# Turkey's Kurds

## A theoretical analysis of the PKK and Abdullah Öcalan

Ali Kemal Özcan

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

# Turkey's Kurds

The Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) is examined here in this text on Kurdish nationalism. Incorporating recent field-based research results and newly translated material on Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK's long-time leader, it explores the ideational nature and the organizational working of the party, from its growth in the late 1970s to its recent shrinkage. A variety of issues are addressed, including:

- the views and philosophy of Abdullah Öcalan
- the successes and failures of the PKK in bringing about the Kurdish opposition in Turkey
- the role of PKK's philosophy of recruitment, organizational diligence, use of arms and other contextual factors in Kurdish resistance
- factors involved in the development of the nationalism of the Kurds in Turkey.

*Turkey's Kurds* also reappraises the Kurdish movement in Turkey and presents insights into the nature of Kurdish social structure, thinking, and the particularities of the Kurdish ethnic distinctness. *Turkey's Kurds* is essential reading for those with interests in the PKK, Turkey, and Turkish politics.

**Ali Kemal Özcan** holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Kent. His recent publications include *Humanisation Movement* (Berlin, 1999); The Nature and Resource Field of the Kurdish Resistance in Turkey: A Dormant Resource', *Middle Eastern Studies* Vol. 41, No. 3 (May 2005); 'Nationalism: Distilling the Cultural and the Political', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer 2005). His research interests include nationalism, democratization and civil society.

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# Preface

There have been many rebellions recorded in Kurdish history, each bearing the ethnic demands of Kurdishness to varying degrees. With the PKK-led movement,[1] Kurdish ethnicity has entered into a supra-tribal resistance. It has moved towards becoming a national entity, transcending the societal and geographic boundaries of tribal structures. The major objective of this book is to examine the extent of the party's organizational share in this process.

In south-east Anatolia, Turkey has been at war with a Kurdish guerrilla army led by the PKK for 15 years. The war started in August 1984, and over 30,000 lives have been lost. The high-profile abduction of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, from Nairobi, Kenya in February 1999, hit the headlines worldwide. Öcalan's capture, which was aided by an 'international cooperation', meant that he became the second 'Turkish citizen' since 1923 to feature on the front page of *Time* magazine. The other was Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Turkish Republic.

Scholars of Kurdish studies, with no exception, talk of Kurdish society's tribal structure as essential to its social, political and cultural existence. In the related literature, the terms 'Kurd' and 'tribe' strike one as inseparable twins. Scholars of nationalism do not oppose Gellner's epigrammatic statement: Tribalism never prospers, for when it does, everyone will respect it as a true nationalism, and no-one will dare call it tribalism' (1983:87).

Whether or not Kurdish tribalism is prospering in the north of Iraq—thanks to the US-led coalition forces' 'Operation Iraqi Freedom'—continues to remain a highly dubious question. In the past decade, Kurds of Iraq have reached the threshold of a nation-state[2] under the KDP[3] and PUK[4] by experiencing self-government. The Kurds of Turkey underwent a considerable detribalization under the PKK to the extent that Turkish intelligence sources publicly acknowledged it as 'a contribution'[5] to the social development in the 'south-east'. In the wake of Saddam's downfall, attention is increasingly paid to the developing self-rule of Kurds in the 'Safe Haven',[6] even if it has so far been managed under a double-headed balance.[7] Growing grievances from shifting parties towards the controversial interim governing body of Iraq encourages some to fear the probable 'Lebanonization' of Iraq (Alkadiri and Toensing 2003), and this in turn threatens the initial assurances concerning the 'territorial dignity' of post-Saddam Iraq. Of the recent pile of articles appearing in various journals and papers, the ones pointing to the division of Iraq into three individual states (Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds), which are substantially inspired by the experience of the *de facto* Kurdistan, are gradually coming to prominence. The 'unnatural' state of existing Iraq dominates the fateful worries about

her ‘territorial dignity’. Policy-making experts of the region have for some time publicized the ‘unthinkable’ as ‘the only viable strategy’ for—they think—‘the costs of preventing the natural states from emerging had been terrible’:

> For decades, the United States has worshiped at the altar of a unified yet unnatural Iraqi state… Washington would have to be very hard-headed and hard-hearted, to engineer this break-up. But such a course is manageable, even necessary, because it would allow us to find Iraq’s future in its denied but natural past.
>
> (Gelb 2003)[8]

A former US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter W.Galbraith, who contributed to the creation of a safe haven for the Kurds, prophesies that ‘Kurdistan will be virtually independent’.[9] Simon Jenkins recommends the break-up of Iraq as ‘the only hope’ for a democratic future: Those who try to do the undoable must also think the unthinkable.’[10]

Scholars in the field also concede that well over half of the world’s 25 million to 30 million Kurds live in Turkey. The emerging statehood in the ‘South’ (north of Iraq) is, in effect, more vital to the Turkish polity than anything else in Iraq:

> Ankara’s biggest concern is no secret: the prevention of a Kurdish nation in northern Iraq. Turkish officials fear a Kurdish state would incite their own Kurdish population leading to a possible uprising as Turkish Kurds express their solidarity with Iraqi Kurds realizing their long-lived dream of statehood.
>
> (Riemer 2003 [26 January])

Turkish officials fear that a Kurdish autonomization of some sort would incite their own Kurdish population, leading to a separation. On the other hand, the ‘indispensability’ of Turkey to the West—especially to the USA—worsens the vicious convolution already there. The question of Turkey’s far larger share of the Kurdish populace is forcing Turkey-US relations into a cul-de-sac more than ever.[11]

The existing literature on the Kurds of Turkey is confined within the fields of history and power relations of regional/global politics. Kurds are overwhelmingly—and euphemistically—being studied ‘as the “Kurdish Problem” in its intrastate dimensions and as the “Kurdish Question” in its trans-state context’ (Olson 1998:xviii). The studies made so far, on Turkey’s Kurds in particular, do not endeavour to recognize the fact of the population at issue. No complete study of a sociological nature engaging with Kurds exists in the Turkish academic literature. Restricted/biased political approaches constitute virtually the entire overall composition of the intellectual domain in this regard. Sociological understanding of the societal phenomenon that is there has been lost breath in the generally tense political atmosphere that exists. Turkey’s importance to the West and her self-contained policy towards Kurds have kept the question of ‘Turkish Kurds’ locked in a Pandora’s Box until recently. The book aims to amend this absence.

This book is a modified and updated version of my doctoral dissertation completed in October 2002. Searching for the internal impetus behind the escalation of organizational systems, I attempt to analyse the dynamics of the most recent Kurdish resistance

movement in Turkey. The main focus of analysis is hence the PKK—its ideational and material structure. Because it is the leading entity of the issue, the research focuses on the PKK's growth (from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s) and its recent shrinkage. Within the framework of the case-study method, much of the research is devoted to answering an indirect question: why wasn't it the *other* Kurdish 'national organizations' that came to prominence? Asking how the organization became capable of revitalizing the 'buried' body of Kurdishness in Anatolia that has been incorporated (in both demographic and geographical terms) into the Turkicized Republic, the study tries to appraise the extent of national and non-national ingredients in the makeup of the movement—the leadership, the grass roots and the masses that give their support.

Ali Kemal Özcan
Cambridge, July 2005

# Acknowledgements

This book is a harvest of over a decade of my personal experiences and seven years of study (MA and Ph.D.) in the University of Kent. The most adventurous and risky part of it, in terms of both my life and the reliability of a sociological study, was conducting the field research among the Kurdish populace in Turkey. Without experiencing it, one cannot appreciate the angles of the 'question' of the Kurds in Turkey and the 'question' of Turkey in handling her Kurdistan. The book, so to say, is a 'story' of a protracted odyssey. However, the study could not have been accomplished without the valuable contributions of my MA supervisor, Professor David McLellan, and Dr Abbas Vali from the University of Swansea. Also, I must mention my older son Giran's helpful sociological insights and my younger son Hilat's command in computer technology which helped me through this huge task. Thanks to all.

# Introduction

## Methodological framework

### *Scope of the study*

The PKK's organizational insight and its relation to Turkey's Kurdish question are the principal items under investigation.

Millions of Kurds in Turkey—the numbers range from 12 million to over 20 million—had been buried 'on the sidelines of history' (White 2000) or had 'slipped off the pages of history' (Fuller 1993) for more than half a century. At the end of the twentieth century, following a deadly silence for decades, 'for the first time a Kurdish movement emerged from below' (Ergil 1995) and 'mounted its biggest challenge to the Turkish state' (Olson 1996) in its republican history by launching a guerrilla war and organizing mass mobilizations. This study puts the 'life span' of the PKK's organizational entity—from the *incubation period* of the early 1970s to the *shrinkage period* that ended with Öcalan's abduction in 1999—into perspective. In short, I ask: how did the PKK turn from a group of university students into a mass movement?

Together, the Turkish state and the PKK form an antagonistic manifestation of the earlier contradictory process that led to the emergence of the 'Republic', in the form of a solidly Turkicized nation-state from the defeated Ottoman Empire. Within the cause-effect frame of reference, the nature of Turkey's Kurdish question is treated as the context in which the PKK is situated. In other words, the method and strategy of the research and the presentation of the thesis are organized in accordance with an exploratory study of structural aspects of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. The efforts of the research's theoretical survey, observations and fieldwork are orientated towards gaining insight into the organizational structure of the party.

Instead of just looking at the PKK's inner workings or its formal constitutional rules and regulations, I investigate its practical functions—in terms of motivating individuals as a part of mass mobilizations. The study's objective is to ascertain the extent and composition of 'national' and 'humanizational' sentiments, aspirations, longings and impetuses that determine the recruitment of individuals to the Kurdish cause as represented by the PKK.

Accordingly, the core focuses in searching for the source of individual Kurd's motivations are the educational 'activities' and their self-contained philosophy. In other words, the central inquiry of this study is into the peculiar nature of the individual-

organization interrelations in the PKK, which rest mainly on the overemphasized philosophy of cadre education—otherwise known as the 'education war'.

Both the theoretical and empirical research look primarily at how the *non-national* insights of the PKK's philosophy of education have generated incitement among the party militants and adherents, and how far this philosophy relates to the successes and failures of the organization. That is, the intensively worded philosophy, which substantially engages with the notion of the 'self-shaping spiritual re-formation of personalities' of the Party's operating cadres, has become the core theme of my argument in relation to the fate of the Kurdish movement in Turkey. So the study seeks to assess whether the rise (and fall) of the PKK is determined by certain conjectural factors formed by the rivalry between regional and imperial powers and Turkey's Kurdish policy or determined by the Party's peculiar philosophy of cadre education and organizational performance.

To date, no systematic study of the Kurds in Turkey, as an ethnic entity, has been carried out. Most textbooks concerning Kurds and Kurdistan offer two simple arguments:

1 'primordial' loyalties: the tribal, kinship and religious institutions of Kurds;
2 the political, economic and/or military tensions between regional and imperial powers over the strategic significance and riches of the Kurdish homeland.

As a result, the inner dynamics and processes of Kurdish society have been almost totally neglected. The lack of attention paid to the internal dynamics and the sociological insights of Kurdish existence within upper Mesopotamia, those Kurds assimilated into Turkey, is particularly apparent. The *first and only* doctoral thesis (in the domain of English and Turkish sources) on the PKK appeared recently in Turkey. That study, however, concludes in its first chapter that 'the existing findings prove that the PKK was founded by the intelligence services of the two countries of the Eastern Bloc, Syria and Bulgaria, which acted on behalf of the Soviet Union' (N.A.Özcan 1999:48). My study, therefore, aims to fill a massive gap by examining what main dynamics of Kurdish societal structure, in the final analysis, determine the nature of the 'question' of 'Turkish Kurds'.

An interesting point about the Kurdish movement is the remarkable participation of women. In the sphere of both civilian (mass protests, marches, celebrations, festivals) and military (guerrilla) activities the noteworthy presence of women appeared to me to be an important phenomenon. Considering the unusually high percentage of women in Kurdish guerrilla forces, set against the fanatically religious and largely pre-feudal state of Kurdish society—and also in view of the fact that the party persists in identifying itself as Marxist-socialist—this issue cannot be ignored. However, it necessitates an additional study in itself. Furthermore, as a man, I felt discouraged from examining an issue that I might not fully understand.

### *The literature on the Kurds*

The studies about Kurds and Kurdistan—excluding some historical works—are limited to analyses of conflicts within the region and tend to assume that Kurdishness is only an element of either an international or regional conflict. The studies of relatively objective scholars have either been works of conflictual analyses in terms of inter-state politics or

historical narratives. The works of indigenous authors concentrate solely on political or vulgar nationalistic concerns. There exists almost no proper sociological study of the Kurds beyond informative paragraphs within the pages of political or historical works—at least among English and Turkish sources. Any studies in Arabic, Persian or French are most likely to concern themselves with the southern (Iraq) or the eastern (Iran) parts of Kurdistan. Such sources would not benefit my inquiry inasmuch as I hypothesize that the socio-political structure of the *possessor* of Anatolian Kurdistan (Turkey) has been the fertilizing and shaping ground for the PKK and the movement it leads.

Most works on the Turkish-ruled part of Kurdistan and the PKK appeared following the wave of large-scale mass demonstrations, which commenced in the spring of 1990.[1] These studies and articles, which appeared throughout the 1990s, have devoted their intellectual efforts to discussing either how the Kurds became an element of the cosmopolitan conflict in the region or how they became a ready-made tool of the powers taking part in the 'wolfish' quarrel over the rich, natural and cheap labour resources of Kurdistan.[2] The overwhelming majority of these scholars focus on the aspect that the Kurds have always, in the ultimate stage of each rebellion, been betrayed by the ex-allied powers as soon as the parties of the conflict reach a compromise. No doubt the aims of these works are not in vain, nor are they pointing to illusory features of Kurdish sociality. On the contrary, they highlight a pandemic trait of the social history of the Kurds. However, these attempts have, by and large, passed over the need for a comprehensive sociological study of the Kurdish social structure. The works have exhausted their intellectual efforts on the Kurdish *problem* or the Kurdish *question*. The titles of many books and articles (e.g. Kirişçi and Winrow 1997; Olson 1998; Barkey 1993) about the Kurds include the words 'question' or 'problem'—if not 'dilemma', 'imbroglio', 'puzzle', etc. Olson rightfully dedicated his latest book to the 'Kurdish peoples: may they live when their existence is no longer defined as a "question" or a "problem"' (Olson 1998).

The principal studies or books dealing exclusively with the PKK and Öcalan are either concerned with journalistic (İmset 1992; Birand 1992) or political (Olson 1996; Kirişçi and Winrow 1997) aspects. The works with a pro-state bias (Aydın 1992; Kirzioğlu 1984, 1995) rather resemble 'made to measure' products.

In short, there has been no comprehensive study of the Kurds of the Turkish Republic and the PKK in sociological terms, except for the Turkish sociologist Beşikçi's works. His works include his doctoral thesis (Beşikçi 1969a) on a Kurdish nomadic tribe (Alikan), the subsequent work being based on the thesis and his experiences during his Ph.D. research (Beşikçi 1969b). More recent studies by Beşikçi rest mainly on his (restricted) observations, readings and dialogues with PKK militants while he was incarcerated in various prisons in Turkey and Kurdistan (Beşikçi 1992).

The works of pro-Kurdish sources on 'Turkish Kurds' provide more factual, historical and political information. Yet from a sociological point of view they are not much more helpful than 'made to measure' books by pro-state professors. These pro-Kurdish publications, which are either sponsored or directed by various Kurdish political circles (Göktaş 1991a, 1991b; Asan 1991; Kalman 1977), purvey propagandizing or agitating exaggerations about the 'national' dimensions of Kurdish society, in reaction to the state's policies of oppression and denial.

Furthermore, in the studies dealing with the concepts of 'nation' and 'nationalism' which appeared before the 1990s—when theorization and hypotheses dealt with many ethnic communities from various continents—the Kurds of Anatolia are ignored, probably due to a lack of knowledge about them. For instance, in his scholarly work, *State and Nation*, Akzin mentions the Kurds twice (Akzin 1964:85, 108) when he describes the assimilation and integration of a 'subordinate' ethnicity by the dominant ethnic group in the context of state-nation relations—but in both instances the example is the 'Kurds in Iraq'. Yet the assimilation programme of the Turkish state in relation to the Kurds of Anatolia is a far better case in point for Akzin's argument than the 'Kurds in Iraq'.

In fact, Iraq's assimilation policy does not include denying Kurdish ethnicity, or denying their land, or banning the Kurdish language—all of which takes place in Turkey. In the official language of Iraq—and also of Iran—the Kurdish-speaking population is called 'Kurds' and the territory where they live as a majority is called 'Kurdistan'. In Turkey, however, with more than half of the Kurdish population and homeland, they have been officially and 'scientifically'[3] declared to be *mountain Turks* or a *sub-branch of Turks*, since the transition from the Ottoman state to the Republic of Turkey. Recently, they have even been 'recognized' as *Turks of Kurdish origin*. The territory they have inhabited for almost four millennia is strictly named 'Doğu' (East) or 'Güneydoğu' (South-east)—a way of denying them and their ethnic legitimacy.

But despite the lack of sociological studies and reliable sources concerning the 'Kurds of the Turkish Republic', there are substantial questions to be studied, answered and demystified surrounding this particular social phenomenon.

When surveying the 'available' literature on Kurds one cannot help but conclude that the tribal structure is essential to the existence of Kurdishness. It is acknowledged that tribality not only applies to traditional Kurdish society but is also fundamental to its political, economic and cultural life.[4] The tribal phenomenon helps to explain the sense of disunity among Kurds, the absence of accord, the pitiless internal clashes, and therefore the 'intrinsic' traitorous sentiments. However, tribal existence *(aşiret)* has been handled as an entity of feudatory extension, whereas the Kurdish *aşiret* that has preserved itself as a basic property of the society up until the twenty-first century descends from pre-medieval history. My study does not include the *aşiret* itself, but rather its cultural manifestation in the form of 'treason' as an inseparable element of the Kurdish ethnic personality. I argue that 'treason' has been the *dormant resource* of the Kurdish *semi-nationalist* resistance against Turkey, and has been well-grasped and converted into its opposite (an effective sentimental base of 'national' awareness) by the leadership of the PKK.

### *Fieldwork and theoretical setting*

Contemporary students of social movements seem to appreciate the holding of ideological positions. According to Pakulski, such students 'are divided by their political and ideological allegiance' (1991:29–30). This seems no less true of the theorization on nations and nationalism, as Nairn emphasizes: 'the theory of nationalism has been inordinately influenced by nationalism itself (1981:94). This may be fitting for the 'scientific' atmosphere of post-industrial 'rationality', but holding ideological positions

would never be fitting for the science produced by students who aim to examine 'the *spirit* and *power* of pbilosophy'. Nor is it fitting for the students of political sociology, 'to whom the question of whether any new knowledge could be made useful in their art is one of living and urgent importance' (Wallas 1910).

Studying a highly controversial phenomenon carries a grave risk of the studies becoming biased. This risk increases when the 'case' being studied is most commonly the object of adverse or hostile reactions (Berkant 1998). Then again, research from an alternative ('sympathetic') point of view may well be partisan. I have therefore made every endeavour not to introduce bias into the research or to allow bias into my inferences and deductions.

The empirical ingredients of this study rest mainly on my prolonged observations, an unstructured interview with Öcalan and an 'illegal' questionnaire. I also conducted a number of unstructured—and strictly unrecorded—interviews with ordinary guerrillas and middle-rank commanders during my several visits to the region in 1998 and 1999. I had to spend seven or eight weeks in the summers of each year to have the chance of conducting these focused interviews. However, direct observations—and partly participant observations—over almost a decade constitute a larger proportion of my field material than is usual in sociological fieldwork.

So what sparked my initial interest in carrying out this research? It started with my experiences as an interpreter with a Kurdish community association in London between 1987 and 1996. The preliminary empirical knowledge drawn from partial participant observation is based on my voluntary work for the community centre from 1990 to 1995. Being a voluntary interpreter 'upgraded' me to being an 'activist', and consequently I was regarded as deserving to be included in a 'one-week intensive education' programme held by the PKK in 1992.

Then, in the summer of 1996, I was allowed to interview Öcalan himself at his base. I travelled to Syria via Lebanon, and stayed there for four weeks, where I was allowed to join the education programme of the Party Central School *(Parti Merkez Okulu)* in which Öcalan's 'Analyses' (*Çözümlemeler*—his recorded and edited inculcation talks) took place after the closure of the guerrilla camp in Bekaa Valley, Lebanon, in late 1992.

I spent three weeks in the Turkish-language training school, during which time I interviewed Öcalan twice in the presence of over 150 of his pupils.[5] These interviews were recorded by video camera. I strictly followed the rules and regulations of the school. In fact, I wanted to be treated as a participant of the education programme, with all that that meant, rather than being treated as a 'guest student'.

During my final week in Syria I was due to travel to Qamişlo and surrounding townships (Derik and Endiwar), which neighbour south-east Turkey. These areas are totally populated by Kurds, most of whom fled in the first half of the century from the 'North' (Turkey). I carried out unstructured interviews with parents (and other family members) of PKK guerrillas who had lost their lives.

I selected three localities for my questionnaire to be filled out. They were Diyarbakir, Mersin and Ankara. Diyarbakır had to be selected for it was the 'heart' of 'Turkish Kurdistan' in which every class and stratum of Kurdish society were condensed—in particular following the inflow of the rural population which fled from the war that intensified in the period from 1993 to 1997. The selection of Mersin was because of the outstanding presence of the newly fled population from all Kurdish provinces of Turkey,

insofar as it has begun to be counted as a Kurdish metropolitan city.[6] The reason for selecting Ankara as the third locality in the 'field' is twofold. On the one hand, it is the capital city of Turkey, in which the state control over Kurdish affairs is most solidly evident; on the other, the presence of Kurdish immigrants in Ankara is the most stable, and it has been far less affected by the 15 years of war than the other major metropolises. In addition to these selected cities I had a few completed questionnaires from İzmir simply because of the availability of a contact person there.[7] Just under half of the total amount of respondents (91) was taken from Diyarbakır.

Finding PKK activists to fill out the questionnaire was, however, not as easy as selecting localities! First of all I had to remove the name of the party, 'PKK', from the questions and replace it with either 'Party', or 'HADEP' in its Turkish version. This caused some confusion, despite my additional diligence. I strove to reduce the perplexity among the respondents to its minimum level by verbal emphases on the PKK *beneath* HADEP to every person to whom I handed the questionnaire. However, the responses contained much less confusion than I expected.[8] Eventually, I managed to gather 184 substantially completed questionnaires. This was not all done on a one-on-one basis, but occasionally in groups ranging, in general, from five to ten. It is for this reason that I have to call it 'illegal' fieldwork.

Because of the nature of my questions I received some manipulative or slightly deceptive answers from some 'sophisticated' respondents—but not a great number. Also, the essence of my inquiry made it important for me to find out what the Kurdish people *think* rather than just what they *are*. To my mind, this reduced the level of problematic data in terms of the generalizability of findings in my questionnaire.

A final confession about the fieldwork: I made every endeavour to draw the most from a questionnaire carried out *illegally*, but the fact remains that I could not prevent myself from leaving a number of wasted questions and a considerable portion of unused findings behind.

The extent of the relevance of theories of collective action and/or social movements is, without doubt, problematic for the study that I undertook. But this, of course, does not mean that I conduct the study of the socio-political phenomenon of a *tribal* or *pre-feudal* society without some light being thrown upon it by the theoretical formulations originating in American and European post-modern experiences. Both the combination and the mobilization of the grass roots of the party and the nature of the actors in the movement necessitated making some references to the intellectual perspectives of the sociology of social movements. That is, when I had striven to understand the 'why' of the mass mobilizations I had to refer to conceptualizations of collective action to some degree. When I turned to exploring the 'how' of the individuals' motivations I needed the intellectual means to argue around the 'new paradigm' of Western 'new social movements'.

However, both in the realm of collective action analyses and theoretical accounts of social movement studies, there are already, as a corollary to the theories' controversial nature, enough enduring problems of interpretation. For instance, despite Diani's optimistic conclusion that there is 'a greater underlying consensus in the field than one might assume' (Diani 1992:1), there appears to be a greater disparity than a resemblance between Diani himself and Pakulski (1991) on even labelling or classifying the main trends within contemporary social movement analyses. Diani places social movement

approaches in *four* main streams, each with a group of representative scholars, and, for example, mentions the names of Touraine and Melucci as leading figures in the 'new social movements' interpretation. He particularly refers to Turner and Killian ([1957] 1992) in relation to the 'collective behaviour' perspective; whereas Pakulski talks of *six* main theoretical accounts, and labels the fifth stream as the 'action-identity approach' citing Touraine's name, and attributes the 'consistent "classical" account of collective behaviour' to Smelser's *Theory of Collective Behaviour* (1962). Furthermore, Klandermans and Tarrow (1988) brand the 'new social movements' trend as a'European' approach and the rest as 'American', whilst Pakulski traces it back to both European and American scholars.

Wary of falling into too much scrutiny on the matter, Tilly's noticing that 'a good deal of agreement about the characteristic life history of movements and widespread disagreement about why and how movements arise in the first place' (Tilly 1978:41) makes me feel more confident. However, his 'parabolic' passage is probably a good illustration of my point of view:

> The analysis of collective action is a risky adventure. For one thing, there are too many experts around. It is a bit like food, or sex, or speech. Almost all of us know enough about food, sex and speech to survive in our own environments, and none of us likes to be told he is ignorant in any of these three regards. Yet from a scientific point of view, we all have lots to learn about all three. The same is true of collective action.
>
> (Tilly 1978:5)

The same is consequently true of social movements and of my concerns. For example, the following conclusion drawn from American experiences intimately refers to the mode of action of the PKK:

> Social movement leaders use bargaining, persuasion, or violence to influence authorities to change. Choices of tactics depend upon prior history of relations with authorities, relative success of previous encounters, and ideology. Tactics are also influenced by the oligarchization and institutionalization of organizational life.
>
> (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1217)

This certainly provides a framework for explaining the Kurdish Offensive's 'terrorism' or 'revolutionary violence'. But it must be appreciated that studying an extremely peculiar phenomenon, as an outcome of the fusion of the 'manufactured character' (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997) of Republican 'nationalization' or modernization and the 'dehumanized/degenerated' condition of Kurdishness, creates difficulties when making broader generalizations. That is, this study does not encourage one to construct allembracing generalizations vis-à-vis concepts such as 'ethnic violence', 'terrorism' or 'revolutionary impetus'. On the other hand, using theories of 'over-civilized' individual motivations to explain the intensity of the self-immolation protests in an 'over-tribalized' ethnic community seems inappropriate.

So, theorization about the concepts of nation and nationalism—though they are highly 'mongrelized' and confusing—has been my main analytical framework. For a clearer application of the theories of nationalism I began by revisiting the most recognized scholars' works in the field, and attempted to distil the 'twin concepts'—nation and nationalism.

## A general picture

To provide a context for the study of the subject matter, an up-to-date picture of the movement led by the PKK—with some facts and figures recognized by both rival parties to this conflict—is vital.

The nature of the PKK is the subject of much contentious debate. The organization has been described as both the 'most violent terrorist organization in the world' and a 're-humanization movement headed by a revolutionary socialist'. Öcalan's arrival in Rome highlighted the disagreement over whether he is a *terrorist* or a *freedom fighter*. While 'Baby Murderer' and 'Head of the Separatist-Terrorists' are used as titles for Öcalan by almost all the Turkish press, some Western journalists have called him 'the last revolutionary of the century' and 'the last of a dying breed of old-style Marxist-Leninist revolutionary' (Rugman 1998).

The PKK insists on identifying itself as Marxist-socialist—and it flourished even in the tumultuous years following the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s, when many socialist countries and parties suffered a crisis of confidence. The PKK, founded by (in the words of a Turkish official) 'a handful of bandits', continued to grow as a mass movement in the early months of 1990, immediately after the collapse of 'socialism'—even though it persisted in calling itself socialist.

In subsequent years, the PKK has again proved itself to be the largest party in the Kurdish territories under Turkish rule, winning a large number of votes in various general and local elections throughout the 1990s. It won slightly more than 50 per cent of votes through the legal parties it backed, despite the oppression and underhand techniques of the Turkish state forces.

The PKK spread itself beyond Turkey to such an extent that it managed to assemble over 100,000 people at a festival in Germany, where the scattered Kurdish population is estimated to be around half a million. As a result of such mass participation in Kurdish politics within Germany, German leaders have initiated a semi-official dialogue with the PKK (Gunter 1998:84, 85; Özkan 2000:58). In 1997 and 1998, Germany released several leading PKK figures who had been imprisoned on charges of organizing violent attacks on Turkish targets, while the United States still brands the PKK 'the most dangerous terrorist organization in the world'. Despite escalating pressure from the United States and Turkey to seek Öcalan's extradition from Italy (he was wanted for murder in Germany on an international arrest warrant issued in 1990), a senior government source in Bonn declared (23 November 1998) that Germany did not want Öcalan extradited. Worried about the potentially explosive impact of mass mobilizations following any trial involving Öcalan, the German source claimed that 'if he [Öcalan] had to stay in Rome it might help to launch a peace initiative between Ankara and the Kurdish rebels' (Traynor and Walker 1998). Some commentators emphasized that the fear of the 'potentially

explosive' impact of Kurdish mass protests out-weighed the legal system and the constitution of Germany.

One might think that such a profitable area of research would be to the student's advantage. However, the reality of the situation could potentially jeopardize the objectivity of scientific deductions, as the issue is surrounded by an atmosphere of obscurity—largely created by the opposing sides' tendency to exaggerate and propagandize.

In this context, one of the prime remedial measures for retaining one's objectivity is by relying on facts and figures, which cannot be forged or twisted. Hopefully, this will minimize the subjective nature of my work.

Accordingly, it would be best to begin investigating the movement and its power of mass mobilization by using the quantitative evidence recognized by the antagonistic parties—Turkey and the PKK: I shall refer to those facts and figures on which the rival parties (almost) compromise. We hence need primarily to concentrate on up-to-date facts and figures on the PKK. This will help us to preserve a sense of direction.

Also, while shedding light on the most up-to-date picture of the case at hand, to begin by presenting a perspective from the Western world on an 'incident' occurring in its heartland will enhance an accurate assessment of the dimensions of international concern, controversy and consensus surrounding the issue.

### *The 'Rome march'*

On the morning of 13 November 1998, Turkish national TV channels turned their entire programming schedules over to continuous news feeds under a single flashing title: *'Apo Roma'da Yakalandi'* (Apo Captured in Rome). The details of his detention released by Italian officials were sketchy—it soon became clear that he was not in custody or prison but in a hospital, and later in a privately rented house—but this particular news story enjoyed prime space in the Turkish media for weeks.

In the days immediately following the news of the 'capture', Madeleine Albright, then the US secretary of state, stressed that 'there is a problem with Mr. Öcalan' and 'he should face justice in Turkey'. Turkish prime minister Mesut Yilmaz called on the United States for assistance, 'although Italy has emphasized that the matter is in the hands of the courts' (*Guardian*, 14 November 1998). In response to the Turkish prime minister's call for help, James Rubin, the state spokesman at the time, said: 'we hope a way will be found to extradite him to Turkey, consistent with international and Italian law'. He added: 'we have no doubt that this man is a terrorist, and he therefore should receive no safe haven' (*International Herald Tribune*, 19 November 1998).

The American ambassador's statement demonstrated the extent to which the US holds the initiative in struggling against the PKK and its leader. Verging on backing Italy's resistance against the Turkish offensive in the case of Öcalan's extradition, the European Union's principal powers and diplomatic sources from Russia and Iran released carefully worded statements to the press in the following days. Yet at the same time, the European Commission produced a report on Turkey's progress towards joining the European Union (EU), and called on Turkey to start a dialogue with the Kurds and to look for a non-military solution to the conflict. Then, under pressure from Turkey and the US, Italian prime minister Masimo D'Alema and German chancellor Gerhard Schröder met in Bonn

on 27 November for talks on Öcalan. There were also a number of visits to the other principal member states of the EU—France, UK and Austria. Furthermore, the EU parliament made a declaration in support of Italy, through the Austrian-term president, which underlined the EU's 'full solidarity with Italy in her determination to fully implement her laws and treaty obligations' (*Turkish Daily News*, 23 November 1998).

During that time, Germany revealed its invalidation of the 1990 international arrest warrant, which culminated in the abandonment of the extradition of Öcalan. Soon after the parliament's declaration, the European Commission adopted a resolution concerning threats of a trade boycott by Turkey, warning Ankara that 'it could face retaliation from all EU members if it went ahead with threats to ban Italian products in protest at Italy's refusal to hand over the leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)' (*Guardian*, 25 November 1998).

But despite official statements from the principal powers of the European Union in support of Italy's resistance against the US and Turkey—and consequently in support of Öcalan's asylum in Rome—the whole of Europe participated in a deadly silence following the meeting of the NATO Ministers' Council held in Brussels. Italy then blamed Bonn for the crisis, asserting that 'Öcalan would not have been arrested when he arrived in Rome on 12 November had it not been for an international arrest warrant issued by Germany in 1990'. Likewise, in spite of Öcalan's publicized insistence on a dialogue with Turkey through Europe,[9] he has been forced to leave not just Italy but the EU territory as a whole. Repeated statements in which 'a dialogue through Europe' was highlighted as the only cause for his 'Rome Venture'—for he had often previously identified the 'Republic of Turkey' as the 'illegitimate child of the West, which the West had monsterized'—did not have any effect.

Öcalan eventually departed from Rome on 16 January 1999, provoking much speculation about his next 'strategy'. Again, Turkish TV made it the top story for days. The United States released an official statement the following day, expressing its 'worry' about Italy's position on 'international terrorism'.

### *Individual and mass reactions*

While European and American powers became increasingly concerned about Öcalan's presence in Rome, mass mobilizations and horrific acts of individual self-immolation broke out among the Kurdish community both abroad and at home. As the breaking news appeared under the title of 'Apo Captured in Rome' on Turkish TV, Kurds from various European countries began to gather in Rome and at once went on a mass hunger strike in Chellio Square. Subsequently, on 17 November, a march called 'You Cannot Extinguish Our Sun' was held in Rome. Estimates of the numbers participating in the march varied from 10,000 to 30,000 (*The Times, Le Republica, L'Unita, Corriere della Sera*, 18 November 1998). In Bonn, on 19 December, there was another mass demonstration organized to support Öcalan's demand for political asylum and a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. Here, numbers were estimated at around 40,000 (*Associated Press*, 20 December; *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 December; *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 21 December). From the day after Öcalan's arrival at Rome airport onwards, widespread mass hunger strikes took place in 147 Kurdish associations (KON-KURD, Federation of Kurdish

Associations in Europe) all over the European, Scandinavian, Caucasian, and Middle Eastern countries, and to a considerable extent in Russia, US, Canada and Australia.

The 'preliminary' hunger strikes had actually started when, in the course of a live telephone interview on Med TV on 19 October, Öcalan had mentioned a '*non-accomplished* Great International Plot' against him and the PKK. At the same time, he asserted that the button for the plot had been pressed on 9 October 1998. Then there was a sudden increase in the number of hunger strikers following the 'Capture of Öcalan' news. Eventually, Öcalan himself sent out word to stop the hunger strikes on 21 November, the day he settled in a private house.

The striking reaction to what Öcalan called a 'plot' seems peculiar to the Kurdish movement. From the date of Öcalan's emphasis on the 'Great International Conspiracy' in the interview by Med TV (19 October 1998) to the aftermath of his capture (19 February 1999)—that is, within the space of just over four months—75 people set themselves on fire and 15 of them burned to death (see Appendix 3). They included an 11-year-old school girl from East Kurdistan (Iran) and a 56-year-old housewife from Istanbul.

Several attempts at organizing hunger strikes or demonstrations were also made in or around the premises of some HADEP[10] branches in Kurdistan and the metropolitan cities of Turkey following Öcalan's appearance in Rome. These were 'disguised' with the slogan 'A Peaceful Solution to the Kurdish Question'. There were also general hunger strikes in prisons by around ten thousand PKK prisoners—but these were soon raided and crushed. The incidents culminated in two deaths. Hamit Çakır was found dead in custody in Diyarbakır.[11] Metin Yurtsever was lynched in front of a HADEP branch in İzmit (a Western city in Turkey near Istanbul) during a police raid on the premises.

'Turkey's First and Only English Daily' summarized the tense events with the headline: 'PKK sympathizers face angry crowd, saved by police' (*Turkish Daily News*, 18 November 1999). In reality, the trouble was the result of specific instructions by the authorities issued under the heading 'Activity Programme of Interior Ministry Concerning the Preventive Measures to be Taken Due to the Capture of Apo in Rome'. The first article of the 'Activity Programme' is worth quoting at length in order to assess the 'how' of the 'social movement' (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Turner and Killian [1957] 1972)—particularly regarding the physical circumstances required for an effectively organized movement to build up the mass mobilization of crowds in Turkish and Kurdish provinces.

> Activity No: 1.
>
> The subject-matter of Activity: Taking psychologically impressive physical measures against the Organization's cadres and supporters.
>
> Activity Time: 17–30 November 1998.
>
> Executing Institutions: The Military Headquarters, The Interior Ministry, The Headquarters of Gendarmerie, National Intelligence Organization (MİT) General Directorate of Security Forces.
>
> Co-ordinator Institution Responsible for Execution: The Interior Ministry.
>
> Targeted Community: Members of the Organization.

> The way of Execution: Psychologically impressive physical measures will be taken and executed by governing bodies of provinces against the Organization's cadres who attempt demonstrations or hunger strikes or passive resistance etc. within the appearance of a legal framework which tends to raise the sympathizers' morale.
>
> The General Directorate of Security Forces will be in co-ordination with the Headquarters of Gendarmerie when necessary.

In addition to other articles pointing to specific targets (such as how to command the means of mass communications, how to wield religious institutions, how to motivate the kin of soldiers who lost their lives in clashes, and so on), 'Activity No: 10' of the 'Program' focuses on HADEP and the newspapers or the periodicals sympathetic to the party. The 'Activity Program' was brought into effect on 17 November. On 19 November, police raided all HADEP premises and the offices of proKurdish newspapers *Ülkede Gündem* and *Welat* based in Turkey and the 'South-east', following an order by the Ankara State Security Court (DGM).[12] The 'balance sheet' for a month's implementation of one article of the 'Activity Program' was as follows:

– the mass detentions of 3,215 people in total, the arrest of 130 members of HADEP, including nine administrators of headquarters and the leader of the party himself, Murat Bozlak (who was badly wounded in an attack on his house on an earlier occasion),
– heavy casualties with many serious injuries,
– the lynching of a man by an 'angry crowd' and a dead body in custody.

The vast majority of HADEP's leading members were arrested—three members of the executive organ, 11 chairmen of administrative provinces, and 86 members with administrative duties (Kemal Peköz, general accountant of HADEP, live tele-interview by Med TV, 4 February 1999) as well as the head of the party, Murat Bozlak. This happened shortly before the general election of 18 April 1999. On 29 January 1999, Vural Savaş, attorney-general of the Republic, had brought a lawsuit in the Constitutional Court against HADEP and called for the party to be banned, claiming he had discovered proof of 'organizational links' between the party and the PKK

A sequence of pro-Kurdish legal parties known to be HADEP's predecessors (HEP, ÖZDEP and DEP, in order) had been banned in previous years by the Constitutional Court for the very same reason (Kartal 1995:183–187). Furthermore, Murat Bozlak's attempt to enter Diyarbakır, for an officially arranged mass meeting, was prevented a short while prior to his arrest by the region's military-dominated security forces due to a 'lack of security measures'.

### *The abduction of Öcalan*

The 'Great International Conspiracy'—in fact, the explicit international hunt for Öcalan (led by the USA) since his appearance in Rome—came to its conclusion on 16 February 1999. Öcalan thought he had received clearance from the Kenyan authorities to go to the airport and fly to the Netherlands. The car in which he was travelling pulled out from the convoy of cars (provided by the Kenyan security police) and disappeared on the evening

of 15 February. Öcalan was bound, gagged and drugged, and placed on a jet back to Turkey from Nairobi. The plane arrived safely at 3.15a.m. on 16 February.

While Turkish authorities declared 16 February the most important day in the history of the Republic, the 'Council of Presidency of the PKK' announced February 15 as *'milat'* (birth of Christ) for Kurds.

Some states denied participating in the abduction of Öcalan—but it was not enough to convince papers unsympathetic to Öcalan and the PKK.

> Despite strong denials from the United States and Israel, it appears that Ankara was able to call on the service of the American and Israeli intelligence services to keep track of Mr. Öcalan's movements across Europe and to provide positive proof that he was in hiding inside a Greek diplomatic compound in Nairobi… Although the full story behind the plot to kidnap Mr. Öcalan was being deliberately 'muddied' yesterday by all those involved…
>
> (*The Times*, 18 February 1999)
>
> However, one US official at the state department, who requested anonymity, said: 'We were engaged for months diplomatically to bring him to justice.'
>
> (Howard 1999:83)

In his first statement through his lawyers after being abducted, Öcalan emphasized that Turkey was not involved in his abduction. Further, Tuncay Özkan, a Turkish journalist close to the intelligence services, has suggested that the US had decided to hand Öcalan over to Turkey following a detailed report presented by Michael M.Gunter who interviewed him in Damascus on 13 and 14 March 1998 (Özkan 2000:57).

Clearly, the exact details of Öcalan's abduction from Nairobi or the parties' stances on the day of his delivery to Turkey are not the main issue here. But these details do show his importance for both regional parties and global powers. There is considerable data indicating Öcalan's importance, and the influence of his charisma among Kurds in the four parts of Kurdistan, and abroad.

As news broke of Öcalan's delivery to the Ankara authorities, Kurdish activists across the world once more mobilized to protest at what they saw as an international conspiracy. Greek embassies and consulates (along with some property of Israel, Kenya and international bodies) were stormed in more than 20 cities across Europe, where almost 1.5 million scattered Kurdish people live.

In Berlin, four Kurdish protesters were shot dead by security guards when they attempted to storm the Israeli embassy. Another six protesters were shot dead during several demonstrations against Turkish diplomatic premises in the principal Kurdish cities of Iran. Tens of thousands of Kurds of the south (northern Iraq) participated in mass demonstrations held in 'safe haven' provinces ruled by either the KDP or the PUK. And yet again, demonstrators engaged in horrific acts of self-immolation. Some protesters set themselves on fire, including a 15-year-old girl in London, a 56-year-old housewife in Istanbul, and even an 11-year-old child in Iran (Appendix 3).

Following the self-immolation attempt by the young girl in front of the Greek embassy in London, an American reporter was insistently asking protesters: 'Why is this man so

important for you?' The question may be a simple one, but the answer is not so straightforward. However, by examining the facts, research and data, a sociological answer can be found.

### *The wave of mass demonstrations of the early 1990s*

In presenting a general picture of the mobilizing dimensions of the party, we must not bypass the widespread mass riots *(serîhildans),*[13] including the participation of an overwhelming majority of the quasi-rural population.

The 'unexpected' demonstrations erupted on the streets of many Kurdish provinces in March 1990 and continued until the late months of 1993 (see Chapter 6). Both the state forces and the other Kurdish political groups who intended to be the 'vanguard parties' of the 'National Liberation Movement' were reluctant to recognize this fact at first (*Yekitîya Sosyalist,* April 1990; *Pêşeng,* April/May 1990; *Riya Azadi,* April 1990, and others). For the military-dominated state sources, 'this group of people were "just a bunch of bandits" who had taken to the mountains and/or young adventure-seeking activists' (İmset 1992:7).

Similarly, when a mass reaction to the exhibition of the corpses of 13 PKK guerrillas in Nusaybin led to the most recent rebellion,[14] the rest of the Kurdish national groupings tended to explain the phenomenon within a feudal-tribal frame of reference by pointing at the tribal origins of the killed guerrillas. But the fact remains that the paragraphs outlining 'A Revolutionary Organizing Plan For Kurdistan' in the early issues of the Organization's official periodical, *Serxwebûn,*[15] present a detailed plan of how to 'build up' crowd behaviour under the social circumstances of the Kurdish populated territories (Turner and Killian [1957] 1972:58). The 'Revolutionary Organizing Plan' had to be made because, according to Öcalan, 'society has been de-organized from top to bottom by the Turkish colonising system' (*Örgütlenme Uzerine,* 1983:11–13).

The *'Serîhildans'* gradually spread until 1993. Mass participation in them increased and spread into many other Kurdish towns and territories. The largest was the funeral procession of the head of the Diyarbakır branch of HEP, Vedat Aydın, who was murdered by assassins. Around 150,000 people were attacked by heavily armed security forces, supported by armoured vehicles and helicopters, leaving 21 dead and hundreds wounded.

Ragıp Duran, a specialist Turkish journalist in the region's affairs, wrote about these casualties in a report submitted to the 'International Conference on North West Kurdistan (south-east Turkey)', held on 13 and 14 March 1994 in Brussels. Duran's words give some clue as to what lay behind the mass mobilizations in the region:

> Nineteen journalists, nearly all of whom are of Kurdish nationality (including Musa Anter who was 70 years old) have been shot and killed over the last two years in south-east Anatolia. Government authorities claim that these deaths are the work of unknown assassins. (More than 500 people have been shot or hacked to death.) A document from the Turkish Minister of the Interior says that the victims 'were people who had links with terrorists and were consequently victims of the internal battle within terrorist organizations'. Delegates from the Turkish Grand

> National Assembly [of Turkey], the European Parliament, Amnesty International, the Association of Human Rights and the Committee for the Protection of Journalists, who made detailed, on-the-spot investigations of these assassinations, concluded that 'the security forces were involved, in one way or another, in these assassinations'.
>
> (Duran 1995:71)

### *'Official' 'figures*

It is worth noting that even pro-state sources recognize the mass dimensions of the party. The first English book published by the *Turkish Daily News* addresses the extent of what it labels 'massification'.[16]

> The fact that the PKK is now rapidly gaining mass support throughout the Southeast [implying Kurdish populated areas] and is now bidding for further control in the region, has led to tension on the part of Turkish officials based here.
>
> Many of the smaller settlements, with populations ranging from between 10,000 to 60,000 have been converted into self-styled PKK fortresses. Even regional officials accept that 'the PKK is everywhere' or in the hearts of everyone.
>
> (İmset 1992:264)

The pro-Kurdish legal party, HADEP, for which the PKK sources announced their support, won 19.5 per cent of the votes in 18 provinces where more than '15 per cent of the population declared their mother language as Kurdish' in the 1995 elections (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997). The percentage in the 'capital' city of 'Turkish Kurdistan' was 73 in the general elections.

Estimates of the number of deaths caused by the 14-year Kurdish guerrilla war against the Turkish army (which began on 15 August 1984) range from 29,000 to 37,000. (*Independent*, 14 November 1998:29,000; *Financial Times*, 14/15 November 1998 and *Guardian*, 14 November 1998:30,000; *International Herald Tribune*, 16 November 1998:30,000–37,000; *The Times*, 18 November 1998:37,000. The numbers given by human rights analysts are also between 30,000 and 37,000.)

While controversy rages over the recognition of the true nature of the PKK, the mass support for and mobilizing abilities of the organization are acknowledged to be undeniable.

### *Summary*

In general, my study is designed to throw light on the processes of the PKK's 'massification'—its mobilizing sources and dimensions among the people of Kurdistan. These people are divided by solid physical, as well as spiritual, borders—and they retain active and vital pre-feudal institutions. In addition, the effects of the PKK's influence in the process of Kurdish nationalization, in terms of *detribalization*, will be discussed at length.

However, the central question I shall endeavour to answer is *how* the movement came into being—how it started as a 'single man's efforts', developed, 'massified', and eventually became part of an international controversy.

To this end, the book will attempt to examine the organization's role in the process, partly by examining theory about social movements but mainly through the analytical framework of nation and nationalism, and of the Marxist conceptualization of the 'national question'. So the main question shall be concerned with the inner dynamics of the movement: What is the determinative internal factor in the organizational growth of the Ankara-born PKK which has enabled it to extend Kurdish resistance beyond provincial borders and to an international level? In view of the effective, functional 'primordial loyalties' (Alavi 1973) and rivalries (clannish, tribal, religious, sectarian and regional) in Kurdish society—which appear as a point of consensus in the literature on Kurds—there may be such a decisive factor.

Considering the multi-causal nature of the development processes of social phenomena, historical and up-to-date realities must not be ignored—particularly within their contexts. The initial proposition is that the circumstances that gave rise to the PKK are intimately linked to the emergence and formation of Turkish capitalism and the Republic. Namely, it is linked to the 'manufactured character of the Republican Turkish identity' (Kadıoğlu 1996:177). Further, the 'manufactured' character of Turkish identity and the Republic is both an effect of and part of the process of the Republic's way of *'colonizing'* part of Kurdistan. Without studying the nationality of Turks and the statehood of the Turkish Republic, it is not possible to assess the true nature of the PKK.

To summarize: subsequent chapters will search for the dominant cause of the PKK-led Kurdish insurgency ('29th revolt'),[17] which developed from a'group of 15–20 university students' (Aydin 1992) into the 'biggest challenge to the Turkish state in the twentieth century' (Olson 1996). I am aware that when an inquiry orientates itself towards the most operative *internal* factor of a process there is always a risk of ignoring, or at least lessening the importance of, the context in which the phenomenon is considered. The study's intellectual, theoretical and empirical balance has thus been watched to avoid confusing phenomena and context.

# 1
# Nationalism

## Distilling the cultural and the political

Societal historiography has been exceedingly fragile against the triumphant advances of history. This appears to be one of the greatest vulnerabilities of historiography with regard to the recorded affairs of humankind's overall socio-political trajectory. The vast literature on the 'twin' concepts (nation and nationalism) represents an utterly victimized portion of this trajectory.

This chapter revisits general theorization on 'nation' and 'nationalism' to provide a conceptual framework for interpreting facts about the PKK. I also aim to escape the trap engendered by the 'mongrelization' of these main concepts as they concern my argument.

The literature is overwhelmingly engaged with the *faces, types* or taxonomies of the 'elusive' concept of nationalism. Here, I endeavour to single out the genuine face. A firm abstraction of the *cultural* from the *political* is necessary, I maintain, to distinguish nationalism as *realpolitik* from the needs and rights—and even deviancies—of ethnic masses. In order to achieve an understanding that can avoid the elusive aspects of nationalism, I argue that a total withdrawal of cultural devices from theories about nationalism is needed. The context of the debate, therefore, concerns itself with the working of national politics instead of its wording.

The PKK emerged as an illegal organization in the late 1970s, claiming a national liberation struggle for the Kurdish 'nation' within the official borders of Turkey. Its programme is a 'Kurdicized' copy of those customary communist parties that undertake a nation's 'national' liberation as an 'initial stage' of the ultimate socialist revolution. The ideology by which the PKK formulates this initiative's aims and objectives is a Middle-Eastern translation of traditional Marxist socialism. So for the purposes of interpreting the nature and dynamics of the ethnic resistance movement that the party generated and led, we should begin by outlining a general theoretical framework.

Insofar as this study's primary unit of analysis is a political party that claims to be ideologically Marxist-socialist and programmatically undertaking a 'national' emancipation, we need to revisit the concepts of nation and nationalism alongside their communist conceptualization. By doing this, we will be able to outline the equivocal nature of the organization's claims about its 'national liberationism' and 'socialism'. This will, hopefully, sharpen our analytic focus—as the nature of Kurdish nationhood itself is also susceptible to further equivocalness.

Because the organization under study claims to be Marxist-socialist, the 'national question' of Marxism must also be incorporated. A great deal of theorization on ethnicity, nation and nationalism in the Marxist tradition excludes the 'large' nationalism—namely, the national politics of preexisting states for preserving and/or furthering their market interests in hinterlands or peripheries. Also, as an unavoidable logical extension of this, the nationalism of 'small' nations is generally evaluated as 'progressive' or 'good', and consequently the tradition has tempted to present nationalism in terms of a healthy/morbid dichotomy. This, in turn, has locked Marxists into the self-contained 'enigma' of the 'national question' for it has never been possible to distinguish the healthy from the morbid. It is thus my concern to 'immunize' my reasoning against the additional enigmas arising from the Marxist mainstream approach to a national question, as well as the ones already present in general conceptualizations about nation and nationalism.

When becoming involved in such a debate, it is important not to further complicate 'vulnerable' concepts, because the particular literature is not just confusing but also convoluted. The classification of 'types' of nationalism and a generally recognized consensual definition of the concepts continue to be deeply controversial—no matter how fast the literature grows. Because the central concepts are inherently problematic, the boundaries and main objectives of my arguments need to be stated here. I shall begin with a brief and selective combing of the conceptualizations offered by mainstream scholars in the field.

As a final introductory remark: despite the occasional overflows beyond modernity in various respects, it is overwhelmingly acknowledged that nations and nationalism are—either as contingently invented or unavoidably emergent—entities of modernity's industrialization. Favouring neither the former nor latter accounts, I share the view about the timeline, and therefore do not find it a prerequisite to incorporate a discussion on segmental timing into the argument.

## Distilling the 'mongrelized' twin concepts of modernity

Although they are largely elided, scholarly attempts to *decouple* the 'twins'[1] do exist. David McCrone, in his recent attempt to focus sociological scrutiny on this subject, *The Sociology of Nationalism*, summarizes part of the problem by, first, alluding to the suggestive coupling statements by writers such as R.Miles, W.Connor, S.Bruce, L.Greenfeld and S.Hall. Of these, Connor—when justifying why he did not simply call his collection of essays 'nationalism' but 'ethnonationalism'—claims that 'there is no difference if nationalism is used in its pristine sense' (McCrone 1998:22). Bruce draws lessons from the case of 'Scottish nationalism' by deducing that 'it is precisely the lack of a single identity of a "people" with common ancestors, common language, shared religion and a glorious history which prevented nationalism emerging in Scotland when it was doing so in the twentieth century' (ibid.: 22–23). Likewise, Greenfeld also couples ethnicity with nationalism, and says that

> ‘nationality’ became a synonym of ‘ethnicity’, and national identity is often perceived as a reflection or awareness of possession of ‘primordial’ or inherited characteristics, components of ‘ethnicity’, such as language, customs, territorial affiliation, and physical type.
>
> (Cited by McCrone 1998:23)

According to McCrone’s interpretation, Miles more radically argues that ‘“nations” have no independent existence outwith the discourse of nationalism’—just as in the pairing of race and racism (ibid.: 25). In Anthony D. Smith’s work *National Identity*, this identity is defined and distinguished from the principal set of other identities by basing it on the ethnic entity of social man (Smith 1991:19–42). Smith, however, devotes the larger share of the book to studying nation and nationalism, for he, too, interweaves the twin phenomena with the ethnic catalyst. In fact, the term ‘ethnicity’, McCrone reminds us, has been referred to as a social scientific concept ‘only in the mid-twentieth century’, and made its ‘official appearance in the *Oxford English Dictionary* as late as the 1970s’ (McCrone 1998:24), although it is clear that this phenomenon began to steer the modern period of history over one and half centuries beforehand. In the face of these and many other similar arguments, Hall states that there is ‘a great deal of work to do to decouple ethnicity, as it functions in the dominant discourse, from its equivalence with nationalism’ (ibid.: 25).

In the wide-ranging debates on nation and nationalism, the competing arguments trying to distinguish or merge the *cultural* and *political* ‘components’ of the phenomenon occupy much space. Students of nation and nationalism will encounter, in Nairn’s metaphor, a Janus-like entanglement when plunging into the literature. We will come back to this. But before that, in order not to vacillate between the ‘twins’, it seems more viable to handle them one by one, and to begin with ‘nation’. A Turkish saying asks: ‘If meat starts to become smelly you salt it; if salt smells, what then do you do?’ Since disagreements arise about both concepts, we need, so to speak, to ‘decontaminate’ the ‘salt’ first.

### *Nation*

The definition of ‘nation’ is more problematic among scholars than the question of ‘the nation’ (or the ‘national question’) itself as the emphatic politics of the past two centuries. Is an exhaustive definition of this elusiveevasive concept possible? This is the question that every author of a study endeavouring to address the subject begins by posing. The question is a simple but dazzling one: what is a nation?

Smith talks of ‘the chimera of universally valid, once-for-all definitions’ pursued by ‘earlier writers’ which, he believed, ‘were *not* pinning down the same elusive “essence”’ (Smith 1983:165). McCrone complains about the absence of ‘neat definitions of key concepts’ at which ‘the student of nationalism can quickly become disillusioned’. He adds, There simply is no agreement about what nationalism is, what nations are, how we are to define nationality’ (McCrone 1998:3). Seton-Watson felt driven to conclude, ‘no “scientific definition” of a nation can be devised; yet the phenomenon has existed and exists’ (Seton-Watson 1977:5). Anderson recalls this observation of Seton-Watson, while

in search of support for his argument (Anderson, 1983:13). While Nairn finds it a 'by nature ambivalent' phenomenon (Nairn 1981:348), Gellner names it an 'elusive concept' (Gellner 1983:7), and so forth. Or, from the same perspective expressed in reverse, Hobsbawm, in the final paragraph of his influential work *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780,* concludes that

> 'nation' and 'nationalism' are no longer adequate terms to describe, let alone to analyse, the political entities described as such, or even the sentiments once described by these words.
>
> (Hobsbawm 1990:192)

So the central source of competing standpoints among social scientists and historians is the question of whether 'nation', as a societal phenomenon, is primarily a cultural entity facing back into history or a political entity based in the present with a futuristic outlook. Because of this divergence of views, it is vital to glance at the most condensed definitions by the recognized scholars in the field. This will hopefully show how to conceptualize the phenomenon and illustrate the concerns behind the shifting approaches to it, owing to the 'evasiveness', 'elusiveness' or 'equivocalness' of the concept 'nation'. A juxtaposition of the main arguments—bearing the historical order in mind—will help us address the 'question' of the nation.

### *The most discussed definitions of nation*

In his seminal lecture in 1882, 'What is a nation', Ernest Renan provides the most realistic, if not revealing, picture of the 'nation' as the *realpolitik* of the adolescent bourgeoisie. Even if his standpoint is characterized by a vindication of the French Revolution in the face of the Germanic nationalism that overemphasized ethnic-primordial ties, the approach is free of self-deception and the temptation to play with the facts. Renan eliminates the widely recognized criteria and reduces them to a *single impetus* for the invention of a nation. Elements such as 'race, language, religious affinity, interests, geography and military exigency' are 'insufficient'. That is, they are by no means compulsory prerequisites of a nation: a *soul* is what makes nations:

> A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which strictly speaking are just one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common possession of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage that has been received in common.
>
> (Renan, in Woolf 1996:57–58)

Renan, while implying the cultural background of the 'soul' by emphasizing the 'common legacy' that existed in the 'past' of a would-be nation, rewrites a slight racial base. Nonetheless, in context, he tends to state that, if needed, a nation may well be imagined, manufactured and invented from a collection of *ethnicities* in a newly

discovered land or in newly made satellites with a newly proclaimed official language made of all *ethnies*' languages.

For Renan, the determinants attributed to the *pasts* of a nation, race (in the sense of ethnic stock) and language are also artefacts. 'Race, as we historians understand it, is something that is made and unmade…and Europe's first nations are essentially mixed blood.' He continues: 'nothing is more false' than languages, to which additional political importance is attached by almost all scholars, 'as signs of race' (Renan, in Woolf 1996:54, 55). To sum up, nations are politically and socially constructed communities by 'strictly one' impetus—a soul, a spiritual principle in Renan's definition.

Otto Bauer, one of the earliest theoreticians on the 'national question' in the Marxist tradition, defines the nation in terms of ethnic-primordial roots—just in the sense of cultural *natio* independent of any political aspect. He calls this 'a psychological theory of nation' (Bauer, in Woolf 1996:78), from which Stalin derives his notorious 'spiritual' definition. Bauer, in effect, defines ethnicity but calls it 'nation'. 'A nation's inherited qualities are nothing other than the sedimentation of its past, its *history frozen*, so to speak', according to Bauer (ibid.: 61). He thereby reaches the 'condensed' definition of his conceptualization: 'The nation is the totality of people bound by the community of destiny in a community of character' (ibid.: 71). When one replaces the 'nation' with 'ethnicity', or adds the suffix 'ality' to it, then no questions remain. But the essay's title is 'The Nation' and it is subtitled 'The Concept of Nation' before the formulation above appears. Moreover, Bauer traces the nation as far back as our earliest humanization from an anthro-pological perspective, by relying upon Marx's teaching of materialistic conception:

> A nation does not come into being at the early stage at which men merely seek their food without having to work for it and support themselves by simply appropriating or occupying ownerless property they find, but instead *at the stage where man extracts the goods he requires from nature by labour*. The emergence of a nation and the special characteristic of each nation is thus determined by people's mode of labour, by the means of labour they deploy, by the productive forces they control and the relation of production they enter into. It is Karl Marx's historical method which has enabled us to solve the great task of understanding the emergence of every single nation, as part of mankind's battle with nature.
>
> (Bauer, in Woolf 1996:64)

The argument proceeds with little involvement in the *cultural* and *political* debate. This is because he is engaged in a discussion about rights (of self-determination) for the 'oppressed nations'. He devotes the rest of his argument to the conceptualization of 'national sentiment' and 'national consciousness'. But we should not solely attribute his conception of nation 'as a community of culture' (ibid.: 69) to Marxist understanding. For example, the views of Williams, a radical anti-nationalist historian with a pro-Marxist approach, are in sharp contrast to Bauer's:

> Nations have not existed from Time Immemorial as the warp and the woof of human experience. Nations do not grow like a tree; they are

> manufactured. Most of the nations of modern Europe were manufactured during the nineteenth century; people manufactured nations as they did cotton and shirts.
>
> (Williams, in Woolf 1996:192)

This is Stalin's definition of 'nation' which, despite his harsh critique of Bauer, was copied from Bauer's psychological theory: *'A nation is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture'* (Stalin 1936:8; italics as original).

Stalin arrives at the definition above following a sequential set of four 'characteristic features': language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up or the 'spiritual complexion of the people…which manifests itself in peculiarities of national culture' (ibid.: 7). It is not easy to situate the definition in either *cultural* or *political* categories, as it seems to be a 'made to measure' definition in search of 'criteria' that comply with the 'right of self-determination'.

More interestingly, it is followed by what we might call a mechanical or mathematical condition. 'It must be emphasized that none of the above characteristics is *by itself* sufficient to define a nation. On the other hand, it is sufficient for *a single one of these characteristics* to be absent and the nation *cease* to be a nation' (ibid.: 8; emphases added). It also must be emphasized that this well-known essay by Stalin was arranged under Lenin's tutelage—and Lenin's pragmatic politics—for the purpose of vindicating the 'right of self-determination for nations' which was believed to overcome the 'national question'. The essay is crucial, not because of its scholarly merit but because the politics and intellectual circles of the 'communist world' were dominated and guided by it until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The next clear *political* conception of nation is presented by the political theorist Elie Kedourie, with no reference to an ethnic ingredient—like Renan. 'A nation came to be understood as that body of persons who could claim to represent, or to elect representatives for, a particular territory at councils, diets, or estates' (Kedourie 1966:14). He also cites a neater definition from Sieyès, who asks himself 'What is a Nation?' before answering: 'A body of associates living under one common law and represented by the same legislature' (ibid.: 15).

Ernest Gellner is the closest we have to a contemporary version of Renan, in terms of his conceptualization of nation and nationalism. He poses the very same question, What is a Nation?, in his book *Nations and Nationalism* (Gellner 1983:53). While the former reveals that 'getting its history wrong is part of being a nation', the latter constructs a useful maxim, stating that 'nationalism sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: *that* is reality, for better or worse, and in general an inescapable one' (ibid.: 49). The second distinguishing facet of Gellner's theory is the contrast he draws between 'culture-mediated nationalism' and 'structure-mediated tribalism', which more neatly provides the framework of his understanding of the concept 'nation'. He defines the phenomenon by relying on the *objectivity* of subjective fact. 'In this sense', he concludes,

> nationalisms are simply those tribalisms, or for that matter any other kind of group, which through luck, effort or circumstances succeed in becoming an effective force under modern circumstances. They are only identifiable *ex post factum*. Tribalism never prospers, for when it does, everyone will respect it as a true nationalism, and no-one will dare call it tribalism.
>
> (Gellner 1983:87)

For Hobsbawm, the phenomenon represented by the concept 'nation' may be recognized—'as conceived by nationalism'—prospectively: 'the real "nation" can only be recognized *a posteriori*'. That is, he seems to say, nation is a political entity in which its shifting components and criteria are 'imagined' and 'invented'. He then explicates further:

> It is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the 'nation-state', and it [nation] is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as both are related to it. Moreover, with Gellner I would stress the element of artefact, invention and social engineering which enter into the making of nations.
>
> (Hobsbawm 1990:9–10)

His condensed conclusion is that 'nationalism comes before nations'—and also 'nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round' (ibid.: 9, 10).

In the preface to the second edition of his comprehensive study, *Theories of Nationalism*, Antony D.Smith makes the 'vital distinction' between 'cultural' and 'political' nation, stating that it was first formulated by Friedrich Meinecke and elaborated by E.K.Francis. But he takes no risks by favouring one or the other. He suggests that Francis 'contrasts "ethnic" with "demonic" nations' and 'prefers to reserve the term "nation" for the dominant ethnic community or *"ethnie"* within a state' (Smith 1983:xii, xiii). Smith views the 'statist' and 'ethnicist' approaches of parties as being coterminous with the *political* and *cultural* approaches. He evaluates the former as being misleading for it 'obscures what should remain as a fundamental distinction—between "nation" and "state"', and the latter as 'itself ambiguous' (ibid.: 180).

Later, in the early 1990s, Smith contrasted these approaches again, while referring to Kemilainen's definition of nation 'as a community of people obeying the same laws and institutions within a given territory' and the non-Western model as an 'ethnic' conception of nation saying that 'a nation' is 'first and foremost a community of descent' (Smith 1991:9, 11). Smith, however, decides on a version of 'ethnicist', or at least non-statist, conceptualization by constructing the italicized definition below by which he 'intended to convey the essentials of the many images of the ideal nation held by nationalists everywhere':

> *The nation is a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more) common characteristic(s) which differentiate its*

> *members from those of similar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict.*
>
> (Smith 1983:175)

He refers to states as being made up of multiple nations and nations of multiple states when citing the dialogue in which Kostic 'explained' that 'one nation can live under several different governments, and again several nations can form a single state' (ibid.: 177). That is, he employs the term 'nation' that at any time one may replace with 'ethnicity' or 'nationality'.

Karl W.Deutsch's *Nationalism and its Alternatives* begins with the following sentence. '"A nation", so goes a rueful European saying, "is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and common dislike of their neighbours"' (Deutsch 1969:30).

In *Imagined Communities*, while he points out that scholars suffer from a misunderstanding of the twin concepts, Anderson goes further when stating his point of departure. He recognizes not only nation but also nationality—or, 'nationness' as he prefers to call it—as 'cultural artefacts of a particular kind'. In agreement with Renan, Gellner, Hobsbawm, Deutsch, Kedourie and Williams, Anderson conceptualizes the term 'nation' as a political community that has been imagined prospectively and invented accordingly 'because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion' (Anderson 1983:15).

Although Anderson employs it in support of his argument for the imaginative element of the nation in its formative process, Seton-Watson at first glance seems to perceive the nation as a political entity but, in effect, defines it solely in cultural terms. 'A nation', for Seton-Watson, 'is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness.' In accordance with this logic, he quite convincingly states in the second paragraph of his major work, *Nations and States*, that 'a nation can be coterminous with the population of one state, or be included together with other nations within one state, or be divided between several states' (Seton-Watson 1977:1).

Within the framework of Seton-Watson's approach, one is bound to talk of the single nation of tens of Arab states or of the four nations of Switzerland, or the two nations of Belgium, or of many similar others in the East and West.

Because of the fear of the 'concealed contradiction' between the 'demand for an exhaustive definition' of nation and the 'relatively rapid development' of its 'distinguished features', Miroslav Hroch prefers not to interfere with the 'opinions of other authors' but instead to 'put before the reader' the 'author's own conception of the nation'. And the author's view is 'decisively to be differentiated from the notion that nationalism is the primary formative factor and the nation is derivative' (Hroch 1985:3).

That is, a nation does exist as a cultural entity with the sequential components of the 'sedimentation of its past' before nationalism arrives: Hroch, in effect, views nationalism as the device of 'small' nations who are struggling for a nation-state or a similar form of emancipation. He is comprehensive in his illustrative comparative study of several European examples, but nevertheless confines the discussion to 'small' nations' 'national liberationist' nationalisms.

McCrone analyses the varied approaches instead of favouring or advocating a particular perspective—similar to what Smith does. But in contrast to Smith, he is precise enough when focusing on the 'common error' (Deutsch 1969) vis-à-vis primordial ancestry and the 'obliterated' (Gellner 1983) character of pre-existing cultures in the chapter titled 'Inventing the Past'—by referring, in particular, to Renan's precondition for being a nation, in which the nation gets 'its history wrong'. His selective reference to Renan is straightforward:

> 'Getting history wrong' is the precondition of nationalist history because it requires not only collective remembering but collective forgetting. This 'forgetting', said Renan, 'I would go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality'.
>
> (McCrone 1998:44)

### *What I shall mean by 'nation'*

It stands out from an ordinary selection of principal scholars of the field that the most 'condensed' definitions of 'nation' leave out some essentials, since the cultural and the political are not taken in a dialectical interrelation and accordingly are not abstracted from one another.

The point of my argument held here requires avoiding the convolutions surrounding the definitions of the 'twins'. To this end, clearing up what I shall denote by the term 'nation' is unavoidable. Under the pressure of a burgeoning critical literature it is essential to be clear about how I shall employ the term 'nation' to unfold 'nation'-alism.

Rather than engaging in ethnic quarrelling between neighbouring culturally diverse social entities, nation-states are historical results of an 'internecine' struggle between modernity's fellow ruling classes. The adolescent bourgeoisies of industrialization emerged one after another within their various outdated dynasties as the result of the leap forward of productive forces. There exist prosperous American, Belgian and Swiss nations of two or more *ethnies* and over 20 modern or semi-modern nations of a single Arab *ethnie*, including Syria-Palestine and Iraq whose 'founder-fathers' were two brothers, Feisal and Abdullah (Rodinson 1968:23). Not to mention the Spanish-speaking nations of Central and South America, the other English-speaking advanced nations of Canada and Australia, the German-speaking and neighbouring nations of Germany and Austria, the separately institutionalized Scandinavian nations of northern Europe, and so forth.

No one would think of considering these states as anomalies. There are the intimate neighbours, France and Germany, each of which is one of the most advanced nation-states in 'native' Europe, and which undeniably arrived at their modern nation-statehood through the poles of the processes of becoming a nation-state—the former on a non-ethnicist path, the latter on a non-statist one (McCrone 1998:9).

There are also convincing non-anomalous examples to suggest that language too is not a determining component in the rise of nations and nation-states. Scholars largely agree that French was a scarce minority language among Parisians before the French

Revolution produced the prototype of the nation-state recognized by everyone. Likewise, after only three-quarters of a century, M.Kemal Atatürk's *Nutuk*[2] has been translated into Turkish from the previous official Ottoman language for the current generation in Turkey. Hobsbawm, referring to 'national languages', firmly states that they are 'almost always semi-artificial constructs and occasionally, like modern Hebrew, virtually invented' (Hobsbawm 1990:54), and no one would dare to brand either those successfully post-industrialized states with two or more official languages or those neighbouring states with the very same languages in the heart of Europe as anomalies.[3]

Therefore, one of the most endemic essentials of nationalism's ideological obligations is the preservation and exaggeration of the sovereigns and, in turn, the assimilation and integration, and—if needed and managed—the annihilation of the subordinates. 'Nationalist discourse is historicist; it relies on genealogy for the legitimation of the nationalist cause, on the historicization of the national origin for the affirmation of the self and denial of the other' (Vali 1996:23). The dustbin of history is full of assimilated and/or annihilated subordinate ethnic entities of various kinds. The nature of nationalist historical discourse entails 'distorting the truth, misrepresenting the historical reality of the formation of nations and nation-states' (ibid.: 23). Although it has been the fate of every example ranging from France to Turkey—as some prosper, others do not—the fact is best expressed in Renan's epigram: *'Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.'*

Neither the pre-existent homogeneity of ethnicity nor that of a common language are preconditions for a sovereign nation-state. Further, given that these examples from around the world are among the most prosperous nations, a would-be definition of 'nation' must include them. At least, it ought not to omit the examples of the United States, Switzerland and Belgium, each of which continues to represent a conspicuous mode of the nation-state in the post-national (global) world of our time.

Unfortunately, as the most potent 'impetus' which forces the concept 'nation' to be either 'evasive' or 'elusive' or 'equivocal', there exists a *hidden concern* preoccupying people's minds and prejudicing decisions about who (which *ethnie*) may or may not qualify as a 'nation-state'—or who may be 'recognized' as having the right of 'national self-determination'. Or, as Nairn puts it, who is qualified to take things (the 'national' market) into their own hands (Nairn 1981:339).

A corollary to this 'concern' has been the misrepresentation of facts. This solely political concern, as it arises from the form and positions of the vacillating arguments, appears to be the fundamental source of a great deal of hesitation regarding what the concept 'nation' should primarily encompass.

What then should I refer to by the term 'nation' in order not to, at least, contribute to its 'elusiveness'?

The versions of *political* definitions of 'nation' are more clear and unbiased, and consequently more viable for discursive deductions. The use of the term 'nation' in this book's discussions shall mean 'an *institutionalized* political, economical and legislative-jurisdictional *unit* of community that is realized in the form of what is called a "nation-state", independent of a pre-existing homogeneous ethnic and/or cultural entity'. In order to make the logic of this study more lucid, this will be the only framework by which a community may 'qualify' to be a nation. This is also a 'viable' conception of 'nation' through which we can circumvent the 'question' of definition that leaves out the

examples of those nations which in respect of fame, prosperity and also quantity are more than mere exceptions. In addition, this is the 'political value' that modernity contributed to the course of human history, which had already produced appropriate cultural superstructures. It is because the form of the nation, in its overall societal sense, is an artefact that denotes a qualitative 'onslaught' on sociopolitical-economical human reorganization that the adolescent bourgeoisie of rising capitalism was led to introduce it to social man's history for the sake of capitalism's 'home' market. The artefact, either as contingency or inevitability, was made possible by the leap forward of productive forces, known as industrialization. One consequence of this social development was that Americanness, Britishness and emerging Europeanness have already been the undeniable subjects of 'trans-ethnic' identities that associate not with 'inner' *ethnie* but 'outer' *patrie*. And as a necessity of this very 'spiritless' logic,[4] which in our time largely manifests itself in the growing 'sentiments' of growing markets, globalizing capitalism will foster and proliferate trans-ethnic 'nations' of trans-national states of various kinds in the motion towards a 'world nation'. Renan prophesied the European Union more than a century in advance, in 1882:

> Human wills change; but what does not change in this life? Nations are not something eternal. They began, so they come to an end. A European confederation will probably replace them.
>
> (Renan, in Woolf 1996:59)

Deutsch's prophecy of an integration that 'changes' circumstances towards a trans-national 'nationalization', which indicates a *fusing* of the fate of nations, lies in a similar understanding of the logic of development of productive forces (Deutsch 1969:34, 35).

When employing the term 'nation', I will *not* imply any 'qualified' cultural/ethnic entity in a community which is akin to the sedimentation of its past—'history frozen'—but, very simply, *the population of a modern state*. I do not find it necessary to mean by the word 'nation' any culturally homogeneous, ethnically self-contained communities. There are sufficient words for such phenomena, such as 'ethnicity', 'nationality' or the familiar French word *'ethnie'*.

### *Nationalism: regurgitated or demystified?*

Does nation relate to nationalism? For this, we need to revisit the definitions of nationalism by focusing on the question of how well it played on the totality of the individual's innate-primordial sentiments, which is termed 'mass nationalism'.

While the concept of the nation suffers from a sometimes overly 'scientific' definition, nationalism suffers rather from a mass of classifications—both vertical and horizontal. Among the vertical classifications we may count ancient, medieval, modern, post-modern, neo- or supra- and eventually 'post-communist' nationalisms. Horizontal classifications appear to be liberationist (small) and colonialist (large) nationalisms or the nationalism of oppressed nations and of oppressing nations, or unity nationalism and expansion nationalism, progressive and regressive nationalism, and so forth.

In sociological terms, however, the primary question vis-à-vis nationalism ought not to be how an all-embracing definition should be structured, or how wisely we classify it in horizontal or vertical dimensions, but *how it operates*. A provisional definition, then, would be more embracing and consequently more viable.

### *Departures and arrivals of national politics*

True, 'there exist no more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism than the cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers' (Anderson 1983:17) on which the countless names of 'ordinary' patriots are engraved whose bodies were not found or collected. But this fact does not present us with any evidence from which we can infer that the masses (the *herd* or *mob* in Nietzsche's metaphor) have had a share in steering the course of history. It merely stimulates the question of '*how faithfully nationalism* (of the nation-state for a national market and of the imperial-state for a trans-national market) *operated*'.

Moreover, this fact tells us how the naïve ethnic-primordial-patriotic sentiments of ruled masses were refined as the most vacant and viable 'raw material' at the service of *market* 'sentiments' by competing adolescent bourgeoisies to manufacture nations of 'indivisible territorial dignity' for their respective nation-states. However, we should not be misled into inferring that 'stupid' mobs have been totally manipulated for the sole purposes of market wars. No doubt, many within the masses devote themselves to 'national' struggles.[5] At first glance, the masses partake of the gains of triumphant liberation movements, such as being free of 'foreign rule', enjoying the freedom to experience the particularities of primordial and local identities, and so on.

But this only represents a tiny, or more accurately dysfunctional, facet of the historicity of prosperous 'national liberation' or 'national union'. Soon after the 'victory', the longings for indigenous cultural 'values' and the particularities of 'home' identities are smoothly followed (most visibly, in almost all cases of the liberation movements of 'oppressed' or 'small' nations) by the former ruler's 'more civilized' equivalents. For instance, while the Turkish language has been reinvented to the extent that Atatürk's *Nutuk* (The Speech) is barely comprehensible to the current Turkish citizen, the TV and radio programmes that perform Turkish national particularities are evidently marginal. Moreover, in the case of the 'Turkish Kurds', Medya TV (the pro-PKK Kurdish satellite television—formerly Med TV) broadcasts have long been dominated by mongrelized and simply copied or translated versions of Turkish cultural artefacts. More interestingly, this was implemented simultaneously with the struggle to unearth the oppressed Kurdish identity faced with serious annihilation, just as the Turkish media has done and is doing in overemphasizing Turkish nationalism. In response to critiques of the spectacle, the current 'broadcast politics' is justified by claims about the *vacant availability of the present state of the people*—that is, the easiest cultivatable 'raw material' for the sake of 'victory'.

What then does *national victory* represent?

What ought not to be overlooked here is that the *departures* and *arrivals* of 'national' movements are without exception doomed to be alien to one another. The primary 'things' longed for in the *hearts* of the entrepreneurs of national emancipation—generally within the intelligentsia and the 'things' envisaged in the *heads* of the bureaucrats who

accomplish the national construction are thoroughly distinct. In a general way, while the former departs from 'national sentiments', the latter arrives at 'home market' longings. The former is driven by the impetus stemming from aspirations to enjoy and experience their innate ethno-cultural elements along with others' aspirations. The latter are attracted by the gains of 'control of the distributive system' (Hah and Martin 1975) against respective others' gains. The former moves from the 'heart', and is consequently emotional and maximalist, the latter moves from the 'head' and so is by nature calm, rational and realistic, and also pitiless. An old Turkish saying goes: 'While the sheep concerns itself with its life, the butcher concerns himself with its meat'. In the case of *national* movements, however, the 'butcher' is always the eventual winner.

