

The Philosophy of the Democratic Nation Between Theory and Practice



By : Ibrahim Khalil

ASO Center for Consultancy and Strategic Studies

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Introduction:

One of the most problematic arts emerging in the exponential population growth during the 20th century in particular, is mobilizing crowds or managing them. It is an art that requires a special and a unique skill that is of an ambiguous origin and is intensified in one individual who brings together some pieces of the ultimate soul, where any individual of the leaded gatherings realizes his/her own weaknesses, his/her own mental deficiency and his/her constant need for a "Father" who leads them to what is in their interest and avoids what may harm them, that is known today as the leader or president.

The vast majority of human beings had to live confined till this day, because humanity is still in development and constant change, the human being is still incapable of accomplishing the process of self-discovery and not to mention discovering the surroundings and dealing with it, despite the different aspects those confinements had, on the opposite they would sacrifice everything to keep them. Because that skill is haphazard, every now and then some conscious minds must appear and different and irresolvable voices arise that might not have the charisma of the dominant leader but possess the common sense of life. Thus, it is those and their likes who start great intellectual reversals that aim at returning communities back on track, the track of basic individual's rights, the principles of dignified citizenship, values of justice, equality and moral superiority reaching to the synthesis of the "free human" who does not need anyone to lead or represent her/him.

Nowadays, the word "State" summarizes all the classical frames created by humans throughout eras for organizing human crowds that are different from each other in a number of identity elements, however, what happened is that it overpassed its organizing task to become a task for oppressing individuals and exploiting them, subsequently, oppressing the different crowds from their general within-structure. This dismay is the main cause for the state of turmoil and instability that everyone experiences with no exception.

Just like the dominant authoritarian state produces its thinkers and theorists who entrench its existence and righteousness, the oppressed crowd in its turn also produces two kinds of thinkers and theorists; the first of whom is the nationalist thinker, who is nothing but an authentic reflection of his oppressors' image; he adopts their thoughts and assumes their approach but in line to what comes in his people's interest and sharing the same demand and ultimate aim that of their oppressors, which is exchanging roles without changing the originally anomalous foundation of coexistence, in other words; the duality of the oppressed and oppressor. The other kind is the thinker calling for breaking and escaping that hatred circle, establishing peaceful coexistence instead of hostilities and imposing parity instead of disparity even if that cost them losing the public sentiment that they represent or aspire to represent.

What settles that entropy on the ground, is the collaboration of the subjective with the objective or in other words the ability of human beings to produce a belief system that comes from within and feeds into others' beings, in which they all together sense the necessity of coexistence rather than its primacy.

First Subsection:

Identity:

I cannot find a theoretical definition that has been exposed, in human thought throughout its history, to a wide disagreement regarding it, as is the case with the concept of "individual

identity" identical to the human's being and the being of an object, in that the definitions are elementary. As we say "that man is man" and "an object is an object," disturbance has prevailed these concepts and they no longer fulfill the purposes of defining and framing.

There are those who attributed identity to the characteristic of difference and differentiation of units, in the sense that mere difference refers to identity. There are those who limited it to the characteristics of the body or the mass of matter, while others, like John Locke (1632 - 1704), believed that "consciousness is personal identity and personal identity is consciousness,"¹ and that this consciousness entails or includes previous memories, the sum of which constitutes the singular identity, in contrast to David Hume, who denied the existence of personal identity in the first place due to its lack of agreement with the meaning of change in time: "What I call a self is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, on the basis of which the imagination is continuous and these perceptions cannot be fixed in reality, hence the continuation of perceptions is a creation of the imagination."²

If this is the case for the individual identity, it is no surprise that the definition of the collective identity is more ambiguous and more complex. How can we find a common denominator that imparts millions of people – who suffer from individual identity disorder - with the commonality of a single collective identity, representing each of them separately and collectively at the same time?

Identity is a singular expression, which would be more appropriate to utilize it in the collective aspect, as it is a set of affiliations, acquired either by birth, such as gender, sex, name, language, and nationality, or by choice of belief, such as religion, sect, homeland and profession. No wonder these sets differ in their narrowness and breadth, forming in their entirety, as in their intersections, the societal and mental structure of individuals. Thus, the individuals' attachment to them and their need for them, due to the complexity of life conditions around them, becomes an existential matter, which they tolerate when they feel safe and adequate, and consider them a haven whenever they feel a danger threatening them, or they imagine that they are threatened, from an enemy belonging to a different identity set.

We do not find it necessary to make any distinction between societal identity - or identities - (I do not mean the social identity that Henri Tajfel and John Charles Turner talked about in the 80s of the last century³) on the one hand, and political identity on the other hand. Societal identities are the result of diverse and distinct ancient cultures, which originated in a specific setting and will contain later within its framework identity variances, within the main condition being the stability of interest and the joint and shared geographical space. This identity is usually less severe and more tolerant than others and the least damage occurs in the event of clash and rivalry (and with this condition, religious doctrines cannot be considered today societal identities). However, any culture of this kind is not valid or qualified to transform into a self-standing "political identity" without the conditions of the collective conscious will being met, the appropriate numerical mass, the mobilizing ideology, the charismatic or revolutionary or ruling management or leadership and with the automatic or deliberate marginalization of the geographical space condition in favor of the identity

1 Mohamed Idrissi, "The Question of Identity" by John Locke, "Tabayan" Magazine, Release 34/Volume IX, (Doha: Fall 2020), P. 157

2 George Larrain, "**Ideology and Cultural Identity**", translated by: Dr. Faryal Hassan Khalifa, (Cairo, Madbouly Library), P.248

3 Categorization of people on the basis of perceived group status differences according to their social circumstances and its impact on individual's behaviors

tendency and with the automatic or deliberate marginalization of the geographical space condition in favor of the acquired identity tendency to expand whenever possible.

The State

It is ambiguous how exactly the initial human groupings (herds) were organized, yet it is possible to assume that two of the most important factors that intervened to form and distinguish between these groups throughout history, starting with the herd and ending with the nation are interest and geography factors, as we have mentioned above. And I perceive that both factors in addition to other secondary factors have played a key role in blocking cumulatively individual cracks between the social cells, in a manner planned by nature and directly supervised it by using both weapons, the enticement and the intimidation. The sectarian, religious, national and tribal designations which appeared later, are only linguistic decorations – with the emergence of language – and spiritual framing – with the appearance of religion – for these two factors in particular.

The state made an inescapable evil throughout history; as it was represented as a total ambiguous spirit in a body of a coercion institution that transcends and oppresses individuals at most, through employed and trained segments of soldiers, military and security men.

In the reasonable hypothetical origin of the formation of the state, the expansion of the closeness (of kin) circles in a tribe has led to the mitigation of obstructs, and being limited to the closest –as the closest – the family is the origin according to Aristotle- before people could find themselves obliged to cohabit and coexist with “the others”; the thing which required the existence of a neutral organization form represented as “central decision and public guard” which take care of and protect this cohabitation. Also, as this guard did not have time to gain its strength, raising (collecting) system appeared. The thing, which in return, necessitated the presence of a management system which has been bureaucratically complicated over time and transformed with the natural development to what has been designated The State.

In the wake of the phase of material formation (which was geographical at most) and the awareness of that formation (which was mostly advantageous), geographies connected and dissolved gradually and long, the separate individual interests in one utmost and collective interest, decided and implemented by an excellent elite of the human community, imposed by appointment, inheritance or election. Later on, it came to create modern states on political maps with boundaries that could be increased or decreased based on the generality of the interest and according to the increase in the decrease of both ambition and power factors.

Almost all of the nations, folks and states we know today were born accordingly, and even though they went through some transformations, modifications and secondary roads throughout its long history, it would soon return to its initial path, on which the utmost majority of its sons allied on and on which its collective awareness was found, without paying attention to the new name or the names acquired through vicissitudes of ages or geography shifting; especially if the common language survived and maintained an equal status to all, in a picture simulates an individual preserving of his identity despite the growth of his organs.

And in the recorded historical origin, the inception of the appearance of the state with its modern concept we know today, meaning the distinction between power and who exercises

it, in the 13th century before its features becoming clear in the 17th century in France, Britain and Spain in particular, and precisely after the famous agreement of Westphalian in 1648.

The modern state can be seen, as for the principle, clustering (or gathering) of a group of helpmates who differ in their many sub-identities within a safe space, in which individuals' affairs are managed on a law basis, and outside of it group affairs on an interest basis.

"Hans Martin – Harald Schumann" states "as the social disintegration increases economically, therefore these terrified people believe that political salvation lies in isolation and separation. Hence, dozens of new states have been added to the world map in recent years"⁴ the thing which explains partially but dries the process states and the national and patriotic entities generation.

