave xwe vekin û dest bidin hev û ji silameta kurdanî [re] pire bixebitin, welatî ji tehlikeye xelas bikin. Îro ji şeş milyona betir kurd hene, weke kurda merxas tune, xwey nav û deng in… Lê sed heyfa min li kurdanî be li na[v] qewma de navê wan nayê gotin (M. S. Azîzî *'Hişyar Bin'* [Be Wakeful], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 154-155)).

[528] This is absolutely one of the central doctrines of nationalism that was taken up by several *Rojî Kurd* writer including H., Süleymaniyeli Ebdulkerim, and Halil Hayali.

agent(s) of the action explicitly, it is left to the reader to interpret the major source of this threat, which probably was none other than the Young Turk regime. To further appreciate the significance of this extract it is important to note that while in the journal *Kurdistan* the *national threat* was constructed predominantly around the loss of Kurdistan and the enslavement of its children by the non-Muslim invaders, here -and elsewhere in *Rojî Kurd*- this threat is specifically constructed around the loss of Kurdish national identity [Kurdanî] (lines 1-3).

The powerful rhetoric of *'we have no friends'* (lines 4-5), suggests that Kurds are on their own and should no longer have expectation from other Muslims including or perhaps particularly the Ottoman Turks holding state power.[529] This also marks the end of 'we are all in the same both rhetoric' of Kurdish Ottomanism especially dominant in *KTTG* discourse. Perhaps that is why we do not see in *Rojî Kurd* much criticism of the government for the lack of policies towards the

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[529] Moreover, M. S. Bedir Khan in another article wrote: 'I assure you o my long-suffering Kurdishness that today you have no protector or friend that could help or empower you other than yourself in such a subordinate and forgotten social position. You are deprived of getting strength and energy from other sources but yourself. [That is why] you should work hard so that you can maintain your existence' [...Ve emîn ol ey benim cefâ-dîde Kürdlüğüm; bugün sen, o kadar ma'dûm ve mensî bir mevki'-i ictimâ'iyyede bulunuyorsun ki sana senden başka imdâd idecek ve kuvvet verecek hîç bir hâmî ve mededresin yokdur. Sen kendinden başka hîç bir menba'dan istifâde-i kuvvet ve hayât idebilmek imkânından mahrumsun.... Onun için çalış ve gayret et... Te'mîn-i beka ve mevcûdiyyet idebilesin.] (Salih Bedir Khan, *'Kiliçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK, (2013: 174-176)).

İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde also warned the Kurds of the hegemonic power of the other Muslim communities. In the 3rd issue of *Rojî Kurd* he wrote: 'Liberating the Kurds, by all necessary means, from ignorance, protecting them from the domination of other [Muslim] elements that are ready to take them down is not only a national but a religious obligation. [Kürdleri her ne sûrtle olursa olsun cehâletden kurtarmak anları meydân-ı rekâbetde kendilerini yutmağa müheyya ve mücehhez diğer 'anâsırın galebesinden masun kılmak yalnız vâcibe-i kavmiyyet değil 'aynî zamanda vâcibe-i diyânetdir.] (İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde *'Kürdlerin Te'âlîsi'* [The Rise of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 282-284)).

Similarly Xezal who took up the question of Ottomanism and the Islamic ummah argued that: 'However, we never worked for our own [people]… Today Arabs, Turks [Rom], Christians and all people assuming the name of Ottomanism and Islam, are concisous of themselves [their national identity] and their ancestors, they have worked hard and made progress but only us poor Kurds have remained behind [Lê belê tu cara em ji xu ra nebûn meriv… Iro; 'ereb, rom, fille, hemû xelkê ku di bin nav[ê] Osmanlî û islametê da ne tevda xu û mezin[ê] xuna nas kirine, xebitîn, pêş da çûn, tenê tenê em xwelî [s]er kurmanc şûnda man] (Xezal, *'Dema Kalê Me – Çaxa Me – Dema Tê'* [The Time of Our Ancestors – Our Time – The Future], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 122-124)).

progress of the Kurds the way we saw in the discourses of *Kurdistan* and particularly *KTTG*. Moreover, in lines 5-7 the author calls upon Kurds from all walks of life in lines 5-7 creates an assumption that Kurds, with all their social classes, form a unified national entity in a 'horizontal comradeship'.

Throughout the article the author is careful in his wording, a precaution that is obvious in the unspecified political objectives of waking up *6 million Kurds;*[530] in why Kurds had no friends; who exactly were the enemies that threaten Kurdishness; and from whom would the Kurds liberate their homeland. [531] This is because the journal's inability to directly engage in Kurdish politics or political propaganda compelled almost all *Rojî Kurd* authors to use a subtle language. Perhaps that is why M. Salih Bedirkhan as well as Halil Hayali, repeated one of the discursive strategies of *Kurdistan* by resorting to the patriotic voice of Khani and the nationalist poems of Koyi to promote Kurdish national unity and political autonomy.[532]

This over-careful attitude of refraining from explicit expressions of political desires of Kurds became too obvious and even strange in some articles. Consider the following extract from Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm:

Humans, from time immemorial, have been in need of one other's help.

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[530] The author estimates the number of Kurds to be around 6 million (lines 7-8). This statement was probably meant to highlight another factor that qualified the Kurds to be seen as a true national community. Halil Hayali also gives the same figure in a similar sociopolitical context; *see*, (Halil Hayali, *'Ziman'* [Language] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 186-187). In addition, M. S. Azizi estimates the population of the Kurds around 7-8 millions; s*ee*, Salih Bedir Khan, *'Kiliçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 174-176) and M. Salih Bedir Khan *'Berî Şîrê Qelem'* [Pen before the Sword] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3., August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 189-194).

[531] Having completed its semantic shift, the term 'welat' [homeland] clearly refers to Kurdish homeland (line 7). More on this will follow.

[532] *See*, Modanî X. *'Pîroznawe'* [Congratulatory Letter], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2., July 19, 1913, in KXK, (2013: 156-159) and M. Salih Bedir Khan *'Berî Şîrê Qelem'* [Pen before the Sword] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3., August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 189-194). For instance, M. S. Bedir Khan in his article recognized and appreciated Hayali for publishing a poem by Koyi. Bedir Khan suggested the reader to memorize Khani's and Koyi's poetry for he felt that 'every single point made in those poems gives life' to the Kurds.

Nothing could happen without collaboration. Even states are always in need of its people's collaboration. If people do not provide soldiers and money through taxes, there cannot be a basis for a state.

[…]

Today France has made such a great progress that fascinates every mind. It is proven based on statistic evidence that every year 20 thousand people die in France and every year 20 thousand people born in Germany. If today Germany declares another war against France who could guarantee that Germans would prevail; if having a greater population guarantees victory then why was Russia defeated by Japan?[533]

Here I will analyse this extract as a whole through 'global text structure', an analytical tool that concerns the coherence relations, i.e., the combination and sequencing of propositions and how each proposition is related to others in the generic structure of the text (Fairclough 1995b).

First, the author Ebdilkerîm makes a reference to the social contract through basic terms, e.g., the origin of the societies and cooperation between the society and the state. Subsequently, the author further elucidates this essential cooperation in political terms: France and Japan, two strong states that could or did defeat their enemies thanks to the collaboration, hard-work and sacrifices of

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[533] 'New'î beşer le rozî ezelewe ta ebed yek muhtacî mu'awenetî yek in. Bê mu'awenet hîç çiştî qabil niye bête wucûd, hetta dewlet da'ima muhtacî mu'awenetî milet e. Eger milet 'esker neda, eger milet pare neda, eger milet tekalif neda, esasen dewlet nayête wucûd.

[…]

îmro Fransa ewende tereqqî kirduwe ke 'eql heyran e. Be defter sabit e ke her salî bîst hezar kes le Fransa dimirêt û her salî bîst hezar nufûs zamî nufûs[î] elman debê, eger îmro elman le gel Fransa dûbare herb bika key dilê ke elman fa'iq debê. Çûnke eger kesreti nufûs sebebî xelebe buwaye, bo çi Rusya mexlûbî Japon debû… eger mu'awenet bê hemû çişt qayil e bête wucûd. (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm *'Be Firya Keyn-Mu'awenet'* [Competition and Cooperation], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 182-183)).

their people around a common cause.[534]

After foregrounding his propositions regarding state-society cooperation in the lead paragraph, he tries to relate it to the Kurdish society in the following lines:

> Then, if there is collaboration anything can be accomplished. Today if the Kurds collaborate with one another they will compile Kurdish literature, reform our language and hence gain name and fame like other people.[535]

A typical reader would expect the author to, in a logical sequence, relate the topic in the lead paragraph to the Kurds within the theme of state-society cooperation that leads to political gains and military victories. However, the author relates this topic to the Kurds without the political substance in the lead paragraph. Instead he limits the social contract or the state-society cooperation to the intellectual activities around Kurdish literature and language reform. Assessing this in connection with what M. S. Bedirkhan had said earlier about the Kurds inability to discuss politics suffices to understand the unwillingness of the author to relate the two topics explicitly because it would meant encouraging Kurds to rally around a prospective Kurdish state or a state-like political body. Nevertheless, even though the author did not 'properly' or expectedly relate the topic of his article to the Kurdish political needs, he perhaps expected the reader to connect the dots. In any case, this article illustrates how *Rojî Kurd* writers were compelled to limit themselves to social and cultural issues without politicizing these matters.[536]

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[534] Here the author refers to the Franco-Prussian wars and the Russo-Japanese War (8 February 1904 – 5 September 1905) to illustrates how victory is gained when the members of a national community cooperate with one another around a common cause and make progress in science and technology.

[535] 'Belê himmetu'r-rical teqellu'u'l-cibal eger mu'awenet bê hemû çişt qayil e bête wucûd. Êsta kurdekan eger textî himmet biken, muheqqeq edebiyatman tedwîn dikrê, zibanman islah dikrê, wek xelq[î] debîn be sahibi ism û şöhret' (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm *'Be Firya Keyn-Mu'awenet'* [Competition and Cooperation], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 182-183)).

[536] Lutfî Fîkrî, another positivist Kurdish intellectual wrote:

> 'In this world it is not possible to resist the natural or social laws… Evolution and rejuvenation of societies are subject to the same fixed and unchanging laws of

As we saw for both *Kurdistan* and *KTTG* education, in addition to industrialization and unity, was a prerequisite for the modernization and progress of the Kurdish society as a nation. Although these were dominant themes in *Rojî Kurd* too, the discourse of *Rojî Kurd* differentiated itself by adopting an overt promotion not of education but ethnic-nationalism as a condition of modernization, progress and Kurdish national unity, a view in line with Gellner's understanding of nationalism who saw nationalism as necessary for industrial modernity (Gellner 1994, 1997). This discursive shift found its most clear manifestation in an article by Harputlu H. B. In line with Anderson's (2006: 42) argument about the Protestant Reformation and the decline of religiously imagined communities, e.g. Christianity, the author H. B. praises the Enlightenment and the ideas put forth by Voltaire that laid the foundation of the modern Western civilization. Then he adds:

This breeze, this spirit caused new ideas and feelings in Christian minds.

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the nature…

Nowadays no body asks what being an Arab, an Albanian or a Kurd means… because in an era in which nationalist [milliyet] thoughts prevail, no idea that is based on the denial of nations can last long. The necessity to accept the existence of those nations sooner or later was a requirement of the social laws'

[Bu dünyâda kavânîn-i tabî'iyye ve ictimâ'iyyeye karşı kat'iyyen gidilemez… hey'et-i ictimâ'iyyelerin tebeddül ve inkılâblan da kavânîn-i tabî'iyye derecesinde sabit ve lâyetegayyer kânunların taht-i te'sîrinde oluyor.

Artık hîç kimse 'Arab nedir, Arnavud nedir, Kürd nedir demiyor…

Çünkü milliyyet fikirlerinin son derece galebe itdiği bir 'asırda milliyyetlerin inkârı esâsına müstenid bir fikir ve meslek elbette çok müddet payidar olamazdı ve er geç o milletlerin mevcûdiyyetlerini kabul itmek mecbûriyyetinin husulü zarurî ve kavânîn-i ictimâ'iyye icâbâtı idi' (Lütfî Fikrî *'Kürt Milliyeti'* [Kurdish Nation], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 202-204)).

The importance of this article for Kurdish nationalist discourse is two fold: First, from a Comptian point of view, the author states that a society, like the physical world, operates according to general law (Comte 1988; Bourdeau 2011); Second, he explains the social evolution from a sociocultural evolutionism perspective, which holds that if organism could develop and change over time so could societies in accordance with discernable laws of nature (Spencer 2005). Through these two arguments the author justifies the rise of Kurdish nationalism by presenting it as a 'natural' phenomena or an inevitable result of the social evolution. Yet, he is not willing to propose a clearly defined political program for these newly emerging nation.

The most important of these was the nationalist current. These supreme and innate feelings spread very fast. Clearly, what served the current development and progress of France and Germany is the feelings of Frenchness and Germanness.

This power that exalted Christianity pervaded Eastern Christians too. In fact, although they lived under the Islamic dominion, the lives and the social rules of the Eastern Christians improved and they became happy and made progress.

Clearly, the power of this novelty that is spreading from the West to the East will bring about great changes in the Islamic world too.

I sincerely hope that the current situation [the spread of nationalism] causes a great awakening in the Islamic world and especially within Kurds, Islam's most backward element.[537]

In the first paragraph, the author asserts that the most significant outcome of the era was the rise of nationalism, which became the driving force behind social, scientific, industrial and commercial progress among the nations of Europe, e.g. France and Germany as well as the nations of the Eastern Europe. Attributing all these progressive qualities to nationalism is the most crucial part of his overall argument because for him not education but nationalism is the primary and true agency of change and the impelling force toward the progress and wellbeing of nations. That is, national consciousness, i.e., Germanness and Frenchness and

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[537] 'Bu nefhe, bu rûh Hıristiyan kafalarında yeni birtakım fikirler, hissler tevlidine sebeb oldu. Bunların en mühimi milliyyet cereyanlarıdır. Tabî'î olarak insanlarda mevcûd olan bu hiss-i 'ulvî pek çabuk tevessü' itdi. Hîç şüphesiz Fransa ve Almanyanın şimdiki derece-I tekâmül ve terakkisine hıdmet iden Fransızlık ve Almanlık hisleridir…

Hıristiyanlığı i'lâ iden bu kuvvet şark Hıristiyanlanna da dâ'ire-i sirayet ve intişârını tevcîh itdi. Hakîkaten onların da hilâlin taht-I hâkimiyyetinde olmalarına ragmen şerâ'it-i içtimâ'iyye ve hayâtiyyelerini değişdirdi; mes'ûd ve daha yüksek bir mevki'e çıkardı.

Garbdan Şarka doğru tevessü' iden bu yenilik kuvveti 'âlem-i İslâmda da pek büyük tahavvüller husule getireceğine hîç şübhe yokdur… Ahvâl-i hâzıramızın da bütün 'âlemi İslâmda ve bi'1-hâssa en geride kalan Kürd unsurunda büyük bir intibâh husûle getirmesini kaviyyen ümîd ederim' (Harputlu H. B. *'Garbla Şark, Milliyet Cereyanlari'* [West and East, National Currents], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 103-104)).

a nation-state, i.e., France and Germany, are preconditions for the progress of Kurdish nation. This was a common perception of the Kurdish intellectuals writing for *Rojî Kurd* as they were convinced that the French revolution established nationalism as a political force capable of reforming the society. Thus the author not only explicitly endorses the outcome of the nationalist movements, i.e. forming nation-states, but he implicitly wishes the same for the Kurds. [538] His claim that nationalism would exalt Islam too is perhaps a reassuring argument that nationalism or Kurdish nationalism is not a threat to Islam.

Another Kurdish intellectual who *daringly* spoke his mind about Kurdish political desires was Abdullah Cevdet. In one article he first mentions a conversation with one of his friends who upon seeing an issue of *Rojî Kurd* on Abdullah Cevdet's desk claimed that *Rojî Kurd* was a separatist publication for it contained articles in Kurdish language. Then Abdullah Cevdet says:

> I think this is a noteworthy incident. It is a deplorable common perception.
>
> […]
>
> Turkey remains as a vast empire that consists of various elements [unsur][539] even after the loss of its territories in the Ottoman Europe. We have not miss the chance to unite these elements or at least to bring them closer to one another… The most effective way of unification is through separation. Undoubtedly, you will find this contradictory…. Let me explain. God has separated humans to [eventually] unite them. In His Qur'an, He says: We made you into peoples and tribes so that you might come to know one another." It is clear that in order to establish a close friendship between the elements, every element should experience its own natural and racial tendencies in a free environment. In empires

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[538] Holding the West in high regard was a common theme throughout *Rojî Kurd*'s discourse. They were convinced that Westernization and modernization were the same thing; *see*, for instance, Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm, *'Her Min Bim û Kesî Tirî Nî'* [Always Me and No One Else] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 152-153).

[539] The term 'unsur', which could be translated as 'element' denotes group of people of a particular kind within a larger group.

consisting of various elements, it is a false conviction that these elements can be united through one language, one set of law and one style of treatment.

 […]

Switzerland consists of twenty-two cantons. The administration and the judiciary of each canton are completely independent [of the central government]… Switzerland, also known as Helvetic Republic, which is the size of one of our provinces, is made up of smaller republics… Switzerland consists of three nations [kavim] based on three different races [ırk].

[…]

Our century is the century of nations [milliyet] and even the most durable and the strongest governments and states have not been and will not be able to avert this movement.

[…]

If we want the unity of the elements then we should want their separation too…

Kurds wants to use their language and write their own history. They want to know their national personage and they want to elevate them to the level they deserve. I am sure that our enlightened government will be in favour of this [wish]. [540]

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[540] Bu bir hâdisedir ki, bence kayd û dikkat idilmeye çok lâyikdir. Bu sûret-i hükm, 'âmî ve 'umûmîdir, buna pek te'essüf iderim…

Türkiya, Avrupa-yı 'Osmânînin ziyâ'ından sonra dahi yine muhtelif 'unsurlardan müteşekkil 'azîm bir imparatorluk kalmakdadır. Bu 'unsurları tevhîd itmek veya hîç olmazsa yekdiğerine yakınlaşdırmak ümîdi henüz zayi' olmamışdır… Tevhidin en mü'essir çâresi tefrîddir. Şüphesiz bu hükm bir tarife görünecekdir… İzâh ideyim. Allah insanları tevhîd itmek için tefrîd itmişdir, ve Kuranında onlari kabileler ve şu'beler hâlinde halk itdik, ta ki yekdiğerlerini tanıyalar demişdir. Bundan da sarîhen anlaşılır ki 'unsurlar arasında mu'ârefe ve muvâlâtın te'essüs itmesi için her 'unsur kendi temâyülât-ı tabî'iyye ve ırkıyyesine serbest bir sâha-i cereyan ve tatbik bulmalıdır. Muhtelif 'unsurlardan müteşekkil imparatorluklar da bu 'unsurların ittihadı yolu münferid bir lisânın, münferid kânunun münferid tarz-ı mu'âmelenin isti'mâl ve tatbiki olduğu zehabı zehâb-ı bâtıldır.

First, the conversation between Abdullah Cevdet and his friend reveals how not only the state but also most members of the Turkish intelligentsia were intolerant and suspicious of the Kurdish nationalist activities, an attitude that Cevdet finds deplorable [te'essüf iderim].[541]

After welcoming the inevitably arrival of nationalism to the Ottoman territories Cevdet makes some radical remarks about the 'false conviction' that the whole empire should be united around one language, i.e., Turkish, and governed with a single set of law. These remarks are followed by the author's most fundamental suggestion that the empire should adopt decentralization similar to Switzerland. However, before he gets to the Swiss example he feels the need to first wrap this Christina/Western style of governing in a dense religious intertextuality by invoking a Qur'anic verse. Cevdet's use of religious intertextuality is very crucial to the understanding of the Kurdish journalistic discourse, in that the use of religious allusion by a prominent positivist figure like Cevdet confirms my argument in Chapter 4 that religion was a mere rhetorical resource and a practical tool in the early Kurdish journals to justify the modern needs of the Kurds and the promotion of the Kurdish national identity. Cevdet's use of religious references make his subsequent argument of Swiss model more compatible with Islam and therefore acceptable in a Muslim society. After all the

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İsviçre yirmi iki "kanton"dan müteşekkildir. Her kanton idâre-i mülkiyye ve 'adliyyece tamamen müstakildir. Bizim bir vilâyetimiz kadar olan bu (İsviçre) ta'bîr-i diğerle "Helvetya" Hükümetini teşkil iden mini mini cumhûriyyetler... İsviçre 'ırken de muhtelif üç kavimden müteşekkildir…

'asrımız milliyyetler 'asrıdır ve en zîşekîme en şedîd hükümet ve devletler dahi bu cereyanın önüne geçmeye muktedir olmamış ve olmayacakdır…

Tevhîd-i 'anâsırı istiyoruz. Tefrîd-i 'anâsırı isteyebilmeliyiz.

Kürdler lisânlarını, târihlerini tedvin itmek istiyorlar, şahsiyyet-i milliyyelerini daha müdrik ve daha medrük bir mertebeye yükseltmek istiyorlar. Ben eminim, ki münevver olan hükümetimiz bunu iyi gözle görecekdir' (Abdullah Cevdet, *'Ittihad Yolu'* [The Path to Unity], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 139-141)).

[541] This Turkish anxiety is understandable given the separatist nationalist movements in the Balkans which resulted in the loss of territories as well as the Armenian activities that led to the Armenian Genocide only two years later. Thus the Turkish intellectuals were probably terrified of the possible breakaway of the Kurds.

mind of the Kurdish masses was not a *tabula rasa* waiting for the Kurdish intellectuals' message to inscribe their nationalist messages. Then through the Swiss example he tries to prove the feasibility of that option. To justify and prove the feasibility of the Swiss model in the Ottoman Empire he presents the decentralization as the only viable option to keep the empire intact. His argument that no state could prevent the inevitable consequences of the nationalist current adds further justification to his argument presenting him as someone whose major concern is the unity and safety of the empire rather than a Kurdish nationalist.

His use of such terms as *'independent* [müstakil], *republic* [cumhûriyyet] and *'race'* [ırk] in the third paragraph are particularly noteworthy in a newly forming Kurdish public discourse on nationalism. The word choices as well as the content of that paragraph imply that each Ottoman element need a separate *republic* based on their *racial* difference from the Ottoman Turks with their own national language, set of law and a certain degree of *independence*. Needless to say term 'element' is used to imply a particular element of the empire: the Kurds. This implication becomes more obvious as the author immediately relates his argument on decentralization and the Swiss example to the Kurds. [542]

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[542] In another article Abdullah Cevdet wrote the following:

> We are in an epoch in which nations are rising and acquiring a character…
>
> The century we live in is not a joke, it is the 20th century…
>
> I would like to ask and understand the young Kurds. What do they want to become? Or what they do not want to become? An element within the Ottoman Empire? [if so] what kind of an element; a decaying and putrefactive element or a progressive and rejuvenating… element?

[Milliyyetlerin ta'ayyün ve teşehhüs itdiği devirdeyiz…

Yaşadığımız 'asır, şaka değil, yirminci 'asırdır….

Genc Kürdlere sormak ve anlamak isterim. Ne olmak istiyorlar? Yâhûd ne olmamak istiyorlar. 'Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda bir 'unsur mu? 'Unsur fakat nasıl 'unsur, çürüyen ve çürüten bir 'unsur mu yoksa müteceddid ve müceddid… 'unsur mu?] (Abdullah Cevdet, *'Bir Hitab'* [And Address], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 99-100)).

Nonetheless, like other authors, he adopts a subtle tone when it comes to what exactly this particular element wishes for. Even though he described decentralization and the Swiss example in political terms (cantons, independent republics with their own judicial and administration bodies, etc.), he limits himself to the importance of the Kurdish language and history when it comes to the Kurds, without going into Kurdish political desires. His last sentence about the 'enlightened government' is perhaps meant to smooth the Young Turks ruffled feathers.[543]

In the previous two chapters we saw the importance of deictic pronouns, e.g., *us, we, they, them,* etc., as forms of taken-for-granted assumptions. As discussed earlier, sometimes it was problematic to tell the denotational meaning of deictic pronouns in the discourse of *KTTG,* as it was not immediately clear whether a deictic pronoun referred to the Kurds or the Ottomans. [544] Such ambiguity hardly exists in the *Rojî Kurd*'s use of such deictic pronouns. Consider the following extract taken from an article by Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm:

> Even though we [ême] have been doing business for the past three years
> why doesn't our capital [sermayekeman] exceed one hundred thousand
> liras? Why a businessman in Baghdad makes one hundred thousand liras
> in three years? For God's sake, it is not my intention to insult [you], I [just]

As the extract illustrates, after explaining the advent of nationalism and nationalist movements in the 20th century Ottoman Empire and its crucial importance for the survival of nations, the author poses several rhetorical and seemingly *'innocent'* questions about the future of Kurdo-Ottoman relations. Although the author does not explicitly question this relation, the fact that he problematizes them is a significant strategy that perhaps implies solutions beyond the existing state of affairs between the Kurds and the Ottoman state.