The alienation of arrival from departure, not in terms of theory and discourse but in terms of the *realpolitik* of nationalism, is a striking aspect of a national movement's overall history. This is without exception the most essential and, at the same time, the most *elided* 'fate' of the factual politics of nationalism. 'National' movements are always initiated and theorized by the *romantic* intelligentsia,[6] but, in effect, they are always triumphed over by a *rational* class that emerges from the fusion of bureaucratic, military and financial components, no matter what it calls itself. With regard to this aspect of the modern segment of history, the experience of the Giuseppes of Italy is the case that one may derive with least effort from the historical clues. Giuseppe Mazzini, the founder and theoretician of Young Italy, who was also to be called 'the prophet of European nationalism', was eliminated when Giuseppe Garibaldi (who joined Young Italy as Mazzini's disciple, and later was to be the militarypolitical leader) decided to form an alliance with Victor Emmanuel II, the king of Sardinia. The entrepreneur intellectual Mazzini was *right* in his 'heart' to be an 'undeviating republican' in keeping with his beliefs, but Garibaldi was *realistic* in his 'head' for the sake of assuring 'victory'. When discussing 'bureaucracy and intelligentsias', Seton-Watson refers to the Kuomintang's China and conveys how first the intellectual elite were eliminated, and then how 'a new bureaucratic structure' took the sole initiative following the Japanese occupation:

> In the following years a large part of the intellectual elite was alienated from the Kuomintang, and came to prefer its rivals, the new revolutionaries—that is, the communists. Communist victory was achieved by a new military and political elite, enjoying massive peasant and workers' support. With the communists in power, a new bureaucratic structure took shape, which was then deliberately combated by the leaders through the Cultural Revolution… The results of this remarkable struggle, continuing in the 1970s, could not be predicted.
>
> (Seton-Watson 1977:424)

It could not be predicted, but what has since unfolded is the pitiless truth that the recurrently naïve intelligentsia—like its predecessors around the world—lost the battle in the Cultural Revolution. That is, the Cultural Revolution, along with the 'Great Leap Forward' which was launched to combat the emerging bureaucratic structure, turned against itself—against its launchers. The elimination of entrepreneur intellectuals was finalized, including Mao Zedung himself in his presence at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, in spite of Mao's 'unchallenged' re-election as chairman. Mao's harsh retaliation—

by mobilizing youth in the Red Guard's bloody riots to attack the party establishment and accomplish the near destruction of the party in the late 1960s—did not have any effect. The sovereignty of the 'bureaucratic structure' was consolidated in the following congress held in August 1973. Mao's name was preserved as chairman at the new apparatus's service owing to his charisma. While the bureaucratic apparatus jealously appropriated the charisma of the national hero, the charismatic person himself had in fact been rendered ineffective. This became more evident at the Fourth National People's Congress (January 1975), at which the 'rehabilitated victim' of the Cultural Revolution, Deng Xiaoping, was allowed to rise.

A fairly similar process was to follow in Bolshevik Russia. The romantic intellectuals, in Gramsci's term 'the Russian maximalists' (Gramsci 1977:31), were brutally annihilated, including most prominent early Bolsheviks such as Bukharin, Kamanev, Zinovyev, and so on. The process began with Lenin himself and ended with Leon Trotsky being assassinated in Mexico. It is known that Stalin climbed to the top of the party and consequently to the head of the state in spite of Lenin's initial warnings and his later calls for Stalin's removal in his political 'testament'. The widely emphasized idea which states that 'luck, wise tactics and adroit manoeuvrings' enabled Stalin to suppress Lenin's opposition is nonsensical from a sociological viewpoint. Such important phenomena cannot be reduced to a personality's rise to the throne through charisma. Further, Stalin's charisma was due to his particular type of personality and intellectuality[7] and so was in keeping with the aspirations of the rising Russian adolescent bourgeoisie out of the 'ashes' of the Bolshevik intelligentsia. Charisma does not function *for* the person of charisma and it by no means operates *through* the person of charisma. Both the person and persona of charisma are only 'bewitching sticks' in the hands of the bureaucratic apparatus wherever this apparatus is built.[8]

This was a fate from which few escaped. The 'founding four' of the Young Turk's İttihat ve Teraki[9] (Union and Progress) were pushed aside as the initiative spread rapidly, and were superseded by the army's 'high officials' ((Ramsaur 1957:17–21).

A similar version of this 'inescapable fate' is the case, for instance, with Germany's *Burschenschaft*, Vietnam's Vietminh, and even with the Jacobins of the French Revolution. When one reads between the lines of history, it does not seem hard to determine that the Jacobins were first terrorized and then eliminated. Also, in the case of revolutions in ancient and medieval times, the history of religions tells us that prophets were eliminated *for*, so to say, being proclaimed and being qualified to be recognized *as* prophets. This appears to be the most recurrent fate of all revolutionary apogees of class societies in the course of humankind's socio-political development. In the modern era of history, this recurrent feature reaches its climax in the form of the politics of nationalism. The entrepreneurs of nationalist movements of any kind have been, at certain stages—depending on the dynamics of the given 'proto-nation' (Hobsbawm 1990)—eliminated, from Italy's Mazzini to Vietnam's Ho Chi Minh.[10] This spectacle has been evident in the most particularly triumphant movements, such as in France's Jacobins, Italy's Young Italians, Turkey's Young Turks, Russia's Bolsheviks, China's Kuomintang, Vietnam's Vietminh, and so forth.

### *'Types' of nationalism*

The wisest taxonomy of nationalism, thus, would only contribute elusiveness, ambivalence and ambiguity to the concept of nationalism, instead of clarifying it. Rather, I maintain, an exclusion of 'non-historical' features at the point of departure will stabilize this very 'volatile', 'evasive', 'equivocal', 'elusive' (and so forth) concept.

For the purpose of bypassing an illusory argument on nationalism, one point of pre-exclusion and another point of further diligence must be made clear. First, the nationalism which the principal Central and Western European nation-states generated in the early phase of the rise of capitalism, and which is widely personified in the irredentism of Italy, is classified by Seton-Watson as 'nationalism fighting for unification' (Seton-Watson 1965:15). I shall exclude this 'type' of nationalism—apart from necessary references—because this sociopolitical phenomenon no longer exists and can therefore not be said to contribute any longer to confusion about concepts of nationalism. The second type merits additional scrutiny: the 'mass nationalism' which is in effect *not* a nationalism. While we shall largely exclude the first type, we shall pull the second into focus for it relates to how nationalism operates as an ideology within masses.

If we come back to the question posed above, nationalism, of course, does relate to nation as a political artefact of modernity. That is, it *does* if we take the nation to be the population of the nation-state institutionalized in its 'national borders' and coterminous with the 'home' market, which I have, in my argument above, found to be the most accurate definition and the one which does not force the researcher to forge facts. Quite understandably, it does not at all relate to 'nation' in the sense in which one means the nati*onality* or *ethnicity* of 'frozen history', for which nationalism invents a politically institutionalized, culturally assimilated and integrated, socially re-identified community in the form of the so-called nation-state. This is well delineated by several prominent scholars in the sphere such as Renan, Gellner, Hobsbawm, Anderson, and others. Therefore, whilst revisiting the analytic conceptualizations of nationalism, I take it for granted that nations are made of ethnic entities—with either single or multiple ingredients—but nonetheless emerge as new phenomena qualitatively differentiated from their constituents. My argument will then not be engaged with decoupling the concepts of ethnicity and nation but with the *political* and *cultural* to search for the finalizing determinant in nationalism's nation-building course of action.

So then, 'are there genuinely different types of nationalism' (Smith 1983:xi) deserving categorization? Smith poses this question as being the fundamental concern 'that underlies a good deal of the attempt to construct an all-embracing typology of nationalism or nations'. Most generally, the emergence of nation-states is acknowledged by the scholars to occur in one of three ways, each giving rise to a different type of national-ism and each leading to belated unification: (1) from unification of dynasties, (2) from dissolution/reunification of empires, (3) from 'liberation'.[11] However, insufficient distinction exists between them to categorize the nationalisms of each under separate headings. Since taking things into one's own hands denotes a good deal of the substance of nationalism (Nairn 1981:339), and since 'control of the distributive system' is equally the *central concern* in the unification, reunification and belated unification movements and is led by the ideology of nationalism in each (Hah and Martin 1975:361–386), categorization would not contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon. In a way

consistent with the essential nature of the phenomenon, Seton-Watson classifies 'nationalist movements', rather than nationalism itself, into three types.

> The first type is the movement fighting for independence from foreign rule. The second type is the movement fighting for unification with an already independent state of its fellow-nationals. The third type is the movement which has achieved independence and unity, but has still to create a deeply-rooted national feeling among its subjects.
>
> (Seton-Watson 1965:15)

Although the third type Seton-Watson lists needs further clarification about creating 'a deeply-rooted national feeling among its subjects',[12] he in fact emphasizes that each of the three types of movements actually entails not three separable individual nationalisms but *one*. He adds that all 'three situations may be described as struggle for independence, irredentism and nation-building. Only when the process of nation-building is completed does the dynamic explosive force of nationalism begin to die down' (ibid.: 15). That is, the overall objective of all 'types' of nationalism is a *statehood* that is territorially unified, socially re-identified, ethnically reforged or re-formed. In sum, the sole objective is an economically, culturally and politically re-institutionalized independent state—what Smith calls 'an essential goal of every nationalism' for which 'possession of territory is, after all, a *sine qua non*' (Smith 1983:xiii)—no matter how 'diverse' the 'types' of the movements are.

Another general temptation is to classify nationalism into two sorts: (1) state or official nationalism *(unionist, assimilationist)*, (2) liberationist nationalism *(secessionist)*. Put that way, we have nationalism for an *existing* state and nationalism for a *potential* state. In other words, the nationalism of 'oppressed nations' for the rights of a 'poor' and/or 'backward' periphery (Nairn 1981:339) and the nationalism of 'oppressing nations' for the further rights of the 'rich' and/or 'advanced' centre. Smith adds to the latter's name ('official') the phrase *'institutional nationalism'* by which 'the ruling class seeks to assimilate ethnic minorities through an educational programme of nationalism, backed by major institutions, so as to homogenize the population into a compact nation' (Smith 1991:102).

Nairn also talks of 'two kinds of nationalism' coterminous with the classification above. In Nairn's understanding, one is the '*main*, essentially healthy sort we applaud in Indo-China and Mozambique' and the other is 'the *derivative*, degenerate sort we oppose in, for example, the American working class, Gaullism, the Chilean Junta and so on' (emphases added). For him, the 'main' kind is progressive as it is the 'mainspring of nationalism' by which the periphery targets the centre's 'foreign' or colonialist rule. So the 'derivative' kind is a regressive, 'abusive' version of the former, tending 'towards the encouragement of social and psychological atavism, the exploitation of senseless fears and prejudices, and so toward violence' (Nairn 1981:347). First, although his general emphasis on a progressive and regressive dichotomy seems to be a fair reflection of the truth, Nairn's branding of the nationalism of the periphery as the main one and that of the centre's expansion as derivative is misleading.[13]

Nairn situates his conceptualization of nationalism in the interrelation of *centre* and *periphery* that is necessitated by the uneven development of capitalism. This is an

insightful explanation of the phenomenon of nationalism in the dialectic of cause and effect relations within the logic of the development of productive forces, despite Nimni's strong objections (Nimni 1991). But it is not clear how he finds the periphery's *reaction* to the centre to be the 'main' type.[14] He contradicts himself—in his reading of the phenomenon within the framework of uneven development—in recognizing the 'reaction' as the main type. Here, it is not the 'reaction' of the periphery that is *primary* but the 'action' of the centre's expansion.[15] Nairn, nevertheless, continues with a frankly illuminating passage with regard to separating nationalism into sorts:

> Without for a moment denying that these political and moral distinctions are justified, and indeed obvious, one is none the less forced to point out that the *theoretical* dimension attaching to them is quite mistaken. The distinctions do not imply the existence of two brands of nationalism.
>
> (Nairn 1981:347)

That is, Nairn clarifies: any classification of nationalism in terms of its real nature will not fit smoothly into an unbiased sociological theorization—a theorization which is not 'influenced by nationalism itself (ibid.: 94). However, the premise on which the conclusion is structured is the 'ambivalent nature' of nationalism, and he consequently fails to escape from Gellner's or Renan's vindication of nationalism according to which the nation is generated as 'one great aggregate of men' (Renan, in Woolf 1996:59):

> The point is that, as the most elementary comparative analysis will show, all nationalism is both healthy and morbid. Both progress and regress are inscribed in its genetic code from the start. This is a structural fact about it. And it is a fact to which there are no exceptions: in this sense, it is an exact (not a rhetorical) statement about nationalism to say that it is by nature ambivalent.
>
> (Nairn 1981:347, 348)

### *Two faces of the 'modern Janus'*

If one ventures into an abstraction about the seemingly tricky 'two-faced' state of nationalism, then neither nation nor nationalism will be 'elusive' or 'ambivalent'. It would then become clear that each actual 'face' of nationalism is not so inclined to interfere with the affairs of the other. Once this is done, one would also not find it difficult to see that the philosophy of 'periphery' (small nation, oppressed nation, hinterland people, etc.) nationalism in terms of its 'hard core' is by no means distinguishable from 'central' nationalism. So, one would not be tempted to applaud the 'progressiveness' and 'healthiness' of the 'poor' periphery against the centre's morbidity. The 'difference' is that while the periphery's nationalism lies in *taking* things—the 'things' of 'home'—into one's own hands, the centre's is in *keeping* 'things'—the 'things' of neighbouring or distant lands—as 'theirs'.

The crux of the issue is the *cultural burden* involved in the 'work' of *national*, which has become the real subtlety due to the 'core exigency' of the *realpolitik* of nationalism. The task of a viable abstraction is precisely an untwisted separation of 'national

sentiments' and '*market* sentiments'. The former sentiments are to do with the individual's cultural self. The latter are to do with the insatiably burgeoning market desire of unevenly developing capitalism. It is this 'love' of both 'home' and 'non-home' objects with its abundance and scarcity, its richness and poorness which have so far decided how the course of history has run. That is, once the task of abstraction has been accomplished, one will have no hesitation in saying that nationalism has nothing to do with ethnic—or 'national'—identity. In his *National Identity*, Anthony D.Smith, analyses ethnic identity as a collective cultural phenomenon by distinguishing it from a set of other human identities such as gender, region, class and religion; and he endeavours to juxtapose some components of nationalism. These, in brief, are: 'a consciousness of belonging', 'a language and symbolism', 'an ideology' and 'a social and political movement' (Smith 1991:72). Then he arrives at an italicized definition of nationalism, which is repeated in almost the same words on the following page:

> I shall define nationalism as *an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'*.
>
> (Smith 1991:73)

The argument followed and the definition structured above are settled in the chapter titled 'Nationalism and Cultural Identity' where he states—in the first sentence of the chapter—that 'it is nationalism that creates national identity' in the 'modernist image of the nation' (ibid.: 71). In other words, Smith strives to delineate how nationalism as a 'movement' relates to *cultural* identity in its form of 'ethnic' or 'national' identity. Later, he refers to Gellner's idea of 'invention' of the nation and Kedourie's conception of the 'doctrine' of nationalism, and raises a double question which concerns my argument about separating the 'two faces' of nationalism: 'How shall we understand such "invention"? In what sense does nationalism invent or create nations "where they do not exist"?'

First, as a crucial point, Smith takes nationalism not as *ideology* but as 'ideological movement' in which ideology is only one of the components—the component which Seton-Watson rightly recognizes as the 'form' of the constant 'core of nationalism':

> Nationalist movements have usually been strongly influenced by whatever political ideas were current at the time of their struggle… But always the hard core of nationalism has been more important than its ideological form.
>
> (Seton-Watson 1965:15)

At first glance, Smith is not in agreement with Gellner's conception of the nation as 'invented' by nationalism or with Hobsbawm's nation as 'made' by nationalism—but he is nonetheless fairly consistent with them by grasping nationalism as an ideological movement 'for *attaining* and *maintaining* a potential or existent nation. Smith's definition of nationalism repeats that it 'is an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining the *autonomy*, *unity* and *identity* of a nation' (Smith 1991:74; original emphasis). The

repeated definition scrutinizes the hard core of the politics of nationalism: *attaining* and *maintaining* the nation. This interprets the nationalisms of both 'periphery' and 'centre' as an ideological movement for either *taking* or *keeping* things—no matter whether these are 'home' or 'non-home' things. So, Smith, in the final analysis, is not in disagreement with Hobsbawm, Gellner or Renan in the sense of how nationalism invents or creates nations. In fact, none of these scholars imply that nationalism invents nations from nothing in the religious sense. Gellner's well-known remark about the invention of nations by nationalism 'where they do not exist' is followed by a transparent explanation on the manner of invention: '—but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to work on'(Gellner 1964:168). Smith himself does not think to elide the point.[16] The central issue here which concerns my argument is that 'inventionist' approaches to the link between nation and nationalism do conform to the view that nationalisms 'work on' some pre-existing entities when inventing the nation—that is, ethnicity or ethnic communities of Hobsbawm's 'proto-nation' as the most viably vacant entities pre-existing there to be refined, redefined and re-identified.

Nations are made from ethnic entities by the nationalisms of either existing states or of emerging liberation movements. Nationalisms are made from innate sentiments of the most available sorts as 'raw material', such as ethnic, primordial, patriotic and—eventually—laborious (contributed by 'communist nationalism') ones. While the basic 'raw material' for nations are ethnic entities, they provide their *innate sentiments* to nationalism. But just as nations are not ethnicities any more, nationalisms are not individuals' innate sentiments in their full-scale operation for the *realpolitik* of rising industrial capitalism.

Who can say that the impetus behind the two world wars of the first half of the past century and the wars and quarrels of its second half between *national* 'communist' states was due to the totality of the masses' innate cultural sentiments?

In its very essence, not as an entity of theoretical *discourse* but as a *course* of politics, nationalism is a non-eschewal of the bourgeoisie's desire and its love of geography and demography for which it had to foster devices cultivated from varying aspects of man's primordial inwardness which '*is* inherent in the nature of things' (Gellner 1964:157), and which manifests as innate patriotism among the masses vis-à-vis 'language, race, culture, and sometimes even religion' (Kedourie 1966:73).

What the sociology of nationalism needs to abstract here are the masses' innate ethnic-cultural sentiments and the insatiable market *'sentiments'* of capitalist enterprises. Hobsbawm states that 'official ideologies of states *and movements* are not guides to what it is in the minds of even most loyal citizens and supporters' (Hobsbawm 1990:11; emphasis added). Here, he precisely points at the non-linked visions in the heads of the ruling apparatuses of states and of the elite of institutionalized national liberation movements in the stage of the 'proto-state' when the 'naïve' initiator intelligentsia is eliminated or rendered dysfunctional. Seton-Watson subordinated the 'ideological form' of nationalism to its 'hard core', particularly highlighted in the 'form' of 'Marxist nationalism' in the 1950s and 1960s, and added that 'nationalist leaders of nationalist movements who are influenced in a more general way by Marxism seem usually to turn out more nationalist than Marxist' (Seton-Watson 1965:15). His argument also, I assume, revolves around the distinction between prospects in the *head* and pursuits in the *body* of nationalism.[17] Here, I have to recall the metaphor I mentioned above regarding the

concerns of the 'sheep' and the 'butcher' with which the parties are respectively occupied, with no interest in the views of one another. The sheep's concern is the innate-instinctual will to live free; the butcher's is a freshly emerged desire to a self-contained market. So far history has always witnessed the final triumph of the latter.

The nationalism of the nation-state, as the rising bourgeoisie's politics of unity, envisages a geographical market (as large as possible) and a demography (as massive as possible)—not necessarily entailing an ethnic homogeneity—independent of the extent of the manipulation of the masses and the severe exploitation of 'raw material' to depletion as 'purely passive recipients' (Woolf 1996:29). The skilful use of 'cultural freedom' by both power-*holders* and power-*pursuers* (Nairn 1981:333) to keep/gain 'the control of distributive systems' (Hah and Martin 1975) ought not to 'force' one to confuse these two disparate 'faces' of nationalism. Rather than the interests beyond national borders, the distillation of the concepts of 'national interest' and 'the interests of the nation' or 'cultural interests' needs to be the primary concern of a sociological conceptualization. Seton-Watson claims that 'nationalism is an explicit doctrine and a movement' and accordingly emphasizes an evident aspect of the phenomenon:

> The doctrine declares that the interests of the nation, as interpreted by its spokesman, come before all other interests within the state, of all other communities beyond its borders, and in the case of extreme totalitarian nationalisms, before all considerations of morality and religion. Nationalist movements aim to realize the interests of the nation at the expense of its enemies.
>
> (Seton-Watson 1965:5)

It is true that the nationalist politics of either the states of 'large' nations or of the liberation movements of 'small' ones aim to realize their interests at the expense of an external enemy. However, while the interests of the community within the borders are themselves fairly explicit they do not lie in the 'doctrine' of nationalism as such. On the contrary, they are obscured and concealed in the discourse of any form of nationalism. Home communities have no interests in values beyond their borders, but millions of them have died for these values in, for example, the two world wars of the last century, and they did so in earlier wars too. Their names are engraved on the cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers in the absence of their bodies. The pursuit of external interests during the 70 years of Russian nationalism, with its communist ideological form, contributed much to Russia as a state which became a superpower; but we all acknowledged, following the demystification of 1989, that nationalism did little or nothing for the community of insiders. This was unearthed as an undeniable fact and 'caught virtually everyone unawares' (McCrone 1998:149) in spite of the absence of the ordinary form of private property in the means of production, which Marx diagnosed as the only source of surplus exploitation. The same is true—but still implicit in discourse—in the case of liberation nationalisms once the movement comes to the threshold of power. Nairn arrives at the very same point from a different angle:

> Mass nationalism was good up to a point, in certain specific conditions, in the fight against alien oppression, and so on. Beyond the point it

> immediately degenerated again into a morbid delusion and an instrument of bourgeois reaction.
>
> (Nairn 1981:351)

That is, the mass 'nationalism' of human expectations of freedom is, without exception, doomed to an inescapable betrayal. The spectacle illustrates that nation is not a compact entity whose interests are inseparable. There lies within the nation a truth of non-resembling interests, which rather equates to the interests of the sheep and the butcher. Here, in the discourse of any nationalism, the term 'national' itself may well have been merely a means of obscuring two disparate phenomena. Rosa Luxemburg, an uncompromising anti-nationalist and an opponent of the 'right of national self-determination', recalls three factors as 'typical aspects of a bourgeoisie society'—with reference to Karl Kautsky—which indicate 'what is actually hiding behind the mask':

> [first] the desire of the bourgeoisie to assure for itself an internal or domestic market for its own commodity production; second, the desire for political freedom—democracy; and finally, expansion of the national literature and culture to the populace.
>
> (Luxemburg 1976:159)

In my view, the extent of the latter two aspects has actually fulfilled and determined the illusory ability of the 'mask' that veils the first one, which in the final analysis has an impact on the fate of the so-called nation-state.

The vital question in the light of the most recent developments—in particular surrounding the unfolding of 'post-communist' nationalism—shall have to concern itself with what nationalism *does* rather than what it *says*. That is, is nationalism a discourse of verbal and textual wordings or a course of premeditated action that locks onto the needs of a self-contained 'free market', independently of what is being theorized?

It has become less easy to assert the former following the dissolution of the pseudo-communist regimes of the 'Iron Curtain' world, because nationalism in their experiences has been demystified rather than 'regurgitated'. The distortion and perversion of 'national sentiment' in the service of market forces has emerged increasingly following the fall of the Iron Curtain. Gellner, in his introductory analysis on nationalism in *Thought and Change*, blames the people 'who had heralded the decline of nationalism' for underestimating 'the power and hold of the dark atavistic forces in human nature' and for overestimating the 'power of reason' over what he calls 'Dark Gods', which include 'apparently the call of ethnic and territorial loyalty'. He goes into deeper discussion of the philosophical and psychological roots of the 'atavistic gods' by referring to Freud, Mill and Dostoevsky. However, Gellner does not endeavour to analyse *how* and *for whom* these 'gods' come to operate on such a fateful scale 'with a shallow psychology, one which saw man as finding his gratification in pleasure' (Gellner 1964:148, 149),[18] and which did no more for common men than carrying their names on the plates of Unknown Soldiers' cenotaphs. One is compelled to ask why these gods of 'atavistic force'—as part of human nature—which include the call of ethnic and territorial loyalty, have been rendered so inactive within the single ethnicity of 22 Arab states in search of a greater unity. 'An utterance of Schleiermacher's' selected by Kedouirie, has a lot to say

vis-à-vis the extent of the distortion and perversion of humankind's innate sentiments which are generally conceptualized as 'patriotism' and briefly defined as 'affection for one's country, or one's group', before they deviate to become nationalism:

> How little worthy of respect is the man who roams about hither and thither without the anchor of national ideal and love of fatherland; how dull is the friendship that rests merely upon personal similarities in dispositions and tendencies, and not upon the feeling of a greater common unity for whose sake one offers up one's life; how the greatest source of pride is lost by the woman who cannot feel that she also bore children for her fatherland and brought them up for it, that her house and all the petty things that fill up most of her time belong to a greater whole and take their place in the union of her people!
>
> (Kedourie 1966:73)[19]

The parodic columnist Bekir Coşkun in *Hürriyet*, a Turkish daily, satirizes the living experience of such a perverted 'Dark God' in Turkey in relation to the nationalists' severe reaction against the European Union's demands for the democratization of Turkey, which prompted the sudden 'united front' composed of extreme right and left circles (*Hürriyet*, 26 February 2002). Coşkun raises a plain question: 'Why are these *National Forces*[20] not visible and why do they not act or react when the IMF and World Bank have their monthly inspection into our country's every privacy but are so prompt when democratization is brought to attention by the EU?' (Coşkun 2002). What 'communist nationalism' contributed to this factual essence of nationalist politics is a perversion of 'laborious' sentiments (Lester 1997:37–40).

Further, the distortion and perversion of patriotic sentiments is not the sole case within a single nationality. They may well deviate far more to the extent that the members of one ethnicity can be fully motivated to the end for another ethnic nationalism. Not only can they be mobilized for 'another' nationalism, they can also be mobilized against their fellow ethnic population. The most notorious activists of extreme Turkish nationalism are among the poorly Turkish-speaking Kurdish youth. The strongest mass base of the pro-state nationalist parties of Turkey resides in three Kurdish populated cities—Elaziğ, Erzurum and Malatya.

### *The only 'face' of nationalism*

'Nationalism' is made of national sentiments just as 'nation' is made of ethnicity. Things are not named according to what they are made of. No one would think of calling 'bread' 'dough' simply because it is made of dough. Alternatively, we never confuse an ashtray with a bottle because they are both made of glass. Why do we not invent a single term to denote both 'iron' and 'hammer', for the hammer is made of iron? We express 'dough' and 'bread' in ethnologically distinct terms even though they are made of the same materials. This is the most elided, but essential and *consistent*, part of the reality of nationalist practice. It is the most hidden part of the phenomenon with which the theory or sociology of nationalism needs to re-engage, if the primary task is to delineate how

nationalism has worked and continues to work—at least for some further decades—in the face of the full-scale expansion of globalization.

The author is compelled to ask why should one not employ *similar* or at least *kindred* terms, but should insist on the *same* one for these remarkably distinct concepts—so-called *national* (identity) *sentiments* and *nationalism?* Smith talks of distinguishing 'nationalism' and 'national sentiments' for analytical purposes (Smith 1983:169) but does not allocate them to the 'above' and 'below' of nationalist movements: to the leading elite and the supporting combative masses of nationalism.

Rulers have no national sentiments in their governmental practices.

Smith's exemplification of some African movements which are, or were, 'durable "nationalist" movements, but with hardly any "national sentiment" outside the adherents of the nationalist movement itself is inconceivable. Shortly afterwards it becomes clear that he is tempted by the conception of nation as 'ethnicity', for he believes that 'you can have a "nation" (say Poland in the nineteenth century) without a "nation-state"' (ibid.: 169).

The pivotal agenda that needs to be raised and refreshed, in terms of sociological understanding, is how nationalist agitation has its effect among the politically dysfunctional masses. That is to say, the point is not what nationalism is but rather how fatefully it operates. Hroch produces a penetrating comparative study on this matter (Hroch 1985). But because it is confined to liberation movements of 'small' nations due to a zealously traditional 'Leftist' approach, the study becomes disabled in terms of embracing generalizations vis-à-vis how states' official nationalisms work among their citizens with no need for the 'three stages' of collective action. What is vital in studying nationalism from a sociological point of view is to delineate the most general processes through which the masses are mobilized and utilized in the service of the insatiable bourgeoisie. These processes cannot be confined within the national liberation struggles of the 'small' nations. In addition, it is not possible to distinguish between the respective processes of 'large' and 'small' nations in terms of the agitation, mobilization and manipulation of the masses.

The real shortcoming of theorization on nationalism is the ostensibly coinciding disparate needs and aspirations of distinct social entities which are in effect directed against one another (Hah and Martin 1975:369)—highly attractive *surplus values of market forces* and *inward-innate values of individuals* that are not easily dispensable. Since these two totally distinct (the worries of 'sheep' and 'butcher') phenomena are taken to be an 'interwoven compound', the attempts towards the clarification or classification of nationalist theory and politics will only contribute to the proliferation of 'facets' of the 'multifarious' nation and nationalism.

By and large, nationalism as the *realpolitik* of modernity, which was entailed by the leap forward in the development process of productive forces manifested in industrialization, is being further demystified as a mere politics rather than an ideology. The fall of the Iron Curtain, after which the depressed—and consequently underdeveloped—nationalistic dissatisfactions blazed and promptly proliferated, contributed a great deal not to the regurgitation of nationalism but to its demystification. It is an intimately destructive and constructive—albeit, mostly internecine—form of politics of a historical arc during which the respectively rising adolescent bourgeois classes (of the centre and periphery) quarrelled about *taking* or *keeping* things in one's

own hands. And this politics took shape in accordance with the needs and results of modernity's industrialization—in fact, its severe 'uneven diffusion' (Gellner 1964:166). An additional catalyst for over-pushing the implantation of nationalism's power of perversion into the 'national consciousness' of the lower social strata is that it has been well grasped as a reaction or counterattack by everyone from the young bourgeoisie in its heyday to infantile Marxism: a political and ideological antidote.

The perverted ethnic-primordial sentiments among Nietzsche's *'herd'* has duly produced a European saying that deserves repetition: 'A nation is a group of persons united by a common error about their ancestry and a common dislike of their neighbours.' The fortunate thing appears to be that the bourgeoisie of global capitalism in our time is, as a matter of fact, not adolescent any more. And accordingly, the flooding 'localization of globalization' (Deutsch 1969:169–174)—in keeping with *supranational* market 'sentiments'—has been pushing nationalism of any 'type' towards obsolescence. This has also been the fate of the communists' nationalism of 'laborious sentiments'.

## The twilight of 'communist nationalism'

No argument can be conducted by the scholars of nation and nationalism without taking on board what Marxism has said and done. Although both Marx and Marxism—with all its variants—have so far had no significant effect upon the factual course of the part of history called 'the era of nationalism', this is conspicuously the case. And this is why Anderson rightly states that 'nationalism has proved an uncomfortable *anomaly* for Marxist theory and, precisely for this reason, has been largely elided rather than confronted' (Anderson 1983:13). By this I take him to mean that the adolescent bourgeoisie's *rational* nationalism has triumphed over infantile Marxism's *emotional* proletarianism and its over-exaggerated internationalism.

Since there will be no major gains in tracing this 'failure' back to the early 'founding-fathers' of scientific socialism and 'infantile' Marxism, it will not be wise to exhaust much of the argument on bygone years. However, in order to advance the reasoning from the central views on nationalism to the 'national question' of Marxist tradition, we need to look at the mainstream opinion of the early days.

### *The banal and naïve* 'realpolitik' *towards the 'national question'*

A temptation to self-deception is the case among the maximalist intelligentsia (not executors) of the premature revolutionary communist power project by which 'Marxism's great historical failure' in relation to the 'national question' is generated. While the 'wise' or 'realistic' politicians of the early communist 'odysseys' have, soon after they ascended the throne, persuaded themselves to obey the necessities of the objective and subjective vacancies of the history there, whoever resisted the 'flow of history' to some degree was ultimately eliminated. I partly argued this above when highlighting the deviant trajectory of the practice of nationalism between its departure and arrival. This, of course, is not the fate of pre-adolescent communist enterprise alone. It is also a factual facet of recorded human history—with sufficiently instructive recurrent experiences from Jesus Christ to Lenin, from Hazreti Ali to Trotsky, from Mazzini to Mao, from Napoleon Bonaparte to

Öcalan, and so forth. This, no doubt, does not fall into the realm of the current study and surely deserves a self-contained research. However, if we come back to Marxism's 'great failure' in its confrontation with the 'national question', the picture may become more lucid.

It is frequently said that Marx and Engels—especially the latter—were hostile towards 'oppressed nations' for they considered them to be 'non-historical'. True, Marx and Engels did largely ignore non-historical ethnic entities, which were assimilated or annihilated. Nevertheless, this was not because they *wanted* these entities to be non-historical but because they *saw* them to be non-historical. This is also consistent with their theory of the irreversible development of the forces of production. In the time of nationalism as 'uneven diffusion' (in Gellner's words), the economy as the 'base' of sociality or the relations of production, which Marx and Engels called infrastructure, did assimilate and annihilate many of the 'small' ethnicities because they were 'non-historical'. The dialectical equilibrium between the forces of production and the relations of production, as manifested in the form of the 'uneven diffusion' or 'uneven development' of industrialization in the modern era, did and still does determine the trajectory of the social history of humankind just as Marx formulated.

Thus, the need to search for the 'sins of the past' in the legacy of Marx and Engels concerning the 'national question' is not vital. Their standpoint was more than clear in the *ad hoc* articles written mostly on the colonial questions of the time. This standpoint was positioned in the 'heat' of the episode from the 1848 revolutions to the Paris Commune in keeping with their conception of—and sympathy towards—the development of productive forces. This has been fairly *unequivocal* in the light of the extensive and impressive lessons of Soviet 'communism' in general and of the 'commimism' of National Liberation movements in particular.

Thus, it would not contribute much to go far back to what the 'founding-fathers' said in the first place—in Nimni's words, 'the perplexing legacy of Marx and Engels' (for this, see Nimni 1991:17–43). Arguing Marxism's essentials, in effect, contributes more to the question of nation and nationalism than the Marxist theory on the 'national question' for the 'failure' relates to the 'infantile' nature of the theory. That is, 'nationality theory…is in fact a central part of Marxist theory' (Davis, in Luxemburg, 1976:12) that represents its 'pre-puberty', which rendered it 'sterile' in its confrontation with the 'national question'.

However, in order to relate the 'question' under discussion to the blameable essential(s), it will be useful to explain the main concerns of the competing standpoints. The essentials of Marxist theory that lie behind the failure in its confrontation with nationalism and the 'national question' are the overemphasis on the proletariat and internationalism. This, of course, is not the whole edifice of the theory, but it is the *one* aspect which fundamentally underlies the 'question'—the 'question' which rendered the so-called socialist-branded revolutions 'national liberation' of each individual adolescent bourgeoisie's capitalist market hunger.

### *The right of nations to self-determination*

The positions moulded on the 'national question' by the Marxist mainstream are manifested in the concept of 'national self-determination', which—as in the general lack

of consensus on nationalism—concerns politics rather than theoretical conceptualizations. Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg represent the best of the positions taken vis-à-vis the right of nations to self-determination.

Just like Marx and Engels, Lenin set out no systematic thoughts on the theoretical aspects of this issue. Rather, he instructed Stalin to fulfil the 'task', which I discussed above in brief (see pp. 25–26). What Lenin provides in his related writings, mainly in his notorious pamphlet *The Right of Nations to Self-determination,* is a polemic on the rights of 'oppressed nations' against 'national oppression'. Lenin was additionally determined, clear and uncompromising on the 'rights of nations to self-determination' for he believed that the right implied 'only a consistent expression of struggle against all national oppression' (Lenin 1968:159). However, he was not so unequivocal in relation to the *how* of its implementation compared to his firmness on the 'indispensable' right. Although he talks of the 'complete freedom to agitate for secession and for a referendum on secession by the seceding nation', the how and who of such 'free' conditions are not discussed, since if there is such an opportunity for the 'seceding nation' then there is no 'national oppression'. Lenin justifies his 'proletarianist' position in the traditional self-misguiding naïvety of the entrepreneur intelligentsia:

> The proletariat of the oppressor nations must not confine themselves to general, stereotyped phrases against annexation and in favour of the equality of nations in general, such as any pacifist bourgeois will repeat. The proletariat cannot remain silent on the question of the *frontiers* of a state founded on national oppression, a question so 'unpleasant' for the imperialist bourgeoisie. The proletariat must struggle against the enforced retention of oppressed nations within the bounds of the given state, which means that they must fight for the right to self-determination. The proletariat must demand freedom of political separation for the colonies and nations oppressed by 'their own' nation. Otherwise, the internationalism of the proletariat would be nothing but empty words; neither confidence nor class solidarity would be possible between the workers of the oppressed and oppressed nations…
>
> (Lenin 1968:160–161)

As has been rendered indisputable by the break-up of the Iron Curtain, the proletariat did not do this. Lenin's naïve 'pragmatism was then fossilized by the post-1917 history' and 'the revolution' did 'easily fall victim to a renascent Great Russian nationalism' (Nairn 1981:85). While Lenin acutely draws attention to the sense of 'empty words' if the proletariat do not demand and fight for 'freedom of political separation for the colonies and nations oppressed by "their own" nation', he is not as concerned with the contingency that the 'right of self-determination' may be doomed to receiving only lip service. Davis (1978) quotes an interesting excerpt from Amilcar Cabral's *Revolution in Guinea,* which penitently questions how Lenin's position was 'fossilized' by the subsequent course of affairs and, moreover, how it served just the opposite purpose:

> I would even go so far as to ask whether, given the advance of socialism in the world, the national liberation is not an imperialist initiative. Is the

> judicial institution which serves as a reference for the right of all peoples who are trying to liberate themselves a product of the peoples who are trying to liberate themselves? Was it created by the socialist countries who are our historical associates? It is signed by the imperialist countries, it is the imperialist countries who have recognized the right of all peoples to national independence, so I ask myself whether we may not be considering as an initiative of our people what is in fact an initiative of the enemy? Even Portugal, which is using napalm bombs against our people in Guiné, signed the declaration of the right of all peoples to independence… The objective of the imperialist countries was to prevent the enlargement of the socialist camp, to liberate reactionary forces in our countries which were being stifled by colonialism and to enable these forces to ally themselves with the international bourgeoisie. The fundamental objective was to create a bourgeoisie where one did not exist, in order specifically to strengthen the imperialist and the capitalist camp.
>
> (Cabral, in Luxemburg 1976:39; quoted by Davis)

But what Cabral was not aware of, just like almost everyone in favour of the 'socialist camp', was that those 'socialist countries' who were their 'historical associates' at that time had themselves long been converted to states which created a 'bourgeoisie where one did not exist'. This was to be further demystified by the 1989 revolutions.

The position of Rosa Luxemburg is similarly firm and uncompromising on the 'rights' of 'oppressed nations' to secession and 'self-determination' against Bolsheviks. Cabral's radical questioning appears to be the heir to her approach on the early disputes of Marxist politics. Luxemburg emphasized decades before him that 'especially striking about this formula is the fact that it doesn't represent anything specifically connected with socialism nor with the politics of the working class'. For her, the so-called remedial formula for the 'nationality question' had been reproduced from the 'paraphrase of the old slogan of bourgeois nationalism put forth in all countries at all times: "the right of nations to freedom and independence"' (Luxemburg 1976:102, 103). What actually stands out in Luxemburg's argument is not the 'thing' demanded by the formula but the applicability of this demand. There can be no self-determination under capitalism', she insists:

> It is true that socialism recognizes for every people the right of independence and the freedom of independent control of its own destinies. But it is a veritable perversion of socialism to regard presentday capitalist society as the expression of this self-determination of nations.
>
> (Luxemburg 1976:289)

She adds a question to highlight the concern above: 'Where is there a nation in which the people have had the right to determine the form and conditions of their national, political, and social existence?' Contrary to Lenin, she strove to bring before the socialist movement the idea that the proletariat was not reluctant to achieve 'freedom of political separation for the colonies and nations oppressed by "their own" nation' but that merely talking about the 'right' itself would be 'empty words', for this right is impracticable under capitalism. The course of subsequent decades has corroborated Luxemburg's

persistent assertion that 'in a class society; to speak of self-determination for the "people" would ordinarily mean the self-determination of the ruling class; the workers would be left in a subordinate position as before' (Luxemburg 1976:15).

### *Revolutionary romanticism versus the fact of social*

At the outset, I stated that human societal historiography has been feeble against triumphant advances. In the case of the 'national question' of the Marxist mainstream, the theorization of this tradition has been the victim of this 'soft' side of historiography. The spectacle from behind the shattered Iron Curtain has further revealed that the acute anti-nationalist Luxemburg was a victim of this misleading historiography and the corresponding self-deceptive theorization of the 'romantic' intelligentsia. Her ideas have been rendered nonsensical by Lenin's pragmatism and, of course, his great successes in introducing the first communist endeavour in Russia—the October Revolution of the Bolshevik intelligentsia. While early theoreticians of the Marxist mainstream such as Otto Bauer and Antonio Gramsci are not exempt from being heirs to the banal romanticism of the entrepreneur intelligentsia in historical leaps forward, Luxemburg was defeated by the prosperity of Lenin's Soviets. Bauer, in this sense, represents an initiating figure in the Marxist tradition that confines nationalism to the struggles of 'oppressed nations' and translates 'nation' to 'ethnicity'. His vindication of 'cultural nationalism' in a multinational state has also been elided by the protagonists of the 'right of self-determination' in the prosperous Bolshevik endeavour. I have already partly discussed his associated ideas (see pp. 24–25). In a similar manner, Gramsci represents the romanticism of the early tradition of the Marxist intelligentsia. One of his articles, written on 29 April 1917, comments on the events of the 'February Revolution' and is a clear mirroring of the spiritual fact. The article begins by posing the question: 'Why is the Russian revolution a proletarian revolution?' After comparing the French and Russian revolutions and emphasizing the resemblance that is 'only on the surface' in terms of the 'act of violence', Gramsci evaluates the Russian Revolution in its early stages:

> The bourgeois newspapers have attached no importance to another intriguing event. The Russian revolutionaries have not only freed political prisoners as well. When the common criminals in one prison were told they were free, they replied that they felt they did not have the right to accept liberty because they had to expiate their crimes. In Odessa they gathered in the prison courtyard and of their own volition swore to become honest men and resolved to live by their own labours. From the point of view of the socialist revolution, this news has more importance even than that of the dismissal of the Tsar and the grand duke. The Tsar would have been deposed by bourgeois revolutionaries as well. But in bourgeois eyes, these condemned men would still have been the enemies of their order, the stealthy appropriators of their wealth and their tranquillity. In our eyes their liberation has this significance: what the revolution has created in Russia *is a new way of life*. It has not only replaced one power by another. *It has replaced one way of life by another.*

> It has created *a new moral order*, and in addition to the physical liberty of the individuals, *has established liberty of mind*.
>
> (Gramsci 1977:29–30; emphases added)

What the new 'way of life' or 'new moral order' generated in 72 years, which 'virtually caught everyone unawares' (McCrone 1998:149), was a mere picture of the Russian capitalism of the 'greenhorn' Russian bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie was well-institutionalized in the form of the bureaucratic apparatus of the Communist Party with nationalism's ideological 'form' of socialist utterance. And one of the most disappointing results of the 'way of life' of almost three-quarters of a century has emerged as being the flood of prostitution into Turkey, the nearest profitable market, to the extent that this flood replaced the Turkish word for 'prostitute', *orospu*, with the Russian female name *Nataşa*. Gramsci makes himself believe that even if there were a 'material base' for the qualitative significance of liberation that effected the change in the lifestyle of the peoples of Russia,

> only in an atmosphere of social turbulence could such an event occur, when the way of life and the prevailing mentality is changed. Liberty makes men free and widens their moral horizons; it turns the worst criminal under an authoritarian regime into a martyr for the cause of duty, a hero in the cause of honesty.
>
> (Gramsci 1977:30)

He ends the article with the following sentence:

> And once again it is from the East that light comes to illuminate the aged Western world, which is stupefied by the events and can oppose them with nothing but the banalities and stupidities of its hack-writers.
>
> (Gramsci 1977:30)

This naïve and self-misleading romanticism dominated the Marxist theoretical tradition not only on the 'national question' but on social affairs in general, except for the enduring intellectual essays admired by the humiliated Trotskyist viewpoint up until the 1989 revolutions.[21]

When pointing to the 'intimate link between nationalist politics and *romanticism*, although he defines it as the 'cultural mode of the nationalist dynamic', Tom Nairn provides an attractive generalization on the insight of romantic spirit:

> In the context, all romanticism's well-known features—the search for inwardness, the trust in feeling or instinct, the attitude to 'nature', the cult of the particular and mistrust of the abstract, etc.—make sense.
>
> (Nairn 1981:104)

This spirit is recurrent among the patriotic intelligentsia. But it is not less true of their Marxist fellows. The point that I seek to bring out here is that the finalizing factor in the actual course of history is not the banal truth of the intelligentsia's naïve romanticism in

relation to either nationalism or Marxism but the realities of class interests and class struggle entailed by the irreversible progress of the forces of production and its conflictual equilibrium with the relations of production. This, however, occupies a great deal of the arguments with regard to Marxism's 'historical failure' in the politics of nationalism and the 'national question'. In this field, the positions of Tom Nairn and Ephraim Nimni are illustrative of the principal approaches to the 'question'.

### *What is to blame for the 'historical failure'*

In his book *The Break-up of Britain*, which is evaluated by some scholars as ground-breaking, Nairn devotes chapter 9 to nationalism and, in particular, the 'national question' of Marxism. Although he handles some basic aspects and elements of nationalism in an earlier chapter on 'Scotland and Europe', the actual argument follows in 'The Modern Janus' (chapter 9). The chapter begins with a frank statement to which many refer: The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's great historical failure' (Nairn 1981:329). 'My thesis', he asserts,

> is that this failure was inevitable. It was inevitable, but it can now be understood. The inevitability lay in the fact that, during the era when Marxists struggled most desperately and brilliantly with the enigma—before the onset of Stalinism—the general process of capitalist development had not gone far enough. The overall characteristics of 'uneven development' had not yet been sufficiently delineated by history itself.
>
> (Nairn 1981:355)

Nairn breaks new ground by relating this inescapable 'historical failure' not to the founding-fathers' '*ad hoc* dealings in the real issues of each individual case' but to the *essentials* of the theory of Marxism in its historical context. His confidence that the cause of inevitable failure 'can now be understood' rests on his understanding of the need to reinterpret history itself with the historical materialist system of thought which 'can perfectly escape from the prolonged and destructive impasse in which it has been on the issue' (Nairn 1981:329). Nairn points towards the need to rescue materialism from its 'native' idealism and to provide an outlet from the 'prolonged and destructive' ordeal. Thus,

> to perceive the cause of *this* failure is to see something of Marxism's real place in history, some of its limitations, some of the unconscious roots which tied it blindly to the course of modern historical development. It means seeing Marxism itself as a part of history in a quite uncomplimentary sense, one which has nothing to do with the holy matrimony of theory and practice. It means losing for all time that God-like posture which, in the guise of science, Marxism took over from Idealist philosophy (and ultimately from religion).
>
> (Nairn 1981:329)

Because socialist theory, 'whose intellect and heart lies more in the Marxist tradition, is the heir of the Enlightenment', it also, for Nairn, involved theoretical errors, and the error concerned class. And because socialism was born prematurely, 'it was not yet possible to employ the concepts of historical materialism in relation to their proper object, the only object which gives them genuine meaning: that is, the world political economy' (ibid.: 352). Thereby he endeavours to lay down the prerequisite for 'unlocking' the Marxist theorization on nationalism, which resides at its centre, and which history now allows to thrive. Nairn suggests with confidence that

> the task of framing a 'theory' of nationalism is that of understanding the destructive mechanisms and contradictions of uneven development—and this, in turn, is the task of re-interpreting modern history as a whole. In this sense the puzzle of Marxism's 'failure' over nation-alism is simple: the problem is so central, so large, and so intimately related to other issues that it could not be focused on properly before. History itself is now helping us towards a solution.
>
> (Nairn 1981:357)

The logical extension of Nairn's account would probably be as follows. What the 'infantile' revolutionary socialism did not apprehend, or could not afford to respond to, was not the 'perplexing' *ad hoc* articles of Marx and Engels printed in various journals of the time and referring to individual cases—what they could not do was to experiment with monopoly capitalism to germinate the two world wars at the apogee of nationalism before these things occurred; that is, what they could not do was analyse the coming course of history!

By contrast, Ephraim Nimni searches for the theoretical-conceptual roots in the early writings of Marx and Engels. Referring to the primary sources of socialist theory, Nimni is, to a degree, right when vilifying the tradition's class-reductionist approaches to the 'national question'. He vilifies the temptation to reduce nationalism to simply a disguised form of class struggle. But, he also longs for the eventual discarding of all the socioeconomic devices of socialist theory. When drawing attention to Marxist parameters to which he traces the 'historical failure' (Nimni 1991:6, 7), Nimni refers to Trotsky's 'futile attempt' in Russia:

> Trotsky's well-known theory of combined and uneven development is a significant acknowledgement of the difficulties experienced by doctrinaire and eurocentric theories of evolution in Russia and, at the same time, an ingenious but ultimately fatal attempt to overcome those difficulties *without discarding the overall universal and developmental logic of Marxist thought*.
>
> (Nimni 1991:196; emphasis added)

Along with this demand, which seems to be a reactionary impulse, Nimni searches for the 'origins' of 'Marxism's great historical failure', through which the 'perplexing legacy' of the 'founding-fathers' of scientific socialism is seen to take the central blame. Frequently referring to Marxism's parameters, he pays a great deal of attention to the role attributed

to the productive forces in the process of human social development. Nimni never attempts to say what the 'forces of production' actually are, but though they are not analysed under a title bearing their name, the concepts of the forces of production and the relations of production—and their dialectical interdependence—are delineated in a fairly understandable way for the ordinary academic reader. True, in *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Marx 1971:20, 21, 37), the conceptualization of the relation between these universal dynamics of social development is confined to an abstract discussion. But it is at least understandable in other writings by Marx. In the first volume of *Capital*, as the crux of the concept of productive forces, the notion is individualized into its elements. And from there it is noticeable how the notion of the forces of production in Marx is even intimately linked with human will through the productivity 'device' of human labour—though the latter is not as such analysed by Marx.[22] On some occasions, Marx talks of productive forces as the 'means of production'. However, in section 1 of chapter VII, under the heading 'The Labour-process or the Production of Use-values', he explains the inseparable relation between *instruments* of production (labour tools) and the *productivity* of human labour as each of the elements of the social forces of production: The elementary factors of the labour process are 1, the personal activity of man, *i.e.*, work itself, 2, the subject of the work, and 3, its instruments' (Marx 1974:174). A little further on, after referring to Franklin's definition of man 'as a tool-making animal', Marx re-contemplates the means of production and the productivity of man's labour, and their interdependency:

> If we examine the whole process from the point of view of its result, the product, it is plain that both the instruments and the subject of labour are means of production, and that the labour itself is productive labour.[23]
>
> (Marx 1974:176)

What is missing from Nimni's overall arguments regarding the social forces of production, as one of the prime Marxist parameters that is also used for analysing the 'national question', is the human element—the productivity of labour as the defining faculty of humankind—in which the intellectual and spiritual wholeness of the human species resides, and which encapsulates the human will to develop and to live better. Thereby one may unequivocally talk of the ineluctable 'desire' of the forces of production to develop in themselves. This is what Nimni finds so abstract and avoids including into his argument—but in fact it is this for which he abstractly blames the Marxist approach for being over-deterministic.

On the other hand, with the same line of reasoning, Nimni grasps Nairn's concept of 'Marxism's great historical failure', but he is reluctant to handle Nairn's related argument of capitalist 'uneven development' and corresponding socioeconomic theorization vis-à-vis nationalism's fertile material base. Nairn's overall argument on nationalism revolves around the 'absolute relative deprivation' of the peripheries caused by the uneven spread of capitalism (Nairn 1981:128) in which he analyses these processes with the materialistic codes of the Marxist conception of history,[24] and Nimni does not interfere with the 'backbone' of the argument whatsoever.

Three interwoven premises of Marxism appear to be the essentials that are embedded in the 'questions' about the theory, which also undermine its confrontation with the

'nationality question'. The initial point of critique of the Marxist tradition that needs to be raised here is the vulgar conception of the materialist dialectic from which many facets of class reductionism and the corresponding subordination of the *material inwardness of human's spiritual satisfaction* emanate.[25] Following the fall of the Iron Curtain one may more confidently state that humankind as a spiritualsocial agent is in a deadly battle for spiritual-cultural values even ahead of material ones. This may well head the agenda of scientific socialist theorization as the most general philosophical deficiency of the Marxist account of the dynamics of society. Marxism's second essential defect, which has been totally refuted by post-Marxian history, and which has been re-demonstrated by its post-Soviet era, is the 'historical role' endowed to the proletariat as both the 'class in itself and 'class for itself. This seems, more than ever before, to be a Messianism in Marx and Engels under the 'depressive' wave of the 1848 Revolution. Reinhold Niebuhr uses the term in relation to Marxist utopianism as a 'religio-political form of Messianism' which

> is really an old form of religious self-righteousness, and combines the two forms of interpretation with which we are concerned—realism and idealism. Thus, Marxism is realistic about human nature and the behaviour of the 'sinners', the competitors, the bourgeoisie, but is idealistic about the 'redeemed' group, in this case not the church or the chosen nation, but the messianic class.
>
> (Niebuhr 1965:38)

This has been unearthed by the most recent spectacle of 'communist nationalism' as the actual question of the theory that germinated the 'national question' for itself, as well as the questions of nation and nationalism in general. And this, of course, is a political manifestation of the former defect—the fundamental materialist weakness of philosophical materialism. Finally, the third interrelated 'question' of Marxism's materialist conception of history is the presentation of history as the 'history of class struggles', which Nairn calls upon for reinterpretation—not only in terms of modern history but the history of class societies as a whole. Accordingly, one might begin with a modification of the first sentence of the first chapter of the *Communist Manifesto* saying The history of all hitherto existing societies** is the history of class struggles' between, 'in a word, oppressor and oppressed'.[26] Instead, while not ignoring the struggle between power-holders and labour-holders, the sentence needs to be modified to say, 'the *written* history of human sociality is overwhelmingly the history of struggles between respective ruling classes'—from the times of Gilgamesh to Muhammad, of Alexander the Great to Saladin, of Caesar to Napoleon, of Hitler to Stalin, and so forth. The fundamental impetus behind this unstable sequence of struggles is the power-holding ruler's insatiable *market* 'sentiments', just like the broader episode of modernity's nationalism, and like the manifest form of the conflict between the social forces of production and the relations of production.

Therefore, we may deduce some rudimentary conclusions.

In terms of both the conceptualization and the politics in the Marxist agenda, the concept of the 'national question' is confined to the 'small' nations' national liberation movements. This is the initial illusory aspect of Marxism when handling the 'question'

because the phrase 'national question' equivocally encapsulates two disparate issues. One is the belated bourgeoisie's rational aspirations; the ineluctable desire for the 'home' market. The other is the innate cultural values of the masses, which are subject to emotional-spiritual satisfaction, for which an individually distinct political approach is required. The second illusory aspect of Marxism is that the concept of 'nation' is understood as an ethno-cultural entity from Marx and Engels themselves onwards. This adds an additional illusion to the 'prolonged and destructive impasse' of the 'national question'.

Deutsch's significant remark calls for the attention of the student of politics and nationalism: The real progress of human knowledge has usually been achieved by a dialogue between a succession of theories and a succession of findings or data' (Deutsch 1969:129–130). Within this frame of reference, only the fact of 'fratricidal' fights inside the Kremlin Palace between *radical* and *moderate* pursuers of recapitalization at the outset of the 1989 revolutions as the chief protagonist of the revolutions may guide one to conclude that the experience of Russia deserves to be the most notorious explanatory case of nationalism in its 'communist' ideological form. Soviet experience, by and large, denotes a relatively belated capitalism's leap forward during which it initially insulted, then deceived, and eventually metamorphosed the Bolsheviks' 'greenhorn' endeavour at a socialist revolution. In this sense, Leninism and the Bolshevik revolution was, so to speak, an attempt by 'infantile' Marxism to have a baby by impregnating Russia while the couple was still shy about reaching puberty. In consequence, 'Leninism' has fascinatingly enabled a gigantic leap forward for Russian capitalism.[27] In the light of this 'succession of findings or data', the *blend* of communism and nationalism in the form of either 'communist nationalism' or 'national communism' in the person of the rejuvenation of the CPRF[28] would be no more than an old platitude (Lester 1997:37–45). The 'blend' of communism and nationalism is doomed solely to be a nationalism polished with communist eloquence.

The endeavours of socialism through national liberation victories—including the legendary Vietnam of Vietminh—have solely built nationstates for their respective 'adolescent' bourgeoisie. No modest exception, in which one may observe an institutionalized communist social transformation, let alone a cultural transformation of the premises of superstructure, exists in the current world. Further, how far have the triumphant national liberation outcomes contributed to the 'confinement of terrain for imperialist exploitation', including Lenin's unhesitating support for Mustafa Kemal in the emerging Turkey?

Some are discontented with the general theorization about nations and nationalism for they find it Eurocentric. Though this discontent draws attention to the significant lack of engagement with non-European phenomena, the theorization deserves not to be branded as Eurocentric because it *was* generated by Europe, just as the Renaissance, the Enlightenment and industrialization were. It is a corollary to the factual course of history that one cannot 'get it wrong'.

### *Conclusions*

To summarize, the 'question' of the 'national' does not lie in the lack of theoretical formulations or in unwise conceptualizations; it lies in the course of the development of the material forces of production, as Renan and others prophesied.

Since the philosophical endeavours of sociopolitical aspirations have not been materially institutionalized and spiritually *'coagulated'* in the form of societal *aberrations* from the persistent course of the private property-based cultural lineage of class societies, they will continue to persist as masturbatory intellectual odysseys. Since the remedial theoretical devices for social maladies do not institutionalize and thereby *culturalize* themselves, they will bear no more significance than being the subjects of resilient academic arguments from which banal exam questions are drawn for college students to pass. This is, by and large, what the Bolshevik endeavour and subsequent experiences taught everyone, which may divert or reshape the *'realpolitik'* and the corresponding theorization of the banal-naïve Marxist intelligentsia.

So the impetus that steers the course of history is not the innocentnaïve innate sentiments towards primordial and geographic-patriotic 'values' but the insatiably greedy *market* 'sentiments' of *market forces*—in the case of modernity and industrialization, the adolescent bourgeoisie. The modern era of human history has provided more than enough evidence to prove this. The Hundred Years War, the Thirty Years War, the Seven Years War, the Seven Weeks War or the Napoleonic Wars, and many other equivalent wars, provide no symptoms indicating that the naïve innate sentiments of the masses were the driving force behind them. These wars of greater Europe were precisely those that gave birth to richly modelled modern nation-states in their 'native land'.

## The Kurds' nationness and nationalism in modern Turkey

Although the PKK has been partially critical of Bolshevism, and especially of the overall socialism of the Soviets, the Kurdish experience under its leadership provides a less 'sophisticated'—in other words, a caricatured—version of the Soviet style. That is, Kurdish 'national liberationist communism' has, to a significant extent, been heir to the banal Marxist tradition and its naïve intelligentsia. We therefore need to have a brief look at the 'form' of nationalism and the 'national question' of the Kurds of Anatolia.

The emergence of a modern Turkey with its 'reborn' Turkishness came into being following the dissolution of the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire. That is, it came into being through one of the three basic, but also the most classical (via the dissolution/reunification of empires), ways of inventing nations. The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic, religio-feudal state—but with Turkish ethnicity at its core. Its cultural and ideological complexion was based on religious sentiments rather than on ethnic ones. In response to the Allies' attempts to dismantle the Ottoman state, a coalition of the military and civilian elite led by the Ottoman army general Mustafa Kemal promptly organized an Anatolian resistance movement composed of mainly Turks and Kurds, with a conspicuous overemphasis on religious concerns. This response succeeded and culminated in the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Up to this point, the movement was solely

a 'religious liberation movement' (discussed in Chapter 2) in terms of its 'form of ideology' (Seton-Watson 1965:15) and its utterance.

The proclamation of the Republic of Turkey was then followed by the Turks' 'war of national liberation'—in fact the over-condensed struggle of the invention of Turkish nationhood. Once the elimination of the 'primitive' Kurds and other minor ethnic entities was accomplished, the genuine 'liberation war' was launched immediately. This is the most striking particularity of the way in which Turkish nationness, and hence the 'modern' Kurdish question, was invented and implanted in the new Turkey.

Following the 'silent decades' from 1938 to 1968, which began with the most recent historical phase of Kurdish tribal resistance (and its absolute suppression) and ended with the knock-on effect of Europe's '68 Generation', a group of university students gathered under Öcalan's leadership and their organization gained momentum in the early 1970s. The group emerged from within the Turkish radical Marxist left and was composed of members of various ethnic groups, the most prominent of which were Kurds and Turks. The gathering first became known as *Apocular* (followers of Apo). Then, in 1978, it declared itself a party (PKK) which would undertake 'the war of national liberation' of the Kurds of 'north-west Kurdistan' against Turkey.

As far as the experience of the Kurds of Turkey under the PKK goes, a kind of caricaturized endeavour by 'adolescent' Marxist entrepreneurs seems to have occurred. Along with the attributes or the unique societal facets of Kurds in general and of 'Turkish Kurds' in particular, the conspicuous birthmarks of the banal Marxist tradition are evident in the emergence and development of the party's discourse and practice. Bearing in mind this aspect of the phenomenon under study, we need to look more closely at both the theorization and agitation that relate to the PKK's Marxism—that is, to the 'national question' of the Kurds of Anatolia.

Relying on his multi-comparative study, Miroslav Hroch begins by warning everyone to avoid the 'urgent temptation to consider their own national history (and therefore their nation as well) as a unique, specific and incommensurable component of the world's development' (Hroch 1985:xi). The warning, of course, is not at all nonsense or baseless. But, on the other hand, every nation or ethnic entity *is* subject to some uniqueness. Each individual out of billions on this planet has unique personal characteristics, including the most diligently 'programmed' test-tube twins from the same ovary. So too with social entities and ethnicities. Theories in the discipline of psychology are constructed with the 'cement' of individual uniquenesses. In our case, a fair treatment would be to grasp uniqueness in the light of the most obvious generalities, and then reach another 'most general' level through the totality of uniqueness. Within this framework, both the organization (PKK) and the ethnicity (Kurds) bear unique particularities. But surely, neither is an 'incommensurable component' of this world.

The organization, the central focus of research in the current study, has come into existence as a corollary of 'uneven development' in Anatolia, manifesting in the Kurdish periphery's 'vindicated' nationalism. It emerged through a customary struggle for 'national liberation' and a 'reprinted' programme of 'national-social emancipation' stamped with the communist utterances of preceding fellow entrepreneur intelligentsias. Following the capture of the organization's charismatic leader Öcalan, the movement eventually converted itself from 'party' to 'congress' in its 8th ordinary congress, which ended in April 2002. The PKK has become KADEK (Kongreya Azadîya Demokrasîya

Kurdistan—The Congress of Freedom and Democracy of Kurdistan).[29] Its programme is by no means one aspiring to 'national liberation'. In fact, the PKK as a 'party' had already adopted a non-national liberationist programme in its 7th extraordinary congress held in January 2000 (discussed in Chapter 4) at which, instead, the 'Democratic Transformation' of Turkey became the principal 'strategic target' that would enhance the 'solution of the Kurdish question'. That is, the programme of a party of 'Kurdistan' has basically become the programme of a party with a socialist perspective on Turkey in general. At the latest congress, at which KADEK was generated, it was declared that the point of the metamorphosis from 'party' to 'congress' was that the 'movement' should become a non-power-envisaging organizational entity. And, after all, these dramatic organizational changes have taken place in accordance with Öcalan's 'perspectives', passed on through the 'meeting notes' with his lawyers in Turkey's İmralli prison.

The 'Marxism' of the movement has been adopted from the wave of the Marxist Left in Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the 'national communism' of the organization has totally diverted from the Turkish Left in the emergence of the party as the PKK, the group originally appeared under the name of *Apocular* as one of the minor components of Turkey's Marxist-socialist movement. (The Marxist ingredients and the ideology of the PKK are the main theme of later chapters—Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.)

The roots, the shaping and the nature of the Kurdish question in Turkey in its peculiar course of affairs are the points of concern in the following chapter.

# 2
# The seeds of Turkey's Kurdish question

The basic focus of this chapter is the source and particularity of the ethnic—not national—question of Kurds under the Turkish Republic. That is, the historical background of the conflict and the roots of the tension between Turks and Kurds in the new 'nation-state', which was shaped during the struggle for 'Turkish National Independence', are brought forward to clarify the source of the Kurdish question in Turkey.

While setting out the study's questions for departure, I posed a fundamental question:

> What is the determinative internal factor in the organizational growth of the Ankara-born PKK which has enabled it to extend Kurdish resistance beyond provincial borders and to expand resistance not just to the national geography but to an international scope?

I then assumed three principal hypotheses, which may be formulated as follows:

1 The 'why' (and, to some extent, the 'how') of the PKK is an outcome of the peculiarity of the 'Turkish War for Independence' and the artificial—or 'manufactured' (Kadıoğlu 1996)—character of Turkish 'nationalization'.
2 The PKK has led to the first Kurdish *'national'* movement in terms of the supra-tribal mobilization of the Kurdish masses.
3 The leading body in the party is not in itself a national liberationist leadership.

It is now necessary to take a closer look at the specificity of the Turkish Republic's emergence and of the struggle for survival of the Ottoman Turks in Anatolia—through which Turkey's Kurdish question took shape. The historical context in which the birth of the republic occurred has been crucial to the Kurds' destiny.

### The last push for the last refuge

Both the establishment of the Turkish Republic and its 'colonization' of Anatolian Kurdistan are anomalous in the sense one may assert that the Turkish state is not a republic and that Turkish-ruled 'Kurdistan is not even a colony' (Beşikçi 1990). Common exaggerations in pro-Western textbooks about 'Atatürk (Father Turk) Revolutions' seem

motivated by Turkey's stabilizing role for the West against the potential threat of Bolshevism and Islamicism, both coming from the East. Such exaggerations do not provide useful data for sociological arguments. It is more beneficial to deal with the *factual process* of the period concerning 'The Rebirth of a Nation' (Kinross 1964), which has either not been mentioned at all or has not received detailed analysis.

### *An aesthetic expression: the National War of Independence*

In almost all studies of the Turkish Republic by Western scholars, the Movement of Ottoman Turks led by Mustafa Kemal is labelled 'The Turkish War for Independence' or 'The National War of Independence' or 'The War of National Resistance' or the 'Turkish Revolution' against imperialist invasion (Luke 1936; Frey 1965; Lewis 1968; Shaw and Shaw 1977; McCarthy 1997).

For now, I will omit the interesting 'accounts' of the transition period of the Turkish state from a multinational empire to a unitary republic—accounts which have been manipulated by many Turkish historians. Suffice it to say that this tradition is strikingly commonplace among the non-Turkish authors engaged with the subject. The facts conveyed in these same works do not manifest the symptoms of a people's national resistance or liberation movement but a state's desperate dash to salvage her shrunken body from the victorious 'Allies' attempt to dismember the Empire' (McCarthy 1997:366, 374; Barkey and Fuller 1998:9), 'the Turkish state under Ottoman Sultans' (Luke 1936:v).

When we bypass the speculative extracts, the real nature of Kemal's movement stands out.

McCarthy, who expresses his gratitude to the staff at the Turkish Embassy in Washington, illustrates the circumstances of the Ottoman state's last push, as stamped onto the *strategic* pattern and the *tactical* innovations of the Ottoman army led by Mustafa Kemal through 'the rebirth of a nation' (1919 to 1923).

> It is difficult not to cast the War of Independence in heroic, even melodramatic terms, because the cause of the Turks at first looked so impossible. For more than a century, Turks and other Muslims had been forced from their homes in the Caucasus region, the Crimea and the Balkans. One generation might have been forced from the Crimea or the Caucasus into Bulgaria, the next generation forced from Bulgaria into Ottoman Macedonia, the next generation forced into Anatolia. Now the Ottoman Empire had been finally defeated; its provinces in Europe and the Arab world were lost. Anatolia, the last refuge, was certainly all that remained to the Turks, but Anatolia too was threatened.
>
> (McCarthy 1997:371)

McCarthy gives us a melodramatic picture of the Ottoman Turks at the culmination of the First World War. The point is to illustrate whether this situation was a stimulus for the Turkish people to enter into a National Liberation War or a stimulus for the Ottoman army to invent a *new* outlet for salvaging the body of the Turkish state, which had been

shrunk after the First World War, in 'the last refuge'—Anatolia. This exploration is necessary if researchers want to reach unbiased conclusions.

Another description of the period before the 'Kemalist Revolution' from a non-Turkish observer would prompt us to search for the factual processes of the transition period, in order that we may draw more reliable conclusions:

> They [Turks] saw Nationalism grow, and bear fruit, among their Greek, Rumanian, Serb, Bulgar and even Arab fellow-subjects before they felt that the time had come to develop the ideal among themselves. It now seems surprising to the non-Turkish observer that while the nineteenth century had witnessed throughout its length the spread of Nationalism among the Christian peoples of the Balkans, it was not until the twentieth century that the Turks began to realize that they alone of all its component races had no place of their own in the Empire which they had created, and began at long last to envisage the possibility of a Turkish instead of an Ottoman Turkey.
>
> (Luke 1936:167)

It is inaccurate to compare the growing nationalistic tendencies of the Balkans' Christian peoples to the equivalent sentiments among the Muslim Ottoman Turks at that time. These two communities differed in their sociopolitical and socio-psychological composition. Even if we put aside the non-Muslim Balkan peoples' close contact with the modern wave of nationalism in Western Europe, the Turks and Turkey were not conquered and ruled by an *alien* power (Ottomans), but by a theocratic 'Empire which they had created'.

Since its inception, the Ottoman state as a sovereign imperial power had fellow Muslim Turks at its core. There are no reliable sociological data in the archives of historical documents to indicate that the Turkish people saw and began to realize that nationalism grew, and bore fruit, and 'began at long last to envisage the possibility of a Turkish instead of an Ottoman Turkey'. This is the critical question relating to the seeds of the complex conflict of the 'Turks of Kurdish origin'.

Such a 'national consciousness' in 'Turkish Turkey' was indeed a veiled aspiration within the Turkish core of the Ottoman army and its 'civil' organization, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). This would have become apparent after the consolidation of Turkishness in the 'new' Turkish state. But Turkish nationalists 'never disclosed such views' (Atatürk 1938:19), as any emphasis on 'Turkish nationalist sentiment' or any demands in favour of Turkish ethnicity would have jeopardized the 'only possible' outlet to salvage a last refuge for the Empire (ibid.: 9). So they would have prevented the other Muslim ethnicity's (in effect, the Kurds' participation in the Anatolian war.

Mustafa Kemal, at the beginning of his famous six-day speech of 1927 reviewing the years leading up to the 'revolution', unveils the nature of his struggle:

> The Ottoman State, its independence, padishah, calip, government, all these were without meaning and consisted of senseless words… Gentlemen, in the face of this situation there existed only one possible

> decision. That was to establish a new Turkish State, unconditionally independent, based on national sovereignty.
>
> (Atatürk 1938:9)

These striking words provide an insight into what Kemal actually did: 'in the face of this situation there existed only one possible decision. That was to establish a new Turkish State.' Nevertheless, before understanding the extent of the *newness* of the state revised under his leadership, or what Kemal meant by describing all of the *old* institutions as 'meaningless and nonsense', the 'unconditionally independent' character of the 'new State' also requires clarification; for it also relates to Turkey's Kurdish question.

### *Kemal's initial proposal*

At the beginning of his initiative, Kemal sought aid from 'some great power', implying America, at the Erzurum Congress (23 July-7 August 1919). This action is recognized as the first major step in the so-called National Liberation War. He raised the question in Erzurum, but astutely avoided mentioning the name because the word 'America' was associated, in the popular mind, with the detested proposal of an Armenian state, which would claim annexation of Erzurum.

Yet four weeks later, at the Sivas Congress, the matter—not 'American aid' but rather the debate of the *mandate*—was located almost at the centre of the Congress's agenda by Kemal. An emissary (Mr Louis E. Browne, ostensibly the correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*) of Mr Charles R.Crane, 'whose King-Crane Commission was appointed by the Big Four in Paris to study the mandate question', was sent to the Congress at M.Kemal's request through Ms Halide Edip:

> The only non-Muslim to attend it, he was well received by Kemal. In a series of talks with him Kemal used the term 'American aid' rather than 'mandate' as being more acceptable to Turkish pride. It should have a social and economic as opposed to a political character. Asked whether the Congress would pass *a resolution inviting America to take such a mandate*, Kemal replied, 'yes', but added *the crucial reservation*, 'Provided you can assure me that America *will accept it, if offered*.' Brown expressed doubts as to whether his country would do so.
>
> (Kinross 1964:188; emphases added)

Kinross also states that M.Kemal envisaged an authoritarian 'big brother' relationship at the meeting held with the American General Harbord and his mission (which arrived in Sivas a week after the end of the Congress), and that the General 'replied that no self-respecting nation would accept a mandatory responsibility without complete authority' (Kinross 1964).

In fact, the historical records show how the relationship was formed. The 'interrelations' between Turkey and the USA after the First World War resemble neither a 'big brother' relationship nor a 'mandate', nor 'only a social and economic' relationship. The nature of relations proves, at least, that Turkey has never been 'unconditionally independent' since the triumph of the 'National Independence War'.

Ottoman Turkey was certainly less modernized than Republican Turkey but not less independent, considering her sovereign power over a realm stretching across the 'three continents' and encompassing peoples of various nationalities and religions.

### *Revolution or reforms and revisions?*

The term 'new' that Kemal employs in describing what he had to do is significant for two reasons. First, it is a concession because Kemal concedes that the old state was also a bona fide Turkish state. Second, it is an exaggeration because Kemal did not alter the essential body of the state.

The genuine Turkish-cored Ottoman state was still there, with its powerful structure and deep-rooted traditions. Reforms and transformations in the remaining Ottoman country were substantially aimed at, on the one hand, the assimilation of the Anatolian society and, on the other, at Western modernization and imitative westernization. Furthermore, the changes were made for the sake of the consolidation of the state apparatus and for securing subordinate ethnic entities' (mainly the Kurds') appreciation of the state's Turkicized character.

Some scholars draw attention to this intrinsic feature of the Turkish state (for example, Rustow 1959; Szyliowicz 1969). Among these scholars, Davison's remarks seem the most instructive. 'What Mustafa Kemal did', he states, 'was to decapitate the Ottoman Empire. The head of the state was lopped off the Turkish body politic. Two strokes disposed of the Ottoman sultan…and of the caliphal title that the later sultans had assumed. But much of the body remained.' Davison continues to explain the crucial aspect of the *transitional* reforms by referring to Kemal's *Speech*.

> He calls the sultanate 'a gang of madmen with no ties of conscience or of thought to the fatherland and nation.' But he refers without any condemnation or stricture to constitution, cabinet, parliament, election, deputies, vilayet, vali, mutasarrif. These facts of life, these heritages of political concept and institution from the Ottoman Empire, he accepted.
>
> (Davison 1990:243)

One of Davison's asides is more interesting in relation to the essential point of the argument. For unknown reasons, he omits the 'backbone' of the argument:

> He [M.Kemal] referred also to the army, another fact of public life inherited from the Empire. Although the army was essential to the state as its bulwark and sometimes its backbone I shall omit it from my discussion.
>
> (Davison 1990:260)

Davison means to show the insignificance of the changes that Kemal made within the state structure of the Ottoman Empire during the transition to the Republic, by using the metaphor of 'decapitation'. But the metaphor is exaggerated because the head of the state, as well as the backbone, was in fact still there—indeed, the *old* head was the subject who was in charge of these very changes. First, the sultanate and the caliphate

were actually one institution, because the later sultans had, as Davison emphasizes, assumed the caliphate. Second, the sultanate itself was not at all a significant institution of the state apparatus in the sense of functional power in the latter decades—if not throughout the whole life of the Empire. In the Republican era, the 'Presidency of the Republic' *(Cumhurbaşkanliğ)* replaced the sultanate.

The army constitutes the 'backbone' of the state structure in any country—but in the Anatolian history of the Turkish state the army's role is additionally important in accordance with the Turks' nomadic status in the region. Almost a century ago, Sir Charles Eliot drew attention to the Turkish army's role: The Turkish army is not so much a profession, or an institution necessitated by the fears and aims of the Government, as the active but still quiet *[sic]* normal state of the Turkish nation' (Eliot 1908:91, 93). Eliot suggested that the roots of such a peculiar tradition are to be found in the nomadic origins of the Ottoman Turks.

Ramsaur cites 'another writer [who] declared in 1908, "The whole Ottoman race is an army permanently encamped upon its conquests"' (Ramsaur 1957:115). Likewise, in his detailed discussion of the Turkish political elite, Frey concludes that all Turkish revolts to date follow a strict tradition of 'revolts from above' (Frey 1965). In addition, the sultan at the culmination of the *Tanzimat*[1] era who had reigned for the preceding 33 years of the 'First Constitutional Revolution', Abdulhamit II, was deposed by the Third Army Corps, which arrived from Salonika in 1909 against no signs of resistance. The sultan viewed these events 'as the will of God' (Shaw and Shaw 1977:281, 282). Essentially, the 'Second Constitutional Revolution' (1908) had also been executed by the Committee of Union and Progress, for which 'İsmet had been working with the Second Army in Adrianople, as Kemal had been working with the Third in Salonika' in co-operation with an 'active group of patriotic young officers'—'Fethi, Rauf, Kazim Karabekir, Rafet, Ali Fuad, Tevfik Rustu, an army doctor, and some others' (Kinross 1964:37). These very same names would become the prominent figures of the 'Republican Revolution' (Lewis 1968:247; Selek 1987:276, 289; Tuncay 1990:59–70; Kutlay 1990:3; Başkaya 1991:36).

The use of the word 'revolution' by Western or non-Turkish scholars to describe Turkish political history is difficult to understand as a sociological term. Two examples: if Frey concludes in his sophisticated study, *The Turkish Political Elite*, that 'all Turkish revolts to date, including the Young Turks, the Atatürk Revolution, and the "Gentle Coup" of May 27, 1960…were revolutions *primarily to maintain or enhance the prestige of the state, not essentially to admit a rising new class to power or adjust a society to major economic or social changes*' (Frey 1965; emphasis added), why then should he call them 'revolutions'? In particular, Kemal's reforms followed not even an ordinary *coup d'état but* a comprehensive reorganization of the state elite, with the consequent transfer *(tebdil-i mekân)* of necessary governmental officers to Ankara (Başkaya 1991:36) in co-operation with the Istanbul government (Tuncay 1990:60) due to the desperate needs created by the unpleasant outcomes of the First World War. Davison, under his quite reasonable title, *'Atatürk's Reforms: Back to the Roots'*, initially writes: The Republic owes much to the Empire; the Empire also owes much to the Republic, for some concepts and institutions that the Empire developed but could not make workable, the Republic took over and made workable' (Davison 1990:243). Davison cites Sıddık S. Onar's remark,

> [First] the Republic inherited the system, bureaucracy, and schools. Second, the *Tanzimat* created a top-to-bottom provincial administration with the vilayet law of 1864 and its subsequent revisions, again on a European model, which the Republic took over.
>
> (Davison 1990:258)

Then, by some system of reasoning, Davison has come to believe that

> the revolution continues. Its work is not yet done. One might speak of it in terms which historians have used of the great French Revolution of 1789: The Turkish Revolution began long before it occurred, and continued long after it stopped.
>
> (Davison 1990:260)

If one were to employ the word not metaphorically but literally, then the term *evolution* may well be more explanatory and more plausible for the process of Turkish westernization or modernization. These terminological confusions may stem either from sympathies towards Kemal's westernizing efforts or from aesthetic concerns. Otherwise, the use of the term 'revolution' denotes, as Lasswell and Lerner state, 'major economic and social changes'.