Certainly, the central role played by the economy during that long march can't be denied; with the sunrise of the 19th century on the western world, it was no longer acceptable for the science of administration, politics and sociology to lag behind the industrial, technical and scientific revolutions. Guaranteeing security and development of scientific achievement had to place political sociology on its right track, which facilitates the movement of capital produced by the accelerated activity in the three main sectors; agriculture, industry and trade. For that would not have been achieved except by the stability of the modern state, which in return would not be achieved unless it is preceded by the emphasis on belonging and loyalty bonds, and reference by all individuals alike to one valid law, which include rights and duties regulations.

The definition of the state by Steven Grosby; "an entity practices, through institutions, its power over a territory through laws connecting individuals inside the territory as considering those individuals as belonging to the state"⁵.

In the French encyclopedia "Larousse," the state is "a group of individuals who live on a specific land and are subjected to certain authority" and the definition of a state by Russell H. Fifield and Percy Cox is that "the state governs itself and has all sovereignty rights" and it does not deviate from this definition.⁶

By socialists; that state was psychologically established, according to Feuerbach, in the wake of "human knowledge that his idol is man" and according to Hegel "an absolute mind and sublime spirit governed by a collective will be represented by the king," in contrast to Marx who believes in matter more than examples, and who believes that 'property is the origin of the state'⁷ and that it is an artificial composite human being based on two cornerstones kinship ties and production means, namely the family and the economy. While Engels believes that the state is "a power found due to the emergence of intractable internal contradictions in the society and it is superior over this society"⁸. Linen followed them, as he added the idea of contradictory existence between the state and the freedom, where there is the state, there is no freedom and where there is freedom, there is no state.

The concept of the state for Hegel, his satire of the need-state, of contracting and of production and his reluctance of it, is confronted with Ocalan's view of the Hegelian state

4 Hans Martin - Harald Schumann, "The Trap of Globalization", translated by: Dr. Adnan Ali, The World of Knowledge Series, No. 238, (Kuwait 1998), P. 55

5 Steven Grosby, "Nationalism", translated by: Mohammad al-Jendy and Mohammad Ismail, (Cairo: Hindawi Publisher. 2015), P. 26

6 Ibid

7 Ibid

8 Ibid

(the substantial state, the property state and the state of a state) which does not hide his reluctance for it.

The previous ideas may provide an initial answer to the question; why and how did the industrially advanced western world inaugurate the era of "the national state, then the patriotic" that which the popular and formal brunt has been carried out for it to be liberal and capitalistic; preserving the public concept of freedom and to ensure the torch of the competition, and the social and economic mobility is burning.

It took a century for the West to export to its colonies in the east a false translation of the legalized and codified English word "nation" to "national cantons" to its residents who are close in terms of interest and geography, which barely suffice, but numerically superior ethnic or religious blocks that are usually ruled by the most powerful and the most violent, not the most reasonable and the most efficient.

For reasons go back to the accelerated social upheavals and the new political generations that swept the West at that time and occupied their elites and leaders. The western political seniors had no time and effort to organize their colonies affairs (their mines and markets) in the historical continents of colonization Asia and Africa; spread and division took place according to the military tides among the major powers, and maps were drawn rapidly, leaving in each modernized eastern country one or more cleaved anxious, which will have two future benefits; first, is to push this country backward continuously or at least to nail it where it is, second is to justify foreign intervention as interest requires.

This is how the pen has moved, in blind fate moments, according to the will of the distant masters, not according to the will of the neighboring slaves...

The Kurdish Cause:

The Kurdish issue, one of the most dangerous time bombs, remained implanted in the soil of the Middle East and Asia Minor, for nearly two centuries, without anyone succeeding in defusing it even though many succeeded in extinguishing it consistently. This issue progressed in the medieval era from large religious or tribal houses that developed into fiefdoms and semi-autonomous emirates in the 19th century, which do not possess the ability or awareness that qualifies them to build a state in the Western style or even to develop their own experience, then to mere persecuted subjects of existing nation-states, to the problem of disobedient, rebellious, and outlaws who "are keen on the safety of their camels and not the safety of the Kaaba." And to the signs of final conscious awareness crystallized in a fully-fledged national cause, in which clans, tribes, religions, doctrines, and personal desires dissolve but without success - Even after a century after the Great Partition - in building its own nation-state, which remained a dream that entices most poets and singers, and is exploited by most rulers and politicians.

In the assessment of the Kurdish issue, one must start from the case of the Kurdish society that is deeply entrenched in a rural, pastoral, tribal root that has been exposed for long and continuous processes of conflict, dissolution and annihilation in the face of the stronger (militarily) sects of the Middle East, before the development of the "societal identity" that the Kurds carried throughout the previous periods of their history and defended it enthusiastically (in the Neolithic Mesopotamia and then in the midst of successive Islamic empires), to a clear political identity; starting from the 19th century as a collective reaction to the feudal movement locally and capitalism globally, and according to the inevitable

interactions caused by the social fluctuations of the milieu that were in turn in the process of becoming political.

Thus, the 19th and 20th centuries witnessed tens of Kurdish revolutions, all of which were suppressed; and leaving behind popular discontent and a slow, gradual progress towards the final accumulation of the concept of "utter nationalism" and "one people."

With the stability of the modern nation-state era, Kurds found themselves surrounded by three impediments that prevent them from achieving their political entity, which are respectively:

- Lack of the elite and weakness of the Kurdish political movement
- Regional neighbors' hostility
- The complicity or neglect of the international powers.

In a literary analogy, the Kurds are locked in a prison with three serial doors, the opening of each door is dependent on the opening of the one before it, without excluding here the hypothesis of direct and indirect collusion between the three parties.

In the midst of the 20th century and the emergence of "Malah Mustafa Barzani", the Kurds in Iraq declared a comprehensive revolution, the general objectives of which were defined for national liberation and the building of an entity for self-governance, with a focus on the concepts of brotherhood and coexistence, in addition to preserving the right to self-defence - for the first time - with two wings: one that is political which is called the "Parti"⁹ and the military one which is called the "Peshmerga,"¹⁰ in a way that it can be said that a seed has finally sprouted in the sea of blood.

Barzani stated verbatim:

"My goal is the freedom and independence of Iraqi Kurdistan and thereafter, the freedom of those Kurds who live under the grip of foreigners and the establishment of a Kurdish state."¹¹

It is apparent that the blatant nationalist psyche in such statements that goes beyond the ambition of a "tribal sheikh", as is the custom, is what has set the alarm bell in Tehran and Baghdad and hastened the setback for the revolution following the agreement signed between the Shah Pahlavi and the Iraqi Ba'athist government, in Algeria in 1975, in a historical restoration reminiscent of the Sasanian and the Lakhmids alliance.

However, after less than three years, a new political organization was established, known as the "Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)", far from the sight of the Iraqi and Iranian regimes and in the Kurdish part of the Turkish state. It was a radical left-wing party, which believed that Greater Kurdistan was colonized. It was not soon after a few years that the armed struggle was announced under the extravagant, costly and provocative slogan, "the liberation and unification of Kurdistan." For this goal, the party fought a bloody war against the Kemalist state that lasted three decades and resulted in huge humanitarian and financial losses on both sides, before the intelligence finally succeeded, on February 15, 1999, in arresting Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and historical leader of the party and transferring him from Kenya to a solitary confinement on Imrali island in Marmara Sea.

9 Latin word for "Party"

10 Kurdish word for "People confronting Death"

11 (Fraternity) Newspaper of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, No. 9294 <http://altaakhipress.com/viewart.php?art=73317>

The arrest of Ocalan was accompanied by a great international media and political uproar, which prevented the execution of the death sentence issued against him, adding to it at that time the revival of Turkish hopes for joining the EU, whose membership candidates must abolish the death penalty.

As for the party, matters did not go as is customary, as the supporters of the Kurdish workers party were not dispersed and the party did not dissolve or split against itself, but on the contrary, what happened was in fact something that outweighs the split ...

Ocalan: Shifts in the Concept of Authority and the Rose Theory:

Perhaps the most dangerous consequence of Ocalan's arrest is the radical upheaval that took place in the deep ideological structure of the PKK, as the party carried out an arduous process of ideological estrangement. As a result, it transformed from an attacking left-wing nationalist party to a defensive internationalist anarchist party, without any clear progression or apprehensions.

Ocalan had embraced classical nationalist ideas and principles even until the day before his arrest, which were based on revolution, liberation, unity, socialism and democracy and similar high theoretical principles, one of which could not be implemented in the absence of the "concept of Authority."

Let us first, deal with the concept of authority, in a few lines, before moving on to the concept of "anarchism" that Ocalan later embraced.