[543] Despite his subtle tone, Abdullah Cevdet constantly found himself in trouble with the CUP. Due to his criticism of the government the CUP shut down his newspapers *'Içtihat'*, *'Işhad'* and *'Cehd'*, one after another (Hanioğlu 1966: 292).

[544] As we saw, there were instances in which Bozarslan felt the need to clarify certain deictic pronouns in the corpus of *KTTG* whether they were referring to the Kurdish or the Ottoman context.

want [you][545] to be as intelligence as they [ewan] are.[546]

In this extract, -and the whole article for that matter- the author does not use the word, Kurd not even once, yet the reader unmistakably knows that every single deictic pronoun, e.g., *'ême'* or enclitic pronouns, e.g.,*'-man'*, refer to *'us/we Kurds'* while the deictic *'ewan'* (they) clearly refers to *'others'* that are *'not from us'*. In the corpus of *Rojî Kurd*, the constant use of these deictic pronouns, whose referent were either *'us/we Kurds'* or *'the non-Kurdish others',* rendered a deliberately *habitual assumption* about the intra-national sameness (Wodak at al. 1999: 37) around Kurdish national identity.

Another noteworthy point in *Rojî Kurd* concerns the journal's use of certain terms in its nationalist discourse. In the discourses of both *Kurdistan* and *KTTC* there was an ambiguity around such term as *qewm, kavm, milet* and *millet* (nation). For instance, phrases like 'our nation' sometimes would refer to 'our *Kurdish* nation' other times to 'our *Ottoman* nation'.[547] However, these terms acquired a more refined meaning in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd* by coming to clearly denote only the Kurdish nation as evident from the following extracts:

> 'There are many reasons for the trouble and disease that have fallen upon us. The first reason is that… we are a nation [qewmêkî] without unity…[548]

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[545] This pronoun is missing in the original Kurdish text because Kurdish, as a pre-drop language, does not require the subject to be expressed since the verb already signifies the subject. *See*, Ekici (2007).

[546] 'Bo çî **ême** sê sal e meşxûlî ticaret în. Ke çî sermayeke**man** nihayet nihayet sed hezar tara niye. Bo çî tuccarî Bexda le zerfî sê sal da debê be sahibî sed hezar lîre, bo xatirî Xuda meqsedim haşa tehqîr niye, metlebim ewe ye ke munewwere bin wek **ewan**...' (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm, *'Tal û Şîrîn'* [Bitter and Sweet], *Rojî Kurd*, No 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 114-116)).

[547]As we saw, Bozarslan, in his collection of *KTTG*, felt the need to clarify the denotational meaning of certain deictic words and phrases.

[548] 'Derdêk 'illetêk ke tûşî ême bûwe, esbabî zor e. Sebebî ewelî… esasen ême qewmêkî bê ittifaq în' (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm, *'Her Min Bim û Kesî Tirî Nî'* [Always Me and No One Else] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 152-153)).

I must tell my nation [qewm] that there is no nation [qewm û milet] on earth that has achieved its objectives only with their swords and shields… [549]

But we know and believe that a nation [millet] cannot survive if it just relies on its essential talents and its innate abilities… Isn't it a necessity for Kurds too…to show a sign of life? [550]

Moreover, unlike *Kurdistan* and *KTTG*, the authors of *Rojî Kurd* included new terms, perhaps neologisms into their nationalist discourse. These terms included *Kurdanî, Kurmancinî, Kurdîtî and Kürdlük,* [551] which could be rendered as *'Kurdishness'*. These terms were instrumental in the journal's *strategy of unification and cohesivation* to put emphasis on intra-national sameness among Kurds (cf. Wodak at al. 1999: 38). Another such new term was *Kurdayetî* or *Kurdeyetî* that might be rendered as *'Kurdish nationalism'* or *'Kurdish nationalist movement or ideology'* (Hassanpour 1992: 46; 2003: 106; Sheyholislami 2011: 52).[552] More precisely, '*Kurdayetî* refers to a movement or an action that is carried out on behalf of the Kurds' (Sheyholislami 2011: 202).[553]

H. Hayali in one article wrote:

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[549] 'Min divê ji qewm[ê] xwe ra bêjim. Tu qewm û milet li dunê nîn e bi şûr û mertalê xwe tenê gihabin meqseda xwe…' (M. Salih Bedir Khan *'Berî Şîrê Qelem'* [Pen before the Sword] *Rojî Kurd No. 3.*, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 189-194)).

[550] 'Fakat biliriz ve mu'tekidiz ki bir millet yalnız, cevher-i isti'dâdıyla, kâbiliyyet-i meftûresiyle yaşayamaz… Artık icâb itmez mi idi ki Kürd de… bir eser-i hayât göstersin?' (Anonymous *'Gaye ve Meslek'* [The Purpose and the Method], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 98-99).

[551] We come across the use of *'Kurdluk'* (Kurdishness) in the discourse of *KTTG* too however not with the same frequency as in *Rojî Kurd*. *KTTG* used the term 7 times compared to 33 times in *Rojî Kurd.*

[552] It is important to note that there is no great ideological divide that separates the original meaning of the term from its use in the contemporary Kurdish nationalist discourse (Hassanpour 2003: 161).

[553] *See*, Hassanpour (1992: 46; 2003: 106) for the definition of *'Kurdayetî'*; also see, Sheyholislami (2011: 52, 202) for an excellent discussion on the term *'Kurdayetî'*. Given the context in which Hayali uses the term 'Kurdayetî' it seems that the term has not gone through any significant semantic shift as it still signifies the same concept today.

Let those [Kurds] who have decency, honour and enthusiasm of *kurdeyetî*… help them [Hêvî and *Rojî Kurd*].[554]

Given the political substance of the term, the use of *kurdayetî/kurdeyetî* intended to unite Kurds around *Hêvî* and *Rojî Kurd* for a common *national cause, ideology* or *movement*.

In brief, all these terms, *'kurdayetî'* in particular, suggest a strong ideological commitment to the Kurdish nationalist ideology without leaving much scope to Ottomanism or parochial Kurdish identities. Then again it seems unfair to label *Rojî Kurd* as the publication of a 'cultural club' despite its clear nationalist voice. Rather, *Rojî Kurd* was a platform on which Kurdish intelligentsia voiced its ideas, albeit mostly subtly, about the political present and future of the Kurds as a national community.

6.2.1.1. Multimodality: The Use of Photographic Images and Consolidation of Kurdish National Identity Discourse

Multisemiotic analysis is an indispensable aspect of text analysis in the case of printing press due to the use of photographic images and the overall visual organization of pages (Fairclough 1995: 58). Like *KTTG*, the corpus of *Rojî Kurd* might be consider as a multimodal text because of the visual images on the cover pages of each issue. Therefore it is necessary to analyse these images as a semiotic modality in interaction with the text to produce meanings (*ibid*.) It is important to note that while all photographic images of *KTTG* were related to Ottomanism and hence contributed to that journals dominant Ottomanist discourse, those of *Rojî Kurd* were related to great Kurdish figures and thus contributed to the journals Kurdish ethno-nationalist discourse.

The photographic images of *Rojî Kurd* might be considered as examples of

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[554] 'Ewê kurd e 'ar û namus û xîreta **kurdiyetî** tê da heye… bila arî wan bike' (Halil Hayali, *'Ziman'* [Language] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 186-187)).

extensive as far as the multimodality of the text is concerned [555] because none of the images are part of an article in an immediate proximity. For instance, the first image was a portrait of Saladin (1137-1193), along with a caption, on the cover page of *Rojî Kurd*'s first issue:

Image 1.
'O you the wonderful creation of this universe, don not think that the mother of time will bring a like of you into this world again.
From exceptional Kurds: Sultan Saladin Ayyubid[556]

Although it was not part of an article in that issue [557] the image is still closely connected to the overall content of *Rojî Kurd* as it supplements the paper's general Kurdish ethno-nationalist discourse. While the first sentence of the caption depicted Saladin as an irreplaceable historical figure, the second sentence proudly specifies his Kurdish identity in an attempt to generate a sense of national pride among the readership.

The second image that appears on the cover page of the 2nd issue is a portrait of Karim Khan Zand (ca. 1705-1779), the founder of the Kurdish Zand dynasty and the ruler of Persia for 30 years in the third quarter of the 18th century (Perry 1979; Jwaideh 2006).

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[555] See Chapter 5 for a detail discussion of *multimodal texts.*

[556] 'Sanma dogura, harika-i hilkat-i alem!
Bir sen gibi ferzende-i diger, mader-i a'sar
Duhat-i Ekraddan: Sultan Slahaddin-i Eyyubi (*Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 97)).

[557] Although, later on M. (probably Modanli Halil) wrote a piece-meal on Saladin that was published in the two subsequent issues of *Rojî Kurd.*

Image 2.
Karim Khan Zand, one of great Kurdish Ameers[558]
From Great Kurdish Figures: Shah Abd al Karim Khan Zand[559]

Similar to Saladin's, this portrait was not a part of any specific article either. Nevertheless, as an *extensive* type of multimodality it fit perfectly into the overall nationalist discourse of *Rojî Kurd* as the caption proudly announces the Kurdish identity of this historical figure.

As I argue later on in details, certain discursive practices and strategies of *Rojî Kurd* aimed at the dis-identification of Kurds from Ottomans by cultivating the non-Ottoman Kurdish culture, history and territory. Parallel to this practice, both of the Kurdish personages above are from outside of the Kurdo-Ottoman history.

Another image that appeared in the 4th issue was a panoramic landscape from Erzurum city along with a caption:

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[558] This caption is in Ottoman Turkish: 'Kurd E'azim-I Umerasindan: Kerîm Han Zend' (*Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 131).

[559] This caption is in Sorani-Kurdish: 'Le Gewrekani Kurdegan: Şah 'Ebdulkerîm Xan Zend' (*Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 131).

Image 3.
Erzurum province, one of the fortified towns of Kurdistan[560]

Notice how the caption specifies the Kurdish identity of the city by significantly locating it in Kurdistan rather than portraying it as a city in the Ottoman Empire or the historical Armenia. This is a noteworthy discursive strategy especially when read in relation with *KTTG*'s discourse, in which almost all visual images were related to the Ottoman capital of Istanbul and thus were closely connected with the journal's Ottomanism.[561]

A picture that stands out in relations to the other three historical images from the pre-Ottoman or pre-Islamic Kurdish history is the portrait of Huseyin Kenan Paşa from the renowned Bedir Khan family. The image was published along with an obituary upon the Paşa's recent death.

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[560] 'Kurdistanin mustahkem biladindan Erzurum şehri' (*Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 200).

[561] The only image from what was considered as Kurdistan was a scenic landscape image from Mosul province with the following caption which made no reference to the cities Kurdish identity: '*the bridge over Tigris River in Mosul'* [Musulda Dicle Nehri uzerindeki bir cist].

Image 4.
The Late Bedir Khani Huseyin Kenan Pasha[562]

Publishing the portrait of or an obituary for an Ottoman Kurdish figure like Kenan Paşa might seem an ordinary act at first. However, what makes it extraordinary is that Kenan Paşa along with his brothers Kamil and Osman Pashas had recently instigated and led a revolt in Botan district of Kurdistan, against the Ottoman state. Promoting a figure like Kenan Paşa, by implication is the endorsement of his political activities even though the journal makes no mention of the revolt in his obituary due to the political circumstances of the period I have explained so far. [563]

6.2.2. The Discursive Construction of Common Language

Kurdish language maintained its position as the most significant marker of Kurdish national identity in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd*, nevertheless with a new approach that distinguished this journal from both *Kurdistan* and *KTTG*.

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[562] 'Bedirhanî Merhûm Hüseyin Ken'an Paşa' (*Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 167)).

[563] *See*, Malmîsanij (2000: 147-149; 2002: 30-31) and Zeki (2002: 144) for more details.

Although *Kurdistan* preferred Kurdish as its primary medium of communication it had never explicitly politicized Kurdish for instance by making demands for the official recognition of this language or its use in public schools. *KTTG*, on the other hand, did politicize Kurdish as the most significant element of Kurdish national identity and therefore demanded its use in Ottoman public schools as a language of instruction. Despite this demand, *KTTG*, unlike *Kurdistan,* favoured the use of Ottoman Turkish in its discourse, due to the politico-symbolic as well as a pragmatic communicative function of Turkish in line with the journal's overall Ottomanist political stance.

Rojî Kurd, however, while similar to *Kurdistan,* preferred Kurdish as its dominant language of communication; like *KTTG*, it problematized Kurdish in political terms as the most crucial element of Kurdish national identity. However, there are three noteworthy differences between *KTTG* and *Rojî Kurd*'s stance on language. Firstly, when Kurdish became the predominant language of communication in *Rojî Kurd*, Turkish lost its politico-symbolic function to Kurdish (See table 7). That is parallel to the decline of Ottomanism among Kurds, Turkish ceased to serve as a symbolic tool that reinforced Kurdish Ottomanism in a Kurdish journal. Thus Kurdish resumed its function of being an exclusive Kurdish national symbol and a boundary marker between Kurds and non-Kurdish Ottomans as the predominant medium of communication in Kurdish journalistic discourse. Nevertheless, Turkish remained as an important medium of communication due to its communicative function as the *lingua franca* of the empire. Another reason for the use of Turkish in *Rojî Kurd* might be that the Kurdish intelligentsia, similr to the *KTTG* authors, still wanted to remain a part of and perhaps have a say in the debates about the future of the Empire, because after all, many Kurdish intellectuals in Istanbul sought a solution within the Ottoman state, albeit in a more decentralized administrative system. Secondly, while the *KTTG* demanded the use of Kurdish as a medium of instruction in Ottoman public schools, *Rojî Kurd* never made such demand nor did it ask for the support of the state to foster Kurdish, rather, as we will see presently, it encouraged the Kurds to take the matters into their hands by estabhlishing schools and producing books on

Kurdish literature, grammar and lexicon, a fact that highlights the gradual demise of the notion of Ottomanism among Kurdish intellectuals, who had lost faith in the existing political system in which the Turks prevailed.

	Kurdistan	*KTTG*	*Rojî Kurd*
Kurdish	*107* texts (including 1 Sorani-Kurdish text)	*14* texts (including 4 Sorani-Kurdish texts)	*37* (including 12 Sorani-Kurdish texts)
Ottoman Turkish	*43* texts	*168* texts	*32*

*Table 7.*Distribution of Kurdish and Ottoman Turkish articles in the early Kurdish journals

Thirdly, while in the language issue was usually dealt with in passing in *KTTG* discourse, many *Rojî Kurd* articles were specifically dedicated to the promotion and cultivation of Kurdish literature and language.

6.2.2.1. Orality and Literacy

With the advent of modernity, the printing press and the wide availability of printed materials undermined the importance of the oral community and increased the value of printed materials (Meyrowitz 1997: 63). Thus orality is deemed inferior to literacy because the proponents of literacy were convinced of the key role of literacy in developing intellectual competence (Goody et al. 1968: 67; Street 1984: 19). They felt that this development would transform oral societies of the spoken word to the Western literal societies of scripturality (McLuhan 1962).

Similarly, a process that started in discourse of the previous journals but intensified in *Rojî Kurd* pertained to the orality and literacy dichotomy. Kurdish intellectuals influenced by the Western mind-set saw the dominance of orality

over literacy as an impediment for social and intellectual progress of the Kurdish society (Allison 2013: 120). Moreover, the theory of 'Great Divide'[564] coupled with the lasting prestige bestowed upon literacy, standard language and printed materials by the ideology of nationalism generated even a greater impetus for the Kurdish intellectuals of the period to pursue the transformation of Kurdish society into a literate society of printed words and thus a 'true' nation.

The section of its declaration on Kurdish language should be helpful to illustrate *Hêvî Society*'s stance on the binary divide between orality and literacy:

> Then, every nation has a language, just like it speaks in that language, it also writes and publishes books in it. While, in the past, Kurds possessed an excellent language for reading, writing and speaking and had many books written in that language, later on, this language was gradually forgotten and came to be spoken only outside of cities. Thus Kurdish lost its previous prominence. However, there is no nation with an inadequate language… Thus the first and foremost purposes of this society is making Kurdish a language of reading and writing; publishing and disseminating books in that language…[565]

The declaration -in the 1st line and later on in the lines 5-6- establishes Kurdish as a major national symbol. Then through the *invention* of a prestigious past in terms of literary productivity[566] the text not only glorifies the socially efficacious written word but also historicizes Kurdish as a component of Kurdish national identity. This prestige, later on, was lost, according to the text, when Kurdish language was pushed out of urban areas, the centres of literacy and printing

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[564] In the comparative analysis of modes of thinking and communication, the Great Divide theories frequently refer to a binary divide or dichotomy between orality and literacy or scripturality promoting the supremacy of literacy.

[565] *The Founding Declaration of Kurdish Students-Hope Society* [Kürt Telebe-Hêvî Cemiyeti'nin Beyannamesidir], *Hetawî Kurd*, No: 4-5, 10 May 1914, p. 1-4, in Malmîsanij (2002: 257-261).

[566] Kurdish literature hitherto remained mainly based on oral tradition, the 'true literary genius of the Kurds' (Kreyenbroek & Allison 1996: 2).

activities, and confined to being a mere spoken/oral language of the impoverished rural.[567] Hence the declaration sets the first and foremost objective of the Society to free Kurdish from the status of an *'inadequate'* rural language of the spoken words under the dominance of orality and in this way elevating it to the status of an urban print-language through intensive publication activities. Kurdish intellectuals, such as Halil Hayali, were convinced that a well established print-language would lead to the construction of a Kurdish 'high culture' and a unified filed of communication *in* and *around* Kurdish which would ultimately contribute to the formation, consolidation and recognition of Kurds as a true nation. Then it is fair to presume that in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd*, language cultivation was not only an intellectual endeavour but also a *political activity* for it was instrumental in *proving* the 'nation-ness' of the Kurds. [568]

One figure that took up the issue of language the most was none other than Halil Hayali. In all of his 7 articles written in Kurdish Hayali attended to such issues as language standardization, literature, alphabet and so forth. In an article entitled *'Ziman'* [Language] Hayali offered a ten-point suggestion in his discussion of 'what Kurds need today'. Below I reproduce and discuss the ones that are most relevant to the issue of language and literature without changing their order in their original sequence:

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[567] More on rural and urban dichotomy will follow.

[568] Another impetus for the cultivation of Kurdish language came from certain Turko-Ottoman circles, which claimed that Kurdish was merely a spoken primitive language not suitable for literature or science. Thus Kurdish intellectuals felt compelled to *prove* that Kurdish was a language capable of producing printed materials in science, literature and education. Perhaps as a response to these claims Bâbânzâde presented language cultivation as a sacred duty for the Kurds in the following lines: "While there are doubt even about the possibility of education and book writing in Kurdish... it is the duty of those who see the social and moral improvement of Kurdishness [Kurtluk] as a sacred [mukaddes] goal to prove that such concerns are baseless and that Kurdish is suitable for science and education' [Kürdce ile tanzîm-i tahsil ve kitâblar tedvin itmek mümkin olduğu bile nazar-ı şübhe ile görüldüğü bir sırada... Bu ihtiraza mahal olmadığını, Kürdcenin 'ulûm ve fünûne ve tedrisâta kâbiliyyeti olduğunu isbât etmek Kürdlüğün te'âlî-i ictimâ'î ve ma'nevîsini mukaddes bir hedef-i âmâl 'add iden erbâb-ı gayretin vazifesidir) (İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde *'Kürdlerin Te'âlîsi* [The Rise of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK, 2013, p. 170-172).

Let's talk about what Kurds need today:

 1. Reading and writing swiftly

 2. A new alphabet based on a new style

 3. A dictionary for the entire [temamê] Kurdish language

 8. A Kurdish grammar book

 10. The Kurdish literature and poetry

To realize these things it is necessary that you send [us] all available books in Kurdish. [Also] request, write down and send [us] Kurdish religious songs as well as stories and folktales from bards.[569]

While the first two points in Hayali's list suggest the adoption of a new alphabet that would suite the needs of the Kurdish orthography, an issue taken up by several other *Rojî Kurd* writers,[570] the third point expresses the need for a

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[569] Kurd îro muhtac[î] çi ne em ewan bêjin:

 1. Ji bo zû xundin û nûsandin[ê] herfek

 2. Ser tarzek nû elifbayek

 3. Ji bo zanîna temam[ê] ziman[ê] kurdîtî "qamûsek"

 8. Ji bo ziman[ê] kurdan serf û nehwik

 10. Edebiyat[a] kurdan û nav[ê] şa'irê wan

Ji bo çêkirina van tiştan çiqa kitêb [ên] kurdî heye lazim e ewan bişînin. Ji deng[bê]jan lawjok û çîrok û qewlêd kurdan pirs kin û binûsin û rê kin' (Halil Hayali, *'Ziman'* [Language] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 186-187)).

[570] For instance, Silêmanî Ebdulkerîm, M.S. Bedir Khan, Bulgaristanli Dogan, Abdullah Cevdet and Bâbânzâde. From their articles one might get the feeling that while Abdullah Cevdet and Bulgaristanlı Dogan felt that a modified version of the Latin alphabet would be more suitable for Kurdish, M. S. Bedir Khan and İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde clearly advocated for a modified Arabic alphabet for Kurdish. For instance, Bâbânzâde openly condemned the unspecified 'those', who might want to 'imitate the Latinist Albanians' by adopting the Latin script for Kurdish. He felt that adopting the Latin script would distance the Kurds from the 'eastern family' they belonged to. Moreover Mevlaznazade Rıfat proposed the adoptation of the old Urartian script claiming that the Urartian alphabet was the ancient Kurdish and Armenian alphabet (Mevlanazade Rıfat, *'Muhterem Hetawi Kurd Gazetesi Muessislerine'* [To the Honorable Founders of *Hetawi Kurd* Journal], *Hetawi Kurd* No. 2, 3 December 1913 pp. 2-3).

Kurdish lexicography that would cover the *entire* Kurdish language. By the word *'entire'* [temamê] the author probably meant all Kurdish dialects, a step towards the standardization of Kurdish as a single unified language, even though -or perhaps purposefully –the author does not openly refer to the Kurdish varieties by their names to background this *'disadvantage'*. The same discursive strategy of backgrounding is also used in the 4th [8th] point where the author suggests the preparation of a *'Kurdish grammar book'*, again treating Kurdish as a single unified standard language.[571] Along the same line as Hayali, no author makes any explicit reference to the multidialectal reality of Kurdish language in the corpus of *Rojî Kurd*. Instead they always use the term 'Kurdish' or 'Kurdish language' as a singular noun in order to conceal the fragmented nature of this language, a hardly surprising practice given the importance of one-to-one correspondence between the nation and its language in the nationalist ideology. Thus, even though the reader might have been aware of this dialectal divide, its absence in the authoritative *semi-official* Kurdish discourse, i.e., Kurdish journals, created the assumption that this divide was insignificant. More on this will follow presently.

The 5th [10th] point, in line with the theory of 'Great Divide', fosters the cultivation of Kurdish literature and its transformation into printed material as a move towards conservatism. The transformation or canonization of oral literature into print-material is also highlighted in the paragraph following the author's 10-points, this time through a call upon the plebeians to collect, record and send him any piece of oral literature, e.g., folktales and folksongs, they could gather from the Kurdish bards. This process, what Smith (2003: 20) calls 'ethno-symbolic reconstruction', includes the reselection, recombination and recodification of

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[571] The *Hêvî Society*, the owner of *Rojî Kurd*, published the *'Kurdish Language Tutorial'* [Hînkerê Zimanê Kurdî] in 1921 during the second period of that society. It was a booklet for basic phrases, vocabulary and short texts in Ottoman Turkish, Kurmaji and Babanî (Sorani). This booklet was republished along with its transcription into the Latin alphabet by' republished this booklet along with its transcription into the Latin alphabet by 'Kurds in the Ottoman Sources Study Group' (see, Osmanlı Kaynaklarinda Kurtler Çalisma Grubu (2008) Hinkerê Zimanê Kurdî: Kurt Talebe Hêvî Cemîyetî, Istanbul: Bgst Publication).

previously existing resources, values, symbols, memories and other cultural elements that needed to be transformed into literate expressions. Such vernacular mobilization encompassed the rediscovery, appropriation and politicization of an indigenous culture by its intelligentsia as the basis for popular agitation as well as the present and future political claims (Smith 2003: 115). In this context, the author's call underlines the importance attached to the 'plebeian authenticity,' similar to the German and English Romanticism during the rise of nationalism in Europe because in Romanticism the commoners' use of language was sometimes referred to as 'native speech' vis-à-vis the language of the cosmopolitan city dwellers influenced by *foreign* languages (Brennan 1990: 53).[572] Since this plebeian authenticity was fed into the 'high cultures'[573] of Europe, Romanticist often pointed to the 'literary language's dept to the 'common language' (Brennan 1990: 53; Wilmer 2004: 17-28). Similarly, Bruce King (1980: 42) has observed that nationalism as an urban movement identifies with the rural areas as a source of authenticity, finding in the 'folk' the customs, attitudes, beliefs, and language to form a sense of national unity among people. The notion of the folk, the people, the plebeians was transformed into the Herderian *Volk* and became an indispensable component of national identity (Brennan 1990: 53). In a similar Romanticist manner, the author Hayali holds up the language of the peasant as a model of purity and authenticity on the ground that it had been least contaminated and corrupted by *foreign* influences (cf. Fishman 1972:80) and presents the collection and preservation of of this cultural heritage as a patriotic duty. This 'bottom-up' approach,

> was particularly attractive to those whose communities had been long
> incorporated in, and subjected to, large and often oppressive empires,
> and who lacked powerful institutions which could carry and impose the

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[572] This view resonates with *Hêvî Society*'s declaration on language, where the Society regrets how Kurdish language had been pushed out of cities and confined to the rural areas.