An ordinary English dictionary definition of 'revolution' is the 'overthrow of a system of government by force'. The Ottoman army never loosened the ropes of governance and, in the case of the Republican reformers, Kemal's clique had obtained full control of the power to rule from 1908 onwards (Kinross 1964:29; Shaw and Shaw 1977:267, 282).

### *The central aim of the efforts*

In addition to these social and political reforms, the scholars in this field ironically draw attention to the *central aim* of the Turkish political actors. The aim of a social or political action may best be recognized by its concrete end-results because the *aim*, in large measure, dominates—and consequently manifests itself in—the quality of changes. Through its actions, the aim engenders the factual end-results which should give considerable clues for the researcher to identify the social or political phenomenon. However, scholars of various persuasions share common ground as to the *eventual ends* of the agents of the 'Turkish Revolution'. They describe these ends as being to either 'salvage' or 'maintain' or 'strengthen' or 'enhance' or 'keep alive' the existing state apparatus. For instance, several scholars describe the situation as follows:

> The Young Turks who came into power in 1908 were Ottoman Imperialists as much as were the representatives of the previous regime, but, as men of the left, believed in other methods of government and hoped to keep the Empire alive by substituting for autocracy a limited monarchy…
>
> (Luke 1936:153–154)

> [T]hey saw reforms as a means of strengthening a dying empire rather than as an end in itself.

(Ramsaur 1957:4)

> But the essential point is that most of these reforms were characteristically devoted to securing the grip of the state over the society,…

(Frey 1965:41)

> The actual purpose of the leading cadres of the *Millet* Movement was to revive the collapsing State.

(Başkaya 1991:42)

> The young officers were little interested in ideologies and social panaceas as such. The fundamental question that concerned them was survival, the survival of the Ottoman state which they and their fathers had for generations served, and both their actions and their discussions revolved around this central problem: *Bu devlet nasıl Kurtarılabilir?*— How can this state be saved?

(Lewis 1968:212)

## The vital concerns of the republican Turkish political elite: a'national war' without nationalism

It should now be easier to understand why Kemal declared the 'Ottoman state' to be meaningless, and called the sultanate 'a gang of madmen with no ties of conscience or of thought to the fatherland and nation'. We can also see why he avoided 'any condemnation or stricture to constitution, cabinet, parliament, election, deputies, vilayet, vali, mutasarrif', and above all why he did not condemn the state's 'backbone', the army. Moreover, we can understand how Kemal managed to triumph in 'An AntiImperialist War [against a block of imperialists] Without Opposing Imperialists' (Avcıoğlu 1977a). Finally, we can see why he did not need to invoke Turkish nationalism in order to motivate the Turkish people for a 'Turkish National Liberation War' but, on the contrary, diligently refrained from doing so.

A little further in the *Speech,* Kemal reveals that he has previously disguised his political cause and that he has taken 'the only practical and safe road' to achieve his goal:

> It would undoubtedly have been of little advantage if we would have put forward our demands at the very beginning in a resolution of such far-reaching importance. On the contrary, it was necessary to proceed by stages, to prepare the feeling and the spirit of the nation and try to reach our aim by degrees, profiting meanwhile by our experience. This is actually what happened. If our attitude and our action during nine years [referring to the period of direct rule by the CUP, 1909–1918] are examined in their logical sequence, it is evident from the very first day that our general behaviour has never deviated from the lines laid down in our original resolution, nor from the purpose we had set out to achieve… But we never disclosed the views we held. If we had done so we would have been looked upon as dreamers and illusionists… The only practical

> and safe road to success lay in making each step perfectly understood at the right time… This was how I acted.
>
> (Atatürk, 1938:19; cited by Frey 1965)

As a result, we cannot find any hint of a nationalistic programme or even a nationalistic rhetoric during the 'Turkish National Liberation War' until after the proclamation of the Republic—the culmination of the struggle for survival. Davison suggests that Atatürk's language in the *Speech*—some four years after the proclamation—'is almost pure Tanzimat language' (Davison 1990:260). Başkaya argues that the ideology of Kemal's leadership is nothing more than mere *Tanzimat* westernism (Başkaya 1991:29–36). The language of Republican ideology is indeed the extension of *Tanzimat* language except for the considerable purging of Arabic, Persian and other vocabularies. This view is shared by many other authorities.

In some cases, the Republican 'ideology' worsened, as is evident in the 1961 and 1982 constitutions. But the vital point that reveals the roots of the 'Turkish Style Kurdish Question', is that the words 'Turk', 'Turkish' and 'Turkey' were withdrawn from view, to be replaced by 'Fatherland and Nation' *(Vatan ve Millet)* during the years of the Turkish State's Salvation and Survival Struggle (1919–1923). The terms *vatan* and *millet were,* of course, deliberately chosen. In particular, *'millet'*[2] is a vague term obscuring the army's hidden Turkification purposes, as the word is associated with a religious context rather than an ethnic one in the Ottoman Turkish language (Dodd 1980) as in the 'Muslim Nation' *(Müslüman Milleti).*

The dominance of Turkishness erupted in the provinces of Anatolia immediately following the proclamation of the Republic by the 'Nationalist' leadership under Kemal. In contrast with such obscurity until the safe announcement of the Turkish Republic, the bombardment of Turkishness onto the Kurdish populated regions was extreme, to the extent that Atatürk's famous maxim, *'Happy is the one who call himself a Turk'* was displayed not only on the public squares and the streets of towns and counties but also on countless rural hillsides with huge lettering made of stone and concrete.

There is one odd question: How could a National Liberation War be organized, mobilized, executed and brought to fruition over approximately three years (May 1919-September 1922) by a leadership whose *views* on the 'Holy Cause' *were never disclosed* in the course of the struggle; that is, a leadership without any nationalist propaganda, nationalist slogans, nationalist ideology or a nationalist programme?

In seeking an answer I will briefly go through the documents about the fundamental stages of the 'National War' and its organizational entities. This war and its significance underlie the Kurdish Question in Anatolia and, consequently, the nature of the Kurdish movement of 'Turkish Kurdistan' and its leadership—the PKK.

### *The Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)*

The Committee of Union and Progress İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) was not vital to the Turkish state's transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic. But the facts of its foundation, organization, transformation and activities, and especially of its intervention into the state's affairs, illustrate the process of transition.

Both Turkish and non-Turkish observers agree on the importance of the CUP with respect to the roots of the invention of the Turkish nation. This matter falls substantially outside the realm of this study for it relates to Turkish history, but aspects of the Committee's nationalism and its composition are crucial to the argument here nonetheless. This is because the seeds of the Republican Turkish state's—but not the Ottoman Empire's—Kurdish question took shape in accordance with the ideological and structural transformation within the 'Young Turk' movement during approximately a decade of its history.

The CUP's formation took place during the final decade of the nineteenth century. A group of students at the Military Medical School in Istanbul—who became known as the 'Young Turks'—tried to set up the committee, which marks the beginning of the movement. Historians and researchers writing after the event have misnamed the 'Young Turks' (see, for example, Ramsaur 1957:3–7; Kutlay 1990:4), as was the case for the Ottoman Empire's earlier modernist generation of the *Tanzimat* era (1839–1876) who called themselves 'Yeni Osmanlılar' (New Ottomans). The official title of the former is the '*Ottoman* Committee of Union and Progress'.

In the basic documents of the CUP we scarcely come across such terms as 'Turk', 'Turkish' or even 'Turkey', though it has been used by Western authors 'since [Anatolia's] conquest by the Turks in the eleventh century' (Lewis 1968). The first clear view of the CUP appears in M.Ahmet Rıza's article published in the society's journal, *Mechveret* (December 1895), under the heading 'Our Programme'. Ahmet Rıza,[3] is counted as being the prime figure with nationalistic sentiments among the principal members of the early group. He gave little importance to religion due to the strong influence of Auguste Comte and of his modernist vision. Rıza took the post of director of *Mechveret*, the official organ of the CUP. In this first programme, which was 'clearly more the work of Ahmet Rıza than of the society' (Ramsaur 1957) we by no means witness any signs of Turkism. The term 'Young Turk' is mentioned in the programme once, in the sentence concerning foreign readers: 'A French supplement will put foreign readers au courant with the tendencies and desires of the Young Turk party.' A striking article emerges in the programme, regarding the party's 'ethnic' dimension: 'We demand reforms, not especially for this or that province, but for the entire Empire, not in favour of a single nationality, but in favour of all Ottomans, be they Jews, Christians, or Moslems' (ibid.: 22–25). In the language of the programme, the various religious communities are referred to by the term 'nationality'.

Following the Turkification practices of the Society's first governmental experience (1908), during which Ahmet Rıza was the first president of the new Turkish Chamber of Deputies, it became evident that the programme was rather superficial. But at the inception of the Society, Turkification was not the real aim of the founders. Moreover, there was not a Turkish founding member at the first meeting of the group. Two founder members were Kurds (Abdullah Cevdet and İshak Sukuti), 'the man of driving spirit' İbrahim Temo was Albanian, and the other, Mehmet Reşit, was Caucasian (Çerkez). Yet following several initial meetings, symptoms of the endemic Ottoman tradition of the 'army-nation' or 'revolts from above' started to appear. After a while, the initiative rapidly spreads to high officials—that is, army personnel—and they work their way up. In fact, the initiative is gradually taken over by the army:

> Within the Military Medical School the movement spread rapidly and soon overflowed into the other government higher schools in Constantinople, such as the Military Academy *(Harbiye Mektebi)*, the Veterinary School *(Baytariye)*, the Civil College *(Mülkiye)*, which was a school for training government officials, the Naval Academy *(Bahriye)*, and the Artillery and Engineering School *(Topcu ve Mühendishane)*.
>
> (Ramsaur 1957:17–18)

Ramsaur elaborates further:

> We can only say that in the two or three years prior to 1896 a number of prominent men joined the society and that the leadership commenced to pass into their hands. Chief among these men were Haji Ahmet Efendi, a civil servant in the bureau of accounting of the *Seraskerat* [War Office],…
>
> (Ramsaur 1957:21)

The horizontal growth of the society among military officials accelerated dramatically following the takeover of the leadership by 1896—to the extent that the society became mature enough to schedule a *coup d'état* for August of that year.

The *coup d'état* conspirators who were guilty of treason were exiled by the ruthless Sultan Abdulhamit, even though procuring their execution would not have been difficult. During the years of the 'exile period', throughout Europe, the leadership eliminated the groupings of the subdivided liberal wing, 'favouring progress in terms of a decentralized regime, on more democratic principles, and with autonomous rights for the minorities' (Kinross 1964:34).

It also developed intimate relationships with Freemasonry (Luke 1936:145–153; Ramsaur, 1957:103–107; Shaw and Shaw, 1977:265). By the end of this period, the society had opened many branches within the territory of the Empire. These branches were founded by serving high-ranking commanders.[4] In less than two years, Kemal had transferred his society's headquarters and himself to Salonika. He managed this by leaving his post in Damascus—at first 'without permission', then for the ostensible reason of 'recovering his health', and in the end having secured 'official permission'. Within this time he had accomplished the fusion of *Fatherland and Liberty* and the CUP, based in Paris. Just 11 months after the fusion of the societies, the 'Young Turk Revolution'—the revolution 'without any real revolution' (Shaw and Shaw 1977)—took place as a result of the *threat* of a 'revolt from above' by the Third Army Corps in Salonika (July 1908). The 'revolution' was conducted without any sign of opposition from almost 20 other army corps in the enormous Ottoman state.

Sultan Abdulhamit was compelled to reinforce the constitution of 1876, to suspend the parliament and, for all practical purposes, to give up most of his powers. A year later, the sultan was deposed after a 33-year reign, due to a 'counter-revolutionary' plot involving 'the murder—supposedly at the hands of the Committee [of Union and Progress]—of the insignificant editor of a liberal newspaper' (Kinross 1964:34). Thus, the years of the direct rule of the *Party* of Union and Progress commenced, to which M.Kemal would later refer as 'our experience of nine years' in the *Speech* of 1927. He considered these years to be the only guide of his action during the period of the Salvation War.

Among the seven articles of the 'fusion' declaration we still do not see any evidence of Turkism. It had even withered away somewhat in comparison with the first programme, in spite of the far stronger consolidation of the Turkish core of the CUP. In the last article, 'Turkish' and French are mentioned as the languages of the society's 'instruments of public dissemination', *Şurayi Ümmet* and *Mechveret*. The 'revolution' unexpectedly motivated the Christian peoples of the Balkans:

> The Revolution, far from arresting the disintegration of the Empire, as the Young Turks hoped, at once accelerated it. The response was in effect a Balkan counter-revolution. Within a bare three months of the establishment of the Constitution, Bulgaria proclaimed her independence; within the same week, Austria annexed the Turkish provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Crete voted for union with Greece.
>
> (Kinross 1964:31)

Nevertheless, the revolution did not have similar effects on Muslim nationalities because of Islam being the state's official religion. The level of societal development (in terms of national consciousness and of its structural equivalence in terms of its organizational dimension) was not comparable with the peoples of the Balkans. Kemal was well aware of this phenomenon. Therefore, he rightly did not lose his hope of profiting from the predominantly Islamic ethnicity of Anatolia (the Kurds) and never underestimated the 'experiences of nine years' of the CUP's rule. He proceeded by stages along the pathway to the goal they had set out from the very first day of the Republican struggle. The leadership did not by any manner of means invoke Turkish nationalism. They did not need to use it, either prior to or throughout the Turkish National Liberation and Independence' war. More importantly, just the opposite—the concealment of nationalist tendencies—was vitally necessary. This is apparent without exception in the language of all the documents of the CUP's history. The deep concern in Kemal's overall tactics throughout the struggle for the Holy Cause was to perpetuate the survival of the state in Anatolia, the last refuge of Turks.

### *The steps subsequent to the CUP's experience*

The principal primary steps—which Kemal calls 'stages'—of the struggle and its declarations were as follows:

**Amasya Protocol** (21 June 1919). The protocol was constructed and signed by Mustafa Kemal, Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Rafet Bele and Kazim Karabekir[5] with no reaction from the rest of the Ottoman army (Shaw and Shaw 1977:344). The seven articles of the protocol, largely considered to be the 'Declaration of Independence of the Turkish Nation', do not mention the words *Turk, Turkish* or *Turkey* (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997:92). Likewise, these words do not appear in the three articles of the telegram distributed to a number of civil and military authorities (Lewis 1968:247). Nothing more explicit than *Fatherland* and *Nation* is used to express the ethnic or national aspects of the struggle.

**Erzurum Congress** (23 July-7 August 1919). This was held with 54 delegates of the eastern provinces, including a large number of Kurdish tribal and religious leaders in

Erzurum (Selek 1987:276), 'the "capital" of eastern Turkey' (Kinross 1964). One is struck by the strict diligence in refraining from the use of any term that may be associated with Turkishness throughout the ten-point resolution, which later came to be known as the National Pact *(Misakı Milli)*. The repeated emphasis on preserving 'the integrity of the Fatherland and Nation *(Vatan ve Millet)*', and on the 'defence and protection of the sultanate and caliphate' is also very clear in the ten articles (Shaw and Shaw 1977).

**Sivas Congress** (4–11 September 1919). The congress opened with the participation of 39 delegates from all over the regions of the *Vatan* (Fatherland), including far-off Thrace. At Sivas, the aim was to extrapolate the decisions taken at the Erzurum Congress to cover the whole country. Although the aims discussed at Sivas were not as clear as they were at Erzurum, the Congress reaffirmed its loyalty to the Sultan along with the well-worn rhetoric of 'Fatherland and Nation'. The first sentence of the oath taken by delegates was 'I shall follow no personal interest or ambition but the salvation and peace of my Fatherland and nation' (Kinross 1964:187). In the telegram which was sent to the sultan by the participating army commanders at the end of the congress, they were 'begging him to "deign to order the formation of a new government, loyal and respectful of the privileges of Your Majesty and of the Caliphate"' (Lewis 1968:249).

**Grand National Assembly.** The last resolution of the Erzurum Congress entrusted the Representative Committee *(Heyet-i Temsiliye)* it had elected with the task of establishing 'national unity on all levels'. This task was also approved at the following Sivas Congress. The Committee accomplished the task in seven months, and the so-called 'first phase of the National Independence War' culminated in the announcement of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara (23 April 1920), with the participation of 120 deputies chosen by countrywide branches of The Society to Defend the Rights of Anatolia and Rumeli' (the renamed identity of the CUP). The deputies included a large number of Istanbul parliament members (Selek 1987:341). In the debates and resolutions of the Assembly's first, second and following days, reflected in the recorded sources, words associated with Turkishness were totally excluded from its language (Shaw and Shaw 1977; Beşikçi 1969b; Selek 1987). Even the Assembly gathered with no predetermined name with which the Law of Treason—*Büyük Millet Meclisi* (Selek 1987:344)—could acknowledge Assembly members. The word *Tükiye* (Turkey) was added afterwards. Particularly in the early days of the Assembly, M.Kemal emphasized the loftiness of the CUP's multi-ethnic composition (Barkey and Fuller 1998:9). In a speech given in May 1920, Kemal explicitly highlighted this ethnic assortment:

> The individuals which constitute our Assembly are not only Turk, or Kurd, or Laz, or Çerkez; but the components of the *Nation of Islam* composed of all. It is a sincere community. Consequently, the nation that we strive to defend and protect does not consist of single element. It is composed of various Muslim nations.
>
> (Atatürk 1952:28; emphasis added)

**The Lausanne Conference.** In a session on 23 January 1923, while the Ankara Government representative İsmet İnönü was conveying the official view of the Turkish state, he reduced the ethnic components of the government and the Assembly to two fundamental equals.

> The government of the Grand National Assembly is also the government of the Kurds as much as of the Turks. This is because the bona fide and legitimate representatives of the Kurds have taken part in the National Assembly, and have been enjoying the right to participate in the government and to rule the country.
>
> (Beşikçi 1969b:399)

Later in the negotiation—in response to the British delegation which accused Turkey of rejecting the Kurds' demands for autonomy—İnönü considered such a position to be humiliating for the Kurdish people: 'the rights which claimed to be given to the peoples of so-called autonomous territories will by no means satisfy a people of such noble descent as the Kurds' (ibid.: 401).

Yet in the course of the discussions referring to the Treaty of Sévres, the question of the Kurds' aspiration for an independent state was at issue, and the Conference decided to gauge the opinions of the Kurdish members of the Assembly by telegram. M.Kemal gathered the responses of Kurdish deputies in a secret session and telegraphed them back to the Conference at once. In this secret session, H.Anvi Bey, deputy for Erzurum, stated in the presence of Kemal: 'This country belongs to the Kurds and the Turks. Only these two nations have the right to speak on this platform: the Turkish and the Kurdish nation' (Hasretyan 1995:76). Similar categorical statements taken from many other Kurds in the Assembly—such as 'Kurds never think of separation from Turks' or 'We Kurds and Turks are brothers, we do not want to separate, there exists no difference between us'—were submitted to the Conference. As a result, the articles concerning the issue took shape, and the Lausanne Conference signed a peace treaty on 24 July 1923. In the treaty, Turkey was entitled to the 'legitimate right' to deny not just the Kurdish national share of victory against *gavurs* (non-Muslims), but also the very existence of Kurds as an ethnic entity (Nikitin 1986).

**The constitution of 1924.** Just three months after the signatures at Lausanne, the Grand National Assembly declared the 'Republic of Turkey'. The following year it accepted the new constitution. The bombardment of Turkishness onto the Kurdish population and the landscape began to manifest itself in the constitution, which insisted that 'anyone who is a citizen of the Turkish Republic' was a Turk. Article 88 of the constitution was clear: *Inhabitants of Turkey shall be deemed to be Turkish irrespective of their religion and race:*

> In the 1924 constitution, the terms "citizenship" and "citizen" had been equated with Turkishness. Accordingly, the document stated that one had to be a Turk to become a member of parliament and the like. Certainly the Kurds could qualify as "Turks," but only at the expense of denying their own ethnic identity. Here then the seeds for eventual Kurdish dissatisfaction were planted: In a state now officially defined as "Turkish" the Kurds were not Turks, and only by giving up their ethnicity could they be treated as Turks.
>
> (Barkey and Fuller 1998:10)

From here onwards, there appeared a flow of 'scientific works' by professors, demonstrating the origins of the Kurds. These books mainly agreed on the Kurds' identity as 'Mountain Turks' because of the 'kirt-kürt' sounds heard when walking on the frozen surface of snow on the mountains. Accordingly, the 'K' pages of Turkish dictionaries were rewritten (Chaliand [1980] 1993:58). The explanation of the word 'Kurd' in an encyclopaedic dictionary published in 1971 is worth translating: 'A community composed of Turks who have largely changed their language, speak a broken Persian and inhabit Turkey, Iran and Iraq; and an individual who belongs to this community'. In others, terms associated with Kurds were entirely withdrawn from the pages.

This 'new ideology' and policy of the 'new' Turkish state managed to hide the Kurdish question for half a century, causing social pathologies to be intensified. These pathologies eventually led the most recent constitution of 1982 to be the first constitution which bans mother tongues. The pathologies also led the Kurds of East Anatolia to give birth to the PKK:

> No language other than Turkish shall be thought of as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education.
>
> (Article 42)
>
> Kurdistan is the place where humanity itself fades away in its most solid form…if in some place humanity descends so sharply and deeply, then the concomitant rise of humanity will be as strong and splendid.
>
> (Öcalan, in Küçük 1993:125)

## The sharp contrast between the two policies

### *The nature of the battle*

Turks and Kurds fought together against *'gavurs'*[6] in the Turko-Greek war,[7] subsequently named—and famed—as the 'National Independence War of the Turkish Nation'. The spokesman of the Ankara government at Lausanne, İsmet İnönü, had to emphasize the Kurds' contribution carefully:

> Our delegation deems it our task to convey the great emphasis placed by all commanders of the Turkish Army, who participated in both the Great War and the Independence War, on their full respect and adoration for the Kurdish People's service and self-sacrifice…against the Greek invasion, as in the various fronts of Anatolia which was under the intensive attacks of our enemies, Kurds and Turks worked in perfect co-operation with one another for the common purpose and the ideal.
>
> (Beşikçi 1969b:400–401)

Kurds fought for the salvation of the *ümmet* (Muslim nation) enthusiastically, but the veiled and disguised purpose of the Ottoman elite was quite distinct: to keep the dying empire alive in the last refuge. Or, as Bernard Lewis (1968) formulated the question: *'Bu devlet nasıl Kurtarılabilir?* How can this state be saved?'

The saved Turkish state had by no means been involved in a war of national liberation or independence. Turks did fight—again together with Kurds—against Imperial powers (the Allies) between 1914 and 1918, but no one talks about a National War of Independence in these years. The years from here onwards became the stages of the Turko-Greek rivalry. At the Aegean Congress, held in Alaşehir (western Anatolia) a week after the Greek offensive at İzmir (23 August 1919), a telegram was sent to Sir George Milne, a British general, on full approval of all delegates. It emphasized that *no one among them thought of opposing the Allies* and added that 'if certain needs necessitate the invasion of İzmir, we will appreciate it if it is accomplished by the Allies' humane and civilized army instead of the cruel Greek army' (Avcıoğlu 1996:21–22). The victorious Allies' plans to dismember the Ottoman state had become nonsense, even dangerous, due to the unexpected occurrence of the October Revolution. From this angle, some scholars have stated that the Turkish War 'of Independence' with the Greeks and Armenians was in fact a diplomatic continuation of the First World War, in the sense that it constructed barriers against Bolshevik Soviet expansion (Başkaya 1991:29–44). That is to say, 'the First World War ended in 1923' (Keyder 1989:61).

Years later, in his statement released on the fiftieth anniversary of the proclamation, İnö revealed that 'the success of the Independence Struggle had essentially become feasible after Britain compelled other Allied nations to accept it' (Başkaya 1991:33). Over and above its TurkoGreek character, the scale of the 'private' war has been exaggerated. The total number of deaths on the frontline of the war was 9,167, whereas a loss of 22,543 lives was recorded in these very same years as a consequence of various diseases (ibid.: 47).

In addition, a 'civil war', which usually follows national struggles, did not exist at all in the Turkish case. The two substantial components (*Yeşil Ordu* [Green Army] and the guerrilla forces led by Çerkez Ethem) of the *Kuvayi Milliye* (National Forces), which operated against the non-Muslim civilians of Anatolia for some time after the Greek invasion of İzmir, were completely eliminated without hesitation by late 1921, two years before the declaration of the Republic (Shaw and Shaw 1977:352, 353).

As well as the victorious Allies' share in the Ottoman Republic, the contribution of Freemasonry to the Turkish cause is certainly worth a mention. I have to exclude the large body of literature that searches for the roots of the 'Turkish Revolution' in the 'world-revolutionary conspiracy' of the Freemasons for it falls outside of my realm of study. However, the words of a prominent figure in the CUP, Refik Bey, in an interview with a Paris newspaper, tell us something about the extent of the Freemasons' part in the rise of 'Turkishness' in Anatolia: 'It is true we found moral support in Freemasonry, especially in Italian Freemasonry.' They 'rendered us real service and offered us a refuge. We met there as Masons, for many of us are Freemasons, but in reality we met to organize ourselves. Besides, we chose a great part of our comrades from these lodges' (Ramsaur 1957:107). That is, the arguments revolving around the international network of Masonry's contribution to the *nationalismless* 'national' triumph of Turks are significant.

## *The seeds of the question are planted*

Despite everything, the surviving empire did invent a Turkish nation, no matter how paradoxically it was manufactured and constructed following the 'astute' war with its neighbouring non-Muslim nations (Greeks to the west, Armenians in Eastern Anatolia). The paradox does not arise out of the triumph of the Ottoman elite saving the Ottoman state without employing nationalist ideology and agitation but from the Allies' attempts to dismember her. The fact which engendered the paradox of Turkish nation-building is that the Turkish imitation of the 'nation-state' did not come into existence following a *national movement* which was socially based on either the bourgeoisie's or the people's national demands, but following an existing state's Salvation War led by its existing military body, based on the support of the Muslim peoples (mainly Turks and Kurds) of Anatolia with fundamental religious concerns. This very paradox simultaneously planted the seeds of Turkey's Kurdish question. Accordingly, the operating state elite constructed a careful contrast between the policies prior to and after the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey. In sharp contrast to the former period's 'intimate brotherhood' of 'distinct components of the Muslim nation', the consistent policy of the latter period, from 1923 to today, was to somehow manufacture a 'single-bodied' *Turkish nation* out of many Muslim entities. Thus, the Turkish question of national identity 'was hardly posed as "Who are the Turks?" but rather as "Who and/or how are the Turks going to be?"' (Kadıoğlu 1996:177). Naturally, the envisaged Turkishness would basically emerge from Turks and Kurds, because of the demographic and religious reality of the 'raw materials' of Anatolia.

İsmet İnönü firmly stated that 'the government of the Grand National Assembly is also the government of the Kurds as much as of the Turks'. Only two years later, in 1925, İnönü position was the extreme opposite:

> In the face of a Turkish majority other elements have no kind of influence. We must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or 'le turquisme'.
>
> (Şimşir 1991:58)

In 1930, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, the minister of justice, was more confident when he was talking to a crowd in the presence of the press:

> We live in a country called Turkey, the freest in the world. As your deputy, I feel I can express my real convictions without reserve: I believe that the Turk must be the only lord, the only master of this country. Those who are not of pure Turkish stock can have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves.
>
> (Kendal, in Chaliand [1980] 1993:56)

The way in which Turkish nation-building was conducted, in the context of the demographic reality of the new Turkey, left no ideological exit for the Ottoman elite: Atatürk Nationalism *(Atatürk Milliyetçiliği)* was to be formulated by Kemal's well-known maxim, *'Ne Mutlu Türküm diyene'*. Happy is the one who *calls himself* (not who *is*) a Turk. In other words, the happy ones are not original Turks but Turks with other origins, or as a matter of fact, the 'Turks of Kurdish origin' in view of the demographic

map of Anatolia. On the other hand, the 'invention' was, in certain respects, a remoulded extension of the Ottoman Empire's profound tradition of recruiting *devşirmes*[8] and *dönmes*.[9] A 'remedy' would thus necessitate a categorical denial of the ethnic existence of Kurds (who populate almost one-quarter of the whole country) and their spiritual elements: name, language, culture, history, etc. So, the Kurds became 'mountain Turks', Kurdish 'broken Persian', Kurdistan 'the south-east' and the Kurdish question 'the south-east question'. As a result, the regularly repeated rhetoric of the state's official view 'demonstrates' the absence of the question as well as the absence of Kurdish material and spiritual existence. Of course, every Kurd 'can be a businessman, a professor, a governor, the Prime Minister, even the President of the State' providing he is happy to call himself a Turk, and thus happy being doomed to deny his or her own identity. In explanation of the phenomenon, Beşikçi makes a comparison between South Africa and Turkey:

> In South Africa, the Apartheid policy essentially tended to say 'You blacks do not resemble us, you are bad, and you therefore should not join us'. But Turkey tells Kurds 'you are us, You should live with us as Turks, and you must resemble us'. This racism is much more destructive than the 'you do not resemble us, you then should live separately' type of racism. This is Turkish-style racism.
>
> (Beşikçi, in *Serxwebun*, issue 199, 1998:6)

Hobsbawm quotes from Ernest Renan: 'Getting its history wrong is part of being a nation.' And he adds: 'Historians are professionally obliged not to get it wrong or at least to make an effort not to.' In the case of Anatolian Kurdistan, 'where human beings have such deformed and destroyed per-sonalities' (Ballı 1991:15–16), not only the historical record but also the social consequences of this history stretch very far beyond that. It seems to me that genuine historians, sociologists and psychologists have encountered an inverted phenomenon.

Since the inception of his struggle, Öcalan's distinct approach to both his own people and the Turkish state might be the result of apprehending this very fact. As he frequently repeats: 'the Kurdish people is a *düşürülmüş* [degenerated/debased] people'. Or, as he suggests at the outset: 'We are the movement responsible for repositioning justice from its *başaşağı* [upside-down] position' (Öcalan 1986:13).

However, from the proclamation of the Republic onwards, the process of inventing the Turkish nation is not dissimilar to fellow processes that occurred in Europe, the 'native land' of nations. Turkey, in effect, has endeavoured to imitate the experience of France as a typical example of nation-building. The new Turkish state, with its new, solid Turkish nationalism, has invented the Turkish nation precisely according the generalizations of Gellner, Hobsbawm and many other scholars.[10] What was unusual and unworkable, and what has consequently become the real 'seed' of Turkey's Kurdish question, was the historical state of the ethnic nature of Turks and Kurds, and their form of interrelation throughout the Ottoman rule. Kurds were not assimilable, due to their deep-rooted cultural existence and indigenous large population with a homogeneous demography, and Turkey could then not 'digest' them. True, the state of the Kurds under the Ottomans was subordinated and far behind the Turks politically and socially, but they were nevertheless more than semi-autonomous in their home affairs. And, in addition—probably more

importantly with respect to the particularity of Turkey’s Kurdish question—the Kurds had taken a significant part in the ‘liberation war’ of the Ottoman state and its transformation into a Republic.

# 3
# Enter the PKK

To provide a further context for the study of the organization's growth, we have to look at the ground in which the phenomenon was rooted. Then, its development from the most initial steps to the founding congress (1978) will be looked at in perspective. The materialization of the PKK in terms of organizational establishments in the early 1970s is the main theme of this chapter. The emergence of the party from a group of six housemates in Ankara (the capital city of Turkey) to its foundation congress in a village affiliated to Diyarbakır (regarded as the capital of Kurdistan) is put in perspective in approximately chronological order.

## The accumulative period

According to Turkish state officials, the offensive launched by the PKK on 15 August 1984 was the work of a 'bunch of bandits'. The offensive was later considered to be the '29th Revolt', which would be smashed in weeks or months just like the preceding 28 attempts. The most recent revolt, 'the 28th', had taken place in Dersim province in 1937 to 1938 and was over in less than six months—the longest one to date.

But this revolt sparked a destructive 15-year war (1984–1999). It took place after a period of relatively uninterrupted peace. After just over three silent decades, which began in the aftermath of the suppression of the Dersim uprising in 1938, there were hints of the 'noisy' years that were to come. The political and social ramifications of the latest revolt extended far beyond Kurdish and Turkish territories.

### *The silent decades*

The sudden appearance of the Turkic face of the 'new state' engendered three big Kurdish armed uprisings in 1925, 1930 and 1937, all led either by religious figures or tribal chieftains. Their suppression by the 'Young Republic' took less than a year in each case. The quiet years followed the suppression of 1938 and continued until the 1960s.

The crushing of the 1938 Dersim revolt was designed by the authorities to be an unforgettable lesson for future generations. A guidebook published by the governor and army commander of Dersim described how to destroy a village in an artillery attack and how to burn down individual houses (Göktaş 1991a:140, 141). Indiscriminate massacres,

massive deportations and the elimination of anything that might be associated with Kurdishness—all of these were used to intimidate the population into silence, submission and obedience. The effects lasted for at least three decades.

A paragraph in a report by Osman Mete, correspondent for *Son Posta,* the Turkish paper of the time, details these effects some ten years after the suppression of the Dersim rebellion:

> I went to Tunç Elli, the old Dersim. The place was desolate. Tax collectors and policemen are still the only state officials the people have ever seen. I tried to meet people, to get to know their way of life, their spirit. But unfortunately very little remains from the period before the revolt. There are no more artisans, no more culture, no more trade. I met unoccupied people whose whole life now seemed to revolve around a flock of a hundred goats. No trace of civilization has yet penetrated the area. There are no schools, no doctors. The people do not even know what the word 'medicine' means. If you speak to them of government, they translate it immediately as tax collectors and policemen.
>
> (Mete, in *Son Posta,* April 1948)

Following the Second World War, the military republic led by Kemal's successor, İsmet İnönü felt obliged to give its regime a democratic façade. İnönü the *Milli Şef* (national leader), liberalized the regime to a limited extent, so that it could be deemed a 'multiparty parliamentary system'. This led to the founding of several political parties in 1946. In the Republic's first general election (1950), the Democratic Party, backed by the bourgeoisie, came to power on a wave of popular support by polling more than 50 per cent of the votes. Led by bourgeois landlord Adnan Menderes, the Democratic Party ruled Turkey for ten years. This 'Menderes period', with its limited anti-military and/or anti-Kemalist initiatives, was undoubtedly a considerable move forward for Turkey. Yet the Kurdish issue remained marginal. The appearance of a small number of *'Doğucu'* (Eastist) publications in these years, desperately demanding infrastructural developments in the 'East' (that is, the Kurdish territories), was an isolated example of the coverage of Kurdish concerns. These documents did little to lift the pall of silence which had descended over the Kurds following the ruthless oppression of the 1930s.

However, the 'backbone' of the state, the military body, could not endure the modest attempts of the bourgeoisie at self-rule and liberalization for more than ten years. On 27 May 1960, the rule of the Republic's first civilian party was ended by a military *coup d'état* led by the chief of staff, Cemal Gürsel. Prime Minister Menderes and two ministers of his cabinet were executed for infringements of the constitution. 'The Committee of National Unity', composed of the principal participants in the coup, took over the government of the country for almost a year and a half until the elections. It then handed power to a 'civilian government'—which must have learnt its lesson well—with the new constitution of 1961. The Gürsel *coup d'état* is known as the '27 May Revolution' in Turkish republican history.

### *The emergence of the Turkish Left through the democratic 'gaps' of the coup*

Ironically, the soldiers' new constitution introduced society to some important democratic rights—probably as a symbolic manifestation of the Ottoman tradition of 'revolts from above' (Frey 1965), or in Kemal's words: 'If communism is needed for this country, *we* will bring it' Among the new rights were public freedom of expression, press freedom, the right to organize public meetings and demonstrations, and the right to form trade unions and associations (Turkish Constitution of 1961, articles 20, 23, 24, 25, 28). Moreover, by 1963 ambitious and progressive interpretations of some articles had led to the granting of the right to strike and to make collective agreements.

After the constitution was pushed through, three political parties were founded—including the Workers' Party of Turkey.[1] This party attracted people's attention, and constituted a parliamentary group in the National Assembly with 15 MPs after the 1965 elections. In the 1960s, some other leftist political factions and trade unions emerged. But such democratic liberties did not apply to the Kurds. Several 'pro-East' Turkish and bilingual publications were banned as soon as they appeared, and after the declaration of the Republic, the monthly magazine *Yeni Akış* (The New Current), which used the term 'Kurdish people' for the first time, was banned in 1966. When its fourth issue was published, the editor was imprisoned for writing 'the Kurdish people'.

After the launch of an armed struggle by southern Kurds in the north of Iraq, Cemal Gürsel, leader of the military coup, stated his position on the probable aspirations of the 'mountain Turks' of Turkey who might think of benefiting from some of the democratic articles in his constitution: 'If the mountain Turks do not keep quiet, the army will not hesitate to bomb their towns and villages into the ground. There will be such a bloodbath that they and their country will be washed away' (Chaliand 1980:65).

Despite all the obstacles, the Kurds did manage to benefit from the limited democratization in the 1960s. In addition to the emergence of various radical leftist groupings gathered around certain publications and youth associations, a few public associations led by *Kürtçü* (Kurdist) intel-lectuals of aristocratic or feudal origins also arose towards the 1970s. While Kurds attempted to raise the 'Eastern Question' in spite of the clear warning by the leader of the 'democratic junta' General Gürsel, many other threats appeared from *civilian* sources on the pages of various papers and magazines. Kendal talks of more than 20 such articles, and cites a paragraph published in the June 1967 issue of the 'nationalist' journal *Ötüken*, by Nihal Atsız, one of the authors:

> If [the Kurds] want to carry on speaking a primitive language with vocabularies of only four or five hundred words, if they want to create their own state and publish what they like, let them go and do it somewhere else. We Turks have shed rivers of blood to take possession of these lands; we had to uproot Georgians, Armenians and Byzantine Greeks… Let them go off where ever they want, to Iran, to Pakistan, to India, or to join Barzani. Let them ask the United Nations to find them a homeland in Africa. The Turkish race is very patient, but when it is really

> angered it is like a roaring lion and nothing can stop it. Let them ask the Armenians who we are, and let them draw the appropriate conclusions.
>
> (Kendal, in Chaliand [1980] 1993:77)

By the late 1960s opposition movements increased in size and influence, coinciding with a wave of student movements in the West. As well as moderate socialist trade unions and student and youth organizations, professional associations of teachers, medical doctors, engineers, public officers and even police officers emerged throughout Turkey, all of which expressed disenchantment with the system. Soon, the Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP) began to suffer from internal conflicts which started to split into factions after 1969. These included moderate 'parliamentarists' and radical 'Leninists', as well as the 'Turkish Left' and 'Kurdish Left'.

Even if the party carried a motion on the Kurdish question, which later caused it to be banned, the 'Eastist' figures in the party acted separately. The faction known as the 'Eastern Group' had organized *'Doğu Mitingleri'* (East Meetings) in the principal towns of Kurdistan in 1967. Meanwhile, in 1969, a series of mass and/or youth associations were set up by various patriotic Kurdish figures from mainly aristocratic and feudal backgrounds.

These associations initially operated in the two largest metropolises of Turkey, İstanbul and Ankara, then in several main towns in the 'East'. These groups were influenced more by the Kurdish armed struggle under Mustafa Barzani's KDP in the south than by the Turkish socialist factions. Associations named DDKO (Eastern Revolutionary Culture Guilds) were embracing organizations for the emerging Kurdish nationalists in Turkey, as was the TİP. Consequently, the disintegration of the TİP led to the formation of a dozen pro-Kurdish organizations in the 1970s (İmset 1992:379–406).

### *The radical tradition of youth movements*

While the TİP was striving to benefit from any democratic 'gaps' in the 1961 constitution for a socialist orientation in Turkey, the Turkish youth organization, DEV-GENÇ (influenced by the tradition of the Latin American revolutionaries and later by the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutionaries), became widely known and organized strikes all over the country. This organization evolved out of the earlier Federation of Debating Clubs (FKF).[2] The Federation of these debating societies originally came into being in 1965 'as a side-arm of the Turkish Workers Party (TİP)' and was modified into the Federation of Revolutionary Youth (DEV-GENÇ)[3] in October 1969 (İmset 1992:407).

The DEV-GENÇ was a movement organized in reaction to the TİP's parliamentarist and pro-Soviet policies—and its militants were aggressively critical of the TİP's 'pacifist' and 'stencilist' practices. They initially got involved in violent activities against the state-backed armed militias of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)[4] and they later formed the armed organizations of various political mainstream movements, whose members were trained in Palestinian camps. The three radical 'adventurer' mainstream groups of the Turkish pro-Marxist Left had appeared under different names and leaders by the end of 1970, and they provided fertile ground for the cleavages of many further factions during the rest of the 1970s:

1 The Popular Liberation Party of Turkey (THKP)[5] under Mahir Çayan remained an imitator of the Latin American revolutionaries, in particular Che Guevara, and was quite critical of the socialist powers of the time, the USSR and China.
2 The Popular Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO)[6] under Deniz Gezmiş adopted the oppositional policies of Eastern European socialist states against the Soviet Union, particularly the policies of Albania.
3 The Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML)[7] under İbrahim Kaypakkaya affiliated itself to Mao's China.

Abdullah Öcalan, the founder and leader of the PKK, was a sympathizer with the THKP and its leader Mahir Çayan until 1973.

The organizations of the 'Kurdish Left' were, as Olson rightly states, offshoots of three political trends: the Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Iraq (KDP), the Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP) and the DEV-GENÇ (Olson 1996:22). But there is a vital detail missing from Olson's valuable work, *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s*—namely, that while more than 20 Kurdish parties or party-like political configurations in Turkish-ruled Kurdistan stemmed from either the TİP or DDKO,[8] or both, the PKK alone originated from the DEV-GENÇ or, more accurately, from its further sub-faction the DHKP, or later the DHKP-C. Öcalan explains his position as a 'very ordinary sympathizer' as being the cause of his escape from the 'sword' of the Military Intervention in 1971 (Öcalan 1995a:40).

## The emergence of the *'Apocular'*[9] group

### *The army marches in again*

Due to the rapid growth of legal and illegal pro-Marxist organizations, the army believed that civilians were once again meddling dangerously with the 'democratization opportunities' they had been presented with. On 12 March 1971, the chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces overthrew the Demirel government, which was considered to be a successor to Menderes' mainstream government.[10] A state of emergency was imposed, associations of all sorts were dissolved, the TİP was banned, the right to strike suspended, ongoing strikes were ended and widespread arrests of politicians and 'extreme' activists took place.

The 'Adventurer' Left did not intend to surrender and attempted to initiate an armed struggle against the 'oligarchic' or the 'boss-lord' state. But their romantic aspirations were at odds with reality. Deniz Gezmiş, leader of the THKO, and other leading members of the organization were captured or killed in various clashes.

Gezmiş and his two closest comrades, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan, were hanged on 6 May 1972. Mahir Çayan, eight leading militants of his party (the THKP), two prominent members of Gezmiş's organization (the THKO) and three English radar technicians were surrounded on 30 March 1972 in a house in Kızıldere.[11] The foreign technicians were being held as hostages for the purpose of preventing the execution of Gezmiş and his two friends. All the occupants of the house were killed by rockets and bombs, including the three English staff, who were from the military base in Turkey. Only Ertuğrul Kürkçü, who met and interviewed Öcalan in Damascus 22 years after the

event (Öcalan 1995a), survived. İbrahim Kaypakkaya, the leader of the TKP/ML, died on 18 May 1973 in Diyarbakır prison—'under torture' according to leftist circles, although official documents describe him 'committing suicide' (İmset 1992:437).

However, the Turkish army handed over power to the government formed following elections held in October 1973, as they had done on the earlier occasion.

### *The impact of particular events on Öcalan's leadership*

On 7 April 1971, Öcalan was arrested in Ankara and imprisoned for seven months, after being found guilty of taking part in an illegal protest against the Kızıldere incident in the Political Science Faculty of Ankara. Öcalan's political adventures began on a personal level with the Kızıldere clash. Öcalan was released from Mamak prison in October 1972.

In an interview, Öcalan 'naïvely' replies to a question about the beginning of his story:

> If the 'Defeat of 71' had not occurred in the form of Kızıldere, I would have remained a good sympathizer or member of the DHKP-C at the very most; I could not have ventured on structuring a new theory… The emergence of myself would have been impossible if Kıziıldere had not happened.
>
> (Yüce 1997:188)

In the course of the interview with Ertuğrul Kürkçü, the only person who survived in Kızıldere, Öcalan refers to the impression made on him by the execution of the THKO leaders while he was in Mamak prison: 'They fell into earth, and we sprouted from there' (Öcalan 1995a:42). The first meeting with Kürkçü made Öcalan feel excited. His first words to Kürkçü were: 'Twenty-two years later, we took your revenge [on the state for the Kızıldere massacre].' He also adds in the same interview:

> If I were to state a commencement date, one of the most important beginnings would be this [the Kızıldere event] because I was imprisoned and these months were an incubation period for me.
>
> (Öcalan 1995a:40)

When he was released from prison in October 1972, Öcalan began looking for friends who might be willing to take the same course as him during what he envisaged as the 'incubation period', but he moved steadily and took diligent steps. He was involved in the activities—and was elected to the management committee—of the AYÖD,[12] which was in fact a legal platform for THKP-C sympathizers. Simultaneously Öcalan continued to compose the nucleus of a future organization. (He later chaired the management committee of the student association for some time before it was banned in 1975.)

> In fact, as soon as I came out [of prison], I tested my options. I took my chance in a manner that did not draw attention…[I was a] THKP-C sympathizer, but a *Kurdish group* appeared.
>
> (Öcalan 1995a:43; emphasis added)

The contradictory nature of Öcalan's political performance dominated his style in the approach to the announcement of the party in the late 1970s; it faded away in the 1980s, then returned during the mid-1990s together with unilateral ceasefire policies. 'Until the end of 1975', one of his early friends states, 'it was not clear whether President Apo led either a Group of Kurdish or Turkish Left' (Yüce 1997:200). The twofold nature of the leadership of the 'Kurdish National Movement' in Turkey was not just a characteristic feature of the movement at the outset, but has always been the case in the PKK to varying degrees.

While the group was being formed, Öcalan's two close Turkish associ-ates within the AYÖD, Kemal Pir and Haki Karer, hesitated to participate in the very first meetings, only joining the group after several meetings had taken place. The incorporation of Pir and Karer had included a slogan which would become well-known in pro-PKK publications: The Revolution of Turkey has to pass through Kurdistan.'

The strategic aim of the PKK for an independent Kurdistan has always been contradictory and vague. Öcalan's project of the 'Anatolian Revolution' (*Serxwebun*, December 1997) and the proposal for a 'Democratic Republic'—covering Anatolia as the common fatherland for Turks and Kurds are by no means novel initiatives. These concepts, further articulated in his fundamental defence document (Öcalan 1999a, 1999b), are essentially an extension of a consistent line. On his first appearance in a Turkish court, when Öcalan stated that he would be proud to serve the state in a democratic republic—because, for him, it was 'a virtue to serve a democratic republic' (*Sabah*, 24 June 1999)—many observers inferred that Öcalan had betrayed his ideals. However, a few who were more familiar with the PKK's background referred to interviews given in the early 1990s that showed that Öcalan was merely keeping to his previous line with these seemingly 'shocking' statements before the court (Can Dündar, *Aktüel*, March 1999). İsmet G.İmset, the former editor of the *Turkish Daily News*, draws attention to another aspect of the 'contradictory' nature of the PKK:

> Thus, the story of the PKK dates back to the early 1970s. It emerged not in the guerrilla camps on the rugged terrain of Southeast Turkey, and not in any other neighbouring country in the Middle East but in Turkey's capital city one day in 1974. In other words, as far as its original roots are concerned, the PKK came to being not in the Kurdish-populated eastern parts of the country but in Central Turkey. It has, however, always been dominated by Öcalan.
>
> (İmset 1992:9)

David McDowall points towards a similar distinctive feature of the PKK: 'The Apocular were unlike all other Kurdish groups in Turkey (or else-where) in that they were drawn almost exclusively from Turkey's growing proletariat' (McDowall 1996:418).

By emphasizing the Turkish and Ankara-related roots of the PKK, it is not my intention to suggest that Öcalan's leadership and the PKK were built on the ruthless suppression of Turkish romantic revolutionaries to whom Öcalan had previously been sympathetic, or the army's similarly oppressive and cruel actions during the 12 March coup of 1971. The factors mentioned above were not the *causes* of the PKK, but they had

a significant influence on its organizational style. When viewed like that, these factors are actually not clues to help us explore the *why* of the PKK but rather the *how* of the PKK.

On many occasions in the course of interviews or during dialogues with his pupils, when talking about the beginning of the movement or about the 'Mamak Days',[13] Öcalan repeats: 'Once I get out of here, I was saying to myself, the organization I must create should guarantee its continuity: An organization and the insured assiduousness.' And, 'I must not be back here again' (Öcalan 1995a:71).

Öcalan has fulfilled his promise of continuity. The organization has extended its active existence for more than two and half decades so far. But he was, somehow, recaptured in Kenya after some 27 years, following an international abduction operation in which the world's superpowers were involved (Uçar 2000). He is now 'back there again' in a one-man prison on an island (İmralli) encircled by the Turkish inner sea (Marmara). He first waited for the death penalty, to which he was sentenced on 29 June 1999, but later began to serve a life sentence following the removal of the death penalty from Turkish law.

### *Preliminary steps towards the group*

The idea of founding a group arose in Öcalan's mind when he was experiencing his first imprisonment:

> Towards the end of the year [1972] we were released. I still remember; the first thing I had to do was to pass my exams in fifteen days and have the right to attend the second year of the faculty. As soon as I achieved that, I had one-to-one meetings in the utmost secrecy with each individual probable person for the nucleus of the group. The idea of colonialism was emerging at that time. The Kurdish question is a colonial matter', I said. Nobody had thought of such a diagnosis [about Kurdistan] if you remember. But the terms 'Kurdistan', 'colony' came to my mind…do you believe that when I was going to tell someone I used to go to the deepest room, if there were two doors I shut them both, and I was simply whispering into the ears.
>
> (Öcalan 1995a:44)

These terms were what Öcalan always refers to when he says: 'I began with *two words*', which he regards as the 'key words' for initiating the struggle for national liberation.

He considers national liberation as being 'only a means' of his struggle: 'I keep asking: How will a human type of our era be formed? There are humanist ideologies; what is human and what is the thing that is humane? In this sense, national liberation is only a means of my struggle' (*Serxwebun*, 192, December 1997).

Öcalan's first attempt to implement his plans for forming the group envisaged during his 'incubation' months was at a meeting in April 1973, arranged as a picnic with seven people (including Ocalan) in a rural area of Ankara. In fact, Öcalan did not plan the picnic for a meeting:

> This is a style in my manner of acting… Taking the picnic was not the ostensible task in my mind. The meeting was not organized with the intention of gathering a group. I smelt the atmosphere there as an opportunity for a meeting, and I did it.
>
> (Ocalan 1995a:45)

These six persons did not know one another very well, but rather they had one-to-one connections with Öcalan. Some of them kept asking: 'When are we climbing up the mountains?' However, they sided with Ocalan only for a few months before returning to their ordinary life—except one, Ali Haydar Kaytan. He is currently one of the chief guerrilla commanders at the PKK's (currently KONGRA GEL) main headquarters. In fact, there has been no significant participation in the group for more than a year: 'It was not so easy to pull someone into the group. Whoever joined us first, they were listening for one or two months, then going back to their work and duties' (ibid.). The on-and-off recruitment subsequent to the first 'unofficial' meeting continued in this vein until the end of 1974, during the time in which activities revolved around the student association mainly based in the Political Science Faculty, AYÖD.

The first meeting in terms of organizational structure was the one held in Tuzluçayır (a district of Ankara) at the end of 1974 when AYÖD was on the verge of being closed down. There were again seven people present at the meeting, but unlike the preceding meeting they are known and recorded in the history of the party. The participants, who were to rise to fame later in the history of the PKK, were Abdullah Ocalan, Haki Karer, M.Hayri Durmuş, Kemal Pir, Mazlum Doğan, Cemil Bayık and Şahin Dönmez (Yüce 1997:251; İmset 1992:11). Along with Öcalan, only Cemil Bayık is still alive. He is currently a prime figure in the leading body of the KONGRA GEL.[14] The other early members have been eliminated or have died in various ways. Haki Karer, known as the first martyr of the party, was killed by an emerging Kurdish group *(Istêrka Sor)* in Antep on 18 May 1977. M.Hayri Durmuş and Kemal Pir died during a hunger strike at the Diyarbakır prison in 1982. Mazlum Doğan 'committed suicide' on *Newroz* day (21 March, the Kurds' national day) of the same year in protest against the 'brutal torture practices of the Diyarbakır Dungeon'. Şahin Dönmez was killed by PKK militants in İzmir for 'betraying the cause' following his release from Diyarbakır prison.

At the Tuzluçayır meeting, Öcalan created a strong position for himself, and from then on he began to be recognized as the obvious leader. He 'was gradually becoming a leader for their nameless gathering' and the rest of the participants noticed that Apo, 'among all of them, was the most outspoken voice on "Kurdish rights", then a major taboo, in Turkey' (İmset 1992:11). Unlike the earlier 'provisional' meeting, those present knew one another, knew each other's standpoints and were also aware of what Öcalan envisaged, for they were gathering to debate the most important issues in the course of the 'legal' activities of the AYÖD. However, these years were the time at which the twofold character of Öcalan's emerging group predominated:

> Naturally, 1974 and 1975 were the two important years during which I devoted myself to the revolution in Turkey. In those years ADYÖD [the replacement of AYÖD after its ban] was set up and I was the prime person

> responsible for it. I was engaged in its primary organizational works as one of the main figures. I subordinated the duties of my own group to it [the perspective of a revolution in greater Anotolia].
>
> (Küçük 1993:74, 75)

### *The declaration of the group and the 'return to the source'*

The next major step in the formation process of the group was the 'Dikmen Meeting' arranged at the end of 1976 following several subgatherings. The exact number of the participants is not clear. 'Between 20 and 25 people' is the figure mentioned in the party sources.

The importance of this meeting, held in Dikmen (a suburb of Ankara), stems from its two vital resolutions.

First, a 'central' committee composed of Öcalan, Haki Karer and Kamer Özkan was elected to lead the group. This was the first organizational committee in the history of the movement. But in terms of Öcalan's leadership, it was the first and *last* organizational election in the PKK's history. Öcalan has since been the 'indisputable' and 'indispensable' acting leader of the movement, to the extent that he was again elected as the 'general president' at the sixth and seventh (extraordinary) congresses of the PKK while he was in a one-man prison in Turkey.[15] No one has even been put forward as deputy president, in order to prevent any confusion about Öcalan's 'indispensability'. Instead, the actual leadership has been replaced with a 'Presidency Council' composed of nine known members. Moreover, any suggestions that Öcalan communicates to the party through his solicitors, including extremely vital decisions such as the ending of the 15-year-long armed struggle—and the consequent withdrawal of the party's armed guerrilla forces from the official territories of Turkey—are approved and implemented at once by the PKK without any resistance or opposition. An extract from his dialogue with Ertuğrul Kürkçü focusing on this particular point is instructive:

*Kürkçü:* Right, have you, for example, ever been elected [in the organization] in any form of procedure?
*Öcalan:* The election has never been required.
*Kürkçü:* Natural leader.
*Öcalan:* It is something beyond naturalness…
*Kürkşü:* At this point for instance; when you make decisions on these issues, do you consult about, or…?
*Öcalan:* An extensive consultation process does in fact take place in these circumstances. Namely, I give a precise opinion; then I do not step back until I convert that opinion into the opinion of the person I am in contact with. This is another secret of my success. That is to say, I work with the person who has come to the point where he/she is ready to die in defence of the opinion, which I gave as my opinion.
*Kürkçü:* Is it still like that?
*Öcalan:* Yes, it is still. This is my style of constructing the organization.
*Kürkçü:* The number of people is now very many. It is not 20, but 20,000.
*Öcalan:* It is still like that.
*Kürkçü:* Are the words enough for 20,000 people?

*Öcalan:* A work cannot be accomplished unless a profound grasp of the work is acquired. It is not a matter of making common decisions. We cannot execute these great activities by an ordinary organizational determination unless the opinions are appropriated to one's spiritual structure, heart, or to the whole personality as a great aim. My whole talent lies behind this; to play the role of a great artist. I mean, by saying an artist, being like an artisan… I spare no effort and do not leave a dot of imperfection in devoting my whole life to this belief. They believe and then make their decisions. The need for elections consequently does not appear. And the way in which works are executed is still the same…

(Öcalan 1995a:56–57)

The second and more important distinguishing 'event' of the meeting was the resolution to return home to Kurdistan, a resolution recorded as the 'first organizational determination towards undertaking not an imitative but a real revolution' in the history of the party. Considering other Kurdish political initiatives—aspiring to a 'Kurdish National Liberation Revolution' in 'Turkish Kurdistan'—while their headquarters were based in Ankara or Istanbul,[16] the resolution on returning home would have drawn and deserved more attention.

Öcalan appointed a large meeting of the Architects and Engineers Association of Ankara, where a wide range of leftist political circles were expected to be represented, as an opportunity to declare the organization's resolution and his determination to implement it. The organization did not yet have a publication as a means of distributing its views, whereas many of the other groups or parties had taken their names from the periodicals published prior to their formation, such as *Devrimci Yol* (Revolutionary Path), *Halkın Kurtuluşu* (People's Liberation), *Rizgari* (Liberation) *Özgürlük Yolu* (The Road to Freedom), etc. This lack of a publication was one of the distinct features of the group and it continued until the foundation of the party.

The organization's publications are neither the exclusive nor the most reliable sources for study—but these are the best sources available to the researcher in Turkey, where data concerning the Kurdish issue are difficult to locate. Information based on quantitative investigations into the organization's period as a group is kept by Turkish security agents and has never been published. Nor will it be until the Kurdish question is completely settled. Although he worked on behalf of the state, İsmet G.İmset, the editor of the *Turkish Daily News*,[17] also complained about the lack of sources relating to this period: 'In 1986, a detailed study on the formation, foreign contacts and structure of the PKK was prepared by two official security departments but has never gone into print' (İmset 1992:13).

### *The meeting in Fis: the founding congress of the PKK*

In accordance with the resolution to 'return to the source' and related sub-resolutions, The 'Apocular' initiated a propaganda campaign targeting the 'home' population. A series of accompanying meetings focused on certain provinces. The first provincial targets were Gaziantep, Maraş, Elaziĝ, Dersim (Tunceli) and Ağrı.[18] Several meetings had been held in and around these selected 'pilot territories' by 15 May 1977, many of them chaired by Ocalan himself.

Despite their radical diagnoses of the Kurdish question, the PKK did not get substantially involved in violence until Haki Karer was killed in Gaziantep on 18 May 1977, three days after the accomplishment of the sequence of meetings.[19] Karer was shot dead in the course of an argument provoked by the member of an emerging group of the 'Kurdish Left' (*Istêrka Sor*—Red Star), which had only been in existence for several months. Karer became the 'first martyr' of the Apocular group, with his Turkish origin providing additional pride. The group had lost its 'second man'—one of the three members of the first leadership committee. Nevertheless, the expected clashes between the two groups did not take place. Instead, the Apocular accelerated the meetings orientated towards the establishment of a party. They had occasional clashes with groups on the Turkish and Kurdish Left such as *Halkın Kurtuluşu* in Gaziantep and Maraş, *Özgürlük Yolu* in Ağrı, *Devrimci Sol* in Elaziğ, *Partizan* in Dersim, and with the KUK and DDKD in Diyarbakır and parts of the country towards the south-east.

'When Haki Karer was killed in Gaziantep, we said: "The state decreed the death sentence for us"', the 'adventurer' Öcalan narrates when con-veying the atmosphere of those days. They were in a serious quandary as they sought to answer two questions: 'Will the Group survive or not? Or, will it upgrade itself or not?':

> The process from 1977 to 1978 was a determining process to decide whether 'we shall be a party or continue as a group'. After having a very hard time, we had come to the point: 'Let's give ourselves a party name; we are weak, we are powerless but it would at least be good if a party name was to go down in history'.
>
> (Küçük 1993:77)

Due to the death of Karer, the group was prompted to decide on the foundation of the party and it drew up the party programme draft 'in memory of him' following the meeting held in Bağlar district of Diyarbakır. The draft was later published with the title of *Kürdistan Devriminin Yolu* (The Path of Kurdistan Revolution), also known as the 'Manifesto'.

Following another intensive propaganda campaign in the light of the Manifesto, the foundation congress of the party in Fis[20] was arranged for late November 1978. The congress took six days, gathered with 22 delegates and ended on 27 November. The 'Fis Meeting' produced the PKK *(Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan)* with General Secretary Abdullah Öcalan and the first Central Committee, including M.Hayri Durmuş, Cemil Bayık, Mazlum Doğan, Mehmet Karasungur, Kesire Yıldırım and Şahin Dönmez. It also decided to set up the magazine, *Serxwebun*, to be issued monthly as the central organ of the party. From then on, all communiques would be signed with the party name, the PKK.

# 4
# The discourse and objectives of the PKK

This chapter studies the mutation of the PKK's ideology and programmes. Its ideas and aspiration, aims and objectives are examined in their totality. The discourse, views and ideas of the organization are studied in relation to setting its political targets and corresponding activities: it discusses the formation and development of the ideological wording, the initial political demands and objectives, and the tactical and strategic transformation at specific stages of the struggle in conjunction with the party's organizational expansion, massification and confrontations. The chapter inspects the alterations in the textual body of the organization with the totality of its consistent, flexible and metamorphosed aspects. In particular, the nationalist undertakings in comparison with socialist aspirations are taken on board.

## The theoretical development of the party and its programme from its foundation to Öcalan's arrest

To understand how the organization was formed and how it works within the scattered Kurdish population we need to look at the ideology and theory of the PKK.[1] Considering this study's particular emphasis on the weight of the 'subjective element' in the rise of the Kurdish movement in Turkey in the 1990s, a critical knowledge of the ideological and programmatic evolution of the party will help shed light on its organizational growth.

The apparent theoretical-programmatic orientation and transformation throughout the large number of party publications—from *Manifesto* (1978) to 'Defences', *Declaration on the Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question* ('Second Manifesto' 1999)—reflect the organizational confrontations within the movement. The evolution of the PKK's theory of the revolution guides one to identify the ground of individual motivation, and consequently of the resources of mass mobilization surrounding Kurdish nationality and sociality.

### *Ideological and programmatic framework*

Just before the founding congress was held in a village affiliated to Diyarbakır, the first written party document appeared. In a highly concealed and camouflaged flat in an upmarket ward of Diyarbakır, Ocalan, with one of his senior comrades, M.Hayri Durmuş,

laid down the basic principles and objectives of the foetal PKK—'a manifesto for proletarian revolutionaries of Kurdistan' (Öcalan [1978] 1992:12). The paper was introduced in the first issue of an illegal magazine, *Serxwebun*, the official organ of the central committee of the PKK, and later printed as a booklet: *The Path of Kurdistan Revolution (Manifesto)*. A brief overview of this document will be of use when trying to understand the group's early initiatives and how Öcalan arrived at his 'defence' against the prosecutors of the State Security Court of Turkey.

The document is the first literal expression of the group's conception of the world and its basic socio-political aims and objectives—even though the emergence of the gathering can almost be traced back to 1973. It for this reason that it has been labelled a 'manifesto'. Unlike other Turkish and Kurdish leftist political parties and circles, the Apocular[2] (followers of Apo) did not have periodicals for propaganda purposes and for recruitment until the party's foundation meeting. There was only a handwritten 'draft programme' distributed to the prominent members of the group to 'study' in early 1978. Öcalan frequently refers to this 'discretion' as the necessary measure taken against the state's operations.

The content and rhetoric of the *Manifesto* look like an ordinary copy of any conventional Communist Party's programme. However, unlike many of the other Kurdish political and cultural groupings it does present ideas for a distinctive future. The 'symptoms' are nevertheless not ideological, nor are they theoretical formulations, but rather show the spirit of the language and the additional emphasis on the extent of the armed struggle, such as:

> Our Movement…would deem leading our people with ideological, organizational and political means to be a sacred and historical task;
>
> Having a life distant from the Kurdistan Revolution would be no different from a bestial lifestyle;

or,

> If the people of Kurdistan venture into a war, they should be absolutely prepared for a protracted people's war which will have to pass through long and various stages.
>
> (*Manifesto* 190, 11, 198)

The Apocular proposed the party to be Marxist-Leninist and 'a revolutionary party of proletariat and peasants of Kurdistan' (Öcalan [1978] 1992: 153–158). A brief definition of the early PKK was provided: 'a political organization under the guidance of scientific socialism' which would be pursuing the 'holy and historical task' of leading the 'Kurdistan Revolution' (ibid.: 190, 194).

They begin with the historical explanation of the social and political roots of 'colonialism', in view of Marx's 'materialist conception of history', with frequent references to the terms 'class societies', 'class struggle', 'surplus value', and 'labour exploitation', and so on. Then, they summarize the general picture of world politics with particular emphasis on the contention between the Imperialist and Socialist camps—the Cold War following the 'Second Imperialist War'. The 'Kurdistan Revolutionaries'

group takes its position in favour of the 'progressive struggle of the Socialist System under the USSR against imperialist expansion', as well as being critical of the 'revisionist' and 'opportunist' policies of the Soviet Union of the time. Still, the group welcomes the Soviets' active support for the 'national liberation struggles of oppressed peoples' around the world.

The focus of the second part is the 'Society of Kurdistan'—where the history of the 'colonization of Kurdistan' is presented. They also give an account of the sociopolitical structure of Kurdish society, with a more detailed map of the classes and the strata of 'mid-northwest' Kurdistan (the Turkish-ruled territory).

In the last part, the national, regional and international dimensions of the Kurdish revolution are discussed: the positive and negative legacy with which the 'Kurdistan revolutionaries' started their initiative; the objective and subjective aspects of the conditions; the features, targets and duties; the method and tactics; the fundamental source of power and the allies of the revolution; and the revolution's place in the 'Middle-East and World Revolutions'—all are discussed and clarified (*Manifesto* 183–214). The revolution is defined, outlined and, to some degree, scheduled in this early draft programme.

According to this:

a Our era is the era of transition from capitalism to socialism and proletarian revolutions.
b Kurdistan is an inter-state colony.
c A national liberation struggle is an unavoidable duty in order to gain the freedom and independence of the Kurdish people.
d The Kurdistan revolution shall be a *national and democratic* one, and the ultimate end would, in long term, be the *socialist revolution* with an uninterrupted transition to a 'classless and non-exploitative' society.
e The revolution's political objective is to establish an *independent, united and democratic Kurdistan*.
f The revolution must be led by a revolutionary party of the proletariat which needs to be initiated by a 'minority' composed of patriotic youth and intellectuals (enlightened) who are disassociated from material production.
g The primary social base and the leading class of the revolution have to be, in spite of its numerical and ideological weakness, the working class. The secondary social base of the revolution and senior ally of the working class are the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeois. The international allies are socialist countries, the working class parties of capitalist countries and the liberation movements of oppressed peoples of the world.
h The targets of the revolution are the conquerors of Kurdistan (the Turkish state) and its native feudal-collaborators, and the imperialist powers behind them.
i The all-in-one use of ideological, political and military forms of the struggle is necessary for the success of the national liberation of the colony Kurdistan.

The striking point is that the views, diagnoses, proposals, aims and objectives outlined so far are simply a copy of all the other fellow political initiatives' programmes claiming to undertake Kurdish national and social emancipation. This is contrary to the widely received idea that the rest of the Kurdish political circles did not have a bias towards armed struggle. Those who gathered around certain periodicals advocating national

aspirations in the 1970s, and later in the 1980s, argued over who was the 'oldest party' while issuing extreme programmes following their safe escape to Europe from the Turkish coup of 1980, had emphasized the inevitability of the military means of struggle since their groups had existed. The relevant lines in the programmes of these initiatives are substantially identical. We will now briefly go through the expressions employed about the 'armed struggle' by the three principal groups which had remarkably drawn more popular support among the Kurds of Turkey than the PKK in the late 1970s.

The Vanguard Workers Party of Kurdistan (PPKK—*Partiya Pêşenga Karkerên Kurdistan*) known as *Şıvancılar*.[3]

> The PPKK, during its national and social liberation struggle, does employ legal, illegal, semi-legal, peaceful, non-peaceful (from mass riots to armed people's war) and all the forms and means of struggle according to the concrete circumstances.
>
> (*PPKK, Programme,* 1984:26)

The Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan (TKSP) known as (*Özgürlük Yolu*Freedom Path) which later changed its name to Kurdistan Socialist Party:

> We hitherto, in a policy towards the victory of the national democratic revolution, insistently emphasized the importance of the following:
> …according to circumstances, also including the armed struggle, to apply many ways and forms of struggle either individually or one in another.
>
> (Burkay 1989:66–67)

The Kurdistan Liberation Party (PRK—*Partîya Rizgarîya Kurdistan*) also known as *Rizgari* (Liberation):

> Even if our general strategy is peace and democracy, we must battle against this unjust war to which we are compelled… Kurdistan Liberation Party is determined to continue this war until all colonialist and imperialist powers get out of our country and until one single man survives… Kurdistan Liberation Party will organize PESMERGE UNITS[4] in urban and rural districts in order to DREAD, DRIVEAWAY and DEMORALIZE[5] the military corps of invaders… Kurdistan Liberation Party will initiate the preliminary destructive attacks…such as sabotage, assassination, provocation etc. prior to launching the general offensive of the Peşmerge forces.
>
> (*Kürdistan Kurtuluş Partisi*, 1988:66–69)

These groups used this language because the term 'armed struggle' was so impressive a means of agitation and there was an indisputable belief among the Kurds under Turkey that they had no chance without arms.

### *Implementation followed by evolution*

Yet the rest of the Kurdish nationalist configurations, despite the intensive use of the agitation 'value' of such language, did not attempt any implementation of the armed struggle which they had proposed:

> I had a principle for myself: Why did I dare to initiate and believe in this war?
>
> Because the greatest harlot is one who does not fight.
>
> My word at the very beginning was this; I moulded myself to believe this. All of these men [implying the leading figures] in the Kurdish groupings which claimed to undertake the national cause are dishonest. Why? Because, I said, they prostitute themselves more than a prostitute. I said I will not be like them; I will fight for loftier aims. In short, in those early times I orientated myself in believing this, and this belief, look, is my nutriment, my sap. It still drives me. Naturally, the belief on its own is not good enough, I also mentioned tactics. Tactics are indeed much more intelligent than the devil.
>
> (Öcalan 1996b:115)

A group of 'patriotic youth-intellectuals *off* the material production' (*Manifesto* 160, 161) agreed to play 'the motor-role of revolutionary intellectuals armed with science of history' (Touraine 1995:105). The bunch of university students mainly from the social science faculties of Ankara-based universities, whose leader concluded from the science of history that 'those peoples or classes—either progressive or reactionary—who are not able to configure a conscious and organized "minority", they cannot reach their economic and political goals' (*Manifesto* 160), decided to undertake the struggle 'under the guidance of scientific socialism' (ibid.: 161).[6]

The specific story of the PKK under Öcalan is the issue from here onwards.

### *The evolution of the years of armed propaganda*

The PKK had its initial experience of the armed struggle when it interfered in a tribal clash in the Kurdish towns of Siverek and Hilvan in 1979. The PKK saw this as part of the fight against the collaborator tribes (on this occasion, *Bucaks*), in the sense of not being a guerrilla war but 'armed propaganda'. This was immediately followed by the *coup d'état* of 1980 and the partial escape of leading figures to the Bekaa Valley (Lebanese territory under Syrian control) which was occasionally to be compared with Mohammed's 'Hegira'. The next programmatic publication appears subsequent to these experiences with the title 'The Problem of Kurdistan National Liberation and the Way of Solution; Kurdistan National Liberation Front—Draft Programme' (*Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluş Problemi ve Cözüm Yolu; Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluş Cephesi—Program Taslağı*, 1982).

This initial document of the series appeared during the 1980s and reflects the circumstances and confrontations encountered following the settlement of the training guerrilla groups in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley and accordingly crucial usage of South Kurdistan (northern Iraq) as a passageway and bases behind the lines. It is partly a

promotion of the programme submitted in the *Manifesto* in an effort to correspond the movement's principals and objectives with a 'front' organization. But we do, however, come across alterations to some basic points, which are not necessarily dependent on the 'witty' concerns about the framework of a *front* programme. On the contrary, the emphasis on the proletariat and socialism has its extension along the lines—if not as strongly and frequently—of a familiar idiom. However, the diligently constructed alterations focus on three susceptibilities:

1 The interrelations, solidarity and independent will of the national liberation movements of each part of Kurdistan.
2 The need to put more effort into finding a possible way of solving the Kurdish national question corresponding with the interests of revolutionary-democratic people's powers within the borders of sovereign states,
3 The Greater Kurdistan.

And the final point is put in more explicit words:

> To work towards handling the question of the independent, united and democratic Kurdistan State on a regional conjectural basis, for it is closely linked with the interests of the revolutionary struggles of the peoples of the region.
>
> (*Kürdistan Ulusal Kurtuluş Problemi ve Çözüm Yolu* 1982)

Yet in the *Manifesto* of 1978, the slogan of 'Independent, United and Democratic Kurdistan' is frequently emphasized in bold print. Also, 'the other theses and forms of solution (referring to "regional autonomy" and "federal unity"), for they do not tend to disturb the existing State borders, are *reformist*, and consequently *reactionary* views' (*Manifesto* 204). So attempting to solve the Kurdish question within the borders of the colonialist states would mean they would become the *uşak* (servant-collaborators) of the 'bourgeoisie of the sovereign nation' (*PKK Kuruluş Bildirisi* [1978] 1984:50).

Thus the change mentioned may be assessed as the first major alteration in the basics of the PKK's programme since the foundation of the party, constituting the seeds of the 'Second Manifesto' which were to be declared in a cell of the İmralli prison in Turkey by Abullah Öcalan in 1999. The change, in fact, does not bear a crucial significance relating to the organization's essential objectives because the PKK—of, in particular, the 1980s and 1990s—avoided employing the term 'independent-united Kurdistan' but rather has been obsessed with the idea of 'Free Kurdistan' instead. Further, the terms 'freedom' and 'independence' were to be gradually employed with reference to the individual's spiritual structure (Öcalan [1986] 1991:107–112) as the organization grew. This is re-emphasized in the 'Second Manifesto': 'I focused on the notion of independence far more in the sense of ideas and individual will' (Öcalan 1999c:90). Additional attention is paid to the concepts of 'free personality' and 'freed individual' in philosophical accounts of Öcalan which deal with human lifestyle and the meaning of life (Öcalan 1995b, 1996a, 1999a). So, how then can the changes be defined, or what is 'new' here, and does it present anything of remarkable significance to the development of the theory of the PKK? It is the restatement of the party programme due to being faced with the harsh reality of sitting down at the 'wolves' dining table'. The early 1980s were the time when the PKK was

beginning to walk with its feet on the ground. And accordingly, on the one hand, restate its policies for the struggle for Kurdish national emancipation appropriate to the regional and international 'vitals' of the Middle East, and, on the other, cease from the idiom and formulations moulded in reaction to Kurdish 'reformist-collaborators' and Turkish 'social chauvinists'. Such slogan-like phrases implying a 'united-independent Kurdistan' almost withered away towards the late 1980s.

In the course of the preliminary years to the guerrilla war of 1984, another three major publications[7] appeared and showed how the party's theoretical efforts intensified. Even if the date of issue of the latter is 1985, it is, as others, substantially composed of the unnamed editing of lectures delivered between 1981 and 1983 by Abdullah Öcalan, prior to launching the guerrilla offensive which was planned for 1983 but postponed until August 1984. Öcalan, in his teachings gathered in these books, continued to be strictly within the boundaries of orthodox Marxism to the extent that the bibliographical list of these three editions are identical and limited to five to eight Marxist classics. The 84 footnotes and quotations of 'The Role of Coercion in Kurdistan' referred to only *eight* authors: K. Marx, F.Engels, V.I.Lenin, J.Stalin, Mao Zedung, G.Dimitrov, V.N.Giap and Le Duan. The 16 sources of 'About Organization' are from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Giap and Che Guevera; and the 83 of The Question of Individual's Personality in Kurdistan' are yet again from certain works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Dimitrov and Victor Serge.

Yet each of the theoretical works deals with three individual subjects. The first, *Kürdistan'da Zorun Rolü*, insists on the indispensability of the use of force against Turkish 'colonialism' for the success of Kurdish national liberation policy. Öcalan kept on this line of the policy of *war*, 'the intensified extension of politics executed by weaponry', by taking it as the fundamental form of struggle until a couple of weeks before his arrest, excluding several unsuccessful attempts at unilateral cease-fire between 1993 and 1998. 'The only way [to liberation] is to organize and enlarge the fire-power of guerrilla corps and orientate them towards almost all targets' (*Serxwebun*, June 1999). The second, *Örgütlenme Üzerine*, focuses on the organizational particularities of a party, which were to undertake the leading of the 'atomized' Kurdish society. While advocating many points and principles of a Leninist party in common with the rest of the Kurdish and Turkish 'radical left', the substantial and distinctive part of the argument in this work is concerned with the '*reorganization* of the whole society' (*Örgütlenme Üzerine* 1983:13). Rather than structuring a 'Marxist-Leninist party of the working class', an overall reorganization is proposed because Kurdish society has been the victim of a 'deliberate disorganizing programme from top to bottom implemented by the Turkish colonialists' (ibid.: 11–13). This is the initial distinguishing theoretical point of argument that separates the PKK from the other Kurdish political circles of Turkish-ruled Anatolia. The third, *Kürdistan'da Kişilik Sorunu* (The Question of Individual's Personality), endeavours to introduce a new matter for discussion. The roots and dimensions of the 'degeneration' of the 'Kurdish personality' are discussed with the aim of forming the personalities of the 'Humanization Movement'. This is the unique aspect of the PKK's theoretical, philosophical—and practical—identity that determines both the successes and failures of the party. (This feature of the PKK will be examined further in Chapters 5 and 6 in the light of the findings of my field research.)

Each theme in these editions of Öcalan's teachings actually constitutes the corners of the structural triangle of the PKK: armed struggle, an organization that transcends the notion of class and moulding personalities appropriate to such an organization. But the 'question of personality' is of primary importance in the PKK's organizational development.

### *The years of building the guerrilla war*

I discussed earlier how the theoretical development of the PKK's conceptual agenda is a reflection of its organizational confrontations. This is even truer in the years of armed struggle from 1984 to 1999.

The reflections of practical problems confronting the organization are consequently more apparent in the writings of this period. Similarly, the evaluations concerning the nature of the socialism of the Soviet Union and 'experienced socialism' (or 'actually existing socialism') of the world developed—in fact metamorphosed—subsequent to the spectacular fall of the Iron Curtain and the demystification of the factual spectacle behind it. On the other hand, the theoretical efforts of these years gradually become more and more composed of editions of verbal lectures given by Ocalan to his pupils as his *'indispensability'* or charisma grew simultaneously with the accumulation of the social and political effects of the guerrilla activities.