The concept of authority ranges or intersects with the concepts of power, influence, leverage, hegemony, state, governance and dominance. Authority according to the "Modern Dictionary of Political Analysis" is; "a rule to ensure consent to comply with a decision or method of action."¹² According to Anthony Giddens, one of the most prominent modern sociologists who is known for his theory of structuration, authority is; "The ability of individuals or groups to highlight their interests or concerns. Even in cases where it may go against vested interests of many other individuals or groups."¹³ While the Egyptian linguist and philosopher Ibrahim Madkour defines it as; "Everything that determines a behavior or opinion for considerations outside the intrinsic value of the matter or the presented issue."¹⁴

Authority according to Max Weber (1864-1920) is; "a compulsory political organization with a central government that maintains the legitimate use of force within a certain framework of land." Weber notes that there are three principles of authority that is, traditional (custom) authority, charismatic (inspiring) authority, and legal (rational) authority. While John Galbraith (1908-2006) divides it into; coercive, taken by force, compensated; achieved by rewarding the subservient and agreement adaptability between the dominant and the subservient.¹⁵

All of these definitions implicitly intersect in one concept, which is the dependence of authority on (its perceived and comprehended right to rule) and the moral and righteous obligation of the governed to (obedience), as Andrew Heywood asserts.¹⁶

12 J. Roberts and E. Edwards, "The Modern Dictionary of Political Analysis", translated by: Samir Abdel-Rahim Chalabi, Beirut: Arab Publisher of Encyclopedias. 1999

13 Anthony Giddens, Sociology, translated by: Fayez Al-Siyagh, ed. 4, Beirut: Arab Unity Studies Center. 1997, P. 467.

14 Ibrahim Madkour, "The Philosophical Dictionary", Cairo: The Amiria Press. 1983, P.98.

15 Faysal al-Marashi, "The Concept of the State", The Political Encyclopedia website <https://political-encyclopedia.org/dictionary/>

16 Andrew Haywood, "Political Theory", translated by: Lubna al-Raidi, Cairo: The National Center for Translation. 2013, P.225

In general, it can be said that authority in the political field is power combined with legitimacy. And legitimacy, conventionally, comes through popular election or predominance. If it is by the first, the governance is called democratic, and if by the second it is called authoritarian.

With regard to the PKK, it is possible to speak of only two authorities; the first of which is of leader Ocalan over all around him; that is synonymous with influence and authority, and the second is the authority of which the party as a whole aspired and worked for, that is here identical to government or state. If power, for the individual, is purely psychological satisfaction then it is a means for any political organization that enables them to reformulate the targeted society in the form they want and aspire to.

At one of the meetings, Ocalan addressed his speech to an elite group of senior party comrades, firmly saying:

"We will push you to adhere to and esteem power at the same time. It is true that it is a difficult mission, but there is no substitute for that. It is a battle that requires you to be strong like bulls and not as fighters with collapsed powers."¹⁷

Adding:

"Since my childhood, I have devoted everything to the slogan 'Everything is for the sake of power, everything is for the sake of battle.' Therefore, today also, if you do not participate in the battle for power, I will not even greet you."¹⁸

Those phrases were back then in their natural context and completely identical to the speeches of leaders of liberation revolutions anytime and anywhere, although they formed an unpleasant mixture, which Ocalan later admitted of its demagoguery and dogmatism.

This was in the beginnings, however, what later happened in the beginning of the third millennium was the absolute opposite. When Ocalan was arrested – and lost full authority – he was over the age of 51 and had reached what could be called, bypassing the "ideological retirement age", which means that he became inclined to serenity and bypassed racist ideas, narrow tendencies and sub-identities and perhaps this is one of the reasons that led him to despise and repudiate the concept of authority.

However, where did Ocalan get the inspiration for these ideas exactly, and how did it occur to him to fundamentally reverse the Kurdish intellectual equation? From a nationalism that can only be achieved by power to a nationalism that can only be achieved by renouncing power and from the concept of the (internationalization) of the Kurds, similar to other nations, to the (non-internationalization) of the world like the Kurds?

Ocalan, at every visit he received in his prison, would request a list of intellectual books and most of their titles dated back to the pre-Marxist or contemporary era of Marx communism. Therefore, he had access to everything written by the elders of anarchism, such as; Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Pyotr Kropotkin, Wallerstein and Murray Bookchin. He was inspired by their revolutionary ideas related to combating the concept of power, theorizing for societal democracy and abolishing the institution of the state and from the

¹⁷ Abdullah Ocalan, Anthology 3, P.148

¹⁸ Ibid.

latter in particular, he was inspired by the theory of social anarchism, municipal government and ecological notions.¹⁹

Proudhon writes: "The despotism of the mind is necessarily linked to the idea of legitimate authority."²⁰

Bakunin writes; "We, anarchists, are enemies of the state and every form of state control"²¹.

Kropotkin writes; "We are accustomed, for reasons related to the prejudices we have inherited and to completely false education and upbringing, that we see in every place nothing but the government, legislation and the judiciary and to believe that people will tear each other to pieces as beasts on the day that the policeman are not watching and that chaos will prevail if the authority gets into a disaster. We pass, unconsciously, along thousands of human gatherings that were formed completely freely and without any interference from the law and which managed to make achievements that greatly exceed what is accomplished under government tutelage."²²

"One can consider himself an anarchist if he believes that society can be run without the state," Bookchin stated.²³

Ocalan agrees with the rest of the leaders of anarchism in rejecting the state institution as well as the authority, which in turn he defines it as "employing all kinds of social activities with the aim of gaining surplus production"²⁴ as he rejects property²⁵.... In my opinion, except that surplus value and previous surplus production are a tool of plunder and banditry, however, as long as the economy is subject to private property and state ownership, it can be presented as a primary tool in plunder and banditry and considering that the economy is the basic foundation of society, all its forms of property, including private and statehood, are immoral and fall into the list of plunder and loot."²⁶

Nevertheless, this did not prevent him from criticizing them and disagreeing with them in a fundamental aspect related to his reduction of power in the right to self-defense, which he discusses through a theory called by a quaint name, the "Rose theory:"

"There are those who conceive power as a terminal disease. Anarchists and passive people are especially so. In their opinion, you must escape from all kinds of strength and might as you escape a deadly epidemic. In fact, this concept is the objective form of surrender to power. The definition and solution offered by the system of democratic civilization are qualitatively different. Self-defense is a sacred right for every social group. And enjoying the power of defense against all kinds of attacks on the group's existence and its values upon which its existence is based, goes beyond the scope of the right to become the cause of existence itself. I am convinced that it is impossible to describe defense force in its classic

19 Debbie Bookchin, daughter of Murray Bookchin, indicated in one of her articles published in July 2019; "When Ocalan's intermediary, a German translator, wrote to my father in 2004, he told him that the Kurdish leader had read all of his books available in Turkish translation and considered himself a good student of his.... That he recommended every head of the Municipalities in the Kurdish cities to read them."

<http://firatn.com/?p=1305>

20 Joseph Proudhon, "What is Property", translated by Adnan Mohammad, Qamishli: Naqsh Publications. 2020, P. 154

21 Mikhail Bakunin, "Critique of the Marxist Theory of the State", translated by Hosni Kabbash, 2011 <https://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art.asp?aid=288752>

22 Piotr Kropotkin, "The Conquest of Bread", translated by Ibrahim Khalil, Qamishli: Naqsh Publications. 2019, P. 148

23 "Anarchism in America", Documentary, 1983 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AHG19a8Bcql>

24 Abdullah Ocalan, **2nd Volume "Capitalism"**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 237

25 Article 17 of the 2nd paragraph of the 1st section of the Basic Charter for the AANES states, "Private property is protected by law."

26 Abdullah Ocalan, **On Economics**, Academic Publications of Abdullah Ocalan of Social Sciences, P. 7

sense of authority. It may be more appropriate to call it the strength or power of democratic defense. When we focus on how the rose - which is a plant - seeks to defend itself with its thorns, I cannot help myself from calling this paradigm of democratic power as (the theory of the Rose)."²⁷

Theory Against the Nation-State:

It would be useful, in the preface to this chapter, to present Ocalan's definitions of some of the basic concepts previously mentioned in order to gain access to the core of his personal philosophy in its political and social aspects.

Ocalan defines identity as the most influential "awareness event" regarding self-awareness of existence, as he sees "the identity of society in monotheistic religions is religion and God Himself."²⁸ As for the state, he summarizes it in the following equation; "The state = surplus production and surplus value + ideological means + devices of violence + art of governance."²⁹

Ocalan intensively exaggerates in criticizing the nation-state (nationalism in the Arabic translation of his works), saying :

"The nation-states in the Middle East were not constructed by revolutions, but rather they were constructed with the support and leadership of the hegemonic system. The primary aim of these states is to colonize their people in the name of this system."³⁰ "Nation-states of a religious and national character are not a predestination for us"³¹ and "the nation-state is the last and most perilous form as it is similarly for the state/deity"³².