[573] I use the term 'high culture' not in its normative sense of 'superior cultur' vis-à-vis the lower peasant culture, but rather in the Gellnerian sense in which the term refers to a distinctive style of conduct and communication of a given community (cf. Gellner 1994: 92)

new vision and its political aims (Smith 2003: 115).

My aim here is not an assessment of the Kurdish case from a Eurocentric view. However, the Kurdish discourse of the period illustrates that the Kurdish intellectuals were either aware of and inspired by the European experience, or they had access to the works of German Romantics or they came to appreciate the importance of the plebeian authenticity for Kurdish national identity of their own accord.[574] In any case, Hayali's call is important because in line with the Herderian notion of 'Volk' he seeks the primordial and ineluctable roots of Kurdish national identity in rural peoples' folktales and folksongs to find authenticity and the distinguishing features of Kurds from other Muslim communities. In this way, the cultivation, codification and canonization of the Kurdish folklore would not only free Kurdish from being a language of the private domain and informal life but it would also give solidity to the Kurdish literature and a 'tangible' and refined quality to Kurdish national culture and identity.[575]

Examples of Kurdish literature also embellished the pages of *Rojî Kurd* as it gave space to Kurdish classical poems, including those by Ahmad Khani, Haji Qadir Koyi and Sheikh Riza. Through this discursive strategy the paper attempted to: (a) prove the capacity of Kurdish as a language of 'high culture,' (b) generate a sense of national pride among its Kurdish readers, and (c) to give the authors of *Rojî Kurd* the opportunity to subtly express and propagate Kurdish nationalism and national rights through the patriotic stanzas of Khani and Koyi's poems.[576]

Moreover, several *Rojî Kurd* authors, especially Hayali, Bâbânzâde and Benî Erdalanî Ahmed Muhsîn, expressed their regrets and criticized Kurdish religious

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[574] As a matter of fact most of the Kurdish intellectuals of the period were exposed to the European ideological currents in variety of ways. For instance, they spoke European languages, received education in the modern Ottoman school system or had received education in Europe.

[575] Halil Hayali intensified his work on the cultivation of the plebeian authenticity in the corpus of the journal *'Jîn'*.

[576] This is very similar to the discursive practice adopted by *Kurdistan* in which due to the unfavorable political circumstances the journal resorted to the voice of such figures as Khani and Koyi to communicate their nationalist feelings to the readership.

dignitaries and other literates Kurds for not using Kurdish as the written language. Hayali in a sarcastic way wrote:

> No matter how much I try, I do not comprehend why our mullahs and our literates talk and lecture in Kurdish in medreses, [but] they use Arabic, Persian or Turkish, and not Kurdish, when they need to write a paper or a document. There must absolutely be wisdom or a mystery in this that we cannot comprehend.[577]

Here the author's entire discussion revolves around the binary divide between orality and literacy in favour of the latter. He criticizes the literate, through *sarcasm* (lines 3-4), for preferring Arabic, Persian or Turkish as the language of the written words depreciating Kurdish as a language suitable for speaking but not for writing.

In another article Hayali laments that the Kurdish men of latters had hitherto written their literary works in other languages without paying attention to their own. He asserts:

> Their names are no more; the ones that have remained have become the properties of the Arabs, Persians ['Ecem] and Turks [Romî]. They have done no good whatsoever to the Kurds. [578]

In this extract the author constructs language and literature as two major properties of national identity because since the Kurdish litterateur had preferred Turkish, Arabic or Persian, instead of Kurdish, Turks, Arabs and Persians have claimed the names and fames of their works as elements of their own national

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[577] 'Çiqa mêze dikim bi tu awayî bi serê min nakevê ku melayêd me, xundayêd me, bo çi qiseyê xu bi kurdî dikin û di medresan da dersê ku dixunin bi kurdî me'nay wê divên wextê ku lazim bê kaxizê xu, temessukê xu ya bi 'erebî, ya farisî, ya tirkî dinivîsin û bi kurdî nanivîsin, ji xala min ve ye ku mutleq, mutleq di vê da hikmetek, sirrek heye ku em pê nizanin[…]' (Modanî X. *'Ziman û Nezaniya Kurdan'* [The Language and Ignorance of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 160-162)).

[578] Nav[ê] yek [ji] van nemaye, ewê maye ew jî mal[ê] 'ereban û 'eceman û dermîyan bûye (M.X. *'Bextreşî û Mehrûmiya Kurdan'* [The Misfortune and Destitution of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 194-196)).

literature.[579] As Kreyenbroek and Allison (Kreyenbroek & Allison 1996: 2) have observed:

> [T]hose Kurds who had the talent and inspiration to create 'high culture' therefore tended to be absorbed into the dominant traditions of Arabic, Persian and Ottoman Turkish. The fact that a celebrated scholar or artist was a Kurds is now usually known only to Kurds, while others think of such figures as Arabs, Persians or Turks.

Influenced by the feelings of nostalgia for the past glorious days of Kurdish literature, Hayali does not fail to honour the Kurdish men of literature who did produce their works in Kurdish as he proudly mentioned the works of Elî Herîrî, Melayê Cizîrî, Ehmedê Bateyî (a.k.a. Melayê Bateyî), Ehmedê Kor ê Sablaxî, Ahmad Khani and Hajî Qadir Koyi.[580]

A similar discussion came from Benî Erdalanî Ahmed Muhsîn (Mehmed Mîhrî Hîlav) who wrote:

> Although Kurdish language is so beautiful and courtly [nazikî], it has neither [a fixed grammatical] basis [qewa'id] nor books. That's why the Kurd is compelled [mecbûr ebê] to devote his time to learning Persian, Turkish and other languages [zimanî dî] and remains deprived of his own language [zimanî xoy]. If he tries to lay a foundation for Kurdish, he will not be compelled to learn another language; and [in this way] Kurdish will not vanish… Now I am asking, is it possible that the Kurd would be willing to see his language disappear [laçûn] and his moral values vanish

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[579] Hayali's approach to the contribution of the Kurds to the Islamic civilization and by implication to the non-Kurdish nations, e.g., Turks, Arabs and Persians is in line with M.S. Bedir Khan's argument in which Bedir Khan laments the unilateral, unappreciated and unreciprocated Kurdish contribution to the Islamic civilization and other Islamic nations.

[580] Salih Bedir Khan also offers a list of Kurdish notables to emphasize their Kurdishness. The list includes Sheyhulislam Ebu's-suud, historian Ibn-al Esir and Ebu Zadra, Molla Guran, Fuzuli, Nefi, Nali and so forth. For the complete list, *see* Salih Bedir Khan, *'Kiliçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK, 2013, pp. 174-176.

[gumkirdin]? [581]

First, the author humanizes the Kurdish community as a unified entity or organism through the personification metaphor *'the Kurd'* in its third person singular form. Then, by asserting that *'the Kurd'* is *'deprived'* of his *own language* and is *'compelled'* to use the *languages of the others* he creates a strong connection between language and national identity. This connection is more obvious in his rhetorical question that echoes the Herderian view that designates language as the unique source of national character and moral values, i.e. the *Volk*.

Still the most fundamental, comprehensive and sophisticated account about the significance of language came from Bâbânzâde:

> …particularly during the last century this nation [kavim] has been completely abandoned, forgotten and neglected by its own sons as well as by the surrounding nations. This nation that has brought up so many celebrated poets and scholars, [who have written their works] in Arabic, Turkish and Persian, has given little importance to its own language…

> In the past, the Islamic world had a distinguished intellectual stratum that was not in the state of defence but rather in superior position vis-à-vis the intellectually inferior Western nations [kavim]. Writing in Arabic used to meet the needs of this very small stratum. In this way the virtuous and pioneers of all [Muslim] nations, seeing their own native languages the secondary, utilized Arabic, the language of our religion, in their scientific endeavours. Latin was serving the same purpose in Europe and thus various nations that composed Christianity paid little attention to writing in their own languages. However, their civilization developed immeasurably. Their experience taught them that a foreign [yabancı] language could no

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[581] 'Zimanî Kurdî bem şîrîniye û nazikiyeke heye, ne qewa'idêkî heye û ne kitêbî... Bem sebebew, kurd mecbûr ebê weqtî xoy hesr bikat bo farisî, tirkî, zimanî [dî] ke, û le zimanî xoy mehrûm ebê. Eger hewl bidrêt qewa'idêk bihinrête naw, ne mecburiyeti fêrbûnî zimanêkî [dî] ke ebêt; û ne kurdîyekîşî le naw eçêt... Êsta depirsim! Kurd heye razî bêt be laçûnî zimanî xoy, be gumkirdinî exlaqî xoy' (Benî Erdelanî Ehmed Muhsin,*'Le Tarîkî bo Ronakî'* [From Darkness to Enlightenment], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 220-221)).

longer meet their needs…

It seems that a long-term development similar to the one in Europe, albeit to a lesser degree, is starting to appear on the horizons of the East. This is an exigency and inevitability.

Kurd would not abandon his religion if he starts reading and writing in Kurdish… Did the Turks abandoned Islam after they systematized and started to use their language? Did the language of the Persians turn them into the enemies of Islam?...

Rendering a written form for a language never means supporting the idea of nation [kavmiyyet fikri] or what Europeans call nationalism [nasyonalite]. This has been banned by the Sharia [law], in any case… Islam will advance if it is protected, defended and disseminated through many languages.[582]

In the first paragraph, the author echoes Ahmed Muhsin and Hayali's arguments

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[582] 'Bununla beraber bu kavim bi'l-hâssa a'sâr-ı âhirede hem kendi evlâdı, hem kendisini ihâta iden akvâm tarafından pek metrûk, pek mensî, pek mühmel bir vaz'iyyetde kalmışdır 'Arabcada, Türkcede, Fârsîde bu kadar nâmdârşu'arâ ve 'ulemâ yetişdiren bu kavim kendi lisânına bi'n-nisbe daha az iltifat itmiş…

Edvâr-ı sâlifede 'âlem-i İslâm pek mahdûd bir tabaka-i münevverenin i'âne-i fikriyyesiyle kendisinden fikren dûn olan akvâm-ı garbiyyeye müd.fa'a değil hattâ galebe idebiliyordu. Edvâr-ı sâlifede 'âlem-i İslâm pek mahdûd bir tabaka-i münevverenin i'âne-i fikriyyesiyle kendisinden fikren dûn olan akvâm-ı garbiyyeye müd.fa'a değil hattâ galebe idebiliyordu… Pek mahsur olan bu tabaka-i 'âliyye içün garbî lisânı üzere yazı yazmak bu ihtiyâc-ı tedâfü'îyi te'mîn idebilir idi. Ve bu sûretle bütün akvâmın fuzalâ ve pîşvâyânı kendi lisânlariyla iştigâli ikinci derecede tutarak bütün himmet-i 'ilmiyyelerini lisân-ı dînimiz olan 'Arabcaya hasr iderler idi. Avrupada da Latin lisânı 'aynî vazîfeyi görüyor ve 'İseviyyeti teşkil iden akvâm-ı muhtelife kendi lisânlanyla yazı yazmağa o kadar i'tinâ eylemiyorlar idi. Fakat oradaki medeniyyet ihtiyâcât-ı bî-nihâye tevlîd eyledi. Ve artık yabancı olmak üzre bir tek lisân ile bu ihtiyâcâtı defe imkân olmadığı sevk-i vakâyi' ile anlaşıldı. Şarkda da 'ayn[ı] hâl görünmeğe başlıyor…

Demek ki garbdeki tek.mül-i medîdin Şarkda da henüz o dereceye vâsıl olmayan bir nazîrî ufk-ı ictimâ'iyyemizde irtisam idiyor. Bu da mecbûri ve zarûri bir şeydir…

Kürd, Kürdçeyi okuyub yazınca dînini terk idemez. Türkler lisânlarını tedvin itmekle İslâmiyyetden ayrıldılar mı? 'Acemlerin lisânı kendilerini İslâmiyyete düşman mı kıldı?...

Lisânı tedvin itmek hîç bir zaman Frenklerin "nasyonalite" denilen kavmiyyet fikrini tervîc demek değildir. Kamiyyet fikrini gütmek zâten şer'an memnû'dur… İslâmiyyet ne kadar çok lisân ile muhâfaza, müdâfa'a ve neşr û ta'mîm idilirse o kadar terakki ider' (İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde, *'Müslümanlik ve Kürdlük'* [Muslimness and Kurdishness], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 137-139)).

about the negligence of Kurdish language by the Kurdish men of literature, significantly referred to as '*the nation's sons*'. Then the author Bâbânzâde blames this situation on the hegemonic dominance of the surrounding languages of other Islamic nations, i.e., Turks, Arabs and Persians.

The second paragraph is particularly important for it is amplified the arrival of the age of nations in the 'East' and its significance for national languages. First, there is a striking similarity between Bâbânzâde and Anderson's (2006: 16-18) arguments on the gradual decline of religious communities and dynastic realm, but more importantly on the slow but steady decline of the sacred languages in favour of vernaculars as a result of the ideology of nationalism. Second, Bâbânzâde explicitly argued that this 'inevitable' Western wave of nationalism had marked the end of the hegemonic power of *'foreign'*[583] languages in the 'East' [the Ottoman Middle East] and by implication the decline of religious communities and dynastic realm, i.e. the notion of *ummahism* and *Ottomanism* respectively. It is striking that Bâbânzâde impressively analysed the advent of nationalism and its outcome for the dynastic regimes, religions and sacred languages decades before McLuhan (1962) and Anderson (1983 [2006]).

In the third paragraph the author unambiguously addresses the issue of compatibility or dichotomy between the notions of ummah and nationalism to ease the Kurds' mind arguing that fostering Kurdish language, and by implication Kurdish national identity, does not go against religion. Then, from the perspective of religious nationalism, he backs up this point by exemplifying the use of Turkish and Persian, conveying that favouring one's national language at he expense of Arabic, the language of God, does not necessarily mean turning against religion.[584] Hence, the conclusion to be drawn by the readers of *Rojî Kurd* was that the Turks and Persians, two prominent Islamic communities have already

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[583] The word '*foreign'* in its modern sense refers unambiguously to Arabic.

[584] In a similar manner Haji Qadir Koyi had written the following lines in his Diwan : Keke ême mu'mîn în, ne rûs în/Bo çi kifir e zubanman binûsîn (Dear, we are Muslims not Russians [Christians]/ Why is it a blasphemy for us to write in our own language) (Koyi 2004: 156).

abandoned Arabic in favour of their own national language and that the Kurds should follow suite.[585]

The last paragraph which perhaps meant to reassure the Young Turks, argues that the promotion of Kurdish language would not lead to 'what Europeans call nationalism', 'which has been banned by the Sharia law' as the author asserts. This religious intertextuality lingers into the following sentence as well where the author justifies the use of Kurdish by claiming that it would contribute to the development of the Islamic ummah.

6.2.2.2. Rapprochement between Kurmanji and Sorani

Rojî Kurd, like its predecessors, generously devoted space to the issue of language and numerous poems, including those by Ahmad Khani, Haji Qadir Koyi and Sheikh Riza. This was meant to prove, to the Kurds and the non-Kurds alike, the capacity of Kurdish as a language of 'high culture' and to generate a sense of national pride among the readers. Hayali, the most prominent author to devote his articles to the promotion of Kurdish language and literature, in most of his articles reproduced stanzas from Kurdish classical literature. One figure that Hayali promoted the most in his articles was Haji Qadir Koyi who wrote his nationalist poems in the Sorani variety. It seems that, in addition to its nationalist content, another reason for Hayali to promoted Koyi's Sorani poetry, in his Kurmanji articles, was to create the assumption that Sorani and Kurmanji were two mutually intelligible varieties of the same language. For instance, after quoting one of Koyi's poems, he states:

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[585] Halil Hayali in one article makes a similar discussion and tries to easy the same anxiety: '[T]oday there are three hundred million Muslims. They all read and write in their own languages. [But] they have never intended to harm the religion [by using their own languages] (Iro sêsed milyon misilman heye. Hemî bi ziman[ê] xu dixwînin û dinivîsin. Tu ziyanek ji bo dîn[ê] xu ferz û tesewwur nakin) Halil Hayali, *'Ziman'* [Language] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 86-187)). Then remarkably Hayali reproduces a section of a poem by Koyi which includes the following verses:

> Eme mu'mîn in ne rûs în
> Bo çî kufr e zibanman binûsîn
> [We are believers [Muslim] not Russians [Christian]
> Why is it blasphemy for us to write in our language]

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A Kurd who has the perseverance and Kurdish bravery needs to know the meaning of Haji Abdul Qadr's poems.[586]

Notice how Hayali omits the fact that not all Kurds speak the Sorani variety and thus cannot *'know the meaning of Haji Qadr's poems.'* What makes the discursive practice of rapprochement between the two varieties more obvious is Hayali's constant and deliberate use of Sorani words in all of his Kurmanji articles. For instance, he deliberately uses the Sorani preposition 'le' instead of the Kurmanji 'li', 'çak' instead of 'baş', 'meramim' instead of 'merama min', 'nûsîn' instead of 'nivîsîn' and so forth.[587] This practice, seems to be another instance of language cultivation that can be related to Kloss' tripartite concept, i.e., *Abstand*, *Ausbau* and *Dachsprache* discussed in Chapter 4. In this sense, through a deliberate language cultivation activity (Ausbau), Hayali attempted to close the distance (Abstand) between the two varieties perhaps toward the construction of a 'roof language' (Dachsprache).[588]

What is more, *Rojî Kurd* used the Kurdish language as a Kurdish cultural peculiarity that dis-identified the Kurds from all other Ottoman communities. Kurdî (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm)[589] in one article claims that Kurds, like Germans, belong to the Aryan people and thus:

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[586] 'Ev kurd[ê] … tê da xîret û mêraniya kurdîtî hebe, lazim e ku me'nay[ê] beyt[ê] Hacî 'Ebdulqadir bizane' (M.X. *'Bextreşî û Mehrûmiya Kurdan'* [The Misfortune and Destitution of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 194-196)).

Similarly M.S Bedir Khan, referring to the poetry of Khani and Koyi states that 'Every Kurd should know those poems by heart' [Divê her kurdek wan beyta hifz bike] (M. Salih Bedir Khan *'Berî Şîrê Qelem'* [Pen before the Sword] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3., August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 189-194)).

[587] A similar discursive strategy is observed in Xezal's article, see, Xezal, *'Dema Kalê Me – Çaxa Me – Dema Tê'* [The Time of Our Ancestors – Our Time – The Future], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 122-124)).

[588] *See* Chapter 4 for my detaile discussion of Kloss' concept and its utilization in the discourse of *Kurdistan.*

[589] According to Abdullah Zengene *'Kurdî'* was a pen name used by Silêmanî Ebdulkerîm, *cited in* KXK (2013: 74).

> Germans and German language resemble [Kurds and] Kurdish. Today if a Kurd goes to Germany he could learn German in two months. However, if a Turk or Arab goes to learn German language it would take them more than a year...[590]

While the extract presents Kurds as an ancient entity, more importantly and from a comparative linguistics point of view it dissimilates Kurds from Turks and Arabs based on their linguistic differences. In this way the author is crafting a new Kurdish identity that is different from the Turks and Arabs, two hegemonic identities that pose threat to Kurdish identity, but closer to the German and Aryan roots. More on the alleged Aryan roots of the Kurds will follow.

6.2.3. The Discursive Construction of Common Political Past

As I discussed in the previous analytical chapters, history is one of the most effective pre-existing cultural traits at the disposal of nationalist ideology to be cultivated as a glorious heritage. Like its predecessors, *Rojî Kurd* constructed a history narrative based on selective national history to reinvigorate a collective Kurdish past that could illustrate an uninterrupted social, political and cultural continuity of the Kurds throughout history as a coherent ethno-national community (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 37). To this end the authors of *Rojî Kurd* playing the role of 'nationalist historians' incorporated such recurrent elements as historical personage, splendid social and political moments in Kurdish history, genealogical research and so forth into their narratives of Kurdish national history.

One of the most common themes in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd* was the importance of Kurdish historiography or rather the lack of it. 13 out of 61 articles were about Kurdish history as well as the importance of history writing. For instance, Abdullah Cevdet wrote:

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[590] 'Elman û zebanî elman zor müşabeheti be kurd heye, îmro eger kurdî biçî bo elman lezerfî dû manga fêrî zebanî elman ebê. Feqet eger turkî ya 'erebî biçê bo ferbûnî zebanî elman muteweqqifet e ser salêk...' (Kurdî (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm) *'Esl û Neslî Kurd'* [The Origins and Ancestors of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 217-218)).

We are in an epoch in which nations are rising and acquiring a character…

Memory to individuals is what history is to a nation… A human that has been infected by 'amnésie complète,' which refers to the disease of complete loss of memory, is no different from a tree… whose green leaves sway to every which way depending on the direction of the wind…

If a nation does not possess a perfectly written history it is as if that nation has never lived. Do the Kurds have a history? Just with a *Sharafname*, a nation cannot lay claim to the glory of its past…

A nation that does not lay claim to its past history… cannot be master in its own house. A nations that is not master in its own house is doomed to be slave to others…[591]

First the author Cevdet establishes the fact that nation is the product and the enduring political force of modernity which is associated with growth, development and progress within a national framework. He fosters an interdisciplinary approach to the age of modernity linking political and intellectual activities. Then he promotes history as a modern discipline and a condition of transition to modernity. Through the metaphor of anthropomorphism the author not only emphasizes the importance of written history as a society's collective memory but it also personifies the Kurdish society as a unified body or organism with a collective disease, i.e., *amnésie complete or* complete amnesia. Then the author portrays the lack of national autonomy and collective memory as anti-

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[591] Milliyyetlerin ta'ayyün ve teşehhüs itdiği devirdeyiz.

Meleke-i hafıza ferdlerde ne ise târîh de milletler için odur… Amnêsie complette ya'nî "nisyân-ı tam" denilen hastalığa mübtel. âdem rüzg.rın esdiği cihete yeşil yapraklarını eğen bir ağacdan… başka bir şey değildir.

Bir milletin ki mazbut ve mükemmel olarak bir târihi yokdur, o millet hîç yaşamamış gibidir. Kürdlerin târihi var mı? Bir *(Şerefnâme)* ile bir millet şeref-i târîhiyyesini veyâhûd târîh-i şerefini tasarruf ve muhafaza idemez…

Mazisinin târihine, müstakbelinin târihine mâlik olmayan millet kendisine mâlik değildir. Kendi kendisine mâlik olmayan milletler ve ferdler memlûk olur…' (Abdullah Cevdet, *'Bir Hitab'* [And Address], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 99-100)).

modern and he metaphorically equates them with slavery because, for the author, national history or collective memory is an ontological matter; history-less nations do not really exist or matter.[592] After posing a rhetorical question whether Kurds indeed have a history, he brings up *Sharafname* and criticises the dearth of history writing among Kurds as *Sharafname* stood out as the only written account of Kurdish history. His this criticism could also be read as an unintended act of bringing forward the existence of a book written on the 'Kurdish national history', implying that Kurds do have a national history, as this is the first time that *Sharafname* is identified as Kurdish national history.[593]

Similarly M.S. Bedirkhan wrote:

> Kurd[594] has brought up many great and magnificent scholars, geniuses, poets and writers, however they have remained unknown or forgotten… by Kurds due to the lack of a written history…
>
> …we have even lost the right to claim Saladin Ayyubi for ourselves… There is no bigger disgrace and crime against history than neglecting and forgetting this magnificent Kurd and a source of pride, who had the honour of being the saviour of Islam… we are on the verge of being doomed to cease, be forgotten and disappear as a nation. [595]

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[592] A similar ontological problematization was discussed in the previous section where *Rojî Kurd* authors regretted the way Kurdish historic personage and their legacies had been claimed by other nations, e.g., Arabs, Turks and Persians.

[593] In the corpus of *Kurdistan* Bedir Khan Brothers had used *Sharafname* as a source merely to back up and elaborate on their own familial past.

[594] A common practice among the writers of *Rojî Kurd* is the use of 'Kurd' as a singular noun sometimes accompanied by the third person singular pronoun to present the Kurdish community as a unified single entity.