At the outset of the guerrilla war, the accounts of world socialism and revolution continued for some time to be under the 'heavy influence' (Öcalan 1999b) of *cold-war socialism*. There were many symptoms of the Stalinist approach. He talks of 'unique examples of world-wide creations of socialist labour-heroism' (Öcalan [1986] 1991:126), the great socialist construction of 1930s and 1940s which 'made the reversion back to capitalism almost impossible' (Öcalan 1992b:75) and in the mid-1980s places emphasis on Trotsky's animosity towards socialism:

> Trotsky—who claims that the socialist establishment under the dictatorship of the proletariat would not be survived in one country in the long term, and that it would absolutely have to be expanded into Europe with fellow revolutions—as a result of disbelief in the revolution in Russia deteriorated his position against it, following a bitter quarrel he was driven out of the Party and the country, and, in consequence, he reconciled with imperialism to the extent of being the enemy of the revolution.
>
> (Öcalan [1986] 1991:125)

But he was to state firmly that Trotsky was the voice of 'anti-bureaucracy' and 'further universalization' in 1987 (Öcalan 1992b:27)—while adding in the following paragraph that without a 'revolutionary bureaucracy' it would have been impossible to shelter the revolution from imperialist offensives in the historical context of Soviet Russia.

On the eve of collapse of the Soviet Union, the estimations of its latest stage of socialist progress were still overwhelmingly optimistic or, in his words, 'fairly pretentious and exaggerated' (Öcalan 1992b:323). In his speech delivered on the

seventieth anniversary of the October Revolution, the pretension was beyond exaggeration:

> Socialism, just at this point, entered into a new stage—from the institutionalization stage to the maturation stage. If the ephemeral and indistinct Khrushchev era—also bearing the quality of a transitory period between the reigns of Stalin and Brezhnev—is not taken into account, the Brezhnev era is indeed a progression and maturation of institutionalized socialism.
>
> (Öcalan 1992b:28)

Even though Öcalan wants to believe the Soviet establishment's loyalty to the socialist cause up until April 1989, the 'Soviet Union does remain loyal to the socialist principles, but there is a *right-deviancy* today in the tactics nevertheless' (ibid.: 161). As other political groups which took part in the controversy surrounding the nature of the Soviet system as defenders of the 'socialist castle', the PKK too was compelled to perform *some* self-critical reassessments by the events in the Eastern bloc.

In January 1990 he talks of the 'emergence of a bureaucratic capitalist class in the socialist countries' and of the 'impasse of the October Revolution since Lenin was doomed to pragmatism', for he was deeply concerned about the personalities of almost all members of the Politburo which was his creation (Öcalan 1992b:197, 204). Yet in the following months Öcalan began to sound off about the PKK's vulgar accounts of world socialism as they seemed fascinated by the geographical scope of the 'socialist camp'. They 'should not have' evaluated the gains of socialism according to its percentage of territorial domination such as *one-sixth* after the First World War and *one-third* after the Second World War. 'Today it is becoming much more obvious that instead of approaching socialism from such an angle, it needs to be reduced to an individual's personality and pursued to the extent that he/she becomes socialist; namely, the extent of living socialism within his/her spiritual structure should have been the point of attention.' Then he confesses: 'We too, for a long time, took up with such accounts of world socialism' (Öcalan 1992b:252, 324). And Öcalan reaches the eventual conclusion on behalf of the PKK with a much sharper reverse from Brezhnev's 'mature socialism' in his speeches of May Day and August of 1991:

> But it appears that the Soviet experience is the realization of a process which was inspired by socialism rather than being an experience of socialism, in which honourable socialists also struggled, and as a result, which emerged in the form of national socialism with the rise of sociality and class related entities that held capitalistic longings but did not have the opportunity of becoming bourgeois at the time.
>
> (Öcalan 1992b:292)

In other words,

> Today, the overwhelming majority of the men of the Soviet Union are in an eager search for capitalism. What then does this mean? We certainly do

> not intend to say that the complete Soviet Socialism is mere capitalism… The conclusion that shall be drawn from this is that the fact of the matter is a flourishing of capitalism obtained under the label of socialism by a greedy capitalism, in the conditions of an underdeveloped country of weak national growth and less-developed means of production.
>
> (Öcalan 1992b:332)

In consequence, he stated that the collapse of 'mature socialism' actually freed socialism from suffocation. So it was not socialism that collapsed but 'a system which institutionalized many features of capitalist, even of feudal, society by extremely dangerous implementations' (ibid.: 337).

Apparently, these statements are not novel diagnoses for those who did not have the standpoint of the 'socialist castle' defenders or, in particular, who were inspired by Trotsky's critiques of the October Revolution. For instance, Füredi, while arguing how to 'generate enough surplus and disposable labour-time, to move from the "realm of necessity" to the "realm of freedom" 'for a *full development of the individual* as the central project of Marxism (Füredi 1986:9), arrives at a quite similar conclusion some years before the collapse:

> The strength of the Soviet system under Stalin lay in the way it over-came constraints on the mobilization of resources. To realise its objectives, Stalin's regime could draw on a vast reservoir of natural resources and labour. Through the use of terror the regime also eliminated much of the demand for consumer goods, thus diverting funds for accumulation. Stalin's regime was more successful in mobilising resources than it was in using them efficiently, but in the thirties and forties the consequences of the inefficient allocation of society's labour-time were not widely apparent. Indeed the exigencies of the Second World War revealed the strengths rather than the weaknesses of the Soviet system.
>
> (Füredi 1986:63)

Füredi was pointing to the extent of wielding socialism in terms of both material and spiritual means for the economic structure of Russia, drawing attention to the *strength* of the Soviet system. For Füredi, an eco-nomic development of society in the framework of *socialist* objectives must have been inextricably linked to the *full development of the individual*, 'the central project of Marxism', instead of eliminating the demand for consumer goods. What Öcalan was concluding was that 'Russia wielded socialism in order to develop its own form of capitalism' substantially in the course of the 'socialist construction' of the October Revolution because a socialism of the genuine liberation of mankind must 'infiltrate into the spiritual structure of the individual' and mould the 'individual who constructs socialism in his/her little nucleus' (Öcalan 1992b:360).

This highlights the mutation in the discourse of the PKK in relation to 'actually existing socialism' which has been, 'for a long time', almost the primary source of controversy for pro-Marxist political mainstreams of Turkey and Kurdistan, as it is in many parts of the world. On the other hand, I will argue, it draws attention to the

negligible effect of such theoretical and programmatic transformations on the grass roots and mass base of the PKK.

As the war of the Kurdish guerrillas expands, Öcalan abandons both the rhetoric of classical Marxism and the agitation language of 'national liberation'. This is gradually replaced by an idiom peculiar to himself, engaged with more universal and philosophical concepts such as 'humanization', 'socialization', 'human emancipation', 'analysing the Self, 'freed personality', 'pure human being', and so on:

> The PKK movement…in brief, is a movement that is composed of individuals who became devoted, not only to the requirements of being human, but to the average life of the average living being; who are resolved to live as a progressive species, a species of humanity, in Kurdistan; who are determined that the nobility of such an aim may only be realizable through a resistance against this dreadful guilt; who believe that the advance on the path of humanization is feasible only through every sign of life which is created in the course of the resistance against this barbarian, and aware that only on this basis can national and social identity be attained; who reorder and remould all aspects of their life in accordance with these exigencies.
>
> (Öcalan 1986:17)

Even if the PKK had a sharp reverse within months about the Soviet experience subsequent to its end in failure, Öcalan stood contemplating the questions of socialism in terms of its establishment within the 'individual nucleus' in the party's third congress held in 1986. In the speech given on 'Planning the Activities and Armed Struggle' he substantially argues the questions of socialism and the individual while titling it the 'Approach to the Revolution and the Question of Personality'. Following some generalizations he made various critical remarks about the 'revisionism' of real (existing) socialism and its *'stencilist'* extension (the Turkish Communist Party of the time); the explanation given for distinguishing their movement from the others is distinct from an ethnic or national context:

> We did not look at the fact from such an angle; our approach to the matter from the very beginning has appeared with a notable resemblance to the human species' feelings—from its inception to the present day—of a noble concern about a harsh natural obstacle, a social affair, exploitation, oppression or progress and a passionate desire for over-coming hindrances. Most of you [the delegates of the congress] approached us with some slogans afterwards, but the approach of the entity which materialized in the form of PKK towards the question that it is obliged to solve is, in essence, within this framework… Of a similar kind of excitement which a primitive man feels when obtaining the first yield of cultivation or when taming a wild animal he/she has caught; of such a virtue of the earliest human being when they acquire it in the course of reaching the faculty of grappling with a very fierce tiger by using hardly developed self-made defence tools; of a spirit and wisdom which raised its

> struggle against nature to a degree of scientific solving creativity; of the noble will, desire and resolution of a man of religion who emerges in the context of very oppressive social circumstances; yes, a similar kind of way to all these, if we also perform in this way when approaching our very reality, and, if we do not deform and degenerate it afterwards, then we may be humanized and shall be able to advance gradually on this path.
> (Öcalan 1993a:183)

Throughout the many talks about the 'genuine nature' of the movement, Öcalan emphasizes the spiritual reformation of personalities who take the initiative of the revolution, and every so often refers to the material and spiritual nature of early civilization. The notion of man's self-reproduction thus constitutes the essential part of the texts. Discussions increasingly abound with references to the individual's will and ability of self-analysis, self-transformation and self-recreation. While stressing that they 'must very deeply penetrate into the spiritual atmosphere—and live up to it—which may be felt in the course of the formation of every new religion, at the inception of every new mode of production, in sum, at the emergence of every new process which gives further strength to the human being', the central issue is concerned with how to get there. 'The item on which we contemplate is production of individual's personality. Namely, first of all, you will have to produce yourself.' He then adds pragmatically that they believe in the realizability of the recreation of personality because 'history is a considerable witness of this…whoever neglects this is simply a reactionary' (ibid.: 190). Then, he universalizes the definition and objectives of the organization:

> Essentially, the thing to be comprehended among all these is that our movement bears certain peculiarities in grappling with the epoch, in opposing the whole history of mankind and in analysing its very insight. Only the style of our movement's struggle is moulded in the context of the particularity of Kurdistan. Being a militant who was to execute this struggle or becoming the representative archetypes of the newness of this reality are intimately related to one another. Compare your personalities with this reality, resolve its complexity into its elements and make it reach a settlement. Certainly, we do not talk about orienting oneself towards some superficial changes. Let's give you another 10–15 years time, or can history give us this time? But then let's not miscalculate, let's not insist on antiquity, let's not be caught unawares. Wherever we go, since our creative unity is not developed in this mould, we shall not be welcomed either in the world or in the region or in the country… That means to say, materialization of these traits of our movement in the form of a national liberation or a freedom movement will bring out the strength to overcome the problems of the humanity which both capitalism and socialism could not [overcome]… In our case, the nature of development is not a mere nationalization of Kurdistan. The reality of Kurdishness in fact, to a considerable degree, represents the fusion of other nations. This precisely signifies, in its factual entity, the material basis for synthesizing internationality or humanity in a most noble form… Because there is, in

> our case, to a certain extent, the presence of Arabization, Persianization and Turkification… In this sense, our existing national liberationism means—in its most broad sense—a movement of freedom for it is both, at the same time, in a battle with the total elements of capitalism and in an encounter with the narrowed and vulgarized forms of socialism.
>
> (Öcalan 1993a:190–191)

The philosophical construction of the idea here appears to be a sort of combination of Marx and Plato, or, in the post-modern form of argument, a version of Touraine's notion of 'subjectivation' or 'reconstruction of the figure of the Subject' (Touraine 1995:204–215, 370, 371) which he introduces in the arguments of New Social Movements, and asserts that it radically differs from the idea of class struggle for it appeals not to the logic of history but to the freedom of the Subject:

> If we are to resist total oppression, we must mobilize the total subject, the religious heritage, childhood memories, ideas and courage… Having recently lived through the catastrophes brought about by the authoritarian modernization forced upon us by totalitarian States, we now know that the production of the subject—the emblematic figure of modernity—is only possible when consciousness does not divorce the individual body from social roles, or the old figures of subject that was projected in to the world in the form of God, from the modern will to construct oneself as a person.
>
> (Touraine 1995:211)

Sometimes in response to questions, Öcalan emphasizes his childhood background, childish longings and religious references. 'If a child does not betray his/her longings and utopias, he/she will never be a bad adult', he says when replying to a question of Küçük's. 'I am', he continues, 'a 44-year-old child. That means, I grew up without betraying the longings and utopias of my childhood' (Küçük 1993:37). In an interview with me, he focuses on the 'principle of conduct' which he claims supersedes the sense of class and the Leninist boundaries of Marxism (the 'Marxism of the imperialist era'):

> —Now, in our case, we did not contemplate moulding our humanity or personalities according to such principles of civilization, but according to natural principles. In other words, this was not according to the rules for the development of a class society, but according to very natural principles. What are these natural principles? In some cases, it was the principle of childhood or of the earliest days of mankind. We did not lose sight of this. It was part of my strategy for action.
>
> (A.K.Özcan 1999:65)

In the early stages of the interview, I attempted to gain further explanation of his response to Küçük's question relating to 'childhood memories':

> —You say, 'I grew up without betraying the longings and utopias of my childhood' or 'If a child does not betray his/her longings and utopias, s/he will never be a bad adult'…
>
> —Yes, not betraying childhood, getting *back* to the principles of conduct from the earliest human societies, taking these principles as fundamental guidelines and within that framework, examining civilisation, class societies, politics and art, diligently and with focus. This approach is at the same time very easy and very difficult. It is difficult to become as pure as either the first human being or as a child, but it is more basic. It is very difficult for those who have been brought up according to the principles of civilisation but it is also very attractive and pleasant for those who are interested by the concept of human naturalness. And, in this sense, we do have a philosophical approach and effect.
>
> (A.K.Özcan 1999:65–66)

In his approach to the conflicts and his grasp of the roots and settlements of the social questions, his point of view, throughout Öcalan's talks at the 1986 congress, corresponds with the definitions above focusing on the self-reconstruction of the individual—of the transformation of the Self into Actor. Within the framework of Marx's materialist conception of history, the fundamental question of humanity from the outset of civilization to the present is taken as the field of departure, and the 'cause' of the 'Freedom Movement' is defined accordingly:

> The process of humanity's progress is in this manner, and scientific socialism has actually elucidated this. As early mankind became capable of producing little more than his/her needs, the instinct of man's fierce greed was stimulated and mobilized, and the eagerness to accumulate appeared. One party in the society, namely exploiters or rulers, thus, came to being. Once they ascended to the throne, they did not desert it. Here is the source of all wars, violence and terror in social existence hitherto. The overall aim of freedom fighters is to emancipate humanity from this millennial chain.
>
> (Öcalan 1993a:193)

Because of his materialistic approach, 'since [Kurdistan] is an international colony; since it is a place in which humanity is ignored to the utmost and regarded as 100 per cent its property, then the revolution of Kurdistan shall be international and the property of humanity in proportion to it' (Öcalan, in Küçük 1993:145). As an extension of such an approach, the universality and historicity of the 'burden' of the 'Freedom Movement' is commented on further in the party congress of 1986:

> If attention is turned towards the point, humanity is faced here with deep-rooted losses, unjustness and deprivation of freedom. But if we are willing to live as human beings, we must then regain [what we have lost]. This is an immense conflict. This conflict will determine the strength and the tactics of the war and the lifestyle of our movement. Since, as the fact that

> lies in the essence of the conflict is so significant, and if our movement does not want to lose, then it must passionately embrace the meritorious values bearing the vital sense of life… Our freedom movement will insightfully handle this question for the purpose of solving it in its entirety. And it will strive to solve the question by using a method which will need to go beyond the methods of violence experienced in the struggle of slaves against slave owners, of serfs against the lords of the manor, of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, and retrieve all the losses in this way. This is the scientific elucidation of the fact that we have handled.
>
> (Ocalan, in Küçük 1993:193–194)

The universalizing aspect of the 'Kurdistan Revolution' took up much discussion at the party congress, held in the second year of the guerrilla war. Then, the rhetoric of classical Marxist ideology gradually transformed into more philosophical accounts of 'personality' and 'lifestyle'—the personalities moulded in the course of the war with its way of living peculiar to itself who were to be the seeds of a future freed society harmonized with its entire nature. Evaluation of the 'holy war' they have endeavoured to initiate is conducted accordingly:

> Notwithstanding that we call it the national liberation war, it is actually a great humanity war, a cultural and social development war; it is both a personal and economic development war, the war for gaining political emancipation and for flourishing in every respect. The war is a lifestyle for us. That is to say, it also has an economic content; and it is a fundamental form of production, a form of the reproduction of everything.
>
> (Öcalan 1993a:202)

This quality of the war he defined is considered as the condition of the development of politicization and a form of production in Kurdistan. 'As profoundly as we transform this war into a lifestyle', Öcalan states in continuation of his lecture,

> we shall be able to enhance the liberation and development of the form of production. As much as we develop the war we may do so in political life. The formation of the individuals' personalities, the development of the social and cultural sphere may only be possible through this war. Here is our party policy on war.
>
> (Öcalan 1993a:202)

The meaning of the 'victory' of which they are in pursuit, in consequence, corresponds to the definition of the war above, in which its men were to be shaped:

> There have hitherto been accounts of victories within the framework of an apparent front-line, of direct fighting with the enemy in a vulgar form, and of the dominance of weaponry, whereas such an approach to victory is so insufficient. The greater and more detailed war, and the one which is not

> quite apparent is the 'inner' war. Since the war is so great a phenomenon, since everything is mobilized and dedicated for it, then it has to be dealt with on the level of the human being who executes it. The only acceptable comment on the war executed in Kurdistan would thus be the one which is expressed in terms of the human species it has realized.
>
> (Öcalan, *Serxwebun,* 1993).

### *The years of massification and the collapse of existing socialism*

These efforts of Öcalan—not of the PKK—were accelerated and intensified in particular from 1990 onwards due to both the collapse of the Soviet system and the rapid rise of confrontations of massification occurring in the spring of that year. Yet in these years he continued emphasizing the 'indispensability' of socialism and socialist ideology while abandoning the classical Marxist-Leninist idiom. A sequence of books (among them, Küçük 1993; Öcalan 1992b, 1993a, 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b, 1996a, 1997, 1998, 1999a; Öcalan and Belli 1999) focusing on today's questions of socialism, the individual's personality and the 'renewed' or 're-humanized' man of the future of socialization, appeared amongst the party publications. They were composed of party instructions, lectures, addresses, interviews and dialogues from no leading figure of the PKK other than Öcalan, on various occasions. (This will be explored further in Chapter 7, which is more engaged with the questions of the organization.) He puts additional emphasis on the inevitability of socialism and its inextricability with man's nature. 'Being without socialism means leaving oneself without air', says Öcalan, in a May Day speech (*Serxwebun,* May 1993), and 'the socialism that is receded from human nature would no way have been doomed to collapse' in the course of an interview with a Russian journalist (*Serxwebun,* October 1995). He subsequently talks about a new programme of international socialism transcending the classical perceptions of class structures and conflicts:

> The approach of nineteenth-century socialism is absolutely insufficient. It always solidly takes the notion of *'class against class, national liberation against colonialism'* as the premier standpoint. This is needed to some extent, but essentially the initial aspect should indeed be the flourishing of the socialist democracy. Struggling against the terrible destruction of the environment and consumption insanity is also essential. This may then be the new programme of socialism. Such a programme will obviously be both the merest expression of socialism and the liberation of humanity itself.
>
> (Öcalan 1998:30)

Anything other than socialism, for the Öcalan of the early 1990s, would pervert human beings towards a 'social bestialization'. According to him, 'being dubious about socialism is equivalent to be dubious about the human being and its social existence' (Öcalan 1992b:283). Naming the overall era of class societies as 'Civilization Satan', because it shaped mankind's spiritual structure on the basis of selfishness, greed and power (*Serxwebun,* December 1996), he sees socialism as the only way of escape from

the bestialization 'flood' of the capitalist-imperialist era. 'Socialism, in our day, is the name of the struggle against the insanity of consumption, the destruction of nature, and against the capturing of society by the global media and similar kinds of epidemic social diseases' (Öcalan 1998:30). In consequence, the main slogan of the 1990s was invented: *'If imperialism is compelling humanity to bestialization to its cells, we must then compel it to humanization to its atoms':*

> In this sense, socialism is the only option for the future of humanity.
>
> It used to be called socialization. Now we term it socialism. When socialization stops bestialization begins. And dangerous dragons breed in the social circumstances of capitalism. It is thus a socialist struggle, in this stage of the capitalist-imperialist era, that is the only pathway to emancipation. It is the single vital condition for a humane survival! If such a generalized and prevalent bestialization is not hindered, humanity will come to an end. And in this sense, I say, insistence on socialism is insistence on becoming a human being.
>
> (Öcalan 1998:30)

From this perspective, the PKK leader began to globalize the theory of the revolution. On occasion, he defines the PKK as a 'Humanization Movement' (Öcalan 1994a; White and Logan 1997) and its aim as founding a 'Republic of Humanity' (*Serxwebun*, October 1995, September 1996). And it is evaluated as the core entity of the 'Peoples' Federation of the Middle East' (*Serxwebun*, May 1992) because, for them, it is the 'Gordian knot' (*Manifesto* 208) of the surrounding geography. Towards the late 1990s, the term 'Great Anatolia Revolution' (*Serxwebun*, December 1997) was gradually employed instead of 'Kurdistan Revolution'. For the PKK, the socialism of Kurdistan shall not be a 'geography socialism' but a 'human socialism'. And the contemporary slogan of socialism was to be 'everything is not for the party and state but for Humanization and the Humanity Republic' (*Serxwebun*, October 1995). Öcalan's definition of the 'movement of the PKK' of October 1991 was the first literal expression of the notion of the 'Humanization Movement' from which all these followed:

> The PKK movement, beyond being an entity of nationalization and national emancipation, is a humanization movement. For that reason, our struggle is not only for the liberation of the Kurdish people but it also, in a sense, means the liberation of the humanity of the world. The loftiness of the Kurdish people will in the final analysis mean the loftiness of the world's humanity too. If a people have so descended to the bottom in a part of this world, I think one cannot speak of the exaltation of humanity. Ignoring Kurdistan to such an extent is the measure of the world's foolishness, and we will arrive at humanity from this very contradiction.
>
> (Öcalan 1994a:517)

Ironic language is used following the paragraph above during the narration to the pupils. 'I do not intend to make you feel sorry, but I have to state that the works are not so

simple as you think.' Yet, when replaying White's question asking about the party's '*class* politics' he gives the same definition in a slightly different manner:

> You should call our movement a humanitarian movement—not a class movement but a movement for the freedom of the human being. So, you can't understand the movement, by looking at the PKK only through the spectacles of class struggle.
>
> (Abdullah Öcalan, pers. comm., Lebanon, 2 July 1992, in White and Logan 1997:229)

Yet Öcalan compares its work with the Islamic, French and Russian revolutions, and, in particular, proposes to accomplish the Bolshevik's 'semirevolution'—or 'quasi-revolution'—of October (Öcalan 1992b:98). He defines the PKK in terms of being the remedial way out from the depression of experienced socialism:

> It is becoming clearer that the PKK is the peculiar name for being consistent in grasping and believing the essential theme of socialism, and of defending it insistently against all the forms of degeneration at a time when the depression has begun to deepen, but in conditions where the chance of escape is viewed as not being fairly possible.
>
> (Öcalan, in *Serxwebun*, June 1991)

The main critique of the Soviet Revolution by the PKK is based on the view that it is the victim of vulgar materialism since it exhausted all the energy of socialism for the growth of the economy, party and state. The Soviet experience of socialism and its counterparts in other parts of the world were seen by the organization as a kind of 'primitive' or 'childish' socialism, whereas 'the socialism of Kurdistan is a great human revolution which by all means does not recognize borders'. According to the PKK, the state should have been dissolved in the people, but in experienced socialism the process has occurred the other way round; people have been dissolved in the state and party (*Serxwebun*, October 1995). Thus, for the PKK, shaping a socialist individual is more vital than establishing a state or a party because 'if the question of socialist cadres is not overcome, either in case of the victory or of executing a quite ordinary political or military activity, everything may promptly reverse' (Öcalan 1998:180, 22). In the course of the interview with the Russian journalist, Öcalan asserts that the self-critique of 'existing socialism' on behalf of socialism is also presented by himself and, thus, rather focuses on the notion of moulding the man of socialism and his corresponding lifestyle:

> The fundamental objective of socialism is to create the personality of a new man… Consequently creating the personality of a new man is essential for our ideology… Because socialism represents the novelty and nobility of humanity, socialism needs to be transformed into a lifestyle and needs to infiltrate society.
>
> The new man, accurate man, good man is socialist man. Why then should it be imprisoned in borders? Why then should it hide itself?
>
> (Öcalan 1998:179)

In Öcalan's view, this universalistic approach to the objectives of socialism may well be the historical task of the inhabitants of upper Mesopotamia—the cradle of primitive civilization. In addition, this background of Kurdistan 'may be quite a component of the material base' for the success of the PKK's re-humanization attempt:

> This country, just as it played the role of being the cradle of civilization in its past, in our time,—through overcoming the immense conflict between down-trodden humanity to an extent that had never been seen before and that is compelled by capitalist-imperialism and nature and social life—may yet again initiate the role of rescuing humanity and of being the cradle of re-humanization of the same weight and loftiness. Our party, if a concession is not made from its essence of taking great humanity as the fundamental source of action, if full awareness and sensitiveness are not weakened [in defence] against the vulgar policies of experienced socialism, all sorts of capitalistic traits and yet against the base illnesses of feudalism, will indeed be able to obtain the chance of being the vanguard orienting humanity from the most backward conditions towards a most developed stage of humanization.
>
> (Öcalan, in *Serxwebun*, March 1993)

Further, the leader of the PKK, in the course of talks and dialogues, frequently ventured into defining himself or explaining the realization and development of his personal spiritual structure in terms of this very global conflict. For example, 'If such a form of combined conflict did not exist, I would by no means be able to survive myself, or 'I am the product of such a logic of the current merciless intricate relation-conflict wholeness' (Öcalan 1994a:517). There are many similar expressions and explanations of himself throughout almost a quarter of a century of talks, to the extent that one may conclude that it is one of his basic methods of educating and motivating his militants. Contemplating the history of mankind, he again refers to himself: 'One can say that I devote the largest share of my efforts to myself. I strive to see, to hear, to perceive, to feel the sciences, the philosophies and the religions, those which are as old as humanity, and whatever can be seen, heard and felt as far-reaching as my eyes, my ears and my spirit are able to see, to hear and to feel' (*Serxwebun*, October 1994).

Being aware of this gradual intensification of rather exalted universal objectives by tackling man's nature led me to formulate a question when I interviewed him in front of over a hundred of his militants and fighters in the Party Central School. I asked him the story of the diversion from the 'two words' ('colony' and 'Kurdistan') to this *re-humanization* perspective:

> —At its outset, your movement appeared to be an attempt to revitalise the Kurdish nation, which had been 'buried in concrete' by the young Turkish Republic, an attempt to smash that 'concrete' to pieces. Later, however, particularly now in the 1990s, it has acquired a more universal and humanistic dimension. Now you focus on human nature, human personality and the spiritual structure of human beings. What has caused this progression from national identity to the quest for humanisation?

(A.K.Özcan 1999:56–57)

His answer seemed to ignore the question, or perhaps was intended to provoke the questioner—which would conform with his style of leadership:

> —It would be very difficult for any ordinary social scientist to comprehend me. I think that, despite all your efforts, you are not going to be able to understand. In fact, my method does not fit into the imagination of ordinary human beings. Only I, so far, know how and who I am fighting.
>
> (A.K.Özcan 1999:57)

I briefly reformed and insisted on my question since this was not the answer.

*Q.* I wanted to know how or why you have redirected your emphasis from rediscovering a buried national identity to the point of universal re-appropriation of the human essence.

*A.* These were only *key words.* You have to place the key in the door and turn it in the relevant direction before you can open the door and see inside the room. These words were not the whole edifice. The subsequent developments are well worth looking at.

(A.K.Özcan 1999:57)

What one may infer from this exchange is that national words are regarded merely as 'instruments' of the genuine struggle. In fact, Öcalan was to put it into more 'undressed' words in the monthly magazine *Serxwebun,* the central organ of the party: 'In this sense, national liberation is only a means of my struggle' (*Serxwebun,* December 1997).

Along with the insistence on socialism, and subsequently on humanization, the weight given to the term 'ideology' is remarkable enough to mention. One of the earliest publications of the party (following the *Program, Manifesto* and *Foundation Bulletin*) is *What is the Ideology and Politics, and How is It Emerged?* It was typed, photocopied and distributed among the early party cadres and subsequently printed. The cause of the functional stage at which they had arrived is largely attributed to ideological efforts. In 1987, Öcalan regarded the main source of their success as diligently putting all the efforts of the party into the implementation of the 'Marxism of Imperialist era—Leninism—' to the concrete circumstances of Kurdistan and 'welding the Leninist theory of revolution into the material condition' of their country (Öcalan 1992b:51); towards the late 1990s, however, he pointed to the crucial importance of ideology in the process of furthering their activities (Öcalan 1998:58–67). Moreover, he finds the cause of the historicity of his leadership and its effectiveness in filling the gap of *'ideologylessness':*

> Why then can I be so effective? I am currently considered to be a miracle; this is because I revealed the state of ideologylessness and absence of morale in the Kurdish existence within the framework of my personality, and the extent of my own self-realization through this very unveiling corresponded quite easily with the concrete circumstances of this

> phenomenal social and political existence. In fact, the miraculous quality of every historical leap emanates from such a conjunction.
>
> (Öcalan 1998:59)

So he tells his pupils in confidence: 'If you break the link between yourself and ideology you will bestialize.' He accuses them of being 'ideologyless': 'I am afraid of you because you are ideologyless. In the past, people used to say *"you are irreligious, immoral"*… Now ideology has replaced all these concepts.' He firmly relates the 'descended' state of the people of Kurdistan and the way of his action also with ideology:

> Instead of saying *'our people are ignorant, thoughtless'* which is repeated in abundance by everybody, we will in general say: Our people are ideologyless, without morale and have been descended to the level of bestiality because of being deprived of these basic concepts… If I could become a great voice, the most fundamental cause of this is improving myself ideologically. If the fact is looked at from a closer distance, one may see that I did not work vulgarly with weapons. I did not work with money either. My style of executing the work is through ideology.
>
> (Öcalan 1998:59)

Then he gives a definition of the party, on this occasion, in terms of ideology. 'Just in this point—what is the PKK?' asks and answers Öcalan: The PKK is primarily the movement of inventing the ideology and morale of the reality of a people whose ideology and morale has totally collapsed' (ibid.: 64).

And the ideology with which Öcalan works and 'grows up' is Marxism. 'Ideologically I am nourished by Marxism', he says during a dialogue with a fellow Turkish prominent revolutionary activist of the early 1970s (Öcalan 1995a:78). Also he tells his militants: 'What extent may socialism shed a light on your existing state? It is important because it is our ideological guide. That is to say, it is the fuel, the consciousness, the soul which makes you walk. What can your feet do without it?' (Öcalan 1998:151). Throughout Öcalan's teachings, the explicit emphasis on the terms 'socialism', 'Marxism' and 'Leninism' is bold in proportion with the refrain from the words 'communist' or 'communism'.[8]

To summarize, the ideology of the PKK at its inception generally squares with the framework of a commonplace version of classical Marxism in the Cold War era, with its hesitant, balanced critique of Soviet socialism. The ideological spirit of the party's programme is identical with an orthodox Communist Party view in spite of the scarce usage of the term 'communist'. The programmatic objectives in terms of the national emancipation cause, including the 'unavoidable necessity' of the armed struggle method to attain its goals, are additionally identical to fellow Kurdish political initiatives, which existed at the outset, apart from the spirit of the PKK's language. Among the written materials of the early years of the organization (the late 1970s) there are no remarkable peculiarities deserving elucidation, with respect to either its ideological framework or programmatic schedule or theoretical accounts of the state of affairs of the day, apart from the enthusiastic—and also aggressive to some extent—ingredients of the language which I consider to be the roots of its future organizational prominence. As the struggle

progresses, transformations, alterations, modifications and metamorphoses occur due to the simultaneous rise of mass participation and confrontations. In certain stages of organizational expansion and progression, universal efforts at micro (reshaping the individual's personality) and macro (the re-humanization attempt for an 'unaccomplished' move into socialism) levels intensify while classical Marxist-Leninist rhetoric withers away. Likewise, with regard to national ends, the change of circumstances is immediately reflected in programmatic targets to the point where the overall renewal of the party programme occurs at the seventh extraordinary party congress, which was held following Öcalan's call from İmralli prison for the withdrawal of guerrilla forces from inside Turkish state borders.

In addition, the published work of the ideological and theoretical body of the PKK merely consisted of Öcalan's recorded-edited verbal 'activity' of two decades (from his escape in 1979 to his abduction in 1999), except for some initial texts of late the 1970s. The rare instances of books by several prominent figures of the party only have a memorial context, with the single exception of the *Collected Writings* (edited posthumously) of Mazlum Doğan, who was killed in Diyarbakır prison at the age of 22 in 1982. This is why Öcalan emphasizes the fact from time to time by saying, 'I execute the revolution with my tongue.'

Of the principal peculiarities of the PKK, the one which needs further elaboration is the *consistency of insistence* on socialism within the framework of its perspective of perception, even if the use of language in this regard is substantially shifted depending on the party's positional policies. For instance, in talking to a Russian journalist, Öcalan contemplates the subject to the extent of penetrating the lack of Stalin's education by Lenin, Lenin's warnings about the potential dangers of Stalin and the importance of his bequest in this case, and even further into Stalin's marriage when arguing the questions of Soviet socialism (Öcalan 1998:179–181). But when Öcalan responds to the 'retired' American diplomat David A.Korn, or to the professor of political science at Tennessee Technology University, Michael M.Gunter, he produces an *'extremely temperate'* language. Gunter reminds Öcalan of the removal of the hammer and sickle from the PKK's flag at the 1995 congress and its subsequent efforts to 'de-emphasize its earlier Marxism'. Gunter then asks him: 'What do you say to those who say this was a cosmetic change and that you are still a Marxist, a communist?' Here is the complete response:

> This is just propaganda. It is not possible for us to be communists. Why did the Soviet Union collapse and the United States has not? It is because the communism made the government every thing, but human being nothing. The United States represents development.
>
> (Gunter 1998:82)

It is clear from the quotations from him so far that Öcalan, in this brief response, employs the term *communism* in quotation marks, implying actually 'experienced communism'—but quotation marks are not visible in verbal statements! The relating part of the question and the 'drizzled' lines of the answer to Korn are as follows:

> —… In addition, is Marxism-Leninism the ideology of the PKK?

> —… As a people and party we are harmed by this socialism… I am not in the position to explain very briefly as to what sort of perception of socialism we have in every aspect. But I can confidently convey that our understanding of socialism is not…a socialism in which the individual is shrunk to its bottom limit but the State is swollen to its top limit.
>
> … *Rights for the individual as much as the needs of society, social benefits and social order as much as the needs of the individual* is what we are trying to be loyal to as a principle. I think this is enough of an explanation to introduce ourselves.
>
> (Öcalan 1998:99–101; emphasis added)

The latter paragraph does present some similarities to Marx's proposal of 'from everyone according to his/her ability, to everyone according to his/her need' for a matured communist society. Or in other words, it is rather a superstructural version of it. That is to say, the leader of the PKK, as the only builder of the party's theoretical and ideological body from the foundation of the party to his arrest, kept on insisting on socialist ideology and its universal aspirations, and he governed his language in this realm by 'dressing' it according to the party's standpoint of a *durational* position. Yet one might conclude, at first glance, that he has not been in pursuit of such a language in his *Defences* and statements issuing from the one-man prison of İmralli island, which are solidly backed as a whole and deemed to be the 'Second Manifesto' by the PKK-whereas the very governance of the 'extreme-temperate' language has been extremized further to the extent that one can hardly notice the difference. For example, it does not seem too easy to state whether he refuses the principle of the 'self-determination right of nations' or actually criticizes the comment and application of the principle in the following sentence: 'The right of nations for self-determination which came into fashion in the seventies, which was interpreted only in terms of separate state in the course of its applications, was, indeed, an impasse in this specific context' (Öcalan 1999c:12). But the firm attitude towards socialism and its significance for the future of humanity have not been moderated as such.

Whatever the language is, the PKK's overall programme underwent major reconstruction and even in certain aspects metamorphosed into a distinct party programme following these Defences, and was approved with no significant opposition at the extraordinary congress held afterwards.

## Following Öcalan's arrest: the 'Second Manifesto'

To develop the argument of the PKK's ideological and theoretical journey, the Defences produced by Öcalan during the trials, and the statements released through his lawyers subsequent to the verdict of the death sentence are more than worthy of investigation. In distinguishing the consistent, flexible, inconsistent, firm and ignored aspects of the journey, these documents will, to a vital extent, be useful, since the changes that appeared here are not customarily relevant to a movement claiming to undertake national liberation.

### *The legal defences at İmralli prison*

One cannot miss the defendant's immediate concern. In the early lines of introduction to the first defence, Öcalan—referring to his earlier statements as regards the war, a separate state, violence and accusations of making tactical proposals—promptly comes to the ideology and programme of the PKK. He begins with the extract below from his statements made during the press conference of 15 March 1993, at which the initial unilateral cease-fire was declared.

> We are not demanding an immediate separation from Turkey. We are realistic on this subject. Do not interpret this [cease-fire] as a simple tactic [serving a hidden agenda]. There are many reasons as to why [we are realists]. Those who understand the historic, political and economic situation of [the Kurds and Turks] know well that separation could not take place. They are intertwined like flesh and bone.
>
> (Öcalan 1999d:7)

This is followed by three other extracts from the statements made at the latest unilateral cease-fire declared on 1 September 1998, emphasizing their genuine understanding of war and violence, and their 'essential objective' for *democratization of the Republic* rather than forcing its abolition. Then he comes to the point:

> I am quoting these for this particular reason: there may be some who tend to incorrectly claim that I have come to such a standpoint due to the harsh conditions of my solitary confinement. Even in the indictment, I have the impression that my earlier statements taken under interrogation will not be of considerable significance. But however, my statements have laid bare *the necessity of altering of both the PKK's programme and its political structure with its narrow, strict ideological approaches of the fiery 70s* in the light of the composition of the world and Turkey in the 1990s. There is an emphasis on the need for *revising and updating* the *principles and programme* [of the PKK] in the aftermath of an immense experience.
>
> (Öcalan 1999c:10; emphases added)

What would he then imply by 'altering of…the programme and…political structure' or revising and updating the principles of the party with its narrow, heavy elements of ideological approaches descended from the 'fiery 70s'? There are extensive texts of, not implications but illuminating explanations indicating the deep-rooted alterations to the programme of the PKK, surrounding the concepts of 'Democratic Solution', 'Democratic Republic' and 'Free Togetherness'. From the national-programmatic point of view, one may, without exaggeration, infer that the only thing that remained unaltered is the name of the party (*Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*—Kurdistan Workers Party) which actually contradicts the essential framework of the texts. But a similar assertion cannot be made with regard to the *revisions and updates of the principles of the party* as those are based on socialist ideology. On the contrary, the ideological aspects relating to socialist purposes and the aspirations of the party are dealt with far less than the 'inevitability' and 'nobility' of democratization. That is, the 'heavy' rhetoric of the 'fiery 70s' and, rather

more, the reflection of the principle of 'the right of nations for self-determination' to the terminology of the PKK's theory and programme, is meant by the 'necessity of alteration' which is indeed superseded by a diligent moderate language. On the other hand, even if it is briefed under certain subtitles of the main defence, the insistence on the belief in socialism as 'the only future of humanity' is expressed in a 'straightforward' locution. But it is phrased simultaneously with an over-highlighted stipulation: *evolutionary* and *democratic* socialism.

Öcalan's 'Second Manifesto' (*Kürt Sorununa Demokratik Çözüm Manifestosu*—The Manifesto of Democratic Solution of the Kurdish Question) consists of three defences produced against the Turkish state institutions of jurisdiction. If one were to give the broadest outline of the defences, it may well be reduced to a word or a phrase: 'Solution' or 'Democratic Solution'. They are consequently a presentation of a bold picture of an attempt at persuasion of the Turkish establishment to come to an 'exterminated' settlement to the Kurdish question within the existing *Misak-ı Milli* (the National Pact of 1920) borders of Turkey, which is believed to be the most feasible, most accurate and most dignified resolution (of the sanguinary conflict of centuries) for both parties. In response to the allegations that Apo's surrender and conversion were because of his fear of death, his justifications also gather around the notion of *solution:* 'This is the celebrity of the Apo personality. The Apo personality is the solution personality…the temperament of my spirit, my attitude is keeping in the same style as my march shaped outside. It is conjectural. It is linked with being the strength of the solution' (*Özgür Politika,* 6 June 1999). In the statement released through his solicitors, while touching on the matter of his survival and death, he points again to the solution:

> The case is not whether I stay alive or die. However, understanding me will lead everybody to win. Both the society and the state will benefit from this. I could take a position of another sort. I could easily strike a non-concessive attitude. But if I desired the solution, I should not have taken such a position. I myself survive for the solution, I urge myself forward for the solution.
>
> (Öcalan, in *Özgür Politika,* 6 June 1999)

Yet in the introduction to the main defence, he repeatedly emphasizes the cause of the standpoint he had to form. He states that he did not attempt to 'revert to either a classical Kurdish nationalist line or the leftist interpretation of this very tendency', because 'a sterile repetition, no matter how heroic it is', would not 'contribute much to the ideal of freedom':

> In general, the PKK's [ideological] defences have followed the two opposite extremes; either a stubborn defence of the classical line, or the abandonment of that line. This, in a sense, is the same as having no solution. I made it a point to go beyond this.
>
> (Öcalan 1999d:9–10)

Öcalan contemplates further on the 'why' of this 'converted' aspect of himself by a philosophization on the transition of his personality, for he regards this as the method of

his 'analysations' (his teachings—*çözümlemeler*). 'Scrutinizing a splendid search-for *[sic]* freedom in the framework of my personality has become my methodology…making an attempt to try for it, here too, was an expected issue' (Öcalan, 1999c:12). By the end of the main defence, 'although it might not be needed', he touches on one more heading before passing on to the conclusion: 'My Personal Status'. In the paragraph of introduction giving, in effect, an abstract of this heading, he talks of a 'transitional' stage of his personality:

> At this point, my greatest fear is *the non-completion of a project of humanity left at the halfway point*. Therefore, my greatest expectation from life is the chance of transition from an overly competent personality of a rebel-for-freedom to that of fighter-for-peace which contains freedom. Only for this reason I regarded the necessity of my survival as a fundamental point of departure in the course of the overall process of my arrest, interrogation and of subsequent events. The personality of peace—and, likewise, that of the society of peace—is a theoretical endeavour which requires both political, social, and, in addition, detailed psychological analysis to a greater extent than is assumed… As I have emphasized, a war, or *any kind of action of violence, which does not aim at a noble, sacred and very necessary peace is madness*. In accordance with this rule [understanding], it was crucial that I should unveil the aspects of the personification of a man of a peace which is needed to a vital degree, not only theoretically but also morally, politically and practically.
>
> (Öcalan 1999c:12–13; emphases added)

The reflection of this *personal* transition, or 'upgrading', to the cause of *national liberation* will be discussed in the course of comparison of the earliest and latest programmes of the PKK because the programme of 're-foundation' is, as I mentioned earlier, a kind of systematized edition of this reflection. Here, thus, I shall have to go through Öcalan's ideological temperament as regards socialism along with the 'why' of his positional state in İmralli prison, for they relate my point of argument—the balance of national and ideological aspects of the PKK.

Even though it is quite limited in comparison with the 'repeated' proposal of 'uniquely solvent' capability of 'free togetherness' under a democratic republic, Öcalan does not refrain from arguing the questions of socialism and his present position towards them. He continues to make every endeavour to govern his style, but it is more straightforward than the one employed in response to the American former diplomatic mission's question concerning this. Under certain headings of the 'Second Manifesto', such as 'The Emergence of the PKK' and 'A New Stage in the Kurdish Question', 'Transformation Problems within the PKK' or 'My Personal Status', we find firm elements in defence of socialism and belief in its significance for the future of humanity. However, he begins with a gathered account of democracy-evolution-revolution under the first heading following the Introduction—'Victorious Democracy at the End of the Twentieth Century':

> Democracies rather possess an evolutionary language, but they essentially rest on revolutions. The most crucial thing is the appropriate time for the democratization of a revolution. Revolutions that fail to democratize, either engender dictatorships or are eventually run wild led by anarchism… To become stuck to the revolutionary stage also means to be fixated on all kinds of conservative bureaucratism as much as on counter-revolution…
>
> Today's democracies…then in the twentieth century, resisted the unforgiving dictatorship of fascism and the totalitarian regimes of its adversaries, experienced socialism, and announced its final victory at the end of the century… It derives its actual power from being the answer to the needs of society's naturalness… Coercion produces rapid development, but also easy downfall. Whereas the democratic system might produce slow development but does not engender easy downfall.
>
> (Öcalan 1999c:14)

He concludes that the crucial thing (for democratic systems) is transforming democratic values successfully, not only into solutions to social problems but also into their power of governance. 'The best politics or politician', for Öcalan, 'will then seek its/his/her identity through the personalities of individuals, leaderships and the nature of parties who/which shall be capable of representing this very power' (ibid.: 15).

Once having given this preliminary base for a relevant conversion of their well-known revolutionary language into a well-formed evolutionary one, Öcalan returns to the peculiar background of the Turkish-Kurdish relations of almost two centuries. Following a scrutinized picture of the Republican era in particular, he again comes to the point. Namely, he gives an assiduously structured definition of the PKK in ideological and non-national terms:

> The PKK is indeed the latest extensive movement of Kurdish rebellion which has emerged and developed initially—between 1970 and 1980—as an ideological rebel movement, but later from 1980 to 1990 as a political and operational movement, of a utopian theoretical group which departed with a theoretical-practical exploration of the world's stormy revolutions and counter-revolutions of the time, on an objective base which had been shaped by the infrastructure and superstructure of the Republic's preceding fifty years. In spite of its formal Kurdishness, it is a unique territorial freedom movement which took progressive steps towards combining the arts of politics and war.
>
> (Öcalan 1999c:27)

When arguing the 'Transformation Problems within the PKK', Öcalan gives another definition—but in terms of lifestyle: 'The PKK is the free life of a new man as much as it is so of a people.'

Yet it is believed that the party should transform itself from a *revolutionary organization* to a *democratic organization*. The PKK leadership persuaded itself that the party had accomplished its revolutionary task by the early 1990s because the years

following became 'rather self-repetitive years' (Ocalan 1999d:31, 32; *Programme* 2000:46–55; Öcalan, 1999d:41). According to the programme echoed from the *Defences;* the war did its part: They have come to believe that this war produced its effects through its extensive, deep-rooted influence over the years, and changed many things to the extent of a non-revertible state; that the 'democratic revolution' eliminated the tribal-feudal social structure apart from 'some remnants and traditional customs' (*Programme* 2000:47, 48); that, even if the assimilation has not been completely stopped in the sense of language, it is considerably driven back by the democratic revolution in terms of feelings and culture; that Kurdishness converted from an entity from which everyone ran away, to an identity of which everyone is proud because of its contribution to freedom, democracy and humanity; and that, while the first condition of being involved in politics used to be the *denial* of Kurds, now there are many people who are active in the politics on behalf of the Kurds. And thus 'it became impossible to execute a colonialism of pre1984 within the Kurdish people whose political and democratic consciousness flourished' (ibid.: 51, 53–55). Namely, the Kurdish people no longer resemble the earlier Kurdish people; 'Kurdistan is no more early Kurdistan' (Beşikçi 1990:50–56). In consequence, the PKK should from now on continue its 'genuine march' by the method of not violent-revolutionary but democratic-evolutionary means of action:

> Giving birth to itself by force does not mean that [the PKK] will keep on growing up in the same way. The birth of a child, too, occurs as a result of a gigantic difficulty but then its natural development takes place without difficulty. This is a law of nature. Qualitative leaps both engender and are engendered by force, but it is quantitative development that is essential.
>
> (Öcalan 1999c:39)

In terms of national undertakings up until the arrest of Öcalan, the self-critiques of the movement's recent past gather around three highlighted points: (1) The self-repetition of the mid- and late 1990s and not being prepared enough mutually with the state for a democratic outlet; (2) exaggerated assessment of earlier Kurdish rebellions based, on the one hand, on misinterpretation of the establishment and authoritarian development of the Turkish Republic, and on the other, on the non-national nature of their leaderships;[9] and (3) not being sufficiently frank and confident on the only adequate solution of 'free togetherness within the *Misakk-ı Milli* (i.e. existing) borders of Turkey'. Therefore, as a result, the overall programme of the party has been rewritten appropriate to a refoundation. Nevertheless, the prospect of the party's socialist views and its reflection to the programmatic dimension are quite distinct. Even more, the undertakings put down in the very new programme of 'democratic liberation' (*Programme* 2000:50) is proposed for a future leap towards socialism (ibid.: 70).

Under the heading 'The Problems of Transformation within the PKK', the overall intellectual effort devoted to some dialectical accounts of the *questions and future of socialism* are substantially re-edited in the renewed programme by the method of simply not using the quotation marks. The main concern here is not how to avoid the potential preventatives on the way to gaining the national cause—that is, those which are engendered by the PKK's hitherto insistence on socialist ideology and objectives. On the contrary, Öcalan focuses on how to meet the historical exigencies of socialism within the

actuality of the PKK's theoretical and practical existence with a deep concern about being the victim of a law of the societal nature formulated by himself as 'if you do not solve, you will then be solved' or, in other words, 'if you do not overcome (the obstacle at a historical conjunction) you will be overcome'. Both the critique of 'Sovietic' socialism, its manifestation in the Turkish Marxist left of the 1970s and the self-critique of the stretch of the dogmatic aspect of the early PKK during the 1990s were guided by this very concern:

> For [socialism] did not manage to open the adequate channels within its own system to freedom and equality which meant to be the part of its essential nature; for it did not actualize both economic and political progressions which have even been ventured by capitalism and partly reflected in the mundane life of the ordinary individual, socialism has simply died of the lack of breathing… Although the heavy global depressions stemming from capitalism were not only [socialism's] fault, but because it was still held responsible for them, socialism would either solve the questions or be dissolved. Because they could not be solved, it was doomed to be dissolved and ultimately was dissolved.
>
> (Öcalan 1999c:32–33)

Even further disabilities of socialism spread, he claims, around Turkey, for 'the socialism introduced to the Turkey of the 1970s was far behind the adequate seriousness of ideologies'; or the transfer of socialism to Turkey 'was conducted in a more eclectic, imitative and schematic manner than that of capitalism'. Öcalan then compares it with the emergence of the Islamic sects. There existed', according to him, 'not the ideology of socialism but its hypocritical sects, namely the fake factions.' And in consequence, 'once again, the rule of *"if you cannot offer the accurate solution, you will be dissolved"'* produced its result; that is, the Turkish socialist left promptly disappeared as the *coup d'état* of 1980 took over. This is the very concern that made him impose the PKK for a comprehensive change of strategy and for a new programme, before missing the opportunity:

> Those who do respond in time to this law of the evolution of the social dialectic will enjoy development, but those who do not will not merely be able to escape from being left under the wreckage of massive sufferings and meaningless losses. In the context of the social transformations we are undergoing at an intense rate in our day, we see the application, virtually under laboratory conditions, of this very law in some corner of the world every day. Not to draw a conclusion from this is possible only if one is blind or extremely conservative.
>
> (Öcalan 1999c:33–34)

In other words, Öcalan believes that life would 'not tolerate those who stand outside it for long'. He warns his party by referring to the broadest law of the social dialectic formulated briefly by Marx: 'the relation of production which does not further the powers of production turns into a barrier to its progression and shall thus be superseded

inevitably'. Once again this is a kind of political version of Marxist socioeconomic formulation: 'A force that does not take life further turns into a hindrance; on such occasions, transcending [eliminating] the force itself becomes the most vital requirement of revolution.' That is to say, in the final analysis, alteration has become inescapable; but to what extent—or, what would be the limit of alteration? For the reason that 'an alteration brings [the entity subject to change] to an end, another creates historicity' (ibid.: 38).

However, no significant hesitation about the extent of change appears within the 'Second Manifesto' in terms of either national objectives scheduled in the initial *Manifesto* and the modified Programme of 1995, or of the method of revolutionary violence (the strategy of 'People's War') operated for almost two decades. On the contrary, there is no hesitation about the 'consistency of insistence' on the socialist objectives, and the idea of utopias and romanticism is found throughout the whole text of the re-foundation proposal:

> Just as capitalism incorporated the gains of socialism into its own democracy by—even allowing the foundation of communist parties—paying more attention to the human rights at the roots of socialism than socialism itself, and thereby outstripped experienced socialism; the socialism of the new era will regain its great power for solutions through incorporating all the values of not only capitalism but of those of all human history and through facing the dangers before the new humanity.
>
> (Öcalan 1999c:33)

Following the statement emphasizing the death of socialism due to 'a virtual lack of breathing' as 'the most progressive, egalitarian and freethinking form of democratic development at the start of century' which 'went on to exert a pressure on capitalism to the utmost', Öcalan constructs several comprehensive sentences containing a firm defence and prophecy of socialism with no noticeable tactical governance of his language as such. In other words, the loyalty to the future of socialism and belief in its potential political, social and philosophical strength are expressed rather in an 'undressed' style. He defends in confidence:

> This of course does not mean that socialism left no positive legacy. The historical role it played in bringing about the social and national institutions that characterize our age, and in the emergence of the classes and nations enjoying a greater degree of equality cannot be disputed. What capitalism had achieved in only a limited way over several centuries, socialism exceeded in half a century.
>
> (Öcalan 1999d:36–37)

In continuation, he makes fairly broad and firm prophecies:

> There is no doubt that it will flower again on its roots. Again it is inevitable that socialism, i.e. scientific socialism as the manifestation of a further scientific analysis of the social actuality, will reflower in its mature

> age by overcoming the basic problems of humanity. It will form the antithesis to the thesis posed by contemporary capitalism with its extreme inequalities and especially its inability to cope with history, with nature and with social problems. The socialist experiment which has in fact left a great deal of experience behind; through a sense of obligation to synthesize what it has to gain for mankind with its hitherto gains, and through recovering its capacity of being the only solvent power to level the social imbalances by flourishing its theory and correct and rich practice amongst one another, particularly in the provinces of the nature-environment, women-children-population, history, culture, ethnic and religious minorities and national complications…will prove its capability of replacing its raw democracy, which essentially led to its very dissolution and from which capitalism even benefited to a considerable extent, with its most developed democratic system in its matured stage.
>
> (Öcalan 1999c:33)

But within the contemplation called 'My Personal Status' towards the conclusion of the main defence document, Öcalan lays emphasis on his loyalty to socialism. He re-emphasizes that he retains his belief in the ability of socialism to be the answer again to the problems of society and the epoch by presenting its genuine democratic perception and the frank application of it (Öcalan 1999d:106).

Alongside these broad generalizations, he outlines his view by suggesting democratic socialism for present-day Turkey. 'The role of non-development of democratic socialism, which is actually an indispensable need for society, is vital in aggravating the societal complications to the current level in Turkey' (Öcalan 1999c:91).

From this point of departure he again draws a dialectical conclusion: 'From consolidation of thesis and antithesis a new synthesis is born. The antagonism of the state-PKK leads to the synthesis of the Democratic Republic, and of its victory' (ibid.: 40).

There will be no need to cite the reflections of Öcalan's statements focusing on socialism in the new programme, for the statements are transferred virtually in the form of the removal of quotation marks. However, a couple of points may be worth mentioning which in a sense transcend the leader's perspective. Just before passing on to state the 'Duties of the Democratic Transformation' in a sequential order, the seventh extraordinary congress of the PKK, while reconstructing the schedule of the party's activity sphere, drops a note of pre-warning:

> The democratic transformation of which we have defined the features is actually proposed to be a preliminary stage in order to reach our actual aim at socialism, and will undertake the following tasks.
>
> (*Programme* 2000:70)

Also, in the recent issues of *Serxwebun* subsequent to Öcalan's stance in the İmralli prison, there has been a striking intensification of articles and speeches concentrating on the 'socialism of the PKK' signed by either the Presidency Council of the PKK or a named member of the Council. One may effortlessly notice the additional emphasis on

the socialist aspect of the PKK in these editions. Many similar and distinct accounts and definitions of the party's earlier and present nature in terms of socialist ideology may be selected (*Serxwebun*, 1999–2000). From January 1999 to July 2000 13 lengthy articles and speeches of either prominent figures or Presidency Council members were published in the central organ of the party, *Serxwebun*. Of these, one of the clearest is that signed with 'Prescience Council' and published in the May 2000 issue entitled 'Socialism is Not the Ideology of Class in its Narrowed Sense':

> From this angle, to know, to appreciate and to acknowledge socialism is crucial. If we refuse socialism, there will be no party left. There will be no more PKK.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, May 2000)

In summary, with respect to the social standpoint, the ideological perspective broadened along with the furtherance of aspirations and tenets of socialism. In addition, the 'democratic transformation' that they 'have determined' under the 'Democratic Republic', which is featured by 'free togetherness' within the existing state borders of Turkey, is regarded as a preliminary stage (*Programme* 2000:70) of the eventual goal—socialism. This will, then, be referred to in the course of the arguments of the forthcoming chapters tackling the questions of the individual, the organization and their peculiar interrelations.

We may now pass on to drawing a very basic skeleton of the latest programme (the 'Second Manifesto') with comparison to the primary *(Manifesto)* and modified (2000) ones in terms of the aspect of national undertakings.

### *The programme of 're-foundation'*

The national standpoint of İmralli prison had its illustrated echo in the new programme of the PKK approved at the extraordinary congress. It is to a large extent a systematized edition of Öcalan's defences and does indeed contain substantial changes in the sense of the party's 'national' undertakings. The first two sentences of its introduction need no interpretation:

> Our party movement is entering in a process of deep-rooted changes and transformations. The currently ongoing changes and transformations are at a strategic level and are occurring in the form of re-foundation.

The programme of 're-foundation' has been rebuilt in accordance with not the target of 'Independent, United and Democratic Kurdistan' (*Manifesto* 202) or of 'A Democratic People's Dictatorship in an Independent and United Kurdistan' (*PKK Kuruluş Bildirisi*, 1978:55) but of a 'Democratic Republic'. The strategy of the re-foundation programme has been designed in accordance with not the violence of the 'protracted people's war' but with the pressure of political escalation and mass mobilization for a'Democratic Solution'. In brief, it has been worded with the language of a *fondling* 'evolution', not of a *frightening* 'revolution'. In other words, the PKK will no more be in pursuit of a

separate independent state of Kurdistan, a violent Kurdistan revolution or the elimination of the Turkish army or its sovereignty in Kurdistan.

Glancing through the programmes, a conceptual variation is striking. In addition to an apparent moderation of the style, the concept of 'Kurdistan Revolution' is converted into 'Democratic Transformation' which links to the notion of 'Great Anatolian Revolution' formerly introduced by Öcalan (*Serxwebun*, December 1997). The heading under which the political, social and cultural 'duties' of the party are written down in sequence has become 'The Duties of Democratic Transformation' (*Programme* 2000:70), whereas in the former two programmes it was called The Duties of the Kurdistan Revolution' (*Manifesto:* 190; *Programme* 1995:71). Among the sequence of tasks of the Democratic Transformation, the following articles are worth taking from the 'national liberation' argument in comparison with the equivalent lines of the earlier two programmes.

In the *Manifesto* of the movement's inception and the *Programme* of 1995:

1 The prime objective of the 'Kurdistan Revolution' is stated in both as being 'to create an Independent and Democratic Kurdistan', and consequently 'the essential nature' of the revolution would be 'A National Democratic Revolution'. In order to accomplish the task: for the *Manifesto*, 'the Turkish political and cultural colonialism and military invasion must be abolished', and in the words of the 1995 *Programme*, 'to end every means of sovereignty of the Turkish colonialism and so of the imperialism behind it' (*Manifesto:* 192, 193; *Programme*, 1995:67, 68, 72). Whereas in the *Programme* of 2000, the prime objective of the 'Democratic Transformation' is to 'end every means of sovereignty of an oligarchic structure and of its extension on the society' (*Programme* 2000:70). Here, the sovereign oligarchic structure and the society subjected to its sovereignty are not named. However, in the context, it is clear that what are meant are the 'Turkish state' and the 'whole population under its rule'. Also, in the beginning of the attached party constitution, in front of the 'Organization's Aim:' they are expressed by name: 'To bring the sovereign power of Turkey's oligarchic structure and its extensions on the Turkish and Kurdish peoples to an end.' (From here onwards, comparison will have to be between the programmes of 1995 and 2000 because in the *Manifesto*, the tasks are not sequenced in articles. Also, comparison between the programmes of 2000 and 1995 with the most recent modifications approved at the fifth congress of the PKK will thus be more significant in the sense of clearer indications pointing at rapid metamorphoses as regards the national targets of the party.)

2 *Programme* 1995: 'To pillory the concessionist policies such as "territorial autonomy" or "autonomy", etc., those which do not aim at breaking the colonialist yoke and which in essence require compromising with the colonialists, and keep on the continuing determined struggle against those approaches'[10] (72). *Programme* 2000: To develop a democratic political system on the base of Turkey's political wholeness and constitutional citizenship in which the free participation of Turkish and Kurdish peoples is realized' (71). 'To further the solution of the national question without disturbance of the borders, within the framework of democratic transformation and free unity' (76).

3 *Programme* 1995: 'To create a national-independent and democratic society under the governance of people's democratic rule' (73). *Programme* 2000: 'To create a free and democratic society under the rule of the Democratic Republic' (71).

4 *Programme* 1995: 'Not to recognize any permission for setting up a military base and right of privilege for any foreign state on the land of the country' (73). *Programme* 2000: 'To be in favour of reducing the army within the framework of protection of the borders and of its conversion from the state of being an entity of menace' (72).

5 *Programme* 1995: 'To establish national institutions of education and culture instead of the colonialist's educational and cultural institutions. To provide the opportunities and arrangements for the development of all dialects of Kurdish, and to encourage one of them to be the national language' (75–76). *Programme* 2000: To work for obtaining the legal guarantee in order to be able to develop the Kurdish mother-tongue in every respect' (75).

From the selected articles above, it is obvious that the programmatic transformation of the PKK goes beyond customary alteration or modification. It is not quite relevant to a party that was meant to be leading a national liberation struggle. Therefore, calling the seventh extraordinary congress a're-foundation congress', or Öcalan's defence a 'Second Manifesto', is not an exaggeration. The change is more than a transformation. It is rather a metamorphosis. According to the structure of the new programme, the Workers' Party of Kurdistan is literally no longer a party of Kurdistan, but of an official Turkey. The reconstructed programme resembles the programme of a legal socialist party of Turkey within the borders set out by the National Pact. For instance, the programme undertakes the abolishment not of Turkish sovereignty in Kurdistan but of the sovereignty of an oligarchic structure over the people. Likewise, it does not target a *national emancipation* but aims at '*furthering the solution of the national question* within the framework of democratic transformation'. What it jealously retains among the duties listed in the constitution, as a manifestation of the PKK's peculiar internationalist socialism, is the assumption of unity among the peoples of the Middle East, which traces itself back to the foetal PKK. It is this assumption to which Graham E.Fuller, the former CIA high official expert on the region, also draws attention:

> For this reason many Kurdish intellectuals from different states see the PKK as the only modern Kurdish political movement, based on ideology rather than tribalism. But the PKK has also pursued an unabashed policy of violent guerrilla warfare in southern Turkey. It is led by an elusive and doctrinaire leader Abdullah Öcalan ('the Avenger') operating from exile, who aspires to social revolution across the entire Middle East.
>
> (Fuller 1993:115, 116)

The phrase describing the unity of Middle Eastern peoples is 'transformed' from the 'Federation of the Middle East' to the 'Democratic Union of the Middle East' (*Programme* 2000:77).

### *Concluding remarks*

The transformation of discourse, the programmatic metamorphosis and the development of a consistent insistence on socialism that the PKK has undergone are outlined above. This outline constitutes the crucial aspect to which the organization's cadre recruitment and build-up of mass mobilization relates. The body of party publications, to which I have partly referred, are not composed of attacks or self-defences shaped in the course of debates with fellow political rivals, but are only composed of the *teachings* of the party. These texts are, even taking into account their repetitions, more voluminous than those of the average party. What is more, the overwhelming majority of them consist of Öcalan's verbal lectures, dialogues and interviews. In addition to the leadership's intensive theoretical and ideological performance, the party's unusual programmatic conversion is important in connection with one of the fundamental issues in the next two chapters—the build-up of mass support and mobilization, and the activation of the grass roots.

Also, the metamorphosis of the party's national standpoint does not of course mean that the party has deserted the cause of Kurdish national entanglement. The first sentence of the Introduction to the main defence, from which the programmatic metamorphosis of the party's ethnic/ national aspect sprouted, is devoted to dispelling such an inference:

> My defence is not so much based on detailed replies to the charges in the indictment prepared by the Chief Prosecutor [of the State Security Court], as it is about what I see as a more important topic: how to reach an historic reconciliation from a revolt under the leadership of the PKK, and increase the possibility of a solution to the Kurdish issue.
>
> (Öcalan 1999d:7)

Therefore, could this entire odyssey be a cleverly worded 'chapter' in the book of the PKK's 'devilish' (Öcalan 1996b:115) tactics? Since Öcalan has placed an overwhelming emphasis on tactical creativity in his teachings, which he believes to be absolutely necessitated by the very nature of the Kurdish struggle, this question is relevant. So in 1989, Öcalan gave this speech:

> One should not approach reconciliation in the form of selling every value that one possesses in order to save one's life, as is done by some opportunists. But it is exactly this way of acting which is performed by many, under the label of tactics. The form of reconciliation which incorporates the idea that everybody uses tactics in socialism and that many vital values can be abandoned in the case of difficult conditions is absolutely not right. We oppose all sorts of tactics which tend to mean the loss of the indispensable.
>
> (Öcalan 1992b:137)

The question of whether the PKK's transformation is a real evolution or a devilish deployment of tactics will be incorporated into the arguments of the following chapters.

# 5
# Sources of motivations

## The organization and the individual

The main themes of this chapter are to explicate individual-organization relations, the form and content of cadre education and the militant's 'lifestyle' in the PKK. At micro level, I look at the leadership's source of power in the recruitment process, which consequently orientates and motivates the grass roots. In the light of the findings of the empirical data collected from the region during fieldwork and the 'self-resembling' ethnic background of Kurds, the chapter is devoted to exploring the organizational 'share' in the actualization of the movement—the central theme of the study.

### Tribe and treason: the 'twin heritage' of Kurdishness

Unless we describe the specific socio-political background of Kurds, it is not feasible to explore the party's organizational decisiveness in the development process of Turkey's '29th Kurdish insurrection'.

If the 'insurrection' led Fuller, the former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA, to reveal that 'almost invariably, […], once the Kurds no longer served the immediate political goals of the external powers, they were abandoned' and made him confess that 'for the first time in modern history, control over the Kurdish problem has slipped out of the grasp of all regional parties as Kurdish politics has taken on a momentum of its own', then it must have a legacy 'appropriate' to itself (Fuller 1993:108).

Before the movement gathered momentum, 'to be sure, various Kurdish guerrilla forces regularly served the external powers as a handy tool with which to weaken local regimes' (ibid.: 108). So the very background of this particularity requires a closer look. I argue here that the Kurdish tribal entity, by nature, is by no means unique but its historical extent and existence or, so to speak, its 'immortality' deserve further studies of specific perspectives. In effect, when handling this perpetual theme, one cannot avoid incorporating its inseparable twin: treason.

To this end, we are bound to examine not the well acknowledged and recurrently argued tribal structure of the Kurdish ethnic existence but its 'arrested' nature. Rather than the *how* of the political usage of the continual Kurdish tribality by the regional and

imperial powers, the mere 'unchanged' phenomenon needs to be taken on board as an internal dynamic of this very society.

### *The constancy of tribal existence*

The majority of those who have written on Kurdish ethnicity or nationality have paid a great deal of attention to the tribal structure of Kurdish society and, consequently, the endemic disunity among Kurds. The intellectual efforts devoted to the subject have addressed not only its cultural and political dimensions but also the *constancy* of Kurdish tribal existence. *Aşiret*[1] has so far been the overriding inheritance of Kurdish *ethne*.

This undying device has echoed the uniqueness[2] of Kurdish existence as the intrinsic nature of the Kurdish ethnic tradition which has coagulated in its national consciousness: the Kurds' temptation to be on the alert *not to miss out on a subordinate 'space'*. That is, the ethnicity has a consistent tradition of seeking not to be the leading entity but a trusty 'right arm' of the superior power. *Aşiret* has been the only structural means of survival in the cradle of civilization for the 'right arm'—consequently 'traitor'—Kurds. This seems to be the most unchanged trait of Kurdish ethnic existence throughout its history since Enkidu in *Gilgamesh*.[3] The recent affairs in relation to the Kurdish question in both the north (Turkey) and the south (Iraq), too, continue corroborating the tradition. The tradition, in turn, reproduced its accompaniment: *ihanet* (treason) as the 'twin' of *aşiret*.

### *Arrested tribality*

The clearest theme in the related literature is *unchanged* tribal existence. Wigram and Westermann present very similar arguments. They point towards the 'changeless character' of this endemic feature of the societal body and stretch it out to cover millennia:

> The only element of Kurdish culture which has changed much in the 4,300 years of known Kurdish life is the language. The Kurds took the Iranian basis of their language from the Medes and Persians about twelfth century BC. They still resent any invasions of their lands and any other intrusion upon their independence just as sharply as they did when Xenophon, the Athenian, led his ten thousand Greeks northward out of Mesopotamia through the 'Karduchian' villages in 400 BC. In this respect, the only thing which has changed among the Kurds is the type of weapon used. Indeed, the only progress worth recording in Kurdish life is that where once the Kurds fought with bows and arrows, they now shoot guns. A predilection of the Kurds for shooting at moving objects, preferably at human beings, has not altered much since Xenophon's time…
>
> The social and political organization under which the Kurds have always lived is tribalism. Once, in the tenth century AD, they established a fairly extensive Kurdish kingdom—but only for the lifetime of the chieftain.
>
> (Westermann 1946:52)

With reference to their numerous 'chronic' uprisings,[4] Westermann finds no remarkable *national* ingredients in Kurdish struggles:

> During the years between the Treaty of Lausanne and 1942, two serious revolts of the Kurds had occurred in Turkey, three in Iran and three in Iraq. These revolts indicated a vital spirit of resistance to control on the part of the Kurds; but it is a mistake to interpret them as evidence of a conscious and active feeling of Kurdish unity and nationalism or even of an overwhelming desire for statehood… For the Kurds have never been a unified people. They have no national tradition, no background of unity and no experience of self-rule.
>
> (Westermann 1946:52–54)

Westermann was writing just after the Second World War while the Kurdish Republic of Mehabad was experiencing its 'independence'—which had been proclaimed some months before with the backing of the Soviet Union. Wigram wrote in the wake of the First World War. But both reach similar conclusions:

> The characteristic feature of the Kurds seems to be that it has never changed during the historical segment between 1000BC and 1900AD. The Kurds are a type that have strong, skilful traits and they are attractive in many other respects. But, in fact, it is not clear, say, whether because of the eccentric complexion of the mountains in which they were born or the lack of some constituents in their formation process, the Kurds are *a type of community that has stayed at the halfway point*. In respect of social development, they have never come out of the 'tribal stage', and are still experiencing this stage.
>
> (W.A.Wigram, *Süryaniler ve Komşulari*, s. 7, in Nikitin 1986:147)

'A type of community that has stayed at the halfway point' is my understanding of the term *(yarım kalmış bir tip)* from the interpretation of the Turkish edition of the excerpt above. However, my actual perception in this context would be that Wigram genuinely tends to call Kurdish society 'a semi-humanized' or 'semi-civilized' society. If we use philosophical literature's definition of the 'human being' as a 'political animal', then Wadie Jwaideh's diagnosis of the Kurds' state of politicization is pointing in a very similar direction. Jwaideh relies on 'many valuable clues' from a wide range of references in related spheres, and thus confidently describes the most developed forms of the political conceptions and practices of the Kurds:

> The autonomous Kurdish political system has never gone beyond the level of *aşiret*. Those Kurdish leaders who succeeded in founding states followed an Islamic rather than a Kurdish pattern of political organizations. The *aşiret* institutions have thus become the most perfected form of Kurdish institutions in consequence.
>
> (Jwaideh 1999:59–60)

Jwaideh also foresees the vital influence of tribal institutions on the future political orientations in Kurdistan, while highlighting the conscious interference in the affairs of tribal entities by the neighbouring rulers of the country for the purpose of impeding the further politicization of an ethnic nationality (ibid.: 60). Further, Jwaideh remarks that 'the peculiar tenacity of the Kurdish tribal sentiment…has on numerous occasions proved even stronger than the religious sentiment' (ibid.: 63).

According to Wigram the term *aşiret* strictly means 'tribe' or 'clan' (Wigram and Edgar 1922). The glossary of the book explains it with a single word: 'Feudatory'. He emphasizes the extent to which this configuration extends to Christian dwellers in the region:

> All the Mussulman dwellers in the land were until lately *'ashiret'*, and much in the same position as the Highlanders 'beyond the line' in days previous to the 'forty five'. A fair proportion of the Christian dwellers there, happening to have arms, are *'ashiret'* as well.
>
> (Wigram and Edgar 1922:167)

The verdict of Bois, in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, leaves no space for discussion about the actual structure of Kurdish society: 'A fundamental element of Kurdish society is without dispute the tribe' (Th. Bois, *Encyclopedia of Islam*, Vol. 5:471).

Yet these shared views are not only found in foreign works. They also crop up in two native sources, *Şerefname* and *Mem û Zin*, written in the late sixteenth (former) and late seventeenth (latter) centuries, as well as in the early writings of Z.Gökalp, a *Kurdish* ideologue of *Turkish nationalism*. Bedlisi states that no accord or co-operation exists among the Kurds. He formed the epigram: 'No common view [has been] recognized within the Kurdish ethnicity so far that links them to one another except the "*kelime-i şahadet*"[5] which expresses the singleness of God' (Bedlisi 1998:22).

With respect to the cause of this peculiarity, he mentions a number of strange stories, and elects to tell the one which ends with the malediction of the Prophet Muhammed. 'All being well, the Almighty God will never allow this community to achieve unity and concord; because if they unite, the world will be destroyed in their hands.' The conclusion of Bedlisi, the oldest Kurdish historian, is not so far removed from Muhammed's malediction.

> In accordance with Hazreti Muhammed's Sunnah,[6] they consider marrying four non-concubine women as *mübah* [religiously tolerated or lawful]; then, if they can cope, they add four concubines to them. So they procreate with the permission of the Almighty God, and multiply rapidly. If killings were not widespread among them, there would possibly be scarcity and famine not just in Iran but it would also spread out all over the world because of the multiplication of their generation.
>
> (Bedlisi 1998:23)

He also claims that the Kurds may rebel because of the most worthless causes, and that they are keen to commit serious crimes due to unimportant blunders and trivial slights. Soane refers to some widely told stories in this regard:

> They are always ready to tell stories against themselves of this very characteristic.
>
> There was once a Khan of the Herki of Oramar (in Hakkari), who was bitten by a fly, scratched the place, five minutes afterwards irritated still, and again he scratched. Yet again it commenced, and he snatched a pistol from his belt, and cursing the father of flies, shot his finger off.
>
> Two Kurds were discussing the position in which the star Sirius (which marks the end of the warmest weather) might be expected in the firmament. Without any abusive language they disagree as to the position, stop upon the road, and fall upon one another. One remains there dead.
>
> (Soane 1926:395–396)

Nikitin refers to a French traveller's contradictory impression about the general quality of the Kurdish character:

> Kurds, notwithstanding their wildness, bear a deep sense of honour nevertheless; they are known as men of their word. If a Kurd promised to take you somewhere safe and sound, you can trust him/her without fear or hesitation. But the day after, if you meet the same person again following the accomplishment of what is promised, he/she robs you and kills you like a dog.
>
> (Nikitin 1986:145)

Researchers have underlined the distinct features of each individual tribe. These differences do not allow broad generalizations of Kurds as a homogeneous ethnic entity. Edmonds points to the linguistic differences in a land with varying national characteristics. 'Kurdistan is a land of high mountains', he states, 'with difficult communications; for centuries it has not had any political unity which might have given it a common literature; it is therefore not surprising that local dialects vary almost from valley to valley' (Edmonds 1957:7). Soane emphasizes the worries of scholars about summarizing the prevailing national features. 'Yet the character of the Kurds is one on which the would-be writer is to experience enough difficulty, for the tribal character differs so much as to make one summary quite inadequate for the whole nation.' However, like others, he advances a firm generalization and, yet again, points towards tribal loyalty as an unquestionable value of the 'whole nation':

> The true feudal spirit is strong in the race. Devoted to the mountains, to his own clan intensely proud of being a Kurd, *the northerner will take arms at the word of his chief, never asking to hear his reason*… A steady faithfulness, a recognition of the given word, a generous affection for near relatives, a manlier treatment (among the southern and middle Kurds) of his women than is seen among any other Musulman race, a keen literary sense and love of poetry, *a ready willingness to sacrifice himself for his tribe*, and a fine pride of country and race.
>
> (Soane 1926:393, 395; emphases added)

The millennial handicap of the Kurdish ethnic nature based on unfortunate tribal consistency is also the main concern of the earliest *literary* work of Ehmedê Xanî, *Mem û Zîn*, written in 1695. Laizer, referring this 'classical' concern, states that Xanî is 'probably the most accomplished Kurdish writer of classical time, renowned for this Kurdish epic *Mem û Zîn* (a Romeo and Juliet style tragedy) [who] had recognized three hundred years ago the dilemma of Kurdish internal political division'. Laizer translates an extract from Xanî's epic poem titled *Our Dilemma:*

> As if the Kurds held the keys to the border
> every tribe as strong as wall
> whenever the seas of the Turks
> lash the oceans of the Persians
> rising and colliding
> it is the Kurds who are washed in blood
> and set one against the other
>
> generosity, benevolence and chivalry
> bravery, self possession and courage
> are attributed to every Kurdish tribe
> famed for their swords and their honour
> brave as they are proud
> in equal measure
> they despise submission
> spurn domination
> and for this remain isolated
> fighting one another, ever divided
>
> (Laizer 1996:206–207)

The suggestion of 'feudalism' and of 'tribalism' among Kurds in Gökalp's words is worth quoting:

> Whoever looks at the wide-ranging escape from military service among the Kurds deems this nation to be without ideals. Or he/she thinks that they are cowards. Whereas loyalty to ideals is extremely strong. But because these ideals are not about the country, or patriotic ones, they are not inclined to enlist for military service. Their tribal ideals are so vehement. They, man and woman, find great pleasure in sacrificing their life, their wealth, their children for this ideal…

> The tribal ideal is extraordinarily strong to the extent that it dominates man's sexual love, which is the most vehement passion of individual.
>
> (Gökalp [1909] 1992:39–40)

Gökalp supports his diagnosis by referring to lines from the well-known quatrain of a Kurdish folk song which expresses a girl's refusal to marry her lover due to the family's and the tribe's opposition to the boy: 'Nav mezine piçuk nabe/Eşîra min qaîl nabe' (The name is grand, it cannot be passed down/My tribe does not approve).