Focusing his criticism on the economic capitalist ground upon which the nation-state is built. In my view, he seems to be right, however he doesn't stop here. Ocalan writes about the state and has in mind that form of the state that was established by the alliance of nobles and priests as a means of ruling and being representatives of the other classes. He declares that this "representative democracy developed by capitalist modernity is aimed implicitly at the adaptation and control of class conflicts,"³³ vastly in agreement with Engels who preceded him by saying that "the modern representative state is a means by which capital exploits indentured laborers"³⁴.

Ocalan's description of the state institution stands in stark contrast to Hegel, who believed that the state was the "real truth of the moral idea" and that it was "the core of the development of history" and that there was no freedom, self, or morality for individuals without it. Ocalan, by his bias for the anarchists, on this particular aspect, he not only strips it of all its advantages, but also ascribes to its disadvantages that should be attributed to cannibals and not to cumulative human innovation, that is the product of the elite political minds to date.

27 Abdullah Ocalan, **2nd Volume "Capitalism"**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 237

28 Ibid., 194.

29 Ibid., 200.

30 Abdullah Ocalan, **5th Volume**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 127

31 Ibid., 204.

32 Abdullah Ocalan, **2nd Volume "Capitalism"**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 198

33 Ibid., 34.

34 Frederick Engels, "**The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State**", translated by Elias Shaheen, Moscow: Takadoun Press. 1986, P. 117

In July 2001, Ocalan wrote, addressing his judges, “viewing the PKK as separatists is, essentially, an extremist assessment. The PKK adopted intrinsically the slogan ‘Unity cannot be achieved without freedom,’ however the claim that it called for a separate Kurdish national state under all circumstances is an allegation that is absolutely unutterable.”³⁵ And he wrote, “Not to mention the appropriateness or harmony of establishing a party or movement that aims to build the state for my goals, which completely contradicts them”³⁶.

He asserted the same ideas in all of his subsequent, broad and abundant pleadings that he submitted from his imprisonment to the European Court of Human Rights.

In fact, there is no more expressive term for what happened than “the coup.” After decades of armed nationalist struggle to establish “Greater Kurdistan”, Ocalan abandoned the traditional “state” idea, which is nothing more than a “tool of domination and a wild beast that is insatiable with blood, colonialism and looting,”³⁷ as he declared. He apologized directly and explicitly for a stage he went through with compulsion and a trap, as he was the only one who fell into it:

“If there is one crime that I have committed then it will be my own infection with this germ as well, which comes from the culture of power and war. I got indulged into this game when I believed that the principle of ‘freedom necessitates the authority of the state and this in turn necessitates war.’ This concept for us, is as the Quranic command for the believer. It is the disease that almost all the militants speaking in the name of the oppressed became infected with and have not survive it. Accordingly, I am guilty not only towards the hegemonic system, but also towards the liberation conflict that I made every effort in my power for it as well, and I will continue to express self-criticism about it till the end”³⁸.

This relatively late awakening against the concept of the state includes and is aimed exclusively at the “nation-state,” that is, “the stereotypical nation-state to which the nation-state aims creates artificial and false violent citizens”³⁹,” summarizing the definition of the nation-state as “the god of industrial capitalism” and “the butcher of modern capitalism.” Meaning that it is just a means of exploiting peoples and depleting their efforts and goods for the benefit of an elite group of politicians, soldiers, merchants and their likes. That is apparently, a genuine left-wing (Anglican, not Marxist) description, not devoid of truth, even if it is devoid of realism.

Ocalan does not seem oblivious to this issue and therefore one can find him augmenting his analyses and evaluations, and approaches the countries of the West themselves with the same assessment and with the same perspective on the basis of the oligarchy’s plundering of the proletariat. It is, as I mentioned previously, a radical leftist perspective that focuses on the economic factor and sees nothing in capitalism as anything but a strong, atrocious “Leviathan,” that we should not wait for him to dig his own grave - as Marxists say about Marx - but rather “free peoples” must initiate and dig this grave for him and bury him.

In fact, only Leviathan himself will disagree with Ocalan regarding the legitimacy of this dear proletarian wish, who is a stubborn and fierce opponent. He was so ferocious that he

35 Abdullah Ocalan, Urfa Pleading, P.19

36 Abdullah Ocalan, “the State”, P. 136

37 Abdullah Ocalan, “the State”, P. 48

38 Abdullah Ocalan, *Anthology – “The State”*, P. 8

39 Abdullah Ocalan, *5th Volume*, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 49

personally buried Marx at Gorbachev's feet a third of a century ago, and restored the globe to the custody of the one political god, preserving the vast difference in the balance of power as it was in the era of the Roman Empire twenty centuries ago and the great disparity in annual income rates among the inhabitants of the rich north and the poor south.

On the other hand, the nation-states that Ocalan defines, and we all know, are just faded and distorted versions of the nation-state model that the West gradually built on solid Greco-Roman pillars, and the East built it on wavy sands, which is unrealistic because reality says that the entire globe is divided into contiguous geographical spaces under the name of "the state" that differ in levels of progress, prosperity and democracy. However, it has never happened that one of its peoples revolted with the aim of undermining the establishment of the state or changing the character or identity of the people. Rather, those peoples revolted and rebelled against tyrannical regimes and corrupt tyrannical governments; the only one deservedly worthy of Ocalan's poignant description of "the butcher of capitalist modernity".

Ocalan does not seem to be critical of the real "patriotic-state". Rather, it is clear - if I do not misunderstand him - that he is inclined to it, but after stripping it from the state's character and assigning it the feature of the democratic administration. On the contrary, he is in a (realistic intellectual rift) that he finds no harm in coexistence together with the nation-state on the condition of mutual respect, in what appears to be a concession required by necessity: "Nation-states must be seen as very fundamental entities, and their relations and contradictions should be arranged in line with the democratic program of the people. The approaches of a democratic society are not intended to destroy nation-states and build their state in their place. Rather, it hopes that nation-states will show respect and appreciation for their projects that are related to the democratic society against the background of a constitutional accord with them."⁴⁰ This vision should not be perceived as a "philosophical slip" resulting from stress and conditions of detention, rather it would be better to evaluate it as a "belated realism" and an "intellectual prudence", which many thinkers throughout history have resorted to, to appease the opponent aiming to achieve a common tactic that is gaining time .

In conclusion, this institution is a natural development, which resulted from the ruins of tens or even hundreds of previous human attempts to create a unifying and organized framework for similar or allied human groups, and the state system has a long and progressive history from theocracy to aristocracy to authoritarian monarchy to democracy. Therefore, if the state institution has exhausted its purposes today and it has become necessary to search for a better and more advanced form at the present time, the protesters must certainly before that:

- Provide a convincing theoretical proof that the source of evil in the world is the institution and not the ones who build it.
- Present the appropriate alternative that fills the state's void and carries out its tasks.
- Convince all countries of the world, without exception, to dissolve themselves and adopt a system of autonomous administration and social communism.

40 Abdullah Ocalan, **5th Volume**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 590

The Neolithic Heaven and the Forbidden Kurdistan Tree:

It became apparent to everyone through the "prison works" that the Kurdish leader has become an international leader, not only abandoning the goal of establishing the nation-state, as previously said, but taking his place in the completely opposite side to it.

Ocalan believes that the nation-state is a primitive, reactionary concept that which star has faded and sunk away and according to the conditions of the region it is more appropriate to build a democratic nation with an anarchist administration, inhabited by components not peoples. In a vision full of conception and a romantic development of the theory of the "patriotic-state" that resolved the clash of nationalities and freed from the ties of religions, which is an extraordinary theory that is not flawed - regarding the Kurdish case - except that it is suitable for the restoration of an already existing state and not to build a state that has not yet been established. We do not yet know a single country in the world that is not nationalistic. It is absolutely impossible for the peoples of the world - or the Middle East at least - to collude in the dismantling of their countries and adopting Ocalan's democratic pattern. It is not clear whether the Kurdish political mind is going through an advanced boom of its times, or if God wanted to test something for the first time, so He would try it on the Kurds first?!

The party ideological review is understandable and even necessary, yet what is problematic to understand is how hundreds and thousands of pre-Kurdish nationalists have transformed in a short period into "democratic internationalists" who reject and obstruct the establishment of their nation-state and stigmatize their previous aspirations with a pejorative term such as the "age of dogma" and "Primitive nationalism" with an intuitive omission that the age of nationalities that they believe to transcend (mentally) is not primitive because it is simply advanced chronologically and culturally by at least 7000 years over the "Neolithic Age"⁴¹ in whose name they preach and perhaps they had not heard of it before the year 2000. Moreover, that the developing and stable national entity that they fight, is the only realistic body that can embrace the very desired "democratic modernity" that Ocalan dreams of.