[595] 'Kürd mâzî-i hayiatinda öyle büyük ve mu'azzam 'âlimler… dâhiler… şâ'ir ve edîbler yetiştirmişdir, ki bugün elde mazbût ve müdevven bir tarîh olmamak yüzünden bir Kürd nazarinda Kürdlük kadar mensî ve mechûl kalmışlardır…

Salâhaddîn-i Eyyûbîyi bile kendimize mâl idebilmek hakkını gâ'ib etmiş bulunuyoruz… bu mu'azzam Kürdün Kürdlük için ne kadar fahr-âver olduğuna rağmen bu darbe-i ihmâl ve nisyâna uğradılmasının bizim için büyük ve mûcib-i şeyn ve 'âr bir cinâyet-i târîhiyye tasavvur idilemez… mevcûdiyyet-i kavmiyyemizi gâ'ib iderek mahkûm-ı inkıraz ve nisyân olmak 'arefesinde

Similarly, M. S. Bedir Khan, and other *Rojî Kurd* writers for that matter, did not only for the first time expressed the fear of *forgetting* by underlining the importance of history writing but they also acted as historians to 'remind' the Kurds of their splendid national heritage and personage that is unknown to them due to the lack of a modern Kurdish historiography. Thus, in the extract above the author laments the fact that Kurds are unable to reclaim Saladin's Kurdish identity (line 4). The author expresses this shortage with strong lexemes of 'disgrace' and 'crime' against history. Although the passage presents Saladin as 'the saviours of the Islam' what really matters is the nationalization of a Muslim Sultan and his period in Islamic history.[596] In this context, the author Salih Bedir Khan, much like Abdullah Cevdet, perceives history writing and historical consciousness as an ontological matter (lines 7-8). After all 'what makes a nation is the past…' (Hobsbawm's 1992b: 4).

In conclusion, constructing a collective memory or a national history is an indispensable part of being a nation and acquiring political legitimacy as such in the modern era. Therefore, history as *la longue durée* or an account of a glorious heritage and heroic past is one of the powerful pre-existing cultural traits in national identity discourses. Thus intellectuals and historians act as the 'official' conservators of the national memories the way the authors of *Rojî Kurd* did.

6.2.3.1. The Discursive Construction of the Pantheon of Kurdish Heroes

Rojî Kurd, like the journal *Kurdistan*, constructed a pantheon of Kurdish historic personage as the protagonists of the Kurdish 'national history,' in which the most prominent figure was Saladin who was promoted by Halil Hayali in a lengthy article in the 2nd and 3rd issues of *Rojî Kurd* in a piecemeal fashion. In addition, *Rojî Kurd* promoted an image of Saladin on the cover page of its very 1st issue. What is more, the journal gave space to Karim Khan Zand, Ahmad Khani, Haji

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bulunuyoruz' (Salih Bedir Khan, *'Kiliçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 174-176).

[596] We observed the same practice in the discourse of *Kurdistan*.

Qadir Koyi, Molla Gurani, Idris-i Bitlisi, Sheyholislam Ebu's Suud, Elî Herîrî, Khanî, Nalî, Fuzûlî, Sheikh Riza Talabanî, Khoyî, Princes of Ardalan and so forth in its construction of the Kurdish ethnic ancestry and personage.

For instance, Halil Hayali nostalgically mentions the names of the previous Kurdish rulers and then harshly criticizes the current traditional Kurdish leadership for not uniting and leading the Kurds:

> It seems that you have no intention to protect miserable Kurds… Where is Alî Eyûb and Marwan the Kurd? Where is Alî Wexnaz the governor of Sanandaj? Where is the prince of Rawanduz? Where are the princes of Jazeera and Botan [and] the ruler of Soran and Baban? Raise your heads and see the [miserable] situation of the Kurds…[597]

In this nostalgic account, the author expresses his longing for the long-vanished romantic past in which Kurds were allegedly united under the protection of their Kurdish rulers. Was there in fact such a period in Kurdish history in which a Kurdish ruler showed the capacity to unify all Kurds under a broad political roof? The Kurdish leaders cited by the author did not have much to do with the idea of Kurdishnes or Kurdish nationalism in the modern sense. However, even if no such historical period or ruler existed in the Kurdish history, nostalgia always invokes 'a past that was unified and comprehensible, unlike the incoherent, divided present… what we are nostalgic for is the condition of *having been*, with a concomitant integration and completeness lacking in any present' (Lowenthal 1989: 29). In the words of Smith (2003: 140) 'such golden ages embody the 'essence' of the community, their 'true' character… they epitomize all that is great and noble in 'our community', now so sadly missing but soon to be restored…' Therefore, the misrepresentation of the object of desire that is the unity of the

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[597] '… Wiha xuya dike ku hûn li kurd[ên] neçar xudanî nakin… Li ku ye Al[î] Eyûb û Merwan[ê]Kurdî, Al[î] Wexnaz li ku ye? Walî[yê] Senendec û begzade[yê] Rewandiz li ku ye? Mîr[ê] Cizîr û Botanêd wan li ku ye? Hakim[ê] Soran û Baban. Serê xwe hilînin halê Kurdan bibînin…' (M.X., *'Ji Mezinên Kurdan Ra'* [To the Kurdish Nobles] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4 September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 222-223)).

Kurds, in this nostalgia is a reasonable response to the demands of nationalist that does not harm the heritage. Rather this conceived heritage works as a political resource to encourages the Kurds to be involved in the nation-building activity.

6.2.3.2. The Discursive Construction of Kurds as a Primordial/Ancient 'Nation'

Nationalist ideologies frequently utilize ancient history as a mean of uncritical identification with the ancient past to construct the nation as a historical antiquity. This in turn, justifies political, social and territorial claims of the nation. As we saw in the previous sections of this chapter, *Rojî Kurd* authors attempted to dis-identify Kurds from the Ottomans and occasionally from the Islamic ummah. We come across similar practices in the journal's construction of the Kurdish common political past. The portraits on the cover pages of the journal were a part of this practice in that two images were the portraits of Saladin and Karim Khan Zand, two Kurdish figures from outside of the Kurdo-Ottoman history.

Similarly, a major historical narrative in *Rojî Kurd* pertained to the pre-Islamic period of the Kurdish history. Kurdî (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm) in one article significantly entitled *The Origin and Linage of Kurds* wrote:

> Kurd existed before the time of the prophets. Kurds as a part of the Aryan people, accepted Islam like the Afghans and Iranians ['Ecem]… The others, such as the Greeks, Armenians and Germans remained on the path of ignorance [by not accepting Islam]. Be it the Greeks, Armenians, Germans [or] Portuguese, they all belong to the Kurdish race… Notice how our cuisine, clothes and traditions resembles those of the Iranians, while they differ from the traditions of those in Baghdad… Germans and German language resemble Kurds and Kurdish language… Now that, as they claim, Germans belong to the Kurdish race [ırq], this verifies how intelligent and brave Kurds are, then why have they [Germans] made such progress while we have remained ignorant? The reason for this is obvious, because first of all they refused discord and collaborated with

each other. [598]

First the author presents Kurds as an ancient nation with their roots traced back to the ancient times or a non-specific before. Then, reflecting on the German philological scholarship and on the basis of a common race, language, and culture, the author asserts that Kurds, like Germans, Iranians and Greeks, *inter alia*, are descendants of the Aryans. In this racial politics the author exploits the issue of race, a natural, rigid and involuntary concept of identity as opposed to the conceived, flexible and voluntary concept of ethnicity (cf. Brubaker 2009: 25), in the service of the journal's dissimilation strategy in that despite their relatively recent common history and religion, Kurds are racially –that is fundamentally, naturally and involuntarily- different from the Turks and Arabs and by implication all other Ottomans. It is also important to notice how the author reduces the difference between the Armenians and Kurds to their differing religions in an attempt to bring the two communities closer to each other.

Another remarkable aspect of the author's primordialist racial politics pertains to the connection he makes between race and biological traits, e.g., intelligence[599] as he argues that since they belong to the same Aryan race, Kurds are as smart as the Germans;[600] the Kurds are legging behind only because, unlike the Germans, they lack a national unity.

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[598] 'Kurd ber[î] le nebuwwet hebûn mewcûd bûn. Kurd le eqwamî aryen le paş bi'set qismê le ewan wekû ême, wekû efxan, wekû îran dînî islamiyan qebûl kird… Qismî le ewan wekû rûm, wekû ermen, wekû elman le ser rêgey cehaleta manewe. Çi rûm, çi ermenî, çi elman, çi portekîz emane hemû le 'irqî kurd in. Diqqet fermûn xwardman libasman, 'en'enatman wekû 'ecem e le ber ixtilatî legel Bexda cuz'î ferqman heye… Elman û zebanî elman zor muuşabeheti be kurd heye… ew weqte tehqîq eka ke kurd çend zekî û çend ez-an êsta ke madam ke iddi'a ekeyn û delên elman le 'irqî kurd e, esbabî çi ye, ew ewende tereqqî kird û ême be cahilî mayinewe, esbabî me'lûm e. Çûnke ewan ber le hemû çeşt nifaqiyan ref' kird' (Kurdî (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm)*'Esl û Neslî Kurd'* [The Origins and Ancestors of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 217-218)).

[599] The promotion of the Germans in this context can also be regarded as an act of reverse-orientalism.

[600] In the continuation his article, which I could not produce here due to the lack of space, the author explains in length the Germans' successful achievements in science.

A similar historical narrative about the origins of the Kurds comes from Xezal, who wrote:

> O Brothers! First and foremost we need to know the times of our ancestors. So far whoever has forgotten their ancestors have vanished… The history of us Kurds and Armenians[601] goes back to the Assyrians. Assyrians constituted a great power back then… In the past… we had everything like our language and our writing and reading system. After we became subordinate to the Arabs we lost everything except for our language… When the Arabs lost power, we fell into the hands of the Turks [Rom]… [602]

After emphasizing the importance of history for nations as an ontological matter, Xezal constructs Kurds along with the Armenians as the descendants of the Assyrians. The discrepancy between his account and that of Ebdilkerîm, who traced the origins of the Kurdish back to the Aryans, indicates that there is still a discursive negotiation about Kurds' origins. In any case, nationalism is the site where different versions of historical narratives contest and negotiate with each other. Still the core of these debates on genealogy is the pursue of authenticity in the ancient past to disassociate and distance the Kurdish identity from the other hegemonic identities and to justify the present claims to nationhood.

The author's use of the historically expanded deictic *'em'* (us) signifies the Kurds during four different historical periods namely the time of the ancient Assyrians (2500 BCE), the advent of Islam (7th century CE), the arrival of the Ottomans, (16th century CE) and the early 20th century, underlining the uninterrupted

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[601] The original term used in the text is 'file' (Christian) which refers to the Armenians.

[602] 'Gelî bira; berî hemû tiştî lazim e ku em dema kal[ê] xuna bizanin, heya nûka her kî ke bapîr[ê] xu, mezinê xu nas nekirîye mirîye,..Em kurmanc û fille pêşiya me bi hev ra diçê digihê "Asûrîya". Asûr berê hukûmeteke pirrî mezin bû…. Weqta berê… zimanê me, nivîsandina me, xwandina me, tevda, tevda gelek tiştê me hebû, paşî ku'" ereba" em kirin bindestê, me tenê ziman[ê] xu berneda, wekî din çîyê me hebû me ji giştika dest kişand... Zeman[ê] ke 'ereb jî xu winda kirin, em îcar ketin nav lep[ê] 'roma''… (Xezal, *'Dema Kalê Me – Çaxa Me – Dema Tê'* [The Time of Our Ancestors – Our Time – The Future], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 122-124)).

historical continuity of the Kurds throughout centuries as an identifiable coherent ethnic community, if not a 'nation'.[603] After nostalgically recalling the glorious days of Kurdish culture, the author depicts the reign of Arabs and Turks as periods of collective suffering as Kurds lost everything but their language during the Arab dominance. Then he significantly asserts that Kurds 'fall into the hands of the Rom [Turks]'. Here the equation of the Turks with Ottomans should not go unnoticed because as I have argued throughout this study Kurdish intellectuals were not naïve devotees of the notion of Ottomanism, on the contrary, they knew too well the strong relation between Turkish and Ottoman concepts. Interestingly in both Xezal and Ebdilkerîm accounts the Kurds are racially affiliated with the Armenians perhaps for a possible collaboration in case the empire collapsed a suggestion made by Abdurrahman Bedir Khan in the journal *Kurdistan*.

6.2.4. The Discursive Construction of Common Culture

Similar to *Kurdistan* and *KTTG, Rojî Kurd* continued to reproduce and reinterpret, in its identity politics, such cultural traits as social values, memories, cultural behaviours, customs, traditions, symbols, and so forth that amounted to 'the Kurdish national character' and as such were meant to generate an imagined 'community of character'. These distinguishing features of Kurdish cultural peculiarities were expected to create social and political solidarity among co-nationals and serve as a tool of boundary maintenance between Kurds and non-Kurds.

Nevertheless, while *Kurdistan* but particularly *KTTG* constructed a particular Kurdish culture to present Kurds as a distinguished ethno-national group as a part of the broader Ottoman culture, in *Rojî Kurd* there is a fundamental discursive shift from this Ottomanist approach. In that Rojî *Kurd* presented a new

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[603] In addition, the corpus of *Rojî Kurd* is full of temporal references that refer to the ancient history of the Kurds.

image of the Kurdish nation constructed through the discourse of folkloric and racial peculiarities.

As we saw earlier, *Rojî Kurd* published examples of classic Kurdish poetry, including the work of Khani and Koyi because they were convinced that language and literature with their nation-forming power were essential elements of common culture and national identity (cf. Dominian 1917: 318; Brennan 1990: 52). *Rojî Kurd*'s repertoire of Kurdish common culture also included various prosaic and poetic genres – articles, short stories, historical anecdotes, as well as classical and contemporary poetry. In this generic abundance the journal presented a richer Kurdish verbal art in both Sorani and Kurmanji varieties compared to *Kurdistan* and *KTTG*. In this sense, the cultivation of Kurdish literature as a discursive act was to bestow Kurdish language with authenticity, validity and prestige proving its capacity as a language of literature vis-à-vis the hegemonic Arab, Persian and Turkish literatures (Hassanpour 1992: 84; 2003: 121). Furthermore, the publication of Sorani and Kurmanji poems were meant to present a Kurdish 'high culture' and in this way to instill Kurds with a shared sense of national pride.

It is noteworthy that the content of stanzas taken from Kani and Koyi poetry was as important as their form. For instance, Halil Hayali often reproduced such stanzas to add credibility and weight to his argument through the voices of such higher authorities, religious scholars and visionary poets inspired by Kurdish 'national' spirit. Furthermore, Hayali, similar to what Bedirkhan Brothers had done in journal *Kurdistan*, reproduced these stanzas to convey his radical and nationalist messages through poems of Khani and Koyi who explicitly resented the Turkish, Arab and Persian hegemony over Kurds and proposed the reversal of this situation, a political stance that could not be overtly express directly by Hayali due to the concerns about state retaliation. These stanzas served at the ideological and political level as they created a link between language, literature and identity politics (cf. Fishman 1972).

Remarkably, in the corpus of *Rojî Kurd* we also see the first example of modern

Kurdish short story entitled *'Çîrok'* [Story] by Fû'ad Temo, published in a piece-meal fashion.[604] The story is full of Kurdish characteristic modes of expressions such as idioms. It depicts the Kurdish agrarian community in a village setting in which the main character is a young boy named *'Şewêş'* the son of a widowed shepherded. The plot is the poverty-stricken life of a shepherd and his son *'Şewêş'* who every night waits for his father to return from the grazing fields. When one day the father falls sick unable to get out of his bed, the villagers begin taking care of the child. Therefore, in terms of its social conditions and relations, the plot resonates with a typical life of poor Kurdish villagers, their communal solidarity, mannerism and customs. The story in a way evades the class-stratification by bringing the wealthy and the poor together in the Andersonian (2006) notion of 'horizontal comradeship, which has enabled the author of the story a member of the urbanized Kurdish middle-class to relate to the Kurdish commoners.

This brings us to a significant discursive shift in the corpus of *Rojî Kurd* vis-à-vis the journal's treatment of the agrarian Kurdish community. As we saw, in their critique of the Kurdish commoners and peasantry all three journals but particularly *Kurdistan* and *KTTG* developed contempt for peasants and adopted a harsh authoritarian discourse of discipline in which they reproached and humiliated the peasant commoners for their ignorance and backward situation. However, *Rojî Kurd* distinguished itself with a more populist discourse that glorified the lower classes and sought authenticity in peasantry, e.g., in the peasants' language, culture, customs, religion, literature, and folklore. This discursive shift is most clearly observed in Hayali's writings as Hayali himself had joined the elitist voice of the *KTTG* in scolding the lower Kurdish classes for their ignorance. In his articles published in *Rojî Kurd,* Hayali becomes a figure that spearheaded this more favourable view of peasantry. For instance, in an article he calls upon the city dwellers on behalf of the Kurdish peasants to resist

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[604] This incomplete story was published in the 1st and 2nd issue of the paper. Although a note in the second part of the story in the 2nd issue said 'to be continued' we do not see the rest of the story neither in the corpus of *Rojî Kurd* nor that of *Hetawî Kurd.*

assimilation and return to their ethno-national roots:

> O people of the city: You and we were brothers in the same tribe and village… We shared our joy and sorrows…

> Time set you apart from us; you went to the cities… You got rich… we remained poor and deprived… You gave up Kurdishness [Kurdîtî] and your peasant roots when you learned the language of the city people [605] and considered yourself as members of another nation [cins].[606] Although we are peasants, ignorant and deprived, we do not give up our nationality.

> Why are you ashamed of us? If you blame us for our ignorance, you are responsible of this… We could be civilized like you if you had helped us. Our and your essence [cewher] was the same…[607]

Analogous to the Herderian notion of 'cultural populism' within romantic nationalism, which had long promoted the 'nurturing peasant culture, from which the nation's native genius sprang,' the author Hayali gives a voice to the Kurdish lower classes in villages arguing that the peasantry and the lower classes have faithfully preserved the authenticity, folklore and the glory of the Kurdish ethno-cultural distinctiveness as they have remained isolated from the foreign influences. Accordingly, the country-dwellers are not simply primitive peasants

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[605] He means Turkish language.

[606] He means Turkish nation. The term 'cins' still refers to 'nationality' in modern Arabic.

[607] 'Gelî xelq[ê] bajêr: Em û hûn di gundeki da di nav 'eşîrek da biray[ê] hev bûn. Şîna me, şayiya me, hewara me yek bû...

Dewr [û] zeman we ji me ra qetand, hûn çûne bajaran, em mane li gundan… hûn xudanmal bûn, em feqîr û belengaz man. Gava ku hûn ziman[ê] xelq[ê] bajêr hîn bûn ji gundîtî û ji kurdîtî vegeran, xo ji cinsek dî hesab kir… Her çiqa em gundî ne, nezan û belengaz in, feqat em ji cins[ê] xu naborin.

Hûn çi ra ji me 'ar dikin? Sûc[ê] me eger nezanîna me ye, sebeb[ê] wê jî hûn in. Eger… we jî mirovatiyek… bikira îro em jî wekî we şareza… dibûn… cewher[ê] me û ê we yek bû…' (.X., *'Gilî û Gazin'* [Complaint and Reproach], *Rojî Kurd* No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 224-226)).

the way the urbanites see them, but they are the repository of the Kurdish folklore and national culture. Then Hayali expresses his observations about how urbanization has brought a loosening of ties to this authentic Kurdish culture and estranged the cosmopolitan intellectuals, upper-class strata and urbanites (cf. Fishman 1972: 8). In fact, individuals who lived in cities were exposed to the Turkish language and were more likely to learn and use Turkish than their peers who stayed in villages (cf. Bruinessen 2006: 31). Even though the linguistic assimilation might not always lead to a change of ethnic identity (Connor 1972) the author presents the situation as such by asserting that linguistic assimilation from Kurdish language to that of a different ethnic group, i.e., Turks, has resulted in ethnic assimilation.

Then the author highlights the *'essence'* [cewher], which refers to the *'Kurdish national essence'* shared by the Kurdish peasants and city dwellers along with their collective joy and sorrow. Notice how the author uses the simple past tense i.e. *'bû'* (was) when highlighting this common essence as a thing of the past that should be revived towards reconciliation among the Kurdish peasantry and the city dwellers. Like Herder who exhorted his fellow-Germans to return to their indigenous roots, the author Hayali urges his fellow-Kurds to return to their native culture (Herder 1877-1913, cited in Smith 2003: 27). This social and political solidarity would in turn incorporate the peasantry that was the storehouse and guardians of authentic Kurdish folklore, and the modernized city dwellers in the same national community forming a new national culture or a collective 'high culture,' to use Gellner's term. Finally the author remarkably laments the attitude of the urbanized Kurds for being ashamed of the 'primitive' Kurdish culture intead of taking pride in it, which constitutes another nationalist approach similar to that of Herder, who once said: 'Let us follow our own path… let all men speak well or ill of our nation, our literature, our language: they are ours, they are ourselves and let that be enough' (*ibid*.).

A similar glorification of the authentic peasant culture is observed in Ergani Medenli Y. C.' article in which the author claims that the Kurdish women in rural

areas are more liberal compared to the Kurdish women in cities who are more conservative. The author, rather in an implicite manner, attributes conservatism to the influence of Islam.[608] More on Y.C.'s article will follow shortly.

What is more, Kurds' distinctive and 'superior' cultural peculiarities were attributed to their non-Turkish, non-Arab and non-Ottoman racial identity. Fahri, in one article argued:

> As we said, Kurds, throughout their history, have had a great tendency and ability toward progress and raising their level of civilization… the proof of this is their national and racial peculiarities…. in addition to their spiritual and characteristic virtues and moral values such as generosity, bravery, hospitality and trustworthiness…[609]

As we saw in the previous section a major distinction between Kurds, on the one hand, and Arabs and Turks, on the other, was made through racial politics in which the authors traced the origins of the Kurds to the –non-Turkish and non-Arab- Aryan and Assyrian civilizations. The same racial politics is utilized here to attribute the cultural idiosyncrasies of the Kurds, which are presented with the lexemes of bravery, generosity, etc., to their distinctive racial or phenotypical characteristics (cf. Brubaker 2009: 25).

This perennialist/essentialist approach to the national character is reiterated in another article where the author says:

> The inherent bravery of Kurdishness and its noble character that stems from its race has shown the merit of being on the front lines of the armies since the beginning of the Islam and has done wonders on the battle field.

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[608] See, Ergani Madenli Y. C., *'Kürdlerde Kadin Meselesi'* [The Issue of Woman Among Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 209-211.

[609] 'Kürdlerin seviyye-i medeniyyelerinin yükselmesi içün ta kadîmden berü büyük bir meyi ve isti'dâd-ı terakki perverde eylediklerinin… şahidi âdât-ı kavmiyye ve te'âmülât-ı 'ırkiyyelerinin ve ahlâkiyyâtda sahavet, şecâ'at, mihmânperverlik, civânmerdlik gibi secaya ve mezâyâ-yi rûhiyyeleridir' ((Fahrî, *'Kürdlerde Kabiliyyet-i Temeddün'* [Kurds' Civilizational Abilities], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 106-107)).

But unfortunately, despite this, it has not been able to recover from the state of being forgotten and abandoned. [610]

Here too the author attempts to construct an image of nation through the discourses of racial dissimilarities to underline the distinctive, inherent and superior qualities of stereotypical Kurdish mind and character with self-admiration. [611] Then, through *the strategy of the shift of blame* the author holds, albeit implicitly, the Ottomans or the other Islamic communities responsible for the backward situation of the Kurds.[612]

Rojî Kurd also incorporated the role of woman in the Kurdish society into its discourse. As we saw, in *Kurdistan*, from a male gendered perspective, women were seen as the property and the chaste mothers of the nation (Mojab 2001: 76) and as such they needed to be protected against infidels. *KTTG* adopted a more refined treatment of women who bravely assisted their husbands in times of difficulties including fighting with them side by side in wars. The depiction of the Kurdish women as such was meant to add further quality to the unique Kurdish culture within the broader Ottoman culture. However, *Rojî Kurd*, in a more sophisticated way constructed a Kurdish women profile from the perspective of gender equality to disassociate the Kurdish culture from that of the Ottomans. The most elaborate argument came from Ergani Madenli Y. C. in an article entitled 'The Issue of Woman in the Kurdish Society.' After explaining the

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[610] 'Kürdlüğün meftûr olduğu şecâ'at-ı ırsiyye ve asâlet-i 'ırkıyyesiyle edvârı evvelîn-i İslâmiyyeden beri orduların ilk saflarında bulunmak meziyyetini göstermiş ve bu meydân-ı ma'âlî-perestîde dâ'imâ hârikalar ibda' eylemiş ve fakat ma' a't-te'essüf bütün buna rağmen hîç bir vakit mensî ve mehcûr kalmak bahtsızlığından tahlîs-i nefs idememişdir' (Salih Bedir Khan, *'Kiliçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 174-176)).