By quoting from sources dating back decades and centuries, it is not my intention to imply that tribal bonds are confined to Kurds' past history. In contrast with the PKK's latest programme which claims it has eliminated the tribal-feudal structure apart from the 'remnants and traditional customs' (*Programme* 2000:48), this structure is a reality of Kurdish social, political, cultural and economic existence.

This Kurdish societal phenomenon functions currently, even given the changes that have taken place in the past two decades and the undeniably extensive transformation towards transcending tribal structures and hence re-socialization. The extensive changes and outstanding remains constitute two sides of a coin. While, for example, the PKK hardly managed to gather 20,000 guerrillas in 20 years, the state—which hardly recognized Kurds as 'Turks of Kurdish origin'—enjoyed rapid activation of over 60,000 *official* 'village guards' during several months in 1986. These guards are still retained, in spite of the PKK's abandonment of the armed struggle since 2 August 1999 and the withdrawal of its guerrilla forces from Turkey's national borders since the first day of the following month. There are also thousands of official and unofficial 'voluntary village guards' reserved as eager to fight against the PKK guerrillas. Seydi Eyuboğlu, the leader of Şeyhanlı tribe of approximately 30,000 members in the Kurdish city of Urfa, has long been MP of the TBMM,[7] along with many other scarcely literate chieftain-MPs from various political parties. Eyuboğlu's interesting and illustrative interview was broadcast on the Turkish television channel Star TV on 28 January 1999. The translation of a segment of the interview transcript is as follows:

*Question: In tribes, do women have the right of words [i.e. the right to join the process of decision-making], and in tribes, why does a man marry more than one woman?*

*Answer:* In tribes, women do not have the right of words. The reason they do not have this right is our region's tradition. For example, if I intend to give my daughter to someone, I would question his family's previous 3–4–5 generations. That is to say, I take his structure [personality], his family, and his tribal status into consideration. That is to say, marriages take place absolutely according to the arrangement of equivalent persons found among the tribes. And this issue, this tradition is descended from our ancestry and still continues. Therefore, the issue of the right of words for women is as I said. In fact, such a demand does not exist on the side of women. And everybody is pleased with the situation.

*Question: How many children do you have?*

*Answer:* Mine? I have 17.

*Question: Are you thinking of more?*
*Answer:* I would guess that one more is on the way.

*Question: Are you thinking of another marriage in addition to your existing wives?*
*Answer:* Mr Saadettin [interviewer], to tell the truth, I was thinking of it, before I got involved in politics I was thinking of it.

*Question: For example, how many would you go up to?*
*Answer:* I would go up to four.

*Question: Maşallah!* [Wonderful! What God has willed.]
*Answer:* My elder brother is now at three. One of my father-in-laws is at four, the other at three. Only my deceased father stayed at one. Generally it goes up to 2–3–4. So, such is the matter; politics bound our [my] hands and feet. I mean, I can say, it prevented our chance of marriage. And it has always bound us and blocked our way. If politics was not an obstacle, I would have resolved on going up to four.

*Question: You had that intention?*
*Answer:* Yes. From time to time, when I joke with my wives, they keep saying: 'You have the right' That is to say, 'You can go up to four.'

Then the interviewer diverts the subject of the dialogue to politics, specifically elections, because it is widely known that members of the tribes do not vote for political parties but for what the chieftain imposes. Furthermore, there are a considerable number of 'fixed' members of the Turkish parliament, based on the 'guaranteed' tribal constituency, no matter which party nominates them:

*Question: Suppose a chieftain said: 'You will vote for Party A or Party B.' If, then, votes for parties other than what you [chieftains] said come out of the polling box, what happens in that case?*
*Answer:* It does not occur.

*Question: Say it occurred.*
*Answer:* Nothing happens.

The programme continued with interviews with young boys and girls complaining about the high rate of *başlık*[8] in the region, which had climbed to 1.5 billion Turkish lira. It also featured a lord of the manor who owned the Bilece village, Urfa, and who was desperately trying to sell his village with its 150 inhabitants for three billion lira. Even the author of *A Modern History of the Kurds* prefers to put more emphasis on this unchanged side of the coin:

> The agha was still intermediary between illiterate villagers and the outside world. It was irrelevant that the state had abolished the class distinction of 'agha', 'beg' or 'shaykh'. These families still operated the village guesthouse, the focus of rural life, and still mediated individual or

> collective village difficulties with local officials. No much had changed since Ziya Gökalp's description half a century earlier.
>
> (McDowall 1996:397)

A section of my questionnaire was targeted at reaching an understanding of today's tribalness among Kurds. I aimed to bring out the extent of *tribal consciousness* in comparison with national consciousness. How far has the sense of national belonging superseded the tribal one in the Kurdish family following the remarkable supra-tribal changes within the ethnic body of 'Turkish Kurds' during the last two decades? The questions numbered 28 and 29 were structured as follows:

- *Do you remember when you first became aware of your nationality?*
- *Do you remember when you first realized that you belong to a tribe?*

The finding was striking. While 84.4 per cent of 184 respondents remembered when and/or how they became aware of their national identity, 26.6 per cent of them remembered the time they realized they belonged to a tribe (Tables 7 and 8). This means that 73.4 per cent of the respondents were born into their family as a 'natural' member of the family's tribe; 84.4 per cent of them, on the other hand, only became aware of their Kurdishness afterwards. This was the phenomenal aspect of Kurdish society in terms of which the PKK premeditated and initiated its inception, and by which its organizational peculiarity has been considerably shaped.

### *Tribe and the 'Kurdish tribe'*

Is the tribe peculiar to Kurds? If not, why has it continued so zealously, and what is its significance to social development in the rest of the world?

The tribe as a social institution and tribalism as a spiritual, cultural or ideological device are, of course, not entities peculiar to Kurds and Kurdistan. Tribe as a form of sociality is a universal entity. 'The history of the human race', Morgan states in the preface to his well-known *Ancient Society*, 'is one in source, one in experience, one in progress':

> Since mankind were one in origin, their career has been essentially one, running in different but uniform channels upon all continents, and very similarly in all the tribes and nations of mankind down to the same status of advancement.
>
> (Morgan 1919:vii)

In all parts of the world, tribes appear to be the creation of prehistory. The emergence of the tribal form can be traced back to primitive communal human sociality in which society has not yet been cleaved into classes and during which 'the idea of government in the human mind' is fertilized (ibid.: 104).

The state, which became indispensable to class societies, emerged from this initial governmental form of sociality, which transcends the primitive family-clan groupings that did not exceed 20–30 people. So tribe, as a socio-political institution, is in fact a

great leap forward in the history of human social development. It replaces the far smaller and more primitive clan system.[9] 'The tribe', Davis defines, 'is a kinship group, including typically a number of clans or gents; it has as a rule a common language and a putative or magical common ancestor' (Davis 1978:202).

The Kurdish tribe is certainly no exception to the universal process of human social development. What is more, given the generally acknowledged view that the Kurds are the indigenous inhabitants of the 'cradle of civilization', the Kurdish tribe may well have been a prototype of the tribal entities of humankind. Therefore, van Bruinessen's assertion that the term 'of standard anthropological usage, "tribe"…appear[s] to be a straightjacket *[sic]* that ill fits the social reality of Kurdistan' is not a relevant concern (van Bruinessen 1992:59). Here, the uniqueness of Kurds is rather exaggerated. The actual unique aspect is not the cultural or political quality of the Kurdish tribe but the *constancy* of tribal structures among the Kurds. In addition, given that the land and people form a 'prototype' of tribal institutionalization, this may well have been one of the effective factors of this constancy as a consequence of the dialectical logic of development.

While the tribe emerges as a premise of the primitive era of human sociality, it does not wither away simultaneously with primitivity. The acknowledged universal pattern is that it emerges in primitivity, retains itself in slavery, matures in feudality and ends with the nation-state of capitalism. So the seeds of nationalism are planted in mature tribalism. Morgan, while pointing to the fact that 'the great body of the aborigines were found in independent tribes illustrates the slow and difficult growth of the idea of government under gentile institutions', dichotomizes the concept of tribe with nation:

> *Tribe* and *nation*, however, are not strict equivalents. A nation does not arise, until gentile institutions, until the tribes united under the same government have coalesced into one people, as the four Athenian tribes coalesced in Attica, three Dorian tribes at Sparta, and three Latin and Sabine tribes at Rome.
>
> (Morgan 1919:104)

A great deal of consensus appears among the scholars in their view that the nation is eventually the outcome of the coalescence, amalgamation, integration, dissolution and finally withering-away of tribes, by forming a 'whole' people under 'one' government. Accordingly Gellner too, like Morgan, highlights the contrast between tribalism and nationalism:

> The contrast I am here drawing between culture-mediated nationalism and structure-mediated tribalism is, of course, meant to be a genuine analytical distinction between two objectively distinguishable kinds of organizations; it must not be confused with the relativistic or emotive opposition between *my* nationalism and *your* tribalism… In this sense nationalisms are simply those tribalisms, or for that matter any other kind of group, which through luck, effort or circumstance succeed in becoming an effective force under modern circumstances.
>
> (Gellner 1983:86, 87)

Elie Kedourie also contrasts tribalism with nationalism. He criticizes descriptions of nationalism as 'new tribalism' by some scholars—those who make the analogy to indicate that, like the tribe, the nation excludes and is intolerant of outsiders. For Kedourie, 'such characteristics…are common to all human groups, and cannot serve to define either tribe or nation'. He states that 'the analogy is not only unable to shed light on the matter, it can also mislead'. While the relation of the tribesman to his tribe is generally regulated by unquestionable customs considered to be 'part of the natural or divine order', Kedourie states that the citizen's ties are arranged, legitimized and governed by general will and/or the 'edict of legislative Reason' (Kedourie 1966:74, 75). He comes to the firm conclusion: 'Nationalism and tribalism, then, are not interchangeable terms, nor do they describe related phenomena' (ibid.: 75).

In Hobsbawm's view, tribalism falls into his concept of 'popular protonationalism' or the 'proto-national', which he relates to 'certain variants of feelings of collective belonging which already existed' there to be worked on by emerging national forces (Hobsbawm 1990:46). So we may deduce that the tribe is succeeded by a broader, more rational social formation—the nation.

What is peculiar to Kurds is that the Kurdish social structure has been *arrested* in tribality. For instance, in the classical pattern (Europe), tribalism is a kind of fertile ground for nascent nationalism, but in the Kurdish pattern it is the basic sterilizing factor for a would-be nationalist adventure. That is, while tribalism served to form nationalism in general, the Kurdish tribe has been an effective deforming entity in terms of an ordinarily viable nationalism in Kurdistan.

So the fragmented politics of Kurdish nationalism are not just an outcome of the fragmentation of land and population. They are rather the absolute lack of *national* desires and aspirations in the *fragmented minds* of the tribal structures that remain in Kurdish society. In short, the Kurdish tribe has never begun to evolve towards having market sentiments for its own commodity production in an envisaged broader ethnic *patrie*. This is the factor that renders Kurdish nationalism *without* nationalism.[10] The very same factor also causes 'the absence of nationalism' in Scotland, which became 'a form of Scottish self-determination' (Nairn 1981:126).

The peculiarity of the *arrested tribality* that haunts the Kurdish social structure is by no means related to the nature of tribal existence. The most general definitions of tribe and tribalism fit in with the tribal structures of Kurds just as problematically as those that communities have experienced in the rest of the world. It is with the following stage that the Kurds have had trouble ever since Kurdistan was introduced to modernity: the absence of a bourgeoisie inspired by a 'home market' emoted by *rational* 'market sentiments'.[11]

Scholars acknowledge that 'a bunch of intellectuals' always initiates national movements with bold romantic-maximalist aspirations. This initiating stage has been a *sine qua non* for all nationalisms. True, in almost all Kurdish uprisings too there has been a modest group from the intelligentsia involved with similar 'national' aspirations, including the latest and most tribally based uprising which occurred in Dersim under Turkey in 1937 and 1938.[12] But the trouble with the Kurds, namely the Kurdish tribe, is that there has never been a 'hope-giving' *base* for a rational bourgeoisie who would take over the job and *accomplish* the following stage—a nation-state with a home market. Kurdish tribalism did not ever generate an adolescent bourgeoisie among itself who

seriously aspired to a profitable home market in which the future ruling class would have been a self-leading superior entity, nor did Kurdish tribalism let it emerge from the surroundings.

The Kurdish tribe's most profitable option—or the only option for survival as a 'mountain people' (Guttians)—has been the consolidation of tribal ties in order not to miss the opportunity for a position of *inferiority*. And this tradition has not been confined to the past at all. The most recent experience of resistance has manifested tradition in the unquestioned support of the Kurdish masses for Öcalan's proposal of a 'Democratic Republic' of Turkey.[13]

In the first chapter I discussed the *non-exceptional alienation* between the departure and the arrival of nationalist 'victories' by giving examples of some well-known experiences in modern history:

> What ought not to be overlooked here is that the *departures* and *arrivals* of 'national' movements are without exception doomed to be alien to one another. The primary 'things' longed for in the *hearts* of the entrepreneurs of national emancipation—generally within the intelligentsia—and the 'things' envisaged in the heads of the bureaucrats who accomplish the national construction are thoroughly distinct. In a general way, while the former departs from 'national sentiments', the latter arrives at 'home market' longings. The former is driven by the impetus stemming from aspirations to enjoy and experience their innate ethno-cultural elements along with others' aspirations. The latter are attracted by the gains of 'control of the distributive system' (Hah and Martin 1975) against respective others' gains. The former moves from the 'heart', and is consequently emotional and maximalist, the latter moves from the 'head' and so is by nature calm, rational and realistic, and also pitiless. An old Turkish saying goes: 'While the sheep concerns itself with its life, the butcher concerns himself with its meat'. In the case of *national* movements, however, the 'butcher' is always the eventual winner.
>
> (Chapter 1:33)

When considering the Kurdish experience, one cannot avoid the fact that a'butcher' did not come into existence at all. The 'sheep' (a kind of 'poor' intelligentsia with considerable mass support) has always interfered with the myriad tribal resistances against foreign invaders, but the actual accomplishing entity, the 'butcher' (a young bourgeoisie longing for the existing and potential profits of the home market) did not emerge. The words of Gellner's dichotomy of tribalism and nationalism, in this sense, well define the so-called Kurdish nationalism: Tribalism never prospers, for when it does, everyone will respect it as a true nationalism, and no-one will dare call it tribalism' (Gellner 1983:87).

The fact is that Kurdish tribalism did not prosper, so 'no-one will dare call it' true nationalism. Moreover, Kurdish tribalism does not aspire to a national market, for which a nation-state may be the *sine qua non*. The most passionate aspirations of a marginal intelligentsia will not suffice for a movement to be defined as a 'true nationalism'.

This appears to be the most distinct feature of all the Kurdish ethnic resistance movements that have occurred throughout the last two centuries in all parts of Kurdistan. The PKK-led resistance against Turkey has not differed from the others in this respect.[14]

### *The appreciation of treason amongst the Kurds*

Travellers and observers have noticeably identical impressions regarding the 'treacherous habits' of the Kurds (Soane 1926), as they do about the unquestioned loyalty to tribal values. Both Soane and Nikitin talk of Millingen's experiences in particular with regard to the Kurds' easy inclinations towards betrayal, scheming and counter-scheming. Nikitin cites Millingen, saying: 'The Kurd is traitor, and he does not hesitate to have the blood of a person on his hands who takes refuge under his own shelter' (Nikitin 1986:146). In order to emphasize the bravery of the Kurdish women in joining the fray, Soane tells how 'Millingen, a traveller among the Kurds, quotes a fantastic story of how the Kurdish women form themselves into bands for the decoy and robbery of the unfortunate traveller' (Soane 1926:397, referring to Millingen 1870:244).

Another continuing feudal—in fact pre-feudal—phenomenon in contemporary Kurdish society is *vendetta,* which became one of the main assets infiltrated into 'Kurdish personality'. The frequent blood feuds and 'peace dinners' organized to bring vendettas to an end (generally arranged with the attendance of government ministers, mayors and the local 'fixed' MPs) are customary items on the news agenda of Turkish media. The battles stretch across the Turkish metropolises. In fact, the bulk of 'voluntary village guards' from the Bucak tribe reserved as a 'rapid reaction force' against the PKK guerrillas may well be explained by tracking back to the clashes of 1979 between the party and the tribe. As far as Kurdish national politics is concerned, Hasretyan has the most interesting document demonstrating the *cultural* dimension of vendetta's penetration into the society. He cites an oath excerpt signed by the tribe leaders who decided to join the organization, Xoybun[15] (Independence), which got involved to some extent in the Agiri (Ararat) Rebellion that took place against Turkey in 1930. This was the first rebellion that had an organization partly involved in it. At the end of its foundation congress the party composed an oath text to be signed by the chieftain attendants, along with two declarations to the public and the Socialist International:

> Brotherhood Oath
>
> Commencing from now onwards, the date of signing this oath, for two years; if a threat which endangers the security and existence of the Kurdish nation does not emerge, and, *if an attack on my life and honour and on others who are obligated to protect their family and Kurdishness…is not made by another Kurd*, I swear on my religion, my honour and my sacrednesses that I shall make every effort to avoid using a gun against any other Kurd, to *postpone* the solutions of vendettas and other disagreements,…to a time after these two years.
>
> (Hasretyan 1995:198–199; emphases added)

Because of the highly volatile nature of the issue, even making any endeavour to resolve the conflicts associated with vendettas is not allowed, but merely postponed for a fixed

time, for the 'Kurds are sometimes cruel against others, but always pitiless against themselves' (Nikitin 1986:13).

Turkish journalist R. Balli has an interesting anecdote to add to Hasretyan's document. While Turkish-speaking Balli was interviewing a *peşmerge* commander from southern Kurdistan (Iraq), he had to use a village guard from the Turkish Kurds fighting against the PKK as an interpreter. At one stage in the interview the commander had said, 'aggressors cannot stand against us because they are *caş*'.[16] Balli's anecdote deserves to be quoted at length:

> When our interpreter came to the sentence he hesitated and stopped. Then he put all his effort into finding a relevant word for *'caş'*… In fact, I knew what the word meant from my years at university. The term *'caş'* which is translated as 'donkey foal' in the dictionary, is, in Kurdish political terminology, employed for 'traitor', 'collaborator'.
>
> The discomfort of interpreter did not seem to be coming to an end. He was still arduously searching for a Turkish word for *'caş'*. Even my interference, by saying, 'OK, I understand', did not persuade him to give up. After he had exhausted all his efforts and language skills, he eventually found the way out! Here is his verdict. He declared, while ceasing to look me in the eye:
>
> '*Caş*. Namely, people like myself.'
>
> Despite rapidly reconnecting all the fuses in my nervous system, I could not prevent my whole body from shaking. My God, neither a Catholic nor a traditional Leninist would venture into such tyrannical self-criticism!
>
> Do not get me wrong. My intention is not to call some people 'traitor' or 'collaborator'. I am dealing with how these human beings see or experience themselves.
>
> The only remaining alternative from my point of view was to be ashamed of myself. Because, at the end of the day, I am a journalist in that region, where human beings have such deformed and destroyed personalities. […]
>
> What do you think? Does the subject need to be elaborated on by psychologists?
>
> (Balli 1991:15–16)

Treason is a cursed phenomenon in every society, no matter whether it occurs within the framework of national, class or personal relations. It is, of course, cursed in Kurdistan too. However, what Balli's anecdote indicates is that it has infiltrated the Kurdish personality considerably and is to some extent appreciated in Kurdistan—at least within some components of the societal structure. Nevertheless, *tribal* treason has evidently not flourished as *national* treason has. On the contrary, tribal treason is by no means tolerated; that is to say, tribal loyalty has been jealously and stubbornly preserved because tribality has hitherto been indispensable to the 'people of the cradle of civilization'.

## The nature and resource field of the organization

The arguments above have been selected from a wide range of historical sources. The aim is to illuminate the *raw* and *well-matured* ground from which the PKK originated.

Obviously, the question of how it has come to be there cannot be neglected. But this question falls outside the realms of this study. Rather, my study tackles the question, 'how has it come here from there?' I ask how and why Kurds have 'for the first time in modern history…slipped out of the grasp of' *treason* to a considerable extent, in their latest 'adventure' undertaken with the PKK (Fuller 1993:108). For this reason, a study of the process of the 'implantation' and functionalization of the individual in the PKK's organizational structure is needed.

In his teachings, Öcalan often tells of his organizational efforts in the early days. One of the most repeated dialogues is the one he held with an old villager, which symbolized a 'question' and a 'diagnosis' bearing a chilling warning. The old man in his seventies, sitting against a wall in the village with a chip of wood in his hand picking the earthen ground in front of him, responds to the indoctrination of young Öcalan—who intends to stimulate his hopes about the Kurds' fate—by pointing at the chip of wood: 'Oğlum sen şu kuru ağaci yeşertebilir misin? Oğlum, hakhısınız, ama devlete devlet lazım' (My son, can you make this dry piece of wood sprout?… My son you are quite right, but [standing against] a state requires the state) (*Özgür Politika*, 14 February 2000). Since every single Kurdish attempt to win some freedom in Turkey invariably culminated in heavy-handed suppression followed by massacre, deportation and evacuation, there was dead silence and a solid hopelessness before the PKK launched its war. Being well aware of this phenomenon, and in spite of agitating about the inevitability of the armed struggle against the 'colonialist Turkish state' in bold-and-capital lettering, almost a dozen Kurdish political configurations never ventured to initiate this struggle, and they consequently withered away. Thus, Öcalan kept repeating in his defence: 'One-third of the Kurdish [social] reality is ill, one-third is maddened and one-third is captive' (Öcalan 1999c:87).

### *A dormant resource*

A kind of 'dormant resource' is an indispensable prerequisite for all nationalisms, Nairn states:

> [Nationalism] always imagines an ideal 'people'…and it always searches urgently for vital inner, untapped springs of energy both in individuals and the mass.
>
> (Nairn 1981:102–103)

Öcalan starts from two primary interrelated diagnoses which he expresses on every occasion: 'Kurds are a people of degenerated-debased (Düşürülmüş)[17] state'; and, 'Other than the Kurds, no people exist in the world who have become the soldiers of others in such a disgraceful way.'[18] In keeping with these and similar statements Öcalan quite frankly concludes in the third congress of the party, 1986, that the Kurds have not 'a base of ethnic nationalism' which will orientate them 'to a customary nationalization as seen in many other countries' (Öcalan 1993a:191). The diagnosis of 'degeneration'

*(Düşürülmüşlük)* is the prime and most distinctive theory of the PKK It was this theory under which the latent group ('Apoists') of the movement gathered and under which the party attained unity and continuity. At the same time, it is as a result of this theory that Öcalan is constantly accused of treating the Kurdish people in a derogatory manner by the rest of the Kurdish political-intellectual circle: 'Kurds are a *namussuzlaştırılmış*' (scoundrelized),[19] 'nationally emasculated' people and 'you were emasculated' are the terms that Öcalan habitually employs in the course of his dialogues and teachings *(çözümlemeler)* (A.K.Özcan 1999:74). According to Öcalan's diagnosis, the degeneration and 'debasement' manifest themselves in the Kurdish lifestyle in two main forms:

1 There exists an extreme inclination among Kurds towards presenting themselves as resembling others. They imitate the image and com-plexion of sovereign nations, for it is not 'feasible' to live as a Kurd. This is additionally true of the north-west population under Turkey, where Kurds are deprived of the basic elements of ethnic identity such as a name and a language, which varies incomparably from the other parts of the country ruled by Iran and Iraq.
2 Kurds are limitlessly brave, resistant and pitiless against themselves and, in consequence, treason has 'infiltrated the genes' of the people to the extent that treason is *appreciated* in Kurdistan.

In keeping with this diagnosis, the PKK's educational-organizational efforts—in fact, Öcalan's speeches—place intensive emphasis on the Kurdish man's 'rich memories' of military service, through which he enjoys the rest of his life. According to Öcalan, the endemic decade-long vendettas caused by a goat or a chicken or a fence or an argument between two children, are indeed the most acknowledged characteristics of Kurdishness by everyone with an average familiarity with the community. The memories' 'richness value' appreciates in proportion to the worst beatings, swearing, insults and the difficulties experienced during the service, and the vendettas' 'dignity' and 'seriousness' is evaluated by the number of decades they lasted and the dead they produced. In daily agitation-aimed propaganda activities Öcalan uses a sentence which is associated with this Kurdish 'national' legacy, and which is not understood in terms of being a direct 'collaborator' with the 'foreign enemy' but of being one pitiless fighter pitted against another: *'There is no one in Kurdistan who has not become involved in some type of treason.'*

Thus, this Kurdish ethnic reality appears to be the fundamental raw resource—'untapped springs of energy'—that is partly converted into and partly utilized as the *well-refined* sap through which the PKK started and decisively extended its organizational functionality. Using this resource, the party orientated itself towards questioning the meaning of men's lives and originating the argument of 'how men ought to live' in an organizational existence (Öcalan 1995b, 1996a, 1999a). When one intends to study the PKK's individual-organizational interactions, it would be more plausible to examine the framework of the PKK's educational 'inculcation' as part of the process of cadre and fighter recruitment and the organization's functioning organic execution rather than its constitutional structure. Considering that the very same material and spiritual base existed in Turkey and Kurdistan as was present for a dozen other Kurdish political initiatives advocating a 'holy national liberation struggle' against the 'fascist-colonialist state of Turkish Republic', there naturally have to be some distinctive factors in the

organization's nature which have enabled it to be the leading force in the outbreak of the most recent Kurdish resistance against Turkey.

There is a fundamental underlying cause of the PKK's ascendancy above all the other initiatives claiming to be liberation movements, and this cause requires sociological identification. However, despite their quite peripheral significance to the organization's working order, we need to know about the basic constitutional structure and certain of the alterations made in the course of programmatic reformation and reconstruction before we can proceed to the actual 'life' of the organization's functioning.

### *The basic organizational structure*

There is no principle in the organizational structure of the PKK or in its constitution that distinguishes it from conventional socialist/communist parties or from other 'parties of Kurdistan'. This is also true of the early PKK. The party's primary organizational structure defined in the constitution resembles an ordinary Marxist-socialist party as much as its fellow organizations' initiatives do[20] (see Appendix 2).

The fifth party congress of 1995 made minor alterations to the constitution, and further ones were approved in the seventh extraordinary congress of 1999.

Under the influence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and its affiliated system, the classical terminology of the 1970s was eliminated from the text and the term 'General Secretary' was replaced by 'General President' in 1995. The 'Council of General Presidency', which consisted of several prominent figures elected by the Central Committee from amongst themselves, was to be configured according to a new constitutional article approved in this congress.[21] The change of the party emblem and the removal of the sickle and hammer from the party flag was also accomplished in this constitution.

In 1999, the Central Committee was replaced by the 'Party Assembly'. The emblem of the party—and the flag—was again changed. The yellow torch that had been placed in the red star in 1995—which superseded the sickle and hammer—was now superseded by the full red star. This could be considered as a particular emphasis on the *socialism* of the party. The other minor changes were terminological modifications.

Nevertheless, the *definition* and the *traits* of the 'individual' necessary for membership of the party remain the same in both updated programmes, and this definition goes back to the time of the PKK's formation—the mid-1970s (*Programme* 1995:80, 83, 84; *Programme* 2000:79, 81, 82). The framework for the personality of the membership, which originated at the inception of the organization, extends into these modified constitutions.

The changes seem to be rather superficial and tactical, such as saying the party member 'struggles *[mücadele eder]* for socialism' instead of 'fights *[savaşır]* for socialism'. This has more to do with the basic lifestyle, beliefs and ambitions required of the person who decides to step into the party than it has to do with the official constitution. Hence, this will be a matter for further discussion.

### *Party membership*

The procedures for becoming a member of and for dismissal from the PKK are simply put down in the constitutions. The issue is dealt with in two paragraphs totalling 72 words in the constitution approved by the fifth congress, and 53 words by the 1999 extraordinary congress (*Programme* 1995:81; *Programme* 2000:79–80). The procedures are basically about the period of provisional membership in which the person is being tested for approval or disapproval and the party organ which decides upon the final approval. While the period was six months and the organ was the Central Committee in the former constitutions, the period was reduced to three months and the approval institution stated as the 'Party Assembly' in the most recent one. But this is by no means a matter at issue in organizational practice as it is actually experienced.

Even if the entirety of constitutional articles are of quite peripheral importance to the facts of party life, the definition of the *'party member'* has significance, for it presents clues to the nature of the PKK's 'organizational life'. The membership constitutes the most essential feature of the party, and it also overwhelmingly determines the successes and failures of the movement:

> A party member is one who acknowledges the programme of the party and is responsible for its implementation; who takes the will of the party as fundamental and gradually *attaches themself to the party's will;* who joins party life and tactical application [daily practical activities] *all day* in an organ of the party; who exuberantly works for the party's fundamental aims in the manner of not making concessions, of not following self-advantages and of unlimited self-sacrifice by embracing the party's demeanour, tempo, and style through *undoing* oneself [analysing-remoulding one's personality]; and who devotes his/her life to the cause of the party.
>
> (*Programme* 1995:80; emphases added)

In the 2000 constitution, it is passed exactly as above with elimination of the final component of the sentence, 'who devotes his/her life to the cause of the party'.

The PKK is a solid, 'all-day' professional organization. This aspect may be a peculiarity of the party's organization, but it is not the entity that defines the *quality* of the organization. In other words, *full-timeness* or *professionality* is not a property that characterizes the PKK's organizational nature, and nor do the extremely firm constitutional articles. Instead, it is the member's complete deprivation of 'personal will' and of 'private life' that is the most distinguishing feature of the PKK. The use of the term 'all day' (or literally 'whole day' *[tüm gün]*) instead of 'full-time' is a deliberate choice here. In fact, unlike the rest of the text of the constitution, the *definition* and the *duties* of the member, along with the *features,* is diligently structured as a corollary of the particular approach to a point—the point that transcends the conventional boundaries of a Leninist party.

When an individual—either man or woman—decides to attach himself/herself to the party's activities as a *full-time* member, it ought unalterably to be *all day* 'work'. In other

words, the incorporation of individuals into the PKK's organizational body does not encompass daytime working hours between sunrise and sunset, but the *whole day and night* of 24 hours. That is to say, the members of the PKK ought somehow not to have *private time* or a *private life* regardless of who/what they are: man or woman, single or married, a childless couple or parents, senior citizen or teenager. This is indisputable and non-negotiable in the PKK. As a matter of fact, it is the first condition for being a component of a *party cell*. As a corollary to the nature of the organization, a member—not only a guerrilla—does not have a permanent address at which he/she practically lives, does not have a private home that he/she may keep for their own usage, does not have a family of which he/she is practically a part. If a *provisional* member merits, gains and is eventually approved as a *professional* (cadre), he/she then must withdraw himself/herself from all social establishments (relations, institutions, belongings) that would usually be part of a person's life. For example, when the wife or the husband of a family—with or without children—becomes a member, he or she leaves the rest of family even if the member works for the party in the very same locality—as does a teenager.

Or, if both husband and wife join the party, then the home is either abolished or converted into one of the common places that a group of party members share and the responsibility for any child/children is taken over by the party.[22] The same regulation applies to every 'cadre' of the party based either in the Kurdistan part under Turkey, or in Turkey, or in other parts of Kurdistan or abroad, including Europe. This is what they call 'party life'. According to 'party life', a member is essentially defined as one 'who…attaches himself/herself to the party's will; who joins the party life…all day'. Members are also defined by what the party twice stated in its constitution about the nine sequential 'duties of the party member' (the 2000 constitution had a sequence of eight, but it combined the last two duties into one). The duties include: 'To live in accordance with the party constitution and party's moral norms' and 'To live within the framework of the requirements of the party membership.' In consequence, having been approved as a member of the party is perceived as an introduction into a novel *way of living* rather than being a member of a political organization. Hence the term 'becoming PKK' *(PKK'lileşmek)* is always employed throughout the party publications instead of 'how to be a member of the PKK'.

### *Organizational procedure and the search for democratization*

The basic principle of the working order of the party is clearly stated in the constitution to be democratic centralism (*Programme* 1995:95). In the 2000 constitution, the first sentence of this section has been slightly changed: 'The organizational procedure is regulated according to the principles of democratic participation and administration' (*Programme* 2000:87). However, the rest of the section remains the same in this most recent constitution. That is to say, the principles of the organizational procedure have, in essence, been retained. The reason for restructuring the first sentence, in which the term 'democratic centralism' is employed, is because it seems to associate the PKK with the conventional communist parties, and the seventh congress of the PKK has made every endeavour to get rid of the jargon of the 'real socialist' orthodoxy. In addition, Öcalan's recently intensified emphasis on democracy and socialist democracy is obviously reflected throughout the programme and constitution of 2000. Nevertheless, the

realization of actual organizational practices has always been in accordance with the 'irrelevant' circumstances of Kurdish reality. In other words, the principles of democratic centralism or socialist democracy have not been substantially realistic or practicable so far. These principles have, to some degree, been implemented in peripheral organizational configurations (such as youth organizations, religious communities or cultural activities), in the provincial or regional guerrilla units and probably in the party congresses, but not in the mainstream of the PKK's organizational execution. In particular, this has never been the case for Öcalan's position in the party.

Also, Öcalan does not refrain from expressing this. He even places additional emphasis on his undemocratic position. In response to Kürkçü's[23] questions, such as 'have you, for example, ever been elected [in the organization] in any form of procedure', the answer is fairly firm: 'The election has never been required', for Öcalan works 'with the person who has come to the point where he/she is ready to die in defence of the opinion' (see the complete dialogue in Chapter 3, pp. 94–95) (Öcalan 1995:56–57). In brief, even if the general application of the organizational rules and regulations stated in the constitution are not totally invalid, the workability of the organizational performance is based on persuasion or (in a more appropriate term) inculcation rather than constitutional principles.

The PKK did attempt to inaugurate some more democratized organizational practices in the early 1990s. This did not work because the cadre body of the party was not ready for, or even familiar with, the practical significance of the notion. In November 1992, the PKK's organizational entities in Europe led a free election among the Kurds over almost the entire continent[24] to establish a National Assembly. They were trying to transfer organizational initiatives from professional party activists to the people themselves in accordance with Öcalan's understanding of socialism. However, the new structure did not work, and somehow dissolved in its second year. Then they made another attempt at constituting the National Assembly in 1995. It has encountered a similar fate.

Öcalan and the management centre of the PKK were quite determined and optimistic about the enterprise, and put great effort into appropriate outlets to enhance the participation of the people in the organizational decision-making processes to try to prevent a Soviet-like destiny of spectacular collapse. Just a year before the elections, Öcalan, on the pretext of conveying his message on the thirteenth anniversary of the PKK's foundation through a live telephone linkage, conducted a live call to the 'Patriotic People of Kurdistan' which devoted the opening of the party to the people and ended with the words: *'I am saying with confidence in the PKK that this world cannot be without socialism, one cannot live in this world without socialism.'* In the call, the emphasis on the 'Kurdistan National Assembly' was striking:

> Now, we have more work to do. What is this? To originate our genuine assembly… A national assembly, a national congress of Kurdistan has to be configured. We learned this lesson very well and our party, while entering its fourteenth year, will also undertake this as a primary task. [The PKK] will obtain the workability and validity of the Kurdistan National Assembly.
>
> (Öcalan 1995c:415)

In the beginning of the year of the initial elections, January 1992, Öcalan gave some 'chilling' warnings such as 'as seen more often than not, an armed movement which does not fulfil basic duties in the interests of people is a movement that becomes the calamity of people', and 'many people [cadres] may promptly emerge as immense careerists by relying upon the PKK's influence, and thereupon they may well be in the position of controlling huge privileges, if not now but in the coming times it will be possible'; thereafter he came to the actual crux of the matter:

> In the light of lessons we have learned from the latest international experiences, not being a party force which stands completely above the people but which becomes the servant of the people, and not being a dysfunctional assembly but an innovation of an assembly which is functioning and *determining everything* is the most fundamental—and distinguishing—task that we will fulfil for socialism. The success that we achieve in this respect will at the same time be the success of socialism.
>
> (Öcalan 1995c:315; emphasis added)

In another part of this New Year talk, he specifies his concern—the 'calamity' of the Bolsheviks' socialism:

> The course of affairs is grave; life has been converted into a very grave state. After 75 years today, in view of what has been done to the October Revolution—to itself, to its essence, to its word—we clearly see that one cannot quite succeed with things as such, as it has been asserted and thought, by making literary rhetoric in the name of revolution, even further, by believing in its eternity. What I mean is that there have been great assertions and promises made for some time on behalf of these kinds of revolutions. But in the end, it has been obviously revealed that they could not oppose/resist offensives, even if these are at least in appearance or temporary. All these demonstrated that we need comprehensive and novel thoughts with regard to the matters of revolution.
>
> (Öcalan 1995c:307)

The main concern of the talk is the search for an outlet for his overconsolidated professional organization after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The talk also contemplates new feasible or workable measures towards democratizing the party. The only outlet on which he concentrates is to open the organization to the people—'the genuine fountain'. In consequence, the search for elected 'people representatives' as *new social leaders* becomes more apparent and is expressed in a more concrete manner:

> If our people have known themselves a little and have started to see there own interests to some extent, then we will say to them 'so, such is the matter, here is the opportunity! Let the party still to perform its vanguard duties, let it be the centre of say ideology, politics, and tactics. But its power is limited; you are the millions…so you select the best representatives for yourselves!' Or, if there are some, we must find and

> bring out a handful of honest men/women in Kurdistan. If not, we have to create them.
>
> (Öcalan 1995c:319–320)

Then, exemplifying himself as usual, he proceeds:

> Death is always there; in fact everyday people are dying like any creature in the streets, and what is more [they are dying] for the enemy. Wouldn't an honest person emerge and say 'death is always there, I am here for lofty interests, national interests, and for humanity?' Wouldn't such men/women emerge from among over thirty million humans? I believe that they will definitely emerge. Even a man like me who is in a most difficult state, who is the most unable to say these words can talk this much. Let me say, I could talk both for the nation and every kind of class and stratum. And thus I started from myself. If I can do this, why not some others among the more than thirty million men and women. It will come about. It will occur more powerfully than expected. We need to know how to make it happen. Every individual person of the people needs to be encouraged and pushed in this regard.
>
> (Öcalan 1995c:320)

In the months and years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was defined as a 're-birth of history—1989 revolutions' by some political theorists (Kumar 1995:189), increasingly 'chilling' confrontations were engendered by the sudden massification of the movement in early 1990 and also by the effects of the '1989 revolutions'. Ocalan seemed desperate not to lose close organic contact with the Kurdish masses shouting his name and the party's slogans. There was an increase in 'strong analyses' *(çözümlemeler)* appearing in the pages of the PKK's monthly central organ *Serxwebun*. These *çözümlemeler* asked for people's organic participation in party activities. Öcalan's passionate arguments followed one another 'at the cost of divulging themselves' in various party publications (Öcalan 1994b:13). Almost three-quarters of the *Political Report* submitted to the fourth congress of the PKK (held between 25 and 31 December 1990) by Ocalan as (still) general secretary of the party, was devoted to frank—and even offensive—arguments over the 'inner questions' about 'democracy' and the 'close contact' of the party with people. The main theme of these writings was various redefinitions of democracy, democratic education and its indispensability, with an emphasis on democracy's linkage with the people's *direct will*. Such statements as 'Democracy is a phenomenon that absolutely needs to be taught and kept alive to the utmost both by education and by experience', 'Democracy is the very activity of the people's coming to itself or 'Democracy is the absolute backbone in the people's organizational entities' are the most striking ones along these lines. Thus, more concentration on 'giving way to people' to enjoy direct participation in the organizational bodies has become the central theme of the educational efforts:

> We are in favour of giving way to people [to rule] and of protecting this. But there are many party cadres who make decisions on behalf of the

> people, who do not even give people the right to talk… The people will talk, the people will decide, the people will make their choice, the people will make changes. Our understanding of democracy is precisely this; it should not be distorted.
>
> (Öcalan 1992a:187)

The frequent references to socialism's experience of a collapse have an additional place in these accounts of the democracy of the party's socialism:

> Many democratic revolutions have been initiated, many so-called socialist democracies have been attempted. In the end, it has become evident that they all put the people aside, that the bureaucratic apparatus has become the calamity of the people, and then, that [socialist democracies] have been overthrown by the very people who had become the followers of those whom the people did not know… You cannot put aside ties with the people even for a moment. If you do this, the demagogues interfere in affairs. And they steal the people from you and take them away, and furthermore, they position them against you and dethrone you. Here is the scene of all Eastern European countries, here is the tragic end of Ceauşescu, here is the wreckage of the chiefs who used to say 'here I am the best'.
>
> (Öcalan 1992a:187–189)

From this view, the boundaries of incorporation have been expanded to the extent that they encircle the primitive institutions (agha,[25] sheikh, chieftain, etc.) with the intention of *'dysfunctionalization'*. The purpose of broadening the limits as the fundamental way of democratizing the party was to be twofold: the incorporation and thereby dissolution of the preserving elements of the tribal structure in the party's frontal or peripheral organizations and giving way to new social leaders or to new people's representatives—'historical personalities':

> *Aşiret* cannot be eliminated, chieftainship too cannot be eliminated, but they can be dissolved in national institutions. We shall tell them this: Well, you be chieftain, but with few national features. You will not say only 'my tribe, my family'. Only if they say 'My tribe too has a significance in the nation, my family too has a value among all the national values, it is loyal to [the national cause] and I am from now on *its* [national significance's] chieftain, its representative' will we allow their existence. The actual work of dissolving them is not that difficult. If it is accurately handled, dissolving the existing traditional institutions and personalities in the national pot is not difficult. And the most important thing is that we will settle the [matter of] historical personalities.
>
> There are historical personalities in the hearts of our people. Now, they literally burst in on us. There does exist a new leader type, a people's new militant type in abundance for whoever looks for it. If the party cadres,

> guerrilla commanders look around themselves, they will come across countless people's representatives.
>
> (Öcalan 1995c:327)

Several months preceding the November 1992 elections were devoted to 'genuine' democratization. Fearing the implications of the collapse of Soviet socialism, Öcalan warned: *'If we do not take adequate measures, novel sorts of aghas will emerge amongst the very PKK cadres who will not be less tyrannical than those who existed in the past.'* This statement was published in three pro-PKK papers and magazines (the central organ of the party *Serxwebun*, the daily paper *Özgür Gündem* and the monthly youth magazine *Devrimci Yurtsever Gençlik*[26]) in the months just before the elections for the National Assembly.

Open elections were held in Europe and in some other parts of the world where an adequate Kurdish population resides; illegal ones were held in Kurdistan and Turkey. But again the election did not work—so the arguments for democratization continued.

Several months after the announcement of the National Assembly, a lengthy editorial article with the heading 'People Assemblies in Kurdistan and On the State-Party Relations' was published in *Serxwebun* 'on the way to becoming a state in Kurdistan'. The main concern of the article was the relations between party cadres and elected representatives, or, in fact, the attitude of party cadres towards elected people's representatives:

> If we do not intend handing the people over to some persons who no one knows, to *agha* and gendarme-like personalities, to newly emerged despots, then, first and foremost the party cadres must assimilate themselves into democratic culture, be absorbed into democracy and convert democracy into a lifestyle for themselves… The party… will not govern the state by instructing people's assemblies. The governance of the state, uniting the masses around ourselves and motivating and directing them towards a common end will be through mass organizations.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, April 1993)

Despite everything, the initial National Assembly attempts failed. It withered away towards the end of 1994. Almost the same experience—but with less participation by voters—was repeated in 1995. It encountered an identical destiny to the former National Assembly. (Further discussion on this event—especially the causes of failures—is undertaken in the next chapter.)

On 1 August 2000, a new attempt containing more radical elements was introduced to the public. It was called 'People's Assemblies' instead of a National Assembly. The new attempt is similar to the old because the over-whelming majority of the assemblies will be constituted by elected members voted for by the people. It is different from the old because the assemblies will have the authority to dismiss the professional party cadres. This authority is clearly expressed in an individual article of its constitution: 'The People's Assemblies…have the right to dismiss the provincial, regional and local co-ordinators [of the organization] by two-thirds of the majority votes in a confidential ballot' But in fact, the latest attempt has been far more of a total fiasco than the previous

ones in proportion to its radicalness. It was silently dropped from the organization's agenda. Whether or not any renewed form of such endeavour will occur is an issue for the future, but what is known so far is that the constitutions of previous inaugurations have not been essential to the reality of the organizational life of the PKK.

### *Party education*

Education is one of the two vital components (along with organization) of the PKK's set up. Rather than formulating the rules of constitutional procedure, the substantial share of Öcalan's leadership work lies in 'producing' individuals appropriate to the 'organizational life' of the PKK by an education of which he is the primary source. His speeches are called *'çözümlemeler'*.[27] On occasion, he says 'we are an education movement' and asks 'if there was not such an intensive education in the history of the PKK, would the PKK exist today?' (Öcalan 1994a:358). He stretches 'organizational life' to cover every aspect of life:

> Life in the organization is a completely organizational life. From all your conducts and behaviours to the most official authoritarian attitude, from conversations at dining tables to a vigorous address, these are all organizational life. The enemy, today, is most irritated by this feature of us. 'They all resemble each other as if they were manufactured by a single machine' says [the enemy].
>
> (Öcalan 1994a:130)

As a manifestation of the requirements for being attached to the organizational structure of the party as a member, the philosophy of 'lifestyle' questioning 'how men ought to live' occupies a major space in the teachings. Accordingly, concepts such as 'analysing oneself, 'undoing oneself and 'reshaping oneself are the fundamental themes in the party's educational efforts. The party uses these concepts in order to innovate a way of living and gradually develop the desired mode of life—which resonates with Raschke's 'new' paradigm of the 'way of life' or 'mode of life' created for the new social movements of Western societies (Offe 1985:825)—within the organization which is believed to be 'in peace with genuine human nature'.

The philosophy of education here, in a sense, is associated with Plato's notion of the 'threefold division of soul' (reason, spirit, appetite) and the equilibrium among those fundamental parts of man's soul. Plato calls this the 'spiritual balance', by which, he asserts, the individual may always attain peace and justice *within one's own personality*. Because I was aware of the additional weight of his philosophical efforts devoted to the individual's personality and spiritual structure throughout his teachings (talks), I constructed a lengthy question in this regard in the course of the dialogue we held when Öcalan was in the Middle East:

*Q*. There are two rival parties in the sphere of philosophy, which goes back through several thousand years of human history. One party, in essence, suggests that man is by nature self-regarding and can never be otherwise; s/he always puts him/herself first and organizes all aspects of life according to instincts or motives. The other school of thought

maintains that the human mind is originally a blank sheet and all knowledge is the product of subsequent experience. Consequently, a human being has a chance of changing his or her own nature. For example, Plato tends to say that the perfect man can be formed by the force of knowledge and education. Within this context there is a claim regarding the spiritual structure of human beings, which divides it into three centres (the threefold division of the soul): Reason, Appetite and Spirit. The first group assert here that man is a passionate being whose major motivations are beyond control and that reason is the slave of passion. Whereas, according to the second group, human beings are essentially rational and aware of this themselves; consequently they have the ability to restrain their instincts and passions. In view of such philosophical approaches to human nature, I think that there are some considerable points to be made in terms of the life of the PKK. What do you say?

> *A.* I feel sorry about this subject as well. I have striven hard not to be in conflict with human nature, not to let it take the wrong path… Whether it is my instincts or my conscious judgement, I leave them absolutely unrestrained. It could be said that they are in contention with one another. I think that the one which is more correct will not yield to domination over one another. If a good balance is kept between the two, you can make enormous strides forward, or you can become a genius; or a politician, a soldier, an artist. My particularity in this subject is, I think, on the one hand, constant deploying of *reason*, on the other hand never putting aside any religious, juridical, even philosophical moral values as much. I deploy a principle such as 'let human beings be unrestrainedly natural', but at the same time I am an absolute obedient servant of some rules and regulations. I keep an extremely sensitive balance on the horns of the dilemma… One must not belittle instincts. They are vital and life is under a strict influence of instincts. But, of course, without the principle, if you say, 'everything has to be according to instincts', your lifestyle will be bestial. Likewise if you say 'everything according to dogmas' you will become a hermit. I am trying to define an existing distorted state of human beings in which both *principle* and *instinct* have been led astray. I am still striving to analyse it.
>
> (A.K.Özcan 1999:79–80)

A definition of the ideal type of a 'new mankind' is expressed, very simply, in terms of naturalness in a related part of an interview: 'According to me, the natural human being is the greatest human being' (Öcalan 1997:81). By this, he means that the greatest human being is the one who keeps the self' s three fundamental spiritual elements in the right balance 'in peace and justice' so as 'not [to] yield to domination over one another'. As a corollary to this, Ocalan, the only source of party education, gives another definition of the movement he leads: The movement of great human naturalness' (*Serxwebun*, December 1996).

The policy and application of 'cadre education' in terms of both form and content is fundamental to the PKK's existence. Öcalan's two expressions on this are famous among the grass roots: 'I execute the revolution with my tongue', and 'Everybody thinks that we are a practical movement which promptly ventures into doing things; on the contrary, we are a theoretical movement, we say 40 but do one.' This particular aspect, the dimension of the educational activities in the organization is, at the same time, the *source* of the

PKK's subjective share in the most recent Kurdish insurgency against Turkey. That is to say, just as *the firm grasp of and reaction to* the intrinsic nature of the overall background of Kurdishness (tribe and treason)—the dormant resource—is the fundamental power source of organizational performance among the grass roots and mass base of the PKK, the source of the *firm grasp of and reaction to* the intrinsic nature of Kurdish ethnic existence lies in the party's *educational activities* with their particular form and content.

No doubt, the form of the education, the method and particular arrangements for it, is inferior to the actual content. However, it is diligently organized and planned in proportion to the sensitivity of the content, and the centre of this solid-centralized education was 'party central schools' established at the outskirts of Damascus, Syria.[28]

The form of the central schools resembles a garrison with no military training, but they are secured by a sentry system in which militants on duty carry rifles. The overall programme of education in the school, with scarce exceptions such as interviews and/or dialogues with Öcalan, or party meetings or perhaps party conferences, is composed of Öcalan's verbal—and edited—texts of these talks; teachings which are called 'Analyses of the Party Leadership' or, in brief, 'Leadership[29] Analyses' *(Onderlik Çözümlemeleri)*. Öcalan was dividing his week between Turkish and Kurdish schools by spending approximately 3–4 days in the former and 2–3 days in the latter. The lingua franca was Turkish rather than Kurdish and consequently the number of learners in the Turkish centre was visibly greater than the other—around two hundred. I was told by Cemil Bayik, one of the earliest comrades of Öcalan, and senior figures in the Presidency Council, that Öcalan's tempo has been constant since 1980. In fact, the total number (pages) of books containing published and unpublished *'çözümlemeler'* corroborates what Bayik said to me. Every single one of these talks and the instructions given to the heads of the guerrilla corps over the radio are recorded by video camera, then edited, printed in the form of books and distributed to party organizations all over the world.[30]

They are named according to the months in which the *'çözümlemeler'* is delivered, such as 'March Analyses—1987' *[Mart Çözümlemeleri]*, 'September Analyses—1993', etc., month by month for almost eighteen years from 1980 to Öcalan's arrest. Öcalan's published books contain material selected afterwards from these 'monthly books' of the 'party education'. The live tele-talks on Kurdish satellite television (Med—later Medya—TV) during the period of his escape (from the date of his departure from Syria, 9 September 1998, to his abduction from Kenya, 15 February 1999) were also evaluated as *'çözümlemeler'*, and recorded, edited and distributed to all units of the organization. Further, since defence lawyers began to visit Öcalan in İmrallı prison, the notes of weekly visits by the group have been regularly edited and distributed as the 'Notes of Visits'. The *Political Report* which has been submitted to the seventh extraordinary congress also consists of the relevant parts of the 'Defences' and 'Notes of Meeting' produced in the one-man prison.

I was incorporated into the lessons *(çözümlemeler)* during the time I spent there. On average, each talk took between three and four hours, and the classes were not classified by age or sex, or according to people's preceding educational level. Öcalan comes, talks and goes without sitting down. Occasionally, and no one knows when he will do this, he asks questions of persons he picks by sight among the all-militant audience and constructs Socratic dialogues. The one who is picked stands up and does not sit back down until Öcalan quite noticeably orders them to do so (in practice at least twice),

regardless of the person's sex, age, experience or newness, including Cemil Bayik—the man who is generally regarded as the 'Second Man' even if it is categorically denied that there is not and never will be a Second Man in the PKK. Öcalan did almost the same thing with me and took the initiative in asking questions: 'I ask you: What do I look like? What do you think that I resemble, as a person who reads those books a lot? What will happen to my [bad] situation? Where does my ending tend towards, according to you?' Yet an incident I witnessed there would, I believe, illuminate the atmosphere into which the *'çözümlemeler'* are born.

In the course of a morning class, which was to be part of the 'July *Çözümlemeler*', a slight creaking sound was heard (the modest sound of a house-fly would have been obvious in the dead silence of the average sized hall). It was thought to be caused by a chair from the right-hand side of the hall where women militants were sitting. Öcalan promptly interrupted his sentence: 'Who was it?' He did not get a response. He repeated his question a bit more loudly. No response was forthcoming. He hesitated for some seconds as to what to do, then went back to his talk. A few minutes later the same sound was heard again. He stopped more abruptly: 'Who was that?' There was absolutely no answer from anyone. He insisted: 'Whoever has made that noise, take your chair and get out of here.' There was no answer and no creaking. Öcalan waited for a few more seconds and continued. Exactly the same sound—but with a slightly more obvious intensity, giving its direction away to a small extent—was heard once again. Öcalan stopped, looked around, and then looked up to the ceiling: 'Himm! [Yes] It is coming from there.' He nodded and reconcentrated on the talk. The creaky noise was merely caused by the sheet-metal roof of the hall due to the heat of the July sunrise in the Middle East. No one, among more than one hundred and fifty men and women, old and young, seasoned and new militants who were spiritually ready to die for their cause, ventured to say anything. Around one hundred people set fire to themselves in less than four months for the man talking there, more than a dozen of them burnt to death (see Appendix 3), and a considerable number of them experienced the very same atmosphere of this party central school. There were, of course, no beatings or killings because of similar incidents. But the incident may be explained by the influence of Öcalan's leadership style.

My week's experience of 'party education' arranged in a 'party home' in Europe[31] led me to conclude that the organizers of these educational activities make every endeavour to imitate the atmosphere of the party central school. In fact, one of the main materials of education is selections from the videotapes of Öcalan's *'çözümlemeler'* produced in the central school in the atmosphere outlined above. I was taken to the 'home', which was a quite large house. There were about fifteen of us consisting of approximately one-third female participants. A couple of shifts of boys and girls—probably militants—supplied us with food and drink during the week. The breakfasts and meals were prepared, cooked and served by a daily sentry system. The programme was intensive. The actual sessions lasted from 8 a.m. to 10.30 p.m. The sessions generally took one hour and fifteen minutes and the break time between the sessions was fifteen minutes. After the final session of the day, one and half hours were left for free discussions based on the day's issues. This was followed by bedtime—at midnight. Men slept on the ground floor and first floor, and women on the second floor. The daily timetable was well ordered and strictly followed (Table 19).

The bulk of party education in the PKK rests on two factors: the personality and lifestyle of the militant, and the intrinsic treason of Kurdishness that is believed to stem from *tribality* and *family*. These factors are treated as being interrelated, and this understanding of the Kurds has led the leadership towards a view of human nature and thence to universality. Because the leadership believes that degeneration, debasement, dysfunctionality and dehumanization in the 'Kurdish personality', based on *tribe* and *treason*, are so deep-rooted and have thereby devastated the humane elements of human nature in the country, they endeavour to re-humanize the community so as to challenge this phenomenon:

> Kurdistan is the place where humanity itself fades away in its most solid form. It is humankind's oldest cradle. A magnificent victory for humanity may be gained in the place where it has been most 'deformed'. Such magnificence will be in proportion to the debasement. Namely, if in some place, humanity descends so sharply and deeply, then the concomitant rise of humanity will be as strong and splendid.
>
> (Küçük 1993:125)

The framework of education features the influence of Marxist-socialist ideology—hence the dialectical materialism. However, a systematic education of classical Marxist principles and theory is by no means taught as part of the intensive educational efforts. The 'theoretical' portion of socialism in the party's systematic programmes is limited to Öcalan's emphasis and insistence on socialist tenets and aspirations, and his contemplation on remoulding the individual's personality for 'genuine socialist relations', which I discussed earlier. This is a phenomenon which was in fact a strength of the PKK at its inception, but later—in particular, by the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s—it became a handicap (see Chapter 7).

The subject headings of the 'education programme', according to my notes of the weeklong experience copied from the actual papers, were as follows:

(A) *Introduction*

1 The Education Policy of the Party and its Implementation
2 Educational Activities in Society
3 The Colonialist Education in Kurdistan and the Destruction Created by it
4 Pacification Activities of the Coup d'état of 12 September [1980]

(B) *The Subject-Matters of the Week*

1 Education within the Party
2 What Is the Party Leadership, Who Is the Party Leadership and What is the Most Accurate Representation of Him?
3 Fundamental Features of the Party Leadership
4 How the Leadership Can Be Rightly Represented in the Life
5 Apo and Apoism: The Party Leadership is the History of a Historyless People
6 The Vitality of the Organizer Militant and Its Apparent Outcomes
7 Historical Development of the Party Organization and the Relations of Comradeship

8 The Persistent Tradition and Militant Personality in the PKK: (a) The Militant Past of the Party, (b) The Traits of Party Militant In the Revolutionary Action
9 On the Questions of the Party and Guerrilla War
10 Becoming Party *[Partileşme]* and the Questions of Becoming Party
11 The History and Social Base of the Political Liquidation in Kurdistan: The Treason
12 The Lifestyle Within the Party and on the Right Relations
13 Critique and Self-critique
14 A Revolution Based on Men-Women Common Sovereignty
15 The Kurdistan Revolution is the Movement of Women's Emancipation
16 The Form and Content in the Party
17 The Six Stereotypes of Individuals

A list of subject headings of the 'Political Education Programme of 20 Days' for a group of 'fighter candidates', cited by Nihat A. Özcan, consists of ten items, and while no Marxist-Leninist one can be found among them, three of them (4, 9 and 10) concern personality and lifestyle:

> 1. History of Kurdistan, 2. Society of Kurdistan, 3. History of the Party, 4. The Culture and Moral of the Party, 5. The Features of Turkish Bourgeoisie and Army, 6. The Nature of Special War [of Turkey] and Its Tactics, 7. Popular War, 8. Guerrilla War, 9. The traits of a Commander, 10. Style and Behaviour.
>
> (N.A.Özcan 1999:424)

It is clear that no heading relating to socialist theory or the philosophy of socialism appears among the above subjects, but each of these headings is discussed under detailed subheadings. Two of the subjects have further details to be studied by sympathizers and provisional members: *The Fundamental Features of the Party Leadership* and *The Traits of the Party Militant In the Revolutionary Action*. The subheadings of the former are as follows:

a He is the intensified expression [form] of science.
b He is the merciless pursuer of truth.
c He is independencist [*bağimsizlikçi*—independence lover in the sense of individual's personality rather than of a state] under any conditions.
d He takes the balance of powers into account but does not take it as fundamental and relies on the genuine power [of people].
e He is the balanced combination of firmness in principle and flexibility in politics, and possesses a great talent for manoeuvring.
f He does not fit into the existing moulds [patterns of leaderships].
g He does not recognize the limits to progress; he always goes along at his peak.
h He is *atilimci* [dashist or the person who does not hesitate to innovate].
i He is an analyser [able to analyse things] and decisive [in having desired results].
j He is always targeted at gaining and succeeds.
k He is the highest representative of the loyalty to labour.
1 He has a talent for decisive persuading and educating.
m He is an explorer and researcher, and has a deep knowledge of history.

n He is the combination of sagacity, determination/stability and bravery.

Each of the features is explained and exemplified in details ranging from two to five pages. *The Traits of the Party Militant in the Revolutionary Action*, which is laid out in almost exactly the same way in all constitutions (1978, 1995, 2000) as 'the traits (or personal conditions) of the party member' mentioned above. These traits are as follows:

He or She

a bears a great love for the country and its humans,
b is in favour of a democratic regime,
c fights for socialism and is internationalist,
d bears love and respect towards his/her comrades and people,
e is the representative [model/example] of the new socialist ethic,
f is not a coward or selfish but brave and self-sacrificing,
g should keep a good balance between firmness and flexibility,
h is careful, sensitive and measured,
i is, in educating oneself, investigative and exploratory,
j should not be dogmatic but creative,
k does not work haphazardly but in a planned way.

Each trait which a militant needs to attain membership is broadly discussed. Strikingly, there are no elements of socialist ideology within the education programme. Instead the spiritual aspects of man's personality are focused on. No elements of national sentiments, such as a focus on national dignity, are found among the subject or materials of the education. Whereas we find in the speeches of the 1986 congress (third congress of the PKK) that Öcalan places apparent emphasis on the study of socialist doctrine and is consequently well aware of the 'vital importance' of the knowledge of socialism for their struggle: 'We see of socialism that it is the most scientific expression of our day's level of progression of humanity and social science… We must thus take scientific socialism, but the single-ply of its scientific essence, as the real basis' (Öcalan 1993a: 214).

In another talk 'On the Party Organization' he becomes more specific in this respect:

> We really strive to create a revolutionary party which is to be under the guidance of scientific socialism… I also said this earlier, if you had been knowledgeable about socialist doctrine, we could argue very well and the disparity between views would not have disturbed us too much.
>
> (Öcalan 1993a:225–254)

The most probable cause of the contradiction is the educational state of the militant body of the party. Recent research on the educational levels in a Kurdish province under Turkey, Şırnak,[32] indicates a phenomenal state of affairs. Sixty per cent of the population of the province are illiterate, and 75 per cent of the rest of the population (who are able to read and write) are educated only up to primary school. The percentage of illiteracy rises to 75 per cent in agricultural (or rural) areas. Only 2 per cent have graduated from universities among the non-illiterates (Mortan 1998). In view of the considerable percentage of the party's grass roots who are somehow related to the peasantry, the educational grounds for a proposed 'party education' guided by socialist doctrine become

disadvantageous. However, while the noticeable implications of a systematic teaching of socialist doctrine are not found in the party's educational activities, there is a bold emphasis on the identification of the party and its ideology with Marxist-Leninist socialism.

The findings generated by responses to a field research questionnaire reflect this aspect of the party education. I constructed two similar questions falling on separate pages of the questionnaire: 'Is the PKK, in your opinion, a national liberation party for the Kurds?' and 'Is the PKK a nationalist party?' The answer 'No' to the former question is 94.5 per cent. That is to say, 94.5 per cent of respondents do not believe that the PKK is a nationalist party, for the term 'nationalism' is deemed to be derogatory and it is defined within the framework of bourgeois ideology by Marxist-socialists. The percentage of 'No' responses climbs to 96.5 per cent among the more educated activists, from high school level education and above (Table 3). In response to the latter question, 70.1 per cent of activists believe that the PKK is a national liberation party for the Kurds (Table 2). That implies that the PKK is not nationalist but 'national liberationist'. This of course does not define the precise ideological and political nature of the party, but provides us with an example of a 'national liberationist' movement in its *communist* 'ideological form' (Seton-Watson 1965:15), or, in Lester's words, the dazzling confusion of 'national communism' (Lester 1997:42).

However, among the responses to two similar questions asking about the PKK's dominant quality and their main expectations from the party, the percentage of the respondents who are interested in the party's socialist aspect is quite low. While the main expectation of only 2.7 per cent of the respondents is the 'struggle for socialism' (Table 15), the socialism of the PKK comes first for 20 per cent of them (Table 4).

Similarly, in response to an open-ended question asking for the briefest definition of the PKK, the second largest percentage of the respondents, 18 per cent, defined the party in national terms, following the unclassifiable total of 'other' answers (Table 18).

In the overall content of the educational activities of the PKK, the usage of socialism, its materialism, its dialectics, even its psychology, is obvious, but the actual theoretical elements of its doctrine have by no means been the issue of party education. 'I felt the need to use the socialist method of psychology very deeply' because 'if you do not contemplate and work daily on the [production of] socialist militants, the [existing] personalities can convert the party into a very solid feudal instrument at once' (Öcalan 1998:22). However, the very 'production of socialist militants' is, in the experience of the PKK, attempted by a 'single machine'—Öcalan's talks during 20 years, using an extremely centralized method.

Öcalan's talks over two decades (from late 1979 to early 1999) are almost the only source material for the educational efforts of the PKK. Thus, the quality (or content) and quantity of these talks are of the utmost importance in respect of cadre recruitment and/or grass-roots motivation. The talks' total quantity in pages or time was impossible for me to find out because many of them are unpublished and are kept as confidential documents by the party. However, I extrapolated an approximate figure from the regularity of unexceptionally recorded talks. First, the number of pages in all the published books is certain. The list of these books, in the English translations of their titles and the number of pages they contain, provides a clue (Table 20).[33]

The talks of Öcalan (both the lectures and telephone-radio instructions or dialogues) have been quite regular since his flight from Turkey to Lebanon. It would then be plausible to calculate the approximate total in pages by the approximate lengths of the talks delivered in a week. Three or four lectures are given in a week and each takes three to four hours. (This is what I witnessed during my stay of four weeks in the party central school. I have also been told by Cemil Bayik, the 'Second Man', that this is the 'tempo' which started when the group decided to be a Kurdish movement in 1976. But the talks were not recorded regularly as such until Öcalan's escape.) In pages, each talk ranges from 30 to 50 (A5). This is more or less equivalent to 600 pages a month. The sum total of the pages over 20 years is 144,000. This, of course, is not a firmly reliable figure. But it is also by no means an exaggerated figure. Moreover, it excludes the tele-talks and interviews. And this very fact seems to be the fundamental cause of the 'indispensability' of Öcalan's leadership[34] and consequently of the terrifying actions by individuals of both sexes and various ages who were shouting his name (*Bijî Serok Apo*—Long Live Our Leader Apo) when they set fire to themselves.

Among those several hundred self-sacrificing individual actions (either through setting fire to themselves or blowing themselves up), two are particularly illustrative of the party education being overwhelmingly centralized on Öcalan's talks.

One was executed by a woman, Zeynep Kınacı, in Dersim on 29 June 1996. It was a 'suicide attack', where she penetrated a group of soldiers who were singing the Turkish national anthem, with a large amount of explosives tied around herself. She was blown to pieces with more than ten soldiers. Zeynep Kınacı was a 24-year-old married woman who graduated from Malatya[35] University with a degree in social sciences and used to work in a state (not private) hospital as an x-ray technician. She began to work professionally for the party with her husband two years before the 'action'. She joined the guerrilla forces operating around Dersim in 1995. Prior to the suicide attack, she recorded three messages in the form of letters: To the Party Leadership' [Öcalan], To the Kurdistan Women Freedom fighters' and 'To the Patriotic People of Kurdistan and Revolutionary Public Opinion'. In the first letter, she constructs a sentence containing a spiritual definition of the PKK in terms of a universalistic socialist aspiration and belief, following a very brief story of her background and attachment to the party: 'Our struggle, which has developed, has become the property of all humanity and gradually converted into the only hope of oppressed peoples on the way to lofty socialism in the vanguard of our party, *has also* brought a people [Kurds] to an exalted state …who were at the threshold of a complete degeneration…for the first time in the history.' She also sets out a diligent—but peculiar—framework for a comprehensive type of political leader:

> The leader is a person who represents the most desired form of life at the highest level, namely with its innovations and progressions in accordance with a new man's new idea of society, who regulates his/her complete life according to the people's life, who literally lives with the pains, emotions and demands of the people and consequently finds his/her destiny directly tied in with the people's destiny, and who shoulders practical duties to the highest extent for liberation.
>
> (Unpublished letter distributed within the organization)

She then expresses her feelings about the 'Leadership', manifesting the fact that party education is over-centralized on Öcalan's teachings. In view of the fact that she is a cadre of only two years standing and has never met Öcalan, the manifestation of his influence is significant:

> My President,
>
> … If we even sacrifice our life to you, it is not adequate in comparison to your unlimited labour and efforts. I wish we had things further than our life that we could sacrifice. You re-create a people through your own life. We are merely your work. You are the assurance of the whole people of Kurdistan and the future of humanity. Your life gives us honour, love, courage, confidence, trust and belief. The whole people of Kurdistan and the millions of humans are loyal to you in peril of their life. The attractiveness of your life also profoundly influences our life. In the most difficult circumstances, we think about your love for us and obtain a spiritual strength. You are the one who is most loyal to the martyrs. On this basis, *we will absolutely not hesitate* over the triumph of our demands.
>
> (ibid.; emphasis added)

In addition, the final sentence of the letter to the 'Party Leadership' is interesting, coming from a 'suicide guerrilla' who has killed more than ten soldiers: 'I carry out this action because I love life and humans.' A similar expression regarding the love of life,[36] human beings and nature is striking in the letter to the 'People of Kurdistan and Revolutionary Public Opinion' which also emphasizes her belief and trust in Öcalan. While blaming the 'imperialist powers' behind Turkey for the 'inevitable pitiless outcomes' of the war, she once again focuses on her love of life, peace and fraternity:

> I shout to the whole world: 'Hear me, open your eyes!' We are the children of a people that has had their country taken away and has been scattered to the four corners of the world. We want to live in freedom in our own land like human beings. Blood, tears and tyranny must no longer be the destiny of our people. We long for peace, fraternity, love, humanity, nature and life more than anyone. We do not want to cause war, to die or to kill. But there is no other way of gaining our freedom. It is the imperialist powers and their lackey, the Turkish state, which are responsible for the war.

She also discusses the woman question and points towards the main defect of 'experienced socialism' concerning this question in her letter to the 'Women Freedom Fighters'. She states that the 'scientific socialist theory proposes to provide women with the opportunity for a "humanly" life', and criticizes the approach of real socialism which has not handled the woman question within the framework of 'scientific socialist principles' or in accordance with its uniqueness, but rather within general questions of humanity. That is to say, the most remarkable point in the letters, which highlights the

limits of party education, is that party activists are given the intensive aspirations and firm beliefs of socialism without the basic principles of dialectical materialist doctrine.

On the one hand, Kınacı emphasizes the socialist longing for universally humane content and the 'principles of scientific socialism' to the extent of subordinating the Kurdish struggle by saying 'our struggle, which…has become the property of all humanity and has gradually been converted into the only hope of oppressed peoples on the way to lofty socialism…*has also* brought a people to an exalted state'. On the other hand, by saying 'you [Öcalan] are the one who is most loyal to the martyrs …[and thus] *we will* absolutely *not hesitate* over the triumph of our demands' she feels herself to be a 'martyr' prior to the 'suicide attack'. Considering that she had graduated from a university, which the majority of militants in the party had not, the dimensions of the PKK's subjective share in the process of motivating its militants and grass-roots support by an intensive and monopolized system of party education become clear.

The other outstanding 'action' was performed in Germany by Eser Altınok, who informed on the PKK's activities to the German police for some time, and who then drank petrol before setting fire to himself 'in order to burn up all the imperialist influences that had infiltrated his spirit'. The letter he wrote to 'Dear Mum' while he was preparing himself for this 'action' is philosophical. Eser, 23 years old, attempts a dialectical account of the 'wrestling' between the enemy and the PKK 'with all their might' within his spiritual structure. The notion of the enemy in Eser's letter transcends the Turkish state or even imperialism. He repeatedly underlines the term 'enemy' but does not specify it as being either Turkey or imperialism. He rather associates the term with the one party of class struggle who have 'govern[ed] the sufferings' of humankind since the 'inception of world humanity' and expresses his confidence in the 'harmonious' future of humanity through dialectical thinking:

> The source of every painful phenomenon is the enemy. The enemy does not only create pain but also governs it… The world's humanity was not born with pain…[humanity] is passing through such a stage in our time. In the future, this darkness which we call pain will wither away because the world's humanity did not emerge with pain but at ease. This fight will consequently culminate in ease. It is so because… every beginning contains the character of its end.
>
> (Unpublished letter distributed within the organization)

He deepens his concept of the 'enemy' and puts more emphasis on the 'internal class struggle' both in the PKK and in the spiritual wholeness of himself:

> The class struggle within the PKK is the struggle between the parties who want to end the pain and those who want to keep the pain alive. The ones who strove to deform the essence of the PKK at its inception are on the one side and the General President of the PKK Abdullah Öcalan on the other. The fight that is executed by these two parties against one another within the PKK is more intensive than the one against the enemy. I felt this intensity within myself, I lived with it everyday.
>
> (ibid.)

Eser Altınok joined the party in late 1993, received 'intensive' party education in Europe in 1994 and became a professional party activist. He received his earlier education, equivalent to pre-university college here in the UK, in Germany. Because the PKK is outlawed in Germany, he was arrested and imprisoned for almost eight months in 1997 due to his organizational activities. However, during his imprisonment, he experienced conflicts within himself and eventually agreed to inform on some fellow activists in the PKK and caused some of them to be arrested. Following occasional usage for operations by the German police, Eser repented of what he was doing. The interesting explanations he gives in his letter are about the period between this repentance and his appalling 'suicide action'. A paragraph in the letter concerning political action and the 'renewal' process of the individual's personality tells us something about the PKK's party education:

> A new personality realizes by *müdahale* [intervention/interference]. To achieve a new personality, to reshape one's emotional body, to adjust the brain in accordance to the new; all these can be actualized by *müdahale*. To intervene in the formation of the personality, to generalize the positive aspects [of the personality] and regulate them according to the party, to unite the power of the feelings and the intellect in aiming at this target and, in the final analysis, to defeat the enemy within one's spirit and on this basis to feel the leadership, to keep alive the leadership in your spiritual structure and to integrate the leadership into one's surroundings entails politicization. This is because politics means a practical entity, namely it falls in the field of *müdahale*… There is no other meaning of politics.
>
> (ibid.)

The above extract is a preliminary generalization intended to describe the actual process of his attachment to the PKK In continuation, he focuses on his 'inescapable end' and exposes the essence of the process:

> The way of my attachment to the party determined the result because I did not grasp politics as intervening in one's existing personality. I wielded the party for my personal interest… I could not grasp even the 'P' of the PKK within its genuine framework. The thing existing in my personality is not the PKK's political *terbiye* [good manner acquired by education and experience] but the enemy's political *terbiyesizlik* [illmanneredness, bad manners].
>
> (ibid.)

As a result, he sees himself as a traitor—'because', Eser repeats, 'every beginning conceals the seeds of its end in itself—and endeavours to illuminate the specific cause of the final effect by exposing his spiritual state in terms of Plato's notion of the 'spiritual balance' between *reason* and *appetite:* 'I created emotionlessness in the name of emotion. I locked my brain for the sake of a *dirhem*[37] pleasure. A bucking [like a horse] pleasure means that the brain becomes locked.'

Then he tries to describe for his mother how the 'contention between the enemy and the PKK…with all their might' caused his particular spiritual imbalances. Even if he is aware that 'mum' is not in the position to perceive 'what a non-PKK life and leadership style' is, he still makes the attempt to describe his situation:

> Mum, you may never sharply feel the heat of the feeling of penitence in the depth of your spirit. It is not a feeling of which you are always conscious. It hides itself in a corner of your spirit. When the other spiritual entities which prevent the sovereignty of this feeling in the spirit—which are indeed potent entities—begin to weaken, lose their omnipotence, it [the feeling of penitence] launches an offensive and conquers the spirit. If the material conditions which have a grasp on spirit and mind present an adequate atmosphere for bringing ease of mind and causing the feeling of penitence to cease, it [penitence] is replaced by gratuitousness. But if such an atmosphere does not sufficiently exist…penitence leaves the sovereignty over the spirit to its opposite; penitence withdraws into its corner in order to erupt one day. During the period of this process, the feelings and inferences formed to justify the event, the circumstance (which caused the feeling of penitence) and its form and content all become the sovereign of the spirit.
>
> The feeling of penitence is not something like a straw flame instantly blazing and going out but a volcano which becomes dormant and rekindles at times. It has occasionally shifted from being sovereign to being oppressed in my spirit. I am very happy for I [have decided to] set fire to myself. It is so because this time, on this occasion, I will by no means let this feeling be oppressed by anti-depressant pills!…I thought that I would have entirely eliminated and destroyed this feeling…and that it would have been non-existent as a feeling when I was completely consolidated into the enemy in theory and practice. Whereas I realized that it had hidden itself in a corner of my spirit. The corner in which it hid itself is the footprint of the PKK. This is what the PKK is like. Once it enters the spirit, it never leaves.
>
> (ibid.)

The 23-year-old European-born militant of the PKK, Eser Altınok, reaches his eventual conclusion and expresses it in an ironic style: 'The feeling of penitence tells me this: *The most beautiful sight of a traitor is his/her burnt-to-ash heart*.' And in accordance with this conclusion, he constructs an interesting final paragraph:

> I will also burn the enemy with myself. I will not burn an individual but a class. When I burn the imperialism inside myself, I want to convert my heart into ashes. If I swallow the petrol and also pour it into myself, I will be burning my heart from inside. I am conquering the castle from within its walls.

The excerpts I have quoted from the letter are selected to draw attention to the main focuses of the PKK's organizational education. I have striven to demonstrate in the foregoing discussions and analyses that this education is first and foremost targeted at rekindling the dormant anti-treason sentiments of the Kurds as 'untapped springs of energy' (Nairn, 1981:102), accumulated in their unique ethnic background. In addition, the party leadership proposes, through simultaneous endeavours, to reassess 'human nature' in terms of Plato's belief in education and his method of 'self re-creation', and in terms of Socrates' philosophy of 'know yourself.

## Messianic charisma: f or whom it operates

The indisputable charisma illustrated by Öcalan's abbreviated name, *Apo*, is an effective source of motivation both within the party organization and among the Kurdish masses, and deserves further study. We need to take a closer look at the concept of 'charisma', because the charismatic authority under Öcalan that operates in the party structure and the supporting masses has much to do with motivational effects in the movement.

As one of the 'three pure types of legitimate authority',[38] charismatic authority that operates both in the organization's structural bodies and the supporting masses has much to do with motivational effects in the social turmoil. In its 'matured' phase, on the other hand, the familiar power metamorphoses into a demobilizing character, and hence the phenomenon has much to do with depressing the masses.[39] Also, charisma has much to do with the Messianic expectations of the helpless masses; we thus need to make a brief reference to Messianism whilst unfolding the phenomenon.

Charisma is one of the precarious or, so to speak, slippery concepts of the sociology of politics—and, of course, of the sociology of religion as politics. A similar intellectual challenge dominates the atmosphere surrounding Messianism. The ideational coverage of theorization on both concepts encompasses a wide segment of human history. Messianism, for instance, ranges from God's messenger (prophet) to Mazzini's 'people', from Plato's 'philosopher ruler' to Hegel's 'World Historical Individuals', from Marx's 'proletariat' to Gramsci's '*élite* of intellectuals'. In a similar pattern, charisma ranges from God or gods itself/themselves to the most hard-line antireligious or so-called materialistic leaders of secular movements.

Thus, in order to avoid such a 'slippery' path towards the multidimensional arguments of a wide-ranging literature, I shall have to condense these two intricately interrelated concepts into a single path of cognizance. By doing this, of course, the individuality of each will not be denied. However, since this study relates to a movement that provides—and is propelled by—a secular foundation, a focus on 'charisma' is apposite.