The explanation of this revolution in Kurdish political and societal thought may be attributed to two factors:

The first is the state of popular frustration resulting from the poor political performance of the Kurdish nationalist political movement in Western Kurdistan, which during half a century of (the struggle) proved that it is not the natural and qualified bearer of the cause of a people and the aspirations of a nation.

The second is the tremendous capabilities of the left-wing revolutionary school in the field of political direction and its reputation for making like-minded comrades, dissolving individual differences and implanting dogma even in the rigidities of rocks.

On the other hand, the vivid character of "secularism" in Ocalan's thought prevented it from reaching the religious and conservative Kurds in general and the character of "non-nationalism" in which it was transformed into a kind of "cosmopolitanism," that explains the reluctance of large segments of the Kurdish people to join them or even sympathize with them. As for the reasons behind this unwillingness, they are not so naive and simple as they

41 Note that one of the necessities of inclusiveness theories is the assumption of a supposed "golden age" that must be referred to as a kind of historical nostalgia

are portrayed and as their authors are ridiculed. Throughout the history of Kurdish political awareness, Kurds have sought, as a complete nation (and not only as feudalists and tribal sheikhs) that owns its divided and occupied lands, its suppressed language and its common history, to achieve this existence and fortify it within the framework of the nation-state institution, which is – unfortunately - the most complete form available to this day for human organization.

Ocalan believes, “with regard to resolving the Kurdish case as well, the basic, principled and valuable way, which is not based on separatism or violence, passes through the acceptance of semi-democratic independence,”⁴² meaning the acceptance by the ruling nation-states to grant different ethnic and religious minorities the right to “autonomous-administration” in exchange for a guarantee of not to separate or to demand separation, which is a solution that the Kurdish movements have surpassed in theory and the Kurdistan Region bypassed in practice. Acceptance does not mean anything but a wide step back and actually returning to the mountain war and the futile negotiations based on perpetuating the problem, not solving it.

As for the hostile positions held by supporters of the Kurdish workers party towards the establishment of the Kurdistan region, which are stances resulting from sensitivity - we will assume that they are of an intellectual and ideological nature - they can be addressed and eliminated by an edict documented by the words of Leader Ocalan personally when he says; “The semi-democratic independence solution can be applied in two ways. The first way adopts reconciliation with nation-states and finds its tangible expression in resolving the democratic constitution.”⁴³

Therefore, considering or assuming the "Kurdistan region" is an already existing nation-state, like Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, the adherents of the philosophy of the democratic nation will not face any conscientious problem and they will be able to reconcile with this state and work with it or within it to formulate a democratic constitution.

However, by rejecting nationalism and rejecting the nation-state, what is the theoretical and practical alternative that "*Ocalani*" offers?

The alternative is the "democratic nation".

The Democratic Nation:

Ocalan defines “the nation” as the following; “the nation is a phenomenon or group of social relations wrapped around tribal consciousness + religious awareness + shared political authority + the market”⁴⁴

It is a general definition through which aspects of blood, religion, economics and politics are fulfilled. As for the more profound definition that the reader conceives along reading Ocalan's study, is a concept that ranges between cosmopolitanism in its maximum breadth and societal cultural identities in its narrowest form. This can be demonstrated throughout almost everything written.⁴⁵

42 Abdullah Ocalan, **5th Volume**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 509

43 Ibid., 508.

44 Abdullah Ocalan, **2nd Volume "Capitalism"**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 198

45 Abdullah Ocalan, **5th Volume**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 181 - 208

The nation, in its shocking reality, is a hypothetical concept and a mental gain, which arose slowly and gradually with the progress of the capitalist mentality (including slavery and feudalism) several thousand years ago; when harsh living conditions imposed on human groups geographic location and societal division, for the preservation of self and property, a request for supremacy and for further spoils, as mentioned above. The Greek term "democracy" (rule of the people), which is a feature of a political system that governs according to the choice, will and interests of the majority of the people, was coined and applied for the first time in ancient Athens, in the 5th century BC. Of course, the democratic system, in comparison to all other systems of governance of monarchy, aristocracy and oligarchy, is - according to its own characteristics - the best of all and not the most reasonable after experience has proven that the best way to ensure security and stability in any country is to involve the people (or to peruse them with participation) in deciding their fate and determination of their interests through the choices they make and announce in the ballot boxes.

Explaining his concept of how to turn into a nation, Ocalan says,

"In order to transform into a nation, it is sufficient for a common mental and cultural world to be formed despite the differences in classes, gender, color, ethnicity, or even the differences of the nation's roots."⁴⁶

Then he explains his definition of the "democratic nation" in particular by saying:

"The democratic nation is that nation that is not satisfied with mental and cultural partnership only, but also unites all its components under semi-independent democratic institutions and runs them."⁴⁷

"The democratic nation is an alternative modernity in which the individual is a free citizen and it is also, the alternative society in the face of social marginalization and the democratic society vs. a society or an anti-society of power and the state and a society that reaches the emergence of a free and equal existence against social consumption."⁴⁸

Setting the democratic society against a society or an anti-society of power and the state, a definition that partly intersects with the definition of "Fichte" and "Spengler" following him, who says that nations are not political, linguistic or ethnic units but rather "spiritual units" as they are identified, on the other hand, with the definition of cultural globalization, yet in a special form that takes into account the plurality and differences of cultures.

He adds broadly, "a person can be a member of more than one nation," which definitely does not imply those nations that are stamped with the seals of race and religion, but precisely what we call social or professional sectors such as nations of law, the army and the economy, an expansion that I do not see successful because it confuses the general and the private or between the total and the sub due to the existence all of these structures and professional bodies, naturally within any minor or vast nation.

Despite Ocalan's definitions, there are hundreds of questions surrounding this vague and broad concept and this updated definition is disputed. We will be satisfied with two of them;

⁴⁶ Ibid., 50.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 51.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 519.

the viability of this pattern and its viability and continuity, which we will address in the second paragraph.

Criticism of the Democratic Nation Dissolution:

"Democratic civilization" is not the first theory to present or claim to provide final and effective solutions to all issues of human society. And that it is the first holistic theory that devotes its "magic recipe" to the herds of wicked, anarchist and ignorant people to make them "the best of a nation brought out to people." The books of local and global history, old and modern, are loaded with intellectual outputs of this kind, that did not depart from the circle of intertwining, influencing, correcting the deviation of the old and completing the deficiency of the previous.

All the divine messages, earthly philosophies and man-made laws, without exception, carried a holistic reformist essence that lies behind the thin veneer of metaphysical teachings and vague or barren philosophical texts and the ultimate goal of all of them was to correct the underlying imbalance in the relationship between man and God (nature) on the one hand, and between man and man on the other hand. Furthermore, what the media success that some of them have had exclusively is nothing but an echo of the approval of the subjective and objective conditions that surrounded the theory and paved the way for it to rise and survive, or it did the opposite, pushing it quickly towards the abyss to where it became a "relic of history" as the victors described it after that.

From Abrahamic and Christianity to the Mohammedan message to the prophets who came after him to the Brethren of Purity, Mazdakism, Qarmatians, Assassins and al-Obaidis, to Abdel-Nasser's "philosophy of the revolution" and Gaddafi's "Green Book" and his liberating revolution, his revolutionary committees and his dramatic end, Mesopotamia and the East in general have been overwhelmed with a load of theories and grand ideas, some of which entered into history and some of them continued to struggle with annihilation with a heterogeneous mixture of ideology and bare power.

Despite all this and after all, whoever casts a panoramic view of the world today (at least through the media) will be amazed by this absurd world, that behaves in a less rational and logical manner than the behavior of some animals that it controls and despises. For example, with the presence of ample quantities of food, females and burrows, it is impossible for the wolf community to witness any internal conflict of any kind, just as it is impossible for a debate to occur between a crow and a dove because of the color of the feathers, nor between a donkey and a zebra because of the difference in the pattern on the skin.

Ocalan wrote this theory, as I suppose, as a response to the capitalist savagery that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union leaving the world a prey between the claws of the one pole, which monopolizes the energies of the earth and drains its capabilities and bounties, leaving others to devote themselves to each other, raising nationalistic, religious and sectarian slogans that have formed, gradually and by virtue of habit, the end of the tunnel and the upper horizon line of its adherents and protectors.

I imagine that the main and fundamental criticism that can be directed to the "theory of the democratic nation" is its unreality and that it is a prophetic message that came after the end of the first era of prophecy or before entering the second age of prophecy, and that it is the amended version of the utopian dream that was set back last time with communist villages and communes on ground (the settlements of Charles Fourier, Saint Simon and Tolstoy, for

example), which did not stand up to human counter-impulses. As well as, the dream of Marxism, which made its way to feudal Russia instead of industrial Britain, as Marx expected and was disappointed.