[611] Several other *Rojî Kurd* writers also touched upon various elements of Kurdish culture, these included M. Salih Bedir Khan, Bâbânzâde, Hayali and M. Bedir Khan. Malmisanij is of the opinion that M. Bedir Khan probably was Mikdad Midhat Bedir Khan, the founder and the first editor of the journal *Kurdistan*, *See*, Malmisanij (2000: 196).

[612] Similar feelings of abandonment by other Muslim nations were expressed elsewhere by other *Rojî Kurd* writers too, for instance an article by Bâbânzâde which was analyzed earlier, *see*, İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde, *'Müslümanlik ve Kürdlük'* [Muslimness and Kurdishness], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 137-139).

advanced role of the woman in the Western societies and its permeation through the Ottoman East, he states:

> I think it goes without saying that the moral and material situation of women in almost the entire Ottoman world is heart-rending… This disease has also infected the [vast] Kurdish family…

> Kurds have an advantage when it comes to reforming the women issues. Let me explain: In Kurdistan, except for the urban centres that have lost their original [Kurdish] character, the place of women in the village life is satisfactory; despite some primitive elements, Kurds show great respect to women.

> …the use of hijab in Kurdish villages and towns is also at a moderate level… Kurdish women are never imprisoned in thick and exhausting sacks.[613] They freely walk around… Women constitute half of workforce in Kurdistan… that means in a Kurdish family, women is close to the level of men in public sphere… the only thing she lacks is a modern education and science.

> The reformation of the citified women, who have lost their original character and the sense of being Kurdish, will require a greater effort and work.

> The progress of a nation is measured by the [role of] their women.[614]

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[613] The author refers to 'çarşaf', a garment worn by women that covers them from head to toe so as to hide their body from the view of men.

[614] 'Hemân bütün 'Osmânlı 'âleminde "kadın"ın maddî ve ma'nevî mevki'inin acınacak bir hâlde bulunduğunu söylemek zâ'iddir zann ideriz… Kürd 'â'ilesi de tabî'atıyla bu hastalıkdan müte'essir ve mutazarrır olmuşdur…

Kadın mes'elesinin ıslâhında da Kürdler husûsî bir suhulete tesadüf ideceklerdir. Şimdi îzâh idelim: Kürdistanda seciyye-i asliyyesini gayb itmiş şehir merkezlerinden sarf-ı nazar idersek ekseriyyetde, köylü hayâtında kadının mevki'i bütün ibtidâî'ligiyle beraber şâyân-ı memnûniyyetdir. Kürdler arasında kadın pek muhterem telakki idilir.

Kürd köylerinde kasabalarında tesettür de nisbeten ma'kûl bir hâldedir dînin, mantığın emr itdiği tesettürden fazla bir şey yokdur. Kürd kadınları hîç bir zaman kalın ve yorucu çuvallar içerüsünde mahbûs değiller kemâl-i serbesti ile gezerler… Kürdistanda sa'yımn nısfını kadınlar der-'uhde ider… Demek Kürd 'â'ilesinde kadın hayât-ı hâriciyyede erkeğe yakın bir derecede çalışıyor…

In the outset of his article the author Y. C. expresses the heart-rending [acınacak] place of gender relations in the 'Ottoman world'. Then he proudly depicts the more prestigious place of the women in the 'Kurdish family' as a distinguishing feature of the Kurdish ethno-cultural identity that dis-identifies the Kurds from the entire Ottoman society. He presents the presence of women in the workforce side by side with men and the scarcity of wearing the Islamic hijab as signs of modernity and gender equality in the Kurdish society comparing it with the inferior position of the oppressed Ottoman women. It is remarkable that the author mockingly refers to Ottoman women's outfit as a sack and prison.

To stress the favourable role of the women in the Kurdish society he particularly excludes, from this progressive profile of Kurdish women, those Kurdish women living in urban centres that have estranged from the 'authentic' and more liberal Kurdish culture and identity and melted into the conservative Islamo-Ottoman culture. Then the author significantly asserts that gender relations should be the yardsticks for progress in a society.[615] `

6.2.5. The Discursive Construction of National Body (Common Territory and Homeland)

We saw in the two previous journals, how the nationalist ideology carried the Kurdish inhabited territories from a geographical space to a new ontological level in ways that did not exist previously. Throughout this study the gradual semantic progression in the term 'welat' (homeland) has served as a barometer in regards to the construction of Kurdistan as the national Kurdish homeland. Although,

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noksan olan 'asra, zamana muvafık terbiyye ve 'ilimdir.

Kürdlerin telakkiyyât ve secâyâ-yı asliyyesini gâ'ib itmiş şehir kadınlarının ıslâhı daha ziyâde zahmet ve kuvvet sarf itmekle mümkin olabilecekdir'

Bir milletin nisvânı, derece-i terakkisinin mizanıdır' (Ergani Madenli Y. C., *'Kürdlerde Kadin Meselesi'* [The Issue of Woman Among Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 209-211)).

[615] Another figure that constantly promoted Kurdish women was Halil Hayali who in one article wrote, 'education is a religious obligation for Muslim women and man alike' (Modanî X. *'Ziman û Nezaniya Kurdan'* [The Language and Ignorance of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 160-162)).

particularly in *KTTG* discourse, the term *'welat'* acquired a more established meaning and came to signify the 'national homeland' as opposed to the 'native region or province', the term still remained vague or elusive, because the journal occasionally stretched the meaning of *'welat'* to include the whole Ottoman territory the way the journal *Kurdistan* had done. However, in the corpus of *Rojî Kurd* the term *'welat'* completed its semantic shift and denotational meaning for the most part [616] and came to unmistakably signify the Kurdish national homeland. M. S. Bedirkhan in an article stated the following:

> From now on we all… our learned as well as our ignorant, should open
> our eyes and hold one another's hands and work hard for the salvation
> [silamet] of Kurds and liberate the homeland [welat]… [617]

Here the term 'welat' clearly refers to the Kurdish national homeland. That is, through the concordance of the words 'Kurd' and 'homeland' (cf. Baker 2006: 71) the term 'welat' signifies the Kurdish national homeland. This semantic change will become clearer in the rest of this section as I analyse more texts from the corpus of *Rojî Kurd*.

The corpus of *Rojî Kurd* is full of taken-for-granted assumptions that establish Kurdistan as the Kurdish national homeland. Consider the following extract:

> When you return to your national territory [muhît-i milliye] first you should
> lay the foundations for a primary education based on solid and rational
> methods and disseminate it as much as possible. [618]

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[616] It is important to note that the only in a few instances the 'term' welat did not refer to Kurdistan but it referred to the Islamic homeland [welatê Îslamê]. Even in those cases the term 'welat' was modified by the word 'Islam' for clarity.

[617] 'Edî divê em hemî... zanay[ê] me û nezanay[ê] me hemî cave xwe vekin û dest bidin hev û ji silameta kurdanî [re] pire bixebitin, welatî ji tehlikeye xelas bikin' (M. S. Azîzî *'Hişyar Bin'* [Be Wakeful], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 154-155)).

[618] 'Muhît-i millîye 'avdet idince sizin en evvel çalışacağınız cihet, tahsîl-i ibtidâ'îyi gayet metîn ve ma'kûl usûller üzerine te'sîs itmek ve mekâtib-i ibtidâ'iyyeyi mümkin olduğu kadar teksir eylemekdir' (Bulgaristanli Togan, *'Milletinize Karşu Vazifeniz'* [Your Duty Towards Your Nation] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 134-136)).

In this extract the author underlines the dissemination of education in Kurdistan and to this end he calls upon the Kurdish leadership and youth in Istanbul to return to their *'national territory'* for this purpose, in which the *'national territory'* renders Istanbul as a foreign territory, a 'general elsewhere' and Kurdistan as the Kurdish intellectuals' *'national territory'* that is their national homeland.

Similarly, in the obituary of Huseyin Kenan (Paşa) Bedir Khan it is stated that:

> … Compelled to live off the holdings he had inherited from his family, [Huseyin Kenan Paşa] felt the necessity to return to his *'original homeland'* [vatan-ı aslîye] and therefore has returned back to Kurdistan with his brother Osman Paşa.[619]

Here, through the adjective *'original'* [aslî] that modifies *'homeland'* [vatan], which together form a strong 'homeland-making phrase', the text subtly conveys that Istanbul, or any other Ottoman territory outside of Kurdistan, is not the 'original' or 'native' homeland of the Paşa and thus that of the Kurds. The term 'Kurdistan' in the last clause consolidates the fact that the referent of the phrase *'original homeland'* is Kurdistan turning Kurdistan into a national homeland and a primary element of Kurdish national identity.

Although we still do not come across any visual cartographic maps of Kurdistan, we observe that the editorial board of *Rojî Kurd*, like those of *Kurdistan* and *KTTG*, constructed discursive maps of the Kurdish homeland. For instance, Kerküklü Necmeddin wrote:

> I want to explicate, as much as possible, the service provided to the office
> of the Caliphate by Kurds, who occupy the entire Mosul, Van, Diyarbakir,
> Elazig and Erzurum provinces as well as parts of Aleppo, Damascus,

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[619] 'bi'z-zarûr hisse-i ırsiyyesini istircâ' ile yaşamak için vatan-ı aslîye 'azîmetmecbûriyyetini hiss itmiş ve biraderi 'Osman Paşa ile beraber Kürdist.na 'azîmet eylemiştir…' (Anonymous, *'Hayat-i Meşahir: Bedirhanî Hüseyin Paşa'* [The Lives of Notables] *Rojî Kurd*, August 14, 1913, No. 3, in KXK (2013: 172-173)).

Bagdad and Sivas –which consists the Kurds living under the Ottoman sovereignty only.[620]

Here the author draws the map of the Ottoman Kurdistan by naming cities presenting them as virtually homogenous geoethnic Kurdish territories whose borders were demarcated by territories inhabited by non-Kurdish 'others'. The spatial reference of the last clause, i.e., 'under the Ottoman sovereignty,' implies that a part of the greater Kurdish territory extend beyond the limits of the Ottoman sovereignty an indirect reference to the Kurdish territories under the Qajar Dynasty. [621] These discursively drawn maps translate into the nationalist claims over territorial ownership while arousing nationalist sentiments. It is noteworthy that this is the first time that a Kurdish journal refers to the 'Greater Kurdistan' partitioned between the Safavid -later on Qajar- and the Ottomans Empires.

Religious allusion has always been an indispensable element of the Kurdish Kurdish journalistic discourse whenever they attempted to promote a concept that was new to the Kurdish society. This was true of the journal's construction of the common homeland in nationalist terms. Kurdî (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm) defending the nationalist line of the journal Rojî Kurd said that the Prophet *commanded* that emotional attachment to the national homeland is a part of the

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[620] 'Musul, Vân, Diyârbekir, Ma'm.retü'l-'azîz ve Erzurum vilâyâtının 'umûmu ile Haleb, Şam, Bağdâd, Sîvâs vilâyâtının bir kısmında yaşayan Kürdlerin -ki zîr-I hâkimiyyet-i 'Osmâniyyede bulunanları bunlardan 'ibâretdir- makâm-ı hilâfete itdikleri hıdemâtı mehmâ-emken teşrih itmek istiyorum…' (Kerküklü Necmeddin, *'Kurd Talebe Cemiyyeti ve Kürdlerin Makam-i Hîlafete Hidmetleri'* [Kurdish Hope Society and the Kurdish Service to the Office of Caliphate], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 100-102)).

[621] Halil Hayali draws a similar map, in the 2nd issue of *Rojî Kurd*. After criticizing the Kurdish ulama for not using Kurdish as a written language in their classes, he adds:

> Now we are looking forward to answers from mullahs from Mosul, Diyarbekir, Bitlis, Wan, Erzurum, Baghdad, Sine, Suleimania, Kirkuk and Elazig…
>
> (Niha em çavnêrê cewabên melayên Mûsil û Diyarbekir û Bilîs, Wan û Erzerûm û Bexdad û Sine û Silêmanî, Kerkük û Xerpûtê ne…) (Modanî X. *'Ziman û Nezaniya Kurdan'* [The Language and Ignorance of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 160-162)).

Islamic faith and a religious duty.[622]

One author that dedicated his entire article to the issue of territory was Diyarbekiri Fikri Necdet. In his article significantly entitled 'Our Land' Fikri wrote:

> Today our strength, our glory [and] our humanity all depend on our land. We have inherited this land from our forefathers. Is it [just] a fistful of dirt? In fact, it is not; our land is our mother, our land is our father. If we take good care of it, it will take good care of us too… First and foremost we get our bread from its soil… In addition to these benefits its soil is filled with thousands of things, like gold, silver, copper and coal… If we do not work on our land it will slip through our fingers [and] Christians will start ruling over us. They will make us work like their slaves...Thenceforth religion will be no more [and] the wrath of God will descend on us…[623]

First, the author presents the Kurdish land as a source of 'strength' and 'glory' and a national property inherited from the 'forefathers'. In this sense the construction of the national homeland as an object of primordial attachment generates strong emotional ties. Second, through the metaphor of anthropomorphisation he likens the land to a mother and father, which essentially signify the same characteristic nature: nurturing, caring affectionate and protective. In this way the author transforms the mere soil into a historic territory

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[622] 'Emane hemû delalet le ser ewe eken ke ême be xilafî qise[y] pêxember sel'em hereket ekeyn. Çûnke ewa fermoy: **Hubbu'l-weten mine'l-îmanî**' (Kurdî (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm), *'Esl û Neslî Kurd'* [The Origins and Ancestors of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 217-218)). As we saw in the previous chapter, Halil Hayali used the same hadith in one of his articles in *KTTG*.

[623] 'Îro xurtbûna me, mezinbûna me, mirovbûna me giş li [s]er 'erdê me da ye. Ev 'erd ji bab û kala da ji me ra hatiye… ew 'erde ewya kulmek xulî ye…? Rastê wê hûn buxazin ne usa ye, ew 'erda me diya me ye, ew 'erda me babê me ye… Heke em jêr baş binerin, ewê jî ji me ra baş dinêre… 'Ewil 'ewil hûn zanin ku xwarina me ji 'erdê derdikeve… Ji xeynî van nif [a] xulîya nav da hezartişt heye. Zêr, zîv, sifîr, komur nav da tije ne… ku [li 'erdê xwe] şuxul nekin, nenêrin wî erdî dê ji dest me derkeve, fileyan li ser me rûnin. Me bişuxulînin wek xulam[ê] babê wan. Wê çaxê bi xu ne dîn dimîne ne îcat. Ew car şerr[ê] Xudê li me bibare' Diyarbekirî Fikrî Necdet, *'Erdê Me'* [Our Land], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 188-189)).

and ancestral land (cf. Smith 2003: 31). Third the author evokes the nurturing fertility of the land's agricultural and mineral resources as well as gold and silver, which are essential for the nation's economic wellbeing. These material resources are important in nationalist discourses only when they are used to strengthen what are fundamentally emotional bonds to the homeland. The author concludes his argument with religious allusion by claiming that if Kurds do not reciprocate the care, protection and affection they get from the land, then the land will fall into the hands of Christian Armenians who will enslave the Kurds and wipe out their religion. In turn, God will also punish Kurds for losing that land to Christians. Thus, the protection of the homeland is first and foremost a religious duty.

It is important to note that relations with the Armenians was not a prevalent issue in *Rojî Kurd*, the way it was in *Kurdistan* and KTTG. Nevertheless a few authors did take up this issue from various perspectives; while some presented the Armenians as a role model of modernity for Kurds, e.g. Abdullah Cevdet (Duman 2010: 126), others claimed that the Armenians and Kurds were descendants of the same race, e.g., Kurdî (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm) and Xezal. Both views promoted friendly relations with Armenians. Nevertheless, the territorial dispute between the two was a vivid issue in the minds of both communities. One figure that took up the territorial disputes[624] between the two groups was M. S. Bedirkhan, who, like Diyarbekiri Fikri Necdet, perceived the Armenian nationalist ambitions as a threat:

> Although the Armenians[625] and we as two nations [milet] have the same 'homeland' they are far fewer than us; we are stronger and manlier than

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[624] After the Treaty of Berlin (1878) the Armenians remained as the only Christian community that had not attained a sort of autonomy or independence. Therefore, in the 1890s American missionaries were encouraging Armenians to achieve independence. Furthermore both the Treaty of Berlin and the Treaty of San Stefano stipulated reforms under the provision of the Great Powers in six provinces of Anatolia, i.e., Van, Bitlis, Elazig, Diyarbakir, Erzurum and Sivas, which were the parts of what was known as the historical Armenia (Akşin 2007: 45).

[625] The original text uses the term 'file' which generally refers to all Christians but particularly to the Armenian Christians.

them; however today, the whole world assume that they are the owners of

this dear ['ezîz] homeland [welat]… [626]

The author acknowledges the fact that the national homeland claimed by both the Armenians and Kurds overlap. However, he asserts that there are fewer Armenians in Kurdistan vis-à-vis the predominant Kurdish population. Then he regrets that the 'whole world', he probably meant European, 'assumes' that the Armenians are the 'owners' of this homeland. The verb 'assume' [dizane ku][627] conveys that designating the Armenians as the owners of this disputed land is only a political view or belief rather than a *'fact'* because the unexpressed *'fact'* is that the *'true'* owners of the land are the Kurds who form the majority. It is noteworthy that the Turkish translation of this article was published in the same issue of the Rojî Kurd. Although it was not a verbatim translation, the extract analysed above is absent in the Turkish version probably not to offend the Armenian readership.

6.2.6. The Discursive Construction of Identities and Relations between the Kurdish Elite and Commoners

As far as the *interpersonal metafunction* is concerned, one thing that differentiates *Rojî Kurd* from the two former journals pertains to its structural character dominated by the new generation of Kurdish youth who came from various non-dynastic and non-aristocratic backgrounds which had a tremendous effect on the class composition of the *Hêvî Society* and the authors of *Rojî Kurd* (cf. van Bruinessen 1992a: 276; Klein 1996: 29; Kendal 1980: 36-37). Therefore the Kurdish national discursive field incorporated a greater number of non-aristocratic figures, which made possible a broader discursive participation of Kurds from different walks of life. This new setting also changed the nature of the relations between the Kurdish elite and the commoners. Some of the non-

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[626] 'Heke em û heke fille em du milet in, bi welatekî ne, ew ji me zehf hindik û kêm in… lê îro li ber hemî 'alemê… dizane ku ew xudanê vî welatê 'ezîz in' (M. Salih Bedir Khan *'Berî Şîrê Qelem'* [Pen before the Sword] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3., August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 189-194)).

[627] In modern Kurmanji the equivalent of the verb 'to assume' is 'wisa zanîn', 'wisa bawer kirin' or wisa hesibandin.'

aristocratic figures included Diyarberkirli Fikrî Necdet, Kerküklü Necmeddin [Huseyin], Abdullah Cevdet, Suleymaniyeli Abdulkerim and Halil Hayali,[628] Their role in the Kurdish political landscape caused the formation of Kurdish national identity discourse to go beyond the monopoly of the previous smaller circle of the aristocratic or religious elite and toward a more populist discourse (Duman 2010).

Consequently, *Rojî Kurd,* became the site of an elusive 'confrontation' between this new social and political force and the previous Kurdish leadership as manifested in the *Hêvî Society*'s declaration:

> O the Kurdish ulama, sheikhs, leaders, nobles!
>
> … You comprehend better than us the situation of the Kurdishness [Kürdlüğün]; and capable of determining it needs and priorities. Therefore, we never dare to lead you off or give you advice. Nevertheless, with your permission we would like to point out that, one thing that the Kurdish nobility has not comprehended is the damage caused by the discord among themselves [the Kurds]... [given this discord] today, the Kurdish ulama and nobles have no greater duty than their national and religious duty. The destiny of a great component of Islam is in your hands…[629]

Notice how the deictic 'we' and 'us' powerfully refer to the new young Kurdish generation establishing it as a new social and political force vis-à-vis the

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[628] Still the member of the Kurdish aristocracy were involved in the *Hêvî Society* but especially in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd* through their writings, including those by Bâbânzâde and Bedir Khan families.

[629] 'Ey Kürd ulemâsı, meşâyihi, ümerâsı, eâzımı!

...Kürdlüğün ne halde bulunduğunu, ihtiyâcâtının derecesini bizden eyi idrâk ve ta'yîn edersiniz. Binâenaleyh size yol göstermek, akıl öğretmek cür'etinde bulunmayız.

Yalnız müsâadenizle, şunu diyeceğiz ki, Kürd eâzımının, Kürdlük içün bu âna kadar mazarrâtını anlayamadıkları bir şey varsa o da aralarındaki nifâk ve şikakdır... Kürd ulemâ ve ümerâsının bugünkü vazîfeleri kadar ağır dînî ve mîllî hiçbir vazîfe yokdur. Koca bir unsur-i Islamın mukadderâtı sizin elinizde...' (*The Founding Declaration of Kurdish Students-Hope Society* [Kürt Telebe-Hêvî Cemiyeti'nin Beyannamesidir], *Hetawî Kurd*, No: 4-5, 10 May 1914, p. 1-4, reproduced in Malmîsanij (2002: 257-261)).

aristocratic elite in the new Kurdish political landscape.[630] Then through carefully worded sentences the text exercises extreme caution as to avoid any pontifical or boastful manner that might offend the older generation of Kurdish religious and secular leaders and activists.[631] This humble tone is particularly noticeable in lines 2-4 in such expression as 'you comprehend better than us,' 'we never dare,' 'with your permission' etc. Immediately after these phrases, the text strikes with a severe criticism of the traditional leadership accusing it of the discord and rivalries among Kurds, and hence holding it responsible for the dire social and political situation. Next, in rhetoric of humility, it does 'dare' to give it advice by calling on this stratum to fulfill its national and religious duty. However, it is noteworthy that the religious aspect of this duty is also subordinated to the national unity of the Kurds. Then it is fair to argue that the Hêvî society's declaration was, in a way, the declaration of the age of the Kurdish youth.

However, it is remarkable that this new breed of Kurdish leadership did not seem too eager to assume the *ultimate* leadership of the Kurdish community. Perhaps they did not see in themselves such ability or they were aware that the Kurdish community was traditionalist and in such a traditional society it is not the place of the young to lead. They rather preferred to leave the role of the leadership to the senior figures, while they set themselves up as the architects and watchdog of a new mode of relation between the traditional Kurdish leadership and the Kurdish commoners.[632]

Thus this novelty in the nature of Kurdish leadership added a new dimension to

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[630] The denotational meaning of the deictic words 'we' and 'us' as in 'we/us the youth' does not depend on the immediate context or the textual properties of the text but on the generic voice of the journal which is a periodical owned by the *Kurdish Students-Hope Society*.

[631] From some of articles in *Rojî Kurd* it is clear that either some veteran Kurdish intellectuals expressed their discomfort with the fact that the youth was in charge of the Kurdish political movement rather then the more experienced senior leaders or the society wanted to pre-empt such reactions.

[632] This preference resembles the CUP attitude after the July 1908 revolution in that the Young Turks as junior officers and civil servants preferred to leave the government in the hands of senior Ottoman statesmen while they assumed the position of watchdog (Zürcher 2010: 75).

the *interpersonal metafunction* of the Kurdish journalistic discourse in that while this young generation, like its predecessors, promoted Kurdish social, cultural and political rights before the Ottoman state, it distinguished itself by assuming the role of the mediator between the Kurdish aristocracy and the commoners. That is the journal took upon itself the duty of building a bridge and reshaping the relations between the Kurdish commoners and the Kurdish aristocracy that had hitherto remained alien, for the most part, to the Kurdish masses; Thus *Rojî Kurd* attempted to rally the Kurdish traditional leadership and mobilized the Kurdish masses around the same cause because it felt that there is a reciprocal relationship between various elites and the non-elites based on collaboration and mutual influence.[633] An announcement by the journal management read:

> For anyone with a bit of understanding and wisdom it is beyond all doubts that Kurdishness, in the midst of the vibrant masses of the 20th century, is a paralyzed and ailing if not a dead organ all together. With this paralysis and illness coupled with destitution and the lack of a leadership, the Kurd day by day gets closer to extinction. As we refrain from saying much in this regard we appeal to the Kurds, particularly to the Kurdish nobles, who have seen themselves as the rightful traditional and historical leaders of the Kurds, to think deeply with logic and conscience on this issue.

> The collaboration of a few youth will not provide much benefit because the national mass that matters will fall behind. It is the influential prominent people rather than the youth that is capable of mobilizing this mass.

> At best the youth can utilized such instruments as *Rojî Kurd* and the *Hêvî Society*. The continuation and the success of these instruments depend on the assistance from the Kurdish community but particularly from the

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[633] During the *Hêvî Society's* first congress in 1913, Memduh Selim, the secretary general of the society, complained abouth the traditional Kurdish leadership of the older generation's the lack of interest in the Kurdish cause (Silopî 2007: 43).