### *The problem of the concepts*

The term 'Messiah' derives from the Hebrew *mashiah*, literally meaning 'the anointed one'. It denotes a 'chosen' individual, or, in Christian theology, the Christ. The idea of 'chosenness', afterwards, exceeds the individual and stretches to encompass either a group or a class, a people or a nation, and so on. Charisma comes from the Greek word *kharisma* which means 'gift of grace'. And that is given by a divine power or, in secular cases, is an inborn quality of the individual. But both the Messiah and the charismatic individual, according to believers or followers, are 'chosen' and/or 'sent' for redemption or salvation of a country or people—or, in the case of 'socialist Messianism', for the 'total redemption of humanity'. In fact, the phenomena are closer relatives than is generally recognized in their respective literatures. The very *idea*—or the culture—that nurtures these unbridled and awesome powers with 'ramifications of an individualized hegemony' (Lee 1992:44) relates the revolutionary yearnings of the helpless mob ('incapable of achieving order for themselves')—that is, Nietzsche's 'herd'.

Scholars are confident of three points regarding Messianism: (a) that it is attached to the human need for 'revolution'[40] (the indispensable hope for total redemption from social evil) as a 'comprehensive movement of thought' (Talmon 1960:17–24; Duncan 2000:48–61; Wegner 2000:68–69[41]); (b) that it originates from the 'Messiah' of Christianity; and (c) that its idea of 'chosenness' can be traced back to Judaism's 'chosen people'. Duncan firmly states that the 'concept of a "chosen people" penetrated into Christian thought from Judaism' (Duncan 2000:141). Arguing for the 'Jewish ingredient' in 'political messianism', Talmon points at 'the fact that Karl Marx was of Jewish ancestry' (Talmon 1960:77) and further states that 'it was the Messianic urge that sent Marx upon his quest' (ibid.: 505). On the other hand, the 'elasticity' of the term 'Messianism' employed in the related literature cannot be overlooked. This is the 'characteristic feature of all movements and ideas described as forms of "messianism"' says Duncan, and he quotes R.J.Zwi Werblowsky:

> The term messianism…denoting the Jewish religious concept of a person with a special mission from God, is used in a broad and at times very loose sense to refer to beliefs or theories regarding an eschatological (concerning the last times) improvement of the state of man or the world and a final consumption of history.[42]
>
> (Duncan 2000:6)

The concept of charisma contains a similar problem. Although, as Conger puts it, 'there is a little disagreement in the literature over the locus of charismatic leadership'[43] (Conger and Kanungo 1988:23), it is not clear whether it is a religious or non-religious phenomenon. It involves both supernatural and secular endowments. And its repositories are not only individual persons but may also be 'groups' or 'objects' such as 'kinship groups', 'blood lines', 'status systems' or 'an institutional structure regardless of the persons involved' (Spencer 1973:343, cites from Weber's *Economy and Society* [1968] edited by Günther Roth and Claus Wittich). Also, it is not yet settled whether the 'power of charisma' is deployed for 'good' or 'evil', or whether it is 'neutral'. There is a problem

in the lack of consensus on the precise meaning of *charisma*, because the term has been applied to very diverse leaders:

> Despite the increased attention being focused on charismatic leadership in the academic literature, to date no scholarly consensus has emerged on the precise application of the concept of charisma.
>
> (House and Howell 1992:83)

Howell refers to Willner's 'mediating' statement, which accords with a classical text—the concept of 'charismatic authority' theorized by Max Weber:

> It should be underscored that, in accordance with Weber's example ([1924] 1947), charisma is used in a value-neutral manner. As Willner …points out, charismatic leadership is 'inherently neither moral nor immoral, neither virtuous nor wicked…such questions arise only when we wish to evaluate whether a particular charismatic leader has used the relationship in the service of good or evil.'
>
> (Howell, in Conger and Kanungo 1988:214–215)

Yet the problem identified in the literature is found in the absence of 'an explanation of the process by which charismatic leadership has its profound effects' (Shamir *et al.* 1993:579). Accordingly, to overcome the problem, research efforts are exhausted in analysing the 'profound effects' that are generated on followers by charismatic leaders (ibid.). Jermier talks of confusion about the 'vague concept' charisma that necessitates 'additional imaginative new theories, critical reconceptualizations' (Jermier 1993:218).

Scholars have explored two main areas when analysing the phenomenon of charisma as a 'process': the personal attributes of leaders as an inborn 'seed' and the social tension of conflicts and contradictions as a nurturing 'soil' accompanied by followers' perceptions/responses. While the scholars with psychoanalytic approaches are rather inclined to restrict themselves to the *person* of charisma (Popper 2000:734–735), inquiries in the social-psychological field investigate the *persona* of leaders (Gabriel 1997:319, 330). In other words, some stress the sociological insights of the phenomenon by calling attention to the 'soil' that yields charismatic leaders. Others focus on the leader's performance in terms of either sacrifice/suffering/benefiting or his/her personality as a constellation of individual qualities, or on leaders' upbringing and backgrounds. On the other hand, when the central focus is charisma's relatively positive or negative consequences, intellectual efforts are devoted to the dichotomous faces of charisma: *personalized* and *socialized* or transactional and transformational types of leaderships (Burns 1978; Howell 1988; House and Howell 1992; Lee 1992; Popper 2000, and others). In fact, the mainstream of the literature overwhelmingly acknowledges the relational dialectic between leader and followers. It is the creation of a twofold process: the *person* of the leader with relevant inborn qualities and the *persona* of the leader influenced by the tension of social affairs:

> Thus, charisma is not a thing that can be possessed by an individual. Neither does it emerge automatically from certain circumstances

> regardless of individual qualities and initiative. Stated more precisely, charisma is a process that exists only in social relationships. It is a product of the qualities and actions of individuals and situational factors, but the nature of the situation is its most important determinant.
>
> (Jermier 1993:221)

Charisma is in any case recognized as a fateful social power that cannot be trivialized.

However, the *idea* that resides at the roots of the concepts *Messiah* and *charisma* is the revolutionary expectations of the masses—the *mob* that is alien to ruling and rulers—no matter whether their usage is in the service of good or evil. The helpless mob, which 'does not "distinguish" itself, does not become independent in its own right' without organizers (Gramsci 1971:334), has so far never dispensed with its radical expectations of total emancipation from social evil. This has always provided fertile soil to give rise to charismatic Messiahs or Messianic charismas. Here, the defining difference is associated with the timeline of human development. The progress of humanization from ancient times to today transformed supernatural Messiahs into relatively secular charismas. Accordingly, while explanations of Messianism are worded in religious terms, charisma is conceptualized instead in secular, modern or 'materialistic/deterministic' terms.

### *The reification and ramifications of the power of charisma: how it operates*

In view of the problematic definitions of the concept *charisma*, as with many other concepts in the social sciences, the crux of the phenomenon entails pursuing the questions of 'how it faithfully operates among the followers' and 'for whom it, in the final analysis, works'—just as I discussed earlier in Chapter 1 on nationalism. The charisma of the *dead*, such as in Khumaini's Iran (Sanasarian 1995; Saeidi 2001), is rather grandiose and is easily considered, but contemplating the mechanisms of its unbridled power in the course of the routinization of charismatic leadership would be a more difficult sociological enterprise.

Charisma, as an 'unbridled power', *demonstrates* itself through 'legendary' successes in 'battle' (Spencer 1973:345–347), salvages its followers from despair and disperses the tension of the existing 'status quo', whose very tension legitimizes and is 'substituted' by the *rationally* institutionalized new charismatic authority (Jones 2001:759–761). This charisma becomes indispensable for the emerging 'bureaucratic staff'. Further, if its very power has recently salvaged the followers or has just dispersed their hopelessness, then charisma is 'reborn' as a rapid *deus ex machina* for the 'adolescent' ruling stratum that has come out of the process. This facet of the phenomenon reveals the genuine socio-political process vis-à-vis charisma and its charismatic ['transformational' (Burns 1978)] leadership. This process of the 'ramifications of an individualised hegemony' (Lee 1992:43–44) is largely overlooked in the vast literature on the subject, in spite of Weber's articulation of the process under his major subtitle (The Routinization of Charisma' [1947:363–373]) to 'Charismatic Authority'—the classical reference source. This may be why Spencer, while finding charisma as always involved with 'a *relationship* between the group and the leader', has repeatedly 'refused to consider charisma as *either* a sociological or psychological phenomenon' (Spencer 1973:348).

In his article on the two faces of the process, in a scholarly analysis containing examples from Islam and Hinduism, Lee briefly pulls the crux of the sociological/political phenomenon into the mainstay of his argument and raises 'the problem of charisma':

> Generally, the problem of charisma is a problem of unbridled power that is psychologically awesome and socially threatening. This is the contemporary meaning of charisma, expressed in numerous studies of idiosyncratic power and its organizational consequences… For Weber, it was not the moral teachings that became routinized but the personal authority of the charismatic individual once he transferred his command to an impersonal, stratified order. By reallocating the source of routinization in the individual, rather than in the teachings, Weberian revisionists have been able to argue that the charismatic qualities of individuals once enshrined within institutions can assume a life of their own, in effect producing charismatic institutions which in a sense transcend individual idiosyncrasies but from which particular incumbents of corporate roles can enjoy tremendous power flowing from them (Shils, 1965).[44]
>
> (Lee 1992:42–43)

Lee, therefore, states that the central concern of contemporary researchers on charisma needs to be 'the dialectical relationship between the personal and social or cultural sources of charismatic power' (ibid.: 44). In a similar mode, Spencer, though contradicting his refusal of charisma as a sociological or psychological phenomenon, draws attention to the 'diffused form' of charismatic power 'in the stratification system of society' (Spencer 1973:342). Weber, in contrast with 'Weberian revisionists', begins his explication of the 'routinization of charisma' by situating his argument on the *base* of the 'stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff'. He first underlines the inevitability of a *radical change* in the pure form of charismatic authority, which 'exists only in the process of originating', towards taking 'on the character of a permanent relationship forming a stable of disciples or a band of followers or a party organization or any sort of political or hierocratic organization'. Then he goes on to the causes of the inevitable transformation, in fact, the metamorphosis:

> The following are the principal motives underlying this transformation: (a) The ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and the continual reactivation of the community, (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff, the disciples or other followers of the charismatic leader in continuing their relationship.
>
> (Weber 1947 [1924]:364)

The vitality of the strong 'ideal and material interests', Weber adds, 'generally become conspicuously evident with the disappearance of the personal charismatic leader…which inevitably arises' (ibid.). Thinking of the charisma of the *dead* when 'the problem of succession' arises, the reification of the power, allocated to the hierarchy of the newly

arisen ruling apparatus, adds to the sense of the genuine significance of the 'routinization' of charisma; in other words, of the 'radical change' in the charismatic authority.[45]

Weber's 'routinization of charisma' denotes *seizing* the power of charisma from the person of the charismatic leader to guard the 'interests of the administrative staff…so that their own status is stable on a day-to-day basis' (Saeidi 2001:222). In fact, power is a non-individual phenomenon. Jermier advises thinking of charisma 'as a pattern of interactions' which necessitates a cosmos-like (a well-ordered, hierarchized whole) communal structure as *sine qua non* to be reified. He refers to Foucault's metaphorical words:

> Power must be analyzed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or a piece of wealth. Power is employed through a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power.[46]
>
> (Jermier 1993:221; excerpting from M.Foucault)

In this sense, charisma is a mere property of the 'bureaucratic staff'. Any charismatic authority operates through a body of staff. A body of corporate staff that steers political affairs defines a bureaucratic apparatus. Thus, the 'bureaucratic administrative staff' is not only a sub-property of 'legal authority' but also of 'charismatic authority'—both in the charisma of the living and the deceased.[47]

The power of charisma, in all cases, undergoes two main stages: (a) the emerging process, 'the process of originating'—during which it is in 'pure' form—in Weber's words, and (b) the process of 'routinization' or, so to speak, of the institutionalization of routinization. In both processes the power is still based on the 'attitude of awe' or 'reverential posture', or 'enthusiasm'. But while in the former period the power is targeted at the tension, conflict and contradictions of the status quo, and consequently is deployed for the mobilization of followers and masses, in the latter it is devoted to securing the status quo, and is consequently 'sacrificed' for the re-establishment of the 'loyal' followers and the demobilization or stagnation of the masses. The former period, in general, squares with the duration of the struggle against the existing ruling order, and therefore charisma functions as 'Messianic power' for the followers and entrepreneurs 'that can fan "the spark of hope" in the dimmest political possibility' (Wegner 2000:72). The latter period squares with the time of ascending to the throne and afterwards, and in consequence 'radically' changes. Its *demonstrated* power is now in the service of guarding the new status order. And this is precisely why the ubiquitous hallmark of the process of rationalization, institutionalization or routinization of charisma is the clear-cut elimination of dissenters—no matter what religious, secular or Marxist stamp the process bears.[48]

Charisma, in the person of the leader, 'emerges in a field of conflict and contradictions and is so sustained' (Perinbayanagam 1971:395) *as Messianism*. It first operates as a pivotal revolutionary force to either end or transform the 'rules and resources that maintain structural order' (Lee 1992:41). Then it rapidly reverses for the sake of the

'ramifications of an individualized hegemony' (ibid.: 44) devoted to maintaining the *new* status order as a pivotal reactionary force. That is, it has 'two faces': it both operates for individual, group or mass mobilizations and for the hegemony of the corporate body. It is an indispensable tool in the absence of institutionalized civic organizations which are *ruled by rules*.

To summarize, the power of charisma tends to enjoy its political mastery for longer than might be expected. The 'magic' power of the charismatic leadership of political parties—or of organized leading entities of non-local social movements exclusive of the field of business, etc.—emerges as a force sparking revolution. It has thus always been Messianic. However, the 'unbridled awesome power' arrives, in the final analysis, at its mission: to operate on the part of newly emergent bureaucratic staff to institutionalize and *class* themselves so as to assure their 'stronger ideal and also stronger material interests'. It continues to function since it succeeds regardless of the existence or absence of the person of charisma. The power of the 'indispensable' leader is, in the beginning, to spark the inferior's motivation. At the end, it is to secure the superior's privileged status. This appears to be one of the chilling resistances of the post-industrial social working in the face of coming civil society.

This recurrent face of human social development appears to recur until civil *political* organizations in every aspect of life have superseded—or obtained mastery of—the political parties that have been 'instruments of the maintenance and the widening of power of some man over others' (Panebianco 1988:viii). That is, the 'sparking' power of both revolutions and 'counter-revolutions', charisma, will be antiquated when what is called 'civil society' is the working of total socialness.

### *The routinization of the* 'Apo' *charisma*

The type of leadership that Öcalan and the PKK experience is evidently a bold charismatic one. No additional proof is needed in this respect. In particular, in terms of being 'foreign to all rules' or at least 'intellectually analysable rules' (Weber 1947:361), the organizational body of the PKK functioned under a 'pure form' of charismatic authority and of the KADEK is functioning under a 'routinized' form. A considerable proportion of the Kurdish masses and the whole structure of the organization have recognized *Apo* as the 'possessor of the quality' who has arisen 'out of enthusiasm, or of despair and hope' (ibid.: 359) from the early 1990s onwards. This has been the case to such an extent that Öcalan himself has begun to complain loudly. In response to a related question from a Turkish journalist, he chastized his followers for not being critical of him: 'My suffering is in their submission like slaves… They either do that [blindly obey] or run away. This is my problem too' (Ballı 1991:282).

The nature of Öcalan's charisma does not provide us with an arguable distinctness in comparison with equivalent present or past experiences in the East, West and Middle East. What is unique to Kurdish societal praxis, and its interaction with Turkey's Kurdish policy, is that the routinization of Öcalan's charisma has been reified before the institutionalization of the party. Even, one may say, the routinization firmly took place without the party having institutionalized.

The processes of institutionalization and routinization in charismatic organizations unavoidably follow a simultaneous path of development, for they nurture one another.

Both processes require, in a *de facto* flaw of organizational working, the elimination or dysfunctionalization of the person of charisma, just as has been the recurrent face of history in examples such as those of Mao, Lenin, Atatürk, and even the prophets, regardless of their secular/materialistic or religious character. Even if the person of charisma does not like it, the process of institutionalization shadows the routinization of charisma:

> Personal charisma is, besides, generally associated with strong resistance to institutionalization. The leader, in fact, has no interest in organizational reinforcement which would inevitably set the stage for the party's 'emancipation' from his control.
>
> (Panebianco 1988:66–67)

That is, the resistance of the charismatic leader by no means has the power to prevent the routinization and institutionalization taking place. This is because charismatic power too 'is employed through a net-like organization', and the 'material and ideal interests' of the administrativebureaucratic staff is far stronger than the love for the person of charisma. This appears to be the plausible reason why Pedahzur and Brichta call to mind Maor's critique of Panebianco in 'defining a charismatic party as uninstitutionalized' (2002:34), for Panebianco places the institutionalization and routinization against one another:

> In a charismatic party (before the routinization of charisma), the absence of institutionalization and the presence of a very strong centralization of authority…are associated.
>
> (Panebianco 1988:66)

Whereas the institutionalization of charismatic parties takes place precisely along with the routinization of charisma. And this is probably the fact that drove Rose and Mackie to develop the concept of 'charismatic institutionalization' (Pedahzur and Brichta 2002:35).

The institutionalization of Öcalan's party began to be on the agenda of the organization in the second half of the 1980s when the movement enjoyed evident mass support and major recruitment. The organization established a popular army and front flanks, along with many sub-branches of various fields of activities (described in Chapter 6). The party even ventured into self-contained 'general elections' twice (1992 and 1995). In fact, these were all fatal enterprises[49] just as is now the case for KADEK. (The preceding PKK is factually there with its routinized charismatic authority—with its 'foreign-to-rules' working under the name of KADEK) However, while the institutionalization attempts of the PKK have not produced noticeable results, the effective routinization of the *Apo* charisma has held sway since the early 1990s, despite everything. Also, the elimination of Öcalan by his arrest in 1998 has not so far effected considerable changes in either the decisive influence of his charisma or its routinized working.

(The question of Öcalan's charisma in terms of organizational entanglements is further discussed in Chapter 6, pp. 222–227.)

### *Conclusions*

Both the form and content of 'party education' and the dominance of Öcalan's talks in the overall educational activities of the PKK have constituted the fundamental base for the organizational motivation of cadres and the grass roots. In other words, the nature and intensity of the educational efforts, which are literally composed by Öcalan's 'tongue', have had a decisive effect on the motivational extent of *national* sentiments of the *tribal* 'Turkish Kurds'.

The very form, content and intensity of the monolingual education reproduced the *Apo* charisma in the tension of Turkey's Kurdish question as a nurturing 'field of conflict and contradictions', and his charisma has been thus 'so sustained' (Perinbayanagam 1971:395). In turn, the *Apo* charisma as an 'unbridled power that is psychologically awesome and socially threatening' had profound effects on the organization's mass activities (Lee 1992:42). On the other hand, the same sources of motivation turned into the organization's fetters throughout the 1990s. This associates with the 'destiny' of the 'conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relation of production' (Marx 1971:21). The most general rule of social progress discovered and formulated by Marx has produced a typical result in the development process of the PKK.

This is the main theme of Öcalan's self-criticism, which he formulated in an epigrammatic style: 'If you do not solve, you will then be solved', or 'If you do not overcome [obstacles], you will then be overcome [by them].' But the resource of mobilization under Öcalan's leadership with his 'routinized' *Apo* charisma is still active and effective. The dominant slogans of the HADEP congress, which gathered about 100,000 Kurds in Ankara, were the ones containing Öcalan's abbreviated name 'Apo' and the name of the island, İmrallı, where he is imprisoned.

Consequently, Turkish prime minister Bülent Ecevit has given a statement through the press: 'The HADEP congress has to be a warning to everyone.' Yet, a few years ago, Ecevit was attacked by opposition parties in the Turkish assembly for he had received 'only applause' (*Türkiye*, 13 June 2000) when he sounded his opposition to the death sentence in a limited public meeting held in a hall on his visit to Diyarbakır. Notwithstanding the fact that an over-centralized organizational nature moulded by Öcalan's theoretical and practical dominance has become the PKK's fetters since the early 1990s, the organization, as it stands, has succeeded in mobilizing its cadres, the grass roots and the Kurdish masses. The findings of two related questions of my field research indicate the influence of Öcalan's leadership cult. I constructed two questions to find out the grass-roots' perception of the most fundamental cause of the PKK's success and the reason for their sympathy towards the party in the first place. In response to the latter question (Table 11), the two highest percentages of the answers of the activists pointed towards (one directly, the other indirectly) the leader of the party: 24.4 per cent of respondents ticked that they first became sympathetic to the PKK 'through the leader' and 38.04 per cent of them 'through observations'. I interpreted the 38.04 per cent of who ticked the option 'through observation' as an indication of the effect of the leader, because observations extensively encompass Öcalan's power due to the perpetual usage of the Apo icon by the state's propaganda machine—the instruments of mass media. In response to the former question, the answer and the percentage were clearer: 50.5 per cent of the grass roots believes that the most fundamental cause of the success of the party is its leader (Table 10). The next highest percentage, 19.5 per cent, is one which

points towards ideology as the main cause of the party's success. This may be interpreted in terms of the effect of the party education composed by Öcalan's 'tongue' and its consistent insistence on socialism. In view of the fact that I carried out field research after Öcalan's 'metamorphosed' standpoint (with respect to the PKK's *national* undertakings at its inception) that he formed in the İmrallı prison, my findings are significant in relation to the party's educational efforts, and consequently in relation to Öcalan's leadership style, in the 'built-up' (Turner and Killian [1957] 1972) work of motivating cadres, grass roots and masses.

The findings reveal that the range of the PKK's organizational decisiveness—the subjective share—in the development of the most recent Kurdish insurgency against Turkey is substantially determined by the educational efforts of the party, which are merely materialized by Öcalan's (recorded and unrecorded) speeches over almost twenty-five years and the significance of these speeches to the organization's procedures and performance. McCarthy and Zald refer to Turner and Killian's ([1957] 1972) conclusion which states that 'there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group'. They then go further, saying that 'grievances and discontent may be defined, created and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations' (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1215). In 1957, Turner and Killian highlighted the aspect of collective action and resource mobilization in more firm words:

> But crowd behaviour does not consist of the mere release of repressed tendencies to action; it is built up. The social cohesion of the crowd does not emerge through a sudden synthesis of common, unconscious, psychological forces; it is developed.
>
> (Turner and Killian [1957] 1972:58)

This is truer of the phenomenon of the PKK in the specific context of 'Turkish Kurdistan' and results from the self-contained policy of Turkey—and its strict application—towards Kurdish existence.[50]

The building-up of a national collective action among the *tribal* Kurds is a phenomenon of the PKK's philosophy and its experience of the structural individual-organization linkage. But this very phenomenon is, as a corollary to the PKK's stage of development, a central property of the organization's failures, defects and impasses, and of its questions and confrontations. This will be dealt with in the next chapter.

# 6
# The rise and fall of the PKK

## Questions, confrontations and the impasse

This chapter continues to address the central theme of this study—the organizational working—by focusing on the PKK's difficulties and shortcircuits.

The inner dynamics of the PKK are examined from the angle of the questions, confrontations and paradoxes within the organization. In the first section, the major argument is the fundamental reasons for the PKK's success, which have transformed it from a 'bunch of bandits' in 1984 to the mass movement of the early 1990s. This evolution is explored to facilitate an understanding of the process of the PKK's decline, which led to Öcalan's abduction from Nairobi, Kenya (15 February 1999). The second section examines the organizational problems within the party to extend the argument about the inner dynamics of the Kurdish movement. The exploration of the PKK's 'subjective share' in the 'revitalization' process of the Anatolian Kurds is broadened with reference to the paradoxical entanglements of the organization. These investigations also draw upon fieldwork. The chapter, therefore, will concentrate on the deficiencies, contradictions and the problematic nature of the PKK's organizational structure.

We must thus begin by clarifying the dynamics which gave rise to the PKK, instead of giving rise to other Kurdish movements, in order to better understand why the movement shrank. To that end, I shall explore the PKK's earlier years, during which the movement built its foundations of collective action among Kurds while ignoring the world around them—from the aftermath of the 1980 *coup d'état* to the mass uprisings of the early 1990s.

### The organizational ascent

#### *Clarifying the cardinal point*

Theories of 'collective action' or 'collective behaviour' are sociological efforts to explain the processes of people acting together. The different versions of these theories, with shifting emphases on *objective* and *subjective* factors, can help us analyse social movements within the framework of 'cause and effect relations'. Scholars in the field

devote their intellectual endeavours to providing adequate answers to the questions of *why* and *how*, vis-à-vis the realization processes of collective social phenomena.

The shifting emphasis, either on contextual factors or on the constructed internal dynamics of the collective phenomena, is a key argument among scholars. So the recurrent problem in this sociological field is caused by the entanglements confronted when searching for the right balance between these two phenomena. Theories of 'collective action' and 'resource mobilization' are seen as approaches paying greater attention to the *organizational factors*. The perspective of the 'political process' further contemplates the broader *multiple processes* 'taking the existence of potential grievances for granted' (Diani 1992). While these theories have similarly dominant emphases on the 'how' of phenomena, the 'New Social Movement' (NSM) approach is instead deemed to be tackling the 'why' question. In view of Touraine's increasing attention to the notions of 'subject' and 'actor', and considering his definitions of the subject as 'the labour through which an individual transforms himself/herself into an actor' or as 'a call to transform the Self into an actor, one may state that the focus of the approach of NSM also tends towards the decisiveness of the *subjective share* in the collective action processes, and consequently towards the "how" of collective phenomena' (Touraine 1995:205–222, 368–375). Despite their valuable contributions to sociology in general and to the sociology of social movements in particular, the arguments remain unresolved. However, Melucci constructs three fundamental questions in order to facilitate the 'understanding of collective phenomena in terms of *action*':

- Through which processes do actors construct collective action?
- How is the unity of the various elements of collective action produced?
- Through which processes and relationships do individuals become involved with—or defect from—collective action?

(Melucci 1989:20)

In 'seek[ing] answers to these questions', one still has to elaborate the 'how' of the processes; namely, the inner dynamics of the subjective configurations of people acting together—the creativity, productivity and transformativity of individual-organization interrelations.

No doubt, the realization of a process, which culminates in people acting together, is a result of various sub-processes. It is the outcome of multiple processes and requires the combination of different components for it to happen. Tilly isolates 'five big components' in the collective action process (interest, organization, mobilization, opportunity and collective action itself), and asserts that

> *[c]ollective action* consists of people's acting together in pursuit of common interests. Collective action results from changing combinations of interests, organization, mobilization and opportunity.
>
> (Tilly 1978:7)

These components are 'vulnerable' to the processes that may either enhance or impede 'the formation of cognitive frameworks and systems of relationships necessary for action' (Melucci 1989). Even a process may well be, at the same time, impeding *and* enhancing

the changing components. So in the situation confronted by this study, the self-resembling nature of Turkey's policy of denial about the Kurdish question, on the one hand, is an impeding constraint in terms of organizational *opportunities,* and, on the other hand, it could also serve as a means for mass *mobilization* in terms of individual motivation.[1]

Some Turkish experts on the Kurdish question draw attention to this. When explaining the oppressions of the Kurds by the Turkish state, Martin van Bruinessen immediately adds that 'the same repression has also contributed much to strengthening the PKK' (van Bruinessen 1988:45). Similarly, Kutschera talks of 'the extent and ferocity of the repression' by the regime which 'thus cleared the way for the PKK' (Kutschera 1994:13).

In the preceding chapters I have tried not to lose sight of this study's points regarding the most specific structural base of the emergence and formation of the PKK: (a) the specifity of the Kurdish social-political background—constancy of *tribe* and *treason,* and (b) the eccentricity of Turkey's Kurdish policy; namely, the particular nature of Turkey's Kurdish question. I have since hypothesized that the PKK is a phenomenon peculiar to Kurds and Turkey resulting from these dual peculiarities.

These aspects are discussed as the basic twofold contextual factor in the PKK's early life—as a common structural condition available to the actors in the fellow Kurdish political-cultural organizations that emerged before the later PKK and which drew considerably more public support than the PKK prior to the 1980 *coup d'état*—in Chapters 2 and 5. I defined the former (tribe and treason) as the 'intrinsic' tradition in the sociopolitical 'heritage' of Kurdishness, which is targeted as a 'dormant resource' by the leadership of the PKK. The latter was handled (policy of denialrepression) as being the 'seeds of Turkey's Kurdish question'. However, I share the view that the explanations 'founded upon common structural condition[s]' ignore 'the very processes that enable or inhibit actors to define the circumstances of common action' and are incomplete in 'explain[ing] how certain individuals come to recognize themselves in a more or less sense of "we"' (Melucci 1989) insofar as these individuals sacrifice their 'private life' to an 'organizational life'. In other words, such explanations omit the causality of how individuals transform their lifestyle from being 'for oneself to 'for ourselves'.

The diagnoses regarding the two peculiarities are not the products of the novel efforts of this study. On the contrary, they are the primary themes of many authors in the field, to whom I have referred throughout. So I chose the central question of my study as focusing on *the determinative internal factor in the growth of the PKK* while constructing the research strategy in accordance with this, which necessitates understanding the inner dynamics of the 'Revolutionary Modernizers' (White 2000) of Kurdistan. That is to say, I have so far handled the organizational factor (what I call the 'subjective share') in the realization processes of the collective phenomena of the most recent Kurdish attempt at a 'national emancipation' as the focal point of my exploratory efforts. I have thus undertaken the discussions of these two interrelated and unique contextual entities to clarify the cardinal question of this study.

In the light of the sophisticated discussions developed by prominent scholars of social movements, I stated that the framework of this study would be to ascertain the most convincing answers to the 'how' question of the process. Accordingly, this central issue is to some extent explored in the preceding two chapters. It has been partly discussed in relation to the programme and ideology of the organization, and it is articulated further in

the arguments about the organization-individual linkage in the PKK Here, I shall extend the argument and the exploration of the 'organizational share' in the processes of the Kurdish 'national' collective action—but rather in the light of the questions and confrontations of the party which will, I expect, contribute to the understanding of the 'share'.

It will be easier to identify the genuine questions and confrontations if we first clarify the period which resulted in the factual ascent of the PKK above its fellow movements.

### *The rising decade: from the 1980* coup d'état *to the 1990 mass eruptions*

On the eve of the 'official' military intervention on 12 September 1980,[2] Abdullah Öcalan managed to escape from Turkey, as did many other leading figures in various pro-Kurdish political groupings. A difference in the escape's significance and its outcomes began to be revealed after the guerrilla offensive—simultaneously launched against Turkey in the Kurdish towns of Eruh and Şemdinli by the PKK on 15 August 1984 (McDowall 1996:40; İmset 1992:40)—and the course of affairs which followed.

Certain forms of resistance organized by the PKK at Diyarbakır prison in protest against 'brutal torture practices' following the military takeover hinted at a remarkable separation from the rest of both Turkish and Kurdish legal/illegal opposing political configurations: the 'tradition' of self-immolation in the history of the movement was initiated by a central committee member in the PKK, Mazlum Doğan, on Newroz[3] day, 21 March 1982. On 17 May 1982, four members of the PKK (Ferhat Kutay, Eşref Anyık, Mahmut Zengin, Necmi Öner) set fire to themselves and burnt to death hand-in-hand. They were later to become famous in the party as 'The Fours'. Some two months later, at the same prison and for the same reason, a group of prominent PKK members went on hunger strike on 14 July 1982, which culminated in four deaths (Kemal Pir, M. Hayri Durmuş, Akif Yılmaz, Ali Çiçek). The first two were members of the central committee and had been among the seven participants at Öcalan's initial organizational meeting of 1974.

While these developments occurred among PKK prisoners, the party was engaged with gathering its escaped militants in Bekaa Valley (a Syrian-controlled Lebanese territory) to be prepared for a long-term Vietcong-style guerrilla war. The PKK managed to gather 'several hundred' (Öcalan 1991:21) members and sympathizers, and held two successive congresses in 1981 and 1982.

The 1981 meeting was a sub-congress, which differs from the regular party congresses held every fourth year. In accordance with the resolutions adopted in these congresses, the leading cadres who had escaped focused on recovering from the impact of the 1980 coup, and utilized the years 1981 to 1984 as a 'border reconnaissance and preparation period' for the well-known guerrilla 'Offensive of 15 August' (İmset 1992:29–36).

Following the organizational preparations in terms of both structure and material military requirements—along with the firm elimination of the 'dissident voices' within the party (ibid.: 37)—the historical offensive which marked the commencement of the 15-year 'low-intensity war' between the PKK and Turkey entered in its materialization period on 15 August 1984. The clashes in the first seven years led to more than five

thousand deaths (İmset 1992:26), and, after ten years, over twenty thousand deaths (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997:126).

Of the initial preparations for the proposed guerrilla war in the organizational sense, the most remarkable was the foundation of a military wing called 'the Kurdistan Liberation Forces' (*Hêzên Rizgarîya Kurdistan*—HRK). This was modelled on the Vietcong, and was composed of basic teams of three fighters, and a structural hierarchy formed from teams and units. A unit consisted of three companies; a company consisted of three teams. The initial body of the HRK was composed of three units (İmset 1992:129)—in other words, the totality of the PKK's military force at the outset was less than a hundred guerrillas recruited mostly from the 'Kurdish peasants (or recent ex-peasants)' (White 2000:211). Later, following the resolution adopted by the third congress of the PKK held in 1986 (Birand 1992:141), the HRK converted into the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (*Artêşa Rizgarîya Gelê Kurdistan*—ARGK), due to increasing public support and attachment to the armed struggle by the Kurds of Turkey.

The period 1984 to 1990 is the one in which the 'unpreventable' rise of the PKK was established, creating the potential for the mass uprisings *(serîhildans)* of the early 1990s. There are three interrelated principal aspects of these years.

First, the initial aspect begins with a false dichotomy between both parties in grasping the actual extent of the '15 August Blow'. While the state officials downgraded the 'First Blow' with an *over-confidence*, the PKK leadership dared to carry out the offensive, but with hesitation—namely, with *under-confidence*. İsmet G.İmset, the former editor of the semi-official daily paper published in English, in his comprehensive work traces the 'over-confidence' of the Turkish state's 'ordinary officials' back to the early 1980s by referring to the *quiet* aftermath of the 1980 *coup d'état:*

> Once those terrorists 'on the streets' were rounded up and sent to prison, Ankara relaxed, believing as in the case of the Turkish armed left, this would be the end of another threat to the stability of the country. But was it?
>
> Facts have shown that the over-confidence of the government back in the early 1980s only served to help the PKK through its days abroad of intensive preparations for launching attacks on Turkey and upsetting the social balances of the south-east [Kurdistan under Turkey] by intimidating the local people.
>
> (İmset 1992:7)

Also, as stated earlier, the state's over-confidence continued until a while after the first offensive. The state belittled the uprisings, believing that in the light of its 'rich' experience of the earlier 'twenty-eight' attempts it had little to worry about. On the other hand, the protagonists of the first offensive themselves were in an under-confident spiritual state due to the very same 'rich' and 'pitiless' lessons of past experiences—the lessons which taught the vital role of 'internal treason' in the crushing of all previous rebellions. Öcalan frequently underlines the anxiety and hesitation in his talks when he contemplates the atmosphere of the 'inception years'. In the beginning of the closing address to the party's third congress (1986) he describes these years:

> If we try to look at the historical and present significance of our congress; our deep-rooted and historical questions have for the first time found the opportunity to discuss it in such an atmosphere… I am thinking about our state in the first congress… I remember my fears and anxieties at that time. We had given a party name to ourselves but would we continue? I was wondering whether the fiasco would knock on our door. Would the steps we had taken meet the target or not? We acted amongst these anxieties and hesitations for years; we experienced many things such as organizational depressions, defections of persons [from the party] and refusals to shoulder the tasks etc.
>
> (Öcalan 1993a:305–306)

In the speech of the fifth anniversary year of the 'Leap Forward of 15 August' (1990), Öcalan states that 'not only friends, but also the very persons among the executors of the action believed that the step they were taking had no chance of success. The feeling of "Yes, we will be quelled, this attempt will end in failure" was the dominant spiritual state in which they were expecting their demise' (Öcalan 1992b:116). He occasionally evaluates their action as being a 'miraculous leap forward' (Öcalan 1998:59). But both parties hurled themselves into a comprehensive and ceaseless struggle with all their might, and the very nature of the struggle in these years culminated in a remarkable extension, expansion and consolidation of the PKK's organizational structure. The party configured its two main flanks of the popular front and the popular army: The National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (*Enîya Rizgarîya Netewa Kurdistan*—ERNK) was established in 1985 and declared as such on Kurdish national day *Newroz*, 21 March.

The HRK, which hitherto operated within the framework of 'armed propaganda', was converted into the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan, ARGK (1986)—the first 'popular army' in the history of 'Turkish Kurds'. The organization built its overall body in the form of a 'Party-Front-Army triangle': *the party* (as the ultimate political structure), *the popular front* and *the popular army*. The ERNK divided itself into four sub-flanks in 1987 so as to organize its various social strata individually: YKWK (Workers' Branch), YRWK (Intellectuals' *[Aydin]* Branch), YXK (Youth Branch) and YJWK (Women's Branch) which was eventually to be converted into the Women's Party at the PKK's sixth congress held between 19 January and 16 February 1999 (Özdağ 1999:225). The frontal flank of the party, ERNK, stretched its organizational network around almost the entire world (White 2000:175, 202) wherever an adequate Kurdish population could be found, such as Russia and other Soviet republics, some Eastern European countries, Australia, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Britain, Canada, etc., but in particular all the countries of Western Europe by the end of 1989. In brief, while the state, a short while after the 'Leap Forward of 15 August', realized the extent of the danger and deepened its struggle by utilizing every means at its disposal, the PKK leadership, under the pressure of fears, anxieties and hesitations, put every endeavour into expanding and consolidating its organizational structure to secure the developing guerrilla war. This is the first aspect of the 'buildup'period (1984–1989) of the decade in which the PKK rose, and, at the same time, it seeded one of the prime elements of the ground from which the main difficulties of the organization arose during the declining period of the mid-1990s.

Second, the most 'self-destructive' activities were carried out by the PKK in this period. In the name of fighting against the traitor 'feudal elements' (van Bruinessen 1988:42) and village guards, a considerable number of villages and villagers were attacked and many civilians, includ-ing women and children, were killed in these clashes (Barkey and Fuller 1998:147; Aydin 1992:185). Even if many of them were probably carried out by Turkish army 'dirty tricks' squads in dubious circumstances (White and Logan 1997:249), Öcalan admitted that such offensives were 'indeed' conducted by 'their own people' (*İkibine Doğru*, 22 October 1989:23); 'inevitably' women and children also lost their lives (Öcalan 1999c:114). Similarly, during these years the organization executed a number of PKK dissidents who were called either 'traitors' or 'divulgers' or 'hostile elements', including some ex-CC members, and carried out executions even as far afield as Europe (Gunter 1990:74; İmset 1992:83; White 2000:145). At worst, the killings facilitated the disguise of further devious eliminations within the organization, which were unveiled afterwards. In particular, some guerrilla commanders, such as Hogır (Cemil Işık) and Halil Kaya (Kör Cemal), carried out many executions in their provinces due to similar accusations (*Serxwebun*, June 1991). Such incidents even continued through to the early 1990s. For instance, 17 prominent guerrillas were executed in a week by a central committee member who was commanding Maraş (south-west) province, Ali Ömürcan (Terzi Cemal), on the accusations of 'being recruited by the enemy as agents' (*Serxwebun*, August, September 1993). It is not yet quite clear whether Ali Ömürcan himself was a state-infiltrated figure or a mentally ill—but talented—personality who managed to reach membership of the CC of the party. He was, however, executed by the PKK afterwards because of these murders.

The organization took a turn towards corruption as a result of increasingly devious murders: the critique and self-critique mechanism began to turn into some basic repetitions and imitations, to the extent that Öcalan complained about the militants' 'over-formalized' approach to himself, at the cost of jeopardizing his 'charismatic authority'. (The nature of Öcalan's leadership is partly handled, but will be discussed further on pp. 222–227.) When responding to Ballı's concerned questions, he seems to be literally rebelling against the Kurds' particular attitude towards criticism:

*Q*…. It is widely said [by the other socialists] that the only remedy for a functional critique-self-critique process is the freedom of critique of the First Man… Is there freedom to criticize Apo in the PKK?

*A.* If they criticize me, it will be of great assistance to me. I said this to *2000 e Doğru*.[4] [Kurdish personality] has been debased so much so that he/she cannot free himself/herself from behaving as a slave. My suffering is not in being criticized but in not being criticized. My suffering is in their submission like slaves. The thing that I need the most is a heavily dosed *[dosaji yüksek]* critique.

*Q.* But I have not come across a different view in your publications. Always party leadership, party line…

*A.* They either do that or run away. This is my problem too.

(Ballı 1991:282)

Similar emphases on worries about this two-way 'barren' attitude towards his leadership are found within several other interviews with Öcalan (Perinçek 1990; Birand 1992; *Serxwebun*, April 1991, January 1992, and others). But the fact of these polarized attitudes has by no means changed, nevertheless, for it was necessitated in the course of the 'routinization' of the *Apo* charisma on the part of 'institutionalizing' administrative staff of the party (see Chapter 5, pp. 187–189).

The third aspect of the years that saw the rise in power of the PKK concerns what Tilly calls 'opportunity' of collective action. These years also denote the duration in which the PKK effected the changes that allowed it to reach its apex of the early 1990s, with its absolute isolation in the sense of relations with the 'whole range of Kurdish nationalists and Turkish leftist groups' (Gunter 1990:62, 66). Further, these hostile relations resulted in occasional clashes between the PKK and various Kurdish or Turkish parties and circles (*Middle East Times*, 14–20 February 1992; White and Logan 1997:226), such as the KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party—Iraq), the PSKT (Socialist Party of Turkey's Kurdistan), HK (*Halkın Kurtuluşu*—People's Liberation), and *Dev Yol* (Revolutionary Path), etc. Notwithstanding the fact that an 'accord document' was signed between the PKK and the KDP in 1983, it did not last long and was invalidated due to the conflicts that arose after the 15 August offensive (Öcalan 1993b: 447–449). Sheri Laizer attributes the 'anti-amalgamation' to the other organizations' dependence on foreign powers, who have betrayed the Kurdish people 'on every occasion':

> The PKK was opposed to amalgamation with other Kurdish parties, all of which it inevitably labelled 'reformist'. It has always taken its political decisions without consultations, being highly critical of the other Kurdish political parties and their leaders. The party claims to depend solely on the Kurdish people and on itself, refusing to rely on the dubious support of outside movements or nations where no good reason exists for doing so—history having illustrated that the Kurdish people have been betrayed by foreign powers on every occasion that a Kurdish leader relied on them.
>
> (Laizer 1996:90–91)

Probably because of a combination of the first and second aspects (namely, due to the organization's *under-confidence* based on the previously 'inverted fate' *[makus talih]* of Kurdishness and an *over-sensitivity* to the intrinsic prevalence of traitorous tendencies), or perhaps because the nature of Öcalan's leadership was not adept at enduring internal or external oppositions, the PKK elite did not tolerate critical approaches both from within and from people close to it. Or this may have been the object of hostile approaches and aggression. Whatever the reasons are, the fact is that these years were a period in which mutually extreme hostile relations were evident between the PKK and the 'others', and the PKK managed to survive, to develop and eventually to reach a peak of organizational expansion and influence in the spring of 1990 with an absolute absence of a component—or an element of a component—of collective action:

> The test of real events has demonstrated that—whatever one thinks about it—the PKK now commands real support among Turkish Kurds. An uprising *(serîhildan)* in the Turkish section of Kurdistan that begin in mid-

> March 1990 had serious effects on many aspects of politics in Turkey as a whole, which require examination at this point, as these events illustrate the degree to which the Kurdish national movement has developed spontaneous militant forms 'from below' (*Middle East International*, 13 April 1990:13–14; *Human Rights in Turkey*, April 1990; *Kurdistan Liberation*, April 1990:5–6; *Independent*, 7 April 1990; *Middle East Times*, 3–9 April 1990, 27 March 1990).
>
> (White and Logan 1997:232)

The founder of an illegal and daily operational paramilitary unit organized in the region (allegedly founded in the late 1980s) also states the extent of the PKK's mass mobilization capability when he sounds a 'chilling warning' for the state forces in the introduction to his book about his direct experiences as part of the organization's activities:

> If, in the south-east, shopkeepers shut or open their shops with a telephone call, if tens of thousands of humans can gather, march and shout slogans such as 'DOWN WITH TURKEY', 'LONG LIVE OUR LEADER APO', if clashes take place in towns over hours or even days, and if all these are approved with silence in the name of 'HUMAN RIGHTS', then that means something has to be changed.
>
> (Aydın[5] 1992:6–7; emphases in original)

As a result, the string of uprisings, which erupted on the streets and pathways of rural localities of the relatively less assimilated Kurdish provinces in Turkey (east and south-east) in March 1990, and which had substantially withered away by 1993, without dispute marked an entirely novel historical era for Kurdish politics and sociality. It introduced a newly detribalized, mass-participated struggle to the history of the Kurds in their modern *national* sense. But the very same era simultaneously multiplied the entanglements upon which the 'turning' of the organization's historical success 'into [its] fetters' has rested.

### *The apex years: settlement of the impasse*

The 'March *Serîhildans*' prompted an influx of new recruits into the organization. Thousands of men and women from the rural and urban populace, particularly from among the high school *(Lycée)* and university students of both Kurdish cities and Turkish metropolises, joined the party's frontal and military bodies.

While, in 1989, ARGK issued the 'Compulsory Military Service Law' for guerrilla recruitment, 'it has been forced temporarily to close off recruitment to its guerrilla force at several points since 1991, due to an inability to properly train the large numbers of recruits coming forward' (White 2000:197). A videotape, recording a hunger strike of the group of more or less fifty boys and girls in Bekaa Valley whose admission to the ARGK was refused, was distributed to the PKK's sympathizers during those years. The 'tactical leadership'[6] of the PKK, in consequence, was enjoying its organizational peak. The front pages of the party's two main magazines (*Serxwebun* and *Berxwedan*) from 1990 to 1993 became nothing more than a celebration of the coming 'pre-evident' victory. *Berxwedan*

carried an Ocalan statement claiming 'We are entering Newroz [1994] with 30,000 guerrillas' (made at the press conference held on 28 September 1993) on its front page in bold letters (*Berxwedan,* 15 October 1993). The next issue announced that the PKK had superseded 'all colonialist institutions' in the Turkish-ruled part of Kurdistan with an 'absolute authority' by splashing the headline *'OTORİTE BİZDE'* (Authority Is Ours) right across its front page. The sub-heading was no less firm.

> The resolutions adopted by the PKK, which are formed in concrete proposals such as 'political parties will shut [their offices in Kurdistan], all their administrators and members will resign, the newspapers serving the Turkish special war will not be distributed, TVs will not be watched, the schools serving as colonialist assimilation institutions will be shut down, teachers will resign, gambling will not be allowed, all the officers of the TC [Turkish Republic] will leave Kurdistan, no one will attend the courts of the TC, no one will join the Turkish military service, taxes will not be paid to the TC, journalists will be allowed to come to Kurdistan only with permission' are implemented in perfect order. Our people have been devoting all their efforts towards implementing these resolutions.
>
> (*Berxwedan,* 15 November 1993)

The headline of the subsequent issue of *Berxwedan* (December 1993) was The PKK is Institutionalizing the People's Rule Step By Step'. *Serxwebun's* earlier (September 1991) front page headline was to predict that: 'We Are Advancing Towards Botan-Behdinan[7] War Government'. Press statements issued by the central headquarters of the ARGK announcing the PKK's arrival 'at a stage of preparing to proclaim a revolutionary government in those parts of Kurdistan where the political and military authority of the enemy has already been broken' were also released through the *Kurdistan Report*[8] (ibid., October 1991, February 1992). Further, the proposals for the 'Revolutionary War Government' were to encompass some parts of non-Turkish ruled Kurdistan (Behdinan) for the growth of the PKK exceeded Anatolian Kurdistan, particularly following the Gulf War (*Middle East International,* 26 July 1991). This enabled it 'to establish bases deeper inside Iraqi Kurdistan than ever before, as well as benefiting from a fortuitous enhancement of its weaponry' (White and Logan 1997:234). Laizer, in her rather journalistic work based on direct observations and experiences, also points towards the PKK's growth 'in both north and south'—but, in terms of its non-military aspects:

> In 1990 for the first time massive demonstrations in support of the PKK erupted in Botan province in the large Kurdish towns like Cizre and Şirnak. During Newroz ordinary Kurds hurled stones at the army and security forces, and marched openly in the streets waving PKK flags and holding up portraits of Abdullah Öcalan.
>
> After 1992 and the war in south Kurdistan, the PKK emerged as the only Kurdish party in that particular conflict whose deeds matched its maxims. This brought the PKK even greater support in both north and south Kurdistan.
>
> (Laizer 1996:90)

These facts were not the whole edifice, but a facet of the peak years. The 'unimaginable' growth of the PKK had been proven by the string of *Serîhildans* spread over 1990, 1991 and 1992. However, those achievements did not lead to a victory. Neither the enormous growth of the party nor the vast number of recruits to the militant and guerrilla body of the PKK made any difference to a modest settlement of Turkey's Kurdish question, not to mention the bold steps like the 'liberated zones' and the 'revolutionary Botan-Behdinan War Government', for they were exaggerations arising out of the state of 'organizational climax'.

The fundamental question was, from the organization-movement point of view, the new recruits to the organization following the uprisings were ironically not pertinent to the organization's recruiting means by which it previously 'developed the spontaneous militant forms "from below"'. In consequence, the extent of new and assorted recruits containing a large number of college-university students and graduates, instead of engendering a further 'revolutionary leap forward', had mutated into the organizations 'fetters'.

Also, the mutation had not been acknowledged by the 'tactical leadership' under the foggy atmosphere of the 'organizational peak'. And the repetition of old customs, shaped by fears, anxieties and hesitations, which seeded the main difficulties of the organization during the 'condensation years' (the second half of 1980s), accompanied by the *intensive one-way education system* of the party (see Chapter 5), inevitably moved the main organizational predicament from 'fetters' to an *impasse* in subsequent years. From another angle, an organization which had been *enabled* to build up its Kurdish national revitalization from a 'nuisance' to 'a security threat' (*New York Times*, 20 October 1991) or from a 'rag-tag terrorist band' to 'a viable guerrilla army' (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 October 1991) by the 'contribution' of kidnapped-abducted cadres gathered through the ARGK's 'Compulsory Military Service Law', has actually been *unable* to achieve a modest national victory even with the *mobilized resource* of unanimously acknowledged massive popular support and the sheer number of new recruits. *Why* this organizational shrinkage should occur is examined further below.

### *Hints of the fall*

Hopes and slogans of the sort listed above were gradually abolished in the following years. The insistence on such proposals had already tended to weaken. The hopes of the 'liberated areas' were being expressed with less emphasis—though they were still alive until the end of 1994. An instruction from Öcalan to the 'war headquarters' was published on the back page of *Serxwebun* (October 1993) with the title 'According to the existing course of the war, we may orientate ourselves towards the liberated territories', and 'War Government' emphases were gradually superseded by the notion of 'liberated territories'. In the political report submitted to the 4th congress of the PKK (8–27 January 1995), Öcalan repeated the PKK's proposals to orientate itself 'towards' liberated territories. That target also faded in later years. Paul White traces the hesitations about such hopes to as far back as 1992 and states that he had the impression that 'Öcalan was noticeably vague on the question' when responding to his request for an explanation of the 'organization's conception of a Kurdish Parliament, for "Botan-Behdinan"'. He cites

the following excerpt from the interview he held at the PKK's training camp in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley on 2 July 1992:

*AÖ:* The people's power is stronger in these areas; it's also stronger for the national parliament, and for the government.
*PW:* Which government?
*AÖ:* The people's government.
*PW:* You can form a people's government in these areas?
*AÖ:* It's being developed in that direction.

(White 2000:168)

The fading of the string of *serîhildans* had actually begun after the 1992 Newroz celebrations. At the PKK's call for celebrations, the response of the Kurds of Turkey had been widespread and there were simultaneous uprisings throughout Kurdistan as well as the western metropolises of Turkey. But the reaction of the Turkish state was harsh and irreconcilable. Extensive violence and bloodshed erupted, involving the military, the police, the PKK guerrillas and civilians. The violence and clashes between PKK supporters and the Turkish armed forces did not end with the Newroz celebrations. The Turkish state was 'determined to quell the PKK Rebellion' which was a full-scale Kurdish revolt (Kohen 1992). Well co-ordinated armed forces composed of military corps, police, militia and village guards continued their offensives over the following months. A city of approximately 25,000 people, Şirnak, was virtually destroyed in an assault by state forces commencing on 18 August 1992 and resulted in the death of 34 civilians according to official reports (*Middle East International*, 11 September 1992; *Middle East Times*, 8–14 September 1992). Further military operations carried out by the state on the towns of Çukurca and Dargeçit in this period led to a death toll of over five hundred in only 30 days—increasing the total in 1992 to almost two thousand (McDowall 1996:435; Hedges 1992).

Despite Turkey's polarizing policies, the PKK did not harden its attitude. On the eve of Newroz 1993, 17 March, a unilateral cease-fire was declared by Öcalan in the presence of the PUK leader Jalal Talabani (*Kurdistan Report*, April/May 1993). Three elements of the cease-fire statement were highlighted: (a) the cease-fire was 'unconditional', (b) the PKK 'do not wish to separate from Turkey' and (c) the 'matter will be resolved within nationally agreed borders'. A couple of days later, on 19 March 1993, Abdullah Öcalan and Kemal Burkay,[9] a 'moderate leader', met in Syria and signed a protocol containing similar moderate demands for the cease-fire and promising joint peace efforts and future co-operation ((*Serxwebun*, April 1993; *Nokta*, 4–10 April 1993; Laizer 1996:95). No response is recorded from the Turkish state. By contrast, violence intensified while military operations against both guerrilla forces and the alleged 'villages backing terrorists' continued, as did the 'death squads' targeting the members and activists of the pro-Kurdish legal party, the HEP (People's Labour Party) (Laizer 1996:75, 76). But the unconditionalunilateral cease-fire was extended by Öcalan on 16 April 1993 at a press conference held in Bar Elias, Lebanon. The HEP leader Ahmet Türk and the 'moderate-soft' *(ılımlı)* Kemal Burkay participated as well as Jalal Talabani to 'promote the cease-fire and Kurdish nationalist unity' (*Serxwebun*, April 1993; *Kurdistan Report*, April/May 1993, back cover).

Allegedly, the PKK took the 'momentous' step of a unilateral unconditional cease-fire following the meeting held between Öcalan and Talabani in late February, at which a message from the Turkish authorities was passed to Öcalan (White 2000:167). This implied that the Turkish authorities had requested the cease-fire. An alternative possibility is that Talabani passed Öcalan's 'modest demands' on to Turkey—along with promises containing 'PKK condemnation of terrorism', 'abandonment of the armed struggle', 'commitment to the unity of Turkey and the rejection of separatism'—which 'were no more than had been mooted by leading Turkish politicians' to Özal (McDowall 1996:436, 437; *Sabah*, 13 March 1993). Or that the leadership of the party may have been compelled by the pressure of 'repression fatigue among the Kurdish populace' from which the PKK was suffering (Muir 1993).

Whatever the immediate cause was, the cease-fire proposals, which indeed contained a radical political departure for the PKK, were virtually made in vain. 'By a cruel irony', President Turgut Özal,[10] with whom the 'moderator' Talabani was in direct contact and whose death 'proved to be an untimely blow to hopes', 'died of a heart attack' on the day after Öcalan's declaration of the 'indefinite extension' of the unilateral ceasefire (McDowall 1996:437; Laizer 1996:76). Turkey's attitude towards the cease-fire and the PKK's diligently *softened* demands were summed up by the general chief of staff and prime minister of the time, Doğan Güreş and Tansu Çiller. The former warned: The PKK will die like dogs in their own blood' (Dağlı 1994) and the latter was reported to have 'cleared the way fully for military-backed policies to "solve" the Kurdish problem' (İmset 1993). The cease-fire thus remained unilateral. Its end was proved in practice on 24 May, with an abrupt operation by a guerrilla detachment commanded by Şemdin Sakık[11] in which 33 unarmed Turkish soldiers were killed, an end that was officially declared by Öcalan on 8 June 1993. So 'the dirty war in Turkey' (Laizer 1996:72–108)—which was to produce a death toll of over 30,000 by the end of 1998—started from the time when the PKK declared another unilateral cease-fire on 'World Peace-Day', 1 September 1993, at the request of some other 'mediators'. By another 'cruel irony', however, the PKK's final declaration of a unilateral cease-fire (World Peace Day, 1998) culminated in an international operation in which Öcalan 'found himself bound, gagged, and drugged on a jet back to Turkey' from Kenya on 15 February 1999 (Howard 1999:38).

The desperate search for a *modus vivendi* was doomed from the start to end in failure because the *decisive* cause on the part of Turkey was that it took 'momentous steps' as an indication *strongly hinting* that the PKK 'had undergone military defeat and now sought whatever he could gain politically' (McDowall 1996:437). Also because Turkey relied on the quantitative reports of its National Intelligence Organization (MİT) which was almost certainly in receipt of satellite intelligence from the United States. Turkey hit out at 'a "soft" side of the PKK' (White 2000:163). Namely, this study argues, the hints of the PKK's decline were getting more visible and becoming more convenient for the intelligence services, whose conclusions were based on quantitative research and the reports they produced.

## The organizational vicious circle and its shrinkage

As has been discussed above, the central question in this study is *how* Kurdish collective action was organized by the PKK in the context of Turkey's past and present policies regarding the existence of the Kurds. In extending this discussion, I am focusing on hints about the decline of the PKK in this particular section. I am going to endeavour to examine the fundamental factor underlying the organization's inability to further mobilize its massive resources acquired—made available and mobile—for collective action and the resulting organizational shrinkage. In other words, we shall see the *why* of this organizational 'pollution' and 'deconstruction' at issue below: the *why* of the *how*.

### *The repetitive cycle: consolidation of the impasse*

In the course of mounting pressures on the D'Alema government of Italy to force him to leave the country, Öcalan 'told an Italian daily on 11 December 1998 that he was planning to resign as PKK president' (White 2000:184). He also expressed in the same interview that the cause of such a'party restructuring' proposal was because of the 95 per cent of the PKK he condemned at that time.

The resignation would 'indeed be realized' if '[the PKK] insist on not changing themselves', he said, adding: 'If [they] continue what they have been doing for 15 years, then I shall have nothing to do with them.' The news of the resignation from Reuters (Rome, 11 December 1998) was sensational, and Italian papers carried this with full front-page headlines. The news became one of the headlines on MED TV too,[12] but the resignation was reported as 'distorted news'. In fact, Öcalan confirmed the news in a live interview for MED TV a few days later, and repeated it in the 'Organizational and Political Report' submitted to the sixth congress held in January 1999 (*Serxwebun*, April, May, June 1999). We, almost two years later, learned from the 'Meeting Notes' of İmrallı prison that Öcalan still insisted on this course of action as a result of the PKK's inability to mutate itself—he was objecting to the vicious circle caused by the repetition of the 'old' which has been sheltered and disguised by 'naïvety and blind adulation':

> I did say this earlier. When I was in Italy, I said: '95 per cent of the PKK is the PKK which I oppose; I do not want such a PKK, I am going to resign from it'. Even the Italian newspapers made these words a front-page headline the following day. I now say it again; if the existing course [of events] continues, if you stay unchanged as you do now, I will leave you.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, August 2000)

It is a most striking fact that Öcalan frequently berates his followers for their habit of 'obstinate-blind' repetition. The reality of repetition is another distinguishing facet of Öcalan's talks spanning more than 150,000 A5 pages—the basic material of the party's non-military education. Naturally, decades of an 'educational inculcation' concentrating on certain matters would have been doomed to repetition to some extent. If the

fountainhead of this inculcation is a 'one-man leadership', then more repetition will be inevitable. Further, if the object of the inculcation is a community dominated by a tribal[13] structure and the subject of inculcation claims to be a socialist one accomplishing the 'quasi-revolution of October' (see Chapter 4) and even undoing the damage and degeneration which humankind has undergone during several millennia, then the extent of repetition will be broader. That is to say, the nature of the leadership movement and the society in which it emerged necessitated a considerable amount of repetition in its 'revolutionary tongue'. However, the particular repetition of the vicious circle in the 'PKK movement' in the 1990s is not a quantitative increase of such general repetition but an additional and qualitative one which decisively altered the movement's nature and development. Öcalan had 'an inkling' of this of sort repetition towards late 1991. He begins his 'analysis' *(çözümleme)*, contemplating the 'party education' under the heading 'The Grasp of the Seriousness of Education is Essential', by saying:

> Our analyses *[çözümlemeler]* are all composed of a repetition. Notwithstanding that I try to renew it, your state of incredible slow-motion progress compels us to repeat, and since it compels us we are driven into more and more difficulty. This, then, reduces our productivity. I have an inkling that you are gradually polluting the life [in the party] more than before at the present time. You are obstructing the way to a fluent and attractive life. You do not have the right to do this at all.
>
> The first prerequisite for education is to take serious comprehension as the fundamental concern. I doubt a person's humanness that does not lock him/her into an accurate grasp of the seriousness [of education].
>
> (Öcalan 1994a:481)

The final sentence of the *'çözümleme'* is filled with warnings—in fact with menaces and swear words—'if they continue to 'insist' [on repetition]. He finishes the analysis with the following words:

> We are a movement that produced a revival from the deathbed. We can never admit adjectives such as non-progressing, non-reaching [the target/victory] and non-achieving as befitting you. I emphasize this again and again. I reject these adjectives with which you describe yourself. If you insist, we will make it cost you dear. The PKK is greatness. We did not dedicate our life for nothing, did we? We did not have this many martyrs in vain. The person who does not take this as an essential [principle] and does not nourish himself/herself with this, he/she is an *alçak*[14] [debased-dishonest-disgraceful person] near us. And you know the place where these *alçaks* go. You will have to take this greatness as a foundation and make it live in yourself. This cannot be objected to; one only carries out its requirements. 15 October 1991.
>
> (Öcalan 1994a:505)

By mid-1998, some months before he came to believe that he should talk about resignation, the level of critique had reached a 'qualitatively' different degree:

> Life is not feasible with *fahişe* [prostitute] personalities in a political sense. Even in other senses, nothing can be gained with this personality! How does it—being the product and means of a mechanism whose only work is to produce *fahişe* personalities for the regime—bore you? If you insist, I will absolutely qualify you as *[fahişe],* absolutely! In fact, it reveals that you are one. What is repeating a fault, guilt 40 times? In Arabic, this is termed *'fahiş'*. *'Fahiş'* is constantly to repeat a fault, to continue an ugliness, to live with an advanced defect continuously. The term *'Fahişe'* derives from here. If you retain these faulty personalities, [then I will say] all of you are *'fahişe'*… A prostitute in the street, in a brothel is much less guilty. She does not harm anyone other than herself. You harm the society, the party, the army. Military, political prostitution is far more dangerous. A person who repeats a fault in the same area…is a dangerous prostitute. If a man who, above all, always repeats this, he is a street-walker *[sürtük],* and he is very dangerous. From now on, my greatest problem is to search for cures to stop this.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, June 1998)

Ahmet Aydın devotes his 'final (fourth) chapter' (1992:182–188) to a selection of Öcalan's similarly scathing sentences picked from the 1990 and 1991 talks, containing scolding expressions, swear words and derogatory implications about both the militants and the Kurdish people, to exhibit the 'genuine nature of Apo and the PKK' in his own words.

The increase in the level of the 'critique' continues from 1991 to 1998: from 'having [an] inkling that' the PKK members 'are polluting the life' to identifying them as 'prostitutes' or 'street-walkers'. It continues in some refined forms appropriate to the circumstances of the one-man-prison on İmrallı island.

What is the significance of this? To what extent does the increasing intensification of Öcalan's scolding of his militants from the early to late 1990s explain the PKK's organizational entanglements, which engendered a remarkable decrease in its military and political capability? No doubt, my aim here is not to prove the most decisive factors in the decline of the PKK by following the chronology of Öcalan's talks, but the ceaseless talks in fact provide a mirror-like reflection of the process of decline in the PKK. Also, the increasingly strong language of the 'person of charisma' is 'associated with strong resistance to the institutionalization' of the 'routinization' of his charisma for he was witnessing 'the party's "emancipation" from his control' (Panebianco 1988).

As has been explored in the preceding two chapters, the two interrelated and distinguishing aspects of the PKK are that its textual body consists merely of these ceaseless 'inculcation talks' and that the talks concentrate substantially on the notion of the 'self-shaping spiritual re-formation of personalities' within the structure of the party's operating cadres. That is to say, the organizational capability or incapability of the PKK was very much related to Öcalan's 'inculcation talks'. This is not only true for the pre-arrest leadership of Öcalan but also for his leadership during imprisonment. In the period following arrest, even if there has been a noticeable increase in articles signed by the 'Council of Presidency' or by one of its members, Öcalan's accounts of general and particular issues noted down by lawyers have been regularly published in the central

pages of the monthly central organ, *Serxwebun*, as 'analyses of the new stage'. What is becoming more apparent under the circumstances of Öcalan's imprisonment is that the inculcation talks, the 'Leadership Analyses', have been functioning for institutionalizing the 'bureaucratic staff' of the organization. Thus, the talks that refer to particular circumstances are additionally illustrative of the party's organizational questions and confrontations, which, in the final analysis, have determined the outcome of the Kurdish movement against Turkey. Considering the individual and group self-immolations of dozens of Kurds within two months, and the mass mobilizations of hundreds of thousands after Öcalan's arrest—in spite of abandoning almost all classical *national* undertakings—in a pre-feudal society in which the deadlock of primordial ties has dominated most aspects of social, political and cultural life, a sociological understanding and explanation of the PKK is not possible without examining both the philosophical and spiritual inwardness of Öcalan's talks. In fact, building a collective action primarily embraces intellectual intercommunication (talks, writings, etc.) and requires attraction, stimulation and the eventual persuasion of individuals to act together, to construct 'networks of informal interactions between plurality of themselves for believed common interests within the framework of rules and procedures (Diani 1992). Thus, proceeding with the discussion of the 'organizational shrinkage' period of the PKK in the light of Öcalan's increasingly tense talks during the 1990s—in particular, from 1993 onwards—will facilitate the identification of the principal causes of the collective process.

Despite the intensifying and thorough 'analyses' containing open threats and swearing, and the use of these 'analyses' in both legal and illegal party publications, the *repetition of wrongs*, or in Öcalan's term the 'political prostitution', was not extricated from its habitual circle. On the contrary, the main predicament which originated in the PKK's 'self-contained' years—during which the *over-consolidation* of the organizational structure took place in the shadow of *under-confidence* and *fear of treason*—settled down and penetrated the whole being of the organization. It has circled repetitively and been routinized because 'to change the traditional Kurdish ways' was 'more difficult than to split the atom' (Gunter 1998:82).

The central theme of the philosophy of the PKK's 'education war', which is repeated throughout Öcalan's inculcation talks, has been the extrication of human naturalness from the 'plague' of civilization's property mechanisms (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). This has been implemented, according to the 'party leadership', on the 'degenerated' Kurdish personalities of 'Turkish Kurdistan'—where 'humanity faded away in its most solid form'. However, the 1990s revealed that 'extrication' accomplished little or nothing when both the education war and guerrilla war themselves had metamorphosed into 'degenerated wars' due to corruption among the 'bureaucratic staff' of the 'routinized' charismatic authority under Öcalan. 'Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely', said Lord Acton. The 'absolute power' with which Öcalan's charisma was endowed had its reflection among the 'trunk cadres' as countless 'mini Öcalans' whose power began to exceed Öcalan's power in the most harsh and absolute terms. That is, the reification of the power of charisma, at its inevitable 'routinized' stage, denotes the 'ramification of an individual hegemony' (Lee 1992)—the power that may only function 'through a net-like organization' (Foucault, cited in Jermier 1993). And thereby, Öcalan has 'confidently' come to confess that '90 per cent of the party adherents who were able

to be, and appropriate to be, real party cadres and members have been' eliminated 'through a deliberate coercion' (Öcalan 2001b:97).

### *The source of repetition*

Three principal questions caused by the sudden increase in recruitment do in fact indicate the source of the repetition of certain wrongs. The extent of the raw recruits prompted by the mass uprisings was, first of all, too vast to educate and inculcate through the one-way and one-man educational system of the party. Second, the recruits were viewed by the experienced cadres as potential spoilers who would release many pollutants into the 'party line' or 'party life'. These recruits were thus either subject to biased treatment and kept distant from the important ranks of the organization, or the victims of prejudged expulsions and murders. In particular, the elimination of the 'deviant' recruits who joined from 'poisoned bourgeoisie universities and schools' was effected 'without delay' owing to 'quick-witted' diagnoses. In his recently published tedious 'defence' against the European Court of Human Rights, Öcalan's confession about the 'calamity' years of the 1990s is horrifying:

> Although it has not yet been precisely unveiled, it may confidently be suggested that 90 per cent of the party adherents who were able and appropriate to be real party cadres and members have been victims[15] of this approach through a *deliberate coercion* making them commit wrongs. Detailed investigations will unearth the actual truth.
>
> (Öcalan 2001b:97; emphasis added)

On the other hand, among the new recruits the ascent to the commanding ranks of the guerrilla forces was heavily determined by physical features rather than political, educational and leadership capacities.[16] The *old members* were not capable of educating and 'absorbing' the *new members* according to the organization's 'initiating spirit', which was defined as a self-rehumanization initiative. Third, and most destructively, the corruption of the *measure of qualifications* pertinent to the individual's ascent and descent in terms of organizational power and status in the party, which had its origins in the late 1980s, has deepened with the multi-faceted effects of the new abundance of recruits. While there were amongst the new members 'many *eager pursuers of power, privilege and esteem*' in the 'emerging state' along with the *believers* in—but those who were alien to—the movement (Polat 1999:48), among the old members there were many *disguised or 'insoluble'*[17] *power-holders* obsessed with the fear of losing their positions, as well as the mass of *devotees* who were substantially distant from organizational power. The premature search for the enjoyment of the 'prestige-feeling that power gives' has been a pervasive and intense feeling among the *trunk-cadre* layer of the PKK:

> The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence. Hence, 'politics' for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state.

> … He who is active in politics strives for power either as a means in serving other aims, ideal or egoistic, or as 'power for power's sake', that is, in order to enjoy the prestige-feeling that power gives.
>
> (Weber 1947:78)

Moreover, the corruption of the qualification mechanisms nourished the success and dominance of the *power-keeping* old members and the *power-seeking* new members by presenting an easy basis for a pervasive and decisive *mutual tacit agreement* between them to 'share power' and enjoy the prestigious feelings it offers. The tacit togetherness of 'power hunters' and 'disguised/insoluble power holders' which was *catalysed* and *secured* by 'naïve and self-deceptive loyal-cadres'[18] strengthened the vicious circle of the 'repetition of the same wrongs'—the 'prostitution'—and this, in turn, consolidated the degradation and distortion of the *qualification measure(s)* of the factual organizational procedure. As a corollary to the nature of the vicious circle into which the 'trinity' (made up of disguised/'insoluble' power-holders, power-hunters and a naïve and self-deceptive constituency) fell, the wave of *new* recruits in the early 1990s resulted in an impasse for the PKK instead of a further leap forward. And the war itself—which was believed to be producing a 'new human species' (see Chapter 4) and shaping 'even the philosophers' for a PKK-ruled society (*Serxwebun*, April 1998:14)—became corrupted during the period 1993 to 1996, in which conflict escalated pitilessly, and was 'dirtied' by all available means (Laizer 1996:72–108). This is precisely how the reification of power takes place through 'ramification of individual hegemony' among the emerging ruling strata of revolutions (Lee 1992). In the case of the movements with charismatic leaderships, the very process signifies the actual face of the routinization of charisma. And this is precisely why Weber repeatedly puts emphasis on the 'stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff' when articulating the 'routinization' process (1947:364). In this sense, the change in Öcalan's opinion about the war within the space of some months is worth looking at:

> The war unveils feelings which have to die and those which have to be revived. The war brings out the greatest power of thinking. The war, in our reality, is a mere intellectual education movement. The person who becomes involved in the war may well be a philosopher, or may aesthetically realize or beautify himself/herself in the best way. The war is precisely an action of self-recreation… Identification and explanation of these notions are so extensive. But you, as an illiterate ignorant, do not draw the conclusion from our war reality. You are still saying: *'Wherever the war is, there will not be thinking, politics, organization but the dominance of an individual's wild feelings and instincts.'*
>
> (*Serxwebun*, April 1999)

This excerpt is from the speech delivered at the opening of the fifth Middle East *Konferans* (sub-congress) of the party held between 15 and 25 March 1998. In the letter sent to the seventh extraordinary congress of the PKK from İmrallı prison, December 1999, which was later published as a 'Political Report' submitted to the congress, Öcalan had come to believe that the *war* had actually shaped a 'fraudulent personality':

> The fact of extreme repetition and the *corruption of war* gave rise to an enormous 'rant' [19] and the framework for a *fraudulent personality*.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, January 2000; emphases added)

This change, in the first instance, may well be attributed to Öcalan's state of imprisonment under the fear of death or to his 'devilish' tactics. However, when one examines earlier statements prior to the 'unexpected' arrest, a 'preliminary' motion towards such a change is noticeable. For example, in the 'Political and Organizational Report' submitted to the sixth congress (12–25 January 1999) which he contemplated during his presence in Rome and put into words just after his departure (16 January 1999), it is striking that Öcalan has already come to believe that the war is not functioning in the direction of his 'recreation' expectations any longer. When scattered lines are put together, the tendency becomes more apparent:

> Let me emphasize once more: the plot which was arranged by imperialism and its most aggressive fascist forces in order to conclude the critical process in the Middle East with a war around my personality is very important and still continues. Why was such an offensive planned against me? There was indeed an accurate revolutionary activity taking place in the region [the Middle East, namely Syria and Lebanon]. In the recent reports you have sent, you say *'Following the closure of the Mahsum Korkmaz Academy, the resources were not utilized sufficiently in spite of quite suitable educational conditions existing in the country.'* The fact is not only the insufficient utilization of resources, but you caused the educational quality we achieved [in the Middle East] to change into an unrecognizable state…
>
> I was executing a merciless war of education up until the day of my departure from there, and I was well aware of its historical meaning. But you did not understand even this… Such a selfish approach to the work by, in particular, almost all of our central [committee] and the overwhelming majority of our prominent figures in the commanding body…[who] suffocate the outcomes of our activities in their personal beings, and further, carry out all these under the name of *'loyalty to the Leadership',*…stems from the nature of your personalities…
>
> You may ask: what link is there with the activities of the Middle East? Yes, the link with the education activities [we undertook] there is very concrete [obvious]. If these educational activities had been carried out in a country where enormous possibilities existed, in all headquarters and all localities, then the tasks which, I said, 'could score several victories' would have been effected, and, first and foremost, splendid successes and solutions to our war and army questions would have been realized. Here is the historical task whose requirements you did not meet and the opportunities which you missed… A friend of ours says 'There is a wrong at the base of this work'. This is not the case. Didn't we provide you with a guerrilla force which was able to wreck an army altogether? What percentage of commanders, which you insisted on making me approve,

> are with you now?… Where are those who you authorized them to command? Who gave the commandership to these base creatures? I used to have gold-like cadres; they are all rotting in the soil now. Thousands of humans who resisted death are rotting in the soil… You evade rendering an account of what you did and bring the question to an insoluble position, and leave it… The thing with which I am infuriated is this situation. With these self-sacrificing forces, even the world could have been beaten into submission, and the world still is afraid of them [the forces]. And because I am the president of these forces, they [superpowers] are mercilessly pursuing me…
>
> There must have been a so-called error in our war-style. Insolubility must have been a destiny. The tongues of those who say these things should be cut off. I say it openly; the reality of the PKK is not this. The reality of the PKK is the reality of victory and work, enough for ten victories, has been accomplished. The ones who have dropped it to the ground should be ashamed!
>
> (*Serxwebun,* April 1999:13–14)

Two main points dominate the excerpts above:

a the vitality and decisiveness of Öcalan's education war in the processes of the PKK's rise and fall;

b the determinative factor of 'almost all' central committee members and the 'overwhelming majority' of the prominent figures of the commanding body (Weber's 'bureaucratic staff') in the process of the *corruption of education* and, in consequence, of the *corruption of war*. In his daily journal of 19 July 1996, Enver Polat[20] quotes Öcalan's firmer words from the *'çözümleme'* (analysis) of the day concerning the corruption of the war:

> Talking about the enemy, we may defeat it a thousand times, but alas, I cannot bring you to the [desired] point. You are more obstinate than camels. The thing that takes me back to square one is neither the enemy nor the people; I am now gradually realizing better than before that it is the trunk-cadre structure with the central [committee] as its head. It is an extremely dangerous situation.
>
> *The friends we interrogated are the most loyal and honest humans, but their factual practices are virtually taking revenge on the leadership.*
>
> (Polat 1999:79–80)

In further parts of the 'Report', Öcalan becomes more explicit. In this part, his first objective is to break one of the three legs of the 'trinity' (the naïve and self-deceptive constituency, or the *catalyst-shelter* body: the ordinary delegates of the congress) because he has already concluded that 'self-deception is the greatest art' among the 'middle stratum' cadres (*Serxwebun,* February 1997):

> You dear participants!

> I think you are discussing [the matters] and certainly you have to discuss them. I say it again; as I emphasized in my earlier speech, if you say *'our elders say and we do'* then I say that there is no greater *şerefsiz*[21] than you. No such elders exist and nor have you the right to listen like that even if there are such elders. You must absolutely know that you have harmed [the struggle] immensely. Approaching us [me] by such an understanding of seniority is the worst offence to us.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, May 1999:13)

Then, the 'main head or mind' (Gunter 1998) comes back again to the first and most permanent leg of the 'tripod'—*the disguised/insoluble power-holders* (namely, the 'trunk-cadres') whom he feels have led him into a culde-sac. Öcalan actually proposes to treat the sixth congress as a 're-foundation congress' before the seventh 'extraordinary' one. 'If not, what may happen, you could say', he warns, '[is that] there may be confusions, the discussions may tend towards an intricate state. Wherever it goes or not, our congress is a renewal of the party foundation, we re-establish the party if needed' (*Serxwebun*, May 1999:14):

> But it seems to me that your existing conduct is the most devilish, the most foolish and the most porter-like, and, at the same time, is the most insidious one. This, on the one hand, is a most innocent *mümin*-like[22] style, on the other hand is a most simple peasant cunning style, which both develop within each other… The most painful aspect is that I cannot see it in the individual's personality or as being a clique and I cannot get out of it. It is a situation peculiar to itself… My feelings, at least, tell me, 'you cannot march with them'. Whatever excuses you provide, my feelings say to me 'don't draw nearer'.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, May 1999:14)

The conclusion at which Öcalan arrives is that he 'unfortunately cannot go further with the existing PKK'. He lays down the condition that if an 'extensive and deep-rooted revision and renewal' does not take place to the extent of a re-foundation, the party 'cannot walk [work] after the sixth congress' and asks himself for the 'answer' below: 'If it walks [as hitherto] what happens then?':

> It will be ordinary, the repetition of the past, as we have been accustomed to. Well, can we endure this anymore? For example, I can no longer endure it. Let such a PKK be dissolved. I cannot endure this pain… It may be emancipation for me to be divorced from those who bear these [accustomed] perceptions… You cannot seduce me [into continuing as we have up to now] by playing along with me which you have been doing through your tricks and performances. Either you alter this personality of yours or I must go my own way.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, May 1999:14)

Namely, if the PKK continues to repeat its habits, Öcalan will somehow 'resign'. In addition, following the 'heated' and 'condensed' experience of the 66-day 'Rome March' (Uçar 2000), his hopes of being physically near to the party organization (in direct or tele-contact with the commanding body) have become extremely faint—if they have not been exhausted:

> If you still say '*our tribe agha, our father will continue to send us something from far off*', then I am telling you openly, there exists no such possibility anymore. The self-sacrificing devotees you wanted, the money, the warm interest, the people's support, have been sent to you for years. Now they are at risk, I say. Our [my] existence still presents you with significant advantages, but this is no longer a reliable entity.
>
> (Uçar 2000)

Thus, while on the one hand he lays down a firm condition by saying either 'you re-establish the party to extricate it from the vicious circle of political prostitution or I will leave you', on the other hand, he strives to prepare for (at least to give way to) the 'centre and trunk-cadres' to achieve the 'new walk' without him.