Attribution of the nation concept to a "political principle" implicitly denies it all other parameters, preserving within it an internal contradiction because in this form - and this is what I suppose - it does not present itself as an alternative to an imagined "dictatorial nation", as the linguistic context implies, but rather to similar totalitarian nations. They may be Islamist, capitalist and communist as it is in the general socio-political context.

On the practical level, the war that Ocalan theoretically is waging, puts him in a violent conflict on two fronts; the rulers and the peoples. It is a task that is said to be hard and undermines lots of energy. On the one hand, all rulers and governments concerned with his speech should look with appreciation to his intellectual arguments and embrace - or at least accept spreading - the new religion among their subjects. On the other hand, the group of disparate, different and conflicting peoples should follow the example of its rulers and voluntarily enter the threshold of transformation into members of a (democratic nation) that we suppose is clear in the author's mind.

Creating a "democratic society devoid of class and state, based on the ecological city and the profit-impartial economy"⁴⁹ and then the "union of global democratic nations"⁵⁰ according to the prescription Ocalan advocates, requires a "global confederation," in which the Kurds - until now - are not a party. This pipe dream is nothing but a mixture that has been alternately agitate by great dreamers throughout history, in varying turns.

On the other hand, we see that in his long and deeply analyzed historical narratives, he assumes and repeats – which I think is a delusion - that the genes of the early makers of civilization (the Sumerians and those who preceded them from the post-dinosaur ages) were transmitted through the veins of inheritance to their grandchild in Mesopotamia and as a chick of the eagle flies by instinct and "everything grows again at its root" - as he personally likes to always be assimilated - these grandchildren will re-turn the wheel of contemporary civilization and we have to assume after that that those who are fighting ferociously today because of their differences in the length of the beard and the color of the turban, the diversity of languages and the revolutions of the history in Syria and Iraq and imported consumers of everything, are not genuine Mesopotamians. I only see him exaggerating in his optimism, because building on the inheritance of history based on the inheritance of geography is a great illusion in the world of the third millennium, the world of giant companies and superstitious means of communication. Where every place has become good for everything, where knowledge is power, and where the ball of knowledge/power has settled north, thus it is very difficult to force it to roll back towards the south unless we dream, as students of Arab nationalism and students of the Islamic caliphate dream of inventing a machine that snatches history back and revive previous or imagined glories.

The main condition that cannot be excluded regarding the establishment of any state (or democratic administration) is the "existence" of a democratic people and not the "creation" of a democratic people. In other words what is required is "spreading the culture of democracy" and not "democratizing the people." To clarify the difference between the two

49 Abdullah Ocalan, **5th Volume**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 470

50Ibid., 670.

concepts, we say; disseminating democracy is an arduous process that takes place in stages and takes time, yet it is effective, integrated, timeless and irreversible. As for the democratization of the people according to the common and clichéd concept of democracy, which is limited to some picturesque drapes and appearances - but useless - such as voting, nomination, election and referendum mechanisms, which are nothing more than laughable aspects. Because you will not find on the ground a corrupt and tyrannical regime that does not implement these mechanisms, but rather boasts of implementing them.

People's democratization begins with the election box and ends with it, while the culture of democracy begins and does not end. It does not start with the voter and having a group of people give a candidate their vote. Democracy, first of all, starts with the candidate and the right democratic culture is what prevents a person who does not see himself eligible from running for a government position or job. It is the same that prevents a brother from giving his unqualified brother his vote. While the types of democracies that exist in Rojava are limited to peasant, ethnic, feudal, tribal or sectarian democracy, all of which are false concepts that do not even deserve to be described as democracy.

On the other hand, we have the essential "language condition" with all the elements contained in this condition specific to the identity of this community bloc and the prospects for its scientific and literary development and perhaps the nature of its cultural and political relations and alliances after that.

Despite the magnitude of this condition, it is the least point that Ocalan touched upon in all of his works and speeches, perhaps because it is the only obstacle that will be confronted and friction with on a daily basis in the life of the citizens of the "democratic nation", and it is the eternal sense of difference and distinction between the elements of that assumed nation.

Let us remember here that the language was, and still is carved, that the ruling regimes in all of Kurdistan, throughout history, wiped from the Kurds to no avail. Let us also remember that the Kurds' preservation of their language was the main reason if not the only one for their survival to this day as a differentiated and coherent nation.

Language is not only a living being, but it also controls the way of its speakers' thinking. Thus, the "common mental and cultural world" that Ocalan aspires to generalize to the citizens of the democratic nation will not be sufficient - even if it is achieved - to find a reasonable solution to the problem of multilingualism within a single nation. Not to mention the administrative problems and chaos that this multiplicity will create within institutions, departments and bureaus.

This linguistic nationalism is not limited to the poor southern countries, but rather countries that seem wealthy and cohesive, such as Canada, Belgium and the United States, are fueling national-linguistic differences within them. For example, the residents of Spanish descent living in America (from the second and third generations) are still, to this day, refraining from speaking in English, even though they were born in America.

- It is understood that there are democratic governments (or administrations); their governance is according to the will of the people, there are others that are authoritarian, where power is given to the individuals and oligarchic elites. Also, the affiliation of all these governments with all their members to a people or a nation that has a specific homeland, a specific official language, a specific flag, slogan, national anthem, history, customs, traditions and costumes common to the overwhelming majority of its people, as is the case in the

countries of East, West, North and South. As for terms such as “a democratic people,” “a democratic nation,” and an “ecological society,” which are difficult to understand, raise the question - on the reader's behalf - about the credibility and legitimacy of granting an intellectual and political character to a human group that is united and in solidarity by virtue of interest, geography, or Both? And how can the concept and definition of the people be consistent by attaching it in an identity form to democracy, for example, which is no more than one of the many mechanisms of governance; that is the same mechanism that even authoritarian and capitalist state regimes claim to practice and implement?!

What I want to say here - presumably not with certainty - is that bringing about changes in the structures of morals and human natures is a very laborious and slow process, and if it shows initial success, it is never-ending success and is based on a fragile base of flurry and caprice. The real and most accurate transformation is what society carries out on its own and in its quiet "natural" course without any pressures and sharp, sudden turns (such as revolutions). This may require twice as long, but it is the most infallible, most durable and most effective.

- I do not doubt Ocalan's great capacity to analyze, yet I assume nonetheless that the lengthy prison period he spent since 1999 far from observing the instincts and behavior of the crowd, marked his writings with a purely rationalist aspect, which does not take into account the real and terrifying power of global capital, nor the cultural differentiation between the four "Kurdistan" Kurds who are supposed to be the cradle and the starting point for the modern democratic revolution that is heralded. The difference in the Kurdish mentality in the four parts of Kurdistan (as the author is more experienced in the Turkish part) places many obstacles in front of him. There are many obstacles and it makes the task of implementing it in Iraqi Kurdistan, for example, similar to the application of Islamic law in the Vatican. This difference will at least delay the success of the theory, if not completely thwart it.

I want to conclude this subsection by expressing my deep regret at two points; the first of which is the tyranny of (*Apochism*) over (Ocalani) within and even outside the party and the second is this intentional neglect that Ocalani has been subjected to today and its lack of the interest it deserves in terms of study, criticism, review and debate. If we exclude some of the few writings previously biased against it⁵¹, we hardly find - with the exception of what Dr. Haitham Manaa wrote⁵² - that deserves paying attention to, any critical trace written objectively by his supporters or enemies alike.

Second Subsection:

The Democratic Self-Administration and the Ground Experiment:

Since any theory in the world needs its natural and qualified bearer, Ocalani - which is a theory after all - must have a custodian, and if "custodian" is perceived as meaning the vanguard and the chosen elite, as happened during the application of most revolutionary theories around the world, I might have failed then to deliver my perspective.

On the other hand, a large global project goes beyond a modest goal such as "building the Kurdish nation-state" to an ambitious attempt to "rework the world" that requires huge

51 Abdullah al-Najjar, "Criticism of Abdullah Ocalan's Project", Shabab Post Website <https://twsas.org/archives/9240>

52 Haytham Manna, Ocalani ... The Ideological Construction and Practice, Beirut, al-Farabi Publisher, 2017.

capabilities, which begins with the existence of a "solid core" of loyal insiders and does not end when the necessary and required material force to implement it, is available then distribute and preserve it. By force we do not mean here its obligatory aspect as much as we refer to its support for thought and its mobility in its hands. But the reality of the situation shows us that the Ocalan movement (and for reasons related to the tyranny of the charismatic personality of the leader and the steel ideological structure of the party) did not produce a single thinker who could be the messenger of Ocalan and his voice (screaming in the wilderness) outside his prison, as much as it produced pupils and guardians, who repeat words they heard verbally. Thus, they memorized it, instead of working to criticize, scrutinize, enrich and spread life in it. On the contrary, they exaggerated the formalities of individual worship and the persistence of the fading demagogic slogans inherited from the region's regimes. Although the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the founder of the Self-Administration, fully and solely adopted Ocalani ideas and principles, the absence of the guide character and reliance on rigid texts, led the party to what the Muslims had fallen into after the death of Muhammad, as they have become to interrogate and interpret the text and that is usually the beginning of the deviation.