Kurdish upper stratum. [634]

Here the text identifies the problems encountered by Kurds through the metaphors of body politic in which the Kurdish nation is presented as a corporate entity like a human body that is stricken with 'illnesses' and thus 'paralyzed', a topos of threat that was popular in all Kurdish journals.[635] Accordingly one of the major reasons for this situation is the Kurdish upper class's lack of 'deep logical thinking' and the 'conscience'. Nevertheless, the author, who represented the Kurdish youth, made sure that every criticism directed to the traditional Kurdish leadership was accompanied by a humble and flattering voice through the strategy of euphemism to mitigate his harsh tone (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 36).[636] This strategy is obvious in the last section of the first paragraph where the author adopts a humbler tone with the expression 'as we refrain from saying much' probably out of respect for the upper class, the major political entity that actually has had a say in social and political matters. However, this humble manner is followed by another harsh criticism in the next clause where the author states that the members of the traditional Kurdish leadership–perhaps the Bedirkhan and Baban families- have seen themselves as the God-given leaders of the Kurds. By implication the sentence communicates that this stratum has failed to

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[634] 'Cüz'î idrâk ve ta'akkulu olan herkes için şekk û şübheden 'ârî bir müte'ârife olmak lâzım gelir ki Kürdlük, bugünkü (yirminci 'asr kütle-i hayâtdân) içünde bir 'uzv-ı meyyit değilse de, bu 'uzv meflûc veya ma'lûldür. Bu felç ve 'illete munzamm olan bî-keslik ve sâhibsizlik ile Kürdün geçirdiği her gün onu inkıraza yaklaşdıran bir 'âmil-i müdhiş oluyor… Biz bu mebhasde fazla söz söylemekden ictinâb iderek, 'umûm Kürdlerin, husûsan 'ale'lhusûs 'umûm Kürdleri idare ve sevk itmeği 'an'anevî bir hakk, bir hakk-ı mükteseb-i târihî olarak iddi'â iden Kürd ekâbir ve e'azımının bu nokta üzerinde, 'akıl ve insaf ile derince düşünmelerini rica ideriz…

Üç beş gencin el ele verüb ilerlemesi bir fâ'ide vermez. Asıl kütle-i milliyye geride kalır. Bu kütleyi yürütecek olan… gençlerden ziyâde… müteneffizân ve ekâbirdir.

Gençler olsa olsa böyle Rojî Kurd gibi, Hêvî gibi vâsıtalar ihzar idebilirler. Bu vesâ'itin imkân-ı pâyidârîsi ve muvaffakıyyeti Kürdlük hey'et-i ictimâ'iyyesinden, daha ziyâde Kürdlük tabaka-i 'âliyye sinden mazhar olacağı mu'âvenete merbûtdur' (Journal Management *Yükselmek İçün Himmet Lazımdır* [Progress Requires Hard Work], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK, 2013, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 214-215)).

[635] A number of articles in all three journals covered in this study use the disease metaphor to express the situation of the Kurdish society.

[636] Although the text does not directly accuse this upper class of not being logical and consciences, it implies that by calling on them to be as such.

fulfill its role given the disastrous situation of the Kurds.

It seems that *Rojî Kurd* and *Hêvî Society* assigned the role of leadership to the Kurdish notables rather than to themselves. This is apparent in the rest of the extract above as the text mentions the Society's and the journal's activities in a very modest way which could only be auxiliary to the activities of the nobles the 'true' and the supreme leaders of the Kurds.[637] In a similar manner, a number of articles in *Rojî Kurd* assigned the role of the supreme leadership to this upper stratum for the mobilization of the Kurdish masses.[638] Consider the following extract from Hayali entitled 'To the Kurdish Nobles':

> O Kurdish nobles, you know too well that your ancestors took great pride
> in Kurdishness, and when the situation arose they sacrificed their wealth
> and their lives for the cause of Kurdishness and Muslimness for which
> history is the witness. What has happened [to you] today that you ceased
> to lead the Kurds? Is it because you no longer carry the blood of your
> ancestors [in your veins]?... [639]

Here through the use of *strategy of unification and cohesivation* (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 38) the author tries to construct a positive political continuity in which he excites the national feelings of the members of the Kurdish nobilities reminding them of their historical roles as leaders by evoking what their ancestors have allegedly done for the Kurds. Then by posing the rhetorical question about their ancestral origins through the metaphor of blood and kinship the author attempts

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[637] It is important to note that the reverse was the case in the discursive practices of *Kurdistan* and *KTTG* in that both journals presented themselves as the principle educatiors while they designated the Kurdish dignitaries as their auxiliaries.

[638] As the history would show later on it was in fact Sheikh Said and Sheikh Mahmud two prominent Kurdish figures equipped with religious authority that rallied Kurds around a common national cause.

[639] 'Gelî mazin[ên] kurdan! Hûn qenc dizanin ku bab û bapîr[ê] we mezinayiya "kurdan" ji bo xwe şeref zaniye û gava qewimiye di riya wan da û di riya misilmanî da mal[ê] xwe, can[ê] xwe daye, şahid[ê] vê qise[yê] jî tarîx e. Iro çi ciriyaye û çi qewimiye ku hûn wekî wan mezinayî li kurdan nakin… Nexu di we de xuna kal û baban nemaye…' (M. X., *'Ji Mezinên Kurdan Ra'* [To the Kurdish Nobles] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 4 September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 222-223)).

to provoke them into fulfilling their leadership role by mobilizing and leading Kurds.[640]

Another author that concerned himself with the issue of disunity and the failure of the traditional Kurdish leadership was Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm. In an article entitled 'Always Me and No One Else' he asserted:

> There are many reasons for the trouble and disease that have fallen up us. The first reason is that… we are in fact a nation [qewmêkî] without unity. The reason for our disunity [bê ittifaqîşman] … [is that] our noblemen (gewrekaman)… have invented a profession for themselves… However, this has resulted in their own and the Kurdish nation's destruction. This profession consists of a couple words: 'Always me and no one else…'[641]

Here, the author openly accuses the Kurdish traditional leadership of the Kurdish disunity due to the fact that the rivalries among the Kurdish dynastic families for the leadership position –significantly indicated in the title of the article (Always Me and No One ElsE) has resulted in their failure to unite and lead the Kurdish masses. Although the author refrains from citing any names he perhaps referred to the rival Baban and Bedir Khan families.

It is noteworthy that although *Rojî Kurd* tried to play the role of an intermediary between the Kurdish aristocratic elite and the commoners, it sided with the Kurdish masses and often called upon the Kurdish aristocracy and the elite through the voice of Kurdish commoners as evident in Hayali's articles:

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[640] In another article Hayali calls on the Kurdish leadership in the following words:

'Oh omnipotent Lord! Fill the hearts of the sheikhs, mullahs and the mîrs of the Kurds with mercy so that they embark on the duty of awakening the Kurds'. [Ya rebbî tu qadir î! Rehmek bixî dil[ê] şêx û mela û mîr û serek[ê] kurdan, rabine piyan, berê xu bidine şiyarkirina wan] (Halil Hayali, *'Ziman'* [Language] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 186-187)).

[641] Derdêk 'illetêk ke tûşî ême bûwe, esbabı zor e. Sebebî ewelî… esasen ême qewmêkî bê ittifaq în. Sebebî bê ittifaqîşman… gewrekanman ta îmro… bo xoyan be ciya meslekiyan îcad kirduwe. Feqet bi'n-netîce sebebî izmihlali xoy û qewmî Kurd e. Em mesleke îbaret e lê du kelîme: Her min bim û kesî tirî nî…' (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm, *'Her Min Bim û Kesî Tirî Nî'* [Always Me and No One Else] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 152-153)).

> Our sheikhs, mullahs, mîrs, leaders and notables know too well that we
> are in the middle of a fire… no body comes to our aid… Let them (the
> nobles) collaborate and protect us miserable, us placeless, us deprived
> [and] rescue us from this fire.[642]

Notice how through the use of inclusive deixis such as 'we', 'our' and 'us' the author claims co-membership with the commoners both as an individual and as a member *Rojî Kurd* and *Hêvî Society.* In this way Hayali takes the side of the commoners vis-à-vis the Kurdish aristocratic elite, a populist or anti-elitist stand that can be observed in the entire *Rojî Kurd* corpus. [643]

6.2.6.1. Addressivity and Convocation of a New Audience

Discussing the rise of novel, Auerbach (1953) suggests that the genre of novel was accompanied by a new concept of 'realism' that acquired its present association with the lower classes. For him, the novel brought about 'the rise of more extensive and socially inferior human groups to the position of subject matter for problematic-existential representation' (cited in Brennan 1990: 52). In this way, the novel connected 'the 'high' and 'low' within a national framework – not fortuitously, but for specific national reasons.' (*Ibid*.). What Auerbach suggests for the role of the novel might be true for the role of newspaper genre as *Rojî Kurd,* in a similar manner, elevated the Kurdish commoners from a dispersed and inferior peasant status to the position of 'subject matter for problematic-existential representation.'

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[642] 'Şêxêd me, melayêd me, feqêd me, mîrêd me, serek û rîspîyêd me îro ji dil dizanin... ku çar alîyê me agirek girtîye… li hawar û gazîya] me da kes nayê… Bila ew rabin dest bidine hev, xudanî li me perîşanan, li me derbederan, li me mehrûman bikin, me ji wî agir[ê] bê eman xilas bikin' (M.X. *'Bextreşî û Mehrûmiya Kurdan'* [The Misfortune and Destitution of the Kurds], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 194-196)).

[643] The treatment of the lower classes, i.e., the peasantry and other Kurdish commoners had radically evolved since *Kurdistan*. For instance, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan in *Kurdistan* and Halil Hayali in *KTTG* adopted a strong paternalistic and authoritative discourse when addressing Kurdish commoners criticizing their backward situation. Moreover both journals often promoted the educated urbanite or the literates, mostly mullahs and sheikhs, giving no credit to the lower classes. Thus the new attitude of the Kurdish elite clearly demonstrates a strong shift in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd* from elitism toward populism.

A particular audience type that was being addressed in the corpus of *Rojî Kurd* was the Kurdish commoner that were seen as the member of a nation abandoned by their leaders and hence in need of progress, modernization and guidance. Seeing the 'lower classes' as the driving force behind the realization of national ideals, *Rojî Kurd*, unlike *Kurdistan* and the *KTTG,* adopted a much softer, eqalitarian and a populist voice when addressing the Kurdish commoners. This populism reveals itself in the journal's forms of addressivity such as:

Gelî bira[yan]!	O Brothers!
Gelî hevala[n]!	O Friends!
Gelî birayê me Kurdino!	O Our Kurdish Brothers!
Gelî Kurdino!	O Kurds!
Hevalo!	O Friend!

As discussed elsewhere in this study, particular ways of addressing the audience, positions the reader in a particular way in accordance with the social identities and relations envisaged by the journal (cf. Fairclough 1995b). In the examples above the predominant use of such forms of addressivity as 'brothers' and 'friends' in the *Rojî Kurd*'s identity discourse perhaps meant to invoke the 1789 French Revolution's motto of 'liberté, égalité, fraternité' in an inclusive manner.[644] The objective here was perhaps to construct closer ties with the commoners, who are the *friends* and *brothers* of the Kurdish leaders, which would increase the nationalist appeal across the social spectrum.

Moreover, despite frequent calls on the Kurdish traditional leadership to fulfill its role, there is a range or spectrum of standpoints expressed in *Rojî Kurd*, some of which presented *Hêvî Society* and *Rojî Kurd* –and by default the Kurdish youth-

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[644] Such writers of *Rojî Kurd* as Abdullah Cevdet, İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde, Kerküklü Necmeddin and Halil Hayali were well informed about the earliest nationalist movements in France and other places in Europe. For instance, *see,* Abdullah Cevdet, *'Ittihad Yolu'* [The Path to Unity], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 139-141) and İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde, *'Müslümanlik ve Kürdlük'* [Muslimness and Kurdishness], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 137-139).

as the most dynamic and worthwhile option for the leadership position in nationalist endeavours. M. Salih Bedirkhan in the following words expresses such view:

> Only you, O the shining youths of Kurdishness! In this glorious clash the heaviest duty is on your shoulders…
>
> … O earnest youth! You are the saviour Noah who will deliver this ill and orphan Kurdishness from the flood of ignorance by your determination and benevolence…[645]

In these poetic lines the author uses the powerful flood narrative by likening the activities of the Kurdish youth to Noah and his ark presenting the Kurdish youth as the saviour of the Kurdish people. Interestingly, the author of these lines was a member of the dynastic Bedir Khan family.

We see a similar viewpoint in an article by Bulgaristanlı Doğan in which he offers the following advice to the Kurdish youth:

> Neither the laws nor the officials of the country or the traditional elite class [sınıf-ı mumtaz] of your nation's notables or anyone else [for that matter] could carry out this duty[646] as successfully as you… You should not settle in centres of civilization far from your national region [muhît-i millî], on the contrary, you are obliged to return with enlightened ideas to your birthplaces that are pure and sacred to you.
>
> If you do not do this and remain outside of your national region and look down upon people like the Ottoman Turkish youth does, you will expose yourself to heavy accusations. Everyone will assume that you are pretending to be the privileged intellectual class of your society with the

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[645] 'Lakin sen, ey Kürdlüğümün nûr-ı şebâbı: bu ma'reke-i pür-şân ve cidalde en ağır vazife sana düşüyor…

Ey 'azm-ı şebâb!.. Sen, o Nûh-ı halaskarsın, ki hasta ve öksüz Kürdlüğün seninle... Senin 'azm û himmetinle… bu tûfân-ı cehâletden kurtulacak' (Salih Bedir Khan, *'Kiliçtan Evvel Kalem'* [Pen before the Sword], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 3, August 14, 1913, in KXK (2013: 174-176)).

[646] The author means the progress and modernization of the Kurdish people.

dream of establishing a class of intellectual aristocracy. As if the other two aristocratic classes are not enough, people will rightfully name you as the 'third' trouble. [647]

First, the author constructs the Kurdish youth as the new leader of the Kurdish society eliminating all other options including perhaps particularly the traditional Kurdish nobles. Then he brings up an issue that was hardly touched in the previous Kurdish journals: the return of the Kurdish youth from Istanbul to Kurdistan, their *'national region'*. [648] Hence leaving the imperial capital for Kurdistan becomes another populist voice in the corpus of *Rojî Kurd* urging this new breed of Kurdish intelligentsia not to alienate itself from the Kurdish masses but embrace them. [649] At the end of the extract the author resents the lack of such populism among the traditional Kurdish leadership whom he labels as 'trouble' and strongly advices the Kurdish youth to stay away from the danger of becoming the 'third trouble' after the two Kurdish aristocratic classes namely the secular and religious elite.

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[647] 'Bu vazifeyi memleketin ne kânunları ne me'mûrları hattâ milletinizin 'an'anâtı mucibince bir sınıf-ı mümtaz 'add itdiği küberâsı, ve'l -hâsıl hîç bir kuvvet, sizin kadar muvaffakıyyetle îfâ idemez.

Siz, milletinize karşu, bu vazîfe-i mühimmeyi îfâ idebilmek içün, muhîti millîden uzak olan merâkiz-i medeniyyede mü'ebbeden yerleşüb kalmak değül, bi'l-'akis neş'et itmiş olduğunuz muhîte 'avdet itmek, sizin içün pek sâf olan o muhitin harîm-i samîmiyyetine, münevver bir fikirle yeniden dâhil olmak mecbûriyyetindesiniz…

Eğer siz, böyle yapmayub da, 'Osmanlı Türk gençleri gibi muhît-i millî hâricinde kalur, ve hâricden bir mevki'-i "bâlâ"dan millete hitâb itmek isterseniz kendinizi ağır bir itham altında bırakırsınız. Kendinize milletin "sınıf-ı münevver-i mümtaz" süsünü vermek, ve millet hesabında "münevverler aristokrasisi" te'sîs itmek, hülyasına düşmüş olduğunuza herkes zâhib olur. Milletinize diğer iki sınıf "aristokratlar" yetmiyormuş gibi, sizi de üçüncü belâ olmak üzere 'add itmekde herkes hakl[ı] olur' (Bulgaristanlı Doğan, *'Milletinize Karşu Vazifeniz'* [Your Duty Towards Your Nation], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 134-136)).

[648] Only on one instance Abdurrahman Bedir Khan, the editor of *Kurdistan*, wrote that one day he would return to Kurdistan to lead the Kurds in a revolt against the Ottoman state and Sultan Abdulhamid's regime. However, this was an expression of his frustration and rage against the Sultan rather than a planned course of action.

[649] It is also interesting to see how the author explicitly criticizes the Turkish intelligentsia's arrogance and alienation from their people.

Despite their populist approach, occasionally some *Rojî Kurd* writers, similar to those of the previous two journals, did not hesitate to adopt a harsh and authoritative tone when addressing the commoner or discussing their situation and shortcomings. For instance the author H. wrote:

> In regard to this social problem I am in favour of violence. I say that nations that do not comprehend their shortcomings and defects should be taught by beating. Nations are like children… Given the situation we should contemplate on how to discipline an utterly ignorant society like our own… As far as I am concerned it is by beating them in the head.[650]

Speaks from an extremely paternalistic authoritarian discourse of family discipline the author likens the reader to 'naughty kids' that should be disciplined by beating. With this patronizing and arrogant manner, the author construct himself and his fellow Kurdish intellectuals as authoritarian father figures who are concerned about the welfare of their children, i.e. the Kurdish people, while the people are constructed as ignorant children in need of discipline.

6.3. CONCLUSION

The July Revolution and its aftermath failed to produce the 'Ottoman man' as envisaged in the ideology of Ottomanism. Moreover, agitated by the outcome of the Tripolitan and the First Balkan Wars in the early 1910s, the CUP, in line with Akçura's proposal, started to promote the Turkish racial superiority more openly as the only viable option to keep the empire intact. The gradual demise of the notion of Ottomanism, ummmahism, and the rising nationalist movements led the Kurdish intelligentsia to opt for a more nationalist line of policy. Thus, *Rojî Kurd*

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[650] 'Ben, bu mes'ele-i ictimâ'iyyede pek ziyâde şiddet tarafdârıyım. Mümkin 'add idilse, diyebilirdim ki nakısa ve seyyi'elerini anlamayan milletlere, dayakla anlatmalıdır.

Milletler ve kavimler, çocuklara benzerler… Bu böyle olunca, bizim gibi koyu câhil olan hey'etlerin nasıl terbiye olunması lâzım geleceği düşünülsün... Bana kalırsa, diyebileceğim ki, başlarına vururcasına...' (H… *'Derd ve Deva'* [The Trouble and the Solution], *Rojî Kurd*, No. 1, June 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 102-103)).

can be seen as partly a response to the increasing Turkish nationalism in the 1910s. In tandem with these developments, now they were convinced that nationalism, as a condition of modernity, was the only driving force behind the political, social and cultural progress of their community, the writers of the *Rojî Kurd* dropped the rhetoric of Ottomanism and put emphasis on the political future of the Kurds as a nation.

As the study showed, due to the more Turkified state oppression mainly in the form of assassinations, intimidation and arrests, *Rojî Kurd* generally refrained from overt political expression of Kurdish nationalism's political objectives. Despite this fact, the paper did take up themes pertaining to Kurdish national identity and its political goals. To this end, the founding declaration, for example, made no mention of the Ottoman state or Ottomanist ideals except for a vague reference to the 'state' only in passing. Additionally, Bâbânzâde, one of seemingly the most ardent supporters of Ottomanism, reformulated his levels of Kurdish identity leaving out the Ottoman component altogether. More importantly Abdullah Cevdet problematized the Swiss model in which he proposed that based on their racial, national and/or confessional differences each Ottoman community should from its own separate *republic* suggesting that the Kurds form their own republic based on their racial, national, linguistic and cultural peculiarities with their own set of law.

This radical discursive shift made itself felt in many other themes of the journal pertaining to the common Kurdish language, culture, political past, homeland and so on. *Rojî Kurd* writers, notably Halil Hayali, Benî Erdalanî Ahmed Muhsîn and İsmâ'îl Hakkı Bâbânzâde, attached particular importance to the cultivation of the Kurdish language and literature. For example, underlining the primordial and authentic roots of Kurdish, Hayali found the origins of the Kurdish national identity rural peoples' dialects, folktales and folksongs, a notion very similar to the German concept of *volk*. Moreover, he underlined the significance of adopting a new alphabet suitable for the Kurdish orthography, the publication of grammar books and dictionaries as well as the canonization of oral Kurdish

literature into print-material. In addition, attempts towards the standardization of Kurdish continued in *Rojî Kurd*, for instance Hayali, imitating what Abdurrahman Bedir Khan had done in *Kurdistan*, constantly and deliberately made use of Sorani words in all of his Kurmanji articles to create the impression that the two varieties belonged to the same language. To achieve a similar outcome, *Rojî Kurd* writers dedicated space to poetry from both Kurdish varieties.

The journal also engaged in anthropological and historical studies particularly in the writings of Abdullah Cevdet and Halil Hayali. It is noteworthy that in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd*, Kurdish history was no longer an extension of the Ottoman history, as it had been designated as such in several *KTTG* texts; on the contrary, through references to the ethnic and racial origins of the Kurds, *Rojî Kurd* put stronger emphasis on the ancient Kurdish history that predated the Kurdo-Ottoman and Kurdo-Islamic history aiming at the dis-identification of the Kurds from other Ottomans, particularly the Turks and Arabs.[651] What is more, the non-Ottoman Kurdish historical narrative was further consolidated by the journal's construction of a pantheon of Kurdish historical figures such as Saladin, Karim Khan Zand and others.

As far as the narrative of the national homeland is concerned, Kurdistan was no longer an extension of the Ottoman homeland but rather an exclusive Kurdish national homeland, which was constructed through various discursive strategies, including, constant references to the ancient Kurdish history and the demography of Kurdistan, drawing discursive maps of Kurdistan, and so on. It is important to note that having completed its semantic shift, the term 'welat' came to clearly denote the Kurdish national homeland vis-à-vis the 'Ottoman vatan'. Similarly,

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[651] For instance, see my analysis of Kurdî's (Silêmanî Ebdilkerîm) article significantly entitled *'Esl û Neslî Kurd'* [The Origins and Ancestors of the Kurds], in this chapter, where the author proudly announces that Kurdish history preadest the time of the Prophet.

Rojî Kurd introduced new neologisms to the Kurdish political discourse such as *'Kurdayetî'* (Kurdish nationalism).

It is particularly noteworthy that the editorial board of *Rojî Kurd* represented a new constituency, namely young Kurdish intellectuals from the *Hêvî Society.* This radical change in the class composition of the *Hêvî Society* and *Rojî Kurd*, which now included members from non-aristocratic background, afforded the journal with a broader discursive participation from various social backgrounds. The new constituency in the editorial board added to the evolution of the Kurdish leadership structure toward a more populist style, which, in turn, led to an anti-elitist stand in favour of the Kurdish lower classes that were now seen as the most authentic Kurds and the depository of Kurdish national identity. This gradual evolution toward a more populist discourse manifested itself in the construction of identities and relations between the Kurdish intellectual elite and the Kurdish layperson, i.e., the readership. For example, although we come across a few articles that utilized a paternalistic authoritarian voice, most of *Rojî Kurd* writers adopted a more humble voice toward both the traditional Kurdish leadership and the Kurdish commoners through a particular way of addressing the audience as well as the use of other discursive devices, e.g., optative and desiderative moods, rather than the imperative mood, which was particularly dominant in journal *Kurdistan*. In this way, the journal intended to imply and promote co-membership with the commoners as well as the traditional Kurdish elite in the same national community.

CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The late Ottoman period marked a formative stage fundamental to the development of various nationalist movements among the Ottoman communities. One such nationalist movement occurred among the Kurdish intellectuals of this period. However, there is a dearth of a comprehensive and multi-faceted large body of knowledge on the origins of Kurdish nationalism and especially on Kurdish journalistic activities in the late Ottoman period. More importantly, the general theoretical literature on this subject and specifically in the context of Kurdish nationalist discourse constructed in Kurdish journals has suffered from linguistic, methodological and theoretical shortcomings and therefore the relevant literature remains inconclusive on several vital questions which has led to common misconceptions on the origins and formation of Kurdish nationalism in the late Ottoman period. One of the major reasons for these misconceptions stems from the imposition of a single and limited theoretical framework on Kurdish nationalist discourse that overlooks the peculiarities of the Kurdish case. Equally important is the lack of an exhaustive close textual analysis informed by corpus linguistic methodology on the content of the Kurdish nationalist discourse. What is more, the analysis of the relevant literature has mostly relied on the Ottoman Turkish articles, leaving out the articles written in Kurdish varieties. Therefore, this thesis, as the first study in the field that applies the CDA methodology, is an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of this emergent stage of Kurdish nationalism through an analytic and systematic exploration of Kurdish journals of the late Ottoman period.

7.1. Theoretical and Methodological Implications

As the study illustrated, a multidisciplinary CDA methodology that combines multiple approaches proved tremendously fruitful as it yield in-depth and exhaustive discourse analysis of the empirical data collected from the corpora of the pre-WWI Kurdish journals. The Faircloughian three-dimensional CDA framework allowed for a discourse analysis at sociocultural, discourse practice and textual levels. The sociocultural level was instrumental in capturing the

sociocultural and political environment in which the journals were published, while the discourse practice level investigated the ways in which the journals' texts interacted with the social and political conditions prevailing in each historical period, in which the journals were published.