These words in Öcalan's 'report', from which I have quoted large excerpts, were shaped when the network of international intelligence agencies were breathing down his neck in Duşanbe, Tajikistan (Uçar 2000:6). This was both the last *'çözümleme'* (analysis) which the 'main head and mind' conveyed to the 'trunk-cadre' body and the last *connection* between the 'leadership' and the party in an organizational sense. Since 2 February 1999 when the plane took off from Greece, organizational contact ended in practice.[23] The crucial importance and specificity of this tele-talk from Duşanbe to the proceeding congress (the sixth) in the eastern mountains of Kurdistan stem from the fact that these were such historically important days for the organization. The tele-talk is, therefore, composed as a kind of 'testamentary bequest'. Throughout the talk, Öcalan was additionally 'transparent' and certain in his diagnoses and conclusions, while realizing in horror that being the only 'head and mind' of the organization's whole existence has actually led to the PKK becoming vulnerable and 'soft'. And so, he formulates the final condition for the 'inheritors' to consider:

> If an organization which has absolute determination for the revolution does not revise and re-establish its real existence in a straight-forward and responsible manner, it will not be able to escape from being a group of liars and deceivers.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, May 1999:15)

The talk's illustration of questions, confrontations and the impasse in the organization also emanates from the sensitive circumstances in which the 'report' was constructed. All preceding reports submitted to the congress were called 'Political Reports' and published afterwards as a book, including the one for the seventh extraordinary congress held a year after the sixth congress. This talk was called the 'Organizational and Political Report', but has not been published as a book.

### *The wrongs of repetition*

We have illustrated how the 'repetition of wrongs' engendered the PKK's organizational shrinkage. The source of the repetition has also been articulated. The remaining item is to clarify what has actually been the object of the repetition. Namely, what has in fact been repeated, or what were the fundamental wrongs that led to the organizational descent?

I argued in Chapter 2 and the first section of Chapter 5 that a dual eccentricity in the framework of contextual factors has been the basis of Turkey's Kurdish question and has consequently given rise to the PKK's organizational *particularities*. This double-faceted peculiarity was, I suggested, the millennial *tribal-traitorous* (*aşiret* and *ihanet*) nature of Kurdishness and Turkey's self-contained policy about *'her'* Kurds based on denial and repression *(inkâr, tenkil)*. In the second part of Chapter 5 I endeavoured to explain the particular build-up of a *national* reaction against internal treason which was—and is—utilized in turn as a 'dormant resource' by the leading elite of the PKK for the motivation of party activists and the mobilization of the Kurdish masses. Correspondingly, *tribe* and *treason*—and *family*—have been a vital concern of the party's educational 'war'. This has led to a further two factors being fundamental focal points of the PKK's organizational structure: individual-organization and personality-lifestyle. The repetition of wrongs, which Öcalan considers to be 'political prostitution', has materialized as a manifestation of these vital concerns of the Kurdish movement in one way or another. Certainly, the wrongs took place in various forms and in an incalculable quantity within the totality of the organizational activities. However, the 'regularized' wrongs have mainly centred, in the case of the PKK of the 1990s, around three kinds of recurrent 'deprivations' in the sense of the inward processes of the organization. These were:

- officialization of sterile education,
- misuse of the 'loyalty to leadership' and
- routinization of the metamorphosed critique and self-critique mechanisms.

**Cadre education** (examined in Chapter 5) has always been more than vital for the PKK's organizational existence. It—the 'education war'—has been deprived of its philosophical and moral ingredients, and considerably reduced to incentive or incitement-making teachings so as to recruit 'determined fighters' against the 'cruel enemy' from the early 1990s onwards. This reduction has been furthered in the education of recruits directly attached to the guerrilla corps in the mountains (N.A.Özcan 1999:423). Whereas, just weeks before the 'Spring Uprisings' in 1990, Öcalan taught that

> [t]hose who come to join our party, who come to our primary education school, are in an unrecognizable state. Even we can bring out to what extent they represent the enemy—many of them express it through their own words—and to what extent they are from the people's side following an arduous effort over months.
>
> (Quoted in Aydın 1992:183)[24]

The intensive philosophical, moral and spiritual education, aimed at engendering the *self-recreation* process within the personalities of those who come to the organization in a 'debased' state, therefore became converted into parrot-like imitations of certain terms

and phrases. The sterilization of educational activities repeated itself throughout the 1990s.

**Loyalty to leadership** has been an additionally decisive 'institution' in the organizational structure, as a result of Öcalan's 'indisputable' charisma (White 2000:209–216). It is defined as denoting loyalty to the people, to the cause and to the future of humanity. In fact, the sterilization of education provided grounds for stating 'loyalty to the leadership' as a 'magic key' to open every door to obtain desired positions and the power of command in the organization. The repetition and 'institutionalization' of the wielding of this 'magic key' during the 1990s gave rise to a caricature of Soviet-like bureaucracy in the PKK that was 'most loyal to the leadership'. In other words, the 'magic key' has been well utilized by the administrative staff of the organization for their self-contained 'institutionalization' in the course of 'routinization' of the Apo charisma. This seems to be what led Öcalan to say, 'this party is not my party' any more and all 'selfish approaches to the work' are being 'carried out in the name of loyalty to the leadership' following the horrifying 'Rome March' (*Serxwebun*, December 1999:16; 16 April 1999:12).

**The critique and self-critique mechanism** occupies additionally crucial space in the inward organizational processes of the PKK for its ideology and educational activities. As shown in the preceding two chapters, this mechanism is dominated by the notion of the 'production of the new man' for the 'Humanization Movement' which was to rise from the 'cradle of civilization'. In the PKK's 'official view', the critique and self-critique mechanism is the primary means of initiating and developing the process of 'self-dissolution' towards the invention of the *re-humanized man*. Generally, no questions arise about finding the faults and defects of others, and consequently no discernible difficulties are met while engaging in critique. However, the instrument of self-critique has been metamorphosed into the 'self-veiling' or 'self-disguising' instrument of bureaucratic authority in the organizational structure due to the organizational complications set out above. So self-critique has been routinized with an imitative rhetoric and has become one of the three basic items of 'obstinate repetition' in the years of decline. Two educated cadres in the PKK (Zeynep Kınacı, whose pre-self-immolation letter was explored in Chapter 5, and Enver Polat, whose daily journal was published as a book among the party publications following his death) point towards this particular aspect. Kınacı, in her letter 'To Party Leadership' (1996), states: 'It has been evidenced that the often repeated kinds of self-criticism which are excused by the influences of the petty bourgeoisie, peasantry, feudal culture, enemy and special war orientations etc. do not make any progress.' Polat notes a 'very important' and 'seriously distinct' facet he witnessed at a 'critique-self-critique platform' chaired by Cemil Bayık in the guerrilla camp. He highlights Bayık's words which underlined the 'freedom to oppose the critiques' for the persons who did not agree with a critique of himself/herself, and adds: 'In fact, the number of persons who wield the self-critique as camouflage are not in a small quantity' (Polat 1999:163).

The *corruption of the norms* of 'loyalty to values' and the distortion of measure(s) for the individual's qualifications to partake in organizational rule have reified as a result of the totality of the repetition of wrongs manifested in the party's basic 'institutions' outlined above. This was to result in organizational shrinkage and consequently to diminish in mass mobilizations—meaning the deconstruction of collective action.

### *The deconstruction of collective action*

From the evidence given so far in this study, it follows that the PKK is a heavily ideological-educational-organizational entity. It is an organization which is operated by absolutely professional cadres who are deprived of their 'private life'. This means that the ethnic 'social movement', which emerges from the 'quiet'—even 'buried' (Kendal, in Chaliand [1980] 1993:54–63)—Kurds of Anatolia, has been constructed. In words of Turner and Killian ([1957] 1972) the movement has been 'built up' through the network of the ideology-dominated educational-organizational works interwoven by the 'off-material-production' actors in the political entity of the party. The phenomenon has come into being 'brick by brick'.

So my research provides support for the 'constructivist' theories developed by a remarkable proportion of social movement scholars who brought forth the idea that collective action is, in the final analysis, a product of the individual's organizational endeavours because 'there is always enough discontent in any society to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effectively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established élite group' (Turner and Killian [1957] 1972:251), and 'even further: grievances and discontent may be defined, created and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations' (McCarthy and Zald 1977:1215). When I examined the process of the 1990s in which the party fell into decline, the argument I developed in conjunction with explicating the questions and confrontations in the PKK's organizational discourse and practice supports this idea. The resulting conclusion would then be that the deconstruction of a collective phenomenon would have to fundamentally be the sequel of a *construction of destruction*—that is, the deconstruction of the organizational 'building'. But, of course, with an evident contrast: the deconstruction is as easy as the construction is difficult—just as it is in brickwork! This is what has been explored in the latter section of this chapter.

A distinct point stood out vis-à-vis this conclusion among the findings of the field survey. While the 'imperialists' venture to capture' Öcalan is attributed to a decline in the organization's power of mobilization by *Serxwebun* and articulated in a lengthy editorial article, the grass-roots body seems reluctant to acknowledge the fact. *Serxwebun*, the official central organ of the PKK, states:

> America, England, Turkey, Germany sat down, investigated, explored: *'these humans* [PKK activists] *are like this…a person [Öcalan] does everything, let's catch him, then they grapple with one another. No sense of executing party, politics, struggle, anything amongst them'* they said. Namely, they diagnosed all these features of us, and dared to launch such an offensive against us, and by the strength, self-confidence acquired from this [our state] they effected this fearless aggression against the Leadership.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, December 1999:17)

The editorial article of *Serxwebun* puts the acknowledgement of the 'organizational shrinkage' in further explicit words: 'This war served the party less, but more the non-party [objectives]. That is why we did not succeed in the war, [then] such wear and tear, loss of strength have materialized'. The grass roots do not agree with this nevertheless. I

asked the respondents: 'Do you think that the PKK fell into decline in the last few years?' Despite the considerable number of blanks in all the other optional questions, only one did not answer this question. But 89 per cent of the 184 respondents said 'no' decline has taken place in recent years. The percentage rises to 95 per cent among the less-educated respondents (Table 9). Likewise, while 80.4 per cent of respondents considered 'The *growth* of the PKK' to be the actual cause which urged the USA to hand Öcalan over to Turkey (Table 12), only 0.5 per cent of them ticked 'The decline of the PKK'. In context, these striking findings refute my suggestion of them taking the organizational decline of the PKK for granted, which has even been acknowledged by its 'leadership' and his successors. However, if we continue to rely on the facts and figures that corroborate the decline of the PKK in the 1990s, how shall we then interpret the ninetenths 'No' answers that oppose the indisputable 'wear and tear, loss of strength'? A fair interpretation would be that the human's spiritual propensity towards self-deception is an as yet undefined 'faculty' in human nature to the extent that it challenges Freud's 'most potent' instinct of sexual desire. The conspicuous findings also support my suggestion that the 'naïve and self-deceptive loyal-cadres' of the PKK served the tacit togetherness of 'power hunters' and 'disguised/insoluble power holders' as a *catalyst* and *preservative* in the party. The deconstruction process, in its complexity, has actually been a result of such an organizational 'decay'.

However, the organizational decay handled above at a micro-level is by no means a unique device of the PKK that caused its inevitable decline. It is, in effect, a typical heir to the fate of the 'national communism' of national liberationist movements during the second half of the last century. And, in general, it is another example in the sequence of the inevitable end of the 'Iron Curtain Socialism' of the belated adolescent bourgeoisie forming the 'socialist camp'. Even further, this is what happened to Caesar, to Mazzini, to Napoleon, to Lenin,[25] to Mao (and so forth) as the recurrent destiny of revolutionary endeavours. What is new to this 'tradition' of history is that the process is well articulated and evidenced by Öcalan's recorded and uncensored talks of the last two decades.

### *Öcalan's charisma: The 'party leadership'*

In contrast with competing assessments of the organization's nature, there is an apparent consensus concerning the position of the leader in the party. The point on which almost everyone agrees is the extent of the *'determinativity'* and 'indispensability' of Öcalan.

Corresponding with Weber's general conceptualization of *authority* and *charisma*, the 'charismatic authority' operating in the persona of Abdullah Öcalan in the PKK is an easily acknowledgeable phenomenon. Its extent and existence 'was strikingly (if not chillingly) illustrated by the self-immolations of PKK supporters and members which began across Europe and in Turkish prisons…in response to perceived threats to Öcalan's person' following his abduction on 15 February 1999 (White 2000:210, 211). I also observed symptoms of its continuity during the HADEP congress (Ankara—26 November 2000) at which tens of thousands of Kurdish people chanted his name and the name of the island (İmrallı) where he is imprisoned, even though he had abandoned the most basic *national* undertakings of 20 years (1978–1998) in his *Defences*. Yet the related findings of the field research of this study, which I carried out following his new stance on the Kurdish 'national question', point the way towards the 'routinization' of

Öcalan's charisma in that 50.5 per cent of respondents see the 'Leader Apo' as the most fundamental cause of the PKK's success (Table 10). Whereas the lowest percentage of the responses (9.2 per cent and 12.5 per cent) were from activists who became sympathetic to the PKK through non-Öcalan effects—that is, through a friend or a fellow activist (Table 11). Three out of five of the options in response to the question regarding the initial approach-means to the party appeared as higher percentages (15.7 per cent, 24.4 per cent and 38.04 per cent) which somehow (one directly, the others indirectly)[26] relate to Öcalan's leadership. Thus, his charisma seems insurmountable or irreplaceable—at least in the near future. Even the embodiment or incarnation of this 'indispensable' charisma seems to be unrealizable.

The point with which this study is concerned is neither the nature nor the extent, nor the future of Öcalan's charisma, but the *nourishing base* of its growth and, in particular, how it later in the 1990s became a paradox of the PKK's organizational structure. In the preceding three chapters I showed the specific causes of such an unusual charisma when I examined the emergence of the party, its theory and ideology, and its organizational education and *modus operandi*. In the present chapter, I partly elucidated the nurturing base of the 'routinization' of the Apo charisma when I discussed the 'wise' wielding of 'loyalty to the leadership' under The Wrongs of Repetition'.

What I am going to add here is, first, that the development of such an impressive and pervading charisma in the persona of Öcalan was inevitable and is quite understandable. This inevitability initially lies in the fact that the 'Apo' charisma has been nurtured by the highly tense Kurdish question in Turkey—a fertile 'soil' in which the charisma 'emerges in a field of conflict and contradictions, and is so sustained' (Perinbanayagam 1971:395). On the other hand, the completely Öcalanled PKK has opened up a historical 'gap' in the millennial 'inverse fate' *(makus talih)* of Kurdishness and this opening is deemed to be a miraculous and phenomenal development among the Kurds of Turkey, to the extent that it is acknowledged even by its enemy. The 'first man' of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) of Turkey, Şenkal Atasagun, confessed: 'If we say that Apo did not have any effect there in 20 years, we would be lying' (Ergin 2000). And the 'second man' of MİT Mikdat Alpay, says that the 'PKK destroyed the feudality' in the region (ibid.). Also, the 'interpretation' of the findings of a survey that was carried out among 1,267 respondents—gathered in the 'Special Research Report'—articulates the 'gap' opened 'this time' in the tradition of Kurdish history:[27]

> When we look at the fact in the light of our recent history, it is evident that the preceding Kurdish revolts have always been the revolts of noble leaders. As soon as the leaders were arrested or exiled or executed, the 'movement' ended. For the first time a Kurdish movement has come from below. And the difficulty of its repression stems from this. Ordinary people are joining a 'cause' which transcends themselves. They discover that their lives are becoming significant. For the first time they believe in their ability to determine their future.
>
> (Ergil 1995:89)

That is, once again: the 'charisma of the general is, quite simply, success in battle' (Spencer 1973:347).

Second, any charisma—even any 'authority' apart from the *impermanent* or *transitory* proletariat dictatorship which itself was bound to wither away *all classes* and *class societies* (Marx and Engels 1962:452), namely, *all authorities* of *(herrschaft)* 'imperative control' (Weber 1947:152)—contradicts socialist ideology, and therein lies the potential bacteria of self-decay, as is proved by the spectacle of its Soviet experiences. In the case of the PKK and Öcalan, this self-decaying contradiction is deeper and tends towards deepening further because the ideology of the PKK is claimed to be Marxist-socialism in a *post-Soviet* version. Moreover, because the philosophy of socialism in Öcalan's talks is dominated by the notion of *re-humanization* versus the 'socialism in which the individual is shrunk to its bottom limit but the state is swollen to its top limit' (Öcalan 1998), any element of charisma contradicts the *articulated* ideology of the PKK. Charisma denotes authority. In fact, Weber (1947) elaborates the phenomenon under 'The Types of Authority and Imperative Co-ordination [or imperative control]', and specifies 'charismatic authority' as one of the 'three pure types of legitimate authority' along with 'legal authority with a bureaucratic administrative staff' and 'traditional authority' (ibid.: 328–363). If an ideology proposes and idealizes the 'swelling individual' and the 'shrinking state', then even a modest charisma or any other of the 'three types' of authority will in no way be a 'bacterial' source for the coming 'decay'. In addition, if a version of the socialist ideology of post-Soviet aspirations, namely the PKK, set forth the 'individual's emancipation' *(özgürleşme)* from all 'sins' of the 'Civilization Satan' [of class societies] in search of initiating the '*movement of great human naturalness* as the cardinal focal point, then a charismatic authority 'swollen to its top limit' would lead the organization holding such an ideology into a vicious circle, then into an impasse. Then, the impasse would lead the organization into overall collapse—if the chance for diversion or reversal is missed.[28]

The contradiction between what has been said and what has been done causes depression in organizations too, just as for an individual. The contradiction between *person* and *persona* generated by the unnatural or inhuman values of the institutions of class-society superstructures is the main source of non-physically inspired spiritual imbalances and depressions in the personalities of individuals. As I have argued in previous chapters, Öcalan himself was becoming aware of the fact, and consequently has been focusing on the growing question of his charisma since the early 1990s. He, in particular, has concentrated on the 'democratization of the organization' through 'people's assemblies' of elected members to loosen, if not break, the *structure* of charismatic authority. But it did not work because it was quite late—in effect, too late. Therefore he has come to say: This party is not my party' (*Serxwebun*, December 1999:16; Öcalan 2001b: 97). More importantly, Öcalan himself either did not want to see or was not aware of his decisive part in the process. In 1996 I asked him about any viable contemporary way out of the inevitable elimination of the 'naïve intelligentsia' in all previous revolutions, while reminding him of the recurrent fate of overall revolutionary odysseys. He did not answer my question, but rather preferred to choose a humiliating response:

> It would be very difficult for any ordinary social scientist to comprehend me. I think that, despite all your efforts, you are not going to be able to understand. In fact, my method does not fit into the imagination of

> ordinary human beings. Only I, so far, know how and who I am fighting. I have said, therefore, that if any researcher or scientist from where you have come from [implying the West] has sufficient self-confidence, they may attempt to learn and understand. You have tried but I fear that you will return with empty hands.
>
> (A.Öcalan, personal communication, 15 July 1996, Party Central School, Syria)

Later in our dialogue, Öcalan became more aggressive and more exaggeratedly self-confident. When I pointed out the contrast between what he says and what is done in the organization to the extent that the things he wants have in practice been rendered 'forbidden' in the party though they are 'officially' accepted and intensively parroted, he instead targeted my 'nonsense' question:

> In these respects, if you mean what happened to prophets, what happened to Lenin will happen to me too, that is a nonsense story because I have organized myself in these aspects insofar as it is out of the reach of your perception, or I am extremely pitiless against all [those who do] these things. No one can use [me] as they think… There is no significant defect in my way of succeeding in things. This is so clear. Aren't your eyes capable of seeing this?

But in the latest 'defence', Öcalan ventures into a harsh self-critique. He is, so to speak, additionally confessional about what he himself could not do, and what was in fact beyond his power of understanding:

> I have been defeated by the organization. The marauder tendency created a state of insensitivity in the [party] structure to the extent that there was nothing that could be done; and hence the very defeat [his helplessness] was melting me inside. I had come to the point of impulsively saying to an Italian paper, 'I am going to resign from the Organization.'
>
> (Öcalan 2001b:97)

After all, Öcalan concludes that he had fallen into the 'cursed' tradition of dogmatism, believing the very general 'banal truths' which he kept warning his pupils against:

> Falling into this cursed tradition while warning my comrades to have the best self-protection against it, not counting on the power of this tradition is my real self-critique that will be left there [for history].
>
> (Öcalan 2001b:275)

However, the confessional self-critique of Öcalan, though he hopes to undo the 'institutionalized' wrongs in the party, has also come too late to revive the existing organizational body, because the organization has over-whelmingly come to be dominated and consolidated by a 'new ruling stratum' whose members are well aware of the danger to themselves. And Öcalan's routinized charisma continues to be the prime

assurance of their future as a privileged stratum. In fact, Öcalan's charisma was already in the service of the party bureaucracy (trunk cadres). The power of charisma relates to the bureaucratic apparatus rather than to the person of charisma because the power 'only functions in the form of a chain' and it 'is employed through a net-like organization' (Foucault, quoted in Jermier 1993). In addition, charisma in its routinized form relates no more to some traits of the charismatic personality but to the very *persona* that is endowed to this personality *by* the bureaucratic staff.

From everything said so far, it follows that there are historically 'frozen' socio-psychological causes for giving birth to such a charisma in the form of Öcalan's 'supernatural' or 'superhuman' persona. So, his charisma was inescapable—or probably, vitally needed—and thus understandable. However, it was doomed to be converted into a cul-de-sac for the organization because since the *charisma* does relate to a 'certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men' (Weber 1947:358), its *authority* does not function through the charismatic person. The charismatic authority too, in contrast with Weber's separation of 'pure types of authorities, is networked and operated by 'a bureaucratic and administrative staff' (ibid.: 329) just as in the 'legal authority'. Further, both the charisma and its authority may well 'be defined, created and manipulated' by the very 'bureaucratic and administrative staff…for all practical purposes' in securing the material and spir-itual privileges that power gives to the bureaucratic staff. It is so, no matter if the person of charisma is alive or dead. This is the case in Iraq with the very-much-alive Saddam Hussein, just as it is in Turkey and Iran in the cases of the deceased Mustafa Kemal and Ayatollah Khomeini. There is a crucial distinction which relates to the argument here. While charismatic authorities of capitalist purposes perpetuate themselves and their bureaucratic staff as long as the system exists because it is appropriate to the ideology and philosophy of capitalism, the charismatic authorities of *articulated* socialist utopias and longings do not function as such because they contradict the ideology and philosophy of socialism. This has already been demonstrated by the avalanche of historical mutations that took place in the Soviet style and in its fellow communist authorities. That is, charisma and the 'institution' of charismatic leadership in Öcalan's personality and his party appear solely to be replications of 'Marxist idealism' (Nairn 1981:329–331).

It is thus the case that the routinized 'charismatic authority' of Öcalan has been one of the paradoxical entanglements of the PKK's organizational structure, which contributed greatly to its shrinkage in the 1990s. And Öcalan's belated attempts at a 'personalization' *(bireyselleşme)* in the current party structure—a reorientation in harmony with socialism or collectivism and against capitalist individualism—have tended to be totally ineffective among the 'remaining' (Öcalan 2001b:97) ranks of the party on whom he himself is doomed to rely. In brief, the 'routinization' of the Apo charisma, the so-called 'Party Leadership' *(Parti Önderliği),* has proved to be a fatal paradox for the leader and the party bureaucracy from which the organization cannot appear to escape. Routinization of charisma is a simultaneous process with institutionalization and bureaucratization. And because 'charisma and bureaucratization are antithetical organizational phenomena' (Panebianco 1988:66), the paradoxical process has for now culminated in Öcalan's serious defeat by his abduction and imprisonment in solitary confinement at the one-man prison of İmrallı island, Turkey.

### *The nationalism of the PKK: a 'nationalismless' nationalism*

I have striven to select the most revealing excerpts from Öcalan's talks to further the delineation of the nature and the questions of the struggle under his leadership. These talks are of a critical value for this study because the ideas, the philosophy, the form and content of these talks have not been shaped as claims or defences in the course of quarrels and arguments against enemies or adversaries. Rather, the overall talks are actually materialized as efforts to inculcate his pupils in the course of—what he calls—the 'war of education'. One cannot escape the fact that Öcalan identifies the nature of the struggle organized in the form of the PKK substantially in non-Kurdish and non-national terms. In addition, no exalting expressions are found in the total sum of Öcalan's talks that bear any indication of a national narcissism. On the contrary, he repeatedly employs derogatory—occasionally humiliating—expressions for Kurds, such as 'debased', 'degenerated', 'dishonest', etc. Yet he does not refrain from saying *'national liberation is only the means of my struggle'*, and lets it be published in the central organ of the party. This has also been proved by the stance he took in his *Defences*, in which he dispensed with all classical national targets without any opposition in the PKK. The words 'Kurds' and 'Kurdistan' are ones which a would-be researcher will come across most rarely in his language. Interestingly, in my personal interview, which took around two hours, Öcalan did not mention the words Kurd, Kurdish or Kurdistan at all (*Serxwebun*, 1996:19, 20, 23). White, the author of the only sociological study written in English about the PKK-led Kurdish movement, talks of 'the Real Kurdish Personality' and the 'New Kurdish Person' (White 2000:139, 210). These must either be comment or inaccurate translations. Such terms literally cannot be found throughout Öcalan's talks, including interviews. What may extensively be found about the Kurds is the 'debased Kurdish personality', and regarding the socialist future, there is the 'new human', 'renewed' or 'naturalized personality' of 'a new lifestyle' or of 'a new way of life'. The former is not narcissistic at all, and the latter is by no means a novel notion. The sought-for 'new man' is not only the concern of the socialist literature of the twentieth century but can be traced back to Plato's 'philosopher kings' or 'philosopher rulers'. Above all, the non-Kurdish aspect of Öcalan's inculcation talks is not the 'greatness' of his leadership demonstrating its socialist principles in not being nationalistic, but rather a manifestation of being aware of the 'absence of a base of ethnic nationalist' sentiments among ordinary Kurds—especially among the Kurds of Turkey (Öcalan 1993a: 191). Further, the eventual conclusion at which Öcalan arrived in one of the recent 'Meeting Notes' is clear enough in terms of a national narcissism: *'Sınırlar ve sınıflar adina savaş dönemi bitti'* (*Serxwebun*, February 2000:13). Which translates: The era of war on behalf of borders and classes has come to its end.' However, his charisma still functions in motivating not only the PKK militants but also the ordinary Kurds of Kurdistan and of the Diaspora.

Collective narcissism is a national sentiment *par excellence*—which was 'defined, created and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs' of modern era capitalism and entails the ultimate aim of sovereignty in a geographic territory. In fact Koenigsberg himself elaborates on the social psychology of nationalism within the 'process of *urbanization* (Koenigsberg 1997:36–52) which genuinely denotes the modern era dominated by the young bourgeoisie of competitive capitalism. Nationalism is consequently defined as the ideology of the bourgeoisie by Marxist tradition. Hastings (1997) selects the corresponding conclusions of both Gellner (1964) and Hobsbawm (1990) which square

with one another: 'Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist'; 'Nations do not make states and nationalisms, but the other way round.' Nevertheless, this does not mean that Öcalan has nothing to do with nation and nationalism. After all, Öcalan and his PKK do lead an ethnic-related opposition. He admits that they 'cannot regard national socialism as treason' (Öcalan 2000:25). But, is there a 'nationalism' in the PKK which actually aims to accomplish a nation-state?

Any national struggle in its actual sense is, in the final analysis, a struggle for borders in which the 'suffering mother'—the 'country'—lies down, and for which a 'holy' state (nation) is the only remedy (Koenigsberg 1997:21). Nation-state is 'an essential goal of every nationalism' for which 'possession of territory is, after all, a *sine qua non* (Smith 1983:xiii). Either Öcalan's teachings or the collective consciousness of the Kurds, as it stands, do not fit into these general or classical definitions of both nation and nationalism. The striking realities of the sub-division of a *piece* of Kurdistan (which is sheltered by the world coalition of the superpowers as a safe haven) between Barzani's KDP and Talabani's PUK in the very minor interests of tribal leaderships, and their regular attacks on the PKK 'to please Turkey' (Lawrence 2000:24), may also be interpreted as a weakness in an ordinary national consciousness in the Kurdish ethnic spirit.

The nature of the struggle conducted by the PKK embodies all the 'raw material' of nationalism but not nationalism itself. That is, the movement's spirit relates very much to the innate sentiments of ethnic-cultural, primordial and patriotic sorts. This 'raw material', however, has never been 'refined' to become a real nationalism of a nation-state with a national market. In other words, the PKK's 'nationalism' has remained a 'mass nationalism' which is not *yet* nationalism. And this, of course, is not because the leading bureaucracy of the party is so committed to socialist utopias and values but because they are well aware of the fact that there exists no 'adolescent' or nascent bourgeoisie class aspiring to a Kurdish national market. More importantly, there exists no viably exploitable—or potentially exploitable—national market to which the party bureaucracy itself would be attracted. The economic network of the region (the Kurdish-populated territories of Turkey) is dependent on and incorporated into Turkey's economy, which is itself already in crisis. In this sense, 'market sentiments' among the Kurds have always been weak, if not totally absent. In consequence, there have never been real 'dreams' of a nationstate in Kurdish ethnic resistance movements (Kutschera 1994). And thus, voices speaking of an 'independent Kurdistan' in each revolt have remained marginal and have always been subordinated to the collaboration with the Kurds' 'others'.

The PKK is the first *national* organization in Kurdish history in terms of transcending pre-feudal (not feudal) institutions as organizational entities in Kurdish social and political existence. But this nationalization was by no means engendered by a nationalism of the bourgeoisie for which it 'is the vehicle *par excellence*' (White 2000:4). That is, the process of 'nationalization' of the Kurds of Anatolia does not resemble the transformation from Hobsbawm's peasant 'primitive rebels' to a 'modern Kurdish nationalism' of nation-state building (ibid.: 3). The findings of my limited field research and of Ergil's 'Special Research' bring out this aspect of the phenomenon. Ergil asks 1,267 respondents two questions relating to the 'goals of the Organization' (Ergil 1995:33, 34): 'What are the goals of the Organization?' and 'Which of its goals can the

Organization attain?' In response to the former question, while 15.3 per cent of respondents ticked the option 'the Independent Kurdish State', 30.6 per cent ticked 'cultural and political rights'. The contrast between the options is more apparent in the answers to the latter question: 3.6 per cent said 'Separate Kurdish State' but 15.9 per cent said 'cultural and political rights'. The diagonal comparison of these percentages indicates that the state-building national aspirations among the Kurds of Turkey represent a marginal tendency. Yet, the general picture of the findings which emerged from the answers to my questionnaire is additionally illustrative of this aspect. I constructed two open-ended questions seeking the 'ultimate end' (Table 16) and the 'most innovative feature' (Table 17) of the PKK, The highest percentage, 29.3 per cent, stated the 'ultimate end' as being 'national liberation'. The second highest portion of respondents (16.3 per cent) defined the 'ultimate end' as being 'equality and fraternity of peoples'. The third (11.9 per cent) and the lowest (4.3 per cent) classifiable groups envisaged a'independent-united' or 'independent-socialist' Kurdistan. In defining the 'most innovating feature', interestingly, anything that implied 'fighting for independent Kurdistan' did not occur at all among the answers. Even though 36 per cent of the answers were unclassifiable, the expressions of 'the most innovative feature of the PKK' gathered around the 'renewal and continuity of the struggle' (26.6 per cent) with a remarkable distance between this and the next classifiable group, which pointed to the 'freedom, democracy and peace' qualities of the party (11.4 per cent).

So, it would be the most plausible interpretation of these findings in association with the 'state-building nationalism' of the *mobilized* Kurds, if one were to state that the 'continuity of struggle' for 'political rights', 'national liberation' or 'freedom' does not substantially imply an 'independent state' of Kurdistan in the backs of their minds. In this sense, a customary state-building nationalism is *still* the weakest link of Kurdishness. And consequently the leadership of the PKK did not in fact base their struggle on state-building nationalism, in spite of the programmatic discourse of the 1970s that aspired to do so. The 'national' ingredients of the PKK's verbal and textual discourse strike one as the mere eloquence of the romantic revolutionary intelligentsia in its adolescent or infantile phase. For this reason, Abbas Vali evaluates Kurdish nationalism as a kind of 'nationalism without nationalism' (Vali 1998:84); that is, so to speak, a glass of water with no water in it.

It has been so, not only because the party claims to be Marxist-socialist but also because they were/are aware that there was/is no reliable resource to be a vehicle for their struggle. Further, the PKK did not *wield* nationalist agitation as a 'vehicle *par excellence*' in its overall struggle. While the sense of 'nationalism' *(milliyetçilik)* in the Turkish-speaking nationalist mainstream of East and West Anatolia is a cause for pride and patriotism insofar as not being *milliyetçi* denotes that one is a traitor, the overwhelming majority of the PKK's grass-roots members do not view their party as nationalist. Fully 94.5 per cent of 184 respondents, which I selected from among the PKK activists, rejected the idea that the PKK is a nationalist party (Table 3). Instead, the PKK wielded socialism in order to develop its own form of 'nationalization' on behalf of the Kurds. This was because the Kurdish socio-political structure in which the organization emerged was not pre-national or feudal but *pre-feudal* and *primitive,* and because Turkey's policy about 'her' Kurds was not actually a *national* or *colonial* oppression but an 'indefinable' one based on denying the existence of both geography and the population (Beşikçi

1990:13–15). And therefore, the lack—if not total absence—of market sentiments among the Kurds of the higher classes has been a factual hindrance in the PKK's 'anti-colonialist' struggle. Only an 'irrepressible' desire and a corresponding perspective for a 'home' market will suffice for a 'tribalism' to prosper which 'everyone will respect…as a true nationalism' (Gellner 1983:87).

A fateful deep-rooted factor caused the Kurds to be arrested in tribality, and in consequence, Kurdish tribalism neither gave birth nor gave way to a bourgeoisie who would develop a true nationalism aspiring to a 'national' (home) market and achieving a nation-state for it. This extreme facet of Kurdish history has built a consistent tradition that stretches from the Gilgamesh of the Sumerians to our own time. The 'historical tradition' refers to the Kurds' *way of survival* as the indigenous 'mountain people' of the 'cradle of civilization' which left no way open to Kurdish tribes other than deadly competition against one another for an inferior position—as the *safest* option—to the habitually changing foreign masterpowers. In conjunction with this tradition dating very far back, the uncompromising policies of denial of the latest 'master' of a large proportion of the Kurds have necessitated a further strikingly *nationalismless nationalism* among the Kurdish population under Turkey. Accordingly, the main—if not the only—aspiration of the 'Turkish Kurds' has appeared to be the emancipation of their ethno-cultural identity, which may well be realized in a 'Democratic Republic' of Turkey. And for this precise reason, the mass support behind the DEHAP or KONGRA GEL (in fact, the PKK) has not considerably decreased—in some cases it has tended to rise—in spite of the U-turn by Ocalan and the PKK away from ordinary nationalist objectives.

### *Concluding remarks*

Just as the construction of dynamics gave rise to the ascent of the PKK above its fellow Kurdish organizational configurations, the deconstruction of the very same dynamics engendered the descent in its military and civilian capabilities. The deconstruction process has been materialized through the repetition and proliferation of certain wrongs. The most 'irresistible' phenomenon is that all these 'cursed' wrongs have somehow been justified and appreciated because the deep belief in the need for an *indivisible-extraordinary organization*, in reaction to the disorganized-deformed state of the Kurdish ethnic existence moulded in the shadow of the 'intrinsic' traitorous background of millennia, leached into the personalities of the middle-class executing cadres of the PKK as the *sacred-immutable organization*. That is, the fresh realization of a vital need for an organization among the greenhorn party militants and fighters—who constituted an overwhelming majority of the cadre body of the PKK following the rise in new recruits in the early 1990s—provided a handy basis for the bureaucratic staff to work on Öcalan's charismatic authority. Thereby, both the charisma and the concept of organization were endowed with further sacredness by the 'infantile' bureaucracy of the PKK. Sacredness is the correlative of immunity. The handiest means of being beyond critique and questioning is to become a sacred organization, which is usually embodied in the individual members of the 'bureaucratic staff'. This appears to be the most pervasive question of the organizational nature of the PKK.

The intensive 'education war' of the party did produce an undeniable result in revitalizing the 'buried' Kurdish ethnic existence by introducing a new culture of

organization that transcended millennial Kurdish tribal structures. However, the education war did little or nothing in the organization in terms of a universal 'undoing' of civilization's property mechanisms. And, in effect, the contrast between the parroted philosophy and the factual functioning of the trunk-cadre body within the property mechanisms of the 'Civilization Satan' has remained the greatest contradiction in the party's organizational dynamics.

Öcalan's abduction was without doubt not only an outcome of the inescapable strength of the international conspiracy organized by 'unchallengeable' global powers, but also of the party's *undisguisable* decline in recent years, which dates back to 1992 and 1993. It was not the strength or danger to the West's New World Order of the PKK's latest performance that urged the USA to arrange the international conspiracy against Öcalan but, on the contrary, its calculable decline of organizational (and consequently military) capability that inevitably culminated in the 'catastrophic' abduction. The USA does not act on instinct or from sentiment but in accordance with reports and surveys based on quantitative information. From the USA's point of view, it was the right time to act because, for example, the party, which was capable of gathering almost 150,000 people in Germany for an annual festival in 1994, this time (December 1998) gathered a crowd of not more than 50,000 for a critical reason: Öcalan's future.

The nature and source of Öcalan's charisma may be covered by other research. In this study, I have only touched on the causality of this specific charisma's efficacy, focusing instead on its problematic aspect within the framework of the organization's entanglements. What I may suggest, relying on my overall Turkish reading of Öcalan's *Turkish* talks (*çözümlemeler*—analyses) is that his charisma is by no means a product of the combination—or mutual satisfaction—of Öcalan's personal narcissism and the Kurds' collective narcissism, which would otherwise have nourished Kurdish nationalism (White 2000:211). The *Apo* charisma is a resultant of the convergence of Öcalan's personal attributes and the highly flammable tension of Turkey's Kurdish question.

'Kurdish nationalism' in Turkey does not concur with the ordinary or classical nationalism of a 'home' market for which a nation-state is the *sine qua non*. An adolescent bourgeoisie among the Kurds of Turkey has hitherto not emerged to take over the flag of a nation-building nationalism from the entrepreneur intelligentsia to accomplish a nation-state of a national market. If not by now, it will never emerge unless a 'nostalgic' or 'miraculous' reverse from these days of supranational globalization to modernity takes place! The actuality is that the globalization of 'supranationalism' is enjoying its heyday, through which national markets of nation-states—and its outdating nationalism—are becoming less and less significant, and are doomed to eventual meaninglessness. Insofar as the remaining discourse of the PKK relates only to the masses' innate ethnocultural sentiments by which they continue to be effectively mobilized in the face of the organization's total abandonment of all national liberationist objectives, the ethnic resistance of Kurds under Turkey shall remain confined within a struggle for a 'Democratic Republic' of Turkey. And hence, their resistance shall have to be defined as an '*identity* liberation movement', rather than a *national liberation* movement.

# 7
# Conclusion

Following a brief outline of the preliminary chapters, a summary of the principal conclusions of the items explored in the main chapters is needed for a clearer general inference. From there, I shall finally venture into a general discussion of an essentially unchanged aspect of human history, attempting to argue that the most universal question of humanity, which manifests itself in the 'uniqueness' of the Kurdish phenomenon too, in fact bears the stamp of a perpetual feature throughout class societies.

### *Summary of conclusions*

The introduction, in addition to the methodological framework, offered a general picture of the PKK's organizational contribution to the mobilization of the Kurdish masses. In bringing forth the principal issues of the study, the substance of the subject matter was presented along with the facts and figures on which the opposing parties more or less converge.

Chapter 1 reviewed the theorization on nation and nationalism to provide an analytical framework for understanding the distinguishing aspects of the phenomenon under study.

Chapter 2 discussed the historical tensions between Turkey and the Kurds, which gave rise to the emergence of the PKK. It is suggested that the 'rebirth' of the 'new' Turkish nation-state as the 'Republic of Turkey' was not *invented* by the 'nationalism' of the 'national liberation' under a young native bourgeoisie. Rather, Turkish nationalism was 'repressed' by the founders of the Republic until after the consolidation of its Turkik core. Only then did nationalism erupt in Anatolia, with an exaggerated emphasis on 'Turkishness'.

Chapter 3 structured a partially chronological presentation of the emergence of the PKK out of the radical Turkish Left, along with the impact of particular events on Öcalan's leadership style and on the structural mould of his organization.

To highlight both the specific and the general conclusions, going through the preliminary conclusions vis-à-vis particular points tackled in the later chapters, instead of taking these chapters one by one, will be useful.

### *The social base and class politics*

It is fairly obvious that the social base of the movement is not working class—even though its name is the 'Kurdistan Workers Party'. Indeed, there seem to be similarities between the PKK-led 'national' movement and the 'New Social Movements' of advanced Western societies in respect of their social bases. Despite the claims about socialism and the 'accomplishment of the October *Quasi-revolution*' after the Soviet Union's decline, the party's identification with socio-economic codes (such as working class and middle class) faded away in the early 1990s and they are hardly mentioned now. The mass demonstrations and celebrations of the 1990s revealed that much of the movement's base is composed of the middle-class (rural/urban or 'old'/'new'), 'decommodified' population; students, educated professionals and wealthy families make up a considerable percentage of this. Furthermore, the working class of the region (the 'east' and 'south-east' of Turkey) remains distant from most mass activities.

However, such a comparison between the New Social Movements of 'post-industrial' Western societies and the 'New Movement' of the nationally disabled Kurdish 'tribal' (or primitive) society can be based on a minor aspect of both phenomena—namely, common rhetoric and activities that orientate towards the human race as a whole. Nevertheless, such similarities, particularly with regard to a reacquisition of the integrity of a genuine human essence, embrace generalizable features: they offer cures for the destructive, vulgar and pitiless rationalism of capitalism and the ills of post-Soviet socialism.

Both White and Ergil point to similar boundaries of the class base of the PKK. While the latter states that 'for the first time a Kurdish movement comes from below' (Ergil 1995:103), the former draws attention to the PKK's prohibition against the 'upper' social strata: 'Despite occasionally aligning itself with so-called "patriotic" tribal chieftains, the PKK never permits élite layers entry into its leadership' (White 2000:155). Further, White seeks Öcalan's view on the PKK's specific '*class* politics' in the course of his personal communication in 1992, in which he found Öcalan 'more explicit':

> *PW:* What place does specifically *class* politics play in your strategy, at this stage?
> *AÖ:* The role of poor peasants, the workers, the intellectuals, *everybody who has got the will to develop,* could shape our policy. We are not only a class movement. You should call our movement a humanitarian movement—not a class movement, but a movement for the freedom of the human being. So, you can't understand the movement by looking at the PKK only through the spectacles of class struggle.
>
> (White 2000:153; emphases added)

Even if a similar social base was proposed for the PKK in its *Manifesto* (Öcalan [1978] 1992:152–161), as being composed of 'urban petty bourgeoisie, peasantry, proletariat, intellectuals and youth', Öcalan was to declare that 'the war on behalf of borders and classes has come to an end' (*Serxwebun,* February 2000:13). The questionnaire in my 'illegal' fieldwork was not designed to survey the social base of the party, but still the answers (Table 1) give a considerable clue about the composition of the grassroots activists, with its unusually high proportion of university and high school graduates.

The total of 184 respondents consisted of 44 persons who had only primary school education or less, 25 secondary schools, 50 high schools and 65 universities. The percentage of activists who had graduated from either high schools or universities was as high as 65.5 per cent. These activists were active to the degree that they dared to fill in the 'illegal' questionnaire. It may be concluded that the social components of the 'PKK movement' are rather 'middle' and 'low' sections of the Kurdish social structure: the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie, and the 'category of the population consisting of people outside the labour market or in a peripheral position to it such as unemployed workers, students, housewives, retired persons, etc' (Offe 1985:832). The actors of the movement are 'patriotic intellectuals'—those who have got 'the will to develop'. In fact, the movement originated from a group of university students—mostly from the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Ankara—whose members still dominate the leadership structure. The same is true of the Congresses (KADEK and KONGRA GEL), the renamed formations of the organization declared following the annulment of the PKK at its eighth ordinary congress. This does not refute the fact that the 'trunkcadre' body of the organization consolidated itself in the 1990s as the 'bureaucratic staff' relying upon Öcalan's charisma.

One of the most peculiar outcomes of the specific mode of incorporation of Kurdistan by the young Turkish Republic has been the unique condition of the working class. Rather than the colonization of a *named* country and a *named* nation as an ordinary colony, the situation of the Turkish Kurds' has involved the incorporation of a 'land' (the east and south-east) and a 'population' ('mountain Turks' or the recently invented *'Kürt Kökenli Türk'*—Turk of a Kurdish origin) into Turkey. Accordingly, while an indigenous *Kurdish* collaborator 'sovereign class' does not exist at all in Anatolian Kurdistan (Beşikçi 1990:83, 84), the working class of the Kurdish region is a relatively *privileged class* given the economic circumstances and standards of welfare in the territory. It is a privilege to obtain employment in state monopolies and other state institutions—the actual structure of the so-called capitalist economy of the region (Taş 1985)—that are protected and controlled by military measures in strict collaboration with the secret intelligence services, considering the massive unemployed population. The executive political authority of Turkey has given rise to this unique phenomenon, while ensuring that pre-feudal institutions remain alive and active.

### *Institutionalization of the 'bureaucratic staff'*

A striking aspect of the movement is the contradiction between the charismatic and indisputable 'national leader'[1] and the trunk-cadre structure. As the party grew, the leader increased his emphasis on *individual extrication* from the damage to the human being's spiritual structure throughout class societies—the millennial 'muddy footprints' of the 'Civilization Satan'—while subordinating the party to individuals' spiritual reconstruction within the party. However, the militants in the peripheral bodies of the party persisted in operating the conventional structure of a socialist organization by providing and maintaining the basis for the party to be *sanctified*. As a result, the party's regional and local executors institutionalized themselves as the 'bureaucratic staff' of Öcalan's 'charismatic authority' following the prompt organizational massification of the

early 1990s. That is, the 'routinized' charisma of *Apo* has now been *indisputable* for the 'institutionalized' bureaucratic-administrative staff of the organization.

More strikingly, Öcalan has, in the final analysis, got along with this bureaucratic apparatus despite his menacing and abusive critique of it.

### *Endeavours towards the re-acquisition of great human naturalness*

In response to a related question during an interview with the Turkish professor of history, Yalçin Küçük, Abdullah Öcalan gave a prompt reply: 'If I thought that I would be leaving the PKK as a calamity to the people, I would prefer to take it to the grave with me' (Küçük 1993:296). In addition, he diagnoses vulgar materialism (if it is to be translated into NSM language: vulgar-pitiless rationalism) as the most general cause of the collapse of Eastern bloc socialism and convincingly asserts that Russia wielded *socialism* in order to develop its own form of *capitalism* (Ocalan 1992b: 292–355) and that socialism was a tactical means to achieve Russian capitalism (Küçük 1993:290). In the course of the interview undertaken by the current author for the purpose of this study, Öcalan gives interesting clues regarding the genuine nature of his initiative when he explicitly says that the words 'Kurds' and 'Kurdistan' *'were only key words'* to 'open the door'. In one of his most recent speeches (December 1997) he points in the same direction, but in simpler language:

> I focus intensely on pure and distinguished human types. It may even be said that the summary of my life is in nourishing the tendency from *pure* towards *distinguished*, and from *distinguished* towards *distinguished human beings*. From my point of view, a pure human being is the most distinguished human being. I search for the distinguished in order to find pure human beings—but not the pure human of the earliest civilization. That would be too utopian. I keep asking: How will a human type of our era be formed? There are humanist ideologies; what is human and what is the thing that is humane? In this sense, *national liberation is only a means of my struggle*.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, December 1997:20; emphases added)

In another interview, he tells the Turkish politician Doğu Perinçek: 'In point of fact, the most important reason for intensifying this war is to create humans who may love and deserve to be loved' (Perinçek, 1990:33), while defining the movement as a *'purification movement'* or *'the movement of great human naturalness'* (A.K.Özcan 1999).

All definitions of the party by its 'leadership' are conceptualized in non-national terms—as discussed in Chapter 4. In relation to the source of the pandemic and perpetual ills of politics, Öcalan seems to respond to Graham Wallas's conclusion, in which Wallas finds the cause of the 'unsatisfactory position' of the theory of politics to be in the division between its theory and practice, which are held in *separate hands*. While Leslie Stevenson suggests that Plato skirts around the question of 'how men ought to live' (Stevenson 1974:29–30), a great deal of the philosophy in Öcalan's talks, some of which are gathered in three successive books (Öcalan 1995b, 1996a, 1999a), is concerned with the very same question. Öcalan claims: 'Our revolution and the history of the PKK is an

arduous attempt to respond to the question of *'how men ought to live'*.[2] He explains why he had to perform as philosopher, politician and military man at the same time:

> The school of philosophy is an extremely difficult school. In various eras, these schools could hardly emerge over centuries, and their pupils at the outset were only taught philosophy. They did not have the chance to be involved in politics or war… Alexander the Great was influenced by Aristotle. This is an indirect influence nevertheless. He implemented this philosophy in the military sphere. But Aristotle is on one side, Alexander on another. The philosopher in one sphere and the executors [of politics] are far distant. But in our case, it has to be all in one; I must be both philosopher and politician, and also a military genius. Why? It is because the special war *[özel savaş]*[3] does not allow you to have any opportunity to do otherwise.
>
> (*Serxwebun*, February 1997:12)

By and large, all this contemplation and philosophizing have been reduced to the mere parroting of the concepts of the 'new man' and the 'new way of life' by the 'trunk cadre' of the party at the end of the 1990s. This was probably the main point of departure for Öcalan's instruction from İmrallı prison to convert the organization from a 'party' (PKK) to a 'congress', which was adopted with no opposition[4] at the ordinary party congress (April 2002). Whether or not this will deconstruct the consolidated bureaucratic structure is a question for the future.

### *Coexisting mutation and insistent consistency*

The most recent stance of the PKK on the Kurdish 'case' in Turkey—as articulated by Öcalan from the İmrallı island in the Marmara Sea—has not been articulated in universal terms. In fact, the mutation that the PKK have undergone since Öcalan's arrest is phenomenal. The 'strategic target' of the party has been altered from the *'Turkish colonialism'* of Turkey as a whole to the *'oligarchic structure'* of the dominant 'clique' in the Republic (Öcalan 2000:13, 14). Rather than eliminating Turkish rule in Kurdistan, the incorporation of the PKK into the 'common state'—the 'Democratic Republic'—in the 'common fatherland' has become the principal objective of the party programme. The 'national liberation' of Kurds undertaken at the inception has been converted into the 'democratic solution of the Kurdish question' in loyalty to the territorial integrity of Turkey. The phrase *'democratic liberation'* superseded 'national liberation' throughout the programme, which was adopted by the seventh congress held in mid-January 2000, and kept its place in the programmes of the subsequent congresses.

The party dispensed with all customary *national* objectives to the extent that the presidency council member Nizamettin Taş was to emphasize that the PKK's new programme was less radical than the 'Democratization Programme' of TÜSİAD[5] (live tele-interview on Medya TV, 10 December 2000). The leadership of the party justifies the abandonment of the objectives associated with 'national liberation', arguing that the 'national task' has been accomplished. The phenomenal diversion of the programme from its aims and the justification of this diversion denote that the 'national task' or 'national

liberation' situated in the back of the PKK leadership's minds was actually an affirmation of Kurdish ethno-cultural identity—not an independent state.

Unlike the attitude towards national goals, the party has maintained its socialist ideology and aspirations. The metamorphosed programme of the party has continued to envisage, not an autonomous state of Kurdistan but a greater federation of the peoples of the region: the 'Democratic Union of the Middle East'.

### *General conclusion*

When contemplating the social history of mankind, despite many violent, magnificent, influential and historically diverting revolutions, it seems impossible to evade the fact of a persistent and prevalent *consistency*. From the early stages of civilization onwards, one may confidently state that books have never been sufficient in following evolutionary and revolutionary *changes*, which have structured both the technological and societal body of humanity. Despite these changes, there coexisted three worlds on the single globe:

- the world of rulers,
- the world of sustenance pursuers,
- the world of science.

*The world of rulers* is a world where well-organized, institutionalized bodies control the weaponry, economy and wealth, and where there are no restrictions on the inhabitants' consumption of the material, moral and scientific goods produced by others. *The world of sustenance pursuers* is wherein the masses, the workers in commodity and service production, have the 'chance of achieving freedom of survival' and have some 'privileged' constituents who become capable of observing what has been done to them. In Nietzsche's terms this is the world of the herd. *The world of science* is the one in which all the producers of scientific values of both natural and social studies live in a way unique to them—but essentially in a way of life which resembles that of the inhabitants of the world of the rulers. These second and third worlds may, in a sense, be assessed as one because both they themselves and their products are ruled and controlled by the *first* world.

However, despite the similarity in their subservient position, it is more accurate to classify the world of scientists as a 'grey' world in between the other two, as they bear a close resemblance to the population of the ruling world.

Now, what would be the most general and most accurate interpretation of the PKK as it stands in the light of this study's overall explorations?

Of the most notable conclusions, *first*, is the suggestion that the nationalism of Turkey's Kurds did not develop as a customary one for which an independent nation-state is *sine qua non*. The supporting masses overwhelmingly do not expect an independent Kurdish state from the PKK—even if the party boldly programmed it at its inception. However, the PKK organized the first 'national' Kurdish opposition, which embodied the *detribalization* of the 'nationalization' process. But the PKK itself is not a national organization in the modern sense of nation and nationalism even if its initial programme was a replication of the national liberationist form. The emergence, development and evolution of the PKK's ideological and programmatic nature and the reality of the demographic map of Turkey's Kurdish population have by no means given

rise to a state-building nationalism. It would therefore not be a coherent explanation to define the PKK-led rebellion as a 'Kurdish nationalist movement' in its sociological sense. *Second,* the Kurdish question is not a national or colonial question in the way experienced in the rest of the world. The combined phenomena of Kurdish ethnic existence and the way in which Anatolian Kurdistan was reappropriated by Turkey did not constitute an adequate base for the colonization of a 'proto-nation' and thus of an anti-colonialist national liberation struggle. That is, the 'new' Turkish state had not matured enough to be an imperial-colonialist power and colonize 'her' Kurdistan, nor had the Kurds of Anatolia reached the stage of proto-nation in order to form an effective anti-colonial nationalism. *Third,* the destruction of the most basic elements of the human spiritual structure in the 'person' of Kurdishness—as a result of the fusion of Turkey's self-resembling policy about 'her' Kurdistan based on denial-repression *(inkâr-tenkil)* and the millennial 'intrinsic' property of the pre-feudal Kurds (tribe-treason)—has provided an ideational resource which has featured in the local and universal specificities of the PKK. Accordingly, the successes which engendered the factual ascent of the PKK among other organizations lie in the end results of the philosophy and intensity of the cadre education in conjunction with a vitalized sense of organization-individual linkage. The successes—and failures—of the PKK in bringing about Kurdish opposition in Turkey are fundamentally related to its philosophy of recruitment and organizational diligence, rather than to its scrupulous use of arms or other contextual factors. The form, content and intensity of educational activities give the organization its strength. This 'education war'—concomitant with the contextual tension of Turkey's Kurdish question—produced an igniting Apo charisma.[6] In its originating period, the 'pure form' of this charisma contributed much to the PKK's ability to mobilize the Kurds. The later 'routinized' form of that same charisma has become one of the principal determinants in what is known as the movement's 'shrinkage process'. The organizational shrinkage of the PKK began to occur when the spirit of the re-humanization initiative began to be transformed into the *premature appetite* of the bureaucratic staff under Öcalan's charismatic authority to partake in the joy of the prestigious feelings that power gives. *Finally*, it was found that the substance of the party education—mainly involving Öcalan's talks—embodies a philosophy of human nature (rather than a strictly nationalistic content) in search of the reappropriation of 'human naturalness'. In the party leadership's view, this human naturalness has to be extricated from the plague of civilization's property mechanisms, which apparently have degenerated the humane faculties of man's spiritual structure. However, it ought not to be understood that the intensively worded philosophy depicts the extent of such extrication in the personalities of the cadre body of the organization. And my field research indicates that this is the party's greatest internal contradiction.

The conduct of the study required that I be cautious about the extent to which the party has carried out the leadership's *re-humanization* initiative within the party structure, for the initiative related to my hypothesis. While concentrating on the most decisive internal dynamic of the Kurdish collective action under the PKK, I simultaneously endeavoured to raise the question of whether the movement presents any concrete clues towards structuring a pattern of *emancipatory power*, not just for Kurds and the neighbouring societies of the Middle East but for the whole of humanity. I aimed to assess whether the PKK's initiative presents a step towards breaking a link in the chain of the ruling world

and closing the gap between the other two *ruled* worlds. This was because I found that the 'leadership' of the party, Öcalan, arduously tries to undo the damage and degeneration which humankind has undergone throughout class societies in the person of the 'debased' Kurdish personality in Anatolian Kurdistan 'where humanity itself faded away in its most solid form'. Accordingly, Öcalan has kept defining the 'PKK Movement' in his inculcation talks over 20 years within the framework of universalistic and humanistic aspirations, to the extent that he names his party the 'Humanization Movement'. Nevertheless, these claims might have been—either totally or partly—a vehicle of Kurdish 'nationalism' peculiar to its manner of 'nationalization'. Further, this philosophical approach might be treated or perceived as mere rhetoric, at least by the considerable number of party officials who may be the embryo of a future, novel, local branch of the omnipotent ruling world. I have striven to devote my diligence to retaining a fair balance of scepticism during the study as an inalienable principle of scientific thinking

Deluding others and, more potently, self-delusion could almost be said to have been an instinctive part of human nature in this world of three worlds. Therefore, I have been in pursuit of practical and quantitative measures in order to reach more objective deductions, rather than intuitive conclusions of 'intellectual taste', as Weber stresses.

Within this frame of reference, I have, in general, concluded that the manner of the PKK's organizational performance lies behind the revitalization of the Anatolian Kurds. The *newness* in this organizational performance is associated with the party's philosophy of cadre education devoted to the reacquisition of *human naturalness as a social being*, which has itself determined the organization's successes and failures in operating Kurdish collective action. However, the question of whether this 'newness' contributes towards structuring a pattern of *emancipatory powers* for the two worlds of the *ruled* (the workers of commodity/service production and the producers of scientific values in social/natural disciplines)—whose inhabitants are *equally* alien to their products—remains unanswered. This study did not set out to answer that question, but merely to raise it.

# 8
# Epilogue

## Apparent obscurity

At the twofold—centurial and millennial—bridge of history, Kurds were to introduce a tradition-breaking mutation in the two respective parts of their greater *patrie:* the 'south-east' and 'northern Iraq' are metamorphosing. This study has taken the opportunity to travel in this fruitful field.

The Kurds of Iraq have become familiar with a degree of supra-tribal autonomization. In Turkey, 'mountain Turks' have succeeded in being called 'Kurds' after a blind *denial-silence* dialectic lasting several decades. These days, the Kurds of both parts are simultaneously experiencing an additionally vulnerable episode at the dawn of the third millennium.

### *Relation of northern and southern Kurds*

This study primarily deals with the issue of Kurds in Turkey. The strategy and presentation of the research has been structured accordingly. However, the course of affairs in the South has always, to a considerable degree, been incorporated into Turkey's 'question'. This inter-influence is extending—insofar as America's 'new Iraq' is not stabilized.

During a large part of the past century—especially subsequent to the First World War, which also produced some highly problematic nationstates in the Middle East due to their non-assimilated Kurdish ethnic existence—Kurds under neighbouring states have been almost totally isolated from one another. The present period is also witnessing the break-up of this isolation: the neighbouring peoples of Kurdistan are watching each other more closely than ever. They are becoming more familiar and more concerned with the affairs of their 'counterparts'.

Being aware of the novel aspects of the current situation, these mutual influences/concerns are underdeveloped, contrary to the expectations and claims of the marginal Kurdish nationalist intelligentsia. Despite the reasonably favourable circumstances provided by global changes and the 'newfangled' regional conflicts between the 'sharers' of the Kurds, the inter-concerns of the parts are limited to the *spiritual*. That is, a concrete 'national spirit' does not exist between the 'neighbours'. This is truer of the interrelation between the South and the North. The concerns of the

peoples of the 'parts' of Kurdistan for one another are, in effect, less than 'underdeveloped'. No action is taken by either 'part' on behalf of its 'counterpart'. For instance, while the Kurds of Turkey do not give a hint of a reaction to Öcalan's harsh opposition to the Kurdish autonomization in the South, the Kurds of Iraq similarly did not react when the *peşhmerga* forces of the KDP and PUK performed a co-ordinated offensive with the Turkish army units on the PKK guerrillas in 1992 in the borders of the North.

Kurds in Iraq have undergone an institutionalization in terms of becoming the nation of a nation-state since the Gulf War. With the downfall of Saddam, the de facto construction of Kurdish nationhood has to some degree been legitimized—thanks to being the only indigenous military and civil ally of the coalition forces led by the United States. Turkey's hesitant policies towards US-led operations against Saddam's Iraq had provided a great deal of indirect contribution to the process of Kurdish 'nationalization' in Iraqi Kurdistan. This process, even if it is in slow motion, proceeds in the form of two co-existent contingencies: fragmentation or federalization of Iraq (a unitary Iraq is becoming eliminated from the options). Accordingly, while the current quasi-independent state of the Kurds of northern Iraq is maintained, the double-headed Kurdish leadership endeavours to have an effective share in the rule of the whole of Iraq. Some prominent figures of the KDP and PUK have obtained principal posts in the interim government which will take Iraq to the general elections proposed to be held at the end of 2005. In March 2004, the Iraqi Governing Council signed an interim constitution (the Transitional Administrative Law) which assures a moderate amount of autonomy for Kurds within Iraq. The United Nations resolution passed by the UN Security Council on 8 June 2004, which made no mention of the interim constitution or of Kurdish rights, prompted Barzani and Talabani to produce a warning in a joint letter to President Bush stating that if this is not altered they will consider withdrawal from the interim governing body of Iraq. However, following some 'side' statements—by both US primary sources and Interim Iraqi president Ghazi al-Yawar—emphasizing a federal Iraq and the interim constitution as fundamental law,[1] the Kurdish parliament endorsed the new UN Security Council resolution on Iraq: 'The Kurdish parliament has decided to adopt a positive position towards the UN Security Council resolution because the entire world has expressed its respect for the fundamental law', said Roj Nuri Shawis, a vice-president in Iraq's caretaker government and the Kurdish parliamentary speaker.[2] Despite everything, the 'consistency' in the twin probability regarding the fate of the Kurds in the north of Iraq tends to linger. Although the double-headed state of the Kurdish leadership of the South lingers, the very developments represent a modest 'prosperous tribalism' which, in Gellner's words, 'no-one will dare call it tribalism'. The Kurds of Iraq increasingly appear to either share the rule of the whole of Iraq as one of the two main ethnic entities or end up with a late/weak 'independent' nation-state. Without a doubt, this is a fresh facet in the history of Kurdish *ethnie*, and this freshness will engender more reciprocal impact between the 'other' Kurds.

On the release of Kurdish MPs (9 June 2004), the Turkish media has, so to speak, rediscovered the 'question' of Kurds in Turkey with noticeably fresh elements of arguments: The conversion of "Iraqi Kürdistan" into Kurdistan of Turkey with a self-contained self-determination may well bring pivotal changes in terms of an ease in peace in the region.'[3] On Talabani's visit to Turkey (22 June 2004), the words of Abdullah Gül,

the foreign minister, were evasive, their sentiments not having been expressed previously in the statements of the Turkish officials on the future of Iraqi Kurds: 'Federation is in general the bridge to independence, but a federation may well be the only barrier to prevent independence.' The subsequent news scattered to the Turkish media highlighted the change of Turkey's 'red line', and hence Turkey will not oppose a probable Kurdish Federation in Iraq.[4]

At the same time, the Turkish media 'discovered' the Kurdish-Israeli collaboration and headlined some words of an unnamed former Israeli 'official': 'We love Turkey, but we must also keep on pressuring Iran. Kurds are the only entity that is near the USA and stands up fit. The only question is how to balance this with Turkey.'[5] The newly found Israeli direct involvement in Kurdish affairs tends to contribute further convolution to the existing multifariousness. Henri Barkey, who was on the State Department's policy planning staff between 1998 and 2000, takes the matter seriously: 'Conspiracy theories abound. One has it that thousands of Israelis are buying up chunks of northern Iraq to establish a self-ruling Kurdish entity or just to control the area's oil resources. The currency given such theories is odd but telling…'[6] Thus, the US vacillates 'between not riling Turkish sensitivities and its moral commitment to the Kurds', and, in consequence, the former Middle East consultant joins the 'balancing' works—while advising the Americans to act quickly:

> A robust, autonomous Kurdish entity in northern Iraq is in Ankara's interests for two simple reasons. As counterintuitive as it may seem to the Turkish establishment, a strong friendship with such a federal state would go a long way toward diffusing Turkish Kurds' anger at Ankara… John Negroponte, the new US ambassador to Iraq, should begin his trip to his new post by stopping over in Ankara for a chat. He should not be bashful about discussing a joint US-Turkish umbrella over a democratically ruled northern Iraq. Paradoxically, it is only such reassurance that would convince the Iraqi Kurds not to seek complete independence any time soon.[7]

Based on the pressing developments in the South, Öcalan's position, with his increasing involvement in his *Meeting Notes* and *Defenses*, prepares for an undetected reverse. Added to his arduous efforts to convince the secularist/Kemalist 'core' of the state to make a settlement within the 'borders' of a Democratic Republic, Öcalan identifies some 'fronts' that are retaking positions in the Middle East contiguous to the Kurdish compound. A passage of the unpublished 'volume' of the *Defences* provides an interesting introduction to this particular reverse:

> It has already unfolded that there will be three forces contesting over Kurdistan. The first is USA, Israel and their collaborator Kurds. The second is the Turkish, Iranian and Arabic status-quo powers with some Kurdish militias and tribalist-comprador bourgeois combination. The third party is The PKK line which is rather composed of destitute, labourer, patriotic-democrat people.[8]

Equally striking, as a newly worded aspect contradicting his İmrallı prison stance, he warns Turkey and Turks by a 'probable' reduction of the fronts into two by bringing the 'patriotic-democrat' and 'collaborator' Kurds together under the USA-led coalition, including his party-led front:

> If a democratic dialogue does not occur, the preference of the Kurds will be a dash of great freedom… If the Turkish, Iranian and Arab rulers do not carry out their Kurdish reforms, varying *collaborations* at any level may rise between the patriotic-democrat Kurds and *imperialism's collaborator* Kurds. All Kurds may well take part in the US-led coalition as a result. If it cannot have the chance of a concession, it ought to be *expected* that the PKK-led Kurds too may develop their relationships with the coalition forces on the basis of a ceasefire and a democratic solution (emphases added).[9]

Öcalan took a consistent line in opposing the southern Kurds' 'primitive nationalism' under the KDP and the PUK—after his imprisonment in İmrallı. Such an 'expectation' of him is an over-sharp refutation of his previously held stance towards 'imperialism's Kurds'. Whether this 'sparkling newness' will soon depict the arrived stance as a customary menace to Turkey or as a move of Öcalan's pragmatic style is to be a significant question of the near future.

### *The PKK's latest scene*

In the 'North', the case of Turkey's Kurds is undergoing a respective shaky juncture nowadays. Even if the nature of the shakiness qualitatively differs from the South in terms of nationalist content, the scale of volatile changes appears to be escalating.

At the start of June 2004, KONGRA-GEL (the latest organizational name/form of the PKK) declared the *undeclared* five-year unilateral cease-fire 'obsolete' as they claimed that Turkey's military operations against the limited remaining guerrilla forces within the borders had been accelerated since early spring. In fact, there existed no five-year cease-fire but an end to the 'armed struggle'. The PKK withdrew its guerrilla forces from the Turkish-ruled part of Kurdistan (outside Turkish borders) in August 1999 on a particular instruction released from İmrallı prison by Abdullah Öcalan. This decision was taken because of fundamental strategic alterations to the aims and objectives of the party, based on Öcalan's *Defences*. Thereby, the programme—and subsequently the name—of the organization was changed accordingly.[10] In other words, the decision and withdrawal were not a tactical step but a major strategic reverse in the history of the PKK for, they believed, the armed struggle had accomplished its mission. The organization, however, decided to re-enter its forces into Turkey at its extraordinary congress held in late May 2004, and noticeable clashes have already taken place in several locations deep inside the borders with a death toll of over three hundred between the dates of 1 June and 28 September 2004. Thus, the 'obsolescence' of the unilateral cease-fire denotes the 'return' of the armed struggle. This stands as one of the two, so to say, confidential newnesses in the 'line' of Öcalan's İmrallı standpoint in terms of the remoulding of his organization: the other is the 're-foundation' talks of Meeting Notes in early 2004. (Although Öcalan

states that 'the essence of the reconstruction of the PKK is obvious',[11] he does not describe what he actually means by this.)

Ironically enough, the four Kurdish former MPs (Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Doğan and Selim Sadak), imprisoned since 1994, were released (9 June 2004) whilst the clashes restarted following a five-year quiet and hope-giving period. On the same day—no one knows whether it is coincidence or not—the state-run radio-television institution TRT (Turkish Radio Television) inaugurated broadcast in the Kurdish language broke the over-eighty-year blind denial tradition. (The very language had been 'scientifically demonstrated' by many Turkish professors as either a dialect of mountain Turkish or a mixture of Turkish, Arabic and Persian.) It has, nevertheless, been presented under a programme entitled *'Kültürel Zenginliklerimiz'* (Our Cultural Richness). Thus, 'the uncertain direction of the contemporary Kurdish rights movement in Turkey' continues to be one of the most fretful items of the upcoming agenda.[12] Everyone is now searching for the real direction: back to mutual violence or speeding up with democratization, or a mixture of both until an obscurer dead end.

The prominent commentators of the Turkish media are preoccupied with identical questions concerning the *apparent obscurity* within both the state and the PKK.[13] However, they are all more certain when underlining Öcalan's position as the 'indisputable agent' of resolutions relating to the organization and, in consequence, the 'question' of the Kurds in Turkey. M.Ali Birand in particular, whose articles are simultaneously published in a number of principal Turkish daily papers *(Posta, Hürriyet, Milliyet, Turkish Daily News)*, points at the 'unspoken negotiations'—which in effect are palpable to all and sundry—and couples Öcalan's 'most realistic approach' with the state's 'silent approval' of Öcalan's obvious command of the PKK from the İmrallı prison under the direct rule of the army.[14]

Relating one of the major arguments of this book, it is becoming clearer that the 'question' of Turkey's Kurds is by no means a 'national' one—of those who aspire to a nation-state of a national market—but an 'identity-seeking movement'. The 'solution' to the 'question' is redefined in terms of the basic ethnic-cultural rights of the Kurdish-speaking population, noticeably louder subsequent to the release of the former Kurdish MPs.[15] A recently conducted sequence of interviews (encompassing eight mayors of the Kurdish-populated towns and cities, 12 prominent politicians, five writers, three lecturers, four lawyers and one musician) is fairly telling. Without exception, the versions of solutions of the constitutional recognition of the Kurdish identity within the 'borders' of Turkey's democratization process and of her territorial dignity stand out as the 'common playground'.[16] Further, not only independent or foreign commentators but both legal and illegal 'branches' of the PKK put more emphasis—and more frequently—on a solution based on the ethnic-cultural rights of Kurds within Turkey's National Pact *(Misak-ı Milli)* borders. On the release day, Leyla Zana performed a brief—and dense—speech. In her speech, which was broadcast live by the foremost Turkish national TV channels, Zana produced a well-structured temperate memo: *'A Turkey whose internal questions are solved will be the star of her region.'* Nobel Prize nominee Zana also highlighted that the past hostilities need to be left behind to provide a secure base for the fraternity of Turks and Kurds in a unitary Turkey. The next day, the spokesmen of the outlawed branches of the organization released similar messages.

More interestingly, Öcalan refers to the 'ruling party's (AKP)[17] attempts at taking the control of the [Turkish] state' with the backing of Barzani and Talabani for, he claims, they are based on the common order of dervishes *(Nakşibendi Tarikatı)*.[18] Öcalan, in his most recent 'Meeting Notes', increasingly refers to the approaching 'threat' from the South: 'They will want to inflame [Kurdish] nationalism… Talabani and Barzani are dangerous. They are so ignoble. Arafat's nationalism is more valuable than theirs. Their nationalism is primitive nationalism… My inheritance cannot be used for nationalism…,'[19] With such aggressive opposition to Kurdish nationalism—which is actually executing de facto independence in southern Kurdistan—Öcalan continues to maintain his 'indispensable' charisma nonetheless.

The intensive 'three-front' attacks from liberal-antimilitarist leftists, Islamic fundamentalists and Kurdish nationalists have not produced a noticeable effect in terms of getting around the 'uncompromising' Öcalan and his mass-based charisma. The attempts at all previous elections that the alternatives to the PKK made in the past decade were in vain: the percentages of the votes kept hitting considerably under 1 per cent. The oppositions raised by the groupings gathered around some Internet sites or journals did not yet go beyond banal 'critiques' rather dominated by impertinent or similar mortifying expressions.[20]

The oppositions from within the organization have always been doomed to escape for survival. The most recent fracture among the entrepreneur members of the organization, which even ignited major hopes in the United States, culminated in a 'friendless' flight of the two senior leading figures of the 'inner opposition'. The opposition, at first, emerged with a comprehensive declaration signed by some 30 prominent members—including several former PKK Central Committee and the KADEK Presidency Council members (one of which was Öcalan's brother Osman Öcalan). At first glance, this was a bright novelty in terms of both form and content in comparison with all past attempts: this opposition was evidently distinct in quality and quantity, and its critiques of the policies and activities of the organization were not shaped by a demeaning structure but rather by an assertive-to-achieve flavour which also covered a confessional selfcritique. A further striking difference is that, they, unlike all preceding opposers, underscored their 'loyalty to the party leadership' (Abdullah Öcalan): 'Our approach means, if the Leadership [Apo] says "you die" we will die; "you live" we will live, but we will not allow those who guide the organization to wither away.'[21] Based on one mainstay message, the leadership's instruction through his lawyers was to end the 'home' struggle: 'They are worse than one another. You [both parties] must come together and must work together.' Following the instruction, the organization, KONGRA-GEL, held an extraordinary congress in late May 2004 on Mount Kandil. In the congress, the leading figures of both sides presented their 'self-critique' and converged on the 'line of the Leadership [A.Öcalan]'. However, at the end of the congress, the 'First Man' (Osman Öcalan) and the 'Second Man' (Nizamettin Taş) of the opposition left the congress field.[22]

Afterwards, followed by several weeks of silence, the friendless flight emerged as a group of 'solution'. The group, led by several former prominent figures of the early PKK, uncovered itself as opposing KONGRA-GEL's uncompromising 'primitive-left' policies that leave no passage to co-operate with the United States and Iraqi Kurds. Then, the leading names of the group began to release various articles through a website[23] engaged with defining—and justifying—themselves by gathering the principal points of the split.

After a short period under the 'Party Building Committee', the dissidents declared a party called PWD.[24] Through the website articles, the 'line' of the group gradually metamorphosed into an intransigent 'anti-Öcalan' flavour—indifferent with all preceding dissidents. However, the opposition did not go beyond the close-circuit of website articles and notices. No signs of any public advocators are yet found among the Kurds of Turkey.

In the meantime, the fate of the initially different oppositional 'dash' tends to be an extension of all previous challenges.

Overall, no indications which may point at dissolution of Öcalan-PKK 'accord' exist in the Kurdish opposition in Turkey—at least in the medium-term. At least as difficult, the isolation of the Öcalan-led Kurdish opposition from the settlement of Turkey's 'question' seems, at present, not feasible. For example, Abdullah Öcalan names the two released former MPs, Zana and Dicle, from the direct military-ruled İmrallı prison, to be nominated as deputy presidents of the KONGRA GEL[25] while the mentioned names do not pronounce a denunciation of Öcalan's nomination. Turkey finds no *reason* to initiate a dialogue—direct or indirect—with the PKK or its renamed entities. The Kurds of Turkey find no way to search for an alternative organizational entity to express their real cultural, political and economic needs. This represents the presently dominating scene of the 'question' of the northern Kurds under Turkey and the PKK

### *Fate at the junction: democratization of Turkey or Iraqization of her 'south-east'?*

One of the main concerns of this study has been the primary causes of the PKK's shrinkage: how has it come to the present shaky position? I have thus attempted a retrospective penetration into the questions of the organization while taking its internal dynamics on board. My central objective has been to facilitate understanding of the likely outcomes with regard to the fate of the PKK. This, nonetheless, is not the only goal of this research. The other is to stimulate sociological questions with regard to the future of the PKK—to visualize the impending contingencies.

The organization's shrinkage—if not marginalization yet—is an indisputable fact. The 'reformist wing' of the reunited KONGRA-GEL conceded it by providing figures on the number of guerrillas and the mass-support:

> The number of guerrillas, which was 13,000 in 1993, had fallen to 8,500 in 1998. In other words, the dwindling was 40 percent… The growth of the guerrilla had stopped; the percentage of recruitment was not enough to meet half of the losses. The political *serihildans* had been reduced to some events on specific annual days.[26]

The fact of the organization's overall existence, despite everything, will have an undeniable impact on the future tendencies of the Kurds of 'south-east' Turkey in the presence of autonomization of the Kurds of Iraq at their very side. Even if the decline in the PKK's political and military capability is substantial, the remaining entity is by no means insignificant. In the local election held in December 1995, the factually recognized legal representative of the organization polled 4.31 per cent of the valid votes in the whole of Turkey. While the percentage scarcely increased (to 4.75) in the local elections

of April 1999, in the general elections of November 2002 it rose to 6.23 per cent. Finally, the graphic of percentage has fallen down to the 'fours' (4.9) in almost fourteen months, 28 March 2004.[27] However, in about a dozen of the Kurdish-populated cities and many other surrounding counties, the legal parties—in different names—of the organization kept polling the largest share of votes in most of them, and the second largest in the rest. The ethnic movement retains its major mass-base. The promptness of mass mobilization following the release of the MPs, re-demonstrated this fact. In this regard, Birand, the 'multiwriter' of the Turkish press, names the PKK as the 'only finalizing power of Kurdish politics in Turkey'. He refers to the extent of mass participation and the dominant mass chanting in favour of Abdullah Öcalan during the series of 'Peace and Democracy Meetings' organized by DEHAP in the region, following the release of Zana and her friends.[28] Another prominent expert, Hasan Cemal, the author of the much-lauded book *Kürtler,* warned everyone by drawing attention to the extent of the PKK's remaining capability of mobilizing the Kurdish masses: 'The masses are overloading the public squares of the south-east with Leyla Zana and her friends. They are becoming vehement with Apo slogans. The wave of Kurdish nationalism is puffing up yet again.'[29] At the above-mentioned Diyarbakır meeting, the pinnacle of the vehemence was recorded when Hatip Dicle named Öcalan as the 'architect' of the five-year peace period. Some observers are also pointing at the 'hardcore' of the Kurdish settlement in Turkey due to the unignorable pressure of the grass-roots movement which 'openly celebrate[s] Öcalan as "our president" and make[s] no secret of the fact that they would vote for the PKK (or its successor) given the chance'.[30]

Most recently, in the latest 'Meeting Notes' (18 February-7 April) recorded from İmrallı prison, Öcalan gives explicit instructions for the re-foundation of the PKK. In fact, he gives instructions for a 'new PKK' because it was dissolved and replaced by KADEK in April 2002 and later by KONGRA-GEL in November 2003. Looking back to the over-five years of Öcalan's imprisonment, this is another apparent contradiction in his post-arrest standpoint. Throughout his *Defences* of thousands of pages, Öcalan's clear and repeated statements do not leave space for the least doubt: The PKK has accomplished its mission; if it does not overcome [itself] it will be overcome.' And accordingly, the party dissolved in 2002.