Ocalan needs, in order to reverse his theory, a huge parallel army of psychologists and educators, which we unfortunately miss today or we do have them, but most of them - if not all of them - grew up on the approaches of capitalist modernity in the liberal West and its theories (corrupt according to Ocalan) that are appropriate for Westerners or they are a product of their Middle Eastern environment, developing on Islamic roots. As it is well known, the national and religious theories occupy the largest part of the minds of their peoples. Recent events have proven that overturning these mindsets, trying to change them, or even refine them, is an extremely dangerous and absurd "labors of Sisyphus".

On the other hand, it needs the "antidote to difference" that preserves the individual personality and ward off the danger of convergence and replication that marked the applications of all totalitarian theories (Russian, Cuban and Korean communists, for example) throughout history and which, through partisanship and militarization, restricted creative individual initiatives and prohibited society from the innovations of individuals, hence one of the main reasons was its decline and backwardness from the ideologies that fight it, and thus its collapse, practically or theoretically.

Although the "PKK" throughout its history (1978 - 1999) did not know an ideology different from that advocated by the classic Kurdish national movement in all its different currents, but rather it was the most extreme and radical with its declaration of armed struggle. This huge party has been led, as is the case with all the totalitarian parties in the world, towards the new theory, which is completely contradictory to the founding ideas and its first goals, as soon as the leader of the party adopted it individually to be adopted later, under the influence of the charisma of the leader, all party comrades and members.

In line with the so-called "democratic nation" with a totalitarian, non-nationalistic political character, most - and perhaps all - organizations and frameworks of the KCK avoid including words such as "Kurd, Kurdish, Kurdistan" within their names, which was one of the reasons for excluding large segments of the Kurdish society, which they prevented from embracing the theory or even accepting it. On the other hand, it drove a deep wedge between this system and all the parties of the Kurdish national movement that remained far from contributing to building the Self-Administration, which made the administration to seek the help of party comrades.

This very last point; I mean turning a fighter into an employee, was faced with great resentment by the peoples of NES in general, and the Kurds in particular.

Intellectual and Behavioral Structure in the Democratic Self-Administration:

One of the consequences of the "Syrian Spring" was that the PYD filled the gap left by the regime and declared, unilaterally, autonomy and the establishment of local government in November 2013, to be followed by the declaration of federalism in March 2016 and then the establishment of the "Democratic Self-Administration of North and East Syria" in 2018.

First experiences are usually risky and evading the temptation of the authority is not an easy task to be able to achieve. "Any administration that guarantees reproach and responsibility, rushes to practice tyranny," according to Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi. The credibility of this is the severe criticism of Ocalan against the Soviet state – pre- and post-its collapse - in which many optimists saw it as the fulfillment of Plato's dreams of a utopian republic. Ocalan believed them as "more regressive than capitalist liberalism" and its transformation from a "workers and peasants state" to the state of the (KGB) requires more than the absence of Lenin's spirit. Ocalan says:

"The transformation to a one-party system implied the transformation into a party state. It was the concept of converting to that party state that prepared for the end of constructed socialism."⁵³

By applying this to the practices of Ocalani organizations spread throughout the Middle East (PYD as an example), we will be surprised by the radical behavior that imposes the theory with all its force and in return rejects any participation in the administration, preferring the weak or fragile opposition to an effective and strong opposition. Thus, there is no doubt that such an administration is the ideal seed of "authority" that Ocalan personally warns from:

"The individual formed in an oppressed and crushed society over hundreds of years, such as the Kurdish community, cannot easily give up the application of all possible influence that they have, similarly to that which was practiced on them."⁵⁴

Accordingly, we can observe a set of paradoxes, most of which result from the erroneous and deviant application of the Self-Administration's experience, as we assume:

The first paradox is the restoration of the "revolutionary vanguard" concept. This concept - which was the main subject of the disagreement between Lenin and Trotsky - is not bad in itself unless it becomes affected by the deficiencies of its society instead of it positively affecting the society. This vanguard that monopolizes the right to speak in the name of the theory and its author have been affected by partisan rivalries, have slipped or almost into a "party ghetto" that is hostile to everyone who stands outside its walls, and does not view in all others anything but absolute delusion that has no other mean to deal with except by forcibly guiding or eliminating it.

The second paradox is the absence of the spatial-temporal condition with which the aforementioned "revolutionary vanguard" had to be currently satisfied with only one of the three pillars of Ocalani, which is the pillar of the democratic nation. This is due to its material incapacity to replace capitalist modernity with democratic modernity first and to its lack of theoretical and practical ability to apply the remaining two items, namely ecological industry

⁵³ Abdullah Ocalan, **5th Volume**, translated by: Zakho Shiyar, 2nd Edition, Azadi Press. 2014, P. 413

⁵⁴ Ibid., 413.

and free-profit gain which, even if it was applied, nothing guarantees that it will surpass the meager success achieved by previous experiences within a small hypothetical area, that is almost unseen from an earthly paradise spread over five continents.

The third paradox is that revolutionary theories and grand totalitarian projects are self-dependent and not dependent on their ideological opponents. Hence, when this opponent becomes one of the makers of victory or rather its chief maker, he will not easily give up his position and his privileges. I have no doubt that the use of the leviathan of the capitalist forces (America) in fighting the oppressors, liberation of Syrian villages and areas and their annexation to the cantons of the democratic nation in Rojava is the glass of poison that Abdullah Ocalan endures while he is in his confinement.

Accordingly, we can detail the deficiencies and shortcomings that the emerging Self-Administration fell into:

1- Authoritarian Mentality and Dialogue Rejection:

While Ocalan says; "Democratic administration instead of state rule is a great opportunity for freedom and equality,"⁵⁵ The Democratic Union Party (PYD), despite its theoretical hostility to notions of state and authority, adopts the behavior of all authoritarian parties and organizations in the world, especially when it comes to negotiating the levers of power and the mechanisms of governance. During their negotiations with the nationalist Kurdish parties, they, on many occasions showed an inclination towards unilateralism and the refusal of rotation and sharing of power.⁵⁶

The reliance on military force and using it as a trump in intra-negotiations does not only indicate a frail belief in the power of theory and the popularity of its advocates. No doubt that treating outstanding problems by threatening of force and raising the tone of voice is one of the last remnants of the methods of dialogue and negotiation in the Neolithic society, and the most significant characteristic of this method is that it postpones the problem rather than solve it. And this is done by transforming the declared enemy into an invisible enemy, hiding in the shadows, waiting for the opportunity to attack and adjust the balance of power again.

2- Deification of Individuals:

The charisma of the Kurdish leader, imprisoned in "Imrali" for two decades, has elevated him in the eyes of his supporters and loved ones from the rank of political leader and ideological theorist to the rank of teacher, guide to the inspiring prophet. Also, since he is the main theoretician or the only one of the movements, his philosophy was adopted for the systematic academic teaching and indoctrination to students of local universities.

Accordingly, most, if not all, partisans and supporters gave up their right to discuss his opinions and assessments, or to review his orders and instructions.

The manifestations of "reverence for the leader" that provoked all components of the Syrian people during half a century and that produced all this devastation in Syria, there are those who try to reproduce them today on the land of Rojava Kurdistan without any change or modification except in names and pictures.

3- Intellectual Dogma:

⁵⁵ Ibid.,51.

⁵⁶ We cite here the Agreements of Hawler I in 2012, Hawler II in 2013 and Duhok I in 2014, all of which failed to help the PYD abandon its inclusiveness and unilateralism.

The most dangerous dilemma that any scientific theory can surpass, is its conversion into a religion, because this conversion is the beginning of its unspoken disintegration and collapse. When the theory is not applied and its author is assimilated, the aspect of creativity becomes marginalized, and the rule becomes imitation.