The Discourse-Historical approach developed by Wodak and her colleagues, on the other hand, afforded this study with a systematic analysis of the major semantic areas of each journal and the way discourse practices operated in the early Kurdish journals. The Wodakian approach was also instrumental in observing the discursive shifts in the each semantic area in the Kurdish journalistic discourse. The Wodakian semantic areas were modified to meet the needs of the Kurdish case under the following headings in each analytical chapter: the discursive construction of common political present and future, common language, common culture, common political past, common homeland and the discursive construction of relations between the elite and Kurdish commoners (cf. Wodak 2002b; Wodak *et al*. 1999). Through an in-depth analysis of the discursive practices in each semantic area, the study illustrated the ways in which different Kurdish journals constructed various forms of an imagined Kurdish national community based on a collective sense of a common language, history, literature, culture and homeland as well as the diachronic changes the Kurdish nationalist discourse underwent in each historical period. That is the study showed through numerous extracts taken from the corpora of early Kurdish journals how each journal adopted different sets of discursive strategies, practices and language devices, in accordance with the requirements of the historical conditions, to transform Kurdish language, literature, history, homeland, and other presumed cultural attributes into collective cultural elements of Kurdish national identity.

Moreover, the study illustrated the applicability of a range of theories pertaining to the concepts of nation, nationalism and the process of identity formation to the Kurdish case. In that it showed that the inception and development of Kurdish nationalist discourse confirms to the modernist/constructivist paradigm that views

nationalism as a product of modernity and the *prima causa* of nation. Additionally, by showing the ways in which Kurdish identity acquired different shades of nationalism in a time span of 16 years in response to each historical circumstances, taking on Islamic, Ottoman and more Kurdish nationalist characters in an ideological and discursive struggle with non-Kurdish hegemonic meta-identities, the study explained, from a post-structuralist point of view, the anti-essentialist, fluid and ever-changing nature of national identity in the Kurdish case. The study also confirmed the fact that for an accurate assessment of any historical period the Foucauldian sense of *historicization of discourses* is necessary because discursive elements such as identities, meanings, morality, knowledge and so on are time/era specific, in that things were meaningful, only within a specific historical, cultural and political context. Hence any study disregarding the sociocultural and political matrix of this nascent stage of Kurdish nationalism would inevitably fail to capture an accurate picture of the formation of Kurdish identity. More on theoretical and methodological implications will follow in research findings and discussion.

Applying a close textual analysis informed by the CDA methodology to the corpora of the Kurdish press, this study was set up to address the following research questions for a thorough investigation of the construction of Kurdish national identity in the Kurdish journalistic discourse of the late Ottoman period:

- How did the socio-political, cultural and historical circumstances of the period and those of the Kurdish intellectual elite contribute to and determine the model of national identity envisaged and devised in the discourse of the Kurdish press?

- Which discourse strategies, practices and language devices did the Kurdish press employ in the construction of a politically imagined distinctive Kurdish community with a shared sense of belonging that dis-identified Kurds from the dominant ethnic and religious identities, particularly the hegemonic discourses of the Islamic ummah and

Ottomanism that were perceived as central components of Kurdish identity?

- How did the journals manage the fragmented nature of the Kurdish community along linguistic, sectarian and tribal lines, in their construction of a unified and homogenous Kurdish national identity?

- How did the Kurdish leadership and the intellectual elite construct social identities and relations between themselves and the Kurdish commoners through the Kurdish journals?

Below I provide a synthesis of the empirical findings from the study to show how these converge to answer the research question and study objectives.

7.2. Research Findings and Discussion

7.2.1. Determinant Effect of Historical Circumstances on the Formation of Kurdish National Identity Discourse

The CDA methodology was particularly useful in capturing the paradigmatic shifts in the discursive practices of Kurdish journals. As discussed earlier, discourse practices mediate between the form of the text and the socio-political realities, in that through discursive practices the social affects the form of the text and, in turn, the text tries to affect (reproduces or challenges) the social. This mutual dependence between the text and the social might result in relatively homogenous and conventional discourse practices in relatively fixed and stabled sociocultural environment or conversely it might result in unstable and changeable discourse practices in unsettled societies, e.g., the chaotic late Ottoman period, where there is a constant battle between different political and ideological views and entities. Such shifting socio-political environment in unsettled societies becomes the source of heterogeneous, fluctuating and creative discourse practices (Fairclough 1995b: 52-66). In turn, these shifting discursive practices can serve as a sensitive barometer of social change and a valuable material for researching the change in a society (Ibid: 52).

Correspondingly, this study showed that the publication of each Kurdish journal roughly coincides with three distinctive historical periods dominated by different

ideological currents in the late Ottoman Empire. In that, the journal *Kurdistan* was published under the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II and his policy of Pan-Islamism, while *KTTG* came out in the immediate aftermath of the July 1908 constitutional revolution and the ensuing liberal environment in which not Pan-Islamism but secular Ottomanism prevailed as the dominant ideology. *Rojî Kurd*, on the other hand, started its publication during a historical period in which the rising nationalist tendencies in the empire had weakened the notion of secular Ottomanism and precipitated the radicalization of Turkish nationalism as a chauvinist state ideology. These changing historical circumstances point to the fact that a different identity discourse or episteme produced new conceptions in each historical moment. Then, given the formative influences of each distinct socio-political circumstances in the late Ottoman period, a complete analysis of the development of Kurdish nationalism would have to take into consideration the distinctive circumstances of each period while avoiding an explanation that isolates the Kurdish identity discourse from its historical context. Subsequently, it can be said that because every discursive element, e.g., values, beliefs, world views, identities and so forth were meaningful, true or proper only within specific historical and sociocultural circumstances, only through *historicization* can we make a better sense of each epistemic regime (cf. Foucault 2002: 23).

In line with this view of the history, the present study analysed the discourses of the Kurdish journals by historicizing them within their respective social, political and cultural conditions of existence. This is because under the distinctive circumstances of each period, nationally oriented Kurdish intellectuals were faced with varying ideological, political and strategic challenges and in response they produced diverse versions of Kurdish national identity discourses. Consequently, the main empirical findings of this study were chapter specific which were summarized within their respective analytical chapters. Therefore this chapter integrates and synthesizes the empirical findings to answer the relevant research question.

7.2.2. Kurdish nationalism in the journal *Kurdistan* under the hegemonic discourse of Pan-Islamism (1898-1902)

Since the advent of Islam, religion has been the major source of political legitimacy and 'macro-loyalty' in the Muslim world. Because starting from the time of the Prophet, Islam vested both religious and the political authority in the same entity; political power drew its legitimacy from religion and God (Razi 1990: 84). The present study showed that although Ottomanism dominated much of the late Ottoman period, the reign of Sultan Abdulhamid II distinguished itself with autocracy and a strong notion of what could be called *Pan-Islamism*, *religious Ottomanism* or *ummahism* under the Sultan Caliph. For instance, Sultan Abdulhamid II, during whose reign the journal *Kurdistan* was published, made extensive use of his title as the Caliph of Islam, more than any previous Ottoman sultan, to promote Islamic solidarity hoping to strengthen his position as the shadow of God on earth, vilify and prevent nationalist tendencies among the non-Turkish Muslim constituents and in this way save what was left of the Empire.

In this period, nationally oriented intellectuals who aspired to political authority also found it wise to profess and sponsor religion regardless of their personal commitment and blended their nationalist discourses with religion. Similarly, in a predominantly Sunni Muslim Kurdish community some sort of religious ancestral lineage as well as religious piety was vital for an individual or group to gain the position of leadership. That is these specific circumstances of the Hamidian era coupled with Kurds' loyalty to Islam and the office of the Islamic Caliphate compelled Kurdish intellectuals to adopt the same strategy of religious allusion as the Sultan Abdulhamid, in order to present their nationalist discourse in a way that would be compatible with the values and principles of Islam and acceptable by Kurdish masses. To this end they adopted in an essentially pragmatic manner an intensive religious intertextuality to justify their brand of Kurdish nationalism and its demands.

Since the Bedir Khan Brothers aspired to the role of Kurdish leadership but lacked the vital religious background, they first and foremost felt the necessity to

invent a religious background for themselves and their dynastic family. To this end, they traced their ancestral linage back to *Khalid ibn al-Walid*, an Arab military general and a companion of the Prophet, hoping that this divine descent would further strengthen and legitimize their search for political authority in the eyes of Kurds. Second, due to the same reason mentioned above the Bedir Khan Brothers felt that they needed to back up and justify their ethno-nationalist arguments through religious intertextuality by frequently citing verses from the Qur'an and the hadith. In this way, as their strategy of persuasion and manipulation required, they transformed the sacred voice of religion to the voice of their nationalist journal as if God and Prophet were speaking through *Kurdistan* or vice-versa. The Bedir Khan Brothers in the pages of *Kurdistan* problematized issues pertaining to the lack of education and modernization, the inter-tribal conflicts and so on among the Kurdish community through a dense religious intertextuality; the modernization of the Kurdish community was necessary for the *progress of Islam*; literacy was needed for the Kurds so that they could at least say their *prayers*; the inter-tribal disputes in Kurdistan were *sinful* acts because they harmed the *Islamic unity and solidarity*; the progress of Kurdish society in science and technology was a *religious duty* because an advanced Kurdish society could serve *the Islamic ummah* in a better capacity and so on. In all this seemingly 'religious advice' the real concern was indeed the consolidation, modernization and the improvement of the Kurdish community in the nation building process spearheaded by the Bedir Khan Brothers and their dynastic family. Nonetheless, such pragmatic approach to the religion does not necessarily mean that the Bedir Khan Brothers –or the publishers of the succeeding Kurdish journals for that matter- were not genuine Muslims, even though there were Kurdish intellectuals who were ardent secularists like Abdullah Cevdet, who was 'accused' of being atheist (Hanioğlu 1966: 21).

Kurdish nationalism in *KTTG* under the hegemonic discourse of Secular Ottomanism (1908)

After the July Revolution of 1908, Ottoman politics, now dominated by the CUP, changed significantly. Under the new constitutional regime, Sultan Abdul Hamid's policy of Pan-Islamism was replaced with secular Ottomanism or *Ottoman nationalism*. The new regime promised large-scale reforms including cultural and civil liberties in favour of Ottoman confessional and ethnic communities in order to secure their support and hence keep the empire intact. After this major paradigmatic shift in Ottoman politics the Kurdish intellectuals and political leaders, this time organized around *KTTC* and *KTTG*, opted for CUP's secular Ottomanism because, like Arabs, they were convinced that in a decentralized constitutional state the social, cultural and political demands of the Kurds would finally be met.

Under the CUP regime, *KTTG* embarked on a rigorous Ottomanist policy; it pledged allegiance to the state and frequently propagated Ottomanism and underlined the compatibility of the virtues of the new regime with the Islamic principles in order to convince the Young Turks of the Kurdish commitment to the state and ideals of Ottomanism. To this end, *KTTG* went to great pains to present the Kurdish ethnic origins, history, homeland and culture as extensions of those of the Ottomans at the expense of inaccuracies and anachronisms.[652] Through this *more royalist than the king* Ottomanist rhetoric, the Kurdish intellectuals hoped that they could present Kurds as an indispensable Ottoman community in the eyes of the Young Turks' and CUP, who controlled the state, and in this way have an opportunity to carve a niche for the Kurds in Ottoman politics, ideally under the leadership of *KTTG/KTTC*. Similarly, when promoting Kurdish as a language of instruction in schools, Ismail Hakkı Bâbânzâde justified this demand from a pragmatist point of view arguing that instead of *wasting precious time* learning a new language (Turkish) in schools, Kurdish children should be taught

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[652] See, *KTTG*, No. 4., December 26, 1908, reprinted in Bozarslan (1998: 200-201).

in their mother tongue, which in a much shorter period of time would produce better Ottomans out of Kurdish students who would come to appreciate the merits of the Ottoman constitutional regime and work towards the protection of the state.

7.2.3. Kurdish nationalism in *Rojî Kurd* under the waning influences of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism (1913)

The socio-political circumstances in the empire kept evolving in tandem with the shifting political balance of power at home and abroad. The political discord within the Young Turks' ranks was exacerbated by the rising nationalist movements, in the Balkans and elsewhere which had culminated in humiliating defeats and great loss of territories, e.g., the Tripolitan War (a.k.a. Italo-Ottoman War) (1911-1912) and the First Balkan Wars (1912-1913) (Davison 1998: 90-91). Under these circumstances the Turkish nationalist elements of the CUP carried out a military coup on January 23, 1913 ousting from the government the anti-CUP opposition, many of who were non-Turkish politicians. This important turn of events marked the CUP's and hence the Turkish nationalists' assumption of total control over the state apparatus and the ensuing reign of terror that was intolerant of any kind of opposition, particularly nationalist tendencies among the non-Turkish Ottoman communities (Kevorkian 2011: 141-146). This new phase of overt Turkish nationalism shattered the myth of Ottomanism in the eyes of non-Turkish Ottoman communities.

The new circumstances set the scene for the social, political and historical rise of a stronger notion of nationalism among the Kurdish intellectuals which resulted in a major discursive shift in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd* that started its publication in 1913. Given the new political environment, the authors of *Rojî Kurd* kept the idea Ottomanism at arm's length while questioning the unreciprocated Kurdish service to ummahism or Pan-Islamism. The paper and its owner the *Hêvî Society* were convinced that neither solidarity around the meta-identities of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism, nor education and industrialization, which were widely propagated in the pages of *Kurdistan* and, but rather the very notion of ethnic nationalism

and political autonomy were major conditions of modernization and the motive power behind the political, economic, social and cultural progress of the Kurdish community. Thus, in stark contrast with *Kurdistan* and *KTTG*, *Rojî Kurd* did not feel the need, as much as the previous Kurdish journals, to justify its nationalist discourse through the notion of Ottomanism or Pan-Islamism. Conversely, the Kurdish identity discourse in *Rojî Kurd* revolved around the construction of a unique Kurdish language, culture, history and political future that particularly aimed at dis-identifying the Kurds from both Ottoman-Turkish and Arabo-Islamic identities. To this end the journal promoted Kurdish language reform and cultivation of the unique and original Kurdish national literature, culture, history and homeland.[653]

To sum up, evident from the findings discusses in details in the analytical chapters of this study, paradigmatic shifts in the three historical circumstances under consideration had a tremendous effect on the various forms of Kurdish identity and nationalism developed in journals *Kurdistan*, and *Rojî Kurd* as each journal adopted distinctive discursive strategies and practices in their discursive construction of Kurdish common political present and future, common language, common political past, common culture and common homeland.

7.2.4. The Kurdish Printing Press and the Ownership Patterns

An essential aspect of CDA approach pertains to the media ownership because ownership is particularly operative in shaping the discourse of media in accordance with social, political, ideological and personal motivations of the owners that might lie behind the construction of a particular discourse.

The analysis of the Kurdish journals revealed that the class composition of the Kurdish press ownership in tandem with their social, political and personal motivations had a determinative effect on various types of Kurdish national

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[653] See Chapter 6 for the construction of a distinctive Kurdish national identity through semantic areas in *Rojî Kurd*.

identities envisaged and constructed in the three journals. For instance, the particular form of Kurdish national identity constructed in *Kurdistan,* owned by the Bedir Khan Brothers, was heavily influenced by the editors' personal and familial concerns. They saw nationalism as a legitimate ideological tool to construct Kurds as a unified national community and themselves as the self-appointed leaders of that nation which would help them regain their former dynastic power. Whereas the *KTTG/KTTC* ownership reflected the diversity of background and ideology of its members as it was composed of a broader class of a well-educated Kurdish aristocratic as well as non-aristocratic elite that had been incorporated into the Ottoman state machinery. Given their social, economic and political background, their nationalist discourse revolved around a form of Kurdish identity that would not go against the welfare of the Ottoman state, but at the same time would establish a Kurdish community as a socially, culturally and politically autonomous nation under the *KTTG/KTTC* leadership. The ownership of *Rojî Kurd*, on the other hand, was composed of a younger generation of the Kurdish students and intellectuals, mostly from non-aristocratic background, who were not integrated into the Ottoman power structure as much as the *KTTG* authors and hence were generally and more genuinely concerned with the welfare of Kurds as a separate nation rather than the welfare of the entire Ottoman community or the Ottoman state.

So far as their pursuit of material gains in the form of political power is concerned, the motivations of the Kurdish leadership in Istanbul conforms, for the most part, to Breuilly's (1993; 1996) account of nationalism which sees nationalism as a purely political movements seeking state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments. However, this does not mean that the Kurdish leadership was not genuinely patriotic or nationalist; rather their dedication to Kurdish nationalism was the combination of personal and familial concerns and gains as well as genuine nationalist feelings. The former motivation is most obvious in Bedir Khan Brothers' *Kurdistan*, while the latter is more noticeable in the enthusiastic efforts of the non-aristocratic figures such as Halil

Hayali and Abdullah Cevdet, among others, and the ensuing generation of the Kurdish aristocratic figures such as Celadet Ali, Kamuran Bedir Khan 'long after political and financial gains could be hoped for' (Strohmeier 2003: 199).

Moreover, the study illustrated that the gradual evolution of the ownership pattern towards a more inclusive organization leaning towards a non-aristocratic structure with a more populist tendency had a tremendous effect on the relations of power and dominance enacted between the participants of the discursive events in each journal. By utilizing a paternalistic authoritative discourse, the Kurdish leadership, in all three journals, constructed itself as the experts, professionals, politicians and members of the elite class and hence the sole source of authority, while constructing Kurdish masses as ignorant, passive and submissive recipients in need of education and guidance. This patronizing and sometimes arrogant manner, particularly noticeable in the discourse of *Kurdistan*, began to fade away, albeit to a certain extent, first in the discourse of *KTTG* but more visibly in *Rojî Kurd* as that journal adopted a more populist discourse.

Furthermore, the study illustrated the ways in which the Kurdish elite monopolized Kurdish politics by imposing its own form, expression and goals of Kurdish nationalism onto those of the traditional Kurdish leadership in Kurdistan as most vivid and clear from the *KTTG*'s treatment of the killing of Sheikh Said Barzanji by the Ottoman state soldiers in 1909.[654] Consequently, as discussed in chapter 5, the Kurdish leadership in Istanbul might have prevented the rise of a more radical and separatist Kurdish nationalist movement or might have pacified or silenced such possible movement by monopolizing Kurdish politics and thus marginalizing alternative Kurdish nationalist voices.

7.2.5. Kurdish nationalists or Ottoman Nationalists?

Due to methodological, theoretical and linguistic inadequacy, it has been argued that the Kurdish leadership and their journalistic discourse in the pre-WWI period

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[654] See Chapter 5 for a detail account on the *KTTG*'s reaction to the killing of Sheikh Said Barzanji.

could not be seen as nationalist because (1) the Kurdish journalistic discourse of the period –particularly that of *KTTG*- was more Ottomanist rather than Kurdish nationalist and (2) the Kurdish nationalist discourse stopped short of making political demands in the form of Kurdish national self-determination or autonomy (Özoglu 2004: Strohmeier 2003; Bajalan 2009). One study goes to the extent to portray Kurdish intellectuals of the last Ottoman period as 'Ottoman nationalists with Kurdish colours' and labels them as 'Young Kurds' as an allusion to the name *'Young Turks'* (Bajalan 2009). It is true that both Islam and Ottomanism were important components of the Kurdish identity and that they were significantly presented as such in the Kurdish journalistic discourse. However, one has to be careful as not to isolate the nationalist discourses of the Kurdish journals from their respective historical context and reduce them to mere consolidation of the dominant ideological currents, i.e., Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism or to impose modern context and criteria onto a historical period that had quite different concerns and assumptions (Smith 2003: 111). The empirical findings of this study indicate that the impetus for Kurdish Ottomanism -and especially for the *extreme form of Kurdish Ottomanism* in *KTTG* -was mainly for pragmatic reasons rather than lofty ideals. This fact is most obvious in the journal's use of 'manifest intertextuality,' particularly observable in *KTTG*, in which Ottomanism was overtly present not to *express* but *propagate* and *prove* to the CUP the Kurdish commitment to the so-called Ottoman ideals.

The empirical evidence presented in this study also showed that reasons behind this pragmatic approach to Ottomanism are manifold: First, Ottomanism was the hegemonic discourse of the period, as such Kurdish intelligentsia was convinced that supporting Ottomanism was the panacea in that they could secure cultural and political autonomy for Kurds without having to go against the state's hegemonic discourse of Ottomanism and the office of Caliphate. Second, given the prevalence of nationalist inclination among the Kurdish intelligentsia, one must also consider the possibility that Ottomanism was instrumental in disguising the journals' nationalist ambitions; that is Kurdish Ottomanism rendered a

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smoother form of Kurdish nationalism, rather than an agreesive nationalist rhetoric, that was acceptable no only to the Kurdish masses loyal to the Ottoman state and the Caliphate, but also to the Young Turks and the CUP who controlled the state. Third, in the face of CUP's oppression and intimidation of non-Turkish nationalist movements,[655] Ottomanism, rather than the propagation of an outright independence, would help the Kurds to remain on the good side of the CUP and in this way avoid state retaliation and have the opportunity to participate in Ottoman politics and possibly steer the state policies in a direction that would benefit the Kurds of the Empire. Fourth, the majority of the Kurdish leadership was wary of the imperialist ambitions of the Great Powers who were perceived to be encouraging the Armenians to lay claim on the eastern provinces of the Empire predominantly inhabited by Kurds. Because it did not see the prospect of dealing with Great Powers on its own, the Kurdish leadership found it wise to stick to Ottomanism to oppose them. A similar concern can be observed among the Arab nationalists of the period. Firro (2009: 38) asserts that most Arab intellectuals 'continued to regard the Ottoman state as the ultimate repository of political legitimacy because they paradoxically regarded it as a bulwark against the Western colonial powers.' Fifth, and more importantly, the Kurdish leadership exploited Ottomanism as an effective concept to curb the rising Turkish nationalism and prevent it from turning into a chauvinistic and oppressive state ideology at the expense of non-Turkish identities. In any case, the Young Turks and the CUP had long ago started to equate the idea of Ottomanism or Ottoman nationalism with Turkish nationalism which provided the Kurds with a clear target. To prevent the transformation of Turkish nationalism into a state ideology, Kurdish intellectuals promoted the rhetorical aspects of Ottomanism, which ensured the social and political equality of each constituent national group without the dominance of one group over another. In a sense, Kurdish intellectuals adopted a strategic pragmatism in which they promoted a civic form

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[655] As the study showed in Chapters 5 and 6, the CUP did not tolerate any form of opposition and to this end intimidated nationally oriented non-Turkish opposition through legally channeled actions as well as harassment and assasinations; *see* Silopî (2007: 43).

of nationalism through Ottomanism; but at the same time they tried to develop a Kurdish ethnic-nationalism within the framework of Ottomanism or Ottoman nationalism. It is important to note that ironically the Young Turks and the CUP regime made use of the same concept of Ottomanism to keep the rising ethno-nationalist tendencies among the non-Turkish and non-Muslim Ottoman communities while they were favouring Turkish nationalism and strengthening the Turkish element of the Empire (cf. Hanioğlu 1966: 209-215).

As far as the political demands of the Kurds are concerned, contrary to the claims of the aforementioned studies, Kurdish intellectuals did in fact aspire to Kurdish political autonomy, albeit within the Ottoman political framework. Nevertheless, rather than overt expressions, this political aspirations were mostly expressed through a range of subtle, implicit or semi-explicit discursive strategies and language devices due to the unfavourable sociocultural and political circumstances of the period discussed here and throughout this study. For instance, although the journal *Kurdistan* failed to adopt a fixed and coherent political program –because its discourse fluctuated between Pan-Islamism under the banner of Ottomanism and full-fledged separatist nationalism- the dominant political line of the paper remained reformist in that it ultimately proposed a political solution within the Ottoman framework hoping that once in power, the CUP would grant certain social, cultural and political autonomy to the Kurds ideally under the leadership of the Bedir Khan family. Similarly, *KTTG/KTTC* also made political demands. First and foremost, *KTTC*, in its organizational constitution, conditioned its loyalty to the Ottoman regime, in that it pledged to protect the new regime *as long as the state upheld the principles of the constitution and Ottomanism*, which ensured the social and political equality of various confessional and ethnic Ottoman communities of the Empire. This was perhaps a subtle warning about the increasing dominance of the Turks in Ottoman state apparatus. Second, the study showed that various texts in *KTTG* promoted administrative decentralization of the state to pave the way for a form of autonomy in Kurdistan. *Rojî Kurd,* on the other hand*,* like its predecessors, remained subtle when it came to Kurdish political demands, this time not

particularly due to the hegemonic power of the meta-loyalties but mostly because of CUP's heavy-handed tyranny, through harassment, intimidation and assassinations.[656] Despite these unfavourable and harsh circumstances *Rojî Kurd* problematized the political future of the Kurds through various discursive strategies. For instance, in stark contrast to the heavily Ottomanist discourse of *KTTG*, the five-point purpose of the *Hêvî Society*[657] made no mention of Ottomanism. Still, the most articulate discussion in regard to political demands in *Rojî Kurd* discourse came from Abdullah Cevdet, who strongly opposed the centralization of the state and instead proposed a loose and decentralized type of government formed after the Swiss model in which Kurds could have their own *republic*.[658] However, due to the lack of a close textual analysis approach informed by corpus linguistic methodology the implicit and explicit expression of Kurdish political demands in the Kurdish journalistic discourse have been overlooked in most of the literature on Kurdish journals.[659]

Moreover, besides the methodological issues there have also been theoretical shortcomings in the relevant literature. As discussed in chapter 2, the general literature on the concepts of nation and nationalism offers a plethora of theoretical frameworks each claiming to be applicable to the most cases of nationalism, in spite of their radical differences in terms of their criteria.