What has changed since then? What has brought Öcalan back to square one? Is 'reincarnation' of the PKK possible?

Without doubt, circumstances are changing, and many changes have taken place in the past few years. The point is, Öcalan does not mention anything which implies the cause/causes that have led him from 'there' to 'here'. What the gradual rise of tension in Öcalan's language of the past several 'Meeting Notes' tells us is that his confidence in the remaining PKK's capability of leading the Kurdish mass in Turkey did come to an end and had done so for some considerable length of time. In effect, Öcalan's proposal for a 'new PKK' is not a rebirth of his 'original' party or, as it were, a reincarnation of the PKK of the early 1980s, but 'an ideological and philosophical movement'.[31] That is, according to the 'Preparatory Rebuilding Committee', the new PKK is to be an intellectual leading entity rather than a national liberationist party, which will exclude both the use of force and 'statist-nationalist' aspirations.

As the initial reaction to the division within his remaining organization, Öcalan stated that it is a power struggle because, he believes, his leading comrades have lost their hopes

from himself. As a matter of fact, whether he has lost hope in the 'remaining' leading figures or they have lost hope in him—or both parties (Öcalan and his co-founder comrades) have mutually lost their hopes of one another—are yet fairly unclear. This is a matter of further scholarly investigations.

What is clear is that the considerably shrunken—but lingering—organization is at a vulnerable crossroad and the PKK cannot be reborn after all: it will either remilitarize (and gradually marginalize) or civilize and will thereby evolve into political and cultural entities in Turkey and her Kurdistan. According to the ascendancy of either option, the 'crossroad' will guide the region towards the democratization of Turkey or the Iraqization of her 'south-east'.

The current research reached two main conclusions: one sociological, the other, political. In terms of the source—and the 'how' of the mobilizations of the source (Kurdish masses in Turkey)—the findings of the research advised us to contemplate on the society's internal dynamics on which the party worked through its organizational micro-education. The Kurdish masses, of course, did not adopt the phenomenon because of a reading of sophisticated investigations into the organization, but do not seem to overlook the *difference* between the Apo-led PKK and the previous '28 revolts' and the other nationalist groupings. The difficulty with the unignorable mass-support for the PKK experienced by Turkey and the West, which is coupled with the 'indispensability' of Öcalan, stems from such a 'quantitative' piece of evidence—a promptly mobilizable mass-base. As a second major outcome, in terms of the organization's strategic objectives and people's expectations of the organization, I concluded that the PKK-led 'cause' of the Kurdish populace in the Republic of Turkey is not a national one but an archetype of '*identity* liberation movement' for which a nation-state is not sine qua non but a forthcoming peril. It is thus, in spite of Öcalan's bold 'surrender' (the total abandonment of aims and objectives of a classical nationalist movement such as independence, federalism or semi-autonomous rule, the unkind and undisguised opposition to the Kurdish autonomization in northern Iraq), that the undeniable majority of the Kurdish masses continue to back the PKK—under any name—and the 'president Öcalan'. It is probably because of that, US ambassador to Ankara Eric Edelman 'reassured', that the US does not anticipate a direct military operation against the PKK in the near future[32]—even if American policy-makers are pretty quick to repeat that the organization is a terrorist organization with whatever name and changes it produces.

Representing the overwhelming portion of the *active* sociopolitical entity, a considerable proportion of the Kurds in Turkey do not intend to give up on 'Apo' and his PKK. With an 'unforged' reception of the fact, the US and Turkey, the sensitively assenting and conflicting partners on this particular phenomenon, are not yet apt to 'socialize' with *their* terrorists when tackling *their* 'question' of Kurds. This is the current actuality of the lingering close circuit in Turkey's Kurdish spectacle.

The future is foreseeable to some extent: of course, the extent of visibility may occasionally be reduced depending on the conditions of the weather.

# Tables

*Table 1* Enumeration of the respondents

| *Total respondents 184* | *Age groups* | | | | *Education level* | | | | *Marital status* | | | | *Sex* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *20* | *20–29* | *30–40* | *+40* | *Primary* | *Secondary* | *High school* | *University* | *Married* | *Single* | *Widowed* | *Separated* | *M* | *F* | |
| Metropolitan | 4 | 29 | 32 | 28 | 27 | 15 | 16 | 35 | 56 | 31 | 3 | 3 | 78 | 15 | |
| Native region (Diyarbakir) | 13 | 28 | 32 | 18 | 17 | 10 | 34 | 30 | 56 | 32 | 1 | 2 | 68 | 23 | |
| Total | 17 | 57 | 64 | 46 | 44 | 25 | 50 | 65 | 112 | 63 | 4 | 5 | 146 | 38 | |

*Table 2* Is the PKK a national liberation party for the Kurds? (question 16)

| *Education level* | *Administrator* | | | *Member+sympathizer* | | | *Sub-total* | *Total* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Yes* | *No* | *No answer* | *Yes* | *No* | *No answer* | | *Yes* | *No* |
| University and high school | 7 | 8 | – | 69 | 28 | 3 | 115 | 76 (66%) | 36 (31.3%) |
| Secondary, primary and less | 14 | 6 | 2 | 39 | 7 | 1 | 69 | 53 (76.8%) | 13 (18.8%) |
| Total | 21 | 14 | 2 | 108 | 35 | 4 | 184 | 129 (70.1%) | 49 (26.6%) |

*Table 3* Is the PKK a nationalist party? (question 31)

| *Education level* | *Administrator* | | | *Member+sympathizer* | | | *Sub-total* | *Total* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Yes* | *No* | *No answer* | *Yes* | *No* | *No answer* | | *Yes* | *No* |
| University and high school | – | 15 | – | 3 | 96 | 1 | 115 | 3 (2.6%) | 111 (96.5%) |
| Secondary, primary and less | 2 | 18 | 2 | 1 | 45 | 1 | 69 | 3 (4.3%) | 63 (91.3%) |
| Total | 2 | 33 | 2 | 4 | 141 | 2 | 184 | 6 (3.2%) | 174 (94.5%) |

*Table 4* What quality of the PKK comes first for you? (question 17)

| *Education level* | *Administrator* | | | *Member+sympathizer* | | | *Other* | *Sub-total* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Nationalist* | *Socialist* | *Social and national emancipationist* | *Nationalist* | *Socialist* | *Social and national emancipationist* | | *N* | *S* | *NS* |
| University and high school | – | 5 | 10 | 2 | 17 | 80 | 1 | 2 (1.7%) | 22 (19%) | 90 (78%) |
| Secondary, primary and less | 1 | 5 | 16 | 1 | 10 | 34 | 2 | 2 (3%) | 15 (21%) | 50 (72.4%) |
| Total | 1 | 10 | 26 | 3 | 27 | 114 | 3 | 4 (2.1%) | 37 (20%) | 140 (76%) |

*Table 5* Who do you believe the PKK struggles for? (question 19)

| *Education level* | *Kurds* | *Peoples of Anatolia* | *Middle East peoples* | *Other* | *Sub-total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| University and high school | 18 (15.6%) | 18 (16.6%) | 65 (56.6%) | 14 (21.1%) | 115 |
| Secondary, primary and less | 16 (23.1%) | 12 (16.6%) | 35 (56.6%) | 6 (21.1%) | 69 |
| Total | 34 (18.4%) | 30 (16.3%) | 100 (54.3%) | 20 (10.8%) | 184 |

*Table 6* Which power/powers of these do you think that the PKK fights against? (question 20)

| *Education level* | *Turkey* | *Turkey and USA* | *Turkey and Europe* | *Turkey USA and Europe* | *Conquerors of Kurdistan* | *Against all* | *Sub-total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| University and high school | 12 (10.4%) | 6 (5.2%) | – | 47 (40.8%) | 8 (6.9%) | 42 (36.5%) | 115 |
| Secondary, primary and less | 12 (17.3%) | 9 (13%) | – | 24 (34.7%) | 8 (11.5%) | 16 (23.1%) | 69 |
| Total | 24 (13%) | 15 (8.1%) | – | 71 (38.5%) | 16 (8.6%) | 58 (31.5%) | 184 |

*Table 7* Do you remember when you first became aware of your nationality? (question 28)

| *Education level* | *Diyarbakir* | | | *Metropolitan towns* | | | *Sub-total (yes) %* | *Sub-total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Yes* | *No* | *Sub total no answer* | *Yes* | *No* | *Average age of awareness (yes)* | | |
| University and high school | 53 | 9 | 6 | 38.00 | 9 | 15.47 | 91 (79%) | 115 |
| Secondary, primary and less | 26 | 1 | 2 | 31.00 | 9 | 18.58 | 57 (82.6%) | 69 |
| Total | 79 | 10 | 8 | 69.00 | – | – | 148 (80.4%) | 184 |
| Average age of awareness | 15.6 | – | – | 16.86 | | – | – | – |

*Table 8* Do you remember when you first realized that you belonged to a tribe? (question 29)

| *Education level* | *Diyarbakir* | | | *Metropolitan towns* | | | | *Sub-total* | *Total (yes)* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Yes* | *No* | *Not belong* | *Yes* | *No* | *Not belong* | *No answer* | | |
| University and high school | 14.0 | 32 | 18 | 14.0 | 26 | 7 | 4 | 115 | 28 (24.3%) |
| Secondary, primary and less | 6.0 | 18 | 3 | 11.0 | 21 | 8 | 2 | 69 | 21 (30.4%) |
| Total | 20.0 | 50 | 21 | 25.0 | – | 15 | 6 | 184 | 49 (26.6%) |
| Average age of awareness | 10.8 | – | – | 13.4 | – | – | – | – | – |

*Table 9* Do you think that the PKK has fallen into decline in last few years? (question 26)

| *Education level* | *Administrator* | | *Member+sympathizer* | | *Total* | | *(Yes)* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *Yes* | *No* | *Yes* | *No* | *No answer* | *Yes* | *No* | |
| University and high school | 2 | 13 | 14 | 85 | 1 | 16 | 98 (85%) | The dominant cause given among the many various answers: *lack of cadre education* |
| Secondary, primary and less | 2 | 20 | 1 | 46 | – | 3 | 66 (95%) | |
| Total | 4 (2.1%) | 33 (18%) | 15 (8%) | 131 (71%) | 1 | 19 (10%) | 164 (89%) | |

*Table 10* What is the most fundamental cause of the PKK's success? (question 24)

| *Education level* | *Leader* | *Ideology* | *Lifestyle* | *Discipline* | *Armed struggle* | *Other* | *Sub-total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| University and high school | 35+21 56 (48.6%) | 21 (18.2%) | 5 (4.3%) | 12 (10.4%) | 9 (7.8%) | 12 (10.4%) | 115 (62.5%) |
| Secondary, primary and less | 19+18 37 (53.6%) | 15 (21.7%) | 3 (4.3%) | 7 (10.1%) | 5 (7.2%) | 2 (2.8%) | 69 (37.5%) |
| Total | 93 (50.5%) | 36 (19.5%) | 8 (4.3%) | 19 (10.3%) | 14 (7.6%) | 14 (7.6%) | 185 (100%) |

*Table 11* How did you become sympathetic to the PKK? (question 11)

| *Through a friend* | *Through an activist* | *Through the leader* | *Through observations* | *Through publications* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 17 (9.2%) | 23 (12.5%) | 45 (24.4%) | 70 (38.04%) | 29 (15.7%) | 184 (100%) |

*Table 12* What was the actual cause which urged the USA to hand over Öcalan over to Turkey? (question 33)

| *The growth of the PKK* | *The decline of the PKK* | *The faults of the Europe branch* | *Other* | *No answer* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 148 (80.4%) | 1 (0.5%) | 16 (8.6%) | 16 (8.6%) | 3 (1.6%) | 184 (100%) |

*Table 13* How do you see the future of the PKK after its being deprived of its leader, Öcalan? (question 11)

| *Continue to grow* | *Continue to decline* | *Survive* | *Revive* | *Other* | *No answer* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 146 (79.3%) | 1 (0.5%) | 17 (9.2%) | 14 (7.6%) | 4 (2.1%) | 2 | 184 (100%) |

*Table 14* Are there similarities between the PKK and carriers of preceding Kurdish insurgencies? (question 32)

| *Education level* | *Yes* | *No* | *No answer* | *If yes, in respect of* | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | *National demands* | *Organizational structure* | *Leadership* | *Fighting for freedom* | *Other* | *Subtotal* |
| University and high school | 46 (40%) | 67 (58%) | 2 | 21 (45.6%) | – | 4 (8.6%) | 18 (39.1%) | 4 | 115 |
| Secondary, primary and less | 30 (43%) | 32 (46%) | 7 | 10 (33.3%) | 1 | 2 (6.6%) | 17 (56.6%) | – | 69 |
| Total | 76 (41%) | 99 (53%) | 9 | 31 (40%) | 1 | 6 (7.8%) | 36 (47.3%) | 4 | 184 |

*Table 15* What is your main expectation of the PKK? (question 15)

| *Solving Kurdish question* | *Preserving humane values* | *Success in reaching the goal* | *Continuity of the struggle (determination)* | *Struggle for socialism* | *Free man and society* | *Other* | *Total* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 63 (34.2%) | 11 (6%) | 46 (25%) | 25 (3.5%) | 5 (2.7%) | 3 (1.6%) | 31 (16.8%) | 184 |

*Table 16* How would you briefly define the ultimate end of the PKK? (question 21)

| *National liberation* | *In socialist terms* | *In humane terms* | *Democratic republic* | *United and independent Kurdistan* | *Independent and socialist Kurdistan* | *Equality and fraternity of peoples* | *Other* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 54 (29.3%) | 15 (8.1%) | 21 (11.4%) | 11 (6%) | 22 (11.9%) | 8 (4.3%) | 30 (16.3%) | 23 (12.5%) |

*Table 17* What is the most innovative feature of the PKK? (question 22)

| *Freedom, democracy, peace* | *Democratic republic* | *Renewal, continuity of struggle* | *Contemporary socialism* | *Approach to women* | *Collective presidency* | *Lifestyle* | *Other* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21 (11.4%) | 16 (8.7%) | 49 (26.6%) | 6 (3.2%) | 8 (4.3%) | 4 (2.1%) | 14 (7.6%) | 66 (36%) |

*Table 18* In as few words as possible, how would you define the PKK? (question 27)

| *In national terms* | *In humane terms* | *In socialist terms* | *In socialist-nationalist terms* | *In terms of lifestyle* | *Freedom lovers, movement* | *Other* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 33 (18%) | 29 (15.7%) | 24 (13%) | 24 (13%) | 4 (2.1%) | 7 (3.8%) | 63 (34.2%) |

*Table 19* A daily timetable of party education

| *Morning (a.m.)* | | *Afternoon/evening (p.m.)* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waking up | 7.00 | Sessions | 2.00–3.15 |
| Breakfast | 7.30 | | 3.30–4.45 |
| Sessions | 8.00–9.15 | | 5.00–6.00 |
| | 9.30–10.45 | Dinner | 6.00–7.45 |
| | 11.00–12.00 | | 7.45–9.00 |
| Lunch | 12.00–14.00 | | 9.15–10.30 |
| | | Free discussions | 10.30–12.00 |

*Table 20* A list of Öcalan's published works

| *Title* | *Date* | *Pages* |
|---|---|---|
| A Militant Personality in a People's War | 1994 | 552 |
| About Organization | 1983 | 229 |
| Collaboration, Treason and Revolutionary Resistance | 1993 | 461 |
| History is Concealed in Our Time and We Are in the Commencement of History | 1997 | 402 |
| How Man Ought to Live?—I | 1995 | 238 |
| How Man Ought to Live?—II | 1996 | 340 |
| Kurdish Love (How Man Ought to Live?—III) | 1999 | 210 |
| I Look For a Negotiator | 1994 | 392 |
| Insistence on Socialism is Insistence on Becoming a Human Being | 1998 | 251 |
| Letters | 1998 | 320 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Political Report to the 4th Congress | 1992 | 250 |
| Political Report to the 5th Congress | 1995 | 340 |
| Political Report to the 7th Congress of the PKK | 2000 | 66 |
| Questions of Socialism and Revolution | 1992 | 365 |
| Selected Interviews—I | 1994 | 394 |
| Selected Interviews—II | 1995 | 288 |
| Selected Interviews—III | 1996 | 395 |
| Selected Writings—I | 1986 | 312 |
| Selected Writings—II | 1986 | 348 |
| Selected Writings—III | 1988 | 356 |
| Selected Writings—IV | 1989 | 342 |
| Selected Writings—V | 1992 | 439 |
| Selected Writings—VI | 1995 | 464 |
| The ‘Special War’ in Kurdistan | 1987 | 284 |
| The Cease-fire and its Reflections | 1993 | 368 |
| The Colonialist Republic Is Dirty and Guilty | 1996 | 340 |
| The Fascism of 12 September and the Resistance of the PKK | 1991 | 523 |
| The Guide of Life and the Army | 1996 | 403 |
| The Initial Talks | 1999 | 258 |
| The Kurdish Patriotism and Our Duties | 1992 | 628 |
| The Language and Action of the Revolution | 1996 | 336 |
| The Liquidating of Liquidation | 1993 | 525 |
| The Manifesto of Democratic Solutions to the Kurdish Question | 1999 | 166 |
| The Manifesto of Freedom: Zilan | 1999 | 103 |
| The People’s Heroism in Kurdistan | 1994 | 296 |
| The People’s War and Guerrillas in Kurdistan | 1991 | 586 |
| The Perspectives of Victory | 1996 | 142 |
| The Questions of Progression in the PKK and Our Duties | 1994 | 308 |
| The Reality of Leadership and the Experience of PKK—I | 1992 | 381 |
| The Reality of Leadership and the Experience of PKK—II | 1992 | 362 |
| The Role of Coercion in Kurdistan | 1983 | 316 |
| The Talks of 3rd Congress | 1993 | 490 |
| The Talks of the PKK Prison Conference | 1994 | 345 |
| The Talks of Rome | 1999 | 334 |
| The Woman and Family in Kurdistan | 1992 | 388 |
| Transformation Process and Tasks | 2000 | 204 |
| Turkish State and the Reality of Leadership in the PKK | 1992 | 194 |
| We Will Change the Countenance of the Middle East | 1994 | 367 |
| | Total pages: | 16,501 |

# Appendix 1

Please do not answer the questions before reading the following instructions

1 The questions I constructed below are for proposed field research of my doctorate study in political sociology (in the University of Kent at Canterbury, UK) on the subject of 'Democratization and Ethnicity Related Questions in Turkey'.

2 These questions that you are going to attempt to answer *are not* for the purpose of examining your intellectual ability but of reaching the most accurate empirical data in the research. Consequently, the answer that expresses yourself most is the answer that the research looks for. For example, an answer such as 'I don't know' or 'I don't understand' will also be a valuable data for the research.

3 The questions or your answers are not for a survey aiming propaganda or political activity but a scientific inquiry into the phenomenon in order to explore, analyse and identify as it occurs or exists. The matter, here, is not writing something either against or for the party but discovering the most reliable reality of the phenomenon. In addition, the most accurate answers will eventually, I think, be beneficial to the party.

4 When I constructed the questionnaire, I strove to refrain from asking confidential information. You may consider some questions as an attempt at the invasion of privacy. However, it is not necessary to answer such questions.

5 The information in your answers *will not be used against* either an individual or an institution. I will use it *for reaching some scientific conclusions* which may contribute to the resolution of a social problem.

Consequently, the most accurate answers and information you will give without 'damaging your childish innocence' will be the most significant empirical contribution to the research.

Many thanks, with regards

*Ali Kemal Özcan*
*Canterbury—1999*

**Questionnaire**

The Province/District .....

1 Age: .....
2 Place of Birth: .....
3 Sex: M ☐ F ☐
4 Marital status: Single ☐ Married ☐ Widow ☐ Divorced ☐ Separated ☐
5 Education: None ☐ Primary ☐ Secondary ☐ High ☐ University ☐ Post-grad ☐
6 Occupation: .....
7 Monthly net income: .....
8 Nationality: .....
9 Live here since: .....

10 What was it first that drew your attention and made you interested in the PKK?
.....
.....

11 How did you first become sympathetic to the party? **(you may tick two)** Through: a friend ☐ an activist of the party ☐ sympathy for its leader Apo ☐ observations ☐ reading its publications ☐ an experience (write below) ☐ Other ☐ specify: .....
.....
.....

12 What year did you begin to work for the party? .....

13 As briefly as possible, how would you express the reason – or principally significant reasons (material or spiritual) – that keep you working for the PKK?
.....
.....
.....

14 What is – or how do you define – your relationship to the party? Administrator ☐ Member ☐ fighter ☐ activist ☐ sympathizer ☐ None ☐
.....
.....
.....

15 What is your main expectation of the PKK?
.....
.....
.....
.....

16 Is the PKK, in your opinion, a national liberation party for the Kurds? Yes ☐ No ☐ Other ☐ specify:.....
.....

17 What quality of the PKK comes first for you? Nationalist ☐ Socialist ☐ Fighting for both national and social emancipation ☐ Other ☐ specify:.....
.....
.....

18 In the organization, is there a goal or value that you would sacrifice yourself for? Yes ☐ No ☐ If *yes*, what.....?
.....
.....

19 Who does the party, you believe, struggle for? **(tick the most relevant one)**
Kurds ☐ Peoples of Anatolia ☐ Peoples of Middle-East ☐ Other ☐ specify:.....
.....

20 Which power/powers of the followings that you think the party fights against? Turkey ☐ USA ☐ Turkey and USA ☐ Turkey and Europe ☐ Turkey, USA and Europe ☐ Conquerors of Kurdistan (Turkey, Iran, Iraq) ☐ Other ☐ specify:.....
.....

21 How would you briefly define the ultimate end that the PKK struggles for?
.....
.....

22 What is the most innovative feature of the party for you?
.....
.....
.....

23 How do you consider the woman participation in the PKK? Less than expected ☐ Normal ☐ More than expected ☐ If your answer is positive or negative, please specify:.....
.....
.....

24 What is the most functional cause of the PKK's success? **(tick one only please)** Leader ☐ Ideology ☐ A new spiritual formation of the activists ☐ The lifestyle of the activists ☐ Organizational discipline ☐ Other ☐ specify:.....
.....
.....

25 What has the party changed so far in the Kurdish society?
.....
.....
– Or, it could not changed?
.....
.....

26 Do you think that the PKK fell into a decline in terms of either its guerrilla activity or its capability of mass mobilization in recent years? Yes ☐ since . . .199 No ☐ If yes, what is the salient cause?

.....

.....

.....

27 In as few words as possible, how would you define the PKK?

.....

.....

.....

28 Do you remember when you first became aware of your nationality?* No ☐ Yes ☐ in year 19..... How?.....

.....

29 Do you remember when you first realized that you belong to a tribe?* No ☐ Yes ☐ in year 19..... How?.....

.....

30 How effective do tribal relations have influence in the organizational structure of the PKK? Very ☐ Little ☐ Very little ☐ None ☐.
– If not *very*, what is the main source of internal problems of the Party? .....

.....

.....

31 Is the PKK a nationalist party? Yes ☐ No ☐ If *yes* or *no*, why? .....

.....

.....

32 Are there similarities between the party and the carriers of preceding Kurdish insurgencies? Yes ☐ No ☐ If *yes*, is it in respect of: national demands ☐ organizational structure ☐ leadership ☐ cadre or guerrilla recruitment ☐ fighting for freedom ☐ Other ☐ specify:.....

.....

.....

.....

33 What was the actual cause which urged the USA to hand Öcalan over to Turkey? The growth of the party to the extent that USA cannot connive at any more ☐ The calculable decline of the party to the extent that it prompt USA to act ☐ Faults and the weakness of the Europe branch of the party ☐ Other ☐ specify:.....

.....

.....

.....

34 How do you see the future of the party after deprivation of its leader, Öcalan? It will: continue to be on the decline ☐ continue to grow ☐ survive ☐ revive ☐ Other ☐ Specify: .....

.....

.....

35 Anything else you expected me to ask you and wish to answer?

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Thank you for your valuable contribution to the research
*Ali Kemal Özcan*
Canterbury, 1999

* I assume that every Kurd belong to a tribe.

# Appendix 2

The basic constitutional schema of the PKK*




* The constitutions of the subsequent organizational reformations (KADEK and KONGRAGEL) were considerably altered. However, the factual working of the organization remained substantially the same. I found no significance in drawing constitutional schemas of the later congresses.

# Appendix 3

List of self-immolations*

| | *Date* | *Name* | *Sex* | *Place* | *Outcome* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **1** | 09.10.1998 | M.Halit Oral | M | Maraş | Died |
| **2** | 18.10.1998 | Murat Kaya | M | Bartın | Seriously injured |
| **3** | 19.10.1998 | Mehmet Gül | M | Amasya | Seriously injured |
| **4** | 20.10.1998 | Ali Aydın | M | Bartın | Died |
| **5** | 20.10.1998 | İsmet İnanç | M | Yozgat | Injured |
| **6** | 20.10.1998 | Meral Kasoturacak | F | Çanakkale | Seriously injured |
| **7** | 22.10.1998 | Aynur Artan | F | Midyat | Died |
| **8** | 22.10.1998 | Bülent Bayram | M | Midyat | Died |
| **9** | 22.10.1998 | Ferhat Karataş | M | Diyarbakır | Seriously injured |
| **10** | 22.10.1998 | Mehmet Bağrıyanık | M | Elbistan | Seriously injured |
| **11** | 22.10.1998 | Selamet Menteş | F | Midyat | Died |
| **12** | 22.10.1998 | Seyri Ipek | M | Sakarya | Seriously injured |
| **13** | 23.10.1998 | Cennet Güneş | F | Antep | Seriously injured |
| **14** | 24.10.1998 | Aysel Ceylan | F | Uşak | Injured |
| **15** | 24.10.1998 | Müslüm Muhammed | M | Antep | Seriously injured |
| **16** | 24.10.1998 | Samet Okay | M | Konya | Injured |
| **17** | 27.10.1998 | Hüsnü Çobanoğlu | M | Erzurum | Seriously injured |
| **18** | 27.10.1998 | Kenan Karahasanoğlu | M | Erzurum | Seriously injured |
| **19** | 27.10.1998 | Mirza Sevimli | M | Erzurum | Died |
| **20** | 01.11.1998 | Berzan Öztürk | M | Stuttgart | Died |
| **21** | 13.11.1998 | Mehmet Aydin | M | Canakkale | Died |
| **22** | 14.11.1998 | Erdal Çeken | M | Midyat | Seriously injured |
| **23** | 14.11.1998 | Hanifı Kuzu | M | Siirt | Seriously injured |
| **24** | 14.11.1998 | İdris Başaran | M | Ceyhan | Seriously injured |
| **25** | 14.11.1998 | İsmail Berkay | M | Adıyaman | Seriously injured |
| **26** | 14.11.1998 | İsmet Akay | M | Adıyaman | Seriously injured |
| **27** | 15.11.1998 | Abbas Sertkaya | M | Ümraniye | Seriously injured |
| **28** | 15.11.1998 | Azime İnan | F | Batman | Seriously injured |
| **29** | 15.11.1998 | Mehmet Karahan | M | Batman | Seriously injured |
| **30** | 15.11.1998 | Muhiyettin Sevici | M | Diyarbakır | Seriously injured |
| **31** | 15.11.1998 | Reyhan Lezgin | F | Batman | Seriously injured |
| **32** | 16.11.1998 | Ahmet Yıldırım | M | *Moscow-Kremlin* | Died |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **33** | 16.11.1998 | Remzi Akkuş | M | *Moscow-Kremlin* Died |
| **34** | 16.11.1998 | Zeyni Arat | M | Antep Seriously injured |
| **35** | 17.11.1998 | Adnan Karatas | M | Mardin Seriously injured |

| *Date* | | *Name* | *Sex* | *Place* | *Outcome* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **36** | 17.11.1998 | Hatice Falay (56-year-old) | F | *Istanbul* | Died |
| **37** | 17.11.1998 | Kadri Ilhan | M | Siirt | Died |
| **38** | 17.11.1998 | Mustafa Sahin | M | Stuttgart | Seriously injured |
| **39** | 18.11.1998 | Cengiz Kaya | M | Agrı | Seriously injured |
| **40** | 18.11.1998 | Zülküf Yilmaz | M | *Rome* | Injured |
| **41** | 19.11.1998 | Fethi Abdullah | M | Malatya | Seriously injured |
| **42** | 19.11.1998 | Mehmet Turgay | M | Konya | Seriously injured |
| **43** | 19.11.1998 | Murat Dursun | M | Diyarbakır | Injured |
| **44** | 19.11.1998 | Osman Tint | M | Malatya | Seriously injured |
| **45** | 19.11.1998 | Ramazan Adibelli | M | Konya | Seriously injured |
| **46** | 19.11.1998 | Zeynettin Atar | M | Diyarbakır | Injured |
| **47** | 20.11.1998 | Şahap Doğan | M | Sakarya | Seriously injured |
| **48** | 25.11.1998 | Süleyman Gültekin | M | Trabzon | Seriously injured |
| **49** | 26.11.1998 | Nuri Acar | M | Ordu | Seriously injured |
| **50** | 27.11.1998 | Zehra (11-year-old) | F | *Iran* | Seriously injured |
| **51** | 28.11.1998 | Cemil Özalap | M | *Diyarbakir-Dagkapı* | Died |
| **52** | 05.12.1998 | Hasan Taskin | M | *Düsseldorf* | Seriously injured |
| **53** | 24.12.1998 | Mihittin Isık | M | *Antep* | Seriously injured |
| **54** | 05.01.1999 | Ramazan Atabaş | M | Siirt | Seriously injured |
| **55** | 15.02.1999 | Nurhak Polat | M | Ümraniye | Seriously injured |
| **56** | 15.02.1999 | Serhat (?) | M | *Athens* | Seriously injured |
| **57** | 15.02.1999 | Yahya Figen | M | Ümraniye | Seriously injured |
| **58** | 16.02.1999 | Arzu Demirat | F | Batman | Seriously injured |
| **59** | 16.02.1999 | Bayram Koymaz | M | Nazilli | Seriously injured |
| **60** | 16.02.1999 | Bülent Akcan | M | Erzurum | Seriously injured |
| **61** | 16.02.1999 | Bülent Akcan | M | Erzurum | Injured |
| **62** | 16.02.1999 | Fatma Saka | F | Stuttgart | Seriously injured |
| **63** | 16.02.1999 | Kahraman Denli | M | *Diyarbakir-Dagkapi* | Died |
| **64** | 16.02.1999 | Mazlum Öncel | M | Diyarbakır | Died |
| **65** | 16.02.1999 | Necla Coşkun | F | *London* | Seriously injured |
| **66** | 17.02.1999 | Ahmet (?) | M | Diyarbakır | Injured |
| **67** | 17.02.1999 | Çiğdem Duman | F | Elbistan | Injured |
| **68** | 17.02.1999 | Serpil Polat | F | Sakarya | Died |
| **69** | 18.02.1999 | Ahmet Tepe | M | Adıyaman | Seriously injured |
| **70** | 18.02.1999 | Hüseyin Ciğ | M | Maraş | Seriously injured |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **71** | 18.02.1999 | Murat Coşar | M | Elbistan | Seriously injured |
| **72** | 18.02.1999 | Veysel Çınar | M | Ümraniye | Injured |
| **73** | 19.02.1999 | Bengin Kurt | F | Ceyhan | Injured |
| **74** | 23.02.1999 | Piro Ecer | M | *Mersin-Cay Mahalles* | Injured |
| **75** | 26.02.1999 | Pakize Karadeniz | F | Uşak | Seriously injured |

*The places where the incidents of self-immolation occurred were overwhelmingly prisons, and the names written under the 'Place' column are the names of prisons in Turkey—except the three self-immolations in Stuttgart, Germany. The non-prison locations are italicized.

# Notes

## Preface

1 PKK: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party) led by Abdullah Öcalan, the founder and constant leader.

2 Peter Galbraith: 'The year 2003 turned out to be very good for Iraq's Kurds. As the year started, the Kurdistan region of Iraq was entering its twelfth year of de facto independence… For the first time in their history, the Kurds governed themselves, having elected a Kurdistan Assembly and government in 1992' (*Bitter Lemons International*, 21, Volume 1–18, December 2003); Simon Jenkins: 'Many Kurds have dreamt of an independence which has never seemed closer than now. Sceptics are already talking of "Kurdistan" becoming "America's second Israel".' (*The Times*, 3 December 2003).

3 KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party, headed by Mesut, the son of heroic Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani.

4 PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan led by Jalal Talabani.

5 In the course of interviews given to Sedat Ergin, columnist for Turkish daily *Hürriyet* (Kürtçe TVye Vize, 28 November 2000) the 'first man' of the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) of Turkey, Şenkal Atasagun, confessed: 'If we say that Apo (Abdullah Öcalan) did not have any effect there in 20 years, we would be lying'; and the 'second man' of MİT Mikdat Alpay, says that the 'PKK destroyed the feudality' in the region.

6 Kurdish 'Safe Haven' was named for the major territory of Iraqi Kurdistan protected by US-led coalition forces following the Gulf War in 1991.

7 Edward Wong: 'The two governing political parties in this country's longdivided Kurdish region are close to establishing a unified government' (*New York Times*, 20 December 2003).

8 Gelb is president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations.

9 Peter Galbraith, 'Kurdistan will be virtually independent', *Bitter Lemons International*, 21, Volume 1–18, December 2003.

10 Simon Jenkins's words are firmer in this regard: 'American strategists in Iraq are contemplating what they have always denied, the search for a "strong man with a moustache" to stop the present rot. If the result is not democracy, so be it. If the result is the dismemberment of Iraq, so be it. Iraq has become a mess. There is only one priority, to "get out with dignity".' ('The only hope now is to divide Iraq into three', *The Times*, 3 December 2003.)

11 The United States, the Republic of Turkey, and the de facto state of Kurdistan maintain a tense three-way relationship punctuated by distrust and uncertainty … Turkey enjoys a mildly paradoxical and triangular relationship with the United States and the Kurds—one not without its fair share of irony' (Matthew Riemer, *Power and Interest News Report*, 18 November 2003).

## Introduction

1 The principal among them are Gunter (1990, 1998), İmset (1992), Robins (1993), Brown (1995), Ergil (1995), Olson (1996, 1998), Kadıoğlu (1996), Kirişçi and Winrow (1997), Barkey and Fuller (1997), Atiyaş (1997).

2 Paul White's recent work, *Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary Modernizers?* is an exception (White 2000). Even though the study contains limited sociological argument and corresponding conceptualization, its main theme concerns the Kurds of Turkey, the PKK and Öcalan.

3 For example, academics such as Ord. Prof. S.Dönmezer (1989), Prof. İ.Giritli (1989), Prof. A.K.Bilgiseven (1991), Prof. O.Türkdoğan (1998), Prof. M.F. Kirzioğlu (1984, 1995) devoted their overall intellectual efforts to demonstrating that the Kurds are actually Turks—the Turks who forgot their Turkish language because of their lengthy mountain life.

4 The concept of the tribe is subject to controversy in related disciplines such as anthropology, history and sociology. However, the conceptualization that dominates the relevant fields refers to the pre-feudal segment of human societal development (Morgan 1919; Davis 1978; Gellner 1983; van Bruinessen 1992, and others). 'Tribe', as a sociopolitical device of humanization, is most generally defined in terms of kinship relations, but in which the initial governmental form of sociality as the nucleus of future state, that has ever been the indispensable entity of class societies, was fertilized. The remarkable consensus among the scholars vis-à-vis 'tribe' is that its coalescence, amalgamation, integration and dissolution give rise to nation because it becomes the 'fetter' for the adolescent bourgeoisie's desire for a 'national market'. The Kurdish tribe *(aşiret)* does not differ in nature from the universal experiences but, on occasion, the fusion or confederation of several kinship structures composes an individual tribe. (The concept is further discussed in Chapter 5 on pp. 147–151.)

5 There existed a similar Kurdish-language school in the vicinity of Damascus to which I went on occasion to interview wounded and mutilated guerrillas.

6 In a local election held in 1999, the pro-Kurdish party HADEP (known to be a PKK-backed legal party) lost the mayoralty of Greater İçel (Mersin) following a contentious vote count. HADEP won the election in the largest sub-district of Mersin (Akdeniz) nevertheless.

7 İzmir is the third largest metropolitan city of Turkey, located on the west coast of the Anatolian Peninsula.

8 This may be attributed to the PKK's organizational 'vulnerabilities' concerning *legal* activities for the HADEP, which has frequently been accused of being the 'legal branch' of the PKK.

9 In the course of a sequence of live telephone interviews by Med TV (25, 31 December 1998 and 1 January 1999) he repeatedly referred to some sort of dialogue with the Turkish state.

10 Pro-Kurdish legal party (People's Democracy Party—Halkın Demokrasi Partisi).

11 The city in eastern Turkey often considered as being in effect the capital of 'Turkish Kurdistan'.

12 DGM: Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi.

13 *Serîhildan:* a Kurdish term equivalent to the Palestinian '*intifada'*.

14 Nusaybin: a town in a Kurdish province neighbouring Syria.

15 These writings were later gathered in an unsigned book published by the party (*Örgütlenme Üzerine* 1983:210–223).

16 The *Turkish Daily News* defines itself as 'Turkey's First and Only English Daily' paper, and it is widely regarded as the state's official bulletin, targeted at foreign diplomatic missions.

17 The term '29th Revolt' was employed by the state authorities—after the PKK launched its initial attack—to emphasize that it was only a repetition of the previous '28' bandit-like Kurdish revolts.

## I
## Nationalism: distilling the cultural and the political

1 By ‘twin concepts’, *nation* and *nationalism* are meant here. However, I may quite interchangeably use the term *‘ethnie’* or ‘ethnicity’ or ‘nationality’ or ‘nationness’ along with ‘nation’ until I clearly distinguish the political nationhood of market borders and the cultural nationhood of ‘history frozen’ (Bauer, in Woolf 1996:61).

2 *Nutuk* (The Speech) is the only book by M.Kemal Atatürk and is edited from his six-day address to the Great National Assembly in 1927.

3 Ernest Renan says the following about the place of language in the formation processes of nations: ‘The political importance we attach to languages stems from our regarding them as signs of race. Nothing is more false’ (Renan, in Woolf 1996:55).

4 The logic of development of the forces of production that bears a constant reproduction/reconstruction ‘faculty’ based on the interrelation and/or inter-dependency between the elements of a ‘three-ring circus’—man’s will to live better, man’s labour productivity and the means of production.

5 Miroslav Hroch, in his richly exemplified comparative study, explores how this is effected, and analyses this process by dividing it into three phases (Hroch 1985:22–30).

6 A.D.Smith asserts convincingly in his influential work, *Theories of Nationalism,* that the intelligentsia ‘do, indeed, play a definitive part in the rise of nationalist movements—everywhere’ (Smith 1983:109)). Also, Tom Nairn presents a brief and scholarly analysis on ‘The Role of Intellectuals’, and points towards its place ‘behind and beneath the more visible “rise of bourgeoisie”’ (Nairn 1981:99–103).

7 Stalin’s personality was occasionally described by Lenin as being ‘too rude’ towards and ‘too tempting’ to Great Russian Nationalism.

8 This aspect of the argument, I suggest, is the most phenomenal insight which Max Weber left out of his penetrating analysis on ‘The Types of Authority and Imperative Co-ordination’, in particular on ‘Charismatic Authority’. Weber distinguishes ‘Legal Authority’ from ‘Charismatic Authority’ by explaining that the manner of its implementation through ‘a bureaucratic administrative staff’ is the particularity of the former. However, ‘a bureaucratic administrative staff’ is not less a factual case in ‘Charismatic Authority’ than in the legal one. It is probably the background concern of Weber’s tempting vindication of the ‘spirit of capitalism’ that drove him to such an elision (Weber 1947:324–423.

9 The organization which was founded by a group of military medical doctors at the close of the nineteenth century for Turkish emancipation from the dissolving of the Ottoman Empire.

10 Antony D.Smith talks of the role of the intelligentsia as ‘a necessary condition of all nationalist movements’ in the approach of the ‘third group of sociological theories of nationalism’, which he considers as ‘a more historical theory’ (Smith 1983:86, 87).

11 Antony Smith reduces it to a more general separation: ‘the civic-territorial and the ethnic-genealogical, and the two routes of the formation of nations, that of bureaucratic incorporation and that of vernacular mobilization’ (ibid.: 123, 59–68) according to which he, however, does not tend to approve of ‘genuinely different types of nationalism’ including ‘religious nationalism’ (ibid.: 49).

12 I understand this as the assimilation and integration of subordinate ethnic entities to be shaped as a corollary to the would-be nation that is qualitatively differentiated from its former constituents. Seton-Watson is here precisely consistent with a *non-cultural* or *non-ethnic* conception of nation; that is, with the *political one*.

13 Horace B.Davis takes this on board as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nationalism by referring to the prominent British Labour Party politician of the 1930s, Harold Laski, in the very sense that Nairn discusses. He begins by saying ‘Nationalism may be considered on balance good; or on balance bad; or neither good nor bad; or both good and bad at the same time’ (Davis 1978:46).

14 The ‘nationalism’ in that sense which has dominated historical development since early in the nineteenth century, was in essence the forced reaction of one area after another to the spread of capitalism (Nairn 1981:127)

15 This seems somehow to be an heir to the volatile temptation of the left-wing tradition towards rendering nationalism as the struggle of ‘oppressed nations’; the ‘progressive’ nationalism whose success was believed to be restricting the exploitation of territories of imperialist expansion. The temptation needs to be traced back to infantile Marxism’s dizziness on the ‘national question’, and in particular to Lenin’s historical mistake—being the principal proponent of the ‘right of nations for self-determination’ in opposition to Rosa Luxemburg. This will be argued further in relation to the ‘question’ of Marxism (see pp. 48–51).

16 What contributes some confusion to Smith’s argument is that he does not clearly distinguish between *ethnic identity* and the *identity of nationhood* by employing the term ‘national identity’ for both. The terms ‘national’ and ‘nationality’ already bear problems in their English usage. So, instead, using the terms ‘ethnic’ and ‘ethnicity’ escapes the possible confusions. And in the case of identities, the usage of the ‘identity of nationhood’ for, say, Swissness in Switzerland or Britishness in the UK and of the ‘identity of ethnicity’ for Frenchness, Germanness and Italianness in Switzerland, or Englishness, Scottishness, Irishness and Welshness in Great Britain.

17 In the conclusion of his *Nations and Nationalism*, under ‘What is not being said’, Ernest Gellner talks of nationalism as ‘a very distinctive species of patriotism’ in terms of its ‘higher’ manifestation, but ‘only under certain social conditions’. But nevertheless, he does not want to be involved with distinctions between the history-making insatiable desire of the emerging class of the ‘modern world’—that is, the adolescent bourgeoisie—and the masses’ expectations of freedom. This, of course, is merely a consistent extension of Gellner’s vindication of nationalism, which he evaluated as ‘the consequence of a new form of social organization, based on deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures’ (Gellner 1983:48). Whereas the ‘insatiable desire’ of the modern world’s rising bourgeoisie in its ‘teens’, which has had the last word on the course of history, has nothing to do with the ‘patriotic’ desires of the *‘herd’* masses.

18 This very elision in Gellner is Hobsbawm’s ‘major criticism of Gellner’s work’, which he expresses as lack of ‘attention to the view from below’ (Hobsbawm 1990:10, 11). However, his understanding of nation and nationalism does not differ from Gellner’s in terms of handling them as ‘dual phenomena’. Although he, in a sense, distinguishes the ‘national sentiments’ of ‘below’ from the market ‘sentiments’ of ‘above’, for him the ‘assumptions, hopes, needs, longings, and interests of ordinary people’ are ‘not necessarily national and still less nationalist’. This (the *worries* of below) is precisely what I strive to separate from nationalism and nationalist politics as an ‘ideological movement’.

19 In a video-cam recorded interview held by myself with a Kurdish woman in her late fifties in Qamişlo (Syria), whose four children lost their lives in the clashes with the Turkish army, she calmly says, in response to a question, Thank god, I have four martyrs.’

20 ‘National Forces’ is a translation of ‘Kuvai Milliye’ which was an unofficial movement composed of civil and military elements in the Anatolian struggle against the Allies’ attempts to dismantle the Ottoman state in the late 1910s following her defeat. The prompt emergent unity of left-right reaction had defined their ‘spirit’ in terms of Kuvai Milliye’s spirit. Coşkun refers to the conditions of Turkey at the time in which this movement emerged, and makes humorous comparisons due to funnily inappropriate circumstances.

21 Frank Füredi’s work, *The Soviet Union Demystified*, is a distinguished study of this sort supported by extensive quantitative information. Further, the study was accomplished some years prior to the ‘1989 revolutions’ and, following the illustration of how the ‘adolescent’ bourgeoisie of Soviet Russia took over and *over-developed* the works of belated Russian capitalism by an absolute control of labour-value allocation in the whole of its society,

Füredi heralds that ‘bureaucracy is more than a caste, but not yet a class’ and ‘bureaucrats would like to become a class’ (Füredi 1986:179).

22 This very point, I suggest, appears to be the most vital and most elided short-coming of scientific socialist theory, on which severe vulgar materialism settled - the wholeness of the *materiality* and *spirituality* of both forces and relations of productions.

23 The footnote that Marx left here for further explanation is as follows: ‘This method of determining, from the standpoint of the labour-processes alone, what is productive labour, is by no means directly applicable to the case of capitalist process of production.’

24 In fact, the concept of class or class struggle is not at all the central premise of Marxist theory but only an aspect of it. The central theme is the materialist conception of history with the dialectical grasp and depiction of the ‘development of production’; that is, the logic of development of productive forces in constant relation-contradiction with the relations of productions. Marx himself put emphasis on such a misinterpretation: ‘I do not claim to have discovered either the existence of classes in modern society or the struggle between them. Long before me, bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this struggle between the classes.’ His claim of a contribution is ‘to show that the existence of classes is merely bound up with certain phases in the development of production’ (Marx, in Marx and Engels 1983:62).

25 The concept ‘spirit’ or ‘spiritual’ is taken here in an Epicurean sense. Epicurus endeavoured to define spirit/soul in physical terms in about the third century BC.Later, Descartes was to analyse humankind’s ‘spiritual world’ further in medical terms as being ‘really joined to the whole body’ (Descartes 1988:218–238).

26 Engels footnoted this in 1888 by adding the note ‘written’:‘**That is, all *written* history’ (Marx and Engels 1975:32).

27 Horace B.Davis provides an illustrative table showing the growth of industry and agriculture in the Soviet republics from 1913 to 1966 (Davis 1978:121).

28 The Communist Party of the Russian Federation under Gennadii Zyuganov.

29 KADEK became KONGRA GEL (People’s Congress) in late 2003 following Öcalan’s instruction. Due to escalating tension surrounding the Kurdish issue both in Turkey and Iraq, he talks of ‘reconstructing the PKK’ in ‘Görüşme Notları’ (Meeting Notes) recorded on 14 and 21 January from İmrallı Prison.

## 2
## The seeds of Turkey’s Kurdish question

1 *Tanzimat* (reformation or reorganization) is the term employed for political reforms introduced by Sultan Abdulmecit in 1839, which were applicable to the era that followed.

2 The word *millet* is also used in daily language to mean ‘nation’, but it rather denotes the ‘people’.

3 Ahmet Rıza was son of an Austrian mother and a father with Anglophile tendencies—and was consequently called İngiliz (English) Ali’.

4 For example, M.Kemal founded the Fatherland and Liberty Society while he was commander of the Fifth Army in Damascus. The Ottoman Liberty Society was led by Talat Bey, a local postal officer who later become a major Young Turk figure; Cemil Bey, adjutant to the military governor of Macedonia; and some other high officials of the Third Army. Others did likewise in Jerusalem and Jaffa (Shaw and Shaw 1977:265; Lewis 1968:205).

5 The positions of signatories other than M. Kemal were as follows: Rauf Orbay, former minister of the navy and Ottoman delegate to Mondros; Ali Fuat Cebesoy, commander at Ankara; Rafet Bele, commander of several corps in northern Anatolia; Kazim Karabekir, the Fifteenth Army Corps commander in the East.

6 *Gavur* is a derogatory term for non-Muslims in the Turkish and Kurdish languages.
7 The Turko-Greek war was 'pronounced to be a private war between Greece and Turkish Nationalists' by the Allies at the London Conference of March 1921 (Luke 1936:175).
8 *Devşirme* is the term used to denote converted non-Muslims (Davison 1990:13–17).
9 *Dönmes* is the Turkish word for converted Sephardic Jews (Ramsaur 1957:96).
10 'Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist' (Gellner 1964:168); 'Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round' (Hobsbawm 1990:10).

## 3
## Enter the PKK

1 The Workers' Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi—TİP is the first leftist party of the republican era in which all left-wing groupings merged. It was later banned due to its sounding of the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
2 FKF: Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu.
3 DEV-GENÇ: Devrimci Gençlik.
4 MHP: Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi.
5 THKP: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi. Later this was modified to THKP-C (Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephe).
6 THKO: Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu.
7 TKP/ML: Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Marxist-Leninist.
8 DDKO: Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları.
9 *Apocular* (Apoists) literally means the 'Followers of Apo'. It was a derogatory name given by opposition circles, but later used by themselves with pride.
10 Süleyman Demirel has been one of the main political figures in Turkish parliament since the mid-1960s and was eventually elected as eighth president of the Republic (*Cumhurbaşkanı*) following the unexpected death of Turgut Özal in 1993.
11 A village near the border between Turkey and Kurdish-populated eastern Anatolia.
12 AYÖD: Ankara Yüksek Öğrenim Derneği (Ankara Higher Education Association) was a student association which was founded by the youth group, DEVGENÇ, as a legal platform for sympathizers of Mahir Çayan.
13 Here, by 'Mamak Days' (the 'first and last' experience of imprisonment in Mamak prison up until his abduction from Nairobi, Kenya) Öcalan implies the imprisonment months which he terms his 'incubation period'.
14 Following the dissolution of the PKK at the eighth congress, April 2002, Cemil Bayık was elected to the Presidency Council of KADEK and apparently was the 'co-ordinator' of the Council. Due to the recent conversion of the organization from KADEK to KONGRA GEL, his position is not currently so clear. Since Öcalan's capture in early 1999, he still appears to be the most influential personality among the top ranks of the organization nevertheless.
15 Öcalan was re-elected with no opposition at the eighth ordinary congress as the general president of KADEK.
16 The 'politburos' of these groupings continued to operate in Turkish metropolises until they were banned and dissolved by the harsh military coup on 12 September 1980.
17 The paper is in fact a state bulletin targeting foreign readers.
18 Interestingly, the targeted provinces did not include, at the outset, the 'capital city' Diyarbakır and other south-eastern towns which were relatively more 'developed' regions in terms of national sentiments, and which consequently bore a profitable potential.
19 Gaziantep is a large semi-industrial city on the border of Turkey and Kurdistan.
20 A village in the town of Lice near the city of Diyarbakır.

## 4
## The discourse and objectives of the PKK

1 The phrase the 'theory of the PKK' is not employed in the sense of a sociological or political theory that explains social phenomena but refers to the party's views on the specific and general questions of the region and the world.
2 The group also called themselves, at that stage, as 'Kurdistan Revolutionaries'.
3 The party was also famed with its youth organization, the DDKD (Devrimci Demokratik Kültür Derneği)
4 *Peşmerge:* special term for Kurdish soldier or fighter.
5 Capital lettering is as in the original text.
6 Uğur Mumcu, the prominent Turkish author-journalist, devoted his last, uncompleted book, *Kürt Dosyası* (The Kurdish File), to this tactical odyssey of Öcalan. An explosive placed under his car in 1991 killed him, while he was writing. The murderer or murderers are still sought. In the book he focuses on the mutual 'devilish' tactics launched by Öcalan and the MIT (Turkish Intelligence Service) in order to find out whether Öcalan or the MIT used their rivals for their aims (Mumcu 1993).
7 *Kürdistan'da Zorun Rolü* (The Role of Coercion in Kurdistan), *Örgütlenme Üzerine* (About Organization), *Kurdistan'da Kişilik Sorunu, Devrimci Militanın Özellikleri ve Parti Yaşamı* (The Question of Individual's Personality in Kurdistan, the Traits of a Revolutionary Militant and Party Life).
8 For the word 'communist' has not just derogatory but also dangerous connotations in Turkey and Kurdistan. It is translated and penetrated into people's Turkish as '*dinsiz-allahsiz'* (irreligious-Godless) and *'ana-baci tanımaz'* (the man who does not recognize the limits of mother and sister in terms of sexual intercourse).
9 The assessment of the nature of earlier Kurdish uprisings against Turkey as being non-national does actually trace back to the early PKK. It is stated in the *Manifesto* that in those [Kurdish rebellions] the Kurds were both 'mutually wielded as a mere pawn by England and Turkey' and the 'right resistance endeavours of Kurdish people were diverted to serve their own benefits by the prominent tribal-feudal leaders' of the time (*Manifesto:* 125, 129). However, it is illuminated further here.
10 While in the *Manifesto* the proposals 'such as in the form of "territorial autonomy", "cultural autonomy", "federal unity" etc.' are accused of being 'reformist' and 'therefore reactionary' theses 'for the reason that they do not touch the state's borders', in the introduction to his main defence Öcalan states that 'even separate state, federation, autonomy and such similar approaches are backward, sometimes obstructive in comparison with the richness of the mode of democratic solution' (Öcalan, 1999d: 11).

## 5
## Sources of motivations

1 *Aşiret:* The entire tribe (van Bruinessen 1992:61) or 'a federation of tribes over which a paramount chieftain may preside' (Kinnane 1964:10)
2 Quite probably it has an equivalence with the Scottish case regarding its superior (the English or British state), of which Grieve came to say that 'the absence of nationalism is, paradoxically, a form of Scottish self-determination' (cited by Nairn 1981:126).
3 The Middle Eastern epic, known as the first literary work in human history, by which biblical writers and many stories of Greek mythology were influenced. Gilgamesh is the eponymous hero. A 'wild-brutish man', Enkidu, lives with his tribe (of Gutians or Horrits, which means the 'people from mountains' in the Sumerian language, who are claimed to be the ancestors of the Kurds) in the forests, and later is 'domesticated' by Gilgamesh and used against his

tribe. With the help of Enkidu, the epic narrates, Gilgamesh captures the leader of the tribe. Gilgamesh decides to 'domesticate' him too in order to support himself better. But Enkidu persuades his senior, Gilgamesh, to kill the leader, for Enkidu believes that he would lose his secondary position if the leader of the tribe stayed alive.

4 Including the most long-lasting one against Turkey in Dersim from 1937 to 1938 (prior to the PKK), the one against Iran which culminated in the Republic of Mehabad for eleven months in 1946, and the prolonged *peşmerge* war for decades under Molla Mustafa Barzani against Iraq.

5 The sentence in the Koran (Qur'an) expressing the confession of faith which is believed to be one of the five conditions of Islam.

6 The practices and rules not laid down in the Koran but derived from Muhammad's own habits and words.

7 TBMM: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi—Grand National Assembly of Turkey.

8 Money paid by the bridegroom to the bride's family.

9 Martin van Bruinessen states, first, that the boundaries between tribe and clan 'are rather vague'; then he immediately adds the difference that tribes are 'often much larger' in number (van Bruinessen 1992:57).

10 The phrase 'nationalist without nationalism' is employed for Kurdish nationalism by Abbas Vali and is a use of words that solely fits the Kurdish 'national' reality, which he also defines as 'a historical anomaly which is nevertheless true'. Vali also makes a footnote here and refers to the PKK's total abandonment of overall nationalist demands, including even modest ones such as a federal system in official Turkey. He correctly states that the PKK 'is the only significant modern Kurdish political organization which started its campaign with a clear nationalist strategy demanding independence for Kurdistan'. Vali points out the state of ambivalence in the spectacle of the latest PKK:

> However the radical change in the strategic objective of the PKK does not seem to have affected its nationalist discourse, which appears side by side with arguments for a political solution in the framework of Turkish sovereignty. This paradox testifies not only to an ambiguous political identity, but also to the curious case of nationalists without nationalism, which characterized the discourse and the practice of the Mahabad republic five decades earlier.
>
> (Vali 1998:94).

In fact, the 'nationalist discourse' too has been affected by the dramatically radical changes in the strategy of the movement since Vali's article was published. The 'national' and 'revolutionary' rhetoric has gradually 'calmed down' and almost withered away since then. Eventually, in its eighth congress held in April 2002, the organization converted itself from a 'party' to a 'congress' (KADEK—*Kongreya Azadi û Demokrasiya Kurdistan* [Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress]) through which the PKK-led Kurdish movement abandoned a programme which was aspiring to and undertaking rule power. The overall strategic objective is to have

a ‘Democratic Republic’ of Turkey in which the culture-related and identity-related questions of Kurdish community are resolved.

11 This ‘intrinsic’ trouble may well be attributable to the overall socio-political history of the ‘keepers of the cradle of civilization’ in conjunction with the dynamics and contradictions of the course of civilization’s history since its inception. This requires additional research.

12 In the Dersim uprising, Dr Nuri Dersimi—in his confined circle—attempted to convert the resistance into a ‘national’ initiative, but neither the leader of the uprising nor the few backing tribes were familiar with such aspirations as ‘Kurdistan’ or the ‘nation-state’.

13 Öcalan justifies his proposal of a ‘Democratic Republic’ by encouraging the PKK members to be consistent with their party’s loyalty to socialist beliefs and aspirations held since its outset, but no one may assert that the masses have adopted such a novel approach to the struggle following a conscious consideration in the light of socialist principles.

14 The recent steps taken by the Kurds of Iraq may well be regarded as exceptional, thanks to the providers of the Safe Haven.

15 Several Kurdish associations and societies with the support of various Armenian circles gathered in Lebanon in October 1927 and held a congress for the purpose of liberating the parts of Kurdistan and Armenia under Turkey. The congress ended with the announcement of the newly established United National Party, which came to be known as *Xoybun*.

16 *Caş*, in a literal translation, means ‘donkey foal’, but it is accepted in Kurdish political terminology as denoting *xain* [traitor].

17 The Turkish word *‘düşürülmüş’* literally means ‘debased’. The leadership of the PKK, in fact Öcalan, employs this term to denote the ‘intrinsic’ state of the Kurdish people which manifests itself in two main ‘unique’ traits: imitating oppressors and being limitlessly brave and cruel in fighting against one another. This appears to be the most distinct aspect of the party’s approach to its own people. When the case in point is an organization which undertakes a ‘national liberation’, the notion becomes more striking because the nationalism not only ‘always imagines an ideal’ nation (Nairn 1981:102) but also emphasizes and exaggerates its ‘greatness’ among followers for whom subordination is not ‘deserved’ and oppression is not ‘acceptable’. This, on the other hand, points at the unusual aspect of ‘Kurdish nationalism’ which in effect does not aspire to the ‘final goal’ of every nationalism, a nation-state, but the emancipation of a denied ethno-cultural identity. This is more true of the Kurds under Turkey, where both the *denial* and *absorption* of the Kurdish population have been furthered far more boldly than in the respective parts of Kurdistan annexed by Iran, Iraq and Syria.

18 Jwaideh penetrates the historical background in this aspect of his thesis, and describes several important personalities in the history of the Middle East, such as Selahaddin Eyyubi and Han Zend who established and ruled the states and empires on behalf of other peoples of the region (Jwaideh 1999:7, 35).

19 ‘Scoundrelized’ is not an entirely accurate English translation of the Turkish word *namussuzlaştırılmış*. However, I do not know of any more satisfactory one.

20 All the organizational configurations appearing during the 1970s in the part of Kurdistan under Turkey claimed to be Marxist-socialist with the exception of the early KDP in Turkey. But it too, later in 1973, changed its name first to T-KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party—Turkey) then to KIP (*Kürdistan İşçi Partisi* [Kurdistan Workers’ Party]), and stated its first article as ‘The Kurdistan Workers’ Party is the political party of the working class of Kurdistan equipped with Marxism-Leninism’ (Hasretyan 1995:128).

21 Following Öcalan’s arrest, it was publicized as the ‘Presidency Council’ and its members increased from nine to 11, including two women, at the 7th Extraordinary congress.

22 There are various arrangements for the ‘party children’ appropriate to the conditions of the country, neighbouring states and Europe.

23 Ertugrul Kürkçü was the chair of DEV-GENC (a Turkish revolutionary youth organization which existed as a legal peripheral configuration of the illegal THKP [People's Liberation Party of Turkey] to which Öcalan was a loyal sympathizer) until 1972. In that year, he was the only survivor found after the Kızıldere clash in which the rest of leading figures of the THKP were killed, including its charismatic leader Mahir Çayan who was regarded as the Turkish Che Guevara.
24 The actual 'election' was held in four parts of Kurdistan and was obviously not as free as it was in Europe. It was held in a strictly clandestine and illegal way and had very limited participation.
25 The lord of the manor.
26 The latter two were being published legally in Turkey in the early 1990s.
27 *Çözümlemeler* is a Turkish word that literally means 'analyses'. However it has a particular meaning which denotes Öcalan's inculcation talks. On almost every occasion these talks are recorded, edited, published and distributed to all party units, and used as almost the only material in the education programme of party cadres.
28 For the purpose of this study I spent four weeks in the two (one for Turkish-, the other for Kurdish-speaking pupils) 'party central schools' based in Syria, where Öcalan himself was giving his teachings.
29 The term 'Leadership' *(Önderlik)* has actually become the official title of Öcalan within the party. On questioning a member of the management committee of the school who had warned me about my use of the word 'you' *(siz)* in the dialogue between myself and Öcalan, I was told that they perceive him as an 'institution' rather than a personality. Öcalan also views himself as an 'institution': 'Leadership is an institution. I am not an individual but an institution. There are peculiarities in this institution. If it walks [works] then it will do the work, and the PKK has done some work' (Öcalan 1994a: 457).
30 The 'monthly books' and video-recorded forms of these 'çözümlemeler' are easily obtainable in London, and one party activist in London who had experienced various Turkish prisons over three years due to his organizational linkage with the PKK told me that the monthly magazine *Serxwebun* (the PKK's central organ which is illegal in Turkey) and 'Tapes of *Çözümlemeler*' were arriving at prisons regularly.
31 In 1992, I was included in the group for an 'intensive party education' programme held at a 'party home' in Europe as a result of my voluntary contributions as an interpreter for the Kurdish community in London.
32 Şirnak is the town in which HADEP (the pro-Kurdish legal party backed by the PKK) cannot officially open its branch because of the severe oppression by the 'village guards' of the state—but it nevertheless polled the largest share of the votes in 1999 elections.
33 The list and figures exclude the recent publications which are composed of Öcalan's latest defences (2001a, 2001b, 2003, 2004) and his dialogues with his lawyers and relatives in the course of visits—known as 'Meeting Notes'.
34 I attended the 4th congress of HADEP (the pro-Kurdish legal party backed by the PKK) held in Ankara on 26 November 2000. The number of delegates at the congress was just over 800, but the police officials' estimate of the masses gathered around the congress hall was 100,000. The dominant slogan expressed sympathy for and loyalty to Öcalan: 'Selam! Selam! İmrallı'ya Bin Selam' (Salute! Salute! Thousand Salutes to İmrallı [the island where Öcalan is imprisoned]). The following day, the chief officer of MIT (Turkish Intelligence Service) declared that allowing TV broadcasts in the Kurdish language would be beneficial (*Hürriyet*, 28 November 2000). This was followed by an immediate statement from Bulent Ecevit, the Turkish prime minister, emphasizing that the views of the chief of the MIT should be seriously considered because 'the HADEP congress has to be a significant warning to everyone'.
35 A Kurdish-populated town in Turkey towards the western border of Kurdistan.

36 This dialectical expression of the ‘love of life’ can be traced back to early militants in the PKK. The reply of Kemal Pir, one of the two Turkish founder-members of the PKK who died on the 56th day of a hunger strike in Diyarbakır prison in 1982, to E.Oktay Yıldıran, the head of the prison, has a similar philosophical flavour. In response to the military commander’s question attempting to persuade him to abandon the hunger strike during his final days (‘Don’t you love life, Kemal?’), Pir’s answer is interesting: ‘We love life so much we are prepared to die for it.’

37 The smallest unit of weight used by ancient Ottomans.

38 Max Weber classifies the ‘three pure types’ as (a) legal authority with a bureaucratic administrative staff, (b) traditional authority and (c) charismatic authority, and theorizes them as the principal means of ‘imperative control’ in societies.

39 In this study I examine the phenomenon in its political dimensions. The other spheres such as business or management are excluded.

40 The common reference point of the literature on charisma, Max Weber, is additionally firm about the ‘revolutionary force’ of charisma and believes that it ‘is scarcely in need of further discussion’. When comparing it with rational and traditional types of authority, Weber finds the ‘charismatic type’ to be their antithesis in terms of being ‘foreign to all rules’, and he consequently concludes that it is ‘a specifically revolutionary force’ (Weber 1947:361, 362).

41 Wegner, in his penetrating article, ‘Messianic Historicity’ in *Rethinking Marxism*, is more inflexible on the ‘revolutionary rupture’ of Messianism: ‘the messianic is always revolutionary, it has to be’ (Wegner 2000:68).

42 Footnoted by Duncan: R.J.Zwi Werblowsky, ‘Messiah and Messianic Movements’, in *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 15th edn (Chicago, 1974), Macropaedia XI: 1017.

43 Conger points towards ‘a relational basis’ as the ‘widely accepted’ diagnosis of charismatic leadership in the related literature. ‘Charisma is believed not to reside solely in the leader and his or her personal attributes but rather in the interplay between the leader’s attributes and the needs, beliefs and perceptions of followers’ (Conger and Kanungo 1988:24).

44 Edward Shils (1965) ‘Charisma, Order and Status’, *American Sociological Review* 30, 199–213.

45 With regard to the ramifications of the charismatic power, both E.Sanasarian (1995) and A.Saeidi (2001) present informative arguments on the Ayatollah Khomeini’s case. The former scholar delineates how the ‘routinization’ became institutionalized through the governing apparatus of theocratic Iran during the lifetime of the person of charisma. He in particular exemplifies the institutionalization of Khomeini’s charisma within the military establishment, the ‘backbone’ of the state, and its premier body *Pasdaran* (Revolutionary Guards). The latter scholar extends his argument to the penetration and solidification of ‘economic charisma’ in post-revolutionary and post-Khomeini Iran, and figures the extent of charismatic power in terms of the redistribution of income and wealth.

46 Jermier excerpts from M.Foucault (1980) *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, edited and translated by Colin Gordon, New York: Pantheon Books.

47 ‘God’ has been functioning for millennia as an effective *charisma*, though it is solely a ‘persona’ of a non-existent ‘person’. God is a charisma, the Messiah is the prophet and the prophet is the *resulullah* (representative) or messenger of God. This fact of history shows how the Messiah is charismatic and how charisma is Messianic.

48 For empirical information about the example of unforgiving elimination of dissenters in Iran see Sanasarian (1995:195).

49 This may be attributed to the Kurdish societal ‘heritage’ of ‘arrested tribality’ which we partly discussed at the beginning of this chapter. While ‘consistent’ tribal structure did not give way to Kurdish sociality to be introduced with modern forms of institutionalizations that transcend ‘tribal institutions’, the perpetual existence of profound tribal and religious leadership types provided a rich ‘experience’ for routinization of charismas. But this

culturalized praxis of Kurds needs comprehensive elaboration, which would provoke further inquiries into the persistent aspects of Kurdish 'history frozen'.

50 This 'policy' repeated itself in the form of an incident that occurred at the HADEP congress held in November 2000. The Kurdish-born German MEP, Feleknas Uca, intended to convey her party's message to the congress in Kurdish because her Turkish was poor. As she began to speak in Kurdish, the police officer superintending the congress promptly interrupted her by pointing out the relevant legal article in a book in his hand: 'any language other than Turkish' is forbidden. She, however, was 'allowed' to continue conveying her message in German. Further, the incident dominated Turkish media's news agenda on the following day, rather than the congress itself. The media was not interested in the state's policy but in the MEP's 'conspiratorial' endeavours targeted at 'propaganda and show'.

## 6
## The rise and fall of the PKK: questions, confrontations and the impasse

1 An incident (see Chapter 5) occurred during the most recent HADEP congress held in Ankara (26 November 2000) in which the peculiarity of Turkey's undiminished 'ostrich' policy on its Kurdish question manifested itself in a coarse form. This incident has since become handy material in the PKK's propaganda and educational activities. The reaction of over 5,000 people in the hall, who protested against the interruption of the MEP's Kurdish speech by the superintendent police officer, was phenomenal.

2 Critiques on the nature of the Turkish state generally converge on its 'Bonapartist' or 'praetorian' character; 'that is, one in which military, para-military or semi-military forces operate independently of the civilian political apparatus' (White and Logan 1997:247). Up until the experience of 12 September 1980, this was almost the most accurate definition of the fact. However, since then, the military apparatus has updated the 'interventions' because of the difficulties encountered both in internal affairs and in the state's developing relations with the West. Consequently, the *occasional-explicit interventions* have been converted into a *constant-implicit grasp* of the rule through the National Security Council *(Milli Güvenlik Kurulu)* in which the military apparatus passed its resolutions to the 'civilian' governmental officers (The president of the republic, prime minister, other ministers, etc.) for execution in the Council's regular meetings.

3 Doğan was appointed as the person responsible for the publication of *Serxwebun* by the party's foundation congress and was to be known as the 'theoretician' of the party. Newroz is a Kurdish national festival day.

4 Referring to the interview by *2000 e Doğru* (Turkish weekly magazine) published in three issues dated 14, 21 and 28 April 1991.

5 Ahmet Aydın is the pen-name used by Ahmet Cem Ersever, who founded a semi-autonomous organization (White 2000:144) composed of military (gendarmes) and paramilitary elements (JITEM) which operated effectively against alleged PKK supporters and civilian activists, including several attempts to assassinate Öcalan. Ersever was later killed in Ankara, and his death still remains mysterious (Bozarslan, in Olson 1996:148).

6 The phrase *(taktik önderlik)* is employed in the terminology of the PKK to mean the regional and local representatives who hold the direct management of party activities or, in other words, who implement the party's strategic policies in daily practice.

7 Behdinan is a province which falls inside the Iraqi-ruled territory (now mainly dominated by the Barzani-led KDP).

8 *Kurdistan Report* is a pro-PKK magazine which is distributed throughout the world and published in most of the European and some of the Eastern languages as well as in English.

9 General secretary of the Kurdistan Socialist Party (KSP).
10 The death of Turgut Özal has been seen as suspicious in many circles, including some Turkish MPs from various parties and his son Ahmet Özal who is currently an 'independent' MP in the TBMM (Turkish Grand National Assembly). They believe that Özal 'was in fact poisoned by Turkish forces opposed to his Kurdish initiative' (White 2000:163, 200). No attempt has since been made to investigate the claims. Allegations have even been made that his hair, which had been kept hidden, disappeared after the raising of suspicions.
11 Şemdin Sakık was a prominent commander and CC member of the PKK. He later, in 1998, deserted from the guerrilla forces and surrendered to the Turkish state through the KDP (McDowall 1996:437; White 2000:169).
12 The first international Kurdish-language satellite television station known to be pro-PKK. It was opened in 1995 under licence of the ITC (Independent Television Commission) of Britain, and reopened later in the name of 'Medya TV' due to its licence termination by ITC—under the licence obtained from France. Medya TV was also closed by the French authorities on 12 February 2004.
13 Tribal structure in Kurdistan is not what we generally find in feudal societies, which may be defined in terms of 'Eric Hobsbawm's "primitive rebels"…in the throes of…capitalist modernization' (White 2000) or as 'proto-nation'. Rather, tribal structure is pre-feudal—in fact, a somewhat higher stage of a primitive communal society.
14 The term *alçak* has no English equivalent. It literally means 'low', but is actually a vulgar swear word in Turkish.
15 Some of these party members and cadres were killed, some were expelled from the party and some ran away.
16 Öcalan was to caricature this fact in the late 1990s by saying, 'a good guerrilla is not a person who has strong leg muscles'.
17 I refer to the concept 'self-dissolution'—which in a way is relevant to Touraine's notion of 'self analysis' (1981:27)—widely used in the PKK's educational texts in the sense of orientating oneself to the 'self-recreation' process.
18 This category is frequently defined as the 'objective agents of the enemy' in PKK publications and it is believed to be more dangerous than the 'subjective' agents of the enemy.
19 *Rant:* easily exploitable material and moral/spiritual values.
20 Enver Polat is an activist of the PKK who joined the guerrilla forces in 1996 following several years work for the party's central organ, *Serxwebun,* and was killed in a clash with state forces in 1997. He left basic education in his third year of primary school and became attached to the party in Europe in his late teenage years following his family's migration from Kurdistan to Germany for work. The book he published, which is composed of 350 pages of his notes from his daily journal, is the most philosophical text among the non-Öcalan authored books.
21 The Turkish swearword *'şerefsiz'* denotes an unesteemed, dishonourable, debased person.
22 Mümin: believer of Islam who never fails to follow his/her worship requirements.
23 Öcalan himself was only informed of where he was going in the aircraft—destined for Nairobi, Kenya (Uçar 2000:11).
24 The quotation was picked from an Öcalan teaching dated 21 February 1990 by Ahmet Aydin (1992) for the chapter 'Selected Words from Öcalan', so as to exhibit how badly Öcalan treats his pupils.
25 In his work, *The Soviet Union Demystified,* Frank Füredi explores how an identical process occurred in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and how the 'reactionary bureaucracy' consolidated its position as a 'new ruling stratum' whose members 'enjoyed widely varying access to privileges and wealth' (Füredi 1986:42–45).
26 The options of 'through observations' and 'through publications' are the ones which considerably embrace the sympathy to Öcalan because the PKK publications are largely

dominated by his talks and pictures, and 'observations' embodies various pro-Öcalan elements as such.

27 The survey was sponsored by a leading businessmen's association in Turkey, TOBB *(Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği)*, whose former chairperson (Yalım Erez) was a minister of government at the time. In the report's introduction, it emphasized that the research aimed to contribute to the 'elimination of the terrorist organization'.

28 It has gradually been revealed that such a chance has actually been missed, and therefore the party has officially annulled itself and converted into a 'congress' which does not aspire to power, in accordance with Öcalan's instructions from İmrallı prison.

## 7
## Conclusion

1 Abdullah Öcalan is generally named 'national leader' *(Ulusal Önder)* by his non-party supporters instead of 'party leadership' *(Parti Önderliği)*. Following the annulment of the PKK, it is now presented as *Kürt Halk Önderi* (Kurdish people's leader) in the publications of the KONGRA-GEL.

2 In a way, Raschke introduces a similar conception of the agenda of New Social Movements. Offe conveys that 'way of life' or 'mode of life' is a substantive concept which was invented by Raschke for *the new paradigm* of West European politics (Offe 1985:825).

3 The term 'special war' in the terminology of the PKK denotes Turkey's particular way of executing its war against the Kurdish struggle, which rests on manipulation and 'psychological warfare'.

4 This, in a sense, reminds one of Mao's 'unchallenged' re-election as 'chairman' of the Communist Party of China at the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, following which the elimination of the entrepreneur intelligentsia, including Mao Zedong himself, was finalized in his presence.

5 TÛSİAD is the largest businessmen's association in Turkey and is known as *Patronlar Kulübü* (The Club of Bosses)

6'Apo' is an abbreviated name for 'Abdullah' in informal Kurdish speech. It also means 'uncle on the father's side' in Kurdish.

## 8
## Epilogue: apparent obscurity

1 Reuters, 11 June 2004.

2 AFP, 12 June 2004.

3 F.Altaylı, 'Barzani ve Talabani, Türkiye vatandasi olsa ne olur?', *Hürriyet*, 17 June 2004. (Altaylı is rather famed for his intimacy with the 'deep state' in Turkey than for his writings.)

4 Sabah, 21 June 2004.

5 *Radikal*, 22 June 2004; *Hürriyet*, 22 June 2004; *Sabah*, 22 June 2004.

6 J.Henri Barkey, 'A Kurdish State Within Iraq Would Benefit the Region'. Online, available at: www.latimes.com/news/printedition/opinion/la-op-barkey20jun20,1,4591313.story.

7 Ibid.

8'Ufuktan'. Online, available at: www.ozgurpolitika.org/2004/06/23/hab44.html.

9 Ibid.

10 The changes to the programmes are discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

11 www.welatparez.com/tr/arsiv/gorusmenotlari/GN_2004–02–18.php.
12 Nicole F.Watts, 'Turkey's Tentative Opening to Kurdishness', *Middle East Report Online.* Online, available at: www.merip.org/mero/mero061404.html.
13 M.Ali Birand, 'Silah birakmaya karşılık af…', *Posta,* 15 June 2004; T.Akyol, 'Kürtler, DEHAP, terror', *Milliyet,* 15 June 2004; A.Bayramoğlu, 'Kürt politikasında yol ayrimi…', *Yeni Şafak,* 15 June 2004; Ü.Fırat. Online, available at: www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=5&ArsivAnaID=20000&SayfaNol.
14 M.Ali Birand, 'Silah birakmaya karşılık af…', *Posta,* 15 June 2004.
15 T.Erdem,' "AB Eşiğinde Kürt Sorunu" (1)', *Radikal,* 8 June 2004.
16 A.Topuz, 'AB eşiğinde Kürt Sorunu' (1–14), *Radikal,* 23 May-5 June 2004.
17 AKP: *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (Justice and Development Party).
18 Meeting Notes. Online, available at: www.welatparez.com/tr/arsiv/gorusmenotlari/GN_2004–04–28.php.
19 Meeting Notes. Online, available at: www.welatparez.com/tr/arsiv/gorusmenotlari/GN_2004–06–09.php.
20 Such as http://www.nasname.com/; http://www.rizgari.org/; http://www.gelawej.com/; *Serbesti,* etc.
21 'Avukatlara ve Mehmed'e'. Online, available at: www.welatparez.com/tr/arsiv/gorusmenotlari/2004–03–19-OsmanOcalan-Imraliya.php.
22 www.ozgurpolitika.org/2004/06/07/hab05.html.
23 http://www.welatparez.com/.
24 PWD: Partiya Welatparêza Demokratik (Patriotic Democratic Party).
25 C.Çandar, 'Leyla Brüksel'e Gidecek mi?', *Tercüman,* 15 June 2004.
26 www.nasname.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=734&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0.
27 Ü.Firat, 'Türkiye'nin Kürt Partisi'. Online, available at: www.kurdishinfo.com/modules.php?name—News&file=article&sid=878.
28 M.A.Birand, 'DEHAP da, biz de tiyatro oynuyoruz', *Posta,* 17 June 2004.
29 H.Cemal, 'Bir daha eski film mi?', *Milliyet,* 17 June 2004.
30 Nicole F.Watts, 'Turkey's Tentative Opening to Kurdishness', *Middle East Report Online.* Online, available at: www.merip.org/mero/mero061404.html.
31 www.ozgurpolitika.com/2004/04/06/hab02.html.
32 ANKA, 18 June 2004. (Edelman, in the same statement, pointed at the existence of 'other' means of struggle against the PKK than military methods.)

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