4- Restrictive Partisanship and the Failed Attempt to Assimilate the Soviet Baathist Experience:

By distinguishing between the partisan citizen and the non-partisan citizen and the formation of suffixes and civic formations, in appearance and in support of power, in reality. Its preface belongs to students, laborers, intellectuals, or women, while they do not allow the existence of any disloyalty to their internal formations. This restrictive partisanship is what allowed the ruling Democratic Union Party to take an alliance from Arab and Syriac politicians who accepted its approach in exchange for the exclusion of those who rejected its approach from the Kurdish political movement. Thus, the Syriac "Sutoro" and Arab "al-Sanadid" forces, were welcomed while the Syrian Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the rest of the opposition or those objecting to the ruling ideology, were unwelcomed.

5- Violent Formation:

Ocalani, as it defines itself as a revolutionary political movement, has taken the violent aspect of the revolution's concept as a means of change that it aspires to. Hence, all its branches have adhered to this condition of formation under the name of "self-defense."

6- Weakening and Marginalizing the Opposition:

With the exception of "prophetic governments," any government in the world needs opposition. This opposition functions as a reflective mirror and subsequently as a catalyst and revitalized element for any ruling party. It is in the interest of any upright ruling party that prioritizes the country's interest above its party's interest to do what it can to strengthen the opposition. As weakening and fragmenting the opposition implies one aspect, which is the departure of its members from the law and the transformation of all into agents abroad or revolutionary projects against the ruling regime.

What the PYD is doing is that it weakens the political opposition and try to dissolve it by closing its offices and preventing it from working and revitalizing. As well as, arresting or banishing its staffs on the one hand and on the other hand domesticating society to accept the existence of the idea of a single party using all its party means and directed media agencies.

7- The Cross-border Revolution:

PYD is acting as the long arm of the PKK in Syria and it targets the Turkish fascist regime in the first place by all its actions, building on PKK's doctrines all its policies and alliances. This is why the Erdogan regime justified for itself recently crossing international borders and occupying some Syrian Kurdish regions, without the Syrian government or even the international community moving a finger.

Problems of the Democratic Self-Administration:

The Democratic Autonomous Administration –guided by the philosophy of Ocalan- is attempting to follow the road that which Lenin followed in implementing Marxism in Russia,

yet today it is more similar to Stalinism than Leninism. Especially its dependence on force, outweighs its dependence on intellect, the thing that makes it today suffer a set of theoretical and practical problems that will be in need of a solution sooner or later:

- Reconcilability Equation between Theory and Reality:

The theory is closer to anarchism (with no authority), yet the reality is in severe need of authoritarianism. Indeed, the only obstacle that prevents society from declining into the bottom of the forest so far is the fear of authority and law, namely the two concepts that are rejected by the theory.

- The Problem of Legitimacy:

The reluctance of any international body to recognize the Self-Administration so far, even those that accuse it of implicit collusion with it, I mean the Syrian regime.

- Difficulty of Applying Law:

With the present authority missing full legitimacy, and the governed society being a “womb” characterized society linked by blood or belief, the application of the stated-civil law to individuals and making them equal before it is next to impossible.

- The Absence of Community Reconcilability:

Kurds, Arabs, Syriacs and other and other national, religious and tribal formations. Each group of these has its own philosophy, deep-rooted beliefs and lifestyle that it has been used for centuries. And it is not easy to break those ghettos and push their people to abandon them in favor of imported ideas even if they seem more developing.

- Lack of Political Consensus:

There are large segments of conservative Kurdish politicians, Kurdish and non-Kurdish civilians who oppose not only the PYD’s rule, but also the Autonomous Administration entity itself. The supporters of these segments are divided between those who forcibly comply with the laws of the Autonomous Administration and its organizational decisions and those who preferred emigration abroad the country or displacement towards the areas of the Syrian regime.

-The Hostile Surrounding:

(Turkey, the Syrian regime, ISIS) and in one way or another KRG as well as the “far enemy” represented by the American Imperialism in particular according to the theory. Therefore, the military forces affiliated to the Self-Administration are obligated to periodically subject to the agreements of major and regional states that are effective in the region, the thing which makes them lose more territory.

- The Economic Dilemma:

The one that is summed up in looking for that is lost in the imposition of (the island of the communal Ocalani economy) survival in the midst of robust waves of the prevalent capitalist economy everywhere around it, let alone the apparent confusion in the management of service files and the spread of default manifestations and corruption internally.

- Confusion about Solving Identity Dilemma:

Even with exceeding the political identity of the entity, we are in front of a bigger dilemma which is the identity of education system with this regarded administration, in other words

schools, institutes and universities. Will the education in three languages of three nationalities be carried out altogether, or will each nationality teach its own language, or will we be facing the imposition of a formal and joint comprehension-language while taking into consideration the languages and cultures of the components, similar to the failed Soviet experience?

Obviously, most of the aforementioned problems go back originally to the difference, but rather contradiction with the environment at the level of theory and practice. As for the viability of the project to continue, I think that the final judgment on that is premature.

Conclusion:

1- The science of politics in the West cannot be summarized by the word "interests" only, nor with the word "emotions," but rather the more accurate description is "emotions that hide behind interests, or interests that wear the mask of emotions" and this mask has a significant role in opening and paving the paths of interests. Based on the fact that the overwhelming majority of people are driven by emotions or at least they often prevent them from achieving self-interest at the expense of their consciences. Therefore, no doubt major powers will intervene in minor affairs on the basis of (achieving democracy, spreading the culture of human rights and helping for development) makes the matter easier than their intervention in the name of (preserving its own national security).

The West intervenes today and every day anywhere it wants and the way it deems most appropriate, because knowledge - the power it possesses - has enabled it to transform the globe into a "small village" as it is promoted on the media and into a "backyard" as it actually perceives it. On the other hand, the real victory in any war is not by seizing additional tracts of land and leaving them under the auspices of loyal garrisons, but rather by seizing the hearts and minds of their inhabitants. And lest this enterprise assume an emotional banal aspect, we must recall the colonial history of the West in the East throughout the first half of the 20th century, for example, and its consequences. Therefore, the moment the West secures the threat of terrorism - Islamic in particular - and no longer needs proxy fighters on the ground, I do not rule out that this file will be closed and return to its bases safely, leaving "Rojava" with a military force experienced in war and dangerously ideologized, in a way that will certainly push it, automatically, to the transition from the stage of "defending the gains of the people" to the stage of "preserving the gains of the people" and then the stage of "achieving new gains for the people", at which point the bloody clash begins not with the forces of Islamic extremism this time but with the nation-states and undemocratic governments in the region. The matter of which will end with the believers of the theory/message in one of two ways; either they are forced to retreat to themselves (the internationalists) and be satisfied with what they control from land, people and money, even for a while. The other possibility is that the drift behind the totalitarian thought and the radical "conquest soul" that the theory carries in its internal structure that might turn it into a "dangerous island" that is a chronic source of concern for the US ally and the neighborhood in general, as ISIS is today, of course taking into consideration the great qualitative difference between the two organizations.

As for the soundest way, which surpasses these frightening and massive possibilities, is to open the closed doors wide and lift the burden of the immense ideology from the emerging Autonomous Administration in Western Kurdistan (Rojava). Likewise, harmony and

compatibility with the democratic principle that the movement adopts and this will only be achieved by neutralizing the security and military force and allowing the people to be the actual source of authority and to choose their representatives through fair elections that are internationally monitored and to abide by their results, whatever they are.

2- In fairness to the Ocalani theory, it must be said that "the democratic non-nation state" as an anarchist-communist renewal of the nation-state theory is a safe and practical solution to the issues of the chronic nationalism and religions conflict, which in some of its most extreme stages has turned into an issue of existence that can only be achieved through the annihilation of the other. Especially with the existence of backward authoritarian governments and a general radical populist mood resulting from the desire for "historical misses" shared by all, and that the principles of brotherhood of peoples and peaceful coexistence between the components of one country allow a wider scope for acculturation and development, but outside this romantic lustrous manifestation of fascinating theoretical explanations there are deep theoretical and practical issues that hinders the realization of this process of "fraternity." It cannot be solved by pure good intentions or by assuming the existence of communities of angels that need a simple type of party and communal organization. They are topics with which an "ideological cleanser", no matter how good they are in effectiveness and potency, cannot easily wipe out centuries of civilizational defeat within the collective mind of the Kurds, Arabs, Syrians and other vulnerable peoples of the region.

Finally, I do not fail to mention the impossibility of capturing everything Ocalan wrote through a research paper or a brief study, just as the criticism presented should not, of course, preclude an expression of deep respect and appreciation for the tremendous theoretical effort that Mr. Ocalan made, challenging the bad circumstances, which he lives in his prison and which I also, do not doubt that history will give him credit and the Kurds as one of the major intellectual achievements that have enriched political sociology by transforming the dream into a theory then trying to transform it into a living reality, even if it is in a disproportionate time and place.

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The Philosophy of the Democratic Nation Between Theory and Practice



 www.asocenter.org
 info@asocenter.org
 (+964) 751-4413372