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[656] CUP dropped the ideals of Ottomanism, a particular brand of civic-nationalism, in favor of an oppressive form of Turkish nationalism in the chaotic early 20th century, which engendered a major shift in the balance of power at home and abroad. The Ottoman defeat at the end of the Tripolitan War (1911-1912) and the First Balkan Wars (1912-1913) exacerbated by the internal opposition formed against the CUP, presented the CUP with a critical juncture to drift away from liberal ideals and instead adopt an authoritarian and chauvinist Turkish nationalist character that became an Ottoman state policy (Kevorkian 2011: 141-146; Davison 1998: 90-92).

[657] *The Founding Declaration of Kurdish Students-Hope Society* [Kürt Telebe-Hêvî Cemiyeti'nin Beyannamesidir], *Hetawî Kurd*, No: 4-5, 10 May 1914, p. 1-4, in Malmîsanij (2002: 257-261).

[658] See Chapter 6 for a detailed analysis of Abdullah Cevdet's article.

[659] Given the variety of different political views expressed, it is not easy to pinpoint what was a collective ideology and what was an individual view in the mapping of the voices in the corpora of the early Kurdish journals (cf. Fairclough 1995b; 188). These dialogues indicate that the early Kurdish journals might not have had clearly defined political goals but rather they functioned as platforms where the Kurdish intellectuals engaged in the negotiation of the form of Kurdish national identity, its demands and objectives.

Consequently, because each theoretical account employs different parameters, each application would inevitably lead to different conclusions. While a particular theoretical approach might portray a movement or a discourse as nationalist, another might suggest otherwise. The same is true of the Kurdish case. Determining whether or not the discourse of the Kurdish journals and their parent organizations were nationalist might depend on one's understanding of the notion of nationalism and what theories or criteria they use in their assessment. For instance, if a theory that requires a strong and clear-cut notion of political self-determination in the form of national independence -the extreme manifestation of nationalism- is applied to a political movement or a discourse to determine whether it is nationalist, then certain movements and their discourses, including the Kurdish case, might fail to qualify as nationalist. The truth of the matter is that contrary to the arguments in the previous scholarship (Özoğlu 2004; Bajalan 2009; Strohmeier 2003), demand for self-determination or statism might not be one of the prerequisites for an individual, a group, a movement or a discourse to qualify as nationalist. For instance, Fishman (1972: 72) asserts that statism or the pursuit of nation-state is not a prerequisite for a movement to be considered as nationalist. He suggests that nationalism is 'essentially conscious or organized ethno-cultural solidarity which may or may not then be directed outside of its initial sphere toward political, economic and religious goals.' In a similar vein, both Hutchinson (1994; ch. 1) and Smith (2003: 9-10), the latter one of the founders of the interdisciplinary academic field of nationalism studies, argue that not all nationalists make claim to statehood. Accordingly 'the close link between ideology and movement in no way limits the concept of nationalism only to movements seeking independence' (Smith 2003: 9). Given the terminological confusion in the field, Fishman (1972: 5) makes a distinction between *'nationism'* and *'nationalism.'* While *' nationism'* signifies the set of behaviours, beliefs and values pertaining to the acquisition, maintenance, and development of a politically independent nation-state, *'nationalism'* denotes the concept of ethno-cultural solidarity around a collective identity. In any case, if we take the demand for the right to self-determination or national independence as a prerequisite for

nationalism, the way Özoğlu (2004) and others have suggested, then there is no Kurdish nationalism to speak of even today given that all Kurdish nationalist movements, including the PKK, have dropped such demands from their respective nationalist discourses opting for political solutions within the existing borders of the nation-state in which they operate (Bruinessen 2006: 28-29). In any case, the strict application of such criteria would rule out the nationalism or the nationness of most nations delaying the timing of their emergence as such until later periods (Smith 2003: 111).

A third shortcoming of the existing literature on the Kurdish journalistic discourse of late Ottoman period also suffers from the vital fault of not paying enough attention to or completely excluding the content of the Kurdish articles from their respective analysis. This deficiency has tremendously contributed not only to the absence of crucial knowledge about but also misconception around the identity discourse of the Kurdish journals because Kurdish articles were more nationalist compared to the articles written in Turkish. Furthermore, as we saw, some Kurdish articles were translated and published in Turkish with significant discrepancies between their original Kurdihs forms and their Turkish translations in that the Kurdish nationalist tone in the Turkish translations were softened.

Based on the empirical findings, this study showed that the Kurdish journals, and by default their parent organizations, were Kurdish nationalists as their primary concern revolved around the solidarity of the Kurds in the form of a unified ethno-national community towards political automony. However, given that their nationalism was not based on a static, coherent and unified nationalist ideology one might speak of various forms of Kurdish nationalisms in the late Ottoman period (Klein 2007). As the analysis revealed, in response to the fast-changing global politics and the fluctuating power structure within the Ottoman Empire, the corpora of the Kurdish journals adopted hybrid discourse practices, rather than homogenous and conventional discourse practices, which resulted in the construction of various forms of Kurdish nationalisms. Therefore, it is fair to state that because several ideological concepts were exploited at different historical

moments, as occasion required, each divergent form of Kurdish nationalism proposed over the span of 16 years covered in this study was the result of the historical conditions of its existence. Consequently, it is not possible to find -and no theoretically based reason to look for- a fixed and permanent Kurdish nationalist ideology in the pre-WWI period, or in any historical period for that matter, because there is no such thing as *one* national identity in an essentialist sense. Rather there are multiple versions of a national identity constructed through discourse practice with each form corresponding to specific needs (cf. Wodak et al. 1999: 188; Klein 2007: 137). Therefore, Kurdish intellectuals' shifting set of ideological and political orientation in response to different historical circumstances should not be seen as strange or an extraordinary phenomena. As Fairclough (1995b: 52) suggests, 'changes in society and culture manifest themselves in all their tentativeness, incompleteness and contradictory nature in the heterogeneous and shifting discursive practices of media.' Similarly, when the Kurdish elite could not challenge the hegemonic discourse of the Pan-Islamism or the Islamic Ummah or did not see a prospect of complete independence from the Ottoman state, it constructed Kurdish nationalism in tandem with greater Islamic or Ottoman identities. However, when these two meta-loyalties began to wane or failed to respond to the demands, the Kurdish identity discourse adopted a more ethno-nationalist discourse parallel to the changing social and political atmosphere as evident in the discourse of *Rojî Kurd*.[660] Thus it is clear that the assessment of each historical period, the motivations and the degree of political power envisaged by Kurdish elites resulted in multiple forms and expressions of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish national identity.

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[660] Yeğen (2006: 144) rightly asserts that since its inception Kurdish nationalism has been through a few paradigmatic changes that overlap with those observed in Turkish nationalism.

7.2.6. Reasons behind the Failure of the Early Kurdish Journals to Produce an Imagined Kurdish National Community

7.2.6.1. Distribution and Consumption of the Text

Although the Kurdish printing press of the pre-WWI period managed to create a nationalist discourse among the Kurdish elite and a small group of literati, evidence from several studies, including Allison (2013), Klein (1996; 2007), Strohmeier (2003) and this thesis seems to point that the Kurdish identity discourse remained inconsequential in terms of making an impact among a larger Kurdish community. [661] This is due to the fact that the nation-making power of the printing press requires the confluences of modern forces, including print-capitalism, industrialization, urbanization, and so forth, which provide an infrastructural base for the formation of an imagined community (cf. Anderson 2006; Gellner 1994; Conversi 2001). One such important infrastructural base has to do with literacy and readership size, which underscores the potential influence and power of the media discourse (cf. Fairclough 1995b: 38).

As discussed earlier, differences in technologies of each media type 'have significant wider implications in terms of the meaning potential' based on the specific technical form they utilize (Fairclough 1995b: 38). Human experience is intrinsically multisensory, and every representation is subject to the constraints and affordances of the medium involved. For instance, in terms of coding and decoding practices while radio uses the technologies of sound recording and broadcasting, television relies on human's audiovisual senses. The printing press, on the other hand, requires a potential reader to be literate in the language of the medium (Meyrowitz 1985; Sheyholislami 2011). Under ideal circumstances these media types contribute immensely to the construction of a 'public sphere,' 'public opinion' (Habermas 1989) or an 'imagined community' (Anderson 2006).

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[661] This situation is not unique to the Kurds as in the overwhelming cases of nationalism, including Turkish nationalism, the urban elite, equipped with intellectual, political and technical means and capacity, became nationalist well before the rest of the population and promulgated their ideas when and if the right social and political circumstances arrived (Kedourie 1994; Hobsbawm 1992; Anderson 2006; Schulze 1996 Greenfeld 1992; Hroch 1985; Behrendt 1993, cited in Whitmeyer 2002).

However a medium on its own cannot provide the conditions for creating a broad public sphere toward the formation of an imagined community, rather it can be instrumental only in the right social, cultural and political context (Firro 2009: 53). As far as the Kurdish printing press is concerned, although it fostered a new form of communication among a national audience[662] and became a possible channel for the formation of a Kurdish nationalist discourse, illiteracy, exacerbated by the polyglossic nature of Kurdish, and restriction on the free circulation of the journals, limited the journals' readership size and tied to this the potential power and influence of the journals' nationalist discourse (cf. Fairclough 1995b: 40).[663] Then it can be argued that mass illiteracy among the Kurds prevented the Kurdish journals of the pre-WWI period to achieve their goal of forming an imagined Kurdish national community through their national identity discourse. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries the small segment of the Kurdish reading public did not exceed 10% compared to, for instance, France of the 18th century where the literacy rate among male populations was 47% (Firro 2009: 55; Klein 1996: 123). [664] To put it differently, during the historical period under consideration the Kurdish literati groups or reading circules, to use Hassanpour's term, gradually increased to become a type of 'cultural class' with the potential of functioning as agents for the dissemination of Kurdish nationalist discourse. However, since this literate segment of the society remained as a tiny literate reef on top of a vast ocean of illiterates, the Kurdish journalistic discourse was not sufficient to introduce a profound shift in the Kurdish public mind and thus unable to break neither parochial nor meta-identities in favour of the conditions in which

[662] As we saw, the newspaper genre in an innovative way provided a new mode of addressing, which was instrumental in convoking a new type of audience. In media studies audience is constructed form two distinct perspective: audience as potential consumer and audience as *citizens* or *national audience* that must be informed and educated (Ang 1991: 28-29). Kurdish journals adopting the latter perspective convoked a new Kurdish public and a new audience of a particular kind: a national audience who shared a common language, culture, history, ethnicity, homeland and common goals.

[663] As the study showed, not only the publishers of the papers but the readers were also persecuted when the papers found in their possession. See a related reader's letter in *Kurdistan*, No. 13., April 2, 1899, reprinted in Bozarslan (1991) Vol. 1: 275.

[664] According to Hassanpour (1996: 66) literacy rate in Kurdistan was around 4% in the 1920s.

Kurds could begin to conceive themselves as belonging to an imagined community of a nation.

Since we do not have access to the readership we cannot analyse the impact of Kurdish publication activities on the Kurdish audience based on surveys or questionnaires. In any case, it is difficult to measure the proportion of a population that is nationalistic.[665] However, a number of reader letters published in the corpora of Kurdish journals seem to point that the journals were read by commoners especially during gatherings perhaps in coffee house, medrese and guest-house settings, which constituted effective agents for the dissemination of nationalist ideology and feelings.[666] Moreover, an article by Lutfi Fikri gives an idea about the reception of the journal by Kurdish commoners. Fikri, recounting his visit to a Kurdish village, wrote:

> I saw a small booklet that was carefully placed on a wooden drawer in a niche… It was a book written in Kurdish probably a couple years back in Istanbul. The villagers venerated it as if it was a religious book. They talked about it with a passionate love. 'Sir, this is a Kurdish book!' they said, 'we had never seen such thing before. So there can be books in Kurdish too! A few times we had the village imam to read it [to us]… we got tearful with joy…' Then I said to myself: all attempts are of no avail! No one can prevent this national current. The time and place are very favourable [too]. See! How nationalism has yield such a heavy harvest, even here in this village of 10 households in a remote part of the world away from all civilized centres that has no [proper] roads and can only be reached with great difficulty.[667]

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[665] It is important to note that no scholarship has specified what proportion of a population characterized by nationalism is needed for that population to be condisered as a nation. (Whitmeyer 2002: 323).

[666] A reader's letter sent to the journal *Kurdistan* from Adana particularly points that the paper was read out loud to those present, *see* Seyid Tahirê Botî, *Ji bo Cerîdeya Kurdistanê* [To Kurdistan Newspaper], *Kurdistan*, No. 5, June 17, 1898 in Bozarslan 1991, Vol 1. p. 162.

[667] 'Bir pencere içinde ufak bir tahta çekmece üzerine kemâl-i ihtimamla konulmuş bir ufak risale gördüm. bu herhalde bir iki sene evvel İstanbulda Kürdce yazılmış bir şeydi. Bu risaleyi köylüler

Fikri's account of the veneration with which villagers treated books in Kurdish, considers the situation as a direct evidence of an unstoppable and ubiquitous nationalism.

7.2.6.2. The Fragmented Nature of the Kurdish Society

The study showed that the fragmented nature of the Kurdish identity along linguistic, sectarian, regional and tribal lines presented another impediment for the Kurdish intellectuals in their endeavour to form a unified Kurdish national community. However, this obstacle too might have arisen from issues related to the dissemination and consumption of the journals' discourse, in that although the Kurdish journals constructed the Kurds as a homogeneous and unified national body - regardless of their aforementioned internal differences- through a wide range of discursive strategies, the lack of a mass readership and other challenges pertaining to dissemination issues prevented the journal from overcoming the challenges posed by the fragmented Kurdish identity and playing its role of constructing a single, unified Kurdish national community.

7.2.6.3. Detachment of the Kurdish Intellectual Elite from the Ordinary Kurds

The fact that the Kurdish leadership in Istanbul remained out of touch with Kurdish masses in Kurdistan also contributed to the Kurdish leadership failure to turn the Kurdish nationalist discourse into a mass national movement. The years in exile, coupled with their Western education and urban experience alienated the Kurdish elite, with a few exceptions, from more traditional commoners in Kurdistan (Strohmeier 2003: 40).[668] Although on a few occasions the journals

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dînî bir kitâb menzilesinde muhterem tutuyorlardı. Bundan büyük bir âteş-i sevda ile bahs itdiler. "Efendim, dediler Kürdce kitâb! Bunu hîç görmemişdik, demek Kürdce de kitâb olurmuş! Köyün imamına bunu birkaç defa okutduk… Meserretimizden gözlerimiz sulandı… O vakit kendi kendime dedim: 'Beyhude teşebbüs! Bu cereyânı milliyyenin önüne kimse geçemez. Zaman, muhît buna gayet müsâ'id! İşte yolsuz bir yerde, çamurlar içinde bata çıka, dünyâdan, bütün merâkiz-i medeniyyeden uzak içine geldiğimiz şu on evil köyde bile ne kuvvetli mahsûl vermiş!'' (Lütfî Fikrî 'Kürt Milliyeti' [Kurdish Nation], Rojî Kurd, No. 4, September 12, 1913, in KXK (2013: 202-204)).

[668] Givne their social backgrounds, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi and Halil Hayali, among others, were more in touch with Kurdish masses in Kurdistan than other Kurdish intellectuals.

Kurdistan and *Rojî Kurd* drew attention to the danger of estrangement between the Kurdish intellectual elite and the Kurdish commoners and emphasized the importance of close interaction and alliance between these two strata,[669] their concern could not go beyond good intention or mere advice as the Kurdish intelligentsia remained in Istanbul detached from ordinary Kurdish masses in Kurdistan. Consequently, this state of estrangement caused the Kurdish identity discourse to remained limited to the Kurdish elite and a small segment of the reading public.

7.3. Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

Although during the historical period under consideration the Kurdish intellectuals published a number of newspapers, magazines and books, this thesis, in order to limit the data to a manageable body, limited itself to offering an analytical perspective on three major Kurdish journals published in the pre-WWI period. Therefore the remaining publications especially those that came out in the immediate aftermath of WWI, noticeably *Jîn*,[670] deserve a thorough examination through an exhaustive close textual analysis informed by a corpus linguistic methodology. Such studies on the discourse of Kurdish print materials of the late Ottoman Empire will tremendously enrich the body of knowledge in the field of Kurdish studies on this particular period and add to our understanding of this embryonic stage of Kurdish nationalism.

7.4. Policy Implications

Recent years have witnessed a historical recurrence in which the contemporary ideological streams on the Kurdish question in Turkey bear striking similarities to

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[669] See, Abdurrahman Bedir Khan's article entitled *'Kurdçe Kısım'* [Kurdish Section], *Kurdistan*, No. 27, March 13, 1901, in Bozarslan, Vol. 2, p. 471-474, where the author claims that he is communicating with the Kurdish notables in Kurdistan to organize an anti-governent movement. As discussed in Chapter 6, Bulgaristanlı Dogan also point to the importance of the relations between the Kurdish intellectuals in Istanbul and the Kurdish leadership and commoners in Kurdistan, see Bulgaristanlı Doğan, *'Milletinize Karşu Vazifeniz'* [Your Duty Towards Your Nation] *Rojî Kurd*, No. 2, July 19, 1913, in KXK (2013: 134-136).

[670] *Jîn* (1918-1919) was the publication organ of *Kurdistan Tealî Cemîyetî* or the *Society for the Rise of Kurdistan*.

those of the late Ottoman period embodied in Akçura's *'Three Types of Policy'* (1904), i.e., *Islamism*, *Ottomanism* and *Turkism* that was discussed earlier.[671] Among them the concept of *Ottomanism (Osmanlılık)*, first developed by Young Ottomans in the 1860 and then became 'the rallying cry of the 1908 Young Turk revolution' (Zürcher 2010: 211), attempted to inspire loyalty to the Ottoman state by constructing a unified Ottoman political community made up of equal citizens who came from different confessional and ethnic backgrounds. Nonetheless, soon after the Young Turk revolution, which put effective state power in the hands of the CUP leadership, Ottomanism lost its credibility because the dominant Turkish nationalist segment of the CUP, which hitherto encompassed varying ideological tendencies, was not truly committed to the Ottoman ideals and thus broke its words when the CUP ideologues decided to abandon Ottomanism and instead turned Turkish national identity into an oppressive state ideology at the expense of non-Turkish and non-Sunni Muslim communities (cf. Zürcher 2010: 211-231; Kevorkian 2011: 141-146; Davison 1998: 90-92). The founders of the Turkish Republic, spearheaded by the remnants of the CUP ideologues, opted for a similar form of Turkish nationalism laying the foundation of the new state on the denial of all non-Turkish and non-Sunni Muslim identities and their forceful assimilation into the dominant, oppressive and chauvinist Sunni Muslim-Turkish identity. Privileging the Turkish nation, article 66 of the Turkish constitution stipulates that 'everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk.'[672]

Ethnic and religious minorities' decades-long struggle for cultural and political rights in Turkey –particularly the Kurdish political struggle- coupled with increased instability in the Middle East and the Turkish state's ambitions to become a regional power, have, in the last few years, compelled the Turkish

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[671] As discussed earlier, Akçura problematized the pros and cons of *Islamism*, *Ottomanism* and *Turkish nationalism* as possible Ottoman state policies to keep the empire intact during the late Ottoman period.

[672] See the constitution of the Turkish Republic: http://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf

state to come to terms with its culturally, ethnically and religiously heterogeneous population. Thus senior Turkish politicians, particularly those in the ruling AKP government, as well as scholars, political analysts, and commentators on Kurdish issue have been discussing, since 2008, the concept of 'Türkiyelilik' as a supra-identity (üst kimlik) that would embrace the marginalized ethnic and religious communities in Turkey. 'Türkiyelilik,' much like Ottomanism, seems to denote a particular brand of civic nationalism that attempts to provide a widely accepted common identity for Turkey's ethnically and religiously heterogeneous society. It allegedly signifies the state of 'being a citizen of Turkey' or 'being from Turkey,' avoiding the official and constitutional concept of Turkish identity that defines all citizens of Turkey as members of the 'Turkish nation.'

The concept of 'Türkiyelilik' as a supra-identity is particularly designed to contribute to the on-going 'peace process' with the Kurds.[673] Hoping that this new form of identity would bring an end to the Turkish racial domination over the state apparatus in favour of their cultural, linguistic and political rights, the Kurds also endorse this new identity. In any case, to facilitate a less radical and more acceptable solution, the PKK has dropped its secessionist demands towards a wholesale democratization of Turkey along with a policy of Kurdish autonomy within Turkey's existing borders. Ahmet Turk, a senior Kurdish politician, the former chairman of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party and the current mayor of Mardin province, stated, in 2008, that 'Türkiyelilik' should be designated as the supra-identity in the Turkish constitution. [674]

However, the driving force behind this new Turkish state policy might not necessarily arise from the Turkish state's genuine concern about and resentment at the past wrongdoings towards Kurds and other oppressed identities. Rather, it

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[673] The so-called 'Peace Process' also known as 'Kurdish Opening,' 'Democratic Opening,' and 'National Unity and Fraternity Project,' is a state initiative launched in 2009 to ostensibly improve democratic standards in Turkey and solve the Kurdish problem (Casier, at al. 2013; Kaya 2013).

[674] http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Siyaset/HaberDetay.aspx?aType=HaberDetay&Kategori=siyaset&KategoriID=&ArticleID=992160&Date=17.09.2008&b=Turk:Turkiyelilik%20%20ust%20kimlik%20olsun

seems that similar to the motivations behind Ottomanism in the early 20th century, the state's incentive for the so-called 'democratic opening' and the on-going peace process with the Kurds is to grant as little rights as possible to the marginalized ethnic and religious communities and in this way pacify and co-opt this dissident voices into the system in order to keep the existing power structure and territorial integrity of the Turkish state. Having solved the internal problems would in turn strengthen the Turkish state's hand in its search for hegemonic power in the region and a greater role in international politics. Therefore, scholars and political commentators refer to this new AKP policy as the revival of neo-Ottomanism[675] in a bid to turn the Turkish state into a regional, if not a global, power. It is noteworthy that the ruling AKP party politicians including, Ahmet Davutoğlu, the former foreign minister and the current PM of Turkey, reject to use the term neo-Ottomanism to describe the new Turkish state policy.[676]

An accurate reading of the notions of Ottomanism in the late Ottoman period and its relevance to the contemporary politics in Turkey are crucial to understanding the motivations behind Turkish state's attempts to reconfigure Turkish politics.[677] As the study illustrated, the Ottomanism of the early 20th century, failed to realize its goal of forming a unified Ottoman nation mainly due to the fact that it remained as an insincere pragmatic policy that sought to prevent the break-up of the Empire and strengthen the dominant position of the Turkish element without

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[675] The Greeks coined the term neo-Ottomanis after Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 (Karpat 2002: 524).

[676] 'I am not a neo-Ottoman,' Davutoğlu says: http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-193944-i-am-not-a-neo-ottoman-davutoglu-says.html. However, ironically, the Turkish National Education Council decided, on December 5, 2014, to make the instruction of Ottoman Turkish compulsory in high schools, in line with the state's overall new-Ottomanist policies, *see*: Why Turkey's president wants to revive the language of the Ottoman Empirehttp: //www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/12/12/why-turkeys-president-wants-to-revive-the-language-of-the-ottoman-empire/ see also: Ottoman language classes to be introduced 'whatever they say,' vows Erdoğan: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ottoman-language-classes-to-be-introduced-whatever-they-say-vows-erdogan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=75329&NewsCatID=338,

[677] Given the ruling AKP's Islamic character and politics it is fair to argue that the new Turkish state's dominant ideology and course of action is a mixture of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism.

any modification in the power structure. Therefore it seems that the notion of 'Türkiyelilik' is doomed to fail, similar to Ottomanism, as long as the state does not show a true commitment to the so-called democratic opening and refuses to reflect the concept of 'Türkiyelilik' in the actual relations of power. That is unless the dominant Sunni-Turkish element is willing to share the state power with Kurds and the other oppressed identities, the policy of 'Türkiyelilik' might not stand a chance of success. It is hoped that this study supplies valuable insights from a historical point of view into the on-going peace process between the Turkish State and the Kurds.

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